

THE POLITICS AND GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN SECURITY SERVICES
PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES: THE CASE OF ANKARA,
TURKEY

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ANKARA, TURKEY**

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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS AND GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN SECURITY SERVICES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES: THE CASE OF ANKARA, TURKEY

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Today, the state continues to be defined as a form of social relationship, organized in the form of a nation-state, and continuing its dual functionality in terms of production and reproduction of capitalist social relations, through the sphere of sovereignty (spatial) and the monopoly of legitimate violence (functional). The transformation process of security production as a part of the commercialization and marketization of certain public services (especially health and education) has been critical in the last three decades in Turkey in terms of both the dialectic of urban social control and the identification of the relationship between urban security production and spatial (re)production, which necessitates a discussion. In this context, the aim of the study is to explore how urban private security is applied concretely in the case of Turkey and Ankara in the neoliberal period by referring to the relationship between the nation-state's use of physical force-violent means and the commodification and commercialization process of urban security services. In the study, while trying to reach real-concrete knowledge, the vantage points determined as “capital accumulation process,” “mediation of state-capital nexus,” “social surveillance practice,” and “production of surveillance spaces” formed the concrete basis of the

critical evaluation. In this direction, the provision of urban security services by private security companies results in the "neoliberal urban security regime," which means the commodification of security and the pluralization of service providers while dialectically bringing along spatial and administrative expansion in terms of nation-state power at concrete and symbolic levels.

Keywords: State, urban space, private security services, police, surveillance.

ÖZ

ÖZEL GÜVENLİK ŞİRKETLERİ TARAFINDAN SUNULAN KENTSEL GÜVENLİK HİZMETLERİNİN SİYASETİ VE COĞRAFYASI: ANKARA, TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

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Bugün ulus-devlet biçiminde örgütlenmiş ve kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin üretim ve yeniden üretimi bakımından üstlendiği ikili işlevselliğini sürdüren, toplumsal bir ilişki biçimi olarak devlet, egemenlik alanı (mekânsal) ve meşru şiddet tekeli (işlevsel) üzerinden tanımlanmaya devam edilmektedir. Belirli kamusal hizmetlerin (başta sağlık ve eğitim olmak üzere) ticarileşmesi ve piyasalaşmasının bir parçası olarak güvenlik üretiminin dönüşüm süreci, Türkiye'de son otuz yılda hem kentsel toplumsal denetimin diyalektiği hem de kentsel güvenlik üretimi ve mekânsal (yeniden) üretim arasındaki ilişkinin tespit edilmesi bakımından eleştirel bir tartışmayı zorunlu kılmaktadır. Bu kapsamda olmak üzere, çalışmanın amacı, ulus-devletin fiziksel zor-şiddet araçlarını kullanma biçimi ile kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin metalaşması-ticarileştirilmesi süreci arasındaki ilişkiye atıfta bulunarak neoliberal dönemde kentsel özel güvenliğin Türkiye, Ankara örneğinde somut olarak nasıl uygulandığını keşfetmektir. Çalışmada, gerçek-somutun bilgisine alan çalışması üzerinden ulaşılmaya çalışılırken “sermaye birikim süreci”, “devlet-sermaye ilişkisinin dolayımı”, “toplumsal gözetim pratiği” ve “gözetim mekanlarının üretimi” olarak

belirlenen konumlanma noktaları, kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin eleştirel deęerlendirmesinin somut zeminini oluřturmuřtur. Bu doęrultuda, kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin özel güvenlik řirketleri tarafından sunumunun, güvenlięin metalařması ve hizmet saęlayıcıların çoęullařması anlamına gelen “neoliberal kentsel güvenlik rejimi”ni ürettięi, ancak aynı zamanda diyalektik olarak ulus-devlet iktidarı bakımından somut ve sembolik düzeylerde mekânsal ve yönetsel genişlemeyi de beraberinde getirdięi iddia edilmiřtir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Devlet, kentsel mekân, özel güvenlik hizmetleri, polis, gözetim.

To My Lovely Daughter Nehir

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
CCTV	Closed Circuits Televisions
CHP	Republican People's Party
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
EUROSTAT	The Statistical Office of the European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDS	General Directorate of Security
GHM	Geographical Historical Materialism
GIS	Geographical Information System
ILM	Intermediate Labor Market
KGYS	Urban Security Management System
METU	Middle East Technical University
MN	Subsection of Administrative and Support Service Activities under of Professional, Scientific, & Technical Activities
MOBESE	Mobile Electronic System Integration
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organization
NSS	Neoliberal Security State
SCs	Sustainable Places and Communities
SEGE	Socio-Economic Development Ranking Studies
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SSI	Social Security Institution
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TMSA	Transformational Model of Social Activity
TOBB	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TURKSTAT	Turkish Statistical Institute
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
ZTP	Zero Tolerance Policing

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As being one of the most controversial topics of the 20th century, production of security¹ has been also discussed in its relevance with the formation processes of the state and its legitimacy in the use of physical force as a way of ensuring internal security². As Marx (1978[1844], p.43) put forward that “Security is the supreme social concept of civil society; the concept of the police. ... The concept of security is not enough to raise civil society above its egoism. Security is, rather, the assurance of its egoism”. In this vein, although the fabrication process of the state in capitalist societies as a form of the nation-state was determined by different variables being the products of specific social and historical processes of production relations, the production of internal security in terms of policing practices and its spatial organization are significant aspects of the formation of nation-states in capitalist societies. Hence, the role of security³ in the statecraft of the capitalist nation-states is not only a constitutive

¹The following studies can be seen as examples on the main discussions on contemporary security and policing practices: Loader (1997), Johnston (1999), Jones and Newburn (1999a), Loader (2000), Neocleous (2000a), Shearing (2001), Garland (2001), Clifford and Shearing (2003), Freedman (2003), Zedner (2003a), Zedner (2003b), Dupont et.al. (2003), Dupont (2004), Krahnmann (2008a), Zedner (2009), Neocleous, (2011), Neocleous (2013) and Eick & Briken (2017) etc.

²As Neocleous (2000a, p42) stated that: “The English word ‘security’ comes from Latin *securitas/securus*, in turn derived from *sine cura*. *Sine* – meaning without – and *cura* – meaning troubling; solicitude; carefulness, or to have a care or be anxious about; attention; pains; anxiety; grief and sorrow; diligent; guardianship; concern for persons and things – together give us *sine cura*: to be without care, free from cares and untroubled. *Seuritas* is consequently defined as freedom from concern and danger or, looked at from a slightly different angle, safety and security”.

³According to Krahnmann (2008a, p.382-3), three distinct meanings of security can be defined as such: i) “as the absence of a threat”, ii) “existing threats that are suspended in the realm of possibility” and iii) “the survival of a threat that does become a reality”. By abstracting certain specifications, there are five meanings of security determined by Zedner (2009, p.14-24) which are objective (the condition of being protected from threats), subjective (feeling of being secure), pursuit (unattainable and impermanent), practice (the role and the function of a wide range of practitioners) and symbol (rhetorically promoted). Although Freedman (2003, p.754) noted that “There can never be an absolute definition of security because it is inherently relational concept”, among these five meanings of security,

and central element but also plays a supplementary and formative function in organizing both its administrative and territorial order. This requires functionally organized state bodies such as the army and/or police forces to be organized for the production and reproduction of social and economic relations, but not vice versa.

In this regard, the history of police forces and policing practices can be seen as a history of the foundation and institutionalization of the nation-states in capitalist societies. For different reasons, police forces as an organization and policing as a process of producing security and public order are not central to the question of state or social relations. For instance, it is viewed as a dependent variable and is discussed in terms of its organizational form in relation to the state or as a sustaining force for dominant classes. Therefore, within the scope of the thesis, arguments that are taken for granted, such as the right of monopoly on the use of physical violence, are going to be critically evaluated as changes in the forms of social and economic relations have dialectically led to changes in the functions of the nation-state.

Furthermore, the new accumulation regime of the neoliberal era requires some structural adjustments, such as the transfer of some public services to the market, including state-owned economic enterprises and properties. In addition to these transfers, some services identified as public goods within liberal ideology have also been questioned, and their provision by companies according to the rules of the capitalist market is going to be promoted by policy adjustment programs. Previously indivisible public goods, such as security, have also been viewed as divisible goods, with companies providing some parts of them. Thus, security itself has become an area of capital accumulation and acquired a dual character. First, it enables the circulation of capital, services, labor, and products; second, security itself has become a commodity and has been commercialized.

Today, the capitalist character of the nation-state remains, whereas its sovereignty and legitimacy are in question. Therefore, one of the fundamental questions is the changing role of the nation-states in capitalist societies in policing practices and the production

this study tries to establish this relationality by employing of the objective and practice meanings of security at urban scale.

of urban security services. The transformation process of the production of security as a part of the commercialization and marketization of public services, both in terms of the dialectic of urban social control and the production of urban security and spatial practices in Turkey in the last three decades, requires critical investigation and research on the issue. This process exemplifies a break from the bureaucratization and professionalization of security as a public practice, known as policing, as a result of the distinctive formation of a capitalist social order, and it simultaneously enables and provides us with the opportunity to question the formal separation of capital and the state. Furthermore, the commercialization of security services revealed that there is a complementary relationship between the state and capital, rather than a substitutive and exclusionary relationship, which provided a foundation for an organic division of labor in urban security provision. Thus, like all other forms of public exposure to marketization, commercialization, and privatization processes, the provision of urban security services and the territorial organization of private security at an urban scale inevitably bring about new discussions.

It is a fact of history that payment for security-related labor is not a new phenomenon. For example, there were many hired soldiers in the armies of empires spanning from the Roman to the Ottoman rule. In addition, guards might be hired for personal security or private property. Notwithstanding, the creation and spread of security, not troops or guards, as a commodity and as an organized commercial activity on an urban scale under capitalism is a phenomenon peculiar to the neoliberal age, particularly in Turkey. Today, neither security guards nor troops are only commodities; rather, security has been marketed and commoditized, and nation-states are no longer the exclusive providers.

Within the scope of this thesis, urban private security will be viewed as an actualized social reality, while its essential dynamics will be derived from its potentials. These possibilities are inherent into the ever-changing products of ownership relationships. The repercussions of new monitoring technology may lead to excessive conclusions, such as labeling capitalist social interactions a "surveillance society" (Lyon, 2001). In contrast, this research contends that the underlying processes and structures as potential social phenomena are still in practice and that the fundamental determinant

of social interactions is the development of relations, regardless of their material or symbolic manifestations.

Furthermore, urban space as a product of social and economic relations has been an area of contradictions both in its physical and symbolic terms. The physical form of urban space has been revealed as a discursive formation. However, this discourse is not determinant but determined by other social phenomenon that have been the capitalist social relations since the 15th century. The realized form of policing by military or centralized police forces under the rule of nation-states are all the result of transformations occurred in institutionalization process of capitalist social relations and its administrative forms. The means and mechanisms of capitalist social order may diversify according to the historical specificities of a given place. In capitalism, control over urban space is critical since it secures the reproduction of the means of production, land ownership, and social production of space. Urban space is not homogenous, and it reveals class-based contradictions and inequalities. Thus, discussing urban private security will provide us to understand the “coercive and non-coercive means” of reproduction internal to capitalist social relations.

In Turkey, in related literature on security and policing, these issues have been evaluated in terms of their political, sociological, and administrative dimensions. These studies proposed significant arguments about modern policing practices, policing practices, state formation and policing, private security, and so on. Thus, some issues raised in this study have already been discussed in other studies⁴. But the uniqueness of this study is its contribution to the field of urban geography, referring to discussions on the history and politics of coercion and policing. Furthermore,

⁴ In Turkey, there are many recent studies on the issue of security such as studies discussing the emergence of modern police forces in Turkey historically (Ergut, 2004), the industrialization process of security (Paker, 2009), the private security as a neoliberalization process (Haspolat, 2012; Dölek, 2011) and the private security as a governmentality (Yardımcı, 2009) and the surveillance of the nation-state in Turkey by means of population census (Özbay, 2010). In addition to the above studies, PhD theses were searched and filtered according to the keyword “private security” on the website of National Thesis Center of Council of Higher Education (<https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/>) and these written by Filiz (2006), Arap (2009), Haspolat (2010), Yıldız (2010), Ekinçi (2011), Sever (2013), Alpkutlu (2017), Örki (2019), and Demiroğlu (2021) were found. Among these thesis the most important one is Haspolat’s (2010; 2012) contributions inspired the discussions made in this thesis in terms of its valuable insights and arguments on the relationship between private security sector and authoritarian statisms.

generally, urban space has been conceptualized as a container or a setting in security studies. The centrality of urban space in social production and reproduction was not regarded as one of the key determinants of the issue. Within this framework, this study argues that urban space should be seen as one of the most important aspects for understanding the production and reproduction of capitalist social order, both materially and symbolically.

1.1. Defining Research Problem

As aforementioned, in related literature, urban scale and the spatial dimension of security are taken for granted, and the research on the relationship between the social production of urban space and the production of urban security has not been done yet except for a few attempts. The issue of urban security has not been discussed in relation to the broader capitalist relations of production, and its spatial analysis remains under-researched. This study aims to fill this gap. There are different studies on the emergence of modern police forces, surveillance, and privatization of security, but this study will provide further discussions to understand the nature of these issues in neoliberal capitalism from the perspective of geography since security “is inherently spatial: to be secure is to possess an inviolable core defended by clearly demarcated boundaries, whether at the scale of the body politic or the human body” (Lizotte, 2020, p. 288).

The role of the nation-state in the provision of internal security has changed during the neoliberalization process, raising questions about the state's role and responsibilities in the fabrication of social order, while private security has become a significant but discriminatory component of spatial practice in securitized private and common urban spaces, resulting in a new urban security regime revealing uneven social and spatial fragmentation. As a result of the dissolution of publicity through the commodification and commercialization of security services (previously presented by public police, while new ones are also invented), the conditions for implementing a new urban security regime emerged, which determined the limits of people's everyday practices on an urban scale. On the one side, militarized urban security measures have been

practiced by the public police (Riot Police, Çevik Kuvvet) in intervening social protests, whereas new participatory governance projects such as “Society/Community Supported Policing (Toplum Destekli Polislik)” and others have been established to increase people’s support and sharing responsibilities for the maintenance of order at the neighborhood scale. On the other side, private security has become one of the fundamental urban issues, providing social surveillance and control services for the sake of urban social order. At an urban scale, the division of labor can also be observed in “public spaces,” “privately owned publicly used spaces” (shopping malls), and “private spaces”(housing sites in gated communities). The first one is controlled by “armed police officers” routinely. Furthermore, urban space is more than just a setting in terms of the dialectic of social control; it also produces and contributes to the production of social order in capitalist societies through various spatial developments, such as space design. For instance, large boulevards in Hausmann’s Paris were designed for preventing and controlling urban social riots, or Bentham’s panopticon was designed for surveilling prisoners by establishing dominance over them.

1.1.1. Aim of the Study

The primary aim of this study is to discover how urban private security is practiced in the neoliberal era by referencing the relationship between the way the nation-state uses its coercive instruments and the process of commercialization of urban security services. The production and fabrication of security at an urban scale is realized on three analytical levels, which are community-based, state-led, and capital-led. Given the particularity of the conditions in different historical circumstances, the weight and concentration of each unit of analysis included in this typology undoubtedly differ. To illustrate, during the Ottoman period, security production based on community organization on a rural and urban neighborhood scale was left to the members of the relevant community in certain dimensions by giving them an autonomous power field to decide who could enter and leave the neighborhood. Although this structure was resolved through the development of the nation-state, it has maintained its presence in security practices in different urban areas and has not completely disappeared.

The process of the institutionalization of the nation-state is supported by the institutionalization of the monopoly of violence, called internal pacification, and the prohibition of the use of violence on the scale of the individual and the community, as well as regulating the use of legitimate violence by public policing. From the 1960s to the 1980s, when social inequalities and political struggles arose in the process of nation-statehood, the monopoly of the state was challenged, particularly the practices presented with the claim of establishing authority in diverse urban areas.

During the period of imposing neoliberal policies with authoritarian administrations, a new era began in which capital was involved in the production of urban security. In this period, poor neighborhoods have been left to the mercy of the community, whereas middle-class residential areas reveal hybrid characteristics (enjoying private security commodities but also depending on the support of public police) in terms of surveillance and preventive measures. Especially in high-class residential areas and mass consumption spaces, urban security services offered by the security capital expanded after the mid-2000s. Therefore, the process of this new urban security regime is implemented by capital and guided by the state. However, this does not mean that community-led or state-led security production is completely eliminated. For instance, the state is still the source of legitimacy and serves as the regulator and guarantor of the entire process, but strategically selected urban areas and social events are the target of public authorities.

1.1.2. Research Questions and Main Hypotheses of the Study

In this study, it is going to be claimed that the private provision of urban security services fabricates a “neoliberal urban security regime” which means the commodification of security and the pluralization of service providers, but also, dialectically, the spatial and administrative expansion of the state’s capacity to govern by means of authoritarian neoliberal practices. The crucial question is that: “How does the commercialization of security services produce the “neoliberal urban security regime”?” It is concluded that being a capital-led and state-referenced process, privately provided urban security services have led to the production of surveillance spaces that are contributing to self-referentiality, i.e., security for the sake of security,

especially for the urban middle-classes. To understand the dynamics and mechanisms involved in the realization process of this regime, the initial hypothesis of the study can be stated as follows: Although the "neoliberal urban security regime" is a capital-led and state-driven process, the relationship between private security companies and the state is complementary rather than competitive, explaining how urban spaces are produced and territorialized as surveillance spaces in Ankara, Turkey since the 1980s. To discuss the initial hypothesis, the following questions are going to be argued throughout the study:

- i. How were the authority and power of the nation-state to use force conceptualized and discussed from different theoretical perspectives?
- ii. Why and how were the authority and power of the nation-state to use force organized as police forces?
- iii. Why and how does the production of urban space have an impact on the commodification and commercialization of policing services in the neoliberal era?
- iv. What have been the historical and political circumstances providing the basis for neoliberal authoritarian state practices in Turkey?
- v. How was the legal basis for urban private security created after the 1980s in Turkey?
- vi. How has the market for private security evolved, and what characteristics and problems have emerged in Turkey's experience?
- vii. How has urban private security been territorialized in Turkey-Ankara?
- viii. How and to what extent have urban private security services been fulfilling the task of surveillance in Ankara?
- ix. What kind of socio-spatial divisions are produced and reproduced at urban scale by the commodification of urban security services?

The initial hypothesis and sub-questions will be discussed in four dimensions or four vantage points: (i) urban private security as a mediation of state-capital nexus (to understand the historical roots of policing practices as a public service provided by the capitalist state; the formation and regulation of the security market; the division of labor between the state and the market in terms of security production, and so on); and (ii) urban private security as a capital accumulation process, (iii) urban private security

as a process of surveillance and social control mechanisms; and (iv) urban private security as a production of surveillance spaces (to discuss policing as a part of a larger commercialization process of public services during the neoliberal era in Ankara, Turkey, practicing at urban areas ranging from parks to housing sites; and to decipher differentiation and discussing these dimensions are not an end in themselves; rather, they are viewed as processes of determining the fundamental aspects of the new urban security regime in the neoliberal era in Turkey, Ankara.

1.2. Research Method

Research methods can be defined as the techniques or procedures used to gather and analyze data related to some research question or hypothesis (Crotty, 1998). Therefore, the focus of the research methods is on the paths followed to discover, gather, and analyze the data to discuss research questions and develop explanations on behalf of or against initial claims and arguments. Although there can be different classifications of research methods, Cresswell's (2002) attempt to synthesize them provides fertile ground for establishing a relationship between different methods. Cresswell (2002, p. 18–20) defined three approaches to research methods as (i) "a quantitative approach... employs strategies of inquiry such as experiments and surveys and collects data on predetermined instruments that yield statistics data," (ii) "a qualitative approach in which the researcher collects open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing themes from the data," and (iii) "a mixed methods approach in which the data collection also involves gathering both numeric information (e.g., on instruments) as well as text information (e.g., on interviews) so that the final database represents both quantitatively and qualitatively. As suggested by the researchers utilizing a critical realist perspective, "the terms qualitative and quantitative are often used interchangeably with intensive and extensive geographical research" (Pratt, 1995, p.68). Therefore, within the classification and definitions provided by Cresswell, this study utilizes a mixed research methods approach⁵ and draws on the analysis of

⁵ "Sayer who argues for the combination of 'intensive' and 'extensive' methods. 'Extensive' methods are usually glossed as sample data collections from whole populations: these allegedly show generalized outcomes. 'Intensive' methods, using fine grained qualitative approaches, are usually advocated for examining causal processes. The argument is that intensive and extensive approaches should be used to

existing databases, official documents, books, articles, and in-depth interviews to analyze urban private security practices in Turkey, specifically the Ankara case. In this vein, quantitative empirical evidence was obtained from different resources (TÜİK-TURKSTAT (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu-Turkish Statistical Institute), SGK-SSI (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu-Social Security Institution), EGM-GDS (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü-General Directorate of Security), EUROSTAT (Statistical Office of the European Union), Corine Land Cover, etc. and analyzed via Excel, SPSS, and GIS.

A crucial feature of the case study research is the utilization of several sources of information, each with strengths and shortcomings, while also providing a chance not to begin research with preconceived theoretical ideas (Gilham, 2000). In addition, as the goal of qualitative research is to contextualize social processes (Esterberg, 2002, p. 2), to achieve this end, the qualitative empirical evidence was gathered from 32 semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with mid-level managers of private security companies in Ankara, Turkey, employed as a case study. Gilham (2000, p. 1-2) pointed out that a case study is an investigation into the aforementioned topics to address specific research questions (which may initially be rather nebulous) by collecting a variety of different types of evidence that is present in the case setting and that must be abstracted and compiled to provide the best answers to the research questions, yet presents no guarantee that any one type or source of evidence will be enough (or adequately valid) on its own. It is also crucial to emphasize that these recorded interviews are typical in a causal sense rather than representing a statistical one (Pratt, 1995, p. 72). Semi-structured in-depth interviews were utilized to understand the field of private security, its practice, and the problems in the Ankara, Turkey case from the perspective of managers representing the supply-side of urban private security. The open addresses of 188 private security companies were listed on the General Directorate of Security's website, and half of them conducted site visits to determine whether these addresses were correct. During the site visits, it was discovered that 10–20% of the addresses did not belong to the security companies mentioned in the list. Hence, 32 interviewees who were present at their addresses were accepted to take part in the research. It is crucial to emphasize that these single

complement one another. In practice, ‘extensive’ has been taken to mean quantitative methods, and ‘intensive’, qualitative methods” (Pratt, 2009, p.379).

recorded interviews are typical in a causal sense rather than a statistical one (Pratt, 1995, p. 72). Recorded in-depth interviews were deciphered, coded, and analyzed in Nvivo 8, which is a qualitative data analysis software program. Analyzing qualitative data is very different from analyzing quantitative data. As Esterberg (2002, p. 177) explained, it involves three stages, which are: "(i) recognizing patterns (or categories), (ii) generating ideas about what these patterns might mean, and (iii) exploring potential meanings in the data." Therefore, during the qualitative research stage, the path for qualitative research described in the quote below was taken:

First, the interviews were transcribed and then read through many times. Emergent key concepts were then selected and the interviews coded up paying particular attention to quotes and their context. The emergent key concept areas were similar to those implicated by the abstract theory; but additionally topics such as property management, rent and leases, interaction with other developers, developers' organizational forms and accounting practices were revealed as significant. In practical terms, for each interview a record card was completed for every key concept. Later, all the information on each key concept was collated and the subsequent analysis was based on it. The abundance of information produced in this type of analysis gives rise to the need to be selective (Pratt, 1995, p.71).

The main qualitative characteristics of the interviewees were classified according to age, gender, and previous job. The interviewees were 51,7 years old on average, with a 15-year background in private security. Only one interviewee was female, and the remaining 32 interviewees were male, revealing male-dominant characteristics of the private security sector. According to their previous jobs, 20 interviewees were retired soldiers, 5 interviewees were retired police officers, and 7 interviewees are professional workers in the private sector. Besides, it can be claimed that the analysis of this study is based on the supply-side of urban private security, and further investigations or studies could be done by other researchers on the demand-side.

It would be appropriate to mention the difficulties of studying security, policing, and private security in Turkey. Studying security and policing is very difficult in the Turkish context since information and data on security are strongly controlled by the state, which sees security as an ontological issue. Nonetheless, this is not unique to Turkey, as the US and Bush administration declared that national security and the war against terrorism were their priorities following 9/11 and striking a balance between freedom to discuss issues and/or fighting terrorism and crime is difficult to achieve

when politicians and their supporters can easily manipulate our critical evaluations of security issues such as police attacks on peaceful urban social gatherings. The difference in Turkey has arisen from not only the state's control over the data but also the absence of organized and detailed information on security, crime, and police produced by the state institutions. The writer of this study made six different applications according to the Right to Information Act for receiving data on crime, police, and private security (for example, the number of crimes recorded by police officers according to the crime place, the number of police officers and private security guards according to the workplace, the types of crimes and their annual statistics for Turkey's provinces, the number of private security guards by province since 2013, etc.), but four out of six of them were rejected by the authorities for confidentiality reasons. Studying urban security requires questioning the status quo and existing power relations within the state and society, functioning mechanisms of social control, organizational forms of policing and security companies, and the legitimacy of the existence of the state. Therefore, putting the question of urban private security in its proper place is hard to achieve in Turkey due to some difficulties in doing research and gathering related data. As a result, the underlying structures, and mechanisms of policing and private policing⁶ practices after the 1980s are attempted to be discussed through the analysis of written documents (articles, books, dissertations, reports, strategic plans, and so on), open national and international statistical data, statistical data presented in studies by scholars, in-depth interviews conducted for this study, and so on.

1.3. On Methodological Approach

“There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits”
(Marx, 1982{1976}, p.104).

⁶ According to Joh (2004, p.55), private policing refers to “the various lawful forms of organized, for-profit personnel services whose primary objectives include the control of crime, the protection of property and life, and the maintenance of order”.

Social realities are not revealing themselves within a closed system being understood by observing daily occurred actualities directly. Rather, there are many underlying generative mechanisms and law-like tendencies conditioning their emergence and appearances (Bhaskar, 1998). As Marx suggested that “all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided” (Marx, 1998, p.804). In this vein, three methodological perspectives guided discussions within this thesis which are dialectical historical materialism, critical realism, and geographical-historical materialism. Moreover, as being a case study, it is not only aimed to testify existing literature or conceptualizations developed by different approaches but also, tries to establish relational approach between different theories and to contribute existing literature on production of knowledge on privately provided security services by emphasizing the importance of geography and space in the process of surveillance.

Before discussing the above three approaches briefly, the role of time-space in terms of different epistemological stances ranging from nomothetic to ideographic are going to be explained to contextualize different time-space dimensions of these approaches and their relevance for the discussion made within this study. Firstly, according to Wallerstein, the study of social change should only be used to refer to changes in phenomena that are the most durable, as the definition of durability will inevitably vary over the course of human history, unless he wants to use the phrase synonymously with the totality of social science (Wallerstein, 1974, p.3). Therefore, it is significant to determine what is going to be a main reference point within history and what is going to be the subject of abstractions in theoretical constructions. Besides, research tools should be determined by conceptualization, not the other way around and the degree of quantification should only reflect the highest degree of precision that is feasible for certain situations and methodologies at specific times (Wallerstein, 1974, p.8). Conceptualizations, referring to the certain social relations of production and their forms and essences, changes in relation to the changes occur in social formations which is also true for the “truth”. As Wallerstein emphasized that “"Truth" changes because society changes” and "Truth" evolves as society does. His main idea is that nothing is sequential at any given time; everything is current, including the past and

even now, which shape people by their upbringing, education, personalities, social roles, and the structural forces that they must contend with (Wallerstein, 1974, p.9).

Secondly, time-space dimensions of social realities have been thought as being separate spheres which has its own capacity to refer the real dimension in the process of abstracting. It is claimed that time and space were disregarded because the social construction of time and space were rarely considered (Wallerstein, 1998c, p.43). Thus, Wallerstein (1988, p.292) argued that time and space are not two distinct categories and time and space are inextricably linked and make up a single dimension (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.71) that he will refer to as TimeSpace based on the Braudel's four dimensions of times as episodic (geopolitical space in the present, which is, of course, every bit as contentious and created a phenomena, serves as "episodic time"), cyclical (ideological space), structural (structural large-scale space) and the time of the stage (eternal space which may found in the universalization of nomothetic social science that are supposed to apply "across time and space" while space also loses significance in this formulation as time does naturally) (Wallerstein, 1988, p.292-294). Linking time and space as a single dimension, he proposed five kinds of TimeSpace which are "episodic geopolitical TimeSpace, cyclico-ideological TimeSpace, structural TimeSpace, eternal TimeSpace, and transformational TimeSpace" (Wallerstein, 1988, p.296). Epistemologically, each TimeSpace employed by different perspectives within science in relation to their approaches to social realities in time and space. First, episodic geopolitical TimeSpace is about the categories on recent history, such as "riots in Brighton" or "elections in Ulster" in the daily newspaper but it is not necessary for immediate history to be recent history (such as fall of the Bastille on July 14, 1789) because the crucial aspect is that both time and space are defined in a short amount of time, and the occurrences are linked to the meanings that are assigned to them by the immediate context in which they take place (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.72). To illustrate, the Gezi Revolt, which began on May 28, 2013, in Istanbul, Turkey, challenged the political power that designed Gezi Park according to the needs of capital investment to transform it into a shopping mall. The brutal intervention of police forces, who used tear gas on protestors in the park, sparked nationwide protests against the AKP governments' political rule, affecting all aspects of social life. Hence, it can be seen as a perfect example of an episodic TimeSpace that reveals its dynamics

in an immediate context, yet, it had deeper underlying social and political causes and reasons that gave rise to its emergence. Second, cyclico-ideological TimeSpace highlights a longer period of time, and this characterization of the situation comes from a consideration of the significance of where specific groups are in time and geography (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.72-3). Despite our predisposition to refer to each downturn in a cycle as a crisis and each upturn in a cycle as a transition to a new order, crises and transitions are not tied to cyclical-ideological TimeSpace and though it takes the shape of a spiral, cyclical-ideological TimeSpace is inherently repetitious (Wallerstein, 1988, p.295). For instance, the crisis of the welfarism gave rise to the new right and neoliberalism which redefined the role of the state both in economy and in social life. At this point, the coercive role of the state in everyday life had also been reorganized according to the needs of capital investments. Third, Wallerstein referred to structural TimeSpace as the categories like the so-called "rise of the West" or the Roman lilies' ongoing cultural relevance, or explanations attempts to understand the causes of East Asia's spectacular improvement in its economic standing in the global economy in the context of structural explanations for how the modern world system works which are considerably more in-depth explanations that define the type of historical system we live in and its limitations in terms of time and place (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.73). Fourth, eternal TimeSpace refers to the fundamental presumption that time and space do not exist, which effectively renders them irrelevant to the investigation and to the claims that the so-called ethnic groups are fundamentally incompatible with one another, or that humans are expected to have violent inclinations, or even that the influence of climate on social behavior (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.73). In this regard, urban security is conceived as a condition for securing the lives of human beings, and socio-spatial inequalities produced by capitalist social relations are disregarded. Each member of society was seen as equal in this liberal understanding, and the question of security for whom was never asked because it was assumed that security for all was a precondition for the society's existence. However, it is clear that in the neoliberal era, security, in particular, has become a commodity rather than a public good provided by the state to all of its citizens. As a result, by portraying security as if it meant the same thing to every member of society, we conceal class-based inequalities within the capitalist city. The last one is the transformational TimeSpace refers to the exactly the opposite kind of analysis, one which emphasizes the specialness of the occurrence, its

exceptional quality, and its profound effect on all the major institutions of our world such as the Christian explanation of the coming of Christ on earth is one such explanation (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.73).

Thirdly, various forms of TimeSpace identified by Wallerstein were abstracted from and applied to understand the disciplinary differences within science ranging from nomothetic to ideographic epistemologies, from natural to cultural sciences through which the social science try to find its own way⁷. In the nineteenth century, the historical breaking point for developing the knowledge of social under the umbrella of social sciences ideologically to stabilize and control social world was the French Revolution through which “the new widespread feeling that social change was both normal and inevitable, it suddenly seemed of urgent importance to understand the rules by which the social world operated, in order to be better able to control where it was going, and at what pace”(Wallerstein, 1998c, p.47). Thus, the idea of social science was only developed relatively recently, in the 19th century and alludes to a corpus of organized knowledge on interpersonal relationships that was developed and institutionalized over the course of these two centuries which claimed that within the divisionalization of knowledge into two cultures as it is located in-between (Wallerstein, 1998b, p.80). Similar to the Bhaskar’s (1998) attempt, Wallerstein asserted there is no inherent methodological distinction between the scientific study of human phenomena and the scientific study of physical phenomena, according to those who believe social science is nomothetic, or in search of universal rules whereas ideographic historians, who occupied the other end of the social science spectrum, maintained that human social action was non-repetitive and, as a result, was not amenable to broad generalizations that remained true throughout time and space (Wallerstein, 1998b, p.81). Being the enterprise of the modern world, the origins of social science can be traced back to the ongoing, since the sixteenth century, effort to create systematic, secular knowledge about reality that is somehow supported by empirical data and the so-called classical view of science, which has been prevalent for many centuries, was founded on two tenets; one was the Newtonian model, which

⁷ In this regard, Akbulut's (2007) article, written in Turkish, is worth reading because he discussed Wallerstein's arguments on the general structure of social sciences as well as the relationship between epistemological debates and public administration.

holds that the past and future are symmetrical (everything coexists in an everlasting present and since we can become certain, like God, we do not need to make a distinction between the past and the future.) and the second premise was Cartesian dualism, which holds that the natural world and people are fundamentally distinct from one another, as are matter and mind and the physical world and the social and spiritual realms (Wallerstein, 1996, p.2). Yet, the division of knowledge into two domains at the beginning of the nineteenth century had lost the sense that they were "separate but equal" spheres and taken on the flavor of a hierarchy: knowledge that was certain (science) versus knowledge that was imagined, even imaginary (what was not science) and the term "science" came to be largely (and frequently solely) associated with natural science (Wallerstein, 1996, p.5). On the one hand, natural science had risen to the position of supreme approach to reality; on the other hand, the division of social science into several disciplinary areas of knowledge had become the new multi-normal of scientific research. The development of the many fields of social science was part of a larger nineteenth-century effort to establish and improve "objective" knowledge about "reality" based on empirical findings (rather than "speculation") (Wallerstein, 1996, p.13). Yet, the objectivity is also another contested term in scientific inquiries. According to Wallerstein (1998c), these two tendencies within social sciences divergent paths towards objectivity and value-neutrality and argued that disciplines that are nomothetic or universalizing insisted that the use of reproducible, quantitative data was the best way to ensure objectivity. They inferred that their findings, which were actually based only on episodic geopolitical TimeSpace, were to be considered findings about eternal TimeSpace because truth was universal, that is, truth statements were valid across all of time and space whereas ideographic or culturalist disciplines claimed that the closer a scholar is to his or her data, the more likely he or she is to be motivated to distort the data recording in order to serve immediate political and social ends. They claimed that studying what is far away in time and space is the simplest way to achieve value neutrality. On the other hand, idiographic social scientists argued that interpretation was at the heart of the scholarly exercise and that intelligent interpretation required a thorough understanding of the entire context (Wallerstein, 1998c, p.48-9). Therefore, there were two cultures of social sciences as an ideographic epistemology highlighting the particularity-uniqueness of all social processes, the limited value of any generalizations, and the need for empathy and as a nomothetic

epistemology emphasizing logical connection between human and all other material processes and searching general applicable laws across time and space (Wallerstein, 1999, p.190). To put it bluntly, nomothetic social sciences put more emphasis on aspects differentiating them from ideographic ones in terms of a desire to arrive at general laws that were assumed to govern human behavior, a willingness to perceive the phenomena to be studied as cases (rather than individuals), the need to segment human reality in order to analyze it, the possibility and desirability of strict scientific methods (such as theory-related formulation of hypotheses to be tested against evidence via strict, and if possible quantitative, procedures) and a preference for systematically produced evidence (Wallerstein, 1996, p.31). The latter utilizes episodic geopolitical TimeSpace (in disciplines such as history, anthropology & Oriental studies), whereas the former utilizes eternal TimeSpace (in disciplines such as economics, political science, and sociology) (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.78; Wallerstein, 1998c, p.44). As a result, the social sciences made eternal TimeSpace essential and reserved an important, albeit secondary, place for episodic geopolitical TimeSpace, but neglected all other kinds of TimeSpace while the ideographic approach, employing episodic geopolitical TimeSpace, informs us in effect that there is no useful explanation for what has happened other than recalling the sequence of events that preceded whatever it is we are watching (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.79-80). Nevertheless, it is asserted that there can be found other alternative perspectives utilizing different approaches to TimeSpace such as Annales version of history represented by Febvre, Bloch and Braudel focusing on cyclico-ideological and structural TimeSpace can be seen as an alternative approach whose primary tools are not eternal but rather a function of the TimeSpace constructs people create accepting the explanations in terms of general rules of behavior are possible, but only within the context of specific long-term structures referred by Wallerstein as historical systems (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.80). As a result, according to Wallerstein, “Social science, which is the effort to study the most complex systems of all, becomes not merely the queen of the sciences, but the most difficult of the sciences”(Wallerstein, 1999, p.166) and for the ones trying to find their own ways it should be vital to realize that there are numerous alternative paradigms, but some are more legitimate, or useful, than others, yet, the validity and utility of established paradigms are not eternal (Wallerstein, 1999, p.163).

Furthermore, though not utilized in dominant traditions within social sciences there are three other kinds of TimeSpace which are cyclico-ideological TimeSpace, structural TimeSpace, and transformational TimeSpace. Firstly, cyclico-ideological TimeSpace refers to “the cycles that occur within the functioning of particular historical systems and which are in effect the regulatory mechanisms of these systems. All systems have regulatory mechanisms, or they would not be systems” (Wallerstein, 1998c, p.51). Yet, as Wallerstein suggested that it frequently undermines itself and its function is to allow people to perceive a system's repetitive patterns, but this is only useful if such repetitive patterns occur within the framework of a historical system that is limited in both time and space (Wallerstein, 1998c, p.53). Secondly, the structural TimeSpace is about the system in the short-run refers to the things cannot be altered and in the long-run refers to the things in change and motion (Wallerstein, 1998c, p.54), but “Structures continue until their internal contradictions, their evolving trajectories, force a bifurcation, and then they explode or implode, and real change occurs” (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.81). Hence, thirdly, the transformational TimeSpace, resulted in a new structural TimeSpace (Wallerstein, 1998c, p.62), refers to the moments of change in one mode of organizing social life to another, the possibility of which determined by the political struggle between opposing-value system holders and the struggle within the historical alternatives that we face, which both criticizes and empowers those engaged in political struggle (Wallerstein, 1998c, p.55). Therefore, Wallerstein argued that transformational TimeSpace open the door for transforming dominant social relations at the ‘right’ moment” (Wallerstein, 1998a, p.81-2).

Another line of discussions on methodology that can be traced in Ollman’s analysis of Marx’s dialectical materialism refers to the philosophy of internal relations that Marx borrowed from Hegel emphasizing “the relations in which anything stands as essential parts of what it is, so that a significant change in any of these relations registers as a qualitative change in the system of which it is a part” (Ollman, 2003, p.5). Therefore, concentrating on relations rather than things, changes and interactions occurred in time-space to discern social realities is one of the fundamental aspects of dialectical understanding (Ollman, 2003, p.12). According to the philosophy of external relations, the whole is simply the sum of its component parts that already exist; when relational components are taken to their utmost extent, the philosophy of internal relations goes

one step further by treating them as numerous, albeit biased, versions of the whole (Ollman, 2015, p.10). Therefore, dialectics cannot be said to explain capitalism (accomplished by historical dialectical materialism), instead, it aids in our understanding of the capitalist relations and processes—of which we are all a part—in all of their past, present, and future manifestations (Ollman & Smith, 2008). However, “dialectic enters this picture as Marx’s way of systematizing and historicizing all the conditions of capitalism, so that they become internally related elements of an organic whole” (Ollman, 2008, p.14). Thus, it “does not designate a philosophy of history but the genesis of mankind as a totality, object of every science of human reality and goal of action” (Lefebvre, 1968, p.20).

Another significant aspect of dialectical research is to contextualize our everyday experiences and to understand them as being a productive part of a broader system of relations which is also producing itself. Yet, differences between nondialectical and dialectical approaches were identified and it was argued that the former begins with a small part and attempts to reconstruct the larger whole by connecting it to other small parts, whereas the latter begins with the whole, the system, or as much of it as one understands, and then proceeds to an examination of the part to see where it fits and how it functions, eventually leading to a fuller understanding of the whole from which one has begun (Ollman, 2003, p.14). In the analysis of capitalism and class-relations in particular, abstractions played vital role for dialectical historical materialism. In order to grasp the essence of the real from everyday experiences within capitalism which is utilized “as a jumping-off point for an examination of everything that happens within it (Ollman, 2003, p.14), Marx put on special emphasis on the process of abstractions in explaining real social relations. Ollman (2003, p.60) identified that as follows: “his method starts from the "real concrete" (the world as it presents itself to us) and proceeds through "abstraction" (the intellectual activity of breaking this whole down into the mental units with which we think about it) to the "thought concrete" (the reconstituted and now understood whole present in the mind) (1904, 293-94)”. Yet, as Ollman (2015, p.15) discussed that Marx uses the term "abstraction" in different, though closely related, ways, which presents a significant challenge to understanding it. Besides, choosing the appropriate level of abstraction should be the fundamental methodological question in any attempt to discuss social realities. In this vein,

according to Marx, “fact is relational, composed of a system of mutually dependent parts. Viewing this mutual dependence within each of the interacting parts, viewing the parts as necessary aspects of each other, they become identical in expressing the same extended whole” (Ollman, 2003, p.77).

There are three modes or aspects of abstraction which are extension, levels of generality, and vantage point determined by Ollman in Marx’s methodology (Ollman, 2003, p.74-75). Firstly, abstraction of extension as a process of spatial and temporal application of abstraction contributes to locate analysis at a certain time-space dimension. Abstracting units of analysis such as value, commodity, capital and money, on the one hand, should be large enough to understand their relations with each other and their essences and roles played in capitalist production relations, on the other hand, they should be narrow enough to understand their particular form in a given historical circumstances specifically (Ollman, 2003, p.77). In order to go beyond appearances, there is the need for deciphering real underlying mechanisms and not mystifying the appearances as the real essence of the concrete. Ollman (2003, p.80-81). explained it as follows:

... the single-minded attentions to appearances is an imaginary reversal of real relations, as what strikes us immediately gets taken as responsible for the more or less hidden processes that have given rise to it. Marx refers to mistaking appearance for essence as "fetishism" and sees it operating throughout society, its best-known example being the fetishism of commodities, where the price of things (something everyone can observe in the market) gets substituted for the relations between the people who made them (something that can only be grasped through analysis)... .."working class," for example, can refer to everyone who is employed by capitalists and the institutions that serve them, such as the state, or to all the people who work for capitalists but also produce value (a smaller group), or to all the people who not only work for capitalists and produce value but are also organized politically as a class (a smaller group still).

Secondly, there are different steps to move from the most specific to the most general levels of abstractions, the former signified the most particular whereas the latter represents the most general characteristics of social realities and entities. These steps in Marx’s method are abstracted by Ollman as seven major levels of generality into which “Marx subdivides the world, seven plains of comprehension on which he places all the problems he investigates, seven different foci for organizing everything that is” (Ollman, 2003, p.88). The level one represents the most specific comprised of

everything special about a person and situation in here and now; level two “distinguishes what is general to people, their activities, and products because they exist and function within modern capitalism, understood as the last twenty to fifty years”; the level three refers to “everything that is peculiar to people, their activity, and products due to their appearance and functioning in capitalist society is brought into focus”; the level four is the level of class society through which societies divided into classes in different eras i.e. slavery, feudalism, capitalism; the level five refers to human society emphasizing qualities that people, their activities, and products share as part of the human condition; the level six represents the animal world and the level seven, being the most general one, refers to the qualities of people as a material part of nature such as weight, movement etc. (Ollman, 2003, p.88-89). These levels of generalizations are all in relation to the abstraction of extension, and although “each of these levels brings into focus a different time period, they are not to be thought of as 'slices of time,' instead “they are ways of organizing time, placing the period relevant to the qualities brought into focus in the front and treating everything that comes before as what led up to it, as origins”(Ollman, 2003, p.89). For instance, Marx claimed that “the classical political economists’ abstract production at the level of generality of the human condition (level five) they cannot grasp the character of distribution in capitalist society (level three)” (Ollman, 2003, p.90) and Marx himself wrote “on man and society falls on level three. Abstractions such as "capital," "value," "commodity," "labor," and "working class," whatever their extensions, bring out the qualities that these people, activities, and products possess as part of capitalism” but “his subject matter on levels two (modern capitalism) and four (class society), thought his is much less frequent” (Ollman, 2003, p.90). As a result, Marx produced the knowledge of reality at three levels of generality (at two, three and four). Yet, as Ollman put it bluntly, social sciences, for example, operate on level one (the unique) and five (the human condition). Main difference between Marxism and social sciences explained by Ollman (2003, p.91) as such:

Where Marx usually abstracts human beings, for example, as classes (as a class on level four, as one of the main classes that emerge from capitalist relations of production - workers, capitalists, and sometimes landowners-on level three, and as one of the many classes and fragments of classes that exist in a particular country in the most recent period on level two), most non-Marxists abstract people as unique individuals, where everyone has a proper name (level one), or as a member of the human species (level

five). In proceeding in their thinking directly from level one to level five, they may never even perceive, and hence have no difficulty in denying, the very existence of classes.

But the question is not which of these different abstractions is true. They all are in so far as people possess qualities that fall on each of these levels of generality. The relevant question is: which is the appropriate abstraction for dealing with a particular set of problems? For example, if social and economic inequality, exploitation, unemployment, social alienation, and imperialist wars are due in large part to conditions associated with capitalist society, then they can only be understood and dealt with through the use of abstractions that bring out their capitalist qualities. And that involves, among other things, abstracting people as capitalists and workers. Not to do so, to insist on sticking to levels one and five, leaves one blaming particular individuals (a bad boss, an evil president) or human nature as such for these problems.

As a result, Ollman revealed that contrary to the Marxism, people are either all different (level one) or all the same (level five) for bourgeois ideology (2003, p.99). Therefore, in order to first understand and analyze then to change structural social relations of production, there is the need for going beyond these two levels.

Thirdly, there is abstraction of vantage point is seen as significant to do research for understanding relationships and ties that connecting each elements of the whole system together both from their own perspectives and their objective positions in a given moment of time and space. Marx's writings contain many similar, seemingly contradictory positions being the result of various abstractions, but not of extension or generality level because they are caused by different vantage point abstractions that is to say the same relationship is seen from various perspectives, or the same process from various points of view (Ollman, 2003, p.99-100). Thus, a vantage point establishes a perspective through which “establishing order, hierarchy and priorities, distributing values, meanings, and degrees of relevance, and asserting a distinctive coherence between the parts” has become possible and “some processes and connections will appear large, some obvious, some important; others will appear small, insignificant, and irrelevant; and some will even be invisible” (Ollman, 2003, p.100).

In addition, by the manipulation of extension, level of generality and vantage point, “Marx puts things into and out of focus, into better focus, and into different kinds of focus, enabling himself to see more clearly, investigate more accurately, and understand more fully and more dynamically his chosen subject” (Ollman, 2003, p.75).

Therefore, the relationality between these three modes of abstraction enables Marx to discuss his focus of research by referring to different abstractions. For this purpose, his dialectical method followed four main steps which are:

(1) He looks for relations between the main capitalist features of our society at this moment in time. (2) He tries to find the necessary preconditions of just these relations – viewing them now as mutually dependent processes – in the past, treating the preconditions he uncovers as the start of an unfolding movement that led to the present. (3) He then projects these inter-related processes, reformulated now as contradictions, from the past, through the present, and into the future. These projections move from the immediate future to the probable resolution of these contradictions in an intermediate future, and on to the type of society that is like to follow in the more distant future. (4) Marx then reverses himself, and uses the socialist and communist stages of the future at which he has arrived as vantage points for re-examining the present extended back in time to include its real past, now viewed as the sum of the necessary preconditions for such a future (Ollman, 2008, p.15).

Also, determining appropriate levels of generality at urban scale is significant to understand empirical and theoretical construction of urban studies. Addie (2020) applied Ollman's levels of generality to urban scale and provided significant contribution for empirical studies to utilize different levels of generality in explaining concrete social relations (see below Table 1). According to Addie (2020, p.583), the relationship between Ollman's Levels of Generality and Urban Levels of Generality can be explained as such:

Generalities at 'level 1' concern the distinct experiences of individual urbanites or exceptional/unique case cities, while 'level 2' draws attention to particular (types of) cities in the recent past (global, world, ordinary, Sunbelt, etc.). It also enables us to abstract generalities regarding the common qualities of particular cities or urban inhabitants in the spaces and over the period these qualities have existed (for example, the subjectivities of urbanites under 'actually existing' neoliberalism. ... 'Level 3' is constituted by broad social structures, including capitalism, patriarchy and imperialism, whereby everything that is peculiar about urbanisation and urbanism related to their appearance and functioning in these structures is brought into focus. Qualities of individuals or particular cities are irrelevant here as the focus of the analysis is urban process itself under capitalism, colonialism, etc. ... Continuing to move from micro to macro levels, urban society— whether virtual or actualised (per Lefebvre, 2003)— frames abstractions at 'level 4'; that is, the times and spaces where human societies have been divided by settlement type. 'Level 5' through 'level 7' correspond to Ollman's most general levels.

Considering the levels of abstraction in the below table, we can state that the analysis in this study, which focuses on the discussion of the provision of urban security services provided by private companies, is made with reference to three basic levels:

i) “specific individuals and their experiences” within the scope of in-depth interviews;
 ii) “particular (types of) cities/urbanities (recent past)” when focusing on the example of Ankara and discussing the state and private relationship and the Turkish context in the neoliberal era, and iii) capitalism and “urban process under capitalism” in the parts where the state is discussed for a longer period of time within the scope of coercion-force-policing.

Also, Marx’s method on understanding and changing the social relations of production provide an opportunity to reveal and to transform causal tendencies and mechanisms at different levels of abstractions. For this thesis, the knowledge of the relationship between police, policing, surveillance, and urban private security services is going to be produced by referring the first, the second and the third levels out of Marx’s level of abstractions extracted by Ollman (2003) as seven levels of generalization.

Table 1. Ollman’s Levels of Generality and Urban Levels of Generality.

Ollman’s Levels of Generality in Marx’s Method		Urban Levels of Generality
1	Individual	Specific individuals or the experiences of a particular city
2	Particular Industry (Recent Past-Industrial Capitalism)	Particular (types of) cities/urbanities (recent past) [financial capitalism/urbanization as dominant development forces]
3	Capitalism	Urban process under capitalism [imperialism, patriarchy, and so on]
4	Class Society	Urban society [as society seen through settlement type]
5	Human Society	Human society
6	Animal World	Animal world
7	Nature as a Whole	Nature as a whole

Source: Addie (2020, p.583).

Everyday social practices are going to be observed and discussed at the first level of generalization and discussions made on the second level of abstraction enables to reveal changes and transformation in social practices and products of these practices in the last 20-50 years of capitalism (commercialization of urban security and emergence of new security technologies). And, at the third level of abstraction, the position of human practices, such as commodified urban security practices emerging

as a part of capitalist relations, is going to be problematized in terms of their role in wider (re)production relations and the practices of the nation-state.

Furthermore, according to Carchedi (2011, p.2), as a method of social research, dialectical logic's starting point is empirical observation⁸, and the first step towards conceptualizing social phenomena as the unity-in-determination of social interactions and social processes is using a clear and practical understanding of dialectics as a method of social research; hence, the three underlying tenets of this approach can be stated as follows: Social processes are always both potential and realized, both determinate and determined, and subject to continuous movement and change (Carchedi, 2011, p.vii-vii). He stated that, obviously, empirical observation is mediated by a prior interpretive (theoretical) (Carchedi, 2011, p.3). Firstly, realities or social phenomena has double dimension, and they are always both realized and potential because "what has become realised and what is only potentially existent and might become realised at a future date" as shown in the Marxian analysis, until they are sold, commodities are just "potentially" money; surplus value is "potential capital" (Carchedi, 2011, p.4). Understanding the internal relationships between potential and actual is not a simple matter of time since "at a certain moment, a realised phenomenon contains within itself a realm of potentialities and subsequently those potentialities manifest themselves as (a different) realised form" (Carchedi, 2011, p.6). To illustrate it, Carchedi stated that "the knowledge needed by an author to write an article exists in that author as a formless possibility. It takes a definite form only when that article is written or the author has clearly conceived that article in her head" (Carchedi, 2011, p.7). According to him there are three considerations that scholars should be aware of: first, "since a phenomenon is potentially different from what it is as a realised

⁸ Carchedi discussed the relationship between Marx's method and empirical evidences as follows: "... to start from empirical, observed reality is not an empiricist standpoint. Marx's starting point of induction is indeed empirical reality, but there is no *empiricism* in his method. The reason is that the inductive phase, the observation of reality, begins on the basis of a previously developed theoretical conception, in Marx's case, a class-analysis, which is the outcome of a previous phase of deduction. If Marx begins with the real concrete, empirical observation, he begins with an observation which has already been filtered through a previous process of induction and deduction. It might be useful to recall that the notions developed in the process of induction and deduction (knowledge-formation) are not a reflection in thought of objective reality, but class-determined conceptualisations" (Carchedi, 2011, p.46-7).

phenomenon, a phenomenon is the unity of identity and difference”; second, “a phenomenon is also the unity of opposites, inasmuch as the potential features of a phenomenon are opposite (contradictory) to its realised aspects”; and third, “a phenomenon is the unity of essence and appearance”(Carchedi, 2011, p.6). Nevertheless, as Marx emphasized there is no royal way to science, Carchedi emphasized three aspects related to above three considerations as the researchers should consider that as follows: (i) realization is the “transformation of what is potentially present into a realised form”, (ii) “potentials, being formless, can never be observed because observation⁹ implies realization” and (iii) “what is potential within a certain sphere of reality (at a certain level of abstraction) can be realised in another sphere (at another level of abstraction)”(Carchedi, 2011, p.7-8). Secondly, Carchedi (2011, p.8) claimed that the dialectical determination materialized as follows:

... all elements of social reality are interconnected (people can live and reproduce themselves only through reciprocal interaction) into a whole (groups, families and thus finally society), that this whole changes continuously (even though some changes might be minimal or even unobservable), that this change can be continuous or discontinuous, and that the whole’s interconnected parts can be contradictory, that is, the reproduction of some phenomena might imply the supersession of some other phenomena and vice versa.

Nevertheless, he warned that dialectical determination is something different from mutual interaction of formal logic since it is a very unique form of interaction between determinant and determined internally because “it is possible for phenomena to be either determinant or determined, according to the section of reality and thus to the *level of abstraction* considered”¹⁰ (Carchedi, 2011, p.17). Thirdly, the reality is in

⁹ “However, some realised phenomena, for example social relations, are unobservable as well. Consequently, it would seem that observation is not the criterion to distinguish potentials from realisations. But the question revolves around direct observation. A realised phenomenon can be unobservable directly, but observable indirectly through other social phenomena. If social relations cannot be observed as such, directly, what people do when engaging in those relations (that is, when they carry out social processes) can be observed. In other words, social processes are the form of manifestation of social relations, of something which has already left the realm of potentialities and has already become realised (the actual interaction among people). This is not the case for the potential aspects of social reality, including those social relations that have not manifested themselves yet” (Carchedi, 2011, p.7-8).

¹⁰ “For example, at a certain level of abstraction, if only distribution and consumption are considered, distribution determines consumption. But, at another level of abstraction, if also production is considered, distribution is itself determined by production. And, if a certain period is considered, production is itself determined by the distribution and consumption of the previous period. Distribution, being determined by production, is a condition for the continuation of the same type of production

constant movement being defined as “the change undergone by phenomena from being realised to being potential and vice versa and from being determinant to being determined and vice versa” (Carchedi, 2011, p.18). In order to comprehend the movement's structure, Carchedi recognized traits including temporality, contradiction, "particular social and historical laws of movement," tendential laws of movement¹¹, and cyclical movement (Carchedi, 2011, p. 18–20).

Furthermore, Carchedi aimed to determine appropriate level of abstraction to understand social phenomena being, rather than their individuality, "relations and processes" among people who are thought of as social group members in its concrete and abstract meanings while he asked that “if social phenomena are relations and processes among real people, and if social phenomena can exist also potentially, how can real, and thus, by definition, realised, people engage in potential (formless) relations and processes?”(Carchedi, 2011, p.22). He answered this question as following:

The answer is that real people can engage in potential social phenomena because they, as *concrete individuals, engage in realised individual phenomena which are formless potential social phenomena* (a relation of friendship can originate an array of social relations and processes), that is, because concrete individuals are potential abstract individuals (Carchedi, 2011, p.25).

(possibly in a different form) or for its radical change in the following period. But, even if we consider a certain level of abstraction at which A is only determinant and B only determined, both A and B are *both* ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ of each other. A ‘causes’ B by being B’s condition of existence and is the ‘effect’ of B, because B is the condition of A’s reproduction or supersession. Vice versa for B which is the ‘cause’ of A, by being A’s condition of reproduction or supersession, and the ‘effect’ of A, because A is the condition of B’s existence. For formal logic, at most, A can be the cause of B within a certain context and B can be the cause of A within a different context. But, once the context has been delimited, A can be only cause and B only effect. To the contrary, for dialectical logic, A and B are always both the ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ of each other” (Carchedi, 2011, p.17).

¹¹ “We have seen that a determinant phenomenon (A) determines a determined phenomenon (B). But A can and does determine not only one but several phenomena (B and C). Given A’s contradictory nature, some phenomena (B) are conditions of reproduction of A (because this is their dominant rather than their secondary feature) and some other (C) are conditions of supersession of A (because this is their dominant feature). Then, at any given moment, if B is dominant, A reproduces itself in spite of C, which is the supersessive force, that is, *it reproduces itself in a contradictory way*. If C is dominant, A supersedes itself in spite of B, the reproductive force. *It supersedes itself in a contradictory way*. However, the contradictory reproduction of A, through the dominant force of B over C, is only temporary because C, the supersessive force, eventually gains the upper hand. The same is true for A’s supersession. Thus, A’s contradictory movement towards reproduction or supersession is the result of contradictory forces that make A’s movement oscillate between its contradictory reproduction and its contradictory supersession” (Carchedi, 2011, p.19).

Therefore, the distinction between concrete and abstract individuals is key to understanding the relationship between realized and potential at the level of the observable. On the one hand, individuals can be viewed as unique individuals in their individuality referred to as “concrete individuals”, on the other hand, individuals who belong to social groups are “abstract individuals” because abstraction is made up of their unique characteristics and tangible ways of existing (Carchedi, 2011, p.23). Comparing abstract and concrete individuals, Carchedi (2011, p. 23) said that:

The basic difference between abstract and concrete individuals is that the former are replaceable (on account of their common features), while concrete individuals, being unique, are not. This is in line with Marx’s notion of commodities as replaceable due to their common social substance, abstract labour: ‘As *values*, the commodities are expressions of the *same unity*, of abstract human labour.... Their *social relationship* consists exclusively in counting with respect to one another as expressions of this social substance of theirs which differs only quantitatively, but which is qualitatively equal and hence replaceable and interchangeable with one another.’ *In reality*, individuals are *always both* concrete *and* abstract. I am a teacher in the abstract because I belong to the group of teachers and, at the same time, I am a teacher with features that are only my own. However, *analytically*, individuals are *either* concrete *or* abstract. If we consider their unique features, we disregard their common features, and vice versa. While concrete features differentiate, general features unify.

As a result, regardless of the concrete humans who, as abstract individuals, hold those particular social relations and participate in those processes, social phenomena can continue to exist and reproduce themselves and individuals and social phenomena fall under the categories of concrete and abstract individuals, which are not merely categories of thought but rather represent the same social reality which actually has two dimensions—concrete individuals (individual phenomena) and abstract individuals—these categories can be objectively justified (social phenomena) and no third dimension exists (Carchedi, 2011, p.24). Thus, for example, a population is potentially contained in and determined by classes at a particular level of analysis, or if a particular slice of social reality is considered; at a different degree of abstraction, classes are potentially contained in and determined by the ownership-relation (Carchedi, 2011, p.46). At this point, interviews conducted for this study with mid- and upper-level managers in private security companies are not only about their unique or particular positions within social setting. Rather, the significance of the interviews arisen from their positions within the private security market as abstract individuals revealing general characteristics of and perspectives on the private security market.

In addition to the discussions raised by historical dialectical materialist accounts of social realities and relations, critical realism challenges both empiricism and idealism by arguing that by abstracting conceptions from reality, causal mechanisms and structures may be studied that, despite being regarded as the results of human praxis, function independently of human praxis and individuals can then understand the structures that limit them critically (Robertson, 1999, p.21). There is a dialectic¹² in science through which “a regularity is identified, a plausible explanation for it is invented, and the reality of the entities and processes postulated in the explanation is then checked” (Bhaskar, 2008, p.3). According to critical realist account, pioneered by Roy Bhaskar, “positivism is said to be correct in holding that some truths are absolute and that we can discover what they are through research. And postmodernism is said to be correct in believing that the point of view of the investigator can never be completely detached from what he or she finds” (Ollman, 2003, p.173). The former applies nomothetic epistemology, whereas the latter applies ideographic epistemology, to use Wallerstein's terminology. Critical realism holds that the formation of social science, its independence from philosophy, and the division of science into specialized domains are all the results of social relations. Comparable to the division of the real social world into distinct domains such as social, cultural, and economic, the separation of philosophy and science is artificial and the result of hegemonic struggles that disguise the whole of social interactions. Once the totality is disguised or

¹² “In its long and complex history five basic threads of meaning of dialectic, each of which is more or less transformed within Marxism, stand out. (1) From Heraclitus, dialectical contradictions, involving inclusive oppositions or conflicts of forces of non-independent origins, are identified by Marx as constitutive of capitalism and its mode of production. (2) From Socrates, the elenchus or dialectical argument is, on the one hand, transformed under the sign of the class struggle, but, on the other, continues to function in some Marxist thought as, under ‘ideal conditions’ (in Gramsci, a communist society; in Habermas, an ‘unconstrained consensus’), a norm of truth. (3) From Plato, dialectical reason takes on a range of connotations from conceptual flexibility and novelty - of the sort which, subject to empirical, logical and contextual controls, plays a crucial role in scientific discovery and development - through enlightenment and demystification (Kantian critique) to the depth rationality of materially grounded and conditioned practices of collective self-emancipation. (4) From Plotinus to Schiller, dialectical process of original unity, historical diremption and differentiated unity, remains, on the one hand, as the counterfactual limits or poles implied by Marx’s systematic dialectics of the commodity form, and acts, on the other, as a spur in the practical struggle for socialism. (5) From Hegel, dialectical intelligibility is trans- formed in Marx to include both the causally generated presentation of social objects and their explanatory critique - in terms of their conditions of being, both those which are historically specific and praxis-dependent and those which genuinely are not” (Bhaskar, 2011, p.124-5).

eliminated, it is feasible to understand social relations in terms of their particularity as opposed to their totality. Bhaskar stated that “Realism is the theory that the ultimate objects of scientific inquiry exist and act (for the most part) quite independently of scientists and their activity”(Bhaskar, 2011, p.12) and the ensuing realist explanation of science presents a clear and coherent alternative to positivism that allows us to maintain both the cumulative nature of research without reinstating monism and a "surplus" component of scientific theory without sinking into subjectivism (Bhaskar, 2011, p.15). Bhaskar attempts to establish a compromise between naturalist positivism and anti-naturalist hermeneutics for the development of scientific philosophy. The former contends that there is no distinction between natural and social sciences and that it is possible to explain and predict law-like order in natural and social events, whereas the latter contends that it is impossible for social scientists to seek causal laws because individual meanings shape and determine the social world. Despite acknowledging the differences between the natural and social sciences, critical realism asserts that social science is possible and that the two disciplines share similar methodological principles, despite their distinct subject-matter, as social objects are the subject of the social sciences. Hence, critical realism¹³ occupies a space between these two epistemological viewpoints. Bhaskar (1998, p.141-142) argued that:

... transcendental analyses of science and society suggest that the subject-matter of social science is both law-like and irreducibly historical in character. Law-like, in opposition both to the ‘findings’ of the interactionist and reductionist wings of (behaviouristic) empiricism and to the humanistic defenders of a truistic (or the advocates of an exclusively *verstehende*) social science. Historical, in opposition both to the (rationalistic) individualism of praxiology and to the ahistorical schools of structuralism, which (at best) can only account for the most species-general aspects of social life” (Bhaskar, 1998, p.141-2).

¹³ Bhaskar called it as transcendental realism and state that: “It regards the objects of knowledge as the structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena; and the knowledge as produced in the social activity of science. These objects are neither phenomena (empiricism) nor human con-structs imposed upon the phenomena (idealism), but real structures which endure and operate independently of our knowledge, our experience and the conditions which allow us access to them. Against empiricism, the objects of knowledge are structures, not events; against idealism, they are intransitive (in the sense defined). On this conception, a constant conjunction of events is no more a necessary than it is a sufficient condition for the assumption of the operation of a causal law. According to this view, both knowledge and the world are structured, both are differentiated and changing; the latter exists independently of the former (though not of our knowledge of this fact); and experiences and the things and causal laws to which it affords us access are normally out of phase with one another. On this view, science is not an epiphenomenon of nature, nor is nature a product of man” (Bhaskar, 2008, p.15).

Bhaskar's approach, called transcendental realism, asked, "How is science possible?" The response was that the material world is more than just a mental construct, and that there are real structures and generative mechanisms within complex and open systems that can be discovered through scientific research. Bhaskar distinguished his approach from transcendental idealism and classical empiricism by emphasizing that neither phenomena nor human constructs imposed upon the phenomena are the sole objects of knowledge. Causal laws as constant conjunctions should be replaced with the various causal tendencies. For instance, B does not always emerge when A exists since there are real mechanisms and structures determining the emergence and realization of B. Hence, from the standpoint of critical realism, it would be appropriate to say that B may or may not occur when A exists and that there is only a causal tendency and not a necessary relation between A and B, which is significant because it ensures escape from reductionism and mechanic determinism. Similar to Marx's tendential explanations of capitalist production relations, tendencies as causal laws of structures and mechanisms offer an opportunity to understand, explain, and change the world.

Also, Bhaskar asked the question that "to what extent can society be studied in the same way as nature?" and stated that the sciences are (actually or ideally) unified in their agreement with positivist principles, according to a naturalist heritage whereas an anti-naturalist school has proposed a methodological division between the natural and social sciences, based on a distinction between their subject-matter according to which the social sciences' primary focus is on elucidating the meaning of significant objects as their subject matter (Bhaskar, 1998, p.1). Bhaskar claimed that transformational model of social action enabled him to develop a relational understanding of social science's subject-matter and he asserted that "society does not consist of individuals [or, we might add, groups], but expresses the sum of the relations within which individuals [and groups] stand" and "the essential movement of scientific theory will be seen to consist in the movement from the manifest phenomena of social life, as conceptualized in the experience of the social agents concerned, to the essential relations that necessitate them"(Bhaskar, 1998, p.28). He summarized fundamental differences between social and natural structures as such: i) "social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they govern", ii) social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently

of the agents' conceptions of what they are doing in their activity" and iii) "social structures, unlike natural structures, may be only relatively enduring (so that the tendencies they ground may not be universal in the sense of space-time invariant)"(Bhaskar, 1998, p.41-2). In this regard, like Bhaskar, Cox (2013, p.16) claimed that the structure is a relevant concept to historical geographical materialism since it entails causal properties which enabled or constrained meaningful relationships of people with others in different ways. According to Bhaskar, "Society, then, is an articulated ensemble of tendencies and powers which, unlike natural ones, exist only as long as they (or at least some of them) are being exercised" (Bhaskar, 1998, p.42). Bhaskar explained the position-practice system as a mediating system composed of "the positions (places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc.) occupied (filled, assumed, enacted, etc.) by individuals, and of the practices (activities, etc.) in which, in virtue of their occupancy of these positions (and vice versa), they engage" (Bhaskar, 1998, p.44). Although an individual is still an actor with powers, and any scientific endeavor requires that they be acquired, developed, and exercised, he/she exists as phenomena, complicated creations of systems that he/she has not created and does not inherently has privileged knowledge, like any other empirically presented item; and therefore, from the perspective of transcendental realism, rivers, hydrochloric acid, and people are all equally (1) agents, (2) products, and (3) potential objects of scientific research (Bhaskar, 1998, p.124).

As Bhaskar asserted that there are two types of object of knowledge¹⁴ which are a transitive "in which the object is the material cause or antecedently established knowledge which is used to generate the new knowledge" and an intransitive "in which the object is the real structure or mechanism that exists and acts quite independently of men and the conditions which allow men access to it" (Bhaskar, 2008, p.6). Thus,

¹⁴ "In short, the intransitive objects of knowledge are in general invariant to our knowledge of them: they are the real things and structures, mechanisms and processes, events and possibilities of the world; and for the most part they are quite independent of us. They are not unknowable, because as a matter of fact quite a bit is known about them. (Remember they were introduced as objects of scientific knowledge.) But neither are they in any way dependent upon our knowledge, let alone perception, of them. They are the intransitive, science-independent, objects of scientific discovery and investigation. If we can imagine a world of intransitive objects without science, we cannot imagine a science without transitive objects, i.e. without scientific or pre-scientific antecedents. That is, we cannot imagine the production of knowledge save from, and by means of, knowledge-like materials. Knowledge depends upon knowledge-like antecedents" (Bhaskar, 2008, p.12).

there are both transitive and intransitive objects of science, according to critical realism. Transitive objects are those created by humans, such as conceptions, models, etc., whereas intransitive objects are those that exist independently of human existence. Existing theoretical explanations and conceptualizations thus belong to the sphere of transitive knowledge, whereas the philosophy of social science generates second-order knowledge. Thus, Bhaskar's own explanations might be viewed as an attempt to reevaluate current viewpoints and provide a technique for scientific explanations, as opposed to explaining or altering the social environment in which we live. His focus on the role of positivist causal laws, hermeneutic meanings, and levels of abstraction in explaining structural components of historical materialism demonstrated that critical realism generates knowledge at the level of transitive objects. Intransitive objects of science are significant for developing knowledge of real structures, events, and mechanisms from unobservable facts by extracting causal tendencies. In this vein, the relationship between the aim of science and mechanisms are explained as such:

...the aim of science is the production of the knowledge of the mechanisms of the production of phenomena in nature that combine to generate the actual flux of phenomena of the world. These mechanisms, which are the intransitive objects of scientific enquiry, endure and act quite independently of men. The statements that describe their operations, which may be termed 'laws', are not statements about experiences (empirical statements, properly so called) or statements about events. Rather they are statements about the ways things act in the world (that is, about the forms of activity of the things of the world) and would act in a world without men, where there would be no experiences and few, if any, constant conjunctions of events. (It is to be able to say this inter alia that we need to distinguish the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical.) (Bhaskar, 2008, p.6).

According to Bhaskar, a conception or image of a natural mechanism or structure in action is the basis of theory and, hence, "under certain conditions some postulated mechanisms can come to be established as real. And it is in the working of such mechanisms that the objective basis of our ascriptions of natural necessity lies" (Bhaskar, 2008, p.1). He asserted that the existence of real structures is independent of actual patterns of events and our experiences, and that three distinct domains can be found: the real, the actual, and the empirical (see the below table) (Bhaskar, 2008, p.2).

Table 2. Bhaskar's Three Domains of Reality

	Domain of Real	Domain of Actual	Domain of Empirical
Mechanisms	+		
Event	+	+	
Experiences	+	+	+

Source: Bhaskar (2008, p.2).

Therefore, there are three domains of reality: the empirical (the world experienced by our senses), the actual (events that occur independently of our material existence), and the real (processes of structures and generative mechanisms). To begin explaining social realities, possible explanations of mechanisms should be determined as descriptions. Second, an explanation of the underlying structure of generative mechanisms should be developed. Third, alternative generative mechanisms should be analyzed and eliminated according to their strength and significance in the explanation of realities that led to the re-description of the first tentative explanation. Since observational statements do not have the advantage of explanation in three domains of social realities, abstracting theoretical conceptualizations plays a significant role in this process. The relationship between mechanisms-events-experiences and domains of real-actual-empirical are summarized as such:

... the causal structures and generative mechanisms of nature must exist and act independently of the conditions that allow men access to them, so that they must be assumed to be structured and intransitive, i.e. relatively independent of the patterns of events and the actions of men alike. ...events must occur independently of the experiences in which they are apprehended. Structures and mechanisms then are real and distinct from the patterns of events that they generate; just as events are real and distinct from the experiences in which they are apprehended. Mechanisms, events and experiences thus constitute three overlapping domains of reality, viz. the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical (Bhaskar, 2008, p.46).

Thus, there is no natural or usual alignment between these three layers of reality; “experiences, and the facts they ground, are social products; and the conjunctions of events, that, when apprehended in experience, provide the empirical grounds for causal laws, are, as we have seen, social products too” (Bhaskar, 2008, p.47). The generative mechanisms of nature – nothing more than the ways of acting things – provide the true foundation for causal laws which should be analyzed as their tendencies being thought “as powers or liabilities of a thing which may be exercised without being manifest in any particular outcome” (Bhaskar, 2008, p.3) and “the world consists of mechanisms

not events. Such mechanisms combine to generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world. ... They are the intransitive objects of scientific theory” (Bhaskar, 2008, p.37). At this point, Pratt argued that “Realists refer to ‘necessary’ conditions (to make a reaction work) and ‘contingent’ factors... Thus, cause is identifiable and a result of particular mechanisms: ‘real’ mechanisms” (Pratt, 2009, p.380). One of the most significant contribution of critical realism into the human geography studies is the concept of ‘contingency’ (Cox, 2013, p.6). In this vein, the relationship between abstraction and investigation is in motion and dialectically interrelated as Pratt (2009, p.379) asserted that:

... abstraction identifies the appropriate mechanisms and the conditions under which a cause may produce an effect. Rational abstractions include only ‘necessary relationships’. Realists have stressed the importance of necessary and contingent relationships to make such distinctions. Once identified, such mechanisms will disclose the relevant set of objects to be investigated. It might look like deducing the world from a model, but realists argue that the whole process involves what is termed ‘retroduction’ (as opposed to induction or deduction): that is, the movement between the real object, the necessary and contingent conditions, a rational abstraction, and the specification of causal mechanisms. For realists, this is an iterative and reflexive methodological process.

As a result, in order to study mechanisms, systems should be isolated; nonetheless, the mechanisms persist and behave quite independently of our activity (Bhaskar, 2008, p.228) as “... to explain an event or a regularity is to bring it under a new scheme of concepts, designating the structures, generative mechanisms or agents producing it” (Bhaskar, 2011, p.90). According to Bhaskar (2008, p.177):

Thus science, I have argued, presupposes the ontological independence and the possible disjuncture of the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical at every stratum or level of reality. At each stratum scientists attempt to identify the entities responsible for what happens at the less fundamental stratum (their point of departure) and describe their normic behaviour.

In addition, Blaikie (2007) asserted that, for Bhaskar, the activity of social science is non-neutral in a double sense: it intervenes in social realities as the object of its investigation and logically entails value judgments by scientists. His approach rejects divisions such as fact and value since social science, by its nature, includes facts and values in its analysis as a result of its subject matter. Following the main arguments of the hermeneutic tradition, critical realism claims the significance of subjective

meanings attributed by individuals to concrete social realities. However, it is clear that there is a need for separation of beliefs and information within subjective interpretations in order to understand real structures. This may seem contradictory at first sight, but it complements the view that the interpretation of subjects is as significant as the observational dimensions in order to reveal generative mechanisms and structures. In terms of doing research on analyzing underlying structures and generative mechanisms, Pratt (1995, p.67) suggested that three significant points should be taken into consideration by the researchers employing critical realist approach:

First, that the process may not be a direct or linear one, often it is an iterative one, the model being refined in an ongoing process. While this may seem a trivial point it does severely challenge existing modes of scientific endeavour, both implying a far more exploratory structure and a challenge to the common form of presentation of results. Secondly, the process of conceptualization and reconceptualization is central throughout the whole endeavour. Thirdly, the use of retrodution may necessitate the application of new methods of 'detection' for sensing the 'reality' of new causal mechanisms. On this last point the question remains as to exactly what methods and styles of analysis might be appropriate to critical realism, and why?"

Thus, at this point, from the perspective of critical realism, the text is not a starting or end point, conceptualization and reconceptualization are two crucial processes to understand the various ways representing the world that encouraged researchers to examined explanations and understandings of the practices of social actors (Pratt, 1995, p.70). In this vein, realists advocate an explanation of the interaction between social structures and human agency based on a transformational vision of social activity and avoiding both voluntarism and reification while simultaneously, extended a concept of the social as primarily comprised of or dependent on relations (Bhaskar, 2011, p.3). Therefore, by the 'Transformational Model of Social Activity' (TMSA), he proposes a resolution of the structure-agency debate that is grounded in a realist philosophy of science" (Pratt, 1995, p.64). According to the relational perspective, a person's personality consists essentially of his or her social particularity; to put it differently, who people are is largely a result of what they have done or what has been done to them in the specific social relationships into which they were born and have lived since what people do or have done to them must be captured within the context of their "historically and socially determined capacities, powers, liabilities, and tendencies"(Bhaskar, 2011, p.7). As Pratt (2009, p.379) put forward that

“Transcendental realism is thus a way of saying that ‘thingness’ is substantial and independent of observation (without denying that observers may apprehend a thing differently; it is they, not it, that are changing).” Positivism, using nomothetic epistemology, assumes timeless and spaceless analysis, whereas humanities, using ideographic epistemology, assume episodic time and space. The third stance, called historical materialism, employs structural time and space to provide explanations for a longer period of time within historical social systems. Bhaskar’s position combined these three times and spaces in his analysis of social realities. Bhaskar’s approach is valuable to make us aware of the ontological issues in epistemology and to emphasize the importance of internal and external relations. Besides, in his recent studies, he tried to develop relationality with dialectics and critical realism. Ollman (2003, p.174) suggested that “In recent writings, Bhaskar has formulated his ideas more and more in the vocabulary of dialectics, so that Critical Realism today can also be viewed as a version of dialectics and even-with its increasingly anticapitalist thrust-as a version of Marxist dialectics.”¹⁵ Bhaskar (2011, p.119-120) claimed that Marx’s dialectical methodology is naturalistic and empirical (not positivist, but realist), scientific

¹⁵ For the discussions on the differences and similarities between Marx’s dialectical historical materialism and Bhaskar’s critical realism Cox’s (2013) and Pratt’s (2013) studies can be followed. Firstly, in brief, according to Cox (2013, p.3), these differences between the methods of critical realism and historical geographical materialism can be stated as such: “Yet, despite the claim that Marx could be regarded as a critical realist before his time, there were always very significant differences from the methods of historical geographical materialism. These include different approaches to abstraction, to the distinction between internal and external relations, to causation and determination, to the question of change and to the relative merits of totalizing rather than pluralizing understandings of the world. These differences were poorly understood at the time and have never been critically examined. With a critical scrutiny as background, contrasting geographical practices can be re-evaluated. Although the author’s conclusion is that historical geographical materialism provides more convincing purchase on the world, the critical realist notion of structure provides an important means of understanding the accumulation process and its contradictory character. This is because it is through the elaboration of new structures of social relations or the transformation of old ones that capital seeks to suspend its contradictions.” Secondly, Pratt (2013, p.27) asserted that: “... critical realism and (geographical) historical materialism seek to do different things with contrasting emphases. Marx was using philosophical tools to sharpen an analytic lens with which to view capitalist societies. With the knowledge thus produced, he sought to mobilise workers to challenge a system not operating in their interests. ... critical realism is similar to my interpretation of Marx’s aims. It however is more explicitly rooted in philosophy, especially a philosophy of science (Bhaskar, 1975). ... The relevant iteration for our current debate is scientific realism. Roy Bhaskar – the progenitor of critical realism – deploys it as an ‘under labourer’. In his view, all Marxists should be realists, but not all realists are Marxists. Bhaskar’s work draws on a lineage of philosophical debate about realism(s), in particular to challenge to positivism and empiricism (faulting a successionist model of causation and nominalist ontology). He has a developed position on the application of this philosophical critique to both the sciences and the social sciences (which is when he adopts the ‘critical’ modifier to realism) (Bhaskar, 1989). In sum, he glosses his position as ontologically bold, but epistemologically timid”.

(ontological dialectic: examining “the contradictions in thought and the crises of socio-economic life in terms of the particular contradictory essential relations which generate them”), historical (rooted in and an agent of the changes in the relations and circumstances), and “an empirically open-ended, materially conditioned and historically circumscribed, dialectical phenomenology.” In sum, Marx's methodology consists of three components: (a) “a general scientific realism; (b) a domain-specific qualified [or critical] naturalism; and (c) a subject-specific dialectical materialism” (Bhaskar, 2011, p.134).

Furthermore, Harvey's attempt to develop relationality between historical dialectical materialism and spatial analysis provides an opportunity to comprehend both capitalist social relations in space and capitalist social relations on space. Harvey suggested that “The form and content of geographical knowledge cannot be understood independently of the social basis for the production and use of that knowledge” (Harvey, 1984, p.2). As Kirsch stated that “Harvey also develops a materialist spatial ontology rooted in multiple and intervening spatialities: geographical space is mediated abstractly, atomized by markets and policed by state regulation; it is dialectical, a product of social and political contest...” (Kirsch, 2009, p.167). In this vein, the term "historical geographical materialism¹⁶" refers to the academic endeavor of developing a Marxist geography while simultaneously injecting explicitly geographical ideas and sensibility into the more general currents of historical and dialectical materialism (Kirsch, 2009, p.163). In a manifesto on historical geographical materialism, Harvey (1984, p.9-10) stated five tasks of geographers as followings:

1. Build a popular geography, free from prejudice but reflective of real conflicts and contradictions, capable also of opening new channels for communication and common understanding.

¹⁶ “By the early to mid 1980s, building on institutional resources created in the previous decade, including the radical geography journal *Antipode*, geographers had begun to seriously rework elements of Marxist theory through explicitly spatial frames. Key works included Harvey’s *Limits to Capital*, Doreen Massey’s *Spatial Divisions of Labor*, Neil Smith’s *Uneven Development*, and *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, a multidisciplinary edited volume, among others. Carried out alongside (and as part of) a more general spatial turn in social theory, geographers, drawing on diverse influences, brought historical materialism into contact with a range of disciplinary concerns and subfields, from urban studies of ghetto formation, suburbanization, and gentrification to agriculture and ecology to international development, industrial and economic geography, political geography and geopolitics. Terrain as diverse as landscape and culture, political movements and public space, labor, migration, commodification and consumption, technology, and the body have been investigated using historical geographical materialist frameworks” (Kirsch, 2009, p.165).

2. Create an applied peoples' geography, un beholden to narrow or powerful special interests, but broadly democratic in its conception.
3. Accept a dual methodological commitment to scientific integrity and non-neutrality.
4. Integrate geographical sensitivities into general social theories emanating from the historical materialist tradition.
5. Define a political project that sees the transition from capitalism to socialism in historico-geographical terms.

