

THE UKRAINE WAR AND THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PERFORMANCE OF
RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FEBRUARY 2023

Approval of the thesis:

**THE UKRAINE WAR AND THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PERFORMANCE
OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE**

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ABSTRACT

THE UKRAINE WAR AND THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PERFORMANCE OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

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February 2023, 177 pages

This thesis aims to study the conflict between Ukraine and Russia and their public diplomacy implications. Contrary to the views of some scholars who argued that public diplomacy informs a wider audience as objectively as possible, this thesis argues that sometimes states use public diplomacy in order to promote their subjective positions by influencing the public opinion in national, regional, and global context. This thesis considers the use of public diplomacy in Ukraine and Russia as the affirmation of this hypothesis. In the first chapter, an introduction will be given. The thesis is composed of six chapters. After the introductory chapter, the second chapter focuses on the concept of public diplomacy. The third chapter scrutinizes the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The fourth chapter elaborates on Russia's public diplomacy, while in the fifth chapter Ukraine's public diplomacy is analysed. The concluding chapter discusses the main findings of this thesis.

Keywords: Post-Soviet Conflicts, Crimea, Donbas, public diplomacy, digital diplomacy.

ÖZ

UKRAYNA SAVAŞI VE RUSYA VE UKRAYNA'NIN KAMU DİPLOMASİ PERFORMANSLARI

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Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Oktay Fırat TANRISEVER

Şubat 2023, 177 sayfa

Bu tez, Ukrayna ve Rusya arasındaki çatışmayı ve kamu diplomasisi uygulamalarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Kamu diplomasisinin daha geniş bir kitleyi olabildiğince nesnel bir şekilde bilgilendirdiğini savunan bazı akademisyenlerin görüşlerinin aksine, bu tez devletlerin bazen ulusal, bölgesel ve küresel bağlamda kamuoyunu etkileyerek öznel konumlarını desteklemek için kamu diplomasisini kullandığını savunmaktadır. Bu tez, Ukrayna ve Rusya'da kamu diplomasisinin kullanımını da bu hipotezin doğrulanması olarak ele almaktadır. Tez altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünün ardından ikinci bölümde kamu diplomasisi kavramı üzerinde durulmaktadır. Üçüncü bölüm, Rus-Ukrayna çatışmasını irdelemektedir. Dördüncü bölümde Rusya'nın kamu diplomasisi, beşinci bölümde ise Ukrayna'nın kamu diplomasisi incelenmektedir. Sonuç bölümü, bu tezin ana bulgularını tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sovyet Sonrası atıřmalar, Kırım, Donbas, kamu diplomasisi, dijital diplomasi.

To my cats: Coco & Pasha

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay Fırat TANRISEVER for his guidance and encouragement throughout the period.

I would also like to thank the examining committee members; Assistant Professor Zerrin TORUN and Associate Professor Burak TANGÖR for their valuable contributions to the thesis. I would also like to thank my family, and my cats for their mental support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1.Scope and Objective.....	2
1.2. Research Questions	3
1.3. Literature Review	4
1.4. Argument.....	11
1.5. Research Method.....	13
1.6. Organization of the Thesis	13
2. WHAT IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?.....	15
2.1. Introduction	15
2.2. Alternative Definitions of Public Diplomacy?.....	15
2.3. Evolution of Public Diplomacy.....	20
2.4. Theoretical Approaches to Public Diplomacy	24
2.4.1. Realism and Public Diplomacy	24
2.4.2. Liberalism and Public Diplomacy.....	26
2.4.3. Constructivism and Public Diplomacy.....	27
2.5. Public Diplomacy as A Form of Soft Power	30
2.6. Types of Public Diplomacy	32
2.6.1. Cultural Diplomacy	32
2.6.2. Education and Exchange Diplomacy	33
2.6.3. Memory Diplomacy	34
2.6.4. Diaspora Diplomacy.....	35
2.6.5. Sport Diplomacy	35

2.7. Stages/Layers of Public Diplomacy	36
2.8. Conclusion.....	39
3. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA	41
3.1. Introduction	41
3.2. Historical Background	43
3.3. The Period 2013 – Now	50
3.4. Different Stages of Euromaidan.....	59
3.5. Crimean Tatars	59
3.6. Crimean Narratives	61
3.7. Results and Peace Attempts	62
3.8. Conclusion	68
4. RUSSIA’S USE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DURING THE UKRAINE WAR	70
4.1. Introduction	70
4.2. Russia’s Foreign Policy Preferences.....	70
4.3. Russian Media and Public Diplomacy	75
4.4. Speeches of Vladimir Putin, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Ministry Spokesperson	85
4.5. Diaspora Diplomacy.....	88
4.6. Public Diplomacy Institutions of Russia.....	90
4.7. Education Diplomacy.....	94
4.8. Economic and Cooperation Diplomacy	95
4.9. Sport Diplomacy	98
4.10. Conclusion	99
5. UKRAINE’S USE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DURING THE UKRAINE WAR	101
5.1. Introduction	101
5.2. Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Preferences.....	101
5.3. Education and Cultural Diplomacy	103
5.4. Economic and Cooperation Diplomacy	105
5.5. Ukrainian Media and Digital Diplomacy	109
5.6. Memory Diplomacy	116
5.7. Diaspora Diplomacy.....	118
5.8. Conclusion	119
CONCLUSION	120

REFERENCES.....	136
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET.....	158
B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU	177

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFU	Armed Forces of Ukraine
ATO	Anti-terrorist Operation Zone
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DCFTA	Deep And Comprehensive Free Trade Area
EAEU & EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EU	European Union
FSB	Federal Security Service
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GUAM	Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
MFA	Multifiber Arrangement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
RCC	Russian Community in Crimea
RIAC	Russian International Affairs Council
RT	Russia Today
SCR	People’s Front ‘Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia’
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
US	United States
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
PD	Public Diplomacy
TWIN	Transboundary Water In-Cooperation Network

WTO

World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many independent states occurred in the international system. Yet, their paths to independence have been painful in terms of political, social, and economic and entailed many problems within their territories which are later called as the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the literature. The reason why their obtainment of independence has been problematic is that these countries such as Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine are vulnerable and open to intervention coming, especially, from Russia. Russia has not lost its sphere of influence in these countries which causes duality in the domestic and foreign politics of those countries. Thus, Russia, maintaining these conflicts alive, tries to maintain its influence in these regions (Grossmann, 2018).

Following its collapse, in the same year, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine became independent. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union caused territorial problems within the newly independent states, including Ukraine. The conflict erupted in Crimea and Donbass region which was followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and by the complications with Russia backed separatist

forces in Donbas. As a result, the war broke out between Russia and Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022. In today's politics, not only traditional diplomacy, but also public diplomacy is used for an effective foreign policy. Both Ukraine and Russia use public diplomacy in different forms and degrees, especially during the conflict. This paper is going to analyse the concept of public diplomacy, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and how they use public diplomacy.

1.1. Scope and Objective

This thesis works towards understanding the conflict between Ukraine and Russia and their public diplomacy implications. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought several territorial problems in which Russia intervened in these regions which resulted in what the literature calls "frozen conflicts" including the conflict of Ukraine and Russia. Even though, the conflict seems to stem from ethnic and territorial problems, the main reason why the conflict does not cease is Russia's involvement (Grossmann, 2018).

Besides all, public diplomacy is one of the most significant components of both Ukraine's and Russia's foreign policy to develop international cooperation and enhance the image of their countries. However, public diplomacy implications of Ukraine and Russia differ since, first of all, their aims and target audiences are different; while Russia tries to target its domestic audience and its compatriots and develop cooperation with them, Ukraine tries to eradicate the influence of Russia and

resorts to the West to get support and recognition in its fight for independence against Russia. Another difference is the capacity both countries have in order to implement public diplomacy. While Russia has more powerful tools and resources to conduct public diplomacy in an active way, Ukraine has to follow a more passive diplomacy with limited resources which usually rely on social media, its diaspora and the support from the West. Russia, on the other hand, has the power to conduct an active public diplomacy through its economic, military, cultural, as well as its diaspora power.

1.2. Research Questions

To understand the basis of and to explain the conflict between Ukraine and Russia and their use of public diplomacy during the Ukraine war, this thesis tries to answer the following research questions: 1) What are the causes of the conflict? 2) On which are their public diplomacy implications based? 3) Whose public diplomacy can be considered more successful? First of all, the conflict should be analysed through the following questions: What the conflict/war does not cease? Why are the existing results of the conflict/war? How do Russia and Ukraine use public diplomacy to mitigate the results and effects of the war? Therefore, a historical analysis along with an analysis of the post 2013 period, the conflict should be scrutinized to understand both countries' foreign policy objectives.

It is assumed that the foreign policy preferences of Ukraine and Russia shaped their public diplomacy. For that, it is necessary to analyze the evolution of their foreign policy to have a better understanding of their foreign policy goals. With which countries they strive for closer relations? What kind of foreign policy they follow? What kind of a political context they are in? Concerning their use of public diplomacy, the following questions are crucial; What are the target audience of Ukraine and Russia? Which public diplomacy instruments do they employ? Does their public diplomacy remain subjective or aim at spreading information as objectively as possible? Thus, the analysis of Russia's and Ukraine's public diplomacy requires to figure out and evaluate both external and internal driving forces.

1.3. Literature Review

Concerning the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the literature analyses these conflicts either within the framework of international law, or ethnic and cultural problems, or Russia-related factors. Laurinavičiūtė and Biekša (2015), argue whether or not these secessionist movements can be justified within the scope of international law. Initially, they argue if these minority groups can be depicted as 'peoples' and state, "There is no sufficient evidence that Karabakh Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russians and Ukrainians in Transdnistria and Russians in Crimea have a collective individuality, therefore, they cannot qualify as "peoples"" (Laurinavičiūtė & Biekša, 2015, p.71).

Afterwards, they analyse whether or not there has been a 'systematic violence' towards these minority groups for them to justify their secessionist movements, however, it turns out that there has been no such violence that menaces their existence prior to the conflicts (Laurinavičiūtė & Biekša, 2015, p.72). They also examine if the fact that a referendum was held in Crimea justifies the annexation under the name of 'self-determination', however, since the Russian military was present during the time of referendum, it cannot be completely perceived as a self-determined decision (Laurinavičiūtė & Biekša, 2015, p.71). Therefore, they argue that these secessionist conflicts have no grounds in international law.

Another stream of research analyses these conflicts within ethnocultural problems. Akbaba (2018), argues that after the Cold War, sub-identities have been stimulated and become significant (p.102). He further examines the conflicts separately and states that in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georginization was the main problem, and similarly in Transnistria, the Russian-speaking population was threatened due to the new language law (p.110-111). Therefore, according to Akbaba, the conflicts occurred since these sub-identities were under the impression that their culture and language were threatened. Therefore, it is argued that the conflicts stem from problems related to diasporas and ethnic minorities. Thus, in the case of Russia and Ukraine, it would be the Russians and Russian speaking population in Crimea and Donbas who felt threatened and kindled the conflict.

Last stream of research perceives these conflicts as a result of Russian foreign policy and world politics. Grossman (2018) asserts that Russia, by creating buffer-zones, tries to exercise its influence on post-Soviet countries (Grossman, 2018, p.52). Further, he argues that Russia tries to impede the European and NATO integration in these countries, and to increase its military presence in these regions (Grossman, 2018, p.52). Therefore, according to him, Russia freezes these conflicts on purpose in order to gain economic, political, and military advantage from them. In parallel, Kozłowski (2016) also claims that “Frozen conflicts are the best emanation of the dominant Russian strategy in the Post-Soviet Space. They epitomize Russian perceptions, ambitions and modes of thought in regards to the region” (Kozłowski, 2016, p.282).

Therefore, according to him, Russia’s understanding of ‘near abroad’ and its paternalistic attitude towards the post-Soviet countries are the main cause (Kozłowski, 2016, p.299). Likewise, Kang (2020) sees the cause of the conflict in Ukraine as a result of “Russia’s neocolonial assertiveness and interventionism” (Kang, 2020, p.18). Peña-Ramos (2017), on the other hand, also sees Russia’s politics as the driving factor but in the context of energy; he argues that maintaining these conflicts massively benefits Russia’s geo-energy interests (Peña-Ramos, 2017, p.11). For example, after the sanctions against Russia imposed by the West, Russia, by importing gas only in rubles, prevented the devaluation of rubles and instead, led to its appreciation (Papadia & Demertzis, 2022).

However, it does not technically mean that cultural and ethnic problems do not have any influence, it is only argued that Russia's politics is the main driving factor along with the other reasons. According to the mainstream literature the thesis accepts the argument of the last group; Russia tries to maintain the continuity of the conflict for both maintaining its influence on the region and gaining economic and political benefits.

Concerning public diplomacy, even though there are alternative definitions of the concept, it is mostly argued that public diplomacy has different components, needs to have long-term goals, and should not be confused with soft power and propaganda. However, there are definitions such as Tuch's which argues that public diplomacy is based on government's communication with the international community to specify its ideas, goals, culture, and institutions (Gilboa, 2008, p.57). Likewise, Gifford Malone (2010), argues that "The core idea is one of direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately that of their governments. It embraces programs in both the government and private sectors, the latter often sponsored or inspired by the former" (Malone, 2010, p.199). Thus, he refers to the supremacy of government over private sectors in practising public diplomacy.

On the other hand, the most common definition of public diplomacy is Edmund Gullion's, that is, "Public diplomacy refers to 'the process by which direct relations

with people in another country are pursued' by state and non-state actors 'to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented'" (Rawnsley, 2016, p.42). Other scholars affirm this broad definition of public diplomacy which consists of enhancing relations and communication, spreading its values and ideas through both governmental and non-governmental actors (Nye, 2008; Cull, 2008; Castells, 2008; Ekşi, 2017; Gregory, 2014; Tam & Kim, 2019). Teresa La Porte (2012) also advocates the idea that public diplomacy is not limited within the government, however, she points out at the legitimacy of non-state actors by stating "when developing public diplomacy actions, it is therefore crucial for the legitimacy of (inter)national non -state actors (1) to prove that they represent the common values of the general public, linked with universal values in the case of global actions; (2) that their criteria or working principles be transparent, participative, and consensual; and (3) that their actions show effectiveness" (La Porte, 2012, p.453). This thesis is going to employ the realist view of public diplomacy with regards to the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, which primarily relies on states and state actors.

With regards to the use of public diplomacy in conflicts, it is analysed through different examples in the literature. One group analyses the Cold War era and how the United States used public diplomacy against the propaganda of the Soviet Union and Communism. The importance of the Voice of America in terms of diffusing information about the war and America's frequent use of cultural, educational, and exchange diplomacy to create its own propaganda against that of the Soviet Union and

the role of United States Information Agency (USIA) in terms of telling the U.S' side of the story are emphasized (Güneş, 2018; Aydın, 2022).

Some other studies are concerned with the war in Iraq. The news in the United States, during the war in Iraq, had negative assessments of the principal Iraqi people than in other countries (Kolmer & Semetko, 2009). Similarly, in the UK, the voice of the coalition has been stressed more than the Iraqis and shaped the story of the war accordingly (Robinson, Goddard & Parry, 2009). On the other hand, the public diplomacy of the US during the conflict in Iraq is proven to be not effective according to some groups of scholars. It is stated that the contradiction of the US actions and discourses as well as the use of hard power made it difficult to achieve an effective public diplomacy, especially toward the Arab World (van Ham, 2003; Cherribi, 2009).

In addition to that, public diplomacy implications in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are also examined in the literature. It is argued that, both sides try to legitimize the violent acts and justify their righteousness through dividing the society as 'us' versus 'them', indicating the number of casualties, and the political context in which they are in (Yarchi, 2018; Simonsen, 2019). China's public diplomacy towards the US during Pearl Harbour, on the other hand, relied on internationalizing the conflict, on the US sanctions against Japan, and US support to China (Akio, 2010).

Apart from military conflicts, public diplomacy can be used in other types of conflict to reach a resolution. For instance, Panikkar (2019) gives the example of Transboundary Water In-cooperation Network (TWIN) and its role in regulating the water governance in the Kabul River Basin between Pakistan and Afghanistan through equal sharing of water, peaceful resolutions including the stakeholders as well as the public (Panikkar, 2019).

Not only states, but non-state actors such as rebels and terrorist organizations are engaged in public diplomacy. Mattiaci and Jones (2020) argue how rebels try to obtain legitimacy from the international community to get support within and outside their country during civil wars (Mattiacci & Jones, 2020). On the other hand, terrorist organizations foster their messages by the virtue of internet more easily and seek to gain international support and recognition, while ‘total conflict organizations’ are completely against the status-quo, emerge as revisionists and try to change it.

Therefore, public diplomacy is analysed in different types of conflict, from inter-state conflicts to civil wars. However, the main idea of public diplomacy remains the same even though the type of the conflict changes. State or non-state actors try to promote their side of the story, their interests, and beliefs to internationalize the issue, to get support from their target audiences and countries, and to gain recognition as well as legitimacy. This thesis also employs the same understanding to the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, arguing that both states try to get support and legitimacy from

their own target countries through using different public diplomacy tools with different capacities.

1.4. Argument

Contrary to the views of some scholars who argued that public diplomacy informs a wider audience as objectively as possible, this thesis argues that sometimes states use public diplomacy in order to promote their subjective positions by influencing the public opinion in national, regional, and global context. This thesis considers the use of public diplomacy in Ukraine and Russia as the affirmation of this hypothesis. Both Ukraine and Russia use different public diplomacy tools in different degrees, however, they are still limited inside the range of a certain audience and do not aim at diffusing objective information. For example, it can be argued that Zelenskyy uses social media, in other words, digital diplomacy, more effectively than Putin does (Feiner, 2022).

While Zelenskyy publishes videos with his army, on the street, and represents himself as a warrior for his country, Putin gives interviews in a very formal atmosphere. While Zelenskyy uses social media and constantly has virtual meetings or talks with European countries and international organizations such as the United Nations and calls them to apply harsher sanctions against Russia, Putin seems more isolated from the international community (Belton, 2022). In fact, the only difference is the target audience of Russia and Ukraine. While Ukraine focuses on the West to get support for

its self-representation as a separate European state, Russia is more fond of the East through the Eurasian and Chinese cooperation.

For example, Russia contributed massively to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and recognized their independency (Gerrits & Bader, 2016). Russia has stable relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan; exercising its influence on these regions and benefitting from the conflict between them by selling weapons and increasing their independency to itself. However, when it comes to the West, Russia has no direct public diplomacy implications other than hosting many international sporting events, which contributed to Russia a lot at that time in terms of tourism, cultural recognition as well as creating its nationhood.

On the other hand, since Ukraine does not possess such powerful tools, its public diplomacy is limited to asking for support from the West and its diaspora, using mostly social media. Therefore, different public diplomacy implications can be observed for Ukraine and Russia, and they can be considered as 'effective' bearing their objectives in mind, that are, for the Ukrainian part, decreasing the influence of Russia and for the Russian part, increasing its sphere of influence in 'near abroad'. Nevertheless, Ukraine's public diplomacy can be considered as more successful in view of its very limited resources compared to that of Russia.

1.5. Research Method

In order to analyse the post-Soviet conflicts and their public diplomacy implications, first, the concept of public diplomacy should be elaborated and then the definitions should be employed while studying the countries' public diplomacy. On the other hand, to analyse the conflict, its historical background, evaluation, existing results, and consequences should be assessed.

In that sense, a multi-method approach is going to be taken to attain the research goals and strategy. Concerning the quantitative data, trade statistics are going to be used to indicate Ukraine's drift from Russia to the West. In addition, documentary analysis will be used such as the analysis of library resources, academic studies, newspapers in Turkish, English, and Russian.

1.6. Organization of the Thesis

This thesis consists of 6 chapters. In the first chapter, an introduction will be given including the scope and objective, the literature review, the argument, the research method, and the organization of the thesis.

In the second chapter, the concept of public diplomacy is going to be elaborated; its definitions, stages/layers, different types, evolution, the theoretical approaches to the concept, and its relationship with soft power.

In the third chapter, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is going to be examined, namely, its historical background, reasons, and existing consequences.

In the fourth chapter, Russia's use of public diplomacy is studied, while in the fifth chapter Ukraine's public diplomacy is analysed. Depending on their capacity, targeted public, and tools, the type/types of public diplomacy they use changes.

In the sixth chapter, concluding remarks will be given. It is argued that each country uses public diplomacy with a limited and subjective character according to their long-term goals. Despite their limited and subjective character, their implications can be considered as successful within their current foreign policy goals. Ukraine's ultimate goal is to get the support of the West and diminish the Russian influence, whereas Russia's is to increase its dominance in 'near abroad' or 'near Russia'. Ukraine's involvement in public diplomacy, considering its limited resources, can be seen as more successful than that of Russia.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

2.1. Introduction

In this section, the concept of public diplomacy is going to be elaborated including its alternative definitions, evolution, different theoretical approaches, stages/layers, its differences with soft power, and its different types. The concept of public diplomacy has become a crucial aspect of foreign policy albeit there is no common definition. Along with the absence of a common definition, the concept of public diplomacy is often confused with the concept of soft power. In this section, different definitions of public diplomacy are going to be given and the preferred definition is going to be specified.

2.2. Alternative Definitions of Public Diplomacy?

Public diplomacy was first introduced by former U.S. diplomat Edmund A. Guillon in 1965 as ““Public diplomacy...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of

international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications”” (Jowett & O’Donnell 2012, p.287). James Pamment (2011) defines public diplomacy as “the communication of a nation’s foreign policies to citizens in sovereign states other than one’s own” (Pamment, 2011, p.313).

He further emphasizes the importance of objectiveness by stating “plans for public diplomacy work must include objective indicators, target audiences and evaluation plans in order to receive funding” (Pamment, 2011, p.320). Malone assumes public diplomacy as “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments” (Gilboa, 2008, p.57). Later, Tuch defines it as “a government’s process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies” (Gilboa, 2008, p.57). Moreover, Frederick further adds that “activities, directed abroad in the fields of information, education, and culture, whose objective is to influence a foreign government, by influencing its citizens.”” (Gilboa, 2008, p.57).

On the other hand, Bruce Gregory (2014) argues that public diplomacy used to be a government-based foreign policy instrument whose aim was to influence the government, whereas in today's world "public diplomacy and the analogous term strategic communication describe an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour; build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values." (Gregory, 2014, p.7). According to Manuel Castells (2008), public diplomacy is "the diplomacy of the public, that is, the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the public" (Castells, 2008, p.91). The University of Southern California (USC) Center on Public Diplomacy defines it as "the public, interactive dimension of diplomacy which is not only global in nature, but also involves a multitude of actors and networks" (CPD, 2018).

Signitzer and Coombs, on the other hand, interpreted public diplomacy as "the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government's foreign policy decisions" (Gilboa, 2008, p.57). Furthermore, Geun Lee and Kadir Ayhan (2015) explain public diplomacy as "a tool used by state and non-state actors for objectives such as advocacy, influence, agenda-setting and mobilization; reinforcing other foreign policy objectives; promotion and prestige; correcting misperceptions; dialogue and mutual understanding; and harmony based on universal values" (Lee & Ayhan, 2015, p.60). Lastly, Joseph Nye (2008) sees the

public diplomacy as “an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments” (Nye, 2008, p.95).

As can be seen from the definitions above, there are different understandings of what public diplomacy is. While in some definitions public diplomacy is seen as a more state-centric instrument that differentiates public diplomacy from the traditional diplomacy only through the significance of foreign publics, in other definitions the concept of “the new public diplomacy” is affirmed which is more comprehensive and embraces new actors such as the non-governmental organizations with a distinct emphasis on cultures and attitudes (Ayhan & Lee, 2015, p.57). This paper employs the realist view of public diplomacy to post-Soviet countries considering their limited and subjective implications.

To have a better understanding of what public diplomacy is, the meaning of ‘public’ is quite important. “According to the most contemporary English dictionary definitions, the word ‘public’ has three common connotations today. It is used to refer to (1) the people/the republic (the people-connotation), (2) to describe a quality of a statement or performance as being in open view (the quality connotation) or (3) as something belonging to the public, i.e., state institutions” (La Cour, 2018, p.26). The meaning which the public in public diplomacy is associated with is the people connotation. The people connotation has its own evolutionary path. According to

Wilson, the public is educated male citizens of a nation and the world, whereas for Nicolson the public has become educated citizens of both sexes in a nation (La Cour, 2018). While Kissinger referred to all citizens in a nation, Nye expanded the understanding of the public by mentioning all citizens of both a nation and the world as well as transnational groups of people (La Cour, 2018, p.27). Thus, the meaning of the public in public diplomacy has evolved over time.

What are the characteristics attributed to the public in each of the understanding? Wilson saw the public as the ‘heart-blood’ of self-determination who can make sage foreign policy decisions, whereas for Nicolson the public is an emotional and irrational entity that does not have enough knowledge of foreign affairs and that can be educated at the same time (La Cour, 2018, p.26). Concerning Kissinger’s view on the public, he believes that the public is quite sensitive to propaganda with a militaristic tendency and thus hard to control, while according to Nye even though the public might get anxious over foreign affairs but should be educated and included into diplomacy (La Cour, 2018, p.27). Therefore, the elites represented optimistic and pessimistic views of the public in different periods.

