

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT: THE US
INVOLVEMENT IN
SOUTH KOREA AND TÜRKİYE BETWEEN 1945-1990

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INVOLVEMENT IN
SOUTH KOREA AND TÜRKİYE BETWEEN 1945-1990**

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ABSTRACT

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The aim of this dissertation is to examine the divergent developmental trajectories of South Korea and Türkiye from the perspective of International Political Economy and find out the role of United States (US) programs and foreign policy in these countries. The US has long been an aid provider since the Second World War, and the noteworthy flow of US' resources has significant implications for both the international political economy architecture and the receiving countries. The development of South Korea and Türkiye has been heavily influenced by US foreign policy tools and their concomitants, which end up with a different and novel governing apparatus. In studying the US foreign programs, sources include; external features that are specific to the relationship between the US and other actors, domestic dynamics, i.e. economic

aid, involvement in defense infrastructure capabilities, promotion of land reform, and promotion of American interests in trade, and the systemic variables, which cannot be abstracted from the ongoing international political economy context. One developmental package existing of four coequal tools were implemented in different degree in Türkiye and South Korea. In this framework, this research will seek answers and investigate how the US programs contribute growth and development of the countries, and why South Korean and Turkish economic and political development become different by situating the cases within a broader political economy framework.

Key words: South Korea, Türkiye, development, US assistance, Cold War.

ÖZ

KALKINMANIN ULUSLARARASI SİYASİ EKONOMİSİ: 1945-1990 ARASINDA GÜNEY KORE VE TÜRKİYE'DE ABD MÜDAHİLİYETİNİN ROLÜ

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Bu tez, Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi perspektifinden, Güney Kore ve Türkiye'nin farklılaşan kalkınma sonuçlarını açıklamak ve bu farklı kalkınma süreçlerindeki Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) programları ve dış politikasının rolünü incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. ABD'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana en büyük kaynak transferi sağladığı gerçeğini dikkate alarak, bu büyük kaynak aktarımının ve dış yardımlarının hem uluslararası siyasi ekonomi mimarisi için hem de alıcı ülkeler için önemli etkileri bulunmaktadır. Özellikle İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında, Güney Kore ve Türkiye'nin kalkınma süreçleri işbu dış politika araçları tarafından etkilenmiş; ABD program ve yardımları, Güney Kore ve Türkiye'nin istikrar ve ekonomik kalkınmalarının temelini atmakta önemli bir rol oynamıştır. ABD dış yardım ve programları incelenirken, diğer aktörler arasındaki ilişkileri kapsayan dış faktörler-

ekonomik yardım, güvenlik altyapısına müdahil olma, toprak reformunun ve ticarete Amerikan çıkarlarının teşviki, toplumsal yapı ve siyasi istikrar gibi bu program ve yardımlardan faydalanan ülkelerin iç dinamikleri, ve uluslararası siyasi ekonomi bağlamından soyutlanamayacak sistemik değişkenler ele alınacaktır. Bu dört eşdeğer araçtan oluşan bir kalkınma paketi, Amerika tarafından Türkiye ve Güney Kore'de farklı derecelerde uygulandı. Bu çerçevede, bu araştırma ABD programlarının ülkelerin kalkınmalarına katkıda bulunup bulunmadığını, nasıl katkıda bulunduğunu, ve neden Güney Kore ve Türk kalkınma deneyimlerinin farklılaştığı sorularına cevap bulmaya çalışacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler, Güney Kore, Türkiye, kalkınma, ABD dış yardımı, Soğuk Savaş.

To my beloved family and my grandmother –
Emire Büyük-

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There is a Korean saying: “In ten years, even the rivers and mountains change.” Since I started the difficult doctoral education process, many things have changed in my life, especially in myself. The world around me is no longer the one I once knew. On the way, I learned how hard and laborious the process of completing a dissertation and becoming a real academic is.

In this completion, I had a chance to work with and get academic support from my supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Fatih TAYFUR, throughout my doctoral years. He introduced me to the international political economy, East Asian and Development studies and helped me understand it from a broader perspective. I was amazed by what I learned during the IR552 course. Then I dived into East Asian cinema and literary corpus to learn more about East Asia. He has been a great mentor in mapping the demanding Ph.D. journey and a role model for me. I am grateful to him for his endless understanding, constructive patience, and empathy in every stage of the writing of the dissertation. My greatest debt is owed to my supervisor.

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and had the opportunity to research.

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There have been a lot of problems and issues that have been affecting the environment I live in. Unfortunately, the difficult process that started for our country with the Soma disaster in 2014 has affected the future of many young people like me. For many people, myself included, life has become more and more difficult. Thanks to the people and my family in the bubble I am in, I was able to get through this process, albeit with difficulty. However, every day, unfortunately, we experience worse and the best years of our youth. I wish for a country and humanity that values art, literature, freedom and science.

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“What did you expect? He asked himself.”

John Williams, *Stoner*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	: Asian Development Bank
AID	: Agency for International Development
ALRAA	: Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act
AP	: Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
ASEAN	: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBO	: Congressional Budget Office
CCP	: The Committee on Comparative Politics
CDIP	: Combined Defense Improvement Projects
CDP	: Community Development Programs
CEB	: Combined Economic Board
CEEC	: Committee of European Economic Cooperation
CENIS	: MIT Center for International Studies
CENTO	: Central Treaty Organization
CFC	: Combined Forces Command
CFR	: Council on Foreign Relations
CHA	: Comparative Historical Analysis
CHP	: Cumhuriyetçi Hareket Partisi
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
COMECON	: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CRIK	: Civil Relief in Korea
DA	: Development Assistance
DAC	: Development Assistance Committee

DCA	: Defence Cooperation Agreement
DECA	: Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DMZ	: Demilitarized Zone
DP	: Democrat Party
DSI	: Devlet Su İşleri (State Hydraulic Works)
ECA	: Economic Cooperation Agency
ECAFE	: Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
EDCF	: Economic Development Cooperation Fund
EEC	: European Economic Community
EIB	: European Investment Bank
EOI	: Export-Oriented Industrial Policy
EPA	: European Productivity Agency
EPB	: Economic Planning Board
ERF	: European Relief Fund
EROA	: Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas
ERP	: European Recovery Program
ESF	: Economic Support Fund
FAA	: Foreign Assistance Act
FAA	: Federal Assistance Act
FAO	: The Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI	: Foreign Direct Investment
FFPA	: Food for Peace Act
FID	: Foreign Internal Defense
FPP	: Family Planning Program
FRUS	: Foreign Relations of the US

FYDP	: Five-Year Development Plan
GARIOA	: Government and Relief in Occupied Areas
GATT	: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GNI	: Gross National Income
GNP	: Gross National Product
HCI	: Heavy Chemical Industry Policy
HDI	: Human Development Index
IBRD	: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICA	: International Cooperation Administration
IDA	: International Development Agency
IDBT	: Industrial Development Bank of Turkey
IFC	: International Financial Institutions
IFIs	: International Financial Institutions
ILO	: The International Labor Organization
IMET	: International Military Education and Training Programme
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
IPE	: International Political Economy
IR	: International Relations
ISI	: The Import-Substitution Industrialization
JAMMAT	: Joint American Military Mission to Aid Turkey
JUSMAG-K	: Joint United States Military Assistance Group-Korea
KAIS	: Korea Advanced Institute of Science
KAIST	: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
KIST	: Korea Institute of Science and Technology

KMAG	: Korean Military Advisory Group
KOICA	: Korea International Cooperation Agency
MAP	: Military Assistance Program
METU	: Middle East Technical University
MIT	: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MITCIS	: MIT's Center for International Studies
MITI	: Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MNNAs	: Major Non-NATO-Ally
MSA	: Mutual Security Act
MSA	: Mutual Security Agency
NAAG	: US Military Assistance Advisory Group
NACF	: National Agricultural Cooperative Federation
NATO	: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDC	: National Defense Command
NGOs	: Non-Governmental Organizations
NSC	: National Security Country
NSC	: US National Security Council
ODA	: Official Development Assistance
OEC	: Office of the Economic Coordinator
OECD	: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	: Organization of European Economic Cooperation
OFLC	: Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner
OPEC	: The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPIC	: Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OTC	: Overseas Territories Committee

POSCO	: Pohang Iron and Steel Company
RDP	: Reimbursable Development Program
ROK	: Republic of Korea
SAL	: Structural Adjustment Lending
SCM	: Security Consultative Meeting
SDR	: Special Drawing Rights
SEC	: Supplies Economic Cooperation
SKY	: Seoul National, Korea and Yonsei Universities
SOFA	: Status of Forces Agreement
SORO	: Special Operations Research Office
SPO	: State Planning Organization
SSRC	: Social Science Research Council
TBMM	: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Türkiye)
TMMOB	: Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
TOPRAKSU	: Department of Land and Water Resource Development
TVA	: Tennessee Valley Authority
TWI	: Training Within Industries
UN	: United Nations
UNCACK	: United Nations Civil Assist Command Korea
UNCTAD	: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	: United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNKRA	: United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency
UNRRA	: United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency

US	: United States of America
USAID	: United States Agency for International Development
USAMGIK	: The United States Army Military Government in Korea
USDA	: US Department of Agriculture
USFK	: US Forces in Korea
USGPO	: U.S. Government Publishing Office
USIS	: United States Information Service
USMG	: US Military Government
USOM	: United States Operations Mission
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTDA	: U.S. Trade and Development Agency
WB	: World Bank
WEP	: The World Employment Programme
WRSA	: War Reserve Stocks
WTO	: World Trade Organization
WWII	: Second World War

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

The developmental divergence of Türkiye and South Korea in the years following the Second World War era is one of the most compelling cases in comparative and historical social science in recent decades. The development process of both countries, mainly South Korea's, has often been analyzed, and many theses and academic studies have evaluated why some countries are more developed than others. However, after the Second World War (WWII), as the international political economy was being designed by America, there was very little research carried out on how it engaged and directed Türkiye and South Korea. Uncovering what has happened in recent history and examining forces within both countries' external and domestic realms is essential; we can then better observe and understand United States (US) interactions with various foreign actors.

This dissertation will try to problematize the US developmental engagement in South Korea and Türkiye through an international political economy perspective. This is what the dissertation sets out to do. This study mainly covers US development efforts in South Korea (from now on Korea) and Türkiye during the Cold War era. The policies of the US, the largest superpower the world has ever seen, vis-à-vis these countries, and how the US has shaped them in the development trajectory after WWII will be considered. Even though the Cold War was a continuation of WWII, at that time, the US had more opportunities, possibilities, and space to infiltrate the post-war order, both ideologically and materialistically. On the one hand, the US emerged as an economic and military superiority and began to impose its vision and strategy on the weak states. In addition, the global political and economic environment granted

vulnerable countries, including Korea and Türkiye, unprecedented autonomy in managing their development destinies (Adelman & Yeldan, 2000, p. 96). In this new order, how the US saw Türkiye and Korea was critical and remained within the hegemonic boundaries of the US-led post-war settlement in the international division of labor.

Today's events are embedded in a historical context. In order to understand the present and future directions of these two countries, it is crucial to examine how the US affected both countries' transformation in more detail, which forces have played essential roles, and what the differences and similarities are in the development paths of Korea and Türkiye. Both growing interdependence and dependence on the US have created multiple communication channels between the US and Türkiye and the US and Korea. Neither Türkiye nor Korea is separate or distinct from the American hegemonic realm. This dependency played a significant role for both Türkiye and Korea in shaping their developmental path and foreign policy choices in alignment with the American Cold War interests. This dissertation will examine the development package the US used to realize its strategic objectives in the Cold War. The four policy instruments (foreign economic aid, land reform, military involvement, and trade) the US wielded as instruments of the American development toolbox in the post-war environment will be examined. The impact of the Classical Modernization Theory, hereinafter referred to as Modernization Theory, and its attendant developmental practices upon regions beyond the Western core, in Türkiye and South Korea, will be examined. It treats the development package as a policy action of the US, to be explained by political and economic goals in an eclectic way.

In this way, the role of the US in the political economies of Turkish and Korean development and the reasons behind the different developmental performances of Türkiye and Korea are identified. This dissertation argues that the US utilized the development package with different degrees in Türkiye and Korea. The multiple aspects of the bilateral relationships between these two countries are not the focus of this dissertation, but, of course, while investigating American influence and the ethnocentric approach of US international involvement, the ebb and flow of American-

Korean and American-Turkish relations between 1945 and 1989 will give us a general understanding of these various relationships. Relations were bolstered with aid, rural development projects, military involvement, and trade since 1945. Both countries were in prime locations where the US needed to radically rethink how it would use its development package tools consisting of foreign aid, rural development projects, trade strategies, and military involvement. Most of the literature deals with economic development but seldom gives a detailed analysis of US involvement via these four channels; thus, this research focuses on how the US used development packages to direct Korean and Turkish development.

Revealing the theoretical and historical background of the American model can lead to a comprehensive understanding of the political economies of Turkish and Korean development. The modernization theory's characteristics on the concept of development also need to be analyzed because the postwar development theory and policies were dominated by this American paradigm, i.e. the modernization theory. As the US power expanded, the modernization approach became popular, and its premises permeated further into policy making. These governments drew on US modernization theories, community development, foreign economic aid, military projects and land reform projects since the US development package drew from the modernization theory. In fact, in some "underdeveloped countries"¹, US models dominated; in others, they did not. In Türkiye and Korea, US models dominated, and both Korea and Türkiye were seen as test examples for their integration of the American-led world order after WWII. That's why this study aims to identify development perspectives and strategies and examine the experiences of Turkish and Korean development as case studies within the aforementioned theoretical context since a comparative analysis of Türkiye with Korea will be later made for a better estimation of their development progress and also of that of other countries.

¹ The term underdeveloped is commonly used in substantial literature on the assistance policies of the US for Third World countries. This makes apparent the ideological and political background of the American perspective toward these countries.

This doctoral dissertation argues that the Turkish and Korean development strategy was a legacy of the Cold War's international political economy. In the Cold War conjuncture, the US and the Soviet Union constituted the opposite poles, and their involvement and influence in the Third World are historically significant. Both USSR and US vied for Third World countries' support. The inherent presence of the US has modified Turkish and Korean priorities in this new political economic environment via close security ties. The security aspects of these bilateral relationships were a key factor in US engagement since the US underwrote international order by securing its supremacy. US military commitment to these nations, economic reconstruction via American aid projects, import/export substitution, trade strategies, and land reform promotion (Hundt, 2009, p. 11). During the policy implementation phase, US influence discursively and ideologically permeated into Türkiye and Korea, which created path dependence. For example, the period during which the US was involved in Korea coincided with the emergence of the developmental state, and the developmental state was founded on the premise of American support (Hundt, 2009, p. 11). Nevertheless, it is essential to evaluate how Türkiye and Korea had to adjust and integrate their development strategies in accordance with US policies and where they were channeling these within this reality.

Evidence that these tools have helped the development of Türkiye and Korea is also provided (Kolbe, n.d., p. 238). However, these have not made a single country prosperous; institutions, culture, political and social structure, social pressures, bureaucracy, the function of the state and the nature of the intergovernmental relationships and other actors linked with the two countries also matter. Based on a detailed comparative analysis of Türkiye and Korea, it will be argued that the way state power, directly influenced by the US, is organized and used has decisively influenced rates and patterns of development in Korea and Türkiye (Kohli, 2004, p. 1). For this reason, the changing role of the state and its relationship with other actors involved in the process in Korea and Türkiye will be examined during the Cold War, along with domestic variables intertwined in reshaping their development processes. The modernization theory formulated the American projection and design framework that

encompasses industrialization to the changing process of psychological attitudes, social values, and lifestyles.

The effectiveness of the US development package (comprising foreign economic aid, trade practices, land reform and military involvement) presents a mixed picture because of the threat they confronted and the different domestic politics of each country. Based on these findings, this study reinterprets the US influence's theoretical and practical significance in these two countries. The threat they faced changed the US' practice of applying these tools. Besides foreign economic aid, military involvement, trade policies, rural development policies/land reform, and other factors like educational investment during the Cold War make up the other significant components of the US development package. These worked complementary to the main four tools, have also left their mark and will continue for many years. Rather than provide a comprehensive history of the US development package, specific and more important issues within Korean and Turkish development have been chosen here to observe the dynamics between theory and practice.

1.2. Research Questions and Outline of the Chapters

Türkiye and Korea were chosen as the case primarily because of the comparison of both countries and their long-term close relations with the US. Both nations moved firmly into the Western camp following state-led yet capitalist development methods during the 20th century inside the emerging Westernized military-bureaucratic apparatus. They both developed a perspective that steadfastly associated independence with state-led development and a sense of national unity. The comparison begins with the similarity between the two post-war countries. However, it continues with what Korea did differently as a developed country and how it used American aid "effectively," but it is complicated to explain which tools and how. Having looked at the phrases used to describe Türkiye, it is seen that it is a country in transition, a rising star like Asian tigers (Öniş & Bayram, 2008, pp. 47 - 84), a model country (Mango,

2006, pp. 726 - 757) for the Middle East, determined as a developing country by the United Nations (UN) (Nations Department of Economic et al., n.d.), one of the Emerging Seven countries (*Will China and Its E7 Emerging Economies Render the G7 a Redundant Clique?* | *South China Morning Post*, n.d.), and an upper middle-income country by the World Bank (*Turkey Overview: Development News, Research, Data* | *World Bank*, n.d.). Although all these categories are structured based on different data, there is a fact that Türkiye exactly coincides with semantic turmoil. It presents the image of a particular country that is neither Western nor Eastern but always taking firm steps towards development and standing in a different place than the countries in its region. Also, references are always made to rare success cases like South Korea and Taiwan. However, the many failures and the fading of earlier so-called success stories, such as Türkiye and Brazil, are neglected (Wallerstein, 1992, p. 523). More importantly, South Korea is presented as a development model for Türkiye since there is clarity about Korea: It is a developed country (*UNCTAD Classifies S. Korea as Developed Economy: International: News: The Hankyoreh*, n.d.). So, what is America's role in this developmental gap between the two countries? In order to understand the degree of US engagement in Korean and Turkish development, I pose three main questions:

- What role did the US development package play in promoting the development of Korea and Türkiye following WWII?
- How did local American experiences with modernization theory shape the perspectives and vision of the development of Türkiye and Korea? Which programs were implemented? What effects these programs had on the donor and recipient nations? Furthermore, how did these experiences influence the concepts that grew out of them?
- How far have Türkiye and Korea extended what the US implemented? Also, were these actions ostentatious or unpretentious?

These research questions are the backbone of this dissertation. However, other complementary queries concerning these main questions also include the following:

Can the American development program in Korea and Türkiye be changed in light of what was successful (and unsuccessful) during the Cold War? How can the United States' political willpower help it make long-term promises to its allies? Did it allow these allies to implement the required changes to strengthen state capacity? How were *sui generis* and recurring aspects of Korea's rapid development reflected in different components of development, such as in economic, military, political, and societal contexts? How do the above comparisons lend insight into what is idiosyncratic or shared about Korea's rise? How did this great transformation come about? What role did the US play in this journey? Did Türkiye and Korea follow different paths after receiving assistance from the US? If so, why? The real question is whether Türkiye and Korea received different US assistance and why? Why did the developmental impact of this assistance differ between the two countries?

This comparative research is therefore meant to provide a comprehensive view of the Turkish and Korean development processes and situate the US development toolbox in both an international arena and countries as mentioned earlier' development paths. The aim is to explain the political economy factors that have influenced developmental policy-making processes and the role of the US in Türkiye and Korea since 1945 and examine these countries' relationship with the US via the prism of country-level initiatives to support development. The aim is to take the political economies of Turkish and Korean development as historical examples and show how the relations between economy and politics have changed not only in a single country over time but also from one country to another. Both the international and national trends shape and bring some limits to the course of the two countries' development; this is where IPE analysis comes into play. To this end, the better timeframe of this study is set primarily between 1945-1990, during which significant development stages are separated; differences over several years varied according to a country's critical junctures. Thus, this dissertation makes at least two contributions to the political economy literature on development in Türkiye and South Korea: First, it contributes to the literature by providing detailed, new evidence on the causes of foreign expansion in Türkiye and

South Korea. Secondly, it demonstrates the distinctly uneven nature of development and the role of external intrusion.

This study is organized into six chapters, including an introduction and a conclusion. To start with, we need a notion that can be used for the comparison of historical events encountered by Korea and Türkiye during that specific time, i.e. 1945-90. the competing definitions and theories of development that exist in the broader social science literature will be reviewed. In the sub-title of the literature review, the academic studies that contributed and influenced this study the most will be briefly examined. Then, it will be discussed how the literature explains this essentially contested concept before elaborating on how this study uses and adopts the term. Theories and approaches to development within IPE will be briefly discussed and critically analyzed. Then the link between US approaches, development theories, tools, and implementation will be established. It establishes a conceptual framework for examining the political economy of Turkish and Korean development. To this end, the modernization theory and its relation to the political economy of development are used. Careful attention to political and ideological contexts in the US in which policies are discussed, drafted and approved shows that contextual factors critically impact how policies are formulated. While discussing the existing literature and established theories, a background on the state's involvement in the domestic and international political economy will be referenced because the essence of developmental change precedes the state's effectiveness in effectively allocating foreign assistance, spending it, and following through on the spending with various kinds of political accountability in terms of results.

The second chapter deals with the theoretical framework and the US development package and further analyzes the development theory and the manifestation of US dominance in the non-Western world. The policy tools in the American development package have been expanded with the legitimacy provided by the modernization theory. Before a closer observation of the role of the US development package in Türkiye and Korea, a brief introduction to the post-war political-economic environment is required since studying the development process would be meaningless

without knowing within what context such a process occurred. This chapter develops patterns and regularities based on legitimate historical experiences of successful and unsuccessful development episodes that serve as the motivation for change in the international political economy. The nexus between theories and policies will be explored, and the framework for the case studies will be established.

Chapter three looks at each component of the US development package in detail and analyses how the US instituted the development project in the free world. It will be discussed how the development issue sprouted in domestic politics in the US before the Second World War and what policies the US implemented to promote economic development in the Tennessee River and the surrounding region. It will be examined how the developmental policies implemented in the American domestic sphere affected his foreign policy in international relations after 1945. This chapter will examine the development policies implemented by the US in its domestic policy, and the four tools that make up the development package will be explained in detail. How domestic and foreign development policies affect each other and the effects of these policies on Türkiye and Korea will be evaluated.

The fourth and fifth chapters are dedicated to the two case studies—Turkish and Korean development practices, respectively, between 1945 and 1990. These chapters provide insight into how the US relations through the development package with the development of the two countries are mutually shaped and transformed in the post-war years. These two chapters analyze the effects of each tool of the American development package on Türkiye and Korea. It has been examined how the influence of America and its development tools have repercussions in each country, its institutions, and policymaking. the interaction of multiple variables (political, economic, cultural, and military), international developments, and the role played by individuals like diplomats and presidents have also played a part. Thus, it is revealed why the development of both countries differed and what has been the role of America in this differentiation.

The sixth chapter aims to put the parts of the jigsaw together. To this end, a comparative analysis of Korean and Turkish cases in the US development package and results will be evaluated. By revisiting the arguments developed in the previous chapters, this chapter will also briefly touch on today's results of the American development package in Türkiye and Korea. Following this evaluation, the conclusion entails a comparative political economy analysis of the Turkish and Korean development cases and draws significant conclusions for foreign involvement in national development processes.

1.3. Methodology

An examination of the literature on comparative studies finds that, whereas there is a plethora of comparative studies on Korea, there are few comparative studies on Türkiye and Korea. Therefore, to examine the development policy outcomes in question, the effects of domestic and external dynamics on development paths and policies and the role of the US development toolbox as an important variable of the IPE of development, Türkiye and Korea will be compared. Furthermore, examining the development paradigms, debates on foreign aid, rural development projects, trade strategies and military involvement—and their theoretical underpinnings—will provide a better comparative historical understanding.

This study aims to fill the gap in the existing literature, namely, the need for a comparative dimension. A comparative historical framework is used to emphasize the typical characteristics of the US development package's role in Türkiye and Korea and the features of the political economy of development against the backdrop of significant economic and political development in each country (Francks et al., 1999, p. 4). A comparative analysis of the two countries can reveal special features of foreign involvement in Korea and Türkiye and demonstrates distinctive policy patterns influenced by both the countries' characteristics and foreign involvement. Moreover, since both countries are located in entirely different regions, driven by their own

domestic and international circumstances, any findings obtained through this comparative analysis may also be used to further generalize across regions.

Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA) is a critique of traditional historiography, which depicts the growth story of institutions and processes, explains their development and organizes itself as a national domain by emphasizing the originality of its subjects (Cohen & O'Connor, 2004, p. 1). CHA is interested in similarities and differences; while understanding given phenomena, it investigates which conditions or causes were broadly shared and which were unique. (Cohen & O'Connor, 2004, p. xi). It helps to understand the unique characteristics of cases and explains why differences or similarities occur. It is the systematic search for similarities and differences rather than solid storytelling of chronological information (*Comparison and Beyond on JSTOR*, n.d.). Therefore, it attempts to explain why some historical instances have similarities in terms of certain social processes while others do not (Palabiyik, 2019, pp. 1 -5). Bearing in mind that comparison and cross-country differences and similarities are fundamental tools of analysis and one that sharpens our descriptive abilities and plays an important role in concept creation by highlighting suggested parallels and contrasts across examples is vital to note (Collier, 1993, p. 105). By undertaking such a study, an assessment of the impacts of the US development package on domestic politics and a comparative analysis with the current era will be possible. Furthermore, the peculiarities in implementing the US development package will be discovered by comparing Korea and Türkiye.

The aim here is to contribute to the academic debate on the political economy of the development of two specific countries comparatively and to examine the factors governing the political economy of development processes from local to global levels. The transformation process of the two countries is discussed in terms of specific breakpoints and the critical signposts that mark Turkish and Korean development. The political economic transformations of Türkiye and Korea and their relevance to contemporary issues are examined by analyzing the historical characteristics underlying historical transformations. This process is analyzed, starting from 1945, to understand the origins of the countries' current positions, how countries in different

periods and regimes reacted to and channeled US involvement and external assistance, and the policies that affected their respective developmental future. A comparative analysis will allow us to specify, in each country, the differences and similarities that can be integrated into their general scheme (Klass, 1985, p. 185). It also clarifies sequences and their relationships to underlying structural conditions, which is required for creating reliable causal accounts. (Kim, 1994, p. 4).

A comparative method is used to analyze American engagement in Korea and Türkiye, the shape it has taken over time, and the effect of this involvement. Korea and Türkiye are key countries in their respective regions and significant partners of the US. Following the end of WWII, both launched a series of reforms. Their state traditions, the legacy of large empires (Choson and Ottoman), land reform, and the role of elites converged into American engagement. However, their developmental status is now wholly different, and it is now more helpful to compare societies that have "enough in common to make . . . [their] differences significant." (Zolberg, 1967, p. 40) While examining and comparing the development processes of Korea and Türkiye, this study will also shed light on the changes in the understanding of development. Exploring ideas about development and the critical relationship between theory and practice is an obligation. In doing so, how theoretical approaches in development studies evolve and reflect on practice or policymaking can be better observed and understood.

To understand the transformation or change of the two countries and to position this transformation in a global context, it is necessary to examine America's role closely. It is crucial to show how America's post-war policies stem from the policies, practices, and ways of thinking it implemented within itself. In addition to the impact of the global context on the transformation of Korea and Türkiye, the peculiar country-specific aspects of this transformation should also be analyzed. This is because each nation had its concerns and patterns based on existing conditions, such as nation-building and post-independence restructuring for Korea and economic development for Türkiye immediately following the end of WWII. It is, therefore, necessary to show how their concerns overlap with those of the US and highlight the importance of their

respective economic structures, policy choices, social and political factors, and external developments.

This study will look at primary and secondary sources in detail. CHA employs documents and archival analysis. As for primary sources, archival and official documents of the Turkish Republic and Korean governments were mainly accessed. Official data, statements, and reports were obtained from original published material, particularly from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Foreign Relations of the US (FRUS) documents, which adequately provide the primary sources. As for Türkiye, journals from the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye archives were examined. Even though the database could not be reached online, the National Archives of Korea contained many documents that were beneficial to the current study, I was able to research in-person in there and found vital documents particularly related to US land reform policies in Korea. At the Library of Congress, I had the opportunity to research and collect primary sources, albeit for a very short time, especially about Türkiye. As for secondary sources, books, articles, and similar materials were used. As a result, qualitative and quantitative data from archival and secondary sources were relied on and brought together as both have different strengths and weaknesses. All in all, this is a library-based dissertation that relies on primary and secondary sources.

1.4. A Brief Outlook on Literature on America's Interventions in Third World Development During the Cold War

This section is divided into two: First, studies focusing on policy formation within the framework of the modernization theory during the Cold War period of the United States will be briefly elaborated. And then, sources that explain the degree of American involvement in Korean and Turkish development will be explored. Finally, it will be explained where this dissertation is positioned, inspired by the work of Stephan Haggard.

This section aims to present the approaches and essential studies in the academic literature on the role of America in the development of the Third World —several significant studies deal with America's presence in other countries during the Cold War. The existing literature is preoccupied with the problem of the role of US aid on development and America's economic and political bilateral relations with Third World countries. While the challenges such as the link between the aid regime type and the effects of aid on development were studied numerically by economists, more bilateral relations and systemic analyses within the IR discipline were much studied too. However, studies on America's role in Third-World development through modernization theory pale next to the US aid policies or policy-based analysis of bilateral relations. In addition to these resources used in this thesis, the limited study on Korea and Türkiye, my case studies, will also be referenced. The inherent role of the US in Korean and Turkish development following the end of WWII makes this comparative study unique.

Some studies provide a comprehensive understanding of US foreign policy during the Cold War (Bilsland, 2015; Costigliola & Hogan, 2013; Hurst, 2005). Especially in the 2000s, critical studies have been carried out examining how the modernization theory took place in the American policymaking process and in other countries. Studies in this manner written on Korea and Türkiye are no more than a handful. The existing literature on the role of the US in Korea and Türkiye, with a few notable exceptions, focuses on bilateral relations. Some individual essays and works do focus on the role of the US, modernization theory, and specific cases. Nevertheless, there is no comprehensive and comparative study of the period during the Cold War. One aspect of this existing literature that is still lacking is the comparative work on Türkiye and Korea; this dissertation aims to contribute and fill the gap in the literature.

There is a vast literature on the issue of US economic aid, which is discussed in this dissertation too, but the focus is not limited to that, it is much broader. Economic aid is only one pillar of the American development package. This dissertation will examine how the four main tools of the US work together and how they occur in Korea and Türkiye. The purpose of this section is by no means to cover all sources related to this

dissertation's topic. It will, however, feature the most relevant and inspiring studies on the topic of this dissertation. Bodies of literature will also contribute to the conceptual framework to analyze the various processes under study in this work. The research question of the dissertation essentially first necessitates a literature review on the role of the US in the Third World as background information. Then, this thesis proceeds with the argument that the modernization theory guides the American development package.

Scholars have attempted to advance the examination of modernization theory and American foreign policy. Although studies were produced in this field in the 2000s, Robert Packenham's seminal work called *Liberal America and the Third World* (Packenham, 2015) and Michael Shafer's book, which examines the US involvement in defeating insurgents in different parts of the world, such as Greece, Vietnam and the Philippines (Shafer, 1988a) by referencing the US' Cold War strategies such as supporting oppressive right-wing regimes, promoting liberal good governments, and preventing communist insurgencies, they have an important place as these studies examine and criticize the policies of the US in Third World countries. In particular, Packenham's work examines the formulation of America's foreign aid policies, how it is influenced by liberal ideology, and their relationship to the economic aspect of development theory.

Frank Ninkovich describes the rise of the modernist view of history and how modernity has shaped American foreign policy, from the Roosevelt, Taft administrations to the Kennedy and Johnson presidency (Ninkovich, 1994). Although this study is primarily about modernity, power and the Vietnam War, it is a vital resource for following the traces of modernity in America's global strategy. Lloyd C. Gardner's work also focuses on the Vietnam policy of the US, yet it provides insightful information on how the US foreign policy was influenced by its domestic policies. Johnson envisioned a major Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) style development project for North Vietnam. Johnson and his adviser Rostow believed these strategies would make Vietnam more collaborative with the United States (Gardner, 1997). The author explicitly mentions Johnson's emphasis on development assistance as a way to

promote peace and prosperity while also including other variables specific to the Vietnamese case.

Even though the US economic policies in the Third World are well established, only recently have scholars examined the integration of economy, belief systems, ideology and culture on policy making. Zaheer Baber, Odd Arned Westad, Nick Cullather, Michael Adas, Nils Gilman, Michael Latham, David Ekbladh and David Engerman have highlighted the formulation and implementation of modernization theory that has held a privileged place in US foreign relations history. The most important feature of these studies is that they are studies that do historicization well and do not accept disciplines separately. That is, they contain many fields such as culture, ideology, ideas, economy, politics, and civil society and show that they complement each other.

There are important studies examining the role of modernization theory in the Cold War strategy of the US. One of the most important of these studies is Zaheer Baber's article titled as 'Modernization Theory and The Cold War'. He examines how the American development discourse was developed with modernization theory and how it was adapted and applied in a structural, political and intellectual context. He states that modernization theory still exists in today's development doctrine and strategies of international development institutions, agencies and organizations (Baber, 2007). This study is one of the first studies on this subject in which he explains the role of the Cold War context in theorizing a Western path to modernity. The power of America has been supported by the relationship between social scientists, the state, the academia, the foreign policy community and the philanthropic foundations, and the knowledge production arising from this relationship. The success of countries is a matter of common free world interest (Baber, 2007, p. 78). Drawing on South Asia and India in particular, he cites how the United States provides aid for "developmental" purposes. Besides Baber, there are studies whose case studies are Iran (Popp, 2011), Japan (Conrad, 2012), Brazil (Wanderley & Barros, 2020), and India (Westad, 2017) which analyzes the reflections of modernization theory in American foreign policy through specific countries.

The seminal work of Odd Arned Westad analyzes the ideological underpinnings of US and Soviet policies and the evolution of Third-World politics that drove superpower intervention. He argues that both the US and the USSR were divided over European modernity and were driven to intervene in the Third World by the ideologies inherent in their politics. They tried to demonstrate the universality of their ideas, expand their values and defend their security simultaneously, and eventually, these policies gave legitimacy to American actions. As a result, liberty, progress, and citizenship took root in the foundation of the States and have persisted up to this day. He examines the US policies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Westad, 2017, pp. 4-5).

With his notable books, Michael Latham explored US Cold War foreign policies, the history of science and their connections to modernization theory. His main argument is that modernization theory is more than just a scholarly model; it is also an ideology (Latham, 2000a). However, after 1945, the modernization theory brought altruistic solutions to America. It was hoped that the Third World should be helped with economic take-off and then quickly transition to self-sufficient growth. In practice, however, Latham argues that this is a weak policy guide (Latham, 2011a), and questions the American belief that liberal capitalism is the key to development. Finally, examining the effects of modernization theory not only on the American side but also on the side he calls "the postcolonial poor" gives a multidimensional perspective.

Nils Gilman also claims that modernization theory provides a systematic and clear framework for understanding the US efforts to promote development in Third World countries and the steps of Western domination. Gilman examines how American development efforts and Western orientations in the Third World are applied systematically and openly under the umbrella of modernization theory (Gilman, 2018). In addition to the cultural effects of American-style modernity, he explains the projection of the theory and how it is still valid today. The positive effects of New Deal policies created the illusion that development could be the same worldwide. American academics have produced it in universities and American government-sponsored think tanks and research committees to make it the "Global New Deal" (Gilman, 2018, pp. 4, 276). He explains this through three case studies: the Harvard University

Department of Social Relations, the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics (SSRC) and the MIT Center for International Studies (CENIS).

Scholars from Harvard like John Kenneth Galbraith, philanthropic foundations and interdisciplinary teams funded by private institutions such as the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) developed a conceptual framework for the development of the Third World, a modernization theory. It was alarmed by these institutions, American policymakers, and CENIS that the US faced a life-and-death issue as America would lose control of its destiny unless an extraordinary effort was made to understand these societies. Adding the incredible personal influence of Rostow to this life-and-death issue, the US initiated large-scale development schemes in rural Asia. Nick Cullather tells the struggle of America in the Cold War through its efforts to transform food, agriculture, and rural in Asia. Cullather and Arnove evaluate philanthropic foundations' investments in health and technology as part of American social engineering that facilitated the entry of American capital into these countries' domestic markets (Cullather, 2013a). Cullather narrated these development schemes on two varieties of reconstruction: land reform and community development projects, which were inspired by the TVA and modernist traditions (Cullather, 2013, pp.75-76). He also emphasizes that as soon as American scientists considered food as a fundamental component of development at the end of the 19th century, the qualitative became quantitative, and comparison and hierarchical classification became inevitable. And development, because it is measurable, has become a matter of logic since then.

Similar to Cullather's argument, David Ekbladh claims that during the New Deal years, America developed its ideology and tools for development policies. The American development style became evident in the 1940s with large-scale planning, technological development, and social transformation. It later transformed into the Truman Doctrine with large aid packages and the modernization doctrine with Point Four (D. Ekbladh, 2011). In this book, Ekbladh examines the role of development and its close cousin, modernization, in American foreign policy and how America, as a critical actor, has driven international development. First, Ekbladh traces the TVA and

then its role and influence within and outside of a government that is actively involved in development projects worldwide.

Michael Adas (Adas, 2006) examines how the US modernizes non-Western areas by demanding submission to American technological prowess and design. The author explains that the development of the modernization theory started with the 1899 American war on Filipino and attributes the first vast engineering project and the first laboratory of the modernization theory to the beginning of this war. America made several interventions in the Philippines, from ideals of productivity and vocational training to reforms influenced by both racial and gender attitudes, and Adas argues that this is making the Philippines fundamentally more unstable in the future. These American projects are based on the assumption that progress (and, in a sense, salvation) is possible even among the "backward" ones. This book is a unique account showing how the Philippines' practices affected America's Cold War-era policies (Adas, 2006). Last but not least, the book edited by David Engerman stands as a significant study that brings together scholars (mentioned in this part) engaged in literary production in this field. The links between modernization and development are explored (D. C. et. al. Engerman, 2003).

The works of Nathan Citino (Citino, 2017, p. 70) and especially his book *Envisioning the Arab Future* are significant in the field in which he uses "modernization" to explain US-Middle East relations during the Cold War. He examines US power in a regional context and the relationship between global and regional histories and the ways of transcending US-centric perspectives on the Middle East. How the US and Arabs worked together on modernization within the set of cold war era concepts, including land reform, community-building, and US regional aims is the focal point of this study. Many Third World countries accepted the concept of modernization as a linear, structural transformation conducted in accordance with a developmental paradigm. (Citino, 2017, pp. 45-46). Citino brings Arab modernizers to the modernization debate and presents how it works and what happens when the reform legacies in that region meet with American policies (for example, the Ottoman Empire's reform policies). Examining narratives of Ottoman decline and Kemalist reforms, Citino argues that

reading the Ottoman past does not develop a deeper comprehension of today's Middle East. However, it has an impact on how actors see the region. From here, we can jump into case studies.

This thesis argues that, under certain conditions, American inclusion accelerates development. These are primarily the degree of American inclusion and internal dynamics of the specific countries, Türkiye and South Korea. As Bradley Simpson argues, if we are to understand the connections between the Cold War and US Third World hegemony, we need to capture the complex process in which the US tried (but partially succeeded) to recruit local elites to its ranks (B. R. Simpson, 2008). This issue will be discussed in the following pages and a framework will be drawn concerning the work of Stephan Haggard, which is one of the purposes of this chapter.

In the case of Türkiye, scholars such as Ali Erken, Begüm Adalet, and Oğuzhan Göksel, have focused on the relationship between the US Cold War projects in Türkiye and the impact of modernization theory. Begüm Adalet and Oğuzhan Göksel's doctoral dissertations are studies that deserve special attention because they stand apart in understanding the modernization theory-policy-making process and its repercussions in the Third World.

Begüm Adalet's stunning book, originally her dissertation, examines the role of American experts and policies on Türkiye's being a site for the development laboratory under the modernization theory. She masterfully examines agricultural policies, how modernization theory works in the country, how social scientists drive it, and how it affects Turkish policymakers. She focuses on how Türkiye is trying to develop a US-based capitalist development model by building a highway, supporting the tourism industry, and supporting the agricultural mechanism. She emphasizes that these are important symbols in the spread of American modernism. Oğuzhan Göksel's Ph.D. dissertation analyzes Türkiye's development trajectories and shows that modernization in non-Western society is a complex phenomenon that produces a different 'modernity' rather than converging to Western values such as liberal democracy. He explains this

analysis of the Turkish Model concept that emerged after the 2011 Arab Spring through modernization theory (Göksel, 2015).

Ali Erken's book focuses on the activities of the philanthropic foundations, US policymakers and social scientists influenced by modernization theory in Türkiye. He examines the growth of Middle East studies after the end of the Second World War to get more information about developing regions of the world, which was intrinsically linked to the interests of the Cold War national security state in the United States. He reveals how American philanthropic foundations' activities shaped and completed the political vision of the Turkish ruling elite in the formation of modern Türkiye, the common discourses that played a role in establishing information networks between the two countries, and its critical tools and strategies for Türkiye's cultural and technological transformation. He states that American institutions played an important role in creating a West-oriented Türkiye, and this situation coincides with the enthusiasm of the ruling elites in Türkiye to achieve democratic freedom and development. The most important aspect of this study is that it examines the common discourse frameworks, key devices and strategies of American institutions that play a role in establishing information networks between the two countries. In this process, which a scientific ethos defined as the ossification process, the Rockefeller Foundation provided aid for the healthcare sector, educational and equipment support, and scholarships and financed the projects (Erken, 2018).

Two significant studies on Türkiye's development that should be mentioned here are written by Vedat Milor and Levent Ünsaldı. Vedat Milor's book compares Türkiye's and France's economic development and planning experiences (Milor, 2022). This study, which examines the state's power and capacity and the relations between the ruling class and the state in detail, is essential. Ünsaldı's book, *A Criticism of Economism: The Idea of Development in Türkiye*, examines Türkiye's understanding and policies of development from a sociological perspective since the Ottoman period (Ünsaldı, 2014). Ünsaldı deals with the story of the development belief in Anatolia from a historical perspective and discusses the representations and imaginations of development in today's Türkiye within the framework of sociological field research.

He presents a detailed study of development plans and various understandings of development in Türkiye. Both studies have references to Korean development.

As for the South Korean case, David Ekbladh, Gregg Brazinsky, Michael Kim, and James Lee's publications significantly contributed to and directed this dissertation. David Ekbladh's doctoral dissertation examines how modernization and development played a role in the conduct of US foreign relations in Asia between 1914 and 1973. He examines the US' role in the modernization of Korea between 1945 and 1960. He focuses on the American aid programs and American-led development that combined the state capacity, private groups, and international organizations to create a modern, anti-communist Korea (D. K. F. Ekbladh, 2003). Brazinsky's study expands upon US-Korean relations during the Cold War and argues that the US provided economic and military aid and other forms of assistance as long as it regarded Korean security and stability as important to its strategic interests. The role of Rostow, modernization theory, and the relations between Korean and US social scientists in contributing to and directing Korean development is elaborated (Brazinsky, 2007).

Two significant studies analyze the link between US Cold War programs and the roots of the Korean developmental state. First, Michael Kim examines the introduction of modernization theory to Korea and explores the links between the modernization theory and state-led industrialization and developmental state (M. Kim, 2007a). James Lee also discovers the role of American foreign aid in its grand strategy during the Cold War and how the US aid and diplomatic influence supported the creation of the capitalist developmental state in Korea (J. Lee, 2018). Although there is extensive literature on the developmental state, these two studies stand apart and are exceptional thanks to these elements as explained.

In studies dealing mainly with the developmental trajectory of Türkiye and Korea, there are only policy-based research articles and dissertations. While these studies are precious, only some link the modernization theory's influence on the US development package to a comparative study. Moreover, no study examines the role of the US development package in both countries comparatively during the Cold War. As a result,

this dissertation fills a void in defining the position of the United States in the national development objectives of Türkiye and South Korea.

These sources most strongly represent and back this thesis' arguments, but while these studies help explain many aspects of it, many questions remain that are, at best, partially clarified. One of the most important reasons for this is that these explanations limit themselves to a single level of analysis. Stephan Haggard's approach adopted in his influential work, *Pathways to Periphery*, will be more enlightening for this thesis.

Stephan Haggard adopts a position that considers both international and national determinants of development policy. When Haggard wrote this book, almost no study systematically compared nations' development. He argues that there are three trajectories that countries follow toward industrialization. The first is import substitution industrialization (ISI), followed by Mexico and Brazil. The second trajectory is export-led growth, followed by South Korea and Taiwan. The third trajectory is entrepot growth, a variant of export-led growth followed by Hong Kong and Singapore. To briefly explain the first and second trajectories, ISI policy promotes and develops domestic industries and reduces reliance on manufactured foreign imports. The export-led growth seeks to produce high-volume, labor-intensive goods for export. Whereas Korea started to export primary goods and develop import substitutes by the early 1960s, Türkiye covered the applications of the ISI policy between the years 1960-80.

He examines how politics and institutions affect what policies a country can and does follow by addressing two types of country groups in different categories: Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and on the other side Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and India. In this comparative work, the author examines the policy changes of these two groups adopted during the post-war era. In particular, the author questions how the transition from import substitution policy to export promotion and how industrialization policies differed. He argues that external struggles factors such as depression, war, foreign external shocks, and limited access to capital drive development strategies, and the links between industrialization strategy and regime

type can shape the countries' developmental routes and domestic policy choices. Finally, he elaborates on why Latin American countries are more dependent on international capital than East Asian countries and why these two groups of countries took different developmental paths.

His answers to these questions lie in exploring the interaction between domestic and international factors. Development strategies are policies to steer economic activity into a particular mixture of ownership and sectors (Haggard, 1990, p. 23). He prioritizes domestic factors, particularly the role of ruling elites in building supporting coalitions in the state institutions, and these institutions have a role in providing differential incentives for groups to organize (Haggard, 1990, p. 4). He shows how corporate and political policies are intertwined with trade, foreign investment, income distribution and democracy through industrialization policies. The international factors such as wars, depressions, shocks and external intervention create pressure and stimulate economic reforms. The effects of external shocks are reduced or augmented by a set of specific internal factors. He also dramatically emphasizes American assistance and how this aid provided a lever for the governments, particularly Korea and Taiwan. The US aid and efforts in Korea both financed and supported the ISI policies. Even though the author chooses industrialization strategies as the object of analysis has made several significant contributions to this thesis:

First, Haggard presents his study as a comparative historical analysis. He does not adopt one single approach in order to establish broad historical comparisons and handle both international and national forces. He reveals the uniqueness and unique conditions of different societies through comparison, not just their similarities and differences, thus he adopts comparative historical analysis as a methodological tool. The second is the level of analysis. He sets four different levels of analysis as follows:

He argued that the international system refers to the historical junctures that affect the balance of power, the capacity of action of states, and their policy choices, especially the weak states. In this title, he particularly examines how US economic aid is effective in industrialization policies. He mentions the weaknesses of international systemic

theories like Marxism or Realism in explaining variations in the behavior of similarly situated states. Therefore, examining what is happening at the domestic level is necessary, like the role of elites and organizational structures. Another level is political institutions which relate to the interaction between international constraints and political leadership. Here, Haggard examines the interests and choices of political and business elites and the political life, political leadership, and organization because development policies lie in establishing supporting coalitions in institutions by the ruling elites. The final one is ideas. The state is more than just an actor; it is a set of institutions that have remained consistent across time, a field of play that offers diverse incentives for groups to organize. Political elites differ in their organizational capabilities and the tools at their disposal for achieving their aims due to differences in institutional structure. Institutional variation is important because it explains why certain states adhere to that policy. A political explanation of development must be constructed at the intersection between choice and institutional constraints.

He criticizes the systemic approaches since their primary determinant is the relationship between state behavior and international environments. However, the domestic variables like the role of elites are significant because where and when political structures prevent politicians and their technocratic associates the reform proposals become more likely, at least in the short term, from certain interest group constraints. Managers having personal influence over economic decision-making, developing security, and supporting a cohesive 'reform team,' and political authority overriding bureaucratic and political opposition to policy change are required for successful reform initiation.

Country-specific factors such as country size, sectoral interests, organizations, government agencies, and economic ideas also influence the timing and pattern of changes in development policy. For example, the relative weakness of the workforce and trade in Korea, the strength of the military, the availability of policy tools (particularly the government's control over the financial system and the private sector), and the US economic advisors' involvement in policymaking led Korea to adopt an export-oriented strategy. Of particular importance was the isolation of the political

elites from popular oppression (particularly from workers' and agricultural interests) through an oppressive legal system. By contrast, governments in Brazil and Mexico lacked such isolation as in Türkiye too, as the protectionism of ISI strategies created massive voters in favor of the status quo. Therefore, the transition to an export-oriented strategy, as East Asian countries did, was not politically feasible. As a result, these governments could not recover from currency, inflation, and debt crises and remained committed to the ISI, even if they implemented some major reforms. It is possible to observe these experiences of Brazil and Mexico almost exactly for Türkiye, as seen in the thesis's following sections. That's why, in this sense, Haggard emphasizes institutional influences and the "independent interests and organizational capabilities of the state elite" (Haggard, 1990, p. 269).

The framework Haggard adopted is actually emphasized by classical modernization theorists: The universality and irreversibility of modernization did not abolish the role of agency in transformation and in initiating and sustaining modernization in underdeveloped countries, particularly the role of elites in initiating and sustaining modernization in underdeveloped countries (Eisenstadt, 1964b, p. 363, 1964a, p.591)(Lerner, 1958, pp.111-113). Eisenstadt also analyzed the role of elites in the modernization process, especially the role of charismatic groups and personalities. In his view, while the Western experience had the advantage of facilitating the conditions for continuous development, the modernizing elites in non-Western contexts had similar and troublesome missions, such as imposing their policies on wider social groups and attracting them to more differentiated institutional groups, making different arrangements for the regulation of their integration into the West. Classical modernization theorists, Rostow and Hoselitz, argued that industrialization was not an automatic, spontaneous process but depended on constellations formed by powerful groups within a society (Knöbl, 2003). Both Türkiye and Korea tried to catch up with Western countries by increasing the speed of social change through authoritarian practices.

Cold War security concerns and the path of development pushed American academics, policymakers and modernization theorists to embrace the role of institutions and elites.

In the path of industrialization, secularization and liberal democracy, ruling elites were expected to lead their own people. It was expected to provide information on how the development would progress by establishing a relationship between the elites and institutions, which were the pioneers of modernization, and the immature masses of the people. And when necessary, many things were permissible for these purposes so that America and the Westerners legitimized authoritarianism as a temporary phenomenon. As can be seen, the elite-driven development structure in the Third World legitimizes authoritarianism within countries and outside intervention (including American involvement).

In line with Haggard's argument, Ruggie also sees domestic political structures as an important factor influencing both the nation's well-being and its role in the international division of labor. He talks about the effect of the state and domestic social coalitions on the appearance and role of the state in the international arena and on international dependence (Ruggie, 1983). This shows us that, in terms of this thesis, for example, it is not enough for the United States to determine Türkiye as Europe's granary, and that Türkiye's institutions in domestic politics also lead to this. Moreover, one of the reasons why this thesis takes into consideration this level of political institutions in domestic politics is that, in the cases of Korea and Türkiye, they are clearly crucial in development paths. For example, corruption scandals in the Rhee period, the narrowness of Rhee's support base, the network of relations based on patronage, and especially the economic aspect of development strategies were seriously affected. Also, the short-lived Second Republic period (with Prime Minister Chang Myon) in Korea in 1960-61 shows us the importance of political institutions for achieving economic development goals, as will be explained in Chapter 4 in detail.

While Haggard examines the industrial policies through the interaction of international and local factors in these four titles, this thesis examines how the influence of the United States resonates locally, and it does this through 4 essential development tools. As Philip McMichael, a critical scholar, argues that the development project is much more than transitioning from import substitution policies to export-based industrialization (McMichael P, 2016). This thesis focuses more on how an external

power (the US) affects the national development policies of Korea and Türkiye. It is examined why, how, and to what extent the US applied the tools of the development package in Korea and Türkiye. Therefore, in this thesis, since the effects of the development package of the US occurred in the domestic areas of Korea and Türkiye, the policy change took place at the first two levels, namely the international system and domestic coalitions, and constitutes the level of analysis of this thesis. The interaction of the decisive internal dynamics in Türkiye and Korea with the American development package. The role of elites (like presidents) and organizational structures (like state-private sector relations) in Türkiye and Korea and issues like how these two countries' ruling classes or bureaucracies negotiated with American advisers lie in examining the cases at both levels and the interaction of the two levels. For example, the trade pillar of the American development package has been aligned with the balance between the interests of the state and business groups in Korea. That is why this thesis argues that it is necessary to incorporate the first level of analysis into the second one to bring the human agency back and provide a more detailed explanation of the role of the US development package in Korean and Turkish development since analyzing this subject transcends the levels of international or inter-state relations. The argument is that the interplay of domestic forces and the effects of US interventions played a large role in determining developmental policies.

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

2.1. Introduction

Theories emerge in particular contexts, and development as a field of study and realm of action has undergone several significant phases. Theoretical debates on the development and development process were first unveiled in the aftermath of WWII. Since 1945, development has been one of the most studied subjects because it has a broad relationship with economic, social, and political dimensions. These variables are related to each other and other aspects of life. Furthermore, through studies and experiences gained over time, we have been in a better position to take lessons by analyzing the approaches and policies behind various success stories. All of this helps us determine the remaining gaps in the development literature, which reveals the need to seek more profound insights into (Frieden & Lake, 2002, pp. 383 - 4) the political economy of Turkish and Korean development and the role the US has played in shaping their particular development paths and the international political economy after the end of WWII.

The characteristics of systemic and domestic problems and the concept of development have been bolstered within the international political economy both as a field of study and as a realm of action. To understand the nature of this significant discussion about the best development path, one must begin at its origins in the early post-war climate. This chapter will examine the development notion from a historical perspective by emphasizing its related aspects and theories. Theories and approaches that have been advanced by social scientists, particularly the modernization theory, will be revisited in the following chapters. The evolution of development concepts, theories, and

policies concerning modernization theory is integral to development studies, IPE, and US foreign policymaking. They provide an essential historical window into how social scientists have thought and continue to think about development (Cypher, 2020, p. 14).

2.2. The Political Economy of Development After WWII

2.2.1. International Political Economy

International Political Economy (IPE) is the general name of the interdisciplinary social science approach that investigates the dynamic interaction of markets with states and how they shape each other. It is a field of inquiry concentrated on power, wealth, and agency distribution. The primary subject matter of IPE is the interaction between power and wealth, states and markets, and politics and economy in a dynamic and contentious global situation: 'Who gets what, why and how, both within the state and in the world economy?', 'what structures underpin the distribution of capability in the world?', 'how might such arrangements be changed or be in the process of changing?', and 'what is the relationship between states and markets, politics and economics?' (Strange, 1991, p. 34) are the main questions IPE focuses on. These questions are directed to the state as a unit of analysis. IPE considers the international context of state activity but also emphasizes the role of other actors, such as non-state entities. The interactions of states with other social, political, and economic entities are also considered, but this time incorporating the 'international' dimension.

Rather than adopting the orthodox political economy approach, this study adopts the critical IPE in which “The long and harmful separation of economics and politics” (Strange, 1970a, pp. 304 - 315) should not exist anymore. In that sense, critical IPE is more inclusive in scope and more critical in rhetoric. In IPE, the emphasis is on the relationship between national units—the linkages created by trade, finance, aid, and other cross-border relationships. IPE’s three essential premises are as follows: the political and economic worlds are inextricably linked; there is a mutual and dynamic

interaction between states and markets and power and wealth; and a close link between the domestic and international levels of analysis (Underhill, 1968, pp. 4 - 5). Thus, as emphasized at the beginning of this study, what distinguishes IPE is the first word of the acronym—*international* (Cohen, n.d., p. 2) which is a critical part of IPE studies.

The conventional IPE ignores how America's military superiority supports its economic and financial hegemony, as well as how America's international economic policies are closely interwoven with its foreign and security policies. (Apeldoorn & Graaff, 2016, p. 143). To recognize and describe the dynamics in developmental paths and the behaviors of the actors at both the national and international levels, Susan Strange's conception of "structures of power" enables us to understand how structurally powerful states (the US) shape other actors' policies and decide which tools they use. Strange's contribution to the IPE was to criticize state-centered analysis and positivism, reject previously neglected non-state forces and interdisciplinary separation, and examine issues not explored by American political economists. Therefore, Strange's questions and her approach to the issue of power are valuable for this study (B. J. Cohen, 2008, pp. 50–51; Yalvaç, 2021, p. 20).

According to Strange, structures and relationships are essential in international political and economic affairs, not physical power. She adopted a more multidisciplinary approach and argued that structures and relationships matter more in economic affairs than physical ones. Who gets what and who depends on whom or what are the more critical concerns. Strange refers to these formations as "structures of power" and considers them essential determinants of power dynamics among individuals, groups, or nations. She states that power operates on two levels: structural and relational. Relational power is the ability of A to persuade B to do something they would not do otherwise. Relational power among actors (states/governments, groups, individuals, etc.) occurs within a specific social, economic, and political context created by power structures, implying that the range of options available to actors during the bargaining process is already determined by the fundamental structures of the international political economy (Tayfur, 2003, pp. 112 - 120). Structural power is the ability to shape and determine global, political, and economic structures; in other

words, the ability to decide the manner in which things will be done and the ability to shape frameworks within which states relate to one another, to people, and businesses. By emphasizing ideas, consent, and institutions, it defines hegemony in a broader sense than the orthodox IPE. Since structural power is the ability to form and determine the political economy structures within which other players must function, by using its structural power, the US has the ability to shape and decide on the structures of the IPE at each level of security, production, finance, and knowledge. Therefore, the IPE approach provides us with the basis for writing this dissertation for two main reasons: first, by showing what American superiority in the international arena stems from and how its domestic policy depends on its foreign policy; and secondly, in terms of examining how America has disseminated this power, thanks to Strange's power conception.

The IPE approach to development studies is very important in theory and practice since theoretical contributions and debates in IPE influence development studies. The core concern of both IPE and development studies is how the wealth of nations and peoples is best achieved. As a result, it is critical to investigate how socio-political factors influence poverty, inequality, and economic growth, as well as how economic factors shape the political trajectories of developing countries. The IPE of development deals with the intricate connection of economic, social, and political engagement at the level of both domestic and international relations since it defies and rejects strict disciplinary boundaries. In order to contribute to the description, explanation, and interpretation of 'development' phenomena in IPE studies, taking into account the domestic interaction, regional, and international factors as they affect economic policies and results is required. Otherwise, there could be no investigation of how the domestic politics of foreign economic policy-making and economic interests transit through institutions of national political economies that determine patterns of delegation and aggregation (Frieden & Lake, 2002b, p. 119).

Development policies, discourses, and theories are crucial functions of the complex interplay of economic, political, and social forces at the domestic and systemic levels of study. (Boyd & Ngo, 2005, p. 43). Considering the discussions made until now,

development is affected directly or indirectly by non-economic factors and the architecture of IPE. As a result, IPE scholars have started to study the development issue seriously and focus on development studies. In addition, other disciplines like anthropology and sociology have further contributed to this field and to a genuinely global and interdisciplinary analysis of the significant issues that have had a bearing on development theory and practice since 1945 (Desai & B Potter, 2014, p. xxi). Development studies primarily address how development theories are linked to development practice; various political systems and their histories; the intricate connection between political economy and development, such as trade, financial systems, and assistance; and regional and national political economies on aid and donor policies. Thus, research in the development field is increasingly engaged with questions of IPE, specifically on how external actors and factors, political decisions, institutional frameworks, and styles of governance all have an impact on the economic decisions that governments and communities make. And Haggard's analysis of the state's relationship to key social forces and the role of external conditions in the developmental path they choose fits into this approach. His emphasis on the state's active and effective creation of favorable conditions for the functioning of the market and the close links between local and international, government and market are the most important factors for development.

The way IPE and development are intertwined can be explained in three ways. The first is the gradual broadening of the concept of development. Development theory traditionally begins with the challenge of national development. As a result, one contribution of IPE to development theory is the freedom from the state-centric viewpoint and the emergence of new alternatives. The second is to widen the development content and disciplinary range of the development discourse by gradually introducing social science ideas from fields other than economics. The final point to mention is the constant conflict in IPE between growth and distribution, as well as between the state and the market as the engine of progress (Currie-Alder et al., 2014, p. 17); market and state are not mutually exclusive. This understanding stems from the separation between economics and politics. Obviously, any effort to treat development

in economics, politics, and society as separate processes simply makes little sense (Lipset, 1969, p. xiii). All of these boundaries and barriers between the two have caused this area to become “stuck.” (Strange, 1970b, p. 304) According to Pierre Achard, it is already significant that a discipline called long-term political economy is called economics today. It is as if "the ‘economics ’doubts its own scientificity, and its political nature is precisely what bothers it" (Achard, 1994, p. 95).

The political economy of development related to various regions are at different levels of generality, including new trends in the international political economy, distinct conceptual categories used to describe, and the roles of domestic institutions and economic and sociocultural dimensions that shape the process of national development (Gereffi, 2015, p. 170). To grasp all these dimensions, as a new “bridge builder” (Strange, 1970b, p. 315), the political economy of the development issue should be studied in depth.

2.2.2. Conceptualizing Development

The content or implications of some concepts are not so much considered as they are accepted as a given. The concept of development, falls into this category, has been one of the most widely used concepts since WWII. Questions include "What do we mean by development; what is a development and why does it matter? Why did development make its appearance after WWII? What are the reasons behind it? Moreover, much more importantly, what meaning does the US attach to "development" and create policies in this direction?" determine which approaches, strategies, policies, projects, and different positions based on differences underlie development theories (Kuhnen, 1986). Post-war social science, especially development studies, has undergone numerous theoretical transformations. To understand these, as a first step, framing some working definitions or core perspectives on development is vital in a theoretical and practical sense. Furthermore, defining the key terms helps to present the theoretical framework better. Without such a viewpoint and some agreed-upon measurement criteria, it would be challenging to develop a "framework."

Conceptualization is significant because it determines the framework from which to start. We must critically examine development since concepts create a hegemony with strong political, economic, and social resonance—and discourses and policies are shaped accordingly. Development, as a term, changes depending on where we are in time and space. As the understanding of development changes over time, the definition and conceptualization of development vary according to different perspectives, and the means of development are diversified, as are their contexts. Examining the two issues—what development is as a concept and as a definition and how development is practiced—is necessary to highlight the merit of each perspective in terms of the development issue and to put their application to practice.

At the end of WWII, the terminological big bang happened, as Solarz calls it (Solarz, 2014, p. 50). Its history runs parallel to the history of the capitalist world economy. Debates on how countries should be developed began as early as the 17th century. (Wallerstein, 1994, p. 4). However, the employment of a developmentalist attitude of the US towards the Middle East and East Asia corresponded to the end of WWII. The ‘development project’ (McMichael, 2008, p. 24) was undertaken by the US. The origin and hegemonic core of the neoliberally permeated "development" was economic growth (Rostow, 1959, p. 9). That is why development was solely considered an economical process for a long time and mainly studied and addressed through the prism of economics; thus, it was perceived in terms of material terms to increase income and provide poor people with access to a variety of goods and services. It was about getting more affluent or prosperous, measured in dollar amounts (Rapley, 2007, p. 1). Traditional economic measures like the steady rates of per capita income growth or real per capita gross national income levels and rates of growth have been used to measure the level of development. As a result, development programs have typically prioritized fast industrialization, often at the price of agriculture and rural development. (Todaro & Smith, 2012, p. 14). As a natural consequence, it was used interchangeably with concepts such as growth, progress, modernization, industrialization, and technological progress but especially with economic growth; the language has evolved with these concepts, yet they have different meanings. To clarify

their meaning: economic growth is a quantitative process or change measured by gross national product per capita, mainly involving the extension of an already established structure of production can only be one dimension of "development". However, development refers to both qualitative and quantitative material changes and indicates the creation of new economic and non-economic factors (Dowd, 2016,) involving political, economic, social and cultural dimensions at individual, societal and global levels, which are inseparable parts of the development process, mutually constitutive forces (Hawkesworth & Kogan, 1992). That is why one variable alone is not enough to evaluate or measure the level of development (Pillai et al., 1995, pp. 9 - 10).

Another terminological big bang occurred in America's classification of the world outside itself. Following the end of WWII, the United States sought liberal expansionism with the goal of establishing a worldwide hegemony based on open, free markets to which global capital, and especially US transnational capital, would have unrestricted access. (Apeldoorn & Graaff, 2016). In this US-centered liberal world order, "cold war," "development," "third world," "backward," and "underdevelopment" were neologisms that shaped the US hegemonic discourse and practices. It can be claimed that these terminologies with ideological imprints shaped foreign and domestic policies accordingly. The terms and classifications occupied the process of development; the Cold War system was composed of the First (Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and later Japan), the Second (Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union), and the Third World (the remaining countries or those that were non-aligned) (O'Brien & Williams, 2020).

The concept of "Third World" which was often used interchangeably with the concepts of underdeveloped, least developed, or backward was coined in 1952 by the French scientist Alfred Sauvy. Although Sauvy made a more geographic reference, the term took on a more political meaning with the Cold War and became synonymous with underdeveloped countries (Solarz, 2012). The term "underdeveloped" could be found in the US assistance initiatives for so-called Third World countries (Pan, 1950, pp. 268–270). At the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) archives, the issues like modernization and foreign aid were a subset of the development discussion and

"underdeveloped countries" was the most used term that referred to the Third World by the US circles (E. S. Jo, 2020). Third World became an explanatory framework and classification for the US-led bloc. Furthermore, considering that Cold War terminology is based on the conception of America, US-led international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) divisions are based mainly on the same criteria as the US called. They classified countries based on their level of development and taxonomies or spatial differentiation like least developed, developing and developed, north and south, and First and Third World countries have been used to identify diverging development paths (Crowther-Heyck, 2006, pp. 420 - 446). All of these definitions and classifications are theory-laden; measuring development is modeled upon the Western experience of progress that America and the modernization theory shape, but from the 1950s to the present day, these definitions were employed in Türkiye and Korea, and they are classified as underdeveloped countries (Rostow, 1959, p. 7). Third World development was inevitably construed through the US' Cold War rhetoric and discourse. Gunnar Myrdal calls this "diplomacy by language/terminology" (Myrdal, 1968, p. 8) and the post-war period is proof of that.

As the world's most destructive war, the Second World War, came to a conclusion — economic growth understandably became the primary policy objective of all nations but mainly for the most vulnerable ones, i.e. the newly independent and underdeveloped countries. The belief that development can be measured and quantified was directed in the first half of the 20th century. This “quantified development” (Hettne, 2009, p. 3) understanding prevailed that divides the whole into data and makes it data-compatible. Then, the collected data is transmitted to a network, yet, development is much more than this quantified approach. It is both a process and phenomenon that has quantitative and qualitative dimensions. It is affected by social contests, public authority, institutional designs, political settlement, crisis, and unrealized demands. Even in fields like economics, where quantitative research methods are prevalent, significant changes are often qualitative, which may not be easily quantified and impossible to reduce to a numerical scale meaningfully (Ang,

2016, p. 286). Gunnar Myrdal emphasizes the totality of the development process needing to transcend the conventional segregation of economic and non-economic factors (Myrdal, 1957, pp. 25–27).

The underlying reason for the concentration on the economic nature of development is that the US power underpinned the golden age of post-war development under the banner of the modernization theory. Modernization theory takes development as linear economic progress that underdeveloped countries should follow the developed countries' policies. It is a phased, homogenizing, irreversible, progressive, lengthy process that tries to emulate the West's development and democratic model (So, 2008, pp. 33–35). In such an "*histoire raisonnée*" process, the form of society is determined by the superior Western model, which must be attained (Shafer, 1988b, p. 49). With the great assistance of government and private sector organizations, American social scientists and policymakers focused on the issues of economic progress, political stability, and social and cultural transformation in other parts of the world.

From World War II to the end of the Cold War, the development issue went through key paradigm shifts. The Cold War history of development paradigms can be divided into three main periods. During the process that started with Rostow's Non-Communist Manifesto continued until the 1960s, national development was the focal point, and the US promoted the capitalist path of development. The block led by the Soviet Union and Communists is defined as “other” (Yilmaz & Bilgin, 2005, p. 51). Third World countries focused on national development plans to reach self-sustaining growth that could be attained through increased national income per capita through rapid industrialization and agricultural development, as the modernization theory assumed. In addition, education, healthcare, and infrastructure investments were considered necessary to boost the national income per capita. Moreover, state intervention was considered crucial during this period since it played a key role in investment and economic development policies. In the second period, the views against the modernization theory (like *dependencia*) that marked the first period and the argument that economic growth, which is its most basic assumption, is a panacea for development rose. "Development" took on the international and social dimension, so

its theorization continued (Hansson & Öjendal, 2017, p. 126). In the third period, when the post-war economic boom ended in 1973, the shortcomings of state-led development came into sight, and the nation-oriented development approach became unostentatious. Less state and more market became a slogan. Between 1945 and 1990, development passed through these three turning points and indeed, international development became a common concern with the end of the Cold War.

This is why "development" is expected to have complex and elusive meanings and implications in different periods. While concepts are being explained, their meanings are given concerning their antonyms. This includes ideological stances and biases as seen in development versus underdevelopment. In the simplest terms, "development" implies some form of progressive change. In terms of lexical meaning, the term "development" refers to a specific stage of growth or improvement, a novel and progressive product or concept; an occurrence that marks a new stage in a changing scenario (*Development*, n.d.). The last quarter-century experience illustrates that aggregate economic growth benefits most people most of the time; it is inextricably linked to success in other dimensions of development (Frieden & Lake, 2000, p. 385). The subject matter of the domains of IPE, namely economic, political, sociological, and psychological domains, are inextricably related in reality (Furtado, 1964, p. 15); "development" that aims to achieve well-being and the common good is involved in this reality and represents the whole gamut of change (M. P. Todaro & Smith, 2012, p. 16), i.e. substantial social structure, public opinion and national institutions alterations, in addition to the acceleration of economic growth, the elimination of poverty, and the lessening of inequality. Development, in its broadest sense, refers to a process bringing forth changes that enable people to reach their full human potential. It entails comparing progress from an initial to the desired state (Mascarenhas, 1999, p. 1). This is why it is about a country's internal and external limits and how it uses them. Naturally, therefore, the construction of international political economy matters. However, in order to have a better understanding of the dimension of development issues, we need to draw briefly on IPE, which is concerned with how national political and economic processes interact with international (global, transnational, and

multilateral) ties, as stated by Wallerstein since there can be no such thing as national development independent of the functions of the world system (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 390).

2.3. The Post-War United States and Its Understanding of Development

As both an initiative and a scholarly discipline, development was addressed systematically and through a formal line of inquiry immediately following WWII (Rapley, 2007b, p. 1). Two important debates have marked development studies. The first, occurring between the 1950s to the late 1970s, was mainly between theories of modernization, dependency, and world system. These are also acceptable models for understanding US-Third World economic interactions, Holsti argues (Holsti, 2004, pp. 57–88). To a certain extent, the second debate, between neo-liberalism and these prior conflicts gave rise to neo-statism. (Minns, 2006b, p. 4). The first debate mainly revolved around modernization theory and its implications since the US has shaped the post-war political economy with steps based on modernization theory. The modernization theory helped the US implement four interlinked tools: foreign economic aid, military intervention, trade policies and rural modernization projects. All of these were promoted under the banner of "development." America's post-war role, with its policy tools and a wide array of social, economic, and political projects aimed at fostering development, was shaped by the theoretical support of the modernization school. Therefore, the origins of development are bound up with US power and its strategies for the Third World.

Discourse creates reality (Cullather, 2000, p. 644). The meaning of development was associated with the ideas and policies derived from the modernization theory and even development/modernity has become the norm for other societies. In simpler terms, modernization portrays economic and technological development and offers to repeat the process of transformation first experienced by Western society. The Western experience was the norm for advancement, and it set the benchmark for the rest of the

world, and the Third World's developmental path taken long ago by Western countries should be followed. Stagnant, traditional and backward had to take the creativity, invention, rationality, and honorable behavior and ethics of the West to reach "the Western mind." (Blaut, 1993) So that they can reach a similar level of development. Implementing the proposed development policies would help overcome fundamental problems such as unemployment, poverty, low living standards, poor environmental conditions, clean water supply, and child mortality. Economic and technological development was humanity's ultimate goal because underdevelopment was the primary challenge essential to winning the Cold War for the US. The essence of this grand narrative is found in the modernization theory (Gülalp, 1998, p. 951).

The modernization theory as a social science paradigm acquired influence with the end of WWII but is not a phenomenon that flared up suddenly after the war; its origins date back to the Enlightenment; the concept of development is closely related to the optimism of the Enlightenment of the 16th and 17th centuries and the progress of the late 19th century since modernism was a project of the Enlightenment and contained many dimensions, including societal advancement, the secular notion of progress and rational, scientific, technological, and administrative activities. Enlightenment ideas about the impact of science on society were accompanied by an abiding and optimistic faith in progress (Tucker, 1999, p. 9). Modernization theory "was a kind of late child of the enlightenment faith in progress." (Bellah, 1980, p. 62).

As a continuation of this understanding, even though the origins of the concept were diffused, deriving from the ideas and trust in the concept of human progress derived from nineteenth-century European social thought (Turner, 1984, p. 1). Modernization theory which was mainly the continuation of classical sociological theories dominated academic discourses following the end of WWII till the late 1970s. Founded and based on the sociology of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Herbert Spencer, the modernization school has fallen under the dominance of the intellectual tradition of the West. Rosenstein, Rodan, Nurkse, Hirschman, Mrydal, and Singer are scholars of European origin, while Hoselitz and Rostow are the most prominent American scholars. The theory is further enriched by the works of Talcott Parsons, Daniel Lerner,

Alex Inkeles, Samuel Huntington, Edward A. Tiryakian, and David Apter. Nevertheless, the closest origins of the theory can be traced back to the studies of American social scientists, intellectuals, and elites. The development discourse was based mainly on Western ideas of progress and growth. The US, its agencies, and US-backed international organizations dominated development agendas based on modernization theory. Furthermore, development came to the fore as a powerful combination of policy, action and understanding during the Cold War (Sidaway, 2014, p. 228).

The modernization theory hailed from the behavioral revolution, a shift in US social science that began in the late 1940s and ascended till the early 1970s. The theory influenced discourse on development in the social sciences. Modernization theory today is a fairly big tent with considerable internal contestation and diversity of thought from conservative to liberal-oriented approaches (Jones, 2019, p. 1121; Klinger, 2019, p. 121). Classical Modernization Theory (it will be referred to as the modernization theory throughout this dissertation) emerged in the 1950s included scholars like Walt Whitman Rostow and Daniel Lerner. Over time, the neo-modernization theory, the second modernization theory, the integrated modernization theory and the multiple modernities paradigm challenged and furthered the modernization theory. Moreover, some scholars examine the varieties of modernization theories in two: The modernization began with the completion of Adam Smith's magnum opus- *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), then the diffusion of modernization continued with the works of David Ricardo, Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter, Angus Maddison. The second modernization theory emphasizes that national advancement is a measurable phenomenon and that being developed is directly proportional to per capita income, advanced technology, industrialization, capital and skill (He, 2012, pp. vi-vii). Rather than all these different approaches, the classical modernization theory guided American foreign policy in the Cold War. The role of Rostow and his conception of the stages of growth is important in promoting the classical modernization theory. Walt Whitman Rostow and his colleagues were the leading figures. Rostow's influence on countries that experienced

colonization and gained independence after WWII and the design of US foreign policy throughout the 1960s was crucial. He left his MIT professorship and joined the Kennedy administration. He also continued through the Johnson administration, ultimately becoming Johnson's national security advisor (Mulcahy, 1995, p. 223). His influence still casts a long shadow over American foreign policy, such as President George W. Bush's response to the September 11, 2001 attacks and his effort to establish the Millennium Challenge Account to stimulate economic development. (Klinger, 2019, p. 163).

The modernization theory puts emphasis on the process of change and the idea of human progress and the dichotomy of traditional and modern. The three interrelated processes of transformation are economic, social and political development. Economic development denotes to material changes, including industrialization, urbanization and mechanization. Social development refers to secularization, the rule of science and logic and the minimizing the influence of religiosity. Political development implies a centralized and democratized state. Industrialization, secularization and democratization constitute modernization theory's 'holy trinity' (Göksel, 2015, p. 82). The historical transformation of Western European and North American experience constitutes the basis of being developed. Thus, modernity and modernization are equated with Westernization.

To fully understand both the temporal and spatial dimensions of modernization and development, we should understand the context within which theories emerge. In the immediate post-war political-economic conjuncture, three fundamental events were influential in formulating the new understanding of the development and shaping of US policies. The first was that the competing social system escalated in a wide geographic area after WWII, and capitalism was restructured worldwide under the US hegemony. There was tension and political competition between the US and the Soviet Union, which determined the economic and political conjuncture after WWII and led to the Cold War. The second dynamic that should be considered in conjunction with the first is the process of decolonization after the mid-1950s. Former colonies gained independence and became new nation-states, but most were poor. One of the critical

aspects of this process was which camp or block, capitalist or socialist, and these young nation-states would be found in. These countries searched for their place and the development path or model they would adopt. The third issue was that these former colonies and less industrialized countries needed to overcome their economic underdevelopment through the appropriate policies, investments, aid, and the provision of capital, machinery, technical skills, and industrialization.

In this Cold War context, the US, as a hegemon, led the process and shaped the international political economy; since the US model of development has become the norm and pervades most of the world. The development seen as an element of modernization was shaped by each element in the Bretton Woods System the US created, i.e. the modernization theory. Accordingly, theories of social sciences reflect a Western bias since post-war approaches and theories to development and literature were dominated by modernization theory. The main purpose of modernization theorists was to build a development theory comprised of economic, social, political, cultural, and psychological facets and facilitate the progress towards being developed for underdeveloped societies through different means.

There were international factors that triggered the spread of the modernization theory. The first is the bipolar structure that started to take shape immediately after the war. The Cold War between the US-represented Bretton Woods systems with its liberal-capitalist market concept and, on the other side, the USSR that advocated the application of socialist economic principles influenced the modernization literature. Secondly, the spread of the modernization theory following the end of WWII is rooted in America's new position of international hegemony. Post-war US policymaking included functionalizing liberal market economies and preventing the communist spread. In terms of the US, the ideological side of modernization was best reflected in the containment (of communism). American hegemony had material capacity options (military and economic sovereignty) and non-material elements like ideology and culture. According to the US, the resistance to Communism would occur in people's minds and their ideology, i.e. their inner spaces. This was ideally suited to the Cold War spirit: the task of winning hearts and minds. America's aim was to implement

reforms in a non-violent and peaceful way. Non-violent campaigns were effectively conducted in three realms: military, economic, and psychological. Finally, in this bipolar world, actors have constantly resorted to foreign aid, grants, or donations. At the global scale, the US acted with a modernizing and civilizing mission, aiming for economic efficiency and aiding and empowering the Third World (Shanin, 1997, p. 66). US policymakers adopted a long-term development strategy that envisioned a military-dominated, development-focused regime integrated into US-led international institutions and the regions of third-world nations. (B. R. Simpson, 2008, p. 5). The US offered its allies and partners, first and foremost, military protection, economic access to its markets, economic and technical aid. Through these policies, the world contracted out to the US to provide a new governance system (Ikenberry & Mo, 2013, p. 170), to resist communism or to prevent Third World countries from succumbing to communism (*The Truman Doctrine, 1947*, n.d.-a).

Solutions to all political, economic, and military problems were taken with scientific knowledge resonating with the modernization theory (D. C. Engerman, 2003, p. 67). The faith in a scientific approach leads to the universal path to the optimal model of development, founded on Western models (Latham, 2000b, p. 288). In order to promote development in the Third World, the implementation of policy tools must be directed at internal dynamics by the First World, using themselves as a model. The US and the USSR designed development-specific programs to extend their spheres of influence (Bracarense, 2012, p. 378). The modernization theory sees development as an evolutionary, pacificatory, driving force of equality, justice, inclusiveness, and economic rationality. So it can alleviate insurgencies and conflicts (Hibou & Bono, 2017, pp. 3–4). The modernization theory takes up development as an evolutionary and progressivist perspective, and the development is based on observable economic, political, social and cultural criteria differences between underdeveloped and developed countries. As mentioned above, development was therefore evaluated as one-sided (economic growth) and quantitative.

The modernization theory argues that endogenous factors and inner dynamics are the reasons why countries are backward. Internal variations like cultural practices or

institutions are ignored and expected to evolve from a traditional to a contemporary society. Traditional societies should acquire the characteristics of Western societies as typical ideal structures. The possibilities of interaction, interpenetration and demarcation between traditional and modern societies are denied, and traditional societies are reduced to a semi-factual epiphenomenal status devoid of their dynamics (Inkeles, 1969, p. 208). Representatives of the modernization school evaluate development and underdevelopment over macro-indicators, which are national income or gross national product. Democracy is expected to result in an improvement in the economic status of countries. Democracy and liberalization were presented as immanent features of development. Variables such as income per head, gross income, infrastructural facilities, and education type distinguish a developed country from a developing one. Consequently, it is expected that improvement in economic indicators should lead to a politico-economic transition in a particular country.

According to the modernization theory, the world is composed of independent national societies, each following a comparable pattern of development on the evolutionary ladder from a traditional to a modern society. However, each starts this process at different time points and different speeds. Nevertheless, to attain a position of relative prosperity, every state must go through the same stages that today's advanced (Western) societies went through in the past by emphasizing economic growth (Tayfur, 2003a, p. 1). The process of development was considered a linear line. Underdeveloped countries should follow the paths followed by the developed countries, i.e. Western societies and the changes in Anglo-American value systems, institutional structures, democracy, and economic life occurring in the 19th century especially. The reasons for becoming underdeveloped lie in internal dynamics. For this reason, these societies cannot develop when they are left with their developmental process. They can be 'developed' or reach the level of the First World like their Western counterparts by dismantling the obstacles in their internal structures and instituting systematic interventions that can create features not typically found in these countries and that have absorbed the rationale of industrialization. Hence, this traditional approach to development centered on industrialization.

Still, the conceptualization and classification of development are made based on these measurable and quantifiable criteria. This is because the idea of development and development studies has been shaped and influenced by this Eurocentric viewpoint. For example, development/développement in its lexical meaning in the Petit Robert Dictionary (1987) is listed as follows: “Developing country or region, whose economy has not yet reached the level of North America, Western Europe, etc. Euphemism was created to replace underdeveloped.” (Rist, 2008, p. 8) To be developed is to be Euro-American (Cullather, 2000, p. 646). Development is defined as “to progress from earlier to later stages of maturation.” (Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary, 1984) Daniel Lerner's modernization definition is “the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquires characteristics common to more developed societies” (Lerner, 19681, p. 386). These definitions show how the US and Western countries' understanding or development model pervades the discourse and IR discipline. America created a "dictionary" during the Cold War period.

The concept of development can be considered a Western-based belief system in an anthropological sense, with the taxonomies it created, reproduced and imposed (such as first world-third world, underdeveloped-developing-developed). In this context, it is extensively questioned. However, this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis. Just like the concept of progress, which provided the justification for the colonial civilization mission of 19th century Europe and was the precursor of development, the concept of development also accepted an understanding of history that follows a single line (evolutionary) as a presupposition, which is an understanding brought by the theory of modernization.

In the US, there was an increased interest in non-Western societies in knowing the enemy (Soviet/the Second World) and the Third World in the period following the end of WWII. As a result, the US entered an intensive knowledge production process and accelerated its efforts to modernize the Third World. For example, in 1943, a report prepared by the Committee on World Regions of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) stated that "...the urgent need for social scientists to know different regions of the world comes in the second rank just after the need for an army and navy officers

to know actual and potential battle areas..." (Wallerstein, 1997, p. 195). This urgent need coincided with the US mission to civilize and modernize underdeveloped countries. The concept of "underdeveloped" came into circulation in 1949 with the occasion of a speech by American President Henry S. Truman. For Truman, the state of underdeveloped areas refers first and foremost to being behind the American level of development or the American way of life (*The Challenge of International Aid*, n.d.). On the same day that 2 billion people were suddenly called as underdeveloped, societies polarized as developed and underdeveloped (Esteva, 2009, p. 7). And modernization theory and its theorists were ready to intervene with their prescriptions for the underdeveloped/Third World. The US improved and developed underdeveloped areas with American scientific knowledge and industrial progress.

Following this call for urgent action, the first step was establishing Area Studies Chairs, under which students started to be educated. Area Studies Chairs represented both the US academic and policy-making circles. Many prominent names, from academia to officials, became advocates of applying the modernization theory in US foreign relations. In addition, universities, think tanks, and foundations were involved in the modernization projects. The intertwining of the academy and the foreign policy circle is characterized as a "mutually reinforcing system of knowledge and power," as Latham argues, and "the interpenetration of the scientific and the political," as Solovey argues (Latham, 2003, p. 12; Solovey, 2001, p. 165). The US was confident in solving the problems of the Third World. The aim was also to understand and improve relations with the underdeveloped countries inside the Free World. The growth in area studies was associated with America's effort to understand these countries and the desire to know about them. Many people received training in the US, and many experts in the US were sent to the countries in emerging areas, learned the languages of those countries, and created an archive for the US by preparing many reports. The US Government, its agencies and philanthropic institutions resorted to many direct or indirect ways and scientific activities to understand both the free world countries and those outside, for example, communist studies for North Korea and China; modernization studies for Japan and South Korea (Cumings, 2019, p. 8).

At that time, the theory of modernization was very promising because it aimed to achieve three separate goals: providing an explanation for the development and ascent of the West, the conclusions drawn from this experience guiding nation-building for others and contributing to the integration of political science and sociology into previous research into a cumulative social science of change (Klinger, 2019, p. 117). Three main institutions had a role in the realization of these aims and the advancement of modernization theory. The modernization theory was mainly promoted through the efforts of social scientists in Harvard's Department of Social Relations, founded by Talcott Parsons in 1945, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), founded in 1923, and MIT's Center for International Studies (MITCIS), founded in 1951. Other private institutions and epistemic communities such as the American Council of Learned Societies, the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations that also had a crucial role in improving the area studies were funded by the National Defense Education Act (1958). This Act, per the US national security interests and national needs, aimed to encourage and assist the educational programs (National Defense Education Act, 1958) and "... established the legitimacy of federal funding of higher education and made substantial funds available for low-cost student loans, boosting public and private colleges and universities." (U.S. Senate: Sputnik Spurs Passage of the National Defense Education Act, 1957) Specifically, with the outbreak of the Korean War, American funding for research increased from 140 million to 5.5 billion of dollars per year until 1960. This tremendous boom in funding for research was channeled into development studies, area studies, and the creation of new scientific and knowledge-generating organizations (Geiger, 1993, p. 29; Leslie, 1993, p. 1).

During the 1950s, US army officials and social scientists worked together to halt the spreading of communism in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Furthermore, the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) was established in 1956 as an interdisciplinary research institute formed by the Army and American University. For 15 years, SORO's researchers and Pentagon officials worked together by writing reports and producing handbooks on foreign areas to identify what was needed and what processes were needed to create stable, developed, and democratic nations; some

examples included Türkiye, Japan and Korea (Croker, 1961, pp. 112–125). Also, the SORO created a Counterinsurgency Information Analysis Center, which later became a major military center for counterinsurgency research to estimate foreign areas' revolutionary potential (Solovey, 2013, pp. 71–72).

The symbiotic relationship between academia, think tanks, and policy-making circles mutually reinforced knowledge production (Latham, 2003, p. 12; Solovey, 2001, p. 165). At that time this was indicated as the "social scientists were converted into social practitioners" (Ball, 1989, p. 81) in the report prepared by the Russell Sage Foundation in 1950. Hence, like the discipline of international relations, IPE studies and development studies also became American-centered; Americans dominated discourse and spread their views everywhere. Debates at the center of development studies revolved around Americans' ideas, which were reflected in practice. The modernization theory deeply led American policymaking, society, and how one thought about the world. The idea of progress is substantial, involving modernization theory, development strategy, and the goal of economic growth. It can be categorized as being threefold: an ideology, a tool of industrialization, and a general construction device (Shanin, 1997, p. 68).

During the construction process and policy implementation of the modernization theory in the Third World/underdeveloped countries, there was a strong interconnection between US governmental agencies and foundations and newly-established international organizations. On the one hand, the developments in the international arena, such as newly independent countries, the rise of the US as a superpower, and the communist movement spread pushed third-world countries the search for a new model. On the other hand, American political elites and social scientists who realized these developments started working in the Third World. The US government provided its institutions with regional experts by expanding research and teaching programs. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regularly debriefed government officials. US scholars traveled to Third World countries to do fieldwork, and the State Department frequently sought out the advice of members of these countries. A typical example of this is that of Paul G. Hoffman, who was the first

administrator of the Marshall Plan between 1948-50, the first president of the Ford Foundation from 1951 to 1953 and, later, the administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) between 1966-72 (Whitman, 1974). Even though the US government strongly supported area studies (*Federal Funding of Foreign Affairs Research*, 1970), research on these was funded mainly by philanthropic foundations such as the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie foundations (Lockman, 2004, p. 125). As a result, remarkable literature on the development of the Third World, mainly the Middle East and Asia regions, was produced.

The modernization theory provided US policy-making circles with a theoretical framework to understand problems and provide solutions. Moreover, American social scientists' circles accepted that development meant accomplishing a single aim, which was, in essence, a Western path to modernity (D. C. Engerman, 2003). Cultural influences, the expansion of the US and international markets and changes in property relations led to a transition in societies. The establishment of free market economies, the acceptance of foreign investment in a country, and democratic political institutions are the main pillars of modernization. Modernizing elites often lead this process in societies. Furthermore, the market is the source of capitalist dynamism by generating change and social mobility (Held, 1984, p. 64).

US policymakers acknowledged "modernization" as such a panacea that it seemed like the end would justify the means. Many came to view modernization as a means of accelerating the trajectory of history by claiming that the US, with its society and history, possessed the power to transform the world and had to play a leading role. Development became a tool of Free World bloc consolidation and solidarity, and 'underdevelopment' was seen as a breeding ground for communism, defined as an "authoritarian ideology." (Hayes, 1950, p. 29). Moral perspectives on the United States' relations with the Third World and US development projects sought to provide a free and liberal order and to universalize the American understanding of modernity. By employing the modernization theory in various policies, the US has tried to institutionalize its commanding position by prescribing liberal foreign policies while implementing interventionist practices.

The modernization theory and developmentalism mark the period following the end of WWII, and it can be claimed that it has remained valid since then. However, Engerman and Unger correctly argue, "We are still at the beginning of the study of modernization as global history." (D. C. Engerman & Unger, 2009, p. 385). The views on the neoliberal transformation of the 1980s had some common characteristics with the modernization theory. Furthermore, the theory has been reconsidered with the terms 'new modernization' and 'neo-modernization'. Nevertheless, development has continued to be negatively affected by its modern origin, in which economic growth was the panacea to progress (Hansson & Öjendal, 2017, p. 125).

