QUESTIONING ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM:
SOCIAL SPACE, CLASS, AND GENDER
IN THE EVERYDAY OF KEÇİÖREN

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ESRA CAN MOLLAER

IN Partial fulfillment of the requirements
for
the degree of doctor of philosophy
in
the department of sociology

MAY 2023
Approval of the thesis:

QUESTIONING ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM: SOCIAL SPACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE EVERYDAY OF KEÇİÖREN

submitted by ESRA CAN MOLLAER in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Ayşe SAKTANBER
Head of Department
Department of Sociology

Prof. Dr. Ayşe SAKTANBER
Supervisor
Department of Sociology

Examine Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Nilay ÇABUK KAYA (Head of the Examining Committee)
Ankara University
Department of Sociology

Prof. Dr. Ayşe SAKTANBER (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Sociology

Prof. Dr. Fatma Umut BEŞPINAR
Middle East Technical University
Department of Sociology

Prof. Dr. Mustafa ŞEN
Middle East Technical University
Department of Sociology

Assoc. Prof. Dr. İlker AYTÜRK
Bilkent University
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Esra CAN MOLLAER

Signature:
ABSTRACT

QUESTIONING ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM: SOCIAL SPACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE EVERYDAY OF KEÇİÖREN

Can Mollaer, Esra
PhD, The Department of Sociology.
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ayşe SAKTANBER

March 2023, 272 pages

This study explores the newly emerging ways of what it has been usually called nationalist Islamic conservatism among lower middle class families living in Keçiören. Based on a 14 months long ethnographic study, it aims to contribute to the understanding of how conservative practices, disposition and embodiments are produced through a complex set of class-based, gendered social relations in everyday life of Keçiören. This study benefited from Bourdieu’s theory of practice to base a theoretical construction of conservatism as a research object. Drawing on the socio-spatial framework of Lefebvre (1991) and following the debates on the significance of ‘politics of scale’, this study constructs its analysis coordinates according to the relational socio-spatial scales; the historical makings of Keçiören as a scale of district; the socio-spatial differentiations at the scale of socio-economically different neighborhoods (mahalle); and the scales of home and body.
Highlighting the significance of the socio-spatial scale of neighborhood in generating and shaping the class-based and gendered practices and dispositions of conservatism in Keçiören, this study also elaborates on the role of negotiated and contested practices of ‘we-makings’ in the formation of sociality.

**Keywords:** Social space, class, gender, neighborhood, Keçiören
ÖZ

İSLAMI MUHAFAZAKARLIĞI SORGULAMAK:
KEÇİÖREN’DE GÜNELİK HAYATTA
TOPLUMSAL MEKAN, SINIF VE TOPLUMSAL CİNSİYET

Can Mollaer, Esra
Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ayşe SAKTANBER

Mayıs 2023, 272 sayfa

Bu çalışma, Keçiören’de yaşayan alt orta sınıf aileler arasında genellikle milliyetçi İslami muhafazakârlık olarak adlandırılan yeni ortaya çıkan toplumsal bicimleri araştırmaktadır. 14 ay süren etnografik bir çalışmaya dayanan bu çalışma, Keçiören’in gündelik yaşamında muhafazakâr pratiklerin, eğilimlerin ve algıların sınıf temelli, toplumsal cinsiyet dinamiklerine dayalı bir dizi karmaşık toplumsal ilişki aracılığıyla nasıl üretildüğinin anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, bir araştırma nesnesi olarak muhafazakârlığın teorik inşasını temellendirmek için Bourdieu’nün pratik teorisinden yararlanmıştır. Lefebvre’nin (1991) sosyo-mekânsal analiz çerçevesini temel alan ve kent çalışmalarındaki ilişkisel ‘ölçek’ tartışmalarını takip eden bu çalışmada analiz koordinatları ilişkisel sosyo-mekânsal ölçeklere göre düzenlenmiştir: ilçe ölçeği olarak, Keçiören’in tarihsel bir kentsel dönüşüm yörüngesi; sosyo-
ekonomik açıdan farklı mahalleler ölçeğinde sosyo-mekânsal farklılaşmalar; ev ve beden ölçekleri. Keçiören örneğinde, muhafazakârlığın sınıf temelli ve toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı pratiklerinin ve eğilimlerinin üretilmesinde ve şekillendirilmesinde bir sosyo-mekânsal ölçek olarak mahallenin önemini vurgulayan bu çalışma, aynı zamanda müzakere ve çatışmalarla yürütülen 'biz/onlar' ayrımı kurma biçim ve pratiklerinin toplumsallığın oluşumundaki rolünün de altını çizer.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Mekan, sınıf, toplumsal cinsiyet, mahalle, Keçiören
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM ...................................................................................................................... iii

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... iv

ÖZ ........................................................................................................................................ vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... viii

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... xi

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. xii

CHAPTERS

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1

2. QUESTIONING ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM IN TURKEY: CONVERGENCES, ACCOMMODATIONS & CONTRADICTIONS ................. 12
   2.1. Introduction: How to Conceptualize, Historicize, and Operationalize? .............................................. 13
   2.2. Trajectory of Conservatism in the Political Field of Turkey ................................................. 19
   2.3. Conceptual Terrain: Critical Perspectives on Islamic Conservatism ........................................ 27
   2.4. Pursuing the Makings of Islamic Conservatism ........................................................................ 31

3. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY & SITUATING THE FIELD ........................................ 34
   3.1. Construction of Research Object .............................................................................................. 34
   3.2. Unit of Research Analysis ........................................................................................................ 37
   3.3. Situating and Mapping of the Field ......................................................................................... 40
   3.4. Ethnographic Engagement ..................................................................................................... 49

4. THE MAKING & REMAKING OF KEÇİÖREN ...................................................................... 57
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 57

4.2. Historical Socio-Spatial Trajectory of the District of Keçiören .................. 60
  4.2.1. Republican Capital’s Vineyards................................................................. 66
  4.2.2. Remaining at the Other Side of Sıhhiye Bridge Threshold .............. 75
  4.2.3. Resurgence: The Making of Nationalist Islamist Stronghold ....... 84
  4.2.4. From Gecekondu to Prospective ‘Elite District of ‘New Turkey’’ .... 94

4.3. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................... 109

5. SCALING DOWN TO THE MAHALLES: THE FRAGMENTS FROM
EVERYDAYNESS OF RELIGIOUS CONSERVATISM IN KEÇİÖREN .......... 112
  5.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 112
  5.2. The Mahalle as a Spatial and Scalar Unit in its Relationalities .......... 116
  5.3. In Pursuit of the Shifting Notions of the Mahalle Ethos .................... 121
    5.3.1. From gecekondu to apartment buildings: ‘Then it was like
          another village in Keçiören’ ....................................................................... 123
    5.3.2. The Shifting Meanings and Roles of Social Networks in the
          Context of Mahalle ...................................................................................... 131
    5.3.3. Evolving Sources and Relations of Dependency, Solidarity, and
          Conflict ............................................................................................................ 141
  5.4. Concluding Remarks ......................................................................................... 155

6. THE FRAGMENTS OF CLASS-CULTURED AND GENDERED
EMBODIMENTS ........................................................................................................... 158
  6.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 158
  6.2. ‘A Sense of One’s Place’: Housing Mobility and Embodied
      Subjectivities ....................................................................................................... 160
6.3. Islamic Conservative Middle Class Ethos: Recasting the Sources of Aspiration
................................................................................................................. 168

6.4. The Sources of Everyday Conducts and Dynamics of Pious Embodiment
......................................................................................................................... 176

6.5. Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................... 184

7. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 186

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 206

APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... 230

A. THE LIST AND PROFILE OF WOMEN INFORMANTS .............................. 230

B. INTERVIEW QUOTATIONS ................................................................................. 236

C. CURRICULUM VITAE ....................................................................................... 247

D. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET ............................................................ 250

E. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU ...................................... 272
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Class-based Neighborhood Distribution of Research Settings in Keçiören...

41
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Mapping of Field Setting, Differentiation of Neighbourhoods .......43
Figure 2: A collage by Hakkı Tez, Keçiören 1936. SALT Research, Said Bey
Archive.................................................................71
Figure 3: An article on the district of Keçiören in Ulus newspaper, 1935......73
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to explore the newly emerging ways of what it has been usually called nationalist Islamic conservatism among lower middle class families living in Keçiören. Keçiören has come to be known as a nationalist, Islamic-conservative stronghold, as the election results has proved that it became an important vote base of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party). Following the 1994 local elections, when the predecessor of AKP, Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party) won the local elections in 28 big cities of Turkey, including Ankara in which Keçiören was one of its larger vote base districts, Keçiören witnessed the counter-hegemonic productions and representations of urban space, and the normative and gendered reorganization of urban public life on the axis of religious morality. Historically situated and developed at the periphery of the class-divided urban topography of Ankara, Keçiören has come to be recognized in the socio-political imaginary of Turkey when the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to reside in the district in 2003, instead of the prime minister’s residence in Çankaya, the district known as the symbol of the Republic. The prime minister’s choice evoked the historical maneuver to distance the newly established Republic from its Ottoman past and even appeared to be an attempt to reverse it. Together with its symbolic meanings, the relocation of the capital from Istanbul to Ankara reflects one of the main axes of political struggles in Turkey. The politically contested historical
duality between the Ottoman capital İstanbul and the Republican capital Ankara, as to what each city symbolizes and represents duplicates itself with varied implications at other scales within the cities.

As a matter of fact, not only the Islamic conservative-secular duality emerged but also it has come to be reified by contrasting districts-spaces, as spatial microcosms of diverse macro politics. Peyami Safa's Fatih-Harbiye, a fictional product of the socio-spatial dualism of early Republican conservatism, serves as an example of the historical prominence of such spatial dualities in conservative thought in Turkey. Yahya Kemal's poem titled 'Neighborhoods without Azan' (Ezansız Semtler), published in Tevhîd-i Efkar Newspaper in 1922, sets another example. What these kind of spatial dualities hinder and what they clarify about spatial inequalities of power relations and its class-cultural ramifications with regard to the social differentiations? Indisputably, the multifaceted sociospatial developments in Turkey is too complex and the changing urban social fabric is too dynamic to be explained by these dualisms. Having said that, what renders these spatial dualities implying a range of dichotomies operative lies both in the historical prominence of this sort of spatial divide in Islamic conservative ideologies and its significant repercussions in ever-lasting populist politics. Despite its fallacies, as any dualistic configuration laden with, reflecting the contentious debate on cultural polarization in Turkey the socio-spatial dualities appear to operate as a schema revealing continuities and/or marking differences on the ever-changing urban social enclaves of the 2000s. The locality of Keçiören, one of Çankaya's peripheral districts, constitutes a peculiar example due to both its own significant historical changes and its interrelationships within this spatial dichotomy. Informed from the Keçiören side of this spatial
duality, I attempted to examine how class-cultural and gendered embodiments manifest themselves and operate at the socio-spatial boundary-makings.

Based on a 14 months long ethnographic study conducted in Keçiören, I attempted to examine how variant forms of so-called nationalist Islamic conservatism shape people’s everyday lives, and in what ways does the emergent lower middle class Islamic conservative culture embody, reproduce, accommodate, and invent itself in the everyday life. By taking the notion of conservatism as embedded within a multifaceted set of familial, class and spatial relations, each of which contribute to its production, my analysis aimed to contribute to the understanding of how conservative practices, embodiments and perceptions are produced through a complex set of class-based social relations in everyday life, thus also led me to question to what extent what we have at hand as conservatism fits to its conventional definitions and/or newly emerging ones. In other words, I aimed to search to what extent and how Islamic conservatism can be pursued in the everyday practices of pro-religious and/or pro-nationalist religious people in the context of Keçiören. In this process of search, I benefited from Bourdieu’s theory of practice to base a theoretical construction of conservatism as a research object, as it unfolds the logic of practices either habitual and repetitive or inventive and imaginative through a relational comprehension. Bourdieu (2005) argues that distinctions in social space are engraven in the physical spaces of the city, solidifying social divisions in the form of spatial boundaries and housing segregation.
Located on the periphery of Ankara’s historical urban development trajectory, Keçiören, with its physical topography, has a certain class residential segregation and socio-spatial inequalities. In parallel, the district has represented certain associated images, symbols and codes based on historically diverse and contextualized features of class, cultural and socio-political belonging dynamics. Different from studies that draw on Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, I have avoided focusing solely on the practices of gaining symbolic power through the accumulation of cultural and symbolic capital and how ‘differences’/ ‘distinctions’ are constructed through changes in the realms of consumption and taste. Pursuing a relational approach attentive to the changing patterns of inequalities based on class and gender, I attempted to explore the interpretations, negotiations and accommodations of spatial differentiations in everyday life which inform us on the spatial inequalities of power relations and its class-cultural ramifications with regard to the social differentiations, all of which can help us reveal what kind of conservatism(s) we can talk about and/or how a discourse of conservatism operates within a given context, within a historical time period.

In Chapter 2, I investigated the question of “how to approach and operationalize conservatism?”. In the scholarly studies, the notion of conservatism is strictly defined either “as an ideology or as a disposition. I argue that treating conservatism merely as a disposition falls into a sort of reductionism neglecting how subjectivities are (re)produced.” Approaches claiming that conservatism does not qualify as an ideology, on the other hand, obscure understandings of its articulation capacity to produce political rationalities and power mechanisms. In this thesis, I departed from a relational approach which recognizes both generative capacity of
conservatism to engender dispositions, practices and representation, and its ideological capacity to articulate political rationalities. In this regard, I benefited from Bourdieu’s theoretical approach which enables us to engage a unified analysis at the level of agents and structures, admitting the dynamics of ‘symbolic struggles’ (Bourdieu, 2018: 110). It also guided me to conduct an ethnographic study as Bourdieu objectifies everyday life by holistically approaching both practices, processes, and relations that shape dispositions, perceptions and practices, as well as individuals' social relationship networks, evaluation schemes, and lifestyles. That being said, my analysis is not per se Bourdieusian.

In Chapter 3, I presented the methodology of the study, how the field setting was designed and ethnographic engagement dynamics. As I attempt to grasp the current sociality in Keçiören as a relational product of its socio-spatial processes and relations, along with Bourdieu’s conceptual tools, I also benefited from Lefebvre’s theoretical framework. Following the debates in urban studies on the significance of “politics of scale” (Smith, 1992; Jonas, 1994; Brenner, 2009), and with a socio-spatial framework offered by Lefebvre (1991), I take the scale not merely as a descriptor or indicator of geographical scope but as a relational concept. Attentive to the relationalities of scales, I tried to construct the chaptering of the analysis according to scales; the historical makings of Keçiören as a scale of district; the socio-spatial differentiations at the scale of socio-economically different neighborhoods (mahalle); and the scales of home and body. Accordingly, in the Chapter 4, by situating the socio-spatial (trans)formation of Keçiören within the larger urban development of Ankara, I attempted to examine the shifting struggles over the production of urban space with a particular focus on what Lefebvre
(1991) calls “representations of space”. This component of Lefebvre’s spatial triad refers to the space informed and produced by the logic of dominating political power, hegemonic ideology, and dominant economic mode of production (Lefebvre, 1991: 33). For the sake of analytical clarity, I treated conceived space separately here. By drawing on my ethnographic fieldwork, in the Chapter 5 and 6, I examined the other co-constitutive components; perceived space, which entails “daily routine and urban reality” (ibid., 38), and lived space, which is “directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’” (ibid., 39).

In Chapter 4, to better capture the transformation of the district to be known as nationalist and Islamic-conservative stronghold, I examined the historically evolving positionality of Keçiören within a relational grid of socio-spatial processes intertwined in webs of political struggles. Instead of following a chronological account of the district, I periodize it in order to delineate the historical processes entailing social, economic and political repercussions. I tried to explore how the urban spatial strategies implemented in Keçiören following the 1994 local elections have contributed to the emergence of diverse nationalist Islamist conservative class-cultural embodiments. Those include the transformation of built environment – particularly the transformation of housing from gecekondu to apartment buildings; the counter-hegemonic productions and representations of urban space; and the normative and gendered reorganization of urban public life on the axis of religious morality. I sought to explore how the shifting Islamist-conservative imagination of Keçiören’s past inform the socio-spatial constitution of Keçiören’s present, and how does it resonate with its search of political legitimacy over representations of this ‘locality’ and its ‘people’? The
discussion in this chapter covers the ideological appropriation of Keçiören as the district staged the political efforts of restoring the primacy of the Turkish-Sunni ‘majority’ pitted against the secular ‘minority.

In Chapter 5, I scaled down the scope to the socio-economically diverse neighborhoods of the district. This scale has been convenient both operationally and observationally, as well as being a relational socio-spatial scale allowing to examine everyday life. In this chapter, recognizing the partial and plural manifestations of Islamic conservative ways of life, I depicted and examined the ways in which people in Keçiören negotiate and appropriate the nationalist Islamic discourses by making use of the class-cultural and gendered means at their disposal. I first elaborated on what would the neighborhood both as a spatial and scalar unit disclose on the everydayness of so called Islamic conservatism. I attempted to explore how imaginary/idealized abstractions of mahalle imbued by nationalist Islamic conservative rhetoric translate into practices, appropriations and negotiations at quotidian.

Drawing on my ethnographic study, in this chapter, I tried to follow a historical trajectory of the subjective experiences of my lower and lower-middle class informants in line with the district’s urban transformation trajectory. The impact of ever-changing provisions in the social welfare system on rural-urban migration processes, solidarity networks, political belonging and urban poverty was also one of the outcomes, with varying aspects and consequences. The mahalle, as the immediate space of the ‘family’, was also a place where the blurred boundaries of public and private were regulated by ethos saturated with patriarchal gender hierarchies. The
discussion here related how the meanings and responsibilities attributed to the family in social reproduction have evolved under the AKP rule, both discursively and in connection with state practices. Construed as the ultimate guardian of the moral order, the family appeared to serve not only to inculcate Islamic-conservative dispositions, but also to assume responsibility for the production and distribution of welfare for individuals.

I elaborated on how the evolving networks of relations with kinship, hemşehri, and neighbors operate in ways that generate solidarity, dependencies, and conflict, as well as how these communal relations are embedded in and articulated into political networks. Drawing from my ethnographic study, in this part, I attempted to relationally examine lived experiences of housing transformation from gecekondu to apartment building in terms of class-cultural and gendered ramifications. Within the context of mahalle life, kinship and hemşehri relations have a great impact over the inhabitants’ senses of their selves in relation to others. On the one hand, a sense of togetherness was maintained through the network of relations in mahalle life. As a web of relations imbued with socio-spatial proximity, “mahalleli” i.e. the inhabitants of a mahalle, re-imagined their collectivity and invested in a sense of belonging. These collectivities were imagined through the encounters with ethno-religious differences (i.e. Alevi communities or non-Muslim minorities) that went well beyond the construction of religious identities and could easily become the markers of Islamist political identities.

The conceived spaces of Keçiören cultivated the cultural politics that, on the one hand, promoted those so called Islamic conservative middle class
subjectivities and, on the other hand, imposed an image of society putting a
great value at familialism and traditional gender relations. For that reason,
dissecting the lived experiences of urban space in Keçiören within the spatial
contexts of mahalle life and embodiment, I argue that what we observe as
both the discourse and disposition of Islamic conservatism was constructed
and performed as a class-cultural and gendered formation. Moreover,
viewing through the spatial and scalar units of the mahalle, I did not simply
suggest that they are the elementary containers within which Islamic
conservatism has been manifested. Rather, I suggest viewing these units as
the elements of socio-spatial relationality through which conservative
conducts of life are constructed and performed. Relationships at the
neighborhood scales appear to play a significant role in the production and
reproduction of emerging forms of Islamic conservatisms. Despite the
tensions and contradictions of neighborhood life, it seems to provide a viable
setting for conservatism that is realized through women and penetrates into
everyday life.

In Chapter 6, I attempted to examine the varying existence of horizontal
tensions and lower middle class cultural repertories and address the
divergent manifestations of class distinctions through everyday interactions,
dispositions, and evaluative schemas of inhabitants of socio-economically
differentiated neighborhoods of Keçiören. This chapter, in a relational
fashion, entailed the scales of home and the body. I tracked and examined
the dynamics of spatialization of class in neighborhood contexts with regard
to the ways in which socio-spatial differentiations tell us about social
inequalities. In order to examine how spatial practice of inequalities impacts
the dynamics of sense of belonging and political dispositions, I focused on
how evolving socio-spatial differentiations disclose social inequalities along the lines of class and gender which reflect themselves in the rhetoric of Islamic conservatism. Relationally, I attempted to explore how families perceive, imagine and negotiate the ‘value’ of their ‘neighborhood’, both economically and morally, vis-à-vis their class-cultural positionalities and their prospects, chances and restraints over horizontal/upward mobilities. Within its urban transformation, Keçiören has witnessed trends and patterns of housing mobility that appeared to homogenize its socio-demographic composition in ways that narrowed the scope and possibilities of everyday interactions and encounters between the Islamic conservative and secular fractions. On the other hand, there was a widely shared perception, as a result of shifting patterns of class-cultural distinctions and evaluation schemes, the upwardly mobile Islamic conservative fractions have tended to relocate the district for locations they believed better reflected their class status. Housing/class mobility has appeared to shape not only informants’ perceptions of the economic and symbolic value of the district, but also how they negotiated horizontal dynamics of class-cultural similarities and differences. Residential mobility aspirations reveal and relate to the ways in which people perceive and appropriate social boundaries and hierarchies and how they negotiate ‘their place’ in relation to the ‘others’ both horizontally and vertically. Subjective perceptions, aspirations and expectations about mobility involve various negotiations at the intersections of class and gender, and include comparisons and negotiations about how religion is lived in other neighborhoods compared to Keçiören. In other words, the neighborhood of the dwelling operates as a sign of ‘distinction’ and allows not only to embody and present the lifestyle aspired to, but also to mark the extent of religious morality. As highly debated, the formative
components of the social class such as belonging dynamics, shared symbols, lifestyles, values, and aspirations cause contestations in terms of class dynamics. Even though the sources of emulation were mainly assumed to be upwardly mobile those groups who were labeled as Islamic conservative fractions who distinguished themselves with the latest consumption items, from housing to clothing, vacation routines, personal care, and ownership of cars, conflict and tensions were the primary axes of the narratives. I tried to explore how class-based spatial segregation impacted the reproduction of class inequalities by enabling and impeding the middle-class aspirations, and how variant forms of nationalist Islamic conservatism shape people’s everyday lives, and in what ways does the emergent lower middle class Islamic conservative culture embody, reproduce, accommodate, and invent itself in the everyday life. Education opportunities were a further problem raised by both families and women in relation to the moral and economic worth of their neighborhoods. The main and most pressing problem was that most of the schools close to their homes in the district had been converted into Imam Hatip schools, leaving inhabitants with no other choice. There are a variety of angles between the Islamic-conservative discourse, rhetoric and policies of two decades of AKP governments on ‘family’ and the forms of Islamic conservatism variably practiced in different neighborhoods of Keçiören district. Among these, the issue of education stands out as it pertains to class reproduction.
CHAPTER 2

QUESTIONING ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM IN TURKEY: CONVERGENCES, ACCOMMODATIONS & CONTRADICTIONS

Taking the ambivalent concept of conservatism as its subject matter, my inquiry through ethnography has to handle with the uneasy questions of ‘how to approach conservatism?’ and ‘how to operationalize conservatism?’.

My conceptual framework benefits from Bourdieu’s theory of practice, not per se Bourdieusian. The novelty of theory lies in its ability to allow us to pursue a unified analysis at the level of structures and agents by postulating a lucid relationship between symbolic meanings and the objective conditions of its production (Bourdieu, 1996; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2008). In rejection to structural Marxists’ approach of social class “defined solely by a position in the relations of production” (1984: 372) and critical of anthropological use of culture, Bourdieu proposes the notion of habitus by which he re-conceptualizes the relationship between social and mental structures. Binding the worlds of objective forces and symbolic representations, the notion of habitus refers to, in Bourdieu’s words, a “system of dispositions, that is of permanent manners of being, seeing, acting, and thinking, or a system of long-lasting (rather than permanent) schemes or schemata or structures of perception, conception, and action” (Bourdieu, 2005: 43). In this respect, I conceive the merit of the theory of practice to base a theoretical construction of conservatism as a research object, as it unfolds the logic of practices either habitual and repetitive or inventive and imaginative through a relational comprehension. I believe in the merit of class specific system of
dispositions to base a theoretical construction of conservatism as a research object.

2.1. Introduction: How to Conceptualize, Historicize, and Operationalize?

The tangle of meanings attached to ‘conservatism’ remains vague. Despite its constitutive faculty of adaptation, there are core tenets, common assumptions and chronic drives of conservatism; the utility of religion, the weight on the significance of family, the acceptance of authority, and the legitimacy of inequality (Muller, 1997: 18-19). The concept of conservatism, commonly, encompasses thought and behavior patterns that connected to a shared concern for the safeguarding of “traditional socio-cultural values, norms, and institutions” (Schumann, 1978: 805). There are different approaches that attempt to define the main characteristics of conservatism and its trajectory of development. Stressing the worldly utility as the major criterion, one of the chief conservative figures, Edmund Burke (2009; first published in 1790) defends the role and significance of tradition, history and institutions for the survival of the society.

Nisbet (1986) identifies the basic premises of conservatism as “disposition and inclination to conserve” and “tendency to preserve existing institutions”. There is another stream of debate that define conservatism as “a style of

---

1 Conservatism has split into so many currents that it has become difficult to grasp and has been referred to with different prefixes: “Neo-conservatism”, “paleoconservatism”, “fiscal conservatism”, “social conservatism”, “feminist conservatism”, “liberal conservatism”, “libertarian conservatism”, “traditionalist conservatism” etc. Tännsjö, T. (2022) “Conservatism”, Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics, Oxford University Press.
thought, *Weltanschauung*” (Macridis & Hulliing, 1996), which contends that conservatism arises when power, property, status, and a certain way of life require to be preserved. Schumann (1978: 805) contends that Greiffenhagen, in his article titled “The Dilemma of Conservatism in Germany” (1971), offered a systematic analysis for conservative patterns of thought where he claims that the meaning of conservatism differs according to the departure from an epistemological or a methodological approach. Whilst the epistemological approach refers to “a historical analysis of sets of interconnected ideas and actions specific to a particular place and time”, the methodological approach conceives “an attempt, using psychological, philosophical and structural anthropological categories transcending time and space to define presumed archetypes of human nature” (Schumann, 1978: 805).

Pocock states that “too many minds have been trying to ‘conserve’ too many things for too many reasons” (cited in Muller, 1997: 22-23), such a plurality hints us about the difficulty in defining conservatism. Though the variety of approaches on the meaning of conservatism, as Muller (1997: 8) suggests there are certain particular “assumptions, predispositions, arguments, themes, and metaphors” which finally constitute a conservative pattern of thought. Addressing the utility of religion as the most chronic conservative drive, Muller (1997: 14) does also point out the recurring ‘conservative’ themes; “the most significant of which are the significance of family, the chief role of traditional values and cultural manners, the acceptance of authority and the legitimacy of inequality” (ibid.: 18-19).
Citing Greiffenhagen, Bora (1997) provides a list of core tenets of conservatism, which are; religion, state, nation, authority, tradition and history. Bora (1997: 9) argues that serving as a foundation for deference to authority and as a legitimate reference for preserving stability and order in society, religion occupies an important place in conservative thought. As for the other tenets; it is with the convergence of conservatism and nationalism that caused the nation to become embodied in the notion of state, serving as the source of legitimacy (Bora, 1998: 70). On the other hand, as one of the core pillars of conservatism, history, according to Bora (1997: 11), performs a crucial function as a repository.

In scholarly works, there are two major, not entirely mutually exclusive, approaches to the notion of conservatism; comprehending conservatism as an ideology or as a disposition. Compared to other ideologies, particularly to liberalism and socialism, it is widely held that conservatism does not categorically qualify as an ideology with respect to “absence of an alternative order”, “incoherency of sets of ideas”, “embarking on particularism in rejection of universal prescriptions”, “inclination to hold onto what exists now”, “being prone to internal contradictions than other varieties of political thought”, and finally “adopting a ‘non-ideology’ attitude to avoid the errors of ideologies” (Graham, 1986: 172). Following similar departure, Macridis (1992: 79) also argues that conservatism is “more a state of mind than a political ideology”. Huntington identifies conservatism as “a coherent, systematic and theoretical reaction ideology that endorses status quo” (1957: 454). On the other hand, according to Huntington (1957: 455), conservatism has a situational quality that manifests itself in recurrent historical events, independent of their contents; specifically, when established institutions are
under attack and its supporters turn to conservatism to maintain the institution’s position. Situational conservatism is one of the four uses of conservatism that Rossiter (1982) suggests; the other three are temperamental, political and philosophical conservatism. Similar to Huntington, Rossiter (ibid: 142) describes situational conservatism as a defending mindset that opposes disruptive alterations with regard to the social, economic, and political order.

Indeed, all these tenets that are what conservatives themselves use to describe suggest that conservatism does not constitute an ideology yet rather it is a way of thinking or a disposition (Oakeshott, 1991; Kirk, 1954). In the literature covered, it is overwhelmingly stated that the conservatism emerges as a response to the challenges and attacks that the established institutions, social customs and values encounter and situates itself against the unanticipated consequences of reformist actions (Oakeshott, 1991; Muller, 1997; Mannheim, 2013). Since such ‘attacks’ differ across time and space, the notion of conservatism tends to be more contextually particular. Therefore, in order to overcome the definitional and operational problems, I argue that conservatism should be contextualized as a process in its own particular socio-political, economic and cultural workings of the society.

Taking conservatism and traditionalism as two different partings, Mannheim (2013) discusses that whereas traditionalism is solely concerned with the past and tends to preserve habits and customs, conservatism adapts itself to the

---

2 Discussion around how to define conservatism as an ideology is crystallized in Peter Viereck’s words; “It is misleading that ‘conservatism’ contains the suffix ‘ism’ ... more an implicit temperament, less an articulate philosophy than other famous isms” (1996, 5).
new. Dahrendorf, in a similar fashion, argues that conservatism appropriates, accommodate and preserves the “already existing” and “natural” state of society (cited in Bora, 1997: 7). Contested from a different angle, conservatism has a defensive ring operating accordingly in ways that it situates itself. In this regard, Huntington maintains that “conservatism is best understood not as an inherent theory in defense of particular institutions, but as a positional ideology” (cited in Muller, 1997).

Besides, in contrast to the arguments defining conservatism as anti-modern movement, conservatism is considered as a dialectical counterpart to political modernization (Minkenberg, 2018: 367). One of the chief paradoxes, which indeed constitute the major dynamics of conservatism, is its pragmatic ability to instrumentalize ‘new’ constants against historical and societal changes (Çiğdem, 1997: 34). In a similar vein, Bora (1998: 57) contends that conservatism as an ideology aptly operates its faculty of adaptation and pragmatism, which transforms its pessimism into a cynical attitude. Therefore, in connection to the preceding debates, there is a widespread inclination to position conservatism as a situational ideology.

Oakeshott (1956: 408), in his well-known essay titled ‘On Being Conservative’, defines conservatism “as a disposition rather than a doctrine or a creed”. Defining conservatism as a disposition, an inclination, a mindset, a manner, and a temperament, he envisions a conservative individual who “prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss” (Oakeshott, 1956: 408). With this imaginary
template on “being conservative”, definitely not free of ideological motives, by setting binary opposites composed of descriptive nouns signifying qualities or features (for instance, sufficient/superabundant sounds referential to income/wealth, as such social equality), not only he transmutes the socio-political categories but also essentializes a ‘being’ by dismissing how conceptions of selves are produced\(^3\). By fixing the boundaries of what makes a person conservative, I argue that the conservative way of thinking not only succumbs to a form of reductionism but also legitimizes and naturalizes the capacities of conservatism in generating dispositions.

The irreconcilability with regards to comprehending conservatism as either an ideology or as a disposition entails a number of drawbacks. Whilst the denial of conservatism as an ideology would fail us to grasp its capacity of rendering a vast body of rationalities, representations, and power mechanisms, the conception of conservatism as dispositions and tendencies succumbs a form of reductionism and essentializes a conservative ‘being’ by bypassing how conceptions of selves/subjectivities are (re)produced. The task of converting textual, abstract definitions of the concepts into research operations and making use of them is prone to the very realization or reproduction of the conservative conception itself. So to speak, as Sennett argues (1992) an incarnate manifestation of an ‘authentic’ conservative person can plausibly be found in fictional literary characters, however the use of abstract templates for a ‘true’, ‘authentic’ person of conservative dispositions fails us to mistake the ideational abstraction. Comprehending

\(^3\) See, Sennett (1992) for his discussion on politics of resentment where aptly addressed the workings of the ideology of intimacy.
human actions as having diverse potentials, not trapped at the binary of submission and resistance (Bourdieu, 1984: 184), the theory of practice allows a relational analysis informed by everyday life.

Therefore, in my search of questioning Islamic conservatism, I argue that this dissertation departs from a relational approach, which attempts to combine the ideological capacities of conservatism in generating dispositions, subjectivities and identities, and the dispositional convergences contextualized in the complex relations of power within which they are formed. Tracing and questioning the ways in which Islamic conservatism politicizing everyday culture, the major aim of this study is to investigate the ways lower-middle class families become agents in the everyday articulation and reproduction of conservative ideological discourses and dispositions, and in what ways and to what extent people incline to render that label of Islamic conservatism as a living social practice.

2.2. Trajectory of Conservatism in the Political Field of Turkey

To overcome the definitional and operational problems, the notion of conservatism necessitates to be contextualized in particular social, political, economic and cultural workings of a society. The historical trajectory of the concept in the political context of Turkey may help out to identify the critical junctures that led to the current state. In a nutshell, it is commonly argued that the main tensions, coalitions and oppositions stem from the peculiar interplays of conservatism with Islamism and nationalism (Bora, 1998; Kalaycinoğlu, 2007; Yılmaz, 2008; Çarkoğlu, 2009; İrem, 2004). In line with its major ideological motives of moderation, conservatism has long appeared to
negate the coercive versions of Islamism and nationalism in Turkey (Bora, 1998). Nevertheless, in the course of AKP hegemony, the question of how and in what ways does conservatism correlate, converge and differentiate with Islamism and nationalism urges substantive analysis over the everyday lives of urban communities.

In order to grasp historically evolving various manifestations and workings conservatism in Turkey, it is crucial to begin with the premise that there are multiple "conservatisms in Turkey" that have changed under historical conditions rather than a singular and uniform "Turkish conservatism". Therefore, the trajectory of conservative thought and ideology in Turkey requires an approach that takes into account the historically shifting transformations both within itself and in line with broader social, economic and political changes. Accordingly, it can be argued that there are three main periods that have shaped the content and contours of conservatism in Turkey: early republican conservatism, conservatism during the Cold War-period, and the streams of conservatisms shaped since the 1980s; from when the workings of conservatism have begun to be blended with neoliberalism. These currents roughly fall into three categories: classical conservatism⁴, nationalist-Islamist conservatism, and neo-conservatism interwined with neoliberalism.

Marking and sorting out the historical moments where conservatism became crystallized is one of the veins that the literature thrives. As a matter of fact, a

---

⁴ The classical conservatism that developed between 1920 and 1960 was largely shaped by literary writers and those who engaged philosophical debates; Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, Peyami Safa, Mustafa Şekip Tunç and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar are among the prominent figures (Irem, 1996; Bora, 1998).
number of scholars, namely Berkes (1998), Karpayt (2001), Köker (1990) and Atay (2005) date the trajectory of conservatism back to the Ottoman Empire. Berkes (1998) argued that conservatism was the ideology guiding oppositional movements against the reforms in the Ottoman Empire that sought to maintain the status quo established by the state and religion. It was not only those who lost power during the reforms, Karpayt (2001) contends, but also those who acquired power with the aid of the reforms upheld to conservatism. The emergence of conservatism in the West has been dated to the first texts published by "counter-revolutionary" thinkers against the French Revolution (Beneton, 2016: 9). Classified as a reactionary movement, conservatism, opposing the "rational reason" principle of Enlightenment thought, upholds the wisdom of tradition and the necessity of natural evolution of humanity based on its assessment of the French Revolution as a "destructive" movement that sought to create civilization from scratch (Beneton, 2016). Departing from here, Çağdem (2003: 26) claims that whilst conservatism in the West developed as a response against the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the Kemalist revolution was the historical turning point for conservatism in the Turkish context. Çağdem (2003: 33) underlines that the conservatism in Turkey differs from other examples in the way that early Republican-era conservatism, recognizing that the past was left behind due to the rigid policies of the authoritarian political regime, sought to establish the present rather than the past. In this regard, rather than a reactionary character, early conservatism in Turkey has taken on a reformist character that registered as a Republican ideology functioning within the parameters of Republican regime (Çağdem, 1997).
In a similar vein, İrem (1999: 141) asserts that conservatism in Turkey emerged as responses to the Kemalist modernization, targeting the regime’s policy vision of Westernization and secularization. Emerged and developed in the early Republican period, the classical Turkish conservatism, as İrem (1996: 352) classifies and states, was the product of a group of intellectuals who supported the reformist projection of the newly established regime, which sought more control over the pace of modernization, particularly in the field of cultural policies. On the other hand, according to Taşkin (2007: 57), early Republican conservatism, which positioned itself within the official ideology and failed to generate criticism against the regime, was content with criticizing excessive Westernization attempts of the regime. Noting that conservative discontent was largely limited to critiques of the processes of modernization and Westernization, İrem (1997: 56) points out that conservatives mostly targeted the cultural and political preferences of the Republican middle classes.

With the transition to multi-party politics, traditionalist-conservative themes began to be widely utilized as a new policy framework by the newly emergent political elites (İrem, 1996: 357). Peyami Safa and Necip Fazıl Kıskakürek are two of the best known proponents of conservative thought in Turkey during the period of Cold War (Bora, 1998). It has been argued that conservatism intersects with nationalism in Turkey since the period defined as classical. In this respect, Ayvazoğlu (2003: 421) addressed that Yahya Kemal (1884-1958) was among the pioneering figures in a "Turkish Islamism" (Türk Müslümanlığı) approach that diverged from Islamism. Unlike the universalist conception of Islamism, “Turkish Islamism” offers an approach that localizes Islam and makes it "Turkish-specific" (ibid.: 421). Culminating
with the Democrat Party’s election to power in 1950 and Turkey’s admission to NATO in 1952, the Cold War period had a significant impact on the political trajectory, content and course of action of conservatism in Turkey (Taşkın, 2003; Köker, 2003).

Taşkın (2003: 189) argues that in this period, conservatism shifted in an ultranationalist and Islamist direction compared to the previous period; moreover, it also played a motor role in the spread of anti-communism in Turkey, which was gaining strength on a global scale. Peyami Safa (1899-1961), whose intellectual life spanned both the early Republican and the Cold War periods, became one of the most popular agents of rising anti-communism (Ayvazoğlu, 2003: 220; Çiğdem, 2003: 527). On the other hand, Necip Fazıl Kıskürek ranks as one of the most influential figures of Islamic conservatism, whose ideological influence can be traced in the discursive political repertoire of the AKP governments. Necip Fazıl Kıskürek (1904–1983) represented Cold War-era conservatism with a strong nationalist and Islamist tone in his periodical Büyük Doğu (1943–1978), which is considered one of the first Islamist publications in Turkey (Güzel, 2003: 335). In fact, Kıskürek is regarded as one of the most significant source of reference for the current juncture of the articulation of conservatism with Islamism in Turkey (Taşkın, 2003).

It is widely argued that conservatism is one of the most influential ideological currents in Turkey’s political trajectory (Bora, 1998; Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Çiğdem, 2003; Çarkoğlu, 2009). In social and political parlance of Turkey, the term conservatism has been generally related with the opposition to the Kemalist revolution’s understanding of modernization,
particularly to religion (Buğra, 2002; Yavuz, 2003). Besides, it has been largely represented by the right wing (center-right) political parties, advocating economic liberalism and promoting traditional values of religion, family and history (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010). In this regard, conservatism, as the core value of rightist politics in Turkey, appears to tie Islamism, nationalism, localism and family (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 241). The main tensions, coalitions and oppositions, in the political context of Turkey, have been fueled by particular interplays of conservatism with Islamism and nationalism (Bora, 2016). Given that the chief motives of conservatism are described as moderation and equilibrium in the society, it does negate the coercive versions of Islamism and nationalism (Bora, 1997).

The early examples of conservatism blending in a number of ways with neoliberalism can be traced back to the governance practices and rationalities under Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Reagan in the United States. According to Brown (2019: 11), the legacy of these periods is that conservatism still primarily operates on the basis of two rationales: on the one hand, a defense of a minimal state that reduced economic intervention in the market and eliminated barriers to the growth of the free market, and on the other hand, a paternalistic conservatism that prioritized authority and a strong notion of state in politics and culture. The transition of Turkey to this neoliberal economic regime commenced following the military coup of 1980. Turgut Özal, the prime minister of the period when neoliberal policies began to be implemented, was a politician attending the meetings of the Aydınlar Ocağı (the Hearth of Intellectuals), one of the major nationalist-conservative tradition of the 1980s and a strong advocate of the "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" (Alper & Göral, 2003: 587).
The (neo)liberal conservatism that emerged in Turkey in the 1980s owes much to its predecessors. Taşkın (2003: 208) states that the "modernization with tradition" projection of classical Turkish conservatism was reinterpreted and revitalized by Özalist liberal conservatism. Like Kısakürek, a Nationalist-Islamist figure of the Cold War period, Turgut Özal was a politician affiliated with the Naqshbandi tradition. According to Taşkın (2003: 215), Mehmed Zahid Kotku, the leader of the Naqshbandi movement, encouraged his adherents to support Turgut Özal's political party, which fused Islamism with the technical thinking of conservative "developmentalism" which helped to open a new path for Islamist conservatism in Turkey, as "development" began to be perceived as a type of "worship" (ibid.) By articulating nationalist conservatism and neo Ottomanism with neoliberalism, the liberal conservatism of the Turgut Özal era was highly effective in fostering the current wave of conservative populism; in ways that neoliberalism, neo-Ottomanism, traditional Islamism based on Islamic sects and populism constitute the credo of the upcoming generation of conservatives (Bora & Erdoğan, 2003: 644).

Evolved into a method of governance under the rule of Abdülhamid II, it was Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats who seized Islamism as a way to rescue the empire and establish a new nation (Mert, 2004). After the establishment of the Republic in 1923, suppressed by the regime Islamism as a political movement lost its legitimacy (ibid.). Following the one-party era, the repertoire of oppositional Islamism expanded and developed through cultural production with a harsh discursive tone (Kurtoğlu, 2004). It was with the founding of the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party- MNP) by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970 that a wide coalition of political Islamists, having
long existed within right-wing, conservative political parties with a variety of
dependency relationships, had a political party where they could express
their ideological positions (Çakır, 1995). The party, however, did not last
long and was disbanded in 1971 following the military intervention. The
party reemerged under the name Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation
Party-MSP) in 1972. In the 1973 and 1977 general elections, the MSP
succeeded in standing as a rival to the center-right Justice Party. Opposed to
the secular reforms of the early republic, the party had a vision of rebuilding
the country as a Muslim nation in which the economy was envisioned to be
restructured in accordance with Islamic morals and ideals (Çakır, 1994).

In the 1990s, the younger generation of politicians within the party adopted
pro-market views instead of the RP’s economic assessments, which were
designed based on Islamic principles, as can be seen later in the case of AKP
led by Erdoğan (Gumuscu, 2010). The AKP embraced a pro-business stance
from its inception, in contrast to its Islamist line of political tradition, which
defended a state-led developmentalist economic program in keeping with its
support base in socioeconomically underdeveloped Anatolian provinces
(Tuğal, 2009). Despite the dramatic differences in their economic agendas,
there is an unmistakable continuity in terms of their social and cultural
agendas, which have been framed by a religious patriarchal normative
morality (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012). In order to distinguish itself from the Islamist
political line from which it had historically emerged, the AKP adopted a
Turgut Özal’s liberal conservatism during the its initial years. The Democrat
Party (DP) and the right-wing political parties that came after it have been
referred to as being conservative in terms of their social and cultural policy
stances. The term, in this regard, has so far been considered to have
descriptive power in interpreting right-wing political practice and orientations in Turkey. Nonetheless, it was only after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) initially identified itself ‘conservative democrat’ that the notion gained popularity.

