

A GENEALOGICAL VIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF YOGA AND ITS  
APPROPRIATION BY THE WEST AS PHYSICAL FITNESS: RELEVANCE  
OF FOUCAULT'S THEORY OF SUBJECT

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submitted by **CANAN TOP** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Science in Political Science and Public Administration, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KIRAZCI  
Dean  
Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. H. Tarık ŐENGÜL  
Head of Department  
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Cem DEVECİ  
Supervisor  
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

---

**Examining Committee Members:**

Prof. Dr. Kürşad ERTUĞRUL (Head of the Examining Committee)  
Middle East Technical University  
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Cem DEVECİ (Supervisor)  
Middle East Technical University  
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

---

Assist. Prof. Dr. Kurtuluş CENGİZ  
Ankara Üniversity  
Department of Sociology

---



**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

**Name, Last Name:** Canan TOP

**Signature:**

## **ABSTRACT**

### **A GENEALOGICAL VIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF YOGA AND ITS APPROPRIATION BY THE WEST AS PHYSICAL FITNESS: RELEVANCE OF FOUCAULT’S THEORY OF SUBJECT**

TOP, Canan

M.S., The Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Cem DEVECİ

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This thesis critically examines the evolution of yoga beginning from Classical Yoga to Modern Postural Yoga within the framework of Foucault’s ethics. A close look at the genealogy of yoga shows that there have always been different traditions in premodern yoga, and it has never had a homogenous form. By examining the evolution of yoga genealogically, I will demonstrate the changes, in terms of continuities and discontinuities, and breaking points in this evolution. The issue of Modern Postural Yoga, which is the prevalent form of yoga today, is critical in terms of its relationship with the norms of neoliberalism; therefore, it is mostly studied in this context. However, it is rarely discussed within the framework Foucault’s theory of ethics. Foucault discusses his theory of the subject by focusing on the subject, truth and power relations. Technologies of the self have an important role in ethics, as they determine the relationship between the subject and the truth and also because of their close relationship with the technologies of power/domination. In this thesis, the possibility and implications of considering yoga as a technology of the self will be analyzed. To examine yoga with its relation to technologies of self will enable us to discuss the possible

role of it in the process of subjectification and in the constitution of the ethical subject with the capacity to exercise his freedom against domination, or to uncover subjectivity the self attains through its practice.

**Key words:** Technologies of the self, Ethics, Subjectivity, Evolution of Yoga, Modern Postural Yoga

## ÖZ

### YOGANIN EVRİMİNE VE BATI TARAFINDAN FİZİKSEL ZİNDELİK OLARAK SAHIPLLENİLMESİNE SOYBİLİMSEL BİR BAKIŞ: FOUCAULT'NUN ÖZNE TEORİSİNİN UYGUNLUĞU

TOP, Canan

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Cem DEVECİ

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Bu tezin amacı; yoganın Klasik Yogadan Modern Postürel Yogaya evriminin, Foucault'nun çizdiği etik çerçevesine dayanan eleştirel bir incelemesini sunmaktır. Yoganın soybilimsel analizi, modern öncesi yoganın her zaman farklı geleneklere sahip olduğunu ve homojen bir yapısı olmadığını göstermiştir. Soybilimsel yöntem; yoganın tarihindeki değişimleri ve kırılma noktalarını, süreklilik ve süreksizlikler bağlamında ortaya serecektir. Günümüzde yaygın olarak karşılaştığımız Modern Postürel Yogaya dair çalışmaların çoğu neoliberalizm ile aralarındaki önemli ilişkiye odaklanmaktadır. Öte yandan bu konu, Foucault'nun etik teorisi açısından nadiren ele alınmıştır. Foucault; bu çerçevede, özne kuramını, öznenin iktidar ve hakikatle ilişkisine dayanarak tartışır. Kendilik teknolojilerinin etik kuramı için can alıcı rolü, özne ve hakikat arasındaki ilişkiyi kurmasından ve iktidar/tahakküm teknolojileri ile yakınlığından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu tezde, yoganın bir kendilik teknolojisi olarak kabul edilme olasılığını araştırılmaktadır. Böylece, yoganın özneleşme pratiğinin ve iktidar ilişkilerine direnerek özgürleşen bir etik öznenin



kurulumunun bir parçası olup olmadığı sorusu tartışılabilir ve yoga pratięiyle ortaya konulan öznellik incelenebilir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Kendilik Teknolojileri, Etik, Özneleşme, Yoganın Evrimi, Modern Postürel Yoga.

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Over the past few decades, there is an enormous increase in the popularity of yoga. In particular, the physical practice of yoga became so popular that the term yoga is almost equal to the physical practice of yoga in common expression. However, the physical practice of yoga is just one kind of yoga that become popular in the Western world for its benefits on the body and health in general. Specifically, it is called Modern Postural Yoga.

There has always been a discussion on yoga, whether it is a religion or it is an Eastern philosophy. Together with the popularization of postural yoga and various types related to it, new topics are added to this discussion, mainly about the origins and the most authentic form of yoga. Nevertheless, a close look at the genealogy of yoga shows that there have always been different traditions in premodern yoga, and it has never had a homogenous form. Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist forms of yoga can be listed as prevailing premodern yoga traditions.

The problem with Modern Postural Yoga where yoga has evolved today is vital in terms of its location in the neoliberal context of modern times. Yoga has taken different forms in different times and contexts so its evolution reflects the values of the context in which yoga has evolved. The genealogical evolution of yoga demonstrates this feature of context-sensitivity of yoga.

Modern postural yoga, as it currently stands, is far from the values of Classical Yoga and corresponds to the values that the neoliberal system imposes on the individual and aims to realize these values. Classical Yoga philosophy, which aims for liberation that once required a reclusive lifestyle and moving to a

different existential level, today has taken a distinct form with Modern Postural Yoga based on bodily movements, primarily for health and wellness.

We can see this change in yoga as a clear example of the impact of neoliberal power relations on the individual. Modern postural yoga has become a tool for a person to take care of the self and to take the responsibility of the self. The theme of abandoning the world, which exists in classical yoga philosophy, is absent in modern postural yoga. Modern Postural Yoga exists precisely to enable one to exist at one's best in this world. The promotion of Modern Postural Yoga today, and publications on its benefits to physical and mental health cannot be thought separate from the logic of neoliberal power relations.

The idea of studying yoga in this thesis was born out of my personal yoga experience. I started with yoga in 2014 with a yoga course affiliated with the METU sports directorate. The name of the yoga course was 'sculpture yoga', promising to sculpt the body like a sculpture. Before yoga, I did fitness and pilates, and the reason I started yoga was to learn, albeit surprisingly, that yoga is a similar exercise, a practice that provides flexibility, fitness and form. However, I only knew before that yoga was a static practice based on meditation. My own yoga journey has given me experience and insight into the modern forms of yoga. I had the opportunity to witness and experience firsthand practitioners' motivation for doing yoga as an insider.

We can examine yoga in various ways and handle it from multiple perspectives: neoliberal economic politics, self-entrepreneurship, governmentality, biopolitics, and ethics. Moreover, we can hold all these discussion grounds within Foucault's theoretical framework. Until now, scholars from various disciplines discussed yoga in many aspects of literature. While the oldest and most widespread debate is over whether yoga is a religion or an eastern philosophy, there is an increasing number of researches in the clinical literature that study yoga's benefits in human health and wellbeing.

In social sciences, particularly, in sociological and anthropological studies, there is a tendency to study yoga over the experiences of yoga practitioners in the context of neoliberalism (Markula, 2014, Godrej, 2016, Rosen, 2019, Aydıner-Juchat, 2019, Bailey et al., 2021, Cengiz et al., 2021, Erkmen, 2021, Ertürk, 2021, Hamed, 2021, Shaw & Kaytez, 2021, Godrej, 2022). These studies discuss the position of yoga in neoliberal societies, the common theme between them is that the expectations and needs of yoga practitioners' from yoga are the direct results of neoliberalism. From this aspect, it can be argued that the dynamics of Modern Postural Yoga are related to neoliberal norms.

### **1.1. The Aim and Scope of the Thesis**

This thesis evaluates the transformation of yoga throughout history starting from Classical Yoga, the oldest systematic form known in the West and limits it chronologically to Modern Postural Yoga, the most popular and latest form it has evolved today. The reason for the genealogical review is to show the changes that occur; otherwise, I have no intention of defining what the original yoga is. I will examine Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga to show the transformation of yoga over time because Modern Postural Yoga radically differs from Classical Yoga. Investigating how and in what way Modern Postural Yoga diverges from Classical Yoga is essential for this study.

Foucault's studies on the modern subject and power will help to make sense of the reasons of changes in yoga. Foucault argues that the modern subject cannot be thought of independently of power relations. According to him, power relations bring the modern subject into existence. Our desires and needs are the products of power relations.

However, in these power relations subject has the freedom to resist the power relations. Foucault defines the “ethics of the concern for the self as a practice of freedom” (1997: 281). Therefore, we can search the subject's capacity for freedom in the area of ethics. In this respect, the area of ethics can be

complementary to the relationship between the subject and power. Foucault's later work of ethics is about his theory of the subject in which he focuses on the subject, truth, and power relations. Foucault studies ethics in ancient times and early Christianity to analyze the genealogy of how the self constituted itself as a subject.

As Dilts comments "Foucault's turn to antiquity is, in part, a subtle but radical response to the rise of neo-liberal subjectivity" (2010: 3). Ethics is the relationship of self to the self, through ethical practice one can work on itself to constitute itself as an ethical subject (1997: 263). In this sense, it is a refusal of the subject that power relations produced since it aims to change the existing subject. Therefore, ethical practice implies practice of resistance and "politics of ourselves" (2016: 76) by making power relations visible.

Foucault thinks that to investigate "the genealogy of the subject in Western civilization" technologies of the self and technologies of power/ domination must be considered together (2016: 25). He explains that the point, technologies of the self contact with technologies of power/domination is called "government" (2016: 25, 1988: 19). This indicates the interdependent relationship between the subject and power. Technologies of the self can be an inclusive floor to discuss yoga's evolution because of their link with technologies of power/domination which explains the reason that most scholars study Modern Postural Yoga in the context of neoliberalism.

In this thesis, I will try to develop a critical examination of the evolution of yoga within the framework of Foucault's ethics. One aspect of ethics in Foucault is the technologies of the self through which he discusses the relation between the subject and truth. These technologies are considered tools to decide the relationship between the subject and truth. Since the interpretation of the subject can be made by analyzing the subject's position concerning truth, that is, truth in general and truth in the self.



One's access to the truth is important because, in the relationship with the power, one needs certain truths that guard itself from being vulnerable in power relations. Within the ethical framework, to clarify if yoga is a technology of self or not shows whether it can be a practice of resistance to be shaped by power relations, in other words, whether it can be a practice of freedom to resist the power relations.

Although a homogeneous form of yoga tradition in the premodern history of yoga never occurred, there was a predominant form of yoga tradition based on Patanjali's Yoga Sutras. Patanjali's Yoga Sutras is the oldest and most authoritative written scripture of yoga. Throughout the evolution of yoga, Patanjali's Yoga Sutras is taken as a reference point even though it is reinterpreted very differently than its original form. Patanjali's Yoga Sutras is generally referred to as Classical Yoga.

Classical Yoga is reinterpreted by sage Vivekananda, who is accepted as the founder of modern yoga and presented to the West as India's spiritual practice. Vivekananda's interpretation of Classical Yoga is called Raja Yoga, and it is the beginning of the epistemological break in yoga's evolution to modern postural yoga.

Posture, *asana* in Sanskrit, practising is developed as a physical exercise. This is a controversial issue since 'asana' has never been regarded as prominent in any form of the yoga tradition. Besides, there has been a radical change in the term over time. Due to India's aim of establishing their spiritual or religious practice as compatible with Western ideals, Modern Postural Yoga emerged as an outcome of colonial India's encounter with Western physical culture, as a search for India's own, national physical culture. In this sense, Modern Postural Yoga is an invention.

## 1.2. Methodology

In this thesis, I will try to explore whether yoga can be thought of as a technology of the self in Foucault's sense. Foucault's methods are archeology and genealogy. These methods can be used as critical methodologies. In *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, Foucault explains that genealogy rejects the idea of "origins" (1977: 140). However, it aims to reinstate the various forms of subjugation including the dangerous "play of dominations" (1977: 148). Foucault underlines that the purpose of genealogical history is not to find out the roots of our identity but to show "its dissipation" and "to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us" (1977: 162).

In his study of ethics, Foucault uses the genealogical method and examines the transformation of the technologies of the self from ancient ethics to early Christianity. He shows the continuities and discontinuities of technologies of the self in different contexts and times, namely, Greko-Roman and Christian cultures. These discontinuities indicate the interaction between the techniques of domination and techniques of the self.

Accordingly, by examining the evolution of yoga genealogically, I want to demonstrate the changes, in terms of continuities and discontinuities and breaking points in this evolution. I do not aim to study what the 'original' yoga is but displaying how it is transformed through time can give us a chance to compare different types of yoga. These changes indicate the effects of different technologies of power/ domination on yoga in different times and contexts.

Yoga an ascetic practice in its history can be thought of as an ethical practice. To examine if it is a technology of the self or not the concept of yoga should be defined first. Therefore, I will differentiate the concept of yoga to conduct the discussion consistently by presenting its evolution genealogically. In the genealogical evolution of yoga, Classical and Modern Postural Yoga stand for

two poles in the line for being the oldest and recent ones in addition to their different aims and means.

In the evolution of yoga, there appear selective appropriations of teachings of yoga. There are certain exclusions and inclusions in terms of the components of yoga. Moreover, there are new additions to the discipline of yoga. Examining the distinct features of both Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga, three themes appear that provide a ground to compare these two kinds of yoga and show the changing meanings of yoga over time. These are spirituality and salvation, medicalization, and the guru/chela relationship. Moreover, these three themes correspond to the technologies of the self in ancient times and Christian ethics. Thus, they can be used to decide to what extent and which kind of yoga can be considered a technology of the self.

The theme of spirituality shows itself in the aim of salvation in Classical Yoga, in this sense, it is the basis of Classical Yoga. In Modern Postural Yoga, the theme of spirituality takes on a different meaning and the aim of salvation disappears. The theme of medicalization appears in Modern Postural Yoga, but it is absent in Classical Yoga. The guru/ chela relationship is a crucial part of Classical Yoga since it reflects the basic dynamics of Classical Yoga. In Modern Postural Yoga, there is no guru/chela relationship. Instead, it takes a different form namely, a class system of teaching and self-learning. As the presence of the guru/ chela relationship designates the core aspects of Classical Yoga, the absence of it is radically transformative for the structure of Modern Postural Yoga.

These three themes are also found in technologies of the self in ancient times and Christian ethics. Their places and forms also change in these two ethics. The theme of spirituality that aims the salvation is the core of Christian ethics while there is no such aim in ancient ethics. In ancient ethics, the medical model is suggested for the care of the self, but there is no concern for the medical care of the self in Christian ascetics. The relationship between the master and the

disciple is important and decisive for the structure of technologies of the self in both ancient times and Christian ethics. Because they reflect the core values of both ethics.

I detected these three values according to the change in the transformation of yoga not according to the technologies of the self in Foucault's study of ancient and Christian ethics. However, in the beginning, these obvious similarities between the technologies of the self in Foucault's work made me think that whether yoga would be a technology of the self or not. Moreover, in some studies, modern postural yoga is considered a technology of the self (Godrej, 2016: 9-10, Black, 2020: 15, Erkmen, 2021: 1038, Bailey et al. 2021: 2, Godrej, 2022) without ever discussing the crucial dynamics of it. They just call Modern Postural Yoga a technology of the self for being a self-care practice for self-development, and self-government in a neoliberal context. In that sense, they do not aim to question the position of the technologies of the self in ethics as a practice of freedom but question its role in constituting neoliberal subjectivities. Although Godrej (2016) distinguishes the emancipatory nature of Classical Yoga in response to neoliberalism, she does not elaborate on the topic and does not examine it from the aspect of truth power relations.

The difference in my approach is that I analyze the issue within the framework of ethics, not in the framework of neoliberal politics. Moreover, I do not evaluate practitioners' experiences with yoga but the evolution of yoga itself considering its capacity of being a practice of freedom, the practice of resistance over the technologies of the self in order to decide the relationship it established between the subject, truth, and power. Though this thesis is in dialogue with the literature which discusses yoga practice as a technology of the self, it differs from them in examining the possibility of being an ethical practice rather than a tool for technologies of domination.

### **1.3. Structure of the thesis:**

This work proceeds as follows, Chapter 1 sets forth the subject matter of the thesis and provides a contextualization of yoga, the aim and scope of the thesis, and the methods I employed. Chapter 2 provides Foucault's theory of the subject within his framework of ethics. In this chapter, I elaborate on the technologies of the self and their roles in the subject, power and truth relations. Chapter 3 provides a genealogical evolution of yoga, the phases it passed through. In this chapter I use secondary sources that discuss the historical and social transformation of yoga. Although the books and articles I referred to deal with the subject considering different problematization than mine, I have benefited from these sources to describe the genealogical evolution of yoga. In Chapter 4, I develop a critical evaluation of yoga by comparing the certain forms of yoga with technologies of the self in Foucault's ethics. This is the chapter in which I analyzed the genealogical evolution of yoga with Foucault's theoretical framework. In chapter 5, I provide the results of my analysis of genealogical evolution of yoga.

## CHAPTER 2

### GENEALOGY OF ETHICS IN FOUCAULT

Foucault is interested in how a human being turns himself or herself into a subject, and after the first volume of *History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge* (1997), he announced that his new project will be a genealogy of how the self constituted itself as the subject. Indeed, Foucault's concern was always about the subject even though it remains in shadow, comparing it to the 'power' analyses he developed, which became more prominent at first glance of Foucault's work. However, Foucault's later works directly focus on the formation of the modern subject, and his later works expanded his early works. That is, when the two terms of Foucault's studies are considered together, they do not focus on two separate topics but converge on the Subject.

As he stated often, Foucault's primary concern is the "subject," and this is why he concentrates on ethics: the relation to oneself. He is after the genealogy of the subject "as a subject of ethical actions, or the genealogy of desire as an ethical problem" (1997: 266). The idea of the creation of the self is significant because it leads us to what Foucault defines as 'ethics' through which we constitute ourselves as moral beings. Foucault describes ethics as the kind of relationship one should relate to oneself, which dictates how an individual should define himself as a moral subject of his own actions (1997: 263).

Through the mode of subjectivation, people are required to acknowledge their moral obligations (1997: 264). Foucault points out four aspects of ethics in an interview by Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus at Berkeley in 1983. According to Foucault, the first aspect of ethics is 'the ethical substance', which indicates the thing that is going to be manipulated by ethics. The second aspect is 'the mode of subjectivation' which is the way people identify 'their moral

obligations’, and the third aspect of ethics is the means by which one can change oneself in order to become an ‘ethical subjects’. In other words, it is how one works on the ethical substance. Finally, the last aspect is what he calls ‘the telos’ that is, “which is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way?”: one aspires to become the master of oneself, or one aspires to perfect tranquillity of the soul or to purification or to immortality (1997: 263-265).

Foucault, in his book *The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure* (1985), extends his research on ethics and gives a detailed and inclusive analysis of ethics on the subject of sexuality in Ancient times. Moreover, we can see the relationship between the four aspects mentioned above of ethics by quoting Foucault more clearly:

There is no specific moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without "modes of subjectivation" and an "ascetics" or "practices of the self" that support them (1990: 28).

Foucault, in the introduction chapter of *The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure* (1990), establishes that “for an action to be ‘moral’, it must not be reducible to an act or a series of acts conforming to a rule, a law or a value” (1990: 28). For an action to be ‘moral’ it must entail a relationship with the reality it is delivered as a relationship with the self.

In *The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure*, Foucault analyzes the genealogy of how the self constitutes itself as a subject. The method he chooses is to study the sexual morality of pagan and Christian antiquity. Foucault indicates that rather than the strict definition of the rules of conduct as in Christianity, the moral notions in Greek and Greco-Roman antiquity were much more focused on practices of the self and the question of *askesis* (1990: 30). He emphasizes the relationship with the self that enabled an individual to have a mastery of himself, “to keep his senses in a state of tranquility”, and to achieve a

way of being that could be characterized by the full enjoyment of oneself or “the perfect supremacy of oneself over oneself” (1990: 31).

Foucault argues that rather than questioning the continuity or break between ancient morality and Christian morality, we have to examine the central concepts Christianity may have derived from ancient philosophy and those that it creates on its own. Thus, he thinks it is more crucial to understand how, in light of the continuity or alteration of codes, “the forms of self-relationship” were adapted and revised (1990: 31). Foucault focuses on a genealogy of ethics rather than the genealogy of morals because the change from the Greek to Christian period occurred in “the relation to oneself,” which means “ethics” for Foucault (1997: 266). Accordingly, there was not a dramatic change in the moral codes and in themes (1997: 266).

Foucault shows the main differences between the attitudes of Christianity and of the ancient cultures towards morality. Foucault states that even though we can find the same restrictive, prohibitive code in the fourth century B.C. with Christian morality, they differ entirely in how they apply such prohibitions concerning oneself (1997: 254). For example, there is no aim of normalization in Stoic ethics, as in Christianity. According to Foucault, Stoic ethics does not intend to normalize the population since the primary objective of this sort of ethics is aesthetic. Two dimensions of this kind of ethics attract attention. First, this form of ethics was merely a matter of individual preference. Second, it was not a matter of providing a behavioural pattern for everyone; it was only available to a relatively small portion of the population (1997: 254).

Making this decision was motivated by the desire to live a great life and leave behind memories of a beautiful lifestyle for others. It is about “the aesthetics of existence” (1997: 260). This assertion clearly indicates another point in Greek ethics. In that, people were considerably more concerned with their moral behaviour, ethics, and relationships with others than they were with religious



issues. Another difference is that no legal or institutional structure had any relationship to ethics (1997: 255).

On the other hand, Foucault emphasizes that the Greek concern does not relate to the *tekhne* of the self but to the *tekhne* of life; as in the issue regarding how one should live. Their problem was, “which *tekhne* do I have to use in order to live well as I ought to live?” (1997: 260). Foucault underlines that this *tekhne* of life gradually evolved into a *tekhne* of the self, which was one of the major changes in ancient society. In short, the central issue of Greek ethics is the aesthetics of existence, which is a problem of individual choice. In order to create oneself as a work of art, one must develop one’s life by giving it style via extensive preparation and everyday work. Foucault finds the independence of ethics from any authoritarian system and disciplinary structure exciting and attractive.

In classical ethics, Foucault tries to show that no one has to obey ethical obligations unless they want to live a beautiful life, have a solid reputation, and have the power to govern others. For the sake of the splendor or beauty of living, they consciously embrace those commitments. Foucault always underlines the aspect of ethics, which is being a personal choice. The mode of subjectivation is the decision they make to accept this way of living, whether it's an aesthetic or political one.

Foucault introduces a concept from the Greco-Roman culture: *Epimeleia heautou*, which is taking care of one’s self. Foucault defines “taking care of one’s self” as “working on” or “being concerned with” something” (1997: 269). It represents a certain type of task or activity, and requires focus, skill, and expertise. Obviously, the practice of taking care of one’s self is not limited to an interest in oneself or self-attachment or self-fascination.

