

BRITISH-TURKISH RELATIONS FROM 1983 TO 1993: THE EMERGENCE OF
A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE OZAL AND THATCHER ERA

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyses British-Turkish relations from 1983 to 1993. In this study, main drivers of bilateral relations between Turkey and the UK, such as external constraints, domestic incentives and leadership are examined. Within a neoclassical realist framework, the author of this thesis aims to investigate the most significant factor in the development of the relationship between the Turks and the British.

Keywords: British-Turkish Relations, Ozal, Thatcher, Neoclassical realism

ÖZ

1983-1993 İNGİLİZ-TÜRK İLİŞKİLERİ: ÖZAL VE THATCHER DÖNEMİNDE ÖZEL BİR İLİŞKİNİN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞI

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Bu tez, 1983-1993 yılları arası İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerini analiz etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, ikili ilişkilerin dış kısıtlamalar, iç teşvikler ve liderlik gibi itici güçleri incelenmektedir. Bu tezin yazarı, neoklasik realist çerçeve içerisinde Türkler ve İngilizler arasındaki ilişkilerin gelişimindeki en önemli faktörün ne olduğunu araştırmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İngiliz-Türk İlişkileri, Özal, Thatcher, Neoklasik realizm

This thesis is dedicated to my late grandmother, Zekiye Üründül

Roll the Dice¹

if you're going to try, go all the
way.
otherwise, don't even start.

if you're going to try, go all the
way.
this could mean losing girlfriends,
wives, relatives, jobs and
maybe your mind.

go all the way.
it could mean not eating for 3 or 4 days.
it could mean freezing on a
park bench.
it could mean jail,
it could mean derision,
mockery,
isolation.
isolation is the gift,
all the others are a test of your
endurance, of
how much you really want to
do it.
and you'll do it
despite rejection and the worst odds
and it will be better than
anything else
you can imagine.

if you're going to try,
go all the way.
there is no other feeling like
that.
you will be alone with the gods
and the nights will flame with
fire.

do it, do it, do it.
do it.

all the way
all the way.

you will ride life straight to
perfect laughter, its
the only good fight
there is.

Charles Bukowski

¹ Bukowski, Charles (1999). "Roll the Dice." *What matters most is how well you walk through the fire.* Black Sparrow Press.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK Party	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation
CSCCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DECA	The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DP	Democrat Party
DSP	Democratic Left Party
DYP	True Path Party
EC	European Community
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organisation
EEC	European Economic Community
ERM	European Exchange Rate Mechanism
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
FCO	British Foreign & Commonwealth Office
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FPE	Foreign Policy Executive
GAP	Southeastern Anatolia Project
HADEP	People's Democracy Party
HDP	The Peoples' Democratic Party
HEP	People's Labour Party
HP	Populist Party
IDU	International Democrat Union
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Irish Republican Army
İTÜ	İstanbul Technical University
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Science

MÇP	Nationalist Task Party
MDP	Nationalist Democracy Party
METU	Middle East Technical University
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
MP	Member of the Parliament
MSP	National Salvation Party
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organisations
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PM	Prime Minister
RP	Welfare Party
SHP	Social Democratic Populist Party
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TRNC	The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TRT	Turkish Radio Television
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis provides a neoclassical realist analysis of British-Turkish relations between 1983 and 1993. The British and the Turks have a long history of good relations with the exception of World War I. In addition to their political, commercial and military relations, the two countries' foreign policies regarding the Middle East, European affairs, and their relations with the US are commonly in harmony. After the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the hostility between the Turks and the British during the World War I was left behind, and their bilateral relations were transformed into an alliance with the Tripartite Alliance Treaty in 1939. After the end of World War II, sending troops to Korea along with the British and Americans, Turkey became a member of NATO due to the Soviet threat. British-Turkish relations continued to improve despite the deterioration of Turkey's relations with other Western countries in the early 1980s. After Turgut Özal came to power in 1983, bilateral relations between the British and the Turks reached the peak; as mutual visits became more frequent than ever, the volume of trade between Turkey and the UK broke records and cooperation between the two countries increased within organisations such as the Council of Europe, NATO and the UN.

1.1. Research Question

The research question of this thesis is "What was the main factor in the development of British-Turkish relations between 1983-1993?". In the thesis, it is aimed to observe the main factors in British-Turkish relations during the Turgut Özal period in Turkey. This study focuses on the time period between 1983 and 1993 because relations between the two countries reached an all-time high in those years. In order to understand the main drivers of bilateral relations reaching peak, the time frame between 1983 and 1993 is worth analysing as it covers Turgut Özal's election as the

PM of Turkey in 1983, and his tenure as president until 1993, including the time slot after Thatcher's resignation in 1990. Aforementioned decade also includes the period of the coalition government of Süleyman Demirel as Prime Minister in Turkey and the period of John Major's premiership in Britain. Due to the ideological and personal similarities between the two leaders, this thesis mainly focuses on the Thatcher and Özal periods.

Beginning in the first half of 1980, the development of diplomatic and political relations between Turkey and the UK also had an impact on trade and defence relations, with the UK contributing to the modernisation of the Turkish defence industry, the volume of trade between the two countries breaking records and increasing mutual investment opportunities. The research objective of this thesis is to observe the significance of external factors, domestic politics, and leadership in bilateral relations between Turkey and the UK.

1.2. Contribution of Study to the Literature

This thesis aims to contribute to studies on British-Turkish relations by providing a neoclassical realist analysis of bilateral relations from 1983 to 1993. The author of this study focuses on the main factors in the improvement of British-Turkish relations after the military regime came to an end in Turkey in 1983. Even though many scholars conducted research on British-Turkish relations in the past (M. Bilgin, 2007; Coşkun, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2018; Doğaner, 2006; Hakan, 2019; Güçlü, 1997; Savrun, 2017; Talbot, 2017; Tamkin, 2009; Tüfekçi, 2018; Yeşilbursa, 2000, 2005, 2019), most of these studies focus on a specific aspect of the relations and there is a limited number of studies that deal with the bilateral relations in the Özal and Thatcher period as a whole (Köse, 2020). There is also a huge gap of a theoretical analysis of British-Turkish relations, especially covering the aforementioned time period. The reason for that can be the lack of availability of primary sources of data on the subject.

Even though scholars such as Yasemin Doğaner and Yasin Coşkun used archival resources in their studies on bilateral relations between Turkey and the UK, they mostly focus on the time frame before 1980. In her research, *İngiliz Büyükelçiliği Yıllık Raporlarında Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türkiye'sinde Dış İlişkiler*, Yasemin Doğaner examines Turkish foreign policy during the DP government in Turkey (1950-1960),

benefitting from British annual reports. However, her study does not cover British-Turkish relations in those years comprehensively. In his studies, *1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtının Türk-İngiliz İlişkilerine Etkileri*, *The Cyprus problem and Anglo-Turkish relations 1967-1980*, *the Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and The British-Turkish Policies*, and *İngiliz belgelerinde 12 Eylül süreci*, Yasin Coşkun provides a historical analysis, but he does not address the issue theoretically. As he is a historian, his works are not a product of the discipline of international relations. In addition, his studies on British-Turkish relations date back to the pre-1983 period. The reason for that can be the 30-year access rule which prevents researchers from accessing archive documents at the British National Archives for at least 30 years after they were created. In addition to studies focusing on a specific aspect of British-Turkish relations, such as *Past and Present Cooperation within the Defence Industry Between Turkey and the United Kingdom* by İbrahim Sünnetçi, *Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940–45: Strategy, Diplomacy and Intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean* by Nicholas Tamkin, and *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: politics and influence in the early Cold War era* by Mustafa Bilgin, *The 'revolution' of 27 May 1960 in Turkey: British policy towards Turkey*, *İngiltere ve Amerika'nın Ortadoğu savunma projeleri ve Türkiye (1950-1954)*, and *İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Türkiye'de 1960, 1971 ve 1980 Askeri Müdahaleleri* by Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, there is a huge gap in the literature on Turkish-British relations after 1983. Bahar Köse's MS thesis, *Margaret Thatcher dönemi Türkiye-İngiltere ilişkileri*, is a very comprehensive study of relations between Turkey and the UK during Thatcher era. However, her study does not provide a theoretical analysis and does not make use of research interviews. It also seems that Köse did not use archival documents that are only physically accessible at the National Archives in her thesis. Thus, Köse's thesis does not address some important developments in bilateral relations in the Thatcher era.

This thesis is the first academic work which focuses on British-Turkish relations from 1983 to 1993 in English. Also, with the theoretical approach it has, the thesis aims to fill a huge gap in the literature. The aim of this study is to examine British-Turkish relations between 1983 and 1993, which has remained mostly unrevealed and under-theorised in the academic field. Therefore, the role of external constraints, leadership and domestic incentives is to be analysed in within a neoclassical realist perspective in this thesis. Arguments provided on the subject is mainly based on the primary

sources. Reaffirming neoclassical realist assumptions, this study argues that external constraints are the most significant factor in the development of British-Turkish relations between 1983 and 1993. While Margaret Thatcher, Turgut Özal, and other foreign policy executives also play an utmost important role in the development of the relationship between the Turks and the British, the role of domestic incentives is limited in this case.

1.3. Methodology

This thesis adopts a qualitative method and benefits from primary and secondary sources. Archival documents such as the Cabinet Papers (CAB) and documents of Foreign and Colonial Office (FCO), retrieved from the National Archives are used in this study. Documents from the Papers of Julian Amery Collection and Thatcher Papers at the Churchill Archives Centre of Churchill College, Cambridge University also contribute to the research. Speeches of Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher, short biographies and articles written about them are also observed to understand leaders' personalities and world views. In addition to the written academic literature and documents published online by the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, parliamentary debates and newspaper articles from both Britain and Turkey are utilised. The author conducted semi-structured interviews with politicians from the Centre-Right tradition in Turkey as well as politicians from the Conservative Party, former diplomats and academics in the UK. The information obtained from these sources was subjected to interpretative content analysis and gained meaning under a neoclassical realist framework. The author has also analysed information from secondary sources such as web pages, books, articles and online videos with a critical approach.

1.4. Research Composition

This thesis consists of seven chapters. In the next chapter, arguments of the neoclassical realist theory of international relations are observed to provide a theoretical framework for bilateral relations. As bilateral relations between Turkey and the UK are examined within a multilevel framework in the thesis, laying out the main assumptions of neoclassical realism which incorporates systemic factors, domestic incentives, and leadership enables the author to come to a conclusion about the main determinants of British-Turkish relations. With the help of the theory chapter, the

impacts of leadership and domestic politics on the importance of external constraints can be better understood.

The third chapter includes a review of the history of British-Turkish relations. Assessing the history of bilateral relations chronologically makes it possible to see the milestones of relations between the British and Turks, and how they developed up to the 1980s. It also helps to reveal whether bilateral relations under Thatcher and Özal improved, stagnated or deteriorated.

The fourth chapter on Özal and the fifth chapter on Thatcher contain short biographies, personal traits, ideologies, foreign policy understandings and reforms of Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher. Understanding their life experiences, analysing their world views in detail and giving information about their reforms in domestic politics lead to a better understanding of their foreign policy decisions. The fact that the fourth chapter also deals with the criticisms against Turgut Özal better reveals Özal's leadership style and personality.

In Chapter 6, British-Turkish relations between 1983 and 1993 are analysed. The chapter firstly examines different factors affecting British and Turkish foreign policies and bilateral relations, then it concentrates on external constraints as the main aim of a neoclassical realist is to understand systemic pressures that leaders face and how they perceive them while making foreign policy decisions. After both countries' policies and experiences during the Cold War are evaluated, the chapter also offers a perspective to understand how European affairs affected British-Turkish relations. Then, cooperation between the Turks and the UK during the Gulf War, and similar opportunities and challenges that Turkey and the UK confronted due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait are investigated. Eventually, political and diplomatic relations, defence relations and economic relations between Turkey and the UK are scrutinised mostly with the help of archival documents.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion, and it provides a brief summary of bilateral relations and reveals the research question's answers, which emerged throughout the previous six chapters.

CHAPTER 2

NEOCLASSICAL REALISM'S CONTRIBUTION TO FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Realism is among theories of international relations that pay attention to external constraints most and it has been concerned with matters such as distribution of power, anarchy, and the balance of power. Even though structural realism (neorealism) also concentrates on external constraints, neoclassical realism is different from neorealism in essence as it also pays significance to domestic politics and the role of individuals in foreign policy making. Neoclassical realists do not try to challenge views of their predecessors, classical realists and neorealists. They aim to refine the notion of external constraints by identifying the impacts of the leadership and domestic politics on them. Therefore, the main focus of neoclassical realists is to understand the external constraints that states face and how state leaders and the foreign policy executive (FPE) interpret such constraints while making foreign policy decisions. Domestic politics has an utmost importance in foreign policy making for neoclassical realists considering that leaders require domestic support to maintain their positions and mobilise that power in foreign policy making. In order to apply neoclassical realism to foreign policies of Turkey and the UK between 1983 and 1993, neoclassical realism's relationship to classical realism and neorealism should be observed as it may help to provide a clear understanding of neoclassical realism's potential contribution to foreign policy analysis (FPA). In addition, the role of domestic variables and the significance of leadership in neoclassical realism must be observed to see if they can be seen as significant as external constraints.

2.1. Background

Realism is among the most controversial theories of international relations even though its influence has been decreased following the end of the Cold War (Guzzini,

2001). It is an approach that refers to states as the main actors in international relations, putting a specific emphasis on anarchy and power politics. Because neoclassical realism has its origins in classical realism and structural realism (neorealism), it is also known as the third generation of realist theories of international relations. Among other realist theories of international relations, classical realism is known as the first, and neorealism is known as the second generation. Hans Morgenthau can be considered among the most remarkable scholars of classical realism, having a state centred approach in the anarchic condition of the international system, focusing on state behaviour which reflects selfish and wicked human nature. However, well known neorealist scholars, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer pay much more importance to the structure of the international system rather than classical realists' focus on human nature while presenting structural realism. Concurrently, scholars such as Fareed Zakaria and Gideon Rose, who can be seen among the main scholars of neoclassical realism, argue that both systemic and domestic constraints should be considered while analysing foreign policies of states (Rose, 1998; Zakaria, 1999, p. 6). Therefore, it can be said that neoclassical realists also aim to explain how domestic incentives of a state interfere with its foreign policy executive (FPE)'s judgement of international threats and foreign policy decisions they make afterwards (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 4).

2.2. Classical Realism

Classical realism is the oldest paradigm in international relations. It especially gained attention during World War II, replacing idealism by providing explanations of the main reasons for the war in an anarchic system where states “met each other in the contests of power” (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 33). For realists, anarchy is one of the fundamental facts of world politics (Jervis & Art, 2015, p. 7). Therefore, a state must pursue power and security for its well-being (Gilpin, 1986). For this reason, it can be said that realists have a much more state-centric way of seeing world politics. As realism has its roots in classical writers such as Hobbes, Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Sun Tzu, their ideas on politics might be seen to be retrieved from such writers. As Thomas Hobbes stated, “*Homo homini lupus / A man is a wolf to other men*” (De Waal, 2005, p. 17), which means people may not trust others, therefore they should be careful of each other and rely on themselves to survive. Similarly, Machiavelli argues that

men are evil creatures and they act according to their wickedness if they find an opportunity (Burchill et al., 2013). Thucydides also acknowledges Hobbes's and Machiavelli's arguments as he claims in his *Melian Dialogue* that humans are egoistic and self-centred beings who aim to obtain as much as power (Lomia, 2020). For realists, international relations should be treated according to such a reality, as states resemble human nature which is wicked, selfish and sometimes opportunist. Considering that there is not an international government to restrain aggression, states which may act rigorously just as humans or wolves may pose threats for survival of other states. For these reasons, realists argue that universal moral principles cannot be applied to actions of nation states (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 9). Furthermore, realists see states as rational and unitary main actors in international relations. According to realists, there is a distinction between domestic politics and international relations as international politics is competitive and challenging, requiring states to seek self-help.

It may not be possible for states to seek help from non-existent higher authorities in the international arena just as a citizen may seek help from national state bodies such as law enforcement authorities within a domestic context. Realists do not deny that other actors such as international organisations exist in international politics, but they claim that capabilities of such organisations are very limited. According to classical realists, leaders are also rational actors and they take decisions in accordance with their countries' national interests. Regardless of their ideologies, culture or other characteristics, all states behave similarly to ensure their survival. It is a competitive and dangerous environment in which states need to survive, thus states can only rely on their own power in absence of a higher authority. Therefore, balance of power can be a solution for the problem of aggression instead of relying on an international organisation. Because states are also governed by humans who have a selfish and greedy nature, engaging in an international organisation can be problematic since states may cheat on each other or they can retract promises. For states, today's allies can also be tomorrow's enemies. For example, the Ottoman Empire, France and the UK had formed an alliance against Russia in the Crimean War in the mid-1800s. Less than a century later, France, the UK and the Soviet Union formed an alliance against the Ottoman Empire in World War I. This may demonstrate how the interests of states and their attitudes towards each other may change in time. Nonetheless, in a circumstance called as bandwagoning, weaker states may find it convenient to align

with militarily stronger states to ensure its protection and this situation may even provide rewards for the bandwagoner state (Güner, 2017). Trying to balance a stronger state may be risky for weak states, thus it can be said that bandwagoning may be both more profitable and safer to some extent. If a state prefers to balance the opposing power, it must increase military capabilities. However, this may require financial resources and time. Therefore, bandwagoning might be easier since technology transfer and economic cooperation may be a bonus besides protection for weaker states (Güner, 2017). To exemplify, realists such as Mearsheimer and Brzezinski think that the rise of China as an economic and military power in the international arena may be threatening because such a resurgence can overturn the balance of power (Brzezinski & Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 47). But there may also be times that states neither balance nor bandwagon stronger states as in South Korea's approach towards China (Kang, 2009, p. 4). For Morgenthau, balance of power may contain a potential to promote common security (Williams, 2007, p. 138). However, assessing the balance of power may require calculation of capabilities of other states. Because there is always the danger of miscalculation, states may just attempt to increase their power to protect themselves from others. If this condition is perceived as a threat by others, those states may also choose to increase their power or form alliances with other states threatened by the same state (Williams, 2007, p. 139). This may help states to ensure equilibrium in the world. The balance of power occurs in such a way. However, balance of power may not always consist of a situation of equilibrium. Equilibrium exists when the balance of power between nation states is approximately indistinguishable. However, in a situation of disequilibrium, a state may acquire too much power that it may be the only hegemonic power in the world in a way balancing all other states. However, when a state increases its power particularly through armament, it can be perceived as a threat as stated above. Consequently, other states perceiving that state's armament as dangerous may decide to increase its military capabilities as well. This is called the security dilemma as the perception of threat increases continuously and mutual understanding of threat gets even bigger (Jervis, 1998).

It should be acknowledged that prominent scholars of the realist school of thought such as Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau do not neglect moral, cultural or ideological values but they just put national interests first, because conflicts arise due to differing national interests of states in international politics. Even though foreign policy

decisions may reflect the moral, political and ideological environment at which they were made, such policies as well as the general conditions of world affairs are based on states' national interests. A notable example of this assumption is Hans Morgenthau's and Kenneth Waltz's objection to American motives in the Vietnam War. Morgenthau argued that American motives to fight in Vietnam where winning might be impossible are unclear. Kenneth Waltz was also among the early critics of the Vietnam War, and he opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq as well. The main argument behind such scholars' objection against those wars was that they did not represent American interests therefore fighting was unnecessary (Bunyavejchewin, 2011). Hans Morgenthau argues that the notion of national interests should remain in the centre of international politics, and it should be considered while explaining state behaviour (Morgenthau, 1967). Realists assume that national interests link the nature of the international system with actions of nation states through the need for security. The notion of anarchy and distribution of powers play a crucial role in this connection even though scholars such as Weldes (1996) find realist assumptions of national interests too general and broad (p. 278). For Weldes, realists think that power and wealth are significant to ensure states' security and national interests as well as providing opportunities for those states to continue competing in the international system, and she argues that realist arguments on national interests may not address specific conditions and are open to interpretation (Weldes, 1996). Nonetheless, Morgenthau argues that statesmen should see incidents in international politics as they are, as 'an independent reality' is accessible for both leaders and analysts (Morgenthau, 1951; Weldes, 1996, p. 279).

2.3. Structural Realism (Neorealism)

Structural realism (neorealism) can be described as the second generation of realist school of thought. It puts emphasis on the international system's anarchic structure and distribution of capabilities of states in the international arena instead of focusing on human nature and the role of individuals. In addition to this, because neorealists pay attention to natural resources, economic power, technological development and such while considering capabilities of states, it can be said that neorealism has a much more scientific approach to the discipline of international relations. As a classical realist would think that conflicts occur due to states resembling human nature, a

neorealist would focus on the international system as the reason for conflicts. For Waltz, the structure of the international system is created through states' interactions with each other. The system is composed of a structure and interactive units (Waltz, 2014), and such a system may also constrain states' behaviours and even prevent them from taking some specific actions (Burchill et al., 2013, p. 35).

As one may distinguish three types of international systems throughout history, it is a bipolar system that neorealists favour while classical realism presents a view of the multipolar world (Waltz, 1999). A bipolar system mainly refers to a structure where two dominant powers exist and balance each other. Structure of the international system was a bipolar one during the Cold War. In addition, a multipolar system exists when more than two great powers exist as they did before World War II. However, peace cannot be guaranteed in either bipolar or multipolar systems and the threat of war always continues. This is also in accordance with the notion of anarchy as it plays the role of a motivation for state behaviours aimed at survival, and there is no guarantee for survival in an anarchic system (Waltz, 1967). Such an understanding makes scholars like John Mearsheimer label neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz as a 'defensive realist'. According to Mearsheimer (2001), hegemony matters for the security of states. It means that states would not only pursue their survival by maximising their security, but they would also try to increase their position in the international power hierarchy by maximising their powers. Yet, anarchy still remains as a core fact of the international system (p. 19). For defensive realists, because states aim to ensure their survival by maximising their security, they may choose to take more balanced actions. However, offensive realists usually concentrate on great powers as all states eventually aspire to be the hegemon. For Mearsheimer (2001), the best defence is a good offense, and strongest states cannot be targeted by others (p. 33).

Neorealists believe that states may be involved in alliances. An alliance may even come to the point that states attach too much importance to their allies because their allies' loss may mean their own loss as well (Evera, 2013, pp. 117-121). However, problems of cheating and violation of agreements can be possible. Therefore, states may choose to rely on self-help and make their defence policies secretive as this situation may increase the possibility of perception of mutual military threat. As

classical realists do, neorealists also believe that there is a lack of confidence between states in international relations. For Brown et al., states mostly rely on their own military capabilities which they invest in to take advantage of other states (Brown et al., 1998). However, unlike classical realists, neorealists are more optimistic about the condition of international relations as they believe that states may choose to focus on economic partnership and make moderate policies by limiting their aggressive behaviour (Brown et al., 1998). This may also lead to economic partnership and other kinds of cooperation between states. However, states may rank differently according to their assets such as natural resources, economic power, technological development. Therefore, neorealism put emphasis on 'relative gain'. In a neorealist perspective, states continuously compete with each other to increase their own gains and their abovementioned capabilities. Even though neorealists acknowledge the significance of cooperation, they emphasise that states are very cautious of other states as every state pursues its own interests (Brown et al., 1998). This is the condition of zero-sum game in which each state's gain may mean other states' loss or each state's loss can be others' gains (Powell, 1991).

For Telhami, there are two phenomenons that affect state behaviour. These are opportunities and preferences. Telhami (2002) claims that neorealists mostly consider opportunities (p. 160). While considering preferences, neorealists may argue that states seek self-protection due to reasons for security. Relative material power matters for neorealists in an anarchic environment of international relations, and states expand their interests by increasing their material power (Telhami, 2002). It can be said that distribution of power may significantly affect the preferences of states as desire for security and relative gains may drive foreign policies (Telhami, 2002, p. 163). However, neorealists do not see domestic politics as a driver of foreign policy, and they think there is a certain distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy. Therefore, it can also be assumed that neorealists 'favour' high politics over low politics (Waltz, 2004, pp. 2-6). High politics is related to matters of defence and national security issues while low politics is about political, economic and social issues of a state (Ripsman, 2006, p. 2).

However, as it is mentioned in this chapter above, neorealists do not sheerly neglect issues such as economic power, national resources and other factors, instead they see

such factors as an element of power. For Gilpin (1983), the international system constitutes a framework for economic actions. Thus, the economy cannot be considered as a separate sphere. Gilpin (1983) also argues that economic power may affect a state's position in the distribution of powers (p. 295). In fact, the economy has always been an important issue when it comes to thinking about generating capital for military spending. In the past, many states aimed to increase their human and financial capital in order to grow the number of their soldiers and military supplies. Kugler et al. (1980) argue that industrialisation also changed states' capacities to wage war (p. 9). States with larger and younger populations, and those who have natural and financial resources acquired the ability to increase their economic productivity, military power and international influence. Therefore, it can be said that there is a high correlation between industrial and military powers (Goldman & Blanken, 2005, p. 4). Michael Beckley (2010) mentions that the economically more developed side usually won the wars against the poorer in battles that occurred between 1898-1987. Furthermore, even though there may also be a correlation between political and social factors and military effectiveness, Beckley claims military dominance of the West stemmed 'primarily' from its economic superiority rather than societal and political factors (Beckley, 2010, p. 44). Jo Jakobsen (2013) states that the United States of America (The US)'s military superiority over other countries in the world is because of its economic development. Jakobsen also argues that China's transformation of economic wealth into military power is among the reasons why China may pose threats to the US (Jakobsen, 2013). In 2019, China had been the second biggest military spender in the world with a 5.1 percent increase compared to the previous year. The military spending of the US, which was the biggest military spender, accounted for 38 percent of military spending in the world in 2019. It is also that the increase in US military spending in 2019 was equal to Germany's entire military expenditure of the same year (Tian et al., 2021). Since the US and China can be thought to have the strongest armies in the world, one can argue that there is a link between economy and military power by looking at these statistics.

2.4. Neoclassical Realism

After the fall of the Soviet Union and the bipolar order, neorealism's intellectual value was decreased, and this circumstance ensued a new quest to respond to this post-cold

war crisis within the realist school in international relations. Neoclassical realism emerged in such an environment and it included domestic politics in foreign policy analysis in addition to the impact of the structure of the international system on foreign policy (Wieclawski, 2017, p. 199). Consequently, the term neoclassical realism was used by Gideon Rose first in 1998 to refer to the third generation of the realist school of thought. Neoclassical realism aims at providing an analysis of foreign policy of states with reference to states' place in the international system, their relative material power capabilities, and external constraints filtered through unit level variables at the domestic level (Rose, 1998, p. 146). The theory does not aim to refute classical realism or neorealism. However, it provides a wider means of analysis to examine states' foreign policies. Even though neoclassical realism brings individuals' role in foreign policy back to the foreign policy analysis as classical realists do, it does not consider human nature as a reason for conflicts. Essentially, neoclassical realists try to figure out leaders' perceptions of external constraints and their reaction to those constraints. In doing this, leaders and the FPE use domestic dynamics as a source of information (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 22). While making decisions on their countries' foreign policies, leaders consult the FPE in order to gain support of domestic actors and interpret the incidents that occur in the international environment. Therefore, leaders may be involved in a two-level game when they decide and implement their countries' grand strategies (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 7). Of Kenneth Waltz's 'three images of analysis', a neoclassical realist would particularly focus on the second and third image. The first image of Kenneth Waltz concentrates on individuals, while the second and third images focus on the state and the international system while explaining the conflict in international relations (Waltz, 1959, p. 239). Neoclassical realists think that foreign policies of states are mostly determined by their relative powers and positions within the international system. Neoclassical realists also attach utmost importance to domestic politics and state structures, and they believe that leaders and the FPE are crucial because they are the ones who define national interests and interpret external constraints to make foreign policy decisions. The FPE may consist of diplomats, bureaucrats, intelligence and military officers, advisors and other political actors such as ministers. Because power is a crucial issue in neoclassical realism and one of the FPE's duties is maintaining the balance of power, neoclassical realism's approach to

the issue of power must be observed. Then, the role of the leaders and the FPE as well as the significance of domestic incentives and external constraints can be investigated.

Just as other realists, neoclassical realists also centre on power and the structure of the international system which is anarchic. Neoclassical realists share neorealists' ideas on anarchy and the relative distribution of power, and they advocate that states function similarly because of anarchy's socialisation effect (Waltz, 1959, p. 206). Furthermore, neoclassical realists argue that the struggle for power and anarchic structure of the international system determine the security of states. According to neoclassical realists, it can be argued that states aim to affect and shape the international environment if involved in a military intervention (Rose, 1998, p. 146). For example, the Thatcher government's decision to use military force to retake the Falkland Islands in 1982 was aimed at protecting the UK's national interests because the archipelago was an overseas territory of the UK. Nonetheless, state leaders may not always consider anarchy as a dominant factor while making foreign policies. In addition, even though neorealists and neoclassical realists share the same arguments about anarchy, their ideas on the balance of power differ. According to Lobell et al. (2009), state leaders and the FPE do not only consider changes in military powers, they also contemplate on other threats regarding other specific components of a state's power. Such shifts may be related to population, ideology, territory and other components (p. 54). Shifts in such specific components in the distribution of power may threaten other states' national interests. Nonetheless, in case they decide to get involved in military operations, state leaders should calculate the opposing state's material power well (Lobell et al., 2009). Therefore, perceptions of the FPE regarding such shifts matter in foreign policy decisions as they are responsible for ensuring their states' security, deciding on national interests, and maintaining their own influence and autonomy (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 56). State leaders and FPE may also need to assess other states' intentions and relative power. Any mistakes in calculating material capabilities or misperceptions of the distribution of power may result in a failure, especially during a military intervention (Lauren, 1979, pp. 96-136). In such circumstances, leaders and the FPE attain incomplete or ambiguous information in relative power especially during crises. Then, states may face suboptimal outcomes and they may give inefficient responses to systemic changes. Therefore, the abilities of leaders and the FPE to adjust to relative powers by investing in the military and forming alliances can

be lost (Schweller, 1998). Nonetheless, Mandelbaum (1998) mentions that security policies of strong states may be different from weak ones (p. 2), thus economically and militarily stronger states may prefer to have greater interests and pursue bigger aims (Gilpin, 1983, pp. 22-23). For Gilpin (1983), grand strategies of states are not only about material power or security. He argues that state leaders and the FPE may be interested in economic, political and social outcomes while deciding and implementing their countries' long-term strategies (Gilpin, 1983). Gilpin also implies that distribution of powers is also about economy as he makes arguments on trade, national resources and states' welfare. For him, the system of international politics creates a framework for economic activities. Economics may have great effects on the distribution of powers between nations and groups (Gilpin, 1983, p. 295). Zakaria (1999) thinks that states "build larger armies, entangle themselves in politics beyond their borders and seek international influence" as they become richer (p. 2).

Though state leaders are drawn from society, their attitudes and preferences change when they experience "the view from the top," as the privileged information they receive and the raison d'état culture they become imbued in make state actors more than simply representatives of their societal coalition (Ripsman, 2011, p. 10).

For neoclassical realists, ideas and perceptions that leaders and the FPE have may influence their foreign policy decisions. For Jervis (2015), leaders' perceptions on security, national interests and grand strategy are important (p. 13). In the decision-making process, leaders consult about their countries' national interests and pursue those interests with a close attention to domestic politics. State leaders may have very distinctive ideas on national interests and foreign policy; thus, such ideas may turn into foreign policy choices (Jervis, 2015, p. 36). For Schweller, neoclassical realists argue that the leaders and the FPE filter systemic pressures through their perception of distribution of powers and their interpretation of domestic incentives (Schweller, 2004). Therefore, the leaders and the FPE hold a critical position at the intersection between domestic politics and international constraints (Ripsman, 2011, p. 10). Even though the leaders and the FPE attach importance to external constraints mostly, they may also have to be attuned to threats to their own power. According to Ripsman, this may explain why leaders may be involved in "diversionary wars" that are not in national interests (Ripsman, 2011). Schweller thinks that the consensus and

compliance between members of the FPE play a crucial part in foreign policy making as such a condition may affect state's willingness to balance (Schweller, 2006). Therefore, it can be said that any disagreements between members of the FPE may create a situation that states may not adequately respond to external constraints. However, regimes may not function as unitary actors for a neoclassical realist. Therefore, state leaders may fail to concur with the FPE, political and military institutions about international threats. In such an occasion, each actor might be contemplating on the threat's impact on their own power. According to neoclassical realists, such divisions and other similar vulnerabilities in the government may usually prevent leaders from implementing policies. However, if a leader grasps more power in her/his country, s/he seeks more power abroad. When the leader loses influence in the country, her/his foreign policy objectives may also be in danger.

It can be claimed that neoclassical realists give priority to international system conditions in foreign policy making as the main determinants. However, according to neoclassical realists, domestic actors may also have a great influence on how leaders and the FPE interpret the international system conditions and their national interests. According to Rose (1998), states with similar powers may behave differently in the international arena, and such a difference may be explained by domestic incentives (pp. 146-147). Therefore, the FPE should consider domestic incentives as they consider external constraints while making foreign policy decisions (Zakaria, 1999, p. 56). Because "people cannot move beyond the system will have difficulty explaining most of what happens in international relations" (Rose, 1998, p. 65). It can also be argued that a leader should pay attention to different units of her/his society while making foreign policy because such units may affect their members' voting behaviour and such an incident may harm the leader's position. Therefore, what state leaders and the FPE do is to consider systemic pressures and filter them with domestic incentives and the state structure (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 191). It is to say that foreign policy makers should take account of external constraints, reactions of domestic audiences and their state structure together when they make foreign policy. The impact of domestic politics on foreign policy is so significant that decision makers may decide on specific policies only to increase their popularity in their country. They may even change their foreign policy decisions if they think such decisions would make them lose support (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 152). The significance that state leaders attach to

domestic politics during foreign policy making is because they need to have backing of domestic actors to stay in power in their countries (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 168). Thus leaders and the FPE should consider reactions they may receive from both abroad and domestic audiences as a result of their foreign policy decisions (Breuning, 2007, p. 116). It can be argued that domestic audiences may affect governments' foreign policy decisions to some extent depending on the democracy level of their countries. In democratic countries, leaders are more likely to listen to the arguments of domestic audiences (Breuning, 2007, p. 121). However, on rare occasions, governments continue to pursue unpopular policies if they think security reasons are strong enough. The US's continued intervention in Vietnam despite negative public reaction can be demonstrated as an example. Leaders and the FPE also tend to listen to domestic audiences more if elections are coming (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 188). Nonetheless, domestic groups who wish to affect their countries' foreign policies should have the deterrent power. Deterrent power may include votes, media power or ability to protest. In anti-democratic countries, physical power such as the armed power of the military during a coup may also be considered as a deterrent power. However, leaders may still need to have support of business, military and religious groups to maintain their power. Therefore, it can be said that domestic incentives may have potential to have impacts on foreign policy if the leader feels her/his position can be vulnerable. The main difference between a foreign policy analyst and a neoclassical realist arises at this point. Foreign policy analysts think that domestic audiences may directly affect their country's foreign policy one way or another. However, a neoclassical realist would argue that whether they may affect foreign policy decisions or not depends on the FPE who interprets domestic constraints (Lobell et al., 2009). While observing domestic politics, its actors and factors should be considered. Domestic factors may comprise the legislature, media and interest groups. Furthermore, political parties and NGOs can be considered among organised interest groups. Similarly, domestic actors may include businesses, labour unions and political institutions such as the military and aristocracy within the society (Snyder, 1991, p. 316). Neoclassical realists also attach significance to factors such as economy, social standards, international prestige and leadership change which are considered as unit level variables (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 62). Such variables may help scholars interpret states' foreign policies and explain domestic actors' behaviours in a society as well as their attitude towards each other.

Every unit within a society may be interested in influencing foreign policy decisions made by the government, because such decisions may have an impact on them. Therefore, those units may disrupt policies to protect the balance of power in their society. For such reasons, neoclassical realists imply that foreign policies of states are mostly intertwined with their domestic politics. Therefore, “leaders can act internationally for domestic reasons and domestically for international purposes” (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 147). To exemplify; Turgut Özal’s approach towards Kurds in Northern Iraq can be assumed to be a gesture for Kurdish electorate in Turkey in addition to making progress in human rights as it can be expected from a ‘Western democracy’. It can be argued that one of the main aims of neoclassical realists is explaining how domestic politics affects foreign policy decisions and to what extent domestic groups may put pressure on leaders and the FPE regarding foreign policy. This is also the main difference between neoclassical realism and neorealism, which neglects domestic politics’ impacts on foreign policy (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 42). Among all interest groups, the strongest ones can be those who have power to affect their members’ voting preference. According to Lobell et al. (2009), interest groups who have greater influence on foreign policy than other groups do can be ethnic groups (p. 182). Because these groups may be densely populated in certain provinces, thus they may have voter bases in such regions. Kurds living in the east of Turkey can be an example. However, for neoclassical realists, such groups should have power to select, support or remove leaders by election. Therefore, the country in which an interest group may affect decisions of the leaders needs to be democratic to some extent. Nonetheless, groups who do not have power to select or remove leaders by elections can find anti-democratic ways to affect policies of states as stated above. Domestic actors who wish to have influence on policy making can be more successful in stable times, as leaders and the FPE may choose to neglect domestic incentives if the state’s security is at risk. In high-threat environments, the risks to state security may override domestic factors as the FPE have strong incentives to neglect domestic political interests with the goal of securing their states’ survival (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 186). In addition, leaders and the FPE may take decisions regardless of public opinion if their position is strong enough to maintain their power despite the media or opposition. Therefore, the FPE and leaders may prefer to listen to domestic actors more if their position is vulnerable. In such cases, the leaders may not have enough majority

in the parliament or they can even be working for a coalition government (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 173). To exemplify, Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands can be seen as a move to buy off domestic audiences who are dissatisfied with the junta's economic performance (Jervis et al., 1989, pp. 89-124). In brief, main aims of the FPE and leaders are to preserve their state's survival and political autonomy, to maintain its power and position in the international system, and to guarantee all other goals they have such as ideological, political, social and economic ones. For the FPE, the first aim, which is to protect their state's survival, is their priority. However, in case the state's security and political autonomy are not at risk, the FPE focuses on other aims. In some conditions such as threats of losing power in their countries, leaders and the FPE may also prefer to trade off their interests on state security to consolidate their power if the damage on national security would not be too serious (Fiammenghi et al., 2018, p. 198).

Neoclassical realism identifies elite calculations and perceptions of relative power and domestic constraints as intervening variables between international pressures and states' foreign policies. Relative power sets parameters for how states (or rather, those who act on their behalf) define their interests and pursue particular ends (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 28).

For neoclassical realists, external constraints determine how states behave in the international arena. Just as neorealists, neoclassical realists also suggest that uncertainty and potential threats are building blocks of the notion of anarchy (Lobell et al., 2009). This situation obliges states to rely on self-help against external constraints. States' responses to such constraints may differ, and the occurrence of a security dilemma may make states even more vulnerable. As it is the leaders' and the FPE's duty to perceive and calculate other states' intentions and respond to changes in global or regional balance of power, difficulties they face in assessing any power shifts are important for neoclassical realists (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 34). In post-war periods, external constraints that great powers face may be very weak, and how they define their security interests can be complex. Therefore, they may make trade-offs between short term security concerns and long-term economic possibilities. This may result in less spending for their armies. However, they may create problems for the future because external constraints can suddenly become stronger (Lobell et al., 2009).

Unlike liberals thinking that economic interdependence and democracy ensure peace, neoclassical realists claim that tribalism is an immutable factor in international relations, and ideas such as nationalism may override the importance of economic interdependence and regimes (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 35). Perceiving threats and opportunities may be a difficult process for the leaders and the FPE. World views, personalities and political ideologies of the FPE may play a major role in that process, and factors such as the prevalence of ideas such as nationalism may help states extract resources for responding to external constraints (Lobell et al., 2009). Such factors may directly affect state power, the ability of states to extract domestic support to respond to external constraints. However, if the FPE ignores or misinterprets external constraints in circumstances that domestic actors may shape the interpretation of national interests, dysfunctional policy responses may occur. Therefore, they should prioritise external constraints while making foreign policy decisions (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 287).

Neoclassical realism is widely used by scholars in their academic works, particularly focusing on the decision-making processes of states. For example, attaching importance to the leadership, Schweller (1998) argues that Adolph Hitler's character and perceptions played a critical role in foreign policy dynamics before and during World War II. Furthermore, according to Schweller, the structure of the international system had an enormous impact on alliance formations and foreign policies in the 1930s and 1940s (Schweller, 1998). Gideon Rose gives the example of the Soviet Union's fall in order to underline the importance of the leaders' perceptions. Rose (1998) argues that decision makers' misperceptions may lead to failures as Gorbachev's attempts to strengthen the Soviet Union actually ensued its fall (p. 159). In his article, Mu Ren tries to answer the question why China joined Russia in vetoing draft resolutions on Syria at the United Nations Security Council. Ren aims at answering this question within a neoclassical realist perspective and s/he argues that China assumed more power in an international order based on the sovereignty principle. According to Mu (2014), China tries to block Western countries' efforts for a regime change in Syria, relying on its non-intervention policy. Even though Mu's primary focus is on the systemic pressures that China faces, s/he also takes the Chinese FPE into account, who focus on their authoritarian regime's survival and trying to prevent external interventions in Syria to overthrow another authoritarian regime there

(Mu, 2014). Steinsson (2017) proposes a neoclassical realist account for the Cod Wars. S/he argues that the Cod Wars occurred because of strong domestic incentives on the statesman to escalate tensions in addition to the FPE's miscalculation. Steinsson (2017) also suggests that it was statesmen who solved the problem and ended the conflict by making concessions. According to Steinsson (2017), British statesmen made great concessions while reaching an agreement because of domestic constraints to end the conflict (pp. 599-617). Lorenzo Cladi and Mark Webber (2011) analyse Italian foreign policy since the Cold War within a neoclassical realist framework. Cladi and Webber (2011) argue that Italian governments had aimed to raise their country's profile in the international system since the Cold War, but their policy choices have varied because of factors such as the FPE's perceptions on the distribution of power and political instability in Italy (pp. 205-219). Similarly, Alagoz (2021) examines international and regional systemic factors behind Turkey's active foreign policy orientation toward East Asia in the past decade. Observing Turkish foreign policy through a neoclassical realist approach, Alagoz emphasises that the change in the centre of international economy, changing regional dynamics in Middle East and Turkish FPE's pragmatic foreign policy understanding can be considered as reasons for Turkey to develop its relations with countries from East Asia, particularly China (Alagoz, 2021).

2.5. Conclusion

Neoclassical realists seek to examine challenges and opportunities that states face in both domestic and international levels during foreign policy making (Fiammenghi et al., 2018, p. 198). Furthermore, with the help of neoclassical realist assumptions, how the FPE and leaders decide on national interests with the help of domestic incentives, and how they interpret relative power capabilities and external constraints can be analysed. Neoclassical realists also acknowledge that leaders interpret those variables through their own world views, backgrounds and personalities. Therefore, it can be said that neoclassical realism is a convenient theory to analyse foreign policies of Turkey and the UK when Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher were in power in those countries. It is also that external constraints Turkey and the UK faced were much more decisive than other factors in foreign policy making between 1983 and 1993, and the leaders of those countries faced similar external constraints such as the relations with

the European Economic Community (EEC), the Gulf War and the Soviet threat. When Turkey and the UK's foreign policies in the Özal and Thatcher era are observed, it can also be suggested that there was a harmony in those leaders' interpretations of external constraints.

This chapter aimed at providing an understanding for the reader to comprehend the theoretical background of Turkey and the UK's foreign policies from 1983 to 1993. In accordance with neoclassical realist assumptions, worldviews and personalities of Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher will be observed in this thesis. The impact of domestic politics and the role of the FPE in foreign policy making will also be investigated. Both countries' foreign policies from 1983 to 1993 will be analysed in the external constraints section of this thesis as external constraints had priority over other factors in foreign policy making in that time period in Turkey and the UK. After that, all the factors behind British-Turkish relations can be better understood. However, in order to investigate if bilateral relations between the UK and Turkey developed in a positive way or not between 1983 and 1993, British-Turkish relations before 1983 should be summarised first.