2.3. Conceptual Terrain: Critical Perspectives on Islamic Conservatism

Described as one of the core institutions and carriers of conservatism, an inquiry on the concept of ‘family’ provides us with substantial insights to comprehend the ways in which conservative practices, perceptions and negotiations are (re)produced and accommodated. Particularly in the context of Turkey, the unit of family plays a remarkably significant role in the formation of the society (Duben & Behar, 1984; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1986; Özbay, 1995; Baştug, 2002; Sirman, 2005; Aytaç, 2007). Many scholars argue that characterized by heavy patriarchal relations; institution of family functions as a survival mechanism both in social and economic terms, encompasses not just the boundaries of the private but the public, and majorly shapes the socio-cultural fabric of the society. Thus, it is also argued that considered from the side of hegemonic politics, the most distinctive feature of AKP’s Islamic conservatism has emerged as familialism (Yazıcı, 2012; Yılmaz, 2015; Kaya, 2015). Whilst the chief reproductive function of family is to perpetuate the continuity of society through procreation, the next reproductive function is said to sustain the intergenerational transfer of social values, conducts, and convictions. In a wider sense, this twofold capacity is what makes ‘family’ indispensable for any conservative ideology. The AKP’s conception and promotion of ‘family’ as a three-generational extended type, in this respect, displays a remarkable example of neoliberal conservative imperatives
(Buğra, 2012; Yazıcı, 2012; Özar & Yakut-Cakar, 2013). The AKP’s project on the ‘pious generation’, relationally, reflects the currency of the concept of ‘generation’ in Islamic conservative imaginations. No doubt, throughout the course of Turkish modernization, the historically contingent perceptions and attributed roles on the youth prove and manifest how this social and demographic category ideologically charged (Mardin, 1988; Neyzi, 2001; Saktanber, 2002; Lüküslü, 2016).

Operating both discursively and practically at social and economic policy-makings, the prominence of the ‘family’ in the political agendas displays and unfolds one major reflection of the coupling of Islamic conservatism with neoliberalism under the AKP rule (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Buğra & Candas, 2011). As a matter of fact, within the last two decades, the AKP’s enforcing of conservative family policies and gender policing have made the already intricate state of family domain even more controversial. The weight of the ‘family’ in the popular imaginations, on the other hand, has been distinctively addressed in the survey studies on conservatism in Turkey. According to the findings of a study, more than half of the respondents considered ‘family’ as the most important institution to be conserved (Yılmaz, 2012). The place of women in the society, relatedly the reproduction of gendered division of labour, and the transfer of values and mores to younger generations are listed as the most referred explanations (Yılmaz, 2012; Esmer, 2012).

In the AKP’s political discourse and practice, religiously informed patriarchal and moral norms have gradually taken precedence with implications for not only controlling of socio-cultural spheres but also governance of politics and
foreign affairs (Öniş, 2009; Acar & Altunok, 2012). Drawing on Wendy Brown’s (2006) widely cited discussion on the workings of neo-conservative and neoliberal rationalities, debates on how the blending of conservatism and neoliberalism operates in Turkey have recently increased. Identifying neoconservatism as a “moral-political rationality” and neoliberalism as a “market-political rationality”, Brown (2006) analyzes how these two rationalities are articulated despite their major ideological differences. For the functioning of neoliberalism, it is required that “the state operates as an agent in the creation of a political culture, where citizens live and act as individual ‘entrepreneurs’ who are responsible for their own welfare” (Acar & Altunok, 2013: 15). On the other hand, neo-conservatism, as a “moral-political rationality”, assists “the state's existence in the political order by assigning it a moral mission, circumscribed by discourses of patriotism, nationalism, religiosity, culture and tradition” (ibid.). Acar & Altunok (2013: 16), drawing on Brown’s analytical suggestion, discuss how the AKP government, which they identify as “a notable defender of a conservative, religion-inspired and essentially patriarchal value system”, intertwines neoliberalism into its discourses, policies and practices they develop on social reproduction, sexuality and family. Then again, the transformation relating to the welfare restructuring, privatization of public services, and flexibility in the labor markets all address the significance of family as the tenet of society. The changes that have taken place of the welfare regime in Turkey have been one of the most major consequences of neo-liberal restructuring under the AKP rule. The social repercussions of the AKP’s structural transformations in the social security, education and health systems, which are required by the neoliberal agenda, are also the subject of studies (Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2009; Özar & Yakut-Çakar 2012; Kılıç, 2010).
The neo-conservative rationality that considers the family as the core of the social order provides a legitimizing ground for the neo-liberal policies adopted by the state. By putting these two rationalities at work, AKP governments, instead of providing services to families and women through social welfare, delegate a number of responsibilities such as care work to families and thus make women dependent by promoting their family-based roles. The distribution of benefits appears to be provided in a way that is consistent with the welfare state's ability to operate legally, but the logic behind how the policy is conducted has a strong moral component centered in the community.

Family policies offer an outlet for maneuver, especially for right-wing politics, due to the close connection between the family and the social structure. Position as the "foundation" of society, the AKP idealizes the family as a defensive fortress for individuals against economic instability and social problems. The function of the family in providing welfare as well as its role in instilling certain lifestyles in society is closely related to the paternalistic character of modernization in Turkey. The promotion of three-generation extended families targets, on the one hand, to compensate for the diminishing social welfare function of the family and, on the other hand, to broaden the social base for the dissemination and circulation of conservative politics with an Islamic overtone. The political basis for the welfare system is tightly connected to the AKP’s conception of the social.
2.4. Pursuing the Makings of Islamic Conservatism

In its effort to crystallize the opposing binaries of authoritarian populist discourse, AKP draws on family metaphors and analogies. In this respect, for instance, the family serves to establish a dichotomizing contrast between "us" and "them," such as the contrast between Turkish society, which is claimed to place a high importance on the family values, and Western societies, which do not. I argue that just as the family is deployed to define the 'us/them' divide, and social assistance is used to foster the construction of paternalistic ties, the networks of social relations localized in the communal context of mahalle function to consolidate ‘we-making’s which are highly tied with paternalism.

I suggest that the forms of conservatisms living in Keçiören might coincide to ‘Islamic conservatism’; chiefly in terms of (i) the dominant role and significance of Islam and Islamism in the political formation and trajectory of conservatism in Turkey; relationally due to the rhetorical power of religion in the rightist politics and imaginations in Turkey; with respect to (ii) the significance of the co-articulations of Islam and neoliberal capitalism for the current workings of conservatism; finally yet most notably due to (iii) the particular role of the piety and religious dispositions in the peculiar conceptions of lived conservatism in Turkey; the significance of religion as a ‘generative schema’ in the everyday life of my informants.

Along with Islamism, conservatism’s nexus with nationalism, one of the most powerful stream of ideology in Turkey, urges to be elaborated. Particular relevance, at this point, derives also from the fact that the district I
conducted my ethnography is boldly marked by Turkish nationalism where the influences of Islam and nationalism in providing social ethos to Islamist conservatism become remarkable. Among multiple forms of nationalism, nationalism upholding Islamic values appears as a very powerful sentiment in popular imaginations which functions beyond being a mere rhetoric. To that end, I discuss and elaborate on the ways in which conservative social ethos link to the constants and changing dynamics of the Sunni-Turkish majority’s ‘we-makings’. Attached to these discussions, I attempt to inquire the differentiations of nationalist reflections between the secular and conservative enclaves from the perspective of the latter. How binary of ‘Turkishness’ polarized between secular and Islamic conservative enclaves and in how peculiar forms does Islamic conservatism accommodate these?

The complex web of political/ideological struggles in Turkey, no doubt, subscribes to and entangles with the axis of societal polarization. The ‘secular/modern’ and ‘Islamic-conservative’ divide is evidently a disputable postulation; reflection of which find itself as a doxa in the academic fields, as a popular buzzword in diverse media and public circles, and ultimately as an over-exploited ideological storyline in Turkish politics. No doubt, this binary approach falls short of comprehending the intricate nature of social and political intersectionalities. Nonetheless due both to its prevalence in diverse socio-political fields and its seeming significance in the repertories of people to recognize each other; the class-based, discursive and affective operations

---

5 As a matter of fact, the trajectory of sources, dynamics and relations of the dialogical cultural formations of urban classes have been complicated and heavily transformed; from the 1950s with the rural to urban migration, since the 1980s with the expansion of consumption, and as of the 2000s with the accelerating facilities provided by the advances of technology (Navaro-Yashin, 2002; Saktanber, 2002b; White, 1999, 2002).
of this dichotomy deserve to be critically inquired so as to explore the tangible power differentials it embodies. The explanatory power of this opposition yields most whilst assessing the ways in which people negotiate their similarities and differences, as defining and distinguishing selves/subjectivities necessitate a negating ‘other’ (Saktanber, 2002). I stipulate a relational approach that unfolds the interplays of the class-cultural dynamics behind the boundary-making processes, which I argue can enable us to see how in that "we making" process both the nationalist and Islamist conducts set the ever-changing boundaries of conservative discursivities to be labeled as Islamic conservatism both in common parlance and mainstream political discourse.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY & SITUATING THE FIELD

This study examines the everydayness of sociality in the district of Keçiören as entrenched in the interplay of spatial, gendered and class relations. I aim to explore how religious conservatism is appropriated, negotiated and reproduced at its mundane and ordinary operations in Keçiören. With the goal of questioning and operationalizing Islamic conservatism to a systematic inquiry, this study is based on a three-fold analysis. I attempt to conceptualize and explore the ways of Islamic conservatisms as embedded in a multifaceted set of spatial, familial, and class relations each of which contribute to its production. My analysis aims to contribute to the understanding of how Islamic conservative practices, attitudes and perceptions are produced through a complex set of class-based, gendered social relations in everyday life. In pursuit of this, I conducted a 14 months-long ethnographic research in four different settings of nine socio-economically distinguished neighborhoods in the district of Keçiören so as to address the subtle processes that manifest and reproduce gendered class-cultural hierarchies.

3.1. Construction of Research Object

In the aftermath of the successive landslide victories the AKP got, particularly the one in 2011 (49,83%), the search for understanding the
changing and emergent composites of electorate in Turkey gained momentum in both scholarly and popular debates. It should be noted that the 2010 referendum registered here as a critical juncture due both to its repercussions and campaigning period as an indicator tapping the axis of polarizations in Turkey (Kalaycioğlu, 2012; Öniş, 2015). Whilst roughly one out of every two people voted for the AKP, the politics appeared to be getting more polarized. To the massive anti-government Gezi Park Protests took place in 2013 against the oppressive Islamic-conservative policies and neoliberal projects, the then-Prime Minister Erdoğan responded by referring to holding the 50 percent voted for them at home. 

Approached from the center-periphery paradigm, in this regard, a deepening of the polarization was not only expected but treated as evidence that society was divided into two poles. However, the portrayal of society in Turkey, as divided into ‘secular/modern’ and ‘Islamic/conservative’ oppositional cultural poles, is indicative of a class blind analysis downplaying cultural complexities. Following Brubaker’s (1996: 15) critical approach towards categories, in this study, I treat these binaries as “categories of practice” rather than “categories

---

6 In one of the pioneering survey studies on conservatism carried out in 2008, 67% of the respondents considered themselves as having high conservative attitudes (Yılmaz, 2012). Similarly, conducting survey studies on political attitudes from the 1990s onward, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu (2009) argued that conservatism with a Sunni Islamic core in Turkey was and will be on rise, by revealing that 51% of their respondents declared that they were closer to being very conservative. Comparing the results of World Value Surveys in 2011/12 with those in 1991, Esmer (2012) asserted that the rising trend of conservatism in Turkey was already persistent. On the other hand, the survey results of the pollster KONDA in 2008 stretched the confinements of the secular-conservative dichotomy by revealing nine different life-style clusters in Turkey. Among these life-style clusters; ‘conservative moderns’, ‘religious conservatives’ and ‘concerned moderns’, ‘humble moderns’ became part of vernacular repertoires.

of analysis”. Due both to its prevalence in diverse socio-political fields and its seeming significance in the repertoires of people to recognize each other; the class-based, discursive and affective operations of these dichotomies deserve to be critically inquired so as to explore the tangible power differentials they embody. As a matter of the fact, the newly emergent articulations of the ‘periphery’ to the ‘center’ are yet to be explored. When I embarked on my study in 2014, at a time when the political field was densely polarized and alliances were at stakes, I was after the question of how and in what ways do these enclaves demarcated by cultural binaries translate into class-cultural and gendered practices, perceptions and negotiations.

Conservatism as a concept has been getting more extensively used to describe the current social, political, and cultural practices and attitudes, particularly after the accession of the AKP to power for the first time in 2002. Within the course of political trajectory in Turkey, conservatism has been discussed as one of the most influential streams of ideology generating coalitions, tensions and oppositions with its peculiar interplays with Islamism and nationalism (Bora, 1998; İrem, 2004; Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Yılmaz, 2008; Çarkoğlu, 2009). Yet, the concept appears to owe much of its current popularity in vernacular repertoires to the initial self-identification of the

---

AKP as ‘conservative democrat’. Getting more ‘mainstream’, one of the chief reasons why the popularity of the AKP among constituencies is being viewed as remarkable has to do with its escalating Islamist qualities, as not only the majority of the party members are successors of the Islamic political line but also as its governments weave neoliberal policies with Islamist conservatism. Commencing on the fringes of the electoral scene, particularly from the 1970s on, ever since the establishment of the National Order Party, Islamist politics have evolved into a potent political agent. By the dint of the victories since the 1994 local elections, what the AKP notably achieved that its predecessors could not has been its ability to consolidate an unprecedented general popular support. The debates on what constitutes the ‘majority’ in Turkey pinpoint the right-wing, religious, conservative segments of the society. If that being the case, how and to what extent does the ‘majority’ in Turkey evolve under the almost two decades-old Islamist conservative hegemonic regime of the AKP with an unsteady neoliberal agenda.

3.2. Unit of Research Analysis

The unit of analysis of this study is the families living in different socio-economically stratified neighborhoods of Keçiören who mostly support AKP. In other words, the lower middle class families living in Keçiören, those who incline to vote for conservative political parties, escalating their Islamist

---


10 At the time I started my field study, the AKP was still identifying itself as ‘conservative democrat’.
character, and who are socio-economically disadvantaged yet eager bearers of middle class aspirations comprise the subject of my study. Along with my ethnographic study, I conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 65 informants; of whom 50 were women and 15 were men whom I contacted through their spouses (See Appendix A). I reached out to fifty women through local women’s meetings, sports center membership, Qur’an courses and sohbet gatherings; which were the four settings located in nine socio-economically distinguished neighborhoods of Keçiören.

The age variety of my informants ranged from 22 to 65. The group includes sixteen young women aged under 30, aged between 22 and 28; I met some of them through their mothers, whom were also among my informants. While the majority of the women were housewives, twelve of them were working either in full-time or part-time jobs. Other members of the families, namely husbands, either occupied in mid-level white-collar or blue-collar workers at state and private sectors, in service sectors, or mostly tradesmen. There were six families with no regular income. Those under the age of 50 had at least a secondary school diploma, while those over 50 had at least a primary school diploma. Among the younger generation, there were seven university graduates and four undergraduate students. Though the level of education among the informants was not very high, there was an increase across the generations. Besides, families were eager for all their children, both girls and boys, to receive good education, however they were dissatisfied with the educational opportunities in their neighborhoods. During women’s gatherings, there were ordinarily collective prayers presided over by a female preacher. Prayers mostly included fervor nationalist wishes for the prosperity of the country and security of the nation; the health, well-being,
and preservation of the unity of families; the strengthening of faith in this life for heaven in the next; and the formation faithful individuals; the loudest collective 'amen' was for children to succeed in education, followed by happy marriages of children. That being said, the common conviction among the informants was that the upward class mobility through education had now become very difficult. Among the women informants, the rate of enrollment in Qur’an courses, both formal and informal, was high. Unlike the male informants, the majority of women knew the Arabic alphabet well enough to recite the Quran. It was less common to read the Turkish translation (meal). They mostly stated that they found it more engaging to listen to preachers. 

The majority of the informants had nuclear families which seems to be in line with the family type commonly found in Turkey. Seventeen of the sixty-five informants had households with extended family. Each of these seventeen households was said to include a grandparent who required care work. There were at least two and a maximum of four children in each of these households, the majority of which were nuclear families. The number of children in the generations before them, that is, in the families they came from, was at least four and at most seven. Though there had been a decline compared to the average family size in the previous generation, the average number of children in families did not fall below three. Whilst the hometowns of majority of the families were from Central Anatolian cities such as Kırşehir, Konya, Çankırı, Çorum, and Yozgat, there were also families from the provinces of Mediterranean, Black Sea and Southeastern Anatolia region. Most of the informants stated that they had grown up in close-knit families with kinship. Families who came with chain migration
resided in the same neighborhoods, and family and kinship ties and relations played an important role in shaping their social lives.

3.3. Situating and Mapping of the Field

My criteria for selecting neighborhoods in Keçiören as field sites were as follows: how long ago the neighborhood was established, which provides information about its class composition; whether it is a well-established neighborhood or a recently transforming neighborhood from *gecekondu* settlement. I included both lower-middle and lower-class neighborhoods in order to capture class heterogeneity and to better grasp the different manifestations of cultural repertoires and patterns of commonalities. Based on the first two criteria, I classified the neighborhoods of the district, which has a very large population within its vast borders, as central, peripheral, and semi-peripheral. The three of the central neighborhoods were Etilik, Subayevleri and Kalaba, the peripheral neighborhoods were Aktepe, Atapark, and Kuşçağız, and finally the semi-peripheral neighborhoods were Pınarbaşı, 19 Mayıs, and Şenlik. Whilst the first three were established neighborhoods in the southern part of the district, the latter six were peripheral areas with rather lower class inhabitants located in the northern part where had been transformed from *gecekondu* areas into apartment buildings within the last two decades.
During my fieldwork, I found out that various religious orders (tarikats) were concentrated in different neighborhoods of the district. For instance, Hicret Mosque, in Etlik, was mentioned as headquarter of İsmailağa tarikat in Ankara. Certain parts of Etlik, particularly one long street near where the Hicret Mosque was located, was a place where there were their boarding Qur'an courses for female and male students. At these course houses, they organized sohbet on Tuesdays and Thursdays, which were open to women of all ages in the neighborhood. I attended one of them, which was on a Thursday, by invitation from an informant and with her accompany; it was different from other sohbet that I had attended before, both in terms of the interactions between the audience and the female preachers and in terms of

Table 1: Class-based Neighborhood Distribution of Research Settings in Keçiören

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTRAL NEIGHBORHOODS</th>
<th>SEMI-PERIPHERAL NEIGHBORHOODS</th>
<th>PERIPHERAL NEIGHBORHOODS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower-Middle &amp; Middle Class Neighborhoods</td>
<td>Lower &amp; Lower-Middle Class Neighborhoods</td>
<td>Lower Class Neighborhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETLİK Sohbet I</td>
<td>PINARBAŞI Sohbet II &amp; Women's Gathering @ Restaurants I</td>
<td>AKTEPE Sohbet III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KALABA Gym</td>
<td>19 MAYİS Women's Gathering @ Homes II</td>
<td>ATAPARK Women's Gathering @ Homes III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBAYEVLERİ Women's Gathering @ Homes I</td>
<td>ŞENLİK Women's Gathering @ Restaurants II</td>
<td>KUŞCAĞIZ Quran Course</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
its religious content. In Tepebaşı and Kuşçağız neighborhoods, the Qadiriyya (Kadiri) order was said to held regular meetings, but I had no chance to attend. On the other hand, the Ja’fari (Caferi) order was said to be very active in Kalaba neighborhood, particularly around the Allahu Ekber Mosque and in Sancaktepe neighborhood around Muhammediye Mosque. My informants informed me on how different to their own religious practices this sect’s interpretation and practice of Islam were. Though some appeared to sympathize certain religious orders, the majority of my informants did not have direct affiliation with religious orders. That is why I rather preferred to attend to informal sohbet gatherings held regularly in women’s houses, which did not have any apparent religious orders affiliations.
The first setting of the field study was the women’s gatherings; I participated and had been a regular attendant to five different women gatherings. Three of these five gatherings were held in the informants’ own houses in rotation, the other two were held once in a month at kebab houses, cafes or restaurants at the different parts of the district (See Table 1). The second setting of my field was the gender-segregated gym\textsuperscript{11} to which I enrolled at a newly gentrified part of the district. The third setting that I attended was the

\textsuperscript{11} See- \url{http://www.kecioren.bel.tr/Kalaba_Spor_Tesisleri-11-sosyal-tesis.html}
Qur’an course\textsuperscript{12} given by the Directorate of Religious Affairs for a month at a lower-class neighborhood. The last setting was sohbets (informal meetings where women gather together and listen to a religiously learned person, pray communally, and sometimes eat snacks), I regularly attended three different sohbet groups, which were held in three different neighborhoods. The first one of the sohbet groups was in Etlik - a relatively middle class, established neighborhood; the second one was in Aktepe - a peripheral, lower-class neighborhood and the last one was in Pınarbaşı - a semi-peripheral, lower-middle class neighborhood. Thanks to the networks that I was able to develop, two female members of a women’ commission of a political party invited me to join their charity visits, which took place at weekend time.

During the Ramadan, my observation and participation were remarkably intense. I joined iftar meals and attended several teravi prayers. I also attended the opening ceremony of Kuşçağzı Family Life Center, established by Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, which was organized as iftar meal with the participation of the former Prime Minister\textsuperscript{13}. To the iftar meal at Kuşçağzı neighborhood, the participation was extremely high. While the state strata-ministers, mayors, bureaucrats, party members and their family accompanies- were seated at a totally separated terrace, the district residents were seated at the tables filled in the backyard, and in the football and

\textsuperscript{12} See- \url{https://ankara.diyanet.gov.tr/kecioren}

\textsuperscript{13} To see the news about the opening of the center; \url{http://www.ankara.bel.tr/haberler/kuscagiz-aille-yasam-merkezini-bashakan-erdogan-acti/#V12QHWSU/ee0}

About more information about the center: \url{http://www.ankara.bel.tr/index.php?cID=6548}

Keçiören Municipality has also established a gender segregated life center, Yonca Life Center, \url{http://www.kecioren.bel.tr/YONCA_YASAM_MERKEZI-11-proje.html}
basketball pitches. The inadequacy of the iftar meal served to the district’s residents caused serious quarrels involving physical intervention between the residents and security personnel. However, when the then Prime Minister appeared on the huge screen set on the walls across the pitches, the quarrels replaced with the echoes of cheers. The then Prime Minister, whom they could only see on the huge screens, received a round of applause and cheering from the men at the iftar table. Joining men, women, on the other hand, expressed their admiration for his physical traits and looks with loud compliments.

At the first setting of my field study, which was women gatherings, I focused to the emerging and shifting patterns in the sociabilities of women, which relates to their public encounters and visibilities, to the dynamic re-negotiation between private and public space and to their familial middle class aspirations. I also concentrated to the ways women establish, negotiate, and accommodate the social interrelations, and tried to trace how different class dispositions and aspirations were embodied and performed with religious and moral attitudes. In the field study, I had the opportunity to observe vivid vignettes of the evolving dynamics of the tension between religious, traditional, moral sensibilities and the interpretation and convergence of secular, modern, urban lifestyles with changing consumption patterns.
The second setting of my field was the gender-segregated sports center. I enrolled to a municipality-owned sport center\textsuperscript{14}, which is located in Kalaba neighborhood. From the backyard of the gym, which has an open, gender-segregated swimming pool, the former Prime Minister’s house could be seen, and this often incited chatter about him and his family. Membership to this place enabled me to get in contact with the upwardly mobile lower middle and middle class women, several of whom appeared at the parking lot with their expensive cars. How women’s subjective experiences intersect with class differences and religious representations of the body and the imaginaries of an upwardly mobile fractions of the lower middle and middle classes offer insights into emerging ways of life in the district. The relationships I developed here enabled me to identify on the spot how women sought to discipline themselves and how they drew on their repertoires of social-cultural and bodily practices to develop moral, religious and ‘modern’ subjectivities.

The third setting that I attended was the Qur’an course given by the Directorate of Religious Affairs during August for one month. There are 85 Qur’an courses and 225 Qur’an course branches in Keçiören\textsuperscript{15}, among them I participated the one in Kuşçağız neighborhood, at an old neighborhood mosque. Located in the western part of the district, Kuşçağız is one of the oldest gecekondu neighborhoods, which in the last decade occupied by 8 to 10-story apartment buildings with limited infrastructure. In this predominantly urban poor neighborhood, Qur’an courses offered by the

\textsuperscript{14} See- https://www.kecioren.bel.tr/kalaba_spor_tesisleri-11-tesis.html

\textsuperscript{15} See- https://ankara.diyanet.gov.tr/kecioren/Sayfalar/home.aspx
state and several different tarikats (religious orders) were seen as major educational institutions and were in high demand. Attending the Qur'an course in Kuşçağız allowed me to come into contact with lower-class women aged between 21 and 65. For many, Qur'an courses were perceived not only as a place of religious education, but also as places for socializing and networking.

Sohbets -informal gatherings where women gather and listen to a religiously competent person, pray together, and occasionally consume snacks and drinks- were the last setting of my field study. Seen as a regular attendee of almost all available sohbet gatherings, - where the regularity of attendance was appreciated by women as it was perceived as a sign of diligence and respect for religion, I received invitations to sohbets held in homes and led by women preachers, and I systematically followed three of them. I regularly attended three different sohbet groups, which were respectively in Etlik- a more of a middle class, established neighborhood in Keçiören; in Aktepe and lastly in Pınarbaşı- both of two were the district centers with lower-middle and middle classes. Nearly every neighborhood in Keçiören had reputable female preachers. Some of them were affiliated with certain religious sects and were very insistent on inviting women to the sects' regularly organized sohbets. The plurality of religious discourses in these three sohbets pointed to the diversity of ways in which religious people perceive and interpret ‘Islam’ as well as how interactions between women and the female preacher varied. While the question of what it means to be a “better” Muslim was a topic that the female preachers tended to focus on, it can be argued that the participant women were rather engaged in indirectly seeking an answer to this question by inquiring whether various practices and choices in everyday life were
“sinful” or “good”. Fasting during Ramadan was perceived as one of the most basic religious practices that no one could imagine otherwise, meanwhile praying five times a day was said to be practiced regularly by women than men for daily practical reasons. It is safe to say that praying five times a day on a regular basis had become a norm among the women in the district; they encouraged each other to pray and tended to judge those who did not. In interviews, a number of women informants expressed feelings of guilt for having to represent themselves differently in this regard due to pressure from their social circles in the neighborhood. They stated that it was normal for them to miss some prayer times in the hustle and bustle of daily life or for personal reasons. In that regard, one another question was; how the community pressure is legitimized, avoided or accommodated?

Participating to sohbets enabled me to explore diverse ways of negotiations in pursuing a religiously informed way of life that did not preclude aspirations for secular practices and dispositions. In sohbets gatherings, as in women’s meetings, the most emphasized positive qualities of a pious life and religious upbringing were described as having and upholding family values. I was careful not to avoid the narratives and ideas of my female informants on family issues. In all settings, I paid particular attention to patterns of perception and value-making, class-based classification schemes, motives and sources of ‘we-making’s, repertoires of imaginaries, and dynamics of consent and negotiation formations, all of which, I argue, emerge, accommodate, and transform as a result of dialogical processes.
3.4. Ethnographic Engagement

Though it is not easy to grasp the patterns and subtleties of sociality in Keçiören molded by and in negotiation with religious conservatism through participant observation, ethnographic methodology allowed me a first-hand understanding and representation of practices and lived experiences, albeit in a fragmented and limited scope. As a female researcher, my main entry to the field was through the women informants. During the fieldwork, I became familiar with the details of how women of different ages, class positions and educational backgrounds, embedded in different aspects of socio-economic structural dynamics, form, accommodate and negotiate various dispositions. For patterning purposes, I gathered the informants' socio-demographic profiles and class-cultural backgrounds through semi-structured interviews in order to trace how their personal trajectories, habitus and social space create differences in their formation of subjectivities and dispositions. Ethnographic embeddedness allowed me to trace inconsistencies, reconciliations and negotiations that are not necessarily reflected in people’s self-representations in controlled, structured formats like interviews. As Strauss and Cobin argue (1998), ethnography challenged me to give up my own assumptions, and influenced both the way I posed questions and the way I articulated my answers.

During the course of the field study, I did not feel that I had any trouble forming rapport with my informants. Despite the fact that I constantly reminded my informants of my position as a researcher, each individual developed their own perceptions of my position as a researcher, the liminality of my insider/outsider status, and their levels of comfort around
me, especially in the later stages of my long-term ethnographic study. My education, gender, and class background played a role in my informants’ perception of me in the relationships and interactions I established in the field. Their perception of me as a researcher was mostly shaped by the fact that I am a student at Middle East Technical University, one of the most renowned universities in the country, and that I had to complete my coursework. The majority of my informants were mothers who were aspirational about their children’s education and believed that education was still the most viable path to social mobility, even if they now found it difficult. Many of them stated that they would be glad to assist a student in any way they could. Undoubtedly, the fact that I am a female researcher made my fieldwork possible as women made up the majority of participants. In other words, in addition to being a student who strove for graduation and interested in observing their lives, which they considered ordinary and found it difficult to understand why they were the subject of research, being a female researcher made it possible for me to engage in their everyday lives, where gender-based segregation operated tightly.

As the fieldwork progressed and the rapport and trust between us grew, they started making suggestions about my study and telling me events and stories that they thought would attract my attention. Just as I was observing them, they were observing me, and drawing inferences about my curiosities and interests by observing which topics I listened to enthusiastically and what kind of questions I asked. Elaborating on the dynamics of her ethnographic study on young working-class women, Skeggs (1994: 81) states that women liked being involved in the research and that valuing their opinions gave them a better sense of their self-worth. Similar in this fashion,
my informants’ engagement can also be interpreted as a reflection of a change in women’s perceptions of their own self-worth, as they struggled at the beginning of the field study to be convinced of how and why their lives and points of views were important and valuable. As it is widely discussed, researchers pursuing a feminist methodology can affect women informants in ways that lead them to question their lives through their ways of questioning (Maynard, 1994: 32; Letherby, 2003: 14).

The format of my interviews was semi-structured rather than a series of questions presented to the informants with strictly delimited boundaries. I began the interviews with a probe on a short life-history which covers basic socio-demographic information on informant and her/his family. The themes that guided the interview were as follows; personal stories about migration, including accounts of leaving hometown, coming to Ankara, and choosing Keçiören; perceptions on changing dynamics of urban life, local politics and everyday life in Keçiören; perceptions and opinions on anxieties of class mobility and class reproduction; perceptions and opinions on value and significance of the social unit of family, and changing dynamics of gender relations; perceptions on extends, possibilities, and limits of permissiveness of everyday religious life; and perceptions on changing dynamics of urban lifestyles. During the interviews, I guided informants with my questions, but I was attentive to let the informant elaborate as s/he wished. This enabled me to learn and explore different dimensions and dynamics that I had not thought about before. Power dynamics entail and characterize all social interactions, including the dynamics of the relationship between the researcher and the study subjects (Lal, 1996). The feminist ethnographic approach directed me on how to engage in dialogue with informants, by
recognizing asymmetrical power relations (Letherby, 2003: 59). In our dialogues, I allowed women informants to ask me questions about my personal life, by paying utmost attention to the distance that required to be maintained between the researcher and the researched. I noticed that women informants were more willing to talk about their own experiences when they heard about the similar challenges that they face as women in society.

During both my ethnographic engagement and the interviews, I was careful about how I represented myself in terms of bodily codes which could be judged from religiously informed moral normative perspectives. As someone who prefers comfortable and loose-fitting clothes with long skirts, I mostly did not receive any negative, judgmental comments on my choices of clothing. Moreover, on a few occasions, informants commended me for having a modest appearance and manners. Some of the women informants commented that even some veiled women were far less modest in their attire and manners than an unveiled woman like me. On the one hand, this judgmental comment indicates that they were trying to draw similarities between themselves and me, while pointing to my belonging to the ‘other’; on the other hand, it signals to the horizontal divisions and negotiations among veiled women on the representation and coherence of religiosity through dress and behavior. There was one instance when I was evaluated based on my physical appearance; an encounter that I did not anticipate would happen.

It occurred at a sohbet gathering in Etilik- a lower-middle-class neighborhood. A respected female preacher from Konya was expected to attend, and I was told that a group of women I had never met before would be present. In the
gathering, I was asked to sit in the living room of the house we were in; in the section with armchairs where older women usually sat. I went to the place shown to me and sat down. I was not worried about my attire, as I left home wearing looser clothes than usual, knowing that I would be attending a sohbet gathering. The moments when the female preacher was telling stories from the lives of companions of the prophet Muhammad were the moments when people would stare at the preacher and listen in silence. I noticed that several of women in the group were viewing me with disapproval. I checked myself to see if there was a problem with my outfit or if I was sitting inappropriately. Nothing appeared to be wrong. I began to look ahead in discomfort. The bordeaux red nail polish on my hands, which I was holding above my knees was the problem, I later noticed. I didn’t understand exactly why my nail polish attracted attention till my informants later clarified. My initial assumption was that nail polish might have been evaluated as a beauty product that a ‘moral’ woman, who should not be into her looks, should not use, as in a story told by a young female informant. The fact was that the women, knowing that nail polish violates ablution, found it strange that I attended the meeting wearing nail polish on my nails. As a secular person who does not pray, this did not occur to me. Later, young women informants told me that they too loved to wear nail polish and that this problem could be solved with nail polishes on the market that does not violate ablution. With an effort to clarify, they stated that older generations were not aware of the existence of ablution-free nail, so they approached it with old judgments. They also complained that ablution-free nail polish was overpriced compared to regular nail polish and only wealthy women could afford it. This instance exemplifies a tense encounter I had in the field as a researcher, as well as the class aspirations of young women who eagerly
followed and aspired to the latest products put on the market by the beauty industry in accordance with religious rules, even though they cannot afford to buy them.

How women's bodies are represented using clothes and veiling is one of the most tangible ways that the "secular-religious" division manifests itself, which is also where class inequalities between people become evident. During the field study, younger women informants were more perceptive about my appearance and what I was wearing, and they commented based on their likes and dislikes, largely shaped by what they followed on social media platforms. A piece of clothing they noticed on me that they liked/dislike helped to start a number conversation with young women on the axis of class and religiosity. This was quite helpful as I was trying to gain insight on how my informants make sense of their headscarf and their pious bodily representations, what kind of boundaries they establish and how they interpret their experiences. A number of my women informants, the majority of whom were veiled women, made comments about me covering my head by 'May God grant you the opportunity to cover your head' (‘Allah sana da nasip etsin, inşallah’). Some of these women were middle-aged, and some were younger. Therefore, it was difficult to identify an aged-based pattern, but I can state that they were self-assured women who chose pursuing more rigidly religious lifestyles. As manifested in this instance where they suggested or wished me to get veiled, the power hierarchy or asymmetry between the researcher and the researched operated in different orientations. With regard to valued/non-valued bodily dispositions, veiling was placed in a higher position for many of the informants. However, except for a few, the fact that I do not veil was not reflected as a difference to be emphasized.
I think that the fact that I was studying at METU- a secular university known for left-wing opposition- was more effective in forming their perceptions of me as the ‘other’, rather than not having my head covered like most of them. The fact that I was studying at METU was appreciated by middle-aged and older female and male informants. Their initial response when they found out was 'Mashallah' and it helped them to form a positive opinion about me as METU has been recognized as a university where only successful students admitted. In the eyes of some of the younger male and female informants, on the other hand, I happened to be perceived with various othering labels such 'leftist', 'dissident' and 'irreligious', as they mentioned when talking about METU students in conversations. I was questioned about my political stance on current political issues, in particular due to my METU affiliation, which I sought to bypass with short answers such as 'I don't know' or 'I couldn't follow it', and I redirected them by saying 'Your opinion is important, not mine'. It was mostly male informants who were more inclined to discuss political issues and less hesitant to confront and inquire about them. However, in this respect, the gender hierarchy often took primacy over the perceived differences based on class and educational attainment in my encounters with male informants. Since I contacted the male informants through their spouses, initial introductions and interviews with the male informants proceeded without any trust issues. Older male informants referred to me as 'my daughter' as they saw me as a young female student, while younger male informants preferred to call me 'ma'am', treating me relatively more equal, but at the same time careful to preserve a distance. During the interviews, male informants were accompanied by their wives; except for four interviews that took place in the pergolas in their gardens and two interviews that took place on the balconies of their houses, the others
were conducted in the living room of the house. In a nutshell, the "secular-religious" dichotomy, operating as a framework for encounters and interactions in everyday life as a result of the societal polarization brought on by the current political climate, also shaped and influenced field dynamics with its various connotations.
CHAPTER 4

THE MAKING & REMAKING OF KEÇİÖREN

4.1. Introduction

Keçiören, one of the oldest districts of the capital *ex nihilo*, Ankara, has been recognized as an Islamist stronghold and a symbolic space of nationalist conservative revival for the last three decades. The district also has a reputation as a ‘backward’, ‘fascist’, ‘macho’, ‘varoş’ enclave in the eyes of the secular socio-cultural fractions in Ankara. However, during the early Republican period, the district was a preferred residential area for the founding elites and bureaucrats and was known for its vineyard houses. The socio-spatial patterns and socio-economic demography in Keçiören, where was not included in the capital city’s initial urban development plan, began to transform, particularly from the mid-1950s on. Long known as a lower and lower-middle class district with a concentration of *gecekondu* (Güvenç, 2001), it was the late 1990s and early 2000s when the district gained particular recognition for its emerging urban spatial political features. The eclectic uses of Turkish-Islamic images, signs, and symbols in public spaces in the district were construed as drastic attempts to contest the capital’s secular ideals (Aydın et al, 2003; Sargın, 2004; Ertuna, 2005; Bostanlioğlu, 2008). As a matter of fact, the then and now re-elected mayor’s aspiration to cultivate a pre-Republican historical narrative manifests itself across urban public spaces (Sargın, 2004). The monument in front of the Keçiören municipality building
features busts of sixteen Turkish state founders\(^\text{16}\) together with a statue of Atatürk. The façade of the municipality building, where a \(\text{tuğra}\)-calligraphic seal of the sultan, a hadith\(^{17}\) excerpt, the phrase “\(\text{Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene}\)” with Atatürk’s signature, and a small portrait of Fatih Sultan Mehmet are displayed, reveals the main motifs of the contesting ideological projection. Inscribed in the urban public spaces of the district, these items, phrases, and symbols accentuate Islam, Turkishness, and the Ottoman legacy. After two decades under the incessant AKP rule, the district of Keçiören, with its urban spatial manifestations, now appears to stand as one of the early exemplars rather than an ‘alarming’ instance.

With its historically proliferated and hybridized urban class-cultural forms, Keçiören presents a diverse array of nationalist, Islamist conservative practices and embodiments. I strive to explore and understand the current sociality in Keçiören as a relational product of its socio-spatial processes and relations, which constitutes one of the three axis that this study is based on. Drawing upon the analytical assumption that “social space is a social product” (Lefebvre, 1991), I attempt to situate the emergent and inherited practices of nationalist Islamist conservatism in their peculiar context by

\(^{16}\) The monument was constructed in the early 2000s. The trope of representing the sixteen Turkish states was reiterated in 2015 at a welcoming ceremony where President Erdoğan met with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the Presidential Complex. On that occasion, soldiers dressed in garments to impersonate the sixteen Turkish state troops; among them, the one dressed in a robe-like garment was particularly mocked on the social media platforms.


https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/iste-16-turk-devleti,WUvx8bQCDky1gvSmzD7TuA

\(^{17}\) The quoted hadith reads as ‘The best of people is the one who is beneficial to others’ (‘\(\text{İnsanların en hayırlısı insanlara faydalı olandır}\)’).
examining how the changing urban space in Keçiören both engenders and has been engendered by diverse nationalist Islamist conservative class-cultural embodiments. Unpacking the intricacies between the production of space and power relations enables us to generate a more nuanced understanding of Islamic conservatism as the spatial relations enclose class-cultural, gendered negotiations, and the dynamics of domination and subordination. In this chapter, I trace out and explore the historical socio-spatial trajectory and transformation of the district in order to better capture the emergence and shifting dynamics of Islamic conservative imaginations and practices in the (re)making of the district.

Following Bourdieu’s holistic approach, Wacquant (2008: 9) contends that it is crucial to reassess the “state and fate” of a scale of city under examination, as well as its position in the hierarchy within the city, those which are materialized and appropriated in the “diachronic sequence of historical transformations”. Following this perspective, by situating the socio-spatial (trans)formation of Keçiören within the larger urban development of Ankara, I aim to examine the shifting struggles over the production of urban space with a particular focus on what Lefebvre (1991) calls “representations of space”. One of the three overlapping components of Lefebvre’s spatial triad, representations of space (conceived space), refers to the space informed and produced by the logic of dominating political power, hegemonic ideology\(^\text{18}\), and dominant economic mode of production (Lefebvre, 1991: 33). For the sake of analytical clarity, I treat conceived space separately here. I examine the

\(^\text{18}\) Lefebvre elaborates on the relationship between the space and ideology as follows: “What is an ideology without a space to which it refers, a space which it describes, whose vocabulary and links it makes use of, and whose code it embodies?” (1991, 44).
other co-constitutive components; *perceived space*, which entails “daily routine and urban reality” (ibid.: 38), and *lived space*, which is “directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’” (ibid.: 39), in the upcoming chapters by drawing on my ethnographic fieldwork.

### 4.2. Historical Socio-Spatial Trajectory of the District of Keçiören

In her memoir ‘The Turkish Ordeal’ (1928), Halide Edib Adıvar notes *Ziraat Mektebi* (the School of Agriculture) in Keçiören as: “…the building within which it was destined that a new government and a new republic should be created. On the northern side of Angora, six kilometers away, is a low hill among other hills.”

Halide Edib’s mention of the place encapsulates the spirit of the period, imbued with the national will. *Ziraat Mektebi*, established in 1907 as part of the Ottoman Empire’s policy to develop agriculture, served a historical mission as headquarters during the War of Independence. The building was used as a headquarters between December 27, 1919 and April 23, 1920, and hosted Mustafa Kemal and the representative council.

---

19 In her memoir, Adıvar writes that the building was ‘erected by the Unionists’. As part of the policy to develop and promote agriculture during 1895-1897, the School of Agriculture in Keçiören was opened in 1908 (Aysal, 2007). Etöz mentions that the School of Agriculture was established under the Numune Farm on May 6, 1895. Ankara, which held the world’s angora monopoly in the 18th century, lost this production feature in the 19th century. The school was among the measures undertaken to increase Angora goat production. Etöz (1998: 85) notes that despite being a remarkable modernization attempt, this measure was not sufficient to revive the industry, which had collapsed completely by the end of the 19th century.

20 I quoted from the original piece written in English by Adıvar. ‘The Turkish Ordeal’ was translated into Turkish as ‘Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı’ in 1962 with some modifications (Adak, 2003: 511).

21 During Mustafa Kemal and the representative committee’s stay at Keçiören *Ziraat Mektebi*, the establishment of news agency ‘Anatolian Agency’ was initiated. And it was founded on April 6th, 1920.
brief place of Keçiören in the 1919 Independence Movement is often-neglected in historical narratives, given the chapter of the new capital began with the district of Çankaya. It does, however, register as a significant historical event for the urban trajectory of Keçiören. During the spatial formation of the capital from *ex nihilo*, the location of the headquarters in the district helped to shape the district’s socio-demographic composition, and as Cengizkan (2002: 41) argues even led to an –unrealized- anticipation that the district would be a prospective central district of the capital.