Foucault concludes that Christianity replaced the usually tolerant Greco-Roman lifestyle with an austere way of life characterized by several interdictions, renunciations, or prohibitions. He says that “in this activity of the self on itself,

the ancients developed a whole series of austerity practices that the Christians later directly borrowed from them” (1997: 270). The most dramatic rupture of Christian morality from antiquity is that Christianity replaced the notion of a self that had to be made into an artistic creation with the notion of a self that one had to give up since holding on to oneself went against God's will (1997: 271, Foucault, 1988: 21) That is, for Christianity, the self is something to be rejected in order to reach salvation. Hence, Foucault often contends that Christianity is a morality of asceticism. This assertion is a crucial point for Foucault because the idea of the self as something to be refused requires someone ‘to know yourself’ since you cannot reject someone you do not know.

The precept of knowing yourself originally belongs to the ancient Delphic principle of, *gnothi seauton*, ‘know thyself’, and we see its different applications in Greco-Roman antiquity than in Christianity. The upcoming section will analyze in more detail what the principle of knowing yourself is in antiquity. However, at this point, it is more important to see why knowing yourself is significant for Christian morality and for the aim of renunciation of the self and what its role is in Foucault’s genealogy of the subject. Primarily, it constitutes the relationship between ‘subject’ and ‘truth’ for Christianity, where Foucault thinks the interpretation of the self in a hermeneutical manner begins.

## **2.1. The Genealogy of the Modern Subject: Subject and Truth Relations**

In 1980, Foucault gave two lectures at Dartmouth College, and he gave the title *Truth and Subjectivity* to his first lecture. At the beginning of the lecture, Foucault introduces the path he follows to study the genealogy of the subject: “by studying the constitution of the subject across history which had led us to the modern concept of the self” (Fruchaud, H. P. Lorenzini, D. 2016: 22). This explains Foucault’s study of Greco- Roman antiquity together with the early period of Christianity. According to him, the subject cannot be comprehended independent of the historical context it lives in.

At this juncture, Foucault indicates a missing point in the relevant literature and justifies his method of study, which is the archaeology of knowledge, with the words, “most of historians prefer a history of social processes, where society plays the role of subject, and most philosophers prefer a subject without history” (2016: 22).

Foucault argues that to investigate the subject’s genealogy in Western culture, the technologies of domination and technologies of the self must be considered together. This affiliation proves the link between Foucault’s early works and his later turn to ethics which is the mode of subjectivation and shows the consistency in Foucault’s theory of the subject. Foucault contends that technologies of the self:

permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (Foucault, 1988: p.18).

In his definition of the technologies of the self, Foucault gives a decisive role to technologies of the self because they consist of practices that discover and formulate the relationship between subject and truth (2016: 26). That is, they are tools for establishing the relationship between subject and truth. The relationship between subject and truth has the utmost importance for the interpretive analysis of the self. Foucault shows that in ancient technologies of the self, truth is not produced within the self. Instead, it is imposed on self by way of teachings. On the other hand, in early Christianity, technologies of the self are means to discover the truth within the self.

It may not be easy to understand the role of the technologies of the self within the discussion of the truth and subjectivity. Therefore, I shall argue that Foucault starts with the long and complex history of technologies of the self from Greko-Roman antiquity to early Christianity. More specifically, technologies of the self start with the Delphic precept of *gnothi seauton*, know yourself, and get through

certain transformations in early Christianity with the monastic precept of confession.

The relation to the truth of Greek philosophical schools and early Christianity differs radically. Foucault explains the aim of the Greek philosophical schools as the transformation of the individual. That is, the goal of philosophical education is to provide the student with a set of rules that will allow him to act appropriately in all situations and retain mastery over himself.

Therefore, “in all the ancient philosophical practices, the obligation to tell the truth about oneself occupies a rather restrained place” (2016: 28). What is at stake is remembering the truth if the subject forgets the rules of conduct that he learned from the master. Because the truth is not about the subject himself or the subject’s nature, but the rules of conduct. In ancient philosophical self-examination practices, the self is not taken as something to be interpreted. The self “has not to be discovered but to be constituted through the force of truth” (2016: 37).

On the contrary, in the Christian technologies of the self, the self is something to be discovered rather than being constituted by the imposition of the truth outside. In addition, Christian thought requires a different kind of truth commitment. Foucault states that:

[e]very Christian has the duty to know who he is, what is happening in him. He has to know the faults he may have committed: he has to know the temptations to which he is exposed. Moreover, everyone in Christianity is obliged to say these things to other people and, hence, to bear witness against himself (2016: 54).

Quite contrary to the ancient philosophies, monastic discipline of Christianity does not aim the mastership of oneself rather, it attempts to maintain a spirit of obedience because it requires the renunciation of the self. Furthermore, it is not about corresponding to the rules of conduct or the external reality as in the ancient philosophies, but examining the thought in itself in order to know its true

origin, whether it comes from God or from Satan (2016: 67). What is at stake in these practices is the hermeneutics of thoughts.

In “The Hermeneutics of the Subject,” Foucault elaborates on the implications and applications of the theme of ‘the care of one’s self and its link with the ‘truth’ (1997:105). The principle of “knowing yourself,” *gnothi seauton*, was frequently linked to the principle of taking care of the self. Foucault notes that the principle of the care of the self suggests more than simply paying “attention to oneself, to avoid mistakes or dangers, or to stay out of harm’s way” (1997: 95).

Foucault points out that in all the ancient philosophical schools, the care of the self was believed to be both an obligation and a technique. He indicates that the primary study focusing on the care of the self is Plato’s *Alcibiades I*. It has three themes involving the relation of “the care of the self with politics, pedagogy, and self-knowledge” (2016: 95).

Foucault, first refers to Seneca, Plutarch, and Epictetus in order to show the link between the care of the self and politics in terms of the control over the self:

It has no other end or outcome than to settle into oneself, to “take up residence in oneself” and to remain there. The final objective of the conversion to oneself is to establish a certain number of relations with oneself. These relations are sometimes conceived on the juridico-political model: to be sovereign over oneself, to exert a perfect mastery over oneself, to be completely “self-possessed.” They are also often represented on the model of positive enjoyment: to enjoy oneself, to take one’s pleasure with oneself, to delight in the self alone (1997: 96).

Secondly, the care of the self has a pedagogical role since it is a means of self-cultivation. Self-cultivation has three important functions. First of all, it has a critical function. To “un-learn” is the crucial duty of self-cultivation, eliminating all the adverse behaviours and false opinions. The second function of self-cultivation is a function of struggle because it is mainly considered a daily struggle. Lastly, self-cultivation primarily has a medical function (1997: 97).

These functions of self-cultivation will be analyzed in detail under the title of *Technologies of the Self* in this chapter.

Thirdly, the care of the self is attained through the help of a master or a teacher or a director. That is, with the help of someone with enough knowledge to equip the individual with the true discourses to prepare for the future. True discourses are the tools that enable us to deal with reality (1997: 99). They function in preparing us for our future. Therefore, they must be accessible to us when we encounter an unexpected circumstance or bad luck manifests. We must be able to turn to them when we feel the need to defend ourselves.

Foucault notes that, unlike a simple memory that would be recalled as needed, this involves something quite different from a simple memory. Some analogies are drawn by different philosophers of the time to describe the presence of these true discourses within us. Plutarch, for instance, likens them to “inner voice” that insists on being heard when the passions stir: these discourses must be in us “like a master whose voice is enough to hush the growling dogs” (1997: 100). Seneca advises that “one must ‘grasp it with both hands’ and never let go; but also ‘cling’ to it, attach it to one’s mind, ‘making it a part of oneself’ and finally, ‘by daily mediation reach the point where these wholesome maxims occur of their own accord’” (1997: 100)

Foucault underlines that there is a change in the position of the true discourses. While Plato instructs the soul to turn back on itself in order for it to recover its “true nature” Seneca proposes the assimilation of a truth that is communicated by a teaching, a book, or a piece of advice to the extent that it becomes a permanent, internal principle of action that is always active (1997: 100-101). Here, internalization of truth comes from outside and not from the deep within oneself as it is in Christian practices. In this sense, it illustrates the difference between the technologies of the self in ancient philosophical schools and Christian discipline.

Foucault enlarges his reflections on the methods of this appropriation. Memorization is important at the basic level, but there are three salient points in this “asceticism” of truth; listening, writing, and habitual self-reflection. For appropriate listening, there are numerous guidelines such as “the physical posture to take, how to direct one’s attention, the way to retain what has been said,” and the disciple is expected to be silent and listen (1997: 101).

Foucault emphasizes that these practices aim to equip the subject with a truth that did not exist in it. It is expected from the subject to learn and memorize this truth to internalize and comprehend his actions according to it. However, he also warns that this relationship between truth and the subject is not the one that provides the hermeneutics of the subject as it is in the Christian techniques.

## **2.2. Technologies of the Self**

### **2.2.1. Technologies of the Self in Greco-Roman World**

In his 1982 seminar on the technologies of the self, Foucault traces the techniques of self-formation from the early Greeks to the Christian age. He specifies these periods as, “Greco-Roman philosophy in the first two centuries A.D. of the early Roman Empire and Christian spirituality and the monastic principles developed in the fourth and fifth centuries of the late Roman Empire” (1988: 19). These two periods constitute two different contexts in terms of the degree of tolerance they show towards the application of these practices, though they are contiguous.

In his discussion about the notion, Foucault starts his analysis with a set of practices in relation to the hermeneutics of the self in late antiquity. According to him, “[t]hese practices were constituted in Greek as *epistēmēsthai sautou*,” which means “to take care of yourself,” “the concern with self,” “to be concerned, to take care of yourself” (1988: 19).

Another critical dimension of this set of practices is the Delphic principle, *gnothi sauton*, meaning know yourself. Foucault underlines that in Greek and Roman texts, know yourself was always associated with the principle of care of the self. In that, “one had to occupy oneself with oneself before the Delphic principle was brought into action” (1988: 20). That is, the principle of knowing yourself comes secondary to the principle of ‘the care of the self’ in Greco-Roman traditions. However, in the Christian tradition, this Delphic maxim is reversed since, in Christian ascetic morality, the self is a phenomenon that one can reject.

Concerning this reversal, Foucault says, “[t]here has been an inversion between the hierarchy of the two principles of antiquity, ‘Take care of yourself’ and ‘Know thyself.’ In Greco-Roman culture, knowledge of oneself appeared as the consequence of taking care of yourself” (1988: 22). In other words, Greco-Romans attained the ‘knowledge of the self’ by taking care of the self their priority was the ‘care of the self’. On the other hand, in Christian ascetic morality, the care of the self was considered an attachment to the self, which is against God’s will, so this principle lost its importance in Christian spirituality.

Foucault starts his analysis of the technologies of the self in antiquity with Plato’s *Alcibiades I*, which is a dialogue that concerns the philosophical elaboration of taking care of oneself. He underlines that the Neoplatonists in the third century A. D. revered *Alcibiades* as the first dialogue of Plato. *Alcibiades* provides a starting point for all Platonic philosophy, and in this sense, “it was *arche*” (1988: 23).

Alcibiades is an iconic figure: a young man who is at the beginning of his public and political life, and he wants to be powerful in the city. He is not content with the privileges of his birth and wishes to gain personal power over people inside and outside the city. The discussion in the book is based on the Delphic principle of ‘Know yourself’ and it is the prerequisite for taking care of oneself. The dialogue ends when Alcibiades knows he must take care of himself by examining his soul” (1988: 26). Foucault highlights that Plato has put more



emphasis on the Delphic maxim of “know yourself” than ‘to take care of the self.’ However, this succession is inverted later in the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Periods. The privilege is given to the concern with oneself rather than knowledge of the self.

Foucault underlines three major themes of Plato’s *Alcibiades*, “first, the relation between care for oneself and care for the political life; second, the relation between taking care of the self and defective education; and third, the relation between taking care of oneself and knowing oneself” (1988: 30). He draws attention to these themes’ departure points from Plato in the Hellenistic and imperial periods.

Foucault states that “[i]n the Hellenistic and imperial periods, the Socratic notion of ‘taking care of oneself’ became a common, universal theme. ‘Care of the self’ was accepted by Epicurus and his followers, by the Cynics, and by such Stoics as Seneca, Rufus, and Galen. The Pythagoreans gave attention to the notion of an ordered life in common. This theme of taking care of oneself was not abstract advice but a widespread activity, a network of obligations and services to the soul” (1988: 26-27). Therefore, it does not aim to prepare one for political life, like in Plato’s *Alcibiades*, it aims to take better care of the self by leaving politics.

When it comes to the second theme in Plato’s *Alcibiades*, Foucault delineates the difference that emerged in the Hellenistic and imperial periods. This distinction points out that the care of the self is not only compulsory for young people with their education but also for everyone as a way of living through their lifetime. Here, two topics appear on the surface: the first one is that Plato’s pedagogical model is replaced by a medical model, which means permanent medical care is required for the care of the self. Accordingly, “[o]ne must become the doctor of oneself” (1988: 31). Secondly, taking care of the self is no longer understood as a groundwork for adult life, but it became a process of training for the whole life. Foucault states that “[f]ollowing Epicurus himself, the Epicureans believed that

it is never too late to occupy oneself with oneself. The Stoics say you must attend to the self, ‘retire into the self and stay there’” (1988: 27). Additionally, this brings a change in the perception of youth in Greek traditional ideals that values youth. Since taking care of the self is a lifelong practice, the individual gets more involved in this practice to reach a certain level when they get older.

The last theme that Foucault underlines in Plato’s *Alcibiades* is the alteration in the affiliation between taking care of the self and knowing the self. During this change, different relations and practices are involved into the former in the Hellenistic Age. As Foucault remarks: “In *Alcibiades I*, the soul had a mirror relation to itself, which relates to the concept of memory and justifies dialogue as a method of discovering truth in the soul” (1988: 31). Foucault underlines a dramatic change concerning the conception of truth and memory in the imperial period.

Since there is a different method of examining the self in Stoicism:

We see the disappearance of dialogue and the increasing importance of a new pedagogical relationship- a new pedagogical game where the master/teacher speaks and doesn’t ask questions and the disciple doesn’t answer but must listen and keep silent. A culture of silence becomes more and more important (1988: 31-32).

Foucault highlights that replacing dialogues with the obligation of listening in silence symbolizes the disappearance of the dialectical structure presented in Plato’s care of the self through dialogue.

Examination of conscience takes different forms in the Hellenistic tradition. For example, the Pythagoreans related it to purification. They aimed for the purification of the conscience with the means of a mnemonic device. Similar to this, Seneca’s examination of conscience and the self is mainly based on remembering. In that, he poses three principles concerning the notion: remembering a truth in the subject, remembering the rules of conduct, and remembering the mistakes made during the day. In line with this thought, the

subject is in the junction between acts and rules. Therefore, Foucault says that “this is quite different from the Platonic conception and from the Christian conception of conscience” (1988: 34).

Foucault elaborates on this Stoic technique of remembering, *askesis*. *Askesis* means mastery over the self through the attainment of truth. The objective of this *askesis* is admittance to the reality of this world. Through the set of practices, “one can acquire, assimilate, and transform truth into a permanent principle of action. *Alethia*, truth, becomes *ethos*. It is a process of becoming more subjective” (1988: 35). For Stoics, truth is not within the self as observed in Plato’s views but in the *logoi*, the instruction of the teachers. That is why memorizing is important for Stoics. The principles of conduct must be memorized, and what is vital in Stoicism is the recall of what has been done and what should have been done.

### **2.2.2. Technologies of the Self in Early Christianity**

After comparing the techniques of the self in Plato’s *Alcibiades* with the imperial period, Foucault dwells on the techniques of the self in early Christianity and its relation to a truth game. Foucault points out that:

Christianity requires another form of truth obligation different from faith. Each person has the duty to know who he is, that is, to try to know what is happening inside him, to acknowledge faults, to recognize temptations, to locate desires, and everyone is obliged to disclose these things either to God or to others in the community and hence to bear public or private witness against oneself. The truth obligations of faith and the self are linked together. This link permits a purification of the soul impossible without self-knowledge (1988: 40).

What is meant here with ‘a purification of the soul’ is the ‘salvation’ since “Christianity belongs to the salvation religions” (1988: 40). To achieve salvation, one must reject the self and the initial step of this is to know the self. Therefore, Christianity centralizes knowing the self and requires the disclosure of the self

by discovering and deciphering the truth about the self. Like in Plato, Christianity aims to discovery of a truth within the self.

There were two main forms of disclosure of the self in early Christianity: *exomologesis* and *exagoreusis*. Foucault emphasizes that these two practices of the disclosure of the self were considerably different. Although *exagoreusis* precedes *exomologesis*, and it is less famous than the other, Foucault supports the reverse. To discuss the practices of *exomologesis* and *exagoreusis*, Foucault recurses to a more detailed study of Cassian's *Conferences* and *Institutes of the Cenobites*.

#### **2.2.2.1. The Practice of *Exomologesis***

*Exomologesis* is a Greek term which does not have a precise translation in Latin, but it implies a "recognition of fact". "For Christians, it meant to recognize publicly the truth of their faith or to recognize publicly that they were Christians" (1988: 41). Here, the critical dimension is the publicity of this act. Most importantly, *exomologesis* had a penitential meaning. That is, *exomologesis* in penance means manifesting one's general state "as a sinner and penitent" (1988: 41).

Foucault marks an evolution of the meaning of penitent. In the early Christianity, penitent was not an act or a ritual but a status. If a sinner sought penance he had to ask for it from the bishop. On the other hand, later in the medieval period, *exomologesis* became a ritual which appeared about at the end of the period of penance. However, it still bore meaning of a status. This method endured till the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries "*Exomologesis* is not a verbal behavior but the dramatic recognition of one's status as a penitent" (1988: 41).

In *exomologesis* the status of penitent affects one's life, marking one as a sinner. Moreover, *exomologesis* imposes strict requirements on a penitent. First of all, penitence is regarded a way of life which must be expressed all times because of

the obligation to disclose oneself. It is sometimes confusing in the text, so I should clarify that the terms penance/ act of penitence and *exomologesis* are used interchangeably in the text because of the penitential meaning attributed to *exomologesis*.

As I quoted above, it is significant to underline that *exomologesis* is not nominal but symbolic, ritual, and theatrical. Therefore, it requires other people's presence in order to recognize the ritual. Foucault emphasizes that, "[r]ecognition also designates the entire process that the penitent experiences in this status over the years. He is the aggregate of manifested penitential behavior, of self-punishment as well as of self-revelation" (1988: 42). In this sense, self-punishment and self-revelation are linked since the way a penitent punishes himself is similar to how he reveals himself. The main characteristic of punishment consists of proving sufferage, demonstrating shame, and displaying modesty.

Foucault highlights the term *publicatio sui* in Greek to underline the public character of *exomologesis* and compares it with Seneca's use of daily self-examination, which is completely private. That means what was public for the Christians was private for the Stoics. Moreover, "for Seneca, *exomologesis* or *publication sui* does not imply verbal analysis of deeds or thoughts; it is only a somatic and symbolic expression" (1988: 42).

The functions of the publication through *exomologesis* in Christianity can be summarized in two articles. Firstly, *exomologesis* was a way to wipe out sin and bring back the purity attained by baptism. Secondly, it was a way to display a sinner as he is. Foucault underlines that the paradox lies at the heart of *exomologesis* as it wipes out the sin but reveals the sinner. The majority of the act of penitence consists more of exposing the sinners' genuine sinful nature than revealing the truth of their sin. The relationship between the paradox of forgiving sins and expressing oneself in Christianity was explained using three models.

The first one was the medical model, which refers to a wounded who must show his/her wounds so that he/she can be cured. The second model, though less frequent, was the tribunal judgment model, whereby confessing faults appeases the judge. The most crucial model was the “model of death, torture, or martyrdom” (1988: 43). In that, the model for the penitent is the martyr’s admission of death. It is based on the idea that one can reject life and self in order to prove that one can face and accept death. Therefore, penance is a rupture with the self, past, and world. Penitence does not aim to find an identity. It is rather the rejection of the self. “It represents a break with one’s past identity” (1988: 43). Self-revelation ends up with self-destruction. In Foucault’s words, “in *exomologesis*, the penitent superimposes truth about self by violent rupture and dissociation” (1988: 43).

A break with past identity implies what Kant proposes in “*What is Enlightenment?*” (1784) For Kant, the ‘*Aufklärung*’ is a critical reflection on its contemporary reality. It is also significantly related to Foucault’s claim that one has to make one’s history. It starts with a break with one’s past identity produced by power relations and is not questioned or criticized by the self until that time. Therefore, Foucault sees this technique of disclosing the self as a subjectivation process.

#### **2.2.2.2. The Practice of *Exagoreusis***

Throughout the fourth century, we encounter another form of disclosure of the self-called *exagoreusis*. While the term is distinct from *exomologesis*, it is evocative of the verbalizing experiences to a teacher/master of the pagan philosophical schools. Foucault indicates several transitions of some of the techniques of the self from pagan to Christian culture. However, these techniques are used in different ways, implying continuities and discontinuities between each other.

The well-established monastic practice of self-examination involves the two principles of Christian spirituality: obedience and contemplation. These terms differ from Senecan self-examination and also sharply differ from *exomologesis* in terms how they construct the relationship of the disciple with master. In addition to the relationship between the novice and master/teacher, the required characteristics of the master/teacher are different in the two mentioned cultures. In Seneca, this relationship was, first of all, established on the capacity of the master to guide the disciple to a happy and autonomous life through good advice. It means that the master's ability to direct and the quality of his wisdom are significant dimensions. On the other hand, in monastic life, the critical dimension in the monk's relationship with the master is founded on total obedience to the master. The monk can never do anything without the permission of the master. So the monk's autonomy is not a concern of this relationship. There is unconditional obedience to the master.

Secondly, in Seneca, the relationship between the disciple and master was instrumental and professional. There was an end to this relationship when the mission was completed. On the contrary, in monastic life, the relation to the master does not serve the purpose of establishing one's sovereign mastery over oneself. Instead, this affiliation necessitates humility, mortification, and detachment from the self. Foucault describes this as: "It is the sacrifice of the self, of the subject's own will. This is the new technology of the self. (...) The self must constitute self through obedience" (1988: 45). This may sound confusing since one can constitute the self by a sacrificial will. However, here we must pay attention to its being a choice at the beginning.

Another principle of monastic life is contemplation, and because of the requirements of contemplation that Foucault identifies as *exagoreusis* is the beginning of the hermeneutics of oneself. Contemplation addresses God, and the belief is that our heart must be pure enough to see God. As the word itself implies, it is about thought. This indicates its basic difference from *exomologesis* and the Stoic techniques of self-examination. *Exomologesis* is about sin one

made, therefore, it focuses on what one did. Moreover, “the Senecan memorization of deeds and their correspondence with rules” (1988: 45) is also about the deed or action rather than thought. However, *exagoreusis* is all about the movement of thought, ‘present thoughts.’

Foucault’s other series of lectures which he gave at the Catholic University of Louvain in the spring of 1981 by the invitation of the Law School and the School of Criminology, published as *Wrong-Doing Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice* (2014), will be more helpful to clarify the technique of *exagoreusis* in monastic life. In that, he gives a broader and more detailed analysis of monastic life and the technologies of the disclosure of the self in early Christianity.

The editors of the book asserted this lecture series remained almost unknown. These lectures were given in 1981, before the faculty seminar on *Technologies of the Self* at the University of Vermont in the fall of 1982. In these, Foucault elaborates more on the technologies of the self within Christianity and in monastic life. In addition to this, he makes a more detailed comparison of the evolution of the technologies of the self between pagan antiquity and early Christianity. For this reason, from now on, I will refer to this book analyzing *exagoreusis* in a broader context.