2.3.1. Rostow and Five Stages, Two Ideals, and the Cold War

With the end of WWII, new and massive power asymmetries, a devastating international order and nations, and an uncertain future had emerged. The US rose to the status of a kind of "global empire" and not only did it legitimize this empire but also supported building it in meaningful ways (Cox, 2003, p. 10). The US was in an unprecedented position to influence global politics. The security-driven development approach was adopted to counter Communism. Anti-Soviet foreign policy and global anti-communism were legitimate policy parameters in all major capitalist countries (Gowan, 2004, p. 258). Thus, both internal and external features of the reshaped core capitalist states tended to provide what the US wanted in international politics (Gowan, 2004, p. 259). According to Gowan, the US virtually made West Germany and Japan, the two main centers of industrial capitalism outside the United States, dependent on his protégés and other capitalist giants for their security, turning them into dependent semi-mandates (Gowan, 2004, p. 258). On the underdeveloped state's side, US supremacy took the form of an invited empire or hegemony rather than a top-down one since the power of the US was also intensified by their fears of dominance and abandonment (Ikenberry, 2000, p. 341).

The modernization theory set the stage for the US global commitment to contain where communism already existed, to prevent its further expansion, and to bring countries

under its domination by presenting a self-image of the US and other western countries and by establishing the necessary institutional infrastructure for international cooperation, i.e. Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs).² The Bretton Woods System was rounded out by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Under this system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which today is part of the World Bank, were established. They are part, in theory, of the UN system, yet they are autonomous in practice (Willis, 2005, p. 41) provided funds to development projects and aimed to form a stable and free-flow international trading environment. Also, the creation of other specialized agencies with a functional role to play in developmental issues closely linked to the central UN machinery, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) or the International Labor Organization (ILO). Under the UN umbrella, UN Development Fund, UN Development Programme, UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization and Regional Economic Commissions were formed (Hawkins, 1990, pp. 112–113). The UN also launched many initiatives, such as the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development in 1958. Moreover, because the US prevailed over the UN General Assembly, particularly till the late 1950s, the US established them as active in development. Ultimately, the US and the international organizations cooperated to achieve specific developmental goals.

The language, thought, and policies originating from the modernization theory dominated the US approach to underdeveloped countries for the remainder of the twentieth century. As Latham argues that the modernization theory “functioned as a powerful ideology about the nature of American society and its ability to accelerate, shape, and direct the forces of change in an increasingly postcolonial world.” (Latham,

² BWIs is composed of two leading organizations: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. World Bank Group has five agencies that are International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)

1998). The theory's main assumptions, the linear understanding of development, a distinct divide between traditional and modern societies, the integrated and interdependent economic, political and social changes, industrial development, science as a common destiny, and faith in capitalism that are supported by state regulation (Latham, 2000c, p. 4). The US development package has operationalized the logic, metaphor, and narrative of Rostow's model that aimed at helping the third world within the liberal capitalist political-economic order (Pearce, 2001, p. 37). In his cult study, he defined development in relation to modernity that was to be substantiated in a capitalist context rather than in a communist one (Rostow, 1959b, p. 1). Inasmuch as, he believed that communism and its developmental techniques in underdeveloped regions of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa led only to chronic starvation (Rostow, 1955b, p. 30).

As mentioned in the first part of the thesis, the development package directed by the US to other countries depended on the degree of danger they faced. The danger of communism influenced the decisions of policymakers. Rostow examines the meaning and nature of the paths that America and Russia have followed in their development path. He elaborates on the differences in the precondition phase of development. One of the first differences is that Russia was a country where there were settled institutions such as the Church and the State, there were serious land problems, there was no merchant middle class, the population living in villages and the uneducated population was very high, while in America, on the contrary, there was a political system in which there were free farmers who had their own land, people were born free, there was a merchant segment with high entrepreneurial skills, and that there was a political system that could facilitate a switch to industrialization. Other differences were the per capita income and diffusion of technology, the fact that America has established close ties in the international economy and gained relative political freedom, and lastly, Russia invested less in construction, infrastructure, and agriculture than the United States at that time (Rostow, 1959b, pp. 98–103). Rostow's comparison of Russia and America shows why the four main tools that make up the development package are important.

Rostow, who discussed the military and economic powers in detail, stated that the total investment made by the Soviets in the military field was equal to that of the US, but while the US had aerial and sea superiority, the Soviets went forward in the field of medium and long-range missiles and research and development (R&D). In economic terms, it is stated that Russia made a great effort and began to catch up with the developed economies in the West. And he states that the problem posed by today's Russia was that it made a modernization movement that was not seen anywhere else, while the main thing America should do was to help Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and India. The underdeveloped countries should also keep the population growth under control, solve the inflation problem. The aid of the US and the West should increase to these countries in order to ensure their efficiency in the democratic regime and economy (Rostow, 1959b). Therefore, the development of the Third World depends primarily on the resources of America and the West. He says the problem is not in the mysterious East, but in the inscrutable West (Rostow, 1959b, p. 105).

According to Rostow, “modernization is a dynamic process occurring through the interaction of the economic, political, social and psychological forces in a society.” (Millikan & Blackmer, 1961, p. 136). The dichotomy of traditional and modern underlies the modernization theory. To be modern, continuous and progressive change was the only way. Progress in the economy means better security and political conditions since there is a close relationship between political underdevelopment and economic growth. Economic growth, industrial development, and the establishment of complementary social and political institutions designed on the model of the US were therefore equated with development. The US needed to support the Third World by sharing its capital, resources, and know-how. As a result, America could bring the Third World into the modern age of capitalism and liberal democracy.

Rostow offers five stages to transition to modernity and projects a natural and universal developmental sequence that all nations must pass. Economic growth is measured by achieving a certain level of investment as a proportion of GNP (Rosen, 1985, p. 26) is based on the five stages of development: traditional society, preconditions for take-off,

take-off, and drive to maturity, followed by a period of high mass consumption. As a result of this linear progress, a country can reach self-sustaining growth by concentrating on national development plans. Political development would follow economic development, that is, democracy, and these two were seen as interdependent and beneficial in reciprocally promoting each other. The assumption of the modernization theory regarding the role of authoritarian regimes in the development process can be summarized as follows: authoritarian political regimes outperform democratic regimes until the economic development level of underdeveloped and developing countries is increased to the level of development. This assumption or expectation was the main reason for many Western countries, especially the US, to support authoritarian governments, especially during the Cold War years (Halperin et al., 2005, p. xiv).

All societies would linearly go through this process along the same path toward development. Rostow and his colleagues had natural optimism that economic development was irreversible after "take-off," Traditional societies need help to catch up with the modern societies supported mainly by aid and investment. Rostow argued that American foreign aid could assist developing nations in eventually reaching the take-off stage, in which industrialization increased and the economy transformed from agriculture to manufacturing (Grubbs, 2003, p. 17). The vital point here is that the stage of preconditions does not emerge endogenously but rather as a result of some external interference by advanced countries; this was the prescription Rostow recommended. Since the modernization theory takes the causes of underdevelopment as internal but quantitatively measurable, external assistance like economic aid would ensure the material advancement that led to progress in the economy, social, cultural and political spheres.

The point reached after these stages would be American-style consumer capitalism. They regarded underdevelopment as an outcome of deficiencies internal to the underdeveloped countries themselves. Underdevelopment is a condition that every nation has experienced once in its history. In this universal and evolutionary model proposed by the modernization theory, while underdeveloped countries follow the

course of development of the West, the external interventions carried out by the First World on this path are regarded as absolute and legitimate. If Western societies, especially America, show the necessary skills, actions, and will, they will find a place in the economic and global design of the "Free World." Third World countries can thus be developed through the spread of Western values, economics, and technology. Deutsch expressed this: "In the course of economic development... countries are becoming somewhat less like Ethiopia and somewhat more like the United States." (Deutsch, 1961, p. 498).

By virtue of the US' overriding concern with the communist threat, the modernization theory was seen as a counteragent to Soviet socialism. The communist revolution in China in 1949 and the tendencies toward communism in Korea led to the fear in the US that the Soviet model of development could be more attractive in many Third World countries. As a policymaker and scholar, Rostow argued that the US should support the expansion of human resources, lay down basic transportation, provide communication, irrigation, and power facilities and promote the equal distribution of land and the transformation of the agricultural sector for the development of the "backward" or "undeveloped" countries (Millikan & Blackmer, 1961, p. 47). In line with these policy recommendations, at that time, the dominant form of US policy during this period was cooperation among free world countries based on their development and security needs. Through the end of WWII, during the 1944 election, to achieve a stabilized interdependent world, the Republican Party's postwar foreign policy committee of the US advocated that the US should be part of the post-war cooperation to hinder military aggression, expand international trade, and secure monetary, financial, and economic stability (Ikenberry, 2000, p. 346; Williams, 1998, pp. 98–100). To prevail in the domains of politics, economics, and the military, the US utilized four primary tools from her development toolbox to strengthen the Third World's state capacity and secure her interests.

The first was economic development through foreign economic aid (Rostow, 1964, p. 123). First aid packages were applied in Türkiye on the European continent; subsequently, the same strategies were adopted in Asia because, initially, the US had

not had a strategy towards Asia. What works in Europe was analyzed first and then applied to Asia. This is why longstanding American allies such as Türkiye and Korea are good case studies to study and compare. Looking at the current situation, we also have to consider the intense American engagement during the Cold War. The flow of economic aid, substantial investment and trade ties, and the transfer of Western innovations could close the gap between traditional and modernized countries. Rostow advocated that the US should direct and increase aid to other nations due to communist pressure. More importantly, he argued that the US should keep separate economic aid from military aid (T.-G. Park, 2001, p. 58). As countries pass through these five stages, the velocity of this unfolding modernization process could be accelerated through foreign economic and technical aid (Blaney & Inayatullah, 2002, p. 104). According to Rostow, the US also needed to build on people's consensus about the need for economic progress. (Rostow, 1959b, pp. 23–25).

The second tool was military involvement through military aid composed of the massive transfer of military equipment, the flow of money and workforce training, and the military installments like bases. Rostow argued that technical aid like educating officers should be part of the military aid since military personnel was the key actors throughout the development process (T.-G. Park, 2001, p. 60). It was not only limited to ideological means since underdevelopment was defined as a threat to the free world. Under US tutelage and military aid, it was a specific operation of survival for the free world. Rostow emphasized the military organization of the countries needing change and the training of their personnel. Militarization was treated as a variable in the modernization and development process in the Third World. The Third World countries joined the military alliances of the US or became the strategic partner of the US that provided bases for the US so that the US could project its power globally.

Rostow recommended that the balanced political and economic system for underdeveloped and developing countries should be included in the capitalist trade system (T.-G. Park, 2001, p. 61; Rostow, 1959b, pp. 93–100). Since underdeveloped countries could not secure investment, massive foreign aid and investments should come from developed countries (J. D. Sachs, 2005, p. 73). Once their economy is

jump-started, all good things will follow. The international integration of goods, services, and capital markets would be ensured through increased trade flow and capital mobility. For him, thanks to military security under US protection, countries would be willing to open their markets to one another, which took us to the third developmental tool of the US. The reincorporation of South Korea and Türkiye into the international political economy was also provided through access to raw materials, credit, consumer and intermediate goods, more importantly, access to American markets. The binding of Third World economies to the US market and integrating the policies and finances of these states with those of the US could be of the greatest benefit to the people of these nations (Örnek, 2013, p. 143). As Lafeber stated, “[u]nder the impact of the industrial revolution Americans began to search for markets not land.” (Lafeber, 1998, p. 407) With the end of the war, the international economy witnessed a remarkable integration in trade, finance, and foreign direct investment because the US willingly and unconditionally opened its markets to Japanese and Korean exports, provided the necessary technologies for their industrial "take-off," and relieved their economic burden, particularly the burden of national defense (Yeung, 2009, p. 203). The US and US-backed international organizations promoted free market capitalism. The Bretton Woods Institutions-the IMF, the WB and GATT- played a critical role in the trade integration and creation of markets for US trade, and they also helped to incorporate US norms and principles. Moreover, by ensuring smooth trade flows among free world countries and markets, the US established an efficient and effective development program to promote a free and prosperous world and win friends for the Free World.

Last but not least, the final tool was again strongly related to the understanding of modernization. Being modern or modern necessitates democracy, to which equalitarian order should be necessary. Thus, those with a privileged position in society should be dissolved, and vast private estates, particularly those with absentee landlords, should also be dissolved (E. Shils, 1966, p. 266). The premise was that development was inextricably tied to productive system transformation. Rostow envisioned development as a series of stages leading from a traditional society to

a mass-producing society after industrialization took off. Before turning to industrial development, Rostow recommended that building up infrastructure and agriculture would lead to balanced economic growth (Rostow, 1955b, p. 30, 1959b, pp. 1–10). Indeed, there were other conditions for development than the absence of a feudal landowning class. However, dismantling the landowner class removed an essential obstacle to development. It also facilitated capital accumulation. Thanks to the US-promoted land reform, what happened in South Korea, in a nutshell, was that the owners were reimbursed by the state of the expropriated land with bonds, and the majority of these bonds were purchased by entrepreneurs at huge discounts. The important point here is that these entrepreneurs were former landowners of those operating in the industry (C. Hamilton, 1986, p. 31). Landowners in Taiwan were compensated with shares in four large state-owned firms producing cement, paper, minerals, and forestry products. (W. F. Bello, 1990, p. 237). Thus, the development path was opened. For this reason, the US promoted land reforms and community development programs in the post-war period. Using these four tools, the US policymakers aimed to speed up the development course of history for underdeveloped countries.

The modernization theory that provided a perfect schema to produce policies in the Third World assumes that aid, trade, investment, technology diffusion and technical assistance would help a country accumulate assets and further its progress. Furthermore, modernization theory explains US Cold War policies and activities toward Türkiye and Korea. The will to be modern/developed made the countries open to US incursion by opening and expanding their markets, scholarly exchanges, advisors, foreign investments, foreign economic aid, military involvement, and the implementation of rural development projects. Furthermore, the cultural base of US engagement was broadening during the Cold War years. American culture, values, and ideology succeeded in penetrating the world; indeed, the recipient countries' ideological stance and willingness to participate in the Free World Alliance against the USSR were also determinative. Türkiye and Korea were two that were willing to participate.

Admittedly, the modernization theory and the physical remaking of Türkiye and Korea within their contours during the Cold War's early stages enable us to reconceive how we approach knowledge practices because one of the most critical tools in the US' ideological arsenal was the modernization theory. Türkiye and Korea emerged as strong test cases for constructing and validating developmental thought and practice. The modernization theory, which left its mark in a series of infrastructure and development projects in Türkiye and Korea, exerted significant influence on American development advisors involved in Türkiye and Korea's development plans (J. Kim, 2019a, p. 5). With the end of WWII, the interpretation of this theory in Türkiye and Korea through US influence dominated both academic discussions and, consequently, policy-making processes (Kansu, 1997, p. 9). For example, Rostow and Parsons' ideas have had a tremendous effect on spreading the modernization theory among Korean and Turkish elites and scholars. The Korean and Turkish mass media thoroughly introduced Rostow's model. Another example is the language Park Chung Hee used. His speeches frequently referred to the dichotomy between traditional and modern society (Seonjnguk-Hujinguk). In the Turkish context, development has long been associated with Westernization, an extension of the modernization concept propagated by US scholars. This shows how the modernization theory interacted with the concerns about the Cold War of the US and with the local conditions of the countries that it engaged.

Since the 1950s, based on these strategies, modernity became a syndrome, and many projects for the development of Third World countries have been planned and implemented; however, the realities the majority of the Third World countries have remained the same. The development concept is still suffering from its modern origin (Hansson & Öjendal, 2017, p. 125); by reducing the development process to a linear process and economic growth and assuming that the road to development must pass through five stages, the unique conditions of the countries have been ignored (Wilber, 1991, p. 69). Also, the modernization theory approached development and underdevelopment problems by reducing cultures to fossilized stereotypes. It was an ahistorical, ethnocentric, ideologically-biased capitalist model of development which

failed to make distinctions between countries and regions and to take into account their unique features; the model assumed that the so-called underdeveloped/traditional/third world nations had no inner dynamism. Modernization theorists see the progress of modernity as inevitable. In other words, if the modernization process starts for any reason, usually due to military, economic, or political interactions with the West, a few traditional aspects of non-western societies are affected and transformed. However, later on, these changes cause a chain of reactions and bring a cumulative series of social changes and transformations. With this problem, the possibilities of interaction, intertwining, and determination between traditional and modern states are rejected. Traditional societies are determined as an "epiphenomenal" that lacks its dynamic (Milor, 2022, p. 59). This reductionist approach, which evaluates development to quantitative economic data, ignores dominance and dependence relations and external factors and renders the relations between countries as aid recipients and aid donors. In addition, history has shown us that the development performance has not been unilinear and revealed the impossibility of universalist claims. To conclude with the words of Alexander Gerschenkron: "Modernization theory obstructs rather than promotes the understanding of processes of economic change." And it did (Gerschenkron, 1977, p. 111).

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the post-war environment in which the US utilized the four tools of its development package on South Korea and Türkiye by exploring it in a broader political economy context. Rostow questions how it happened that at different times in modern history, particular countries progressed more than others, deeply affected and directed the post-war international political economy led by the US and changed countries' futures differently. America's development package, decision-making and foreign policy processes were highly influenced by its practices and the modernization theory, origins, supporters, diffusion, and impact on policy formulation and execution. As a First-World country, the US played a leading role and

advanced tools, policies, and linkages to establish relationships between the Third and First World. American social science, scientists, and scholars dedicated themselves to establishing a base for America's policymaking. The modernization theory provided a justification and framework for the US in establishing relationships between modern and traditional societies.

The impact and pervasiveness of the modernization theory have been very substantial on those being modernized - Türkiye and South Korea - and national and international development planning in many Third World countries and international institutions. The articulation of the modernization theory among US policymakers had already started in the 1930s. However, with the end of WWII, it became an important aspect of US foreign policy policymaking and development discourse. In order to realize its liberal world project, the US has had strategic articulations and confrontations. The promotion of development, along with the American model, is one of them. In the 1950s, universities, research institutes, and foundations were active in recognizing the changing world and non-Western societies. As a result, development became the new intellectual organizing theme in the universities, think tanks, foundations, research institutes, and centers of the US (Wallerstein, 1992, p. 523). There was an increase in area studies programs and in shaping activities within the modernization theory framework. Rostow and other modernization theorists' universal and linear interpretation of development helped shape the American development package in the Third World. As a result, applying the same development tools to different degrees in different countries led to different results in their development experiences when colliding with their internal dynamics.

The security-driven and developmental goals went hand in hand since the US and the recipient countries' national security were the most important. The effectiveness of the four development tools depended on the degree of the US implementation of them and the country's state capacity, institutions etc. Via these four main tools, the US put development at the center of its agenda, and the development experiences of Türkiye and Korea were shaped by modernization theory. The importance of the US tools in shaping different societies' development can be seen in the Turkish and Korean cases.

CHAPTER 3

LAUNCHING THE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE IN THE FREE WORLD

This chapter examines the post-1945 context and the tools the US utilized in the development process, foreign economic aid, trade policy, rural development projects, primarily the promotion of land reform, and military and strategic considerations like the establishment of military bases, an essential feature of the host states' alliances with the US and the most prominent. These four tools make up America's development package to ensure the economic, political, or military stability of countries considered strategically important to the country (Ruttan, 1996, p. 475). Emerging from WWII as the most formidable economic and military power in shaping and leading the international political economy (Gilpin, 2001, p. 243), committed to an economic system based on open markets and economic linkages and accompanied by a system of alliances designed to contain communism (Pempel, 1998a, p. 57), the US provided military protection, foreign economic and technical aid, technology transfer, assistance to education and health sectors, population control mechanisms, and access to its markets. In addition, the US has worked through direct bilateral foreign economic aid and conducted programs and projects that permeate societies. In that regard, land reform and military engagement offer a thorough comprehension of one of the powerful instruments of the US post-WWII, perhaps the most crucial aspect of foreign policy (Kato, 2016, p. xvii).

The issue of development has been identified as a vital and core pillar of US strategic, economic, and political interests since then. One of the critical tools of American foreign policy is the development intertwined with the defense, economy and political aims in US strategies that need to be addressed at home and abroad. To that end, the

US has tried to diversify and strengthen its programs because the loss of any of these instruments of national authority would jeopardize the national security of the US and, in turn, the global order. The following section will look at the post-1945 context, elaborates on how the US framed the development project abroad by inspiring from its internal endeavors, and examine the tools the US utilized in the development process and how the modernization theory became embedded in the Cold War understanding and the present state of Türkiye and Korea. This four-pillar strategy was shaped ideologically by the modernization theory with a specific mode of development that was a state-directed, top-down industrialization project. The change from traditional to modern industrial societies entailed technological changes, bureaucratic institutions, and social and political structures (Gilman, 2018, p. 3). Therefore, the effects of domestic and international events between 1945 and 1990 on these two countries' development processes and the intersection between their policy choices and US strategies will be examined. To understand why Korea has managed to solve most of its development-related problems while Türkiye has been tackling economic, social, and political problems, we should examine the dynamics of the Cold War era and the degree of US engagement in each country. Once these are more detailed and an examination of US approaches to the theory and practice of the development paradigm is carried out—and how it affected the international political economy and specific countries (Korea and Türkiye)—a better overall picture and understanding of the issue is possible.

3.1. Introduction

“Our strategy... must be both global, embracing every part of the world, and total, with political, psychological, economic, and military considerations integrated into one whole.”

Source: United States, International Development Advisory Board, *Partners in Progress*, Rockefeller Report; Washington, 1951, p. 4, quoted in Price, H. B. (1955). *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning*, Cornell University Press, p. 372.

The world political and economic order system has been largely established since 1945, and the idea of transforming societies has gained greater credibility. The conception of development was perceived as catching up with the West, industrialization, technological progress, economic growth, an increase in investment, liberal democracy, and importing technology from and following the path of the West. While some have yielded more results than expected, some have failed. However, in different geographical areas, Türkiye and Korea suffered for different reasons after WWII and were massively dependent on the US. Although Türkiye did not enter the Second World War, it was heavily affected socioeconomically. In Korea, with the victory of the Second World War by the Allies, the 35-year rule of Japan came to an end, and the Korean peninsula was divided into two occupation zones as North and South Korea. Both Türkiye and South Korea are capitalist countries where anti-communist discourse dominates. In the 1960s, Türkiye's GDP was 3.5 times larger than Korea's (*1960-2021, GDP (Current US\$) - Türkiye, Korea, Rep., 2021*). Nonetheless, the late 1970s marked a breaking point, and the entire situation was reversed. The reason for this is that post-war Korean and Turkish development was heavily influenced by the strategies of land reform, military involvement, trade policies, and foreign economic aid of the US that were implemented at different degrees and are socio-economic-political phenomena in the capitalist world order dominated by the US.

The US, called the "national security state," emerged from WWII with fear of revolution and communism, economic instability, and fierce competition for military supremacy of technology and weapons (Raskin, 2004, p. xi). The physical security, promotion of values and economic prosperity were the main concerns and interests of the US. President Truman clarified that these issues were directly associated with the security of the United States and all free nations (*E-Text of State of the Union Addresses, by Harry S. Truman, 1948*). The national security concerns of the US in the post-1945 period dominated its policies toward Turkish and Korean development. The US' developmental tools for Korea and Türkiye were governed by two factors: The recipient country's geopolitical alignment and the degree of an external threat

(communism) that the country faced. The ruling elites of Korea and Türkiye allied themselves uncritically with the US and the Western world, yet they transferred the resources from America differently. Even though the degree of proximity to the communist threat was at the highest level for both countries, the Korean peninsula was one of the top hot spots of the Cold War. The US and Japan allied with South Korea, and Russia and China became North Korea's most important allies. After the Korean War, South Korea's dominant and primary goal was to keep another war or attack away from the Peninsula, particularly from the North. Türkiye's closeness to the Soviet Union, as well as its historical ties to the Middle East, made it vital to the United States.

The end of WWII signaled the advent of a new age in which US policymakers faced challenges like poverty and economic problems. In the eyes of the Americans, underdeveloped countries had to eliminate their backwardness and embrace modernity and the US' three-faceted goals, namely, liberal democracy, open market economies, and the rule of law. US power could organize the international political economy and ensure the expansion of capitalism. The American free market economy was the foundation of all other capitalist and free world development. The US dollar rivaled the monetary order based on a gold sterling standard, and the dollar became an international currency. The US experienced remarkable trade integration. With the massive economic aid programs, the reconstruction of liberalism was an aim because the liberal world had collapsed under British leadership in 1914 and was never reconstructed until 1945. After WWII ended, the US re-established the liberal world order—a kind of resurrection of the liberal world economy—invested in Asian and European countries and provided military security as a first step, especially to countries willing to open their markets to one another. Between 1945 and the 1960s, called the Golden Age, Europe and Japan recovered from war ruins and started to develop rapidly.

A set of economic and ideological concerns has arguably driven US strategy since the 1940s and the present. These mainly served US national interests: security and creating a world "open to U.S. economic infiltration." (Layne, 2006, p. 30) Any instability in the developing world could affect and overwhelm the US, its national security, and its

varied interests. A more imminent challenge, i.e. an ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, embodied the severity of an external threat. In this period of encountering many severe problems, as the US was well aware of its role, prescriptions for US foreign economic and foreign policy were reconsidered and prepared. As a hegemon, the US used every means available to help its allies, challenged the Soviet threat, and created structures to provide an "umbrella" for itself and its allies. America sought to establish its domination in the Pacific and the Middle East, creating economic, political, and military bases.

To secure peace, build a new order out of the ruins of war, and reduce poverty and instability in the developing world, the debate was at the forefront of American politics on how the United States could better manage these problems, which necessitated the country's active engagement. Driven by the motivation of the success brought by the policies implemented in the New Deal period, the US implemented policies for strategic centers in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia: Türkiye, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel in the Middle East; Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam in Asia during the Cold War. The US consolidated its development programs, empowered its institutions, and guided international organizations and financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank, UN, IMF, and WTO in addressing various developmental challenges. Through these institutions, standard rules and an open system of alliances, the US had more room to maneuver in order to sustain the liberal international order.

US policymakers aimed to expedite the transition of traditional societies by facilitating a transformative process that involved the displacement of established values, ideas, and structures in favor of liberal, capitalist, and democratic principles. This desired transformation, which policymakers predominantly observed in the United States, was pursued through various means such as foreign economic aid, technical assistance, rural development initiatives, trade integration, development planning, and military intervention (Latham, 2011b, p. 7). In the economic, social, military, and political realms, the US gave support not just to war-damaged countries but to the Third World, as well. These countries benefited from US foreign programs, aid, investment, and security schemes to ensure development (Stubbs, 1999, pp. 337–355) as the Soviet

threat posed a serious challenge to the historical course of these projects. America's potential to reshape the world through a technologically driven strategy known as modernization arose as “a primary conceptual framework for thinking about US relations with the developing world.” (D. C. Engerman, 2003, p. 135)

Development tools to achieve post-1945 American foreign policy goals were guided by domestic development policies implemented during the 1930s and 40s to solve global problems. By the end of the 1930s, US policymakers had started to develop an early version of modernization theory, which became a distinguishing feature of US foreign policy and American-led development discourse in the years following 1945. American policymakers and academics (in the context of the New Deal and the Good Neighbor Policy) were increasingly willing to perceive other countries as capable of achieving the same level of political and economic development as the US under the tutelage of a benign powerful North America. The destructive consequences of the Great Depression (1929) on the US economy led President Roosevelt to act in the domestic sphere. In the New Deal Period (1933-39), the state intervened systematically to make liberal capitalism strong again, as it had previously collapsed economically and socially. In his 1941 "Four Freedoms" speech, President Roosevelt stated that the US wished to help oversee the rebuilding of the post-war world, promote peace and prosperity, and abolish world poverty since America had experienced several. For this purpose, most policies of the New Deal era were taken as an example in the international sphere to overcome several problems.

3.2. Searching at Home

As William Easterly states, politicians in rich countries are, above all, searchers at home (Easterly, 2007, p. 15). It is, therefore, imperative to take a brief look at what America has experienced in domestic affairs. Even though the modernization theory is associated with the Cold War and Rostow's work, it dates back to the 1930s, when the New Deal was implemented in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The TVA

became a turning point in American development thinking and practice. Working in one of the most underdeveloped regions of the United States, the TVA showed early signs of success with natural and human development resources and created a successful and grand prototype of the state's role in development. More importantly, along with a specific mode of development model promoted by the US abroad, state-directed, top-down industrialization projects and development planning modeled on New Deal programs like the TVA were initiated at home (D. Ekbladh, 2011, pp. 48–58). First with the Point Four Program, then the Truman Doctrine, and last but not least with the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), which was described as a European TVA (Patterson, 2005, p. 131).

The extension of New Deal policies was seen in employment initiatives, long-term planning, state intervention in the economy, and the formation of international institutions funneling capital into underdeveloped areas to promote international monetary stability (Burnham, 1990, p. 36). As soon as Roosevelt took office, he recognized the Soviet Union and initiated aid initiatives to other countries via the Law of Lend Lease. While the Soviets modernized rural and urban areas through industrialization and collectivization in the 1930s, a fear emerged among US scholars and policymakers that the USSR would become stronger. Thus, Roosevelt also took steps to fix unemployment at home and adopted many mechanisms, like the TVA, to rescue Americans from the destructive impacts of the Great Depression. Development plans implemented in this specific region became a model for global development, a scheme to repeat elsewhere. New Deal activism was applied globally, and the TVA was internationalized through American development programs (Cullather, 2002, p. 524).

The New Deal was a recovery package that aimed to restore prosperity to Americans. The New Deal aimed to boost various projects, such as the country's electricity supply, agricultural development, and democracy, through state intervention and planning. This package regulating the banking system introduced measures to protect the rights of those with savings and to prevent banks from lending to create speculation in stock exchanges. The state, through the "Reconstruction Financing Institution," set out to

provide loans in the market at an unprecedented level with the funds it transferred to banks and the industrial sector. As a result, the American economy and social life became administered and managed with the application of Keynesian economic prescriptions.

The Keynesian understanding was the dominant paradigm in directing the American economy at home and managing foreign relations. Keynes transformed liberalism under new terms and conditions after the 1929 of Great Depression. Classical liberalism was updated and adapted to the Keynesian world, and efforts were made to show the harsh realities of communism and to create sensitivity and awareness for the free world. Keynesianism justifying state intervention created a favorable intellectual ground for the emergence of development economics, which also advocated for the necessity of systematic state intervention in developing underdeveloped countries; the state's task was to provide stability at home and support the functioning of the capitalist system (Dube, 1988, p. 37). Between 1949 and 1973, Western countries, led by the US—despite its very different political parties in power—embarked on an engineering of stable economic growth and standard of living with Keynesian governance and control of wage relations. Then, as internal problems slowly eased, the focus shifted toward the US' foreign relations and to an understanding of other parts of the world that almost coincided with the end of WWII. During the same period, interest and academic studies about Third World regions increased with the publication of books such as Keynes's *Indian Currency and Finance*. The concentration on development studies also coincided with this period, but, of course, at that time, development studies were seen as a sub-discipline of economics.

It was apparent that the modernization apparatus was tightly embedded in US efforts in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Given that poverty and backwardness could further exacerbate the communist threat, the Americans believed that they should focus their efforts on industrialization, economic growth and the promotion of democracy (Millikan & Rostow, 1957a, pp. 37–40, 55, 121–122, 128–131, 149–151; Rostow, 1961, pp. 234, 237). US assistance to Korea and Türkiye started in the 1950s, and American experts were sent to many regions worldwide,

including these two countries. American intellectuals' efforts were vitally crucial in advising and attempting to direct the development process in these countries. During the same period, Vietnam was first thought of as a testing ground where the US could implement its modernization programs by Rostow and like-minded presidential advisors (Adas, 2006, p. 303). In Türkiye's immediate geography—Greece—the Civil War, which took place between 1946-1949, was also a crucial testing ground for the US. The US supported right-wing governments there and tried to block the communist incursion since a possible Communist victory would threaten Türkiye too. American aid in such conditions helped Greece recover from the ravages of war and also helped to defeat a communist insurrection, which naturally contributed significantly to Greece's development. The US realized that allowing instability in other regions, mainly the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, would endanger its national security.

In the last month of WWII and at the beginning of the Cold War, Harry S. Truman became president in 1945; he encountered historically unprecedented problems in international affairs such as the final stages of WWII, the transition to a peacetime economy, the outbreak of the Cold War in Europe and Asia, and the struggle to establish a new global economic system based on liberal capitalism (Dorn, 2011, p. 3). Truman needed to gain experience instituting global economic change, his War Minister, Henry Stimson, primarily drew up the new policy. They believed that if Greece and Türkiye did not take American aid, they would easily fall into the clutches of Communism, which would subsequently affect the whole region. According to Stimson, the US had to fight twice for the sake of Europe despite its reluctance. In the end, achieving political and economic stability in Europe became one of the cornerstones of American politics. European stability was equated with American liberal peace, so the Cold War had officially begun. The US officials realized that peace and stability could be achieved in Europe by building a strong German economy. The same strategy was applied in East Asia; first, Japan was strengthened, then Taiwan and South Korea.

Considering the circumstances of the period, the Truman administration attached huge importance to national security, which entailed military might, tools reliant on a robust

economic structure, and industrial and production capability. In order to fight communism abroad, the US should support the “free world” as a leader. President Truman used the occasion to connect global economic and national security objectives. The Truman Administration brought in development as an alternative to communism (Esteve, 2009, p. 43). Described as a program of “development” in 1947, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine by stressing the power of development to transform society and promote peace (Cullather, 2002, p. 515). Through the Doctrine, the US provided economic and military aid to states under the threat of communism, mainly Türkiye and Greece. However, the main landmark step was in 1949 with the announcement of Point Four, which was an aid program for economically underdeveloped countries (*Point Four, Background and Program, International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949*, 1949) that would shape and define foreign economic aid policy for the next 60 years. This program sparks widespread and sustained interest in the design and practice of development. This bold new program pointed at Africa, Asia, and Latin America as “underdeveloped areas” that required development, and the US aimed to make its scientific advances and industrial progress available (Ziai, 2007, p. 47). Any increase in capital, trade flows, and human or material sources would augment a country’s development progress. His legacy of foreign economic aid programs makes the Truman era important.

The great aid packages that started during the Truman period also continued during the Eisenhower period. During the Eisenhower years (1953-61), two names behind the modernization project, Max F. Milikan and Walt W. Rostow, who were among the most influential and prominent proponents of the modernization theory, prepared a memorandum that circulated throughout the Eisenhower administration, making a case for modernization as a crucial Cold War strategy and weapon (Latham, 2011b, p. 56). Eisenhower saw the foreign economic aid issue as part of a military and budgetary strategy. In 1957, he introduced a new program called the Eisenhower Doctrine to aid Middle East countries facing the Soviet threat economically and militarily. The aim was “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled

by international communism.” (*The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957*, n.d.) The key concern of Eisenhower and his advisors was the low level of economic development that could prepare these countries for the Communist incursion and cause the communist groups in the countries to get stronger; that is why foreign economic aid policy that was inherited from Truman was seen as a tool in promoting development and preventing the communist spread.

In the 1960s, as the tense environment of the Cold War prevailed, US policymakers thought that the assumptions of the modernization theory provided a helpful schema through which meaningful actions could be carried out in the Third World. Hence, by adopting a development-oriented approach, the incoming administration also guided an uncommitted Third World toward America’s vision of middle-class modernity that would prevent the region's descent into communism (Field, 2014, pp. 2–3). The understanding of modernization— considered the same as the development perspective—continued during the Kennedy administration (1961-1963). President Kennedy’s election signaled a new sense of purpose in international relations, and considerable changes in development understanding and policies occurred. He christened the First Decade of Development in his inaugural address at the UN General Assembly in January 1961. Development was accepted as multifaceted with social, economic, and political dimensions. All developmental tools like food aid and technical came under a common umbrella. Better coordination between the United States and the UN came to the fore, and America's development policies became more diverse, including Food for Peace or education policies in Third World countries or policies for children. Even still, these practices were considered as a powerful method for winning over recipients' hearts and minds (Villani, 2020).

Rostow’s modernization theory shaped the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, particularly their policies towards Asia. When Rostow became a Counselor of the United States Department of State in 1961, the Development Decade that aimed to use aid as a weapon led to the US development package abroad (Latham, 2000c, p. 1). Thus, with an increase in foreign aid and military assistance (Patterson, 2005, p. 496), the scope of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was broadened, and the

factors that previously stymied development were diversified; in addition, the scope of foreign aid was reassessed (*Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development*, n.d.). This act divided US foreign assistance programs into two parts: military and non-military. As a result, USAID, the successor of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), was established as the principal agency for articulating the political and state projects of US development efforts tied to the liberal internationalist visions of world order (Essex, 2013, p. 26). Until USAID's establishment, the ICA provided foreign assistance, 'non-military security' programs, and funds like training activities for rural producers. After 1961, with further institutionalization of foreign economic aid programs under the umbrella of USAID, this agency undertook the programs previously implemented and financed by ICA. The difference was that the funds available were now more considerable, and the objectives became more ambitious, responding to growing anxieties in Washington in relation to many other parts of the world. USAID's past and present goals are to continue to foster the interests of the US via its programs abroad and to contribute to international development. Again, USAID's development ideology was constructed within Cold War geopolitics, with theory and strategy thoroughly intertwined (Field, 2014, pp. 2–3).

Not only American bilateral initiatives through governmental institutions like USAID and the CIA but philanthropic foundations like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and NGOs helped implement the modernization idea on agriculture, health, and population control. This was also done in a multilateral manner with the twin institutions of Bretton Woods, i.e. the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—later called the World Bank; these were established to manage both global capitalist development and the trade process and were a great help both in the investigation of problems and the provision of help. Towards the end of the 1950s, these institutions became more development-oriented and promoted national development projects. For instance, the IBRD offered loans and grants for development in the world's poorest developing countries, stepped into this process with finance projects in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico after WWII. Economic Development Institute established under the Bank directly aimed to train Third World

officials. It also initiated a wide field of activity for developing countries primarily through its International Development Association founded in 1960. Notably, World Bank provided loans, grants and financed investments in line with its aims, which the US government undoubtedly supported.

Transforming traditional societies or colonial regions into appropriate modern systems was the primary target. However, this was achieved in mainly economic and technical ways. If these countries received aid, they could join the First World. Three initiatives, the Alliance for Progress, in which the most extensive aid was made, the Peace Corps, Project VISTA, the Model Cities Program and the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam, were introduced. The introduction of these programs shows that modernization theory indeed became an ideology as well as a theoretical model and political agenda (Adas, 2006, p. 304). These programs and others, such as Food for Peace and Agency for International Development, incorporated Rostow's modernization theory in their design. Although these steps were taken and policies became relatively more comprehensive, the 1960s, described as "A Decade of Development," ironically witnessed the militarization of US development policy because the Americans believed that military engagement through aid, by sending forces or through direct involvement to Vietnam, Cambodia, Congo, Israel, and Lebanon could substantially boost economic and social development.

These processes and exporting modernization were arranged to function like clockwork; however, they did not work as expected. One of the most significant handicaps was the Vietnam War (1954-75), where more than 2.7 million American men and women served there during the war. As a result, Richard Nixon believed that the US faced severe changes in the international arena. Furthermore, due to the Vietnam quagmire, reforms failed at home, like the balance of payment deficit, and this led to public anger towards foreign assistance; this international situation made Nixon make the following statement in 1970: The United States would no longer "seek to dominate the international development process." (*Action Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 1970; Duncombe, 2001*) Even though the Vietnam War was a significant setback in the

US-envisioned modernization plan, with the help of multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the US would continue to assist. Nixon also sought a retreat plan to protect America's reputation.

By 1975, the US withdrew its troops, and Nixon tried to distract the world's attention from the US failure in Vietnam to US success stories in Japan, Korea, and Singapore. In the 1970s, it was crystal clear that these countries achieved development. Nixon saw nations that had “discovered and applied the lessons of America's own economic success.” (Ferguson, 2015, p. 803). With lessons learned from successful and unsuccessful cases, Nixon embraced a more comprehensive development approach and stated that the US should prioritize factors such as private investment, population control, and export-led development, which meant the diversification of the US development toolbox. This would serve the United States' national security and enable those countries that received US aid to defend and develop themselves (*Action Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon*, 1970; The American Presidency Project, 1970).

What is important about the Nixon administration is the conclusion of the US' postwar commitment in land reform. in developing countries. Internal practices inspired foreign policy: Land reform was significant in 19th-century America. Henry George, an American political economist, considered poverty the most important problem of humanity. He summarizes this by saying, “the land question is nowhere a mere local question; it is a universal question.” (George, 1982, p. 106) Inspired by this way of thinking, land reform promotion and community development programs (CDPs) emerged as one of the leading US-led international projects of rural modernization (Cullather, 2013a, p. 77), supported by a view of development as a national industry that can be replicated across a global network of sovereign nations (McMichael, 2008, p. 19). Furthermore, to the Keynesian understanding of economics, land reform was regarded as very useful in increasing agricultural productivity and growth (Arestis & Sawyer, 1997, p. 182) and an important tool to overcome poverty; economists like Keynes strongly recommended state intervention in the form of land reform (Cristiano, 2014, p. 53). Even though it was implemented in many parts of the world, variables

like the degree of US support, strong political will, a competent bureaucracy, market reforms and preferential policies for economic zones accompanying land reform, and social coalitions were some of the primary causes for land reform successful in some countries but also why it failed in others.

In the 1970s, the Golden Age of capitalism did not survive dramatic political and economic traumas. When it had come to an end, the world economy disintegrated. The system was rearranged and restructured, but it was only in the 1980s that the neoliberal capitalist development model introduced a strategic solution to the crisis. This solution created a global economy based on neoliberal premises such as free enterprise and market principles. The US would use this model to restore its hegemony. All these point to the US' expanding and evolving role in the international political economy. The primary purpose of the following sections is to elucidate the four main pillars of the US in Korea and Türkiye.

3.3. US Foreign Economic Aid for Development

Foreign economic aid is deemed an essential component for financing the development programs of developing countries since it frees up resources for other services. Foreign economic aid as a significant independent variable of development still has its importance in the development framework and improves the nature of people's lives (Wolfensohn, 1999). Foreign aid (regardless of what form it is) affects a country's institutions and policymaking. Foreign economic aid has been an area of investigation in the global development discourse. After WWII ended, developed countries spent billions of dollars on foreign economic aid for the developing world with a welfare motivation. Even before WWI, it was used as a profitable investment and was the primary source of external finance for developing countries (Veiderpass & Andersson, 2007, p. 73). However, it was only after WWII that the flow of foreign economic aid began in a 'planned and systematic way', when developed Western countries began to contribute mostly to their wartime allies' infrastructure building, poverty eradication,

disaster assistance, peacekeeping activities, and socioeconomic reconstruction programs (Sahoo & Sethi, 2013, p. 114).

Foreign economic aid has become increasingly tied to geopolitical, humanitarian, economic, social, and cultural considerations. For this reason, it is important to consider foreign economic aid from a historical and doctrinal perspective since it became a standard component of the US development package early on. The US had used foreign aid as a tool of statecraft and foreign policy for a long time. American engagement through its developmental toolbox was first realized via foreign economic aid because of the widely held assumption in the US that the modernization theory held that if the underdeveloped countries that receive foreign aid would also be able to close the investment gap, then they would invest more and grow faster. If they achieved higher levels of growth, their middle class would be more significant, and the expanding middle class would also form the foundation of democracy (Hadley, 2017). Since 1945, the US, the biggest economic aid donor, has made generous contributions such as large-scale military assistance, trade subsidies, and bilateral economic aid to other nations through its agencies and international institutions (Bandow, 1995, p. 226). Although America created this package with strategic concerns, its assistance was generally developmental because it both enhanced the recipient's military power and promoted the development and improved the social welfare of Türkiye and Korea is crucial and permeated different areas as the most prominent tool of the US development package.

The motivations and considerations behind donor aid programs change with many variables, such as alliances, the Cold War, recipients' domestic features, countries' level of development, and so forth. American aid was sometimes given to these countries regardless of the ideological stance of the countries because American aid was to get them onside or at least prevent them from aligning with the Soviet Union. The containment of the Soviet Union was among the key goals of the US, and preventing the spread of communism was the most immediate aim of the US (S. P. Huntington, 1987, p. 40). Furthermore, the Soviet Union emerged as a significant economic power with aid programs (Tansky, 1968, p. 6). Ideological competition

permeated the international aid landscape at first. Therefore, one possible conclusion that can be drawn is that the communist threat gave birth to the US' extensive and planned foreign economic aid program (Field, 2014, p. 10).

US Post-war involvement and foreign aid strategies aimed to realize geopolitical goals with the premises of the modernization theory, i.e. with resource transfer from developed countries, for the underdeveloped countries, it was easier to go through the development path followed by developed countries. Besides these ideological and strategic concerns, American aid to allied countries followed a developmental goal. The aim was to create a strong alliance network by ensuring the development of underdeveloped countries, including Türkiye and South Korea. The use of aid began as an initial developmental tool to help allies and possibly future allies of the US, bearing in mind that aid and assistance programs would only work if the interests of American policymakers and those in target states overlapped.

Since the early 1950s, various definitions, drastically different in scope, rationale, and goals, have caused growing uncertainty about the concept's boundaries. Scholars in economics and other social sciences have emphasized practitioners' concerns and favored the conceptualization of foreign economic aid concerning the issues of security or national interests (Santiso, 2001, p. 4). Starting with the lexical meaning, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica, foreign aid is “the international transfer of capital, goods, or services from a country or international organization for the benefit of the recipient country or its population.” The more recent and widely-cited definition of foreign aid comes from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which defines foreign aid (or the equivalent term, foreign assistance) as “financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that are (1) designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective (thus excluding aid for military or other non-development purposes); and (2) are provided as either grants or subsidized loans.” (Radelet, 2006, p. 4) (*The San Francisco Conference*, n.d.). A more important definition for this thesis will be the definition made by the US. The US' present-day foreign aid policy (USAID) was formed by the 1961 US Foreign Assistance Act, defining foreign aid as “*the*

unilateral transfers of U.S. resources by the U.S. Government to or for the benefit of foreign entities (McBride, 2018).” The resources essential to development include goods, funding, technical assistance, educational programming, financial and economic aid, and other services. US foreign aid was defined under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (§634) as “*any tangible or intangible item provided by the United States Government [including “by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty”] to a foreign country or international organization under this or any other Act, including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal, or mixed property, any agricultural commodity, United States dollars, and any currencies of any foreign country which are owned by the United States Government...*” (Darden, 2019). The US approach to the aid issue shows that foreign aid is not material; it includes grants, loans, technical or other kinds of advice, resource transfers like food or equipment, moral support, and information and diplomatic recognition, as seen in the instances of engagement of US officials in Korea and Türkiye (Organski, 1990, pp. 121–122).

As for the categorization of economic aid, the very first scholar who wrote on the political theory of foreign aid, Hans Morgenthau, stated that there are six general types of foreign aid (Morgenthau, 1949, p. 302). These are humanitarian, subsistence, bribery, military, prestige, and economic. Today’s most common classification comprises bilateral, development, humanitarian, multilateral, military, and economic aid. Even though these classifications may be misleading in some instances, the United States adopted a similar approach. It is worth noting that economic aid was separated from military aid but not excluded it. In parallel with this definition and categorization, the US foreign aid is composed of (1) Economic Support Fund (ESF), (2) Development Assistance (DA), (3) Food Aid or PL 480, (4) Security Assistance, and (5) Multilateral development banks (Guess, 1987, p. 1; Tarnoff & Nowels, 2005, p. 1).

The major foreign aid authorization laws or legislative acts were the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, covering most bilateral economic and security assistance programs (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151), the Arms Export Control Act (1976), which authorized military sales and financing (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2751), the Agricultural

Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480), which covered food aid (P.L. 83-480; 7 U.S.C. 1691), and the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (1945), which authorized US participation in multilateral development banks (P.L. 79-171; 22 U.S.C. 286) (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2005, p. 2). All types of loans and grants the US provided during the Cold War years were as follows:

Table 3. 1. All Types of Loans and Grants of the US during the Cold War

Economic Aid	Military Aid	Other U.S. Government Loans
A.I.D.	MAP Grants	Export-Import Bank Loans
Food for Peace	FMS Credit Financing	CCC Export Sales Program
Peace Corps	Transfers from Excess Defense Stocks	OPIC Direct Loans
Contributions to International Lending Organizations	International Military Education and Training Program	P.L. 480, Title I Private Trade Agreements
Other Economic Programs	Other Military Programs	

Source: *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1988 CONG-R-0105.* (1988).

The United States primarily aimed to stabilize geopolitically important regions by using economic and military aid and trade. In particular, a significant amount of aid was given to countries such as South Korea, Türkiye, Iran and Israel, which are potent states in their regions. At the same time, policies such as the Soviets' proposing large aid packages to the Third World and the support of the helping states in continuing these aids to support central planning and public ownership in their development policies put America on a higher level of alarm. This was a situation that threatened the security of America. As Rostow stated, it is not about the transfer of Western resources to the Third World but also about the military security of America, the future

of Europe and Japan. Until the 1970s, this was the primary trend in American aid policies to aid geostrategically important countries (McMichael, 2008, pp. 48–49).

The institutionalization of foreign aid became more and more entrenched towards the end of the 1960s. In 1969, Richard Nixon asked Rudolph Peterson, the chairman of the Bank of America, to examine the US' entire development assistance program to develop a set of rules, procedures, and organizations to ensure the proper use of assistance funds and the attainment of US national interests (McNeill, 1981, p. 52). The report was presented after six months, stating that the US should give more attention to aid provided through multilateral institutions and that this aid should be divided into long-term, short-term, and security-related aid (Pastor, 1980, p. 277). The USAID, which was founded in 1961, is primarily responsible for administering the majority of bilateral foreign economic assistance. Multilateral aid, on the other hand, is primarily overseen by the Treasury Department. Additionally, the Department of Defense and the State Department are involved in the implementation of military and other security-related initiatives (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2005, p. 22).

Three more meaningful reports show the close connection between the foreign economic aid policy of the US and policy priorities. The first was published in 1963 during the Kennedy administration, the Clay report, which advised that American aid was scarce and needed to be increased by referring to the increasing threat of communism (*Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Kennedy*, 1963). The Pearson Commission on International Development prepared the second report under Canada's leadership, in which the Commission encouraged other developed countries to allocate at least %1 of their GNP (Judd, 1969; *Report of the Commission on International Development: Pearson Report*, 1970). Furthermore, free trade, higher foreign investment and better management, debt reduction, slower population growth, and increased multilateral aid processing were urged. The Commission called for the US to increase its aid by 1975, and the ones that should and should not be in international cooperation are listed for equal and fair trade. The last critical report was the Peterson Task Force Report of 1970, in which more specific policy recommendations were made on foreign economic

and military aid. The sharp separation between military grants and development aid was made. More importantly, multilateralization of aid was emphasized; international organizations should devise aid as well as the US and its agencies (*Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon*, n.d.; L. Richards, 1977, p. 48). The last two important reports coincided with the Nixon period and the internationalization era of "development". Foreign aid policy, launched to prevent communism, became much more human rights oriented and democracy promotion by the 1970s and 80s, especially with the Carter and Reagan administrations (United States Congress House, 1979, p. 1).

Following the end of WWII, to support economic development and to defend the recipient countries against Communist aggression, the planning and implementation of the foreign economic aid policy came were realized. Historically, US foreign economic aid has had three main cornerstones: The Point Four Program (1949), the Truman Doctrine (1947), and the Marshall Plan (1948), which was the first large-scale use of foreign economic aid. In 1947, with the Truman Doctrine, he sought to prevent external threats, primarily communism and Soviet expansion. All democratic nations under attack from external or domestic authoritarian forces would receive political, military, and economic help from the United States. (*The Truman Doctrine, 1947*, n.d.-b). To that end, Truman wanted Congress to allocate \$400 million. Upon Congress's acceptance of this request on May 22, \$100 million was given to Türkiye and \$300 million to Greece to energize their crumbling economies and politically vulnerable situations. The second plan was announced in 1949 and was called the Point Four Program, and it made up the fourth foreign policy aim (Macekura, 2013, p. 129), providing additional technical aid for developing countries. In this program, four main directions were determined for US foreign policy, which was the cooperation with the US and related agencies, ensuring the continuation of the European Recovery Program (ERP) and the reciprocal trade agreements, protecting the Free World countries from the dangers of aggression, and last but not the least aiding the underdeveloped areas for their development by providing technical aid and capital investment (*Point Four; Background and Program, International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949*, 1949, p.

1). The US committed to transferring material resources and knowledge by advancing industrial and scientific techniques, as the modernization theory suggests (*Point Four; Background and Program, International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949*, 1949, p. 21).

The launch of the Point Four Program was a success. Many projects were launched from this endeavor, such as antimalarial campaigns in Peru and Myanmar and rural development projects in Haiti, Mexico, Jordan, and India (Lorenzini, 2019, p. 28). Later, experts were sent to countries that requested this aid. Joint initiatives like projects with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1948 in Chile and Mexico were also implemented. Within the Point Four Program, cooperation with civil society NGOs, philanthropic institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation, and the private business sector, such as the German Krupp, launched initiatives in various countries (Lorenzini, 2019, pp. 27–28). Point Four was first implemented by a Special Agency of the Department of State; later, in 1953, it was merged with other US foreign economic aid programs. Point Four was a milestone in development history because the US had fully committed itself to a massive global project.

In his inaugural address, Truman emphasized the link between the problem of underdevelopment and security. He stated that poverty as a handicap and threat caused people living in underdeveloped areas to be far from realizing their most basic human needs, leading them to fall prey to any ideology (Truman, 1949). Development was also defined as an inherently anti-colonial venture. In Truman's speech and overall vision, the ideological foundation of the modernization theory was already present. With complete belief in the ability of American scientific research and technological knowledge to make the world a better place from a social standpoint (Gilman, 2018, p. 71), in these programs, it was evident that the development issue was regarded as technical and scientific and addressed similarly. Development was especially spoken of with an emphasis on its economic aspects, disregarding the social dimension of development theory and practice. This language and understanding of development, reflecting Cold War ideology, was used in many other regions: Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. Hundreds of US experts were sent to many Latin American,

Asian, Middle Eastern, and African nations. Liberal versus socialist paradigms of development shaped the peripheries of the US and USSR. The aid programs resulted in the dissemination of millions of dollars in scientific and technical assistance and industrial development.

At that time, modernization figures such as Milikan and Rostow stated, “We have put relatively too much emphasis in recent years on pacts, treaties, negotiations and international diplomacy and too little on measures to promote the evolution of stable, effective and democratic societies abroad.” (Millikan & Rostow, 1957a, p. 4) Thus, another successful aid package, the European Recovery Program (ERP), better known as the Marshall Plan (1948-51), was officially introduced and provided to America’s European allies. It included a series of initiatives aimed at accelerating economic recovery, stabilizing the region, assisting the continent in rebuilding its infrastructure, creating credible political commitments, strengthening Europe’s economy, rebuilding war-battered economies, and stabilizing the region (Selva, 2005, p. 4). These aims were all achieved. The Marshall Plan worked because, although it did not entail massive amounts of money, it did a lot to leverage investment, which boosted economic growth, helped finance imports, and promoted trade liberalization to Americanize West European businesses. However, the Plan's success in rebuilding war-torn economies of Europe was a silver lining. Because the broad and ongoing interest in the concept and practice of "development" did not arise as a form of convergence in battling poverty, rebuilding infrastructure, keeping enemies at bay, and strengthening institutions of good and democratic government until the Marshall Plan (Kanbur, 2014, p. 3). This success fostered a great sense of optimism about the chances of assisting poor, developing countries and contributing to development in different regions; in 1954, at the Colombo Plan meeting, a Marshall Plan for Asia was projected, which Korea joined in 1962 (Oakman, 2010, p. 152).

Gimbel argues that at the start of the Marshall Plan, the US had domestic recession fears and bureaucratic inertia because of the struggle between the US Army and the State Department. Also, the costs of keeping American troops in Europe, particularly Germany, were very high (Gimbel, 1976, pp. 4–5). However, the US had to sustain its

aid flows to the Third World. Development efforts were marked by ideological struggle, and several Western development projects emerged from the competition with Soviet projects in the 1950s. For example, the Soviet equivalent programs of the Marshall Plan, the Molotov Plan of 1947 and the Permanent Commission for Technical Assistance in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) of 1949 were put into place by the Soviets to provide aid to rebuild and aid countries in Eastern Europe and to facilitate trade and development in countries politically and economically aligned to the Soviet Union.

Through the Marshall Plan, the US utilized military aid to maintain its presence in Europe, created large markets for its surplus arm, and made European countries dependent because it also followed the unconventional rearmament project of American allies. According to Arrighi, the close integration of European and American military forces would give a method to prevent Europe from cutting itself off from the United States as an economic region (Arrighi, 1994, pp. 297–298). With the Marshall Plan, reconstruction of liberalism was the goal because the liberal world had collapsed under British leadership and was never constructed again until 1945. Stability was therefore established after 1945 by American hegemonic power. Since commercial, financial, and monetary investments are all related, they are part of the same story. Thus, good management of those is required. Charles P. Kindleberger's vision was that the US could manage and stabilize the international political economy with its solid hegemonic leadership.

The Marshall Plan and the formation of an essential foundation for European Cooperation (finally the formation of the European Union); the Yoshida Doctrine and strong bilateral military agreement in North East Asia (with Japan in 1951, Korea in 1953, and Taiwan in 1954); the formation of ASEAN in 1967; and the creation of close relationships with South East Asian capitalist countries were how American hegemonic power strategy created and enhanced the American economic and political sphere of influence to sustain international stability. However, until the Korean War, the US had little interest in Asia; Rostow observed that the vast majority of Americans were only familiar with Western Europe (Rostow & Hatch, 1955, pp. 6–7). The Korean

War caused US concerns to shift substantially from Europe (Türkiye and Greece) to Asia. Specifically, Thailand, Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines received the most significant part of US foreign aid, which included military and economic aid. Other countries in the region benefited similarly from American security-inspired assistance. In the 1950s, the US promoted a “development cure” for underdeveloped countries with projects and studies such as the Baldwin Plan, the Colombo Plan, the Hilts Report, the Thornburgh Report, and the Barker Report. These reports and the genesis of foreign economic aid programs are elaborated more thoroughly in the case study chapters.

In the Cold War context, the nexus between development and security was evident in the role of foreign aid in the US foreign policy. Not only security and ideology-related dimensions but also the use of the term “development” by US policymakers to advance their standing shaped the international political economy, especially when it corresponded with the economic interests of their constituents, as seen in the case of American food sales abroad. This program, explicitly known as PL-480, offered foreign aid but mainly served domestic purposes to protect and expand the US markets abroad (D. C. Engerman, 2017, p. 9; L. Richards, 1977, p. 50). Also, title II of P.L. 480 provided free wheat and other agricultural products and equipment as part of technical assistance (Benham, 1962, p. 29). In 1954, through Food for Peace, now called the Food for Peace Act (FFPA, P.L. 83-480), Türkiye and Korea were recipients of it (Coffing, 1974, pp. 13–21; Goodloe, 1980, p. 340; Hise, 1963, p. 54; Witherell, 1988, p. 44). The US saw hunger and poverty as threats to international stability, including the fear of a worldwide rural acceptance of communist ideas. As a result, between 1946 and 1976, food aid made up 15% of US aid (Cathie, 1989, p. 15). America shaped the world food order, both with its aid policies and its trade policies. During the import substitution industrialization, which was the first stage in which the protection of infant industries was aimed, Third World countries were able to create the infrastructure for turning to the manufacturing sector. Korea was the best example, which also encouraged agro-industrialization.

America initiated this program to dispose of its farm surpluses (*USAID and PL-480, 1961-1969*, n.d.). The goal was to strengthen links with the Third World and increase consumption of American agricultural commodities in these countries, ultimately moving from food aid to commercial trade and increasing familiarity with American products. From the perspective of the recipient countries, it was to expand their markets and assist their industrial development through increased investment. Cheap food bolstered the consumer's purchasing power in these countries and stabilized urban politics by subsidizing the cost of labor. In particular, wheat exports dominated the food imports of the countries included in this program (McMichael, 2008, pp. 54-57). Under the guise of assistance, modernization, and development, the US offered wheat aid as a tool for spreading American superiority during the Cold War, which is called Breadbasket diplomacy (Zielinski & Gilpin, n.d.). The role of American wheat in Türkiye and Korea became prominent. This program's direct and indirect effects were different in Korea and Türkiye.

Food aid is a vital form of aid and figured predominantly in the aid policy of the US; Europe and Japan were primary recipients following the war. The Marshall Plan was also a primary agricultural export drive of the US, and Türkiye, as a recipient of the Marshall Plan, was a beneficiary of food aid. In addition, under the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program, the US provided food supplies to countries, including Korea, after 1945. Later, PL480 became the Food for Peace Program and aimed at relieving the US of its accumulating agricultural surpluses, improving its domestic market, and stimulating new markets abroad (*A Short History of U.S. International Food Assistance*, n.d.). During the 1960s and 70s, the US increasingly used food aid as a developmental tool to promote Western-style agricultural practices, which also helped expand markets for US producers.

Starting from the late 1940s, Korea and Türkiye, along with Greece, Spain, India, Taiwan, Israel, Costa Rica, Pakistan, and Vietnam, were the largest developing country recipients of US aid for an extended period (A. O. Krueger, 1993, pp. 44-45). The US provided foreign economic aid to nearly ninety countries; however, the bulk of foreign economic aid was highly concentrated in East Asia and the Middle East. For example,

from 1946 to 1965, the primary recipients of US aid were India, Korea, Pakistan, Brazil, Vietnam, Greece, and Türkiye, respectively (Tansky, 1968, p. 15). According to USAID statistics, since 1946, Türkiye has received \$62 million in US aid and Korea \$119 million. Funding agencies are the US government agencies from which funds used to implement foreign assistance projects or activities originated. According to one estimate, foreign aid accounted for nearly 70% of Korea's domestic capital formation throughout the 1950s (Haggard, 1990a, p. 196). Even though the rationale for aid can be anything from humanitarian to political, this does not change the fact that US foreign economic aid affected Turkish and Korean development processes and enhanced their economic development remarkably.

The United States is primarily motivated by a desire to protect political allies and economic partners, increase export markets, and minimize poverty and military conflicts that endanger international stability. However, there are many motivations as to why states give foreign aid. Among these motivations, in the context of the Cold War, the main motive of the US was to keep countries from slipping into the hands of communists: “Economic prosperity was thought to be a prophylactic against communism.” (Krasner, 1989, p. 252). Foreign economic aid was evaluated as a triggering force, and growth-enhancing policy recommendations were given to underdeveloped countries by American experts, especially those who were familiar with the specific local or regional environment. Foreign economic aid from the US has long been seen as a vehicle for initially serving geopolitical purposes. In the context of a free trade world under the supervision of the Bretton Woods system, the US demonstrated a willingness to grant significant political autonomy in economic affairs and to accept the adoption of mercantilist policies by regional states. In East Asia, as well as in Europe, significant departures from the liberal, multilateral norm were driven by strategic considerations.

3.4. Promotion of American Interests in Trade, Investment, and Markets

World wars have shown that financial difficulties or economic challenges have had serious spillover effects that have affected markets. As Susan Strange stated in her book *The Retreat of the State*, the only hope to cope with these challenges was a significant rise in foreign aid and a fundamental shift in trade practices (Strange, 1996, p. 58), which was thus thought of as a potent instrument for dealing with market failures mechanisms and enable countries to create jobs, reduce poverty and increase opportunities. These tools have boosted economic growth through increased productive investment and technological knowledge (Aime, 2010, p. 1; Chenery & Strout, 1966, pp. 680–683). America and its leading international institutions -IMF, WB Group, and GATT- became powerful sources of the instruments of international economic cooperation, which are aid, trade and capital flows. US Cold War political, economic and security concerns permeated its trade policies with Third World countries. Promoting a vibrant US economy might be a stimulus to others and a beacon for the benefits of a free, market-oriented economy based on enterprise. The US aspired to build a "civilized community" through international rules, standards, safeguards, and conflict resolution mechanisms. (Truman, 1947, pp. 167–172).

Since the American understanding of development is equivalent to this way of industrial development, the way to do this was first through the material resource flow such as aid, and then practices that facilitate the transfer of financial resources such as investment and trade. The US aimed to integrate its allies into the world capitalist economy and ensure the establishment of commercial networks by addressing budget and trade disparities, making room for the development of institutional and technological capacities necessary for effective industrialization and development. Especially in the 1960s, the countries that received assistance grew because global trade was thriving, and most economies expanded. While Korea was among these successful countries, Türkiye could not effectively use these advantages in the international system provided by the United States.

What America experienced in the New Deal period was later applied to the international arena. The US experienced a development breakthrough thanks to Keynesian economics in the New Deal period. The dominant economic understanding after the 1930s was Keynesian economics, which justifies government intervention to achieve a free market, full employment and price stability. That is why the US implemented the New Deal period policies internationally. The main feature of the development practices between 1945 and 1980 was that they included systematic state intervention. A suitable environment was provided for developing capital accumulation in the domestic market with the help of import substitution and foreign trade policy.

The Great Depression taught America how protectionist policies could be destructive, so when US leaders experienced that commercial policies could lead to a world war, they were convinced not to repeat past mistakes. Furthermore, as strict followers of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the fathers of modern international economics, they firmly believed that trade was always a win-win situation. Adam Smith argued that trade promoted the efficient use of resources, and America aimed to expand international trade and investment with improved economic conditions in the Third World (Butterfield, 2004a, p. 8). Because the market's size limits the division of labor, the role of trade that stimulates the domestic economy is significant (McVety, 2012, p. 118). Through the expansion of economic transactions like economic aid, the US opened more space to increase ties and gather allies. In many Third World countries, investments were mainly financed via US economic aid. Thus, trade and aid went hand in hand in the US development toolbox. Sometimes, one of these was given priority, as was the case during the Eisenhower administration when he called for “trade, not aid.” (Kaufman, 2019, pp. 12–16) However, in the end, the extension of economic aid to Third World countries and the regulation of equally important trade policies became very apparent. Foreign trade was identified as an effective tool to promote free markets (Pentony, 1960b, pp. 112, 114) and to disseminate the knowledge of the US.

Following the end of WWII, the first motive of the US was to prevent Western Europe from falling into communist hands, the second was to meet Western Europe’s widening

dollar gap in trade with the US (Krasner, 1989) and the third one was to create enough and effective demand in the world for American production partly through aid schemes, the Marshall Plan in Western Europe, and Japan in East Asia (Krasner, 1989, p. 252). Security alliances like NATO and security agreements with Japan and Korea also reinforced this aim. The absolute well-being of the free world alliance, which aimed to rebuild capitalist Europe, Japan, and the world economy, was the main aim of the US. In Europe, Germany and in Asia, Japan was given particular importance in the creation of a capitalist Europe. To establish a favorable international economic environment, a more open political system, a more liberal and open economic model, free enterprise, and foreign trade were the elements that the US utilized them. Promoting trade among the free world countries was a significant part of economic development. In 1951, in the report published by the UN, it was stated that national development programs would only succeed with an international component (Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1951, p. 49). The international component could be accessed through participation in the global market and foreign capital infusion. US policies such as huge capital flow to the free world countries, reduced tariffs and trade restrictions, opening its markets to some of its allies (Pentony, 1960b, p. 112) and the international organizations backing these US policies led the national economies as well as the international economy (Klassen, 2015, p. 77). These strategies also increased trade flows among countries and unified allies. Moreover, trade between countries was also seen as a way to prevent communism. Thus, the US became the dominant player in the establishment of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls in order to counterattack the COMECON established by the Soviet Union and also to control the trade of strategic goods and the military dependence of Western European countries, including Türkiye. This situation led them to give in to the American demand (Eloranta & Ojala, 1992, p. 14). The US and BWs institutions were dedicated to opening and creating larger foreign markets for American products. As John. J. McCloy, the first director of the WB between 1947 and 1949, promised that “The Bank would create markets for U.S. trade ... [and] stop Communism.” (Caufield, 1998, pp. 53–54).

For the continuation of American financial superiority, the movement of US exports, and a liberal trading order, the US needed to solve Asia's foreign exchange and deficit problems in the mid-1950s, which threatened America's economic interest as a trading nation dependent on foreign purchases and markets (Mcmahon, 2014, p. 215). For the development of the American domestic market, the US and free world members required more integration into international markets through trade, investment flows, technological transfers, people-to-people exchanges, and knowledge dissemination. America tried to unify Europe in every sense with initiatives such as the Marshall Plan, European Coal and Steel Community, and Organization for European Economic Cooperation, but by the 1960s, Europe was still a problematic region for America because it wanted to bind Germany and France more closely, both politically and economically. The trade liberalization quest of America would be accelerated, and Europe would be able to meet a very large part of American exports, about 30% (Eckes, 1995, p. 180). In East Asia, it regulated bilateral trade relations with countries, just as in the hub-and-spokes system.

According to Rostow, trade is significant because it effectively widens the market for goods. Workers and institutions concentrate around a new industry when industrialization and take-off begin. So, trade gives countries some elbow room to create jobs, reduce poverty, and increase opportunities. Aid plans like the Marshall Plan would help to build a triangular pattern of trade relations between Western Europe, the US and semi-peripheral and peripheral regions of the world, as well as strengthen and speed up the restoration of the European core economies (Rostow, 1997, p. 207). If investments outstrip population growth, the transition from traditional to modern society could happen, as Rostow argued (Rostow, 1959b, p. 21). In order to pave the way for a pre-condition to taking off, underdeveloped countries' consumption and production patterns based on their trade should be increased. Rostow finds that radical changes in market organization and agriculture mainly preceded take-off. Moreover, foreign economic aid and foreign loans are essential sources of funds for investment and commercial activities and contribute to capital accumulation (Chapman, 1966, p. 169). Mobilizing capital and resources is only possible with

development and economic growth. It should be denoted that Rostow advocated state intervention in Third World development based on planning and foreign economic aid. He stated that the state and society could stimulate economic development and accelerate the growth rate by making strategic decisions on resource allocation. Resource allocation should be designed to trigger investment in manufacturing and investment (Mehmet, 1999, p. 72). US foreign economic aid was mainly given to advance foreign policy goals or terms of trade. In that sense, trade and aid are tied to each other. Trade and aid links were purposefully established to achieve three mutually beneficial goals: economic reconstruction, boosting the domestic political position of pro-American political elites, and reinforcing strategic relations through economic reliance (Haggard & Moon, 1989, p. 8).

The open international trading system was critical to the economic and security interests of the United States since it maintained peace and created economic interdependence. Before the Cold War, Roosevelt and other State Department officials stood for open trading and tariff reduction agreements because bilateralism and economic blocs of the 1930s brought instability and war. This liberal economic thought shaped American practices toward the future world order (Hull, 1948, p. 81). Following 1945, the US commitment to “economic peace” involved the reduction of tariffs and the establishment of rules and institutions that promote and regulate trade and investment. An open trading system would also provide economic viability to the US. In addition, American policymakers believed that the US must have market and resource access in Asia and Europe. To that end, the US should advance its security interests and expand military engagement and defense ties because the communist threat posed a threat that could control the Eurasian landmass (Ikenberry, 2000, p. 354). A study published by the CIA in 1947 also stated that the economic collapse in Western Europe could lead to the Communist’s accession of power in the region (Leffler, 1984, p. 364; *Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States*, 1947). That is why the market and raw material supply and security in Asia and Europe and economically integrated Asia and Europe were the main goals of the US (Williams, 1999, pp. 92–95). Through its development package, the

organization of post-war institutions, and a consensus on international economic governance -fixed exchange rates and gold convertibility of the US dollar- the US achieved these goals until the 1970s.

The 1941 Atlantic Charter established the US' view of security as a liberal international system built on free commerce and open markets. This first required a strengthened European capitalist economy at its heart to function as a global affairs center once more and Japan. Lowering trade barriers, reducing tariffs and opening markets were the main strategies of the US that stimulated development. Strategies of having free access to critical raw resources and a global market for its exports (open market) served US goals. The diffusion of innovation, technology, and industry can be transferred to underdeveloped countries through trade and the sustainability of open markets. Rather than having a nationalistic and closed economy, maintaining free markets as the mode of economic integration was promoted by the US (Bacevich, 2004, p. 5; Peet & Hartwick, 2009, p. 142). This policy served recipient countries since they had access to Western and international markets. Korea, Taiwan and Brazil were able to rapidly industrialize and realize economic development, mainly because of their access to open American markets as well as the practice of free trade in their own countries. Therefore, the positions of these countries in the international division of labor and trade relations also differed. Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan are the best examples of Third World countries that were successful in foreign trade since they had and have been trading partners with Western countries (Ballance, 1982, p. 140). Between 1955 and 1972, Korea developed millions of jobs by exporting its products around the world while receiving approximately \$100 per person (in today's currency) in annual aid. (Radelet, 2005).

This strategy also served the global division of labor. The US was selective about where and in which sectors it worked. Specialization in one specific good is a necessary determinant of market development (Rostow, 1963, pp. 54–56). During the Cold War, for East Asia, market openness constituted one of the significant parts of the developmental route. Korea, along with Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, enjoyed the benefits of US markets. For instance, the Philippines' sugar exports enjoyed access

to a guaranteed market in the US. Türkiye was not granted such a privilege. This has determined the country's domestic market and role in the global division of labor, alongside a development path and economic structure that seriously diverged from Korea's. Expanding trade and aid opportunities with the US gave Türkiye and Korea room for maneuvering in other areas and improved the economic environment (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2005, p. 3).

The idea of continuous progress emphasized by the modernization theory and the fact that the US applied the Cold War development policies in its internal affairs first appeared in the field of trade. The concept of continuous improvement was first used in the United States during WWII, when it was discovered that firms struggled to develop and keep up with supplies for the war effort while so many men were serving overseas. As a result, the United States established a series of initiatives known as Training Within Industries (TWI), which attempted to encourage the private sector. Instead of waiting for orders to be dictated from above, the emphasis was placed on the existing employees to pay attention to working patterns and offer ways to improve them. This approach encourages employees at all organizational levels to put good ideas and suggestions into action. These projects were deemed a huge success since they assured that enterprises could supply reliable equipment to personnel overseas while also keeping the domestic side of things afloat. TWI continued abroad after WWII and was implemented in Türkiye and Korea. The "J" programs³ that was introduced throughout Europe, and Asia was put into operation in Türkiye in 1953 and by 1956. Over 5000 foremen and supervisors had been qualified. These were from approximately 100 companies, employing over 200.000 men and women. In Korea, courses were developed for use, however; with the eruption of the Korean war, the program's progress was interrupted (Bevens, 1970, pp. 66–67). Korean *chaebols*⁴ and

³ "J" programs mean that TWI includes four main components: job methods, job instructions, job relations and Program development. The first three are together known as the J programs.

⁴ The term *chaebol* represents a group of industrial and commercial businesses founded and often owned by a single family. They are similar to the Japanese *zaibatsu*.

Japanese *zaibatsus* adapted this practice to their own culture and strategies and inspired many countries (E. M. Kim, 2017, p. 1). Korean motor and car industry exported its model. Later, the fundamental principles of TWI were constantly being adapted to meet commercial and industrial demand.

The US which tried to strengthen Free World cooperation on multiple fronts accommodated Korea and Türkiye in the integration within that, through aid, trade and food policies. Korea, Taiwan and Brazil were able to rapidly industrialize and realize economic development, mainly because of their access to open American markets as well as the practice of free trade in their own countries. Therefore, the positions of these countries in the international division of labor and trade relations also differed.

3.5. Involvement in Defense Infrastructure Capabilities

When the liberal international order evolved following the end of WWII, an urgent need to reorganize the military, military structures and military strategies emerged. Military-security considerations were significant factors in determining the structure of the national and international political economy. The military power of the US was one of the essential pillars of its strong backing of the system and for the reconstruction of the system. The established linkages with Free World would make America much stronger against the 'others' through the US' active and robust military, economic and ideological presence in these countries. To stop the communist incursion, the US needed to expand all necessary military and diplomatic means (Stevenson, 2017). To maintain a given country's economic prosperity and freedoms and, ultimately, American national security and well-being, communism had to be vigorously opposed. (Hilsenrath, 2017). An effective military apparatus, especially in this context, was essential. In order to achieve a working military apparatus, wealth and development were crucial for this process. The US security interests and concerns orientated the Cold War US development toolbox. US foreign aid during the Cold War was provided for mostly military-oriented reasons (Wolfensohn et al., 2002, p. 93), and technical or

economic aid was geared towards enhancing the military capabilities of recipient countries. The main motives behind the US interest in Türkiye and South Korea were not just the aid but security-related reasons. However, even though the geographic locations of Korea and Türkiye were necessary, more was needed to shape US policies. The economic importance of a nation to the US is a pertinent consideration, as well as a nation's military assets. Thus, through direct U.S. military presence and aid, the US enhanced its allies' military capabilities and promoted economic development. In return for recipient countries' political support in their fight against communism, the US used economic and military aid to support the development of its allies to defend them. As a result, through the economic aid that would bring economic development, the US helped its allies enhance their military power and capabilities and allowed them to strengthen their military structures.

In traditional societies at the take-off stage to modern life, a special mission was assigned to the military and armies, which was defined as a "progressive force" in order to prevent the painful process brought about by change, especially the left movements from taking over the power. Rostow and other prominent policymakers have suggested that the US should cooperate with the military class regarding the role it would play in traditional societies. Therefore, with the assumption that development would bring democracy, military dictatorships were supported in the Third World and democracy was shelved for a while. In the transition from tradition to modernity, the military was one of the critical actors of this process. With education, technical training, arms sales, military base establishment and military aid programs, America began to engulf the world by the mid-1950s. This was triggered by the Soviet pressure on Türkiye in the 1940s and the Korean War that alarmed it. As a matter of fact, American activities remained at the "modest" level until 1949. In 1951, the number of American military personnel nearly tripled (Converse, 1995, p. 139).

In the sense of modernization theory, since development was characterized by technological, military, and bureaucratic progress, American foreign aid programs, directly or indirectly, could not be thought of as separate from military considerations; instead, they were mutually constitutive. Rostow and Milikan argued that economic

development aid be distinguished from other types of aid assistance, including military aid and pacts (Gilman, 2018, pp. 174–179; Hagen & Ruttan, 1987, pp. 34–35; Millikan & Rostow, 1957a, p. 129; Packenham, 2015, p. 56). Military aid became one component of foreign assistance and was provided separately from foreign economic aid. Influenced by Pye’s views, they saw the military as a modernizing agent and a vigorous champion of change and development (Pye, 1966, p. 181).

Under Truman's leadership, the US decided to make open-ended alliances and provide substantial aid to other countries. Most of the time, American aid required a condition such as establishing a military base and later deploying US military forces abroad. For example, the US created NATO in 1949, spearheaded a military coalition to protect Korea from invasion in 1950, and signed a New Security Treaty with Japan in 1960 (Russel, 2020). The process started with restructuring Germany and Japan and continued with economic mobilization, rural development projects, foreign economic aid, and a rearmament project of the Free World. Arrighi explains how the US embraced these tools for development that were so intermingled: “Military aid to Europe would provide a means to continue providing aid to Europe after the expiration of the Marshall Plan. Furthermore, the close integration of European and American military forces would provide a means to prevent Europe as an economic region from closing itself off from the United States.” (Arrighi, 1994, p. 297) The same strategy was applied to Asia: the strong Japan and alliance with Japan meant ensuring stability, peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. For the US, forming alliances with the key countries in the region was the bedrock of US security. Not only the American bilateral relations or regional alliances but also the establishment of political, economic and cultural ties between continents, especially between Europe and Asia, would also serve the American market and enterprise (Bacevich, 2004, p. 4). As European allies and Japan developed, the US channeled military aid to other East Asian and Middle East countries (Hammond, 1983, pp. 161–162).

The reason why the US did not create a security framework like NATO in the East Asia region depends on both the American strategic choices and the dynamics among the three important states in the region (V. D. Cha, 2009). Here, the US alliance system

became distinctive due to geography and is referred to as a "hub-and-spokes" system based on a collection of bilateral alliances. Although America tried to form a multilateral alliance in the region until the 1960s, the regional states mostly preferred bilateral cooperation with the US. US allies in the region, which is also blocked geographically by the large bodies of water separating them, had different threat perceptions and geopolitical orientations. Japan, for example, has benefited from its isolated location and US naval supremacy by isolating itself strategically (Matsuda & Park, n.d.). Therefore, while emphasizing the role of military power, Japan focused on economic development and sought to avoid interference in regional security affairs. In contrast, South Korea and Taiwan were hotspots of the Cold War, and the US preferred bilateral security arrangements to protect and control these countries from the threat of communism. That's why, between Korea (Taiwan and Japan) and the US, bilateral security, military and defense agreements were signed (Izumikawa, 2020, p. 8).

The principal allies of the Free World, including Türkiye and Korea, generally agreed that the US should have a substantial military presence and more or less concede its military subordination (Meiksins Wood, 2003, p. xii). For the security of both itself and its allies, the US spent vast amounts on defense and provided military aid to its allies under the 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Act that supervised all foreign aid programs of the US to bolster the defense capability of Free World (Chambers II, 2000, p. 737), and established military bases abroad. Between 1947 and 1950, actual annual military spending never exceeded \$60 billion; after 1952, it never fell below \$143 billion, and it was usually substantially higher (the average for 1956-65 was \$168 billion) (Higgs, 1994). Samuel Huntington claimed that "without the war, the increase probably would have been about the size of 1948–1949," 20 percent instead of nearly 200 percent (S. P. Huntington, 1961, p. 201). In particular, after the outbreak of the Korean War, a triggering event, the US increased its defense spending, multiplied its geopolitical alignments, and built hundreds of bases in almost all corners of the world. In addition, America sought to establish itself in the Pacific and the Middle East, creating economic, political, and military bases.

American military bases have played a significant role in the integration of countries into American hegemony worldwide. The US spent vast amounts of money and had several overseas military bases (Kiely, 1996, p. 46) to protect the Free World from the communist threat, notwithstanding its direct defense support. Throughout WWII, the US opened 636 military bases, which increased ten times during the Cold War period to 6092 military bases (Bölme, 2010, p. 126). This was regarded as a crucial factor for America's global hegemony. To help allies defend themselves, the US provided military equipment, weapons, and training to those allied and friendly nations that shared the US' view vis-à-vis the threat of communism. America provided facilities for military cooperation and installed military personnel there, established the military bases and the deployed military made credible security commitments under the institutional frameworks to extend its sphere of influence. In 1951, the US recognized that many countries needed budget contributions to support a heavy defense load. As a result, budget support was granted to countries that gave the US necessary military base rights (Kuebler, 1962, p. 917). US agencies like USAID also sent military hardware to developing countries. As a result, military assistance was intertwined with the first tool, i.e. foreign aid.

Military bases are a significant part of the US relationship with Türkiye and Korea in terms of enhancing, supporting, and strengthening the alliances. As part of a bargaining chip for Türkiye's membership to NATO, the Incirlik Base, which began construction in Adana in the spring of 1951, was one of the most critical air bases for the US during the Cold War era. The base has maintained its value throughout the period in terms of being NATO's wing and because of its proximity to the Soviet Union and the Middle East. NATO's founding purpose was the security of the North Atlantic area. Later, a Major non-NATO-Ally (MNNAs) status was created to enable the US to engage militarily with countries, not in this area. Korea was designated with this status in 1987. In Korea, for 60 years, the US has maintained an extensive network of military bases (Lord & Erickson, 2014, p. 67); the US presence was formalized in 1953, even though it dates back to the immediate end of WWII. The US has, since then, established a long-standing global network of military bases. As of 2018, there are seven Air Force

bases and one Army base in Türkiye. Apart from these, five other sites are referred to as US Locations, which do not meet the criteria of at least ten (10) acres and at least \$10 million plant replacement value. In addition, there are 64 US bases in Korea, including Army, Air Force, Navy, and (*Base Structure Report FY 2018*, n.d.) Marine Corps locations and 16 other sites (*Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline*, 2018).

Under the name of the modernization program, through the Joint American Military Mission to Aid Türkiye (JAMMAT), the US provided training and technical resources to improve the Turkish military beginning in 1947 since Türkiye was seen as “the keystone of the defense of the Middle East region.” (U. S. Department of State, 1982, pp. 24–25, 65) Later, through the triple axis of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and a secret document, NSC-68, Western European countries, Greece, and Türkiye received billions of dollars of economic and military aid from the US. As for Korea, to ease the Country’s purchase of American military equipment and modernize its military structure, the US aided under a program of military assistance and foreign military sales. In addition, the US deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Korea. Furthermore, both Türkiye and Korea benefitted from international military education and training programs. These have left a legacy influencing both countries' security and military structure in their regions.

Another important point to consider is that the United States was involved in two “hot” wars: The Korean and Vietnam wars. When “considered necessary,” the US intervened militarily, directly in Korea and Vietnam or indirectly in Chile and Nicaragua. The Vietnam War was the turning point for the course of the Cold War, and when the 20-year war ended in 1975, it reassessed America's role, policies, and, more importantly, its position in the global system. The Korean War made the United States take the development package for South Korea seriously. While the Korean War continued, Republican Party candidate Dwight Eisenhower won the election in 1952. US politicians were inspired by a game that is based on the principle of overturning adjacent stones when the domino stones are overturned; during the Cold War era, the domino theory was put forward, which is based on the assumption that the fall of one

country to the communist rule would lead to the spread of communism in neighboring countries. This understanding forced the US to continue to convince its allies to install more bases abroad because of their relevance to its security. The Korean War made it possible for America to therefore make arrangements in this part of the world. In other words, it was vital for America to guarantee its military presence in Asia. With the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, Japan gave up its rights and claims on Korea, Formosa, Pescadores and the Kuriles Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin Island, and Spratly and Paracel Islands. Moreover, with the security agreement between the US and Japan on 8 September 1951, the US had the right to deploy air, land, and sea forces in and about Japan to protect first Asia and then international peace and security (*Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan*, 1951). This treaty was followed by similar security agreements signed with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand; later, Korea (in 1953) and Taiwan (in 1954) formed security alliances with the United States. All of these involvements and relationships were made with the expertise and guidance of the instrumental figures of modernization, Max Milikan and Walt Rostow, who emphasized the need to shift the Cold War's geography towards Asia. Thus, military means were seen as the solution to confront the communist threat, as well as the economic ones.

Arguably, military and economic aid were encouraged by the strategic and ideological interests of the US. It has primarily set the continuation of these military bases as preliminary to the continuity of foreign aid; via bilateral agreements, the US increasingly included military bases as part of the overall aid package (Kuebler, 1962, pp. 915–917). Furthermore, it established security alliances that ensured generous provision of foreign aid. For instance, resources transferred to countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Türkiye, and the Philippines, under Supporting Assistance and Economic Support Fund, were, in fact, rent payments for the US in return for the use of facilities in these nations' territories (Ruttan, 1996, p. 324). These policy agreements functioned as the basis for extensive foreign economic aid relationships (Schraeder, 1998, p. 307). Thus, US military engagement and ongoing aid packages interlaced with one another.

Eisenhower, like Truman, was an advocate of American military strength. Both believed the war against communism was primarily military, diplomatic, and economical. Therefore, in the light of this understanding, in the report published on 30 October 1953 to the National Security Council, there were two main problems stemming from national security policy: to stand against the Soviet threat and, in doing so, to prevent any damage to the US economy, American values, and US institutions. More importantly, in line with Eisenhower's new foreign policy called the New Look, the US would use more co-efficient nuclear weapons to transfer more resources to the development of other countries, which would be an extra deterrent against the Soviet threat (*Basic National Security Policy*, 1953). Likewise, as Kennedy stated on 18 December 1961, "Military forces can contribute substantially to economic and social development, and we should make such a contribution a major function of these forces."(*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961*, 1961) Therefore, during the early years of the Cold War, the development of understanding tightly intersected with America's security concerns. During the Cold War, an increasing militarization of US foreign aid policy could be observed. The increase in military material became a part of the US liberal grand strategy and development toolbox. Under US military protection, Türkiye and Korea did not spend much on their defensive capabilities because of their militarily limited nature.

3.6. The Role of The United States in Rural "Take-Off": Rural Development Policies

Almost all industrialized countries have an agrarian past, and the land was and currently is a key asset and factor of production. Thus, considering the conditions of the period in question and even today, it can be argued that land reform is the basis of development. Land reform is certainly not a modern phenomenon and has existed since pre-historic times. Land reform dates to the Roman era, around 133 BCE. The Roman Senate approved agrarian regulations that indirectly led to the Roman Republic's demise and foreshadowed the rise of feudalism. In modern times, the land problem

comes to the forefront as a problem of “being underdeveloped.” In this sense, the first land reform initiative occurred during the French Revolution, which sparked Western Europe's first broad peasant liberation. The feudalism that constituted the social framework had already given way to less qualified land tenure in England and other areas (Barlowe, 1953, p. 174). During the 20th century, land reform has frequently occurred in countries following revolutions such as Mexico (1917), Russia (1917), and China (1949). Later, after WWII, it was paired with the process of decolonization (Beehner, 2005). This process caused a change in focus, and challenges related to land reform shifted from Europe to Asia and the Middle East (Eckstein, 1955, p. 650). The land became the most prominent political issue following the end of WWII.

Land reform, which has an essential role in the development policy toolbox of the US, Türkiye, and Korea, needs to be researched more in political economy studies. As mentioned in the first chapter, political and economic analysis begins with the question, ‘who gets what and how?’. The land reform issue is directly related to this question and the question, ‘who owns what?’, which necessitates an all-inclusive approach. This fundamental question, which IPE is concerned with, was also at the heart of 18th-century philosophical debates. Its pre-eminence today lies in the issue of ownership because, for example, the modern market economy system initiated by the American military government in Korea in 1945 was established through land reform, which is a fundamental component of development of capitalism.⁵ Modernizing rural areas through land reform promotion also sped up the capitalist development in agriculture.

One of the structural problems of development is the need for land reform. It is a significant pre-condition for high growth (Besley & Burgess, 1998, p. 4) that aims to achieve economic growth, poverty and inequality reduction, and conflict mitigation and prevention (Kjeldsen-Kragh, 2007, p. 160) since severe inequality in land distribution is a fundamental problem of social injustice and income inequality.

⁵ Capitalism is a system in which stocks of vehicles, equipment, structures, and goods, in a word, *capital* produced, are essentially private or individual ownership issues.

Poverty and inequality can be reproduced or aggravated when land is misallocated. Such reform and its effects can radically change the distribution of economic power in a country and, by implication, the distribution of political power (Borras & Mckinley, 2006). Land reform can also be considered an institution that reduces transaction costs, increases overall efficiency and, ultimately, facilitates development. It is described as an integral part of development strategies and as a tool of social justice, poverty reduction, equal land rights, income distribution, food production, defining power relations amongst society, and human capital development—all results of the abolition of the landlord system and the creation of independent farmers. Land reform is an essential tool in balancing society's socioeconomic demands and the ruling class's interests. one of the main goals of land reform is the removal of social and economic inequality in the agrarian structure and society. The level of development depends on the success of land reform; Eastern European countries and the Philippines (previously called 'the sick man of Asia') (Veseth & Balaam, 1995, p. 311) are the most prominent examples of where and how land reform largely failed. On the other hand, Korea, as a successful example, established a political, social, and economic base for its development but the East Asian high economic growth (Besley & Burgess, 2000, p. 4) in which the egalitarian distribution was state-led and top-down.