Keçiören, rather, has gained recognition in the socio-political imaginary of Turkey with the choice of the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to live in the district in 2003, instead of the prime minister’s residence in Çankaya, the district known as the symbol of the Republic. Reinforcing the district’s conservative image, this decision, along with a set of related political dualities, was predicated on a political narrative that pits the “victimized religious masses” against the “privileged secular minority”, tapping into Turkey’s major axes of political struggle. As a result of the uneven development of the capital, Keçiören has historically been situated and developed at the periphery of the class-divided urban topography of Ankara. When taken within the local context of Keçiören’s development trajectory, this ideologically charged maneuver to choose Keçiören over Çankaya hints also at how the district’s socio-demographic character has evolved over the course of Republican history.


22 See also- http://www.kecioren.gov.tr/cumhuriyet-tarihi-ve-ilcemiz
As Massey (1995: 185) argues the (counter)claims on a place’s present character are based on competing interpretations of its past, which inextricably include forms of invention. Along the same lines, I pose and seek to explore the following questions: How does the shifting Islamist-conservative imagination of Keçiören’s past inform the socio-spatial constitution of Keçiören’s present, and how does it relate and resonate with its search of political legitimacy over representations of this ‘locality’ and its ‘people’? Keçiören, one of the oldest districts of the capital *ex nihilo*, has a limited spatial heritage from which to generate historical representations. Among these, as I mentioned above, the historic building *Ziraat Mektebi*, which once served as a headquarters, sets an example which crystallizes competing histories. Symbolic meanings assigned to the historical instance that the headquarters under the command of Mustafa Kemal was briefly located in Keçiören have varied over the years. The ways in which the legacy of *Ziraat Mektebi* has been appropriated would help to reveal shifting representations of space in the district as well as demands of political legitimacy through the ties forged between the past and the present.

 Governed by mayors elected from nationalist and Islamist-conservative parties since 1994, and the local governance practices in Keçiören have been tailored to the contextual dynamics of the AKP’s political agenda since 2002. Within the AKP’s political trajectory, the 2010s marked a juncture when, with

---

23 According to official documents, there were three Ottoman fountains and the zawiya of Şeyh Muzaffer; none of which have survived. Other than the Manastır Bridge and the ruins of the Vank Monastery, there are no significant remnants of the Ottoman past. The tomb of Hacı Bayram Veli’s (1352-1430) mother, located in Yeşilöz neighborhood in Keçiören, was recently repaired and recognized as part of the Ottoman past. Ankara School of Agriculture is one of the buildings remaining from the Ottoman Empire in the district.
the result of the 2010 constitutional referendum, Erdoğan raised the stakes in the debates around *kulturkampf* in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 2011). In particular, for Keçiören, it was a period when Altınok was not nominated due to an intra-party conflict and another candidate took his place. Turgut Altınok (1994-2009), who started his political career in Hearths of Idealism24 (*Ülkü Ocakları*), used to refer to the historical significance of what Keçiören witnessed during the War of Independence and particularly Atatürk’s brief stay in the district. In contrast to Islamists’ widespread criticism of the uses of the Atatürk cult (see Saktanber, 1997: 142; Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 199), Altınok did not refrain from invoking the cult of Atatürk. Set as a prelude to the district’s history, it also served as a benchmark for the district’s historical trajectory. In contrast, the symbolic historical significance of the *Ziraat Mektebi*, as a space of testimony, was neither acknowledged nor included in the local government’s historical narratives of the district during Mustafa Ak’s tenure (2009-2019), who hailed from the AKP’s party administration cadres, and the building has been left to rot25. Forgetting of the first headquarters’ symbolic significance in the district inextricably linked to the Islamist conservative municipality’s ambition to foster a counter-history. In other words, this act of forgetting is part of the struggles over the production of space; relating to anti-Kemalist sentiments in the Islamist political

24 Hearths of Idealism was initially founded in 1968 as a youth organization to fight communism. Affiliated with the Nationalist Movement Party, the organization has been identified as the militant wing of the party and has been suspected of having close ties with the Turkish mafia.

25 The Chamber of Architects in Ankara announced in 2018 that they filed a criminal complaint against the Minister of Culture. According to the statement, the Ministry of Culture failed to fulfill its responsibility to preserve the historic building, which currently faces demolition.

imagination, it pertains to the increasingly evident efforts of the AKP to conceal certain symbols in representations of space.

Here, it would be pertinent to provide an example of how the municipality attempted to imbue the district with an Islamic character by drawing on the AKP’s accumulated pool of discursive symbols. In the early 2010s, the long-forgotten grave of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s Nakshibendi Sheikh Abdülhakim Arvasi (1865-1943) in Bağlum-Keçiören was restored as a tomb and resurrected as one of the district’s symbols. Erdoğan, at the opening of a recreation area in 2015, stated that “Keçiören is surrounded by the spiritual-moral armor of Abdülhakim Arvasi.”

The municipality, with the goal of making it a tradition, initiated a commemorative program for Arvasi in 2013. The commemoration program, however, was abruptly halted three years later, and when the successor mayor from the same political party took office, it was completely removed off the agenda. Attempts to make Arvasi’s long-forgotten grave a symbol of the district and then the abandonment of such efforts when in fact they failed to garner the desired attention exemplify how competing histories are shaped by shifting articulations of polarized politics as well as internal/intra-party struggles.

26 See https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/32151/gezi-ve-17-25-aralikta-basaramadiginizi-7-haziranda-yapabileceginizi-saniyorsaniz-cok-yanilyorsunuz

Erdoğan’s visit to Arvasi’s tomb. See-


27 At one of the commemoration programs, the district governor remarked that ‘Keçiören is a fortunate/blessed place since Arvasi was buried here’, adding, ‘This cannot be a coincidence’. News on the memorial program- https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/arvasi-hazretleri-keciorenede-anildi-40288951

Alike, the long-neglected symbolic historical significance of the *Ziraat Mektebi* was remembered six months following the 2019 local elections. Turgut Altınoğlu, the incumbent mayor, who was re-elected after a ten-year hiatus and previously served as mayor for fifteen years, announced that the *Ziraat Mektebi* will be converted into a museum. "Keçiören is one of the symbolic places of our Republic and the national struggle," he said, after acknowledging that the building has long been neglected. The results of the 2019 local elections, in which the AKP lost control of 11 of the metropolitan municipalities after 25 years, appear to have played a key role in the remembering of the long-neglected historic building. When coupled with the contours of Altınoğlu’s election campaign, the return of the *Ziraat Mektebi* signals a shift in perspective prompted by and accommodated to the discontent with coercive polarized politics, and the restored political credibility of Mustafa Kemal.

The ways in which the representations of Keçiören’s recent past are transposed, articulated, and invented in the changing rhetoric of political discourse also inform the ways in which contours of ‘locality’ and ‘people’ in Keçiören are molded accordingly. To better grasp the district’s transformation into a nationalist and Islamic-conservative stronghold, in this chapter, I examine the historically evolving positionality of Keçiören within a

28 https://www.kecioren.bel.tr/keciorene_2_milli_mucadele_muzesi_birden_yapilacak-1029-haber.html


http://www.mimarlarodasiankara.org/?Did=11154

relational grid of socio-spatial processes tangled in webs of political struggles. Rather than presenting a chronological account of the district, I periodize so as to demarcate the historical processes entailing social, economic and political repercussions. In doing so, I resort to some discursive labels employed by politicians themselves. Accordingly, under roughly four phases, I examine the continuous struggles over the production of space in the district of Keçiören. In order to address the contextual peculiarities of Keçiören, I briefly highlight a number of junctures in the district’s local political history. I also allude to the diverse fragments that shed light on the spatial appropriations that shape the district’s spatial and hence social transformation.

4.2.1. Republican Capital’s Vineyards

In the 1920s, after being chosen first as the base of the War of Independence and then as the new capital city, Ankara witnessed an influx of members of parliament, civil servants, and journalists (Tekeli, 1982; Tankut, 1993). What the Istanbulite founding cadres encountered was “a barren, neglected small town with mud bricks in the middle of Anatolia” (Ağaoğlu, 1964: 39), devastated by fire and malaria disasters (Şenol-Cantek, 2004). Due both to a shortage of housing and the poor conditions of existing houses in the city center, the Istanbulite newcomers preferred dwellings in vineyard settlements at the city’s outskirts (Kurtoğlu, 2004; Şenol-Cantek, 2004). Keçiören was one of these vineyard settlements chosen for accommodation.

---

30 The vineyard settlements in Ankara were Etilik, Keçiören, Büyük Esat, Ayrancı, Dikmen and Çankaya (Etöz, 1998: 90)
The proximity of the district to the now-old city center and the location of the headquarters were other significant factors said to shape the political elite’s residential preferences, until after Mustafa Kemal relocated to Çankaya (Cengizkan, 2002; Kurtoğlu, 2004).31

Before the Republican period, Keçiören32, favored for its good air quality, had been a summer residence for mostly wealthier Armenian and Greek Christians and a smaller number of Muslim traders, as well as a promenade for lower-income groups (Koç, 1973; Etoz, 1998; Kurtoğlu, 2004; Aydın et. al., 2005). The ownership of a vineyard house was one of the markers that drew symbolic boundaries between classes in 19th-century Ankara (Etoz, 1998: 146). Keçiören’s vineyards and mansions were among the most valuable in Ankara (Etoz, 1998; Ortaýt, 2014). One of the few remaining vineyard houses in the district, which currently functions as a research center33, belongs to the Koç family, an established Ankara local and one of Turkey’s leading entrepreneurs. Vehbi Koç’s (1901-1996) recollection of Keçiören, as a witness of the pre- and the early Republican Ankara, is noteworthy, given the scarcity of historical documents on the district’s trajectory. Stating that life at vineyards was part of wealthier Ankara locals’ seasonal routines, Koç mentions the district as follows: “Keçiören used to be mostly populated by Armenians. I envied the vehicles, horses, and apparel of the inhabitants of

31 The district was home to many prominent military and political figures including Fevzi Çakmak, Kazım Orbay, Celal Bayar, Recep Peker, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, Reşit Galip, Ahmet Hamdi Aksêki, Hasan Saka, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Yusuf Akçura (Cengizkan, 2002).

32 Other than Christian clergymen living in two monasteries, one of which later converted into a sanatorium, there were not many permanent residents (Kurtoğlu, 2004).

33 https://vekam.ku.edu.tr/en/
Keçiören.”34 (quoted in Dündar, 2006). After the majority of Armenians left Ankara, he says, their properties were sold and passed down to the city’s newcomers35. The shift in exchange of property can be traced in his son Rahmi Koç’s (born in 1930) account of the district, where he underlines that they were surrounded by “very decent neighbors” by listing a number of Turkish-descent members of parliament and civil servants36. Owning a house in the vineyards served as a status-marker in the early Republican Ankara, in the same way it did in the nineteenth century Ankara, and many MPs and bureaucrats bought vineyard houses (Bilgen, 1985).

Cengizkan (2002: 41), citing pre-1924 urban planning documents, notes that the urban development direction of Ankara was thought to be towards Keçiören and Etilik during the War of Independence. The urban development


35 After Ankara became the center of the National Struggle, the wealth of the non-Muslim minorities caused more discontent than before (Şenol-Cantek, 2003: 303). Şenol-Cantek (2003: 305-306) quotes a dialogue between Mustafa Kemal and Ademzade Ahmet Bey, an Ankara local, which is taken from Şeref Erdoğan (1999: 25):- a researcher who worked on old Ankara. The dialogue takes place during the War of Independence when Mustafa Kemal resided in Keçiören. While two were watching the scenery of vineyards in Keçiören, “Mustafa Kemal envies the three-storey houses scattered dot-by-dot among emerald-like greenery and asks: – That beautiful mansion, whose is it? Who does it belong to? – Agopzades. – And that mansion? – Bodos Efendi’s. – And that mansion on the hill? – Ohannes Efendi’s. Upset with the answers he got, Mustafa Kemal Pasha turned and left.”

direction of the new capital, however, was projected towards the south of the railway line in 1924 (Cengizkan, 2004), and was implemented with the Jansen plan, which began in 1932 (Altaban, 1998). Mustafa Kemal’s choice to stay in Çankaya was undoubtedly decisive in determining this process (Şenyapılı, 2004). Keçiören, to the north of the railway line, was planned to be preserved as a vineyard settlement and was left out of the Jansen plan (Şenyapılı, 2005). Nonetheless, the city had already spread towards Keçiören before the new residential settlements in the south were established (Nalbantoğlu, 1984: 303). The Republican cadres, those who preferred to buy houses in the Keçiören vineyards to be close to the first headquarters and the old city center, did not abandon the district right away (Kurtoğlu, 2004).

Among those, Recep Peker, a military officer and politician who served as prime minister and held several ministerial positions, is often acknowledged for his contributions to the district’s development (Cengizkan, 2004; Terzioğlu, 2010; Kurtoğlu, 2004; Şenol-Cantek, 2003). Peker’s presence in the district at the time not only increased the value of the real estate in the district (Şenol-Cantek, 2003: 143; Terzioğlu, 2010: 63), but also enabled some infrastructural improvements (Terzioğlu, 2010: 63). Naming streets after local historical figures is common in municipal practices; however, in Keçiören, there are no streets named after Peker. This is most likely due to his unpopularity among Islamist-conservative circles.

37 The first asphalted double-lane road in the vineyards regions of Ankara was said to be built in front of his mansion in Keçiören (Terzioğlu, 2010: 117, 122).

38 The name of this first asphalt road, built thanks to Peker, was Çiftasfalt, which was later renamed to Fatih. Inhabitants of the district, however, continue to refer to it as Çiftasfalt.
Ankara grew from a small settlement with a population of 20,000 in the early 1920s to 75,000 in 1927, and to 120,000 in 1935 (Altaban, 1998). Apart from the agricultural sector, military and civil bureaucrats appointed after the Republic made up about half of the working population in Ankara in 1927 (Nalbantoğlu, 1984: 254). With the growing numbers of Istanbulites, the everyday cultural fabric of the city underwent changes (Şenol-Cantek, 2003). As it is widely covered in scholarly studies, reflected in literary works and mentioned in autobiographies, the discrepancy between the locals and founding cadres was evident in public spaces such as streets and official occasions (Baydar-Nalbantoğlu, 1997; Şenol-Cantek, 2003). In a developing capital with limited public space, domestic life served as a significant extension of public life where the founding elites displayed the new Republic’s modern ideals (Nalbantoğlu, 1984: 295). Alike, vineyard settlements in Ankara evolved into places where a particular way of life flourished and where high cadres led isolated lives during the early years of the Republic (Nalbantoğlu, 1984; Bilgin, 1985; Cengizkan, 2002). The collage

---


Donated by Hatice Gonnet Bağana, the archive covers three generations of a family, encompassing late Ottoman and early Republican period. The archive belongs to Mehmed Said Bey (1865-1928), a graduate of the Imperial School (Galatasaray High School) who worked as an interpreter at the Ottoman place. In the project booklet, it is said that Said Bey is defined as a ‘caricature of a bourgeois Istanbulite’ by French historians. The collage below is a work of Hakkı Bey, Said Bey’s son or grandson, yet there are no specifics on him at the project. Hakkı Bey is also the one sticking out his tongue, second person from the left in the collage. The couple on the right is Nesrin and Mehmet Ali Bağana who moved to Keçiören due to husband’s job as an agricultural engineer. Nesrin Bağana is Said Bey’s granddaughter; unfortunately, no further information about her can be found at the sources. Mehmet Ali Bağana was one of the first high-ranking bureaucrats working on the land reform. The couple’s family photographs document not only their everyday and family lives- family gatherings, entertainment with friends, interiors and exteriors of their home, and also the early Republican
below, which reads Keçiören 1936 on the right end, is a rare and remarkable piece depicting emergent urban culture in the early Republican Keçiören. Not only it exhibits the emerging modern way of life and also provides a fragment to the narrative on the formation of a new capital city as “built from scratch”.

Figure 2: A collage by Hakkı Tez, Keçiören 1936. SALT Research, Said Bey Archive.

Keçiören here is sketched as a rather barren settlement at the foot of hills, with several houses, some with gardens, scattered around a two-lane road with electric poles. The two cheerful couples perched atop the hills, particularly the stylish women wearing hats in compliance with the cultural

Ankara’s emergent urban culture. In particular, the ones in Keçiören, are rare documents of the period. For the collection of photos, see-

https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/moderni%CC%87-sergi%CC%87lemek/QQnw7UgX?hl=tr
reforms at the time powerfully depict the modern way of life embraced by Istanbulite cadres in the capital. The two-lane road with electric poles in the sketch, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a sign of the district’s relative infrastructural development, since the Keçiören of the 1920s was mentioned as having muddy pathways and complete darkness at nights (Aydemir, 1990: 219).

The article, published in the Ulus newspaper\(^{40}\) in 1935 and titled “One of Ankara’s most beautiful spots: What kind of a place is Keçiören?”, is also noteworthy as it reveals how the district was portrayed and presented to the public, as well as it features rare photos of the district from that period. *Hakimiyeti Milliye* newspaper (renamed Ulus in 1934), as Şenol-Cantek (2003: 61) writes, in its effort to consolidate the position of Ankara both as the new capital city and the symbol of the new regime, drew on the ‘Ankara-Istanbul’ contention. A parallel effort of the newspaper was to persuade the public that Ankara possessed urban qualities (Şenol-Cantek: 2003).

---

\(^{40}\) The initial name of the newspaper was *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, it was renamed *Ulus* in 1934. *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, founded by Mustafa Kemal in 1920, served to circulate the ideological pursuits of the Republican regime. Mustafa Kemal wrote editorial pieces in the newspaper. Hamdullah Suphi, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Recep Peker, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Falih Rifki were among the editorial staff of the newspaper (Şenol-Cantek, 2003).
Figure 3: An article on the district of Keçiören in Ulus newspaper, 1935

The gist of the article on Keçiören is likewise disclosed at the outset which reads “Ankara is neither a small nor a dull place”. The author reluctantly concedes Ankara’s lack of recreational facilities and urges ‘the duty of

---

41 In the second paragraph, the author explains what was expected from places; “… the places to be open-minded, a cup of coffee to drink is clean, a glass of beer to be cold, and these beverages to be served on a clean tablecloth”. Though the expectations appear to be humble, it is fair to state that it contains a latent arrogance. (“Ancak bir subaşı, bir ağac altı artık modern Ankaralıya yetmemektedir. Azat gün yahut akşamüstü işinden çıkmaktan sonra gezip göreceği yerlerin hoşgörülü, içeceği bir fincan kahvenin temiz, bir bardak bıranın soğuk olmasına ve bu bir fincan kahveyi veya bir bardak birayı kirsız örtülü bir masanın başında ve rahat bir kanepede oturup içmek istiyorlar. İşte Ankara’da böyle yerler azdır.”)
endearing Ankara to those who do not know it well’. Keçiören is presented as a pleasant summer resort, with regular bus services to its village club, which is mentioned to be superior to its European counterparts. The included photos depicting asphalted, landscaped roads, mansions, and socializing spaces in greenery serve to highlight the district’s orderly, clean and modernizing features. Following the 1930s, vineyard areas of Ankara that were not included in the Jansen plan also developed into small centers with relatively good roads, small shops and recreational facilities (Bilgen, 1985: 19). A female painter, who lived with her family in Keçiören during the 1940s, mentions a vibrant urban public life on the boulevard in front of Peker’s mansion: “In the evenings, everyone put on their most beautiful clothes and strolled just like in Beyoğlu” (Terzioğlu, 2010: 122). In personal memories from the 1930s and 1940s, Keçiören is described as a district with an emerging urban publicness, as well as with limited but popular recreational places (Terzioğlu, 2010).

During the early Republican period, Keçiören, where was known for its vineyards, grew from a summer resort for Ankara locals to a permanent residential area. In a city with a severe housing shortage, well-kept vineyard houses (bağevleri), which mostly used to be owned by wealthy non-Muslim

42 The village club mentioned in the Ulus article must have been the one in Gazino, after which the neighborhood was named. Gazino, which is close to both Peker’s and Koç’s mansions, is frequently mentioned by those who witnessed the period for its popularity in Ankara in the 1930s (Şenol-Cantek, 2003: 353, Terzioğlu, 2010).

locals, provided alternative for the Istanbulite founding cadres. The district lost its appeal as residence among the founding cadres after Mustafa Kemal relocated to Çankaya. Nonetheless, thanks to being preferred for residence by the Republican cadres, albeit modest, the district not only developed infrastructure and also witnessed a shift in urban public culture. Due to the conditionally granted housing permits, on the grounds of maintaining its feature as a vineyard as stipulated by the Jansen Plan, housing construction in Keçiören was scarce until the mid-1950s (Kurtoğlu, 2004: 33; Terzioğlu, 2010). During this period, surrounded by vineyards and crossed by a clear-running Çubuk stream, Keçiören was known as a place where immigrants and Armenian locals cohabited (Kurtoğlu, 2004; Terzioğlu, 2010; Ortaçlı, 2014).

4.2.2. Remaining at the Other Side of Sıhhiye Bridge Threshold

Ankara witnessed the emergence of a contesting duality of lifestyles in the early 1920s (Nalbantoğlu, 1984: 254). Vala Nurettin, who came to Ankara in 1921 to join the National Struggle, uses the following analogy to describe the chasm between the incoming civil servants and the local people: “… it is like a mixture of olive oil and vinegar… they (civil servants) were attempting to cling to the top in the same way as olive oil clings to surface. Locals, on the other side, were sour as vinegar to them” (1969: 88-89). The cultural antagonism between Westernized, Istanbulite bureaucratic elites and rural Anatolians is also a recurring theme in Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu’s
renowned novel, *Ankara* (1934), which spans the years 1921 through 1943\(^4\). When Istanbulite protagonist Selma came to Ankara, she was not only disappointed by the city’s spatial and climatic features, as were many of the parliamentarians and bureaucrats of the First Assembly, she also found locals to be ‘impolite’ and ‘ignorant’. On the other hand, the lifestyles and physical appearances of newly arrived Istanbulites, particularly of women, were unfamiliar to Ankara locals\(^4\). There is a noteworthy dialog (this one takes place during the War of Independence) between Selma and one of her local neighbors, both of whom dwell in the now-old city center, which also reflects the changing cultural landscape of Keçiören at the time. In this fictional conversation, when Selma told her neighbor that they came back from Etlik, in Keçiören, she was met with wonder. The local neighbor woman asks her whether she has seen the rider, who is said to be “a male from the waist down, a female from the waist up”\(^4\), relaying what Kalaba (in Keçiören) villagers told with bewilderment. The local woman also adds that ‘many more strange things are happening in the vineyards’.

How and in what ways the early Republican-era spatial (trans)formation of Ankara accommodated the complexities of inherited and emerging social

\(^{44}\) See Baydar, 1997; Cantek, 2003.

\(^{45}\) Şenol-Cantek (2003), in her study on the transformation of Ankara into the capital, mentions that ‘strangers’ (dişarılıklı) was the name given by the locals of Ankara to the incoming civil servants who came to Ankara during the National Struggle and the first years of the Republic, whom were mostly ‘urbanities’. Kurucu kadronun, kendilerine yaban adını veren yerli halkı ‘yabani’ gibi gördüğüne dair anlatılara da sık rastlandığını yazar (p.163).

disparities remains a contested political matter. Ankara has been a stage for
contesting ideologies and tactically referred by political actors to convey
ideological narratives of Turkey’s past, present, and future throughout the
Republican era. Once the ‘new’ against the ‘old’, Ankara now represents the
past and the status quo (Saktanber, 2009). In 2015, at Hacı Bayram Veli
mosque, President Erdoğan addressed the socio-spatial division created
during the establishment of the new capital; the resentment of people to the
belittling attitudes and not being allowed beyond Sıhhiye due to their local
attire; the ‘authentic’ qualities of the capital; and the ‘denial’ of its religious
origins.47 The socio-spatial transformation process during the early
Republican period matters, particularly given its foundational feature; as its
controversial and troublesome repercussions cannot be denied. However,
pinning the source of the social discrepancies entirely to the first quarter of
the Republican period’s reforms serves only to reinforce the political
storyline constructed on the divide of ‘secular vs. conservative’.

The spatial transformation of the early Republican Ankara has generated a
divided social topography and Sıhhiye, the focal point of the railway line
cutting the city along north-south axes, has long been a threshold (Bademli,
1985; Tankut, 1993; Şenyapılı, 2004). The direction of urban development

47 ‘Ankara asında bir Ahi, İslam şehridir. Ankara, Selçuklunun, Osmanlı’nın şehridir... Fakat bir dönem
geldi ki, bu şehri adeta ikiye böldüler. Yeni inşa edilen Ankara ile şehrin güneyi ile eski Ankara’yi, bu
bölgeyi karşı karşıya getirdiler. Bu ülkede, millete’göbeğini kaşıyan adamlar, bidon kafalılar’ diyenler,
’baldırı çiplak’ diyenler, kilğına kıyafetine bakarak insanınızı Sıhhiye ötesine almayanlar,
isyanlarımızın gönül dünyasında ciddi kirlımlara yol açtı. Hatta öyle ileri gittiler ki, ‘Kabe Arap’ın
olsun, bize Çankaya yete’ diyenler, Hacı Bayram Veli’yı, yani gerçek Ankara’yı hafızamızdan silmek
istediler, kazmak istediler. Başaramadılar. Çünkü bu millet hiçbir zaman aslına inkar etmedi. Tam
tersine köklerine sıkı sıkıya bağlı kaldı’. Retrieved from
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/32345/bir-sehir-insaatcilardan-cok-manevi-mimarlar-tarafindan-
sa-edilir

77
within the city was a major source of contention, which marked the first quarter of the Republican Ankara. This contention is commonly articulated and referred to as the “old-new Ankara duality” (Tekeli, 1987; Tankut, 1993; Şenyapılı, 2004). While deciphering the symbolic implications charged by the changing political regime’s quests; this dualistic framework tends to cast out the other major relational causes of the spatial process molded around economic conflicts. Indisputably, the decision to leave the old capital Istanbul behind in order to construct a new capital city (a prototype national space) was inextricably tied to the new Republic’s strive to forge a new present severed from the Ottoman past (Bozdoğan, 1997). In a similar vein, instead of developing the old center of Ankara, which represented the Empire’s remnants, a brand-new center was constructed, which was designed to embody the spatial qualities of the modern nation-state (Tekeli, 1987; Tankut, 1993). On the other hand, key determinants in the realization of Ankara’s spatial formation, which outstripped the symbolically-laden quests of the ‘new’, were initially the difficulties in the expropriation of land and then the rising demand for and the conflicts over urban rent (Bademli, 1985; Tankut, 1993; Tekeli, 1994; Şenyapılı, 2004; Sarıoğlu, 2001). The actors of the ‘old-new’ tension were the wealthier local tradesmen who owned land in the historic center and fueled the speculation over the expropriation, and the newly arriving Republican cadres aspired to benefit from emergent urban rent (Sarıoğlu, 2001: 38; Şenyapılı, 2004: 37; Şenol-Cantek, 2003). Whilst former supported the development of the existing center, and the latter

---

48 In 1925, the area towards Sihhiye-Yenişehir-Kızılay direction was expropriated. Implemented due to the immediate need to solve the housing crisis, this expropriation decision determined the dual structure of Ankara divided by the railroad, which is also addressed as the beginning of the Old Ankara- New Ankara dichotomy (Bademli, 1985; Sarıoğlu, 2001; Şenyapılı, 2004; Şenol-Cantek, 2003).
proposed the formation of a new one with qualities of a modern capital (Bademli, 1985; Şenyapılı, 2004). When the decision to establish new center was made, the Republican elite received preferential treatment in the distribution of urban land, which was one of the most valuable financial assets (Aydın, 2019). The urban land rent generated by the spatial formation of Ankara served as a means of developing a new Republic’s bourgeoisie with a Western way of life (Tekeli, 1994; Tankut, 2000; Saroğlu, 2001; Şenol-Cantek, 2003).

In the making of the new capital, the most troublesome aspect of the spatial (trans)formation was the emergence of symbolic and spatial boundaries in the practice of everyday life (Baydar-Nalbantoğlu, 1997; Şenol-Cantek, 2003). The quest for a new capital entailed socio-spatial configurations that were compatible with and conducive to the new Republic’s goal of forming a new subjectivity for its citizens (Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1997). The ways in which spatial transformation permeated social life and how it impacted the everyday conduct of people have long-lasting implications for class-cultural relations. Relationally, as crystallized manifestations of the social vision of the secularist, modernizing founding elites, the repercussions of socio-spatial transformation continue to fuel the Islamist conservative political storyline. Nevertheless, understanding the socio-spatial transformation of early Republican Ankara through the ‘old-new’ dichotomy, which implies a set of

---

49 In this respect, the most troubled and unfortunate practices applied during Tandoğan’s administration. Nevzat Tandoğan, known for his ‘stern and uncompromising’ governance style, was in charge of maintaining the sense of security, order, and hygiene Mustafa Kemal sought to create in the capital city (Şenol-Cantek, 2003:218). During his term as governor, Tandoğan concentrated his efforts particularly to the area between Çankaya and Ulus. Those who were deemed incompatible with the new regime, such as peasants and workers in overalls who ‘spoiled the image’ of the new capital city, were the undesirables (ibid., 219 & 222).
accompanying binaries (rural-urban, traditional-modern), hinders to grasp the larger contradictions. It not only excludes the wider social segments of the city that belong neither of the camps, and also flattens the historical class-cultural intricacies caused by the complexities of newly modernizing and urbanizing society\textsuperscript{50}.

The ‘old-new Ankara’ duality of the first period (1923-1950) was further intensified with the emergence of \textit{gecekondu}\textsuperscript{51} settlements. Ankara began to receive immigrants almost immediately after it was declared the Republic’s capital, and notably from the 1930s onwards (Altaban, 1998; Şenyapılı, 2005). The increasing rural-to-urban migration, primarily from neighboring central Anatolian cities, resulted in a substantial housing crisis, which was not anticipated by the urban planning projections. \textit{Gecekondu}, a \textit{sui generis} housing type belongs to Turkey, addresses more than just the housing problem. An inferior and deprived physical space, \textit{gecekondu} was considered to be the space of poverty. It is also widely perceived as a space that evokes ruralness and backwardness in terms of the socio-cultural characteristics of its inhabitants (Erman, 2001; Işık & Pınarcıoğlu, 2002; Buğra, 2007). In the eyes of the early Republican state authorities, squatter settlements were an alarming and unwelcome phenomenon that hampered the new capital’s modernization ambitions (Şenyapılı, 1998). Despite common preconceptions about \textit{gecekondu} settlements, \textit{gecekondu} inhabitants - who originally migrated

\textsuperscript{50} In ways that a larger number of inhabitants encountered diverse interactions and experienced not only tensions but also fascinations, and thus ambivalences of modernizing urban space (see Baydar-Nalbantoğlu, 1997).

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Gecekondu} translates as ‘built overnight’. Gecekondu settlements, first emerged in the late 1930s, grew rapidly as housing solution built by migrant communities on low-value, state-owned, vacant lands without any permits or property rights.
as a result of economic restructuring - assumed substantial yet shifting functions as the labour force in the urban economic space (Keyder, 1987; Şenyapılı, 1998; Tekeli, 2008). From 1937 to 1950, the number of gecekondu settlements increased fivefold and gecekondu inhabitants made up a quarter of the capital’s population (Keleș, 2010).

In the 1950s, the dividedness of social topography of Ankara was sharpened with the expansion of squatter settlements. The elections of 1950, which marked a critical turning point for the politics in Turkey, had also significant impacts on the socio-spatial transformation of Ankara. In this respect, the two major issues during the Democrat Party’s rule (1950-1960) were the populist approach towards squatter settlements and the revival of the old capital, or tensions over the Istanbul-Ankara duality. In the course of the post-World War II period, under the rising liberalization tendencies both in the political and economic realms, new spatial practices entangled with the shifting dynamics of political mobilization strategies (Tekeli, 1993). The target demographic addressed by the Democrat Party’s political discourse included the urban poor at the fringes of the cities (Öncü, 1988). The Democrat Party pledged to grant title deeds and provide infrastructure to squatter inhabitants, in line with its populist politics, and enacted an amnesty law\(^{52}\) (Şenyapılı, 1998). Squatter settlements\(^{53}\), formerly considered

\(^{52}\) In order to regularize the status of squatter settlements, a number of amnesty laws were enacted; first was passed in 1949, followed by enactments ‘in 1953, 1963, 1966, 1979, 1984, and 1990’ (Buğra, 1980: 310). The Gecekondu Law no. 755 enacted in 1966 was the first law where the squatter settlements were formally named and recognized as ‘gecekondus’ (Tekeli, 1993; Buğra, 1980; Erman, 2001).

\(^{53}\) The number of gecekondu settlements in Ankara increased drastically. In the face of massive internal migration and liberal economic policies, the state’s action to supply the demand for housing proved insufficient. In 1955, gecekondu inhabitants made up 21.8 percent of the capital’s total population. In
to be a transient problem that needed to be eliminated, gained permanence as inhabitants attained political bargaining power over title deed rights\(^{54}\) (Şenyapılı, 1998). As a matter of fact, the redistributive practices in urban land tenure and the regulatory measures on irregular urban housing enabled the Democrat Party’s populist politics, which in the long run has set a pattern of trading rights to public property for votes (Buğra, 1980).

Located to the north of the railway line that divides the capital, Keçiören preserved its vineyards status until the 1950s thanks to the limited and conditional construction permits\(^{55}\). Keçiören of the 1950s, which was still surrounded by intact greenery, retained its residential type of the vineyard houses. While there were mansions manifesting the prosperous lifestyles of the time, the vineyard-style houses in the district were not exclusive as they were inhabited by various social classes (Ortaylı, 2014: 114). After the 1960s, migration to the district accelerated, construction permits were violated, and the physical landscape began to change (Kurtoğlu, 2003). Between the 1960s and 1980s, in addition to the gecekondu constructions, build-and-sell housing (yap-satçılık) also became a common practice to overcome the problem of housing supply in Keçiören (Güvenç, 2001). Flat ownership began to proliferate as a result. The supply of zoned lands in Keçiören was not only

---

\(^{54}\) Şenyapılı (2004: 187) writes that stories of people bartering votes for squatter title deeds, and/or infrastructural investment to the squatter neighborhoods by registering to the Democrat Party appeared in the newspapers of the time.

\(^{55}\) Kurtoğlu (2003: 39) notes that before the 1950s, three building cooperations of civil servants and workers were granted building permits. This indicates that the middle and lower-middle classes began to settle in the district.
insufficient but limited with the southern part of the district. In his monography on Ankara, Akçura (1970: 82, 102, 139) notes that the southern parts of the district, where were relatively absent of gecekonduş, were populated by middle and lower-classes. With the expansion of the gecekondu areas in the late 1970s, the majority of residents’ occupational profile shifted from civil servants to shopkeepers (esnaf) (Akçura, 1970; Kurtoğlu, 2003). Akçura (1970: 92) underlines that it was the district’s location in the direction of Ulus and its distance from the new city center that caused Keçiören’s sociodemographic features to regress in the 1970s compared to its former character. The ‘fate’ of the district and its position within the urban hierarchy of the capital, or, to put it another way, the historical trajectory of its urban development, had been affected and shaped by being on the other side of the railway.

Following the immigration waves of the 1960s and 1970s, Keçiören transformed from a low-density vineyard resort area into an expanding district under housing constructions. The legally established neighborhoods in the district’s southern parts developed in a rather planned manner, whereas gecekonduş mushroomed the district’s north and peripheries.

Gecekonduş and apartment buildings coexisted in the district, with the former being dominant, resulting in socio-spatial duality as it happened in many other districts of Ankara of the time. As a result of chain migration, with neighborhoods formed and segregated along the lines of migrants’ cities of origin, hemşehrilik and other socio-cultural categories became major indicators of social difference in the district (Ayata& Ayata, 1996; Kurtoğlu, 1996).

---

The categories that informed the social differences began to take shape around the socio-religious differences between Alevi and Sunni in the district, which used to be made up of Armenian and Greek minorities and a Turkish majority (Kurtoğlu, 2003: 39, 40). Keçiören remained a township until 1966, and then was officially governed under the district of Altındağ. To put it another way, until 1984, Keçiören did not have a separate administrative structure.

4.2.3. Resurgence: The Making of Nationalist Islamist Stronghold

By the 1970s, the evolvement of urban land in Turkey indicated a structure dominated by secondary and ‘informal’ housing markets mediated through respectively small-scale contractors and local developers (Danielson & Keleş, 1980; Öncü, 1988). Unlike the early cohorts of immigrants (1950s & 60s) who benefited from unregulated urban tenure land, later cohorts of immigrants had to face the speculative housing market and became renters or buyers (Öncü, 1988; Tekeli, 1992; Işık-Pınarçoğlu, 2001). For more than two decades, first the Democrat Party and then the Justice Party governments benefited from generating and maintaining electoral consensus through redistributive spatial policies that performed well particularly among the urban poor (Öncü, 1988). However, the socioeconomic repercussions of the speculative urban land market, amid oil and debt crises, challenged the dynamics of the clientelistic nature of electoral politics, which were rooted in urban redistributive practices (Öncü, 1988; Tekeli, 1992). Besides, the 1971 military regime’s violent demolitions of gecekondu settlements induced a weakening of patronage relations, and the resistance of gecekondu dwellers to the demolitions contributed to the politicization of the urban poor (Batuman,
2010). This period brought social democrat mayors (from the CHP) to office in major cities, including Ankara, in both the 1973 and 1977 local elections. The counter-hegemonic urban politics of the CHP, named ‘new municipal movement’, succeeded in responding to the demands of the working classes living in *gecekondu* settlements, the most pressing of which was housing (Tekeli, 1992; Şengül, 2003; Batuman, 2010)\(^{57}\). However, the conflicts between the Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe) central governments (1975-78) and leftist local governments, resulting from the central governments’ refusal to transfer financing to local governments, politicized the services that municipalities were unable to provide (Keleş, 1998; Batuman, 2010). In a wider context, with the escalation of political conflict along the axes of left and right, Turkey witnessed a political battleground in the second half of the 1970s (Sayari, 2010).

After 1980 coup d’état, the elected government of Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) enacted a two-tier administrative system in 1984 which stipulated a significant transfer of resources from the national budget to local governments. With this governance restructuring of metropolitan cities, one goal of the ANAP was to expand its constituency base. As urban redistributive sources had been proven to generate patronage relations, increasing subsidies and revenue of local governments were to perform for (re)consolidation of clientelistic consensus (Öncü, 1988; 60). One major consequence of this rescaling has been the market-driven structuring and mediation of urban processes (Tekeli, 1991). Harvey (1989) elaborates on

\(^{57}\) Positioning itself at the periphery, the ‘new municipal movement’s slogan was “from the periphery to the center” (çevreden merkeze belediyecilik) (Tekeli, 1992; Batuman, 2010).
how, in the context of emergent neoliberal globalization of 1980s, there was a transition from the urban ‘managerialism’ of the 1960s to urban ‘entrepreneurialism’ with the restructuring of the local-central governance relations. Despite major differences in capital accumulation processes with the Western capitalist world, as discussed by some scholars Turkey’s spatial and governance rescaling also eased, enabled, and encouraged entrepreneurial practices in urban space and services (Öncü, 1988; Keleş, 1992; Şengül, 2003). Following the 1980s, the restructuring of governance at different scales made it possible the neoliberal urban policies to become entrenched. In general, major cities in Turkey became the sites of capital accumulation, with the construction sector serving as the engine of the economy (Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008). The commodification of informal housing in the cities’ peripheries had already began in the 1970s, with construction activities of build-and-sell and concurrent rehabilitation of gecekondu areas. The evolving urban redevelopment of the 1980s further enabled construction companies to seize lucrative prospects (Şenyapılı, 1996).

Keçiören became a district in 1984 with the local governance legislation. The first mayor of the district was Melih Gökçek, elected from the ANAP (56.6%)58. Gökçek then served as the mayor of Ankara Metropolitan (first from the Welfare Party, then from the Virtue Party, and finally from the AKP) beginning in 1994 for five consecutive terms. The political track of Gökçek, who was initially known as a nationalist (ülküçü) in Keçiören, 

58 The district’s voter turnout in the 1984 local elections was 84.07%. The SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party- Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti) came in second with 28.86%, followed by the TPP (True Path Party-Doğru Yol Partisi/ DYP) with 5.11%, the PP (Populist Party- Halkçı Parti/HP) with 4.5%, the MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party- Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi) with 2.17%, and the RP (Welfare Party-Refah Partisi) with 2.68%.
provides hints on the loose but not conflict-free political alliances among the right-wing parties. In the 1989 local elections, Gökçek ran again from the ANAP and lost the election (24.2%) to Hamza Kırmızı from the SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party), who won with 36.26%. In the 1989 elections, the SHP succeeded well in consolidating diverse segments of the electorate nationwide and won control of major cities, including Ankara with all its seven major districts. In this election campaign, the ANAP circulated a brochure asking “Do you want a mayor with tied hands?” Apparently, the ANAP’s emphasis on a local government’s “working in harmony with the government” backfired. This expedient strategy, which includes a not-so-subtle threat of probable punishment, discloses the dynamics of the resource

59 In the 1989 local elections, the voter turnout in the district was 82.7%. The TPP (True Path Party-Doğru Yol Partisi) came in second with 25.6%, the RP (Welfare Party-Refah Partisi) with 5.2%, the Democratic Left Party (DSP- Demokratik Sol Parti) with 4.44%, and the Nationalist Task Party (Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi- MÇP) with 3.58%.

60 In an interview conducted in 2013, Hamza Kırmızı, who is introduced as ‘the only name that made Melih Gökçek taste defeat during his 29-year political career’, mentions that when asked about the Ankara election results in 1989, the SHP’s leader Erdal İnönü said ‘We will win 6 out of 7 in Ankara. In Keçiören, Mr. Kırmızı will lose.’ Kırmızı also shares an anecdote about Gökçek’s response to the election result; ‘Melih Bey made a confession to me. He said that ‘If they had said, I would have believed that the world would turn upside down. I never thought that I would lose this municipality’. Retrieved from [https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/ankara/ankara-nin-kirmizi-siyaseti-22458670](https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/ankara/ankara-nin-kirmizi-siyaseti-22458670)

61 Following the 1980 coup, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) remained banned from elections.

62 The Turkish original version is: “Eli kolu bağlı bir belediye başkanı ister misiniz?” The Motherland Party’s 1989 local election campaign leaflet reads as follows: “The investments of local administrations have increased 20 times in the last 5 years. Because with the new laws, our state allocated most of its income to local administrations and created new resources for them. This great financial support has given all municipalities and other local administrations a wide range of opportunities. It enabled them to provide services to their hemşehris at an unprecedented level. In this election, too, let’s vote for candidates who will work in harmony with the government, who will do great things, and who are broad-minded, honest and hardworking. Let’s re-select the ones we’re happy with, and change the ones we don’t like. Motherland Party” (translation is mine) Retrieved online, published on the 23th March 1989 at Yeni Asır Newspaper.

allocation between local and central governments as well as the manners ingrained in clientelistic exchange in politics in Turkey.

During the 1980s, the bulk of the housing stock in Keçiören was composed of gecekondu settlements, and the population was about to reach half a million.\textsuperscript{64} Beginning in the 1970s, the housing development in Ankara was directed towards the city’s western corridor in accordance with the 1990 master plan’s controlled decentralization projection, and the process accelerated with the 1980’s liberal economic policies (Şenyapılı, 2005: 218). Development of new residential areas in the western corridor generated intra-urban mobility, which modified the socio-spatial patterns of segregation in the city (Güvenç, 2001). As a result of this process, the socio-spatial duality demarcated by the railway along the north-south axis, which had been inherited from the capital’s founding years, began to shift and diverge (Şenyapılı, 2005: 242). This process also caused intra-urban housing mobility from Keçiören, where middle-classes differentiated along the axis of education and employment tended to depart the district (Şenyapılı, 2005: 240).