On the basis of these views of the public and the characteristics of the public, each has a different definition of public diplomacy. Wilson stated that public diplomacy is “sharing of written opinion statements between negotiating delegations” (La Cour, 2018, p.29). Regarding Nicolson, public diplomacy is “diplomatic conferences where

negotiation takes place in front of the microphone while being transmitted by radio” (La Cour, 2018, p.29). On the other hand, Kissinger defined public diplomacy as “the formal negotiations happening via standardized diplomatic channels” (La Cour, 2018, p.29). Moreover, they all argued that it should be conducted by state leaders and diplomats (La Cour, 2018, p.29). As regards Nye, he interpreted public diplomacy as a diplomacy “directly addressing the public with targeted communication and selected information” (La Cour, 2018, p.29). Distinctively, he asserted that it should/can be conducted by NGO’s, citizens, and private companies along with states leaders and diplomats (La Cour, 2018, p.29).

Briefly, while Wilson and Nye have a positive attitude towards the public and do not mention what should be secret from the public, Nicolson and Kissinger have relatively a negative attitude towards the public and argue that negotiations and policies should be secret from the public since the public is an irrational and emotional entity (La Cour, 2018, p.30). Therefore, the concept of public diplomacy is quite different from the one that was introduced in 1960s. In the next section, the evolution of public diplomacy is going to be analysed more in depth.

2.3. Evolution of Public Diplomacy

During the second World War and Cold War, radio was the main means for public diplomacy along with Voice of America, Radio Moscow, etc. (Rawnsley, 2016, p.43).

Thus, “In the Basic Cold War model, a government uses its own means of communication, such as radio stations, to conduct public diplomacy” (Gilboa, 2008, p.60). However, after the Cold-War, the world conjuncture has changed drastically, and the bipolar world gave its place to a multi-polar and a more interdependent one (Gilboa, 2008). The change in the system and different dynamics changed the concept of diplomacy as well (Gilboa, 2008). Apart from the evolution of the meaning of the public and the evolution of public diplomacy stemming from it, there is also an evolution arising from the globalization process and the development of technology (Castells, 2008). “The structure of opportunities for political action is no longer defined by the national/international dualism but is now located in the “global” arena. Global politics have turned into global domestic politics, which rob national politics of their boundaries and foundations” (Castells, 2008, p.82).

Therefore, the line between the national and global politics has become even more blurred as non-governmental actors have become more influential (Castells, 2008). “In every country, there are local civil society actors who defend local or sectoral interests, as well as specific values against or beyond the formal political process” (Castells, 2008, p.83). For example, labour unions, interest groups could be an example. “As a result of these crises and the decreased ability of governments to mitigate them, nongovernmental actors become the advocates of the needs, interests, and values of people at large, thus further undermining the role of governments in response to challenges posed by globalization and structural transformation” (Castells, 2008,

p.83). Hence, in the times of a crisis, it is not only the situation in the country to be controlled, but also the societal movement and their capacity to bring the issue on the international arena (Castells, 2008).

The public now has the opportunity to influence the international audience as a response to a crisis in their country (Castells, 2008). “The decreased ability of nationally based political systems to manage the world’s problems on a global scale has induced the rise of a global civil society” (Castells, 2008, p.83). As a consequence, non-governmental organizations came into the scene. They are often called ‘global civil society’ which touch upon global issues operating outside the government (Castells, 2008, p.84).

In essence, Castells divides the expression of global civil society into four groups; ‘local civil society actors’ which advocates for local interests and specific values (e.g., the labour movement), ‘nongovernmental organizations’ which care for global issues, ‘Social movements that aim to control the process of globalization’ which try to shape the impact of globalization and lastly, ‘the movement of public opinion’ which is composed of specific mobilizations through communication and information sharing (e.g., the protests against the Iraq War in 2003) (Castells, 2008, p.83-85). Therefore, the global civil society has grown into different categories with different targets (Castells, 2008).

However, the question is how legitimate they can be? Concerning the legitimacy issue, as La Porte (2012) argues, there are three important points to be fulfilled on the part of non-governmental actors/organizations; the first one is manifesting that they defend and represent common values and/or universal values, the next one is operating in a transparent and democratic way through citizens participation, and the last one is showing effectiveness (La Porte, 2012, p.453). They bear responsibility towards the public for what they do and by fulfilling those responsibilities with the participation of citizens, non-governmental actors gain the trust of the public, and therefore legitimacy (La Porte, 2012).

Another reason for the evolution of public diplomacy is the spread of democratic regimes which as a result generates pressure on the society to question the legitimacy of their governments and the information technologies which enable a faster information circulation without boundaries and a creation of transnational public opinions (Gurgu & Cociuban, 2016, p.131). The most significant components of information technologies are the internet and the global news networks such as CNN International (Gilboa, 2008, p.56).

While in the past, mostly state officials could communicate with the world, in today's world, individuals and non-governmental organizations have the chance to demonstrate themselves to the world, communicate with each other about the global issues and mobilize, but most significantly, brand themselves to the world by the virtue

of these information technologies. Thus, information technologies have the capacity to shape and change politics (Ekşi, 2017, p.13). Such developments have led to an increase in the actors involved and widened the focus of public diplomacy which was only on government officials before (Ekşi, 2017).

2.4. Theoretical Approaches to Public Diplomacy

Another reason for this separation of what public diplomacy is the difference between theoretical approaches. For example, realists would argue that only states have the capacity to create an impact on the international arena, whereas liberals would recognize the role of non-state actors and individuals in public diplomacy in terms of building relations and making a difference in the international system (Ayhan & Lee, 2015, p. 66). On the other hand, constructivists would assert that “individuals and nonstate actors can play important roles in changing the current discourses in the international system by influencing reconstruction of prevalent ideas, norms, beliefs, and, in turn, the interests of states about their surroundings” (Ayhan & Lee, 2015, p.66). In this section, different theoretical approaches to the concept of public diplomacy are going to be analysed.

2.4.1. Realism and Public Diplomacy

Realism bases public diplomacy on two hypotheses; states are the main actors and power, and national security are the main concerns of states (Yun & Toth, 2009,

p.494). Thus, realists would insist on a more state-centric public diplomacy. Moreover, since realism defines the world system through anarchy, the absence of trust, security dilemma, and war are at the centre of focus of public diplomacy ensuring “public diplomacy to be in the service of power politics and national security” (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.494). Therefore, “realists see the immediate utilities of public diplomacy mainly in the form of war propaganda” (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.494). Moreover, it is also argued that public diplomacy is nothing but ‘propaganda’ and ‘psychological warfare’ (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.494). Considering the war in Ukraine, it can be seen that both parties try to spread its propaganda through public diplomacy and conflicts are at the centre of the discourse.

The U.S. public diplomacy during and after the Cold War can be an example for realist public diplomacy; during “the first Iraq War (1992), the Haiti intervention (1994), and the Kosovo War (1999)” (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.495). Concerning the post-Cold War period, “The September 11 terrorist attacks and the following Afghanistan (2001) and second Iraq War (2004) quickly positioned U.S. public diplomacy in the service of the War against Terrorism” (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.495). In addition to all, economic and political aid to developing and underdeveloped countries to win hearts of their citizens occupied a significant part of the U.S. public diplomacy (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.495). The same example can be seen in Russia’s public diplomacy in both the conflict in Ukraine and in other post-Soviet conflicts; how it recognized the independence of

Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic and helped them economically and militarily (Gerrits & Bader, 2016).

2.4.2. Liberalism and Public Diplomacy

Contrary to Realism, Liberalism argues that states are not the only main actors as national security is not the main concern and their influence keep decreasing (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.496). “Still acknowledging national security though, they define national security and interests from a wide perspective of transnational economic, social, and ecological issues emanating from the growth of globalism” (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.496). Thus, globalization and growing interdependence have changed the world conjuncture and new actors have entered to the scene such as NGO’s. Therefore, according to Liberalism, unlike Realism, the aim of public diplomacy should be making the country’s values and norms attractive for other countries (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.496).

Liberalism sees two types of public diplomacy; when a country’s norms and values are closer to the dominating ones and when a country has numerous communication channels (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.497). The European Union can be an example for the first one since the fundamental values of the European Union are quite widespread and leading norms in the world (Bentzen, 2020). Canada or Norway could be an example for the second one whose public diplomacy which is “centred on building a behavioral, cooperative partnership, in which the country enables the passive, foreign audiences

to work together to address transnational challenges” (Yun & Toth, 2009, p.497). Especially the concept of human security which was embodied within the foreign policy of Norway and Canada and the cooperation around it have helped ameliorate the image of these countries in the international arena (King & Murray, 2001).

2.4.3. Constructivism and Public Diplomacy

Constructivism is a theory based on social aspects of the international relations rather than material aspects (Prabhu & Mohapatra, 2014, p.227). In other words, materially identical things are perceived differently by different actors (Prabhu & Mohapatra, 2014). “Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life” (Prabhu & Mohapatra, 2014, p.227). Thus, unlike Realism, constructivism values the perception, identities, emotions, norms, and beliefs which shape the society overall (Prabhu & Mohapatra, 2014). Therefore, public diplomacy through the lenses of constructivism gains even a broader perspective than it gets through Liberalism.

In the first section where different definitions of public diplomacy are given, Bruce Gregory’s (2014) definition is also mentioned; “public diplomacy has come to mean an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” (Gregory, 2014, p.7). On the bases of this definition which is one of the

broadest and the most comprehensive definitions, the new public diplomacy almost completely corresponds to Constructivism since Constructivism even further emphasizes on the significance of cultures, behaviors, interactions, in short, all human aspects that can be thought of (Gregory, 2014). “Effective modern PD is widely accepted to represent a ‘two-way street’, that projects in such a way as to solicit an interpretation and response from the receiver, including through but also encourages listening and genuine dialogue with publics” (Byrne, 2012, p.4).

Similarly, constructivism underpins the significance of “mutually constitutive interactions between ideational structures and actors” (Byrne, 2012, p.4). For example, nationalism can be damaging to public diplomacy since nationalism would prevent a nation from learning from other nations, being affected by them, and emphasizing with them, which would eventually ruin public diplomacy whose aim is to create bridges between foreign nations (Tam & Lee, 2017, p.231).

Yet, Rogers Brubaker asserts that “nations are not by any means “enduring components of social structure”; they are constructed, contingent and fluctuating, they are “illusory or spurious communities,” and an “ideological smokescreen” (Walicki, 1998, p.611). Therefore, Constructivist Public Diplomacy would argue that the concept of nationalism is socially constructed and shaped over time and thus the concept as a whole is vague which as a result provides a broader understanding of public diplomacy without the restrictions of nationhood (Walicki, 1998).

Nevertheless, in the case of Ukraine and Russia, it can be observed that nationhood occupies a significant place in their public diplomacy (Laruelle, 2014).

Another crucial aspect of Constructivist Public Diplomacy can be the inclusion of 'emotion' which is also a part of the human aspect. Stereotypes are important in public diplomacy which are emotional reflections of the self and the other (Graham, 2014, p.535). "PD practices must therefore carefully consider processes of self-representation as they seek to influence target audiences, given that articulating one's own self-stereotypes constitutes a performance of boundaries and exclusion" (Graham, 2014, p.535). Thus, for an effective public diplomacy, constructivists would argue that identifying the self and the other with an inclusion of emotions for a better communication is a must (Graham, 2014).

In addition to all, 'Positioning Theory' is also a supporting component of Constructivist public diplomacy, which "explains how people use discourse (understood both as text and action) to locate themselves and others" (Pavón-Guinea, 2021, p.2). Here, both the human aspect and interactions are considered (Pavón-Guinea, 2021). Not only state-state relations but also state-individual and individual-individual interactions are crucial in public diplomacy (Pavón-Guinea, 2021). Since dialogues are at the heart of public diplomacy, how individuals place themselves within these dialogues also becomes important (Pavón-Guinea, 2021).

There are three elements of positioning theory: positions, speech acts, and storylines (Pavón-Guinea, 2021). “Positions are defined as ‘the momentary clusters of rights and duties to speak and act in a certain way’” (Pavón-Guinea, 2021, p.5). ‘Speech acts’ are the actions to authorize the position, whereas storylines organize the course of actions and interactions in a dialogue (Pavón-Guinea, 2021, p.6). Thus, positioning theory helps to examine identities/positions of different international actors, narratives and storylines in different contexts, assignments of the actors involved and where conversations take place and how they affect the power structure and actors. In line with these elements, it can be interpreted that positioning theory creates a connection between individuals, discourses, dialogues, and public diplomacy (Pavón-Guinea, 2021).

2.5. Public Diplomacy as A Form of Soft Power

The concepts of public diplomacy and soft power are often confused. According to Joseph Nye (2008) Soft Power is “getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them” (Nye, 2008, p.95). Thus, both public diplomacy and soft power are non-coercive means. However, Joseph Nye (2008) further argues that “Good public diplomacy has to go beyond propaganda.... Conveying information and selling a positive image is part of it, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies” (Nye, 2008, p.101). Therefore, the first difference between public diplomacy and soft power is the ultimate purpose; while public diplomacy aims

for long-term partnerships/relations and ideals, soft power's aims can simply focus on some short-term outcomes which do not necessarily hold promise for the future (Nye, 2008).

He further argues that public diplomacy is part of producing soft power (Nye, 2008, p.108). Nevertheless, public diplomacy refers to an older and a wider concept than soft power (Yağmurlu, 2019, p.135). Thus, public diplomacy also contains nation-branding and enhancing the country's image as well as prestige, however, they are not necessarily the ultimate goal of public diplomacy (Yağmurlu, 2019).

Another difference is that public diplomacy involves credibility, openness and self-criticism, misinformation and manipulation should not be part of a well implemented public diplomacy, whereas propaganda as a part of soft power might contain such manipulations (Lebedeva, 2020, p.297-298). Thus, public diplomacy should be based on actions rather than speaking as mentioned above, it must go beyond speaking (Lebedeva, 2020). Otherwise, building long term relations or outcomes may not be realizable. In other words, public diplomacy should be related to 'policy' (Nye, 2008).

Lastly, as mentioned earlier, public diplomacy has different equally important layers which are monologue, dialogue, and collaboration. To put it another way, public diplomacy is also about 'two-way dialogues' (Ulusoy, 2018, p.145). Hence, it is about

listening, understanding the situation and the needs, communicating on a mutual basis, evaluating/caring for feedbacks and opinions, and lastly building a collaboration accordingly with the participation of both government officials, NGOs, individuals (Ulusoy, 2018). There are different occasions in which public diplomacy or soft power operate better. In addition to that, there are common domains through which both public diplomacy and soft power are nourished (Nye, 2008). Yet, these two concepts should not be confused.

2.6. Types of Public Diplomacy

There are different types of public diplomacy such as cultural diplomacy, sport diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and so on even though some of the new types of public diplomacy such as digital diplomacy is yet to be defined conclusively. In this section, they are going to be examined in order to understand the broad spectrum of public diplomacy.

2.6.1. Cultural Diplomacy

According to Cull (2008), “Cultural diplomacy is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad” (Cull, 2008, p.33). Afterwards, he gives the example of the British Council and Italian Cultural Institute (Cull, 2008, p.33). Such organizations operate in different countries and their aim is to

represent their own culture by introducing and spreading it. Ociepka (2018) perceives cultural diplomacy as an instrument “to reduce the cultural distance between nations” (Ociepka, 2018, p.297).

For a broader example, the European Union formed EU Cultural Diplomacy Platform in order to have a better external cultural policy through activities with cultural investors, cooperation with global creative sectors, etc. (European Commission, Culture and Creativity, n.d.). Moreover, in Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations (2016), the role of culture in terms of fighting radicalization, promoting peace, sustainable social and economic development and cooperation in cultural heritage is emphasized (Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, 2016, p.5). Thus, discarding cultural barriers can be an important step towards building long lasting relations with different countries.

2.6.2. Education and Exchange Diplomacy

Nicholas J. Cull (2008) defines exchange diplomacy as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or acculturation” (Cull, 2008, p.33). He further gives the example of Fulbright Scholarship of the U.S. (Cull, 2008, p.34). Another example would be Confucius Institute Scholarship program

which enables foreign students to take part in language education program (Zhu, 2021, p.9). Thus, education diplomacy can also be included in exchange diplomacy.

Zielinska (2016) characterized educational diplomacy as “spreading positive knowledge about and attitudes towards a given country through mobility of students and academic professionals (sending them to study or work abroad or accepting foreigners at own universities, promoting own educational system” (Zielinska, 2016, p.11). Exchange and educational diplomacy are complementary to cultural diplomacy; both aims at dealing with cultural problems.

2.6.3. Memory Diplomacy

Zielinska (2016) asserts that historical diplomacy is “promotion of appropriate aspects of a given country’s history and of a preferred historical narrative in order to build a positive image abroad” (Zielinska, 2016, p.12). History is extremely important in politics and countries’ relations with each other. Ociepka calls historical diplomacy as ‘politics of memory’ and gives the example of Poland and its close relations with Baltic states due to the common history they have (Ociepka, 2018, p.297). Similarly, Russia has close relations with some post-Soviet countries by the virtue of the common past (Pavlenko, 2008).

2.6.4. Diaspora Diplomacy

Diasporas have become crucial actors in international politics as well. Goirizelaia (2019) argues that “diaspora members are potential actors in the international relations, in the relations between the countries and in the public diplomacy of their country of origin and their host country” (Goirizelaia, 2019, p.281). What diaspora diplomacy does is allowing the diaspora state to have an impact on another country’s culture, economy, and politics (Goirizelaia, 2019, p.281). Actually, in diaspora diplomacy, there is the same logic as exchange diplomacy; welcoming foreigners to the country and exerting influence through them. Armenia can be a great example of using diaspora diplomacy (Ho & McCornell, 2019).

2.6.5. Sport Diplomacy

Sport has also become a crucial instrument for public diplomacy. “Sports-diplomacy falls under the wide umbrella of public diplomacy. It involves representative and diplomatic activities undertaken by sports people on behalf of and in conjunction with their governments” (Murray, 2012, p.8). Sport can be used to enhance bilateral relations, represent a good image of the country, spread values, and gain prestige. For instance, “the “ping-pong diplomacy” between China and the United States, “cricket diplomacy” between India and Pakistan, “hockey diplomacy” between Canada and the USSR or even “baseball diplomacy” between Cuba and the United States” (Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, n.d., p.5). Such sport events help break the ice between disputed countries and pave the way for friendly diplomacy (Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, n.d.).

The Olympic Games are also another good example. “Countries, communities and non-governmental organizations are targeting the Olympic Games, trying to reach local, national and international goals. The Olympic Games are getting bigger and with the ever-technological development of media and social media, they reach larger population” (Dubinsky, 2019, p.37). Therefore, such sport occasions facilitate relations and promote countries’ values and image and thus are a powerful public diplomacy instrument (Dubinsky, 2019). Another advantage of sport diplomacy is that sport is universal and can gather all different kinds of cultures together (Heere et al, 2013). It is a strong language that everyone can speak regardless of their origins.

2.7. Stages/Layers of Public Diplomacy

According to Cowan and Arsenault (2008), there three layers of public diplomacy which are monologue, dialogue, and collaboration (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.11). He further argues that each of these three layers is important at specific times and in certain circumstances (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.11). Hence, it cannot be said that dialogue or collaboration is always the best option in public diplomacy since it depends on the situation (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008).

Starting with monologue, even though one-way communication (monologue) should be supported with other public diplomacy involvements, it should not be seen as the opposite of dialogue, but an indispensable advocacy instrument through which a

country expresses its values, policies, identities etc. (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.13). Thus, it is crucial how a country demonstrates itself both on the domestic and international arena. However, there are naturally limitations for monologue (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008). The first limitation is the absence of feedback from audiences and not being able to listen to them (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.16). As a result, it becomes difficult for a public diplomacy practitioner to know whether the monologue was useful or not.

The other limitation is that for countries with deep-rooted reputations such as the U.S., monologues become knotty since people are exposed to these countries' images everyday which leads to an understanding that they know their cultures, lifestyles, and so on (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.16). Thus, already having a reputation all around the world which is unlikely to change makes it difficult for these countries' monologues (outside their usual reputations) to work well (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008). However, bearing in mind these limitations, monologues can be an effective advocacy instrument which would improve a country's credibility and reputation. These limitations can be eliminated through other layers of public diplomacy (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008)..

Continuing with dialogue, dialogue corresponds to circumstances such as conferences, summits, sports, and cultural events with people's involvement, in which ideas and opinions are exchanged and communication is mutual (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008,

p.18). Thus, unlike monologue, in dialogue there is a chance to get feedback and to listen to the targeted audiences. Another advantage of dialogue is that by the virtue of dialogues, bridges can be built between different cultures by eliminating stereotypes and bias (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.20). While monologue has a limited capacity to change ideas and demolish prejudices, dialogues, due to the fact that they are mutual, can bring people together (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008).

Last but not least, collaboration means engagement of people from different countries jointly in a project, which is naturally more influential than monologue and dialogue (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.21). Therefore, collaboration refers to actions and implementations, while both monologue and dialogue stay in theory. Collaboration encompassing both monologues and dialogues within itself, takes the relations to the next level where exist “concrete and typically easily identifiable goals and outcomes that provide a useful basis and structure upon which to form more lasting relationships” (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.21).

There are different types of collaborations such as musical (West-Eastern Divan Orchestra), scientific (global warming), sports, cultural, etc. (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.21). These different types of public diplomacy collaborations are analysed more in depth in the previous sections. “The Internet and other new communication technologies also offer unprecedented opportunities for promoting cross-national

collaborations as well as dialogue and monologic communications” (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p.26).

Gurgu and Cociuban (2016) break down the elements of the new public diplomacy into seven pillars; advocacy for policies, providing context for the policies, credibility, capacity to customize the message for different audiences, the media’s place to spread the message, cooperation with NGO’s and different organizations, and lastly exchanges based on reciprocity and mutual understanding (Gurgu and Cociuban, 2016, p.50-51). In other words, both symbolic environmental (media analysis) and behavioural analysis (such as surveys with foreign audiences) should be organized (Tam & Kim, 2018, p.35). In short, for an effective public diplomacy, all these three elements should be practiced together online and offline.

2.8. Conclusion

The concept of public diplomacy has evolved over time. There are different definitions for public diplomacy stemming from different theoretical approaches (Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism); while some of them support the idea that public diplomacy should be implemented by only states and state actors, others argue the opposite, that is, public diplomacy can be implemented by state officials, NGOs as well as individuals. However, traditional public diplomacy is not solely preferable anymore in today’s world. On the contrary, new diplomacy should be applied through

cultural diplomacy, diaspora diplomacy, sport diplomacy, development diplomacy, and so on.

This paper argues that realist view of public diplomacy is more applicable to the case of Ukraine and Russia. Even though they do not only use state-centric instruments, their public diplomacy is mostly concentrated on states/state actors, limited, and subjective. In addition to that, nationalism and security dilemma are at the heart of their policy. As already stated, public diplomacy has different stages which should be implemented at the right time and together when necessary. Apart from that, the concepts of public diplomacy and soft power are analysed, and the differences are elaborated. These two concepts are different from each other (albeit there are similarities), and thus should not be confused. Public diplomacy is based on actual policies and acts rather than merely speaking and aspires to have long-term outcomes and partnerships unlike soft power.

CHAPTER 3

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

3.1. Introduction

Russians and Ukrainians does not only share a similar culture, but also a common history (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015). Ukraine has always had a special status and was not completely assimilated (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015). Thus, Ukraine's desire to create a 'nation' and its significance for Russia can be observed throughout the history (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015). The roots of the post-2013 conflicts go back to their common history (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015). The Ukraine's desire to extinguish the Russian influence and create a Western identity of itself to become independent and Russia's strategic aims on Ukraine have clashed and the conflict still continues in 2022 in the region Donbas.

This thesis argues that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is not only political but also social due to the nationalistic impulsion the Ukrainian side has which is embodied in its desire for 'nation-building' and the breakout of the war is a result of Russia's policy towards the post-Soviet countries. Moreover, Russia is stimulated by the desire to become a great power again and the path to be one goes through the

strategic and political significance of Ukraine. The war, however, which broke out in February 2022 demonstrated the drastic truth of the world politics.

Considering the causes of the conflict and how it unfolded, it can be analysed from different perspective. Cognitive one could argue that beliefs rather than financial and economic concerns led Russia to follow such aggressive policy towards Ukraine (Kurnyshova & Makarychev, 2022, p.11). On the other hand, policy-making perspective would argue that “the phenomenon of groupthink and the concomitant crisis of the whole system of independent foreign-policy expertise and analysis in Russia seems to be of utmost importance” (Kurnyshova & Makarychev, 2022, p.11). Realists would argue that Russia felt threatened by Ukraine’s pro-Western policy and NATO’s engagement in Ukraine which led Russia to wage a war because of the security dilemma, that is, suspecting NATO’s and EU’s intentions in cooperating with Ukraine and feeling the need to react pre-emptively (Kurnyshova & Makarychev, 2022).