When the post-war conjuncture is considered, the most pressing domestic problems of the Third World stemmed from the rural situation that prevented these nations from developing toward prosperity. Within this reality, the last element of the US' reconstruction toolbox concerned policies applied in rural areas, i.e. a modernization of rural life. The issues of peasant, land and rural development became the most critical policy priorities of the US because the "Third World" was equated with the rural world (Cullather, 2013b, p. 192). Land reform was the most significant policy backed in some countries by the US after WWII. Therefore, in its foreign policy, US officials analyzed that land reform was most probably a pressing issue in many countries. That is why the US aimed to promote land reform by underlining its technical relations to economic development and modernization. There are four main reasons why America attached importance to this policy. The most basic and straightforward answer is that in

countries going through the first development phase after WWII, agriculture employed three-quarters of the population. and lived in the countryside. East Asia and the Middle East were no exception (Studwell, 2014, p. 42). The second reason is that income distribution, and socio-economic equality were significant development variables. It is very easy to say which countries were poorer and richer; however, this does not tell us the distribution of income and the allocation of resources among social groups. The third reason for the US land reform promotion was to break the closed economy of the landed interest in developing countries (Parvin & Hic, 1984, p. 209). Last but not least, being aware of the communist structures in developing countries, including Türkiye and Korea, America supported distributive land reform and community development projects to prevent communism from taking root in these countries and other nonaligned countries. Also, these projects pushed forward the development at the early stages and drove poverty reduction. Most of them were generally considered successful, but, as in Türkiye, in some of these countries, land reform initiatives could not achieve the expected results.

Land reform has many implications, yet there have been few studies on these kinds of reforms in the literature. In addition to providing egalitarian order, modernization experts gave huge importance to population growth and the modernization of agricultural practices. Why? In the post-war period, population growth was very high. Modernization theorists thought that population growth could undermine the process of modernization and lead to problems in food security and stability. According to Rostow, if population growth is slow, the probability of a land problem is relatively low. However, if population and population growth are high in traditional societies, there will be a land scarcity problem and the productivity of land decreases. Thus, the land was taken from the hands of the farmers because Western ideas and implementations like contracts and sales had not yet been introduced. Also, landlords overtaxed clients using their power. All of these caused communist-based peasant revolts. Although not preferred, repression was involved in land reform implementations in Latin America. Milikan asserted that to avoid this scene, “Westerners introduced ownership in fee simple, mortgages, and alienability of land

in Asia.” (Millikan & Blackmer, 1961, p. 15). The US approach towards land reform implementation did not favor repression or revolt.

As Rostow argued, the influence of the West and Western ideas like egalitarianism paved the way for adjusting to the forces of capitalist development (Millikan & Blackmer, 1961, pp. 15–16) and peacefully implemented land reform, one of the pillars of capitalism (private property rights are one of the cores of capitalist institutions), integrates rural development with technical and financial assistance (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2015, p. 21). In Rostow’s stages of growth model, at the initial stage, the traditional society’s feature is that they have to devote a large part of their resources to agriculture because of limited production capabilities and low investments. The labor force employed in agriculture is the dominant sector. In these societies, traditional land-dependent production methods are used; the political power is usually in the hands of the landowners. In the second stage, the transformation through modern society occurs with the change of ideas and attitudes towards economic development. Some of the agriculture and land reform income is transferred to the industry. The entrepreneurial landowners invest in trade and industry. Thus, in the first two stages of economic growth, Rostow finds the producing elite among the farmers who are ready and willing to respond to the possibilities of new techniques (Chapman, 1966, p. 172). As seen in the Korean case, these dismantled landowner classes later became entrepreneurial elites. Landholding arrangements, transportation facilities, and market forms are all affected by land reform programs’ implementation.

The reasons for America’s support for land reform during the Truman period were listed as follows: to prevent political instability, to improve the position of the farmer on the land, to provide property security, to increase production and to protect resources. However, more importantly, it was to make it different from the land reform implemented by Soviet Communism (*United States Policy Regarding Land Reforms in Foreign Areas*, 1979, pp. 1666–1667). The report argued that unequal land ownership and use caused underdevelopment in many places, and examples of land reform in India, Japan and Korea were referenced as democratic, peaceful and successful examples. America-sponsored land reform was described as being peaceful,

democratic, redistributive, and ensuring the safety of farmers. In addition, it was stated that the land reform would contribute to economic and political stability and the development of institutions such as rent, tax and ownership. Besides the regional committees, committees were formed for other priority countries, namely the Philippines, Indonesia, Bolivia, Egypt, Iran and Pakistan (*United States Policy Regarding Land Reforms in Foreign Areas*, 1979, p. 1671). While the Korean example was referred to as a successful case, Türkiye's was not mentioned in this report, even though land reform initiatives started before.

US-led land reform had desirable components specified by the US officials as such: distribution of significant holdings to farmers, establishing farmer-secured ownership, establishing voluntary cooperatives, agricultural credits to farmers, a fiscal reform to regulate the tax system, ensuring water rights, providing securing evidence of ownership rights, health services, education and training to the rural communities and consolidation of fragmented holdings (*United States Policy Regarding Land Reforms in Foreign Areas*, 1979, pp. 1675–1676). At the end of the report, it was indicated that agrarian conditions were one of the most critical problems that hinder development that the US “must face up to in looking ahead to the future” (*United States Policy Regarding Land Reforms in Foreign Areas*, 1979, p. 1680).

US officials thought their attention on agricultural development distinguished “Free world” development methods. Whereas the Western methods of modernization were humane and technically efficient, Communism only brought hunger wherever it went, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed (Rusk, 1962). Harvard professor John Kenneth Galbraith and economist and the co-creator of America's Cold War Massive Aid program Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan saw the rural as the trouble spots (Cullather, 2013b, pp. 192–193). In 1952, Dean Acheson, President Truman’s secretary of state, stated that “land reform is absolutely in our whole international policy.” (Gittinger, 1961, p. 197). The US officials deemed the land reform vital to their national security, the tool to affect allies' domestic political economy and prevent communist-led insurgencies and rebellions. Since “...where they are inequitable and where the peasant lives in poverty and suffering, revolution is likely, if not evitable.”, Huntington

argues (S. Huntington, 2006, p. 375). For the US, communists could exploit land inequality. Also, the Soviet Union supported its version of land reform for its allies, and Rostow said this led to unsuccessful and even intractable problems (Rostow, 2017, p. 98). The US government warned its allies about the need for land reform.

After the War, many agricultural economists in America began to produce policy-oriented research that could guide the development processes of underdeveloped and developing countries with modernization theorists. Especially for underdeveloped countries such as South Korea and South Vietnam, the prescription offered was a quick land transfer to tenants. Agricultural economists recognized that land is a crucial political power source in both underdeveloped and developing countries, emphasizing the role of redistribution that will play an important economic role and political role in their development and create a new class structure. As Western countries' agricultural sectors shrank, relative to their GDP in the post-war years, they turned their attention to these countries. Agricultural economists, who clustered around the *Land Economy Journal* founded by the University of Wisconsin, an important medium where academic articles on the relationship between development and land are published, defended these views (Gawthorpe, 2021, p. 284).

Regarding land reform and rural issues, the US promoted community development projects to provide political stability, particularly in rural areas. This was support for projects with locally focused efforts to initiate rural development. An approach that has been associated with the efforts of the United States in the New Deal period and the efforts of the post-war era also came with a high–low modernism (Scott, 1998, pp. 90, 196–201, 270–273) distinction. Whereas high modernism is more of a top-down, centralized approach, low modernism promotes social change through small-scale, local projects focused on specific groups and communities. Building large-scale infrastructures and construction projects served exactly the purposes of high modernism: moving towards a life in which nature was controlled by technology and science. At the same time, each project was simultaneously an act of national self-assertation (Nixon, 2010, pp. 65, 69). And the Cold War played a big role in spreading these megaprojects such as large dam culture, new forms of river basin plans, and hotel

construction. Low modernist thinking was especially apparent in many of the agrarian reform programs implemented by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) during the late 1930s and early 1940s and is associated with the bottom-up approach and more small-scale and low-tech technologies like land reform and community development. Therefore, the emphasis on localism, initiated within US politics and reform efforts to promote US rural society, systems and agricultural practices were also applied to the post-war development understanding and policies of the US in the Third World (Miller, 2013, p. 58). Prominent scholars such as Nick Cullather claim that high modernism triumphed over community development and land reform. Although this argument is valid, it still needs to be completed. US community development projects were implemented simultaneously with the modernization blueprint. Rostow argued that development anchored in rural areas in limiting peasant resettlement, improving agriculture and infrastructure, urban development, and importing consumer goods within a global capitalist market would bring about overall development (Rostow, 1955b, pp. 25–30). The current study also argues that modernization, land reform, and community development programs went hand in hand until the 1970s. The American intellectual Edward Shils demonstrates how the modernization theory penetrated US policy-making process and thinking of development in 1958 (Gilman, 2018, p. 2).

“In the new states “modern” means democratic and equalitarian, scientific, economically advanced and sovereign. “Modern” states are welfare and democratic states; modernity entails the dethronement of the rich and the traditionally privileged from their positions of pre-eminent influence. It involves *land reform* (emphasis added). It involves steeply progressive income taxation. It involves universal suffrage. Modernity involves universal public education.” (E. Shils, 1966, pp. 1–3)

Village-level modernization programs were especially launched during the Eisenhower administration, and their scope was gradually expanded. However, the US pressured foreign governments to institute land reform programs first, one of the core political determinants of development and late industrialization (Kalecki, 1993, pp. 23–44). A democratic form of government combined with a capitalist economy is the ideal modernization or development process for the US. However, neither democracy

nor a Western-style development model can spring up in a vacuum; instead, they require a social, political, and economic infrastructure. With the presence of the traditional elite, landed aristocrats, and the apolitical and uneducated masses, this could not be achieved.

Furthermore, one of the underlying causes of existing inequalities, besides poverty, insufficient wealth, lack of education, and poor health conditions was the traditional, supposedly inefficient method of agriculture. In order to initiate permanent change and innovation, disseminate democratic values, provide the elite with integrity, cause a disintegration of the land-owning class, and eliminate corruption, an internally consistent social structure was needed (Yeh, 1989, p. 7). The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations during the 1960s provided funds, and The Peace Corps volunteers worked to solve problems, especially in rural areas, such as illiteracy and lowering birthrate that caused breaking down peasants' standard of living (Cullather, 2013b, p. 202). The capitalist camp led by the US arranged land redistribution campaigns. It promoted these via programs like the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and sweeping land reforms in East Asia. Another policy that had enormous impacts on Asia was the American-sponsored Green Revolution which aimed to promote high-yielding seed varieties, irrigation, mechanization, fertilizers and pesticides and to boost output in countries thought to be vulnerable to communism due to rural poverty and hunger (*Green Revolution*, n.d.). Subsistence farming was systematically replaced with commercial agribusiness and the bonds of village and family with contractual arrangements (Cullather, 2013b, p. 202).

Scholars, policy-makers, and development practitioners concentrated on why underdeveloped or developing countries were backward and focused only on the traps that awaited them. One of the most important traps that prevented development was understood to be the lack of land reform. US agencies and philanthropic institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation actively participated in rural policies. Agronomists and officials were chosen and sent to relevant countries to participate in these endeavors. The Center for International Studies included promoting land reform and community development policies in the policy recommendations prepared by the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1960 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960). Isador Lubin, the head of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics between 1933 and 1946, foresaw the importance of land reform: “There are sound and pressing reasons for the practical consideration by the United Nations of problems of land reform at this time” (C. Senior, 1958, p. 4). International institutions such as the United Nations, the ILO, the World Bank, and the FAO also took part in these projects and supported the US policies. US delegates supported land reform resolutions at the UN Economic and Social Council.

During the 1950s and 60s, the ILO and its various bureaus did considerable research, published these studies, and established commissions (*The World Employment Programme (WEP): Past, Present and Future*, 2020, p. 23). Besides the ILO, the FAO periodically published reports and journals on land reform (Munro-Faure, n.d.). After WWII, especially in the negotiations held in the UN, joint planning of land reform and social/economic/political development and the need to search for a solution that took into account the economic, social, and managerial measures were thought to be necessary for the realization of this reform. However, due to the activities undertaken within each institution, land reform has taken different approaches from different angles. Furthermore, because there are different regions, different land types, ways of farming, a history of land acquisition, general social and economic circumstances, and political goals and implementations for land reform, developing a precise definition of land reform was and continues to be a difficult task.

More broadly, the idea of land reform refers to the whole spectrum of policies that may or should be implemented to change the structure or relations among persons in terms of their land rights (Blase & Goodwin, 1961, p. 93). One of the first sources we should refer to is the 1975 Report of the World Bank, which defines land reform as changing the institutional structure governing and improving man's relationship with the land (*Land Reform*, 1975). In a narrower sense, land reform aims to reduce poverty (predominantly rural) by raising the less fortunate individual's share of land rights, expropriation of extensive land holdings, and their distribution for the welfare of landless people small farmers, agricultural workers, and renters by providing them

with more equal land distribution and secure access to land (Barraclough, 1999, p. 1). As a result, land reform indicates a wide range of alternatives such as land claims, land acquisition, and land distribution to the landlord-like partner or landless farmers by breaking up state land (Morvaridi, 1990a, p. 303), gaining access to land for specific purposes, land use planning, infrastructure development, agricultural and commercial assistance, and resettlement initiatives, reconciliation among different segments of society, security of tenure, and training (Villiers, 2003). For this, legal arrangements, laws, and legislations enter into force (Dorner, 1972, p. 1). Land reform is also described as a political reaction that brings about a socio-economic structural change emerging from such factors as a rising population, pressures on limited land resources, ideologies based on equality in the land, and income distribution. Underuse or misuse of land directly affects the development of the nation. Furthermore, low production and a low standard of living were related to overpopulation, considered a danger to global security in the 1950s and 60s (D. C. Engerman & Unger, 2009, p. 381). Land reform can occur over time in response to a demand for greater equity or social justice. (D. C. Engerman & Unger, 2009, p. 381). Thus, it mainly refers to restitution, expropriation, redistribution and/or confirmation of rights in terms of land to the benefit of the poor or dispossessed. However, land reform is more than just a land-distributing process. It is a set of measures transcending the elements preventing industrialization and development. Even though most reform efforts fail, those considered successful are the efforts we see in developed states today. This is an indication of how vital land reform is.

Land reform is a powerful policy regarding class structure, social classes, and power relations in society. Social structure and power relations are strongly related to political consequences and the effects of direct land reform. The most crucial reason for land reform is the numerical multiplicity of agricultural producers who depend on land besides large properties and do not have enough land. Such a reform is the starting point in transforming indigent peasants into self-owning farmers and assuring their livelihood on small but sufficient land (Kwon & Koo, 2014, p. 6). In this context, land reform's social and economic aspects are intertwined with political dimensions. This

interconnectedness is fundamental due to the legal intervention in private land ownership.

For a long time, land reform was used interchangeably with the concept of agricultural reform, but this terminology needs to be corrected. Therefore, at present, it is necessary to distinguish two concepts. Agricultural reform points to the broader institutional framework within which agricultural and related rural activities occur (Barraclough, 1999, p. 4). Agricultural reform aims to increase agricultural productivity and change land ownership status and organization. Thus, it entails a more comprehensive and intensive use of services, such as credit, capital, marketing, education, publishing, research, organization, and equipment required by the agricultural sector (Parvin & Hic, 1984, p. 208). Land reform programs and land tenure systems that form the core of the agrarian structure refer to the legal and customary relations among parties directly using the land or appropriating its products. Terminology helps us to fully understand demonstrating policy orientations, as Türkiye preferred to say agricultural reform instead of land reform in the 1970s.

Today, however, both are seen as intertwined since their main objectives are the same. The economic goal is to efficiently use the land and increase and utilize the subsequent production. The social aim is to organize equitable land distribution. The political goal is to use the rights granted by laws freely. In both reforms, the primary goals are to ensure that the distribution of land is fair, to operate the land efficiently, and to provide land for landless farmers who do not have sufficient land. Land reform policies are also closely related to the social (fair distribution of income and land), political (liquidation of feudal relations), and economic (expansion of the internal market, acceleration of industrial transfer of resources from rural areas) dimensions, which are important factors in the development of any country. In developing countries and countries where development is mainly dependent on agriculture, achieving an effective structure of agriculture has greater importance. Otherwise, inappropriate land policies or implementations would significantly impede economic and social growth in many respects and are of significant importance for emerging countries. Insecure land tenure, antiquated land laws, and slow or ineffective land administration systems

can all limit private investment and undermine good governance. (Deininger, 2003, p. 1).

These issues became more acute with population growth and more market integration for agricultural products after WWII. As a result of increasing demands to remedy these circumstances, many governments have reconsidered the concept of land access and land policy reforms. While large-scale expropriative and redistributive land reforms were often incompatible with present political circumstances, various other types of property and property use rights provided policy instruments for changing the conditions of access to and use of land. Thus, a broad agenda of land policy interventions exists to assist those who had and have access to land and provide circumstances for increased efficiency, poverty reduction, sustainability, and political stability (Janvry & Sadoulet, 2001, p. 1). As a significant issue of the developmental agenda, many countries started to undertake land reform initiatives after WWII. Various examples include Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, Egypt (1952-70), Iran (1962-72), India (in the 1950s), and Türkiye (1945-50 and 1973 onwards) but also countries where there was a high risk of revolution and insurgencies like in Cuba and Vietnam (Pee, 2016, pp. 10–15). Both the USSR and the US favored land reform of one sort or another during the Cold War. However, whereas the communist countries sympathized with state-centered collectivism in all sectors, including agriculture, the liberal capitalist understanding promoted the idea of ‘reform that you may preserve’ (Lipton, 2009, p. 321). Capitalism requires the state to create an institutional and policy framework for the capitalist development process, and the state should create an institutional and policy framework to ensure citizens' and private property protection (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2015, p. 1). Land reform integrated the development processes between rural and urban areas and agricultural and industrial sectors. Institutionalization is achieved through the application of standardized cadastral records and the systematization of the tax base.

Land reform in US politics and foreign policy was significant in boosting rural income and its spillover effects on development. Even more critical for the US was the danger that the region and countries it saw as potential allies after WWII would fall into the

hands of communism in this transition period, with rural insurgencies thought to be important to the national security of the US. After the war, while US officials and the US military forces worked in Japan, they concluded that land reform should be promoted to contain the internal dissension that could halt the post-war effort of an indigenous elite there. Local populations' persuasion and consent were necessary because the US wanted to solve land problems without coercion. Ordered by General Douglas MacArthur, land reform was carried out in Japan in 1947. Under the American occupation of Japan, the land was taken away from powerful landlords and redistributed to farmers; farm families could now own the land they worked on. Wolf Ladejinsky, who joined McArthur's staff, worked for the USDA, the Ford Foundation, and the World Bank—and who was the architect of Japanese land reform—believed that the US could fight communism with a compelling version of the American farm tradition (Ladejinsky, 1977, p. 154). To achieve peaceful land redistribution in war-ravaged Japan, Ladejinsky and McArthur both advocated for a successful implementation of land reform in the country. Similar successes were achieved in Korea and Taiwan. Today, one of the reasons for the “development” success of the North and East Asian countries, i.e. Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and China, was the successful implementation of land reform policies. Korea is a convincing case study of successful land reform, while Türkiye is not.

The countries that implemented the land reform had two main objectives: the removal of feudalism that paved the way for an equal society by abolishing oppressive concentrations of economic and political power and nationalism. The achievement of national independence was associated with removing institutional hangovers from the past that included the ownership of large estates by persons of alien nationality or the survival of forms of land tenure imposed under colonial rule. While the first reason was valid for Türkiye and Korea, the second one was only for the Korean example in post-war land reform initiatives (Warriner, 1969, pp. 4–11). These two reasons were obstacles to development. Successful development included improving the rural society's livelihoods and lofty goals such as increasing the number of hectares and

exports, decreasing imports and modernizing the machinery used in agriculture (Bonine, 2001, p. 235).

Indeed, though the causes of the problems differ, the threats are still the same. American academics like Samuel Huntington and Barrington Moore saw land reform as a way to improve political, social, and economic order and considered landholding inequality a primary driver of civil conflict (S. P. Huntington, 1970, p. 1; Moore, 1966, p. viii). Land inequality was seen as the leading cause of conflicts in countries such as China, the Philippines, Vietnam and various Latin American states. The US understanding was that land inequality was the leading cause of insurgencies, especially in Asian countries like China, Korea, and Vietnam. In the Cold War environment, ideological threats, especially communism, threatened US dominance and exploited the land reform issue (Kapstein, 2017, p. 69). For America, the recovery of these strategic countries had not yet been achieved, and threats like civil war could easily lead to the "trap of communism" (as in China and Vietnam). They would be considered an additional failure in US-supported agricultural modernization programs, land reform, and community development.

Since the 1950s, US officials have determined the agrarian population as a vulnerable but crucial issue. The Policy Planning Staff, the principal strategic arm of the US Department of State, stated that "the peasants who control the food supply and constitute a substantial majority of all underdeveloped countries are in a crucially important political position. They could form an irresistible revolutionary tide." (Cullather, 2013b, p. 193) Both development agencies and the US focused on the rural areas of developing countries. Since President Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson's proclamations in 1952, land reform has been at the forefront of the entire international policy of the US. Acheson stated, "Our democracy has its roots in a sound land policy." Thus, the promotion of land reform aimed to further the development of democracy (C. Senior, 1958, p. 4). US policymakers were, therefore, increasingly more interested in the issue of land reform. The proponents of the modernization theory, such as Rostow, claimed that "The wealth that is largely concentrated in the hands of those who own land must be shifted into the hands of those who will spend it

on roads and railroads, schools and factories rather than on country houses and servants, personal ornaments and temples.” (Rostow, 2017, p. 19)

The US-sponsored land-to-tiller program’s primary objectives were promoting democracy, increasing living standards, stimulating economic development and industrialization, preventing feudalism, stopping counterinsurgency movements, and expanding revolutionary appeals (I. Kim, 2016, p. 98). To achieve these ends, the required transformation was carried out by deployment of US foreign economic aid, military involvement, and the services of US technocrats to carry forth socioeconomic reforms, including land reform, tax reform, the strengthening of institutions, and advanced technical training within a coherent and consistent framework. Indeed, land reform, resettlement, educational reform, technological measures like irrigation, the use of artificial fertilizers and new seed varieties, the introduction of modern techniques and structures, extension, maximization of land resources and production, mechanization of farm technologies, addressing land redistribution, and the support these many initiatives entailed all required substantial funding.

US-backed land reforms were implemented in many parts of the world, including Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Land reform policies continued alongside cooperative agricultural and community development initiatives, and major irrigation schemes, indicating the diversification of US programs. The reforms backed by the US in Korea followed the careful steps taken in Japan. The US-implemented extensive land reform programs created a smallholder and family farming economy, and by almost all accounts, these projects effectively neutralized the influence of communism. The US formulated its diplomatic and foreign economic aid policy towards a land issue that had previously posed formidable problems. By promoting land reform and community development projects, the US aimed to set the stage for rapid economic growth (Boyce et al., 2005, p. 1), helped to reduce poverty and inequality, promoted agricultural growth, and laid the social foundation for rapid industrialization (Boyce et al., 2005, p. 3). Land reform changes a country's economic and political power distribution (*The Unresolved Land Reform Debate: Beyond State-Led or Market-Led Models*, 2006). However, these can differ from the exact effects of land reform as it

depends on many variables such as management style, country, geography, and a country's past. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the contribution of land reform to development can be magnified by its spillover effects.

Why did land reform succeed in some places and fail in others? The Turkish and Korean examples address and answer this question and help us draw essential conclusions. US-promoted land reforms have been evaluated as a critical variable for the East Asian miracle, but why could they not succeed despite many attempts in Türkiye? In the case of Korea and some other countries, such as Vietnam and El Salvador, the crisis mobilized American support. The situation in Korea in 1945 galvanized tardy US support as an alternative to the Communist revolution. The land reform promotion and other tools of the development package were compatible with the countries where the US supports land reform. One of the most important features that positioned Korea to implement successful land reform is colonialism (C. Hamilton, 2007, p. 40). Colonialism had already resulted in the weakening of the traditional dominance of the landowning class. However, in other countries like Türkiye and Egypt, even where there were enough resources and capacity, bureaucracies were reluctant to weigh in on the issue of redistributive land reform (McCormick, 1990, p. 29). Scholars such as Ellen Kay Trimberger, Nora Hamilton and Theda Skocpol argue that authoritarian states in Türkiye were checked by elites' remaining power and the fear of inciting a peasant revolt. Because of the state autonomy's bounds, the goals of these states, like the modernization of the industrial base, conflicted with those societies' resource capacities or elite class privileges (N. L. Hamilton, 1975, pp. 83, 104; Skocpol, 1979, pp. 112–117, 1994, p. 99; Trimberger, 1978, p. 3). This dissertation argues that Türkiye could not implement land reform because of its domestic restraints and the lack of a US-sponsored policy. Furthermore, the US-sponsored land reform in Korea was implemented in order to market agricultural production and advance agricultural capitalism. More importantly, since land reform is a redistributive measure, it constituted the primary components of state development programs to boost agricultural production and industrial productivity. The US promoted a land-to-tiller policy that suggested transferring control to less

powerful, small and poor farmers. As will be seen in both cases, land reform had a direct impact on the political sites of the domestic spheres of countries and the course of class struggles in many countries, including Türkiye (Najmabadi, 1987, pp. 193–203).

An unequal land tenure system resulted in delaying agricultural development and farm investment and reducing the widening gap between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. The argument here is that the frustration of that experience (land reform) was the point of departure for development in Korea and Türkiye. Also, in the Korean case, the rural poor established their independent organizations; the pro-reform political coalition at the national level generated powerful political influence. Moreover, this coalition used and channeled material support efficiently, aid and technical assistance from the US. Indeed, land reform's successful implementation and the distribution of American aid to the appropriate areas required strong political will, the role of elites, and an existing domestic structure. These factors are explored in the following sections with country-specific case studies.

3.7. Conclusion

Until the 1970s, grandiose expectations and representations of America were used, which were reflected in development understanding, projects, and planning. The penetration of the modernization theory in US development efforts and rhetoric affected US policymakers' way of seeing and thinking about development and the Third World. Since 1945, modernization has become a "lens" through which to observe the Third World. Social scientists like Rostow and Milikan were the leading figures that helped bridge the theoretical and natural worlds. In the Cold War context, the US tried to make this war "global" in every realm, and the ensuing rivalry helped shape many emerging nations. Underdeveloped countries like Türkiye and Korea, especially, were then and are now not merely endowed with economic power but have been constrained by the 'definitional power of the West' (Storey, 2003, p. 35).

Admittedly, the US post-war strategy was ideologically and security driven, i.e. the containment of communism. US overseas development programs were tied to domestic concerns, national security, and commercial interests. To establish an international economic system that is open and egalitarian, America was committed to helping developing countries obtain the expertise and resources necessary for their development, build the economic and political structure, and establish social institutions that would enhance their quality of life. This strategy came into existence through the development package. US policymakers' penchant for development projects includes four main pillars: foreign economic aid, trade policies, military instruments, and land reform. Each element was included in the reconstruction of Europe and Asia and establishment of international institutions. This package provides a model for the others.

In this section, it is claimed that the basis of the Cold War policies of the US is the policies implemented in domestic affairs. The tools of the development package applied to the third world are the result of policies previously experienced in internal affairs. These tools have been regular components of US foreign policy and development package and used to win over states into joining the American side. The US hoped to gain leverage over developing societies in this way. Although the US strongly affected these countries' development paths, in the specific cases of Türkiye and Korea, it can be said that the intervening foreign power could not wholly alter the domestic political economy of these two countries. This is why it is necessary to examine their specific development experiences and the US domination of IPE and development studies that include domestic and international factors. As will be seen, besides the determining role of US efforts in shaping each country's developmental path, colonial history, land reform, literacy, nationalism, geography, the role of elites, culture, whether they adopt export-oriented or import-oriented development strategies, investment, trade flows, market opening strategies, the war economy, the suppression of social divisions, the particular circumstances of the global economy, and the emergence at a particular time under a particular model of a neoliberal or developmental state identity have also all affected these two countries' developmental

success or failure. In light of these factors, the following chapters will examine and question why Korea developed more than Türkiye and which factors played a role in this differentiation. There are various analyses exploring the underlying reasons for Korea's development success.

CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE SOUTH KOREAN EXPERIENCE

4.1. An Introductory Glance at South Korea

Following the end of WWII, the world changed dramatically—but probably no region has gone through such dynamic and extraordinary progress as East Asia. Only a few peripheral countries managed to transform successfully into developed countries. First, Japan, and then South Korea and Taiwan made remarkable progress, often hailed as miraculous. South Korea is one of those countries which transformed from an aid-dependent country into a success story. The developmental success of Korea, in particular, comes from decades of hard and efficient work. There are many references to intangibles (Toh, 2017) like Confucian ethics that have been denoted as the factors contributing to Korean development; it is true, yet not enough. As Krugman rightly notes, as a resource-poor but mind-rich country, Korea is not an inspiration but a perspiration case (Krugman, n.d.), and this study shares this view.

Korea's situation, which was much worse than Türkiye's in 1945, was considered an economic anomaly at the time. Korean "miracle" is its achievement of development in one generation—in only 30 years. The underlying factors that explain the differences between Türkiye and Korea and the domestic and international forces that have bolstered South Korean development since WWII cannot be examined without considering the changing relations of forces in the international political economy. The foreign (US) involvement and penetration into Korea and Türkiye have not been examined in the literature in detail from the perspective of international political economy (IPE). In this study, the aim will be to focus on the interplay of domestic and external dynamics (US engagement) that served the development objectives of each

country. A systematic framework is therefore needed to address multiple points: domestic, international, and sectoral perspectives, which will be examined in the international political economic dimension.

Both Türkiye and South Korea were wholly dependent on the US, not just for military defense but also a large portion of their energy and food needs, as well as a market for their produced goods (Arrighi, 1994, p. 23); they also benefited from large-scale US foreign aid. However, in a regional context, South Korea and Taiwan are the only states that, under the US regime of accumulation, have succeeded in moving from the low-income to the high-income group of states (Hamadeh, 2022), particularly South Korea since it is the only country that has substantially changed its place in the international ordering of development and democracy. Over the past 30 years, Korea's political and economic policies have been far more supportive to long-term growth and development than those of other countries (S. J. K. et. al. Kang, 2009, p. viii). This remarkable developmental experiment is thanks to massive US-sponsored aid programs, military involvement, land reform promotion, an opening of the American domestic market, and educational and cultural programs. However, undoubtedly, the South Korean case also shows us that foreign involvement, in general, will only work if the interests of American policymakers and those in target states overlap. Therefore, it is only possible to grasp South Korean development by examining Korea's prioritizing of its human resources, capacity building, and ownership of the development process and how the US entered the picture.

In this chapter, the role of the US development package tools (which have a history of over half a century in South Korea): foreign aid, particularly foreign economic assistance, land reform promotion, and military involvement, will be examined. The role of trade, financial flows, remittances, market opening, and investments will also be examined. This will be made considering the interplay between international conjuncture and the domestic environment. This chapter focuses on South Korean development from 1945 to 1990.

4.2. South Korea in the Post-WWII Era and Development Strategies Between 1945-60

Most studies address South Korea's development from the year it declared its independence, barely mentioning its history. This approach could be considered ahistorical. Furthermore, the interest and engagement of the US in Türkiye and South Korea did not begin after 1945; instead, the origins of US concerns, just like the modernization theory's permeating American policymaking processes, about Türkiye and South Korea began during the Second World War but intensified with the American containment policy of the Soviet Union following the end of WWII. Therefore, although this study's focus also begins with the end of WWII, one must touch upon a brief historical sketch of the South Korean political economy and the relevance of the United States to improve understanding of the fundamental structures of South Korea's modern transition.

Korea's miraculous development from a severely impoverished and aid-dependent country into one in a position to compete with the top economies in the world presents a unique case. After WWII, the country, considered an outlier with no significant natural resources, was further devastated by the Korean War (1950-3), and had to start all over again at the end of the War. Compared to other newly industrialized countries (NICs) (Minns, 2006a, p. 118), South Korea's developmental transition and successful global market integration were spectacular (Adelman, n.d.). South Korea has been a source of inspiration for other developing countries since it has become the 4th in Asia and the 10th-largest economy in the world (*South Korea - Country Profiles*, 2023) and represented 2% of the world economy (R. Smith, 2018). In 2010, it joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD and became the 24th member by emphasizing its growing role as a major foreign aid donor. South Korea's official development assistance (ODA) started in 1987 with the establishment of the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), which aimed at providing concessional loans to developing countries (S. J. K. et. al. Kang, 2009, p. 2). It also became the first Asian country and non-G-7 member to host a G-20 summit.

South Korea is not a brand-new nation but has a deep-rooted 5000-year-old history. The Korean nation was founded by Dangun, who ruled Korea under the founding principle of *Hongik Ingan*, a motto of Korea that refers to living and working for the benefit of others and the human race. The most significant period in Korean history was the era of the four kingdoms. Starting from 57 BCE and the Silla Dynasty (57 BCE-935 AD), the Goguryeo Dynasty (37 BCE-668 AD), the Baekje Dynasty (18 BCE-660 AD), and the Joseon/Choson dynasty (1392-1910), this has been one of the most prolonged continuous regimes in human history, lasting over 500 years (K.-D. Kim, 1987, p. 274). The origins of Korean modernization can be traced back to the Joseon Era. Notably, during the last decades of the Joseon dynasty, the Empire tried to embrace modernity and maintain tradition. Under such a vision, it pushed for reform in many areas, including rites, alphabets, education, military, finance, health care, infrastructure, land and agriculture, and industry, by mastering the new based on the old (M. E. Robinson, 2007, p. 4). These kinds of reform series, which formed the nucleus of Korean development, explain why the Joseon period is particularly noteworthy. US-Korean interactions date back to the 1850s when American ships first appeared along the Korean coastline and then to the 1870s through migration (Song, 2006, p. 53). Diplomatic relations were established between the US and Korea in 1882 with the Treaty of Commerce and Friendship (finalized in 1884), but Japan soon swallowed Korea (Bandow & Carpenter, 1992, p. 75). The Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 ended Korea's last dynasty, i.e. the Joseon.

Japanese colonialism had positive and negative effects and certain continuities and discontinuities on Korean development, and the literature is divided accordingly. However, it does not alter the reality that Korea was in chaos in every sense after liberation from Japanese colonial rule on August 15, 1945. Korea was divided between the US and Soviet spheres of influence. The war and Japanese colonization-related humanitarian issues were made worse by the social, economic, and political instability in the South (L. K. Woo, 2015, p. 12). The Korean economy was struggling with problems on many fronts. When WWII ended, all Japanese troops and engineers returned to Japan. The majority of technical workers (82% of all technical workers)

were Japanese, and not only these technicians but also Japanese business people, managers, and officers all returned to Japan (*Broad Overview of US Aid in Korea*, n.d.). Due to the lack of materials and skilled labor needed for industry and because of the disruption of marketing channels, Korea experienced some severe problems—not just because of the effects of Japanese colonialism but because of the country's division into South and North, as well. North Korea contained 79% heavy industry, while the South had 70% light industry, which furthered problems for the South. Japan was also a vast market for Korean goods; these ties were broken after liberation. The hyperinflation in the economy was an additional extra burden (Koh, 2010, p. 10). At this juncture, the US appeared as a liberator for Korea from Japanese colonialism.

After long decades of Japanese influence on and in Korea, American investment, both material and ideological, directed the country's transformation. The relationship between the two manifested itself through diplomatic, economic, and military means. This relationship was aligned and intensified following Korea's independence in 1948. The security issue, first and foremost, directed US actions towards Korea because Korea is geopolitically located in a critical area. Common enemies and threat perceptions were the international communist movement and the spread of communism. The US' security interests led to its engagement with Korea, and this is why America wanted to ally with security partners where it had significant stakes. Revolutionary nationalists who gained power were anti-imperial and anti-systemic in North Korea, China, and North Vietnam, along with these countries' commitment to the Soviet development model and a communist offensive in Korea's near region, frightened the US (Cumings, 1999a, p. 112). The most substantial factor differentiating South Korea from Türkiye for the US was that Korea was under communist threat from inside and outside. North Korea could attack to South with the backing of Communist China, and communist organizations in South Korea served as a sort of glue for US-Korean relations. The expansion of Soviet and Chinese power in East Asia was one of the biggest fears of the US. Furthermore, the Communist-influenced Koreans in Japan posed a threat too. US officials were concerned that economic

weakness could easily lead to Communist internal and external subversion (L. J. Smith, 1993, pp. 183–184).

The Pacific War (1937-45) and later the Korean War (1950-3) left Korea as a severely impoverished society with no significant natural resources. Many people, including civilians, were presumed dead and missing, and even worse, production facilities, property infrastructure, industrial facilities, and domestic homes were in deplorable conditions. The effects of the Korean War were the destruction of industrial facilities. In addition, they resulted in the disruption of productive activities, an extreme over-issue of money and consequent hyperinflation, and the discontinuance or distortion of two prime national economic reform policies (J. W. Lee, 2001a, p. 98). Even though South Korea had a strong and large army during the Korean War, it lacked adequate combat training and equipment. Therefore, the US Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) aided the South Korean military (Office of the Historian, 1950b). The Soviets immediately began working with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North, land reforms were implemented, and industry was nationalized. The US Government's approach was initially committed to South Korea's survival and then the survival of the region as a whole (Hundt, 2009a, p. 59). US forces were deployed, not just in South Korea but also in Taiwan, to protect the region against Communist China and North Korea. The military engagement was linked to economic development, and the US aimed to prevent and contain communist incursions in the countries at risk. America also worried about its vulnerability to communism since South Korea (and Türkiye) were dangerously positioned in the shadow of the communist threat. This was the context in which the US development toolbox arrived in South Korea. The enter of American power following the Japanese surrender (1945) to rebuild the regional and global economy—and in the cases of South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam to create new capitalist states through military occupation, intervention, and crucially, the provision of massive flows of US aid—was a crucial stage in the development of post-war East Asian capitalism (Gray, 2013, p. 1).

Until 1950, US policies toward Korea were in the formulation phase (Y.-B. Lee & Patterson, 1986, p. 67). The US policy leading up to the Korean War was vague and

ambiguous. No particular significance was given to Korea in the region designated by Acheson as the "defense perimeter" during his speech on 12 January 1950 (*Acheson Speech 1950*, n.d.). However, with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the threat of North Korea further increased the interest of America. It led to establishing intense political and economic ties for deterrence with South Korea. The main reasons for this were Korea's geostrategic location, its independence, keeping away from the threat of communism and last but not least, the US' priority was to create a stable alliance in the region where the 'Red Danger' was at its highest. Since America had a trusteeship experience in the Philippines, it first leaned towards the idea of international trusteeship for Korea (*Interest of the US in the Future Status of Korea and the Question of Recognition of a Provisional Korean Government*, 1962, pp. 859–881). After the US declaration of war on Japan and following its subsequent victory, the independence and future of the countries under Japanese colonialism came into question. Consequently, the US mainly focused on three significant issues concerning Korea's independence: Which role the US should take in Korea's ultimate independence, to what extent it could or should Korea contribute to the war against Japan, and how this contribution and the roles to be undertaken would contribute to the war efforts in Korea and the recognition of the exiled Korean Government in Shanghai at that time (M. Kim, 2019, p. iv).

These questions and issues from the American standpoint coincided with the efforts of Korea at the time. Upon the failed 1919 Revolution initiative, the Koreans established a provisional government in Shanghai led by Syngman Rhee. Rhee was also among those in exile and had played an active role in the Korean Commission, especially since 1939. The United States first secured the official recognition of the Provisional Government as the sole representative of the Korean people. So the process in which America led the establishment of a separate regime in the Southern part of Korea began. Following the elections held in May 1948, the Republic of Korea was officially founded and Rhee took over the government from the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). Soviet and American troops withdrew, and both states commissioned military advisors in the region to establish armies. South Korean troops,

under US consultancy, played a prominent role in suppressing the outbreak of communist uprisings. However, the conflict at the border peaked in June 1950, and the Korean War started. After WWII ended, the loss of heavy industry, raw materials, and electric power in North Korea and the Korean War devastated limited human physical resources and material sources. Following this, American involvement in the South reached its highest level.

4.2.1. Withstand, Recover, and Adapt: US Policies and Syngman Rhee

The US aimed to establish stability before growth or development in Korea. Accordingly, Ernst Fraenkel, an adviser to the American Government, set off to Korea to participate in democracy building, making a constitution, and preparing the country for its free elections, albeit unsuccessful (Luther, 1984, p. 43). Following US military rule between 1945 and 1948 and the elections, the right-wing leaning Syngman Rhee was elected as president in 1948, and the First Republic was proclaimed on 15 August 1948 with the strong support of America. Syngman Rhee shaped the future of modern Korea and directed the Korean state. Even before Korea's independence, Rhee was in communication with US officials and the Department of War about the issue of Korean independence. He was educated in the US and had lobbied for Korean independence; he was interested in engaging with democracy, democratic participation, Western liberalism, social progress, and the road to national resurgence (E. A. Shils, 1971, pp. 256–266). He was an advocate of Korean independence from Japan (M. and K. W. Kim, 2011, p. 107) and held a solid anti-communist (Sang-Hoon, 2011a, p. 50) and pro-American sentiment (CISJD, 1988, p. 9). His regime was manageable for the US to get Korea under its influence. He also feared the communist threat, which led him to prioritize military and defense-related aid from the US during his presidency. Therefore, Rhee maintained a close dialogue with the US government.

The US effectively and actively used modernization items like values, institutions, capital, and technology. Due to the ideological milieu created by the US, student revolts, and worries over the political views of the new regime were supporting; the

modernization theory was first introduced to students and intellectual circles in Korea through mass education. Creating an anti-Communist intellectual consensus was one of the most effective tools in the intellectual realm. Then, through academic exchanges, student programs, propaganda through gazettes, radio, and conferences, the US understanding of development and ideas influenced the South Korean public. During the late 1950s, the discussion on which path Korea would adopt for her development was dominated by Rostow's theory. On the side of an elite base, to fight the spread of communism, the Education Ministry published an official bulletin called *Sasang*, later renamed *Sasanggye* (the World of Thought or the Realm of Ideas). The bulletin's editor-in-chief published it privately (M. Kim, 2007b, p. 369). *Sasanggye* had a big reputation and became the most influential magazine during the 1950s and 1960s. It had a remarkable influence on students and intellectual circles and the intellectual and academic history of South Korea. Its circulation was broad; the writers had anti-coup and anti-authoritarian stances and were proponents of democracy and state-led industrial development. In line with the modernization premises, *Sasanggye* promoted population mobilization, cultural revitalization, and achieving parity with the West so that the 'backwardness' could be overcome. As stated by Rostow, traditional societies could be modernized and industrialized by rationalizing economic production and modernizing the economy. Furthermore, traditional societies could escape production capacity limitations if they make discoveries and develop new technologies (M. Kim, n.d., p. 278). Intellectuals who contributed to the magazine reinforced anti-communism in Korea, as well as the liberal ideas and modernization theory's premises (S. R. Lee, n.d., p. 255). In the end, modernization-oriented liberal democracy permeated Korean society. The principal means the US employed in order to shape South Korea's development direction were identified by Rostow. To realize the 'take-off' of its allies, the US identified some decisive factors for Korea:

- “the adoption of a sound growth strategy, promoting institutions and public policies,
- high-quality workers and entrepreneurs,
- a technological backlog available to Korea as a latecomer,
- proper use of public resources for infrastructure development, propaganda, and education,
- population control,

- the ‘intellectual trap’—the assumption that an economy can be managed adequately using only such macroeconomic tools as the regulation of money supply, interest rates, and so on.(Rostow, 1991)"

For the US development package, democracy was desirable and necessary for a thriving free market economy, a premise of the modernization theory, and served as a hegemonic ideology, yet it was not a mandatory condition (C.-I. & K.-M. Moon, 2000, pp. 141–142). During the Cold War, as in Korea, several right-wing dictatorships emerged in the developing world. In general, these regimes relied on repression and US assistance to stay in power (Roland, 2014, p. 251), and this allowed capitalism to flourish in their countries. As a result, US-based businesses were able to profit greatly. The US supported the right-wing dictatorial regimes in the developing world, and the justification for this was “the defense of freedom” (Hunt, 2009, pp. 135–150). Korea showed remarkable development performance under authoritarian regimes. As a right-wing dictator, Rhee was well-fitted for the 'free world' notion of the US and was supported by America (Later, American officials like Henry Kissinger expressed their regret because of this policy, which continued in later periods) (Hitchens, 2004). In 1953, Vice President Nixon, discussing South Korea, exclaimed, "they are hard to work with, but thank God they're on our side. With all the things that are wrong with [South Korean President Syngman] Rhee, the Communists are a lot worse" (Schmitz, 1999, pp. 184–204). The possibility of enticement toward Communism in Korea intimidated and preoccupied American policymakers' agenda because the critical groundswell of the Cold War was ideological and psychological warfare between Capitalism and Communism. Syngman Rhee's pro-American and right-wing tendency in Korea was described as a success and guided Vietnam's Policy toward America. Later, US policymakers stated that they only needed "another Syngman Rhee" (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 372) in Vietnam.

The US felt a moral obligation to help Korea's security for failing to anticipate and prevent the Korean War (USAID, 1972, p. 1). Initially, these two motivations explain the flow of massive US aid to Korea. However, whereas the US provided vast amounts of aid to Korea, Rhee frequently used the 'Communist threat' (or the US' Achilles heel) as a trump card, mainly when asking for US aid. In time, the degree and level of US

infiltration increased incrementally through various means, including education, population control, trade, propaganda, and foreign economic aid. After the Korean War, the developmental goals of the US during the Rhee Administration were macroeconomic stabilization and postwar reconstruction so that developmental tools were prioritized accordingly (J. Kim, 2019b, p. 123). Thanks to the American development toolbox, well-educated young engineers, bureaucrats, economists, and other skilled professionals were hired, and institutions were restructured.

The Rhee regime was marked by two 'achievements' realized through America's influence and policies. First, Rhee oriented the country in an anti-communist direction; without a strong leader like Rhee, South Korea would indeed have been swept away by communism. The external threat's proximity, the North's military modernization initiatives, and aid from China and the Soviet Union galvanized the Rhee regime into action (Shen & Xia, 2012, p. 3). Rhee used the 'anti-communist' theme as a domestic political tool to maintain this sentiment among the South Korean population. In addition, by establishing close ties with the US, Rhee ensured that South Korea took a strong position on the "correct side" of the Cold War (Macrae, 2016, pp. 327–328). Rhee's second success was land reform, through which he laid the basis for the country's capitalist system and economic growth. But unfortunately, land reforms were often abandoned for political reasons (Kinsey & Binswanger, 1993, p. 1477) since such movements are predominantly a political choice (J. Robinson, n.d., p. 2) (as will be seen in the Turkish case). However, most East Asian countries, including South Korea, implemented successful land reform and rural development projects backed and praised by the US. These two significant policy initiatives and the massive flow of US aid shaped Korean development.

4.2.2. Aid Politics in the Rhee Regime

The primary aim was to make the Korean economy self-sustaining and self-efficient. Since the country experienced two devastating wars, this would have been very hard to achieve without foreign help—South Korea received massive US foreign assistance.

US aid was central to Korea's survival following Japanese colonialism and Korea's survival during the post-Korean war reconstruction (Kohli, 2004b, p. 77). The aid flow from the US started with US Military Government (USMG) trusteeship that was operated between 1945-48. US foreign aid provided a necessary condition for the miraculous Korean development model, if not all-sufficient (E. M. Kim & Kim, 2014, p. 7). From a liberal vantage point, Anne O. Krueger, a former chief economist at the World Bank, described the significance of US aid for South Korean growth as a significant source of savings throughout the 1950s (A. O. Krueger, 1979, pp. 208–209). The US aimed to help Korea and Türkiye with economic aid first (Millikan & Rostow, 1957b, p. 133) and possibly freed up some resources that could initially be used for military rather than developmental purposes.

In South Korea, the USMG initially adopted the colonial Japanese institutions and systems but subsequently tried to transform the government structure and implement the 'Koreanization' policy, which involved more Korean officials and bureaucrats within the bureaucratic system. Koreans were actively working to shape the political economy of their own independent country but in collaboration with US advisors. Another policy to eliminate colonial economic practices was establishing the National Economic Board in 1946 to supervise national policies and the budget. When the Republic of Korea was officially established in August 1948, the US signed an Economic Cooperation Act with the Korean government to be involved in economic policymaking. Under the Act, the US Congress created the Economic Cooperation Administration to administer aid programs. The Eisenhower administration emphasized aid effectiveness, coordination, and the recipient's capacity for development to maximize aid effectiveness. To accomplish its objectives, the US created the Foreign Operation Administration and the Office of the Economic Coordinator in 1952 (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*, 1953; Millikan & Rostow, 1957b, pp. 50–59). Later, the Economic Development Committee was established in 1958 in order to design an economic development plan (T.-G. Park, 2001, p. 62; Seth, 2013, p. 44). A decades-long Korean economy under the Rhee regime could be rightly called an aid economy because of its

high reliance on the US government, aid agencies, and UN-based relief organizations delivering multilateral aid.

Between 1945 and 1990, the main actors of the US foreign assistance were the US military, the Peace Corps, NGOs, philanthropic foundations, missionary organizations, and government entities such as USAID, the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Ex-Im Bank, and the Reimbursable Development Program (RDP). American aid also included funding from the Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas (EROA), the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA), US Public Law 480 (PL 480), and the International Cooperation Agency (ICA) (T. Kim, 2014, p. 224). The US directed funds across various sectors through these agencies and institutions, and its aid program emphasized investments for economic growth, health, education, agriculture, and land reform. Indeed, US foreign aid provided an extra pool of capital that the Korean economy used for saving and investing.

Rhee was not the best alternative for America, and during her 12-year rule, he amended the 1948 constitution three times to stay in power; extensive corruption prevailed during this period. However, Rhee's anti-communist stance, the fact that no alternative could provide stability other than himself, and the fact that America has a significant stake in Korea could not keep America away from cooperation and took the first step of the development package with massive aid flows (Satterwhite, 1994, p. 217). The donor-recipient relations between the US and Korea were stable. The Rhee regime was talented at receiving aid from the US. Since the Korean War halted the progress achieved between 1946 and 1950 by ruining infrastructure, roads, schools, and ports with US help, American aid was necessary for Korea to survive.

Rostow believed that the Korean War showed the US officials that they needed to develop new strategies and concepts to support US foreign policy along with confronting the communist threat directly. Therefore, he advocated that the US devote its academy to shaping policy and knowledge production (Rostow, 1987, p. 240). The

US-Korean policy switched from indifference to qualified commitment (Matray, 1985, p. 17). One of the aims of the US was "to assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system." (Office of the Historian, 1949b) and aid—both military and economic—was the primary tool. The aid process started with the US Military Government, which aimed to transition in an orderly manner from the Japanese administration. America chose to move forward by building on its Japanese heritage without eliminating it; indeed, America achieved this. Both the legacy of Japanese imperialism and the American policies during the USAMGIK period played an important role in the formation of a strong Korean state. The effects of setting more concrete policies towards Korea are also seen in the increase in aid to Korea. From 1946 to 1952, American economic aid more than doubled (USAID, 2012).

Korea worked closely and harmoniously with US officials in allocating and spending the US aid received (Suh & Kim, 2016a, pp. 64–65). At first, reconstruction and maintenance of living standards were the primary objectives because of a lack of resources and management capability till the end of the Korean War. Between 1954 and 1959, about 70% of all reconstruction investment was financed by the US. During the 1950s, the aid received from the US accounted for up to 10% of GDP (Sakong & Koh, 2010, p. 3). In 1957, foreign aid flowed and reached 16% of GNP (Collins & Park, 1989, p. 155). Between 1953 and 1962, 95% of foreign aid came from the US. This large amount of economic aid enabled Korea to spend on its military and economy, and US aid was critical in Korean development between 1953 and 1975 (A. O. et. al. Krueger, 1989, p. 226). Although the aid was not received under the auspices of military aid, it was mostly spent for this purpose. This aid became the source for South Korean development by alleviating the financial burden of South Korean military spending, as the massive amount of US military aid continued well into the 1970s (P. H. Kim, 2017, p. 47).

Korea was among the top recipients of aid from America. Korea received more aid per capita during the 1950s than any other developing country in the world (Evans, 1987, p. 208) and this amounted to six billion US dollars in non-military economic aid from the US until the 1980s, making it second only after Israel (Mason, 1980, p. 2). Till

1960, Korea was one of the countries that received the most aid (other than military) from the United States (*Overview of Official Foreign Assistance: 1950-60*, n.d.). The basis of economic aid was the NSC-156 document dated 1953. Its primary objective was the economic stabilization of South Korea, preparation for the possibility of a communist attack, and making the military aid from both the UN and the US more efficient. In the program, four to five years of economic aid planning was made, and the importance of military, security and defense-related aid was emphasized (Office of the Historian, 1953). In the preparation of this document, the report of the mission led by Henry J. Tasca was helpful (Tasca, 1953). Foreign diagnosis through the Nathan Report (Nathan, 1952) and the Tasca Report (Tasca, 1953) both emphasized the importance of human capital and workforce for development since the only resource that Korea has its human resources (Jeong, 2018, p. 3). Through Nathan Report, Korea's economic recovery was devised through a five-year plan and it was prepared a post-conflict planning and detailed program for the stabilization of Korea's economy (UNKRA, 1954). So the US incrementally increased the economic aid to Korea. In the 1950s, the US provided one-third or more of South Korea's overall government budget, reaching 58% in 1956. From 1953 to 1963, the US was the primary source of foreign assistance to South Korea in virtually every sector (Runde, 2012, pp. 15–16). At first, US aid was in the form of grants, technical assistance, and loans from the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank); by the end of the 1970s, the aid had shifted to concessional loans.

Foreign assistance from the US came in various forms, such as capital, consumer goods, infrastructure, and technical assistance. More importantly, these sources mainly focused on the educational and agricultural sectors. During the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), between 1945-8, the US provided aid to Korea for its economic development and growth through GARIOA and EROA. Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) provided relief and food supplies between 1945 and 1948 and was administered by USAMGIK. According to USAID documents, from 1945 to 1960, the US government provided \$3,194,639 in economic aid (military aid excluded) (Meohau, n.d.). From the end of WWII to 1949, US aid to

Korea was implemented within the framework of the GARIOA program. Under these programs, the US attempted to lift the country out of poverty by providing aid ranging from medical funding to clothing. In the same period, the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC), the United Nations Command, Civil Relief in Korea (CRIK), the United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency (UNRRA), and the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) played a critical role in administering and distributing its aid programs (Suh & Kim, 2016a, p. 59). In total, US aid coming from GARIOA was \$502 million (J. W. Lee, 2001b, p. 104).⁶ This was followed by the Economic Cooperation Act (ECA), signed between the US and the Korean governments; it aimed to achieve economic stability and promote aid effectiveness. Under this Act, the US Economic Cooperation Administration was created to administer aid programs; its primary mission was first to stabilize Korea economically (Sherman, n.d.). In that regard, Korea received \$109.16 million from the ECA between 1949-53 (J. Kim & Kim, 2014, p. 54; J. W. Lee, 2001b, p. 104), and the American Military Government and ECA were instrumental in achieving other reforms, including land and educational reforms.

Throughout the 1950s, the Korean economy struggled since it suffered from inflation that had to be subdued before any meaningful economic policies could begin. Thus, one of the South Korean's government first acts in 1953 was to introduce currency reform. The currency unit was changed from the *hwan* to the *won*, and two zeros were removed from the currency; the next step was to restrict the money supply. Consequently, inflation stabilized in 1958, and from then on, the government gave full attention to industrialization and economic growth. US economic aid that (economic, technical, educational, etc.) contributed much more to South Korea's successful development ranged from agricultural goods to solid fuels, as seen in the table below:

⁶ In some sources it was USD 409.4. Please see: Lee, K. K. "Development Assistance and Cooperation to South Korea (in Korean)", Kocia Research Paper, 2, (Seongnam: Koica, 2004)

Table 4. 1. American Aid in the USAMGIK Period

(Unit: USD 1,000,000)

	GARIOA-EROA					OFLC	Total
	1945	1946	1947	1948	Subtotal		
Food	3.6	21.6	77.6	67.7	170.5 (41.6)	0.1	170.6 (39.3)
Agricultural goods	-	7	31.4	38.69	77.0 (18.8)	-	77.0 (17.7)
Clothing	-	1.7	25.8	14.1	41.6 (10.2)	2.6	44.2 (10.2)
Solid fuels	1.3	7.7	9	15.3	33.3 (8.1)	-	33.3 (7.7)
Petrochemicals	-	4.5	5.2	10.2	19.9 (4.9)	0.4	20.3 (4.7)
Railway equipment	-	1.6	10.5	0.8	13.0 (3.2)	0.2	13.2 (3.0)
Communications equipment	-	0.3	2.2	4.5	7.0 (1.7)	0.9	7.9 (1.8)
Building materials	-	0.4	2.9	3.3	6.6 (1.6)	1.1	7.7 (1.8)
Medicines	-	0.1	2.1	3.3	5.5 (1.4)	2.1	7.6 (1.8)
Automotive parts	-	2.3	0.6	2.6	5.4 (1.3)	3.1	8.5 (2.0)
Raw materials	-	0.1	3.8	8.1	12.0 (2.9)	0.1	12.1 (2.8)
Other	-	2.2	4.3	11.1	17.6 (4.3)	14.3	31.9 (7.4)
Total	4.9	49.5	175.4	179.6	409.4 (100)	24.9	434.3 (100)

Note: Figures in parentheses represent the respective shares (%).

Source: Seoungyu, H. (1961). *Korean Economy and American Aid*, p. 49

The US channeled its aid programs towards allocating imports of raw materials and intermediate goods to help the manufacturing industry in Korea (Suh & Kim, 2016b, p. 62). In the mid-1950s, US aid goods provided raw materials for the three white industries: sugar, cotton yarn, and wheat flour (W. Lim, 2014, p. 43). Notably, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) relief provided supplies to these industries. Raw cotton used in the textile industry and raw sugar used in the sugar manufacturing industry came mainly from US aid. The development of these industries has been a cornerstone since the *chaebols* had a significant presence in these industries; for instance, the sugar refinery industry was dominated by Samsung, Samyang, and Daehan. In 1954, with funds from the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), the Keumsung Textile Cotton Plant was established (S. Rhyu, 2005, p.

213). USAID also provided extensive aid and technical support to the officials and agencies responsible for South Korea's export drive in the 1970s.

At that time, food shortages and famine were severe worldwide. As a development assistance resource, food aid was also used as a weapon on the main battleground—the developing world. For food and other necessities, Korea was mostly reliant on the US. The US food aid program was provided through the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480), which enabled those in the free world suffering from food deficits to purchase US agricultural goods with local currency, thus saving foreign exchange reserves and relieving and reducing American surpluses of food grains (*Public Law 480: "Better Than a Bomber,"* 1987). This Act was defined as "a major constructive instrument for economic development" by Milikan and Rostow (Milikan & Rostow, 1958). During Rhee's regime, South Korea imported about \$242.6 million worth of food, mainly through the Public Law 480 surplus sales program (*The Economy of the Republic of Korea,* 1993). Under this initiative, the largest food aid recipients were India, Egypt, and South Korea (Uvin, 1992, p. 297) by receiving \$157.722 million between 1945-60 (*Aid Received for Agriculture,* 2004). Under the PL480 program, surplus products such as cotton, barley, and wheat were also imported by Korea from the US for free or much below the market price. The income obtained from selling these products by the Korean state in the market also contributed to the enrichment of the state. PL480 was instrumental for developing and underdeveloped countries: this program met the import of food grains and the demand created by population growth in them. Nevertheless, it is claimed that the aid provided by the PL480 program remained relatively low compared to other aid types. However, this type of aid, which is one of the seven items of US economic aid, has an essential rate as follows:

Table 4. 2. Types of US Economic Aid in Korea

	US/AMGI K (1945- 49)	USECA/SE C (1948-52)	UN/CRIK (1951-56)	UN/UNKRA (1951-59)	US/FOA (1953-55)	US/ ICA (1955-59)	US/ PL480 (1955-61)	Total \$ (1945-61)
Agriculture /Fishery				8.1	1.3	40.4		49.8
Mining				12.8	0.9	59.6		100.3
Manufacturing				27.0				
Physical Infrastructure				8.9	48.5	219.5		276.9
Other Reconstruction	69.8	6.0	47.9	NA	1.2	19.6		144.5
Education				9.6	17.4	14.0		106.6
Housing/Health	7.9		16.2	11.5		30.0		
Food/Raw Materials	416.8	196.0	393.3	36.2	136.0	891.0	202.6	2,271.9
Technical Assistance	7.7	NA	NA	7.8	NA	NA	NA	15.5
Total	502.2	202.0	457.4	121.9	205.3	1,274.1	202.6	2,965.5

Retrieved: https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Development-Overview/official-aid/overview-official-foreign-assistance-1950-60—201412170000445.do?fldRoot=TP_ODA&subCategory=TP_ODA_GE.XIJ4TJMzZ0s

The PL480, enacted in 1954, was the world's first law institutionalizing international food aid. However, there needs to be more research on this form of US aid. Mainly, between 1945 and 1972, US food aid (commodity aid) to Korea was exceptionally high. For the same period, 28% of US aid was in the form of food aid (Cathie, 1989,

p. 15). Grains, cotton, tallow, and tobacco were the main items in the food aid package. Until 1980, Korea was the third country to receive food aid from the United States, after India and Egypt (Cathie, 1989, p. 32). In the 1950s, roughly a third of US agricultural exports were for food aid (Clapp, 2005, p. 468). This is why this type of aid, which has a multidimensional nature, is a mixture of trade, self-interest, and humanitarian approach. In addition, this form of aid immensely helped because it coincided with land reform and low agriculture production in Korea (Morrow & Sharper, 1970, p. 63). For the US, it helped its market expansion and developing exports.

US aid helped Korean institutions' administrative capacity. The competent bureaucratic infrastructure left over from Japanese imperialism laid the foundation for Korea's development. Therefore, with the help of the United States, Korea could implement long-term policies to plan its development (Gray, 2014a, pp. 48–49). Following the signature of the ECA between South Korea and the Unified Command in 1952 (UNKRA, n.d.), the US established the Office of the Economic Coordinator (OEC) (1953-9) and the Combined Economic Board (CEB) (1952-1963). The former aimed to establish coordination between the US, Korea, and other aid agencies. The latter dealt with implementing economic aid coordination, aid procurement and allocation processes, and domestic and foreign capital in the economic planning process (Minns, 2006b, p. 224); it also monitored the activities of the OEC (J. Kim & Kim, 2014, pp. 55–56). In the agreement of the creation of the CEB, it was stated that both parties “have agreed to cooperate fully within the economic reconstruction and financial stabilization program, to prevent further inflation and to create stable economic and financial conditions in Korea.” (USFK, n.d.) The establishment of these two institutions shows that the US supported economic planning in Korea, which served as an effective policy to promote the efficient use of US aid. What is important to note here is that the CEB worked closely with the South Korean Ministry of Reconstruction, which served as one of the predecessors of the Economic Planning Board during the Park Chung Hee regime. In other words, US aid helped Korea to develop a well-functioning governance system, administrative capacity, and

bureaucratic ability. Moreover, the US government and its agencies imposed stricter and tighter accountability on Korea. They recommended that Korea improve its administrative capacity to monitor, analyze, report, and collect data on its economic policies (Suh & Kim, 2016a, p. 62). The country made a breakthrough in the next period by gaining experience in planning development with institutions established under America's leadership.

American aid was realized not just bilaterally but in multilateral initiatives. On a global scale, other countries within the free world were afraid of the communist threat and were trying to take measures to fight and contain it. With the end of the Korean War, Stalin's death in 1953, and the steep increase in Soviet aid to the developing world, the 'free world' realized that ideological warfare led to economic warfare (Kan, 2014, pp. 178–190). The US, already anxious about the Chinese Communists and communist strength in Korea, was put on full alert; it was even more conscious of the potential for aid as a tool to influence the developing world. The belief that an increase in aid was a solution was put into practice. For the sake of both regional economic integration and preventing the increased communist aggression in Asia, as demonstrated by the Korean War, the US aimed to consolidate alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. America diversified the channels of aid and alliances for its allies. It paved the way for them to become members of international organizations, be included in military pacts, and participate in multilateral initiatives. The most important of these was the Colombo Plan, which originated in the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Colombo in 1950 (Akita, 2014, p. 187). To strengthen the development of Asian countries (mainly south and southeast Asian countries), the Colombo Plan was adopted by the Commonwealth countries, namely Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Pakistan, the colonies British Malaya and Borneo, and the US (Akita, 2014, p. 1). The main goal was to achieve development via foreign aid and technical assistance and bilateral arrangements for regional development.⁷ Thus, according to the parties in the Plan, "the West must take whatever steps were

⁷ Today, the number of member states is 24 (starting with seven countries).

open to it to prevent any further large segments of the Eurasian land-mass from falling under Communist domination.” (McGee & Manson, n.d.)

The US was to be by far the most significant contributor of aid to the Plan (Fisher, 1971, p. 301). In addition to aid, America insisted on including Japan in the process as the regional integration policy in East Asia concentrated on Japan. According to reports from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (established in 1945 and the first US agency aimed to coordinate the policymaking process of the State Department and the National Intelligence Authority) (CIA FOIA, 1946), the US put Japan at the center of Asia because Japan was the only industrialized country with a strong economy and military (hub-and-spokes system). The security situation in East Asia was therefore centered on Japan, which served as a hub to strengthen the free world alliance on the East Asian front against Communism. Therefore, the political-economic dynamics of US-Korean relations pivoted on the normalization of Korea's relations with Japan, though this was only realized after Rhee, although East Asian countries preferred to establish bilateral relations with the US.

President Eisenhower's fund for Asian economic development, the Baldwin Plan (the so-called ‘Marshall Plan for Asia’), was formulated in 1954 (Shenin, 2005, p. 48). International organizations like the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and the World Bank were also integrated into the Plan, especially through bilateral and multilateral aid schemes to support their development. What America did under these plans was Japan's integration into the American-led world order by securing Japan's membership in international organizations such as the IMF and GATT. This strategy, which was applied to Japan, was later applied to South Korea. Under American political-military tutelage, Korea was integrated into the international political-economic structure. All these efforts can be evaluated as US efforts to reorganize and reorder Asia in line with the liberal economic order.

As Krueger and Ruttan argue, Korea made massive progress in its development by the mid-1950s because it completed its economic infrastructure—for example, roads, ports, and schools—with American aid (Lahiri et al., 1991, p. 227). Following the

establishment of infrastructural needs, Korea implemented policy reforms in the second half of the 1950s. The US aid formed about 77% of all savings and 69% of total imports of Korea (Lahiri et al., 1991, p. 231). In the Rhee era, while moving forward in the framework of eradicating the effects of the Korean War, promoting recovery, and creating policies for long-term growth and development, America focused primarily on technical assistance in the 1960s. However, after Rhee, in the 1960s, the donor-recipient relationship began to change.

4.2.3. Promotion of American Interests in Trade, Investment, and Markets

South Korea is now a major trading nation in the international economy. Its trade volume has increased almost 3,000 times, from \$357 million in 1961 to \$1.06 trillion in 2012 (M.-K. Kang, 2014, p. 199). More interestingly, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore's (i.e. the Gang of Four) share of world manufacturing output increased 0.4% in 1963 to 0.7% in 1970 and 1.4% in 1976; in other words, these countries' shares in output have almost more than tripled in just 13 years (Branson et al., 1980, p. 193). It took the Koreans only almost 20 years to reach that stage.

The withdrawal of Japan created gaps in Korea's foreign economic relations and domestic management. South Korea was almost deprived of fertilizer, iron, steel, intermediaries, and other raw materials due to the partitioning of Korea as south and north. Retail prices nearly doubled between 1946 and 1947, yet total industrial output in 1948 was only a fifth of what it was in 1940. Post-war trade declined to very low levels, creating serious balance of payments difficulties. However, the recovery was very fast. While rapid growth was seen in the manufacture of tungsten for export and electric power, the progress of heavy industry, especially the iron and steel sectors, was slower. In addition to all this, the Korean War again took a toll on industrial production. However, the Korean trade patterns improved by the end of 1953. Of course, there is the fact that the imports of Korea were financed by two sources between 1953 and 1960: The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and United Nations Civil Assist Command Korea (UNCACK) provided relief and United States

provided aid amounting to over 1,5 million for the same period (Frank et al., 1975, pp. 8–12).

Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, all in the same mindset, advocated that the US could act as a giant of economic development for developing nations. For example, in a 1963 speech, President Kennedy spoke of the "Atlantic responsibility" to open "our markets to the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. (*Address in the Assembly Hall at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, 1963*)" Although the Vietnam War put the US balance of payments in trouble and challenged its economy, the former chairman of the US International Trade Commission stated at that time that Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Brazil and many other rapidly industrializing countries rapidly developed since they enjoyed access to the open American market as well as had free trade practices (Amsden, 2007, pp. 47–48) In 1953, US-Korea trade volume was \$123 million, and in 1956 it amounted to \$202 million (V. D. Cha, 2016, pp. 114–115). The US assured absolute control over the Rhee regime by leveraging aid and trade dependence and became the largest final market for Korean exports, a source of technology and investment capital.

American aid was crucial to the political economy of Korea's import substitution policy in the 1950s. Imports financed by the US aid exceeded %80 of total imports and %74 of Korean investments was also financed by the US aid (Frank et al., 1975, pp. 8–12). These humongous rates equaled %75 of total fixed capital formation (Haggard, 1990b, p. 55). Trade deficit and Korean investments were also financed by the US aid. Some Korean investments particularly those in the import substitution sector, such as cement, had low rates of return because of the instability in the budget and monetary policies, which were obstacles in front of Korea then. Countries in the early stages of development cannot easily finance highly productive sectors such as textiles, road, and port construction, so they have limited capacity to generate foreign exchange income, cannot borrow commercial money, and need long-term investments. At this stage, foreign aid comes into play that can increase the country's borrowing capacity and contribute to the development process, albeit a little (Lahiri et al., 1991).

Inflation was a serious problem at that time, Rhee implemented stabilization policies to control inflation, but this slowed private investment against long odds. Since America primarily aimed at self-sufficiency and stability in the commercial and economic sense, the high inflation in those years or how Korea implemented ISI was not a problem for the American authorities. In Korea then, the executive branch was more potent than the legislature, and rural elites and local entrepreneurs were also in a weak position (Haggard, 1990a, pp. 60–61). Moreover, it was heavily dependent on American aid. Thus, the side effects of ISI policy, which mainly was the first-stage shaper of economic development strategies in the Third World, emerged in the mid-1950s, Rhee's political base was weakened by the corruption scandals, and as a result of the student demonstrations of 1960, Rhee was resigned.

The obstacles to Korean development during the Rhee Administration were handled in the NSC 6018 document, which adopted Rostow's take-off theory of development and recommended that Korea reform its exchange rate, improve its fiscal management, and stimulate production for export and domestic demands (Chi, 1994; Vogel & Kim, 2013a, p. 61; J. Woo, 1991, pp. 70–71). This document also addressed and identified the needs of Korean development; economic growth through a balanced national budget, increased exports, reduction of inflation, and economic stabilization programs. The US advised these policies because President Rhee tried to get more aid from the US by overvaluing Korean currency (T.-G. Park, 2000, p. 98). American advisers insisted Korea use aid for commodity imports designed to slow inflation. However, disagreements arose between Rhee and America about where aid should be channeled. In addition, UNKRA consultants recommended Korea to follow a policy of infrastructural development and import substitution. The Rhee regime's agenda included policies other than all these suggestions. The reason for this was purely because of Rhee's tendency to increase and maintain his political support.

At the regional level, the US promoted Japan's economic resurgence since Japan had a huge place in the US Cold War strategy in Asia. The inclusion of Japan in such cooperation guaranteed the diffusion of liberal norms, American capital, free flow of goods, investment, capital, and ideas; it was also crucial because it could keep the

communist threat at bay and increase economic ties. Japan became a client and ally of the US, and America determined the contours of the East Asian regional economic order. Furthermore, including a pro-American Japan provided secure access to key raw-material-producing and trading areas like South Korea, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia. For the industrial recovery of both Japan and itself, the US needed access to Southeast Asia's markets and raw materials (McMahon, 2014, p. 217). Japan and Korea's inclusion in the Colombo Plan served these US goals. Japanese markets were allowed to remain closed, and Japan implemented restrictions on imports and foreign investments while the American market was open to Japanese goods. Japan gradually opened its markets to foreign penetration, i.e. the US. Japan and South Korea received American help in opening up trade and investment. This strategy was called "managed trade" or "Japan's voluntary restraint of exports." (Feenstra, 1984, p. 54) Textiles, television sets, steel, automobiles, and machine tools were exported to the US and primarily dominated American markets for an extended period. This strategy enabled cartel formation and non-market-driven variables in the Japanese economy and eventually led to the formation of an export-led economy. Furthermore, by participating in US-led international institutions like GATT, Japan benefitted from an international market of low tariffs and low cost of oil and other essential raw commodities for industrialization (Felipe, 2018, p. 1). Thanks to its US-bound export-oriented economic policies, the capitalist structure imported from the West, and the US recovery plan following the end of WWII, the Japanese and Korean economies developed exceptionally (Paik, 2011, p. 207). The US supported even individual Korean firms like textile and infrastructural projects with the scheme for importing commodities and government grants of American grains and consumer and intermediate goods (McNamara, 1992, p. 335). This market-opening strategy during the Cold War has undoubtedly left its mark for years.

The US emphasis on the normalization between Korea and Japan suited Japan and Korea very well, along with America's overall strategy, since integration into the regional and world market was influential in the US strategy. First, Japan needed to have access to raw materials and markets. Since the regional economy would be

centered on Japan, Korea-Japan vertical regional integration benefited both sides since it deepened the trade growth effects of trade barrier reduction. Thus, the division and specialization of labor were accomplished not only regionally but globally. The Korean semiconductor success, which started during the Park Regime, resulted from the interactions and trade agreements signed with the US and Japan (Ran Kim, 1996, p. 2). According to the US aid plan and the NSC/61-1 directive of 16th May 1950, aid was promoted to regional integration through vertical specialization in the Far East (S.-Y. Rhyu, 2003, p. 24). (The use of imported inputs in producing goods that are exported (Hummels et al., 2001, p. 75)).

The same policies implemented in Japan were also applied to Korea. In addition, the US opened its markets to its military protectorates and frequently tolerated mercantilist trade practices that unilaterally harmed U.S. industries (Lind, 2018). Through trade partnerships and the privileges provided by these partners, the development and integration of Korea into the markets were relatively rapid. During the Cold War years, Korea enjoyed favorable trade and investment relations with America. Among the factors that have played an essential role in this are Korea's active participation in US-led security alliances, improving bilateral relations, and increased participation in US-led international agencies and institutions. Ezra Vogel argues that the US was proud to have been so generous in providing technology, aid, a security umbrella, and market access (Vogel, 1992, p. 38).

Korean exports and commodities' primary host became the US markets. The US market's role was very significant in the initial export growth and, later on, Korea's export success. The major trading countries of Korea's exports were the US and Japan between 1967 and 1976 (Castley, 1997b). The Korean manufactured exports had higher quality than most of their Asian counterparts, which led to the domination of Korean products in the US market (Rodrik, 1988, p. 3). Furthermore, opening US markets enabled Korea to adapt to the newly adopted development strategy quickly. During the mid-1960s, when South Korea adopted export-oriented industrialization, it had access to the largest marketplace and military security, making it easier for the country to benefit from this rapid economic growth and catch up (K. J. Kim, 2006, p.

120). With the policy interventions of the US, South Korea's economic take-off gained speed. America gave South Korea a comprehensive technical guide for promoting exports so that, in the mid-1960s, South Korea's transition to export-led industrialization accelerated (S.-Y. Rhyu, 2003, pp. 139–144).

During the Rhee administration, Korea tried to maximize aid from the US and maintain discretionary control over various policy instruments to build political support. Even though there was also no coherent planning (Haggard & Kim, 1991, p. 850) an import substitution policy was successfully implemented. Therefore, economic and trade policies were shaped accordingly. The state intervened heavily in the economy. One of these focused areas was foreign trade by granting tariff protection for sales in the domestic market conditional on achieving export targets (Edwards, 1992, p. 163). Investments were made in import-substituting activities. With the export-led growth started in 1967, the Korean government formed government-financed institutions for trade promotion (Adelman, n.d.). Thus, between 1945 and 1970, the state-led development process was conducted with regulatory interventions in agriculture, industry, and the general financial market. High-amount Foreign Direct Investment of the US in East Asia was made in banking, insurance, petroleum, and in commercial and chemical companies. The below table shows the US foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to East Asian countries until 1995.

Table 4. 3. The FDI Flows of the US in East Asia Untill 1995

	China	Hong Kong	Indonesia	Korea	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Taiwan	Thailand
All industries	2.8	13.8	7.1	5.3	3.7	2.6	12.6	4.4	4.6
Petroleum	0.8	0.6	5.1	d	0.6	d	2.4	d	1.4
Total	0.9	2.0	0.2	1.5	2.7	1.3	5.3	2.9	1.8
Food and kindred products	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	d	0.3	d	0.1	0.1
Chemicals and allied products	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.3	1.1	0.3
Primary and fabricated metals	0.0	d	0.0	d	d	0.0	0.2	d	d
Machinery except electrical	0.1	0.5	0.0	d	0.1	0.0	2.0	0.2	d
Electric and electron. equipment	d	0.6	0.0	0.2	2.3	0.3	2.4	1.2	0.4
Transportation equipment	d	d	d	0.1	-	-	d	d	0.0
Other manufacturing	0.1	0.6	d	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Wholesale trade	0.1	5.0	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.2	1.8	0.4	0.4
Banking	d	1.3	d	1.8	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.5
Insurance and real estate	d	3.8	0.0	0.4	0.2	d	1.8	0.2	0.1
Services	d	0.6	d	0.0	-	d	0.4	0.2	0.0
Other industries	0.1	0.6	1.4	d	0.1	0.2	0.3	d	0.5

Source: In billion dollars, Ichimura, S. (1998). *Political Economy of Japanese and Asian Development*, Springer Japan, p. 48

Due to payment difficulties, the increased import of intermediate goods, and a limited market, Korea was experiencing economic turmoil. The most important reason for this was the result of the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policy, funded and backed by US financial support. Initially, the successful application of this policy was the development policy that marked the Rhee era. Since economic policymaking was directed at producing goods domestically, production in South Korea focused on the three white industries, i.e. sugar refining, flour mining, and cotton. Until the 1960s, Korea was self-sufficient in these sectors instead of relying on imports.

In order to discourage competitors from flooding the South Korean market with their goods and services, South Korea implemented tariffs and non-tariffs on these three white industries and, consequently, created a favorable environment for its export products (*Trade Profile: South Korea's Transformation From "Hermit Kingdom" to*

Economic Power, 2017). Samsung made products in these sectors; in fact, in 1953, Samsung's Lee Byung-Chul founded Korea's first sugar conglomerate company. The company began producing sugar in 1954 under the name Cheil Jedang. When the export level reached a satisfactory level, export-oriented industrialization and heavy chemical industrialization were adopted.

The US intention to integrate "free world countries" into global markets and trade was achieved through; first, land reform promotion aimed to improve productivity and therefore making South Korea a better participant in the international economy and, second, by providing favorable trade conditions for Korea by opening its markets. Having wisely utilized American aid and trade concessions under Rhee, the modernization and militarization of South Korea became a determinant of the 1950s. Thanks to US foreign aid, economic development had gradually begun. Being under the umbrella of the US and part of the free world—in every sense—increased South Korea's confidence as military expenditures financed by America allowed resources to be used in other areas. Military aid during the Rhee period made the South Korean military one of the largest in Asia.

4.2.4. Involvement in Defense Infrastructure Capabilities

Right after WWII, the main priorities of the US in Korea were maintaining internal security and economic stability. While providing economic aid to make a more significant financial contribution to Korea's development, the US also supported its military forces and sought to reduce Korea's defense spending. Between 1945 and 1947, the United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK) and a National Defense Command (NDC) were formed by the American Government to establish a strong military and defense force. The threats were not only emanating from the internal but also the outside. The communist insurgents in Korea and communist North Korea worried America. In addition, US officials worried about Korea's security in the early 1940s because of Soviet involvement. They were concerned that the Soviets would bring with them Korean guerrillas who had been fighting the Japanese in

Manchuria (Office of the Historian, 1969). That is why, as soon as WWII ended, America was physically in Korea and provided assistance. The U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea remained in Korea to arm 50,000 Korean soldiers.

The perceived communist threat from both sides was extreme. Strong cooperation between the US and the Korean military was necessary because of the communist establishment on the Korean border. In addition, America encouraged establishing institutionalized military cooperation by promoting cooperation between the region's countries. In the US report of 1945, it was stated that Korea was an "extremely fertile ground for the establishment of Communism"(I. Kim, 2016). The US officials believed that US military and economic programs were so intermingled that they aimed to help situate Korea in a proper setting. That is why the US commitment to Korea went beyond the military and economic aid. The US provided technical cooperation, defense support, and ocean freight for voluntary agency shipments to armed forces assistance till the 1960s (Meohau, n.d., p. 2) via mainly ICA and MAP programs and the three major US agencies -Department of State, AID, and Department of Defense operated under a country-team concept that required collaboration and contact between those two regarding the problems of Korea (The AID Department of State, 1988, p. 7).

The Korean War stunned the Asian politics of the US. After the War, US leaders and policymakers recognized that the US had done a poor job in protecting Korea—and Korea's geopolitical importance was not fully understood then. The Americans accepted that the Armed Forces Security Agency (today's National Security Agency) (Center for Cryptologic History, n.d.) had failed to predict the Korean War (Thomas, n.d., pp. 53, 409)— despite the Agency's mandate to carry out communications, security, and intelligence operations within the national military establishment. The priority of the US in terms of Korea's security was to recover and proactively build this nation, ensuring its territorial integrity and economic restructuring by establishing formal military and economic ties. The second aim was to ease the regional tensions and provide détente between the North and the South. American military aid and physical presence provided significant deterrence to North Korea and the communist threat and served these two aims. Through US military aid, the Mutual Defense Treaty,

stationing US troops and instigating the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the Peninsula (Heo & Roehrig, 2014, p. 53), Korea's institutional capacities were improved by helping the military as a national security tool. On the one hand, Korea was further militarized by these tools of the US. Last but not least, the US strengthened Korea's orientation toward the West by utilizing military apparatus. On the other hand, US military aid helped Korea with its defense needs and, thus, conceivably freed up some resources, which were then used in sectors such as development, health, education, and agriculture (CBO Memorandum, 1997, pp. 19–20).

The Korean War was also influential in transforming US aid that had become more military-oriented. At the end of the War, the US achieved its goals, i.e. overcoming its dollar gap, containing the Soviet Union, communism, other undesirable forces like neutralism, and expanding abroad (Jervis, 1980, p. 576). US National Security Council (NSC) directive 48 was adopted in 1949 to arrange US relations with East Asia and the Pacific countries (Office of the Historian, 1949a). It aimed to prevent the communist threat and expansionism and draw up the framework for economic and military aid to East Asia and the Pacific countries. The role of Japan, India, China, and Southeast Asia in preventing communist aggression was evaluated (Office of the Historian, 1949c). Korea, which was not included in the defense perimeter immediately after WWII, entered the defense perimeter with the actualization of this document with Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines. Despite the differences of opinion on the role of Korea (between the State Department and the ECA and the Defense Department and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff), the US officials committed themselves to establish a political and economic unit that was free and republican in South Korea (T.-G. Park, 2000, p. 94). Moreover, with this document, the priority order among the countries that received military and economic aid increased considerably (Bandow & Carpenter, 1992, p. 6). Later, with the Korean War, NSC-68 (1950) marked a turning point for goal setting during the Cold War and further militarizing the US strategy (Office of the Historian, 1950a). Military spending and aid were proposed to increase dramatically by the Truman Administration so that while military aid would guarantee stability, countries could speed up their development through other

modernization means like economic and military assistance. Truman aimed to reduce defense spending, but Korea changed all the plans (Gaddis, 2005, p. 110). The Korean War began when the Soviet Union dropped an atomic weapon and Mao Zedong's Communist Party seized power in mainland China. This prompted the US to warn American citizens and the wider world about the communist threat. As a result, the US appeared to declare that they were not only policing East Asia but the whole world. On the Korean side, he was using Korea's geostrategic importance as Rhee's aim was to continue the flow of aid.

The outbreak of the Korean War brought both the American Truman Doctrine to Asia and the Mutual Defense Treaty, which was launched in 1951; it was a prominent American foreign aid program of grants. The Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in October 1953, was a new institutional framework for the common defense and a key element in the security policies of both countries (C. Kang, 2015, p. 30). This Treaty became the defining moment in the US-Korean alliance. The US guaranteed Korea's national security since both nations assured that they "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process." (Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea; October 1, 1953, 1953) One of the reasons for the signing of this agreement is that the states of the region, including Korea, want to conduct bilateral relations with the United States. President Eisenhower invited President Rhee in 1954 and demanded normalizing relations with Japan (Izumikawa, 2020, p. 22). But Rhee repudiated this demand. Normalizing relations between the two countries would coincide with the Park period.

With the Mutual Defense Treaty, the US transferred a massive number of arms. In 1955 alone, the US military aid was about 33 million dollars, and economic aid was almost ten times greater than military aid (Choi, 1989, p. 18). Moreover, the US Department of Defense provided armed forces assistance to Korea with about 28 million dollars till 1961 (Comptroller General of the United States, 1931, p. 54). In order to improve Korea's organizational and operational abilities, maintenance, and training skills, the US sent the Korean Military Advisory Group (Choi, 1989, p. 19). US Forces in Korea (USFK) already helped Korea's military technology development and provided

military education and training. Moreover, Korea's military bought weapons and equipment from the US, and thus, Korea had the largest military in the Free World in 1958 and in the same year, Korea's support to the Vietnamese army began (J. A. Kim, 1966, p. 28). Koreans gained skill formation, job training, knowledge on how to use equipment and technological devices, and experience through US aid and supervision. So, the main aim of the US, to defend Korea from external aggression, particularly from the North Korean threat, was achieved.

Under the Mutual Security Program, the US also helped Korean military and development programs overall by generating commodity imports financed by ICA and revenue from PL 480 sales. This was institutionalized under the Local Currency Military Budget administered by the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (NAAG) in Korea. Until 1960, 251.6 billion *hwans* had been allocated to this program (Comptroller General of the United States, 1931, p. 61). Ships, automotive, military hardware, and machining equipment received from the US were delivered and planned in pursuit of the directives of American advisors. As a result, the military assistance of the US accelerated Korea's economic development and technological progress. Furthermore, it was stated that since Korea put much emphasis on defense and military development, the impact of the military assistance of the US released resources for development purposes (Wolf, 1971, p. 5).

The main front of the Cold War was changing, and the US had to follow stricter policies during the mid-1950s. As a result, Korea became one of the essential sites for US military procurement. The US no longer provided direct foreign assistance (especially military aid) to South Korea but maintained about 37,500 troops there to supplement the 650,000-strong South Korean armed forces. The 1.2 million-strong army of North Korea, which maintained a high level of readiness and is stationed in advance positions close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which separated North and South Korea, was dissuaded by this force (Sutter, 2010, p. 54). The security dimension of the US developmental toolbox was a deterrent to another attack from the neighboring communist country, North Korea, and provided a continental base for US forces to face China and Russia; it was also Japan's front-line defense. The alliance has

also increased South Korea's military capabilities and given the country a nuclear umbrella, allowing it to pursue economic advancement with relatively modest military expenditures (K. Oh, 2008). As seen in the table below, Korea has received the bulk of military aid to East Asia.

Table 4. 4. Comparison of the US Military Aid in Korea and the Rest of East Asia

(millions of dollars)

Fiscal Year	Total Military Assistance to Korea	Total Military Assistance to East Asia	% to Korea
1949-1952	11.7	160.7	7.2
1953-1957	527.8	2,403.7	21.9
1958	331.1	627.8	52.7
1959	190.5	606.7	31.4
1960	190.2	501.6	37.9
1961	192.2	495.4	38.8
1962	136.9	523.3	26.2
1963	182.5	651.8	28.0
1964	124.3	563.7	22.1
1965	173.1*	648.9	26.7
1966	153.1*	535.6	28.6
1967	149.8*	673.0	22.3
1968	197.4*	1,026.9	19.2
Total 1953-1961	1,431.8	4,635.2	30.9
Total 1949-1968	2,560.6	9,419.1	27.2

Source: SIPRI (1971). *The Arms Trade with the Third World*. Paul Elek Limited, pp. 146-147.

During the 1950s, Korea and Türkiye were among the top recipients of US military aid (Hartman & Walters, 1985, p. 434). Between 1946 and 1952, the military assistance of the US to Korea was more than 12 million US dollars (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2012, p. 38). In the years that followed, American military aid increased

incrementally, accounting for more than half of total American aid. In due course, the military means of the US military assistance program were diversified. Part of the military was allocated to educating and training the Korean military personnel. They were also sent to the US for training and education in modern warfare techniques and to gain technical skills and managerial know-how. In addition, Korea implemented compulsory military service. The effects of this practice that increased with American assistance significantly impacted the industrialization process. Between 1961 and 1970, 2.7 million men were conscripted, approximately 160,000 discharged from the army each year, and at least a quarter of them could work in the industry without additional training. The number of total trainees totaled over 11 thousand by 1960 (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2012, p. 65). Skilled laborers such as electricians and mechanics generally came from the military (The Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, 1997, p. 23). So the US contributed to Korea's long-term capacity building and helped to keep military spending down. Today, the two countries' militaries are still firmly tied to one another, with US assets aiding the Korean military and vice versa (Garamone, n.d.).

Until the 1970s, Korea depended on the US to fund its military. US military grants were channeled through the Military Assistance Programme, and the International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET) provided military sales and grant aid. These two programs, instruments of US security and foreign policy, provided nearly four billion dollars in military aid. However, even at the end of the Rhee period, less than a quarter of South Korea's defense budget was self-funded (Bowers, 2019, p. 118). As well as the aid, training, and education of the Korean military, the US-trained personnel also contributed their knowledge about economic development. Another aspect of American influence is that through these programs, America aimed to spread its values to these countries, educating citizens about American military doctrine and allowing this education—or indoctrination—to guide the country's development as well as the security needs of both.

4.2.5. Constructing Feudal Korea: Rural Modernization Projects

In order to understand modern Korean history—even Asian history—two keywords to be carefully considered are *land* and *peasants*. Korean modernization was not achieved by landlords and the bourgeoisie but by peasants—and this was profoundly different from the path made by capitalism in the West (Pang et al., 2005, p. 7). In the post-WWII decade, the US warned its allies in underdeveloped countries about the need for land reform. As a result, the US took upon itself a significant distribution of land intending to provide the necessary bases for political democracy and, more importantly, prevent communism from sprouting (Russett, 1964, p. 445). The period between 1946-9 was marked by land reform, which lasted till 1953 and became the decisive feature of the Rhee Administration.

It is striking that South Korea still falls short of the American and Japanese models of democracy. However, when it comes to the egalitarian distribution of wealth, Korea was ahead of America (Cumings, 1999b, pp. 116–118). Education, civil society activity, and successful implementation of land reform are among the things that ensured this. According to US officials, particularly comprehensive land reform implementation that lasted till 1957 was a significant factor in the survival and development of South Korea (Weedeman, n.d.-a, p. 409). On the one hand, means like education and rural development projects were influenced by the spirit of the New Deal at home, and America thought the grassroots change could be accomplished by promoting these two policies and even by the intermingling of these two policies. On the other hand, the motivation for Korea was to eliminate the Japanese colonial legacy and support self-sufficiency. The support of the US in educational and rural reforms in Korea in the 1940s and 1950s was valuable in paving the way for the country's miraculous developmental status today.