Following the governance rescaling of 1984, the significance of locality, both scalar and spatial, was rediscovered as a starting point for the political parties to mobilize people and consolidate voter base. The local elections of 1994 register as a major juncture in the urban Turkey’s drastic transformation under the Islamist parties, ranging from the redistribution of urban resources to the redefining of urban public culture and space with varying degrees of Islamist conservative social control (Çinar, 2005). Likewise, it stands as a

\textsuperscript{64} In 1985, the population of Keçiören had reached 433.559. https://www.kecioren.bel.tr/kecioren.html
milestone that led to the gradual making of Keçiören into a nationalist and Islamist stronghold. The electoral shift and the balance of politics established in the 1970s, since when the contested articulations of pro-Islamist and nationalist elements became dominant, have had long-lasting effects both on the formation of ideological orientations and the permeability of the boundaries between Islamism and nationalism in Turkey (Çarkoğlu, 1998; Kalaycıoğlu, 1999). The 1994 local election results of Keçiören, an end result of a coalition between nationalists and Islamists, are notable as to how and in what ways the MHP and the RP got to differentiate themselves within the right-wing parties and consolidated electorate swings.

Hamza Kırmızı elected as mayor from the SHP in 1989, ran for the CHP in the 1994 elections and failed (6.88%). Despite a significant decrease in votes in comparison to the previous election, the total votes cast for the social democrat parties (the SHP, CHP, and DSP) added up to 31.31% in the district. With a drastic rise in votes, the Welfare Party, which won municipal governments in 28 cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, finished in second. Turgut Altınok, from the MHP won the elections. Keçiören is the first metropolitan district won by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) since the party’s establishment in 1969 (Kurtoğlu, 2004). The electorate swing in the district is remarkable because the top two parties in this election remained on

---

65 The MCP made an electoral alliance with the Welfare Party and the Reformist Democracy Party in the 1991 general elections. In 1993, the MCP reestablished as the MHP under their former leader, Alparslan Türkeş. Since its electoral success in the 1999 elections, in which it got 18.4%, the MHP has become one of the major political parties.

66 The district’s voter turnout in the 1994 local elections rose up to 92.5%. The MHP- 24.02%, the RP- 21.53%, the SHP- 17.03%, the Motherland Party- 14.85%, the DSP- 7.40%, the CHP- 6.88%, and the TPP- 6.64%.
the fringes of the electoral scene in the March 1989. Whilst the RP got 5.2% of the votes cast in the district, the MÇP (the precursor of the MHP) had only 3.58%. Within 5 years, the RP rose to 21.53% and the MHP achieved to receive 24.02% of the votes in Keçiören. As a result of the electoral coalition behind doors, while the MHP’s candidate got the mayoral position in Keçiören, together with the majority at the Keçiören municipality council, the Welfare Party guaranteed to win the Ankara Metropolitan with a small electoral margin by the support of the MHP votes (Kurtoğlu, 2004).

In the 1994 local elections, the split of the votes among the parties directly led to the defeat of social democrats both in the district and the Ankara Metropolitan67. Not only the SHP’s reputation was tainted by corruption scandals and lost credibility in the eyes of the electorate, but also the party was criticized for underperforming in delivering urban public services and responding the needs of urban poor (Tekeli, 1998). As Öniş (1997) argues the void left by the social democratic parties was filled by political Islam, which managed to offer a viable alternative with demands for equity as well as concrete anti-poverty projects aimed at enhancing the economic conditions of the urban poor. Since the local elections in 1994, there has been a remarkable permeability between the voter bases of the RP and MHP in Keçiören; whilst the electoral base of the former political tradition in the district has continued to expand and consolidate over the years, the base of the latter, while

67 The SHP, the winner of 1989 local election in Keçiören, struggled with internal strife and the formation of offshoot parties in the early 1990s.
maintaining party affiliation, has tended to vote for the former depending on the political climate.

As it was argued by some observers of the Turkish politics, the Cold War period and the political atmosphere following the 1980 coup d’état, which enabled the cultivation of diverse blends of nationalism and Islam at the grassroots, had a cumulative socio-political impact that is directly tied to the triumph of the far-right in 1994 (Tuğal, 2009). Indeed, the expansion of the population as well as sociodemographic change are major determinants of the rise of the far-right in Keçiören. The district’s socio-demographic makeup has largely been composed of immigrants coming from the central Anatolian cities, where the RP’s predecessor parties had significant success in consolidating pious Sunni voters throughout the 1970s. Besides, in its political discourse in the 1990s, as Ayata argues (1996: 54) the RP spent “more time and energy discussing equality, social security, welfare, and social justice than any other political party”. The RP’s appeal among voters had less to do with Islamist slogans and more to do with its promises of better municipal services, the provision of in-kind aid to the poor, and eradication of corruption (White, 1997; Doğan, 2008). In a district like

---

68 Despite occupying distinct locations on the far-right spectrum, the political traditions of the RP and the MHP have a set of comparable political claims and opposition motives in common (Mert, 2007).

69 In the 1994 local elections, the RP’s major campaign slogan was ‘Turkey’s guarantee’ (Türkiye’nin teminatı). One of two campaign leaflets reads ‘The guarantee of a Turkey in which cities and towns are decentralized’ (Şehirlerin ve beldelerin yerinden yönetildiği bir Türkiye’nin teminatı). The latter reads ‘The guarantee of a Turkey where bribery is eradicated’ (Rüşvetin kökünden kazındığı bir Türkiye’nin teminatı) Özkan, N. (2002). Seçim kazandıran kampanyalar. [Election Winning Campaigns] MediaCat Kitapları, İstanbul.

During my fieldwork, the male interviewees mentioned with longing and admiration a rally held by the RP in Keçiören in 1993, where Şevki Yılmaz gave a speech. On Youtube, there is a 5-minute-long video-clip from the rally- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lg4D6YxFdB0
Keçiören, which was mainly made up of gecekondu settlements, where urban poverty prevailed with poor infrastructure, the campaign agenda of the RP appeared to bring success. The RP’s organizational capacities - hierarchically structured grassroots organizations within the cities-, proved to be another factor that contributed to the success of voter mobilization at the local levels (Arat, 2005). This organizational capacity, based on direct face-to-face interactions with voters, was effectively taken over by the AKP and gave the party the ability to penetrate urban localities and effectively steer populist policies such as the distribution of in-kind aid, which entails a wide social network (White, 2004; Doğan, 2008).

Turgut Altınok, who was elected mayor of Keçiören from the MHP in 1994 and later continued with Islamist parties, employed the slogan ‘not a ruling, but a servant state’ (‘hâkim değil, hadim devlet’) in his campaign. This is notable because the notion of ‘servant state’ differs from the MÇP/MHP’s conception of the ‘state’. After joining the RP’s successor parties, Altınok has

---


Altınok also quoted the saying by Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli, ‘Let’s be one, let’s be big, let’s be alive’, in his 1994 campaign to express his opposition to discrimination and othering practices. The unity implied here, as Altınok expounded, was the allocation of investments equally among the district’s regions.

72 The MHP has traditionally prioritized the state over society (‘society for the state’/ ‘devlet için toplum’). The notion of ‘servant state’, on the other hand, is adopted by the MHP offshoot, far-right Sunni Islamist and ultranationalist BBP (The Great Unity Party) which was founded in 1993 after the rift between Alparslan Türkeş and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu (Bora & Can, 2004).
more extensively used the populist rhetoric of ‘service to people’, which under the FP (Virtue Party-Fazilet Partisi) evolved into the version of ‘service to people is service to God’ (halka hizmet hakka hizmet). Altınok defeated the RP, which he later joined, by a margin of two percent in 1994. It has been also argued that the surge in Kurdish separatist movement of the early 1990s, which featured in the 1994 local election campaigns (Özkan, 2002), played a role in this outcome. In line with the direction the MHP adopted following the 1980 coup d’état, which targeted Kurdish nationalism as the major threat (Bora & Can, 1991), the party focused particularly on two issues in its campaign: maintaining national integrity and combating ‘separatist terror’73. The Refah Party, on the other hand, framing Sunni Islam as the cement that binds Turks and Kurds together, highlighted the Muslim fraternity/brotherhood as a tool for bypassing, mediating, and negotiating ethnic cleavages (Öniş, 1997)74. The different positions taken by the respective political parties on the Kurdish issue cause rifts in the district’s voter base, which have occasionally benefited the MHP. As a matter of fact, the MHP’s political weight in the Keçiören has been larger than what the election results indicated.

73 The MHP’s 1994 local election campaign slogans were: ‘Conscious votes to the MHP’, ‘The voice of the silent majority’, ‘Every vote for the MHP will weaken the hope of separatist terrorism’, ‘Strengthening the MHP, Strengthening National Integrity’, ‘Principled politics, principled management. Turkey needs the MHP’. (Özkan, 2002)

74 In the Kurdish-populated Eastern and Southeastern provinces, the RP got 16.6% of the votes in the 1991 general elections. This figure increased to 27.3% in the 1994 local elections and to 27.2 % in the 1995 general elections.
4.2.4. From Gecekondu to Prospective ‘Elite District of ‘New Turkey’”

Initially elected as mayor from the MHP, Turgut Altınok, coming from the Hearths of Idealism (Ülkü Ocakları) which has long been functioning as a powerful political socialization ground for male youth in Keçiören, passed to the Virtue Party (the successor of the Welfare Party) in 1999, then continued with the AKP until the 2009 local elections. The urban spatial strategies implemented under Altınok’s fifteen-year rule in Keçiören ranged from (i) the transformation of built environment – particularly housing which was delegated to local governments in the 1980s, (ii) to the counter-hegemonic productions and representations of urban space, and (iii) to the normative and gendered reorganization of urban public life on the axis of religious morality.

Keçiören’s urban transformation in the ten years after the 1994 local elections has been promoted as ‘from a city of gecekondu into a modern city’76. This transformation has also been embraced by Erdoğan, who became a district resident later in the 2000s when he was prime minister, and it has been presented as an example of the ‘new Turkey’ under the AKP rule. With the local government playing a key role, Keçiören witnessed a construction boom over a ten-years period, resulting in a drastic reduction in the amount

---

75 There is a video clip on Youtube, from the day Melih Gökçek received the mandate after the 1999 local elections. Gökçek, together with the mayors of five metropolitan districts elected from the FP, was greeted by a sizable crowd gathered. In his short speech, Turgut Altınok says that he will work for ‘a modern (çağdaş) Keçiören, a district worthy of the Turkish nation’. The crowd in front of the building chants ‘The Virtue Party and the MHP shoulder to shoulder’ (Fazilet MHP, omuz omuza). Retrieved from- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tD6PjD9miMA

of gecekondu areas— from 5/6 to 1/6, and the emergence of a dense urban texture with apartment buildings. As a *sui generis* housing type, the *gecekondu* has been a major spatial feature of Turkey’s urbanizing topography. The *gecekondu* entails more than simply the housing problem; it is also a socio-spatial embodiment of the uneven development of cities, where social inequalities based on class and socio-cultural differences are embodied. Considering that this spatial—housing—transformation is also a social transformation, how the Keçiören municipality perceived and handled the *gecekondu* issue is noteworthy. More specifically, the municipality’s approach to *gecekondu* issue provides insight into how the nationalist, Islamist-conservative local government in Keçiören has reframed its own socio-political vision and economic agenda, how it consolidated the ‘people’ in the district, and how it has envisioned and cultivated new subjectivities in this locality.

During the urban transformation process, the Keçiören municipality adopted a strict policy stance against *gecekondu*, which was perceived to ‘contradict urban aesthetics and modern urban silhouette’77. In this regard, the municipality’s approach was consistent with the widespread perception that *gecekondu* are a major impediment to modern urbanization, a perception that has persisted since the early Republican period78. The municipality objected to *gecekondu* neighborhoods on the grounds that they lacked planning, which contradicts the modernist goals of order and control, and


disparaged gecekondu as ‘invasive’, ‘uninhabitable’, and ‘disgusting’. By the second half of the 1990s, the gecekondu neighborhoods came to be pejoratively referred to as ‘varoş’\(^\text{79}\) and stigmatized as decaying urban areas where militant political groups and hubs of illicit activity and crime were located (Ayata, 1996; Erman, 2001; Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008). As part of the municipality’s rhetorical repertoire, these evolving representations of gecekondu were locally reproduced and used as justification for demolitions. Moreover, getting rid of the ‘varoş’ label attributed to the gecekondu neighborhoods was part of the municipality’s agenda to ameliorate the district’s image.

The Keçiören municipality’s narrative on gecekondu mainly problematized the physical deprivation -considered inappropriate for a modern city, and portrayed it as though the spatiality of the issue had no social aspects. Centered on urban aesthetics, the municipality’s narrative thereby concealed rather than directly addressed the extents of social inequalities. In contrast to what might be expected given its gecekondu-dwelling electorate, the municipality made no attempt to romanticize\(^\text{80}\) gecekondu in its political storyline; instead, it sought to eliminate gecekondu associated with backwardness and an absence of modern. Even when identifying and thus politicizing the main problem as the long-term neglect of the district, the

---

\(^\text{79}\) The term ‘varoş’, originally Hungarian, is used to refer to the gecekondu neighborhood on the outskirts of the city. The term is used pejoratively, particularly in popular culture, to refer the urban poor as disorderly masses who pose a threat due to their ‘inferior’ culture, incompatible social norms, and ‘radical’ politicization. For detailed analysis on the shifting media representations of the concept of varoş, see Demirtaş & Şen (2007).

\(^\text{80}\) Gecekondu was romanticized in popular culture, notably in cinema during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The depictions of gecekondu tended to portray life in gecekondu as “poor but happy”—the ‘other’ to the alienated lifestyles of the urban middle class based on greed for money. See Öztürk (2004).
dismissive tone toward gecekondu persisted. The discursive devaluation of
certain areas is a strategy employed in urban regeneration processes to
justify the transformation, which ultimately facilitates the realization of
potential land value and revenue (Paton, 2018). Similar in this fashion, the
demolition of gecekondu and replacement of them with apartment buildings
not only helped the municipality achieve its vision of modern urban
aesthetics, but it also enabled the creation and closing of the urban rent gap
and a substantial rise in revenue\(^{1}\) through the expansion of the local
government’s tax base.

The municipality succeeded in reorienting and uncoupling adverse
associations it attributed to gecekondu from gecekondu inhabitants by playing
up the benefits this regeneration would bring. On top of the acquisition of
property rights- the subordination of use value to exchange value,
transformation of housing provides a means for the gecekondu owners to
reconfigure it for their own gain (Öncü, 1988). This is inextricably linked to
what gecekondu and apartment building represent within the existing
symbolic class-cultural hierarchies. Whilst the former denotes lower-class
dispositions and a continuation of peasant way of life, the latter indicates a
symbol of middle-class status with modern urbanized way of life (Ayata,
1988; Öncü, 1997). Therefore, moving into apartments was appealing for the
gecekondu inhabitants both materially and symbolically as a means of
elevating class status and practically improving daily quality of life. That
being said, the demolitions of gecekondu neighborhoods were not all conflict-

\(^{1}\) Real estate activities serve primary source of revenue for the municipality of Keçiören due to the lack
of commercial and industrial activities.
free. Though in most neighborhoods, the demolitions were carried out by consensus, there were also clashes in some others, such as in an Alevi neighborhood where a housing project initiated by the former mayor from the SHP was underway82.

In order to showcase the ongoing modernizing efforts, Altınok began by transforming the Keçiören’s entrance, where was formerly surrounded by gecekondu settlements on the slopes that front the main boulevard connecting the district to the city center, into a botanical park83 with huge artificial waterfalls84. Former gecekondu in the area were replaced with multi-story luxurious residential buildings with colorful facades decorated with motifs of Seljukian and Ottoman architecture. Altınok, in his interviews and speeches, highlighted that the transformation of the district’s built environment aimed at turning the district into a tourist destination and eventually boosting property values85. Elevating Keçiören’s position within

82 Altınok decided to demolish the houses in Ovacık gecekondu neighborhood, which were part of the ‘build your own house’ (kendi evini kendin yap) initiative launched during the previous SHP mayor’s term. The A-team was involved in the suppression of the inhabitants’ resistance against the rent-based urban transformation. Erdal Yıldırım was shot dead by alleged members of the A-team. See also-
https://www.birgun.net/haber/a-takimi-cetes-tarafindan-oldurulen-erdal-yildirim-mezari-basinda-anildi-313835

83 The park is named Atatürk Botanical Garden.

84 The obsession of having and construction the biggest of any architecture can be traced here. The artificial waterfalls were promoted as the world’s biggest artificial waterfalls. See also;

85 Altınok stated the following on the district’s real estate market’s development: “in the past, one could buy three apartments in Keçiören for the price of an apartment sold in Dikmen”, he continued, adding that “this situation has reversed.”
Ankara’s urban hierarchy as assessed by the metrics of economic and symbolic value was identified as the municipality’s ultimate goal. In framing this objective, the municipality referred to the popular urban concept of ‘brand city’, which has also been promoted in the pro-business local governance policy agenda of the AKP.

The other, and by far the most contentious, component of the municipality’s aestheticization efforts entails the spatial production of counter-hegemonic representations that contest the ideological contours of Kemalist regime (Sargin, 2004). A replica of Esztergom Castle as a cultural center built to represent Turkish-Islamic architecture and history; monuments to incorporate a pre-Republican and pre-Ottoman historical narrative to emphasize Turkishness; pastiches of motifs, symbols, and idioms as well as architectural fragments used to signify Islam, Turkishness, and the Ottoman heritage are some of the most notable examples of these spatial displays of Altunok’s administration. Seizing control of local governances have enabled the Islamic-conservative political tradition to carve out scales of localities to reproduce its ideological claims. Laden with references to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, these spatial representations in the district were also


86 The concept of ‘brand city’ has been largely referred in the AKP’s local elections declaration documents. One example reads as follows: “The goal of the AK Party municipalism, which has now become a phenomenon, in the upcoming period is to turn our cities into brand cities”.


87 The original Esztergom Castle is located on the banks of the Danube, 60 kilometers northwest of Budapest, the capital of Hungary. The castle, which dates back to the early 13th century, was first conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1543, followed by another conquest in 1605. The Ottoman rule ended in 1683.
presented as integral elements of the efforts to turn Keçiören into a brand-city, or a ‘centre of attraction’\(^88\). The enhancement of the attractiveness of cities through “the symbolic and economic commodification of ‘history’” (Öncü, 2007) has become a widespread strategy triggered by globalization, particularly since the 1990s (Zukin, 1995; Scott, 1999). The revitalization of past, not only of the Ottoman past with a bold emphasis on Islam, but also of pre-Islamic Turkish history in Central Asia with a sole emphasis on Turkishness, through the spatial representations reveals an unmistakable quest to redefine the constitutive boundaries of national history and identity. This quest, however, has not excluded the marketability of these elements as historical and cultural spatial artifacts that would contribute to the district’s attractiveness. The Republic Tower (Cumhuriyet Kulesi), planned to become one of Ankara’s emblematic landmarks yet still under construction due to its high cost, is illustrative of this convergence of two rationalities: the quest to instill political claims and the search for economic return. The under-construction tower in Keçiören is positioned as the ‘rival twin’ of Atakule\(^89\), a tower which was inaugurated by Turgut Özal in 1989 on the 66th anniversary of Ankara’s becoming the capital. Located in the district of Çankaya, Atakule is not only a symbolic landmark of Ankara, but it is also a byproduct of the 1980’s economic liberalization that encouraged consumption. To compete with what Çankaya represents socio-politically and socio-culturally as a district, the Keçiören municipality proposed its own version of a tower, one

---

\(^88\) The term ‘centre of attention’ (cazibe merkezi) is a popular notion, which has been extensively used in local governance policy agendas. It is also adopted by the regional development agencies, established in 2009.

\(^89\) The architect of the Cumhuriyet Tower (Republic Tower) is Ragıp Buluç, who is also the architect of Atakule. The 100-meter-tall tower is inspired by the architecture of the Taj Mahal and will be topped with a massive Seljukian star.
that would be appealing to both tourists and Ankara’s affluent social segments, as well as proven to be a tool for a district’s economic growth⁹⁰ by extending spaces of consumption.

As manifestations of the discontent with the Republican regime for its break with the Ottoman past and Islamic elements, the spatial representations in Keçiören demonstrate the efforts to reassociate these discarded aspects as constitutive. Remarkably, to instill its counter national imagination the municipality implemented urban spatial strategies, which were akin to those employed during the spatial formation of Ankara. In that respect, what really marks the nature of the municipality’s relationship with the Kemalist modernization project is an oscillation between admiration and negation; a constant accommodation of acknowledgment and denial⁹¹. Indeed, these spatial manifestations, which we may now refer to as proto-hegemonic spatial interventions, also reflect the ideological negotiations and the bargaining dynamics of the period. After almost three decades of the AKP and its predecessor parties dominating local governments and two decades

---

⁹⁰ From the 1980s on, the shifting capital accumulation regimes have challenged the previously assumed primacy of the national scale, altered the scalar character of policy-making (Brenner, 1998; Jessop, 2002), and led a process of turning the city-scape into ‘projected spaces’ (Theodore et al, 2001). Through the intervention of governmental bodies, most notably local governments, neoliberal urban governance regimes employ a number of socio-spatial strategies to stimulate economic growth (Harvey, 1989; Theodore et al., 2001; Jessop, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The non-Western parts of the world, where likewise underwent global capitalism’s economic restructuring, are engaged in neoliberal urban restructuring. The cities, which are primarily identified by complex informal economies and the deepening of urban poverty, are similarly driven by entrepreneurial policies with distinct dynamics of patronage relations (Roy and Alsayyad, 2004; He and Wu, 2009; see also Ghannam, 2002).

⁹¹ For comprehensive elaboration on the tangled dynamics of the Islamists’ uneasy relationship with the Kemalist regime, see Mardin (2005), Saktanber (1994, 2002), Tuğal (2009).
of AKP rule, negotiations over urban spatial representations have evolved, on the verge of fading out.

One major aspect that has distinguished Keçiören from the other RP-winning local governments was the municipality’s accentuated political emphasis on Turkish nationalism, which overall molded urban socio-spatial strategies in this locality. Despite his rhetorical closeness to the Sunni-Islamist political line of the BBP, Altınok’s political affiliation with the Hearths of Idealism and the fact that his local administration and grassroots cadres were largely composed of nationalists (ülkücü) have been effective in differentiating the municipality’s perception of Atatürk from the RP line. In this regard, the conceptions of ‘history’ and ‘national history’ embraced by the municipal governments of Keçiören bear parallels with Kemalist nationalism in terms of its ‘Turkishness’ emphasis. The symbolic and discursive elements that contrasted with the Kemalist conception of nationalism were the bold emphasis on Islam and the Ottoman legacy. On the other side, in the 1990s, when Islamists were considered as a threat to the regime, the Keçiören municipality was attentive not to directly target the Republican regime by maintaining a rhetoric that reassured the Kemalist bureaucracy and the military that they were loyal to the regime92.

As mentioned earlier, the brief presence of Atatürk in Keçiören during the War of Independence has been attributed historical significance. The

92 On the main boulevard that connects Keçiören to the city center, there used to be a signboard which read ‘We love Turkey and Atatürk’, along with a drawing of Atatürk’s head and a map of Turkey with Atatürk’s head and the star and crescent symbols. The municipality opted to use the word ‘love’ to state its commitment. The object of affection (love) here is Atatürk as the victorious military, in contrast to Atatürk as the reformer of the Republic, who is addressed with the slogan ‘We are on the footsteps of our founder’, common in Kemalist circles.
municipality narrated the 1994 election victory as a second historical moment that brought ‘great change and development’\(^93\) to the district, following the historic moment when the district hosted Atatürk and military cadres. Arguably, this narrative might be compared to the Islamist narrative which presented the RP’s election victory of Istanbul in 1994 as the second Muslim conquest after 1453 (Bora, 1999). With an obvious plot twist, the narrative of Keçiören municipality endorsed Atatürk and –inadvertently- disclosed that Ankara, as a *tabula rasa*, has no history other than the one that began with the Republican regime. In this narrative, Keçiören of the 1920s -the district’s heyday- is also addressed as a model of sociability to be emulated due to its socio-demographics; the municipality sought to (re)turn Keçiören into a modern district where people with higher education and income prefer to reside.

However, the post-gecekondu landscape of Keçiören featured an overwhelmingly dense urban fabric. One of the most populated districts in Turkey\(^94\), the district has had high population density\(^95\) which has been a major problem that the municipality has sought to solve. To tackle the district’s spatial density, the municipality constructed over four hundred urban public parks, some of which contain sports and physical activity

---

\(^93\) Cited and translated from the infomercial of Keçiören Municipality, published in 2004.

\(^94\) According to 2022 statistics, the top five of the most populated districts in Turkey are listed as; Esenyurt in Istanbul (957,398), Keçiören in Ankara (938,568), Şahinbey in Gaziantep (931,116), Çankaya in Ankara (925,828), Osmangazi in Bursa (881,456).


\(^95\) The number of people per square kilometer in Keçiören is 1.237; it is the third highest density among the metropolitan districts in Ankara. For the details on the ‘Population Density by Districts’ in Ankara, see [http://istatistik.ankaraorg.tr/cizelge/2020/7](http://istatistik.ankaraorg.tr/cizelge/2020/7)
facilities, such as jogging tracks, outdoor sports equipment, tennis courts, and swimming pools. This also served as a way of promoting middle-class sociability. These urban recreational spaces have addressed the lack of space for socializing and brought a vibrant publicness to the district. Given that Keçiören is predominantly a residential district, with women making up the majority of daytime occupants, parks have significantly increased women’s visibility and participation in the district’s public spaces.

Women’s publicness links us directly to the extents of normative and regulatory mechanisms that reorganize urban everyday practices, that are inherently spatial. In its attempt at the socio-spatial mediation of the moral order, the Keçiören municipality has capitalized on the notion of ‘family’ based on the dominant patriarchal gender hierarchy. The construction of gender relations and space are mutually constitutive (Bondi & Rose, 2003); the identification of the district public spaces as ‘family spaces’ dictates family as the framework of moral order. As one of the primary institutions of conservatism, the ‘family’ here serves as a legitimate source of regulatory norms to govern, control, and confine everyday conduct in public spaces. Besides, the family also functions to (re)calibrate the boundaries of the public-private dichotomy, including its spatial dimensions, which are not mutually exclusive⁹⁶. Thus, by imposing family values as lines of negotiation, ‘family space’ accordingly regulates and constrains gendered subjectivities in the public space, particularly ‘women’s place’.

---

⁹⁶ For detailed discussions on the ways in which the public-private dichotomy is instrumentalized to gender the state and nation and on the roles assigned to women in the realization of ideological projects of modern nation-state, see Joseph (1997), Abu-Lughod (1998), Yuval-Davis & Anthias (1989), Kandiyoti (1991), Saktanber (2002).
As some scholars put it the results of the 1994 local elections had sparked “fear and panic” among the secular segments of society, that the rising influence of religion in urban public life would pose a fierce challenge to secular ways of life (Navaro-Yashin, 2002). The RP local governments’ restrictive control over alcohol consumption has registered as one of the most pronounced conservative municipal practice that interfered with lifestyle choices (Öncü, 2007; Doğan, 2007). Similarly, in Keçiören under Altınok’s rule, alcoholic beverages were banned in municipality-owned public facilities, restaurants’ alcoholic beverage licenses were not renewed, the number of package stores was drastically reduced and rental contracts were made more difficult to obtain. In addition to confining the options within the legal framework of municipal legislation, a Keçiören-specific method was also operated in the district. The mayor’s unofficial security team, dubbed the ‘A team’\(^97\), intervened not only in the sale of alcohol but also in its consumption in public spaces by using intimidation. The restrictions on alcohol was not only justified as a matter of Islamist conservatism but also promoted for its role in facilitating being outside safely, particularly in places that have acquired a semi-public character, such as urban parks used mostly by women. In addition to the enforcement of the alcohol ban, the ‘A team’ was also involved in ensuring ‘peace’ and ‘order’ when any ‘immoral’ acts took place in parks and other public spaces. For instance, the district parks

\(^97\) The ‘A team’, mainly composed of nationalists (ülkücü), first emerged following the 1994 elections. The ‘A team’, which is claimed to have been established to ensure public order, prevent immorality, and prevent alcohol and drug use, came to light with incidents of beatings and armed fights. See also https://eksisozluk.com/kecioren-a-takimi--2461597?p=1

And for the A-team’s re-emergence after 2019, see also-

https://www.indyturk.com/node/80861/haber/ke%C3%A7i%C3%B6ren%E2%80%99de-tak%C4%B1m%C4%B1-s%C3%B6ylentileri-veniden-hortlad%C4%B1
were not designated as women-only places, but the presence of lone men, groups of men, or couples hanging out there was frowned upon. The characterization of the district’s public spaces ‘family spaces’ served to recalibrate gendered selves and corporeal bodies according to a religiously-informed normative order. Constrained by the patriarchal norms and cultural practices, women’s participation in public spaces have already been subject to restrictive control. The boundaries and possibilities of women’s presence in urban public spaces are shaped and conditioned by the extent and intensity of judgmental and threatening scrutiny, which includes how they present themselves, how modestly they dress, and their manners in everyday conduct. On the other hand, men’s self-presentations in the district have been scrutinized in terms of whether they conformed to hegemonic ideals of masculine bodily schemas; having long hair or tattoos may cause the risk of physical assault. With evolving dynamics of urban everyday encounters in the district, Keçiören has come to be known as a ‘macho’ and ‘fascist’ enclave; the former denotes performances of ‘low brow’ masculinities, and the latter addresses banal forms of ultra-nationalism. That being said, Altınok’s active involvement to the everyday life of the district, which does not exclude his and his cadre’s interferences into the regulation of urban spaces, was one of the most praised feature of his local government performance. Prior to the 2009 local elections, Altınok was considered as a strong candidate to replace Melih Gökçek as mayor of the Ankara

---

98 For instance, Altınok himself regularly went to control the weekly neighborhood bazaars, and the A team was in charge of maintaining the ‘discipline’. The district residents mention that they were pleased that they had city officials to whom they could direct their complaints and that the problem was resolved there and then. In addition to providing municipally subsidized facilities and assistance for weddings and funerals for the poor, Altınok personally attended in such events which helped him to build rapport among the district electorate.
Metropolitan, owing to his local governance performance in Keçiören. However entrapped with a political plot behind which Gökçek’s name was mentioned, Altınok was left out of the politics\(^9^9\). Not all surprising for politics in Turkey but also resonating with the impasse the AKP encountered in the district, Altınok turned back to the AKP\(^10^0\) and elected as the mayor of Keçiören in 2019 once again with 63% of the votes\(^10^1\).

\(^9^9\) In the 2014 local elections, Altınok ran for mayor of Keçiören from the Grant Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi), a far-right Islamist and nationalist party. He received 30.3% of the votes but lost to the AKP, which won the election with 43.8%. In an interview with the pro-AKP TV channel Kanal 7 ahead of the 2019 local election, Altınok mentioned that in 2014, his vote share was initially 51%, but the elections came after a period in which the impacts of the December 17-25 incidents were highly effective, turning the local elections into general elections, as he put it. Upon hearing the December 17-25, the host’s comment ‘that victimhood carried the AK Party…’ (‘o mağduriyet durumu AK Parti’yi…’) was remarkable. Altınok responded with an affirmative tone; ‘Sure, sure!’ and continued in an apologetic manner, saying that he prioritized ‘our country, our state, our homeland and our flag’ (‘ülkemiz, devletimiz, vatanımız ve bayrağımız’) over the rest, including his election to office. This populist discourse and the rhetoric on ‘victimhood’ are two of the leitmotifs of right-wing politics in Turkey that has been overused by the AKP. To watch the mentioned scenes between 05:53-06:49 minutes, see: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ajCCl1Mapw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ajCCl1Mapw)

\(^10^0\) Prior to his candidacy from the AKP, for the People’s Alliance-Cumhur İttifakı (formed as a conservative nationalist block in 2018 for the presidential elections) in 2019, Altınok’s name was associated with The Good Party (İyi Parti), a nationalist, liberal-conservative, secularist political party founded in 2017. In fact, Altınok’s daughter, Ayça Altınok, joined the İYİ Party in 2018. Meral Akşener introduced her as the daughter of the ‘legend’ mayor at the İYİ Party rally in Keçiören. His daughter’s membership to the İYİ Party strengthened the rumors that Altınok would run for the İYİ Party in Keçiören. However, once his father became candidate from the AKP, she decided to leave the Good Party. [http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/babasi-ak-parti-adavisi-olunca-iyi-partiden-ayrildi-41071230](http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/babasi-ak-parti-adavisi-olunca-iyi-partiden-ayrildi-41071230)
[https://www.independentturkish.com/node/4421/siyaset/alt%C4%B1nok-yeniden-sahnede](https://www.independentturkish.com/node/4421/siyaset/alt%C4%B1nok-yeniden-sahnede)

\(^10^1\) In the 2019 local elections, a candidate from the İYİ Party ran for the Nation Alliance- Millet İttifakı (a CHP-led alliance with several right-wing parties, including the İYİ Party and the Felicity Party) in Keçiören. The candidate came second with 30.89% of the vote. According to the rumors told by my informants in Keçiören, Altınok, during his 2019 local election campaign, confidentially asked not only Alevi voters living in the district, but also resentful AKP and MHP voters to vote for ‘Altınok in Keçiören, Six Arrow (the insignia of Republican People’s Party, CHP) in Ankara (‘Keçiören’de Altınok, Ankara’da Altı Ok.’). The same rumors were in circulation in the 2014 local elections when Altınok was a candidate from the Grand Unity Party (BBP).
See: [https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/03/140328_ankara_ulkuculer](https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/03/140328_ankara_ulkuculer)
Also watch the scenes between 04:28-04:32 in [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xDo65IIIrMo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xDo65IIIrMo)
Between 2009-2019, the municipality of Keçiören was run by Mustafa Ak\textsuperscript{102}, who was appointed as a candidate by the AKP headquarters. Ak was not a Keçiören local, and appointed several municipal administrative staff from other districts; this was deemed problematic on the grounds that the municipal administration could not sufficiently grasp the district, its contextual dynamics, and its problems. In this period, the municipality invested in recreational and socialization spaces, namely, Family Life Centers, Ladies’ Clubs, and Youth Centers, which manifest the shifting dynamics of gendered publicness in the district. These facilities, which are examples of representations of space conceived around the notion of family, which the AKP identifies as the main bearer of the values it claims to uphold, are presented and promoted as places that contribute to the peace of a family-centered sociality in Keçiören. Coming from the AKP party elite, Mustafa Ak’s main agenda in municipalism was to translate his party’s discursive policies at a local level. As under the former mayor’s term, cultural events and activities were organized around Islamic and nationalist themes, this time with a particular focus on involving cognates and Muslim groups in the Middle East and the Balkans, in an effort to incorporate the discursive contours of AKP’s foreign policy following the Arab Spring. Unlike Altınok’s mayoral terms, however, during this period Turkish nationalist discourse toned down. Likewise, during Ak’s mayoral terms, groups affiliated with the nationalist movement, such as the A-team, had less dominance in the urban public spaces. Perceived as an ‘outsider’ mayor, Mustafa Ak’s two election wins were credited to his nomination by the AKP rather than his own performance in local government. The local election

\textsuperscript{102} Ak currently works as the General Secretary of Sakarya Metropolitan Municipality.
results of these two terms (2009-2019) were remarkable in terms of revealing the local parameters of the vote permeability between the AKP and the MHP, the surfacing of the complaints separating ‘good’ Erdoğan from ‘bad-corrupt’ AKP cadres, and the significance of the candidate’s identity and local government performance.

4.3. Concluding Remarks

With its historically shifting patterns of spatial segregation, the socio-spatial structure of Ankara became more stratified following the 1950s; still, the city consists of a ‘center’ and plural ‘peripheries’, concomitantly bearing the discursive, class-based, affective, and spatial103 operations of this dichotomy. The district of Keçiören, as one of the periphery districts to Çankaya104, the central district known as the symbol of the Republic, sets a peculiar example due both to the significant historical changes in itself and its interrelations within this spatial dichotomy. Since the second half of 1990s, Keçiören has distinguished itself with its emerging representations of space contesting the secular spatial symbolism of the capital. The then prime minister’s decision to reside in Keçiören instead of Çankaya undoubtedly plays a significant role

103 Edward Shils considers the centre as ‘a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs’ rather than ‘a spatially located phenomenon’ (1962, 117). Mardin, in his article published in 1973, did not use the terms ‘space’ or ‘geography’. However, throughout the article, Mardin frames the cleavage within the clashing processes of urbanism and nomadism, and addresses the differences between urban-rural based sections of the population. Mardin recognizes the fact that ‘... the urban masses could also be counted as part of the periphery’ (1973, 173), and at following pages he describes the Patrona revolt as ‘one urban form of a new type of estrangement of the Ottoman periphery from the center appeared in Istanbul in 1730’ (p. 175).

104 Home to the National Assembly, the Çankaya Mansion, the new Presidential Complex, state institutions, economic sectors, and cultural facilities, the district of Çankaya is the center of the capital, in each and every possible meaning the notion of ‘center’ suggests.
in granting Keçiören a relative hegemonic position within the then existing socio-political field. Predicated on the dichotomies of new-old, secular(minority)-conservative(majority), the political rationality behind this decision sought to reverse and reproduce the hierarchical asymmetries of these binaries in its quest for power. On the other hand, as the locus of power and source of prestige, the district of Çankaya was also taken as a model for what it represents socio-politically and socio-culturally- the constitutive other to be negotiated and competed with by the nationalist Islamist-conservative local governments of Keçiören.

Based on the nationalist-conservative writer Peyami Safa’s\textsuperscript{105} (1899-1961) novel titled *Fatih-Harbiye* (1931), the contrasting portrayal of the two historical districts of early Republican İstanbul has been extensively used to refer to the contentious debate on cultural polarization in Turkey. In his exposition, Safa constructed the localities and inscriptions of these localities onto his protagonists on a web of dichotomies\textsuperscript{106} reflecting conservative political imaginary of the time span. The districts of Fatih and Harbiye, as places of ‘two different conceptions of life’\textsuperscript{107} (cited in; Gürbilek, 2015: 85), have then turned into spatial metaphors. The ideological appropriations of the Fatih-Harbiye duality, however, appear to be frozen or fixated at the early Republican period, reproducing ahistorical conceptions of social

\textsuperscript{105} Peyami Safa is an intellectual figure of early Republican conservatism (İrem, 2002).

\textsuperscript{106} Whilst the district of Fatih symbolizes “the tradition, East, piety, nativity, poverty and authenticity”; the district of Harbiye is associated with “modernity, West, alienation, cosmopolitanism, wealth and artificiality” (Bora, 2000; Yumul, 2009).

change in Turkey. Relationally, what renders those sorts of spatial dualities operative for the Islamist conservative politics lies in their capacity to generate polarizing politics, by relegating political struggle to oversimplified cultural differences. Likewise, the shifting discursive positioning of Keçiören in relation/contrast to Çankaya through a set of dualities is bound up with struggle over power relations.

To unfold the dynamics of conservatism in Keçiören in its embeddedness within broader sociopolitical relations and hierarchies, in this chapter, I examine the historical formation and positionality of Keçiören within a relational grid of political struggles. I briefly include the historical processes entailing social, economic and political repercussions as the differentiation of space in cities are products of the political decision-making practices which directly link to the processes of uneven and combined development of capitalism (Smith, 1985; Harvey, 2005). Situating the socio-spatial (trans)formation of Keçiören within the larger urban development of Ankara, I particularly focus on what Lefebvre (1991) calls ‘representations of space’ which refers to the space informed and produced by the logic of dominating political power, hegemonic ideology, and dominant economic mode of production.
CHAPTER 5

SCALING DOWN TO THE MAHALLES:
THE FRAGMENTS FROM EVERYDAYNESS OF RELIGIOUS
CONSERVATISM IN KEÇİÖREN

5.1. Introduction

In 2017, in his remarks on Keçiören, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a former resident of the district, highlights how Keçiören “preserves the traditional neighborhood- mahalle life that has become rare”\textsuperscript{108}. Praising the preservation of neighborhood ‘intimacy’ in the district, Erdoğan also acknowledges the rarity of traditional neighborhood life. The survival of mahalle culture in the district was also a theme mentioned as one of the most characterizing aspects of sociality in Keçiören by the majority of my informants. Children playing on the streets, the elderly men frequenting the neighborhood mosques for the five daily prayers, the clamorous street weddings with electro-saz music, soldiers’ farewell in convoys, and the community acting attentively to support their neighbors in times of loss such as funerals were counted as instances of surviving mahalle culture in the district. Besides, there was a recurring emphasis on the sense of ‘modesty’, not only as an indicator of

\textsuperscript{108} In his speech, Erdoğan also addresses the preservation of neighborhood ‘intimacy’. The Turkish original version reads as follows: “... geçtiğimiz çeyrek yüzyılda Keçiören adeta küllerinden yeniden doğdu, kendini plansız yapışmadan, mahalle samimiyetini muhafaza ederek, kurtarıp yenilendi.”


112
religiosity but also an alignment along lines of class differentiation that prevails the neighborhoods. As elaborated in the Chapter 4, since the 1994 local elections, the nationalist Islamist-conservative local governments sought to implement urban socio-spatial strategies to regulate urban public life in the district on the axis of religious morality. In doing so, the Keçiören municipality has benefit from the notion of ‘family’ that is based on the dominant patriarchal gender hierarchy. The configuration of district’s public spaces as 'family spaces' has been a part of the urban spatial strategies employed by the nationalist Islamist municipality led by the AKP that attribute importance to the preservation of the traditional notion of mahalle. To ensure 'peace' and 'order' in the district, the mayor's informal security team, the so-called 'A team', was responsible for maintaining 'discipline' in bazaars and public parks. Kandiyoti (1997: 121), in an article discussing changing forms of masculinity in Turkey where she also elaborates on the social stereotype of the 'kabadayı' argues that "the neighborhood, like the home and family, has an honor to defend". In ways that imply a masculine character that preserves the normative order, the A-team squad resembles the ‘kabadayı’, now a nostalgic social typology. Imbued with nationalism, these 'low-brow' masculinity performances have played a significant role in Keçiören's reputation as a 'macho' and 'fascist' enclave in Ankara. However, the mayor and his cadre's emphasis on the notion of mahalle, their

---

109 According to the dictionary of the TDK (Turkish Language Association), “kabadayı” refers to: "A person who takes his own rules of honor as a basis and acts as a bully by going beyond the rules of society". "Kabadayı" refers to a male person who seeks to regulate and control the social life in the neighborhood and expect the neighborhood inhabitants to behave accordingly. Reflecting the oppressive side of the mahalle culture, he registers as a social typology who does not let in those he believes to come from outside the boundaries of the neighborhood, and who happens to applies power to others in cruel ways.
interventions in the normative organization of district’s public spaces, and their active participation in the daily life in neighborhoods are highly appreciated by the residents of the district.

On the other hand, the notion of neighborhood implies ‘similarity’, which features as one of its defining characteristics. Deriving from this aspect of the notion, the mahalle is metaphorically used to denote an imagined community that enables people to convey a sense of belonging, a sense of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ based on certain similarities and differentiations. For that matter, in order to mark the differences, the boundaries that divide such an imagined community are typically drawn along the lines of Islamic vs. secular, - which is mostly referred by the informants as ‘our neighborhood/people’ ("bizim buralar", "buranın insanları") in ways that signify this divide- reflecting the intricate debate of socio-political segregations in Turkey. In a similar fashion, this abstraction of identifying similarity/difference manifests itself, or gets to materialize, in the differentiation of urban residential areas, particularly given the pervasive currency of the Islamic conservative-secular divisions in socio-political imaginaries.

The primary research questions that guide this chapter are as follows: How and in what ways does the emergent lower-middle class religious conservative culture embody, reproduce, accommodate, and invent itself in the everyday life in Keçiören? Given that it is one of Ankara’s peripheral districts that has undergone uneven urban development and ruled by nationalist, Islamic conservative local governments for the last three decades, what are the constants and changing dynamics of the Sunni-Turkish majority’s ‘we-makings’ in Keçiören? Accordingly, in this chapter, I first
discuss on what would the neighborhood- *mahalle* both as a spatial and scalar unit disclose on the everydayness of nationalist religious conservatism. What is the significance and role of *mahalle* in schemes of nationalist religious enclaves and how the notion of neighborhood is defined, imagined, produced, and lived? To do so, I trace how imaginary abstractions of *mahalle* saturated by nationalist religious conservative rhetoric translate into practices, appropriations and negotiations at the quotidian of *mahalle*. Following and in relation to this debate, drawing on my ethnographic study, I examine how and in what ways different class positions embedded in spatial hierarchies and their class-cultural implications intersect with, generate, and shape religious conservative dispositions and practices as well as how religious conservative dispositions play a role in the formation of subjectivities.