This thesis employs the realist view for several reasons; first of all, there is anarchic nature of the war. Moreover, Putin and Zelenskyy tirelessly emphasize on the fact that Russia’s / Ukraine’s national interests are at stake (Putin approves new foreign policy doctrine based on 'Russian World', 2022). Furthermore, international organizations are not as effective as liberalism argues (Kurnyshova & Makarychev, 2022). As Kurnyshova and Makarychev (2022) argue, “the whole set of conventional

instruments of the liberal order—such as communicative or institutional power—does not seem to properly function, which inevitably opens a new debate on international liberalism in times of exceptions and emergencies” (Kurnyshova & Makarychev, 2022, p.11). The conflict stems from national interests and security issues, which are not necessarily rational, and the liberal system does not work out to cease the war (Kurnyshova & Makarychev, 2022; Kirby, 2022).

First, the historical background and interactions including Ukraine’s features, its interrelation with Russia before and after the independence, the problems Ukraine has been facing and the first sparks of the conflict are going to be analysed, in the second part the post-2013 incidents and the causes are going to be analysed, and finally in the last part the existing results stemming from the conflict and the peace attempts (The Minsk Agreements) are going to be discussed.

3.2. Historical Background

Russians and Ukrainians, both being Slav, have a lot in common in terms of religion and culture (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.658). Yet, the disagreement between these two goes back to the 19th century when Russians aimed for the project, “All-Russians Nations” (which includes White Russians as well as Ukrainians), whereas Ukrainians aimed for the creation of the Ukrainian nation with a distinct language, history and culture (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.658). Even though

the creation of Ukrainian People's Republic was a great step towards this aim, it was occupied by the USSR in 1920 (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.658).

However, even in USSR, Ukraine was a representative republic in USSR in the UNGA along with the Russian Federation and Belorussia) and even the decision to dissolve the Soviet Union was taken by the leaders of these three republics (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.659). Thus, a complete assimilation of Ukraine by Russia never occurred in the history and Ukraine has always been treated distinctively (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım). Even though during the Czarist Russia and the USSR, Russians were intentionally settled in Ukraine (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.659), Ukraine obtained its independence right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union since there has been a long period of separation movement until the end of 1980s (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015).

In the matter of the ethnic situation in today's Ukraine, it is highly fragmented as followed; "Ukrainian 77.8%, Russian 17.3%, Belarusian 0.6%, Moldovan 0.5%, Crimean Tatar 0.5%, Bulgarian 0.4%, Hungarian 0.3%, Romanian 0.3%, Polish 0.3%, Jewish 0.2%, and other 1.8%" (Indexmundi, 2020). Thus, due to this multi-ethnic structure, there is a West-East conflict in Ukraine (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015). Concerning the situation of Crimean Tatars, Stalin exiled them during the second world war under the pretext that Tatars were helping the Nazis and settled Russians there in lieu of Tatars just like he did when millions of Ukrainians died from the Great

Famine (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.659). For example, because of this settling policy “in Crimea, ethnic Russians were the majority (58%) and ethnic Ukrainians a minority” (Harris, 2020, p.596). Another distinctive trait of Ukraine is that the nationalist Catholics that are closer to the West appertain to the Kyiv Patriarchate rather than to the Moscow Patriarchate (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.660). Therefore, these differences deepen the problems in terms of ethnicity and religion.

Concerning the period after the independence of Ukraine, many problems related to economy and politics can be observed. The presence of oligarchs and the intervention from the EU, the US and Russia along with the radical groupings in the political parties, made it almost impossible for Ukraine to have a stabilized political and economic environment (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.660).

Leonid Kuchma ruled Ukraine in 1991 up until 1994 which can be considered as ‘a semi-authoritarian regime’ and due to the economic fall during his administration, Kuchma was elected in 1994 (Barata, 2014, p.33). During his 10 years of administration, the political elite in Ukraine emerged as a result (Barata, 2014, p.33). After the period of Kravchuk and Kuchma, a pro-Russian leader, Yanukovich was elected in 2004. Yet, the other candidate, Yushchenko who was pro-European did not recognize the election which resulted in a great protestation called “Orange

Revolution” backed by the Western powers (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.661).

As a result of Orange Revolution, Yushchenko announced his presidency. Yet, Putin highly criticized the incidents stating that ‘it, the exported coup, was anti-democratic’ (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.661). Thus, the conflict between the camp of pro-Western and the camp of pro-Russian is not nothing new in Ukrainian politics, but something rooted in it. When Yushchenko became the president undemocratically, nothing major changed in Ukraine concerning the corruption and the economic crisis (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.662). Thus, Yushchenko gradually lost the trust of people (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015). In 2010’s elections, Yanukovych was elected again. Thus, the foreign policy of Ukraine changed in the pro-Russian direction.

Regarding Ukraine’s relations with the EU, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1998 between two parties codified the Ukraine’s desire for closer relations with the EU (Barata, 2014, p.32). In addition to that, Eastern Neighbourhood Policy which entails a sustainable development, a more liberalized economy and an increase in foreign investments has also an important role in Ukrainian European relations (Barata, 2014, p.35). In Prague Summit in 2009, the EU started the initiative of Eastern Partnership which aims to conduct reforms in terms of fundamental values of the EU and a more cooperation (Barata, 2014, p.37).

In 2012, the EU necessitated the Association Agreement for Ukraine to become a member of the EU and in the summit in Vilnius in 2013, the EU gave Ukraine and its other Eastern partners the green light for a further integration (Barata, 2014, p.37-38). Nevertheless, Yanukovych chose to postpone the agreement which sowed dragon's teeth. During the administration of Poroshenko, "In June 2017, it became possible for Ukrainian citizens holding a biometric Ukrainian passport to travel visa-free to Europe for 90 days" (Fournier, 2017, p. 48).

Thus, such steps to get closer and closer to the EU provoked Russian authorities even further. Yet among these positive features in EU-Ukrainian relations, there has also been some disappointments on the part of Ukraine (Aydın, 2016). For example, when Gazprom increased the prices and reduced the gas amount with a threat of cutting the supply to both Europe and Ukraine, Ukraine had to accept the prices due to the pressure from the EU which made Ukraine more dependent on Russia in terms of natural gas (Aydın, 2016, p.451-452). Thus, the EU does not always have the capacity to counter Russia due to dependency issues and as a result, cannot live up to the expectations of Ukraine (Aydın, 2016).

With regards to the relations with Russia after the independence, Ukraine is highly dependent on Russia in terms of energy, being one of the biggest importers of Russian gas and having a very asymmetrical trade relation with Russia; "in 2011 Russia accounted for nearly 28% of Ukraine's trade, whereas Ukraine accounted for less than

5% of Russia's trade" (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.680). However, after the conflict broke out, the trade relations between Russia and Ukraine gradually decreased while the trade relation between the EU and Ukraine increased (World Bank Integrated Trade Solution, n.d.). According to the statistics of World Bank, the export partner share with Russia went from 25.67% in 2012 to 7.7% in 2018 and similarly the import share with Russia went from 32.39% in 2012 to 14.15% in 2018 (World Bank Integrated Trade Solution, n.d.). Apart from the trade relations, Ukraine is quite significant because of its geopolitical location for Russia to become a 'great power' again through the Russia-led economic bloc (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.681). Thus, the Russo-Ukrainian relationship can be examined under three periods; the first one is Commonwealth of Independent States in the mid-90s, the second one is the Eurasian Economic Community launched by Russia in 2000s and the last one is related to the Yanukovich period and after (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.679).

In 1993, a free trade agreement was signed between Russia and Ukraine, however, concerning the CIS Economic Union, the president Kravchuk accepted only associated membership (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.684). Even now, Ukraine is not among the member states (Commonwealth of Independent States, n.d.). To make Ukraine become a part of the CIS Customs Union, Russia imposed the 'excise duty' on oil and gas for those outside of the Customs Union which did not work since Ukraine was only interested in 'free trade' with Russia but suspecting a deeper integration (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.685). After the Orange Revolution, the first gas war

launched by Russia against Ukraine in 2006 followed by the second one in 2009 resulted in a drastic decrease in Ukraine's GDP by 15% (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.689). Hence, after Yanukovich was elected, European integration did not appear to be the perfect solution for the problems, whereas Russia seemed to provide a faster solution (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.690).

Afterwards, some concessions were given to Russia in return of booming the Ukrainian economy (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016). These concessions include Kharkiv Records in 2010 "which extended the lease of the Sevastopol naval base to the Russian Black Sea Fleet in exchange for a 30% discount on the 2009 pricing formula for gas" (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.690). Concerning Ukraine's membership to the Eurasian Economic Community, since it was not compatible with Ukraine's membership in WTO, the oligarchs did not want to risk the 'economic sovereignty' and the relations with the EU in return of a free trade (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.687). On the other hand, the political elites did not want to face the economic cost of turning their back to Russia (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.689). Thus, the power struggle between the elites and the oligarchs, the pressure from the Russian side for a deeper integration, and the Ukrainian prospect for a closer relation with the EU complicated the situation even further.

Since Ukraine is a member of WTO, it could not join the Eurasian Economic Union under the administration of Yanukovich. Yet, he looked for an alternative which was

the CIS FTA signed by Ukraine in 2011 which mainly focused on free trade; however, the CIS FTA “allowed Russia to raise tariffs in the case of increased volumes of Ukraine’s imports” (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.691). In short, Ukraine’s efforts for free trade with Russia and decrease in prices did not work out the way Ukraine wanted it to. On the contrary, Russia launched a trade war against Ukraine in 2013 which caused an enormous loss on the Ukrainian part (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.692).

In the same year, Yanukovich attempted to sign the Association Agreement with the EU when the EU relaxed the democracy condition; yet as a result of Russia’s offer of a great economic support to Ukraine (through the secret meetings with Putin), the signing of the Association Agreement was postponed (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.692). After Yanukovich’s decision to choose a closer relation with Russia and the EEU over a closer relation with the EU, there has been several successive events that deteriorated the Russo-Ukrainian relations even further which is going to be explained in the next part.

3.3. The Period 2013 – Now

Having given the historical background of Ukrainian history and politics, the period starting from 2013 is the turning point for Russian-Ukrainian relations. As mentioned above, the foreign policy of Ukraine disregarded the EU and favoured Russia after the

election of Yanukovych. Afterwards, the conflict broke out in three phases: the protests in Maidan after the postponement of the Association Agreement in favour of Russia, the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk. Even though Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia, United States, and United Kingdom in 1994 which supported the idea of becoming non-nuclear and respecting other states' sovereignty, Russia justified the violation, stating that the agreement cannot be binding since "Russia did not recognize the newly elected Ukrainian government as legitimate" (Shymanska,2020, p.42).

The conflict started when the people revolted against the decision of Yanukovych and started protesting since the Association Agreement could be a step towards an EU membership for Ukraine. As a result of the protests, Yanukovych had to leave the country, a week later Russian troops invaded Crimea which was followed by a referendum that officialised the annexation and later in Donetsk and Luhansk the pro-Russian separatist groups held referendum and declared their independence from Ukraine (Harris, 2020; Matveeva, 2022).

However, the problem with the referendum was that there were only two questions that are "1. Do you support Crimea rejoining Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation? 2. Do you support restoration of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea and Crimea's status as part of Ukraine?" (Bebler, 2015, p.205). Thus, the referendum ignored other alternatives, that are, a complete independence of Crimea

and being part of Ukraine under the current constitutional structure (Bebler, 2015, p.206). Therefore, this referendum has not been recognized either by the EU or the OSCE due to the credibility issue (U.S. and Europe reject Crimea referendum, 2014). “Russian intelligence trained Donbas and Crimean Pro-Russian groups since the Orange Revolution and in Summer 2009, Russian diplomats were expelled for supporting extremist pro-Russian and separatist groups which led to Medvedev’s open letter” (Kuzio, 2018, p.533). Thus, Russia have been directly or indirectly involved in the conflict for a certain period of time (Kuzio, 2018).

To understand the reasons of this conflict in Crimea and Donbas, it has to be analysed through the perspectives of both Russia and Ukraine. Starting with the Russian perspective, as mentioned before, Ukraine represents a great interest for Russia’s aim of becoming a great power again through augmenting the influence over the region and Ukraine is the inseparable part of this plan due to its geopolitical location and thus, such forceful policy of Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine has come as a response the increased activism, that is Euromaidan, and Ukraine’s western-oriented foreign policy to reconrol the course of Ukraine’s foreign policy (Götz, 2014). “Political elites in Moscow perceived Ukraine’s drift toward the West as a threat to Russia’s national security interests and great power standing” (Götz & Staun, 2022, p.492). Thus, Putin started with Crimea since the port of Sevastopol is the gate for Russia to the warm water port (Sönmez, Bıçakcı & Yıldırım, 2015, p.666).

Hence, along with its tremendous strategic value, Putin, through the annexation of Crimea, tried to demonstrate his power and maintain his reputation as well as to get rid of the western influence in Ukraine (which would be Ukraine's membership to the EU and NATO) (Götz & Staun, 2022). Another reason is Russia's desire to protect the Russian-speakers in Crimea (Lazarenko, 2019, p.554). This has been the case during the Medvedev presidency as well (Harris, 2020). For example, during the conflict in Georgia where Russian-backed separatists won against the Georgian government and Transnistria where the Russian-speaking separatists backed by Russia again, felt discriminated by the Romanian-speaking elites (Harris, 2020, p.599). However, the majority of Russian speakers supported Ukraine in this conflict since %60 of the Ukrainian army is Russian speakers (Kuzio, 2018, p.541). Moreover, only 5% of young Ukrainians faced discrimination because of the language (Kuzio, 2018, p.541). In addition to that, Ukrainian Jews (who are mostly Russian speakers) supported Euromaidan and the most popular Ukrainian TV channel broadcasts in Russian whereas in Crimea, Tatar and Ukrainian schools were closed along with the Crimean Tatar Mejlis (Kuzio, 2018, p.541).

Regarding the conflict in Donbas, it has become a battle between the West and Russia for geopolitical goals (related to the geopolitical importance of Ukraine as mentioned before) (Lazarenko, 2019, p.557). The increased presence of NATO in the Black Sea and an enhanced relation with Ukraine exacerbated the conflict since Ukraine considers the war as a way of reducing its dependence on Russia as the support comes

from the West (Sanders & Tuck, 2020, p.27). It is even argued that this is the 'prolongation of Cold War' (Lazarenko, 2019, p.562).

Moreover, there is the idea of "the creation of 'Novorossiya', or New Russia, which would constitute all of southern Ukraine past Odessa to Moldova" (Robinson, 2016, p.507). In addition to Novorossiya, the idea of 'Russkiy Mir' (Russian World which is to protect Russians outside) justifies Russia's influence over other states based on culture and language (Kuzio, 2019, p.532). Thus, Putin is aiming at regaining the power and the influence, Russia had before the dissolution of the USSR, by using the pretext of similar language, culture and history stemming from the once existed USSR (Kuzio, 2019). Another dimension is the protection of ethnic Russians in the region just like in the case of Crimea. According to Russian media, Ukrainian Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone was committing atrocities against civilians (Marples, 2016, p.429).

The last reason would be Russia's reluctance to recognize Ukraine as a distinct nation and its belief that Ukraine's interest must be exactly the same with the ones of Russia (Sanders & Tuck, 2020, p.27). Even the rhetoric of Putin clearly explains Russia's perception of Ukraine; "Our historical, spiritual and other origins give us the right to say that in the main we are one people. There is nothing that differentiates Ukrainians from Russians. Nothing at all." (Kuzio, 2019, p.529). Moreover, "Putin stated, at the NATO 2008 summit, that Ukraine was not a 'real state', that it 'received huge territories from Russia in the east and the south', and that '17 million Russians living

in Ukraine” (Harris, 2020, p.600). In addition to all, Putin even referred Kyiv as “the mother of Russian cities” (Harris, 2020, p.603).

To sum up, Russia’s motives behind the annexation of Crimea and the intervention in Donbas could be listed as; gaining a strategic advantage over the West, increasing influence in near abroad for a deeper integration while getting rid of the Western influence, protecting ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, and declining to see Ukraine as a separate state.

Continuing with the Ukrainian perspective, considering the common history of Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine’s desire to become independent has been forever as mentioned earlier. Thus, the first reason is, “to emphasise Ukraine’s European values and roots and to distance it from Russia as much as possible” (Harris, 2020, p.607). Hence, even though in Euromaidan it was for democracy and Europeanisation, the historical struggle for a distinct identity made the separation even sharper between these two nations (Harris, 2020, p.610). When Crimea was under Russia’s occupation, Ukraine cut the water and energy supplies and banned the entrance of the people who came to Ukraine from Crimea through Russia and even further it was stated that Crimea and Donbas lacked ‘the Ukrainian identity’ (Lazarenko, 2019, p.553). Thus, while Russia’s aim is to build a state, Ukraine is aiming for building the nation (Kiryukhin, 2016, p.442).

For example, “The history of Ukraine is represented in textbooks as the history of the Ukrainian people (nation) that from time immemorial have lived in its land and struggled against various enslavers for freedom and sovereignty” (Kirhukyin, 2016, p.443). This conflict gave the occasion for the Ukrainian people to unite and fight against the ‘common enemy’ for the sake of their European national identity away from the Russification (Pond, 2017, p.144).

To ensure the independence from Russian influence, the first step would be the removal of Yanukovich from power who was corrupted and took sides with Putin (Lazarenko, 2019). As soon as Yanukovich left the country, Ukraine now was ready for the democratisation (Lazarenko, 2019, p.553). Yet, the question of whether or not Ukraine’s identity is really European; even though the Minsk-2 Agreement was not acceptable for Ukraine, “The Germans and French supported Russia in putting the onus on Ukraine to make concessions to the rebels” (Robinson, 2016, p.516). In addition to that, “Angel Merkel, announced, ‘I would like to thank Mr. Putin that he pressured the separatist leaders to sign’” (Robinson, 2016, p.515).

In the EU, there have been disagreement between the member states on the issue of the sanctions imposed on Russia and apparently the EU and the support for Ukraine or the reaction to Russia’s action have not been united; even after the war broke out, the consensus between all member states could not be attained (Liboreiro & Koutsokosta & Murray, 2022; Muzikárová, 2023). Despite all the sanctions, the interdependence of

the EU on Russia and its consumption of Russian gas was still high in 2016 (Cipek, 2018, p.20). According to Eurostat (2021), the graph of EU trade in goods with Russia 2010-2020 shows no drastic decrease but rather a stable line and the trade balance is still under 0 for the EU (-16.4) (Russia-EU – international trade in goods statistics, 2021). Even though, EU's gas import from Russia drastically reduced only in 2022 (from 48% in 2021 to 17.2% in 2022), in world's gas import sources, Russia's share in the first half of 2022 is still the highest with 31.4% (Where does the EU's gas come from?, 2022).

Following the latest sanctions after the war broke out, the data shows that “The model quantifies the vulnerability level of the European Union economies due to trade and investment interdependence. Findings indicate that high levels of trade suffocation significantly affect macroeconomic foundations in both parties in the short run” (Estrada & Koutronas, 2022, p.611). In other words, economic sanctions imposed by the EU damage drastically their economy which means that it is less likely for the EU countries to continue their sanctions in the long-term (Estrada & Koutronas, 2022).

Another important reason that kindled the conflict even further is the power of media & social media. Mass-media is one of the crucial elements to shape the public opinion (Yarmak, Tsepikova & Kalinskaya, 2020, p.37). The anti-Russian propaganda takes its definite shape in the Ukrainian media in the sphere of internet especially after the annexation (Yarmak, Tsepikova & Kalinskaya, 2020). Thus, the first trait is to

“convince the youth that in Ukraine there is a functioning democracy and freedom in Ukraine unlike Russia” (Yarmak, Tsepkova & Kalinskaya, 2020, p.38). Moreover, the false information that the Crimean students can study in Ukrainian universities for free and have a chance to study in the US or the EU for free with their special programs (Yarmak, Tsepkova & Kalinskaya, 2020, p.38). Furthermore, the Ukrainian media does not reflect the real events in Crimea but the events that ‘should’ be occurring in the given political and social environment that Crimea put into (Yarmak, Tsepkova & Kalinskaya, 2020, p.42). Thus, the media is trying to penetrate into the youth and spread anti-Russian propaganda along with the textbooks mentioned before and the anti-Russian politicians (Yarmak, Tsepkova & Kalinskaya, 2020).

For example, “President Petro Poroshenko, who signed a decree on ‘Defender of the Motherland’ day (23 February) to move this holiday to 14 October, the date of the establishment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1942, which fought battles against Soviet forces into the early 1950s” (Marples, 2016, p.427). Thus, the reasons for Ukraine’s involvement in the conflict can be listed as; its desire to remove Russia’s influence and create its own European identity, to obtain its long-awaited cultural and economic independence from Russia, and the growing anti-Russian propaganda through using both mass media and the historical events which shapes the public opinion (especially the youth’s) towards that direction.

3.4. Different Stages of Euromaidan

There were different stages of Euromaidan in terms of its intensity. Students occupied a great significance in Euromaidan who in the first stage protested peacefully for changes towards the Western direction (Shveda & Ho Park, 2016, p.87). Nevertheless, the brutal reaction (such as the police beating students) against those protests stimulated first a nationwide then a worldwide repercussion against the oppressive regime in Ukraine (Shveda & Ho Park, 2016, p.87). The last stage of Euromaidan represented the regression in democracy through prohibiting any kind of demonstrations in the country and which generated a further intensity of the protests that resulted in the escape of Yanukovich (Shveda & Ho Park, 2016, p.88). Therefore, the harsher policies were applied vis-à-vis the demonstrations, the more intense and bloodier it became (Shveda & Ho Park, 2016).

3.5. Crimean Tatars

Crimean Tatars merit a separate examination in terms of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The situation of Crimea has always been complicated. In 1954, Crimea was given to the Ukrainian state by Khrushchev (Rusu, 2020, p.14). It was not a big problem at that time since for the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Russia were ‘one nation’ (Rusu, 2020). Notwithstanding, it has become a real issue after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Rusu, 2020). However, the alliance between Ukraine and Crimean Tatars has not always been that consolidated (Wilson, 2021). “Before the annexation, Kyiv often seemed to view the Crimean Tatars’ claims as an obstacle to maintaining

the quiescence of local Russian-speakers. Since the annexation, Kyiv has seen indigenoussness as a useful part of its claims under international law” (Wilson, 2021, p.864).

Concerning the Crimean Tatars’ return to Crimea under the Ukrainian administration after the Cold War, they were not granted with Ukrainian citizenship or nothing major was done for Crimean Tatars to integrate them with the Crimean society (Özçelik, 2020, p.40). Thus, Ukraine made a tiny progress about the rights and status of Crimean Tatars before 2014 (Özçelik, 2020). The Ukrainian Parliament acknowledged Crimean Tatars as indigenous people and its Mejlis as “the highest representative organ’ of them in 2014 (Wilson, 2021, p.839). It further defined the 1944 deportation as ‘genocide’ in 2015 and in 2016 condemned the ban of Mejlis (Wilson, 2021, p.839). Therefore, after the conflict flared up, Ukraine perceived Crimean Tatars as a loyal ally and a useful tool against the Russian aggression (Özçelik, 2020).

On the other hand, Crimean Tatars’ reactions were peaceful aiming to show a kind of resistance with fear stemming from the trauma of Soviet times, that is the deportation ‘sürgün’ (Özçelik, 2020, p.39). On the other hand, Russia closed Crimean Tatars’ and Ukrainians’ schools and ‘Mejlis’ as mentioned above. In addition to that, Russia many times crushed peaceful protests. Moreover, a ban of all kinds of demonstrations was introduced before the 70th anniversary of the sürgün of the Crimean Tatars (Coynash & Charron, 2019, p.40). After the annexation, Sergei Aksionov was elected the new

prime minister and collaborated tightly with Vladimir Putin to ensure his power and security (Rusu, 2020, p.15).

Moreover, “The seven states that recognized Crimea is a part of the Russian Federation are as follows: Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Syria, Afghanistan, Nauru, and Venezuela. Additionally, other non-state entities such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh have backed up the Russian claims about Crimea and Sevastopol” (Özçelik, 2020, p.34). However, in Freedom House, Crimea is labelled as ‘not free’ having 7 points out of 100 with -2 of political rights out of 40 and 9 of civil liberties out of 60 (Freedom House, 2022). In the overview, it is stated that after the annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar populations have faced discrimination as well as LGBTQ+ people and Muslims; that, protests are usually banned and when there is any, protesters are usually arrested; and that, corruption is quite common (Freedomhouse, 2022). Therefore, in Crimea, there are a lot of violations related to the international law, human rights, and good governance after the annexation (Freedomhouse, 2022).

3.6. Crimean Narratives

Apart from Crimean Tatars’ narratives, other Crimean narratives should also be considered. There are three types of narratives that are: supportive, ambivalent, and non-supportive (Nedozhogina, 2019). Starting with the supportive narratives, the main

idea is, among the public, that Crimea has always been meant to be part of Russia (Nedozhogina, 2019, p.1080). This idea is accompanied with the hope for a better life in Russia (especially in terms of economic), and a fear of becoming marginalized and Ukrainisation (Nedozhogina, 2019, p.1081). Thus, what happened in Euromaidan was perceived as a kind of negation of Slavic values and a possible act of aggression towards Russians living in Crimea (Nedozhogina, 2019, p.1082).