The land issue was probably the most important problem for South Korea, as stated in a 30-page report published by Edgar Johnson, a US-ECA aide. About eight of the 30 pages were allocated to the land problem (*Personal Papers of Edgar A.J. Johnson*, n.d., no. 1. COOOO1242) since this reform initiative was significant to state-building

processes, redistributing wealth, and reducing inequalities. Interestingly, at that time, none of the international organizations or agencies also pressured Korea into genuine land reform; however, the US saw land reform's importance that became more central to the US development package in Korea during the 1950s. The US and Korean governments administered this process peacefully, redistributive, and increased productivity. It was not a simple rural development effort but something that immensely affected the social, political, and economic outlook of Korea. The path to the formation of *chaebols*, capitalist society, egalitarian distribution, export-led growth, and rural development evolved out of successful land reform implementation. Then it led to wide-scale rural development projects during the Park period.

In parallel with modernization, the promotion of land reform and provision of assistance in order to advance the agricultural industry was one of the American policymakers' priorities (CIS MIT, 1960). Since developing countries were agricultural societies, both socialist and capitalist economies had almost similar land ownership issues. The US government began increasing its pressure on Korea to demonstrate more substantial development achievements in the latter half of the 1950s. The US wanted the same successful results of the land reform initiated by the US in Japan following the end of WWII since the reform transformed millions of poverty-stricken peasants into conservative middle-class farmers (Nester, 1996, p. 218). The same achievement was a goal for the US in Korea, and the targeted result was achieved. The process of land reform—which played a significant role—was carried out under US auspices. By promoting and leading land reform, providing the funds and policies for agricultural development, and cooperatives in rural areas, the US provided security to rural Korea and triggered the renewal of rural prosperity.

During the interwar period, Korea's role in the regional division of labor was determined as a rice provider. Japan invested in infrastructure and rationalized traditional land relations by fixing property rights (Haggard, 1990b, p. 52). These reforms allowed Japan to buy more food from its colony, but on the one hand, tenancy in rural Korea increased and became increasingly polarized. Rural development programs were minimal until the liberation of Korea in 1945. At the end of Japanese

colonial rule, first and foremost, there was a need to reassign property rights in Korea. The next step was to suppress the riots and protests. Peasant protests and resistance in colonial Korea were frequent, but, especially starting from the 1920s, tenant protests became increasingly common. During the Rhee era, with the support of the American Military Government, the left was increasingly eliminated from power. Peasants and laborers launched strikes and riots like the Daegu Riot of 1946. This made America worried about triggering communist insurgencies. One of the reasons for the discontent was the failure of the American Military Administration's land and food policies; the protesters' demand was urgent social and political reform—land reform in particular (G. Shin, 1994, p. 1606). South Korean communist leaders like Pak Hun-Yong and the South Korean Communist Party supported the riots. Furthermore, North Korea financially and physically supported these endeavors by sending its Communist party members and supporters to South Korean industrial sites to help with the strikes (S. Y. Kim, 2009, p. 137). Rural uprisings were suppressed and People's Committees, which assumed governmental functions, lost their powers (Haggard, 1990b, p. 53). So with America's support, the left was dismantled. Last but not least, in 1946, North Korea carried out land reform on the socialist principle of "uncompensated redistribution" (*musang bunbae*) of land (S. G. Cho & Park, 2013, p. 1) which also created an element of pressure on the South to guarantee the support of the peasants. Its surroundings influenced South Korea, and discussions on land reform had already begun.

US-sponsored land reform in Korea was significant in diffusing rural tensions, egalitarian resource distribution, and laying a more solid foundation for Korea's economic growth. Also, America encouraged governments to realize land reform peacefully. The motivations of the US were not limited to these. Promotion for land development was carried out both as a security measure, the prevention of Communism and geopolitical considerations, and aimed at increasing agricultural production. The US played a pivotal role in encouraging the reintegration of South Korea and Taiwan into the Japan-centered regional economy (in which the US needed an export in order to meet its consumer demand) through sponsorship of land reforms. It was first implemented in Japan by the US Army and, as a result, the absentee

landlord class disappeared; then, it occurred in Korea.⁸ Post-colonial South Korea certainly had some capacity from the Japanese heritage; therefore, the land reform implementation succeeded.

During the Great Depression, Japan accelerated industrialization activities, particularly the activities of the *zaibatsus* made considerable contributions to Korea. With the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941-1945), Japan needed an increasing labor force and raw materials. As a result, the Koreans started to work within the Japanese Empire: nearly 4 million Koreans, constituting 16% of the total population, were working abroad in 1945 (Cai, 2008, pp. 20–25). The "Japanization" policy had been achieved. After the Japanese colonial rule in Korea ended, changing ownership rights, and resuming external trade and foreign exchange regime emerged as problems that had to be resolved urgently. As a colonial power, Japan saw Korea as a colonial source of raw materials and agricultural crops. Japan recodified the land system when occupying Korea in 1910 since landlords always made up the supporting base. For fertile land and cheap labor, Japanese land development companies like the Oriental Development Company moved to Korea to settle for experienced and skilled farmers and provide them with low-interest capital (Gragert, 1994, p. 64). Japanese colonialism, which lasted 35 years, destroyed this structure, and during this time, large tracts of land were owned by the Japanese. Japanese implementations made Koreans, especially farmers, poorer because about 90% of farmers worked as tenants. When agricultural production increased, Japan aimed to expand its industrial base in Korea. Despite being on a small scale, industrialization in Korea finally began, and we can see this in the textile industry.

Following the end of WWII, the main problem was poverty, but in rural areas, it was more severe and chronic (Y.-H. Shin, 1976, p. 15), considering the fact that the issue

⁸ Whereas land reform was a success in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan—in which the US, as a familiar ally, sponsored land reforms—in South Vietnam, land reform failed because of the state's weak presence.

has become more severe because of humanity's historical dependence on the land. The "leading sector" of the Korean economy was agriculture. As an integral part of the US development package, US-sponsored land reform, with its varying contributions and modernization campaigns, was carried out in Korea. South Korean rural development occurred in three stages: First, radical land reform was carried out (land-to-tiller program) during the American military government period and the Rhee regime in two separate and interconnected phases. The USAMGIK effectuated the first stage, and the second stage was implemented under Syngman Rhee. As a first step, land reform was carried out by the USAMGIK, promulgating the distribution of formerly Japanese-owned land to tenants between 1945-8 (I. Kim, 2016, p. 97). And then, Rhee completed a land reform by amending the Land Reform Act on March 10, 1950, proclaiming the Enforcement Ordinance of the Land Reform Act on March 25, and adopting the Enforcement Regulations of the Land Reform Act on April 28, 1950 (Sang-Hoon, 2011b, p. 48). So, thanks to land reform, landlords migrated to cities, the rural power structure changed, the spirit of ownership to farmers and community awareness strengthened, and Rhee's voter base was formed (Hong, 2013, p. 23). The third stage was realized during the Park Regime, called the *Saemaul Undong* (the New Village Movement), which was a community-based modernization program between 1970 and 1975. The aim was to achieve rural development by mobilizing villagers through technical and financial assistance from the state and training and guidance of Saemaul leaders (village leaders). Between 1973 and 1977, *Saemaul Undong* was extended to non-agricultural sectors and cities (Douglass, 2013, p. 9). Following *Saemaul Undong's* extraordinary success, between 1972 and 1978, there was the Green Revolution (a forced adoption of high-yielding varieties of grain), an extension of services (embedded in the Green Revolution phase of *Saemaul Undong*), rural cooperatives (set up during the Green Revolution) and mechanized/mechanization of farming. *Saemoul Undong* had a snowball effect, which led to substantial village improvements, raised rural living standards and incomes in a short period, and the advent of the Green Revolution in rice production (Douglass, 2014, p. 136).

Following liberation, land reform was on the agenda for politicians, farmers, and intellectuals. The emphasis was on equal opportunity for everyone, which the USAMGIK supported. A concrete program was developed by US State Department economists like Burns, Kinney, and Anderson (Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 2001, p. 5). The American land reform method was implemented with the slogan 'land to the tiller' (Bernstein, 1994, p. 43). Following the redistributive land reform, the poverty incidence in rural areas diminished from %60 to %9.8 (El Ghonemy, 1999, p. 9). Also, 700,000 peasants acquired their farms in five months (C. O. Senior, 1958, p. 4). Initial investments in agricultural infrastructure were accompanied by programs providing food and other necessities for rural dwellers while seeking to support that population so that it could develop self-sufficiency.

Following the UN-sponsored elections in May 1948 and the Republic of Korea's formal establishment, the American Military Government formed the National Land Administration that sold ex-Japanese farmlands. As a result, the agrarian inequality and the resulting peasant rebellions were somewhat suppressed (Y. H. Jo, 2011, p. 440). US military authorities took charge of enemy asset management, and the Americans controlled everything (Katsiaficas, 2012, p. 90); the Korean government sold confiscated Japanese-owned property. Even though the realized sales of businesses and farmland during the three years of US military occupation were negligible, this was a crucial step in building a market economy based on private property ownership (Koh, 2010, p. 11). The transition from feudalism to capitalism necessitated the establishment of the development conditions of the American path to and by land reform.

The most powerful feature of the US understanding of land reform was the transferability of land. The transferable property right may be the fundamental idea in economics and capitalism. According to the conservative editorial magazine *National Review*, since 1955, it has been argued in America that “countries that do not have transferable property rights do not really have economies at all.” (Bethell, 1984, p. 24) All land holdings larger than three hectares were expropriated and granted to poor tenant farmers. Later, the government supported these farmers with a variety of

agricultural policies. As a result, lands worked by owner-cultivators increased from 35 % to 60 %, and tenancy lands shrank from about 3,550,000 to 1,840,000 acres (Y. H. Jo, 2011, p. 440). Ultimately, the two interconnected aims of the US, the grassroots change through education and land reform, were achieved since these farmers, for the first time in Korean history, sent their children to school instead of the fields. As a result, within a generation, the country became well-educated and is among the most highly educated countries in the world (Albertus, 2021).

The land reform implemented by the USAMGIK is considered to be a delayed one. After North Korea's decisive, timely, and successful implementation of land reform, USAMGIK postponed its land reform implementation until 1948. In the meantime, new regulations, such as new labor laws, including those surrounding child labor, were introduced to prevent any hotbeds of communist activities. However, the actual expectation was a successful land reform, as realized by North Korea. This belated land reform occurrence led to Korean society's loss of support for America and the USAMGIK (M. E. Robinson, 2007, p. 108). To appease these sentiments and unrest in society, to prevent communist uprisings, and to ensure that elections were held quickly, the American administration, which wanted to win the support of the villagers, subsequently decided to sell lands from Japanese territory to the tenants under their control. These lands, called 'enemy territories/properties-vested properties' by the Koreans, and which constituted 13% of total agricultural land, began to be sold on the 3rd of April, 1948. Each tenant was designated 300% of the average annual revenue of the land, with a maximum of two hectares of land sold. The tenants would pay the cost over 15 years, and they would pay 20% of the product obtained each year. As a result, 554,000 tenants now owned their lands (I. Whang, 1982, p. 13).

This was partial reform because some tenants became landowners, but the inequality of land distribution was still the most important political, social, and economic problem in South Korea. A month later, on May 10th, 1948, elections were held—the main issue on the agenda was land reform, and, as it had been during the Rhee presidency, the development strategy of Korea was directed toward an agricultural economy. For this reason, the National Assembly was convened soon after the

elections to work on the Constitution. One of the most important articles of the Constitution, which was drafted and accepted in just two months, was land reform. The land distribution on an equal basis to those who worked became a bylaw. Following the adoption of the Constitution, the Republic of South Korea was proclaimed on the 15th of August, 1948; under the Constitution and based on the presidential system, Syngman Rhee became the president of the state.

As soon as ‘the day the light returned (*Gwangbokjeol*)’, the Rhee regime started working on the land reform law, which provided Rhee with enormous political power. However, the preparation and enforcement of the land reform law took work. After a series of discussions, the draft law was presented on the 4th of February, 1949. Finally, it came into effect as the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act (ALRAA) on the 10th of March, 1950. With this law, tenant farming was formally abolished. Actually, in 1949 the bill was accepted by the general assembly but vetoed by Rhee so that the law could give more advantages to landlords (J.-Yong. Chung & Kirkby, 2002, p. 52). This legislation remained in effect until 1994 when new legislation on agricultural land was enforced. And so began the second stage, from 1950-1952, based on the principles below:

“Any individual can own agricultural land but only if he or she cultivates or manages it for himself or herself; second, one can own approximately three hectares at maximum; and third, tenancy arrangements and land-renting activities are legally prohibited.” (*Republic of Korea, Land Legislation, The Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act (ALRAA), 1950, n.d.*)

Under the supervision of the ECA, Korea purchased fertilizer to re-enrich land so miserably depleted during the war—thanks to American aid, agriculture was once again built up to high productivity (S. Rhee, 1950). The long-term effects of land reform were astonishing; Rhee was fully aware that the land issue had underpinned the Korean political economy. The enormous political power of the unproductive landlord class was seen as an obstacle to industrialization and modernization. Many elites had a historical *yangban* landlord background, and the high transaction cost between landlords and tenants was a negative part of the tenancy system. With the elimination of the landlord class, income was redistributed to other agents such as the government,


tenants, and the public. For example, most bonds were used for investment in the industry. Agricultural production increased, as did the food supply, which minimized inflationary pressures. In the 1960s, when labor-intensive industries like agriculture were promoted, rural underdevelopment, especially among young females, was absorbed through the first wave of industrialization (J.-Yong. Chung & Kirkby, 2002, p. 52)—this led to economic growth, reduced class tensions, and removed unease and discomfort at the societal level, thanks to its equalization effect. As a result of this virtuous cycle, Rhee continued its rule thanks to successful land reform, albeit the abuse of power.

In 1953, Rhee implemented another land reform program that significantly altered the rural society's structure and created a smallholder agricultural economy (H.-C. Lim, 1986, p. 48). Before the land reform, tenant farming was practiced by more than 80% of the rural population. The tenancy rate fell to 7% in 1965 (Hsiao, 1981, pp. 71–79). By December 1969, all land securities had been redeemed (Morrow & Sharper, 1970, p. iiiii). Even though the full impact of land reform on economic growth was still open to question, the indisputable truth was that the impact of land redistribution was profound: in 1964, 71% of the peasants were complete owner cultivators, while the proportion of tenants fell to around 5-7% from 48.9% in 1945 (Teichman, 2016, p. 136).

One of the most important items in the development process is to provide industrial and modern services for the domestic demand that could be achieved through certain agricultural surpluses and transforming the food and agricultural sectors. Korea achieved this through the exported agricultural products of the US until 1978 and, more importantly, through comprehensive land reform and rural area development projects backed by the US. The implementation of land reform made Korea also known as a productivity miracle (Lucas, 1993, p. 270) that indicates the importance of human capital and income distribution, which were affected mainly by the distribution of equal land ownership. Additionally, the government of Korea's food pricing strategy and US food aid both contributed to keeping food prices and worker wages low, which facilitated industrialization. As Korea advanced, the US' feeling of its political

vulnerability subsided, and it started to concentrate on initiatives that involved Korea more heavily in the hope of achieving post-assistance sustainability.

Figure 4. 1. Initial Land Distribution and Economic Growth



Retrieved:
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/485171468309336484/310436360_20050007001644/additional/multi0page.pdf

The graphic above shows that successful post-war land reform implementation has positively impacted the economic growth in South Korea, Japan, China, Vietnam, and Thailand. These countries had equal land redistribution and the world's most equally distributed economies (Amsden, 2001, p. 18). Arguably, land reform forms the basis of rural development. As will be seen in the Park period, the spirit of the New Village Movement could not have been possible if inequality had not been reduced. Moreover,

stability in domestic affairs had been achieved, which made it easier for Rhee and Park to focus on industrial development. For instance, land productivity had fallen 20% from pre-war levels at the time of land reform due to the lack of agricultural service agencies and supplies. Services were curtailed because of the political instability (Morrow & Sharper, 1970, p. 1). The egalitarian distribution of services and goods contributed to political and economic stability. The abolition of the tenancy system led to increased production, economic growth, and societal change.

Successful and comprehensive land reform implementation had a leveling effect on Korean development. Intense external pressure and involvement by the US, combined with the internal pressure generated by peasant movements and the public, were the main reasons for the successful results of land reform in South Korea. One study found that between 1940 and 1960, land reform increased agricultural productivity by 25%. This suggests that pure land redistribution accounted for more than 10% of the entire GDP growth between 1953 and 1960 (Hwan Hong & Kim, n.d.). Rural development and increased production helped to solve the food shortage problem, while the US also met the growing grain deficit in Korea.

The institutionalization continued later. The US funded village projects and cooperative ventures prompted by land reform (Wiegersma & Medley, 2000, p. 41). As planted areas, productivity, and fully irrigated agricultural lands increased, living standards also increased. These projects were aided by the US agricultural commodities donations that provided 45 million days of employment till 1965 (Cole & Lyman, 1971, p. 146). However, both the Korean government and villagers worked on these projects to increase the cultivated area in the country. In 1961, the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) and, in 1962, the Office of Rural Development were established by USAID, which controlled marketing, credit, inputs, using new technologies, the delivery of fertilizer, and the cost of agricultural products to administer research and extension services (Brake, 1973, pp. 1–7; Morrow & Sharper, 1970, p. 56). Farmers participated directly in the Rural Development Council in their local areas. Since the awareness and active participation of farmers and the public had increased, their communication with the state institutions and issues also

grew. Because their voices were heard, land reform reduced the feeling of subordination directly related to equality. The feeling of independence and individualism was increased and contributed to the strengthening of nationalistic spirit and unity among farmers (Morrow & Sharper, 1970, p. 61).

Successful land reform implementation was the basis of one of the most vital forces in Korea today. It led to an egalitarian society, a solid rural village structure, and equality. Land reform implementation had another significant dimension: human socio-cultural factors. It was an essential reform for spreading education, a vital tool for any country pursuing development. As observed in Japan and Taiwan, significant educational reforms followed land reforms. A widely accessible education system triggered social mobility in Korea. Land reform contributed to the rapid expansion of education, and school enrolment increased rapidly. As a result, a more balanced society was primarily provided. In the post-reform period, education became available for the public, not just wealthy landowners like in the pre-reform period (Morrow & Sharper, 1970, p. 59). By promoting education, reducing inequality, and undermining political clientelistic practices, land reform also promoted meritocratic bureaucracy and increased pressure for the spread of democracy and fairness (J. You, 2015, p. 166). The 1948-50 land reform implementation period, in particular, was an essential step in achieving a more significant outcome—the establishment of developmental states. All of these served the social modernization of Korea that started in the rural areas.

The answer to why Korea did not mismanage the land reform and agricultural projects or behave populist like Türkiye is hidden in three important factors. The first is, of course, the support of the United States and American advisers. The other is that Japan bequeathed bureaucracy, infrastructure, and industrial basis to Korea. Moreover, Japanese colonialism weakened the control of Korean landowners (*yangban* class). Last but not least is the seriousness of the threat from China and North Korea. Therefore, the state is trying to stabilize the rural areas with land reform quickly and to prevent the communist calls on the peasants by raising their economic and social conditions.

In the institutional sense, due to land reform, the landlord class had primarily lost its power base by the end of the Korean War. As a result, a formal institution was established by law, the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act (ALRAA), in 1950. The ALRAA has three main principles:

“Any individual can own agricultural land but only if he or she cultivates or manages it for himself or herself; second, one can own approximately three hectares (*jungbo*) at maximum; and third, tenancy arrangements and land-renting activities are legally prohibited”(*Republic of Korea, Land Legislation, The Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act (ALRAA), 1950, n.d.*).

So, the tenancy system and landlord-oriented ownership system ended (Jeon & Kim, 2000, p. 253). The tenant farmers who possessed land afforded to send their children to school. Whereas tenants gained political power, the landlords who lost their power and wealth looked for new ventures by migrating to cities. The farmer-oriented system created the basis of a capitalist society. The landlord class was abolished with land reform, which formed a new capitalist class. Vested properties underpinned the formation of many chaebols and a new wealthy class (W. Kim, 2003, p. 42). In the 1950s, there was a massive explosion of entrepreneurship. As a result, the Korean government passed legislation that enabled cooperatives to engage in specific business activities in 1957, and in 1961, cooperatives could function in the credit field (Larson & Hurbert, 1966, pp. 3–4). With the increase in agricultural production and structure in society, sizeable industrial capitalist entities were now being created, and these are the *chaebols*. As the capitalist class emerged, the working class expanded (Lie, 1992, pp. 290–291). A new class of wealthy Koreans emerged, and some of these newly rich individuals went on to find several large *chaebols* that would become the backbone of Korean development. These largely emerged as a result of the disposal of ex-Japanese enterprises (Graham, 2003, p. 13).

Seven of the top ten *chaebols* in 1960 got their start under the Rhee administration, while three of them did so during the colonial era (H.-R. Kim, 2007, p. 86). In essence, the colonial-era seeds of contemporary Korean entrepreneurship lay dormant until being cultivated by several specific Rhee regime initiatives (H.-R. Kim, 2007, p. 89).

The market economy, based on private property ownership, was established through the discretionary policies of the Rhee regime: state disposal of Japanese property, allocation of foreign assistance projects, and licensing of export and import firms. When enemy properties were also transferred from the US military government to the Korean government, Rhee began to grant privileges to his political supporters to continue his presidency. He maintained resources under state control, granting privileges from the state-controlled resources to his political supporters. To bestow privilege on his cronies, Rhee set certain conditions to do away with a competitive environment on their sale. The Rhee government typically sets the assessed value of the vested industrial properties at 25-30% of the market value (W. Lim, 2003, p. 42). Moreover, generous installment plans were offered to these new property owners.

There was a disagreement with America on two main points. First of all, the American goal of creating an East Asian economic bloc with Japan at the center was triggering Rhee's fear of recolonization by Japan, and thus could not be realized. Secondly, despite the tremendous American aid, there was no economic leap. Moreover, there was growing dissatisfaction on the American side due to corruption scandals and abuse of American aid. The crony capitalist practices of the Rhee regime were followed by the misuse of US aid and siphoning off for private use and the eruption of corruption scandals. American discontent with these policies grew increasingly with the growing economic problems faced by Korea during the Rhee regime (*Foreign Aid and Economic Reconstruction*, n.d.; Kohli, 2004b, p. 62). Import-substitution industrialization (ISI) applied in many developing countries (as in Türkiye) at that time emphasized local production of consumer non-durables of textiles and foods (H.-C. Lim, 1986, p. 49) by creating a class of ultra-wealthy entrepreneurs (Graham, 2003, p. 14). The US policy discouraged Korean firms that might have become successful exporters from selling outside Korea, especially in the textile industry. As a result of this policy, from the mid-1950s on, protests in Korea started to emerge across the country.

Korea went through a challenging phase as a poor and agrarian society. President Rhee was elected democratically but was particularly authoritarian during his rule. His

presidential years were determined by the heavy direction from the US and their massive grants and aid financing. However, ISI policies and immense corruption led to discontent against the Rhee regime. As Rhee and his political associates were power-seeking, they sought to maintain American aid rather than develop the country to gain public support. However, by far, the most significant accomplishment of the Rhee regime was the land reform urged by the US. US policymakers attained their aim: a stable model of anticommunist development. The promotion of land reform and peasant cooperative associations, and related government intervention were encouraged (Wiegersma & Medley, 2000, p. 36). It virtually eliminated Korea's centuries-old landed elite class, increased rural productivity, broadened production distribution, gave Korean peasants a stake in the new economy, and removed key obstacles to industrialization (Fields, 2007b, p. 119). Rhee prioritized politics rather than the economy; thus, economic decisions were determined by political goals, leading to the politicization of economic resources and opportunity allocations; during this period, the *chaebols* gained momentum (H.-R. Kim, 2007, p. 86). Thanks to the reform, Korea's bottleneck in the food supply that caused the inflationary pressures was relieved. Korea achieved a far more equal income distribution, and the reform cleared the field for centralized solid-state power (Amsden, 1992, p. 37).

However, the discontent against the Rhee regime also spread to the elite. Demand for change was also starting to be made in the intellectual realm. In addition, relations with the US began to worsen in 1957 gradually; in 1958, the US took a hostile attitude towards the regime. Those who were upset and angry by Rhee's 12-year-old despotic regime started to act when Rhee attempted to extend his mandate by changing the Constitution. In April of 1960, student revolts (*Sa-Il-Gu*) broke out against the oppressive, authoritarian and corrupt government and also against the economic stagnation and growing inflation making poor people even poorer. As a result, the Syngman Rhee government fell. Elections were held shortly after the chaos, and the Second Republic was born in April 1960.

The Second Republic, under Prime Minister Chang Myon, formed a liberal democracy and formulated the first five-year plans to accelerate the development of the country.

However, due to the turmoil in the country, the order established by Chang Myon was short-lived, Park Chung-Hee came to power on 16 May 1961 with a coup, and the third republic was established. In the next section, the development policies of America during the Park Chung Hee era, which left its mark on Korean development history, will be examined.

4.3. The Political Economic Groundwork of the Miracle: The Park Chung Hee Era (1960-80)

4.3.1. Introduction

In a period when there were to be radical changes across the entire international political economic system, John F. Kennedy in the US and Park Chung Hee in South Korea took up their respective positions as president. Both leaders eventually changed the policies and attitudes of their countries. Under the Kennedy administration, the US put pressure on the use of economic aid for policy reforms. It also underlined democratic values, human rights issues, and fashioned liberal constitutions in its foreign policy then. Now, the pressing issue was to achieve a *democratic modernizing ideal*, as required by the ‘holy trinity’ of modernization theory (industrialization, secularization and democratization) (Göksel, 2015, p. 74). After Rhee's resignation, Korea fell into disarray, which worried America. Despite this, America has declared that it will not support the junta unless it turns into a democratic government (K. Il Baek, 2007, p. 128), but this chaotic environment created an open ground for an attack that may come from communist countries, particularly China.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the emphasis of US policy on the communist threat was still at the forefront. During this period, the primary motivation of the American development package was based on its overriding concern with security and stability in Korea. The People's Republic of China (in support of Communist North Korea) participated in the Korean War, ever heightening the US' perception of the threat. In

the early 1960s, the rise of Chinese nationalism, China's increased engagement with the developing world, China's human rights abuses in Tibet, and its domestic security problems like the Great Chinese Famine (which occurred between 1959-61 because of drought, bad weather, and the Chinese Communist Party politics, causing about 15 million deaths) all put pressure on the US (Ó Gráda, 2009, p. 95) to protect its allies against China. Also, the Vietnam War (1954-1975) front, which included the participation of the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and China from the Eastern Bloc, was another element of pressure for the US and its partner South Korea—which was also exposed to the provocations of North Korea and surrounded by communist neighbors. North Korea aimed to divert America's attention away from Vietnam (Kwon, 2018); America's policy was to dampen the “defensive bastion on the flank of Red China and the burden placed upon its economy.” (D. Engerman, 1966, p. 10) American engagement was legitimized ideologically to expand the free world, balancing Chinese power in Asia and challenging the Chinese model of development—which was responsible for the disaster of the Great Leap Forward (D. C. Engerman & McMahon, 2013, p. 77). US development programs were combined with ideological investment and ideological flexibility accordingly.

This period was a critical period for Korea until 1980 when Korea was integrated with the international political and economic system, and this integration shaped its development. It was a period in which the Park regime adopted development as the overriding common good, and while American dominance continued, self-sufficiency and outward-looking development policy were targeted.

4.3.2. US and Park Relations

US-Korean relations became more problematic as the Rhee regime became more corrupt and authoritarian. Following the spring demonstrations of 1960 and its outcome was the overturn of the Rhee regime, at the end of the elections—which we can term as democratic, relative to the previous ones—Chang Myon (August 18, 1960-May 18, 1961) was popularly elected as prime minister, but he faced many difficulties.

Again, student revolts led to the resurgence of labor demonstrations and disputes; this time, white-collar and public-sector workers joined in, too (Gray, 2008, p. 54). Following the violence against Rhee's security forces and the police, there was a severe power vacuum. The Chang Myon government was deprived of the tools to deal with these incidents. However, as we will discuss later, Myon brought many initiatives quickly. These initiatives taken during his power would be projects that would be continued and developed during the Park period. Nevertheless, the military coup could not be prevented, and Park was elected president (Mason, 1980, p. 45). The Park Chung Hee era is considered controversial and challenging to put into perspective, but we can divide it into two parts: the period between 1961 and 1970 and the one from 1970 to 1979. In the first-time frame, Park focused more on institutional arrangements (such as the Economic Planning Board and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency), normalized relations with Japan, and the transition to the export-driven model, providing special incentives and planning for chaebols to sell abroad. Meanwhile, the Korean economy reached double-digit growth and realized a take-off. In the 1970s, Park's authoritarian management tightened even more, a heavy chemical industrialization policy was adopted, and Korea moved towards the level of economic maturity. However, although economic success was achieved, reactions began to emerge among the public against the increasing authoritarianism.

Instead of the stability-oriented policies of the Rhee era, America now emphasized democracy in its policies. The transition to the parliamentary system was interpreted as a good sign, and many Koreans relied on the US to bring democracy to Korea because martial law was declared many times till the end of the Cold War.⁹ In 1961, General Park Chung Hee overthrew the Myon government—the US did not prevent the coup and accepted it with reservations (*Coup Brought Park Chunfi Hee to Power in 1961*, 1979; Y.-B. Lee & Patterson, 1998, p. 5). According to a report prepared by the US in 1961, "the Chang Myon regime had failed to win the confidence of the

⁹ Four times during the Rhee administration (1948-60), four times under Park Chung Hee's presidency (1963-79), and twice under Chun Doo Hwan (1980-88).

people” (J. K.-C. Oh, 1969a, p. 171). The factors that somehow legitimized May 16, 1961, military coup were mounting dissatisfaction with the Rhee regime, the failures of Chang Myon, a faltering economy, rapid North Korean industrialization, communist fluctuations in the immediate proximity of Korea, and student movements.

The period which began with the Park Chung Hee regime has been pointed to as a critical juncture in the history of South Korea's political economy. Rhee did not have a roadmap to use two essential sources, a massive flow of American aid and Japanese-owned establishments. Instead, he used both resources to strengthen the national economy and his power (Kohli, 2004b, p. 69). Unlike Rhee, it would not be wrong to describe the 1961-1979 period as one of 'guidance' in every sense under Park's strong leadership. Park's two main aims were the efficient use of US assistance and establishing of heavy industry in Korea. We could barely notice or hear developmental concepts being used in Rhee's speeches. However, concepts such as *munmyeong* (civilized), *gaemyeong* (enlightenment), and *bugang* (wealth and strength) were frequently used concepts in Rhee's discourse. While the first two refer to cultural and historical aspects, the concept of *bugang* highlights economic and military aspects (C. Kim, 2018, p. 49). Park Chung Hee frequently referred to the dichotomy between traditional society and modern society (*Hujinguk-Seonjinguk*) in his speeches—an extension of modernization thinking influenced by US scholars. Park's regime was zealously dedicated to modernization (*kūndaehwa*) (Eckert, 2016, p. 2) and, inarguably, during his presidency, the country passed through a formative era in its developmental path and laid the foundations for today's South Korea. Since the new government was military and authoritarian, the only way to achieve political and economic stability was to achieve development with a US development package (*Korea: General, 5 June 1961, Task Force Report*, 1961, pp. 1–2).

The emphasis on the mental revolution—very apparent in the Park Chung Hee period—in the *Sasanggye* community posed the idea that to reach scientific rationality, cultural and mental obstacles, which are incapable of modernization, should be overcome, and society should be organized accordingly. When traditional institutions became obsolete, citizens' political and social skills were improved through education

and social mobilization, and modern institutions began to emerge: democracy. In the Park period, this elite circle supported state-led development and heavy state intervention in promoting an export-oriented industrialization policy, although they strongly opposed the military regime. All possibilities were mobilized both spiritually and materially during the 1960s.

Rostow's influence during that period was spectacular since his theory triggered nation-building and economic development debates. First, Rostow became a national security adviser of President Kennedy, and then he and his close associate Robert Komer started to develop policy on Korea. In a March 15, 1961, memorandum called "Action in Korea" in which they stated that the US should focus on Korea's economic development, creating light labor-intensive industries, directing and supervising Korea's development, and helping to underutilize resources: Korean people (Office of the Historian, 1961). Rostow's visit to Korea played an important role in forming Park's discourse and policies. On May 3, 1965, Rostow and President Park Chung Hee met and had a long conversation. On the following day, Rostow visited Seoul National University to give a presentation titled "Economic Development in Asia" in which debates on development planning in Korea among professors and students were held (T.-G. Park, 2001, p. 63).

For Americans, Park Chung Hee was a problematic ally for two reasons (Weedeman, n.d.-b, p. 890). First, the US was not pleased with Park's economic policies. When he came to power, the US' first concern was whether or not Park was a 'closet Communist' (Lankov, n.d.). The US did not doubt Rhee's commitment to the free world and his strong anti-communist stance. As for Park, this was not the case—he was court-martialed and was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1949 for his secret connection with the South Korean Workers Party, a communist underground movement that had infiltrated the military. Thus, the US felt the need to secure Park's ideological adherence. Park initiated an approach to America himself and eventually arranged a meeting with Kennedy. Because of a spying scandal with North Korea (*The Mysterious Visitor from the North*, n.d.), the original plan to meet in the summer was postponed. Later, between the 13-25th of November 1961, Park organized a trip to America (Hong-

Koo, 2005, p. 250). On the 14th of November, 1961, Park and Kennedy met and made a joint statement in which they recognized “the common interest of their two countries as bulwarks of the Free World against Communist expansion.(*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy* , 1961, p. 468)” As soon as Park took office, he publicly stated that anti-communism was Korea's national essence (B.-K. Kim, 2011, p. 15) and he proclaimed anti-communism as Korea's state policy guidelines by enacting the Anti-Communist Law in 1961. Anti-communism in Korea became far more than a government policy. It permeated every aspect of Korea's national consciousness and reached the point of hegemonic dominance over society (Bleiker, 2008, p. 13). During the Park regime, repressive and pro-American policies were determinant factors. The second was that President John F. Kennedy had concerns over the democracy and human rights practices of the Park regime and was highly critical of the way Park seized power through a military coup and did not show any indication to civilianize his administration (Y.-B. Lee & Patterson, 1998, p. 84).

One of the main reasons why this era represents a critical juncture is the significant changes in the relations between the state, society, and the market, as well as the relationship between Korea and the US (Byeong Cheon, 2006, p. 63). The state in South Korea, which was heavily dependent on the US, started to gain autonomy during the Park period. Beginning in 1961, South Korea began an economic take-off that eventually elevated it to one of the rising economic powers in Asia (Heo & Roehrig, 2014, pp. 48, 53). The policies implemented during this period differed from the previous period, as did the role of the US in the process. Furthermore, at the regional level, significant changes were taking place in the power relations in Asia in the period between 1960-1980. The Soviets were establishing Pacific Fleet forces. Relations with China and Japan had entered a normalization process. With the Paris Peace Accords signing, America began to withdraw from Vietnam and Thailand. Communist-oriented states began to emerge in Indochina. The Carter Administration's decision to withdraw US ground forces from South Korea was subsequently reversed. In August 1978, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was signed emphasizing their anti-hegemonic stance. Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviets and Vietnam were agreed to on

November 3, 1978. Diplomatic relations between China and America began to normalize in January 1979. China invaded Vietnam in February 1979 and terminated its 30-year cooperation with the Soviets in 1980. Support for Taiwan by the Reagan administration led to strained relations with China (Bell, 1983, p. 223). These events and trends especially pushed Park Chung Hee to reduce military dependence on the United States (C. et. al. Moon, 2011, p. 2). That's why, although the reconciliation between the two countries on the development of Korea continued during this period, the Park Government was selective in accepting American tutelage and was creative in finding new ways. As a matter of fact, America also helped Korea to find alternatives (Brazinsky, 2005, p. 84).

4.3.2.1. US Aid and Park Chung Hee

US aid was not the sole or even the main driver of economic development for Korea. Instead, changes were paved by domestic determinants like the Korean strongman Park Chung Hee. Walden Bello asserts that Park was successful in transforming South Korea from underdevelopment to industrial status by utilizing the chances and space made available by American hegemony and implementing a state-led nationalist economic strategy that successfully raised the standard of life for the vast majority of the population (W. Bello, 2009, p. 186). An anti-communist and statist nationalist stance were reinforced by guided liberalism. Establishing a comprehensive developmental state differentiated the Park regime from its predecessors. The role of US aid in reinforcing the capacity of South Korea was supported by other domestic determinants like state capacity, strong government guidance, and its colonial legacy from Japan, which explains why Türkiye and Korea followed different development paths at some point. In this period, Kennedy adopted a policy that prioritized development and growth rather than economic stabilization, marked by slogans such as "Aid to End Aid" and "Helping People to Help Themselves." The American pressure for aid, which was tied to conditionality for policy reforms, increased (Haggard &

Kim, 1991, p. 1). As a result, this critical juncture for Korea in the 1960s coincided with the new international aid arena.

Park's regime is defined as a developmental dictatorship or as authoritarian developmentalism. He had been obsessed with modernization and export-led growth, which severed the vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment. Park was very ambitious, and his deep motivation to implement reforms attracted the attention of Americans (M. Green, n.d., p. 223). Park is often compared to Ataturk by scholars like Bruce Cumings and Ezra Vogel. Donald Gregg, a retired American politician, a former CIA employee, and a US Ambassador to South Korea, mentioned in his memoirs that during a dinner in 1974, he asked President Park a question:

“I asked Park if he ever compared himself to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Türkiye. ... he replied, I do not know much about Kemal Pasha, but I would like to do for Korea what he did for Türkiye—make it economically strong and militarily secure.”
(Gregg, 1999)

With this determination, Park transformed South Korea in every sense during his eighteen-year term. Park's strong personality and strong military regime mobilized the workforce effectively, creating a stable economic and political situation and social unity. However, before the implementation of the first five-year economic development plan, South Korea was stricken by poverty, inflation, and traces of the great destruction caused by the Korean War, especially the destruction of industrial facilities. Thus, Park adopted the 'economy first' policy (*kyeong chae chaeiljuui*) since he believed that “in human life, economics precedes politics and culture.” (C. H. Park, 1970, p. 26) Economic development serves to gain domestic legitimacy, and Park Chung Hee is a clear example of this (D. A. Smith & Lee, 1990, p. 86). On the American side, Kennedy stated that the US wanted to help Korea's five-year economic development plan, expand its economic aid, and aim to develop the country (Brazinsky, 2005, p. 85). Therefore, the priorities of both countries were aligned with each other.

While Syngman Rhee's regime had focused on import-substitution industrialization and the maximization of US aid while stubbornly resisting restoring South Korea's inferior status in relation to the Japanese economy, instead of focusing on ISI, General Park focused on export-oriented industrialization and Rostowian ideas regarding the necessity of facilitating an industrial 'take off', which rendered such a change in tactics impossible to resist for the Park administration (J. Woo, 1991, pp. 73–78). The aim was to save Korea from the trap of being a marginalized, isolated *hujinguk* (backward) country. In addition, given the decreased dependence on US aid over time, America used aid as a stimulus for South Korea to change from import-substitution policies and reintegrate into "the Japan-centred regional economy as part of a broader export drive dependent on US consumer demand." (Gray, 2014b)

Between 1963 and 1966, the predictive factor on economic activity was an import substitution policy that aimed to increase employment, cut poverty, and improve the balance of payments (Adelman, n.d.). However, this policy came to a deadlock and was abandoned because of hyperinflation. During the Park regime, a transition from an inward-oriented development model to an outward-oriented and capitalist development model was adopted. The primary engine of economic development became outward-looking export. Park believed that nation-building could be achieved through export (*sichuk ipguk*) oriented development strategy and with skillful people (*leisuribgag*). Via the export-oriented industrialization policy (EOI) implemented between 1967-72, Korea participated in the dynamic production network created mainly by *chaebols* that linked trade and investment. As the economy grew, the private sector became more significant, and the link between the government and the private sector became more intertwined. In order to eliminate the limitations of import substitution and provide diversification in the economy, products like textiles, electronic components, plywood, wigs, and intermediate goods like paper and steel were exported. Since South Korea had permission to enter the American domestic market, it faced little trouble in its export market. In sectors such as electronics, automobiles, and semiconductors, the government supported the activities of the *chaebols*. Therefore, these government-supported products contributed to the export

market of Korea. An open and market-based economy attracted foreign investors, and South Korea's exports drove its development.

The views of prominent scholars on South Korean development claim that Korea's policies under Rhee and Park are similar because the patron state, the US, had a considerable influence during the Park period, as well. For instance, Stephan Haggard and Chung-In Moon have written that "American influence was crucial" in determining the outcome of President Park's economic reforms; Bruce Cumings has noted that Korea's "export led program was decided by the US." (Haggard & Kim, 1991, p. 864) However, by all odds, Korea was a strict follower and observer of Japanese policies regarding the export-oriented development strategy—partly a result of Japanese policies (Weedeman, n.d.-a, p. 406). Promotion of export-oriented development, granting aid, and the gradual integration of the South Korean economy with the global and regional economy, through easy access to major markets like the US and Japan helped Korea's success. As a result, the country started diversifying its export destinations and goods (Cai, 2008, p. 39). Of course, international political economic conditions smoothed the way for South Korean development.

Park's government followed an industrial deepening program and did large-scale industry investment projects funded by primary exports, loans from abroad and compelled domestic savings and inflation. In 1962, America tried to dissuade the Park administration from these strategies by arguing that stabilization measures should be taken in the economy first by using American aid as a trump card. Despite the extreme measures that Park took to boost exports and increase economic independence (W. Lim, 2014, p. 44), he also initiated economic reforms such as devaluing the currency, reforming interest rates, imposing tighter fiscal policies, lowering trade barriers, and, especially, putting in place several incentives to encourage exports in parallel with the US recommendations. Thanks to the implementation of export promotion policies, GDP per capita was increased.

Park was willing to strengthen the partnership with the US and Japan, so he supported the US war in Vietnam and, in return, was generously rewarded. By sending over

320,000 military personnel to Vietnam, Korea had the second-largest foreign troop numbers in the Vietnam War after the Americans (Fuchs et al., 2018, p. 334). Normalizing relations with Japan and the Vietnam War contributed to Korean economic growth. During the War, Korea became a supplier to the American army, further supporting the national treasury through export-oriented industrial growth. Entrepreneurial Koreans signed up to fight in the Vietnam War as soldiers; some were fortunate and acquired wealth; others contributed to the country by sending the money they earned to their families, while others used the experience and knowledge they gained during their military experience for their jobs. As well-respected scholar Frank Baldwin put it, "in the construction and service field, at one point more than eighty South Korean companies held contracts with the US government in Vietnam." (F. Baldwin, 1975, p. 39) In Vietnam, Korean firms and *chaebols* operated and made a significant contribution to the political economy of South Korea. Until the end of the 1980s, the US supported South Korea commercially both at home and in Vietnam.

US economic and military assistance until the end of the 1960s was vital to Korea's national survival and its initial post-war recovery. By 1960, most of the relief aid was terminated. The aid to Korea peaked at around \$380 million in 1956 and was around \$170 million in 1961 (IMF, 1956). In any case, declining US aid served as a warning: Even though it still contributed 63.6% of all foreign aid to Korea between 1961 and 1975; America was no longer the sole main donor; from 1976 to 1990, it contributed only 14.6%, a much smaller amount. During the same time period, Japan contributed 57.4% while other countries contributed 28% of South Korea's aid. In 1975, having achieved a gross national income (GNI) per capita income of 660 dollars (World Bank, 2021a), Korea was now ineligible for the low-income economy segment by the International Development Association and thus could no longer receive soft loans. Foreign aid to Korea reached \$3.9 billion between 1961 and 1975. Following 1975, US aid policy switched from grants to concessional loans, asking beneficiaries to take more ownership and accountability (World Bank, 2021a). As a result, Korea militated for economic development and utilized concessional loans for its development plans.


The nation ultimately graduated from being a recipient in 1995 after 20 years by repaying the World Bank's structural adjustment loan (J. Kim & Kim, 2014, p. 59).

Between 1953 and 1975, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA, former Foreign Operation Administration and current USAID) provided Korea with USD 2.4 billion (Sus & Kim, 2016, p. 60). ECA and ICA supplied %66 of the US foreign economic aid to promote Korean administration and development. Other agencies and programs like GARIOA, CRIK, and UNKRA, were more emergency relief and reconstruction-oriented. In this period, especially the effects of the PL 480 program on Korean development are significant. Wheat imports started in the Rhee period and increased dramatically between 1966 and 1977, approximately four times. South Korea, Pakistan, and India were major recipients of PL 480 aid. This led to decreased rice consumption and centralization of the government's role in rice production and consumption because the government created a market where it could sell the US surplus wheat flour purchased from the US at low prices. Moreover, cheap food allowed the government to maintain low grain prices to keep industrial wages low. Low wages subsidized the industrial export strategy, starting with labor-intensive apparel manufacturing. In addition, there was a great migration from rural areas to industrial cities like Busan, which started especially in the Park period and continued until the mid-1980s. The decrease in rice consumption in Korea and the increase in the consumption of flour-based products and animal protein by the American farm commodities show that precisely what America aims at was realized. Given that pre-1945 Korea's role in the regional division of labor was determined as a rice supplier, the importance of this situation is crucial in understanding American cultural and economic influence.

With the advent of the 1970s, the predominant form of US aid was concessional loans; this form of aid, received from the Export-Import Bank, was the most considerable portion of American aid until the mid-1970s (Runde, 2012, p. 15). US officials say, "It is not healthy for Korea to continue long to be so exclusively dependent upon a single outside friend as it is at present." (Office of the Historian, 1964b) American aid and funds were used in many sectors but were explicitly directed to the agriculture,

development, and economic sectors. As seen in figure 4.2, US aid to Korea decreased in the 1960s, and loans increased. It wasn't because America was moving away from Korea. On the contrary, it diversified its inclusion to make Korea more self-reliant, like providing instructions to Korean bureaucrats and technical assistance (Brazinsky, 2005, p. 89).

Figure 4. 2. US Assistance to South Korea between 1950 and 1979



Retrieved:

https://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/115197/kimnamhee/Korea%20case%20study%2020110615%20_corrected%2020111027%20TU_%20-%2050th.pdf

The US directed its programs to affect the economic policymaking of Korea since there was an urgent need to establish a relationship among important sectors, institutions, and policies (*Program and Project Data FY1966*, n.d.). The United States Operations Mission (USOM) that administered American aid in Korea also gave advisory services in educating Korean officials (*Program and Project Data FY1966*, n.d.). The US

officials realized that lousy planning and neglect had occurred in Korean economic and political development in 1964 (Office of the Historian, 1964b). Economic aid poured into the Korean development efforts. First, the US tried exporting its meritocratic public personnel administration system to Japan and Korea. Whereas the US attempt was reasonably successful in Japan, in Korea, it completely failed at first. The reason for this was that the South Korean government replaced the US military government. In the post-1945 period, the Korean people could not comprehend how vital the civil service system was because they prioritized independence and economic security. In Japan, the people were already criticizing the Japanese bureaucracy and demanding democratization. Therefore, American authority implemented a more systematic and regular practice in Japan (1945-52); this also happened in Greece (Papastathopoulos, 1964, p. 374). Furthermore, Park's Japanese bureaucratic training¹⁰ (and that of his senior officials) enabled the administrative leadership in the country to establish a meritocratic and competent bureaucracy, influential in promoting export-oriented industrialization in South Korea.

Secondly, US aid was directed to Korean development planning and transitioned from ISI to export-oriented industrial policy (EOI). The US put significant pressure on the country's transition to an export-oriented policy in 1964, which coincided with Park's aim. One of Korea's most noteworthy achievements was the transition from ISI to EOI in a relatively early period. However, the drawbacks of ISI policy had become apparent: domestic producers were exhibiting rent-seeking behavior, monopolizing their increased share of existing wealth through bribery, lobbying, and taxing foreign goods so that consumers could not afford them. The primary goal was to get the economy moving, and this was to be promoted by an intrusive government. The first task was to create a government institutional structure (Krause, 1997, p. 112) in order

¹⁰ He served in the Japanese army during World War II. When Korea was liberated from Japanese rule, Park returned to serve in the Korean army and was promoted to general after the Korean War. In shaping a developmental state model, Park Chung Hee was also influenced by what he learned from Japanese values and the colonial system of government.

to achieve a merit-based bureaucratic recruitment and promotion system (J. S. You, 2017, p. 535). To this end, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was established in 1962 to make coordinated decisions. The strategic mechanism for managing and maintaining export-oriented policy was the EPB. The planning/coordination by a 'pilot' – EPB – agency (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry MITI in Japan, the Industrial Development Bureau in Taiwan, the Planning Commission in France, and the State Planning Organization in Türkiye) had a preeminent place in economic policymaking and a great degree of autonomy in restructuring the economic bureaucracy (Haggard & Kim, 1991, p. 860). The EPB immediately introduced the first five-year plan for Korea's development, eliminating the problems ISI had previously caused. The EPB united and tried to gather under one roof the various elements of developmental thinking that had previously been dispersed and separated. Planning duties were transferred from the Ministry of Reconstruction, and monetary duties were transferred from the Ministry of Finance's Bureau of the Budget. It also controlled foreign borrowing and direct investment and increased its capacity information gathering (Haggard, 1990b, p. 64).

The Myon government laid the groundwork for the first five-year plan (1962-66), in which the key issues were to achieve a self-sustaining economy (S. Han, n.d., p. 17), transition to EOI policy, and access to Japanese aid. The US took an active role and guided in preparing development plans. Park Government sought to expand Korea's export and it is found that the primary stimulus to Korean economic development came from the expansion of the export sector. During his visit to Washington, Park requested more US aid for a successful implementation First Five Year Plan and Kennedy reaffirmed that (Yoo, 1990, p. 189). During the preparation of the first plan, Park did not include the American advisors first; however, the USOM stated that the ROK officials and planners needed to be more competent and that the first five-year plan should be revised. The second version of the Plan reflected American ideas on economic development (Brazinsky, 2005). In preparing the five-year development plans, the US, through the USOM, influenced Korea's choices. USOM director James Killen and, later on, Joel Bernstein, who replaced Killen as the director of USAID

(formerly USOM), was highly involved in the economic policy-making process. Bernstein even became Park's most trusted economic tutor (C. Moon & Jun, 2013, p. 135). A well-known American development economist, Irma Adelman took on a major economic advisor role in preparing the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967-71) (Adelman, 2007). The US officials actively took part in the preparation of the plans and the purposes, verifiable, detailed and impact areas of the plans were made under the guidance of America (Brazinsky, 2005, p. 92).

For Park Administration, development planning was significant because he aimed to accelerate economic growth and to create an infrastructure disallowing Rhee's corrupt regime and inefficient policymakers to retain control of the Korean government guided by the plans as precondition for power transfer to civilian government (Yoo, 1990, p. 198). The US, through USAID, hired export-promotion advisors to advise Park's government on developing the export sector, disciplining fiscal and monetary policies, and implementing tax reform, trade liberalization, and stabilization measures (C. Moon & Jun, 2013, pp. 132–137). The US also helped Korea establish the Korean Development Institute in 1971, which had a significant role in defining what role should be pursued in terms of economic development. As a result of these policies, the export-led growth of Korea began. The highlights of the development plans of Korea are indicated in the table below:

Table 4. 5. Scope of the Korean Development Plans

YEARS	SCOPE OF THE PLANS
1962-66	Building a self-reliant industrial structure
1967-71	Modernizing the industrial structure and building import substitution industries
1972-76	Building an export-oriented industrial structure by promoting heavy and chemical industries

1977-81	Promoting the development of industries that could effectively compete internationally in industrial export markets
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Table 4.5. (cont'd)

Source: Own Elaboration

Until the mid-1960s, tensions arose between America and Korea because Park aimed to replace American aid with German capital and aid. German industrial investments in Korea started to worry America, mainly when a German consortium of industrial organizations visited Korea in 1962 and established credit facilities of \$35 million in loans (Brazinsky, 2005, p. 95). However, contrary to the expectations of Korean officials, due to its unstable location and the lack of natural resources, Korea needed help attracting foreign investment and accepted American guidance and tutelage with Park's presidential election in 1963. In the coming years, the dynamic relationship between Park and the US flourished again. For instance, Park consulted for economic advice Joel Bernstein, an economist and AID director for Korea, in 1965 (Brazinsky, 2005, p. 96).

The concept of the "developmental state" is one of the most important features of Korea's development. Even though there are many definitions of it, the fundamental features of the developmental state are as follows: a powerful state with a significant effect on the economy, a state entity with centralized authority to create development plans and organize political and business players around this strategy; a meritocratic administration that is shielded from social interest groups; and a tightly connected the public and private sector (*chaebols*). In order to provide coordination between *chaebols* and the state to discuss development plans, coordinate their implementation and results, and monitor the export-promoted policy, top government officials and business representatives held monthly meetings. From 1965 to 1977, Park personally attended and chaired the Export Promotion Meetings and the National Export Promotion meeting in which firms, government agencies, and related actors exchanged information (Chaibong, 2018). With the founding and management of policy think tanks and planning organizations by economists, business school graduates, and

engineers with degrees from US universities, President Park laid the foundation of a sizable technocratic capacity (T.-G. Park, 2005, pp. 666–667).

Park's military regime pursued state-guided industrialization and guided capitalism inherited from Japan, and the export promotion policy worked successfully. Successful export-oriented policy equates to a strong institutional state in which the state and business are tightly linked (Stubbs, 1999, p. 340). *Chaebols*, leadership, and bureaucracy were always referred to as South Korean development's three primary agents and engines in the 1960s and 1970s. In this process, the *chaebols* played a critical role. *Chaebols* that got incentives from the Government played a crucial role in producing for international markets. Also, US aid was mainly channeled to the development of *chaebols* like Hyundai. *As a result*, *chaebols* such as Hyundai and Daewoo began to look to expand overseas in the 1970s. In parallel with the EOI policy and the support of the US, Korea revived connections with Japanese and American capital and market. Moreover, the *chaebols* engaged in developing arms and construction projects and offshore procurement contracting for the US military, starting with the US venture in the Vietnam War and later in the Middle East. Offshore procurement enabled the rapid expansion of the industrial capacity of Korea (Glassman & Choi, 2014, p. 1163). Hyundai, Daerim, Samhwan, and Hanjin were the corporations engaged in Vietnam that financially greatly benefited. In the later stages of the Park regime, the *chaebols* were selected as the main drivers of the Heavy Chemical Industry Policy (HCI), which was implemented between 1973-1978.

With the adoption of the HCI in 1970, a state-led growth strategy focused on building an industrial base for South Korea and promoting exports and HCIs such as those connected to electronics, steel, or the automobile. Park gave privileges to the business class, such as transferring resources as direct subsidies to them. It also provided enormous sums of capital in the form of loans with low interest rates and subsidies to reputable *chaebols*, which experienced amazing growth (Khan & Jomo, 2000, p. 97; E. M. Kim, 1996, p. 231). Furthermore, institutions like the Economic Planning Board frequently adopted policies supporting the *chaebols'* activities. The *chaebols* also enjoyed well-defined property rights, in which successful land reform implementation

played an important role. The government tried to eliminate corruption and rent-seeking; meritocratic institution-building and monitoring agencies helped to reduce these problems. Both public and private sectors actively participated in research and development. Labor-intensive light industry, HCI and export-oriented development were the two main features of the late Park era. Korea, in the mid-1960s, was already strong in the textile, apparel, footwear, and consumer electronics sectors. With these policies, Korea undertook construction projects in the Middle East (the Middle East Special Demand Era), which led to the foundation of a strong national economy.

The US aimed to strengthen relations between Korea and Japan, a reconciliation between two American key allies served both American geostrategic aims and economic cooperation between two (Japan and Republic of Korea Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-Operation, 1965). Park thought normalizing relations with the Japanese would contribute to the economy because of slow growth, increasing inflation and unemployment. Moreover, American economic aid had fallen considerably. So, during the Second Development Plan period, Park determined that he needed more foreign capital flows to solve these problems, and the alliance with Japan would bring that (V. D. Cha, 1996)pp.128-129. For this reason, in 1965, the South Korean government decided to attempt to secure foreign loans— sparked ferocious opposition from students who perceived the decision as an embarrassing concession to the nation's previous colonizer. As a result, the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, which both parties accepted to promote economic cooperation and establish political ties, was signed in 1965 (M. Lee, 2014). This cooperation helped Korea's market search and opening up since Korea, with the HCI drive, industrial machinery, shipbuilding, electrical and steel industries, and petrochemical industries grew rapidly. In order to normalize relations between Japan and Korea, Park visited the US and exchanged ideas with US officers on integrated steelworks construction on the 22nd of May, 1965 (*POSCO's 50 Years of History*, n.d.). After receiving support from the US, the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) was initially funded by a large loan from the Export-Import Bank of Japan in 1969. Also, it benefited from

technical assistance from major Japanese steel companies in its early years (*POSCO's 50 Years of History*, n.d.). POSCO's foundation on the 1st of April, 1968, coincided with the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967-1971), in which the US actively took part in preparing it. As a result, in this period, the policies of America and Korea were in harmony with each other, and economic aids were vital for Korea to pick up steam in its developmental road.

4.3.2.2. Promotion of American Interests in Trade, Investment, and Markets

During the Park period, reforms were carried out in all areas. The American economist Ronald McKinnon was invited to Korea to get advice from the United States for the steps to be taken regarding trade. McKinnon suggested that Korea should apply a uniform rate for those items Korea wanted to develop (Haggard, 1990b, p. 67). In 1963, Korea negotiated a major stabilization program with the US. The US put pressure on Korea to implement devaluation and exchange rates. These pressures from the United States led Park to adopt an export-promotion policy and aim for economic independence. American consultants collaborated with the EPB and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. A Joint US-Korean Economic Cooperation Committee that was formed in 1963 became a locus for the discussion of development strategy (Haggard, 1990b, p. 69). America supported Korean trade policies in two more ways: American economists worked closely with the Korean bureaucracy and orchestrated macro-level reforms. Secondly, they formed the basis of the export success of Korea by making institutional reform and micro-level reforms (Haggard, 1990b, p. 70).

Before the Park Chung Hee term and the success of the Chinese revolution, the US had already started to seek Korean-Japanese rapprochement since the US saw the tense relationship between Japan and Korea as an obstacle to unity and mobility in the free world. With the Sato-Nixon Communique of 1969 (Office of the Historian, n.d.-d), the status of Japan in Asia was defined as: "Japan's role should be to progressively assume international political responsibilities, and to contribute actively to the field of

economic development.” (Office of the Historian, n.d.-d) Even much earlier, following the inauguration of the Truman Doctrine, Secretary of State George Marshall wrote a note to Acheson, which stated, "Please have a plan drafted of policy to organize a definite government of South Korea and connect up its economy with that of Japan." (Cumings, 1999b, p. 212) However, Rhee was not in favor of normalizing relations with Japan.

The US took steps to resolve the contentious situation between South Korea and Japan and promoted strengthening relations between the two countries to build military cooperation and security in the region. Instead, it sought ways in which Japan, Korea, and Taiwan could remain within the hegemonic boundaries of the post-war settlement (Cumings, 1999b, p. 32). America emphasized Japan's role in the region and continually drove South Korea to normalize relations with Japan. In addition, the US aimed to take an active role in the Asian political economy, where Japan is at the center, and mainly tried to expand and increase its exports here. Also, US officials realized that Korea needed more trade partners and supporters to expand product varieties and bring better technologies (V. D. Cha, 1996, p. 137). In fact, as soon as Chang Myon (prime minister before Park) took office, he sought to normalize relations with Japan, even sending Pak Hungsik (his close friend and supporter) to meet Cabinet Secretary Ohira Masayoshi in Japan (C.-S. Lee, 1985, p. 45). His government is considered the founder of the "Korean-Japanese economic cooperation system” (Gills, 1994, p. 213). It can be said that the policies that were the 'shining stars' of this entire Park period began life in the ephemeral Chang Myon government (August 1960-May 1961). America's policy coincided with Park's skillful policy in bringing these two actors into a transnational coalition to support his economic and military development programs (Vogel & Kim, 2013b, p. 5). President Park departed from the anti-Japanese posture of Syngman Rhee. Ultimately, America's attempts yielded results, and the Treaty signed between Japan and South Korea established fundamental diplomatic relations in 1965 (G.-W. Shin, 2010, pp. 18–19). In that regard, the US, as a regional stabilizer, also played a role in this renewed partnership.

Following the normalization with Japan, Korea became a significant importer of Japanese technology and goods. Thanks to American encouragement and offshoring Japanese production to South Korea, South Korean companies were given access to international markets like the European Economic Community. The growing security and ideological ties between China-North Korea, and the Soviet Union, as well as the establishment of a trade partnership, encouraged the United States to strengthen economic integration and prosperity in the East Asian region. US foreign policy towards East Asia, its aim to deepen regional integration, and where it saw Japan and South Korea in the regional division of labor contributed significantly to South Korea's success.

The US, as a liberal hegemon, aimed to exert both coercive power and influence through economic cooperation, the creation of the common market, free trade zones, and inter-regional economic flows from their domestic markets (such as from Korea to the US). For the establishment of a commercial network, the US opened its markets in which regional states enjoyed the benefits of the cooperation. Committed to an international economic system based on open markets and economic interdependence, the American government welcomed both Japanese and Korean imports (Pempel, 1998b, p. 57), which provided these countries with tremendous development opportunities. The open US market provided big opportunities to the labor-intensive type of manufacturers in Korea (Myint, 1972, p. 76) and Korea's exports expanded and played a dominant role in the US market. America opened its vast consumer market to Asian exports without insisting that Asia's doors be wide open to American products. The protected national capitalists invested their profits in the national market. After the income pyramids were flattened, political leaders supported a change in people's lives by improving the workforce quality and investing in health and education (Sogge, 2002, p. 118). These two staunch US allies enjoyed the open market of the US and gradually integrated into the international market.

The Vietnam War significantly boosted the Korean and Taiwanese economies by increasing their exports. In addition, the Brown Memorandum delivered by the US to Korea in 1966 confirmed that the US promised to furnish more economical and

military aid to Korea in exchange for Korea's expanded military presence in Vietnam. The US also provided weapons, equipment, and sources for the modernization of Korean armed forces and to counter North Korean infiltration; increased the employment opportunities in Vietnam for Korean technicians; ensured immediate use of aid funds (S. J. Kim, 1970, p. 529). With this agreement, Korea ensured to send 50,000 Korean soldiers to Vietnam. Koreans in Vietnam accounted for 70 percent of all Koreans employed outside South Korea. Thanks to this agreement, Korea earned 200 million USD annually, which amounted to about 40 percent of its foreign exchange profits at the time (S. Rhyu, 2015, p. 40) and the Park Government generated revenue of over \$1 billion just between 1965-1970 (Kuznets, 1971, p. 14). President Park stated, "Vietnam was a battlefield but it was also a market." (K. J. Yi, 2000, pp. 104–105, 109–110) By providing special economic concessions, the US tried to empower Korean economic and military actors (F. Baldwin, 1975, pp. 36–37; USGPO, 1970, pp. 149–150). The more significant consequence of this agreement was to lead the development of chaebols, which are significant players in the Korean development and developmental state. Heavy industries such as shipbuilding, steel production, and machine tools formed the basis of the industrial drive for Korea. The Brown Agreement and US offshore procurement provided Korea also engagement with regional countries so that Korea's regional position became much more connected and powerful by the 1980s. Therefore, this agreement was signed to create big Korean chaebols and a developmental state.

Thanks to its Vietnam engagement, Korea provided an entire combat division and a non-combat engineering unit to Vietnam. That is why Korea acquired significant trade benefits, made enormous profits, and profited economically via US offshore procurement (Office of the Historian, n.d.-c, p. 126). The Vietnam War provided Korea with urgently needed capital to promote industrial development and experience to Koreans just as the Korean War boosted the Japanese economy even though it was referred to as "divine aid" thanks to orders for Toyota trucks and other necessary recourses for Korea (Schaller, 1985, p. 289). Just as the Korean War became a revival for the Japanese economy, the Vietnam War opened the way for a developmental boost

in the Korean economy (Gray, 2013, p. 16) through procurement contracts for Korean *chaebols*, Korean exports to Vietnam, and dollar earnings contributed to the Korean economy (Stubbs, 2005, pp. 131–133). Korean big *chaebols* strengthened their ties with Japanese capital and the US market thanks to the US efforts to normalize Korean and Japanese relations. *Chaebols* like Samsung, Hyundai, and Hanjin that received contracts to deliver goods to the US military grew dramatically due to the US offshore procurement. As a result, Hyundai, LG, Samsung, and Hanjin became big global brands (Glassman & Choi, 2014, pp. 1164–1171). Moreover, Korea's technological and industrial upgrading was realized thanks to these opportunities. For Korea, Vietnam War also served as a ready market for her heavy industrial products (Naya, 1971, p. 47). Furthermore, thanks to the explosion in demand within the US market, both Korea and Taiwan established a rapid surplus by the early 1970s (Gray, 2014a, p. 55).

In the 1970s, the division of labor was significantly restructuring the world system. Japan was rapidly rising, and simultaneously, the close relations between Korea and Japan provided advantages for both countries. As a result, Japan experienced economic upward mobility in the direction of high-technology production, and other East Asian nations followed Japan's example (Petri, 1988, p. 47). These countries took over Japan's existing market and role in the global division of labor, i.e. labor-intensive industries (K. J. Kim, 2006, p. 121). Within the region, Japan dominated the developmental routes of other countries via trade, technology transfer, and investment (K. J. Kim, 2006, pp. 120–121). Other newly industrialized countries like Korea and Taiwan, particularly in East Asia, attained developmental success quickly. For example, thanks to low production costs, low wages, and high profits, Korea achieved rapid development by the end of the 1970s. This is why we can easily find similarities in the development patterns of many East Asian countries that emerged as new epicenters of capital accumulation in the global economy.

As of 1978, the US was the largest creditor, with 27% of Korea's total loans. After that, however, America's share of Korea's total trade fell by almost half (Sungjoo, 1980, p. 1084). By all means, Japan and the US had the most share of Korea's total trade.

Between 1962 and 1979, Korean export and import markets heavily depended on Japan and the US. In 1962, the trade between the two countries accounted for 78.6 and 64.8 percent in imports and export, respectively. Towards the 1970s, this figure increased (J. Kim, 1988, p. 118). Between 1962 and 1978, the US investment was about 162 million USD, and most of the foreign investment was from Japan and the US (Westphal et al., 1979, p. 366). In this process, the US open market also contributed to Korean development. Thanks to the cooperation with Japan, South Korea had an unprecedented and highly profitable open market since the entire sales network was in the hands of the Koreans (Chibber, 2003, p. 51). Therefore, the trade pattern of Korea suddenly turned into “buy from Japan and sell to America” instead of importing from the US and selling to Japan (Chibber, 2003, p. 79). Over time, as seen in table 4.7, the Korean share of the US market increased dramatically till the mid-1970s whereas imports from Japan to Korea increased (Castley, 1997a, p. 98). The Korea-Japan connection stimulated industrial development and specialization thanks to the US initiatives. At that time, Japan also saw the trade agreement's benefits because the US imposed an embargo on itself. Japan, which made many subcontractor investments in the heavy chemical and metal industry in South Korea, thus turned its commercial relationship with Korea into a win-win game. American and Japanese markets were the main markets for Korean products as seen in table 4.6. Access to the US and Japanese markets gave Korea an enormous advantage (Castley, 1997b, p. 206).

Table 4. 6. Main Sources and Destinations of Korea’s Trade (%)

	<i>Exports</i>		<i>Imports</i>	
	<i>Japan</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>United States</i>
1960–62	49	17	23	48
1965	26	35	39	37
1967	26	43	45	31
1968	22	52	43	31
1969	21	50	41	29

Source: Castley, R. (1997). Korea’s Export Growth: An Alternative View, *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 18(2), p.195

Korean firms enjoyed the open US market that was the leading destination for key exports such as clothing, plywood, footwear, and textiles. As the trade relations, training, and exchange programs between Korea and the US increased, cultural and social interaction also increased. The arrival of American fashion, music, films, and the influences of celebrities coming to South Korea (such as Louis Armstrong in 1963 (Ricketts, 1963), had a significant impact on what would be fashionable or consumed in South Korea and increased the demand for American products. Furthermore, through USAID-funded projects like the Participants' Training Program, more than 4,000 South Koreans received graduate-level training; later, many took a leading part in Korea's public and private sectors. Thanks to such programs, relations were not limited to a single field. For example, the formation of alumni associations provided long-lasting interaction. Other significant bilateral organizations are the Korea-US Economic Council, the US-Korea Business Council, and the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (Runde, 2012, p. 18).

As a result of the institutions remaining from the Japanese colonial period and the survival of these institutions in the American Military Government period, and the enhancement of the power of the state and the bureaucracy, Park was able to build a developmental state that was entirely laid till the end of 1972. Korean state adopted a strong and interventionist manner state pursuing a capitalist development strategy in which a pilot agency (Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), for example) plays a significant role in maintaining the relationship between the public and private sector. American development package, the transition from an agricultural to an industry-based economy, the normalization between Japan and Korea thanks to the US, US aid officials working with Korean technocrats to improve the quality of government intervention and establishing export-oriented industrialization, and American aid and military procurements' chaebols contributed to the Korean developmental state. Park's efforts cannot be ignored either; his inclination towards statism, declining aid from the US, and the continuing communism threat directed Park to create a developmental state (also called a cohesive-capitalist state by Atul Kohli) (Kohli, 2004b, p. 88).

The role of the US in developing the developmental state was as follows: The communist threat resulted in the transfer of large amounts of US aid and resources and the adoption of military measures. After the immediate threat passed, without threatening its allies, America began to reduce the amount of aid in the 1960s and show support for governments to be self-reliant. When the US' allies started to implement liberalization in their trade regime, privatization and active support for the private sector, and promotion of public-private partnerships, America also began to contribute to the formation of new industries for policymaking in economic reforms so that its allies could achieve self-reliance. On the other hand, the US insistently advocated strong state and state intervention. Since planning and a technical-rational approach for policymaking are features of the developmental state, EPB published five-year economic plans. Development planning was taken into consideration seriously by Rostow and his colleagues. More importantly, entrepreneurs in South Korea did not have to waste much time with the government or bureaucracy. On the contrary, all other processes are brought about by the support of the Government and EPB. The cooperation of the private sector and the government increased the efficiency of the industrialization process, eliminating time wasting, and created an isolated space for its development by protecting the private sector in its competition with foreign markets. When these advantages are combined, the late development process has been carried out successfully. Thanks to land reform implementation, Park gained political support from rural areas in implementing developmental state strategies; the same happened before in Japan: thanks to land reform, landed elites' power was weakened, a new domestic capitalist class was formed, and the state itself shaped the private sector and this new class. The rural sector constituted the support base for the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and Park Chung Hee in Korea (Yamaguchi, 2003, p. 5).

4.3.2.3. Involvement in Defense Infrastructure Capabilities

One of the dynamics of the politico-military sphere of influence of the US was the Western Pacific during the Cold War (W. Bello, 2009, p. 183). Especially considering

the Vietnam front, the US commitment to the formation of strong armies against the communist threat increased incrementally. Although Kennedy strongly advocated the democratization of the Park Regime, he threatened Park withdrawing economic aid, not military aid (Y.-B. Lee & Patterson, 1998, p. 51). During the Park Administration, the US military aid strongly backed the Government and supported many development projects (*The Role of Foreign Aid in Development: South Korea and the Philippines*, 1997, p. 23) subsidized the largest sectors of Korean public spending. The US provided about 7 billion dollars in military aid that even slightly outpaced economic aid during the Park years. Korean military officers were trained in the US and took significant government roles. This figure does not include the massive military support provided during the War (Mason, 1980, pp. 183–184). During the Rhee era, Korea sent troops to South Vietnam, requesting increased security and military assistance from the United States. This policy continued during the Park period and even extended his stay in Vietnam. Therefore, military aid continued until America withdrew from Vietnam in 1975 (M. Y. Lee, 2013, p. 422).


Table 4. 7. Summary of Economic and Military Assistance to Korea from the US (Millions of US Dollars for US Fiscal Years)

	1946-52	1953-61	1962-69	1970-76	Total
Economic Assistance	666.8	2,579.2	1,658.2	963.6	5,745.4
Military Assistance	12.3	1,560.7	2,501.3	2,797.4	6,847.3
TOTAL	679.1	4,139.9	4,159.5	3,761.0	12,592.7

Source: Mason, E. S., et al. (1980). *The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea*. Series: Studies in the Modernization of The Republic of Korea: 1945-1975. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, p.182

Because of the communist threat, the South Korean military expanded more and more. Its number grew from 100,000 men in 1950 to 600,000 men in 1960 (Jonsson, 2011, p. 4) and accounted for one-fortieth of the country's total population. Compared to other developing countries, this was one of the highest ratios. US-oriented training also helped the South Korean officer corps to learn modern managerial and organizational skills. The US provided South Korea with millions of dollars of military aid, which was spent on modernizing the army. Approximately 80% of South Korea's defense industry was funded by US military aid (G. Baek, 2013, p. 151). Until the mid-1970s, American military aid continued, and after 1973, military assistance to Korea declined substantially before the end of the Cold War. In this decline, the 1973 Oil Embargo, which had a considerable impact, severely shook the American economy, becoming increasingly dependent on foreign oil, as seen in the table below:

Table 4. 8. Foreign Aid to Korea, 1953-1993



Source: CBO Memorandum. (1997, December). *The Role of Foreign Aid in Development: South Korea and the Philippines*, p. 16.

The heavy involvement of the US military in East Asia made these countries (in particular Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines) semi-sovereign states because they were incapable of pursuing independent foreign and domestic policy and taking separate defense initiatives (Cumings, 1999b, p. 215). They depended on American defense and had American military bases in their territories. With military bases and personnel deployed throughout the country, the US invested in the Korean economy and created new jobs and business opportunities. In addition, the Americans helped Korea to ensure compliance with direct investments, aid, new industrial bases, and the labor force in state management. For this reason, the military was a more modernized institution when compared to other institutions, like the bureaucracy. Furthermore, technological advancement in the armies and military equipment became the pioneers of improvements in other areas.

In 1969, the Nixon Doctrine was put forth by the US administration. The Doctrine had several essential points in terms of US foreign policy. First, America relinquished its mission as a regional gendarmerie and announced that it would no longer send troops to regional conflicts worldwide. The US also decided to withdraw its troops from the country and pull out of the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. As a result of the defeat in Vietnam, all soldiers would be withdrawn to take the pressure off of the war. The US also withdrew 24 thousands of troops from Korea by the end of 1973. In the meantime, the US increased military aid (Y.-B. Lee & Patterson, 1986, p. 84). Second, the struggle with the Eastern Bloc, with whom they competed, would continue through soft means like trade and diplomatic relations but no longer through direct contact.

This announcement of the gradual decrease of the US troops and “relief from involvement in Asian contingencies” (Ravenal, 1971) caused panic and massive disappointment in South Korea. Park stated his anxiety and fear over the US decision and external threats: “This series of developments contained an almost unprecedented peril to our people’s survival.” (Whyte, 2015) This doctrine led South Korea to create plutonium as a nuclear weapon, pushing to give more weight to the Heavy Chemical Industry (HCI) Policy. The rapprochement between North Korea and South Korea responded to the US-China rapprochement in 1971 (Nam, 1986, p. 125). Even though

the US was afraid to make a move that would endanger the security of Korea, starting with the Nixon Doctrine, many security crises, such as Nixon's political rapprochement with China in 1972, the investigation conducted by the US on Pak Tong-sôn's Korean lobby after 1974, and Carter's decision to withdraw ground troops from Korea led to the crisis of confidence. Taking advantage of it, Park expanded his presidential powers with Yushin Constitution in 1972 (B.-K. Kim, 2011, p. 17) allowing Park lifetime tenure and sweeping powers to rule by decree. Park was dedicated to working on the HCI project because he wanted to lessen the reliance on American weapons by fostering the military sector. The HCI project was conducted within the nexus of the world capitalist economy because this project was attempted to be financed with foreign loans, and heavy and chemical goods were attempted to be sold in the international market (Im, 2006, p. 165).

Despite the adverse developments, two main factors cemented US-Korea security relations. First was the 1968 North Korean attack on the Blue House to assassinate Park Chung Hee. The second one was Korea's participation in the Vietnam War. Some 4,600 soldiers were killed, and 17,000 were seriously wounded in Vietnam (J. Kim, 2012, p. 451). Moreover, with the Ford Administration, the US tried to augment US economic, political and military participation as a Pacific power. The Pacific Doctrine of Ford declared that the US called for a resolution to the longstanding conflict in Korea. The US approach would no longer be as "donor to dependent" in allied countries; the technological and scientific exchanges would be prioritized (Naughton, 1975). Thus, the US again became supportive of the Korean defense, economic and military alliance. Despite the fluctuations in relations that became official with the Mutual Defense Treaty signed during the Rhee Administration, the US commitment to Korean security in every sense did not waver.

4.3.2.4. The New Rural Empowerment Paradigm: Saemaul Undong

By 1965, the land tenure structure of Korea had already changed thanks tremendously to land reform that started to be implemented during the Rhee Administration and American Military Government. As a result, complete owners increased from 13.8% in 1945 to 69.5%, and tenants decreased from 48.9% to 7% (Morrow & Sharper, 1970, p. 38). This resulted in increased production, productivity, and employment in agriculture because after the redistributive land reform, and farmers started to work harder when they became owners (Işcan, 2018, pp. 15, 18). Furthermore, the cultivated land rose dramatically and the rural class structure was substantially transformed. The American aim of eliminating tenancy and full ownership of landowners was achieved through redistributive and non-violent land reform. Land reform made it possible to create social and structural factors that supported state autonomy and helped foster the creation of a bureaucracy that valued merit by promoting the rapid expansion of education, reducing political favoritism and increasing state autonomy, thus avoiding the patronage demands of politicians and elites. Dani Rodrik (Rodrik, 1995, p. 92) argues that land reform in Korea ensured distribution of wealth and income that is largely equal and prevented widespread rent-seeking and powerful landowners' takeover of the state. Alice Amsden (Amsden, 1992, pp. 52, 147) similarly states that the disintegration of the traditional landed aristocracy and the weakening of social classes constitute a solid ground for a strong state in Korea. In other late industrializing countries, she argues that large landowners are led to seek rents from state authority in countries with unsuccessful land reform. Indeed, this argument explains Türkiye's situation, as will be seen in the next section.

On this basis, after two administrations, Park, who became president, built a developmental state and a meritocratic structure. This gradual development was furthered by Park. Park adopted a development-friendly ideology: a “can-do attitude” (*hamyeon teonda*) or self-help spirit (Jwa, 2017, p. 40). This ideology served as a powerful force for a national transformation that promoted ideological education, propaganda, selective economic policies implemented by the top-down government strategies, export promotion policies, industrial policy, and the New Village

Movement, known as *Saemaul Undong*. Park, whose main aim was industrialization, furthered the successful land policies by pursuing proactive agricultural development policies and adopted a strategy called “favoring agriculture (*chungnong* in Korean)”. In rural areas, he was remembered for his achievements in riverside construction, groundwater drilling, and arable land reorganization through measures such as different planting patterns and hunger relief for rice fields (S.-M. Han, 2004, p. 75).

Park's peasant background was an important factor in his focus on agricultural policies. Park guaranteed high and stable prices to farmers. By establishing the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the Medium Industry Bank, he consolidated his support among farmers and small and medium-sized industries (Haggard, 1990b, p. 67). Selective industrial policies and export-oriented trade policies adopted in the first five-year economic development plan led to a growing urban-rural living standards disparity. In order to prevent discontent with the Park regime among the rural population and to modernize the rural areas and economy, Park launched the rural modernization campaign, the New Village Movement, in 1970. It was the most crucial pillar of Park's development policies regarding rural policies. Within the scope of this program, roads were built, new housing was provided for people, and the rural standard of living improved (Clarke, n.d., p. 778). At first, it was a modest rural program. However, this initiative was so powerful that today it has been transformed into a global initiative of South Korea and still serves as a model and inspiration for many countries (*Kazakhstan Eager to Learn Korea's 'can-Do' Spirit*, n.d.). It is considered with pride that this rural modernization campaign is one of the most successful events in modern Korean history.

Park had a vision that agricultural and industrial development should complement each other (Bedeski, 1994, p. 21). That's why, Korea implemented both its outward-oriented and import-substitution industrialization policies at the same time. While selected markets opened to international competition, sectors that were not competitive but open to improvement were protected. In order to strengthen agriculture sector, agriculture-based industrial products became an essential export item. Considering the developmental state's planning-based and technical-rational approach to

policymaking, it is interesting to observe how Park mobilized the nation for rural development. These policies were accompanied by ambitious investments in developing economic and social infrastructure such as transportation, communication, energy, irrigation, and education.

Park carried out agricultural restructuring and farmland development policies, established the institutions, and passed the laws since he saw that agriculture and industry were indissociable (C. H. Park, 1973, p. 129). He also pointed out the connection between economic development and non-economic changes. He stated that the two sides of the same coin are economic development and mental development (Presidential Secretariat, 1973, p. 18) and strongly advocated for a mental revolution through education and training (Sonn & Gimm, 2013, p. 27). The three *Saemaul* spirits—diligence, self-help, and cooperation—represent this change in mindset. Park stated that mental development was an essential prerequisite for economic development: "The spirit of self-help and attitude to take initiatives are the fundamental elements in making our villages prosperous" (Presidential Secretariat, 1973, p. 847). This strong motivation influenced the public. Villagers were not only sacrificed for the developmental policy of the Government but greatly benefited from this spiritual revolution of developmentalism. Dedication and strong leadership, in addition to the public's participation and commitment, resulted in success. As with the Export Promotion Meetings, Park personally participated in general meetings, nationwide government-led trainings, and exposure visits. This way, politicians, government officials, villagers, village leaders, farmers, and entire village communities were mobilized, and the *Saemaul* spirit was built up. The *Saemaul Undong* represents a nexus between culture and state policy that is less concerned with repression and censorship and uncovers a dual role of culture also working as a development tool.

President Park established substantial state autonomy through the land reform implemented during the Rhee regime, the nationalized banking system, and the strengthening of chaebols. Notably, the nationalized banking system gave the state tremendous leverage over the business interests. In addition, it subsidized the *Saemoul*

Undong process, in which the US economic and military aid also played a significant role (Douglass, 2014, pp. 7, 22). USAID officials positively evaluated and followed South Korean efforts to improve its rural conditions; budget allocation was also made to finance these efforts (*An Interview with Marcus L. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Arlington*, 1968, p. 19) so that Saemoul Undong became entirely centered around community-led development (*Saemaul Undong – the Republic of Korea’s New Village Movement, Part 1 – The Movement for Community-Led Development*, 2016). The US also provided funds to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in the late 1960s. These funds were used to ensure an adequate supply of food, agricultural raw materials, and a trained technical workforce to promote industrial development (*Agrarian Reform Activities in the Republic of Korea*, 1964, p. 14). Furthermore, the American-Korean Foundation, the UN, and 4-H Clubs (*4-H Club: American Organization*, n.d.; Brinn, 2016)¹¹ established five upland development demonstration centers in 1963 to increase production (*Agrarian Reform Activities in the Republic of Korea*, 1964, p. 14; Economic Research Service, 1971, pp. 76–77). America included comprehensive clauses in its annual aid packages, from training courses to supplying fertilizers for agriculture. For example, FY 1964 included training about 92 thousand farmers, research, and organizational development projects. In addition, with the Korean Government policies such as keeping prices stable, lowering the farmers' production costs, and providing good credit facilities to farmers, the US aid and policies improved Korea's agriculture.

All this American aid and support is actually due to the local-specific practices of the New Village Movement in Korea. Aside from Park Chung Hee's goal of transforming the countryside, the key here is using American food aid to build industrial

¹¹ 4-H is a US-based network of youth organizations whose mission is "engaging youth to reach their fullest potential while advancing the field of youth development".

South Korea 4-H focuses on the values of agriculture, environment, and life. This movement cooperates with the public and private sector with leadership from the rural development organizations.

infrastructure and heavy industry. America's Food for Peace's Provincial Development Program in cooperation with US Operations Missions Korea (USOM) took into account the local conditions in Korea, the resources transferred through this program were realized by the local villagers themselves. Thus, self-help/agrarian self-reliance, one of the three principles of the New Village Movement, proves the success of this policy already initiated by the United States and continued by Park. Also, when the Food for Peace Program ended in 1972, Park continued the program by including it in its own policies (D. Chung, 2015, pp. 225–229).

As Rostow has suggested, the country should balance population and natural resources (in this case, land since South Korea was an agricultural country at that time) as wealthy nations did (Rostow, 1956a, p. 28) because in pre-take-off societies, population pressure is a disruptive element tightly interlinked with income distribution, land distribution, poverty, family planning, and fertility. With its limited resources, Korea could not deal with its human population growth. The increasing population, which put pressure on land resources, was also related to health conditions, family organization, and the standard of living. Being aware of this, America resorted to a population control mechanism to remove this obstacle on the development path.

The US wanted its aid to be consumed by something other than an uncontrolled increase in population or lost in the sea of human needs. So America advised many developing countries (like India, Pakistan, and Taiwan) on how to adopt slow population growth policies, which in the end, turned out to be an international campaign. Connelly rightly argues that it was "population control as a Cold War strategy the West foisted on the rest of the world." (Connelly, 2003, p. 123) Between 1960 and 1980, population stabilization policies were implemented (*Population Change and Development in Korea*, n.d.). As well as international institutions like the UN, philanthropic foundations like the Rockefeller and the Ford, and various other international organizations were actively involved in this policy-making process. Within that framework, Family Planning Program in Korea (FPP) was adopted in 1961, right after Park's coup. The government set the goals like controlling the birth rate by establishing a partnership with non-governmental organizations. For instance,

the International Planned Parenthood Federation organized Family Planning Mother's clubs, which were later integrated into the *Saemaul Undong* program (E. Cho, 2016, p. 805) Korea's Planned Parenthood Federation collaborated with USAID, the Population Council, the International Planned Parenthood Federation, and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities. Furthermore, Korea received considerable foreign aid from these agencies, specifically directed to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (I.-J. Whang, 1981, p. 26).

Thanks to maintaining stable fertility, parents devoted their time and efforts to extra domestic, productive activities rather than spending a lot of time and effort raising many children. In addition, since Koreans were so devoted to being 'developed', they sold their livestock to send their children to be educated, which ultimately led to the country's success as a developed nation. USAID continued to fund South Korean rural development and management through the Office of Rural Development, the Korean Institute of Science and Technology, a multidisciplinary research institute, and the South Korean (Steinberg, 1985, p. 87) counterpart to the US National Academy of Sciences; the Korean Development Institute, which promotes the continued economic advancement of South Korea; and the Korean Educational Development Institute. The Korean government also provided massive incentives for overseas Koreans trained in the US (Young, 2003, pp. 75–76). Korea gave importance to scientific advancement, education, modernizing institutions, establishing new ones, governmental research institutes, and joint research between universities and public organizations with the support of the US. During the Park regime, government-sponsored research institutes were restructured. For example, KAIS (Korea Advanced Institute of Science) and KIST (Korea Institute of Science and Technology) were integrated into KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology).

The effects of American developmental tools in Korea during the 1980s will be examined in the next section. In the last 10 years of the Cold War, the ground for development was established during the authoritarian Rhee and Park era, and now the democratization phase has come for Korea. American policy, which aimed at creating

conditions under which political and economic democracy could flourish, succeeded in Korea (J. K.-C. Oh, 1969b, p. 164).

4.4. After Park: 1979-90

After the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979, a series of movements began. Social movements in Korea started to accelerate during the Park regime, but the abrupt termination of Park's rule plunged the country into crisis. Choi Kyu-hah served under Park and Rhee and became South Korea's president (1979-1980). He faced robust popular demand for democratic governance and an unstable political and social environment. He took initiatives in political liberalization. However, widespread riots and revolts emerged. Against Choi's government, Major General Chun Doo-Hwan seized control of the Government through a coup d'état and became president in September 1980. During his two terms between 1980 and 1988, South Korean history was marked by democratization efforts. Consequently, democratization ceased to be a hindrance to development and instead became a necessary component of modernization (K. J. Kim, 2006, p. 118), as Rostow highlighted the importance of democratic and steady development for Korea (T. Park, 2012, pp. 320–328; Rostow, 1955a, pp. 6–7).

Under the regime of Chon Doo Hwan (1980-1988), frustration and anger towards his policies rose among students, workers, and later the white-collar middle class. As a result, a massacre was carried out by the armed forces of the South Korean government in May 1980 to suppress the actions of pro-democratic students in the city of Gwangju. The Gwangju uprising is the intense struggle of the people, especially the students, against the continuing rule of the dictatorship from May 18 to May 27, 1980. As a result of widespread protests, the constitutional amendment and free and open presidential elections were held on August 27, 1980. Gwangju left a painful mark on the South Korean journey to democracy. However, after this tragic events, public

opinion and civil society organizations would have a voice in policymaking since most political censorship and control over civil society was lifted.

Korea's democratization movements also suited well to the US interests that, include spreading free markets and democracy since they provide the most enduring way to protect the "Free world" (Bergsten & Sakong, 1995, p. 66). Even though America's recipe for development includes democracy and democratic values, democracy has never been the primary goal; the assumption that democracy will eventually be achieved with the tools in the development policy has already prevailed. What worried America was the instability in both political and economic spheres that could affect the security and alliance stability. Even the Gwangju events did not cause much concern for America because all elements of society in South Korea were pro-American. The US government condemned the oppressive regime of Chun yet reaffirmed its commitment to Korea's security (Heo & Roehrig, 2018b, p. 95). President Jimmy Carter stated, "we have maintained our alliance with Korea and helped assure Korea's security during a difficult period of political transition." (Office of the Federal Register, 1982, p. 2984) President Carter did not react negatively to the Gwangju massacre and quickly directed an aircraft carrier to Korean waters to prevent North Korea from taking advantage of the internal turmoil. A week after the massacre, the President of the US Ex-Im Bank went to the country and presented the US economic support guarantee with a loan of 800 million dollars approved by Carter (T. Park, 2012; Scalapino, 2006, p. 29). America's ambiguous attitude towards the massacre caused anti-Americanism to flourish in Korea in 1980 because of the tacit American approval of brutal suppression.

In addition to this explicit support of the US, the issues of whether Chun got help from America and the US approval on the Korean military's violent response (K. M. Hwang, 2017, p. 226; T. Park, 2012, p. 328) triggered anti-Americanism among the public, and public support for the American military and security assistance fell. In addition to the intensification of anti-Americanism, nationalistic policies were beginning to be adopted by the opposition groups. Democratic South Koreans become more nationalistic in their fight against authoritarianism. As they rose to power in the

government, they aimed to build a free-standing, equal relationship with the United States (D. S. Lee, 2007, p. 477). Anti-Americanism, however, did not represent an ideological opposition to the US, American culture, or capitalism. Instead, nationalist interests and consciousness became the main political drivers of anti-Americanism (G. W. Shin, 1996, pp. 798–800). This sentiment was not peculiar to any group; it was familiar to the general public, even though it first erupted among the students (Office of the Historian, n.d.-e; *Roh Tae Woo, President of the Republic of Korea, Addressed a Joint Meeting of Congress | US House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives*, 1989). The Gwangju Events, a historic moment representing the democratization movement in Korea, ignited anti-Americanism to question the US presence in Korea and the ties between the two countries (Jhee, 2008, p. 307). And then, towards the 90s, criticism against the 1967 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and US bases started to rise among the public and the students (K. H. S. Moon, 2003, pp. 134–135).

When Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981, relations became smoother. Reagan followed a "quiet diplomacy" while secretly pushing for democracy and liberalization, and the US tried to improve the security dimension of the alliance (Heo & Roehrig, 2018a, p. 101). However, the real change in American attitude occurred towards the end of the 1980s, when it changed its policy from quiet diplomacy to active persuasion. In Korea, demands for democratization were increasing from the Korean people, and the era of Chun, who came to power in a coup in 1987, was coming to an end. Furthermore, the Government placed importance on Korea's international image, such as the Olympic Games held in 1988 in Seoul, which indicated Korea's accomplished development. In addition, the Cold War was ending in the international environment, the threat of communism was decreasing, and the American anti-communist policies were being replaced by promoting democratization. In Asia, the critical role played by the United States in the democratization of the Philippines shaped the Korean policy of the US. Moreover, the Reagan administration was motivated to intensify its efforts in promoting democracy in foreign nations due to mounting pressure from the US media and the American public. The Reagan administration actively engaged in the promotion of democracy in South Korea during the year 1987 (Fowler, 1999, pp. 287–

288). When South Korea crossed the threshold of democracy in 1987, the US-Korean alliance became much more potent since the political foundation of the relations was established.

During the 1980s, what worried the US was also South Korea's faltering economy. The inflation rate skyrocketed, and the growth became much lower (*Overview of the Korean Economy in the 1980s and 1990s*, n.d.). The assassination of Park Chung Hee, the oil price crisis of 1979-80, slowing economic growth, the increasing foreign debt, a slowdown in exports, and the 1980 harvest failure shook Korean development, and the economy went into recession (Hart-Landsberg, 1993, p. 148). At the same time, at the global level, a macroeconomic imbalance appeared in many countries, including Türkiye and Korea. However, unlike Türkiye, Korea implemented immediate action plans and new development policies. In 1982, the five-year economic and social development plan (1982-86) was adopted, in which economic stabilization was the primary aim. By abandoning the HCI campaign, the macroeconomic balance was achieved, inflation was brought under control, and high growth with low inflation was achieved in 1983 (Michell, 1988, p. 14). The technology-intensive industries that helped to build high-technology products were prioritized. The aim was to compete in the world market. In the meantime, the US put pressure on Korea to liberalize its import market and economy. The US continued to support the export policies of Korea, just as it supported the import-substitution policy. Exports to the United States shifted from textiles to high-value products such as automobiles and integrated circuits in the 1980s, with its share of Korea's total exports reaching nearly 40% in 1986 (Stangarone, 2013).

The growth and development of Korea continued. The gross national product of Korea, which was 8 billion dollars in 1970, reached 21.2 billion in 1975, 62.2 billion in 1980, and 93.4 billion dollars in 1985 (*GDP (Current US\$) - Korea, Rep.*, 2021). The reason for this success, which started with the support of the US, is the strategic investments and the increase in the value of the yen by the Japanese Central Bank in 1985. Hereupon the signature of the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the fast-paced liberalization and market opening in Asia and the world, Korea under the Chun Administration

(1981-7), accelerated the liberalization measures (Fields, 2007a, p. 124). The initial appreciation of the yen against the dollar benefited Korea and other newly industrialized Asian countries because their exports to industrialized nations like the US grew more competitive than Japan's. In addition, the yen's appreciation made Korean products cheaper than Japanese products. Thus, in 1986, Korea's foreign trade balance gave a surplus for the first time, reaching 10 billion dollars in 1987 and 15 billion dollars in 1988 (Salmon, 2020, p. 41). Korea's terms of trade with the US improved, and the trade surplus began to rise. In 1987, US direct investment was over 1 billion USD, and Korea was the seventh largest trading partner of the US (*US and Asia Statistical Handbook*, 1988, pp. 39–40).

Trade became a severe friction point between the two countries, resulting in the emergence of South Korean economic anti-Americanism during the 1980s. Thanks to Park's trade policy reforms, such as export-oriented policy, and the HCI drive, Korea had an export surplus with the US for the first time in its history. Since the US had a pressure of a large trade deficit with Japan (United States Congress Senate Committee on Finance, 2006, p. 2), it reacted harshly to open Korean markets to US exports. The US request for trade reform with Korea ranged from agriculture to intellectual property rights. In 1989, the US strengthened its pressure on developing nations, including Korea, to revalue their currencies and end special tariff status. This pressure led to their trade surplus declining, and they began to relocate their production to neighboring countries to sustain their competitiveness (Chua, 1999, p. 20). In order to correct and eliminate the trade imbalance, Korea gave the status of “priority foreign country” yet the US these actions of the US were not received well. Public reaction against these US pressures was strong. Only shortly after the Gwangju massacre and the US attitude toward this incident doubled the public outrage. Even pro-American people became anti-American. The public backlash also increasingly focused on the tools America was using to open up Korean markets and its pressure on trade-related arrangements. Public perception associated the US with the international economic system. GATT, and later the WTO, seemed to be instruments under American control. This perception

was later reinforced during the 1997 Asian economic crisis (J. S. Robertson, 2002, p. 90).

Korea began to diversify export destinations and foreign policy destinations, making it less dependent on America (Seth, 2017). In 1974, the US and Japan took approximately 70% of Korea's exports, and by the 1980s, it had dropped to 44% because Korea entered into new markets like the European one (Y. W. Rhee, 1984, p. 14). She also established relations with China, the Soviet Union, and other communist countries within the framework of its Nordpolitik strategy during the Roh Tae Woo Administration. With the growing economy and democratization, South Korea's boldness and self-confidence increased. As a result, Korea started looking for its interests and gradually reduced its dependence on the United States.

Korea revised its growth strategy and switched from a state-led to a market-led approach. Korea began to liberalize its foreign trade, and the government left the job of choosing industrial branches that could be candidates for rapid growth to private entrepreneurs and reducing its impact on the financial sector (Sönmez, 2001, p. 14). It reduced government involvement in the economy and aimed to create the conditions for a second take-off to high and stable growth rates. As a matter of fact, this aim was actualized. The 1960s and 70s were characterized as industrial take-offs, the 1980s as industrial adjustment, and the 1990s were the years when they reached industrial maturity (J.-D. Park, 2019, p. 208). The acceleration of heavy industry in the 1970s and the liberalization process during the Chun administration continuously expanded the central position of the ten *chaebols* in Korean development (Kuk, 1988, p. 116).¹² The export growth in quantity and variety, which started with Park, accounted for approximately 32% of GNP by 1982 (*The Role of Foreign Aid in Development: South*

¹² Samsung, Hyundai, Lucky-Goldstar, Daewoo, Sunkyung, Ssangyong, Korea Explosives, Kukje, Hanjin, Hyosung.

Korea and the Philippines, 1997, p. 12). Their share of the country's total sales of manufactured goods increased from 34.1% in 1978 to 67% in 1984 (Chu, 2007, p. 189). Hyundai cars were exported for the first time and entered the world's biggest automobile market in 1983, i.e. the US. Later, it will become the world leader and enter the fields of cement, chemical, and even electronic goods and shipbuilding.

Thanks to the liberalization policies and international circumstances like a weak dollar, low oil prices, and interest rates (L. K. Woo, 2016, p. 21), Korea developed quickly. The HCI industries developed as the industrial sector's hub, and exports began to outpace those of the light industry. This was followed by incredible development in welfare and social development status. The average actual wage was 30% more than the average wage in Great Britain. Among all countries, South Korea came in at number 12 in terms of social development (Adelman, n.d., p. 9). US government development activities continued mainly through agencies like the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Ex-Im Bank, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). USTDA provided approximately \$6.6 million to Korea to help with economic and infrastructural development between 1983 and 2011. OPIC provided almost \$675 million to finance projects between 1974 and 2010 (Runde, 2012, p. 17).

Chun's economic policies and liberalizing measures coupled with the external factors during the 1980s. Three lows-low interest rates, a devalued won, and a return to lower oil prices brought economic prosperity that led to rising expectations and increased demands for democracy, social justice, and equal wealth distribution. As demonstrations and reactions from the public skyrocketed (Fields, 2007a, p. 125), the elections were decided to be held, and a new constitution was approved in 1987. Roh Tae Woo was elected president by popular vote and initiated a broad program of democratic reforms (S.-H. Lee, 1993, pp. 352–353).

Table 4. 9. Loans, Grants and Assistance from the US and International Organization Between 1946-1988

PROGRAM	(U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)										TOTAL LOANS AND GRANTS 1946-88	PRINCIPAL REPAY- MENTS 1946-88	OUT- STANDING LOAN BALANCES 1946-88	
	U.S. OVERSEAS		MUTUAL SECURITY		FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT			TOTAL	LOANS AND	PRINCIPAL				OUT-
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-48	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-52	SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-61	1962-84	1985	1986	1987	1988	PERIOD 1962-88	GRANTS 1946-88				REPAY- MENTS 1946-88
I. ECON. ASSIST. -TOTAL	181.2	485.6	2579.0	2857.2	-	-	-	-	2857.2	6068.7	470.0	1040.0		
LOANS	24.9	-	27.4	1427.2	-	-	-	-	1427.2	1509.6	470.0	1040.0		
GRANTS	156.3	485.6	2551.6	1430.0	-	-	-	-	1430.0	4559.1	-	-		
A. AID AND PREDECESSOR	-	10.0	2062.4	1080.1	-	-	-	-	1080.1	3042.2	143.0	339.0		
LOANS	-	-	25.3	501.9	-	-	-	-	501.9	481.3	143.0	339.0		
GRANTS	-	10.0	2037.1	578.2	-	-	-	-	578.2	2560.9	-	-		
(SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)	(-)	(-)	(1861.9)	(501.1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(501.1)	(2332.0)	-	-		
B. FOOD FOR PEACE	-	0.3	313.8	1738.0	-	-	-	-	1738.0	2128.2	299.0	696.0		
LOANS	-	-	2.1	916.8	-	-	-	-	916.8	994.9	299.0	696.0		
GRANTS	-	0.3	311.7	821.2	-	-	-	-	821.2	1133.3	-	-		
TITLE I - TOTAL	-	-	176.5	1359.5	-	-	-	-	1359.5	1612.1	299.0	696.0		
REPAY. IN \$-LOANS	-	-	-	903.6	-	-	-	-	903.6	985.7	290.0	696.0		
PAY. IN FOR. CURR.	-	-	176.5	455.9	-	-	-	-	455.9	626.4	9.0	-		
TITLE II - TOTAL	-	0.3	137.3	378.5	-	-	-	-	378.5	516.1	-	-		
E. RELIEF, EC. DEV. & WFP	-	-	22.1	314.8	-	-	-	-	314.8	336.9	-	-		
VOL. RELIEF AGENCY	-	0.3	115.2	63.7	-	-	-	-	63.7	179.2	-	-		
C. OTHER ECON. ASSIST.	181.2	475.3	202.8	39.1	-	-	-	-	39.1	898.3	28.0	5.0		
LOANS	24.9	-	-	8.5	-	-	-	-	8.5	33.4	28.0	5.0		
GRANTS	156.3	475.3	202.8	30.6	-	-	-	-	30.6	864.9	-	-		
PEACE CORPS	-	-	-	30.6	-	-	-	-	30.6	30.5	-	-		
NARCOTICS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
OTHER	156.3	475.3	202.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	834.4	-	-		
II. MIL. ASSIST. -TOTAL	-	12.5	1785.1	6600.5	231.9	164.5	2.0	1.7	7000.7	8791.4	1956.0	393.0		
LOANS	-	-	-	1955.9	230.0	162.7	-	-	2348.6	2348.6	1956.0	393.0		
GRANTS	-	12.5	1785.1	4644.6	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.7	4652.1	6442.8	-	-		
A. MAP GRANTS	-	10.2	1555.1	3298.6	-	-	-	-	3298.6	5130.1	-	-		
B. CREDIT FINANCING	-	-	-	1955.9	230.0	162.7	-	-	2348.6	2348.6	1956.0	393.0		
C. INTL. MIL. ED. TRNG.	-	1.7	57.8	103.9	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.7	111.4	170.5	-	-		
D. TRAN-EXCESS STOCK	-	0.6	128.9	810.7	-	-	-	-	810.7	667.5	-	-		
E. OTHER GRANTS	-	-	43.3	431.4	-	-	-	-	431.4	474.7	-	-		
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL.	181.2	498.1	4364.1	9457.7	231.9	164.5	2.0	1.7	9857.9	14860.1	2426.0	1433.0		
LOANS	24.9	-	27.4	3383.1	230.0	162.7	-	-	3775.8	3858.2	2426.0	1433.0		
GRANTS	156.3	498.1	4336.7	6074.6	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.7	6082.1	11001.9	-	-		
OTHER US LOANS	-	-	-	3742.9	36.6	-	-	-	3779.4	4105.1	3189.0	916.0		
EX-IM BANK LOANS	-	-	-	2770.3	35.8	-	-	-	2806.0	2838.3	1922.0	916.0		
ALL OTHER	-	-	-	972.6	0.8	-	-	-	973.4	1266.8	1267.0	-		

* LESS THAN \$50,000. @ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION
 ** VALUES IN THESE COLUMNS ARE NET OF DEOBLIGATIONS. SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS

Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1988 CONG-R-0105. (1988), p. 78.

Table 4. 10. US Aid to Korea (unit: million US dollars)

		1945-60	1961-75	1976-90	1991-99	TOTAL
US Aid	Grant	2464.7	1524.0	16.0	0.2	4004.9 (72.3)
	Loan	52.3	982.1	496.0	7.0	1537.4 (27.7)
	Total	2517.0	2506.1	512.0	7.2	5542.3 (100.0)

Table 4.10. (cont'd)

Source: Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), Development Assistance and Cooperation, 75; Jiyoung Kim, J. (2015). Aid and State Transition in Ghana and South Korea, *Third World Quarterly* 36(7), p. 1343.

Table 4. 11. Assistance from International Organization (unit: million US dollars-US Fiscal Years)

Korea, Republic of (Millions of Dollars- US Fiscal Years)

	1953-61	1962-80	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Total
Total	2.1	4,333.7	977.5	699.8	813.8	258.2	373.2	9,540.9
IBRD		2,971.5	768.5	556.0	626.0	200.0	196.0	6,847.3
IFC		119.1	34.6	7.2	18.7	2.5	43.2	235.7
IDA		107.0	-	-	-	-	-	106.9
ADB		1,094.8	172.8	134.0	167.0	53.0	133.2	2,291.5
UNDP	1.8	29.0	1.6	2.6	1.0	2.7	-	42.3
Other UN	0.3	12.3	-	-	1.1	-	0.8	17.2

Source: *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1988 CONG-R-0105*. (1988), p.215

As seen in the tables above, even though the US aid in every form was reduced dramatically since the mid-1970s, Korea still received much bilateral aid from the US and the multilateral institutions in the mid-1980s. While economic aid drastically decreased, military aid continues, albeit declining. Since Korea has come a long way from its development, it has been stated that the USAID Mission is not needed for Korea, and the Mission's activities were restricted in 1980 (United States Government Memorandum, 1980, pp. 1–2). However, the US continued to provide aid in emergencies; for instance, in 1984, because of a flood, the US gave assistance amounting to 25,000 US dollars to the Korean National Red Cross (Office of US

Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1984, p. 61). That is why particularly, between 1980 and 1990, there was no impact of both loan and grant aid in economic and human capital development (Yoon, 2014, p. 35). Nevertheless, Korea asked the aid from Japan due to the difficulties she faced in the early 1980s played an important role. As a result, Japan provided a 6-billion-dollar development assistance loan and 4.1 billion dollars in public and commercial loans between 1965 and 1982 to Korea (Casse, 1985, p. 65). Between 1976 and 1990, Japan became one of the prominent donors of development aid to Korea after the United States and Japanese aid constituted 58% of total aid to Korea (L. K. Woo, 2015, p. 22). The two significant donors -The US and Japan- aid to Korea began to decrease sharply in the mid-1980s, and in 1981, Japan issued the last significant aid Korea received (Marx & Soares, 2013).

On the one hand, the US enjoyed a dominant position as a trade partner of South Korea till the 1990s. On the other hand, the transition to export-oriented industrialization was eased by the US. In this transition, the US played an active role, and the IMF did not involve Korea through structural adjustment programs, unlike in Türkiye. The US and Japan remained by far Korea's largest trading partners; other Asian countries also became important trade partners of Korea towards the end of the 1980s (*Review of Agricultural Policies in Korea*, 1999, p. 25) that's why America was no more extended Korea's most important trading partner. One of the reasons why America gave importance to Korea's trade was Korea's rapprochement with Russia, China, and the ASEAN countries eager to make investments and transfer technology (K. J. Kim, 2006, p. 121). Korea continued to diversify its trade partners. This situation became more prominent with the end of the Cold War and the decrease of the east-west confrontation. As a result, Korea's exports increased, and Korean companies made such a breakthrough that they cut Japan's market share, especially in the United States (Hart-Landsberg, 1993, p. 154). For instance, the number of cars sold by Hyundai in the United States was 168,882 in 1986 and 264,282 in 1988 (Hansen, 1991, p. 22). The open US market contributed a lot to an export-led industrialization policy of Korea, especially following the oil crisis in 1979. By granting Korea's most favored nation access to its vast domestic markets and providing access to capital and technologies

(Young, 1995, pp. 45–49, 46), the US became the top destination for Korean exports alongside Japan and China (*Review of Agricultural Policies in Korea*, 1999, pp. 23–25). the US share of South Korean exports rose steadily from 26 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 1986 (Hart-Landsberg, 1993, pp. 158–159). In just a few years, Korea got a comparative advantage in the automobile sector associated with steel and machinery sectors in the US and world market (Gilpin, 1987, p. 205).

As Korea developed from a US client state to an industrialized middle power and trading partner of the US by the end of the 1980s, it was no longer granted the same privilege of access to US markets. As a result, the trade measures and pressures of the US increased, and economic relations between the two were affected by the growing trade frictions (K. J. Kim, 2006, p. 122). In the 1980s, the US put pressure on Korea regarding the bilateral trade balance, which was one of the key factors which pushed Korea towards liberalization of her economy (K. K. Hwang, 1994, pp. 37–38). Furthermore, *chaebols* became "too big to fail," and Rostow's ideas were still circulating during the 1980s when he visited Korea and made the presentation to the community of the owners of the conglomerates and large companies. Finally, Rostow recalled the Korean bureaucrats whom he called as "take-off boys" (T.-G. Park, 2001, p. 65).

As Korea continued to proliferate in heavy industries, the concept of rural development was given priority by Korea during the 1980s and 90s. Successful land reform and rural development projects laid the foundation for Korea's rapid growth with equity. As a result, in 1985, the wealthiest 10% of households in Korea received 27,5% of the nation's income, which is virtually on line with the United States, whereas those same 10% households in Brazil and Mexico received 50.6% and 40.6% respectively (G. W. Shin, 1998, p. 1313; *World Development Report 1990*, 1990, p. 178). "The comprehensive plan for rural area development" was adopted in 1989 to improve rural living standards, infrastructure, and services, off-farm employment. In the 1990s, the state-subsidized and gave more institutional support to rural development projects. With the Special Act for Rural Development in 1990 and the new rural village construction Project in 1996, rural development was promoted and supported by every

means (S. H. Park, n.d., pp. 20–27). The *Saemaul Undong* was still in operation and reformulated many times till the 1990s. During that period, the movement was reborn as a private sector organization and recentered on the social atmosphere, economic development, environmental awareness, and enhancing government and private sector relations (Douglass, 2013, p. 16). Korean approach towards agriculture and rural areas became a model for many countries. China and many other countries emulated the "new countryside" built by Korea (Wan, 2008, p. 24).

Rhee was widely viewed as a corrupt, ineffective dictator by Korean scholars. Yet that rhetoric changed after the end of the Cold War, Korea's democratization, and the next major development spurt. Even though his period has been remembered with the taint of corruption till the late 1980s, Rhee is positively appraised for ensuring that the seeds of capitalism in Korea sprouted by establishing intimate relations with the US at the end of the Cold War (Macrae, 2016, p. 338). The modernization theory and developmental state theory, which emphasized the positive aspects of the colonial period and the Park Chung Hee period, gained considerable popularity during this period. Although not as popular as in the early Cold War era, they enabled different perspectives and debates to emerge. Furthermore, the land reform was also seen as the success of South Korean capitalism, as the discourse that developed itself, which gave importance to the nation's efforts, gained strength (S. G. Cho & Park, 2013, p. 3). Clearly, political economic conditions have affected how particular periods are evaluated: Seeing the world through specific periods' lens. Fukuyama expressed that the global victory of capitalism, led by the US and marked the end of history, was probably the most important factor.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the détente of the 1970s came to an end, the tension between the US and the Soviet Union became more dramatic. Following Park's assassination, the turmoil in Korea made the US-Korean military alliance much stronger. When Chun visited President Reagan in 1981, the United States had no plans to withdraw its troops from Korea. President Reagan indicated that the US had no intention to withdraw US ground combat forces from the Peninsula since the US aimed to maintain its power in the Pacific. That is why the US

expanded its military assistance to Korea by providing more weapons and modernizing the forces (V. D. Cha, 1999, p. 172; P. Hayes, 1991, p. 89). Later, the Korean Peninsula's crisis flared again with the Soviets shooting down a Korean Airplane in 1983, in 1983, North Korea tried unsuccessfully to murder President Chun in Myanmar. To address the communist bloc's resurgence as a threat in 1985, a thorough debate of military cooperation between the two nations took place at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) (Committee on Appropriations, 1985, p. 244). For all reasons listed, US forces have increased gradually since 1984, as seen in the table below. Although the number of US forces in Korea varied between 1980 and 1989, a substantial amount remained.

Table 4. 12. The Number of US Forces in Korea

Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
USFK	39000	38000	39000	39000	41000	42000	43000	45000	46000	44000

Source: Kim, H-W. (2008, May). *Critical Junctures and Alliance Cohesion: The Post-Cold War US-South Korea and US-Japan Alliances*, PhD dissertation, The Department of Political Science at Brown University, p. 92

Especially since the establishment of North Korea's nuclear research reactor with Soviet technology in the 1960s, the threat perception of both countries was identical. During the late 1980s, since Korea was still vulnerable without the US support against North Korea and the potential danger of war with North Korea that would cause China and the Soviet Union to support and involvement, Korea needed US support to deter these threats. On the US side, the same threat perception towards Korea is still vivid even though Korea is increasingly strengthening her forces. Moreover, Korea transformed its stable deterrence defense policy into armed deterrence since the US started reducing the number of American forces by the late 1990s and demanded to

reduce the equal share of costs of American forces located in Korea (Olsen, 1992, p. 140), as the US Cabinet report put it: “The timeframe for the withdrawal of the US ground forces and our plans for a self-reliant national defense have coincided, as anticipated.” (Suhrke & Morrison, 1977, p. 371)

However, American policymakers were divided. Some argued that Korea was responsible for its security and that the US should cut off military aid, while others argued that America's disengagement could be dangerous. In any case, the North Korean threat was real, and the US asked to increase Korea's contribution to defense costs to cope with North Korea. For the US, maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula was essential to its national security interests, and still, North Korea posed a formidable threat (US Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1980, p. 261). Thereupon, the 2nd Force Improvement Plan (1982-6) was signed between Korea and the US. The US put pressure on Korea to increase the percentage of its GNP devoted to defense to almost 6 percent (Y.-B. Lee & Patterson, 1998, p. 94) and give importance to the purchase of artillery, armor, and anti-tank weaponry. Since then, Korea has developed into a robust economy, generating a \$6.26 billion trade surplus with the United States in 1987 thanks to a sharp increase in "per capita GNP from \$125 in 1966 to \$2,850 in 1987 (Merritt, 1989, p. 172). That is why, while the United States stated that South Korea should allocate approximately 6% of its GNP for military expenditures, it also reduced its grant aid to Korea and demanded that both countries share defense expenditures and the expenditures of the USFK (Y. Cha, 1986, p. 142). Thus, Korea started to increase its defense expenditure in the 1980s. For instance, in 1984, in terms of the ratio of defense expenditure to GNP, the top five countries were North Korea, the US, the UK, South Korea, and Türkiye respectively (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986, pp. 212–215).

In 1974, America asked Korea to assist the Allies logistically, paying for the upkeep and storage of war reserve stocks (WRSA) as well as funding the completion of Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP). After 1976, South Korea assumed the burden of construction costs and covered the operating costs of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group-Korea (JUSMAG-K). In July 1982, the Foreign

Military Aid Bill was passed by the Senate that included the Korean aid package, and a month later, it was approved to aid Korea with up to US\$800 million for its defense equipment and services (Ok, 1989, p. 197). However, military aid to Korea under the Mutual Security Act (MSA) and the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) became unavailable by the end of 1989 (P. H. Kim, 2017, p. 44). South Korea also started contributing to the ROK-US Combined Forces Command's (CFC) operational costs in 1983 (J.-Y. Chung, 2003, p. 38; H.-W. Kim, 2008, p. 103). Korea's dependence on military and economic aid from the United States changed in the 1980s, turning into a military cost-sharing relationship, primarily as envisioned by the CDIP, which began in 1974. This change later made it possible to share regional defense expenditures and roles at the end of the Cold War. Regional security role-sharing was enabled by taking the considerable military and defense burden on America and Japan.

American ground troop withdrawal in 1981 under President Carter's Administration ended. During the Carter Administration, political turmoil worried the US, and the State Department stated that deterioration in civil and political rights and stability overall threatened the security posture of South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea (Y.-B. Lee & Patterson, 1998, p. 94). However, with the election of Reagan, the US started to emphasize the improvement in Korea-America relations and the strong security ties. As a result, the issues of withdrawing American troops and the human rights practices prioritized during President Carter were less emphasized in the Reagan Administration (Y.-B. Lee & Patterson, 1998, p. 95).

The US-Korea relations are one of the least affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, the continuation of cooperation in the security military field after the Cold War revolved around the North Korean threat and nuclear weapon program. Therefore, the US commitment to the security of South Korea was emphasized by, for example, Clinton in the following years is crucial (K. W. Kim, 1995, p. 62). Towards the end of the Cold War, Korea began to transfer its development experience to developing countries by providing aid and technical cooperation (Chun et al., 2010, p. 790). Korea made a more concerted attempt to extend and broaden its aid initiatives in the late 1980s, which led to the founding of the Korea International Cooperation

Agency (KOICA) in 1991 and the Korea Eximbank's Economic Development and Cooperation Fund (EDCF) in 1987 (OECD, 2008, p. 9).

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the US development package in South Korea between 1945 and 1990. Korea, which collapsed with WWII and the Korean War, was heavily dependent on America's military and economic aid for a short time. However, with land and education reforms backed by the US, the country became the most extensive modernization program in the world (Mason, 1980, pp. 181–182). The twin events/transitions, land reform, and democratization marked Korean developmental history.

The US support surrounding the implementation of land reforms and the establishment of state institutions was profound. Rhee implemented land reform, invested in education, realized a currency reform, gave importance to import substitution policy and investments, and procured US aid for all these initiatives. In the transition period when US policies were in the formulation phase vis-à-vis Korea, the South Korean economic structuring was mainly targeted by the US; however, with the start of the Korean War, which was a significant turning point, US aid was linked to purposes related to a close monitoring of foreign exchange, sound fiscal and monetary policies, and the privatization of Japanese properties. The legacy of the politics of development during the Syngman Rhee regime is so strong that it can be claimed that reforms in South Korea implemented during this period reflected US policy preferences.

In the capitalist development of South Korea, the Rhee period is significant, especially in one respect: the application of land reform is conducive to many policies and orientations such as capitalist class formation, consolidation of the state itself and the state formation process. The alignment with America, the leader of the capitalist world and capitalism, provided Korea with tremendous opportunities like stability for economic development, as well as US-promoted land and education reforms. The US

also played a very constructive role in South Korea's membership in international organizations or multilateral platforms. In 1955, South Korea became a member of the IMF and the World Bank; the US was the principal sponsor of South Korea as an applicant for membership to those entities. In addition, the US became the leader of the regional security architecture and provided security assurances to its allies, mainly Japan and South Korea.

For the US, South Korea was one of the most significant entry points to win friends and influence policies in the developing world in the late post-war decade. Moreover, considering the whole region surrounding Korea, Northeast Asia, and Asia, the US promoted cooperation between Korea and Japan under the US aegis. However, as this dissertation claims, the security objective and concern of the US overrode and directed the others of the development package. Even though the seeds were sowed in the colonial period, the *chaebols* formed during the Rhee period are also significant. The seeds of chaebols, one of the essential factors in the development of Korea, were also planted thanks to the land reform. Due to the land reform implementation, Koreans who went to Vietnam established small companies there and expanded them when they returned. *Chaebols'* preeminent role in the economy continues today, and they are still well positioned for today's reality, just as they were in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. In the 1960s, Korea's take-off, which Park Chung Hee often emphasizes, was, in fact, thanks to these policies.

During the Park administration, Korea benefited from the Cold War system by utilizing a specific form of state intervention (the developmental state). Until 1979—the last year of the Park regime—it would not be wrong to say that America acted first with regard to South Korea with a security motive and, in this sense, aimed at country development. The US—actively involved in the development planning process of many developing world countries like India—behaved similarly to Korea: economic reforms, planning, and population control were part of top-down modernization projects. Another policy priority of the US, regional economic integration, was also achieved. The normalization between Japan and Korea during the Park Administration increased trade relations. Market openings supported Korean development since the

Korean government had already prioritized economic development and investment. Despite mutual agreement on many issues, historical events like the Nixon Doctrine—which shows us how domestic policy is nested within the larger context of international political and economic concerns—Korea continued to be developed with the legacy inherited from the US' development practices in different areas.

Korea's and the United States' security interests converged, and US security interests oriented economic and political development. Economic policies, institutional arrangements, planning, population control, and educational and rural reforms were made in accordance with the US prescription. Korea was heavily dependent on the US aid that helped Korean development. Indeed, the constituents of the US development package played a prominent role; however, they do not account for Korea's development alone. The policies adopted by Korea overlapped with American ones. From the 1970s on, by reducing Korean dependence on US aid, international and development agencies were involved in South Korean policymaking and directed their efforts, particularly to the rural areas of the developing world. The total package made Korea an economic powerhouse.

As well as the US development package tools, the domestic variables such as an active private sector, efficient bureaucracy, and committed political leadership to development made Korea a miracle. By the 1970s, Korea laid the foundations of its economic development and started to wean itself from US aid. In the 1980s, the United States changed the aid-giving process, and simultaneously, Korea made a breakthrough in development. Economic and social development paved the way for democratized development. Later, making the switch from a dictatorship to a democracy improved South Korea's development in 1987. Both economic and democratic development has also helped transform Korea into a regional force with some clout that can affect US policies in Northeast Asia.

Since the end of World War II, the US has become increasingly dependent on economic tools to further its foreign policy objectives. Between 1945 and 1979, the US used sanctions, economic pressures, the promotion of free trade, and open markets to exert

its influence. Both sides have taken advantage of the heavy involvement of the US, and every policy initiative presents a trade-off. The American development package was used for South Korea's developmental aims thanks to pressure from the US, strong executive power, and bureaucratic reforms. Between 1945 and 1979, the US played a critical role in the Korean political economy and consistently intervened in policymaking processes to support state-led capitalism. Thus, the contribution of this chapter is to show that the US development package was far more systematic, coherent and purposive than previous studies have acknowledged.

CHAPTER 5

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE

5.1. An Introductory Glance at Türkiye

This chapter delves into the implementation of the four pillars of the US development package in a broader understanding of the political economy of development in Türkiye between 1945 and 1990. To determine the strategic factors associated with the development of a country, it is necessary first to ascertain at what stage the economic, social, and political factors are found. This chapter aims to reveal how Türkiye's development has been affected by both internal and external contingencies, how theoretical discussions in the development literature mentioned in previous chapters converge on the US development package on Türkiye following the end of WWII, and how the developments that are exogenous to the Turkish political economy affect its developmental path and links the previous discussions with the political economy of Turkish development.

To discuss a country's development, the political powers of the specific periods and the perspectives and policies of the power foci affecting them should be examined. For this reason, we will examine how the US shapes the Turkish development path, the role of American engagement in the domestic agenda, the interplay of national and international events, and the evolution of US-Turkish relations following the end of WWII. Since the countries' trajectories differ frequently, the role of US involvement in each stage was somewhat different. Thus, following the conceptual framework of this study, the similarities and differences between these cycles in Türkiye and South Korea will be discussed.

The Cold War restructured, reshaped, and reconfigured US attitudes toward developing countries, especially those that were under the threat of Communism. As has been repeated throughout this thesis, the Cold War conjuncture and the Soviet threat were the determining factors in the US foreign policy; the geopolitical factors have always been there, especially for Türkiye, considering its geopolitical proximity to the Middle East and Mediterranean region. However, the US development package does not only refer to strategies like containing the Soviet threat, projecting US military and economic might, and serving US interests. Instead, it is also a commodity that leaders have coveted as a means of stabilizing their own rule, pursuing national development and security plans, avoiding restriction of their future options and angering their public (Zimmermann, 2017, p. 2). Thus, the argument here is that the US development package affects the policy choices of leaders and the broader domestic and political milieu from which they emerge; it also affects state institutions, development trajectories, policymakers, and academics' preferences that have a massive role in how to utilize the tools of the American development package. Besides the increasing economic, military, and political engagement with the US, ideology, ideas, cultural interactions, and propaganda significantly impact foreign and domestic policies (Lumsdaine, 1993, pp. 2-3).

Many studies have dealt with US aid and US-Turkish relations. However, the operation of the US development package, how the four elements (economic aid, military assistance, trade policies and land reform) interact with each other, and how they work in Türkiye have been neglected or superficially examined. Comparing the bilateral relations between Korea and the US and Türkiye and the US would offer important clues as to if/how prosperity and development travel from the advanced West to other nations. Given the extensive engagement of Korea and Türkiye with the US, this study aims to compare bilateral relations between Türkiye-US and Korea-US and the level of involvement of the United States in the development of the two countries during the Cold War. US-Korean engagement is very different from that of the US-Türkiye partnership. The question is how, why, and in what ways these engagements are different.

5.2. Türkiye in the Post-WWII Era and Development Strategies Between 1945-1960

A proper understanding of Türkiye's political economy and its connection to the United States can be found within the context of the changing external and domestic constraints since the Ottoman Period. It would be appropriate to call the 20th century the period of independence from the old colonies as in Korea. Although Türkiye did not experience colonialism, Mears summed up the Empire's situation by saying, "There is no independent state in which the influence of foreign capital is more widespread than the Ottoman Empire." (Mears, 1924, p. 401) Parallel to Mears' rightful claim, the Ottoman Empire has even been described as "a semi-colonized society" (Boratav, 2011, p. 19) due to the foreign debt and gradually worsening and widespread capitulations granted to other countries. Türkiye was not subjected to direct colonialism like Korea. However, the foreign capital and debt were a heavy burden on the Empire's shoulders and put it under the control of imperialism, mainly in the military, economic, and political realms.

Foreign-source dependency for the Ottomans began with the Trade Agreement of 1838 (the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of Baltalimanı). The 1838 Agreement signed between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain abolished state-imposed trade monopolies. In addition, it provided for the liberalization of customs duties so that Ottoman trade was liberalized via the *laissez-faire* policy. This agreement was a milestone because the Ottoman domestic markets opened to British merchants; then, similar agreements were signed with other countries (Somel, 2003, p. 302). Whereas Britain reached its goals, such as tempering Russian influence in the Empire and gaining advantages in the Ottoman market by this treaty, the Ottoman Empire shaped its economic and political policies with the *Tanzimat* (1839) and *Islahat* (1856) reforms that projected to resolve the Empire's problems by adopting Western policies, norms and freedoms. Relations with the US began via trade in the late 18th century. Eventually, embassies and consulates were established in both countries as relations further developed in different areas, particularly in trade, and lasted until 1917. Following the end of the American Revolution (1783) and recognized as an independent nation, the US continued its trade

with the Ottoman Empire. In 1820, the first American missionaries arrived in the Empire; in May 1830, the Ottoman-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed, and bilateral trade volume exceeded 1 million dollars for the first time. In 1845, the Ottoman Empire sent its first consul to Boston (*Chronology of Turkish-American Relations*, n.d.). Economic and technical assistance strengthened these relations and continued with trade and commercial endeavors and missionary activities. For example, the US provided technical aid to the Ottoman navy for ship construction (Quadri, 2014, p. 183). Furthermore, the two states helped each other after the natural disasters they both suffered. After a flood in 1889 and the fire disaster in Johnstown in 1894, the Ottoman State sent aid to the US. Again, in 1894, after the earthquake in Istanbul, the US provided the Ottomans with aid (Ürekli, 2007). In addition, regarding the socio-cultural aspect, American missionaries continued to arrive in the Ottoman Empire during this period. Robert College was established in Istanbul in 1868, followed by the mushrooming of American missionary schools there. All these instances show that American interests in the Empire were first commercial and economic, then became missionary-educational philanthropic enterprises and finally politico-strategic (Howard, 1996, p. 292).

Since the *Tanzimat*, when the idea of Western supremacy began to invade Ottoman thought, most streams of political thought in Türkiye have defined their positions in terms of the West. However, it is an imaginary West, a representation of the West by the East, rather than an objective Western reality. The East constructs its own identity through the West (Gole, 1996, pp. 57–58). The transition from the Empire to the Republic was quite painful. With the foundation of the Republic on October 29, 1923, based on a Western-style nation-building process embracing positivism, scientism, and progress, the new Republic aimed to construct the nation by leaving behind its Ottoman heritage except for one thing: Westernization that was equated with the modernization and development carried out since Ahmet III's period (1703-1730). Modernization reforms began in the military and reached their pinnacle during the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) that, introducing the social grounds of liberalism (Çavdar, 1992, pp. 8–10) and permeated the socio-cultural structure. Turkish elites perceived

the West as the source of enlightenment and modernization that were the guiding principles for a future Turkish state (Fuller, 1999, p. 161). Rostow states that with the political reforms initiated in the Ottoman army at the end of the 18th century in order to reach the military capacity of the West, Türkiye had actually started to pass into the take-off phase (Rostow, 2017, p. 29). Development with Westernization, Western culture, and civilization have always been Türkiye's grand project. As an inheritor of the modernizing initiatives of the Tanzimat Era and the legacy of Kemalist reforms, Türkiye became an excellent laboratory experiment for modernization theory and a role model for Muslim-majority nations in the Middle East and Africa (Citino, 2008, p. 592). Walt Rostow, Dankwart Rustow, Daniel Lerner, Bernard Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington, and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt explored Turkish modernization and its influences.

The modernization process of Türkiye started in the 19th century, the reforms and regulations were focused on centralization and expansion of state capacity through top-down reforms, and state elites began to emulate European institutions (Gumuscu, 2023, p. 26). In this period, Middle Eastern countries, particularly Türkiye and Egypt, were aware that the balance of power had shifted to the West in the international arena. Therefore, to catch up and align themselves with the West, they adopted top-down policies to prevent their country's disintegration, expand their own authority, eliminate the vulnerability of their states to threats from within and outside, and finally manage their own people and resources. James Gelvin called this process “defensive developmentalism” (Gelvin, 2020, pp. 71–72) which encapsulates military reform, building a modern army, regulating tax collection, getting the support of farmers, promoting education, training new administrators, adopting new laws and implementing centralized economic planning (Gelvin, 2020, p. 72).

From 1923, the orientation towards the West became even more radical. Several reforms were adopted with a top-down approach; the newborn Republic joined international and regional organizations led by Western countries. Kemalist reforms and cadres adopted modernization as a political program. Given that the concept of development was only limited to economic aspects, this makes Atatürk's vision

revolutionary. The statement "National sovereignty should be supported by financial independence and economic development" (Akalin, 2008, p. 23) indicates that economic development is only one phase in the total formation of states and nations. Thus, political, social, religious, cultural, legal, and economic policy reforms were undertaken to establish a modern nation-state. Development considerations assumed a more significant role in Turkish internal and international strategy since Türkiye allied itself with the Western Bloc (Benli Altunışık & Tür Kavli, 2004, p. xv). With a historical legacy of modernizing reforms, the belief that Westernization is a prerequisite for development has ensured that the Turkish political economy will work towards being Western. Türkiye, from the period in which the modern Republic was founded till this day, has conducted its foreign policy on certain principles, one of which was the ideal of being a Westerner.

Dankwart Rustow, is known for his close cooperation with the institutions involved in the American policy-making process (such as The Committee on Comparative Politics (CCP) of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)), the spread of modernization theory and development policies to other parts of the world during the Cold War period and in particular Türkiye's position within modernization theory and development policy-making process. Like Rostow, he examines the transition between Turkish-Ottoman modernization, stating that the modernization process in Türkiye actually started in the military field first. Rustow further claimed that the universality of modernization theory offers a development path pointing to the highest stage of the social sciences; therefore, the role assigned to Türkiye had been to act as a laboratory for modernization theory (Adalet, 2014, p. 43; Ward & Rustow, 1964, pp. 435–436). Bernard Lewis also analyzed in detail Turkish modernization and deliberate attempts at Westernization. He attributes the beginning of Turkish modernization to the *Tanzimat* Era. Even in his cult book, In the first chapter, titled Stages of Emergence, he examines the early stages of Turkish modernization from the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the death of Atatürk (B. Lewis, 2002).

In the monograph "The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East" by Daniel Lerner, an influential representative of the "modernization theory" in American social sciences, Lerner reemphasized the basic premises of modernization theory: the post-war international system imposes the dichotomy of East-West: developing-developed, rural-urban, and industrial-agricultural, and it establishes links between development and Westernization. In a section titled *Turkey: From the Past*, Lerner claimed that Türkiye's political and social transformation in the early Republican period was in harmony with the understanding of modernization. Türkiye's obsession with Westernization and modernization can be explained by quoting Lerner: "What the West is ... the Middle East seeks to become" (Lerner, 1959, p. 92). Atatürk's reforms to modernize the country, such as the language and education reforms, were seen as significant steps toward modernization. (Lerner, 1958a, pp. 111–112) This is an argument that confirms Rostow's claim: Türkiye entered the take-off stage in 1937 (Rostow, 2017, p. 38), considering that Atatürk implemented revolutions between 1924 and 1938, which were of vital importance for the salvation and survival of Turkish people and aimed to ensure the Turkish nation attains the level of contemporary civilization and Westernization.

Lerner's analysis and results of fieldwork conducted in Türkiye by the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research, urbanization, mass media, increased literacy and political participation are the variables that measure the delineation of a universal, teleological trajectory of modernization. However, he stated that although Türkiye was not a modern country yet, it was far from being a traditional country in many respects, with the transformations it had undergone for a long time. Rather than a black-and-white approach, as we saw in Lerner, Ward, and Rustow's famous *Political Modernization in Japan and Türkiye* published in 1964, which compares 19th and 20th-century Türkiye and Japan, examines which areas both countries in the process of modernization have succeeded and failed in. This study also showcases the modernization theory approach and development is considered as the industrialization of the economy and secularization of ideas (Ward & Rustow, 1964, p. 3), which is the same understanding as the point of view of the Turkish authorities at that time. While

Türkiye had gained momentum in political participation before, it lagged far behind Japan on the issues of political institutionalization and legal Westernization. On the other hand, Türkiye showed a modest change in the economic and technological development process, and Japan has made a giant leap forward (Ward & Rustow, 1964, pp. 434–469).

During the interwar years, the new Turkish Republic faced enormous problems, and a national industrialization experiment with a closed economy, protectionism, and statist policies was pursued. WWII brought significant changes to Türkiye, as well as to the whole world. Türkiye had friendly relations with the Soviet Union until WWII. The Soviet Union, which signed the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Türkiye in 1925, declared that it would not renew the existing agreement and requested a new one. Türkiye rejected this because of the Soviet demand to ensure the security of the Straits, which led to Turkish-American rapprochement. The US secured Türkiye within the anti-Communist periphery at the end of the war. The growing international pressure towards liberal reforms and the emergence of the US as the dominant world power (Pamuk, 2008, p. 281) pushed countries to make a choice about which camp they would belong to. Having placed itself in the Western camp and line with its Westernization/modernization project, Türkiye was ready to take the necessary steps to become part of the liberal world (Örnek & Üngör, 2014, p. 3). As Çağlar Keyder defines it succinctly and clearly, Türkiye “took a very clear anti-communist stance and appropriated Americanism as a shallow and mimetic modernization model without any critique” (Keyder, 1993, p. 123).

The US prioritized supporting the free world to maintain the order of American imperium, economically and militarily. This concern and policy priority overlapped with the rising importance of economic considerations within Turkish foreign policy. Ensuring its security, independence, economic development, and military modernization were the main reasons behind Türkiye's pro-Western alignment. As the 1951 CIA Report indicated, Türkiye was directed by its security-related concerns, and its foreign relations developed in this direction. Moreover, the report stated that Turks strongly believed that America would lead the free world to victory (*Contribution to*

NIE-9: Turkey, 1951, p. 1). On the one hand, Türkiye was important since it is located in the Northern Tier, which could be used as a buffer zone against the mounting Soviet threat regarding US containment policy (Beling, 1973, p. 189). On the other, Türkiye's goals were met by receiving US aid in various forms: being under the security umbrella, serving its Westernization aim, and blocking the left wing in domestic affairs. Moreover, the extension of US military and economic aid reinforced Türkiye's anti-Communist stance (*Contribution to NIE-9: Turkey*, 1951, p. 4). The intensification of anti-Communist policies and friendship with the US and US-backed international institutions marked the period from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1950s. Since then, Türkiye has been a capitalist country where anti-Communist and anti-Soviet approaches dominate the public discourse.

The assistance the US gave peripheral countries for their respective economic development became determinant. Of equal importance was that the US post-war toolbox created military, political, social, and cultural outcomes in both the short and long term. In this period, the focus of the US in the Middle East was stability rather than democracy or a multi-party system. However, land reform promotion by the US was not observed in Türkiye but was observable in East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan and Middle Eastern countries like Egypt and Iran (Elik, 2018, p. 134). All of these significantly impacted domestic political, economic and developmental outcomes. Thus, Western orientation was mainly based on Türkiye's domestic and international security concerns, and Turkish policymakers, by keeping the Soviet threat on the agenda, sought more US help needed for the country's development.

The Turkish post-war development path and political economy were marked by US influence and liberal ideas. *Fortune Magazine*, one of the most prominent voices of capitalism at that time, claimed that liberal tendencies in Türkiye accorded with the dollar diplomacy of the US (Thornburgh, 1947, pp. 106–107, 171–172), which was inherited earlier before the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye. American foreign policy, headed by President William Howard Taft, focused on promoting and protecting American commercial interests, organizations, investments, and trade

worldwide. In the short term of his presidency, Taft emphasized maintaining this dollar diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire and Central American countries and China. However, this policy failed since it could not sufficiently increase American initiatives in the Ottoman Empire (AP U.S. History Topic Outlines, n.d.). However, the traces of this policy, which was designed to promote US investments, were chased and following the end of WWII with the extensive US interventions to maintain American economic interests, both powers' interests became compatible.

In 1947 and 1964, Turkish-American relations entered a golden period, so the American development package and its application intensified. Türkiye's development strategies and economic policies took form through a transition to a multi-party system and through a conjuncture in which the capitalist world economy was restructured under US leadership. American resources flowed to Türkiye through institutions established with the Bretton Woods regime, US-led organizations in the region, and bilateral agreements with the US government. This period coincided with agricultural development and the expansion of the internal market in Türkiye. With the development strategy implemented in the 1960s, Türkiye launched an initiative to establish a quasi-Keynesian competition state under the auspices of organizations like the OECD. Till the end of the 1970s, Türkiye experienced a high growth rate and development but still lagged behind East Asian countries, including Korea.

The main reason for Türkiye's lagging behind its Asian counterparts does not lie in exceptional events and intervening variables such as immense emigration from rural to urban areas, political crises, and coup d'états that suddenly broke existing structures (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 4, 45–48) and have prevented the stable development of Türkiye for the next many years. All this happened in Korea too, and the difference is that the state in Türkiye differed significantly from its East Asian counterparts. In the case of South Korea, the state maintained a principled stance towards the domestic business sectors. It imposed strict international competition requirements and implemented 'carrot and stick' policies to reward the successful ones and penalize underperformers between 1960 and 1990 (Wiltse, 2015, p. 87). The relevance of institutions, or the written and unwritten laws and rules that govern

society, has an impact on the incentives for investment, innovation, and development. Examples include property rights and how they are upheld, social standards, and political and economic stability (Pamuk, 2010a, p. 18). The diverging developmental paths of Türkiye and Korea lie in factors such as the interaction between the American development package and Türkiye's institutions, political leadership and organization, the strengthening of institutions, and the establishment of policy-supporting coalitions, as stated in the literature review part of this dissertation.

In Türkiye, the state could not develop or reconstruct the concepts and policies it had imported. In importing different intellectual properties and products, the admiration of the producer of these products and concepts, namely the US, undoubtedly generated prestige and positive returns to the US from within Türkiye. Importing without internalizing indicates the deep-rooted traditional pathological state of the Turkish intellectuals. These pathological conditions include alienation from one's culture, inadequacy in relations with the West, being like them, and self-shame. While the "intangible" elements in the development path mentioned in the conceptual framework carry it forward in the Korean example, they appear in this way in the Turkish example. That is, both internal and external factors (US engagement) are determinants of development and are mutually supportive.

5.2.1. Menderes Period and the US

Türkiye, which started to receive military and economic aid from the US and England during WWII, also changed its political system at the end of the war. To be included in the reconstruction process of the world economy, Türkiye adopted "pluralist democracy" as a political system in 1945, and the Democrat Party was founded in 1946. In their first election, the Democrat Party, under the leadership of Adnan Menderes, declared that it would defend liberal policies, would follow liberal and private sector-based policies in development, that their government would give priority to agriculture, and they would encourage foreign capital. The election promises resonated with the public, and the Democrat Party won by a landslide against

the Republican People's Party in the 1950 election. In this period, a process began in which the private sector expanded its activity in different sectors, especially in agriculture, under the influence of the commercial bourgeoisie and large landowners, which became stronger during the war years.

The date of 1950 heralded a new era in Türkiye's modern history. The Democrat Party had a populist and right-wing inclination, it used discourses of egalitarianism, developmentalism, democracy and Americanism throughout its period. The government program emphasized minimizing state intervention in the economy, promoting entrepreneurship, paving the way for privatizations, and liberalizing the Turkish market. and Americanism was not only included in government programs, but it was also injected into social life by the government itself. This had already been the condition of each tool of the American development package. Therefore, for 10 years, Türkiye surrendered to an ever-deepening dependency relationship with the United States.

External conditions, such as Russia and the war in Korea, pushed Türkiye into a closer partnership with the United States. As a result, what was necessary for "development" was available. To embark on a full-fledged development process, Menderes Government used a significant portion of American aid to purchase and distribute capital-intensive farm equipment. Just like Rhee, Menderes aimed at ensuring the continuity of US foreign aid and managed the security concerns of Türkiye during this period. Just like in the Rhee period in Korea, one of the most important factors that would determine Türkiye's development path was the land reform debates and initiatives, which left their mark on Türkiye's development. These security concerns affected the policy-making process of both sides; strengthening military cooperation and transferring military resources from the United States became the mainstay. Cooperation with America has formed the primary basis of foreign policy principles.

Türkiye also invested in the industrial sector and set up government-owned industries like sugar and cement. The main elements of the economic policy adopted by Adnan Menderes were liberalization of the economy, which quickly evolved into a mixed

economy, import substitution growth model, and priority given to agriculture. American aid was directed to specific projects like factory construction and machinery and equipment purchases in Türkiye rather than institutions as in Korea. As a result, the period between 1950 and 1955 gave favorable results in economic development. Also, Türkiye participated in many international and regional organizations prioritized by the United States. The United States presented Türkiye as both a model ally and a model of modernization theory in its region. American experts consisted of modernization experts, theorists and practitioners flocked to Türkiye, and information and experience were exchanged. Till the 1960s, the US, through its tools, had a very substantial hand in helping to chart Türkiye's course of development (D. J. Simpson, 1965, p. 143). Although the implementation of the development package was smoother in the Menderes period until the mid-1950s, due to Türkiye's failure to fulfill the American proposals, the disagreements between the two sides, and the political and economic crises experienced, there was much more to the rough structure of the America-Türkiye relations between America and Menderes.

5.2.2. US Foreign Assistance Programs in Türkiye

US foreign economic aid was the first pillar of the American development package in Türkiye, which has a long history of receiving aid from the United States, like South Korea. Both were among the developing countries that received the most US aid during the 1950s (Kruger, 1993, pp. 7–10). US aid was consistent from the end of WWII until the 1990s, even with occasional breaks. Türkiye received aid from the US and its agencies and IFIs, based on the goals and interests of both sides, which would have had a detrimental effect on Türkiye's economy if it had been correctly applied. US aid was mainly channeled through the European Cooperation Agency (ECA), Mutual Security Agency (MSA), Foreign Operations Agency (FOA) and International Cooperation Agency (ICA). Funding agencies include many US government institutions (such as the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Agriculture), from which the funds used to execute foreign assistance projects or activities originate (*USAID History*, n.d.). The type of aid varied,

i.e. cash assistance, technical assistance, textile aid, educational aid, lend-lease credits, and export-import bank loans.

George Harris claimed that the Second World War laid the basis for the Post-War Turkish-American rapprochement (G. Harris, 1972, p. 12). The process starting with lend-lease aid and aid politics set the conditions for the US - Türkiye cooperation, as well as a broad-based development effort in the international political economy. Although Türkiye did not participate, World War II affected the country because of its increasing military spending and domestic consumption. In 1941, President Roosevelt wrote a letter stating that Türkiye was necessary for the security and interests of the US. It was stated that the lend-lease aid would be provided to Türkiye alongside over 40 countries. Thus, a new era in US-Türkiye relations began. The lend-lease aid became the first tool of the US in keeping Türkiye in the allied camp. Lend-lease aid was the earliest indication of sustained and systematic US involvement in Türkiye, and until the 1960s, the US was the only donor.

At the time of the Second World War, the framework of military aid and bilateral relations that Türkiye received from the US was determined by the Lend and Lease Agreement. Between 1941-1945, it was envisaged that the resources provided to Türkiye during the war would be returned precisely at the end of the war. Through the lend-lease aid, the US militarily and economically supported its allies on a large scale till the end of the war. The lend-lease program covered all the bases of measures regarding commerce and trade between the two countries, the trading of machinery tools, cash payment, and mutual aid. Furthermore, with the Agreement on Lend-Lease and Claims, signed in Ankara on May 7, 1946, Türkiye's debt received through the Lend-Lease Bill during the war was substantially written off, which was about 130 million dollars (*Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V, 1944*). Türkiye paid 4 million 500 thousand dollars which was a symbolic amount. Türkiye also purchased eight freighters from the US in 1946. The years 1945 and 1946 revived the relations between the two countries. Another development was that when the American army was demobilized after WWII, it left all its equipment in many countries, including

Türkiye, Iraq, Egypt, Italy, and Malta. Instead of returning them to America, the US sold them to the region's countries by providing loans. In this context, Türkiye borrowed 10 million dollars and bought sanitary materials to drill machines in 1946 (Kars Kaynar, 2022, pp. 172–175). In 1945, Türkiye requested 300 million dollars from US lending agencies like the Import-Export Bank was rejected to improve her post-war economy. However, it was in November 1946 that it was able to obtain 50 million dollars, against its initial request, which Türkiye found far from satisfying. An agreement was also reached between the United States and the United Kingdom, whereby the latter would continue to be the chief weapons supplier. However, at the same time, the former would provide economic assistance (G. Harris, 1972, pp. 11–12).

In the end, however, only aid totaling 25 million dollars was available. As a result, on July 3, 1946, Eximbank granted 25 million dollars in exporter credits to Türkiye for the fiscal years 1946 and 1947, with the National Advisory Council's permission (FRUS VII, 1946, pp. 903–904, 911, 916–917). Then, the US recommended Türkiye apply to the IBRD to finance its developmental projects (Özcan, 2003, p. 122). The US announced that a loan of 25-50 million dollars with five year-term and a 4% interest rate would be given to Türkiye. However, this amount was quite far from ameliorating Türkiye's economic problems because external deficits started to become chronic, which led even more to Türkiye's dependence on foreign aid. This dependence on US foreign aid became a feature of Turkish development for many years. Too much reliance on US foreign assistance for necessary reforms created a dependency on Türkiye's path toward the West, mainly on the US.

The main reasons for the American aid to Türkiye were that Türkiye could use these funds for developmental purposes and thus contributed to the Western European recovery. In addition, as Western European countries supplied the United States with the necessary supplies, it needed to revive its markets and a more balanced and diversified economy and trade environment that could better adapt to post-war trade conditions. This is how Türkiye found its place in this division of labor (US ECA, 1949, pp. 41, 84). American officials were aware that aiding Türkiye would also help

to block the Communist incursion, and Türkiye's transformation would serve as a model for other Middle Eastern countries in demonstrating Western Values to them (G. S. Harris, 2004, p. 68). There was a belief that Türkiye could assume a leadership role in the Middle East region and offer the Turkish model of modernization. Modernization scholars like Dankwart Rustow believed that reforms of the early Republican Era and Türkiye's secular stance could be emulated as a model by the Middle Eastern Neighbors (D. A. Rustow, 1961, p. 197). By making Türkiye the principal focal point in the Middle East, the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) singled out Türkiye as its favored example of modernization and as the preeminent case for understanding development by the late 1950s. Along with Rustow, Richard Robinson, Robert V. Presthus, and Edwin J. Cohn studied Türkiye and prepared reports (Citino, 2008, pp. 588–589).

In the 1952 meeting between the President of Türkiye, Celal Bayar and the American Ambassador of the time, George McGhee, McGhee suggested that Türkiye follow a Good Neighbor Policy in the Middle East in line with its interests. Türkiye could be the leader of the Middle East thanks to its membership in NATO. By attending meetings such as the Foreign Relations Council, McGhee had the opportunity to talk with social scientists and officials working on Türkiye's development, such as Max Thornburg, who was once the economic advisor to Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. McGhee sought to persuade Türkiye to assume a leadership role through regional agreements such as the Baghdad Pact, which later became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (Adalet, 2015, p. 86). Institutions like universities were opened in Ankara for this purpose. The opening of Middle East Technical University dates back to this period. Public administration institutions with "Middle East" names were also opened in Türkiye to attract students and young administrators from neighboring countries. Türkiye was intended to be the shining example of modernity for the region (Lerner, 1958a, p. 79). None of them turned out as American and Turkish experts had imagined. Indeed, ideologically, Türkiye could not offer any viable alternative to pan-Arabism or the like. However, it is interesting that the emergence of Türkiye's regional leadership as a “model” is encouraged by American politicians.

Last but not least, one of the main motives behind the US aid was to protect Türkiye and its immediate geographic region, i.e. the Middle East and the Mediterranean, from the Communist threat. On the one hand, the Greek Civil War of 1946 exacerbated US threat perceptions of the region. On the other hand, Britain faced a severe economic crisis by 1947 that mobilized America to take an action (Trask, 1968, p. 134), so the power vacuum in the world order was filled by the US. US military advisors believed that Türkiye would have an essential role in offensive actions against the USSR in the Middle East (Leffler, 1985, pp. 816–817) and protected from the Communist threat as a natural barrier to the Eastern Mediterranean in her near region. Hence, the freedom of Türkiye and Greece and the preservation of their independence were bound to the security concerns of American foreign policy.

Until the 1960s, US aid was administered by the Mutual Security Agency. As the name implies, national security concerns in Türkiye and Korea, and other sensitive countries were paramount (Kruger, 1993, p. 9), which was a sign of how US aid was extended to help the free world. During the four years following the end of the war, Türkiye, which received foreign assistance as part of the Western security system, determined its domestic and foreign policy direction (M. Aydın, 2005, p. 21). It received abundant US economic and military assistance from the end of WWII to the late 1980s. By 1949, US economic aid to Türkiye reached 181.7 million dollars; by 1952, it amounted to 351.7 million dollars (Berberoglu, 1982, p. 65). Later on, the concerns of the US were extended for further cooperation through different means, for instance, in terms of aid plans. In both Türkiye's domestic and foreign policy agendas, relations with the US are decisive and stem from three significant milestones: the Truman Doctrine (1947), which initiated a comprehensive security and military relationship, the Marshall Plan (1948), which was an intensive economic and financial program and, finally, various joint strategic initiatives, which shaped the fabric of the relationship.

Being under the US security umbrella was first realized with the Truman Doctrine in the period following WWII, which meant the US' declaration of its alliance with Türkiye. The team preparing the Truman Doctrine believed that Türkiye was too economically and militarily weak. So it could not stand up "for long to a determined

attempt by the Soviet Union to have its way." (Geselbracht, 2015, p. 128) On March 12, 1947, President Truman delivered a speech to Congress stating that America should take responsibility for the Western alliance. As a result, the Truman Doctrine, which was formed under Public Law 75 or the Assistance to Greece and Türkiye/1947 Greek-Turkish Aid Act of the US, entered into force, and the Cold War between the US and the USSR was proclaimed. The Treaty was signed in Ankara on July 12, 1947, between Türkiye and the United States. On the same day, Türkiye became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The US provided 400 million dollars (300 million for Greece and 100 million for Türkiye) for both countries until 30 June 1948 (Montgomery, 1962, p. 199; Satterthwaite, 1972, p. 83; Ülman, 1961, pp. 109–112). The Truman Doctrine's primary purpose was to make the Turkish army more effective, reducing the number of soldiers under arms, directing them to productive civilian tasks without increasing the Turkish defense budget, and thus improving the defense and economy of the country (*Fifth Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey*, 1948, p. 15). Material aid was provided to the land and air forces, and the navy and aid were provided for the technical training of personnel. Again, aid was sent to build a road, but this was done for the defense of Türkiye. Therefore, although the aim of economic aid was in the first place, military aid was inevitably predominant in the whole package.

The Truman Doctrine provided the US administration broad authority and set general guidelines for how the Turkish government may use the aid (Sander, 1979, pp. 25–27; Ülman, 1961, pp. 110–112). The Act also gave the authority to the US president to provide financial, service, and informational support and to send military and technical experts. Training of Turkish and Greek personnel was planned in the US, and American personnel was to be sent to these countries. Moreover, because Türkiye had autocratic tendencies, there was a controversy in Congress not to give aid to the country. However, these opposing views were suppressed by those who claimed that Türkiye adopted the multi-party system in 1946 and had held a general election. One of the most important results of the Truman Doctrine was that for the next 40 years, Türkiye

became one of the steadiest recipients of US military and economic aid – its grant total was exceeded only by Britain and France, South Korea, and South Vietnam and, most recently, Egypt and Israel (D. A. Rustow, 1987, p. 91).

The US supported Greece and Türkiye with economic aid, personnel and military services and instruction and training opportunities although most of the aid was allocated to military purposes. Intense training programs were implemented for military personnel to use the equipment provided by American aid (McGhee, 1990, p. 43). Under this Doctrine, aid to Türkiye ran smoothly, and Major General Horace McBride was appointed as the director of the army group and got his mission underway in Türkiye in 1948. As a result, the military and civilian personnel serving under the Chief of the Mission increased from 374 to 1364 by 1952 (Satterthwaite, 1972, p. 80). The Truman Doctrine was an indication that the US had shifted its policy from benign indifference to intense concern regarding the region. Later, this intense concern was extended through the Marshall Plan and for financial and economic coordination throughout the first world through institutions such as the IMF and the OECD (D. A. Rustow, 1987, p. 108).

Rather than heavy industry, the priority was given to other sectors as those American experts recommended—the economic aid coming in until the 1960s was mainly directed at the infrastructure and agricultural sectors. For the US, investing in developing transportation networks and infrastructure like roads for NATO-military purposes was significant. The aid provided under the Truman Doctrine enabled Türkiye to use its resources for economic purposes since the military aid freed up some sources. As a result, the transportation network was established throughout the country. Moreover, highway development and road construction legitimized aid since the aid to Türkiye was announced as merely being for military development. That is why 5 million dollars was allocated in the Truman Doctrine to purchase highway equipment (Jafri, n.d.). The planned highway construction started from Iskenderun harbor to Kars and Erzurum (Garrett, 1960, p. 198). Charles P. Kindleberger, a State Department officer at the time, referred to the military aid of the Truman Doctrine in Türkiye as, "to a great extent, building a network of roads which brought strong economic

benefits." However, he also indicated that the Doctrine consisted of "a lot to build military roads...but there was nothing much being done. (Kindleberger, 1987, pp. 98, 107, 123)" To examine the aid given by the US to Türkiye in May of 1947, the US sent a survey mission to Türkiye, led by Maj. Gen. Lunsford B. Oliver and Rear Adm. Ernest E. Herrmann. This mission investigated the aid to Türkiye, the economic and industrial capability, and the needs of the Turkish Army, Navy, and Air Force (Office of the Historian, 1947). In that report, it was indicated that due to its low level of economic development, Türkiye would be unable to absorb a high rate of investment even though Türkiye tried to improve the conditions of its transportation services and fulfill needs in railroad and highway construction (G. Harris, 1972, p. 16). So the resumption of both British and American aid was strongly recommended. The US policy recommendations and aid were extended through the Hilts Report, the Thornburgh Report and the Barker Report on road construction and highway transportation in Türkiye. These reports addressed the question of how Türkiye would develop. They also served as reference documents for the decision-making processes of US policymakers and determining documents specifying Türkiye's role in the world capitalist system.

On March 22, 1945, engineers at the Department of Roads and Bridges of the Turkish Ministry of Public Works spent two months in Washington, DC. They conducted interviews with the Federal Bureau of Public Roads. After returning to Türkiye, it was indicated in the reports that the country needed American aid and American experts and engineers (Kanat, 2015, p. 82). Three years later, an American delegation led by the Vice President of the US Federal Roads Organization delegation, M. G. Hilts, arrived in Türkiye at the end of 1947. The delegation head, in his four-month examination of Türkiye, presented a report entitled Highway Situation in Türkiye: A Report of the United States Public Roads Mission to Türkiye, which is also known as the Hilts Report, to the Ministry of Public Works of Türkiye on February 26, 1948. Recommendations in the Report were similar to the report prepared by Vecdi Diker, an engineer at the Turkish Ministry of Public Works in the mid-1940s, in which Türkiye aimed to replicate the American highway network (Jafri, n.d.).

This report presented the development of highway networks across the country. In this way, easy circulation of agricultural products would be ensured. During the negotiations, the leaders of the CHP, like Kasım Gülek, advocated direct US involvement in the planning and construction. Gülek and Hilts subsequently signed an agreement between Türkiye and the US. Following the recommendations from this report, on 11 February 1950, The Law on the Establishment and Duties of the General Highway Administration (*Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü Kuruluş ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun*) was passed (Tütengil, 1961, pp. 20–21). The Turkish General Directorate of Highways was then established in 1950 (Erken, 2018, p. 61). Aid amounted to 31.5 billion US dollars between 1950 and 1955; additionally, 2.8 billion dollars was given to Türkiye between 1956 and 1960 (Coşar & Demirci, 2009, pp. 26–31). In addition to aid provided by the American agencies and the ECA, the US provided vehicles for road construction that benefited the US contractor companies for highway construction in Türkiye. The American Bureau of Public Roads transferred expertise and technical skills to Turkish highway engineers. This aid program in Türkiye was referred to as a successful project involving direct technical assistance by the US American Bureau of Public Roads and project loans for equipment, direct imports of road building and other highway equipment under the general commodity import programs (Lubell, 1969a, p. 149). Thus, both commodities, economic aid and technical assistance were provided in the same program and simultaneously. The same policy of the US was also applied in another successful aid program to develop the Turkish State Waterworks Department (*Devlet Su İşleri*) in 1954. The US provided technical assistance and equipment to build significant irrigation and drainage works. However, it could probably be used for more technical assistance in figuring out methods of getting water to the individual farmer (Lubell, 1969a, p. 149).

Furthermore, the US also aimed to create a market for motor vehicles that were needed by underdeveloped countries. Following the Foreign Direct Investment Law and recommendations of Hilts Report, the Ford–Otosan partnership was established; this partnership became the first example of this growing assembling industry. In 1954, Turkish firms built on the partnership with the Minneapolis-Moline company, a large

tractor and farm and industrial machinery producer; later, the Willys Jeep and Ford factories were established via these partnerships. The establishment of these factories contributed to employment; however, they caused the national income to flow out of the country. Moreover, gaps in legislation regarding import substitution policies were insufficient in contributing to the domestic industry and the assembling industry's expansion (H. Kazgan, 1981, p. 8). It should be noted that one of the reasons America encouraged highway construction in Türkiye was the roads that even off-road vehicles such as Jeeps could barely pass. The poor condition of the country's roads could have eliminated the effect of the American military aid in Türkiye. Although the Hilt Report envisaged a program for industrialization dependent on capitalist countries, mainly in the US, the inadequate road construction and railways in the country, the failure to spread asphalt roads throughout the country, the use of dirt roads built under primitive conditions in the countryside revealed how incompletely and incorrectly the intended targets were implemented. Türkiye received around 7550 Willy's Jeeps between 1947 and 1952 for military purposes (Thornburg, 1949, p. 81). In order to ensure the efficient use of military aid, a highway group was added to the JAMMAT, and American missions came to Türkiye to examine the highway development situation (Güvenç, 2014, pp. 539–540).

In 1956, the establishment of *Gümüş* Motor, the first diesel engine factory produced with completely local facilities, was considered a significant step. Even with this, Türkiye's first local locomotives were produced under the names *Karakurt* and *Bozkurt*, which were started in 1958 upon the instruction of prime minister Adnan Menderes and completed in 1961. Again, in 1961, *Devrim* Cars were produced at *Eskişehir* Cer, a revolutionary moment for Türkiye. However, in addition to the already existing economic problems and liberalization policies followed in the 1960s, most of these national undertakings could not find sufficient support, and the products produced nationally could not compete with those exported from the outside. The mid-1950s was a period in which the American automobile industry developed rapidly, especially after the Korean War, and even shaped the economic power of the United States (Ikuta, 1988, p. 18). Korea, like Türkiye, was not producing for the automobile

industry in this period; Korea started to produce in 1962 and became the first developing nation to gain a significant presence in the American import automobile market (A. E. Green, 1992, p. 411).

On June 5, 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall gave a speech at Harvard University and proposed a more comprehensive foreign aid package, later known as the Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program, to aid in Europe's post-war economic recovery. This was about five months after the Truman Doctrine was announced (OECD, 1947). This topic is still studied today since it preserves its relativity with America's global engagement. Some scholars, such as Benn Steil, called the Marshall Plan the Dawn of the Cold War (Naftali, 2018). The Plan served American interests in promoting democratic freedoms and market liberalism, which created a “winning amalgam” (Kunz, 1997, p. 163). However, what made the Marshall Plan the Dawn of the Cold War is that its success and US development efforts paid off very well, considering the economic revival of Europe and pioneered the aid packages to be implemented in Asia.

Direct aids (loans, grants, conditional aids), indirect aids (circulation rights, initial loan, special resource), counterpart monies, and finally, technical assistance (the receiving country sends experts to the United States, sending experts from the United States to the relevant country, the supply of technical materials, and the solution of technical difficulties encountered through information exchange) were provided to the countries covered by the Marshall Plan (Tören, 2007, pp. 114–117). The US gave million-dollar military and economic assistance to Western European countries within this policy's framework to stabilize the European continent. Türkiye's aid with the Truman and Marshall Plans amounted to about 2.6% of all ECA (Adalet, 2014, p. 10). Following Türkiye's inclusion in the program, the aid expected and provided by the parties differed from each other's expectations. The aid requested from the United States was below the expectations and demands previously experienced. For example, while Türkiye was waiting for 85 million dollars in aid for the years 1948-9, 40 million dollars by ECA was provided within the framework of the Marshall Plan. While

Türkiye expected to receive 94 million dollars for 1949-50, ECA provided 30 million dollars to Türkiye (Economic Cooperation Administration, 1949, pp. 84, 41).

Table 5. 1. European Recovery Program Recipients April 3, 1948, to June 30, 1952
(unit: million US dollars)

	Current Dollars	Constant 1997 Dollars
Austria	677.8	4,486.9
Belgium/Luxembourg	559.3	3,702.5
Denmark	273.0	1,807.2
France	2,713.6	17,963.6
Greece	706.7	4,678.2
Iceland	29.3	194.0
Ireland	147.5	976.4
Italy	1,508.8	9,988.0
Netherlands	1,083.5	7,172.6
Norway	255.3	1,690.0
Portugal	51.2	338.9
Sweden	107.3	710.3
Turkey	225.1	1,490.1
United Kingdom	3,189.8	21,115.9
West Germany	1,390.6	9,205.5
Regional	407.0	2,694.3
TOTAL	\$13,325.8	\$88,214.5

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Türkiye would benefit from 2.6% of the Marshall Plan, which aims to revive war-weary economies in Western Europe (Keskin-Kozat, 2011, p. 184)). These funds were channeled to finance road construction, agricultural mechanization, training activities, and industrial management; a large portion of the aid was direct aid for purchasing goods from the US market (Keskin-Kozat, 2011, pp. 184–185). Furthermore, to

administer the Marshall aid, the US requested that Türkiye establish a specific institution to manage the incoming aid. Therefore, in 1949 Türkiye established a State Ministry to coordinate all foreign assistance programs (Keskin-Kozat, 2011, p. 190). Türkiye entered into compliance efforts with the Americans' political and economic objectives, namely democracy and free enterprise, in order to receive more aid. The Marshall Plan was intended to be project assistance and centered principally on infrastructural and agricultural development (Heper & Criss, 2009, pp. 119–121). Approximately 60% of the aid was invested in the agricultural sector (İlkin & İnanç, 1967, p. 23).

The most important effect of the Marshall Plan was on agricultural investments, which were applied in two main areas. The first one was the mechanization of agricultural production, and, as a result, it would lead to an increase in production. The number of tractors and combine harvesters almost tripled in 1969 (TSI, 2012). The introduction of 4,000 tractors helped expand the total acreage of wheat production by 400 percent by 1950 (Machado, n.d., p. 89). In Türkiye, almost %60 of the Marshall Aid was spent on agricultural modernization via purchasing tractors and harvesters (G. Harris, 1972, p. 71). These imports caused further heavy expenditure on spare parts in later years. It will be much clearer if we briefly compare how Türkiye channels American aid with the example of France. America financed 10,000 tractors for France. As a result, France transformed the existing harvest unions into communal machinery cooperatives when a mass of American equipment flowed into the country so that France reduced the mechanization costs of the farmers significantly (Tekelioğlu, 2010, p. 48).

This amount received by Türkiye corresponds to the current account deficit in the balance of payments. About two-thirds of the aid received was devoted to financing investments in the agriculture and mining sector (Üstün, n.d., p. 51), and the rest was devoted to military expenditures. During this period, 40 percent of the investments made in Türkiye were financed by Marshall aid (Komisyon, 2005, p. 130). The Turkish government channeled the Marshall aid more to build roads, bridges and water projects (Ahmad, 1977, p. 134), and the national income increased by nearly 45% thanks to the Marshall Plan (R. D. Robinson, 1956, p. 8), and also, Türkiye became one of the most

important wheat exporters in the world for the first time in 1953 (Nichols, 1995, p. 45). It exported a net amount of 600,000 metric tons in 1953 and 950,000 metric tons in 1954 (A. Krueger, 1987, p. 176). As a result of increasing agricultural production, food production increased, too. However, these developments could not be factors that contributed to the agricultural and, more generally, the country's development in the long run since they were conjunctural. Thanks to the intense American aid, the use of improved agricultural and breeding methods, suitable weather conditions and mechanization, Türkiye increased its production and cultivated areas (Üstün, n.d., p. 43) and provided a boom in agricultural production and resulted in a growing economy in Türkiye. During the Korean War (1950-3), the high demand for grains made Türkiye an exporter of agricultural products, which allowed Türkiye to incorporate into the US-led world economic order and liberal trade policies (Z. Aydın, 2005, pp. 28–29).

The second result of the Marshall Plan was in the realm of transportation. The Plan increased road construction and tractor purchases; the tractors carried agricultural products to markets more easily. Also, small producers now had access to the market more efficiently, and production started to increase (Keyder & Buğra, 2003, p. 167). According to the Plan, building out the highway system would be prioritized to transport goods to markets quickly and affordably. This advancement facilitated the movement of the peasants to the city and brought the villagers closer to the market. The completion of the technical foundation made it easier for peasants to move toward urban areas. The goal of the American package and the DP politicians was to support rural development with a road system that would make it easier to market agricultural products.

Even though these initial results seem impressive, they turned out to be ephemeral because dependence on the US increased due to the purchase of agricultural tools and spare parts for maintenance. In this case, most of the aid given in the long run indirectly returned to the US (Erhan, 2006, p. 542). Furthermore, more than mechanization was needed to meet Türkiye's agricultural challenges. For over 90% of Turkish farm families who farmed less than 25 acres, as well as for some larger farmers whose property was divided into relatively tiny portions, huge machinery proved to be

unfeasible. The price of mechanization was further made more expensive by a lack of qualified engine operators and the requirement to import gasoline and spare components. Due to a disastrous 1954 harvest that was cut short by bad weather, Turkish agriculture also experienced comparatively little long-term increases in efficiency. As a result, the nation required a well-coordinated agricultural development strategy, an effective extension service, and hybrid plant and livestock varieties tailored to the region (D. J. Simpson, 1965, pp. 149–150). The Marshall Plan increased the amount of farmed land, which opened up technical possibilities for rural migration. Due to imported tractors and mechanization, small-scale peasants, which remained the dominating production unit despite increased commercialization in rural production, made up the human resource of the rural migration (Yıldırım, 2009, p. 72).

The American government put forward some conditions for managing the Turkish economy. These conditions included in the bilateral agreements with America meant that investments in the industrial sector should not be prioritized. Instead, as all American reports recommended, that importance should be given to mechanization in agriculture and the construction of highways (Tezel, 2002, p. 224). Thus, for the first time in the history of the Republic, foreign intervention in the government's economic policies was accepted, in addition to mismanagement in agrarian mechanization and transportation.

Marshall aid, for the US, served as the guardian of the international and domestic economic status quo. Industrial countries have all secured their wealth with some kind of international division of labor. For the US, Türkiye did not have to become the industrial bridgehead between Europe and the Middle East, but Türkiye's place in the free world was determined as the "granary, dairy and butcher for the region." ("Economist Argues Pastoral Turkey," 1978) Türkiye provided agricultural products in the international division of labor. American policymakers thought that Türkiye's ability to offer crucial agricultural goods, mining output, and minerals to Europe's reconstruction efforts would be its greatest contribution to that continent (Örnek & Üngör, 2014, p. 179). The Plan also charged Türkiye with supplying Europe's agricultural and the US' metal demands, such as chrome (Erhan, 2006, p. 540). By

including Türkiye in the free world, the US aimed to import liberalization, eliminate customs barriers, promote the private sector, and have access to foreign capital. The Plan was not only for the post-war recovery of Europeans but also for protecting and nurturing profitable export markets for American industry. So, the US helped feed Europe and increased its market share for US agricultural exports (ADST, 2015). In a nutshell, the Marshall Plan served as a grand strategy of the US rather than Türkiye's vital necessities. As a result, Türkiye's political and economic situation was shaped in a way that was consistent with the preferences of US leaders. In the international division of labor, Türkiye, prioritizing agriculture, would be a source of agricultural goods for the West and a market for Western industrial goods.

Following the termination of the Marshall Plan in 1953, American aid decreased, and a dispute arose with the World Bank; Türkiye resorted to short-term and high-interest commercial loans, and her foreign debt was over 1 billion dollars at the end of the 1950s (Başak, 1977, p. 65; Lynch, 1953). Economic aid to Europe turned massively into military aid (Pentony, 1960a, pp. 15–17) and the US continued its aid program under the Mutual Security Act. America's solid cooperation was tied to two pillars, its economic restructuring with the Marshall Plan and the establishment of a defensive alliance with NATO against future attacks and aggressors. After the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in April 1949, the Mutual Security Act of October 1949 was enacted to provide military assistance to member states. It was decided to give aid of 211 million 370 thousand dollars to Türkiye and Greece, and Türkiye received 75 million dollars (Kars Kaynar, 2022, p. 184). Under the authority of this Act, loans to Türkiye were extended by the Development Loan Fund (United States Treaties and International Agreements, 1959, p. 1251). These aids were used for agricultural machinery and coal mining, indicating that the order of priority was beginning to shift between the economy and defense sectors.

The Marshall Plan's prioritization of the agricultural sector was in line with the Democrat Party's strategy (Öniş, 1998, p. 33), founded in 1946 and won the majority of seats in the National Assembly. With the victory of DP, large-scale economic transformation and a radical shift in development strategy occurred as a part of a new

political framework (Öniş, 1998, p. 33). Policies under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who was one of the founders of the DP, were highly populist. The Party's pledge to make Türkiye "Little America" (Mufti, 2011; Parlak, 2016, p. 38) was widely used by the DP, and future governments maintained this discourse. Menderes claimed that by making Türkiye a smaller version of America, he would create a millionaire in every neighborhood and stated that the country was transformed with the aid received within the framework of the Marshall Plan. The DP rulers believed that an economic system based on free enterprise and capitalism was the best system to improve an economically backward country (*Yılmayan Millet Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar'ın Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine Yaptığı Ziyaretin Kronolojik Hikayesi ve Seçilmiş Nutuklar: 28 Ocak-27 Şubat 1954, 1955, p. 49*)), which explains why they aimed to make Türkiye "Little America." Furthermore, the Menderes government focused on the farmers and workers as a powerful voting bloc. With the strong support of the US government, free market policies started to be implemented, and a liberal Foreign Direct Investment Law was enacted in 1954 (*Foreign Direct Investment Law, 2003*), but investments were less than expected. Rather than adopting heavy industrialization, Türkiye prioritized agriculture and infrastructural development at that time. Moreover, America and various aid organizations complained about the atmosphere created by the state's intervention and about the unwillingness of the Turkish bureaucracy to develop.

A visible deterioration in the Turkish economy became prevalent in 1954. In 1955, Türkiye requested a 300 million dollar loan, which the US rejected because the US accused the DP government of wasting aid, and unplanned and unproductive investments. The disagreement between the two governments regarding Turkish development continued; while Türkiye wanted to use and advance its industrial potential, American officials argued that remedial measures should be taken to put the economy on sound footing first (*1955-1957, Dwight D. Eisenhower
 Vol. XXIV, The Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean 608, 1989, pp. 647-648*). Eisenhower's balanced budget, the sensitivities of the Republicans about a balanced budget and the conservative economy understanding also significantly impacted this refusal. In the

NSC paper, it was stated that Türkiye's request was declined because "Türkiye has increasingly lived beyond its means; with the result that in the last two years, foreign exchange resources have been exhausted, a burdensome external debt has been accumulated, and inflation has developed internally." (Office of the Historian, 1955) High inflation, the balance of payments crisis, and the decline in output growth were the main problems faced between 1954-1958. Nevertheless, the leaders of the Democratic Party claimed that these problems were not the results of their economic policies. Rather these were the structural problems of any developing country (Özcan, 2003, p. 121). The evaluation of the US on the Turkish economy and how aid was utilized was formalized in the report prepared by the Randall Mission (*Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Abilene, Kansas Randall, Clarence B.: Journals, 1953-1961, 1956*). In this report, the reasons for the unstable Turkish economy were listed. It was stated that Türkiye should act in the light of the recommendations of the United States, IMF and WB, take measures for economic stability, and that American aid should be conditional (Office of the Historian, 1958). Following these pressures, Türkiye accepted the IMF stabilization program in 1958, a rescue program initially planned by the US upon Türkiye's inability to pay its foreign debt. Within the framework of this program, the Turkish lira was devalued against the dollar; inflation was reduced, and public spending was envisaged to be carried out within the framework of the development program. However, the proposed foreign aid amount came with conditions; it had five main elements: devaluation, external debt procrastination, restrictions on monetary and fiscal policy, liberalization of foreign trade, the prices of public economic enterprises, and the controlling of the private sector's activities (Barth & Hemphill, n.d.). However, the developments in the Middle East, like the Iraqi coup, re-enhance the US aid to Türkiye, and on August 4, 1958, a US-Türkiye bilateral defense agreement was signed (Gönlübol, 2014, pp. 307–309).

Since 1945, particularly following the inception of the Marshall Plan, in order to advise Turkish policymakers about how to channel US foreign aid, how to reconcile American sources with the Turkish system, and how to understand opportunities for assistance, the US sent American specialists to foreign peripheries, including Türkiye, to prepare

the intellectual groundwork and reports for carrying out any program of American aid. This policy required conducting field research and examining the conditions for the entry of American capital; America had to do comprehensive examinations of the countries such as Greece, Brazil, and Türkiye (Thornburg, 1949, p. 12). In the 1950s, the reports prepared by the American experts that visited Türkiye shaped policies and became a reference for cadres and intellectuals in Türkiye. Some came individually, while others came in commissions or under the auspices of the Marshall Plan. US influence on the Turkish public administration and policymaking process increased through these visits, along with reports resulting from these visits. H.G. Hilts, Max Weston Thornburg, and Professor Hollis B. Chenery ascertained the overall socioeconomic structure of the country and were influential in creating new economic development plans. The Thornburg Report, Dorr Report, Barker Report, and Hilts Report were subsequently prepared. Despite having different focal points, the nuts and bolts of these reports were about Turkish development, and they focused mainly on Turkish institutions, the transportation system, industrialization, and trade (Kanat, 2015, p. 82).

The Thornburgh Report is the most well-known report on Turkish development. In 1947, an American expert, Max Weston Thornburg, came to Türkiye to prepare a report on Turkish development. The aim was to determine weaknesses in internal reform and where American aid might do the most good (Woolbert, 1950). He recommended the abolition of statism and giving priority to the private sector. American aid was conditioned on the reassessment of economic objectives and the function of government in that development (Thornburg, 1949, p. 205). To be included in the Marshall Plan, Türkiye was requested to change its development plan, especially regarding agriculture and transportation systems. One feature that makes the Thornburgh Report interesting is that there was no room for the plan for railway development. Instead, the development of road transportation networks based on trucks and cars was highly recommended (Rivkin, 1965, sec. III; Thornburg, 1949, pp. 76–81). Türkiye was so dependent on the American model that it attempted to

dismantle all railways as some American cities had before WWII. Istanbul's tramways were considered too traditional and not representative of modernity.

Another American expert who conducted investigations in Türkiye was Richard D. Robinson. Robinson had lived in Türkiye for many years and served as a correspondent for the American Universities Field Staff. As a result of his observations, in his first monograph, he analyzed the pace of economic development, the rural situation, and the role of the increase in US foreign aid (R. D. Robinson, 1963, p. 99). He stated that even though Türkiye received excessive US aid, it failed regarding democracy and development. The traditional rural village, an important social institution, was identified as one of the main problems in Türkiye. Türkiye's main developmental problems were the significant difference between the majority of relatively illiterate villagers who value tradition and a small, educated elite who live in cities (R. D. Robinson, 1963, pp. 51, 89, 198).

Later, The American aid mission led by Professor Chenery, an expert on development planning based at Harvard University and the World Bank, was sent to Türkiye in 1953 (Ünay, 2006, p. 93). The Turkish Investment and Economic Development Report (Chenery Report) was prepared, but it was not favored by the Menderes government then. The report focused on trade relations between the US and Türkiye, Türkiye's trade balance, and in which sectors US aid was needed. Furthermore, American advisors were involved in the law-making process. With the US recommendation, in 1954, The Petroleum Law was enacted based on a bill prepared by Max Ball, and thus, the oil sector was fully opened to foreign oil companies.

Relations with international organizations, particularly BWIs orchestrated by the US, increased through foreign aid. That's why, not only the expertise of the Americans but also the expertise of those who were leaders in their fields were consulted. The Industrial Development Bank of Türkiye (IDBT: *Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası* TSKB in Turkish), as the country's first private investment and development institution, was founded in 1950 in Istanbul with the support of Türkiye's Central Bank, the World Bank, and the shareholding of commercial banks. Founded with a mission to support

the development of the Turkish private sector, the IDBT assumed critical duties in the fields of development and investment banking: providing medium to long-term loans on a project basis, technical consultancy for project sponsors, and initiatives for the establishment of the capital market. The IDBT was the only institution able to provide the foreign currency required for imports, while the absence of foreign exchange was at its highest level and the only institution that mediated the sale of foreign currency with the cash released by the Marshall Aid. Later, the World Bank sent experts and missions following the membership of Türkiye in 1947. In 1949, upon the request of the Turkish Prime Ministry, Dr. Fritz Neumark made essential contributions to the development of education and income tax laws of economics by preparing a report called *About the Rational Study of Government Offices and Institutions*. In this report, Neumark focused on why reorganization in public administration was required, the necessary organizations for new regulation, and the measures, principles, and recommendations that would provide a rational work model.

The World Bank mission, led by Barker, investigated Türkiye. As a result of this investigation, the Barker Report, also titled *The Turkish Economy*, was prepared in 1950. The Report reflected the same opinions and recommendations as Thornburg. Türkiye should give priority to the agricultural sector was seen as the engine of development and industrialization (Ünay, 2006, p. 93). Investments should be made to train technical personnel and the mining sector. Agriculture was defined as the mainstay of the Turkish economy. "In this context, the main dispositions of the structuralist school of neoclassical economics were expressed through the demands for public support for the prioritization of agriculture as the lynchpin of a comprehensive package of socioeconomic reconstruction." (Ünay, 2006, p. 91) The table below shows the recommendations of the Report. It can be seen that highway construction, mining, public investment and agriculture were areas that need to be prioritized for Türkiye:

Table 5. 2. The Barker Mission Recommendations to Türkiye

<u>PARKER MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR</u> <u>GROSS PUBLIC INVESTMENT: 1949, 1952 & 1952 TO 1956</u>			
(millions of liras)			
<u>Purpose</u>	<u>1949*</u> (Actual)	<u>1952</u> (Recommended Range)	<u>Five-Year</u> <u>Period</u> <u>1952-56</u> (Recommended Range)
Agricultural Development	27.5	50 - 60	350 - 425
Public Health and Education (New training programs)	...	10 - 15	75 - 100
Transportation:			
Railroads	91.8	45 - 60	200 - 225
Highways	58.6	55 - 70	350 - 475
Ports and shipping	56.3	50 - 60	200 - 225
Airways	15.7	15 - 20	75 - 100
Other	<u>2.6</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total Transportation	225.0	165 - 210	825 - 1025
Communications	21.7	15 - 20	75 - 100
Public Works	103.0	70 - 90	350 - 450
Electric Power	22.4	45 - 60	250 - 350
Industry	37.9	40 - 60	150 - 200
Mining	79.6	55 - 60	175 - 225
Other	<u>6.1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	523.2	450 - 575	2250 - 2875
Local Government - unallocated	43.2		
Inventories	<u>-37.8</u>		
Total	528.6		

Retrieved:

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/507751468109487239/pdf/671290SR0B0x460000Economic0Position.pdf>

Two main problems are seen in the reports and examinations prepared by the American delegations: not paying enough attention to the agriculture sector and the lack of trained, skilled, and qualified people in Türkiye (Armour, 1957). Officials and specialists from the US recognized Türkiye's comparative advantage in the expansion of agricultural production. They recommended increasing Turkish agricultural

capacity, adopting an agriculture-based development strategy, and investing in highway construction, infrastructure, and agriculture-based industrial projects. They all recommended that heavy industrialization should be abandoned, agriculture and light industry should be prioritized; and the private sector should be brought to the fore by giving up statism. Unfortunately, industrialization efforts did not improve the general well-being of Turkish citizens (Thornburg, 1949, pp. 141–142). They claimed that the application of statist and interventionist economic policies did not improve the living standards of the vast majority of the population (Thornburg, 1949, p. 82). Türkiye should adopt liberal economic policies in order to ensure the flow of American aid. Including Thornburg, American experts criticized the statist nature of the development plans and initiatives and called for private enterprise and agricultural and infrastructural development. They emphasized that US aid should have been channeled to these sectors. With the recommendations of the experts from the United States, tractors, agricultural and road construction tools, and equipment were bought, and aid was mainly used for the financing of imports. Turkish officials and policymakers spent American economic aid and bank loans in this way to accelerate the commercialization of agriculture. Structural problems in the Turkish state system, like political patronage and clientelistic relations within political spheres, hindered the development of a legal-rational bureaucracy (Rodríguez, 2018, p. 227). Thus, in almost all reports, developmental solutions for Türkiye's industrialization and a significant part of the aid and tools of the US development package were dedicated to developing agriculture, the military, and road networks.