CHAPTER 3

BRITISH-TURKISH RELATIONS BEFORE 1983

British-Turkish relations have a long history. The UK was among the first countries which established regular diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. The first British diplomat was appointed to the Ottoman Empire in 1583 whereas the Ottomans appointed Yusuf Agah Efendi as the first Ottoman Ambassador to London in 1793 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). The Turks and the British had been enemies and allies at different times in history. Although the Turkish-British alliance that started during the Crimean War did not continue in World War I, the alliance between the two countries was revived in 1939 and started to gain importance continuously during and after the Cold War. Turkey and the UK maintain good bilateral relations. The period between 1983 and 1993 at which Turgut Özal was in power in Turkey can be considered as a milestone in the relationship between Turkey and the UK. This is one of the arguments that this thesis tries to make. However, first of all, Turkish-British relations before 1983 should be summarised in order to provide an understanding of the direction of bilateral relations between 1983-1993.

3.1. Relations from 1919 to 1929

When the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk initiated a national movement against occupying forces including the UK. He started the Turkish War of Independence in 1919, and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) was founded on 23 April 1920. During the Turkish War of Independence, the British thought that the resilience of the Turks could be broken with the military operations of the Greek Army (Edi & Polat, 2017, p. 61). The successful fight of Turkish forces against Greeks changed the anti-Turkish attitude in the UK (Gökay & Yalçın, 1998, p. 88). Even though the British thought that the Turks' efforts for

independence must have been taken into consideration because the Turks could have power to defend the peace in their region in future, Lord Curzon tried to achieve significant concessions from the Turks at the Lausanne Conference (Edi & Polat, 2017, p. 61). The main aim of the British at Lausanne was to ensure free passage through the straits, to maintain Greek sovereignty over islands in the Aegean Sea, and to guarantee that the new Turkish state would play a role of a buffer near the Soviet territory (Edi & Polat, p. 62). As a result, the International Straits Commission was established and straits were demilitarised. Another significant issue affecting bilateral relations between the UK and Turkey following World War I was Mosul. The city of Mosul in Mesopotamia was of historic importance for the UK (Eraslan, 1994) and the British did not want to lose their control over it. After continued negotiations on the future of the city, Turkey had to renounce Mosul. The Mosul problem between Turkey and the UK continued until the Treaty of Ankara was signed by Turkey, Iraq and the UK in 1926. With the treaty, it was aimed to solve the issue of borders and to ensure good neighbourhood between Turkey and Iraq (Coşar & Demirci, 2006). Following the solution in Mosul, the significance of bilateral relations between the British and the Turks began to increase. Nonetheless, one may not speak of a certain rapprochement between the UK and Turkey in that period due to “Britain's focus on domestic issues and developments in Europe, as well as Turkey’s concentration on solving minor problems that could not be resolved with the Treaty of Lausanne” (Boyar, 2014, p. 1170; Kürkçüoğlu, 1984, p. 96).

3.2. 1929: A Fresh Start in British-Turkish Relations

The era between 1929 and 1939 had been a milestone in Turkish-British relations. Until 1929, the British resisted the idea of moving their embassy to Turkey’s capital, Ankara. In 1929, they started the construction of the new embassy building in the city. This was a sign that there would be a change in the UK’s foreign policy towards Turkey, because the UK had not recognised Ankara as the capital of Turkey until 1929. The reason for that was the British underestimated the city of Ankara, finding it comfortless and considering that Istanbul would be the capital again (Şimşir, 1991, pp. 209-210). In 1925, the British Ambassador Ronald C. Lindsay visited Ankara and presented his letter of credence to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first President of the Republic of Turkey. However, the Ambassador had still resided in Istanbul. In those

days, the Turkish government sent a diplomatic note to the UK, France and Italy specifying that the representation of those countries in Turkey should be at the embassy level and their embassies should be located in Ankara (Kaya, 2019, p. 33). After Ronald C. Lindsay, George Clerk had become the British ambassador to the Republic of Turkey, and the UK's negative attitude towards the capital was continuing. In the mid-1929, the British Ambassador organised a reception to celebrate King George's birthday in Istanbul instead of the official capital of Turkey. Hearing this, Atatürk made a clever diplomatic manoeuvre:

In order to put an end to Britain's stance on the capital, President Mustafa Kemal Pasha had a garden party organised at the Marmara Mansion in Gazi Farm and invited leading foreign diplomats two days ago. Ambassador Clerk, who was considered to attend this invitation, was in an important dilemma. He was stuck between the King's birthday reception on the one hand, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha's invitation on the other hand. Thus, the British Ambassador had to both attend the event in Ankara Çankaya and to organise an official reception in the capital on 3 June 1929. (Kaya, 2019, p. 33).

Such an incident paved the way for the British to indirectly recognise Ankara as the capital of Turkey (Kaya, 2019, p. 38). In 1929, the new building of the British Embassy began to be constructed in Ankara. The UK was the last country which decided to move its embassy to Ankara after a long time of resistance. The start of the construction may demonstrate that there would be a certain change in the attitude of the UK towards Turkey's capital and its new regime. In those years, the Turks and the British also began to pay more significance to cooperation in the field of defence industry. As a part of efforts for modernisation of the Turkish army, Turkey purchased military equipment such as machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, mountain howitzers from the UK. In the meantime, Turkish military officers regularly visited the UK for training (Kaya, 2019, p. 105).

In the 1930s, Turkish leaders sought to develop relations with the West, particularly the UK. It can be argued that relations with the UK had been the key stone of Turkish foreign policy (Çalış & Bağcı, 2003, p. 216) due to the changing international political landscape. The economic crisis in 1929 had a crucial impact on world politics and Turkish foreign policy. When Turkey sent delegations abroad to find foreign aid, it was only the Soviets and the British whom the Turks could obtain loans from in the

1930s (Edi & Polat, 2017, p. 66). The Turks also managed to sign the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with the UK in 1939. The economic problems that emerged in the early 1930s had caused the countries to be divided into two separate groups as revisionists and anti-revisionists (Ayla, 1993, p. 65). Whereas countries such as Italy and Germany were revisionists, France and the UK were anti-revisionists. Turkey was also in the anti-revisionist camp (Ayla, 1993). When policies applied by Italy began to jeopardise British interests in the Mediterranean, “London’s policy towards Ankara warmed up considerably” (Çalış & Bağcı, 2003, p. 216). Such a circumstance led to the Mediterranean Pact in between Turkey, UK, Greece and Yugoslavia in 1936. The UK also encouraged the Turks to sign the Balkan Pact in 1934 and Saadabad Pact in 1937, and Turkey’s membership to the League of Nations was supported by the British (Çalış & Bağcı, 2003, p. 217).

While Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated considerably at Montreux, the Conference positively contributed to the Turco-Anglo rapprochement. As such, when King Edward VIII visited Turkey in 1936, he received a cordial welcome from all of the Turkish people (Çalış & Bağcı, 2003, p. 217).

Turkey’s application to the League of Nations in consideration to reclaim its sovereignty over straits was backed by the UK because the British did not want Turkey to side with revisionist groups (Barlas & Gülmez, 2018). In return, the UK’s relations with Italy were a concern for Turkey because of security risks that Italians pose in the Mediterranean. However, due to the British-Italian agreement in 1937, Italians pledged to respect the status quo in the region and this indirectly meant that Turkey’s territorial integrity would be recognised by Italy (Barlas & Gülmez, 2018). In 1937, Turkey obtained a 16 million pounds loan from the UK. Such a credit was approved by the UK because the British wanted the Turks to have less links with Germany. If the British had lost Turkey to Germany, it would have endangered their ties with the Middle East and the Far East (Barlas & Gülmez, 2018). Turkey’s political orientation and strategic location had become a focal point for both revisionists and anti-revisionists. This situation increased the significance of bilateral relations between Turkey and anti-revisionist countries, especially the UK (Güçlü, 1997, pp. 59-107). After Italians invaded Albania, Turkey and the UK signed a joint declaration mentioning that they would stand against any attempts for aggression in the

Mediterranean. Such a development was interpreted by Italians as an important turning point in Turkish foreign policy because the Turks then left the non-alignment policy for the first time since the foundation of the new republic (Barlas & Gülmez, 2018).

3.3. Bilateral Relations During World War II

Drastic change which occurred in Turkey's foreign policy following its abandonment of its non-alignment policy was not limited to the joint declaration signed with the UK. In 1939, the cooperation between Turkey and the UK turned into an alliance. The Tripartite Alliance Treaty, which can be considered as a crucial step for Turkey to establish an alliance with the West (Barlas & Gülmez, 2018), was signed between France, Turkey and the UK on 19 October 1939 (Hansard HC Deb., 19 October 1939). After the Treaty was signed, France and the UK decided to provide Turkey war equipment worth around 25 million pounds, 9 million of which would be covered by the French and the rest by the British. The UK also agreed to write off Turkey's 15 million pounds of gold bullion debt (Karakuş, 2004, p. 107; Özlü, 2013). In addition, the Tripartite Alliance Treaty made the Turks, the French and the British committed to collective defence in case it was needed. However, even though France and the UK tried to convince Turkey to enter World War II, the Turks hesitated to do it. When Italy joined the war, the UK and France had demanded Turkey to declare war on Italy in addition to opening its naval and air bases to the use of the Allies (Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1973, p. 26). Furthermore, the UK also wanted Turkey to join the war against Germany after Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were attacked by the Nazis. In the Casablanca Conference in 1943, Churchill expressed the idea that the Allies should use Turkey's land as a base and Turkish naval force in the war. Churchill himself also visited Turkey to convince İnönü in order to make Turkey join the war. However, Turkey was not eager to take part in that war and İsmet İnönü refused such offers (Altınörs, 2017, pp. 3-5). Indeed, Turkey preferred to pursue a balanced foreign policy and maintained that approach until the end of World War II in order to minimise risks posed by the war (Çalış & Söker, 2019, p. 447). In 1941, the Turks had also signed a friendship treaty with Germans, and they did not prevent German ships from passing the straits to back the anti-British uprising in Iraq (Çalış & Söker, 2019, p. 452). After Germany's failed coup attempt in Iraq, Turkey's position as a strategic actor became even more important for both sides. The Soviet Union and the UK saw Turkey as a

barrier to prevent Germany from reaching Middle East and they “assured Ankara of their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and the respect of Turkey's territorial integrity” (Çalış & Söker, 2019, p. 454). Turkey’s balanced foreign policy continued until the last days of the war. However, when the UK and US announced that the countries that did not enter the war would not be a part of the United Nations that is going to be established, Turkey declared war against Germany in 1945 in principle (Demirdöven, 2014, p. 19).

3.4. British-Turkish Relations Between 1945 and 1983

Turkey’s foreign policy had already taken a westward turn in 1920s with the aim of founding leaders to locate Turkey in contemporary civilisation, but with the incidents occurred right after the World War II, Turkey began to follow an ‘explicitly’ more Western oriented foreign policy (M. Bilgin, 2009, p. 121). In 1946, the USS Missouri battleship coming to Turkey represented American support for the Turks who are threatened by Soviet expansionism (M. Bilgin, 2009). The UK had provided military aid for Turkey and Greece from the end of World War II until 1947. In 1950, Turkey decided to fight side by side with Americans, the British and other members of the UN Coalition in Korea. That decision helped to ease Turkey’s NATO membership. In the beginning, the UK had objected to Turkey's NATO membership, and relations began to worsen due to this attitude. The reason behind the UK’s objection for Turkey’s membership to NATO was that the British had not considered Turkey as a part of Europe and they thought the Turks should have concentrated on the security of the Middle East instead (Doğaner, 2006, pp. 227-248). After the UK supported Turkey’s membership to the organisation in return for Turkey's active contribution to the security of the Middle East simultaneously, Turkish public opinion’s reaction towards the British was softened and relations began to improve once again (Doğaner, 2006). In 1955, Turkey was among the countries forming the Central Treaty Organisation, namely the Baghdad Pact together with the UK (Duman, 2005, pp. 313-326; Bağcı, 2001, pp. 61-70). It can be argued that the bilateral relations between Turkey and the UK was developing in a win-win situation because the British presence in the Middle East also meant more assurances for Turkish national interests as the Soviets were also competing against the West in the region. Therefore, Turkey was among the countries which cooperated with the UK and supported the American-French-British position of

international operation of the Suez Canal, and it condemned Egypt's decision of nationalisation of the canal. Furthermore, the Turks played an active role in the crisis and they participated in the proposal of the US, France and the UK to establish the Suez Canal Users Association as one of the first members of it (Yalansiz, 2012, p. 398; Bağcı, 2001, pp. 79-84). Furthermore, even though both the UK and Turkey pursued an American-oriented foreign policy in the Middle East, the idea of including Jordan in the Baghdad Pact created divisions between the British and Americans, as the UK took side with Turkey (Sever, 1998, p. 80). The US was not eager to include Jordan in the Pact because it would harm Israeli-American relations even though Jordan had been a country with a pro-Western orientation, particularly pro-British one (Sever, 1998). In the meantime, the Turks wanted the Pact to expand and the British were also in favour of Jordan joining the Pact because of Jordan's orientation and the fact that they did not want to carry the burden of the security of the Middle East longer (Sever, 1998). Eventually, pro-Nasserist propaganda in Jordan as a result of such developments caused the failure of the pro-Western government in the country and Jordan's membership to the pact became impossible (Sever, 1998). Similarly, Turkey had to join Americans demanding the British and French withdrawal from the Canal when they deployed forces in Egypt (Sever, 1998, p. 127). This may show how policies of allies may differ from each other depending on their own interests. Turkey may have favoured the US's position regarding the British military operation against Egypt because the US had already taken over the UK's responsibility for supporting Turkey militarily and economically since 1947 (Sever, 1998; Bağcı, 2001, pp. 79-84; Sander, 2005). Nonetheless, the British maintained their significance for Turkey. In the government program of the 3rd Adnan Menderes Government, it was stated that the cooperation with the old and loyal ally Britain would continue (Kodal, 2021, p. 709).

Between 1955 and 1967, the Cyprus issue played an utmost important role in British-Turkish relations. In the mid 50's, the UK began to pursue the policy of establishment of an independent state on the island. In the case of British withdrawal, Turkey started to defend the thesis of granting the island to itself, and then it defended the thesis of partition. However, Turkey acknowledged that the UK was party to Cyprus after four years of British endeavour to solve the issue and parties had to resolve the problem with the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959, establishing an independent republic in Cyprus (Savrun, 2017, p. 350; Bölükbaşı, 2001; Bağcı, 2001, pp.103-124). In those

years, Turkey did not want the UK to leave the island, because such departure would ensue more problems between parties in Cyprus. Therewithal, British policy makers were also reluctant about leaving the island completely because it would have adverse effects on the UK's strategy on the Middle East (Göktepe, 2014, p. 153). Due to Zurich and London Agreements, the UK was one of the guarantors on the island, and it had two sovereign base areas and 33 military facilities in Cyprus (Göktepe, 2014, p. 152). The British also had a significant role in UNFICYP. In 1963, Macarios III tried to change the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus unilaterally. His aim was to exclude the Turks from the government of the republic and he thought that the British would support such an aim. However, the UK did not indulge the Akritas Plan aiming to achieve enosis on the island (Göktepe, 2014, p. 154). In the meantime, the UK pursued a positive non-interference policy towards the conflict in Cyprus and this approach was criticised by many including the Turks (Göktepe, 2014, p. 157). After these incidents, the US began to play a bigger role in mitigating the conflict. This relieved the British who did not want to carry the economic and military burden of guarding peace on the island. After Greek troops attacked two Turkish villages in Cyprus in November 1967, the situation on the island deteriorated as the conflict between Turk and Greek Cypriots grew even further. The British then considered closing down its military bases in Cyprus because of security concerns, but the US put pressure on the UK not to give up any bases (Mallinson, 2009, p. 742). Following the rising conflict between the Turks and the Greeks in Cyprus, Turkey was threatening to use military force on the island and wanted the UK to be involved in the situation. The British thought that if the Turks had invaded Cyprus, they would not have stopped and invaded Greece as well. They also considered that their bases on the island were not expected to be involved in the Turkish invasion (Coşkun, 2018). In addition, the British did not want to see a war between two NATO allies on the island and supported the dialogue between the Turks and the Greeks until the dispute was settled. The dispute on the island was settled with the American reaction to prevent Turkey's military intervention, and the British were relieved as the dispute did not turn into a complete war between the Greeks and the Turks.

Britain was happy with the result that a possible Turkish military intervention in Cyprus was stopped. Also, the active American role in this process helped the British not to be found itself in a difficult position, such as preventing the Turks from

conducting a military operation. As a result of this, the November crisis did not cause trouble in Anglo-Turkish relations (Coşkun, 2018, p 395).

Despite the crisis in 1967 was settled without harming Anglo-Turkish relations, Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 had a negative effect on the British's perception of Turkey. Even though the UK was also unhappy with the Greek coup d'état on the island, it hoped Turkey would not deal with the problem militarily. When the Turks wanted to use the British bases during the intervention, the UK rejected Turkey's request. Instead, the UK was expecting to hold a meeting attended by the British, the Greeks and the Turks as the UK unconditionally objected to any military intervention. However, Turkey did not accept such a demand. This situation was demonstrating the different approaches that the British and the Turks had over the Cyprus dispute (Coşkun, 2015a, p. 456). Even though the UK continued to put pressure on Turkey diplomatically, the British did not want to put relations with Turkey at risk and they tried to convince Turkey through NATO, the UN and the US (Uslu, 2003, pp. 26-27.) However, Turkey's intervention in Cyprus worsened the relations as it can be seen in the Nicosia Airport crisis. According to Callaghan (1987), the Turks aimed to take control of the Nicosia airport, but the airport was actually controlled by the UN forces mainly consisting of the British soldiers (p. 347). On that day, the UK threatened Turkey to use military power if their soldiers were attacked. However, the Turks stated they did not aim to confront the UN forces including the British on the island. These incidents may demonstrate how both sides lost confidence in each other (Coşkun, 2015b, p. 126). The second Turkish intervention on the island continued to worsen the relations, as the UK continued its negative approach towards Turkey's Cyprus policy. However, the British continued to be criticised for its passiveness during the conflict. In the 1960s and 70s, the US played even a bigger role in settling the conflict in Cyprus than the British did. Even though British-Turkish relations deteriorated to some extent due to incidents taking place on the island, the Cyprus issue did not create any major problems between Turkey and the UK. This may be the result of the need for the partnership between two countries, which have common security concerns and interests due to external constraints. Indeed, Mustafa Bilgin (2007) argues that "Anglo-Turkish relations were determined to a greater extent by wider strategic and security considerations and the Cold War atmosphere" (p. 226) since strategic interests of both countries were under Soviet threat in the Near and Middle East. At the same time, both

countries relied on the US's role in protection of abovementioned regions (M. Bilgin, 2007). Whereas the UK's presence meant more security for Turkey, the British thought that the Turks "represent a valuable bulwark against Soviet penetration to the south and into the Mediterranean area" (M. Bilgin, 2007, p. 228). Although there were differences in the perspectives of the UK and Turkey on the developments in the Middle East, it can be stated that the Cyprus issue was of great importance for the bilateral relations between the two countries. After the Cyprus dispute relatively settled down, relations between the Turks and the British calmed down and bilateral relations followed a more stagnant course.

The military coup taken place on 12 September 1980 in Turkey was followed closely by the British. The British Embassy in Turkey continuously informed British authorities in London before and during the military coup. During this period, the assessments made in the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office to determine the UK's policy towards Turkey was very important (Coşkun, 2016b, p. 530). By 1980, the political and economic environment of Turkey was getting worse. According to assessments made by the British, Turkey had two major problems concerning internal security and economy, and such problems were threatening the democratic regime in the country (Coşkun, 2016b, p. 531). In those years, political violence was one of the most important problems in Turkey. This situation eventually paved the way for a military coup. After the coup, the British were assuming that the coup aimed at protecting the constitution, and the diplomatic report sent to London by the British Embassy in Ankara was stating that the coup cannot harm British-Turkish relations, therefore the British Government should approach the military regime with sympathy (Coşkun, 2016b, p. 534). Turkey's relations with the West maintained its importance, and it can be said that Turkey particularly improved its relations with the US under the military regime (Balci, 2013, p. 17). However, especially the opposition party in the UK, the Labour Party, continued to criticise the military regime and its performance on human rights continuously. Even though this situation did not create a real problem in bilateral relations, Turgut Özal Government, which came to power in 1983 with pluralist election and created a better outlook for Turkey abroad as well as evoking transformation in Turkish foreign policy, ensued a more positive approach towards the Turkey in the UK.

CHAPTER 4

TURGUT ÖZAL'S WORLD VIEW, REFORMS AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDERSTANDING

Halil Turgut Özal can be considered as one of the most significant and controversial political figures in Turkey. The period between 1980 and 1993 can be described as the 'Özal period' in Turkey. Because Özal began to put his mark in Turkish politics in 1980 as the deputy prime minister after the Demirel government was overthrown by the military, and he assumed different positions beginning from his premiership and lasting until his death as the President between 1983 and 1993. The Özal period ensued a radical change in Turkish political, economic and social life, and Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (ANAP) achieved to maintain its majority in the parliament and run the government as the single party until 1991. As a catch-all centre-right political party, the ANAP can be described among the most popular political parties in Turkey ever, consisting of people from different political backgrounds with the help of Özal's strong personality (Çiçek, 2018, pp. 73-98). Furthermore, it can be said that Özal's political heritage continued to influence Turkish politics after his death, since his party managed to take part in different governments until 2002. It is also that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AK Party) considers itself as a part of political tradition inherited from historical right-wing political parties such as the ANAP (Topcuoglu, 2006). Turgut Özal himself also pursued a Western-oriented, assertive and proactive foreign policy understanding which evoked a rapprochement between Turkey and its Western allies, placing Turkey in a more strategic position in world politics. For all these reasons, Özal can be assumed to be one of the most remarkable, popular and referenced politicians in the political history of Turkey.

4.1. Short Biography of Turgut Özal

Turgut Özal was born in 1927 in Malatya. He was the second child of a middle-class, conservative family. His father Mehmet Sıddık Özal, and his mother Hafize Özal were civil-servants and they assumed their duties with utmost respect to the republic and constitution. Hafize Özal is claimed to have Kurdish origin. Even though the Özal family can be considered as a middle-class family, Özals could be considered to belong to the elite people in Malatya due to their education levels and two civil servant salaries they received (Özdemir, 2014, pp. 9-13). Turgut Özal completed elementary school in Mersin, middle school in Mardin and high school in Kayseri because his family had to travel a lot because of the civil service post. He also lived and went to school in Konya and Bilecik. Having lived in different cities of Anatolia, Turgut Özal had a chance to see how Anatolian people lived.

Özal graduated from the Electrical Engineering Department of Istanbul Technical University and began to work at the Electric Works Study Administration. In the following 30 years, he gained experience in Turkey and abroad, working or receiving education at different institutions (Özen, 2011, p. 122). Having received education in economics in the US, he contributed to the establishment of the State Planning Organisation and worked there as the undersecretary. He also worked as an advisor at the World Bank for two years (Özdemir, 2014, p. 72). After returning to Turkey, he worked at Sabanci Holding as a coordinator. However, Turgut Özal's experience in the private sector was not limited to this position. He also worked in the private sector in banking, iron and steel, and automobile industries. Apart from working in the private sector, Turgut Özal gave lectures at Middle East Technical University (METU) and served as the president of the Metalware and Industrialists' Association. Furthermore, Özal was an advisor to former Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, and he also served as the Undersecretary of the Prime ministry. Before assuming the duty of undersecretary at the prime ministry, Özal had become Izmir deputy candidate from the National Salvation Party (MSP), from which his brother Korkut Özal was appointed as a minister. However, Özal could not achieve to be elected at the first general election that he was a candidate (Yılmaz, 2016, p. 2). It is also claimed that Turgut Özal was to be nominated as a senator from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), but he narrowly missed out (Çölaşan, 1989, pp. 83-96). When he served as the

Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry at the 43rd government of Turkey, Özal became the architect of regulations known as 24 January Decisions, which is known to be a milestone in liberalising Turkish economy (Kazdağlı, 1996, p. 94). After the military coup in 1980, Özal's previous performance made him appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and he continued to manage Turkey's economic policies broadly (Coşkun, 2016a, p. 3). Turgut Özal's impact on the liberalisation of the Turkish economy was so big that he went on implementing economic reforms during the military regime (Barlas, 2000, pp. 3-6).

After he received increasing criticism due to the great banking crisis (Beim, 2005, p. 19) that took place in Turkey in between 1981 and 1982, Özal resigned from the office. Following the approval of the new constitution created by the military regime with the referendum held in 1982, political developments started to gain momentum in Turkey and Özal was among the statesmen preparing to found a new political party. Eventually on 20 May 1983, the ANAP was founded by Turgut Özal. Özal's new party had been the pioneer of a new kind of politics in Turkey, which could be seen as a reflection of New Right politics particularly referred to as Thatcherism in the UK and Reaganism in the US (Arslan, 2010, p. 31; Eryılmaz, 2018, p. 128). The ANAP succeeded to win the first pluralist election which took place in Turkey after the military coup. Özal left his mark in Turkish politics with his decisions that could be considered a revolution in the administrative and financial sphere after the ANAP came to power, and this brought him an overwhelming advantage in the first local elections, thus the party also won the local election in 1984. Furthermore, the ANAP and Turgut Özal, the 19th Prime Minister of Turkey, also achieved to be re-elected at the general election in 1987 and formed a government for the second time. Turgut Özal survived an assassination attempt at the ANAP congress in 1988 (Hamit, 2020).

After President Kenan Evren's term of office had expired, Turgut Özal was elected as President by the Parliament on 31 October 1989, and became the 8th President of the Republic of Turkey. After he became the President, he saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity, and wanted Turkey to play an active role in the region. Özal immediately passed away after his return to the country, following a long and tiring journey he made to the Balkans and Central Asia. There had been ongoing rumours on Turgut Özal's death from 1993 to 2012 even though he was known to have died of a

heart attack. Turkey's State Audit Board released a report classifying his death as 'suspicious' (Turkish President Özal's death suspicious, 2012) in 2012. However, Ankara Chief Prosecutor's Office stated that there was not any clinical evidence suggesting Özal had been poisoned after receiving a report from the Forensic Medicine Institute, which performed an autopsy on the body of the former President (Late President Özal' not poisoned to death, 2012) During his career in statesmanship, Özal particularly gained fame for his economic and political reforms as well as supporting the rights of Kurdish minorities, allowing Bulgarian Turks and Iraqi Kurds to immigrate to Turkey, avoiding war with Greece in 1987 and joining the UN led coalition against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Turgut Özal was married to Semra Özal and this was his second marriage (ANAP, 2001a). Turgut and Semra Özal had three children.

4.2. Turgut Özal's World View and Vision

Turgut Özal had been a son of a conservative family. He lived in different cities of Anatolia, where the majority of the population are also conservatives. His parents, Mehmet Sıddık and Hafize Özal were also religious people. Hafize Özal learnt how to read the Quran at school, and his father was raised at a madrassah, speaking both Arabic and Persian. Turgut Özal lived in Söğüt, a district where the Ottoman Empire was founded, for some time. It can be said that Turgut Özal was raised as a person in faith by his family, but he paid even more significance to religion as he got older. According to his brother, Korkut Özal, living in Söğüt gave Özal brothers a conscience of history (Birand, 2001, p. 13). It can also be mentioned that Turgut Özal and his brother learned how to perform namaz during university years. They were also secretly reciting the azan in Arabic, even though reciting it in Arabic was prohibited during the one-party period in Turkey (Avşar & Kaya, 2017). Özal was even claimed to be a member of Iskender Paşa Community of Nakhsbandi cult. He was among the founders of İlim Yayma Foundation, which is the modern organisation initiative of the community (Uluç, 2014, p. 120). However, just as his parents respected the constitution, societal norms and republican values, Turgut Özal did the same and he was open to personal development, critical thinking and modern way of life, as he said:

After all, I see a strong belief in God as an essential element in the wellbeing of societies. I believe it is useful to teach the

fundamentals of religion. But this should not be a reason to be against the new, to be closed to the world. Research, thinking and discussion should not be diminished (Barlas, 2000, p. 84).

Hasan Celal Güzel, one of close friends and colleagues of Turgut Özal, states that his family was acquainted with Özals since his childhood, and the intimacy between their families was also because the Özal family supported the Democrat Party (DP), which was a conservative right-wing political party of that time. Turgut Özal also knew Recai Kutan, who is among leaders of a religio-political movement, the National Outlook. In *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü* written by Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalçın, Recai Kutan argued that Turgut Özal was conscious of political developments in Turkey while a high school student, and that he supported the DP (Birand, 2001, p. 16). University years were also times that Turgut and Korkut Özal began to become involved in politics even though Korkut Özal was politically much more active than Turgut Özal. Hikmet Özdemir (2014) argues that the Özal brothers represented the conservative fraction among students of Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ) (p. 32). Turgut Özal, Korkut Özal and Recai Kutan studied at İTÜ together and they were also members of Turkish Culture Hearths. At Turkish Culture Hearths, they found a chance to meet Ali Fuad Başgil, who was an intellectual and right-wing statesman, and Nureddin Topçu, who has been an important thinker for people supporting right-wing political parties in Turkey. Korkut Özal claims that he and his brother Turgut Özal were among the group which organised a huge demonstration during the funeral of Fevzi Çakmak, a former Turkish field marshal and a prominent conservative politician (Özdemir, 2014, p. 38). Fevzi Çakmak was a member of the Democrat Party, and he had co-founded the Nation Party which was even more conservative than Democrats. Korkut Özal's arguments may demonstrate that Turgut Özal had begun to actively involve in political events during his time at İTÜ. After he was divorced from Ayhan İnal, his first wife after a short time of marriage, Turgut Özal went to the US in order to receive education in economics at Texas Technology University. Experiencing the 'American dream' extremely affected Özal's mindset. He fell in love with the US so much that he felt like he left his own country while leaving New York (Özdemir, 2014, p. 40). His brother, Korkut Özal mentions that living in the US changed their mindset in a positive way:

We had an egocentric, introverted education understanding.

There was a bigoted and racist nationalism during our education years in Turkey, which made us bigoted. When I went abroad, met the world and saw Turkey from there, I corrected all my wrong views and beliefs. I think it was the same for my brother, Turgut Özal (Özal, 2010, p. 18).

After returning from the US, Özal worked at the Electric Works Study Administration until 1959. He also contributed to establishment of the State Planning Organisation. In those years, Turgut Özal attended various meetings with prominent right-wing politicians, including Süleyman Demirel, Necmettin Erbakan, Recai Kutan, Sadettin Bilgiç and Temel Karamollaoğlu. Recai Kutan argues that Turgut Özal helped the foundation of the Justice Party and it was the first time that Özal was officially active in politics (Birand, 2001, p. 32). It can be assumed that people whom Turgut Özal attended meetings with were conservatives, but it was Süleyman Demirel who was similar to Turgut Özal most. Because, even though Turgut Özal was religious, he could be described as a moderate person. To exemplify, in an interview with Yener Süsoy, Turgut Özal says he also drank alcohol (Özdemir, 2014, p. 58). Unlike today's politicians in Turkey, Özal did not hesitate to drink alcohol in front of cameras, he and his wife wandered around the beach with swimsuits, and they also went to entertainment venues for fun (Uluç, 2014, p. 120). Furthermore, it is claimed that Özal was tolerant of nonreligious people during his term of office at the State Planning Organisation (Kansu, 2004, p. 232). Living in the US and working in different sectors must made Özal even more moderate as he closely met with foreign politicians and witnessed their ideas there.

The seventh and final leader of the ANAP and Izmir MP from the Democrat Party (DP), Dr. Mehmet Salih Uzun who was interviewed for this thesis, says that he talked to Ahmet Özal, Turgut Özal's son while contemplating on the questions that had been asked to him. Dr. Uzun says he asked Ahmet Özal how his father became so liberal and indulgent despite the devout environment which he lived in. The answer Dr. Uzun received from Ahmet Özal was short but clear: "my mother, Semra Özal" (Dr. Mehmet Salih Uzun, personal interview, 27.10.2021). In fact, both Turgut Özal and Korkut Özal grew up in the same house, they studied at the same university and even went to the US together, but Turgut Özal was much more tolerant and liberal compared to Korkut Özal. The difference between the brothers can be the way they lived after they married. Korkut Özal preferred to marry a conservative lady, while Semra Özal whom

Turgut Özal married was more liberal and modern. In the interview, Dr. Salih Uzun calls Blaise Pascal's aphorism to mind: "Cleopatra's nose, if it had been shorter, the whole face of the world would have been changed" (Hooykaas, 1999, pp. 319-341). Meeting Cleopatra and falling in love with her had changed the direction of Julius Caesar's political career and the Roman history. Similarly, if Semra Özal had not been married to Turgut Özal, the course of Turkish politics could have been different and Turkey might not have witnessed a liberal democratic progress, free market experience and foreign expansion strategies. Without Turgut and Semra Özal together, the Turkish society could also have experienced the advanced level of conservatism earlier as it experienced under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership in the 2000s (Dr. Mehmet Salih Uzun, personal interview, 27.10.2021).

Özal's term in power may be claimed to pave the way for great changes in Turkey's political and societal life. However, it cannot be seen as a radical break from Kemalism, which is thought to be the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey (Köker, 1995, pp. 1253-1257). Because Özal wanted to westernise Turkey, just as most of the Kemalists also saw westernisation as a way of reaching the level of modern civilization (Bora, 2005, p. 589-601). It can also be assumed that Özal attached great significance to secularism, and his conservatism was not based on living sheerly in a religious way. His understanding of conservatism was based on synthesising secular life order and religious conservatism in accordance with the liberal-conservatism in the US and the UK. Therefore, the party Turgut Özal founded in 1983, the ANAP, was ideologically closer to Süleyman Demirel's True Path Party (DYP) than political parties of the National Outlook movement. For many, the DYP represented conservatives in rural areas, whereas the ANAP was more urban and offered new policies which made the party seem uncommon than the previous and current political parties of that time (Çavuşoğlu, 2009, pp. 173-174). For Gültekin Uysal, the leader of the Democrat Party which merged with the ANAP in 2009, the ANAP and the DYP were ideologically the same. But the bitter disagreements between two parties emerged from the power struggle (Gültekin Uysal, personal interview, 5.10.2021).

Economy was at the centre of the ANAP's policies and the party's founding fathers emphasised economic issues in the party program, declaring that their party was in favour of a competitive free market economy (Yengin, 1987, p. 8). Furthermore, it

could conceivably be suggested that the ANAP openly advocated privatisation and economic liberalism. Such an economic approach was based on free enterprise, as well as encouraging people's willingness to develop, and spreading prosperity. It was also argued that the new party was committed to national and moral values, backing equal opportunity for everyone and putting people in the centre of politics, instead of the old 'statist' understanding in Turkey. According to Atilla Yayla (2005), Turgut Özal can be described as a politician who saw the state as a tool instead of an end for the first time after Adnan Menderes (p. 585). Similarly, Feroz Ahmad (1993) argues that Özal projected a liberal, anti-statist and anti-bureaucratic image (p. 190), and he believed in a limited government and decentralisation. Thus, Turgut Özal wanted local administrations to be responsible for social services such as transportation, water works, health and education (Uluç, 2014, p. 118). In the first election manifesto of the ANAP in 1983, it was declared that the state should be mainly responsible for security, legal system and foreign policy. Therefore, it should not interfere with the economy too much, having only regulatory and guiding functions (ANAP, 2004). The final chairman of the ANAP, Dr. Salih Uzun also argues that his party was different from other political parties because there were no "others" for them. Özal had gathered conservative, nationalist, social democrat and liberal people together in his team, and they tried to expand everyone's realm of freedom regardless of their differences. To exemplify the ANAP's approach, Dr. Uzun mentions that Özal governments removed Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the former Turkish Penal Code numbered 765 in 1991, paving the way for the freedom organisation and propaganda for both leftist and conservative circles (Dr. Mehmet Salih Uzun, personal interview, 27.10.2021; Akyeşilmen & Özcan, 2014, p. 32).

It should be noted that Özal began to support liberals against conservatives within the ANAP soon after he became the President. At the *Özallı Yıllar* documentary, Semra Özal argues that Özal wanted his wife to be the Party's provincial head in Istanbul because he thought that conservatives were increasing their influence at ANAP's provincial organisation, and Mrs. Özal could stop them (32. Gün Arşivi, 2017a). At the same documentary, Turgut Özal can be heard saying at a meeting with the ANAP members while he was the President that their party should be different from the former Justice Party, which could be described as highly conservative (32. Gün Arşivi, 2017a). Such a meeting which Turgut Özal held when he was the President can

demonstrate Özal's ambition to interfere with political matters within the Party even though he was legally enforced to be neutral towards all political parties. This ambition may also be the main reason why he could not get along with Mesut Yılmaz any longer, whom he supported at the ANAP congress in 1991. Beginning to lose control over the ANAP and being constrained by his position as the President, Özal even considered establishing a new political party subsequently (32. Gün Arşivi, 2017b).

In addition to the conservative and liberal views prevailing at the party, the ANAP also had nationalist instincts. In the party program, it was openly mentioned that the party was a nationalist and conservative party. However, such an understanding was not linked to the idea of race. Instead, the ANAP's nationalism was based on the view that 'everyone saying they are Turks are Turks' as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk once claimed (Yengin, 1987, p. 15). Furthermore, such nationalism was not based on a superiority of a group of people, and it did not create any divides in the society. Instead, the ANAP's nationalism was about competing with Europe and the world, and becoming a developed country in terms of economy, technology and arts (Duman, 2010, pp. 267-270). The party's ideas on conservatism were not directly related to religion either. In the party program, it was stated that the ANAP was conservative in a way it welcomed the traditions and beliefs of Turkish society. It was also that the ANAP wanted to strengthen the structure of the society and to enrich social solidarity (Yengin, 1987, p. 16).

For Süleyman Demirel, the ANAP's founding leader Turgut Özal was an opportunist person (Cemal, 1989, p. 27) whereas Atilla Yayla argues that Özal did not have strict political borders but he just wanted to blend economic liberalism and domestic culture as a pragmatic politician (Yayla, 2019). It was also that Özal attached great significance to the idea of freedom as a politician whose mindset was mainly concentrated on economic development, knowing that a country could not be developed without freedom (Yayla, 2019). Because economic freedom is not enough for the development of a country, Özal argued that respecting fundamental rights and freedoms should have become the basic principles of the Turks' social lives (Uluç, 2014, p. 130; Dağı, 2016, p. 207). Thus, Turgut Özal's political philosophy is composed of three fundamental freedoms, as he said:

I will mention three important issues for change. We must focus on three important issues and continue with these principles. These are three main freedoms. One of them is the freedom of thought. The second important freedom is essentially the freedom of religion and conscience. The third freedom is the freedom of enterprise (Aktan, 1996, p. 15).

Being aware of developments in the Western countries, Turgut Özal was the practitioner of 'New Right' policies in Turkey (Şener, 2015, p. 393). Thatcherism in the UK was also an example of the New Right in the world. In retrospect, the New Right policies were a new type of liberalism and conservatism incorporated into each other in world politics. Because the capitalist system struggled with a crisis in the 1970s when social inequalities and decline of prosperity challenged welfare states around the world, particularly the UK and the US. In those countries, states had been criticised for being too weak to endure demands of the interest groups, and the New Right demanded a strong but limited government (Topal, 2000, p. 79). The reason why such policies were known as Thatcherism in the UK or Reaganism in the US was also because of the strong leadership of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Similarly, Özal had come to power after a military coup following a civil conflict in Turkey. Politicians of the 1970s could not mitigate the civil unrest and thousands of people died as a result of political violence between rightist and leftist groups. Özal always reminded the incidents before the 1980s to present how weak politicians and governments were then. As a strong leader, Özal offered a middle way to the people of Turkey, instead of strict right and left policies which had pushed Turkey into turmoil (Özen, 2011, p. 129).

It can be argued that the New Right can be argued to have been a kind of the evolution of liberalism and conservatism (Topal, 2000, p. 73). What the New Right brought to politics is the combination of liberal and conservative arguments which would contradict each other if used separately. For example, the market is of utmost priority for the New Right while the limited state is conserved (Topal, 2000). Furthermore, traditions, religion, family, national identity as well as a strong government to construct and preserve those institutions also mattered. In accordance with such an understanding, Turgut Özal wanted to limit the state's involvement in the economy, even though it was not a complete laissez-faire understanding. According to Özal, the free-market economy and open competition were key for achieving democratisation

and freedoms (ANAP, 2001b). However, he also thought that the government should still have a role to preserve the rules and procedures of the economy. Coherently, as the New Right conservatives also believed in a strong state, public expenditures in the UK, Turkey and the US went up in the 1980s (Topal, 2000, p. 82). Furthermore, it may be noted that the New Right conservatives believed decision making processes were to be centralised and revolved around the leader (Topal, 2000, p. 75). Many incidents where Turgut Özal tried to neglect bureaucratic and diplomatic constraints and made decisions by himself are examples. Such an attitude may also be the reason why Özal wanted Turkey to be governed with a presidential system instead of the parliamentary system.

For Özal, people should learn about collective beliefs, traditions and values as a heritage that must be preserved. Turgut Özal saw economic development as a path going towards democratisation and freedom. For him, a country could not be democratic and free without economic success. Furthermore, Özal thought that liberal economy was the right way to achieve economic development. Turgut Özal firmly believed in ‘three freedoms’ which consisted of the freedom of thought, the freedom of religion and conscience, and the freedom of enterprise. Because Turkey suffered from political conflicts in the past, Özal preferred a smoother rhetoric and he tried to unite people from different backgrounds in his party, the ANAP. Even though the population of Turkey mostly consisted of Sunni Muslims, Özal saw the Turkish nation as a part of the Western civilisation and wanted his country to be a part of the European Community (EC) (Özal, 2013). Nonetheless, in order to better understand Turgut Özal’s personality and vision, his reforms and foreign policy direction should be observed.

4.3. Turgut Özal’s Political and Economic Reforms

Having won the first pluralist election after the 12 September military coup in Turkey, Özal made reforms that could be seen as enormous change by people who suffered from political violence, repression, other antidemocratic occurrences and economic problems in the past years. Turgut Özal’s reforms were both political and economic and they were aimed at integrating Turkey’s economy into the neo-liberal world order. Thus, it can be said that his political reforms were also aimed to form the basis for

economic development. The 1970s had been problematic for the Turkish economy. Oil crises, the Cyprus Peace Operation and embargos applied against Turkey as well as the political instability affected the Turkish economy significantly. In those years, exports had decreased while imports increased 13 per cent. This made foreign trade deficit more than 4 billion dollars and the ratio of exports to imports was decreased to approximately 30 per cent (Karabulut, 2010, p. 984).

Özal saw liberal economy as a solution to Turkey's constant economic problems. First of all, he focused entirely on his economic agenda, which remained unfinished in his under-secretaryship and ministry before the banking crisis at the beginning of the 1980s. In doing this, Turgut Özal initiated new practices on the structure of the Turkish economy, and opening up the country to the outside world as soon as he became the Prime Minister. In previous governments, Özal had already aimed to transform the Turkish economy with the 24th January decisions, providing a growth model directed at export and a free market economy, removing obstacles in front of capital movements (Azgün, 2012, pp. 189-196). After he became the Prime Minister, Turgut Özal had a greater chance to put his economic vision into practice. He tried to adapt to a realistic and flexible exchange rate policy, imports were liberalised, an export-led growth model was adopted, foreign banks were allowed to open branches in Turkey and foreign investments began to enter the Turkish capital market. Turkish Lira was made convertible and utmost priority was given to privatisation and the private sector in investments (Duman, 2018, p. 124). Build-operate-transfer model started to be implemented in this period. The Istanbul Stock Exchange Market was also founded in those years (Duman, 2018; Kazgan, 1995, pp. 192-193).