Though not the first to attempt to interpret geography, or at least the populated planet, as the result of human activity, historical geographical materialism does offer up new perspectives and it necessitates a method that starts with particular material geographies, whether they are present or past, and aims to explain how and under what circumstances they were produced (Kirsch, 2009, p.166). For instance, Harvey suggested a geographical understanding of capitalist accumulation and he shed light on “the tensions between capital’s need for spatial fixity, on the one hand ... and its demand for spatial mobility and new ‘spatial fixes’, on the other, that is, the geographical movement of production processes as a strategy for lowering labor and land costs, in the context of unending competition over relative surplus value” (Kirsch, 2009, p.167). Harvey (1984, p.5) argued that in the late 1960s, the central question was whether social concerns could be sufficiently articulated from behind the positivist shield or if that shield was as neutral as it looked at first glance, but the radical and Marxist drive in geography centered on a criticism of ideology and practice within the then-dominant positivism in five terms: i) tried to pierce the positivist barrier and reveal the concealed assumptions and class prejudices that lay within, ii) came to consider positivism as a symptom of bourgeois managerial consciousness devoted, at worst, to the manipulation and control of people as objects and, at best, capable of expressing paternalist beneficence, iii) criticized the role of geographers in imperialist initiatives, namely in urban and regional planning processes that allow social control and capital accumulation; and iv) questioned the racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, and blatant political bias expressed in several geographical literature. Indeed, although none of this is completely included into theoretical formulations that are strong in terms of time but weak in terms of space, Marx constantly acknowledges the relevance of geography and place in his theory and practice (the opposition between English and Irish working-class interests parallels oppositions in his theoretical work between town

and country, inner and outer transformations, and the like) (Harvey, 1984, p.9). Historical-geographical materialism investigates the specific social form (capitalist social form) through which nature is altered to allow the continuance of individual and collective human life, resulting in tensions, contradictions, and conflicts that present a field for social action and struggle (Swyngedouw, 2000, p.45). The role of the state is significant “in containing and ``managing” the tensions that exist within capitalism and in mitigating conflict”, hence, “By intervening, the state contributes to maintaining cohesion in societies in which capitalist social relations of production are dominant” (by means of social welfare, regional development or collective consumption such as education, housing, policing services etc.) (Swyngedouw, 2000, p.50). According to Mishra’s interpretation, Marx attempted to seek for historical precedents and scientific understanding of forces that have a spatial relation on a terrain of development and in a capitalist economy, industrialization and the process of capital production reflect class conflict with its local environment and geographical space towards which the dialectical approach can be applied in a scientific manner based on three basic tools of Marxism which are “Historical materialism: historical (GHM) enquiry of problems like, poverty, inequality, deprivation and environmental degradation. Dialectics of nature: conflicting forces of development and political economy: role of state in perpetuating problems” (Mishra, 2017, p.177). Swyngedouw claimed that Marxism appeared to be the most substantively and epistemologically coherent attempt to explain how the dynamics of social relations were both dependent on and formed by space and since the space is deeply political, space and spatial configurations became not only inscribed with contradictory processes of “empowerment/disempowerment”, “domination/subordination”, and “appropriation/exploitation”, but space is also an active and integral moment and arena expressing and embodying the struggles that develop along the aforementioned dialectical pairs (Swyngedouw, 1999, p.93). In this regard, historical-geographical materialism’s main assertion is that processes take ontological precedence over things being the embodiment of interiorized relationships and processes or flows constitute the thing (Swyngedouw, 1999, p.94). As Harvey (1993, p.288) pointed out that “An ontology is a theory of what exists. To say, therefore, that something has ontological status is to say that it exists.”

In addition, according to Harvey (1993, p.288.), totality can be interpreted in two fundamental ways: (i) “as an aggregate of elements – a mere sum of parts – which enter into combination without being fashioned by some pre-existing structure within the totality” and (ii) “the totality is viewed as something "emergent" that has an existence independent of its parts, while it also dominates the character of the parts it contains.” Therefore, in the second sense of the meaning of totality, it is structured by the elaboration of the relationship within it and each pieces of the totality reflects all the qualities of the whole as it is the locus of a series of interactions within the whole while the whole endeavors to mould the pieces such that each portion serves to maintain the existence and overall structure of the whole (Harvey, 1993, p.289).

Elaborating the structure “as a system of internal relations which is in the process of being structured through the operation of its own transformation rules” is significant to determine the relevance and relationship of an observable action to the larger structure of which it is a part since structures are neither "things" nor "activities," hence their existence cannot be determined via observation (Harvey, 1993, p.290). Yet, when no transformation occurs by which one structure may be derived from another, structures can be regarded as separate and differentiable entities, whereas the failure to recognize a transition does not indicate that none exists (Harvey, 1993, p.291). Therefore, as Harvey put forward that “Society comes to be viewed as a set of structures in the process of continuous transformation” (Harvey, 1993, p.295). In Marx’s analysis, there is a certain relationship between subject and object by which "subject and object are to be seen not as entities but as relationships one to the other," and "the subject is thus regarded as both structuring and being structured by the object" (Harvey, 1993, p.297-8). In this vein, Harvey (1993, p.303) asked the question that “What kind of object or entity are we dealing with when we seek to investigate urbanism?” and responded that:

Urbanism has to be regarded as a set of social relationships which reflects the relationships established throughout society as a whole. Further, these relationships have to express the laws whereby urban phenomena are structured, regulated and constructed. We then have to consider whether urbanism is (1) a separate structure with its own laws of inner transformation and construction, or (2) the expression of a set of relationships embedded in some broader structure (such as the social relations of production). If we assert the former, then we are obliged to identify the transformation laws internal to urbanism and the semi-autonomous processes that structure it as well

as the relationship which urbanism bears to other structures in the totality. If we take the second view then we have to establish the process through which urbanism is derived out of other structures (Harvey, 1993, p.304).

Furthermore, Harvey combined the two dimensions of space and time as absolute, relative, and relational on the one dimension and, extracted from Lefebvre's abstractions, experienced, conceptualized, and lived on the second dimension (Harvey, 2008, p. 99). In the first dimension, absolute space is described as fixed, pre-existing, immovable, and distinct from time enabling calculation being the "exclusionary space of private property in land and other bounded territorial destinations" from a social standpoint (Harvey, 2008, p.99). Relative space is mostly a space of processes and motion and assumed that time and space cannot be separated while the standpoint of the observer plays crucial role (Harvey, 2008, p.100). Relational space implies the internalization of space-time, and it provides an opportunity to understand an event or a thing at a specific time-space as a process (time and space in dialectic) (Harvey, 2008, p.101-2). These conceptualization of space as absolute, relative and relational are not exclusive and can be seen in a relational perspective as Harvey (1993, p.13-14) pointed out and explained it as follows:

... it can become one or all simultaneously depending on the circumstances. The problem of the proper conceptualization of space is resolved through human practice with respect to it. In other words, there are no philosophical answers to philosophical questions that arise over the nature of space-the answers lie in human practice. The question "what is space?" is therefore replaced by the question "how is it that different human practices create and make use of distinctive conceptualizations of space?" The property relationship, for example, creates absolute spaces within which monopoly control can operate. The movement of people, goods, services and information takes place in a relative space because it takes money, time, energy, and the like, to overcome the friction of distance. Parcels of land also capture benefits because they contain relationships with other parcels; the forces of demographic, market and retail potential are real enough within an urban system and in the form of rent relational space comes into its own as an important aspect of human social practice. An understanding of urbanism and of the social-process-spatial-form theme requires that we understand how human activity creates the need for specific spatial concepts and how daily social practice solves with consummate ease seemingly deep philosophical mysteries concerning the nature of space and the relationships between social processes and spatial forms.

In this regard, as Harvey indicated that "the dialectics of space and time entails keeping all three conceptions of absolute, relative and relational in dialectical tension with each other" (Harvey, 2008, p.104). Moreover, Lefebvre (1991 as cited in Harvey, 2008,

p.104) provided a tripartite division which are “material space (the space of experience and of perception open to physical touch and sensation); the representation of space (space as conceived and represented); and spaces of representation (the lived space of sensations, the imagination, emotions and meanings incorporated into how we live day by day).”First, material space represents the physical space; second, the representation of space signifies abstract forms such as words, graphs, maps, geometry etc.; and third, spaces of representations indicate “the way we humans live – physically, affectively and emotionally – in the world”(Harvey, 2008, p.104-105). Thus, he proposed that “we experience space, conceptualize and represent space and live space” and they are in dialectical relationship with each other not in hierarchical (Harvey, 2008, p.105). Harvey (2008, p.111) exemplified it by referring his discussion on Marx’s abstractions and explanations as follows:

In the first chapter of *Capital*, Marx introduces three key concepts of use value, exchange value and value. Everything that pertains to use value lies in the province of absolute space and time. Individual workers, machines, commodities, factories, roads, houses and actual labor processes, expenditures of energy and the like can all be individuated, described and understood in themselves within the Newtonian frame of absolute space and time. Everything that pertains to exchange value lies in relative space-time because exchange entails movements of commodities, money, capital, labor power and people over time and space. It is the circulation, the perpetual motion, that counts. ... The circulation and accumulation of capital occurs, in short, in relative space-time. Value is, however, a relational concept. Its referent is, therefore, relational spacetime. Value, Marx states (somewhat surprisingly), is immaterial but objective. ‘Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values’ (1976, 138; see also 167). As a consequence, value does not ‘stalk about with a label describing what it is’ but hides its relationality within the fetishism of commodities (1976, 165–77). The only way we can approach it is via that peculiar world in which material relations are established between people (we relate to each other via what we produce and trade) and social relations are constructed between things (prices are set for what we produce and trade). Values are, in short, social relations and these are always immaterial but objective.

Subjects or issues that a historical geographical materialism deals with are “questions of scale, uneven development, mobility and fixity, demonstrating the difference that they make to state forms and practices” since “the state is clearly of central significance to the reproduction of capitalist production relations” (Cox, 2020, p.82). In fact, since the need for the state as a social relation and as an entity ensuring the maintenance and accomplishment of circuits of capital for the reproduction of the total capitalist social relations is crucial, the state locates itself “(1) seemingly above the competitive fray as it affects the sphere of commodity exchange; and (2) seemingly above the tensions

of class conflict in the sphere of production” (Cox, 2020, p.83). It fulfills functions such as regulating banks and controlling money supply, dictating prices to private landowners, regulate prices in the provision of public services (electricity, gas and rail transport), introducing minimum wages, unemployment compensation and pensions for facilitating consumption (Cox, 2020, p.83-4). Thus, as much as “the state is subordinated to the capitalist accumulation process” (Cox, 2020, p.85), it serves for the broader interests of capital rather than workers.

As Soja and Hadjimichalis recommended that “the materialist dialectic applied to history remains incomplete without the simultaneous development of a spatial or geographical materialism as its necessary complement” because, as being the social product of human practices, the production of space is also “rooted in the mode of production and is shaped by the same contradictions between the forces and relations of production, between reproduction and transformation, that permeate all modes of production”(Soja & Hadjimichalis, 1979, p.4). Lefebvre discussed the process of reproduction at three levels, which are "a) bio-physiological reproduction, essentially within the context of family and kinship relations; b) reproduction of labor power (the working class) and the means of production; and c) production of the social relations of production," and the organization of space becomes predominately associated with the reproduction of the dominant social relations, while the reproduction of the dominant social relations themselves becomes the major basis for the survival of capitalism in advanced capitalism (Soja & Hadjimichalis, 1979, p.4-5). Therefore, according to Lefebvre, “machines, material commodities and the labor force were reproduced under specific social legislation (labor contracts, civil laws, technological agreements) and an oppressive state mechanism (police, the military, colonial administration)” (Soja & Hadjimichalis, 1979, p.7) through which the production of capitalist social order is guaranteed. In this vein, the two main dimensions that are attempted to be discussed in this study are the reproduction of labor force in terms of surveillance spaces and the production of urban security services.

At another level of analysis, significance of space should also be taken into consideration since spatial aspects of the production of security constitutes an integral part of state-security relationships. Establishing domination over space and securing

the re-production of existing capitalist social relations are dialectically determine each and distancing, appropriation and use of space, domination, and control of space and other. Harvey (1992) develops a matrix categorizing spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation in terms of different criteria such as accessibility and distancing, appropriation and use of space, domination, and control of space and the security-urban space continuum. It also helps us to analyze how domination and control over space established while social relations are controlled by certain social order mechanisms. First, as material spatial practices (experience) socio-spatial exclusion is main target to achieve social control through surveillance spaces.

Table 3. A 'grid' of spatial practices developed by Harvey in part inspired by Lefebvre (1974).

	Accessibility and distancing	Appropriation and use of space	Domination and control of space	Production of space
Material spatial practices (experience)	flows of goods, money, people labour power, information, etc.; transport and communications systems; market and urban hierarchies; agglomeration	land uses and built environments; social spaces and other 'turf' designations; social networks of communication and mutual aid	private property in land; state and administrative divisions of space; exclusive communities and neighbourhoods; exclusionary zoning and other forms of social control (policing and surveillance)	production of physical infrastructures (transport and communications; built environments; land clearance, etc.); territorial organization of social infrastructures (formal and informal)
Representations of space (perception)	social, psychological and physical measures of distance; map-making; theories of the 'friction of distance' (principle of least effort, social physics, range of a good, central place and other forms of location theory)	personal space; mental maps of occupied space; spatial hierarchies; symbolic representation of spaces; spatial , discourses'	forbidden spaces; 'territorial imperatives' ; community; regional culture; nationalism; geopolitics; hierarchies	new systems of mapping, visual representation, communication, etc.; new artistic and architectural 'discourses' ; semiotics.
Spaces of representation (imagination)	attraction/ repulsion; distance/ desire; access/ denial; transcendence 'medium is the message'.	familiarity; hearth and home; open places; places of popular spectacle (streets, squares, markets); iconography and graffiti; advertising	unfamiliarity; spaces of fear; property and possession; monumentality and constructed spaces of ritual; symbolic barriers and symbolic capital; construction of 'tradition'; spaces of repression	utopian plans; Imaginary landscapes; science fiction ontologies and space; artists' sketches; mythologies of space and place; poetics of space spaces of desire

Source: Harvey (1992, p.220-221).

Second, as representations of space (perception) forbidden spaces or dangerous places are territorially determined. Third, as spaces of representation (imagination) some urban places stigmatized as spaces of fear and spaces of repression while other spaces are protected by the private security guards against the dangerous other.

Therefore, it is one aim of this study to analyze the emergence process of the urban private security industry and its today's observable situation in Turkey empirically. Then, the potentialities within this empirical evidence are going to be critically analyzed and theoretically discussed. And the conceptualizations developed as concrete in thoughts are going to be discussed in their relation to empirical realities. To achieve these goals, urban is going to be taken both as determinant and determinate (in its realized and potential forms) to discuss dialectical formation of urban private security in neoliberal era. There is one significant thing that the readers should take in mind as the empirical evidence was collected from Ankara-Turkey case and conclusions may be misleading to explain other cases in developed capitalist countries. Hence, this study utilizes structural TimeSpace, episodic TimeSpace and cyclico-ideological TimeSpace rather than understanding arguments within this study as utilizing. In addition, empirical findings revealing the supply side of the urban security industry as being the strength of the arguments developed in this study could also be seen as its weakness. However, the assertive aspect of this study is to show how capitalism penetrates everyday life through different underlying generative mechanisms and how the logic of capital and production of surveillance spaces contributes to the formation and fragmentation of urban space by means of new capital-led and state-driven urban security practices after the 1980s, as in the three domains of reality in Bhaskarian terminology.

1.4. Outline of the Thesis

In this Introduction, after contextualizing the subject, the research problem was defined. For this purpose, the initial hypothesis and research questions were mentioned according to the objective of the study. This section has also included methodological discussions that are going to be considered while conducting the theoretical

discussions of the thesis and that guide the discussion of empirical research. In the Second Chapter of the study, three subsections are going to concentrate on the three research questions, which are: (i) How were the authority and power of the nation-state to use force conceptualized and discussed in different theoretical perspectives? (ii) Why and how were the authority and power of the nation-state to use force organized as police forces? (iii) Why and how does the production of urban space have an impact on the commodification and commercialization of policing services in the neoliberal era? To find possible answers to these questions, first, the relationship between state and its power to use force in different theoretical perspectives, such as Weberian, Marxists and Foucault's. Second, historical development of policing is going to be discussed both in Western experiences and in Turkey case until the neoliberal era. Finally, the relationship between urban space and security and more specifically commodification of urban policing practices is going to be discussed. In the Third Chapter of the study, three research questions are going to be discussed which are: (i) What have been the historical and political circumstances providing the basis for neoliberal authoritarian state practices in Turkey? (ii) How was the legal basis of urban private security created after 1980s in Turkey? and (iii) How has the market of private security been developed and revealed what features and problems exist in Turkey's experience? Hence, first, urban private security is defined as a mediation between state and capital and legal administrative aspects are going to be discussed. Second, urban private security, defined as a capital accumulation process, is going to be analyzed both in terms of economic indicators and qualitative data provided by in-depth interviews. Fourth Chapter of the thesis is going to ask three research questions which are (i) How has urban private security been territorialized in Ankara, Turkey? (ii) How and to what extent have urban private security services been fulfilling the task of surveillance in Ankara? and (iii) What kind of socio-spatial divisions produced and reproduced at urban scale by commodification of urban security services? Therefore, surveillance practices as a preventive policing measure, practices of private security guards, spatial distribution of private security services in Ankara case are going to be at the center of the discussions. In Chapters 3 and 4, the abstracted analysis of state and coercion is transformed into an explanation of changing relations and production of security services materialized in the case of Ankara, Turkey, to reveal how these transformations in the coercive functions of the state and its spatial

organization contribute to the reproduction of capitalist social relations and self-referentiality through privately provided security services at urban scale. In the Fifth Chapter of the thesis, there is going to be a general overview of the main arguments of the study and discussions, as well as explanations of the limitations of the thesis and suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Coercion and the Nation-State

To understand how security is produced and exercised by the nation-state institutions is an important step towards the discussion on urban private security. Historically, establishing control over coercive instruments and practicing physical force have strong relationships with the organization of social production relations. The ones in power in production relations determine the ownership of non-economic coercion. For instance, the use of physical force and non-economic coercion was the fundamental aspect of feudal society and in the dissolution process of feudal production relations, non-economic coercion contributed to the primitive formation of capital while the fundamental coercive force has still been the economic.

Although the use of physical force is not one of the basic aspects of capitalist societies, control over it and the use of it for capital accumulation process by accumulation by dispossession and production of capitalist social order have been remained as main concerns for the sake of its re-production. In this section, debates on the state, its formation in capitalist societies and different approaches on the relationship between the state and non-economic coercion in the form of physical violence – referred as legitimate violence are going to be analyzed. Therefore, organization of internal security as a state-building process, authoritarian statism, governmentality, territoriality, and surveillance are going to be main theoretical issues. The conceptual references mentioned above are inevitably being selective, concentrated more on main theoretical approaches in the literature and leaving aside some others.

2.1.1. On Legitimacy, Coercion, and the State Power

In a related mainstream literature, discussions made on security and states are generally based on Max Weber's definition of the state and his emphasis on the legitimacy and violence. The state is defined according to the functional aspects of the production of security, specifically on bureaucratic organization and its relations in nation-building process whether in its direct use of force or indirectly imposed on society by various social and administrative mechanisms. Hence, this part of the study is dedicated to clarifying Weberian approaches to the state and legitimate use of force and its importance for the formation process of the state power. In his discussions on the sociological aspects of the state, Weber (1946, p.78) defined it as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state". Hence, there are two significant aspects of Weberian conceptualization of the state which are "use of legitimate physical force" and "territory". Sovereign power of the state is stemming from its established territorial order and this territorial order, in turn, re-produced by means of some administrative techniques and institutions such as police or army forces. For Weber, with its original position within all organizations, the state stands out as a meta-organization that regulates the entire at the top and the state's legitimacy and regulatory power stem from its legitimate monopoly on violence (Şengül, 2012, p.46). Establishment and maintenance of internal social order requires some sort of control over spaces and relations occurring within these spaces due to the centrality of social order in capitalist relations of production hiding different forms of exploitation within itself.

Furthermore, Weber's conceptualization on the state is seen as being the proof of monopolization of the coercive functions in the hands of state forces. Notwithstanding, second part of the Weber's definition is not cited as the ones emphasizing legitimate use of physical force. Weber's arguments were not only authorized the state and its institutions for exercising legitimate physical force but rather he had given the power of announcing or authorizing legitimate users of physical force. Weber clearly stated that "the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only 'to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source

of the 'right' to use violence” (Weber, 1946, p.78). As Loader and Walker (2001, p.12) indicated that “two somewhat different these inscribed within this account. The strong version of the argument holds that only the state has the right to deliver legitimate violence; a weaker variant views the state as the sole regulator of such violence”. The latter provided fertile ground for the discussions of plural policing, nodal governance of policing or commercialization of policing regulated by the institutions of the state. Therefore, the right of monopoly of the use of physical force cannot be evaluated as it can only be exercised by the state, rather, Weber’s arguments emphasized the other side of the coin and permitting or authorizing the use of physical force to other institutions and organizations. When the relationship between the state and use of physical force put it in this way, then, there emerges a possibility to discuss the role of the state in organization of security functions in each society rather than concentrating on the uniqueness of the role of state institutions in service provision.

Following the Weber’s definition of the state as enjoying the monopoly of the use legitimate physical force, Charles Tilly’s (1990) discussions on state-formation processes try to establish some sort of relationship between states and cities on the one hand, and coercion and capital on the other hand. In a process of state-building process, the role of force, coercion, security etc. is argued as being one of the determiner aspects of its formation in relation to other contemporary rival states both in terms of its territorial sovereignty and capital formation processes in Europe. Besides, as Tilly (1990, p.16) argued that “wielders of coercion, who played the major part in the creation of national states, drew for their own purposes on manipulators of capital, whose activities generated cities”, the role of cities is seen as central elements relationally determine the formation processes of different states. Hence, development of cities is seen as a derivative of their ties with the accumulation and concentration process of capital which in turn determines urban growth and conditions for production and reproduction relations.

In addition, production process of states determined by the accumulation and concentration of coercive means and these states fabricates distinct organizational units for exercising power within a well defines territories (Tilly, 1990, p.19). Since Tilly’s conceptualization of states based on Weberian definition of the state, he claims

that coercive and territorial aspects of states are formative in terms of being sovereign power and defeating rivalries. Therefore, it can be argued that the state is something out and above all social class struggles and can be manipulated for the interests of different social groups in Tilly's conceptualization. He states that "Demands major classes made on the state, and the influence of those classes over the state, varied correspondingly" (1990, p.28). Thus, though his arguments are based on historical facts and developments, assertions on the state and its formation as an entity is ahistorical because he treated the state as not a product of historical struggles among different social classes but objective social entity whose growth determine by the accumulation and concentration of coercive means. As a result, there are two fundamental aspects of Tilly's arguments, on the one hand, the relationship with the growth of cities and accumulation and concentration of capital and on the other hand, the growth of states and accumulation and concentration of coercive means (1990, p.17-20).

In his discussions on the relationship between the warfare and organizations of states, Tilly defined four historical segments for European experience since AD 900 which are (i) patrimonialism (up to 15th in much of Europe), (ii) brokerage (roughly 1400-1700 in important parts of Europe), (iii) nationalization (especially 1700-1850 in much of Europe) and (iv) professionalization (from mid-19th century to the recent past). For the discussions made in this study, the last phase defined as professionalization is significant. Components and characteristics of this age are stated as such; (a) military has become a powerful specialized branch of national government, (b) fiscal activities separated from military ones, (c) deepened division of labor between armies and police forces was institutionalized, military expenditures opened to the influences of representative institutions, and (d) distributive, regulatory, compensatory, and adjudicative functions of states enlarged (Tilly, 1990, p.29).

Therefore, according to Tilly (1990, pp. 108-119), most of the states in Europe depends on indirect rule arisen from "local level, relying especially on priests and nobles for mediation" before the last two ages called as nationalization and professionalization, whereas after the French Revolution, indirect rule of states turned into direct rule and entailing changes in systems of taxation, justice and public works and policing, for

instance, turned into proactive from reactive policing and selective information-gathering to prevent rebellions or collective violations of law. Before the professionalization of coercive instruments as police forces, policing was regarded as “public management, especially at the local level; relation of the food supply was its single largest component”.




Figure 1. Tilly's Relations among Coercion, Capital, States and Cities.
Source: Tilly (1990, p.27).

Civilization of government was the product of the state formation process, although this process was determined by the expansion of military forces. Increasing power of civilians over military forces was conditioned by the geographical necessities for ruling across large territories since the spatial distribution of state and military activities differs and encourages the creation of separate organizational units such as armies, located in places where international strategy dictates, and police forces, geographically approximated to the areas where the civilian population concentrated in. As a result of this civilization process, urban police performing policing activities “crisscross dominated by public spaces and having valuable property within reach of that public space” whereas military forces organized as gendarmes dealing with territories “in which private property occupies most of the space, and therefore spend most of their time patrolling communication lines and responding to calls from civilians” (Tilly, 1990, p.122-126). Hence, police forces are organized to maintain public order at urban scale whereas the gendarmerie forces at rural areas. The police institution serves as a modern urban symbol of the lawful power of the state. The question of whether private security guards are taking the place of the public police in the urban security sector will be attempted to be answered in the subsequent sections of this thesis.

In his study on the power of the state, Michael Mann claimed that the state should be understood as “an arena, a place, and yet this is the very source of its autonomy” (1984, p.187). Thus, as being a central element of what a society is strength of states determined by the level of their territorialization and centralization contributing its autonomous power. Following Weberian state conceptualization, he asserts that states have two fundamental features: being a place and enjoying autonomous power. This autonomous power of the state emerges out of its success to accomplish the establishment of “a *territorially-centralized* form of organization” (Mann, 1984, p.185). Therefore, discussing state power, Mann tries to crystallize institutional and functional dimensions of state extracted from different theories of state and develops his own conceptual tools as asserting that there are two meanings of state power: despotic power and infrastructural power (Mann, 1984, p. 187-189). His thesis claims that the power of state is arisen from these two fundamental sources which determine the degree of its institutionalization within the civil society and its coercive characteristics. The despotic power of the state defined as “the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups” (Mann, 1984, p.188), whereas the infrastructural one refers to “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann, 1984, p.189). According to Mann, states in the capitalist democracies, as organized in a nation-state form, are “despotically weak but infrastructurally strong”, thus, despotic power of state as a practice of exercising the power of state over civil society is weaker than infrastructural power of state as practice of penetrating into and coordinating centrally activities of civil society (Mann, 1984, p.185-212).

Like Weberian ideal types as typological abstractions, Mann argued that there can be defined four ideal types according to the differentiations in the degree of two meanings of state power in different state formations in history. First one is the feudal state and being “the weakest, for it has both low despotic and low infrastructural power”; second one is the imperial state “possesses its own governing agents, but has only limited capacity to penetrate and co-ordinate civil society without the assistance of other power groups”; third is the bureaucratic state which “has a high organizational capacity, yet cannot set its own goals ; ... controlled by others, civil society groups,

but their decisions once taken are enforceable through the state's infrastructure"; and fourth one is the authoritarian "having high despotic power over civil society groups and being able to enforce this infrastructurally"(Mann, 1984, p.191). Though these are ideal types and exaggeration of objective realities unidirectionally, as in the fabrication of the nation-states in capitalist societies revealing professionalized and bureaucratized state forms revealed, the nations-states tend to increase their infrastructural co-ordination power in comparison to the despotic power.




Figure 2. Two Dimensions of State Power
Source: Mann (1984, p.191).

In addition, it is asserted that the infrastructural power of the state is determined by the penetration of different logistical techniques into everyday life of societies which are classified as (a) division of labor between centrally coordinated activities of state, (b) literacy allowing the stabilized systems of communication throughout its territory and the codification and storage of legal responsibilities, (c) coinage, weights and measures ensured by the value system of the state enabling exchange of commodities and (d) infrastructural investments such as roads, ships, telegraphy etc. providing necessary conditions for rapidity of communication, transport of people and resources (Mann, 1984, p.192). However, these techniques are the products of social and economic developments of societies in specific historical circumstances. Therefore, their impacts on social relations and the infrastructural power of the state are not naturally defined way but rather because of historical struggles. Mann put it in another way and claimed that different techniques of power revealed three basic features which are military, economic, and ideological and like other techniques these are characteristics of all social relationships, but the state uses them and does not add any other means for itself (1984, p.193).

Furthermore, as Mann (1984, p.194-198) believes that infrastructural power is one of the main characteristics of civil society and appropriated by the state, he tries to establish dialectical relationship between “the necessity of the state, its multiplicity of functions, and its territorialized centrality” (p.194). Firstly, it is argued that there are no societies except primitive ones and all civilized and complex societies are governed by binding rule-making authorities (p.195). Thus, the existence of the state was presented as an inevitable consequence of historical developments and a condition for being civilized society. Second dimension is the multiplicity of state functions associated with four dominant types of state activities which are (i) “the maintenance of internal order” providing benefits to secure existing property relations from the mass of property-less; (ii) “military defense/aggression directed against foreign foes and the former may be collective whereas the latter for specific interests; (iii) “the maintenance of communication infrastructures” for the sake of general interest but particularly for the interests of trade-centered groups and “economic redistribution” determined by the interests of economically active social groups through the authoritative distribution of scarce material resources between different social groups (Mann, 1984, 1984, p.196-197). Thirdly, territorial centrality of the state is one of the fundamental aspects the definition of the state since “the power of the state is irreducible in quite a different socio-spatial and organizational sense” and the state is the only entity “inherently centralized over a delimited territory over which it has authoritative power”. The state, as asserted by Mann, “is, indeed, a place—both a central place and a unified territorial reach” (Mann, 1984, p.198).

As a result, reading Mann within the context of infrastructural and despotic state power provides a basis for understanding and debating neoliberal authoritarian practices, where urban security services is provided by private security firms and state authority has become authoritarian. Besides, considering the spatial expansion of private security services to the urban scale, the capital mediated penetration of "infrastructural power of state" to urban spaces via surveillance spaces should also be seen as another significant aspects of the neoliberal urban security regime.

As being the part of his critique of historical materialism, Anthony Giddens (1989) discussed the role and importance of violence for states ranging from the traditional to

the nation-state in general and the formation and the functioning of nation-states in modern societies. For Giddens, there are four ‘institutional clustering’ associated with modernity which are (i) heightened surveillance, (ii) capitalistic enterprise, (iii) industrial production and (iv) the consolidation of centralized control of the means of violence (Giddens, 1989, p.5). In his study, first and fourth aspects of modern nation-states were discussed in detail. It is asserted that collection and storage of knowledge to coordinate subject populations are as important as the development of material production related with the foundation of both traditional states and nation-states (Giddens, 1989, p.2). Hence, establishing control over information and people can be seen one of the fundamental aspects of nation-states since (i) storage of information plays a central role in “authoritative resources” enabling structuring of social systems in space and (ii) surveillance, as a way of “control of information and the superintendence of the activities of some groups by others” contributes to the expansion of authoritative resources (Giddens, 1989, p.2).

In addition, power is defined as a transformative capacity referring to “the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them” and agents in each social systems should have resources, which can be differentiated as allocative and authoritative resources depending on the management of time-space relations, to alter events and to achieve their ends. Rather than applying power as a sanction of force, running silently through the repetition of institutionalized practices is preferable for fabricating domination expressed in and through institutions embedded in regularity of social life. Therefore, exercising power is determined by the degree of penetration of power into social practices revealing itself as an indispensable part of it. Internalization of power depends on the strategies of control determined by the form of domination (Giddens, 1989, p.7-10).

Giddens (1989, p.12-13) stated that establishing domination requires taking control of time-space and of locales, rather than of places, referring to “the settings of interaction, including the physical aspects of setting — their ‘architecture’ — within which systemic aspects of interaction and social relations are concentrated” and “internally regionalized settings of very wide time-space extension, from cities to nation states and beyond”. Giddens (1989, p.13-14) argues that:

Certain types of locale form ‘power containers’ — circumscribed arenas for the generation of administrative power. A locale is a power container in so far as it permits a concentration of allocative and authoritative resources. In what I shall call class-divided societies, castles, manorial estates — but above all cities — are containers for the generation of power. In the modern world, the administrative settings of organizations — business firms, schools, universities, hospitals, prisons, etc. — are centres for the concentration of resources. But the modern state, as nation-state, becomes in many respects the pre-eminent form of power container, as a territorially bounded (although internally highly regionalized) administrative unity. Power containers generate power, as has been mentioned, first and foremost through the concentration of allocative and administrative resources. The generation of allocative resources is, of course, influenced directly by forms of available technology in any society, but the level of their concentration depends primarily upon factors creating authoritative resources.

As being a power container, the nation-state enjoying the power of direct and indirect surveillance involving processes of urban transformation and the internal pacification (Giddens, 1989, p.120). Thus, mobilization of administrative power by surveillance is seen as “the primary means of the concentration of authoritative resources involved in the formation of the nation-state” (Giddens, 1989, p.181). Factors creating authoritative resources were classified as such; (i) “possibilities of surveillance¹⁷ that settings of various kinds allow”, (ii) “possibilities of assembling, within definite settings, large numbers of individuals who do not spend most of their daily activity involved in direct material production”, (iii) facilitating of the scope and intensity of sanctions, above all the development of military power¹⁸“and (iv) “creation of certain conditions that influence the formation of ideology”(Giddens, 1989, p.14-17).

¹⁷ According to Giddens, ‘Surveillance’ refers to two related sorts of phenomena. One is the accumulation of ‘coded information’, which can be used to administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered. It is not just the collection of information, but its storage that is important here... The other sense of surveillance is that of the direct supervision of the activities of some individuals by others in positions of authority over them. The concentration of activities within clearly bounded settings greatly enlarges the degree to which those activities can be ‘watched over’, and thus controlled, by superordinates (Giddens, 1989, p.14). ... “But only in cities could direct and regular surveillance be maintained by the central agencies of the state, and then with a low degree of success compared with modern organizations. In modern organizations, either large segments of the daily lives of social actors (as in factories or offices), or substantial periods of their lives in a more ‘total’ setting (as in prisons, or asylums) can be subject to more-or-less continuous surveillance” (p.15).

¹⁸ Giddens stated that “There are two locales of overwhelming significance here, or so I shall argue — the city in class-divided societies and, in modern societies, the nation-state ... It will be part of my main thesis later in this book, however, that in many modern organizations — in contra distinction to what was the case in class-divided societies — the sanction of the use of violence is quite indirect and attenuated. Moreover, military power on the whole tends to become rather clearly distinct from policing power, the one turned ‘externally’, the other pointed ‘internally’” (p.16).

Centralized control of the means of violence was not one of the main characteristics of states in traditional societies. As a result of deprivation of the states in their direct administration capacity throughout their own territories, there was always “fluctuating tension between centralized control of the means of violence and decentralized military power wielded by local warlords or various sorts of insurrectionary leaders” (Giddens, 1989, p.57-58). Therefore, claiming the monopoly over the means of violence within their territories was common to all traditional states but it is only nation-states succeeded in ensuring the “internal pacification” (Giddens, 1989, p.120). This process of internal pacification can be seen as “an inherent part of the expanding administrative co-ordination which marks the transition from the absolutist state to the nation-state” (Giddens, 1989, p.160). Separation of the police forces from the military ones was the product of an array of historical developments in the organizational form of the state. Thus, on the one hand, “the army is not the main basis of the preservation of internal order in absolutist states for the first time in history’ and, on the other hand, “the existence of large standing armies and the progression of internal pacification are complementary expressions of the concentration of the administrative resources of the state” (Giddens, 1989, p.113). The material basis of the withdrawal of the army from internal security production processes was fabricated by the eradication of means of violence and its use from the labor contract being a major feature of the separation of economic and the political in capitalist societies (Giddens, 1989, p.190-191). The withdrawal of the military from direct internal security production process revealed that industrial capitalism in 19th century produced internal-external division of labor between armed forces of the state through which the expansion of surveillance capabilities and internal pacification ensured by police forces (p.192). Similarly, private provision of urban security services can be seen as the next step for the internal pacification because urban surveillance spaces are under the gaze of surveillance cameras and private security guards determining the limits of social behavior and drawing the boundaries for appropriate social behavior that should be approved.

2.1.2. Marxist¹⁹ Approaches to the State and Non-Economic Coercion

In this part, the relationship between the state and the use of force or non-economic coercion are going to be discussed by referring selected Marxist thinkers such as Engels, Althusser, Poulantzas, Hirsch and Neocleous. To begin with, one of the significant parts of Engels' (1987) discussions on political economy was titled as *Theory of Force* providing a critique of the role of force in history and claimed that it is not a main determinant but the function of broader property and production relations. At the beginning, Engels cited two long paragraphs from Duhring's studies to distance himself from Duhring's arguments emphasizing the priority of direct political force instead of indirect economic power (Engels, 1987, p.146) and claimed that "... force is only the means, and that the aim on the contrary, is economic advantage" (Engels, 1987, p.146-8). Critically evaluating Duhring's examples on Robinson Crusoe and Friday, he asserted that social relations of production provided the basis of relationship between Crusoe and Friday rather than vice versa. Hence, he stated that "before slavery becomes possible, a certain level of production must already have been reached and a certain inequality of distribution must already have appeared" (Engels, 1987, p.148). Moreover, rather than being a priori social phenomena, emergence of private property is also questioned by Engels in terms of its relationship with coercion. According to him, private property developed into the form of commodities in a community where barter for foreigners started and force played no part because it does have a power to change possession but not have a power to produce or to create private property (Engels, 1987, p.149-150). Main concern of Engels was to show that "always and everywhere it is the economic conditions and the instruments of economic power which help "force" to victory, without which force ceases to be force" (Engels, 1987, p.159). Thus, the precondition of the force to be used by the state is the degree of the development level of production relations in each historical circumstance. If these conditions do not contribute to the necessary conditions for the use of force, the existence of coercive means does not enough to provide material basis to use it. In his

¹⁹ Neocleous (2000, p.6), stated that: "...Marx ... will assert the struggles within civil society as the driving force of history, Marx at times makes use of Hegel's insight into the nature of state power. 'Police' is read as the fundamental political precondition of civil society, the political guarantee of property which, for the bourgeois, is more effective than force."

discussions on army as a coercive force of the state, Engels stated that without the money accumulated by the economic production, necessary equipment, and maintenance of the instruments of force could not be provided and dependency level of the army and navy to the economic prerequisites is the highest when compared to the others (Engels, 1987, p.154).

To sum up, according to Engels, the role of force in history depends on the development level of productive forces and any transformations in each society is conditioned by them. Thus, the power of the state is not arisen out of concentration and strength of the physical force, rather, it is determined by economic production relations as being the derivative of it. When there emerged some sort of mismatch or conflict between the power of the state and economic development, social transformations are inevitable. Engels (1987, p.170-171) criticized Dühring's arguments claiming force being a productive historical force and he gave the example of the French Revolution and stated that:

If, in accordance with Herr Dühring's theory, the economic situation and with it the economic structure of a given country were dependent simply on political force, it is absolutely impossible to understand why Frederick William IV after 1848 could not succeed, in spite of his "magnificent army, ingrafting the mediaeval guilds and other romantic oddities on to the railways, the steam-engines and the large-scale industry which was just then developing in his country; or why the tsar of Russia, who is possessed of even much more forcible means, is not only unable to pay his debts, but cannot even maintain his "force" without continually borrowing from the "economic situation" of Western Europe.

As a result, rather than being productive, the role of force in history is supplementary to institutionalization of economic relations and socio-political developments. And it would be wrong to claim that non-economic coercion is as productive as the economic coercion for the (re)production of capitalist social relations.

Furthermore, Gramsci (1992, [1971], p.244) argued that “the State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” and analyzed the role of force in terms of its significance in the production of hegemony as being conceptualized by a combination of force and consent. He pointed out that “The "normal" exercise of hegemony on the now classic

terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by a combination of force and consent” (Gramsci, 1992 [1975], p.155-156). In this vein, Jessop (2019a, p.121) stated that:

Gramsci identified two main modes of class domination: force and hegemony. Force involves the use of a coercive apparatus to bring the mass of people into conformity and compliance with the demands of a specific mode of production. It can be employed by private groups (for example, fascist squads) as well as state organs, and its mobilization and impact depend on economic and ideological factors as well as police and military considerations. Hegemony involves the creation and reproduction of the ‘active consent’ of dominated groups by the ruling class through their exercise of political, intellectual and moral leadership. The ruling class must take systematic account of popular interests and demands; shift position and make compromises on secondary issues to maintain support in an inherently unstable and fragile system of political relations (without, however, sacrificing essential interests); and organize this support to attain ‘national’ goals that also serve the fundamental long-term interests of the dominant class. Just as the moment of force is institutionalized in an array of coercive apparatuses, hegemony is crystallized and mediated through a series of ideological apparatuses dispersed throughout the social formation.

Gramsci identified two major superstructural levels: civil society (being the collection of organisms referred to as private) and political society or the state, and with regard to the role of the state, it exercises legal power over those groups not presenting consent either actively or passively to the system as a whole (Gramsci, 1992 [1971], p.12). Yet, as Gramsci put it, “the general notion of State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)” (Gramsci, 1992 [1971], p.263). In this regard, a hegemony-centered approach to power allows us to overcome the messy duality of power that manifests itself everywhere with centralized power finding expression in the state (Şengül, 2012, p.52). Thus, it is argued that “the State represents the coercive and punitive force of juridical regulation of a country” and “the basis for the State in the narrow sense of the governmental-coercive apparatus” (Gramsci, 1992 [1971], p.264-267). In this vein, Gramsci (1992 [1975], asked the question that “What is the police?” and responded it as follows:

It certainly is not just that particular official organization which is juridically recognized and empowered to carry out the public function of public safety, as it is normally understood. This organism is the central and formally responsible nucleus of the "police," which is a much larger organization in which a large part of a state's population participates directly or indirectly through links that are more or less precise and limited,

permanent or occasional, etc. The analysis of these relations much more than many philosophical juridical dissertations help one understand what the "state" is (Gramsci, 1992 [1975], p.361).

Although the state can be seen the organ of one particular group i.e. bourgeoisie, it is argued that “the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups-equilibria” (Gramsci, 1992 [1971], p.182). Therefore, the function of the state cannot be viewed as merely the organization of the ruling class; rather, it promotes itself as an objective institution seeking balance. In other words, Gramsci explained it with following words: “The State's function is to find a juridical settlement to internal class disputes, to clashes between opposed interests: thereby it unifies different groupings and gives the class a solid and united external appearance” (Gramsci, 1998 [1977], p.39-40). As Lefebvre suggested that “Although the state is born of the social division of labor, it ends up setting itself above society” (Lefebvre, 1968, p.154).

Furthermore, Althusser (2014) discussed the state power for analyzing main determinants of the capitalist social relations enabling the reproduction of capitalist system. Exploring the significance of ideology and the role of the state in production of ideology, the repressive state apparatuses were also questioned since “the state apparatuses, both repressive and ideological, intervene at the level of the reproduction of the relations of production (Althusser, 2014, p.155). He suggested that the possession of state power requires exercise of power over the state apparatuses being in two types which are the repressive (the government, administration, army, police, and specialized repressive corps: gendarmerie, courts, judiciary, prisons) and the ideological (in our social formations, scholastic, religious, familial, political, associative, cultural, the news and information apparatus) (Althusser, 2014, p.92).

Since the reproduction of capitalism depends on the state practices and activities, repressive functions of the state ensured necessary conditions through its preventive organizational forms such as courts, fines, prisons, and the various detachments of the police (Althusser, 2014, p.65-66). These preventive forms, however, are not regarded as formative instruments but rather they are in a supplementary relationship with

ideological state apparatuses. According to Althusser, Marxist arguments on the state emphasized four dimensions which are “the state is the (repressive) state apparatus”; “state power and state apparatus must be distinguished”; “the objective of the class struggle has to do with the possession of state power...; and “the proletariat must seize state power in order to destroy the existing bourgeois state apparatus” (Althusser, 2014, p.74). Providing main characteristics of the state in Marxist theory of the state, he asserted that there is a need to separate the ideological from the repressive apparatuses of the state. Then, there emerges the question of which one is more important for Althusser or put it another way which one have priority over the other one in determination of the reproduction of capitalist social relations. He put forward that the basic difference is that “the Repressive State Apparatus functions 'by violence', whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses' function 'by ideology’“(Althusser, 2014, p.244). It is substantiated by historical experiences as such:

The army and police, for instance: internally, they train their own recruits both by repression and ideological inculcation; externally, they act by violent repression, but also by 'discussion' and 'persuasion'. The latter watchwords appear black on white in the circulars issued by police chiefs and army generals possessed of a modicum of good sense. In May 1968, Mr Grimaud, the Paris police chief, 'conducted discussions' in person with the 'wild ones' during the battles in the Place Maubert. The army and police also operate with the help of their own 'ideological aura' ('Join the Army and learn a trade! ') and the prestige of their uniforms ('Join the riot police and you'll stand guard over the beaches!'), and so on (Althusser, 2014, p.85-86).

Moreover, there is also the need for formation of special means of force to organize everyday social practices. Hence, police forces and armies fulfilling the function as necessary means for ensuring the social relations of reproduction. The police are organized as “specialized repressive units (riot police, mobile security forces, and so on), as well as its repressive apparatus 'of last resort’” and the army is organized as “an organization of hundreds of thousands of people marshalled in the infantry, armored divisions, air force, and navy” (Althusser, 2014, p.108). Also, in terms of functional division of labor, these repressive apparatuses provide services such as “preventing infractions, apprehending offenders, and applying material sanctions after judgements” (Althusser, 2014, p.203).

In addition, Althusser claimed that once the state ideology is determined by the politics of dominant class, the distinction between public and private lost its importance

because both are accepted as component parts of determinate Ideological State Apparatuses and both private and public institutions contribute to the system called the State Ideology (2014, p.81). Therefore, guaranteeing the unity of the system could only be possible through the fabrication of the unity of class in power whose main objective is to ensure the conditions for exploitation providing material basis of relations of production (Althusser, 2014, p.93). It is defended that primary determinant in the last instance is exploitation emerged out of capitalist relations of production rather than repression which is determined and secondary being in the form of Repressive State apparatuses both in direct (the police, army, courts, and so on) and indirect (the administration) forms (Althusser, 2014, p.126).

To sum up, according to Althusser (2014, p.247), there are some fundamental characteristics of the state apparatuses. First, both repressive and ideological state apparatuses function through repression and ideology but the former predominantly based on repressive practices whereas the latter based on ideological. Secondly, the repressive state apparatus is centrally organized according to the unity of command mediated through the political representatives of the ruling class in state power while the ideological apparatuses are enjoying relative autonomy and revealing multiple and distinct features providing basis for class struggles. Thirdly, the unity of the repressive state apparatus is ensured by the leadership of the representatives of the class in power by means of unified and centralized organization while the unity of the ideological state apparatuses is guaranteed by the ruling ideology or the ideology of the ruling class in conflictual forms.

In his book called *State, Power, Socialism*, Poulantzas (2000) argued about the power of the state referring to the developments in France and Europe during 1970s. He specifically discussed the authoritarian characteristics of the capitalist state abstracting historical and social realities representing increasing coercive forms of the interventions made by the capitalist state. First of all, following Althusserian conceptualizations, it is asserted that the unity of the state ensured by the totality of apparatuses including the repressive ones such as military or police and in organization and unification of the interests of bourgeoisie and power bloc, the state enjoys relative autonomy being the constitutive of the capitalist state referring separation of the state

from relations of production providing basis for class struggle over it (Poulantzas, 2000, p.127). Suggesting that, methodologically, the state can be regarded as a Thing implying the instrumentalist view of the state as being a passive and even neutral tool manipulated one class or class fractions and as a Subject underlying an absolute autonomy as being a rationalizing instance of civil society originated from Hegel and taken up by Weber; Poulantzas stated that “the State is not purely and simply a relationship, or the condensation of a relationship; it is the specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions”(Poulantzas, 2000, p.129). Nevertheless, his theoretical approach reproducing Hegelian-Weberian state in terms of the roles attributed to the state in the formation of relations of production as being rationalized institution intervening social relations. Clarke (1991a) argued that Poulantzas’s theoretical perspective on the state and its capitalist characteristics are criticized as suffering from structural-functionalism and reproducing bourgeoisie sociology in terms of the functional role of state and moreover, it is claimed that historical division between economics and politics is taken for granted by him resulting in the naturalization of capitalist social relations as evolutionary process.

In addition, the role of state in production and reproduction of capitalist social relations is twofold which are exercising organized physical repressive forces and organizing ideological relations and the dominant ideology being embedded in the state apparatuses since there is the need for legitimation and production of consensus among different social classes (Poulantzas, 2000, p.28). He suggests that “dominant ideology also enters into the organization of other apparatuses (army, police, judicial system, prisons, state administration) whose principal responsibility is the exercise of legitimate physical violence” (Poulantzas, 2000, p.29). The role of the state is to establish and maintain an unstable equilibrium between dominant and dominated classes within the society requiring idealist conception of power over the masses leading police conception of power internalizing repression (Poulantzas, 2000, p.30-31). These dual roles played by the state in production and reproduction of social relations lead to two consequences with regard to the state apparatuses which are (i) the exercise of power divided between the repressive and ideological state apparatuses reducing the specificity of economic state apparatuses and (ii) the functioning of certain

state apparatuses as purely repressive and/or ideological criticized by Poulantzas as being highly debatable since police or army can play ideological role as much as repressive role in a specific historical circumstances (Poulantzas, 2000, p.33-34).

Furthermore, analyzing the experience of the capitalist state in 1970s, Poulantzas specified it by naming as an authoritarian statism exercised through an “intensified state control over every sphere of socioeconomic life combined with radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called 'formal' liberties (Poulantzas, 2000, p.203-204). According to Jessop (2009, 7-8), the term authoritarian statism was used to characterize a particular stage in the evolution of the capitalist state under advanced capitalism; in this respect, it is potentially relevant to all stages of neoliberalization, particularly if the crisis-tendencies of this state form and their ties to other economic and political crisis-tendencies are considered. It is indicated that authoritarian statism depends upon structural adjustments in the relations of production and social division of labor and can be practiced in different geographical locations in different forms (Poulantzas, 2000, p.204). Poulantzas (2000, p.205) asserted that this form of the state is a response to the political crisis and the crisis of the State and increasing economic role of the state conditioned by its authoritarian interventions. He claimed that political control over the state bureaucracy increases whereas the presidential control over it strengthened at the same time (Poulantzas, 2000, p.224). Therefore, it is a distinct form of totalitarianism and intersects the official State in the day-to-day functioning and exercise of power exemplified in the obscuring of each state branch or apparatus (army, police, judicial system, etc.) by dislocating formal and visible networks and by tight control provided by the Executive summits (Poulantzas, 2000, p.239). Jessop (2019a, p.125-126) summarized fundamental elements of “authoritarian statism” of Poulantzas as follows:

... first, a transfer of power from the legislature to the executive and the concentration of power within the latter; second, an accelerated fusion between the three branches of the state – legislature, executive and judiciary – accompanied by a decline in the rule of law (1973: 303–7, 310–15; 1975: 173; 1978: 222–5, 227–8); third, the concentration of power in prime ministerial or presidential offices, including their staffs (1973: 311–14; 1978: 221–28, 233, 238); fourth, the functional decline of political parties as the privileged interlocutors of the administration and the leading forces in organizing hegemony; fifth, the rise of a dominant ‘state’ party that acts as a political commissar at

the heart of the administration and ensures its subordination to the summits of the executive and transmits the authoritarian state ideology to the popular masses, thereby reinforcing the plebiscitary legitimation of the new state form (1978: 233–7); sixth, the growth of a reserve repressive parastate apparatus whose role is preemptive policing of popular struggles and other threats to bourgeois hegemony (1978: 210, 212); and seventh, the growth of parallel networks that crosscut the formal organization of the state and exercise a decisive share in its activities (1978: 217–31). Poulantzas also argued that certain ‘exceptional’ features develop alongside the normal elements of this regime in response to the permanent instability of bourgeois hegemony and the general intensification of the inherent tendencies towards political and state crisis.

Accordingly, increasing preemptive surveillance and policing, emergency measures and the decline of rule of law signifies the development of authoritarian statism as a response to political, economic and security crises which the neoliberal states unable to manage (Jessop, 2015, p.14-15). Yet, Bruff claimed that the rise of authoritarian statism was neither “predetermined, eternal, or universal”, according to Poulantzas; indeed, “the state’s materiality, as the crystallization of various compromises between different social groups, inevitably renders as a multilinear, uneven, and contradictory process any attempted reshaping of the state’s social purpose” (Bruff, 2014, p.119). Also, according to Yalman (2021a, p.16), since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, attention has been focused on the connections between several crises that followed the capitalist West's 1970s crisis at both the global and nation-state levels and it is claimed that the experience of some nations of the global South in particular has taken an "authoritarian turn" with or without a "regime transition."

Determining the political structure during the ‘Fordist’ phase of capitalist development, Joachim Hirsch’s (1991, p.143) tries to decipher the regulatory and interventionist aspects of the state enabling a high degree of administrative regulation of the reproduction of labor. After World War II, regulatory practices of the nation-states for creating necessary conditions of the reproduction of labor force had gradually increased. Thus, Hirsch’s discussions on the role of the state in reproduction of capitalist social relations should be seen as products of this specific historical circumstance. Being a structural necessity rather than voluntaristic policy preferences for securing realization of capital, the welfare state and social security measures emerged out of class struggle and Fordist form of socialization. The regulatory character of the state had been institutionalized and replaced old social relations providing security to a certain degree. Former social relations based on the market and

traditional way of life disintegrated in this capitalist development process and started to be provided by bureaucratic control and regulation constructing the basis of the 'Fordist security state' being a security state in a double sense as ensuring the material survival of its members and their functional adjustment, regulation, social conditioning, and surveillance (Hirsch, 1991, p.146).

Furthermore, two aspects of the Fordist security states as welfare and surveillance, contributed to the development of productive forces and its penetration into all segments of society that allowing Hirsch to negate that Fordist security state cannot be defined properly by calling interventionist state or welfare state because state is not an external entity to a society rather it is a principal component of it (Hirsch, 1991, p.146-147). As a result of this line of thinking, Hirsch rejected the idea of state as a superstructural institution and argued that as a result of stratification of society, state has become a main constituent of the basis of social life itself and emerged as a 'security state' being a new form into particular classes and class fractions (Hirsch, 1991, p.148-9). As Jessop (2019a, p.131). pointed out that the state is "prepared to use force outside the framework of law to secure bourgeois rule whenever the proletariat threatens the foundations of the capitalist order. Freedom, equality, and the rule of law are only one side of bourgeois rule: its other side is *raison d'état*, class bias and open violence." Following the arguments of Poulantzas and the West German state derivation debate on the 'relative autonomy' and 'partialisation' of state apparatus which creates the general prerequisites of capitalist production and reproduction outside the spheres of competition and exploitation, Hirsch (1991, p.148-149) argued that a strong homogenization of state apparatus with the emergence of security state led to a diminishing relative autonomy of the particular organizations of the political system whereas security agencies gained power and become 'states within the state'. Notwithstanding, stratification of society produces the necessary conditions for the emergence of social movements endeavor to alter the existing capitalist social relations, thus, as Hirsch claimed that the security state is not as strong as it seems to be (Hirsch, 1991, p.155).

One of the most important contributions to the discussions on the relationship between social order and the state was made by Mark Neocleous. He has written a lot of articles

and books on the state and its coercive functions as policing, security, pacification etc.²⁰. Suggesting a Marxist state theory in his book called *Administering Civil Society* based on Hegelian ideas on the nature of the state and civil society, Neocleous (1996) argues that state power is central to social and political theory. According to his assertions, there is the need for developing an explanation of political administration being a mediation between state and civil society fabricated by means of class struggle which in turn polices that struggle (Neocleous, 1996, p.viii). While discussing Hegel's arguments on state and civil society, one of his main concern is to show how Hegel analyze the role of policing practices in production of bourgeoisie social order since there is a dual mechanism characterized as "the police and corporations represent the penetration of the state into civil society, while the Estate assembly represents the penetration of civil society into the state" and being the mediating institutions and practices between state and civil society, police as an organization and policing as a practice providing necessary means to tackle with the problems arisen from free market (Neocleous, 1996, p.3). Developing mediations and organizing the relationship between civil society and the state provides necessary peaceful solutions for problems emerged out of conflicting interests of different classes within civil society. Hence, for Marx these mediations could not be able to overcome fundamental contradictions withing civil society, on the contrary, they reproduce class based contradictions and inequalities via underestimating them under an administrative form organized by the state and as a result, Marx's ideas differentiated in three basic dimensions which are: (i) most of the mediating institutions are state institutions rather than being civil society institutions, (ii) civil society not the state is driving force behind the struggles of history and (iii) Marx develops his own solutions to solve the division between state and civil society (Neocleous, 1996, p.14). For Neocleous, these dimensions should be thought as in tension with each other and any attempts to develop historical materialist accounts to social realities must use other categories such as 'political administration' produced by class struggle through which the power of the state could be understood (Neocleous, 1996, p.15). To illustrate, the passport, being a product and a function of

²⁰ These are some studies of Neocleous which are the most cited: Neocleous (1996), Neocleous (2000a), Neocleous (2000b), Neocleous (2007a), Neocleous (2007b), Neocleous (2008), Neocleous (2011), Neocleous (2013a) and Neocleous (2013b).

the state, is a form of political administration and a policing mechanism while it registers citizens and constitutes them as citizens (Neocleous, 1996, p.89).

Deriving his theoretical approach to state from Hegelian Marxism, Neocleous (2000b) discussed the issue of social order in general and policing as a constructive part of the state in the capitalist societies and claimed that policing is a way of pacifying social classes and establishing the capitalist social and public order by means of the concentrated coercive instruments controlled by the state. According to him, located at the core of the state, policing civil society is very significant aspect of state power and it has three fundamental functions which are (i) “the fashioning of the order of labor (the market)”, (ii) “the constitution of legal subjects” and (iii) “the subsumption of struggle” (Neocleous, 1996, p.89). Emphasizing the significance of the concept of police in materialist theory of the state, Neocleous (2000b, p.xii) tries to decipher how policing has become not only central to the repression of the working class and the reproduction of order but also to show how it fabricates social order as being based on the bourgeois mode of production. Since the capitalist social relations based on the principle of property ownership, there is the need for thinking the police and policing practices in relation with the property relations. Neocleous (2000a, p.12) asserted it as follows:

To make the point in more explicit class terms: it is because civil society generates its own enemies that private property is inherently insecure. The economic inactivity of the working class is the heart of the insecurity of the system; the resistance of this class to the social domination of private property is its next step; and the political mobilization of the class its highest form. Thus, the history of police as a security project is a history of private property’s fear of its most radical ‘other’ (communism).

In this vein, liberal political discourse restricts the idea of police to the ‘law and order’ as a function of crime prevention and order maintenance fulfilled by the state institutions in order to implement laws protecting the rights of rich and propertied classes against the poor working classes (Neocleous, 2000b, p.41-42). However, the fabrication and reproduction of bourgeois social order requires, in Gramscian words, the consent of the working classes. If the power of the state exercised limitlessly over the working classes, then the ideological assumption of the liberal order promoting freedom and liberty would be falsified in practice. Therefore, since the tension between liberty and security should be balanced, security has become the supreme

concept of bourgeois society for masking underlying insecurity of capitalist production relations (Neocleous, 2000b, p.43-44). The class dimension of the issue arisen from the very nature of the capitalist production relations providing the basis for exploitation in essence. However, it would be wrong the claim security or police produces the capitalist production relations. On the contrary, the insecurity of the private property-based capitalist system generating its own gravediggers who should be kept under control both social and politically and the police project providing security for social domination of bourgeoisie by the mediation of state institutions (Neocleous, 2000b, p.61).

Moreover, Neocleous argues that there is the need for understanding the relationship between police and the welfare system's use of the term security because the way of dealing with insecurity arisen from the capitalist private property relations by means of social policies reveals continuity with the early ideas of the police (2000b, p.64). The role of the police within capitalist societies cannot only be limited to their physical existence at city streets for surveilling but also, they provide public services. Although the justification of the existence of police arisen from its significance for order maintenance duties, they spent most of their time for providing social services rather than crime prevention which resulted in the debates on a police force or police service²¹ (Neocleous, 2000b, p.94).

To conclude, Neocleous claims that police power is very important for fabricating social order in capitalism and there is not any significant relation with crime and police rather the defining feature of policing is to fabricate and to protect bourgeoisie social order. Seeing the police through the lens of administration as well as law enables us to understand its integral links between them in the exercise of modern state power and since the civil society administered by the state and it provides an opportunity to place the police as a mediating institution of a political administration into the discussions on the state (Neocleous, 2000b, p.95). Political construction of the bourgeois order

²¹ Neocleous stated that "But as Reiner points out, the service/force debate rests on a false dichotomy. Insofar as the two roles are distinguishable, they are interdependent. In truth, both 'service' and 'force' roles derive from the mandate of *order maintenance*" (Neocleous, 2000b, p.94).

requires to bring the concept of police to the center of the discussion of the state as “one can only really make sense of state power by thinking about the ways in which this power is used to police civil society” (Neocleous, 2000b, p.118).

2.1.3. Foucault: Security as an Art of Government

As aforementioned, use of legitimate physical violence and production of security in a given territory requires the existence of a sovereign organization and special administrative techniques. In his lectures called *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault (2009) discussed the apparatuses of security, police, territory, and governmentality as a practice of the art of government²². According to him, the art of government approaching to the essence of perfect government employing two major assemblages of political technology which are (i) the technique ensuring the organization and development of forces and inter-state compensation of them by means of diplomacy and army and (ii) the technique of police refers completely different meanings until 18th century (Foucault, 2009, p.312). Foucault (2009) asserted that it is not the state above the civil society, but it is the governmentalized civil society organized as a form of the state being an episode in government or in governmentality²³ from the sixteenth century (Foucault, 2009, p.248). Hence, his emphasis is more on the role of governmentality as a technique of government or as a 'governmental rationality' (Gordon, 1991, p.1) than on the significance of the state regarded as a type of governmentality in organizing social relations. Governmentality has three meanings, according to Foucault (1991, p.102-103) as follows:

1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.

²² Gordon claimed that “Foucault used the term 'rationality of government' almost interchangeably with 'art of government'. He was interested in government as an activity or practice, and in arts of government as ways of knowing what that activity consisted in, and how it might be carried on. A rationality of government will thus mean a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practised” (Gordon, 1991, p.3).

²³ For further discussions on governmentality, readings in Burchell et al.(1991) can be followed.

2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of *savoirs*.

3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 'governmentalized'.

Therefore, the concept of governmentality is used for designating the structural entanglement between the government of a state and the techniques of self-government in modern Western societies (Lorey, 2015; p.23). In other words, it is “the irruption of the ‘political economy’ into the *raison d’ état*: that is, into the complex of *savoirs* concerning the proper management of a territory and of its population” (De Giorgi, 2006, p.69). In this regard, governmentality is something more than being repressive, instead it is a mode of self-control or internalized discipline (Lorey, 2015, p.28). Neoliberal governmentality, for instance, assumes that everything of social life, public and private, in civil society, the state, and the market, should be understood as a forum for building and deploying personal human capital to operate as a market-based social actor and this hypertrophy of market logic as the basis for all social choices demands” disciplined citizen-subjects internalizing market rationality as their social ethic” (Schram, 2018, p.314).

Also, the state²⁴ is not seen as an entity or as a thing, rather it is regarded as a practice or the set of practices (Foucault, 2009, p.277). Thus, the centrality of the state is disregarded, and it is proposed that there is the need for understanding how population

²⁴ “We all know the fascination which the love, or horror, of the state exercises today; we know how much attention is paid to the genesis of the state, its history, its advance, its power and abuses, etc. The excessive value attributed to the problem of the state is expressed, basically, in two ways: the one form, immediate, affective and tragic, is the lyricism of the *monstre froid* we see confronting us; but there is a second way of overvaluing the problem of the state, one which is paradoxical because apparently reductionist: it is the form of analysis that consists in reducing the state to a certain number of functions, such as the development of productive forces and the reproduction of relations of production, and yet this reductionist vision of the relative importance of the state's role nevertheless invariably renders it absolutely essential as a target needing to be attacked and a privileged position needing to be occupied. But the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly, this importance; maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. May be what is really important for our modernity – that is, for our present – is not so much the *etatisation* of society, as the ‘governmentalization’ of the state” (Foucault, 1991, p.103).

governed since from the early 17th century to mid-18th century population has become one of the central political elements elaborated through the apparatus of the police (Foucault, 2009, p.278). Since the state has no essence, according to Foucault, the nature of the state institution can be seen as a function of changes in government practices; therefore, as demonstrated in *Discipline and Punish*, changes in the rationale and meaning of practices take precedence over transformations and changes in the structure of penal institutions (Gordon, 1991, p.3-4). Foucault (1991, p.102) claimed that there is not “the replacement of a sovereign society by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government”; rather, there is “a triangle of sovereignty-discipline-government” whose main target is the population (“as a datum, as a field of intervention and as an objective of governmental techniques”) and whose crucial mechanism is the apparatuses of security since the 18th century and revealed movements. As Jessop (2019, p.129-130) stated that “the governmental state arose from the governmentalization of the state rather than the statization of society and was based on continual (re)definition of state competences and the division between public and private.” Foucault's analysis transcends a postmodern emphasis on indeterminacy, rather, it focuses on the special features of the modern political system, such as the various forms of power and cohesiveness that arise in a community more preoccupied with the future which captured “the future as open and its own relation to the world as involving a key element of risk” driven by “a concern with security” (Konings, 2018, p.415). In contrast to modern approaches' centralized emphasis on power, Foucault emphasized power relations that are messy and permeate every sphere of society; thus, power is everywhere because it originates from everywhere (Şengül, 2012, p.47). Therefore, the Foucauldian perspective frequently lacks a compelling means of connecting these forms of power to macro-structures, despite its emphasis on localized, capillary forms of power/knowledge (Gill, 1995, p.403). Gordon (1991, p.5) explained it as follows:

In his 1982 essay 'The subject and power', Foucault affirms, on the contrary, that power is only power (rather than mere physical force or violence) when addressed to individuals who are free to act in one way or another. Power is defined as 'actions on others' actions': that is, it presupposes rather than annuls their capacity as agents; it acts upon, and through, an open set of practical and ethical possibilities. Hence, although power is an omnipresent dimension in human relations, power in a society is never a fixed and closed regime, but rather an endless and open strategic game...

Yet, the emphasis that power reproduces from everywhere and therefore manifests itself everywhere has created the risk of not seeing the state as an authentic focus of power and reducing it to an ordinary haunt of power relations, while the emphasis on the productivity of power has resulted in the oppressive aspect being thrown into second place (Şengül, 20120, p.51). Since Foucault's study on power in modern societies and his concept of "governmentality" have decisively changed the emphasis from "a centralized power center to the capillaries" disseminating power and to the sites where power is deployed in its subjectifying consequences, through the triadic link between power, knowledge, and subjectivity, he enabled us to recognize the constructive consequences of power rather than its oppressive repercussions (Kalpagam, 2006, p.79). In this vein, Henry (2009, p.96) stated that "disciplinary power revolves around the accumulation of information about individuals, the use of that information to govern the conduct of individuals, and the acceptance of that personalized governance by individuals." Private policing is a crucial component of business structures whose goal is to maximize revenues while minimizing losses; hence, in order to increase business productivity, private policing integrates disciplinary forms of authority into organizational structures (Hoogenboom, 1991, p.23). In this perspective, Gill (1995, p.411-412). claimed that:

The concept of discipline advanced here combines macro- and micro- dimensions of power: the structural power of capital; the ability to promote uniformity and obedience within parties, cadres, organisations, and especially in class formations associated with transnational capital (perhaps involving self-discipline in the Durkheimian sense); and particular instances of disciplinary power in a Foucauldian sense. Thus, 'disciplinary neoliberalism' is a concrete form structural and behavioural power; it combines the structural power of capital with 'capillary power' and 'panopticism'. In other words, neoliberal forms of discipline are not necessarily universal nor consistent, but they are bureaucratized and institutionalized, and they operate with different degrees of intensity across a range of 'public' and 'private' spheres.

Therefore, while the neoliberal forms of state have been more authoritarian, "disciplinary neoliberalism, under conditions of increasing fiscal crisis, may tend to make aspects of civil society and the state form more panoptic, and indeed coercive, in nature" (Gill 1995, p.418-420).

In addition, until 18th century, there were three discussions on the term of police which are (i) the meaning of the word 'police' (ii) the European equilibrium and (iii) the

differences in police practices though provided with the same instruments in each states (Foucault, 2009). Firstly, the word ‘police’ had many different meanings in 15th and 16th centuries such as (i) a form of community or a public body, (ii) the set of actions guiding communities and (iii) the positive results of good government (Foucault, 2009, p.312-313). From the 17th century, it was referred to the set of means for preservation of good and stable internal order and good use of the state forces (Foucault, 2009, p.313-314). Secondly, in European equilibrium the police provide internal basis for developing state forces ensuring stability and the instrument of the statistics²⁵ employed by the state contributed to know each other for maintaining equilibrium to a certain degree. Thirdly, police were not pre-given or planned social organization but rather it was practiced administratively and institutionalized through measures, rulings, collection of edicts and critiques, hence, different practices and organizational units emerged in different countries (Foucault, 2009, p.318). To put it briefly, since the beginning of the 17th century, “Police is the set of interventions and means that ensure that living, better than just living, coexisting will be effectively useful to the constitution and development of the state’s forces (Foucault, 2009, p.327). Moreover, police are concerned with necessary conditions for market issues such as exchange, circulation, manufacture, marketing of goods by means of providing security for the town and the road network arisen from the urbanization of the territory in late 17th and early 18th century (Foucault, 2009, p.336). For this reason, according to Foucault, the police are seen as a condition for the existence of urban existence and police-commerce, police-urban development, and police-the development of all market activities in a broad sense are in unity until the beginning of 18th century (Foucault, 2009, p.338). To illustrate, Foucault emphasizes that urbanization and policing are nearly equivalent concepts in France throughout the eighteenth century and one articulation of the purpose of police was to organize the entire royal area as if it were one large metropolis with public places, bridges, highways, and waterways being the primary police targets (Gordon, 1991, p.20).

²⁵ “Police makes statistics necessary, but police also makes statistics possible. ... Police and statistics mutually condition each other, and statistics is a common instrument between police and the European equilibrium. Statistics is the state’s knowledge of the state, understood as the state’s knowledge both of itself and also of other states (Foucault, 2009, p.315).

Furthermore, based on the idea of Panopticon²⁶ suggested by Bentham (1995) and developed by Foucault in his different writings, studies of surveillance concentrated on the control of society and behaviors of people through surveilling techniques. Surveillance has been one of the most popular issues due to the developments in technological infrastructures ranging from Closed Circuits Televisions (CCTV) to fingerprint systems coding and keeping population under control after the mid-1990s. Thus, determining the reasoning behind Bentham's Panopticon and the historical-material circumstances giving rise to the emergence of the idea of Panopticon is a significant step towards criticizing contemporary urban surveillance practices. As Bentham (1995, p.34) stated that keeping a large number of people under inspection for reasons such as "*punishing the incorrigible, guarding the insane, reforming the vicious, confining the suspected, employing the idle, maintaining the helpless, curing the sick, instructing the willing in any branch of industry, or training the rising race in the path of education*", there is the need for a space enabling constant surveillance. One of the fundamental principles of the Panopticon is providing surveillance without being seen. According to Bentham's design, "the *centrality* of the inspector's situation, combined with the well-known and most effectual contrivances for *seeing without being seen*" (1995, p.43) which produces new kind of power exercised over the ones surveilled. De Giorgi (2006, p.77). asserted the relationship between the capitalist social order and the exercise of power via the Panopticon as follows:

... the Panopticon is a concretisation of the modern capitalist utopia of a continuous and total visibility of the subordinates by the eye of power: the 'one' can observe the 'many'

²⁶ Spatial organization or architectural design of Panopticon summarized by Bentham (1995) as such: "The building is circular. The apartments of the prisoners occupy the circumference. You may call them, if you please, the cells. These cells are divided from one another, and the prisoners by that means secluded from all communication with each other, by partitions in the form of radii issuing from the circumference towards the centre, and extending as many feet as shall be thought necessary to form the largest dimension of the cell. The apartment of the inspector occupies the centre; you may call it if you please the inspector's lodge. It will be convenient in most, if not in all cases, to have a vacant space or area all round, between such centre and such circumference. You may call it if you please the intermediate or annular area. About the width of a cell may be sufficient for a passage from the outside of the building to the lodge. Each cell has in the outward circumference, a window, large enough, not only to light the cell, but, through the cell, to afford light enough to the correspondent part of the lodge. The inner circumference of the cell is formed by an iron grating, so light as not to screen any part of the cell from the inspector's view. Of this grating, a part sufficiently large opens, in form of a door, to admit the prisoner at his first entrance; and to give admission at any time to the inspector or any of his attendants. To cut off from each prisoner the view of every other, the partitions are carried on a few feet beyond the grating into the intermediate area: such projecting parts I call the protracted partitions" (p.35).

because s/he knows exactly where and when to watch; the many conform meticulously to the norm because they never know exactly from where and in which moment they will actually be observed. The exercise of panoptical power is automatically also an act of knowledge: power knows everything about the observed people, and its gaze is at the same time the source and product of knowledge. On the other hand, the many who are observed never know enough about the power that is watching them. It is exactly around this imbalance between a power that knows and a mass that doesn't know, that the internal economy and rationality of disciplinary power could establish itself successfully. In turn, it is this rationality that allows for the progressive constitution of a disciplinary society: a society defined by the diffusion of this 'unequal knowledge' (and of its main protagonist: the 'expert') across various fields of power: the school (where pupils are exposed to the eye of the teacher); the hospital (where patients are scrutinised by the eye of the doctor); the factory (where workers are put under the surveillance of 'scientifically organised' supervisors); the prison (in which guards, officers and the correctional personnel concentrate their eyes on the prisoners).

This kind power over the ones surveilled provides necessary conditions for both directing behaviors of the being watched without spending any efforts to do so and internalization of disciplining himself or herself. Also, by isolating one from another, the necessary material conditions for rebelling against the authority become something impossible. As Bentham (1995, p.48) states that "Overpowering the guard requires a union of hands, and a concert among minds. But what union, or what concert, can there be among persons, no one of whom will have set eyes on any other from the first moment of his entrance?"

The significance of Panopticon for the production and reproduction for disciplinary mechanism within the society is explained by Foucault in his book called *Discipline and Punish* (1977). His discussion on Panopticon starts with the measures being taken against plague at the end of seventeenth century by describing spatial partitioning and it is elaborated that the inspected spatial and social relations fixing people to their places. This kind of fixity enables the state power to establish surveillance system based on a permanent registration and the plague provides an opportunity to establish an order through enclosed and segmented space (Foucault, 1977, p.195-197). Foucault suggested that the panopticon functioned as a template for a new paradigm of power that stretched beyond the prison to the factory, hospital, military, and school (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p.607). Therefore, presenting a fascinating historical metaphor for the creation of tactics intended to order the bodies in a certain space and time, the Panopticon represents "a broader rationality" that spawned a plan for the maximization of social forces and permits "the tactics of disciplinary power" to function from within

the social body, discretely and independently of the many social activities such as production, correction, education, care, etc. (De Giorgi, 2006, p.77).

2.1.4. Dynamics of the State in Neoliberalism and Authoritarianism

The external circumstances of production, distribution, circulation, and consumption are all provided by the law and the state (Jessop, 2019a, p.131). Neoliberalism promotes privatized and market-like arrangements over the supposedly corrupt and bloated objects of reform, such as "big government" and "big labor," by telling a self-serving story of free markets and small states, selective deregulation and targeted reregulation, low taxes, and lean administration (Peck et al., 2018, p.3). As suggested by Saad-Filho and Yalman (2010, p.1), neoliberalism is "the contemporary form of capitalism, and it is based on the systematic use of state power to impose, under the veil of 'non-intervention', a hegemonic project of recomposition of the rule of capital in most areas of social life." Peck et al. (2018, p.6) suggested that neoliberalism is a complex term referring different meanings in different levels of abstraction as follows:

In approximately descending levels of abstraction, neoliberalism can be taken to refer to: an historically ascendant pattern and hegemonic ideology of capitalist development, organically linked to a host of post-1970s tendencies towards global economic integration, financialization, and normalized practices of 'market rule'; a political-economic philosophy, with a predisposition for liberal economics, encompassing a naturalized understanding of market forces and rationalities, together with a license for market-complementing state interventions; a pervasive rationality of lean- or small-state transformation, modeled on the principles of entrepreneurialism, efficiency, cost control, privatism, and competition, but speaking more to a strategically selective approach to governmental restructuring than to a comprehensively achieved institutional condition; and an umbrella term for a programmatically connected family of pro-market, pro-corporate, and pro-choice policy measures, including the sale of state assets and services, regressive tax reform, programs of 'deregulation', the granting of corporate concessions and exemptions (even from market rule itself), the penal or paternalist management of poverty, the commodification of social life and natural resources, and the (often technocratic) imposition of fiscal discipline, structural adjustment, market tests, and devolved austerity.

Neoliberalism has had two major stages: First, once the post-war boom collapsed, was a form of shock treatment more applicable to transition economies afterwards in which the state intervenes to boost private capital and financial markets and second stage includes two parts which i) the state has intervened to soften the consequences of financialization, most notably through rescuing financial firms and ii) the state must

commit to supporting private capital and financialization (Fine, 2010, p.19). Kotz (2018, p.430) stated that the privatization of formerly government-run services (such as social services, schools, prisons, policing-military services etc.) is another hallmark of neoliberal capitalism and has taken different forms in Europe, US or developing countries according to their relative position in global capitalism and can be indicated as follows:

In Europe, privatization has meant selling-off state-owned enterprises. In developing countries, where publicly owned oil and other natural resources companies had been formed in the postwar decades, governments sold them off, usually to investors from the US or Europe. However, in the United States, privatization has taken the form mainly of contracting out public services to private companies rather than a sell-off of state-owned enterprises. Not only have auxiliary aspects of public services been contracted out, such as cafeterias in public buildings, but core public functions as well. This has taken place in social services, housing for the poor, schools, prisons, and even military functions, as was learned during the Iraq War when private contractors supplied a significant proportion of those under arms.

In order to leave the markets as unrestrained as feasible, the state should have a limited role in political and economic affairs, establishing and preserving the institutional framework that protects property rights, ensures free markets, and encourages free trade and neoliberalism views the polity as composed of the individual first and the community second, with legitimate state action regarding community-based demands on the individual being severely limited (Schmidt, 2018, p.70). Therefore, by prioritizing the economy over the state, neoliberals promote markets (they made competition the moral norm, with competitive markets helping to define merit and justify disparities of circumstance) as the neutral solution and the state as the politicized issue (Schmidt, 2018, p.70). Although stated otherwise, the major objective of neoliberal changes is not to produce faster development, decrease inflation, or even expand the portfolio options of financial institutions; but “to subordinate local working classes and domestic accumulation to international imperatives, promote microeconomic integration between competing capitals, and expand the scope for financial system intermediation of the three most important sources of capital in the economy: the state budget, the banking system, and the balance of payments”(Saad-Filho & Yalman, 2010, p.2). Neoliberalization often involves the mobilization of institutional power in conjunction to privatization (Bruff, 2014, p.114). Jessop (2018, p.348) stated that the unique set of neoliberal policies is including followings:

(1) liberalization (more competition); (2) deregulation (fewer state and ‘hard law’ controls over capital); (3) privatization to sell off the public sector, often at below-market value, facilitating accumulation through dispossession (especially the politically-licensed plundering of public assets and the intellectual commons); (4) market proxies in the residual public sector to promote quasi-commodification; (5) internationalization (reducing the frictions of national ‘power containers’ and analogous borders, generalizing competition through world market integration, promoting best practice and, coincidentally, promoting a race to the bottom); and (6) a shift in the tax burden from direct to indirect taxation to boost consumer choice, increase post-tax profits of firms and financial institutions and, additionally, from mobile transnational capital to less-mobile small and medium enterprises, subaltern classes, and citizens (Jessop, 2002b).

As a pragmatic reframing of the relationship between government intervention and the market, neoliberalism is neither the abdication of the state nor its bureaucratic expansion, nor is it the solely instrumental state (Dardot et al., 2018, p.194-5). According to Wacquant (2010, p.212-3), there is the need for understanding neoliberalism “beyond this economic nucleus and elaborate a thicker notion that identifies the institutional machinery and symbolic frames through which neoliberal tenets are being actualized.” Hence, it is asserted that four distinct institutional logics can be followed in addition to a reaffirmation of capital's traditional roles and a push for more market competition (Wacquant, 2010, p.213-214):

1. Economic deregulation, that is, reregulation aimed at promoting “the market” or market-like mechanisms as the optimal device not only for guiding corporate strategies and economic transactions (under the aegis of the shareholder-value conception of the firm), but for organizing the gamut of human activities, including the private provision of core public goods, on putative grounds of efficiency (implying deliberate disregard for distributive issues of justice and equality).

2. Welfare state devolution, retraction, and recomposition designed to facilitate the expansion and support the intensification of commodification and, in particular, to submit reticent individuals to desocialized wage labor via variants of “workfare” establishing a quasi-contractual relationship between the state and lower-class recipients, treated not as citizens but as clients or subjects (stipulating their behavioral obligations as condition for continued public assistance).

3. An expansive, intrusive, and proactive penal apparatus that penetrates the nether regions of social and physical space to contain the disorders and disarray generated by diffusing social insecurity and deepening inequality, to unfurl disciplinary supervision over the precarious fractions of the postindustrial proletariat, and to reassert the authority of Leviathan so as to bolster the evaporating legitimacy of elected officials” (Wacquant, 2010, p.213).

4. The cultural trope of individual responsibility, which invades all spheres of life to provide a “vocabulary of motive”—as C. Wright Mills would say—for the construction of the self (on the model of the entrepreneur), the spread of markets and legitimization for the widened competition it subtends, the counterpart of which is the

evasion of corporate liability and the proclamation of state irresponsibility (or sharply reduced accountability in matters social and economic).

For the promotion of a neoliberal agenda, the state is a crucial instrument and one of the most significant characteristics of neoliberalism, both as a school of thought and as a practical political tactic, is the commitment to a strong state, capable of fending off threats to ideologies and economic rivalry (Davies, 2018, p.273). Hence, the 'small state' rhetoric no longer makes any sense in light of the practical reality of governmentality (Davies, 2018, p.281). The contradiction at the heart of neoliberal underpinning concepts is that while neoliberal principles necessitate a severely restricted state, neoliberal practice demands a strong state capable of imposing neoliberal transformation and as a result, neoliberalism has spawned 'liberal neo-statism,' in which a considerably more interventionist state than is compatible with basic neoliberal ideals has evolved to implement the neoliberal policies and programs required by those principles (Schmidt, 2018, p.71). Although it advocates for the priority of the economic domain, neoliberalism depends on the support of the state for its expansion and reproduction and it faces a paradox explained by Jessop (2018, p.357) as follows:

This is that (1) neoliberalism is a political project that aims to extend the logic of exchange-value within the profit-oriented, market-mediated economy, in conjunction with extending market forces and economic calculation into spheres of social life where they were absent before (primacy of the economic); but (2) the pursuit of this project depends on integrating neoliberalism not only into accumulation strategies but also state projects and hegemonic visions, which requires both struggle for hegemony and control over the state apparatus (primacy of the political). This paradox is reflected in important institutional features and social practices that can be interpreted in terms of the primacy of the political – notably distinctive forms of political capitalism and the reorganization of state power on post-democratic, authoritarian statist lines to defend finance-dominated accumulation and the broader neoliberal project. This is even truer of finance-dominated accumulation, which benefits from different forms of political capitalism and a more general neoliberal environment. As such, its leading forces have a strong interest (as does transnational profit-producing capital) in weakening liberal bourgeois democracy in favour of an authoritarian statist 'post-democracy' that can reinforce financialization, manage financial crises, and channel or defeat economic and political resistance.