When it comes to the ambivalent narratives, they are mostly confused and the picture is blurred in which they cannot exactly decide what is wrong or right (Nedozhogina, 2019, p.1084). Thus, such narratives usually contradicted each other. Lastly, the non-supportive narratives focused on the trauma the Russian intervention caused as well as on the imaginary united Crimean community with Ukraine (Nedozhogina, 2019, p.1088). Thus, the supporters of such narrative identify themselves with Ukraine, rather than Russia (Nedozhogina, 2019). It is crucial to see different opinions that Crimean people share apart from those of Crimean Tatars.

3.7. Results and Peace Attempts

Even though the conflict is still unfolding, some results can be extracted by virtue of surveys and statistics. Trade statistics are important to indicate Ukraine's drift towards the EU to understand that eradicating Russia's influence is not only political or social, but also economic. According to the data of The Observatory of Economic

Complexity, Ukraine's export rate to Russia went from 24% in 2012 to 9.46% in 2019 and similarly its import rate from Russia went from 30.7% in 2012 to 12% in 2019 (OEC Ukraine, n.d.). Thus, Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia has been reduced drastically since the beginning of the conflict (OEC Ukraine, n.d.). Moreover, in 2016 Russia started imposing the MFA tariffs on Ukraine disregarding the CIS FTA (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016, p.694).

Moreover, the decline of Russia's soft power among the young people is obvious since according to a survey conducted in 2018 "only 1% of young Ukrainians support their country adopting the Russian model of development" (Kuzio, 2018, p.535). In addition to that "the Russian model of development is associated with "aggression" (65.7%), "cruelty" (56.9%), and "dictatorship"" (Kuzio, 2018, p.535). Besides all, only 2% of young Ukrainians consider themselves as ethnic Russians whereas the share of the people who identify themselves with the Ukrainian identity rose to %92 (Kuzio, 2018, p.535). This has led to a gradual decrease in the popularity of the Russian language; Russian speakers started becoming bilingual (speaking both Ukrainian and Russian) while Ukrainians who only speak Russian reduced to %13 (Kuzio, 2018, p.536). Considering the 17.3% ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, these statistics are rather shocking. Furthermore, in Ukraine de-Communization (de-Stalinization) started in 2016 when four laws removing Soviet and Communist monuments and making Communist and Nazis symbols illegal were introduced (Kuzio, 2018, p.543).

In 2014, the Minsk I agreement failed and was followed by the Minsk II agreement in 2015 which also did not produce any results (Champion, 2022). The second Minsk agreement created a plan for the termination of the conflict which consisted of 13 points including full bilateral ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, monitoring by the OSCE, local elections, amnesty of those involved in the conflict, release of hostages, safe delivery of humanitarian aid, restoration of economy and society in the affected areas and so on (Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, p.2). But the most important points of the agreement are that all foreign armed groups would withdraw, Ukraine would gain the full control over its borders with Russia and ‘a constitutional reform’ would be required on the Ukrainian side for the decentralisation of Donbas so that local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk regions would take place under the control of the OSCE (Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, p.2).

In other words, Ukraine was required to give a special status to Donetsk and Luhansk which would only satisfy Russia in that case (Robinson, 2016, p.515). Even further, this agreement does not oblige Russia to comply with the terms (Sanders & Tuck, 2020, p.32). Even though, it was an unacceptable agreement for Ukraine, the rebel leaders were not satisfied either since they believed that they were getting stronger which resulted in Putin’s pressure on them to sign the agreement which was later appreciated by Angele Merkel as mentioned in the previous section (Robinson, 2016,

p.515). Thus, rebel forces wanted a full independence rather than a compromise (Robinson, 2016).

Nevertheless, Putin's insistence on the agreement changed their opinion; in February 2019, both leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk affirmed their consent for the Minsk agreement (Sanders & Tuck, 2020, p.24). In 2019, both Ukraine and Russia agreed on the Steinmeier Formula which was introduced first in 2016 (Volkova, 2019, p.79). The Steinmeier Formula consisted of the withdrawal of arms, the conduct of local elections under OSCE observation and granting autonomous status to the disputed regions (Donetsk and Luhansk), however Zelenskyy's decision to agree on this formula was completely rejected by the Ukrainian public and triggered protests (NewEasternEurope, 2020).

As a result of series of unsuccessful peace attempts, in 2021 the conflict got even more intensified with an increased presence of NATO and on the 24th of February 2022 the war started between Russia and Ukraine which still continues, there are various sanctions imposed by the EU and the US against Russia which have not been able to end the war and it's been reported that both sides have committed atrocities (Council on Foreign Relations Conflict in Ukraine, 2022). The process of formation of the Ukrainian-Russian border has come a long and difficult historical path, and at the same time, the final demarcation in the near future due to the deterioration of the political situation is hardly possible (Harybin, 2019).

The separatist regions have conducted a referendum to join Russia. In Kherson, 87%, in Luhansk 98.4%, in Zaporizhzhia 93.1%, while in Donetsk 99.2% of participants voted to join Russia (Euronews, 2022). Yet, the referendums are not recognized globally even though Russia claims them to be in accordance with the international law (Reteurs, 2022). In addition to that, Putin has declared a partial mobilisation which foresees further escalations of the war (Martin, 2022).

There are several reasons why the conflict has not ceased yet. According to Sanders and Tuck (2020), the rebel groups are being supported by Russia which gives them the hope to never quit (Sanders and Tuck, 2020, p.28). That's why they did not want to sign the agreement at first. Sanders and Tuck (2020) also states that it is a 'value-based' conflict for Ukraine and its society in which Russia is demonized and important nationalistic values are at stake (Sanders and Tuck, 2020, p.30). According to the survey conducted in 2020, "14–28-year-old citizens revealed that more than 60 percent thought that Ukraine and Russia were at war and that Russia was responsible for the escalation of the war, and 56 percent believed that the conflict with Russia can only be settled if Russia returns Crimea and withdraws military forces from Donbas" (Sanders & Tuck, 2020, p.31). The Ukrainian public opinion demonstrates that compromise has become difficult considering the terms they would agree for a peace settlement (Sanders & Tuck, 2020).

Another reason why the conflict still continues, just like the rebel forces never lose the hope thanks to the support from Russia, Ukraine also does not lose its hope thanks to the sanctions imposed on Russia and the US support (Sanders & Tuck, 2020, p.33). For example, when Donald Trump was in charge, he even stated that he'd recognize Crimea as part of Russia (Sanders & Tuck, 2020, p.34). Hence, the West's policy of playing both ends against the middle also contributed to the conflict (Kusa, 2023). Lastly, a peace agreement would damage the prestige, the credibility and the reputation of both sides (Sanders & Tuck, 2020, p.35).

Besides, "In many ways, advocating peace has become an electoral problem in Ukraine" (Sanders & Tuck, 2020, p.36). Because of the strict public opposition to a peace settlement (unless it agrees on the terms as mentioned above) has the Ukrainian leaders bound hand and foot (Champion, 2022). On the other hand, Putin's insistence on non-compromission on the Ukrainian issue also adds fuel to the fire (Champion, 2022). Moreover, according to Marten (2015), a regime change in Russia is quite less likely since such political systems, that is 'patron client', tend to be more stable compared to others (Marten, 2015, p.198). "Putin and his closest supporters are tied to KGB and FSB networks. This means that they have access to information (and can easily create false information) that could destroy any potential rival, either through public humiliation or through prosecution and imprisonment" (Marten, 2015, p.199).

For example, the most prominent opponent of Putin in Russian politics could be Alexei Navalny who was imprisoned. Recently, his imprisonment could be prolonged up to 15 years more (Roth, Guardian, 2022). Moreover, it was again and again stated by Russia that Russia will not stop until it achieves all its goals. Götz and Staun (2022) argues that Russia's policy towards Ukraine is based on Russia's 'strategic culture' which refers to expanding its domination through the post-Soviet area, especially Ukraine, further stating that "Russia is unlikely to back down in the near future, despite heavy military losses in Ukraine. The perceived interests at stake—security and status—are vital for any government in Moscow" (Götz & Staun, 2022, p.492).

3.8. Conclusion

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia that's been evolving since 2014 actually has its roots in the common history. The first part analysed the historical background of Russo-Ukrainian relations in the pre-independence and post-independence period of Ukraine including its ethnical structure, its economic relations with Russia, its political and economic instability and its weakness against external interventions, coming especially from Russia, and overall the seeds of the conflict along with the fragmented structure of Ukraine in terms of ethnicity, the asymmetrical trade relations with Russia, the struggle between the oligarchs and the political elite, and Russia's desire to propagate its influence in 'near abroad'.

The second part examined the post-2013 period when the conflict got a more intense character; the Euromaidan protests, the toppling down of the pro-Russian president, the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, the increase in anti-Russia propaganda in Ukraine, the effects of the near abroad policy, Ukraine's desire for a distinct identity, the mass media in shaping the public opinion and Russia waging a war against Ukraine.

In the last part, the results of the conflict and the peace attempts were examined separately. A drastic decrease in trade relations between Ukraine and Russia, a decrease in the popularity of Russia and the Russian language in Ukraine, the start of the de-Communization in Ukraine to cut the ties with the Russian history even more, the war in Ukraine, the economic, social, cultural sanctions against Russia, a risk of famine in the world and a possible scarcity of gas in Europe can be considered as the existing results of the conflict which can evolve in the upcoming years.

For the peace attempts, it has been argued that the Minsk agreement gives what Russia wants and puts Ukraine in a disadvantaged position. Thus, the support for each side from different parties, the Ukrainians' view of the war as a field to protect their values and the need of both Russia and Ukraine to maintain the prestige make the conflict continue. Unless this political and social environment change, the conflict seems to continue.

CHAPTER 4

RUSSIA'S USE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DURING THE UKRAINE WAR

4.1. Introduction

Russia's use of public diplomacy during the Ukraine war remains subjective and limited in terms of target audience. In this section, first how Russia's foreign policy preferences have evolved is going to be analysed to grasp a better idea of what Russia's foreign policy objectives are. That way, Russia's use of public diplomacy is going to be associated with those objectives. Afterwards, different types of public diplomacy Russia has been employing are going to be elaborated and finally it is going to be argued how Russia's use of public diplomacy corresponds to the hypothesis of this thesis. Moreover, it is going to be argued how effective and consistent Russia's public diplomacy is.

4.2. Russia's Foreign Policy Preferences

The foreign policy of Russia can be divided into two. The first part is the period of Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev in which Russia's foreign policy was more western

oriented with the liberalization and desire to integrate with the West (Doğan, 2015). During this period, a fast privatization process took place as a result of which oligarchs, a group of rich people that have the ability to influence the politics and economy, emerged (Doğan, 2015, p.183). Yet, despite the western oriented foreign policy, Russia did not receive expected welcoming from the West in terms of politics and economics. In addition to that, Russia's interests were always neglected during the Gulf war, dissolution of Yugoslavia, and Kosovo war (Kazantsev, Rutland, Medvedeva & Safranchuk, 2020).

The second part is the period when Russia felt closer to Eurasia rather than Europe (Doğan, 2015). During this period, closer relations with China, India and Muslim countries were targeted in order to balance against the West. During the presidency of Putin, close economic ties (in terms of gas and petrol) were constructed with the West (Doğan, 2015, p.184). Even though it was stated that Russia shared similar values with Europe such as democracy and human rights, it was, on the other hand, stressed that Russia has an exceptional situation and when necessary, it can decide on the rules of these values (Doğan, 2015, p.184).

Several examples can support this idea such as the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and how Russia positioned itself throughout these conflicts (Doğan, 2015). Especially, during the conflict with Georgia, Russia focused on hard measures and sanctions instead of public diplomacy; for instance, pressuring the Georgian

government through pressuring the Georgian diaspora within the Russian territory or several economic sanctions (suspending exports from Georgia to Russia) (Doğan, 2015, p.186).

After the Rose revolution, Russia acknowledged the importance of media (information war) and the fact that it must reflect the conflicts to the international community from their point of view (Avgerinos, 2009). Since 2014, Russia paid more attention to public diplomacy tools, specifically to media, while still giving more weight to hard power tools (Avgerinos, 2009).

According to Freedom House index, Russia is classified as ‘consolidated authoritarian regime’ (Freedom House Russia: Country Profile, 2022). Thus, as an authoritarian regime, it represents a different understanding of soft power (not compatible with those of democratic states) which is “instrumentalist, pragmatic and interest-centric” aiming at promoting its national interests on international arena and counterbalance the West to obtain status and influence (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015; Kiseleva, 2015; Sørensen, 2017). Its public diplomacy, as a form of soft power, follows the same logic of pragmatism (Nye, 2008).

Russia’s target audiences embrace “ethnic-Russian or Russian-speaking minorities abroad” (Laruelle, 2020, p.125) and “local secessionist groups, which include but are

not limited to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers” (Laruelle, 2020, p.125). Russia does not aim at creating strong bonds with the West or gaining the trust of the Western public but rather the public of target communities such as Donbas, Abkhazia, Crimea, etc. (Laruelle, 2020). For example, in Crimea since 2008, communities which support ethnic Russians living in this region were supported by Russia and the influence of Russian Orthodox Church increased (Doğan, 2015, p.187). As can be seen, these practices targeted the Russians living in Crimea or other people supporting Russian Orthodox Church and policies thanks to which in the referendum, the majority wanted to join Russia (even though the legitimacy of the referendum is disputed) (Doğan, 2015).

In addition to all, Russia exercises its influence on the Latin America as well as the Central Asia (Jackson, 2010; Chaguaceda & Herrera, 2022). A demonstrative example would be the politics of BRICS countries after the conflict in Ukraine started; “The conflict, centred on the status of the Ukrainian regions of Crimea and Donbass, has led to a sharp deterioration in Russia–EU and Russia–US relations. Yet a 2015 study showed that Ukraine made fewer headlines in Brazil or South Africa than in the EU and the US; indeed, the BRICS states adopted an approach based more on *realpolitik*” (Ambrosetti, 2022, p.14). This attitude of those countries proves that Russia’s critics on the interference of the Western countries have been effective (Ambrosetti, 2022, p.14). The norms, values, and tradition which Russia has been advocating for years do not disappear in those regions right away, even after the war (Güneylioğlu, 2022,

p.344). Therefore, that dialogue and cooperation Russia has with those regions enable Russia to maintain its positive status (Ambrosetti, 2022; Güneylioğlu, 2022).

On the other hand, its effectiveness is limited within certain countries. In other words, Russia's public diplomacy targeting Asia and Africa aims at a relatively deeper and longer cooperation and it is neither multi-directional targeting both the West and the East, nor has long-term purposes (except when it is directed towards the partnership with the East and Africa) (Ambrosetti, 2022; Güneylioğlu, 2022). While Russia exercises public diplomacy in these areas, Russia's such possessive attitude in post-Soviet regions is considered as imperialist and hegemonic by the West (Ekşi, 2015, p.55). In other words, while creating a good image in one place, it damages its image in another.

As Thomas Just (2016) argues, Russia's public diplomacy gained significance under the administration of Putin, however, faces multiple challenges such as conflicting messages, limited audience, the identity crisis after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Just, 2016, p.93). He further states that "Russia has attempted to forge bonds with Russian diaspora populations through mass media, cultural and linguistic institutions, and the Russian Orthodox Church, while dismissing, or even disparaging, other potential audiences that are not already as stridently aligned with Russian foreign policy goals" (Just, 2016, p.94). This also shows how Russia's public diplomacy is not multi-directional, but rather accentuated on its domestic audience and compatriots

abroad (Just, 2016). Yet, this paper argues that, despite these limitations and subjectiveness, Russia's public diplomacy is coherent and meaningful within its political context and objectives.

4.3. Russian Media and Public Diplomacy

The media and internet have a great role in terms of shaping public opinion and even shaping the course of events in times of conflict. As mentioned above, Russia started paying more attention to public diplomacy and it has invested in its mass media to broadcast internationally in different languages (Avgerinos, 2009, p.116). In 2006, after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russia started moving away from democracy by imposing restrictions on free Russian media and nongovernmental organizations (Avgerinos, 2009, p.118). Moreover, with the conflict in Georgia, Russia hit rock bottom in terms of international reputation, and it lacked an effective media strategy that would reflect Russian foreign policy, its aims and reasons (Avgerinos, 2009, p.121).

Even though, in the Russian press targeting the Russian population, Saakashvili was repeatedly portrayed as lunatic and by calling the war as 'Saakashvili's War', Russia tried to shift the war responsibility to Georgia (Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 598), it was not adequate. Moreover, like in other cases, then President Dmitry Medvedev stated that he should protect all Russians regardless of where they are (Driscoll &

Maliniak, 2016, p. 599). In Ossetia and Abkhazia, Putin's popularity rose to 88% after the conflict in 2008 (Bykov & Kuzmin, 2017, p.1698). Therefore, it can be seen again that Russia's foreign policy and public diplomacy target its compatriots (Laruelle, 2020).

Afterwards, Russia tried to improve its image on international arena by Russian Winter Festival in London and by Russia Today which was supported by RIA Novosti to bring Russia more on international media sphere by broadcasting 100% in English (Avgerinos, 2009, p.121-122). In addition to that, in the second gas conflict in 2009 contrary to that of 2006, Gazprom launched a website (www.gazpromukrainefacts.com) to explain their side of the story to Western audiences which, as a result, unmasked the fact that "Ukraine's Naftogaz was stealing gas and not paying the bills" (Avgerinos, 2009, p.129-130). Thus, by effectively using the component 'advocate' of public diplomacy, Russia could gain the upper hand over Ukraine in the natural gas conflict back then (Avgerinos, 2009).

Albeit, in the last years, Russian mass media has been challenged by alternative media (telegram, YouTube, twitter, broadly speaking internet), it is still a powerful tool since not everyone is fond of alternative media tools, many people do still rely on traditional media (Kizilova & Norris, 2022). For example, "evidence from the latest World Values Survey, conducted in Russia in 2018 and Ukraine in 2020, indicates that two-thirds of Russians still use television as their primary source of daily news and only a

minority rely on the internet” (Kizilova & Norris, 2022, p.4). In addition to that, the same survey demonstrates that Russians usually use their own social media such as Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki rather than Instagram or Facebook (Kizilova & Norris, 2022, p.4).

As part of non-traditional media, Telegram, as a non-Western social media application, could be a significant information source. On Telegram, there are numerous pro-Russian channels which circulate pro-Russian information with millions of people following them. For example, Rybar (Рыбарь) is one of the biggest pro-Russian telegram channels with 1.1 million of subscribers (Telegram Rybar). The news specifically related to the war in Ukraine are reported in both English and Russian (Telegram Rybar). Even though it is a pro-Russian channel, it tries to use an impartial language while reporting the news (The Bell, Unmasking Russia’s influential pro-war ‘Rybar’ Telegram channel, 2022).

In the latest news, it was reported that “Ukraine units once again shelled the border areas in Belgorod Region. The village of Novaya Tavorzhanka came under attack” (Telegram Rybar, 23 December 2022). On December 26, 2022, it was reported that “Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group was discovered in Bryansk Region while attempting to breach the border” (Telegram Rybar). They further added that “Nevertheless, Russian forces, liberating house after house, are gradually pushing through AFU defences” (Telegram Rybar, 26 December 2022). AFU stands for Armed

Forces of Ukraine. In another report, it is stated that “Ukrainian formations continue to carry out terrorist shelling of Donetsk and nearby towns” (Telegram Rybar, 26 December 2022). The language employed in those reports has a pro-Russian character with a slight impartial tone added to it. The specific words describing Ukrainian activities such as ‘terrorist’ and those describing Russian activities such as ‘liberate’ show that Rybar tries to demonstrate to its subscribers, which is not little, the benign character of Russia and the rebellious character of Ukraine during the war (Telegram Rybar).

Apart from that, during the Ukrainian crisis, the Kremlin-led mass media has been the key instrument portraying Ukraine as neo-fascist and those who are against Russia as dangerous and ‘extreme nationalists’ (Just, 2016, p.94). Before the conflict broke out, Ukrainians were depicted as ‘one of Russians’ like a brother who speak the same language, share the same religion and history (Khaldarova, 2021, p.8-12). Yet, it has changed even shortly before the conflict when Yanukovich regarded the alternative

of signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. Russian Media labelled this action as ‘a brother’s betrayal’ which even a prominent Russian host on Ch1 Mikhail Leontiev argued saying that it is the Ukrainian Elites’ commitment to the EU and denial of an integration with Russia which can be considered only as a betrayal (Khaldarova, 2021, p.12).

Last but not least, after Euromaidan Ukraine started to be portrayed as ‘the enemy’, ‘Nazi Riots’ who turned her back on Russia and adopted ‘fascism’ against the Russian speaking population (Khaldarova, 2021, p.17). For instance, Ch1 represented Euromaidan as “a group of radicals detached from the peaceful rally and started wreaking havoc, purposefully and violently” (Khaldarova, 2021, p.14). In addition to that, “among the main lexical items used in this narrative we can name: fascists, (neo)-Nazis, extremists, radicals, Ukrainian nationalists, anti-Semites, banderovities (banderovtsy), the Bandera junta, Kiev junta, punishers (karateli), punitive operation (karatelnaya operatsiya), cleansing (zachistka) and pogroms” (Novikova, 2016, p.249).

Some examples of such headlines can be listed as “Genocide. Thousands of residents of the Donbass were brutally killed by karateli (Rossiiskaya Gazeta), The Telegraph: neo-Nazis and mercenaries are fighting with militias of South-Eastern Ukraine (Russia Today)” (Novikova, 2016, p.249). Thus, one of the biggest channels (Ch1) and newspapers in Russia, focused on the brutality, on the idea of fascism, and gave prominence to the number of casualties, most significantly to the World War II memories in which Russians fought the Nazis in order to stimulate hatred of Russians and help justify Russia’s actions in the region (Novikova, 2016).

In addition to all, Russian media despises Ukraine by associating it with femininity while associating itself with masculinity (Edenborg, 2017, p.302). Furthermore,

Russia blames Europe for distorting the traditional norms of sexuality and associates Ukraine with the same mentality as that of Europe (Edenborg, 2017). For example, “Early on during the Ukraine events, Russian state-aligned media suggested that the Maidan protests were co-organised by LGBT activists. Komsomolskaya pravda wrote: ‘Ukraine is invited to Europe by nationalists, anti-Semites, neo-Nazis and homosexuals’” (Edenborg, 2017, p.304). With such descriptions, Russia tries to tarnish the image of Ukraine in the eyes of particularly, the conservative society who adheres to the traditional and religious values (Edenborg, 2017).

Apart from the crisis in Ukraine, when Russia Today (RT) started broadcasting in Spanish in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Cuba, the Russian influence has spread through the Latin America (Tsvetkova & Rushchin, 2021, p.55). Furthermore, “the Arabic version of RT has since gained position as one of the three most popular online resources in the Arab world. In 2018, RT was watched by roughly 11 million viewers and surpassed Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya in weekly views. The website arabic.rt.com was visited by 24.92 million customers each month in 2020, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia leading in number of viewers” (Tsvetkova & Rushchin, 2021, p.56).

Besides all, Russia’s governmental media companies including RT, TASS, and Sputnik, continuously aspire to establish cooperation with African media companies (Clifford & Grudz, 2022, p.16). The increase in Russian media’s presence in those

countries would be another reason why these countries follow a policy based on realpolitik towards the war in Ukraine and cannot explicitly support Ukraine, but even support Russia (Ambrosetti, 2022, p.14).

Into the bargain, within RT, there are special programs such as *Breaking the Set* and the *Truthseeker* focused on conspiracy theories working towards telling other sides of the events (Yablokov, 2015, p.306). Such programs help Russia to justify its actions referring to those of the U.S. and to change its image on international arena by demonstrating the ‘hidden’ facts related to the U.S. interventions (e.g. in Kosovo and Iraq) (Yablokov, 2015). Furthermore, in one episode of *Truthseeker*, it was argued that a genocide took place in the Eastern Ukraine supported by the Ukrainian government (Jackson, 2015, the Guardian).

Moreover, RT gives quite enough place to a nice and friendly representation of Putin, some of the headlines from RT can be listed as “Putin presents Croatian president with flowers, gets football jersey in return, We did it! Proud of World Cup, Putin offers visa-free entry bonus to foreign fans, Football fans smashed stereotypes about Russia through social media” (Crilley, Gillespie, Kazakov & Willis, 2021, p.9). Thus, RT, especially during the World Cup, tried to normalise Russia, demonstrate the hospitality of Russians and Putin as a friendly president.