Within the scope of 'cultural conservatism' understanding, Turkey increased its economic cooperation with Middle Eastern countries. Thus, Turkey's export to the region increased 5 times between 1980 and 1985 (Duman, 2018, p. 116). Özal's liberalisation policies led to positive statistics in Turkey's trade with foreign countries overall. To exemplify, Turkey's exports were approximately 5.9 billion dollars at the end of 1983, and it rose to 13.6 billion dollars in 1991. Also, in the Özal period, quantity controls in imports were largely abolished during this period and tariffs were reduced (Çavdar, 1992, p. 235; Eştürk, 2006, p. 78). It was also that new companies arose in different cities in Anatolia and they were claimed to spread the capital to

different areas instead of only Istanbul (Öniş, 2000, pp. 283-306). Those companies called ‘Anatolian tigers’ were export oriented and most of them pursued principles of Islamic finance (Hoşgör, 2011, pp. 343-360). As a result of these export incentive policies in the 1980s, the ratio of exports to imports increased continuously until 1988 even though a decrease was also seen afterwards (Karabulut, 2010, p. 990). With the ‘supply side economics’ understanding, tax discounts were made for companies. It had been envisaged that companies would make more profit with the help of such discounts and they would be able to invest more in return. Furthermore, it was also expected that total tax revenues and total demand would increase due to increasing investments (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 402). In fact, those policies were resembling the New-Right economic policies of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US, and Turgut Özal was trying to adapt to the conjuncture in the world by implementing such policies. After all economic reforms made by Özal governments, a relatively high annual average growth rate of 5.2 per cent was achieved (Erdoğan, 2017).

As stated above, Turgut Özal had seen democratisation as a way for economic development and he knew economic reforms were not adequate alone. Therefore, making political reforms was a must in order to develop the Turkish economy. When Turgut Özal came to power as the Prime Minister in 1983, Turkey’s image regarding human rights and democracy was very negative. Under the military regime, many people were detained, blacklisted, tortured and killed. Newspapers, magazines, books and films were banned and destroyed, while political parties and associations were prevented from operating (Tanör, 1995, pp. 26-57). Even in the first pluralist election after the military coup, there were only three parties which could take part: the ANAP, the Populist Party (HP), and the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP). During the election campaigns, the junta openly supported the MDP which was led by a former general, Turgut Sunalp (Ahmad, 1993, p. 189). The Prime Minister of the military government, Bülent Ulusu and four ministers from his cabinet also joined the MDP. The reason why the military regime let the ANAP take part in the elections might be because generals may have wanted a party from each different political position to participate in the elections, including the MDP representing the status quo or right wing, the HP from the left wing, and the ANAP from the centre or centre-right. It is also that nobody expected the ANAP to win the elections at the beginning. Therefore, letting Özal take part in the elections would not harm the interests of the military, but

it might also make the process look more democratic. However, some argue that Turgut Özal had too strong relations particularly with the financial circles in the West that the junta had to let him participate in the elections. For example, retired American General Alexander Haig is claimed to have visited President Kenan Evren to let him know the West's trust in Turgut Özal (Ahmad, 1993).

After Turgut Özal and the ANAP took part in the general election in 1983 and surprisingly defeated other parties, they also began to make political reforms besides economic ones. First of all, the Özal period was transition to civilian rule in Turkey (Barlas, 2000, p. 147). Therefore, taking steps for the demilitarisation of the regime was of utmost priority for Turgut Özal. As a result, people who are close to the military regime were not included in the new cabinet (Özen, 2011, p. 159). Özal also seemed to pay significance to three freedoms. As stated above, one of the most important steps that was taken by the ANAP governments regarding individual freedoms is removing Articles 141, 142 and 163 from the former Turkish Penal Code numbered 765. Article 141 was aimed at preventing people from establishing communist organisations and Article 142 aimed at prohibiting making communist propaganda. Article 163 forbade establishing organisations for people advocating 'sharia' (Duman, 2018, p. 113; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1991). However, establishing any organisations regarding religious beliefs could also be prevented due to the aforementioned article. In addition, after the 1980 military coup, women were unable to enter universities with head scarfs. In 1988, Özal tried to enable girls to enter universities with a headscarf with the help of new Higher Education Law numbered 2547. President Kenan Evren vetoed the law, but he had to sign it once the Parliament passed the Law again. Then, the President filed an application to the Constitutional Court, and the Court ruled against the law. Despite President Kenan Evren and the main opposition Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP)'s objections, Turgut Özal and his government was successful in passing the law in 1990, thus women obtained the right to enter universities with their head scarfs until 1997 (Türban Tartışmaları, 2010).

The Turgut Özal period did not only remove the obstacles to the freedom of leftists and religious people. Following the cultural pluralisation in this period, people from different identities including Alevis, Kurds, and LGBTs also started to appear in public life and express themselves by leaving their private spheres and started to contribute

to democratic life (Duman, 2018, p. 114). However, among all groups belonging to different identities, it may be Kurds who suffered from the anti-democratic policies of the state most. After the military coup in 1980, broadcasting in any languages apart from Turkish and speaking Kurdish were also prohibited. Kurdish citizens of Turkey were also prevented from naming their children in their native languages (Cemal, 2003, pp. 378-379). It can be argued that the military regime before Özal governments was even denying the existence of the Kurdish ethnic group. Such an approach also made Kurds in the eastern part of the country experience other anti-democratic practices. For example, many Kurds including politicians and community leaders faced systematic torture and assimilation in Diyarbakır prison in the first half of 1980s (Cemal, 2003, pp. 378-379). The 1990s was a milestone in acknowledging the core of the issue. Starting from the President Turgut Özal, state officials and politicians began to admit that there is a Kurdish problem and they contemplated on democratic solutions for it (Uçar, 2017, p. 368). Turgut Özal was aware of the longstanding Kurdish problem in Turkey, and he tried to provide permanent solutions for it. For Cengiz Çandar (2015), Özal had been the only political leader who took cognisance of the issue, aiming to provide political solutions via negotiations (p. 22).

It is argued that Özal first continued the policy of assimilation against Kurds by instituting a village guards system and declaring the State of Emergency in the east of Turkey, but his stance began to change in his second term (Gunter, 2010, pp. 105-120). There can be two reasons for this change. On the one hand, Özal may have targeted more Kurdish votes and aimed to form a coalition with them for the future as he suffered a great defeat in local elections in 1989. On the other hand, he may have overcome bureaucratic and military restraints to some extent and eventually found a chance to take action on the Kurdish issue. Both possibilities would be consistent with neoclassical realist assumptions. However, the second suggestion can be more accurate because real change in Özal's stance on the Kurdish issue actually occurred when he was the President. According to Faik Tunay, who was the former Istanbul MP and the vice chairman of the International Young Democrat Union (IYDU), Turgut Özal was always disappointed by assimilation policies against Kurds as a liberal politician who wanted Turkey to integrate with the modern world, and he approached the issue within the framework of democratisation, paying attention to the economic undevelopedness at the same time (Faik Tunay, personal interview, 15.10.2021).

Amid the democratisation process, Özal's efforts brought about the political initiatives in the axis of Kurdish identity. In the 1990s, pro-Kurdish political parties began to be founded, including the People's Labour Party (HEP) and the People's Democracy Party (HADEP). The Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) is the successor of those political parties in Turkey. Furthermore, Özal governments accelerated the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), and encouraged investments to be made in the eastern part of Turkey. The government gave 90.000 additional staff to the public sector whereas it also provided other privileges such as additional wage opportunities for public officials assigned to the eastern provinces of Turkey (Uçar, 2017, p. 371). The military regime's prohibition on speaking Kurdish language after the military coup in 1980 was lifted by Turgut Özal (Demirel, 2018, p. 65). The law forbidding broadcasting in languages other than the official language of the country was also abolished. At the same time, Turkey's foreign policy had been intertwined with its domestic policy towards Kurds as a neoclassical realist would expect. The government's dialogue with Iraqi Kurdish leaders such as Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, and its support for the Operation Provide Comfort, aiming to defend Kurds against the Saddam regime and to provide humanitarian aid for them (Oran, 1996, pp. 19-47), may demonstrate this harmony between domestic politics and foreign policy. It should also be noted that Turkey opened its doors to more than 500.000 Kurdish refugees fleeing from Iraq in those years (Gürcanlı, 2019), In the meantime, the rhetoric of state officials towards Kurds and the Kurdish problem had undergone a significant change when Turgut Özal was the President. Turgut Özal himself declared that his mother was a Kurdish lady from Malatya (Uçar & Akandere, 2017, p. 373), and he stated that the Kurdish problem needs democratic solutions as the issue cannot be solved with a 'stick' (Uçar & Akandere, 2017, p. 382), After he became the President, Özal remarked on 6 September 1991 that even federalism should be discussed in order to solve the Kurdish problem, and stated that the protector of the Kurdish people in the region was Turkey. Jalal Talabani announced on 11 June 1991 that Turgut Özal had persuaded the US to send troops to Northern Iraq and said "Özal prevented the slaughter of the Kurds" (Özal ve Kürtler, 1993). Even Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist organisation, conveyed his condolences to Turkish society after Turgut Özal passed away, declaring that he is sorry to hear of Özal's death (Özal ve Kürtler, 1993). President Özal also

argued that the state should establish a television channel broadcasting in Kurdish (Özal ve Kürtler, 1993). In a speech he gave to journalists in Çankaya, Turgut Özal openly declared that there is a gap between the Turks and the Kurds, and the policy of assimilation is wrong (Cemal, 2003). His rhetoric on the Kurdish problem was also reverberated in the opposition. Whereas the SHP prepared a report on the issue, Süleyman Demirel openly admitted that the reality of the Kurdish identity cannot be neglected (Bila, 2005). Özal also had Adnan Kahveci and Hikmet Özdemir prepare a report for the democratic solutions of the Kurdish problem (Özdemir, 2014, p. 519).

According to Özal, if there is an ethnic issue in Turkey, it should be addressed and resolved like all other issues. Speaking and listening to music in Kurdish should not be something to be afraid of. Among groups living under the Ottoman Flag, the non-Muslims were first to break off. The Arabs were the last. The English involvement, the mistakes of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the understanding of nationalism instead of ummahism among Arabs, caused their separation. Kurds, on the other hand, were not in favour of separation despite everything (Özdemir, 2014, p. 498).

It was also in the Özal period that some political prisoners were released, and approving death penalty punishments was suspended in the Turkish Parliament. The right of individual application to the European Court of Human Rights for Turkish citizens was approved by the Özal Government (Gürbey, 2010, pp. 146-147; Dağı, 2001, p.23), and Turkey signed the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in the same period (CoE, n.d.). These steps ensued a relief for both Kurdish citizens and people from all segments in Turkey. Although Özal himself was against lifting political bans, the bans of Süleyman Demirel, Necmettin Erbakan, Alparslan Türkeş, Bülent Ecevit and hundreds of other politicians in Turkey were lifted with the referendum held in 1987, and this situation had led above mentioned leaders to become the leaders of their parties including the DYP, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Task Party (MÇP) and the Welfare Party (RF). The reason why Turgut Özal was against lifting political bans is that those leaders were claimed to be responsible for the chaotic environment in Turkey before the military coup (Siyasi Yasakları Halk Kaldırdı, n.d.). In addition to such reforms and developments, a minor amendment in the article 130 of the constitution allowed private universities to be established in 1984, and Bilkent

University was established by Prof. Dr. İhsan Doğramacı as the first private university of the country in 1984 (Birler, 2012, p. 140). An amnesty law was enacted for those who were expelled from Turkish citizenship because they did not fulfil their military service obligations (Özal ve Siyaset, 1993). Bureaucratic procedures in government offices have also been reduced and the government provided the opportunity of partially exempted paid military service for its citizens (Özal ve Siyaset, 1993).

It can be argued that impacts of reforms made after the transition to a democratic regime cannot be shrunk to only political and economic ones. It is also that Turgut Özal's policies may have affected Turkish people's way of life, paving the way for a more dynamic social life. During the Özal era in Turkey, private television and radio channels began to be established (Özal ve Siyaset, 1993). This development may have broadened Turkish people's horizons, especially by making people from different segments more visible within the society. In fact, Turgut Özal himself had relations with 'uncommon' people in the media. For example, Zeki Müren, who was famous for his colourful and distinctive style, whose clothes and oratory resembled those of a lady, was awarded the title the 'State Artist' in 1991. It was also claimed that President Özal regularly phoned and talked to Müren when the artist lived in Bodrum (İzel, 2021). Moreover, transsexual musician Bülent Ersoy was devoted to Turgut Özal and his wife with great respect since she was able to overcome the problems and prohibitions that arose after her gender reassignment surgery with their help (Kutluay, 1993). Özal also helped a musician known to have socialist ideas, Cem Karaca after he was unable to return to Turkey following the military coup in 1980 (Kutluay, 1993). Even though he was a conservative, Turgut Özal was in touch with many other artists from different segments of the society including Kurds, Gypsies, people with different sexual orientations and socialists. It is also claimed that Turkish society experienced openness and westernisation more than anytime in Turgut Özal's premiership.

American culture, backed by the victory of the West at the end of the Cold War and liberal policies applied by charismatic movie star Ronald Reagan, spread faster in Turkey following Turgut Özal's reforms. After Turgut Özal's death, Madonna, Michael Jackson, Guns N' Roses and Metallica came to Turkey to give concerts on summer days of 1993. That summer may have represented the global triumph of liberalism in Turkey as Metallica's concert in Moscow in 1991 did after the collapse

of the Soviet Union. Turgut Özal's reforms helped the westernisation process of Turkish society. Imports were released. After that, McDonald's and Levi's came, Lee Cooper advertisements tempted massive attention. Turkey only lacked one thing. The Turks did not have their own Michael Jackson. Then, Tarkan appeared. The beginning of the 1990s can be seen as a turning point for Turkish pop music. Along with Tarkan, there were also other new pop artists. But only Tarkan became an iconic pop star and achieved worldwide fame. The fact that Tarkan has given concerts in different countries including the US, UK, Mexico, Morocco, France and Kazakhstan may demonstrate that the Turks were not only influenced by the Western culture, but they also 'exported' their own culture in a Western image. During the Turgut Özal period, the tourism sector also experienced a great leap forward. While the number of foreign tourists coming to Turkey was 1.288.060 in 1980, this figure increased to 2.614.924 in 1985 and 5.389.308 in 1990. In the same time period, tourism revenues increased approximately 10 times (Okuyucu & Somuncu, 2018, p. 8). Such statistics were mostly driven by government support, private enterprises and the increase in international tourism demand (Okuyucu & Somuncu, 2018). An introductory television programme about holidays in Turkey on the BBC in 1989 is quite remarkable. On the programme, Kathy Tayler, a presenter on BBC, describes Turkey as "just more than another beach destination, a unique bridge between Europe and Asia" (BBC Türkçe, 2018). Considering that the British had been the third largest tourist group who visited Turkey in 1990 (Okuyucu & Somuncu, 2018, p. 8), one may argue that the growth in the tourism sector that occurred with the help of policies implemented by Özal governments, contributed to Turkey's global outlook and vice versa.

It can be said that the Turgut Özal era ensued great changes in different aspects of societal life in Turkey. Following the three years of military regime, liberal policies of Özal governments were seen as reforms. People from conservative and liberal segments in Turkey still argue that the Özal years provided more prosperity and freedom for Turkish people. Nonetheless, Turgut Özal was criticised by his rivals primarily for being authoritarian in some instances. It seems that Turgut Özal sometimes pursued policies which are inconsistent with his reforms, violating his own principles and suppressing the opposition. For this reason, having examined Özal's political and economic reforms in Turkey, it would also be convenient to take a look at criticism directed towards him.

4.4. Critics Against Turgut Özal

After Turgut Özal became the Prime Minister in 1983, arrests, closure of newspapers, trials in military courts and torture in prisons continued (Özen, 2011, p. 159). Because there was still the Martial Law and Özal could not go beyond the limits of the Military in his first years. Özal was careful not to spoil the relations between politics and the Military. Thus, he never questioned the legitimacy of the military coup and warned the politicians of his party not to talk about it (Özen, 2011). Nonetheless, Özal opted for decision-making through decrees as in Erdoğan's rule in the 2000s, bypassing the parliament, bureaucracy, diplomacy and even the cabinet in some cases. Even in very significant decisions regarding privatisation, cabinet decrees were used instead of parliamentary decisions (Öniş, 2004, pp. 113-134). Turgut Özal's objection to lifting political bans of hundreds of politicians in 1987 has also been a heavily criticised attitude. Even though the ANAP tried to portray lifting political bans as its own accomplishment, Süleyman Demirel strongly opposed such an approach:

Lifting political bans is not the accomplishment of this government. The government is 'orange'² towards lifting the political bans. The people are 'blue'. It is the people who lifted political bans. "(They say) if we had not brought it forward, political bans would not have been lifted." You did not have to. Who told you to bring it forward? You brought political bans forward in order to not lift it. Not for the purpose of lifting. We are not grateful for anything. Long live the people! (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1987).

Süleyman Demirel had also criticised Turgut Özal for abusing state resources, including state owned TV channel TRT, in order to campaign for 'no' during the 1987 referendum. In addition, Demirel was among the politicians who criticised Özal's economic policies. He suggested that cartelisation increased more than ever before during the Özal period. For him, the Özal government contradicted their views of liberal economy and social justice, because the state did not interfere with the economy that much even in periods when governments openly said 'we are statist'. According to Demirel, the Özal government was setting the prices of goods, and the state owned 60 percent of the investments at that time, whereas such amounts of the investments

² Orange was the colour of the 'No' side in the ballot paper in the 1987 referendum while 'Yes' side was blue.

were made by private enterprises in the previous periods (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1987). Similarly, Özal governments increased taxes in a way not to comply with economic liberalism, and introduced new taxes such as the Value Added Tax (Uluç, 2014, p. 125). The opposition also criticised the Özal government for ignoring corruption and bribery (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1994). Words that Özal is claimed to say after he was asked about the issue, “my civil servant knows her/his stuff” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1994), is still displayed as an example for statesmen condoning corruption (Ekşi, 1998). Ertekin Durutürk, who was a DYP deputy between 1987 and 1994, asserts that Özal’s biggest gaffe was the words mentioned above. For Durutürk, words of Özal meant the government could not pay civil servants much, thus they could accept a bribe (Ertekin Durutürk, personal interview, 8.11.2021). However, some argue that Turgut Özal’s words actually mean civil servants knew their way around surviving on such low salaries (Abdestli Liberal, 2022).

It is claimed that an increase was observed in policies such as rent seeking, nepotism and corruption during the Özal period. For example, it is asserted that state economic enterprises were under the influence of special interest relations, public funds were transferred to bankrupt banks and industrial organisations in this manner, and there was corruption in tenders (Özen, 2011, p. 162). It is also claimed about the Özal Period that cheap loans were distributed to businessmen close to the government, an imaginary export phenomenon was created, favouritism was made in the privatisation process, and tax incentives were abused (Özen, 2011). However, the importance given to businessmen when the ANAP was in power was not given to workers and unions. Following the military coup, all strikes organised by labour unions remained outlawed until 1987, and the ANAP governments did not do much to relax the inhibitions on those unions. In addition, because the government was not inclined to compromise with labour unions when they gained the right to strike again, real wages stayed low (Onis, 1992, p. 18). In 1991, the miners organised a massive march from Zonguldak to Ankara with 150.000 workers, but they could not get the wages they wanted (Özgönül, 2021). Doğan argues that Turkish workers’ actions took place in those years might be compared to the experience of British miners resisting the policies of Thatcher governments in the UK (Doğan, 2010). As a result of these policies, Özal governments’ success in the economy did not last long. The inflation rate, which declined until 1987, increased to 69 percent in 1989. In addition, the foreign trade

deficit grew and foreign debt increased threefold. The increasing current account deficit paved the way for the 1994 crisis. Although the growth rate of the Turkish economy was 3.3 percent in 1983, it declined to 0.3 percent in 1991 (Karabulut, 2010).

By ‘appointing’ a passive but loyal leader, Yıldırım Akbulut to his party and the government, Özal wanted to maintain control over the party and the government after he became the President. While in the office of the Presidency, Turgut Özal took decisions by consulting only a few ministers or high-level bureaucrats, bypassing the Prime Minister this time. Even though this situation did not create any problems between Yıldırım Akbulut and Özal, the President’s such attitude ensued tension with the following Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz (Heper, 2013, p. 145). Turgut Özal also helped his wife, Semra Özal to become the Istanbul provincial head of the ANAP (Özal'dan Eşine Tam Destek, 1991). Furthermore, with the help of a cabinet decision, Turgut Özal’s mother Hafize Özal was buried in a graveyard where some of the Ottoman dynasty members were also buried (Öktener, 2001). It can be claimed that Özal was severe with criticism directed to himself, and he sometimes found it appropriate to take decisions on his own initiative. Therefore, he was considered as an authoritarian by some, and his so-called authoritarianism resulted in the resignation or dismissal of some ministers within the cabinet when Özal was the Prime Minister. Turgut Özal emphasised that the constitution could be ignored in some occasions in order to speed up accomplishments within the government. On the issue, he said there would be no harm to violate the Constitution once. However, many laws that the government enacted in the Özal era could not have been implemented because they violated the constitution (Örnek, 2020, p. 143). In addition to that, Özal governments widely restructured the bureaucracy in Turkey, as young technocrats Turgut Özal knew from the private sector were appointed to state institutions. Young and educated Turks were also brought from abroad to work for the government. Such people were known as ‘Özal’s princes’. It is claimed that people from religious communities were appointed to similar positions within the state. Such an attitude drifted the state away from traditional bureaucracy understanding of the Republic (Örnek, 2020).

Although Özal tried to pretend to be a colourful and tolerant person participating in talk shows, laughing at people imitating him at TV shows, and posing to cameras when he drove and listened to music with his wife, his intolerance sometimes manifested

itself against the media. With the Protection of Children from Obscenity Law, many media outlets were fined. Between 1986 and 1988, fines given to media outlets were 7 billion 730 million Turkish liras (approximately 6.5 million dollars in 1988) in total (Uluç, 2014, p. 131). In addition, the number of ongoing lawsuits against the press was around 200 (Soydan, 2010, Feb 14). Özal criticised the law himself later, and he stated that his conservatism and the conservative masses that he gets votes from affected his decision to enact the law (Barlas, 2000, p. 94). Between 1988 and 1989, 263 lawsuits were filed against newspapers. Many journalists and writers including Can Yücel, Altan Öymen and Aziz Nesin were also sued. Despite the removal of articles 141 and 142 from the Turkish Penal Code, the elements in those articles were started to be implemented with the regulation of a law providing for new and heavier penalties. With the new anti-terror law, the expression of thought could be seen as an act of terrorism. Subsequently, 17 books and 63 newspapers or journals were confiscated or seized in addition to many journalists who were arrested (Soydan, 2010, Feb 12).

Özal was also criticised for his approach towards the PKK terrorism. He was alleged to have underestimated the terrorist attacks by the PKK in its first years by leaving the issue to the military. After the 1984 Şemdinli and Eruh Raids, he went on vacation to Bodrum instead of gathering the Cabinet (Uçar, 2017, p. 370). His words regarding the PKK attacks, “three to five bandits”, were also found odd. Because he did not attach enough significance to the problem, it was thought that Özal had harmed the fight against terrorism and gave ground to terrorists (Cemal, 2003). At the same time, Özal's dialogue with Kurdish leaders and his open speech about the possibility of a federation in northern Iraq further increased the suspicions that he was fuelling separatism (Uçar & Akandere, 2017, p. 37). Former DYP deputy Ertekin Durutürk argues that Turgut Özal did not mean to fuel separatism. First of all, “Özal was a Kurdish but he was not a Kurdist” (Ertekin Durutürk, personal interview, 8.11.2021). Durutürk thinks Özal's main aim was to enlarge his country by compounding Kurds in northern Iraq with Turkey. For him, Turgut Özal had been an imaginative person for he thought Turkey's economy might benefit from such a union due to natural resources in the Kurdish region. Furthermore, the former MP thinks that Özal may have underestimated terrorists because he thought that his state was too strong (Ertekin Durutürk, personal interview, 8.11.2021). Therefore, it can be said that Turkey's reactions to constraints and opportunities at the domestic and international levels were

based on Turgut Özal's own calculations and perceptions of the issues, as it would be argued by neoclassical realists. Furthermore, disagreements between the Turkish FPE and Özal regarding relations with the Kurds within Turkey and Iraq are also consistent with neoclassical realist views. In fact, it can be said that Turgut Özal was aware of the Kurdish problem in his country, and he thought the problem could be handled with the help of economic and democratic solutions. However, the reason why he had not taken important steps regarding the issue to solve the issue in democratic ways when he was the Prime Minister may be because of pressure from the military and the nationalist/conservative electorate in Turkey. Relieving from the domestic restraints after he became the President, Turgut Özal became more outspoken about Kurdish problem and wanted to come up with remedies until he surprisingly passed away in 1993. Having drawn a line between the terrorist organisation and Kurds, Özal's approach on the Kurdish problem created a major change in policies on the issue. However, both the Kurdish problem and the PKK terrorism remained as unsolved issues for Turkey despite the government's increasing efforts to tackle terrorism especially after 1989.

As it may be seen above, Turgut Özal's policies are criticised for contradicting the vision he put forward. In fact, there are many occasions that Özal governments pursued oppressive and statist policies which led to criticisms against Özal for being an authoritarian leader. However, such a setting might have occurred because Özal also had to consider support he mobilised from conservatives as he needed to be re-elected until 1989, and the military could intervene with his policies as the material law lasted until 1987. For example, after he met the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Bonn on 17 April 1985, Turgut Özal was told by his executive assistant that the *Tercüman* newspaper was closed by the Martial Law Command (Altan, 2021). Özal did not know the newspaper was going to be closed because the military did not need to inform him or ask his opinion on the issue. Such an incident may demonstrate that the military was still very influential on politics and Özal might have to compromise with generals before making a decision on an issue or the military could even take decisions itself. It is also that Özal wanted to act as a 'strong leader', aiming to create a synthesis between liberals and nationalists within his party (Salt, 1995, p. 15). Therefore, Turgut Özal may have taken inconsistent decisions with his reforms while in power because he may have wanted to test the limits of his voting base consisting of different groups

and he may have not wanted democracy to be damaged by creating a conflict between the military and the government. It can be suggested that Özal preferred to behave more moderately and pursued more liberal policies after he became the President, because he could tackle restraints of the military then, and he was no longer in need of conservative votes.

However, in spite of criticisms directed at him, people who favour Özal argue that he wanted to liberalise Turkey by making reforms within the framework of three freedoms and he aimed to change his country which seemed very much inward-oriented, statist and anti-democratic before he came to power. It may also be argued that such an approach provided a better outlook for Turkey in the international environment. When intertwined with his foreign policy direction, Özal's reforms can be claimed to have helped Turkey consolidate its position in the Western alliance and its region. Thus, it can be suggested that Turgut Özal's foreign policy orientation also played an extremely important role in his political career, for this reason, Turgut Özal's foreign policy understanding should be observed before one could generalise about Turkish foreign policy in between 1983 and 1993.

4.5. Turgut Özal's Foreign Policy Understanding

Having a Western-based orientation, Turgut Özal's foreign policy understanding is claimed to have aimed at maintaining Turkey's position in the international system, positioning the country as a regional power within the Pax Americana and increasing its autonomy in such an order (Balcı & Güleler, 2018, p. 78). In doing this, Özal sought to pursue a pro-active foreign policy (Bağcı, 1996, pp. 20-27). Turkey had begun to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy after 'The Johnson Letter' (Sönmezoğlu, 2016). Whereas Turkey's aspiration to have autonomy in world politics was inherited from previous governments as the ANAP paid significance to continuity in state affairs (Erkmen, 2018, p. 732), Özal governments focused on departing from established policies, taking 'calculated risks' and finding alternatives at the same time (Sayari, 1992). The economy played an utmost significant role in Turkey's foreign policy decisions during the Özal era, and Özal's personality was decisive in economic relations (Gürbey, 2003). In fact, Turkey opted for a multidimensional foreign policy, trying to improve its relations with the West and countries around the world,

particularly those in the Middle East. Such an approach was based on ensuring Turkey's security and benefiting from economic cooperation. Turkey's involvement in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), as well as its increasing trade volume with Middle Eastern countries can be considered within this context.

Turgut Özal's aim to make Turkey an autonomous regional power had also presented itself in the country's foreign policy regarding the 1991 Gulf War and establishing relations with countries in Central Asia. Unlike his predecessors, Turgut Özal had not used Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union as a bargaining chip against the West. He knew that the Soviets were weakening, and relations with the Turkic nations in Central Asia would both enhance Turkey's position in the Western alliance (Balcı & Gülenler, 2018, p. 81) and provide economic opportunities. Therefore, Turgut Özal had seen the collapse of the Soviet Union as the "opening of the gates of opportunities." (Cıvaoglu, 2013). Turkey's support for the coalition forces in Iraq during the Gulf War was also an opportunity for the Turks to become more active in its region. Turgut Özal's dialogue with the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq aimed at affecting decisions regarding the region's future. By getting closer to Kurds in northern Iraq, Turkey might have increased its influence in the region, gained more support from the West and also benefited economically. During the Özal era, Turkey also improved its relations with Eastern European countries and Muslim countries in the Middle East. This multi-dimensional approach started a new chapter in Turkish foreign policy (Yeşilada, 1993, pp. 169-192).

Having a Western-oriented foreign policy was not an end, but a tool for Turgut Özal (Ataman, 2003, p. 53). Özal saw that the Soviets were to collapse and the 'end of history'³ was coming. Furthermore, having problems with the West had affected Turkey's economy negatively in the past and Turkey's relations with the Eastern bloc had not been easy either. For this reason, it can be said that Turgut Özal's Western-based foreign policy orientation can be described as a realist approach. Nonetheless,

³ Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was argued in Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History and the Last Man" that Western liberal democracy prevailed in a way it universally became the final form of human government.

Turgut Özal tried to diversify Turkish foreign policy as much as he could. Instead of merely relying on the relations with the West, Özal governments also improved its relations with countries from Central Asia, Middle East and Balkans. For example, the autonomous foreign policy orientation of Özal governments led Turkey to improve its economic relations with Iran and Libya which were isolated by the West, and to increase the support Turkey received from the Islamic world (Ataman, 2003, p. 54). One reason for that was Özal saw Middle Eastern countries as potential markets and allies, and he thought that Turkey could have the leading role among them (Ataman, 2003, p. 54).

Such an approach was also a result of significant changes in the Turkish elite group. Before the 1980s, Turkish elites mostly consisted of strictly secularist and republican people who were educated in the Western countries. From 1983 on, a group of technocrats were placed in state affairs in Turkey. The new elites were mostly conservatives and they tried to synthesize Islamic values with a pragmatic and rational approach as Özal himself did. This situation must have disturbed secularist groups including the military within the Turkish society (Eralp, 1996, pp. 93-112). After the Republic of Turkey had been founded, Turkish elites securitised the issue of secularism, and this provided the military a chance to affect foreign policy making (P. Bilgin, 2015, pp. 123-142). In order for strictly secularist groups not to hinder him, Turgut Özal often preferred to make a decision in consultation with a small group around him. In addition, Özal emerged as a leader who put his personal characteristics forward in decision-making processes (Dündar, 2016) and he was not even interested in informing the Parliament about his foreign policy decisions (Gürbey, 2010, pp. 70-79). Therefore, Özal was criticised for pursuing a ‘black box diplomacy’ by the opposition (Kurt, 2018, pp. 157-171). To exemplify, Turgut Özal is claimed to have neglected the view from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on recognising the Palestinian state in 1988. However, the Palestinian issue was not the only subject that Özal had been at odds with the MFA. In 1989, Özal’s statement regarding people immigrating from Bulgaria ensued a crisis between the MFA and Turgut Özal. Because Özal bypassed the MFA on the issue, Mesut Yılmaz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs resigned citing the excessive personal interventions made by Özal in foreign policy making (Özcan, 1994, p. 311). Necip Torumtay, the former Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, also resigned due to Turgut Özal’s persistence in sending

Turkish troops to Iraq alongside the coalition forces during the 1991 Gulf War (İşte Geçmişteki İstifalar, 2010).

Turgut Özal's term in power ensued a transformation in Turkish foreign policy. Özal initiated this change with his determinant personality, and he was described as "the architect of new Turkish foreign policy" by The New York Times (Haberman, 1991). In an official visit he paid to Algeria, Turgut Özal openly apologised for abstaining at the United Nations (UN) during the Algerian War of Independence, which was also construed as a diplomatic support for France. This was something new and unexpected in Turkish foreign policy (Birand, 2001, p. 247). Özal's approach towards the Armenian Allegation of Genocide was also unconventional. Turgut Özal thought that Turkey must change its attitude towards genocide allegations since trying to solve the issue can be a 'one shot bullet' (Ergin, 2021).⁴ He wanted to solve the issue with the help of a peaceful dialogue (Özdemir, 2014, p. 505), aiming to find a solution that could be also accepted by the Turkish public. However, due to the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)'s violent terror attacks and the criticism that Özal received in domestic politics, he was not able to provide solutions on the issue. Moreover, despite the opposition of the MFA, Turgut Özal had proposed four-way talks on the Cyprus issue and he thought that the issue should be resolved with mutual concessions. He also adopted a soft attitude towards Greece and ensured that the conflict was avoided even in the 1987 Aegean crisis.

Leaving the passive approach of traditional Turkish foreign policy, Özal governments sought a more assertive role for Turkey in its region, as they believed Turkey played the role of a bridge between the East and the West (Mor, 2001, p 386). This approach also provided Turkey economic opportunities, creating networks or improving existing ones in different markets around the world. As a *homo economicus*,⁵ Turgut Özal tried to increase his country's influence in world politics and make economic, political and security-related benefits. Turkey's application to join the European Economic Community can also be considered within this scope. As a result of Özal's economic reforms, Turkey fulfilled its obligations to the EEC and made an official application

⁴ In Turkish, a one shot bullet may refer to trying to solve an issue at once, instead of dealing with it for too long. In such circumstances, the shooter may not get another chance if misses the target.

⁵ The term is used to describe people as agents who are consistently rational and narrowly self-interested.

to join the Community on 14 April 1987. For Özal, Turkey's membership to the EEC would provide economic benefits, as Turkish goods would compete with the European ones and the Turkish economy would be more developed (Ataman, 2003, pp. 57-58). Furthermore, the application of Turkey was a natural result of the westernisation of Turkish society which continues for a very long time. Turgut Özal thought that Turkey was a part of Western civilisation despite its differences as a Muslim country, and he even saw the candidacy itself as a valuable process since it was a long and narrow road in front of his country (Erdenir, 2015, pp. 23-38). Turkey's efforts to join the EEC was backed by the US. In fact, Turkey received US support on many international issues that create problems for its national interests (Ataman, 2002, pp. 145-147). The Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was renewed with the US as a result of Turgut Özal's long efforts, and such an agreement provided many opportunities for Turkey, including modernisation of the Turkish Military (Ataman, 2002, pp. 145-147). Turkey's relations with the US were of utmost significance in the Özal era and Turgut Özal developed very close relations with American Presidents himself.

To sum up, it may be claimed that Turkey had a pro-active, enterprising, assertive, Western-oriented and multidimensional foreign policy understanding when Turgut Özal was in power. Turgut Özal wanted to develop relations with the countries in Central Asia, Middle East and Balkans, demanding on the historical and cultural ties they had with Turkey. He also aimed to pursue a compatible foreign policy with the Western countries including the US, by using the influence it had in the abovementioned regions. However, Özal and the FPE around him also aimed to have autonomy for their country in international politics especially for commercial purposes (Balcı & Güleler, 2018, p. 78). While doing this, Özal faced challenges from the opposition, the bureaucracy and the military. But he preferred to neglect such constraints as much as he could and to make decisions by consulting a small group of the elite around him. Turgut Özal is also claimed to have paid importance to economic relations with the world and democracy and human rights in domestic politics as much as he could. Özal's policies of liberalisation in domestic politics can be seen to have reverberated the rise of New Right policies in the world. Faik Tunay thinks that Özal did not implement liberal policies simply because he wanted to. For Faik Tunay, Turgut Özal's policy choices were aimed at Turkey's integration with the world. The

rise of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher to power in their countries had raised expectations that liberal policies would rise in the world. Turgut Özal also implemented liberal policies in Turkey in order to adapt to such expectations (Faik Tunay, personal interview, 15.10.2021). This circumstance also led to intimacy between Turkey and countries such as the US and the UK. Therefore, it can be argued that Özal's approaches towards issues in domestic and international levels were in accordance with a neoclassical realist assumption that "leaders can act internationally for domestic reasons and domestically for international purposes" (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 62). This section sought to observe Turgut Özal's foreign policy direction by also attaching significance to his background, world view and some policy decisions as well as the criticism directed at him. Turgut Özal's foreign policy decisions will be examined in more detail in the chapter on bilateral relations from 1983 to 1993.

CHAPTER 5

MARGARET THATCHER'S IDEOLOGY, LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTION

Margaret Hilda Roberts Thatcher was a British politician who served as the Prime Minister of the UK between 1979 and 1990. She was also the longest serving prime minister of her country in the 20th century besides being the first woman holding that position in Britain and Europe. Margaret Thatcher was nicknamed the 'Iron Lady' due to her hard-liner and strong leadership. While Thatcher in power, the British economy can be claimed to have experienced a revival due to her policies accelerating transformation from welfare statism to liberalism. It can also be argued that Thatcher tried to restore her country's position in the international system and stopped the ongoing loss of its prestige in world politics after World War II. Just like Reaganism in the US, her policies are known as Thatcherism, representing the world wide New Right politics in the UK.

Margaret Thatcher advocated liberal economy, democracy and individual freedoms together with Ronald Reagan internationally, who was the US President between 1981 and 1989. With the help of such harmony and intimacy between the UK and the US in her time in power, Margaret Thatcher also became one of the most influential and controversial politicians throughout the world. As the first woman leader of a major political party in the UK, Thatcher won three general elections but she had to resign after her leadership was challenged within the party as a result of her policies towards the EEC. Following her departure from politics, a life peerage was given to her as Baroness of Kesteven. Baroness Thatcher died of a stroke in 2013, but her legacy and principles still continue to be advocated among conservatives around the world. At the same time, she remains to be a controversial figure especially in British politics.

5.1. Short Biography of Margaret Thatcher

Margaret Thatcher was born in Grantham, Lincolnshire in 1925. It can be claimed that Thatcher's early life played an important role in shaping her political ideas (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.). Thatcher's parents, Alfred and Beatrice Roberts were the owners of a grocery and his father Alfred was also a preacher and local politician. Alfred Roberts was a liberal, but he found the policies of the Conservative Party closer to him later although he never described himself as a conservative (Thatcher, 1995). Alfred Roberts was a respected person in his town as he served as the Alderman and Mayor of Grantham. Her father's role in Margaret Thatcher's personal development had been enormous. While entering 10 Downing Street as the Prime Minister for the first time, she said:

Well, of course, I just owe almost everything to my own father. I really do. He brought me up to believe all the things that I do believe and they're just the values on which I've fought the Election. And it's passionately interesting for me that the things that I learned in a small town, in very modest home, are just the things that I believe have won the Election (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.a).

In fact, growing up in a small town such as Grantham may have taught Margaret Thatcher values such as dutifulness and charitableness (Margaret Thatcher: A Biography, n.d.). Attending a local state school, Thatcher studied chemistry at Somerville College of Oxford University. When she was a student at Oxford, Thatcher served as the president of the Student Conservative Association. After graduating from Oxford as a chemist, she became the Conservative candidate for Dartford at the 1950 general election. Even though Thatcher could not be elected as the Member of the Parliament, she had been the youngest female candidate that year and her campaign was found impressive (Margaret Thatcher: A Biography, n.d.). As a result of Margaret Thatcher's election campaign, the Conservatives increased their votes 50 percent in Dartford that year. During the election campaign, she also met her prospective husband Denis Thatcher, who was a local businessman (Margaret Thatcher: A Biography, n.d.). Margaret and Denis Thatcher married in 1951. After she married, Margaret Thatcher passed her bar finals and began to work as a lawyer, specialising in taxation (Lewis, 1975, p. 23). In 1953, she gave birth to two children, Mark and Carol.

Because she had to take care of her children, Thatcher could not be a candidate at 1955 general election as she could not find time to run a campaign (Lewis, 1975). However, she managed to stand as a candidate in Finchley at the general election of 1959 and was elected as a Member of the Parliament (MP). In the first session that she gained the right to introduce a bill to the Parliament, Margaret Thatcher was quite successful (Margaret Thatcher: A Biography, n.d.). The bill was aimed at admission of the press representatives to the meetings of public bodies such as city councils. Thatcher's speech introducing the bill was found to be tremendous, and the Parliament passed the bill. After that session, Margaret Thatcher increased her popularity. In the coming days, she began to appear in newspapers often, and she was invited to a lunch to address the audience at the Savoy for Greater London Fund for the Blind, where she was chosen as the one of six Women of the Year (Lewis, 1975, p. 28). Meanwhile, she started her own business and ran a junior fashion fair. In 1961, she backed restoration of 'birching' as a corporal punishment and she was among the 'rebels' of the Tories, collided with her own party's official position (Campbell, 2000). In the same year, Thatcher secured her place in the shadow cabinet and became the Shadow Secretary of Pensions and National Insurance. Margaret Thatcher continued to serve in this position until 1970. When the Conservative Party won the general election in 1970, she became the Education Secretary in Edward Heath's cabinet.

Thatcher experienced many difficulties while she was the Education Secretary. Student radicalism was at its peak, protestors disrupted her speeches and the opposition media criticised her roughly in a way they made it difficult for her to change the education policies of her country (Margaret Thatcher: A Biography, n.d.). Edward Heath's government was so much under pressure from the opposition that it had to make changes in its promises and applied statist economic policies. As a result, Conservatives were defeated in two general elections that took place in 1974, and Margaret Thatcher was no longer the Minister. After the failure of Heath's premiership, Thatcher decided to challenge the former Prime Minister Edward Heath at the Party Conference, and she became the first women leader of a major political party in the West, also serving as the opposition leader.

When Thatcher was the opposition leader in the UK, the Labour government suffered from crises arising from economic conditions in the country. Strikes continued to be

organised by unions, the value of the British currency had declined and the government even had to negotiate with the IMF to receive a loan (Margaret Thatcher: A Biography, n.d.). The Conservative Party won the next general election as a result of the Labour Party government's troublesome term in government, and Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister of the UK in May 1979. Margaret Thatcher served as the PM for three terms and assumed the duty for eleven and half years. In 1984, Margaret Thatcher survived an assassination attempt of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) during the party conference. She continued to serve as the PM until her leadership was challenged over her policies on the ECC in 1990. In that year, Thatcher resigned as the party leader and the PM. After she also retired from the House of Commons in 1992, a life peerage was given to her as Baroness of Kesteven, which would enable her to sit in the House of Lords. The 'Iron Lady' continued to have an influence over politics after 1992. She established the Thatcher Foundation and gave lectures on democracy and free economy around the world. Her statue was erected in the Houses of Parliament as the statue of a living PM for the first time in the UK. Margaret Thatcher died of a stroke in 2013 at the age of 87.

After becoming the PM, Thatcher tried to transform British public life in addition to her efforts for reviving the British economy. Having worked as the British PM during the Cold War, Thatcher also tried to increase her country's prestige in world politics and spread norms such as democracy, free economy and personal freedoms around the world. With Ronald Reagan, Thatcher became one of the leading figures of conservatism in the West. When Margaret Thatcher was in power in the UK, Britain encountered many significant developments in foreign policy. Thatcher's endeavour to develop personal relations with Gorbachev changed the direction of the Cold War, and her decision to intervene in the Falklands dispute is still a controversial issue in world politics. Her principles and policies known as 'Thatcherism' are still popular among conservatives in the world, and Thatcher remains to be one of the most controversial politicians the world has ever seen.

5.2. Margaret Thatcher's Personality and Ideology

Margaret Thatcher grew up in a small town as a daughter of a middle-class, conservative family. Similar to Turgut Özal's parents, Thatcher's family was also a

religious one. Margaret Thatcher's father, Alfred Roberts and her mother Beatrice Roberts were members of the Methodist Church. Alfred Roberts had also been a preacher, and he was an old-school liberal. Russell Lewis (1975) claims that Alfred Roberts and his family never missed the Church on Sundays (p. 11). Mr. Roberts was also a politician and he served at Grantham City Council as the Chairman of the Finance Committee for 25 years. Afterwards, he became the Mayor of Grantham. It can be implied that her father's religious and political beliefs affected the development of Margaret Thatcher's personality and mindset. Thatcher was so affected by her father that her school exercise books included her father's sermon notes (Weiss, 2011, p. 11). As a result of her religious belief and being involved in charity work when she was young, Margaret Thatcher strongly believed in 'social justice' (Weiss, 2011, p. 3). Thus, Thatcher (1995) argued that Britain "should find some way of combining Christian charity with sensible social policy" (p. 11). Her views on liberal economy, which may have been inherited from her father, were criticised by the Church of England. For the Church, neoliberalism was not compatible with Christian values (Filby, 2015). Thatcher had been disappointed by this as she thought the Church supported collectivism (Weiss, 2011, p. 9).