Similar to Jessop, Kotz (2018, p.428) also emphasized the paradoxical role of the state in neoliberalism and argued that since the private property is in need of a state or a coercive power to define and protect market relations and private property, the state is

a precondition; thus, the philosophy of neoliberal ideology promotes a state confined to protecting private property and enforcing contracts, combined with preserving order needed for market interactions and providing national defense. As mentioned by Schram (2018, p.311) in lieu of abolishing welfare state, “neoliberalism involves marketizing welfare state operations, so they run more like a business in the name of getting everyone involved in them, policymakers, program administrators, and clients to act in market-compliant ways.” Following Foucault’s discussions on discipline, Schram argued that neoliberalism not only relies on punishment but also discipline including negative dimensions in limiting whereas positive dimensions in producing new type of responsabilized citizens looking for rational-best choices (Schram, 2018, p.312). Thus, it contributes to replace welfare state/governments with self-governance and self-responsibility as being the ultimate form of privatization (Schram, 2018, p.313). Hegemonic neoliberal representations of market trade as efficient and just obstruct reconstructions of actual labor processes because they encourage individuals to behave as if they are solely responsible for any problems that arise in their daily lives (Harvey, 2008, p.116).

Neoliberalism is circulated and (re)produced locally, where the whims of social forces and individual agency play a crucial part, but by focusing simply on an externally built neoliberalism, the local geographies of current political economic conditions and institutional frameworks have been missed; in other words, if one just considers external factors, he/she runs the risk of creating too simplistic descriptions of a single, omnipresent kind of capitalism (Springer, 2016, p.157). According to Jessop (2010, p.25-26; 2018, p.349-350), neoliberalism began to take four primary forms in different geographical locations in the last three decades of the 20th century which are: (i) “neoliberal system transformation” in post-Soviet states, (ii) “neoliberal regime shifts” in Atlantic Fordism as being the heartlands of neoliberalism, (iii) “economic restructuring and regime shifts”(entailing embracing neoliberal policies consistent with the Washington Consensus in exchange for financial and other aids) imposed by transnational economic institutions and organizations in crisis-ridden capitalist economies in parts of Africa, Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, and Latin America and (iv) “neoliberal policy adjustments” in Nordic social democracies and Rhenish capitalism. As Peck et al. (2018, p.13) explained that the phrase "actually existent

neoliberalism" was initially conceived as a tool for navigating the bewildering intricacies of neoliberalism "as an unruly, polymorphic, and discrepant social formation, as a mode of regulation wrapped in (self) delusion and (purposeful) misrepresentation, and as an historical-geographical process (re)produced through uneven development" and three distinct analytic functions can be identified that the concept of actually existing neoliberalism has come to fulfill as follows:

First, it called attention to the necessary (but still generative) discrepancies between neoliberalism as a tutelary theory and its evidently variegated practice, between the utopian ideology of the free-market counter-revolution and its earthly manifestations, and between the programmatic ambition of this frontal discourse and its frustrated, compromised, crisis-prone and yet restlessly experimental form. Second, it problematized the complex, contingent, and contested ways in which neoliberal restructuring strategies interact with pre-existing and coexisting uses of space, institutional configurations, and constellations of socio-political power. And third, it underscored the basic claim that uneven spatial development has all along been integral to the conditions of existence and relational dynamics of neoliberalization as a polymorphic historical process, and not merely a source of contingent variation or downstream 'aftereffects' (Peck et al., 2018, p.13).

The instability caused by the neoliberal growth process has presented dangers to the inherent stability of geographical space, hence it requires alternative economic and social geography methodologies that conceptualize the evolution of the economic and social landscape (Mishra, 2017, p.180). Peck et al. (2018, p.5) argued that actually existing neoliberalism goes beyond a simple recognition of neoliberalism's "varieties" or "localizations" in a static sense of cross-sectional or planar difference, and instead concerns the problematization of dynamic differences in constitutive and articulated form, as well as the accumulative and combinatorial nature of neoliberalization as a historically uneven process of development and reproduction. Despite the fact that neoliberalization processes are always already embedded and context-dependent phenomena, their own discursive (mis) representations constantly try to deny this same contextual embeddedness (Peck et al., 2018, p.7).

Competitive authoritarianism is another significant conceptualization in analyzing the forms of state in neoliberal era in a continuum of democracy on the one end and autocracy-authoritarianism on the other end. As Levitsky and Way (2002, p.51) indicated that, in the 1990s, hybrid regimes merged democratic rules with authoritarian government practices in places such as "Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia,

Zimbabwe), postcommunist Eurasia (Albania, Croatia, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine), Asia (Malaysia, Taiwan), and Latin America (Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru).”According to them, competitive authoritarianism, es being a specific type of hybrid regimes, reveals that though democratic institutions are commonly regarded as the primary mechanism of attaining and wielding political power, incumbents' frequent and severe violations of these laws mean that the system does not even fulfill the very minimal requirements for democracy (for example Cortia (Franjo Tudjman, Serbia (Slobodan Milosevic), Russia (Vladimir Putin) etc.) (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p.52). Levitsky and Way (2002, p.53) claimed that it is important to differentiate competitive authoritarianism from both democracy and totalitarianism in terms of four minimum criteria which modern democratic regimes should fulfill:

- 1) Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair;
- 2) virtually all adults possess the right to vote;
- 3) political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected;
- and 4) elected authorities possess real authority to govern, that they are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders.

When competition is fierce under authoritarian regimes, these standards are routinely and severely violated, giving the government's opponents a significant advantage, and elections are held on a consistent basis and without major fraud, despite incumbents frequently misusing state resources, failing to give the opposition proper media attention, harassing opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases influencing electoral results; they also spy on opposition politicians; yet, even if competitive authoritarian governments are not quite as democratic as totalitarian ones, they are not quite as authoritarian, either, since incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes cannot destroy them or reduce them to a mere façade, though they may and do frequently exploit nominal democratic standards (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p.53). According to Levitsky and Way (2002, p.60-61), in the 1990s, competitive authoritarianism arose from three distinct regime pathways summarized as follows:

One path was the decay of a full-blown authoritarian regime. In these cases, established authoritarian regimes were compelled—often by a combination of domestic and international pressure—either to adopt formal democratic institutions or to adhere seriously to what had previously been façade democratic institutions. ... A second path

to competitive authoritarianism was the collapse of an authoritarian regime, followed by the emergence of a new, competitive authoritarian regime. In these cases, weak electoral regimes emerged, more or less by default, in the wake of an authoritarian breakdown. Although the absence of democratic traditions and weak civil societies created opportunities for elected governments to rule autocratically, these governments lacked the capacity to consolidate authoritarian rule. ... A third path to competitive authoritarianism was the decay of a democratic regime. In these cases, deep and often longstanding political and economic crises created conditions under which freely elected governments undermined democratic institutions—either via a presidential “self-coup” or through selective, incremental abuses—but lacked the will or capacity to eliminate them entirely. Examples of such transitions include Peru in the early 1990s and perhaps contemporary Venezuela.

Economic crisis was triggered to transformation of neoliberalism from a marginalized intellectual position into a hegemonic ideology which “mutated into a series of unique and hybridized state projects, regulatory failures and recurrent crises would continue to distinguish, if not energize, the uneven dispersion of neoliberalizing practices across the globe” (Springer, 2018, p.622). It is also commonly assumed that the state becomes more authoritarian in order to impose changes on groups that do not want to follow neoliberalization process, such as labor unions, monopolistic industries, and “benefit dependent,” and the oppressive aspects of neoliberalism are sometimes seen as being exacerbated by its secondary effects, which include, most notably, a rise in social inequality and the creation of a marginalized “underclass” of jobless people (O’Malley, 2018, p.284). As Springer emphasized that “The multiple crises of neoliberalism have produced fertile soils for the cultivation of populism, which the political Right has seized upon, ... to advance its own divisive political agenda by exploiting reactionary sentiments” (Springer, 2018, p.622-3). Once the immediate threat of global collapse had been avoided at the end of 2008, neoliberalism has become much more pronounced rather than being rolled back, and importantly, blame has shifted from financial companies to consumers who incurred big credit card and mortgage debts and to states whose ineffective regulation led to the “immoralization” of finance and, in turn, their own budget deficits for “making bad capitalism good (again)” (Bruff, 2014, p. 121). Since the process of neoliberalization has no finite endpoint and being an ongoing process, politically, this highlights the fact that neoliberalization is not a stable and freestanding system, but rather a collection of overlapping tactics of restructuring, the consequences of which are likewise open and not predetermined (Peck et al., 2018, p.8). As Tansel (2017, p.2) argued that

neoliberalism today encourages and increasingly relies on two main tenets: “(1) coercive state practices that discipline, marginalize and criminalize oppositional social forces and (2) the judicial and administrative state apparatuses which limit the avenues in which neoliberal policies can be challenged.” The former indicates that contemporary authoritarian neoliberal transformation initiatives use claims of state capture by progressive social movements, "takers," and their elite allies as a means of (re)establishing sustainable conditions of control and distorted forms of public consent (Peck & Theodore, 2019, p.261-2). Therefore, even though privatization, free trade, and flexible labor markets have become pillars of the neoliberal agenda, its tentacles are spreading to new areas of social and criminal policy, where a mix of ameliorative and punishing measures are being tested and new neoliberal state-building processes have been tried through complex scalar politics, such as the criminalization of urban poverty, the invasive micro-regulation of black bodies, and the privatization of local social services (Peck, 2003, p.230).

Relying upon the ideas evoked by Poulantzas on authoritarian statism, recent discussions of the form of the state in neoliberal era put emphasis on the state's neoliberal dimensions both in terms of its economic policies and authoritarian political orientations. Poulantzas' structural-functionalist view of authoritarian state formation, arising from the collapse of the post-war settlement, provided the theoretical foundation for most modern Marxist studies of crime and control (the meta-negotiation between capital and labor), and asserted that state authorities were essentially forced to resort to the use of force in order to create favorable conditions for liberal democratic capitalism (Edwards & Hughes, 2011, p.441). Namely, the practices of “actually existing neoliberalism” evolved since the beginning of the 1980s into more state-regulated in economy and more authoritarian in political and social sphere rather than being more “liberal”. Tansel (2017, p.9) suggested in his study that the term "neoliberalism" is used to describe a certain approach to capital accumulation and political rule utilizing established state apparatuses to de/re-regulate economic activity in a way that gives priority to the commodification of labor, the environment, and social reproduction in a "self-regulating" market domain and a "competitive" public sphere. Through a competitive orientation and (re)positioning as caretakers of accumulation, neoliberalism does not demolish but rather flourishes off the

institutional architecture of state apparatuses, and when seen through the lens of neoliberalism's function as a form of accumulation, the reasons why neoliberal governance increasingly exemplifies authoritarian control based on the weakening of democratic politics and the use of coercive state authority become clear (Tansel, 2017, p.10). This shift toward constitutional and legal mechanisms and the move away from seeking consent for hegemonic projects (i.e. away from neoliberalism) have brought to the fore neoliberalism's authoritarian tendencies, such as the increasingly punitive nature of penal and criminal policy, making authoritarian neoliberalism qualitatively distinct from neoliberalism's practices prior to 2007 (Bruff, 2014, p.116). According to Peck and Theodore (2019, p.245) as “the tawdry array of authoritarian (re)turns that have been witnessed in various parts of the world in the decade since the global financial crisis of 2008—from Trump to Turkey, from the Brexit debacle to the Brazilian coup, and much else besides”, one question that lingers behind (and between) each of these authoritarian advances is whether neoliberalism—as a constantly shifting project of state-facilitated market rule, propelled not least by its own limitations, contradictions, and reactionary tendencies—remains a salient and appropriate signifier. At this point, Bruff (2014, p.124; 2016, p.108) claimed that authoritarian neoliberalism is a reaction to the general capitalist crisis and to the legitimation problems of individual capitalist regimes; thus, the state's seeming power includes its rising fragility, as it is becoming an increasingly direct target of a variety of public conflicts, demands, and dissatisfaction as a result of pressures stemming from this apparent strength. As a result, although the valorization of the "free market" in contrast to the diminishing role of the state has been emphasized as one of neoliberalism's main characteristics, "authoritarianism tends to be portrayed as an outcome of the contradictions between "pure" neoliberal ideology and "messy" neoliberalizing practices that result in a larger role for the state than anticipated," as well as the construction and preservation of this politico-economic system defending it against inclinations towards greater equality and democracy, rely heavily on state-directed coercion that is shielded from democratic constraints (Bruff, 2016, p.107). Violence and inequality being integral system or specific moment, they both produce and reproduce each other via the conditions created by neoliberalism (Springer, 2016, p.156); hence, neoliberalization resulted in “increased class tensions, intensified policing, expanded surveillance, and heightened security measures, which inevitably

arise from strained relations” and it is “integral to violence inasmuch as it generates social divisions within and across space” (Springer, 2016, p.160). When a state tries to settle the conflicts and dislocations caused by socioeconomic transformation without providing substantial concessions to subordinate social groups, the state's own crisis deepens at the same time; therefore, the "authoritarian cure" may be more of a band-aid than a long-term solution and the issue becomes whether the conditions have arisen for progressive and radical politics to begin to reverse the trend of the previous three decades, given the contradictions inherent to authoritarian neoliberalism, especially with regard to the strengthening/weakening of the state (Bruff, 2014, p.125). As Bruff (2014, p.115) asserted that “Authoritarianism can also be observed in the reconfiguring of state and institutional power in an attempt to insulate certain policies and institutional practices from social and political dissent.” Therefore, many capitalist governments have been facing a legitimation problem since the global crisis of 2007–2009, and this issue has been exacerbated by the authoritarian neoliberal approach, which might make the state less open and democratic (Bruff, 2014, p.116). Bruff (2014, p.115-116) suggested that authoritarian neoliberalism is on the ascent and there are three facets to this effort to reshape the relationship between the state and its institutions:

...(1) the more immediate appeal to material circumstances as a reason for the state being unable, despite “the best will in the world,” to reverse processes such as greater socioeconomic inequality and dislocation; (2) the deeper and longer-term recalibration of the kinds of activity that are feasible and appropriate for nonmarket institutions to engage in, diminishing expectations in the process; and (3) the reconceptualization of the state as increasingly nondemocratic through its subordination to constitutional and legal rules that are deemed necessary for prosperity to be achieved.

The state should be considered an inseparable and indispensable component of neoliberal thought and policy, and state-directed coercion, shielded from democratic constraints, is fundamental to the establishment and maintenance of a politico-economic order that resists attempt to bring about more equality and democracy (Bruff, 2016, p.109-110). As a result, according to Bruff (2016, p.115), “unlike many understandings of neoliberalism, and ‘free market’ thought more generally, the state is central to such understandings and their implementation in practice.” Bruff and Tansel (2019, p.234) clarified that the term ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ as follows:

... we locate the term at the intersection of a range of social relations and utilize it to highlight how contemporary capitalism is governed in a way which tends to reinforce and rely upon practices that seek to marginalize, discipline and control dissenting social groups and oppositional politics rather than strive for their explicit consent or co-optation. Such practices include the repeated invocations of ‘the market’ or ‘economic necessity’ to justify a wide range of restructurings across various societal sites (e.g. states, households, workplaces, urban spaces), the growing tendency to prioritize constitutional and legal mechanisms rather than democratic debate and participation, the centralization of state powers by the executive branch at the expense of popular participation and other nodes of governance, the mobilization of state apparatuses for the repression of oppositional social forces at a range of scales, and the heightened pressures and responsibilities shifted onto households by repeated bouts of crisis and the restructuring of the state’s redistributive mechanisms.

Therefore, they asserted that, in the analysis of authoritarian neoliberalism, two distinct lines of inquiry can be pursued: the first examines the relationship between authoritarian statisms and neoliberal reforms (to investigate how neoliberalization in authoritarian governments results in a mutually beneficial arrangement, with reforms being executed and safeguarded by use of the state's already established authoritarian apparatus), and the second follows the lineage of transformation of key societal sites in capitalism (such as states, households, workplaces, and urban spaces) through spatially and temporally uneven yet cumulative neoliberalization processes (utilized by authoritarian states and formal democratic regimes alike to safeguard sites and circuits of capitalist accumulation, and on the ways in which the efficacy of these practices depends on their persistent, shifting, and often contentious intertwining with central spheres of everyday life, including homes, workplaces, and urban spaces) (Bruff & Tansel, 2019, p.239).

Also, Jessop (2009, p.19) stated that “the consolidation of authoritarian neoliberalism as the “best possible political shell” for a still evolving, and inevitably crisis-prone, predatory, finance-dominated accumulation regime.” In this vein, Göbel (2017) discussed the authoritarian regimes by seeking for the reasons on why they find supports and reproduce their power and claimed that authoritarian consolidation process conducted by ruling elites to develop and to increase the capacity to govern based on three forms of power which are “the power to coerce one’s will on the people (despotic power), the power inherent in regulating society through institutions and organisations (infrastructural power) and the power to make people want what the government wants them to want (discursive power)”; thus, the ability of regime elites

to improve their infrastructural and discursive capacities is positively correlated with the longevity of authoritarian regimes because it gives these elites more tools to deal with social problems and regime challenges beyond just intimidating or cracking down on opponents (Göbel, 2011, p.177). As coercion is exceedingly costly in terms of internal and international legitimacy, the long-term survival of a regime must rely on other strategies and even authoritarian governments will resort to nonviolent ways of control (Göbel, 2011, p.180). Private provision of security services and the commodification of surveillance and policing practices provide necessary conditions, especially at urban scale, to diminish the cost socially and politically whereas increasing the economic cost of security services.

2.1.5. Contribution of Discussions on State to the Thesis and Beyond

The state is not an ahistorical entity, rather, it is a product of social production relations and fulfills regulatory functions both for production and reproduction of social order. As Jessop (2015, p.5) pointed out that “The state is not a thing or a rational subject but an ensemble of institutions and organizations that exercises power, insofar as it does, through an institutionally-mediated condensation of a changing balance of forces that seek to influence forms, functions, and exercise of state power.” The relationship between the state and production of security is obvious in terms of the apparatuses performing security functions on behalf of the nation-state in modern capitalist societies. However, this obvious reality hiding some inner structural and underlying social relations and mechanisms arisen from the necessities of social production relations. Since the very existence of the state is seen as an ahistorical phenomenon in security-coercion-violence discussions, formal appearances of direct physical forces or modest changes appearing in its production can be discussed as fundamental changes in the form of the state. Different discussions can be found on the nation-states and its production in capitalist social formations. These theories give different answers by asking different questions on the discussions on coercion, security, and state. The knowledge produced by these theories conditioned by their epistemological stances. Some leading ideas guided these approaches but before discussing them, further elaborations on security and urban security could not be made. This section is

dedicated to discussing these theories and their contributions to understand the relationship between security and state in modern capitalist societies. Three fundamental theoretical approaches, Weberian, Marxist and Post-Structuralist and their variations were discussed.

Weberian approaches provide highly important discussion tools in explaining the production of urban security today. These approaches, dominating the corresponding literature, on the one hand discuss the state's practices of institutionalization and penetration of social relations, and on the other hand, they discuss the transformative role of actors outside the state in using the practice of legitimate violence monopoly. Security production is determined by similar processes in terms of state administration evaluated within the framework of rationality of central and bureaucratic state organization. However, while the elements of social legitimacy can be expressed in state formality, the commercialization of security, which has become the object of capitalist market relations, can also be seen as a threat against the integrity of nation-state.

The position of the state in the regulation of social relations, whether structural or instrumental in terms of Marxist approaches, is addressed in the context of the production and reintroduction of class inequalities. Marx's main focus was on the dynamic between society and state rather than on the state itself and even if a state was built on force (by conquest, for example), that alone would not be enough to ensure its survival; the state still needed to serve important societal purposes in order to be viable (Lefebvre, 1968, p.153-4). In this respect, the production of the security service by the state is becoming very important for the regulation of class relations and the political organization of the state. In terms of the above theoretical approaches, the oppressive and coercive aspects of the state for providing advantages to dominant classes, coercive instruments of the state are seen under the absolute dominance of the state formally. In this scope, the social ground on which class struggles rise is eliminated and its coercive devices in suppressing existing conflicts gain a certain level of functionality.

It is the consensus on the legitimate violence monopoly of the state that is both implied and explicitly determined in discussions on the state and its difficult relationship, whether Weberian or Marxist. These approaches take for granted this legitimate monopoly of violence, the former relating it to the function of rational state and bureaucratic specialization in generating social legitimacy, in the latter suppressing class struggles and instrumentalizing the state in establishing social consent. Yet, unlike Marxist perspectives, the Weberian paradigm suggests that power empowers the state and state actors to exercise power autonomously (Şengül, 2012, p.45). In this context, it is possible to say that the Weberian-Marxist approaches included here come together on the ground of "Weberian instrumentalism". This is where Foucault's criticism of the state begins with an analysis of the community, like Marx's analysis of society and economics, not the state. For Foucault, it is the deciphering of these managerial mechanisms and the analysis of their social origins that aims to extend social management technologies beyond state formality. In this respect, security and land management are important for the management of the whole society. As identified by Jessop (2015, p.5) there are four pillars upon which modern states are built:

1) a clearly demarcated core territory under the more or less uncontested and continuous control of the state apparatus; (2) a politically organized coercive, administrative, and symbolic apparatus endowed with both general and specific powers; (3) a permanent or stable population on which the state's political authority and decisions are regarded, at least by those in charge of that apparatus, if not those subject to it, as binding; and (4) a political imaginary that defines the nature and purposes of the state in pursuing policies that realize an imagined (illusory) general interest.

Furthermore, Bourdieu (1994), following the definition of the Max Weber's on state as "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population", stated that the state is able to deploy symbolic violence because it manifests itself not only in the objective, in the form of particular organizational structures and methods, but also in the subjective, in the shape of mental structures and categories of perception and cognition and the established institution has all the trappings of the natural since it manifests in social structures and in the mental structures suited to them, making us forget that it emerges out of a lengthy sequence of actions of institution (Bourdieu, 1994, p.3-4). According to Bourdieu (1994, p.4-5) the state can be defined as follows:

The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital. It is this concentration as such which constitutes the state as the holder of a sort of meta-capital granting power over other species of capital and over their holders. Concentration of the different species of capital (which proceeds hand in hand with the construction of the corresponding fields) leads indeed to the emergence of a specific, properly statist capital (capital *etatique*) which enables the state to exercise power over the different fields and over the different particular species of capital, and especially over the rates of conversion between them (and thereby over the relations of force between their respective holders).

For Bourdieu, as being conceptualized as a process of emergence, the genesis of the modern state identified as the sum of concentration of physical force capital, as first characterized by Max Weber, concentration of economic capital, concentration of information capital like statistics, and concentration of symbolic capital in the form of judicial authority (Kalpagam, 2006, p.80). Therefore, Bourdieu suggested that “the state as the agency that monopolizes the legitimate use not only of material violence..., but also of symbolic violence, and shapes social space and strategies by setting the conversion rate between the various species of capital” (Wacquant, 2010, 199-200). Army and police forces, as being the coercive units of the state, ensure the social order by separating themselves from the rest of the society as a specialized, centralized and disciplined organizations and internally, the state must express its physical force in response to competing powers (princes and lords) and to opposition from below by domestic law enforcement and order and internationally, in response to other real or potential states (foreign princes), in and via battle for land (which led to the construction of great armies) (dominated classes) against international rivalry (Bourdieu, 1994, p.5). According to him (Bourdieu, 1994, p.15) the problem of legitimacy arises from the crises, and “State does not necessarily have to give orders or to exercise physical coercion in order to produce an ordered social world, as long as it is capable of producing embodied cognitive structures that accord with objective structures.” Bourdieu did not aim to de-institutionalize the state, but he pointed out that the state, in its roles as both an administrative framework and an authoritative regulator of practices, consistently and uniformly imposes constraints and disciplines on all agents that have the effect of shaping those agents' dispositions over time and it plays a pivotal role in the creation and maintenance of the tools used to shape people's everyday lives and the society in which they live (Kalpagam, 2006, p.79). In the United

States and Western Europe, the 'right hand' of the State, i.e. the police, courts, and prison system, are becoming increasingly active and intrusive in the lower regions of social space, replacing or supplementing what Bourdieu calls "the left hand" of the State, symbolized by education, public health care, social security, social assistance, and social housing (Wacquant, 2003a, p.11). In this vein, private provision of urban security services not only contributes to the extension of the state's right hand, but also to the spatial expansion of symbolic power of the capital's coercive functions in collaboration with the state.

2.2. Historical Development of Modern Police

“The development of modern policing and the evolution of a policed society are of fundamental importance to an understanding of the society in which we live”
(Taylor, 1997, p.1).

This section is intended for discussing the development of modern policing as a centrally organized police forces and its relationship with the institutionalization of the nation-state and capitalist social relations in Europe. Before discussing historical developments and transformation process of modern police forces and policing practices, it would be better to clarify meanings of basic concepts which are police²⁷ and policing. The word of police derived from the Greek word politeia applying to general instruments of government and its meaning was broadened with the police of the Roman Empire and then seventeenth century Europe recognized policing as functions for maintenance of social order (Mawby, 1990). Though meanings of concepts determined by social and historical relations and struggles, to guide further arguments on the issue, making basic definitions is inevitable to historicize them. It is

²⁷ Neocleous stated that “From the late fifteenth century political discourse in Europe centred very much around the concept of police. Originating in French-Burgundian *policie* in the fifteenth century, the word ‘police’ spread across Continental Europe and generated a range of words adopted from the French-Burgundian: ‘Policei’, ‘Pollicei’, ‘Policey’, ‘Pollicey’, ‘Pollizey’, ‘Pollizei’, ‘Politzey’, ‘Pollucey’, and ‘Pullucey’. Though the spelling of the word varied, the meaning remained constant, denoting the legislative and administrative regulation of the internal life of a community to promote general welfare and the condition of good order (as encapsulated in phrases such as ‘police and good order’ or ‘good police and order’), and the regimenting of social life (as in ‘regiment and police’)” (2000, p.1).

argued that functions of policing were carried out voluntarily by communities or private workers being a by-product of social relations as anthropological studies revealed that policing as a social control mechanism did not exist in pre-literate societies (Reiner, 2000, p.4). Police gains its publicness when it is administered and waged by communities collectively and becomes specialized body as it implements duties emerged out of differentiation in state mechanism (Gleizal et al., 2000, p.83).

Historical developments of modern police forces and policing practices have strong ties with the development of capitalist nation-states and their institutional organizations trying to establish their legitimacy by means of various mechanisms. Police forces and policing practices can be seen as one example of such kind of attempts. As Reiner points out that “modern societies are characterized by what can be termed ‘police fetishism’, the ideological assumption that the police are a functional prerequisite of social order so that without a police force chaos would ensue” (Reiner, 2000, p.1). This ideological superiority of the term police stems from its role in production of social order being the source of its legitimacy. Following Weberian views on the state as being legitimate power to use physical force, Reiner recognized that “the distinctiveness of the police lies not in their performance of a specific social function but in being the specialist repositories for the state’s monopolization of legitimate force in its territory” (Reiner, 2000, p.6). Thus, police forces differ from an army in terms of its jurisdictions because an army is external to collectivity and organized for defending a community against outside threats whereas targets of police forces are within the community (Bayley, 1975).

Moreover, according to Reiner (2000, p.1) police and policing should be separated since “police refer to a particular kind of social institution, while ‘policing’ implies a set of processes with specific social functions”. In other words, police are unique organizational body authorized for fulfilling policing practices while policing is a process through which power of the authorized institutions realized. Thus, it is asserted that police are only one example of policing in modern sense being the part of wider social control mechanisms (Reiner, 2000, p.2). Bayley claimed that police forces should be understood in broad term and its functions are indispensable part of its organizational existence. Therefore, Bayley defined police force as “an organization

authorized by a collectivity to regulate social relations within itself by utilizing, if need be physical force. ... a particular function and not ... a given body of men (1975, p.328). Bayley's (1990) another definition suggested that the term of police refers to "people authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relations within the group through the application of physical force". He asserted that there are three essential parts of this definition which are (i) physical force distinguishing police not by actual use of but being authorized to use it and affecting behavior; (ii) internal usage excluding military institutions and (iii) collective authorization exceeding the boundaries of state and implying authorization by other social units (Bayley, 1990, p.7-8).

In addition to the definitions of police and police forces, there is the need for clarifying what policing refers to. Rawlings (2008, p.47) defined policing as "the maintenance of order, the control of disorder, the prevention of crime and the detection of offenders, and by the police is meant those officials concerned with policing matters". Thus, as cited in Reiner (2000, p.3), "the essential concept of policing is the attempt to maintain security through surveillance and the threat of sanctioning (Spitzer 1987; Shearing 1992)" which is practiced by means of patrolling of public spaces. Also, Reiner suggested a definition of policing (cited in Rawlings, 2002, p.5) as "efforts to provide security through surveillance and the threat of sanctioning... Policing is the set of activities directed at preserving the security of a particular social order". As a result, Reiner (2000, p.7) summarizes discussions on police and policing as such:

... policing' is an aspect of social control processes which occurs universally in all social situations in which there is at least the potential for conflict, deviance, or disorder. It involves surveillance to discover actual or anticipated breaches, and the threat or mobilization of sanctions to ensure the security of the social order. The order in question may be based on consensus, or conflict and oppression, or an ambiguous amalgam of the two, which is usually the case in modern societies. While policing may be universal, the 'police' as a specialized body of people given the primary formal responsibility for legitimate force to safeguard security is a feature only of relatively complex societies. The police have developed in particular as a key institution in modern societies as an aspect of the rise of modern state forms.

While definitions mentioned above is revealed that policing is a broader term than the police, Mawby (2008, p.17) asserts the opposite and argues that police refer to processes of preventing and detecting crime and maintaining order for wider issues

and public services than policing. Therefore, rather than being the sub-section of policing, police as being a service provider in nation-states should be thought not only fulfilling order maintenance functions but also other public service duties. In this study, police refer to public agents authorized for providing public services including maintenance of social order, surveillance, social assistance etc. whereas policing refers to the security practices for production and reproduction of social relations by various agents such as private security guards.

Furthermore, comparing police systems in England & Wales, Continental Europe, Colonial Societies, Communist Societies-Post Communists, North America and Far Eastern, Mawby (2008, p.17-18) suggested that these systems can be examined according to three criteria which are legitimacy implying degree of monopoly within society granted by elites; structure implying organized force with some degree of specialization and with a code of practice; and function implying the role of police as the maintenance of law and order and prevention and detection practices. As a result of his study, it is argued that “the police systems of different countries have, historically, varied markedly, and while shifts in policing arrangements in most countries can be identified, these are based on changing circumstances that are only occasionally global, and are mainly localised” (Mawby, 2008, p.18). Therefore, definitions of police and policing may differ according to the historical and social circumstances and specific conditions of different societies.

2.2.1. Police and Policing until the 20th Century

This section will provide a brief assessment of the evolution of modern police forces and policing in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom, until the twentieth century. This is going to be done both by analyzing the historical development and institutionalization process of police and policing practices and by analyzing the classifications and different perspectives that are examining the foundation of a centrally and bureaucratically organized and politically controlled New Police in Great Britain.

First and foremost, British system of policing goes back to Anglo-Saxon period (400-1066) based on the mutual responsibility of all inhabitants for law enforcement responsabilisation²⁸ for each other's conduct (Joyce, 2011, p.1). This system of law enforcement was determined by feudal power relations characterized as the lack of strong central authority whereas the Norman Conquest provided the basis for increasing central control over policing law enforcement practices (Joyce, 2011, p.2). Nevertheless, as Rawlings (2008, p.47) mentioned that in feudalism the relationship between the Crown and its subjects was indirectly established by means of mediaries. Later in 13th century, the 1285 Statute of Winchester was a significant step towards developing policing in England through which constable system was institutionalized, responsabilisation of local people in criminal affairs was maintained and night watch system called "watch and ward system" was established to guard the gates of town for arresting person of interests (Joyce, 2011, p.2). In terms of law enforcement at local scale during medieval era, the constable – who served for one year period, unpaid and was appointed from the substantial people in a parish – maintained his position after 13th century (Rawlings, 2008, p.50). As Joyce (2011, p.2) stated that during 14th century detaining suspected criminals and summoning the militia were two key functions of the constables and later in Tudor period administering the poor law and enforcing action against vagrants were added to these duties.

Furthermore, Rawlings (2008) argued that in late 13th and early 14th century, decline in agricultural production brought about problems in reproduction of feudal social relations conditioned by labor shortages pushing up wages and encouraging mobilities. He asserts that these mobilizations resulted in concerns for maintaining economic and political order as well as policing system based on relatively stable society. This problem was tried to be overcome by "the centralization of power and support a national strategy coordinated by justices of the peace appointed by the Crown and operating in the counties (Palmer 1993)" (as cited in Rawlings, 2008, p.49). The position of the justice of the peace was significant since they were the representative of the center at local scale after 14th century in Great Britain. This office was

²⁸ Interestingly, this sense of responsibility has been one of the most important parts of neoliberal policies, especially in the changes that have happened as the security services have been privatized and community responsibility has increased.

established for “controlling wages and prices, but the justices later acquired a broad range of judicial and administrative responsibilities” (Rawlings, 2008, p.52). Although the Justices were appointed from land-owning gentry and some of them were members of the Parliament by the Crown, they were not puppets of the Crown and had enjoyed certain level of autonomy and authority in the county (Rawlings, 2008). Notwithstanding, there was not a zero-sum game between the roles of constables and justice of the peace, rather there was a division of labor and the former responsible for “military organization, tax collection, the regulation of alehouses, weights and measures, the maintenance of public order, the control of vagrants and environmental pollution, in addition to the duties relating to the arrest and custody of suspects” (Rawlings, 2008, p.50). Hence, until 1750s, there were two basic authorities, justices of the peace and parish constables, appointed by justice of the peace fulfilling policing functions while the duties of the latter served for meeting everyday security needs of local people (Gleizal et al., 2000, p.79-80). Additionally, for eighteenth century, employment of private watchmen had increased, and prosperous neighborhoods were joined together for hiring and funding private patrols in London to provide security of gates (Rawlings, 2008). For instance, the Thames River Police was funded by the merchants operated on the River Thames and protected their interests which was given official status and was put under the control of the Home Secretary with the 1800 Thames River Police Act (Joyce, 2011, p.7). To sum up, regulating broad aspects of communal existence for establishing the common good of the community and maintenance of the moral order, security and the maximization of national resources were main objectives of 18th century police as a general system of government in England (Dodsworth, 2008, p.583-4).

As the accumulation of wealth in the agricultural capitalism forced the landless peasant to migrate cities finding jobs, cities became main sites of living and earning life by wages. Thus, the expansion and growth of urban settlements after agricultural capitalism gave rise to the migration of landless workers to the cities resulted in the increase in both population density and unequal distribution of wealth among different social classes. The centralized police organization enables the state to provide control over working classes and necessary conditions for the work and accumulation of wealth (Neocleous, 2000). As a result, modern policing was established when

reproduction of social relations necessitates centrally organized policing practices in the 18th century. Before the foundation of modern policing, production of security services was fulfilled both by local organizational units and/or parts of armies authorized for local social order.

The most significant breaking point towards the establishment of modern policing was the foundation of the Metropolitan Police in London in 1829 by Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel and as it is claimed that social changes in cities and towns due to the consequences of industrial revolution and civil disorder led by returning soldiers and sailors mostly homeless, unemployed and disabled were fundamental reasons for the establishment of modern police forces in London Metropolitan area (Edwards, 2005, p.25). As aforementioned, in the old British system, based on the Common Law, the constables, sheriffs and Justice of the Peace were responsible from maintenance of law and order but after the foundation of Justice of the Peace and parish constables, much of the power were devolved to local officials answerable to the land-holding members of local communities (Edwards, 2005, p.26). Bayley claims that “in 1829 the central government placed the weight of its authority against the centuries-old and thoroughly discredited parish-constable system” (Bayley, 1975, p.342). In the historical evolution of the legal administrative aspects of the New Police in Great Britain for ensuring its institutionalization throughout the territory, there are also some other significant breaking points. First, after the 1829 Act, except the City of London for whom new policing arrangements were made in the 1839 City of London Police Act, police agencies in the surrounding area of the city merged with the metropolitan forces (Bayley, 1975, p.342). Then, on the one hand, the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act dealt with foundation of elected councils, which formed a committee called the Watch Committee, in urban areas, and, on the other hand, the 1839 Rural Constabulary Act was enacted for ensuring the local control over the newly created police forces in rural areas being subject to higher degree of control by the Home Secretary compared to the urban counterparts (Joyce, 2011, p.10). Moreover, to overcome uniformity problems in policing practices, the County and Borough Police Act of 1856 was enacted and declared that creation of full-time professional police organizations in all towns and counties was compulsory (Bayley, 1975, p.343). Reasons behind this Act mentioned by Joyce (2011, p.10) as such “the contemporary concern of the threat of vagrant

crime, associated with unemployed soldiers returning from the Crimean War, which required a uniformity in the provision of policing”. Although local political control seemed to continue until the end of 19th century, the 1888 Local Government Act²⁹ was a breaking point by establishing Standing Point Committees in the Counties to inspect policing practices (Bayley, 1975, p.343). Above all, it would be better to discuss explanations on the reasons why the new police established in 1829 in Great Britain to understand historical formation process of modern police forces. Broadly speaking there can be found three different accounts on the reasons for the emergence of modern police forces which are (i) Orthodox/Traditional/Liberal/Whig³⁰, (ii) Revisionists³¹ and (iii) Neo-Reithian/Revisionist/Skeptical Synthesis (Taylor, 1997; Gleizal et. al., 2000; Reiner, 2000).

To begin with, according to Orthodox/Traditional/Liberal/Whig explanations on police, the old system was too corrupt and inefficient to cope with the growth of population and wealth in 18th century resulted in increasing criminal activities and the new police presented as inevitable (Reiner, 2000; Rawlings, 2002). There are three main assumptions of Orthodox-liberal perspective which are (i) police was a traditional institution rooted old times, (ii) insecurity in London was tried to be overcome by the establishment the New Police³² and (iii) legitimacy of this police

²⁹ The 1888 Local Government Act stated that control over county police forces would be discharged by a standing joint committee consisting of 50% elected councilors and 50% magistrates (Joyce, 2011, p.11).

³⁰ “There is a spectrum of sobriety and rigor running from jingoistic eulogies intended for a popular audience (Minto 1965), through the early pioneering explorations of the English police tradition (M. Lee 1901; Reith 1938, 1940, 1943, 1948, 1952, 1956), to some awesomely detailed and scholarly work (Radzinowicz 1948,1956,1968; Hart 1951,1955,1956; Critchley 1978). The orthodox interpretation, even in its straightforward form, still appears in some local force histories, and even the occasional general history (Stead 1985). Although the different orthodox accounts vary in analytical penetration and informative detail, they share certain core assumptions” (as cited in Reiner, 2000, p.16).

³¹ Hart (1978), Bailey (1981), D. Philips (1983), Ignaticff (1983), D. Jones (1983), Styles (1987), Gatrell (1988), Hay and Snyder (1989), Knafla (1990), Emsley (1983, 1996, 1997), D. Taylor (1997, 1998), and W. Miller (1999) all address this revisionist position and offer a critique—or autocritique—from somewhat different perspectives” (as cited in Reiner, 2000, p.46).

³² The view that insecurity has risen in the 18th century does not fully reflect reality, except for very specific offences, perhaps some of which have already arisen from sanctions given according to the customary law. ... As for the effectiveness of the new police in crime prevention, on the one hand, there is an overall decline in the crime rate of key European countries during the second half of the eighteenth century, on the other hand, it is appropriate to recall the limited impact of police presence on the overall

provided it superiority (Gleizal et. al., 2000, p.79). Edwards (2005, p.27) argues that at the end of the 18th century, the population movement to the cities led by the foundation of mechanized steam-driven industry, resulted in high density, poor housing quality for poor population and proliferation of street crime. It is asserted that “cities, starting with London, were in desperate need of new instruments for maintaining law and order” (Edwards, 2005, p.27). The need for organized and disciplined units concerning with crime and its prevention told by one of the Commissioners as such:

It should be understood at the outset that the principal object to be attained is the prevention of crime. To this great end every effort of the police is to be directed. The security of person and property, the preservation of the public tranquility and all other objects of a police establishment will thus be better affected than by detection and punishment of an offender after he has succeeded in committing the crime’ (as cited in Edwards, 2005, p.28).

Thus, it was thought that the old system relying on private and amateur efforts unable to provide necessary services (Reiner, 2000, p.17). The new police were regarded as historical inheritors of the ancient traditions of communal self-policing, its newness is arisen from “the institution of a bureaucratic organization of professionals rationally administered and directed towards a policy of ‘preventive policing’, that is, regular patrols to deter crime, suppress disorder and maintain security” (Reiner, 2000, p.19). Based on these assumptions, main argument of the Orthodox-liberal explanation is that because of industrialization and urbanization processes society divided into different social classes and the role of police was defined as to discipline working people under industrial capitalism (Rawlings, 2002, p.3; Gleizal et al., 2000, p.84; Reiner, 2000, p.16). However, the emphasis made by Orthodox-liberal historians was more on the evolutionary and criminal features³³ of new social conditions rather than class-based

level of criminality, one of the most supported hypotheses in today's police sociology.” (Gleizal et. al., 2000, p.85).

³³ “Robert Peel, introducing his Metropolis Police Improvement Bill to the House of Commons in April 1829, argued that his proposed reforms were necessary to meet the growing threat to property and person in the capital which was clearly to be seen in the annual statistics of committals for trial. While recognising that some districts of London were adequately protected, he stressed the inability of existing law-enforcement officers to maintain acceptable levels of protection for the capital as a whole. As he was the main architect of reform, his words have to be considered carefully. For orthodox historians Peel's explanation provides clear evidence to support their general thesis of a rising tide of crime overwhelming incompetent, if not corrupt, watchmen. However, on closer examination there are difficulties in accepting this explanation as a complete answer, partly because both the elements on

struggles. Therefore, the motives behind the police reform were fear of crime and moral disorder engendered by the problems of urban industrial society (Reiner, 2000, p.18).

In addition, as Emsley (2008, p.72) emphasized that their accounts are based on the idea of social progress and late Georgian and Early Victorian British society grounded on consensual society model was under threat of rising violence and crime incidences committed by individuals regarded as criminals separated from most of the members of society. Orthodox-liberal assumptions mainly produced by “Charles Reith in the mid-twentieth century and, most notably, in the impressively researched writings of Sir Leon Radzinowicz and the influential survey history of the police by T. A. Critchley” revealed that their interpretations were based on a consensual model of society and their underlying assumption was that “modernisation was unproblematic and that the police, as they developed, represented the most appropriate, most progressive and most effective response to the problems of society”, hence, security problems were seen as deviation from the normal and could be fixed by reforms (Taylor, 1997, p.2). Since the reform process was a natural product of historical developments, there is not any detailed analysis of oppositional views against the reforms in Orthodox-liberal accounts (Reiner, 2000, p.19).

Furthermore, this view underestimates the political played by the new police in production of social order when compared to the military as a soft power whose legitimacy derived from (Gleizal et al., p.2000). However, it was also recognized that policing transient population has become impossible after agricultural and industrial revolutions and deploying military in urban riots proposed as a solution whereas it led to other severe problems illustrated in 1780 Gordon Riots³⁴ (Joyce, 2011, p.35). As a

which it rests are flawed and partly because it fails to acknowledge other considerations” (Taylor, 1997, p.14).

³⁴ “The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries seem to have been high points in the history of riot: food rioting was common and increasingly riots emerged out of labour disputes and politics... The function and legal powers of both the magistrates and the soldiers were also unclear and created problems during the Gordon Riots in 1780. There was a fear both of using violent means to disperse the crowd and of failing to disperse it, and there was also concern that the soldiers might sympathize with the rioters. ... The riots continued for five days and stayed in the collective memory of the ruling class well into the nineteenth century as a symbol of the dangers of an inefficient system for responding to disorder” (Rawlings, 2002, p.110-111).

result, deriving legitimacy was one of the main concerns of Orthodox-liberal accounts and for this reason they assert that “the police were the police not of government but of the community” (Reiner, 2000, p.21).

Secondly, Revisionist historians provided alternative accounts on the emergence of modern police and historical developments giving rise to its institutionalization. As Reiner (2000, p.15-16) stated that “the police were seen as a means... maintaining the dominance of a ruling class against the interests and opposition of the various sections of the working class”. Revisionist accounts based on conflictual model of society and analyzing the impact and advent of the new police as the extension of the control of bourgeoisie class over the dangerous working classes (Taylor, 1997, p.3). As Taylor (1997, p.3) mentioned that rather than explaining significant changes and problems emerged in 19th century morally as good or evil, this approach provides an analysis of the new police by relating them with wider economic and political circumstances and transformations. In this respect, Storch (1975, p.61) claimed that the modern police “resulted from a new consensus among the propertied classes that it was necessary to create a professional, bureaucratically organized lever of urban discipline... into the heart of working-class communities”. Being seen as a valuable repressive instrument in the class war “for controlling and disciplining a burgeoning, and increasingly self-confident and non-deferential, working class (Storch 1975, 1976)” (as cited in Emsley, 2008, p.72). Thus, Revisionists provided that the main aim of the police is to control working classes rather than preventing crime as it is claimed by Orthodox-liberal accounts. As Reiner (2000, p.28) pointed out that in Revisionist account “the motive for formation of the new police was the maintenance of the order required by the capitalist class, with control of crime, riot, political dissidence and public morality being separate subsidiary facets of this overall mission”. In practice, it is true that police forces were located and patrolled in poor working-class neighborhoods (Rawlings, 2002). Although Revisionist accounts underestimating the significance of the crime-control problem, their emphasis on the conflicting interests of propertied elites and working class indicates that the organization of modern police contributing

the institutionalization of capitalist social relations within the society by means of both repressive and ideological instruments and practices employed by the police.

Lastly, an account synthesizing Orthodox-liberal and Revisionist approaches called Neo-Reithian/Revisionist/Skeptical Synthesis has the claim to offer more comprehensive explanations on the emergence of modern police. According to Reiner (2000, p.45) it “gives due weight to the success of the police reformers and the tradition they created, but also recognizes that policing is embedded in a social order riven by structured bases of conflict, not fundamental integration”. As Taylor (1997) suggested that there are two attempts in synthesizing research on development of police forces provided by Robert Reiner and Clive Emsley. The latter approach “recognizing their power of coercion, the police, and the law generally, are seen as 'multifaceted institutions used by Englishmen of all classes to oppose each other, to co-operate with, and to gain concessions from, each other” whereas the former 'recognizes that policing is embedded in a social order riven by structured bases of conflict, not fundamental integration' and in which policing may be 'more or less harmonious, or overtly oppressive' (as cited in Taylor, 1997, p.4). Reiner (2000) raised ten different questions for both comparing Orthodox-liberal and Revisionist accounts and suggests his answers for nine of them. First, he asserts that the source of the need for the new police was not only resulted from merely class conflict emerged out of pressures of industrialization and urbanization; there are also intra-class victimizations Secondly, he rejects orthodox-liberal and revisionist explanations on old policing arrangements and claims that “The eighteenth-century criminal justice system was enormously diverse and discretionary, but not as ineffective as earlier writers had suggested. Nor was it the unilateral weapon of the ruling class portrayed by revisionism” (Reiner, 2000, p.37). Thirdly, the motives behind police reform were not perceived threats of crime and disorder or automatic response to urbanization and industrial capitalism; rather, the entrepreneurial activities of the reformers gaining dominance in central government determine the foundation of the new police in Great Britain (Reiner, 2000, p.39). Fourthly, upper, and middle classes as well as working classes were opposed to new police but for different reasons. The latter’s hostility arisen from its interventionist role in production and reproduction spheres of daily life, whereas the former’s opposition “encompassed fears for traditional civil liberties, apprehension about

central government encroachment in local affairs, and resentment at the expense to ratepayers” (Reiner, 2000, p.39). Fifthly, the oppositions last at the end of the nineteenth century and police had gained large legitimacy in the eyes of the working class though some suspicions remained (Reiner, 2000, p.40). Sixthly, it is asserted that local studies on provincial forces indicates that the new police were not very new and establishment of powerful Professional system of surveillance was a mere myth (Reiner, 2000, p.41-42). Seventhly, the social impact of the new police was far more than its impact on petty crimes on the streets and it has contributed to a “broader process of pacification or integration of Victorian society” (Reiner, 2000, p.43). Eighthly, the working class also benefited from the police as they enjoyed the right to apply for the criminal justice mechanisms when victimized (Reiner, 2000, p.43). Lastly, contrary to the Orthodox-liberal claim that police are controlled by people, the accountability of police forces has become one of the significant problems when compared to the constable system based on local popular control (Reiner, 2000, p.44).

As a result, these above mentioned three explanations provided by different scholars based on different social, political, and economic assumptions. Nevertheless, they also share some common points being the most significant one is the instrumentalist approach to the functions of the state whether being in the form of rational bureaucratic organization or class-determined practices.

Furthermore, the foundation of police forces in London did not result in the creation police forces in other British cities simultaneously and “with alternative models and practices of policing co-existing and competing with each other during the first half of the nineteenth century” (Taylor, 1997, p.12). Thus, it had taken some time to establish the new police throughout the British territory. As Edwards (2000, p.29) stated that “only half of the counties and not all cities choose to establish police forces, so police conforming loosely to the same system and standards were not established throughout the nation until after legislation in 1856”. Being slow evolutionary process, according to Rawlings (2002, p.5), the diversity in police types survived for a long time, to illustrate, “the railway police, security guards employed in warehouses and even private watchmen employed by householders did not only survive the establishment of the new police, they flourished”.

Moreover, one of the main problems is the legitimacy/hostility problem that modern police forces had to tackle with. There can be found two groups being suspicious both centrally governed police forces which are propertied upper and middle classes and working class. The former group believed that the Metropolitan Police would be a threat against English liberties resulted in militarization of the society and there was an unwillingness to pay for centrally organized police forces (Emsley, 2008). The latter, on the other hand, was exposed to surveillance of the New Police as being potential criminals. Rawlings (2002, p.156) asserted that such kind of perception among police forces was widespread and not only working class but also the others knew they were treated as a criminal class. Nevertheless, these perceptions contradicted with the target of policing by consent implicated in the General Instructions of the Metropolitan Police (Joyce, 2011). Therefore, to gain support of masses composed of working class, the tasks of the police forces were extended, and they fulfilled not only order maintenance and law enforcement duties but also social service functions (as cited in Joyce, 2011, p.13). As a result, there were three types of police forces in Great Britain which are the London Metropolitan Police, county forces and borough police at the end of the 19th century (Mawby, 2008, p.19). These forces were paid, uniformed, and bureaucratically controlled and established in every county and borough and contrary to the above-mentioned hostilities they gained public support most of the places (Taylor, 1997, p.1).

In addition to above mentioned historical development of modern police in Britain, Edwards (2005) claimed that British heritage also determine the development of police in the US and the roots of the system of law enforcement in America can be found in the British system composed of constables and sheriffs established in the American colonies based on the model of those of Tudor and Stuart England. Nevertheless, three significant historical developments were determined the path of policing practices in the US which are (i) the underlying sentiments of the Declaration of Independence being free of governmental control; (ii) westward expansion and settlers' local government; (iii) mass immigration" (Edwards, 2005, p.35). Majority of early settlers lived in townships where modern police forces firstly founded and "policing and law enforcement... emerged in the aftermath of the struggle for independence" (Mawby, 2008, p.30). Similar to London experience, when the old system of night watchmen

and constables lost their effectiveness for patrolling and supplementing night watch, first police organization was established in New York in 1844 followed by Boston ten years later and by the end of the century most cities had their own police forces, but they lack unified policing styles and standards (Edwards, 2005, p.36). It is also indicated police forces were responsible for many non-policing tasks during the 19th century. As cited in Mawby (2008, p.31) “Local government interests dictated that these early police carried out a wide variety of administrative and service tasks, rather than concentrating solely on law enforcement (Fosdick 1920: 211–15; Smith, 1940; Fogelson, 1977; Monkkonen, 1981)”. To illustrate, urban police in New York was responsible for street cleaning until 1881 (Lane, 1992) (as cited in Edwards, 2005, p.38). Nevertheless, there are also some differences with the new police in Great Britain; for example, the US experience was based on the community base in terms of recruitment policies and control of the police until the 20th century (Mawby, 2008, p.31).

The police system of France established in the 17th century under the rule of Louis XIV who appointed the first Lieutenant General of Police in Paris (Bayley, 1975, p.344) earlier than the British and the US experiences. Historically, distinguishing feature of the French police was its relationship with the political authority. According to Gleizal et al. (2000, p.41-42), it was positioned at the center of political-ideological struggles and contrary to the other community rooted policing experiences in Great Britain and the us, the French police emerged out of the state and being the function of it. Hence, the struggles over the state to gain political power also have influences on the administration of police or vice versa. Although being centrally administered and hierarchically organized it was still urbanized and Parisian until the beginning of 20th century (Gleizal et al., 2000, p.43). In rural areas, a military organization called the National Gendarmerie in 1791 established after the abolishment of the Marchaussee during the Revolution though their functions were very similar (Bayley, 1975, p.344). Notwithstanding, duties of the Gendarmerie were to secure law and order across the roads and to provide judicial services, they were also employed for preventing and suppressing the urban riots threatening public order and could not be controlled by police forces (Gleizal et al., 2000, p.57).

Moreover, following Weberian ideal types and comparing British and France experiences, Emsley (1999, p.35-36) stated that three kinds of policing typology can be found in these countries which are (i) state civilian force composed of the police of metropolitan London and of Paris both centrally commanded and autonomous from local authorities, (ii) civilian municipal police composed of the borough and county police in Britain, and the urban police and *gardes champêtres* in France being under the control of local and (iii) state military consisted of by the *Gendarmerie* and the Royal Irish Constabulary, being under the control of a central government ministry. In France, there was some sort of duality between state civilian forces and civilian municipal forces in urban areas until the end of the 19th century since the state civilian forces tried to extend their jurisdictions to prevent political and social struggles threatening the maintenance of law and order (Gleizal et al., 2000, p.45-46). Besides, in Germany, the development of modern police forces dates to eighteenth century but institutionalized after unification in 1871 in Prussia and the key development was the establishment of *Landrat* and *Steuerrat* as the authoritative means of central political power (Bayley, 1975, p.345-346). Full-time employed police forces in major cities and a *Gendarmerie* force in the rural areas were established until the early 19th century (Bayley, 1975, p.347).

Furthermore, comparing and contrasting policing systems in Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, Bayley³⁵ (1975, p. 351-360) examines seven general hypotheses explaining the reasons for the emergence of policing systems which are; (i) growth of population and its distribution between cities and rural areas; (ii) extent of criminality

³⁵ Emsley criticized Bayley's study as such: "David Bayley's comparative investigation of police development in Britain, France, Germany and Italy... suggests that distinctive national features within the different police forces have remained remarkably constant through a multiplicity of upheavals. He denies that the growth of crime, industrialisation, population, or urbanisation have been especially significant in the development of these police forces; much more important was the transformation of the organisation of political power, the extent of violent popular resistance to government, the erosion of the old social bases of community authority, and the creation of new law and order tasks... so general as not to explain very much in terms of specific historical development. In particular, while he suggests that the forms of policing are to be explained by prior practices, he never explores the longevity of the old social structures and of traditional policing; and at times he appears to assume a degree of national organisation which, the following discussion will argue, did not exist. While he notes that the Italian *Carabinieri* was based on the French *Gendarmerie*, he generally ignores the importance of cultural exchange and the borrowing and subsequent reshaping of police models; something which again will be stressed in what follows" (Emsley, 1999, p.31).

and insecurity; (iii) occurrence of a social or economic transformation; (iv) occurrence of a political transformation; (v) marked changes in general governmental capabilities; (vi) an external threat and (vii) an ideological demarche. He tries to analyze each hypothesis in detail by referring social realities and facts and disproved some of these generalizations accepted without doubts. Firstly, there is a widespread agreement among Orthodox explanations that the growth of population and its distribution in cities and rural areas resulted in the need for a new police force, however, there can be found “no clear pattern of impingement of population size or change in the rate of increase upon the timing of development of police systems” (Bayley, 1975, p.352). Secondly, the development of police cannot be understood in terms of crime because it is hard to determine exact crime rates at that time and the reasons were more complex. Thirdly, social, and economic transformation emerged out of industrialization did not coincide with the rise of police systems. Fourthly, it is proved that there is a relationship between police systems and political transformation since the consolidation of government in a given territory associated with the establishment of police forces and politics and policing have close relationship when compared to other generalizations. Fifthly, though changes in general governmental capabilities were not only related with policing, increase in national policies such as municipal administration, public health and economic regulation also coincide with the changes made for establishing new police. Sixthly, there is not any relationship with great wars and police reform. Lastly, there can be found no proofs for asserting that any single intellectual movement or ideology contributed to the formation of police since bureaucratic centralization under an absolute power led to different consequences. As a result, Bayley found that there are three significant factors determining the path of development of police in different countries which are (i) a transformation in political power, (ii) prolonged violent popular resistance to government and (iii) development of new law and order tasks while the former basis of community dissolved due to socioeconomic changes (Bayley, 1975, p.360). Reiner’s arguments on political aspects of police support Bayley’s claims and the role of politics in policing is embedded its very existence. However, Reiner (2000, p.9) claims that although policing is a political activity contributing the reproduction of social inequalities it presents itself as ensuring the minimal conditions of civilized and stable society invisibly when there is not any problem.

To conclude, the police systems on continental Europe followed different paths and revealed different characteristics compared to the British and the US experiences. According to the analysis made on these countries, basic differences of European countries on the Continent can be summarized as: (i) structurally being more centralized and militaristic, (ii) functionally fulfilling more political and administrative tasks and (iii) being more closely tied to government and less accountable to public (as cited in Mawby, 2008, p.22).

2.2.2. Police Forces during the 20th Century

The long history of the modern policing in the 19th century revealed that its development as a centrally organized and bureaucratically controlled administrative structure was determined by the development of capitalist social relations and its spatial concentration in urban areas. Therefore, establishing and maintaining law and order has become an issue of establishing control over working class regarded as dangerous. Moreover, the 20th century police systems exhibited “a shift from private to public agency, from decentralized to centralized organization or from feudal to state authority” (Bayley, 1975, p.349). During the 20th century, developments in science, converting old hypothesis into conclusive facts, and technology, changing all aspects of policing by the improvements in communications and transport, contributed to the policing practices and old hypothesis (Edwards, 2005, p.38-39). Increasing relationship between public and police due to the improvements in communication and transport, resulted in the problem of corruption since patrolling system of cities had necessitated cooperation between communities and police which in turn “leaving the way open for corruption” during the first half of 20th century (Edwards, 2005, p.41). Although there were several different political and social fluctuations in 20th century, policing systems were remained almost unchanged until the 1970s.

In the early 20th century, police forces had been expanded and consolidated in Great Britain (Taylor, 1997, p.61), however, it was difficult to determine one single British model (Emsley, 1999, p.31). In terms of work routine, there were two basic beat system types in policing, diversified geographically in the post-war years which are “being under responsibility of constables for the entire policing of a particular area in

rural areas and being under responsibility of full 24-hour cover officers walked a fixed or a variable beat in shifts” (Newburn, 2008, p.91). According to Newburn (2008, p.90) “by the 1930s, what had originally been a somewhat amateurish and chaotic system had been replaced by one in which officers earned wages almost one-third above the national average”.

As Bayley (1975, p.332) asserted that decentralization in command but unification in practice is one of the most significant defining features of British police exercised by the Home Secretary. In the post-war years, there were four processes contributing the centralization of policing which are; (I) decrease in the number of police forces in England and Wales and increase in government Powers of amalgamation, (ii) increase in ability to coordinate and to control police forces by means of national policing organizations (the National Crime Intelligence Service-NCIS and the National Crime Squad-NCS) (iii) the formalization of police representative organizations such as the Police Federation and, in particular, ACPO and (iv) increase in the impact of government in policing by means of legislative and managerial reforms (Newburn, 2008, p.98-99). After 1960s, there were two legislative arrangements providing the structure of policing in British case which are the 1964 Police Act, enabling the Home Secretary to compel police force amalgamations and the 1972 Local Government Act, provided for the alignment of police forces with the newly created structure of local government forming 43 separate police forces each with its own police authority and territorial areas (Joyce, 2011, p.20). However, Mawby (2008, p.20) suggested that “the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police identified the protection of local police forces’ autonomy through the institution of the tripartite structure of accountability: individual chief constables, police authorities and central government”.

Policing political demonstrations and industrial disputes for preserving public order being the interests of citizens and the state was increased and local police involvement was extended during the 20th century and functions being carried out for the interests of local elites carried on behalf of the state (Joyce, 2011, p.182). Therefore, though the role of the Home Office was defined as service provider, their functions in riot control and the policing of public protests revealed the reasons for their existence (Mawby, 2008, p.19). Additionally, doubts on the roles of police forces had been continued

during 20th century since working class uprisings and other urban social movements were suppressed by harsh policing measures. Thus, as Joyce (2011, p.183) stated that “the police have performed a number of activities in connection with acting as guardians of the state, taking offensive action against those who threaten to undermine it through political activities such as industrial disputes, direct action and demonstrations”. The relative increase in the legitimacy of the police forces at the end of the 19th century and during the early years of the 20th century among working classes diminished during the 20th century being referred as the golden age of policing accomplishing policing by consent by the 1950s (as cited in Joyce, 2011, p.17). As Reiner (2000, p.10) stated that “after the 1960s a set of interrelated changes once more politicized the police”.

During the 20th century, the police forces institutionalized, and their characteristics have been felt into their place in other countries. Thus, further reforms and changes occurred during neoliberal period of the capitalism conditioned by these characteristics. Revealing similar characteristics to the British experience in England and Wales, the US model of policing was also based on the model of community-policing in the 20th century. However, the US model was concentrated more on crime fighting activities called crime prevention services (as cited in Mawby, 2008, p.33). Thus, the US police system has been presented itself as a crime fighting police in this period. In addition, at the beginning of the 20th century, police forces in France were completely centralized and centralization of police forces were achieved and not only legal arrangements and procedures identical but also the Ministry of the Interior was main decision maker throughout the territory since policing was regarded as the responsibility of national government (Bayley, 1975, p.334).

Nevertheless, as aforementioned before, police forces were not the only organizations providing internal security services in France. Thus, policing system in France organized as a dual structure, on the one hand, the state police come under the Ministry of the Interior, on the other hand, the gendarmerie is a military force under the Ministry of Defence” (Mawby, 2008, p.22). Moreover, in the case of Germany, policing responsibility was belonged to the Federal Republic representing a return to the practice of the Weimar period and the Second Reich being accountable to legislatures

in each state while the central government providing a border police force and a reserve riot force for emergencies (Bayley, 1975, p.337). Most of the police forces are based in the *Länders* (Mawby, 2008, p.22). As a result, as Mawby (2008, p.37) stated that, there can be determined two distinct systems of policing, one is the community oriented, "where the main function of the police is to provide a public service that addresses the wider needs of the community" and identified with traditional model on Continental Europe and the other one is the control-dominated "where the main function of the police is to maintain order, and where the population generally fails to recognize the legitimacy of the state and its agents, the police" and identified with British model applied in England and Wales.

2.2.3. Brief History of Policing in Turkey

While discussing organization of police forces within state and policing practices in Turkey's history, there is the need for understanding historical-organizational development of policing and its role in the fabrication of social order in Ottoman territory. Therefore, this section is intended for discussing the development of centrally organized police forces and its relationship with the emergence of capitalist social relations and the nation-state. Though this thesis is not a history of policing, in the way grasped in this study, policing is a product of dual processes of both formation of the capitalist state, represented by the nation-state, and production of urban space according to the new division of labor through the (re)production of social relations. Hence, methodologically, after brief discussions of the historical development of policing practices by analyzing literature on history of policing, there is going to be an investigation on identifying the underlying structures and mechanisms policing in Turkey. In this respect, rather than depicting Ottoman experience on security and policing as independent processes, this chapter is going to contend that they could only be understood by exploring organization of production (i.e. agricultural production) and appropriation of surplus by means of taxation and the forms of state's armed forces. In particular, the main concern is to elaborate social and political aspects of security production process within Ottoman territory. Because Ottoman experience revealed that production of security is a part of wider economic and social processes embodying administrative organization of the state. However, as Tongur (1946)

asserts that Tanzimat was the main breaking point in provision of internal security in Ottoman Empire and organization of policing practices revealed different features before and after the Tanzimat. Hence, in this part, organizational configuration of internal security before Tanzimat and after Tanzimat until the 19th century, throughout the whole territory of Ottoman Empire, is going to be interpreted briefly. This kind of interpretation is significant for two reasons; one is to understand social and economic characteristics of the empire shaping the organization of the state at local scale and second is to grasp the changes and developments in policing during modernization period of the state's administration.

As being semi-colonial empire, Ottomans' social development and its organizational form both within society and state apparatus revealed different characteristics compared to the European countries³⁶. But this does not mean or imply that Ottoman Empire is a unique and free from the historical material developments in production relations towards the way of capitalist production. Land regime and organization production relations determine administrative organization in general and its internal security forces and production of social order across the Ottoman territory. This was achieved by means of cooperation between local and central ruling classes whose interests stemming from land regime producing surplus that is extracted as pay in kind or by fulfilling state military duties. Different actors were appointed and/or delegated by the state, to serve for internal security services. For example, Tımar system was one of the most significant features of the Empire, which enables the control of both economic and social relations as well as providing security when it was needed. As

³⁶ Notwithstanding that social development and its organizational form both in society and within the state apparatus revealed different characteristics compared to the European counterparts, Ottoman Empire is not a unique experience. There is a close relation in terms of capital accumulation process in Europe and its organizational form in the modern nation-state and the developments within Ottoman territories. Focusing primarily on the studies of Ottoman Empire, Abou-El-Haj (1991) argued that socioeconomic transformations affect the functioning of the state and the state may in turn reflect transformations in economy and society, but this relationship is mostly neglected in orthodox explanations on Ottoman history. Also Timur (2010) asserts that "Recent studies revealed that Ottoman society evolved towards a real feudal structure, but the difficulty to understand this evolution is the anachronism that is the difference in periodization compared to the Western Europe in which feudalism evolved into a centralized and absolute monarchies whereas the evolution was from absolute monarchy to feudal monarchy in Ottoman Empire, especially, strong governors were in power in provinces and districts after 18th century and plantations were the economic side of this evolution" (Timur, 2010, p.87).

Singer (1994, p.24) points out that the main function of the rural administration throughout the Ottoman territory was the collection of taxes and ensuring peasant production of extracting surplus products and it was shown in the case of Jerusalem that, the combined urban and rural taxes of the *sancak* of Jerusalem supported the local Ottoman military administration in the mid-sixteenth century. Hence, focusing primarily on Jerusalem, Singer (1994) revealed that the centrality of rural administration was the collection of taxes for ensuring the production of villagers and Subaşı was carrying out various policing functions for keeping the peace and controlling the villagers' agricultural obligations. It is asserted that Subaşı is the first policeman in Ottoman Empire whose originated from Selcuklu Empire (Tongur, 1946). Previously being the commander of the army at local scale, the role played by Subaşı was changed in meantime and he was authorized in fulfilling social order, providing municipal services and preventive policing functions (Tongur, 1946, p.31-2). Subaşı was responsible for safety and municipal policing issues in Ottoman cities under the administrative rule of Kadı. The Subaşı was a police authority or a town commander conducting investigations in military, commercial and criminal cases and making arrest and presenting the facts of a case before the Kadı (Singer, 1994, p.26). There were *yasakçı* (fulfilling surveillance functions at portcullis), *ases* (night-watchman) and *asesbası* (head of ases) under the command of Subaşı providing security services in Ottoman cities (Demiröz, Babacan, & Çelikkilekli, 1973, p.4-5). Local administration functions of Ottoman Empire were fulfilled by the military and judicial officials appointed from İstanbul to the provinces and districts such as the Beylerbeyi (provincial governor), Sancakbeyi³⁷ (district governor), Sipahi³⁸ (cavalry

³⁷ Being a second career military man after the timar-holding cavalry, Sancakbeyi was responsible from the district administration in Ottoman cities fulfilling general security services inside his own town, conducting commercial activities, controlling regular and sufficient food supply and being ready for war with his local military forces (Singer, 1994, p.25-6).

³⁸ “*Sipahis* were assigned *timars* (revenue grants) or *ze'amets* (large *timars*) which were usually made up of the tax revenues due from local villages. The *sipahis* (cavalry officers) and janissaries were recruited either as slaves captured in war, through the *devsirme* (the periodic Ottoman levy of Christian boys from the Balkans as slaves) or from the sons of Ottoman officials. Occasionally, a *sipahi* may have originally been a Muslim of non-military status, a peasant or modest city dweller, who had volunteered for service and distinguished himself on campaign. *Sipahis* and janissaries alike received rigorous training as servants of the sultan before being posted to the provinces. In exchange for the income grants, by which they supported themselves and varying numbers of retainers and equipment, the *sipahis* served on imperial campaigns and kept the peace locally. Each town and the fortresses built or restored by the Ottomans to safeguard the major routes had a garrison of janissaries to provide additional military

officials), Subaşı (soldier with police functions), local garrison of Jannissaries and the Kadı (Singer, 1994, p.24). Provincial authorities of Ottoman cities are tripartite which are military officials, the Kadı, being the arbitrator between the military administration and the peasants, and the local population (Singer, 1994, p.29). Until the 17th century, duties, and responsibilities of executive (including municipal services) and judiciary functions of the Ottoman cities were provided by the Kadı appointed by the Sultan (Tongur, 1946; Ortaylı, 2005; Seyitdanlıoğlu, 2010). Moreover, as being religious head of the neighborhoods, İmams also provided municipal policing functions such as moral policing for preventing the use of houses as whorehouses (Ergin, 1987, p.126).

However, since there is not well-developed local administration in a Western sense throughout the Ottoman territory for the provision of municipal services, Kadı was supported by other institutions or administrative assistants such as Vakıf and Lonca System or Muhtesib (Eryılmaz, 2005, p.389). Establishing control over space and economic relations, muhtesib was also responsible for price control and inspecting marketplaces and bazaars (Eryılmaz, 2005, p.390). The role of Muhtesib was not only limited with providing economic control but also, they must deal with the security issues at neighborhood scale, and they were appointed to each neighborhood to help Kadı in provision of municipal services (Tongur, 1946, p.25-6). Moreover, the role of neighborhood and community was also officially recognized by the state and auto-control or collective responsabilisation was very important providing socio-spatial stability in Ottoman localities (Tongur, 1946, p.94). For instance, people living in same neighborhood were responsible from each other and they were joint guarantor when there was a crime committed at the same neighborhood (Taşkömür, 2005, p.36). Social control mechanisms were exercised directly upon people because surveillance was socially organized and performed in Ottoman Empire. Artisans, for example, were responsible from other neighbor artisans, employers were responsible from his employees, people living in same neighborhood stood surety for his or her neighbors (Kırlı, 2012, p.617). Hence, collective responsibility was a very significant component of social control architecture of Ottoman Empire.

manpower. They were primarily meant to be a military force, whereas the *sipahis* combined military and administrative-bureaucratic functions” (Singer, 1994, p.25).

In addition to the role played by Kadı and local communities, Guild of Janissary was the main institutional organization responsible for both internal security and war against other countries. Janissaries, called *yasakçı* or *kulluçu* and lived in castles, were the main organization, being under the rule of local authorities such as Kadı, Subaşı or the Governor, responsible from internal security throughout the whole territory and they acted when there emerged the threat of rebellion or social order problems (İnalçık, 2014, p.130). According to Tongur (1946, p.23), duties and responsibilities of military organization at local scale can be summarized as such; (i) participating to the war in military expedition, (ii) providing protection against attacks across the borders and coasts and repressing uprisings and brigandage events and (iii) providing internal security services at cities and rural areas.

Municipal services were also seen as a security service and fulfilled by *subaşı*, *böcekçibaşı*, *çöplük subaşısı* being the members of Janissaries (Seyitdanlıoğlu, 2010, p.12-13). The Agha of Janissaries, serving to the Sultan, was responsible from policing in İstanbul for preventing crime and arresting the ones acting against law and order (İnalçık, 2014, p.134; Tongur, 1946). Janissaries, under the rule of Agha, patrolled in the city and were arresting criminals and sent them to the Grand Vizier. But if the criminal was a Janissary, they were punished in the Guild of Janissary (İnalçık, 2014, p.134). There were five policing regions in İstanbul according to the responsibility allocated to different policing agents which are (i) Agha of Janissaries, (ii) *Cebecibaşı*, (iii) *Kaptanpaşa*, (iv) *Topçubaşı* and (v) *Bostancıbaşı* (Demiröz, Babacan, & Çelikkilekli, 1973, p.5). The Janissaries, called *yasakci* or *kullukcu*, were representing the authority and control of the Sultan across the whole territory and fulfilling the function of police to fabricate social order against plunders and rebellions, meanwhile, they were free from local authorities like *kadı*, *subaşı* and governors and directly under the rule of the Center since the rule of Fatih Sultan Mehmet (İnalçık, 2014, p.130). *Yasakçı* was the name given mostly to the *kullukcu* personnel employed at local scale though there were also *yasakçı* at İstanbul (Tongur, 1946). *Yasakçı* was not only responsible for providing surveillance but also to control the process of collection of taxes and to ensure fair collection (İnalçık, 2014, p.146). Also, there were other watchmen in Ottoman Empire such as neighborhood watchmen, fire watchmen called

as watchmen of mansions, Pasbans of bazaars and woodsmen of groves, vineyards and orchards (Tongur, 1946, p.94).

Providing secure environment for commercial activities and the satisfaction of merchants were very significant for the Sultan and the ruling elites of Ottoman Empire. Thus, there were various regulations determining the rules of internal security production at local scale ranging from the road security to marketplace security services. For instance, access of Subaşı, Agha of Janissaries and other groups providing policing functions to the bazaars of was prohibited by the Sultan since merchants had their own organizational units such as pasban (private guards) for providing security at their workplace and this was recognized by the Sultan (Tongur, 1946, p. 35-8). Another example was the safety of road-commercial activity across the Ottoman territory. As Ortaylı (1979) stated that road security services were provided by the central authority in cooperation with the villagers living on the critical gates of the trade road called *derbent*. Villagers assigned to fulfill *derbent* duties could not be able to avoid providing services because it was an obligation for villagers (Tongur, 1946, p.103). These villagers providing security services and in return they were exempted from taxes but when merchants were exposed to robbery, these villagers should compensate their losses (Ortaylı, 1979, p.233).

While *Derbent Organization*³⁹ provided road security throughout Ottoman territory whereas the security of the capital city, İstanbul, provided by the Guild of Janissary and the security services were named as “*kulluk*”⁴⁰ (called *kolluk* today) (Özcan, 2002, p.1753). It is stated that there is not any detailed information about *kulluk* organization in Ottoman chronicles except from “*Mebde-i Kanun-ı Yeniçeri Ocağı Tarihi*” written in Moscow in XVII. Century. According to this document, “*kulluk* organization

39 Tongur (1946, p.105-109) stated that villagers responsible for road and gate security along the trade routes was named as *derbentçi*, while their names change according to the regions such as “*Martolos*” located along the Tuna River and “*Pandor*” employed in the regions where Serbian population lived.

40 The name of *Karakol*, Police Station in English, came from *Kolluk*’s of Janissaries keeping the peace on the territory because the duty of keeping peace on the sea was belong to *Bostancıbaşı* (İnalçık, 2014, p.146).

emerged in Fatih Period (1451-1481) and head of Janissary was also being the head of this organization.

The main prerequisite for the establishment of the kulluk organization in any area was the existence of demand coming from the dwellings of that area and in different documents stating the lists of kulluks in İstanbul, it is found that more kulluks established in the areas where artisans concentrated and population density was higher (Özcan, 2002, p.1754-7). In 17th century, because of the high population increase (46%) in Anatolian territory, there emerged landless peasants called Levend by the 17th century migrated to the city centers like İstanbul and accommodated in single rooms and it was witnessed that the number of murder and robbery was increased after their arrivals, which resulted in their relocation to out of the city by force (İnalçık, 2014; 8). Hence, the need for kulluks was increased in İstanbul.

Table 4. Breaking Points in the History of Policing at Ottoman Period

Date	Legal-Administrative Changes
20 March 1845	First Police Regulation
16 February 1846	Zaptiye Müşiriyeti (Police Ministry)
19 April 1846	Police Council
29 March 1891	First Police School
19 November 1891	Promotion Arrangements for Policemen
25 April 1893	Determination of Police Organization in the State Administration
4 August 1909	Zaptiye Nezaretı was abolished and Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdürü was established. It has become the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
6 November 1937	First Police Institute

Sources: Birinci (1999).

Although it has been widely accepted that Ottoman Empire was highly centralized, the dependency of the central state to the provincial magnates was high for both internal security and external aggression by the 18th century (Abou-El-Haj, 1991). At local scale, there were five types of policing forces which are (i) infantry and cavalry zaptiehs formed by local people called as “başı bozuk”-undisciplined ones, (ii) sekbans formed by local villagers voluntarily as zaptieh regiments, (iii) armorer zaptiehs, (iv)

temporary zaptiehs providing services for limited time period in a year (hıfziye) and (v) timar holders zaphies (Tongur, 1948, p.2).

As it was mentioned before, the first centralized modern police forces established in 18th century in Britain. In Turkey, reforms towards modern policing began in 1845 with the Polis Nizamı (Police Regulation) enacted in the Tanzimat period (1839-1876). Gülmez (1983) claimed that the founding document of police organization was adapted from the Regulation Defining the Duties of Chief Police of Paris (1 July 1800) and the comparison made by him revealed that Police Regulation – Police Council was based on the second section of the Paris Regulation. The first Turkish police activities, consisting of security work to protect property and the right to live and to secure reproduction of social life and to conduct surveillance in urban areas, were seen in İstanbul. Although there were various territorial practices to provide social order in different parts of the Empire, İstanbul was the first city where a centralized police force started to serve. Many different state administrations were responsible from security in different parts of İstanbul (Alyot, 1947). As Sönmez mentioned that the process of founding, construction and abolishment of the Police Council operated in Galata and Beyoğlu areas of İstanbul between 1845-1850 period was examined and after Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu announced, there emerged the need for new internal security measures and new organizations to establish security across the Ottoman Empire territory.

The history of policing practices and the organizational emergence of the police as a modern organization was the product of late-18th and early-19th centuries. The army was mainly responsible for providing internal security functions until late-18th century. In a related literature, especially in the analysis of Ottoman Empire, all organizational transformations of the state were accounted for modernization of the state and its administrative organization and functions (Ergut, 2004). Tanzimat Period led to the establishment of new administrative organizations due to the reasons arisen from land loss and diminishing territorial sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Modernization of the state and transformation of social control in Ottoman Empire was discussed by Ergut (2004) in relation to wider processes of state-building process by referring to the infrastructural and despotic power of the state. Following Mann's formulation, Ergut

(2004, p.11-18) argued that bureaucratic and professional organization of the centralized police forces and their separation from the army is one of the most important dynamics in the modernization process of Ottoman Empire. According to him, in terms of the practicing of surveillance and social control mechanisms via public police required to establish control over space and on society (especially the ones called vagabonds) because the main dynamics behind policing practices were to limit the movements vagabonds by forcing them to work or to leave the city and to protect the community of commerce in the city against vagabonds (Ergut, 2002, p.153). The need for changing administrative structure was arisen from the newly emerging social and economic developments. It was not possible to reproduce and to preserve existing state-society relations and emerging capitalist production relations created pressures on the world economic and political order. In order to understand and discuss these transformations in general and policing practices in particular, social, political, and economic practices should be analyzed from the mirror of social control, security, and policing practices. Since, for instance, the success of the empire is not only the success of the army but also the success of the land-production relations and the social order produced as a derivative of these relations though fluctuations and struggles observed in Ottoman history.

Nevertheless, until the collapse of the Empire and the foundation of Republic in 1923, there was not any well-developed, centralized, and strong modern policing organization throughout the whole territory of the Ottoman Empire, though there were a lot of attempts to achieve it. It should also be noted that Ottoman social formation was not organized according to the necessities of industrial capitalism, and its dominant mode of production was based on the production of small artisans and exportation of raw materials to foreign countries. Within the Republican period, the organizational power of the modern police force was centralized, institutionalized, and territorialized within its borders. During 1970s Turkish society politicized and “class based” politics and policies were become fundamental element determining social practices. Declining welfare policies and internal contradictions of capitalism led to the emergence of urban social movements. In this period, called as “Urbanization of Labour” (Şengül, 2001), urban security has become an important part of wider policing practices and urban has become both the place and space of political struggles. There

were “rescued zones” within cities in Turkey controlled by the people living in that area and labelled according to the political orientation of its residents. It can be argued that main determinant of that era was political orientation and urban space shaped by political struggles. This was not only struggle for controlling certain area but also this was struggle against capitalist social order and the state’s power and authority.

In addition, one of the most important developments in this period is the implementation of the "Police for the Society" organization. This organization was established to prevent leftist social uprisings and political protests that targeted the government and the capitalist social order. The formation of leftist political groups was viewed as a threat to social order. In addition to these areas, defending public spaces such as Kızılay and Sıhhiye in Ankara or Taksim in Istanbul was crucial for reproducing the hegemonic power of those in power and preventing the proletariat's hopes of uniting. When various social groups gathered in these public spaces to protest government policies, they became and remain symbols of resistance to the established social order. Thus, violence based policing tactics have been implemented in these areas, and these tactics and practices have resulted in the loss of lives. The symbolic and material importance of these areas has continued since the 1970s in Turkey.