The neighborhood, *mahalle*, is imagined with ideologically loaded affective qualities which endorse conservative family values and religious moralities. The *mahalle*, as the immediate space of the ‘family’, is also a place where the blurred boundaries of public and private are configured and regulated by ethos saturated with patriarchal gender hierarchies. The debate here addresses how, both discursively and in relation to government operations, the roles and duties assigned to the family in social reproduction have shifted during the AKP rule. The family as a social institution is one of the major tenets of conservatism. Construed as the ultimate guardian of the moral order, the family serves to inculcate Islamic-conservative dispositions, while at the same time assuming responsibility for the production and distribution of welfare for individuals. Drawing on the subjective experiences of my informants, I attempt to address the angle between two-
decade-old AKP governments’ Islamic-conservative discourses, rhetoric and policies on the ‘family’ and the forms of religious conservatism variably experienced in socio-economically different neighborhoods of the district of Keçiören. Moving from my ethnographic study, I argue that (i) the neighborhood as a scale is politically appropriated to inculcate the ideas of religious conservatism and (ii) it is a locality that regulates and reproduces social relations at the intersection of classed gender dynamics and patriarchal religious moralities, and (iii) it is a setting that functions to generate ‘we-making’, produce clientelist relationships and consolidate political belongings.

5.2. The Mahalle as a Spatial and Scalar Unit in its Relationalities

As a socio-spatial entity, the ‘neighborhood’ historically occupies a substantial place in the everyday makings of communities. Behar (2003: 7), in his study of the Kasap İlyas neighborhood in the 18th and 19th century, asserts that “the mahalle was essentially a basic urban community defined by a dense web of relationships, before being a local administrative unit”. The mahalle, as an economic and social entity, entailed not only a particular modus vivendi but also a variety of mechanisms to regulate and monitor public morality (ibid: 4,6). As a matter of fact, the ‘neighborhood’, the mahalle, holds a historical significance imbued with ideologically loaded functions at the formation of sociality in Turkey. Saktanber (2002: 134-135) points out and

110 Lewis Mumford, in his article titled “The Neighborhood and the Neighborhood Unit”, mentions the historical existence of neighborhood as follows: “Neighborhoods, in some annoying, inchoate fashion exists wherever human beings congregate, in permanent family dwellings, and many of the functions of the city tend to be distributed naturally- that is, without any theoretical preoccupation or political direction- into neighborhoods” (1954, 258).
notes that in his analysis on the patrimonial social system of the Ottoman society, Mardin addresses the *mahalle* “as an inseparable part of ordinary Ottoman social life, heavily colored with its religious ideas of morality and conduct”. Mardin (1981: 213) points out the significance of the *mahalle* where he suggests that the secularization efforts of the founding cadres were inextricably entailed “liberation of the individual from the collective constraints of the Muslim community”. In his assessment on the significance of *mahalle*, Mardin also addresses the social weight and role of the family as an institution, and he argues that “the family and the individual, both subjects of *mahalle* control, were sub-units comprised within the concept of ‘society’, and persons who wanted to reform ‘society’ also wanted to reform the family” (ibid.: 215).

One of the most essential qualities of the ‘neighborhood’ is the socio-spatial proximity, which entails this spatial unit to embrace the everyday life of urban communities, from admitting intimate social ties and local solidarity networks and exercising social-moral-religious control to molding socialization mechanisms, and determining the confines of class reproduction (Mardin, 1997; Behar, 2003; Small& Newman, 2001). In contrast to the city which promise anonymity and indifference, as sub-category to city, the neighborhood has been viewed as places of face-to-face encounters, intimacy, solidarity (Kearns & Parkinson, 2001). According to Sennett (1974: 3), the neighborhood as a community space where family ties and intimacy

---

111 On the other hand, a number of conservative intellectual figures, the mahalle is an entity to hold on to. Samiha Ayverdi, Halide Edip, Münevver Ayaşlı and oppose the “extremes” of the Republic, which they found rootless and uncouth, by returning to the past, to “neighborhood morals and manners” with the mosque at its center (Türkeş, 2005: 603).
play an important role, is distinct from the public space, which he defines as the space of the crowd and the stranger. Problematizing the defensive qualities of neighborhoods, Sennett points out the ways in which neighborhood as an urban unit create its own ethos of local defense and the insular politics (ibid.: 9). In many respects, neighborhoods are inherently gendered, including their spatial and temporal organization. Mills (2007) in her study in an old but gentrified mahalle in Istanbul addresses the gendered characteristics of the mahalle life. While the communal ties of men are mostly maintained within seemingly more public areas like local shops, street life and market places, women’s relations extend into the private (or semi-public) zones. Domestic life is the ultimate domain of women’s gatherings that help them become a part of mahalle culture. Evidently, the functions and roles that the unit of neighborhood performs alter, and the forms it takes multiply, in line with and due to social, economic, and cultural transformations.

Harvey (1989) argues that the production of neighborhood space is intricately bounded with the logics of capitalist uneven development. Moreover, as he contends, taken in relation to the politics of scale, the neighborhoods reflect the patterns of class-based residential differentiations (Harvey, 1973: 284). Treating neighborhood as a spatial product of neoliberal urbanization, the debates in the urban political economy address the ways in which neighborhoods are capitalized as key sites of secondary circuits of capital as well as political mobilization through the distribution of social benefits (Harvey, 1989; Cox, 1981). Under the AKP’s neoliberal urban policies, the urban transformations featuring vertical and high-density residential units have drastically transformed the urban fabric of the
neighborhoods, which in turn has drastically altered the community dynamics as well as the inhabitants’ everyday conducts and dispositions (Batuman, 2017; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Karaman, 2013). The AKP has enacted a number of institutional and legal restructuring to implement urban regeneration projects that have turned cities into construction sites. Indeed, the expansion of the construction sector has been the source of the AKP’s policy of economic growth and consolidation of its political power (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014; Moudouros, 2014). Urban regeneration projects, which have deepened the existing social and spatial inequalities, have mobilized the grassroots movements in neighborhoods which demand the right to the housing and city (Eraydın & Taşan-Kök, 2014). Subjected to the processes of gentrification and commodification, the neighborhood has been evolving as a result of the AKP’s extensive urban transformation projects, particularly since the 2010s.

This study examines the everydayness of sociality in the district of Keçiören as entrenched in the interplay of spatial, gendered and class relations. In doing so, I recognize that the scale of district is embedded in broader webs of social, political, and economic relations and interdependencies with other scales such as the city and the nation-state (Brenner, 1999). In the Chapter 4, I examined the historically shifting positionality and contextual particularities of Keçiören within a relational grid of socio-spatial processes intertwined with political struggles. In this chapter, I scale down to the district’s neighborhoods. As a socio-spatial scale, the district is composed of neighborhoods that, due to its spatial and temporal configurations, involve more direct and multifaceted relations with smaller scales, namely the household and the body (Smith, 1992; Brenner, 1999; Marston, 2000).
Following the political-economy stream of urban studies debating on the significance of ‘politics of scale’ (Smith, 1984; Jonas, 1994; Brenner, 2009), and with a socio-spatial framework offered by Lefebvre (1991), I take the unit of neighborhood in relation to its formation as a politically expedient scalar unit. Utilizing it both in operational and observational ways, I treat the scale not merely as a descriptor or indicator of geographical scope but as a relational concept. It constitutes a chief part of my methodological departure.

Keçiören has a reputation as a nationalist Islamist-conservative bastion due to the district’s election results for the past three decades. However, the district does represent more than the sum of its parts. Though the majority of the constituency inclines to vote for the right-wing, nationalist conservative political parties, a recognizable segment of population in Keçiören aligns with the social democrat political parties. This appears roughly on a par with the nation-wide default voting percentages\(^\text{112}\). In other words, unlike for instance Sultanbeyli in İstanbul, a district recognized with prominence of bold Islamic enclaves, Keçiören is distinguished as a district representing a microcosm of Turkey, where is distinctive with its majority of dwellers migrated mostly from the Central Anatolia with Turkish-Sunni origins. The district of Keçiören is made up of fifty-one neighborhoods that are heterogeneous in terms of their socio-economic demographic compositions and distinctive with respect to their own urban trajectories. As a critical

---

\(^{112}\) For instance, in the 2018 general elections the national percentages of the political parties were as follows; The AKP- 42.6%, the CHP- 22.6%, the MHP- % 11.7, the IYIP- %10, and the HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party)- 11.7. The election results of 2018 for Keçiören; the AKP- %46.1, the CHP- 20.7%, the MHP- 14.8%, the IYIP- 12%, and the HDP- 4.5%. Since it is mentioned above, the results of Sultanbeyli at 2018 were as follows; the AKP- 57.2 %, the CHP-7.6 %, the CHP- 11.2%, and the HDP- 18.2. In contrast to Sultanbeyli, in Keçiören the HDP’s constituency, which is predominantly composed of Kurdish people, is considerably smaller.
inquiry into the socio-spatial differentiations within the district would provide a more nuanced understanding, I conducted my ethnographic research in four different settings of nine socio-economically distinguished neighborhoods in Keçiören. Using the voting preferences of the neighborhoods as a guide, I chose localities more affiliated with nationalist Islamic conservative leanings than, for instance, neighborhoods where Alevi communities outnumber\textsuperscript{113}.

5.3. In Pursuit of the Shifting Notions of the Mahalle Ethos

Keçiören’s population has more than doubled due to rapid internal migration since it was granted district status in 1984\textsuperscript{114}, resulting in the emergence of new residential areas and transformations in existing neighborhoods, as well as a significant change in the district’s socio-economic profile. The variations between the fifty-one neighborhoods of the district can basically be drawn according to their urban transformation histories, which are closely related to their socioeconomic demographic compositions. As it is commonly the case, the classification of neighborhoods in the district reflects a sort of ‘center-periphery’ divide where the socio-spatial repercussions of this dichotomy have been complicated both by the historical processes of internal migration and urban restructuring. While a number of neighborhoods in the district’s center developed as apartment-building residential areas from the beginning, the majority of neighborhoods

\textsuperscript{113} The voting preferences of the neighborhoods, both in general and local elections, were taken as a cross-checked affirmation.

\textsuperscript{114} The population of the district, which was 433,559 in the official census recorded in 1985, has increased to 942,884 as of 2021. https://www.kecioren.bel.tr/kecioren.html
and some of the peripheries completed urban transformation processes of conversion from *gecekondu* into apartment buildings until the first decade of the 2000s (Güvenç, 2001). The neighborhoods in the district’s center, as well as a number of newly constructed areas with urban redevelopments, are primarily inhabited by conservative fractions of the middle class, most of whom are endowed with property assets and composed of less established middle class families (Güvenç, 2001). The lower and lower-middle class families living in the peripheral neighborhoods are socio-economically disadvantaged yet eager bearers of middle class aspirations. The selected neighborhoods on a socio-economic basis enabled me to unpack the varying existence of horizontal tensions and divergent manifestations of lower-middle and lower class-cultural repertoires.

I pursue and address the dynamics of spatialization of class in neighborhood contexts with regard to the ways in which socio-spatial differentiations tell us about social inequalities. In order to examine how *spatial practice* of inequalities impacts the dynamics of sense of belonging and political dispositions, I focus on how evolving socio-spatial differentiations disclose social inequalities along the lines of class and gender. As revealed during my ethnographic study, I elaborate on how the evolving networks of social relations with kinship, *hemşehri*, and neighbors operate in ways that generate solidarity, dependencies, and conflict, as well as how these communal relations are embedded in and articulated into political networks. The ways in which these networks of social relations evolved, accommodated, and negotiated address the conflictual yet persistence dynamics of ‘we-makings’ at the intersection of class and religiously conservative subjectivities. Moving from my ethnographic study, in this part, I relationally examine (i) lived
experiences of housing transformation from *gecekondu* to apartment building in terms of class-cultural and gendered ramifications, and (ii) how class-based spatial segregation impacts the reproduction of class inequalities by enabling and impeding the middle-class aspirations, and (iii) how variant forms of nationalist religious conservatism shape people’s everyday lives, and in what ways does the emergent lower middle class religious conservative culture reproduce, accommodate, and invent itself in the everyday life in Keçiören.

5.3.1. **From *gecekondu* to apartment buildings: ‘Then it was like another village in Keçiören’**

Personal narratives of residential stories, including the choices of settling in Keçiören, provide insight not only into the district’s shifting socio-spatial and class-cultural transformation but also into how people’s perceptions, expectations and accommodations of sociality have evolved in response to shifting socio-political and economic processes. For instance, Fatma, born in Yozgat, mentioned that she was fifteen years old when her family relocated to their *gecekondu* in Kuşçağız, Keçiören in the late 1970s. Her father, a farmer and active member of the MHP, chose the neighborhood because his relatives and fellow villagers had already moved there. Fatma, a housewife with three children, was a respected woman who was invited to women’s gatherings to recite the surah of *Yasin*\(^{115}\). In *sohbet* gatherings, she often praised her father’s piety, stating that even though he couldn’t afford to send

\(^{115}\) *Yasin* is the thirty-sixth chapter of the Quran. Published as a booklet commonly with a picture of roses on its cover, it is the most recited chapter by pious women in religious meetings.
her to high school due to financial constraints, he was a ‘good’ Muslim who valued his daughters. The changes in values, perceptions, and experiences of parenting, the generational conflicts between parents and children, the ways of and tips for negotiations with father figures were among the issues frequently brought up by women in the sohbet gatherings. Remarkably, it was quite widespread that women sought guidance on how to resolve family or marital conflicts using justifications and reasoning from Islamic sources. On that account, Fatma’s praisal of her father’s religiosity with an emphasis on his care for his daughters entails an effort to set an example. In a conversation on how Keçiören was back then and how it has evolved over the years, she also shared details on how her imagination and expectations of an urban setting were shaped by her father’s child-rearing attitude. Referred to the Prophet’s fondness for his daughters, she mentioned that her father had taken her and her sister to the center of the provincial city where they used to live, disregarding the traditional patriarchal reactions of the villagers.

When we first came to Keçiören, I was very disappointed. Our neighborhood was a dark, muddy place at night. (...) We came to settle in the capital city, but this place was no different from our village. It was my mother who was very enthusiastic that we moved from the village. She was tired of the workload in the village. Not just her husband but there were many other bosses that she had to act accordingly. She was happy to get out of the village, then it was like we were in another village in Keçiören... The only thing that my mother survived was the animal breeding at the village. (Fatma, 53, Yozgat)

Spatial clustering of immigrants from the same provinces in urban neighborhoods is a widespread pattern of urbanization in Turkey (Erder, 1996; İçduygu, 1998). In a similar fashion, Keçiören’s demographic

\[\text{126 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 1.}\]
composition has been shaped by chain-migrations mainly from Central Anatolian cities like Kırşehir, Çankırı, Çorum, and Yozgat. The hemşehri and kinship relations were a common theme in the accounts of informants on both migrations to Ankara and residential mobility within the city and district. As it has been extensively discussed in scholarly studies, hemşehri (fellow townsman) relations have emerged as a result of the need for socioeconomic support, solidarity, and mutual assistance, as well as the search for the feelings of familiarity and trust that people seek in the alienating conditions of the urban context (Erder, 1996; Işık & Pınarcıoğlu, 2002; Buğra & Keyder, 2006). These networks of relationships, however, have played a major role in extending and translating the dynamics of rural sociality into urban space (Erder, 1996; Buğra & Keyder, 2006). As revealed in Fatma’s words; “then it was like we were in another village in Keçiören”, by which she meant not only the physical deprivation of place but also the continuity of types of sociality that bind interactions. With regard to the socio-spatial changes from rural to urban life, this dual continuity was a recurring theme, highlighted most by women who experienced the gecekondu neighborhoods during the 1980s and 1990s in Keçiören. Rather than as an economic safety net in finding jobs or housing, the mutual solidarity provided by kinship and hemşehri relations was mostly conveyed as “sharing the same hardship” and “not feeling alone”, particularly during weddings, funerals, and religious holy days. In this manner, the district effectively constituted a socio-spatial setting in which the immigrants’ senses of togetherness resonated with their former rural belongings.

Though the lasting impact of rural belongings and continuing networks play a significant role in the makings of ‘we’ at the urban setting, the patriarchal
and religious dispositions engendered by the same persistent rural sociality also arise tensions, contradictions and negotiations. In women’s narratives, interwoven with these networks of relationships, the difficulties and struggles of gecekondu life occupied a rather significant place. For women, the major challenges included not only the intensity and invisibility of home-based care work in gecekondu but also the restrictive dynamics of the patriarchal relations retained from rural life which required renegotiations due to the novelties of urban life. The latter was largely associated to the spatial concentration of these social networks, which women mostly characterized as restricting, using descriptions such as ‘being under constant gaze’ and ‘feeling surrounded’. Emine, 51, was a mother of three daughters, whose taste in clothing was commended at sohbet gatherings. She liked to pay attention to the tonal harmony of her colorful scarves with her abaya (ferace). Emine’s account provides an example of the women informants’ experiences on and negotiations with the lasting of impact religious morality of rural sociality into urban life. Initially describing her parents-in-law as “…used to be abnormally strait-laced (mutaassip)”, she then felt the need to correct and recalibrate their degree of religiosity as “when I said strait-laced, it wasn’t like we were wearing chador”, Emine reasoned that “we were peasants, maybe they were afraid. I don’t know, but they oppressed and made us (women) suffer a lot.”

Addressing the persistence of patriarchal surveillance culture in her lower-class neighborhood where the urban transformation had completed during

---

117 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 2.
the late 1990s, Hatice (43) said that “… people moved to living in apartments, but the mindsets have not changed much”\textsuperscript{118}. As in Hatice’s example, where she stated that it was still found to be quite reprehensible for a woman to smoke on the streets, conservative social control that permeating everyday life continues to dominate women’s lives in the district. Nevertheless, like Hacer, who stated that she now gained her freedom to smoke her cigarette at her apartment without reproach or anyone interfering, Emine stated that she did not allow anyone to interfere with her daughters’ dress codes, whom she believed should enjoy new varieties of modest clothing. She mentioned the ultimatum she gave to her husband as follows: “I never restrict or bore my daughters, nor do I let my husband restrict them. I say, 'Your parents have constrained me enough, let them live.' He has nothing to say but remain silent.”

Questioning their own subjective experiences, the majority of women informants, whom were also mothers, sought to create space for themselves by negotiating the extends of religious conservatism that dominated their familial and neighborhood lives. Different from the older generations’ religious dispositions which for them connotes ‘rurality’ and ‘backwardness’, the women informants aspired for more egalitarian gender relations which were believed to be compatible with the changing values of urban middle-class ways of life. However, this quest for their own and their children’s lives does not seem to indicate a break or disengagement from religiously informed morality. The majority of women informants identified and

\textsuperscript{118} See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 3.
perceived themselves as adhering to traditional religious values on issues such as patriarchal family order, the *fitrat* of women, and male dominance in public life. It is within these boundaries, they sought to expand, negotiate and redefine the reconfiguration they demand in everyday social relations.

Informants identified themselves or their family members, mostly the older generation, as ‘peasants’ (*köylü* or their dispositions as ‘peasant-like’ (*köylü gibi*). The ways they articulated ‘*köylü*’ (peasant) appear as more of a transitional label used to describe themselves in the recent past than a label with which they identify themselves today. They tended to use ‘peasant’ to convey an excuse for inability to adapt to urban life, to express not a lack of manners but a lack of knowledge to navigate the opportunities or challenges, or to address being closed or reserved to changes brought by urban life. The antonym of peasant was not necessarily ‘urbanite’, but rather ‘modern’ or mostly ‘educated’. That being said, they treasured the ‘village’ as a place of origin, a source of belonging and, especially for men, a sense of community that extended to the relationships they maintained in the district. The majority of informants mentioned that up until about the mid-2000s, they had frequent contact with their villages, spending summer vacations there and bringing in or providing supplies that facilitated households’ livelihoods. However, this contact had been seriously disrupted by the shrinking village population and the drastic decline in agricultural production, which was felt economically in urban households.

On the other hand, the difference between identifying oneself as a ‘peasant’ and being labeled as one by others manifests itself in the narratives. In their accounts, informants expressed that they were offended to be referred to as
‘köylü’ by others which was largely the case following the transition from gecekondu to apartment buildings or began to live in apartments right after migrating from the village to the district. That is when they experienced a variety of encounters with the middle classes, who had adopted and embodied urban secular ways of life. What is at stake here is the socio-cultural hierarchy repertoires operating at the intersection of class differences and the perceptions of the corporeality of religiosity. The following statement of Cavidan (49, Kırşehir) is one that may represent the major contours of what was described: "My father-in-law might have been wealthier than everyone in our apartment building, however our clothes, veils, our accent of Turkish screamed ‘we are villagers.’ Our neighborhood used to be an established place; if we were in Aktepe119, we would have blended in”120.

Another instance of urban encounters in which class, ethnic, and religious differences become visible came from Safiye- a 55-year-old housewife who stated that she and her husband had voted for the AKP since the day it was founded and that their two married sons were ullahcü- idealist nationalists. Safiye was one who had lived more than 35 years in Keçiören, where she had experienced the district’s diverse ethnic composition. She mentioned that, contrary to what might be expected, she had no problems in neighborly relations with Armenians, historically one of the district’s local communities

119 Aktepe is a lower-middle class neighborhood, undergone urban transition from gecekondu to apartment buildings

120 “Kayınbabam belki de bizim apartmandakilerin hepsinden daha zengindi ama kılığımız, başörtümüz, Türkçemiz falan bağlıyordu ‘biz köylüyüz’ diye. Bizim mahalle oturma bir yerdi, Aktepe’de olsak karışır giderdik.”
whose population has drastically declined, and Alevis, who, like them, came to settle in the district with internal migration. "We’ve never witnessed any of their wrongdoings"\(^{121}\) she said of her neighbors, underlining that even though they were from different religious and ethnic backgrounds, and were more ‘modern’ and ‘educated’ than her family. Despite attributing positive qualities to them and criticizing the bias towards them, one can discern how she classified Armenians and Alevis as the ‘other’. Her narrative illustrates inner dynamics of Sunni-Turkish majority’s ‘we-makings’; this is particularly evident in her comparison of her landlords, who despite being “Sunni alike and, on top of that, venerated pilgrims” looked down on her family as ‘clumsy villagers’. While the positive encounters with those coded as ‘the other’ were tended to be perceived as ‘unexpected’, ‘exceptional’, and ‘surprising’, the negative encounters or experiences with those seen as ‘us’ tended to be interpreted as compensable exceptions, even if they cause resentment. This narrative, on the one hand, demonstrates that religiosity, which was ascribed worthiness or superiority, does not conceal class distinctions, as in this case with the pilgrimage neighbors; on the other, it points out the inadequacy of religious morality in ensuring relations in the maskings of "we" such as the fact that even though they are both Sunnis, Sunni neighbors who went on pilgrimage look down on them as "peasants".

The term ‘\textit{varoş}', circulated in a pejorative sense against \textit{gece kondus} in the 1990s, especially in popular culture, was not used by any of my informants, the majority of whom were women. On the other side, the label ‘peasant’ was

\(^{121}\) See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 4.
mentioned to still be pejoratively attributed by ‘others’, and used within their own communities to mark various intersections of class-cultural position and religious corporeality in societal hierarchy. Younger generations used it as a judgment critical of the class-cultural dispositions and lifestyle patterns of their own families and neighborhoods, particularly in ways that denoted ‘köylü’ as a marker of an inferior class identity largely shaped by consumption practices. On that account, the perceived and lived space aspects of the neighborhood were marked and construed as being on the inferior and negative side of hierarchical dichotomies (rural/urban, traditional/modern, rude/polite) by younger generations who stated that these aspects lasted even after the transformation brought by apartment buildings, particularly in the peripheral neighborhoods. The spatial practice in the district was characterized in the narratives of women, notably younger women, as restrictive with the neighborhood life failing to adapt to the shifting dynamics of urban life that allow room for women’s urban mobility and visibility as well as more egalitarian interpretations of women’s piety. The majority mentioned that they strive to overcome this everydayness through spatial distancing strategy, i.e. by moving away from the neighborhood or district to another place, which would also enable an upward class mobility.

5.3.2. The Shifting Meanings and Roles of Social Networks in the Context of Mahalle

Classified as lower-middle class residential areas, the sociality in the neighborhoods of Keçiören has been bounded by relations of kinship and hemşehri, which also directly signal religious identities and impact political dispositions. These relations, which are evolving with shifting dynamics of
power relations, occupy a place that shapes everyday live, molding practices, perceptions and dispositions in individual and familial subjective experiences. On the other hand, this aspect of sociality particularly pertains to the centrality of the unit of ‘family’ in the everydayness of the district both in its sociality and spatiality. During the urbanization process, informal solidarity relations had been crucial not only in solving the problems facing migrants but also in easing the burden on the state. Buğra and Keyder (2006: 220) identify three mechanisms that provided socioeconomic security to the individual and argue that these mechanisms -on which the state’s welfare regime was based until the 1980s- also led to the preservation of certain aspects of rurality in urban environments during the migration process from rural to urban. These mechanisms, as Buğra and Keyder (2006: 220) argue, include “…the continuing ties of newly urbanized immigrants with their villages of origin, possibilities of informal housing, and the importance of family and neighborhood assistance mechanisms”. Following the 1980s, the market-oriented regime in development strategy replaced the protectionist one based on state intervention, which on the long run drastically challenged and weakened these mechanisms that provided socio-economic security to the individual (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; İşık & Pınarcıoğlu, 2002).

In the narratives of my informants living in socio-economically diverse neighborhoods of Keçiören, the functioning of kinship and hemşehri relations as a survival mechanism in the city seemed to be a thing of the distant past. However, despite the spatial proximity and intensity of families' origin-based relationships have changed as a result of upward class mobility's impact on residential mobility patterns, these relationships have nonetheless found a place in the narratives with both their social and economic aspects.
As a matter of fact, the moral economy of these relations was one of the major neighborhood dynamics that was addressed as causing and triggering horizontal tensions by tapping feelings of expectations, resentment, and competition. Hülya was a retired low-level civil servant, who decided to veil after retirement. As she mentioned, her neighbors, who first encouraged her to begin praying as a kind of remedial action during her post-retirement depression, were also influential in her decision to veil. Hülya was coming from a family that overcame financial challenges and resided in the affluent neighborhoods of the district. She explained how, despite coming with a limited budget from village, her family succeeded to grant their sons ownership of apartments in Keçiören while, as she had anticipated, keeping their daughters out of the inheritance. Hülya underlined the importance of kinship and hemşeri relations which provide the social capital that converted into economic capital. In her narrative, she described the dynamics of kinship relationships by saying, “relatives want you to be in a good position; they don’t want you to be too dependent on them, but they also don’t want you to be too successful.” This comment represents a shared sentiment I observed in the field: the intricate interplay of solidarity and subtle competition among kinship which appears to result in strengthening the commitment to the nuclear family. Despite prioritizing the maintenance of social relations, there was a common conviction among the informants that

---

122 She said that veiling had caused her to lose contact with her friends from work, and she had built herself a new social network by participating in religious circles. Hülya referred to her twenties as her ‘Moscow years’ when she wore tiny skirts like ‘almost all the young girls of the time’. Her Özalist father and her mother, who wore a traditional headscarf, did not intervene in the way she dressed. She characterized her family as a ‘typical Turkish family’, one that regularly fasted during Ramadan and was flexible in its religious practices.

123 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 5.
social networks were not reliable, even if there were blood ties. Based on this conviction, families stated that they insistently conveyed to their children that the only reliable source of help and support for an individual was her/his nuclear family. They noted that while they told their children to prioritize and look after their own individual interests, they underlined that they should do so without neglecting their responsibilities and duties towards the nuclear family, i.e., their mothers, fathers and siblings.

The struggles of surviving in the city, on the other hand, particularly for the urban poor, have not necessarily been mitigated by informal solidarity relations; rather, the absence or looseness of these networks causes to generate new types of social inequalities. In her study on Ümraniye, Erder (1996: 257) contends that the relations of hemşehri and kinship do not function as relations of solidarity for those in economic difficulties: this was largely valid for Keçiören as well. My informants, especially the poor, tended to negatively characterize the existing networks of kinship and hemşehri, describing the ones in which they were involved as unreliable, incidental, and not conflict-free in terms of solidarity, and those they were not involved in as exclusionary. Mustafa, a staunch Turkish nationalist in his mid-forties, was a high school graduate. He was working as a deliveryman for a cargo company. Mustafa mentioned that his family could not escape being tenants in poor gecekondu neighborhoods in Keçiören, for which he still resented his father for not leaving the village earlier. His resentment towards his father stems from the fact that the period of arrival to the city determines the
possibilities of informal housing. "You can't break that chain, you know?" Mustafa said, metaphorically expressing his struggle to escape the state of poverty, which he believed was due in part to the lack of support from kinship. By bringing this up, he also compared the strong solidarity practices of Alevi communities, which he coded as the 'other' in the district, with his own networks that failed to provide support. He referred to the instance when Turgut Altınok, the district mayor who comes from a nationalist political tradition, had demolished housing projects in Alevi neighborhoods and continued his words as follows: “At the time, we were content because God knows what the communists were up to, and that ours prevented them from realizing their goals.” Mustafa said that he questioned and wondered whether the municipality did want the solidarity practices of the Alevi community to set an example. However, he concluded by saying that he believed that the authorities, whom he identified as ‘our people’, should have known something he did not.

The scholarly studies on informal solidarity relationships widely indicate that the forms and intensity of kinship relations, as well as their definitions and functions, have evolved over the years (Erder, 1996; Işık & Pınarcıoğlu, 2002; Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Erdoğan, 2007). Yılmaz, a 56 years old clerk in a municipality ruled by the AKP, mentioned that his extended family had struggled financially for a long time and was ‘stuck’ in one of the poorest gecekondu neighborhoods of Keçiören. It was only after he officially joined the AKP, he noted, that he was able to establish connections that benefited not

124 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 6.
only his children but also his relatives. Yılmaz used familial addresses and codes to describe his relationship with the political party and said, “we found our dayı (maternal uncle) (we could rely on). they treated us as if we were family”\(^\text{125}\). The use of the term ‘dayı’ in this context does not appear to be incidental, as it also bears an implication of nepotism. In the case of Yılmaz, the kinship relationship –which, in his words, “does not necessarily require blood ties”- appears to have been redefined in a way that reinforces political belonging to the extent that it promises upward mobility. This redefined version of kinship, articulated in political networks, does not exclude either the inner dynamics of mutual obligations or the parameters of intimacy such as loyalty, and feelings of indebtedness. Indeed, mahalle culture plays a constitutive role for such redefinition of kinship ties to the extent that it sets the scene for communal ties and affective proximity. In other words, the narratives about the relations with others like “as if we were family” reveal to what extent the communal ties within mahalle context are prone to be simultaneously translated into familial ties and political solidarity.

In Keçiören, women’s uses of and participations in urban space are largely contained within the neighborhoods and their everyday mobilities are limited within these boundaries. In this respect, women’s gatherings constitute one of the most prominent public activities for women to socialize. I observed, and my informants concurred, that women’s gatherings in the neighborhoods had evolved from being a merely leisure-based activity to

\(^{125}\) See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 7.
include reciting Quran, prayers, and having religious conversations. The majority of the women informants noted that attending a gathering included religious activities strengthened women’s hands when negotiating with men to go out of the house. However, perceptions of this religious content change at women’s gatherings are shaped by more than simply women's pragmatic use of religious activity as an irrefutable, ‘legitimate’ excuse for leaving the house. By engaging in religious activities at women’s gatherings, women believed that they made better use of their time through practices that would earn them good deeds, such as participating in prayer chains. Another common explanation was that such informal collective religious activities provided them with psychological comfort and ‘peace of mind’ in coping with the variety of daily life struggle. This pattern of change is noteworthy as it reveals how everyday life in the district has taken on an Islamic character.

It was also a recognized fact that these gatherings function as a kind of networking where women seek to find support or contacts for their family members to find jobs or solutions to work-related problems. In a women’s gathering hosted by Ümran (45, Kırşehir) whose husband ran a successful business in the construction sector and was known to have close ties with the AKP, the women in the group began to complain about not getting enough assistance from their party-affiliated relatives to help their children find jobs. Seher, a mother of four in her late 30s, who had been actively working for the AKP’s women’s branch commission in her neighborhood for two years, intervened. She exhorted them to feel grateful for the positions their relatives now hold in both the state and the private sector, thanks to the AKP, adding: “They didn’t let us into the state, like giaour (gavur). Alhamdulillah, it’s
finally our turn. (...) Your turn will come, too; have a little patience.”¹²⁶ In a
similar tone to Seher’s rhetoric and drawing on a vernacular repertoire on
‘victimhood’, I witnessed several times that female preachers reminded
women in gatherings that they used to be victims of the ‘Old-Turkey’, which
was coded as religiously oppressive and ‘elitist’. As exemplified by Seher's
reassuring remark "it’s finally our turn” in response to women's complaints
about the difficulties they encounter in finding jobs for their children, these
gatherings also serve to form and consolidate the motifs of "we-making". The
ways of making and consolidating sense of ‘we’ also entail negotiations. As
Seher's call for patience by saying "Your turn will come, too” makes visible,
even though the 'turn' has come, it appears that there are still many among
the imagined 'us' who are waiting for their turn. At such gatherings, women
voiced their expectations that they would be rewarded by the party they had
lozally voted for, and these negotiations were fueled by comparisons of their
circumstances with those of their relatives or neighbors. The district’s
neighborhood party representatives or those staunchly committed to the
city were striving to bypass the discomfort felt about the class
differentiations that have become more evident among AKP constituencies.
In doing so, they drew on the circulation of an imagined ‘we’ against ‘them’;
with religion serving as the key symbolic dividing line.

Though they were still regarded as significant social networks as they were
also major components of the sociality in the district, neither kinship nor

¹²⁶ “Çok şükür, Ak parti sayesinde akrabalarımız devlette, özelde, her yerdede. İnsanlara yardım
Bir tane tanıdık bulmak ne kadar zordu. Ama bakın elhamdülillah sıra sonunda bize geldi. İhtiyaç
sahibi çok. Akraba diye öncelik beklemeyelim. Hepimiz akrabayız, din kardeşiyiz. Sıra size de gelir,
gelecek, biraz sabır.” (noted during the sohbet gathering).
hemşehri relations seem to be sufficient to provide the social capital networks needed to generate economic and cultural capital. On the other hand, it was widely held that extended family and kinship relations had deteriorated due to the economic difficulties of urban life. The majority of my informants further complained that these relationships had become competitive rather than solidarity-based. The matters of family and kinship relations were among the most prominent topics of conversation in the meetings where women came together; as male informants stated, they were also discussed in mosque circles and addressed in sermons. I witnessed on several occasions at religious gatherings that it was urged that the kinship ties should be preserved by referring to the Qur’an, hadith, and siyar(siyer) and the concept of sila-i rahim\textsuperscript{127}. The sila-i rahim is a moral notion used to describe upholding kinship ties, establishing good relations with and paying respect to family and relatives. When elaborating on this Islamic norm of morality, women tended to underline the primacy of protecting one’s own nuclear family and individual rights. Conceived as both an economic and social network, kinship was also considered as a significant social network to be preserved for tebliğ- religious preaching-call. In this respect, it also served as a social network to consolidate and reinforce a sense of political belonging and party loyalty. Besides, there was a strong emphasis placed on preserving strong family ties, which were considered to be a crucial pillar of social unity and cohesion, and passing these ties on to younger generations in order to preserve them and thus their political belongings. In this regard, as ‘holy’ mothers and ‘self-sacrificing’ wives, women were held responsible for both

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{127}] The sila-i rahim is defined by the Turkish Religious Foundation Islamic Encyclopedia as follows: “A moral term that refers to maintaining ties of kinship, visiting relatives and establishing good relations.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
repairing kinship relations and passing on the importance of these relations to younger generations, for the sake of both their families and social cohesion. The socialization circles of neighborhood life play a crucial role in the reproduction and circulation of religious patriarchal culture as well as in the responsibilization of the family and women in particular, in ways that the AKP regime’s discourses of familialism can be traced.

However, the socio-economic standing and class mobility of the households, such as the family’s livelihood, wealth or state of poverty, educational achievement of children, or their marriage choices, were all referred to be subjects of comparison, imitation or disdain in the context of neighborhood relationships. Relations with neighbors were not exempt from this; however, due to the binding social ties, relations with kinship were found to be more conflictual. In their narratives, some male informants described competition between relatives and neighbors as motivating and disciplining for upward mobility; given the asymmetries of the gender inequality, women informants mostly addressed these relationships as troubling in terms of class dynamics in everyday life. Besides, though women opened up these familial private matters in women’s circles they were engaged and commonly sought guidance from female hocas, they tended to persist in renegotiating and compromising religious norms with the convictions they had reached based on their lived experiences.
5.3.3. Evolving Sources and Relations of Dependency, Solidarity, and Conflict

Serap, 26, was preparing for the exams to become a private security guard after graduating from university with a degree in history. The eldest of a family of four children, she was one of women who complained that in order to obtain a ‘poverty certificate’ from the administrative head of the neighborhood (*muhtar*), one had to maintain good relations with those who had political ties with the ruling party. The social assistance they received from the state and the municipality through her mother’s registration was vital for the family’s survival because her father did not have a steady income. Serap’s account reveals the intricate dependency dynamics of neighborhood context; the ways in which women’s presence and mobility in everyday life are tied to their class positionalities and constrained by scrutinizing gazes over their gendered religious morality.

I change my route as I see the stalls selling fruits and vegetables in the corner of our mosque. Why? Because apparently the *cemâl* has not been disbanded yet. This has been annoying me since my childhood. Encountering the elderly coming out of the mosque, those shopkeepers... You know that their eyes are on you. ‘What are you up to, why are you on the street, how are you dressed?’ Always a concern for them. (…) Sometimes I wish I was invisible. There is always someone who watch, you can’t avoid them. It’s like you owe them an explanation. They make me feel ashamed of the grocery bag in my hand. The municipality gives in-kind aid, it’s every six months. Alhamdulillah, for sure. They are also involved in this, it is like you have no right to take your brother and go to Kızılay. The farther away from them, the better! But there’s nothing to do. For better or worse, when you’re in need, you’re dependent on them. We shall be thankful for that.128 (Serap, 26, born in Keçiören, parents migrated from Kırıkkale, residing in Atapark neighborhood)

128 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 8.
Sennett (1972: 28-9) contends that class does also have to do with freedom and dignity. The ways in which the poor make sense of social hierarchies and power relations that limit their freedom are related to and disclose the dynamics of the moral economy of interactions. Serap’s narrative demonstrates how social control in the neighborhood, while policing gendered moral codes of conduct based on religious norms, also restrains her everyday life by assigning ‘appropriate’ ways of conduct within the boundaries of her marked class position. In telling this, Serap sought to reconcile her anger and resentment with a sense of gratitude for the help she received when her family was in need. Even though local neighborhood relations can exhibit solidaristic characteristics, these local social relations operate within a moral economy in ways that generate a sense of indebtedness, no matter how it cannot eliminate class injuries and discontents.

In the post-1980 period, the social welfare system underwent a series of restructuring processes to respond to growing needs and alleviate poverty; among these, the Social Solidarity Fund established by the Özal government in 1986 and the Green Card scheme introduced in the 1990s are recognized as important initiatives (Buğra & Candaş, 2011). By combining them with an Islamic discourse, the AKP, as Buğra and Candaş (2011: 520) argue, has effectively expanded on these neoliberal restructurings, which have the potential to play a decisive role in the relationship between the state and its citizen and to generate political support. The distribution of social assistance by local governments, which have become an important component of the welfare system in Turkey, was introduced and expanded by the Welfare Party. Taking over the RP’s effective utilization of the neighborhood scale in
organizing political mobilization, the AKP continued to use this politically expedient scalar unit for its neoliberal political agenda.

In the 1990s, the RP succeeded in mobilizing the urban poor, who were excluded from the benefits of economic growth brought about by globalization, through the extensive networks they established among the grassroots (Ayata, 1996; Öniş, 1997; White, 2002). In that respect, the RP’s social assistance approach, based on Islamic morality and charity, responded the increasing need caused by the erosion of the welfare system’s ability to provide for its citizens in the post-1980s period (Buğra & Candaş, 2011). The 1994 local election results of Keçiören set an example of the success of the RP’s neighborhood-level grassroots campaign among the urban poor; as the party, which had been on the margins of the electoral scene with 5.2% in the previous election, increased its vote fourfold within five years. In the 1994 elections, a similar success was registered for the MHP in the district, which won the elections by quintupling its votes compared to the previous elections. Mahmut, a 53-year-old retired carpenter, recounted how hard he worked for Altınok during the MHP’s election campaign in 1994 and how they narrowly won the election from the RP. He described the differences between the two parties’ election campaigns as follows;

The streets were ours (the MHP), but they (the RP) succeeded in entering the houses. That’s where the votes come from. Women must be won over. I mean the votes of mothers and sisters ought to come in full. Ours is a male organization. We couldn’t get our heads out of the fight, we got into a lot of trouble. We’ve been in and out of jail. These guys were mummy’s boys; they’ve never been a problem for their families. (…) Then again, people of this district are all from Central Anatolia (bozkırın tezenesi). Sunni, Turkish, religious nationalist social stratum. Later on, it was thanks to our başkan (Altınoğ) that they expanded the voter base. As our mayor then had to run from the Virtue Party and continued from there. But neither he nor we left Turkish nationalism (Ülkücüülük). They couldn’t have done it here without
Sprouting from the same political tradition, the AKP inherited and maintained the social assistance system at the scale of neighborhoods, which relied primarily on in-kind aid (Doğan, 2008). Drawing on a repertoire of “neighborliness, fictional kinship, mutual assistance” (White, 2002: 269), the organization of aid distribution by AKP-led local governments was driven by a broader agenda of political interest (Doğan, 2008). According to what my informants mentioned, these social assistance initiatives, which began as political party organizations then were institutionalized under the local governments, have impacted the political belonging trajectories of individuals and their families, and transformed the dynamics of political mobilization in the neighborhoods. Şerife, a 47-year-old housewife with three children, is one of the witnesses to how Islamic political organizations were effectively organized and controlled the district’s neighborhoods through the provision of aid. She recounted how her father, who voted for Özal and considered the Islamist parties of the time radical, transformed his political views with the support he received from them at a time when their family was struggling financially. Quoting her father as saying “I received the help that I did not receive from the state from the party that I perceived as opposing the state”, Şerife stated that “since then we have been voting for them out of a sense of indebtedness.” As an example to women’s motives in voting behavior, she mentioned that the women in her family continued to

129 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 9.

130 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 10.
vote loyally after this assistance, but that her brother did not stop voting for MHP even though they helped him get a job. It appears that the sense of indebtedness plays a significant role in people’s party affiliation and voting behavior; however, this does not necessarily indicate a state of unquestioning submission. Likewise, Şerife concluded her narrative by stating her satisfaction with the local governance performance of these political parties, implying that it was not simply a sense of indebtedness that influenced her voting behavior.