*Exagoreusis* has the aim of discovering a truth hidden deep within the self. Foucault explains the logic of this aim as follows: “I must know my truth to adhere to the truth of the text, and it is the truth of the text that is going to guide me in the search I pursue among the secrets of my consciousness” (Foucault, 2014: 167). This argument is parallel to the discussion of having a pure heart in order to be able to see God or to contemplate him permanently in the technologies of the self. The main point is the same in these two texts, but the terminology Foucault used in these lectures changes.



For the translation of the term “*exagoreusis*,” Foucault suggests “permanent avowal of oneself” (2014: 164), and he underlines that *exagoreusis* has nothing to do with actions rather, it focuses on the constantly moving reality of thought at the present moment. The aim here is to scrutinize one’s conscience in order to immobilize it and to eliminate the movement of the spirit from God. This process requires permanent control of one’s thoughts. In other words, one becomes a self-censor to cease the constant flux of thought. Foucault emphasizes that this permanent examination of oneself is not about measuring the truth of one’s thought. But it is about whether they are bearing ‘illusions.’ That is, a permanent examination of oneself aims to know whether one’s thoughts are not presenting themselves as something other than what they are.

Foucault underlines that, at this point, we are not in a world of error or mistakes, like in the Stoics, we are in the world of suspicion of illusion. The concern is knowing from where the individual’s thoughts derive. It is about deciding whether it comes from God or another spiritual being, namely Satan. Foucault says that “it was thus within this dimension of the internal other that the practice of *exagoreusis* was deployed” (2014: 165).

Permanent verbalization of thoughts is necessary to verify the quality of thought, concerning its purity and contamination by illusion. One can neither discriminate the quality of thoughts nor test the illusions without telling all thoughts that come to mind as one thought them to a master. Master, here, has a discriminating power with his greater wisdom. However, even if the master does not say anything, confession reveals the truth since evil thoughts cannot be expressed without difficulty. This practice also necessitates complete obedience to someone else. Self-renunciation is achieved through the permanent verbalization of thoughts and total obedience to someone else by renouncing one’s all autonomous will.

Within the practice of verbalization, another dimension necessary to be emphasized, which leads to a fundamental break and marks the birth of

hermeneutics of the self in the Western world. Foucault says that “[w]hereas in antiquity verbalization emanated from the master in the direction of the disciple who served as the listener, to the contrary, in the new relationship of obedience that developed in monastic institutions, the structure was completely reversed. To obey one needed to speak” (2014: 140). “As a result, it was the other who listened, and it was the one who was subjugated who spoke” (2014: 141).

At the end of the *Technologies of the Self*, Foucault claims that between these two technologies of the disclosure of the self, *exagoreusis*, verbalization becomes more important. From the eighteenth century to the present, it has appeared in a different context by “the so-called human sciences in order to use them without renunciation of the self but to constitute, positively, a new self. To use these techniques without renouncing oneself constitutes a decisive break” (Foucault, 1988: 49).

The concern here is the emphasis on a break with past identity and with the past in order to attain self-renunciation in both technologies of the disclosure of the self, namely, *exomologesis* and *exagoreusis*. In *exomologesis*, the disclosure is attained through dramatic self-destruction by penance, whereas in *exagoreusis* the emphasis is put on present thought. Both of these practices refer to the notion of being concerned with the present time and the question of what we are in this very moment Kant discusses, Foucault suggests that we must reject who we are because we are the result of the effects of power relations.

Kant and Foucault both propose that we critically evaluate who we are today in order to identify the power relations that have shaped us as subjects. According to Foucault,:

[p]ast actions, updating one’s memory, and future actions: such is the functioning of Seneca’s examination of conscience. It is by no means a hermeneutics of the self, nor the decoding of a secret that is sealed deep within oneself. There is no subjectivity in Seneca’s examination of conscience (Foucault, 2014: 100).

That is why Foucault insists that Christianity invented the hermeneutics of the self through the hermeneutics of thought.

The Stoic practices of examining conscience are philosophical acts through which one establishes a particular mode of relation with the truth in general. It means accepting the truth that is imposed on us. On the other hand, becoming an ethical subject requires establishing a relationship with one's own truth, like in Christian disclosure practices of the self. According to Foucault, producing one's own truth means subjectivation since it means rejecting the truth that is imposed on us.

It does not imply establishing a relationship to one's own truth. Therefore, according to Foucault, there is subjectification in Christianity in one sense.

### **2.3. Ethics as a practice of freedom**

Foucault's interview *The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom*, provides us with clear insight into the political aspects of ethics in Foucault. Foucault states that he has mainly been interested in the problem of subjectivity and truth, more specifically, "how the human subject fits into certain games of truth" (1997: 281-282). He claims that "games of truth no longer involve coercive practice, but a practice of self-formation of the subjects", an ascetic practice, "as an exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being" (1997: 281-282).

Indeed, the words of 'attempting' to develop and transform oneself bring out the concepts of 'will' and 'freedom,' which have political connotations. Foucault himself defines ethics as a practice of freedom, the conscious practice of freedom. He takes freedom as the ontological condition of ethics and ethics as a form of freedom when it is informed by reflection.

Significantly, Foucault questions why we are concerned with truth, and more so than with the care of the self and he asks, “Why must the care of the self occur only through the concern for truth?” (1997: 295). These questions reveal explicitly what is political about Foucault’s understanding of ethics. Foucault suggests that the practices of the self, allow us to play the games of power “with as little domination as possible” (1997: 299). Regarding the issue, he explains that it is possible to proceed in any direction within the area of the duty to tell the truth, sometimes in opposition to the consequences of dominance that may be connected to the truth's structures or institutions (1997: 295).

According to Foucault, the past two centuries has been dealing with a critical inquiry: “What could be the positive foundation for the technologies of the self that have been developing during centuries and centuries?” (2016: 76). To answer this question, he challenges the necessity of the hermeneutics of the self by the so-called human sciences and argues that our problem should not be the positive foundation of the self. Foucault invites us to realize that our sense of identity is nothing more than a technological construct whose roots lie in our past (2016: 76). Therefore, he proposes to change those technologies (2016: 76). Foucault’s proposal to change the existing technologies of the self reflects the key principles of his morality, which are refusal, curiosity and invention.

#### **2.4. The Relation Between Critique and Power**

Foucault’s main theme in his research published in *The Subject and Power* is the subject. In this article, he explains that his reason for involving the question of power too much is due to the fact that a human subject is embedded in a web of intricate power interactions (1982: 209). For him, subject is the effect of power relations, which is why it is necessary to study them.

According to Foucault, power exists only when actualized and power is not just a social dynamic between two people; it is also the means by which one person can influence another. (1982: 219). An action upon an action “defines a

relationship of power,” which is “a mode of action that does not operate directly on others” (1982: 220). Moreover, Foucault points out “a new economy of power relations” that infuses into every aspect of our life and he claims that we are the result of power effects (1982: 210). This new economy of power relations is “a form of power which makes individuals subjects” (1982: 212). In this sense, Foucault opposes defining power as repressive or negative. Instead, he depicts it as productive and positive since power relations necessitate the existence of resistance.

Foucault is after a much more concrete analysis of present-time problems. Therefore, he praises Kant’s text and he develops his arguments on this question in his articles “What is Enlightenment?” and “What is Critique?” Herein, Foucault underlines that Kant’s question is a discussion of its very current time. The answer to why he takes this question so seriously brings us to Foucault’s main problem: the subject. In that, Foucault highlights that what Kant is searching for is the answer to the question of what we are, in this very, moment not as an abstract and universal entity.

For Foucault, we are the effect of power relations and asking the question of ‘who we are’ requires analyzing power relations. While asking this question, Kant’s concern was to criticize the concepts of rationality and modernity. On the other hand, Foucault’s concern, in his analysis of the subject and power, is to propose rejecting what we are since we are the effects of power relations. According to him, state power, as the most concrete form of power, is “both individualizing and totalizing” (1982: 213). He mentions individualizing in the sense that it “categorizes an individual, marks him by his own individuality,” and “imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him” (1982: 212). That is why we have to reject who we are.

In “What is Critique?” Foucault claims that “the core of critique is made of the relationships that are tied to one another, or one to the two others, power, truth, and the subject” (2007: 47). Critique would essentially insure the de-subjugation

of the subject in the context of (...) the politics of truth” (2007: 47). Foucault sees the question of the *Aufklärung* as “the question of the relationship between power, truth, and the subject” (2007: 57). In *What is Enlightenment?* (1984) he elaborates his argument on modernity based on Kant. Here, the basic premise is that “the enlightenment is the age of critique” and “*Aufklärung*” is a critical reflection on its contemporary reality compared to history (1984: 39). Therefore, Foucault emphasizes that modernity is “an attitude” rather than a period of history since it is a manner of thinking, feeling, acting, and behaving that simultaneously indicates a relationship of belonging and presents itself as a task. It is a method that some individuals choose to relate to contemporary reality (1984: 40).

In defining modernity as a ‘task’, as an attitude, and by voluntary choice, in thinking and acting, we can recall Foucault’s proposal to reject who we are because we are the effect of power relations. In order to achieve this task, we first become aware of our present moment, and we need to criticize it. In the historical, philosophical research, or practice, Foucault explains, “one has to make one’s own history and fabricate history in terms of how it would be traversed by the question of the relationships between structures of rationality that articulate true discourse and the mechanisms of subjugation which are linked to it” (2007: 56). These all point out constituting ourselves as autonomous subjects.

Foucault defines counter-conduct as the practical opposition to the politically instituted government of individualization. Within this framework, he refers to Baudelaire’s description of modern man. According to Baudelaire, the modern man is not the man who “discovers himself, his secrets and his hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself” (1984: 42). Modernity compels the man to face the task of producing himself. Baudelaire’s definition show parallelism to Foucault’s ethical action. Voluntary choice refers to freedom which is the ontological condition of ethics, and inventing the self requires the practices of

the self as an attempt for “the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject” (1984: 42).

Foucault underlines that ethical action, the act of creating ourselves through practices of the self is not for once, he considers it as an ongoing experimental process. He does not envisage ethical action to destroy the given structure and build a new one. Instead, he proposes these ethical actions to be part of an exploratory process, which means not to institutionalize a new form of power relations, not to replace a given structure with an alternative one. However, he proposes a process of “‘permanent’ creation of ourselves in our autonomy” (1984: 35). That means having a “limit attitude,” always staying within limits, moving “beyond the outside-inside alternative”; being at the frontiers and this also means “crossing-over” the structure (1984: 35). This is what Foucault suggests as a positive critique instead of the negative critique which Kant made by fixing “the limits of knowledge” (2007: 49). A positive critique is “a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression” instead of a “critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation” as in Kant (1984: 36).

## **2.5. Concluding remarks**

Within the scope of Foucault’s framework of ethics, in which he discusses the subject, truth, and power relations, I aim to analyze whether yoga can be considered a technology of the self. I believe that the evolution of yoga reflects, albeit from the reverse side, the features of the transformation of the technologies of the self from ancient to Christian ethics. Yoga evolved from premodern yoga, primarily focusing on philosophical and spiritual exercise, to Modern Postural Yoga. The latter practice emphasizes bodily postures, *asanas*, and physical and mental well-being. It has been considered a cure for the backbreaking effects of neoliberalism.

Many scholars emphasize that yoga is context-sensitive, which means it can be affected by the conditions of the specific time and society in which it is

practiced. Suppose we recall Foucault's argument that technologies of the self are produced by society to where they belong. In that case, a similarity can be drawn between the discipline of yoga and the technologies of the self.

Foucault defines ethics as a practice of freedom that establishes a particular relationship between the subject and truth. In this ethical practice, technologies of the self have an essential role in determining the relationship between the subject and the truth. The subject's position regarding the truth affects its position in "the games of power" (1997: 299). If the subject equips itself with certain truths that are not the discourse of truth power produced, the subject can have the capacity of resistance to power. Therefore, technologies of the self and power/domination are closely related.

Within this framework, yoga has a controversial position. In this study, I will evaluate yoga from an ethical perspective by analyzing whether it can be considered a technology of the self. I believe that this analysis will also reveal the dynamics of technologies of power/domination in the transformation of yoga, as Foucault often underlines that technologies of the self and power are closely linked together.

Foucault asserts that the human subject is drawn into "certain games of truth" by power, and coercive tactics are no longer used in games of truth (1997: 281). Instead, the techniques of the self are used as tools for the technologies of power. Power relations manipulate the self-formation of the subject as an ethical action as "an action upon action" (1982: 220). If we think of yoga as an exercise of the self on the self to develop oneself, it can remind a practice of the self, in other words, a technology of the self in Foucault's discussion of ethics.

Elaborating on the genealogical evolution of yoga in the next chapter will reveal the turning points in the history of yoga that show the underlying dynamics that affect its evolution. The contexts of the phases it passed through can highlight the agendas influencing the changing meanings and attributions to yoga.



Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate yoga genealogically before examining its certain types according to the features of technologies of the self.

## CHAPTER 3

### AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF YOGA

#### 3.1. What is Yoga?

Whether yoga is a religion or an Eastern philosophy has always been debated. In addition, there are also some relatively recent discussions about the nature or origin of yoga depending on the increasing trend of postural yoga, in the West. Yoga is studied by a wide range of sciences, from religious studies, sociology, and anthropology to sports and medicine. Considering that yoga has a wider range of meanings than nearly any other word in the entire Sanskrit lexicon (White, 2012: 2) it is understandable why there is so much discussion about this practice and why it took this much attention from different sciences.

In the South Asian literary tradition, yoga had a wide range of meanings specific to particular contexts. According to David Gordon White:

“Yoga” has a wider range of meanings than nearly any other word in the entire Sanskrit lexicon. The act of yoking an animal, as well as the yoke itself, is called yoga. In astronomy, a conjunction of planets or stars, as well as a constellation, is called yoga. When one mixes together various substances that, too, can be called yoga. The word yoga has also been employed to denote a device, a recipe, a method, a strategy, a charm, an incantation, fraud, a trick, an endeavor, a combination, union, an arrangement, zeal, care, diligence, industriousness, discipline, use, application, contact, a sum total, and the Work of alchemists. But this is by no means an exhaustive list (White, 2012: 2).

This definition shows different contextual meanings of the term. However, in order to demarcate our use of the concept in the context of this thesis, it is wise to refer to Mircea Eliade, who was proficient in the history of religions. Eliade explains that “Yoga is one of the six orthodox Indian "systems of philosophy" ("orthodox" here meaning "tolerated by Brahmanism," in distinction from the

"heretical" systems, such as Buddhism or Jainism)" (Eliade, 1958: 6). In particular, yoga refers to "the school of Patanjali the author of the Yoga Sutras" and his school of yoga generally called Classical Yoga (Feuerstein, 2002: 103).

In her book *Selling Yoga* (2015), Andrea Jain argues that modern postural yoga is fundamentally different from premodern yoga traditions. Moreover, she claims that premodern yoga traditions were not homogeneous. Instead, they were radically heterogeneous and took on many different forms, such as those of the Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain traditions. Jain insists that contrary to what many practitioners and non-practitioners both frequently believe, the popularized yoga systems of today are not an extension of some fixed premodern yoga legacy (2015: 3). She focuses on the context-sensitivity, heterogeneity, and flexibility of premodern yoga, instead of any fundamental feature or essence that some might assume to be shared by all systems (2015: 4). In other words, she claims that each contemporary yoga system is unique to its own social setting.

Jain is not alone in her claim about the flexibility and heterogeneity of premodern yoga. Mark Singleton also made a similar claim in 2010, in his book "Yoga Body: The Origins of Modern Posture Practice." (2010) In addition to Jain's claim of "context-sensitivity" of premodern yoga history, Singleton puts emphasis on yoga's "multilinear transnational" history (Singleton, 2010). In his book, Singleton shows how today's different forms of postural yoga were influenced by Western physical culture in the 1930s and transmitted to the West as the ancient esoteric practices of India in the 1970s. Godrej, also, discusses the critically comprehensive and complex tradition of premodern yoga and points out that yoga's lengthy history represents the confluence of the sacred and the worldly objectives by aiming for both pleasures, material improvement of this world, and ascetic and spiritual development at the same time (Godrej, 2016).

As an example of the togetherness of sacred and mundane affairs, Godrej points out the term *Tantra* which refers to South Asian philosophical traditions that employ embodiment as a means of achieving transcendence. Compared to the

more prevalent ascetic systems of yoga in South Asia up until that point, the term entails the adoption rather than the renunciation of bodily pleasure (Godrej, 2016: 3, Strauss, 2008: 70). Therefore, *tantra* challenges the idea that yoga has only ever been primarily concerned with either transcendence or materialism (Godrej, 2016: 21). This shows the ambivalence and complexity in the history of yoga.

In this chapter, my main concern will be about the difference between the meditative, spiritual yoga and the postural yoga. This difference is the core reason for many debates about yoga today. It is the reason why there are several branches of science that study yoga at the same time. We can differentiate yoga mainly into two categories considering how yoga is practiced and perceived by different yoga practitioners: classical or raja yoga, also called “royal” yoga, and hatha yoga, which consists of mostly physical practices. Raja yoga can be defined as meditative yoga, and hatha yoga can be defined as postural yoga.

In this chapter, I will examine both Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga and try to show the ambivalences of contemporary yogic practice and the differences between these two types of yoga. I will use recent secondary research to show contemporary discussions about yoga relevant to my analysis of modern postural yoga without attempting a detailed review. For the traditional yoga discussion, I will mostly rely on Mircea Eliade’s book “*Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*” (1958) as a comprehensive and inclusive analyses of yoga system.

### **3.2. The Doctrines of Yoga**

The oldest and most authoritative written scripture on this “classic” Yoga philosophy is *The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali*. *Sutra* means ‘threads’ or ‘aphorism’ in Sanskrit. The Yoga Sutras were formulated by the Indian sage Patanjali. After Patanjali, “The Yoga Sutras” were interpreted by his commentators. According to Eliade (1958: 7), Patanjali’s contribution to the theoretical framework of Yoga technics is minimal. Patanjali just reconsidered the philosophical material of the

*Samkhya* philosophy, which is the oldest philosophy in Indian tradition, around the technical formulas for concentration, meditation, and ecstasy (Eliade, 1958: 7, Feuerstein, 2002: 103). According to Eliade, Patanjali helped yoga, which had previously been a mystical tradition, transform into a philosophical discipline (Eliade, 1958: 7-8).

The only significant difference between *Samkhya* and yoga philosophy is their methods for achieving salvation. That is, while in *Samkhya*, the way to emancipation is received through metaphysical knowledge, in yoga it is provided by an asceticism and techniques of meditation (1958:7-15). Although their ways differ, the aim of emancipation exists in all Indian philosophies and mysticisms (1958: 12).

Four main concepts of Indian spirituality are: *karma*, *maya*, *nirvana* and *yoga*. These four concepts are interdependent. To epitomize, *karma* is the “law of universal causality” “which connects man with the cosmos”, *maya* is the “cosmic illusion,” “the mysterious process that engenders and maintains the cosmos”, *nirvana* is “the absolute reality, “situated” somewhere beyond the cosmic illusion woven by *maya* and beyond human experience as conditioned by *karma*” (1958: 3). Eliade underlines that *nirvana* is called by different names like pure being, the absolute, the Self, *brahman*, the unconditioned, the transcendent, the immortal etc. Lastly, *yoga* is “the means of attaining to Being, the effectual techniques for gaining liberation” (1958: 3).

According to Eliade, “the word *yoga* serves, in general, to designate any ascetic technique and any method of meditation” (1958: 4). Furthermore, he underlines that the numerous Indian intellectual currents and mystical movements have examined these varied asceticisms and meditations in different ways. Thus, one of these currents is the “classic” yoga explained by Patanjali in his *Yoga Sutras*. Eliade highlights that alongside this “classic” yoga, there are different forms of nonsystematic yogas, non-Brahmanic Yogas like Buddhist, Jainist yogas and other yogas whose structures are “magical”, or “mystical” etc. (1958: 4).

Eliade shortly explains certain meanings of the word yoga. Etymologically, yoga derives from the root *yuj*. Eliade says,

To bind together,” “to hold fast” “to yoke”- the purpose of all these is to *unify* the spirit to do away with the dispersion and automatism that characterize profane consciousness. For the “devotional” (mystical) schools of yoga this “unification,” of course, only precedes the true union, that of the human soul with God (1958: 5).

This quotation underlines that unification of the spirit is obtained by detachment from the world, from the cosmic circuit. Only then can one succeed in mastering oneself and achieve liberation in this “mystical” varieties of Yoga (1958: 5).

Another important point is the role of a guru, a master in the structure of yoga. Yoga is not learned alone without the guidance of a master; a guru is necessary. The existence of the guru in the structure of yoga indicates the initiatory character of yoga. Eliade claims that even though all the traditional disciplines in India thought by masters and, therefore, all of them are initiations transmitted orally, the initiatory nature of yoga is considerably more apparent.

Like in other religious initiations, the yogins start by renouncing the worldly life and under the guidance of their guru, they work diligently to progress beyond the norms of human behaviour and values. This is an effort to distance oneself from the profane state for “dying to this life” which is “followed by a rebirth to another mode of being,” meaning liberation (1958: 5).

Eliade insists that the initiatory character of yoga is more evident if we consider the pursuit of the creation of a mystical body. This conception of body is used in all kinds of yoga “especially in tantrism and alchemy” (1958: 5). Mystical body enables the yogin to attain the transcendent state of being. As a result, indicates accessing a nonprofane and hardly comprehensible form of being, which Indian schools refer to by a variety of names. One of these terms is *nirvana*, “the initiatory rebirth” (1958: 6).

These different approaches and systems illustrate the various meanings of yoga in Indian thought. As it is seen, Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras* is just one of the meanings that yoga assumes in Indian literature. Eliade's explanations of different approaches to yoga illustrate that we cannot talk about a homogenized, static or monolithic form of yoga in history. It is not possible within the scope of this thesis to analyze all these various forms of yoga. Therefore, I will analyze the most known forms of yoga in the West, which are Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga.

### **3.2.1. Differences of Patanjali's Yoga Sutras from the Samkhya Philosophy**

As it is stated in the beginning, Patanjali redefined the Samkhya philosophy, the oldest philosophy in Indian tradition, and formulated the yoga philosophy in a systematic manner. Feuerstein underlines that both Samkhya and Yoga philosophy are dualist philosophies that separate the transcendental Self, *puruṣa*, from Nature, *prakṛiti*. While the Self, Spirit, is eternally unchanging, Nature, Substance is in a constant state of transition/alteration (2002: 103).

Two basic differences between the Yoga and the Samkhya philosophies: the existence of God and the way these philosophies attain salvation. Samkhya is an atheistic philosophy, Yoga, on the other hand, is theistic. It affirms "the existence of a supreme God (*Ishvara*)" (1958: 7). Eliade underlines that this God is not a creator in the sense of divine religions, *Ishvara*'s role is rather minor (1958: 73-74).

Eliade explains that "*Ishvara* corresponded to an experiential reality: *Ishvara* can, in fact, bring about *samadhi*, on condition that the yogin practice (...) devotion to *Ishvara*" (1958: 75). *Samadhi* is the final limb of Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. Eliade calls *Samadhi* as "stasis", which is a "cultivation of one-pointed concentration" (1958:70). In this respect, the God *Ishvara* has a kind of role that makes concentration easier for the last stage of Yoga practice for yogins. He is

an object of concentration, and he is primarily a god of yogins. As a god, his only role is to hasten the process of arrival at *samadhi* (1958: 73).

Eliade makes it explicit that:

*Ishvara* is not an omnipotent Creator-God, “*Ishvara* is only an archetype of the yogin- a macro-yogin; very probably a patron of certain yogic sects. At least Patanjali says that *Ishvara* was the guru of the sages of immemorial times, for, he adds, *Ishvara* is not bound by time (1958: 75).