Today, three legal arrangements (Law No. 3201, Law No.2559 and Law No.7245) can be referred to in order to understand the organizational structure of police forces and neighborhood watchmen, their rights, and their duties⁴¹. Firstly, the organizational structure of police forces is determined by the Law on Security Organization No. 3201 which was enacted in 1937 and amended many times. According to the first article of the Law, Ministry of Interior is responsible for the public security and public order affairs of the country and in order to fulfill this responsibility, General Directorate of Security and General Gendarmerie Command are determined as necessary organizations which are also defined by the Article 3 as the two main parts of general police organization. The Article 4 defined the police as is an armed enforcement and

⁴¹ At this point, municipal police officers working in local administrations in Turkey may also come to mind. However, the duties and powers of the municipal police and the duties and powers of the police are quite different from each other, hence, municipal police services are neglected in this study. For a detailed study on municipal police services in Turkey, see. Aslan et al. (2002).

police force and consists of two parts, uniformed and civilian. Besides this division, the Article 8 states the departments of law enforcement as administrative, political, and judicial departments. According to the Article 9, “Administrative police is the part that is responsible for ensuring social and public order”, “The political police is the part that is responsible for the works related to the public security of the State” and “The judicial police is a part of the staff that is separated from the staff by the General Directorate of Security in order to deal with forensic affairs in places where there is at least a full-fledged police station.” Therefore, responsibilities of the administrative police are going to be our main focus while analyzing the role, duties, and responsibilities of private security guards at urban scale since (as it is going to be discussed in a related chapters) private security guards have similar but limited responsibilities to prevent crime rather than having political or judicial functions or responsibilities. Secondly, Law on Police Duties and Authority No. 2559 was enacted in 1934 and duties and responsibilities of police forces have been determined according to this Law. Article 1 stated that “The police maintain the public order, the security of individuals, savings, and the innocence of the dwelling. It protects the honor, life and property of the people and ensures the rest of the public.” Hence, the priority of the police forces is to maintain social and public order which can be seen as the main motivation behind preventive policing. At this point, Article 2 stated that there are two duties of police forces which are preventive-administrative policing and judicial-investigator policing. The former is significant for understanding the complementary relationship between public and private policing as the only responsibility of private security forces in Turkey is to be prevent crime and fulfill surveillance function. As the first sentence of Article 16 stated that “If the police encounter resistance while doing their duty, they will try to break this resistance and is authorized to use force to the extent that it will break.” Thus, the condition for the use of force is determined as the presence of resistance. The second sentence of the Article 16 indicated that: “Within the scope of the authority to use force, according to the nature and degree of resistance and bodily strength, material strength in a gradually increasing proportion to neutralize those who resist and when the legal conditions are met, the gun can be used.” Therefore, as a rule in certain circumstances and conditions police forces have the right to use gun. Also, Additional Article 4 stated that “The police are responsible and authorized to seize, prevent, detect, preserve and deliver the

accused and crime evidence to the authorized police when faced with a crime, regardless of the branch, place and time of service within the boundaries of its jurisdiction”. This reveals that the boundary of its jurisdiction is significant issue for defining feature of place-boundedness of police service, yet, the priority of the police forces, unlike private security guards, is to “to seize, prevent, detect, preserve and deliver the accused and crime evidence to the authorized police when faced with a crime, regardless of the branch, place and time”. Thirdly, Law on Bazaar and Neighborhood Watchmen No.7245 is one of the most significant legal arrangements in defining the preventive role of public officials at urban scale. Article 1 stated that: “In order to assist the general law enforcement officers, bazaar and neighborhood watchmen are employed as an armed law enforcement agency within the police and gendarmerie organizations.” According to the Law, duties and powers assigned to Neighborhood Watchmen are as follows: public aid mission (Article 5)⁴², preventive and protective duties and powers (Article 6)⁴³, stop and ask for identification (Article

⁴²Article 5: “(1) The watchers of the bazaar and neighborhood, in terms of ensuring the rest, health and safety of the people within the territorial boundaries of their duties;

- a) To help those who get sick, get into an accident, fall, or in need of help in terms of their general condition,
- b) Delivering the women and children, orphans, the disabled and the helpless, who are deemed to need assistance, who are victims of violence or who are at risk of being abused or abused, to the nearest general law enforcement units,
- c) To give the necessary information to the applicants to inquire about a district, place, road or street,
- ç) To give priority to those within the power of request for assistance due to important and urgent situations such as birth, death, illness, accident, fire or disaster,
- d) Immediately warn the residents of the neighborhood in case of disasters such as fire and flood that pose a great danger,
- e) When an animal threatening public health and safety is encountered, to remove people from the area in order to prevent damage, to inform the relevant general law enforcement and the municipality, in charge and authority.”

⁴³ Article 6: “(1) Bazaar and neighborhood watchers;

- a) Carrying out patrol services in the region where they are assigned during duty hours,
- b) To complete the measures taken by the owners in the protection of properties such as residences, workplaces and vehicles within their jurisdiction,
- c) To notify the general law enforcement units to which they are affiliated, of any suspicious situation or persons they are familiar with, during their duty hours,
- ç) To take preventive measures until the arrival of the general law enforcement in order to prevent demonstrations, marches and disturbances that may disrupt public order,
- d) Notifying the general law enforcement units to which they are affiliated, of places suspected of manufacturing, selling or using drugs, gambling or prostitution within their jurisdiction,
- e) To prevent attacks and threats against the life, property and honor of individuals and to take the necessary measures until the general law enforcement officers arrive,
- f) To report malfunctions such as electricity, water, natural gas, sewerage affecting the residents of the neighborhood to the general law enforcement units and related institutions and organizations and to take the necessary preventive measures until the assigned teams arrive,
- g) To prevent those who disturb the peace and rest of the people and disturb others,

7), judicial duties and powers (Article 8)⁴⁴, force and authorization to use weapons (Article 9: "...has the authority to use force and weapons.") and duty to assist general law enforcement (Article 10: "The bazaar and neighborhood guards assist the general law enforcement officers in the tasks entrusted to the general law enforcement officers by legislation"). Therefore, neighborhood watchmen can be seen as public counterparts of private security guards, yet neighborhood watchmen's area of duty is wider than the private security guards and they have much more responsibility and rights as public officials. As a result, policing services have still been one of the main duties and responsibilities of the state. The emergence of private security services can be seen as a new phase re-defining and re-structuring the role of public law enforcement officials at urban scale. Yet, this does not mean that public bodies are leaving their places to the newcomers. On the contrary, the role of public law enforcements officials as being in the case of neighborhood watchmen have been increased since the 2020. The following part of the study is going to contextualize and to discuss how the policing services are practiced in urban space and how the commodified urban security services resulted in the production of spaces of surveillance.

2.3. Urban as a Locus of Policing and Commodified Security Services

"The police project, therefore, is mainly an urban project"
(Rigakos et. al., 2009, p.4).

ğ) Ensuring the removal of vehicles and other obstacles preventing traffic by blocking streets, passages and squares, and notifying the general law enforcement units to which they are affiliated when necessary,

h) Informing the general law enforcement in case of disasters and dangers such as fire, earthquake, flood and taking the necessary preventive measures until the duty teams arrive, in charge and authority."

⁴⁴ Article 8: "(1) The watchers of the bazaar and neighborhood, while the crime is committed or after it is committed, while their traces are still in the square;

a) Catching suspects,

b) To take measures to prevent the suspects they have caught from harming themselves or others,

c) To take the necessary preservation measures so that the evidence of the crime is not lost or corrupted,

ç) To determine the identity and address information of the witnesses of the event, if any, and to inform the general law enforcement units, in charge and authority.

(2) The watchers of the bazaar and neighborhood are in charge and authorized to catch and hand over to the general law enforcement forces they are affiliated with, if they see anyone for whom an arrest or warrant has been issued."

According to Harvey (1989) urbanization should be viewed as a spatially rooted social process in which a wide range of diverse players engage through a specific configuration of interconnected spatial practices, each with quite different goals and agendas while these spatial behaviors take on a clear class dimension in a class-bound society like capitalism, although not all spatial practices can be read in this way. However, he further stated that under capitalism, the necessity to control labor power and the wide range of class behaviors related to the circulation of capital, the reproduction of labor power, and class relations continue to be hegemonic (Harvey, 1989, p.5). As a result, the production of space can be read through the lens of capital accumulation as well as the perspective of labor force reproduction in terms of securitization of space, which contributes to the hegemony of capitalist relations at the urban scale. Urban space is playful space - a world of spontaneity where space and time boundaries have been abolished to for the unfettered play of individual creativity, but underneath the surface of the current urban landscape, the signal features are not playfulness but control, spontaneity but manipulation, and interaction but separation (Christopherson, 1994, p.409). More specifically, urban neoliberalism should be understood as the application of the logic of free market capitalism to the socio-spatial relationships that exist in cities (Rossi & Vanolo, 2015, p.846) including the provision of the urban security services. Thus, today, the reconfiguration of urban space depends on increased commodification, yet security is equally essential to preserving property values and generating revenue in contemporary cities and once more, the need for control leads to an urban environment that is homogenized and administratively segregated (Christopherson, 1994, p.419).

Furthermore, although there is a close relationship between space and policing, geographers allocated limited time to study it (Yarwood, 2007, p.448). The city has received extensive attention in criminological literature as both a setting for ambitious initiatives of inclusive and democratic social organization and as the location of growing dystopias of complete control and urban isolation (De Giorgi, 2006, p. 81). Urban space as a locus of privately provided security services is at the core of neoliberal agenda since “the most important goal of today’s urban policy is to mobilize city space as an arena of market-oriented economic growth protected by policing mechanisms either in a state-led or a private form” (Eick & Briken, 2014a, p.13). The

neoliberal restructuring in many developed and underdeveloped countries resulted in unemployment and growing poverty transformed into (in)security and (dis)order problems while commercial security companies have been promoted as the missing link between civil society and public police forces (Eick, 2006a, p.66). Therefore, fragmentation and polarization of urban space and society as “prosperity enclaves” between “islands of poverty” has a connection with the restructuring of state-run, private, and commercial security (Eick, 2003, p.370-371). Main determinants of this neoliberal restructuring of state-society relations at urban scale and forms of urban neoliberalism should be clarified in order to understand the relationship between transformation of security services and urban spatial developments. According to Harvey (1989) entrepreneurialism is the defining feature of this process and the new urban entrepreneurialism is typically based on a public-private partnership emphasizing investment and economic development, with the speculative construction of place rather than the amelioration of conditions within a specific territory as its immediate (though not exclusive) political and economic objective (Harvey, 1989, p.8). Hence, “urban entrepreneurialism (as opposed to the much more faceless bureaucratic managerialism) here meshes with a search for local identity and, as such, opens up a range of mechanisms for social control” (Harvey, 1989, p.14) and under urban neoliberalism, a citizen public shifted to a consumer public (Krinsky & Simonet, 2011) in accordance with the logic of entrepreneurialism. In this vein, as Eick (2006a, p.69) presented, space is being reproduced through commodification; semi-public areas like shopping malls and rent-a-cops are gaining virtually unrestricted access to all types of urban space, whether it be public, semi-public, or private.

Moreover, according to Eick and Briken (2014b, p.266), “the neoliberalized city does not only entail serious hardship for the urban populace but also brings about new policing strategies... so-called distressed neighborhoods and their surplus populations”. Since every neoliberal development depends on contextually relevant regulatory rearrangement techniques, there is no one "pure" form or "ism"; these conceptualizations of the project or regime emphasize the active mobilization of state institutions to extend commodification and support market rule rather than perceiving a reduction in state authority (Mayer & Künkel, 2012: 10–11). Therefore, despite the broad adoption of neoliberal discourses and policy formulations, there is no neoliberal

city, just as there is no pure "neoliberalism", as the quest for policy ideas and forms of governance has intensified on the urban scale, numerous place- and territory-specific patterns of neoliberalization have evolved (Mayer, 2018, p.484). Yet, there are also neoliberal policies followed by policymakers at the urban scale, revealing some sort of common pattern. According to Mayer, "urban services (what is left of them) have become increasingly privatized, and city governments have become purchasers rather than providers of services, with the goal of activating and entrepreneurializing "clients," while the enforcement of low wages and precarious working conditions, the restriction of tenants' and employees' rights, and the use of debt as a tool for sustaining habitual levels of spending and as a kind of discipline (Mayer, 2018, p.485). Namely, the increase of stop-and-frisk policies, identity checks, and surveillance technologies has had a disproportionately negative impact on people of color and immigrant groups, especially their youth; nonetheless, this disciplinary, oppressive aspect of neoliberal urbanization is gaining prominence in the government's response to political, militant, and riotous behavior (Mayer, 2018, p.489).

In this vein, entrepreneurial urbanism and growth requirements of market determines the urban policing and security practices (Samara, 2010, p.211). For instance, while it was asserted that although surveillance cameras are only one dimension of wider surveillance practices, "camera surveillance in the UK is a normal feature of city development that propagates the idea of 'capable guardians' and symbolizes the state imaginary with respect to urban order in the UK" (Coleman, 2005, p.133). In the replacement of streets with secured skyway systems, in the private airport quarters for business travelers, in the prominence of fences as design elements, and in the emergence of 'gated' housing developments as the fastest-growing mode of community living, there has been a marked increase in the use of security measures (Christopherson, 1994, p. 409-410). Increasing visibility of private security measures such as patrolling of private security guards, parking attendants and technological equipment such as CCTV, alarms, security passes etc. has become part of urban everyday life in managing private spaces (Yarwood, 2007, p.445). The logic of profit defined by (new) urban elites started to dominate agenda of policing entities to decide "what kind of social behavior and which whereabouts and what degree of visibility especially for the undesirables remains tolerable"(Eick, 2006b, p.8) and though urban

public spaces regarded as all-inclusive regardless of differences, it should be noted that being an ideological tool public/private differentiation emerges as a social product of capitalist production relations to determine who are allowed to be part of it who are not (Belina, 2011, p.15-17). Yet, on the other hand, according to Coleman (2005, p.144), injurious street behaviors that cause injury to women, racially victimized groups, and corporate victims are not on the radar of current urban surveillance language and practice and are deemed insignificant by the existing definitional grid of city governance. As a result of this, the visibility of “reserve army labor” at urban public space, as a socio-economic reality of capitalism, is regarded as a moral problem (Briken and Eick, 2011, p.22).

In addition, four dimensions as features of the neoliberalization of cities are identified by Mayer as: (i) the pursuit of growth; (ii) the adoption of entrepreneurial forms of governance; (iii) the process of intensified privatization; and (iv) the renewal of a toolkit for dealing with the intensifying social polarization (Mayer, 2018, p. 485–489). Firstly, by the pursuit of growth production of urban enclaves and privatized spaces of consumption has become main determinants in transforming the built environment (Mayer, 2018, p.485). Secondly, entrepreneurial forms of governance are being implemented in an increasing number of policy areas, where they are increasingly utilizing ostensibly more efficient business models and privatized forms of government and in contrast to the previous Keynesian mode of governance, which typically secured the consent of the governed through tripartite, corporate, and long-term designs, these novel modes of regulation, while less transparent and frequently not democratically legitimized, produce hegemony (if at all) by making flexible, small, and constantly changing concessions to specific groups, primarily middle-class-based and upwardly mobile groups (Mayer, 2018, p.486-487). Urban forms of governance also adopt an entrepreneurial mindset when utilizing municipal space as a platform for market-driven economic growth and these types of governance include initiatives aimed at involving locals in enhancing "security and order" and target pro-growth ideas (Eick, 2006a, p.73). Thirdly, privatization of the local public sector encompasses both destructive and creative moments, such as the loss of public monopolies for municipal services such as utilities, sewage, and mass transit, and the establishment of new markets for service delivery and infrastructure maintenance and privatizing train

stations or (quasi-public) retail malls has restricted access to community facilities and/or made their use more expensive (Mayer, 2018, p.487-488). Kempa et al. (1999, p.203) defined “new private urban spaces” which are gated residential communities, mass retail outlets, sporting and other leisure complexes as hybrid places offering open access to public as soon as obeying the rules determined by the owners and practiced by the private security guards. These places were named by Zedner (2009, p.61-2) as “contractual communities” purchasing security products and services from the growing market offering “private security solutions; personal insurance; purchase of security hardware (such as burglar alarms) and personal security services” (Zedner, 2009, p.64). Fourthly, it was stated that since the advent of neoliberal urbanization, social and socio-spatial polarization have been more pronounced and the prong of urbanism that is utilized considerably more frequently in times of austerity only includes tools and procedures that are oppressive and criminalizing. The majority of individuals who are subjected to this oppressive aspect of neoliberal politics are people from communities of color, undocumented immigrants, homeless people, informal laborers, and a rising number of new austerity victims (Mayer, 2018, p.488-489). For instance, the relationship between zero-tolerance policing and urban entrepreneurialism revealed that “zero-tolerance policing turns out to be a moment of urban entrepreneurialism, designed to serve as a means of fostering and pursuing interurban competition by making a safe, and perceived to be safe, city centre more attractive to consumers” (Belina & Helms, 2003, p.1863).

According to Christopherson, it is still conceivable to argue that modern cities are distinct from those of the 1950s and 1960s since this distinction is exemplified by the fortress-like nature of urban growth and the intensive administration of urban area and as social disintegration and rising economic inequality have made the city more dangerous, designs in response to danger, especially those to secure property, have altered the spatial relationship between public and private, a relationship based on a sense of shared ownership and control over the street (Christopherson, 1994, p.410). Security is determined one of the main characteristics of the new city by Sorkin (1992) and it is stated that with increasing degrees of manipulation and surveillance over its citizens, and a development of new forms of segregation, there is a concern with "security in the city where both technological and physical methods employed; while

the former consists of invasive policing technologies – domesticated versions of the "electronic battlefield" – and an increasing number of daily connections to the computer grid, ranging from encounters with automated teller machines to the comprehensive regulatory environment of the electronic workplace, the latter means are likewise diverse: parallel, middle-class suburban cities expanding on the outskirts of old centers abandoned by the impoverished; wealthy enclaves; gentrification (Sorkin, 1992, p.xiii-xiv). The dissemination of 'mass surveillance' tactics in post-modern cities were all highlighted by the increasing prevalence of CCTV systems, the emergence of 'gated communities,' and the language of situational crime prevention while all of these policies and practices reflect a strange post-Fordist rationality of control that is increasingly indifferent to the individual and geared toward broad categories of (possibly harmful) "others." (De Giorgi, 2006, p.80).

Deciphering and questioning neoliberal urban security regime require discussions on the transformation of policing practices determining the urban spatial practices in fragmented urban spaces because historically, urban has been a place or in Giddens's formulation locale for policing practices. In terms of domination and suppression policing materialized in urban space by means of social control and surveillance mechanisms. Thus, it is significant to discuss this process in its relationship with capitalist social relations fabricated through new urban spatial practices and spatial formations. There are numerous reasons for the private provision of urban security services, but two significant processes observed at the urban scale are the decline of traditional public spaces and the changing nature of land and property relations giving rise to commercially owned urban spaces (Jones and Lister, 2015, p.252). This section deals with these issues and tries to provide a conceptual framework both in terms of urban and security dimensions for analyzing the geography of urban security services provided by private security companies in Ankara, Turkey.

2.3.1. Territoriality of/and Urban Security Services

There can be found many different definitions of territory and territoriality⁴⁵ in a related literature. Some authors only define territory while others discussed territoriality. The differences between these two concepts arisen from meaning – determined by the social practices in each historical circumstance – attributed to them. Therefore, first there is the need for a brief discussion of these concepts to make judgments about its significance for the analysis of urban security as a territorial issue.

Territory and territoriality are related concepts that are influenced by historically situated spatial practices and have connotations of enclosure, power dynamics, defining boundaries, maintaining control over a specific area, and other things. Elden, for example, argued that "Territory can be understood as a political technology: it comprises techniques for measuring land and controlling terrain" in response to Foucault's assessments of security and governmentality (Foucault, 2010, p.811). In his view, territory could not be taken for granted, nor approached through the notion of territoriality because it led to the undermining the historical and geographical specificity of territory both as a practice and a form (Foucault, 2010, p.757-758). Hence, he asserted that before grasping the meaning and importance of territoriality, one should, first, understand territory. Nevertheless, for some scholars these two concepts seem referring same things and relations. For instance, due to their historically and socially influenced differences, Kärholm (2007) incorrectly classified territory and territoriality as being synonymous concepts. Thus, it is important to make clear what this study means when it refers to territoriality when discussing urban security as a territorial issue. The arguments developed in this study are benefited from three main approaches in territoriality discussions represented by the works of Soja (1971), Sack (1983) and Raffestin (1984). Though they have some basic epistemological differences in approaching to the territoriality, they present an opportunity of grasping different aspects of the term in diversified historical and geographical configurations. Soja, firstly, described territoriality as "a behavioral phenomenon associated with the organization of space into spheres of influence or

⁴⁵ Ideas discussed in this section and other parts of the thesis referred territoriality is based on the paper presented in Ekistics Conference in Ankara by the author of the thesis in 2013.

clearly demarcated territories which are made distinctive and considered at least partially exclusive by their occupants or definers” (Soja, 1971, p.19). According to his definition, it is obvious that territoriality emerges by the behavior of human beings spatially signifying the rule over a given territory which determines the access to certain territories. This kind of conceptualization offers a chance to understand the exercise of territoriality as a process depending on the ownership (it might not be in a legal form that is defined by the liberal state) of a land or a space through the social practices of people. Thus, in capitalist societies, the exercise of territoriality is conditioned and bounded with the existing class-based divisions within the society. The accesses to certain places or the prevention of the entrance (as private security guards play a significant role) are arisen from the differences between social classes, rather than being a natural process of the development of human beings as a species. Yet, Soja did not put the issue in that way, his conceptualization suggests thinking territoriality both in individual and societal scale while the latter indicating “political organization of space” (1971, p.20), which provides a chance of questioning its social practice in capitalist societies. Secondly, Sack (1983, p.55) defined the term as “the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions, interactions, or access by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographic area”. Sack’s definition provides a chance to discuss how different agents practice territoriality by controlling not only through a geographical area but also people, their relationship, and the way they behave. Hence, territoriality is not referring to something physical, fixed, and stable, on the contrary, it is a relationship determined within a given social context (Sack, 1983, p.56-57). While such kind of analysis of territoriality suggesting the analysis of social facts seeking for social practices, it may cause to fall into a trap of actor-based analysis excluding the social structure in a secondary position. However, this study, by questioning the transformation of both practice and organizational structure of urban security, tries to overcome such kind of possible problems. Lastly, according to Raffestin, territoriality refers to “the system of relations of a collectivity or an individual with exteriority and/or alterity by means of mediators” (Raffestin, 1977) (as cited in Raffestin, 1984, p.141). In his approach there are two kinds of territoriality which are the concrete (spatial organization) and the abstract (social organization), both of which play the role of mediator for specific relations (Raffestin, 1984, p.139-140). In his perspective, for instance, dysfunctioning if the mode of mediation emerges

when the high probability of being a victim of violence prevents one to visit certain parts of city on certain times which in turn reducing the territoriality of one or several relations (Raffestin, 1984, p.144). Therefore, the exercise of territoriality determined by or connected to the possible ways offered as alternatives to access certain places. Urban security, as a result, is one of the constitutive parts of territoriality both as a facilitator and a producer of the exercise of territoriality. His conceptualization of territoriality as a dialectical process of territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization (Raffestin, 2012) suggests the dynamic process of changes in the practice of territoriality. In a similar way, production of urban security requires territorialization-deterritorialization-reterritorialization through everyday practices of different social actors ranging from the organized one such as public police forces of private security guards to an ordinary citizen.

Nevertheless, each definition should be thought within the limits of the thinkers' theoretical assumptions about the concept. Because when Agnew (1994) wrote the article called "Territorial Trap" he tried to show how it is wrong to claim that "territorial state" is an unchanging entity rather than gaining meanings according to the historical-geographical circumstances (Agnew, 1994, p.53). Like Agnew's account (1994, p.70), seeing the territorial state-society is a historically and geographically contingent one, this study tries to establish some sort of link between historical-geographical circumstances revealing shift in the practice and production of urban security services and the construction of territoriality of urban security in neoliberal era. For instance, territory of the state and territoriality exercised within different social formations are bounded with the development level of productive forces. Territoriality exercised in each capitalist society by its representational organizational form, the nation-state seen as a fixed territory, enabling the practice of territoriality by the police forces in every sphere of everyday life. It shapes and dialectically shaped by the social practices of different social classes. The boundaries of urban security provided by different authorities – public/private – are the result of inequalities in capitalist societies. Hence, dichotomies such as inside/outside, ours/others etc. can only be meaningful when it is understood as being constitutive part of the whole carrying some features of the same whole. Social relations produce territoriality and there is not ahistorical existence of territoriality. Dynamics of the practices of privately provided

urban security can be understood by looking into daily policing and surveillance practices and actors of these practices.

In this vein, in the literature, territoriality and urban security have not analyzed in detail except a few studies. One of the most significant research projects were made by Herbert (2000) on Los Angeles Police Department called “Policing Space” discussed territoriality as a practices of police officers to establish control over urban space. His discussions mainly focused on how and why police exercise territoriality (Herbert, 2000, p.3). Although he questioned Weberian-inspired works in neglecting periphery despite center, over-emphasizing rationality and under-developed empirical studies, his study can also be criticized being too much state-centric and neglecting other aspects and actors of territorial practices (Herbert, 2000, p.15-16). As a result, there is the need for discussing territoriality of urban security where the free-market principles are in practice and where it is not only the public police but also private security companies and even the communities itself are constitutive part of the exercise of territoriality.

To conclude, both in a concrete and an abstract way, urban security is one of the most important parts of publicity in capitalist societies because it shows both the power of the state and the citizens' agreement with it. Thus, it requires some sort of territorial order to be established. As it is mentioned above in the discussions, in the case of urban security, the main actor of territoriality can be seen as the public police. However, territoriality is exercised not only by the police but also by the community itself and private security guards. It can take the form of direct community control in a given neighborhood – community policing⁴⁶ – as a collaboration between citizens and police, or it can take the form of private security guards employed by community

⁴⁶ As quoted by Nalla and Boke (2011, p.286), there are four possible meanings of community policing which are: “Firstly, community policing is an ideology (Manning 1984) that includes such aspects as police legitimacy and the existence of close community-police relations and interactions. Secondly, community policing has programmatic content that includes broad political aims to promote close working relationships with the community (Manning 1989; Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994; Cordner 1997). Thirdly, community policing is pragmatic as programs were designed in response to perceived citizens’ discontent with impersonal, cold, and bureaucratic police organizations (Manning 1984). And finally, community policing has organizational structures and dimensions, which imply an operating philosophy, long-range strategic plan, and an organizational value system to support working relationships with community groups (Greene 1998)”.

members living in the same urban housing sites known as gated communities, and private security guards employed by various organizations ranging from the public to the private. Like “the emergence of territories of new economy” (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2012, p.213) in transition from feudalism to capitalism, in new phases within capitalism it is seen that *new capital accumulation processes result in the production of new territories and territorial orders*. Therefore, the dual characteristics of the emergence of private security companies can be seen both as being the product of commodification process in neoliberal era and being the historical-geographical result of the capitalist urbanization processes.

2.3.2. Commodification of Urban Public Spaces

“The world of the shopping mall – respecting no boundaries, no longer limited even by the imperative of consumption – has become the world”
(Crawford, 1992, p.30).

The idea of urban public space as being a locus of accessibility and openness to all people in a democratic society has been in decline since the 1980s. Increasing tendencies towards commodification and privatization have been resulted in both redefinition of the openness and accessibility. Rather than attempting to force people from different backgrounds to become one, public spaces work to foster understanding and acceptance so that people can celebrate their similarities and differences while also taking advantage of the opportunity for co-visibility that these spaces provide (Kärrholm, 2012, p.126). Unquestionably, the commercialization of urban space has led to a tremendous increase in the extent to which residents are constantly monitored in the public sphere (Wakefield, 2004, p.542). In other words, the ones who are eligible to have access to certain urban “public” spaces and the notion of openness turned into a new area of struggle determined by politically and socially while surveillance provide necessary tools for order maintenance. Thus, the exclusion of homeless individuals, ethnic minorities, and others from public space is therefore frequently seen as a political act with profoundly political consequences: it affects who is and who may be a member of the public (Mithcell & Staehli, 2009, p.512). In this vein, geography of the public space can be understood as “the relationship between the physical materiality of specific kinds of (generally) publicly accessible spaces, the

processes that structure inclusion and exclusion, and the struggles to change (or maintain) both the structures and form of public space” (Mitchell & Staeheli, 2009, p.513). Moreover, public spaces became increasingly distinguished by traits such as “privatized, walled, and/or restricted for those who are “members” rather “citizens”” (Low, 2006, p.100). Since the defining property relations has changed and the private spaces gained priority over the public ones at urban scale and “some publicly accessible space (malls, festival marketplaces) is privately owned” (Mitchell & Staeheli, 2009, p.515). The distinction between what is private and what is public has recently grown blurred, and privatization and other neoliberal practices have been altering public space and handing it back to corporations or for-profit businesses (Low, 2006, p.82). Privatization is the reason why public space is disappearing, and private ownership eventually replaces public spaces like town squares and is replaced by commercial spaces like shopping malls and theme parks, which maintains existing segregation trends while making it simpler to guarantee that entrepreneurs do not encounter homeless individuals, customers do not interact with residents, and the wealthy do not see the destitute (Kohn, 2005, p.3-6).

Furthermore, Kurt Iveson (1998) identified four models of public space which are “ceremonial public space; community public space; liberal public space; and multi-public public space”. In Iveson's analysis of four models of public space—models that refer to both specific arrangements of physical space and certain ideals advanced by theorists of public life—concepts of exclusion and access are also prominent (Collins & Shantz, 2009, p.517). Firstly, according to the "ceremonial model," authentic public space, is place that symbolizes the triumph of the public over the market, typically through state ownership and large-scale civic design which are the big venues where key events in the national, state, or local history can be commemorated (Iveson, 1998, p.22). Second model prioritize the quality of 'public life' fostered by various types of public space is of utmost importance and many urban planners have investigated the relationship between public space and community and have concluded that a space's 'publicness' is based not on state ownership, but on its capacity to cultivate or house community (Iveson, 1998, p.23). Thirdly, pre-WWII liberal capitalist cities' parks and inner-city streets inspire a liberal public space paradigm and excellent public space is open and accessible to everybody, ignoring social disparity. Citizens participate in

daily life and public issues there and this approach emphasizes inclusion and exclusion more than ceremonial or communal forms (Iveson, 1998, p.25-26). Fourthly, the multi-public model of public space substitutes the liberal model's universal public sphere with an organized environment for several publics to interact and leans clearly on Habermas' critiques of the liberal public sphere. Revisionist historians say subaltern or counter-publics form to promote their own interests in the public realm. Counter-publics allow marginalized people to build their own cultural standards and define their interests collectively (Iveson, 1998, p.27). According to Madanipour, public space, as it currently exists, no longer contributes as significantly to urban life as it once did because the public area served as a hub for sociability, commerce, religion, and politics in the smaller cities of agrarian communities, whereas the development of the large industrial city, the dissolution of social ties, and the atomization of urban populations all caused the public events to be dispersed across numerous locations, especially high-rise corporate headquarters in the new cities, which took over the symbolic and functional values of the public space (Madanipour, 2015, p.790). Therefore, it is argued that “public spaces play a central role in the development of spaces of experience and in encouraging consumption, to the extent that they might be even seen in some instances as the preconditions for the development of new consumerist activities in an area” (Madanipour, 2015, p.790).

In this vein, today, shopping malls serve as crucial examples of how the meanings of urban public places has changed over time. Shopping malls can be seen as prototypes of privately owned publicly consumer spaces originated from the USA⁴⁷ and “referred to as covered shopping centers in a complex or new buildings housing a variety of retail units with a number of anchor stores and entertainment facilities” (Rice, 2009, p.312). According to Crawford, for example, “by reproducing the city inside its walls,

⁴⁷ Rice (2009, p.312) explained the development stage of shopping malls and their evolution in the USA as follows: “This type of development is largely associated with the first prototype built in 1956 at Southdale outside Minneapolis by mall guru and architect Victor Gruen. Malls can be at in-town or out-of-town locations where they have become the cornerstones of suburban life. Malls at both locations can be further subdivided into a number of different types depending upon the size, scale, and extent of service function. Based on the experience of the US, ‘regional malls’ are defined as having at two department stores and a 100 shops and attracting customers as far as 20 miles away (smaller in the UK). ‘Super regional malls’ have at least five department stores and up to 300 shops attracting customers from up to 100 miles away. ‘Mega malls’ are even bigger in scale again in the West Edmonton Mall (WEM) and the Mall of America. In 2006, the ‘mega mall’ was dwarfed by the opening of a monolithic development, the Mall of Asia outside Manila in the Philippines”.

the mall suggested that it was safe and cleaner to experience New York inside its climate-controlled spaces than on the real streets outside” (Crawford, 1992, p.24). Also, Davis (1992) discussed any truly democratic urban area will be destroyed as a result of the battle to secure the city and for example, traditional streets have been replaced by the "public" areas of the new megastructures and supermalls, which have controlled their spontaneity; public activities are segregated into purely functional sections inside shopping malls, business hubs, and cultural complexes under the watchful eyes of private police forces. Therefore, malls with a high level of security now offer a safe urban environment with a clientele similar to that of their suburban equivalents (Crawford, 1992, p.23). Additionally, a parallel reconfiguration of electronic space is occurring in tandem with the architectural privatization of the physical public sphere, as carefully guarded, pay-access databases and subscription cable services seize control of the invisible agora (Davis, 1992, p.155). Shopping malls fulfill two duties at the same time; they are privately owned public spaces produced for encouraging consumption and they also serve as workplaces for the service sector workers (Crawford, 1992). Hence, as “Gottdiener (2000) argued that malls entail the commodification of “public” space, and whereas traditional public spaces exist to support every social form, malls exist to promote consumption” (as cited in Manzo, 2005, p.84). A range of tactics that rely on "indirect commodification," a practice in which non-saleable items, activities, and images are purposefully inserted into the mall's commodified universe, have helped malls attain financial success (Crawford, 1992, p.14).

Exploring the reasons behind the expansion and growth of private security in urban areas in United States, Canada and the United Kingdom until 1980s, Shearing and Stenning (1981, p. 193) argue that the growth of private security as a process of reshaping and reorganizing modern policing is facilitated by the shifts in nature of property relations implying the emergence of mass private property at urban scale which encouraged them to name this new condition as a new disciplinary society. Their article concentrated on the modern private security as a historical transformation in policing practices through discussing some issues which are (i) what makes private security as private, (ii) what are the components of it, (iii) its size as an economic industry, (iv) the role of private security in production of social order and division of

labour between police and private security and (v) the reasons behind its growth. It is argued that there are two alternative accounts for the growth of private security which are (i) historical one establishing relations with the decrease in state budget and in the number of police as a result of economic crisis of the state paved the way for its growth and (ii) structural one based on a fiscal crisis of the state but dealing with geographical consequences of economic changes such as the emergence of industrial towns which are in need of private security control (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, p.226-227). Based on the structural explanation their emphasis on the property relations for explaining the reasons behind its growth has been attracting attentions of scholars. They argue that shifts in property relations as a form of “mass private property”, being defined as a “control over large tracts of property by corporate interests dominated by relatively small numbers of people”, contributed to the growth of private security in 1970s (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, p.228). Shearing and Stenning suggests that “large corporations controlling extensive industrial and commercial facilities, as well as large residential complexes, who are the principal users of modern private security rather than local grocery stores and individual homeowners” (1981, p.229).

Therefore, increasingly, social activities take occur on privately owned property rather than in traditional public settings and the importance of shopping malls, entertainment centers, and other private facilities for public assembly and social networking has increased throughout time (Zhang, 2017, p.3465). Zhang proposed a model of classification according to three dimensions to clarify the nature of a mass private property and brings order to the conceptual confusion surrounding the identification of physical mass private property facilities (2017, p.3465-2476). The below table summarized his main identifications to understand the certain characteristics of properties in order to determine whether they are mass private property or not.

Drawing on three setting of mass private property, a shopping mall, a retail and leisure complex and a cultural center, Wakefield argued that “‘people watching people’, by means of localised foot patrol and closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance, was the fundamental feature of a commercial management strategy” and governmental strategies were employed “for engaging non-state organisations in crime control as a shared responsibility, extending the surveillance capabilities of the police with respect

to local populations in general, and ‘troublesome’ individuals in particular” in British case (Wakefield, 2004, p.530). While Shearing and Stenning’s arguments on the growth of private security sector put more emphasis on the importance of privately owned but publicly used spaces whereas there are other places owned by the state such as parks or private spaces such as gated communities that security has been provided by the private security guards and Wakefield shed light on the significance of mass private property in responsabilisation via surveillance of communities.

Table 5. Zhang’s Classification on the Features of Ideal Mass Private Property

The Features of an Ideal Mass Private Property (MPP)	
	Ideal Features
Real-estate Dimension	MPP is privately owned
	MPP is open for public use
	MPP is consumerist
Legal Dimension	The private owners have full disposal rights
	Private regulation of MPP applies to the ‘reasonable access rule’
Sociological Dimension	MPP has publicness
	MPP is socially used beyond the scope of business

Source: Zhang, 2017, p.3476.

According to Jones and Newburn (1999b, p.112) the term "mass hybrid property" has more meaning than the term "mass private property” because the expansion of mass private property is a significant development, but it is not the primary driver of change in Britain. In relation to urban space, there is both the process of fragmentation and the progressive commodification of space. The important point here is that the realities of space in late modern society are so complicated that they cannot adequately be captured by the private/public dichotomy. To this extent, changes in the nature of space are likely to affect the policing division of labour. The more 'private' space is the more likely it is to be policed by ‘private’ policing organisations. The situation can be identified as "hybrid places," which are neither unequivocally public nor unambiguously private (Jones and Newburn, 1999b, p.115). Nevertheless, Jones and Newburn warned us that despite how crucial they are, the reasons behind changes in the division of labor in police cannot be boiled down to spatial considerations and although understanding how space is changing, especially in urban settings, will

continue to be essential to understanding the nature of police, the spatial aspect of policing is tied to other aspects of policing, each of the characteristics has contributed to the shifting police labor division, which has seen a particularly noticeable increase in private security as one of its components (Jones and Newburn, 1999b, p.115-6). Similarly, Kempa et al. (2004) claimed that in particular these novel types of public space, of which mass private property is simply one embodiment, can be understood in the context of broader transformations in the nature of property relations and they also contend that by using the concept of "communal spaces," one need not restrict their analysis of police trends to the reappearance of paid private security forms and many recent interrelated advances in "low" and "high" public policing as well as autonomous non-state policing can be positioned within the rise of the forms of "communal space" (Kempa et al. 2004, p.572-573).

To sum up, as private property grew in popularity, state police were less able to maintain public order in areas where it was not their responsibility, and private property owners increasingly turned to the services of "private police" and "private security" firms to protect their assets which resulted in the conclusion that increasing levels of private property encourage the development of private police forces, which in turn contributes to the proliferation of police agencies (Palmer & Whelan, 2007, p.403). Yet, there are many other questions on the impact of commodification of public spaces and surveillance on the experienced urban public spaces. Harvey's criticized the existing relations of property and the relationship between privatization of public places, malls-surveillance and publicness and asked that:

... how it might be possible to encourage political participation in an urban world constructed out of segregated suburbs, gated communities, privatized spaces, and shopping malls under surveillance and downtown streets monitored (thanks, these days, to some shadowy form of governance in U.S. cities called a "business partnership") with a video camera at every corner" (Harvey, 2006, p.17).

Therefore, the surveillance practices are going to be discussed in the next section to understand the underlying dynamics and generative mechanisms of the production of surveillance spaces by means of private security services.

2.3.3. Surveillance and Urban Space

Surveillance is defined as the systematic monitoring of actors' behaviors in order to generate personal data as in geographers' work, it has been most strongly associated with the emergence of state and capitalist bureaucratic apparatuses, though it has been one of the features of all societies (Henry, 2009, p.95). Yet, as technology advancements have accelerated, monitoring targeted population has increased in areas that are geographically constrained. Concreteness of the surveillance, security or violence and their spatial representations both produced within space and by means of space.

Today, the geographic scope of regulation and surveillance has shifted from the building to the greater environment (business improvement district, commercial development, or shopping mall) (Christopherson, 1994, p.413). For instance, uniformed security guards of shopping malls watched over closed-circuit televisions (CCTV) behind a glass wall and panopticon monitors every area of the shopping center, alerting customers to its omnipresence and turning ordinary security procedures into a show of assurance and deterrence (Crawford, 1992, p.27). Graham et al. argued that "closed circuit television (CCTV) camera systems are rapidly becoming a taken-for-granted element" of the British urban landscape which are increasingly viewed as a new and cost-effective part of the local policy "tool kit" for addressing a variety of urban issues, including reducing crime, boosting consumer and business confidence in town centres, and bolstering the economic competitiveness of urban areas in the United Kingdom (Graham et al., 1996, p.1). They argued that citizens are increasingly being watched by a horde of electronic eyes at almost all times as they go about their daily lives in the landscapes of towns and cities and as people go about their daily lives, they continuously leave a stream of "electronic images" on various CCTV systems. (Graham et al., 1996, p.2). CCTV is often used as a means of securing public spaces and it aims to raise awareness of criminal and antisocial conduct in an effort to improve police responses and promote better self-control and as the primary justification for the widespread installation of CCTV is that it reduces crime and enhances safety as part of urban renewal initiatives and initiatives to maintain the moral order of public areas (Collins & Shantz, 2009, p.520).

In addition, as aforementioned before, territoriality of state is a significant component of socio-spatial ordering. In this regard, surveillance as a mechanism employed by the state, is used to control access to the territory of the state and to defend state itself against the unwanted internal political activities called as ‘the political geography of surveillance’ (Koskela, 2000, p.245). Yet, surveillance is much more than monitoring population, as Fernandez & Scholl (2014, p.276) claimed that it is also one way of practicing repression since “...repression is not only what happens on the streets... It also includes monitoring and surveying, following, and undermining, threatening, and pervading, chronicle and indexing...”. According to Lyon (2007, p.94): “... surveillance helps to classify areas as, for instance, ‘hot spots’ – whether these are defined by police, marketers or sports fans – and to determine who should be present when and where, who is ‘out of place’, and who is likely to be visible to whom while they are there”. The reason behind the rise of surveillance cameras at urban space is assumed to be a response given to the global crisis of capitalism at the end of the 21st century (Fuchs, 2013, p.684). The below long quotation made from Fuchs summarized the whole relationship between capitalism and surveillance as follows:

Capitalist society is based on the instrumental and competitive logic of accumulation that stratifies society and, as a result, creates economic, political, cultural, social and ecological problems. Surveillance is connected to these ongoing stratification processes. It is the collection of data on individuals or groups to control and discipline their behaviour. It can be exercised through threats of targeting someone by violence. Surveillance is an expression of instrumental reason and competition: it is based on the idea that certain individuals or groups are watched and that data on their behaviour, ideas, look, etc. are gathered so that the targets can be controlled and disciplined and as an effect of these disciplines will choose certain actions and avoid others that are considered undesirable. Competitive interests and behaviours are involved, the controlling group, class or individuals try to force the surveilled to avoid certain actions by conveying to the latter that information on them is available that could be used for actions that could have negative influences on their lives. Surveillance operates with threats and fear; it is a form of psychological and structural violence that can turn into physical violence. Surveillance is a specific kind of information gathering, storage, processing and assessment, and its use involves potential or actual harm, coercion, violence, asymmetric power relations, control, manipulation, domination and disciplinary power. It is an instrument and a means for trying to derive and accumulate benefits for certain groups or individuals at the expense of other groups or individuals. It tries to bring about or prevent certain behaviours of groups or individuals by gathering, storing, processing, diffusing, assessing and using data so that potential or actual physical, ideological or structural violence can be directed against humans in order to control and steer their behaviour (Fuchs, 2013, p.684-685).

Surveillance, employed as a mode of governance⁴⁸, contributes reproduction of social divisions by creating “data subjects” (Lyon, 2002, p.242). This process is not a unidirectional and does not employ repressive use of force. Rather, subjects have been active participants of it via allowing and giving direct or indirect permissions to data gathering electronic surveillance mechanisms such as “making telephone calls, using credit cards, passing our hands over entry scanners, claiming benefits, walking down the camera-watched street, surfing the ‘net, and so on” (Lyon, 2002, p.252). One of the most striking aspects of surveillance at urban scale is its constant nature crosscutting time and space (Lyon, 2007, p.95). Thus, as Lyon (2001, p.51) asserted that “urban experience involves the regulation of daily life. ... social sorting process, which depends on surveillance, is based increasingly on attempts to predict and to stimulate behaviours: in other words, ‘stimulating sorting in the city’”. Similarly, Zedner (2009, p.74) pointed out that "new surveillance technologies" subject more people, both citizens and non-citizens, to social sorting methods that determine which people should be categorically suspected and subject to closer monitoring. Today, according to Haggerty and Ericson's (2000, p.606) claims, the new system of surveillance can be identified as ‘surveillance assemblage’ which “operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled into distinct ‘data doubles’ which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention”. They asserted that this assemblage functions across both state and extra-state institutions, unlike Orwell's totalitarian state-centered Oceania (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p.610).

The surveillance camera systems, for instance closed-circuit television (CCTV), being “part of a social ordering strategy which although not always coherent designates who can legitimately use public space, where and when” (Coleman & Sim, 2000, p.634). Because the key target of CCTV is determined as “to deny, or render invisible, the unequal social relations and/ or incongruent behavioral activities that neoliberal city building finds morally and politically unacceptable” (Coleman, 2003, p.22).

⁴⁸ “By suggesting that surveillance has become a means of governance, I mean that it serves to organize social relationships and contributes to patterns of social ordering. It does so largely through what Michel Foucault called biopower, making people up by classifying them according to categories” (Lyon, 2002, p.249).

Nevertheless, analyzing the UK as a case for “Street Camera Surveillance” Coleman (2004, p.199) claimed that: “The efficacy of CCTV is questionable, and its significance may be understood less for its ‘crime prevention’ potential and more for its success in reinforcing a long-established scrutiny and criminalisation of the activities of the least powerful inhabitants of urban areas...”. He defended the idea that “... the drive for the ‘good order of city streets’ has placed CCTV as the new orthodoxy in responding to a range of urban problems, including crime, and as a key component in a wider criminalisation process that routinely incorporates private actors and agencies” (Coleman, 2004, p.201). On the one hand, surveillance camera systems are used to stigmatise vulnerable groups such as homeless people and small-time street traders to establish spatial ordering and control to enable secure and safe uses of public space via monitoring entrepreneurial landscapes (Coleman, 2004, p.207). On the other hand, the uneven distribution of victimisation and policing practices across the urban space resulted in “the construction of underscrutinised spaces that enhance possibilities for the powerful to evade responsibility and accountability for their actions” (Coleman et al., 2005, p.2526).

In terms of spatial practice, Koskela (2000, p.251) suggested that urban space can be thought of as "power-space" in terms of surveillance: a place where disciplinary procedures are permeated and the goal of surveillance cameras is to exercise control over undesirable behavior, lessen crime, and maintain the safety of an area. Therefore, regarded as a matter of power, there can be found two sides of surveillance cameras which are those behind the camera and those under surveillance (Koskela, 2000, p.256). As a result, it can be claimed that CCTV continues to enhance the reach and power of neoliberal objectives and within neoliberal order techniques (Coleman, 2003, p.30).

In the current context, many segments of society and policy bodies perceive CCTV as a quick-fix technical answer to many of the crime-related issues plaguing urban areas (Graham et al., 1996, p.3). Nevertheless, CCTV by itself is not the answer, in fact, it might result in issues down the road and might merely move the crime elsewhere; it may help turn the open and democratic nature of public areas into "fortressed" commercial ghettos where entrance is determined arbitrarily by a person's appearance

and supported by increasingly sophisticated face and crime databases rather than on the idea of rights to citizens (Graham et al., 1996, p.25).

Furthermore, Fuchs (2013) tried to discuss surveillance as economic surveillance in relation to capital accumulation process. It was argued that “Marx’s distinction between the sphere of production and the sphere of circulation, and between constant capital and variable capital, allows different forms of economic surveillance to be systematically distinguished”. (Fuchs, 2013, p.677). As can be followed in the Figure 3, Fuchs determined six forms of surveillance which are “applicant surveillance, workplace surveillance, workforce surveillance, property surveillance, consumer surveillance and surveillance of competition” (Fuchs, 2013, p.684) according to sphere of the accumulation process and target of surveillance.

Fuchs’s (2013) study makes an important contribution to the discussion on the role of surveillance in contemporary capitalist society by integrating Marxist analysis of capital accumulation. Following Fuchs, it can be asserted that privately provided urban security services proved to be in the sphere of production in three fundamental aspects which are “workplace surveillance”, “workforce surveillance” and “property surveillance” by means of private security guards, surveillance cameras, alarm systems etc.

In addition, geographers studied what some have dubbed the "place ballet," which formed from the largely unscripted but nevertheless norm-structured interactions of people going about their daily lives, hanging around, and moving through, in order to better understand the relative liveliness of urban public areas and according to researchers from this school, the threat to public space comes from the homogenization of daily life caused by modernist urban design and planning, suburbanization (which is also a victory of private over public interest), or just plain neglect as people neglect the street life in favor of television's allure (Mitchell & Staeheli, 2009, p.511). Pioneering figure of the school of geographers is Jane Jacobs and in her seminal book, called *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, Jane Jacobs (1961, p.30), discussed one of the uses of sidewalks in terms of safety as claimed that “to keep city safe is fundamental task of a city’s streets and its sidewalks”. Thus, she claimed that

in order to secure city spaces, there is the need for increasing safety of sidewalks. To defend her claims, two points were clarified by her as such (Jacobs, 1961, p.31-32):

...the first thing to understand is that the public peace – the sidewalk and street peace – of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves and enforced by the people themselves. ... The second thing to understand is that the problem of insecurity cannot be solved by spreading people out more thinly, trading the characteristics of cities for the characteristics of suburbs. If this could solve danger on the city streets, then Los Angeles should be a safe city because superficially Los Angeles is almost all suburban.

Sphere of the accumulation process	Surveillance target	Description	Surveillance methods (examples)
Circulation	Potential variable capital (v)	<i>Applicant surveillance:</i> Surveillance of potential employees	Access to criminal records, health databases, bank data, employment histories and other databases; talks with former employers and supervisors, information searches on the Internet
Production	Variable capital (v)	<i>Workplace surveillance:</i> Surveillance of labour force at the workplace	Managers, supervisors, workplace surveillance technologies, databases, corporate identities, integrative management strategies, participatory management, identification systems, electronic work flow systems, e-mail surveillance, surveillance of employees' Internet activities; fixation of workers' knowledge, answers to problems and best practices in databases
Production	Variable capital (v)	<i>Workforce surveillance:</i> Surveillance of productivity	Taylorism: in order to increase productivity, data on the activities of workers are collected, recorded, measured, stored and analysed
Production	Constant capital (c)	<i>Property surveillance:</i> Surveillance of private property (commodities, capital, means of production) in order to circumvent theft and sabotage	Security guards, alarm systems, CCTV, access control systems, invisible security labelling or electronic tagging of commodities
Circulation	C' => M'	<i>Consumer surveillance:</i> Consumption interests and processes are systematically observed and analysed in order to guarantee the selling of as many commodities as possible and the realization of profit	Marketing research, consumer research, electronic consumer surveillance, Internet consumer surveillance with the help of cookies, targeted advertising mechanisms, spyware, profiling of internet usage behaviour, data gathering by intelligent Internet spiders, spam mail databases, data mining, clickstream monitoring, collaborative filtering, loyalty cards, product testing
Circulation	C' => M'	<i>Surveillance of competitors:</i> Corporations have an interest in minimizing competition by other firms in order to maximize market shares and profits, therefore they are interested in collecting and analysing data about the technologies, labour force, organizational structures, commodities, economic performance etc. of their competitors	Marketing research, industrial espionage, information gathering on the Internet, hacking and cracking of computer systems

Figure 3. Fuchs's The Role of Surveillance in Circulation of Capital
Source: Fuchs (2013, p.678).

Jacobs also emphasized the need of comprehending the link between public street usage and safety, since the use of streets for sociability purposes in locations such as pubs, theaters, and restaurants creates the circumstances for natural monitoring. Her views on natural surveillance are predicated on the premise that the circumstances for committing a crime are impossible when a street is alive. Jacobs (1961, p.34-35) asserted that:

A well-used city street is apt to be a safe street. A deserted city streets is apt to be unsafe. ... A street equipped to handle strangers and to make a safety asset, in itself, out of the presence of strangers as the streets of successful city neighborhoods always do, must have three main qualities: First, there must be a clear demarcation on between what is public space and what is private space. ... Second, there must be eyes upon the street, eyes belonging to those we might call the natural proprietors of the street. ... And third, the sidewalk must have users on it fairly continuously both to add to the number of effective eyes on the street and to induce the people in buildings along the street to watch the sidewalks in sufficient numbers. ... Large numbers of people entertain themselves, off and on, by watching street activity.

Like Jane Jacobs, Oscar Newman (1972), studied the relationship between the design of housing units and their spatial location in American cities and crime seeking for “an alternative, about a means for restructuring the residential environments of our cities so they can again become livable and controlled, controlled not by police but by a community of people sharing a common terrain” (Newman, 1972, p.2) in 1970s. Hence, it was asserted that to achieve community-oriented social control and surveillance mechanisms⁴⁹, there is the need for creating new urban forms providing necessary physical conditions for social cohesion and cooperation against criminal activities. It is claimed that “Defensible Space’ is a model for residential environments which inhibits crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric that defends itself” (Newman, 1972, p.3). Therefore, it is asserted that improving surveillance capacity in residential areas by means of environmental design contribute to the reduction of irritational fears and anxieties for inhabitants and encouraging the use of public space and increasing the sense of belonging a community (Newman, 1972,

⁴⁹ Newman (1972, p.204) discussed the relationship between surveillance and territory as such: “Territory and surveillance have after all traditionally been understood as the devices of the propertied classes and their agents or police authority. We, however, are advocating territorial definition and the creation of surveillance opportunities to allow the *citizen* of the open society to achieve control of his environment for the activities he wishes to pursue within it—to make him instrumental in curtailing others from destroying his habitat, whether the others are criminals or a reactionary authority”.

p.78). Community control as a mechanism for ensuring safe urban spaces was promoted and was seen as a long-term solution for problem of crime and socio-spatial fragmentation. It is asserted that increasing police manpower and equipment in problem urban areas are only palliative and short-term solutions (Newman, 1972, p.204). Analyzing the spatial organization of housing and public spaces in urban areas, seeking for a meaningful statistical relationship between crime and spatial design. The high-rise apartment blocks inhabiting thousands of dwellers was suggested as a solution for middle and low-income families in the US during 1960s (Newman, 1972, p.188) however, as examples given by Newman indicated that “a housing project composed of high-rise double-loaded corridor buildings is much more vulnerable to criminal activity than its walk-up counterpart” regardless of the features of location – being poor or wealthy neighborhoods – of housing units (Newman, 1972, p.200). Moreover, it is found that when compared to lower buildings the interior public spaces of high-rise projects experience a greater proportion of crime cases (Newman, 1972, p.29). Thus, spatial design of housing units and public spaces are significant determinants of social and crime control processes by providing “natural surveillance”⁵⁰.

Yet, there are some basic differences between Jacob’s and Newman’s approaches toward the relationship between the spatial design and security. First, the natural surveillance is collectively produced public good generating eyes on the street in Jacob whereas streets are under direct control and surveillance of individual households in Newman (Hope, 1999, p.18-19). Second, while Jacobs enhancing the public use of streets by reproducing and protecting privacy of individual at private realm, Newman excluding outsiders and privatizing streets (Hope, 1999, p.19). Third, Newman advocated for removing confused space and clarifying private-public boundaries whereas Jacob abolished borders for achieving the integration of communities to the city (Hope, 1999, p.20). Fourth, Newman believed that social heterogeneity is the source of disorder, Jacob, on the contrary, asserted that achieving urban social order

⁵⁰ However, the increasing use of surveillance camera bring about questions on the efficiency of natural surveillance. Koskela (2000, p.244), for instance, argued that “space is becoming more defended – or defensible” by video-surveillance in contemporary cities.

could only be possible by the integration of diverse communities to the city (Hope, 1999, p.20). Finally, natural surveillance for Jacob is a public good whereas it is a club good for Newman (Hope, 1999, p.21).

In addition, contrary to the arguments developed from Jacobs prioritizing the use value for citizens as 'eyes on the street' by claiming positive relationship between housing and surveillance contributing safety, "crime prevention through environmental design" (CPTED) is a concept that promotes designing buildings and other large spaces to deter "regular" users from entering the space and to safeguard them once they are there (Christopherson, 1994, p.420-1). In reality, architecture starts to function as a dispositive of surveillance, a mechanism of "environmental control" that once again targets groups of subjects rather than specific people. Here, a multitude of "criminogenic situations" replace the lone deviant, a perceived risk and the need to avoid it are the common elements; indifferent to people and their unique qualities, post-disciplinary urban control technologies like CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) and "situational crime prevention" in general can even treat human behaviors like polluting agents (De Giorgi, 2006, p.81-2).

To conclude, although Jacobs's and Newman's contribution to the role of natural surveillance and spatial design of urban space is significant, contemporary surveillance cities are under the pressure of technological innovations enabling constant surveillance via cameras, id cards, tracking devices etc. Therefore, as Lyon asserted that older techniques are not merely replaced by new ones; rather, new techniques are imposed. And the modern techniques are made to push surveillance beyond all of its previous boundaries (Lyon, 2001, p.51). Similarly, Graham claimed that the war against terror policy of the US contributed to "persistent surveillance" and "colonial military technologies and militarized urban planning practices emerging which stress the connection and integration of cities within both the US and in targeted nations within a single, urbanizing 'battlespace'" (Graham, 2006, p.272). Consequently, one of the most crucial political targets in the establishment of neoliberal social order has been the (in)securitization of urban places. This process of (in)securitization will be discussed in the next part of the study.

2.3.4. (In)Securitization of Urban Spaces

This section will discuss three fundamental approaches to the (in)securitization of urban space: the "broken window" thesis and zero-tolerance policing, new military urbanism referring urban as a battlespace and the policies of penalization of urban poor and fortress cities. First of all, the transformation from an insecure to a secure urban environment can be seen a prerequisite for the securitization of urban space. In this regard, the relationship between the presence of police and neighborhood safety was analyzed by Wilson and Kelling (1982) in their famous studies called Broken Windows. Their main concern is to decrease the level of crime and to increase community support in production of social order at American neighborhoods. They analyzed different programs and studies on crime ranging from the statistical evidence on crime to psychological research. To begin with, a "Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program" implemented in New Jersey in the mid-1970s encouraging the use of foot patrol for reducing the level of crime resulted in the increase in the feel of safety but there was not any real decrease in the crime rates (Wilson and Kelling, 1982, p.1). Another example discussed by them, being the title of their article, is that "if a window in a building is broken and is left unprepared, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken" (Wilson and Kelling, 1982, p.2). This means that when no one prevents and/or cares damages to properties in neighborhoods, it leads to further criminal activities resulted in the decline of the whole area. In sum, Wilson and Kelling identified two general symptoms of disorder which are physical meant graffiti, litter, general decay, and the "broken windows" referenced in their title and behavioral refers to the United States of the 1970s, offensive elements of urban life included public urinating, fee evasion on public transportation, loutish behavior by youth groups, street solicitation by prostitutes, and others (Grabosky, 1999, p.2). Their main thesis is that criminal behavior will spread and take control in regions where physical symptoms of deterioration are prevalent and are not addressed; thus, it is crucial to pay attention to low-level public order offenses, including all types of "incivilities" that contribute to the physical deterioration of a local environment, such vandalism, graffiti, and broken windows and this emphasis is thought to be the solution to the public's fear of crime and is intended to improve bonds within the community (Belina & Helms, 2003, p.1847-8). Rodenstedt (2014, p.327) mentioned that to reduce the expectation of the

fear, the physical environment should be neat and tidy, and citizens should take responsibility in caring for and controlling the neighborhood. Foot patrol policing practices establishing strong ties with the community and contributing to the feel of safety in neighborhoods are seen as alternative solutions for this problem. Thus, increasing the social relationship between the police and community members leads to diminish in criminal and undesirable activities. Although they knew community support is very important, they asserted that the role of police is fundamental and other informal or private mechanisms could not be able to tackle with social order problems as the police do. Their analysis is significant at least for two reasons which are (i) emphasis made on the role of community support and police relations in crime prevention and (ii) symbolic and material features of urban spaces have determinative impacts upon the occurrence of criminal activities. As Coleman (2005, p.141-2) asserted that “the ideological ‘success’ of current trends in surveillance in their focus on ‘broken windows’ and street propriety can be gauged in terms of their reinforcement of a surveillance blackout when it comes to the spatial habitus and activities of the powerful”. Yet, Briken and Eick (2011, p.4) stated that these kind of “measures not only harm the weakest and worst-off parts of society, but also shift the (social) meaning of public space more generally. ...the intensified segmentation of the city as a whole and ...the citizenship along economic, social, cultural, and ethno-racial lines”. The idea that concentrating "police attention on those socioeconomic categories thought to be crime vectors" may stop crimes is more troubling because the risk with such an idea is that police officers would be able to harass minorities, the homeless, and the poor in an illegal manner (Sridhar, 2006, p.1843). George Kelling has frequently stated his disagreement with the concept of "zero tolerance", yet this author's reading of the seminal book *Mending Broken Windows* (Kelling and Coles, 1996) shows that Kelling supports the idea that the police should "take care of the little things and the big things will take care of themselves" (a popular bumper sticker now seen on police cars in some parts of the USA) (Burke, 1998, p.668). Therefore, according to the ideas developed by the broken windows thesis, strong punishment for minor offenses and the repair of physical damage would stop the emergence of conditions that would encourage more serious criminal activity (Grabosky, 1999, p.2).

In this vein, the revanchist turns in the production of urban space and the elimination of unwanted social classes gained momentum during the 1990s. Revanchism symbolizes a backlash against the fundamental tenet of liberal urban development, namely that the government has some obligation to guarantee a respectable minimum standard of living for everyone (Smith, 1998, p.1). Its central claim is to remove undesirable and ugly activities from the streets and parks in order to improve the city's reputation and marketability and to create new social norms pertaining to lawful public participation (Collins & Shantz, 2009, p.520). The terrible cultural politics of neoliberal globalization are embodied in revanchism in every way, and it reflects on various levels, a reaction led by white and middle-class interests against those who they believe have taken their world (and their power) from them (Smith, 1998, p.10). Hausmann's⁵¹ experience in creating new Paris supporting the stronger presence of the commodity as spectacle; thus, the bourgeoisie could claim exclusive access to and control over the public spaces of their city while simultaneously establishing their hegemony in politics and the economy while they were in need of legal force to support their claim, which the empire in Paris gave (in much the same way as Giuliani provided it in New York) (Harvey, 2006, p.31-32) can be seen as an early example of what the New Yorkers experienced in 1990s as zero tolerance policing (ZTP)⁵² in gentrification process. Harvey pointed out that "affluent New Yorkers, women in particular, are similarly grateful to Mayor Giuliani for removing the homeless and panhandlers from their paths en route to the boutiques of mid-town Manhattan" (Harvey, 2006, p.22). At this point, Smith (1998, p.2) stated that:

Giuliani time, in some formal sense, began in early 1994 when Rudolph W. Giuliani took over as mayor of New York City from David Dinkins. ... Giuliani time began for

⁵¹ "Baron Haussmann's reconstruction of Paris in the mid nineteenth century, which included an extensive set of public works, and the replacement of narrow streets with broad avenues and boulevards. These were intended to promote public order by inhibiting the ability of protest movements to establish blockades, and improving the ability of troops to move through the city" (Collins & Shantz, 2009, p.518).

⁵² "ZTP first came to public attention in the mid-1990s with the appointment of William Bratton as the Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), where he introduced a policing strategy of targeting 'quality of life' offences. These so-called 'beer and piss' patrols focused on drunkenness, public urination, begging, vandalism, and other anti-social behaviour. ... The strategy was based on the claim that quality of life offences, like aggressive begging, squeegee cleaners, street prostitution, boombox cars, public drunkenness, reckless bicyclists and graffiti, restricted the use of public space and contributed to 'the sense that the entire public environment is a threatening place' (New York City Police Department, 1994: 5)" (Fyfe, 2004, p.45).

real a few months later with the issuance of the innocuously named Police Strategy No. 5 dedicated to "reclaiming the public spaces of New York." Bearing the names of both the mayor and the police commissioner, William J. Bratton, this document more than any other was a founding statement of a fin-de-siècle American revanchism in the urban landscape.

The success of Giuliani come from his appropriation of public fear, and he achieved two things with Strategy No.5, by describing proactive policing, which are identification of "the enemies who had indeed stolen the city from the white middle class; and second, a solution that reaffirmed the rights of the white middle class to the city" (Smith, 1998, p.3-4). The six components of ZTP were stated by Newburn and Jones (2007, p.226) as follows:

- vigorous law-enforcement responses to minor crime and disorder;
- the use of civil remedies against those perceived to be involved in criminal activities;
- enhanced accountability, using Compstat (see later), of local police managers for crime and disorder in their areas;
- public target setting in relation to crime reduction;
- conspicuous use of the media as a public relations tool on behalf of the police and policing strategies; and
- aggressive enforcement action against street crimes

Zero-tolerance or order maintenance policing is a proactive policing strategy that emphasizes the aggressive enforcement of minor crimes with the goal of restoring and maintaining order in communities which is derived from the well-known broken windows theory, which emphasizes that unattended disorder can lead to a spiral decline in community (Wolff & Intravia, 2019, p.165). Therefore, military-style tactics of zero-tolerance policing may result in the counter-productive since the community members lessen the information flow to the police, which is essential for identifying severe criminals, both in terms of quality and quantity, due to the "by labelling entire communities "criminal", the police themselves attract the label "enemy" (Burke, 1998, p.669). In this vein, the concept of spatialization of criminality resulted in police measures aimed at removing criminals or troublemakers from urban spaces who belonged to the white middle class. As Fyfe pointed out that "zero tolerance policing (ZTP) and closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance, can be seen 'as tightening the ratchet of social control and as the forerunner of some new technologically sophisticated totalitarianism' (Young, 1999: 90)" (as cited in Fyfe, 2004, p.42-3). Moreover, though Smith concerns on Bratton's zero tolerance policy is "a frightening

sign of potential urban futures" and is a manifestation of the urban revanchism of the 1990s; Bratton's strict "law and order" strategy was about emancipation for people on the political right (Fyfe, 2004, p.42). Therefore, the 1994 anti-crime drive was a cornerstone of the growing revanchist city, and a "database" was created to track homeless people, precinct commanders were given extensive new powers to circumvent legal and administrative restraints on police behavior, and the police were instructed to pursue with "zero tolerance" any and all alleged minor offenders whose actions "threatened the quality of life" (Smith, 1998, p.4). Smith explained that falling crime rates in the 1990s were rapidly cited as proof of the initiative's effectiveness, and Bratton and others traveled the world, from Berlin to Vancouver, evangelizing for it; although the incarceration of a record number of people, many of them for minor offenses, has likely contributed, the end of the crack epidemic, which had run its course by the early 1990s, seems to be a much more potent cause of lower crime rates and in reality, crime rates were already declining nationwide at the beginning of the 1990s (Smith, 1998, p.4). As a result, contrary to the late 1960s, when a massive infusion of funds was used to address the crisis of social reproduction in order to support marginally employed people's living standards and placate opposition, today all indications point to "legal repression" rather than co-option as the primary means of maintaining control (Smith, 1998, p.12).

In terms of contemporary urban policing practices, geographers have called attention to the role that various police modalities play in initiatives aiming at the 'purification' of public space in response to concerns that the destruction of any really democratic urban space is a result of the crusade to safeguard the city; one such is the so-called zero tolerance policing (ZTP), which was first implemented in New York City in the 1990s and later spread to numerous other US and UK cities focusing on "quality of life" offenses including public intoxication, begging, urinating in public places, and vandalism, ZTP seeks to reclaim public spaces for "respectable residents" and stop communities from going downhill, where minor offenses lead to more severe sorts of crime (Fyfe, 2009, p.214).

In the overall meta-narrative Zero Tolerance Policing the reduction of crime rates drastically in New York in the 1990s were seen as a proof of the success of the policy,

yet the reduction was largely attributable to police methods and if it worked in New York, it could work everywhere (Newburn & Jones, 2007, p.236). For example, Dixon argued that any impact the police did have was not exclusively attributable to zero tolerance policing, any such impact in New York is mainly irrelevant to Australia, and the costs of such tactics must be considered (Dixon, 1998, p.97) since the benefits could not outweigh the costs (Dixon, 1998, p.100). Besides, cities and urban violence are more tightly interwoven than merely being key targets for crime or locations where violence occur (Mendel, 2015, p.953). The harsh style of zero-tolerance policing, which frequently targets minorities and underprivileged populations, may contribute to poor police–citizen relations in impoverished urban areas (Wolff & Intravia, 2019, p.169). Drawing the picture of post-liberal Los Angeles as an example of “fortress cities” divided into “fortified cells” of affluence and “places of terror” where police fight against the criminalized poor Davis (1992) argued about the militarization of city life by the penetration of security systems into everyday life due to increasing socio-spatial inequalities (Davis, 1992, p.155). According to him (Davis, 1992, p.154):

Wealthier neighborhoods in the canyons and hillsides cower behind walls guarded by gun-toting private police and state-of-the-art electronic surveillance systems. Downtown, a publicly subsidized “urban renaissance” has raised a forbidding corporate citadel, separated from the surrounding poor neighborhoods by battlements and moats.

As Davis emphasized that there is a big difference between old liberal and neoliberal urban policies in regard to social control since old liberal attempts at social control, which at least tried to find the right balance between repression and reform, have been replaced by open social warfare that pits the interests of the middle class against the well-being of the urban poor (Davis, 1992, p.155). The warfare metaphor is significant to understand the new urban geography and its relationship with the state intervention as exemplified especially after 9/11 terrorist attacks. According to Mike Davis, modern Los Angeles—likely the poster child for the post-Fordist city—is not a flawless implementation of disciplinary methods but rather a “city of quartz,” a postmodern prismatic fortress where obsessions with social control are amplified and reflected, producing distorted images of seclusion that are very different from the disciplinary dreams described by Foucault (De Giorgi, 2006, p.81). The most significant contribution discussing the relationship between urban space and warfare has been

made by Stephen Graham⁵³. The term “new military urbanism” is claimed to be main dynamic behind the organization of the city in the neoliberal era. Graham (2009b, p.384) defined “the new military urbanism” and mentioned its five pillars as follows:

The new military urbanism is defined as encompassing a complex set of rapidly evolving ideas, doctrines, practices, norms, techniques, and popular cultural arenas through which the everyday spaces, sites and infrastructures of cities—along with their civilian populations—are now rendered as the main targets and threats within a limitless ‘battlespace’. The new military urbanism, it is argued, rests on five related pillars; these are explored in turn. Included here are the normalization of militarized practices of tracking and targeting everyday urban circulations; the two-way movement of political, juridical and technological techniques between ‘homeland’ cities and cities on colonial frontiers; the rapid growth of sprawling, transnational industrial complexes fusing military and security companies with technology, surveillance and entertainment ones; the deployment of political violence against and through everyday urban infrastructure by both states and non-state fighters; and the increasingly seamless fusing of militarized veins of popular, urban and material culture.

The last major support pillar for the new military urbanism is how it seamlessly combines with militarized veins of popular, urban, and material culture to garner much of its force and legitimacy illustrated via military concepts of monitoring, surveillance, and targeting frequently do not call for whole new systems; instead, they merely take the high-tech consumption infrastructure that cities have built to support the most recent forms of digitally coordinated transportation and consumption (Graham, 2009b, p.397-8). For the conceptualization of new military urbanism, the overlap between the military and civilian applications of cutting-edge technology – between the surveillance and control of daily life in Western cities and the prosecution of aggressive colonial and resource warfare – is a significant issue (Graham, 2011, p.xiii). Hence, the central idea behind military urbanism is summarized by Graham as the ‘homelands’ and domestic cities of the West, as well as the neo-colonial frontiers of the world, must permanently invade the cityscape and the spaces of daily life with militaristic surveillance and targeting methods (Graham, 2009b, p.388; Graham, 2011, p.xiv). Rather than being the environment of war and terror, cities – their buildings, assets, institutions, industries, infrastructures, cultural diversities, and symbolic meanings – have become target of attacks” (Graham, 2004, p.166). In this regard, battlespace is the primary notion driving the current "revolution" in military thought

⁵³ Graham (2004), Graham (2006), Graham (2009a), Graham (2009b), Graham (2011) and Graham (2012).

and practice; temporally and geographically, nothing exists beyond the battlespace, thus, the concept of battlespace encompasses everything from the molecular scales of genetic engineering and nanotechnology to the everyday sites, locations, and sensations of urban life, to the planetary spheres of space or the internet's globe-spanning "cyberspace" (Graham, 2009a, p.279-280). As the lines blur between domestic and international urban battlegrounds and terrorist mobilization occurs within and through the everyday architectures and infrastructures of global cities, policing has expanded into new territories, military mobilizations have increased within domestic cities, and military power, policing, and state intelligence are increasingly combining to target the urban quotidian on both sides of the Atlantic (Graham, 2009a, p.282). Organized political violence against cities both in the form of the informal (terrorist) and the formal (state) violence reveals that the systematic and planned targeting of cities and urban places has extended since post-Cold-War and post 9/11 world (Graham, 2004, p.170). Graham discussed the "war on terror" policy of Bush administration after 9/11 terrorist attacks and argued that "the discursive construction of the 'war on terror' since September 11, 2001, has been deeply marked by attempts to rework imaginative geographies separating the urban places of a putative US 'homeland' from those Arab cities..." (Graham, 2006 p.256). Graham (2006, p.258-9) identified four processes as reimagining of the homeland cities as follows; i) protecting those insides (defined as the US citizens whose bodies and everyday spaces are worth to protect) from the demonized other through a wide range of security instruments; ii) securitization and militarization of everyday life by penetration of 'intelligent' surveillance systems, checkpoints, 'defensive' urban design and planning strategies etc.; iii) reconstruction of national boundaries and iv) the production of constant and permanent anxiety at urban spaces internalized and ignored in US urban everyday life. Hence, contemporary urban space reveals an "emerging urban security propagates hyper-militarized perspectives in which every aspect of urban life is transposed as an act of limitless and boundless warfare" (Graham, 2009a, p.278). Unmanned drones, verticalized satellite monitoring, space partitioning, and biometric checkpoints are just a few of the high-tech urban warfare tactics that are increasingly serving as templates for the redesign of domestic urban space and the virtually endless metaphorization of "war" - on crime, drugs, or terrorism, for example - strengthens broader trends away from social, welfare, and

Keynesian urban models toward authoritarian and militaristic ideas of the state's role in upholding "order" (Graham, 2009a, p.284). Thus, it is not unexpected that market growth in security services and technology continues extraordinarily strong notwithstanding a global financial catastrophe (Graham, 2012, p.146). As a result, there is a chance that urban securitization will serve as a shop window for industrial policy in developing "security" markets and this rationale is particularly effective when temporary urban securitization operations are conducted in the vicinity of important political meetings and athletic events (Graham, 2012, p.147).

Furthermore, for Wacquant, neoliberal punishment is paradoxical in that it tries to address the widespread rise in objective and subjective insecurity by deploying "more state" in the realm of law enforcement and prisons, but this is actually a result of "less state" on the economic and social front in all First World countries as well as those of the Second (Wacquant, 2003b, p.198). Wacquant (2012, p.75) summarized the indicators of the penal state in addition to the increase in the carceral population as such:

...the aggressive deployment of the police in and around neighbourhoods of relegation and the increased recourse to the courts to handle unruly behavior and minor offenses; the widening of the judicial net through alternative sanctions, post-custodial schemes of control and the exponential development of digitalised justice data banks; the mushrooming of administrative retention centres to corral and expel irregular migrants; the hyperactivity of legislatures on the criminal front (they have multiplied and hardened penal sanctions at a clip never before witnessed) and the boom of a media sector trading on catastrophic images of criminal danger; the promotion of crime-fighting on the streets to the top of the government agenda (even as corporate offending was being actively decriminalised) and the salience of 'insecurity' in electoral campaigns; and the bending of penal policy to emotive and symbolic parameters, in overt disregard for penological expertise.

As Wacquant (2010, p.212) indicated that "neoliberalism correlates closely with the international diffusion of punitive policies in both the welfare and the criminal domains." Hence, one of the defining features of neoliberal societies is the penalization of poverty and he claimed that in their interdependent entanglements, the body, the social and "penal state," and urban marginality must be comprehended and explained together (Wacquant, 2009, p.114). The penalization of poverty evolved as a major component of the domestic implementation and transnational transmission of the neoliberal vision, with the 'iron fist' of the penal state combining with the 'invisible

hand' of the market and the fraying of social safety nets. (Wacquant, 2012, p.67). As being a part of a larger transformation of the state, which is itself prompted by the evolution of wage labor and sparked by the upset of the inherited balance of power between the classes and groups vying for control of both employment and the state, harsh police practices and extensive prison measures are now adopted throughout the continent where the reemergence of an old-style punitive state, social deregulation, and the increase of insecure wage labor all go hand in hand with the continuation of Europe's mass unemployment and the United States' gradually increasing "working poverty"(Wacquant, 2003a, p.10). By the end of the 20th century, they had been reduced to nothing more than raw materials for the construction of the complex and many correctional facilities that make up the stern face of the neoliberal state that scowls down on the outcasts of market society (Wacquant, 2008, p.71). Nevertheless, governments develop their own political agenda to prevent major social uprisings. Thus, more than just repressive measures, criminalizing supporters of social and economic rights is part of a larger political agenda that will result in the establishment of a new "liberal-paternalist" regime that is liberal towards business and the privileged classes at the top and paternalistic and punitive towards those who are negatively impacted by the concurrent resurgence of social inequality and marginality at the bottom (Wacquant, 2003a, p.11). Nevertheless, although incarceration rates have risen in a number of Western nations throughout the 1990s, de Koster et al. (2008) claimed that this does not indicate a trend towards penalization and criticized two explanations for the observed shifts in incarceration rates over time: Wacquant's materialist theory, which places primary emphasis on the neo-liberalization of the economy, and a second hypothesis that looks to the emergence of a distinctively political culture, as there is no correlation between any of the neoliberal economic measures and the incarceration rate (De Koster et al., 2008, p.729-730).

In addition, the spatial dynamics are also taken into consideration while implementing penalization policies. Territorially divided borders within city provide fertile ground for isolating urban marginality from the middle-class neighborhoods. Instead of spreading throughout working-class neighborhoods, advanced marginality tends to concentrate in confined, isolated areas that are increasingly seen by both outsiders and residents as social purgatory, leprous badlands at the center of the postindustrial

metropolis where only the underclass would accept to live (Wacquant, 2007, p.67). Through the historical mediation of conflicts over the definition, distribution, and appropriation of public goods, Wacquant demonstrated that what urban sociologists refer to as "neighborhood impacts" are actually effects of the state inscribed in space which is true not only in the United States and Western Europe but also in the areas of second-world cities that have been subject to dispossession, such as the varoş in Istanbul, the townships in Cape Town, or the favelas in Rio de Janeiro (Wacquant, 2009, p.109-110). Therefore, he provided a thick sociological definition that includes supervisory workfare, a proactive criminal justice system, and the cultural cliché of "individual responsibility" in opposition to the thin economic idea of neoliberalism as market dominance to understand the jail as a key political capability, whose selective and forceful deployment in the bottom echelons of social space breaches the principles of democratic citizenship, rather than as a technological implement for law enforcement (Wacquant, 2010, p.197). As a result, it should be acknowledged that the police, the court, and the jail are fundamental political institutions through which the Leviathan rules over physical territory, divides up social space, dramatizes symbolic distinctions, and stages sovereignty (Wacquant, 2012, p.76).

To conclude, on the one hand, approaches that purport to avoid the insecurity of urban space in some manner set constraints on how urban space may be used, and on the other hand, the same approaches offer a foundation for the monetization of public police services. The state asserts that it will rid the metropolitan area of undesirable populations and patterns of conduct. In this situation, an exclusion mechanism that extends beyond state-citizen collaboration at the level of the community leads societal segments that are said to have contributed to insecurity to pay a price for their actions. In addition to official initiatives such as zero tolerance police, private security agencies sterilize more urban space as a complementary strategy of neoliberalism.

2.3.5. Commodification of Urban Security Services⁵⁴

The state continued to provide policing services as a public utility throughout the 20th century since it has been intrinsically a political activity (Fyfe, 1995, p.770; Johnston, 1992, p.25). Jones and Newburn (2002, p.134) asserted that as the private security business has grown in importance since the 1950s, both in absolute terms and in comparison, to public policing, it would be more accurate to characterize recent events as the continuation of a decades-long trend than as a seismic upheaval occurring in the latter years of the twentieth century; in other words, substantial continuity and change coexist. Yet, according to Zedner's (2009, p.50) observation, "the key fact of contemporary security politics is that the state's (in any event relatively recent and largely theoretical) monopoly of security is being dispersed among non-governmental, private, and community-based actors". Indeed, governing social order through new urban security practices have been on the agenda of neoliberal restructuring of urban policing in developed capitalist countries since the 1980s. Neoliberal restructuring of policing is suggested as being one of the striking examples of changing internal composition and organization of the functions of the capitalist state rather than being "hollowed out" and it was claimed that the state has become less visible (Bricken and Eick, 2011, p.1). As Jones and Newburn (2006, p.4) suggested that "... from the 1980s onwards we have seen successive waves of 'civilianization' and the beginning of discussions about possibilities of privatization". Privatization promoted by neoliberal political agenda as a significant factor for accomplishing higher growth rates in national income and wealth creation, but the process of privatization has come at the

⁵⁴ According to Johnston (1992, p.73-4), there can be found five privately provided security services which are "private enquiry agents", "specialist security consultants", "Physical/mechanical: i.e. the provision of locks, safes, strong rooms, grilles, shutters, security glass ... etc.", "Electrical/electronic: i.e. manufacturers, surveyors, and installers of alarms, detectors, control panels, CCTV... , etc." and "Manned (and womanned) services: static or patrol guarding services... , etc." (last three stated by Jordan & Sons Ltd 1989 as cited in Johnston, 1992, p.73). Besides, Jones and Newburn (1998; as cited in Zhong and Grabosky, 2009, p.435) distinguished five categories of privately provided security services as such: staffed services, electronic security equipment (CCTV, alarm, etc.) manufacture and installation; investigatory services; bailiffing and debt collections and physical security equipment (locks, safes, etc.) manufacture and installation. Fragmented or commodified forms of urban security services discussed in terms of "the fiscal crisis of the state' (Spitzer & Scull, 1977); the spread of 'mass private property' (Shearing & Stenning, 1983); the unmet – and seemingly insatiable – demands of anxious citizens for police protection (Loader, 1997a), and broader transformations in the character of either governance (O'Malley & Palmer, 1996) or late-or post-modern society more generally (Reiner, 1992a)" (as cited in Loader, 1999, p.374).

expense of rising social and geographic inequality (O'Neill, 2009, p.445). O'Neill identified four types of privatization as follows: i) the sale of publicly owned enterprises (also services such as health, education, policing etc.), ii) the shift from provision to procurement (responsibilities of basic community services transferred to private providers), iii) the shift to market-based regulatory systems (market liberalization policies) and iv) transformation of the modern state (“private ownership, monetized ways of measuring value, market based regulation and control arrangements, and individual, merit based reward and advancement systems”) (O'Neill, 2009, p.442-444). In this regard, Zedner (2009, p.90) argued about the marketization of security and suggested that security has become a club or contractual good led to uneven spatial distributions separating people within or outside gated communities and creating extended policy family composed of civilian, volunteer, and private actors. Despite the fact that community governance of security services produces new opportunities for democratic involvement of different social classes, the gap accessing to private, common, and public goods between rich and poor has been widened (Shearing and Wood, 2003, p.221). According to Garland “Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, government authorities became increasingly aware that crime control is ‘beyond the state’ ... to relocate the work of crime-control ‘in the community’” and it has turned into “a mixed economy of public and private provision as more and more routine security functions are undertaken by private police and more and more businesses and households invest in the hardware and protective services offered by the commercial security industry”(Garland, 2001, p.17-18). Owing to the emergence and promotion of governance mechanisms as a new doxa in agenda setting and implementation processes of public policies, restructuring of policing in general and urban security in particular have been on the neoliberal agenda. Garland pointed out that “The key phrases of the new strategy are terms such as 'partnership', 'public/private alliance', 'inter-agency co-operation', 'the multi-agency approach', 'activating communities', creating 'active citizens', 'help for self-help' and the 'co-production of security’” and the main goal is to make agencies, organizations, and people who work outside the criminal justice state accountable and responsible for crime control and to influence them to behave properly (Garland, 2001, p.124-125).