Another account, which also evaluates the distribution of social benefits in relation to her perceptions of the ‘state’, voices the growing criticism of the shifting patterns of aid distribution over the years. Zeynep\textsuperscript{131} was a housewife with two children who received her degree in painting from Gazi University after the ban on headscarves was lifted. In her partisan account, drawing comparisons to the rhetoric of party members in the past, she criticized the current conduct and manners of those in charge of aid distribution by referring to Islamic morality. She said, ‘They used to say, ‘we are sisters and brothers in religion, we shall take care of each other’. They did not make you feel lame or like you needed a pity alms (sadaka).’ The subject of alms (sadaka) was one of the contentious topics among my informants, as to whether they were the giver or receiving party, and ‘to whom, how much, and how to give’. Perceiving it as ‘ezik’ to be on the receiving side, Zeynep clarified her remarks on the giver side of alms saying that ‘The neighborhood responsible (sorumlu) mediates the alms, directing the rich to

\textsuperscript{131} See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 11.
which poor family they can help. The good deed (sevap) here is great.”. She stated that what bothered her was that the responsible officials have been acting as if they were donating the assistance provided by the state out of their own pockets.

Zeynep’s narrative does also contain an imagined 'us'; the boundaries of which are typically drawn along the lines of Islamic and secular, and in her case, more prominently along AKP supporters and other parties’. Unlike before, she says, "... now the state is also ours". She questioned the distribution of state-organized social aid, which "now belongs to them", and lamented how party representatives who once shared her social class "became rich and arrogant". Zeynep’s narrative illustrates an example of horizontal tensions caused by growing class disparities among the AKP base. Bourdieu (1984: 478) argues that generating common classificatory systems vis-à-vis which “people define 'us' as opposed to 'them'”, the social relation networks determine the social capital possessed by different social groups. Similar to the informants’ efforts to establish social networks to access employment opportunities in the state or private sector, as exemplified in the previous sections, the debates on social assistance from the state, which is claimed to be theirs, appear to be another area of negotiation in their "we-making" from within conservative discourses and practices.

In the district, which has been governed by Islamist conservative municipalities for the last thirty years, social aid distribution has been intensively carried out; in this respect, there is a widespread perception that the district has been favored by the ruling party. Addressing the socio-spatial ‘embeddedness’ of Hezbollah in Beirut’s poor suburbs, Harb (2008: 137)
describes how service provision “not only provide material resources to their beneficiaries, but they also define a world of social and moral meanings”. In a similar vein, the AKP operates its socio-spatial embeddedness with its extensive neighborhood-based commissions through aid distribution in Keçiören. As the elected head of a neighborhood, the local headman (muhtar) has historically played a significant role in establishing a variety of networks between the neighborhood residents and the state institutions. The local headmen are also involved in the distribution of social assistance, as they have the most reliable information of the neighborhood residents. It is a known fact that the local headmen cooperate with local branches of political parties, but my informants mentioned that the distribution of aid has been rather organized by the neighborhood branch commissions of the AKP; they even intervene in the issuing of poverty certificates. In that respect, one needed to have close ties to AKP representatives in the neighborhoods. Many of them also maintained that official registration to the party was the most effective way to benefit from a variety of facilities; such as getting in-kind aids like Ramadan package, which are entirely organized in an informal manner. My fieldwork spanned the month of Ramadan, a time when aid distribution intensified, some of my informants were seeking ways to get Ramadan packages from the municipality. Yıldız, a 43-year-old woman with two sons whose husband owned a business selling PVC windows, was not one of them. During the interview at her house in one of the lower-middle class neighborhoods, she mentioned how her family’s official

132 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 12.
registration to the AKP as party members was ‘gifted’ with a Ramadan package, as follows:

We received a phone call from the municipality, they said 'Pick up the Ramadan package from your representative'. I was confused as I was fasting, because they hadn't called like this before. Anyway, I called the muhtar. When I thought of a representative, I thought of him. He said 'I didn't receive any package. The AK Party neighborhood representative must be distributing them.' Then my son said, 'My father has recently made you and my brother members of the party. Why are you calling the muhtar?' (...) Our eldest son had an employment situation, his father was already a member of the party, but they said that the whole family should be members. The neighbors also said it was easier that way. It slipped my mind. But we didn't take the Ramadan package. Alhamdulillah, we don't need it. If the neighbors did see it! It's embarrassing when there are so many needy people out there. We didn't take it! They called me later to check if I received it. They are tracking. I said there must be some mistake, we are not in need. They said, 'There is no mistake in the list, but it is up to you'. (Yıldız, 43, migrated from Çankırı, residing in Pınarbaşı neighborhood)

The notion of ‘mahalle’-neighborhood is commonly, or rather traditionally, defined and imagined with reference to notions of solidarity and security; however, it simultaneously bears social control and insecurity. In her narrative, Yıldız notes that accepting the Ramadan package, which her family does not need financially, would be noticed and shamed by her neighbors. The category of ‘deserving’ poor, as well as the criteria by which it is defined, appear to be a source of tension in the neighborhoods. This was particularly salient for low-income neighborhoods, where dependency on in-cash aid was higher and the AKP received the majority of votes. The common perception among my informant was that in neighborhoods where the majority of people struggle to make ends meet, doubts and convictions about whether those receiving social assistance are genuinely in need are inevitable. They mentioned a few, albeit rare, instances in which verbal threats to report neighbors resulted in reports. Songül, a 32-year-old mother
of three, was a regular attendee at the Qur’an course in Kuşçağız. The young woman, who was living in one of the poorest neighborhoods in Keçiören, mentioned that they would not be able to make ends meet without the solidarity of a group of neighborhood women and the sharing of the aid they received. Songül complained that neighbors did not refrain from interrogating households receiving assistance and that they felt like they had to prove that they were truly needy: “They say, it multiplies when shared, it really does not! But we have to help each other (...) we sometimes give away the food we cooked to the neighbors. It’s a little bit of a hush against mischief”\textsuperscript{133}.

Under the AKP governments, the realization of the neoliberal goal of reducing the state’s responsibility for providing social welfare was implemented through the strengthening of the family (Yazıcı, 2012; Yılmaz, 2015; Kaya, 2015); this process has been distinguished by the fact that the role attributed to the institution of the family is more prominent than in previous periods, and this time with a bold emphasis on Islamic morality (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). Within this policy framework, the privileging of women in the distribution of social assistance does not seem to contradict the gendered roles assigned to the women; rather, hailed as ‘reliable’ and ‘devoted’ mothers, wives, and care providers, they are held responsible for the welfare of their families (Özar & Yakut-Cakar, 2013; Akkan, 2018). Thus, the provision of social assistance to economically disadvantaged women hardly serves for their individual empowerment. They are rather built upon certain

\textsuperscript{133} See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 13.
norms and values that privilege familialism over individuality, connectivity over autonomy, and social control over care.

Besides, the subjective everyday experiences of poor women in Keçiören provides insight on how discursive construction of social assistance on Islamic morality helps to conceal the social vulnerabilities and class wounds inflicted on women by the entitlement to these benefits based on disadvantage. On the other hand, the studies indicate that social assistance distribution, carried out in the form of clientelist relationship, also induce and foster paternalistic relationships between beneficiaries and the state (Buğra & Candaş, 2011; Yörük & Özsoy, 2013). In a similar vein, despite discontents, social assistance provisions both by the state and the municipality seem to be highly appreciated in the district and shapes the dynamics of political belonging.

Similar to the general pattern in Turkey, it was largely assumed that the majority of those who received social aid in the district’s neighborhoods were poor women, who benefited from a variety of limited, irregularly distributed, and often in-kind aids that were crucial for the household income of families. Birsen, 28, was a newlywed who was working at a health institution’s reception desk. In sohbet meetings, she gave references to Muhammed Emin Yıldırım, who is known for his siyar lectures, on topics such as marriage and family, and recommended his books and his Facebook page – with the assumption that the books wouldn’t be read. Birsen, who
participated in the AKP women's branch activities in her neighborhood, recounted an anecdote\textsuperscript{134} that she found very infuriating.

Once I had an altercation with a jerk in our women's commission. They said there was a woman who was in a miserable situation with three children. They were planning to arrange help for her. Our sisters (ablalar) were talking about how to do it. An annoying guy came into the room. He started to investigate, 'Who is she?' They told him that she was very poor, she couldn't find bread to feed her babies. The guy looked at the form. 'She's divorced,' he said. I couldn't stand it, I said, 'So what? The way he looks at me! It was like I cursed him. The sisters in the room raised their eyebrows, telling me to shut up and not to get involved, so I kept quiet. (...) They've already investigated this woman. She is a woman in hijab. Just because she's divorced doesn't mean she'll fall into sin. I thought that's what he thought. Then the sisters said, 'Don't worry about him, we'll take care of it.' It turns out that these gentlemen think that by giving aid to divorced women, women will emulate divorce. May God make them better (Allah ıslah etsin), what can I say. Who among women chooses to divorce? If only the help was worth something. If men knew their responsibilities towards their wives, there would be no divorces in the world, let alone in Turkey. (Birsen, 28, migrated from Kayseri, residing in Pınarbaşı neighborhood)

Birsen's anecdote is remarkable as it helps to elaborate on the intersecting dynamics of gender, class and religious conservatism in Keçiören. It, on the other hand, provides an example of the extent to which AKP’s neighborhood commissions are organized and able to monitor and keep track of the changing socio-economic status of residents. In the district, it was common for men, like the male party member Birsen furiously refers to with harsh terms, to be actively involved in the party’s women's commissions. However, their presence and involvement were not welcomed either by party-affiliated women or by women in need who sought help from the commissions. Women described this as a restriction on the organization of women's rights

---

\textsuperscript{134} See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 14.
at the local level, interpreting it as 'interfering in women’s affairs', rather than as incompatibility with gender-based spatial segregation conceived from a religious framework, i.e. the discomfort of sharing the same public space with foreign men. In the story she told, Birsen does not seem to have hesitated to express her reaction to the male member, unlike the women she calls "elderly sister". Nonetheless, the women party members, who remained silent and silenced Birsen, assured her that they would meet the needs of the divorced woman. A woman party member who allowed me to accompany her on a neighborhood visit complained that not only did they have to manage their husbands at home, but they also had to manage male party members while doing charity work for the party. She noted that the neighborhood women’s commissions initially had no male members and that this made far more comfortable working conditions. The arrival of male members, she continued, had limited not only their voice and right to intervene and also the social rights of women seeking aid, adding that "even the most religious man does not understand the state of a woman".

The variety of difficulties divorced women face in their social lives in the neighborhood context and the extent to which they have become economically vulnerable were among the issues mentioned by the informants. Informally operated Islamic conservative social policies such as denying social assistance to a divorced woman in order to deter women from getting divorced for the continuity of the family were met with reaction by most of the women. In her reaction, Birsen first tries to justify the fact that even though the poor woman was divorced, this does not mean that she has fallen into a "go astray" (kötü yol) by listing the fact that she lives in a "family neighborhood" like Keçiören, that she has already been investigated for what
kind of person she is, and that she wears a headscarf on top of that. Once she understood what the real motivation was, she fiercely argued that divorce is never a desirable option for women and put the blame on men who neglect their responsibilities towards women. Young women do not intend to submit to such Islamic conservative practices that limit women’s chances of survival, but even as they seek to expand their boundaries, the patriarchal sociality in which they live seems to inform their counter-arguments. Their selective inclusion of more critical and egalitarian religious references when talking about spousal relations within marriage or experiences of woman in marriage seems to involve negotiations that "old times are behind us" for women.

Like the other young women, I met in the field study, Birsen was a young woman with ideals and dreams about married life. One of the main commonalities among the young woman informants was that they highly valued the institution of family and considered a womanhood that did not fall within the definition of family as “frightening”. The one of major criteria they aspired in a marriage, which they idealized as “building auspicious homes” (hayırlı yuva kurmak), was that the husband should “know his responsibilities towards his wife”. Following “having good financial status”, being religious was identified as a quality that a prospective husband should possess. They were eager to comment on what defines a religious husband135. In accordance with the habits and dispositions cultivated within the

135 At a women’s gathering where ideals on marriage were discusses, Zehra, a 22-year-old nursing undergrad, put it "Be careful what you ask Allah for. When you pray, ask in detail" and all the women smiled in agreement.
framework of religion, it was believed that a religious husband would be faithful to his wife and his home, and that he would not consume alcohol and engage in excesses such as moodiness, violence, and extra expense. However, young women also underlined that they did not want a traditional religiosity that places women in a subordinate position, as experienced by the previous generation. In order for them to determine the degree of veiling (tesettür), it was found to be equally important that religiosity be practiced in "moderation" and "without exaggeration". In their ideals of marriage, "having a good financial status" was highly valued as a criterion for a spouse.

Rabia, 26, who determinedly continued to the Kalaba Gym to lose her extra pounds, was also looking for a job as a Kindergarten Teacher. She described her dream, which she thought she would achieve only if she had an 'auspicious' (hayırlı) marriage, as follows:

I will get in my car, turn on a hymn by Maher Zain. At maximum volume. After a skin care at a spa, I'll head to Beymen in Panora (a shopping mall in the district of Çankaya). I'll buy a jacket from Massimo Dutti without a second thought. My husband is very fond of me, he treasures me. I’ll meet him at Starbucks and we’ll walk around until the time we pray Isha (yatsı) together at home. It's nice to dream, but one shouldn’t get caught up in things that are out of reach. I'll settle for less. Starbucks in Antares (a shopping mall in Keçiören) is fine. At least a scarf from Vakko in Antares (she laughs)\textsuperscript{136}. (Rabia, 26, migrated from Çorum, residing in Kalaba neighborhood)

On the one hand, younger women considered an ‘ideal’ marriage as a possible chance to escape from the poverty they had observed and experienced in their class-cultural milieu; which they described as “being

\textsuperscript{136} See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 15. Panora Shopping Mall is in Çankaya. Antares Shopping Mall is in Etlik, Keçiören. Maher Zain is a popular Lebanese-Swedish R&B singer who is well-known among conservative fractions of young people in Turkey. The younger female informants suggested me his debut album, Thank You Allah. To see one of his popular song- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vMQVC7_b0po](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vMQVC7_b0po)
able to live without needing anyone”\textsuperscript{137}. On the other hand, by asking “what is it that we lack”\textsuperscript{138}, an ‘ideal’ marriage was regarded as a life chance to pursue the urban middle class lifestyles they aspired. The desired upward class mobility, for them, was a guarantee way to attain the lifestyles they emulate, when they believed they would be more capable to negotiate the harshest and subtlest religiously normativity of everyday life.

5.4. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I scaled down the scope to the mahalle. Drawing on my ethnographic research conducted in four different settings in nine socio-economically diverse neighborhoods of Keçiören, I addressed and investigated the fragmented manifestations of religious conservatism in the everyday life of the district. The main research questions that this chapter sought to elaborate on were: How and in what ways does the emergent lower-middle class religious conservative culture embody, reproduce, accommodate, and invent itself in the everyday life in Keçiören? What are the constants and changing dynamics of the Sunni-Turkish majority’s ‘we-makings’ in Keçiören? In analyzing the outcomes of the ethnographic study, I framed the historical trajectory of the subjective experiences of my lower and lower-middle class informants in parallel with the urban transformation trajectory of the district. Two-thirds of the informants, most of whose families had settled in Keçiören with internal migration since the 1960s, had once lived in gecekondu neighborhoods of the district. In parallel with

\textsuperscript{137} The Turkish original is ‘kimselere muhtaç olmadan yaşayabilme’.

\textsuperscript{138} The Turkish original is ‘bizim neyimiz eksik’
urbanization patterns in Turkey, the networks of social relations with kinship and *hemşehri* have been crucial in their struggle for the survival in urban setting. Due to the weak functioning of the state’s welfare regime, the networks of social relations, which serve as a form of social capital, have played a role in determining the possibilities of social groups to generate economic and cultural capital. I examined how shifting dynamics of networks of social relations with kinship, *hemşehri*, and neighbors operate in ways that generate solidarity, dependencies, and conflict, as well as how these communal relations are embedded in and articulated into political networks. Through the networks of relationships, it creates, neighborhood life, despite being strongly marked by a variety of tensions and conflicts, most of which are class-based, contributes significantly to the production and reproduction of Islamist conservatism, which places a high emphasis on the family. Moreover, women’s active role in this process do not only effectively put into practice conservative lifestyles and values but also helps translating Islamist politics into quotidian life.

Moving from my ethnographic study, I argue that due to its quality of socio-spatial proximity, surrounding the everyday life of urban communities (i) the neighborhood effectively operates as a bounded locality that regulates and reproduces social relations where classed gender dynamics and patriarchal religious moralities variably intersect, and (ii) due to one of its defining characteristics of ‘similarity’, the neighborhood facilitates a multitude of interactions that generate and reinforce ‘we-making’ that involve boundary-makings and horizontal negotiations; and (iii) in relation to these, I contend that politically appropriated by the AKP to implement its social welfare policies, that serve to a neoliberal agenda and have become increasingly
Islamic in content, the neighborhood context also functions to produce clientelist relationships and consolidate political belongings all of which are thought be marked by Islamic conservatism, yet, the demarcations of this discourse vary according to the aspirations, expectation and needs of people who seemed to adjust their cultural baggage into new socio-spatial life conditions.
CHAPTER 6

THE FRAGMENTS OF CLASS-CULTURED AND GENDERED EMBODIMENTS

6.1. Introduction

In this study, I aim at developing an analytical framework that situates everydayness of Islamic conservatism in a grid specified by three axes: the spatial, the familial, and the class-based. One of the three axes around which this ethnographic study holds onto is the dynamics of class relations which inform us to detect the horizontally and vertically formed socio-cultural hierarchies. In exploring how class inequalities are connected to broader social divisions in the case of Keçiören, I follow the theoretical framework that Bourdieu inspired class-cultural studies which underline the embeddedness of ‘class’ in the cultural hierarchies and cultural dispositions (Savage, 2003; Sayer, 2005; Skegg, 1997, 2004; Lawler, 2000; McKenzie, 2015). The analysis that focus on the ‘secular vs. conservative’ dichotomy fall short of capturing the wider social division that intersect and are complicated by class cleavages. The convergence of neoliberalism and conservatism under the AKP rule has expanded the upwardly mobile sectors within rather religiously conservative segments of the population. Within the last two decades, both the trajectories of the upward and downward mobility and the sources of emulations for different socio-cultural fractions have been altered. As highly debated, the formative components of the social class such as belonging dynamics, shared symbols, lifestyles, values, mindsets, and
aspirations cause contestations in terms of class dynamics (Savage, 2003; Skegg, 2004). My aim is to reveal the shifting presence of horizontal tensions and cultural repertoires of conservative fractions of lower middle class and to explore different manifestations of class distinctions in the everyday interactions, dispositions and evaluative schemes of the residents of different neighborhoods of Keçiören. In a similar vein, I aim to explore how conservative, patriarchal conceptions of gender does contour and inform the perceptions, dispositions, and practices. In light of the perspectives which conceive classes as lived entities with their own historicity and spatiality rather than as rigorously defined occupational categories, in this study I explore the dynamics of the lower middle class positionings, which encompasses gender, age, family arrangements, religious affinities, and urban life experience.

Described as one of the core institutions of conservatism, the concept of family provides an important insight into understand how and in what ways class structures and patriarchal relations are intertwined. To scrutinize the social unit of family enables us to explore the dynamics of class reproduction, power relations and the flow of resources together with the intergenerational transfer of social values, dispositions, and gender perceptions. I attempt to articulate on how the varieties of womanhood and classed femininities within families are subjectively constituted through reflexive, conservative social practices, and how and in what ways women of different age cohorts engage in (re)producing family composites and values.
6.2. ‘A Sense of One’s Place’: Housing Mobility and Embodied Subjectivities

The urban transformation trajectory of Keçiören and its socioeconomic demographic structure have been diachronically shaped by three main factors: the district's distance from the new city center, the expansion of *gecekondu* areas, and its transformation into a right-wing stronghold under nationalist Islamist conservative control over the last three decades (Akçura, 1970; Güvenç, 2001; Kurtoğlu, 2003; Işık & Pinarcıoğlu, 2005). The first two factors caused the district to be preferred by lower-income groups: the occupational profile of the majority of the district’s inhabitants has shifted from civil servants to tradesmen and shopkeepers (*esnaf*) (Akçura, 1970; Kurtoğlu, 2003; Şenyapılı, 2005). The intra-city housing mobility that started in the 1990s had also a sizable impact on the already-shifting socio-economic demographic makeup of the district (Şenyapılı, 2005: 240). The middle-classes, which differentiated on the axis of education and employment, tended to depart the district to relocate new residential areas in the western corridor of Ankara (ibid.: 242). These patterns of housing mobility appear to have class-cultural ramifications for the district, reducing the scope and possibilities of everyday interactions and encounters between the Islamic conservative and secular fractions.

Saadet was a retired tailor who identified herself as a MHP voter. She was one of the regulars attending the gym at the Kalaba Sport Center. She was a talkative and assertive woman who liked to talk about current political events and tended to embrace conspiracies. At times when she made anti-AKP remarks that drew attention among the women groups, she defended
her right to criticize by stating that she had voted for the AKP when she thought it was ‘necessary’\textsuperscript{139}. This was a common tactic used by those who voiced their criticisms to the AKP. Given the party’s weight in the district and the shared nationalist sentiments, being a supporter of the MHP was considered a ‘respected’ political affiliation. With the exception of criticisms on nationalism, notably the Kurdish issue, one anti-AKP remark was enough to be labeled as a dissident who was equated with someone who sympathized with the CHP. Despite the polarized political atmosphere that seemed to dominate the everyday interactions, the ways in which perceived ideological divergences came into play in the everyday encounters, interactions, and confrontations varied. One instance of how perceived ideological differences were translated into everyday experiences can be traced in the narratives on how Keçiören’s socio-demographic transformation had altered the everyday life in the district.

A number of woman informants addressed the departure of the secular-leaning middle-class families as a loss for the mahalle culture in the district.

\textsuperscript{139} Sometimes I took the risk of intervening in the conversation, in others I kept my questions for a spare moment and reminded informants of their comments about ‘voting for the AKP when necessary’. I asked "Why (and when) did you think it was necessary?" They mostly explained that they voted for the AKP candidate against the CHP candidate and that their decisions were shaped by last minute guidance from their social circles in the neighborhood. Responses largely followed a similar pattern, three of them were as follows; ‘If it is not going to be from us (MHP), let’s give it to the AK Party, not to those irreligious (\textit{dinsiz}); ‘It runs in the family. My grandfather vowed all the way back in the village, did they take our land and give it to someone else? They closed the mosque? He was an old man; he would change the story. Obviously there is something to hold a grudge. He kept telling us ‘we won’t vote for the CHP.’; ‘The lesser of two evils, at least these are Muslims.’ A young man in his late 20s from the MHP expressed his discontent that this vote swing was only from the MHP to the AKP; “Anasını satayım, hep biz açık kapatırız. En sağlam duruş bizde ama taviz de hep bizden. Bi kerede AK partililer bize versin kardeşim. Ocak’ta tembihliyorlar, annenizle babanızla konuşun, esnafa söyleyin diye. Bu seferlik öyle gerekıyor! Gerekıyor da sonu gelmiyor. Başlar birlikte iş tutuyorlar, cepleri dolduruyor. Biz fukaralar bunların cepleri dolsun diye... Yaa onca küfür sayıdıkları adamlar için seçime bir gün kala ‘hadi dinsizler gelsin, daha mı iyî?’ diye oy istiyorlar. Kızıylorum ama yine verip çıkıyoruz."
Rather than portraying tensions over socio-cultural differences along the lines of rural-urban and secular-conservative, the narratives tended to point out the class-culturally enriching possibilities of everyday encounters and a sense of cultural mobility enabled by the spatial proximity. In her complaint about the district’s current socio-economic composition, Saadet mentioned the departure of ‘educated’ and ‘cultured’ families and the ‘quality’ people as a loss, as quoted below.

We used to have very good neighborly relations in our neighborhood. Those educated, cultured families, and quality people all left here. They all ran away. We had a sister called Lütfiye Hanım. She was such a well-groomed woman for her age. She used to get her hair dyed at the hairdresser. Her husband was a clerk at the courthouse. They used to vote for the CHP, we knew them. They had a son who was a communist who later became an architect. ‘Look, Saadetçim,’ she would say, ‘if you cook your meal in the morning, it will be ready by the evening’, ‘Wear long tunics, long shirts, wearing overcoats is not easy in summer,’ she would say. She taught me a lot. Compared to them, we were kinda rude, peasant folks. ‘Well, we didn’t come from Mars either,’ she’d joke. ‘You are a smart girl, you can do it,’ she used to tell me. In those days, we used to pay particular attention to what we wore when we went from one apartment to another, let alone the street. Everyone would go out looking their best. This has nothing to do with money or wealth. That was something else. It’s a mess around here now. People are hanging around in their pajama bottoms and tattered t-shirts. I say to myself ‘Dress up, be an example’, but I don’t feel like that. We were open to learning, now if you happen to give someone advice, they say, ‘what’s wrong, don’t you like it? If I get dressed, they say, ‘where are you going, to a wedding? They make you regret it. (Saadet, 47, migrated from Çorum, residing in Kalaba neighborhood)

Woman informants those who had long been residing in the district’s central neighborhoods shared a similar perspective that the sociodemographic shift had negatively impacted the district’s everyday culture molded by class manners. Expressions similar to ‘they escape/fled’ in Saadet’s narrative were also used by others. When asked what they thought the departing families

140 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 16.
were fleeing from; they briefly listed the ‘ignorance’ and ‘rudeness’ of the
district inhabitants, the crowdedness of the district, and the search for a
neighborhood with ‘similar’ kind of people\textsuperscript{141}. In their narratives, the
differences in political and religious affiliations or identities were not directly
addressed; rather, they tended to interpret, perceive and categorize the
‘others’ through class-cultural differences and hierarchies in taste. In parallel
to the significance of the class aspect, some women informants’ initial
responses to this question were evasive. They made gestures that suggested I
could guess the reasons of departing the district, and responded ‘it’s
obvious, isn’t it?’. Skeggs (1997: 48), in her study on respectability, argues
that one’s ‘sense of self-worth’ and ‘sense of place’ in society is informed by
the judgements of the ‘others’. The informants’ evasive responses might be
considered a sort of resentment as the departing ‘others’ perceptions of the
district relate to the everyday reality in which my informants -as those who
remained- make sense of themselves.

In their addresses of housing mobility, male informants tended to focus more
on the district’s rent-generating economic worth. Cemal, a 48-year-old
plumber who employed three workers, was a staunch Erdoğan supporter.
He praised how Keçiören’s built environment had improved significantly

\textsuperscript{141} In their words: ‘Buralar kalabalık, insanlar görgüsüz, kaba, affedersin ‘ayı’. Duramadılar. Ayı
olmayanların yanına kaçtılar (güliyör)’ (Emine, 51, residing in Etilik); ‘Sokağın, apartmanın
kavgasından gürültüsünden işte. Buraların ederi hepten düşer diyordu Arif beyle kansı. Düştü de
doğru.’ (Fazilet, 65, residing in Pınarbaşı); ‘Ne olacak buralara kendilerini yakıştırmadılar. Bi gün
Filiz’le, o eski komşumla yürüyorum. ‘Baş’ dedi, ‘Şuna ba, adım atamıyor insan. Balgam dolu
kaldırım. Hayvan bunlar ya’ dedi. İşgii be, hakkı var kadınım.’ (Saniye, 57, residing in Kalaba);
‘Çocuklarını falan burada yetiştirmek istemediler. Valla çocukken skinti yok aslında ergen
olduklarından itibaren çok zor. Okulların etrafı hep bela. Parası olan gider, benim de param olsa ben
de giderim’ (Kader, 39, residing in Kuşçağız).
over the past twenty years, and how the district has turned into a ‘paradise’. However, he then expressed his discontent as follows; ‘If the house is in Keçiören, it doesn’t matter if it’s is a palace; it’s a dead investment. That’s why, even before our president left here, all those AK Party members who got wealthy sold their property and fled’\textsuperscript{142}. In his study on the socio-spatial differentiations in Ankara, Güvenç (2001) classifies several neighborhoods in the southern parts of Keçiören as ‘islands’ of affluence. Keçiören appealed to upwardly mobile Islamic middle-class fractions, particularly during the period when the then prime minister resided in the district (Şenyapılı, 2005). The relocation of Islamic-conservative fractions from the district appeared to be a relatively recent, ongoing, and rather contentious matter for the district’s inhabitants. This pattern of demographic change is remarkable as it unfolds how perceived ideological similarities generate horizontal conflicts. In other words, this aspect of housing/class mobility not only shaped the informants’ perceptions of the district’s economic worth and symbolic value but also how they negotiated the horizontal dynamics of class-cultural similarities and differences and ideological changes in dispositions.

Güler, a 38-year-old housewife with three children, resided in a neighborhood that was marked as one of the district’s ‘islands’ of affluence. In one of the women’s gatherings hosted by her, she noticed that a frame hanging on the wall caught my attention. She mentioned that it was the first

\textsuperscript{142} See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 17.
issue of the magazine Şadırvan dated 1976, with an oil painting of Fatih Sultan Mehmet’s conquest of Istanbul on the cover. She said that it was framed by her husband, an engineer who was working in a state institution and pursuing a postgraduate study in history. She told me that she knew there are nationalist Islamist women among the magazine’s authors, one of whom was a distant relative of her husband, but that she had not yet had the opportunity to read the magazine. Güler was an unassuming and quiet person whose Qur’an recitations with tecvit moved women to tears in the religious gatherings. Conversely, she was quite bold and tempered when she criticized the newly cultivated dispositions and lifestyle choices of her close group of upwardly mobile pious friends.

We grew up in the same neighborhood. We spent our childhood together. We attended the same Qur’an courses, we competed amongst ourselves to become a better hafiz. We together encountered condemning gazes of our secularist aunts and uncles in the neighborhood. Look, maybe it sounds exaggerated to you now, but we always felt timid in schools, when entering a government office, etc. We couldn’t feel comfortable. We veiled to avoid attracting attention, as our religion commanded, but we attracted more attention because we veiled. Most of those sisters of mine got married and changed neighborhoods. It is not for me to condemn. I just feel very sorry for them. How do you change what makes you who you are when you change neighborhoods? You cannot compromise on faith or the limits of hijab. Our

---

143 Şadırvan magazine was published between 1976 and 1980 under the Ladies’ Scientific and Cultural Association (1973) - Hanımlar İlim Kültür Derneği. On the İslami Dergiler Projesi website, there is a brief overview about the magazine: “The magazine, which published its first issue on May 29th, the anniversary of the Conquest of Istanbul, had a milliyetçi-mukaddesatçı line. It was one of the first journals to produce a discourse on religious women in the post-Republican period. Şadırvan, which undertook an intellectual and religious mission in the construction of the urban religious woman identity, expressed its mission with the slogan “Learn knowledge from the cradle to the grave” ("Beşikten mezara kadar ilim tahsil ediniz"). Mukaddes Çıtılak, Hicran Göze, Nevzat Yağıştaş are among the important names who took part in the magazine.” (I translated into English)

Retrieved from https://katalog.idp.org.tr/dergiler/90/sadirvan All published issues of the journal are available on this website.

144 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 18.
fathers wouldn’t let fish from the Black Sea inside the house, you know? Why? Russia was communist at the time. They even hated the fish because it was from the Black Sea (laughs). Fish from the godless unbelievers! Communism would seep into our veins! Don’t mind me laughing, there was such sensitivity, such uneasy watchfulness, such fear. So, my dear sister, you left Keçiören for a better life, a better house, a better neighborhood. You would not find a place like Keçiören, where you despise. Look, Keçiören is a place where the contented Muslim family setting (kanaatkar müslüman aile ortamı) is the most intact. Nowhere else would you spend Ramadan like here. (Güler, 38, family migrated from Yozgat, residing in Subayevleri neighborhood)

Drawing on a number of place-based class studies, Paton (2014: 96) contends that “the relationship between place and social identities can elucidate both class position and identity, via mobility and embodied subjectivity”. To narrate their subjective experiences and perceptions, the majority of the informants resorted to comparisons on the basis of housing/class mobility and embodied subjectivities. These seem to have served as interpretive frames for evaluating ‘others’ and making sense of themselves, as well as markers of class position and socio-political identities. Residential mobility aspirations reveal and relate to the ways in which people perceive and appropriate social boundaries and hierarchies and how they negotiate ‘their place’ in relation to the ‘others’ both horizontally and vertically. The following quotes provide brief lists of districts where Keçiören residents tended to relocate. Both of them exemplify how subjective perceptions and expectations about mobility involve negotiations at the intersection of class and gender as well as compromises on how religion is lived in these neighborhoods in comparison to Keçiören.

Places like Batıkent, Eryaman are more in our league. Those who move, they move to those districts anyway. There are also many people moving to Çakırlar (Batıkent), but there are too many congregations and sect houses there. I would not want to live there, neither would my husband nor my
children. They are good, religious people, but living in these neighborhoods happens to be very oppressive. I would like to go out with my neighbors and sit in the park as much as I want, walk around in the street, and take my walks comfortably. It is just home for women there, nowhere else. If women go out, they go down to the camellia in the garden of their apartment building. I can't stand this. They judge your veil; they would say your ankle is not veiled. It's comfortable here, you can wear a headscarf and go out on the street. You can go to your market, your park. There are many young girls whose mothers are veiled, and their families are all very religious, but they themselves are uncovered. They're young; they'll cover up when they get married anyway. If they fit into the norms of womanhood, I love seeing them all chirpy. It's worse when it's too oppressive. Well, our apartment building is 55 years old; it's very old; it's like a coop compared to the new houses, but I'm content, everyone owns the house they live in. People are familiar, we are comfortable. I hope it doesn't deteriorate. (Nisa, 46, family migrated from Kayseri, residing in Subayevleri neighborhood)

... A very close neighbor of mine moved to Söğütözü. Her house is like a palace. But she didn't like it there. There is no neighborliness. There were soldbets, too; but she still comes to our meetings. People there pretend that they are socialites. One should have a different scarf for every outfit, overcoats, pairs of shoes. They've turned it into a competition. They bought their house, they are doing very well. But she says, 'No, I can't keep up with their cloth spending'. When our friend was about to perform an ablution, the owner of the house kinda humiliated her, as she said. She told her that, "You should have done your ablution at your own home before coming here". It's not over, wait. She watched her perform her ablution. She said, "You missed it, you broke the order". She was very upset, she said, "They say, 'You veil like an older woman, be modern and stylish'. Let's forget about that, I'm very offended that they despise my style of worship". She is very uncomfortable; she couldn't keep up there. There are many others like her, they say 'I'm out of here' and leave Keçiören. Then they don't find the warmth and modesty of Keçiören in other places. In our women's gatherings, there are rich women, wives of five shop owners, or the ones who try hard to survive their families with the minimum wage. (Kader, 39, family migrated from Kırşehir, residing in Kuşçağız neighborhood)

Bourdieu identifies habitus as a schema of taste which “continuously transforms necessities into strategies, constraints into preferences, and

145 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 19.

146 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 20.
without any mechanical determination, it generates the set of ‘choices’ constituting life-styles, which derive their meaning, i.e., their value, from their position in a system of oppositions and correlations” (Bourdieu, 1984: 175). Likewise, the majority of the informants’ evaluations and perceptions of their place of residence and their gendered embodied subjectivities appear to operate on a schema of comparisons which address not only the varying existence of horizontal class-cultural tensions but also negotiations over religious dispositions and self-representations.

6.3. Islamic Conservative Middle Class Ethos: Recasting the Sources of Aspiration

As a cumulative impact of historical processes, distinctions in social space are inscribed in the physical spaces of urban, hardening social divisions in the forms of spatial boundaries and residential segregations (Bourdieu: 2005). In pursuit of a related analytical objective, Gieryn (2000: 467) identifies place as “the interpretative frame through which people measure their lives, evaluate others, take political positions, and just make sense”. Savage et al. (2005) treat class as a socio-spatial relationship and contend that “one’s residence space is a crucial, possibly the crucial identifier of who you are”. Remaining at the periphery of Ankara’s historical trajectory of urban development, Keçiören has witnessed certain residential segregations bearing socio-spatial inequalities perceived through physical experience. In parallel, the district has represented certain associated images, symbols and codes based on its historically varied and contextual particularities of class, cultural, and socio-political belonging dynamics. Informants’ perceptions of
Keçiören, which economically and symbolically condition their subjectivities as inhabitants, are tied to their own ‘sense of place’ in the society.

During the formative period, urban stratification pattern in Ankara was imprinted by the duality of ‘old’ versus ‘new’; a kind of duality that is ideologically resurrected and twisted by Erdoğan’s AKP rule. An instance to this political twist, the historical trajectory of the district of Keçiören, a ‘periphery’ to the ‘center’ Çankaya, provides an outlet to explore the ideological processes of spatial entitlement. In what ways do the qualities ascribed to the imagined ‘Keçiören’ in relation to the imagined ‘Çankaya’, as pitted against each other, translate into dispositions, practices and negotiations in the everyday life. As a matter of fact, varieties of spatial dualities are operated in everyday life as schemas of distinguishing, either for expressing emulations or mostly for marking disdains. In this respect, parameters of evaluation derive from historically cumulated class-cultural repertoires in a multitude of emergent combinations with the categories of piety, Turkishness, morally superior/inferior femininities and masculinities, and political party affiliations etc. The dialogically formed class-cultural repertoires of people in recognizing the other help us to capture the makings of social boundaries and hierarchies. As formations of spaces, subjectivities and emotions are intermingled (Bondi, 2005), varied kinds of encounters relatedly entangle dispositions and negotiations of the boundary-makings (Ahmed, 2004) across the lines of class and gender in the everyday life.

The major commonality among women’s narratives entail aspirations and desires to move outside Keçiören. As the majority of my informants were housewives whose everyday lives were pretty much bounded by their
immediate neighborhoods, their dispositions were marked by their cultural and economic resources. On the other hand, the visions and aspirations of younger generations were informed by a broader and more diverse repertoire for their upward social mobility, given that they not only had wider spatial mobility within the city and also larger networks of social interactions and encounters. It appeared to be a widely held conviction that a change in their place of residence would enable them to shift their habitus. By the same token, the residential place choices and aspirations were indicative of their quest for distinction. The fact that Keçiören is seen as a ‘backward’-‘fascist’-‘macho’-‘mafia’-‘slum’ enclave in the eyes of various socio-cultural segments plays a role in decisions regarding intra-urban residential mobility. Contrary to those who believed that these external derogatory labels stemmed from ideologically based perceptions of the district, the majority contended that these labels are not unfair based on their own subjective experiences in the district.

For Keçiören locals, nothing but commuting to Çankaya engenders certain schemas to compare and contrast with their own lives and relations. All imbued with aspirations, desires, injuries, and fears; these evaluative schemas operate on inequalities of class, gender, and self-worthiness. In that regard, prolific hybrid practices, embodiments, and negotiations taking place in everyday urban spaces surpass conventional binaries of societal polarizations. Neslihan, 28, who grew up in one of the gecekondu neighborhoods of Keçiören that had recently undergone urban transformation, was working as a salesclerk in a chain store selling electronic products in a shopping mall in Çankaya. She was a devout Muslim who prayed five times a day and enjoyed listening to arabesk music on the
popular Ankara-based radio station called Megasite. Her account of a typical workday, her commute from work to home, offers not only a subjective map of women’s urban mobility but also a remarkable illustration of how the boundaries between public and private spaces, which vary by district, are negotiated by different gendered and classed subjectivities.

When I leave the house in the morning, I’m at the bottom of my depression, miserable. From the entrance of Kalaba on the bus until I got home, Neslihan, the cheerful Neslihan at work, began to lose her cheer. I’d be happy working as a cleaner or anything. Then I wouldn’t have to pretend, would act the same way wherever I went as I do at home. I work in Çankaya. It's a place of snobby, rich people. I have to watch how I dress, how I speak. The manager would reprimand me, 'stop that Keçiören way of talking; pay attention'. If you don't pay attention, you won't make any sales anyway. I don't wear a turban, I normally tie it under the chin like a grandmother, I'm used to it. I just untie it on the way to work. Otherwise, it would be a problem in my neighborhood. It is like they have to check whether a woman is going to work properly. It has become a habit, when I go from home to work on the bus, I take off my headscarf when the bus arrives somewhere near Gençlik Park. On my way home, I slowly take it out of the bag at the entrance of Kalaba. As a matter of fact, most people living here pursue two different lives, like me. During Ramadan, you witness people who claim to be fasting in Keçiören while eating in Çankaya. That is OK. Even though we can't afford to live there, we enjoy the comfort of Çankaya.147 (Neslihan, 28, family migrated from Çorum, residing in Atapark neighborhood)

The scope and boundaries of women’s engagement and visibility in urban public spaces are heavily shaped by the intersections of class positions and gendered religious morality. Younger women in Keçiören’s lower-class neighborhoods aspire to pursue a more anonymous everyday life routine in urban life, relying less on dependent relationships based on hemşehri, kinship, and family networks. Likewise, not only younger generations

147 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 21.
aspired to move, either in different neighborhoods or other districts, but also parents hoped their children to relocate. In this respect, spatial distancing is seen as both liberating and indicative of upward mobility.

As studies indicate, the direct association between the lower-class positions and the embodiment of piety in Turkey has been getting dissolved (Yılmaz, 2007). The rising Islamic bourgeoisie and its new consumption patterns became more visible in class differentiations within the last three decades (Navaro-Yashin, 2002; Saktanber, 2002b; Sandıkçi & Ger, 2007). Given the dominance of nationalist, Islamic-conservative fractions in the socio-demographic composition of Keçiören, the Islamic way of life as articulated with consumption has turned out to be a source of emulation for the aspiring lower-middle class fractions of the district. Zeynep, a 26-year-old software developer, was about to marry a lawyer of her age whom she had met through an arranged marriage that her family had set up for her. She explained that one of her family’s red lines in her arranged marriage was that the husband-to-be must be a person who prays regularly; she added that this alone was not good enough for herself, and that she did not compromise on her own expectations from the marriage. She said that she did not expect an equal division of labor between spouses, but that it ought to be equitable and that she should be allowed to work. She described the kind of location she envisioned for her self-realization as she considered her housing choices for the near future. In her narrative, she mentioned the decency of the people, the cleanliness of the streets, the physical qualities of apartment buildings, the vibrant urban public spaces, and the Islamic boutique stores selling high-end brands, all of which, as in her words, provide “…a quality setting where you can fit yourself in...”.

172
Frankly, I don’t want to live in Keçiören when I get married, we should be able to get out of here. It is full of people, very crowded, there is terrible traffic. There is literally no room to breathe. But, maybe I would consider staying here if it were in Etilik, Subayevleri or Aşağı Eğlence neighborhoods. I like those neighborhoods in Keçiören. The streets are clean and orderly, 3-4 storey apartment buildings. Our wealthy relatives reside there. I know the apartments there were not built according to the stove system, there are no rooms that open to the living room. People are more civilized. The bazaar market is decent. In the evenings, there are streets where you can take a walk with your husband, drink tea or coffee and eat dessert. There are also luxury boutique hijab shops that sell such stylish, modern clothes for veiled people. So it has a quality environment, where you can fit yourself and enjoy. In fact, I don’t even compare it with most parts of Çankaya… It is not like every part of Çankaya is like Tunali, or Çayyolu… There are worse places, too. I think Keçiören is much more suitable to pursue a family life.\textsuperscript{148} (Zeynep, 26, born in Keçiören, parents migrated from Kırşehir, residing in Pınarbaşı neighborhood)

Although the upwardly mobile Islamic middle class fractions set models to be emulated with their consumption habits and lifestyles, they were also criticized, particularly for their religious disposition. With the deepening of class cleavages, embodied cultural hierarchies seem to generate conflicting encounters in everyday life. Saktanber (2002a) addresses the significance of the role religious Muslim women play in cultivating an Islamic way of life. Likewise, in the case of Keçiören, women played a crucial role within the quest to establish Islamic middle-class lifestyles which also makes them the focus of criticism. In their study on pious urban middle class women’s clothing dispositions, Sandıkçı & Ger (2010: 33) calls for studies “to look at the internal class struggles within the Islamist community and tease out the influence of different class sensibilities on consumption”. The municipality’s gender-segregated sports center provided an ideal setting for ethnographic

\textsuperscript{148} See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 22.
study due to the socio-economic diversity of its members, including affluent women, and the opportunity to observe sports/exercise participation as a middle-class practice and sociability. The latest model, expensive cars parked in the lot near the sports center, which was mostly used by women during the day, were the subject of women's conversations. The well-dressed, headscarved women who confidently got out of these cars tended to establish distant relationships with the low-income women in the same exercise groups. Their distant attitude was perceived as class arrogance. Nezahat, a 44-year-old mother of three, was one of the sports center participants who read Aidin Salih's books and shared the practical information on healthy living she followed on online platforms with the other women in the group. Her narrative of an anecdote she experienced at the sports center provides an example of not only the evaluative frameworks of a pious lower-class fraction.