On the other hand, Eliade adds that the yogin can attain liberation through the technique of Yoga without the help of *Ishvara*. Moreover, he compares the minor role that Patanjali gave *Ishvara* with the increasingly active role that the later commentators of Patanjali give him. Eliade interprets this phenomenon as the result of an “almost universal victory of “mysticism” which makes the “classic” yoga leave behind its initial characteristic of “magic” (1958: 76).

Another critical point where Samkhya and Yoga philosophies are differentiated is their way of reaching salvation. This is the most notable variation between these two. Salvation bears associations with suffering. Eliade points out that Patanjali writes, “all is suffering for the sage”, and he highlights that Patanjali is not the only one who puts into words this suffering, Buddha avowed this universal suffering much earlier than Patanjali by saying, “All is pain, all is ephemeral” (1958: 11).

This suffering is the reason for the longing for salvation. Eliade says that “for the more man suffers (that is, the greater is his solidarity with the cosmos), the more the desire for emancipation increases in him, the more intensely the thirst for salvation” (1958: 11). The way Yoga philosophy proposes for the salvation is techniques of meditation. In contrast, Samkhya proposes knowledge, more specifically metaphysical knowledge, for salvation. Feuerstein explains that this knowledge “discriminative knowledge” since it is about to discriminate “pure



Consciousness”, transcendental Self from “mutable and unconscious forms of Nature” (2002: 100-101).

Many commentators, who comment on Yoga Sutras or the texts of different Indian philosophies like *Vedanta-sutra-bhaṣya*, rank the value of knowledge according to its aim of deliverance. Therefore, only metaphysical knowledge is prized since it can provide freedom from the illusion of a profane world by making someone find his “true “Self” –in its ascetic and spiritual sense”- (1958: 14) or “his “true spirit” (*puruṣa atman*)” (1958: 13).

Both Samkhya and Yoga explain the reason of the suffering as the “ignorance of “Spirit” which means to confuse “psychomental states” like senses, feelings, thoughts, and volitions with the Spirit, with the Self. That is to say. These psychomental activities are apart from one’s Self. Thus, emancipation from suffering can be achieved by eliminating the illusion that one’s “Spirit” or one’s “Self” is identical to one’s psychomental life (1958: 14).

Eliade states that:

States of consciousness are the refined products of the same substance that is at the base of the physical world and the world of life. Between psychic states and inanimate objects or living beings there are only differences of degree. But between psychic states and Spirit there is a difference of an ontological order; they belong to two different modes of being (1958: 15).

For Samkhya philosophy, the first step toward emancipation is knowing the essence of nature, Substance, (*prakṛti*) and the rules that regulate its evolution. Although Yoga confirms the analysis of nature, Substance, it gives a crucial role in the practice of contemplation which means a technique of meditation in order to arrive at salvation. Hence, we can say that what is metaphysical knowledge for Shamkya thought is turned into techniques of meditation for Yoga. And “metaphysics becomes soteriology” (1958: 13).

### 3.2.2. Method and Techniques of Classical Yoga

Yoga meditation begins with focusing on a single item; it makes no difference if this is a physical object “(such as the space between the eyebrows, the tip of the nose, or anything luminous)”, an idea (such as a metaphysical truth), or God (*Isvara*) (1958: 47). By integrating the psychomental stream, one can achieve this deliberate and ongoing focus, also known as *ekagrata* (from the Sanskrit for "on a single point") (1958: 47).

Eliade underlines that the first task for the yogin is to stop thinking, which is why yoga practice starts with *ekagrata*, which is the control over the senses and ability to know the soul. One acquires a true will—the ability to freely control a significant area of biomental activity—through *ekagrata*. *Ekagrata* can be achieved by practising countless techniques and exercises in which physiology plays a crucial role. Eliade highlights that this is why Patanjali asserts that many types of physiological and spiritual exercises are implied by the yogic approach (1958: 48).

*The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali* is organized into four chapters and provides descriptions of eight limbs of Yoga *sadhana* or ‘practice’. These aphorisms offer guidelines for living a meaningful life.

The first five limbs (*Yoga Sutras* 2:28–55) are “external limbs,” which Gerald Larson defines as “largely practical, preparatory exercises” (Larson, 2012: 79 cited in Jain 2015: 10). These external limbs are (1) *yama*: behavioral restraints common in South Asian renouncer traditions—*ahimsa* (nonviolence), *satya* (telling the truth), *asteya* (restraint from stealing), *brahmacharya* (celibacy), and *aparigraha* (restraint from attachment); (2) *niyama*: ritual observances; (3) *asana*: postures; (4) *pranayama*: “breath control” exercises; and (5) *pratyahara*: “sense withdrawal” exercises. The final three limbs (*Yoga Sutras* 3:1–8), called “internal limbs,” are described as “comprehensive reflection” (*samyama*) (Larson, 2012: 80 cited in Jain 2015: 10) and are (1) *dharana*: “spatial fixation on the object of meditation;” (2) *dhyana*: “temporal flow regarding the object of meditation;” and (3) *samadhi*: “cultivation of one-pointed ‘concentration’” (Larson, 2012: 78 cited in Jain 2015: 10).

Eliade underlines that Patanjali hierarchizes these ‘limbs of Yoga’ so that the yogin cannot neglect any of them except in specific circumstances. According to Eliade, there is nothing particularly yogic about the first two groups—*yama* and *niyama*—as they clearly serve as the prerequisites for all asceticism. The constraints (*yama*) cleanse from some transgressions that all moral systems condemn but which social life tolerates (1958: 49). All ethical systems may identify these constraints, and any good human can understand them, whether one is a yogin apprentice or not. Therefore, they do not achieve a yogic state explicitly but rather a “purified” human state as a result of their practice (1958: 50).

### **3.2.3. Yogic Postures *Asana* and *Pranayama***

The actual start of yogic practice is the third limb of yoga, that is *asana*. *Asana* is the popular yogic position Yoga Sutras identify as “stable and agreeable.” *Asana* provides the body with a stable rigidity while also requiring the least amount of physical effort. Here, Eliade points out that although *Hatha Yoga* treatises put much emphasis on *asanas*, Patanjali does not do so. He only defines *asana* in outline since “it is learned from a *guru* not from descriptions” (1958: 53).

*Asana* is initially painful and intolerable. However, with repetition, the effort required to maintain the body in the same position diminishes. *Asana* reaches its perfection when the mind becomes infinite or when it makes the concept of its infinity its own content. Regarding “the mind converted into infinity,” this refers to a full suspension of awareness of one's own body's presence (1958: 53).

Eliade explains that *asana* is the first action made to eliminate the modes of human existence so *asana* is unmistakably a symbol of overcoming the human predicament. *Asana* is an *ekagrata* -a concentration on a single point- when viewed from the plane of the body (1958: 54). That is, *asana* puts a stop to the body's mobility and disposability just as *ekagrata* does for the states of

consciousness' fluctuation and dispersion “by reducing the infinity of possible positions to a single archetypal, iconographic posture” (1958: 55).

As *asana* is a “refusal to move,” while *Pranayama* is the refusal to breathe like most of mankind, which is non-rythmically. Eliade quotes from Patanjali’s definition of pranayama: “Pranayama is the arrest of the movements of inhalation and exhalation, and it is obtained after asana has been realized” (1958: 55). Eliade also adds that even though *pranayama* is particularly yogic exercise, Patanjali does not assign profound importance to it, and *pranayama* is covered in just three sutras, as it is in the case of *asana*. His primary focus is on the theoretical underpinnings of ascetic activities. Technical specifics are found in the commentaries by Vyasa, Bhoja, and Vacaspatimisra, but especially in the *Hatha-yogic* treatises (1958: 55).

#### **3.2.4. Yogic Concentration and Meditation**

Yogic practices of *asana*, *pranayama*, and *ekagrata* can only be successful when even for a little time practitioner eradicates the human condition. Eliade explains this mode as a passing beyond the secular mode of existence while remaining still, breathing regularly, and focusing the eyes and minds on a single object (1958: 66).

The last step of psychophysiological asceticism is *pratyahara*, which is withdrawing sensory activity from the dominance of outer objects. After this stage, the yogin does not get “distracted” or “troubled” by the senses, sensory activity, memory, etc. (1958: 69).

Autonomy in regard to the dynamics of the subconscious and external stimuli, which the yogin realizes via *pratyahara* allows him to practice a three-fold technique, which *The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali* named “*samyama*.” The term *samyama* represents the final three limbs of yoga (1958: 69). These three limbs are “*dharana*” (concentration), “*dhyana*” (meditation), and “*Samadhi*” (stasis).

### **3.3. Modern Postural Yoga: Western Reception**

In the above, we saw the methods and techniques of Classical Yoga based on sage Patanjali's Yoga Sutras. The various concepts concerning these techniques show that the word yoga has various meanings in Sanskrit language, and so as a philosophy, it has been influenced by different schools of Indian thought, particularly by Samkhya philosophy. Hence, Patanjali's Yoga Sutras, which are taken as an authority on Yoga and named "Classical Yoga," is just one form of doctrines of yoga among other Indian Yoga traditions. Also, it is mainly based on contemplation and meditational techniques in order to reach *Samadhi*.

Patanjali's Yoga Sutras is the most common form of yoga in the Western world. Therefore, it will constitute the subject of the analysis. In his book *Yoga Body: The Origins of Modern Posture Practice* (2010), Mark Singleton in his book claims that it is because of the influence of European scholarship and early initiators of practical Yoga like Swami Vivekananda that Yoga Sutras of Patanjali became the foundational text for anglophone yoga practitioners in the twentieth century (2010: 26).

In this part of the chapter, I will discuss the changing role of the practice of asana (posture) throughout the history of yoga. In today's modern world, the mostly known form of yoga is postural yoga which consists of practicing asana. Postural yoga has been so much popular that yoga come to mean asana practicing in common expression although 'asana' has a limited and controversial place in yoga philosophy.

#### **3.3.1. History of the Emergence of Modern Postural Yoga**

In his historical study, Singleton makes the similar claim that despite postural yoga's enormous global appeal, there is no enough proof that asana (exception of seated postures of meditation) has ever been given this much importance in any Indian yoga tradition, even in the body oriented Hatha Yoga treatises (2010: 3).

Therefore, he asserts that asana or posture practicing yoga is a radical innovation and its equivalence had never existed in premodern yoga traditions.

Practitioners of Modern Postural Yoga predicate modern postural yoga's roots on the Hatha yoga treatises even though there is no clear analogy between them (Jain, 2015: 14, Singleton, 2010). The teachings of *hatha* yoga are rooted in the methods and philosophical foundation of the *Saiva Tantra* school of Indian thought, which was active between the thirteen century and the eighteenth (Eliade, 1958: 230, Singleton, 2010: 27). On the other hand, the corpus of hatha yoga does not “belong” to any one single of Indian tradition, it is not a whole doctrine (Singleton, 2010: 27). Godrej (2016: 3) also underlines that *hatha* yoga is not a “pure” form of yoga. It has rather significantly recent and atypical development. That is, *hatha* yoga was influenced by a different system of Indian thought.

Hatha yoga first appeared in *Gorakṣa Sataka* text around twelfth century attributed to Gorakhnath who was the founder of Kanphata yogins. These Kanphata yogins called their discipline *hatha* yoga. The word *hatha* literally means “violence”, “violent effort” in Sanskrit, and one commentary on *Gorakṣa Sataka* text explains the term *hatha*: *ha* means sun and *tha* means moon, the union of moon and sun forms yoga (Eliade, 1958: 228-229). One of the clearest descriptions of *hatha* yoga is provided by Eliade (1958: 227) with the title “praise of the body: hatha yoga,” he gave a subchapter in his book. This description implies that hatha yoga is about achieving the perfect mastery of the body. On the other hand, as Eliade emphasizes, this perfection is not about having sanitary or sport-specific objectives (1958: 228). Hatha yoga aims to transform the body into a divine body.

Three more texts in which we can find hatha yoga treatises after *Gorakṣa Sataka*. The first is the *Hathayogpradipika* around the fifteenth century, which is believed that it is based on the lost Hatha Yoga. The second one is *Gheranda Samhita*, and the third one is *Siva Samhita*, the longest among these three and

philosophically elaborated by tantric yoga and Vedanta. Eliade highlights that all these texts are influenced by Buddhist tradition. The primary subject of this text is mainly about the physiology of meditation.

In the *Gheranda Samhita* thirty-two asanas are described, *hathayogapradipika* describes fifteen, and lastly *Siva Samhita* mentions eighty-four asanas but describes only four of them. The objectives of these asanas are to destroy old age and death by strengthening health and conferring *siddhis* (complete understanding and enlightenment, or magical power, in English) (1958: 230). The aim of having a divine body is the main convergent point of hatha yoga with *Tantrism*. The same objective of divine body is the reason why hatha yoga is, to a large extent, influenced by tantrism. Eliade explains that tantrism gives so much importance to the human body that sanctity can only be attained through having a divine body. That kind of importance had never been given to the human body in India's spiritual history (1958: 227). If liberation can be reached in the spiritual world, the body must be maintained in its perfect condition as it helps to meditation. Therefore, the body is a tool to conquer death rather than the cause of pain, as it is in other systems of Indian thought.

The way hatha yoga preserves the human body from mortal decay can be explained by the subtle physiology of hatha yoga. Both Eliade (1958) and Singleton (2010) explain the details of the subtle physiology relying on the texts mentioned above; *Gorakṣa Sataka*, *Hathayogapradipika*, *Gheranda Samhita*. According to these texts, the human body consists of a web of subtle channels, *nadis*, although the number of these channels changes in different texts. For example, the *Siva Samhita* identifies 300,000 channels, whereas *Hathayogapradipika* identifies 72,000. All in all, the aim is the purification and balancing of the *nadis* (1958: 237, 2010: 29).

The core of hatha yoga is *pranayama* (breath control exercises) because *pranayama* regulates and purifies the subtle channels of the body, *nadis*, the *prana* (vital air), is pushed into the main channel, which is called *susumna* or

*brahmanadi*, by *pranayama* (White, 2012: 16). In this practice, specific bodily seals, *mudras*, cooperate with *pranayama*. At the end of this practice, the *kundalini* energy comes out (White, 2012: 16). Eliade highlights that these terms do not designate “anatomical organs and strictly physiological functions” because “subtle physiology” is built upon the foundation of an ascetic, ecstatic, and contemplative experiences and uses the same symbolic language with the traditional cosmology and ritual. These experiences are trans-physiological and represent yogic states, which require prior spiritual asceticism (1958: 233-234).

*Kundalini* is described as a serpent sleeping at the base of the spine, as the form of a goddess, and as the form of an “energy”. More specifically, *Hathayogapradipika* presents it with these terms: *kutilangi* (crooked bodied), *Kundalini*, *Bhujangi* (a she-serpent), *Sakti*, *Isvari*, *Kundali*, *Arundhati*, which are synonymous words. Eliade points out an analogy of a door and a key. He states that “the Yogi opens the door of *mukti* (deliverance) by opening *Kundalini* through *hatha yoga*” (1958: 245).

As we have seen from these discussions, *hatha yoga* is very different from today’s form of modern postural yoga. Not only had the content of *hatha yoga* changed with time. However, interestingly, the perception of *hatha yoga* among European and Indian societies changed also radically. The change in the perception of *hatha yoga* is also related to its changing aim according to time and according to the needs of society. Jain (2015), Singleton (2010), and White (2012) maintain that *hatha yoga* was marginalized and excluded by authoritative yogi figures of the time, like Swami Vivekananda, by Indian elites and Europeans in the 1890s. It is associated with backwardness because it involves in physical techniques and its relation with occult magic.

First, it is better to contemplate on the reasons why *hatha yoga* was marginalized in the early history of modern postural yoga. Singleton starts his historical scrutiny from the time of modern European colonial expansion. Yogins, at that time, turned more and more to exhibitionism as a source of income, and the



practice of yogic postural ascetics was the most prominent symbol of Indian religious backwardness. Therefore, the image of yogins practising asanas is regarded with hostility and suspicion by both the European observers and the Indian elites (Singleton, 2010:39).

Singleton points out that the reason why yogins are disliked by many is not only their strange religious practices but yogins were challenging to be disciplined. Between the fifteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, well-organised gangs of militarized yogins controlled trade routes across Northern India. These yogins were the hatha yoga practising Nath yogins. They became so strong in the eighteenth century that they started to compete with the East India Company's monopoly in politics and the economy (2010: 39). These yogins were also seen as posing a threat to British economic interests, and the term yogi meant an ascetic marauder rather than a hermit for Company personnel.

Thus, in 1773, Warren Hastings, a British colonial administrator, who was the first Governor-General in Bengal between 1772 and 1785, enforced a ban on Bengal's nomadic yogins. Instead, he started to advocate for the more sedentary form of religious practice, namely, Vaisnava forms of devotional religious practice, which were already dominant in India then. In this way, the censuring of wandering (Saiva) yogins served the interests of Vaisnava commercial elites and the British. Yogins were demilitarized and compelled to settle in by the police forces (Briggs 1938: 59 cited in Singleton, 2010: 40).

Since yogins could no longer support themselves through trade-soldiering, most were obliged to perform yogic postures and mendicate for a living. Ultimately, they were degraded by the broad segments of Hindu society and became an object of entertainment for European tourists. Singleton says that "the (*hatha*) yogin was the common pariah of colonial India" (2010: 40). Because hatha yoga was practiced to foster *siddhis* (supernatural abilities) and aimed to obtain occult power (White, 2012: 15).

All in all, Jain explains that due to hatha yoga and tantra's links with what was then regarded as strange yoga postures, severe austerity, sexual perversion, magic and popular entertainment. They were subjected to serious exclusion. Instead of these aspects of yoga tradition, the philosophical, meditational, and ethical components of yoga tradition were put forward by some modernizing movements like Transcendentalism, Theosophy, Vedanta Society, and Indian Reform Movements (Jain, 2015: 29). For Hindus, this means in order to be taken seriously and to gain respect for their religion, it was crucial to keep a distance from these kinds of practices and of yogins because these yogins were considered as the representative of religious figures of India in the European imagination.

De Michelis (2004) claims that Swami Vivekananda is the public figure of the yoga renaissance, and it is the iconic figure to create "modern yoga." Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) was a Bengali Hindu and monk who made an influential speech at the World Religions parliament in Chicago in 1893 and represented his interpretation of yoga in Hindu tradition to America. Vivekananda reinterpreted the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, and he presented them in a way that was compatible with the ideals of modernity by emphasizing the experiential dynamics of yoga philosophy rather than a doctrinal one (Jain, 2015: 32, Shaw & Kaytez, 2021: 280).

To put it more clearly, Albanese underlines that Vivekananda proposed to read "the dualistic Patanjali work in ways that were monistic" (2007: 353). Vivekananda offered "no longer the isolation of the soul from matter and desire but the presence of a divine source of bliss within an embodied individual consciousness" (Albanese, 2007: 353). Therefore, Vivekananda offers to improve life in this world, however, not in the sense of enhancing bodily pleasure but rather by enhancing psychological processes through self-control and meditation (Jain, 2015: 34). He locates the religious authority not to an external power but in the individual, in this sense, Vivekananda's interpretation of yoga philosophy is akin to enlightenment idea (Shaw & Kaytez, 2021: 281).

De Michelis points out that from Vivekananda onward, Modern Yoga's religious and philosophical foundations are frequently made up of fragile intellectual fusions. The eclectic aspects of Modern Yoga theory come from four intellectual schools, namely "Dharmic and Abrahamic religions, modern empirical science, and modern esotericism" (2008: 23). Contrary, the premodern forms of yoga firmly anchored in the conceptual framework of Dharmic religions (2008: 23).

Vivekananda's book *Raja Yoga* (1896) was based on his selective reading of the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. He rejected the physical practices of hatha yoga but conceded some components of it, namely, the subtle body of hatha yoga. He argues that we can see its healing effects on the physical body that have been proven by modern anatomy and physiology. Vivekananda's acceptance of this part of hatha yoga is for the aim of proving the scientificness of Raja Yoga as being modern is almost equal to being scientific (De Michelis, 2004: 163-168 cited in Jain, 2015: 33). On the other hand, Vivekananda does not give priority to the healing benefit of hatha yoga. As Singleton explains, according to Vivekananda, *haṭha* yoga's main objective and effect that is to lengthen men's lives and provide them optimum health is a lesser objective for someone who is seeking spiritual enlightenment. In this way, Vivekananda clearly distinguishes the spiritual practices of raja yoga from the purely physical practices of hatha yoga (Singleton, 2010: 71).

Although Vivekananda keeps some parts of the hatha yoga as a means to support his modern raja yoga doctrine, he totally refused the ends and means of hatha yoga practices. According to him, these practices were obstacle in the way of the development of mind and spirit since the entire process of hatha yoga based on the body. Vivekananda says, "one little body, with all its delusions, is enough" in response to hatha yoga's promise of long life and a strong body (Vivekananda, 1992: 225 cited in Singleton, 2010: 71).

### **3.3.2. The Return of Hatha Yoga**

After the bad reputational history of hatha yoga, which is full of humiliation and degradation by both European and Indian elites, it is interesting to observe that today, hatha is the most popular yoga form in the West. As we have seen above, the postural/ asana practice of yoga was never praised in any yoga tradition in history. It gained popularity at the beginning of the twentieth century. There is a considerable difference between what Vivekananda offered with Raja Yoga to the modern practitioners of yoga and today's predominance of hatha yogic asana among modern practitioners.

De Michelis asserts that early manifestations of Modern Yoga were essentially the result of a mutualistic relationship "between Indian nationalism, Western occultism, and neo-Vedantic philosophy. When it comes to Modern Postural Yoga, it is the result of modern physical culture systems (2008: 20). Also, Singleton (2010) bases the roots of popular postural yoga upon the colonial history of India. He claims that the reason for the predominance of asana practices is the Western physical culture that effects Indian society and leads them to establish their way of physical culture. As a result, what started in the West turned back to the West as an "esoteric" Eastern practice. This is the reason why Singleton calls it "transnational Anglophone yoga" since he thinks there is a dialogical relationship between India and the West utilizing the English language (2010: 10). There is an interactive exchange between the West and India over the physical culture and yoga.

Singleton claims that the emphasis on the body in modern times is the initiator of the circumstances which give rise to the renaissance of hatha yoga. Innovative hatha yoga style emerged in this period of European interest in the improvement of the body as a source of a national asset. Cultivation of the body was not only seen as a sign of physical development but also a sign of moral development. Singleton points out that a strong and healthy body is the necessity of the new

industrial world (2010: 83). In addition to the nationalist agenda, there was also an economic agenda underlying the emergence of physical culture in the West.

For the working-class men, in England, for example, it was essential to discipline the body. For the middle class, on the other hand, it was because of the health concern. In Germany, gymnastic exercises were designed to create new Germans. All in all, from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, the flourishing of physical culture in Europe meant more than only individual bodily improvement. It meant masculinity, nationalism, morality, and being a good Christian at the same time (2010: 82-83).

India's encounter with the Western physical culture took place via the Britain colonizers in India. Singleton introduces the most influential forms of Western gymnastics and body culture that affected Indian physical culture and perception during the physical culture movement in Europe. These western gymnastics are Ling, Sandow and YMCA, and they spread from France, Prussia and Scandinavia. English public school system gave so much importance to the games and sports in their curriculum, and the British army was also under the influence of gymnastic exercises.

Singleton points out that especially the Swedish gymnastic system established by Pehr Henrik Ling (1766-1839) directed the growth of modern physical culture in the West and postural yoga in today's modern form. Ling's training was concerned with the mind and the spirit as well as the body. There is an emphasis on the wholeness of the individual. It is also considered a natural system for health and healing.