Margaret Thatcher and her parents were Wesleyan Methodists. However, Thatcher made a switch to the Church of England later, which is an Anglican community. It should be mentioned that this change may not be seen as significant since beliefs of Wesleyan Methodists resemble those of Anglicans rather than other Methodist churches (Weiss, 2011, p. 17). In Alfred Roberts's sermon notes in Margaret Thatcher's school exercise book, it can be seen that Roberts' religious belief clearly reflected the idea that Methodism was a religion of personal salvation (Weiss, 2011, p. 21). This may thus explain the difference between the Church of England and Margaret Thatcher's approaches to political events. As Thatcher believed in personal salvation in terms of religion, she also objected to collectivism and rather backed individualism in political issues. Weiss argues that sermon notes of Margaret Thatcher's father indicated that their family were not fundamentalists, they believed in modern evolutionary theory and "whilst in passing Roberts's notes echo or quote St Augustine, Nicodemus, Pope Gregory I and Luther, there is far greater weight attributed to secular theory than theological authority." (Weiss, 2011). It is also argued in Weiss (2011)'s article that Thatcher underlined the need for revival of Christianity

in Britain, and her speeches in politics resembled her personality and personal belief. Her speech at the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, which is also known as the ‘Sermon of the Mound’, she laid out her objections to those who criticised her ‘individualist’ policies, and she tried to justify her policies with regard to her religious beliefs (Weiss, 2011, p. 27). In her speech, Thatcher claimed that every person is responsible for her/his own actions and one may not blame the society if s/he disobeys the law (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.b). She also added:

I am an enthusiast for democracy. And I take that position, not because I believe majority opinion is inevitably right or true—indeed no majority can take away God-given human rights—but because I believe it most effectively safeguards the value of the individual, and, more than any other system, restrains the abuse of power by the few. And that is a Christian concept (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.b).

Even though previous PMs also expressed their belief in God publicly, Thatcher’s Christianity was seen as something new by the writers who worked on her biography. Eliza Filby argues that Thatcher had been the most religious PM of the UK since William Gladstone, and she had a “clear understanding of the religious basis of her political values” (Filby, 2015). While the emergence of Thatcherism can be seen as a response to the UK’s economic and political decline, it also corresponded with the decline of religion in Britain (Filby, 2015). Therefore, Margaret Thatcher’s term in power can be seen as the revival of Victorian values to some extent. Thatcher called for the restoration of authority principle within the society, and she was in favour of tough punishments for some who were involved in crime. Furthermore, she championed family values as the cornerstone of society, backed ‘parent power’ in schools and demanded her economic principles on laissez-faire understanding (Samuel, 1992, p. 11). Thatcher also saw businesses as the creative forces, the risk takers and the doers of the nation (Samuel, 1992, p. 12). She always advocated for Victorian era capitalism and thought that it was the era of “selflessness and benefaction”, which is claimed to be behaved badly by socialist propagandists (Samuel, 1992, p. 11).

It can be noted that being raised in a middle-class family in a small town, Thatcher achieved great success by studying at Oxford. Oxford was seen as the playground of the British upper middle class, and such a situation may have created a lack of

confidence and edginess in the personality of Margaret Thatcher later. To exemplify, Thatcher's "irritation with criticism and meanness with the press" may be a result of that situation (Lewis, 1975, p. 15). Even though Thatcher was not class conscious and she managed to be attuned to her new environment easily, there had always been obstacles for a young lady in British society. Studying chemistry was a sheer success for ladies at that time, and even getting admitted to a university was also very difficult for them. Pursuing a career in politics would have been difficult for a woman without being the best among all ladies around. Because the number of women who could find a place in politics was still very few. But Thatcher learned a lot from her father, and she was able to pursue a career in politics. For example, women were not allowed to the Union Society where political debates were held at Oxford. Thus, Thatcher joined the university's Conservative Club and became its president instead of the Union Society (Lewis, 1975, p. 15).

By growing up in a conservative and middle-class family in a small town, Margaret Thatcher paid attention to skills and values such as responsibility, enduringness, benevolence and personal communication. Furthermore, the fact that she had the opportunity to compete with people from higher class by being admitted to Oxford, and the success she later achieved with many difficulties, may have caused her to have a tougher personality and to be known as the 'Iron Lady' in politics. The challenges Margaret Thatcher experienced in achieving success as a woman may also have caused her to seem supportive of women in British society. In the speeches she made after she became a politician, it was seen that Thatcher complained about women not being able to find a place in politics and social life sufficiently:

More women in the House of Commons to see that women's rights are adequately defended; more women to take an active interest in local affairs; more women to apply their innate common sense to cut the cackle of politics and sort out the real questions that now face us before they vote... Women are affected as much as, if not more than, the men, and are taking a more lively interest in politics...All parties are wanting to attract more women: in fact, women are the V.I.P.s of the moment. For once, the demand is great as the supply!
(Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.c).

According to Matthew Paris, Thatcher thought the men were weaker than women, and she simply believed that "men are fun but dumb, women are smart but strident"

(Freeman, 2013). However, Margaret Thatcher is claimed to lack interest in female-friendly policies when she was the PM (Freeman, 2013). Thus, Thatcher was claimed to be a classical conservative lady who overlooked other women in the society, and she was not a feminist despite of her speeches regarding the ‘sex war’ (Freeman, 2013). Even though she complained about women's place in the British society, even her cabinet did not include more than one woman for 11 years. What stood out during Thatcher's premiership was that she was a pragmatist while appointing her ministers. For Thatcher, it was important if a person was a good communicator and a successful person, not whether s/he was a man or a woman. Even the ideology did not play a bigger part than Thatcher's pragmatism in appointments to the cabinet. For example, non-Thatcherites were in majority in the cabinet between 1979 and 1981, and Thatcherites outnumbered them from 1981 to 1985. However, Thatcher pursued a more balanced approach in ideological makeup of her appointments to the cabinet after 1985 (McMeeking et al., 2021). From year to year, there was a decrease in the number of people who are Thatcherites in the cabinet as Thatcher herself claimed that she “had never kept talented people out of her Cabinets just because they were not of her way of thinking.” (McMeeking et al., 2021). It can be said that the reason for some reshuffles conducted by Margaret Thatcher may be that she wanted to gain more control over the ministers in the cabinet. Furthermore, the July 1989 reshuffle may have aimed at winning the next general election by presenting new faces to the public (McMeeking et al., 2021). Even though newly appointed ministers were non-Thatcherites in 1985, they were people who would be glad to serve in the government (McMeeking et al., 2021). In addition, most of them were loyalists even if they were not Thatcherites. Therefore, appointments of the ministers during the Thatcher era may show the reader that Margaret Thatcher was a pragmatist, and her political influence played an important role as much as her ideology did while appointing ministers. It can be argued that Thatcher wanted to work with people whom she can get along with, and people she appointed were good communicators and successful people. It can also be mentioned that reshuffles made in the cabinet were also results of political ‘calculations’ made by Thatcher's advisors (McMeeking et al., 2021). Therefore, Margaret Thatcher's advisors must have considered the MPs' popularity and political influence while nominating a person for an office. Such an approach considering Thatcher's personal influence and popularity during appointments in his premiership

is in keeping with the New Right ideology that proposes a strong authority and a political decision-making mechanism which is “centralised and revolved around one person” (Topal, 2000, p. 80).

As stated in this thesis before, the New Right simply represented the ideas aligning economic liberalism with individualism and traditional conservatism. Conceiving One Nation Toryism as a form of patriotism rather than paternalism, Thatcher localised the ideas of the New Right (Evans, 2009, pp. 101-121), which is also referred to as Thatcherism in the UK. It can be mentioned that Thatcherism is based on three phenomenons: the free market, the strong but limited state, and stable families (Adonis, 1994, p. 7). It can also be said that Thatcherism aims to revive market capitalism and to limit the role of the state in economics while protecting its authority at the same time. The limited state does not mean a weak one for Thatcherites, because they think that state should maintain the order within the market, and it should provide services that the market itself cannot provide (Gamble, 1994, p. 6). In this vision, individuals and families rely on themselves rather than their governments. Furthermore, they may benefit more from a free market rather than relying on public services.

Thatcherism was heavily influenced by *The Road to Serfdom* (Hayek, 1976) written by Friedrich A. Hayek, who won the Nobel Prize a year before Margaret Thatcher became the leader of Tories. It may be assumed that main economic principles in *The Road to Serfdom*, such as individual self-reliance and living in one's means, contributed to the doctrine expressed by Thatcherites (Raymond, 2016, p. 4). Such principles were transformed into a populist idiom and termed as ‘Thatcherite ideology’ (Raymond, 2016). For Ralf Dahrendorf, who was the director of London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the reason behind Britain's psychology of decline was cultural (Raymond, 2016). Because Britain had not experienced a dictatorship or revolution before, and thus coalitions and interest groups were too strong there. Eventually, this situation might have led to a stagnation (Raymond, 2016). Since the end of World War II, the UK was in a political and economic decline and Thatcher's main aim in politics was to reverse this situation. According to Raymond (2016), Thatcher had a sense of personal conviction to achieve this goal rather than any ideology (p. 5). Indeed, Thatcherism was seen by some as a mixture of

feelings and prejudices rather than a viable ideology. Nick de Bois, former Conservative MP and Special Adviser and Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State for the Exiting the European Union, argues that Thatcher's goal in politics was simply to reform Britain from the perceived "sick man of Europe" to the liberal based market economy where entrepreneurs thrived alongside strong inward investment into the UK (Nick De Bois, personal interview, 5.10.2021). According to Bois, Thatcher believed in the power of the free market, not a particular ideology:

She believed that if you liberate people from the heavy hand of the state and let them keep more of their own money, they would drive the economic resurgence of the country and build stable, secure futures for themselves. But she was above all pragmatic (Nick De Bois, personal interview, 5.10.2021).

For journalist Peter Ridell (1991), Thatcherism was just a resemblance of Thatcher's personal background, which highlights hard work, family values, duty and patriotism (p. 3). Similarly, Dennis Kavanagh argues that Thatcherism can be seen as a reaction to Keynesian economics, and it was aimed at eliminating failures of public policy in the post-war consensus (Kavanagh, 2015). In addition, Raphaele Espiet-Kilty (2015) also claims that Thatcherism has not been a single set of ideas or doctrines, but it is a mixture of Margaret Thatcher's style and policies which sometimes consisted of inconsistent and simple reactions to different circumstances (pp. 11-32). Therefore, Thatcherism can be seen as an attitude to power depending on the personality of the leader, but it included principles such as conservative policies regarding law and order and utmost priority given to neo-liberal economy (Espiet-Kilty, 2015, pp. 11-32). Therefore, because her pragmatism and conviction for the future of her country override her ideologic stand, Margaret Thatcher's reactions to incidents occurred in domestic politics and her foreign policy understanding must be observed in order to understand her mindset better.

5.3. Domestic Politics in the UK During the Premiership of Margaret Thatcher

Margaret Thatcher is the first woman who presided as the PM of the UK. In 11 years of her premiership, Thatcher tried to transform the UK into a more liberal, prosperous and assertive country following the years of economic and political psychology of decline at domestic and international levels. Among domestic policies of the Thatcher governments, their economic policies can be seen as the most remarkable ones. While

Thatcher's supporters claim that she transformed and saved the British economy, "detractors say she made it unbalanced and unequal" (Elliott, 2013). According to Bolick (1995), the UK's nationalised industries were inefficient, productivity decreased, and the country was "cracked by constant labor turmoil with violent strikes and long interruptions of essential services" before Thatcher came to power in 1979 (p. 529). Moreover, the UK's economy was heavily dependent on the role of the state, taxes were heavy, unemployment was on the rise, economic growth was slowing, the British pound was losing its purchasing power, there was an underinvestment in the country and inflation rose. It is also that almost 55 percent of the workers were members of unions, and strikes significantly affected British public life (Bolick, 1995, p. 530). In the middle of 1970s, house prices fell, GDP slumped, the stock market crashed (Stuttaford, 2019) and the share of the national income spent by the government continued to rise (Lewis, 1975, p. 155). However, the previous Tory PM Edward Heath had done very little to recover the British economy, and the Labour Party could not fix things when it returned to the government either (Lewis, 1975, p. 155). According to one of the former PMs of the UK, David Cameron, economic problems that Britain faced in 1970s were beginning to be called the 'British disease' (HC Deb 10 April 2013), and "the state had got so big that it owned our airports and airline, the phones in our houses, trucks on our roads, and even a removal company" (HC Deb 10 April 2013).

After Thatcher became the PM, inflation was to be controlled by monetary and fiscal discipline, the government was to set industries free for the private sector, and council homes could be bought by citizens (HC Deb 10 April 2013). During Thatcher's premiership, the government also approved laws making striking more difficult. This evoked bitter strikes especially by coal miners. But Thatcher was reckless and got what she wanted by not being soft on the unions (Zarrolì, 2013). Just as Ronald Reagan in the US, Margaret Thatcher paid utmost significance to the privatisation, and many industries which were under control of the government since World War II, were privatised. Thatcher's era in the UK also paved the way for the rise in incomes, deregulation began and taxes were reduced (Zarrolì, 2013). For Zarrolì (2013), Thatcher "saw her task not just as reviving her country's moribund economy. She wanted to change the very nature of British society and show the world what free market principles could accomplish." (Zarrolì, 2013). In the 1979 budget, Thatcher

acted to cut taxes, the standard rate and the top rate. Public spending began to decrease, and the government curbed regulations of the economy in order to end wage, price and dividend and currency controls (Bolick, 1995, p. 536). Even though Thatcher “slashed public spending and borrowing and established limits on medium term monetary growth” in the 1970 and 1980 budgets (Bolick, 1995), such policies did not pay off immediately and the UK experienced the greatest collapse in industrial output since the 1920s in addition to rising unemployment (Bolick, 1995). Thatcher once again revealed her tough and determined leadership and she did not consider calls for making u-turns in her economic policies. She even sacked some ministers for opposing her plans to cut the public spending in the new budget. In 1981, recession began to ease in the UK and inflation was reduced to six per cent in 1985. It was also that “government borrowing was brought under control, unemployment and interest rates fell, and economic growth climbed at a stable annual rate of three percent.” (Bolick, 1995). Thatcher also tried to transform unions by restoring the nature of union membership and regulating unions in terms of decision taking mechanisms. In doing this, the government tried to reshape those unions as ‘voluntary associations’ (Bolick, 1995). It was a big change aimed at curbing the power of unions. However, despite long strikes and criticism from the Labour Party, Margaret Thatcher found a chance to tackle unions even more effectively after the 1983 general election when Conservatives increased their majority in the parliament.

With the election of Margaret Thatcher as the PM of the UK in 1979, the UK experienced a radical change in the attitude of the government regarding the role of the state in the economy. Therefore, privatisation gained momentum during Thatcher’s term in power. The significance of privatisation also derived from Thatcher government’s plan for a lower tax regime and cutting public spending (Parker, 2004, p. 4). The British Aerospace was among the first institutions that were privatised. It was followed by the privatisation of British Shipbuilders and Naval Dockyards, British Petroleum, British Gas, British Airways, British Telecommunications, Jaguar, Rolls-Royce, Amersham International, Enterprise Oil, and the National Freight Corporation (Parker, 2004, p. 5). The Thatcher government also began to sell ‘council houses’ which enabled tenants to buy homes for reduced prices (Forrest, 1991). Such policies of privatisation demonstrated “the Conservatives’ objective of creating a share-owning democracy as a bulwark against socialism” (Parker, 2004, p. 7). As the British

economy benefited from privatisation, these policies spread to sectors such as electricity, steel, water and coal (Marsh, 1991, pp. 459-480). Even though the public reaction was intense against the privatisation of nationalised companies and public services, Thatcher stood up to the opposition and continued to implement policies of privatisation. Thatcher government's privatisation policy was followed by deregulation and personal ownership was supported with programs such as stock equity plans and portable pensions (Bolick, 1995, p. 541). Thatcher also saw deregulation and privatisation as tools against labour unions which dominate local governments and have grip over educational institutions, properties and public services. The Local Government Planning and Land Act gave the central government an authority to sell local properties, and this enabled developers to build new homes. This policy helped people buy their own houses, as more than a million families became home owners (Bolick, 1995, p. 541). Introducing the poll taxes, which began to be collected by all adults regardless of their incomes, was an unpopular policy and decreased Thatcher's popularity among British people even though it provided a new source of income for local governments and also limited their power (Bolick, 1995, p. 543). Thatcher's deregulation policies also focused on education. The government tried to reduce bureaucratic control on government schools and families became able to send their children to independent schools. Furthermore, she established the open enrollment system and deregulated government-run schools, giving authority to schools on admission and budgeting (Bolick, 1995, p. 543), making state education a part of marketisation and competition.

Another remarkable domestic issue during Thatcher's premiership in the UK was the Irish problem. In fact, there were two aspects of the problem for Margaret Thatcher: the terrorism aspect and the Irish aspect. Thatcher was quite tough on terrorism, and she thought that solution for the conflict required a military victory over the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (O'Connell, 2013). When Bobby Sands, a member of the IRA, and his friends organised hunger strikes in the Maze Prison and claimed the status of 'prisoner of war' in 1981, Thatcher declined such a demand, and said: "crime is crime. It is not political, it is crime" (McGrory, 1985). Even though Bobby Sands and his friends were claimed to have offered ending strikes, the Thatcher government rejected the offer, and ten protesters including Bobby Sands died as a result (Barry, 2011). In 1984, the IRA attempted to assassinate Margaret Thatcher at the Conservative Party

Conference in Brighton. Even though Thatcher was not hurt by the bomb that exploded at the Grand Hotel where the conference was held, five people died and dozens were injured (Mayer, 2014). The PM seemed to have determinant about her robust policy on tackling terrorism and she said that “terrorism will fail” (Mayer, 2014). Thus, her signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was surprising in 1985. The agreement provided the Irish Republic an advisory role in Northern Ireland’s government. Even though Margaret Thatcher was heavily criticised by the Unionists due to signing such an agreement, the agreement is believed to have eased the peaceful settlement of the Irish issue. Just as the Kurdish issue came into prominence in foreign affairs during Özal’s premiership in Turkey, the UK’s position on the Irish issue was intertwined with its foreign policy. Such a circumstance is coherent with neoclassical realist views. It may be said that Americans wanted the Irish issue to be settled peacefully as Ronald Reagan had been a great friend of Ireland. It is argued that the US President remained neutral over the problem but he encouraged Thatcher to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cooper, 2017). Indeed, Americans did not want to alienate the UK, and Reagan remained neutral on the issue. But, the President’s advisors, friends of Ireland within the congress and the Irish-Americans in the society may have affected the President’s approach to the issue to some extent. Therefore, it is claimed that Reagan heartened Thatcher in adopting a flexible and peaceful approach towards the problem (O’Clery, 2015). It must also be noted that the Republic of Ireland’s stance on the Falklands War also played a part in Anglo-Irish relations as the Republic was a temporary member of the UN Security Council when the war broke out (O’Connell, 2013). Besides her ‘flexible’ approach to the ‘Irish’ aspect of the problem, Thatcher continued to remain tough on terrorism. She introduced a broadcasting ban on “11 loyalist and republican organisations but Sinn Fein was the main target” (O’Connell, 2013). Just as Turgut Özal could not solve the Kurdish problem in Turkey, the Irish issue in the UK could not be solved during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher. However, the distinction made by Thatcher between terrorists and others helped the British government to have a flexible approach over the issue, and significant progress was made. It is also that signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement may eventually have paved the way for the Good Friday Agreement.

The year 1990 marked the end of the Thatcher era at 10 Downing Street. Three years ago, Thatcher had secured another term in office due to her successful economic

policies. However, poll taxes and Thatcher's obstinacy regarding the UK's integration into the European Community divided Tories and Thatcher failed to acquire majority at the Conservative Party Conference that year. Disagreement between Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe and Margaret Thatcher played a role of trigger for further problems between Thatcher and others in the party. While Howe was a pro-European championing the UK's membership in the European exchange rate mechanism, Thatcher thought that the mechanism was troublesome for the UK. In the interim, Howe was sent out of Whitehall and replaced by John Major. After a while, Geoffrey Howe unfurled the rebel flag. Howe's letter of resignation had a major impact on Thatcher's political career and dealt a solid blow to her stubborn stance against her ministers. In a sense, the 'Iron Lady's firm stance considering an issue regarding foreign affairs led to her decay in domestic politics. For Nick De Bois, Thatcher's troubled relationship with the EU eventually brought about her own demise, but that was symbolic of how many had tired with her style of leadership rather than the EU question. Domestic politics and most notably the reform of local taxes led to the leadership challenge within the Conservative Party (Nick De Bois, personal interview, 5.10.2021).

After retiring from the House of Commons in 1992, Margaret Thatcher was given a life peerage as Baroness. After Thatcher, John Major became the PM in 1990 and held the position for seven years. Thatcher's term in 10 Downing Street is still seen as favourable by conservatives in the UK. Even though she remains a controversial figure, her policies which are known as Thatcherism are still popular among Tories. This chapter sought to observe Margaret Thatcher's leadership style and domestic incidents occurred in the UK while she was the PM. In order to understand British foreign policy from 1983 to 1993, one should also pay attention to Thatcher's foreign policy understanding.

5.4. Thatcher's Foreign Policy Direction

Before and after world wars, foreign policy had been the cornerstone of politics in the UK. While "the First World War transformed the interventionist powers of the state, the Second World War saw the creation of the 'warfare state'" (Simms & Mulligan, 2010, p. 338). Thus, the UK "remained geared to warfare, be it the open conflict of the

Second World War or the latent threat of the Cold War” (Simms & Mulligan, 2010). It can be said that foreign policy continued to have primacy over domestic politics until the end of the Cold War, but British governments could not achieve playing a major role in the international economic system even though they tried to. Economic problems that occurred in the 1970s escalated the psychology of decline among the British. Therefore, decision makers in the UK formulated a more flexible and reactive strategy in coming years (Sanders, 2016, p. 104). After coming to power, Thatcher governments paid utmost importance to the UK’s position in the international system and they tried to restore their country’s status as a liberal superpower, pursuing more assertive and enterprising foreign policy until 1990. It was also that governments in the UK paid more attention to sovereignty and nationalism from 1979 on (Sharp, 2016, p. 160).

The Soviet threat was an important subject for Thatcher governments. Even though the Cold War already had a great influence on British foreign policy before Thatcher came to power, the ‘Iron Lady’s robust approach towards Cold War events and strong leadership during decision making made the UK play even a more significant role in the struggle between the East and the West. Indeed, the reason why she was associated with the name ‘the Iron Lady’ was her powerful stance in East-West relations. From the beginning of the Cold War to 1980s, the “British Cold War diplomacy concentrated on two things: maintaining a common military and political front to deter Soviet expansion; and maintaining contacts with the Soviet Union to reduce tensions” (Sharp, 2016, p. 183). After the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan in 1979, Thatcher declared that the UK would back a tougher American approach towards the Soviet Union. However, the PM also supported *detente*, and she visited Moscow following the invitation of Alexei Kosygin (Sharp, 2016, p. 185). Such policies may demonstrate that the UK was maintaining its position during the Cold War by attaching significance to deterrence and dialogue at the same time. However, the UK had become an even more decisive actor in the Cold War after Margaret Thatcher became the PM, and the British played an utmost influential role in the democracy’s victory against communism. It should also be acknowledged that Thatcher’s Soviet policy was guided by Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington (Sharp, 2016, p. 183), and this may validate the neoclassical realist assumption that the role of the FPE to maintain balance of power is crucial. In 1975, Margaret Thatcher set out her vision for foreign policy and the Cold

War as the leader of the Conservative Party, and it might be understood from her speeches that she championed a 'real detente'. It was to mean that *detente* was necessary but Soviets were contravening it by further armament. Therefore, talking about *detente* was not adequate and the words should have been put into action (Bromund, 2009). For Thatcher, the Cold War was also about human rights, and she always criticised and raised voice against violations of human rights within the Soviet Borders. In fact, the real problem for Thatcher was the ideology of the Soviets. Thus, the West should have remained united and deter the Soviet Union together in order to protect freedoms all over the world (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.d). Indeed, when Ronald Reagan was elected as the President of the US, ideological affinity between two leaders made them work in a better harmony. The relationship between Margaret Thatcher and Mikhail Gorbachev was also remarkable. Even though she was a militantly anti-socialist, Thatcher established a good relationship with Gorbachev, who was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Brown, 2008, p. 3). Brown (2008) argues that Gorbachev was a different statesman from his predecessors, as he abandoned Leninism and his concept of socialism could be seen as a social democratic one (p. 3). Thus, Thatcher may have found it convenient to establish good relations with him so that fundamental changes might arise in the Soviet Union. Indeed, Gorbachev changed his country's policies fundamentally. Thatcher governments' foreign policy could be considered multi-dimensional, as British foreign policy makers also tried to engage with other Communist societies. In order to decide on the UK's foreign policy on the East-West relations, a long seminar was held with the participation of academic experts, bureaucrats and politicians. Not trusting the Foreign Office (FCO), Thatcher mostly sought to hear from academic experts regarding her country's policies towards the Soviet Union. That seminar had an enormous effect on British foreign policy (Brown, 2008, p. 5). If the issue had been left to the Foreign Office, they would have neglected views from academics and the British's approach towards the Soviets would have never changed. Using his position and the leadership, Margaret Thatcher chose to listen to academics and decided to change the UK's Soviet policy slowly. For her, establishing relations with other Communist societies in the Eastern Europe also meant opportunities to increase the influence of the UK in the region. With the help of such an approach, the Soviet Union would have also evolved into a more pluralistic society

(Brown, 2008, p. 7). Just as Turgut Özal did, Margaret Thatcher also knew that the Soviet Union was to change and her country should have benefited from it. It can also be said that both leaders neglected views from bureaucrats and diplomats on some occasions and made decisions by consulting others. It should be noted that the 'Iron Lady's understanding of the fight against communism and oppression was not just about establishing relationships and dialogue. When the junta in Argentina invaded the Falklands, Thatcher did not hesitate to show strength and fight back. Under the influence of Thatcher's determination and leadership, the British took the Falklands back, and this had enormous effects on tackling Communism in the world. For all these reasons, it can be argued that the UK substantially contributed to the victory of the West during the Cold War. Margaret Thatcher's leadership style, personal relations that she established, and her reforms she made in the UK were determinant in such contribution.

During the Falklands War, Margaret Thatcher had demonstrated her stubborn and uncompromising personality in decision making. When the war divided the cabinet, Thatcher made a very difficult decision to retake the island. However, Thatcher's approach towards the European Community revealed her inner convictions and leadership style even more than the Falklands War did (Bulmer-Thomas, 2013). Even though she signed the Single European Act which would enhance attempts for an 'ever closer union' in 1986, she opposed the idea of greater European integration and European federalism in coming years. Thatcher later said the reason why she signed the Single European Act was that officials in the British government did not explain the consequences of signing it. The PM's personal relationship with the US President Ronald Reagan had also convinced her that "Anglo-American relationship was sufficient to meet British foreign policy needs without the development of a common foreign policy for the European Union" (Bulmer-Thomas, 2013). Such an idea had a great impact on Thatcher's approach towards the EC. As mentioned in this chapter before, Thatcher's ideas on the EC brought her leadership to an end. After a disagreement with Geoffrey Howe, who supported the UK's membership in the European exchange rate mechanism, the 'Iron Lady' sacked Geoffrey Howe as Foreign Secretary and this contributed to her downfall. Despite divisions within the Cabinet and her party, Margaret Thatcher objected to the UK's budget contribution in the European Economic Community because she thought that her country was not

involved in setting up the financial rules of the game back in 1957 (Pylas, 2020). The Iron Lady also opposed the creation of a European single currency, and she thought that the EEC “was venturing into areas that would significantly dilute the sovereignty of individual nation states to set economic policy” (Pylas, 2020). In fact, the EEC had begun to be seen as transforming from an economic partnership to a political body. For Lord Conrad Black, who personally met Margaret Thatcher, this was the real problem about the EEC for the British, because the British did not like receiving seemingly impractical directives from Brussels (Peterson, 2021). As mentioned in this chapter before, sovereignty had become a crucial issue in British politics after Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979. For Thatcher, entering an international treaty meant giving up a part of sovereignty (HC Deb 12 December 1989). Furthermore, she thought that European nations were drawing closer for economic purposes (HC Deb 12 December 1989). When directives of the EEC seemed to have potential to undermine the sovereignty of the UK, the Community seemed to be far more political and Thatcher turned against it. Disagreements between the PM and the Foreign Office manifested itself on the issue of EEC. Former PM John Major argued that the Foreign Office made a mistake by “not always exposing to the Prime Minister’s forensic mind all aspects of the issues on which it needed her decision” (Wall, 2008, p. 90). However, Thatcher believed in conviction politics and she preferred to persist in her principles. Such persistence created divisions among the ministers, MPs and the Conservative Party officials and it eventually led to her subsequent downfall.

The Cold War, the Falklands War and the UK’s relationship with the EC can be considered as the most crucial events that took place during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher. Having observed the PM’s approach towards those issues, it may be convenient to examine her decision-making style and foreign policy understanding more. Even though Thatcher lacked trust in the Foreign Office, she carefully read reports prepared by the officials there. After reading a report written on Palestine, she told Lord Carrington that his policies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could make Tories lose the next election, thus the UK needed to have a different approach on the issue (Aitken, 2013, p. 319). This event may not only show the significance Thatcher paid to domestic incentives, but also reveals her decision-making style and willingness to stay in power. Because Thatcher described the Foreign Office’s Palestine policy as

a 'moral cowardice' and argued that it would even make her lose her position in the Parliament. Another reason why Thatcher disliked the Foreign Office's report on Palestine can be that Thatcher and Carrington had been in Washington when Thatcher read the report, and Thatcher may have wanted to avoid a controversy with the pro-Israeli US President Ronald Reagan whom she was to meet. Due to the report, Thatcher and Carrington had a tough argument and Lord Carrington had to defy the PM. However, despite of the problems arose between the PM and him, Lord Carrington told that:

I admired her enormously, particularly her courage and her character. I understood that in her passion to change things, she decided to ignore people, sometimes trample over people, who told her she couldn't or shouldn't take such a course. But the problem was that if you do that when you're wrong, you can get into serious trouble (Aitken, 2013, p. 321).

It can be argued that Thatcher's 'adamancy' had the Foreign Office and Lord Carrington have more robust stances (Aitken, 2013, p. 333). It can also be suggested that Margaret Thatcher's personal convictions also had a great impact on British foreign policy while she was the PM. Jonathan Aitken (2013) claims that the 'Iron Lady' did not establish good relations with the most of French and German leaders such as Kohl and Giscard because she witnessed 'the shadows of Nazi Germany and Vichy France' when she was a teenager during the World War II. However, Thatcher had a softer stance towards Mitterrand because of his helpfulness during the Falklands War (p. 334). Despite her tough and adamant leadership demanding on her personal convictions, Thatcher is also described as a pragmatic and flexible PM in terms of foreign policy (Bulmer-Thomas, 2013). Her relationship with Gorbachev may demonstrate this. In addition, more than 150 years of British rule in Hong Kong ended in 1982 and a timeline was decided for China to assume sovereignty in 1997 as a result of negotiations between Thatcher and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang (Griffiths, 2017). Today, many argue that Margaret Thatcher could do more to protect the UK's interests in the city. The reason why Thatcher did not show her tough stance against the Chinese government may be that market confidence should have been retained in the city and a circumstance such as the Falklands War should have been avoided, as the Chinese government was very determined to assume sovereignty over the city (Griffiths, 2017). It may also be noted that the American-Chinese relations were eased and the Chinese

economy had begun to be modernised before the British government signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 (Lee, 1984). In addition to this, Hong Kong would remain as an autonomous and capitalist region. Such circumstances may have affected Margaret Thatcher's approach towards the issue of Hong Kong.

Sir Charles David Powell, the Lord Powell of Bayswater who served as the Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, argues that domestic politics had not played an important role during the Thatcher era when foreign policy making is considered (Charles Powell, personal interview, 26.11.2022). He mentions that Margaret Thatcher took decisions based on views developed over a long period of time in Parliament and in government about what was best for Britain. For Thatcher, the UK should be a strong partner to the US and she was determined to defeat communism. This was partly because Thatcher grew up before the World War II and she saw the horrors inflicted by the North Korea (Charles Powell, personal interview, 26.11.2022). For Sir Powell, the 'Iron Lady' was a strong believer in democracy and the rule of law. She rejected dictatorship and believed in a strong lead by the US partnered with the UK. Margaret Thatcher's foreign policy was a strong conservative foreign policy to promote Britain's and democratic rule of law system in the world. Sir Powell prefers to call Thatcher's foreign policy approach an 'ideal' rather than an 'ideology' (Charles Powell, personal interview, 26.11.2022).

The economy was also at the heart of Margaret Thatcher's foreign policy. In 1986, the UK signed the largest export contract in British history. The Al Yamamah deal was signed with Saudi Arabia, and it worthed around 90 billion pounds. Such a deal helped British Aerospace and many other companies survive (Aitken, 2013, p. 470). Margaret Thatcher's personal communication skills played a very significant role in the deal as Thatcher had close ties with Prince Bandar Bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia. In addition to economic benefits, the deal also increased the UK's political influence in the Middle East (Aitken, 2013, p. 470). The Iraq-Iran War started in 1980 played an important part in British foreign policy towards the Gulf countries. Because Iran experienced a revolution and it was no longer considered as an ally for the West (Çavusoglu, 2018). The Thatcher administration found it convenient to pursue an active and assertive foreign policy in the region especially with arm sales. In addition, Saudi Arabia could be considered as a good customer because of its economic power and role to balance

Iran. Therefore, it can be said that the UK's active foreign policy towards security of the region was to ensure the security of the West and to protect its interests in the Middle East (Çavusoglu, 2018). In 1980, Margaret Thatcher became the first British PM paying a visit to Gulf states and the reason why her administration decided to pursue an active foreign policy in the region was also linked to economic consequences. In the 1970s, British imports of the Gulf oil were supplying around 45% of British oil. Furthermore, British companies such as BP and Shell were exporting Gulf oil to the world and they had significant partners in the region (Çavusoglu, 2018). The revolution in Iran made the British face substantial losses in the oil industry as British oil companies lost their positions in the country (Çavusoglu, 2018). Indeed, Paul Sharp (2016) argues that Thatcher preferred to focus on the economy in her first years at Downing Street as she left foreign policy matters to Lord Carrington (p. 30). Just as the hunger strikes in Ireland, terrorism and the pressure coming from the opposition within the Conservative Party, the need for success in the economy had drawn the PM's attention to domestic politics (Sharp, 2016, p. 30). As stated in this chapter before, even Thatcher's 'alienation' from centralising policies of the EC was also linked to issues regarding managing the British economy (Aitken, 2013, p. 600). Economy was very important for Thatcher governments because regaining the UK's influence in world politics and its economic strength at home were among the main aims of Margaret Thatcher (Aitken, 2013, p. 87). Just as she did not take an uncompromising approach regarding the Hong Kong issue due to possible impacts that a major crisis in Hong Kong may have on the British economy and the global economy, Thatcher also opposed stronger sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa for the same reasons (Sharp, 2016, p. 207). This may demonstrate how important the economy was for Margaret Thatcher. The significance that Thatcher attached to the economy may have been used as a tool for her to maintain the support of the British electorate. However, foreign policy matters such as the Falklands victory and the British troops' involvement in military operations that prevented Saddam's invasion of Saudi Arabia and liberated Kuwait during the Cold War also played a great role as much as the PM's economic performance did in maintaining her popularity.

When it comes to thinking about the 'special relationship' between the UK and US under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, it should be noted that Thatcher admired the US. For Thatcher, America was more than a state, a super power or an ally. The

Iron Lady saw the US as an idea that transformed humanity for good. According to Margaret Thatcher (2002), the US was unique, its roots were English and it belonged to the English-speaking world (p. 20). Thatcher (2002) also argued that the relationship between the UK and the US had strong roots such as a shared literature, a shared legal system, and a shared religion (p. 22). According to her, the US had the moral and material capacity for world leadership and the US's allies should have regarded America's vision as their own visions (Thatcher, 2002, p. 24). Indeed, Margaret Thatcher was "stridently pro-American" (Applebaum, 2005). During her premiership, Margaret Thatcher shared similar ideas with the US President Ronald Reagan on the economy, East-West relations and the future of the world. Such an affinity paved the way for a good relationship between two leaders and also played an important role in the special relationship between Americans and the British (Dee, 2016). When the US's arm sales to Argentina ensued a great disagreement with the British, Margaret Thatcher sent a very tough message to Ronald Reagan. Instead of reacting in exasperation, Ronald Reagan said: "Well, that's Maggie" (Dee, 2016) and this incident did not affect good relations between the UK and the US. Normally, such an incident would worsen bilateral relations between any countries, but the good relationship between Thatcher and Reagan prevented such a possibility. Margaret Thatcher's relationship with the next president George H. W. Bush was not as good as Reagan. However, Thatcher continued to be a pro-American British leader and tried to improve bilateral relations even more. Lawrence P. Taylor, Economic Counsellor in London from 1985 to 1989 describes Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan as political soulmates and tells what he discovered about the UK in London:

What I found in Britain – and it's the only other country that I know of in which it is true – was a natural desire and ability to think in global terms, much as U.S. foreign policy leadership does, and not to just see things through the prism or a bilateral relationship or a regional relationship. But to think in global interests and global objectives and to approach issues through those (Dee, 2016).

Thatcher had been the first foreign visitor in the White House after Ronald Reagan became the US President. A correspondent said about the visit that "Washington greeted her ... as a heroine of pan-Atlantic conservatism ... a kind of Baptist to Reagan's Messiah." (Sandbrook, 2008, p. 176). In fact, the ideological affinity

between Reagan and Thatcher was without precedent in the history of the UK-US relationship. Even though there had been anti-American factions within the Labour Party, stronger transatlantic relations were developed when the Democrats and Labour Party were in power, not when Republicans and Conservatives were (Sandbrook, 2008, p. 178). However, Tories and Republicans changed this course in the 1980s and the special relationship under two conservative leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan is still seen as the golden age of British-American relations today. After Thatcher left the office, her successor Sir John Major also tried to have a steady relationship with the US. However, there were some sharp differences in foreign policy understandings of Margaret Thatcher and John Major. In order to comprehend the differences in foreign policy preferences of two PMs and to provide a better understanding of the term between 1990 and 1993, the British foreign policy during John Major's premiership should be observed briefly.

5.5. John Major's Foreign Policy and 'Thatcherism with a Human Face'

John Major served as the PM of the UK for six and a half years. While contemplating on John Major's premiership, it could be seen that he is not a popular and effective political figure as much as Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair are. When he was at 10 Downing Street, John Major's leadership style was sometimes described as weak, ineffective and powerless (Kavanagh, 2009, pp. 27-35). However, it may be noted that John Major tried to play the role of a unifying leader after the political turmoil in the Conservative Party at which Thatcher had to resign as a result (Hickson & Williams, 2017). The most remarkable incident that took place during John Major's premiership was the collapse of the UK's membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). While negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty at the Parliament was going on, John Major failed to convince doubters among MPs and the "ratification process dragged on." (Hickson & Williams, 2017). One reason for this was that Major did not have a big majority in the Parliament as Margaret Thatcher once did (Hickson & Williams, 2017). In 1992, the UK government was forced to withdraw from the ERM as a result of the declining value of the pound below limits set by the mechanism. In fact, the Conservatives had seen the ERM as the core of the Party's counter-inflation discipline under Major's leadership (Kavanagh, 2009, pp. 27-35). Therefore, the incident known as the 'Black Wednesday' and the tax increases in 1993 made the

Major government lose its popularity and reputation. As a result of these developments, Tories lost the general election in 1997 after having won four elections in a row since 1979. The Major government's failure on the ERM had encouraged eurosceptics within the Party and they stepped up their criticism against the PM.

Unlike Margaret Thatcher, John Major did not see continental Europe as a source of problems for the UK. He also declared he wanted to see the UK "at the very heart of Europe" (Kieninger, 2019). Stephan Kieninger (2019) mentions that Major's presentation of foreign policy was also different from Thatcher's style. Kieninger argues that Major was much more interested in establishing a relationship with Helmut Kohl and Germany. However, Thatcher was biased about Germany from the beginning. The 'Iron Lady' thought that a united Germany would be too powerful and it would be Germany that would rule 'the federal European superstate' which she objected to (Kieninger, 2019). It can be argued that John Major had a more compromising style compared to Thatcher in relations with the EC. Even though he could bring the Maastricht Treaty to the Parliament, 91 Conservative MPs asked him to abandon the Treaty following the Danish people's rejection of it (Kieninger, 2019). Furthermore, the UK continued to lose its exceptional influence in Washington during the premiership of John Major as the Major government had little credibility with Bill Clinton's administration (William, 2005).

John Major experienced the Gulf War just after he came to power. However, the UK had already decided to join the coalition against Iraqi aggression. The PM did his part to ensure that Britain continued to play an active role in the alliance, and he temporarily had the highest approval rating of any PMs since Churchill in the UK following the liberation of Kuwait (Reitan, 2003). When Saddam Hussein began to persecute Kurds in Iraq, the PM launched the 'Safe Havens' policy and helped to save thousands of lives. Before it got worse, British-American relations were on track after the Gulf War, and both countries approached foreign policy matters in a very similar perspective (Reitan, 2003). However, the UK and the US had different approaches towards incidents in Bosnia. While the UK and other European countries backed the arms embargo on all parties involved in the war, the US supported the idea of lifting the embargo so that Bosnians could fight Bosnian Serbs (Wright, 2018). It is argued that

Sir John Major personally objected to the use of military force in Bosnia even though Americans managed to ensure air strikes against Bosnian Serbs (Reitan, 2003).

John Major seemingly tried to “advance the substance of Thatcherism but with gentler style” (Reitan, 2003). It is suggested that Major tried to extend Thatcherism and continue reforms made by Margaret Thatcher particularly in the public sector (Reitan, 2003). However, it must be noted that John Major was a one-nation conservative, and he was specifically concerned with low-income people who had not benefited from Thatcherite policies (Reitan, 2003). Furthermore, Major got along better with his ministers and consulted with the cabinet more than Thatcher did (Reitan, 2003). Nonetheless, John Major was not a dominant and popular political figure as much as his predecessor had been. Even though he was a much more agreeable person trying to unite the Conservative Party and pursuing an active foreign policy agenda, it can be argued that John Major could not fully realise his vision in foreign affairs. Major’s desire to place the UK at the heart of the EC failed, he could not achieve to maintain the arms embargo in Bosnia, he had problems with the Clinton administration in the US and he faced incidents such as ‘Black Wednesday’ and suffered from euroscepticism in his party. Among the supporters of the eurosceptic movement within the Party, there was also the former PM Margaret Thatcher. Even though Thatcher's term as prime minister also ended due to problems with the EC, her vision continued to be effective both within the party and in the policies of future British governments. Despite the disagreements between Margaret Thatcher and John Major, Major was seen as a leader who kept Thatcherism alive with his government’s policies, and there were even those who touted his era as 'Thatcherism with a human face' (Dick, 2005, pp. 322-341).⁶ Tony Blair’s New Labour also began to be defined with the same analogy. These may demonstrate the fact that Thatcherism remained popular and controversial even after she left 10 Downing Street. However, controversy over Thatcher's legacy still continues.

⁶ With the analogy of 'Thatcherism with a human face', Alexander Dubcek and his friends' 'Socialism with a human face' program may have been referred to, and it may have been thought that a new breath was brought to Thatcherism in a more decentralised way during the Major period.