Besides, in 2015, the money which Russia invests in RT has grown by 40% to 15.38 billion rubles (Rawnsley, 2015, p.278). With the growing interest towards media, in 2014 Sputnik was launched which appears in different cities in 30 different languages to eliminate anti-Russian prejudices, whereas Russia Beyond the Headlines (<https://www.rbth.com>) supported by Rossiyskaya Gazeta focuses on less political but fun aspects of Russia (Rawnsley, 2015, p.278). On the other hand, Rossiyskaya Gazeta operates only in Russian. In addition to that, in 2012, Putin stressed the importance of digital diplomacy, which is a tool of public diplomacy, and charge Russian diplomats with supplementary duties related to social media (Tsvetkova & Rushchin, 2021, p.56). Thus, an effective use of Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook is also targeted by the Russian government (Tsvetkova & Rushchin, 2021).

Besides all, Russia employed 'disinformation' in order to change public opinion during the elections in Ukraine, especially during Orange and Euromaidan protests, by reflecting the West as 'unreliable' as well as contributing financially to both Yanukovich and Kuchma for a more effective media (Shyrokykh, 2018, p.843). Another 'disinformation' example would be that while Ukraine declared that the soldiers in Snake Island opposed Russia's call to surrender and that, they died fighting Russian soldiers, in the following days of the war, Russia shared the images of the Ukrainian soldiers surrendering with the international community (Tass, 2022; BBC News, 2022).

Hence, by revealing the truth, Russia gains credibility and tarnishes the image of Ukraine implying that not everything Ukrainian authorities say about the war is true and therefore should be filtered (Tass, 2022). Therefore, Russia complements to its own image as well as to favoured leaders' image in its near abroad. In addition to news tools, Russian serials and documentaries about World War II are also popular in post-Soviet countries and significant in terms of spreading the idea of "similarity" between those countries (Vladislav, 2017, p.740). By using the historical elements, Russia tries to create an imaginary community (Vladislav, 2017).

Besides all, Russia has tightened its laws regarding media, especially after the war broke out (Troianovski & Safronova, 2022). For example, Russia banned the usage of the words such as 'war' and 'invasion' in media (The Moscow Times, Russia Bans Media Outlets from Using Words 'War,' 'Invasion', 2022). Besides, people who are accused of spreading false information or information that does not go on the same line with the Russia's policy in the Ukraine war might be sentenced to prison up to 15 years (Aljazeera, Russia's parliament approves jail for 'fake' war reports, 2022).

Moreover, Open Russia (Открытая Россия) which was founded in 2001 by a businessman, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, to generate and animate civil society in Russia, has contested the Russian government in its several decisions and funded many educational, cultural and social projects (Popkova, 2019, p.74). Therefore, Open Russia could be considered as a non-state actor exercising public diplomacy, however,

in 2021, the organization announced its complete cessation of activities (BBC News Russkaya Sluzhba, 2021).

According to BBC News Russkaya Sluzhba (2021), public organization "Open Russia", associated with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, stops its activities and closes branches in the regions due to the plans of the authorities to toughen the law on 'undesirable' organizations, according to which the activists of Open Russia were persecuted (BBC News Russkaya Sluzhba, 2021). Furthermore, Open Russia executive director Andrei Pivovarov stated that all members of 'Otkrytki' have been expelled from the organization, and their membership has been cancelled to avoid possible persecution and that the State Duma is preparing to further toughen article 284.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, they do not want new fines and criminal cases, and want to protect their supporters (BBC News Russkaya Sluzhba, 2022).

Another example can be the Russian historian Tamara Eidelman who has been doing live shows (historical lectures) on YouTube through which she raised funds for Ukraine (YouTube Tamara Eidelman, 2022). Subsequently, she was labelled as a 'foreign agent' by the Russian government (Novaya Gazeta Europe, Foreign agent Friday: journalists Yulia Latynina, Elena Shukaeva and historian Tamara Eidelman added to Russia's 'foreign agent' list, 2022). Therefore, it can be seen that Russia's public diplomacy, especially related to media, is practically government based and

such NGOs are not allowed to exist freely which can be considered as one of the limitations of Russia's public diplomacy. The voices of opposition are repressed, and the pro-government voices are praised (Troianovski & Safronova, 2022). Nevertheless, such policy does not contradict with the aims of Russia's public diplomacy.

4.4. Speeches of Vladimir Putin, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Ministry Spokesperson

Maria Zakharova, as Russia's Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman, also merits an analysis. "Female diplomats require professional knowledge, intellectual sharpness, and inventiveness, but femininity and attractiveness are also being taken into consideration when appointing frontline diplomats" (Krasnyak, 2020, p.167). Making Maria Zakharova the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry, Russia tries to demonstrate that women are prominent in Russian politics as well as to profit from Marika Zakharova and her femininity in public speeches (Krasnyak, 2020).

Since the war broke out in Ukraine, she has been even a more prominent actor. Stating that Ukraine has bioweapon labs, that Russia has no intentions to threaten the U.S but seeks its own security, that EU citizens will sooner or later understand the drastic consequences of the sanctions against Russia, that the massacre in Bucha is a fabrication by the Ukrainian authorities, etc. (Tass Russian News Agency, 2022).

Furthermore, she uses the word ‘Russophobe’ in her speeches to present Russia as the victim since Russia is discriminated by the whole world in almost every sphere including sports and culture (Tsvetkova & Rushchin, 2021). “Her sharp responses to journalists, and her emotional, cynical, and provocative posts have not only attracted the attention of foreign audiences but also been cited by mainstream media in various other countries” (Tsvetkova & Rushchin, 2021, p.56). Therefore, she represents a ‘strong woman’ who advocates for the rights of Russia with determination (Tsvetkova & Rushchin, 2021).

Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov, has been also another prominent figure during the war in Ukraine. His speeches also contain the similar narratives as Putin’s and Marika’s. For example, in September 2022, at the UN General Assembly, he accused the western countries, especially the US, with Russophobia, the illegitimate sanctions which cause energy and food crisis all over the world and justifies their actions in Ukraine by stating that they are responsible to their own people (UN News, Russia had ‘no choice’ but to launch ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, Lavrov tells UN, 2022). Therefore, he also points at the West’s Anti-Russian sentiments as well as the provocations from the Ukrainian part to prove Russia’s righteousness in the Ukraine war (UN News, Russia had ‘no choice’ but to launch ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, Lavrov tells UN, 2022).

In addition to that, Vladimir Putin unceasingly emphasizes on the concept of ‘Russian World’, Russian history, and the need to re-establish the unity and on the common features between Ukraine and Russia that cannot be separated from one and another (Just, 2016, p.87). He emphasizes on three main themes in his speeches: being one nation with Ukraine, killing and discrimination of Russians in Ukraine, and eradicating Nazis in Ukraine (Kilp & Pankhurst, 2022). “Foreign policy discourse is not about objective truths but rather subjective myths locating dangers outside and disciplining citizens inside” (Valenza, 2022, p.26). Therefore, Putin, while emphasizing on imaginary features of the conflict, aims at fortifying the regime on domestic level (Valenza, 2022, p.26).

There are some controversies occurred in his speeches as well. In March 2022, he stated that only professional soldiers would take part in the war and that there would be no mobilisation or a call for extra soldiers (BBC News Russkaya Sluzhba, 2022). Nevertheless, the mobilisation started on the 21st of September. More interestingly, in the street interview conducted by RadioSvoboda (2022) in Moscow, people are asked why the mobilisation has started, and most of them say that it is needed because the professional soldiers are not enough, it is needed to protect ‘homeland’ and those in Luhansk and Donetsk and even some people state that the mobilisation should have started earlier (Зачем понадобилась мобилизация?, 2022). Therefore, in some cases, consistency is not necessary to keep the public under influence while one of the components of public diplomacy is to deliver objective and consistent information to

the public and being open to self-criticism (Nye, 2008). It can be interpreted that Russia's public diplomacy does not really fit into this definition.

4.5. Diaspora Diplomacy

Besides all, Russia has a strong diaspora power and in many Putin's speeches, it has been emphasized; even in 2008, he stated that "There are regions, where only the Russian population lives, for instance, in the Crimea 90 % are Russians. ... Well, seventeen million Russians currently live in Ukraine. Who may state that we do not have any interests there?" (Nasirov, Iskandarov & Sadi Sadiyev, 2017, p.52). Moreover, Putin believed that there was a huge double standard and once said "for some reason, what is permitted to Albanians in Kosovo . . . is forbidden for Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea" (Lewis, 2020, p.146). Therefore, since the beginning Putin has been trying to justify Russia's presence and interference in these regions on the basis of ethnic Russians residing there and the independence of Kosovo (Lewis, 2020).

In addition to that, Russia profits from diaspora diplomacy in Crimea. The Russian Community in Crimea (RCC) and the People's Front 'Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia' (SCR) have operated in many ways against the Ukrainian government, democracy, and Euro-Atlantic (Roslycky, 2011, p.306). Their activities include "the burning of Ukrainian books, unlawful hanging of Russian flags on Ukrainian administrative

buildings, publicly equating NATO and Ukrainian patriots with the Nazi regime” (Roslycky, 2011, p.307). In addition to that ‘the passportization policy’ of Moscow in Crimea further reinforced the Russian influence (Roslycky, 2011, p.312).

In addition to the diaspora power Russia has in Crimea, Russia represents itself as the defender of orthodoxy in the Middle East to foster the positive narratives in the region as well as its presence (Timuş, 2022, p.1023). Furthermore, Russia also used the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine as a political power. Both Cossack Union (which is known to be anti-Islamic as well) and Russian Orthodox Church promoted anti-Western ideologies and a religious way of life (Roslycky, 2011, p.312). Plus, Russia tried to “bring the major Ukrainian Orthodox denominations under its jurisdiction” (Just, 2016, p.89).

Furthermore, “The leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church contribute uniquely to Russian military aggression by laying a strong emphasis on the spiritual unity of Russian and Ukrainian people within the religious narrative of the Russian World” (Kilp & Pankhurst, 2022, p.20). Both Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Hilarion stress the spiritual unity of Russians and Ukrainians, excluding the political features in their speeches, and blame the Western institutions for the eruption of the war (Kilp & Pankhurst, 2022). Religion is a powerful driven force. Thus, creating a domination in the sphere of religion, and becoming the sole protector of Orthodoxy and the

supportive rhetoric of the religious leaders to the Russian government would contribute to Russia's image in orthodox communities (Kilp & Pankhurst, 2022).

4.6. Public Diplomacy Institutions of Russia

In addition to diaspora power and the Russian Orthodox Church, other Russia's public diplomacy tools include; the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), 'Voice of Russia' (the radio station), the 'Russkiy Mir' (Russian World) Foundation, and the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund (Feklyunina, 2016, p.782). The first component of all these tools is the imagined 'Russian World' which corresponds to the Russian language, culture, and orthodoxy (Feklyunina, 2016, p.783). Thus, the Russian-speaking populations beyond the territories of Russia are targeted by the Russian World Foundation (Feklyunina, 2016).

The second component is the idea of 'common past' with an emphasis on the common history (Feklyunina, 2016). Putin on many occasions stated on the common features of Ukraine and Russia; "Kievan Rus started as the foundation of the enormous future Russian state', with Russians and Ukrainians as its descendants sharing 'common traditions, a common mentality, a common history and a common culture'" (Feklyunina, 2016, p.784). Thus, Putin perceives Ukraine not as an independent entity, but an integrated part of Russia. Further, even Patriarch Kirill referred to the same idea

by perceiving “the Ukrainian, the Belarusian and the Moldovan cultures as ‘organic parts’ of the ‘Russian world’ that had ‘enriched [its] multi-faceted culture’” (Feklyunina, 2016, p.784). According to Russian narratives, Euromaidan events are corrupted and violent which led to a change in the government (Smoor, 2017, p.69). Therefore, the legitimate government was toppled down following a revolt and an illegitimate pro-Western government came to power which Russia does not recognize.

In addition to that, Russia sees this as an ideological conflict “between the Russian world with its Slavic or Eurasian ‘traditional and authoritarian’ values on the one hand and the Western World with its liberal ‘decadent and double-sided’ Western values” (Smoor, 2017, p.67). Further, those who oppose Russia are considered ‘Nazis’ referring to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and their collaboration with the Nazis during World War II so that they could have their own state (Smoor, 2017, p.81). As a result, Russia is advocating the war by referring to the extreme-nationalists in Ukraine, to the oppressed Russian-speaking population in the eastern part of Ukraine, to the fact that Russia is the protector of traditional values against the degenerated West and that Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus have the common history and values which cannot be separated from one another.

Having given the main idea of these institutions, it is valuable to note that these institutions were not specifically founded after the war in Ukraine; they were founded

many years ago (Simons, 2014; Feklyunina, 2016). Nevertheless, their impact can be observed during the war in Ukraine; these institutions reinforced the idea of ‘Russkiy Mir’ and contributed to the russification of post-Soviet countries and played a significant role in shaping the ideas of the people in these countries after the conflict broke out in Ukraine (Simons, 2014; Feklyunina, 2016).

Concerning Russotrudnichestvo, it was established during the Presidency of Medvedev in 2007 which aims at contributing to Russian culture, Russian speaking populations and Russian fellow citizens living abroad (Simons, 2014, p.445). Moreover, it organizes ‘cross cultural years’ with other countries such as Russian-Armenian cross-cultural year in 2017 on Sakhalin (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.80). It can be seen that Russia tries to exercise its influence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. There are other cultural activities of Russia in post-Soviet countries. For instance, in Azerbaijan, there are many cultural events (opera, ballet, etc.) every year in which prominent Russian artists participate (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.61).

In addition to Russotrudnichestvo, there is Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) which started its activities in 2011 (Simons, 2014, p.446). On its website, it is stated that “The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is a non-profit academic and diplomatic think tank” (Russian International Affairs Council, n.d.). It has two

language options (English and Russian) (Russian International Affairs Council, n.d.). Furthermore, it is stated on the website that RIAC's purpose is to promote peace and peaceful integration of Russia to the international community (Russian International Affairs Council, n.d.). However, there is no article or statement about a sort of condemnation of the war in Ukraine (RIAC, n.d.).

Another institution, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation, which was established in 2010, has several aims such as helping create a nice image of Russia abroad, helping research, cultural, social, educational programs, improving international relations, etc. (Mission and Goals, n.d.). It has two centers; one in Tbilisi, another in Minsk. The Primakov Russian-Georgian/Georgian-Russian Public Center was established in 2013 with the Gorchakov Fund and the Institute of International Relations (Tbilisi) (The Primakov Georgian-Russian Public Center, n.d.). This center also aims at increasing cooperation between Georgia and Russia (The Primakov Georgian-Russian Public Center, n.d.)

The center in Minsk, Center for Analysis and Forecasting of Allied Integration Processes (Центр анализа и прогнозирования союзных интеграционных процессов, n.d.) was established in 2020 with the support of the Gorchakov Fund. In addition to those centers, Baltic Dialogue which targeted the Russian speaking youth and Caucasus Dialogue which focalised on the 19th century Caucasian War can be nice example of projects (Simons, 2018, p.152). Another organization is Historical

Memory Foundation which was established in 2008 with an aim to contribute to the research related to Russian and Eastern Europe history during the 20th century (Simons, 2018, p.152). Furthermore, RIA Novosti is a governmental news platform which appears in 45 countries in 14 different languages (Simons, 2014, p.446). Besides, Russian Foreign Ministry has Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter pages, however, on both Instagram and Facebook there are few English content, whereas it has a separate English page on Twitter (Russian Foreign Ministry Facebook, n.d.; МИД России / Russia's MFA Instagram, n.d.; MFA Russia Twitter, n.d.).

4.7. Education Diplomacy

Russia's education diplomacy also needs consideration. In addition to exchange students from Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, and other post-Soviet countries, North Caucasus Federal University cooperates with several universities from the South Caucasus region such as Russian-Armenian University, South Ossetian State University, Azerbaijan Technical University, Abkhazian State University, Azerbaijan State Oil and Industry University, and in 2015 in Yerevan a branch of Moscow State University opened under the name of M.V. Lomonosov to which more than 450 instructors of Moscow State University were sent from Moscow between 2015 and 2019 (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.81). Moreover, with the concept of 'Russian Schools Abroad', Russia aims at providing education in Russian abroad not only at university level, but also at other education levels (Public Diplomacy: Forming

Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.81).

Besides all, in October 2016, events were held in the Republic of Abkhazia dedicated to the study of the Russian language (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.18). In addition to Abkhazia, students in Azerbaijan can also easily learn Russian at schools (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.61). Rossotrudnichestvo within the framework of public diplomacy aims at strengthening the position of the Russian language abroad through such activities (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020).

4.8. Economic and Cooperation Diplomacy

Moreover, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU or EEU) and Commonwealth of Independent States are important components of Russia's foreign policy. The members of Eurasian Economic Union are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia (EAEU, n.d.). Eurasian Economic Union provides free trade zones and elimination of tariffs and restrictions on trade between its members (Politicheskiye Protsessy Na Postsovetskom Prostranstve: Novyye Trendy I Staryye Problemy, 2020, p.224). Besides, the implementation of the free trade agreements

might be one of the effective ways to mitigate the direct and indirect consequences of Western sanctions against Russia and its allies, including those restricting their access to the necessary industrial goods and sources of raw materials, as well as to modern technologies (Politicheskiye Protsessy Na Postsovetском Prostranstve: Novyye Trendy Staryye Problemy, 2020).

Concerning, Commonwealth of Independent States, the program called the Commonwealth Cultural Capital is a very crucial one with regard to cultural and historical ties between the member states (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.60). However, such projects have a limited geographical sphere of influence. Especially after the isolation of Russia from the Western world, Russia has reorientated its cooperation sphere (Ashby et al, 2022). Russia's foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has conducted various visits to Asia and Africa including Myanmar, Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Republic of Congo (Ashby et al, 2022).

While the junta regime in Myanmar and Russia have further advanced their nuclear cooperation, Egypt, which did not explicitly support the Western attitude towards Russia, and Russia have developed strategic projects mostly related to trade (Ashby et al, 2022). Moreover, through such cooperation, Russia emphasizes the importance of equality and mutual trust, referring to the asymmetric relations between the Western countries and Africa since the colonial times (Ashby et al, 2022). These visits aimed

at enhancing economic and energy cooperation demonstrating to the world that Russia is not that isolated and that it has its own ‘partners’ (Ashby et al, 2022).

After the war in Georgia, Russia consolidated its relations with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in terms of military and economy and with Georgia after Saakashvili lost in the elections in 2013 (Kazantsev, Rutland, Medvedeva & Safranchuk, 2020, p.152). Moreover, many Abkhazian citizens obtained Russian citizenship (Kazantsev, Rutland, Medvedeva & Safranchuk, 2020, p.151). In addition to that, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Abkhazia and Russia was signed on September 17, 2008, which was based on close historical ties between peoples (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.16). On November 4, 2014, an Agreement on Alliance and Strategic Partnership was signed between parties, which provides the preservation of a common cultural, spiritual, and humanitarian space (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.16).

In 2014, within the framework of the third Russian-Abkhaz Humanitarian Forum in Sukhum, a cooperation agreement was signed between the North Caucasian Federal University and the Abkhaz State University (ASU, Sukhum), providing for the exchange of students, educational and scientific internships, joint research in the field of Caucasian studies, jurisprudence, economics and other areas (Public Diplomacy:

Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.17). Throughout only 4 years, more than 100 agreements were signed concerning political, socio-economic and cultural spheres of cooperation (Public Diplomacy: Forming Effective Models of Systemic Cooperation in The Caucasus Region Materials, 2020, p.143).

Russia acts as the guarantor of security for both Abkhazia and South Ossetia where ruble is the currency, while contributing massively to their budgets including billions of rubles of financial aids (Kirova, 2012, p.15-16). In addition to post-Soviet countries, Russia sees BRICS as an organization to counterbalance the West and even a New Development Bank was founded in 2015 to support infrastructure and sustainable projects in those countries (Joao, 2017, p.100). Thus, that way BRICS countries can assist each other financially (Joao, 2017).

4.9. Sport Diplomacy

Russia have been using sport diplomacy effectively as well. For example, FISU World University Games 27th Summer Universiade in Kazan in 2013, 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, 2017 FIFA Confederations Cup, 2018 FIFA World Cup, the 1st Winter Children of Asia Games in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in 2019, 2021 Beach and Snow Rugby Finals, etc (Velikaya, 2016). These major sports events helped Russia create a 'normal' and open' image. However, with the war in Ukraine, Russia has been excluded from

all these activities and the events which were supposed to take place in Russia were either cancelled or modified in terms of host country (Sporting sanctions on Russia 'non-negotiable': IOC, 2023).

Even though it seems like the effective use of sport diplomacy for years as well as other components has been neutralized by the act of war, the annexation of Crimea after the Sochi Olympics, Russia's aim appears to be different than enhancing its 'international image' and "there appears to be signs of the mobilization of a Russian national consciousness and self-identification" (Grix & Kramareva, 2015, p.472). Russia uses sports, especially hosting sporting mega events, not to bolster its international image as its primary goal, but to influence its domestic audience and to establish a strategic partnership with other authoritarian states like China against the Western-centred liberal order (Grix & Kramareva, 2017; Lee, 2021). Hence, Russia's sport diplomacy focuses primarily on its domestic audiences and compatriots rather than the international community. Russia's understanding of public diplomacy follows a similar lane as its sport diplomacy (Grix & Kramareva, 2017).

4.10. Conclusion

Therefore, it can be argued that Russia's public diplomacy implications are diverse targeting education, sport, culture, economy, etc. and it can be stated that they hang together despite the war in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine does not contradict the attitude

of Russia towards public diplomacy since it targets its compatriots as a priority and the war would not tarnish but, on the contrary, enhance its image. According to a survey conducted in 2022 by a British Agency in CNN Russia, “half (50%) agreed that “it would be right for Moscow to use military force to prevent Kyiv from joining NATO” whereas only 25% say it would be wrong (Kizilova & Norris, 2022, p.2). Moreover, as reported by the same survey, “two thirds of Russians (64%) in the poll said that Russians and Ukrainians are ‘one people’” (Kizilova & Norris, 2022, p.2).

Thus, the public predominantly shares the same opinion with the government concerning the war according to the surveys and interviews. Furthermore, after the sanctions that aim at isolating Russia from the international arena, Russia seeks for other partners in Asia and Africa conducting cooperation in different areas such as energy, nuclear, and economy. Hence, Russia’s subjective and limited (in terms of target audience) public diplomacy implications affirm the realist view. Russia’s security issues combined with its regional interests shape its public diplomacy. The affirmation of its superpower status and the emphasis of the excellence of its nation are at the core of its public diplomacy.

CHAPTER 5

UKRAINE'S USE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DURING THE UKRAINE WAR

5.1. Introduction

Ukraine's use of public diplomacy during the Ukraine war remains limited and subjective. In this section, first how Ukraine's foreign policy preferences have evolved is going to be analysed to grasp a better idea of what Ukraine's foreign policy objectives are. That way, Ukraine's use of public diplomacy is going to be associated with those objectives. Afterwards, different types of public diplomacy Ukraine has been employing are going to be elaborated and finally it is going to be argued how Ukraine's use of public diplomacy corresponds to the hypothesis of this thesis. Moreover, it is going to be argued how effective and consistent Ukraine's public diplomacy is.

5.2. Ukraine's Foreign Policy Preferences

Ukraine's foreign policy had different objectives and directions under different presidencies. Between 1991 and 1994 under Leonid Kravchuk's presidency Ukraine's foreign policy was western oriented aiming at NATO and EU membership, whereas

Leonid Kuchma (1994-1999) followed a multidirectional foreign policy (Shyrokykh, 2018, p.832). Further, Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) adhered to pro-Western foreign policy, while Viktor Yanukovych returned to Kuchma's understanding and afterwards, Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019) continued a western oriented foreign policy (Shyrokykh, 2018, p.833). Finally, Volodymyr Zelensky who was elected the Ukrainian president in 2019 maintained similar anti-Russian policies which eventually led to a war (Mirovalev, 2021).

As can be seen, Ukrainian politics relied on balance between West and East (Shyrokykh, 2018). Petro Poroshenko supported Minsk Accords, whereas his successor Volodymyr Zelensky demanded amendments to the agreement and threatened with the complete refusal of the agreement and consequently freezing of the conflict (Semenov, 2021, p.261). Of course, such policy did get no support from neither Russia nor the region Donbass and deteriorated the situation (Ilinova, 2018). According to Ilinova (2018), the acts of new Ukrainian government and the growth of nationalist elites led to a polarization of the country between West and East and a deterioration of relations between Russia and Ukraine (Ilinova, 2018, p.92-94).

Furthermore, according to Vavilov (2020), the ideological factor and self-awareness of the political elite determined the direction of Ukrainian foreign policy more than in Russia (Vavilov, 2020, p.138). Thus, the Ukrainian political elite is sure that widening cooperation with Russia would result in a loss of independence (Vavilov, 2020).

Moreover, the policy of European integration and refusal to participate in Eurasian integration are supported by almost all the largest Ukrainian oligarchs (Vavilov, 2020, p.140). Ukraine's foreign policy can be defined by the conflict between the political elites and oligarchs and their differences in terms of the politics towards Russia and the West (Vavilov, 2020). Ukraine uses public diplomacy along with the traditional diplomacy; however, it has intensified its public diplomacy activities (especially digital diplomacy) after the conflict with Russia broke out to represent itself as an independent and democratic country fighting for the European values and to eventually get support from the West (RevDem Immediate EU Membership for Ukraine? In Conversation with Dimitry Kochenov, 2022).