Because of the impact of the British school system in colonial India, Ling's teaching started to spread to the Indian education system. Another advantage of Ling's system is that it did not need costly equipment (2010: 86). Ling became an example for the Indians to invent their own postural exercise in India. Asana was thought of as an Asian version of the Swedish movement cure. Swedish

Gymnastics ling set an example for the presentation of asana as ancient form of movement cure which works with individualized postures for specific diseases because, from its early origins, modern asana was viewed as a bodily hygiene and health regimen (2010: 86). Another common point of asana practice with Ling's system is that practising asana did not require any equipment, so it is very convenient.

Another turning point for the physical culture movement is the term "bodybuilding." Eugene Sandow (1867-1925), using his widely read magazine *Sandow's Magazine of Physical Culture* (1898), started a global revolution in bodybuilding (2010: 88). Singleton underlines that the term "physical culture" became well-known thanks in part to his health and exercise advice. Beginning at the turn of the century, in India, bodybuilding experienced much more popularity because of Sandow's influence. Hence, it played a significant role in influencing the "indigenous" fitness renaissance that gave rise to modern postural yoga (2010: 89). According to Joseph Alter, more so than Vivekananda, Sandow has had a significant impact on the style and method of modern yoga, specifically, modern Hatha Yoga (2004: 28).

Lastly, YMCA, Young Men's Christian Associations made an important contribution to the physical culture to attain a level of social and moral acceptability under the control of YMCA, a position it had not before held in India (Singleton, 2010: 92). Physical culture was regarded by YMCA as a means for the development of mind, body and spirit. Moreover, it helped awaken the ideals and values of Christian philosophy in Indian youths.

#### **3.4. Yoga as Indian physical culture**

All in all, the dominant idea which underlies the physical culture is the idea of "sacralization of the body" (2010: 89). Because of the physical culture's emphasis on the body, asana practices of hatha yoga found their way back. Already accepted physical functions of asanas of hatha yoga strengthen their

place by foregrounding the medical and fitness functions of asanas. According to Singleton, today's modern postural yoga is rooted in this environment of extensive experiment and study over a physical practice that would conform to Indian bodies and minds at the beginning of the twentieth century (2010: 81).

The invention of modern postural yoga resulted from a search for national physical culture to substitute for foreign ones. It is affected by the Western physical culture because India did not have a "system" or "brand" of physicalized yoga that could adequately suit its needs (2010: 94). It had to be developed considering what resources were accessible even though most of them do not match with the system of yoga such as bodybuilding, therapeutic gymnastics, and nature cure. However, the Scandinavian gymnastic, the bodybuilding system of Sandow, and the techniques of YMCA had a significant role in establishing a modern physical culture in India. In the end, what was created as a national physical culture was yoga. However, as Singleton emphasizes, it was "a hybridized product of colonial India's dialogical encounter with the Western physical culture movement" (2010: 80).

The main reason for India to catch the growing trend of physical culture in the West is due to the racial stereotypes of Indian males as weak, effeminate and morally degenerate who deserve to be dominated. This stereotype was initially produced by British colonial administrators and then interiorized by Indian elites themselves. They first adopted the British physical culture regimes in order to regenerate and strengthen Indian male bodies (2010: 22). On the background of this motivation, Indians tried to develop a nationalist physical culture through which they could resist colonial rule and challenge the racial stereotype. Accordingly, physical health and strength evolved into powerful cultural and political manifestations (2010: 96).

Moreover, Singleton claims that modern physical culture related to Social Darwinism and the eugenics movement that started to influence the Western psyche just before the turn of the nineteenth century. Therefore, in Europe, like

in colonial India, physical culture was related to the eugenics movement (2010: 97-98). In the Indian context, being a physical culture of India, yoga was viewed in certain circles as a sort of suggestion for genetic and spiritual perfection across generations.

Singleton points out an interesting controversy in Vivekananda's thought concerning physical culture. Vivekananda rejected the techniques of hatha yoga due to its emphasis on bodily strength. However, he passionately supported the Indian physical culture movement, and even prioritized the physical development of Indian youth over their mental and spiritual development. From this aspect, according to Vivekananda, the spiritual advancement of the modern Hindu critically depends on physical strengthening (2010:100). As if physical culture is something different than strengthening the body. Vivekananda's changing attitude can be interpreted as the result of the increasing popularity of the physical culture.

In certain contexts, yoga became a cover for training in violent, militant opposition. This process is how the term "yoga" came to represent an uprising. A remarkable example of how yoga can be used as a tool for independence as being physical culture and a violent resistance method at the same time is the modern yoga author Trikuva (Sri Raghayendra Rao). Trikuva travelled throughout India beginning in the 1930s while disguising himself "as an itinerant guru", learning a variety of fighting and training methods that he then taught "future freedom fighters as 'yoga'." (Singleton, 2010: 103). For seven years, Tiruka travelled to the Karnataka State pretending to be a yoga teacher. Sometimes he narrowly avoided capture while employing the techniques he had learned to get people ready for liberation. Although he appeared to be teaching yoga asanas, suryanamaskara, pranayama and dhyana, his true purpose went well beyond that. It involved preparation for physical conditioning and self-defence techniques. Therefore, in this context, "doing yoga" or "becoming a yogi" meant to prepare for guerilla warfare and be a particular symbol of violent resistance to British rule (2010: 103-104). This example of yoga's function in different context shows



its characteristic of flexibility in the sense that it can be converted from a physical culture. This indicates challenging the stereotype of weak effeminate Indian male into a tool for independence through which violent resistance can be possible.

### **3.5. Yoga as a practice of physical fitness**

Singleton claims that after the 1920s, gymnastics and physical culture started to present themselves as a modern representation of *hatha* tradition and to impact modern yoga's conceptual and practical diversity profoundly. He maintains that the success of the yoga market can be seen just by looking at the synonymous usage of the word “yoga” with posture practicing in the Western common language (2010: 113).

Sri Yogendra (1897–1989) and Swami Kuvalayananda (1883-1966) were the two primary figures who influenced yoga's transformation into a discipline for physical health and fitness (Alter, 2004: 27, Strauss, 2008: 62, Singleton, 2010: 115-116). Kuvalayananda's work *Popular Yoga Asanas* addressed those who have only a physical interest in yoga and made him the leader of yoga's physical tradition (2010: 116). Kuvalayananda was the leading advocate for the examination and approval of yoga practices by science (Strauss, 2008: 62). Yogendra was also personally attracted by yoga's ability to improve eugenic traits in both individuals and races permanently. Therefore, like Kuvalayananda, Yogendra was interested in producing reachable asana courses for the public and giving scientific support for yoga's health benefits.

In 1919 Yogendra established a yoga center in Bombay, and after him, Kuvalayananda opened another one in Bombay in 1924. Both developed yoga curricula for youth and school courses (2008: 62). According to Goldberg, Yogendra's crucial invention was “the yoga class as a social institution,” where students practised in harmony for a certain period before leaving (Goldberg, 2016: 23). Goldberg emphasizes that this was a significant break from the

conventional *guru-chela* relationship, which requires the student to live with the guru for a long time (Goldberg, 2016: 23)

Yogendra also published a large amount of material on this issue, and Singleton reflects that Yogendra, except Kuvalayananda, is the one who established the fitness regime that today prevails transnational yoga industry. In their belief, modern physical yoga would be inclusive, safe, and scientific, and its democratic practice would be characterized in opposition to the secret, shameful abilities of the wandering hatha yogis. These abilities still serve as an indication of yoga's magical potential both inside and outside of the scientific yogic attempt (2010: 117). Yogendra's work epitomizes the combination of hatha practice with modern biology.

Another important figure in the context of the physical culture of yoga, Singleton names, was Sundaram. Hatha yoga's one of the first and most popular do-it-yourself books *Yogic Physical Culture or, the Secret of Happiness* (1928), belonged to him. He defined hatha yoga as gymnastic, hygiene and bodybuilding. What is striking about Sundaram is his opinion of the adaptation of yoga to the sociopolitical situation of the time, which he thinks requires a new interpretation of asana with bodybuilding. He asserts that physical strength is a must more than brain power to make India equal to other nations. The initial purpose of yoga was spiritual practice, but he thought that modern people with sedentary occupations who were not born to be saints use yoga as a system of physical culture. This example shows the logic behind pursuing the aesthetic perfection of the body (2010: 126).

Singleton underlines the change among do-it-yourself yoga books in the West. Earlier manuals prioritize meditations and breathing techniques while trivializing the role of asana (2010: 129). Another feature of these manuals is that they symbolize an epistemological break *from* the guru-chela relationship because they rely on the self-help model and did not require a guru's presence (2010: 137).

Singleton shows that in the 1930s, harmonial gymnastics was popular among Londoner women in Britain. These gymnastics are based on breathing, stretching, and relaxation techniques and the main objectives of these gymnastics were body aesthetics, health and spiritual growth. Singleton underlines the similarities between the contents of the ‘harmonial’ gymnastics and today’s hatha yoga classes, and he states that before yoga reintroduced spiritualized gymnastics, it was already common in Britain. It was not just called yoga (2010: 152).

In short, women in the 1930s frequently engaged in similar types of physical activities with today’s postural practices; therefore, stretching had a long history of popularity in the West before the arrival of yoga. The old stretching and relaxation techniques that were already widely practiced in the West were supplanted by postural modern yoga. (2010: 154). This supports Singleton’s thesis that yoga, as a product of the national physical culture of India is mostly affected by the Western physical cultural movements and turned to the West as a “pure” Indian physical culture.

In addition to these conditions under which asana practicing yoga gained popularity through the mid-1920s, Singleton also points out the effect of visual representation of the Indian male bodies in mass circulation, like in journals or magazines. He highlights that modern postural yoga requires visual representation because it needs to be shown. On the other hand, “mental” forms of yoga, like Vivekananda’s Raja Yoga, do not require visual representation because it gives its message through written words, and it does not have anything to show with images (2010: 165). Singleton also warns that the development of the photographed yogic body created the appearance of continuity with the *hatha* tradition, but it represents an epistemological break from *hatha* tradition.

### 3.6. Concluding Remarks

The aim of this chapter is to provide a genealogical evolution of yoga, the phases it passed through. In this chapter I used secondary sources that discuss the historical and social transformation of yoga. Although the books and articles I referred to deal with the subject considering different problematization than mine, I have benefited from these sources to describe the genealogical evolution of yoga.

The objective of this chapter was to show the continuities and discontinuities through the evolution of yoga and how it is affected by the popular physical culture of the West that is dominant at the time. It has been seen that yoga has been shaped considering different agendas of power relations of the society it belongs. Modern postural yoga is based on practising asanas (postures), and it generally claims to be the heir of traditional hatha yoga because traditional hatha yoga is the only yoga practice that which makes clear emphasis on asana practice. However, I tried to show that hatha yoga has a very different context and agenda concerning today's postural yoga. Therefore, modern postural yoga cannot be the heir of hatha yoga.

The crucial point in this chapter is that *asana* and *hatha* yoga practicing were despised and underestimated for a period in history, and they were tried to be eliminated from the Indian culture. However, then with a different agenda, they were brought back and had been cast into different shapes via the discourse of science and health.

The exclusion and inclusion of asanas in the yoga tradition depends on various discursive aims and political agendas. This proves the political agenda is shaping yoga. From this angle, when we consider the promotion or the popularity of modern postural yoga today with the discourse of health and fitness as a care of the self, we should think there might be political agenda behind such mentality.

Foucault states that the technologies of the self are the product of the society to which they belong, and they can be used as a tool for governmentality. In the context of Modern Postural Yoga, when we consider it a technology of self, it suits the schema Foucault draws. That is, it is linked with technologies of power/domination. This affiliation explains why yoga is promoted today and why there is an increasing tendency toward practicing modern postural yoga.

## CHAPTER 4

### A GENEALOGICAL VIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF YOGA AND THE RELEVANCE OF FOUCAULT'S THEORY OF SUBJECT

Foucault did not study modern technologies of the self. He made a historical study on ancient time ethics and early Christian technologies of the self. These studies showed the continuities and discontinuities between them and how the technologies of the self from ancient times transformed into techniques toward the formation of the truth concerning the self in Christianity, which was not concerned with certain reality as in ancient times' ethics (Foucault, 2016: 26-27). Foucault made a kind of comparative study in this respect. Through this comparison, he showed how technologies of the self in different times and cultures were applied and to what extent these technologies of the self led to a subjectivation. In ancient times ethics, the self has "to be constituted through the force of truth" (gnomic self), which is taught by "the master's discourse" through technologies of the self. Contrary to this, Christian technologies of the self require one to discover what is hidden in the self to produce his own truth (2016: 37). In the end, he concludes that there is a *techne* of the self in Christianity and there is a *techne* of life for 'how to live?' in ancient times ethics.

In this respect, I will evaluate yoga according to the points it converges with Christian technologies of the self and with technologies of the self in ancient time ethics. I will try to answer the question of whether modern postural yoga, in which classical yoga evolved today, can be thought of as a technology of the self that produces a subjectivation ultimately.

In this chapter, I will discuss whether modern postural yoga can be thought of as a technology of the self. In order to analyze this, I will compare the main features

of how Foucault defines ethics which is a relation to the self, and its examples in ancient time ethics and early Christianity.

At first glance, the discipline of yoga in common sense connotations, which means without making any difference to what kind of yoga is meant, can suit Foucault's definition of the technologies of the self . It implies being an operation on the body, soul, thoughts, and conducts. Its aims to transform the self to reach happiness, wisdom, perfection or immortality etc.

However, yoga has never implied one homogenized form. It has always been heterogenous and context-sensitive in its premodern history, as discussed in the third chapter. Therefore, in the scope of this thesis, I will limit my analyses to Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga as they are predominant forms of yoga worldwide. Only after specifying what kind of yoga may be seen as a technology of the self can we examine whether it is a technology of the self or not in Foucault's sense.

Foucault's study of technologies of the self is part of his broader study of the hermeneutics of the self. He uses the technologies of the self to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western culture. Thus, technologies of the self are the means for the mode of subjectivation -establishing the relationship between subject and truth.

#### **4.1. The Theme of Spirituality and Salvation**

In this section, the presence of the theme of spirituality and salvation will be examined in Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga. Since this theme does also exist in Christian technologies of the self the similarities between Christian technologies of the self and Classical Yoga will be compared.

#### 4.1.1. The theme of Spirituality and Salvation in Classical Yoga

In Classical Yoga there is the aim of salvation through an asceticism and techniques of meditation (Eliade, 1958: 7). In other terms, yoga aims to “unify” “the human soul with God” and it is achieved by disinterestedness to the profane world (1958: 5). Similar to other religions, the yogins have to renounce the worldly life, and with the direction of their guru, they have to work diligently to go beyond the human conditions. This practice means to dissociate from possessions and ambitions. Eliade considers it an effort to withdraw from this world. In other words, it is a kind of “dying to this life” in order to attain “another mode of being” a kind of “rebirth” (1958: 5). Yogins regard this as liberation.

Here, I have to note that God in Classical Yoga has not the same meaning as in divine religions. It is not an omnipotent creator God as Patanjali defined. The name of this God is *Isvara*, and it is mainly “a God of yogins” since his only role is to accelerate the process of liberation for the ones “who have already chosen the path of yoga. Therefore, *Isvara* is “an archetype of the yogin- a macro-yogin” and he is an object of concentration for yogins (1958: 75). On the other hand, the yogins can attain liberation by just applying the technique of yoga without the help of *Isvara* (1958: 76)

Here, salvation is connected to suffering. Suffering is the condition for the desire for salvation. According to the Indian philosophy:

Man is not alone in suffering; pain is a cosmic necessity, an ontological modality to which every "form" that manifests itself as such is condemned. Whether one be a god or a tiny insect, the mere fact of existing in time, of having duration, implies pain” Unlike the gods and other living beings, man possesses the capability of passing beyond his condition and thus abolishing suffering (Eliade, 1958: 12).

In this respect, the “ignorance of the true nature of ‘Spirit’” is the cause of suffering. This ignorance is because of confusing human’s psychomental



qualities like senses, feelings, thoughts, and desires, which belong to nature/Substance (*prakriti*) with “the eternal and autonomous” Spirit, the true Self (1958: 14). Anything that becomes, evolves, or disappears is not part of the realm of being which Spirit is (1958: 16). They are not sacred. Spirit is an eternal reality, therefore, it is distinct from human’s psychomental activities. Hence, in order to emancipate from suffering, one has to differentiate Spirit from nature/substance (*prakriti*).

To summarize, in the philosophy of Classical Yoga there is an aim of salvation. This salvation is in response to suffering due to the ignorance of Spirit; in other words, confusing the eternal Spirit, the Self, with the temporary nature/Substance. In this sense, yogins have to withdraw from this profane worldly life and go beyond the human condition to attain another mode of being. Attaining another mode of being means salvation or liberation for yogins. The way Classical Yoga proposes to reach salvation is the practice of contemplation, the techniques of meditation.

Regarding that, there is an aim of attaining another mode of being, an aim of transformation in Classical Yoga. This objection can be thought of as a technology of the self since it is very parallel to early Christian technologies of the self. The latter principles aim for salvation, described as the technology of the self. Foucault explains two technologies of the self in early Christianity, as mentioned in the second chapter. For him, these technologies of the self create different kinds of relations between truth and subject, which is the purpose of technologies of the self. As Foucault shows, technologies of the self used in ancient times create a relation with the “truth in general,” while Christian technologies of the self establish a relation to “one’s own truth.” That is why Foucault thinks there is “a subjectivation, in one sense” (Foucault, 2014: 117).

#### **4.1.2. Comparing Classical Yoga with the technologies of the self in early Christianity**

Frederic Gros (2011), while locating the course context of Foucault's lectures at the College de France in 1984 under the title of *The Courage of Truth*, highlights that,

[a]ccording to Foucault, the originality of Christianity is precisely its having blended the Platonic aim of "another world (*autre monde*)" and the Cynic demand for an "other life (*vie autre*)": faith and hope in a heavenly homeland will have to be authenticated by an existence which transgresses temporal customs (Gros, 2011: 355).

Gros highlights that Foucault interprets this longing for other life is at the base of the criticism of the existing world (2011: 354). Considering that one of the three principles of Foucault's morality is "the refusal to accept what is proposed to us as self-evident," this critic of the existing world in Christianity and Cynics can be why Foucault finds this criticism attractive (2016: 127).

In this study, the reason for comparing Classical Yoga with the technologies of the self in early Christianity is that these two traditions are similar in terms of their aim of salvation through the rejection of worldly life. Even though their techniques of renouncing the profane world differ, they both reflect Foucault's moral principle of refusal. It is a gesture to change the present reality.

Foucault states that "Christianity belongs to the salvation religions" (1988: 40). Salvation means the "purification of the soul" in the Christian context. Foucault clarifies that, to reach salvation and attain the truth of the text in Christianity, one must attain a specific mode of existence by pursuing a certain way of life (2014: 127). Here, the theme of a specific mode of existence requires a particular way of life. It is similar to the aim of Classical Yoga because the yogins who want to attain liberation have to attain a specific mode of being through meditation.

In Christian ascetics, self-purification requires disclosure of the self, and there were two leading technologies of the self in early Christianity: *exomologesis* and *exagoreusis*. These are mentioned in the third chapter in detail, here, I will mention only *exagoreusis* since it has specific similar points to the philosophy of Classical Yoga. Exagoreusis is about self-examination, and it has two main principles: obedience and contemplation. The principle of obedience contradicts Classical Yoga since in yoga, there is the aim of self-mastery, while the Christian ascetics lacks this objective. In that, the monk “must keep the spirit of obedience as a permanent sacrifice of the complete control of behaviour by the master” (Foucault, 1988: 45).

The principle of contemplation in Christian ascetics focuses on thoughts, images, wishes, and desires “that the Latin Fathers called the *cogitations*, the *logismoi* this constantly moving reality of thought” (Foucault, 2014: 164). Contemplation aims to decide whether these thoughts bear illusions or not concerning where they really come from. The concern for differentiation of illusion is similar to Classical Yoga’s aim of separating human psychomental activities from the eternal Spirit. There is an aim of reaching the sacred one in both.

Another critical part of this contemplation is its requirement of permanent verbalization of thought to a master. Hence, self-renunciation is achieved by the permanent verbalization of thoughts and total obedience to a master. Of course, verbalization of thoughts and the renunciation of one’s autonomous will are not the case in the techniques of meditation of Classical Yoga. However, the common point in both techniques of meditation of Classical Yoga and techniques of disclosure of the self in Christianity is to “cease the constant flux of thought” and to eliminate the illusions of profane affairs according to their own conceptualization.

### 4.1.3. The Theme of Spirituality in Modern Postural Yoga

The loss of the theme of spirituality and salvation in modern yoga started with Swami Vivekananda who is the public figure of the yoga renaissance and creator of modern yoga (De Michelis, 2004). Vivekananda reinterpreted Patanjali's Yoga Sutras and made the philosophy of yoga compatible with the ideals of modernity. He put the experiential dynamics of yoga philosophy forward rather than its doctrinal side (Jain, 2015: 32, Shaw & Kaytez, 2021: 280).

As Albanese emphasizes, Vivekananda converts Patanjali's dualistic philosophy, which separates Spirit and substance, soul versus matter/ desire, into a monistic philosophy where the source of divinity is in the individual consciousness (2007: 353). This move indicates a major change in the spiritual dynamics of yoga philosophy because, in this logic, the source of religious authority does not belong to an external power anymore but belongs to the individual consciousness (Shaw & Kaytez, 2021: 281). To give authority to the individual accords with enlightenment ideas. Because of the individual's appropriation of the religious authority, De Michelis argues that Modern Yoga has experienced discernible 'secularization' processes (2008: 24).

With these changes, Vivekananda offers to improve life in this world by enhancing the psychological process through self-control and meditation techniques (Jain, 2015: 34). That is to say, this world is not something to be rejected. This can be interpreted as a radical change since in the philosophy of Classic Yoga, there are dualities between Spirit and nature (substance, *Prakriti*) and between the profane and sacred world. It must be noted that the term "sacred world" is not implied a kind of "afterworld" as in Abrahamic religions, of course, but the notion that the present world we are in is something that can be rejected, that can be withdrawn and seeking for another mode of existence is the common point in both Classical Yoga and divine religions.

About the Reformation era in Christianity, Gros states that “the meaning of the break represented by Luther and the Reformation consists in refusing to make access to the other world depend on another life: henceforth one will be able to ensure one’s salvation by fulfilling one’s daily task, one’s immanent vocation” (2011: 355). Here, we can see that with the effect of enlightenment, both Christianity and yoga philosophies evolved in the same direction by losing their aim of salvation and their feature of rejecting this world.

In parallel to Modern Yoga's philosophy of attachment to this world, there is another point it diverges from the philosophy of Classical Yoga. It can be seen from the conducted studies that Modern Postural Yoga provides 'socialization.' In certain situations, it is used to develop a sense of connection to one’s community. Bird made an ethnographic study on “the health and wellbeing practices of urban middle class households in Providence County, Rhode Island” (2021: 395). He concludes, in addition, that Yoga is "bodywork as individualized self-care" it also helps to increase one's capacity for sociality (2021: 405-407). For some people, yoga classes help to ease their loneliness; for some, it is "quality time together" (2021: 403-404). The result of Bird's study shows that practicing Yoga contributes to "domestic intimacy and togetherness" by setting bounds between work and home life and bringing any negative energy to a home.