5.6. Margaret Thatcher's Legacy

Margaret Thatcher remains as a remarkable and controversial political figure in British politics. Never before have any PMs served longer than Margaret Thatcher in the last 190 years except for Benjamin Disraeli, William Gladstone and Lord Salisbury (Black, 2013). After she became the PM, Margaret Thatcher experienced crucial incidents and she had the responsibility to take important decisions. The Brighton hotel bombing and the Irish issue, the war on the Falklands, the Cold War, massive privatisation, union reforms, reduction of tax rates, problems with the EC and the Gulf War can be considered as the most significant developments during the Thatcher era in the UK. Some argue that Margaret Thatcher was the person who sped the end of the Cold War with the help of her constructive relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev (Williams, 2013). Even though Schwarz (1987) argues that it is not a distinctive view (pp. 116-152), Thatcherism, which can be described as “the belief that economic freedom and individual liberty are interdependent, that personal responsibility and hard work are the only ways to national prosperity” (Gregory, 2013), is still a popular understanding among conservatives and liberals around the world. Margaret Thatcher is claimed to be one of the greatest post-war leaders in the UK especially for what she had done to transform the British economy into better (Smith, 2019). However, the legacy of the UK's first female PM is also problematic. Some people argue that Thatcher governments failed to “halt the strengthening of public support for a tax financed welfare state” (Radice, 1992), and they widened the gap between rich and poor (Radice, 1992). It is claimed that “per capita real income growth slowed markedly after Thatcher came into power in the UK (Albertson & Stepney, 2020). In addition to this, Margaret Thatcher's economic policies are claimed to cause an increase in health inequalities and they were seen as inadequate to enhance the growth rate (Albertson & Stepney, 2020). Thatcher's relationship with unions and her ‘inability’ to compromise in domestic politics have also been critical issues (Cameron, 2020). Some argue that Margaret Thatcher is actually a divisive political figure in British politics especially for her approach towards the Irish issue. Gerry Adams claims that Thatcher's “policy decisions entrenched sectarian divisions... and subverted basic human rights” (Adams, 2013). Adams also argues that Thatcher neglected Irish people's right to vote for their own representatives by changing the law when Gerry Adams himself and Bobby Sands were elected (Adams, 2013). The Thatcher

government also allegedly helped supply the Unionists with weapons and inflamed the civil war in Ireland (Adams, 2013). Margaret Thatcher's disinterest in compromising during the hunger strikes in 1980 and 1981 is also criticised. A history teacher Caspar Joseph describes her as a confrontational and a dogmatic person who even did not listen to people in her own party (Faulconbridge & Holton, 2013). Furthermore, the 'Iron Lady' is blamed for euroscepticism in the UK today as her policies such as reduction in the UK's payments to the budget of the EC continued to hold sway in politics for long years (Whitman, 2019).

Thatcher was the unrivalled senior figure on the international stage, at least in terms of personality, if not of power. She had often been more pragmatic in foreign affairs than she let on, and had generally fared better when she adopted that approach (Cannadine, 2016, p. 103).

Margaret Thatcher has been a popular political figure in American politics as the special relationship between the UK and the US advanced more than ever during the Thatcher and Reagan era. Thatcher had been the last official visitor of Ronald Reagan while he was the President, and she also aimed to establish closer ties with Bush at her visit, but the incoming President "was determined not to be intimidated or patronized by Thatcher as Reagan had often been" (Cannadine, 2016, p. 105). With the 'teamwork' of the Reagan-Thatcher duo ended, the British-American relations were not as good as before. In addition, the 'Iron Lady's declining influence in world politics and British-American relations was more visible when the Gulf War broke out (Cannadine, 2016, p. 107). However, relations with the US have always been given utmost importance until the end of the Thatcher era. Due to the importance that she attached to the special relationship between the UK and the US, Margaret Thatcher remained popular among American conservatives as well as most of the Tories in the UK still continue to advocate her principles. In 2005, a think-tank named after Thatcher was founded in the US, and its director Nile Gardiner argued that Margaret Thatcher "was more popular in the US than in the UK" (Geoghegan, 2013). Thatcher is still such a popular political figure in her own country that the British conservatives compare almost all Tory leaders to her. However, as stated above, Margaret Thatcher remains to be criticised especially by left-oriented people.

Despite criticism against Margaret Thatcher directed by the left wing, some argue that it was not only Conservatives but also Tony Blair's Labour Party which consolidated Margaret Thatcher's legacy since the Labour party seemed to have had more tolerance towards liberal economy when Blair was the party leader (Kavanagh, 2015). The former Labour MP Tony Wright even argues that it was Thatcher who saved the Labour Party because the party continuously lost elections until adopting new changes in its economic policies (Kavanagh, 2015). According to Kavanagh, Tony Blair led the party to accept "all privatisation measures, flexible labour markets and... private finance initiatives" (Kavanagh, 2015). Even though the 'New Labour' promised to reverse policies of eighteen years of Conservative governments, Blair governments are claimed to have disappointed such hopes (Gürbey, 2010). The Labour Party's liberal-tolerant policies continued until Ed Miliband was elected as the party leader in 2010. Because of the change they created in the Labour Party's economic policies, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were seen as "sons of Thatcher" (Kavanagh, 2015). As a result of the Labour's tolerance with liberalism when Tony Blair and Gordon Brown served as the PM, Margaret Thatcher's economic agenda was almost complete by the beginning of the 2000s (Kavanagh, 2015).

In this chapter, Margaret Thatcher's life, personality and leadership style were observed. This chapter also sought to examine domestic politics during the premiership of Thatcher and foreign policy issues between 1979 and 1990. At last, the legacy of Margaret Thatcher was touched upon. It may be noted that Margaret Thatcher's legacy is controversial and there have always been those who support her as well as people criticising her. In domestic politics, Thatcher's main aim can be seen as recovering the British economy, restructuring the public life and tackling terrorism. In terms of foreign affairs, the 'Iron Lady' contributed to the West's decisive victory at the Cold War, increased the UK's influence in world politics and adopted a more active and assertive understanding of foreign policy, taking the principle of national sovereignty into account. Having examined short biographies, personalities, world views and foreign policy understandings of Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher, impacts of external constraints and other determinants on British and Turkish foreign policies between 1983 and 1993 will be observed in the next chapter. This will also provide an opportunity to understand whether there was a harmony between the foreign policy preferences of the Turkish and British leaders.

CHAPTER 6

BRITISH-TURKISH RELATIONS FROM 1983 TO 1993

6.1. The Main Determinants of Foreign Policies of Turkey and the UK and the Course of Bilateral Relations

The relationship between Turkey and the UK had been generally good apart from the World War I. Before the Ottoman Empire entered the World War I, two countries had been considered allies, facing similar threats, especially from Russia. After the World War ended and the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, the Turks and the British improved their relations despite of the fact that they had some disagreements regarding issues such as Mosul and the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of Straits (Daniel-Joseph, 2018). However, such matters did not create serious challenges for bilateral relations. The Tripartite Alliance Treaty between France, Turkey, and the UK manifested that British-Turkish relations had turned into an alliance, and both countries remained very significant strategic partners ever since. British-Turkish relations continued to be good even during the military regime following the 1980 coup in Turkey, and the Turks did not experience serious problems with the British while continuously having problems with their European and American allies over the years. The Thatcher & Özal period in Turkey was a milestone for the relations between Turkey and the UK as the two countries developed their economic, military, political, and cultural relations even more after both Margaret Thatcher and Turgut Özal came to power in their countries.

One of the most significant determinants in the development of bilateral relations was Özal's and Thatcher's strong leadership as the two leaders had enormous influence on their countries' foreign policy making. As stated in this thesis before, Turgut Özal's foreign policy was seen as the 'black box' diplomacy by the opposition sometimes, because he would not condescend to share the latest developments in foreign policy

with the public and the Parliament (Gürbey, 2010). Furthermore, it is known that Özal had disagreements with members of his own party and the MFA about foreign policy decisions. An exception to this situation could be Turgut Özal's and his party's loss of power after he became President. As a result of his decreasing political influence, Özal's foreign policy aspirations faced greater pressure from society and the Parliament. For example, if he had been able to maintain his political influence without becoming the President, Özal could have more easily achieved his aspirations in the Gulf War and allowed Turkey to play a much more active role in this issue. Murat Yetkin argues that Özal repeatedly urged Bush to overthrow Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and he conveyed first-hand the news to Bush which he did not even share with his own ministers during the war. As a result of such a behaviour of Özal, Turkey was treated as a 'Trojan horse of the USA' (Meric, 2022). Yetkin also mentions that Turgut Özal had not even taken Nüzhet Kandemir, Turkey's Ambassador to Washington to the meeting with Bush in Camp David. The only person who entered the meeting with the American President and Turgut Özal was Engin Güner, the principal clerk of Özal. For Yetkin, Özal aimed to give the message if Bush wanted to talk about Turkey, he could only talk to Özal as there was not any second name in the command (Meric, 2022). It may be stated that Özal's personality had an enormous impact on Turkish foreign policy. Even though Özal faced pressure from within especially during the Gulf War, he played an important role in Turkey's policies towards the region. As a result of Özal's intolerance and egocentrism, Mesut Yılmaz and Ali Bozer who were the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Safa Giray who was the Minister of National Defence, and Necip Torumtay who was the Chief of Defence Staff resigned (Acar, 2017, p. 48). It may be noted that the opposition was quite concerned about Turkey's policy towards the Gulf War because involving in such a crisis would lead to Turkey's entry into the war (Meclis Haber Dergisi, 1991). However, the PM Yıldırım Akbulut argued the government aimed to protect Turkey's interests in line with the developments that may take place during and after the crisis, and the President Turgut Özal played a role in this (Meclis Haber Dergisi, 1991). When he became the President, Turgut Özal also had a problem of authorisation with the PM Süleyman Demirel. When the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) held a meeting in Istanbul in June 1992, Özal wanted to represent Turkey and sign the joint declaration at the end of the meeting together with Süleyman Demirel. This was the prerogative of the Prime

Minister as the head of the executive power. But as a statesman who contributed to this organisation a lot, Özal wanted to have a privilege. When he could not have such a privilege, Özal left the meeting (32. Gün Arşivi, 2017b). These examples may be indicative of Özal's aspiration to maintain influence in his country's foreign policy.

Similar to Özal, Margaret Thatcher's personality also played an important part in foreign policy making. Thatcher had disagreements with the Foreign Office from time to time and took decisions based on her own opinions or the advice of her close circle. Lord Charles Powell argues that Thatcher believed the only solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands was to defeat Argentina and throw it out of the islands despite of the 'compromising and misleading' pieces of advice put forward by the Foreign Office (Charles Powell, personal interview, 26.11.2022). Although the Falklands War was mainly concerned with the defence and foreign policy of the UK, it also saved Thatcher's political skin, who was subjected to harsh criticism in domestic politics and needed to increase her popularity (Kennedy, 2020). Therefore, although it can be argued that domestic politics had little to do with this intervention, it cannot be considered as completely disconnected from domestic political developments. Considering European affairs, Thatcher's policies also received criticism from his own party, the opposition, and the Foreign Office. The PM believed that the UK should be a part of the European Community, but not follow all its rules. Her disagreement with other politicians was also obvious, and it was the same issue which led to the end of her premiership although she was able to realise some of her ideas on the European Community. Julian Amery, who also served on special missions in Turkey, presented in his diary how much Margaret Thatcher was robust and she was very fast to shut down opinions that she thought wrong-headed when it comes to consider foreign policy decisions (The Papers of Julian Amery, GBR/0014/AMEJ 4 1 22). In 1991, when she met the Romanian leader Iliescu after she was no longer the PM, the 'Iron Lady' insisted on the idea of defeating Saddam completely and bringing him to trial. She criticised Bush and Major for missing a great opportunity (The Papers of Julian Amery, GBR/0014/AMEJ 4 1 22). Because she was no longer in the office, she was able to speak more vigorously and freely (The Papers of Julian Amery, GBR/0014/AMEJ 4 1 22). Just like Özal, she wanted the US to go even further than where it was in the Gulf War. Even though she played a great role as the British PM during the Iraq-Kuwait War, Thatcher no longer had authority. If she did not have to

leave the office after her policies on the EC, she could try to change the course of events in the Gulf. These examples also demonstrate the significance of the neoclassical realist view that the extent to which leaders are comfortable making foreign policy decisions is linked to the limits of their political influence.

The importance Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher attached to the economy at home and abroad may also be related to increasing their popularity in domestic politics. Because they may have thought that voters would support them as their countries developed economically. It should be noted that economic cooperation between the two countries was very important and especially the British saw Turkey as an important market. This can be seen as an indirect effect of domestic politics on foreign policy. In the UK, public opinion seemed to have very little influence on relations with Turkey. The UK continued to attach importance to its relations with Turkey despite the human rights violations and criticism of Turkey in British society after the 1980 military coup. The British also supported Turkey in its fight against terrorism and made a clear distinction between the PKK and the civilian Kurds (HC Deb 29 June 1993) despite the criticism in British domestic politics against Turkey's pressure on the Kurds. Questions on Kurdish minorities and Turkey's military actions against the PKK were especially coming from Labour MPs, including Mr. Jeremy Corbyn who became the leader of his party later (HC Deb 12 June 1991). In Turkey, domestic incentives mattered more in foreign policy making. Even though Özal wanted Turkey to actively participate in the Gulf War, he could not do it because his authority was limited after he became the President, and the Turkish public was suspicious of Western intentions in Iraq (The National Archives of the UK (TNA): FCO 9/8019, Julian Amery's letter to John Major, p. 2). This may show the significance of domestic incentives and unit level variables in foreign policy making, in accordance with the neoclassical realist assumptions.

While the foreign policies of the Turks and the British and the bilateral relations between Turkey and the UK from 1983 to 1993 are concerned, it can be seen that factors such as external constraints, domestic politics, personalities of leaders, and the role of FPE play a part in driving the relations between those countries to some extent. However, it can also be argued that domestic politics played a limited role in foreign policy making in both Thatcher and Özal administrations as Sir Charles Powell stated

in his interview for this thesis (Charles Powell, personal interview, 26.11.2022). It does not mean that domestic politics did not have an influence on the leaders' foreign policy decisions. However, the role of external constraints and the strong leadership of Özal and Thatcher had a more significant impact on British-Turkish relations due to leaders' decision-making style. Sir Timothy Daunt, the British Ambassador to Ankara between 1986 to 1992 also stated that domestic politics and the FPE had less influence on the decisions affecting British-Turkish relations, as exemplified by the Margaret Thatcher government's lack of concern for human rights in Turkey despite pressure from various political groups As Sir Daunt stated in the interview:

Sitting in on talks between Thatcher and Özal, I was amazed at how they did get on. The leaders were reactionary, intolerant right-wing politicians and shared similar views. Mrs. Thatcher was not quite interested in human rights in Turkey despite the interests of different political groups in the UK and Europe. I remember one occasion when Thatcher said to Özal "I should tell the press that I have raised human rights with you" and that was all she did. Özal replied, "Good" (Timothy Daunt, personal interview, 14.11.2022).

For Ambassador Daunt, one of the most significant reasons for the remarkable development in bilateral relations during the Thatcher & Özal era was the harmony between leaders in terms of their personalities and political views (Timothy Daunt, personal interview, 14.11.2022). However, the relationship between leaders is not the main determinant of British-Turkish relations. For example, when it comes to the tenders that the British wanted to get in Turkey, it may be observed that business people constantly asked for Thatcher's help to convince Turgut Özal in giving tenders to the British. British must have thought that the personal relations between the British PM and Özal could help them get tenders as Turgut Özal's leadership had an enormous impact on Turkish foreign policy making just as it was also the same for Thatcher in Britain. However, there were times when Thatcher's personal link with the Turkish President did not work enough as in the case of the Turksat satellite project and the British Aerospace. Despite the British's aspiration and endeavour to get the tender and Thatcher's personal communication with Özal, the Turks decided to give the Turksat tender to the Aerospatiale from France (TNA: FCO 9/7006). Likewise, Turgut Özal wanted the British PM Thatcher to intervene in the Asil Nadir trial in the UK. Asil Nadir was claimed to steal millions of pounds from a collapsed business in the UK and

flew to Turkey for meeting Özal to ask for help afterwards. Then the Turkish government got in touch with the Thatcher administration for helping Asil Nadir and the Polly Peck company, and even Özal had written a letter to Thatcher about the issue, but the Turks could not get the result they wanted (Neville, 2012).

For Professor William Hale, Margaret Thatcher and Turgut Özal enjoyed good personal chemistry and were ideological allies in their commitment to ‘rolling back the state’ free-market policies, which also linked them to Ronald Reagan. But for both of them, their relations with the US were more important than one another. Inevitably, the alliance was highly asymmetric, given that the US was clearly the dominant actor (William Hale, personal interview, 11.11.2022). For Professor Hale, one of the UK’s foreign policy main characteristics was to follow the lead of the US. Professor Hale explains the implications of such a characteristic for British-Turkish relations as follows:

An important value Britain attached to the alliance with Turkey was its assumed role in supporting the British position in the middle east, However, the Suez fiasco in 1956 and the collapse of the Baghdad Pact in 1958-9 ended Britain's ability to act independently in the region. From now on, British policy was to follow the lead of the US. A clear sign of this came in 1974, when the British failed to act independently in the Cyprus crisis once they realised the Americans would not intervene (William Hale, personal interview, 11.11.2022).

It may also be stated that the rise of liberal and conservative leaders Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher in politics may be the outcome of different factors. At the end of the 1970s, the world had already begun to change, so had Turkey and the UK. The global economic crisis and the financial problems that these two countries experienced may have been decisive in the policies and political careers of Özal and Thatcher. The US also continued to suffer from the great inflation until Ronald Reagan came to power. When he became the President two years later than Margaret Thatcher became the PM in the UK, Ronald Reagan would also promise a ‘Reagan revolution’ focusing on laissez-faire economics where a government's role is reduced, a free market and capitalism and his policies paid off (Amadeo, 2022). Steger and Roy describe Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies as the first wave of neoliberalism (Steger & Roy, 2021). Cronin argues that the paradigm created by the common visions of Thatcher

and Reagan overlapped with the return of economic growth in the West and the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviets (Cronin, 2014). Before Thatcher, the UK also experienced economic problems including high inflation. Under Thatcher's leadership, the British economy began to recover and inflation settled around 4-5 percent annually (Matthews, 2021). Similarly, Turgut Özal became the architect of neoliberal economic policies beginning in the early 1980s in Turkey and he was often likened to Reagan and Thatcher, especially because of his understanding of economics. Therefore, it can be said that the implementation of neoliberal economic policies and an anti-communist, pro-Western foreign policy that prioritised national interests seemed necessary for the UK and Turkey when Margaret Thatcher and Turgut Özal came to power. For this reason, the policies of these leaders can be seen as much a consequence of the new liberal wave in the world. It may also be assumed that the trend of neoliberalism coincides with the third democratic wave in the world and are related developments (Huntington, 1993). Therefore, it may be suitable to consider those phenomena as a systemic factor in a bipolar world where one of the poles began to lose its influence.

Considering the external factors behind the developments in British-Turkish relations in those years, it can be stated Turkey and the UK carried out important duties as significant members of the Western world. Turkey had a very important geo-strategic position as a member of the NATO bordering the Soviet Union, and a "European window on to areas of different race and religion to the south and south-east of the European land mass" (TNA: FCO 46/7803, 5 nov 90 2nd UK-Turkey Defence Staff Talks, Defence relations between the UK and Turkey). Turkey was also important because it had geographical and historical links with several areas with potential instability, namely "the Middle East, the Balkans, and countries of the Soviet Union where the central authority was most in decline" (TNA: FCO 46/7803). In return, the Soviet threat was still too important for Turkey and the NATO played an important part in Turkey's defence policies. Both countries had faced similar problems with the US, their main partner in NATO. The two states, once heirs to great empires, were facing an economic crisis, internal turmoil, and security threats. The Falkland Islands were invaded by the junta in Argentina when Margaret Thatcher came to power, and Thatcher had to deal with unions and the IRA in the domestic sphere. Even though the British governments tried to play a major role in the international economic system

after the World War II, they were unsuccessful to achieve such a goal. That approach was replaced by a more flexible, reactive strategy (Sanders & Houghton, 2016, p. 104), and after becoming the PM, Thatcher and her government tried to restore their country's status as a liberal superpower, pursuing a more assertive and enterprising foreign policy. In general, Tory governments starting from 1979 were paying more attention to sovereignty and nationalism (Sharp, 2016, p. 160). In terms of policies regarding the Middle East, there had also been a transformation in British foreign policy as the UK adopted a new post-imperial role in the region, which was shaped by the British interests and historical ties with the region as well as the Anglo-American special relationship and the UK's commitment to the EC and NATO (Çavusoglu, 2018). The Pax-Americana was established in the Persian Gulf in the wake of the Gulf War, and the war also started American military hegemony in the region (Macris, 2010). Both Turkey and the UK supported the construction of Pax-Americana there as they actively contributed to American policies and military action. Turkey, as a NATO member and a country that applied for the EC membership, had been a crucial partner for the UK. Turgut Özal's Western-oriented foreign policy, including his support for the US and the UK in the Gulf War by letting them use Turkey's bases and territory was important for British interests (Haberman, 1991). In those years, bilateral relations between the Turks and the British reached an all-time high level. Despite the problems the UK faced within the EC, Thatcher was one of the leaders seeing the Soviet Union collapsing and she advocated the idea of enlarging European Union eastwards before she left the office (Victor Bulmer, 2019). Furthermore, even Thatcher's domestic policies against unions and her efforts to liberalise the British economy were also related to what happened in the international system as the perception of Soviet threat grows. In addition, Ted Bromund argues that Thatcherite policies in the UK also helped tackling communism in the world (Bromund, 2009). For Bromund, Thatcher's decision to intervene in the Falkland crisis also surprised the Soviets, it brought democracy to Argentina by diminishing the junta regime's reputation and it partially helped the trend of democratisation around the world in the 1980s (Bromund, 2009).

Similar to the UK, Turkey also had significant problems with the communist Soviets before. Furthermore, the country experienced political violence between left and right groups. Because Turkey was still under the influence of the military regime in the 1980s, the leftist political groups could have been considered as a greater threat to the

establishment. After those incidents, the Marxist-Leninist PKK started terrorist attacks. Similar to the Falklands Conflict, Turkey also had to intervene in Cyprus following a coup organised by Greeks. Following Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, the US had imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975 (Bölükbaşı, 2001, p. 263), Just as the Suez Crisis in the 1950s also evoked problems between the UK and the US after Americans opposed the British, French and Israeli intervention in the area. Considering the relations with the EC, neither country felt a full sense of belonging to the community. Turkey also stayed long at the doors of the EC to become a member just like the UK did. Following the military coup in Turkey in 1980, the EC suspended its relations with the Turks and the British were the first nation who continued to maintain bilateral relations with Turkey in Europe. Within this scope, Turkey's strategic role for the UK and the UK's support for Turkey was of utmost significance in the international arena.

As a result of this perspective, it can be argued that the foreign policies of Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher and the bilateral relations during their premierships were based on necessity and mutual interest rather than personal preferences, and that the problems the two countries faced with the opposing bloc and their relations with their own allies also had a great impact on bilateral relations. In the interim, Özal and Thatcher's personalities and leaderships, which can be seen as products of a post-war bipolar world, were important factors in bilateral relations. However, because external constraints are believed to have a more significant role in bilateral relations, impacts of external constraints on Turkish and British foreign policies and bilateral relations from 1983 to 1993 must be observed, just as the personalities and world views of the leaders, and domestic politics during the leaders' premierships were examined before.

6.2. External Constraints

In structural realism, external constraints play a crucial role in deciding a state's foreign policy. In neoclassical realism, even though it is the perception of those constraints by the FPE and leaders which is critical, external constraints are still the primary drivers of foreign policy. In his article, *The Emerging Structure of International Politics*, Waltz (1993) mentions that the multipolar era consisted of twelve great powers before the Second World War. At the beginning of the Second

World War, seven great powers remained and during the Cold War there were only two great powers (Waltz, 1993, p. 44). According to Waltz (1993), after the Second World War, “the behaviours of states, the patterns of their interactions and the outcomes of those interactions had been repeatedly continued despite the changes in the internal composition of states” (p. 45). Bipolarity conditioned the international system not just for the superpowers, but middle powers such as Turkey and the UK, and these countries also had to operate in this East-West structure. For London and Ankara, the Cold War simplified external constraints. Furthermore, strategies and alliances such as NATO enabled them to pursue a defined foreign policy. In general terms, foreign policy making was conducted against a very clear and simplistic context for both the British and the Turks. The leadership of Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher and how they perceived external factors are very important in understanding their foreign policy decisions. The aim of the two leaders was to strengthen their positions in a prospective triumphant Western world with a more pragmatist approach and to protect their own national interests by increasing influence in the international environment. This part of the thesis will try and examine the role of external constraints in British-Turkish relations and in foreign policies of the Turks and the British from 1983 to 1993. The position of the two countries within the international structure during the Cold War will also be considered and the specific regional constraints that confront Turkey and the UK will be examined. Since it is directly related to the international system itself, analysing the Cold War policies of the two countries will be useful to see the harmony and rapprochement in the foreign policy preferences of the two countries. In addition, as Turkey and the UK's relations with the EC are a critical factor in positive developments in the relationship between the two parties, this issue should also be among the external factors to be examined. Eventually, it would be useful to investigate the cooperation between the two countries during the Gulf War in order to understand the external factors affecting bilateral relations, assuming that the war took place close to the end of the Cold War and the relations between the two countries were at a top level.

6.2.1. The Cold War

Following the World War II, an era which a ideological and geopolitical struggle between the world's two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union and their allies

began. In that period called ‘the Cold War’, the world was divided into two poles, East and West. The Western bloc was led by the US, which favoured democracy, free markets and personal freedoms, while the Eastern side of the ‘iron curtain’ was led by the communist and authoritarian Soviet Union. While the Soviets were trying to spread their ideology by force, if necessary, the United States was trying to increase its influence and counter Soviet expansionism by containing the Soviets and providing aid to some Western countries under threat.

Turkey, which had just emerged from a new struggle for independence, had just completed its modernisation reforms and was still not economically strong, was among the countries that the US helped against the Soviets. The Soviet demands for territory from Turkey and the Turkish straits crisis (M.S. Bilgin, 2004) after the World War II increased the perception of the Soviet threat in the eyes of the Turks and brought Turkey closer to the West. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (Sander, 2005; Bağcı, 2001) helped Turkey to adopt even a closer stance to the US. In 1950, Turkey applied for NATO membership and sent troops to the Korean War, eventually becoming a part of the Alliance in 1952 (Oran, 2008, p 550). When Turgut Özal came to power as the PM in 1983, “the relations between the USA and the USSR were shaped by disarmament negotiations, not by perceptions of great threat as in the late 1960s or 1970s” (Kurt, 2018, p. 158). This led Özal to pursue a more economy-oriented and more autonomous foreign policy (Kurt, 2018). Such a change in international politics, and liberal economic policies led by Turgut Özal made Turkey have new breakthroughs in many regions including Central Asia and the Middle East. Developing relations with countries in these regions also increased Turkey’s political influence in these regions, thus it can be considered as a development for the benefit of the West while the end of the Cold War was approaching. As the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union collapsed, and new independent Turkic republics emerged in Central Asia, and the Balkan countries experienced regime change. Özal regarded these developments as great opportunities and he tried to improve Turkey’s relations with these countries. Such policies including Turkey’s participation in international organisations such as the OIC and the BSEC, and its application for membership to the EC may demonstrate that Turks wanted to be a part of the West, but they wanted to continue to have a more pro-active and autonomous foreign policy, just as the British did. Ali Balcı and Elif Madakbaş Gülenler (2018) argue that Turgut Özal’s

foreign policy was based on two main motivations: first one was to eliminate the costs of crises that Turkey faced with the US before Özal came to power, and the other was to have an autonomous and effective foreign policy within the American order (p. 78). Even though Turgut Özal's personality and strong leadership skills played an utmost significant role in that aim, "the motivation and strategies of Turgut Özal in foreign policy were largely based on the legacy of the roughly fifteen-year period before him" (Balcı & Gülener, 2018, p. 78), which was shaped by a realist understanding of foreign policy facing the systemic constraints and security threats of the bipolar world.

When he became the PM in 1983, Turgut Özal mostly followed the American leadership together with the British PM, Margaret Thatcher. While working with the former PM Süleyman Demirel, Özal had presented a report to the PM stating that Turkey's economic development must be considered while implementing a foreign policy and the relations with the US should be assessed within such a perspective (Balcı & Gülener, 2018, p. 80). Prof. Hüseyin Bağcı states that "the Bush era was a period when Turkish-American relations were at the highest level" (Yazıcıoğlu, 2018). For Bağcı, one of the reasons for such development in Turkish-American relations was the Gulf War in 1990-1991. For Prof. Bağcı, the second reason was the "special relationship between Turgut Özal and Bush" (Yazıcıoğlu, 2018). It may be noted that an external constraint such as the Gulf War and the importance of the personal relations between the leaders, just as the neoclassical realists claim, are very important in the Turkish-American relations. These determinants are also remarkable in the Turkish-British and the British-American relations. According to Prof. Bağcı, Özal was a pro-American and Turkey pursued liberal policies under his premiership. With the help of harmony between leaders and their policies, Turkey, the UK and the US contributed to the collapse of the Soviets together (Yazıcıoğlu, 2018). However, Turkey's relations with the Americans faced problems in some occasions. Problems between Turkey and Greece, Armenian Resolutions in the US, problems in the American aid to Turkey due to the Cyprus issue, and the Kurdish problem are some of these problems (Kavuncu, 2009, p. 44). Such problems between Turkey and the Americans can also be considered as external constraints that Turks experienced, and they circuitously helped development of the relationship between Turkey and the UK. The UK was an important economic, military and political partner for Turkey because the Turks could get the support from the British if the Americans could not provide. Turkey, in turn,

was both an important market for the British and a regional power with an important geopolitical position.

The Cold War was also of great importance in determining the British foreign policy after the World War II. Although there was no longer a hegemonic British Empire in the new bipolar world, the British were one of the most important actors in the struggle against communism throughout the Cold War. The UK's descent from world power had started due to economic problems and decolonisation and the British handed over this role to the increasingly influential Americans, often following the American lead in global affairs. The Truman Doctrine came after when the UK could no longer provide economic and military assistance to allies in Eastern Europe to tackle communism (Paravantes, 2009, p. 2). Pursuing the American leadership, the British helped the fight against communists in Greece, Korea, Vietnam and Germany and they contributed to the ending of the Cold War. Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain Speech', the 'special relationship' that the UK had with the US and the critical positions that the British had held in international institutions including the Baghdad Pact and in conflicts such as the Suez Crisis may demonstrate the significant role of the British in defeating communism and promoting liberal democracies until the Soviet Union collapsed. As the decline of the UK as a global power had begun, the Cold War also meant new struggles for the British, trying to protect former colonies from the influence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan soon after Margaret Thatcher became the PM of the UK in 1979 gave "a chance for Margaret Thatcher to demonstrate her Cold War credentials and her commitment to US leadership" (Victor Bulmer, 2013). Thatcher, with her farsightedness and pragmatism, thought that Gorbachev was a person to do business with even before he became the leader of the Soviets, and she contributed to the winds of change that started in the Soviet Union by establishing warm relations with Gorbachev (Craig & Stone, 2022). Such an approach by the British PM also led to an idea that Thatcher was not only Reagan's favourite partner abroad, she also "became Gorbachev's most important European partner" (Brown, 2020). According to Brown (2020), Thatcher hosted Gorbachev three months before he became the leader of his country. Thatcher was unlikely to have a compromising approach with the Soviets in her first years in office. Brown argues that Thatcher did not trust the Foreign Office as it was "too ready to compromise and not robust enough with the Soviet Union" (Brown, 2020). However, Sir Anthony Parsons

and John Coles were able to convince Thatcher and they made her re-examine the UK's relations with the Communists (Brown, 2020). Gorbachev's visit was the result of a Chequers seminar on the UK's relations with the Communists, at which the UK's foreign policy on relations with the Communist Europe had undergone a great change. These incidents may illustrate the importance of external constraints, leadership and the role of FPE in the UK's Cold War policies and foreign policy in particular as a neoclassical realist would predict. At the seminar,

The academics were somewhat bolder than the FCO in the range of possible future change they could see occurring, but they reinforced the Foreign Office view that isolating the Soviet Union was counter-productive. Thatcher was persuaded that the time had come for high-level contact with the Eastern half of the European continent. As part of the new policy of engagement, she went to Hungary in early 1984 and, in the course of a single year, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe visited every Warsaw Pact capital. In June 1984 an invitation was issued specifically to Mikhail Gorbachev, who had become number two in the Soviet Communist Party hierarchy, to visit Britain (Brown, 2020).

For Cavusoglu (2018), the UK's foreign policy towards the Middle East was also affected by the Cold War. The Thatcher administration found it convenient to attach significance to Saudi Arabia which had a Western orientation, against the anti-Western bloc consisted of Iran, Iraq and PDRY (Çavusoglu, 2018). Such an approach emerged with a sectarian approach in the determinants of the Western alliance on regional security (Çavusoglu, 2018). According to Bermant (2016), Thatcher's mindset on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was also shaped by the perceived Soviet threat (p. 10). This understanding may justify neoclassical realist theory, which refers to the worth of the perceptions of the leaders and the FPE as their perceptions are crucial to interpret external constraints. For the British, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was destabilising the Middle East. In a region where countries such as Iran where an Islamic revolution took place, and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, such a conflict could pose a threat to the security of moderate Arab countries and thus harm Western interests in the region. "The need to prevent Soviet expansion and political instability in the region had now become a matter of greater urgency" (Bermant, 2016).

Between 1983 and 1993, there was harmony between the Cold War policies of Turkey and the UK. Backing the stability in the international system and pursuing the leadership of the hegemonic state, they supported neoliberal economic policies and the trend of democratisation in the world. Having the same concerns about the Soviets, the Turks and the British pursued similar policies in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The harmony in their foreign policies positively impacted the bilateral relations, and by the time the end of the Cold War approached, Turkish-British relations were at an all-time high level. To exemplify; the UK did not want to alienate Greece or Turkey from the Western world by getting too involved in the Cyprus issue. The fact that a major actor in international relations such as the UK, which was also one of the guarantors, did not pursue a policy against Turkey as in Cyprus worked in favour of the Turks. Turkey, which has ties with both the Middle East and Europe and has a strategic importance, also pursued a pro-Western policy, which facilitated the UK's policies in these regions. Moreover, the problems that both countries had in the past with the hegemonic state, the USA, arising from the Cyprus and Suez Crisis may have had a positive impact on Turkish-British relations in the 80s in terms of defence and trade relations. Because both countries were aware of the importance of the defence industry and since they had economic problems in the recent past, trade was of great importance in their foreign policies. Turkey, which had been in close cooperation with the UK both in the defence industry and in political and commercial relations, supported the US and the UK in the Gulf War. Such a policy increased the significance and influence of the Turks in the West. Therefore, just like the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War coincided with the highest level of bilateral relations and led to further development of relations. Although Turkey did not actively participate in the war, it was one of the most important actors in this campaign together with the UK. In order to understand the harmonisation of the two countries' foreign policies and the development in Turkish-British relations, the Gulf War policies of the two countries will be examined in the next section.

6.2.2. The Gulf War

The Gulf War was a military conflict between Iraq and the United Nations-led coalition forces between August 1990 and February 1991, which began as a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, it ensued great

concern in Western countries because such aggression would cause risks of instability and crises in the Middle East, higher oil prices and further economic problems in the world. The invasion of Kuwait was also a systemic constraint, as the use of force by an anti-democratic regime, which was claimed to have nuclear and chemical weapon facilities, could threaten other countries in the region and the international order.

The UK played an important role in the US-led coalition forces in the Gulf War. The British took a tough stance against Iraq after the Saddam regime invaded the Iraq, and they supported the UN Security Council's sanctions against Iraq as well as participating in the military coalition. The UK had been the second largest contributor in the coalition forces, participating in air and ground operations against Iraq. Turkey also supported decisions taken by the UN Security Council and cooperated the implementation of the sanctions against Iraq. After the war started, Turkey opened its air bases, harbours, and it provided further logistical support to the coalition forces and Turks' support for the West strengthened Turkey's military, political and economic relations with Western countries, including the UK. In this section, archival documents from the National Archives and the Hansard will be explored and the cooperation between Turkey and the UK during the war will be examined.

The Gulf War was an important turning point for the UK's interests in the Middle East, particularly in oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. With the end of the war, the UK maintained its access to oil and other resources in the region and its contribution to help countries experiencing economic difficulties as a result of the war also significantly affected the British influence in the region. For the UK, the success of the coalition also meant the success of the international community and order. Because the necessary decisions for military intervention had been taken by the UN Security Council and the international community had clearly supported the coalition, forces from more than 30 countries were deployed to defend Saudi Arabia and Gulf states and to deter Saddam from use of force (Hansard HL Deb., 17 December 1990). The UK sent thousands of servicemen to the Gulf region and assisted the process of resettling refugees in addition to assisting the EC's special programme to help Jordan, Egypt and Turkey (Hansard HC Deb., 15 October 1990). According to a written answer debated on 22 April 1991 in the British parliament, the aid sent by the UK to the region was as follows:

As our share of the EC special allocation to countries affected by the Gulf crisis, we are providing £20 million to Jordan, £23 million each to Egypt and Turkey, £8 million to the occupied territories and £21 million to Israel. Since the invasion of Kuwait, the United Kingdom has provided £18.65 million in humanitarian assistance through bilateral and EC channels. In addition, we have committed £21.7 million to alleviate the plight of the Iraqi refugees. In the current financial year, we expect our normal bilateral assistance to amount to £5.25 million for Jordan, £11 million for Egypt, £5 million for Turkey and some £1.5 million for the occupied territories (Hansard HC Deb., 22 April 1991).

When the war started, the UK had already made it clear that it was committed to participate in the air and ground elements of the coalition in southern Turkey, depending on the developments in Iraq (TNA: CAB 128/100/6, CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on TUESDAY 23 JULY 1991 at 9.30 am, pp. 3-4). During a meeting of the British cabinet, ministers discussed that providing humanitarian aid for the Kurdish refugees could be possible in places close to the Turkish border, and the Minister for Overseas Development of the UK, Lynda Chalker visited Turkey and Iran to discuss the relief effort in the region. In meantime, airlift operations consisting of Hercules aircrafts and helicopters began to make a significant contribution to the relief effort (TNA: CAB/128/99/14, CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on THURSDAY 18 APRIL 1991 at 10.30 am, pp. 3-4). These examples demonstrate Turkey's role and strategic importance in helping the coalition forces during the Gulf War. Before the War, stopping flow of the Euphrates River from Turkey to Iraq was considered by the British, but they did not support such an idea because Syria and the civilians of Iraq might also be affected by that action (TNA: FCO 46/7441, Gulf crisis: military commitments by Turkey, f 12). Furthermore, even though Turgut Özal himself was believed to be interested in the plan, the British diplomats thought that he had not got constitutional authority to take such a decision by himself (TNA: FCO 46/7441, f 12).

Although Turgut Özal saw the war in Iraq as an opportunity to increase the Turkish influence in the Middle East, Turks did not want to send troops to the war unless they were under attack, because the long-term consequences of involving in such a war were unclear. There were objections to Turkey's involvement in the war from the army, the MFA and the opposition. Nevertheless, Turkey could not remain indifferent to such

major developments in its region, and the Turks were also in favour of deterring Saddam, thus they opened their bases to allied forces. Therefore, it can be said that Turkey had a low-key approach during the Gulf War (TNA: FCO 46/7441, f 2), considering the external security concerns as a neoclassical realist would predict. The UK was aware of Turkey's security concerns, and recognised Turkey's key role in the crisis. For example, the Turkish side indicated their requirement for 1230 Sidewinder Aim-9B and 970 Sidewinder Aim-9L air to air missiles and they asked whether the UK could be able to provide them on a grant or loan basis (TNA: FCO 46/7441, f 11). The UK was not able to provide missiles, and Germany and Belgium were not eager to provide them for the Turks. However, the American and British thought that it would signal a wrong message to Turkey and they lobbied for Turkey's request in Bonn and Brussels (TNA: FCO 46/7441, f 10). Furthermore, when Turkey requested the deployment of air components of the AMF mobile force from Italy, Belgium and Germany, the British suggested that the deployment would be a gesture of solidarity with Turkey and instructed their ministers and UK Delegation to NATO to support Turkey's proposal (TNA: FCO 46/7441, f 9).

The UK attached significance to the requests of Turkey during the Gulf War because the British thought Turks were making the greatest contribution that they could by opening their air bases to the coalition, and they recognised that Turkey was an important country for the success of this campaign (TNA: FCO 46/7441, Gulf crisis: military commitments by Turkey, The letter from Mr N Bevan). It was not entirely ruled out that Turkish troops could enter Iraq and contribute to ground operations, but Özal's own aspiration was not enough to achieve it. Knowing that, British hoped that the Turks would keep troops on the Iraqi border, but not cross it for that time (TNA: FCO 46/7441, f 5). When Turgut Özal met the UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher just a week before her resignation, their views were still similar on the Gulf War as Özal also agreed that going to a war might be needed "if a peaceful solution was to have any prospect." (TNA: FCO 46/7441, f 1). Nonetheless, the Turks thought that it was an intra-Arab conflict and involving in 'other people's businesses was against "the tenets of Atatürkism." (TNA: FCO 46/7441, f 2). This view was expressed by the Turkish General Staff's Chief of intelligence in a meeting with the British. Thus, it may be argued that although Turkey is no longer ruled by a military regime, the military could still exert influence on Turkish foreign policy. However, the concerns

of both the military and the opposition about Turkey's role in the war were more about Turkey's security than an ideological perspective. To exemplify, referring to the Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Turks asked for military preparedness plans to be made by the NATO if attacked by Iraq. Turkey also stressed that any possible attack upon Turkey from Iraq would invoke the Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, after the Turkish Parliament granted the authorisation to enable Turkey to provide support for the actions undertaken against Iraq under UN Security Council Resolution 678 (TNA: FCO 177/247, Gulf Crisis: NATO Defence of Turkey). Although the British thought that Iraq was unlikely to attack Turkey then, they declared that NATO should show the necessary solidarity with the Turks if attacked. The NATO countries deployed air defence systems such as Redeye, Stringer, Patriot and Rapier to Turkey, and they have repeatedly reaffirmed their support for Turkey's security (TNA: FCO 177/247).

The Gulf War also contributed to the Pax Americana in the region and empowered the norms of non-intervention and sovereignty. With the war, the US presented itself as an architect in the region through its neoliberal economic and financial 'coercion' (Ismael & Ismael, 2020). In the following years, the US remained to be engaged in the Middle East, and it had a strong role in presiding over regional politics (Ismael & Ismael, 2020). The result of the Gulf War also assisted the West with enriching the new world order derived from the end of the Cold War, and it also prevented any greater shocks for the neoliberal economic system. Peter Gowan argues that the values such as human rights, international law and justice were more forcefully articulated by the US as a result of the Gulf War and it helped weaving such norms into a legalist discourse (Gowan, 1991). These were positive developments for the UK and Turkey, significant actors of the West, which wanted the US to have an active approach against the instability in the world and followed the US leadership in the international arena.

The UK's active and effective role in the Gulf War, and Turkey's support for the West, had a positive impact on the two countries' political and military relations. Relations peaked in the 1980s, and military cooperation between two parties was of this magnitude for the first time since the Korean War. Turkey, which was almost unanimous with the Americans and the British on the intervention in Iraq, received great support from the UK and the US when faced with the security concerns arising

from the war. It is noteworthy that Turkey received support from a European country such as the UK, while having minor disagreements with other countries such as Germany, with which it had very good relations, in the face of security concerns. In fact, this situation reflected the general state of Turkey's cooperation with its Western allies. Turkey viewed its relations with the US and the UK differently from its relations with other Western countries. This approach was also reflected in Turkey's EC policies. The UK and Turkey, two countries that had problems with Europeans but wanted to remain a part of Europe, had almost similar views on European policies. In the next section, the effects of European affairs on Turkish-British relations will be analysed.