Above all, the plural policing process suggests governance of security in a rescaled manner. That is to say, policing practices have been regulated in “a geographical area (a neighborhood, a city, a nation-state, etc.); a trans-boundary sector (the environmental sector, the nuclear sector, etc.); or social realms (morality, family affairs, the virtual world, etc.)” (Scarpello, 2016, p.2). Besides, plural policing is understood as a set of legal and formal practices fulfilled by “state policing units, private security companies (PSCs), and state-authorized forms of communal and community policing” (Scarpello, 2016, p.3). In particular, O’Malley and Palmer (1996) suggested that the transition from Keynesian to Post-Keynesian policies has led to the search for new ways in community policing from welfarist to neoliberal forms. Namely, rather than establishing close relationship with communities via police and social service experts, “a more contractual neo-liberal imagery” has been adapted and “community appears as a network of agentive, expert and independent actors who enter partnerships with police” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996, p.138). Garland (2011, p.124) suggested that “to extend the reach of state agencies by linking them up with the practices of actors in the 'private sector' and 'the community' might be described as a responsabilization strategy”. Within this new model of community policing, three main components can be determined as such: i) “the ascendancy of 'consumer' discourses”, ii) “the erosion or decentring (especially localizing) of state services”, and “the cultural emphasis on individual enterprise and responsibility” (O’Malley & Palmer, 1996, p.142). On the one hand, advantages of community policing policy were stated as follows: “...achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, improved police services and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime-causing conditions”. But, on the other hand, it requires “greater accountability of police, greater public share in decision-making and greater concern for civil rights and liberties” (Friedman, 1992, p.4). Among the benefits of security governance, 'rule at a distance' (Rose and Miller, 1992 as cited in Shearing, 2001) has been emphasized as practices realized at neighborhood level policing initiatives. Generally speaking, neoliberalization promotes a model for security governance beyond the state revealing five basic characteristics which are summarized by Ericson et al. (2000, p.532-3) as follows:

First, there is to be a minimal state. People are presumed to have enough self-restraint, willingness to share, and capacity for self-governance at levels of organization beyond the state that civil society can be a self-generating basis of social solidarity. Second, market fundamentalism is stressed. A 'free market' is supposed to provide security and prosperity by encouraging fragmented individuals and collectivities to participate in market relations that stimulate economic growth and, in the case of insurance, manage risk. Third, emphasis is placed not only on risk management but also on risk taking. As participants in fast-moving and fluctuating markets, people must become educated, knowledgeable, reflexive risk takers who are adaptable to transitions in their lives. Fourth, individual responsibility is underscored. Each individual is to be her own political economy, an informed, self-sufficient consumer of labour markets, personal security markets, and other consuming interests. Fifth, within a regime of responsible risk taking, all differences, and the inequalities that result from them, are seen as a matter of choice. Conceived as a choice, inequality is also seen as inevitable.

“Nodal governance⁵⁵” as a theoretical construction of pluralized governance of policing practices is defined as a variety of actors (e.g., businesses and nongovernment groups), and not just states, shape the flow of events. Dupont (2004, p.79), for example, identified four ideal types of security network distinguished both vertically and horizontally in terms of scale as “local security networks, institutional security networks, inter-national security networks and virtual security networks”. These security networks work for “transcend the established conceptual boundaries drawn between ‘public’ versus ‘private’ agencies, places, and functions” (Kempa et al., 1999, p.199). Nodes⁵⁶ are conceived as the sites that mobilize knowledge and capacity to intentionally manage the course of events” (Holley and Shearing, 2017, p.1). The emphasis is on the neutrality, or put it differently, equality of the actors within governance mechanisms in nodal governance rather than the priorities of the state or powerful civil society groups (Shearing and Wood, 2003b, p.404). Therefore, it is presented as an alternative model of security governance which “have the *potential* to derive ‘best practices’ through successive approximation and repeated testing, rather than through centralised long-term planning” (Kempa et al., 1999, p.218-219).

⁵⁵ “Within nodal governance we may now speak of first (state), second (corporate or business), and third (non-governmental organizations) sectors” (Shearing and Wood, 2003b, p.405).

⁵⁶ Accordingly, any attempt to do empirical analysis of nodes in “nodal governance” should do research on four elements which are defined as such: mentalities (relating to how nodes conceive of the worlds in which they operate); technologies (relating to the methods they deploy); resources (relating to the social, cultural, economic or other means they mobilize); and institutions (relating to the structures that enable the mobilization of resources, mentalities, and technologies in pursuit of governance outcomes) (Holley and Shearing, 2017, p.1).

Scarpello (2016, p.4) evaluated the significance of nodal governance conceptualization as such:

It represents the first quantum leap in the conceptualization of plural policing. The paradigm has two key aims: first, moving the analytical attention away from the state-centered view of policing; and second, making policing work better for disadvantaged groups (Wood and Shearing 2007, 97–113). It has been successful on both accounts. Nodal governance traces the roots of the pluralization of policing to the shift in economic structures following the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and by the spread of neoliberal modes of governance. Ontologically, the paradigm understands governance as resulting from a set of interlinked nodes, seen as new forms of governance that transcend the state and non-state dichotomy (Johnston 2006, 33). Burris (2004, 341–42) explains that a node “need not be a formally constituted or legally recognized entity, but it must have sufficient stability and structure to enable the mobilization of resources, mentalities, and technologies over time. A street gang can be a node, as can a police station, or even a particular shift at a firehouse.

Whether being a planned or an unplanned process, the reality is that the pluralization of policing governance resulted in, Bayley and Shearing’s notion, “multi-lateralization” defined as a dispersion of governance into different governmental nodes and non-state nodes named as ‘private governments’ by McCauley” (Shearing and Wood, 2003b, p.403). In addition to public police force “specialist policing, regulatory authorities, municipal policing, civilian policing, embedded policing; and commercial policing” were regarded as being patchwork of policing in the UK (Crawford, 2008, p.147-153). Hence, being a local phenomenon pluralization is not just a process of only commercialization or commodification (Devroe & Terpstra, 2005, p.240). Nevertheless, privatization of security services has been one of the component of new governance mechanism and plural forms of service provision (Jones & Lister, 2015). In this regard, some arguments on commodification process have been conceived it as “a change of supplier that affects neither the nature of the ‘good’ security nor the state monopoly on violence” (Krahmann, 2008a, p.380). Krahmann suggested to discuss commodification process with regard to the definition of security in terms of seven questions raised by Baldwin (1997, p.13-17, as cited in Krahmann, 2008a, p.387-8) which are “security for whom, security for which values, how much security, from what threats, by what means, at what cost, and in what time period”. The answers given these questions by Krahmann are listed in the below table. At this point, Krahmann pointed out that commodification of security has resulted in the individualization, militarization and marketization security services; hence the whole process of

provision of security services have changed towards the supply and demand relationship whose cost should be met by individuals afford to buy the service rather than citizens enjoying policing services as public good.

This transformation promoted to the increasing role of the individuals and communities should have to play or the increasing responsibilities that should be taken by them. Due to the provision of security services privately on the basis of wealth, the connections between public safety and citizenship weakens which results in the idea that “security can be obtained without reference to the common good” (Loader, 1997, p.386).

Table 6. Questions and Responses on Commodification of Security Services.

Seven Questions	Krahmann’s Responses
Security for whom?	Shift the focus from collective to individual level and a militarization of civilian spheres.
Security for which values?	Private security suppliers promote individual over collective values emphasizing interests of their customers.
How much security?	Demand and supply determined by commodification and marketization and profit-oriented companies overstating the need for security. Production and reproduction of fear and insecurity for the sake of increasing the number of customers and, hence, their level of profits.
From what threats?	Individual and excludable, rather than collective threats. But also providing security for private and public assets from non-state security threats.
By what means?	Deterrence and protection services are provided and cost and consequences rather than causes are on the agenda.
At what cost?	Outsourcing of public security services can lead to increased cost.
In what time period?	Only short-term security solutions are provided since causes of threats are out of their focus and being excludable, constant demand of security ensured.

Source: Krahmann, 2008a, p.388-395.

Neoliberal policies prioritize the responsabilisation of community and mobilization of them as street patrols and neighborhood watches in addition to do investments on private provision of urban security services (Shearing and Marks, 2011, p.212). Community support is seen as a vital part of policing practices and the police forces as problem-solvers concentrated more on “problem-oriented policing” defined as such: “... an explicit attempt to make police work more analytical in the identification of the ‘problems’ to be addressed, and constructive in the solutions applied to the problems identified. ... looks for connections and patterns, with the aim of finding

lasting solutions to ongoing problems (Moore 1992)” (Newburn & Reiner, 2012, p.819-20). Two significant processes emphasized by Loader (2000, p.327; p.331) as “policing through government” which means state as a customer “purchasing from the security market staffed services and hardware for the protection of premises” and “responsibilized citizens and commodified policing”. The responsabilisation of community in policing practices were named as “a new form of governing-at-distance” (Garland, 2001, p.127). Jones and Newburn (2002, p.139) argued that commercial security and citizen-led initiatives have, predictably, experienced significant development as a result of the demand for formalized policing services being so much more than the capacity of public police agencies to respond; however, there is a general trend towards the formalization of social control and the expansion of alternative kinds of policing at the moment is tied to a reorganization of social control mechanisms unrelated to official "policing," whether it be private or public. They were skeptical about changes in policing for three reasons which are i) focusing on commercialization and other changes in policing prevent to realize continuities; ii) neglecting differences among nation-states, and iii) lack of establishing relationship between changes in policing and wider changes in social control mechanisms (Jones & Newburn, 2002, p.142-143). According to Kempa et al. (2004, p.568), Jones and Newburn’s main contribution is their discussions of the decline in the prevalence of ‘secondary social control’ agents such as caretakers and bus drivers occupying physical space and fulfilling surveillance function which resulted in rising demand for more public policing services to fill the gap and it presented new opportunities for the expansion of privately provided security services. Three significant shifts determined by Shearing and Stenning (1983, p.503-504) in terms of the features of social control as such:

First, private security defines deviance in instrumental rather than moral terms: protecting corporate interests becomes more important than fighting crime, and sanctions are applied more often against those who create opportunities for loss rather than those who capitalize on the opportunity - the traditional offenders. Thus, the reach of social control has been extended. Second, in the private realm, policing has largely disappeared from view as it has become integrated with other organizational functions and goals, at both the conceptual and behavioral levels. With private security, control is not an external force acting on individuals; now it operates from within the fabric of social interaction, and members of the communities in which it operates are simultaneously watchers and the watched. They are the bearers of their own control.

Third, this integration is expressed in the sanctioning system, in which private security draws upon organizational resources to enforce compliance.

In the Rand Report, the growth of commercial security in North American experience discussed in relation to its role in preventing crime against corporations (as cited in Button, 2002, p.29-30). The reasons why there emerged the demand for private policing practices were mentioned as follows:

... high levels and increased rates of reported crime; increased public fear of crime; the security demands of the United States Government's space programme; increased threats from demonstrations, bombings and hijackings; the growth of the electronics industry and the associated development of manufacturers specialising in alarms and other security devices; increased property ownership arising from the growth of corporate and private incomes; greater demands for property protection and increased capacity to pay for it; and, last but not least, a developing perception that overburdened police forces, unable to stem the rising tide of crime, should be supplemented by private security provision (Kakalik and Wildhorn 1971, p. 4) (as cited in Johnston, 1999, p.179).

To put it bluntly, like all other aspects of changing social and economic relations in the neoliberal era, neoliberalization of policing reveals similar characteristics, such as deregulation, privatization, commercialization, and precarity. In the neoliberal era, as Mulone (2013, p.414) pointed out that security revealed market-oriented perspective has been defined as a way of consumption practice and never-ending activity. Fabrication of neoliberal social order requires on the one hand (in)securitization of social life for working classes but on the other hand increasing the security measures and expanding the surveillance practices in everyday urban life. According to Button (2004, p.103-107), private security policing against workers is representing hard policing whereas on demand provision of security services for property owners is called soft policing (see the below table for comparison).

As was already noted in this study, for instance, police in Turkey may be broken down into three categories: general, political, and judicial. The current state of private provision of urban security services can be best described as "soft private policing," as it merely shares duty with ordinary police including functions such as "seeking for consensus," "crime prevention," "proactive measures," "discretion," "desire to avoid criminal justice system," "non-political practices," and "support to the state," (Button, 2004, p.102) will be discussed in the context of private policing in Ankara, Turkey in the analysis of field research.

Table 7. Characteristics of Hard and Soft Private Policing

Hard Private Policing	Soft Private Policing
Confrontation	Consensus
Detection	Prevention
Reactive	Proactive
Rigorous enforcement of the law and regulations	Discretion and desire to avoid criminal justice system
Politically motivated	Non-political
Threat to the state	Support to the state

Source: Button (2004, p.102).

Moreover, Crawford and Lister (2004, p.414-417) asserted that (i) citizens' demands for better service, (ii) the limited capacity of the professional police, (iii) the transformation of public services by penetration of private sector principles, (iv) pluralization of responsibility enhancing the role of community, (v) marketisation of security and (vi) the decline of traditional institutions of secondary control can be seen as broad trends in policing and security in England and Wales. The pluralization of responsibility is key factor in security consumption as Goold et al. suggested that neoliberal regimes such as UK, USA, Australia or New Zealand employs responsabilisation of other social actors by emphasizing that protection from crime, disorder and, latterly, terrorism...—and not simply be left to government” (Goold et al., 2010, p.16). In this vein, Briken and Eick (2014, p.129) argued that “‘security’, formerly known as a state-granted service safeguarding a smooth capitalist development, has undergone a commodification process”. While describing the UK experience since the 1980s, Wakefield (2014, p.209) explained the reason behind the expansion of private security as follows:

Such expansion can be attributed not only to political developments but to a host of social and economic forces, including increasing prosperity, with more private property and consumer goods to protect; an accompanying rise in crime in many countries, especially from the 1970s to the 1990s; the expansion of privately controlled, publicly accessible spaces ranging from hypermarkets to airports; a general growth in the sub-contracting of security functions within both the public and private sectors to limit spending and gain from the economies of scale achieved by specialist providers; and increased safety concerns on the part of companies, public institutions and private individuals. All of these factors have promoted a growing governmental and social acceptance of private security, as it has become increasingly recognized that the commercial sector has a role to play in the security of citizens and organizations.

As a result, Button (2002; 2004) summarized different explanations on the emergence of private security in his study. According to him, there can be found two categories which are i) fiscal constraint theories (divided into two sub-categories as Radical and Liberal Democratic) and ii) pluralist or structuralist (Button, 2002, p.27-32). First, fiscal theories asserted that the inability of the state to meet the need for security due to fiscal problems complemented with the involvement of private sector. The second perspective claimed that the crisis of the capitalism especially in production spaces resulted in the growth of private policing (Button, 2002, p.28). The factors led to the growth of private security were indicated as follows: i) an increase in both crime and fear of crime which resulted in more demand for security, ii) the expansion of terrorism and increase in the number of demonstrations and protests, iii) the privatization processes in the criminal justice system, iv) the increase in the number of privately owned but publicly accessible spaces such as shopping malls, v) the increase in the number of privately provided security services and products to deter crime and vi) the need for new security products and services increased as the construction of new homes and factories continued (George & Button, 2000, as cited in Button, 2002, p.98-99).

In their analysis on privatization of security, Briken and Eick (2017, p.44) asserted that “if there is talk about ‘privatization’ with regard to security, it is essentially about commercialization and commodification of ‘security promises’”. Observing German experience, Eick claimed that “... state-run (bureaucratic), for-profit (commercial), and nonprofit (brokering) policing stakeholders led to a “pluralization of policing”, or policing by a customers’ community” (Eick, 2014, p.144). Nevertheless, different paths towards private policing followed by different countries according to their specific characteristics. For example, development of private security in China discussed by Zhong and Grabosky and they argued that as the economy shifts from a command economy to a market economy, the movement from a monopoly of public police to an integration of public and private policing, as well as the formation of policing institutions outside of the state apparatus were observed; however, the public security police continue to play a vital role in directing the other aspects of law enforcement (Zhong and Grabosky, 2009, p.452). As Briken and Eick (2017, p.44) asserted that “the dialectical deepening of market relations within and around the most

important pacifying organization of the state apparatus, the police, and its corporate counterpart, the commercial security industry”. Following Neocleous, they argued that “Under authoritarian neoliberalism the commodification of pacification intensifies, yet does not entail a retreat, or ‘hollowing-out’, of the state or its privatization, but builds upon an intimate intertwining of the state and corporate security” (Briken and Eick, 2017, p.50). Also, the experience of Russia revealed that this deepening also provides support of the enhancement of the state power rather than the decline of it while pacifying criminal groups by regulating the use of force. Volkov (2000, p.499) explained the development path of private security services in Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union as follows:

Organized force became a major market resource convertible into profits irrespectively of the origin and legal status of the group that managed this resource. Hence the rapid proliferation of various armed formations such as criminal groups, private guards, paramilitary units attached to fragmented state security and police organs, and the like. Once the state failed to control the process of institution building it also lost the monopoly of force and fiscal monopoly vital for its existence. The law on private protection, adopted in 1992, can be seen as a successful example of legal development whereby informal practices, in this case the private use of force and coercion, acquired legal status and became subject to state regulation. ... it enabled the state authorities to achieve at least some degree of account of and control over the private use of force and coercion.

In addition, Johnston’s study examines the issue from the historical-Weberian perspective analyzing private policing in a wider context and asserts that there is the need for separating policing as social function from the police as a specific body of personnel since “the modern police’s domination of policing has been the historical exception” (Johnston, 1999, p. 176-177) being the product of specific historical period between the middle of the 19th and the middle of 20th century. However, its relationship with the development of early capitalism was not well-established. Policing is defined as ‘the act of governance (or rule) directed towards the promotion of security’ (Johnston, 1999, p.192). For instance, Singh (2005) claimed that in controlling crime, private security does not represent negative form of coercion, on the contrary, it reveals broader shift in process of governing security which applying strategies shaping individual behaviors in a certain way. Her approach benefits from Foucauldian governmentality discussions and makes emphasis on the productive side of governing individuals by means of both state and non-state actors in every sphere

of daily life. Analyzing 1990s South African private security experiences including coercive and punitive techniques of them, she argues that industrialization of security and expansion of private security revolved around the issue of crime as a justification mechanism and enables private security to take punitive measures in addition to preventive ones (Singh, 2005, p.154).

Although security has been seen as a public good for a long time, privately provided security services open the door for conceiving it as a private and luxury good that should be purchased which is enabling companies providing it to maximize their profits (Zedener, 2003b, p.162). The commodification of security necessitates not only supplying security as a commodity but also creation of conditions of fear to fueling the demand. As a result, private security must be considered in light of its current status as a business operating according to the capitalist mode of production (Rigakos, 2002, p.25). Nevertheless, Loader and Walker (2001, p.9) asserted that there is the need for reconstituting the connections between policing and the state through appreciation of policing as a public good by means of four conceptual constructions which are “(i) the monopoly of legitimate coercion, (ii) the delivery of civic governance, (iii) the guarantee of collective provision and (iv) the symbolism of state and nation. For the first one, they argued that whether it is in the form of stronger view of Weber’s monopoly of legitimate violence or weaker one, state’s role remains as being main legitimizing authority of practicing violence”. In terms of civic governance, police are “a constitutive element in the production and reproduction of political order and community” (Loader & Walker, 2001, p.15). Thirdly, policing is seen as a public good means that most efficiently provided by the state collectively free of charge and even the liberal minded theorists believed that security should be provided by the minimal state. Fourthly, there is a cultural linkage between police, security, state, and nation which symbolically connecting state and national/cultural community. As a result, they argued that though policing is pluralized, “state-regulated policing which continues to emphasize the vital role played by politically constituted governments in the delivery and coordination of security” (Loader & Walker, 2001, p.29). Changes in policing in provision of urban security services resulted in pluralization and commodification of urban security and new actors and processes have become fundamental determinants of urban social order production. Bayley and Shearing

(1996, p.585) determined the driving force behind restructuring of policing in developed democratic societies as follows: (i) fear of crime, (ii) the inability of government to satisfy society's longing for security, (iii) the commodification of security, (iv) the rise of mass private property, and (v) cultural individualism. As Jones and Newburn (2002, p.131) argued that “The core of Bayley and Shearing’s thesis is that ‘in the past 30 years the state’s monopoly on policing has been broken by the creation of a host of private and community-based agencies that prevent crime, deter criminality, catch law-breakers, investigate offences, and stop conflict’ (1996: 586)”. Particularly felt in Anglophone countries, new Right administrations have sought to limit the state's influence, reimagine government through public-private partnerships, encourage citizens to take greater initiative in solving social issues, and re-balance the power dynamic between the for-profit, nonprofit, and government sectors (Stenson, 2007, p.28). The Police Reform Act of 2002 was a watershed moment in the diversification of security services outside the traditional confines of the state, the private sector, and the volunteer sector and public guardianship in the form of, say, park rangers and railway workers has been degraded in the name of state reform and efficiency, and now there are initiatives to reimagine guardianship in new forms accelerated with the help of the exponential growth in CCTV and other security technologies, the number of sworn public police officers in the UK reached a record 139,000 by 2006 (Stenson, 2007, p.33).

The new security architecture for urban communities individualized security measures and “forms of security gadgetry (alarms, bars, gates, walls, surveillance cameras and so on) to fortify their homes, an – in some cases – to commercial patrols to keep watch over the surrounding streets” (Loader, 1999, p.374). Evaluating commodification of policing and security in terms of consumer culture, Loader emphasized the satisfaction of consumers received from security devices established in their homes, businesses, and communities which are separating them from the outsiders (Loader, 1999, p.374-381). Although it has been accepted that private security services market prioritizes meeting customers’ demands rather than public interest, there are two strategies proposed for public bodies as to develop new regulatory bodies maintaining state control over companies and to find solutions for the integration of disadvantaged communities to market as customers (Shearing and Wood, 2003, p.217).




Figure 4. Newburn's Streams of Influence in Late Modern Urban Policing
Source: Newburn (2001, p.843).

Newburn's (2001) study examines new forms of policing and its implications in commodified urban environment in British cities. Critically approaching to the issue of monopoly of legitimate violence, he asserts that private security has always been existed, but its growth is dramatic since the 1980s (Newburn, 2001, p.830-832). Thus, it is argued that some broader and deeper structural changes determine the path of policing (the above figure) such as: (i) massive economic restructuring and progressive fiscal restraint, (ii) the experience of high crime levels as a normal social fact, (iii) the politicization of crime control and the dominance of neo-liberalism, (iv) the experience of endemic (ontological) insecurity, (v) changing property relations and the emergence of private governments, (vi) the emergence of new technologies and (vii) the decline of secondary social control occupations (Newburn, 2001, p. 844). In this context, Neocleous (2009a, p.12-13) discussed the "liberalization" and "individualization" process of security and insecurity as follows:

‘Security’ becomes a positional good defined by income and access to private protective services, a prestige symbol concerned less with dealing with the social causes of insecurity and more with one’s own private safety and personal insulation from ‘unsavoury’ social elements. This revives the liberal assumptions about individual autonomy and private property in the guise of new forms of neo-liberal subjectivity. Much of the contemporary sociological discourse on security, for example, assumes that its achievement can be found in a more productive relation to the self as a condition for liberty, requiring active participation in the schemes and plans put forward by those institutions of corporate finance which have come to replace the more traditional mechanisms of ‘social security’ (the ‘third way’). Thus, ‘insecurity’ comes to be used as a strategy for encouraging investment in private healthcare schemes and pensions, or for consuming the commodities which are said to make us more secure. This denies that security is a political relation and makes it the responsibility of the private individual pursuing their self-interest, consolidating its position as one of the greatest commodities of our time.

In terms of changing property relations, Newburn (2001) suggests that increase in the number of privatized spaces such as malls and gated communities and their spatial sprawl in cities contributed to the emergence of urban private security services in these areas. Nevertheless, his assertions differentiated from Shearing and Stenning’s (1981) ‘mass private property thesis’ in terms of his emphasis on wider and structural characteristics of social and economic relations as mass private property is one example among the others.

Furthermore, social production of urban space and administration of cities are discussed by various authors in their relationship with urban private security. Issues of community safety have always been highlighted as particularly in need of attention in neighborhoods where citizens have had the ability to set the objectives of redevelopment programs and although prostitution and drug sales are known to be prominent in some locations, most people's worries center on low-level disorder and non-criminal behavior, such as young people hanging out on the streets (Johnstone & MacLeod, 2007, p.82). In terms of urban politics, for instance in the UK, New Labour Government developed urbanized security strategies. As Helms et al. (2007, p.270) argued that “New Labour governments have certainly been able to conjoin policies for crime with a discourse of respect and moral order. Linking these policies not only to social policy (as welfare reform) but also to urban renewal (as, in a sense, a spatialization of public policy) has enabled the promotion of a politics of public safety.” According to them (Helms et al., 2007) there is a close relation with urban regeneration and strategies for securing cities and they explained it as such:

The economic profitability of urban space – whether in the form of business districts, shopping centres, hotel complexes, or tourist sites – is patently dependent on it being maintained as clean, secure and attractive. ... Thus, the interconnectedness of urban regeneration, policing and social regulation – through urban spaces and also through labour markets – exposes the much wider range of implications which efforts to ‘secure the city’ have on the lived practices of urban populations (Helms et al., 2007, p.271).

In the UK, the necessity to engage with ‘confidence-boosting’ strategies that involve the control of crime and disorder has had a significant impact on urban policy and is a necessary precondition for achieving an urban renaissance (Atkinson & Helms, 2007, p.2). Cities and the planning of their public spaces and centers were a primary emphasis of the British urban renaissance agenda, whereas the social inclusion agenda shifted its attention to residential areas and as a result, local communities have become a key level of intervention and point of policy delivery for programs addressing issues such as education, employment, entrepreneurship, truancy, neighborhood decay, health, and most recently, crime and disorder (Atkinson & Helms, 2007, p.7). Therefore, as Atkinson and Helms (2007, p.15) claimed that “the links between safety, investment, and urban fortunes have continued to produce an entrepreneurial form of city governance, albeit one that now combines the tenets of neoliberalism with those of zero tolerance and community policing.” In addition, Helms (2007) discussed the City-Centre Warden Project in the UK to reveal how revitalization of urban space and the construction of social order are integral parts of urban policy. This project has two contributions to the reproduction of capitalist relations, firstly, by means of preparing reserve pool of workforce and secondly, by means of the production of new moral order for urban spaces. However, local authorities are not only regulator within these processes but also, they have “increasingly become (again) involved in the policing and patrolling of public spaces such as parks and city centres” (Helms, 2007, p.290). Besides, the main motivation behind this project is stated as being “an intermediate labour market (ILM) programme to integrate long-term unemployed people into the urban labour market” (Helms, 2007, p.291). Thus, on the one hand, target of this project was to secure city center, but on the other hand, it aimed to contribute diminishing unemployment rates by providing new low paid job opportunities for surplus labor. Moreover, Raco (2007, p.305) examined “the trajectories of urban and regional planning policy during the 2000s and the relationships between security, safety and the government’s latest concern with creating *sustainable places and*

communities” (SCs) defined as “as a place free from the fear of crime, where a feeling of security underpins a wider sense of place attachment and place attractiveness (Raco, 2007, p.306). Security has become a major component of modern reconstruction and regeneration programs which consists of three connected components: i) for attracting profitable investment flows, place marketing and image construction have become crucial policy weapons, ii) the idea that cities have become "dangerous" places to visit gained acceptance especially in the US, and iii) concerns on security has increased and coincided with the advent of new technologies and the expansion of the security sector (Raco, 2007, p.309). The sustainable communities agenda in the UK put more emphasis on security concerns and its analysis was based on three issues “the mobilization of new forms of relational citizenship; the planning and design of new, secure environments; and the governance, management and implementation of security strategies in SCs” (Raco, 2007, p.310).

The topic of how to best ensure the economic viability of downtown regions that have experienced considerable capital investment in the effort to develop lively, entrepreneurial cities presents a fundamental challenge for neoliberal urbanism since the economic prosperity “is highly dependent on a costly system of surveillance performed through a blend of architectural design, private security, and a technological infrastructure of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras as well as the presence of the public police” resulted in establishment of local security networks (public police, municipal policing, civilian or voluntary policing and commercial or private policing) which is concentrated on “reclaiming the streets for the ‘consumer citizen’ and enforcing patterns of behavior commensurate with the free flow of commerce and the new urban esthetics”(Fyfe, 2009, p.213). Wood et al. (2007, p.92) classified “policy responses to urban threats into three broad categories: (1) emergency or contingency planning; (2) territorial control and the drawing of boundaries; and (3) growing and more sophisticated surveillance.” As being the example of the Defensive City, the second response includes the “internal physical or symbolic notions of the boundary and territorial closure” such as residential gated communities, airports, civic buildings, or financial centers dividing urban spaces in terms of risk sites of exclusionary zones (Wood et al., 2007, p.94). As a third response, called as the Watchful City, in the 1990s, electronic surveillance in public and semi-public urban places was viewed as a

solution to a number of the challenges associated with defensive architecture and design and the first permanent public CCTV system was installed in Bournemouth in 1985 for the annual Conservative Party conference, following an IRA bombing the previous year (Wood et al., 2007, p.95). Challenging the notion that surveillance cameras just "pave the path to a better future" by revitalizing urban problem areas, Klauser discussed CCTV's potential and limits for the revitalization of metropolitan areas suffering from concentrated social poverty in the case of "Swiss city of Olten, where CCTV was employed between 2001 and 2004 to monitor the largest street prostitution area in Switzerland" (Klauser, 2007, p.337). According to Klauser's (2007, p.338), CCTV physically and psychologically separates the watched (individuals under surveillance) from the observers (operators) and as a technology, CCTV is fundamentally concerned with "territorial separation, resulting in two distinct categories of space and in two distinct groups of people" who are the ones below the cameras and behind the cameras while the spatial dichotomy of 'control spaces' and 'controlled spaces' resulted in conflicts with the current trend of urban renewal efforts that aim to include and activate local civil society in more participatory forms and community-led solutions. Four significant disadvantages of CCTV summarized by Klauser (2007, p.338) as such: i) while it is true that installing surveillance cameras can reduce crime in the short-term, evidence from studies with longer follow-up periods is required, ii) surveillance camera impacts are not only restricted in time, but also in geography, iii) the effectiveness of CCTV relies heavily on the kind of crime being examined; to illustrate, empirical evidence indicates that CCTV has little or no effect on vandalism and acts of aggression on public transportation systems and in city-center settings, despite widespread agreement that CCTV is successful in reducing vehicle crime in parking garages, and iv) several system-inherent aspects, ranging from partnerships between operators to camera specifications, contribute to the success and effects of CCTV-systems.

Additionally, there is the issue of social inequality which is especially severe in Brazil, where the difference between classes is vast and the working classes have long been the primary targets and victims of a brutal police force and with the proliferation of private security, "security" forces discriminate twice as much against the poor since, on the one hand, police misconduct continues to affect the poor and on the other hand,

the poor will be subjected to new types of monitoring, control, disdain, and humiliation as the affluent choose to live, work, and shop in walled enclaves and use private security services to keep the destitute and all "undesirables" away (Calderia, 2000, p.207). One of the distinguishing features of the postmodern city, according to many scholars, is that it is a 'carceral city,' where a combination of public police, private security guards, and electronic surveillance is utilized to protect the safety of high-income gentrified enclaves and corporate citadels (Fyfe, 2009, p.213). "Fortified enclaves" is the term utilized by Calderia to explain the new pattern of spatial segregation, referring to "privatized, enclosed, and monitored spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work" justified by means of the fear of violent crime employed for abandoning the traditional public sphere of the streets to the poor, the marginalized, and the homeless (Calderia, 2000, p.213). Therefore, the new picture of urban spaces highlighted by Calderia as follows:

Middle-class streets and upper-class residences have been turned into fortified enclaves secured by iron grates, intercoms, attack dogs, armed guards in watchbooths or manning roadblocks after dark, while "gated communities" cordoned off from the city by high walls and advanced surveillance technologies have mushroomed and become a coveted ingredient of elite status (Caldeira 1996 as cited in Wacquant, 2008, p.59).

Moreover, urban policing methods such as area bans in German cities (first issued against non-Germans in Bremen on the basis of special federal laws for foreigner in 1992) are highlighted by Belina (2007, p. 321-322) as a neoliberal urban renaissance strategy. Thus, the spatialization processes of crime and policing (i.e., policing space) are well suited for managing the repercussions of neoliberalism in the city (Belina, 2007, p. 322). Area bans are not only targeting the local illegal drug market but also the homeless, beggars, and punks who gather in most German cities; as a result, it is claimed that the problem being solved is not the use of drugs but where the drug dealers and consumers are (Belina, 2007, p.326).

Furthermore, although most of the functions of the state reorganized in neoliberal period of the capitalism, the role of the state has not been eroded in provision of public services as being the main authorization power. Therefore, transition from welfare to workfare and risk management mode of the state requires more coercive forms of management to deal with security problems (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011). Though

coercive measures are under the responsibility of the state or implemented by the authorization provided by state, its role is underrated. Jones and Newburn (2002, p.133) claimed that the monopoly enjoyed by the public policing forces could only be sustained functionally, spatially, and symbolically while low crime rates and relative social harmony existed; thus, the myth of a monopoly over policing could not be maintained when the supportive informal social control mechanisms declined. Schuilenburg combined the concepts of safety, security, and certainty in concrete cases under the title of “securitization of society” and defined it as “the increasing use in different milieus of society since the nineteenth century of a variety of techniques designed to manage the future or, to phrase it better, to ensure a safe and secure future” (Schuilenburg, 2011, p.77).

Hallsworth and Lea’s contribution is significant in this point, because analyzing the British experience, their main concern is to bring state back into the discussion and they seek for “how developments in distinct areas of social policy, crime control and national security are facilitating the emergence of a new state form that we term the ‘security state’” (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, p.142). As shown in the below figure, they determined dynamics of the security state as (i) transition from welfare to risk society, (ii) de-bordering of social and spatial areas and (iii) transition from citizenship to powerful offenders as threats (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011, p.143). Being fetishistic desires, commodification of social control and risk management have been new capital accumulation areas (Rigakos, 2002). This is a post-welfare hegemonic project called securitization and three fundamental transformations are made in the state practices which are (i) “crime control becomes the pre-eminent paradigm for social control”, (ii) social policy and welfare are criminalized, and (iii) previous functions of the state distributed among state and non-state actors (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, p.144). Thus, expansion of crime control functions from the welfare state to the non-state actors has resulted in the changes in ‘policing family’ on the one hand, and expansion of the state involvement on the other hand which led them to conclude that it is a practice of soft fascism (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011). Compared to the welfare state sought for long-term solutions for social problems such as crimes, the security state tends to develop short-term and coercive solutions by criminalizing different social groups (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, p.147).




Figure 5. Dynamics of the Security State
 Source: Hallsworth and Lea (2011, p.143).

Securitization of the society brings about new questions on being in secure or safe is something impossible to accomplish unless securitized urban spaces produced. These spaces emerged as closed and controlled by private security guards. Therefore, the meaning of the border separating two states from each other has changed and “The real border is no longer simply that of the nation state but of the secured enclaves and neighborhoods within it” (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, p.150).

In sum, it is now much easier to monitor both the whole of the city as well as the locations where people congregate and engage in conversation due to the expansion of the provision of urban security services by private security organizations. This brings us to another concern, which is why preventative policing services, such as surveillance, are becoming less often offered by the public. At this point, places like shopping malls and private security complexes have become a "natural-eternal" part of urban public life, and the dialectic of social control has started to change in favor of capital, at least on an urban scale. Through private security, social control mechanisms get into the social sphere. This makes the security logic internalized and self-referential, which makes it harder for people to fight against the neoliberal social order.

This neoliberal approach to urban security is predicated on the social inequalities that are brought about by capitalist production relations and the unequal distribution of services, both of which have an impact on how space is utilized in cities. In addition, this regime helps to the expansion of the state's diminishing administrative capacity in the political sphere by allowing the practices of an authoritarian neoliberal state to expand to metropolitan areas under the jurisdiction of their administrative units.

CHAPTER 3

PRIVATELY PROVIDED URBAN SECURITY SERVICES IN TURKEY

Privately provided urban security services is going to be discussed as a mechanism of mediating the state-capital nexus in Turkey in this chapter of the research. To begin with, however, the neoliberalization experience of Turkey is going to be contextualized as a sort of authoritarian neoliberalism⁵⁷ since the 1980s and notably after the Justice and Development Party (hereinafter AKP) won the 2002 General Election. The neoliberal transformation of the Turkish state and society began in the early 1980s and Turkey's authoritarian neoliberal state experience utilized both roll-back and roll-out dynamics of neoliberal policies and demonstrated continuity rather than rupture during the 2000s. Indeed, despite assertions to the contrary in discussions about the rule of AKP governments as the agent of democratic reforms, the roots of the “AKP rule's authoritarian consolidation”⁵⁸ can be found in legal and administrative arrangements made during its so-called 'democratic-reformist' era. In this vein, brief discussions of the literature on the rule of AKP is going to be made in the following section to clarify the political-historical context of the privately provided urban security services. Then, firstly, the analysis of private security services as a mediation

⁵⁷ Authoritarian neoliberalism can be defined as a type of governance based on two contrasting tenets which are: (1) establishing a disciplinary statecraft preventing the impact of the popular pressures, public input and non-partisan auditing mechanisms on key decision-making and (2) marginalizing democratic opposition and dissident social groupings through the employment of the state's coercive, legal, and administrative tools (Tansel 2017b, p. 3, as cited in Tansel, 2018, p.199). Six fundamental characteristics of authoritarian neoliberalism consolidated by the AKP can be summarized as such “(1) the centralisation of economic and political decision-making (i.e. executive centralisation); (2) transformation of the rule of law through executive and judiciary interventions; (3) reorienting key administrative and bureaucratic functions of the state in line with the governing party's strategic interests; (4) reconfiguring media ownership through state interventions; (5) de-collectivising workplace organisation and labour relations; and (6) reproducing discourses of mobilisation and consent generation that are based on existing gendered, racialised and class-based hierarchies” (Tansel, 2018, p.200).

⁵⁸ See Akçay (2021).

of the state-capital nexus in Turkey is going to be made and it seems significant for at least two reasons; first, the changing role of the state indicates that, rather than being withering away of the state, both public policing and private security forces have enlarged in terms of their number of labour force and their spatial organization at urban scale. Second, it I will provide fertile ground for understanding the changing role of the state as being a regulator in urban security service provision for spatially and strategically selected areas by deciphering the amendments in legal arrangements in private security services in different historical circumstances determined by the needs of capital. The latter also reveals class-based distribution of private security services at an urban scale, which is going to be discussed in the next section. After discussions on the relationship between the neoliberal state and the legal aspects of private security services, urban private security is going to be analyzed as a capital accumulation process in Turkey. In this vein, urban private security market is going to be examined by referring various statistical data obtained from many different resources in addition to the information gathered from in-depth interviewees conducted with private security company managers-representatives in Ankara. Lastly, urban private security is going to be spatialized and uneven geographical distribution of private security is going to be examined. To acknowledge these targets, archives of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), the Official Gazette, statistical data obtained from articles, strategic plans of General Directorate of Security (GDS), annual activity plans of GDS, Turkish Statistical Institution (TURKSTAT), EUROSTAT etc. and in-depth interviews conducted by the author of this thesis are going to be main sources of information.

3.1. Political Context of Neoliberalism and the State in Turkey

First of all, following a military takeover in 1980 that drastically depoliticized daily life and subdued civil society and labor unions, Turkey started to liberalize in order to join international financial markets, and following the choices on January 24, the neoliberalization process accelerated by “the improvement of the balance of payments, a decrease in inflation, and the development of a market-based, export-oriented economy” being defined as the major goals of Turkey's neoliberal agenda, and at the same time, “the Turkish Lira was completely convertible in 1989, and capital

transactions were fully liberalized" (Gönenç & Durmaz, 2020, p.619). The military coup of 1980, which placed long-term restrictions on popular democratic empowerment and the autonomous collective involvement of the working classes in policymaking processes, is largely responsible for the authoritarianism ingrained in the Turkish neoliberal experience (Kıvılcım, 2021, p.196). The military coup and the subsequent military dictatorship that lasted until 1983, marked a turning point in Turkey's political and economic history while, on the one hand, it gave a crushing blow to the Left; on the other hand, it marked the beginning of a shift in the national economic strategy, away from the import substitution industrialization (ISI) program that had been in place since the 1960s and toward an export-based approach (being the part of a greater shift toward market-based neoliberalism that the new military dictatorship pushed through) (Akçay, 2018, p.2). The experience of Turkey is instructive so as to problematize the processes of change within the setting of the state's authoritarian form from the 1980s to the present as AKP's constitutive role throughout the post-2001 phase of neoliberal restructuring revealed that the reorganization of the state in an effort to firmly establish the replacement of class-based politics with identity-based politics that it inherited from the post-1980 era accomplished by instrumentalizing debates among Western liberal intellectuals, such as multiculturalism and the politics of recognition, on the one hand, and dismantling the historical posture of the Turkish military as the defender of the secular regime, on the other, it attempted to assume the role of democratizing force in Turkish politics which has been desecrated by the organic intellectuals of the dissident but hegemonic discourse to present this as "normalizing" the political regime (Yalman, 2016, p.247).

After the economic-financial and political crisis of 2001, the previous mainstream political parties failed miserably and were supplanted by the newly founded AKP which adopted the IMF-recommended neoliberal policies and increased the country's financialization by encouraging foreign direct investment, the removal of agricultural subsidies, and the acceleration of public asset privatization as the EU accession discussions prepared the ground for a surge in foreign direct investment (Gönenç & Durmaz, 2020, p.627). One of Turkey's worst economic crises ever, in 2001, proved pivotal in releasing the country from the 1990s' deadlock and a new economic strategy was developed in the years following the financial crisis to enable neoliberalism that

would be compatible with the post-Washington Consensus framework by the adoption of a number of policies that succeeded in politically neutralizing the working class—not through the use of force, but rather through atomization of politics and the economy—was the key to this new policy framework which enabled the new government under Erdoğan and the nascent AKP to attain the political stability (Akçay, 2018, p.4). From the perspective of political economy, Ercan and Oğuz (2020, p.98) asserted that the rule of AKP governments can be followed in three distinct periods which are:

(1) adoption of policies aiming at internationalization through increased relative surplus value production and the restructuring of state economic apparatuses (2002–10); (2) failure to increase relative surplus production and further authoritarian transformation of the state so as to create new financial resources to postpone crisis dynamics (2010–18); and (3) crisis of postponement mechanisms and the AKP’s move towards collapse (2018 onwards).

In this vein, “the AKP-led process of neoliberalization” (Tansel, 2018, p.207) has begun after the 2002 General Elections and the rule of AKP Governments and President Erdoğan’s domination in Turkish politics can be seen as a political journey from neoliberal authoritarianism revealing liberal-conservative policies to nationalist-conservative policies. Hence, it is hard to accept the idea that the rule of AKP was democratic in the beginning but then Erdoğan’s charismatic leadership turned it into an authoritarian one⁵⁹. On the contrary, the stones lined the road to authoritarianism were accomplished in the first period (2001-2016) defined as democratic-reformist era. As Bedirhanoglu and Yalman (2010, p.122) suggested that “the AKP represents more continuity than radical change in terms of the authoritarian form of the state that has been the defining feature of the Turkish political economy in the neoliberal era.”Özden et al. (2017) claimed that the rule of AKP has undergone a significant transformation towards authoritarian mode as is widely acknowledged by the

⁵⁹ As also cited in Tansel (2018), there are many different analyses of labeling AKP’s rule as hybrid regime (Aslan-Akman, 2012; Öniş, 2016), delegative democracy (Özbudun, 2014; Taş, 2015), electoral authoritarianism (Kaya, 2015; White & Herzog, 2016), unconsolidated democracy (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2015), illiberal democracy (Türkmen-Derivoğlu, 2015), competitive authoritarianism (Özbudun, 2015; Esen & Gümüüşü, 2016; Çalışkan, 2018), Erdoğanism (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018), weak authoritarian (Akkoyunlu, 2016) and authoritarian neoliberalism (Özden et al., 2017; Tansel, 2018) etc. since the 2002, although there is an emerging consensus that the AKP’s recent years have been characterised by an explicit authoritarian shift, even though there is disagreement about the precise typology to explain the transformation of the political system in Turkey (Tansel, 2018, p.197-8).

interpretation of many liberal and left-liberal analysts, yet, the AKP's hegemonic aim has always been authoritarian for two reasons which are; first, the party did not abolish the authoritarian neoliberal state structure put in place in the years following 1980 and the second the party has maintained “the majoritarian and monolithic understanding of democracy it inherited from Turkey’s conservative right-wing tradition”(Özden et al., 2017, p.192). In this vein, they would rather see the AKP's "shift" as a transition from an expansive (a hegemonic group adopts the interests of its subalterns in full, and those subalterns come to “live” the worldview of the hegemonic class as their own’) to a limited (‘the hegemonic class fail[s] to genuinely adopt the interests of the popular classes and simply neutralize[s] or “decapitate[s]”them through depriving them of their leadership’) hegemonic strategy (Özden et al., 2017, p.192). As the defining feature of the state form in the pre-AKP period was its militarized character, the only way for the AKP to achieve hegemony at the state level was through political conflict with the military; thus, one of the AKP's hegemonic project's most crucial cornerstones under the expansive hegemony strategy was the promise of political change and democratization represented by civilianization reforms (Özden et al., 2017, p. 197). Nevertheless, since the AKP did not change the authoritarian essence of the state but instead reorganized it to achieve complete control over the state apparatuses, the civilianization process did not result in a democratization of the state in Turkey, but it just substituted the military-centered authoritarian state model with one that is centered on the police and courts (Özden et al., 2017, p.201-202). The so-called “new police- and judiciary-centred state form” reveals, globally and locally defined, two characteristics: the first, it relates to the neoliberal reorganization of police forces, the transition from a "post-crime society" to a "pre-crime society," and the new punitive tactics of the "criminal state" to control emerging potentially harmful social and political groupings and the second, following the events of September 11, 2001, this security-based political rationale received additional impetus such as the war on terror, the philosophy of preemptive war, and the anti-terror legislation created a new state of exception, which has been utilized internationally and domestically to manage social and political unrest (Özden et al., 2017, p.202). The Penal Code (2005), the Criminal Procedure Code (2005), the Counterterrorism Law (2006), and the Police Powers and Duties Law (2007) were all amended to create new authoritarian state structure (Berksoy (2010, 2013) as cited in Özden et al. 2017, p.202) while at the same time

new legal arrangements like Law on Private Security Services (2004) provided capital-led soft-policing aspects of this transformation era. Through a series of legal a new authoritarian state form was created that broadly defines terrorism crimes to include many legal acts of political and social protest and the regime employs the penal code excessively as a tool of legal coercion and intimidation (Kıvılcım, 2021, p.201). As Bedirhanoglu and Yalman (2010, p.109) emphasized that “the neoliberal authoritarian form the state had acquired as early as the 1980s has persisted since then through the powerful articulation of these economic, political and cultural processes into each other.” Insofar as the AKP promises to perpetuate neoliberal authoritarianism in Turkey, it symbolizes continuity rather than dramatic change in terms of state-class relations, and it is more reasonable to view the incident as an illustration of how political Islam adapted to the neoliberal restructuring effort throughout the globalization process (Bedirhanoglu & Yalman, 2010, p.110). Therefore, the disputes around the neoliberal-authoritarian nature of the Turkish state are not new and in reality, critical leftist scholars have always seen the brutal coup d'état of 12 September 1980 and the three-year military government that followed it as the triumph of the dominant capitalist classes since the junta reclaimed power over the working class, pacified labour militancy, and ushered in a complete neoliberal restructuring of the nation (Bedirhanoglu et al., 2020, p.1). Nevertheless, today, it does appear that the 'Turkish-style presidential system' that Erdoğan and his supporters have advocated would go much farther than Poulantzas' definition of authoritarian statism (Özden et al., 2017, p. 206).

After the 2010 constitutional referendum and the AKP's landslide electoral victory in June 2011, the regime began to transition from what Poulantzas termed "authoritarian statism" to an "exceptional state form" characterized by a profound restructuring of the relations between ideological and repressive state apparatuses as well as by an increase in the relative autonomy of the state and economic apparatuses in order to generate revenues and control the economy (Ercan & Oğuz, 2020, p.105). The AKP's political policy ties democratization to the civilianization of state institutions, promoted by the term "dismantling the military tutelage system” and the conception of democratization as civilianization dominated the vast majority of political analysis until the late 2010s, when authoritarianism rose under the civilian government of the

AKP (Akkaya, 2020, p.188). Nevertheless, according to Akkaya (2020), political developments in Turkey during the 2010s and the years following July 15 have demonstrated the inadequacies of a military tutelage regime interpretation in three aspects which are: i) the military tutelage analysis employs unsuitable notions for this endeavor which views the military as an autonomous and uniform actor, has been significantly challenged by the 15 July coup attempt, as the events of 15 July have exposed that the military is an institution that houses competing and/or cooperating political fractions, ii) developments in Turkish military politics in the 2010s have also revealed the shortcomings of the military tutelage analysis's suggested democratization since its main premise that the correction of the power imbalance between civilian and military institutions will enable democratization in the country has simply failed as a result of the AKP's establishment of an authoritarian regime without precedent in Turkish political history and iii) the inadequacies of the military tutelage analysis in making sense of the role of international and global dynamics in military politics, for example, reducing Turkey's EU accession process to the transfer of democratic norms to Turkey (Akkaya, 2020 p.200-201). Explanations on the issue of authoritarian turn of AKP' liberalization program undervalue "the party's judicial and political repression of oppositional forces, the enactment of repressive security regulations and the imposition of authoritarian neoliberal policies in conjunction with a cultural project characterized by paternalist and patriarchal patterns" and initiatives such as Specially Authorized Courts (2004), Police Powers and Duties Law (2005), Anti- Terror Law (2006) and decree laws in 2011 strengthened security-based legal and judicial processes and expanded police discretionary authority (Babacan, et al., 2021, p.1). The AKP government was placed on center stage not just as the giver of political and economic stability that Turkey had been unable to attain for years, but also as the carrier of a democratic project based on market-oriented reforms and multiculturalism during its first five years in office while the political requirements for the EU accession process played a key role and in accordance with the neoliberal conception of the state, it is assumed that the state's control over society would be reduced as the state's grip on the economy is weakened via privatization measures (Bedirhanoğlu & Yalman, 2010, p.121). The whole political journey of the AKP government summarized by Bedirhanoğlu et al. (2020, p.1-2) as follows:

... the general attitude within and abroad until the 2010s was to perceive the AKP as the representative of the 'peripheral' masses who had long been oppressed by the patronizing Kemalist cadres at the 'centre', and as a political actor that would ensure liberalization, restoration of human rights, and even 'revolutionary' democratization in Turkey. It is true that the AKP in its early years in power tried to send the military back to the barracks and initiated some reform processes within the context of the European Union (EU) membership process. Indeed, state violence in the early 2000s was not as pervasive as it had been in the 1990s, enabling the AKP's alliance with the liberal intellectuals, then fierce critics of the brutal policies of the Turkish state. The AKP promised to investigate state atrocities committed under the so-called 'military tutelage' and make a new social contract with the excluded of Turkey, namely the Kurds, Alevis and Romas, among others. Some argued that even if the Islamists of the AKP might not be sincere in their promises, the path they had pragmatically opened up would urge them to become 'forced democrats'. The course of events, however, has drastically proved the opposite. By the beginning of the 2010s, along with the new direction Turkish foreign policy took in the Syrian War and especially after the 2013 Gezi Uprising, state violence was resurrected, the military returned through the back door, and the police became the new custodian of the AKP regime.

As Bedirhanoglu et al. (2020) identified the new neoliberal state in the making in Turkey has been founded on the oppressive and coercive policies of the AKP regime which reveals characteristics such as "the privatization and personification of state power, the rise of coercion, discretionary economic management, and the crippling of basic modern state institutions through processes such as deconstitutionalization and Islamization" (Bedirhanoglu et al., 2020, p.3). The rapid commodification of space has become one of the striking examples of a transformative effect, to the extent that it has essentially triggered violence and authoritarianism through three different triggering processes which are: a) suspension of democratic processes due to their "speed breakers" features as a direct result of indexing the production of space as a commodity to speed, b) to make the use of coercive and violent practices (which in most cases break even liberal laws and morals) as common and normalized, where commodification is not possible through institutionalized market mechanisms, where it encounters resistance or creates high costs, it is difficult and violent use expressed as accumulation through primitive accumulation or dispossession and c) in accordance with the logic of commodity, space have become a target of creative destructiveness based on violence, not reproduction (Şengül, 2015, p.3). This economic change could only occur under oppressive conditions and without considerable conflict, as a result, the functions and effectiveness of trade unions nearly vanished; the influence of opposition parties nearly vanished from political life; economic decision-making became exclusive to business elites and the state bourgeoisie; and sub-contracting

became pervasive, even in the public sector, significantly reducing the working class's capacity to criticize, all of which together with a persistent trade imbalance, high unemployment, and poor employment production capacity, set the stage for the rise of authoritarian populism in the country (Gönenç & Durmaz, 2020, p.629-630).

Furthermore, the Gezi Revolt-Uprising-Movement was a breaking point not only for the political history of Turkey but also for the test of AKP's hegemonic capacity or in Mann's terms its infrastructural power. The relationship between the emergence of Gezi Revolt and the policies of AKP on establishing hegemony on society explained by Özden et al. (2017, p.203) as such:

Having established its control over all state apparatuses and gained another victory in the 2011 elections, the AKP set about constructing a new Turkey in its own image in a fashion that was increasingly indifferent to and inconsiderate of oppositional groups. It introduced a kind of biopolitics distinguished by its articulation of neoliberalism and religious conservatism, including the increasing control of social life by means of a myriad of policies imposed in authoritarian ways. Those policies were related to the control of women's bodies, the Islamization of national educational system, limitations imposed on the sale and consumption of alcohol, various unwarranted interventions in cultural and artistic fields, numerous urban renewal schemes, severe pressure on the media, and harsh police violence against social protests and street politics.

The AKP government exhibited considerable reluctance to initiate inquiries into the excessive use of force by police against protestors during and after the Gezi demonstrations and Erdoğan endorsed police violence by applauding the police's handling of the demonstrations in public speeches (Esen & Gümüüşçü, 2016, p.1594). In his analysis on Gezi Revolt, Şengül (2015, p.2) suggested that there is a need for persuasive explanation of authoritarian/totalitarian practices and orientations at two space-oriented strategies of power, one economic (the rapid and intensive commodification of urban space) and one political (the conservatism of cities) being the common denominator of these two main strategies is the selection of cities as battlegrounds, alongside the suspension of democratic processes and the prescribing of politics as a war. The capitalist accumulation machine turns structures and relationships outside of capitalism's history and geography into its own history and geography in the urban sphere. It does this through authoritarian mechanisms other than economics, making liberal democracy impossible as a political form and turning cities into battlegrounds and these processes also have effects that go beyond just

changing cities and fundamentally change politics (Şengül, 2015, p.5). The politics of urban public space have been designed around the exclusion of the certain segments of citizens as dangerous or as posing threat to the ‘public life’, yet, exclusionary policies have also provided opportunities for enabling counter-hegemonic strategies or reclaiming the urban public space around accessibility and publicness.

Critical academics frequently emphasize the continuation and deepening of the authoritarian tendencies within the authoritarian statism under the AKP regimes rather than the frameworks of "democratic backsliding" or "competitive authoritarianism" (Akçay, 2021, p.80). Competitive authoritarianism referred some scholars to explain authoritarian practices of the AKP rule. To illustrate, Esen and Gümüştü (2016, p.1582) asserted that the rule of the AKP government has transformed Turkey from a tutelary democracy into a competitive authoritarian regime, and as a part of a larger worldwide trend of authoritarian retreat, the weakening of political institutions and the destruction of the rule of law by leaders who came to power through elections were also witnessed in Turkey. They stated that “The AKP used its electoral strength – based on a cross-class coalition across both urban and rural areas – to dominate political institutions and exploit state resources in a partisan manner to block the opposition’s chances of winning an election” (Esen & Gümüştü, 2016, p.1585). Nevertheless, Esen and Gümüştü claimed that, despite the fact that elections are not always fair, there is no organized electoral interference and since the authority of elected officials are not constrained by unelected tutelary authorities, Turkey cannot be regarded as a full authoritarian regime (Esen & Gümüştü, 2016, p.1586). Similar to the views developed by Esen and Gümüştü, Çalışkan (2018) also argued that Turkey is an example of institutionalized competitive authoritarianism and exhibits “out of a total of eleven qualifications within a set of three indicators of competitive authoritarianism as theorized by Levitsky and Way”and “During and after the 2017 constitutional referendum, all eleven qualifications of competitive authoritarianism were observed for the first time since 2010” (Çalışkan, 2018, p.8). Yet, he furthered his argument that “the aftermath of the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016 and the 2017 constitutional referendum structured a new path of political regime transformation in

the country, creating a clear drift toward full authoritarianism”⁶⁰ (Çalışkan, 2018, p.8). In his perspective, as soon as the AKP administration eliminated the military's privileges, Turkey's political path shifted from democracy to authoritarianism (Çalışkan, 2018, p.28). In this regard, since it has been a repressive regime limiting and reducing the effective channels for oppositional forces to vie for power, full authoritarianism, under the rule of the AKP government utilized various instruments "to either make the opposition obsolete or to bypass the constitution, which would guarantee a transfer of power in the country" (Çalışkan, 2018, p.30). According to Altınörs and Akçay (2022, p.1030), competitive authoritarianism and authoritarian neoliberalism are two significant frameworks revealing the present processes of increasing authoritarianism in Turkey and they suggested that the recent experience of Turkey with authoritarianism imposes a difficult burden on them to develop explanations and to understand the principal causal mechanisms of the growing authoritarianism of AKP regimes in the 2010s. Since the competitive authoritarianism is a recognized notion for comprehending the dynamics of authoritarian governments in which opposition parties may still attain power through elections, it does not give a sufficient analytic viewpoint to explain the causation involved in comprehending the regime transition in Turkey and it rather stays descriptive as it depicts the regime's rigged elections and/or unequal playing ground and provide opportunity to describe formal aspects of hybrid regimes (Altınörs & Akçay, 2022, p.1032-3). Tansel rejected the view that the party's methods of governing have changed from an earlier "democratic" model - characterized by "hegemony" - to an emerging "authoritarian" and claimed that the party's previous "hegemonic" efforts were also influenced by authoritarian inclinations that emerged at various levels of governance by tracing the mechanics of the state-led reproduction of neoliberalism since 2003 (Tansel, 2018, p.197). He emphasizes the "importance of placing the two periods in a continuum whereby the "authoritarian" practices of the later AKP rule can be traced back to --

⁶⁰ Full authoritarian regimes mark political contexts where the opposition's ability to compete for power is restricted in real terms to the extent that elections become structurally non-competitive. In such settings, which narrow the formal channels through which the opposition can contest for political power and in which the incumbent mobilizes formal and informal means of neither sharing nor abandoning political power, opposition parties open channels of participation that move beyond formal politics and mimic social movements on the ground. After discussing these contemporary developments, the article concludes with a discussion of the consequences of the constitutional amendments following the 2017 referendum and analyzes the drift toward full authoritarianism in Turkey” (Çalışkan, 2018, p.8).

and properly understood in -- the context of its earlier "democratic" incarnation" (Tansel, 2018, p.198). Tansel does not reject the assertion that the AKP's authoritarian methods have expanded significantly from 2011–13; but, "this oscillating periodisation and the focus on the 'fluidity' of the Turkish regime risks losing sight of the enduring patterns and practices that criss-crossed and connected different 'phases' of the AKP rule" (Tansel, 2018, p.206). At this point, Akçay proposed that the AKP administration may be divided into two distinct periods: "the establishment of authoritarian neoliberalism (between 2002 and 2013 depoliticised macroeconomic management, guided by an existing IMF program enabled the disintegration of Turkey's organized labor with the introduction of dependent financialization as the primary capital accumulation regime) and the structural crisis of Turkish capitalism (experienced two transformations which are the re-politicization of economic management and struggle within the power bloc being the main motivation for the executive presidential system and "authoritarian consolidation" attempts since then) (Akçay, 2021, p.81). Based on the state theory of Nicos Poulantzas and the framework of the Regulation School, Akçay argued about the main elements of the Erdoğan administration's current efforts towards "authoritarian consolidation" (Akçay, 2021, p.81). He defined it as a transitional phase in which the new government gains legitimacy by enhancing its problem-solving capabilities and using populist rhetorical methods in addition to repressive actions, yet, "although the new regime's discursive and despotic powers are strong, its infrastructural power (i.e. for state restructuring and institution building) is quite weak" which is challenging the Erdoğan's power to consolidate the new authoritarian regime (Akçay, 2021, p.94). Moreover, as Akçay and Altınörs (2002, p.1033) asserted that after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, neoliberalism's hegemonic position was endangered, therefore economic governance became more dependent on repressive state institutions and the intertwining of authoritarian statism and neoliberal reforms makes neoliberalism a durable method of economic and political control and defines its essential component despite public resistance; hence, the authoritarian neoliberalism idea is more complete than competitive authoritarianism since it encompasses the dominant political economy trajectory, neoliberalism, that drives authoritarianization tendencies. Right-wing, religious, and conservative movements led the post-2008 authoritarianization trend in

nations where organized labor and left-wing politics were marginalized (Altınörs & Akçay, 2022, p.1034).

Following the attempted coup on 15 July 2016, Turkey has been through a violent and extensive regime change applied by means of “Emergency policies, new judicial repression strategies and intensifying crackdown on the political opposition, academia, media and civil society have been accompanying this regime change” (Yılmaz & Turner, 2019, p.691), As a response to emerging democratic politics and expanding democratic opposition following the Gezi Uprising and the 7 June 2015 election, the AKP recreated the security state of the 1990s and orchestrated a reactionary backlash comprised of anger, extreme nationalism, and state brutality and to frighten and crush civil society organizations and political groupings who dared to criticize the government's authoritarian policies, a multiplicity of legislation changes reinforced the state's security and surveillance capability (Yılmaz & Turner, 2019, p.694). A regime transition in 2018 strengthened the authoritarian transformation and Erdoğan was able to weaken all opposition forces and impose a new system devoid of checks and balances two years after the failed coup attempt utilized by him for authoritarian consolidation attempt (Altınörs & Akçay, 2022, p.1030-1031). The primary factor for the authoritarian consolidation project is the restructuring of the state and intensifying despotic power (being the main driver of its rise is the nationalist alliance called *Cumhur İttifakı* between the AKP and the MHP-Nationalist Movement Party) (Altınörs & Akçay, 2022, p.1040). The new presidential system granted the president complete administrative authority and diminished the independence of parliament and the judiciary by means of executive orders, the president exercises *de facto* legislative authority since the new system envisioned a dictatorship of a single individual, not a rigid division of powers and the rule of law deteriorated to significantly worse levels than the military dictatorship of 1980–1983 era (Altınörs & Akçay, 2022, p.1045). There are some concerns about the potential of power to become authoritarian, and statements that emphasize the leader's personality are frequently heard; however, despite the significance of such a subjective aspect, it is also necessary to consider certain structural factors that support authoritarianism in order to comprehend it (Şengül, 2015). In this vein, moving beyond the personalistic and culturalist

explanation⁶¹ and adding structural variables is significant to comprehend the primary dynamics of authoritarianism in Turkey since the survival of neoliberalism requires less and less consensus-based politics in addition to its reliance on coercion and coercive state institutions (Akçay & Altınörs, 2022, p.1036).

Furthermore, Kaygusuz (2018), from the standpoint of "authoritarian continuity" as opposed to the perception of a recent "authoritarian turn", suggested that Turkey experienced a steady rise and consolidation of "a neoliberal security state" (NSS) between 2006 and 2015 and a transition towards a politics of regime security, especially following the Gezi Park demonstrations in 2013 and the general elections in June 2015, and the AKP's regime security has become associated with and naturalized as state security after the July 15, 2016 coup attempt (Kaygusuz, 2018, p.282). The neoliberal political reasoning that supports the primacy of the so-called "market" values and the empowerment of the executive for the enforcement and protection of these values served as the foundation for the creation of the new security state (Kaygusuz, 2018, p.282-3). According to Kaygusuz (2018, p.289), the years between 2006-2013 can be seen as the initial phase of the neoliberal security state by means of strengthening the AKP's position with regard to the military and reforming the coercive state mechanisms to handle the unfolding neoliberal change efficiently; hence, "the first steps towards the establishment of Turkey's NSS were taken in this early phase through the empowerment of the police along with the adoption of pre-emptive measures and intelligence-based security practices" (Kaygusuz, 2018, p.289). In this regard, the emergent neoliberal security state was strengthened by the forcefully suppressed Gezi Revolt, which signaled the start of an extraordinary upsurge in the AKP's authoritarian and security-focused policies (Kaygusuz, 2018, p.291), and since 2016, the AKP government has been attempting to create a new authoritarian state (Kaygusuz, 2018, p.298). For Kaygusuz, there are two complementary factors, which were "the consolidation of AKP's power after its repeat electoral victories in 2007 and 2011, and its successful triumph over the 'establishment' forces in the military and

⁶¹ For instance, Yılmaz and Bashirov (2018) asserted that since conceptual framework provided by electoral authoritarianism is not seen enough to explain the new regime in Turkey, it should be appropriate to characterize it as Erdoğanism referring to four dimensions which are "electoral authoritarianism as the electoral system, neopatrimonialism as the economic system, populism as the political strategy and Islamism as the political ideology" (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018, p.1813).

judiciary”, gave AKP’s authoritarianism further fuel throughout those years (Kaygusuz, 2018, p.281). In his analysis, Tansel (2018, p.209) stated that Kaygusuz (2018) asserts that the government's security paradigm has changed into a more extreme conception of "regime security" in the wake of the coup attempt in 2016, but places the expansion of the AKP's disciplinary statecraft within a global context defined by the rise of "neoliberal security state" forms and reveals that the AKP's constant commitment to executive centralisation, or collecting crucial decision-making powers and coercive capabilities of the state tightly under the government's umbrella, through a comprehensive examination of the party's changes in the court and state security institutions.

In addition, as Ercan and Oğuz (2020, p.102) stated that there are three fundamental responsibilities that capitalist states need to fulfill in order for society to be able to reproduce itself completely (in light of the fact that the AKP was unable to fulfill these three responsibilities, the party decided to implement measures that would lighten its financial burden and provide new resources for the material reproduction of the state) which are: (1) preserving the general conditions of production; (2) ensuring the conditions for the improvement of productive forces, in particular the production of relative surplus value; and (3) creating an environment that is conducive to investment for capital that is active on a global scale while also implementing the institutional reforms required for the internationalization of domestic capital and the integration of international capital into domestic markets. The state complemented privatization with a partial welfare state, which was a set of policies meant to soften the impact of liberalization by giving low-income households access to easier credit and income supports, thus, this policy paradigm represented a particular brand of neoliberal populism which contributed to the success of the AKP governments in restraining the labor movement in the 2000s (Akçay, 2018, p.5). Nevertheless, AKP governments and President Erdoğan have garnered the support of large segments of the working class in three ways: (1) extending welfare programs to previously excluded persons and implementing additional aid programs to ensure basic social protection; (2) booming consumer credit market facilitates the incorporation of low-income households into the financial sector; and (3) the utilization of "symbolic/ideological materials" that are able to persuasively appeal to the lifeworld of the working classes (Özden et al., 2017,

p.195). Neoliberalism has recently abandoned the illusion of protecting individual liberties, shifting its political worldview firmly toward growing authoritarianism while concealing it with developmentalism where the development is seen as the main solution to societal ills and as a goal worth to sacrifice other political and social values such as the rule of law, adherence to commonly accepted ethical and political standards, etc. (Arsel et al., 2021, p.262). Nevertheless, despite the leaders' such as Erdoğan and Trump claims that doing so is their top priority, authoritarian developmentalism cannot address the needs of the socially excluded groups who have been harmed by both the early stages of neoliberalism and even more so by the austerity measures taken in response to its crises (which generally fails to do in any sustainable way) (Arsel et al., 2021, p.262-3). Although the AKP's authoritarian power has been exercised through the use of police batons and tear gas against political opponents, it has produced and reproduced consent by promoting developmentalist policies that prioritize economic development over environmental concerns (Adaman & Akbulut, 2021, p.280). This does not underestimate its authoritarian character rather it is obvious that “coercion was used when deemed necessary, best concretised in the AKP’s “strong stance” on labour and their almost categorical labelling of any environmentally-driven resistance as “results of manipulations by Western enemies”” (Adaman & Akbulut, 2021, p.281). Nevertheless, Di Giovanni stated that “in an authoritarian neoliberal regime, neither consensus nor popular conviction are necessary at all times. There is no need for power to explain itself” (Di Giovanni, 2017, p.123), in Luhmann’s (1990) terminology⁶², power has become self-referential in an authoritarian neoliberal regime.

⁶² According to Luhmann (1990, p.114-116). , “The term "self-reference" refers not only to the identity of the system (as does "reflection" in its classic sense, e.g., as ,used in the philosophy of consciousness of German idealism) and not only to the structure of the system, that is, to its morphogenesis and its self-organization. It refers also, and primarily, to the constitution of its basic elements. The elementary units of self-referential systems can be produced and reproduced only as self-referential units. They combine self-identity and self-diversity (to use Whitehead's formulation) and their status and function as elements mean that this combination cannot be dissolved by the system itself. This means also that the system cannot distinguish its own basic elements from its own operations. Such systems are called, following Maturana, "autopoietic." Autopoietic systems are closed systems in the sense that they cannot receive their elements from their environment but produce them by selective arrangement. I could also say—and this reminds me that I am operating very close to my background in transcendent theories—that everything used as a unit by the system, whether its elements, its processes, or the system itself, has to be constituted by the system. Units, of course, are complex facts and can be analyzed by an observer. The system itself, however, has to rely on self-constituted reductions to link and reproduce its own operations. The unity of the system, therefore, is nothing but the autopoietic process of constituting units for itself within itself. Producing units requires reducing complexity, namely, the

Also, Akçay (2018) argued that the key to the AKP's success in remaining in power for the past sixteen years has been its unique neoliberal economic strategy, which atomizes the working class while simultaneously obtaining its partial acquiescence via a restricted welfare regime and via a "neoliberal populism" in accordance with other analyses, has succeeded in muting interclass tensions; however, it did so while intensifying the confrontation between elite interest groups and instead of eradicating political conflict, the AKP's neoliberal populism has simply relocated its locus upward, from the workplace and neighborhoods to the higher echelons of the political elite. Consequently, power conflicts have taken the shape of intra-elite conflict, most notably a failed coup, rather than class warfare (Akçay, 2018, p.1-2). As Bozkurt-Güngen argued that 'embedded authoritarianism,' which has been an integral element of Turkey's neoliberalization experience, has impeded popular democratic empowerment that this longer-term historical trajectory of Turkish political economy has enabled and laid the way for the expansion and diversification of the AKP government's authoritarian toolbox; for instance, the labor policy agenda undertaken during the AKP era has been a fundamental, if not the sole, aspect of this authoritarian statecraft that has consistently thwarted efforts to build popular democratic empowerment and the policy agenda of the AKP has been primarily defined by the collective/institutional isolation of laboring classes from policy-making processes and their "disciplining via unmediated/individual absorption" into the AKP's political project as consumers, credit users, and welfare recipients (Bozkurt-Güngen, 2018, p.219-220). In reality, the technocratic policymaking that characterized the 2000s in Turkey and its link with formal/procedural democratization should be viewed as the predominant form of authoritarian neoliberalism during the AKP's early years in power while in the early 2010s, the primary authoritarian tactic shifted from a rule-based/technocratic strategy to a more discretionary one, which referred by Bozkurt-Güngen as "rule by fait accompli" and "rule by overt coercion". Ultimately, after the

complexity of a domain in which distinguishing between system and environment makes no sense. The autopoietic system has to use distinctions and indications as basic operations... Autopoietic systems produce their elements within temporal boundaries, depending on a beforehand and a thereafter. Many of them, certainly conscious systems and social systems, consist of events only, of thoughts, for example, or of actions. Self-referential systems are paradoxical; their existence implies the unity of different logical levels, of different logical types. ... the autopoietic theory states that the different is the same".

November 2015 elections, the latter started to be coupled with greater overt coercion and suppression of dissident social groups (Bozkurt-Güngen, 2018, p.233). The rule of the AKP tightened trade union rights, precarized labor, and boosted absolute surplus value production to dominate labor, but, without a development in productive forces, these systems could not be enough to assure the value expansion needed for social reproduction, hence, it commodified nature and public services, which was made feasible by strengthening executive authority, adopting a presidential system, and personalizing power in Erdoğan's hands, commencing a move to its own collapse (Ercan & Oğuz, 2020, p.100).

At urban scale, according to Şengül (2015), while the conservatism project, which targeted daily life and public space, strengthened totalitarian trends; the commodification project, which transformed the city's space quickly and by suspending democratic and legal processes, deepened authoritarian tendencies. He asserted that this two-pronged approach involves mediating unlawful practices like the use of force unlawfully and disobeying court orders while also redefining the functions, rules, and form of politics as well as reconstructing the urban space and social life and political space are looked at through the rules of wartime emergencies (Şengül, 2015, p.6). Based on the differentiation developed by Raymond Williams for cultural structures at societal level as dominant, residual and emergent, Şengül claimed that this triple classification may also be used to categorize physical features that are a component of cultural practices such as financial and business hubs, "residence" and abandoned sites, and shopping malls as today's dominant venues; slum areas that are the subject of transformation can be thought of as locations where traditional middle-class settlements can be regarded as residual; and the collective living spaces created by the Gezi process, such as the earth tables and occupation houses can be seen as emergent spaces (Şengül, 2015, p.15).

3.2. Urban Private Security Services as a Mediation of the State-Capital Nexus: Following Legal-Administrative Dimensions

The relationship between the state and the capital is worth to discuss especially in the neoliberal transformation process of Turkey since the 2000s. Yet, in order to

understand dynamics of privately provided security services, the historical-political context discussed above section should be taken into consideration since the ‘big bang’ of the private security services in Turkey has come into being after the 2000s and the product of authoritarian rule of the AKP governments. Hence, rather than being the signifiers of civilization or democratization of internal security practices at urban scale, this capital-led urban security regime⁶³ practices have been contributed to the expansion of the state’s ruling capacity and ensured the self-referential consent production mechanisms for urban middle-classes. Therefore, neoliberal urban security regime as the spatial form of authoritarian neoliberal policies of the AKP government produced and reproduced complementary relationship between the state and capital. Nevertheless, as it was previously mentioned, both the legacy of the pre-AKP period and its ruling period have revealed authoritarian characteristics despite the pseudo-democratic era of the AKP governments' claims otherwise. Public police have not yet been withdrawn from the architecture of provision of urban security services. On the contrary, police forces have been main actor and legitimate supplier of urban security services. Rather, this new urban security regime revealing itself with a new division of labour. As one of the interviewees claimed, private security guards were expected to be the eyes and ears of police officers rather than challenging their legitimacy at urban scale (Interviewee 32).

Furthermore, the commodification of urban security services has not led to the abolition of the nation-state both in terms of public budget allocated to these services (see below figures) and its role as being the primary source of legitimate violence; on the contrary, surveillance mechanisms at urban scale have been expanded and the means of security provision pluralized. During the 1970s, especially in the U.S., fiscal

⁶³ “The concept of regimes emphasizes the provisional qualities of political power as an ongoing struggle rather than an accomplished state formation or a condition that can be otherwise imputed from constitutional-legal mandates or membership of elite groups. In doing so, regime analysis privileges a focus on the arrangements that equip regimes with the capacity to govern; with the political agency of forming coalitions around distinctive policy agendas and securing the governing resources to deliver on these agendas. It is concerned with the ‘schemes of co-operation’ used to interest, enrol, mobilize and sustain governing coalitions. ... Of course regimes are not neutral mechanisms, they do exercise ‘power over’ others, and the resources needed to form and sustain governing coalitions are unequally distributed. Yet it is this sense, akin to Marx’s 18th Brumaire, of the possibility of actors making their own history albeit not in conditions of their own choosing, of therefore having to negotiate not simply command order, which is re-centred in the analysis of regimes as contrasted with analyses of sovereign, state or elite power” (Edwards & Hughes, 2011, p.436).

constraints on public policing expenditures contribute to privatization of urban policing services in areas where not only order maintenance but also profit protection was seen responsibility of public authorities (Spitzer & Scull, 1977, p.24). For U.S., as Spitzer and Scull (1977, p.27) argued that “the private policing of today is organized as a corporate undertaking; and its major customers are large-scale organizations who invest in policing for the same reasons they make other investments: to guarantee profits and secure an environment for uninterrupted growth” in 1970s. Private and public policing may seem opposites, but they share a matrix of connections and processes (Calderia, 2000, p.206). As the below discussions on the legislative processes of private security services is going to clarify that profit protection for capital was also one of the main determinants of privately provided urban security services in Turkey. After 1980s, though neoliberal policies propose contrary by means of privatization practices, as O’Neill (2009, p.444) suggested that “the state still remains a key producer of public goods, the prime regulator of economy and society.”




Figure 6. Comparison of Share (%) of Budget of Gendarmerie and Police Forces in Total Public Budget in Turkey, 1924-2020
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Treasury and Finance (2021).

As shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the share of the total budget allocated to internal security agents has not decreased since the 1980s. On the contrary, both in real numbers and in average shares over a ten-year period, the share of budget allocated to total policing (gendarmerie and police) has increased gradually. According to 10-year periods, the average share of the total policing budget in the total public budget of

Turkey was 3.7 percent between 1980 and 1989, 4.4 percent between 2000 and 2009, and 5.15 percent between 2010 and 2019. As a result, it is impossible to claim that private security services resulted in a reduction in the public budget allocated to internal security services; on the contrary, its average share for 10-year periods has risen from 3.7 to 5.14 percent, corresponding to a 3.3 percent increase in the public budget.

In addition, this new urban security regime both produce and reproduce class-based inequalities at urban scale while the role of state is going to be rescaled and redefined⁶⁴ in terms of its role in high-policing practices. On the one hand, as being an example of low-policing practices, community policing called “Society Supported Policing” in Turkey is proposed for enhancing the role and responsibility of urban communities in preventing crime and establishing safe neighborhoods at urban scale. On the other hand, middle and upper-class neighborhoods encouraged to pay for their safety from private security companies. This dual process reveals that responsibilities of citizens increased at an urban scale in the provision of urban security services.

As Fielding (1995, p.30-33) suggests “community policing consistently seeks a more ‘proactive’ and preventive mode of operation” and “provided an opportunity to spread policing functions to other agencies”. Yet, the community policing form realized in Turkey is very different from the ones in developed world and they are state-led attempts. There is not any voluntary support, for instance, from communities. As Kempa et al. quoted that: “In the context of Turkey, Aydin (1996) notes that officially recognised forms of ‘grass-roots’ initiatives which mirror mainstream developments in the US, Great Britain, and Canada, are virtually non-existent: “In terms of voluntary policing, in Turkey, there is no organised form of voluntary police such as the Special Constabulary or Neighbourhood Watch, but there are some individual volunteers who can be named as vigilantes”(Kempa et al., 1999, p.208).

⁶⁴ Singh (2005, p.162-3) noted that “the role of the state has been redefined. In policing, as in other areas, the state takes on the role of manager and facilitator (Lacey, 1994; Rose, 1999). It is no longer required to meet all the security demands of the population, either individually or collectively, but it creates a framework wherein enormous and sometimes conflicting demands can be appropriately met by a range of providers including private security”.




Figure 7. Average Share (%) of Total Public Policing Budget in Total Public Budget in Turkey, 1924-2020

Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Treasury and Finance (2021).

Furthermore, the number of private security guards has increased tenfold while the number of public police has been increasing too. As shown in the above table, total number of police officers have been rising since 2005. Therefore, rather than replacement of public policing with the private one, there is an increase in “total policing”. Total policing can be defined as a process of urban security practices fulfilled by both public and private security forces and refers to the division of labour between public and private security forces whose responsibilities determined by the law according to the priorities of the capitalist social order and continuity of the nation-state territorial order at all scales.

In this regard, urban scale has become significant both for production of territorial order of the state and for controlling the everyday life of people through different surveillance mechanisms ranging from direct patrolling of both public and private policing to electronic surveillance technologies. As Eick (2014, p.166) stated that “commercial security companies redefine and take over former ‘core tasks’ of the state and also develop new fields of expertise such as IT security provision” and “private forms of policing are rather intended to supplement state-run law enforcement agencies with additional manpower and thus to extent the state monopoly on violence” (Briken & Eick, 2014, p.131).

Table 8. Comparison of Total Number of Active PSGs in Police Area and Total Number of Police Officers in Turkey, 2005-2020.

	No. of Active PSGs in Police Area	No. of Police Officers
2005	23458	171451
2006	56005	181196
2007	80983	187510
2008	105646	198491
2009	135916	209246
2010	158817	218255
2011	167642	232647
2012	190760	242228
2013	209796	250557
2014	217302	256904
2015	245358	260679
2016	255967	260361
2017	238451	264890
2018	315409	276094
2019	324704	307813
2020	335635	313215

Sources: GDS (2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014a; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020).




Figure 8. Comparison of Total Number of Active PSGs in Police Area and Total Number of Police Officers in Turkey 2005-2020.

Sources: GDS (2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014a; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020).




Figure 9. Total Number of Police Officers and Number of Citizen Per One Police Officers in Turkey, 1923-2005
Source: Demirbaş (2005).

In addition to this expansion, class-based inequalities widened in the urban security context, and socio-spatial segregation was reproduced by means of the new urban security regime, which produced new geographical divisions according to the desires of the middle and upper classes, who were able to pay for the provision of security services by private security companies.

As a result, privately provided urban security services has become one of the significant component of both everyday life and governmental practices. This neoliberal urban security regime reveals pluralized forms of policing in fulfilling the uniformed general preventive policing by sharing duties and responsibilities. The role of the state both as a provider and regulator has been redefined legally and the private provision of security services has been on the agenda of public policies since the 1980s.

3.2.1. First Era: Law on the Protection and Security of Certain Institutions and Organizations No. 2495

In Turkey, private provision of security services discussed in 1970s for protecting critical infrastructures such as dams, power plants, factories etc. against attacks and

sabotages, however, there is not any legal arrangements until 1980s. After 12 September 1980 Military Coup, Draft Law on the Protection and Security of Certain Institutions and Organizations was prepared by the Commission of Interior and proposed to the National Security Council. Draft Law (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi, 1981) proposed by the Ministry of Interior in 63rd Session of National Security Council and General Preamble of the law explained the need for the private provision of security as such:

In today's world, which is the scene of a great ideological war, it is imperative that individuals or organizations that try to destroy and weaken our State, whose resources are located at home and abroad, must find more effective security formulas in the face of the determination to continue these actions by changing and expanding appearance, despite all the measures taken.