Modern Postural Yoga's other way of providing an attachment to the social world is through yoga festivals and retreats. These yoga festivals and retreats bring many yoga practitioners together and offer them a friendly environment in which they share common interests. Patterson et al. evaluate Modern Postural Yoga as a leisure activity since it provides people with an escape from the monotonous responsibilities of life and emotional and social advantages (2016: 296). The study accepts the personal and introspective nature of Yoga and focuses on the social world of Modern Postural Yoga in yoga communities. They found out that participation in Modern Postural Yoga events like festivals, retreats, and conferences helps those who want to have a career in Modern

Postural Yoga to build a network providing a related social circle (2016: 310). The study underlines that Modern Postural Yoga does not require isolation or solitude from society but supports an active social life. Even the name of the journal where this study is published, *Leisure Studies* shows how Modern Postural Yoga deviates from Classical Yoga regarding its material and worldly aims.

Another study on the socialization effect of Modern Postural Yoga is made by Patel et al. (2011). Patel et al. did research on older adults who live in "the independent living center" and "attend a weekly Iyengar yoga session at a local retirement community" (2011: 153). The study aimed to examine the perceptions and effects of participation in Iyengar Yoga class among older adults. They found out that in addition to many physical and mental health benefits of Yoga, such as improving physical mobility, decreasing the need for medicine, and relieving stress, the older yoga practitioners reported that attending yoga classes motivated them to become more social. Older yoga practitioners said they interact with other adults and started to participate in other activities, thanks to yoga classes.

Research in medicine, specifically the branch of disability and rehabilitation, shows that people with traumatic brain injury can get the help of Yoga to eliminate the effects of brain damage from their lives (Donnelly, Goldberg, & Fournier, 2018). Because after traumatic brain injury, people suffer from negative emotions and stress that they have difficulty continuing their social lives. Yoga, in this study, is used as a "holistic therapy involving physical movement, breathing exercises, meditation practices, and moral principles" (2018: 2483). In conclusion, Yoga can help these people to participate in their community again and increase their sense of belonging. This conclusion has been reached in similar contexts, and one of the examples is a study on people with disability (Regan et al. 2022).

As it is seen from these researches, Modern Yoga, in general, and Modern Postural Yoga in the scope of this thesis, does not require withdrawal from social relations like family or community as in Classical Yoga. On the contrary, Modern Postural Yoga is promoted as a tool to support social relations. Also, it helps increase social integration and the sense of community for older people who suffer from loneliness, people who experienced traumatized injuries and lost track of their social life, for the ones who want to have a career in Yoga, or for anyone who wants to experience its autonomous individuality and sociality together. These studies demonstrate this situation. Practicing Modern Postural Yoga to increase one's capacity for socialization distinctly diverges from Classical Yoga's philosophy of ascetics, which requires one to distance oneself from societal relations.

Moreover, Modern Yoga's aim of improving life in this world, although it does not mean to attribute negative meaning to death, leads Modern Postural Yoga to cling to this world. Relatedly, Sengupta (2021) criticizes Modern Postural Yoga's body-centric approach, underlines that it focuses on improving this life too much, and disregards Yoga's principle of gracefully embracing death. He elaborates on this criticism concerning the medical sciences' approach toward practicing Yoga as a palliative intervention. However, Yoga's soteriological aim would provide both a good life and a 'good' death.

Also, the existence of research interests in yoga in the medical area indicates another point that can be discussed more clearly by referring to McGushin's book *Foucault's Askesis: An introduction to philosophical area* (2007). McGushin comments that according to Foucault, two general models of the relationship between the subject and the truth emerged from the history of philosophy. The first is the spirituality model and the second is the knowledge model of the subject and truth relation (2007: xxii). The emergence of the knowledge model caused the 'despiritualization' of philosophy that McGushin discusses as the result of modern forms of power and knowledge (2007: xxii).

Within the context of the evolution of yoga, we can see the same transformation toward despiritualization in the sense that yoga is not an ascetic, spiritual practice as in Classical Yoga.

That is, the growing production of scientific knowledge of the modern form of yoga in the medical area illustrates the knowledge-based model in the subject's relation to the truth. The proven benefits of yoga by the scientific knowledge are the truths that a subject wants to attain.

## **4.2. The Theme of Medicalization as Care of the Self**

The medical treatment of the body comes to be seen as care of the self. Modern Postural Yoga became a medical tool to care the self and it is promoted as a medical treatment. This theme did also exist in technologies of the self in ancient time ethics. Therefore I will provide the account of both Modern Postural Yoga and Ancient time technologies of the self in terms of the topic of medicalization

### **4.2.1. Modern Postural Yoga: Medicalization as Care of the Self**

Modern Postural Yoga is based on asana practices, considered the most popular form of yoga today. Asana means posture. It represents the third limb of yoga where the particularly yogic practice starts because asana is the initial action to transcendence “the human condition” (Eliade, 1958: 54). In Patanjali’s Yoga Sutras, asana is defined as “stable and agreeable.” Patanjali does not give a detailed description of asana since it is not learned from a description but from a guru (1958: 53).

Asana stops the body’s mobility in the sense that it is a “refusal to move” “by reducing the infinity of possible positions to a single archetypal, iconographic posture” (1958: 55). An asana is considered perfect if there is no longer an effort to maintain it since it means a “complete suspension of attention to the presence of one’s own body” so that “the mind transformed into infinity” (1958: 53).



Practicing asana is not an end in itself in Classical Yoga. It has a preliminary role in attaining another mode of existence by overcoming human conditions. As Larson emphasizes, the first five limbs of yoga are “external limbs,” and they are mostly “preparatory exercises” (2012: 79). As it has been mentioned above, yoga aims to unify the human soul with “God” by going beyond the human conditions. This state is reached in the final limb of yoga which is *Samadhi*, stasis, and after reaching *Samadhi*, liberation is achieved (Eliade, 1958: 94).

When it comes to Modern Postural Yoga, it seems that practicing asana is an end in itself. This reflects Rose’s argument that ethical practices prioritize working on one’s body as a fundamental place for self-reflection. Self-reflection means, here, the reconstruction of the self, and Rose calls this type of self-construction with the emphasis on the body in terms of both bodily and mental health as “somatic individuality” (2001: 14). Despite the popularity of postural yoga today, posture practice has never been given this much importance in any yoga tradition. Even Hatha Yoga treatises, the most body-oriented yoga type, put this much emphasis on asana (White, 2012: 3).

Practitioners of modern postural yoga establish the legitimacy of Modern Postural Yoga Hatha Yoga tradition, but many scholars claim that there is no clear link between Modern Postural Yoga and Hatha Yoga. Hatha Yoga is not even a “pure” form of yoga. It is influenced by different yoga schools, especially from *tantrism* (Singleton, 2010: 27, White, 2012: 14, Jain, 2015: 14, Godrej, 2017: 3). As it is discussed in the third chapter, Hatha Yoga involves different aims and means which Modern Postural Yoga does not give credits like occult magic, or some tantric elements (White, 2012: 18).

There is a selective appropriation in terms of what should be taken as traditional elements which provide credits to the authority of Modern Postural Yoga, and in terms of what should not be taken as backward beliefs, which damages the reliability of Modern Postural Yoga. Therefore, while Modern Postural Yoga keeps Hatha Yoga’s emphasis on asanas it does not include the aim of occult

magic of Hatha Yoga. The most appealing side of Hatha Yoga is its emphasis on the body, which parallels the physical culture in the West. The purpose of Hatha Yoga is the perfect mastery of the body. More specifically, it aims to have a “divine body” (Eliade, 1958: 227).

In Classical Yoga, the body is the cause of suffering. In Hatha Yoga, on the other hand, it is a tool to conquer death through its subtle physiology. This side of Hatha Yoga is very parallel to Vivekananda’s interpretation of Patanjali’s Yoga Sutras in which he proposes a nondualistic reading of yoga philosophy that no longer separates the soul from substance and proposes to improve life in this world. If there is no longer the body's submission to the soul and liberation must be attained in this world, the body must be protected in its best condition since it helps to meditate and it helps to liberate in this world.

Even though Vivekananda rejects the physical practices of Hatha he keeps the subtle body of Hatha Yoga since the healing effects of it have been proven by modern anatomy. Accordingly, Postural yoga is practised as a body-enhancing, body-maintenance regime (Jain, 2015: 68-69). In addition, it helps practitioners to realize themselves through physical and psychological healing advancements (2015: 109). Therefore, Modern Postural Yoga is mainly promoted by its effects on physical and psychological health rather than the aim of attaining another mode of being. Rose’s discussion on medicine can be explanatory for the dimensions of the changing perception towards the understanding of yoga:

Medicine was linked to the secularization of the ethical regimes through which individuals come to describe themselves in the languages of health and illness, to question themselves in terms of norms of normality and pathology, to take themselves and their mortal existence as circumscribing their values (2006: 49).

The predominance of medicine through health and wellness discourse explains why modern postural yoga's physical and mental health benefits are highlighted and promoted.

The medicalization and sacralization of the body in Modern Postural Yoga partly indicate taking the place of spirituality in Classical Yoga. Another quotation from Rose will be very helpful to demonstrate how the medicine took place of the moral codes and becomes the new ethics since it mediates the relationship of the self to the self:

At a time when we have lost faith in the sanctity of moral codes, have no wish to be bound by legal imperatives and are forced to rationalize our fate in terms of our choices, the new ontology of ourselves constituted by medicine appears to offer us a rational, secular and corporeal solution to the problem of how we should live our lives for the best; how we might make the best of our life by adjusting it to our truth, by letting medicine enlighten our decisions as to live it (2006: 69).

I want to argue that the medicalization of yoga can be thought of together with the elimination of the spiritual dynamics of Classical Yoga. These practices can be interdependent because the emphasis on the body results from the monistic approach toward the world. This relation can be due to Vivekananda's monistic reinterpretation of the dualistic Patanjali's Yoga Sutras. That is, by refusing the separation of soul/ Spirit and Substance/ matter/ nature, and the attainment of another mode of existing in another world, Modern Yoga emphasizes the embodied individual consciousness and this world.

This shift of emphasis in Modern Yoga leads to a change in the priorities of people's ethical values.

#### **4.2.2. Comparing Modern Postural Yoga with Ancient Time Ethics:**

The common point between Modern Postural Yoga and ancient time technologies of the self is their emphasis on the medical care of the body. Both of these traditions emphasize the medical care of the body and the soul. Modern Postural Yoga can be easily related to maintaining physical health at the individual level because it is based on physical practice (Strauss, 2008: 71).

In Greko-Roman ethics, there are two principles of technologies of the self: *epistemelsthai sautou* “the care of the self,” and *gnothi sauton* ‘know yourself’. The care of the self was the main aim, and “knowing yourself” was necessary for a better care of the self. The care of the self is closely related to medical care (Foucault, 1986: 54). There is significant attention to the body in Greko-Roman ethics. Seneca's letters include several examples of this concern with health, regimen, maladies, and other issues that can arise between the body and the spirit (1986: 57).

Foucault underlines that, theoretically, Greek culture is soul-oriented, but the concern of the body plays an essential part in their meaning of self-cultivation. The principle of taking care of the self was based on the pedagogical model in Plato's time, but the medical model takes the place of the pedagogical model. “Permanent medical care is one of the central features of the care of the self. One must become the doctor of oneself” (1988: 31).

The Stoics do not give so much importance to the body. On the other hand, Marcus Aurelius gives detailed accounts of his bodily experiences in his letter to Fronto (1988: 29). For example, he mentions his illness and how he deals with it, in addition to his diet of eating. Greeks emphasize what they eat to be healthy. These accounts elaborately describe the relationship between food and “the climate, seasons, the humidity or dryness of the air and the dryness of the food, and so on” (Foucault, 1997: 259). Physical exercises and gymnastics are suggested. Epictetus recommends walking in the streets every morning (1997: 270).

The care of the body is not only compulsory for young people for their preparation for political life in their adult life as in Plato's time, but for everyone since “it is a way of living” (1988: 31). It is a permanent care of the self throughout one's whole life and it is no longer for concern for political life it is better to give up politics to take care of the self. As Epicureans believe, “it is never too late to occupy oneself with oneself” (1988: 27). Foucault differentiates

the goal of preparation for adult life, or “for another life”, from the care of the self “throughout life” since the latter implies a “certain achievement of life” which can be completed “at the moment just prior to death” (1988: 31).

It must be noted that the notion of the “complete achievement of life” implies very worldly aims. It does not search for another life or another time. It specifically aims for the achievement of “this” life. The aim of Greko-Roman ethics is not the afterlife or another life; it is all about this life. The problem of Greko-Roman ethics is, in Foucault’s own words, “which *techne* do I have to use in order to live well as I ought to live?”, “it was the *techne* of life, the *techne tou biou*, how to live” (1997: 260).

What can be noticed here in the aim of both Greko-Roman ethics and Modern Postural Yoga is the concern for the enhancement of the body and the soul to have a better existence in this life. Modern Postural Yoga is mainly promoted by its being beneficial for bodily and mental health (Brown, 2022; Erkmen, 2021; Godrej, 2016; Bailey, Rice, Gueltari & Gillet, 2021; Shaw & Kaytaz, 2021; Ben Hamed, 2021; Sengupta, 2021; Markula, 2014). It gains legitimacy through scientific knowledge, as Vivekananda did in his time to promote his Raja Yoga. Today, Modern Postural Yoga owes its popularity to its physical and mental benefits.

Goldberg and Singleton (2014) discuss that the modern perspective of Yoga depends on the medicalization of Yoga. They assert that “early modern yoga gurus” pioneered the field setting in the medical area by presenting the asanas and pranayamas, breathing techniques, to cure diseases (2014: 3). There are examples among the gurus who suffered from serious illnesses started Yoga to cure themselves rather than to become enlightened. Iyengar is one of these gurus, and he suffered from many illnesses. In his childhood, Iyengar had tuberculosis, malaria, and typhoid; being malnourished, he was feeble (Newcombe, 2014: 154, Smith & White, 2014: 124). Yoga made him stronger and healthy and gave him a long life.

The emphasis on the physical and mental health benefits of Yoga has been increasing parallel to the growing number of researches about Yoga in the medical area. Regular yoga classes' effects on psychiatric disorders like schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, Mild Cognitive Impairment, substance use disorders (Bhargav et al., 2021), and mental disorders in general (Varambally & Gangadhar, 2016) have been found promising. Moreover, the effects of 12 weeks of regular yoga classes on somatoform disorders that cause bodily pain without apparent clinical signs or identifiable origin are tested, and positive results are obtained in terms of decreasing pain severity and anxiety and increasing quality of sleep and quality of life (Sutar et al., 2016). In these kinds of studies, Yoga is considered an intervention tool and presented as if prescription. Practicing Yoga is explicitly measured in terms of frequency, duration, and regularity. In these studies, Yoga adapts to the medical language.

Recently emerged research attention is on the effect of Yoga on eating disorders (Cook-Cotton et al., 2020). Eating disorders are complicated mental disorders that disturb the patient's "food and body-related attitude, cognitions, and behaviors" (Perey & Cook-Cotton, 2020, 316). In particular, "yoga offers the experience of being with and in the body," and this experience helps to conceive the body as a "subjective site" to which the Self can attribute meaning and function (2020: 325). Hence, Yoga can help to generate "a positive body image and well-being by cultivating positive embodiment" (2020: 315). It must be underlined that Yoga in these studies is defined as "active yoga." Therefore, what is referred to as "active yoga" in these medical studies can be categorized as Modern Postural Yoga.

There are also studies about psychological traumas, like being the victim of abuse or sexual violence. Yoga can help to cope with the effects of traumas. Moreover, a study conducted on people who are in search of spirituality in their lives shows that one of the reasons for turning to spiritual experiences such as yoga, Buddhism, meditation, and reiki, is because they experience psychological

traumas like losing their loved ones, being exposed to domestic violence in their childhood, having a severe illness. (Cengiz et al., 2021, 129-149).

On the other hand, there is a claim in the critical literature that there is not enough evidence to prove unequivocally yoga's benefits on health, especially, considering its risks of accidents (Shaw & Kaytaz, 2021: 286). Instead, the scientific construction of yoga as a medical practice promotes the belief that yoga is good for overall health.

### **4.3. The Theme of Guru/Chela Relationship**

In this section, the theme of guru/chela relationship will be discussed over the comparison between Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga. The guru/chela relationship is crucial in Classical Yoga and it does not exist in Modern Postural Yoga. This relationship is significant in both ancient and Christian technologies of the self, therefore, I will elaborate on the master/disciple relationship in these ethics.

#### **4.3.1. Comparing the guru/chela relationship in Classical Yoga with Modern Postural Yoga's class system of teaching**

It can be said that for the dissemination of Modern Postural Yoga, the absence of the obligation to have a guru in order to practice yoga is an important dimension. Yoga classes take the place of the guru-chela relationship. In Classical Yoga, those who want to learn yoga and be yogis have been initiated yoga by a guru because "yoga was often secretive and exclusive" (Goldberg & Singleton, 2014: 4). One has to be a disciple of a guru and undergo extensive training in which he devoid a considerable part of his life. The authority of the guru is a critical aspect of the training and a disciple must obey the master.

The text of *Siva Samhita*, written around the 14th century CE, where we can find hatha yoga treatises, explains the guru and the chela relationship with the following words:

If it comes from a guru's mouth wisdom is potent. If it does not, it is barren and impotent and brings great suffering. He who zealously makes his guru happy and practices his teachings quickly gains the reward of those teachings. The guru is the father, the guru is the mother, the guru is god. (In this) there is no doubt. For this reason, disciples serve him with their actions, thoughts and words. Everything that is good for the self is obtained through the grace of the guru, so the guru is to be served constantly or else no good will happen (Mallinson & Singleton, 2017: 68).

As it is seen from this quotation, the guru is attributed great importance and his role implies more than a master who teaches a student. However, he is in the very position of the ontological condition of the student by being compared to the father, the mother, and god. Moreover, the knowledge that comes from him is effective. Otherwise, it is useless, even dangerous. In this quote, the service to the guru is offered as an imperative for the embodiment of knowledge by the side of the student.

In the exact text, *Siva Samhita*, the success of the student is depended upon the withdrawal from worldly attachments, devotion to one's guru, and having faith (2017: 68). In *Hathapradipika*, written around the 15th century CE, which is another text we can find hatha yoga treatises, there is a passage about "initiation," and it says "the fool who wishes to master yoga otherwise, without the process of yoga initiation (*yogadikṣa*) (and) without a guru, does not obtain success, even after billions of aeons" (2017: 69). Here again, we see the indispensability of the guru to internalize the teaching of yoga successfully. All in all, the guru is an essential part of the training of a yogi in the premodern time since the absence of the guru was seen as a threat.

On the other hand, today, the most dominant forms of learning yoga are enrolling in a yoga class or learning through materials alone. Students of yoga classes do not have to devote their life to the philosophy of yoga. Sri Yogendra (1897-



1989) is the inventor of “the yoga class as a social institution” where students practice yoga for a particular time (Goldberg, 2016: 23). According to Goldberg, this is a significant break from the traditional guru-chela relationship. Swami Kuvalayananda (1883-1966) is another crucial figure who contributes to the promotion of yoga as a discipline for physical health and fitness (Alter, 2004: 27, Singleton, 2010: 115-116, Strauss, 2008: 62). Both Yogendra and Kuvalayananda worked for the inclusive, scientific, and democratic practice of yoga in opposition to the secret abilities of the wandering Hatha yogis (Singleton, 2010: 117). That is, the relationship between the guru and the chela is exclusive in Classical Yoga because it is private. On the other hand, the class/studio system of teaching yoga, which means the absence of a guru, makes Modern Postural Yoga public and inclusive.

The absence of the guru in a yoga training class required the institutionalization of yoga because of the need to check the quality of the given training (Newcombe, 2014: 157). B. K. S. Iyengar is one of the key figures in the spread of yoga in Britain and Newcombe argues that Iyengar’s way of institutionalising his charisma as a guru helped his system of yoga’s popularization throughout the world. Newcombe analyzes the reports of the requirements of the Inner London Educational Authority (ILEA), which was an “ad hoc local education authority for the city of London” (ILEA) for the acceptance of Iyengar’s teaching into its body. ILEA wanted Iyengar to train yoga teachers and conditioned two things: first, only the physical aspects of yoga will be taught, and there will be no discussion on religion or spirituality. Second, safety and avoiding injuries will be the utmost priority. These conditions represent the sensitive and disputable sides of yoga, whether yoga is a religious or spiritual activity.

One of the essential dynamics of the institutionalization of yoga is creating a syllabus that leads to standardization. Another effect of the institutionalization of yoga is the sanitization of the guru-student relationship, which prevents “the dynamic, unpredictable, transformative and possibly abusive” guru-chela relationship (Newcombe, 2014: 163). That also means a de-personalization of

the guru-chela relationship. On the other hand, what Foucault is after for “the conditions and indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject” (Brion & Harcourt, 2014: 293). It is certain that within the very structured guru/ student relationship of the studio/class-based system of Modern Postural Yoga, it is hard to find those indefinite possibilities due to the standardization of the course syllabus without respecting the student’s needs, the specific time restrains for those possibilities to be actualized.

It should also be noted that unlike in the Classical Yoga system, the teacher in the studio/class setting of Modern Postural Yoga cannot be referred to as a guru. Because of the guru-chela relationship in Classical Yoga, the chela withdraws from the outside world and gives up his social and family life. In contrast to classical yoga, modern postural yoga allows practitioners to become certified yoga teachers after completing two or five hundred hours of training, depending on the level they desire to teach. In this way, one can be a yoga teacher in her/his free time without a need to withdraw from her/ his social life or mundane affairs. There is a radical change in this sense. It reflects the logic of the modernized interpretation of yoga in which there is the aim of improvement of life in this world.

Another learning model in the absence of the guru/ chela relationship is the self-help model, based on learning through printed materials like pamphlets, magazines, and books. As examples of influential printed materials, Yogendra's books *Yoga Asanas Simplified* (1928), *Yoga Personal Hygiene* (1931), and Kavalayananda's *Popular Yoga Asanas* (1931) can be given (Singleton, 2010: 116-117). In addition, in 1936, the establishment of the Divine Life Society as a spiritual institution by Swami Sivananda in Rishikesh led to the institutionalization of Yoga. It was created as an official organization (Strauss, 2008: 50). One of the primary aims of the Divine Life Society was to produce and disseminate textual publication, as well as other media products like "phonograph records, audiocassettes, photographs of Sivananda, and videocassettes" (2008: 52).

These publications were all translated into English. Moreover, it helped the dissemination of Yoga. As a striking example of the dissemination of yoga through published materials, Strauss mentions a German man, Boris Sacharow, who became a "disciple by mail" in the 1940s. Boris Sacharow never became the disciple of Sivananda in person but through following Sivenanda's publications. In the end, he was recognized as a yoga master. Sacharow opened the first yoga school in Germany, and it is regarded as one of the driving causes behind the growth of "professional yoga instruction in Europe" (2008: 53). Being a master of Yoga without having a guru, in this example, illustrates well the epistemological break from premodern yoga traditions.

It can be seen from the learning models in the absence of the guru/chela relationship, which are studio/class-based learning systems and self-help models, that they provide more public access to Yoga. The absence of a guru/chela relationship in Modern Postural Yoga makes yoga available for everyone since it does not require an exclusive guru/chela relationship or devotion to one's life to learn yoga philosophy by withdrawing from worldly life. On the contrary, anyone who wants to practice yoga can learn yoga by herself/himself. In this way, Yoga became more democratic as Yogendra and Kuvalayananda aimed (Singleton, 2010: 117) because the relationship between a guru and a chela is private and exclusive in Classical Yoga and traditional Hatha Yoga.