There were also areas where the American advisors and the American aid package were successful, and they acted in harmony with Turkish policymakers, especially in building large factories, dams tourism infrastructures, and highways; the concrete materialization of the modernization theory is seen in Türkiye. TVA showed the American authorities that even if only rivers are used effectively, they can be an important step towards achieving economic and social development goals. Additionally, it was believed that TVA would work best in the Middle East to deal with poor production and productivity as well as an increasing population (Sneddon, 2015,

p. 63) State elites in Türkiye imagined how to build large factories and buildings, tourism infrastructures and prioritizing highway construction as concrete symbols of modernization (Ekinci, 2019). At the same time, this served the purpose of reversing Türkiye's backwardness, emulating the development trajectory of the West (Evren, 2014, pp. 405–419, 409) and increased its dependence on hydroelectric energy, building big dams and the establishment of large structures with the ideal of being developed like western states (Adaman, 2018, p. 96). In 1954, the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) was founded—this institution was modeled after the US Bureau of Reclamation (Kibaroglu et al., 2012). Similar to the US Bureau of Reclamation, DSI was given the responsibility of serving as the principal state agency for the planning and management of Türkiye's water resources. During this period, the relationship between the Bureau and Türkiye began with the invitation of Turkish engineers to the United States (Sneddon, 2015, pp. 182–183), and later, the Bureau was deeply involved in Türkiye's policies, and the opinions of the bureau experts began to be implemented. As a result, as will be seen in the next period, DSI spent more than half of its budget on large dam constructions till 1962 (Tekeli, 2008, p. 58). In 1955 the Bureau advisory team was further enlarged and reassigned to the ICA and renamed the River Valley Development Team, with mission members' emphasis on adapting river basin planning and development techniques to the Turkish context. This project was successful and it was emphasized that the close cooperation between American and Turkish technicians had a great impact on this success (Sneddon, 2015, p. 183). In fact, these technological innovations were, again, related to the American TVA experience; With the concept of unified development, Roosevelt at that time aimed to control rivers, build multi-purpose dams, and develop local development inclusively, from afforestation to transportation. Indeed, many hydraulic bureaucracies were established in the early 20th century, for example, the US Bureau of Reclamation, and the General Directorate of Public Works in Türkiye (1914; now DSI) (Molle, 2009, pp. 332–333). American economic aid alongside its technical assistance and advisors' knowledge transfer, the success of the Marshall Plan and project-oriented American assistance, in many ways, became a model for later ideas about 'aid'. Later on, these experiences were implemented in other countries, including South Korea. Major

projects such as dams and highways have also impacted land ownership models (WCD, 2000, p. 116).

5.2.3. Promotion of American Interests in Trade, Investment, and Markets

Following the end of WWII, the US aimed to reestablish conditions of trade and build an environment suitable for investment. In order to achieve these, first, by removing trade barriers among the free world countries that speeded up progress and development, and second the consideration of the careful coordination of trade. Through the aid packages, particularly the Marshall Plan, and ensuring Türkiye's membership in international organizations, American policymakers vowed to improve the US' trade relations with the rest of the world and trade relations among the free world countries, promoting international trade among receiving countries by reducing or eliminating trade barriers or tariffs (Surrey, 1948, p. 509).

The ISI strategy resonated with the Third World in the late 1950s as in Korea. Türkiye also transformed its policy into an ISI strategy on the advice of international organizations and the US. Yet, unlike in Korea, the US was unwilling to back Türkiye's economic initiatives and ISI because of Türkiye's wasteful aid use, unplanned economic policies, and stagnant economy till the 1950s. What America wanted was for it to produce labor-intensive industries for the domestic market to attract private domestic and foreign investment. Between 1950 and 1960, the DP tried to satisfy its constituency with state subsidies, chiefly the agricultural sector and traders. These programs created excessive demand for imports, government spending, and credit, and the resulting inflation and imbalances in the balance of payments dissatisfied both the US and its own electorate. America proposed a coordinated and planned ISI policy. However, due to agricultural policies and the generous credit policies of the Turkish government, a consistent ISI policy could only be implemented after 1960 (Maxfield & Nolt, 1990, pp. 68–70, 72). Another requirement of the stable implementation of the ISI policy or the promotion of it by the United States, as in Korea, is that American investments and trade remain low in Türkiye; for example, in 1950, American direct

investment in Türkiye was almost one-twentieth of Argentina and one-tenth of the Philippines when compared to these Third World countries (Maxfield & Nolt, 1990, p. 62). The difference has widened more and more.

The US paved the way for Türkiye's membership at the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) in 1947, later becoming a member of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to increase cooperation between Türkiye and Western Europe. The objectives of the organization were to boost output levels, lower trade barriers and tariffs, upgrade transportation and industrial machinery, increase employment, support worker mobility within Europe, and work towards internal financial, monetary, and economic stability. In addition, the US and international organizations recommended that Türkiye eliminate state economic controls in its economy to attract foreign investment and liberalize its trade. Turkish officials also expected that Türkiye could contribute to the trade between European countries and the US and the European economic recovery (*TBMM Tutanakları*, 1949, p. 11). Thanks to increased interaction with other free world countries, Türkiye's trade with Western European countries like Germany and OEEC members was revived. As a result, its foreign trade in 1950 reached its highest point, and the foreign trade deficit fell dramatically (Carver, 2011, p. 99).

Specific trade promotion initiatives accompanied US aid to European countries, including Türkiye. In the 1950s, in order to speed the recovery and reconstruction of the European countries, the Overseas Territories Committee (OTC) was established. Another important task of the OTC was to reinforce the export-oriented development model and open them to US investment and the US market. The countries coordinated under the Marshall Plan received around eight percent of the Marshall Plan's funding by the OTC, and the OTC also worked on technical aid and investment (Schmelzer, 2014, p. 175). During the 1950s, the OTC ensured the careful growth of dollar-earning production in the free world countries. The OTC also worked on the agriculture, energy, and processing industries, tax incentives for foreign private capital investments and economic development (Schmelzer, 2014, p. 175). the OEEC and the European Productivity Agency (EPA), a quasi-independent body within the OEEC, aimed to

develop underdeveloped countries, increase their productivity¹³ and their economic integration in the European region. However, later, rather than promoting the US' techniques and methods that increased production capacity, the EPA focused on getting underdeveloped countries to catch up with the US. The OEEC investigated strategies for promoting economic development in the Agency's pilot zones, trial areas, and demonstration areas (Boel, 2003, pp. 21, 204).

The OEEC also encouraged the Marshall Plan countries to reduce or remove the import restrictions and liberalize imports (Meerhaeghe, 1980, pp. 203–205). Some scholars interpreted this as a threat to Türkiye's independence and economy by claiming the US aimed to overcome its economic crisis and to unite the countries included in the Marshall Plan into a single American market (Aybar, 1949b). Moreover, this import liberalization created victims that were Turkish workers because their bosses cut their wages to reduce their costs. Last but not least, import liberalization caused the inflow of American products to Turkish markets, which paved the way for the deficits in foreign trade and balance of payments in 1949 (Aybar, 1949a). Consequently, towards the middle of the 1950s, the Turkish economy experienced a recession and a crisis. As a result of the economic stagnation, the liberal system of foreign commerce was overthrown. The government started implementing import restrictions to maintain the trade balance due to the drop in export and foreign investment. In addition, Türkiye's foreign debt increased as the economy contracted, and the trade balance deteriorated. To address the economic crisis, the DP administration gave up on liberal reforms and expanded government control over the economy. The National Protection Law, enacted during World War II, was reinstated in 1955. The IMF started putting pressure on the government to rein in the economy by reducing spending, regulating imports, and depreciating the Turkish currency. Neither Western institutions nor its largest creditor, the US, did support Türkiye (Kasapsaraçoğlu, 2015, p. 336).

¹³ Member countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United Kingdom

It is even more evident in the case of Türkiye that foreign aid and trade relations are closely tied. While maintaining economic development with foreign aid is the primary goal, the quality of aid and its spending is more important to the economy. There is no huge gap between American aid to Türkiye and Korea. However, the extensive aid received in the long term had adverse effects in Türkiye. Marshall Aid was spent on agriculture, infrastructure and mechanization, which accelerated economic development in the short term and had positive results. However, as mentioned in the previous subtitle, these long-term unplanned aids caused great difficulties in domestic politics and social transformation. US aid was conditioned on importing capital goods from the US, which led to a gradual increase in Türkiye's trade deficit (Morrissey, 1996, pp. 92–93). Türkiye was compelled to import goods at significantly higher prices than usual, and the form of foreign assistance led to a relationship of dependency between Türkiye and the United States. Türkiye became heavily dependent on American technology (Morrissey, 1996, pp. 92–94). Therefore, one among the primary causes for the failure of the Democrat Party's free trade experiment in the 1950s was the increasing trade deficit, which resulted from the adverse effects of ties with the US as a foreign actor on the Turkish economy. A large part of the increasing budget deficits was met with American aid and also from Europe through domestic borrowing (Evsile, 2022, p. 166).

The automotive sector was where Türkiye could find support from America. Apart from helping Turkish development, America needed new and expanded motor vehicle markets. The win-win situation for both countries would later cause a distorted development for Türkiye. Cooperation in the automotive industry had begun between Türkiye and the United States before 1945. Ford and Chevrolet entered the Turkish market through the American Foreign Trade company, and Ford Motor started production in the assembly plant in Istanbul in 1929. However, the first assembly attempt was unsuccessful, and in 1934, its activities were stopped. After 1945, American companies (like Willy's Jeep) invested in the automotive industry and established factories. However, these investments focused on tractor production rather than automobiles or trucks since Türkiye was seen as an agriculture-based economy

(Çoban, 2007, pp. 19–20). In the 1950s, Türkiye had an outstanding foreign currency stock, and the Turkish people bought a lot of US-made automobiles. *Dolmuş* (a vehicle that is smaller than a bus but sets routes more in the city with the logic of a taxi), the American cars, started to diversify and evolve (Özbilen, 2016, p. 57) that contributed to huge migration from rural to urban areas while the rapid urbanization continued in big cities.

The rationale for the highway construction was that it ensured door-to-door delivery and farm-to-market transportation and provided the infrastructure for an agriculture-based development program that replaced railroad-led industrialization policies of the 1930s and 1940s. As a result, Türkiye started to abandon railway-led and state-owned industrialization policies and adopt agricultural development, privatization and highway-led industrialization. The DP fully implemented this model starting in the 1950s, which coincided with the recommendation of US officials and experts because Turkish policymakers thought that the link between domestic transportation and international trade was significant in terms of evaluating the wealth of the country and the way to reaching for this goal would be through the American aid and highway construction aided by the US. Therefore, with the American planners' recommendation, the highways' construction was prioritized over the railroad; the heavy industry products were exported from the US, and the US and Western goods were poured into the country. In time, import-substituting industries became heavily dependent on imported goods such as machinery, raw materials, semi-finished goods and petroleum products (World Bank Staff, 1981, p. 59). With the recovery of European economies, trade accelerated, but Türkiye continued in this direction as it showed productivity in agricultural production (Economic Cooperation Administration, 1949, p. 2; Özcan, 2003, p. 129).

Despite a liberal foreign investment law enacted in 1954 with the strong support of the American Government, only 17 million dollars of foreign direct investment entered the country in the 1950s. In the 1960s, this rate increased slightly, hovering around 15 million to 50 million dollars (Keyder, 2007, p. 219). The American investment rate was minimal compared to its aid rates. Throughout the 1950s, US investment in

Türkiye made up only %2 of total US foreign aid inflows. Nevertheless, it boosted the Turkish private sector and led to cooperation between the actors in the Turkish domestic market (Göymen & Tüzün, 1976, p. 66). US aid was utilized as the mean of closing the foreign trade deficit and providing additional funding to domestic savings in order to solve the problem of the trade deficit (Keyder, 2007, pp. 216–219). What solved the trade deficit problem was the remittances from Turkish living in Germany that contributed to the development of the internal market and narrowed the foreign trade deficit for a while during the 1960s.

The US aid packages aimed to encourage the countries' agricultural and industrial production and strengthen or maintain the value of their currencies and financial situations (D. C. Stone, 1949, p. 67). However, although Türkiye took steps to consolidate its domestic market and try to make industrialization the main driver of development policy, its excessive dependence on US economic and military aid made trade conditions difficult (Eralp, 2009, p. 210). To empower the private sector in against statism, the DP government implemented market-friendly policies. The government worked to enact open trade policies and integrate Türkiye into the US-led global economic order between 1950 and 1953. This was, of course, carried out through agricultural exports. During the Korean War, Türkiye enjoyed the world's high demand for grains, which allowed Türkiye to be an exporter of agricultural products (Z. Aydın, 2005, pp. 28–29). Türkiye's agricultural exports increased by about %50 during the Korean War because excellent weather conditions added value to the effects of mechanization. The increase in export volume also corresponded to an increase in export incomes because the Korean War changed the international terms of trade in favor of agricultural products (Keyder, 1987a, p. 294).

Even though Türkiye enjoyed a boom earlier than Korea, Türkiye did not use this chance for economic development (From 1950 to 1960, the processed agricultural area, wheat and barley production increased significantly) (Takım, 2012, p. 168). The big landowners and urban merchants that formed the DP coalition took advantage of the short-lived export-oriented policies. Many investments, aid, and subsidies to agriculture only benefitted a small class of landowners. As a result, the economic

model implemented between 1946-1953 was blocked, and the expected results from the liberal policies could not be achieved. From 1954 to 1960, liberal foreign trade policies were abandoned, and an industrialization policy based on limited import substitution was followed. Then, in 1953, the DP changed its approach and implemented a protectionist trade regime to boost domestic demand. It also used import permits, import taxes, and multiple foreign exchange rates to control inflation through price control and resolve the ongoing balance of payments deficits (Nas, 2008, p. 19; Waldner, 1999, pp. 66–67). In this period, state entrepreneurship has emerged in establishing infrastructure for the private sector and providing protection in areas where it is needed. Paradoxically, the government with a pro-business stance imposed limitations on the market, while the economy's erratic interventionist practices and frequent policy alterations generated a sense of uncertainty among entrepreneurs and business professionals (Buğra, 1994, p. 120). In contrast to its previous commitment to privatize state economic enterprises, the DP (Democrat Party) augmented the public sector by utilizing it as a political instrument during electoral campaigns (Waterbury, 1992, p. 256). Türkiye's economy became much more strained and showed sluggish growth and trade imbalances till the 1960s. That is why the investments in the military and other areas were so minimal, and there were no favorable trade conditions (Evered, 2010, p. 52). Notably, following the Truman aid, Türkiye depleted its dollar reserves quickly. Moreover, the increase in imports from the US in the following years further deepened the dollar crisis and led to a worsening of the trade balance (Erhan, 2006, pp. 536–537).

5.2.4. Involvement in Defense Infrastructure Capabilities

Even though Türkiye stayed out of the Second World War and was not attacked, it was in a difficult situation economically because it was prepared to enter the war at any moment. In addition to this burden created by defense expenditures, the most crucial problem of Türkiye during the War was its army's weakness and lack of equipment. Despite the efforts to purchase weapons and establish a defense industry from 1923 to 1939, the army could not be modernized, and the land forces could not be motorized.

Military aid to eliminate the deficiencies of the army was an important factor in determining the relationship between Türkiye and America throughout the 1940s. Türkiye's declaration of war on Germany and Japan towards the end of the war, after a long period of neutrality during the war, aimed to determine a preference for the post-war world order and led Türkiye to receive American and British aid. American military aid started through England and continued after the war. This choice was a sign of the direction in which the US would be the deterministic force on its side in the post-1945 order.

US military strategy-strategic planning that provided aid, education, training, and equipment would bolster Western Europe's security and enable a Middle Eastern security system that is supportive of NATO and anti-communist. The US officials agreed that Türkiye was "the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East" and that "the Soviet expansion would have a serious impact on the vital interests of the U.S." (Campany, 1986, p. 80) America had three priorities: First was to ensure that Türkiye used aid effectively. The second priority was to create the alliance chain from the Balkans to Pakistan and prevent communist influence in the Middle East. Türkiye's geographical location was suitable for achieving this aim. Türkiye was to become the cornerstone in building a defense in the area based on the northern tier, including Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Türkiye (Office of the Historian, n.d.-b, pp. 385–386). Finally, the US military requirements ensured access to Turkish military facilities by US forces (Office of the Historian, n.d.-a, p. 913).

For the defense of Türkiye, Truman had discussions with Acheson (Undersecretary of State), Forrestal (Secretary of Defense), and Royall (Secretary of the Army) in 1946, and they decided that it was crucial to provide military assistance to Türkiye (M. J. Cohen, 1997, pp. 53–54). As a result, a military assistance program based on the Pincher series, in which the Griddle Plan aimed to aid Türkiye, particularly involving the development and use of aircraft (Rubin, 1980, p. 214). This plan emphasized the role of Türkiye and its geostrategic importance in combatting the Soviet Union in the event of war (Mark, 1997, p. 383). US military assistance made establishing bases and

logistics networks in allied countries easier, including Türkiye. In addition, it contributed to modernizing the Turkish Armed Forces from air landing strips to roads to facilitate troop mobilization. Last but not least, improving Türkiye's military capabilities served to support Türkiye's government budget and economic development by improving its ability to meet its own military expenses considering that military expenses consumed a large percentage of the budget (Adams, 1954). American aid was an essential resource for the modernization of the Turkish military.

As part of the Truman Doctrine, Türkiye started to receive military assistance. Between 1948 and 1952, Türkiye received 687 million dollars in military aid from the US (Esenbel & Criss, 2011, p. 287). The Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Türkiye (JAMMAT) was formed in 1947, under the Greek-Turkish Aid of 1947, to provide procurement, training, and material to the Turkish Armed Forces and manage the planning, formulation and implementation of US military aid programs (Munson IV, 2012, pp. 1–2). JAMMAT was renamed in 1958 as JUSMMAT (Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Türkiye). The mission, composed of the US Army Group, the US Navy Group and the US Air Force Group, started to train the Turkish military. In addition, the mission played a role in the Turkish army's construction and determined which equipment and weapons the Turkish Army required. This was furthered and gained continuity with equipment distribution of American weapons to the Turkish Army. Throughout this period, an American advisory group used the aid given to Türkiye as a leverage tool to bring Türkiye's military plans and establishment in line with American interests (Leffler, 1985, p. 818).

The Turkish military had an advantage in terms of workforce. However, there were severe and large-scale problems identified by JAMMAT: The country's obsolete weapons/weapon systems, poor logistics service, the application of old military tactics, and the inexperience and lack of training of many Turkish soldiers and military personnel were among the significant problems. Lastly, a lack of sufficient permanent non-commissioned officers, a lack of command inspections, and a lack of trained personnel to keep and operate new equipment were the remaining significant problems (Office of the Historian, 1950c). Before the mission arrived in Türkiye, these problems

were already well-defined. Young Turkish soldiers with no information about the new, mechanized equipment – received from the Truman and Marshall aid packages – need to be quickly trained. This was expressed by an American military advisor in 1949 in such as way:

"The difficulty is that the men are conscriptees, and the most complicated piece of machinery they may have seen before coming into the service is a wooden stick plough. They hardly know the difference between a hammer and a screwdriver.... The Turkish Army will have a tough time keeping the equipment going which we have given it."(Lerner & Robinson, 1960, p. 29)

A large number of military personnel received training both in the United States and in Türkiye. The US was also involved in creating the curriculum in military schools. All of this benefited America's interests both politically and economically. The close relations between the American military personnel and trainers and foreign officers through the training programs within the scope of the aid, the connection that the United States was established in the sale of weapons, and the "train and sell" administration paved the way for the underdeveloped countries not only to be allies, but also to earn money from them (Johnson, 2004, pp. 132–133). JAMMAT's army section conducted inspections and evaluated how Türkiye spent military aid. As a result, it was indicated that US advising and incoming material assistance were utilized efficiently. Moreover, the American aid, the navy, and the air force advisors succeeded in modernizing the military through training troops in the use of American equipment and military techniques, education, and improved equipment so that the US decided to end the aid program's major parts such as training and supply management in 1953 (Sağlam, 2022, p. 61).

The purpose of the Turkish model was also mentioned in JAMMAT reports. Türkiye's steps towards democracy, its anti-Soviet and pro-American stance and its relatively more stable nature compared to other middle eastern countries ensured the flow of some of the aid through JAMMAT(Munson IV, 2012, pp. 157–160). It is an undeniable fact that the fighter and training planes, tanks, cannons, jets, submarines, destroyers, trucks, jeeps, guns and other military equipment sent by the US carried the Turkish

army much further in terms of weapon inventory compared to before 1947. It increased Türkiye's defense capability, but its burden on the budget was not alleviated. The reason for this was that this transformation turned into an economic burden, the expenses of the military personnel sent to the United States, the fluctuation in agricultural production that started in the mid-1950s, and the decrease in the demand for agricultural products in foreign markets, in order to operate these tanks and military equipment given to Türkiye, Türkiye became dependent on American military and economic aid. Over time America became the leading supplier of the Turkish army. Despite this, the Turkish army evolved into a more institutionalized structure, from career officers' training to material shipment and classification.

The majority of US military assistance programs during the Cold War were carried out under the doctrine of Foreign Internal Defense (FID). FID was known for sending American Special Operations Forces, as well as large amounts of supplies and equipment, to partner nations to support their militaries and governments in their fight against insurgencies with communist roots. Via this flow of military aid, the partner states could invest in the aid to improve their state capacity and strengthen their security forces against regime opponents (Matisek, 2018, p. 272). Between 1946 and 1965, the US provided nearly 635.3 million dollars for these endeavors (USAID, n.d., p. 21). Military aid included grants for military equipment, supplies, services purchased with appropriated funds, transportation of equipment and supplies, their cost, funds, and loans (USAID, n.d., p. 3).

Even though Türkiye received a large amount of aid, America was more committed to East Asia during this period. In fact, Türkiye got \$1.6 billion in military and economic aid from the United States between 1946 and 1949, compared to South Korea's \$2.7 billion (USAID, 2022). Between 1946 and 1991, the total American Cold War economic and military aid to Türkiye and South Korea, respectively, was 60.87 billion and 79.01 billion USD (Matisek, 2018, p. 273). Both long-term and large-scale military and economic aid helped South Korea to direct their resources and the aid they had received to increase their state capacity and, thereby, their development (Scitovsky, 1985, p. 221; Welfield, 2012, pp. 106–109). Because of the need for an

institutionalized and coordinated government policy, Türkiye could not efficiently utilize the whole development package from the US.

US military strategy had many components from the large financial outlays that included arms, training, money, and other forms of assistance to establishing US bases. For example, between 1950 and 1974, US military aid to Türkiye averaged \$165 million per year (Duke, 1989, p. 274). American military aid also included weapons, equipment, improved transportation, and communications infrastructure (Leffler, 1985, p. 817), which assisted in transforming the Turkish Air Force (Livingston, 2006, p. 778). Institutions such as the Ministry of Defense, the War Staff College, and the Turkish Armed Forces were reorganized with US supervision. Turkish military troops were also given technical and administrative training by American military advisers (Leffler, 1985, p. 817). US army missions helped to prepare ports for incoming material and train personnel about US weapons such as the 81mm mortar and 3-inch anti-tank gun. The US Navy implemented mine warfare, submarine, and surface training. Air Force advisors led the development and establishment of airbases, logistics, and pilot training (Weber, 2016, p. 102).

Türkiye was a significant actor in America's regional defense scheme. At that time, the US emphasized the presence of Türkiye, Iran, and Pakistan in the anti-Soviet/Communist alliance in the Middle East. As a result, agreements and pacts were signed and formed in which these countries were involved. The Middle East Command, Middle East Defence Organization, Northern Tier, and Baghdad Pact are all vital signs of how America attributed importance to Türkiye's role in the Middle East and the defense of the Middle East. Later, the rapprochement between the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Syria made Türkiye more critical of America. Thus, aid and military politics were quite intertwined, and Türkiye received the most economical and military aid among the Middle Eastern countries (Meyer, 1964, p. 65).

The military aid package was based on the protection of American bases, the preservation and enforcement of collective security agreements with the donor country, the protection of strategic raw materials, and the enhancement of the military

strength of the Allies. Moreover, realizing these elements in the "cheapest" way was also essential for the American economy. However, for the Turkish case, an understanding of "Türkiye the country that serves the American economy and interests" guided America's Türkiye policy. This could be seen in the dialogue between Senator Alexander Wiley and United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1957:

“Senator Wiley: Is the annual cost of a Turkish soldier \$200?

US Secretary of State J. F. Dulles: Yes, around \$200.

Senator Wiley: Is it true that every American soldier we recruit costs more than \$6,000 a year?

US Secretary of State J. F. Dulles: Yes, must be.

Senator Wiley: So, from an economic point of view, it would be a good job to have a Türkiye fighting with us.

US Secretary of State J. F. Dulles: Yes.” (Sander, 2016, p. 137)

As can be seen, the transfer of resources to Türkiye was entirely due to the strategic importance of Türkiye's geopolitical value and economic and military benefits. Therefore, the most crucial aim of Menderes was to get help from the US rather than from the IMF and the World Bank (Türel, 2004, p. 44). As a matter of fact, between 1953-1958, Türkiye experienced problems with these two institutions. For this purpose, the Menderes administration became a member and assumed responsibility for all American-led institutions. Türkiye holds a role in America's gendarmerie in the Middle East within alliances like the Baghdad Pact, which was formed by Iran, Pakistan, and the UK (later called CENTO, which ended in 1979) as a part of the Northern Tier Strategy. The US joined the military committee of the Pact in 1958. Despite resistance from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan (Guess, 1987, p. 152), US aid to Türkiye increased, and extra military aid was provided following the signing of the Pact (Abou-El-Fadl, 2018, p. 199).

The military alliance and collective defense formation led by the US, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was formed in Western Europe in 1949. It is certain that the formation of NATO, which is a military organization aimed to defend the Western alliance's interests, served to extend US influence. The first element of

Turkish foreign policy was to be a member of NATO (Oran, 2006, pp. 538–542). Türkiye could eliminate isolationism by being a member of NATO, and her territorial integrity was secured by being included in this Organization against the Soviet Union. Thanks to NATO membership, the Alliance with the US was expanded in the military sphere, along with the flow of money and guidance. Membership in NATO brought with it the opportunity to modernize the army, and NATO membership ensured the continuity of aid packages. America hoped to modernize the Turkish military structure to strengthen the Turkish economy and military and to oppose Communism (Hasanli, 2011, pp. 298–311). After becoming a member of NATO, it was difficult to distinguish the types of American assistance to Türkiye, and aid programs were tied to American military engagement. In addition, NATO membership brought more US aid and security assistance.

Without US economic aid, US officials thought Türkiye could not reach a level of economic development to preserve its military modernization. The report titled “Basic Assessments and Materials for the Military Assistance Program Proposal for the Foreign Correction Committee”, published on 7th April 1950 by the American Chief of Staff, underlined that US foreign aid was also crucial for the US' security. In 1950, a budget of 1.766 billion dollars was allocated to the program in which Türkiye had a place (Celep, 2018, p. 156). Following Türkiye's membership to NATO in 1952, the two countries guaranteed to sustain and expand both their individual and collective capabilities to resist an armed attack with ongoing and efficient self-help and mutual assistance. So, a vital part of the southeast wing of NATO's security system, the defense-focused relationship became much more institutionalized and formalized.

US officials like the Chief of Staff thought that weak states outside NATO should not be able to strengthen and stabilize their defenses without help from the outside (Leffler, 1985, p. 814) and that they should be supported in building modern military structures. After the attack on Korea in 1950, a turning point in the Cold War, American aid began to be defense-oriented rather than geared toward economic recovery. The rearmament race gained speed between the US and the USSR, and the Mutual Security Act in 1951, signed with Türkiye, is the most obvious example. Based on this Act, the US military

committed to providing a workforce or facilities to improve Türkiye's economic condition.

At first, when NATO was established, Türkiye was not included in the alliance despite the few attempts for membership. That is why Türkiye felt that the interest of the US regarding Türkiye's security had decreased. NATO membership was realized in 1952 when Türkiye announced sending troops to the Korean War. Türkiye's crucial role, contribution, and fight alongside American forces during this war were symbolic. The US praised Türkiye for its support in the Korean War, the contributions of the Turkish army there and involvement in other regional or defense-related organizations. More importantly, the cotton prices soared as a result of the Korean War. Cotton production in the US and other countries remained insufficient too. So the demand for cotton in the world increased, and Türkiye had sufficient cotton stock to meet that demand. The only Turkish agricultural commodity to benefit from the Korean boom was cotton. Cotton producers quickly became rich, and more than 30 family-owned holdings (Zürcher, 2004, p. 228) (such as *Kıvanç*, *Bakırlar*, *Egedeniz*) that are still influential actors in the Turkish textile industry today were established. Just as the Vietnam War contributed to South Korea, the Korean War also contributed to Türkiye.

The growth of the US presence accompanied significant economic and military aid packages. In addition to military aid and security-oriented organizations, the US aimed to create a safe circle by establishing military installations. While much of the literature focuses on American bases in non-Western countries, 52% of American troops have been stationed in Europe and 41% in Asia since 1950 (Holmes, 2014, p. 9). The United States decided that the full membership of Türkiye and Greece in NATO was necessary for its security interests. Upon this, when Türkiye became a member of NATO on February 18, 1952, the construction of many bases was completed, and Adana Air Base, the biggest project of the program, became operational a few months later in October 1952. The air base in Incirlik is one of the important military centers of the US in the world (Congressional Research Service, 2023). Following the NATO Agreement, Türkiye also signed the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed by all its members, on 25 August 1952. With this agreement, it was accepted

that the US should establish military bases and facilities in Türkiye and have military personnel. The rules to which they would be governed were determined (Bölme, 2012, p. 54). Even though its establishment was started before Türkiye's membership in NATO, it served to provide deterrence and project power from NATO's southern flank (*Incirlik Air Base*, n.d.). The US did not limit its activities to prevent the spread of Communism in Türkiye and the Middle East but also used Turkish territory to gather intelligence on the USSR (Criss, 2002, p. 473). In addition to the Incirlik Air Base, other bases, radar stations, naval facilities, storage centers, and communication nodes were built in different parts of the country. As a result, the US presence expanded to include 30,000 troops at its height in the mid-1960s (Holmes, 2014, p. 32). Thanks to the US aid, integrating airport improvement, military development and fuel storage projects into the military aid program in Türkiye succeeded. For the US, economic aid was access to these facilities and assistance with their establishment. Furthermore, the US aimed to obtain the right to use the bases in exchange for military and economic aid. For Türkiye, US installments were a guarantor of economic and military aid.

5.2.5. Inner Dynamics, Land Reform and Elites

The archetypes of modernization theory, modern and traditional, are exemplified in Daniel Lerner's famous work. In a district of Ankara (Balgat), the capital of Türkiye, the Chief is traditional, backward, and unable to imagine himself outside his current milieu, whereas the Grocer is on the way to being modern by imagining that his situation and Turkish society are more capable and developing (Lerner, 1958a, p. 19). The hope the Grocer had during the Cold War was given to the farmer in the 1950s. However, the result shows us how fragile such categories are and the failure of the narratives and policies of American intellectuals and officials based on modernization theory.

According to the modernization theory, land reform and capitalization in agriculture are important development triggers. Although Rostow stated that Türkiye started to develop, especially in the period of 1930-40, that is, when the industrialization

movements started and the agricultural income and production increased, he stated that the main issue depends on whether it can be directed towards a regular and stable development or not. Therefore, he stated that although Türkiye moved to the take-off stage in 1937, it was too early to make a decision on whether it would be successful in development. Indeed, the issue of land reform has proven this (Rostow, 2017, p. 38).

A focus on the social, political, and economic aspects of land reform concerning inequality, poverty, and development, along with the role of land reform in US development policy based on Turkish and South Korean development, is necessary, considering that this study argues that the implementation of land reform can provide vital clues as to the specificity of the political economy of that country's development. On the one side, South Korea was able to implement land reform because there was a strong political and societal will for it, US support, and a competent bureaucratic structure. On the other side, Türkiye's development journey is full of momentous "what ifs," and probably the most important one is the lack of land reform implementation. The land issue has always been a delicate one in Türkiye. Before WWII, debates among Turkish intellectuals revolved around village development, education, and the role of peasants in society (Sucu, 2020, pp. 1963–1964). The biggest debate of the first 30 years of the Republic was land reform. The observations of the Soviet diplomat Aralov, who was appointed to Türkiye as the official representative in 1922, are important. Among the most organized forces were obscurantist religious officials who were loyal to the caliph and religious values were still very strong at that time. The main fear of the landlords, the bourgeoisie, and the ex-officers was land reform. Religious foundations also had extensive lands in their hands. Although the lands of religious foundations passed to the state, Turkish development and democracy actually stagnated before 1945 when it came to the lands of large landowners. The state could not interrupt the relationship between landlords and landless peasants (Aralov, 2022, p. 58). Therefore, land reform, the ultimate aim of which was socially progressive, democrat and trying to lean on the grassroots, could not be implemented. The values of the republic could not reach the villages in Türkiye, neither did its consciousness or mentality.

Land reform is an issue that has affected the course of politics and even Turkish development, because of this issue, the Democrat Party was born, leaving the CHP. At that time, Anatolian peasants were generally landless, and landless peasants worked for large landowners. Apart from this, religious foundations had large lands in their hands. Land was one of the most important ways of material capital accumulation in those years, and naturally large landowners tried to prevent it. In time, the lands of religious foundations pass to the state, but when it comes to the lands of the big landowners, Turkish development and democracy are blocked because the landowners who supported the national army in the War of Independence have the desire and expectation of gaining greater gains, rather than giving up their lands. Celal Bayar, who was against the land reform, left the CHP and founded the DP in 1946, and Adnan Menderes, who became the Prime Minister after Bayar, was likewise the big landlords against the land reform.

The land problem or the landless poor peasantry problem, whose effects are still felt today, is one of the most critical problems in the history of Türkiye (Dillon, 1965, p. 174). Due to the lack of a strong and effective system, all of the steps toward arranging land ownership furthered the unequal situation of the ownership structure. They led to profound social stratification, poverty, and socio-economic problems. Instead of implementing land reform, a policy of land provision was pursued. Thus, the solution was sought without disturbing big landowners. Unfortunately, due to policies pursued during this period, Türkiye did not regulate the inequality of land ownership; on the contrary, by establishing a legal basis for inequality, this bias was deepened further and became entrenched. The lack of American support also plays a decisive role in this failure. The story of US-promoted land reform played out somewhat differently in Türkiye, as this dissertation argues.

The US promoted land reform or agricultural development in most countries, including Türkiye's geographic neighbors, Egypt in the Middle East and various European countries. In 1951, Justice William O. Douglas identified medical care, land reform and modern farming techniques as the primary desires of the people living in the rural areas of the Middle East (Douglas, 2007, pp. 315–317) and also as an immediate

security problem, namely the Communist threat. The fear of rural insurgency was one of America's biggest fears. Douglas reported that "There are professional agitators who stir this brew of discontent; but the rebellious drive comes from the masses. I have not seen a village between the Mediterranean and the Pacific that was not stirring uneasily." (Douglas, 2007, pp. 315–317)

Agricultural development further served the goals of US national security, like food sources and the decrease in imports as a result of the loss of foreign currency (Bonine, 2000, p. 222). Therefore, through many programs like PL 480, the Food for Peace Program, the Marshall Plan, and US aid, the US pushed the free world towards worldwide agricultural modernization so that self-sufficiency in food and agriculture for their population would occur and its domestic supply could be provided. These programs were committed to a developmental focus for US agricultural aid. Türkiye and many countries received farm equipment and products, tractors, harvesters, and fertilizers from the US (McGlade, 2009, p. 84).

After Türkiye participated in US foreign aid policy and the recommendations from US officials with their reports on Türkiye, it implemented policies for development that emphasize agriculture. This was supported by comparative advantage theory, which American specialists and diplomats used to condition Türkiye's participation in American foreign aid programs on. Until 1950, large-scale initiatives to develop the agricultural sector were not undertaken. The successful land reform implementations in the Middle East and East Asia enabled the countries' incorporation into international markets was provided in most cases, and state power expanded (Kazemi & Waterbury, 1991, pp. 1–3). However, Türkiye was an exception in the Middle East region, with no land reform implementation and measures occurring (United Nations, 1951, p. 48). Egypt can be shown as an example of success in the region where Türkiye is located. However, problems caused by the failure of successful land reform are still seen in Türkiye. In Korea, it can be argued that US-promoted land reform implementation, which can be regarded as now successful, is a crucial variable of a miraculous development.

The land reform issue arose in the Ottoman era with the advent of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. The failures and successes of this code were intensively studied and analyzed by American scholars inclined to follow the modernization school in the 1950s (Kerwin, 1959; Stirling, 1965, pp. 4–10). In the report prepared by the US in 1926, it was stated that Türkiye, whose primary industry was agriculture, needed a radical revision of issues concerning land (Ravndal, 1926). With the motto of "no landless peasants in the country", intense efforts and discussions were made in 1934 and 1937, but they were inconclusive because of the start of WWII (Keyder & Pamuk, 1985, p. 54). Intellectuals in Türkiye also thought that the country was too late in taking the land reform issue seriously (Barkan, 1980, pp. 127, 284) because land-related issues were discussed in many parts of the world before WWI– in the Balkan countries, for example.

In the Ottoman period, the economic structure was based on agriculture; however, the backwardness in industry and the dependency on foreign trade continued. Despite minimal reform attempts, when the new Turkish state was established, the situation of the peasants was grave. The agricultural tithe (*aşar vergisi*) was abolished in 1925, with the abolition of the agricultural tithe, which was a 10% tax on agricultural products produced by the workers since the Ottoman Period and the most crucial income item of the State. There was no resource to establish the industry because agriculture was left out of the tax system. Even though Mustafa Kemal Atatürk put agricultural issues at the forefront of the economic development plan and advocated that small farmers should be supported rather than large landowners, all the decisions taken at the Izmir Economic Congress held in 1923 were in the direction of the wishes of the big landowners that made and controlled production in the market despite the slogan of "*The true owner and master of Türkiye is the peasant who is the real producer.*" (ATATURK: *Creator of Modern Turkey*, n.d.) During that time, the system favored a large landholding class. Moreover, no measures were taken to satisfy the peasant population and raise their living standards. But, on the other hand, the peasants who were employed in various jobs and provided animals per the Obligation for National Defense during the war years took a hard stance against the Government

when the road tax and gendarmerie pressure were added to the negativities caused by the National Protection Act leading to state control through their production (Karaömeroğlu, 2006, p. 95). In 1930, Türkiye asked for the ILO's guidance in implementing land reform, and the Organization commissioned the Italian agronomist Olindo Gorni. Gorni wrote a report on land reform implementation by referring to the experiences of European countries such as Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, and the UK (Gorni, 1994, pp. 12–21). Policymakers were aware that land should be given to peasants without land and to terminate tenancy and sharecropping; thus, Türkiye, whose population was mainly composed of workers and farmers, could increase its production. However, in the preface of this report, translated by the Presidency of State Archives for submission to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, it was stated that Türkiye failed to implement land reform and was late for even in adding land reform to its development agenda. Therefore, policymakers wanted to again push for a new initiative in light of land reform implementations abroad (Gorni, 1994, pp. 3–4).

There were two main reasons why America did not support the land reform in Türkiye: The primary and sole purpose of America in Türkiye was to prevent social perversions and ensure political stability, especially in the eastern regions of Türkiye. Moreover, America advised that large lands should not be confiscated and distributed (Kaya, 2014, p. 230). When Marshall aid began in 1948, the new priority for America was to determine how the aid was used and for Türkiye to ensure that agricultural development would be achieved thanks to American aid, moving away from previous decades' emphasis on Soviet-inspired, state-led development. Subsequently, American aid was channeled into these areas as it was aimed to establish government-sponsored agricultural infrastructure and irrigation to produce market-oriented farmers.

In the 1952 report, Turkish land reform was evaluated to be a modest initiative. The report highlighted that broader agricultural development necessitated technical and marketing aspects, as well as land distribution (Owens, 1970, p. 30). The US advised and assisted some governments in the Middle East with land reform but not Türkiye. This was because the land reform issue in the Middle East, particularly the Arabic-

speaking part of it, was seen as a threatening issue. Land reform was suggested as the key answer to the national quest (Tannous, 1951, p. 20). This is why the US supported land reform in the Middle East, such as in Egypt, Iraq, and Iran. Moreover, the US sent advisors to Egypt before the implementation of land reform. Considering Egypt's dominant position in the Arab world, it is clear why the US took this approach.

In Türkiye, agricultural development was an important national imperative at the end of the destructive war, as in many parts of the world and small land ownership was common in Türkiye. The 1950s was a benchmark decade in the mode of production for agriculture. Türkiye's place in the international division of labor was determined as a provider of agricultural goods and supplier to the global grocery that started in the 1950s and lasted up to the 1980s. Turkish policymakers reoriented the development policy and started a program of mechanized agriculture thanks to the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan displaced a proposed Land Reform Bill of 1945. Although the land problem was seriously taken into account during the nation-building process of the 1920s, due to the sensitive balances in politics and the bumpy road of changing from Empire to Republic, it was in 1945 that the land reform law came to life. This program focused on large landowners, a minority in the Turkish rural structure. The agricultural development plan of the 1960s also held true to this orientation toward the large landowner. Turkish officials used intensive agriculture methods in order to increase agricultural outputs despite their negative social effects. Moreover, Turkish farmers played a critical role in the election of the DP, which seriously affected the country's future, and in the transition to a multi-party system. This transition strengthened modernization scholars' impression that Western-based reforms were being carried out; they even supported the 1960 coup d'état solely because they believed Türkiye had implemented reforms based on the Western democratic system.

After long and intensive discussions and work starting from 1930, a Law for Providing Land to Farmers (No. 4753) (*Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*) was adopted on 11 June 1945 in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. This law aimed to prevent the collection of land by a small number of large landowners, to meet the land need of small farmers, and to combine dispersed agricultural land. It consisted of 66 articles

collected in 8 chapters and remained in practice for 28 years until it was abolished in 1973. This law had been amended for 28 years and did not find the possibility of realizing its initial goal. Its main objectives were to provide land and the necessary equipment to landless or less-landed farmers with families and to evaluate their workforce, to provide them with credit support, to equip them with fixed assets, to ensure the continuous operation of the land of the country, to eliminate structural problems in land ownership, and to prevent the land from being collected in sure hands or to be insufficiently minimized (*Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*, 1945, pp. 5–25). Within the application period, 2.2 million hectares of land were distributed to 446,825 families in 8,116 villages. Also, with Law No. 4753, 3 to 4 million hectares of state property meadow and pasture were designated for the everyday use of farmers (Ulger & Cay, n.d., p. 5). However, the core articles of the Law were changed continuously for 28 years, and its purpose was not realized. Thus, it became null and void. Furthermore, the country's political structure was also affected by the content and implementation of this particular law.

More debates took place in the parliament for months, and İsmet İnönü added the 17th article to the end of this long legislative process. Under that article, “even up to three-quarters of the land owned by farmers with more than 50 acres could be expropriated in densely populated areas. The peasants would also be given 20-year interest-free loans.” (Zürcher, 2004, p. 210) According to this article, land distribution to landless or under-landed farmer families was envisaged. This important rule for the land to be expropriated was changed in 1950 with Law No. 5618, and the possibility of application of the land reform ceased to exist.

Law No. 5618 was such an important step that it led to major changes at the political level. The struggle between the reformist wing within the CHP and the big landowners became crystallized. As a result of this struggle, first, some social groups shouldered more burden than others (Öniş, 1992, p. 4). Among them, peasants and people who lived in rural areas or lived by the land were the most disadvantaged. Second, a group representing big landowners departed from the CHP and established the Democrat Party, and land reform did not come up on the agenda again. Cavit Oral, the most

ardent opponent of the land reform, became the Minister of Agriculture. Prior to the 1950 elections, Article 17 of the Law aimed to collectivize the non-cultivating lands of the big landowners (Ş. Turan, 2003, p. 172) was abolished, the remaining articles were amended, and the law was rendered inoperative. The most important of these changes was that the lower limit of the lands to be expropriated was increased to 5000 acres (Evrin, 2010, p. 13). It is a fascinating and important point that the stratification in society and politics – a kind of social structure split – became increasingly visible at the end of this implementation. The law could not change the land regime and support the peasants regarding credit opportunities, agricultural training, and education or with the steady collections of seed, machinery, equipment, and fertilizer. Coordination between organizations and agricultural institutions could not be achieved, and research and education were insufficient to increase productivity and production quality. The reason for this was the early mechanization and the state's inability to provide jobs. Powerful landowners, including Adnan Menderes, claimed that the overarching problem was that farmers sold their goods cheaply and purchased their needs expensively. The greatest need of the farmer was equipment with the necessary tools, increasing credits, and using scientific methods in agriculture (*Türkiye'de Toprak Reformu Sorunsalı ve TMMOB, Toprak Reformu Kongresi*, 2005). That is why almost %15 of 300 million USD of ECA aid was allocated to agricultural equipment, representing the most important single item in US aid till 1952 (R. D. Robinson, 1952, p. 451). American agricultural advisors met with farmers in Türkiye in order to provide information (USAID, 2013, p. 7).

In this transition period, landless families or villagers who were already affected by the mechanization of agriculture due to the Marshall Aid migrated to the cities or engaged in non-agricultural activities in the country's rural areas. They also continued their agricultural activities as tenants. In the past, the landlord had provided the land and the peasant his labor, and this did not change. As Yasar Kemal stated, the peasant is again share-cropping on the land distributed by the Government; he provides the land, and the landlord provides the tractor (Kemal, 1960). There was no need for sharecroppers because of the sudden and mass influx of tractors, and there was great

migration because of unemployment (R. D. Robinson, 1952, p. 451). Migration led to unemployment and shantytown settling in big cities like Istanbul and spreading to other cities until the 1970s. Since inequalities in land distribution have not been eliminated, this situation has exacerbated poverty, migration, and the rural-urban divide and still causes socio-economic problems (Saito, 2003, p. 19). Also, criticism from the public and intellectuals led Edward L. Waggoner, a second secretary of the American Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, to report the public complaints on agricultural US aid that favored already wealthy big landowners (Bilgiç, 2015, p. 259).

Since land reform failed, its components, such as agricultural cooperatives, regulations on protecting small producers against big traders and the market, development in production technologies, preventing inadequate education, shaping investment policies across the country, fair distribution and income distribution, and the establishment of industrial facilities for transforming agricultural goods, could not be achieved entirely. As Thornburgh stated, illiteracy, lack of employment, vague laws, various heritage customs, and disputes over water rights were the most serious and urgent problems in rural areas of Türkiye. All of these problems needed to be resolved (Thornburg, 1967, p. 67). In addition to all these bottlenecks encountered in the 1940s, particularly illiteracy and the security-mindedness of institutions in Türkiye still undermined development programs (Aresvik, 1975). Unfortunately, rapid mechanization did not keep pace with development in the social sphere, which Robinson called the *industrialized village* (R. D. Robinson, 1952, pp. 461–462).

The US missions' reports highlighted the need for Türkiye to abandon rapid industrialization and to produce a capitalist model of development in agriculture since agriculture was the mainstay of the Turkish economy (Economic Mission to Turkey, 1951, pp. 32–33, 57; Ross, 1952, p. 8). Moreover, most American reports were considered extreme examples of American intervention in the Turkish economy by Turks, especially by Thornburgh, and some of the reports, such as the Chenery report, were banned by the Menderes government. These reports were seen as tools to prevent industrialization and heavy industry in Türkiye. For instance, the recommendation for the closure of the Karabük Iron and Steel Mill was evaluated as a primary effort to

keep Türkiye in a backward state. In the Thornburgh report, it is stated that the Karabük Iron and Steel Mill exhibited underperformance. However, Turks tend to have magnificent planning, construction, and production in heavy industries like the Soviets (Economic Mission to Turkey, 1951, p. 109). Barker and his mission also visited the Karabük Iron and Steel Mill, Zonguldak coal mines and the port of Izmir; in the report, he stated that Türkiye should focus on agricultural development and then on industrialization since the increase in mechanization and efficiency in agriculture gave way to industrialization (Black, 2013, pp. 3, 30–31, 46).

The 1952 Report published by the US highlighted that Türkiye's land system was sound and advised the progress of land reform as an urgent issue in Türkiye. It refers to the 1945 Land Law and its positive impacts on land distribution. Moreover, it touched upon the Government's activities, such as tax reduction and aid to farmers (Department of State, 1952, pp. 15–16). Whereas South Korea was among the countries that received substantial assistance for land reform programs from the US, America did not provide any assistance to promote land reform in Türkiye, as seen in the table below.

Table 5. 3. US Aid to Land Reform Programs in the World

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Table:

U.S. OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE TO LAND REFORM PROGRAMS

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Years (Implementation)</u>	<u>Extent of U.S. Assistance*</u>			
		<u>None</u>	<u>Little</u>	<u>Considerable</u>	<u>Substantial</u>
Mexico	1915 -	None			
Cuba	1959 -	None			
Guatemala	1952-54	None			
	1954 -				Substantial
Venezuela	1960 -		Little		
Colombia	1961 -				Substantial
Ecuador	1964 -		Little		
Peru	1964/1970		Little		
Bolivia	1953	None			
Chile	1966 -		Little		
Brazil	1960 -	None			
Hungary	1920 & 1945	None			
Yugoslavia	1919 & 1943/1953	None			
Italy	1950			Considerable	
Algeria	1963 -	None			
Tunisia	1956 -	None			
Nigeria	1960 -	None			
Kenya	1961 -	None			
UAR	1952 -	None			
Iran	1961/62		Little		
Iraq	1958 -	None			
India	1948 -	None			
Japan	1868-1945	None			
	1945 -				Substantial
South Korea	1949 -				Substantial
Taiwan	1949 -				Substantial
Philippines	1955/63			Considerable	
North Vietnam	1953 -	None			
South Vietnam	1955-1962		Little		
	1970				Substantial
Turkey	1945 -	None			
Pakistan	1959 -	None			
Indonesia	1962 -	None			

Source: *AID Spring Review of Land Reform* 11-12, June 1970, USAID Department of State, Washington D.C., p. 52

Why the landless peasants became a big problem in Türkiye is directly related to, firstly, Türkiye's rulers' ideological and intellectual formation and, secondly, the international environment and the impositions of the US and the fear of insurrection that could have led to Communist inclinations in societies. These were the two pressing problems. Why did this issue result in political sensitivity? Why did Turkish politicians approach this issue with ideological concerns? Why did intellectuals in South Korea support land reform and community development projects while intellectuals in Türkiye did not?

One of Türkiye's priorities was to be called a democratic state, unlike South Korea, where economic development causes democratization (Diepraam, n.d., p. 5). Turkish authorities realized that there was a need for reforms and that creation of a democratic parliamentary system should come before development. The United States served as the democratic model for this since several American senators fiercely condemned Türkiye because of its political system during the aid debates in Congress. The representative from Ohio, George H. Bender, for instance, made a speech emphasizing Türkiye's political system:

“It will be a hypocrisy act for this House to vote a law, which guarantees the freedom of the press for American newspapers, while we know with an absolute fact that freedom does not exist in Türkiye today. The arrogant Turkish military dictatorship is asking money from us with the full knowledge that they intend to violate every provision required by the Congress.” (Karpas, 2015, p. 189)

Secondly, what is striking about the Turkish case, and something that clearly distinguishes it from the Korean case, was “the ruralizing election” phenomenon, as Huntington has argued (S. Huntington, 2006, p. 147). The DP emphasized rural development as a crucial component of the national development agenda. In winning the election of 1950, the issues of control over land and relations with the peasants formed the main base of the DP, which owed its appeal to farmers and workers. The DP utilized populist discourses effectively on these groups of people and took advantage of a conflict between Kemalists and the landlords who managed to capture state power with increased financial and political support provided by the US

(Berberoglu, 1982, p. 65). Specifically, traditional and conservative rural masses became a target for the Party. The expansion of voting rights to rural populations in a country where traditional values still dominate reinforces and legitimizes the power of the traditional elite (S. Huntington, 2006, p. 444). This situation was much graver in the countryside. In 1950, there was still almost complete illiteracy in Turkish rural areas, and nearly the entire community obeyed the words that came out of their landlords' mouths (Oron, 1965, p. 450). The DP and its leaders used this situation in their favor. Prioritization of agriculture enabled the landowning class to be among the most benefitting segments of the existing conditions with the DP. In the end, it received rural votes and the majority in the cities. As a result, the DP increased the percentage of votes in the 1954 elections, pleasing the farmers, who were an essential supporting base for the party (Örnek & Üngör, 2014, p. 180). Richards and Waterbury have summarized that the question of land expropriation was an election issue, and this was the pattern in the Middle Eastern countries:

“All the societies of the region face similar problems in extracting and investing resources, building industrial sector while modernizing agriculture, absorbing an ever-larger proportion of growing populations into cities, all the while trying to maintain political order and to build a credible military establishment. This set of problems confronts all developing countries.” (A. Richards & Waterbury, 2007, p. 6)

As Huntington claims, it is not only elections, but ruralization occurred in Turkish politics, society, and life. This was not just a case Huntington claimed. Leading U.S. historian Frey argued long before that he examined Greek villages since 1946, argued that contrary to the developments in Greece, the peasantization of the city in Türkiye progressed faster than the urbanization of the peasants (F. Frey, 1965, p. 391; Mardin, 1978, p. 243). This is an assessment that many people who study Türkiye agree on.

Adnan Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister from 1950 to 1960 and one of the party's founders in 1946, made a concerted attempt to link the party to the rural working class. In terms of the economy, it promoted rural roads, farming tools, agriculture subsidies, and credits (S. Huntington, 2006, p. 453). Menderes, a large landowner himself, was opposed to İnönü's proposal for the distribution of some agricultural lands to farmers,

and he accused İnönü and the Government of being communist by likening this move to the collective farming conception of the Soviets. While he was a deputy of CHP, he was fired from this party because of this. It is false to claim that Türkiye's initiatives at land reform were motivated by a fundamentally radical or left-wing urge for modernity. If we keep in mind that the US supported land reform in developing nations after World War II, we can better comprehend the veracity of this argument. During the Cold War, a lot of US government experts recommended land reforms as the strongest and most efficient deterrent to socialist and guerrilla activities in the so-called "Third World." However, those who supported land reform in Türkiye were frequently mistakenly charged with being communists.

Contrary to the example of Türkiye, the role of the agricultural sector in the import substitution policy in Korea is evident. The land reform that could not be implemented in Türkiye has many negative effects in terms of development, the most basic ones are the inability to create rural support, the inability to provide social cohesion and egalitarian policies, the inability of the state elites to expand their room for maneuver, the inability to eliminate the rural elites who were against industrialization. Moreover, the intermediate capital required for agriculture and mining exports could not be provided which caused very fundamental problems such as the inability to import goods and the inability to increase productivity in connection with the reforms and the inability to transfer the surplus to industry (Haggard, 1986, p. 348). Although productivity increased thanks to the investments made in tractors and equipment from the US and the loans given to the farmers for a short time, there was an increase in prices and a decrease in productivity in the products in the long run. And all this, combined with the worldwide surplus of post-Korean war production, put a huge strain on the Turkish economy. While Türkiye was a wheat exporter until 1953, with the wheat purchased through the PL 480 program, and unsuccessful agricultural and trade policies, it became an importer from the US under PL 480 in the 1960s. However, in 1952, Menderes proudly declared that Türkiye would have to import wheat for the last time, regardless of the climatic conditions (Maxfield & Nolt, 1990, p. 70). Yet, the exact opposite happened. Climate conditions is the most important factor for

agricultural productivity. Although motor vehicles facilitate and accelerate work on the soil in the agricultural sector, they cannot be replaced by the soil. In this respect, machinery plays a secondary and auxiliary role in agriculture. In the first years of the DP government, when the weather conditions were good and suitable for cultivating the product in the country, about 448 in 1952, 600 in 1953, and 950 thousand tons of wheat in 1954 were exported to foreign countries. However, since 1955, when the weather conditions were not suitable for the growth of the crop, the import was applied because the production of wheat was not sufficient for the needs and the import period began. Between 1955 and 1960, approximately 1500 thousand tons of wheat were exported from foreign countries mainly from the US (Yurtoğlu, 2014, pp. 118–119).

Agricultural development within the Marshall Plan became a significant cornerstone despite the need for US land reform promotion. As a result, American aid to agriculture was more widely distributed in southern Türkiye, further enriching the already wealthy large landowners (Bilgiç, 2015, p. 259). The US also involved Turkish rural development with rural improvement projects and education. Agricultural education was seen as a bearer of social change. Many studies on the land reform issue (M. A. Karaömerlioğlu, 1998; Yıldırım, 2021) Türkiye emphasized that the state's and people's power should be united; that is, materially and morally, peasants should contribute to the state's efforts (Bingöl, 1976, p. 19). These ideas resembled Park Chung Hee's discourse and policies like *Saemoul Undong*. Having almost the exact characteristics of *Saemaul Undong* in Korea, the People's Houses and Village Institutes in Türkiye, which are still mentioned proudly by a large segment of the society, started to be established in 1932 and 1939, respectively, to educate peasants about the modern techniques of agricultural production and to provide general education to village youth (G. L. Lewis, 1955, p. 110). They served to remove the economic and cultural differences between towns and villages and empower individuals without discrimination as teachers. They were referred to as general missionaries of enlightenment and advancement in science (Stirling, 1965, p. 276).

The education system in the Village Institutes and People's Houses was highly influenced by John Dewey, an American educator and philosopher. Village Institutes

and People's Houses aimed to modernize the nation based on Dewey's ideas and suggestions. Notably, the Village Institutes' founders were inspired by Washington's Tuskegee Institute in the US South, and the Rockefeller Foundation undertook that during the late 19th century (Adalet, 2022, p. 979). Dewey was invited to Türkiye to help form a new education system in 1924, and the new schooling system was operated under an ideology of nationalism and secularism (Wolf-Gazo, 1996, p. 16). Dewey believed that social progress and reform could be achieved through education and that democracy was an educational principle that should be practiced in school life (Dunn, 2005, pp. 8–12). For him, this was the longstanding solution for social reconstruction; schools should teach students to cooperate in the spirit of a community to develop patterns of mutual respect and tolerance. Thus, schools are responsible for cultivating habits to form a better society (Dewey, 2010, pp. 237–245). Dewey prepared reports on the Turkish Educational System in line with these principles. The first report included teacher training and funding issues. More specific recommendations were made in the second study for the creation and implementation of an educational plan, the transformation of schools into community centers, the restructuring of the Ministry of Education, the preparation and treatment of teachers, the redefining of the school system, the improvement of health and hygiene issues in schools, and the enhancement of discipline (S. Turan, 1997).

During the DP period, American experts and teachers such as Prof. Watson Dickerman and Kate Wofford were invited to consult their opinion in forming and revising school curriculums and teachers' training. These experts suggested the role of village institutes both in terms of education and agricultural activities. American experts stated that it is challenging to implement the new education system and methods for the training of teachers proposed by them because the new education policies put into practice by DP are not organized and planned. The biggest reason for this is the conflicts between DP and opposition parties (Öztañ & Çađlı Kaynak, n.d., pp. 107–108). These institutions were a significant part of the rural community development programs in which community members came together to find solutions to common problems and take action to advance the welfare of society (economically, socially, environmentally, and

culturally). For this reason, these two institutions were undeniably a significant attempt at the development of Türkiye, besides their contributions to agriculture and rural development. Lerner also argued that People's Houses and Village Institutes played a significant role in the transformation of the rural areas in the modernization of Türkiye, raising awareness of the masses and increasing the literacy rate and their political consciousness (Lerner, 1958a, pp. 112–117). Fay Kirby, who wrote one of the most comprehensive histories of the Institutes, compared Türkiye with India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Sudan and Egypt and stated that what these countries could not do, Türkiye, which was in the process of modernization, did in education with the Village Institutes (Kirby, 1962, p. 7). However, ironically, the Menderes government, which emphasized the “rural” and which was trying to win the support of the farmers, closed down the Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*) and People’s Houses (*Halkevleri*) in 1954. Particularly among the business circles and large landlords, the discontent with the CHP's economic and social development programs, such as the Village Institutes and the land reform law, causing panic, can be mentioned as the primary reason for the closure. Another reason behind their closure was the "blame culture" in Türkiye, which was, at the time, labeling someone a "communist". The Village Institutes were labeled as being "communist housings or nests" (A. Karaömerlioğlu, 1998, pp. 73–74; Kucuktamer & Uzunboylu, 2015, p. 392) even though they were a significant and unique attempt in Türkiye's development and rural revitalization history. Even today, the term "communist" can be used offensively. This shows that ideas and ideologies do not have to align with the boundaries of political history.

Türkiye's agricultural challenges tried to be met by promoting education. The US adopted two different approaches in terms of education development. First, to bolster rural development, the US-funded educational institutions in specific areas like teaching practical agriculture. In 1950, the University of Nebraska began to assist with establishing Atatürk University in Erzurum. In 1954, the delegation from this college went to Erzurum and prepared a report in which lack of education, income and trained personnel were among the problems they had found and later presented. In order to correct all of these deficiencies and strengthen the work in agriculture, veterinary

science, and vocational education, the university experts proposed the establishment of a university in the eastern part of the country (US ICA Office of Public Reports, 1957, p. 24). Turkish faculty members received an education in Nebraska at the end of 1955 (US ICA Office of Public Reports, 1957, p. 26). The second example was the role of the US in founding the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara (under the original name of Middle East High Technology Institute) in 1956. METU continued to receive US aid until the end of the 1960s. It is possible to claim that there is a parallel between the American support given to METU and the increase in the American support given to METU after 1959, along with the more serious and increasing presence of the Soviet Union in science and regional politics. In order to ensure the spread of English education in Türkiye, Robert College, founded in 1863, was considered necessary in combating Communism (Erken, 2017, p. 35). Furthermore, New York University was involved in a public administration program in Türkiye (Weidner, 1962a, p. 249). Georgetown University trained Turkish personnel in English by sending them to America (Payashlıoğlu, 1996, p. 32). The Spring Garden Institute of Philadelphia subsidized Türkiye's automobile repair and maintenance schools like the Automotive Repair School at Izmir (Weidner, 1962b, p. 161). In line with these training goals, Turkish academics were sent to Michigan State University to study business administration and economics (Garlitz, 2008, p. 233). This school was also involved in USAID-university contract programs for Türkiye. Developmental activities continued in parallel with philanthropic works. Institutions such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations supported educational initiatives in Türkiye, which were part of the public diplomacy strategies of the US. Through different cultural events, the United States Information Service (USIS), depending on the US diplomatic mission, aimed to make Türkiye's cultural and intellectual environment more suitable for US involvement. In this context, these organizations carried out activities such as agreements with libraries, cultural exchange programs, and leadership and scholarship agreements like the Fulbright Program.

Truman once stated: “I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their

aspirations for a better life.” (Merrill, 1995, pp. 1–5) American universities and experts ’knowledge sharing was channeled to “freedom-loving people.”(*Avalon Project - Truman Doctrine*, n.d.) Special attention was given to training and educational activities. Therefore, the intellectual exchange of ideas through partnerships, cultural associations, and universities also helped promote positive views about US influence and policies in Türkiye. As a result, the social underpinnings of development, like the ideas, institutions, historical memory, values, and representations in shaping a country's political economy, were and are very important. The capitalist bloc got the edge over the Communist threat, given that the Cold War was a war of ideologies. In the end, besides through various political and economic means, America's ideological power and reach irreversibly shaped Türkiye's development.

In brief, as Ayşe Buğra argues, in the post-WWII period, economic development was hampered by the Turkish government's policy direction and choices. It hampered land reform and so the commodification of labor and money (Buğra, 2017, p. 45).

5.3. Türkiye in the Development Planning Age—The Planning of Development in Türkiye (1960-80)

5.3.1. Introduction

Suppose one wants to understand the development process of Türkiye and Korea today. In that case, a detailed review of the domestic and foreign political-economic histories of the 1960s and 70s is required, including the perusal of individual and institutional backgrounds. A new episode in Türkiye began due to a series of changes in politics and the economy during the 1960s. The changes in Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s appear alongside significant developments in the world system and within capitalism. In domestic politics and in terms of its relations with the US, the period between 1960-80 was quite turbulent for Türkiye. The positive atmosphere of Turkish-American

relations gradually diminished, particularly after 1962 (Erhan & Siviş, 2017, p. 94). Therefore, Türkiye's expansion in terms of development coincides with the period that marked the beginning of contested Turkish-American relations. By the 1970s, Türkiye was at a serious crossroads.

What mattered for the US with its relations with free world countries was whether that country was in the Western camp and that the country should be stable and not have a risk of switching to the Communist camp. Following these two factors, building consensus on the consolidation of liberal capitalism through the flow of resources and establishing and maintaining international cooperation with the development and security needs of her allies were the aim of the US. Therefore, it was not very important for America whether that country was democratic or not in the first instance. The main issue of the American development package was not democratization until the 1990s (Brown, 2005, pp. 179–198). The defense of the free world against communist expansion justified the arrival of the development package, provided comfort to authoritarian regimes like those in South Korea and Türkiye, and disregarded the greatest threats to the democratization process, like coup d'états (Trask, 1968, p. 140). Like South Korea, Türkiye's development trajectory has suffered from ruptures mainly stemming from the country's coup d'états (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997). Even though coups were not just a trend unique to Korea or Türkiye (David, 1987, pp. 1–2)¹⁴, the military coup of 27 May 1960 in Türkiye was a prelude to the age of the country's string of coups, unlike Korea. Nevertheless, the turning points of the two countries correspond almost precisely to the same periods: following the overthrow of Rhee in Korea on April 27, 1960, Park came to power in 1961.

Until 1960, relations between the two countries were relatively free of crises. However, the relations between the two countries in 1961-1980 were almost equipped with political crises. For America, Türkiye's security was still at the forefront, as the right-

¹⁴ Between 1945 and 1985, 357 coups were attempted in developing-world countries, and 183 succeeded.

left division at home and the threat of communism from the outside continued. But even this did not save the relations from being vulnerable and they left behind the golden age of their relations during this period. Following the first military coup in Türkiye in 1960, an additional string of US-related crises developed, spanning from the Cuban Missile Crisis to US nuclear-capable weapons stationed on Turkish soil (1962), Lyndon Johnson's letter in 1964 on US opposition to the Turkish intervention in Cyprus (1964), and a growing wave of anti-American rhetoric among Turkish youth. The first major event happened when, without consulting Ankara's leadership, the US negotiated away Türkiye's Jupiter missiles during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was followed by the infamous 1964 Johnson letter, warning Türkiye against military intervention in Cyprus (Barkey, 2010, p. 245). Political turmoil affected the countries' relations, particularly Türkiye's decision to intervene in Cyprus. Johnson's letter in 1964 on US opposition to the Turkish intervention in Cyprus and Washington seemed to side with Greece. Johnson cautioned that if Türkiye intervened in Cyprus, NATO would not defend the country against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Türkiye could not use military equipment supplied by the US (Office of the Historian, 1964a). The Cyprus issue has long impacted Turkish domestic and foreign policy and its relationships with interested parties.

The dynamics of the period also dominated other events: strengthening US-Israeli security cooperation, the oil struggle in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the rapprochement between the USSR and Türkiye, and the escalation of the war in Vietnam. All these had repercussions on public opinion and inflamed public opinion against America; anti-Americanism replaced pro-American sentiments. Anti-Americanism in Türkiye and demonstrations against the US continued on and off until the 1971 coup d'état. Public opinion also affected decision-makers' policies; Turkish foreign policy was more multilateral and multidimensional than before. For instance, during the Arab-Israeli war, Türkiye remained neutral and did not permit the US to use the İncirlik Air Base in Adana. However, increasing political and economic hardships ultimately resulted in a coup d'état on 12 March 1971. Moreover, the ties between the two countries began to weaken gradually because of US sanctions and arms embargoes

against Türkiye following the Turkish army's intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Another reason for the strained relations was that Türkiye was going through a severe economic crisis. Increased tension in universities and social unrest, significant defense spending due to the Cyprus Peace Operation, increased cost of imports, and an increase in foreign debt triggered an already worsening US-Türkiye relationship. One of the most challenging periods was undoubtedly the post-Cyprus intervention period.

With the establishment of the second coalition government after the 1960 coup in the domestic political scene, political stability was relatively achieved. However, after the 1965 elections, the proliferation of political parties became a trend (Altıntaş, 2003, p. 9; Özgişi, 2014, p. 76). The proliferation of political parties could either bring about a consensus among stakeholders (student associations, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, etc.) or have a negative effect, such as a lack of democracy within the party, factionalism or splitting of parties. The negative effect hit Türkiye, and the country's road to democracy was severely affected. Since there was polarization in development policies like every other issue, the state could not carry out consistent industrial and development policies. Therefore, the weak political economy, which was heavily dependent on Amerika, and 1960 economic crisis could not be resolved. In Türkiye, the concept of 'state of the parties' became dominant instead of 'state parties'. As party politics heated up, the budget deficit widened to 4.62 in 1977 – the highest level until the 1990s, which led to an unstable economy and greater dependency on foreign sources (Yüzer, n.d.).

5.3.2. End of The Golden Period and Türkiye-US Relations

It is hard to find a single strong figure in Türkiye like Korea. Coalition and provisional governments dominated the 1961-80 period. The coups (1960 and 1971) and the political atmosphere of the 1960s (student movements, economic difficulties) weakened Türkiye, which was on the path of development. This domestic atmosphere in ally countries directly correlated with the success of the American development package, too. In this period, we can observe that the American development package

changed depending on the domestic conditions in Türkiye. Following the crises such as the U-2 Crisis of 1960, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the Cyprus Crisis of 1964, the opium crisis of the 1970s, and especially Türkiye's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, relations between the two countries experienced one of the most challenging periods. The US embargo had a severe impact on the Turkish economy and defense capacity and cast doubts on the credibility of the US. Even though NATO and military formations between the two countries have reinforced this aspect of the development package, this pillar, which was considered to be the strongest one of the development package, turned out to be unstable.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations and international bodies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund intervened in the late 1970s when the Republic went through its worst economic crisis. However, we cannot argue that these aids outside the United States were aimed at the "development" of Türkiye; significant external variables, namely the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Soviet entry into Afghanistan, the Soviet initiatives in South Asia and the Middle East, revived the fears in the Western bloc and these aids were given due to Türkiye's geostrategic position (Öniş, 1995a, p. 52). American support for development continued, but a consensus was not reached between American experts and Turkish governments.

Türkiye's deteriorating economy and political crises led to a reversal in the political and economic trajectory of the country. Thus, unlike Lerner's prediction, it was revealed that Türkiye could not be presented as a developmental model for the Middle East. In fact, it failed in the linear progression predicted by modernization theory. This period revealed the fragility of the reversals in Türkiye's development route and the fact that Türkiye is portrayed as a model by the United States.

5.3.2.1. US Economic Aid to Türkiye and Planning the Development

During the mid-1960s, American officials knew that Türkiye still needed aid to continue the country's economic development, maintain a strong army, and have an environment conducive to material improvement. Therefore, it was frequently emphasized to determine Türkiye's specific needs and reduce Türkiye's dependence on aid by aiding in this direction. As a result, the US stated that it would continue to provide military, economic and agricultural aid, but to a more limited extent to reduce Türkiye's dependency on the US aid (Office of the Historian, 1960, pp. 897–899). In the meantime, the US tried to help Türkiye access key programs from international financial institutions and other countries; and new actors emerged like Britain and Germany (Göktepe, 1960, p. 168) as funding sources for Türkiye in the 1960s. As the Vietnam War became a quagmire for America, American aid to Türkiye declined.

With the influence of Rostow and the modernization theory, the US gave importance to national development planning since it would serve a significant role in facilitating economic growth (Rostow, 1959c, p. 11) and a gradual transition from an aid-financed economy to one relying on export earnings as a source of foreign exchange (J. Lee, 2018, p. 21). From take-off to maturity, national development planning played a significant role in American development strategies. During the take-off phase, society must be prepared to zealously respond to new opportunities for productive activity. Changes in politics, society, and institutions are needed to support an increase in investment levels and lead to the routine adoption and assimilation of innovations. According to Rostow, Türkiye increased agricultural income, productivity and industrial activities for take-off in 1937. However, he did not make a definitive judgment on whether there would be a transition to self-sufficient growth and whether Türkiye would overcome its existing structural problems (Rostow, 1956b, p. 31). Like Türkiye, in developing countries, the planning process and the planning for US economic aid to them were essential, which fit with the USAID encouragement to have national development strategies too. That's why, the United States supported development planning and the establishment of an accompanying institution to reduce Türkiye's dependence on aid.

Promoting development planning was essential to America as it would ensure the efficient use of American resources, serving America's strategic interests. As a result of the combination of both domestic economic difficulties and external pressures from the US, Türkiye initiated development planning. The introduction of development planning also meant that foreign aid could be integrated with economic development more closely, and the US supported Türkiye's planning initiatives. These plans aimed to turn Türkiye into a self-sufficient nation (Helseth, 1957, p. 97). Turkish policymakers believed that the 1950s had failed because of unplanned and uncoordinated policies. However, during the planning period, the economy slowed down due to populist policies aimed at gaining electoral support, fragmentation in institutions, unclear targets and lack of "development determination" in the Turkish nation (Hibou & Bono, 2017, p. 45). This led Turkish development to be called 'moderately successful' compared to Korea (Öniş, 1992, p. 5). Another reason for Türkiye's transition to the planning period was that external pressure mainly came from international institutions and the US. For instance, the OECD conditioned economic aid to Türkiye on preparing the development plan and foundation of a planning organization. A broad coalition now supported the idea of development planning: the Republican People's Party with its *étatist* heritage, the bureaucracy, prominent industrialists, and even international agencies, most notably the OECD, IMF, and the World Bank (Milor, 1990, p. 5). Necat Eder, who is one of the pioneers of the idea of planning in Türkiye, indicated that there was complete harmony between the Turkish bureaucrats and the experts of the American and Bretton Woods institutions regarding the economic model (industrialization within the framework of the mixed economy) to be implemented in Türkiye and the start of planning efforts (Eder, 2003, pp. 10–11).

Table 5. 4. Loans, Grants and Assistance from the US and International Organization Between 1946-1988 to Türkiye

COUNTRY: TURKEY @												
(U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)												
PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS				FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT				TOTAL	TOTAL	PRINCIPAL	OUT-
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-48	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-52	MUTUAL SECURITY PERIOD 1953-61	ACT PERIOD 1962-84	1985	1986	1987	1988	FAR PERIOD 1962-88	LOANS AND GRANTS 1946-88	REPAYMENTS 1946-88	STANDING LOAN BALANCES 1946-88
I. ECON. ASSIST.-TOTAL	12.2	225.1	1093.0	2696.1	175.9	119.6	103.1	32.4	3127.1	4326.8	756.0	1279.0
LOANS	12.2	85.0	301.8	1640.6	85.0	-	2.4	-	1728.0	2035.0	756.0	1279.0
GRANTS	-	140.1	791.2	1055.5	90.9	119.6	100.7	32.4	1399.1	2291.8	-	-
A. AID AND PREDECESSOR	-	225.1	926.5	2282.8	175.0	119.6	102.4	32.0	2711.8	3865.5	625.0	1227.0
LOANS**	-	85.0	240.8	1398.0	85.0	-	2.4	-	1485.4	1852.0	625.0	1227.0
GRANTS	-	140.1	685.7	884.8	90.0	119.6	100.0	32.0	1226.4	2013.5	-	-
(SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)	(-)	(-)	(724.5)	(1310.4)	(175.0)	(119.6)	(100.0)	(32.0)	(1737.0)	(2448.5)	-	-
B. FOOD FOR PEACE	-	*	166.5	394.1	-	-	-	-	394.1	427.9	119.0	52.0
LOANS	-	-	61.0	242.6	-	-	-	-	242.6	170.8	119.0	52.0
GRANTS	-	*	105.5	151.5	-	-	-	-	151.5	257.1	-	-
TITLE I-TOTAL	-	-	149.7	268.6	-	-	-	-	268.6	285.6	119.0	52.0
REPAY. IN \$-LOANS	-	-	-	78.3	-	-	-	-	78.3	92.8	41.0	52.0
PAY. IN FOR. CURR.	-	-	-	149.7	190.3	-	-	-	190.3	192.8	78.0	-
TITLE II-TOTAL	-	*	16.8	125.5	-	-	-	-	125.5	142.3	-	-
E. RELIEF, EC. DEV & WFP	-	-	12.2	42.7	-	-	-	-	42.7	54.9	-	-
VOL. RELIEF AGENCY	-	*	4.6	82.8	-	-	-	-	82.8	87.4	-	-
C. OTHER ECON. ASSIST.	12.2	-	-	19.2	0.9	-	0.7	0.4	21.2	33.4	12.0	-
LOANS	12.2	-	-	19.2	0.9	-	0.7	0.4	21.2	12.2	12.0	-
GRANTS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.2	-	-
PEACE CORPS	-	-	-	15.2	-	-	-	-	15.2	15.2	-	-
NARCOTICS	-	-	-	4.0	0.9	-	0.7	0.4	6.0	6.0	-	-
OTHER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
II. MIL. ASSIST.-TOTAL	68.8	553.2	1463.4	5076.7	703.6	618.5	493.5	493.3	7385.4	9894.6	943.0	3195.0
LOANS	-	-	-	2455.9	485.0	409.5	177.9	178.0	3706.3	4137.9	943.0	3195.0
GRANTS	68.8	553.2	1463.4	2620.8	218.6	209.0	315.6	315.3	3679.1	5756.7	-	-
A. MAP GRANTS	-	439.5	1339.8	1655.0	215.0	205.8	312.1	156.0	2543.8	4326.9	-	-
B. CREDIT FINANCING	-	-	-	2455.9	485.0	409.5	177.9	178.0	3706.3	4137.9	943.0	3195.0
C. INTL MIL ED. TRNG.	-	3.0	55.4	65.5	3.6	3.2	3.5	3.3	79.0	137.1	-	-
D. TRAN-EXCESS STOCK	-	20.9	56.5	791.6	-	-	-	-	791.6	857.7	-	-
E. OTHER GRANTS	68.8	89.8	11.7	108.7	-	-	-	156.0	264.7	435.0	-	-
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL.	81.0	778.3	2556.4	7772.8	879.5	738.1	596.6	525.7	10512.5	14221.4	1699.0	4474.0
LOANS	12.2	85.0	301.8	4096.5	570.0	409.5	180.3	178.0	5434.3	6172.9	1699.0	4474.0
GRANTS	68.8	693.3	2254.6	3676.3	309.5	328.6	416.3	347.7	5078.2	8048.5	-	-
OTHER US LOANS	32.3	-	32.0	370.8	15.0	34.0	-	-	419.8	491.6	440.0	52.0
EX-IM BANK LOANS	32.3	-	32.0	300.3	-	34.0	-	-	334.3	406.1	358.0	48.0
ALL OTHER	-	-	-	70.5	15.0	-	-	-	85.5	85.5	82.0	4.0

* LESS THAN \$50,000. @ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION
 ** VALUES IN THESE COLUMNS ARE NET OF DEOBLIGATIONS. SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS
 *** INCLUDES CAPITALIZED INTEREST ON PRIOR YEAR LOANS.

Source: *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1988 CONG-R-0105.* (1988), p.30

Table 5. 5. Assistance from International Organizations to Türkiye

	ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)												TOTAL
	U. S. FISCAL YEARS												
	1946- 1948	1949- 1952	1953- 1961	1962- 1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	
NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA CONTINUED													
SYRIA													
TOTAL.....	-	0.1	5.8	596.1	15.9	23.6	5.0	30.0	39.2	108.0	16.4	-	839.8
IBRD.....	-	-	-	488.1	15.6	22.0	-	30.0	-	77.5	-	-	633.2
IDA.....	-	-	-	47.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	47.3
UNDP.....	-	0.1	4.8	39.3	0.3	0.1	5.0	-	0.9	0.7	0.4	-	51.3
OTHER UN.....	-	-	1.0	5.7	-	1.5	-	-	-	1.8	-	-	10.0
EEC.....	-	-	-	15.7	-	-	-	-	38.3	28.0	16.0	-	98.0
TURKEY													
TOTAL.....	-	48.0	21.1	3,240.6	872.3	713.9	676.8	945.2	706.9	1,090.6	1,083.8	1,194.7	10,584.5
IBRD.....	-	47.9	12.8	2,344.0	722.0	647.8	669.4	794.3	698.5	1,057.0	1,069.4	1,063.9	9,118.9
IFC.....	-	-	-	213.3	13.5	14.8	5.3	150.0	7.1	31.6	11.5	129.1	575.1
IDA.....	-	-	-	178.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	178.1
UNDP.....	-	0.1	6.7	54.3	1.8	1.8	2.1	0.9	1.3	1.3	2.9	-	73.3
OTHER UN.....	-	-	1.6	9.7	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.7	-	1.7	14.1
EEC.....	-	-	-	441.0	135.0	49.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	625.0
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC													
TOTAL.....	-	*	0.3	329.3	46.1	45.6	53.6	58.3	29.6	60.3	39.5	35.6	618.2
IFC.....	-	-	-	3.2	-	-	4.0	-	4.9	11.9	-	-	23.9
IDA.....	-	-	-	288.3	41.0	42.0	47.5	56.0	22.7	46.4	32.7	35.6	532.2
UNDP.....	-	*	0.3	34.7	0.1	3.6	2.1	2.3	0.4	2.0	0.9	-	46.6
OTHER UN.....	-	-	*	3.1	5.0	-	-	-	1.6	-	5.9	-	15.5
YEMEN, PEOPLES DEM REP OF													
TOTAL.....	-	-	-	114.9	25.9	25.0	24.5	17.8	23.5	-	23.4	-	254.3
IDA.....	-	-	-	86.0	24.0	19.5	23.6	17.4	19.4	-	22.4	-	211.8
UNDP.....	-	-	-	21.2	0.3	5.5	0.9	0.4	0.5	-	1.0	-	29.7
OTHER UN.....	-	-	-	7.7	1.6	-	-	-	3.6	-	-	-	12.8

* LESS THAN \$50,000.

Source: *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1988 CONG-R-0105.* (1988), p.202

As seen in the tables 5.4. and 5.5., in the 1962-84 period, the total American aid increased by almost 2 times compared to the previous period. Likewise, for the same period, the total aid provided by international organizations increased by a large margin compared to the previous period. The 1960 coup was a rupture in democracy and affected foreign aid allocation to Türkiye; in this period, the promotion of democracy and even development aid by the US began to be distributed considering the situation of democracy and human rights in that country. However, it was not the priority of the US. Concerns by the US government that Türkiye's new junta might move the country in a more left-wing or pro-Soviet direction were quickly addressed

by Türkiye (Danforth, 2016). The US officials strongly believed that leftist opposition groups threatened the rule of conservative, pro-US dictators and military juntas (Zimmermann, 2017, pp. 10–15). In the immediate release of Türkiye's coalition government (CHP-AP) after the coup, it was announced that Türkiye would continue close relations with the US (Sander, 2016, p. 200) and maintain a pro-American stance. The country immediately declared that it would continue to fulfill the responsibilities required from a member of NATO and CENTO, both being indispensable to America's containment policy (Aktürk & Dağlı, 1988, p. 5; Oran, 2006, p. 681). The US was satisfied to learn that the new government intended to preserve ties with NATO and CENTO, as was indicated by President Eisenhower (Dilek, 2010, p. 313).

By the early 1960s, US aid to Türkiye alone had already reached nearly 4 billion dollars (W. M. Hale, 2000, p. 121). After Vice President L. B. Johnson's visit to Türkiye on 26 August 1962 and following a promise to begin to help Türkiye more, US economic aid rapidly increased to 237 million dollars in 1963. However, the trend reversed in 1964 and decreased to 148 million (The Comptroller General of the United States, 1956, p. 5). In the following years, the aid level continued around this amount. Ultimately, the new government became more dependent on the US than previous governments and thus was increasingly open to its influence. In the words of William Hale, after the May 27th coup, Türkiye's dependence on the West was confirmed (W. Hale, 2003, p. 111).

In the late 1960s, Turkish officials knew there was a need for formal economy-wide planning due to low and unstable economic performance. The idea that Türkiye could only be 'developed with planning' influenced the mindset of both the government and the Turkish people (Aktürk, 1988, p. 54; R. F. Barbaros & Yıldırım, 2013, p. 87). This need and the US encouragement led to establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO) on September 30, 1960. The Dutch planner Jan Tinbergen and his assistant J. Koopman had already been working on a planning agency and a development plan for Türkiye before the 1960 coup; following the coup with the recommendation of the OECD, Tinbergen was invited to Türkiye to prepare the country for a planned economy. Tinbergen had presented a draft study on the

organization of the planning agency and contributed to the preparation of a five-year development plan between 1963 and 1967 that was over 500 pages and covered many subjects ranging from energy to agriculture.

Table 5. 6. Scope of the Türkiye’s Development Plans

YEARS	SCOPE OF THE PLANS
1963-67	ensuring and maintaining the highest rate of development within the democratic order, which is the way of life chosen by the Turkish society and realizing social justice.
1968-72	recommending that import substitution policies be taken further to cover certain durable consumer goods and products and intermediate goods. Industrial development is one of the main priorities. However, agricultural development, rapid urbanization, and unequal income distribution were secondary issues.
1973-77	industrialization was the main aim since the goal of “industrialization within 10 years” was not realized.
1979-83	the obligation to solve problems that reached irrecusable cost

Source: Own Elaboration

The SPO prepared five-year development plans and annual programs focused on the consolidated treatment of government accounts, balanced macroeconomic projections, sector-level consistency studies, and improved methods for project selection until the late 1980s (J. D. Sachs & Collins, 1989, p. 621). The SPO in Türkiye and the EPB in South Korea were established around the same period. However, the SPO (unlike the Economic Planning Board of Korea or the MITI in Japan) needed a more critical degree of autonomy and a strong agency and suffered from severe fragmentation. Nevertheless, it still played an essential role in private sector decisions, as did the EPB.

In 1962, before the preparation of development plans, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics outlined several recommendations about the SPO's functions:

1. "...The manpower information program should describe manpower problems in general and should concentrate specifically on manpower conditions in those sectors of the economy which the development plan intends to influence."
2. "...The organization should participate in setting manpower goals in the economic and social development plans"(US Department of Labor, 1969, p. 228).

Increasing administrative capacity, particularly setting workforce goals in the economic and social development plans and solving problems in rural areas (large migration to cities, children's inability to access education, lack of technical education) should be prioritized in planning (US Department of Labor, 1969, pp. 227–230). Although most of the problems were the same as in the previous period, the US and IFIs' officials had a welcoming attitude about development planning conducive to the effective integration of aid with domestic policies and measures taken under the first plan (Tinbergen, 1967, pp. 71–77). However, American officials declared that “a critical shortage of foreign exchange makes outside assistance essential if Türkiye is to carry out an effective development program.” (The Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1964, p. 233) That is why the US pledged 70 million dollars only for development program lending and affecting Türkiye's macroeconomic policies, and USAID also made additional loans for projects (The Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1964, p. 233). Even though the US aid policy was directed at development planning, the aim to reduce dependence on foreign aid could not be successful; Türkiye continued to depend on aid from the US.

On the US front, it was realized that “the actions taken by the new government will not overcome the weakness of Türkiye's financial position and its chronic foreign trade deficit, and thus continued foreign aid will be necessary.” (1958-1960, *Dwight D. Eisenhower, Vol. X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey*, 737, 1993, p. 861) It was indicated that even though Türkiye made considerable progress, a combination of financial mismanagement, an attempt to carry out over-extended and

poorly organized investment, and the maintenance of a heavy military establishment increased the strain on the Turkish government, and the economy kept stumbling severely between 1955-1958 (*1958-1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Vol. X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, 737, 1993, p. 892*). All of these events weakened Türkiye's economic resilience. Without external assistance, primarily for the maintenance of military forces, a sound development program would not likely be attained in the foreseeable future (*1958-1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Vol. X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, 737, 1993, p. 893*).

For long-term development, US military and economic aid and support would continue. Also, between 1960 and 1969, by benefiting from AID technical assistance, 2878 trainees were sent from Türkiye to America, and priority was given to people from the education, industry and transportation sectors, especially agriculture, labor and public administration (*Türkiye'ye Amerikan İktisadi Yardımları 1949-1969*, 1970, pp. 10, 24). Through the PL 480 program, Türkiye imported wheat, grains, oil, and a small amount of meat, poultry, and dairy products from the US. The use of Turkish liras received in return for this was divided into two: to meet some of the expenses of America in Türkiye and for the financing of Türkiye's development (including the supply of materials, equipment, facilities and services, the purchase of industrial fertilizers, the financing of some projects, and Cooley loans) (*Türkiye'ye Amerikan İktisadi Yardımları 1949-1969*, 1970, p. 12). Cooley loans were for developing business life in Türkiye, expanding the trade volume, using American agricultural materials and using them as loans to the private sector (*Türkiye'ye Amerikan İktisadi Yardımları 1949-1969*, 1970, p. 14). Between 1964 and 1969, many projects such as Türk-İş Building, the Turkish Highway Department, Industrial Development Bank, Ereğli Iron and Steel Factory, and Keban Dam received this loan from the US (*Türkiye'ye Amerikan İktisadi Yardımları 1949-1969*, 1970, p. 33). The US also provided direct technical assistance, economic aid and project loans to the projects of these institutions. The third project where direct technical assistance, project loans, and economic aid were provided was the major financing for Ereğli Iron and Steel Mill, with 130 million USD in 1961 (Lubell, 1969b, p. 148; D. A. et. al. Rustow, 1967,

p. 48). This was the largest private-sector AID project in the world built by a consortium of US companies (*Turkey-Eregli Steel Mill-AID-DLC/P-506: Washington D.C. 20523, Capital Assistance Paper, Proposal and Recommendations for the Review of the Development Loan Committee, 1967, p. 1*).