5.3. Education and Cultural Diplomacy

There are several foundations complementing Ukraine's public diplomacy one of which is namely "Open Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk Foundation". It was established in 2007 with an aim to enhance Ukraine's international image and cooperation (Open Ukraine Mission, n.d.). There are several programs within the organization under the titles of international dialogue, cultural horizons, and young leaders (Open Ukraine International Dialogue, n.d.). For international dialogue, Kyiv Security Forum which is dedicated to European Security to discuss global security issues, consolidate the link between European Union and Black Sea Region, as well as affecting Ukraine's policies and Youth Kyiv Security Forum in which young people participate and discuss security issues could be a good example (Open Ukraine Mission, n.d.). For

example, on the 8th of May 2022, there was a live session called ‘Fight for Ukraine’ in which Ukraine’s triumph over Russia and Nazism was discussed (Kyiv Security Forum, 2022).

Under Cultural Horizons, there are programs to consolidate cooperation in cultural sphere with European Countries such as ‘Travel Grants for Artists’ which aims for an increasing interaction between foreign artists and Ukrainian artists (OpenUkraine Travel grants for artists, n.d.). Lastly, under Young Leaders, there are projects aiming at the Ukrainian youth to educate more responsible experts and leaders (OpenUkraine Young Leaders, n.d.). Thus, prioritising the youth and artists is quite important for an effective public diplomacy. Plus, cultural diplomacy has several implications in Ukrainian foreign policy. “The First Cultural Diplomacy Forum of Ukraine was held on June 2, 2015 at the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine” (Ihorivna, 2019, p.64). This organization helped Ukraine become more recognized by the international community and more connected to the global cultural sphere (Ihorivna, 2019, p.64).

Furthermore, in the same year the Office of Public Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was founded (Ihorivna, 2019, p.65). Later, the Ukrainian government established ‘the Ukrainian Institute’ (Ihorivna, 2019). On its website, the objectives of the institute include enhancing the image of Ukraine on international arena, improving Ukrainian actors in cultural spheres including science, education, and civil society, consolidating cultural relations with other countries, and increasing popularity of the

Ukrainian language (Mission, n.d.). The website clearly states that the institute does not belong to any political power and that it is completely objective (Mission, n.d.).

Yet, the 'news' section contains articles in different languages such as French (News, n.d.). The articles are usually based on cultural affairs, however, there are distinct ones related to the conflict with Russia such as "Russia's intention is to destroy the statehood and people of Ukraine" in which it is emphasized that to war or not to war does not depend on Ukrainians since all they can do is to defend themselves and that Russia has been involved in war crimes (Russia's intention is to destroy the statehood and people of Ukraine, 2022). The Second Cultural Diplomacy Forum of Ukraine took place in 2016 in which several proposals have been made by Ukrainian and American diplomats and other NGOs to improve Ukraine's cultural diplomacy capacity (Ihorivna, 2019, p.65). Therefore, Ukraine's cultural diplomacy applications are limited to those aforementioned and need improvement.

5.4. Economic and Cooperation Diplomacy

Ukraine's economic relations and cooperation in other domains also merit a consideration. For instance, in 2013, Ukraine signed a natural gas agreement with Shell in order to reduce its dependency on Russia (BBC News, 2013). Apart from that, international cooperation, especially with the EU, is a very crucial aspect of Ukrainian public diplomacy targeting the collaboration aspect of public diplomacy even though

cooperation with the EU does not only stem from Ukraine's efforts in terms of public diplomacy, but also the EU's (EU relations with Ukraine, 2022).

One of the major results of this cooperation is the association agreement. This agreement provides stronger political and economic ties as well as the promotion of common values (EU relations with Ukraine, 2022). There has been 6 Association Councils of which the last one took place in 2020 in which several discussions related to Ukraine's reform process, politics, and economics occurred (EU relations with Ukraine, 2022). In addition to that, there has been a new visa regulation in 2017 which allowed Ukrainian citizens to travel to Europe without visa with a period of stay of 90 days (EU relations with Ukraine, 2022). Moreover, EU-Ukraine summits of which the 23rd one took place in 2021 in which a common aviation agreement was signed, are complementary to EU-Ukraine relations (EU relations with Ukraine, 2022). Along with a common aviation agreement, other agreements were also signed such as Ukraine's inclusion to Creative Europe Program and Horizon Europe program and the Euratom Research and Training program (EU-Ukraine summit, Kyiv, Ukraine, 12 October 2021, 2021).

Furthermore, the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) which came into force in 2016 paved the way to an augmented trade circulation between the EU and Ukraine (EU relations with Ukraine, 2022). Therefore, such cooperation is crucial for Ukraine in time of crises with Russia. Another example would be the EU Ukraine

Business Council, an independent forum created in 2006, that includes European and Ukrainian leaders. The Business Council was founded as a non-profit organization, the purpose of which is to promote the development of trade and investment activities between the EU countries and Ukraine, to assist companies in expanding and finding new business opportunities, to establish a dialogue between governments of countries and companies to solve market problems and overcome difficulties of a legislative nature both for Ukrainian business in Europe and for European business in Ukraine (Ihorivna, 2015, p. 11).

Not only such joint projects but also the growth of trade between Ukraine and the West is remarkable (Eurostat Translate Ukraine-EU - international trade in goods statistics, 2022). According to a chart of Eurostat, both import and export increased during 2011-2021 with an exception between 2019-2020 where there was a slight decrease in both export and import (Eurostat Translate Ukraine-EU - international trade in goods statistics, 2022). In 2011, there was 14.9 billion euro of import and 20.8 billion euro of export, whereas in 2021 they became 24.1 and 28.3 billion euro respectively (Translate Ukraine-EU - international trade in goods statistics, 2022).

On the other hand, in 2014, Ukraine's export partner share with Russia was 18.18%, whereas in 2018 it fell drastically to 7.72% (WITS, Ukraine Exports, n.d.). Concerning the import partner share with Russia, in 2014 it was 23.31% while in 2018 it reduced to 14.15% (WITS, Ukraine Imports, Tariffs, n.d.). Since 2018 up until 2021, Ukraine's

trade value with Russia dropped from \$277M to \$267M (OEC Ukraine Russia Latest Data, n.d.). Considering the trade value in 2011, which was \$1.54B, there has been such a great decline since then and for the past few years it has been a rather slight decrease (OEC Ukraine Russia Latest Data, n.d.).

Another example for international cooperation would be the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development which was established in 2001 with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine as its member states (GUAM Member States, n.d.). Its objectives are the affirmation of democratic values, ensuring human rights, sustainable development, strengthening international and regional security and stability, deepening European integration to create a common security, as well as the expansion of economic and humanitarian cooperation, etc. (Politicheskiye Protsessy Na Postsovetskom Prostranstve: Novyye Trendy i Staryye Problemy, 2020, p.269). In December 2019, a GUAM meeting at the level of prime ministers was held in Kyiv and representatives of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova once again agreed that there should be no trade borders and barriers between them (Politicheskiye Protsessy Na Postsovetskom Prostranstve: Novyye Trendy i Staryye Problemy, 2020, p.271).

Yet, the prospects for the revitalization of this organization's activities seem very vague to experts and the main problems of GUAM, according to them, are that it duplicates the functions of already existing organizations, does not have a procedure

for implementing decisions taken by member countries and does not have common approaches to resolving ethno-national conflicts within member states. (Politicheskiye Protsessy Na Postsovetskom Prostranstve: Novyye Trendy i Staryye Problemy, 2020, p.272). For so many years, same topics have been discussed within the organization such as free trade zones which should have been realized years ago (Politicheskiye Protsessy Na Postsovetskom Prostranstve: Novyye Trendy i Staryye Problemy, 2020). Thus, GUAM has no means for ambitious projects and a stable environment which would help develop such projects and its member states usually struggle with their own domestic and international problems (Politicheskiye Protsessy Na Postsovetskom Prostranstve: Novyye Trendy i Staryye Problemy, 2020).

5.5. Ukrainian Media and Digital Diplomacy

Contrary to Russia, according to the World Values Survey, TV and internet sources are used equally as a source of information (Kizilova & Norris, 2022, p.4). Similarly, the same survey shows that western social media applications such as Twitter and Instagram are highly used in Ukraine unlike in Russia (Kizilova & Norris, 2022, p.4). Therefore, the public diplomacy Ukraine employs via media and digital platform is different than that of Russia.

Against the powerful Russian mass media such as RT and the Voice of Russia, Mohyla School of Journalism at National University of 'KyivMohyla Academy' created the

site stopfake.org in 2014 which operates in 12 different languages (Vladislav, 2017). The aim of this site is to disclose distorted news about Ukraine (Vladislav, 2017, p.739). In addition to that, the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (www.mfa.gov.ua) is useful for foreigners as well as Ukrainians since it has 2 language options (English and Ukrainian). Besides, there are different parts of the website; About Ukraine in which general facts and international collaborations of Ukraine, MFA news in which news related to the ministry of foreign affairs appear, speeches and statements, etc. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, n.d.). Thus, a person can easily have access to information about Ukraine's foreign affairs which is important especially in a time of war when the state needs the international support the most.

Concerning the digital/virtual diplomacy, Ukraine introduced in 2016 'the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine' (Shypovskiy, 2020, p.122). Its objectives can be recapitulated as; protection from Russian propaganda, providing free flow of information, consolidating information link with the Ukrainians living abroad, increasing the prestige of Ukraine and the Ukrainian language on international arena, improving the broadcasting mechanism of Ukraine, etc. (Shypovskiy, 2020, p.123). In addition to the doctrine, "Law of Ukraine on the foreign broadcasting system of Ukraine" lays the foundation of the basis of Ukrainian broadcasting; its interests and how it should be done including forming a united standard in terms of promoting Ukraine on international platform, spreading true information, reinforcing Ukraine's integration to the EU (Shypovskiy, 2020, p.125). Thus, in order to improve its digital

diplomacy in which mass media occupies a great place, Ukraine aimed at forming a legal basis for broadcasting and media in Ukraine (Shypovskiy, 2020).

Moreover, Ukrainian Media perceives the secessionist movement in the Donbas region as terrorism (Novikova, 2016, p.246). Some of the headlines in Ukrainian Media can be listed as “We have to punish not only terrorists, but also their allies, Illegal armed groups continue the escalation of the conflict in the area of ATO, Genocide. Thousands of residents of the Donbass were brutally killed by karатели” (Novikova, 2016, p.246-248). Therefore, in the Ukrainian Media, the separatists were considered as terrorists and Russia as an aggressor.

In the news, Ukraine is usually portrayed like “moving towards or back to Europe” (Pshenychnykh, 2019, p.356). Moreover, the EU is usually put forward as a favorite direction with common history, trade relations and a force to hinder the Russian influence (Pshenychnykh, 2019, p.356). Thus, Ukrainian media firstly emphasizes the fact that Ukraine has always been part of Europe and it is now directing back to it and secondly stresses the similarities with the EU and the imagined distance between Ukraine and Russia (Pshenychnykh, 2019). Besides all, Ukraine blames Russia for 15,000 suspected war crimes (BBC, Ukraine reports 15,000 suspected war crimes, 2022). Moreover, on social media, the hashtag ‘braveukraine’ achieved an enormous interaction with millions of views and thousands of posts which led to a tremendous increase in anti-Russian narratives (Seraphin, 2022, p.465).

Along with the mass media, Telegram also is an information source for Ukrainians just like in the case of Russia. The Telegram channel Trukha Ukraina is one of those pro-Ukrainian channels on Telegram with 2.7 million of subscribers (Telegram Trukha Ukraina, 2022). The channel operates in Russian and Ukrainian (mostly) (Telegram Trukha Ukraina, 2022). Another pro-Ukrainian telegram channel is ‘Ukraina Seychas’ with 1.7 million of subscribers which reports news every day in both Russian and Ukrainian (Telegram Ukraina Seychas, 2022). The channel does not only report news, but also shares memes, emotional videos (for example, in one of the videos, there is a cat with a Ukrainian flag hanging around his neck and a Ukrainian soldier holding the cat) (Telegram Ukraina Seychas, 2022). In one of the news reported by Ukraina Seychas, there is a video of Bakhmut with a caption ‘Bakhmut. The city-fortress, which was practically destroyed by the Russian army’ (Telegram Ukraina Seychas, December 27, 2022). Therefore, while in pro-Russian telegram channels, news is reported from a completely different perspective, pro-Ukrainian telegram channels try to show the brutality of Russian activities (Telegram Ukraina Seychas, 2022; Trukha Ukraina, 2022).

On the other hand, Zelensky frequently uses social media (twitter, Instagram, virtual meetings) and talks about Russia’s violent and criminal acts on the territory of Ukraine. Moreover, it is argued that Zelensky won the information war against Russia, disproving the rumours that he has fled, and he’s been hiding, motivating the Ukrainian army and public with his daily speeches, and his videos in which he meets with the

army, whereas Putin represents a lonely leader disconnected from his people (CNN Business, How Zelensky is using social media to dominate the information war, 2022).

Both the president Zelensky and foreign minister Dymtro Kuleba conducted an active digital diplomacy through the official accounts of the state that reached a large audience (Başpınar & Ürer, 2022, p.424). Zelensky has 6.9 million followers on Twitter and 3.1 million followers on Facebook, and his YouTube channel has 815 thousand subscribers (Başpınar & Ürer, 2022). On the first day of the war, he even tried to address the people of Russia by publishing a 9-minute video on YouTube (Başpınar & Ürer, 2022, p.424). Throughout the war, Ukraine has 3 target audiences: Russians, Ukrainians, and the international audience (Yarchi, 2022). With regards to Russians, Ukraine preferred to focus on the mothers of Russian soldiers, stating that the mothers can come and pick up their sons who were captured by the Ukrainian authority, to change Russians' perspective vis-à-vis the war (Yarchi, 2022, p.7).

Concerning the international community, as repeatedly stated, through social media, Zelensky and other Ukrainian state actors shared an enormous content with the international audience including the videos of the president, Zelensky, with his soldiers emphasizing on his leadership skills, the video conferences he conducted with the West to increase the pressure on Russia from the international community, and the way he uses Twitter to spread the 'truth' regarding the war (Zijderveld, Bol & Zwick, 2022). When it comes to Ukrainians, "Mostly in the initial stages of the conflict, he

stressed the ability of his people to rise up to the challenge, beyond the world expectations, highlighting their steadfastness” (Yarchi, 2022, p.8). Therefore, he emphasizes the uniqueness of his people (Yarchi, 2022).

In addition to that, unlike Russia, Ukraine attaches a great importance to civic societies (Yarchi, 2022). Ukrainian citizens tell their side of story including their heroic stories, represent refugees fleeing their country with their children, share videos showing the Russian aggression and their resistance towards it (Yarchi, 2022, p.9). “Obtaining a favourable climate of opinion, generating support and influence through strategic narratives is ultimately about creating attitudinal or behavioural outcomes with intrinsic emotional layers” (Dolea, 2022, p.5). Thus, such civic actions also create resonance on international arena (Dolea, 2022).

Hence, it can be stated that Zelensky shared the narratives of the Ukrainian state with the digital society by producing a large amount of content over these accounts during the war period addressing both its own people, the Russians as well as the international community (Yarchi, 2022). Moreover, his participation in several virtual meetings with the EU, France, and G7 leaders, and his constant work to incite them to be stricter on the sanctions against Russia are also considered as part of Ukraine’s public diplomacy (Macias, 2022).

In addition to Zelenskyy's activities on social media, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, Mykhailo Fedorov, is also a prominent figure on social media, especially on twitter (Miller et al, 2022). His direct tweet to Elon Musk about the need for Starlink Equipment, the rapid shipment of the equipment SpaceX, and SpaceX's president's confirmation that the shipment happened thanks to the tweet demonstrate how powerful social media can be (Miller et al, 2022). Another example would be Mykhailo Fedorov's tweet to Visa and Mastercard on blocking their services in Russia (Twitter Mykhailo Fedorov, 27 February 2022). Thus, such tweets by the Ukrainian statemen calling certain people and companies to take actions against Russia's aggression produce concrete results (Miller et al, 2022).

In addition to that, many people including the official twitter account of Ukraine have been calling for donations to Ukraine which enabled Ukraine to receive funds from all over the world (Official Twitter Account of Ukraine, 25 February 2022). Even the Russian historian Tamara Eidelman conducted several live lectures on YouTube through which she raised funds for Ukraine as mentioned in the previous section (YouTube Tamara Eidelman, 2022). Therefore, social media users all over the world including Russia try to raise funds, get any kind of support from the international community, and spread the news and memes related to them to win the digital war against Russia in the West (Butler, 2022).

5.6. Memory Diplomacy

Ukraine uses historical events as a public diplomacy tool as well. For example, it is argued by Ukraine that Kievan Rus was entirely a Ukrainian state, whereas Russians appeared afterwards as a separate nation (Kappeler, 2014, p.113). That way, Ukrainians can claim that Ukraine is a separate state with a distinct history. Another example can be the personage, Mazepa, who tried to free Ukraine from Peter the Great to establish an independent Ukrainian state and who is considered as a traitor by Russia while he is a hero according to Ukrainians (Kappeler, 2014, p.113). A person who aimed for independence is heroized in the Ukrainian public (Kappeler, 2014).

Holodomor, on the other hand, in today's Russia is perceived as a disaster that concerned all Soviet people, however, in Ukraine it is considered as a crime exercised by the Soviet Union against Ukrainians (Kappeler, 2014, p.113). Moreover, during the Second World War, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent army (UPA) were against the Soviet Union and even they joined forces with the Nazis (Kappeler, 2014, p.114). When Yushchenko was the president, the rehabilitation of both OUN and UPA by constructing their monuments and granting the title of hero to the heads of these organizations, namely, Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera (Kappeler, 2014, p.114).

In addition, Arseniy Yatsenyuk (Prime Minister of Ukraine between 2014-2016) once stated that ““what did we have in the [common] past apart from Holodomor, Stalin, ... executed priests, burnt down churches [and] destroyed genetic code of the Ukrainian nation’?” (Feklyunina, 2016, p.788). Therefore, by employing these historical facts to the contemporary situation, Ukraine is trying to prove that it is a separate state with a distinct culture and history and by praising the historical anti-Russian personages (Feklyunina, 2016).

Further, in 2015 de-Communization laws were launched including “dismantling of monuments glorifying the Soviet past and the renaming of Soviet toponyms, attempting to purge vestiges of the Soviet past from public spaces” (Kharkhun, 2021, p.153-154). Moreover, the Kyiv Occupation Museum was opened to reflect the true Soviet History (Kharkhun, 2021, p.158). Thus, by opening a museum like that Ukraine aims at branding their type of history as well as blaming Russia and the Soviet past for the current problematic situation (Kharkhun, 2021).

In addition to that, in 2017 a new law came into force stating that Ukrainian is the sole language of education (Demydova, 2020, p.587). This law generated discontent among Russian speaking population of Ukraine (Demydova, 2020). Another related change is that Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul recognized the independence of Ukrainian Orthodox Church from Russian Orthodox Church in 2018 (Hurriyet Daily News,

2018). It is another improvement for Ukraine to reduce the influence of Russia over its territory.

5.7. Diaspora Diplomacy

Besides all, Ukraine has a strong diaspora community. As Euromaidan started, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress conducted protests to raise awareness about the tragic events in Ukraine and collected money to help people there (Nikolko & Şahin, 2020, p. 101). Similarly, Crimean Tatars have also an effective diaspora community in Türkiye. The Platform of Crimean Tatar Organizations expressed their sincere support to Crimean mejlis and qurultay in 2015 following the Crimean crisis (Nikolko & Şahin, 2020, p. 103).

On the other hand, Canada recognized the deportation of Crimean Tatars as a genocide in 2016 (Nikolko & Şahin, 2020, p. 102). The Ukrainian government, especially after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, expressed its great support to Crimean Tatars (Başpınar & Ürer, 2022). To conduct favourable relations with Türkiye which has a large Crimean Tatar population, Ukrainian Embassy in Türkiye organized several events for the anniversary of the deportation of Crimean Tatars and published them on its twitter account (Başpınar & Ürer, 2022, p.425). Moreover, the Ambassador of Ukraine to Türkiye condemned the deportation explicitly through a video message (Başpınar & Ürer, 2022, p.425).

Thus, both Crimean and Ukrainian diasporas in Türkiye and Canada helped economically, politically and mentally during the crisis (Nikolko & Şahin, 2020; Başpınar & Ürer, 2022). In this case, even though Ukrainian and Crimean Tatars did not have close relations before, after the annexation and the war, they found a common ground to conduct cooperation (Başpınar & Ürer, 2022). By targeting the Crimean Tatars in different countries like Türkiye and Canada, Ukraine aims at increasing the international support it gets (Nikolko & Şahin, 2020; Başpınar & Ürer, 2022).

5.8. Conclusion

Ukraine's public diplomacy implications aim at decreasing the influence of Russia and being more integrated both politically and culturally to Europe. In that sense, even though its effective public diplomacy tools are limited to digital and diaspora diplomacy, they are consistent and can be considered as effective regarding the results. Its PD targets the Russians (particularly the mothers of Russian soldiers), its own public, and the international community. Zelenskyy has a great support from his own public as well as several states of the EU and the U.S. Despite its limited resources, Ukraine represents its side of history, keeps promoting it on social media and any other platform that can be used for this purpose and in the end, manages to get the support from the West using social media and diaspora power.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis is to examine the Russia-Ukraine conflict and to compare the public diplomacy performance of these two countries. In this context, it seeks answers to questions such as what caused this conflict, why the conflict does not cease, how their use of public diplomacy corresponds to their foreign policy objectives, and which country's public diplomacy is more successful. For this purpose, firstly the concept of public diplomacy, then the causes and consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and finally the public diplomacy policies of these two countries are examined. There are many alternative definitions of public diplomacy in the literature. While some argue that public diplomacy is the objective activities of the state, some see it as the state's dissemination of its subjective values and ideals. On the other hand, some authors argue that not only the state actors, but also non-governmental organizations and individuals can be involved in public diplomacy.

Post-Soviet conflicts are examined in the literature in terms of international law, ethnic cultural problems, and Russia's policy. The first group analyses whether separatist movements in the former Soviet societies (such as South Ossetia) have a ground in

international law and argue that they have no basis in international law due to the absence of systematic violence against these groups.

The second stream of research argues that these disagreements stem from ethnic and cultural problems. They argue that sub-identities became important especially after the Cold War and they felt threatened. The last group argues that these disagreements stem from Russia's expansionist and protectionist policy towards the former Soviet countries. Russia maintains that it aims to maintain its influence in these regions by creating buffer zones by continuing the conflicts in these countries. This thesis deals with the Russia-Ukraine conflict from this perspective. The Ukraine war is completely related to Russia's foreign policy and its problematic relations with the West, namely, the European Union and NATO. Russia's protective policies towards the post-Soviet conflicts and its insistence on maintaining its influence on these regions serve as the main driving factor of these conflicts.

Finally, the use of public diplomacy in disputes is studied through different examples; It is possible to see many different examples in the literature, including the American public diplomacy of the Cold War, public diplomacy in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and even the public diplomacy of terrorist organizations. The purpose is the same in all of them; to internationalize the conflict, to explain the conflict from their point of view, to gain approval, support, and legitimacy from the international community by

demonstrating their own righteousness. This thesis considers the purpose of using public diplomacy in the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the same way.

In the second part of the thesis, the concept of public diplomacy is discussed. There are many alternative definitions of public diplomacy. However, this thesis accepts Hans Tuch's definition. Hans Tuch defined public diplomacy as states' instilling their own interests, ideals, ideas and policies to other nations. This thesis also states that public diplomacy is primarily done by states and has a subjective character. Addressing the evolution of public diplomacy is also important when defining public diplomacy. While public diplomacy used to target only statesmen or a certain part of the population, it can now target all segments of the population.

In addition, while public diplomacy used to be done with radio and limited television broadcasts, today it has become possible to do with many tools with the development of globalization and technology. In addition, it seems that there are different theoretical approaches to public diplomacy; such as realism, liberalism and constructivism. While realism argues that public diplomacy is primarily a state activity and that security and war are at the center of public diplomacy, liberalism and constructivism see public diplomacy as a process in which both states, non-governmental organizations and individuals can be involved, and argue that values and norms are at the center of public diplomacy. This thesis employs the realist point of view because war, security and regime security seem to be the priorities of both Russia and Ukraine.

In addition to all these, it is mentioned that public diplomacy and soft power should not be confused. Although public diplomacy is a form of soft power, it aims for long-term objectives. Soft power, on the other hand, can target short-term interests through propaganda. Public diplomacy is based on a policy, while soft power has no such obligation. Public diplomacy has different stages: monologue, dialogue and cooperation, and a successful public diplomacy should address all these stages separately. While a public diplomacy policy with only monologue or dialogue cannot achieve long-term results, one that addresses all three stages separately can bring long-term cooperation. There are also many different types of public diplomacy: cultural diplomacy, sports diplomacy, diaspora diplomacy. All of them use different public diploma tools and aim for similar purposes.