Even though the published materials provide more public access to yoga, it comes with a cost of structuration and standardization. In this way, it loses its individualizing character. That is, in the exclusive guru/chela relation, the student's training is customized according to the needs and features of the student. However, in the class system of training or learning through the yoga manuals, there is no chance to adjust the content of the course according to the needs of different individuals. Of course, as an individual, one has a chance to modify the poses according to one's need, but it is different from the exclusive relationship one has with his guru.

In addition to the loss of the authoritative guru figure in Modern Postural Yoga, the image of the ‘entrepreneurial’ yoga teacher emerged. Yoga teachers have to compete with each other to attract a large number of students (Goldberg & Singleton, 2014: 3). A particular study on yoga teachers in Ankara, Turkey, shows how competitive the yoga training sector is (Aydiner- Juchat, 2019). Yoga teachers are articulated with neoliberal logic and just behaves like an entrepreneur of themselves. Therefore, the absence of the authority of a guru gave way to the entrepreneurial yoga teacher.

To conclude, the absence of a guru-chela relationship caused the institutionalization and standardization of yoga. As it has been underlined by Newcombe (2014), this leads to losing the transformative character of yoga. Therefore, Modern Postural Yoga is more like a technology of life than a technology of the self because it lost its capacity to be a transformative experience by being standardized. The obedience of the disciple to the master is not the case like in Christian technologies of the self.

The relationship between yoga teacher and student is instrumental and temporary in Modern Postural Yoga. In this aspect it reminds the master/ disciple relationship in ancient ethics. As an “external” other, a yoga teacher does not help the yogis to transform themselves since there is no room for unpredictability, s/he teaches how to exercise certain poses to achieve certain predictable ends like mental and physical health or a fit body. However, in ancient time ethics master teaches in broader areas than this limited care of the self as health and fitness. Therefore, yoga teacher only leads students to establish a relationship with the truth in general or, in other words, with the existing reality. From the side of Modern Postural Yoga, the truth in general, the reality that students must adopt themselves is the code of having a healthy and fit body in modern times. This is “an attitude of modernity,” which means to constitute herself according to the present time reality (Foucault, 2007).

In a Christian monastery life master or the “external” other, a master or listener, helps the monk, the student, to establish a specific relationship with oneself and produce his/her own truth. Classical yoga bears much more similarities with Christian technologies of the self, leading to a transformative experience.

#### **4.3.2. The nature of the master/ disciple relationship in ancient time ethics and in early Christianity:**

In Christianity, the relationship between the master and the disciple is crucial, and the nature of this relationship is a large part of Christian technology of disclosure of the self: *exagoreusis*. The presence of a master or someone else is necessary for the disciple’s examination of his conscience. “Examining one’s conscience is a purifying practice in Christianity” (Foucault, 2014: 96). It requires exposing the disciple’s conscience to someone else who can be a guide or even a friend (2014: 95). The disciple by verbalizing what he thinks to the listener exposes himself under the eyes of God. The listener is “the image of God,” and verbalization is an act toward God (Foucault, 2016: 72). It can be seen that the presence of others, the presence of a master, has a crucial part in this Christian technology of the self.

Another dimension in the relationship between the master and the disciple is the spirit of obedience which reflects the “renunciation of the self” because the disciple must unconditionally obey the master. He can do nothing without the permission of the master in the sense that he has no autonomy or will. Moreover, this master /disciple relationship has no end. The disciple must keep the spirit of obedience throughout his life. Obedience is not for a particular time like in Greco-Roman ethics, until the disciple learns how to master himself.

In Greco-Roman ethics, the relationship between the master and the disciple is instrumental, which means it ends when the disciple learns how to have an autonomous life. The disciple learns to obey the laws, not the master in Greco-Roman ethics (Foucault, 2014: 138). To have an autonomous life and to be a

master of himself are the objectives of this relationship. In this relationship, the master is the one who speaks, and the disciple is the one who listens. Therefore, the master's wisdom capacity is an essential factor to consider.

On the other hand, in Christian practice, although the master's wisdom is important, it is not the most important dimension because the master is the listener, and the disciple is the speaker in this relationship. The dimension of obedience is a vital dynamic in this relationship. It can be seen that the presence of a master or guru is a crucial part of technologies of the self in both Greko-Roman ethics and Christian monastic life.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

The main aim of Foucault's study on the technologies of the self is to analyze the genealogy of the modern subject. Technologies of the self are tools for deciding the relationship between the subject and the truth. As Foucault says, technologies of the self can be used as a tool for technologies of domination because technologies of the self are the products of the culture of the society to which they belong. Therefore, it can be used as a technology of domination (power) within the power relations. By managing the technologies of the self, the relationship between the subject and truth can be manipulated. In other words, if the technologies of the self do not lead someone to produce her own truth but lead her to constitute herself according to the certain truth, then they can function as a tool for technologies of domination /power.

As an example, Foucault shows the transition of certain technologies of the self from Greko-Roman ethics to the early Christian monastic life. However, the same technologies were used differently, in a different context, in Christian monastic life, which is more strict compare to the context of Greko-Roman ethics. In the end, Christian spirituality produces a subjectivity with technologies of the self while this cannot be achieved in ancient times. Instead, in ancient times, they are used as a government of the self, in one sense, because they are about "how to live well," in order to leave a good memory behind, which means modifying yourself to a certain reality. If we think back to Plato's Alcibiades, we can see why Plato places such a strong emphasis on taking care of oneself: only by taking care of oneself can one take care of the city and other people. For that reason, technologies of the self in ancient times is about the government of self and the government of others.

Technologies of the self is a part of Foucault's discussion of ethics which he defines as a relation of the self to the self. Foucault's definition of technologies of the self proposes a self transformation at the end of the process. He starts to discuss technologies of the self from ancient time ethics, and he shows the developments of these technologies in early Christianity with the monastic practices of the disclosure of the self. Foucault compares the technologies of the self in Greko-Roman ethics with Christian technologies of the self and concludes that at the end of the application of technologies of the self in Greko-Roman ethics, there is no subjectivation. On the other hand, Christian technologies of the self produce subjectivation by breaking with one's past identity and with one's past since the subject is the result of the existing power relations. Renunciation of the self implies rejecting the past self, which results from power relations. If we relate to ourselves with emancipatory technologies of the self, we can literally be a subject, in Foucault's terms, though this subjectivation comes with a renunciation of the self.

The technologies in ancient time ethics are the 'techne of life' not a 'techne of the self' since they are about how to live well to make an 'art of existence.' Subject constitutes herself concerning the existing reality. She establishes a relationship with an external truth, she modifies herself according to that truth. On the contrary, Christian technologies of the self is based on the aim of discovering the subject's own truth deep inside herself. That is, the subject produces her own truth since it is not about modifying herself according to the existing truth, existing reality. She rejects this world which is the existent reality. Foucault calls this attitude of early Christianity as critical; in the sense that, they reject to conform to the external reality as they see it. These are 'critics', according to Foucault, meaning aiming to establish a deliberate relation with the world. Moreover, it is a practice of freedom since it leads to resist power relations.

The reason to compare the 'techne of life' in ancient ethics with the 'techne of the self' is that certain technologies are transformed from ancient pagan ethics to



Christian technologies of the self. There are some continuities and discontinuities that Foucault wants to show as an archaeologist. His study of ethics is related to politics because ethical action is a political action to change the existing reality. In other words, ethics means to reflect on politics critically.

In this theoretical framework, I analyzed yoga, asking whether it is a technology of the self or not. In order to do that, I conceptualized what I mean by the word 'yoga' since it is a very loaded, and controversial word. In the third chapter, I made genealogical evolution of yoga to show that there is no homogenous or monolithic history of yoga. For the sake of argumentation, I made a distinction according to the predominant forms of yoga in the world: Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga.

I categorize these two because there are certain distinctions between them and they are also on the margins of the chronological spectrum among the most known form of yoga worldwide. These definitions are made for the sake of the argumentation in this thesis. After defining what I mean by Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga, I compared them with the technologies of the self in ancient ethics and Christian philosophy. In doing so, I attempted to provide a critical perspective to yoga in terms of its relation to modern technologies of the self, which Foucault explained in different contexts.

I made comparisons according to the common point between these technologies after specifying the certain themes which change through the evolution of yoga from Classical Yoga to Modern Postural Yoga. These themes are, first, the loss of spirituality/ loss of the aim of salvation, and the second theme is the medicalization of yoga or yoga as wellness/fitness. The third theme is the loss of guru/chela relationship in yoga. These themes are all responses to yoga's evolution to Modern Postural Yoga and also in response to the features of the technologies of the self in ancient ethics and Christian philosophy.

The theme of salvation is the common point between Classical Yoga and Christian technologies of the self. Therefore I compared them in order to show their similar points. The theme of salvation does not exist in Modern Postural Yoga, and this is one of the major differences between Classical Yoga and Modern Postural Yoga. In this respect, I examined the absence of the aim of salvation in Modern Postural Yoga. Moreover, the absence of the theme of salvation is the common point between ancient ethics and Modern Postural Yoga.

The second theme is the medicalization of yoga or yoga as wellness/fitness. This theme emphasizes bodily and mental well-being in Modern Postural Yoga, which is absent in Classical yoga. The medicalization and aim of wellness can be thought over the concept of care in ancient ethics. Therefore, care for the self is the common point between Modern Postural Yoga and ancient ethics. For this reason, I compared Modern Postural Yoga with ancient ethics in this section. Since the principle of “the care of the self” does not exist in Classical Yoga and Christian technologies of the self, I did not compare them under a separate title.

The final theme is the loss of the guru-chela relationship in yoga, which is a crucial component of Classical Yoga and also exists within the self-technologies in both ancient ethics and Christian spirituality. Since institutionalization and standardization of yoga have very negative effects in terms of creating a structured experience which closes all the possible alternatives, I discussed the loss of the guru-chela relationship in Modern Postural Yoga. This is the exact opposite of Foucault's "limit attitude," which refers to remaining in liminalities and refusing to create a new structure after rejecting the preexisting ones (Foucault, 1984: 46). This limit attitude provides someone a creative perspective that rejects being categorized, or shaped in a certain way but being always open to new possibilities. Limit attitudes is critical attitudes in this sense.

According to my findings, Modern Postural Yoga cannot be considered a technology of the self because it shares more similarities with technologies of the

self in ancient ethics, which are not actually technologies of the self as a critical practice that can resist power relations. However, they are the techniques for governing the self and others. Modern Postural Yoga is about how to live well. It does not have a critical attitude toward existing reality and is a response to the moral codes of modern reality. In the case of modern postural yoga, the accepted code or norms of the period are to strive to better the quality of life in this world by taking care of the body through fitness or medicine. Modern Postural Yoga enables the self to better adapt to the existing reality, and existing codes of the time rather than critically reflect on the truth of its time, the truth of modernity.

Although Modern Postural Yoga, because of its physical and mental benefits, can be regarded as a self-care, in Foucault's terminology: a 'concern for the self,' it lacks the potential of being a practice of freedom. Because it is about the 'government of the self' in the existent regime of power relations. Foucault asserts that the human subject is drawn into "certain games of truth" by power, and coercive tactics are no longer used in games of truth (1997: 281). Foucault defines government as "a technique which permits one to use the self of people, and the self-conduct of people, for the purpose of domination" (2016: 114, 1988:19). In this aspect, Modern Postural Yoga can be considered a governmental technique that power uses as a tool to make someone conduct upon oneself. The techniques of the self are used as tools for the technologies of power. Power relations manipulate the self-formation of the subject as an ethical action as "an action upon action" (1982: 220). Therefore, Modern Postural Yoga creates neoliberal subjectivities rather than ethical subjectivities.

In this respect, Modern Postural Yoga as the product of the modern, western appropriation of yoga reflects the effects of technologies of power/domination. That is, it became a practice that technologies of power/ domination extended to technologies of the self. It lacks the potential of practice of resistance to power, it lost the emancipatory capacity of being a critical ethical practice. Modern Postural Yoga is interpreted as the point where technologies of the self are integrated into the technologies of power/ domination. Modern Postural Yoga as

a self-care practice provides a tool for people to shape themselves according to the norms of society.

Modern Postural Yoga serves to power relations that produce scientific discourses of truth since it is promoted by scientific knowledge. Modern Postural Yoga follows "a law of truth" that power imposes on the subject (1997: 212). It is more akin to the techniques that one uses "to relate to contemporary reality," as Foucault discusses in his argumentation of modernity and enlightenment (1984: 40). Therefore, it cannot initiate an ethical subjectivation with the capacity to exercise freedom against the power relations.

Modern Postural Yoga serves the individualizing power relations that categorize an individual (1982: 213). It helps to create neoliberal subjectivities rather than ethical subjectivities. Moreover, Modern Postural Yoga's institutionalization is far from Foucault's definition of ethical action, which is an ongoing experimental process. It is institutionalized and structured within power relations—scientifically produced knowledge of Modern Postural Yoga limits its transformative possibilities.

On the other hand, as we see over the comparisons, Classical Yoga, to a great extent, carries the potential of being a technology of the self in terms of being a critical practice to resist the technologies of power/domination by rejecting to be dominated by the truths that power produced. Instead, Classical Yoga aims at the transformation of the self by resisting the truths produced by technologies of power/domination and being an active agent in the truth games. As it is seen, Classical Yoga has a critical attitude toward existing reality because there is a refusal of this world and the aim of attaining another mode of being. That means changing the existing mode of being, so it is a critical gesture like in Christian technologies of the self where Foucault claims the existence of the subjectivation, by which the self can constitute herself as a subject.

Classical Yoga is an ethical and ascetic practice, in this sense, it has the potential to transform oneself into an ethical subject. As Foucault defines ethics for the self as a practice that could potentially bring about freedom, when we consider Classical Yoga as a technology of the self that aims transformation in one's self, it can be located in a position that provides the self a capacity of freedom to resist power relations because it rejects the truth politics that power imposes on us.

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## APPENDICES

### A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Son yıllarda yoganın popülaritesi büyük ölçüde arttı. Özellikle yoganın fiziksel pratikleri o kadar popüler hale geldi ki, yoga terimi neredeyse fiziksel yoga pratikleri ile eş anlamlı hale geldi. Ancak, Batı dünyasında popüler olan bu fiziksel yoga pratiği sadece beden ve genel sağlık açısından yararları nedeniyle Modern Postural Yoga adı verilen bir tür yogadır.

Yoganın bir doğu felsefesi mi yoksa bir din mi olduğu hep tartışılmıştır. Postürel Yoga ve ilgili türlerin çeşitlenmesiyle birlikte bu tartışmaya yoganın kökenleri ve en otantik formu ile ilgili yeni tartışmalar da eklenmiştir. Bununla birlikte, yoganın soyağacına dikkatli bir bakış, yoganın modern zaman öncesindeki tarihinde de her zaman farklı geleneklerin bir arada olduğunu, hiçbir zaman homojen bir forma sahip olmadığını gösterir. Modern zaman öncesindeki yoga geleneklerine örnek olarak Hindu, Jain ve Budist yoga formları verilebilir.

Yoganın bugün geldiği en son hal olan Modern Postürel Yoga ile ilgili sorun, modern zamanın neoliberal bağlamındaki konumu açısından önem taşıyor. Yoga farklı zamanlarda ve bağlamlarda farklı şekiller almıştır ve bu yüzden yoganın soy bilimsel olarak evrimi yoganın bağlam duyarlılığını gösterir.

Modern Postürel Yoga, mevcut haliyle Klasik Yoga'nın değerlerinden uzak olup, neoliberal sistemin bireye dayattığı değerlere tekabül etmekte ve bu değerleri gerçekleştirme hedeflemektedir. Bir zamanlar münzevi bir yaşam tarzını ve farklı bir varoluşsal düzeye geçişi gerektiren özgürleşmeyi hedefleyen Klasik Yoga felsefesi, bugün sağlık ve zindelik için yapılan bedensel hareketlere dayalı Modern Postural Yoga ile birlikte farklı bir biçim almıştır.

Bu deęişim, neoliberal gc iliřkilerinin birey zerindeki etkisinin aık bir rneęidir. Modern Postrel Yoga, bireyin kendine bakmasına ve kendi sorumluluęunu almasına ynelik bir ara haline gelmiřtir. Klasik Yoga felsefesinde var olan dnyadan uzaklařma teması Modern Postrel Yogada yoktur. Modern Postrel Yoga, tam olarak bireyin bu dnyada en iyi řekilde var olmasını saęlamayı amalar. Modern Postrel Yoganın gnmzdeki tanıtım řekli, fiziksel ve ruhsal saęlıęa faydaları zerine yapılan yayınlar, neoliberal iktidar iliřkilerinin mantıęından ayrı dřnlemez.

Bu tezde yogayı alıřma fikri, kiřisel yoga deneyimimden doędu. Yoga yapmaya 2014 yılında ODT Spor Mdrlę baęlı bir yoga kursu ile bařladım. Yoga kursunun adı ‘Sculpture Yoga’ydı ve vcudu bir heykel gibi řekillendirmeyi vaat ediyordu. Yogadan nce, fitness ve pilates yapmıřtım ve yogaya bařlamamın nedeni, řařırtıcı bir řekilde yoganın da benzer bir egzersiz olduęunu ęrenmekti, esneklik, zindelik ve form saęlayan bir pratik. Ancak, ncesinde yoganın meditasyona dayalı duraęan bir pratik olduęunu biliyordum. Kendi yoga yolculuęum, bana modern yoga formları hakkında deneyim ve fikir sahibi olmamı saęladı. Yoga yapanların yoga yapma motivasyonlarını ieriden bir kiři olarak deneyimleme ve tanık olma fırsatım oldu.

Yogayı farklı yntemlerle inceleyebilir ve eřitli perspektiflerden ele alabiliriz: neoliberal ekonomik siyaset, giriřimcilik, ynetimsellik, biyopolitika ve etik gibi. stelik, tm bu tartıřma zeminlerini Foucault'un teorik erevesi iinde ele alabiliriz. řimdiye kadar, farklı disiplinlerden dřnrler yogayı eřitli ynleriyle tartıřmıřlardır. En eski ve en yaygın tartıřma Yoganın bir din mi yoksa bir doęu felsefesi mi olduęu zerine olsa da, yoganın insan saęlıęı ve esenlięi zerindeki faydalarına dair klinik arařtırma alıřmalarının sayısı artmaktadır.

Sosyal bilimlerde, zellikle sosyolojik ve antropolojik alıřmalarda, neoliberalizm baęlamında yoga yapanların deneyimleri zerinden yogayı alıřma eęilimi vardır (Markula, 2014, Godrej, 2016, Rosen, 2019, Aydınler-Juchat,

2019, Bailey et al., 2021, Cengiz et al., 2021, Erkmn, 2021, Ertürk, 2021, Hamed, 2021, Shaw & Kaytez, 2021, Godrej, 2022). Bu çalışmalar, neoliberal toplumlarda yoganın pozisyonunu tartışır ve aralarındaki ortak tema, yoga yapanların yogadan beklentilerinin ve ihtiyaçların, neoliberal siyasetinin doğrudan sonuçları olmasıdır. Bu yönüyle, Modern Postürel Yoganın dinamiklerinin neoliberal normlara bağlı olduğu iddia edilebilir.

Bu tez, Batı'da bilinen en eski sistematik form olan Klasik Yogadan başlayarak Yoganın tarih boyunca geçirdiği dönüşümü değerlendirmekte ve bu değerlendirmeyi kronolojik olarak yoganın geliştirdiği en popüler ve en son form olan Modern Postürel Yoga ile sınırlandırmaktadır.

Yoganın soy bilimsel incelemesinin yapma nedenim meydana gelen değişiklikleri göstermektir, yoganın orijinal bir başlangıç noktası tartışması yapmak gibi bir niyet taşımamaktayım. Klasik Yogayı ve Modern Postürel Yogayı inceleme nedenim yoganın zaman içindeki değişimini göstermektir çünkü Modern Postürel Yoga, Klasik Yogadan radikal olarak farklıdır. Modern Postural Yoganın Klasik Yogadan nasıl ve hangi yönlerden ayrıldığını araştırmak, bu çalışma için esastır.

Bu noktada, Foucault'un modern özne ve iktidar üzerine çalışmaları, yogada meydana gelen değişimin nedenlerini anlamaya yardımcı olacaktır. Foucault, modern öznenin iktidar ilişkilerinden bağımsız düşünülmemeyeceğini iddia eder. Ona göre, iktidar ilişkileri modern özneyi var eder. İsteklerimiz ve ihtiyaçlarımız iktidar ilişkilerinin ürünüdür.

Ancak, bu iktidar ilişkilerinde özne iktidar ilişkilerine karşı direnme özgürlüğüne sahiptir. Foucault, "kendilik kaygısı etiğini bir özgürlük pratiği olarak " tanımlar (1997: 281). Dolayısıyla, öznenin özgürlük kapasitesini etik alanında araştırabiliriz. Bu yönüyle, etik alanı özne ve iktidar arasındaki ilişkiyi tamamlayıcı nitelikte olabilir. Foucault'un geç dönem etik çalışmaları, özneyi, hakikati ve iktidar ilişkilerini odağına aldığı özne teorisi hakkındadır. Foucault,

kişinin kendisini bir özne olarak nasıl oluşturduğunun soy kütüğünü analiz etmek için antik çağlarda ve erken Hıristiyanlıkta etik üzerine çalışır. Dilts'in yorumladığı gibi, "Foucault'nun antik çağa dönüşü, kısmen neo-liberal özneliliğin yükselişine ince ama radikal bir yanıtıdır" (2010: 3).

Etik, kişinin kendisini etik bir özne olarak oluşturmak için kendilik pratikleri aracılığıyla kendi üzerinde çalışabileceği kendinin kendisi ile olan ilişkisidir (1997: 263). Bu anlamda etik, var olan özneyi değiştirmeyi amaçladığı için iktidar ilişkilerinin ürettiği öznenin reddidir. Bu nedenle etik uygulama, direnişi ve 'kendilik siyaseti'ni (politics of ourselves) ima eder (2016: 76).

Foucault, "Batı uygarlığında öznenin soy kütüğünü" araştırmak için kendilik teknolojileriyle iktidar/tahakküm teknolojilerinin birlikte düşünülmesi gerektiğini düşünür (2016: 25).

Kendilik teknolojilerinin ve iktidar/tahakküm teknolojilerinin temas noktasını 'yönetim' olarak adlandırır (2016: 25, 1988: 19). Bu, özne ve iktidar arasındaki ilişkinin bağımlılığına işaret eder. Kendilik teknolojileri, iktidar/tahakküm ilişkileriyle olan yakın ilişkisi nedeniyle yoganın evrimini tartışmak için kapsayıcı bir zemin olabilir çünkü birçok araştırma yogayı neoliberal iktidar/tahakküm ilişkileri bağlamında incelemiştir.

Modern öncesi yoga tarihinde homojen bir yoga geleneği olmasa da, Patanjali'nin 'Yoga Sutralar'ına dayalı bir Klasik Yoga geleneği hâkimdir. Patanjali'nin Yoga Sutralar'ı, yoganın bilinen en eski ve en yetkili yazılı kaynağıdır. Yoga'nın evrim süreci boyunca, Patanjali'nin Yoga Sutralar'ı, orijinal halinden oldukça farklı şekillerde yeniden yorumlanmıştır.