There's a woman at the gym. She's one of types that comes in their Mercedes jeeps. You should see how she swaggers. Every time I see her, she is in a different gym outfit. Garish colors. She's wearing pistachio green with a purple scarf. Like a fluorescent lamp. Like she wants everyone to notice her. I'm wearing the kids' old ones coming here. If I had those nice tracksuits, I'd wear them on a picnic or a trip. This stinker... She even gives the greeting of Allah with her head nodding... It was before Ramadan, she approached to me. She said, “Excuse me, do you know a family in need, I want to give fitre. I don't have anyone around me.” One should smack her in the mouth, spoiled. I snapped at her, I said no. Hacer, you know Hacer, I said to her, “Why is she asking this to me? Is it because she thinks that a person of my type would know poor people”. She said, “Don't mind, she is not doing OK, her husband has an affair. He just took her affair to Umrah.” Oh my! All those clothes, cars, and houses we aspire to are all lies. Money has no faith; it corrupts people. If he had the money, he would say it's religiously permissible, and mine would get married to another woman. This has become normal for the rich. This is not the way a pious, faithful man would pursue his life. May God give you enough to not be in need; wealth is just
another form of poverty.\textsuperscript{149} (Nezahat, 44, parents migrated from Kırşehir, residing in Atapark neighborhood)

Zeliş, a 46-year-old mother of three, was one of the most committed participants in the Quran course. Her husband was a minimum wage worker and she worked as a paid babysitter at home. She sought advice from her female religious hoca on how to persuade her two daughters in the secondary school to wear headscarves. She complained that she could not get help from her relatives, even though it was known that she was having financial difficulties. Her narrative provides an example of subjective perceptions on how Islamic conservative lifestyles have been transformed by consumption habits, women’s pious embodiment was problematized.

My uncle’s son got married last year. They had a ‘countryside wedding with a concept’, as they put it. They were dressed in different costumes. They were costumed as Hürrem and Kanuni. It’s a pity that my cousin used to have a very nice girlfriend. My uncle didn’t want her because she was Alevi. The bride, whom he thought was a girl of faith, wore a strange wedding dress. The dress was supposedly veiled, but it was tight-fitting. At her henna, after the recitation of the Qur’an, she wore such a tight, silver sequin, snake-like dress. She danced all night with her friends. My uncle, who criticizes everyone, remains silent about his daughter-in-law. A house was furnished for her in the most beautiful part of Keçiören; it has a concept, too. She likes the palace concept. Her parents stipulated that she must go on a pilgrimage every two years. Do you see the tariff? Once you go on a pilgrimage, the obligation is fulfilled. Subsequent visits are futile. My uncle was a pilgrim; he used to condemn extravagancy and preach about the strictness of the hijab. Once, he scolded me for nothing. Now he’s being tested by his daughter-in-law. But I don’t think he cares. As long as he’s on good terms with his co-in-laws, who are contractors affiliated with the AK Party, the rest is not important.\textsuperscript{150} (Zeliş, 46, Konya, residing in Pınarbaşı neighborhood)

\textsuperscript{149} See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 23.

\textsuperscript{150} See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 24.
Bourdieu (1989: 4) contends, that the different positionalities in social space generate and result in distances in physical space, which in turn have ramifications on social interaction and encounters. The options of staying in Keçiören are restricted to some specific neighborhoods where residents could enjoy Islamic conservative consumption habits. In relation to the ‘valued’ bodily dispositions and embodiments, as manifestations of articulated of class positions and religiosity, the place of residence was marked as significant for people to assert their own ‘presented selves’. In other words, the neighborhood of the residence serves as a ‘distinction’ marker, allowing not only to embody and present the aspirant lifestyle but also mark the extent of religious morality embodiment.

6.4. The Sources of Everyday Conducts and Dynamics of Pious Embodiment

Arjun Appadurai (1996: 189) remarks that examining a locality requires us to capture dynamics of its production “as a structure of feeling, a property of social life, and an ideology of situated community”. The portrayal of the district’s public spaces ‘family spaces’ served to recalibrate gendered selves and embodiment practices according to a religiously-informed normative order. Constrained by the patriarchal norms and cultural practices, women’s participation in public spaces have already been subject to restrictive control. The boundaries and possibilities of women’s presence in urban public spaces are shaped and conditioned by the extent and intensity of judgmental and threatening scrutiny, which includes how they present themselves, how modestly they dress, and their manners in everyday conduct. On the other hand, men’s self-presentations in the district have been scrutinized in terms
of whether they conformed to hegemonic ideals of masculine bodily schemas. Keçiören has become recognized as a 'macho' and 'fascist' enclave due to the changing dynamics of urban everyday encounters in the district; the former implies performances of 'low brow' masculinities, and the latter conveys banal forms of ultra-nationalism.

Zümrüt (52) and Sibel (56) were close friends and neighbors who lived in the same apartment building. Zümrüt, a mother of four, was an AKP member and a fan of Erdoğan. Sibel, a mother of four, came from a family politically aligned with the MHP. Identifying herself as a Asena, she mentioned that she was active in the Hearths of Idealism (Ülkü Ocakları) during her high school education in Keçiören. Drawing on their subjective experiences and observations of their children, the narratives of Zümrüt and Sibel are illuminating to provide a glimpse of the dominant structure of feeling in the district. Residing in a lower-middle class neighborhood, both women’s houses were owned by their husbands. Neither of the families were on rental. Both of the women stated that their husbands’ occupation fell under the category of serbest meslek; whilst the Zümrüt’s husband was a real estate agent, Sibel’s husband was a taxi driver. While less intense and less oppressive for women than in the recent past, it was important for both families to maintain kinship relations. In addition to kinship relations, their main sociality networks were composed of neighbor relations and socialization circles developed around religious sohbets. Both families, who identified themselves as Sunni and Turkish, migrated to Ankara from neighboring Central Anatolian cities in the late 1960s. Sibel's hometown, Kırşehir, was the city where the majority of the residents of their neighborhood migrated from. The store signboards on the streets in this
neighborhood, which its inhabitants refer to as ‘Little Kırşehir’ were full with the names of Kırşehir’s districts namely ‘Mucur’, ‘Kaman’ and ‘Çiçekdağı’. Kırşehir, stands out with its local music culture, colored the street culture in the district. Especially in the spring and summer seasons, it was typical for the district to witness weddings in the streets accompanied by music dominated by electro reeds and local figurative dances, now known as ‘Ankara airs-havaları’. The weight of the relationships of hemşehri, which were mostly maintained by men, can also be traced in the lobbying activities carried out by political parties during election periods. In her study on Keçiören, Kurtoğlu (2001) discusses how operative the social ties of hemşehri and family in the makings of local political relations and political mobilization, and how these networks evolve into source and forms of cultural capital that provide political benefits.

In the district, religious holidays, which seemed to have a more Islamic tone, continue to be experienced with their traditional intensity. Inhabitants of the district were also very sensitive about national holidays. Turkish flags hung on apartment windows and balconies, shop windows and even in alleyways with ropes were an important part of the daily visual image of the district. Both Sibel and Zümrüt said that their children grew up playing on the streets of the neighborhood and that they still maintain the relationships they established there. Sibel was worried that her sons, aged 15 and 17, who were affiliated with the local branch of the Hearths of Idealism, would become vagrants (serseri) because of their friends, who gathered at neighborhood corners, spending their time doing nothing but smoking cigarettes, gazing at girls, and tending to drink alcohol. Sibel said that she wanted her sons to spend more time at home like Zümrüt’s two sons, aged 17 and 21, and that
she held them up as an example for her own son. She mentioned that she repeatedly warned and advised her children to be ‘Be alert, be cunning, know your business.’ (‘Uyanık olsun, kurnaz olsun, işinizi bilin’). Zümrüt’s sons were engaged with the AKP’s youth branches. According to their mother, though they smoked, they did not drink alcohol, and though they did not pray five times a day, at least they never missed Friday prayers. Zümrüt had two daughters, one aged 15 and the other 24. Her eldest daughter graduated from a prestigious university in Ankara with a degree in public administration, and thanks to her father’s AKP acquaintances, she got a job in a state institution. Although their mothers were close friends, the daughters did not have a close relationship. Zümrüt mentioned her efforts to raise ‘pious’, ‘self-sufficient’ and ‘competent’ children, the difficulties she faced and the generation differences as follows:

The daughter has changed since she went to university. She says she feels ashamed to live in Keçiören. She says her peers make fun of her. I tell her they should mind their own business. ‘You don’t know,’ she says and shushes me. She also stopped coming to our sobhets. She doesn’t like the preacher either, she said ‘I won’t guide my life according to her advice’. She's an educated girl, she thinks people here are backward. Now she is obsessed with my little girl, Sude. ‘I spent all my summers at the Qur’an course. If I missed one prayer, you’d be nagging me. When it comes to Sude, you say ‘don't let her get bored, don't push her’. But time has changed. Occupied with her cellphone, it became difficult to convince her to pray. None of this existed when Hicret was growing up. She would either play in the street or watch TV at home. I would say, "Let's pray" and she would come. I can't control this little one.151 (Zümrüt, 52, migrated from Kayseri, residing in Aktepe neighborhood)

---

151 See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 25.
In her remarks about Sibel’s daughthers, Zümrüt describes a typology of young woman that I observed to be called ‘wannabe girls of Keçiören’ (Keçiören kızı, özenti kızlar) while conducting the fieldwork. The aspirant young women living in Keçiören appropriate, challenge and negotiate morally superior/inferior and valued/devalued femininities at their disposal. It was quite common that formations, visibilities and representations of feminine subjectivities not only tapped into the contested Islamic conservative-secular cleavage yet also were subjected to horizontal questioning. What would reflect vignettes from ‘Keçiören way of life’ include hybrid stereotypical instances of masculinities and femininities based on class-cultural embodiments and dispositions. ‘Keçiören bebesi’, mostly referred to male youngsters adopting, displaying and performing certain sets of nationalist dispositions and masculine embodiments with reference to be born and raised in cultural settings of Ankara. Sibel’s sons appeared to have dispositions that match with the characteristics of a ‘Keçiören bebesi’. She mentioned that she worried about the future of her sons when she compared them to the children of her neighbors:

I can’t deal with my boys’ wandering. Their father doesn’t care. They will end up unemployed. Our preacher (referring to the Qur’an teacher) advised me to show Erdoğan and his children as an example, they are all İmam Hatip graduates. “Encourage your children”, she says. It has nothing to do with it, I begged and begged. My boys are idealist nationalist ülkücü. I watch them, I observe them, they don’t give a inch about Erdoğan being a hafız. Let them have a military operation; that is what they love. He’s a good raconteur, so they say. The little one came to me and said, ‘Don’t worry, I will be the father who goes to Friday, fasts and distributes zakat’. I naively rejoiced. I said, ‘Amin inshallah, my son, may God show me those days.’ It turns out he
wants to be a mafia boss. Would you laugh or cry? (Sibel, 56, migrated from Kırşehir, residing in Aktepe neighborhood)

During the fieldwork, one of the issues that both families and women highlighted in terms of both the moral and economic value of their neighborhoods was educational opportunities. As a matter of fact, education was one of the themes that most preoccupied the everyday lives of the women informants, most of whom were mothers. Educational opportunities in the district were addressed in relation to their perceptions of the moral and economic value of the neighborhoods as well as their residential mobility aspirations. Savage et al. (2005) argues that depending on its position in the city’s socio-economically ranked hierarchy, the neighborhood is a key site to observe the reproduction of class inequalities in ways that affect life chances. In this respect, studies on the neighborhood effect’s significance in determining individuals’ socio-economic trajectories also focus on inequalities in access, provision, and equality of opportunity to education (Small & Newman, 2001; Galster, 2012; Sharkey & Faber, 2014).

During one of the sohbet gatherings, a young woman began expressing her discontent. At the time, the women were in groups talking about the quality of high school education and the dissatisfaction of their children in one of the central neighborhoods of the district. An Imam Hatip (religious vocational high schools) high school graduate herself, she complained that ‘graduating from this school used to have a privilege, it no longer has one’. Nodded in agreement, Nuray, a teacher working at a vocational high school, expressed

\[\text{See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 26.}\]
her concern that rather than getting them disciplined along the Islamic morality, Imam Hatip education appeared to be distancing students from religion. Hayriye, a respected female preacher in her late 50s, interrupted and said “You don’t say, “Alhamdulillah, the obstacles in front of our religion have been lifted!” So many excuses… (...) With what difficulties we got our Imam Hatip schools, now you don’t appreciate them.” Hayriye did not receive the approving feedbacks that she was used to. As a matter of fact, in these sorts of religious gatherings, education was one of the themes to which women in general responded very realistically and did not compromise on their expectations. It was widely recognized that the already poor state of education services in the neighborhood schools had gotten worse under the AKP rule. The women participating in the gatherings pointed out that educational success could not be attained by individual will and efforts. The main and most pressing problem was that most of the schools close to their homes in the district had been converted into Imam Hatip schools, leaving inhabitants with no other choice. The fact that private schools were the only alternative, on the other hand, had eliminated chances for those without financial means to attain education. The following two quotations provide insight into what district inhabitants experienced:

There are a lot of thugs and bums in schools, parents don't care about their children. They just send them to school. There is all kinds of filth around schools. Especially in the upper neighborhoods, substance use has increased tremendously. I'm really scared. It's very hard to take care of a boy. Those who get involved with drugs are hurting themselves and their families. It's no

153 “Kusura bakmayın, şimarıklık artık bu kadarı! Elhamdülillah artık dinimiz önündeki engeller kalktı demiyorsunuz da! Bir sürü mazaret... Şuna benziyor bu... O kadar anlatıyorum ne kadar büyük sevap olduğunu, sizi hala sabah namazına üşeniyorsunuz. İmam Hatip’lerimize ne zorlukla kavuştuk, şimdi beğenmiyorsunuz.”
longer the same with the girls. You have no idea what she is doing with her smartphone if you confine her at home. The neighborhood matters in that sense. They say people to send their children to Imam Hatip, they will get wiser there. Almost every school changed their signboard to Imam Hatip. Nothing has changed. They teach religion instead of course subjects that might be important for youngsters in examinations. There’s one around the corner. Every day, a spectacle unfolds in front of the school. Girls are fighting, boys bring a cleaver or something.\footnote{Filiz, 37, parents migrated from Çorum, residing in Kuşçağız neighborhood}

My boy says ‘What do I learn at school, what do you expect from me in the exam? Send me to a private school and then hold me responsible.’ How much do schools cost, is it possible? We couldn’t enroll the older one in the science high school in Batıkent, because we couldn’t afford the trip expenses. When he notices that I’m upset, he says, "Never mind, don’t worry, what’s the point of studying? And he is right. There are university graduates who are unemployed. They become police officers. There are others who work as cashiers at A101.\footnote{Solmaz, 51, migrated from Konya, residing in Kalaba neighborhood}

Lüküslü (2016) argues that the education system, which in the past allowed for class mobility despite its problems, has now become a system that further deepens social inequalities with the Islamist conservative practices that the AKP has blended with neoliberal policies. During the AKP period, the public expenditures education services were significantly reduced and the commodification of these services accelerated (Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Cosar and Yeşenoglu, 2009; Eder, 2010). One of the consequences of the neoliberal narrowing of social welfare practices is the problem of equal opportunity in education. The AKP’s familial social welfare approach holds the family responsible for providing education for their children.

\footnote{See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 27.}

\footnote{See Appendix B for the Turkish original quotation at length. The mentioned quotation is placed at no: 28.}
6.5. Concluding Remarks

The quest for class-cultural segregation, spurred by a disdain for lower-middle-class, rural migrants, is widely regarded as one of the most key factors behind the trend of the middle class to leave urban centers and the emergence of gated communities during the 1990s. Ayata (2002), in his article on the urban lifestyle quest of new middle classes, argues that bodily dispositions and representations serve to manifest class distinctions and one’s place in social hierarchy. Residential mobility as a sign of upward mobility has been found to impact and inform not only informants’ perceptions of the district’s economic and symbolic value, but also how they negotiated and accommodated the horizontal dynamics of class-cultural similarities and differences.

In this regard, my informants’ residential mobility aspirations reflect and connect to how they perceive and appropriate their social positions and self-worth imbued by symbolic hierarchies. Informants tended to negotiate ‘their place’ in relation to the ‘others’, both horizontally and vertically. I investigated how the growing class inequalities in the informants’ daily interactions, dispositions and evaluation schemes manifest themselves in their social relations as social capital in their neighborhoods. I argue that the representations of class distinctions by conservative fractions of middle classes who experienced upward class mobility, as well as their representations of social differentiation through religious practices, produce complex relationship dynamics that generate resentment on the one hand and foster class aspirations on the other. In this regard, I argue that conservative, patriarchal conceptions of family and gender inform the
perceptions, dispositions, and practices through the variety of social relations informants formed in the neighborhood scale.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This study was set out to explore the forms and dynamics of sociality that emerge and evolve among lower middle class families living in Keçiören, commonly called as nationalist, Islamic conservative. Keçiören, one of the oldest districts of Ankara, has over the last thirty years become a right-wing bastion under and with the local governments of nationalist Islamist political parties. The district was initially recognized among the inhabitants of Ankara for proto-hegemonic spatial interventions of its mayor elected in 1994, such as urban public representations of Turkish-Islamic symbols, which were construed as contestations to secular ideals of the capital. In 2003, the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chose Keçiören over the prime minister’s residence in Çankaya. This political move, by strengthening the district’s popular image, positioned Keçiören as one side of a set of interrelated political dualities in the socio-political imaginary of Turkey.

Bourdieu (2018: 107), in his discussion on the durable relationality between physical space and social and symbolic spaces, argues that “the structure of social space manifests itself, in the most diverse contexts, in the form of spatial oppositions, inhabited (or appropriated) space as a sort of spontaneous metaphor of social space”. One of the unevenly developed, ‘peripheral’ districts to Çankaya- the central district of Ankara and the symbol of the Republic-, Keçiören presents an interesting example of locality
to observe how socio-political segregations are translated and manifested into urban spatial segregations. Following Bourdieu’s analytical approach, as a student of urban sociology, I embarked on my ethnographic study in the district to relate one fragment of how the socialities and subjectivities of urban communities are contextually transformed in relation to the historically shifting socio-spatial, class-cultural, gendered, and religious dynamics in Turkey.

Speaking at an opening of a recreational area in 2015, Erdoğan described Keçiören’s urban transformation trajectory as follows: “Keçiören, which was a slum yesterday, has become one of the elite districts of Ankara.” The adjectival choice of ‘elite’ (‘seçkin’) at first glance seems to contradict his political storyline based on the victimhood caused by the elitism of the Kemalist establishment. Regardless of the extent to which this word choice reflects the district’s socio-spatial reality, it is remarkable that it was identified as a marker of aspirational status. In other words, given how the term ‘elite’ has been construed by the Islamist-conservative political tradition within a framework of conflicted socio-political binary, and particularly how it has been politicized as a signifier that elicits feelings of resentment, this choice of term presents ambivalence. In this particular instance, the term ‘elite’ appears to have been stripped of its loaded affective aspect, signifying the ‘other’, and reduced to signifying a hazy socio-economic development.

156 The Turkish original version reads as follows- “... dünün kenar ilçesi Keçiören’i, hamdolsun, bugün Ankara’nın en seçkin ilçelerinden biri...” The English version is retrieved from the official webpage of Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. I checked official website to see how the adjective was translated into English.

Due to its position in the political field designated by the AKP, Keçiören had become an enclave preferred by Islamist-conservative fractions of the middle classes. However, by the late 2010s, a sizable portion of these conservative middle classes had left Keçiören to relocate to newly developing areas such as Çukurambar, where is close to the AKP’s headquarter. Eventually, with the relocation of Erdoğan to the Presidential Complex in Beştepe in 2014, built as part of his ‘New Turkey’ ambition, Keçiören lost its appeal for Islamic-conservative fractions of the affluent classes.

Erdoğan’s political appropriation of the socio-spatiality of Keçiören can be best traced in his responses to questions about why he chose the district as his place of residence instead of Çankaya Mansion and whether he lost his sense of humility by moving to the Presidential Complex. Presented as evidence of his anti-elite political stance, this choice was promoted as a sign of his modesty and humbleness, as well as his preference for closeness to the ‘majority’\textsuperscript{157} to whom he claimed to represent. Inconsistent with these claims, his classification of Keçiören as an ‘elite’ district exposes the twists in the AKP’s political rhetoric. No doubt, the social divisions manufactured by struggles in the political field, fueled effectively by the ruling AKP, have resulted in lines of symbolic polarization in the social space. However, as the

\textsuperscript{157} As part of an over-exploited political narrative in which Kemalist state elites are blamed for causing the ‘victimization’ of the ‘masses’, Erdoğan repeatedly referred to a line from a poem that reads ‘Let the Kaaba belong to the Arabs, Çankaya is enough for us’. This line is taken from the poem ‘Çankaya’ by Kemalist poet Kemalettin Kamu (1901-1948). Erdoğan referred to this verse especially during the 2014 presidential election campaign, which was promoted as a major step towards a ‘New Turkey’. The following is a part from one of speeches: “This CHP mentality has nowhere to go. Çankaya has become alienated from other provinces; even from neighboring districts- Yenimahalle, Keçiören and Mamak. Çankaya has become unconcerned with the problems facing the country. Some presumptuous people came out and wrote poems saying ‘Let the Kaaba belong to the Arabs, Çankaya is enough for us’. See-https://www.internethaber.com/erdogan-kabe-arapin-olsun-bize-cankaya-yeter-siirleri-yazanlar-vardi-708473h.htm
AKP’s own versions of the ‘elite’ have grown larger and stronger, class differences among its own constituency have become more visible. In this regard, the solidification of class distinctions, such as trends in residential mobility from Keçiören, was reflected in horizontal tensions stemming from class inequalities. Drawing on a shared sense of “we”, the majority of the informants identified and embraced the period of AKP rule as “it is our term/it is our turn”. However, the widening class gaps between those who had experienced upward class mobility and those who had been left behind seem to be exacerbating negotiations on the common denominators that unite the imagined “we”. The horizontal differences in Keçiören were voiced with expressions such as “those who got richer among us” (aramızdan zenginleşenler) versus “those whose turn has not yet come” (‘sira kendisine gelmeyenler’); nevertheless, the anticipation that their turn would come in this “turn” appear to be kept alive in the socializing circles of the neighborhoods.

Drawing an analogy between the district’s transformation and Turkey’s overall transformation under AKP rule, Erdoğan, in one of his speeches in 2015, stated that “the history of Keçiören is, in a way, the history of Turkey”. This statement appears to be more pertinent in terms of defining the district’s urban development trajectory. Harboring the political efforts of restoring the primacy of the Turkish-Sunni ‘majority’ pitted against the secular ‘minority’, the district has come to be known as an Islamist-conservative stronghold in the capital, embodying dispositions, practices, and imaginary inculcated by shifting contours of Islamist conservatisms. In this study, I attempted to examine and question how conservative practices, embodiments and dispositions are produced through a complex set of class-based social relations in everyday life of Keçiören.
I argue that whereas denying conservatism as an ideology fails us to grasp its capacity to generate a broad set of rationalities, representations, and power mechanisms, understanding conservatism solely as dispositions yields to a kind of reductionism and essentializes a conservative 'being' by neglecting how notions of self/subjectivity are (re)produced. Therefore, I suggest a relational approach which recognizes capacities of conservatism in generating dispositions, subjectivities and identities, and the dispositional convergences contextualized in the complex power relations in which they are formed. I benefited from Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of practice to base a theoretical construction of conservatism as a research object, as his relational approach allow us to track a unified analysis at the level of agents and structures by recognizing relationship between symbolic meanings and the objective conditions of its production. Accordingly, this study attempted to examine the ways lower-middle class families in Keçiören become agents in the everyday articulation and reproduction of conservative ideological discourses and dispositions, and in what ways and to what extent people incline to render label of Islamic conservatism as a living social practice. Moving from my ethnographic study, I argue that the preservation of family, the significance of religion, and patriarchal gender relations, which register as core tenets of conservatism, play an important role in shaping dispositions and schemas of perception acquired through family and networks of social relations that were shaped and bounded by the neighborhood contexts of Keçiören and conditioned by the class trajectories of individuals; all of which involve constant (re)negotiations.

The lower middle class families living in Keçiören, those who were inclined to vote for nationalist Islamic conservative political parties and who were
socio-economically disadvantaged but bearers of middle-class aspirations, comprise the subject and unit of analysis of my study. I conducted an ethnographic study at four different settings located in nine socio-economically distinguished neighborhoods of Keçiören; I participated and had been a regular attendant to five different women’s gatherings and three different sohbet groups; I enrolled in a gender-segregated gym in a newly gentrified part of the district; and I attended a Qur’an course given by the Directorate of Religious Affairs for a month in a lower-class neighborhood. In selecting neighborhoods in Keçiören as field sites, I took into account the neighborhood’s period of establishment, class composition, and urban transformation trajectory. The variety of the lower-middle and lower-class neighborhoods enabled me to better grasp both class-cultural heterogeneity and varying manifestations of cultural repertoires and patterns of commonalities and differences. Together with my field study, I conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 65 informants; of whom 50 were women whom I reached out through the relations I established at the field settings and 15 were men whom I contacted through their spouses.

Departing from Lefebvre’s (1991) theoretical framework, I attempted to examine the current sociality in Keçiören as a relational product of its socio-spatial processes and relations. Relationally, as the spatial scale in question is a district with a very large population, following the methodological debates in urban studies on the significance of “politics of scale” (Smith, 1992; Jonas, 1994; Brenner, 2019), I take the scale not merely as a descriptor but as a relational concept embedded within broader sociospatial processes, relations and interdependencies. Accordingly, by recognizing the relationalities between scales as analysis units, I organized the chaptering of the study
according to scales: (i.) with a focus on *conceived space*, the historical trajectory of the socio-spatial makings of Keçiören, the district scale; (ii.) then, focusing on *perceived* and *lived spaces*, the socio-spatial differentiations at the scales of its socio-economically different neighborhoods (*mahalle*); (iii.) and the scales of home and body.

In order to explore how sociality in the district have contextually transformed, I began with an examination of the historically evolving positionality of Keçiören within a relational network of socio-spatial processes and political struggles. The majority of informants’ perceptions on the changing dynamics of urban life included their assessments of the local governments’ performance, which in turn, I argue, informed their perceptions of politics in general. In this regard, the transformations in the district’s built environment, most notably the transformation of housing from *gecekondu* to apartment buildings, were recognized as substantial services that brought about not only major changes in the very practice of everyday life but also a sense of upward mobility and an elevation in social status. During and after the realization of the housing transformation from *gecekondu* to apartment buildings, the Islamist conservative local governments in Keçiören promoted and circulated a political discourse on the “marginalization” of the district by the prior administrations and the “abandonment” of the district’s residents to *gecekondu* that are neither suitable for urban aesthetics nor for decent living standards.

In the narratives of informants, the large-scale housing transformation in the urban built environment of the district was commonly addressed in ways that reflected the political discourses of Islamist conservative local
governments and served the imaginary of ‘us vs. them’. In expressing this, they tended to define it as follows: “those who serve us” vs. “those who deem us unworthy of service”. It can be argued that there was a shared conviction that prevailed in the district: even when criticizing local and central governments, the wrongdoings they made were viewed as compensable because they were “those who brought transformation to the district”. In this regard, I argue that despite the resentments, deprivations, and tensions they generated, informants remain emotionally invested in the relationships built on the "we" that function as social capital, with the anticipation that these relationships would create real power differentials.

The notion of family, informed by religious morality and patriarchal gender codes, and registered as one of the constants of "we-making" in the district, was one of the priority and among the most discussed themes. In this respect, the normative and gendered configuration of urban public life on the axis of religious morality was identified as an appreciated spatial intervention of the Islamist conservative local governments that caters the informants' imaginary of "us". The majority of the women informants commended the local governments for facilitating their access to the semi-public urban parks built in the district with limited urban public spaces. Characterized as “family spaces”, urban public parks were guarded by unofficial security teams who also enforced the de facto alcohol ban in the district. The majority of women informants, rather than underlining the fact that alcohol is prohibited by Islam, highlighted their concern that men who drink alcohol pose a threat to the safety of women and children. In ways that reproduce the Islamic conservative conception of the social, the interventions
of local governments were praised for "recognizing the needs and sensitivities of its people and taking care of the needs of 'ladies'".

Besides, instead of bureaucratic anonymity, in its relationship with the inhabitants of the district, the municipality maintained face-to-face interactions in which Islamic idioms and expressions were distinctively articulated. For instance, the frequent use of the phrase “working for the sake of Allah” was echoed in the informants’ narratives, expressing their confidence in local authorities assuming responsibility with a sense of Islamic morality. Highlighting the significance of the use of shared religious idioms for the continuity and reproduction of Islamic societies, Mardin (1989) states that the shared vocabulary provides maps guiding and legitimatizing "the individual’s perception of social rules and positions" (ibid.: 7) and make individuals to feel safe. In the case of Keçiören, the use of Islamic idioms appears to serve to foster rapport and trust between local government and residents by providing a shared moral code for social relations. Likewise, in assessments of discontent with current local and general governments, the same common religiously-informed moral codes were employed when referring to the loss or degradation of religious morality.

Elected in 1994 and governed the district for three consecutive terms, Turgut Altınok, whose political position has oscillated between admiration and negation of the Kemalist modernization project, sought ways to promote middle-class sociality in the post-gcekondu landscape of district through implementing a number of public spaces where 'family' was set as the framework of regulating moral order. In this regard, the conceived spaces of
Keçiören were configured to generate cultural policies that, on the one hand, promote middle-class subjectivities characterized by religiously conservative dispositions, and, on the other hand, present and inculcate a social ideal that places great value on familialism and traditional gender relations. The majority of informants commended Altınok's urban spatial strategies, noting both his efforts to preserve the 'family space' demanded by religious residents of the district and his efforts to boost the economic value of the district by introducing economic investments that cater to middle class habits and practices. When expressing their views and evaluations on everyday life in Keçiören, informants commonly underlined that the district had developed with spatial practices that encouraged middle-class sociality during the Altınok period and illustrated their remarks by comparing Keçiören with other districts. Among these, the districts of Sincan in Ankara and Fatih in Istanbul were commonly referred to as having a daily life based on the restrictive rules of religious life; certain parts of the district of Altındağ such Çinçin neighborhood, on the other hand, were identified as varos and the moral ‘other’. In the majority of the narratives, Keçiören was differentiated as a place where ‘modest, orderly family life’ prevailed, where religiosity lived not at its 'extremes' and where it was not closed to engaging and cultivating new tastes and habits of urban life.

Informants living in the central, middle-class neighborhoods stated that Erdoğan's residence in Keçiören, albeit for a short period of time, led to the expectation that the district could evolve into a settlement that both preserved its religious identity and achieved class mobility, competing with the district of Çankaya. However, as mentioned before, the trend of the conservative fractions of the middle classes leaving the district, which began
before Erdoğan moved out, was evaluated in a way that pointed to horizontal tensions in the narratives of the informants whose perceptions of the district also shaped their perceptions of their own class-cultural positions. In this respect, it is possible to argue that emerging class differences and inequalities caused internal horizontal conflicts within social groups that were considered to share similar religious dispositions.

In their evaluations of Keçiören, I observed that the majority of the informants were rather defensive, possessive and tended to emphasize the district’s positive features. This again appears to pertain to how the place of residence operates as an indicator of one's sense of her/his own social place. However, when evaluating Keçiören at the district scale, the informants underlined the socio-economic and socio-cultural differences between the neighborhoods and assessed the district in light of these differences. In this regard, while the central neighborhoods were described as places where one could pursue middle-class aspirations, the peripheral, lower-middle and lower-class neighborhoods of the district, though providing a sociability marked by the desired ‘family life’, were often portrayed as oppressive and competitive places where habits and dispositions of rural sociality were perpetuated, especially by young female informants. This brings us to the point that the neighborhood proved to be a scale that plays an important role in determining the dynamics of everyday life.

In this study, I benefited operational and observational use of the socio-spatial scale of the mahalle-neighborhood to conduct my ethnography, which allowed me to examine everyday life. On the other hand, the neighborhood as the space of the ‘family’, which has a historically important place in the
formation of sociality in Turkey, resonated with the main discussion axes of the research. Though the roles assumed by the unit of neighborhood have evolved and its forms have varied substantially in response to social, economic, and cultural changes, the mahalle retains significance in the Islamic conservative social imaginary with respect to its role in defending, protecting, and ensuring the continuity of the social order. Drawing on my ethnographic study, I argue that, due to its quality of socio-spatial proximity that encompasses the everyday life, the neighborhood in Keçiören effectively functions as a bounded locality that monitors, shapes and reproduces social relations where classed gender dynamics and patriarchal religious ethos converge. One of the distinctive features of the notion of neighborhood is the assumption of "similarity"; given this feature, the neighborhood scale operates as a class identifier as well as a part in the establishment of a shared sense of 'we'. In this respect, I contend that the mahalle as a context in Keçiören not only facilitates but also generates a wide range of social interactions and relations that maintain and foster 'we-makings', including horizontal bargaining.

Relatedly, I argue that the neighborhood context in Keçiören has effectively been appropriated by the ruling AKP to produce clientelist relationships that in turn appear to consolidate and foster political belongings. The ruling AKP's political appropriation of neighborhood contexts in Keçiören operates in ways that not only yield political benefits and electoral gain for the party but also shape the dynamics of sociality in the district in ways that affect negotiations of belonging. The AKP operates its spatial embeddedness in the district, which it inherited from the RP, through the relationships that the party's extensively organized neighborhood branches establish with
households. Accordingly, one of the most prevalent way is the provision of family-oriented social assistance to poor families in socio-economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. Within the AKP's social policy framework, the family, considered the keeper of the moral order, not only functions to inculcate Islamic-conservative dispositions but is also held responsible for the production and distribution of welfare for individual. Despite contentions and discontents at the neighborhood scale over the criteria upon which social assistance was distributed and complaints over how social assistance built on an Islamic morality obscuring social vulnerabilities, the majority of informants tended to express their perceptions of social aid distribution with reference to the sense of indebtedness that in turn informed their political alignment and belongings to an imagined 'us'. The state of destitution, the sense of indebtedness to 'protective' authorities, and the concern for the continuity of aid seem to constitute the main dynamics of the relationship that poor families in Keçiören, primarily women, establish with the ruling party.

Academic studies on the restructuring of the social welfare regime, which is identified as one of the products of the AKP's socio-economic agenda that blends neoliberalism and Islamist conservatism, address the economic vulnerabilities experienced by women who are held responsible for the welfare of households (Buğra & Candaş, 2011; Özar & Yakut-Cakar, 2013; Yörük & Özsoy, 2013). In this respect, the ethnographic findings of this study may contribute by providing an insight into how and in what ways the social assistance was carried out in the neighborhoods of Keçiören, as well as the experiences and perceptions of the women beneficiaries, including feelings of gratitude, indebtedness and class wounds.
The mahalle contexts in Keçiören, as realms of sociability, appear to generate intricate relationships and interactions along the lines of class. I argue that these networks of social relations, by determining the extent and volume of social capital of the neighborhood inhabitants, contribute to the production and reproduction of conservative dispositions. The majority of informants expressed that solidarity networks and relations based on kinship and hemşehri evolved in a competitive rather than solidaristic direction. This was in part because, like many of them, the majority of their social circles were debt holders who had to prioritize their own nuclear families due to economic uncertainties. In this respect, though they remain important social networks as they were and remain the primary components of sociality in the district, neither kinship nor hemşehri relations were sufficient to ensure the social capital required to generate and convert into economic and cultural capitals.

The socializing circles that were a major part of the everydayness of neighborhood life, whether it was women’s gatherings, sohbets, or men’s mosque congregations, and the hemşehri association activities they maintained for political lobbying, functioned to establish networks of social relations that could be converted into economic capital. These networks of social relations, on the one hand, despite mostly being motivated by pragmatic and calculative ends, were introduced as solidaristic. On the other hand, and at the same time, due to the sense of indebtedness, obligation and variety of dependencies that these relations involved and engendered, they were characterized by conflictual qualities. As Bourdieu (1984: 478) suggests, the networks of social relations operate on a shared classification of ‘us-them’ distinctions. In a similar fashion, I argue that despite having intricate and
oscillating relationship dynamics, a shared classification schema of "we" and the constant negotiations of "we-makings" make these networks of relationships possible and lasting in the district.

While Turkishness and Sunni origin were the primary defining characteristics of "us" in Keçiören, a politically instilled repertoire of socio-cultural differences and thus AKP party affiliation appeared to play a role in defining boundaries. At this point, the AKP affiliation, which often appeared to embrace and transcend the categories of Turkishness and Sunnism all at once, with the patronage opportunities and power differentials it made possible, had a significant role in the makings of “we”. Having said that, "we-making" entailed ongoing discussions in which the internal dynamics of shared duties or intimacy parameters such as loyalty, senses of indebtedness, and resentment were at stake. In sum, facilitating the inculcation of conservative dispositions, these networks of social relationships appear to consolidate commitment to party allegiance by makings of "us/them" based on a variety of negotiations and expectations of reciprocity.

In their relationality to previous scales, I incorporated the scale of body into the analysis. By focusing on the everyday interactions, dispositions, and evaluative schemas of my informants residing in socio-economically differentiated neighborhoods of Keçiören, I tried to explore class-cultural repertories and unpack the different manifestations of class distinctions that led to horizontal and vertical tensions. In examining how the spatial practice of inequalities impacted the sense of one’s own place, I focused on how changing socio-spatial differentiations led to social inequalities along class and gender axes and how these were accommodated and negotiated within
the discourse of Islamic conservatism. I attempted to explore how families perceive and negotiate the ‘value’ of their neighborhood with respect to their aspirations and restraints over horizontal/upward mobilities.

The scope and possibilities of everyday interactions and encounters between the conservative and secular fractions in Keçiören appear to be narrowed due to the changing socio-demographic makeup over the last three decades. In this regard, the fact that, after the secular middle classes, the conservative fractions tended to depart the district appears to have caused not just resentment towards those who went, but also conflicts among those who stayed. The ways in which housing and class mobility were evaluated by informants are revealing in terms of how the secular-conservative divide, defined by insurmountable socio-cultural differences, was encountered and experienced in everyday life and how it constituted a framework for "we-makings". Identifying their neighbors, with whom they said they shared similar dispositions as being less educated, 'ignorant', and 'rude', older woman informants living in the central middle-class neighborhoods, expressed longings for the old mahalle culture where a sense of cultural mobility brought on by the encounters with different fractions of middle class families. On the other hand, there was a widely shared perception that similar to the secular fractions of middle classes, the upwardly mobile Islamic conservative fractions have tended to relocate the district for locations they believed better reflected their class status.

When comparing their everyday living standards in Keçiören with districts of similar socioeconomic status, the informants listed religiosity, morality, and family life as evaluating criteria; the same set of criteria was applied to
the districts they aspired to move to as a means of class mobility. Almost all informants, women and men alike, mentioned that they were in favor of “gradual” and “moderate” forms of religiosity; drawing on the religious ways of life of the sects (tarikat) they observed in the district, they considered “dark”, “exaggerated”, and “extreme” conducts of religious lifestyles as restrictive both on the basis of gender relations and in terms of the embodiment of class aspirations.

Recurring themes in informants' narratives were the enduring impact of rural-urban migration and emerging class mobility on the perpetuation, cultivation and transformation of dispositions and practices. In this respect, the roles of women and men in public and private life were seen as one of the most prominent topics of the negotiations among the traditional values that they believe their families carried from the rural areas and perpetuated. In particular, young women informants stated that their perceptions of family life and family values were very different from their families and older generations due to the different socialization circles they were involved in through their education or work life and the different perspectives they had developed from the social media outlets they followed. That being said, all of the young women informants defined the institution of the family as "indispensable" and family values as values that require preservation and transmission to future generations in class conditions marked by economic uncertainty.

In the district, the categories of piety, Turkishness, morally superior/inferior femininities and masculinities, and political party affiliations were among major parameters of evaluation in classification schemes. Shaped by
interwoven negotiations on class, religion, and patriarchal norms of acceptable femininity, veiling emerged to occupy a particular place in evaluation schemes as one of the primary concerns that define the permissiveness of religious conservatism. Several of young women informants complained that secular norms still prevail in the visibility of the headscarf in public spaces; this was most commonly mentioned as a problem encountered as an obstacle in working life. In this respect, according to what they said, what they resented the most was the constant monitoring of veiled female embodiments in their neighborhoods, both in the physical and imagined senses of the term, as well as the questioning of the coherence of their piety.

In their narratives, young women informants from lower-middle and lower class neighborhoods recounted how newly emerging embodiment practices instilled in veiled women from upper-middle class conservative fractions an attitude and feeling of superiority. This attitude of superiority appears to both generate resentment and aspiration among the lower and lower-middle class young informants. Revealing how class transects the symbolic social division of "religious-secular", the majority of young women and several older women informants highlighted in their narratives that they felt much more comfortable with their uncovered friends than the wealthier pious women with whom they said they shared religious affinity. I argue that informants tended to identify the contours of their religiosity as dynamic. In relation to the intersections of class and gender inequalities that they were situated in, the contours were continually shaped, accommodated and contested through negotiations that pursue better ways of life.
To conclude, in this study, I attempted to relate at least one fragment of how the sociality of urban communities in Keçiören and subjectivities it helped to form have contextually been transformed in relation to the historically shifting socio-spatial processes and class-cultural, gendered, and religious dynamics. The questions of ‘what is peculiar about Keçiören?’ and ‘how it relates to nationalist Islamic conservatism’s power field?’ derive their relevance from the trajectory of political mobilizations at the district. With its historically proliferated and hybridized urban class-cultural forms, and its socio-spatial positionality, backed by the ruling party’s populist politics, on one side of interrelated socio-political dualities in the socio-political imaginary of Turkey, Keçiören appeared to present a diverse array of nationalist, Islamic-conservative practices and embodiments. In pursuit of investigating to what extent and how Islamic conservatism can be pursued in the everyday practices of the district, this study questions the *conceived* and *perceived* spaces imbued by Islamic conservatism in Keçiören and how they are *lived* within the diverse spatial scales, namely *mahalle*. I argue that shifting urban space in Keçiören both engenders and have been engendered by diverse conservative class-cultural embodiments in the course of the quotidian.

I examined on how and whether lower-middle class families in Keçiören become agents in the everyday articulation and reproduction of conservative dispositions and ideological discourses as well as the complex set of relations behind the formation of horizontally and vertically diversified class-cultural and gendered repertories. Drawing on my ethnographic study, with regards to the dispositions, I contend that the defense of family, the importance of religion, and patriarchal gender relations, which record as main tenets of
conservatism, play an important role in shaping dispositions and evaluation schemas acquired through family and networks of social relations that were shaped and bounded by the mahalle contexts of Keçiören and constrained by individuals’ class trajectories; all of which encompass constant (re)negotiations.
REFERENCES


214


Kalaycıoğlu, E. (1999). The shaping of party preferences in Turkey: Coping with the post-cold war era. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 20, 47-76.


Öncü, A. (2007). The politics of Istanbul’s Ottoman heritage in the era of globalism?


understanding of neighborhood effects. *Annual review of sociology, 40*, 559-579.