There was a difference of opinion between the two countries regarding development planning. Türkiye wanted to follow the developmental model that worried the Americans the most. In the 1960s, Türkiye moved to a development model based on planning that prioritized heavy industry; however, the US did not respond warmly to Türkiye's demand. Following the loss of comparative advantage in agriculture, the unplanned channeling of American aid, the distress in the world price of agricultural products, followed by the trade deficit and foreign exchange bottlenecks that Türkiye experienced, Türkiye could not get more aid and credit from the United States (Pamuk, 2014, pp. 229–230). America started to marginalize Türkiye, which led Türkiye to seek different cooperation possibilities in its foreign policy. Furthermore, Türkiye devalued its currency and entered a major economic crisis in 1958. The need for external resources increased during the planned period because of rising financial problems, political tensions, and problems in foreign relations with the US. This led Türkiye to become closer to the Soviets and seek other sources of assistance (Wallace, 1990, p. 102). In the same period, the Soviet Union's foreign policy changed from aggressiveness to taking its place in the international division of labor resulting in tightening relations with the Third World and nonaligned countries in the Western bloc (Brun & Hersh, 1990, p. 45).

These conditions resulted in rapprochement between Türkiye and the Soviet Union. The Menderes Government requested funds from the Soviets for the projects, but it was interrupted by the coup. In the early 1960s, Turkish companies and state-owned enterprises started a dialogue with Soviet companies. Türkiye, deprived of capital and technology, was dependent on foreign aid and investment, especially assistance in technology, and sought a partner to establish another cooperation instead of the United States. In 1963, Türkiye gave signals that it was ready to accept Soviet aid, and in 1967 the Soviet Government provided technology and credit for the construction of several

industrial projects. In addition, trade relations between the two countries have also tightened. In 1960, Türkiye signed a commercial agreement with Russia and Poland. According to the agreement, 21 million dollars of goods will be exchanged with Russia and 22 million dollars with Poland in 1960, and many products (such as glass, pulp, fruit, cotton, leather machinery, metal, and wool) would be purchased (Kurban, 2014, p. 269).

In 1966, under Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, a loan was given to Türkiye by the Soviets. In 1967, the Soviet Union invited Demirel for an official visit. Following Prime Minister of the Soviet Union-Alexei Kosygin's visit to Türkiye in 1966, the Soviets committed to finance and aid Türkiye's heavy industry and energy investments. In March 1967, Türkiye signed an aid agreement with the Soviets (Yeşilbursa, 2019, p. 120). Following this agreement, a contract between *Tyazhpromeksport* and Turkish *Etibank* on Soviet technical aid in constructing an aluminum plant near Seydişehir was signed in Ankara (Ginsburgs & Slusser, 1981, p. 392). A glass factory was established in Çayırova in 1962, with the agreement signed in 1957 between *Türkiye İş Bankası* and "Technoexport", an institution of the USSR. Again in 1962, with the agreement between Sümerbank and Technoexport, machinery and equipment were purchased from the Soviet Union for three weaving factories as a result of the agreement signed between Türkiye and the USSR in Moscow on March 25, 1967. With this agreement, an iron and steel factory in Iskenderun, a hydroelectric power plant in *Oymapınar* and on the Manavgat river to meet the electricity needs of the aluminum factory in Seydişehir, an oil refinery in İzmir *Aliğa*, a sulfuric acid factory in Bandırma, and a plywood factory in Artvin will be established by the USSR. The materials and equipment necessary for expanding the *Çayırova* glass factory would also be provided. Türkiye received a loan of 200 million dollars to build iron and steel plants, an aluminum factory, a refinery plant and a sulfuric acid factory (Masumova, 2018, p. 35). Later, in the five years following 1975, the Soviet Union gave Türkiye 2.830 million dollars in economic aid to undermine US dominance (Guan-Fu, 1983, p. 76). The negative response of the United States to Türkiye's demands and preferences for

development pushed Türkiye to seek new donors, such as the Soviet Union, and this rapprochement created discomfort in the Western alliance.

Of the total 8.5 billion dollars in economic aid allocated to Western Europe under the Federal Assistance Act (FAA) Program since 1962, Türkiye had received over 60% of the total sum. In terms of military aid during the FAA years, Türkiye received almost half of the amount allocated, with a total of 11 billion out of over 24 billion dollars (Callaway & Matthews, 2016, p. 142). Military aid certainly relieved the constraints in the economy. However, in just three years, between 1958-60, the US experienced substantial deficits in its balance of payments. After many years of ignoring the deficit problem (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1961), the US started to see and associate this problem with the distribution of foreign aid and chose to reduce it. The US chose to diversify aid allocators because of the overwhelming pressure from Türkiye's aid needs and demands. The US pressed for more assistance from other actors to shift the post-war aid burden of America to the European countries and enable reconstructed countries to take more active roles in development programs in the Free World and diversify Free World resources. Shortly after John F. Kennedy took office as US President, he proposed that developed European countries and Japan should also share foreign aid distribution.

While the US experienced difficulties in its economy, which was another reason to decrease aid to Türkiye (The Comptroller General of the United States, 1974, p. 6). Türkiye took steps to recover its economy in light of the IMF's recommendations. When positive results began to be obtained, Türkiye requested the Fund's assistance in the form of a standby agreement in 1961 (*History of Lending Commitments: Türkiye, Republic Of*, 2008). Türkiye's reserves declined, although substantial aid from abroad was received. However, Türkiye's problems still needed to be eliminated despite the IMF and OECD funds and US aid. The US and these institutions sent public administration advisors to help Türkiye manage her chronic economic problems (Butterfield, 2004b, pp. 23, 129). Therefore, Türkiye's dependence on foreign economic aid continued (Evrensel, 2004, p. 11).

Türkiye wanted to ensure a steady flow of external financing, including aid and loans from International Financial Institutions, to realize its aims in its development plan. For that reason, Türkiye applied to NATO in 1961 and asked for a NATO-sponsored aid consortium. However, this proposal was declined by NATO authorities (Tuncer, 1975, p. 214). In the same year, the Federal Republic of Germany announced its plans to undertake a part of the economic aid that the US gave Türkiye. However, America considered the international setting more beneficial to finance Türkiye's development plan and reduce its aid burden. Thereupon, NATO and the OECD prepared a working group called "Türkiye's Long-Term Developmental Issues Working Group" on July 10, 1962, to assist Türkiye in its hardships with its developmental efforts and development plans. This working group comprised representatives from OECD countries, the EEC, the European Investment Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank, including the US (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1968, p. 710). The Consortium first examined Türkiye's financial needs (Pelt, 2006, p. 241). The Group aimed to “review medium-term economic policies of Türkiye” and “examine the ways and means by which an adequate flow of foreign resources, public and private, can best be mobilized in support of Turkish development programmes, including the continued operation of the OECD consortium of aid to Türkiye.” (A. Robertson, 1979, p. 197) The Group focused on the flow of resources financing Türkiye’s development plan and the suitability of the administrative structure (Çetin, 1967, p. 250).

Table 5. 7. Gross and Net Aid Flows to Türkiye, 1963-70 (unit: million US dollars)

Year	Consortium Credits	Project Credits	Commodity Imports	Debt Service	Net Aid
1963	169	97	94	145	215
1964	145	36	32	141	72
1965	169	57	29	191	64
1966	175	56	17	148	112
1967	161	60	—	133	88
1968	145	127	—	106	166
1969	106	174	41	152	169
1970	217	179	83	205	274

Source: Gupta, K. L. (1999). *Foreign Aid: New Perspectives*, Springer, p. 237

The Aid Consortium for Türkiye was formed on July 12, 1962, to enable OECD countries to contribute aid to the country (Kuchenberg, 1967, p. 91). The Consortium took part in coordination economic aid activities in accordance with Turkish five-year development plans and facilitated bilateral agreements that were negotiated between Türkiye and other donors. Large projects were partially financed by the Consortium, such as the Keban Hydroelectric Dam, which was built to store and regulate water in Eastern Türkiye. After the Consortium was established, the US share of economic aid dropped to less than 20% (*United States Economic Assistance to Turkey- B-125085*, 1974, p. 7) since the amount of aid was smaller than expected by Americans. However, the volume of the Consortium's aid was considerable and amounted to \$700 million between 1963-1965 (Kuchenberg, 1967, p. 97). The US continued to be the leading aid provider to Türkiye (Tuncer, 1975, pp. 216–219). In 1963, the US aided through the Consortium, giving approximately \$66 million. America asked for the remaining amount to be given by countries in the Consortium. Therefore, aid to Türkiye slowly began to be transmitted through more diverse channels. The aid was to be used in the financing of foreign debt and development plans. The OECD's evaluation of "very

excellent” concerning the first two plans was justification for this aid (Cicioğlu & Cicioğlu, 2017, p. 9).

The assistance provided by the Consortium dropped from 237 million to 147 million dollars in 1964 (Hackett, 1969, p. 20). The Federal German Government attempted to rebalance this sum by increasing its aid offering (in 1967, Türkiye received 155.7 million dollars), but the 1968 figure had fallen to 106.6 million (Heper & Criss, 2009, pp. 108–111). In 1965, the USAID director announced that economic aid to Türkiye would end in 1973 (on the basis that this period was within a reasonable timeframe for Türkiye to realize its economic objectives). The cessation of aid was intended to prevent Türkiye's use of American aid for purposes outside those set out in the five-year development plan. Changes in macroeconomic policies, like the exchange rate between the Turkish lira and the US dollar, became the main discussion topic between USAID and Turkish officials. America also made a sharp change in foreign aid policy in 1968, with significant reductions in aid to all countries due to intense pressure from the public for the reduction of economic aid, one of the critical items of government spending, to close the budget deficit. Combined with the reduced American aid, all these created growing dissatisfaction in Türkiye (Hackett, 1969, p. 20). Pressure intensified on the Turkish government to devalue the local currency. This was led by the US, the Consortium, the World Bank, and the IMF, all asking for emergency economic measures from Türkiye. At first, Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, resisted these ideas and recommendations, thinking that implementing these policies would jeopardize his party's situation in the elections in 1969. However, the pressure increased in August 1970, and the value of 1 US dollar increased from 9 to 15 Turkish liras. The US tried to reduce the panic the devaluation would cause in the Turkish economy by giving an additional 25 million dollars in aid (Hackett, 1969, p. 20).

Investment in infrastructure provided by NATO decreased during the Development Plan II period and slightly increased during the Development Plan period III. The 1963-70 period was characterized by relatively more macroeconomic stability than previous periods. The US strongly recommended reorganizing macroeconomic policies, and Türkiye took measures to correct the macroeconomic indicators. As

Krueger argues, trade policies highly affect macroeconomic stability and have significant ramifications for the effectiveness of aid and appropriate macroeconomic policies to support economic development (A. O. Krueger et al., 1989, p. 257).

Between 1960 and 1969, the domestic market and industrialization efforts were institutionalized through development planning and protected by the import substitution industrialization (ISI) policy. As a result, these years were defined as a growth phase for the ISI and accepted and legitimized as a conscious development strategy (Öniş, 1998, p. 34). The main aim of the planning mechanism was to extend the ISI into more advanced sectors of economic activity (Öniş, 1998, p. 34). Rapid growth was generated during this period based on the domestic production of simple consumer goods and thanks to an inward focus and import substitution policies; for a while, the country reached relatively high growth rates (Balassa, 1986, p. 163) and the relative economic and political stability was restored in the mid-1960s. The domestic production of commodities that had previously been imported grew as a result of ISI policy. The US supported Türkiye's ISI policy. In the 1950s, America encouraged developing nations to adopt the planned economic model and implement ISI. While the ISI strategy met the aspirations of developing countries to establish a national industry, on the other hand, the expansion of America's industry over developing countries was the primary economic strategy (Maxfield & Noldt, 1990, pp. 49, 63). To accomplish this, American authorities encouraged industrialization through import substitution in emerging nations. As a result, the ISI helped to construct the worldwide international division of labor and integrate the developing world into the American economy. As a result, increasing import volume has made Türkiye a permanent market for the US and other core countries (Keyder, 1987a, pp. 298–299). US foreign investment was much lower than aid during the ISI and planning period. The foreign investment made up about 2% of total foreign aid inflows (Eralp, 1994, pp. 211–212).

Table 5. 8. Inflows of Foreign Aid and Foreign Investment to Türkiye (1963-73)

Year	Foreign Investment	Foreign Aid
1963	10.16	413.33
1964	7.7	222.22
1965	10.62	451.67
1966	7.73	403.33
1967	7.53	431.67
1968	10.27	421.67
1969	6.82	365.00
1970	6.00	306.00
1971	7.35	337.50
1972	9.22	266.79
1973	5.29	166.79
Total	88.80	3785.97

Source: Eralp, A. (1994). Turkey in the Changing Postwar World Order. In A. Öncü (Ed.), *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*. The American University in Cairo Press, p. 212.

Whereas the total military and economic aid was about 297 million dollars in 1971, Türkiye received aid at about one-third of this amount in 1975 (USAID, 1977, p. 28). Following this decline, the US canceled the arms purchases, grants and commercial and military sales to Türkiye on February 5, 1975, because of Türkiye's Cyprus intervention (*Turkey - Military Aid Embargo (7)*, 1975; Uslu, 2003, p. 93). With the

election of President Carter, the tension was relieved towards the end of the 1970s, yet the US did not increase aid. However, the US still aimed to prevent Türkiye from collapsing since the economy went bad, inflation gained momentum, agricultural subsidies, and state enterprises drained the budget. Therefore, President Carter mobilized Western countries to gather at Guadeloupe to discuss Türkiye's deteriorating economy, giving economic aid to Türkiye for NATO to maintain its strength (*The Department of State Bulletin*, 1979). Arguably, this situation is suitable for the conditions of the period because the new era toward the end of the 1980s was characterized by "disenchantment with aid" and "aid fatigue," except for the underdeveloped countries look rather dim (Ruttan, 1991, p. 10).

Through the end of the 1970s, Türkiye became increasingly vital to the US because of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The situation in Iran curtailed Turkish oil supplies. In order to remedy this, many Turks from Europe sent remittances. Also, the US provided economic aid of about 300 million dollars, and more than half of this aid gave as grants. However, as of 1982, economic aid decreased, whereas military aid increased from 403 million to 700 million dollars in 1985 (Guess, 1987, p. 152).

5.3.2.2. Promotion of American Interests in Trade, Investment, and Markets

The Turkish political economy of the previous period was determined by state-led industrialization, and infrastructure was highlighted with American aid. There were almost no foreign direct investments. Undoubtedly, the integrated market economy created by road construction during the Democratic party period contributed to economic development. However, uncoordinated development policies, large foreign debt increase, a budget deficit, and high inflation dragged the country into a serious economic crisis in 1958 and the IMF was asked for help (Weiker, 1981, p. 183; Yenil, 2010, p. 107). In addition, while ISI policies aimed at industrial production for domestic consumption, they made the country more dependent on foreign aid. In the 1960-80 period, ISI, referred as mixed economic strategy by Turkish policy makers,

aimed to create large-scale state-owned manufacturing industries in the absence of the capitalist interested in investing (Kılıçbay, 1972, p. 84). The structure of Turkish trade became increasingly problematic as exports were mostly dependent on commodities imported, which was the principal cause of the ongoing chronic trade deficit. The ISI strategy failed to achieve sustainable economic growth despite some moderately successful attempts in the 1960s and early 1970s because of low export levels and local industries' reliance on imports of goods used in industrial production, which resulted in a serious foreign exchange crisis in the late 1970s (Şenses, 1988, p. 9).

One of the most critical events of the 1960s was Türkiye's application for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). The European Union was born under the name of the EEC, with the Treaty of Rome signed on March 25, 1957. Türkiye applied to be a part of this community in 1959. The Ankara Agreement, signed on 12 September 1963, established a partnership framework between Türkiye and the European Economic Community. And this led to a further concentration of Türkiye trade mostly in the European economy. In the period from applying for membership to becoming a member, Türkiye actively sought the support of the US. However, in this process, policy differences between America and Türkiye emerged. Türkiye needed to be included in the Common Market in order to get the support of the US. Kamuran Inan, who headed relations with the EEC on behalf of the Turkish Foreign Office, met with William M. Kerrigan of the US Embassy. He stated that Türkiye's involvement was vital for its trade, its political connections with Western countries would be strengthened, and the flow of Western ideas to Türkiye would be faster and more effective. However, the officials in Washington did not show any interest in Türkiye's membership. Although embassy officials shared their concerns with Washington that Türkiye could change its foreign policy direction and that both the American aid and Türkiye's efforts in the development path would be in vain, Türkiye did not receive the support it expected in this regard.

The second significant event was Türkiye's rapprochement with the Soviets to take its place in international markets and suppress its concerns. Soviet leaders knew that Türkiye aimed primarily for Western and mostly American resources, yet they

accepted payment for factories in Turkish agricultural exports. Especially from the Syrian crisis in 1957 to 1980, a Soviet-Türkiye relationship emerged in economic and commercial terms. While Turkish governments determined their countries' "underdevelopment" status as the most important problem, Soviet economists added Türkiye to the list of "developing countries" (Hirst & İşçi, n.d., p. 846). While Türkiye's tensions with America and the West over the status of Cyprus continued, the Soviets sent engineers and machines to Türkiye to construct factories (Hirst & İşçi, n.d., p. 846).

Planning is also the way to harness resources most effectively. For example, the first Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) focused on increasing the efficiency of domestic savings and limiting imports through various measures such as quotas or licensing. As a result, the automotive industry was established in a period of import substitution, and until the 1990s, it thrived (Taymaz & Yilmaz, 2017, p. 6). Domestic automotive production got a serious push from the FYDP between 1963 and 1967; the role of the locomotive production sector of the automotive industry in Türkiye's development and industrialization was particularly emphasized (Taymaz & Yilmaz, 2017, p. 6). For the years 1963 to 1977, three five-year plans were adopted. The primary focus of the first two plans for 1963–1973 was enhancing domestic savings performance. Its trade policies were characterized by a predominance of restrictive elements, such as import and export licensing, quotas, and high customs duties, as well as many surcharges and advanced import deposit requirements (Kopits, 1987).

Even though the SPO was not a strong agency compared to the EPB, it still played an essential role in private sector decisions, as did the EPB. For example, the SPO's approval was compulsory for all private-sector investment projects. In addition, since the Turkish government failed to implement incentive mechanisms for rapid private-sector-led industrialization, the SPO's functions, such as tax exemptions, import privileges, and foreign exchange access, gained importance. Furthermore, the SPO placed compulsory guidelines on the private sector and regulated industrial production, foreign exchange regimes, price controls, and resource allocation.

The principal sectors under the planning scheme were infrastructure and agriculture (Yulek, 2016, p. 3). Also, to encourage the private sector, during the planning period, generous government policies helped determine how financial capital would develop, and the number of conglomerates (called 'holdings' in Turkish) sharply increased. These new conglomerates grew quickly; there were just two conglomerates in Türkiye before 1963, but the number rose to 19 by 1970. What's more surprising is that between 1971 and 1976, 106 new corporations were founded. As a result, the most prominent finance capital firms in Türkiye (namely, Koç (1963), Sabancı (1967), Yaşar (1968), Eczacıbaşı (1970), Alarko (1972), Borusan (1972), Çukurova (1972), and Enka (1972)) came into existence during this time (Öztürk, 2010, pp. 92–93). The emergence of the private sector provided a much more diverse economy, promoting industrialization in Türkiye throughout the 1970s (Mokyr, 2003, p. 136). They emerged in the manufacturing and distribution sectors. By the 1980s, many private sector actors realized that the ISI model was unsustainable, so they started to back policies that were more export-oriented (Onis & Webb, 1992, p. 17). Compared to Korea, Türkiye could not shift from the ISI to the EOI and was stuck with an inward-looking orientation for a long time; planning efforts were directed to support and deepen the ISI during the 1960s. The severe balance of payments crisis in the late 1950s led Türkiye to implement this policy.

There are two main differences regarding the role of the private sector in development between Korea and Türkiye. First, low foreign direct investment meant that family-owned conglomerates mainly administered this process (Mokyr, 2003, p. 1). Unlike Korea, the Turkish industrial elite exploited financial resources, personal connections and networks, and various advantages provided by the government. Furthermore, we can perceive a bias against foreign trade, so the private enterprise system dominated for a long time (Wälstedt, 1980). The second difference is that even though the Turkish political sphere was dominated mainly by urban bureaucratic and elite groups (S. Huntington, 2006, pp. 356, 381), the private sector and the state became an ally rather than a rival. The significant difference here is that, in the case of South Korea, the state maintained a principled stance towards the domestic business sector. It imposed strict

international competition requirements and implemented “carrot and stick” policies to reward successful firms and penalize underperformers (Evans, 1997, p. 78). The state continued to be the leading actor and played a significant role in supporting the private sector, namely privately-owned local conglomerates and holding companies (Pre, 2006, p. 59). However, unlike the Korean chaebols, the Turkish state created a business class without experience and was not an inherently strong economic autarky. At first, Korean *chaebols* played a crucial role in expanding and diversifying production and export during the 1960s, and later, developed and expanded capability, investing in high-tech industries during the 1980s and 1990s. However, because of their inherent weaknesses, the Turkish private sector actors supported protectionist policies for the domestic market.

The US and international institutions' delegations recommended that Türkiye ease unnecessary state intervention. The American model of development presupposes private sector–government cooperation from the beginning; in the 1950s, Rostow strongly recommended that agriculture should be taken seriously, and land reform was the primary tool to counter the widening the gap between the countryside and the cities: "For this end, the private sector is necessary to the government in determining the opportunities and prices of the market by itself or by collaboration with the government." (Rostow, n.d., pp. 74–78) In the first FYDP, following a recommendation from the US, it was stated that private enterprise would be supported and that the coexistence of public to private entities would be emphasized, especially in terms of the change required for its structure, behavior and organization, investment was being directed to productive fields (*Birinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1963-7)*, n.d., p. 4). Financing, providing credit, staff, and training issues were also addressed in the plan (*Birinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1963-7)*, n.d., pp. 490–495). However, the targets were not specific. Further comprehensive work done by the Korean Development Institute elaborated upon Türkiye's weaknesses and strengths in the planning. Over time, the training and expertise of Türkiye's public personnel were achieved, and policies and programs became more comprehensive and compatible with the standards of international institutions. Concerning weaknesses:

"The implementation of policy and programmes is somewhat passive. A more target-oriented and pro-active approach is needed.

Furthermore, mitigating regional disparities is a major concern, if not a major priority of most of Türkiye's developmental efforts. In the words of economists, equity issues weigh more heavily than efficiency issues. Balanced growth strategy is not always the most effective way to achieve economic development goals. Finally, the size and amount of public policy and decision-making institutions need to be streamlined to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies. There is a need to reduce administrative obstacles faced by the private sector, and to reduce or eliminate some unnecessary and repetitive bureaucratic transactions as well as improve and simplify procedures rapidly." (*A Way Forward for the Turkish Economy: Lessons from Korean Experiences*, 2006, p. 55)

In the 1970s, the United States suggested Türkiye's most urgent development problem, comprehensive reform in trade policies and the devaluation of the Turkish lira, was agreed upon in the Consortium with the OECD established. As a result, the United States has decided not to interfere in negotiations with the IMF (1969-1976, *Richard M. Nixon/Gerald R. Ford*
 Vol. XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972, Turkey, 2007, p. 1036). It was also stated that Türkiye had a serious trade deficit and needed more foreign aid (1969-1976, *Richard M. Nixon/Gerald R. Ford*
 Vol. XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972, Turkey, 2007, p. 1055). In the same period, due to the decrease in American aid and Türkiye's ambiguous attitude towards American private investment, there was a difference of opinion among American policymakers, especially between the Embassy and Department of Commerce, on whether trade promotion activities in Türkiye should be maximized or not. In addition, foreign investors were discouraged due to Türkiye's delayed and burdensome bureaucratic procedures, strict investment restrictions, and the application of rigid non-tariff barriers in imports (The Comptroller General of the United States, 1974, pp. 51–52). Moreover, it is stated that Türkiye is not a prime market for America and is not even a principal world trade nation. Finally, it is pointed out that American policies may change, provided that Türkiye changes its trade practices (The Comptroller General of the United States, 1974, p. 60).

Apart from the declining aid and economic and political problems, the US-Türkiye relationship was interrupted by an incident specific to trade: The Chrome Crisis. Chromite was a very important material utilized by Türkiye since WWII, and, in the field of industry, chromium was essential for the US defense industry. The US was a significant importer of Turkish chromium. However, the Soviet Union dumped its chrome export materials in 1963, and, like many countries, US importers preferred Soviet chrome to the Turkish variant (Sander, 2016, pp. 205, 207–208). Thus, American chrome trade shifted from Türkiye to the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union dropped the price of its chrome exports in 1963, America began to import it from the USSR instead of Türkiye, knocking Türkiye's trade agreements with the US off balance.

Türkiye was a latecomer in liberalizing trade through the free-market economy and export substitution model compared to Korea. Between 1954 and 1980, the US Government and IFIs often complained about the interference and unwillingness of the Turkish bureaucracy because state control over foreign exchange and investment kept foreign investment and capital at bay. As a result, the US investment was only %12 (Keyder, 2007, p. 220). As an agency that could not work in Türkiye, SPO did not play a constructive role in this trend either. As a result, the organization was abolished with a single decree in 2011 and was replaced by the Ministry of Development, which was also closed in 2018 (*DPT 2001'de Uyardı, Yapılması Gerekenleri Anlattı: Can Sıkan DPT 2011'de Kapatıldı*, 2020). Beginning in the 1970s, the US and the UK pushed for trade reforms and supported financial and monetary regimes intended to increase market forces while limiting government intervention in the economy. As a result, the American Dollar fulfilled its international currency mission in 1971. The fixed exchange rate system was terminated, indicating that the US no longer had the power to sustain the system. With Nixon's declaration in August 1971, the Bretton Woods System was over, and a new period began. International Keynesianism was put aside, and an alternative development paradigm of 'neoliberalism' emerged.

5.3.2.3. Involvement in Defense Infrastructure Capabilities

The tensions between America and Türkiye started in the 1960s. They lasted until 1987, showing us the change in Türkiye's US protection regime and military development (through aid, base establishments etc.). Contrary to the previous period, the emphasis on supporting Türkiye militarily would bring economic development, and a strong Türkiye could set an example for its region was changed. However, American actions on Turkish development changed because of political crises; the US prioritized its strategic interests rather than strengthening the Turkish military.

It can be understood from the 3 events that the strategic considerations of the US directed its interests rather than the development package. First, the significance of Türkiye's geopolitical position for NATO and the US diminished with the détente between East and West during the 1960s and 1970s, as could be seen in the Jupiter missile crises. The US unilaterally removed protective missiles from Türkiye during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Second, relations were worsened by the US's inadequate military aid (Uslu, 2003, p. 218). Third, The Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter in 1964 (President Lyndon Johnson's warning to Türkiye not to intervene in Cyprus caused drastic changes in US military aid and eventually resulted in the enactment of a weapons embargo in 1975. The silence of the US on the Cyprus events and blocking Turkish intervention on the Island put a strain on the relations. Last but not least, during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts, Türkiye forbade the US from using its military bases to support Israel (Aras, 2002, p. 4). In 1969, with the Bilateral Defense and Cooperation Agreement, Türkiye limited the military activities of the US in Türkiye because of the Johnson letter (Erhan, 2001, p. 556).

Nevertheless, American aid to Türkiye continued to modernize and transform the Turkish Air Force and military and develop strong and relatively modern armed forces. The US provided large financial outlays with the condition that the Turkish military is improved. That is why despite the fluctuations of US military aid to Türkiye averaging 165 million dollars per year (Duke, 1989, p. 274), between 1945 and 1970, the US military aid totaled 3,132.4 dollars (USAID, 1971b, p. 26). Up to 1967, Türkiye had

also invested about 2.5 billion dollars of its funds for its defense, so over 5 billion dollars was invested in Türkiye's military (United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1967, p. 164). Between 1961 and 1970, US military aid decreased. Turkish army and air force officers (over 1,000 officers and 300 pilots) got training under International Military Education and Training (IMET) in the US, costing about 55 million dollars (USAID, 1984, p. 28).

US policy towards Türkiye was identified in a National Security Country Report (NSC 6015/1) in October of 1960, just before the planning initiatives and with the effects and reverberations of the coup. After listing general considerations and objectives, the US set significant policy guidance in economic, military, and political issues and Türkiye's relations with the Free World. The report warned that the new Turkish government may be "less inclined" to informally-based agreements and may "look more closely at US use of Turkish military facilities." In the Report, it was indicated that the US had five main aims for Türkiye, in the following order:

- (1) preserve Türkiye's territorial integrity,
- (2) secure continued access to military facilities and Türkiye's cooperation within NATO and CENTO,
- (3) maintain the Turkish Armed Forces,
- (4) achieve a democratic government, and
- (5) pursue economic growth that will eventually eliminate Türkiye's need for economic aid.

In short, maintaining access to military bases in Türkiye was given priority over fostering economic growth or democratization. However, US aid and military engagement encountered problems in Türkiye, particularly related to the country's political sphere. The increase in the number of political parties gave room for the rise of different groups. Particularly, left-wing parties clamored against the American presence in Türkiye. As a result, organized strikes, demonstrations and protests were organized by leftist groups and Turkish workers at American military facilities. This is understandable because the US presence expanded to include 30,000 troops at its height in the mid-1960. This was comparable to the size of the US presence in South Korea (Holmes, 2014, p. 32). Following the rise of anti-base protests and anti-Americanism, the US started to withdraw its personnel by around 75%, and the Navy stopped making port visits (Holmes, 2014, p. 32). Improving relations between

Türkiye and the Soviet Union coincided with this period, as already indicated. In 1964, the Soviets deployed naval forces in the Mediterranean that posed a severe challenge to competing with US hegemony.

Considering Türkiye's particular importance and geopolitical location, it was seen as a gateway into the Middle East. Türkiye's strategic location straddling the East and West and NATO's southern flank required special consideration. In 1966, America proposed that Türkiye use US military aid to modernize its land forces (the air and maritime security of NATO's southern flank was provided by the US Air Force in bases in Türkiye and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean). This American initiative was primarily designed to prevent Turkish interference in Cyprus—a proposal deemed unacceptable by the Turkish government and its general staff (Holmes, 2014, p. 36). The commander of the Turkish naval forces went to Washington in September 1966 to negotiate the modernization of the Navy. However, the US had to agree to this proposal because of Türkiye's response and reaction. In fact, by 1969, the US agreed to sell five destroyers to Türkiye, and in October 1970, it sold them units for Türkiye's submarine fleet.

The Cyprus problem has been the primary determinant in Turkish-American relations. The US Congress forbade the sale of weapons and established a military embargo (over 200 million dollars in arms purchases, grants, and commercial and military sales to Türkiye were canceled) following the provisions of Section 620 (X) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which went into effect on 5 February 1975 (Kınacıoğlu & Gürzel Aka, 2018, p. 146). In 1975, Türkiye closed most US defense and intelligence installations when the US Congress began the embargo in response to Türkiye's military intervention in Cyprus. The embargo on Türkiye lasted three years and was a significant triggering factor for increasing anti-Americanism within the country. Furthermore, due to the *détente* and political shocks between Türkiye and the US, the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 1969 collapsed (Erhan & Siviş, 2017, p. 95). US military activity on Turkish soil were restricted by Türkiye, and the US was forced to recognize Turkish authority over all installation (Murphy, 1991, p. 424).

Following the embargo, the US stopped providing military aid to Türkiye. In response, the Turkish government suspended all operations at US military bases in Türkiye and transferred complete control of them to the Turkish military. During that time of crisis, the relations deteriorated in every area. To reduce tensions between the two countries, US President Carter lifted its embargo on aid to Türkiye in 1978 and approved military aid to Türkiye in 1979. The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was signed in 1980 to sustain bilateral defense and security relationships, regulate the military facilities of the US in Türkiye, provide military assistance, and co-production of military hardware and supplies (Spain, 1984, p. 31). This agreement was later extended in 1987 and 1990. However, the economic and military aid issue in American domestic politics was still a point of contention. In particular, the US emphasis on human rights, which began with the Carter Administration, could be seen in the establishment of The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in 1977 within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this factor was taken into account in foreign economic and military aid allocation. As a result, American military assistance to Türkiye was halved from the beginning of the 1980s to the end of the Cold War (USAID, 1984, p. 30).

5.3.2.4. Türkiye's Agricultural Policies

While developments in agriculture enabled Türkiye to integrate into international markets, global industrial developments with which Türkiye had not kept pace caused the country to turn more inward. Therefore, the 1950s have come to be seen as a 'hinge decade', during which economic policy shifted towards the ISI. Because of the failure of liberal policies implemented in the 1950s, the country directed domestic sources to establish a national industry based on agricultural development-led industrialization rather than industrial development. As a result, Türkiye had a more closed economy following import-substitution industrialization policies.

Between 1960 and 1980, Türkiye attempted to eliminate the land issue's hindrances. In 1961, with the support of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), land consolidation, a deliberate readjustment and rearrangement of fragmented land parcels and their ownership, was implemented as a first attempt because international organizations like the FAO still advised Türkiye to implement land reform (El-Ghonemy, n.d.; FAO, 1973). The significant problems related to the land in Türkiye were that the lands were used for purposes other than agricultural activities; lands were fragmented, scattered and irregular in a way that prevented the production from being efficient. Small family businesses still were the majority. Despite the regulations made in Law No.4721, the land fragmentation problem still needed to be solved, which led to the inability to create non-agricultural employment and income opportunities, decreased productivity, and prevented structural transformation in the rural areas. Moreover, the intense population pressure on the land doubled with economic crises.

Within the 'Law to Provide Farmers with Land' framework, between 1947-1972, the land provision rate remained very low, amounting to approximately 10% of all families who farmed (Aysu, 2015; 25.6.1973 Günlü ve 1757 Sayılı Toprak ve Tarım Reformu Kanununun 212'nci Maddesinde Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun, 1962). This law remained in force until Law no.1757 on Land and Agricultural Reform was passed on 19 July 1973. However, by considering the political and economic fluctuations that might arise from the changes that the land reform could create in the individual property structure, Turkish policymakers decided to use the concept of agrarian reform instead of land reform (Keleş & Mengi, 2022, p. 125). It is not a coincidence that land reform discussions came to the fore again in this period. The 1971 constitution constitutes a breaking point for the history of Türkiye. The 1961 constitution, which was the most liberal constitution, was left behind, and in the 1970s, the threat of communism really existed in Türkiye's domestic policy. Riots began in the people, the most massive strikes in Türkiye took place between 1977-80 (*Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi: 1970'li Yıllar*, n.d.), in short, the social reaction gradually increased and there was a real leftist movement threatening order in the eyes of the government officials.

Therefore, it is highly probable that the state authority also wanted to intervene in the relationship between the landlord and the landless peasant to deal with all these discontents.

There was optimism that Türkiye could adequately implement the land reform in the international media this time. For instance, in 1977, the New York Times published the following: “Land reform is coming to Türkiye.” (S. V. Roberts, 1977) However, this optimism did not last long. Like in previous periods, via populist policies, the discourses of the parties were built upon land reform to gain votes. It served as an agenda to promote the regimes' control, which made it more difficult to transition to full democracy. The CHP under Bülent Ecevit gained more votes in the 1973 election thanks to pledges to redistribute wealth through taxes and social services, develop rural areas, implement land reform, maintain state control over economic activity, and grant general amnesty to political prisoners detained under martial law. As a result, the gap between landlords and landless farmers grew. This indicated a crisis of democracy in Türkiye—democratization was not a mere regime problem.

In this period, rather than promoting a land reform in Türkiye, American assistance to agricultural development also focused on expanding fertilizer use. For example, in 1966, a USAID team composed of six fertilizer experts from the TVA advised the SPO for about two months. As a result of this two-month consultancy, a detailed fertilizer program was incorporated into the second Five Year Plan (A. O. Krueger et al., 1989, p. 260). Between 1962 and 1965, technical support, financial help, and aid for financing facilities to produce agricultural inputs were all provided to Türkiye (e.g., fertilizer plants). This total amount is approximately 29.5 million dollars, whereas Korea received more than three times, amounting to 108 million dollars (Schutjer & Weigel, 1969, p. 790).

USAID helped Turkish bureaucratic institutions in coordinating agricultural planning and development. For example, wheat production campaigns were conducted by the Organization starting in the late 1960s. The US further aided projects to improve the agriculture system and raise rural prosperity and services during the 1960s and 70s by

aiding water management projects. In 1960, USAID established the Department of Land and Water Resource Development (TOPRAKSU) (Kibaroglu et al., 2012). Furthermore, farmers were educated on soil and water management issues. During the late 1960s, both USAID and the World Bank funded significant projects in Türkiye, such as the Seyhan Irrigation Project (Heper & Criss, 2009, p. 109). USAID helped increase the capacity of TOPRAKSU for on-farm water development, particularly in Aydın Province (located in Türkiye's Aegean Region) and increase the capacity of the private sector to assist farmers outside the project regions (to the coasts of the Aegean and Mediterranean on Türkiye) (A. O. Krueger et al., 1989, p. 262; USAID, 1971a, pp. 2–4). Türkiye could not deliver water to most farmers outside the US, or international institutions aided projects until the 1970s.

Up to 1980, government policies supported the agricultural sector and aimed at keeping the peasant economy strong. However, since 1925, when the agricultural tithe was abolished, the agricultural sector was left out of the tax system, and this policy changed in 1980. Furthermore, the surplus extracted from agriculture was never used to support industrial development (Buğra, 2017, p. 46). In addition to the failure of land reform and the closure of Village Institutes, one of the biggest mistakes was made in the realm of land or agricultural tax. Before the first 5-year plan was prepared, Nicholas Kaldor was invited to prepare a report. In it, he argued that taxation should come from the entirety of potential production and not only from one actual revenue source. As a result, people could buy land, and capital-intensive production would increase production and, thus, tax receipts. Therefore, as production areas would be created in the villages, a regional and village-city income distribution would entail fairer distribution.

As part of the development program, the US sent many young American people to rural and urban areas in many countries. Kennedy launched the Peace Corps project. He believed that the determining factor of technical education was "whether a free society can compete" (*The Founding Moment*, n.d.). A Protocol on the Peace Corps between Türkiye and the US was signed in 1962; Ross Pritchard, appointed director of the program in Türkiye, worked to help the volunteers for a long time.

Approximately 1200 Peace Corps volunteers came to Türkiye and worked in many fields, from health to education (Erken, 2015a, p. 52) and operated in 48 cities between 1962-9 (Soysal, 2015). The young volunteers received training in language and culture and took on many tasks, from teaching English to healthcare services, working mainly in rural areas (Erken, 2015b, p. 51). Via educational exposure, they collaborated with METU to advance community development, expand social work, and reach out to different urban and rural communities. Ultimately, at a micro level, the number of Turkish teachers learning English enabled the spread and improvement of English-language education, knowledge exchange, the development of a skilled workforce, and growth in one-to-one interaction between cultures. Thus, unlike South Korea's self-made community development project, Türkiye's made through the US intervention (T. Smith, 1977).

The US aid and project-based assistance contributed to Turkish development, however; despite mechanization, expanded irrigation systems, improved seed varieties, and an increase in the use of pesticides, agriculture's contribution to overall GDP growth decreased quickly. Because with the transition to intensive agriculture in the 1960s, it became increasingly expensive to increase agricultural production (Pamuk, 2009, p. 386) and Türkiye could not specialize in almost any field. Moreover, policymakers' populist policies to win votes or stay in power put Türkiye in a situation with no return. The closure of the state-run Village Institutes and People's Houses interrupted a balanced development. Finally, due to disruptive population movements, the gap between urban-rural divide became more acute with the continued failure of land reform implementation. Migration from rural to urban areas would not have been this intense and, therefore, so painful. As a result of waves of migration from rural to urban areas across Türkiye, the foundation of semi-slum neighborhoods showed up. Among migrant communities on the urban periphery, political Islam is a generational phenomenon rooted in the 1970s and flourished in the 1980s. Semi-slum neighborhoods formed the basis for Islamist development in the 1970s and 80s and affected Türkiye's political sphere for the upcoming decades. 1950's policies that led to unequal development and wealth distribution caused the spread of Islamist groups'

ideology and influence in society. The urban population was about 25% of the total population in 1945 and reached 44% in 1980 (Pamuk, 2009, p. 386). In addition to the coup series in Türkiye, the underdevelopment in both urban and rural areas affected the destiny of Türkiye's development.

The opium poppy crisis stands in a significant place as an event that shows the situation of Turkish agriculture. Particularly how American aids were transferred and used, how fragile the relations between Türkiye and America were managed with crises, and finally, the state's capacity. Indeed, this crisis is significant in terms of showing how the American development package is implemented in Türkiye and what dynamics it depends on. The cultivation of the opium poppy turned into a predicament between the two countries and became a significant foreign policy and domestic problem for Türkiye between 1968-1975.

Anticipating that this issue would become a problem after the war, Türkiye cooperated with the United States. Because after 1949, the use of drugs started to increase at an unprecedented rate, which caused great concern in the United States. However, the Menderes government, which did not want to lose the votes of the opium-producer villagers, avoided taking more drastic measures. The reason for this was that the Government aimed to establish an alkaloid factory with aid received from the United States, and thus smuggling would be prevented. But, according to one view in the literature, America did not want such a factory to be established in Türkiye (Örmeci, 2020, p. 69). If Türkiye produced opium derivatives in its factory and offered it to the world markets at a lower price than the United States, America would have suffered an economic loss. In time, America increased its pressure, despite Türkiye's measures regarding opium production. After Nixon came to power in 1968, he aimed to solve the issues of the Vietnam War and the drug problem of the US as devastating as the Vietnam War. Therefore, America constantly pressured Türkiye to stop opium production completely and spoiled Türkiye's international image in this way. While the Turkish government was trying not to offend the opium producer, it was also trying to alleviate the increasing pressures, but without success. In 1971, American and Turkish officials met again, and John Warner, Deputy Director of the American Drugs

Department, announced that the United States would provide 3 million dollars for developing new agricultural products to be planted instead of poppy, but the negotiations were inconclusive. Discussions increased in the American Congress, and it was requested to stop Türkiye's military and economic aid (Spain, 1975, p. 302). Moreover, there were even those who advocated economic sanctions on Türkiye. The Turkish Government refused to accept a ban on the total plantation (while the US demanded the prohibition of poppy cultivation), and a compromise could not be reached, leading to a breaking point in relations between the two nations. After a memorandum overthrew the Demirel Government in 1971, the softening or fading of the crisis began on 30 June 1971, when Türkiye prohibited opium poppy cultivation.

With the memorandum given by the Turkish Armed Forces on March 12, 1971, the Government resigned. Many views have been put forward that the United States had prior knowledge of the March 12, 1971 intervention. The general view (Turkish officials such as former prime minister Bülent Ecevit, and former Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil) in Türkiye is that the US supported the 12 March intervention and thus wanted to ensure that poppy cultivation was banned (Clarridge & Diehl, 1997, p. 117; Erhan, 2018, p. 116). Meanwhile, the debates in Congress got tougher, and it became the subject of reviewing the aid given to Türkiye within the AID framework. The dissatisfaction of the American government against the measures taken by Türkiye did not go away. Poppy production was banned in 1971 as the Turkish government acceded to the further pressures of the US. Later, America gave compensation, but this amount was limited to 35 million dollars spread over ten years, and Türkiye expected at least 100 million dollars. The 35-million-dollar compensation, reached by verbal agreement, had not been devised with a program on how the aid would be spent, whether it would be used to compensate producers or to develop new crops instead of the opium poppy. A short time later, a report was prepared between the Turkish and American authorities, in which the characteristics of the poppy cultivation areas were examined, and suggestions were made for the development of field crops, livestock, food products and agriculture-based industry projects. The agreement between the AID Türkiye mission and the Minister of Finance of Türkiye was signed in 1972, and

America agreed to aid 35.7 million dollars (*Poppy-Ban Cost to U.S. Disclosed*, 1971). Only one-fifth (2 million dollars) of the aid should have been distributed to the farmer. The rest was transferred to the Treasury. Eight million dollars were used to finance long-term projects other than their determined purpose. Therefore, the objections of poppy cultivators increased due to the inequalities arising from the distribution of compensation and the inability to receive compensation. There was a great reaction from the public.

In 1973, as the general elections were approaching, all political party leaders promised to lift the ban. Bülent Ecevit made CHP the first party in the elections years later. Establishing a coalition government, Ecevit announced in 1974 that poppy cultivation would be allowed. On 1 July 1974, Türkiye lifted a ban on cultivation—the ban on opium production, introduced under US pressure in 1972, was rescinded (Maher, 2002, p. 1114; Uslu, 2003, p. 248) and production began again, which led to an escalation in the drug crisis in America. The United States continued to put pressure on Türkiye with the threat of ceasing its military and economic aid to Türkiye. The 1961 foreign aid act was amended, and America's Exim bank stopped aiding Türkiye. However, with the intention of not harming the United States, controls on poppy cultivation were much tighter after the ban was lifted and limited to 20,000 hectares. Ecevit wanted to gain an important political trump card and a success story that he could use against Demirel in domestic politics rather than harming the US. In addition, in an environment where the Cyprus Problem started to occupy a more important place on the agenda and Türkiye was preparing for military intervention on the island, this issue started to fall off the agenda. However, the dissatisfaction created by removing this ban with the Cyprus Peace Operation (1974) was partially effective in the US Congress's arms embargo against Türkiye in the 1975-1978 period (Erhan, 2018, pp. 132–140).

Most probably, these two crises (Cyprus and opium issues) can be considered one of the most serious ones that the US and Türkiye experienced during the Cold War. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated that no independent country would agree with other countries on the issue of what it cannot cultivate on its lands and that these

interventions of the US would be dishonorable and incompatible with its sovereign right. However, the public reflects that the United States treated Türkiye as a colony without considering its national dignity (Erhan, 2018, p. 13).

The effectiveness of American aid in determining the country's policies has been revealed once again. For example, upon the prohibition of poppy cultivation, Prime Minister Nihat Erim said that he wanted to bring "the most modern agricultural system in the world with the help of America" (Gülen, 2019, p. 380). However, with the reaction of the producers and farmers, the United States agreed to help and pay compensation to Türkiye. The Turkish Government stated that it would continue to pay compensation to the farmers in 1975 that suffered losses due to the prohibition of opium production to implement projects that would increase the production of export-oriented and import-substituting goods, develop agricultural industry and establish marketing and infrastructural facilities. The US Secretary of Agriculture, Hardin, stated they were ready to provide extensive financial and technical aid to these projects (*T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, 1944, pp. 37–38). Furthermore, in 1972, an agreement was signed between the United States and Türkiye, which envisaged 35.7 million dollars of aid and 300 thousand dollars to be given to the security forces to combat smuggling (Erhan, 2018, pp. 128–129). Although the areas where the American aid would be used were determined, a small amount of the aid was distributed to the farmers, the dissatisfied farmer did not leave their tarts empty, and replacement projects still needed to be implemented. Even though the government stated all farmers' losses would be compensated, alternate sources of income would be devoted to the development program as soon as possible (Spain, 1975, p. 299). The desired goals were not achieved just because the Government relied solely on US aid far below the expected amount.

After the 1979 oil crisis, the level of economic depression experienced by Türkiye increased to such an extent that diesel could not be found, and textbooks could not be printed because the paper could not be produced. Tires could not be provided even for the vehicles of ministers. The United States decided to continue the aid to Türkiye, but the purpose of this aid was determined to provide a "regional balance" (US Congress

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1979, p. 112). While in such a deep depression, Continental Grain Company, one of the largest grain companies in America, applied to Congress, arguing that the US should stop the aid to Türkiye and that Türkiye should pay the 80 million dollars that it owed (Şenses, 2017, p. 57). The dispute resulted in Türkiye giving 125,000 tons of wheat, a burden to Türkiye then (*Turkey Settles Claim Of Continental Grain*, 1979). Türkiye's most important products produced and exported in the 1970s were wheat, cotton, tobacco, nuts, vegetables and fruits ("Farming in Turkey," 1979, p. 1). On the other hand, particular importance has been given to the wheat production of Türkiye and the place of wheat in the Turkish economy. The Rockefeller Foundation has started a project (the Turkish Wheat Project) in Türkiye. From 1970 to 1982, they examined wheat varieties in Türkiye, and Turkish scientists received training abroad on this subject. The most important source of motivation for this project was that Türkiye could not reach its agricultural potential and was still dependent on American aid (Zajicek, 2019, pp. 5–6). While Türkiye's geographical location, rich oil and gas deposits, and "great development consciousness" were counted as advantages, instability in Government in Turkey and the strained political situation were cited as the most significant disadvantage. Nevertheless, just as modernization theorists positioned Türkiye as a model of Muslim democracy, Ford and Rockefeller's officials hoped that this project would serve as a model for other countries national programs (Zajicek, 2019, p. 7).

5.4. Through the 1990s: Türkiye–US Relations: Development, Neo-Liberalism, and Beyond

The 1960s import substitution policy instigated by America came to a deadlock in the late 1970s. With the advent of the 1980s, the debt squeeze, difficulties in attracting external funding, the crisis of ISI policy, and problems in the economy that worsened and made new arrangements necessary all consolidated capitalist ascendancy (Keyder, 1994, p. 45). The neoliberal turn in the 1970s was also a turning point for Türkiye. Türkiye struggled to adapt because former developmental strategies and notions like

import substitution, national development, and planning had become outdated. As a result of the primary development strategy that was relatively closed and tightly regulated before 1980, Türkiye, which became an import substitution country, has not been able to achieve competitive power in the international arena. Through the 1990s, the dominant development agenda became in stark contrast to the previous periods, a time marked by instability for both developed and underdeveloped countries. The agenda of this period was determined by the terms such as structural adjustment, neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus. After two decades of turbulence in the international political economy and countries' -whether developed or underdeveloped- diverse and complex development journeys, a new paradigm in development studies emerged.

When developments in the international arena, such as recession, and the oil crisis, negatively affected Türkiye's balance of payments and the flow of external funds, the country experienced a breakdown; as stated in a US report, Türkiye faced tremendous economic difficulties and struggled to maintain military strength (US Comptroller General, 1982). These problems were so severe that America did not criticize the 1980 coup. Instead, President Reagan said that Türkiye-US ties should be back to the period of the 50s (Karasapan, 1989, p. 160). Even though the Turkish side had every distrust towards America due to the rising anti-Americanism in the 1970s, the crises and problems between the relations, the US economic aid and military assistance to Türkiye continued in this period as well. Breaking all ties with America was not among the options, as cutting off the aid provided by America could paralyze the military and the economy. In order to broaden its field of action, Türkiye was to develop its role as a political and commercial bridge between the Middle East and Europe in this period (Karasapan, 1989, p. 160). The neoconservative Reagan administration took power in 1981 and was sympathetic toward the military regime. In turn, the Turkish military government proved to be the closest ally of American interests in the region. As a result, in the 1980s and 1990s, US military aid to Türkiye largely dominated.

Although the Reagan administration adopted a very compassionate attitude towards the Turkish military regime, we cannot claim that the US administration had no interest

in democracy and human rights issues in Türkiye. On the contrary, the Turkish government was told to restore democracy and human rights (Dağı, 1996, pp. 127–128; Önder, 2016, p. 134). However, the Turkish military's modernization and strengthening became the US' primary objective.

This period began with Türkiye having opened up her economy to free market forces and the outside world, adopting a structural adjustment program that signaled the transition to neoliberal economic policies on January 24, 1980 (Şenses, 2016, p. 16). The creation of an export-oriented economy program was based on liberalization. Türkiye aimed to be an open economy and wanted to adapt to the international division of labor. The objective was to shift from import substitution to export focus by relying more on market-based policies (*Dördüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1979-1983)*, 1948, p. 493; Şenses, n.d.). The development strategy focused on exporting, replacing the formerly dominant ISI strategy. The main expectation was to gain the confidence of foreign capital circles through the increase in exports and to be able to borrow money from international markets again (G. Kazgan, 2002, p. 129). For the privatization practices to be carried out within a plan, the state planning organization was assigned to prepare this plan. As a result of the international tender opening, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York company (US) and Price Waterhouse (UK) were involved in preparing a privatization master plan (Sezgin, 2015, p. 71). Türkiye was a late-comer to the movement, which believed that economic development could be achieved through the shrinking role of the state, which started with Reaganism and Thatcherism. Here, at this point, it can be rightly claimed how different situations are between Türkiye and Korea.

Following the January 24 decisions, Özal sought to integrate Türkiye into the global economy with structural adjustment programs and tried to do this by planning an EOI strategy with large conglomerates, just like in the case of Korea. Özal's promotion of liberalization was to open the businesses created in the import substitution period to competition. However, Özal's reaction to these policies was mixed. Privatization lists were created arbitrarily and constantly modified. Groups close to the government were favored, and import-substituting industries lobbied for continued protectionism

(Findley, 2019, pp. 375–375). New technocrats were chosen by Özal in the latter half of the 1980s to accelerate neoliberal reforms and put them at the head of critical government apparatuses and SEEs. A new group of young technocrats, popularly known as Özal's princes, had almost all been educated in the United States or worked for organizations such as the IMF and WB (Dalgıç, 2012, pp. 132–134). However, this elite group lacked the bureaucratic traits of Weber's system necessary for the bureaucratic autonomy that formed part of the state's capacity. Moreover, persons with direct or indirect links to Prime Minister Özal and his family were recruited, so a merit-based system was not established (Heper & Selçuk Sancar, 1998, pp. 155–156). In addition, this group could not show solidarity and corporate identity formation (Onis, 1991, p. 124). The majority of Korea's neoliberal technocrats received their undergraduate education in the US after graduating from the country's top universities, known as SKY (Seoul National, Korea, and Yonsei universities), and went on to achieve high marks in the civil service test to become bureaucrats in the EPB. As opposed to their Korean counterparts, Özal's princes were not as homogeneous. Nor did they have a school, institute, or government institution to formally incorporate and organize their ideas and views systematically.

Thus, Türkiye's state and apparatuses could not be as autonomous as in Korea. The main factor determining Türkiye's development has been foreign capital movements. Promoting education for development, investing in physical infrastructure, preventing environmental degradation, promoting technological development, supporting the financial sector, and reducing inequalities are among the duties of the state. Unfortunately, policymakers have acted irresponsibly by applying short-sighted and populist policies in Türkiye. High budget deficits, excessive debt accumulation and the chronic inflation problem have made Türkiye incomparable with Korea. By the 1980s, Türkiye was already a "premature deindustrialized" country (Rodrik & Kennedy, 2015, p. 1). Contrary to the planned South Korean model, Türkiye missed the opportunity to invest in high-value-added areas. The construction-based model condemned the country to a permanent current deficit (Milor, 2022, p. 17). Korea, on the other hand, first went through a period of rapid development with intense state

intervention and then a liberal economy period. It reflects a long-term capitalist industrialization-development perspective based on intense state interventions, in which the state directs the private sector and distributes scarce resources for this purpose. However, private sector firms predominantly make investment, production and employment decisions. America did not intervene in the intense interventionist attitude of the state in Korea. The fact that the US also turns a blind eye to the state's intense interventionism in Korea is a factor in this success.

The advent of neoliberalism in South Korea and Türkiye began in the 1980s. However, unlike Türkiye, neoliberalism came before democratization in South Korea, and neoliberal principles became the prevailing agenda after the 1997 Asia crisis (H. C. Lim & Jang, 2006, p. 450). Neoliberalism's effect on developmental states like Korea and social states like Türkiye was different. The 1980s could be described as when Türkiye looked to the example of South Korea, along with Japan and Taiwan. Now, the developmental difference has become a visible reality. However, unlike Korea, since there was political instability and no coordination in implementing economic and trade policies, a reform constituency did not exist within a broader consensus in Türkiye. Economically, a liberalization program was implemented, and state intervention decreased. Unfortunately, economic liberalization between 1980-2001 resulted in a notorious financial meltdown in the 2000s.

Türkiye's strategic importance for America increased substantially, and that was reflected in the US' development package implementation. The focus of the US in Türkiye was the impact of American aid, particularly security and defense assistance, in meeting Türkiye's economic needs and the use of military installments by America within Türkiye's territory. This resulted in US funds and aid flowing back into the country. In 1978, the arms embargo was removed, and the US–Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was finalized in 1980. However, even though relations between the US and Türkiye were good, they were fragile because the US failed to sustain the pace of developmental performance that the Turks needed and wanted (CIA FOIA, 2008, p. 6).

One of the primary reasons for continued American economic aid was turmoil in Türkiye's domestic politics, such as political polarization, increased terror acts in urban areas, the Kurdish issue, and economic downfall. In addition, the high inflation rate (at about %50), rising unemployment, account deficit (in 2 billion dollars in 1979), and industry operating at half capacity mobilized the US official to do something. These worried the US, and US officials thought the new government founded in 1979 needed foreign aid (Sönmezoğlu, 1995, p. 126). In the fiscal year 1980, approximately 98 million dollars in aid was also allocated solely for economic purposes (*The Department of State Bulletin* , 1979, pp. 33–34). The aid totaled 453 million in 1981, 704 million in 1982, and 688 million dollars in 1983 and reached an all-time high in 1985 (Dağı, 1996, p. 127). Türkiye continued to receive aid from America even in the 1990s. Nevertheless, it was expressed that the aid was not substantially larger when compared to Türkiye's balance of payments needs (*The Department of State Bulletin* , 1979, p. 34). The size of external financing is measured by the purchasing power provided to a country and the domestic income that can be used for its consumption and investment. Every year, from 1947 to 1980, imports were higher than exports in Türkiye. Dependence on the US and foreign aid was so high that bureaucrats were not even aiming for the country's self-sufficiency—they explicitly planned foreign funds to be used in projected investment financing (Keyder, 1987b, p. 215).

Table 5. 9. US Aid to Türkiye Between 1978-1989

Year	US AID
1978	125.0
1979	250.0
1980	400.0
1981	450.0
1982	700.0

1983	685.5
1984	856.5
1985	878.1
1986	738.0
1987	590.0
1988	525.3
1989	500.0

Table 5. 9. (cont'd)

Source: Sezer, D. Türkiye in the Western Alliance in the 1980s, in Eralp, A. *et al.*(1993), eds., *Socioeconomic Transformation in Türkiye Since 1980*, Praeger.

To assist Turkish forces in meeting their NATO-related defense obligations and establish a constructive relationship between both sides, in 1980, 200 million dollars in foreign military sales-related loans and a military education and training loan of 2 million dollars were allocated (*The Department of State Bulletin* , 1979, p. 34). In 1983, the US Congress vowed that military aid to Greece and Türkiye had to be extended at a 7:10 ratio. This led to a suspicious approach by the Turkish government towards America since this ratio was thought to be unjust because Türkiye's population was much larger than Greece's, the level of development and economic situation was much worse than Greece's, and hostile neighbors surrounded Türkiye. Türkiye's complaints were not taken into consideration, and events continued similarly. Also, the aid was used as leverage to seek a solution to the Cyprus problem Congress; this also strained Turkish–American relations (G. Harris, 2003, pp. 73–75).

The recovery of Turkish–American relations facilitated the flow and diversification of foreign aid from other institutions like the EEC, which provided aid for Türkiye's

economic and social development (*The European Community's Relations with Turkey*, n.d.). The first step towards the reform era was solidified with the help of international financial institutions. Stabilization and adjustment were introduced in 1980: the IMF, the WB, and OECD pressured developing countries to transition from ISI to EOI, and the primary tool they used was financial assistance. The aim also was to curb inflation and stabilize the balance of payments. In doing this, the Turkish Central Bank also decreased credits given to the public sector. Nevertheless, Türkiye received large amounts of economic aid, principally organized by the IFIs after 1980. Through the structural adjustment programs of these institutions, Türkiye's economic policies transformed radically. The reforms recommended by the BWIs involved liberalization in foreign trade, foreign investment, and financial markets (Şenses, 1999, p. 241). They rescheduled Türkiye's debts and provided new loans and a massive flow of aid. In addition, aid from international organizations increased dramatically after 1979, as presented in the table below:

Table 5. 10. International Organizations' Assistance for Türkiye Between 1979-1984 (Unit: million US dollars)

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	Total
Total	371.2	654.1	872.3	713.9	676.8	944.3	6,507.6
IBRD	312.5	600.0	722.0	647.8	669.4	794.3	5,230.1
IFC	48.5	5.6	13.5	14.8	5.3	150.0	395.9
IDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	178.1
UNDP	2.7	2.5	1.8	1.8	2.1	-	66.8
Other UN	1.2	-	-	0.5	-	-	11.7
EEC	6.3	46.0	135.0	49.0	-	-	625.0

Source: *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1984 CONG-R-0105*, p.200

In the early 1980s, efforts were made to conduct a significant neoliberal economic reform, including efforts to liberalize foreign commerce, reduce agricultural subsidies, free up private sector prices, promote exports, and switch to a more forgiving exchange rate regime. The implemented measures encompassed the devaluation of the currency and the establishment of a novel exchange system that relied on daily fluctuations in the Turkish Lira's value relative to other currencies. Furthermore, price control regulations were abolished, and a stringent monetary policy was adopted, guided by recommendations from the IMF. Additionally, financial markets were liberalized, freeing them from regulations pertaining to deposit and credit rates, thereby allowing these rates to be determined by market forces. Lastly, individual agreements between parties were eliminated (S. A. Lee, 2006, p. 45). The bigger picture thus revealed that neoliberal globalization had compelled Özal's administration to embrace a market-oriented strategy, which went hand in hand with the state's abrupt withdrawal from the economy. The nation adopted full liberalization as its national slogan. The state was crucial in the post-1980 export boom and restructuring while promoting neoliberalism in nearly every sphere of economic and social life (Adly, 2013, p. 28).

The WB extended Structural Adjustment Loans for five consecutive years (1980-1985). Net transfers by the WB via project loans and structural adjustment lending (SALs) reached 1486.2 million dollars (Şenses, 1999, p. 241). The OECD provided 1 billion dollars in 1980, which made up half of US and German aid alone (Şenses, 1999, p. 240). The significant contribution of the OECD was to reschedule Türkiye's debt in 1980, which amounted to 2.8 billion dollars until 1983 (Wolff, 1987, pp. 88–90). In June 1980, the IMF entered into a three-year standby arrangement, which extended a total of 1.25 billion dollars in special drawing rights (SDR), the highest amount and the most prolonged period since the first standby arrangement in 1961 (*History of Lending Commitments: Türkiye, Republic Of*, 2008). Between 1980 and 1983, IMF transfers to Türkiye reached 2 billion dollars (Şenses, 1999, p. 241). Türkiye was the first country to benefit from structural adjustment lending and a three-year standby arrangement in the history of the IMF. It was also the recipient of the highest amount of credit (Şenses, 1991; World Bank, 1980). Based on such loans, funds, aid, and

recommendations, Türkiye began to reshape its development policy from an import substitution to one export-oriented policy. However, a distinctive feature of the 1980s and 1990s must also be considered. Unlike East Asian countries and Korea, in many Latin American countries and Türkiye, investment and savings rates did not increase in a way that negated the neoliberal understanding. The increase in investment and savings, highlighted as the most important results of the free market economy, did not occur here to a large extent for various reasons. High real interest rates, lack of investment drive, and the lack of resources allocated to research and development spending were all factors. Thus, Türkiye was in a position to reproduce its current industrial and economic structure.

Table 5. 11. Flows of Medium- and Long-Term Credit to Türkiye: 1975-1981 (unit: million US dollars)

	Annual average (1975-1978)	1979	1980	1981
Official Sources	623	1,131	2,683	1,799
Bilateral	360	659	1,671	988
OECD	226	596	1,138	491
OPEC	11	54	288	56
CPEs	124	9	245	441
Multilateral	263	472	1,012	811
World Bank	224	306	616	570
EIB	10	112	271	55
ERF	25	39	104	110

Other	4	15	21	76
Private Sources	494	634	299	249
of which: syndicated loans	131	407	0	0
Total	1,117	1,765	2,982	2,048

Table 5.11. (cont'd)

Source: Celasun, M. & Rodrik, D. Debt, Adjustment and Growth: Turkey, in Sachs, J. D. & Susan M. Collins, S. M. (1989). *Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Vol. 3: Country Studies, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Türkiye*; University of Chicago Press, p. 758.

The Özal government, which came to power in November of 1983, expressed Türkiye's reservations about the implementation and content of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). The Özal government first indicated that the US unfairly determined the 7:10 ratio in providing aid to Greece and Türkiye. Secondly, US aid to Türkiye was linked to the Cyprus issue, Türkiye's human rights record, and the Armenian issue (CIA FOIA, 1987, p. 3). Lastly, even though the DECA emphasized Türkiye's economic development and cooperation between Türkiye and the US, America did not provide suitable trade conditions, especially in the Turkish textile industry. The US had not provided suitable trade conditions for the Turkish textile industry as expected (Armaoğlu, 2004, pp. 304–305). The trade imbalance between the US and Türkiye caused profound dissatisfaction on the Turkish side since Türkiye did not see any positive results on the issue of the textile quota despite being promised by America (Haass, 1986, p. 466; D. A. Rustow, 1987, p. 106). The imbalance in US–Turkish trade was clear because Turkish exports to the US were worth 534 million dollars, in contrast with the 1.7 billion dollars generated by US exports to Türkiye in 1991 (Acar, 1993, p. 92).

After 1980, Türkiye took a new turn in funding its economic institutions, economic management, and development projects with the aid it received. As such, the country became heavily dependent on the West, especially the US, for financing its economy (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 64). The US was content to provide Türkiye with substantial amounts of aid as long as Türkiye fulfilled its duties as a loyal ally, aligning its foreign policy actions and decisions with US goals and allowing American bases to operate on Turkish territory (Çelik, 1999, p. xix). Close relations with the West were also expected to bring about the country's economic development through aid, trade, and loans, but economic aid from the US began to decrease in 1984 (McDonald, 1988, p. 214). With this reduction in US foreign economic aid, political issues like human rights became prominent—the US Congress was reluctant to give foreign aid and therefore justify human rights violations (Kirişçi, 1998, p. 23). During this period, the US established a direct relationship between human rights records, democratic government, and economic development (Amnesty International, 1994). Through this linkage, aid from American and Western European countries depended mainly on the democratic process. One of the significant problems for Türkiye was that the US Congress had a pattern of placing conditions on aid with respect to critical questions like the Cyprus and Armenian issues. Also, it was pointed out that human rights and democratic governance were essential for Türkiye's recovery (CIA FOIA, 2008). According to the data set of Freedom House, the 1980 coup constituted an important break in terms of Türkiye's democratic record. Between 1980 and 1983, Türkiye was labeled as a non-free country, and with the 1983 elections, Türkiye's slow progress in democracy was observed (Balta, 2018). See below for the Human Development Index (HDI) estimates:

Table 5. 12. Changes in the Human Development Index, 1913-2003

Table 10.2. Changes in the human development index, 1913-2003

Country	1913	1950	1975	2003	Change in 1950-2003 as per cent of possible
Western Europe	0.580	0.707	0.848	0.935	77.8
North America	0.643	0.774	0.861	0.945	75.7
Japan	0.466	0.676	0.851	0.943	82.4
China	n.a.	0.225	0.522	0.755	68.4
India	0.143	0.247	0.406	0.602	47.1
Africa	n.a.	0.271	n.a.	0.549	38.1
Greece		0.625	0.800	0.912	76.5
Russia	0.345	0.694	n.a.	0.795	33.0
Bulgaria	0.403	0.607	n.a.	0.808	51.1
Argentina	0.511	0.526	0.784	0.863	71.1
Mexico	0.270	0.484	0.688	0.814	64.0
Brazil	0.249	0.448	0.641	0.792	62.3
South Korea	n.a.	0.459	0.687	0.901	81.7
Malaysia	n.a.	0.407	0.614	0.796	65.6
Thailand	0.388	0.603	0.757	0.778	44.1
Indonesia	n.a.	0.337	0.467	0.697	54.3
Tunisia	n.a.	0.303	0.512	0.753	64.6
Iran	n.a.	0.331	0.507	0.736	60.5
Egypt	n.a.	0.291	0.433	0.659	51.9
Nigeria	n.a.	0.194	0.326	0.453	32.1
Turkey	0.190	0.382	0.592	0.750	59.5

Notes: Regional or continental averages are weighted by the population of the individual countries. For definition of HDI, see the text. In the last column, the maximum possible improvement in HDI is $1 - (\text{HDI in 1950})$.

Sources: Crafts (1997) and (2002) for 1913-1975 values except for Turkey in 1913 and United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2005* for 2003 values.

Source: Kasaba, R. (Ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey Volume 4: Turkey in the Modern World*, p.272

Despite Türkiye's poor human rights record, America's security-based interests in the region outweighed. US military and economic aid continued because Türkiye's increasing strategic importance for the US brought increasing military engagement through aid and treaties. Moreover, the chain of significant events, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 led to broadening American interests in the Middle East and the renewal of the areas of military cooperation between Türkiye and the US between 1980 and 1991 (Arıcanlı, 1990, p. 243). Türkiye was seen as a vital partner in Western security by America. However, it was defined as the poorest member of NATO since Türkiye could not meet its modernization goals with its resources (CIA FOIA, 1984, p. 2). Even

so, in the CIA report, it was stated that all major Turkish modernization efforts (tanks, missile systems frigates, submarines, and Air Force fighters purchased or received with US, German, and Great Britain assistance in 1984) were undertaken with outside assistance, in particular from the US, Germany and Great Britain (CIA FOIA, 1984, p. 7).

The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) (D. A. Rustow, 1987, pp. 104–105) also governed the use of military installations in Türkiye by US personnel and explicitly recognized the principle that 'the maintenance of an adequate defense posture is an important element for the preservation of world peace and stability' (CIA, n.d.). Military aid was the most fundamental issue under the agreement (US Comptroller General, 1982). The US provided military aid to Türkiye through the Foreign Military Sales and Southern Regional Amendment in the 1990s after the Military Assistance Program (MAP) ended (*Greece and Turkey: U.S. Assistance Programs and Other Activities*, n.d.). Foreign economic aid was now supplied through the Economic Support Fund, which was sometimes used for arms sales and occasionally referred to as security aid. Besides the cooperation defense consultations, training, and military exercises, the agreement further arranged economic cooperation, emphasizing that 'a sound defense rests on a sound economy' (Zanotti, 2011). In November of 1982, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Türkiye and the US. The US undertook the modernization of ten airfields in Eastern Türkiye and agreed to help the country modernize its air defenses. Even though the aim was to strengthen cooperation in all areas, including military, social, and economic development (The Comptroller General of the US, 1968), the 1980s 'did not generate a strategic relationship as close as it used to be in the first phase' (Güney, 2007, p. 343).

The geopolitical position of Türkiye seems to be its main asset to the US during the Cold War both as a model that carried democracy and other Western values and in terms of America's access to valuable Middle Eastern resources like oil (Citino, 2017b, p. 70). In the mid-1980s, Türkiye's military and economic aid dramatically decreased despite the signature of the 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). On the one hand, some argued that the United States and the international

community should pursue ongoing efforts to support economic development in the Middle East. On the other hand, the Armenian and Cyprus issues and the Kurdish issue preoccupied US policymakers' agenda. In 1989, in the US Congress, Congressman John D. Dingell argued that US foreign policy and development package was contributing to poor human rights conditions in Türkiye by continuing to supply millions of dollars in military aid. He urged his colleagues in Congress:

“Türkiye has violated the US Foreign Assistance Act, the US Military Sales Act, the Lausanne Treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights articles, and the NATO and UN charters.” (Callaway & Matthews, 2016, p. 139)

Congressman Bob Filner argued that it “is imperative that we affirm a human rights linkage with any foreign aid given by the United States and oppose the furnishing of lethal equipment to those who would use it for repressive purposes.” (Callaway & Matthews, 2016, p. 139) These suggest that US assistance to Türkiye was meant to promote and strengthen democracy and, thus, human rights in a country bordering a mostly non-democratic region (the Middle East) and its security interests in the Middle East (Callaway & Matthews, 2016, p. 139). Later, in the early 1990s, Congress ceased to grant military aid to Türkiye and Greece, instead converting the grants to low-interest loans. The conditions of aid began to get more severe as the international arena saw a decrease in tension, much like that accompanying Gorbachev's Glasnost policy. In the meantime, Türkiye tried to get more aid by putting forward geostrategic factors as in previous periods. Necdet Tezel, the undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1985-6), said:

"Türkiye's ability to ensure an effective defense in southern flank of NATO and to continue to play the important role as an element of stability in the region is closely connected with the rapid development of her economic and military capabilities. Türkiye is spending great efforts in these fields." (Tezel, 2002, p. 198)

The Reagan administration prioritized increasing security aid to Türkiye because of the post-Cold War changes in global dynamics; USAID mainly supported Türkiye's social and economic development. The central security issue of the US was the Soviet threat that directed the US to announce the Carter and Reagan doctrines of the 1980s.

Türkiye was part of every strategic doctrine devised by Washington. First, the Carter Doctrine (1980), the policy that the US would use military force in the Gulf region, if necessary, allowed for an increase in the US military's capabilities in the region. In military terms, in 1983, military aid almost doubled (USAID, 1984, p. 27; Uslu, n.d.-a, p. 219). Türkiye ranked fourth in the number of US nuclear weapons deployed overseas in this era—about 489 in 1985—. US aid for Türkiye peaked in 1985, totaling 878 million dollars, compared with 200 million dollars in 1979 (Stearns, 1992, pp. 49–50). However, economic and military aid from America began to decrease in the mid-1980s. Thus, in a militarily-mobilized world, Türkiye served as a strategic partner. Second, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan's election, and other regional developments, such as the Iranian Revolution in an oil-rich strategic zone, the detente period came to a close. With the Reagan Doctrine (1985), the US went beyond increasing military build-ups and announced that to defend freedom, America would support freedom fighters—this was evaluated as self-defense by the US (*Reagan Doctrine, 1985*, n.d.). Türkiye served American interests in the Middle East and maintained its strategic importance for America. With a new period in the global economy, Israel and Egypt became the largest recipients of US aid since the 1970s; thereby, American security objectives directed the politics of aid.

Table 5. 13. Turkish Arms Imports from the US between 1980-1999

	Arms imports*	Grant Aid	Direct Loans**
FY80	\$136 million	\$202.9 million	\$0
FY81	\$109 million	\$250 million	\$0
FY82	\$197.6 million	\$343 million	\$0
FY83	\$155.1 million	\$290 million	\$0
FY84	\$327.4 million	\$585 million	\$0
FY85	\$423.4 million	\$485 million	\$0
FY86	\$303.7 million	\$409.4 million	\$0
FY87	\$332.9 million	\$177.9 million	\$0
FY88	\$735.5 million	\$156 million	\$178 million
FY89	\$961.8 million	\$340.7 million	\$90 million
FY90	\$943.0 million	\$412.2 million	\$85.6 million
FY91	\$697 million	\$500 million	\$100 million
FY92	\$741 million	\$475 million	\$25 million
FY93	\$878.7 million	\$0	\$450 million
FY94	\$951.8 million	\$0	\$405 million
FY95	\$536.9 million	\$0	\$328 million
FY96	\$547 million	\$0	\$320 million
FY97	\$1.27 billion	\$0	\$175 million
FY98	\$1.01 billion	\$0	\$0
FY99	\$1.56 billion	\$0	\$0
Total	\$11.551 billion	\$4.627 billion	\$1.982 billion

* Arms imports refers to the total dollar value of arms Turkey took delivery of from the United States through the Foreign Military Sales (government to government) program and through direct commercial sales from industry.

**As of 30 September 1997, Turkey had \$3.954 billion in outstanding and undispensed military loans from the U.S.

Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military Sales Facts FY89 and FY99

Regarding trade relations, Türkiye's relative economic improvement led to more trade in this era. In addition, Özal worked to develop a domestic defense industry and to entice both domestic and foreign investment into the Turkish economy. Opening the US market to Turkish products, particularly textiles, and forging strong partnerships with US businesses were key factors in these initiatives (Henze, 1987, p. 82; D. A. Rustow, 1987, p. 106). Turkish officials and businessmen stressed trade over aid and highlighted the value of access to US markets. So, the long-standing trade dispute between Türkiye and the US concerning textile and clothing goods was relieved. The income from textiles was one of Türkiye's primary earnings from exports. In 1986, the two countries reached an agreement, and Turkish textile goods gained a foothold in the US market. On the one hand, Türkiye wanted more access to the American market for textile and steel (CIA, 1986, p. 5) and was not content with the new agreement and felt frustrated by the Reagan Administration's protectionism. On the US side, there

were complaints about the market disruption caused by the sudden monetary increase in Turkish textile exports from 2 million in 1982 to 121 million in 1985 and 186 million dollars in 1986 (Alemdar, 1986). Türkiye's actions damaged the American textile industry, and the unions highly criticized the Reagan Administration (United States Congress Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 1989, p. 53). With the quotas set on Turkish textile and clothing industry imports imposed by EU countries in 1985 and the US and Canada in 1986, a significant reduction in exports to these countries was seen observed later on (Uğur, 2004, p. 38). Towards the 1990s, Türkiye aimed to switch from agricultural products, which constitute a large part of its export portfolio, to industrial products. As a result, by 1990, the trade volume increased four times compared to 1980 and reached 13 billion dollars (Emil & Vehbi, 2003, p. 6; World Bank, 2021b). The trade imbalance between the two countries continued in the 1990s. While Türkiye's export to the US worth was 534 million dollars, America's exports to Türkiye were 1.7 billion (Uslu, n.d.-b, p. 25).

Land reform was back on the agenda in 1982. The Turkish government prepared the land and agrarian reform bill and submitted it to the advisory assembly. The draft, which started to be discussed in the temporary commission in February 1982, was prepared based on land and agriculture reform law No. 1757. The bill's purpose was to use the soil efficiently, obtain maximum economic efficiency from a unit area, establish an agricultural structure that would accelerate national development and land, and support and organize farmers with little or no land. Unfortunately, however, this reform initiative also failed (Korkut, 1984, p. 61). No agreement was reached between the stakeholders. After one year, in June 1983, the Government again started to prepare a land and agriculture reform bill. The name "agrarian reform" was adopted, and the word "land" was removed from the draft, but it was unsuccessful due to the upcoming elections and the advisory body's recess period (Korkut, 1984, pp. 61–65).

In the 1980s and 1990s, Türkiye's agriculture still suffered from chronic structural and institutional weaknesses mainly because of land fragmentation (Agriculture and Economic Development Analysis Division, 1994, p. 198). In 1984, issues such as giving land to landless farmers and providing support and education by the

Government were tried to be regulated with the enacted laws and the establishment of accompanying implementing institutions (Sulama Alanlarında Arazi Düzenlenmesine Dair Tarım Reformu Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Tasarısı ve Tarım, Orman ve Köyişleri Komisyonu, 1999). By the 1990s, land reform was outdated. However, this does not mean that land reform is no longer needed. On the contrary, capitalist market forces have already shaped the pattern of agriculture in some regions of Türkiye, especially in the eastern regions, where agriculture is the primary source of livelihood, and poor social conditions still need land reform (Morvaridi, 1990b, p. 305). Tourism and manufacturing were expanding in rural areas instead of strengthening agricultural activities (Pamuk, 2009, p. 391). The agricultural sector was mainly left out (Öniş & Riedel, 1993, pp. 99–100; Pamuk, 2010b, p. 26) And the Government policies in favor of agriculture were declining in part due to the declining share of agricultural producers in the electorate and part due to the demands of IFIs like the IMF for fiscal discipline. As a result, Türkiye was among the few nations in the world where agricultural productivity did not increase between the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank, 2001, p. 312). Until 1980, state support and protectionism for agriculture continued. However, with the decision of January 24, 1980, the number of agricultural products included in the state support purchase was reduced. In 1999, within the framework of the agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, the state purchases of agricultural products were terminated, and the adventure of importation of agricultural products began for Türkiye. However, instead of establishing well-grounded institutions, including property rights through land reform and democratic institutions, Turkish agriculture has never undergone a completed land reform program that could not go beyond being a part of politicians' demagogies (Avcıoğlu, 1979, p. 697).

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the US efforts in Türkiye during the Cold War years. Previous studies have been drawn primarily on the politics of Turkish-American

relations, but studies have yet to focus on the US engagement in Türkiye's development compared to Korea. While the 1950s were determined by external turning points (the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, the end of WWII, and the Korean War), from the 1960s on, Türkiye's issues became the true determinants. In the obstructed democratization process, Türkiye faced political and economic instability, which led to the involvement of IFIs in Türkiye's domestic problems. The 1960s indicated that the country's underdevelopment problem had become acute. The policy recommendations of international financial institutions under the supervision of the US came to fruition, and a tense political climate at home and in relations with the US led to a decrease in aid and US involvement. Instead, US-led IFIs became more involved in Türkiye's developmental path.

Türkiye was well positioned to engage in economic, political, and cultural convergence with the US and the West. The Menderes period was characterized by security issues and the maintenance of foreign aid for the country's development. Until the 1960s, much economic dependence on America took root in Turkish foreign and domestic policy. This was ensured through American engagement via the development package and Turkish policymakers' Western-oriented development understanding. However, economic problems like high inflation and depression, a vicious circle that Türkiye could not get rid of, became severe at the beginning of the 1970s. The leading cause of this was the industrialization policy, the shortage of foreign exchange and difficulties in paying foreign debts that brought the economy to a halt. Furthermore, during the 1950s, on the recommendation of American experts, Türkiye concentrated development on highways rather than railways. International shocks dramatically impacted Türkiye because of her chosen development path. For instance, since Türkiye was trying to focus on agricultural policies that could not also be completed due to populist policies rather than industrial investments, the dramatic rise in oil prices in 1973 weakened highway development projects.

The contribution of this chapter has been to show that when we examine only the aid programs of the US in Türkiye, for instance, the Marshall Plan, it is seen that it diffused into the farmers' life, highway construction, and industrial orientation. Thus, Türkiye

is a very complex and rich site where ideas about modernization come together at multiple levels. While Americans viewed Türkiye's modernization and development through the prisms of scientific management, liberal corporatism, and Keynesianism, Turks were able to benefit from the US development package due to the intricate relationships between Türkiye's history of nation-state formation and Westernization as well as the country's shift to multi-party politics. Modernization was therefore identified with the Westernization process or being Western. The state of being pro-American/ Western was tried to spread to every level. The obvious indication that the doctrine of development in Türkiye is linked with foreign aid and military concerns is the establishment of a strategic alliance between the recipients of Marshall aid and the US. Türkiye determined the direction of domestic and foreign policy with the resources and help it received from the US, as in the South Korean case.

US modernization efforts in Türkiye were primarily technical. The American development package made possible comprehensive road construction, highway administration, and achieved rapid industrialization. Türkiye is also one of the nations where US-supported educational and economic development since the 1950s became critical in promoting the indigenous growth of democratic attitudes and institutions. Türkiye has also been incorporated into the capitalist division of labor within the free world with policies recommended by the United States. America has structured the Turkish political economy through its expanded activities. The US was essentially Türkiye's only donor nation up until 1958. The majority of aid was meant for project support, primarily for the development of agriculture and infrastructure. Land reform in Türkiye was not crucial to the United States, as promoted in Korea and most East Asian countries.

To ensure social stability and garner public approval following the transition to multi-party governance in the post-World War II period, subsequent Turkish administrations implemented a strategy that deliberately decelerated economic progress and hindered the transformation of land, labor, and currency into commodities. The failed liberal policies of the 1950s that marked the end of the DP era in 1960 emerged under American hegemony, and the bourgeoisie's party came to power just after the end of

the war. Since political and economic power remained with the elites, this was a significant shift (Pamuk, 2008, p. 274).

This chapter has focused on how the US as an external actor and the domestic variables are significant in the policy-making process. Failing to implement the land reform for benefits, not using American aid efficiently and effectively, and evaluating modernization or Westernization only based on material gains created an inextricable spiral for Türkiye. My analysis places the American position at the center and emphasizes the prerequisites for successful development, which are multidimensional and may be produced in many different locations with different sociocultural circumstances. The implementation of the American development package was interrupted in Türkiye, mainly due to the fact that the security concerns of the United States towards Türkiye were not robust as in Korea, the inability to reach an agreement with Turkish policy makers on planning, the economic and political problems that became irreversibly chronic at the national level following the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, tensions determined the course of bilateral relations.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The primary inquiry for the pursuit of this research is America's engagement in the development of Türkiye and Korea during the Cold War period, by what ways, and how the US influenced the development process of these two countries. The endeavor to understand this is to research what policy tools the US development package consists of, what ideological stance and approach these policies are guided by, and where they originate. Also, the issue of what Türkiye and Korea did with American resource flow in their domestic policies is of vital importance. The US development toolbox, comprised of economic aid, involvement in defense and military infrastructure capabilities, rural development projects, and trade-related policies, has been dealt with in the respective chapters of the study so far. These tools created more options for both states but to different degrees. While the degree of American involvement and strategies differed, the tools of the US cannot be the sole source of development and highlights the importance of the competence of the recipient country in utilizing these tools to which the development package arrived.

This dissertation tried to uncover the entangled development history in Türkiye and Korea during the Cold War years. The developmental program of the US and the discourse accompanying it, modernization theory, consolidated the new liberal internationalist era and the developmental paths of Korea and Türkiye. In this context, each package tool strengthened America's creation of a new world and improved America's military, economic, and political effectiveness in its spheres of influence. The US utilized four main tools to do that. During the Cold War, the US dominated the global economy, trade, security, and information networks. According to the US application of the modernization theory, if developing or underdeveloped nations

continue to pursue development by joining the political, security, economic, and commercial networks the US maintained, American prominence will likely be further strengthened by their development.

The US' priorities led to some instruments being utilized more frequently and others not at all. In particular, there are few studies on how the US guides the nations through the development package, how it utilizes the tools of the development package, and how the dynamics within the recipient country, especially the societal and political coalitions, meet and interact with these tools. There needs to be a study on why the US implemented the development package in Korea and partially implemented it in Türkiye, even though scholars have done brilliant work unpacking the origins of developmental understanding, as discussed in Chapter 1.

Pierre Achard is quoted at the beginning of the thesis, which summarizes the 20th-century understanding of development: Development refers to the state or states of infinite, unlimited, quantitative expansion and increase; the modernization theory is drawn within this framework. This understanding governed American foreign policy during the Cold War. Instead of comprehension evaluated by the increase of quantitative variables, through the IPE approach, it can be examined in a much more versatile way. Analyzing international conditions, as provided by the IPE analysis, is extremely important in analyzing country conditions. The rhetoric of measurable development promoted by America is a prerequisite for the circulation of American goods, economic and political models, and ideology. This is the reason for the existence of Bretton Woods institutions, and it has ultimately shaped the international field after 1945, from various transferred resources to the Third World. America facilitated the integration of Türkiye and Korea into the world economy as a superpower providing aid, markets, and strategic materials. They are tied and incorporated into the US-led system in which IFIs had a significant role too.

The historical break that the start of the Cold War caused has been highlighted in this dissertation. With the commencement of the Cold War, American ties with both nations saw a significant shift, and the engagement with Korea underwent a significant

adjustment in terms of all available tools with the outbreak of the Korean War. Due to the immediate threat to Korea and the war in 1950, the implementation of the American development package in Türkiye and Korea and the positioning of the two countries differed dramatically. A durable Communist threat served as the prime reason for the US engagement via the four tools that helped to gain Korea's and Türkiye's political support in fighting against the communist threat. If the communist threat had not existed, America would have been less interested in the ally's development. Since Korea was near threatened, all these tools have been applied more reliably to defend and expand America's sphere of influence. The United States positioned these countries in the international division of labor in line with its immediate geostrategic concerns.

The backdrop of Korea and Türkiye's continuing solid relations with the US originated when the post-war system first began. However, Korean and Turkish development in a global setting diverged substantially. The Cold War years offer an essential clue to tracking their developmental patterns. The two different development paths of Türkiye and Korea also result from their internal dynamics. Both the recipient country's internal dynamics, like the interplay of state, market, and societies in the making and implementation of US development strategies, and the global scheme, including economic restructuring, domestic politics, epistemic alterations in the global political economy following the end of WWII have been the determinants of differentiation of the development of Türkiye and Korea. Türkiye's paralysis includes poor economic management, misuse of resources, corrupt practices, and institutional problems and weaknesses. So, that is why how the resources flowed from the US channeled and exercised by Korea and Türkiye assumed greater importance. It is crucial to how the decisions taken by policymakers in implementing trade policies, land reform, and agricultural policies, and how economic aid was spent affect the development orientation of the country and how they interact with external factors.

Modernization theory saw the US or the first-world countries guiding third-world development through the US development package. The notion of linear development for all nations has obscured significant social, political, cultural, and economic

disparities across countries, invalidating the basic premises of classical modernization theory. When Rostow claimed “the problem is not in the mysterious East, but in the inscrutable West” (Pearce, 2001, p. 118), he saw the East as passive, the West as omnipotent, and the tools and policies of the US envisioned on this road sufficiently. Contrary to what was predicted, Türkiye and Korea have different development trajectories because of internal struggles and different degrees of American involvement. Haggard emphasizes that policymakers have a crucial role in managing the critical link between domestic and international political economies (Haggard, 1990a, pp. 269–170).

To reach that conclusion, I have started researching development by observing the US domestic policies in Chapter 2 and their incidences of post-war involvement in Turkish and Korean development. When the US assumed the role of a great power in East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, it faced the daunting question of how to defend a vulnerable sphere of influence against the international communist movement. The US development package in Türkiye and South Korea supported state-led initiatives to promote economic development and political stability. The US decided to implement a long-term strategy for enabling South Korea to maintain its security while reducing the economic burden that the US itself would bear. The US aimed to make Türkiye a model for other regional countries in the Middle East, which was paradoxical by adopting a Western identity from the beginning. Ultimately, the role attributed to Türkiye has not been as American policymakers and scholars envisioned.

In the years following World War II, the US undertook the development project and developed measures to alter the nature of the international system and its subjects. The American development package was the fundamental means to defend its allies against Communism. The US foreign policymakers and intellectuals interpreted the US role in the world to form the US developmental agenda. As a result of this evaluation, a discourse, global vision, language, and ideology (Latham, 2000, p. 15) was determined to get to know "others" and develop policies accordingly: This became the modernization theory. The discursive space that the modernization theory created was seen in the development concept. Categorization began with first aid packages, and the

US officials construed underdevelopment/backwardness as a threat to its security. What the US did abroad was that within the framework of modernization theory, America applied the development package, and these applications gained local qualities in different regions. The most obvious example of this is seen in rural development projects and trade practices of the US.

This work intentionally focuses on the contours of modernization theory because it offers an understanding of how the US utilizes its development package. It tells how the US applied the package as a national security policy tool to counter threats that other means could not stop or neutralize. Defending the American sphere of influence in East Asia and Europe against a communist threat was the element that first served to create this package. Later, the narrowing of the domestic market, the international expansion, and a tendency to transform the world outside of itself due to rapid technological developments and increasing interconnectedness led America to adjust the development package. A proponent of modernization theory, Rostow, aims to explain the development journey of each society in the historical process. Therefore, the difference between underdeveloped and developed societies is only a "stage" difference. However, in the end, it would appear that only a stage difference was not the case. Because of its monistic approach, the modernization theory failed to foresee what would happen. The point of Turkish development defied the expectation and premises of modernization theory. Korea and Türkiye's development story has been highly differentiated through the 1970s. Despite their notable differences, South Korea and Türkiye have been widely compared as emerging powers in the 2000s. This comparison still stems from Türkiye's ideal of being 'developed' today. Studies are being produced on how Türkiye could realize developmental state policies and institutional mechanisms by taking Korea as an example. These comparisons have ignored mainly their developmental evolution and US engagement during the Cold War.