Klasik Yoga, Modern Yoganın kurucusu olarak kabul edilen bilge Vivekananda tarafından yeniden yorumlanarak Batı'ya, Hindistanın manevi pratiği olarak sunuldu. Vivekananda'nın Patanjali'nin 'Yoga Sutralar'ını yeniden yorumlaması Klasik Yoganın Modern Postural Yogaya evrimine dair epistemolojik kopuşun



başlangıcı olarak bilinir. Sanskritçe "asana" olarak bilinen 'postür,' duruş ve pozlar fiziksel bir egzersiz olarak gelişti. Duruşların, pozların yani 'postür' pratiklerinin yogada bu kadar popüler hale gelmesi tartışmalı bir konudur çünkü "asana" pratiklerine modern öncesi hiçbir yoga geleneğinde bu kadar önem atfedilmemiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, zaman içinde "asana" teriminde radikal değişiklikler meydana gelmiştir. Hindistan'ın manevi veya dini uygulamalarını Batı idealleriyle uyumlu hale getirme amacı nedeniyle, Modern Postural Yoga, sömürge Hindistan'ın Batı fiziksel kültürüyle karşılaşmasının bir sonucu olarak, Hindistan'ın kendi ulusal fiziksel kültürünü arayışı olarak ortaya çıktı. Bu anlamda, Modern Postural Yoga bir icat olarak kabul edilebilir.

Kendilik teknolojileri Foucault'da etiğin bir yönüdür ve bu teknolojiler aracılığıyla özne ile hakikat arasındaki ilişkiyi tartışır. Bu teknolojiler, özne ile hakikat arasındaki ilişkiyi belirlemek için kullanılan araçlar olarak kabul edilir. Kişinin hakikate erişimi önemlidir çünkü kişi iktidarla olan ilişkisinde kendisini iktidar ilişkilerinde savunmasız kalmaya karşı koruyan belirli hakikatlere ihtiyacı duyar.

Bu tezde, yoganın bir benlik teknolojisi olarak kabul edilme olasılığı araştırılmaktadır. Böylece, yoganın özneleşme pratiğinin ve iktidar ilişkilerine direnerek özgürleşen bir etik öznenin kurulumunun bir parçası olup olmadığı sorusu tartışılabilir ve yoga pratiğiyle ortaya konulan öznellik incelenebilir.

Foucault, soybilimsel tarihin amacının kimliğimizin köklerini keşfetmek değil, köklerin nasıl "dağıldığını" göstermek ve "bizi kesen tüm bu süreksizlikleri görünür kılmak" olduğunun altını çizer (1977: 162). Etik üzerine çalışmalarında, Foucault soy bilimsel metodu kullanır ve antik etikten erken Hristiyanlık dönemine kadar kendilik teknolojilerinin dönüşümünü inceler. Böylelikle farklı bağlam ve zamanlarda kendilik teknolojilerinin sürekliliklerini ve süreksizliklerini gösterir.

Bu süreksizlikler tahakküm teknikleri ile kendilik teknikleri arasındaki etkileşimi gösterir.

Bu nedenle, bu tezde de yoganın evrimini soy bilimsel olarak inceleyerek, bu evrimdeki süreklilik ve süreksizlikler açısından değişimleri ve kırılma noktalarını göstermeyi amaçladım. Bu değişiklikler, farklı zaman ve bağlamlarda yoga üzerindeki iktidar/tahakküm teknolojilerinin etkisini gösterir.

Yoganın bir kendilik teknolojisi olup olmadığını incelemek için, öncelikle yoga kavramını tanımlamak gerekir. Bunun için, yoganın evrimini soy bilimsel olarak inceleyerek yoganın ifade ettiği farklı anlamları göstermek ve tartışmayı tutarlı bir şekilde yürütmek için yogayı Klasik ve Modern Postürel Yoga olmak üzere ikiye ayırdım. Çünkü bu iki yoga türü soy bilimsel olarak incelendiğinde yoganın en eski ve en yeni türü olmak üzere iki kutbu temsil ediyor, üstelik amaçları ve kullandıkları yöntemler yönüyle de birbirinden belirgin şekilde ayrışıyor. Yoganın evriminde, yoganın bileşenleri açısından belirli dışlamalar, içermeler yapılmıştır. Bunların yanı sıra, yeni eklemeler de yapılmıştır.

Hem Klasik Yoganın hem de Modern Postürel Yoganın belirgin özelliklerini incelerken, bu iki Yoga türünü karşılaştırmak için bir zemin sağlayan ve yoganın zaman içinde değişen anlamlarını gösteren üç tema ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunlar maneviyat/kurtuluş, tıbbileştirme ve guru/şela ilişkisidir.

Üstelik bu üç tema, eski çağlardaki ve Hristiyan etiğindeki kendilik teknolojilerine de karşılık gelir. Bu nedenle, yoganın ne ölçüde ve ne tür bir kendilik teknolojisi olarak kabul edilebileceğine karar vermek için bu temalar kullanılabilirler.

Bu üç tema, antik zamanlardaki ve Hristiyan etiğindeki kendilik teknolojilerinde de bulunur ve bu iki etikte de yerleri ve şekilleri değişir. Kurtuluşu amaçlayan maneviyat teması, Hristiyan etiğinin çekirdeğini oluştururken, antik ahlakta böyle bir amaç yoktur. Antik ahlakta, kendine bakmak için tıbbi model

önerilmiştir, ancak Hıristiyan münzevilerinde kendiliğin tıbbi bakımı ile ilgili bir endişe yoktur. Üstat ve öğrenci arasındaki ilişki, her iki etiğin de temel değerlerini yansıttığı için eski çağlardaki ve Hıristiyan etiğindeki benlik teknolojilerinin yapısı için temel ve belirleyicidir.

Bu tez, yoga pratiklerini kendi teknolojisi olarak tartışan literatür ile diyalog içinde olsa da, var olan literatür yogayı iktidar/tahakküm teknolojisi olarak neoliberalizm bağlamında inceler. Bu tezde ise yoganın bir kendilik teknolojisi olabilme olasılığı etik çerçevede incelenerek konu farklı bir yönden ele alınmış ve yoganın iktidar ilişkilerine direnerek özgürleşebilen bir etik özne kurup kuramayacağı tartışılmıştır.

Foucault'nun kendilik teknolojileri üzerine yaptığı çalışmanın temel amacı, modern öznenin soykütüğünü analizini ortaya koymaktır. Kendilik teknolojileri, özne ile hakikat arasındaki ilişkiye karar vermek için kullanılan araçların toplamı olarak görülebilir. Foucault'nun iddia ettiği gibi, kendilik teknolojileri, tahakküm teknolojileri için bir araç olarak kullanılma potansiyeline de sahiptir. Çünkü kendilik teknolojilerini üreten ait oldukları toplumun kültürüdür. Dolayısıyla iktidar ilişkilerinde bir tahakküm (iktidar) teknolojisi olarak kullanılabilir. Başka bir deyişle, kendilik teknolojilerinin kullanılmasıyla, özne ile hakikat arasındaki ilişki manipüle edilebilir. Bunu ayırt edebilmek için teknolojinin öznedeki yarattığı etkiyi değerlendirebiliriz. Eğer kendilik teknolojileri, birini kendi hakikatını üretmeye değil de, kesin bir hakikat zemininde kendini kurabilmesinin mümkün olduğunu düşündüğü bir noktaya taşıyorsa, tahakküm/iktidar teknolojilerinin bir aracı olarak işlev görmeye başladığını söylenebilir.

Foucault aynı teknolojilerin nasıl farklı bağlamlarda farklı etkiler yaratabileceğini göstermek için bazı örneklere başvurur. Bazı kendilik teknolojisi pratiklerinin, Greko-Romen etiği çerçevesinden sıyrılarak erken dönem Hıristiyan manastır yaşamında farklı anlamlarla devam etmesine dair analiz bu örnekler arasındadır. Bu teknolojiler, Greko-Romen etik bağlamından daha katı olan Hıristiyan manastır yaşamında farklı bağlamlarda farklı şekillerde pratik

edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Foucault Hıristiyan maneviyatının, kendilik teknolojileriyle, önceden tahayyül edilmesi mümkün olmayan bir öznelik ürettiğini gösterir. Greko-Roman etiğinin baskın olduğu dönemlerde, aynı pratikler bir anlamda kendiliği yönlendirmek ve yönetmek için kullanılmışlardır. Çünkü bu dönemin asıl sorusu iyi yaşamdır; geride iyi bir anı bırakmak içi bu soru ile ilgilidirler; buna bağlı olarak kendilerini belirli bir cevaba ve kurdukları gerçekliğe göre şekillendirmek isterler. Platon'un Alcibiades'ine geri dönersek, Platon'un kendi başının çaresine bakma konusuna neden bu kadar güçlü bir vurgu yaptığını görebiliriz: insanın kendisine gösterdiği özen kent ve diğerlerine gösterdiği özenin ön koşuludur. Bu nedenle, eski çağlardaki kendilik teknolojileri, daha ziyade kendiliğin ve başkalarının yönetimi ile ilgili olarak mana kazanmıştır.

Kendilik teknolojileri, Foucault'nun kendinin kendiyile ilişkisi olarak tanımladığı etik tartışmasının bir parçasıdır. Foucault'nun kendilik teknolojilerinin en önemli yönlerinden biri sürecin sonunda bir kendilik dönüşümü önermesidir. Antik zaman etiğinden itibaren kendilik teknolojilerini ele alıp tartışmaya başlar ve daha önce de dediğim gibi, bu teknolojilerin erken Hıristiyanlıktaki gelişimini, kendiliğin ifşasına ilişkin manastır uygulamalarını örnek göstererek tarihsel olarak bir zemine oturtur. Greko-Romen etiğindeki kendilik teknolojilerinin, Hıristiyan kendilik teknolojileriyle karşılaştırılması ve Greko-Romen etiğindeki kendilik teknolojilerinin uygulamalarının hakiki bir 'özneleşme' ortaya çıkarmadığı sonucuna varır. Öte yandan, özne mevcut iktidar ilişkilerinin bir sonucu olduğu için, Hıristiyan kendilik teknolojileri, kişiyi geçmiş kimliğinden ve geçmişinden koparan bir 'özneleştirme' üretimi olarak görülebilir. Kendinden feragat etme, bu manada, iktidar ilişkileri içinde kurulan kendiliği reddetmekle ilgilidir. Kendimizi özgürleştirici kendilik teknoloji pratikleri içinde kurduğumuzda, Foucault'nun anlayışıyla kelimenin tam anlamıyla bir 'özne' olabiliriz, ancak bu özneleşme, kendinden vazgeçmeyle birlikte gelir.

Eski zaman etiğindeki teknolojiler, bir 'varolma sanatı' çerçevesinde iyi yaşamı aramakla ilgili olduğundan, bize 'kendiliğin *techne*(si)' değil, 'yaşam

*techne*(sini)' sunarlar. Özne kendini var olan gerçekliği algısı ekseninde oluşturur. Dış bir hakikatle ilişki kurar, kendini bu gerçeğe göre değiştirir. Aksine, Hıristiyan kendilik teknolojilerinin temelinde öznenin kendi hakikatini kendi içinde derinlemesine keşfetme amacı yatar. Yani özne, var olan hakikate ya da gerçekliğe göre kendini değiştirmekle ilgilenmemekte, kendi hakikati üretmektedir. Gördüğü dünyayı kendisini ilgilendiren bir gerçeklik olarak kabul etmez. Dolayısıyla Foucault bu bağlamda, bu tavrı bir 'eleştiri' olarak görür. Eleştiri etiği kavramıyla anlatılmak istenen varolan gerçekliğin direkt olarak kabulünden kaçınan eleştirel bir tavidir. Ayrıca, Foucault'ya göre, bu yaklaşım kişiyi iktidarın merkezine direnmeye ittiğinden özgürleştirici bir pratiktir.

Kadim etikteki 'yaşam *techne*(si)'ni 'kendiliğin *techne*(si)' ile karşılaştırmanın altında yatan sebep, bazı teknolojilerin eski pagan etiğindeki hallerinden Hıristiyan kendilik teknolojilerine dönüşmesidir. Foucault'nun bir arkeoloji çalışması çerçevesinde ortaya koyduğu süreklilikler ve süreksizlikleri incelemesi onun etik çalışmasını belirler. Bu çalışma ayrıca siyasetle de bağlantılıdır; çünkü etik eylem, mevcut gerçekliği değiştirmeye yönel olması bağlamında açıkça siyasi çağrışımlar taşıyan da bir eylemdir. Diğer bir deyişle etik, siyaseti eleştirel olarak ele almak gibi de görülebilir.

Bu tez, ortaya konulan teorik çerçeve bağlamında, yoganın bir kendilik teknolojisi olarak kabul edilip edilemeyeceği sorusuna bir cevap aramaktadır. Böyle bir soru sormadan önce, çok yüklü ve tartışmalı bir kelime olduğu için 'yoga' diyerek tam olarak ne kastettiğimi de kavramsallaştırmam gerekti. Tezimin üçüncü bölümünde, yoganın homojen ya da yekpare bir tarihi olmadığını göstermek için yoganın soykütüksel bir analizini ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Yoganın soykütüksel tarihindeki süreklilikleri ve süreksizlikleri daha anlaşılır bir biçimde ifade edebilmek amacıyla, şahit olabildiğimiz yaygın yoga formlarının incelemesine dayanarak ikili bir ayırım ortaya koydum: Klasik Yoga ve Modern Postural Yoga.

Bu ikili kategorizasyonun mantığı, ele aldığım iki tür yoganın belli başlı farklarının yoga açısından kritik oluşuna ve bu kritik açılardan dünyadaki tüm yoga türlerini içeren bir yelpazenin iki ucunda olmalarına dayanmaktadır. Bu tanımlar, tezimin savını daha iyi ifade edebilmek adına yapılmıştır. Bu noktada, Klasik Yoga ve Modern Postural Yoga ile neyi kastettiğimi açıkça tanımladıktan sonra, bunları antik ahlâk ve Hıristiyan felsefesindeki benlik teknolojileriyle karşılaştırdım. Bunu yaparken, Foucault'nun farklı bağlamlarda açıkladığı modern kendilik teknolojileriyle ilişkisi açısından yogayı eleştirel bir perspektifle çerçevelemeye çalıştım.

Yoganın Klasik Yoga'dan Modern Postural Yoga'ya evrilmesiyle değişen belirli temaları belirledikten sonra bu teknolojilerin ortak noktalarını dikkate alarak karşılaştırmalar yapmayı uygun buldum. Bu temalardan birincisi, maneviyatın kaybı/selamete erme amacının kaybı olarak okunabilir. İkinci yaygın tema ise, yoganın medikalleşmesi ya da yoganın bir sağlıklı yaşam/fitness aracı olarak tekrar kavramsallaştırılmasıdır. Üçüncü tema ise, yogada önceden önemli bir yer tutan guru/şela ilişkisinin kaybıdır. Bu temaların tümü, yoganın Modern Postural Yoga'ya doğru evrimine ve aynı zamanda antik etik teknolojilerin, Hıristiyan felsefesindeki kendilik teknolojilerine dönüşümüyle ilgilidir.

Selamete erme manasında bir kurtuluş fikri, Klasik Yoga ile Hıristiyan kendilik teknolojileri arasındaki bulunan ortak bir temadır. Bu sebeple karşılaştırılmaları bize yoganın soykütüksel araştırması amacımız için bir zemin oluşturacaktır. Modern Postural Yoga'da selamete erme benzeri bir tema yoktur ve bu, Klasik Yoga ile Modern Postural Yoga arasındaki en büyük farklardan biridir. Bu açıdan da düşünüldüğünde Modern Postural Yoga'da kurtuluş amacının noksanlığı güzel bir karşılaştırma başlığıdır. Aynı zamanda, kurtuluş temasının yokluğu, eski zamanlar etiği ile Modern Postural Yoga arasında da bir ortaklık oluşturmaktadır.

İkinci tema, yoganın medikalleşmesi ya da sağlık/fitness olarak algılanmasıyla ilgilidir. Bu tema, Klasik Yoga'da olmayan, Modern Postural Yoga'da ise çok

temel bir ağırlığı olan bedensel ve zihinsel refahı vurgular. Sağlıklı yaşam fikrine yapılan vurgu ve genel medikalleşme, eski etik fikrine ait önemli bir kavram olan bakım kavramı üzerinden düşünülebilir. Dolayısıyla, modern Postural Yoga ile kadim etik arasındaki ortak noktanın, kendine özen göstermek, kendinle ilgilenmek olduğu söylenebilir. Bu nedenle bu bölümde Modern Postural Yoga'yı antik çağ etiği ile karşılaştırdım ve bu benzerlik üzerinde durdum. Klasik Yoga ve Hıristiyan benlik teknolojilerinde 'kendine özen gösterme' anlamına gelebilecek bir ilke bulunmadığından, bunları ayrı bir başlık altında karşılaştırmadım.

Son tema, Klasik Yoga'nın çok önemli bir bileşeni olan ve aynı zamanda hem antik etikte hem de Hıristiyan maneviyatında öz-teknolojiler içinde var olduğu söylenebilecek olan guru-chela ilişkisinin kaybıdır. Yoganın kurumsallaşması ve standardizasyonu, olası tüm alternatifleri kapatan yapılandırılmış bir deneyim yaratma çabasıdan son derece olumsuz şekilde etkilenmiştir. Modern Postural Yoga'da guru-chela ilişkisinin kaybının bu çerçevede tartışılması başka açılardan da önemlidir. Bu, Foucault'nun eşiklerde kalmaya ve var olanı reddedip yeni bir yapı yaratmayı reddetmeye işaret eden 'sınır-tutumu'nun tam tersi olarak görülebilir. Bu tutumla Foucault, özneye, kategorize edilmeyi veya belirli bir şekilde biçimlendirilmeyi reddeden, ancak her zaman yeni olasılıklara açık olan yaratıcı bir bakış açısı sunar. Sınır-tutumlar da bu anlamda eleştirel tutumlardır.

Bulgularıma göre, modern postural yoga bir kendilik teknolojisi olarak kabul edilemez. Modern postural yoganın pratikleri, kadim etik çerçevesinde incelediğimiz kendilik teknolojileriyle daha benzer yanlara sahiptir; ki kadim etik çerçevesi, açıkladığımız üzere, iktidar ilişkilerine direnebilen eleştirel pratikler sunan teknolojiler değildir. Ancak iktidar ilişkilerine girmek için benliği belli doğrularla donatmayı amaçlarlar; ki bu da iktidar ilişkilerinde var olan, onunla yaşayan teknolojiler olduklarını gösterir. Diğer bir deyişle, Modern Postural Yoga, nasıl iyi yaşanacağı ile ilgilidir ve mevcut gerçekliğe karşı eleştirel bir tutumu sunmaz. Ancak modern gerçekliğin ahlaki kodlarına bir yanıt olarak görülebilir. Modern postural yoga söz konusu olduğunda, genel toplumsal kabul ve normların fitness veya tıp yoluyla vücuda özen göstererek bu dünyadaki

yaşam kalitesini iyileştirmeye çalışmayı normalleştirdiğini gözlemleriz. Modern Postural Yoga, zamanının gerçeğini, modernitenin gerçeğini eleştirel bir şekilde tekrar düşünmek yerine, kendiliğin mevcut gerçekliğe ve zamanın mevcut kodlarına daha iyi uyum sağlamasına olanak tanır.

Modern Postural Yoga, fiziksel ve zihinsel yararları nedeniyle bir kişisel bakım olarak kabul edilse de, Foucault'nun terminolojisiyle 'kendilik kaygısı', bir özgürlük pratiği olma potansiyelinden yoksundur. Çünkü söz konusu olan iktidar ilişkilerinin var olan rejimindeki 'kendini yönetme'dir. Kendini yöneterek iktidarın bir aracı ya da sahibi olmayı kabul eden bir özne öngörür. Bu yönüyle, Modern Postural Yoga, iktidarın bir kişinin kendi üzerinde hareket etmesini sağlamak için bir araç olarak kullandığı bir yönetim tekniği olarak düşünülebilir. Bu bağlamda da, Modern Postural Yoga, etik öznellikler yerine neoliberal öznellikler yaratır.

Bu bakımdan, yoganın modern, batılı temellükünün bir ürünü olan Modern Postural Yoga, iktidar/tahakküm teknolojilerinin etkilerini yansıtır. Yani iktidar/tahakküm teknolojilerinin kendilik teknolojileriyle ilgili pratikler haline gelebilecek kadar genişlediğini gösterir. İktidara karşı direniş pratiği potansiyelinden yoksundur, eleştirel bir etik pratik olmanın özgürleştirici kapasitesini kaybetmiştir. Modern Postural Yoga, kendilik teknolojilerinin iktidar/tahakküm teknolojileriyle bütünleştiği nokta olarak yorumlanır. Bir kişisel bakım uygulaması olarak Modern Postural Yoga, insanların kendilerini toplumun normlarına göre şekillendirmeleri için bir araç sağlar.

Öte yandan; Klasik Yoga, tahakküm altına alınmayı reddederek iktidar/tahakküm teknolojilerine ve bu ilişkiler içinde üretilen hakikate karşı direnen, eleştirel bir pratik olması bakımından bir kendilik teknolojisi olma potansiyelini büyük ölçüde taşımaktadır. Klasik Yoga, iktidar/tahakküm teknolojilerinin ürettiği hakikatlere direnerek ve hakikat oyunlarında aktif bir aktör olarak kendiliğin dönüşümünü amaçlar. Görüldüğü gibi Klasik Yoga, var olan gerçekliğe karşı eleştirel bir tutuma sahiptir çünkü bu dünyanın reddi ve başka bir var olma



biçimine ulaşma amacı vardır. Bu, var olan var olma biçimini değiştirmek anlamına gelir. Bu açıdan, böylece benliğin kendisini bir özne olarak oluşturabileceği Hıristiyan benlik teknolojilerinde olduğu gibi eleştirel bir jesttir. Ancak burada gerçek bir özneleşme sürecinden bahsedilebilir. Klasik Yoga etik ve münzevi bir uygulamadır, bu anlamda kişiyi etik bir özneye dönüştürme potansiyeline sahiptir. Bu yoga anlayışını, Foucault'nun kendilik kaygısından doğan etiği bir özgürlük pratiği olarak kabul etmesine uygun biçimde, etik bir pratik olarak değerlendirdiğimizde, kişiye iktidar ilişkilerine direnme özgürlüğü kapasitesi verme kapasitesi olduğu görülmektedir.

Modern Postural Yoga'yı, Foucault'yu izleyerek, kişinin kendisini değiştirme çabası olarak düşünürsek; bilimsel bilgi tarafından desteklenerek bilimsel hakikat söylemleri üreten güç ilişkilerine hizmet ettiği sonucuna ulaşabiliriz. Modern Postural Yoga, iktidarın özneye dayattığı hakikatin yasasını takip eder. Foucault'nun modernite ve aydınlanma tartışmasında da ele aldığı gibi; modern gerçekliğe uyum sağlayabilmek için kullanılan tekniklere daha yakındır. Dolayısıyla hakikat siyaseti içerisinde bir öznellik yaratma kapasitesinden yoksundur.

Özetle, Foucault, etik eylemi iktidar ilişkilerine direnen eleştirel bir eylem olarak tanımlar, ancak Modern Postural Yoga, bireyi kategorize eden bireyselleştirici güç ilişkileriyle paralellik gösterir. Etik öznellikler yerine neoliberal öznellikler yaratmaya yardımcı olur. Ayrıca Modern Postural Yoga'nın kurumsallaşması, Foucault'nun devam eden deneysel bir süreç olan etik eylem tanımından çok uzaktır; iktidar ilişkileri içinde kurumsallaşmış ve yapılandırılmıştır. Bilimsel bilgiye dayanan Modern Postural Yoga, dönüştürücülük olanaklılığına sahip değildir.

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