## APPENDICES

### A. THE LIST AND PROFILE OF WOMEN INFORMANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Neighborhood/Setting</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Place/Origin of Family</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work Experience *</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hatice</td>
<td>19 Mayıs / Women's Gathering @ Homes II</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Saadet</td>
<td>Kalaba / Gym</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Çorum</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Retired Tailor</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zeliş</td>
<td>Pınarbaşı / Sohbet II</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fatma</td>
<td>Aktepe / Sohbet III</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Yozgat</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Safiye</td>
<td>Pınarbaşı / Women's Gathering @ Restaurants I</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Çankırı</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Filiz</td>
<td>Kuşçağız / Quran Course</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Çorum</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Şengül</td>
<td>Subayevleri / Women's Gathering @ Homes I</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hacer</td>
<td>Etilik / Sohbet I</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Bolu</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kader</td>
<td>Kuşçağız / Quran Course</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ayşe</td>
<td>Atapark / Women's Gathering @ Homes III</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Erzurum 2</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Part-time House Cleaning</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Emine</td>
<td>Etlik / Sohbet I</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Çankırı 1</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Fazilet</td>
<td>Pınarbaşi / Sohbet II</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Çorum 3</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Şerife</td>
<td>Subayevleri / Women's Gathering @ Homes</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Çankırı 1</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mukaddes</td>
<td>Kuşçağız / Quran Course</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Siirt 1</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Cavidan</td>
<td>Aktepe / Sohbet II</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Kırşehir 2</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Zümrüt</td>
<td>Aktepe / Sohbet III</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Kayseri 1</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hülya</td>
<td>19 Mayıs / Women's Gathering @ Homes II</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Çankırı 1</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Retired Civil Servant- low level</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Nisa</td>
<td>Subayevleri / Women's Gathering @ Homes</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Kayseri 1</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Ümran</td>
<td>Şenlik / Women's Gathering @ Restaurants II</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Kırşehir 1</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Zeynep</td>
<td>Pınarbaşi / Sohbet II</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Bolu 1</td>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Hayriye</td>
<td>Etlik / Sohbet I</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Kayseri 1</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Preacher</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Seher</td>
<td>Aktepe / Sohbet III</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Tokat 3</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Nuray</td>
<td>Etlik / Sohbet I</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Nevşehir 1</td>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>Vocational School Teacher</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Place of Gathering</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Güler</td>
<td>Subayevleri / Women's Gathering @ Homes I</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Yozgat</td>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Saniye</td>
<td>Kalaba / Gym</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Nevşehir</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>Working at a Bakery</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Yıldız</td>
<td>Pinarbaşı / Sohbet II</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Çankırı</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Nesibe</td>
<td>Kalaba / Gym</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Kayseri</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Part-time Cook</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Sibel</td>
<td>Aktepe / Sohbet III</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Türkan</td>
<td>Kuşçagız / Quran Course</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Kars</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Songül</td>
<td>Kuşçagız / Quran Course</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Yozgat</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Part-time House-Cleaning</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Nezahat</td>
<td>Atapark / Women's Gathering @ Homes III</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Nedret</td>
<td>Şenlik / Women's Gathering @ Restaurants II</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Tokat</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Solmaz</td>
<td>Kalaba / Gym</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Fidan</td>
<td>Kalaba / Gym</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Sales Assistant</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Younger Generation / Women Informants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35/1</td>
<td>Aleyna</td>
<td>Subayevleri / Women's Gathering @ Homes I</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36/2</td>
<td>Neslihan</td>
<td>Atapark / Women's Gathering @ Homes III</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Çorum</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Salesclerk</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37/</td>
<td>Yasemin</td>
<td>Pinarbaşı</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Profession</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zeynep</td>
<td>Women's Gathering at Restaurants I</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>Software developer</td>
<td>Engaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38/ 4</td>
<td>Serap</td>
<td>Women's Gathering @ Homes III</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Kırıkkale</td>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>Part-time Ironer preparing for exams to become a private guard</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39/ 5</td>
<td>Meryem</td>
<td>Women's Gathering @ Homes III</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Çankırı</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40/ 6</td>
<td>Merve</td>
<td>Women's Gathering @ Homes III</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Yozgat</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41/ 7</td>
<td>Sanem</td>
<td>Women's Gathering at Restaurants II</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Çankırı</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42/ 8</td>
<td>Rabia</td>
<td>Gym</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Çorum</td>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>Seeking job as a Kindergarten Teacher</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43/ 9</td>
<td>Atapark</td>
<td>Women's Gathering @ Restarants I</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Kayseri</td>
<td>University-2 years</td>
<td>Receptionist at a health institution</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44/ 10</td>
<td>Ayten</td>
<td>Women's Gathering @ Restaurants I</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Isparta</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45/ 11</td>
<td>Zehra</td>
<td>Women's Gathering @ Restarants II</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46/ 12</td>
<td>Habibe</td>
<td>Women's Gathering</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Çorum</td>
<td>University Drop-out</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

233
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48/14</td>
<td>Nevin Şenlik</td>
<td>Women's Gathering @Restaurants II</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Kayseri High School</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49/15</td>
<td>Zübeyde Atapark</td>
<td>Women's Gathering @ Homes III</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Aksaray High School Drop-out</td>
<td>Hairdresser Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50/16</td>
<td>Kevser Pinarbaşı / Sohbet II</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Kirşehir High School-Drop-out</td>
<td>Cleaner at a firm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The List and Profile of Male Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work Experience</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ramazan</td>
<td>Pınarbaşı</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Çankırı</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Hairdresser</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cemal</td>
<td>Atapark</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Plumber</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Numan</td>
<td>Kalaba</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>Retired Foreman</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yılmaz</td>
<td>Şenlik</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Çorum</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Clerk at an AKP municipality</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Dursun</td>
<td>Kuşçağız</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Nevşehir</td>
<td>High School Drop-out</td>
<td>Municipal Police</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nihat</td>
<td>Atapark</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Yozgat</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Locksmith</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mahmut</td>
<td>Aktepe</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Retired carpenter</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fatih</td>
<td>19 Mayıs</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Çorum</td>
<td>University Drop-out</td>
<td>Waiter</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Muhammed</td>
<td>Şenlik</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Kayseri</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Owns a shoe shop</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mustafa</td>
<td>Atapark</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Kırşehir</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Deliveryman for a cargo company</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Fevzi</td>
<td>Pınarbaşı</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Çankırı</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Murat</td>
<td>Aktepe</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Çorum</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>Shopkeeper</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Osman</td>
<td>Etlik</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Tokat</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Bus Driver</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Rıza</td>
<td>Subayevleri</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Blue-collar at a State Institution</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>İlyas</td>
<td>Etlik</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Yozgat</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Tradesman</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5


başında kooperatiflere giriyordu insanlar. Zengin fala da değiştirliyor ha. Evine kira vermiyordu, az biraz tutumluysa 5-10 senede kooperatiften bir ev sahibi daha oluyordu. Oraya girebilecek için de tanıkuluzuzu lascım tabii. Onu da yapamadık, zaten yetiremiyorduk ki. Aile kalabalık... (B... Bizim başkanın (Altınok'u kastediyor) yaptığı yanlış bir iş var. Ovacık tarafından Alevilerin başında olduğu ev projesi vardı, bozdu dağıttı. Alläh'nin komünistleri kim bilir ne... (Mustafa, 46, migrated from Kırşehir, residing in Atapark neighborhood)


çıkarmayacak. O yardım ne kıymetlidir aile için bilirim yani biz de oralardan geçtik. (Zeynep, 38, family migrated from Bolu, residing in Pınarbaşı neighborhood)


ya. Verilen yardım da bir şey olsa. Bi kere erkekler hanımlarını karşı sorumluluklarını bilser, bırak Türkiye’yı dünyada boşanma kalmaz be. (Birsen, 28, migrated from Kayseri, residing in Pınarbaşı neighborhood)


CHAPTER 6


falan temiz düzenlenir, 3-4 katlı apartmanlar. Zengin akrabalarımız
oralarda oturuyor, biliyorum daireler sobalı sistemden dönme değil,
salona açılan odalar yok. Daha bi medenidir insanları falan da. Çarşısı
pazarı düzgün. Akşamı şöyle eşinle yürüşe çıkabileceğin, bi çay
kahve içip bi tatlı yiyebileceğin caddeleri falan var. Kapılar için böyle
tarz, modern kıyafetler satan lüks butik tesettür dükkanları falan da hep
oralarda. Yani kaliteli bir ortamı var, kendini yakıştırıp oturmak
isteveyebileceğin. Bakarsan Çankaya’nın çoku yeriley karşılaştırmam bile...
Çankaya dediğin de sonuçta hep Tunali değil, Çayyolu değil yani... Çok
beter yerleri var. Keçiören aile hayatı sürdürmeye çok daha uygun
bence. (Zeynep, 26, born in Keçiören, parents migrated from Kırşehir,
residing in Pınarbaşı neighborhood)

23. Spor salonunda bir kadın var. Mercedes jiplerle gelen tiplerden. O
Fıstık yeşili giymiş üstüne mor eşarp takıyor. Florasan gibi. Herkes beni
görsün der gibi. Ben çocukların eskimişlerini giyiyorum burda. Terliyor
insan be, o güzelim eşofmanlar bende olsa pikniğe, geziye gidince falan
giyerim. Bu kokoş... Allah’ın selamını bile kafasıyla verir... Ramazandan
önce gelmiş yanına. ‘Ay pardon, var mı tanıdığınız muhtaç bi aile
fırt ve vermek istiyorum. Benim etrafımda kimse yok da’ dedi. Çarpıcı
azına bi tane, şımarık. Tersledim, yok dedim. Hacer var ya, ona dedim
‘bunların kafası yerinde değil, kocalarının hep dostu var. Bunun kocası
daha yeni umreye götürmuş ev açığı kızı’. Aman! Azıcık aşım ağrısız
başım be. O özendiğimiz kılık kıyafet, arabalar, evler süs yalan. Böyle
bole hayatı mı olur insanın. Paranın imanı yok, bozuyor insanları. Para
olsa dine de caiz der benimki de alır başka kar. Normal bi şey oldu bu
zenginlerde. Böyle dindar, imanlı adan olmaz. Allah muhtaç
etmeyecek kadar versin, zenginlik de başka bir fakirlik bakma sen.
(Nezahat, 44, parents migrated from Kırşehir, residing in Atapark
neighborhood)

düğünü yaptılar. Kaç kılık değiştirdiler. Hürem’le Kanuni gibi
giynildiler. Yazar o kuzevinin Alevi bir sevdiiği vardı, ne iyi kızdı.
Mühendislik okuyordu, çok cana yakındı. Amcam istemedi kızı Alevi
diye. O imanlı diye aldığı nemrut gelini bir gelinlik giydi. Güya kapalı,
daracıktı. Kinasında Kuran tilavetinden sonra gitti böyle dapdar, gümüş
paletli, yılan gibi bir elbise giydi. Arkadaşlarıyla ne oynadılar ne
oynadılar. O herkesi eleştiren amcam yengem geline hiç ses etmiyor.
Kıza Keçiören’in en güzel yerinde ev açığı kızı. O da konseptli. Saray
konsepti seviyomuş. İki senede bir de haccı gitme şartı koşmuşlar kızı
verirken. Milletin tarifevi görmuyor mu? Bir defa haccı gittikten sonra
faz yerine gelir. Sonrağı gitmeler nafile düşüyor. Amcam kendisi haci,
israfı çok kınardı, tesettür ahlakını çok önemserdi. Bi keresinde beni
boynum görüşümüş diye ne azarladı. Ben de nasıl özen gösteririm
yani evden çıkmadan çocuklara sorarım 'bakan bakalım, rahatsız edici bir görüntü var mı? Boynum gözükmüyor mu, kollarım açılıyor' diye. Şimdi geliniyle konuşuyorum. Ama umurda midir, sanmam. Ak Partili, müteahhit dönerleriyle arası bozulmasında gerisi laf. (Zeliş, 46, Konya, residing in Pınarbaşı neighborhood)


C. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION
Name-Surname: Esra Can-Mollaer
e-mail: esracanmollaer@gmail.com

EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>METU Sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>METU Social Anthropology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>BS-Minor</td>
<td>METU Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>BS</td>
<td>METU Sociology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PUBLICATIONS


PRESENTATIONS


SCHOLARSHIPS

Research Fellowship (2015-2017) Institute for Religion Culture and Public Life, Columbia University, New York, USA
TÜBİTAK (Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey), PhD Researchers Fellowship (12-months) (2015-2016) Department of Sociology Columbia University, New York, USA

Travel Grant to the Conference in Yokohama, Japan, July 2014
International Sociological Association (ISA)

Erasmus Exchange Program Grant, (2008-2009)
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany
D. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET


bir kent sosyolojisi öğrencisi olarak, Türkiye’dede tarihsel olarak değişen sosyo-mekânsal, sınıfsal-kültürel, toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı ve dini dinamiklerle ilişkili olarak kentseltoplulukların toplumsallıklarının ve öznelliklerinin bağlamısal olarak nasıl dönüştüğünün bir fragmanıyla ilişkilenmek için ilçedeki etnografik çalışmama başladım.


Bu mekânsal ikiliğin Keçiören tarafından hareketle, sınıfsal-kültürel ve toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı somutlaşmaların sosyo-mekânsal sınırlar oluşumlarında nasıl tezahür ettiği ve işlediğini incelemeye çalıştım. Keçiören’de 14 ay süren etnografik bir çalışmaya dayanarak, sözde milliyetçi İslami muhafazakârlığın çeşitli biçimlerinin insanların gündelik hayatlarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini ve ortaya çıkan alt orta sınıf İslami muhafazakâr kültürün gündelik hayatta kendini hangi şekillerde somutlaştırdığını, yeniden ürettiğini, uzlaştırdığını ve icat ettiğini incelemeye çalıştım. Muhafazakârlık kavramını, her biri muhafazakârlığın üretimine katkıda bulunan çok yönlü ailesel, sınıfsal ve mekânsal ilişkiler kümesine gömülü olarak ele alan analizimde muhafazakâr pratiklerin, eğitimlerin ve algıların gündelik hayatın karmaşık sınıf temelli toplumsal ilişkiler kümelerinde nasıl üretildiğini anlamalasına katkıda bulunmayı amaçladım. Muhafazakârlık
olarak tariflenen toplumsallığın, geleneksel tanımlara ve/veya yeni ortaya çıkan tanımlara ne ölçüde uyduğunu sorgulamaya yöneldim.

Bir araştırma nesnesi olarak muhafazakârlığın teorik inşasını temellendirmek için Bourdieu'nün pratik teorisinden faydalandım; zira bu teori, ilişkisel bir kavrayış yoluyla ya alışılmış ve tekrarlayıcı ya da yaratıcı ve yaratıcı pratiklerin mantığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bourdieu’nün teorik çerçevesinden yararlanan çalışmalarдан farklı olarak, salt kültürel ve sembolik sermaye birikimi yoluyla sembolik güç kazanma pratiklerine, ve tüketim ile beğenli alanlarındaki değişimler yoluyla ‘farklılıkların' ya da 'ayarlarının' nasıl inşa edildiğine odaklanmaktan kaçınım. Sınıf ve toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı eşitsizliklerin değişen örüntülerine dikkat eden ilişkisel bir yaklaşım izleyerek, güç ilişkilerinin mekânsal eşitsizlikleri ve toplumsal farklılaşmalara ilişkin sınıfsal-kültürel sonuçları hakkında bizi bilgilendiren ve ne tür muhafazakârlık(lar)dan bahsedebileceğimizi ve/veya bir muhafazakârlık söyleminin verili bir bağlamda, tarihsel bir zaman diliminde nasıl işlediğini ortaya çıkarmamızda olabilecek gündelik yaşadaki mekânsal farklılaşmaların yorumlarını, müzakerelerini ve uyumlarını keşfetmeye çalıştım.

ederek, analizin bölümlendirmesini ölçeklere göre kurgulamaya çalıştım: buna göre önce ilçe ölçeği olarak Keçiören'in tarihsel olarak değişim gösteren kentsel oluşum ve gelişim yörüngesini; bunu takiben sosyo-ekonomik olarak farklı mahalleler ölçeğindeki sosyo-mekânsal farklılaşmaların sınıf, toplumsal cinsiyet ekseninde oluşturduğu sonuçları; ve tüm analize entegre edilen ev ve beden ölçekleri.

Keçiören'de yaşayan, milliyetçi İslami muhafazakâr siyasi partilere oy verme eğiliminde olan, sosyo-ekonomik açıdan dezavantajlı ancak orta sınıf özelemleri taşıyan alt orta sınıf aileler, çalışmamın öznesini ve analiz birimini oluşturuıyor. Keçiören'in sosyo-ekonomik açıdan farklı dokuz mahallesinde bulunan dört farklı ortamda etnografik bir çalışma yürütüyorum. Beş farklı kadın toplantısına ve üç farklı sohbet grubuna katıldım ve düzenli olarak devam ettim; ilçenin yeni soylulaştırılmış bir mahallesinde cinsiyete göre ayrılmış bir spor salonuna yazıldım ve alt sınıf bir mahallede verilen bir Kuran kursuna bir ay boyunca devam ettim.

Keçiören'deki mahalleleri saha alanı olarak seçerken, mahallenin kuruluş dönemini, sınıfsal yapısını ve kentsel dönüşüm yörüngesini dikkate aldım. Alt-orta ve alt sınıf mahallelerinin çeşitliliği, hem sınıfsal-kültürel heterojenliği hem de kültürel repertuarlarının ve ortaklık ve farklılık örüntülerinin değişen tezhürlerini daha iyi kavramamı sağladı. Saha çalışmamla birlikte, 50'si saha ortamlarında kurduğum ilişkiler aracılığıyla ulaştığım kadınlar, 15'i ise eşleri aracılığıyla temas kurduğum erkekler olmak üzere toplam 65 bilgi sahibi ile yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşmeler gerçekleştirdim.

'Aile' kurumunun yakını bir mekâna olarak mahalle, aynı zamanda kamusal ve özelin bulanık sınırlarının atarken cinsiyet hiyerarşileriyle doymuş ethos tarafından yapılandırıldığı ve düzenlendiği bir yerdir. Sosyo-mekânsal bir birim olarak 'mahalle', tarihsel olarak toplulukların gündelik oluşumlarında önemli bir yere sahiptir. Mahalleler, mekânsal ve zamansal örgütlenmeleri de dahil olmak üzere, birçok açıdan doğası gereği cinsiyetlidir. Erkeklerin toplumsal bağları çoğunlukla yerel dükkanlar, sokak yaşamı ve pazar yerleri gibi görünüşe daha kamusal alanlarda sürdürülürken, kadınların ilişkileri özel (veya yarı kamusal) alanlara uzanmaktadır. Ev içi yaşam, kadınların mahalle kültürünün bir parçası olmalarını sağlayan bir araya gelmelerinin nihai alanıdır. Açık ki, mahalle biriminin yerine getirdiği işlev ve roller
toplumsal, ekonomik ve kültürel dönüşümlere bağlı olarak değişmekte ve aldığı biçimler çoğalmaktadır. Öte yandan, soylulaştırma ve metalaştırma süreçlerine maruz kalan mahalle, AKP’nin kapsamlı kentsel dönüşüm projelerinin bir sonucu olarak gelişmektedir. Mevcut sosyal ve mekânsal eşitsizlikleri derinleştiren kentsel dönüşüm projeleri, mahallelerde konut ve kent hakkı talep eden taban hareketlerini harekete geçirmiştir.

Bu bölümde, etnografik çalışmamdan yola çıkarak, alt ve alt-orta sınıftan katılımcıların öznel deneyimlerinin tarihsel yörüngesini, ilçenin kentsel dönüşüm yörüngesiyyle uyumlu bir şekilde takip etmeye çalıştım. Bu noktada, sosyal refah sisteminde sürekli değişen düzenlemelerin kırdan kente göç süreçleri, dayanışma ağıları, siyasi aidiyet ve kentsel yoksulluk üzerindeki etkisi de farklı yöneri ve sonuçları olan sonuçlardan biriydi. 'Aile'nin yakın mekânı olarak mahalle, aynı zamanda kamusal ve özelin bulanık sınırlarının ataerkil cinsiyet hiyerarşileriyle doymuş bir ahlak tarafından düzenlentiği bir yerdi.

Buradaki tartışma, toplumsal yeniden üretimde aileye atfedilen anlamlar ve sorumlulukların AKP iktidarı döneminde hem söylemsel olarak hem de devlet uygulamalarıyla bağlı olarak nasıl geliştiğiyle ilgilidir. Ahlaki düzenin nihai koruyucusu olarak yorumlanan aile, yalnızca İslami-muhafazakâr eğilimlerin aşılansına hizmet etmekte kalmıyor, aynı zamanda bireyler için refahın üretimi ve dağıtımı sorumluluğunu da üstleniyor gibi görünüyor. Kadınlara kamuallığı bizi doğrudan kentsel gündelik pratikleri yeniden düzenleyen ve özünde mekânsal olan normatif ve düzenleyici mekanizmaların kapsamıyla ilişkilendirir. Keçiören Belediyesi, ahlaki drownin sosyo-mekânsal dolayına yönelik girişiminde,
egemen ataerkil toplumsal cinsiyet hiyerarşisine dayanan 'aile' kavramından yararlanmıştır.


Keçiören’in tasarlanan mekânları, bir yandan sözde İslami muhafazakâr orta sınıf özneliklerini teşvik eden, diğer yandan da aileciliğe ve geleneksel cinsiyet ilişkilerine büyük değer veren bir toplum imajı dayatan kültürel politikaları geliştirmiştir. Bu nedenle, Keçiören'deki kentsel mekân deneyimlerini mahalle yaşamının ve bedenlenmenin mekânsal bağlamları içinde inceleyerek, İslami muhafazakârlığın hem söylemi hem de eğilimi olarak gözlemlediğimiz şeyin sınıfsal-kültürel ve toplumsal cinsiyetli bir
oluşum olarak inşa edildiğini ve icra edildiğini iddia ediyorum. Dahasi, mahallenin mekânsal ve skaler birimleri üzerinden bakarak, bunun sadece İslami muhafazakârlığın tezahür ettiği temel kaplar olduğunu öne sürmedim. Daha ziyade, bu birimleri muhafazakâr yaşam davranışlarının inşa edildiği ve icra edildiği sosyo-mekânsal ilişkisliğinin unsurları olarak görmeyi öneriyorum. Mahalle hayatının gerilim ve çelişkilerine rağmen, kadınlar üzerinden gerçekleşen ve gündelik hayata nüfuz eden muhafazakârlık için uygun bir ortam sağlıyor gibi görünüyor.

Keçiören’in sosyo-ekonomik olarak farklılaşmış mahallelerinin sakinlerinin gündelik etkileşimleri, eğilimleri ve değerlendirmeye şemaları aracılığıyla yatay gerilimlerin ve alt orta sınıf kültürel repertuarlarının değişen varlığını incelemeye ve sınıf ayrımlarının farklı tezahürlerini ele almaya çalıştım. Sosyo-mekânsal farklılaşmaların bize toplumsal eşitsizlikleri hakkında neler söylediğine ilgili olarak mahalle bağlamlarında sınıfın mekânsallığının dinamiklerini izledim ve inceledim. Eşitsizliklerin mekânsal pratiğinin aidiyet duygusu ve siyasi eğilimlerin dinamiklerini nasıl etkilediğini incelemek için, gelişen sosyo-mekânsal farklılaşmaların, İslami muhafazakârlık retorliğinde kendini gösteren sınıf ve toplumsal cinsiyet çizgisindeki sosyal eşitsizlikleri nasıl açığa çıkardığında odaklandım. İlişkisel olarak, ailelerin sınıfal-kültürel konumları ve yatay/yukarı doğru hareketlilikler üzerindeki beklentileri, şansları ve kısıtlamaları karşısında 'mahallelerin' 'değerini' hem ekonomik hem de ahlaki olarak nasıl algıladıklarını, hayal ettiklerini ve müzakere ettiklerini keşfetmeye çalıştım.

Keçiören, kentsel dönüşüm sürecinde, İslami muhafazakâr ve seküler kesimler arasındaki gündelik etkileşim ve karşılasmaların kapsam ve

Öte yandan, sınıfsal-kültürel ayrırların ve değerlendirilme şemalarının değişen kalıplarının bir sonucu olarak, yukarı doğru hareket eden İslami muhafazakar kesimlerin, kendi sınıfsal statülerini daha iyi yansıttığına inandıkları yerler için ilçeyi değiştirme eğiliminde olduklarını dair yaygın bir algı vardı. Konut/sınıf hareketliliğinin, yalnızca katılımcıların ilçenin ekonomik ve sembolik değere ilişkin algularını değil, aynı zamanda sınıfsal-kültürel benzerlik ve farklılıkların yatay dinamiklerini nasıl müzakere ettiklerini de şekillendirdiği görülmüştür.

Konut hareketliliği istekleri, insanların sosyal sınırları ve hiyerarşileri algılama ve benimseme biçimlerini ve hem yatay hem de dikey olarak 'ötekilerle' ilişkili olarak 'kendi yerlerini' nasıl müzakere ettiklerini ortaya koymakta ve bunlarla ilişkilendirilmektedir. Hareketlilikle ilgili özel algılar, özlemler ve beklentiler, sınıf ve toplumsal cinsiyetin kesişim noktalarında çeşitli müzakereler içermekte ve Keçiören'e kıyasla diğer mahallelerde dinin
nasıl yaşandığına dair karşılaştırmalar ve müzakereler içermektedir. Başka bir deyisle, konutun çevresi bir ‘ayrım’ işaret olarak işlemekte ve sadece arzulanan yaşam tarzını somutlaştırıp sunmaya değil, aynı zamanda dini ahlakın kapsamlını işaretlemeye de olanak tanılmaktadır. Çok tartıştığı üzere, aidiyet dinamikleri, paylaşılan semboller, yaşam tarzları, değerler ve özlem gibi sosyal sınıfın biçimlendirici bileşenleri, sınıf dinamikleri açısından çekışmelere neden olmaktadır. Her ne kadar öykünme kaynaklarının, konuttan giyime, tatil rutinlerinden kişisel bakıma ve araba sahipliğine kadar en son tüketim kalemlerinde farklılaşan İslami muhafazakâr kesimler olarak etiketlenen yuvarlak doğru hareket eden gruplar olduğu varsayılsa da, çatışma ve gerilimler anlatıların ana eksenlerini oluşturmıştır.

Sınıf temelli mekânsal ayrışmanın, orta sınıf özlemlerini mümkün kılarak ve engelleyerek sınıf eşitsizliklerinin yeniden üretimini nasıl etkilediğini, milliyetçisi İslami muhafazakârlığı farklı biçimlerinin insanların gündelik hayatlarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini ve ortaya çıkan alt orta sınıf İslami muhafazakâr kültürün gündelik hayatta kendini hangi şekillerde somutlaştırdığını, yeniden ürettiğini, barındırdığını ve icat ettiğini keşfetmeye çalıştım. Eğitim olanakları, hem aileler hem de kadınlar tarafından mahallelerinin ahlaki ve ekonomik değeriyle ilgili olarak dile getirilen bir başka sorundu. Yirmi yıllık AKP hükümetlerinin 'aile' konusundaki İslami-muhafazakâr söylem, retorik ve politikaları ile Keçiören ilçesinin farklı mahallelerinde değişken bir şekilde uygulanan İslami muhafazakârlık biçimleri arasında çeşitli açılar bulunmaktadır.

İlçenin kamusal alanlarının 'aile alanları' olarak nitelendirilmesi, cinsiyetlendirilmiş benliklerin ve bedensel bedenlerin dinsel olarak bilgilendirilmiş normatif bir düzeye göre yeniden ayarlanmasına hizmet etmiştir. Ataerkil normlar ve kültürel pratikler tarafından kısıtlanan kadınların kamusal alanlara katılımı halihazırdı kısıtlayıcı bir denetime tabi tutulmaktadır. Kadınların kentsel kamusal alanlardaki varlıklarının sınırları ve olanakları, kendilerini nasıl sundukları, ne kadar mütevazi giyindikleri ve gündelik davranışlarındaki tutumlarını da içeren yargılanmayı ve tehditkâr incelemenin kapsamlı ve yoğunluğuya şekillenmekte ve koşullanmaktadır.

"Aile mekanları" olarak nitelendirilen kentsel kamusal parklar, ilçedeki fiili alkol yasağını da uygulayan gayri resmi güvenlik ekipleri tarafından...
Kadın katılımcıların çoğunluğu, alkolün İslam tarafindan yasaklandığının altını çizmek yerine, alkollü alan erkeklerin kadınların ve çocukların güvendine tehdit oluşturduğuuna dair endişelerini vurgulamışlardır. İslami muhafazakâr toplumsal anlayışı yeniden üretecek şekilde, yerel yönetimlerin müdahaleleri "halkın ihtiyaç ve hassasiyetlerini fark ettiği ve 'hanımların' ihtiyaçlarıyla ilgilendiği" için övülmüştür. Keçiören örneğinde, İslami deyimlerin kullanımının, sosyal ilişkiler için ortak bir ahlaki kod sağlayarak yerel yönetim ve ilçe sakinleri arasında yakınlık ve güven oluşturmayı hizmet ettiği görülmektedir. Benzer şekilde, mevcut yerel ve genel yönetimlere yönelik hoşnutsuzluk değerlendirmelerinde, dini ahlakın kaybolması veya bozulması dile getirilirken, dini temelli ahlaki kodlar kullanılmıştır.

Keçiören'deki gündelik hayata ilişkin görüş ve değerlendirmelerini ifade ederken, katılımcılar genellikle ilçenin Altınok döneminde orta sınıf sosyallığını teşvik eden mekânsal pratiklerle geliştixinin altını çizmiş ve Keçiören'i diğer ilçelerle karşılaştırarak görüşlerini örneklemişlerdir. Bunlar arasında Ankara'nın Sincan ve İstanbul'un Fatih ilçeleri yaygın olarak dini yaşamın kısıtlayıcı kurallarına dayalı bir gündelik hayat sahip olarak anılırken; Altındağ ilçesinin Çinçin mahallesi gibi bazı ilçeler ise varoş ve ahlaki 'öteki' olarak tanımlandığı, Anlatıların çoğununda Keçiören, 'mütevazı, düzenli aile yaşamının' hüküm sürdüğü, dindarlığın 'uçlarda' yaşanmadığı ve kent yaşamının yeni zevk ve alışkanlıklarını edinmeye ve geliştirmeye kapalı olmayan bir yer olarak farklılık göstermektedir. Öte yandan, erkeklerin iççedeki benlik sunumları, eril bedensel şemaların hegemonik ideallerine uyup uymadıkları açısından incelenmiştir; uzun saç veya dövme yapımı fiziksel saldırı riskine neden olabilmektedir. İççedeki kentsel gündelik
karşılaştırmaların değişen dinamikleriyle birlikte Keçiören 'maço' ve 'faşist' bir yerleşim ilcesi olarak anılmaya başlandı; ilki erkeklik performanslarını ifade ederken, ikincisi aşırı milliyetçiliğin banal biçimlerine işaret ediyor.

Merkezdeki orta sınıf mahallelerde yaşayan katılımcılar, Erdoğan'ın kısa bir süre de olsa Keçiören'de ikamet etmesinin, ilçenin hem dini kimliğini koruyan hem de sınıfsal hareketliliği sağlayan ve Çankaya ilçesiyle rekabet eden bir yerleşime dönüşebileceğini beklen紧盯ını belirtmişlerdir. Ancak daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, Erdoğan'ın ilçeden taşınmasından önce başlayan orta sınıfların muhafazakâr kesimlerinin ilçeyi terk etme eğilimi, ilçeye ilişkin algıları kendi sınıfsal-kültürel konumlarına ilişkin algılarını da şekillendiren katılımcıların anlatılarındaki yatay gerilimlere işaret edecek şekilde değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, ortaya çıkan sınıf farklılıkları ve eşitsizliklerin, benzer dini eğilimleri paylaştığı düşünülen sosyal gruplar içinde iç yatay çatışmalara neden olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

Keçiören'e ilişkin değerlendirmelerinde, katılımcıların çoğunluğunun daha ziyade savunmacı, sahiplenici ve ilçenin olumlu özellikleri vurgulama eğiliminde olduklarını görmüştim. Bu da yine ikamet edilen yerin kişinin kendi sosyal yeri hakkındaki hissiyatının bir göstergesi olarak nasıl işlediğiyile ilgili görülmektedir. Ancak Keçiören'i ilçe ölçeğinde değerlendirirken katılımcılar mahalleler arasındaki sosyo-ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel farklılıkların altını çizmiş ve ilçeyi bu farklılıklar ışığında değerlendirmişlerdir. Bu bağlamda, merkez mahalleler orta sınıf özlemelerinin peşinden gidilebilecek yerler olarak tanımlanırken, ilçenin çevre, alt-orta ve alt sınıf mahalleleri, arzulanan 'aile yaşamının' damgasını verdiği bir sosyallık sağlamakla birlikte, özellikle genç kadın muhataplar

264
tarafından kırsal toplumsallık alışkanlıklarının ve eğilimlerinin sürdürüldüğü baskı ve rekabetçi yerler olarak tasvir edilmiştir. Bu da bizi mahallenin gündelik hayatın dinamiklerini belirlemede önemli rol oynayan bir ölçek olduğunu noktasına getiriyor.


Bununla bağlantılı olarak, Keçiören’deki mahalle bağlamının, iktidardaki AKP tarafından, siyasi aidiyetleri pekiştiren ve besleyen kientalist ilişkiler üretmek için etkili bir şekilde tahsis edildiğini iddia ediyorum. İktidardaki AKP’nin Keçiören’deki mahalle bağlamlarını siyasi olarak kendine mal etmesi, sadece partiyi siyasi fayda ve seçim kazancı sağlamakla kalınmayıp, aynı zamanda ilçedeki toplumsallık dinamiklerini aidiyet müzakerelerini etkileyerek şekilde şekillendiren yollarla işlemektedir. AKP, RP’den
devraldığı ilçedeki mekânsal yerleşikliğini, partinin yaygın örgütlü mahalle kollarının hanelerle kurduğu ilişkiler üzerinden işletmektedir. Buna göre, en yaygın yollardan biri sosyo-ekonomik açıdan dezavantajlı mahallelerdeki yoksul ailelere aile odaklı sosyal yardım sağlanmasıdır. AKP’nin sosyal politika çerçevesinde,ahlaki düzinen koruyucusu olarak görülen, İslami-muhafazakâr eğilimlerin aşılanması işlevinin yanı sıra, bireyler için refahın üretimi ve dağıtımından da sorumlu tutulmaktadır.

Mahalle ölçeğinde sosyal yardımların hangi kriterlere göre dağıtıldığına dair tartışmalara ve hoşnutsuzluklara ve sosyal yardımların toplumsal kirlenmeleri gizleyen İslami bir ahlak üzerine hidalğa edildiğine dair şikayetlere rağmen, katılımcıların çoğunluğu sosyal yardım dağıtımına dair algılarını borçluluk duygusuna atıfla ifade etme eğilimindeydi ve bu da onların siyasi uyumlarını ve hayali bir 'biz'e aidiyetlerini belirliyordu. Muhtaçlık halı, 'himayeci' otoritelerle borçluluk duygusu ve yardımların sürekliliği kaygısı, Keçiören’de başta kadınlar olmak üzere yoksul ailelerin iktidar partisiyle kurdukları ilişkisinin temel dinamiklerini oluşturuyordu. Muhtaçlık halı, 'himayeci' otoritelerle borçluluk duygusu ve yardımların sürekliliği kaygısı, Keçiören’de başta kadınlar olmak üzere yoksul ailelerin iktidar partisiyle kurdukları ilişkisinin temel dinamiklerini oluşturuyordu. AKP’nin neoliberalizm ve İslami muhafazakârlığı harmanlayan sosyo-ekonomik gündeminin ürünlerinden biri olarak tanımlanan sosyal refah rejiminin yeniden yapılandırılmasıyla ilgili akademik çalışmalar, hanelerin refahından sorumlu tutulan kadınların yaşadığı ekonomik kirlenmeleri ele almaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışmanın etnografik bulguları, Keçiören’in mahallelerinde sosyal yardımların nasıl ve ne şekilde yürütüldüğünün yanısıra, yararlanıcı kadınların minnettarlık, borçluluk ve sınıflar yaralar da dahil olmak üzere deneyim ve algılarını dair bir içgörü sağlayarak katkıda bulunabilir.
Keçiören'deki mahalle bağlamları, sosyallık alanları olarak, sınıfal çizgiler boyunca girift ilişkiler ve etkileşimler üretiyor gibi görünmektedir. Bu sosyal ilişki ağlarının, mahalle sakinlerinin sosyal sermayelerinin kapsamını ve hacmini belirleyerek, muhafazakâr eğilimlerin üretilmesine ve yeniden üretilmesine katkıda bulunduğunu iddia ediyorum. Katılımcıların çoğunluğu, akrabalık ve hemşehri temelli dayanışma ağları ve ilişkilerinin dayanışmacı olmaktan ziyade rekabetçi bir yönde geliştiğini ifade etmiştir. Bunun nedeni kısmen, birçoğu gibi, sosyal çevrelerinin çoğunluğunun ekonomik belirsizlikler nedeniyle kendi çekirdek ailelerine öncelik vermek zorunda kalan borç sahipleri olmasından kaynaklanıyordu. Bu bakımdan, ilçede sosyallığın birincil bileşenleri olmaları nedeniyle önemli sosyal ağlar olmaya devam etseler de, ne akrabalık ne de hemşehri ilişkileri, ekonomik ve kültürel sermayelerin üretilmesi ve dönüştürülmesi için gereken sosyal sermayeyi sağlamaya yetmemiştir.

İster kadın toplantıları, sohbetler, ister erkek cami cemaatleri olsun, mahalle hayatının gündelikliğinin önemli bir parçası olan sosyalleşme çevreleri ve bir tür siyasi lobicilik için sürdürdükleri hemşehri dernek faaliyetleri, ekonomik sermayeye dönüştürülebilecek sosyal ilişki ağları kurma işlevini görmekteydi. Bu sosyal ilişki ağları, bir yandan, çoğulukla pragmatik ve hesapçı amaçlar tarafından motive edilmelerine rağmen, dayanışmacı olarak tanınmıştır. İşte bu arada ve aynı zamanda, bu ilişkilerin içerdiği ve doğurduğu borçluluk, yükümlülük ve çeşitli bağımlılıklar duygusal nedeniyile, paylaşıcı niteliklerle karakterize edilmişlerdir. Bourdieu'nün (1984: 478) de belirttiği gibi, sosyal ilişki ağları "biz-onlar" ayırmasına dayalı ortak bir sınıflandırma üzerinden işlenmişlerdir. Benzer bir şekilde, karmaşık ve değişken ilişki dinamiklerine sahip olmasına rağmen, ortak bir "biz" sınıflandırma şemasının ve "biz-
oluşların" sürekli müzakerelerinin bu ilişki ağlarını ilçede mümkün ve kalıcı kıldığını iddia ediyorum.


Keçiören'deki muafazakâr ve seküler kesimler arasındaki gündelik etkileşim ve karşışmaların kapsam ve imkanları, son otuz yılda değişen sosyo-demografik yapısı nedeniyle daralmış görünecektiyi. Bu bağlamda, seküler orta sınıflardan sonra muafazakâr kesimlerin de ilçeden ayrıma eğiliminde olması, sadece gidenlere yönelik kızgınlığa değil, kalanlar arasında da çatışmalara neden olmuş gibi görülüyor. Konut ve sınıf hareketliliğinin katılımcılar tarafından değerlendirilme biçimleri, aşilmaz sosyo-kültürel farklılıklarla tanınan seküler-muafazakâr ayrımının gündelik hayatta nasıl karşılaşıldığı ve deneyimlendiği ve "biz-oluşlar" için nasıl bir çerçeve oluşturduğu açısından açıklanabilir.
Merkez orta sınıf mahallelerinde yaşayan orta yaş grubu kadın katılımcılar, benzer eğilimleri paylaştıklarını söylediğimiz komşularını daha az eğitimli, 'cahil' ve 'kaba' olarak tanımlayarak, orta sınıf ailelerin farklı kesimleriyle karşılaştığını, kültürsel hareketlilik duygusuya eski mahalle kültürünü duyduları özlemi dile getirmişlerdir. Öte yandan, orta sınıfların seküler kesimlerine benzer şekilde, yukarıya doğru hareket eden İslami muhafazakâr kesimlerin de kendi sınıf statülerini daha iyi yansıttığına inandıkları yerler için ilçeyi değiştirme eğiliminde oldukları için bir algoritma bulunmaktadır. Keçiören'deki gündelik yaşam standartlarını benzer sosyo-ekonomik statüdeki ilçelerle karşılaştırırken, katılımcılar değerlendirme kriterleri olarak dindarlık, ahlak ve aile yaşamını sıralamış; aynı kriterleri sınıfsal hareketlilik aracı olarak taşımak istedikleri ilçeler için de uygulamışlardır. Hem kadın hem de erkek katılımcıların neredeyse tamamı, dindarlığın "ölçülü" ve "ılımlı" biçimlerinden yana olduklarını belirtmiş; ilçede gözlemledikleri tariyatların dini yaşam biçimlerinden yola çıkarak, dini yaşam biçimlerinin "koyu", "abartılı" ve "aşırı" davranışlarını hem toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkileri temelinde hem de sınıfsal özlemlerin somutlaşması açısından kısıtlayıcı bulmuşlardır.

Katılımcıların anlatılarında yineleden temalar, kırdan kente göçün ve ortaya çıkan sınıf hareketliliğinin, eğilimlerin ve uygulamaların sürdürülmemesi, geliştirilmesi ve dönüştürülmesi üzerindeki kalıcı etkisidir. Bu bağlamda, kadınların ve erkeklerin kamusal ve özel hayatındaki rolleri, ailelerinin kırsal kesimden taşındıklarına ve sürdürüklerine inandıkları geleneksel değerler arasında müzakerelerin en öne çıkan konularından biri olarak görülmüştür. Özellikle genç kadın katılımcılar, eğitim veya iş hayatları boyunca dahil olduklarını farklı sosyal ve çevresi ve takip ettikleri sosyal medya
meçralarından geliştirdikleri farklı bakış açıları nedeniyle aile hayatı ve aile değerlerine ilişkin algılarının ailelerinden ve eski nesillerden çok farklı olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Bununla birlikte, görünüşen genç kadınların tamamı aile kurumunu "vazgeçilmez", aile değerlerini de ekonomik belirsizliğin damgasını vurduğu sınıfsal koşullarda korunması ve gelecek nesillere aktarılması gereken değerler olarak tanımlamıştır.


Anlatılarında, alt-orta ve alt sınıf mahallelerden genç kadın katılımcılar, yeni ortaya çıkan somutlaştırma pratiklerinin üst-orta sınıf muhafazakâr kesimlerden örtülü kadınlara nasıl bir tutum ve üstünlük hissi aşıadığını anlattılar. Bu üstünlük tavrı, alt ve alt-orta sınıf genç katılımcılar arasında hem kızgınlık hem de sınıfsal atlama arzusu yaratabiliyor gibi görülmektedir. Sınıfın "dindar-seküler" sembolik sosyal ayrımını nasıl aştığını ortaya koyan
genç kadınların çoğu ve bazı orta yaş grubu kadın katılımcılar, anlatılarında, dini yakınlık paylaşıkları söylediğimleri daha varlıklı dindar kadınlara kıyasla baş açık arkadaşlarının yanında kendilerini çok daha rahat hissettiklerini vurgulamışlardır. Görüşme yaptığım kişilerin, dindarlıklarını sınırlarını, içinde bulundukları sınıf ve toplumsal cinsiyet eşitsizliklerinin kesiştiği noktalarla bağlantılı olarak daha iyi yaşam yolları arayışına yönelik müzakereler yoluyla sürekli yeniden şekillenen, bulanıklaşan ve meydan okunan dinamik bir yapı olarak tanımlama eğiliminde olduklarını ileri sürüyorum.

E. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics
Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : CAN MOLLAER
Adı / Name : ESRA
Bölümü / Department : SOSYOLOJİ/ SOCIOLOGY

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English): QUESTIONING ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM: SOCIAL SPACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE EVERYDAY OF KEÇİÖREN

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master ☐ Doktora / PhD ☒

1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide. ☒

2. Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two years. *

3. Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six months. *

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature .......................... Tarih / Date ..........................
(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)
(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)

Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.