6.2.3. Relations with the EC

Considering the history of the European integration process, it may be seen that the UK had a doubtful political approach towards the European integration process and transnationalism. The UK found it more convenient to object to further integration into the EC and develop its relations with the Commonwealth and the US at the same time (Atik, 2021). It was also that the UK had differences from other European countries when it comes to think about acting together in different areas such as monetary union, foreign policy and security (Atik, 2021). When the European Coal and Steel Community was founded, the UK refused to join it because the British did not want to hand over authority to an external 'undemocratic body' (Reuters Staff, 2020). The UK also stayed out of the EEC when it was founded in 1957. When the British eventually decided to join the EC, France objected to the UK's accession, and the UK could only join the Community after the third application. The first referendum to decide if the UK should have stayed in the EC or not was held in 1975 and the UK decided to stay in the Community and adopted a policy of a privileged member status. The British had opted for a less integrated and more isolated status despite being a member, and such an approach even brought Margaret Thatcher's premiership to an end. Debates over the single currency and more European integration divided the Conservatives and Thatcher could not receive a majority at the Conservative Party's leadership election. Such a polarity led to Thatcher's resignation and John Major had to "pull sterling out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism" after he became the new PM (Reuters Staff, 2020).

Turkey's relations with the EC had also been ambivalent. Two years after EEC was founded, Turkey applied for the association with it in 1959. In 1963, the Ankara Agreement, which created the association between Turkey and the EEC, was signed. Even though it was also an important step towards 'Westernisation' for the Turks (Torun, 2021), such an agreement was mostly expected to be beneficial for economic integration. Nonetheless, the association did not only consist of advantages for the Turks. While the Community eliminated tariffs on industrial products imported from Turkey, it also imposed "quotas on Turkish imports of textiles and clothing" (Kuneralp, 2017). Furthermore, political instability, military coups, the Cyprus intervention and terrorist attacks in Turkey delayed the Turkish economy's integration with the Community. For Kuneralp (2017), the Ankara Agreement naturally presented a perspective of Turkey's eventual accession to the EC. However, such a perspective "remained in the hands of the EEC which preserved the right to decide when those conditions were met" (Kuneralp, 2017). This circumstance affected the popularity of the EC in the eyes of the Turkish society and caused the Turks to be cautious and sceptical about relations with the EC. Following the 1980 military coup in Turkey, relations between the Turks and the EC were officially suspended. In addition, European countries including the UK started to ask for visas from Turkish visitors due to the high number of Turks seeking political asylum and Turkey's human rights records (TNA: FCO 9/6219, UK Visas for Turkey).

The UK had been among its most significant partners of Turkey in terms of the EC membership process. Even though the UK thought that it was early for Turkey to apply for full membership (TNA: FCO 98/1659, European political cooperation: Turkey, f 2, Telegram number 202 of 2 August), the British expressed this opinion very carefully and never openly opposed Turkey's accession. Just as the UK, Turkey felt "particularly alienated and isolated from Europe" (TNA: FCO 9/5194, Political relations between Turkey and the UK, f 92) and the Turks were claimed to be regarding the UK as one of their only reliable friends there (TNA: FCO 9/5194, f 92). Meanwhile, the British thought that Turkey "should play a full part in the life of Europe" and Turkey's Association Agreement with the EC was in the British interest (TNA: FCO 9/5194, f 88). For Ambassador Daunt, Turkey's full membership application to the Community was difficult to handle and premature (Timothy Daunt, personal interview, 14.11.2022). The one of the biggest reasons for that was Turkey's size and level of

economic development (Akman & Çekin, 2021). However, the British did not want to upset the Turks (Timothy Daunt, personal interview, 14.11.2022). Daunt thinks that the British were dishonest considering the issue, because they actually did not want Turks to make an application and he mentions that he remembers telling somebody that he was sent to Turkey as an ambassador to ensure the Turkish government did not make an application for the EEC membership (Timothy Daunt, personal interview, 14.11.2022). When the EC aid towards Turkey was to be considered after Turkey returned to democracy, the Greeks and the Danish opposed such a move. The UK tried to play a constructive role in this sense by asking the Turks to continue to make progress on democracy and has endeavoured to resolve this issue in talks with Denmark and Greece (TNA: FCO 9/5193, f 76). Similarly, when it came to Turkey's vice-chairmanship of the Council of Europe for a year in 1985, the only supporter of Turkey was the UK in the beginning, and the Germans declared that they would support Turkey afterwards (TNA: FCO 9/5193, f 76). The UK's position was to strengthen EC-Turkish relations without giving any outright rejection to Turkey's full membership application, but the British were keen to safeguard European and British interests in terms of Turkey's application, and they thought that full membership of Turkey should be discussed only after Turks had made the necessary progress under the Association Agreement (TNA: FCO 9/5849, Turkey: post objectives and output measurement, Chancery/Political Objectives for 1987, pp. 1-2). Meanwhile, the fact that the British did not openly oppose Turkish ambitions and even supported Turkey at some points may have caused the Turks to want to strengthen their relations with the UK.

Good relations between Turkey and the UK considering European affairs were also reflected in the issues regarding European security. To exemplify; in the beginning of the 1990s, there was a divide between European countries about the future of the European security. When debate about the ESDP continued, some countries including the UK advocated that European defence policy should be considered within the NATO framework, and they were called Atlanticists (Özen, 2002, p. 233). While their views on European security was centred on NATO, the other group called 'Europeanists' envisaged "a European foreign and security policy and to balance the overwhelming influence of the US in the post-Cold War era." (Özen, 2002, p. 234). If the Atlanticists had lost the debate, the approach of the Europeanists might have

excluded Turkey from contributing to the European security architecture. As a result of the Atlanticists' endeavour, the new European security architecture functioned as the European pillar of NATO and Turkey found it easier to be involved in the European security in future, after the issue of participation of non-EU NATO members in the EU operations were resolved with the help of the Americans and the British (Özen, 2002, p. 235). The British were aware of Turkey's position within NATO, and they thought that Turkey's exclusion of the Western European Union (WEU) until 1992 was wrong, and such a circumstance was caused by marginalities (TNA: FCO 9/6674, Turkey: CSCE and CFE, f 99). When Turkey wanted to become a member of the WEU, the UK had sympathy the Dutch proposal which aimed at "revising the WEU treaty to try to weaken the mutual assistance obligation in Article 5", which would ease Turkey's membership (TNA: FCO 46/7320, Western European Union (WEU) enlargement: Turkey, f 16). Even though the UK had not openly supported Turkey's membership either, the UK approached the issue constructively during its presidency of the WEU (TNA: FCO 46/7320, f 12).

Turkey and the UK's relations with the EC have contributed greatly to the improvement of bilateral relations between them. Both nations had felt alienated from the EC when compared to continental European countries, and they conducted their relations with the Community in a manner consistent with their special relations with the US, reflecting their general foreign policy approach. While Turkey was an important partner for the British due to its geopolitical importance, cultural and historical ties, and its pro-Western foreign policy, the UK did not openly oppose Turkey's WEU and EC membership and helped Turkey to solve the problems in its relations with Europe. For the UK, Turkey's relations with the EC were important for Turkey's further integration into the Western world. Moreover, Turkey could perhaps be characterised as an 'Atlanticist' power, whose developed relations with the EC could contribute to preventing the EC from evolving into an institution politically violating the national sovereignty and the nation-state, and completely independent from NATO in the field of defence. However, it was also important for the future of Europe that the Turks fulfil certain conditions before joining the EC, and the British were aware of this. This mutual understanding and cooperation between the Turks and the British in the European context had a positive impact on bilateral relations.

Between 1983 and 1993, external constraints were the main determinants of Turkish-British relations. The ideological affinity and personal similarities between Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher, and the work of the FPE who were sometimes ignored by the leaders, have always played an important role in the development of bilateral relations. However, both the interviews conducted for this thesis and the information gathered from resources in the National Archives suggest that the systemic constraints played the most important role in Turkish-British relations from 1983 to 1993, while the role of domestic politics was minimal. Özal and Thatcher interpreted external constraints and factors with the help of the FPE and their own world views, thus they wanted their countries to have a more active role in the international arena and to develop politically, militarily, and economically. It may be noted that the challenges that Turkey and the UK faced in the past within the bipolar system were crucial in the formation of Özal and Thatcher's personalities, as well as in determining the Cold War policies of Turkey and the UK. Furthermore, the Cold War, as a systemic factor, also influenced the European and Middle Eastern policies of the Turks and the British. Therefore, it may be argued that the similarities in the external constraints faced by the UK and Turkey led to an alignment between their foreign policies. The cases mentioned above also demonstrate this. Despite Özal and Thatcher lost influence over their countries' foreign policies in the beginning of the 90s, both Turkey and the UK continued to have similar foreign policy objectives and to develop good relations. If the fact that relations between the two countries reached their peak in the decade in question had been due solely to leaders or other reasons such as domestic politics rather than external constraints, there might have been some changes in bilateral relations after Özal and Thatcher left office. However, both Suleyman Demirel and John Major interpreted external constraints within the framework of defined national interests, and they maintained bilateral relations in a constructive manner and pursued foreign policies in harmony with each other. Nevertheless, the role of FPE, domestic incentives, and personalities of Özal and Thatcher cannot be ignored in the development of bilateral relations. In this chapter so far, the main drivers of Turkish-British relations between 1983-1993 were analysed. Having discussed these factors, commercial, political and defence relations between Turkey and the UK within those years may now be observed more easily.

6.3. Political and Diplomatic Relations Between Turkey and the UK

When the military coup had taken place in Turkey in 1980, the British had a more moderate and pragmatic approach towards Turkey than other European countries did. While the military coup worsened Turkey's relations with the EC and some European countries, a diplomatic report sent to London by the British Embassy in Ankara was stating that the coup cannot harm British-Turkish relations, therefore the British Government should approach the military regime in Turkey with sympathy (Coşkun, 2016b, p. 534). Following the 12 September coup, the main concern of the British regarding Turkey was to maintain stable relations with the Turks, while they also hoped to see that the military regime in Turkey would return to democracy before too long. When Turgut Özal won the first pluralist election after the coup in November 1983, the British saw that as an "important step towards the restoration of democracy in Turkey" (HC Deb 9 November 1983) as they had already been supporting the idea of maintaining Turkey's membership to the Council of Europe which may help Turks in their way to return to a fully democratic system (HC Deb 9 February 1983).

When Turgut Özal came to power, he witnessed an important development regarding the Cyprus problem, just as Margaret Thatcher faced the Falklands War in her early days. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) declared its independence just in a week after Turgut Özal won the election in 1983. The UK, one of the guarantor powers on the island, condemned this declaration and did not recognise the independence of the TRNC. Margaret Thatcher even called the government of the Turkish Cypriots an "illegal regime" (HC Deb 1 December 1983), but those developments did not cause any serious problems between Turkey and the UK after Turgut Özal became the PM in Turkey, and the momentum in relations accelerated after Özal took office. Considering the Cyprus dispute, the traditional policy of the British was being careful enough to not alienate Turkey or Greece by acting against any parties on the island, which might put bilateral relations at jeopardy. The British wanted crisis to be solved through negotiations and it wanted international community to put pressure on Turkey and Greece, considering NATO and the UN as an important factor in this process (Coşkun, 2015b).

When Margaret Thatcher had been elected as the PM for the second time in the UK, such an election result was welcomed by the Turkish public, as “the 1979-83 Conservative government was seen as the Turks’ closest ally in Western Europe” (TNA: FCO 9/4286, f 64). The Conservatives’ support for Turkey in the Assembly of the Council of Europe played a very important role in popularity of the Tory government in Turkey. For some of officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UK was the closest ally of Turkey after the US, and the Conservative victory in Britain would help develop relations further (TNA: FCO 9/4286, f 64). As stated in the section on external constraints in this thesis, as a result of Britain's European and Cold War policies, Turkey was seen as a partner of high strategic significance and the British did not want the Turks to feel alienated by the West. This led the UK to support Turkey in European affairs and the Cold War, thus perceptions about the British in Turkey became more favourable. In a letter from the British Embassy in Ankara to the British FCO, it is stated that the similarities between Thatcher's and Özal's policies played a role in the positive image of Tories and the British in Turkey. However, it can be understood from the letter that the UK's attitude towards Turkey had a more primary impact on the popularity of the British in Turkey. Similarly, the British-Turkish relations had already been developing steadily under the military regime in Turkey, and it was considered by Britain that the current military rule in Turkey served British interests well (TNA: FCO 9/4286, f 83). The support the Turks received from the British and Turkey's strategic importance to the West played a role in this. A letter on the British Ambassador Sir P Laurence’s valedictory dispatch titled ‘Turks and Their Meaning to Us’, “a good government” paying attention to the human rights and democracy was required in Turkey as the Turks was highly criticised abroad, and having Turkey on the Western side was mutually beneficial (TNA: FCO 9/4286, f 83). When Turgut Özal came to power in Turkey, his reforms contributed to Turkey's image in the West, which in turn led to a further improvement in relations between the Turks and the British.

After the new government was elected in Turkey following the first pluralist election in 1983, the UK lobbied for improving relations between Turkey and the EC, especially by unblocking the special aid programme for Turkey. The British played a major role in Turkey’s readmission to the Parliamentary Assembly of European Council, and Sir F. Bennett MP was awarded an honorary degree from Istanbul

University as a result (TNA: FCO 9/4844, Brief No.1 on the Interview with Turkish Journalist on 2 July 1984 at 4.30 PM, pp 2-3). It also encouraged the strengthening of relations between Turkish and British Parliamentarians. Talks about the establishment of the Turkish equivalent of the British-Turkish Parliamentary Group in the British Parliament, which visited Turkey in June 1984, coincided with the same year (TNA: FCO 9/4844, f 36). The Conservative government and parliamentarians of the UK achieved to maintain good relations with Turkey and support the Turks in international arena despite pressure coming from the Labour Party on human rights violations under the military regime in Turkey (TNA: FCO 9/4844, A document titled “Conversation with Mr Firat”, p. 1). Even though the Labour Party’s criticism on human rights in Turkey did not change the Tories’ attitude towards Turkey, the issue of human rights was always discussed in bilateral meetings, and the British encouraged the Turks to make progress on human rights without criticising them.

When Turkey voted against British interests at the United Nations General Assembly regarding the Falklands issue in 1985, the British were disappointed by this development. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs apologised for the Turkish vote and they declared that it does not represent Ankara’s position on the issue (TNA: FCO 9/5194, f 94). Thus, the incident did not have a major impact on bilateral relations. 1985 was a year in which the number of mutual visits increased. The visit of British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe to Turkey in February 1985 was very successful. At the same time, Turgut Özal's official visit to the UK was decided in the same year (TNA: FCO 9/5194, f 92). In November and December 1985, seven delegations from Turkey visited London to conduct research in a variety of fields in the UK (TNA: FCO 9/5194, A Newspaper Article from Cumhuriyet on 21 November 1985: An Intense Period in Turco British Relations). A delegation from Turco British Friendship Group in the Turkish Parliament also visited officials from the UK on the same days (TNA: FCO 9/5194, A Newspaper Article from Cumhuriyet on 21 November 1985: An Intense Period in Turco British Relations). During a lunch given at the UN’s 40th Anniversary Celebrations in New York in 1985, Turgut Özal was seated between Margaret Thatcher and Herr Kohl. Turgut Özal expressed that he enjoyed speaking to Thatcher, and believed that they had got on very well (TNA: FCO 9/5194, f 88). Mutual visits contributed to commercial relations between two countries, and the British exports to

Turkey increased 30% (TNA: FCO 160/223/1, Diplomatic Documents, Turkey: Annual Review for 1984). Turkey's economic and democratic development was appreciated by the British, and the British Ambassador to Ankara argued in his annual review for 1984 that Turkey needed the support of Western Europe to continue this development. Because Turkey was “too important strategically to be allowed to drift away” from the West (TNA: FCO 160/223/1). Within this scope, the UK’s contribution to ‘the international rescue operation of Turkey’s economy’ had been pledging a total of 60 million pounds between 1979 and 1982 through the OECD framework (TNA: FCO 9/5186). The UK’s “official commitment including aid debts, ECGD risk and Community aid was more” as the British share “of the latter was 111 million pounds” (TNA: FCO 9/5186, Turkey: Country Assessment Paper 1985).

Özal's visit to the TRNC in 1986 had wide repercussions in the UK. Since the British had a cautious approach to the Cyprus issue, they were content to ask both sides to show restraint. Upon this, the British Ambassador to Athens was summoned to the Greek Foreign Ministry to complain about the British’s “failure to protest the Özal visit.” (TNA: FCO 9/5348, f 7). Within the same year, Turgut Özal made a very successful visit to the UK. Özal was the first PM who visited the UK since Adnan Menderes (Köse, 2020). The only problem regarding the visit was Margaret Thatcher’s gaffe she made at the dinner with Özal, as she unwittingly quoted from Lord Byron who was known to be a ‘enemy of Turks’. When Turgut Özal was asked about Thatcher’s gaffe, he replied: “Don’t bother me with such senseless things.” (TNA: FCO 9/5512, f 22, pp. 1-2). Eventually, the British Embassy spokesman Chilcott declared they were sad about what happened (İngilizler Üzgün, 1986), and Thatcher's gaffe was forgotten without any damage to bilateral relations (TNA: FCO 9/5512, f 22). In fact, Thatcher made a very warm speech at the dinner with Özal, and she mentioned a newspaper article claiming that her policies were not Thatcherite but Özalite, which she said she took as a compliment (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.e). In her speech, Thatcher also stated that the British wanted to do more business with Turkey (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.e). This represented the British view that developing political relations between the Turks and the British should be reflected in the trade between the two nations.

In 1986, Naim Suleymanoglu, a Bulgarian-born world weightlifting champion with Turkish origins, defected when he was competing in Australia and he was granted asylum in Turkey. He transited to Ankara from London, and the British officials assisted the Turkish Embassy with protocol and security arrangements when Suleymanoglu was at Heathrow Airport (TNA: FCO 9/5513, Call by Professor Ali Bozer, 18 December 1986, Essential Facts UK Turkey Relations, pp. 1-2). The British assistance for Suleymanoglu's defection was appreciated by the Turks, as the problems experienced by the Turkish minority in Bulgaria were an important issue in Turkey. The UK's assistance for Suleymanoglu can be perceived as support for the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Indeed, the rights of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria became an important issue for British officials in the coming years (Armaoğlu, 2018), and the UK's policies on this issue had a positive effect on Turkish-British relations.

In July 1987, Turkish Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu and Turkish Planner Onur Oymen met David-Goore Booth from the planning staff of the British FCO during the Turkish Ambassador's reception in the UK. Booth argued that Turks appreciated similarities between Turkey and the UK's views on world issues, and they expected that it was time for "major expansion of economic cooperation with the UK" (TNA: FCO 9/5820, f 45). The UK's statement regarding the European Parliament's Armenia resolution was also highly acclaimed by the Turks. The British was sympathetic towards Turkey on the Armenia issue, because they had to face resolutions on sensitive subjects such as the Northern Ireland themselves. According to the Secretary of State of the UK, Howe, Halefoglu argued that any word directly or indirectly support Turkey on the issue would be appreciated and would be very helpful for the Turkish government internally (TNA: FCO 9/5820, f 44, pp. 1-3). This incident also demonstrates how domestic incentives can affect foreign policy issues. Although the effects of domestic politics on the Turkish-British case are limited, domestic politics can influence foreign policy and vice versa just as neoclassical realists argue. In the same year, Mr. Halefoglu paid a visit to the British PM and the Foreign Secretary. At his meeting with the PM, Halefoglu mentioned that the Turkish government wants to see a stronger British presence in Turkey, and that Özal would be very delighted to meet Thatcher (TNA: FCO 9/5820, f 43). During the meeting of Halefoglu and Thatcher, Turkey's application to be a member of the EC was also touched upon. When Halefoğlu raised the issue, Thatcher stated that Turkey's accession would take time

(TNA: FCO 9/5820, f 41). The UK did not oppose Turkey's membership to the EC, but the British knew that the Community had to absorb the Portugal's and Spain's memberships first, and Turkey also needed time to harmonise with the EC. At the meeting of the British Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on 30 April 1987, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary reported against strong Greek opposition against Turkey's membership application (TNA: CAB 128/86/2, Conclusions of Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on 30 April 1987, p. 5). During the meeting, it was said that

there were strategic reasons for maintaining Turkey as an effective member of the Western Alliance. But it was acknowledged that the cost to the United Kingdom, and indeed to the Community as a whole, of Turkish membership of the Communities would be a very substantial one; the Community was not ready to absorb another member state... (TNA: CAB 128/86/2, Conclusions of Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on 30 April 1987, p. 5).

In fact, the UK's role as Presidency during the phase of reopening relations between Turkey and the Community shows that the British wanted the Turks on the side of Europe, but that they preferred to be honest with the Turkey about the accession. When Thatcher and Özal met in Berlin for International Democratic Union meeting, Thatcher made these views clear again (TNA: FCO 9/5833, f 15, p. 2). In coming years, the British approach towards Turkey's relations with the Community was reflected on Turkey's decision at the United Nations General Assembly to switch their Falklands vote back to abstention (TNA: FCO 9/5833, Turkey: annual review and calendar of events for 1986, p. 1-4). As a result of such developments, Sir Timothy Daunt, the British Ambassador in Ankara wrote in his annual review that Anglo-Turkish relations were at "new peak" (TNA: FCO 9/5833, Turkey: annual review and calendar of events for 1986, p. 1-4).

In 1988, Turkish asylum seekers leaving their countries for European countries caused a great problem especially in Germany. Upon this, an EC level proposal to introduce a visa regime for Turkish citizens was made, and German officials began to put pressure on the British to apply a visa requirement for the Turks (TNA: FCO 9/6219, f 21). At first, the British thought that imposing a visa regime would give a wrong message to Turks which try to ease its relations with the EC and also harm British-

Turkish relations (TNA: FCO 9/6219, f 14, p. 1). However, they eventually had to impose the visa regime as a country which was one of the most popular destinations for Turkish asylum seekers. In return, Turkey also applied a retaliatory visa regime for countries including Britain (TNA: FCO 9/6219, Turkey: retaliatory visa regime against UK nationals, C A Jones's letter to J Cowling on 31 July 1990).

Margaret Thatcher went to Turkey in 1988 as the first British PM to visit Turkey since Winston Churchill. Before her visit, Thatcher gave an interview to a famous Turkish TV presenter, Mehmet Ali Birand. During the interview, Thatcher said her visit was aimed at demonstrating that the friendship between Turkey and the UK was alive and flourishing (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.f). Thatcher also told Birand that she admired Özal's policies and they are both very similar (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.f). During her visit, the PM of the UK also met the Mayor of Istanbul, Bedrettin Dalan, and she participated in the ground breaking ceremony of Ankara natural gas plant on which a British firm is working. In the luncheon given by the Mayor of Istanbul, Thatcher said that Turkey's exports to Britain rose by 42% in 1987 and they also aim to improve the UK's exports from Turkey, thus they send a large number of trade missions to Turkey (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.g). The meeting between Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher was their fourth meetup, and they talked about the economy, European Affairs, Cyprus, and the Middle East (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.h).

Thatcher's visit to Turkey in 1988 was featured prominently in the British press. In his article on the meeting between Özal and Thatcher, Michael Jones wrote in The Sunday Times that Özal was Thatcher's 'man' and Thatcher was Özal's 'foremost champion' (Jones, 1988). The interest in Thatcher during her visit to Istanbul was so great that the British officials were even disturbed by this interest. Thatcher, who visited the British graves in the Crimean War cemetery, then went to Florence Nightingale hospital and when the Turkish press's interest in Thatcher went on, British officials said that that was "total anarchy" (Oakley, 1988, p. 7). On April 1988, In the Financial Times article titled "Thatcher Visit Delights Turkish People", it was written about the British-Turkish relations that:

With Mr Ozal manipulating the controls - he is an engineer - and Mrs Thatcher beaming beside him, the amity in UK-

Turkish relations was cemented to the sounds of triumphant martial music and concrete oozing from the nozzle of a hydraulic arm. (Bodgener, 1988, p. 2).



Figure 1. Margaret Thatcher in Ankara, 1988 (The Churchill Archives Centre, GBR/0014/THCR 8/1/135)



Figure 2. Margaret Thatcher's visit to Turkey in 1988 (The Churchill Archives Centre, GBR/0014/THCR 8/1/135)

On 16 October 1989, the Ambassador of Turkey to the UK, Nurver Nureş said in a conference titled 'New Opportunities in Turkey' held at Manchester University that the relationship between Turkey and the UK was at its best, the UK was number one foreign investor in Turkey, and it was also Turkey's fifth largest trading partner. The

Ambassador also stated in the conference that the number of British tourists visiting Turkey reached to half million and they are the largest tourist groups After Western Germans (TNA: FCO 9/6660, f 54, p. 1). In the same year, Turgut Özal became the President of Turkey and his authority was limited. Thatcher continued to be the PM of the UK a year more. By the 1990s, bilateral relations between Turkey and the UK had never been better, and there was an excellent rapport between Özal and Thatcher (TNA: FCO 9/6996, f 11, p. 2).

In 1990, Margaret Thatcher visited Turkey for the Gallipoli commemorations, and she held talks with President Özal and the PM Yıldırım Akbulut. It was the last mutual visit between Özal and Thatcher, and they were to meet again in Paris at CSCE summit in the same year. Thatcher's visit had a great repercussion in the Turkish media. Cumhuriyet Newspaper announced Thatcher's visit to Turkey on 21 April with the headline "Alone with Thatcher" and published a caricature of the two leaders (Thatcher'la Başbaşa, 1990). In Cumhuriyet dated 29 April, Özal and Thatcher were described as two determined and stubborn leaders in the column titled "Queen Thatcher and President Özal" (Ulagay, 1990, p. 11).

1990 was the year in which cultural links between the UK and Turkey also peaked. The British Council administered a million-pound scholarship for 104 Turkish students to study in the UK (TNA: FCO 9/6992, The State of Secretary's letter to Graham Sawyer on 18 December 1990, p. 2). Similarly, 750 English teachers from Turkey received training from the British Council while 10 British teachers came to Turkey for English teaching posts (TNA: FCO 9/6992, The State of Secretary's letter to Graham Sawyer on 18 December 1990 p. 2). Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) received a regular supply of programmes from Britain (TNA: FCO 9/6992, The State of Secretary's letter to Graham Sawyer on 18 December 1990, p. 2), and British books exports to Turkey doubled just in four years (TNA: FCO 9/7028, Mr Sainsbury's Visit to Turkey: 18-21 July, p. 3). The Suleyman the Magnificent Exhibition which was held at the British Museum in London in 1987 was a milestone in British-Turkish cultural relations. The exhibition was also visited by Margaret Thatcher, Prince Charles and Princess Diana (T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, n.d.). The exhibition was opened by Princess Diana and Semra Özal, wife of President Özal, made a speech at the opening. Semra Özal's presence and speech at the exhibition caused controversy in the TBMM

(TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1989). After Turgut Özal became president and the new government was formed, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin from SHP proposed to the British Foreign Minister in 1992 to establish a British university in Turkey, referring to the agreement with French President François Mitterrand to establish Galatasaray University. But the British stated that it was too early for establishing a British university in Turkey (TNA: FCO 9/7958, f 77). The proposal of Hikmet Çetin shows the strength of cultural links between the Turks and the British and the sympathy of a minister from the SHP which came to power after the ANAP, for the UK.

After the DYP-SHP coalition government was formed by Süleyman Demirel, bilateral relations continued to be on a good course. As President, Turgut Özal tried to continue to be influential in foreign policy matters. In 1991, he phoned John Major to discuss the latest developments during the Gulf War, and both leaders expressed their appreciation for the cooperation during that war (TNA: FCO 9/7510, f 31, p. 1). Turkey was not one of the main actors of the coalition forces during the Gulf War, but its logistic assistance for the coalition forces was appreciated by the UK as John Major stated in the phone conversation with Özal that what the British had done especially in Northern Iraq could not have been achieved without the Turks (TNA: FCO 9/7510, f 31, p. 1). The Turks' active support for the coalition forces without getting involved in the war was based on the realisation that what was happening in Iraq could also harm Turkey. The British Ambassador Timothy Daunt thought that Turkey's Demirel was still underestimating the PKK, and the conflict in Iraq could destabilise Turkey rather than the Saddam Regime (TNA: FCO 9/7955, Turkey: annual review for 1991 and valedictory despatch by Sir Timothy Daunt, HM Ambassador, Ankara, August 1992, p. 2). Indeed, the PKK terrorism caused great suffering to the Turks in the following years. Perhaps if the Turks had a more active role in the Gulf War as Özal wanted, this could have been a threat to the terrorist bases in Iraq. But the rest of the Turks were cautious about the possibility of involvement in the war. As neoclassical realists argue, different leaders have different perceptions of external constraints, and they try to decide on the national interests by interpreting them. It was also the same with Demirel and Özal cases in some foreign policy decisions.

However, although the personal synergy between Thatcher and Özal was no longer existing in the relationship between Turkey and the UK, the agenda in British-Turkish

relations was good except for the attacks by PKK sympathisers against the Turkish Embassy in London and the murder of British businessman Andrew Blake in Turkey. However, these issues did not cause problems for bilateral relations. The good trend in British-Turkish relations, which continued after the democratisation of Turkey in 1983, was mostly due to the challenges that the two countries faced in the international arena. Turgut Özal and Margaret Thatcher, who came to power after the psychology of decline dominated their societies in the 70s, wanted to increase mutual cooperation in order to put their countries in a stronger position against these challenges. Bilateral relations, which were also slightly influenced by domestic incentives, peaked under Thatcher and Özal and continued to develop under Demirel and John Major. Defence relations and trade played a very important role in bilateral relations in those years.

6.4. Defence Relations Between Turkey and the UK

As Köse argued, the military relations between Turkey and the UK started to follow a better course after 1983 (Köse, 2020). For the Thatcher government, Turkey had been an important NATO ally, thus the UK would always support Turkey's effort to establish a defence industry infrastructure (Köse, 2020). Due to the Cyprus intervention and human rights violations following the 1980 military coup, Turkey had faced many problems with its Western allies regarding the defence industry. At the same time, Turkey was also an important market for the British to sell their military equipment because it was a NATO country that needed modernising its army. Compared to other Western countries, the UK took a more commercial and pragmatic approach to the sale of military equipment to the Turks. Therefore, 1983 was a turning point for both Turkey's defence industry and Turkish-British military cooperation.

Turkey first ordered Rapier and Sea Skua from the UK in 1983. The total value of these orders was 164 million pounds. Talks also started between Turkish and British officials on how British defence and technology systems can contribute to the Turkish defence manufacturing capability (TNA: FCO 9/4844, Interview with Turkish Journalist. 2 July 1984 at 3.30 PM. Brief No. 1, UK/Turkey Relations, Essential Facts, Defence, p. 2). BAe was the main contractor in the Rapier sale to supply all equipment and to provide technical support (TNA: FCO 9/4324, UK defence sales to Turkey (including visits between Turkey and the UK), Summary of Progress on Turkish

Shopping List Presented to S of S During visit on 19/18 October 83'). In the same year, the Turks also approached the British officials for a Tornado sale and a limited number of Turkish military personnel attended various trainings in the UK with the British funds. Although Turkey needed financial assistance for its military expenditures, especially for buying Tornado aircraft and discussed this issue with British officials, the UK was reluctant to lend credit to Turkey for Tornados (TNA: FCO 9/4867, f 53, p. 4). After several years of negotiations, the Turks could not buy Tornado aircraft due to financial difficulties. Because of the military aid programmes of the US and Germany, those countries had an advantage over the UK in Turkish defence industry (TNA: FCO 9/6180, f 2, p. 4), in which the British might have a much better position if the UK could provide the same financial support. Nonetheless, the UK's defence sales to Turkey reached 350 million dollars by 1986 (TNA: FCO 9/5813, Turkey: annual review and calendar of events for 1986, pp. 1-4). The second contract for the sale of Rapier missiles to Turkey took place in 1985. According to Köse (2020), the total cost of both contracts for the Rapier, including 72 fire batteries was around 300 million pounds (p. 49).

Turkey also signed a contract for the procurement of Marconi's BlindFire surveillance and fire control radars. Such a procurement was followed by "Otokar's launch of producing tactical vehicles under the Land Rover licence in 1987 and the technology transfer and domestic production of Scimitar H Radio sets" (Tüfekçi, 2018). With another contract signed in 1990, a joint venture company MKAŞ was established to produce 2784 HF-SSB radio sets for the Turkish Military and Turkey also bought 152 HF-SSB radio sets from the UK to meet urgent requirements (Tüfekçi, 2018). In meantime, In the 1990s, critical defence system procurement activities continued with TigerFish Mod II heavyweight torpedoes for Preveze Class submarines, SeaSkua air to surface missiles for helicopters, surveillance and air/surface search radars, frigates, FPBs, ECM systems and submarines (Tüfekçi, 2018). By 1990, the British had been the fifth largest military equipment suppliers of Turkey (TNA: FCO 9/5509, Turkey: country assessment paper 1990, section II: British interests, trade, p. 4). In 1992, the FCO was asked to clear applications for licences to sell Browning heavy machine guns, and SALCO Grenade Launchers along with Saxon Armoured Personnel Carriers to the Turkish government (TNA: FCO 9/8004, f 5, p. 1). As Germany, a major supplier to the Turkish defence industry, banned arms sales to Turkey probably over the

Kurdish issue, the FCO recommended arms sales be allowed, stating "we do not consider Turkey has adopted a formal policy of repression" (TNA: FCO 9/8004, f 5, p. 1).

During Margaret Thatcher's visit to Turkey in 1988, the PM of the UK was informed about Turkey's defence deficiencies and requirements. A study was initiated to see if any assistance could be provided by the British. Although the option of financial aid was ruled out in that occasion again, an adjustment of DPF funding raised the availability of funds that had been allocated under UKMTAS regime before (TNA: FCO 9/6642, p. 3). Under the UKMTAS regime, the British set aside 240.000 pounds to cover the training demands from Turkey in 1986 (TNA: FCO 46/5511, f 1). Due to Turkey's inability to fully use its allocation, this amount was reduced to 150.000 pounds for courses including Platoon commanders course, explosive ordnance disposal course, photographic interpretation course and intelligence & security course (TNA: FCO 46/5511, f 1). In 1988, the annual military officer exchange was also made for the second time since 1986 (TNA: FCO 9/6642, Defence Attache's Annual Report Turkey – 1988, p. 4). For the British officials, such a programme was seen as an opportunity to show the Turks "the world continued outside the boundaries of their own country, US, and the Federal Republic of Germany." (TNA: FCO 9/6642, Defence Attaché's Annual Report Turkey – 1988, p. 4). Even though the Turkish officers could not communicate adequately with the British military personnel as they did not speak English well, it was believed that an English language programme organised to teach the language to Turkish military personnel would be helpful (TNA: FCO 9/6642, Defence Attaché's Annual Report Turkey – 1988, p. 4).

During these years in which military relations between Turkey and the UK were at their peak, Turkey became an important base for coalition forces during the Gulf War. Within the scope of operations which were based in southern Turkey, the British Tornado aircraft undertook reconnaissance tasks and they were also accompanied by other Royal Air Force aircraft, supported by VC10 tankers (HL Deb 20 February 1997). Among other deployments of the British, there were 8 RAF Jaguars to operate from Incirlik Air Base (TNA: FCO 8/9119). In meantime, there were regular flights between the UK and Turkey to support deploying British brigades to Iraq in addition to the UK's transport aircrafts and helicopters based in Turkey while conducting

operations. The British also had three squadrons at Silopi landing zone, which was one of the operation locations that Turkey provided for the coalition forces (Brown, 1995). As US Marine Corps Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown wrote (1995, p. 12):

Turkey provided operating locations at Incirlik, Mersin, Iskenderun, Diyarbakir, Batman, Silopi, and Yuksekova. It dedicated aircraft and railway lines to send relief supplies forward. Turkish security forces maintained order and provided medical care in the temporary mountain camps. Fuel, building materials, food stuffs, and clothing were provided by Turkey. Individual Turks provided carpentry, sanitation, and transportation services. Operation Provide Comfort could not have been conducted had it not been for Turkish support.

While the Turks intended to extend the mandate for Operation Provide Comfort, the US Navy announced that they would terminate the use of the fuelling facility in Iskenderun in April 1993 (TNA: FCO 9/8002, Minute by J G Blamey, 9 April 1992). However, the British decided to delay their decision on the issue until the mandate by the Turks officially run out, as they also thought that the success of the operation depended on Turkey's cooperation (TNA: FCO 9/8002, f 1).

During the Gulf War, the Kurdish problem was a foreign policy issue for Turkey which also interested the UK. Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq, was welcomed in the UK with a red-carpet treatment (TNA: FCO 9/8019, Julian Amery's letter to John Major on 27 April 1992). Just before and after his visit to London, Barzani met both Turkish President Turgut Özal and the PM Süleyman Demirel (TNA: FCO 9/8019, Julian Amery's letter to John Major on 27 April 1992). The British thought that Turks were interested in increasing their influence in Northern Iraq and somehow gain control in oil production in the region (TNA: FCO 9/8019, Julian Amery's letter to John Major on 27 April 1992). The British long advocated the Kurds in Northern Iraq, but they did not have enough options to affect Turkey's policies regarding the Kurds in the region. However, despite there was rumour in Ankara that the UK was to form a petroleum corporation with the Kurds in Iraq (TNA: FCO 9/8019, Julian Amery's letter to John Major on 27 April 1992), the Turks were still much more sympathetic to the British than the Germans on many occasions. One

of the reasons for that was the British-Turkish cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

As the PKK terrorism had begun to be a growing problem for the Turks, bilateral counter-terrorism talks were held between Turkish and British officials in London in October 1991. At the meeting, the British side was provided the list of existing terrorist organisations' offices in the UK (TNA: FCO 9/7552, f 61). The Turks were arguing that terrorist organisations are using sociocultural institutions and small businesses to exhort financial resources. Therefore, Turkey expected the British government to take the necessary steps to take such organisations into account (TNA: FCO 9/7552, f 61). During the bilateral counter-terrorism talks in October 1991, the British and the Turks shared similar views on the role of the 'main state sponsors' of terrorism such as Iraq (TNA: FCO 9/7552, f 50, p. 1). On 12 July 1991, the Turkish Embassy in London was occupied by terrorists and they were arrested by the British government. The British government also agreed to pay compensation to Turkey (TNA: FCO 9/7552, f 50, p. 2). The British also shared their counter terrorism experience with Turkey in a session with the Turkish Interior Ministry delegation (TNA: FCO 9/7552, f 40).

In 1992, the biennial meeting between the Chatham House and the Foreign Policy Institute, The Anglo-Turkish Round Table was held on 13 January in London. Both organisations expressed their satisfaction with their exchanges (TNA: FCO 9/8016, f 3). Many issues related to the terrorism, WEU, Turkish-Greek territorial waters, Cyprus, Central Asia and the Middle East were discussed during the meeting (TNA: FCO 9/8016). Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu made a speech on Turkish-Greek territorial waters, and Britain's Middle East policies were explained by Sir Patrick Fairweather (TNA: FCO 9/8016, f 3). In Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı's speech on WEU, objections raised in Germany to the mutual defence guarantee to be given to Turkey under the WEU was discussed, and Prof. Bağcı stated that such a public discussion in Germany had a negative impact on Turkish public opinion (TNA: FCO 9/8016, f 3). In fact, this situation also summarised the attitude of the British and other EC members towards Turkey. The British were the most supportive partners of the Turks among the EC members, especially on security issues. This created a great deal of trust between Turkey and the UK.

After Süleyman Demirel became PM in Turkey and John Major in the UK, bilateral relations continued to improve. As President, Turgut Özal occasionally wanted to take a more active role in foreign policy matters, but his powers were limited. It was also that Süleyman Demirel was not a leader who would allow Özal to interfere in his affairs. Nevertheless, Özal's influence on Turkish foreign policy remained much higher than an ordinary President. Turgut Özal used his personal contacts and knowledge, and he shared his views on issues such as the Gulf War and the Middle East with Thatcher and then with John Major. Özal's great effort to play an important role in Turkey's foreign policy continued until he died after an intensive visit to Turkic countries in Central Asia.

6.5. Economic Relations Between Turkey and the UK

Political and diplomatic relations which reached a peak between Turkey and the UK during the Thatcher and Özal era also contributed significantly to economic relations as well as defence relations. After a new civilian government formed in Turkey in 1983, the UK's exports to Turkey increased by 11% as a result of growing interest in the Turkish market by British firms (TNA: FCO 9/4844, Interview with Turkish Journalist. 2 July 1984 at 3.30 PM. Brief No. 1, p. 3). The main British exports to Turkey were road vehicles, transport equipment, machinery and chemicals while British imports from Turkey included agricultural products (TNA: FCO 9/4844, Political relations between Turkey and the UK 1984, Interview with Turkish Journalist. 2 July 1984 at 3.30 PM. Brief No. 1, p. 3).

British exports to Turkey rose by 40 percent in 1984 (TNA: FCO 9/5193, f 76) and 30 per cent in 1985 (TNA: FCO 160/223/1, Diplomatic Documents, Turkey: Annual Review for 1984 p. 5). In addition, Turkey's exports to Britain "more than doubled" by 1985 due to the export of Iraqi oil through Turkey (TNA: FCO 9/5512, Anglo/Turkish Political Director Talks: 18 June, p. 2). High level business missions from Britain, including one led by the Duke of Kent have made a considerable impact in this statistic (TNA: FCO 160/223/1, Diplomatic Documents, Turkey: Annual Review for 1984, p. 5). Even though British firms wanted to participate in major contracts in Turkey, including a contract for the Second Bosphorus Bridge, such moves ended up in a disappointment for the British because of the problem of financial cover.

The Akkuyu nuclear power plant project was another project that the British were keen to participate in (Köse, 2020, p. 39). Due to problem of financing and the hesitant approach of the companies regarding profit expected by the Turkish government from the build-operate-transfer model, no agreement had been reached for this project (Köse, 2020, p. 40).

From 1983 to 1986, British exports to Turkey expanded by 122% and reached to 434 million pounds (TNA: FCO 9/5513, Call by Professor Ali Bozer, 18 December 1986, Essential Facts UK Turkey Relations, pp. 1-2; TNA: FCO 9/6180, f 2, p. 4). and the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement was signed between the two countries within the same year (Köse, 2020, p. 40). In 1987, the British began to win contracts over major public sector projects, including Ankara natural gas conversion project (TNA: FCO 9/6180, f 2, p. 4), and Turkish exports to the UK rose by 42% (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.h). Even though trade relations between Turkey and the UK “presented a stable structure up to 1980” (Kayacıklı, 1988), economic relations gained a new momentum after in the Thatcher and Özal era. In 1981, Turkey's exports to the UK totalled 147.9 million dollars, rising to 541 million dollars in 1987. At the same time, British exports to Turkey had managed to rise to 697 million dollars in these six years (Kayacıklı, 1988).

Table 1. Turkish & British Exports in 1981 and 1987

Years	Turkish Exports	British Exports
1981	\$147.9 million	\$433.6 million
1987	\$541.4 million	\$697.4 million*
Trade statistics obtained from Kayacıklı, T. (1988). Turco-British commercial relations. <i>Middle East Business & Banking</i> , 7(4), 11-12.		

* This figure is \$690.679.000 in T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü, 1989.

As of the end of 1987, the UK capital was invested in different companies in Turkey with an average share of 30.851 million Turkish liras (Kayacıklı, 1988). Some of 72 British and British affiliated companies invested in Turkey were British Airways, British Steel Corporation, BP, British American Tobacco, Unilever, Ramada International, Shell, Longmans English Teaching Services and Ottoman Bank (British

and British Affiliated Companies Operating in Turkey, 1988). As stated in this thesis before, Turkish Ambassador to the UK, Nurver Nureş stated said in a conference held at Manchester University in 1989 that the British had become the number one foreign investor in Turkey, and they were also Turkey's fifth largest trading partner, ranking third in the EC (TNA: FCO 9/6660, f 53, p. 1). According to Nureş, the number of British firms operating in Turkey also leaped to 104 in the first half of 1989, with a 70 percent increase in three years (TNA: FCO 9/6660, f 53, p. 10).