In the third part of the thesis, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is discussed. First, this conflict is analysed from a historical perspective. It is argued that Russia and Ukraine have a common religion, culture and history, but throughout history, Ukraine has had a special status, has never been fully assimilated by Russia, and finally, Ukraine has always wanted to present itself as a separate state. There are examples of this in history such as; Ukraine was one of the states that voted for the dissolution of the Soviet Union; the establishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic was later occupied by the Soviet Union; and the revolts that took place during the Orange Revolution, etc.).

After having obtained its independence, Ukraine has never had a stable political structure as a result of its complex ethnic situation, the conflict between the oligarchs and the political elites, and the interventions from other countries, especially from Russia. In particular, the asymmetric trade relationship with Russia has made Ukraine even more dependent on Russia.

In 2004, the Orange Revolution occurred as a result of pro-Russian Yanukovich winning the elections and pro-European Yushchenko rejecting the election result, and Yushchenko became president by undemocratic means. However, Yushchenko, who could not find a solution to corruption and the economic crisis, gradually lost the trust of the Ukrainian people and lost the elections in 2010. As a result, Yanukovich became president again. Some concessions were made to Russia in return for the revival of the Ukrainian economy. Regarding Ukraine's membership to the Eurasian Economic Community, it never happened as it was not compatible with Ukraine's membership in the World Trade Organization. Similarly, Ukraine's full membership to the Commonwealth of Independent States was also never realized.

Yanukovich tried to sign an Association Agreement with the EU when the European Union (EU) loosened the democracy condition; however, the signing of the Association Agreement was delayed as Russia offered (through secret meetings with Putin) a large economic boost to Ukraine. Regarding the relations with the EU, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1998 codified Ukraine's desire to

establish closer relations with the EU. At the Prague Summit in 2009, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership initiative, which aims to reform the EU's core values. In 2012, the EU stipulated the Association Agreement for Ukraine to become an EU member, and at the 2013 summit in Vilnius, the EU gave Ukraine and its other Eastern partners the green light for further integration.

However, when the signing of the above-mentioned Association Agreement was postponed, Euromaidan protests started in Ukraine in 2014. After the protests that resulted in Yanukovich leaving the country, Russia annexed Crimea. Afterwards, with the referendum held in Crimea, Crimea joined Russia. The referendum was not recognized by any country except some pro-Russian countries. In addition, separatist forces in the Donbas region also declared their independence. As a result of NATO's increased presence in 2022, Zelensky's complete anti-Russian policy and the intensification of the conflict in the Donbas region, the war broke out on February 24, 2022. It was further exacerbated when Russia declared mobilization in the country in September 2022. Referendums were held in many separatist regions in Ukraine whether to join Russia or not, which predominantly resulted in favor of Russia.

As for the existing results of the conflict, Anti-Communist laws came into force in 2016. Four laws were passed that demolished Soviet and Communist monuments and made Communist and Nazi symbols illegal. In addition, it is clear that Russia's soft power has suffered a disastrous decline in Ukraine. While the people who identify

themselves as ethnic Russians has dropped drastically, those who identify themselves as Ukrainian rose to 92%, making Ukraine the 4th most nationally homogeneous country in Europe. In addition, the Russian development model began to be associated with "aggression", "oppression" and "dictatorship". On the other hand, Russia-Ukraine trade relations have also suffered a great damage. While Ukraine's economic relations with the European Union have been increasing almost each year, its trade relations with Russia have been declining since the conflict started.

To put a separate parenthesis on the issue of the Crimean Tatars, although Ukraine did not make a great effort to integrate the Crimean Tatars into Ukraine before, it increased its support for the Crimean Tatars after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and saw it as a loyal ally in the face of Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Parliament recognized the Crimean Tatars as the indigenous people and the Majlis as the "highest representative body" in 2014 and condemned the 1944 exile and organized events especially to get support from the Crimean Tatars diaspora in Türkiye. In other words, Ukraine has truly accepted and started supporting the existence of the Crimean Tatars after the conflict with Russia.

Therefore, the geographical importance of Ukraine, the dominance of the idea of *Russkiy Mir* (Russian World) in Russian foreign policy, and the policy of protecting Russians and Russian-speaking communities living outside of Russia, its desire to maintain its political and cultural influence and to prevent Ukraine's integration into

Western organizations can be listed as the reasons on the Russian part. On the other hand, Ukraine's desire to present itself as a completely independent state separate from Russia by emphasizing its European values, to prevent Russification, and to spread its own language, history and culture can be listed as the reasons on the Ukrainian part.

As for the peace attempts, the Minsk I agreement failed in 2014, followed by the Minsk II agreement in 2015 which failed to maintain peace as well. The second Minsk agreement established a plan for ending the conflict consisting of 13 points. However, the most important points of the agreement were the need for 'constitutional reform' for the decentralization of Donbas on the Ukrainian side so that OSCE-controlled local elections could be held in Donbas. In other words, Ukraine had to give special status to these separatist regions, and this was unacceptable for Ukraine. In 2019, both Ukraine and Russia agreed on the Steinmeier Formula, which was first implemented in 2016. The Steinmeier Formula consisted of the withdrawal of arms, the holding of local elections under the supervision of the OSCE, and the granting of autonomous status to the disputed areas (Donetsk and Luhansk), but Zelensky's decision to agree on this formula was completely rejected by the Ukrainian people and led to protests.

In the fourth part of the thesis, Russia's public diplomacy has been examined. The foreign policy of Russia can be divided into two periods. The first period is the period of Boris Yeltsin and Andrey Kozyrev, in which Russia's foreign policy was more western-oriented, along with the desire for liberalization and integration with the West.

In this period, a rapid privatization process was experienced and as a result, oligarchs emerged. However, despite its Western-oriented foreign policy, Russia did not receive the expected welcoming from the West in terms of politics and economy. In addition, Russia's interests have been neglected in the Gulf War, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the Kosovo war. The second period is the period when Russia felt close to Eurasia rather than Europe. In this period, closer relations with China, India and Muslim countries were aimed to counterbalance the West. Close economic ties (in terms of gas and oil) with the West were established during Putin's presidency.

Russia, which is defined as the Consolidated authoritarian regime, has a different understanding of public diplomacy. Russia aims to advance its national interests in the international arena through public diplomacy and counterbalance the West in order to gain status and influence. For example, after the 2008 conflict in Ossetia and Abkhazia, Putin's popularity rose to 88%, and the referendum in Crimea (albeit controversially) was concluded in favor of Russia. Moreover, Russia exerts its influence in Central Asia as well as Latin America and Arab countries.

Although alternative media is challenging Russian mass media, evidence from the most recent World Values Survey conducted in Russia in 2018 found that two-thirds of Russians still use television as their primary source of daily news, and only a small minority trust the internet sources. In addition, the same survey showed that Russians often use their own social media, such as Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki, instead of

Instagram or Facebook. While before the conflict broke out, Ukrainians were portrayed as 'one of the Russians', like brothers who spoke the same language, shared the same religion and history, then Ukraine was portrayed as an 'enemy', a 'Nazi' who turned his back on Russia and adopted 'fascism' against the Russian-speaking population.

Russia Today (RT) started broadcasting in Spanish in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Cuba to increase its influence in Latin America. Also, the Arabic version of RT has since become one of the three most popular online resources in the Arab world. Besides all, Russia's state media companies, including RT, TASS, and Sputnik, aim to establish cooperation with African media companies. Apart from these, Russia has tightened its laws on the media, especially after the outbreak of the war. Russia, for example, has banned the use of words like 'war' and 'invasion' in the media. In addition, individuals who do not comply with Russia's policy in the Ukraine war or are accused of spreading false information can be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison.

In addition to digital diplomacy, Russia also employs diaspora diplomacy (especially Russian-speaking communities and Orthodox), sports diplomacy (hosting mega-sports events), cultural diplomacy (cultural events with countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russian language teaching events, educational diplomacy (Russian universities other than other countries). Russia also used economic diplomacy (cooperating with African, Chinese and Central Asian countries in the field of

economy, establishing the Eurasian Economic Union, being a member state of the BRICS organization, etc.). Considering its aims and various public diplomacy tools, we can say that Russia's public diplomacy is successful. Against the democratic and liberal public diplomacy understanding, Russian public diplomacy, which stands out with its authoritarian and anti-democratic character, appears to be successful and consistent.

In the fifth part of the thesis, Ukrainian public diplomacy is examined. Unlike Russia, according to the World Values Survey, Ukrainian people use TV and internet resources equally as information sources. Similarly, the same research shows that western social media applications such as Twitter and Instagram are used extensively in Ukraine, unlike Russia. For this reason, Ukraine's public diplomacy through media and digital platforms is different from Russia's. Against the powerful Russian mass media such as RT and Voice of Russia, 'Kyiv–Mohyla Academy' National University Mohyla School of Journalism created the stopfake.org site operating in 12 different languages in 2014. In addition, the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is a great source of information for foreigners as well as Ukrainians. There are 2 language options (English and Ukrainian). In addition, there are foreign policy news, speeches and statements, etc., about Ukraine, which includes the general facts of Ukraine and international cooperation, and news about the ministry of foreign affairs.

In addition, " the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine' " has entered into force in 2016, which aims to legally protect and update the Ukrainian media. Its objectives can be summarized as follows; Protection from Russian propaganda, ensuring the free flow of information, strengthening the information connection with Ukrainians living abroad, increasing the prestige of Ukraine and the Ukrainian language in the international arena, improving the broadcasting mechanism of Ukraine, etc. In addition, the "Law of Ukraine on the foreign broadcasting system of Ukraine" forms the basis of Ukrainian broadcasting; many issues such as promoting Ukraine on the international platform, disseminating correct information, creating a unified standard in terms of strengthening Ukraine's integration with the EU are stressed.

In the Ukrainian media, Ukraine is often portrayed as "moving towards or returning to Europe". Also, the EU is often cited as a favored direction for its shared history, trade relations, and power to thwart the Russian influence. Thus, the Ukrainian media firstly emphasizes that Ukraine has always been part of Europe and is now turning towards it, and secondly, the similarities with the EU and the imaginary distance between Ukraine and Russia are stressed. When it comes to social media, the hashtag "braveukraine" has generated enormous engagement with millions of views and thousands of shares, resulting in a tremendous increase in anti-Russian narratives. In addition, Telegram functions as an important source of information for Ukrainians, just like in the case of Russia. Telegram channel Trukha Ukraina is one of the pro-Ukrainian channels on Telegram with 2.7 million subscribers. The channel broadcasts

in Russian and Ukrainian (mostly). Another pro-Ukrainian telegram channel is 'Ukraina Seychas', which has 1.7 million subscribers and provides daily news in both Russian and Ukrainian. The channel not only gives news, but also shares caps and emotional videos.

Both President Zelensky and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba conducted an active digital diplomacy that reached a wide audience through the official accounts of the state. In fact, while Zelensky actively uses social media to dominate the information war, refutes rumors that he fled and hides, and motivates the Ukrainian army and public opinion with his daily conversations and videos of meeting with the military, Putin represents an isolated leader who is cut off from his people. Through social media, Zelensky and other Ukrainian state actors shared with the international audience a tremendous amount of content, such as videos of President Zelensky emphasizing his leadership qualities with his soldiers, and video conferences he organized. It is also seen as part of Ukraine's public diplomacy that it participates in many online meetings with Western officials, EU, France and G7 leaders to increase the pressure on Russia from the international community and constantly works to encourage them to be tougher on sanctions against Russia.

It also uses the Ukrainian diaspora as an effective public diplomacy tool. When Euromaidan began, the Canadian Congress of Ukraine raised money to organize protests and help people there to raise awareness about the tragic events in Ukraine.

Similarly, the Crimean Tatars have an active diaspora community in Türkiye. Crimean Tatar Organizations Platform expressed its sincere support to the Crimean parliament and congress in 2015 after the Crimean crisis. Canada recognized the deportation of the Crimean Tatars as genocide in 2016. The Ukrainian government has expressed its great support for the Crimean Tatars, especially after the annexation of Crimea by Russia.

Ukraine's public diplomacy studies are also seen in the field of economy and cooperation. In particular, the increasing trade relations with EU countries, the abolition of the visa requirement, the joint aviation agreement, the inclusion of Ukraine in the Creative Europe Program and the Horizon Europe program, and the signing of agreements such as the Euratom Research and Education program can be listed as successful examples in this field. However, the GUAM organization remains rather shallow and ineffective.

Ukraine also uses historical events as a public diplomacy tool. For example, it is argued by Ukraine that Kievan Rus was entirely a Ukrainian state, whereas the Russians later emerged as a separate nation. Another example would be the figure of Mazepa, who tried to save Ukraine from Peter the Great in order to establish an independent Ukrainian state and was seen as a hero by the Ukrainians but as a traitor by Russia. In addition, while the Holodomor is perceived as a disaster that concerns

the entire Soviet people in today's Russia, in Ukraine it is considered as a crime committed by the Soviet Union against the Ukrainians.

Therefore, public diplomacy implications of Russia and Ukraine are completely different due to their long-term aims, capacity, and target audiences. Nevertheless, even though their public diplomacy implications are subjective and limited, within the political framework in which they are present, they can be considered as effective. Thus, their public diplomacy implications do not correspond to public diplomacy's objectiveness and wide range of targeted audiences, however, are effective according to their foreign policy objectives. Comparing Russia and Ukraine in terms of public diplomacy, Russia's implications are consistent; as an authoritarian regime, it targets its compatriots as well as its domestic audiences, it tries to combine military diplomacy with public diplomacy, uses cultural and sport diplomacy aiming at gaining either short term benefits or creating a sense of nationhood. It has huge resources for public diplomacy which enables Russia to increase its sphere of influence in mainly Eurasia. As Russia has become more and more isolated from the Western world, it has tried to establish close relations with Africa and Asia.

On the other hand, Ukraine's public diplomacy implications focus on reducing the Russian influence and become more integrated with the West. Ukraine does not possess huge resources as Russia does, however, it uses relatively cheaper and feasible tools to implement its public diplomacy such as social media and its diaspora power.

Even though its public diplomacy does not seem to produce long-term positive results and even led to a war with Russia, considering the ultimate goal of Ukraine, which is to get support from the West, its public diplomacy can be considered as 'successful'. Zelenskyy is perceived as the hero protecting his country, Ukrainians perceived as liberals fighting against the oppressive and authoritarian politics of Russia, whereas Russia is isolated from every Western political and cultural sphere possible. Taking all into account, it can be argued that Ukraine's public diplomacy is more successful since it is implemented with a very limited resources and financial means compared to those of Russia.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Bu tezin amacı Rusya Ukrayna anlaşmazlığını incelemek ve bu iki ülkenin kamu diplomasi performanslarını karşılaştırmaktır. Bu bağlamda, bu anlaşmazlığa nelerin sebep olduğu, bu anlaşmazlığın sona ermemesinde nelerin rol oynadığı ve hangi ülkenin kamu diplomasisinin daha başarılı olduğu gibi sorulara yanıt aramaktadır. Bu amaçla öncelikle kamu diplomasisi konsepti, sonrasında Rusya Ukrayna anlaşmazlığının nedenleri ve sonuçları ve son olarak iki ülkenin ayrı ayrı kamu diplomasi politikaları incelenmiştir. Literatürde kamu diplomasisinin birçok alternatif tanımı olduğu görülmektedir. Bazıları kamu diplomasisinin devletin objektif aktiviteleri olduğunu savunurken, bazıları devletin subjektif değerlerini savunması ve yayması olarak görmüştür. Öte yandan bazı yazarlar sadece devlet değil sivil toplum örgütlerinin de kamu diplomasisine dahil olup yapabileceğini savunmuştur.

Diğer taraftan Sovyet sonrası çatışmalar literatürde uluslararası hukuk, etnik kültürel problemler ve Rusya'nın politikası açısından incelenmiştir. İlk grup eski Sovyet toplumlarındaki ayrılıkçı hareketlerin (Güney Osetya gibi) uluslararası hukukta bir yeri olup olmadığını incelemiş ve bu gruplara karşı sistematik bir şiddetin olmamasından dolayı uluslararası hukukta bir dayanaklarının olmadığını savunmuştur.

İkinci grup ise bu anlaşmazlıkların etnik ve kültürel problemlerden çıktığını savunmuştur. Özellikle Soğuk Savaş sonrası alt kimliklerin önemli hale gelip buldukları ülkelerin kültürlerine ve kimliklerine tehdit oluşturduğunu düşünüp ayrılmak istediklerini savunmuşlardır. Son grup ise bu anlaşmazlıkların Rusya'nın yayılmacı ve eski Sovyet ülkelere karşı yürüttüğü korumacı politikasından kaynaklı olduğunu savunmuştur. Rusya bu ülkelerdeki anlaşmazlıkları devam ettirerek kendisine tampon bölgeler yaratıp bu bölgelerdeki etkisini devam ettirmeyi amaçladığını savunmaktadır. Bu tez de Rusya Ukrayna anlaşmazlığını bu açıdan ele almıştır.

Son olarak, kamu diplomasisinin anlaşmazlıklarda kullanımını birçok farklı örnekle incelenmiştir; Soğuk Savaş dönemi Amerika kamu diplomasisi, Filistin İsrail anlaşmazlığında kamu diplomasisi ve hatta terörist organizasyonların kamu diplomasisi olmak üzere birçok farklı örneği literatürde görmek mümkündür. Hepsinde amaç aynıdır; anlaşmazlığı uluslararası hale getirmek, kendi açılarından anlaşmazlığı anlatmak, kendi haklılıklarını ortaya koyarak uluslararası toplumdan

onay, destek ve meşruluk elde etmek. Bu tez de Rusya Ukrayna anlaşmazlığında kamu diplomasisi kullanımının amacını bu şekilde düşünmektedir.

Bu tez kamu diplomasisinin objektif olmayı ve olabildiğince büyük bir kitleye ulaşmaya çalıştığını amaçladığını savunanların aksine, kamu diplomasisinin bazen subjektif ve belirli bir kitleyi hedef alabileceğini savunmaktadır. Rusya Ukrayna anlaşmazlığı ve bu iki ülkenin kamu diplomasisini kullanım şekillerini de bu hipotezin bir kanıtı olduğunu belirtmektedir. Buna ek olarak, Rusya ve Ukrayna'nın kamu diplomasisi politikalarını buldukları siyasi durum göz önünde bulundurulduğunda başarılı olduğunu; ancak Ukrayna'nın Rusya'ninkine nazaran oldukça kısıtlı olan kaynakları düşünüldüğünde Ukrayna'nın kamu diplomasisinin daha az kaynakla daha başarılı olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Tezin ikinci bölümünde kamu diplomasisi konsepti ele alınmıştır. Kamu diplomasisinin birçok alternatif tanımı bulunmaktadır. Ancak bu tez, Hans Tuch'ın tanımını kabul etmektedir. Hans Tuch kamu diplomasisini devletlerin kendi çıkarlarını, ideallerini, fikirlerini ve politikalarını diğer milletlere aşılama durumu olarak tanımlamıştır. Bu tez de kamu diplomasisinin öncelikle devletler tarafından yapıldığını ve subjektif bir karaktere sahip olduğunu belirtmektedir. Kamu diplomasisinin geçirdiği evrime değinmek de kamu diplomasisini tanımlarken önemlidir. Kamu diplomasisi öncesinde sadece devlet adamlarını veya popülasyonun

belirli bir kısmını hedef alırken, Őu an popölasyonun her kesimini hedef alabilecek bir hal almıŐtır.

Buna ek olarak, kamu diplomasisi eskiden radyo ve kısıtlı televizyon yayınlarıyla yapılırken, günümüzde globalizasyon ve teknolojinin geliŐmesiyle birçok araçla yapılabilir hale gelmiŐtir. Buna ek olarak, kamu diplomasisine farklı teorik yaklaŐımların olduđu görölmektedir; realizm, liberalizm ve konstrüktivizm gibi. Realizm kamu diplomasisinin öncelikle bir devlet aktivitesi olduđunu ve güvenlik ve savaŐın kamu diplomasisinin merkezinde olduđunu savunurken, liberalizm ve konstrüktivizm kamu diplomasisinin hem devletler hem sivil toplum örgütleri hem de bireylerin yapabileceđi bir konsept olarak görmekte, deđerlerin ve normların kamu diplomasisi merkezinde olduđunu savunmaktadır. Bu tez realist bakıŐ açısını ele almaktadır çünkü savaŐ, güvenlik ve rejim korumanın Őu an hem Rusya'nın hem de Ukrayna'nın öncelikleri olduđu görölmektedir.

Tüm bunlara ek olarak, kamu diplomasisi ve yumuŐak gücün karıŐtırılmaması gerektiđine deđinilmiŐtir. Kamu diplomasisi bir tür yumuŐak güc olmakla beraber daha uzun vadeli ortaklıklar hedeflemektedir. YumuŐak güc ise propaganda veya kısa vadeli çıkarları hedef alabilmektedir. Kamu diplomasisi bir politikaya dayanmaktadır, yumuŐak gücün ise böyle bir zorunluluđu yoktur. Kamu diplomasisinin farklı aŐamaları bulunmaktadır: monolog, diyalog ve iŐ birliđi gibi ve baŐarılı bir kamu diplomasisi tüm bu aŐamalara ayrı ayrı deđinmelidir. Sadece monolog veya

diyalogun olduđu bir kamu diplomasisi politikası uzun vadeli sonuçlar elde edemeyecekken ayrı ayrı üç aşamaya da değinen bir kamu diplomasi politikası, beraberinde uzun vadeli iş birlikleri getirebilmektedir. Ayrıca kamu diplomasisinin birçok farklı türü bulunmaktadır: kültürel diplomasi, spor diplomasisi, diaspora diplomasisi gibi. Hepsinde farklı kamu diplomasi araçları kullanılmaktadır ve benzer amaçları hedeflemektedir.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde Rusya Ukrayna anlaşmazlığı ele alınmıştır. Öncelikle, bu anlaşmazlığa tarihsel açıdan bakılmıştır. Rusya ve Ukrayna'nın ortak din, kültür ve tarihe sahip olduğu ancak tarih boyunca Ukrayna'nın özel bir statüye sahip olduğu, hiçbir zaman Rusya tarafından tam anlamıyla asimile edilemediği ve son olarak Ukrayna'nın kendini hep ayrı bir devlet olarak göstermeyi istediği savunulmuştur. Tarihte bunun örnekleri de mevcuttur (Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasında oy kullanan devletlerden birinin Ukrayna olması, Ukrayna Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulması daha sonrasında Sovyetler Birliği tarafından işgal edilmesi, Turuncu Devrim, vb.).

Ukrayna bağımsızlığını elde ettikten sonra gerek karmaşık etnik durumu, oligark ve siyasi elitlerin çekişmesi, gerekse dış dünyadan, özellikle Rusya'dan gelen, müdahaleler sonucunda asla stabil bir siyasi yapıya sahip olamamıştır. Özellikle Rusya ile sahip olduğu asimetrik ticaret ilişkisi Ukrayna'yı Rusya'ya daha da bağımlı hale getirmiştir. Bazı dönemlerde Rusya yanlısı bir politika izlerken bazı dönemlerde batı yanlısı bir politika izleyerek aslında bir çeşit denge politikası kurmaya çalışmıştır.

2004'te Rusya yanlısı Yanukoviç'in seçimi kazanması ve Avrupa yanlısı Yuşçenko'nun seçim sonucunu reddetmesi sonucu Turuncu Devrim meydana gelmiştir ve demokratik olmayan yollarla Yuşçenko cumhurbaşkanı olmuştur. Ancak yolsuzluğa ve ekonomik krize çare bulamayan Yuşçenko yavaş yavaş Ukrayna halkının güvenini kaybetmiştir ve 2010'da seçimleri kaybetmiş, Yanukoviç tekrar cumhurbaşkanı olmuştur. Ukrayna ekonomisinin canlanması karşılığında Rusya'ya bazı tavizler verilmiştir. Ukrayna'nın Avrasya Ekonomik Topluluğu'na üyeliği ile ilgili olarak, Ukrayna'nın Dünya Ticaret Örgütü'ne üyeliği ile uyumlu olmadığı için asla gerçekleşmemiştir. Bağımsız Devlet Topluluğu'na tam üyeliği de aynı şekilde hiçbir zaman gerçekleşmemiştir.

Yanukoviç, Avrupa Birliği (AB) demokrasi koşulunu gevşetince AB ile Ortaklık Anlaşması imzalamaya çalışmıştır; ancak Rusya'nın (Putin'le gizli görüşmeler yoluyla) Ukrayna'ya büyük bir ekonomik destek teklif etmesi sonucunda Ortaklık Anlaşması'nın imzalanması ertelenmiştir. AB ile ilişkilere ilişkin olarak, iki taraf arasında 1998 yılında imzalanan Ortaklık ve İş birliği Anlaşması, Ukrayna'nın AB ile daha yakın ilişkiler kurma arzusunu kodlamıştır. AB, 2009 yılındaki Prag Zirvesi'nde, AB'nin temel değerleri açısından reformlar gerçekleştirmeyi amaçlayan Doğu Ortaklığı girişimini başlatmıştır. 2012'de AB, Ukrayna'nın AB üyesi olması için Ortaklık Anlaşması'nı şart koştu ve 2013'te Vilnius'ta yapılan zirvede AB, Ukrayna'ya ve diğer Doğulu ortaklarına daha fazla entegrasyon için yeşil ışık yakmıştır.