The origin of America's Cold War developmental policies period stemmed from the policies it implemented in its domestic policy during the 1930s through TVA reforms and New Deal policies. These development programs shaped America's global mission

as the new order was formed after 1945. The success of the development policies that America implemented in its domestic policy before 1945 created an over-optimism in American policymakers that they could implement them in the rest of the world, which would result in the success of this model. Policymakers of Türkiye and Korea were no exceptions to this over-optimism. They all shared the belief that their countries would attain "developed" status with the help of the US and the flow of American resources. In the post-1945 period, these four main tools of America interacted to shape the political economy of Korea and Türkiye. Security externalities defined US foreign policymaking, and the US development package supported these two countries' development and served American interests. The security threat to Korea was more significant and immediate than Türkiye's; hence the American development package was implemented much more densely. While South Korea attained "developed" status in the 1970s and was freed mainly from this dependence by the 1970s, Türkiye did not. On the contrary, Türkiye institutionalized its dependence on the United States.

The modernization theory is among the most influential historical and policy paradigms. It became the leading paradigm for understanding development during the Cold War. It was a development model as an alternative to Soviet-style planning. At that time, modernization theory became very popular and widespread in academia and, to some extent, in official US circles. It is a progressive and linear theory of how development should be, and it claims that society undergoes a fundamental transformation while developing economically. It is a model built on an idealized Anglo-American idea that all good things fit together. These are; urbanization, industrialization, and democracy. The idea of military-dominated and development-oriented progress envisaged by American policymakers permeated both countries guided by this theory. It can be argued that the military part of the package was successful. US military and technical assistance has contributed significantly to strengthening the armies of both countries. Both countries have the most powerful militaries in the world, with South Korea 6th and Türkiye 9th. The long-standing American efforts also transformed Korea and Türkiye in their image through its development package. The spread of American culture to both countries contributed

to reproducing Western identity and generating ideas about Western modernity for them. It affected their cultural organization. Symbols like anti-communist propaganda or the Peace Corps etc., and the idea of being developed became the virtual devices for the spread of American modernization.

Modernization theory was first embodied in Western Europe and countries such as Greece and Türkiye through plans and projects such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which focused on restructuring production and consumption patterns. This US-based capitalist development model and an ideological component offer resources for building highways and agricultural machinery. South Korea and Türkiye became "testing grounds" for modernization theory. The initiation of the Korean War marked a significant catalyst for the rapid acceleration of American policies. The advocates of these programs in South Korea emphasized that they encompassed more than mere post-war reconstruction efforts, instead being regarded as initiatives for expediting development. The United States, with its new development agencies, ensured the involvement of the UN and several international institutions and NGOs in efforts to rebuild South Korea. In the 1950s, it became the world's most significant development effort.

In this framework, uncovering what US development policies in Korea and Türkiye during the Cold War years can tell us about the United States' approach to the problems of 'others' development on a global scale. The vital aspect of this dissertation is how it incorporates domestic and international factors in the analysis of development during the Cold War. Therefore, the most significant contribution of this thesis is to examine the role of foreign leverage in the development of Türkiye and Korea not featured in the storyline. The second noteworthy contribution is to investigate the four main tools of the American development package: Economic aid, land reform promotion, trade and market policies, and military assistance. The reason for choosing these four tools is that in the American-style development model predicted by the modernization theory is; military aid would alleviate the defense burden on countries; therefore, governments would be able to use these resources for their development along with economic aid. Not long after, a network within the Free World would be established

with liberal trade policies and America's open market, and community development projects and land reform promotion would bring many opportunities to develop in the society with regulated property relations. These four tools were intermingled.

In narratives laced with development, none of the four tools alone could contribute to the development of that particular country. This study probed into the US economic aid, military aid, land reform promotion, and trade policies in Chapter 3. First, these states received vast amounts of US military and economic aid. Under the larger military assistance category, the US aimed to create stable allies, defend them against Communism, and make long-term commitments to combat threats (Holmes, 2014). The United States was physically involved by establishing military bases. Moreover, it has contributed to the institutional structures of the two countries by sending many experts. Second, land reform is one of the most challenging domestic policy issues to be dealt with by post-war governments. In Türkiye, the land reform process is incomplete, unlike in South Korea.

Under strong guidance and pressure from the US, Korea implemented peaceful countrywide land reform, which allowed for the rapid development of chaebols and the establishment of the practices of the developmental state. Lastly, the US opening its markets to Korea considerably impacted the development and opening of the international arena of *chaebols*. The sources flowed from the US, creating more options like increased capital accumulation and foreign purchasing power. This 4-pillar US plan was essential in promoting development, industrialization, and democratization. However, the recipient's shortcomings, like chronic inflation or polarized politics, are equally significant as how this package will be transferred and how it will be utilized.

This analysis demonstrates the fundamental means by which American supremacy was established during the Cold War, how it was inextricably linked with America's foreign economic and security policies, and how these were sown in its domestic policy in the pre-war period. How economic aid policies were aimed at making the regions where Korea and Türkiye are located more permeable for mobile capital, how trade policies

through PL 480 program affected their productivity and trade dynamics, as well as how they determined their position in the division of labor, and how all these served both the development of countries and American interests and national and international security policy. Even Korean and Turkish societies' eating and drinking habits have changed and come under American influence in every sense. What countries do with American aid in their domestic politics is as important as the amount of received American aid. America drew the path these countries took on the development path. This is even evident in the food aid program in the US. Surplus commodities from US farmers to provide food aid worldwide have given America an edge internationally and nationally. As a part of this program of the US in Korea and Türkiye, their food regimes, trade patterns, and their place in the international division of labor have changed.

More importantly, all these tools were created primarily for security reasons due to the nature of the Cold War. The ultimate motivation of the US was to secure political, economic, and social ends by utilizing development. Korea and Türkiye were covered by US security. The US aimed to prevent the flames of local and regional conflicts that could escalate violence and increase poverty. This was a situation that America did not want in the face of the Soviets. Indeed, the threat to Korea was much more severe and imminent than that of Türkiye. This external factor created a legitimizing mandate for the state to prioritize development. Korea used the US development package as an essential catalyst for institutional upgrading since the state has a degree of autonomy. Notably, the degree of autonomy of the state and investment in education made Korea different. The interaction between the public and private sectors is the most glaring illustration of how those with connections and talent benefit the nation. Türkiye, on the other hand, stands out as an example of the contrary, and we see an example of this in land reform. Yes, there was no American support, but instead of cooperating with domestic actors. At the same time, the governments in Türkiye promised to implement the land reform program, and they aimed to gain political support and eliminate their enemies. The populist stance of governments in Türkiye resulted in a land reform debacle that could not be implemented in the country. Land reform policies of both

countries are truism to show the ability of the state, its capacity to use its agencies, and ability to agitate for society.

While the land reform was successfully implemented in South Korea, it is one of the biggest failures of Türkiye, where US support is absent. As for the issue of why the US did not promote land reform in Türkiye, it is because the experts who came to Türkiye and even the experts who advised about Turkish villages and education structure gave advice by considering Turkish villages as American farms (Kirby, 1962). This shows that the modernization theory has failed, and that the American development package should at least be shaped depending on the local characteristics of the recipient countries. Consistent with Haggard's assertion of the country's ability to create cohesive groups in achieving development, Türkiye's development adventure was interrupted from the very beginning. The fact that land reform could not be realized in Türkiye has affected the social structure, the relationship among classes, and even the structures of political alliances. The state's autonomy which is the product of these relations and partnerships creates incentives for the productive behavior of market actors through well-defined and protected property rights and fair competition institutions.

However, America's land reform policy was implemented in the opposite way in Korea by pioneering land reform and later adopting a more inclusive and bottom-up approach to policy making, taking into account the opinions of rural Koreans. Following the success of Korea's land reform in the late 1940s, the New Village Movement of the 1970s as a strategy for rural development led to notable advancements in village residences, infrastructure, health and sanitation, and education. American support was also valid in this policy. By inspiring the TVA experience, local Koreans in the villages were given the right to speak and procedures were created and implemented in cooperation accordingly.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the two countries experienced simultaneous attempts to implement reforms. Until the 1950s, both needed to be more robust with low state capacity. However, from the 1970s onwards, their paths diverged: Korea started to

achieve its goals such as meritocracy, macroeconomic stability, improving living standards, an increase of income, giving importance to both agriculture (via successful land reform), industrial development, good income distribution and industrial structure and transformation to democracy. Korea and Türkiye experienced coups in 1960 and 1961, respectively; however, the policymakers of the two countries took different positions. Türkiye's inability to fully establish a political stabilization process and the military coup 1971 brought social ruptures and the political structure. In South Korea, after the coup in 1961, the soldiers remained in power, and elections were held in a partial sense. However, the unchanging political administration, except for elections and relatively experienced bureaucrats, ensured that the development plans were implemented better and more efficiently. In Türkiye, nine different governments were established during the development planning period, and both left and right parties came to power on different dates. The political instability, chronic economic problems, and failure to agree on economic policies with American experts in Türkiye also affected its relations with America. Türkiye only channeled much US economic aid to mechanizing agriculture and road network development. Whereas South Korea achieved success in the 1970s, which can be viewed as a turning moment in the global political economy, Türkiye became more agile in the decision-making and implementation of development policies; chronic economic problems were left unaddressed and new problems became acute. The whip of external necessity (as during the Ottoman period) sowed the seeds of Türkiye's dependent development trajectory.

The US development package enabled Korea to make a breakthrough in its development quickly; it helped the developmental state operate in Korea under the guidance of a pilot agency, as elaborated in Chapter 4. In other words, a strong state takes center stage in the economy, and a centralized state agency establishes a development strategy. It combines the economic and political actors around this strategy, a meritocratic bureaucracy cut off from societal interest groups, and strong ties between the public and private sectors. In addition, America had a critical role in the transition between the colonial and postcolonial eras in Korea, ensuring the

continuation of the Japanese heritage in Korea without dismantling it like institutions. Although both countries were in a difficult situation, Korea, exposed to post-conflict Japanese colonial occupation, created differences beyond geography compared to Türkiye. At the end of WWII, Japan's 35-year colonial rule in Korea ended, and some inherited institutional, bureaucratic and organizational strategies accelerated America's development policies.

As a result, careful management in economic planning between Korea and the US and building solid institutions began even in the Rhee era. Haggard argues that leaders are critical in creating and maintaining cohesive reform groups. In the 1960s, President Park drafted a long-term growth strategy and personally attended most meetings with business leaders, farmers, industrialists, and other groups. By doing so, he established close relations with the social groups, which constituted an essential step in institutionalization, strengthening intergroup communication and producing more coherent policies. He also founded the pilot agency EPB. Türkiye established a similar pilot agency, SPO, after the coup, but unlike Korea, it did not have bureaucratic autonomy. The US encouraged the application of economic aid to institutions like EPB in South Korea. In Korea, American officials adopted a more flexible strategy regarding the state's function in development. As a result, the US created a new economic bureaucracy in Korea. In Türkiye, the US aid was mainly directed to specific projects like establishing factories or combat with chronic economic problems. Regarding Korea's and Türkiye's policy responses to economic crises, while EPB officials in Korea presented stabilization plans, that is, there was the 'from below' approach, in Türkiye, a stabilization program was adopted by Özal, someone outside the bureaucracy, in agreement with the US-led IFIs.

Korea could realize its transition to EOI with high state capacity by transferring American resources to its institutions and long-term planning. While Korea worked on long-term development plans for HCI in the 1970s, government and private sector collaboration was gradually established and institutionalized. More importantly, the American encouragement of South Korean-Japanese cooperation gave Korea room to finance its development plans. In Türkiye, during the same period, there were

endeavors to enhance the country's industrial framework. However, the coalition governments engaged in political interference with the SPO, thereby compromising its autonomy. Furthermore, the establishment of collaborative partnerships for the purpose of economic development between the state and the business sector in Türkiye has not yet materialized. The lack of bureaucratic autonomy and limited cooperation with business circles posed significant challenges for the SPO and other state apparatuses. These challenges were exacerbated by economic crises resulting from the unsustainable ISI policy and external shocks. The ability of Türkiye and Korea to benefit from the advantages of their external environment depends significantly on making their institutions and economic management convenient.

The package did not work in Türkiye as it did in Korea due to the US engagement level and the domestic restraints of Türkiye itself, as seen in Chapter 5. The fact that Korea recognized the significance of modernizing agriculture as the foundation of further industrial development is one notable point of divergence between the developmental histories of Korea and Türkiye. Besides the unsuccessful land reform, no particular policies regarding the agricultural sector have been included since the 1980s in Türkiye. The land reform implemented in the 1950s was one of the vital turning points in the development path of the two countries. Successful land reform and US economic and military aid made Korea spend more on education, saving, and investment. After this success, Korea mainly focused on reforms it could implement in education, human resources, and technology. Thanks to currency reform, the intelligent and timely implementation of import and export-oriented strategies, development plans in coordination with the US, and direct American aid to investment projects, Korea achieved its "take-off" already. Thanks to the war economy created by the situation in Vietnam, Korean firms and construction companies invested in Vietnam, and the war economy worked out in favor of Korea. Later, these companies significantly impacted the development of Heavy Chemical Industries in the implementation of export promotion policies in the 1970s, which shaped the development of Korea. In the 1980s, Korea now reached a level to compete with Japanese products in international markets.

The US alliance system in East Asia has become unique due to geography. The US kept Japan separate and placed it in the center. Since South Korea was one of the Cold War flashpoints, the US preferred to forge bilateral ties with them to avoid and control their inclination toward communism. America's preference for establishing bilateral alliances in East Asia contributed more to Korea and the United States than a multilateral alliance. Bilateral relations were established with allies in East Asia, and the rapprochement of Korea and Japan took place at a time when the two countries were ready. A Korean-Japanese rapprochement strengthened American dominance in the region and created a safer area against Communist threats from the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (hereafter China), and North Korea. The re-developing trade, security, and aid relations between the countries also had positive effects. However, the positioning of Türkiye within the general Middle East policies of the US had, of course, caused differences in the implementation of the development package. Nevertheless, both Korea and Türkiye benefitted from US military assistance materially and practically. Military assistance strengthened the military structure of both countries. Military-led modernization and the role of the Turkish army as modernizing force, envisioned by the US for Türkiye, came true during the Cold War (Lerner & Robinson, 1960, p. 44). Armed forces were identified by the US policymakers as significant political actors, and the US utilized mechanisms such as training, education programs, aid, and bases to nurture Korean and Turkish militaries. From the mid-1960s, this situation became even more entrenched in Turkish politics and development.

Türkiye, on the other hand, received military and economic aid and the advice of many American experts. However, it could not receive support from the United States for trade and land reform promotion. Although the issue of land reform was controversial before 1945, the law enacted in 1945 was emptied for ten years by politicians and made it null and void. Unlike South Korea, state and business cooperation could not be used as a tool in foreign policy. The resources given by the United States could not be used effectively due to issues like bureaucratic staff actively participating in the development of industrial strategy and foreign policy, Türkiye's lack of a thorough

industrial strategy, its lack of an industrial plan of action, asymmetric trade frameworks, social division and chronic inflation (Kutlay, 2012, pp. 101–105; Weiss, 2019, p. 7). The primary purpose of US aid in Türkiye was to promote patronage and distribution systems that were not conducive to development, such as weak extraction, government employment, welfare transfers, and complicit state-capitalist relationships. In contrast, South Korea did employ aid for institutional improvement, specialization, and meritocracy in their bureaucracy, the development and execution of economic reforms, and the creation of incentives for production effectiveness rather than distribution.

When the total amount of aid given until 1988 is examined, there does not appear to be a significant difference (*U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1988 CONG-R-0105*, 1988). Yet, Korea and Türkiye channeled the American economic aid they received differently. Whereas Türkiye primarily directed the aid from the US to the military and agricultural sectors, in Korea, economic aid resulted in strengthening institutions, cooperation with the United States, or creating institutions with American involvement. In Türkiye, the state established factories, hotels, large dams, and built highways, imagined as symbols of modernity, a Westernized and developed country. The construction of railways started during the Ottoman Empire and accelerated during the Republic period. It was different from the pre-war industrialization initiatives led by the state, with the one-party rule of the CHP and its five-year development plans. However, Türkiye left the state's industrialization policies, especially railways, to receive US aid for agricultural development, privatization, and highways. In the 1950s, the Democrat Party fully realized this model of development. Turkish policymakers' serious interest in road and highway development coincided with American aid. Experts and machinery arrived in Türkiye with the aid plans. Highways were seen as more efficient in delivering door-to-door goods from farm to market and as legitimate to reach rural outposts.

Till 1980, Türkiye experienced periods of intense political crises that this situation threatened its development opportunities. Progress remained minimal even in

agriculture, where Türkiye was in a relatively better situation. Development and self-sufficiency were discussed within the planning framework between 1960 and 1980 during the planned development phase. However, Türkiye could not get the support it wanted from the US to implement the plans. Therefore, it tried to increase aid channels, but its development efforts were undermined by the military memorandum in 1971. The Green Revolution implemented under the leadership of philanthropic foundations towards the end of the 1970s was incomplete due to the economic and political situation of Türkiye.

Despite confrontations in domestic politics, three coups, and significant political crises with the United States, Türkiye did not compromise its pro-Western, pro-American foreign policy. While the socio-economic change was experienced very rapidly, the tendency of militarization increased. Although Türkiye grew economically until 1973, with the global economic collapse of the 1970s, it could not catch up with Korea. In the 1970s, while sea changes in the international political and economic environment were taking place, the tools of the American development package, especially economic aid, and land reform promotion, began to decline. As a result of the changes, they experienced internationally and internally in the 1970s, both countries sought to diversify the countries they cooperated with, and while Europe emerged as a key strategic partner for Türkiye, Korea strengthened its relations with Japan. Meanwhile, Korea established economic ties with other countries alongside Japan and opened its economy to the world market.

At the end of the three turbulent decades (1950-1980), due to the problems in domestic politics and the arbitrary implementation of development policies, even though ties with the United States were more solid than they had been previously, Türkiye could not be on the right track in terms of the process of development. While being developed and modernized, the traces of the Cold War's agricultural policies, which could not be implemented successfully, continue to follow. Türkiye has been dealing with issues: irrigation, financing, productivity, lack of training in agriculture, production planning, farmers' inability to be organized, expensive and unaffordable materials, lack of specialization, food insecurity, and failing to use the lands correctly. The advantages

Türkiye had in producing many agricultural products in the international arena have faded over time. Türkiye has not been among the leading global exporters of agricultural products for a long time (*Top 10 Agricultural Exporters* , 2018). Know-how, research and development, and innovation are still one of the most severe problems. Long-standing economic problems (like chronic high inflation) are not purely associated with economic or technical policies. They reflect deeper issues related to an unequal distribution of income and wealth. By the 1980s, the Korean development model had been a controversial issue in Turkish academia and policy, and Türkiye tried to emulate the development models of Korea and Japan.

America supported Korea's import substitution industrialization and the export-oriented policies that followed it. Korean exports enjoyed an open American market. During the Korean War, the US made huge military investments and procurements in Korea. The heavy military buildup through the American and Korean armies helped to improve the automotive sector by providing auto parts, body repairs, a level of technology, and enhanced skill. In addition to these successful initiatives that started in the mid-1950s, although there were crises between the two countries later on, with Korea's versatile and calm response to these crises, bilateral relations never came to a breaking point, unlike in Türkiye. As a result of the actions that triggered Korea's perceptions of insecurity, such as the fall of South Vietnam, the Nixon administration's rapprochement with China, and the decision to reduce its troops in Korea, Korea chose to find alternatives. It agreed with Japan and encouraged foreign investment from the United States through this partnership. In the 1980s, the Korean automotive industry had great success, and its exports to America increased dramatically and dominated the American market.

The developmental gap between Türkiye and Korea deepened in the 1970s, and this gap would be more decisive in the 1980s. Of course, economic indicators fall short of showing the current situation of Korea and Türkiye, but they are essential in showing how they differ and where they are. In order to show the country level of Korea and Türkiye, the HDI provides us with a clearer picture. According to the HDI 2019, Korea ranked 22nd, and Türkiye ranked 59th (*Country Insights | Human Development Reports*,

2023). As a starting point, the vast gap in the HDI between Türkiye and Korea will provide us with an understanding of their changing status in the international political economy. Another assumption of the modernization theory was falsified: While the 1961 constitution was a libertarian one, Türkiye took a different path with the 1971 coup. Türkiye's steps towards democratization at the beginning of the Cold War gradually declined after 1970, whereas Korea's transition to democracy was easier (Deyo, 1987; Öniş, 1995b) after laying the foundations for development. After Korea entered the full-scale democratization process in 1987, their paths diverged, and neoliberal transformation varied in the two countries over time. Today, while South Korea is described as "free" according to Freedom House's data, Türkiye appears to be "not free."(*Global Freedom Status* , 2023)

Modernization theory aimed to build nations from the inside out by sending experts to train local elites in economic policies. This policy was implemented in both countries, especially in the case of Türkiye, where the involvement of American experts in the guidelines is more evident. However, in the Korean case, the US adopted a two-pronged approach. The US opened its doors for immigration to all countries by abolishing discrimination based on national origin with the Immigration Act of 1965. Although it also received immigration from Türkiye, it received many immigrants from Korea (Keely, 1971, p.157) since America prioritized European, Asian, and Caribbean immigrants. Another criterion was giving priority to highly skilled immigrants. In particular, they encouraged well-educated Korean leaders, a new generation of politicians, scientists, or military officers to immigrate or stay in the United States. A substantial influx of Korean immigrants to the US was additionally made possible by the close military-related, political, and economic relationship between South Korea and the US.

This thesis argues that the US development package was critical in advancing South Korea and Türkiye. Within the development project context, the US policies achieved the expansion of the US-led world system. In the case of Türkiye, the US did not promote land reform in Türkiye, unlike in Korea. The Turkish state failed to establish an egalitarian society due to the inability to form rural organizations and implement

land reform. This was because of the effective opposition of the politicians' well-entrenched political and economic interests and the lack of US support. Knowing who is in charge and what they want and believe is essential to understanding a state's development tactics preferences (Geddes, 1996, p. 6). In Türkiye, society does not have power. However, the Korean example shows us that change can occur from below, which can be decisive in the development process.

America's development package has successes, failures, and legacies. First, the abstraction of economic studies, which American social sciences attach importance to, with mathematical models, and the separation of politics and economy affect policymaking. Secondly, it is undeniable that modernization theory contributes to the long-standing understanding of "us" versus "other" European and Western countries describing themselves as developed and others as traditional, backward, and underdeveloped of the Third World (Marwah, 2016). Furthermore, today, both countries continue to have alliances with America. However, the relations between Türkiye and the US have been steadily downward. The US-Korea relations patterns show a stark contrast with the US-Türkiye relations. Unlike US-Türkiye relations, the US and Korea share some common interests and policy priorities on development issues brought about by a long-standing development relationship. Overall, the US development package functioned as a mechanism to integrate Türkiye within the Western alliance, whereas it functioned as a mechanism to transform Korea. The long shadow the US cast over Türkiye's and Korea's development processes could illustrate the pros and cons of particular theories, policies, and methods over others.

This dissertation is an endeavor to show the changing and fragmented nature of Turkish and Korean development and the role of the US development package in their development. The development project was an instrument of the US in the Cold War guided by the premises of the modernization theory. Contrary to the assumption of modernization theory, the traditional-to-modern developmental change could not be catalyzed by only the tangibles like aid or resource flows. Instead, the Korean example demonstrates how intangibles like tenacity, a leader's skills, and other factors may promote growth when combined with outsourcing in the US. It would be naive to

attribute South Korea's success primarily to geopolitical variables. Its unique vernacular structure was vital to its success when the Application of effective domestic policies coupled with the US development package.

Beyond the issues discussed above, several fruitful avenues exist for future studies. This study offers clues as to what dependencies were created in the development process during the Cold War. Future studies may examine how these dependencies have been shaped in the years following the Cold War period and need to explore the modernization theory's projections on today's development policies because still today, the critical tools of American foreign policy are defined as defense, diplomacy, and development—the 3D approach (*Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy*, 2010; Lopez, 2022). It would be helpful to examine whether today's policies share similar discourses and tropes with their Cold War counterparts and what they have become. The broad questions, such as have the US tools increasingly turned into instruments of neoliberal discipline and whether they have further entrenched the US power, may provide further research avenues. Other avenues for future research that may further the research aims of this dissertation could be to multiply comparative analyses, scrutinize each tool used by the United States, and examine its current effects. For example, few studies on land reform, agricultural and trade policies exist. Social movements during land reform efforts in Türkiye and Korea are just one of the areas open to scrutiny. Finally, while recent scholarly studies specifically explore the role of religion and ideologies in Türkiye, Japan, and Korea, comparing these studies, the divergence of non-western country cases that converge or aim to converge toward Western modernity is necessary.

This thesis claims that continuing America's Cold War development policies is still seen. Daniel Lerner's 1958 book *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* was one of the earliest texts to explain the use of modernization theory in policymaking. However, today, even in the speech of former President George W. Bush, we see that the idea of “Modernizing the Middle East” is still valid (Hancock, 2002). Links like these show us that there may be studies that could open many doors and encourage future research that can also be done in or cross-country comparisons.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Demirel, Özge

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 13 February 1988, Ankara

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
Ph.D.	METU International Relations	2023
LL.M.	University of Sussex International Law: Rights and Responsibilities	2011

BS Gazi University International 2009
Relations

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2013- Present	AYBU International Relations	Research Assistant
2020-2021	Turkish Heritage Organization	Contributor
2018-2019	Turkish Heritage Organization	Non-Resident Fellow
2017 Fall	Yonsei University, GSIS, Institute for Modern Korean Studies	Visiting Scholar
2012-2013	Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Economy, DG of Agreements	Assistant Specialist
2012 Feb- 2012 Oct	Bartın University	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Intermediate Korean, and French

PUBLICATIONS

1. Book review, *Social Media and Anti-democratic Opposition Movements*, *The International Spectator* (2022)
2. Book review, *Progress in Development Studies* (2019), 19 (1) *States in the Developing World*; Centeno, M., Kohli, A., Yashar, D.J. and Mistree, D., editors (2017).
3. Book review, *Turkish Policy Quarterly* (2019), *Rising Powers and South-South Cooperation*; written by Kevin Gray and Barry K. Gills (2016).
4. Book review, *Rising Powers Quarterly* (2019), 3 (4) *A Relational Theory of World Politics*; written by Yaqing Qin (2018).
5. Book chapter, “Unilateralism in European Union” in *EU Single Market and Commercial Policy* edited by Angelo Santagostino, Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2017).
6. Book review, *Insight Türkiye* (2017), 19 (1) *Obama’s Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror*; written by Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland (2014).

RESEARCH INTERESTS

International Political Economy, Development studies, East Asian studies, US Foreign Policy, social movements

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKEÖZET

Bu çalıřma Türkiye ve Güney Kore'nin (bundan sonra Kore olarak isimlendirilecektir) kalkınmalarının siyasi ekonomisinin karşılařtırmalı incelemesidir. İki ülkenin 1945 sonrasında neredeyse aynı zor kořullarda bulunması ile bařlayan süreç, Kore'nin kalkınmış bir ülke olarak 1980'lerde ortaya çıkması ile dikkat çekici bir araştırma konusu olmuřtur. İki ülkenin kalkınmalarının farklılaşması, karşılařtırmalı çalıřmalardaki ve sosyal bilimlerdeki en önemli örneklerden biridir. Bařta Kore olmak üzere her iki ülkenin kalkınma süreci sıklıkla analiz edilmiş ve birçok tez ve akademik çalıřmada, ülkelerin neden diđerlerinden daha kalkınmış olduđu deđerlendirilmiştir. Ancak İkinci Dünya Savařı'ndan sonra, uluslararası ekonomi politik Amerika tarafından tasarlanırken, Türkiye ve Kore'yi nasıl yönlendirdiđi konusunda çok az araştırma yapılmıştır. Yakın tarihte neler olup bittiđini ortaya çıkarmak ve her iki ülkenin iç faktörlerini ve dış müdahalenin etkisini incelemek elzemdir; böylece Amerika Birleřik Devletleri'nin (ABD) Üçüncü Dünya ülkeleriyle etkileřimi daha iyi gözlemlenebilir ve anlaşılabilir.

Bu tezin temel sorunsalı, ABD'nin Güney Kore ve Türkiye'deki kalkınma angajmanını uluslararası bir politik ekonomi perspektifinden sorunsallařtırmaya çalıřmaktadır. Gelmiş geçmiş en büyük süper güçlerden biri olan ABD'nin, Sođuk Savař dönemi boyunca bu iki ülkeye yönelik politikaları, kalkınma süreçlerinde onları nasıl şekillendirdiđi ve hangi politika araçları ile müdahil olduđu ele alınacaktır. Sođuk Savař, İkinci Dünya Savařı'nın devamı olsa da, o zamanlar ABD'nin savař sonrası düzene şekillendirmek için hem ideolojik hem de sahip olduđu kaynak ve olanaklar açısından daha fazla fırsatı ve alanı bulunmakta idi. ABD ekonomik ve askeri bir hegemon olarak ortaya çıktı ve kendi vizyonunu ve stratejisini zayıf devletlere empoze etmeye bařladı. Ayrıca, küresel siyasi ve ekonomik ortam, sadece Amerika gibi kalkınmış ülkelere deđil, Kore ve Türkiye de dahil olmak üzere kalkınmamış ülkelere, kalkınma serüvenlerini yönetmede benzeri görülmemiş bir özerklik verdi.

Bu tezin temel savı şu sorular çevresinde oluşmaktadır: ABD kalkınma paketi, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Kore ve Türkiye'nin kalkınmasında nasıl bir rol oynadı? Amerika, Türkiye ve Kore kalkınmasına yönelik bu ülkelerin bakış açılarını ve vizyonlarını nasıl şekillendirdi ve bu iki ülke Amerikan politikalarını ne derece ilerletti? Bu soruları yanıtlama çabası, Amerikan kalkınma paketinin hangi politika araçlarından oluştuğunu, bu politikalara hangi ideolojik duruş ve yaklaşımın yön verdiğini ve nereden kaynaklandığını araştırmaktan geçmektedir. Bu soruları cevaplandırmak ve anlamak tarihsel bir bağlamı incelemeyi gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu iki ülkenin kalkınma serüvenlerinin bugünü ve geleceğini anlamak için, ABD'nin her iki ülkenin dönüşümünü nasıl etkilediğini, hangi araçların belirleyici rol oynadığını ve farklılıkların ve benzerliklerin hangi alanlarda olduğunu daha ayrıntılı olarak incelemek önemlidir. Türkiye ve Kore'nin kalkınmasının ekonomi politiğinde ABD'nin rolü ve Türkiye ile Kore'nin farklı kalkınma performanslarının arkasında yatan nedenler tespit edilmektedir. ABD hem Türkiye hem de Kore ile arasında çok sayıda iletişim kanalı yarattı, bu en nihayetinde Amerika'ya bağımlılık yarattı. Bu bağımlılık, hem Türkiye'nin hem de Kore'nin kalkınma yollarını ve dış politika tercihlerini Amerikan Soğuk Savaş çıkarları doğrultusunda şekillendirmesinde önemli bir rol oynadı. ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş'ta stratejik hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek için kalkınma paketinin araçları olarak kullandığı dört politika aracı (dış ekonomik yardım, toprak reformu, askeri müdahale ve ticaret) incelenecektir. Klasik Modernleşme Teorisinin (bundan sonra Modernleşme Teorisi olarak adlandırılacaktır) ve buna bağlı kalkınmaya yönelik politikaların, Batı dışındaki ülkeler olan Türkiye ve Kore gibi ülkeler üzerindeki etkisi incelenecektir. Amerika'nın politika eylemi olan kalkınma paketi, eklektik bir şekilde siyasi ve ekonomik hedeflerle açıklanmaktadır.

Uluslararası Siyasi Ekonomi, hem Uluslararası koşulların ve ülke koşullarının etkileşimi analizinde hem de niceliksel değişkenlerin artmasıyla değerlendirilen kalkınma anlayışı yerine daha kapsamlı bir perspektif sunmaktadır. Bu tez, ABD'nin kalkınma paketini Türkiye ve Kore'de farklı derecelerde kullandığını öne sürmektedir. Bu iki ülkenin ABD ile ikili ilişkilerin farklı yönleri bu tezin odak noktası değil, ancak elbette Amerikan etkisini ve ABD'nin uluslararası müdahalesinin etnosentrik

yaklaşımını araştırırken, Amerikan-Kore ve Amerikan-Türkiye ilişkilerinin iniş-çıkışlarına da temas etmektedir. 1945 ve 1990 yılları arası bize bu çeşitli ilişkiler hakkında genel bir perspektif verecektir. İlişkiler 1945'ten beri yardım, kırsal kalkınma projeleri, askeri müdahale ve ticaret politikaları desteklendi. Her ne kadar çok güçlü bir Amerikan yönlendirmesi olsa da, her iki ülke de ABD'nin bu kalkınma paketi araçlarını nasıl kullanacağını ve nereye kanalize edeceklerini belirleyecek konumdaydılar. Kore'de bu süreç Amerikan uzmanları ve politika yapıcıları ile uyumlu bir şekilde ilerlemişken, Türkiye ve Amerika arasında ciddi görüş farklılıkları bulunmaktaydı. İç politikadaki tercihler ve dış bir aktörün kalkınma politikalarına dahiliyetinin etkileşimi bu tezin temelidir. Literatürde çoğunlukla kalkınmanın ekonomik yönüyle ya da dış yardım ile ilgili çalışmalar bulunurken, ABD'nin bu dört kanal aracılığıyla dahil olmasına dair ayrıntılı bir analizini nadiren bulunmaktadır; bu nedenle, bu çalışma, Kore ve Türkiye'yi vaka çalışmaları olarak kalkınma perspektiflerini ve stratejilerini daha iyi anlamak için karşılaştırmalı bir analizle incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Amerikan kalkınma paketinin hangi teorik duruştan ve politikalardan kaynaklandığını ortaya çıkarmak, Türkiye ve Kore kalkınmasının politik ekonomilerinin kapsamlı bir şekilde anlaşılmasını sağlamaktadır. Modernleşme Teorisinin kalkınma kavramı üzerindeki özelliklerinin de analiz edilmesi gerekmektedir çünkü savaş sonrası kalkınma teori ve politikalarına bu Amerikan paradigması hakim olmuştur. ABD'nin gücü genişledikçe, modernleşme teorisi popüler hale gelmiş ve öncülleri dış politika oluşumuna daha fazla nüfuz etmiştir. Türkiye ve Kore'de de Amerikan'ın teşvik ettiği model hakim oldu, ve Amerika liderliğindeki dünya düzenine entegrasyonlarının örnekleri olarak görüldü. Modernleşme teorisinin ABD uygulamasına göre, gelişmekte olan veya az gelişmiş uluslar ABD'nin sürdürdüğü ve teşvik ettiği siyasi, güvenlik, ekonomik ve ticari ağlara katılarak kalkınmayı sürdürmeye devam ederse, hem kalkınmış olacaklar hem onların kalkınması Amerika'nın güçlenmesiyle sonuçlanacaktır.

Bu çerçevede, ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki Kore ve Türkiye'deki kalkınma politikalarının ortaya çıkarılması, ABD'nin küresel ölçekte 'ötekilerin' kalkınma

sorunlarına yaklaşımı hakkında bize bilgi verebilir. Bu tezin önemli bir yönü, Soğuk Savaş sırasındaki kalkınma analizinde yerel ve uluslararası faktörleri nasıl bir araya getirdiğidir. Bu nedenle, en önemli katkısı, olay örgüsünde yer almayan Türkiye ve Kore'nin kalkınmasında yabancı bir aktörün rolünü incelemektir. İkinci dikkate değer katkı ise, Amerikan kalkınma paketinin dört ana aracının araştırılmasıdır: Ekonomik yardım, toprak reformunun teşviki, ticaret ve piyasa politikaları ve askeri yardım. Bu dört aracın seçilmesinin nedeni, modernleşme teorisinin öngördüğü Amerikan tarzı kalkınma modelinde; askeri yardım ülkelerin üzerindeki savunma yükünü hafifletecek; hükümetler bu kaynakları ekonomik yardımla birlikte kalkınmaları için kullanabileceklerdir. Kısa bir süre sonra da, Serbest Dünya içinde liberal ticaret politikaları ve Amerika'nın açık pazarı ile bir ağ kurulacak ve toprak reformunun ve tarımsal kalkınmayı getirecek politikaların teşviki, düzenlenmiş mülkiyet ilişkileri ile toplumsal kalkınma için birçok fırsat doğuracaktır. Bu anlamda, bu dört araç birbiri ile içiçe geçmiştir. Bu analiz, Soğuk Savaş sırasında Amerikan üstünlüğünün kurulmasının temel araçlarını, bunun Amerika'nın dış ekonomi ve güvenlik politikalarıyla nasıl ayrılmaz bir şekilde bağlantılı olduğunu ve bu politikaların savaş öncesi dönemde Amerika'nın iç politikasındaki uygulamalardan nasıl kaynaklandığını göstermektedir. Türkiye ve Kore'nin kalkınma stratejilerini ABD politikalarına göre nasıl ayarlamak ve entegre etmek zorunda kaldıklarını ve Amerikan kaynaklarını bu gerçeklik içinde nereye yönlendirdiklerini değerlendirmek önemlidir.

Türkiye ve Kore kalkınma stratejisinin Soğuk Savaş'ın uluslararası ekonomi politiğinin bir mirası olduğunu iddia edilmektedir. Soğuk Savaş konjonktüründe zıt kutupları oluşturan ABD ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin Üçüncü Dünya'ya dahilîyetleri ve etkileri tarihsel olarak önemlidir. Hem SSCB hem de ABD, Üçüncü Dünya ülkelerinin desteği için rekabet etmiş, bunun için farklı politika araçları kullanmışlardır. ABD'nin bu dört temel araç ile Türkiye ve Kore'deki varlığı bu ülkelerin önceliklerini ve konumlanmalarını değiştirdi. ABD'nin bu iki ülkeyi uluslararası iş bölümünde nasıl konumlandığı kritik öneme sahip oldu. ABD'nin şemsiyesi altında olmak, uluslararası düzende de güvence getirmiştir. Amerikan angajmanı hem söylemsel hem de ideolojik olarak Türkiye ve Kore'yi etkilemiş, bu da Batı tipi kalkınma yolunda

bağımlılık yaratmıştır. Örneğin, ABD'nin Kore'ye müdahil olduğu dönem, kalkınmacı devletin ortaya çıkışına denk gelmiş ve kalkınmacı devlet, Amerikan desteği öncülüğünde kurulmuştur.

ABD'nin kalkınma paketi aracılığıyla uluslara nasıl rehberlik ettiği, kalkınma paketinin araçlarını nasıl kullandığı ve alıcı ülkedeki dinamiklerin, özellikle toplumsal ve siyasi koalisyonların bu dinamiklerle nasıl buluşup etkileşime girdiğine dair çok az çalışma bulunmaktadır. Bu araçların Türkiye ve Kore'nin kalkınmasına yardımcı olduğuna dair kanıtlar da sunulmakla birlikte, dış aktörün politika araçlarının tek bir ülkeyi refaha kavuşturmadığı; kurumlar, kültür, siyasi ve sosyal yapı, bürokrasi, devletin işlevi ve hükümetler arası ilişkilerin doğası ve iki ülke ile bağlantılı diğer aktörlerin de önem arz ettiği vurgulanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Amerika'nın kalkınma paketinin tek başına o ülkeyi kalkındırdığı iddia edilemez. Yani, Türkiye ve Kore'nin, Amerikan kaynakları ile iç politikalarında ne yaptıkları konusu hayati önem taşımaktadır. Tam bu noktada, Stephan Haggard'ın kitabında sunduğu çerçeve, bu teze katkıda bulunmuştur. Haggard, yeni endüstrileşmiş ülkeleri incelemiş, Amerikan dahiliyetinin rolüne vurgu yapmıştır. Yazar ayrıca, politika yapıcılarının yerel ve uluslararası politik ekonomiler arasındaki kritik bağlantıyı yönetmede çok önemli bir rolü olduğunu vurgulamaktadır (Haggard, 1990a, pp. 269–170). Haggard, liderlerin tutarlı ve uyumlu reform grupları oluşturma ve sürdürmede kritik öneme sahip olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu çerçeve, Türkiye ve Kore'nin ayrıntılı bir karşılaştırmalı analizine dayanarak, doğrudan ABD'den etkilenen devlet gücünün örgütlenme ve kaynakları kullanma biçiminin, Kore ve Türkiye'nin kalkınma süreçlerini ve kalıplarını belirleyici bir şekilde etkilediği tartışılmasında önemli katkı sunmaktadır. Bu nedenle, Soğuk Savaş döneminde devletin değişen rolü ve süreçte yer alan diğer aktörlerle ilişkisi, kalkınma süreçlerinin yeniden şekillenmesinde iç içe geçmiş değişkenler ile birlikte incelenmektedir.

ABD kalkınma paketinin (dış ekonomik yardım, ticaret uygulamaları, toprak reformu ve askeri müdahaleyi içeren) etkinliği, bu iki ülkenin karşı karşıya kaldıkları tehdit ve kendilerinin farklı iç politikaları nedeniyle karışık bir tablo sunmaktadır. Karşılaştıkları tehdit, ABD'nin bu araçları uygulama pratiğini değiştirdi. Özellikle,

1950-1953 yıllarında cereyan eden Kore Savaşı Güney Kore'nin Amerika için önemini artırmıştır. Dış ekonomik yardımın yanı sıra, askeri müdahale, ticaret politikaları, kırsal kalkınma politikaları/toprak reformu ve Soğuk Savaş sırasındaki eğitim yatırımı ya da nüfus kontrolü gibi diğer politikalar, ABD kalkınma paketinin diğer önemli bileşenlerini oluşturup, bu dört ana aracı tamamlayıcı olarak çalışmış, ve Kore'de daha sistematik bir şekilde uygulanmıştır.

20. yüzyılın kalkınma anlayışını Modernleşme teorisi belirlemiş, Soğuk Savaş döneminde Amerikan dış politikasına bu anlayış yön vermiştir. Modernleşme teorisi, ülkeleri, endüstrileşmeden sosyal değerler ve yaşam tarzları sürecine kadar kapsayan geniş bir yelpazede etkilemiştir ve yönlendirmiştir. Buna göre, kalkınma, sonsuz, sınırsız, niceliksel genişleme ve çoğalma hali veya hallerini ifade eder. Politik ve ekonomik dönüşümün tek yönlü olduğu düşüncesinden yola çıkarak bütün devletlerin doğrusal bir yol takip edeceği var sayımı ile hareket etmiştir. Ancak, tüm uluslar için öngörülen doğrusal kalkınma, modernleşme teorisinin temel öncüllerini geçersiz kılarak, ülkeler arasındaki önemli sosyal, politik, kültürel ve ekonomik eşitsizlikleri gizlemiştir.

Bu doğrultuda, Amerikalı politika yapıcılar ve entelektüeller, ABD'nin dünyadaki rolünü ve kalkınma gündemini oluşturmak için bir araya gelip yorumladılar. ABD'li yetkililer az gelişmişliği/geri kalmışlığı kendi güvenliklerine yönelik bir tehdit olarak yorumladılar. Bu değerlendirme sonucunda (Latham, 2000, p. 15) “öteki”ni tanımak ve ona göre politikalar geliştirmek için bir söylem, küresel vizyon, dil ve ideoloji belirlendi: Bu modernleşme teorisi oldu. Modernleşme kuramının yarattığı söylemsel alan, kalkınma kavramında görüldü. Bu ilk olarak, ekonomik yardım paketleriyle başladı. Kritik olan ise, Modernleşme teorisi çerçevesinde Amerika'nın kalkınma paketini uygulaması ve bu uygulamaların farklı bölgelerde yerel nitelikler kazanmasıydı. Bunun en bariz örneğini ABD'nin kırsal kalkınma projelerinde ve ticari politikalarda görüyoruz.

Modernleşme teorisi, en etkili tarihsel ve politik paradigmlar arasında yer almaktadır. Soğuk Savaş sırasında kalkınmayı anlamlandırmak için önde gelen paradigma haline

geldi. Sovyet tarzı planlamaya alternatif olarak bir kalkınma modeli sunuldu. Teori, akademide ve politika çevrelerinde çok popüler ve yaygın hale geldi. Kalkınmanın nasıl olması gerektiğine dair ilerici ve doğrusal bir ilerleme öneren bir teoridir ve toplumun ekonomik olarak gelişirken köklü bir dönüşüm geçirdiğini iddia eder. Tüm iyi şeylerin -kentleşme, sanayileşme ve demokratikleşme- birbirine uyduğu idealize edilmiş bir Anglo-Amerikan fikri üzerine inşa edilmiş bir modeldir. Amerikalı politika yapıcılar tarafından öngörülen askeri yönü ağır basan ve kalkınma odaklı ilerleme fikri, bu teorinin rehberliğinde her iki ülkeye de nüfuz etti. Dahası, Amerika, kalkınma paketiyle Kore ve Türkiye'nin imajını da şekillendirdi. Amerikan kültürünün her iki ülkeye nüfuz edilmesi, onlar için Batılı kimliğin yeniden üretilmesine ve Batı modernliği hakkında bu ülkelerde fikir üretilmesine katkıda bulunmuştur. Kültürel ve sosyal organizasyonlarını da etkiledi. Komünizm karşıtı propaganda veya Barış Gönüllüleri vb. semboller ve doğrusal ilerlemeye dayalı kalkınma fikri, Amerikan modernleşmesinin yayılması için önemli araçlar haline geldi.

Modernleşme teorisi, ABD'nin kalkınma paketini nasıl kullandığına dair bir anlayış sunuyor ve paketi bir ulusal güvenlik politikası aracı olarak nasıl uyguladığını anlatıyor. Bu paket, Amerika'nın Doğu Asya ve Avrupa'daki nüfuz alanını komünist bir tehdide karşı savunmaya hizmet eden unsur oldu. Daha sonra iç pazarın daralması, uluslararası genişleme ve hızlı teknolojik gelişmeler ve artan birbirine bağımlılık nedeniyle kendi dışındaki dünyayı dönüştürme eğilimi, Amerika'yı kalkınma paketini dönem koşullarına göre düzenlemeye yöneltti. Dolayısıyla, Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca, aynı araçlar aynı derecede uygulanmadı; hatta her iki ülke için de 1970'lerin ortasından itibaren askeri yardım dışında diğer araçların uygulanması giderek azalmıştır.

Modernleşme teorisinin savunucularından Rostow, her toplumun tarihsel süreçteki kalkınma yolculuğunu açıklamayı amaçlar. Dolayısıyla az gelişmiş toplumlar ile gelişmiş toplumlar arasındaki fark sadece bir "aşama" farkıdır. Rostow, "Sorun gizemli Doğu'da değil, anlaşılmaz Batı'dadır" derken (Pearce, 2001, p. 118), Doğu'yu pasif, Batı'yı her şeye muktedir ve ABD'nin bu yolda tasavvur ettiği araç ve politikaları yeterli görmüştür. Ancak, tahmin edilenin aksine, Türkiye ve Kore'ye farklı derecedeki

Amerikan dahiliyeti ve kendi iç dinamikleri nedeniyle, kalkınmaları doğrusal bir çizgide ilerlememiştir. Kalkınmanın, sadece bir aşama farkı olmadığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu anlamda, monistik yaklaşım nedeniyle, modernleşme teorisi ne olacağını öngörmekte başarısız oldu. Türk kalkınmasının geldiği nokta, modernleşme teorisinin beklenti ve önermelerine meydan okudu. Kore ve Türkiye'nin kalkınma hikayesi 1970'lerde oldukça farklılaştı. Soğuk Savaş bitiminde ise, Kore, kalkınma alanında gösterdiği başarı ile gelişmiş ülke statüsüne kavuşmuş ve "Güney Kore Modeli" olarak referans gösterilir olmuştur. Önemli farklılıklarına rağmen, Kore ve Türkiye, 2000'lerde yükselen güçler olarak karşılaştırıldı. 'Kore örneği' bugün de Türkiye'nin 'kalkınmış' olma idealinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Türkiye'nin, Kore'nin kalkınmacı devlet politikalarını ve kurumsal mekanizmalarını örnek alarak nasıl hayata geçirebileceği üzerine çalışmalar yapılmaktadır. Ancak bu karşılaştırmalar, esas olarak onların kalkınmalarını, Kore kalkınma modelinin kendine has özelliklerini ve ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş sırasındaki angajmanını göz ardı etmektedir.

Amerika'nın Soğuk Savaş kalkınma politikaları döneminin kökeni, 1930'lu yıllarda Tennessee Vadi Projesi (Tennessee Valley Authority-TVA) reformları ve Yeni Anlaşma (New Deal) politikalarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Kendi iç politikasında uyguladığı bu kalkınma programları, 1945'ten sonra yeni düzen kurulurken Amerika'nın küresel misyonunu şekillendirdi. Bu politikalarının başarısı, Amerikan politika yapıcılarında bunları dünyanın geri kalanında uygulayabileceklerine dair aşırı bir iyimserlik yarattı. Türkiye ve Kore'deki politika yapıcılar, bu aşırı iyimserliğin istisnası olmadı. Hepsi, ülkelerinin ABD'nin yardımıyla ve Amerikan kaynaklarının akışıyla "kalkınmış" bir statüye kavuşacağı inancını paylaşıyorlardı. Modernleşme teorisi ve TVA politikalarının uluslararası alandaki ilk yansımaları Batı Avrupa'da Yunanistan ve Türkiye gibi ülkelerde, üretim ve tüketim kalıplarını yeniden şekillendirmeye ve ekonomilerini yeniden yapılandırmaya odaklanan Dört Nokta (Point Four), Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı gibi ekonomik yardım plan ve projeleri aracılığıyla somutlaştı. Batı Avrupa'daki uygulamalardan sonra, Doğu Asya'da da ekonomik yardım paketleri işlerlik kazandı. Özellikle, Güney Kore ve Türkiye, modernleşme teorisi için "deneme alanları" haline geldi.

Özellikle, Kore Savaşı'nın başlamasından sonra Amerikan politikaları dramatik bir şekilde değişti. Kore'ye yönelik Komünizm tehdidi çok daha ciddi olduğundan, Amerikalı politika yapıcılar, Güney Kore'deki programların sadece savaş hasarını iyileştirmekten çok daha fazlası yapılması gerektiği konusunda uzlaştı; hızlandırılmış ve yoğun kalkınma projeleri bunun en önemli aracı oldu. Bunun en önemli sebebi ise, Kore'nin komünizm tehdidine hem içeride hem de dışarıda daha yakın olması ve Amerika'nın Kore savaşını öngörüp engelleyememesidir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Kore'yi yeniden inşa etme çabalarına kendi kurumlarının yanı sıra, Birleşmiş Milletler ve çeşitli uluslararası kurumların katılımını da sağladı. 1950'lerde dünyanın en önemli kalkınma çabası haline geldi. Güney Kore 1970'lerde "kalkınmış" statüsüne kavuşup ve 1970'lerde bu bağımlılıktan büyük ölçüde kurtulurken, Türkiye bu noktaya erişemedi. Aksine ABD'ye bağımlılığı arttı.

Öncelikle, hem Kore hem de Türkiye çok büyük miktarlarda ABD askeri ve ekonomik yardımı aldı. Ekonomik yardım politikaları, Kore ve Türkiye'nin bulunduğu bölgelerde Amerikan sermayesi için daha geçirgen hale getirmeyi amaçladığı, PL 480 programı ile ticaret politikalarının verimliliklerini ve ticaret dinamiklerini nasıl etkilediği ve uluslararası iş bölümündeki konumlarını nasıl belirlediği, ve tüm bunların hem ülkelerin kalkınmasına hem de Amerikan çıkarlarına ve ulusal ve uluslararası güvenlik politikasına nasıl hizmet ettiğini göstermek açısından önemlidir. Dahası, sadece politika, ticaret ya da ekonomik anlamda değil, yardımlar, Kore ve Türkiye'nin gıda rejimleri, ticaret kalıpları, uluslararası iş bölümündeki yerleri ve hatta iki toplumun da yeme-içme alışkanlıklarını bile değiştirmiş ve iki ülke her anlamda Amerikan etkisi altına girmiştir. Amerika'nın sadece gıda yardımı programında bile, iki ülkenin kalkınma politikalarını nasıl etkilediği belirgindir. ABD çiftçilerinin dünya çapında gıda yardımı sağlamak için ihtiyaç fazlası malları, Amerika'ya uluslararası ve ulusal düzeyde bir avantaj sağlamıştır.

Daha geniş askeri yardım kategorisi altında ABD, istikrarlı müttefikler yaratmayı, onları komünizme karşı savunmayı ve tehditlerle mücadele için uzun vadeli taahhütlerde bulunmayı amaçlıyordu (Holmes, 2014). Paketin askeri kısmının her iki ülkede de başarılı olduğu söylenebilir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri askeri üsler kurarak

fiziksel olarak müdahil oldu. ABD askeri ve teknik yardımı, her iki ülkenin ordularının güçlendirilmesine önemli ölçüde katkıda bulunmuştur. Askeri yardım her iki ülkenin askeri yapısını güçlendirdi ve dünyanın en güçlü ilk 10 ordusu içinde yer aldılar. ABD, Kore ve Türk ordularını geliştirmek için eğitim, öğretim programları, yardım ve üsler kurmak gibi mekanizmalara başvurdu. Ayrıca çok sayıda uzman göndererek iki ülkenin askeri kurumlarına katkı sağlamıştır. Askeri yardım her iki ülkenin askeri yapısını güçlendirdi. ABD'nin Türkiye için tasavvur ettiği askeri öncülüğündeki modernleşme ve modernleştirici güç olarak Türk ordusunun rolü, Soğuk Savaş sırasında gerçekleşti (Lerner & Robinson, 1960, p. 44). Silahlı kuvvetler, ABD politika yapıcıları tarafından önemli siyasi aktörler olarak tanımlandı Amerikalı uzmanların tavsiyeleri doğrultusunda, askeri alandaki iş birliği ve yardım paketin diğer unsurlarına göre daha uyum içerisinde ilerledi ve 1960'ların ortalarından itibaren bu durum Türk siyasetinde ve kalkınmasında daha da yerleşik hale geldi. Türkiye, askeri ve ekonomik yardım ve birçok Amerikalı uzmanın tavsiyelerini aldı.

Tüm bu araçlar öncelikle Soğuk Savaş'ın doğası gereği güvenlik endişeleri nedenleriyle oluşturulmuştur. ABD'nin nihai motivasyonu, kalkınmayı kullanarak siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal amaçlarını güvence altına almaktı. ABD, şiddeti tırmandırabilecek ve yoksulluğu artırabilecek yerel ve bölgesel çatışmaların alevlenmesini önlemeyi amaçladı. Bu Amerika'nın Sovyetler karşısında istemediği bir durumdu. Gerçekten de Kore'ye yönelik tehdit Türkiye'den çok daha şiddetli ve yakın olduğundan, bu faktör, devletin kalkınmaya öncelik vermesi için meşrulaştırıcı bir rol oynadı. Kore'de, devletin bir dereceye kadar özerkliğe sahip olması nedeniyle ABD kalkınma paketini kurumsal iyileştirme için temel bir katalizör olarak kullandı. Özellikle, devletin özerklik derecesi ve eğitime yapılan yatırım Kore'yi farklı kıldı. Kamu ve özel sektör arasındaki etkileşim ve yakın bağlantılar ve meritokratik sistemin ulusa nasıl fayda sağladığını gösteren en çarpıcı örnektir. Türkiye ise bunun tam tersi bir örnek olarak öne çıkıyor ve en açık şekilde toprak reformu uygulamasında görülüyor. İç politikada, diğer aktörlerle iş birliği yapmak yerine, Türkiye'deki hükümetler toprak reform programını uygulama sözü vermelerine rağmen, seçimlerde siyasi destek kazanmayı ve düşmanlarını ortadan kaldırmayı amaçladıkları için

1970'lere dek toprak reformuna ilişkin yasaların içeriği boşaltıldı ve hükümsüz kılındı. Huntington bunu “kırsallaşan seçim” olgusu olarak tarif etmiştir (S. Huntington, 2006, p. 147). Demokrat Parti (DP) kırsal kalkınmayı ulusal kalkınma gündeminin önemli bir bileşeni olarak vurgulayarak 1950 seçimlerini kazanmıştır. DP, köylüler ve çiftçiler üzerinde popülist söylemleri etkin bir şekilde kullanmış ve artan mali kaynaklarla devlet iktidarını ele geçirmeyi başaran toprak ağaları ile Kemalistler arasındaki çatışmadan yararlanmıştır. Türkiye'de hükümetlerin popülist duruşu, ülkede uygulanamayan bir toprak reformu fiyaskosuna yol açmıştır.

Amerika'nın Türkiye'ye ihraç ettiği traktörler, ekonomik yardımlar ile birleştiğinde Türk tarımını gerçekten geliştirebilirdi. Türkiye'nin tarımda makineleşme konusundaki Amerikan yardımlarını nasıl yanlış politika uygulamaları ile israf ettiği şu örnekten de açıkça anlaşılabilir: Amerika, Türkiye'de uyguladığı gibi Fransa için de 10.000 adet traktör finanse etmişti, ancak Fransa ortak kooperatifler kurarak, çiftçilerin makineleşme maliyetlerini azaltma yolunu tercih etmiş, dolayısıyla, yedek parça ya da bu araçların diğer ihtiyaçları için daha fazla harcama yapılmasının önüne geçmiştir. Türkiye ise bunu tercih etmeyerek, daha fazla ithalata bağımlı hale gelmiştir (Tekelioğlu, 2010, p. 48). Haggard'ın, politika yapımcıların kalkınmada uyumlu gruplar oluşturma yeteneğine sahip olduğu iddiasıyla paralel olarak, Türkiye'nin kalkınma serüveni daha en başından kesintiye uğramıştır. Kore ve Türkiye'nin farklılaşan toprak reformu politikaları, devletin yeteneğini, kurumlarını kullanma kapasitesini ve toplum desteğini kazanma yeteneğini göstermek için önemli bir göstergedir.

Toprak reformunun, savaş sonrası hükümetler tarafından ele alınması gereken en zorlu iç politika sorunlardan biri oluşu, Türkiye'nin bu politikayı uygulayamışını ve sonuçlarını daha vahim hale getirmiştir. ABD desteğinin olmadığı Türkiye'nin en büyük başarısızlıklarından biridir. ABD'nin Türkiye'de toprak reformunu desteklememesinin nedeni, Türkiye'ye gelen uzmanların, Türk köyleri ve eğitim yapısı hakkında tavsiyelerde bulunan uzmanların, Türk köylerini Amerikan çiftlikleri gibi değerlendirerek tavsiye vermelerindedir (Kirby, 1962). Bu, modernleşme teorisinin başarısız olduğunu ve Amerikan kalkınma paketinin en azından alıcı ülkelerin yerel özelliklerine göre şekillendirilmesi gerektiğini göstermektedir. Türkiye'de toprak

reformunun gerçekleştirilememesi toplumsal yapıyı, sınıflar arası ilişkileri ve hatta siyasi ittifak yapılarını etkilemiştir. Bu ilişki ve ortaklıkların ürünü olan devletin özerkliği, iyi tanımlanmış ve korunan mülkiyet hakları ve adil kurumlar aracılığıyla piyasa aktörlerinin üretken davranışları için teşvikler yaratmaktadır.

ABD'nin güçlü rehberliği ve baskısı altında Kore, ülke çapında barışçıl bir toprak reformu uyguladı ve bu, *chaebol*'lerin hızla gelişmesi ve kalkınmacı devlet uygulamalarının yerleşmesi sonucunu doğurdu. Ticari politikalarının en temeli olan Amerikan pazarlarının Kore'ye açılması ise, bu şirketlerin uluslararası arenaya açılmalarını ve gelişmelerini önemli ölçüde kolaylaştırdı. Amerika'dan Kore'ye aktarılan kaynaklar, artan sermaye birikimi ve satın alma gücü gibi daha fazla seçenek yarattı. Bu dört sütunlu ABD planı, kalkınmayı, sanayileşmeyi ve demokratikleşmeyi desteklemek için gerekliydi. Ancak bu paketin nasıl aktarılacağı ve nasıl kullanılacağı kadar kaynakların aktarıldığı ülkenin kronik enflasyon veya kutuplaşmış siyaset gibi sorunları, yani iç politikası da bir o kadar önem arz etti.

Bununla birlikte, Amerika'nın Kore'deki toprak reformu politikasına öncülük etmesi daha fazla fırsatlar yarattı. Toprak reformu iki aşamada Syngman Rhee döneminde Amerika Askeri Hükümeti ile birlikte uygulandıktan sonra, topluluk geliştirme programları aracılığıyla, kırsal kesimde yaşayan Korelilerin görüşleri dikkate alınarak daha kapsayıcı ve aşağıdan yukarıya bir politika oluşturma yaklaşımı benimsedi. 1940'ların sonlarında toprak reformunun başarısının ardından, kırsal kalkınmanın üçüncü aşaması olarak 1970'lerde Yeni Köy Hareketi (New Village Movement) başlatılmıştır. Bu proje ile, kırsal kesimdeki yapılaşmada, altyapıda, sağlık ve sanitasyonda ve eğitimde kayda değer ilerlemelere yol açtı. Bu politikada da Amerikan desteği geçerliydi. Amerika'nın TVA deneyiminden ilham alınarak kırsal kesimdeki yerel halka söz hakkı verildi ve buna göre projeler ve prosedürler oluşturuldu ve iş birliği içerisinde uygulandı. Türkiye'de ise bu politikalar uygulanmadı, Amerikalı uzmanların yer aldığı heyetler ile Türkiye'deki politika yapıcılar arasında uzlaşma olmadığı gibi, Amerikan yardımları sadece otoyollar, tarım makineleri, barajlar gibi büyük altyapı hizmetleri oluşturulmasına aktarılmıştır.

1950'ler ve 1960'lar boyunca, iki ülke reformları uygulamak için eş zamanlı girişimlerde bulundu. Ancak, 1970'lerden itibaren iki ülkenin kalkınma güzargahları tamamen farklılaştı: Kore, liyakete dayanan ve herkese fırsat eşitliği sunan bir sistem inşa etti ve makroekonomik istikrar, yaşam standartlarını iyileştirme, gelir artışı, hem tarıma önem verme (başarılı toprak reformu yoluyla), hem de endüstriyel kalkınma, iyi gelir gibi hedeflerine ulaşmaya başladı. 1970'lerde başlayan bu süreç 1987'de demokrasiye geçiş ile birlikte dönüşümü tamamlamış oldu. Kore ve Türkiye sırasıyla 1960 ve 1961'de darbeler yaşadı; ancak iki ülkenin politika yapıcıları farklı pozisyonlar aldı. Türkiye, siyasi ve ekonomik istikrar sürecini tesis edememişken, 1971 askeri darbesi daha ciddi toplumsal kırılmaları ve kırılğan siyasi-ekonomik yapıyı beraberinde getirmiştir. Güney Kore'de 1961 darbesinden sonra askerler iktidarda kalmış ve kısmi anlamda seçimler yapılmıştır. Ancak seçimler ve nispeten deneyimli bürokratlar dışında değişmeyen siyasi yönetim, kalkınma planlarının daha iyi ve verimli uygulanmasını sağlamıştır. Türkiye'de kalkınma planları döneminde dokuz farklı hükümet kurulmuş ve farklı tarihlerde sağ ve sol partiler iktidara gelmiştir. Türkiye'deki siyasi istikrarsızlık, kronik ekonomik sorunlara ilaveten kalkınma politikaları üzerinde Amerikalı uzmanlarla uzlaşma sağlanamaması, Türkiye'nin Amerika ile ilişkilerini ve kalkınma paketinin işlerliğini de etkiledi. Türkiye, ABD ekonomik yardımının çoğunu yalnızca tarımı makineleştirmeye ve yol ağı geliştirmeye kanalize etti. Türkiye'de ABD yardımı, esas olarak fabrika kurmak veya kronik ekonomik sorunlarla mücadele etmek gibi belirli projelere yönelikti. Küresel ekonomi politikte bir dönüm noktası olarak değerlendirilebilecek 1970'lerde Güney Kore başarıya ulaşırken, Türkiye'de kronik ekonomik sorunlar kapsamlı bir şekilde ele alınmadı ve sorunlar akut hale geldi. Osmanlı döneminde olduğu gibi, Türkiye'nin bağımlı kalkınması devam etti.

ABD kalkınma paketi, Kore'nin kalkınmasında hızlı bir şekilde ilerleme kaydetmesini sağladı; tezin dördüncü bölümünde ayrıntılı olarak açıklandığı gibi, kalkınmacı devletin Kore'de bir pilot kurumun rehberliğinde faaliyet göstermesine yardımcı oldu. Diğer bir deyişle, güçlü bir devlet ekonominin merkezinde yer aldı ve merkezi bir devlet kurumu ise bir kalkınma stratejisi oluşturdu. Ekonomik ve siyasi aktörleri,

meritokratik bürokrasi ve kamu ile özel sektör arasındaki güçlü bağlar bu strateji etrafında birleştirdi. Ayrıca Amerika, Kore'deki sömürge ve sömürge sonrası dönemler arasındaki nispeten yumuşak geçişte kritik bir role sahipti ve Kore'deki Japon mirasının, kurumlar gibi, parçalanmadan devam etmesini sağladı. Hem Kore hem de Türkiye İkinci Dünya Savaşı bitiminde zor durumda olmasına rağmen, çatışma sonrası Japon sömürge işgaline maruz kalan Kore, Türkiye'ye kıyasla çok daha farklı zorluklarla karşı karşıya kaldı, bu da iki ülke arasında coğrafyanın da ötesinde farklılıklar doğurmuştur. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonunda Japonya'nın Kore'deki 35 yıllık sömürge yönetimi sona erdi ve miras kalan bazı kurumsal, bürokratik ve örgütsel stratejiler Amerika'nın kalkınma politikalarının uygulanmasında daha kolaylaştırıcı bir rol oynamıştır.

Sonuç olarak, Kore ve ABD arasında ekonomik planlamada dikkatli yönetim ve sağlam kurumlar inşa etme Rhee döneminde başladı. 1960'larda, Başkan Park Chung Hee uzun vadeli bir kalkınma stratejisi hazırladı ve iş adamları, çiftçiler, sanayiciler ve diğer gruplarla yapılan toplantıların çoğuna bizzat katıldı. Bunu yaparak toplumsal gruplarla yakın ilişkiler kurmuş, bu da kurumsallaşma, gruplar arası iletişimi güçlendirme ve daha tutarlı politikalar üretme yolunda önemli bir adım olmuştur. Ayrıca pilot ajans Ekonomik Planlama Kurulu'nu (EPK) kurdu. Türkiye darbeden sonra benzer bir pilot kurum olan Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı'nı kurdu, ancak Kore'nin aksine bu kurumun bürokratik özerkliği yoktu. ABD, Kore'deki kurumlara -EPK da dahil olmak üzere- kurumsal altyapı ve inşa için teknik ve ekonomik yardım sağlamıştır. Kore'de Amerikalı yetkililer, devletin kalkınmadaki işlevine ilişkin daha esnek bir strateji benimsedi. Sonuç olarak ABD, Kore'de yeni bir ekonomik bürokrasi yaratılmasına aracılık etti. Kore'nin ve Türkiye'nin ekonomik krizlere yönelik politika tepkilerine ilişkin olarak, Kore'de EPK yetkilileri istikrar planları sunarken, yani 'aşağıdan' bir yaklaşım benimsenmişken, Türkiye'de bürokrasinin dışından uzmanlar işe alındı ve Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal ile mutabık kalınarak bir istikrar programı benimsendi. Bu programlara, Amerika liderliğindeki uluslararası kuruluşlar müdahil oldu.

Kore, Amerikan kaynaklarını kendi kurumlarına aktarıp kapasitelerini artırmaya yönelik ve uzun vadeli planlama yaparak yüksek devlet kapasitesiyle ihracata dayalı sanayileşme stratejisine geçişini daha hızlı gerçekleştirebildi. Kore, 1970'lerde ağır kimya endüstrileri için uzun vadeli kalkınma planları üzerinde çalışırken, hükümet ve özel sektör iş birliği yavaş yavaş kuruldu ve kurumsallaştı. Daha da önemlisi, Amerika'nın Güney Kore-Japonya iş birliğini teşvik etmesi, Kore'ye kalkınma planlarını finanse etmesi için daha fazla kaynak sağladı. Türkiye'de ise aynı dönemde sanayi yapısını derinleştirme çabaları vardı, ancak koalisyon hükümetleri DPT'yi siyasallaştırdı ve böylece özerkliği ihlal etti. Ayrıca, Türkiye'de devlet ile iş dünyası arasında ekonomik kalkınmaya yönelik işbirlikçi ortaklıklar da henüz oluşmamıştı. Bürokratik özerklikten ve iş çevreleriyle iş birliğinden yoksun olan DPT ve diğer devlet aygıtları, sürdürülemez ithal ikameci sanayileşme politikası, dış şoklar ve ekonomik krizlerle karşı karşıya kaldı. Türkiye ve Kore'nin hem Amerika'dan hem de uluslararası gelişmelerden kaynaklı avantajlardan yararlanabilmeleri önemli ölçüde kurumlarının ve ekonomik yönetiminin elverişli olmasına bağlı olduğundan, Türkiye'nin sık sık aynı sorunlarla mücadele ediyor oluşu hem küresel statüsünü geriletmiş hem de kalkınma paketini etkili kullanamamasına sebebiyet vermiştir. Bu konu, tezin Beşinci Bölümü'nde ayrıntılandırılmaktadır. ABD'nin angajman düzeyi ve Türkiye'nin kendi iç problemleri nedeniyle kalkınma paketinin Kore'de olduğu gibi işlememesine sebep oldu.

Kore'nin endüstriyel kalkınmanın temeli olarak tarımı modernize etmenin önemini kabul etmesi, Kore ve Türkiye'nin kalkınmaları açısından dikkate değer bir dönüm noktası teşkil etmiştir. Başarısız olan toprak reformunun yanı sıra, Türkiye'de 1980'lerden bu yana tarım sektörüne yönelik özel bir politikaya yer verilmemiştir. Başarılı toprak reformu ve ABD'nin ekonomik ve askeri yardımı, Kore'nin eğitim, tasarruf ve yatırıma daha fazla harcama yapmasını sağladı. Bu başarının ardından Kore, ağırlıklı olarak eğitim, nüfus politikaları, insan kaynakları, araştırma-geliştirme ve teknoloji alanlarında uygulayabileceği reformlara odaklandı. Para reformu, ithalat ve ihracata yönelik stratejilerin akıllıca ve zamanında uygulanması, ABD ile eşgüdümlü kalkınma planları ve yatırım projelerine doğrudan Amerikan yardımının

aktarılması sayesinde, Kore, modernleşme teorisyenlerinin öngördüğü "kalkış"ını gerçekleştirdi. Vietnam'daki durumun yarattığı savaş ekonomisi sayesinde Koreli firmalar ve inşaat şirketleri Vietnam'a yatırım yapmış ve savaş ekonomisi Kore'nin lehine sonuçlanmıştır. Daha sonra bu şirketler, 1970'lerde Kore'nin kalkınmasını şekillendiren ihracatı teşvik politikalarının uygulanmasında ağır sanayiinin gelişimini önemli ölçüde etkiledi. 1980'li yıllara gelindiğinde Kore artık uluslararası pazarlarda Japon ürünleri ile rekabet edebilecek düzeye ulaşmıştır.

Doğu Asya'daki ABD ittifak sistemi, coğrafya nedeniyle benzersiz hale geldi. ABD, Japonya'yı ayrı tuttu ve merkeze yerleştirdi. ABD, bölge ülkelerinde Topla-Dağıt Sistemini (Hub-and-Spokes System) uygulamıştır, buna göre bir kurum çatısı altında buluşmaktan ya da çok taraflı bir ittifak kurmaktan ziyade, Kore, Tayvan ve Japonya ile bir dizi ikili ittifaklar kurma yolunu tercih etmiştir. Güney Kore, Soğuk Savaş'ın en sıcak yaşandığı bölgelerden birinde olduğu için ABD, komünizme eğilimlerini önlemek ve kontrol etmek için bölge ülkeleriyle ikili ilişkiler kurmayı tercih etti. Amerika'nın Doğu Asya'da ikili ittifaklar kurma tercihi, Kore ve ABD'ye çok taraflı bir ittifaktan daha fazla katkı sağladı. Ama bu politika, aynı zamanda bölge ülkelerinin de tercihiydi. Kore ile Japonya'nın yakınlaşması iki ülkenin hazır olduğu bir dönemde gerçekleşmiştir. Kore-Japon yakınlaşması, bölgedeki Amerikan hakimiyetini güçlendirdi ve Sovyetler Birliği, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti ve Kuzey Kore'den gelen Komünizm tehdidine karşı daha güvenli bir bölge yarattı. Ülkeler arasında yeniden gelişen ticaret, güvenlik ve yardım ilişkilerinin de olumlu etkileri oldu. Ancak ABD, Türkiye'yi genel Ortadoğu politikaları içinde konumlandırılmış, bu da elbette kalkınma paketinin uygulanmasında farklılıklara neden olmuştur, Türkiye ya Avrupa'nın "tahıl ambarı" olmuş ya da "Ortadoğu için bir model" ülke konumuna yerleştirilmiştir.

Türkiye, toprak reformunun teşvikinin yanı sıra Amerika'dan ticaret (özellikle Amerikan pazarının Türk ürünlerine açılması gibi) politikalarında da destek almadı. Güney Kore'den farklı olarak, devlet-iş dünyası iş birliği dış politikada bir araç olarak kullanılmadı. Bürokratik kadroların sanayi stratejisinin ve dış politikasının geliştirilmesine aktif olarak katılması, Türkiye'nin kapsamlı bir sanayi stratejisinin

olmaması, kutuplaşma, enflasyon gibi kronik ekonomik problemler, sanayi eylem planının olmaması, asimetrik ticaret uygulamaları gibi hususlar yüzünden ABD'nin verdiği kaynakları etkin bir şekilde kullanamadı (Kutlay, 2012, pp. 101–105; Weiss, 2019, p. 7).

Türkiye'deki ABD kalkınma paketinin birincil amacı, maden çıkarma, baraj, otoyol vs. inşa etme, makineleşme gibi alanlar ile kısıtlı kaldı. 1988 yılına kadar verilen toplam yardım miktarı incelendiğinde ise önemli bir farklılık görülmemektedir (*U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1988 CONG-R-0105*, 1988). Ancak Kore ve Türkiye, aldıkları Amerikan ekonomik yardımını farklı kanallara yönlendirdiler. Türkiye, ABD'den gelen yardımları öncelikle askeri ve tarım sektörlerine yönlendirirken, Kore'de ekonomik yardımlar, kurumların güçlendirilmesi, ABD ile iş birliği veya Amerika'nın da dahil olduğu kurumlar yaratılmasıyla sonuçlandı. Türkiye'de devlet, modernitenin, Batı'lı ve kalkınmış olmanın simgesi olarak tasavvur edilen fabrikalar, oteller, büyük barajlar, otoyollar inşa etmiştir. Demiryollarının inşası Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminde başlamış ve Cumhuriyet döneminde hızlanmıştır. Ancak CHP'nin tek parti iktidarı ve beş yıllık kalkınma planları ile savaş öncesi devletin başını çektiği sanayileşme girişimlerinden sapmıştır. Türkiye, tarımsal kalkınma, özelleştirme ve otoyollar için ABD yardımı almak üzere devletin sanayileşme politikalarından, özellikle demiryolu yapımından vazgeçti. 1950'lerde DP bu kalkınma modelini tam anlamıyla gerçekleştirdi. Türk politika yapımcıların otoyol projeleri ve tarım makinelerinin satın alınması konusundaki vurgusu, Amerikan yardımı ile aynı zamana denk geldi. Yardım planları ile uzmanlar ve makineler Türkiye'ye geldi. Karayol yapımı tarım ürünlerinin çiftliklerden pazara ulaşmasında verimliliği sağlayacağından, yapılan her yatırım meşru görüldü.

1980 yılına kadar Türkiye, kalkınma fırsatlarını tehdit eden yoğun siyasi kriz dönemleri yaşadı. Türkiye'nin nispeten daha iyi durumda olduğu tarımda bile ilerleme minimal düzeyde kaldı. Planlı kalkınma evresinde 1960-1980 yılları arasında kalkınma meselesi kendi kendine yeterlilik üzerinden tartışıldı. Ancak Türkiye, planları hayata geçirmek için ABD'den istediği desteği politika uyumsuzlukları

nedeniyle alamadı. Bu nedenle yardım kanallarını artırmaya çalıştı. Bu kalkınmaya yönelik girişimler 1971 askeri muhtırasıyla baltalandı. 1970'lerin sonlarına doğru hayır kuruluşlarının (Ford ve Rockefeller) öncülüğünde gerçekleştirilen Yeşil Devrim, Türkiye'nin ekonomik ve siyasi durumu nedeniyle yarım kaldı. Türkiye'de devlet, toprak reformunu uygulamak için hem Amerika'dan destek alamadığı hem de kendi iç sorunları yüzünden uygulayamadığı için taşra teşkilatlarını oluşturamadı, eşitlikçi ve söz sahibi bir toplum kuramadı. Bunun nedeni, politikacıların iyice yerleşmiş siyasi ve ekonomik çıkarlarını koruma güdüsü ve ABD'nin desteğinin olmamasıydı. Politika tercihlerinden kimin sorumlu olduğunu ve toplumsal grupların ne istediğini ve neye inandığını bilmek, bir devletin kalkınma stratejileri ve tercihlerini anlamak için elzemdir (Geddes, 1996, p. 6). Bununla birlikte, Kore örneği bize değişimin aşağıdan da gerçekleşebileceğini ve bunun da kalkınma sürecinde belirleyici olabileceğini gösteriyor.

Türkiye, iç siyasette yaşanan çatışmalara, üç darbeye ve ABD ile önemli siyasi krizlere rağmen Batı ve Amerikan yanlısı dış politikasından taviz vermedi. 1970'lerde uluslararası siyasi ve ekonomik ortamda büyük değişimler yaşanırken, Amerikan kalkınma paketinin araçları, özellikle ekonomik yardım ve toprak reformunun teşviki geri planda kalmaya başladı. Sosyo-ekonomik değişim çok hızlı yaşanırken, militarizasyon eğilimi arttı. 1970'lere kadar ekonomik olarak büyümesine rağmen, Türkiye 1970'lerdeki hem uluslararası alandaki hem de iç politikasındaki istikrarsızlıklar sebebiyle, iş birliği yaptığı ülkeleri çeşitlendirme yoluna girmiş ve Avrupa, Türkiye için önemli bir stratejik ortak haline gelmiştir. Kore de Japonya ile ilişkileri güçlendikten sonra diğer ülkelerle de ekonomik bağlar kurmuş ve ekonomisini dünya pazarına açmıştır.

Çalkantılı geçen otuz yılın (1950-1980) sonunda, iç siyasetteki sorunlar ve kalkınma politikalarının gelişigüzel uygulanması nedeniyle, Türkiye ve Kore kalkınması arasında büyük bir fark oluştu. Başarısız tarım ve ticaret politikalarının izleri de halen devam etmektedir. Türkiye, sulama, finansman, verimlilik, tarımda eğitim eksikliği, üretim planlaması, çiftçilerin örgütlenememeleri, pahalı ve karşılanamayan malzemeler, uzmanlaşma eksikliği, gıda güvencesizliği ve toprakları doğru

kullanamama gibi sorunları günümüzde halen çözmeye çalışıyor. 1950'lerdeki Türkiye'nin birçok tarım ürününü uluslararası arenada üretme konusunda sahip olduğu avantajlar zamanla ortadan kalktı. Türkiye uzun süredir dünyanın önde gelen tarım ürünleri ihracatçıları arasında yer almamaktadır (*Top 10 Agricultural Exporters* , 2018). Bilgi birikimi, araştırma-geliştirme ve yenilik konusunda hala çok ciddi sorunlarla karşı karşıyadır. Uzun süredir devam eden ekonomik sorunlar (kronik yüksek enflasyon gibi) yalnızca ekonomik veya teknik politikalarla ilişkili değildir. Eşit olmayan bir gelir ve servet dağılımıyla ilgili daha derin sorunları yansıtıyorlar.

Amerika, Kore'nin ithal ikameci sanayileşmesini ve bunu takip eden ihracata yönelik politikalarını destekledi. Kore ihracatı, Amerika'nın pazarlarını açması ile arttı ve hatta 1990'lara doğru Amerikan pazarına Kore menşeli ürünler hakim oldu. Amerika'nın Kore'de çok büyük askeri yatırımlar ve alımlar yapması, ağır askeri yığınaklar, otomobil parçaları, gövde onarımları, teknoloji ve teknik bilgi aktarımı sağlayarak otomotiv sektörünün gelişmesine yardımcı olması, Kore'ye her anlamda avantaj sağlamıştır. 1980'lerin ortasına doğru Amerikan pazarına egemen olan Kore ürünleri de bu otomobillerdi, Amerika'ya ihracatı önemli ölçüde arttı ve Amerikan pazarına hakim oldu. 1950'li yılların ortalarında başlayan bu başarılı girişimlerin yanı sıra, daha sonra iki ülke arasında krizler yaşansa da, Kore'nin bu krizlere çok yönlü ve soğukkanlı tepki vermesiyle ikili ilişkiler, Türkiye'deki gibi hiçbir zaman kopma noktasına gelmedi. Güney Vietnam'ın düşmesi, Nixon yönetiminin Çin ile yakınlaşması ve Kore'deki asker sayısını azaltma kararı gibi Kore'nin güvensizlik algısını tetikleyen eylemleri sonucunda Kore alternatifler bulma yolunu seçmiş, Japonya ile yeniden iş birliği ve bu ortaklık aracılığıyla Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nden yatırımları ülkesine çekmiştir.

Türkiye ile Kore arasındaki kalkınmışlık farkı 1980'lere doğru gittikçe derinleşti. Elbette ekonomik göstergeler Kore ve Türkiye'nin mevcut durumunu göstermekte yetersiz kalıyor ancak nasıl farklılaştıklarını ve nerede olduklarını göstermeleri açısından da önemlidirler. Kore ve Türkiye'nin ülke seviyesini göstermek için İnsani Gelişim Endeksi bize daha net bir tablo sunuyor. Endeks 2019 raporuna göre Kore 22, Türkiye 59. sırada yer aldı (*Country Insights | Human Development Reports, 2023*).

Modernleşme teorisinin bir başka varsayımı daha yanlışlandı: 1961 Anayasası özgürlükçü bir anayasa iken, Türkiye 1971 darbesiyle farklı bir yola girdi. Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş'ın başındaki demokratikleşme adımları 1970'ten sonra giderek gerilerken, Kore'nin kalkınmanın temellerini attıktan sonra demokrasiye geçişi daha kolay olmuştur (Deyo, 1987; Öniş, 1995b). Kore 1987'de tam kapsamlı demokratikleşme sürecine girdikten sonra yolları ayrıldı ve zaman içinde iki ülkede neoliberal dönüşüm farklılaştı. Bugün Freedom House'un verilerine göre Güney Kore "özgür", Türkiye ise "özgür değil" olarak nitelendiriliyor (*Global Freedom Status*, 2023).

Modernleşme teorisi, yerel seçkinleri ekonomik politikalar konusunda eğitmek için uzmanlar göndererek ulusları içten inşa etmeyi amaçlıyordu. Kore örneğinde ABD iki yönlü bir yaklaşım benimsedi. ABD, 1965 tarihli Göç Yasası ile ulusal kökene dayalı ayrımcılığı ortadan kaldırarak tüm ülkelere göç için kapılarını açtı. Türkiye'den de göç almasına rağmen, Amerika'nın Avrupalı, Asyalı ve Karayipli göçmenlere öncelik vermesi nedeniyle Kore'den çok sayıda göçmen kabul etti (Keely, 1971, p.157). Diğer bir kriter de yüksek vasıflı göçmenlere öncelik verilmesiydi. Özellikle, iyi eğitilmiş Koreli liderleri, yeni nesil politikacıları, bilim adamlarını veya subayları Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne göç etmeye veya burada kalmaya teşvik ettiler. Amerika'da halen, Koreli Amerikalılar (Korean Americans), en büyük beşinci Asyalı Amerikan alt grubunu oluşturmaktadırlar. ABD'ye önemli bir Koreli göçmen akışı, ayrıca Güney Kore ile ABD arasındaki askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik yakın ilişki sayesinde mümkün oldu.

Amerika'nın kalkınma paketinin başarıları, başarısızlıkları ve mirasları var. Birincisi, Amerikan sosyal bilimlerinin önem verdiği ekonomik çalışmaların matematiksel modellerle soyutlanması ve siyaset ile ekonominin birbirinden ayrılması politika yapımını ve disiplinleri etkilemektedir. İkinci olarak, Modernleşme teorisinin, Üçüncü Dünya'nın kendilerini gelişmiş/kalkınmış, diğerlerini geleneksel, geri ve az gelişmiş olarak tanımlayan Avrupa ve Batı ülkelerine karşı "öteki" ile ilgili uzun süredir devam eden anlayışa katkıda bulunduğu inkar edilemez (Marwah, 2016). Ayrıca bugün her iki ülkenin de Amerika ile ittifakları devam etmektedir. ABD-Kore ilişkileri, ABD-

Türkiye ilişkileriyle tam bir tezat oluşturarak, Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişkiler istikrarlı bir şekilde gerilemektedir. ABD-Türkiye ilişkilerinden farklı olarak, ABD ve Kore, uzun süredir devam eden bir kalkınma ilişkisinin getirdiği kalkınma konularında bazı ortak çıkarları ve politika önceliklerini paylaşmaktadır. Genel olarak, ABD kalkınma paketi, Türkiye'yi Batı ittifakına entegre etme mekanizması işlevi görürken, Kore'yi dönüştürme mekanizması işlevi gördü. ABD'nin Türkiye ve Kore'nin kalkınma süreçlerine olan etkisi, belirli teorilerin, politikaların ve yöntemlerin diğerlerine göre artılarını ve eksilerini göstermektedir.

Bu tez, Türkiye ve Kore kalkınmasının değişen doğasını ve bu yoldaki ABD kalkınma paketinin rolünü gösterme çabasıdır ve ABD kalkınma paketinin Güney Kore ve Türkiye'nin kalkınmasında kritik rolünü ve bu paketin iki ülkedeki iç politikalarla etkileşimini incelemektedir. Kalkınma projesi, ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş'ta modernleşme teorisinin öncülleri tarafından yönlendirilen bir aracı oldu. Modernleşme teorisinin varsayımının aksine, geleneksel toplumdaki modern topluma geçişteki değişim, yalnızca yardım veya kaynak akışları gibi somut unsurlar tarafından hızlandırılmayacağı ortaya çıkmıştır. Dahası, ABD, başından beri Batılı kimliği benimseyen Türkiye'yi Ortadoğu'da diğer bölge ülkeleri için bir model haline getirmeyi amaçladı. Nihayetinde Türkiye'ye atfedilen rol, Amerikalı siyasetçilerin ve akademisyenlerin tasavvur ettiği gibi olmadı. Diğer taraftan, Kore örneği, liderlerin becerileri, halkın kolektif iyiliğe olan adanmışlığı gibi soyut unsurların Amerikan kaynak akışı ile birleştiğinde kalkınmayı nasıl destekleyebileceğini göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla, Güney Kore'nin başarısını öncelikle jeopolitik değişkenlere bağlamak yanlış olur. Eşsiz yerel yapısı, etkili iç politikaların uygulanması ABD kalkınma paketiyle birleştiğinde kalkınmadaki başarısı için hayati önem taşımaktadır. Hem Kore ve Türkiye'nin ABD kalkınma stratejilerinin oluşturulması ve uygulanmasında devlet, piyasa ve toplumların etkileşimi gibi iç dinamikleri hem de ekonomik yeniden yapılanma, iç politika, küresel politik ekonomideki epistemik değişiklikler de dahil olmak üzere küresel olgu ve olaylar da aynı öneme sahiptir. Kore'nin aksine, Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki politikaları, kötü ekonomik yönetimi, kaynakların yanlış kullanımını, yolsuzluklar, sürekli kesintiye uğrayan demokrasisi ve

kurumsal sorunları ve zayıflıkları içeriyor. İşte bu nedenle Amerikan kaynaklarının Kore ve Türkiye tarafından nasıl kanalize edildiği, politika yapıcıların ticaret politikaları, toprak reformu ve tarım politikalarının uygulanmasında aldıkları kararların ve ekonomik yardımların nasıl harcandığı, ülkenin kalkınma yönelimini nasıl etkilediği ve dış faktörlerle nasıl etkileşime girdiği önemlidir.

Yukarıda tartışılan konuların ötesinde, gelecekteki çalışmalar için birçok araştırma alanı mevcuttur. Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki kalkınma sürecinde hangi bağımlılıkların yaratıldığına dair ipuçları sunmaktadır. Gelecekteki çalışmalar, bu bağımlılıkların Soğuk Savaş dönemini takip eden yıllarda nasıl şekillendiğini inceleyebilir ve modernleşme teorisinin günümüz kalkınma politikaları üzerindeki projeksiyonlarını keşfetmeye ihtiyaç duyabilir çünkü bugün hala Amerikan dış politikasının kritik araçları savunma, diplomasi ve kalkınma olarak tanımlanmaktadır (*Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy*, 2010; Lopez, 2022). Bu tez, devam eden Amerika'nın Soğuk Savaş kalkınma politikalarının hala görüldüğünü iddia ediyor. Daniel Lerner'in 1958 tarihli *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* adlı kitabı, politika yapımında modernleşme teorisinin kullanımını açıklayan en eski metinlerden biriydi. Bugün eski Başkan George W. Bush'un konuşmasında bile "Ortadoğu'yu Modernleştirme" fikrinin hala geçerli olduğunu görüyoruz (Hancock, 2002). Bunun gibi bağlantılar, birçok araştırma sorusunun geliştirilmesine ve gelecekte de karşılaştırma yapılabilecek akademik üretimlerin olabileceğini gösteriyor. Bugünün politikalarının Soğuk Savaş muadilleriyle benzer söylemleri ve politikaları paylaşıp paylaşmadığını ve hangi durumlara evrildiklerini incelemek faydalı olacaktır. ABD araçlarının giderek neoliberal disiplin araçlarına dönüştüğü ve bunların ABD gücünü daha da sağlamlaştırıp sağlamlaştırmadığı gibi kapsamlı sorular, daha fazla araştırma alanı sağlayabilir. Modernleşme teorisinin dogmatik yaklaşımının ardından, piyasa toplumunu önceleyen neoliberalizmin kalkınmayı nasıl ve hangi politikalar ile sağlamaya çalıştığının incelenmesi önem arz etmektedir. Bu tezin araştırma amaçlarını ilerletebilecek gelecekteki araştırmalar için diğer yollar ise, karşılaştırmalı analizleri çoğaltmak, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından kullanılan her bir aracı tekil olarak ve mevcut etkilerini incelemek olabilir.

Örneğin, toprak reformu, tarım ve ticaret politikaları ile ilgili çok az sayıda çalışma bulunmaktadır. Türkiye ve Kore'de toprak reformu çalışmaları sırasındaki toplumsal hareketler incelemeye açık alanlardan sadece bir tanesidir. Son olarak, son yıllardaki bilimsel arařtırmalar, özellikle Türkiye, Japonya ve Kore'de din ve ideolojilerin rolünü arařtırmada, Batı modernitesine yaklaşan veya yaklaşmayı amaçlayan Batılı olmayan ülke örneklerinin farklılaşmalarının incelenmesi de özgün çalışmalar ile sonuçlanacaktır.

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