In our country, which has embarked on a major development initiative, we have faced the necessity of reorganizing the protection services of the institutions and organizations that emerged because of these movements, and which were brought into being with great capital and effort becoming a strategic and tactical target of destructive actions. It is a fact that these values, which significantly contribute to our national economy and to the power of our State, may undermine any kind of development movements that constitute an economic integrity, as well as undermine our society's existence.

For these reasons, to protect all kinds of institutions and organizations belonging to public institutions and private individuals in accordance with the conditions of the day, in addition to the general security measures taken by the State, this Bill has been prepared to ensure that those identified by the Council of Ministers from these places are protected by establishing a private security organization or establishing special security measures or including both.

The head of the Coup, Commander Kenan Evren, and the National Security Council discussed the need for private provision of security services in National Security Council's 64th Session. As being the Head of Council Kenan Evren said that "They come and said: "Give us Soldiers!" Before there were a few factories in Turkey but now it is not the case. There are 19 factories now. How can soldiers protect them?" General Sedat Celasun replied that "...each institution and every factory ask for gendarmerie...". General Nurettin Ersin added that "All private institutions should take their security measures/personnel by themselves." And General Haydar Saltık (General Secretary of National Security Council) said that "... we believe that soldiers should not be employed for security reasons in these places". As a result, these discussions revealed that in the confrontational environment of the 12 September period, the state authority represented by National Security Council asked for

privatizing provision of security services for buildings and institutions in order to concentrate more on public order issues.

As Palmer and Whelan (2007, p.413) suggested that “the importance of examining administrative laws as mechanisms for enabling self-governance and the formalization of social control.” The first attempt towards developing legal basis for private security services were Law on the Protection and Security of Certain Institutions and Organizations No. 2495 enacted in 1981. Article 1 stated the aim of the law as such:

Threats such as sabotage, fire, theft, robbery, looting, demolition and forced dismissal of public or private institutions and organizations that contribute significantly to the national economy or the fighting power of the State, which will have negative consequences for the country's security, the country's economy or public life, even if they are partially or completely destroyed, damaged or detained for a temporary period of time, the provisions of this Law apply to protect against danger or rape and to ensure their safety. Protection of military and police institutions and organizations is subject to special legislation.

Ensuring security of public and private institutions producing value added for national economy and the fighting power of the state were main targets of the law. These two aspects are significant for three reasons. First, it reveals that the motivation behind the law was to protect selected areas being determined by their contribution to the national economic activities. Second, in addition to private institutions public institutions were also taken under the jurisdiction of the law except military and police institutions. Third, rather than task-based perspective, places that should be protected privately were territorially defined as being the targets of threats such as sabotage, fire, theft, robbery etc. Thus, this territorial approach determined the scope of private security services as defined in Article 2 as such:

The places to be protected and to be secured in accordance with the provisions of this Law; commercial, industrial, and agricultural institutions and organizations with the characteristics specified in the first article and their factories, workshops, workplaces, dams, power plants, refineries, power transmission lines, fuel transmission - storage - loading facilities, coal, oil and mining enterprises, radio, television, and radio transmitter stations, all kinds of transportation and communication structures and facilities, educational and educational structures, historical monuments, ruins, sites, indoor and outdoor museums, and tourist facilities. These places being referred in this Law regarded as "organization".

The preamble of the Article 2 stated the territorial dimension of protection perspective as below:

... There is no doubt that, with the enactment of the draft law, the priority in the implementation of this Law will be given to those institutions from energy, transport, and industrial enterprises, which are important because they produce goods and services in a large extent. It is not possible to apply the law to the various prison offices as penitentiaries and execution institutions (established for social purposes other than producing goods and services). It would be useful to disclose this matter to eliminate any hesitations in practice.

Nevertheless, being energy, transport, and industrial enterprises is not led to the determination of these organizations as the places where this law could be applied. Rather, Article 3 gave this authority to the Council of the Ministers on the proposal of Ministry of Interior considering the characteristics of these organizations. According to Article 3, in determination of private provision of protection of security, three options stated as “a) by establishing a private security service within the Organization; b) by only taking private security measures; c) by applying both methods together.” Costs related to the fulfilment of obligations should be covered by the relevant organization (Article 4). Governors were authorized for taking physical and other additional security measures “to ensure more effective conduct of protection and security services in the organizations” and “authorized to have the protection services performed temporarily partially or completely by general law enforcement officers” (Article 5). In addition to the role of governors to take additional security measures to ensure and monitor the implementation of the law at provincial scale, " Provincial Coordination Board of Private Security Organization" were established to identify and recommend to the relevant authorities the measures required to be taken according to the characteristics of the local and organizations “under the chairmanship of the governor or deputy governor in each province.” (Article 7). Moreover, the law defined “private security organization” as “a private law enforcement agency whose authority is limited by this Law, tasked with protecting and ensuring the security of the organization to which it is affiliated in the jurisdiction of this Law” (Article 8). Article 9 determined the duties and power of the private security organization as follows:

a) Protecting the organization against all kinds of threats, dangers and rape such as sabotage, fire, theft, robbery, looting and destruction, forced retention;

- b) Immediately report to the law enforcement officers any offenses committed or being committed within their areas of duty, and detaining them until the general law enforcement officers arrive;
- c) To preserve evidences;
- d) To assist general law enforcement officers by taking over from the time of his seizure
- e) To take other measures required by the protection and security services
- f) Assisting the Civil Defense Service in fulfilling its duties.

It is clearly stated in the Preamble of Article 9 that “the establishment of a private security service in an organization does not impede the fulfilment of duties given to general law enforcement personnel and for this reason the private security organization must assist them”. Therefore, the duties and powers of “private security organization” limited both in terms of the activities that they were able to perform and places where they were able to perform. These issues have been preserved in the second legal arrangements with a few amendments made in Law No. 5188.

Furthermore, the authorization to carry and use weapons given to the private security organizations personnel was another significant issue defined by the law (Article 10). The preamble of Article 10 stated the reason behind this authorization as such:

The private security service will be an armed organization due to the nature of the service it fulfils. Therefore, it is natural for the personnel of these organizations to have the authority to carry a gun while working and to use it when necessary. However, it is also mandatory to limit these powers. In this respect, the authority for personnel to carry weapons is limited by the area and purpose of the task.

Therefore, carrying and using guns and weapons are seen indispensable part of the private security service. The place where private security personnel can carry and use weapons coincides with the area of the duty determined in Article 11 as “the settlement area of the relevant organization”. As a result of this, private security personnel are not allowed to intervene any events outside of the settlement area of the organization they should protect. On the one hand, this place-boundedness is an important aspect of private security because rather than claiming legitimacy across the country, their duty is only limited within the place they serve as a protector. But on the other hand, private security personnel are “considered as civil servants in the implementation of the Turkish Penal Code. Those who commit crimes against them during or depending

on their duties are punished as if they had committed crimes against civil servants” (Article 13). Considering as a civil servant in service, empowering them as presenting service not only for the interests of their customers but also for the welfare of public. In this vein, following Garland (2001), it can be said that “state agencies activate action by non-state organizations and actors. The intended result is an enhanced network of more or less directed, more or less informal crime control, complementing and extending the formal controls of the criminal justice state” (Garland, 2001, p.124). The Ministry of Interior was also responsible for auditing private security services and Governors were also responsible for auditing at provincial scale via the Provincial Gendarmerie Regiment Command or the Provincial Police Directorate (Article 18).

Additionally, in terms of the position of private security service personnel, there were lots of bans restricting their rights as workers. For instance, Article 21 prohibited private security personnel being a member of trade unions, associations, and political parties. Article 22 prohibited participation of private security personnel in strikes, meetings, and demonstrations. Besides, according to Article 27, “In case of strikes or lockouts in their affiliated organization, the personnel of the private security service fall under the command of the general police chief appointed by the provincial governor to assist the general law enforcement officers and perform the duties to be assigned to them within the organization”. Hence, private security guards were seen as a complementing force of state security personnel in any case.

3.2.1. Second Era: Law on Private Security Services No. 5188

“A city cannot only be administered with these Articles”.
Interviewee 22

Law on Private Security Services No.5188 was enacted in 2004 by the AKP Government. It has been the first comprehensive legal arrangement setting the rights and duties of private security companies and private security guards. As one of the interviewees compared it with the Law No.2495 and asserted that “private security companies had covered everything; one could do cleaning, security, tourism under the Turkish Commercial Code” and there is not any rule for specific to the private provision of security according to the Law No.2495 (Interviewee 18). Hence, while

the Law No.5188 has organized the field of security services, it has also enabled the legalization of established private security companies and created a new capital accumulation area (Haspolat, 2008). As the Interviewee 7 said that “prior to 2004, private security companies in Turkey worked with an irregular approach. They only provided bodyguards or guards on demand. It was a structure without a law. Their duties and authorities were not fully defined. ... This work has been in order since 2004”. In this part of the study, before discussing the articles of the law in detail, there is going to be evaluation on “the law proposal”; “what justifications did the ruling party offering for the proposal” and “what criticisms did the main opposition party bring in Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) sessions”.

Tekirdağ Deputy Tevfik Ziyaeddin Akbulut being former member of Ministry of Interior as district governor and chief inspector and Yalova Deputy Şükrü Önder being former member of General Directorate of Security submitted the Law's proposal on May 26, 2004 to TBMM. As one of the interviewees said that “It's a law made mostly by the police. It was done without the knowledge of the military and private sector. The Law that was written without the knowledge of NGOs and the private sector. Now there's a big difference between writing at your desk and...”. The preparation period of the proposal dominated but Ministry of Interior bureaucrats and the proposal submitted by former bureaucrats of Ministry of Interior. Hence, there was not any involvement of military forces and civil society organizations as the above quote approved.

In terms of legislative procedure, when a deputy proposes a new law, there should be a general preamble and article preambles for justifying the need for the law written on the proposal. Therefore, it is significant to know and discuss these preambles to understand the logic of the law and its justification by the ruling party. According to General Preamble of the Law No.5188, previous Law No. 2495 has been inadequate and led to problems in practice such as i) not including regulations regarding the private protection of individuals, ii) inability of institutions and organizations other than those listed in the law to establish a private security organization, iii) institutions and organizations covered by the law must establish a private security organization, and those who do not comply with this requirement are subject to sanctions. However, it was also stated that “despite not being covered by the law, many institutions and

organizations began to ensure their private security because of the need. Many companies began to provide private security services without permission or control to meet the demand in the market". Hence, de facto situation was created by the companies whose main duty was not the provision of security services. Though, being one of the main duties of the state is to provide security and safety for their citizens principle was stated in General Preamble, it was also mentioned that "people have the right to protect their lives and property. In addition to the general law enforcement services provided by the state, this opportunity should be provided to those who wish to protect their lives and property". In this respect, "In accordance with the rule of law, the provision of private security is entrusted to the free will of persons and organizations" while three different options could be employed by the ones granted private security permissions which are a) employing private security guards, b) setting up a private security unit or c) buying service from a private security company. In addition to permanent use of private security services, it was also stated that "Private security services may be used for temporary events such as meetings, concerts, and ceremonies, as well as for transportation of money or valuables". Also, the role of the state is determined as an authority giving permission and providing supervision services and "while allowing private organizations to provide private protection and security services, heavy penalties are envisaged for unauthorized activities and for behaviors against the rules laid down in the Law". The General Preamble summarized the intention of the law as such: "to provide effective and democratic protection and private security services under the permission and control of the state in line with modern needs and developments". Second step in legislation procedure is doing discussions on the law proposal in Sub-Committee⁶⁵ meetings. According to TBMM Sub-Committee Report Decision No:2 Date: 1/06/2004, "the Law Proposal aims to fill the gaps of Law No. 2495 and it takes a different approach to the issue of "private security" than Law No. 2495". It was emphasized that "the Proposal makes a distinction between private security and public safety, and private security is left to private space or privatized. ... If requested by the public, services can be purchased

⁶⁵ Comission Members: Adana Milletvekili Ali KÜÇÜKAYDIN, Eskişehir Milletvekili Muharrem TOZÇÖKEN, Isparta Milletvekili Mehmet Sait ARMAĞAN, İzmir Milletvekili Hakkı ÜLKÜ, Kırklareli Milletvekili Mehmet S. KESİMOĞLU ve Yalova Milletvekili Şükrü ÖNDER.

from private security organizations and public institutions can reduce the service cost by purchasing private security services without endangering public security". This argument on the privatization and marketization of security services is significant because security services opened for free competition in capitalist market relations whereas the state remains as supervisor in inspecting their practices. The role of the state in this architecture was defined as such "due to the security dimension of private security, private security companies are meticulously supervised by the state and illegal practices are tried to be prevented". Besides, attracting international capital is one of the main components of opening security field to free competition and "provisions limiting foreign capital are abolished and no limitations are left in this regard other than the principle of reciprocity". Third step in legislation procedure is doing discussion on the law proposal in Interior Affairs Committee⁶⁶ meetings at TBMM. Both members of oppositional parties and the ruling party declared their decisions in Committee meetings. TBMM Interior Affairs Committee Report Decision No:67 Dat:01/06/2004 summarized these discussions as such:

During the negotiations on the whole Sub-Committee Report, the Committee concluded that the issue of public security was too important to be privatized, that the public order might be seriously compromised by the privatization of security, and therefore, the regulations to be introduced must be strictly adhered to.

In reply, it is stated that the general security of the public is being provided by the State, and that the law enacted does not change this issue. The arrangements adopted in the Sub-Commission text are additional security services to the overall security services provided by the State.

Private individuals and institutions will be able to be protected by purchasing services from private security companies when they wish to be protected privately, in addition to the general security service provided by the State. Thus, the fulfilment of the overall security service offered by the State will be facilitated. In addition, under various names, today, companies provide security services illegally, and undesired results may arise due to lack of supervision. Therefore, with the arrangement made, the event that actually exists will be under the control of the State.

Fourth step in legislation procedure is to discuss and to vote for or against the law in TBMM Plenary Sessions. If the general majority of the TBMM votes in favor of the

⁶⁶ Committee Members: Tevfik Ziyaeddin Akbulut, Ali Sezal, Şükrü Önder, Ali Küçükaydın, Şevket Gürsoy, Reyhan Balandı, Şevket Orhan, Mehmet Soydan, Mehmet Sait Armağan, Nusret Bayraktar, Hakkı Ülkü, Serpil Yıldız, Sinan Özkan, Mehmet Sefa Sirmen, Ali Oksal, Mehmet Kartal, Mehmet Erdemir.

proposal, then it is sent to the President for approval, and he should have the chance to publish it in the Official Gazette so that it can enter into force. Hence, speeches on the law proposal in TBMM sessions is significant to understand justifications of the law proposal and criticisms made by members of opposition parties.

On behalf of the AKP Group, Yalova Deputy Şükrü Önder spoke about the law proposal. He said that security is a primitive need for individuals fulfilled by modern states as a public service. And he also summarized the need for private security and the need for new legal arrangement as such:

... the private security service entered into force in a place where police services were not adequate or where tools and materials were insufficient. ... Since the 1990s, efforts were made to provide private security services by establishing companies that have no legal basis. It is estimated that 50,000 people work in such companies today. What we're trying to do is register all of these companies that are working unlawfully and all of the unregistered staff... In particular, private, and public security are differentiated, and private security services are relocated or privatized. ... of course, the state is still responsible for public order.

Speaking on behalf of the government, Minister of Interior Abdülkadir Aksu, emphasized the need for new legal basis for actually existing practices in private security sector in Turkey. Although accepting the idea of safety and security of life and property is the foremost duty of the state, Aksu said that:

... like all developed countries, we believe that the right to protection of individuals should be respected in Turkey as well. Regarding this issue, needs and developments in the modern state approach are forcing us to adopt liberal changes even in the security sector, where classical liberal theory of state is most sensitive. Besides, as is clearly stated in the proposal, private security does not eliminate the authority and responsibility of the state for general security. The State shall, again, continue to ensure public security and well-being by means of authorized property chiefs.

According to him, there can be argued for two benefits of private security services for the state: First, privatization of security and surveillance services in public supervision led to decrease in workload of public institutions and organizations in security services and, second, private security sector will provide new employment opportunities and, hence, the state's tax revenues would increase. As being conceptualized as a new capital accumulation field for capital, Aksu said that the proposal reveals the government's trust in Turkish private sector in the service industry in terms of the

added value it provides and the capacity to fulfil private security services appropriately.

On behalf of the main opposition party CHP (Republican People's Party), İzmir Deputy Hakkı Ülkü spoke in TBMM Plenary Session on the Law Proposal in 10 June 2004. His speech had lots of criticisms that will be summarized below but it should be noted that though main opposition party's criticisms, they vote for on behalf of the proposal and agreed with the ruling party. Nevertheless, their criticism declared by Hakkı Ülkü is worth to discuss. First, he explained the significance of security in terms of state-society relations and said that:

The proposal we are discussing is one that directly determines state-society relations. While describing the state, it is briefly defined as "the monopoly of the use of legitimate power". Only the state uses force to maintain social peace. State does not share this authority with anyone. One of the most basic tasks of the State is to protect all of its citizens under the same umbrella and is obliged to take the necessary measures. Security is offered to society equally and everyone benefits equally; but, in a sense, the law proposal sees it as sufficient to put aside the umbrella and protect it with overcoat or raincoats"

...

The provision of security services by the market as a result of needs and demands seems consistent within the rules of a free market economy, at first glance and within itself. Accordingly, it is said that "security services can be purchased and sold freely like any goods or service" - it is known that there are no matters which are not clear up until here - but after this point, we come to a point which we can call a "security trap" or be called a "security paradox." As the need for security increases, so will the cost of security. The increase in security costs will also increase production costs. Today, the United States spends close to \$50 billion annually on private security. The need for safety is not diminishing, but it is increasing in number and brings an additional burden to individuals. From the idea of free market, the idea that the state should leave the security services to the market will burden individuals with more costs in society, and in the future, it will perhaps be an indispensable element in the calculation of production costs.

Second, according to CHP's spokesman, the need for private security arisen since the 1990s since the notion of security services commercialized. Thus, the need for law is emerged because of the developments in security services and in private security sector around the world and in Turkey. As it is stated by him, since the early 1990s, the private security sector has grown like an avalanche in the world and reached an annual volume of almost \$100 billion. Private security in Turkey has changed its meaning since the 1990s and has been largely privatized." Third, according to his assertions, on the one hand, private security sector, was unregulated sector in Turkey needed to be

taken under control of the state. It was stated that “Today, companies providing private security services still do not have a legal basis. The draft law we are currently discussing prepared to fill the legal vacuum created by the actual situation”. On the other hand, he asserted that although “the purpose of this draft law is to define the principles and procedures for the provision of private security services, complementing public security; this draft law substitutes public security”. Therefore, whereas the need for private security was defended and supported by the main opposition party, the draft law criticized as being ambiguous in terms of relations between public-private security forces. He said that “The police department prevents the occurrence of crimes in public places such as cinema or theatre, and other authorities provide services; this task also will be provided by private security”. Gülcü (2004a) supported this idea by arguing that employing public law enforcement for the security of private space arises from a necessity in conditions where private security guards are not available or insufficient, and hence, fixing public law enforcement in the private area leads to a weakening of public security.

The weaknesses of the draft law were summarized in six main points by the spokesman of the CHP as follows; (i) “Private security companies could be able to exercise their authority out of their own field of duty. In this case, fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to attack”, (ii) “the mechanism of the state is not effectively included in the proposal. In practice, a small number of officers and the lowest rank supervisors are trying to conduct an audit. If a highly respected private security system is to be introduced, surely the audit organization must be defined in the law in detail”, (iii) “Individual disarmament must be accomplished in order to minimize the number of armed people in social life, achieve social peace, and prevent crime. In this respect, governors should call the condition that security requirements are found when the armed private security guard issues the permit. Approval is not enough; necessity must be sought”, (iv) “the lack of balance in labour-employer relations”, (v) “... the standards for imported security devices have not been determined. ... Turkey's scientific and technological know-how can make these devices to work. So, we must protect our country from becoming an import heaven and a safety zone, a waste of unstandardized appliances”, and (vi) as Turkey wants to be a stabilizing island in a region. Participation of security companies as military forces in foreign operations

would result in declaration of war against these countries without the approval of TBMM. Despite all their above reservations and criticisms, CHP's spokesman declared that they would vote in favor of the law proposal. Therefore, the bill was passed by 251 acceptance votes versus 1 rejection vote on 10 June 2004 in TBMM.

The purpose of the Law on Private Security Services No. 5188, published in Official Gazette on 26 June 2004, is stated in Article 1 as "to determine the principles and procedures for the provision of private security services complementing public security"⁶⁷. The main discussions made on the issue is that whether private security forces complementing or replacing state security forces or in competition with each other (Interviewee 3). Supporting this idea Interviewee 2 said that "Two cannot compete. No competition. The law defines security forces as police, gendarmerie, and coastal security. Other than that, private security is seen more as a complementary service, not even as a co-guard. You can't compete." The Law states that private security guards are not replacing but complementing public security forces. This approach is consistent with the relationship between the state and the capital in its broadest sense. As Jessop emphasized that "the expanded reproduction of the capital relation also depends on an appropriate (ex post, rather than ex ante) balance between the 'market' and the 'state' as complementary moments of the capital relation" (Jessop, 2015, p.4).

As Interviewee 31 summarized the main difference between complementing and replacing as such: "I don't think it's right to compare police and gendarmes to private security. Private security is a job to earn money, to make profit and you fulfil it without any sense of belonging. The police-gendarmerie is a job that you have the responsibility of the whole country and the nation". In addition, one of the interviewees (Interviewee 24) said that "The powers of the police-gendarmerie and private security have already been incomparable. It's clearly written in the Law... Private security

⁶⁷ It is similar to the experience of Spain as Gimenez-Salinas mentioned that: "security is an exclusive responsibility of the state but integrates private security companies as a complementary and subordinated form of security that contributes to public order. ... This particular model of a private-public security relationship creates a double loyalty for private security companies, to both the public sector and their clients. On the one hand, they have corporate and economic challenges as a business, but the law also requires them to cooperate and inform police forces whenever necessary to maintain public order" (Gimenez-Salinas, 2004, p.160).

guards are already poor children... When police forces arrive, private security guards should follow orders of police officials. But private security guards are being mistreated by the police". Crawford and Lister (2004, p.426) explained the above examples as follows: "The historic position of the professional police, symbolically, culturally and legally accords to them a dominant position within the contemporary marketplace."

Nevertheless, there are also others believing that it is an opportunity to downsizing the state and minimize state's involvement in service production sectors. For example, Interviewee 18 said that "Duty of military forces is readiness against foreign invasion or attacks. What the duty of the police is the safety of the public. Do you think it's appropriate for the police to secure their own building while keeping the public safe? Let the police get on the field". Hence, "since you can't put a police-gendarmerie on every person, on everywhere, the state put this system into practice" (Interviewee 18). The lack of resources was asserted as another reason why the state defined private security as a supplementary force. As Interviewee 27 said that "...the government said that "Don't ask me for a police-soldier. I don't have a lot of resources to allocate. But I'm giving an opportunity to the private sector". Gülcü (2002) argued that if it is understood that the danger is great or that the private security measures cannot be implemented, the local authority should be able to intervene and, if necessary, send the public police to solve the problem and a price in accordance with the market price should be collected from the relevant institution to pay for the public authorities. Therefore, it is claimed that public police can also be seen as a commodity to be purchased in need of intervention. Interviewee 7 also asserted that: "If we leave everything to the state, it will come somewhere and get stuck. The state cannot perform its primary duties and investment duties. Therefore, it is very important for us to receive private security services and even state units". These neoliberal ideas are not unique to Turkey and as the Eick (2006a, p.86) indicated that:

Neoconservative social commentators have seized on this critique to advance their own vision of policing, one that has been extraordinarily "successful in reshaping popular opinion on policing and public safety. The resulting commonsense understanding of security that the police cannot be everywhere, that more security is needed, and that effective crime control begins with the maintenance of social order (along the lines of

the "broken windows" thesis) has (unintentionally perhaps) laid the foundation for the rapid growth of the private security industry in major U.S. cities.

In this complementary⁶⁸ relation, both in legal arrangements and in practice, there emerged some sort of division of labour in practice, especially at urban scale. Pacification of citizens in modern nation-states replaced with responsabilisation process when security services commercialized. Moreover, spatial boundaries of this responsabilisation for private security guards determined in Article 9 as follows:

Private security guards may use the powers listed in Article 7 only within the period of their duty and in their assigned areas. Private security guards cannot be able to take their weapons out of their area of duty. The follow-up of the person who is a defendant or strongly suspected of committing a crime, the taking measures against outside attacks, the transfer of money or valuable goods, and the funeral ceremony are all considered as the area of duty throughout the route. Its area of duty may be expanded by the Commission decision if necessary. The area of duty of private security guards working for person protection; when he/she is with the person, it is the borders of the province that is granted permission to protect him/her throughout the country. Incidents that require the use of forced occupancy or capture powers are reported to the authorized general police in the most immediate manner; the person caught, and the item seized shall be delivered to the public police.

As mentioned in the above article, "area of duty" is the most significant aspect of the law since it determines the spatial boundaries of the division of labor between public and private security forces. The area of duty concept provided that private security guards have not power or authority out of this area. Although private security guards cannot escape from their responsibility by throwing out the dangerous people that they find-detected in their field of duty and should call the police forces (Gülcü, 2001), rather than being space-free responsabilisation or authorization of private security guards, their duties and powers are limited in a permitted area of service. This is also significant for urban security since spatial boundaries should be determined for private security services according to property relations. Being private, semi-public/private owned common spaces, public spaces or state buildings have impact upon affording private security services.

Furthermore, duties and powers of private security guards, whose requirements mentioned in the Article 10⁶⁹, have been controversial issue since the law came into

⁶⁸ The complementary relationship between public and private counterparts are evaluated as cooperative by Shearing and Stenning (1983, p.503) "based on the exchange of information and services".

⁶⁹ a) Being a Turkish citizen,

force. In-depth interviews conducted with private security company managers for this study revealed that authorities and duties given private security guards are not enough on the one hand, but on the other hand, private security guards should have adequate training skills and education to have more power. Article 7 defined powers of private security guards⁷⁰. According to some interviewees these duties and responsibilities of private security guards are broad enough for providing private security services (Interviewee 11, 18, 29, 7, and 3). However, they also added that when compared to

b) (Amendment: April 21, 2005 - article 5335/23) At least eight years of elementary or secondary school for those who will perform unarmed duties; for those who will be armed, at least a high school or equivalent.

c) Being over 18.

d) (Amendment: January 2, 2017 - Decree No. 680/69 Article: Exactly accepted: February 1, 2018 - article 7072/67) Even if the deadlines set forth in Article 53 of the Turkish Penal Code No. 5237 dated September 26, 2004, have passed or it has been decided to postpone the announcement of the verdict;

1) Not being sentenced to prison for one year or more for an intentional crime.

2) Even if pardoned, not being convicted for crimes against the security of the state, constitutional order and its functioning, privacy and the hidden area of life and sexual immunity and crimes of drugs or stimulants, embezzlement, corruption, bribery, theft, fraud, forgery, breach of trust, fraudulent bankruptcy, bid rigging, fraud in execution, laundering criminal assets, trafficking, and prostitution.

3) The absence of ongoing investigations or prosecutions concerning the crimes against the constitutional order, the operation of this order, private life and the hidden area of life, sexual immunity and crimes against drugs or stimulants.

f) Not being disabled with body and mental illness may prevent the task from being carried out.

g) To have successfully completed the private security basic training specified in Article 14.

h) (Annex: January 2, 2017 - Decree No. 680/69 Article: Exactly accepted: February 1, 2018-7072/67 Article) The security investigation must be positive.

⁷⁰ a) Passing through responsive doors to those who want to enter the areas where they provide protection and safety, detecting them for their tops, moving items through the X-ray machine or similar security systems.

b) Asking IDs for meetings, concerts, sports competitions, stage performances and similar events, as well as for funerals or weddings; precision gate; searching them on a detector; transmit items through an X-ray machine or similar security system.

c) (Amendment: January 23, 2008 – Law 5728/ Article 544) Seizure according to the Article 90 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

d) (Amendment: January 23, 2008 – Law 5728/ Article 544) Seizure and search of persons in their field of duty who are subject to arrest warrants or convictions.

e) To enter the workplaces and residences in the field of duty in case of natural disasters such as fires and earthquakes and if help is requested.

f) Asking IDs at public transportation facilities such as airports, ports, terminals, terminals, and so on, passing through responsive doors, detecting these people by detectors, sending their belongings through the X-ray machine or similar security systems.

g) Provided that you notify general law enforcement immediately; entrust items that may be criminal or evidence or that may not be a crime but may pose a danger during searches.

h) Entrusting abandoned and found items.

i) Capturing the person in order to protect him/her from a danger existing to his/her body or health.

j) (Amendment: January 23, 2008 – Law 5728/ Article 544) Protecting the scene of the incident and the evidence, for that purpose, apprehending them pursuant to Article 168 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

k) (Amendment: January 23, 2008 – Law 5728/ Article 544) Use of force according to Article 981 of the Turkish Civil Code, Article 52 of the Law on Debts, Articles 24 and 25 of the Turkish Penal Code.

the powers and authorities of police and gendarmerie forces their powers are limited (Interviewee 11) since their powers end up as soon as the police comes (Interviewee 14) according to the Law. As Interviewee 3 said that private security guards and public police is in a very strong relationship with each other. This relationship should be strengthened according to some interviewees. To illustrate, Interviewee 22 said that “The private security system was set up to assist the general police forces. I think the private police unit should not be separated from the general police department very much. The powers used by some private security units should be the same as those of the general police”.

Legal arrangements are significant in determining the scope of practices of urban private security guards and companies. However, in-depth interviews proved that there are some problems in practice. As Interviewee 2 said that “There's no guarantee provided by the law. They're legally entitled to and authorized according to Article 7. You have almost the authority to do these things as an ordinary citizen”. In general, in-depth interviews revealed that there are some problems related to the law and its practice by private security guards. As one of the interviewees said that “The legislation has all kinds of responsibilities on paper. When you open it. When you look on the Law No. 5188. But it has problems on the executive side” (Interviewee 15). First, according to Article 23, “Private security guards shall be punished as public officials for the crimes they have committed in connection with their duties. Those who commit crimes against private security guards for the purpose of their duty shall be punished as if they committed an offense against the public official”. Therefore, one the one hand, private security guards assume that they are police-like personnel, though, their duties and responsibilities are not same according to the Law (Interviewee 23). One of the most significant examples given by interviewees is searching anybody with or without their consent (Interviewee 13) since “the physical intervention is not allowed. No coercion. The security guard will warn or call the general police. When he/she caught the thief, of course, and when the law enforcement came in, he would hand them over” (Interviewee 14). But, on the other hand, they have responsibilities in terms of surveillance and crime prevention though they have not enough powers. As one of the interviewees said that: “It's like a police work, but in terms of authorizations and responsibilities, they can't even get close to it... the Law

is not adequate... even if they have not similar responsibilities that police and gendarmerie forces have... They work as public officials” (Interviewee 24). Another interviewee (Interviewee 16) supported this idea and added that “There's no respect... There's no such thing as private security right now. They don't have a security system right now, like a standard police force enjoy etc. The system is based on consultation, guidance, and effective communication with the administration or with visitors”. The right to search is another significant example given by interviewees (Interviewee 4, 9, 18, 20 and 22) for exemplifying differences between rights and responsibilities between police and private security guards. As one of the interviewees clearly stated that private security guards are not authorized to search, to ask identification card and to ask for opening the trunk of the car (Interviewee 18). Another example given by Interviewee 20 as such: “... we're going to the airports now... You're not authorized to search by hand. No... After all, he knows, but he was ordered to... Normally, the police should take care of it. If it were not for the state of emergency, I would say call the police.”

Second, the right to bear arms and to use guns given to private security guards is criticized by interviewees as being unclear. According to Interviewee 10, the authority to keep and bear arms should not be given to the private security guards due to their inadequate training of using a gun. In addition to training related issues, one of the most important aspects is the authorization given to the private security guards in areas of duty led to prohibition of the use of gun out of this area (Interviewee 31). For instance, one of the interviewees explained it as such: “Why don't I work with banks? Weapons, Guns... When a private security guards of the bank shot on him, it is not a crime actually. But when he or she shot or hit, the prosecutor may ask for a sentence... Being an armed private security guard is all risky” (Interviewee 20). Another point is the prohibition of carrying gun in some places according to the Law No 5188 resulting in security vulnerabilities. As Interviewee 4 exemplified that “...there was a terrorist attack in Reina Club, Istanbul. it was under an armed attack. What can private security do at this location? Nothing. ...That's where the security vulnerability emerges... Private security guards, in places like this... should be allowed to be armed”. In this regard, there has been new developments since the failed coup attempt was experienced on 15 July 2016. One of the interviewees said that “the need for

security was considered to be at different level. ... Previously, the security needs should be met by the company managers or determination of the need left to business owners' will. Now, the state suggests armed private security guards for some important places at urban scale" (Interviewee 7).

Third problem is that chore-work is demanded by the employer though the Law says that private security guards could only be employed for provision of security services. As it was stated by one of the interviewees as "The Law says that private security guards could not be able to do search or could not be employed for works other than security etc. So, what this private security guard can do? Just stand and wait. Look out for example, the ones employed in public institutions working as car parking attendants" (Interviewee 13). Another example is given by Interviewee 19 as such: "Employers determine working conditions... These people wear uniforms. When he wears this, it needs to be treated like a police officer... The employer says, "Clean up here". For overcoming these problems some interviewees offered solutions. First, there is the need for increasing training hours and contents of training should be improved for giving more power and authorities to private security guards (Interviewee 8 and 28). Second, the Law should be revised to ban employers asking for services other than security (Interviewee 8 and 9). Third, area of duty determined by the law should be changed and spatial limits should be removed for private security guards (Interviewee 2 and 8).

Furthermore, Article 2 described the scope of the law as it "covers the subjects regarding the granting of a private security permit, licensing, and auditing of the persons and institutions performing this service." Since 2019, the auditing-inspection of private security services has been carried out by the Private Security Inspection Department, which was established under the General Directorate of Security. The Department is responsible for inspection and the control of private security sector. Hence, three significant duties emerged from this Article which are granting permit, licensing, and inspecting fulfilled by the state authorities. To fulfil permission duties, "private security commission" is established. According to Article 4, organizational structure of the Commission is defined as such:

The Private Security Commission shall consist of a deputy governor appointed by the governor, a representative of the Provincial Police Directorate, the provincial Gendarmerie Command, the Presidency of the Chamber of Commerce, and the Presidency of the Chamber of Industry to make decisions on the private security as specified in this Law. In provinces where there is no industrial chamber, the representative of the chamber of commerce and industry attends the commission. The person or representative of the organization applying for private security permission or removal of the removal of it participates in the relevant commission meeting as a member. The Commission takes its decisions by majority vote; in case of equality of votes, the party on which the president is present shall be deemed as the majority; abstention is not permitted.

Thus, the Commission is an example of governance mechanism including state, capital, non-governmental organizations representing interests of capital and the ones demanding permission for private security services. Duties and responsibilities of the Commission are as significant as its organizational structure. Article 3 explained duties and responsibilities of the Commission as follows:

The protection of individuals by armed personnel, the establishment of a private security unit within institutions and organizations, or the provision of the security service by companies depends on the governor's permission upon the decision of the private security commission. At meetings, concerts, stage shows and similar events; in the temporary or emergency circumstances such as the transfer of money or valuables, the governorship may issue a private security permit, without the need for a commission decision.

Upon the request of individuals and organizations, the security service is allowed to be provided by the personnel to be employed, to establish a private security unit within institutions and organizations, or to have this service provided by security companies, considering the need for protection and security.

The establishment of a private security unit within an organization does not prevent security companies from being served when needed.

The Commission shall be authorized to determine the maximum quantity and features of the weapons and equipment that may be kept or handled by the personnel who will perform the protection and security services, and, if necessary, other physical and instrument security measures.

International obligations regarding security measures for places such as airports and ports are reserved.

Other than temporary situations, private security may be terminated upon the decision of the commission and the approval of the governor, provided that the application has been submitted at least one month in advance.

It is asserted that roles of Deputy Governor as a head and a representative of the Provincial Police Directorate, and the Provincial Gendarmerie Command as members

are important to determine the conditions of permission such as required number of private security guards, number and types of weapons, types of electronic equipment etc. (Interviewee 27). Since the permission is a requirement for providing private security service at urban scale, the Commission examined the application and asks some questions such as “How many private security guards are required? Armed or unarmed? If he is armed, his permission is recorded, indicating the type of weapon he will use... How many people are secured here?” (Interviewee 14).

The operation permit given private security companies is another significant regulatory function fulfilled by the Ministry of Interior. According to Article 5, “The activities of companies in the field of private security are subject to the permission of the Ministry of Interior. In order to grant the permission for the activity, the company’s shares must be registered, and the activity area must be for protection and security service exclusively”. After granting permission, the Ministry of Interior is also responsible for inspecting private security companies. As it is stated in Article 22 “The Ministry of the Interior and the governorships are authorized to inspect private security units, private security companies and institutions providing private security training within the scope of private security services”.

These articles determine legal context of regulation process of private security units, companies, and institutions. However, rather than regulation, non-regulation is stated by some interviewees as an example of the state’s unwillingness to audit private security companies. For instance, Interviewee 23 asked and replied that “Who’s inspecting? No one. What does the police do? Nothing”. Interviewee 2 said that “... we are making a protection plan. I don't think anyone of them is controlled. As you can imagine, I have been in this sector for ten years, given a protection plan for almost eighty projects nobody has said that what you’ve done this wrong as well”. Rather than doing control on their desk by reviewing submitted documents, the need for field research is stated by some of the interviewees. For example, “... auditing and inspecting done by private security branches of police forces are insufficient. ... the branch should visit the projects, the location, site etc. How many people are there for security? ... This should be made by on-site-monitoring” (Interviewee 14) which is not exists in private security services (Interviewee 17).

To conclude, although there are many problems in regulating the field of private security market, above discussions on legal aspects of the urban private security services in Turkey revealed that “private police is not outside of the state’s monopoly of power but a cheap expansion of it” (Belina, 2003, p.52). Therefore, the role of the state has been redefined, and rather than the oppressive-coercive function of the police forces, privately provided security services contribute to the consent-building and expansion of infrastructural power of the state via expanding social control over urban social spaces ranging from gated-communities to shopping malls.

3.3. Urban Private Security Services as a Process of Capital Accumulation: Private Security Market

“Private security is a system established by the state to create new job opportunities in Turkey”.

Interviewee 15

“Security is not something measurable”.

Interviewee 18

“The private security sector is seen as a solution to decrease unemployment rates”.

Interviewee 29

“In fact, the demand for urban private security in the world always stays alive because there is a need”.

Interviewee 30

Markets for security services and solutions are flourishing like never before, despite the global economic downturn (Graham, 2011, p.xxii), since "neoliberalism deploys the market as the engine of active citizenship" (Kempa et al., 2004, p.566), rather than passive welfare beneficiaries. Therefore, the expansion of private security may have a negative impact on social justice; while the private policing sector transforms security into a competitive market system and rivalry among residential communities causes relocation since private security is distributed unequally in a market system and identifies and excludes 'risky' categories of persons on purpose (Zhang, 2017, p.3467). Corporate security services are increasingly in charge of "securitizing" these new commons zones such as large privately owned shopping malls and office, recreational, educational, industrial complexes etc. and these agencies implement security governance programs to manage communities of residents, workers, consumers, and patrons, and the power with which corporate security governance is implemented in these realms of autonomy is facilitated by a variety of pre-packaged liberal policies

(Hutchinson & O'Connor, 2005, p.132). These autonomous agents may strengthen their security initiatives by using the state's coercive authority (such as ejecting disruptive or undesired individuals from their "community") in collaboration with the state, since policies responsabilizing them for their own security did not contribute to the decrease in the sovereign power of the state, but rather a new network of governance opportunities emerged (Hutchinson & O'Connor, 2005, p.133). The industry believes that its products will appear to pay for themselves by making the supply of security financially beneficial for those who invest in it, indicating more than just a shift in who controls crime and a more fundamental shift away from upholding rules and toward maximizing profit (Zedner, 2009, p.108). Three types of private security services which are determined as i) staffed services (uniformed guarding of both people and property); ii) security equipment; and iii) investigation and it was stated that "competition is largely based on price rather than quality" (Crawford, 2008, p.163).

In this vein, private security guards are those that 'patrol and check property to defend against fire, theft, vandalism, terrorism, and unlawful activities,' and defend their employer's property, uphold local ordinances, and avert criminal activities and other issues according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (as cited in Fuchs, 2013, p.681). Garland (2001) asked the question that "Why have we made such massive new investments in private security and created such thriving markets in commodified control?" and listed four interrelated reasons as follows:

Because the old-fashioned sovereign state can deliver punishment but not security, and this has become apparent to economic actors who have a real stake in the process. Because affluent sectors of the population have become accustomed to insuring themselves and their property and are increasingly willing to spend money on the pursuit of personal safety. Because these same groups are acutely aware of the social and racial divisions that characterize today's society and resort to defensive space and fortified property as ways of warding off threatening outsiders. And because in high crime societies, the problems of personal security, crime prevention and penal provision have created commercial opportunities that have been vigorously exploited by the private interests and market forces that neo-liberalism has so effectively liberated (Garland, 2001, p.200).

Currently, private companies provide the majority of individual security, and their position in national and international security is expanding and the proportion of public

to private security services is shifting although the shortcomings of the security market are still being addressed by governments and other public institutions on an individual, national, and worldwide scale (Krahmann, 2008a, p.396). It is argued that the market delivers security more effectively than the state does, that the market is more responsive to consumer demand, and, most contentiously, that the purchase of private security by the wealthy frees up state resources for the protection of those who are less well off (Zedner, 2009, p.109).

Also, as Montreal case revealed that the state itself has become a supplier in the field of private security market and receive money in exchange of the provided service (Mulone, 2011, p.166-7). Based on the research on “a short case study of a municipal police department, the business section of the Montreal Police” Mulone indicated that “commercialization practices as a strategy to increase their operational capacity and to answer budget restriction” (Mulone, 2011, p.167-8). The history of security guards and watchmen is similar to that of their fellow proletariat in that they have traditionally been low-wage wage workers who have been viewed as requiring continual monitoring. The security agent is compelled to make his location known at all times, much like the factory worker who punches a time clock under the careful eye of the owner and his "police" (Rigakos, 2002, p.99). Hence, it is one of the most profitable investment area for capital as the share of service sector increases in total employment.

Similar to all other capital accumulation areas, in legitimization of private security sector, it was presented as an opportunity for reducing unemployment. The share of service sector has been gradually increasing in the last two decades in Turkey. As the below figure shows that the share of labor in service sector was 42,27 % in 2005 while it has risen to 56,17 % in 2020. Interviewee 17 described this process as such: “When the sector was initially established, it was founded entirely to find jobs for unemployed people and to reduce the unemployment rates. It is aimed that a person who does not have any work can get an ID and get a job and a SSI security”. As Briken and Eick (2014, p.130) stated that “commercial security provision dates back in the 19th century and therefore the industry is not entirely new. However, in times of glocal neoliberalism, commercial actors gain more influence in the decision-making concerning the mechanisms and the actors” involved in the process.




Figure 10. Share of Labour by Economic Activity in Turkey 2005-2020
Source: TURKSTAT (2021a).

In this regard, the process of commercialization of the security services in Turkey has accelerated especially in the 2000s. Security has become a commodity traded on the market as an urban security service, especially with the Law No. 5188. Hence, private security market has become profitable investment service area for national and foreign investors. As Interviewee 24 stated that: “... by the year 2005, there was a complete explosion. Obviously, this sector has been viewed as a new employment area. Entrepreneurs had started companies, opened courses etc. There's been some significant level of economic activity”.

Furthermore, there are two main aspects of urban private security realized as a capital accumulation process are (i) employment conditions-requirements and wages of private security guards and (ii) characteristics and the ways private security companies do businesses. First, the role of state could not be limited as being a regulatory body, but the state provided human resources for private security sector as retired police

officers and military personnel have become owners of local companies (Interviewee 18), managers of companies (Interviewee 1) or even started to work as private security guards (Interviewee 21).




Figure 11. Comparison of Employment by Economic Activity and Insured Person in Security and Investigation Services in Turkey 2008-2020
Source: TURKSTAT (2021a); SSI (2021).

As Johnston proved that this has been a pattern of private security in UK experience and pointed out that “Commercial security companies have always recruited senior personnel from the public police and there are historical links between commercial, military and state security dating back to the era of Alan Pinkerton in the 1830s” (Johnston, 1999, p.187). As one of the Interviewees explained it as such “In the operations section of the business, I refer to the private security sector as "half military-half policing." In some ways, private security is law enforcement. Hence, police or TSK retirees are preferred because discipline is needed to manage the employee on the

field” (Interviewee 3). Since retired police and military personnel know what security means (Interviewee 4) and the discipline it requires both in the field and in management activities, military-police retirees are preferred (Interviewee 11). As shown in the Figure 11, labor employed in the service sector and the number of insured persons in security and investigation services revealed parallel trend while increasing and decreasing in terms of their number.

In addition, the role of private security guards is very significant since being a service sector, surplus value extracted from services provided by private security guards is the main source of profit. Briken (2011, p.129) clearly summarized the differences between public officers responsible for security and private security guards as follows:

... the state employs police officers as public servants and their employment conditions and career-based personnel policies are more or less privileged. They are trained and socialized to produce a public, normative good by representing the state and its power. Security guards are employed by private firms to generate surplus value. They face mainly poor working conditions, with very few opportunities for a career. In the process of valorization of labor, private security guards are forced to produce a commodity, but at the same time are commodities themselves.

Compared to electronic surveillance systems, “The need for physical security i.e., private security guards, creates most of the job opportunities in the private security sector... They install the system, then operation is up to the physical security” (Interviewee 8). Thus, some of those private security companies provide also electronic surveillance systems or equipment necessary for the service, but exploitation of private security guards’ labour force is almost the only source of profit. As one of the interviewees (Interviewee 12) declared that “The truth is that this is our business, we can't hide it. We can't cover anything. Clear... A private security guard is the last ring of capitalism. That's the thing about capitalism, he is the one that works the most and paid the least wage”. As an employment policy in the private security sector, almost all interviewees stated that one of the most important problems is the level of minimum wage determined by the state. As quoted in Gahan et.al. (2014, p.188), “the private security industry resembles what might be termed ‘low road’ industries, characterized by low pay and unattractive employment conditions (Sengupta, Edwards and Tsai 2004).” Also, Wakefield (2014, p.223) founded in his study on UK that “contract security officers’ earnings were low and their hours were

long”. Similarly, in Turkey, “there was a private security boom after the Law No. 5188, private security guards were well paid resulted in increased demand for participating training courses and receiving the certificate... but now wages are minimum wages”. George and Button (2000, p.15; as cited in Button, 2002, p.97) defined “private security industry” as such:

The term ‘private security industry’ is a generic term used to describe an amalgam of distinct industries and professions bound together by a number of functions, including crime prevention, order maintenance, loss reduction and protection; but these functions are neither common nor exclusive to all the activities of the private security industry, though the more that apply to a particular activity the more clearly it can be considered as private security. To be included within the industry, personnel must have a primarily security role, whether this is full-time or part-time, and there must also be an employment relationship, whether as an employee or self-employed. The industry also includes certain public sector security employees ... where their role is paralleled in the private security industry, the interest served is private and they hold no special statutory powers. The services and products of the private security industry are also generally categorised into a number of distinct sectors. There is also a large grey area around these sectors – and between them, in some cases – which we have called the ‘margins’ of the private security industry.

As shown in the Figure 12, daily earnings of labor in private sector were 24 USD in 2008 and it has decrease to 20 USD in 2020. Besides, the comparison of average daily earnings between insured labor in private security services and total insured labor revealed that average daily earnings of insured labor in private security services is 20% lower than the average daily earnings of total insured labor. The numbers in the below figure also approved the minimum wage standards told by Interviewees when compared to the above information on average daily earnings for insured persons in private security and investigation services.

Since wages given to private security guards were seen as a most important cost factor (Interviewee 15), employers try to minimize wages at a certain minimum level. There are a few examples paying 10 or 15 percent over minimum wages (Interviewee 22 and 27), most of the interviewees declared that they pay minimum wage for private security guards. As a result of this, “Private security guards employed in this sector are people who have no other choice or opportunity to find job” (Interviewee 23) and as it is seen “as a last resort”; companies pay the lowest wages (Interviewee 22). Besides being employed as managers of private security companies (Interviewee 2), retired military personnel or police officers is a method to provide low cost armed




Figure 12. Average Daily Earnings (USD) of Total Insured Labour and Average Daily Earnings (USD) of Insured Labour in Private Security and Investigation Services in Turkey 2008-2020.
Source: SSI (2021).




Figure 13. Gross Minimum Wage in Turkey Based on Annual Average of USD-TRY Exchange Rate 2005-2022.
Sources: Adopted from Data of Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (2022).

private security for certain places since they have their own guns (Interviewee 11). In addition to this, cost of retired personnel is lower than active workers. As Interviewee 31 said that: “Some private security companies usually try to employ retired personnel since “the tax payment is low, and they know the job. They can come armed with their own guns wherever they want”. Therefore, “the most important factors that determines the price are how many private security guards will work in the field and whether these private security guards are retired/pensioners” (Interviewee 31).

According to some interviewees (Interviewee 29 and 31), this can only be overcome

by determining “an exclusive minimum wage” for private security guards by taking into consideration the features and difficulties of working conditions (Interviewee 29). It is also asserted that “since wages are low, you can only find retired or unqualified workers” (Interviewee 31). Thus, in order to employ skilled workers, it is stated that private security guards should be well paid (Interviewee 2) and offer career in private security sector. Since “the nature of this work is based on insecurity. The maximum life span of the private security personnel is 2-3 years” (Interviewee11). As the Interviewee 20 told that “Low cost, low cost, maximum benefit. That's what people in the market think” which means high exploitation but low wages. Besides, this is contradicting with the decisions given by the Commission. To illustrate, “The employer had taken approval for 20 private security guards from the Commission. They came us and said that “Make it a minimum: 10. I don't want to pay a lot of money”. The cost of private security guards is the priority, not the quality of security” (Interviewee 2).

Although there a lot of private security guards graduated from university (Interviewee 7), being a pattern discovered in the field research, lack of necessary training and qualifications for private security services emphasized as one of the major problems affecting wages, duties, rights, and responsibilities, working hours etc. For instance, it was stated that “80 percent of the security industry personnel are unqualified. They don't know their authority and responsibility. They don't know how to behave” (Interviewee 13). The problem of training⁷¹ evaluated as being one of the main obstacles in front of the private security sector. Being a middle school graduate for unarmed and being a high school graduate for armed private security guards are compulsory. However, they have to complete training programs successfully in order to receive the certificate. This training programs criticized by many interviewees as being inadequate and incomplete (Interviewees 2, 3, 11, 12, 14, 22 and 29).

According to Interviewee 7 “... if they are trained enough, private security will be able

⁷¹ In addition to the questions on the quality of pre-service training, as Gahan et.al. (2014, p.174) stated that in-service training is also problem in Australian context since “there is limited evidence concerning the extent to which individuals or employers engage in training beyond that formally required by licensing arrangements in specific jurisdictions”.

to do the work that the police are doing right now. As long as he's trained, just the name of it is changed from police to private security guard... they can replace the police". Besides, it was noted that working conditions should be reviewed according to necessities of the service. For instance, one of the interviewees compared it with police officers and said that: "... a police officer has to work 24 hours and has a rest for 48 hours. You can't do that in private security because you're subject to the Labour Law... I'm doing complementary work, so adapt me to it" (Interviewee 27). Moreover, exemptions from military services like police officers were given as an example of supporting their rights and reputations within society (Interviewee 28).

Private security companies established according to the Law No. 5188 operate in three main areas which are (i) training programs providing private security guard certificates, (ii) physical private security services providing private security guards for urban spaces and (iii) electronic surveillance systems establishing surveillance infrastructure. Companies providing physical private security services are main source of labour and they determine characteristics of the private security market. As mentioned before, these companies are providing complementary urban security services, thus, their establishment, management and functioning is as significant as the state security administration at urban scale.

In this vein, obtaining a Certificate from the General Directorate of Security and notifying it about starting business are preconditions for starting operation as a private security company other than financial requirements (Interviewee 12 and 28). As previously mentioned, private security companies can only provide private security services and dealing with other areas such as retail, shopping, cleaning etc. are forbidden by the Law No.5188 in 2004. As one of the interviewees stated that "The industry has developed a lot since 2004. This is because the Law... Private security industry has now become the most advanced, most need-oriented, and job-creating industry of our time". Thus, private security companies are companies established to sell and provide security services (protection and security, private security training and alarm centers) to third parties (Gülcü, 2004b).

In private security market, there are different types of companies in terms of their size

(small-medium-large enterprises), their origin of capital (local-national-international companies), their spatial area of service (housing sites – shopping malls – public spaces etc.) and their field of operation (training – physical security – electronic surveillance systems). There are large companies such as Securitas⁷² and Group 4⁷³ as international companies, TEPE, OYAK Security as national companies and ATK as local companies (Interviewee 4) in physical private security services whereas Bosch, Panasonic and Samsung provide electronic surveillance systems such as cameras, security equipment etc (Interviewee 1). In physical private security, some of these international companies entered into Turkish market by buying companies (Interviewee 6). For instance, Securitas, as being one of the most significant international capitals in private security services, bought Kare Security and DAK Security being formerly owned by one of the most famous mafia leaders in Turkey called Drej Ali (Interviewee 23). As Briken and Eick (2014, p.128) stated that “the commercial market today is characterized by the predominance of global players such as G4S, Prosegur and Securitas that invade national markets”.

Within the market of private security services, there are also some sort of division of labour. Large and corporate companies are mostly providing security services in privately owned common/public spaces such as shopping malls (Interviewee 11). As Interviewee 4 said that: “International and national companies provide security services mainly in areas such as shopping malls. Ankara’s local companies primarily provide security in smaller-scale areas such as residential areas.”According to Interviewee 23 the reason why there is such kind of division of labour is that: “Corporate companies prefer corporate companies for provision private security services though the provided service is the same... For instance, Anadolu Group says that this company will protect all Efes Pilsen facilities in Turkey”. Another example is given by Interviewee 25 as such: “ISS or TEPE security, for example. They operate in 81 provinces across Turkey. Banks, for example, are either ISS or TEPE”. In

⁷² Dupont et al. (2003, p.339) mentioned that “Securitas, a Swedish security company, employs for example 230,000 people around the world and claims a global security market share of 10 per cent”, but it is stated that they employed 355.000 people in 2020. (Annual and Sustainability Report, 2020).

⁷³ “The Group is a focused global leader in security ... across six continents, G4S and its more than 490,000 employees...” (Annual Reports and Accounts, Group4S, 2020).

addition, international private security companies such as Securitas, ISS and G4S provide private security services for international institutions located in Turkey such as the UN (Interviewee 7). Securities of investments of French and German companies in Turkey are also provided by international private security companies (Interviewee 22). There are also some objections to international private security companies since they raise the level of wages (Interviewee 2) and stealing their businesses though they provide same service. For example, Interviewee 29 said that “For us, international companies is bad for us since they raise salaries and take jobs. Their services are no different from us. The guys are the same”. One of the interviewees (Interviewee 30) explained the situation as such: “I am against them because they earn money by employing my citizens. I can provide same services. If they produce something or if they make investments on manufacture industry, I am ok. But in service sector such as private security, national companies should be supported here.”

It is stated that compared to national and local companies profit margins, international companies profit margin is high (Interviewee 7). Their profit margin is high, so they do not work with public institutions (Interviewee 12). Besides, since large international capital investing in private security services have huge budgets, many interviewees stated that national or local companies have no chance to compete with them (Interviewee 18, 24 and 30). This high profit margin and high cost of the service is big obstacles for these international companies to participate in public procurement processes because the lowest offer takes the tender (Interviewee 5).

In addition, one of the significant issues is how to determine performance of private security companies and private security guards in operation. As being a service industry, its performance depends on the quality of its workforce (Gahan et.al., 2014, p.203). The communication capacity of the staff with visitors and customers is mentioned by interviewees as a first criteria (Interviewees 19, 20, 28, 31). If private security guards in the field establish good communication and fulfil their duties, employers are satisfied with the services provided by them. The second one is the performances of private security guards and managers before and after an incident occurs. How many incidents do they prevent and take under control? How they respond to them? etc. (Interviewees 10, 16, 17 and 24). Third, working in one place

for a long time is also seen a sign of good performance for the companies (Interviewees 8 and 9, 29). As one of the interviewees said that “Being not any theft incident in one place could not be a criterion of success. Urban private security service cannot be presented with zero errors “(Interviewee 3). Hence, rather than providing private security service for achieving zero-theft incidents, private security companies concentrate more on establishing good communication with the customers and visitors by decreasing risk⁷⁴ for the sake of them. A customer-oriented approach created by such an understanding of urban security is more important than preventing crime in cities; and instead of detecting and eliminating the sources of crime, new urban security strategies based on this understanding see crime as an opportunity that any rational individual can seize (Kavuncu, 2018, p.183). As Gahan et.al. (2014, p.203) argued that “There appears to be a paradox at the heart of our attitudes towards the industry: at a time when everyone is demanding greater security and protection from risk no one appears to be happy to pay for it or to respect it as ‘legitimate work’”.

Furthermore, there are also significant problems within private security market in Turkey. First of all, “unregistered small enterprises”⁷⁵ create unfair competition especially in housing sites since they reduce their costs by not paying necessary taxes to the state. This is expressed as “small fish-eating big fish” by one of the interviewees (Interviewee 11). Though they do not have enough capital, they do business with public institutions by means of public procurement (Interviewees 27 and 28). Second, by offering low costs and decreasing prices, some companies are not earning money or making profit but doing money laundering (Interviewee 14). Third, companies

⁷⁴ “In everyday language the term 'risk' is understood as a synonym for danger or peril, for some unhappy event which may happen to someone; it designates an objective threat. ... Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, considers the event. ... As a technology of risk, insurance is first and foremost a schema of rationality, a way of breaking down, rearranging, ordering certain elements of reality. The expression 'taking risks', used to characterize the spirit of enterprise, derives from the application of this type of calculus to economic and financial affairs. Rather than with the notions of danger and peril, the notion of risk goes together with those of chance, hazard, probability, eventuality or randomness on the one hand, and those of loss or damage on the other - the two series coming together in the notion of accident. One insures against accident, against the probability of loss of some good. Insurance, through the category of risk, objectifies every event as an accident” (Ewald, 1991, p.199).

⁷⁵ Analyzing private security sector in Indian case, Ferus-Comelo (2014, p.257-8) stated similar problem as such: “many security agencies in operation do not have the requisite registrations and licences to operate legally. This is a concern even though the registration process required of security agencies (and other companies) appears to be a straight-forward administrative procedure”.

established on paper for public tenders, but they do not exist in reality (Interviewees 12 and 29). They do not have their own private security guards, necessary equipment, or any experience in the field of private security. Fourth, it is asserted that private security services sector is one of the most vulnerable sectors to economic crisis since the first thing that will be reduced is the budget for security (Interviewee 25). Fifth, corruption and political impact upon public procurement processes were stated as significant problems. As it was stated by one of the interviewees “If you have a political power, there is no project you cannot take. If you have a reference to the leading political party, there is nothing you cannot take. Less in private, but more in public. Municipalities often do (Interviewee 15). Final problem is the lack of institutionalization and professionalization in private security sector in Turkey (Interviewee 12).

CHAPTER 4

PRIVATELY PROVIDED URBAN SECURITY SERVICES IN ANKARA

In this chapter, the relationship between private security services, surveillance, and (re)production of space is going to be discussed in the case of Turkey, Ankara from two vantage points determined as surveillance strategies and surveillance spaces. At this point, the political economy and uneven geography of the provision of urban security services by private companies in Turkey will be discussed primarily. Then, in the case of Ankara, the uneven geography of urban private security services will be discussed in terms of the classification of surveillance spaces. In this direction, the quantitative data collected within the scope of the field study will reveal Ankara's position in Turkey comparatively, and its objective positioning compared to other cities will be determined. Along with the quantitative data, the findings obtained from the semi-structured in-depth interviews will also be evaluated together with the quantitative data, especially in the discussions of surveillance strategies and surveillance spaces.

To understand the practice of urban private security services and problems in its implementation processes in the case of Ankara, there should be made clarification on basic determinants of economic aspects of private security services. Hence, statistical data provided by national institutions (TURKSTAT, SCI and GDS) are going to shed light on this issue. First, being the sub-section of service sector according to the economic activities classifications, the share of private security services in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Turkey by provinces and in Ankara are going to be compared. For this purpose, both national and international statistical data sources were analyzed. In initial analysis, it was discovered that TURKSTAT uses NACE

Rev.276 of European Union for statistical classification of economic activities. In this classification, M covering “Professional, scientific and technical activities” whereas N covering “Administrative and support service activities” (EUROSTAT, 2008).




Figure 14. Share of MN in GDP by provinces by kind of economic activity (A10), at current prices, Ankara, and Turkey 2004-2020.

Source: TURKSTAT (2020).

There are six divisions within “administrative and support service” classification, and one of them is “security and investigation activities” covering all private security activities. By combining them together TURKSTAT calculates share of MN in GDP by provinces. As shown in the above figure, according to the estimation of GDP by provinces the share of professional, administrative and support service activities (MN) in Ankara was 5,1 % whereas it was 4 % in Turkey in 2004. Until 2017, the share of MN increased by 8,3 % in Ankara and 6,1 % in Turkey. However, the share decreased

⁷⁶ “NACE is the acronym³ used to designate the various statistical classifications of economic activities developed since 1970 in the European Union. NACE provides the framework for collecting and presenting a large range of statistical data according to economic activity in the fields of economic statistics (e.g. production, employment, national accounts) and in other statistical domains. ... NACE Rev. 2 is to be used, in general, for statistics referring to economic activities performed from 1 January 2008 onwards (Article 8 of the NACE Regulation provides details on implementation” (EUROSTAT, 2008, p.13-17).

by 6,6 % in Ankara and by 5,4 % in Turkey by the year 2020. The below maps illustrated the province-based distribution of share of MN in GDP for the years of 2004 and 2020.




Figure 15. Share of MN in GDP by provinces by kind of economic activity (A10), at current prices, in Turkey 2004.
Source: TURKSTAT (2004).




Figure 16. Share of MN in GDP by provinces by kind of economic activity (A10), at current prices, in Turkey 2020.
Source: TURKSTAT (2020).

As shown in the below table, İzmir, Muğla, Ankara, Antalya and İstanbul are top 5 provinces whose share of MN in GDP are higher than the other remaining 76 provinces. Total share of MN in GDP was 25,37 % whereas increased by 32,96 in 2020 for these five provinces.

Table 9. Share of MN in GDP by provinces by kind of economic activity (A10), at current prices, for Top 5 Provinces in Turkey 2004-2020.

	2004	2020	2004-2020 Change %
İzmir	3,97	5,42	36,48
Muğla	3,97	5,76	45,10
Ankara	5,10	6,59	29,29
Antalya	6,09	6,98	14,54
İstanbul	6,24	8,21	31,71
Total Share	25,37	32,96	

Source: TURKSTAT (2004; 2020).

Secondly, one of the statistical data on private security services by province is the number of insured persons in “security and investigation services” provided by Social Security Institution (SSI) in Turkey. Following the data of registered labor force working in “security and investigation services”, SSI determined the number of insured persons in Turkey.




Figure 17. Number of Insured Person in Security and Investigation Services in Turkey and in Ankara 2008-2020.

Source: SSI (2008; 2021).

The above figure exhibits that there were 17.616 insured workers in 2008 whereas it had risen to 35.780 in 2019 in Ankara. In Turkey, it was founded that there are 131.496 workers in 2008 while it had risen to 320.081 in 2019. The breaking point is the year 2019 because after the implementation of the Statutory Decree 695, most of the security guards working for the public institutions were given cadres and became

contracted public personnel. Therefore, the number of insured workers in security and investigations services started to decline gradually after 2018. For instance, there was 23.519 insured workers in 2020 whereas it was 35.780 in 2019 in Ankara. However, as the below maps visualized that the geographical distribution of the insured workers has not changed significantly. İstanbul and Ankara remained the first two cities in terms of the number of workers in security and investigation services being higher than the other cities. As a consequence, although private security services have become spatially widespread throughout Turkey in the past 12 years, the number of employees employed in private security services has continually increased in cities that are at the top of population density and the level of economic development. And the uneven geographical distribution has been reproduced. This is due to the fact that cities that are at the top in terms of population density and economic development level have the highest concentration of private security service employees.




Figure 18. Province Based No. of Insured Person in Security and Investigation Services in Turkey, 2008.
Source: SSI (2008).

Thirdly, statistical data on the number of active private security guards can be used to show geographical distribution of private security services in Turkey. Since the Law

No. 5188 enacted and started to be implemented in 2004, there was not any systematic data on private security until 2005. Furthermore, Aydin (1996; as cited in Kempa et al., 1999, p.201) documented that “the paid private security sector in Turkey has grown from nil at the inception of the legislation in 1981, to an expanding industry of 2,227 institutions employing 34,928 persons in 1993”. Gülcü’s article published in 2002 is the only source of data revealing the province-based number of private security guards fulfilling security services according to the rules and regulations determined by the Law No. 2495. Province based number of private security guards for 2008 and 2013 were received by the author of this study from General Directorate of Security to make comparison between these two periods of legal arrangements.




Figure 19. Province Based No. of Insured Person in Security and Investigation Services in Turkey, 2020.
Source: SSI (2021).

Besides, data were equalized by calculating the number of private security guards per one hundred thousand population in each city and comparison is limited with the cities whose statistics available for the year 2001. Hence, the below table and maps were generated to see changes and differences before and after the implementation of the Law No.5188.

Table 10. 2001 Province Based No. of PSGs Per One Hundred Thousand Population (Law No. 2495) and Active No. of PSGs Per One Hundred Thousand Population 2008, 2013 (Law No. 5188)

Province	2001 PSGs Per One Hundred Thousand Population	2008 PSGs Per One Hundred Thousand Population	2013 PSGs Per One Hundred Thousand Population
Şırnak	656	56	116
Kırıkkale	466	297	527
Ankara	381	307	611
Antalya	367	303	296
Muğla	324	652	411
Sivas	323	0	289
Diyarbakır	284	173	167
Denizli	208	189	180
Karaman	197	146	173
İstanbul	196	248	461
Sinop	187	95	255
Uşak	164	126	249
Konya	155	161	193
Mardin	154	64	38
Çorum	137	103	165
Eskişehir	28	287	400

Source: Gülcü (2002); GDS (2014b).

As it was mentioned before, the focus of the Law No. 2495 was to protect and to secure significant infrastructural investments of Turkey such as dams, hydroelectric power plants, factories, banks etc. For instance, Kırıkkale being weapons and ammunition manufacturing center for the military or Şırnak being the center of Ilisu Dam were at the top of list. According to the data given by Gülcü, there were 656 private security guards per 100.000 population in Şırnak and there were 466 private security guards per 100.000 population in Kırıkkale. Ankara was in the third ranking by 381 private security guards per 100.000 population in 2001.

In 2008, number of private security guards per one hundred thousand population was 652 being the highest in Muğla and Ankara was the second with 307 number of private security guards per one thousand population in Turkey. Geographical distribution of these unevenness can be followed in the below map.




Figure 20. Available Data on Province Based No.of PSGs Per One Thousand Population in Turkey 2001, (Law No. 2495).
Source: Gülcü (2002).




Figure 21. 2008 PSGs Per One Hundred Thousand Population
Source: GDS (2014b).

In 2013, number of private security guards per one hundred thousand population was 611 being the highest in Ankara and Kırıkkale was the second with 527 number of private security guards per one thousand population in Turkey. Geographical distribution of this can be followed in the below map.

To conclude, above comparison done for following the changes of geographical distribution before and after the Law No. 5188. Hence, it revealed that the number of

private security guards per one hundred population increased in metropolitan cities such as Ankara, İstanbul and Muğla whereas decreased in Şırnak and remained almost same in Kırıkkale.




Figure 22. 2013 PSGs Per One Hundred Thousand Population.
Source: GDS (2014b).

Furthermore, the above evaluation on geographical distribution of private security guards is based on the comparison of 16 cities since the only available data that can be found for the year 2001 was the data of these cities. However, there is the need for revealing the geographical distribution and concentration of private security guards and places received permission for private security services in Turkey after the implementation of the Law No. 5188 which has changed the whole picture private security. Therefore, province-based statistical data obtained from General Directorate of Security for 2008 and 2013 period was analyzed and the following maps produced by the help of GIS. Three classifications were made to exhibit province-based data on private security services which are: (i) the province-based number of active private security guards for 10.000 population in Turkey for 2008 and 2013, (ii) the province-based share of the number of active private security guards in Turkey for 2008 and 2013, and (ii) the province-based share of the number of places received permission from the Commission for providing private security services in Turkey for 2008 and 2013. First one is the province-based number of the active private security guards for 10.000 population in Turkey for 2008 and 2013.




Figure 23. Provincial Distribution of Private Security Guards per Ten Thousand Population by Province in Turkey, 2008
Source: GDS (2014b).

As the geographical-provincial distribution shown in the above figure, top five cities according to the number of the active private security guards for 10.000 population were Muğla (65), Zonguldak (42), Erzincan (33), Ankara (31) and Antalya (30) whereas last five cities were Sivas(0), Van (0) Şırnak (6), Mardin(6) and İzmir (6) in 2008.




Figure 24. Provincial Distribution of Private Security Guards per Ten Thousand Population by Province in Turkey, 2013
Source: GDS (2014b).

As the geographical-provincial distribution shown in the above figure, top five cities were Ankara (61), Kırıkkale (53), Erzincan (47), İstanbul (46) and Kırklareli (46) whereas last five cities were Mardin (4), Şanlıurfa (5), Van (11), Ordu (11) and Aksaray (11) in 2013.




Figure 25. Provincial Distribution of Private Security Guards -% in Turkey 2008.

Source: GDS (2014b).

Second, is the province-based share of the number of active private security guards in Turkey for 2008 and 2013. As the geographical-provincial distribution shown in the below figure, top five cities according to the share of the number of active private security guards in Turkey were İstanbul (%29,5), Ankara (%10,5), Bursa (%4,4), Antalya (%3,7) and Adana (%3,6) whereas last five cities were Van, Sivas, Ardahan lower than %0,1, Gümüşhane and Tunceli were % 0,1 in 2008.

As the geographical-provincial distribution shown in the below figure, top five cities according to the share of the number of active private security guards in Turkey were İstanbul (%31,1), Ankara (%14,7), İzmir (%5,8), Bursa (% 3,8) and Kocaeli (%3,4) whereas last five cities were Iğdır (%0,1), Bayburt(%0,1), Ardahan(%0,1), Tunceli (%0,1) and Artvin (%0,1) in 2013. Thus, due to the fact that it has the second spot in the ranking of the geographical intensity of private security guards, Ankara holds an important role in the industry.




Figure 26. Provincial Distribution of Private Security Guards -% in Turkey 2013

Source: GDS (2014b).

Third is the province-based share of the number of places received permission for private security services in Turkey for 2008 and 2013. As the geographical-provincial distribution shown in the below figure, top five cities according to the share of the number of permitted places for private security service provision in Turkey were İstanbul (%26,2), Ankara (%10,5), İzmir (%9,7), Bursa (%4,1) and Adana (%3) whereas last five cities were Ardahan (%0,1), Tunceli (%0,1), Kilis (%0,1), Hakkari (%0,1) and Gümüşhane (%0,1) in 2008.




Figure 27. Provincial Distribution of Permitted Places in Turkey, 2008.
Source: GDS (2014c).

As the geographical-provincial distribution shown in the below figure, top five cities according to the share of the number of permitted places for private security service provision in Turkey were İstanbul (%26), Ankara (%11,1), İzmir (% 6,3), Bursa (%4) and Kocaeli (3,2) whereas last five cities were Iğdır (%0,1), Kilis (%0,1), Siirt (%0,1), Tunceli (%0,1) and Gümüşhane (%0,1) in 2013.




Figure 28. Provincial Distribution of Permitted Places in Turkey, 2013.
Source: (GDS (2014c).

Furthermore, in order to discover correlation between different variables (2015) and number of active private security guards (2013) in Turkey, the statistical correlation analysis of different variables was made. In addition to the data on population 2013, these variables derived from Life Satisfaction Survey (2015) conducted by TURKSTAT (except population-2013) are as follows: Number of Cinema and Theatre Audience (Per Hundred Persons), Access Rate of Population to Sewerage and Pipe System (%), Percentage of Population Receiving Waste Services (%), Shopping Mall area per Thousand People (m²), Access Rate to Airport (%), Percentage of Households Having Noise Problems from the Streets (%), Number of Internet Subscriptions (Per Hundred Persons), Percentage of Higher Education Graduates (%), Satisfaction Rate With Municipal Public Transport Services (%), Voter Turnout at Local Administrations (%), Satisfaction Rate with Municipal Cleaning Services (%), Percentage of Households Having Problems with Quality of Dwellings (%), Satisfaction Rate With Public Education Services (%), Level of Happiness (%), Satisfaction Rate with Public Safety Services (%), Percentage of People Feeling Safe When Walking Alone at Night (%), and Satisfaction Rate with Social Relations (%). The statistical correlation analysis between the TURKSTAT Life Satisfaction Survey (2015) results conducted in Turkey according to provincial-based data and the number of active private security guards by provinces in Turkey in 2013 can be followed in the below table 11.

The results can be summarized as follows: In terms of positive strong correlation: Firstly, there is a very strong ($r=0.893$) and statistically significant positive association between the population and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Secondly, it suggests that there is a strong ($r=0.778$) and statistically significant positive association between “number of cinema and theatre audience (per hundred persons)” and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Thirdly, a strong and statistically significant positive correlation between “access rate of population to sewerage and pipe system (%)” ($r=0.775$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey was detected. Fourthly, there is a strong and high level of positive correlation between “percentage of population receiving waste services (%)” ($r=0.764$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Fifth, a strong and statistically significant positive correlation between “shopping mall area per thousand people

(m2)” ($r=0.704$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey was detected. In terms of moderate positive correlation: Firstly, there is a statistically moderate association between “access rate to airport (%)” ($r=0.489$) and the number of private security guards. Secondly, there is a statistically moderate association between “percentage of households having noise problems from the streets (%)” ($r=0.472$) and the number of private security guards. Thirdly, there is a statistically moderate association between “number of internet subscriptions (per hundred persons)” ($r=0.446$) and the number of private security guards. In terms of weak positive correlation: Firstly, weak but statistically positive association between “percentage of higher education graduates (%)” ($r=0.382$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Secondly, weak but statistically positive association between “satisfaction rate with municipal public transport services (%)” ($r=0.379$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Thirdly, weak but statistically positive association between “voter turnout at local administrations (%)” ($r=0.350$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Fourthly, weak but statistically positive association between “average daily earnings (TRY)” ($r=0.338$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Fifth, weak but statistically positive association between “satisfaction rate with municipal cleaning services (%)” ($r=0.334$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. In terms of weak negative correlation: Firstly, weak, and statistically negative association between “percentage of households having problems with quality of dwellings (%)” ($r= - 0.245$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Secondly, weak, and statistically negative association between “Satisfaction Rate with Public Education Services (%)” ($r=-0.251$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Thirdly, weak, and statistically negative association between “level of happiness (%)” ($r= - 0.299$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Fourth, weak and statistically negative association between “satisfaction rate with public safety services (%)” ($r= - 0.312$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. In terms of weak moderate correlation: Firstly, weak, and statistically moderate negative association between “percentage of people feeling safe when walking alone at night (%)” ($r= - 0.410$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey and secondly, weak, and statistically moderate negative association between “satisfaction rate with social relations (%)” ($r= - 0.438$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey.

Table 11. Province-Based Statistical Correlation Analysis Results of Different Variables in Turkey (2013 and 2015 Data)

TURKSTAT DATA Variables	Active Private Security Guards 2013
	Spearman's Correlation Coefficient
Population 2013	0.893
Number of Cinema and Theatre Audience (Per Hundred Persons) – 2015	0.778
Access Rate of Population to Sewerage and Pipe System (%) – 2015	0.775
Percentage of Population Receiving Waste Services (%)– 2015	0.764
Shopping Mall area per Thousand People (m2) – 2015	0.704
Access Rate to Airport (%) – 2015	0.489
Percentage of Households Having Noise Problems from the Streets (%) – 2015	0.472
Number of Internet Subscriptions (Per Hundred Persons) – 2015	0.446
Percentage of Higher Education Graduates (%)– 2015	0.382
Satisfaction Rate With Municipal Public Transport Services (%) – 2015	0.334
Voter Turnout at Local Administrations (%)	0.350
Average Daily Earnings (TRY) – 2015	0.338
Satisfaction Rate with Municipal Cleaning Services (%) – 2015	0.334
Percentage of Households Having Problems with Quality of Dwellings (%) – 2015	-0,245
Satisfaction Rate With Public Education Services (%) – 2015	-0.251
Level of Happiness (%) – 2015	-0.299
Satisfaction Rate with Public Safety Services (%) – 2015	-0.312
Percentage of People Feeling Safe When Walking Alone at Night (%) – 2015	-0.410
Satisfaction Rate with Social Relations (%) – 2015	-0.438

Source: TURKSTAT (2013; 2015); GDP (2014b)

To sum up, the above results of correlation analysis revealed that living conditions have significant relationship with the number of private security guards. Hence, urban middle classes demand more private security services to improve their living conditions. The statistical correlation analysis (which can be explained as “The sample correlation coefficient (r) is a measure of the closeness of association of the points in a scatter plot to a linear regression line based on those points” and “Possible values of the correlation coefficient range from -1 to +1, with -1 indicating a perfectly linear negative, i.e., inverse, correlation (sloping downward) and +1 indicating a perfectly

linear positive correlation (sloping upward)⁷⁷ of these variables was made. It was found that there is a very strong ($r=0.893$) and statistically significant positive association between the number of population and the number of private security guards which has been also proved by the data obtained from General Directorate of Security used for generating maps on Turkey. Moreover, the three most significant results for the discussions of the remaining part of the study can be put forward as follows: i) a strong and statistically significant positive correlation between shopping mall area per thousand people (m^2) ($r=0.704$) and the number of private security guards, ii) weak and statistically negative association between satisfaction rate with public safety services (%) ($r= - 0.312$) and the number of private security guards and iii) statistically moderate negative association between percentage of people feeling safe when walking alone at night (%) ($r= - 0.410$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. These three results are going to be referred in the next sections of the study.

4.1. Urban Private Security Services as a Surveillance Strategy

*“We are their solution partners.
We exist for people desiring to live in safe.”*
Interviewee 23

There has been a dramatic increase in the use of private security police forces since 1945; in fact, in both the United Kingdom and North America, the number of private security officers currently exceeds that of public police officers and more importantly, private policing has expanded to become a part of everyday life for most city dwellers through which various public and private locations (retail centers, public transportation systems, housing projects, hospitals, and university campuses) are now under the watchful eye of private security guards and video surveillance systems (Fyfe, 1995, p.767). Surveillance technologies and innovations help to define the boundaries between the post-Fordist city's chosen and un-chosen ghettos, with the former including the likes of shopping malls, theme parks, airports, and gated communities and the latter including the likes of many neglected areas of the inner cities in the

⁷⁷ Correlation Analysis (<https://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/PH717-QuantCore/PH717-Module9-Correlation-Regression/PH717-Module9-Correlation-Regression4.html>).

United States and the decaying peripheries of Europe, hence, they uphold the inequitable social and racial distinctions that serve as the foundation for the privilege of entry (and egress) (De Giorgi, 2006, p.83). Today, cities are the “‘incubators’ not only for strategies such as commercialization and commodification, privatization, and place-marketing but also for the related ‘innovative’ experimentations with policing practices, surveillance strategies and coercive control mechanisms” (Eick & Briken, 2014a, p.14) and concerns about safety in public spaces are alleviated by the widespread installation of cameras (Lyon, 2001, p.62). In fact, being at the core of the commodification process, “Surveillance was defined as a fundamental function of commercialized security services” (Shearing & Stenning, 1981). Yet, the role of urban private security in the provision of social order is ambiguous. How is it positioned as a surveillance strategy? Protect what and against whom? Does the security concern or anxieties of society provide material concrete demand for urban private security? What was the level of citizens satisfaction from public security services? Given the crime rates and their change, did urban private security contribute to war against crime? Also as being a surveillance technique, how urban private security is placed in the context of urban crime is a significant but difficult question to answer. Wakefield (2014, p.218) suggested that:

... security products and services such as open space CCTV monitoring, gated communities or armed private security may reflect the inevitable inequalities associated with an increasingly market based system relation to citizens’ personal feelings of security and insecurity, their access to security measures, or their experiences on the receiving end of others’ security procedures. Notably, those most likely to be able to afford the measures that will protect them, while inhabiting a social position that places them under greater levels of scrutiny and control by public and private interventions alike.

As the lines dividing public and private spheres are blurred, nobody believes that the street belongs to anybody who walks on it and its function as a transitional zone devoid of significance—a place for idle chatter, cafés, and people-watching—has been eliminated while the roadway has turned into an insecure obstacle course and formerly public events are now held in privately managed areas, including the atriums of office buildings, because of safety concerns (Christopherson, 1994, p.421). The rise of electronic technology has resulted in a more efficient means of monitoring and policing public areas and many areas now use panoptic policing strategies, in which

individuals are subject to near-constant observation by privately owned or state-run CCTV cameras (Yarwood, 2007, p.459). CCTV's political utility is demonstrated by the fact that it is increasingly being funded by businesses and local governments; this helps the central government advance its "responsibilization" strategy of delegating responsibility for some aspects of crime control to the local states and the private sector (Fyfe, 2004, p.49).

As the new urban architecture determined a social geography of risk-containment and danger-prevention according to the status of people rather than their actions, fortified zones, gated neighborhoods, and automated armed response systems have become apparent indications of the 'ecology of fear' that has supplanted the 'human ecology' of the Chicago School (which inspired potentially inclusive urban schemes like the Chicago Area Project) (De Giorgi, 2006, p.82-3). Thus, securitization that focuses on the body and residential community or neighborhood is surveillance, which is the capacity to observe, follow, and restrict the movement of others, especially individuals of color are excluded from and rendered immobile inside a community when surveillance cameras are installed in public areas like a co-op building's lobby, elevators, and hallways as well as the roads, parks, and amenities of a gated community and both guards and neighborhood watch organizations in gated communities and doormen and video cameras in co-op corridors have the same goal: to identify those "who should not be there" and swiftly investigate or remove them (Low, 2017, p.373). The new form of surveillance, called systematic predetection, is a type of surveillance work for detecting and stopping the onset of a problem before it becomes serious, such as disease, abnormality, deviant behavior, etc. and this form of monitoring, however, does away with the need for physical presence or a contract, as well as the traditional hierarchical relationships of guardian and ward or caregiver and cared-for while all the traditional forms of discipline, beneficence, and therapy required some degree of copresence, if only in the form of the observant gaze (cf. the model of the panopticon as analyzed by Michel Foucault) (Castel, 1991, p.288).