Ancak yukarıda bahsi geçen Ortaklık Anlaşması imzalanması ertelenince, 2014'te Ukrayna'da Yevromaydan protestoları başlamıştır. Yanukoviç'in ülkeyi terk etmesiyle sonuçlanan protestoların ardında Rusya Kırım'ın ilhakını gerçekleştirmiştir. Sonrasında Kırım'da gerçekleştirilen referandumla Kırım Rusya'ya bağlanmıştır. Bu referandum bazı Rusya yanlısı ülkeler dışında hiçbir ülke tarafından tanınmamıştır. Buna ek olarak, Donbas bölgesindeki ayrılıkçı güçler de bağımsızlığını ilan etmiştir. 2022'de NATO'nun varlığını arttırması, Zelenski'nin tamamen Rusya karşıtı izlediği politika ve Donbas bölgesindeki anlaşmazlığın daha da yoğun hale gelmesi sonucunda 24 Şubat 2022'de savaş başlamıştır ve hala devam etmektedir. Eylül 2022'de Rusya'nın ülkede seferberlik ilan etmesiyle daha da şiddetlenmiştir. Ukrayna'da birçok ayrılıkçı bölgede Rusya'ya katılıp katılmama referandumları gerçekleştirilmiş, hepsinde Rusya'ya katılmak çoğunlukta olmuştur.

Bu anlaşmazlığın ve savaşın bazı sonuçlarını gözlemlemek mümkündür. 2016'da yürürlüğe giren Anti Komünist yasaları bunlardan biridir. Sovyet ve Komünist anıtlarını yıktıran ve Komünist ve Nazi sembollerini yasa dışı kılan dört yasa çıkarılmıştır. Buna ek olarak, Rusya'nın yumuşak gücünün Ukrayna'da dehşet bir düşüşe uğradığı da aşikârdır. Kendisini etnik Rus olarak tanımlayanların sayısı büyük ölçüde düşmekle beraber, kendisini Ukraynalı olarak tanımlayanlar %92'ye çıkarak Ukrayna'yı Avrupa'nın ırk olarak en homojen 4. ülkesi haline getirmiştir. Buna ek olarak, Ukrayna'da Rus kalkınma modeli "agresyon" "zulüm" ve "diktatörlük" ile ilişkilendirilmeye başlanmıştır. Diğer taraftan, Rusya Ukrayna ticari ilişkileri de

büyük hasara uğramıştır. Avrupa Birliği ile ticari ilişkileri neredeyse her sene yükselirken, Rusya ile ticari ilişkileri her sene daha da düşüşe geçmiştir. The Observatory of Economic Complexity verilerine göre, Ukrayna'nın Rusya'ya ihracatı 2012'de %24 iken 2019'da %9,46'ya, benzer şekilde Rusya'dan ithalatı da 2012'de %30,7'den 2019'da %12'ye düşmüştür.

Kırım Tatarları konusuna ayrı bir parantez açmak gerekirse, her ne kadar Ukrayna Kırım Tatarlarını Ukrayna'ya entegre etme konusunda büyük bir efor sarfetmese de 2014 Kırım ilhaki sonrası Kırım Tatarlarına olan desteğini arttırmış, Rusya agresyonu karşısında sadık bir müttefik olarak görmüştür. Ukrayna Parlamentosu, 2014 yılında Kırım Tatarlarını yerli halk olarak, Meclisini ise “en yüksek temsil organı” olarak kabul etmiştir ve özellikle Türkiye'deki Kırım Tatarları diasporasından destek almak için 1944 sürgünü kınamış, etkinlikler düzenlemiştir. Yani, Ukrayna, Kırım Tatarlarının varlığını Rusya ile çıkan anlaşmazlık sonrası gerçek anlamda kabul etmiş ve desteklemeye başlamıştır.

Rusya Ukrayna anlaşmazlığı sebeplerine Rusya ve Ukrayna açısından ayrı ayrı bakmak gerekirse, Rusya için Ukrayna'nın coğrafik önemi, Russkiy Mir (Rus Dünyası) fikrinin Rusya dış politikasındaki baskınlığı ve bu fikirden doğan Rusya dışında yaşan Rus ve Rusça konuşan toplulukları koruma politikası, eski Sovyet ülkelerinde siyasi ve kültürel etkisini sürdürmeye devam etmek istemesi ve Ukrayna'nın Batı organizasyonlarına entegrasyonuna engel olmak olarak

listeleyebiliriz. Öte yandan, Ukrayna'nın ise kendisini tamamen bağımsız ve Rusya'dan ayrı bir devlet olarak, Avrupa değerlerini vurgulayarak gösterme isteği, Ruslaşmanın önüne geçmek, kendi dilini, tarihini ve kültürünü yaymak olarak listeleyebiliriz.

Barış denemelerine gelirse, 2014'te Minsk I anlaşması başarısız olmuştur ve ardından 2015'te yine sonuç vermeyen Minsk II anlaşması gelmiştir. İkinci Minsk anlaşması, ikili ateşkes, ağır silahların geri çekilmesi, AGİT (Avrupa Güvenlik ve İş Birliği Teşkilatı) kontrolünde yerel seçimler, çatışmaya karışanların affı, rehinelere serbest bırakılması, güvenli teslimat dahil olmak üzere 13 noktadan oluşan çatışmanın sona erdirilmesi için bir plan oluşturmuştur. Ancak anlaşmanın en önemli noktaları, tüm yabancı silahlı grupların geri çekilmesi, Ukrayna'nın Rusya ile olan sınırlarında tam kontrolü ele geçirmesi ve Donbas'ta AGİT kontrolünde yerel seçimlerin yapılabilmesi için Ukrayna tarafında Donbas'ın ademi merkeziyetçiliği için 'anayasa reformu' gerekmesi olmuştur.

Diğer bir deyişle, Ukrayna'nın bu ayrılıkçı bölgelere özel statü vermesi gerekmekteydi ve Ukrayna için bu kabul edilemezdi. 2019'da hem Ukrayna hem de Rusya, ilk olarak 2016'da uygulamaya konulan Steinmeier Formülü üzerinde anlaşmışlardı. Steinmeier Formülü, silahların çekilmesi, yerel seçimlerin AGİT gözetiminde yapılması ve ihtilafli bölgelere (Donetsk ve Luhansk) özerk statü verilmesinden oluşuyordu, ancak

Zelenski'nin bu formül üzerinde anlaşmaya varma kararı Ukrayna halkı tarafından tamamen reddedildi ve protestolara yol açmıştır.

Tezin dördüncü bölümünde Rusya'nın kamu diplomasisi incelenmiştir. Rusya'nın dış politikası iki döneme ayrılabilir. Birinci dönem, liberalleşme ve Batı ile bütünleşme arzusu ile birlikte Rusya'nın dış politikasının daha batı odaklı olduğu Boris Yeltsin ve Andrey Kozırev dönemidir. Bu dönemde hızlı bir özelleştirme süreci yaşanmış ve bunun sonucunda oligarklar ortaya çıkmıştır. Ancak Rusya, Batı eksenli dış politikasına rağmen siyasi ve ekonomik açıdan Batı'dan beklenen karşılamaı görmemiştir. Bunun yanında Körfez savaşında, Yugoslavya'nın dağılmasında, Kosova savaşında Rusya'nın çıkarları hep göz ardı edilmiştir.

İkinci dönem ise Rusya'nın kendini Avrupa'dan çok Avrasya'ya yakın hissettiği dönemdir. Bu dönemde Batı karşısında denge sağlamak için Çin, Hindistan ve Müslüman ülkelerle daha yakın ilişkiler hedeflenmiştir. Putin'in başkanlığı sırasında Batı ile yakın ekonomik bağlar (gaz ve petrol açısından) kurulmuştur. Rusya'nın Avrupa ile demokrasi ve insan hakları gibi benzer değerleri paylaştığı ifade edilse de, Rusya'nın istisnai bir durumu olduğu ve gerektiğinde bu değerlerin kurallarına karar verebileceği vurgulanmıştır. Mesela, 2008 Gürcistan ile olan anlaşmazlıkta Rusya topraklarındaki Gürcü diasporasına baskı yaparak veya çeşitli ekonomik yaptırımlarla (Gürcistan'dan Rusya'ya ihracatı askıya alarak) Gürcü hükümetine baskı yapmasını örnek gösterebiliriz. Gül devriminden sonra Rusya, medyanın (bilgi savaşının)

önemini ve çatışmaları uluslararası topluma onların bakış açısıyla yansıtması gerektiğini kabul etmiştir.

Freedom House'a göre Konsolide otoriter rejim olarak tanımlanan Rusya'nın farklı bir kamu diplomasisi anlayışı bulunmaktadır. Rusya kamu diplomasisi ile ulusal çıkarlarını uluslararası arenada ilerletmeyi ve statü ve nüfuz elde etmek için Batı'yı dengelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Örneğin Osetya ve Abhazya'da 2008'deki ihtilaftan sonra Putin'in popülaritesi %88'e yükselmiş, referandum (tartışmalı da olsa) Rusya lehine sonuçlanmıştır. Rusya, Orta Asya'nın yanı sıra Latin Amerika ve Arap ülkelerinde de etki göstermektedir.

Rus kitle iletişim araçlarına alternatif medya meydan okusa da 2018'de Rusya'da gerçekleştirilen en son Dünya Değerler Araştırmasından elde edilen kanıtlar, Rusların üçte ikisinin hala birincil günlük haber kaynağı olarak televizyonu kullandığını ve yalnızca küçük bir azınlığın internete güvendiği görülmüştür. Buna ek olarak, aynı anket Rusların genellikle Instagram veya Facebook yerine V Kontakte ve Odnoklassniki gibi kendi sosyal medyalarını kullandıklarını göstermiştir. Çatışma çıkmadan önce Ukraynalılar, aynı dili konuşan, aynı dini ve tarihi paylaşan kardeşler gibi 'Ruslardan biri' olarak tasvir edilirken, sonrasında Ukrayna, 'düşman' olarak gösterilmeye başlanmış, Rusya'ya sırtını dönen ve Rusça konuşan nüfusa karşı 'faşizmi' benimseyen 'Nazi Ayaklanmaları' olarak tanımlanmıştı.

Russia Today (RT), Latin Amerika'daki etkisini artırmak için Venezuela, Arjantin, Bolivya ve Küba'da İspanyolca yayın yapmaya başlamıştır. Ayrıca, RT'nin Arapça versiyonu o zamandan beri Arap dünyasındaki en popüler üç çevrimiçi kaynaktan biri olmuştur. Hepsinin yanı sıra, RT, TASS ve Sputnik dahil olmak üzere Rusya'nın devlet medya şirketleri, Afrika medya şirketleriyle sürekli iş birliği kurmayı hedeflemektedir. Bunların haricinde Rusya, özellikle savaşın patlak vermesinden sonra medyayla ilgili yasalarını sıkılaştırmıştır. Örneğin Rusya, medyada 'savaş' ve 'işgal' gibi kelimelerin kullanılmasını yasaklanmıştır. Ayrıca, Rusya'nın Ukrayna savaşındaki politikasına uymayan veya yanlış bilgi yaymakla suçlanan kişiler 15 yıla kadar hapis cezasına çarptırılabilir.

Dijital diplomasiye ek olarak Rusya, diaspora diplomasisini (özellikle Rusya konuşan toplulukları ve Ortodoksları), spor diplomasisini (mega spor etkinliklerine ev sahipliği yapmak), kültürel diplomasiyi (Ermenistan, Azerbaycan gibi ülkelerle kültürel etkinlikler, Rus dili öğretme etkinlikleri, eğitim diplomasisini (Rus üniversitelerini diğer eski Sovyet ülkelerinde yaymak) ve ekonomi diplomasisini (Afrika, Çin ve Orta Asya ülkeleriyle ekonomi alanında yapılan iş birlikleri ve Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği'ni kurması, BRICS topluluğuna üye olması, vb.) de oldukça etkili kullanmıştır. Rusya'nın hedef kitleleri, dış politika amaçları ve kullandığı çeşitli kamu diplomasi araçları göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, Rusya'nın kamu diplomasisi başarılı diyebiliriz. Demokratik ve liberal kamu diplomasi anlayışının dışında, otoriter ve anti demokratik karakteriyle ön plana çıkan Rus kamu diplomasisinin, Rusya'nın içinde

bulunduđu siyasi durum ve dıř politika hedefleri göz önünde bulundurulduđunda tutarlı olduđu görölmektedir.

Tezin beřinci bölümünde ise Ukrayna kamu diplomasisi incelenmiřtir. Rusya'nın aksine, Dünya Deđerler Arařtırması'na göre, Ukrayna halkı bilgi kaynađı olarak TV ve internet kaynakları eřit olarak kullanılmaktadır. Benzer řekilde aynı arařtırma, Twitter ve Instagram gibi batılı sosyal medya uygulamalarının Rusya'dan farklı olarak Ukrayna'da da yođun olarak kullanıldığını göstermektedir. Bu nedenle Ukrayna'nın medya ve dijital platform aracılıđıyla uyguladıđı kamu diplomasisi Rusya'dan farklıdır. RT ve Voice of Russia gibi güçlü Rus kitle iletiřim araçlarına karřı, 'Kyiv–Mohyla Akademisi' Ulusal Üniversitesi Mohyla Gazetecilik Okulu, 2014 yılında 12 farklı dilde faaliyet gösteren stopfake.org sitesini oluřturdu. Buna ek olarak, Ukrayna Dıřıřleri Bakanlıđı'nın web sitesi Ukraynalılar kadar yabancılar için de harika bir bilgi kaynađıdır. 2 dil seçeeneđi vardır (İngilizce ve Ukraynaca). Ayrıca site içerisinde Ukrayna'nın genel gerçeklerinin ve uluslararası iř birliklerinin yer aldıđı Ukrayna hakkında, dıřıřleri bakanlıđı ile ilgili haberlerin yer aldıđı dıř politika haberleri, konuşmalar ve açıklamalar vb. gibi farklı bölümler bulunmaktadır.

Buna ek olarak, hukuki olarak da Ukrayna medyasını korumaya ve günlendirmeye yönelik, 'Ukrayna Bilgi Güvenliđi Doktrini' yürürlüğe girmiřtir. Amaçları řu řekilde özetlenebilir; Rus propagandasından korunma, serbest bilgi akıřının sađlanması, yurtdıřında yařayan Ukraynalılar ile bilgi bađlantısının sađlamlařtırılması,

Ukrayna'nın ve Ukrayna dilinin uluslararası arenadaki prestijinin artırılması, Ukrayna'nın yayın mekanizmasının iyileştirilmesi vb. Buna ek olarak, “Ukrayna'nın yabancı yayın sistemine ilişkin Ukrayna Kanunu”, Ukrayna yayıncılığının temelini oluşturmaktadır; Ukrayna'yı uluslararası platformda tanıtmak, doğru bilgileri yaymak, Ukrayna'nın AB'ye entegrasyonunu güçlendirmek açısından birleşik bir standart oluşturmak da dahil olmak üzere çıkarları ve bunun nasıl yapılması gerektiği gibi birçok konuya değinilmektedir.

Ukrayna medyasında Ukrayna genellikle “Avrupa'ya doğru hareket ediyor veya Avrupa'ya geri dönüyor” olarak tasvir ediliyor. Ayrıca AB, genellikle ortak tarihi, ticari ilişkileri ve Rus nüfuzunu engelleme gücü ile gözde bir yön olarak öne sürülüyor. Böylece Ukrayna medyası, öncelikle Ukrayna'nın her zaman Avrupa'nın bir parçası olduğunu ve artık ona yöneldiğini vurgularken, ikinci olarak AB ile benzerlikleri ve Ukrayna ile Rusya arasındaki hayali mesafeyi vurgulamaktadır. Sosyal medya söz konusu olduğunda ise “braveukraine” hashtag'i milyonlarca izlenme ve binlerce paylaşım ile muazzam bir etkileşim yakalayarak Rus karşıtı anlatılarda muazzam bir artışa yol açmıştır. Buna ek olarak Telegram, tıpkı Rusya örneğinde olduğu gibi, Ukraynalılar için de önemli bir bilgi kaynağı işlevi görüyor. Telegram kanalı Trukha Ukraina, 2,7 milyon abonesiyle Telegram'daki Ukrayna yanlısı kanallardan biridir. Kanal Rusça ve Ukraynaca (çoğunlukla) yayın yapmaktadır. Ukrayna yanlısı bir diğer telgraf kanalı ise 1,7 milyon abonesi olan ve her gün hem Rusça hem de Ukraynaca

haberler veren 'Ukraina Seychas' kanalıdır. Kanal sadece haber vermekle kalmayıp aynı zamanda capsler ve duygusal videolar da paylaşmaktadır.

Hem Cumhurbaşkanı Zelenski hem de Dışışleri Bakanı Dmitro Kuleba, devletin resmi hesapları üzerinden geniş bir kitleye ulaşan aktif bir dijital diplomasi yürütmüştür. Hatta Zelenski'nin bilgi savaşına hükmetmek için sosyal medyayı etkin bir şekilde kullandığı, kaçtığı ve saklandığı yönündeki söylentileri çürüttüğü, günlük konuşmaları ve orduyla bir araya geldiği videolarıyla Ukrayna ordusunu ve kamuoyunu motive ederken Putin, halkından kopmuş yalnız bir lideri temsil etmektedir.

Sosyal medya aracılığıyla Zelenski ve diğer Ukraynalı devlet aktörleri, Cumhurbaşkanı Zelenski'nin askerleriyle liderlik vasıflarını vurguladığı videoları, düzenlediği video konferanslar gibi muazzam bir içeriği uluslararası izleyiciyle paylaşmıştır. Uluslararası toplumdan Rusya üzerindeki baskıyı artırmak için Batılı yetkililerle, AB, Fransa ve G7 liderleriyle birçok çevrimiçi toplantıya katılması ve onları Rusya'ya yönelik yaptırımlarda daha sert olmaya teşvik etmek için sürekli çalışması da Ukrayna'nın kamu diplomasisinin bir parçası olarak görülmektedir.

Ukrayna'nın dijital diplomasisini, farklı hedef kitlelerle düzenli olarak yapılan toplantılar, hedef kitlelere atılan tweetler, videolar ve paylaşımlar aracılığıyla

uluslararası topluma Ukrayna'nın savaştaki haklılığını göstermeye, Rusya'ya daha sert yaptırımlar uygulamaya ve Ukrayna'ya fon toplamaya çalışmak olarak özetleyebiliriz.

Ukrayna diasporasını da etkili bir kamu diplomasi aracı olarak kullanmaktadır. Yevromaydan başladığında Ukrayna Kanada Kongresi, Ukrayna'daki trajik olaylar hakkında farkındalık yaratmak için protestolar düzenleyip oradaki insanlara yardım etmek için para toplamıştır. Benzer şekilde Kırım Tatarları da Türkiye'de etkin bir diaspora topluluğuna sahiptir. Kırım Tatar Örgütleri Platformu, Kırım krizinin ardından 2015 yılında Kırım meclisine ve kurultayına samimi desteğini dile getirmiştir. Kanada, 2016 yılında Kırım Tatarlarının sınır dışı edilmesini soykırım olarak tanımıştır. Ukrayna hükümeti, özellikle Kırım'ın Rusya tarafından ilhak edilmesinin ardından Kırım Tatarlarına büyük desteğini dile getirmiştir.

Ekonomi ve iş birliği alanında da Ukrayna'nın kamu diplomasi çalışmaları görülmektedir. Özellikle AB ülkeleriyle artan ticari ilişkisi, vizenin kalkması, ortak havacılık anlaşması, Ukrayna'nın Yaratıcı Avrupa Programı ve Horizon Avrupa programına dahil edilmesi ve Euratom Araştırma ve Eğitim programı gibi anlaşmaların imzalanmasını bu alandaki başarılı örnekler olarak gösterebiliriz. Ancak GUAM organizasyonu oldukça sığ ve etkisiz kalmaya devam etmektedir.

Ukrayna tarihi olayları bir kamu diplomasisi aracı olarak da kullanmaktadır. Örneğin, Ukrayna tarafından Kiev Rus'un tamamen bir Ukrayna devleti olduğu, oysa Rusların daha sonra ayrı bir ulus olarak ortaya çıktığı iddia edilmektedir. Bir başka örnek de bağımsız bir Ukrayna devleti kurmak için Ukrayna'yı Büyük Petro'dan kurtarmaya çalışan ve Ukraynalılara göre kahraman iken Rusya tarafından hain olarak görülen Mazepa şahsiyeti olabilir. Buna ek olarak Holodomor günümüz Rusya'sında tüm Sovyet halkını ilgilendiren bir felaket olarak algılanırken, Ukrayna'da Sovyetler Birliği'nin Ukraynalılara karşı işlediği bir suç olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Ayrıca, Kiev Sovyet İşgali Müzesi, gerçek Sovyet tarihini yansıtmak için açılmıştır. 2017'de ise Ukrayna'nın tek eğitim dilinin Ukraynaca olduğunu belirten yeni bir yasa yürürlüğe girmiştir.

Ukrayna'nın kamu diplomasisinin Rusya'nınki kadar çeşitli ve geniş çaplı olmasa da dış politika amaçları doğrultusunda kendi içinde tutarlı ve etkili olduğunu savunabiliriz. Avrupa'dan ve Amerika'dan destek almaya ve Rusya etkisini tamamen yok etmeye yönelik Ukrayna politikası göz önünde bulundurulduğunda Ukrayna'nın kamu diplomasisinin başarılı olduğunu belirtmek mümkündür. Her ne kadar şu anda savaş halinde de olursa, Ukrayna her alandan destek almaya devam etmektedir ve Batı ile daha derin entegrasyona her geçen gün daha da yaklaşmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak, Ukrayna ile olan çatışma tamamen Rusya'nın dış politikası ve Batı ile, yani Avrupa Birliği ve NATO ile sorunlu ilişkileri ile ilgilidir. Rusya'nın Sovyet

sonrası çatışmalara yönelik korumacı politikaları ve SSCB'de olduğu gibi bu bölgelerdeki etkisini sürdürme ısrarı, bu çatışmaların ana itici gücüdür. Kamu diplomasisi hem Rusya hem de Ukrayna dış politikasının ana unsurlarından biridir.

Bu tezin amacı, uzun vadeli amaçları, kapasiteleri ve hedef kitleleri nedeniyle Rusya ve Ukrayna'nın kamu diplomasisi uygulamalarının tamamen farklı olduğunu tartışmaktır. Bununla birlikte, kamu diplomasisi uygulamaları sübjektif ve sınırlı olsa da içinde buldukları siyasi çerçevede etkili sayılabilirler. Bu nedenle, bu iki ülkenin kamu diplomasisi uygulamaları, kamu diplomasisinin tarafsız oluşu ve geniş bir hedef kitle yelpazesine sahip olmasıyla çelişmekle birlikte, dış politika hedeflerine göz önünde bulundurulduğunda etkilidir. Rusya ve Ukrayna'yı kamu diplomasisi açısından karşılaştırdığımızda, Rusya'nın uygulamaları tutarlıdır; otoriter bir rejim olarak hem yurttaşlarını hem de kendi halkını hedef alıp askeri diplomasi ile kamu diplomasisini birleştirmeye çalışıp kültür ve spor diplomasisini ya kısa vadeli çıkarlar elde etmek ya da bir ulus duygusu yaratmak için kullanmaktadır.

Rusya'nın ağırlıklı olarak Avrasya'da etki alanını artırmasına olanak sağlayan çok büyük kamu diplomasisi kaynaklarına sahiptir. Rusya, Batı dünyasından giderek daha fazla soyutlanırken, Afrika ve Asya ile yakın ilişkiler kurmaya çalışmaktadır. Öte yandan, Ukrayna'nın kamu diplomasisi uygulamaları, Rusya etkisini azaltmaya ve Batı ile daha entegre olmaya odaklanmaktadır.

Ukrayna, Rusya kadar büyük kaynaklara sahip olmamakla beraber kamu diplomasisini uygulamak için sosyal medya ve diaspora gücü gibi nispeten daha ucuz ve uygulanabilir araçlar kullanmaktadır. Kamu diplomasisi uzun vadeli olumlu sonuçlar vermese ve hatta Rusya ile savaşa bile yol açmış gibi görünse de Ukrayna'nın nihai hedefinin Batı'dan destek almak olduğu düşünüldüğünde, kamu diplomasisi 'başarılı' olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Zelenski ülkesini koruyan kahraman olarak algılanırken, Ukraynalılar Rusya'nın baskıcı ve otoriter siyasetine karşı savaşan liberaller olarak algılanırken, Rusya Batı'nın mümkün olan her türlü siyasi ve kültürel alanından izole edilmiştir. Tüm bunlar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, Ukrayna kamu diplomasisinin, Rusya'ya kıyasla çok sınırlı kaynak ve mali imkanlarla uygulanmasından dolayı daha başarılı olduğu söylenebilir.

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