In addition, architecture and design have a significant part in allowing surveillance, which is presented as a "natural" technique for regulating human behavior since it is claimed that when people believe they are being observed, they are more likely to

modify their behavior and social interactions accordingly (Raco, 2007, p.316). The long quotation made from Bauman discussed the relationship between securitization of urban spaces and social relations as follows:

The urban citadels of security... Built with the idea of cutting out islands of order from a sea of chaos, cities have turned into the most profuse fountains of disorder, calling for visible and invisible walls, barricades, watchtowers and embrasures – and innumerable armed men. Second, as you point out, quoting Monahan, ‘the unifying thread’ of all those inner-city security contraptions ‘is fear of the Other’. But that ‘Other’ we tend to, or are nudged to be afraid of is not some individual or some category of individuals who have put themselves, or have been forced, beyond the bounds of the city and denied the right of settlement or sojourn. Rather, that Other is a neighbour, passer-by, loiterer, stalker: ultimately, every stranger. But then, as we all know, city-dwellers are strangers to each other, and we are all suspected of carrying danger, and so we all to one degree or another want the floating, diffuse and unnamed threats to be condensed and congested into a set of ‘usual suspects’. It is for that double reason – to be protected from the dangers and from being cast into the class of a danger – that we develop vested interests in a dense network of surveilling, selecting, separating and excluding measures. We all need to mark the enemies of security in order to avoid being counted among them ... We need to accuse in order to be absolved; to exclude in order to avoid exclusion. We need to trust in the efficacy of surveillance devices to give us the comfort of believing that we, decent creatures that we are, will escape unscathed from the ambushes such devices set – and will thereby be reinstated and reconfirmed in our decency and in the propriety of our ways. ... And third, by now, it seems, we all, or at least the great majority of us, have turned into security addicts (Bauman & Lyon, 2013, p.89-90).

Furthermore, the idea of risk is set apart from the idea of danger since a risk does not come from the fact that a specific danger is present in a specific person or group and it is the effect of a combination of abstract factors that makes it more or less likely that undesirable behavior will happen (Castel, 1991, p.287). Risk identification, risk assessment, and risk mitigation are three parts of private risk management that show why and how demand is growing: i) The process of identifying risks entails locating threats and the people who may be vulnerable to them; ii) To determine which threats should be prioritized for reduction, a risk assessment weighs the likelihood of each and the severity of their potential consequences; and iii) Risk mitigation is an effort to lessen the impact of potential dangers. (Krahmann, 2008b, p.17-8). According to Krahmann (2008b, p.27), at least six distinct approaches to reducing risks are discernable: “prevention, pre-emption, avoidance, deterrence, protection and resilience” and privately provided urban security services mostly fulfill the functions of deterrence and protection. Deterrence in the private sector is often used in tandem with the judicial system to combat terrorism and other forms of organized crime; to

put it bluntly, private companies aim to improve the chances that a criminal will be identified, detained, and tried by services provided by private security companies such as static guards, mobile patrols, closed-circuit television, security checks at buildings and airports, intruder alarms, cash and property marking, access control technologies, and information technology security solutions are just some of the services and tools available to deter would-be attackers and criminals (Krahmann, 2008b, p.29). Yet, security guards, as being an example of deterrence technologies, also fulfills protective duties for their clients individually (bodyguards) or their properties (patrols for gated communities, shopping malls or business estates) (Krahmann, 2008b, p.29-30). Also, as asserted by Shearing and Stenning (1981, p.210), “the role of private security may be characterized by its emphasis on a preventative approach to protection of assets and the maximization of profits.” Thus, the commercial security industry also had a role in fostering this heightened awareness of security, since its products fed the public's anxieties and insecurities even as they were being sold (Garland, 2001, p.161). In order to maintain a stable security market, criminal activity is crucial since shares would likely drop without it (Zedner, 2003a, p.159). There is a clear conflict of interest between the private security industry's goal in keeping insecurity at a certain level to assure a continued demand for their goods and the security and safety claims made by such products (Zedner, 2003a, p.165). Therefore, as Lyon argued that “It seems that, ironically, today’s security generates forms of insecurity as a byproduct – or maybe in some cases as a deliberate policy? –...” (Bauman & Lyon, 2013, p.87).

In-depth interviews in the field study revealed and highlighted the role of urban private security in deterrence and crime prevention. As mentioned in the previous section, there is a weak and statistically negative association between satisfaction rate with public safety services (%)” ($r = -0.312$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Therefore, the prevention role played by private security guards is one of the most significant aspects of provision of urban security services by private security companies. In this regard, when compared to public police forces fulfilling both preventive and judicial roles, private security guards at urban scale do only have preventive policing duties and responsibilities. The role of police officers explained by Interviewee 3 as such: “There is no room for private security in the examination, collection and subsequent processing of the crime and evidence. If there is evidence,

private security guard will protect it. If he can catch the person of interest within the area of duty, he should call the police... The police force does the real work". There is some sort of division of labour between police and private security guards in terms of preventive function and protection of crime scene. The former according to Interviewee 4 can be explained as follows: "When we say preventive policing, physical security is completely in mind, when we use physical security, such as patrolling, spot duty, creating checkpoints and so on. Now private security is more of a preventive service, that is, to prevent crime from occurring". The latter is described by Interviewee 23 as such: "...to retain the crime scene if an incident occurs... It was his job to put a tape in there, to protect the evidence and to call the police. No interrogation, no handcuffs. ... Query permission already does not exist. We don't have any police authority". Therefore, "rather than simply seen as repressive or negative, such strategies are best regarded as productive, seeking to promote and shape individual agency in particular ways" (Singh, 2005, p.155). Furthermore, the only systematic data set in Turkey on crime is prison convict statistics. The key indicator of urban safety can be followed is the crime of theft, which is particularly prominent among crimes against property. Accordingly, statistical data should be interpreted to understand whether urban private security sector, institutionalized especially after 2005, contributed the decrease in crime against property such as theft.

Undoubtedly, theft, a kind of crime or crime in general, is related to other social processes. However, if the data in terms of deterrence and prevention points to a change in this issue, it can be easier to positively correlate or evaluate the role of urban private security. Therefore, it was found that there is not any significant change in total number of convicts for theft among convicts during 1990-2020 period, but there was a systematic increase in the number of theft convicts between 2012-2020 in Turkey. And a similar trend is evident in total crime rates of Ankara and there is not a significant numerical change of theft convicts during 1990-2020 period. However, the convicts of theft in Ankara have increased almost 9 times between 2011-2019. Considering this data, though it is difficult to say that urban private security alone is not sufficient to demonstrate success or failure, at least when considering the dramatic numerical increase and spatial prevalence of urban private security during the period

in question, it is hard to say there is a positive relation between prevention of theft and the increasing number of private security guards and surveillance practices.

Table 12. Change in Theft Convicts Received into Prison in Ankara and Turkey According to the Base Year 1990 for Period of 1991-2020.

Year/Type	Change in Theft Convicts Received into Prison in Ankara	Change in Theft Convicts Received into Prison in Turkey	Year/Type	Change in Theft Convicts Received into Prison in Ankara	Change in Theft Convicts Received into Prison in Turkey
1991	-33	-13	2006	25	21
1992	-43	-10	2007	24	38
1993	-15	-13	2008	40	27
1994	-22	-5	2009	13	26
1995	-22	2	2010	13	52
1996	-17	6	2011	-6	18
1997	-8	13	2012	68	119
1998	19	20	2013	227	309
1999	-8	1	2014	340	448
2000	-24	-4	2015	368	451
2001	-18	-10	2016	397	480
2002	15	8	2017	545	582
2003	1	18	2018	670	732
2004	27	43	2019	574	683
2005	-3	23	2020	462	619

Source: TURKSTAT (2021b).

In addition, some urban private security measures are imposed by public authorities as a priority. For example, private businesses are urged to support public surveillance by establishing their own surveillance infrastructure alongside the CCTV system owned by the government. CCTV is defined as a “commonplace good” by Goold et.al. (2010, p.18-19) meaning “one that has become widespread and whose purchase or use is regarded as routine and uncontroversial” and “consumed indirectly. As one of the interviewees said that “There are companies in Ankara that are currently paying for it. They're collecting signatures to establish CCTV-MOBESSE⁷⁸ and pay for it as a

⁷⁸According to the General Directorate of Security, “by enhancing the infrastructure, solutions tried to be found that will reduce the use of lawful force by police. The Urban Security Management System (KGYS-MOBESSE (Mobile Electronic System Integration) is a system that enables the processing of image, sound, and location data obtained in accordance with the law and produces meaningful results

donation to the police, write a petition.” (Interviewee 1). The positioning of urban private security indicates a break in the process that we see as pacification in the past. The state's control over the means of violence with the claim of forming the monopoly of violence aimed at pacifying the working classes. In this process of pacification, security has been deposited with all dimensions to the authority of the state. But urban private security is a break in the process. Because a breach has been made in the claim of monopoly by the state authority. Here, the state itself asks its citizens to act and buy this service. In a way, the process of responsabilisation that we have seen on the neighborhood scale in the Ottoman state is being reborn in the context of urban private security services and it is handed over to private security companies, even if it is under the government’s supervision. The state tells its citizens that you are responsible for your own safety. In fact, it is necessary to note that this audience, which is isolated as citizens, is especially the urban middle- and upper-classes. The following words from one of the interviewees about government accountability are important in this respect:

An official letter was sent to artisans by the governorship in one of our provinces. The article suggested that each artisan should install a surveillance-camera in front of his store located throughout the touristic street area. It said that artisans would be responsible. They will do surveillance in that street. Requests from the governor's office and requests from the gendarmerie for camera images come when there occur incidents. I don't know if this is in the law. The public governor's office has made it compulsory for artisans to have cameras to ensure security in the city. The police are coming to us. We have a construction company across the road, and it set up a camera-surveillance system. When there's an incident here, the police come there once a week. A vehicle passed through here, for example, there's a theft in the building next door, and one of your cameras recorded it. They are asking for the video or image. If anyone's been caught, and the police station comes and asks us for an official video (Interviewee 1).

This responsabilisation can also be seen as a sign of promotion for active citizen participation to service provision by purchasing the necessary equipment, and information, and as Johnston (1992, p.137) indicated that “‘responsible citizenship’, is officially sanctioned and sponsored by the state” and “public police pass on responsibility for crime prevention to private citizens” (Johnston, 1999, p.189).

These camera surveillance systems provide two significant benefits which are pre-incident preventive and post-event detective. One of the interviewees (Interviewee 2)

in order to ensure public order, detect threats to urban security in advance, and combat crimes and criminals quickly and effectively” (GDS, 2008a, p.59).

exemplified this as such: “while one of our friends checks our area with a camera, he suspected a group of people at another point. He zoomed in on them, he followed them, and called the police after he was sure that they are stealing. He led the police. He provided support to the police for catching the thieves”. Nevertheless, rather than preventing crime to occur, these surveillance systems work when there occur incidents. Hence, the most significant aspects of camera surveillance systems described by Interviewee 1 as such:

As an urban security system, surveillance camera systems are being established in order to obtain evidence once there is a crime in Turkey. The success of this isn't 99 %. The success of this is 40 %. The reason is the cost of the camera-surveillance system. It means that not a lot of money has been spent on storage, recording, etc. They say record a month or two months. The camera you need to record two months costs \$300. For 50 cameras, \$15,000 should be paid. When you store the video for 2-3-6 months, the payment amount will be in USD. In camera-surveillance system a measure of performance is determined by how long we can store video recording.

Surveillance has become main discussion topic since the technological developments gave rise to new surveillance methods ranging from satellite tracking systems to CCTVs. As Lyon (2001, p.62) emphasized that “One of the most obvious signs of surveillance is the overhead ‘electronic eye’ of the closed-circuit television camera. Indeed, this is the most visible face of surveillance expansion today, even though miniaturization and secretion are also becoming more common”. In Turkey, MOBESE is the name of closed-circuit camera system applied in Turkey’s cities though it has not yet had any legal basis. As Interviewee 1 said that “In 2005, a structure was created in Turkey under the name of MOBESE as part of city safety. This was brought to the agenda as part of city safety, whose foundation dates to the 2000s. Police in Ankara worked on a system architecture that could monitor social incidents.” With the establishment of CCTV system and its use by the police, direct surveillance of the state in urban everyday life is also becoming widespread. Also, its success as being a preventive policing measure is debatable. However, as it was previously mentioned above, responsabilisation of citizens and use of MOBESE system goes hand in hand in establishing surveillance society. The success or the need for MOBESE system is out of question. The need for them taken for granted not only by the state officials but also by private security companies. One of the interviewees’ said that “In the case of urban security, MOBESE cameras will go further with the new identity cards. For the reason,

this is the kind of infrastructure that would allow anyone in this place to be immediately identified via any face recognition cameras. I think that MOBESes will become more important in urban security” (Interviewee 4). A surveillance system is, essentially, a management system on the market, a virtual network built on the concept that residential and commercial regions may be ordered in order to reduce risk and at its core, risk mitigation is a contractual agreement that makes homes habitable and boosts business success in factories; therefore, during the process of maintaining order, it collects data on population, it is tasked with watching and disciplining those people which enables the parapolice to have a more authentic and traditional definition of 'police' than their public counterparts (Rigakos, 2002, p.113).

Then, another question comes into mind, if one could not be able to pay for urban security services, who is going to provide it. The answer is not so simple but there are two possible solutions-options: one is the community⁷⁹ itself and the second is the public police officers⁸⁰. In this regard, urban private security changing the nature of nation-state's legitimacy in terms of security as a public good to security as a club good. As Zedner (2009, p.110) observes that:

Private security is promoted on the grounds that the market provides more efficiently than the state; that it is more responsive to consumer demand; and, most contentiously, that private security consumption by the rich frees up state resources for the protection of the less well endowed.

Therefore, the ones who can afford to buy could have the chance to be in safe at their homes while the others are less significant citizens or even threats to the ones enjoying private security services. The remaining part of this section is going to reveal how managers of private security companies discuss the role of urban private security especially private security guards in crime prevention and surveillance processes.

Private Security Services Law No.5188 entered into force in 2005 and as shown in the

⁷⁹ Wallace (2014, p.68) argued that “... a key strategy of urban security in neoliberal cities: the policing of individual behaviour within and through the trope of ‘community’ and urban areas such as “slums are no longer enactments of straightforward state control, but have been redefined as responsible actors within reconstructed, civic, social and economic sphere”.

⁸⁰ Eick (2014p. 138) stated that “Commercialization and commodification, thus the neoliberalization of policing, puts employees and their labor conditions under pressure. Consequently, policing is intrinsically connected with the struggle over wage labor as overseeing the (urban) poor is one of the core tasks of the police”.

above paragraphs, after then, there was a significant increase in the crime of theft, especially compared to the 1990 base year. Rather than being the indicator of failure, this increase has been used as an indicator to produce more demand for urban private security services. As Interviewee 1 said that “The rise in crime is putting pressure on demand for urban private security... Why do you have an alarm system because theft is increasing. The rate of thefts is increasing every day.” Therefore, the main claim put forward in the process of spreading private security in Turkey cities is that private security fulfils the deterrence function in the prevention of crime. For example, Interviewee 3 claimed that “the biggest contribution of private security to law enforcement is that it's a preventive unit”. Private security guards and surveillance technologies such as cameras are all seen as contributors to this urban security regime. This new urban security regime provides ground for supplementary relationship between security guards and police officers. As Interviewee 7 said that “What is the security industry doing; it provides building protection, housing protection, land protection, person protection, valuables and money transport protection, and also by setting up and managing alarm monitoring centers, it notifies the Police”. But he emphasized the necessity of physical existence of private security guards as such “Electronic security only detects the incident. But it's physical private security guards that's going to prevent the incident. ... the presence of a security guard there prevents theft. The point of private security is the preventive security”. Other interviewees also support this perspective, and the following quotes reveals that managers of private security companies agree on the preventive function of private security services:

Interviewee 7: Private security prevents a crime. If the person's intentions are bad, if there is good security, he is preventing them from doing so.

Interviewee 8: The preventive measures are: stand at the door, inspect entrances and exits, watch suspected individuals, record, take identification, etc.

Interviewee 9: In terms of outsiders, there's a security guard here. It has a deterrent function. It primarily serves as a deterrent, as it is under constant supervision and control. The second is that there is discipline. The risk of theft is minimized and is seen as a precaution against theft.

Interviewee 19: Private security guards are on alert to prevent security issues wherever they are...it is important to prevent dangerous persons or those who come to act. We are constantly taking every measure to prevent any action. If possible, we warn the personnel every time when the guards shift. Make sure yourself following these threats.

Interviewee 28: If the private security guard is checking in and out properly, preventing or catching thefts, etc., he is successful.

Interviewee 31: More specifically, private security guards are useful in preventing assault and theft. For example, if there is going to be a terrorist attack, then private security has no chance of preventing it. But if there's going to be theft or kidnapping, we have a deterrent function. Private security is primarily a deterrent. Prevention before crime.

Therefore, private security market seems attractive to provide necessary conditions for living in safe but when taken as a whole, it is evident that the goal of neoliberal crime prevention programs in all of these cities is to protect the safety of the most affluent members of society and the neighborhoods where they live (Kavuncu, 2018, p.183). Loader (1999, p.382-383) identified four possible benefits of private provision of urban security for “a group of residents, or board of school governors, or the manager of a shopping mall” as follows:

(i) the chance to choose (from a range of alternatives) a company who can provide a 24-hour round-the-clock presence, and who (instead having to respond to the demands of other constituencies) are tasked only with meeting the needs of their paying customers; (ii) a service that is contractually ‘accountable’ to them, able to watch over their property and ‘enforce’ the behavioural norms they wish to see prevail; (iii) the ability to take their custom elsewhere should the company’s standard of performance be deemed not up to scratch; and (iv) the continued availability of the public police (part of whose ambit they have ‘exited’ from), who can be called upon whether situations arise that private patrols lack the power or authority to cope with.

The need for it as a preventative measure and the importance of risk analysis for private security services to ensure this preventiveness, has been emphasized by different interviewees (Interviewees 3, 5, 7, 19, 22 and 25). The private security sector tries to determine the need for urban private security through possible risk/threat. As one of the interviewees said that “potential risks and the measures to be taken against them are identified. The electronic infrastructure and the quantity and quality of the physical security personnel required for this purpose shall be written in the report” (Interviewee 3). This process of risk analysis is a process of assessment of the safety risk of different urban areas. It is explained as such:

The risk analysis is as flows: When you come to the facility, as an analyst, you can identify the threats that it is exposed to. Not only you identify where threats might come from, but also what threats can occur: theft, fire risk, sabotage risk, assassination, environmental security, physical security, electronic camera systems, lighting, location of the watch cabins, neighboring settlements etc. should be considered (Interviewee 5).

The probability of terror, theft, extortion etc., location of place within the city, number of entrance and exits etc. are all significant in determination of technical equipment, the need for surveillance cameras and private security guards. In terms of location, class-based inequalities are significant. As Interviewee 7 argued that “in terms of security, in my view, rich neighborhoods are much less risky, on the other side, there is more risk in the residential areas where low-income groups live”, though the ones living in poor neighborhoods could not be able to afford to buy private security services. In terms of surveillance, both camera systems and physical existence of private security guards are significant components of the process. As one of the interviewees told that “the first decision of the administrations of housing sites is to build a camera-surveillance system on each floor and buildings’ entrance” (Interviewee 1). The number of entrance and exists are significant for establishing camera surveillance systems as one of the interviewees explained it as such: “the residential site has minus 4 floors of parking under the building, for example. Now my security guard is sitting at the door, he can’t see it. There should be surveillance cameras at each floor” (Interviewee 25). But surveillance via electronic devices the main determinants is customer’s demand rather than necessity (Interviewee 23). Nevertheless, electronic surveillance systems should be supported with physical existence of private security guards in order to intervene incidents on time. It is explained by Interviewee 2 as such:

Imagine a large area, a thousand acres, you think you've got the environment under control with cameras. If you're saying that you're protecting it with a camera, and you don't need physical security, the man will drive away and steal until your security arrives there. If you do surveillance in this area with a camera, you can only identify the car, often the license plate is removed, and nothing will be found... The camera is certainly a precaution. You can identify people or events, but you may not be able to see them and intervene in real time. And the person watching the camera is a human being. Imagine there are 60 cameras. There's no way to immediately detect which camera was recording the theft. Sometimes you can't just swap them all on the screen at the same time, it changes and appears on the screen. It is not necessary to consider the camera as a measure on its own.

To conclude, as Briken and Eick (2014, p.128) asserted that “the commercial security industries’ strategy is based on creating ‘solutions’ for the never-ending and ever-expanding problem called security”. Preventive policing risks turning cities into a tangle of freedom-destroying strategies, and all the measures, such as surveillance, inspection, risk assessment, situational crime prevention, protection measures, and

precaution, cause us to build our lives with security as a priority (Kavuncu, 2018, p.180). This problem is vital to be reproduced since the production of private security could only be possible if the insecure social conditions reproduce itself which can be named as the contradiction or the paradox of private security. Thus, production of surveillance spaces is significant not only for preventive reasons but also for the reproduction of private security investments of capital. The next part is dedicated to understanding the main dynamics and mechanisms how the production of surveillance spaces contributes to the production of neoliberal urban security regime.

4.2. Urban Private Security Services as a Process of Production of Surveillance Spaces

The relationship between spatial dynamics and surveillance is complicated but, as Crawford (2008, p.166-170) suggested that mass private property, private residential estates, urban fortunes, the expansion of the night-time economy and the policing internet can be seen as main reasons for the marketisation of security. When the security threats posed by the ever marketized neoliberal state become more obvious, property relations provide individuals (classified as the ones who have or have not) with a range of policing options, which they would eventually start to use (Kempa et al., 2004, p.575). The built environment does not serve as a neutral stage on which social interactions might play out, and the quality of people's interactions in a given space is inextricably linked to the standard of the space's physical construction, but not entirely; there is always potential for alternative appropriations of space, and the coordination of social acts that challenge the norms established by spatial practices and the kinds of social ties that are conceivable on the public stage are influenced by the physical locations that make up that stage (Caldeira, 2000, p.299). For instance, as the growth of private security services in São Paulo has no relationship with an increase in crime or fear of crime or the inability of the public police forces to provide policing services and revealed similar characteristics with their Western counterparts as the new and pervasive structure of urban segregation based on fortified enclaves has made private security a fundamental component and "consumers depend on private services for the identification, screening, and isolation of undesired people, as well as surveillance and protection of their property" (Caldeira, 2000, p.199).

Another example is the use of CCTV, found in almost any public or private building, business, or retail establishment nowadays, even in more remote areas, and it is commonly used to illustrate how panoptic logics and disciplinary authority are increasingly present in people's everyday environment, and geographers have suggested that CCTV is only one expression of wider processes of (re)ordering and that this is key to understanding the effects of CCTV on public areas, in particular, situations where worries about the viability of urban (and especially inner-city) areas as economic places have led to the installation of CCTV systems (Henry, 2009, p.97). In stark contrast to the stereotypical picture of a prisoner under the watchful eye of an invisible guard, "regular" people now live in constant, close proximity to a plethora of surveillance systems, each with its own set of algorithmic rationales and a need for order; hence, the outcome is a fragmented landscape of control exercised over persons and a fragmented landscape of visibility resulting from a large and frequently divergent number of distinct surveillance technologies (Henry, 2009, p.97). Therefore, law and its interpretation shape the way urban areas are policed and, by extension, who is allowed to enter them at the "street level" (Belina, 2003, p.54). Patterns of inclusion and exclusion within urban space are perpetuated in part through symbolic and material barriers since interaction is not so much managed as stopped; 'disturbing' persons are not punished, rectified, or changed, but rather eliminated, thus, control is inscribed in architectural forms not to regulate interactions, but rather to prevent them from occurring in the first place (De Giorgi, 2006, p.84). Individuals may be subject to searches, monitoring, and filming, and exclusion without cause demonstrated in these private settings (many of which are huge public venues like shopping malls that happen to be privately owned and operated) in which the harsh justice of exclusion and full-force monitoring that has become all too common in our experience and is widely accepted as a precondition for guaranteeing the safety and pleasure of customers and good citizens (Garland, 2001, p.160).

In addition, economic rationality, which cares less about the mechanisms that give rise to civil society and more about the restricted objective of loss management, displaces social and moral considerations, hence, attention is redirected from the after-the-fact mechanics of the criminal procedure, trial, and punishment, to the actual settings and opportunity structures within which criminal acts occur and relies on a wider range of

preventative measures implemented by the public, government, and commercial sectors (Zedner, 2009, p.76-7). Under the neoliberal order immigrants in the European cities and African-American and Latino labour force in the American inner cities are segregated spatially in certain neighborhoods which resulted in the symbolization of the stranger, the foreigner, the unemployed, and the drug-addict as a source of "fear" that is socially reproduced in metropolitan areas and contributed to the production of control rationale works against the development of subordinate political coalitions by portraying some subject categories as 'dangerous classes' and threatening 'others,' who are therefore held responsible for the rising insecurity and fears of modern urban life (De Giorgi, 2006, p.85). Where private security services are purchased, the result is often the privatization of public space or the segregation of society between the wealthy and the poor. This undermines the basic human right to safety for all residents (Zedner, 2003a, p.180).

In the restructuring of space in neoliberal regimes, the private security companies have been responsible for the production and administration of privatized areas, sometimes in partnership with the state, the private companies are also responsible for maintaining order and policing in these privately owned urban spaces (Yarwood, 2007, p.455). Responses to crime and its prevention that are now commonplace in the public sphere had their genesis in the private sector, including the resurgence of private policing, the creation of segregated spatial enclosures, the implementation of managerial routines that integrate security into the organization's functioning, the introduction of cost-benefit crime-control analyses, security audits, the elimination of potential crime scenes, the mitigation of harm, and the reduction of supplies that could be used to commit crimes (Garland, 2001, p.160). As Wacquant (2010, p.211) indicated that "Neoliberalism readily resolves what for Garland's "culture of control" remains an enigmatic paradox of late modernity." As a rule, the use of force by those who remain in the private sphere is unacceptable; thus, private security belongs to the private domain, so it is an essential feature not to use force (Gülcü, 2003). Thus, the symbolic power of the private security guards could only be reproduced by not using physical violence and the capacity to govern increases which contributed to the infrastructural power of the state. Otherwise, their existence, as a legitimate power, started to be questioned.

Moreover, office buildings, shopping malls, and even hospitals, movie theaters, and amusement parks are all examples of fortified enclaves sharing common features such as: i) The private nature of these areas for public use raises the value of the enclosed and closed, while lowering the worth of the open and public; ii) They are separated from one another in a physical sense by means of barriers (such as walls, fences, and vacant spaces) and aesthetic techniques; iii) They are facing inward, away from the street, symbolizing their rejection of public life, iv) Armed guards and other security measures regulate access and enforce restrictions and v) To a large extent, the enclaves are isolated communities with a population sharing similar class characteristics (Caldeira, 2000, p.258). Class-based nature of fortified enclaves provide middle- and upper-classes the sense of belonging and differentiating themselves the rest of the other. Calderia (2000, p.258) explained it as follows:

People who choose to inhabit these spaces value living among selected people (considered to be of the same social group) and away from the undesired interactions, movement, heterogeneity, danger, and the unpredictability of open streets. The fortified and private enclaves cultivate a relationship of rupture and denial with the rest of the city and with what can be called a modern style of public space open to free circulation. ... Fortified enclaves confer status. The construction of status symbols is a process that elaborates social differences and creates means for the assertion of social distance and inequality. Fortified enclaves are quite literal in their creation of separation.

Accordingly, bearing in mind the above theoretical discussions, the first step of the field research was to get information about Ankara's private security from the GDS and TURKSTAT and to analyze them. This section presents data collected from 2005 through 2014 on Ankara citizens' applications for the issuance of private security permits. These licenses were categorized according to their uses, and use rates were calculated.

Table 13. Classified Private Security Permits in Ankara 2014

	Frequency (Number)	Percent (%)	Valid Percent (%)	Cumulative Percent (%)
Privately Owned Public Spaces	250	8,2	8,2	8,2
Commercial/Industrial	2289	75,2	75,2	83,4
Residential areas	505	16,6	16,6	100,0
Total	3044	100,0	100,0	

Source: GDS (2014c).




Figure 29. Classified Private Security Permits in Ankara, 2014.
Source: GDS (2014c).

The three groups were separated out in the table and the figure above. Spatial data on private security based on provinces were published in the web site of the General Directorate of Security until 2014. Hence, first, this information, shared as an address, was extracted from the website, and analyzed in Excel. Second, wrong, and correct addresses are determined by the help of Google Maps and site visits in Ankara. Third, these addresses were classified, and typologies were developed according to their purpose of use. Fourth, coordinates of these addresses were received from Google Maps and written down on the Excel file. Finally, they were visualized in Geographic Information System (GIS) software program. The Figure 30 reveals the first grouping

done according to the information written in the address rows towards developing typology of spaces under the surveillance of private security companies.




Figure 30. Geographical Distribution of Permitted Places in Ankara, 2013.
Source: GDS (2014c).

Thus, classifications of 6507 points (almost half of them was public and the remaining half was in private use), which were received permissions for private security services, were determined as follows: art center, bank, commercial-industrial, dormitory, education, energy, general directorate, health, hotel, housing-commercial use, housing-embassy, housing sites, housing-shopping mall, industrial, insurance, military bases, office building, parking area, personal protection, plaza, shopping mall, techno park, telecom buildings and trade center. Only 8.2 percent of the authorized areas were designated for privately owned public areas like shopping malls; 16.6 percent were designated for residential purposes; and 75.2 percent were designated for commercial or industrial use. The relevant parts of this chapter will have images depicting the specifics of this categorization.

Urban private security companies provide surveillance and control of the space in the determined area of duty. The Commission headed by Governors specifying this area and the boundaries are stated in the permission document clearly (Interviewee 27). Therefore, determination of the area of the duty is the most significant element in provision of security services by private security guards since “they have no power out of the space being under their control” (Interviewees 5 and 9). The space-bounded feature of the private security services limits its role in social control when compared to public law enforcement officers. For instance, private security guards are not allowed to take part in suppressing social uprisings across the city (Interviewee 17) unless any incidents occur in their area of duty.

In this section, there is going to be discussions on urban private security as a production of surveillance spaces. Since private security service is an urban issue, how it is practiced in different urban spaces and how different urban space have impact upon private security services are significant to understand changing practices of urban life in neoliberalism. As previously mentioned, there is a statistically moderate negative association between percentage of people feeling safe when walking alone at night (%) ($r = -0.410$) and the number of private security guards in Turkey. Hence, the relationship between these two variables constitutes the condition of the existence of the private security service. In this regard, in order to analyze urban private security as a practice of production of surveillance spaces in Ankara, the first step was to develop typology of the places received private security permission.

As mentioned above, public and private spaces were determined according to their purpose of use. Second analysis is done for identification of 3044 points, as privately owned spaces, and the below map was produced by grouping them into three common categories which are housing sites, shopping malls and commercial-industrial use. Among these classifications, this study concentrate more on housing sites and shopping malls since the commercial-industrial use is not unique to post-2005 period. These areas are going to be discussed by referring information obtained from in-depth-interviews as being the sites of “neoliberal urban security regime” in Ankara case. Since urban private security services are provided by private security guards on the field of duty, providing private security at urban scale requires to obtain specific

permissions from the General Directorate of Security as mentioned in discussions on legal aspects.




Figure 31. Three Typologies of Places Received Private Security Permission in Ankara, 2013.

Source: GDS (2014c).

Hence, in order to provide private security services in the areas shown in the above figure, on the supply side, the process receiving permission for private security is compulsory. This process was summarized by one of the interviewees as such:

The Provincial Private Security Commission meets twice a month. The Governor or his deputies are its natural members. The governor, the director of the private security unit, a member of the gendarmerie, plus a representative from the chamber of commerce, or a person authorized by the legal entity, who is applying should be present. After being discussed, the governor decides to give permission or not. Then you get a document like this. ... Within 15 days of that, you report the identities of employees, who are required to have a personal security ID. These are valid everywhere in Turkey. It's given for five years, then there is a refreshment training for guards. As far as your health allows, you can go on. Then, you should notify the necessary police departments. You have to obtain private security liability insurance to cover damages caused to third parties on the day

of commencement of service. It is fixed in the Law. We had these done. Where private security permit has been obtained, within a month, a plan under the name of a Protection Plan against raids and sabotages, standards are written for entrances and exits. Private security is also responsible for natural disasters. Fire, health, natural disaster... You continue there during the term of the contract (Interviewee 18).

It is worth noting that the Commission decides the maximum number of private security guards needed for the provision of private security services in a given place, and as soon as the working hours of private security guards are adjusted, the Commission does not intervene (Interviewee 9). However, one of the interviewees said that this should be changed, and the State must determine the number of private security guards required to protect a place” (Interviewee 29). Hence, there is the need for standardization rather than leaving the decision to the customers will. On the demand side, the process purchasing private security permission can be summarized as such: “First, private security license should be obtained from the Commission by the Housing Site Managers. Second, tender offers are going to be received from different private security companies. Third, the private security company and the housing site management sign a contract” (Interviewee 29). After receiving permission from the Provincial Private Security Commission, the private security company should prepare a Protection Plan to submit General Directorate of Security according to the necessities of a given place.

In this Protection Plan, “the locations where employees work and their entry and exit” (Interviewee 3) and “who's going to do what and when. How the private security guard will react in different circumstances” (Interviewee 10) are all recorded. Nevertheless, it is criticized by some interviewees that there should be some limitations for private security services by the specifications of different urban spaces. For instance, Interviewee 23 believes that “there should be armed police forces in the jeweler store streets, exchange offices or banks” rather than private security guards. Another important finding obtained from the field study data is that the distribution of residential areas and commercial-industrial areas with private security permits in Ankara is in harmony with the district-based development index data. For example, when we look at the table below, it is seen that Çankaya, Altındağ and Yenimahalle districts are in the first three places in terms of the most developed ones. When we look at the districts where the urban periphery or rural settlements are dense and which

are at the bottom of the development index, it is seen that the number of places with private security permits is almost zero.




Figure 32. Districts of Ankara Based on Development Index Coefficients 2017.
Source: SEGE (2019).




Figure 33. Geographical Distribution of Permitted Places in Ankara 2013 and Districts Development Index Coefficients 2017.
Source: GDS (2014c); SEGE (2019).

When we combine the above table with the geographical distribution of the places that have private security permits in Ankara, the above figure was generated. According to this figure, it is seen that the places that have private security permits are concentrated especially in Çankaya, Altındağ and Yenimahalle districts. Apart from these areas, it can be said that a remarkable concentration can be seen in Gölbaşı district. It is not a surprise that the urban areas where private security services are concentrated are in the districts that are at the top of the development index. Because in order to purchase private security services, the income level must be at a level that can afford these services. In addition, shopping malls, as commercial areas where private security services are used intensively, are mostly concentrated in the districts mentioned above and shown in the map below. Of course, the distribution of social inequality in the city cannot be read through mere district-level data, but this data, at least empirically, shows that private security services are an urban phenomenon, that they are not common in rural settlements, and that the number of places that receive private security permits tends to increase as the level of development increases at urban scale. As a result, we tried to reveal above the unequal geographical distribution of private security services, whose typological distribution in the city of Ankara is classified as privately owned public spaces, commercial-industrial public spaces, and residential places. In the following section, based on this triple typological classification, residential areas, and shopping mall areas, as well as public areas owned by the state, will be analyzed as areas where private security services are provided.

4.2.1. Residential Areas: Gated Communities as Surveillance Spaces

The shopping mall or gated community might restrict access to its private public facilities by enforcing strict rules on who is allowed inside and when there is a public facility or resource on the inside, it makes sense to create walls and fences, complete with gates and guards (Low, 2006, p.83). Calderia (2000, p.304) pointed out that “Cities of walls and fortified enclaves are cities of fixed boundaries and spaces of restricted and controlled access.” In this vein, gated communities⁸¹ which can be

⁸¹ Beginning in the 1850s with the construction of affluent communities like Llewellyn Park in Eagle Ridge, New Jersey and resorts like New York's Tuxedo Park, gated residential communities in the United States were first designed for permanent residents of family estates and wealthy communities

defined as “spatially enclosed residential developments surrounded by walls, fences or earth banks covered with bushes and shrubs, with a secured entrance. The houses, streets, sidewalks, and other amenities are physically enclosed by barriers and entrance gates operated by a guard, key or electronic identity card” (Low, 2017, p.372) are one of the most significant spatial developments of 20th century. Being an emerging feature in the landscape of the neoliberal city Rozen and Razin’s (2009, p.1703) suggested that “Gated communities can be regarded as an emerging feature in the landscape of the neoliberal city (McKenzie, 2005; Genis, 2007; as cited in Rozen & Razin, 2009, p.1703). Blakey and Snyder (1997b, p. 6 as cited in Jones & Newburn, 1999a, p.231) classified middle- and lower-income people gated communities as ‘security communities’ and argued that these communities can be “characterized by the closed streets and gated complexes of the low income, working class and middle-class perches”.

As the New Right policies promoted individual autonomy, deregulation, privatization, and the application of market principles to government services, calls to action emphasized the importance of place, personal accountability, and community, resulting in people living in gated communities or other enclosed areas away from the deterioration (Stenson, 2005, p.269). Traditional methods of social control have been eroded as a result of economic reorganization and the movement of money throughout the world and there was a shift in the opinion on the efficacy of social control mechanisms and the institutions that employ them, such as the police and the educational system (Low, 2006, p.86). Security concerns have prompted urban planners, architects, and builders to start incorporating more secure features into their building plans and products, being the most egregious manifestation of this trend is the so-called "gated community," which is said to be the most popular form of community living at present and yet the major focus of the new urban design, which originated in Los Angeles but is spreading to shopping centers and central business districts across the United States and Great Britain, is on space management and the segregation of different "categories" of people (Garland, 2001, p.162). Although

and defined as “a residential development surrounded by walls, fences, or earth banks covered with bushes and shrubs, with a secured entrance” (Low, 2006, p.84-85).

walled communities have been around for a while, Blakely and Snyder claimed that their numbers have increased dramatically during the 1980s and the 'elite' neighborhoods for the affluent and famous have been around the longest but there has been a recent uptick in "leisure and lifestyle" communities that cater to a specific demographic such as golfers can spend their vacations in gated communities designed specifically for them, and retirees can find safe haven in gated communities designed specifically for their age group (Blakey & Snyder (1995, 1997a) as cited in Jones and Newburn, 1999a, p.230-1). In this regard, communities have dual roles: they may be seen as protective and a remedy to an intrusive state, or they can be held accountable for the violence they experience and the security of its members (Christopherson, 1994, p.422). Thus, their dual roles contribute to the extension of the state's surveillance capacity on the one hand, but on the other hand, they have been responsabilized for the maintenance of social order and safety by the state.

In the field research, many interviewees discussed the reasons why there is an increase in the number and visibility of private security guards in housing sites and gated communities. First argument was that the sprawling of residential areas and gated communities has a positive impact on the demand for urban private security services in residential areas in Ankara (Interviewees 8 and 19). The rise in the number of constructions of housing units is seen as an opportunity for an investment by private security companies (Interviewee 8). As illustrated in the figure below, Ankara's spatial development demonstrated that once new areas were opened to development⁸², private security services followed. Second line of argument can be followed by the words of Interviewee 17: "Visibility of the private security guards in everyday life increase, and people started to think it is one of their needs and what happened is that society began to get used to the private security guards. Society will not be able to live without private security guards anymore". In fact, as the map below shows, when we look at how Ankara has grown and changed over time, private security services have spread out in the same way. Therefore, it can be argued that as new urban areas are opened for development, the demand for private security services will continue to increase. Because the spatial scattering of the city increases as new residential areas are formed

⁸² For a detailed discussion of urban sprawl in Ankara, see Yaşar (2010).

in the city periphery, the responsibility for ensuring their security falls to the community level. The middle and upper classes, who can afford these services, are thus building their own "safe islands" or "fortified enclaves".

Although Marx rarely addressed the topic of security outside of the realm of direct production at factories, private security companies increasingly find work protecting businesses and private residences; hence, obviously, private security services do much more than pacifying the workers (Rigakos, 2002, p.11). For example, Davis argued that major "grassroots" manifestations of modern urban planning's security-focused logic as 'High-Rent Security' in the case of Los Angeles, can be found in middle- and upper-class residential communities built on the outskirts of cities as "fortress cities," complete with their own security walls, private security guards, guarded entries, and even private roads (Davis, 1992, p.172).




Figure 34. Spatial Development of Ankara Between 2000-2018 and Distribution of Private Security Services in 2013.

Source: Corine Land Cover (1990; 2000; 2006; 2012; 2018); GDS (2014c).

Similarly, the wealthy residents of cities with walls such as Sao Paulo have to cope with private guards, identification, categorization, iron gates, intercoms, domestic employees, electronic gates, dogs, and a great deal of mistrust if they do anything as

routine as visit a sister and if they are walking instead of driving a car, the guy approaching the gate of the gated condominium identifies himself as someone who uses urban public space in a way that the occupants of the condominiums reject, raising suspicions about his motives (Caldeira, 2000, p.257). The need to surround oneself with people who are "like" oneself and who act in ways that are "like" one's own is seen as normal and natural, but the methods by which this is accomplished are fundamentally complicated and concealed even from the inhabitants themselves and this intended uniformity is achieved in gated communities by means of restrictive covenants and laws, as well as the enclosing and monitoring of public areas through the use of walls and other means of physical restriction and surveillance as being the main reason why some people think gated communities are bad as they encourage physical isolation of people (Low, 2017, p.378).




Figure 35. Uneven Geographical Distribution of Permitted Places-Residential Areas, in Ankara, 2013.

Source: GDS (2014c).

Furthermore, one of the most important spatial dynamics on provision of urban private security is the location of the place. Being at the center of the city or not has impact upon threats and risk in positive or negative ways (Interviewee 12). First, comparing and contrasting Kızılay Square and Çayyolu neighborhood, Interviewee 21 and 24 agreed on that the possibility of incidents such as social uprisings, terrorism, muggings, etc. is higher in a Kızılay Square whereas the threat of theft is higher in a housing site located in Çayyolu area. Second, it was also mentioned that there can be some differences in terms of locations within Çayyolu neighborhood. To illustrate, “A residential site that is not isolated and located at the center of Çayyolu, may not require private security services. But, for instance, the ones located in Alacaatlı neighborhood may require more private security guards, though, the residents’ profiles are the same” (Interviewee 3).

Third, residential sites in Çayyolu neighborhood take more security measures such as alarm systems, camera-surveillance systems, high walls⁸³, physical conditions of housing sites etc. whereas housing sites in Mamak do not have such kind of systems due to the cost of these systems are exceeding their budgets (Interviewee 7). Fourth, Interviewee 1 claimed that “Housing sites in Balgat may be riskier compared to the residential area in Çayyolu. Because you are on a highway route. Entry and exit are not unique. It's very crowded, so it's easy to make it happen and to escape. There are many risk-enhancing factors”. Nevertheless, some other interviewees claimed that there are not any differences in terms of provision of private security services for a housing site or a building, for spaces in Çayyolu or Kızılay since the essence of the provided service is same (Interviewees 8 and 16). In order to take necessary measures against threats and risks, weaknesses of the place, which is going to be protected, should be analyzed (Interviewee 31) rather than its location in reference to the center of the city.

⁸³ As Ponting and Rigakos (2014, p.88-89) explained that “walls are one of the oldest-known technologies employed to secure populations. These are walls of enclosure - city walls, gated communities, and fully-enclosed properties”. They function as “territorializing agents, walls engage with space to separate, differentiate, divide, filter, stratify and codify populations, while concurrently seeking to homogenize, civilize, and pacify in order to ‘smooth’ the workings of capitalism and responses to it” and “as tools of pacification, walls seek to ‘smooth’ out conflict and produce docility.”

In explaining the characteristics of the privately provided security services in different residential areas, though depends on the company policy, some private security companies offer at least three-day orientation training for private security guards who are going to work in the housing site under the duty of the company. The reason why there is a such kind of an orientation was explained by Interviewee 14 as such: “Housing sites are like villages in Anatolia. People sit there, people know each other, people belong there. The security guard has to know who lives on that site as soon as possible. And they have to be respectful, and careful to them in accordance with the rules”. An analogy of village is significant since the involvement of community is high in ensuring security in the village in contrast to the responsibilities assigned to public law enforcement officers in urban areas. In this regard, the practice of community policing is produced by means of private security guards in housing sites at urban scale in addition to the involvement of public police.

When the management of gated communities asks for offers to employ one private security guards, it means that there is going to be employed three private security guards due to the 8-hours working limits (Interviewee 29). Besides, there are differences between cost of private security services for residential areas located in different areas in Ankara. For instance, as being an example of gated communities for upper classes in Ankara, private security companies’ offers for Angora Houses are much higher financially than the ones in Keçiören or Mamak. The values of the villas in Angora Houses rising the cost of the private security services and also, they do not have budget limits for purchasing private security services which is approximately 200.000 USD per year. (Interviewee 1). As Interviewee 5 said that “Pricing depends on the income level of residents. There are some housing sites where people have high economic income and can pay more” in addition to the features of places such as number of entry points, day-night shifts etc. Moreover, the residents of housing sites being diplomats, political party deputies, leaders, businessmen etc., living in Angora Houses, may ask for high level of security (Interviewee 3). Thus, private security companies try to meet their needs by both increasing number and quality of the service resulted in increasing financial cost. As a result, pricing policies of private security companies are determined according to the class-based inequalities produced within urban space. According to Interviewee 2, this should be taken into consideration when

Permissions given by the Commission (Interviewee 2).

In addition, one of the significant aspects of private security guards' duties is registering incomers and taking under surveillance their assigned area of duty (Interviewees 19 and 23). For the purpose of maintenance of order at housing sites, Protection Security Plans are prepared. But they are not seen as adequate for being ready to threats and risks in housing sites in Ankara (Interviewee 20) because these plans are mainly concentrated on external threats and risks but sometimes threats are inside the site. For example, Interviewee 20 told that "What will be the role of the security guard when two neighbours fight? What's the security guard's role here? He should try to calm both of them" since "each resident of the housing sites are the bosses of private security guards" (Interviewee 30).

Moreover, theft is the most common crime committed in residential areas that private security guards reported (Interviewees 4, 11 and 30). Thus, as being preventive measures in addition to physical existence of private security guards there is the need for camera and alarm systems (Interviewee 9). According to Interviewee 1, cameras and alarm systems are installed for doing surveillance and controlling space for three possible reasons which are (i) if there was an incident in one place, (ii) if the probability of incident is high and (iii) if the customer asks for constant check and control. As he said that the main difference between cameras and alarm system is that "Alarm enables you to control your home and camera your whole residential site" (Interviewee 1). Thus, spatially, impacts of camera surveillance system are broader than alarm systems.

Two significant cost factors for private security companies are the level of minimum wage and transportation expenses in housing sites located periphery of the city (Interviewee 28). Since the former was discussed in previous part of the study, now, the latter is going to be explained by referring to the in-depth interviews. Generally, private security guards live in Mamak, Keçiören or Sincan districts in Ankara (Interviewees 7 and 25). Thus, the transportation is one of the significant costs for arrival of private security guards to their area of duty (Interviewee 12). Housing sites that private security guards work is located in Yaşamkent, Ümitköy, Çayyolu and Oran

neighborhoods. As a result of this, Interviewee 7 said that “we need to think of at least 3 bus stops to the Çayyolu if private security guards live in Keçiören”. To overcome transportation problems some private security companies use staff bus services increasing the cost of private security services for housing site managements (Interviewee 15).

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, most of the managers in private security sector are retired military personnel or police officers whereas private security guards are generally young, undereducated in security and live in low-income urban areas such as Sincan, Etlik and Keçiören (Interviewee 20). In order to provide security for million-dollar houses, the level of private security guards’ wages should be paid fair enough and more than minimum wages (Interviewee 24). Hence, there should be well-trained and well-paid private guards in housing sites such as Angora Houses, Çayyolu etc. (Interviewee 21). Besides, the management unit of housing sites have the right to choose private security guards according to the features that they seek for (Interviewee 25).

Moreover, how the performance of private security services can be measured at housing sites is another aspect of understanding and discussing why private security guards work in residential areas. Although Zedner was right saying that “the market for crime control is a highly competitive one, driven by price as much as quality, and in which profit is a more powerful motive than performance” (Zedner, 2009, p.90), there are also modest standards for performances mentioned by interviewees. First, Interviewee 25 argued that “If you've been working at a housing site for many years, you're successful. If a site manager doesn't change staff very often and the housing site management make their payments regularly, then, you're successful”. Thus, provision of the private security services for a long time is seen as a sign of approval of housing site management. Second, according to Interviewee 18, the performance of private security companies is determined as such: “do your job well, give the necessary equipment to your guards, communicate with housing site management regularly etc. After that, you should give the personal rights, pay salary on time, set the rest hours in a straight manner”.

To sum up, as the urban experience of city dwellers changed, gated communities have been regarded as safety islands due to their enclosed and guarded environment within the city. As Kavuncu (2018, p.184) asserted that “Gated communities function as a disciplinary control technique that integrates with the contemporary capitalist concept of the city, which sees security as a necessity”, yet, “The question is not whether people choose a quiet, safe environment in which to live, work and play but what rules and interventions they are willing to accept in order to ensure that security” (Christopherson, 1994, p.413).

4.2.2. Privately Owned Public Spaces: Shopping Malls⁸⁴

In a neoliberal society, the mallification of daily life has progressed to the point that it is hardly noticeable, and there is a growing resemblance between airports and retail malls in which each strategy and tactic of private policing supported by legal means goes hand in hand with the commercialization of inner-city space, the sanitizing and privatizing of railway stations and transportation hubs, the creation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), the redefinition of public space, and the reordering of what is perceived as acceptable behavior is determined by these private security guards (Briken & Eick, 2011, p.3). One of the most striking depictions of modern cities is that of streets that are open to the unrestricted flow of pedestrians and automobiles referring two essential ideas of public life in the city: first, that public spaces are available for anyone to use and enjoy, and second, that everyone has equal access to the consumer society that these spaces foster (Caldeira, 2000, p.299). Nowadays, public spaces are crammed into shopping malls (Şengül, 2015, p. 16), and the majority of socialization spots in metropolitan cities are located within the shopping malls including cafes, cinemas, theatres, bookstores etc. As the term was first conceived, 'mass private property' referred to large swaths of land held privately but controlled by a small number of corporations; in fact, the economic viability of many of these types of mass private property depends on open public visits to places like shopping centers, condominium communities, and entertainment, sports, and leisure venues are classic examples of this type of area (Kempa et al., 2004, p.566). Trends in the management,

⁸⁴ As Davis called it “The Panopticon Mall” (Davis, 1992, p.169).

ownership, surveillance, and (re)development of public space in the modern era often give the impression of being overwhelmingly hostile to ideas of inclusivity and the actualization of public space's political potential, especially for socially or economically marginalized individuals and groups (Collins and Shantz, 2009, p.520). Kohn (2005, p.58-59) asserted that "The mall has become an entertainment mecca, a major employer, and a premier vacation destination" and it is appealing as "it combines the pleasures of public life with the safety and familiarity of the private realm." In this vein, for example, "the end of public space" refers to the trend of restricting access to areas of cities that were once considered public, and the future of public spaces in cities is in jeopardy due to the proliferation of for-profit alternatives to public areas, such as shopping malls (Collins & Shantz, 2009, p.517).

The mall, along with other commercial landscapes, helps privatization by hastening the shift of public activities to the for-profit sector and resulted in labelling "the end of public space" represented the complete privatization and privatized control that the public had over formerly public locations (Collins & Shantz, 2009, p.519). There are many similarities between the work of CCTV in public spaces and the surveillance work of private security guards in areas of large private property like shopping malls and office buildings as geographers' studies of public spaces like shopping malls reveal that private security teams' use of monitoring is targeted in part at intimidating and humiliating those who do not "belong" (i.e., have little purchasing power) in the establishments and any behavior that is seen as discouraging the business of other visitors is reason for intervention, with the danger of ejection for those who persist in transgressing the tight behavioral standards of shopping malls (Fyfe, 2009, p.214). Zhang (2017, p.3468) asserted that mass private properties can be seen as a form of disciplinary society in Foucauldian sense in three following points:

... first, as long as a customer is enjoying the service in the private property, the spatial control is continuous. Second, the control in MPPs is not punishment-oriented; rather, the control aims to decrease the risk by specifically regulating customers' behaviours. Third, the users of MPP space should consciously follow the behavioural instruction; otherwise, they might be excluded from the space.

There are three points summarized by Zhang (2017, p.3474) on publicness of mass private property: i) "accessibility is assumed to be the essential feature that makes a

private property public” enabling socialization of diverse people, ii) being essential for the vulnerable populations that cannot be seen to have their voices heard, and iii) being a space for socialization. As the below table exhibited that Zhang classified these dimensions into two domains based on the criteria of consumption.

Table 14. Categories of Privately Owned Public Space Classified by Zhang

	Non-Consumerist	Consumerist
Privately owned public space	Privately owned open space (e.g., privately owned park, sidewalk)	Mass private property (e.g. shopping malls, recreation centres)

Source: Zhang (2017, p.3471).

Yet, conceptualizing mass private property may not be adequate to explain the whole picture since shopping malls and surveillance systems are also at work to follow the behavior of workers at shopping malls. Hence, surveilling shopping malls also means surveilling workplaces and workers in the service sector.

Moreover, Fyfe (2009, p.214-215) indicated that “security personnel are hired by mall owners and have a right to exclude whomever they wish from their property.” As Hutchinson and O’Connor (2005, p.136) study suggested, security officers determine risky individuals within the new common places such as shopping malls by sorting people according to certain features, which are stated by one of the officers as follows: “We look for signs of intoxication, level of voice, hand movements, what they’re wearing; their eyes. At this property, there is a certain dress code; our everyday patron is more or less in business attire, so when someone is in ripped jeans and a faded t-shirt, you get a little wary.” As Baumann argued that:

Every and any kind and instance of surveillance serves the same purpose: spotting the targets, location of targets and/or focusing on targets – all functional differentiation starts from that common ground. ... instruments of surveillance installed at the entrances of shops or gated communities are not equipped with an ‘executive arm’ designed to annihilate the spotted and pinpointed targets – but their purpose, all the same, is the targets’ incapacitation and removal ‘beyond bounds’ (Bauman & Lyon, 2013, p.80-81).

As Koskela (2000, p.245) recognized that “Video-surveillance has become particularly common in spaces of consumption: shopping malls, the main shopping areas of city centres and inside individual shops. Shopping malls in particular often have an extremely high level of surveillance.” The use of surveillance technology in

shopping malls has become increasingly common as a method of combating both criminal activity and the paranoia that it inspires, and its goals extend beyond the mere preservation of material possessions to include the promotion of personal security and the suppression of criminal activity (Koskela, 2000, p.245). Since shopping malls are privately owned, most video surveillance systems in them are run by independent security companies, and surveillance equipment and security guards are used to keep out those who do not fit the mall's demographic (Koskela, 2000, p.246).

As mentioned before, privately owned public spaces called mass private properties are seen as the core reason for the rise of private provision of urban security services. Shearing and Stenning (1981) argue that the rise of privately owned large shopping malls, retail parks, workplace and educational complexes, theme parks, and residential areas has led to a decrease in the traditional sphere of responsibility for public police forces while simultaneously increasing the role of private security guards (as cited in Jones & Newburn, 1999a, p.227-229).




Figure 36. Geographical Distribution of Shopping Malls in Turkey 2021.
Source: <http://www.ayd.org.tr/alisveris-merkezleri>

Although it is hard to mention as being the main sole reason to explain the rise of private security, increase in the number and their spatial expansion throughout the city

is significant factors for the rise of private security⁸⁵. As mentioned in the previous section of this study, a strong and statistically significant positive correlation between shopping mall area per thousand people (m2) ($r=0.704$) and the number of private security guards was found in the correlation analysis. Hence, shopping malls are positively and strongly correlated with the rise of urban private security services. The first shopping mall of Ankara was opened in 1989 at the Çankaya district and followed by another shopping center opened in 1991 at Çankaya district's Tunalı Hilmi street area (Büyükcivelek, 2014, p.244). Today, according to the statistical data provided by Council of Shopping Centers, there are 48 shopping malls in Ankara and sprawled throughout the city (see the Figure 37). Also, there are 428 shopping malls in Turkey and Ankara is in the second rank with its %11,21 share of total shopping malls in Turkey while the share of İstanbul is % 34,34⁸⁶. The duties and responsibilities defined in the Law No. 5188 are also applied to the private security guards work in shopping malls. There is also a special regulation for shopping malls known as the "Regulation on Shopping Malls," which was published in the Official Gazette on February 26, 2016. According to the Regulation, to define any commercial area at urban scale as a shopping mall, it should have certain features which are stated in Article 4 as such: (i) a building or group of buildings within the integrity of the area, (ii) at least five thousand square meters of sales space, (iii) at least one of them is a department store where some or all of the nutrition, dressing, fun, rest, cultural and similar needs are met, at least thirty workplaces meeting some or all of the nutrition, dressing, enjoyment, rest, cultural and similar needs, even if there are no fewer than ten workplaces or large store-qualified workplaces, (iii) common spaces for use determined by this Regulation and (v) a centralized management.

Therefore, places meeting these requirements classified as shopping malls should provide certain level of private security services for their owners, shop tenants, visiting customers etc. According to the Article 19, titled Security Services, of the Regulation,

⁸⁵ For instance, Jones and Newburn (1999a, p.234-238) argued that “the growth of mass private property appears to have been more limited in Britain than in the USA. The very fact that it has been relatively limited, and yet the expansion of private security has been very extensive, immediately casts doubt on the efficacy of the mass private property thesis” and “we would argue that what we would call ‘mass hybrid property’ has been of greater relevance in Britain (and Europe) than ‘mass private property’.”

⁸⁶ <http://www.ayd.org.tr/alisveris-merkezleri>.

first, “Private security is provided within the framework of the Law on Private Security Services and related legislation No. 5188 dated 10/6/2004 at the entrances and exits of the mall with all connections and add-ons including parking”. Second, “In the shopping mall, common areas other than areas that are inappropriate to register, such as the infant care room and toilet, are recorded by camera and stored for at least thirty days. Mall management is responsible for keeping these records”.



Figure 37. Geographical Distribution of Shopping Malls in Ankara 2021.
Source: <http://www.ayd.org.tr/alisveris-merkezleri>

Third, “The installation and operation of license plate recognition system by the mall management is provided to the entrances and exits of controlled areas such as open and closed parking in and out of shopping centers. Data from this system is shared momentarily with law enforcement units”. Fourth, “In shopping malls deemed necessary for public safety by the Ministry of Interior, the installation and operation of an under-car imaging system by the mall management is provided to the entrances of controlled areas such as open and closed parking with the vehicle in and out”. Fifth, “The technical specifications and data sharing considerations for the systems to be installed in accordance with the third and fourth clauses and other matters relating to the operation of these systems are determined by the Ministry of Interior.”




Figure 38. Geographical Distribution of Permitted Places-Shopping Malls, in Ankara, 2013. Source: GDS (2014c).

Therefore, ensuring surveillance of the space is one of the most important aspects of private provision of security services in shopping malls. For instance, according to information given by Interviewee 1, “CEPA has 350-400 cameras; Ankamall has 1,000 cameras; Armada has 64 cameras... Putting them on fire exits, putting them on exits, placing them in between each store, putting them on stairs or integrating them into store interiors... Cameras are everywhere”.

Thus, establishing and using camera surveillance systems are indispensable part of patrolling of private security guards in shopping malls. As Interviewee 4 said that: “In the case of shopping malls, it is becoming more important to combine a more physical security with an electronic system in the face of similar theft problems and terrorist attacks”. Private security guards keep their eyes on suspicious people walking around in shopping mall and intervene with them if they engaged in inappropriate behaviors (Interviewee 17). As Lyon (2007, p.94-95) stated that “the safety of the shopping mall is thought to be dependent on cameras that can ‘see’ potential troublemakers and wrongdoer.”

In addition, ensuring security in parking areas are another significant aspect of shopping mall security. Parking areas can be targets of terrorist attacks (as Interviewee 5 said that effects of bombs in closed spaces are higher), thieves (as Interviewee 14 said that most common in shopping malls), and kidnappers etc. Thus, in order to prevent terrorist attacks or theft incidents, necessary measures should be taken by private security companies. For example, “If there is a vehicle in the parking lot for a long time, private security guards should report it to the police. It could be a bomb-car” (Interviewee 17) or “special attention should be given 34 plates car since they are usually belonging to companies’ personnel, thieves think that there can be a laptop or electronic devices within them” (Interviewee 30).

Malls are spaces where different brands from the retail sector gather together exhibiting diversity in terms of services and products and have thousands of daily visitors. Thus, it is significant to make shopping malls easy to enter, make visitors and customers feel safe while they are shopping or enjoying their time (Interviewee 27). Providing private security contributes to the feeling of safety by door detectors, camera surveillance systems, physical patrolling of private security guards etc. According to Interviewee 12, there are 30-40 private security guards employed by each shopping malls and total number of private security guards employed by all shopping malls approximate 2.000 in Ankara.

As being the most visible sign of security and safety in shopping malls, private security guards present themselves in every mall, looking professional and often wearing uniforms and carrying weapons (Manzo, 2005, p.85). But it was also emphasized by some interviewees that the state should determine the required number of private security guards in big shopping malls such as Gordion or Ankamall and even takes responsibility, when necessary, since these places are significant for macro-economic development of Turkey (Interviewee 2). As the above regulation demonstrated that, “access to the many shops, outlets, post-offices, etc. providing, often essential goods and services, have become at the discretion of the landowner or normally his/her agents” because shopping malls differ from the experiences consumers have in street-level shopping areas (Button, 2003, p.229). Even shopping malls are portrayed as a threat to the “natural” or "organic" social situations that used to be the focal points of

city life (Manzo, 2005, p.84). As Stenning (2000, p.334) stated that:

...the person who declines to comply with the order and security demands of private police in a shopping mall (such as not wearing rollerblades or handing out leaflets), may well find themselves required to leave the mall (or, if compliance is not forthcoming, ejected from it with force), and denied access to it for some specified or unspecified time in the future.

In addition, as it was mentioned before, large corporate international private security companies like Securitas are specialized providing private security in shopping malls (Interviewees 10, 12 and 27) but TEPE Security, as being a national security company, is an exception in Ankara (Interviewee 12). It was asserted that there is a domination of international private security companies in shopping malls in Ankara since they have more systematic approach to private security when compared to national and local ones. As Interviewee 30 said that ISS Security (established in Denmark in 1901) provided security for Ankamall.

Moreover, there are two types of customers that private security guards serve in shopping malls: one is the owner or manager of the shopping malls and the second is the visitors or shoppers. Satisfying the former depends on the satisfaction of the latter. Hence, performances of private security guards measured by their success in communication with visitors, their way doing surveillance, their speed in problem-solving etc. (Interviewees 2, 12 and 15).

4.2.3. State-Owned Public Spaces⁸⁷

Private and public outsourcing activities that adhere to the principles of lean production or innovative public management generate fresh demand for commercial security services and even the police purchase private security services today to protect their facilities (Briken, 2011, p.30). Therefore, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, private provision of security services was not limited to private spaces. As Interviewee 28 told that: “Private security companies did not provide security only at

⁸⁷ Although “public space” is a mere normative ideal and nothing that can be found in “real life” (Belina, 2003, p.), the term utilized in this part implies publicly accessible and state-owned buildings or open spaces at urban scale.

the housing sites or at the shopping malls. It also provided services in urban public spaces” such as public parks⁸⁸, courthouses, stadiums, hospitals, metro stations, university campuses, bus terminals, airports etc. First, public parks, for example, are places under the watch of private security guards and they patrol the area constantly (Interviewee 8). On the one hand, some interviewees (11 and 13) sharing their thoughts about private provision of security in public parks said that there is no need for police forces in there. As Interviewee 11 asserted that “What is he guarding at night in the park? The chairs, entertainment equipment? There is no logical explanation for patrolling of police in there? Police should do his/her own job”. As Briken and Eick (2017, p.54) stated that “the outsourcing of policing tasks driven by the idea to focus on ‘core police functions’, which, in turn, are evaluated according to market mechanisms”. But on the other hand, some others (Interviewees 8 and 28), claimed that public parks are not safe places because there are drug addicts, homeless people, young offenders, thieves etc., thus, there is the need for more private security guards or support of police forces. As mentioned before, camera surveillance systems are significant for complementing private security guards working in the field. In this regard, Interviewee 1 said that most of the parks in Ümitköy area are under surveillance by camera systems bought by the Municipality in addition to MOBESE cameras. Second, the security of courthouses is provided by private security guards in addition to the existence of police forces. Nevertheless, it is criticized by almost all the interviewees negatively since courthouses are critical places for the maintenance of urban social order, the role of private security guards should be limited or eliminated from these places wholly (Interviewee 8, 11, 15 and 27). Providing private security at hospitals are mentioned as a third example to securing public spaces. Although there is also a hospital police in every hospital, private security guards work in hospitals at the door and patrolling around it (Interviewee 13). The reason why private security guards employed in hospitals is not registering visitors as is the case in housing site but to intervene when a violent act occurs (Interviewee 17) and protect doctors, nurses, and other medical workers against relatives of patients (Interviewee 13). Fourth,

⁸⁸ “In contrast to other countries, Belgium has no private guards who have surveillance and/or enforcement in the public space as their main task. In Belgium a general consensus predominates that these tasks should remain in public hands (although private security companies are trying to get their share of the market)” (Terpstra & van Stokkom’s, 2015, p.337).

Ankara Bus Station, Metro Stations and Esenboğa Airport were given as other examples for public spaces public places secured by private security guards (Interviewees 12 and 25). Fifth, university campuses such as Middle East Technical University (METU) were mentioned but Interviewee 19 and Interviewee 27 both emphasized that provision of security services should be done by public authorities not by private security companies in university campuses due to the level of threats such as student demonstrations, meetings, and protests. Sixth, stadiums were given as an example for public spaces where private security guards are not enough to ensure security (Interviewees 15, 23 and 27).

Furthermore, employing or hiring the same private security guards who work as private security guards in state institutions is a pattern followed by the companies involved in the public procurement process (Interviewees 2, 10, 11 and 29). This process was summarized by Interviewee 11 as such:

Let's say I win the tender and there are 10-15 private security guards in the institution. I am going to run private security services for three years with those private security guards appointed by the public institution. This is the customers' right anyway. They bring these private security guards in front of us, and we start to work with them. The tender shall be re-opened after three years. Let's say I lost the tender. Company B bought it. Company B shall hire those personnel if the institution wants. If the company tells me it doesn't matter, then they don't sign a contract.

On the one hand, some interviewees complained about public procurement processes that the lowest cost bid winning the tender resulting in low quality of service (for example Interviewees 6, 18 and 22). On the other hand, some others argued that providing private security services for state institutions is more profitable than others since payment is under the guarantee of the state whereas there are payment problems in housing sites (for example Interviewee 24 and Interviewee 27). Between 2005 and 2018, the state served not only as a regulator but also as a customer of these services.

As shown in Table 15 and Figure 39, the number of insured persons in private workplaces for security and investigation services was 2483, with a share of 1,89%, whereas the number was 129.012 with a share of 98.11% in Turkey in 2008. The number of insured labors increased in public workplaces continuously and it reached to 293.902 and its share slightly decreased to 94,65 % in 2017. However, the Statutory

Decree No.696 can be seen as the breaking point since the composition of public-private share has changed dramatically and the share of private was decreased to 65,69 whereas the share of public was increased to 34,31 in 2018. Nevertheless, it can be followed from the below figure that the share of public decreased to 21,94 % whereas the private was increased to 78,06 % in 2020.

Table 15. Number and Share of Compulsory Insured Person in Security and Investigation Services: Public-Private Division in Turkey 2008-2020

Years/Type	Public	Private	Total Number	Public %	Private %
2008	2483	129012	131495	1,89	98,11
2009	4379	156450	160829	2,72	97,28
2010	5922	175564	181486	3,26	96,74
2011	3027	200246	203273	1,49	98,51
2012	5458	219406	224864	2,43	97,57
2013	1882	238173	240055	0,78	99,22
2014	4547	255343	259890	1,75	98,25
2015	5447	269978	275425	1,98	98,02
2016	7285	280805	288090	2,53	97,47
2017	16597	293902	310499	5,35	94,65
2018	107083	204983	312066	34,31	65,69
2019	110023	210058	320081	34,37	65,63
2020	48204	171520	219724	21,94	78,06

Source: SSI (2021).

Therefore, it can be claimed that the role of the state has not been eliminated. Rather, the state has increased its share in private security services provision as a being service provider for herself. Besides, though the share of the public increased after the Statutory Decree No. 696, two years later the share of public was started to diminish while the share of private was increased. Although province-based data was not provided by SSI, the public places received permission from General Directorate of Security for private provision of security services was half of the total permissions received in Ankara in 2013 which was calculated approximately as 3400 places. Thus, it can be claimed that the share of public has increased in Ankara more than the share of public data of Turkey. In addition, public procurement processes and demand for private security services by state institutions have shaped private security market for a long time.




Figure 39. Share of Compulsory Insured Person in Security and Investigation Services According to Public-Private Division in Turkey 2008-2020
Source: SSI (2021).

One of the interviewees (Interviewee 10) explained their companies experiences in public procurement process as such:

We usually follow public tenders. We don't take jobs from the private sector because the private sector doesn't pay. As you know, the Public Procurement Authority has a website. From there, we follow tenders. We decide on which projects our company can perform and give bid for them. There is a rating system for tenders. Our company wins when it offers a better price. The organization determines this in its terms and conditions. There are certain notifications and periods if our company takes the job. After the tender, we prepare for it in two or four months until we start work. If we win the tender, the company is changing, but the employees are staying the same. In a sense, we hire those personnel.

Since the enactment of Law No. 5188, public institutions have been one of the largest customers of private security companies. As shown in the below table, the total budget allocated to the public procurement of private security services in 2006 was 22.378.000 TRY and total spending was 14.985.000 TRY. In 2017, the total budget allocated to the public procurement of private security services was 1.213.698.000 TRY, and total spending was 1.882.615.000 TRY. The public budget allocated to private security services has increased by approximately 5324 percent while total spending has increased by 12463 percent in 11 years.

Table 16. Public Budget Allocation and Spending for Private Security Services Procurement, 2006-2018.

Thousand TL	General Budget		Special Budget Institutions		Regulatory and Supervisory Institutions		Total Public Allocation	Total Public Spending
	Allocation	Spending	Allocation	Spending	Allocation	Spending		
2006	6200	3057	16118	11884	60	44	22378	14985
2007	15984	14070	49679	63231	50	1	65714	77302
2008	30795	33339	64240	85731	50	0	95085	119069
2009	46264	51727	96432	110873	2200	6341	144896	168941
2010		82042		183118		9917	0	275077
2011		94369		268267		12429	0	375065
2012	101922	126797	326322	394025	14450	13756	442694	534578
2013	162581	187989	388729	498685	15338	14601	566648	701275
2014	201885	227548	417716	603628	16888	14688	636489	845864
2015	254901	288275	461639	759780	17153	19960	733693	1068015
2016	305940	405707	604356	1087939	24025	23080	934321	1516726
2017	430030	515090	755928	1344918	27740	22607	1213698	1882615
2018	449453	188646	786535	382171	34790	6444	1270778	577261

Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Treasury and Finance (2019).

As a result, when we look at this extraordinary increase, it is clear that the resources transferred from the public budget to the private security sector will enable the private security capital in Turkey to grow and be ready for new investment areas. Although it is currently limited to the surveillance and control of specific urban areas in Turkish cities, it can be claimed that the state has already provided capital accumulation supports to make new investments, particularly in military security companies, in the future.

Nevertheless, public spaces had been targets of private security companies, and procurement processes were in practice until 2018 because the government enacted Statutory Decree No. 696 on December 24, 2017, giving them cadres as contract civil servants. Therefore, as can be seen from the above figure, total spending on procurement of private security services has decreased to 119.516.000 USD in 2018.

When compared to the previous year 2017 total spending, it can be seen that the decrease in expenditures was 76.9 percent.




Figure 40. Total Public Spending on Procurement of Private Security Services 2006-2018
Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Treasury and Finance (2019).

In sum, although public buildings or other state-owned public spaces are evaluated in the context of the opening of public buildings to private security companies through tenders and the shrinking of the state by privatizing some public services, the findings of the field study showed that until the change made in 2018, the share of the public budget for policing services did not decrease, as well as the purchase of private security services. The expenditures made from the public budget by means of tenders have increased at an extraordinary rate. The generative mechanisms underlying this process, which we can see as the privatization of security services when we look at it on the surface, can be seen as a contribution to the capital accumulation process, at least when we look at the financial resources allocated from the public budget rather than security. Therefore, the neoliberal urban security regime, on the one hand, ensures the spread of private security to large urban areas, on the other hand, it makes new security expenditures from the public budget, contradicting one of the main arguments of neoliberalism for reducing public spending.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the issue of urban security services provided by private security companies was chosen as a subject of study and discussed in relation to the broader neoliberalization process, which included an examination of the restructuring of the nation-state, the reorientation of capital, the reproduction of urban social surveillance mechanisms, and the production of surveillance spaces. It is claimed that recent transformations are not indicative of a shift in the relative importance of the public and private sectors; rather, the expansion of both sectors has led to a greater degree of formalization in policing's forms (Jones & Newburn, 1999a, p.240). Historically speaking, as the city has been the setting for our interactions with the unknown other, and for the encounters of strangers, our urban experiences have been shaped by the construction of a wider social identity (Christopherson, 1994, p.424). Yet, privately provided urban security services opened the way to discuss the reasons why urban surveillance to become widespread and preventive policing services to become less public. By making them a “natural-eternal” part of urban public life in places such as shopping malls, gated residential communities, private social control mechanisms penetrate into the social sphere, resulting in the internalization of the logic of security and, hence, contributing to the prevention of opposition to the neoliberal social order via security as it becomes self-referential. Thus, this neoliberal urban security regime has been founded on the social inequalities produced by capitalist relations of production and spatial dynamics of this regime determined by uneven distribution of commodified services and contributes to the enhancement of the capacity of the authoritarian neoliberal state to govern by penetrating to urban spaces of social reproduction.

In this vein, after explaining the study's primary objectives, research methods, and methodological approach, it was stated that this research argued about the privatization of urban security services results in a "neoliberal urban security regime," characterized not only by the neoliberal commodification of security and the proliferation of service providers, but also by the dialectical expansion of the state's spatial and administrative capacity to govern through authoritarian neoliberal practices. The critical question is that How does the for-profit security industry contribute to the emergence of a "neoliberal urban security regime"? Given that private urban security services are a capital-led and state-referenced process, it follows that they have contributed to the development of surveillance spaces that are contributing to self-referentiality, i.e., security for the sake of security, particularly for the urban middle-classes.

Moreover, based on Cresswell's categorization and classifications, this study employed a mixed research techniques strategy to examine private security activities at urban scale in Turkey by focusing on the Ankara case through analyzing databases, government documents, books, articles, and in-depth interviews. In the methodological section, an introduction was made in order to clarify in which TimeSpace the discussions in the thesis will be carried out in the information production process by first referring to Wallerstein's TimeSpace conceptualization. At this point, it is possible to state that, while approaching the structural TimeSpace conceptualization in the sections of the thesis that refer to the structural dimensions of coercion, state, neoliberal authoritarianism, policing, securitization, militarization of surveillance spaces, etc., evaluations within the scope of episodic time-space or cyclico-ideological time-space are occasionally employed. For example, while the discussions on Gezi Revolt employs an episodic TimeSpace, it has been argued that it is a structural result of neoliberal authoritarian state administration within the scope of structural TimeSpace. Similarly, urban private security services have been tried to be discussed within the scope of structural TimeSpace and cyclico-ideological TimeSpace. The second perspective is based on Ollman's discussions on Marx's historical materialist rule, and vantage point, levels of generality and extension abstractions are explained. The most important achievement of this approach in the analysis part of the thesis is that the dimensions determined during the research phase of the thesis can also be considered as vantage points, and in this direction, the main

problematic of the thesis, especially in terms of abstraction levels, is identified at the first level (individual), the second level (recent past welfare state to neoliberalism), and the third level (capitalism). It has been clarified that capitalism in general and the emergence of police forces in particular will be analyzed within the scope of levels of generality. Additionally, the methodological foundation for the questions about the connection between security and insecurity in the following parts of the thesis is the dialectical explanation that Carchedi developed regarding the social phenomena being both realized and potential. At the same time, Carchedi's analysis of concrete and abstract people made it possible for understanding the dialectical relationship between the specific and the general to be considered in the actor-based evaluations made in the empirical part of the thesis. In this context, the findings and patterns obtained in the field study were abstracted and moved to the theoretical realm. Thirdly, Bhaskar's critical realist theory helped to bring relationality to the study through actor-structure-mechanism-events-experience concept sets. In particular, Bhaskar's contribution to considering the relationship between the structural-general and the contingent-particular while establishing the relationship between theory and practice contributed to the evaluation of the data in the thesis and the discussion of the results implicitly or explicitly. Finally, following in the footsteps of Harvey, who made significant contributions to the development of historical geographical materialism, a dialectical analysis of urban space and geography was attempted to be explained in the context of their relationship with the perspective of urban private security as providing ground for control spaces. These three basic points of view, which make up the methodological approach of the thesis, have been used to figure out how the evaluations of the thesis relate to each other in a concrete and abstract way, even when there is no direct reference to the relevant parts of the thesis.

The second chapter on the theoretical and conceptual framework laid the groundwork for the discussion on "urban private security" by contextualizing the issue of security in relation to the nation-state and capital nexus. Different theoretical evaluations referred by Weberian, Marxian, and post-structuralist perspectives on the state, non-economic coercion and surveillance were shed light on understanding neoliberal urban security regime produced by pluralization of urban policing practices by means of commodification process. In the theoretical part of the study, first of all, how the

relationship between non-economic coercion-physical force-violence-security and the state is handled in terms of different theoretical approaches discussed. An evaluation has been made by considering the historical sections corresponding to capitalism in terms of Wallerstein's structural TimeSpace and Ollman's levels of generality. Considering Bourdieu's additions to Weber's definition, the intensification of physical and symbolic violence, territorial boundaries and legitimacy is taken as a reference in the definition of the state in terms of internal security-policing practices. With reference to Mann, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the time at which the infrastructural power of the state begins to wane is the one at which the physical-despotic force begins to acquire strength and finds new application areas. The capacity to infiltrate to the social realm rather than the direct use of physical force provides the foundation for policing's legitimacy as a social institution. The presence of the police gains legitimacy to the extent that there is no need for violence. To the extent that the police use violence and continue it systematically, its legitimacy is open to public discussion. Marxist theories to the function of violence-force place significant emphasis on the role of the state as a social relation in maintaining the bourgeois order via its involvement in the development of social consent or hegemony and the production of primitive accumulation. For example, Gramsci, while emphasizing the importance of the production of social consent in terms of hegemony, states that the use of force and violence is sometimes used as a functional tool in the establishment of hegemony.

In addition, the state's infrastructural power, in Mann's conceptualization, has always been weakened by the harsh and disproportionate response of its law enforcement officers to protest that are the social ground of what look like political social conflicts or class struggles. It is questionable that private security services have not yet been utilized in this regard because particularly in legal-administrative laws, the realm of private security services defined apart from social conflicts. At this point, it can be argued that if the qualitative deficiencies of the private security guards are left aside, it can be seen as a new potential area that will be re-evaluated or debated in the future in terms of the objective position of the state. In the monopoly of legitimate violence, which is accepted as a fundamental element among the reasons for the existence of the state – both within Marxist and liberal-Weberian explanations – on the one hand, the

state continues to be the primary source of legitimacy, while on the other hand, private security companies provide concrete control of social inequalities without the involvement of the state at first sight. Aside from the state's service provider role, regulatory-supervisory roles have begun to be the new ground for its legitimacy. Also privatized and commercialized security services might facilitate urban militarization by highlighting the state's exclusive coercive role, which will be condemned for political and social reasons. Consolidating its infrastructural power through private security, rather than through oppressive-coercive means, the role of capital mediated the state in becoming functional in the setting of governmentality. In this context, the state-capital relationship turns into a complementary-totality relationship (perhaps more than in other social production-consumption areas).

In the section devoted to contextualizing policing and development of police forces in historical context and three approaches which are orthodox liberal, revisionist and synthesized versions of liberal and revisionist views were elaborated. The main aim of this discussion is to understand policing practices and the organization of police in their historical circumstances. Policing and the organization of police are seen indispensable part of the nation-state and it is regarded as ahistorical and eternal phenomena. Yet, on the contrary, this part of the discussion revealed that, it is relatively new development in production of social order unique to capitalist social relations. social surveillance mechanisms and production of surveillance spaces were made. Security services offered on an urban scale, which we can also define as internal security, have to ensure that these social conditions can reproduce themselves, while creating the conditions for capitalist production and reproduction of social relations. A discussion was held on how the state is evaluated as the source and actor of security-difficulty-physical violence. In this respect, it can be stated that the state is accepted as the only institutional organization mechanism with a monopoly on legitimate violence, but different motivations are determinative in the process of applying this monopoly of legitimate violence. Besides, the growth of cities has always coincided with the expansion of police forces. As urban enforcement has become more complex and specialized, new divisions have formed to handle it. In this process, the provision of urban security services by private corporations, similar to the separation of the army from the police, also represents a new stage. Despite the fact that police historically

began as an urban activity or service, departmentalization and specialization within the field have steadily developed through time in tandem with the growth of capitalist production relations. The provision of urban security services by private security companies through the use of monitoring/surveillance practices has also recast the role of the police force in terms of the social purpose that they serve. In this regard, the territorial organization of the state has not weakened with the privatization of security services, on the contrary, it has expanded. Even while the state's "monopoly of legitimate violence" is dwindling as its monopolistic quality fades, the state's use of force is not being questioned; rather, it is growing and expanding as a result of the state's regulatory function.

Furthermore, the four basic dimensions discussed in the study were seen as vantage points, following Ollman, and especially in the fieldwork part, the discussion was made over these four different vantage points which are determined as follows: urban private security as a mediation of state-capital nexus, as a capital accumulation process, as a surveillance strategy and as a production of surveillance spaces. In order to contextualized privately provided urban security services in Turkey, firstly, the neoliberal transformation of the state towards authoritarian form under the rule of AKP was discussed as a part of case study. Then, urban private security is discussed as a mediation between state and capital by following the path of legal-administrative amendments. In the analysis of the private security as a mediation of state-capital nexus, the research indicated that, which is a significant result in its own right, the state's involvement in providing security services has not diminished but has indeed increased in Turkey. Paradoxically, on the one hand, the militarization of urban areas by oppressive governments constituted the sociopolitical basis for the implementation of market-friendly policies carried out through the discourse of downsizing the state (although the practices prove the contrary), but on the other hand, an authoritarian neoliberal state that took refuge behind the discourse of democratization-civilization aiming to overthrow the military tutelage. Although authoritarian liberalism is not unique to the Turkish context, the structural ground produced by the 1980 military coup facilitated the transformations experienced after the political power change in 2002. In the private security market, the state's position has been recast as a regulator-controller and a client, rather than solely a service provider. As evidenced by the

number of employees in private security sector revealed that the percentage of the budget, and the financial resources transferred to the capital through private security service procurement bids have increased up until the 2018. In addition to these, fieldwork has shown that retired police and army personnel are quantitatively dominant in the private security sector, especially in decision-making and managerial positions. This aspect can be seen as the proof of the organic relationship that this neoliberal authoritarian state has established with the private security sector. In this respect, private security is functional for the state in two aspects. First, while maintaining the monopoly of legitimate violence, it facilitates the penetration of violence-surveillance practices into the social sphere through urban spatial practices. Second, transferring the threat of the state's use of violence to private security, at least in urban everyday life, expands its capacity to represent objective legitimate violence. When the state employs direct physical violence against its citizens, the state engages in a confrontation with those individuals; on the other hand, when private security inflicts physical harm on a citizen, the state positions itself as an arbiter. This strengthens the objective regulatory position of the state rather than weakening it through the market. In this direction, urban private security services are functional as complementing the social practices of the authoritarian neoliberal state. As a governmental technology, while strengthening the objective position of the state through private security surveillance-control practices, it expands to the private sphere-social reproduction realm and reproduces the scale of social and political power.

The analysis concentrated on the post-2005 period in Turkey and the semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted in the fieldwork provided qualitative data on private security practices in Ankara Turkey case. Both the rise of privately provided urban security services and the political-social transition of the state toward an authoritarian form take place concurrently in the post-2005 period. In this vein, firstly, the legal-administrative dimensions and their historical development were questioned in the context of actors-mechanisms-structure relationship, and the development and current situation of the private security services sector in Turkey in terms of the capital accumulation process were analyzed. The second focus of the fieldwork has been the discussion of the spatial dimensions of social surveillance practices in the case of

Ankara. In this context, the impact of surveillance practices upon the private security sector in terms of production and use of space, as well as the relationship with security, were discussed. The study examined the relationship between urban settlement and security through various abstractions, as well as the themes of regional-public space surveillance, security, and commodification, both historically and spatially. This conceptual-historical analysis has shed light on the discussions in the context of private security services in the case of Turkey.

In addition, privately provided security services were discussed both as a surveillance strategy and as a spatial strategy in the case of Ankara. As an area of capital accumulation, urban private security services develop in relation to the production of certain built environment areas such as residential areas (gated communities) and shopping malls. It was found that there is a correlation between the production of urban areas such as shopping malls and the need for the private security services as confirmed by the data obtained from the field research. On the one hand, the provision of private security services on an urban scale embodies the class appearance of social segregation as the erosion of citizenship rights based on those who can afford the service and those who cannot; on the other hand, it has become possible to determine who is inside and who is outside, or who is a respected citizen and who must be monitored as a member of social groups regarded as potential threats (the process of redefining the circumstances of class-based usage of urban social places is seen as a threat). Rather than preventing crime, this role of urban private security emphasizes observation and control of conduct in urban public places. In the absence of a monopoly on the use of physical force and violence, private security services in urban areas are deployed as a means of introducing surveillance-control activities into social relations by means of urban space. In this regard, similar to the state's coercive function, the less the threat of physical force is realized, the more it reproduces its legitimacy and the easier it is to produce social acceptance or consent.

Another finding is that the boundaries of both social reproduction and publicity are redefined by making surveillance/supervision practices as a natural part of daily life in areas where urban private security services are common, especially in residential areas such as gated communities and in social reproduction areas such as shopping

malls. In the case of shopping malls, for example, these establishments play a role in the growth of the private security industry because they are examples of publicly accessible areas that are privately owned. Within these malls, surveillance techniques are utilized in a dual sense, serving both as production (service production) and reproduction (consumption) spaces. It is possible to make the argument that the most important point that can be emphasized in this context is that the presence of private security guards in the shopping mall goes beyond the prevention of crime, the protection of correct-acceptable social behavior norms, and the prevention of the presence of dangerous populations in these areas. For this reason, it is important to underline that the existence of private security, rather than the prevalence of crime, is to secure the repetition of specific behavior patterns associated with the urban middle classes.

Apparently, the labeling of urban private security operations as "security" also requires the replication of insecure or unsafe conditions. The correlation between the number of private security guards and the rate of feeling safe, which is one of the findings of the quantitative data analysis, also shows that as individuals are concerned about their own safety, their need for private security services also increases. In other words, the connection-relationship between the numerical size of private security guards and the feeling of security of individuals constitutes the existence condition of the private security service. This is also the paradox or contradiction of the private security industry. Therefore, the manufacture and repetition of individuals' feelings of insecurity serves as the social foundation for private security firms to generate profits. Yet, the social relationships that emerge in an urban space where people feel safe do not need production of private security or surveillance technologies. As Jacobs states, surveillance and security occur naturally in urban spaces where public social relations are lively. However, the private security sector reproduces the insecurity and fear of crime, producing the conditions of its own existence. Therefore, private provision of urban security services revealed paradoxical-contradictory features as all self-referential systems have that "their existence implies the unity of different logical levels, of different logical types. ... the autopoietic theory states that the different is the same"(Luhmann, 1990, p.114-116). In other words, private security sector is a self-contradictory system depends on the insecurity for producing security. Whether

they are stationed in privately owned public spaces or gated communities located in residential areas, the presence of private security guards, complete with uniforms and either armed or unarmed equipment, contributes to the militarization of everyday life in metropolitan areas. The normalization or the internalization of the presence of security-equipped officers in different spatial areas of the city transforms urban security practices and also serves as a potential threat to possible conflicts in the socio-political field because the ubiquity of private security guards corresponds to the ubiquity of insecurity.

In addition, on the one hand, decisions protecting the safety of the middle and upper classes within gated communities from external threats take center stage in discussions about housing. But, on the other, these same authorities set the ground rules for how those communities' occupants must conduct themselves. In this respect, the security strategy in residential areas expresses two basic orientations: inside and outside. Hence, territorially, preventive-detecting against the outsider can be seen as an inward-stimulating regulator. Therefore, unlike Marx's surveillance of the workplace, the surveillance of the social (re)production areas has expanded to the residential areas, and the control of the working classes in all areas of capitalist social life is secured in a way that does not threaten the holistic functioning of the system. Yet, this does not mean that there is no room for contingency. In some cases, power is rescaled through urban security without the social agents' knowledge or consent, and the reproduction of the capitalist social order is secured by transforming security into "for the sake of security" rather than being part of larger political plans.

Furthermore, private security is found to be militarizing urban life in terms of the manufacturing public consent in the setting of gated communities and new mass consumption places where the urban middle classes reside. It can be argued that the implementation of surveillance practices through both camera systems and private security guards paves the way for the internalization of violence in the context Bourdieu defines as symbolic violence. It results in the fact that the urban middle classes, who are kept under constant surveillance with cameras and private security guards, are oppressed, not despotically, but also symbolically. Hence, the provision of security by private companies makes possible the continuous surveillance of the

middle classes in the areas of social production and reproduction. Consequently, social criticism and dissent are relegated to strictly formal and official channels. Representation of political opposition or protests in areas of mass consumption has been restricted which makes political representation of different voice in public realm almost impossible on a practical or symbolic level. Therefore, for the urban middle classes, security becomes invisible or, more precisely, normalized to the extent that it is defined by self-reference. Security, which becomes self-referential with private security services, turns into security for security after a while, and a discussion ground cannot be produced on its existence-absence or its function. For the urban middle classes, the question of whether there is a need to purchase private security services in residential areas is no longer a question. The question of whether a private security service is necessary has been replaced with the question of what sort of private security service is required. As stated by the interviewees in the field study, employment of private security personnel has become a generally accepted norm from the moment the construction of built environment begins.

Urban middle classes, who can afford private security services, fund access to these services both directly in residential neighborhoods and indirectly in public consumption areas. After 1980s, cities began a process of deindustrialization that coincided with the restructuring of urban public spaces as a result of the shift toward a consumer-driven economy centered on the service sector. Considering the use of urban spaces, while the public spaces that become functional in terms of the reproduction of labor power have narrowed, there has been a process of expansion of privately owned public consumption areas such as shopping malls. This process at an urban scale is characterized by its fundamental dynamic component, which is the proliferation of large shopping malls as venues for mass consumption. Another finding is that the correlation relationship between shopping malls and private security services is strong and positive. As the urban spatial areas reserved for shopping malls increase, the need for private security services also increases. Shopping malls, in which many employees from the service sector produce labor-intensive services throughout the day, work as places of reproduction of the workforce, as well as being places of seizure of the service produced by the workforce. In this direction, the private security services offered in shopping malls also fulfill a dual function that secures both service

production and workforce reproduction. Now, shopping malls as venues for mass consumption stand in for a new kind of constrained public sphere. These malls are run by the property owners, who also administer and define the regulations. Surveillance and control tactics, as well as private security, are the new norms within these places. Urban middle classes, who are seen as the user-consumers of these privately owned public mass consumption spaces, consent to a socialization practice in which they are under the constant surveillance and control of surveillance cameras and private security guards, which are spread all over the place, after the doors they pass through the x-ray and detector search. Surveillance cameras fill this gap at points where security guards are not physically present, and the continuous-uninterrupted surveillance of individuals' behavior in social areas is constantly reminded and the boundaries of behavior are rearranged. After a while, beyond the preventive control-security dimension, a mechanism emerges that decides what is appropriate and/or inappropriate behavior in urban public spaces or what kind of individuals are suitable for the right to use these spaces. While this process constantly reproduces the perception of the need for security, it also contributes to the reproduction of social inequalities and spatial segregation based on social class. Although it could not find a basis for implementation of a policy such as “zero-tolerance policing” in Turkey, the goal of making urban social life safe by preventing inappropriate behaviors that constitute the essence of zero tolerance has found a chance to be implemented with the spread of private security services. Because, similar to zero-tolerance policing practices, urban private security services have been active implementers of a zero-tolerance policy against segments of society who are likely to deviate from the behavior determined normally by preventing the presence of unwanted persons in urban spaces or their entry into certain urban spaces.

The urban geography of private security services also reveals an uneven geographical distribution, which is consistent with the socioeconomic inequalities that exist in metropolitan areas. For instance, shopping malls, as private property areas in public use, are located at points of the city that can be reached mostly by private vehicles, as the new sacred temples of urban consumption, and are unevenly distributed in the city. This geographical distribution of private security services leaves some places in the city to their own desperation as areas of the city that are kept out of sight. To illustrate,

certain areas of the city (for example some neighborhoods in Altındağ, Ankara) are left to the community and stigmatized as places of danger, except for the harsh interventions of the public law enforcement only within the scope of drug operations or public order inspections. Although this is not the subject of this thesis, it has been stated in an empirical study⁸⁹ that these areas are stigmatized as places of crime and criminals and the intervention of the public police here is quite harsh. Residents living in these areas of the city are the losers of this process in two respects: On the one hand, they are seen as a dangerous unwanted population for both gated communities and shopping malls, on the other hand, their living spaces are classified as dangerous places and they are exposed to police violence.

Neoliberal policies laid the social and political groundwork for the meteoric ascent of the process of privatization and commercialization of the urban security services. Even though neoliberalism has its own internal contradictions (the growing role of the state despite talk of downsizing, the fact that public spending does not go down despite privatizations, etc.), the role of the state in social life and the creation of new institutional mechanisms in the relationship between the state and the market have helped to maintain the complementary-totality relationship. In this process, while the public character of urban security services as a private administrative area eroded, on the other hand, the capacity of the state to penetrate the social sphere increased due to the provision of private security services by companies regulated by the state and the organic relationship between the state and retired military and police officers employed as managers in private security companies. It has come to a point in the surveillance and control of urban spaces where private security companies are in a position to buy services directly and sell products to those who will produce the service. This can be accomplished through the utilization of both physical security personnel and surveillance technology with the various camera systems that are on the market. Therefore, it can be concluded that while the surveillance and control practices of the state expand, it also gains a new representation/power position within the state in terms of the way capital is associated with the state. The fact that the executive

⁸⁹ Dölek's (2020) recent study called "The Law of the City?: Social War, Urban Warfare and Dispossession on the Margin" can be read as a case study on these areas, discussing the state's violence on these areas and the people living there.

levels of private security companies are mostly composed of retired police and army members does not pose a risk at least in the short term, but it also carries the potential to create problems in potential conflict or disorder situations that may arise in the future. From this perspective, the rise of the neoliberal urban security regime, on the one hand, reinforces the authoritarianism of the state as a social relation, and on the other hand turns into a complementarity relationship with the state and benefits from the market's capacity to penetrate urban social spaces and the state's capacity to dominate. The state assumes responsibility for producing, controlling, and regulating the legal-administrative conditions that make the production of the neoliberal urban security regime possible and for reproducing the conditions of accumulation of capital through private security. Going beyond the state's effort to position itself as an objective relationship, it camouflages its authoritarian tendencies on an urban scale through the market as it becomes authoritarian in the political arena. On the one hand, political power appears to be becoming more authoritarian, but on the other hand, the capital's privileged position has been reproduced in the name of democratization and demilitarization, resulting in the militarization of urban space via privately provided security services contributing to the reproduction of social inequalities. Following the Luhmann's (199, p.236) argument on "no functional subsystem is able to solve the core problems of another system", it can be claimed that increasing urban security measures or increasing surveillance of urban spaces do not solve social justice problems because social injustice and security are the main problems of two separate systems. As you can solve the inequalities produced by the bourgeois society that defines the security problem, you also redefine the meaning of security.

While the neoliberal authoritarian state assumed responsibility for the failures of capitalist market dynamics as a savior, it also made a significant contribution to the transformation of huge sectors of society's urban daily living practices. Transforming surveillance and control into a normal and an inevitable part of urban life has gained governmental practice as a legitimate mechanism to minimize the possibility of social resistance and to ensure the reproduction of the security/insecurity dichotomy, especially for the urban middle classes. This assessment, however, is more nuanced than the simplistic view that private urban security agencies merely replicate existing state structures. It should be made clear that private security firms are not and cannot

act as a simple branch of the state, despite the fact that their organizational structure and definition of authority-responsibility places them in a complementary relationship with the state. Urban private security services enable private property owners to take over social control and to apply their own game rules within certain spatial limits. Contemporary surveillance treats every person, item, and location as suspicious, whereas traditional methods of surveillance only act upon the target of suspicion, hence, we are all suspects, if not for the past, then for the present and the future, and all subject to monitoring (Henry, 2009, p.99). In the analysis of authoritarian neoliberal formations, Bruff (2014, p.127) asserted that these instances make emancipatory change seem more out of reach since they draw attention to the systemic nature of the power imbalances that characterize capitalist societies, but they also open us up to the possibility of alternative as focusing on the increasingly coercive imbrication of nonmarket with market forms of class power not only generates a direct criticism of such authority but also aims to rally support for an alternative conception of how people may govern themselves. This provides the surveillance of day-to-day life practices and can sometimes aid authoritarian policies implemented by the state. This tremendous expansion of urban private security is the single most important development that has permitted surveillance techniques to spread to such a degree in urban areas that they have become an art of neoliberal authoritarian governments (or governmentality), which is called the neoliberal urban security regime in this study.

This study tries to develop and discuss the relationship between abstractions at the theoretical level and concreteness at the empirical level in the analysis of privately provided urban security services. However, it should be noted that there are some limitations to the study in this process. The first and most important limitation, which focuses on the provision of urban security services by companies, is that it only discusses the issue in terms of its supply-side capital and its relationship with the state. It neglects the workers voice and demand side of the coin. In this context, the perceptions, and evaluations of those who produce the service and who buy or use these services are not included in the study. The second limitation of the study is that there is a limited, or even no, data set on private security in Ankara, Turkey. In this direction, an analysis was tried to be made on limited data gathered under very difficult conditions, and the data were analyzed in terms of temporal series, limited to the

periods when the data were shared by the state. Public authorities in Turkey are quite conservative about sharing data on security issues. For example, the security incident records kept in police stations are not disclosed to the public or compiled by TURKSTAT and transferred to a database on time series. Hence, there are serious methodological difficulties in front of scientific studies on security in general and private security services in particular. The third important limitation is that the opinions of public law enforcement officials are not included in the study. When it comes to security, it is more difficult for public employees to share their opinions in any scientific research. No police or other law enforcement officials wanted to express their opinion on this matter. The fourth important limitation is that among the companies that provide private security services in the study, only companies that provide surveillance camera and physical security services in urban areas were evaluated within the scope of the study. Apart from these, military security companies providing training and consulting services, providing alarm center services, or operating in war zones were not evaluated within the scope of the study. The fifth important limitation is that the discussion about the surveillance cameras was carried out mostly on the theoretical level in relation to the findings expressed in the in-depth interviews. Thus, since the geographical data of the MOBESE cameras in Turkey and the surveillance cameras are under the control of the public law enforcement agencies, they were not shared with the public for security reasons, and they could not be included in the discussions of the study. The sixth important limitation is that the empirical dimension of the study is limited to Turkey at the macro level and Ankara at the micro level. Thus, private security services in different cities of Turkey were not discussed in any way and were excluded from the evaluation in the study.

Considering the limitations mentioned above, the following issues can be suggested for future studies in this area: i) The perceptions of those who purchase private security services or benefit from these services by paying a fee and their effects on the use of space can be investigated; ii) empirical studies on the relationship between private security services and different types of crime (public order, smuggling, theft, etc.) can be conducted for different cities or comparatively between cities; iii) the reason for the existence of private security can be questioned by comparing the crime-security incidents between the areas protected by private security guards and the urban areas

without private security guards, by discussing the evaluations of the people living in those areas of the city selected as a case study; and finally v) it is possible to investigate how private security guards experience exploitation and alienation by focusing on their working conditions in various urban areas such as gated communities, shopping malls etc.

Suggestions for urban policy can be expressed as follows: i) Despite the fact that it is an urban phenomenon, local administrations bear no responsibility for urban security, and only the provincial organization of the central administration is authorized to act both as a public law enforcement agency and to supervise private security officers. In this direction, transferring some supervisory powers to local governments and the inclusion of local governments in the field of urban security can be discussed; ii) To ensure that urban social-public life is not confined to a constant threat-security-risk spiral, it can be determined as an urban policy priority to remove surveillance cameras both in urban public spaces and in places that see the public spaces from private spaces such as residential or commercial places; iii) If the private security services of urban spaces are to be protected (which is a challenge in the next proposal), the training of private security companies' guards should be restructured, taking into account the characteristics and priorities of different urban spaces; finally, iv) although the urban private security sector is established to provide preventive and deterrent policing services, as the findings of the field study indicated, public relations and communication activities constitute a large part of the workload of private security guards. Besides, the uniformed and armed visibility of private security guards contributes to the militarization of urban space. For these reasons, the private provision of urban security services security in urban areas should be abolished, and its purchase should be stopped. Instead, social counseling and support service public personnel, who will be employed by public authorities and work at appropriate points in the city, should be employed.

As the last word, this study revealed that everyday urban social life is under the gaze of surveillance cameras and urban security guards, while at the same time the role of the state has been redefined and authoritarian policies have become dominant since the 1980s. Episodic events such as Gezi Revolt emerged out of authoritarian policies

of neoliberal state proved that though the realized social practices may seem inevitable and irresistible, there is always the way to resist, stand against the social and political power of the capital (regardless of utilizing reactionary or liberal political hegemonic blocs). Historical moments have proven through experience that organized people should not underestimate the power they have in realizing structural transformations. We are not condemned to the private security measures embodied by surveillance cameras and private security guards and the (re)production of urban space in the form of gated communities or privately owned public spaces. This process, like every historical moment, has the potential to be abolished and transformed into a more progressive society based on mutual interdependence rather than individual responsabilisation strategies.

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APPENDICES

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
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05 NİSAN 2017

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Prof.Dr. Melih ERSOY;


Danışmanlığını yaptığınız doktora öğrencisi Ayhan Melih TEZCAN'ın "*Devlet Güvenlik ve Kentsel Mekan*" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay 2017-SOS-048 protokol numarası ile 05.04.2017 – 30.07.2017 tarihleri arasında geçerli olmak üzere verilmiştir.


Bilgilerinize saygılarımla sunarım.



Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN


Başkan V



Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL
Üye


Prof. Dr. Ayhan Gürbüz DEMİR
Üye


Doç. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Üye


Doç. Dr. Zana ÇITAK
Üye


Yrd. Doç. Dr. Pınar KAYGAN
Üye


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B. CURRICULUM VITAE

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Education Information

- Doctorate, Middle East Technical University, Graduate School Of Social Sciences, Urban Policy Planning and Local Governments (PhD-Dr), Turkey 2010 - Continues
- Postgraduate, Middle East Technical University, Graduate School Of Social Sciences, Urban Policy Planning and Local Governments (M.S. -YI) (Tezli), Turkey 2007 - 2010
- Undergraduate, Middle East Technical University, Faculty Of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Department Of Political Science And Public Administration, Turkey 2002 - 2007

Foreign Languages

English, C2 Mastery

Dissertations

Rethinking transformation with tourism: The case of İzmir-Alaçatı, Middle East Technical University, Eski Türk Edebiyatı Anabilim Dalı, Kentsel Politika Planlaması Ve Yerel Yönetimler (YI) (Tezli), 2010

Research Areas

Urban Policy, Urban Politics, Local Governments, Public Administration, Methodology.

Academic Titles

- Lecturer, Ankara University, Hukuk Fakültesi-Faculty of Law, Adalet Meslek Yüksekokulu-Vocational School of Justice, 2018 - Continues
- Lecturer, Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and The Middle East, Türkiye Ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 2015 - 2018

- Research Assistant, Middle East Technical University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Urban Policy Planning and Local Governments, 2009 - 2015

Academic and Administrative Experience

- Program Coordinator, Ankara University, Open and Distance Education Faculty, Justice Distance Education Program, 2021 - 2022
- Deputy Director of the Center, Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and The Middle East, Local Administration Center, 2016 - 2017

Courses

- Public Personnel Legislation, Associate Degree, 2022 - 2023
- E-Government Applications, Associate Degree, 2022 - 2023
- Justice Psychology, Associate Degree, 2022 - 2023
- State Organization and Ministry Organizational Structure, Associate Degree, 2022 - 2023
- Research Techniques, Associate Degree, 2018 - 2019
- Public Private Sector Structure and Relations, Associate Degree, 2018 - 2019
- Teamwork, Associate Degree, 2018 - 2019
- Effective Professional Communication and Career Planning, Associate Degree, 2018 - 2019

Articles Published in Other Journals

- I. **Başkanlık Sisteminde Siyasal/Yönetimsel Biçimleşmiş ve Yerel Yönetimler: Endonezya Deneyimi**
TEZCAN A. M.
Memleket Siyaset Yönetim, no.31, pp.129-170, 2019 (Peer-Reviewed Journal)
- II. **Kamu Yararı Kavramının ve Türkiye'deki Yasal Dayanaklarının Kentsel Politikalar Açısından Değerlendirilmesi**
TEZCAN A. M., POYRAZ U.
Çağdaş Yerel Yönetimler, 2013 (Peer-Reviewed Journal)

Books & Book Chapters

- I. **Bulgaristan'da Kentleşme ve Konut Politikaları**
TEZCAN A. M.
in: Bulgaristan: İdari, Siyasi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Yapı, Burak Tangör, Editor, TİAV, Ankara, pp.429-472, 2020
- II. **Türkiye'de Tüketim Coğrafyasının Yerelliği ve Yoğunlaşması**
TEZCAN A. M., POYRAZ U., YAŞAR C. G.
in: Kentsel Politikalar, Ayşegül Mengi, Deniz İşçioğlu, Editor, Palme Yayıncılık, pp.701-723, 2018.

Refereed Congress / Symposium Publications in Proceedings

- I. **Kırda Spekülasyon ve İmar Ankara Örneği**
Yaşar C. G., TEZCAN A. M., POYRAZ U.
9. Kamu Yönetimi Sempozyumu, Ankara, Turkey, 7 - 09 May 2015
- II. **Towards the Conceptualization of Territoriality of Urban Security**
TEZCAN A. M.
The Cities, Security and Poverty: The Meeting of the World Society for Ekistics, 7 - 10 July 2013
- III. **Kentsel Dönüşümün Yasal Yönetimsel Boyutunun Dönüşümünün Tipolojiler Aracılığıyla Okunması Ankara Örneği**
POYRAZ U., YAŞAR C. G., TEZCAN A. M.
Uluslararası Türk Dünyası Yerel Yönetimler Sempozyumu, Turkey, 25 - 26 November 2014
- IV. **Türkiye'de İnsan Hakları Mücadelesi ve Sivil Toplum Örgütleri**
POYRAZ U., TEZCAN A. M.
4. Uluslararası Ekonomi Politik Konferansı, 27 - 29 September 2012
- V. **Neoliberal Kentleşme ve Kıyı Kentlerinde Mutenalaştırma İzmir Alaçatı Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme**
TEZCAN A. M., PENPECİOĞLU M.
8 Kasım Dünya Şehircilik Günü Kolokyumu: Kentleri Korumak/Savunmak, Turkey, 6 - 08 November 2009

Supported Projects

- TEZCAN A. M., CB Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (Kalkınma Bakanlığı) Projesi, Yerel Yönetimler İçin Eğitim Malzemesi Geliştirme YEREP YERELNET Projesi Yerel Yönetimlerde Yeni Yasal Düzenlemelerin Işığı Altında Hizmet Sunum Yöntem Arayışı Araştırması-İlçe Araştırması Raporu Projesi, 2016 - 2017
- TEZCAN A. M., CB Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (Kalkınma Bakanlığı) Projesi, Türkiye'de Parleментар Sistem Araştırma Projesi, 2013 - 2015
- TEZCAN A. M., ZENGİN O., CB Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (Kalkınma Bakanlığı) Projesi, Yerel Yönetimler İçin Eğitim Malzemesi Geliştirme YEREP-YerelNET Projesi Yerel Yönetimlerde Yeni Yasal Düzenlemelerin Işığı Altında Hizmet Sunum Yöntem Araştırması: Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2014 - 2014
- TEZCAN A. M., Project Supported by Higher Education Institutions, Ankara Mobilyacılar Sitesi'nde Üretim Alanında Çalışan Genç İşçiler ve Farklı Ölçeklerdeki Dışlanma Süreçleri Araştırma Projesi, 2012 - 2012
- TEZCAN A. M., CB Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (Kalkınma Bakanlığı) Projesi, Türkiye'de İl Büyüklüğünün Sayısal Ölçeklendirilmesi Araştırma Projesi, 2011 - 2012

Scientific Refereeing

Memleket Siyaset Yönetim, National Scientific Refreed Journal, September 2019.

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bugün ulus-devlet biçiminde örgütlenmiş ve kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin üretim ve yeniden üretimi bakımından üstlendiği ikili işlevselliğini sürdüren, toplumsal bir ilişki biçimi olarak devlet, egemenlik alanı (mekânsal) ve meşru şiddet tekeli (işlevsel) üzerinden tanımlanmaya devam edilmektedir. Tarihsel bakımdan kapitalist toplumsal düzenin kendine özgü oluşumunun bir sonucu olarak, polislik olarak bilinen güvenliğin bir kamusal pratik olarak bürokratikleşmesi ve profesyonelleşmesi feodaliteden ve monarşiden bir kopuş örneği olmasının yanı sıra sermaye-devlet ilişkisinin biçimsel ayrımını sorgulama fırsatı da vermektedir. Bu nedenle, araştırılmaya muhtaç temel konulardan biri, kapitalist toplumlarda ulus-devletlerin gündelik polislik pratiklerinde ve kentsel güvenlik üretimindeki rolünün, özellikle neoliberal politikalarla birlikte, ne ölçüde değiştiği ya da değiştiyse hangi tür değişikliklerin kentsel mekân üretimi ile ilişkisinin nasıl kurulduğunun tartışılmasıdır. Belirli kamusal hizmetlerin (başta sağlık ve eğitim olmak üzere) ticarileşmesi ve piyasalaşmasının bir parçası olarak güvenlik üretiminin dönüşüm süreci, Türkiye'de son otuz yılda hem kentsel toplumsal denetimin diyalektiği hem de kentsel güvenlik üretimi ve mekânsal (yeniden) üretim arasındaki ilişkinin tespit edilmesi bakımından eleştirel bir tartışmayı zorunlu kılmaktadır.

Ulus devletinin biçimlenişinde kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin sağlanmasındaki nesnel-somut rolü kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin üretim ve yeniden üretiminin de koşullarına katkıda bulunmuştur. Neoliberal politikalarla birlikte, güvenlik hizmetlerinde yaşanan metalaşma ve ticarileşme süreci, devlet ile sermaye arasındaki ilişkinin ikame edici ya da dışlayıcı bir ilişki yerine tamamlayıcılık ilişkisi olarak gerçekleştiğini gözler önüne sermiştir. Bu kapsamda olmak üzere, çalışmanın amacı, ulus-devletin fiziksel zor-şiddet araçlarını kullanma biçimi ile kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin metalaşması-ticarileştirilmesi süreci arasındaki ilişkiye atıfta bulunarak neoliberal dönemde kentsel özel güvenliğin Türkiye, Ankara örneğinde somut olarak nasıl uygulandığını keşfetmektir. Çalışmada kentsel ölçeğe yoğunlaşarak, topluluk-ulus-devlet-sermaye

katmanları ile ilişkisi bakımından kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin özel güvenlik şirketleri tarafından sunumu ana odak olarak alınmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin özel güvenlik şirketleri tarafından sunumunun, güvenliğin metalaşması ve hizmet sağlayıcıların çoğullaşması anlamına gelen “neoliberal kentsel güvenlik rejimi”ni ürettiği, ancak aynı zamanda diyalektik olarak ulus-devlet iktidarı bakımından somut ve sembolik düzeylerde mekânsal ve yönetsel genişlemeyi de beraberinde getirdiği iddia edilmiştir. Otoriter neoliberal uygulamalar aracılığıyla devletin yönetme kapasitesine katkısı bakımından kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetlerine ilişkin çalışmanın temel sorusu şu olmuştur: "Güvenlik hizmetlerinin metalaşması-ticarileştirilmesi, nasıl bir "neoliberal kentsel güvenlik rejimi" üretmiştir? Sermaye öncülüğünde ve devlet referanslı bir süreç olarak, özel olarak sağlanan kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin, öz-referanslılığı (self-referentiality), yani güvenlik adına güvenliğin sunumu, özellikle kentsel orta sınıflar için gözetim mekanlarının (yeniden) üretilmesini gerektirmiştir.

Bu rejimin gerçekleşme sürecinde yer alan dinamikleri ve mekanizmaları anlamak için çalışmanın başlangıç hipotezi şu şekilde ifade edilmiştir: "Neoliberal kentsel güvenlik rejimi"nde, sermaye öncülüğünde ve devlet güdümlü bir süreç olarak sunulan özel güvenlik hizmetleri, kentsel mekanları gözetim alanları olarak üretmiş ve territoryalleştirmiştir. Ankara-Türkiye örneğinde 1980 sonrası süreçteki deneyimler göstermiştir ki özel güvenlik şirketleri ile devlet arasındaki ilişki rekabetçi olmaktan çok bir tamamlayıcılık ilişkisi şeklinde gerçekleşmiştir. Çalışmada, kentsel özel güvenlik bir çalışma konusu olarak seçilmiş ve ulus-devletin yeniden yapılanması, sermayenin yeniden yönlendirilmesi, kentsel toplumsal gözetim mekanizmalarının yeniden üretimi süreçleri ve kentsel gözetim mekanlarının üretimi daha geniş neoliberalleşme süreciyle ilişkileri içinde tartışılmıştır. Özellikle güvenlik hizmetleri söz konusu olduğunda hizmetin metalaşması sürecinin, kamu ve özel sektör arasındaki görece önemde bir kaymanın göstergesi olmadığı aksine sermaye lehine ortaya çıkan yeni yatırım alanlarının güvenlik-polislik pratiklerinin toplumsal alandaki kabulünü kolaylaştırıcı bir işlevi üstlendiği ileri sürülmektedir. Bu açıdan, tarihsel olarak kent bilinmeyen ötekiyle etkileşimlerimizin ve yabancılarla karşılaşmamızın ortamıdır. Kentsel toplumsal-sınıfsal kimliğin inşası bakımından önemli bir boyut oluşturan bu özellik, toplumsal tahakkümün denetim-gözetim-boyun eğdirme-egemenlik kurma vb.

kavramlar üzerinden tartışılrsa da, mekân üretimi ile arasındaki diyalektik ilişki genellikle görmezden gelinmektedir. Gözetimin mekanları tahakkümün mekanlarına dönüştürebildiği ölçüde egemen toplumsal sınıfların kentsel toplumsal yaşamın belirleyicisi olma potansiyellerini realize etmelerinin önünde herhangi bir engel kalmamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, özel olarak sağlanan kent güvenlik hizmetleri hem kentin bütününe hem de kentsel toplumsal ilişkilerin gerçekleştiği mekanları gözetim altında tutma pratiklerini yaygınlaştırmıştır. Dolayısıyla, bu da bizi bir başka sorgulamaya yöneltmiştir: gözetimin bir parçası olduğu önleyici polislik hizmetleri neden daha az kamusal hale gelmiştir? Bu noktada, alışveriş merkezleri, özel güvenli siteler gibi yerler kentsel kamusal yaşamın “doğal-ebedi” bir parçası haline geldikçe, toplumsal denetimin diyalektiği en azından kentsel ölçekte sermaye lehine dönüşmeye başlamıştır. Özel güvenlik dolayısıyla toplumsal denetim mekanizmaları toplumsal alana nüfuz ederek güvenlik mantığının içselleştirilmesine ve öz-referanslı hale gelmesinin yol açmakta ve böylece neoliberal toplumsal düzene karşı muhalefetin güvenliğin içselleştirilmesi yoluyla önlenmesine katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bu neoliberal kentsel güvenlik rejimi, kapitalist üretim ilişkilerinin ürettiği toplumsal eşitsizlikler ve hizmetlerin eşitsiz dağılımı tarafından belirlenen mekânsal dinamikler üzerine kuruludur. Bu rejim aynı zamanda, otoriter neoliberal devletin kentsel toplumsal alanlara yayılmasını sağlayarak, toplumsal olana nüfuz ederek, siyasal alanda azalan yönetme kapasitesinin artmasına da katkıda bulunur.

Tezin birinci bölümde çalışmanın temel amacı, soruları, kullanılan araştırma yöntemleri ve araştırmanın metodolojik konumlanması açıklanmıştır. Çalışmanın veri toplama ve analiz süreçlerinde karma yöntemlere başvurulmuş ve hem nitel hem nicel veriler toplanıp analiz edilerek birlikte değerlendirilmiştir. Odağında Türkiye ve Ankara örneği olan çalışmada konu ile ilgili veri tabanları, devlet arşiv belgeleri, kitaplar ve makaleler incelenmiştir. Aynı zamanda tez kapsamında yürütülen saha çalışmasında gerçekleştirilen derinlemesine görüşmelere dayalı olarak kentsel ölçekte özel güvenlik faaliyetleri ve bu faaliyetlerle ilgili veriler toplanmaya çalışılmıştır. Metodolojik kısımda, öncelikle Wallerstein'in ZamanMekan kavramsallaştırmasına atıfta bulunularak bilgi üretim sürecinde ZamanMekan kavrayışının önemi değerlendirilmiş ve tezdeki tartışmaların hangi ZamanMekan kavrayışı zemininde ele alındığı ortaya konulmuştur. Bu noktada, tezin fiziksel şiddet-zor, ulus-devlet,

neoliberal otoriterlik, polislik, güvenlikleştirme, gözetleme alanlarının militarizasyonu vb. yapısal boyutlarına gönderme yapan bölümlerinde “yapısal ZamanMekan” kavramsallaştırmasına yaklaşırken, “epizodik ZamanMekan” veya “döngüsel-ideolojik ZamanMekan” kapsamındaki değerlendirmelere de zaman zaman başvurulmuştur. Örneğin, Gezi Direnişine ilişkin tartışmalarda “epizodik bir ZamanMekan” kullanılırken, ortaya çıkan sürecin “yapısal ZamanMekan” kapsamında neoliberal otoriter devlet yönetiminin yapısal bir sonucu olduğu ileri sürülmüştür. Benzer şekilde, kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetleri de “yapısal ZamanMekan”, “döngüsel-ideolojik ZamanMekan” ve “dönüştürücü ZamanMekan” kapsamında ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Metodolojik kısımdaki ikinci perspektif, Ollman'ın Marx'ın tarihsel materyalist kuramına ilişkin tartışmalarına dayanmakta ve onun genellik düzeyleri, kapsam soyutlamaları ve konumlanma noktası kavramlarına referans vermektedir. Bu yaklaşımın tezin analiz kısmına en önemli katkısı, araştırma aşamasında belirlenen temel boyutların birer konumlanma noktası olarak alınmasını sağlamanın yanı sıra bilgi üretimi bakımından tezin ana sorunsalının birinci soyutlama düzeyinde (bireysel), ikinci soyutlama düzeyinde (yakın geçmişteki refah devletinden neoliberalizme) ve üçüncü soyutlama düzeyinde (kapitalizm) ele alındığını ortaya koyması olmuştur. Örneğin, polis güçlerinin tarihsel oluşumu ile kapitalist ilişkilerinin ve kentleşmenin arasındaki ilişkiler belirli soyutlama düzeylerinde analiz edilirken alan çalışmasında elde edilen derinlemesine görüşme verileri bir başka soyutlama düzeyinde analize dahil edilmiştir. Ayrıca tezin ilerleyen bölümlerinde güvenlik ve güvensizlik arasındaki bağlantıya ilişkin soruların metodolojik temeline, Carchedi'nin toplumsal olguların aynı anda hem gerçekleştirilmiş (realized) hem de potansiyel (potential) olmalarına ilişkin geliştirdiği diyalektik açıklama katkıda bulunmuştur. Aynı zamanda Carchedi'nin somut ve soyut insan (human being) analizi, tezin ampirik bölümünde yapılan aktör temelli değerlendirmelerde özel ve genel arasındaki diyalektik ilişkinin tartışılabilmesini sağlamıştır. Bu bağlamda, saha çalışmasında elde edilen bulgular ve örüntüler soyutlanarak teorik alana taşınmıştır. Üçüncü metodolojik perspektif, Bhaskar'ın eleştirel gerçekçi kuramı olarak gündeme getirilmiş ve aktör-yapı-mekanizma-olaylar-deneyim kavram setleri aracılığıyla çalışma ilişkisellik zeminine taşınmıştır. Özellikle Bhaskar'ın teori ve pratik arasındaki ilişkiyi kurarken yapısal-genel ile olumsal-tikel arasındaki ilişkiye dair yürüttüğü tartışma tezdeki verilerin değerlendirilmesine ve

sonuçların tartışılmasına katkı sağlamıştır. Son olarak, tarihsel coğrafi materyalizmin gelişimine önemli katkılarda bulunan Harvey'in izinden gidilerek, kentsel mekan ve coğrafyanın diyalektik analizine olanak sağlayan bazı soyutlamalar ve bunların tarihsel coğrafi materyalizm perspektifiyle ilişkisi bağlamında açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Tezin metodolojik yaklaşımını oluşturan bu üç temel bakış açısı, ilgili konuya doğrudan atıfta bulunulmasa bile tezdeki tartışmalarda somut-soyut ilişkisinin tartışılmasına katkıda bulunmuştur.

Teorik ve kavramsal çerçevenin ele alındığı ikinci bölümde, güvenlik konusunu ulus-devlet ve sermaye ilişkisi bağlamında bağlamsallaştırarak “kentsel özel güvenlik” tartışmasının temeli atılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, kuramsal bölümde öncelikle fiziksel güç-şiddet-güvenlik ve devlet ilişkisinin farklı kuramsal yaklaşımlar açısından nasıl ele alındığı tartışılmıştır. Bu kapsamda, Weberci, Marksçı ve post-yapısalcı bakış açılarının devlet, ekonomi dışı zor ve gözetime ilişkin gönderme yaptığı farklı teorik değerlendirmeler ile kentsel polislik pratiklerinin metalaşması süreciyle çoğullaşan yönetsel pratiklerin ürettiği neoliberal kentsel güvenlik rejiminin anlaşılmasına ışık tutulmuştur. Örneğin Michael Mann, devletin altyapısal iktidarının azalmaya başladığı dönemde, despotik iktidarının artmaya başlamasının yönetme kapasitesindeki gerilemeye işaret ettiğini ileri sürmektedir. Mann'ı takip ederek doğrudan güç kullanımı yerine toplumsal alana nüfuz etme kapasitesine katkıda bulunduğu ölçüde, polisliğin toplumsal bir kurum olarak toplumsal meşruiyetini artırabileceği ileri sürülebilir. Polisin varlığı, şiddete başvurulmadığı ya da ihtiyaç olmadığı ölçüde meşruiyet kazanmaktadır. Polis şiddeti uyguladığı ve sistematik olarak sürdürdüğü ölçüde meşruiyeti tartışmaya açıktır. Benzer biçimde özel güvenlik görevlileri de (potansiyel) fiziksel zor-şiddeti uyguladıkları (realized) ölçüde toplumsal meşruiyetlerini yitirecektir. Mann'ın kavramsallaştırmasına göre, devletin altyapısal gücü, siyasi toplumsal çatışmalar veya sınıf mücadeleleri gibi görünen şeylerin toplumsal zemini olan protestolara, kolluk kuvvetlerinin sert ve orantısız tepkisi nedeniyle her zaman zayıflamıştır. Özellikle adli-idari kanunlarda özel güvenliğin toplumsal çatışmalardan ayrı tutulması nedeniyle özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin bu konudaki rolü henüz belirsizdir. Bu konum, özel güvenlik görevlilerinin niteliksel eksiklikleri bir yana bırakılırsa, devletin objektif konumu açısından gelecekte yeniden değerlendirilecek veya tartışılacak yeni bir alan olarak görülebileceği söylenebilir.

Bunların yanında, fiziksel şiddet-zor ve devlet ilişkisine dair Marksist teoriler, toplumsal rıza veya hegemonyanın gelişimine ve ilkel birikimin üretimine dahil olması yoluyla burjuva düzenini sürdürmede toplumsal bir ilişki olarak devletin rolüne önemli bir vurgu yapmaktadırlar. Örneğin Gramsci, toplumsal rıza üretiminin hegemonya açısından önemini vurgularken, güç ve şiddet kullanımının bazen hegemonyanın kurulmasında işlevsel bir araç olarak kullanıldığını belirtmektedir. Yine çalışmada Engels, Althusser, Poulantzas, Hirsch ve Neocleous gibi kuramcılara referansla Marxist yazın içerisinde devlet-iktidar-zor aygıtı üzerine yapılan tartışmalara yer verilerek devletin hakim sınıfın basit bir aracı olması iddiasının ötesindeki tartışmalar ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, devletin özellikle burjuva toplumsal düzeninin yeniden üretimi bakımından işlevsel konumu sorgulanarak farklı tarihsel dönemlerde sermaye birikim süreci ve toplumsal yeniden üretimi bakımından sermaye ile kurduğu tamamlayıcılık ilişkisi tartışılmıştır. Öte yandan, Foucault'un güvenlik ve devlet arasındaki ilişkiye dair eserlerine referansla yönetimsellik bağlamında devletin toplumsal alanının denetiminde üstlendiği roller tarihsel bağlamda ele alınmıştır. Bu noktada gözetim pratikleri bakımından öne çıkan Bentham'ın Panopticon mimarı tasarımı ile toplumsal denetimin diyalektiği yönetimsellik kavramı üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir.

Devletin varoluş nedenleri arasında temel bir unsur olarak kabul edilen meşru şiddet tekelinde -hem Marksist hem de liberal-Weberci açıklamalarda- devlet birincil meşruiyet kaynağı olmaya devam etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, devletin bu alandaki konumu veri alınırken, özel güvenlik şirketlerinin (ilk bakışta devletin müdahalesi olmaksızın toplumsal eşitsizliklerin somut kontrolünü sağlamaya katkıda bulunan rolüyle) bir yanda devlet iktidarının sermaye dolayısıyla genişletilmesinin zeminini oluşturan, diğer yandan da sermayenin devlet dolayısıyla toplumsal üretim ilişkilerindeki ayrıcalıklı konumunu yeniden üretebilmesinin koşullarını oluşturan bir toplumsal işlev üstlendiği ileri sürülmüştür. Bu bağlamda, devletin hizmet sağlayıcı rolünün yanı sıra, düzenleyici-denetleyici rolleri de meşruiyetinin yeni zemini olarak sunulmaktadır. Ayrıca, özelleştirilmiş ve ticarileştirilmiş güvenlik hizmetleri dolayısıyla, siyasal ve toplumsal itirazlara konu olabilecek fiziksel şiddet içeren müdahalelerden polis güçlerini geri çekip bir yandan da gündelik hayatı militarize ederek kentsel ölçekte yeni bir konumlanma alanı oluşturmaktadır. Altyapı gücünü

baskıcı-zorlayıcı araçlardan ziyade özel güvenlik yoluyla sağlamlaştıran sermayenin bu süreçteki rolü, devletin yönetimsellik ortamında işlevsel hale gelmesine aracılık etmektedir. Bu bağlamda devlet-sermaye ilişkisi (belki de diğer toplumsal üretim-tüketim alanlarına göre daha fazla) tamamlayıcı-bütünlük ilişkisine dönüşmektedir. Bourdieu'nün Weber'in tanımına yaptığı eklemeler, fiziksel ve sembolik şiddetin yoğunlaşması, bölgesel sınırlar ve meşruiyet gibi unsurların devlet tanımında referans alındığı düşünülürse, iç-dış güvenlik temel unsurlardan biri olarak görülebilir. Bu açıdan, kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetleri hem fiziksel hem de de sembolik düzeyde bu şiddet tehdidinin gözetim mekanlarında üretim ve yeniden üretimini garanti altına almaktadır.

Polisliğin ve polis güçlerinin gelişiminin tarihsel bağlamının tartışılmasına ayrılan bölümde, polisliğin açıklanmasına ilişkin ortodoks liberal, revizyonist ve sentezlenmiş versiyonları olan üç yaklaşım ayrıntılı olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu tartışmanın temel amacı, dünyadaki polislik uygulamalarını ve polis teşkilatının tarihsel gelişimi ile kapitalist üretim ilişkileri arasındaki ilişkiyi tarihsel koşullarında anlamaktır. Zira polislik ve polis teşkilatı ulus-devletin ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak görülmekte ve tarih dışı ve ebedi bir fenomen olarak kabul edilmektedir. Ancak tam tersine, tartışmanın bu kısmı, kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilere özgü toplumsal gözetim mekanizmalarının ve gözetim mekanlarının üretiminin yanı sıra toplumsal düzen üretiminde de polisliğin görece yeni bir gelişme olduğunu ortaya koydu. Zira, iç güvenlik pratikleri olarak da tanımlayabileceğimiz kentsel ölçekte sunulan güvenlik hizmetleri, kapitalist üretim ve toplumsal ilişkilerin yeniden üretimi için gerekli koşulları yaratırken, bu toplumsal koşulların kendi kendini yeniden üretebilmesini sağlamak zorundadır. Bu bağlamda, devletin meşru şiddet tekeline sahip tek kurumsal örgütlenme mekanizması olarak kabul edildiği ancak bu meşru şiddet tekelinin uygulanma sürecinde farklı saiklerin belirleyici olduğu ifade edilebilir. Ayrıca, kentlerin mekansal büyümesi her zaman polis güçlerinin genişlemesiyle aynı zamana denk gelmiştir. Kentsel mekânsal pratikler daha karmaşık ve uzmanlaşmış hale geldikçe, bununla başa çıkmak için güvenlik aygıtı içinde de yeni bölümler oluşmuştur. Bu süreçte, tıpkı ordunun polisten ayrılması gibi, kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin özel şirketler tarafından sağlanması da yeni bir aşamayı temsil etmektedir. Polisin tarihsel olarak kentsel bir faaliyet veya hizmet ortaya çıkışıyla birlikte, bu alanda departmanlaşma ve uzmanlaşma, kapitalist

üretim ilişkilerinin büyümesine paralel olarak zaman içinde istikrarlı bir şekilde gelişmiştir. Kentsel güvenliğin özel güvenlik şirketleri tarafından izleme/gözetleme uygulamaları yoluyla sağlanması, polisin rolünü hizmet ettiği toplumsal amaç açısından da yeniden şekillendirmiştir. Bu bağlamda, güvenlik hizmetlerinin özelleştirilmesi ile devletin territorial örgütlenmesi zayıflamamış, aksine genişlemiştir. Devletin "meşru şiddet tekeli", tekelci niteliği giderek zayıflarken bile, devletin güç kullanımı sorgulanmamış, daha ziyade, devletin özel güvenlik sektörünü düzenlemesinin bir sonucu olarak etki alanı hem mekânsal hem de yönetsel bakımdan büyümüş ve genişlemiştir.

Ayrıca çalışmada ele alınan dört temel boyut, Ollman'ın izinde giderek birer konumlanma noktası olarak görülmüş ve özellikle saha çalışması kısmında, devlet-sermaye ilişkisinin bir aracı olarak kentsel özel güvenliğin bu dört farklı konumlanma noktası üzerinden tartışması yapılmıştır. Bu kapsamda, gerçek-somutun bilgisine alan çalışması üzerinden ulaşılmaya çalışılırken “sermaye birikim süreci”, “devlet-sermaye ilişkisinin dolayımı”, “toplumsal gözetim pratiği” ve “gözetim mekanlarının üretimi” olarak belirlenen konumlanma noktaları, kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin eleştirel değerlendirmesinin somut zeminini oluşturmuştur.

Türkiye'de özel sektör tarafından sağlanan kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerini bağlamsallaştırmak için, ilk olarak, mevcut siyasal iktidarın devletin neoliberal dönüşümünün otoriter bir biçime evrilmesi vaka incelemesinin bir parçası olarak ele alınmıştır. Daha sonra, yasal-yönetsel değişiklikler izlenerek, devlet ile sermaye arasında bir aracı olarak kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetleri tartışılmıştır. Araştırma, devlet-sermaye ilişkisinin bir aracı olarak özel güvenliğin analizinde, başlı başına önemli bir sonuç olarak, Türkiye'de devletin güvenlik hizmetleri sağlamadaki rolünün azalmadığını, hatta arttığını göstermiştir. Paradoksal olarak, devleti küçültme söylemi üzerinden yürütülen piyasa dostu politikaların uygulanmasının sosyo-politik temelini oluşturan baskıcı hükümetler tarafından kentsel alanların askerileştirilmesi ve askeri vesayeti yıkmayı amaçlayan demokratikleşme-medeniyet söyleminin arkasında otoriter neoliberal devlete geçiş sağlanmıştır. Otoriter neoliberalizm Türkiye bağlamına özgü bir sorun olmasa da, 1980 askeri darbesinin ürettiği yapısal zemin,

2002'deki siyasi iktidar deęişikliğinden sonra yaşanan dönüşümleri de kolaylaştırmıştır.

Türkiye'deki özel güvenlik piyasasında devletin konumu, yalnızca bir hizmet sağlayıcı olmaktan ziyade (ki dünyanın başka kısımlarında kamunun sunduęu kolluk hizmeti de satın alınabilmektedir) hem bir düzenleyici-denetleyici ve hem de bir müşteri olarak yeniden düzenlenmiştir. Özel güvenlik sektöründeki çalışan sayısından da anlaşılacağı gibi, özel güvenlik hizmet alımı ihaleleri yoluyla devlet bütçesinden sermayeye aktarılan mali kaynaklar 2018 yılına kadar artmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak, saha çalışmasındaki bulgular özel güvenlik sektöründe, özellikle karar alma ve yöneticilik pozisyonlarında çalışanların önemli bir kısmının emekli polis ve ordu personelinden oluştuęunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu yönüyle, bu tespit neoliberal otoriter devletin özel güvenlik sektörüyle kurduęu organik ilişkinin bir kanıtı olarak da görülebilir. Bu bakımdan özel güvenlik devlet açısından iki açıdan işlevseldir: Birincisi, meşru şiddet tekeli korurken, şiddet-gözetleme pratiklerinin kentsel mekânsal pratikler üzerinden toplumsal alana nüfuz etmesini kolaylaştırmaktadır. İkincisi, devletin şiddet kullanma tehdidini, en azından kentsel gündelik yaşamda, özel güvenliğe aktararak, devletin nesnel meşru şiddeti temsil etme kapasitesini de genişletmektedir. Devlet, vatandaşlarına karşı doğrudan fiziksel şiddet uyguladığında, vatandaş-bireylerle karşı karşıya gelir; ancak, özel güvenlik bir bireye-vatandaşa fiziksel zarar verdiğinde, devlet kendisini hakem olarak konumlandırma şansına kavuşmaktadır. Bu, devletin nesnel düzenleyici konumunu kapitalist piyasa dolayısıyla zayıflatmak yerine güçlendirmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetleri, otoriter neoliberal devletin toplumsal pratiklerinin tamamlayıcısı olarak işlev görmektedir. Bir devlet teknolojisi olarak, özel güvenlik, gözetim-kontrol uygulamalarıyla devletin nesnel konumunu güçlendirirken, güvenlik uygulamalarını yeniden üretim alanına (özel ya da özel mülkiyetteki kamusal mekanlar daha fazla olmak üzere) doğru genişletmekte ve toplumsal gücün ölçeğini yeniden üretmektedir.

Çalışma kapsamında, özellikle 2005'teki yasal deęişiklik sonrası döneme odaklanan analiz ile gerçekleştirilen alan çalışmasında, yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmış ve Ankara-Türkiye örneğinde özel güvenlik uygulamalarına ilişkin nitel veriler toplanmıştır. Özellikle 2005 sonrası dönemde, hem özel sektör

tarafından sağlanan kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin yükselişi hem de devletin otoriter siyasal politikalara geçişi eş zamanlı ya da eş zamanlı olmasa bile benzer bir izlek takip edilerek gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, çalışmada öncelikle aktör-mekanizma-yapı ilişkisi bağlamında özel güvenliğin hukuki-idari boyutları ile tarihsel gelişimi sorgulanmış, Türkiye'de özel güvenlik hizmetleri sektörünün sermaye birikim süreci açısından gelişimi ve mevcut durumu incelenmiştir. Saha çalışmasının ikinci odak noktası, Ankara örneğinde sosyal gözetim uygulamalarının mekânsal boyutlarının tartışılması olmuştur. Bu kapsamda gözetim uygulamalarının özel güvenlik sektörüne mekân üretimi ve kullanımı açısından etkisi ve bu süreçlerin güvenlikle ilişkisi ele alınmıştır. Çalışma, kentsel yerleşim ve güvenlik ilişkisini çeşitli soyutlamalar üzerinden ve ayrıca territoryal-kamusal alan gözetimi, güvenlik ve metalaşma temalarını hem tarihsel hem de mekansal olarak incelemiştir. Bu kavramsal-tarihsel analiz, Türkiye örneğinde özel güvenlik hizmetleri bağlamındaki tartışmalara ışık tutmuştur.

Bunların yanında, Ankara örneğinde özel olarak sağlanan güvenlik hizmetleri hem bir gözetleme stratejisi hem de mekânsal bir strateji olarak ele alınmıştır. Bir sermaye birikimi alanı olarak, kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetleri, konut alanları (güvenli siteler) ve alışveriş merkezleri gibi belirli yapıları çevre alanlarının üretimine bağlı olarak gelişmektedir. Saha çalışmasından elde edilen verilerle de teyit edildiği üzere alışveriş merkezleri gibi kentsel alanların üretimi ile özel güvenlik hizmetlerine olan ihtiyaç üretimi arasında bir ilişki olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Bir yandan, özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin kentsel ölçekte sağlanması, hizmeti karşılayabilenler ve karşılayamayanlar temelinde vatandaşlık haklarının erozyona uğraması olarak toplumsal ayrışmanın sınıfsal görünümünü somutlaştırırken; öte yandan, kimin içeride, kimin dışarıda olduğunu veya potansiyel tehdit olarak görülen toplumsal grupların bir üyesi olarak kimin saygın bir vatandaş olduğunu ve kimlerin izlenmesi gerektiğini belirlemek özel güvenlik eliyle mümkün olmaktadır. Kentsel özel güvenliğin bu rolü, suçu önlemekten ziyade, kentsel kamusal alanlardaki davranışların gözlemlenmesini ve kontrolünü vurgulamaktadır. Fiziksel güç ve şiddet kullanımında bir tekelin olmadığı durumlarda, kentsel mekân aracılığıyla gözetleme-kontrol faaliyetlerini toplumsal ilişkilere sokma aracı olarak kentsel alanlarda özel güvenlik hizmetleri işlevselleşmektedir. Bu bakımdan, özel güvenlik görevlileri fiziki güç

kullanma kapasitesine sahip olmasına rağmen, bu tehdit somut düzeyde fiili olarak ne kadar az uygulanırsa, meşruiyetini o kadar yeniden üretir ve toplumsal rıza üretmesi de o ölçüde kolaylaşır.

Diğer bir bulgu ise kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin yaygın olduğu, özellikle güvenli siteler ve alışveriş merkezleri gibi yerleşim alanlarında gözetleme/denetim uygulamalarının gündelik hayatın doğal bir parçası haline getirilerek hem toplumsal yeniden üretimin hem de kamusal alanın sınırlarının yeniden belirlendiğidir. Alışveriş merkezleri söz konusu olduğunda (ki AVM'ler özel mülkiyetteki kamuya açık alanlara örnek oldukları için) özel güvenlik sektörünün büyümesinde rol oynamaktadır. Bu alışveriş merkezlerinde gözetim teknikleri, hem üretim (hizmet üretimi) hem de yeniden üretim (tüketim) alanları olarak hizmet veren ikili bir anlamda kullanılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda üzerinde durulabilecek en önemli noktanın, alışveriş merkezinde özel güvenlik görevlilerinin bulunmasının suçun ve suçun önlenmesinin yanı sıra doğru-kabul edilebilir sosyal davranış normlarının korunmasının ve bu alanlarda tehlikeli-tehdit olarak tanımlanan toplumsal öznelerin varlığının önlenmesidir. Bu nedenle suçun yaygınlığından çok özel güvenliğin varlığının kentli orta sınıfla ilişkilendirilen özgül davranış kalıplarının tekrarını güvence altına almak olduğunun altı çizilmelidir.

Kentsel özel güvenlik uygulamalarının görünüşte güvenlik olarak adlandırılması, aynı zamanda güvensiz koşulların (yeniden) üretilmesini de gerektirmektedir. Nicel veri analizinin bulgularından biri olan özel güvenlik görevlisi sayısı ile kendini güvende hissetme oranı arasındaki ilişki de bireylerin kendi güvenlikleriyle ilgili endişeleri arttıkça özel güvenlik hizmetlerine olan ihtiyaçlarının arttığını göstermektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, özel güvenlik görevlilerinin sayısal büyüklükleri ile bireylerin kendilerini güvende hissetmeleri arasındaki bağlantı-ilişki, özel güvenlik hizmetinin varlık koşulunu oluşturmaktadır. Bunu özel güvenliğin uzlaşmaz çelişkisi ya da paradoksu olarak da değerlendirebiliriz. Dolayısıyla, bireylerin güvensizlik algılarının üretilmesi ve yeniden üretilmesi, özel güvenlik şirketlerinin kar elde etmesinin toplumsal temelini oluşturmaktadır. İnsanların kendilerini güvende hissettikleri bir kentsel mekânda ortaya çıkan ilişkiler, özel güvenlik veya gözetleme teknolojilerine ihtiyaç duymaz. Jacobs'un belirttiği gibi, kamusal toplumsal ilişkilerin canlı olduğu kentsel

mekanlarda gözetim ve güvenlik doğal olarak gerçekleşir. Ancak özel güvenlik sektörü güvensizlik ve suç korkusunu yeniden üreterek kendi varoluş koşullarını da yeniden üretmektedir. Bu nedenle, kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin özel olarak sağlanması, tüm kendine referanslı sistemlerin sahip olduğu paradoksal özelliklerden olan farklı mantıksal düzeylerin biraradalığına ihtiyaç duyar. Başka bir deyişle, özel güvenlik sektörü kendi kendine çelişen bir sistemdir, güvenlik hizmeti üretebilmesi güvensizliğin üretim ve yeniden üretimine bağlıdır. Özel mülkiyetteki kamusal alanlarda veya yerleşim alanlarında bulunan kapalı topluluklarda, özel güvenlik görevlilerinin fiziksel varlığı (üniformalı ve/veya silahlı) gözetim kameraları ile donatılmış sürekli denetlenen metropol alanların farklı mekanlarında, günlük yaşamın militarizasyonuna katkıda bulunur. Kentin farklı mekansal alanlarındaki teçhizatlı güvenlik görevlilerinin varlığının normalleştirilmesi, kentsel güvenlik uygulamalarını da dönüştürmektedir. Örneğin, kapalı konut sitelerindeki orta ve üst sınıflar açısından güvenlik stratejisi, içeri ve dışarı olmak üzere iki temel yönelimi ifade eder: Territorial olarak, dışarıya karşı önleyici-tespit edici iken içeriye karşı ise toplumsal ilişkilerin düzenleyicisi konumundadır. Bu nedenle, Marx'ın işyeri gözetimine ek olarak, kentsel mekanların yeniden üretiminin gözetimi yerleşim alanlarına kadar genişlemiştir.

Ayrıca, özel güvenliğin, kentli orta sınıfların ikamet ettiği kapalı siteler ve yeni toplu tüketim mekanları ortamında toplumsal rıza üretimi açısından kentsel yaşamı militarize ettiği de ileri sürülebilir. Zira gözetim uygulamalarının hem kamera sistemleri hem de özel güvenlik görevlilerinin fiziksel varlığı aracılığıyla uygulanması, Bourdieu'nün simgesel şiddet olarak tanımladığı bağlamda şiddetin içselleştirilmesine zemin hazırlamaktadır. Kameralar ve özel güvenlik görevlileri ile sürekli gözetim altında tutulan kentli orta sınıfların despotça değil sembolik olarak da baskı altına alınması ve davranışlarının yönlendirilmesine yol açmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, güvenliğin özel şirketler tarafından sağlanması, toplumsal üretim ve yeniden üretim alanlarında orta sınıfların sürekli gözetimini mümkün kılmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, toplumsal itiraz ve siyasal muhalefet katı bir şekilde resmi temsil kanallarına havale edilmektedir. Kitleli tüketim alanlarında siyasi direnişin veya protestonun temsili, pratik veya sembolik düzeyde mümkün değildir. Dolayısıyla, kentli orta sınıflar için güvenlik, kendi kendine referansla tanımlandığı ölçüde görünmez hale gelir, başka bir deyişle normalleştirilir. Özel güvenlik hizmetleri ile kendi kendine

referanslı hale gelen kentsel güvenlik, bir süre sonra güvenlik için güvenliğe dönüşmekte ve varlığı-yokluğu veya işlevi üzerine bir tartışma zemini üretilememektedir. Kentli orta sınıflar için yerleşim yerlerinde özel güvenlik hizmeti satın alma ihtiyacının olup olmadığı sorusu artık soru olmaktan çıkmıştır. Özel güvenlik hizmeti gerekli midir sorusu yerini nasıl bir özel güvenlik hizmeti gereklidir sorusuna bırakmıştır. Örneğin, alan araştırmasında görüşmecilerin de belirttiği gibi özel güvenlik personeli istihdamı, yapılı çevre inşaatına başladığı andan itibaren başlamakta ve genel kabul görmüş bir düzenleme biçimi haline gelmektedir.

Özellikle 1980'lerden sonra kentlerde başlayan sanayisizleşme süreci, hizmet sektörü merkezli ve tüketim-tüketici memnuniyeti odaklı bir ekonomiye geçişin bir sonucu olarak kentsel kamusal alanların yeniden yapılandırılmasıyla aynı zamana denk gelmektedir. Kentsel mekanların kullanımına bakıldığında da emek gücünün yeniden üretimi açısından işlevsel hale gelen kamusal mekanlar daralırken, alışveriş merkezleri gibi özel mülkiyete ait kamusal tüketim alanlarının genişleme süreci yaşanmıştır. Kentsel ölçekteki bu süreç, temel bileşeni olan büyük alışveriş merkezlerinin kitlesel tüketim mekanları olarak çoğalmasıyla karakterize edilebilir. Bu kapsamda, çalışmada elde edilen verilerden yapılan analizde ortaya çıkan bir diğer bulgu ise alışveriş merkezleri ile özel güvenlik hizmetleri arasındaki korelasyon ilişkisinin güçlü ve pozitif olmasıdır. Alışveriş merkezleri için ayrılan kentsel mekânsal alanlar arttıkça özel güvenlik hizmetlerine olan ihtiyaç da artmaktadır. Hizmet sektöründen çok sayıda çalışanın gün boyu emek yoğun hizmetler ürettiği alışveriş merkezleri, işgücünün yeniden üretildiği yerler olduğu kadar, işgücünün ürettiği hizmetin de ele geçirildiği yerler olarak çalışmaktadır. Özel mülkiyetteki kamusal alanlar söz konusu olduğunda ise hem işçi sınıfının işyeri olarak AVM'ler çalışma hayatının gözetimini kamera-gözetleme sistemleri ile mümkün kılarken hem de kapitalist toplumsal yaşamın yeniden üretim alanlarının denetimini özel güvenlik hizmetleri ile sağlayarak toplumsal yeniden üretimin bütüncül işleyişini güvence altına almaktadır. İktidar kentsel mekânda güvenlik üzerinden yeniden ölçeklenirken ve özellikle kentsel orta sınıflar açısından ebedi-doğal bir "güvenlik için güvenliğe" dönüşen bir toplumsal pratik üretmektedir. Bu ise kapitalist toplumsal düzenin farklı kentsel ölçekteki somutlanma biçimiyle güvenlik eliyle yeniden üretimini güvence altına almanın yeni bir yolu olarak görülebilir. Bu doğrultuda alışveriş merkezlerinde sunulan özel

güvenlik hizmetleri de hem hizmet üretimini hem de işgücünün yeniden üretimini güvence altına alan ikili bir işlevi yerine getirmektedir. Artık alışveriş merkezleri, kitlesel tüketim mekanları olarak yeni bir tür kısıtlanmış kamusal alanı temsil ediyor görünmektedir. Bu alışveriş merkezleri, territorial düzenlemeleri de yöneten ve tanımlayan mülk sahipleri tarafından işletilmektedir. Kamera sistemleri, gözetleme ve kontrol taktikleri ile özel güvenlik görevlileri bu yerlerdeki yeni kuralların olmazsa olmaz uygulayıcı unsurlarıdır. Özel mülkiyete ait bu kamusal toplu tüketim alanlarının kullanıcı-tüketicileri olarak görülen kentli orta sınıflar ise her yere yayılmış güvenlik kameraları ve özel güvenlik görevlilerinin sürekli gözetim ve denetimi altında oldukları bir sosyalleşme pratiğine farkında olsunlar ya da olmasınlar rıza göstermektedirler. Güvenlik görevlilerinin fiziksel olarak bulunmadığı noktalarda güvenlik kameraları bu boşluğu doldurmakta ve sosyal alanlarda bireylerin davranışlarının sürekli-kesintisiz gözetlenmesi sürekli hatırlatılmakta ve sosyal davranışın sınırları yeniden düzenlenmektedir. Bir süre sonra, önleyici kontrol-güvenlik boyutunun ötesinde, kentsel kamusal alanlarda nelerin uygun olup olmadığı ya da hangi özelliklere sahip bireylerin bu alanları kullanma hakkına sahip olduğuna karar veren bir mekanizma ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu süreç, sürekli olarak güvenlik ihtiyacı algısını yeniden üretirken, toplumsal eşitsizliklerin ve toplumsal sınıfsal farklılıklara dayalı mekânsal ayrışmanın da yeniden üretilmesine katkıda bulunmaktadır. Türkiye'de “sıfır toleranslı polislik” gibi bir politikanın yaygın bir politika olarak uygulanması siyasal bir zemin bulamasa da, sıfır toleransın özünü oluşturan uygunsuz davranışların önlenerek kentsel sosyal hayatın güvenli hale getirilmesi hedefi, Ankara, Türkiye örneğinde özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin yaygınlaşması ile uygulama alanı bulmuştur. Çünkü, sıfır toleranslı polislik uygulamalarına benzer şekilde, kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetleri de istenmeyen kişilerin kentsel mekanlarda veya yerleşim yerlerinde bulunmalarını engelleyerek normalde belirlenen davranışlardan sapma olasılığı yüksek olan toplum kesimlerine karşı sıfır tolerans politikası uygulanabilmesini sağlamaktadır. Ayrıca, özel güvenlik hizmetlerini satın alabilen kentli orta ve üst sınıflar, bu hizmetlere erişimi hem doğrudan kapalı konut sitelerinde hem de dolaylı olarak kamusal tüketim mekanlarında finanse etmektedirler. Tabii ikincisinde maliyetin bir kısmına alışveriş merkezlerine giden ve harcama yapan alt sınıflar da katılmaktadırlar.

Özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin kentsel coğrafyası, metropoliten alanlarda var olan sosyoekonomik eşitsizliklerle uyumlu olarak eşitsiz bir coğrafi dağılımı da ortaya koymaktadır. Örneğin alışveriş merkezleri, kamusal kullanımdaki özel mülkiyet alanları ve kentsel tüketimin yeni kutsal mabetleri olarak, kentin çoğunlukla özel araçlarla ulaşılabilen noktalarında yer almakta ve kent içinde dengesiz bir şekilde dağılmaktadır. Özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin bu coğrafi dağılımı, şehrin bazı yerlerini şehrin gözden uzak bölgeleri olarak kendi çaresizliğine terk etmektedir. Örnek vermek gerekirse, sadece uyuşturucu operasyonları veya asayiş kapsamında kamu kolluk kuvvetlerinin sert müdahaleleri dışında, şehrin belirli bölgeleri (örneğin, Ankara Altındağ'daki bazı mahalleler) siyasal iktidarlar tarafından terk edilmiş ve tehlikeli yerler olarak damgalanmıştır. Kentin bu bölgelerinde yaşayanlar bu sürecin iki açıdan kaybedenidir: Bir yandan hem kapalı siteler hem de AVM'ler için tehlikeli istenmeyen nüfus olarak görülüyorken, diğer yandan da yaşam alanları damgalanmakta ve tehlikeli yerler ve nüfus olarak sınıflandırılarak sürekli polis şiddetine maruz kalmalarının toplumsal meşruiyeti yeniden üretilmektedir.

Neoliberal politikalar, kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin özelleştirilmesi ve ticarileştirilmesi sürecinin hızlı yükselişinin toplumsal ve politik zeminini hazırladı. Neoliberalizmin kendi iç çelişkileri (küçülme konuşulmasına rağmen devletin artan rolü, özelleştirmelere rağmen kamu harcamalarının azalmaması vb.) devlet ile piyasa arasındaki ilişkideki mekanizmalar, tamamlayıcı-bütünlük ilişkisinin sürdürülmesine yardımcı olmuştur. Devletin gözetim ve denetim pratikleri genişlerken, sermayenin devletle ilişkilendirilme biçimi açısından da devlet içinde yeni bir temsil/iktidar konumu kazandığı söylenebilir. Özel güvenlik şirketlerinin yönetim kademelerinin ağırlıklı olarak emekli polis ve ordu mensuplarından oluşması en azından kısa vadede bir risk oluşturmamakla birlikte, oluşabilecek olası çatışma veya düzensizlik durumlarında sorun yaratma potansiyelini de taşımaktadır. Bu açıdan neoliberal kentsel güvenlik rejiminin yükselişi, bir yandan toplumsal bir ilişki olarak devletin otoriterliğini pekiştirirken, diğer yandan devletle tamamlayıcılık ilişkisine dönüşerek piyasanın farklı kentsel mekanlara yayılma ve toplumsal yaşama nüfuz etme kapasitesinden yararlanmaktadır. Devlet, neoliberal kentsel güvenlik rejiminin üretimini mümkün kılan yasal-yönetimsel koşulların üretilmesi, denetlenmesi ve düzenlenmesi ve özel güvenlik yoluyla sermaye birikim koşullarının yeniden

üretilmesi sorumluluğunu üstlenmektedir. Devlet kendisini nesnel bir ilişki olarak konumlandırma çabasının ötesine geçerek, siyasal arenada otoriterleşirken kentsel ölçekteki otoriter eğilimlerini piyasa aracılığıyla kamufle etmektedir. Bir yandan, siyasi güç daha otoriter hale geliyor gibi görünürken, öte yandan, demokratikleşme ve askeri vesayetten kurtulma söylemi etrafında siyasal meşruiyetini yeniden üretmektedir. Ancak ne otoriterleşme-demokratikleşme dikotomisi tek başına ne de kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin piyasalaşması tek başına herhangi bir şeyi açıklamaktan uzaktır. Çünkü Luhmann'ın ifadesiyle “hiçbir işlevsel alt sistem başka bir sistemin temel sorunlarını çözemeyeceği” için artan kentsel güvenlik önlemleri veya kentsel alanların artan gözetimi, sosyal adalet sorunlarını çözemediği gibi otoriter eğilimleri gizleyen demokratikleşme adımları da toplumsal sorunlara çözüm üretememektedir. Güvenlik sorununu tanımlayan burjuva toplumunun ürettiği eşitsizlikler ortadan kaldırılabildiği ölçüde, güvenliğin ve kentsel güvenliğin anlamı da yeniden tanımlanabilir ve buna uygun kentsel politikalar geliştirme olanağı üretilebilir.

Neoliberal otoriter devlet, kapitalist piyasa dinamiklerinin başarısızlıklarının sorumluluğunu bir kurtarıcı olarak üstlenirken, aynı zamanda kentsel toplumsal yaşamın gündelik pratiklerinin dönüşümüne de önemli bir katkı yapmıştır. Gözetim ve denetimi kentsel yaşamın olağan-işsel bir parçası haline getirmek, özellikle kentsel orta sınıflar için toplumsal direniş olasılığını en aza indirmek ve güvenlik/güvensizlik ikiliğinin-çelişkisinin yeniden üretilmesini sağlamak için meşru bir mekanizma olarak iş görmektedir. Bununla birlikte, bu değerlendirme, özel kentsel güvenlik kurumlarının yalnızca mevcut devlet yapılarını kopyaladığı şeklindeki basit görüşten daha çetrefillidir. Özel güvenlik firmalarının, teşkilat yapıları ve yönetici aktörlerin özelliklerinin yanı sıra yetki-sorumluluk tanımları onları devletle tamamlayıcılık ilişkisi içine sokmasına rağmen, devletin basit bir şubesi gibi hareket etmediklerini ve hareket edemeyeceklerini açıkça belirtmek gerekir. Kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetleri, özel mülk sahiplerinin toplumsal kontrolü ele geçirmelerini ve belirli mekânsal sınırlar içinde kendi oyun kurallarını uygulamalarını sağlamaktadır. Çağdaş gözetim teknikleri önsel olarak her bir bireyi, ögeyi ve yeri şüpheli olarak ele alırken, geleneksel gözetim yöntemleri yalnızca şüpheli hedefe göre hareket eder; bu nedenle herkes ve her şey geçmiş için değilse bile bugün ve gelecek için şüpheli

konumundadır. Otoriter neoliberal oluşumların analizinde, kapitalist toplumları karakterize eden güç dengesizliklerinin sistemik doğasına dikkat çekildiği için bu örneklerin özgürleştirici değişimi daha ulaşılmaz gösterdiği, ancak aynı zamanda bize yeni mücadele alanları açtığı da ileri sürülebilir. Kapitalist piyasa ilişkileri ile egemen sınıf iktidarının giderek daha zorlayıcı bir şekilde iç içe geçmesine odaklanmak, alternatifin olanaklılığına dair düşünmeyi de zorunlu kılmaktadır.

Bu çalışma, özel sektör tarafından sağlanan kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin analizinde teorik düzeyde soyutlamalar ile ampirik düzeydeki somutluk arasındaki ilişkiyi geliştirmeye ve tartışmaya çalışmıştır. Ancak bu süreçte çalışmanın bazı sınırlılıklarının olduğu da unutulmamalıdır. Kentsel güvenlik hizmetlerinin şirketler tarafından sağlanmasına odaklanan bu çalışmanın ilk ve en önemli sınırlılığı, konuyu yalnızca arz yönlü olarak sermaye ve devletle olan ilişkisi açısından ele almasıdır. Madalyonun diğer yönünde yer alan işçilerin sesi ve talepleri maalesef ihmal edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, hizmeti üreten ve bu hizmetleri satın alan veya kullananların algı ve değerlendirmelerine çalışmada yer verilmemiştir. Çalışmanın ikinci sınırlılığı, Ankara-Türkiye örneğinde özel güvenlikle ilgili sınırlı veri setinin bulunması ya da hiç olmamasıdır. Türkiye'deki kamu otoriteleri, güvenlik verilerinin paylaşımı konusunda oldukça muhafazakardır. Örneğin, polis karakollarında tutulan asayiş olay kayıtları kamuya açıklanmamakta veya TÜİK tarafından derlenip bir veri tabanına aktarılmamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda çok zor şartlar altında sınırlı düzeyde toplanabilen veriler üzerinden analiz yapılmaya çalışılmış ve veriler devlet tarafından verilerin paylaşıldığı dönemlerle sınırlandırılarak zamansal seriler açısından analiz edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla genel olarak güvenlik, özelde ise kentsel özel güvenlik hizmetleri ile ilgili bilimsel çalışmaların önünde ciddi metodolojik zorluklar bulunmaktadır. Üçüncü önemli sınırlılık ise kamu kolluk görevlilerinin görüşlerine çalışmada yer verilmemesidir. Güvenlik söz konusu olduğunda, kamu çalışanlarının bilimsel araştırmalarda fikirlerini paylaşmaları daha zordur. Dördüncü önemli sınırlılık ise çalışmada özel güvenlik hizmeti veren firmalardan sadece kentsel alanlarda kamera ve fiziki güvenlik hizmeti veren firmaların çalışma kapsamında değerlendirilmesidir. Bunların dışında eğitim ve danışmanlık hizmeti veren, alarm merkezi hizmeti veren veya savaş bölgelerinde faaliyet gösteren askeri güvenlik şirketleri çalışma kapsamında değerlendirilmemiştir. Beşinci önemli sınırlılık, güvenlik kameralarıyla

ilgili tartışmanın derinlemesine görüşmelerde ifade edilen bulgularla ilgili olarak çoğunlukla teorik düzeyde yürütülmüştür. Bu nedenle kamu kolluk kuvvetlerinin kontrolünde bulunan MOBESE Kameralarının Türkiye'deki coğrafi verileri güvenlik nedeniyle kamuoyu ile paylaşılmadığından çalışmadaki tartışmalara dahil edilememiştir. Altıncı önemli sınırlılık ise çalışmanın ampirik boyutunun makro düzeyde Türkiye, mikro düzeyde Ankara ile sınırlı olmasıdır. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin farklı illerindeki özel güvenlik hizmetlerinin eşitsiz coğrafi dağılımı dışında, iller arası karşılaştırmalı analiz çalışmada değerlendirme dışı bırakılmıştır.

Yukarıda belirtilen sınırlılıklar göz önünde bulundurularak bu alanda ileride yapılacak çalışmalar için şunlar önerilebilir: i) Özel güvenlik hizmeti satın alan veya bu hizmetlerden ücret karşılığında yararlananların algıları ve bunların kentsel mekan kullanımına etkileri araştırılabilir; ii) farklı iller için veya iller arası karşılaştırmalı olarak farklı suç türlerinin (asayiş, kaçakçılık, hırsızlık vb.) özel güvenlik hizmetleri ile ilişkisine ilişkin ampirik araştırmalar yapılabilir; iii) özel güvenlik görevlileri tarafından korunan alanlar ile özel güvenliğin bulunmadığı kentsel alanlar arasındaki suç-güvenlik olayları karşılaştırılarak, bu alanlarda yaşayan insanların değerlendirmeleri tartışılarak özel güvenliğin var olma nedeni sorgulanabilir; ve son olarak v) özel güvenlik görevlilerinin güvenli siteleri, alışveriş merkezleri vb. çeşitli kentsel alanlarda çalışma koşullarına odaklanarak nasıl bir sömürü ve yabancılaşma yaşadıkları araştırılabilir.

Kentsel politikaya yönelik öneriler ise şu şekilde ifade edilebilir: i) Kentsel bir olgu olmasına rağmen, yerel yönetimlerin kentsel güvenlik konusunda herhangi bir sorumluluğu yoktur ve bu alanda, kamu kolluk kuvveti olarak merkezi yönetimin taşra teşkilatları yetkilidir. Bu doğrultuda bazı denetim yetkilerinin yerel yönetimlere devredilmesi ve yerel yönetimlerin kent güvenliği alanındaki hizmetlere dahil edilmesi tartışılabilir; ii) toplumsal-kamusal hayatın sürekli bir tehdit-güvenlik-risk sarmalına hapsolmemesi için hem kentsel kamusal alanlarda hem de özel alanlardan kamusal alanları gören yerlerde güvenlik kameralarının kaldırılması kentsel politika önceliği olarak belirlenebilir; iii) kentsel alanların özel güvenlik hizmetleri korunacaksa (ki bu bir sonraki öneride sorun teşkil etmektedir), farklı kentsel alanların özellikleri ve öncelikleri dikkate alınarak özel güvenlik görevlilerinin eğitimi yeniden

yapılandırılmalıdır; ve son olarak, iv) kentsel özel güvenlik sektörü, önleyici ve caydırıcı polislik hizmetleri vermek üzere kurulmuş olmakla birlikte, saha araştırması bulgularının da gösterdiği gibi, halkla ilişkiler ve iletişim faaliyetleri özel güvenlik personelinin iş yükünün büyük bir bölümünü oluşturmaktadır. Ayrıca, özel güvenlik görevlilerinin üniformalı ve silahlı görünürlüğü, kentsel mekânın askerileşmesine katkıda bulunur. Bu nedenlerle kentsel alanlarda özel güvenlik kaldırılmalı ya da etkinlik alanları sınırlandırılmalıdır. Bunun yerine kamu kurumlarınca istihdam edilecek ve kentlerde uygun noktalarda çalışacak sosyal danışma ve destek hizmeti personeli istihdam edilmelidir.

Son söz olarak, bu çalışma, gündelik kentsel toplumsal yaşamın güvenlik kameralarının ve özel güvenlik görevlilerinin gözetimi altında olduğunu, aynı zamanda devletin rolünün yeniden tanımlandığını ve 1980'lerden itibaren otoriter politikaların egemen hale geldiğini ileri sürmüştür. Neoliberal devletin otoriter politikalarına bir yanıt olarak gelişen Gezi Direnişi gibi epizodik olaylar, ilk bakışta kaçınılmaz ve karşı konulamaz görünen siyasal iktidarların ve sermayenin iktidarına (gerici güçlerden yararlanılsa da veyahut liberal siyasi hegemonik bloklar şeklinde kendini sunsa da) karşı çıkmanın, toplumsal-bireysel maliyeti yüksek olsa da direnmenin her zaman bir yolu olduğunu kanıtlamıştır. Toplumun geniş kesimlerinin örgütlendiğinde, yapısal dönüşümleri gerçekleştirmede sahip oldukları gücü hafife almaması gerektiğini tarihsel anlar-momentler yaşayarak kanıtlamıştır. Toplum gözetim kameraları ve özel güvenlik görevlileri ile somutlaşan özel güvenlik önlemlerine ve kentsel alanın güvenli topluluklar veya özel mülkiyete ait kamusal alanlar biçiminde (yeniden) üretilmesine mahkûm değildir. Bu süreci, kolektif toplumsallığa dayalı, daha ilerici ve toplumcu bir kentsellik üreterek dönüştürmek her zaman olanaklıdır.

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