Turkey's rapid engagement with the newly established Turkic states in Central Asia under the leaderships of Özal and Demirel also created new economic opportunities for the West. The Turks wanted Western countries to support the economic initiatives they were launching in the Central Asian republics, and 13 of the 45 protocols signed between Turkey and the Central Asian countries included the US (TNA: FCO 9/7962, f 25, p. 4). In 1991, Hikmet Çetin, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to Douglas Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, asking for support for these projects and for British involvement in economic cooperation in Central Asia (TNA: FCO 9/7962, f 26, p. 1). Timothy Daunt, who was in Istanbul for the Anglo-Turkish Business Council meetings, reported the conversation between Angella Conning and Dr Kurdoglu from Turkish side:

His thought was that Turkish businessmen might be able to give their British counterparts some introduction to joint business in the Soviet Union resulting from the natural gas offset, while the British businessmen might be able to do the same in reverse for the Turks in the African country. (TNA: FCO 9/6698, British Ambassador Timothy Daunt's letter to Micheal Collins, p. 1).

In the 1980s, British also invested in a ranitidine hydrochloride production facility in Turkey, which was described as "our most important product" by D B L George, director of the Intellectual Property, Scientific and Regulatory Affairs (TNA: FCO 9/6698, a letter from D B L George, on 5 June 1989, p. 1). In the meantime, the British had submitted their bids for different projects in Turkey including Turksat Communications Satellite Project, Bodrum Airport Project, Cerkezkoy-Kapikule Railway Electrification Project, and Izmir Water Supply Project (TNA: FCO 9/6698).

The British also helped the Turkish textile industry exporting products to the EC. In 1990, Turkish President Turgut Özal wrote a letter to the British PM, seeking an increase in voluntary restraint arrangements which limit Turkey's textile imports to European countries. As a result of this, the British asked the European Commission to bring forward proposals for liberalization (TNA: FCO 9/6992, CSCE Summit: Paris: 19-21 November 1990, Bilateral Meeting with Mr Alptemocin (Turkey), p. 3, textiles). Even though the British continued to complain about their lack of success in major public projects, they have won Ankara Metro and Yok projects (TNA: FCO 9/6992, Call by Ambassador Bleda on DTI Minister, p. 3). In addition, Yenikapı Water Treatment Plant project was also completed with a significant British contribution and it was visited by Margaret Thatcher in 1988 (TNA: FCO 9/6187, f 35, p. 3).

In 1990, there were certain difficulties in the Turkish economy. Despite this, British-Turkish trade relations remained good as the British exports to Turkey reached 606.8 million pounds with an increase of 40 percent over 1989 (TNA: FCO 9/7562, f 9, p. 3). For the British, this figure was a record (TNA: FCO 9/7562, f 9, p. 3). Despite this positive outlook, the British felt that the economic situation in Turkey would present challenges for the future, particularly for the British companies in the Turkish private sector (TNA: FCO 9/7562, f 64, p. 3). Indeed, Turkey's exports to the UK decreased from 744.786.000 dollars to 676.045.000 dollars in 1991 (T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü, 1996). However, the Turks continued to increase exports to the UK in 1992 and 1993. By 1993, UK imports from Turkey totalled 835.075.000 dollars (T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü, 1996). The reason for the decline in 1991 may be the impact of the Gulf War on the Turkish economy. However, British exports to Turkey continued to increase steadily for three years, including 1991, rising from 1.013.686.000 dollars in 1990 to 1.545.951.000 dollars in 1993 (T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü, 1996).

Table 2. Turkish & British Exports from 1983 to 1989

Years	Turkish Exports	British Exports
1983	\$247.039.000	\$433.767.000

1984	\$261.045.000	\$436.394.000
1985	\$538.724.000	\$463.982.000
1986	\$334.213.000	\$512.847.000
1987	\$541.407.000	\$690.679.000
1988	\$576.142.000	\$735.234.000
1989	\$615.923.000	\$727.720.000
Trade Statistics obtained from <i>Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri - Foreign Trade Statistics</i> . (1989). T.C. Basbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, p. 20.		

Table 2. Continued

Table 3. Turkish & British Exports from 1990 to 1993

Years	Turkish Exports	British Exports
1990	\$744.786.000	\$1.013.686.000
1991	\$676.045.000	\$1.165.598.000
1992	\$796.311.000	\$1.187.332.000
1993	\$835.075.000	\$1.545.696.000
Trade Statistics obtained from <i>Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri - Foreign Trade Statistics</i> . (1996). T.C. Basbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, p. 24.		

Political and diplomatic relations which reached the peak between Turkey and the UK in Özal and Thatcher period had a positive impact on economic relations as well as the defence industry. During the Premierships of Süleyman Demirel and John Major, economic relations continued to be positively affected by developing political relations. The British saw the liberalisation of the Turkish economy as an opportunity to become a major player in the Turkish market after Turgut Özal came to power in Turkey, bidding for major public projects, increasing bilateral trade and investing in Turkish companies. From 1983 to 1993, bilateral trade increased significantly and the British were involved in important public projects such as the Ankara natural gas

conversion project, Ankara and Yenikapı water treatment plants, but they could not participate in projects such as the Second Bosphorus Bridge and Bodrum Airport due to financial aid matters. The effects of the rise of neoliberalism in the world and the two countries' adaptation to this order in economic relations between Turkey and the UK cannot be denied. Also taking into consideration the policies of the UK and Turkey aiming to be economically more active in the former Soviet countries, it can be said that external factors play the most important role in the economic policies of the two countries and their trade relations with each other. However, Thatcher and Özal, who knew that economic growth would increase their influence in domestic politics, also allocated an important place to the economy in their foreign policies. Therefore, after external factors, the impact of domestic politics and leadership on economic relations is also important.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Turkey and the UK have a long history of friendly relations with the exception of World War I. Following the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, relations continued to follow a positive course despite challenges such as the Mosul question and the Cyprus problem. After the 1980 military coup in Turkey, the Turks managed to maintain a stable relationship with the UK, while their relations with other Western allies deteriorated due to the demise of democracy and the violation of human rights by the military regime. With the restoration of Turkish democracy and Turgut Özal becoming the PM in Turkey in 1983, political and diplomatic relations between Turkey and the UK reached an all-time high. Political and diplomatic relations reaching the peak in 1980s were also reflected in defence and economic relations. During the Turgut Özal period, the Turkish army was modernised and the British wanted to support the Turks in this regard. Although the British could not export military equipment to the Turks as much as Germany did due to the financial aid problem, they made great contributions to the development of the Turkish defence industry. In economic relations, it can be observed that the trade between the Turkey and Britain increased regularly, mutual investments were made in the both countries, and joint cooperation was sought in different parts of the world. The aim of this thesis is to examine the main drivers for the peaking of British-Turkish relations in the 1980s. Accordingly, the question "What was the main factor in the development of Turkish-British relations between 1983-1993?" is addressed in this thesis. The reason for examining the period between 1983 and 1993 in British-Turkish relations is that it covers Turgut Özal's tenure beginning from his election as the PM in 1983 and ends with his death as President in 1993. The time period also covers the era after Thatcher's resignation as the PM in 1990.

In this thesis, official correspondences, cabinet papers and other documents from the British National Archives, the Thatcher Papers and the Papers of Julian Amery from Cambridge University, online documents published by the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, debates in the British and Turkish parliaments, news published in the media of the two countries, academic and journal articles, books and newspaper columns were used. The author conducted semi-structured interviews with politicians from the Centre-Right tradition in Turkey as well as with Conservative Party politicians, former diplomats and academics in the UK. Archival research in the National Archives were conducted by the author himself.

After examining the main assumptions of neoclassical realism, this thesis provided information on the history of British-Turkish relations. The research objective of the thesis is to analyse which factor was the most important element in determining British-Turkish relations. In doing that; personality traits, world views, and foreign policy decisions of Margaret Thatcher and Turgut Özal were examined first. The author also referred to the domestic policy preferences of the two leaders and the impacts of domestic incentives on foreign policy making. Eventually, two countries' policies regarding the Gulf War, European affairs and the Cold War, which were external factors and constraints that directly affected bilateral relations between the two countries are observed, and British-Turkish relations from 1983 to 1993 are examined in this thesis.

The author of the thesis argues that external constraints were the main drivers of British-Turkish relations between 1983 and 1993. In the Özal and Thatcher era, improving bilateral relations was not a preference, but a necessity for the British and the Turks. While the Cold War, the Gulf War and relations with the EC brought the British and the Turks closer; international problems such as Cyprus issue, the Falklands War and the Aegean dispute underlined the strategic importance of the two countries for each other. Although such problems caused Turkey and the UK to have problems with their allies before and during the 1980s, they did not have a serious negative impact on British-Turkish relations. Before 1980, the two countries, which were highly influenced by issues such as their weakened economies, their declining status in the international system and major disagreements with their allies, pursued harmonised foreign policies on issues of great concern to the international system, such

as the Cold War, the Gulf War and European affairs. This circumstance led the British and Turks to develop their bilateral relations more in 1980s and 90s.

The Cold War Period led both Turkish and the British FPE to decide their national interests based on an understanding that prioritises their security in a bipolar, anarchic world. Thus, Turkey and the UK conducted a pro-Western foreign policy, which in some cases could also be described as Atlanticist. As Turkey and the UK attached great importance to their relations with the US and argued that NATO should be the main actor in European security, these two countries were in a psychological state of alienation in their relations with other EC countries. This circumstance caused the UK and Turkey to cooperate in European affairs and led to the further development of bilateral relations. The Gulf War took place at a time when relations between the two countries were at their peak, and while the UK was one of the main actors in the coalition against Iraq, the logistical support provided by Turkey ensured the success of the operations conducted.

From a neoclassical realist point of view, this thesis suggests that how the FPE and leaders perceive developments is crucial in foreign policy making (Lobell et al., 2009). Indeed, cult leaders such as Özal and Thatcher had a significant impact on the development of bilateral relations due to their personal relationship and similarities. However, it was observed in this thesis that both leaders failed to exert sufficient influence on issues such as Second Bosphorus Bridge and Turksat tenders in Turkey, the failure of the British to provide sufficient loans while selling the military equipment to Turkey, and the Asil Nadir trial. Therefore, it can be argued that the leadership was not as effective as external factors in influencing the course of bilateral relations. When issues such as the third democratic wave, the rise of the New Right and neoliberal economy in the world, and the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the two countries are taken into consideration, it can be said that the policies implemented by Özal and Thatcher were not only results of their personal preferences, but they also reflected the spirit of the time in international relations. Following the leadership change in both countries, bilateral relations continued to follow a positive course in economic, military and political fields in the Demirel and Major era. This fact also demonstrates that external constraints overcame the significance of the leadership in British-Turkish relations.

As it can be seen in the British-Turkish relations during Thatcher and Özal era, it is not just leaders' and the FPE's perception of the security dilemma and external constraints that matters, it is also their perception of domestic politics. However, it only becomes important when they think it is important. The impact of domestic politics on British-Turkish relations was only important in terms of preventing the two leaders from being criticised and losing power in domestic politics, and domestic incentives were not taken into consideration by the two leaders much. Issues such as Margaret Thatcher's gaffe by quoting Lord Byron and the criticism of human rights violations in Turkey by the British public, were ignored by Özal and Thatcher and they had almost no impact on bilateral relations. However, the fact that the UK's support for Turkey on the Armenia Resolution in the European Parliament was thought to ease the Turkish government's hand internally, and the Turks' position in the Gulf War may also be linked to the Kurdish problem in Turkey, demonstrate that domestic politics have influence on bilateral relations, although not as much as the leadership and external constraints do. As domestic incentives and groups which can elect or deselect a leader are also significant in affecting leaders' foreign policy decisions, substantiality of the leaders' impacts on foreign policy can also be related to the influence that leaders have in domestic politics. This is also the case for Özal and Thatcher. It may also be assumed that the FPE acts as a roundabout between domestic politics, leaders and external constraints and they can influence decisions of leaders. However, leaders can ignore the views coming from the FPE, as Özal and Thatcher did from time to time. Therefore, it can be argued that the leaders and their perceptions of developments matter more than domestic politics in foreign policy making.

Neoclassical realism provides a framework for foreign policy analysis in three different levels; system, state and individual. Neoclassical realists argue that main driver of foreign policy is external constraints, and the leadership also play a role in determining countries' foreign policies. It is also that domestic incentives are of a significance for neoclassical realists although their impact can be limited as in the British-Turkish relations case from 1983 to 1993. If the impact of external constraints, leadership and domestic politics on British-Turkish relations between 1983 and 1993 were to be ranked as in Maslow's hierarchy of needs, external constraints would come first, the leadership would come the second, and domestic politics would come the third, just as a neoclassical realist would predict. In such a circumstance, domestic

politics and the leadership would still matter. Therefore, it can be stated that British-Turkish relations between 1983 and 1993 is an appropriate case to apply the paradigm of neoclassical realism. However, just as other international relations theories, neoclassical realism may “show the tendency of overgeneralization.” (Yesilyurt, 2017). Therefore, more research into other states’ foreign policies and more case studies would be needed before one could generalise about any possible deficiencies of the general theory. It would also help strengthen neoclassical realism’s explanatory power.

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
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APPENDICES

A. SELECTED FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (FCO) DOCUMENTS

Turkish Reaction To UK Elections (TNA: FCO 9/4286, f 64)



RESTRICTED



of tough policies was necessary. That such policies were so clearly endorsed is said to have pleased and given credibility to Ozal's "Motherland Party".

Yours ever,
T. J. Craddock

T J Craddock

cc: H M Consul-General
Istanbul

LETTER TO MR TURGUT OZAL


1. We have been asked by Number 10 to forward the enclosed letter to you for onward transmission to Turgut Ozal. They have seen fit to seal the envelope but we understand it contains a brief acknowledgement from the Prime Minister to a message of congratulations from Ozal on her election victory.

Yours ever

A. J. F. Cate

A J F Cate
Southern European Department

The Turks And Their Meaning To Us (TNA: FCO 9/4286, f 83)



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
prevent further Turkish disillusionment with Western Europe (and vice-versa). In particular, our role in the Community's relationship with Turkey will remain an important one. As Sir P Laurence rightly observes, a crucial test will be the Community's handling of a Turkish application for full membership. This needs to be handled with the greatest care. No Member State is likely to want further enlargement in the near future. We must get the Turks to realise this and so avoid a damaging rebuff.

5. Sir P Laurence might be criticised for employing a rather narrow focus on the Turkish character. Whilst the Turks are certainly homogeneous in their nationalism from one perspective, there is, of course, a good deal of ethnic diversity. In determining Turkish attitudes we need to take into account the wide disparities in education, competence and experience between a small elite and the mass of the people. Sir P Laurence might also have added that the Turks are not so much passive as unwilling to act except where their own interests are directly affected. Their historical experience is of going it alone, and they are aware of deep differences between themselves and their Arab neighbours. Their preference would appear to be for siege or trench warfare rather than the diplomacy of movement and initiative.

6. Sir P Laurence concludes by stressing the importance of Turkey's strategic relationship with us and the rest of the Alliance: the advantage of having Turkey on our side is mutual. In this, Sir P Laurence argues, the Turks have another asset: they keep their word. This is a virtue not to be slighted; but it is made easier for them by being sparing with their promises.

7. The despatch surprisingly makes no mention of the vexed problem of Greece/Turkey relations which is not only a major irritant to relations within the Alliance but also complicates our bilateral relations with both countries. We recently considered this problem in some depth. We concluded that there is no good alternative to our current policy of evenhandedness and urging on both sides a reduction of tension and the resumption of direct dialogue (my letter of 4 March to Mr Rhodes).


8. Sir P Laurence went down well with the Turks. The favourable comments made to Mr Russell during the latter's initial calls confirm this. He has enabled the new Ambassador to get off to a good start.




D C Wilson
Southern European Department

7 April, 1983

Summary Of Progress On Turkish Shopping List Presented To S Of S During Visit
On 19/18 October 83 (TNA: FCO 9/4324)



British/Turkish Parliamentary Links (TNA: FCO 9/4844, f 36)



H o C
Counsellor

Reference

cc: Mr. Spicer, STP
cc: DA
36

BRITISH/TURKISH PARLIAMENTARY LINKS

1. I spoke today to Mr Ozkoçak in the MFA to ask what progress had been made by the Turkish side in connection with the establishment of a Turkish equivalent to the British/Turkish Parliamentary Group which visited Turkey in June. He said that before the Assembly went into recess some progress had been made and a firm decision to set up such groups had been taken. In the first instance this would involve the UK and the FRG, and the Assembly had gone as far as preparing draft statutes. He expected that a group would be established by late autumn.

2. On the exchange of delegations before that, Ozkoçak referred to a recent initiative by Jim Spicer MP (see para 8 of folio 34 on attached file). Mr Spicer has followed up the proposal he mentioned to Lady Young by suggesting in a letter forwarded by the Turkish Embassy and the MFA to Mr Karaduman, the Speaker of the GNA, that a delegation of 4 British MPs (from the Anglo/Turkish group and interested in defence) should visit Turkey in the first week of September, and that 4 Turkish MPs from the Defence Commission should visit the UK a week later. They would travel by a private 'plane laid on by British Aerospace. Ozkoçak felt sure that the Turkish side would welcome this proposal but that, coinciding as it does with the Kurban Bayram and the parliamentary recess, a postponement would be suggested.


T J Craddock

8 August 1984

T J Craddock

WST 020/4
13 AUG 1984

Interview With Turkish Journalist - Points To Make (TNA: FCO 9/4844)



Interview With Turkish Journalist - Essential Facts (TNA: FCO 9/4844)

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Basis of relationship is importance of Turkey as NATO ally on strategically vital South eastern flank of Alliance. Relationship has thickened since the military takeover of 12 September 1980 as the Turks have recognised us as one of their few close friends in a Western Europe which has appeared intent on indicting them for lack of democratic credentials and violations of human rights. We have deliberately avoided engaging in conspicuous public criticism which would have been ill received by the Turks. (At the same time we have made known our concerns in confidential high level exchanges which have led to good-tempered dialogue in which the Turks have never questioned our motives).

Defence

2. Although disappointed that UK cannot offer defence equipment on aid terms, defence cooperation has increased markedly in the past two years. In 1983 the Turks placed orders for Rapier (£146 million) and Sea Skua (£18 million) and are actively pursuing possible purchase of Tornado as well as repeat order of Rapier. Talks at official level are being conducted to identify areas where British defence technology and systems, and training might be made available to assist in the development of Turkish defence manufacturing capability. Mr Heseltine and Mr Pattie have both paid recent visits to Turkey (October 1983 and February 1984 respectively).

High Level Visits

3. (Not for use) As a demonstration of our approval of recent internal developments and to set the seal on their return to the Western European fold the Turks have invited the Secretary of State to visit Turkey; in the long term they hope that President Evren might be accorded a state visit. The Secretary of State is agreeable in principle to a visit later this year if it can be fitted in. If not Lady Young will go.

Council of Europe

4. The successful Turkish readmission to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in May owed a great deal to the

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Sale Of Tornado To Turkey (TNA: FCO 9/4867, f 53)

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SALE OF TORNADO TO TURKEY


7. The Secretary of State recalled his earlier conversation with Dr Woerner in Turkey about the sale of Tornado; he wondered where matters now stood. Dr Woerner said that he had asked the Turkish Government to write him a letter setting out clearly their priorities for the use of available military aid. He had now received such a list which included Tornado at the end. He could ask the Turkish Government which items they would wish to give up in order to make room for Tornado but even on this basis there would be no means of funding a sale of 40 aircraft. He was as interested in selling Tornado to the Turks as the British Government. His Government could offer normal credit financing. The possibility of offering special credit terms was minimal given the level of existing commitments to Turkey. The Secretary of State said that it would be preferable if the sale could be pursued as a joint venture with which Germany industry and the German Government would be closely associated, rather than solely on the initiative of British Aerospace. He was anxious to avoid any impression that a British company was negotiating on the basis of spending German money. Dr Woerner commented that his initial reaction to the proposition put to him in Turkey had been one of astonishment that it should have been pursued in this way.

8. The Secretary of State asked about the possibility of some contribution from the German military aid programme. Dr Woerner said that the sums involved were very large in relation to available aid, the next tranche of which would be 130M deutchmarks over a period of 18 months. There were discussions underway about a special programme of additional aid but these still had a long way to go. He thought that realistically the outside limit of new provision would not be more than 200M deutchmarks and the Finance Ministry would probably argue for a figure of 20M! These were not in any case matters within his control since the German Foreign Minister was responsible for the military aid budget. The Secretary of State commented that one difficulty was that British Aerospace were aware of the possibility of this additional provision but had no means of getting a feel for what it might amount to. Mr Belloch added that there was concern within British Aerospace about their exposed position, not having a clear understanding of German intentions. The Secretary of State asked whether it would be possible to establish more clearly the prospects for additional military aid. Dr Woerner said that he would be happy to discuss further with Herr Genscher this aspect of the problem. He commented that the Turkish interest in Tornado had to be seen in perspective. Their military needs were huge and they had no money. There were other high priorities for them such as armour, tanks, air defence and the provision of NBC equipment.

ASRAAM

9. The Secretary of State referred to the earlier exchange in Turkey about ASRAAM. Dr Woerner said that he had checked the position on his

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MR GREENSTOCK'S VISIT TO TURKEY 13/14 SEPTEMBER 1990

BULL POINTS

Bilateral Points

- Bilateral relations never been better. Excellent rapport between Prime Minister and President Ozal
- Look forward to continuing two way flow of ministerial visits
- (If raised) visa regime working smoothly now. Glad we can both put this behind us

Commercial Issues

- UK companies anxious to do business in Turkey
- Cannot understand why Turksat project awarded to Aerospatiale. BAe's bid much cheaper. Decision defies commercial logic. Chance of reconsideration?
- Pleased that Hawker Siddeley granted ATP for Ankara Metro. Evidence of UK support and confidence in Turkish economy


Gulf Crisis

- As Prime Minister told President Ozal we are deeply grateful for robust support given by Turkey to imposition of UN sanctions. Conscious of the damage to Turkish economy. Looking at ways to alleviate; considering US proposals and discussing community contributions with EC partners.
- Conscious of Turkey's humanitarian gesture in opening borders to some refugees. Believe that international help should be directed through United Nations; they are best placed to co-ordinate. We have donated £2 million to UNDRO. Note that you have appealed to UN for assistance.

EC/Turkey (Ankara's telno 399)

- Attach great importance to strengthening EC/Turkey relations under Association agreement in accordance with the Commissions

Julian Amery's Letter To John Major (TNA: FCO 9/8019)



From: The Rt. Hon. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,
LONDON SW1W 9AE
Tel: 071- 235 1543
071- 235 7409

27th April, 1992

Dear John,

I was in Ankara last Monday (20 April) and had a good general talk with President Ozal together with Qais Zawawi. Qais had other business in Ankara but had arranged the meeting.

The President seemed well disposed to the idea of extending the agreement under which the RAF are stationed in the south of the country. He also seemed keen that we should extend our diplomatic representation in the new countries of Central Asia. Douglas Hurd was there at the same time so you will have a fuller and more authoritative analysis of what is going on in Turkey from him.

I would only venture one or two general thoughts.

The Turks are pursuing, a surprisingly dynamic foreign policy. In the Balkans they have good relations with Albania; and have recognised Macedonia and Bosnia. Their sympathies are quite openly with the Moslems in the Kossovo. So, once again, Islam is approaching the gates of Vienna!

They are playing an active part in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, projecting a cultural image but also looking for trade. They are also much involved in the Middle East, not least with their control of the source of the Tigris.

Their trouble is that they don't have the wealth to underpin these policies. They might, however, acquire it, if they could make friends with the Kurds. They might then gain control of, and a share in, the oil production of Mosul and Kirkuk. We (my father as it happens) took it away from them in the early 1920s when Iraq was a British Protectorate. It would suit us better now to let Ankara have it than leave it to the present day Baghdad.

Both Ozal and Demirel understand this and have been courting the Kurds to some extent. Ozal has legalised the use of the Kurds language, and there is discussion of a Kurdish broadcasting service. These initiatives, however, have run into considerable opposition.

The Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P.

../.

Ataturk laid it down that there was no place in Turkey for minorities. The Kurds were to be regarded as "mountain Turks" and assimilated. This doctrine is still very strong not least in the army, the most important institution in Turkey. Then the formerly communist Kurdish Party have recently embarked on guerilla and terrorist tactics. There is thus a good deal of resistance to any attempt to win over the Kurds although, as you will know, Ozal and I think Demirel both saw Barzani on his way to London and on his return.

There is the further complication that Ozal and Demirel are at loggerheads; and Demirel is now using the allegedly pro-Kurdish sympathies of Ozal as a stick with which to beat him.

I don't think we can do very much in this situation for the time being. But the Germans, their closest trading partners, are just now in their bad books. They probably look to us as their closest friends in the European Community. They have been impressed by the red carpet treatment we gave to Barzani in London. Indeed, there is a rumour in Ankara that we are forming an Anglo-Kurdish petroleum corporation! In the course of our talk Ozal said that it was Turkish policy to maintain the integrity of Iraq but that it was becoming increasingly difficult to do so. I have never seen much advantage, myself, to Britain in maintaining the integrity of Iraq. I should have thought it might well be in our interests to encourage the Turks to reach some agreement with their own Kurds and through them with Barzani and so gain control, if indirectly, of Mosul and Kirkuk. Might King Hussein then return to Baghdad where he was for a short time co-King? Could there be a Shia Emirate of Basra not necessarily subservient to Teheran?

All these, however, are wider and you may think wilder thoughts occasioned by my visit but I pass them on for what they may be worth.

I am copying them to Douglas Hurd and Malcolm Rifkind.

Yes sum,

Julian

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P.

Turkey And UKMTAS (TNA: FCO 46/5511, f 1)

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PA Turkey Assistance
23/10

(1)

Mr Lever.

Turkey and UKMTAS.

1. In FY 1985/86 we set aside £240,000 to meet the cost of training demands from Turkey. At the end of the year we had spent only £67,670, on places at both the Army and RAF Staff Colleges, Language Training in connection with the RAF College, a Maritime Tactical Course and a NATO Staff Officers Course. One student attended each course.
2. In the current FY, and in the light of Turkey's apparent inability to fully utilise its allocation, we reduced this to £150,000. We have so far committed £141,884 to courses which include;
 - (a) one place on each of the three service staff colleges;
 - (b) one place on the Platoon Commanders course;
 - (c) one place on the Explosive Ordnance disposal course;
 - (d) one place on an Intelligence/Security course;
 - (e) four places on two Photographic Interpretation courses;
 - (f) five places on three NATO courses.
3. We can also expect to fund a place on the 1987 RCDS course commencing in January next year. Turkey have no student on the current RCDS course.
4. It remains to be seen whether Turkey take up all the places on offer.
5. Turkey is also eligible for DPF support. In 1985/86 this amounted to £23,000. We shall propose, at the next UKMTAS/DPF targeting meeting, that the DPF assume full financial responsibility for Turkey, thus releasing UKMTAS funds for more appropriate Out-of-Area countries.

22 October 1986

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23 OCT 1986	
ASK OFFICER	REGIS
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M.E.Morris.
Defence Dept.

LAST PAPER

SECRET UK EYES A



Mr. N... ON 9/12

From: P J Goulden

Mr. Hand

Date: 30 November 1990.

RHS

cc: Mr Fairweather
Mr Greenstock

30/11

bcc: *Mr Smith, RVPDD (with refs)*

Mr Broomfield

IRAQ/KUWAIT: TURKEY

1. We can assume that Turkey will allow the US to operate from Turkish bases and that the Turkish army in south-eastern Anatolia will, in any circumstances, pin down Iraqi forces on the northern frontier. The main policy issue raised by your minute of 30 November to Mr Greenstock is therefore two-fold:

- whether Turkish deployments across into Iraq would play a significant military part in forcing Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Iraq? It seems to me that this is unlikely. Saddam could not afford to withdraw forces from the south (unless Baghdad itself was under threat from the north, which can be discounted). Moreover, the Turkish Government would be hard put to justify an invasion of Iraq under any of the Security Council resolutions, since the connection with the liberation of Kuwait would be indirect and remote. A Turkish invasion would also raise suspicions, given past history, that the Turks were making a predatory grab at the Mosul oilfields. Iraq might well be able to generate condemnatory action at the UN. All in all it seems to me that the risks (for Turkey as well as the allies) outweigh any benefits;

- whether a Turkish contingent on Iraq's southern frontier would help stiffen the allied position there? To this the answer must surely be "yes", given the fighting spirit of Turkish forces and the need to stiffen the Arab forces on the western flank. Deploying Turkish forces would be an expensive business, but the tab would presumably be picked up by the Gulf Arabs. It would not be easy to insert the Turks into a command structure led, even notionally, by the Saudis or Egyptians: in practice they would probably come under the Americans. There would be a heavy logistical burden, since the Turks would probably not bring full logistical support with them. But on balance the arrival of, say, a Turkish armoured division in January would be a potent further message to Saddam.

2. I suggest, therefore, that we should encourage the Turks to:

(i) maintain a busy presence on the Turkish/Iraq border, but without crossing it;

/(ii)

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
SECTION 3 (4) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

- 1 -

SECRET UK EYES A

SECRET UK EYES A


SECRET UK EYES A



(ii) announce in early January that, if Saddam does not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January, a Turkish armoured division will be deployed to Saudi Arabia.

3. We need to bear in mind that Turkish help never comes without a price tag. The Turkish aid bill will be inflated. The handling of the Turkish relationship with the Twelve and WEU will be the more difficult. But, given the stakes in the Gulf crisis, we should give priority to maximising the pressure on Saddam and worry about the political bill later.

4. I agree with the procedural thoughts in paragraph 4 of your minute, with the gloss that we would surely have to approach the Turks at the political level as well as through the Ambassador.


F J Goulden

WEU And Turkey (TNA: FCO 46/7320, f 16)

0202/7

BRITISH EMBASSY
No 13
Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 77 5300 Bonn 1
Telex 88 68 87 Telephone (0228) 23 40 61

1989

UNCLASSIFIED

R Barnett Esq
Security Policy Dept
FCO

Your reference
Our reference
Date
6 March 1989

16

RF

Dear Robin,

WEU AND TURKEY

1. You may like to be aware of an article by the Paris correspondent of the Bonn-based General Anzeiger, dated 24 February. It claims that the Netherlands, with UK support, is using the process of revising the WEU Treaty to try to weaken the mutual assistance obligation in Article 5. The aim is said to be to ease Turkey's membership application. I should be interested in your comments on this thesis, which I have not seen elsewhere. No source is given, but the article may result from French briefing.

2. The main points of the article are:-

- in the WEU Treaty revision negotiations, according to previously confidential information, the Netherlands have recommended the removal of the automatic obligations in Article 5 to come to the aid of a treaty partner with all available means in the event of an attack.
- it is surprising that this offensive against the special character of the WEU, which was explicitly confirmed in the Platform, should come from the Netherlands, an energetic supporter of European integration.
- in the background is recent US advice to NATO partners to accept Turkey in the WEU, in order to strengthen the European grouping. Greece must then follow.
- The Ankara government sees in the WEU a springboard into the EC, and is therefore doing everything to ensure that its application is taken seriously. Thus the President of the WEU Assembly was recently invited to Ankara, although this was not announced.
- The automatic assistance article is an obstacle. It would be inconceivable for a European state automatically to become involved in a military conflict between Turkey and Greece. Hence the proposal to make the WEU commitment the same as NATO's, to smooth the way for Turkey.

/- Britain

UNCLASSIFIED



- Britain has not taken an official position, but does not hide its sympathy for the Dutch attempt. Behind the scenes, Britain has long presented the thesis that the WEU only justifies its existence if it strengthens NATO. Mrs Thatcher less than ever desires the building up of a stronger European pillar in the Alliance. The more members WEU has, the less its autonomy in defence policy, especially if some partners pursue egocentric and heterogeneous objectives.
- the proposed revision is incompatible both with the Platform and with the repeatedly declared German-French goal of a European defence community, naturally closely linked with the Alliance. Without an absolute commitment to assist, both a German-French community of destiny and a common European security space are unthinkable.
- the revision being undertaken in connection with the entry of Spain and Portugal should only remove blemishes, not shake the organisation's foundations.

Yours etc,

Robert

R E Brinkley


cc: Chanceries: Paris
The Hague
Ankara
Athens
Washington
UKDEL NATO

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Prime Minister's Telephone Conversation With President Ozal (TNA: FCO

9/7510, f 31)

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

REC-1
17 JUN 1991

Dear Richard,

**PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT OZAL**

We were warned by Denis Keefe (Resident Clerk) yesterday that President Ozal wanted to speak to the Prime Minister this afternoon and Denis sent over some briefing which the department kindly put together. The 'phone conversation took place this afternoon.

President Ozal said that he wanted to tell the Prime Minister about the forthcoming visit of Tariq Aziz to Ankara. The visit had been on the cards for some time. At an earlier stage, President Bush had advised against it on the grounds that no ceasefire with Iraq was in place but President Bush had urged Ozal, if he did see Tariq Aziz, to tell him to accept the ceasefire. In the event, the visit had been delayed. Now that it was about to take place, President Ozal proposed to tell Tariq Aziz what the West thought of Saddam Hussein. He would say a solution in Iraq must lie in a new system including a democratic regime. He would try to give Tariq Aziz the right message and not to allow the Iraqis to use the visit for other purposes.

The Prime Minister agreed with President Ozal on the need to tell the Iraqis that they must change their system. He was confident that the President would put the message across with great skill. What did he think the Iraqis were up to? President Ozal said that Iraq wanted some kind of recognition from the visit but Turkey would not give them that. He envisaged putting out a press release after the talks which would explain what had been said to the Iraqis on democracy.


The President added that he wanted to thank the Prime Minister for British efforts in northern Iraq. There were now only 1100 refugees left and, from the refugee point of view, the task was therefore almost completed. The Prime Minister said that he could never have achieved such a reduction in the number of refugees without Turkish co-operation. He knew this had been difficult for Turkey but the operation had been a successful one. It was a good example of international co-operation. He was very grateful.

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Handwritten notes:
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for draft on 'Y' by 13/6/91
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N/Gore Bossler
N/Brownfield
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Mesut Yilmaz's Letter To Sir Geoffrey Howe (TNA: FCO 46/7320, f 12)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

19 December 1986

Mr. Secretary,

I would also like to welcome the formal and high level consultative mechanism to be established between my Government and the WEU. Before sharing my suggestions with you on ways to realize such a formal consultation, let me underline my understanding that this consultative mechanism could in no way be construed as an alternative to Turkey's full membership to the WEU. As to the actual mechanism of the consultations, which by definition should be both ways I would like to propose that at least once a year they be undertaken at the Ministerial level, between the Chairman of the WEU and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, possibly utilizing some other occasion where they are to meet following or before WEU Ministerial Meetings. Another venue of the formal consultations when there would be no opportunity to hold one at the Ministerial level could be, as you have suggested, between the Chairman of the WEU Council and the Turkish Ambassador in the Presidency capital, with the participation of the Secretary General. We shall also be ready to send high level delegations to the Presidency capital to hold such consultations.

Yours sincerely

Mesut Yılmaz


A. Mesut YILMAZ

Minister of Foreign Affairs

As you know, the Ministerial Committee on Turkey's interest should be kept under active review while the organisation's objectives and legal structure were reviewed following the accession of Spain and Portugal.

His Excellency Mr Mesut Yılmaz

Anglo-Turkish Round Table (TNA: FCO 9/8016, f 3)





5. There was general Turkish support for the view of the Balkans as an area where historically, German, Russian and Turkish interests overlap, therefore the long-term solution to Balkan fragmentation lay in the relationship between the 3 states. Turkey's underlying fear was the threat of fresh ethnic Turkish emigration from the Balkans to the motherland. Views differed on the Black Sea Cooperation Zone, with Andrew Mango disdainfully discounting the prospects for agreement, and calling into question Bulgaria's interest following the Soviet collapse: Bulgaria would prefer to look Westwards for her economic prospects, and feared a wholesale buy-out of Bulgarian industry by the Turkish private sector. A counter-argument was that the end of Soviet ideology and the new freedom of manoeuvre for Georgia, the Ukraine and Moldova would breathe new life into the proposal.
6. On the Middle East, Patrick Fairweather spelt out crisply that HMG's interest in northern Iraq was driven by humanitarian concerns only: he unequivocally discounted the theory of a "hidden agenda" for Kurdistan (and one can only hope the message filters back to the right people in Turkey). Participants noted the growing warmth of Turkish relations with the Iraqi Kurds, and discounted the possibility of Turkish military action against the PKK in either Syria or the Bekaa; Turkey would not risk a bitter lesson from the opprobrium directed towards Israeli strikes against Palestinian camps in Lebanon (and the Turks had learnt a bitter lesson from the international reaction to their cross-border operations against the PKK in northern Iraq last year). Turkey would use the economic carrot rather than the military stick; the Turkish water 'peace-pipeline' to Syria was an example.
7. Also on the Kurds, Mango reported that his HEP contacts had recently told him that the Kurds would seek federation not with Turkey but with the Kurds of Iran and Iraq. There was no evident reaction from the Turkish participants to this seditious sort of talk - indeed I was struck by their complacency over the whole Kurdish question, in the light of Kate Holgate's teletext of 15 January - and we have no collateral for Mango's claims.
8. Turning to central Asia, the Turkish participants warned of Japanese and South Korean efforts to get in early on any trade prospects, and advocated Turkey as the natural bridge for European businessmen into central Asia. Europe should not underestimate the central Asian appetite for instruction in democracy and good government: Iran could not fill this need. The litmus test would be the choice between the Latin and Arabic alphabets.
9. During this discussion Patrick Fairweather was struck by the forthright Turkish reaction (to a point raised by HM Ambassador in Riyadh) - that the Turks might be working together with the Saudis to counter growing Iranian influence. The idea was preposterous: Saudi Arabia and Iran were interested only in fostering religious influence, and despite Turkey's limited resources there was no call to enlist Saudi financial support. The British participants were equally dismissive. One explanation put to us for the Turkish reaction was the unease or concern that cooperation with Saudi Arabia could undermine the secular basis of Turkish society.

T62AAA

Return by (05/12/20...)
...oris spl-143166 (P...



10. EC was perhaps slightly less dominant as a theme than two years ago. But, as the two days wore on, the Turkish side seemed increasingly fixated on the theme of Turkish membership, despite pleas from the Chatham House team that they should look at alternative ways of taking forward the relationship with the Community. There seemed a general reluctance (?weariness) to think through the implications for Turkey of Greek membership of the EC.

R G Lewington
Southern European Department
cc HM Ambassador, RIYADH
Chanceries: ATHENS, NICOSIA (w/o enclosures)
Mrs Gillon, RAD

T62AAA

FILE No. **MSI** TD87

SECURITY GRADING


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SECRET

YEAR STAMP

1992

Requirement For Visas For British Persons Visiting Turkey (TNA: FCO 9/6219)



Telephone: Twinstead 296
(078 729)

Nether House,
Mill Lane,
Febmarsh,
Halstead,
Essex. CO9 2NH.

Ma Wilson

more joins than mine? 22nd. November 1989

4/25/11

The Officer in Charge,
Visa Section,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON.

Subject: Requirement for visas for British persons visiting Turkey.

Dear Sir,

It will generally be known that as from the first of November 1989 British nationals visiting Turkey require visas.

My wife and I have just returned to Britain from three months touring countries in the Middle East by road and our experience at the Iraq/Turkey frontier should be brought to the attention of all interested parties. We were based in Baghdad and contacted the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad to confirm the necessary procedure for obtaining Turkish visas and were correctly informed that we should obtain them on arrival at the Iraq/Turkish border; the cost would be £5 sterling for each visa. On the second of November we again telephoned the Turkish Embassy and the position was confirmed.

We left Baghdad on Wednesday the eighth of November, drove to Mosul and Zakho and cleared Iraq customs without any difficulties. On arrival at the Turkish frontier an official, one Mehmet Tahir Kumri identity number S01 or D01 209554 promised to handle the formalities on our behalf and handed us his identity card. A police officer took our two passports, returned in five minutes and the following exchange took place:

- police officer - you have visas?
- ourselves - no, we were told by the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad that visas should be obtained at the border.
- police officer -- you return to Mosul for visa and then come here
- ourselves - we were told to obtain them at the border and we have just cleared the Iraqi authorities (including the export of the Land Rover) and cannot simply re-enter Iraq
- police officer - you return to Mosul and obtain visas.

He then threw our passports on the concrete counter and walked away. My wife, who speaks fluent arabic, tried to remonstrate with him but to no effect whatsoever. Mehmet Kumri pulled us by the sleeves to the other end of the customs shed and said quietly "he want money" i.e. a bribe. "How much?" said my wife. \$100 said Mehmet Kumri. We had no dollar bills but only \$ travellers cheques and Mehmet Kumri then asked for 100,000 Turkish lira. This was exactly the amount we had with us and Mehmet Kumri finally settled for 90,000 lira leaving us with 10,000 lira (about £3) for something to eat. The money was handed over to the police officer and we continued to wait. Later the officer appeared with a file and showed us the official letter quoting the cost of visas at £5 sterling which of-course we already knew and with which we had no argument. After about another 45 minutes during which the police officer appeared several times with his face full of smiles, our passports were returned complete with visas, we completed the Carnet formalities and were allowed to proceed.


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We both feel that we took the only course open to us at the time and paid the bribe; we cannot argue with officials when they hold all the cards and we were effectively stranded in a no-man's-land between Iraq and the Turkish authorities.

Let me say that both my wife and I have travelled widely in the Middle East for nearly forty years and are not unfamiliar with the difficulties one can encounter on occasions but this recent episode with a country that prides itself on becoming a member of the European Economic Community we find totally incredible. It was also unique amongst all the countries we visited. My wife has suffered from diabetes for a number of years and the traumatic effect of such a stressful situation can be well imagined.

If anyone wants to discuss these events with me or have them confirmed I am available on the telephone number in Twinstead.

Yours faithfully,




D.R. Williams.

2. His Excellency,
The Turkish Ambassador,
The Turkish Embassy,
LONDON.

His Excellency,
The Turkish Ambassador,
The Turkish Embassy,
Baghdad,
Republic of Iraq.

B. BRITISH CABINET PAPERS (CAB)

Conclusions Of A Meeting Of The Cabinet Held At 10 Downing Street On 23 July
1991 (TNA: CAB 128/100/6)



CONFIDENTIAL

the progress which had been made so far, particularly on the prospect that the Kurds would no longer be required to sever any links with external powers. Nevertheless, Saddam Hussain had clearly not changed his nature and would be ready to break any agreement with the Kurds when it suited him. The situation in southern Iraq continued to preoccupy Western Governments. Large numbers of Shia refugees had congregated in the marshes and were being subjected to privation by the Iraqi Army. When Prince Sadruddin had visited the area the Iraqi Army had been withdrawn, but had returned to its earlier positions two days after he had left. Supplies of food, secured by Prince Sadruddin, had stopped after his departure. UN personnel had been forced to leave the post which had been set up near the marshes. So far it had not proved possible to improve materially the position of the Shia refugees in the south, who faced growing hardship. Mr Peter Ledger, a British businessman, who had been detained by the Iraqi Government after mistakenly crossing the border from Kuwait, had been released through the International Committee of the Red Cross and had now returned to Kuwait. There had been discussions about the release of Mr Ian Richter, a British subject detained in Iraq. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had sent a personal message to the Iraqi Government through Prince Sadruddin repeating that the United Kingdom Government would be willing to look sympathetically at unfreezing Iraqi assets in London once Mr Richter had been released, provided that the assets were used to finance humanitarian relief supplies purchased in the United Kingdom.

In discussion, it was noted that the threat of force was an essential element in maintaining pressure on the Iraqi Government to fulfil its obligations and might well prove more effective than force itself in view of the likely operational and targeting difficulties and the need to make sure that the scope of the action was legally justifiable. The situation in northern Iraq remained a source of concern. Kurdish activity and Iraqi brutality could bring about a resumption of fighting in the area. The delay in the departure of the coalition forces, at the insistence of the United Kingdom Government, had provided a useful breathing space which had strengthened Kurdish ability to defend themselves. There were still problems over the Turkish Government's attitude towards the coalition forces, who were confined to camps around Silopi. When compensation was paid from the assets of the Rafadain Bank in London it would be important to ensure that British companies and citizens were allocated a fair share.

THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, noted that sustained pressure should continue to be exerted on the Iraqi Government both to make a full disclosure of its NBC weapons programme and to desist from further repression against the Kurds in northern Iraq. In order to ensure that UN Security Council Resolutions were implemented, it might become necessary

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Conclusions Of A Meeting Of The Cabinet Held At 10 Downing Street On 30 April
1987 (TNA: CAB 128/86/2)

The National Archives' reference CAB 128/86/2

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Turkish Application for Membership

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY reported that against strong Greek opposition the Turkish application for membership of the Communities had been remitted, according to the normal practice, to the Commission to produce an opinion. It could well take two or three years for this to be forthcoming.

Previous Reference: CC(87) 15.4

In discussion it was said that there were strong strategic reasons for maintaining Turkey as an effective member of the Western Alliance. But it was acknowledged that the cost to the United Kingdom, and indeed to the Community as a whole, of Turkish membership of the Communities would be a very substantial one; the Community was not ready to absorb another member state when it was still adapting to the recent membership of Spain and Portugal; and the accession of Turkey would tilt the balance of the Community even further towards the interests of the southern member states. The application must be handled in the orthodox way, but it would not be surprising if the conclusions were deferred to the Greek Kalends.

Opening the Japanese Market

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY reported that the Foreign Affairs Council had discussed the next steps for maintaining pressure on Japan for a more liberal approach in key sectors of interest to the Community. Commissioner de Clercq had forcefully made the European case to the Japanese Government on his recent visit to Tokyo, and the Commission had now announced proposals for the surveillance of Japanese exports which might be harmfully diverted to the Community market following the measures taken by the United States against Japan. In the Council's discussion only France and the United Kingdom had been forthright in their support for Commissioner de Clercq. During the discussions on further measures against Japan which were scheduled for the next three Foreign Affairs Councils, it should be the United Kingdom's objective to ensure that all members states give their full support to the Commission's actions and presented a united Community front to Japan.

Co-ordination Against Illegal Immigration

THE HOME SECRETARY said that the co-ordination meeting on 27-28 April between Ministers of the twelve member states concerned with combatting terrorism and illegal immigration had given unanimous support for making airlines and other carriers responsible for bogus asylum seekers whom they convey and for applying penalties to them. The action which member states would now take was entirely in line with Government policy as set out in the Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Bill.

1987 Agricultural Price Fixing

THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD reported that the Agriculture Council had met for three days between 27 and 29 April to discuss the four most contentious items in the Commission's proposals,

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Conclusions Of A Meeting Of The Cabinet Held At 10 Downing Street On 18 April

1991 (TNA: CAB/128/99/14)

CONFIDENTIAL

was not possible at present to mount a similar operation close to the Iranian border even though more refugees had congregated in that area. The Minister for Overseas Development (Mrs Chalker) was leaving that day for Turkey and Iran, where she would hold discussions with both governments. She would concentrate in particular on measures to increase the relief effort in Iran.

Continuing, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that discussion was continuing on the legal basis for providing United Nations (UN) authority for the use of armed personnel to protect the relief effort. The Attorney General, the legal advisers to the US and French Governments and the legal adviser to the Belgian Government, which held the Presidency of the UN Security Council, all agreed that present plans to provide troops to sustain and protect the relief effort were consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 688. The UN Secretary-General, Mr Perez de Cuellar, had received contrary legal advice from the UN legal advisers. The latter had argued that a new Security Council Resolution would be needed to provide the necessary cover. Securing the passage of such a Resolution might well be difficult in view of the likely attitudes of the Chinese and Soviet Governments. The United Kingdom, US and French Governments had decided, on the basis of their legal advice, that the relief effort should not be delayed. The Prime Minister had spoken to the UN Secretary-General on 16 April and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had contacted the Secretary-General earlier in the day. The Secretary-General had said that he had sympathy for the humanitarian effort and did not wish to create difficulties. However, in addition to the legal advice which he had received, the UN Special Representative, Prince Sadruddin, was conducting negotiations with the Iraqi Government for a substantial build-up of UN relief personnel in Northern Iraq. The Iraqi Government had held up the negotiations in response to the announcement of the international relief effort. The Secretary-General now thought that there was a good chance that the negotiations would be concluded successfully and that several hundred UN personnel would be able to travel to Northern Iraq. In that event, the Secretary-General considered that it should be possible to co-ordinate the UN effort with the international relief plan and conceivably in the longer run to provide the international relief personnel with UN armbands.

Continuing, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Labour Party and the German Foreign Minister, Herr Genscher, had proposed that the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussain, should be condemned for genocide. This move had attracted considerable support, including in the House of Commons. In purely legal terms, the offence of genocide had been defined in the Geneva Convention of 1948 and appropriate procedures were available for handling such cases. At the EC Foreign Affairs Council on 15

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April, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Garel-Jones) had suggested that the UN Secretary-General should be asked to look into this question. The Secretary-General had now been approached so that the matter was in a proper legal format. At the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting on the 17 April, Mr Baker had warned against any attempt to hold a trial in absentia. This would bring no benefits and considerable disadvantages. In a recent statement, the United States President, Mr Bush had indicated that the prime objective was to remove Saddam Hussain from power in Iraq. He had hinted that if this could be done by allowing him to go into exile, it might be a better solution than trying to bring him to trial, since this would simply encourage him to remain in Baghdad. The United Kingdom Government's policy was to accept that Saddam Hussain had a case to answer and to begin accumulating evidence. It would not be sensible to go beyond this to argue in favour of establishing an international tribunal.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE said that airlift operations involving Hercules aircraft flying from Turkey were continuing although they had been hampered by bad weather. Altogether, 9 Royal Air Force Chinook helicopters would be in operation in the next few days, which would enable the relief effort to be increased substantially. Military staff talks had taken place in Stuttgart the previous day between representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the United States Command in Europe. A British reconnaissance team was now on its way to Turkey, headed by Air Vice-Marshal Johns. The team included the Commander of the 3rd Commando Brigade, who would be given in-theatre command of the British operation. The reconnaissance team would discuss the scope and nature of the British contribution to the US plan. It had not yet been decided whether the British contingent would operate independently, running its own camp, or whether it would form part of a multinational force in a number of camps. A ceiling on the size of the British commitment had been set at 5,000 troops. The actual size of the contingent would depend upon the available logistic support and the contributions of other countries. Although every effort would be made to limit costs, which he would discuss with the Chief Secretary, Treasury, it was clear that the British contribution to the relief effort had the support of colleagues. The first elements of 3 Brigade would travel out to the area later that day or the next day, so that the operation could be put under way as rapidly as possible. According to US estimates, 350-750,000 refugees were in desperate need of relief. An even bigger effort might well be needed on the Iraq/Iran border. A Ministry of Defence Colonel had been attached to the team which the Minister for Overseas Development was taking to Iran. The Secretary of State for Defence proposed to make a statement in the House of Commons that afternoon.

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C. SELECTED MEDIA OUTPUTS

Media Fracas Triggers Thatcher Alarm (Oakley, 1988)

☆☆☆

THE TIMES SATURDAY APRIL 9 1988

Media fracas triggers Thatcher alarm

From Robin Oakley, Political Editor, Istanbul

Downing Street authorities are to demand tighter security and better control of the media on Mrs Thatcher's future tours.

This follows a security nightmare in Istanbul yesterday when she visited British graves in the Crimean War cemetery. The Prime Minister was separated from her security detail and was visibly distressed as a vast throng of photographers tramped over flowers and gravestones in a distasteful circus.

Pale and angry, Mrs Thatcher intervened to restrain photographers from desecrating graves, amid scenes of chaos which had become typical during her Turkish visit.

She told local residents: "This is not a very dignified visit, I am afraid."

Mr Denis Thatcher was among those separated from the Prime Minister by the surging crowd of photographers. He had to elbow his way back to her side.

As the media circus jostled through the cemetery near Florence Nightingale's old hospital, Mr Timothy Dault, the British Ambassador, was heard to say: "Here we go again." And British officials complained of "total anarchy" as photographers swarmed

prevented from giving the full dancing display which they had prepared for her.

The previous night fighting broke out between a television crew and photographers at the state banquet given by Mr Turgut Ozal, the Turkish Prime Minister, for Mrs Thatcher in Ankara.

Official complaints were made to Mrs Thatcher's press secretary by a Turkish protocol official about the use of four-letter words by one British crew. One Turkish photographer was beaten up by police after the disturbances.

Mr Thatcher last night told Turkish journalists accompanying Mrs Thatcher on her journey home: "You are an ill disciplined crew."

Nevertheless, the visit was a considerable success, and Mrs Thatcher promised Turkey yesterday that she would help to unlock £375 million of EEC funds to assist the country's economic programme.

The funds, due under the so-called Fourth Protocol of Turkey's association agreement with the EEC, have been blocked at Greek instigation by the European Parliament. But relations between Greece and Turkey are thawing.

She added that the release of the funds would be an appropriate "earnest of good intent"

given by the city's Mayor, Mr Bedrettin Dalan, Mrs Thatcher said that more could be done to make Turkey's association agreement with the EEC work better.

But she warned the Turkish authorities not to be in too much of a hurry over their EEC application. She said that the European Commission was preparing its opinion on the Turkish application in the normal way. "It is bound to take time. The issues are complex and it is not in either side's interests to rush consideration of them," she said.

In an airport press conference in Ankara, Mrs Thatcher lavished praise on Mr Ozal's management of the Turkish economy, which she said he had "transformed".

Although she said it was for all 12 EEC countries to decide on Turkey's eventual entry to the community, she said that Mr Ozal's stimulation of the Turkish economy "will be a great help".

On the thorny question of human rights in Turkey, which could cause complications with the application to join the EEC, Mrs Thatcher said that she had discussed the question with Mr Ozal in the past. In a surprising tribute she said: "He is doing everything he possibly can to see

full human rights are enjoyed





'Kraliçe' Thatcher Ve 'Başkan' Özal (Ulagay, 1990)

PAZAR NOTLARI

OSMAN ULAGAY

'Kraliçe' Thatcher ve 'Başkan' Özal

Her iki örnekte de güçlü bir seçmen desteğiyle iktidara gelip kişisel inançları doğrultusunda bir politik çizgiyi ve yönetim biçimini partilerine ve topluma empoze edebilen iki kararlî ve inatçı lider söz konusu.

"Kraliçe Margaret'ten sonra..."

Ünlü kitapların yazarı Anthony Sampson'un 16 Nisan 1990 tarihli Newseek dergisinde yer alan yazısı bu başlığı taşıyor... Yazıda "Kraliçe Margaret" diye anılan Başbakan Margaret Thatcher'dan başkası değildi.

Bayan Thatcher'ın İngiltere'nin yazılı olmayan anayasal düzenini büyük ölçüde değişikliğe uğrattığını belirtten Anthony Sampson, üçüncü makalesinde şöyle diyor:

"Bayan Thatcher, geleneksel anlamda bir başbakanın çok monarşik bir hükümdara benzeyebilir. Onun görev verdiği üst düzey yetkililer ve danışmanlar bpkı hükümdar gözlemlerini andırıyor. Onun gözetilmediği işadamları ve sanayiciler, eski çağlarda hükümdarın himayesindeki saray kuzularına gibi. Onun hatırlanması, felaket bölgelerine ve askeri birliklere yaptığı ziyaretler adeta kraliçenin ziyaretleri gibi duyuruluyor..."

BBC'nin başkanından devlet denizyollarının başkanına kadar hemen tüm kamu atamaları Bayan Thatcher'ın gözetimi altında yapılıyor. Kabin üyeleri, önceğin Churchill ya da MacMillan dönemlerinde olduğu gibi Muhafazakar Parti'deki farklı eğilimlerin temsilcileri seçili, açıkça Bayan Thatcher'ın görüşlerini paylaşan kişiler. Onlarla herhangi bir konuda aynı görüşü paylaşmayan bakan derhal azlediliyor ve yerine onun sözünden çıkmayacak biri getiriliyor. Bayan Thatcher, televizyon aracılığıyla doğrudan seslenmek istediğini bildiği seçmenlerden büyük bir saygı gördüğü için kabine üyeleri üzerinde bile böyle bir tahakküm kurabiliyor. Şimdi ise popülaritesini büyük ölçüde kaybetmiş halde tahakkümünü sürdürmek istiyor."

The Independent gazetesinin yazarı Colin Hughes da 19 Nisan 1990 tarihli International Herald Tribune gazetesinde yer alan yazısında aynı görüşü deyişimini parlamentodaki muhafazakar milletvekillerinin çoğunun "baş vergisi"yle ilgili kararın bir ölçüde odayuna çok iyi bildikleri halde Bayan Thatcher'ı bu uygulamadan geri döndürmediklerini belirtiyor.

"Baş vergisi" uygulaması, "her şeyi ben bilirim" ve bildiğinden geri dönmem" anlayışıyla İngiltere'nin son on bir yılını damgasını vuran Bayan Thatcher'ın belki de son milliyetçilerden biri olacak. Katımuyla yaklaşımları Bayan Thatcher'ın ankasındaki seçmen desteğinin yüzde 90'lara düştüğünü gösteriyor. Muhafazakar Parti içinde onun yeni atacak adayın tartışması yapıyor.

Özal'la ortak noktalar

Bayan Thatcher'ın olağanüstü serüveni ve hakkındaki yazılanlar, geçen hafta tarihi bir nedenden dolayı bir ayağı gelen Bayan Thatcher ile Cumhurbaşkanı Özal'ın buluştuğu başka ortak noktalar bulunduğunu düşündürüyor.

Sayın Özal'ın ANAP Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan iken izlediği çizgi, Bayan Thatcher'ın izlediği çizgi'den farklı mıydı? Sayın Özal da her bakımdan "tek adam" konumunda değildi miydi? Sayın Özal'ın bakanları da onun sözündeki dışarı çıkmayacak



1980'lerde, kendilerine özgü bir anlayışla ülkelerinin yönetimine dâhalarını vuran iki liderden Özal, cumhurbaşkanlığına atanabilirdi, ama Bayan Thatcher'ın kraliçeliğe atanması pek mümkün görünmüyordu.

bir konumda değiller miydi? Her süreç içinde arka planındaki güçlü seçmen desteğini yitirmeleri Özal'ın direktörlüyle yapılmıyor mu? Bürokrasi ve işadamları arasında Sayın Özal'ın gözdelelen öne çıkmıyor mu? Ve bu ayrıcalığı sürdürmek isteyen bunlara televizyondan meler, doğrudan seçmene seslenebilirdi Sayın Özal'ın güçlü bir seçmen desteğine sahip olduğunu inandırdığı için göz yumuluyor mu?

Her iki örnekte de güçlü bir seçmen desteğiyle iktidara gelip kişisel inançları doğrultusunda bir politik çizgiyi ve yönetim

biçimini partilerine ve topluma empoze edebilen iki kararlî ve inatçı lider söz konusu. Her iki liderin diğer ortakları, ekonomide sağladıkları başarıları, ekonomik başarıları yeni sorunlara yol açması, ama onların "benim tuttuğum yol ama herhalde İngiliz seçmenin doğrudan" ısrarı yine gerekir. "Sevimsiz" ve "tekrarlı" olmayan bir lideri yedeğeceğini belirtiyor.

Thatcher'ın resmen "Kraliçe Margaret" olması pek mümkün görünmüyor. Bu nedenle Thatcher sonrası geçiş süreci bugün İngiltere'nin gündeminde. Anthony Sampson, bu süreç için bu dönem sonuna gelindiğini belirtiyor. Sampson, Thatcher'dan sonra gelecekte liderin farklı bir yapıda olması gerektiğini ileri sürüyor.

Bayan Thatcher'ın Fos Çıkan 'Devrimi'

1979 yılında iki hanesî rakamlara ulaşan bir enflasyon, duran yatırımlar ve carları iyi dönmeyen bir ekonomi devralan Bayan Thatcher'ın devleti ekonomiden çekerek ve serbest girişim yolunu açarak edata bir devrim yaptığı çok söylenir. Ne var ki bu göz boyayıcı niteliği ağır basan ve tamamen hizmet sektörüne dayanan bir 'devrim' di. 1979-88 döneminde İngiltere'de banka ve finans sektörlerinde yüzde 125'lik, işletim sektöründe yüzde 52'lik, dağıtım hizmetlerinde yüzde 44'lük yatırım sıçramaları olmuştur, ama sanayi ve tarım kesimindeki yatırımlar reel olarak yüzde 8 dolayında gerilemiştir.

Bu süreç sonunda 1990 yılında gelinen noktaya kadar parlık değil, IMF'nin son tahminlerine göre İngiltere gerek GSMH büyüme hızı, gerek enflasyon, gerek dış açık bakımından önde gelen sanayileşmiş ülkeler arasında en kötü performansa aday ülke. Geçen yıl bir ara yüzde 8'lere yükselen enflasyon bu yıl da yüzde 7'ye aşağıya, büyüme hızının yüzde 1 dolayında kalacağı, cari işlemler açığının GSMH'ye oranının ise yüzde 3'ü aşacağı tahmin ediliyor. Çeşitli anketler yatırım eğiliminin de hızla düştüğünü gösteriyor.

Genel ekonomi böylesine kötü giderken gelir dağılımının bozulması; eğitim, sağlık ve ulaşım hizmetlerinin kalitesinin düşmesi; altyapıların yetersizliği. Bayan Thatcher'a karşı duyulan tepkileri artırıyor. Tamamen adaletsiz bir vergi olan "baş vergisi"nin bu ortamda gündeme gelmesi Bayan Thatcher'a karşı duyulan tepkilerin birden açığa çıkmasına neden oldu ve çok sayıda kişimin yaralandığı gösterilere yol açtı. Bayan Thatcher'ın bir ara yüzde 60'a yaklaşılan seçmen desteğinin ise yüzde 20'ye kadar gerilediği görüldü.

IMF'İN 1990 TAHMİNLERİ

	GSMH Büyüme Hızı (%)	Enflasyon (%)	Cari Hesap GSMH (%)
JAPONYA	4.6	1.7	2.0
F. ALMANYA	3.2	2.5	4.9
FRANSA	3.1	3.1	3.0
İTALYA	3.0	5.5	-1.0
ABD	2.6	4.0	-2.0
KANADA	1.6	4.9	2.7
İNGİLTERE	1.3	7.2	-3.1

Thatcher'la başbaşa

ANKARA (Cumhuriyet Bürosu) — Çanakkale Savaşı şehitlerini anma töreni nedeniyle Türkiye'ye kısa süreli bir ziyaret yapacak olan İngiltere Başbakanı Margaret Thatcher ile Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal arasında gerçekleşecek baş başa görüşmede ekonomik konuların ağırlık taşıması bekleniyor. Thatcher ve Özal'ın Çanakkale'de "resmi" bir nitelik taşımayacak görüşmeleri sırasında, özelleştirme, işsizlik ve enflasyon gibi genel ekonomik konuların yanı sıra İngiliz şirketlerinin Türkiye'deki hizmet sektörüne artan ilgilerinin de gündeme geleceği öğrenildi.

İngiltere Başbakanı Margaret Thatcher'ın Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal'la yapacağı görüşmenin "nezaket" çerçevesinde gerçekleşeceğini hatırlatan diplomatik kaynaklara göre liderlerin iki ülkeyi ilgilendiren tüm genel konular üzerinde görüş alışverişinde bulunmaları bekleniyor. Ancak Türkiye'de iş yapan bazı İngiliz şirketlerinin çeşitli kanallardan Bayan Thatcher'a ilettikleri bilgiler çerçevesinde, görüşmede Samsun ili ve çevresi elektrik dağıtım hizmetlerini İngilizlerin üstlenmesi ve İngiliz bankalarının Türkiye'deki etkinliklerini arttırmalarının ikili işbirliğine olumlu katkıların ele alınması da bekleniyor.




Edinilen bilgiye göre kısa bir süre önce Samuel Montagu ile birleşen ve İngiltere'nin en büyük bankalarından biri olan Midland Bank'ın Türkiye'de özelleştirme alanındaki çalışmalarından sonra ticari bakıcılık alanında da etkin olmak amacıyla yaptığı şube açma başvurusu İngiltere Başbakanı tarafından "ikili ilişkilere

önemli bir gelişme" olarak dile getirilebilecek. İstanbul'a 24 nisan akşamı gelmesi ve hemen Çanakkale'ye geçmesi beklenen Bayan Thatcher'ın ayrıca Samsun ve çevresine elektrik dağıtım hizmetini üstlenen İngilizlerin eski devlet kuruluşu BEI'nin yapacağı çalışmanın önemine dikkat çekmesi de bekleniyor. Samsun yöresinde da-

ğıtım sisteminin eksikliği nedeniyle yaklaşık yüzde 25'e kadar çıkan elektrik kaybını önlemek amacıyla modern bir sistem geliştirilmesi hedefini de taşıyan yeni dağıtım hizmetlerini yürütecek Karadeniz Elektrik Şirketi AŞ, en büyük ortağı BEI olacak şekilde sembolik bir sermayeyle kurulmuş bulunuyor. Bu şirket Bakanlar Kurulu'ndan ilgili kararnamenin çıkmasından sonra devralma sözleşmesini imzayarak Samsun'da elektrik dağıtım hizmeti verecek.

İngiliz kaynakları, Türkiye'de önemli altyapı ve savunma projelerine etkin olan İngiliz şirketlerinin Türkiye'nin içinde bulunduğu ekonomik sorunlar ve genel politika tercihleri çerçevesinde giderek artan biçimde hizmet sektörüne yöneldiğini belirtiyorlar. İngiliz şirketlerinin 11 Ocak 1990'da sonuçlanan 200 milyon dolarlık telsiz ihalesi başta olmak üzere, alçak irtifa savunma sistemi, gece görüş cihazları üretimi, gaz maskesi imalatı ve uçaksavar topu atış kontrol sistemi gibi savunma ihalelerindeki etkinliği bilinirken köprü-baraj-karayolu-metro gibi alanlarda önemli deneyim sahibi olan İngilizlerin son dönemde Türkiye'nin bu alanda durgunlaşan yatırım pazarından "zorunlu bir çekilme" içinde oldukları kaydediliyor.

Cover Of Middle East Business & Banking (1988)



D. SELECTED TBMM MINUTES

Tbmm Minute On 'Suleyman The Magnificent' (1989)

T.B.M.M.

B : 62

22 . 2 . 1989

O : 2

davranış Türkiye Cumhuriyeti geleneklerine uygun mudur? Sayın Semra Özal'a bu gezisi nedeniyle harcırah ödenecek midir? Masrafları nasıl karşılanacaktır?"

BAŞKAN — Buyurun Sayın Bakan.

KÜLTÜR VE TURİZM BAKANI MUSTAFA TINAZ TİTİZ (Zonguldak) — Sayın Başkan, sayın milletvekilleri; açılışı İngiltere'de British Museum'da İngiltere Kraliyet Ailesinden Prenses Diana tarafından yapılan Kanunî Sultan Süleyman Sergisi sebebiyle Londra'ya giden Sayın Semra Özal; Leydi Diana tarafından yapılan açılış konuşmasına cevaben, mütebakiyet esasları çerçevesinde bir konuşma yapmıştır.

Konunun, Londra'da gazetecilerine gündeme getirilmesi üzerine, Londra Büyükelçiliğimizce, Sayın Semra Özal'ın, serginin açılışına herhangi bir resmî sıfatla katılmadığı vurgulanmıştır.

KAMER GENÇ (Tunceli) — Cevabı ne sıfatla vermiştir?

KÜLTÜR VE TURİZM BAKANI MUSTAFA TINAZ TİTİZ (Devamla) — Ulu Önder Atatürk'ün birçok Batı ülkesinden evvel Türk kadınına verdiği haklar ve gösterdiği güven çerçevesinde, bir başbakan eşinin, ülkemizi temsil eden bir serginin açılışında bulunmasının cumhuriyetimiz geleneklerinden kabul edilmesi doğal olmalıdır.

Kendileri, kararname çerçevesinde hak ettikleri harcırahlarını almamışlardır. Sayın Semra Özal için, sadece Türk Hava Yollarından ekonomi sınıfı bir bilet alınmıştır.

Arz ederim efendim. (ANAP sıralarından alkışlar)

BAŞKAN — Teşekkür ederim Sayın Bakan.

Sayın Gürseler, konuşacak mısınız efendim.

GÜNEŞ GÜRSELER (Tekirdağ) — Evet efendim.

BAŞKAN — Buyurunuz. (SHP sıralarından alkışlar)

GÜNEŞ GÜRSELER (Tekirdağ) — Sayın Başkan, sayın milletvekilleri; biraz önce Sayın Bakanın cevaplandığı sorunun verilmiş amacı, yapılmak istenen eylemin yanlışlığına dikkat çekmek ve böyle bir hatanın yapılmasına engel olmaktır; ama sonuç umduğumuz gibi olmadı. Sayın Bayan Özal, Londra'daki açılışta bulunmakla kalmadı, daha sonra, bir dizi serginin açılışını da yaptı; kendisine Sayın Kültür ve Turizm Bakanımız da refakat ettiler. Yani, soru önergemizi ve kamuoyunun o günlerdeki tepkisini, büyük bir pervasızlıkla, dikkate almadılar. Dönüşte de, Bayan Özal, Sayın Bakanı da yanına oturarak, havaalanında bir basın toplantısı yaptı ve oradaki izlenimlerini anlattı.

Sayın Bayan Özal'ın gezisiyle ilgili olarak, milyonlarca lira harlandı. Sayın Bakanımız, "Harcırah alınmadı" diyorlar ve o harcırahın da ne olduğunu bilmiyorum; ama yine de milyonlarca lira harlandı. Bunlardan bir tanesi gazetelerde de var; sadece zırlı araç kiralınması için 3 565 sterlin, yani o zamanki kurla 7 milyon 397 bin lira ödendi.

İktidar Partisinin değerli milletvekilleri; şimdi bu pervasızlığın nedeni, her şeyi, herkesi küçümsemenin kaynağı, sizlersiniz. Sizlerin, Özal Ailesine ve bu ailenin her türlü eylemine verdiğiniz açık ve sınırsız destek, onları bu hale getirdi. (SHP sıralarından "Bravo" sesleri, alkışlar) Ailenin iki üyesi bakan oldu, sustunuz. Büyük oğul, gölge başbakan oldu, prensler ithal etti, sustunuz. Yaşadığı milyarder hayatının kaynağı nedir, sormadınız. Kız, fakir bir müzisyenle evlendi, butik açtı, milyarder oldu; bu değirmenin suyu nereden gelir, bu itibar nedendir, sor-

E. INTERVIEWS

Dr. Mehmet Salih Uzun	The Final Chairman of ANAP, İzmir MP from DP	27.10.2021
Ertekin Durutürk	Former Isparta MP from DYP	8.11.2021
Faik Tunay	Former Istanbul MP from CHP & Former Vice Chairman of IYDU	15.10.2021
Gültekin Uysal	Former Afyonkarahisar MP and DP Chairman	5.10.2021
Nick De Bois	Former Conservative MP for Enfield North & Former Special Adviser and Chief of staff to the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union	5.10.2021
Prof. William Hale	Emeritus Professor Specialised on Turkey	11.11.2022
Sir Charles Powell (The Lord Powell of Bayswater)	Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister of the UK (1983-1991)	26.11.2022
Sir Timothy Daunt	Former British Ambassador to Turkey (1986-1992)	14.11.2022

F. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Üründül, Polat

Nationality: Turkish

E-mail:

Web: www.polaturundul.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
PhD	ODTÜ / METU – International Relations	2023
MA	Portsmouth – IR and European Studies	2016
BA	Bilkent – English Language and Literature	2015

MEMBERSHIPS

Ankara Galatasaray Executives and Businesspeople's Association

British Association for Turkish Area Studies

Past Memberships:

The Royal Institute of International Affairs - Chatham House, The Henry Jackson Society, Conservative Friends of Turkey, Turkish Student Union of UK.

G. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Bu tez, 1983-1993 yılları arasındaki İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerinin neoklasik realist bir analizini sunmaktadır. İki NATO müttefiki olan Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık, Birinci Dünya Savaşı haricinde, uzun bir geçmişe sahip iyi ilişkiler geliştirmişlerdir. Siyasi, ticari ve askeri ilişkilerinin yanı sıra, iki ülkenin Orta Doğu, Avrupa meseleleri ve ABD ile ilişkilerine dair dış politikaları genellikle uyum içindedir. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk tarafından modern Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasından sonra, Türkler ve İngilizler arasında Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında yaşanan düşmanlık geride bırakılmış ve ikili ilişkiler 1939 yılında Üçlü İttifak Antlaşması ile ittifaka dönüştürülmüştür. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sona ermesinin ardından Türkiye, Sovyet tehdidi nedeniyle İngiliz ve Amerikalılarla birlikte Kore'ye asker göndermiş, NATO'ya üye olmuştur. İngiliz-Türk ilişkileri, 1980'lerin başında Türkiye'nin diğer batılı ülkelerle ilişkilerinin bozulmasına rağmen gelişmeye devam etmiş ve 1983'te Turgut Özal'ın iktidara gelmesiyle zirveye ulaşmıştır.

Bu tezde, Türkiye'de Turgut Özal döneminde İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerindeki temel faktörlerin gözlemlenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Bu çalışma 1983 ve 1993 yılları arasındaki döneme odaklanmaktadır çünkü bu yıllarda iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler tüm zamanların en iyi seviyesine ulaşmıştır. İkili ilişkilerin zirveye ulaşmasındaki ana etmenleri anlamak için 1983 ve 1993 yılları arasındaki zaman dilimi, Turgut Özal'ın 1983 yılında Türkiye Başbakanı olarak seçilmesini ve 1993 yılına kadar cumhurbaşkanı olarak görev yapmasını ve Thatcher'ın 1990 yılındaki istifasından sonraki dönemi kapsadığı için incelenmeye değerdir. Söz konusu on yıl aynı zamanda Türkiye'de Süleyman Demirel'in başbakanlığındaki koalisyon hükümeti dönemini ve Birleşik Krallık'ta John Major'ın başbakanlığı dönemini de kapsamaktadır. Ancak liderler arasındaki benzerliklerden kaynaklı olarak tez, esasen Thatcher ve Özal dönemine odaklanmaktadır.

Bu tezde neoklasik realizm teorisine dayalı olarak dış kısıtlamaların, liderliğin ve iç teşviklerin rolü analiz edilecektir. Konu hakkında sağlanan bilgiler ağırlıklı olarak birincil kaynaklara dayanmaktadır. Dış politika yapımına dair neoklasik realist varsayımları da teyit eden bu çalışma, 1983-1993 yılları arasında İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerinin gelişiminde en önemli faktörün dış kısıtlamalar olduğunu savunmaktadır. Margaret Thatcher, Turgut Özal ve diğer dış politika yöneticileri de Türkler ve İngilizler arasındaki ilişkinin gelişiminde son derece önemli bir rol oynarken, iç teşviklerin rolü ikili ilişkilerde sınırlıdır.

Bununla uyumlu bir biçimde, neoklasik realizm de Kenneth Waltz'un üç analiz düzeyinden özellikle ikinci ve üçüncü düzeye odaklanmaktadır. Kenneth Waltz'un ilk düzeyi bireylere odaklanırken, ikinci ve üçüncü düzeyler uluslararası ilişkilerdeki çatışmayı açıklarken devlete ve uluslararası sisteme odaklanır. Neoklasik realizm, klasik realizmi veya neorealizmi çürütmeyi amaçlamamaktadır. Ancak, devletlerin dış politikalarını incelemek için daha geniş bir analiz aracı sağlar. Neoklasik realizm, klasik realistlerin yaptığı gibi bireylerin dış politikadaki rolünü dış politika analizine geri getirmektedir. Esasen, neoklasik realistler liderlerin dış kısıtlamalara ilişkin algılarını ve bu kısıtlamalara verdikleri tepkileri anlamaya çalışırlar. Bunu yaparken liderler ve dış politika elitleri iç dinamikleri bir bilgi kaynağı olarak kullanırlar.

Neoklasik realistler için liderlerin ve dış politika elitlerinin sahip olduğu fikirler ve algılar dış politika kararlarını etkileyebilir. Liderlerin güvenlik, ulusal çıkarlar ve büyük stratejiye ilişkin algıları önemlidir. Neoklasik realistler, liderlerin ve elitlerin sistemik baskıları güç dağılımı algıları ve iç teşvikleri yorumlamaları yoluyla anlamlandırdıklarını savunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla liderler ve elitler, iç politika ve uluslararası kısıtlamalar arasındaki kesişme noktasında kritik bir konuma sahiptir. Neoklasik realistler, devletlerin dış politika yapımı sırasında hem iç hem de uluslararası düzeyde karşılaştıkları zorlukları ve fırsatları incelemeye çalışırlar. Ayrıca, neoklasik realist varsayımların yardımıyla, dış politika elitlerinin ve liderlerin iç teşviklerin yardımıyla ulusal çıkarlara nasıl karar verdikleri ve görece güç kabiliyetlerini ve dış kısıtlamaları nasıl yorumladıkları analiz edilebilir. Neoklasik realistler liderlerin bu değişkenleri kendi dünya görüşleri, geçmişleri ve kişilikleri

üzerinden yorumladıklarını da kabul ederler. Dolayısıyla neoklasik realizmin, Turgut Özal ve Margaret Thatcher'ın iktidarda olduğu dönemde Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık dış politikalarını ve iki ülkenin birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerini analiz etmek için uygun bir teori olduğu söylenebilir. Ayrıca, Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık'ın karşılaştığı dış kısıtlamalar 1983-1993 yılları arasında dış politika yapımında diğer faktörlerden çok daha belirleyici olmuştur ve bu ülkelerin liderleri Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu (AET) ile ilişkiler, Körfez Savaşı ve Sovyet tehdidi gibi benzer dış kısıtlamalarla karşılaşmışlardır. Özal ve Thatcher dönemlerinde Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık'ın dış politikaları incelendiğinde, bu liderlerin dış kısıtlamaları yorumlamalarında bir uyum olduğu ve her iki liderin de dış politika yapım süreçlerinde iç politikaya yeterince önem verdiği söylenebilir. Bu bağlamda neoklasik realist varsayımlara uygun olarak, Turgut Özal ve Margaret Thatcher'ın dünya görüşleri ve kişiliklerinden kaynaklanan dış politika anlayışları da ikili ilişkilere etki anlamında dış faktörlerden sonra ikinci sırada gelmektedir.

Turgut Özal'ın iktidarda olduğu dönemde Türkiye'nin pro-aktif, girişimci, iddialı, batı odaklı ve çok boyutlu bir dış politika anlayışına sahip olduğu söylenebilir. Turgut Özal, Orta Asya, Orta Doğu ve Balkanlar'daki ülkelerle, Türkiye ile olan tarihi ve kültürel bağlarına dayanarak ilişkilerini geliştirmek istemiştir. Ayrıca, ABD'nin söz konusu bölgelerdeki nüfuzunu kullanarak başta ABD olmak üzere batılı ülkelerle uyumlu bir dış politika izlemeyi amaçlamıştır. Ancak Özal ve çevresindeki elitler, ülkelerinin uluslararası politikada, özellikle de ticari amaçlarla, özerkliğe sahip olmasını da amaçlamışlardır. Özal bunu yaparken muhalefetin, bürokrasinin ve ordunun meydan okumalarıyla karşılaşmış; ancak o, bu tür kısıtlamaları olabildiğince göz ardı etmeyi ve çevresindeki elitlerden oluşan küçük bir gruba danışarak karar vermeyi tercih etmiştir. Turgut Özal'ın dünya ile ekonomik ilişkilere ve iç politikada demokrasi ve insan haklarına elinden geldiğince önem verdiği de iddia edilmektedir. Özal'ın iç politikadaki liberalleşme politikalarının, dünyada Yeni Sağ politikaların yükselişinin bir yansıması olduğu görülebilir. Ronald Reagan ve Margaret Thatcher'ın ülkelerinde iktidara gelmeleri dünyada liberal politikaların yükseleceğine dair beklentileri artırmıştır. Turgut Özal da bu beklentilere uyum sağlamak için Türkiye'de liberal politikalar uygulamış ve ülkesini dünya ile bütünleştirmeye çalışmıştır. Bu durum Türkiye ile ABD ve Birleşik Krallık gibi ülkeler arasında yakınlaşmaya da yol

açmıştır. Dolayısıyla, Özal'ın ulusal ve uluslararası düzeydeki meselelere yaklaşımının liderlerin uluslararası alanda iç siyasetten kaynaklanan nedenlerle, iç politikada ise uluslararası amaçlarla hareket edebileceği şeklindeki neoklasik realist varsayımına uyumlu olduğu söylenebilir.

Tıpkı Özal gibi, Margaret Thatcher'ın mirasının tartışmalı olduğu ve onu destekleyenlerin yanı sıra eleştirenlerin de her zaman var olduğu görülmektedir. İç politikada Thatcher'ın temel amacı İngiliz ekonomisini toparlamak, kamu hayatını yeniden yapılandırmak ve terörizmle mücadele etmek olarak görülebilir. Dış politikada ise Thatcher, batının Soğuk Savaş'ta kesin bir zafer kazanmasına katkıda bulunmuş, Birleşik Krallık'ın dünya siyasetindeki etkisini artırmış ve ulusal egemenlik ilkesini dikkate alarak daha aktif ve iddialı bir dış politika anlayışı benimsemiştir. Margaret Thatcher'ın başbakanlığının ilk yıllarında iç politikanın dış politikaya göre öncelikli olduğu düşünülebilirse ancak, Thatcher'ın görevde olduğu dönemde dış kısıtlamaların her zaman İngiliz dış politikasının en önemli itici gücü olduğu söylenebilir.

Thatcher dönemine bakıldığında iç politika, dış politika yapımı söz konusu olduğunda önemli bir rol oynamamıştır. Thatcher'a göre Birleşik Krallık ABD'nin güçlü bir ortağı olmalıydı ve komünizmi yenmeye kararlıydı. Bunun nedeni kısmen Thatcher'ın İkinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinde büyümüş olması ve Kuzey Kore'nin yarattığı dehşeti görmüş olmasıdır. Thatcher, demokrasiye ve hukukun üstünlüğüne inanan biriydi. Diktatörlüğü reddediyor ve ABD'nin Birleşik Krallık ile ortaklaşa güçlü bir liderlik yapması gerektiğine inanmıştır. Margaret Thatcher'ın dış politikası, ülkesinin ve dünyadaki demokratik, hukukun üstünlüğü sisteminin desteklenmesi için güçlü bir muhafazakâr dış politika olarak görülebilir.

Turgut Özal ve Margaret Thatcher'ın başbakanlıkları dönemindeki dış politikalarının ve ikili ilişkilerin kişisel tercihlerden ziyade zorunluluk ve karşılıklı çıkarıya dayandığı, iki ülkenin karşı blokla yaşadığı sorunların ve kendi müttefikleriyle olan ilişkilerinin ikili ilişkiler üzerinde büyük etkiye sahip olduğu söylenebilir. Bu arada, Özal ve Thatcher'ın savaş sonrası iki kutuplu dünyanın bir ürünü olarak görülebilecek kişilikleri ve liderlikleri ikili ilişkilerde önemli faktörler olurken, iç politikanın ikili

ilişkiler de dahil olmak üzere dış politika tercihleri üzerinde çok az etkisi olduğu görülmektedir.

Turgut Özal ve Margaret Thatcher'ın içeride ve dışarıda ekonomiye verdikleri önem, iç politikada popülaritelerini artırmalarıyla da ilgili olabilir. İki ülke arasındaki ekonomik iş birliğinin çok önemli olduğunu ve özellikle İngilizlerin Türkiye'yi önemli bir pazar olarak gördüklerini belirtmek gerekir. Bu, iç politikanın dış politika üzerindeki dolaylı bir etkisi olarak görülebilir. Ancak Birleşik Krallık, 1980 askeri darbesinden sonra yaşanan insan hakları ihlallerine ve İngiliz toplumunda Türkiye'ye yönelik eleştirilere rağmen Türkiye ile ilişkilerine önem vermeye devam etmiştir. İngilizler ayrıca Türkiye'yi terörle mücadelesinde desteklemiş ve İngiliz iç siyasetinde Türkiye'nin Kürtler üzerindeki baskısına yönelik eleştirilere rağmen PKK ile sivil Kürtler arasında net bir ayırım yapmıştır. Buna karşın Türkiye'de dış politika yapımında iç teşviklerin etkisi kısıtlı olsa da daha önemlidir. Özal, Türkiye'nin Körfez Savaşı'na aktif olarak katılmasını istemesine rağmen, Cumhurbaşkanı olduktan sonra yetkilerinin sınırlı olması ve Türk kamuoyunun batının Irak'taki niyetlerine şüpheyle yaklaşması nedeniyle bunu yapamamıştır.

Tezde ayrıca 1983-1993 yılları arasında Türk-İngiliz ilişkilerinde ve Türklerin ve İngilizlerin dış politikalarında Soğuk Savaş, Avrupa ile ilişkiler ve Körfez Savaşı gibi dış kısıtlamaların rolü detaylıca incelenmektedir. 1983 ve 1993 yılları arasında Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık'ın Soğuk Savaş politikaları arasında bir uyum söz konusudur. Uluslararası sistemde istikrarı destekleyen ve hegemonik devletin liderliğini destekleyen bu iki ülke, neoliberal ekonomi politikalarını ve dünyadaki demokratikleşme eğilimini desteklemiştir. Sovyetler konusunda aynı kaygıları taşıyan Türkler ve İngilizler, Orta Doğu ve Doğu Avrupa'da da birbirlerinininkine benzer politikalar izlemişlerdir. Bununla birlikte Birleşik Krallık, Kıbrıs meselesine fazla müdahil olarak Yunanistan'ı veya Türkiye'yi batı dünyasından uzaklaştırmak istememiştir. Aynı zamanda garantörlerden biri olan Birleşik Krallık gibi uluslararası ilişkilerde önemli bir aktörün, Kıbrıs'ta olduğu gibi Türkiye'ye karşı bir politika izlememesi Türklerin lehine işlemiştir. Hem Orta Doğu hem de Avrupa ile bağları olan ve stratejik öneme sahip Türkiye'nin batı yanlısı bir politika izlemesi de Birleşik Krallık'ın bu bölgelerdeki politikalarını kolaylaştırmıştır. Ayrıca her iki ülkenin de

geçmişte Kıbrıs ve Süveyş Krizleri nedeniyle hegemon devlet ABD ile yaşadığı sorunlar, 80'li yıllarda Türk-İngiliz ilişkilerini savunma ve ticari ilişkiler açısından olumlu etkilemiş olabilir. Çünkü her iki ülke de savunma sanayinin önemini farkında olmuşlar ve yakın geçmişte ekonomik sorunlar yaşadıkları için dış politikalarında ticaret büyük önem vermişlerdir.

Birleşik Krallık, Irak'a yönelik hava ve kara operasyonlarına katılarak koalisyon güçlerine en büyük katkıyı yapan ikinci ülke olmuştur. Operasyonlar sırasında koalisyona ev sahipliği yaparak sağladığı lojistik destek, Iraklı mültecilere yönelik yaklaşımı ve Irak'a uygulanan ekonomik ambargoya destek olması sebebi ile Türkiye, savaşın önemli aktörlerinden olmuştur. Bu minvalde Türkler ve İngilizler arasındaki askeri iş birliği Kore Savaşı'ndan bu yana ilk kez bu boyuta ulaşmıştır. Irak'a müdahale konusunda Amerikalılar ve İngilizlerle neredeyse fikir birliği içinde olan Türkiye, savaştan kaynaklanan güvenlik kaygıları karşısında Birleşik Krallık ve ABD'den büyük destek görmüştür. Türkiye'nin Birleşik gibi bir Avrupa ülkesinden destek alırken, Almanya gibi çok iyi ilişkiler içinde olduğu diğer ülkelerle güvenlik kaygıları açısından küçük anlaşmazlıklar yaşaması dikkat çekicidir. Aslında bu durum Türkiye'nin batılı müttefikleriyle iş birliğinin genel durumunu yansıtmaktadır. Türkiye, ABD ve Birleşik Krallık ile ilişkilerini diğer Batılı ülkelerle olan ilişkilerinden farklı görmüştür. Bu yaklaşım Türkiye'nin AT politikalarına da yansımıştır. Avrupalılarla zaman zaman sorun yaşayan ancak Avrupa'nın bir parçası olarak kalmak isteyen iki ülke olan Birleşik Krallık ve Türkiye, Avrupa politikaları konusunda da benzer görüşlere sahiptir.

Türkiye'nin AT ile ilişkileri de ikircikli olmuştur. AET kurulduktan iki yıl sonra, Türkiye 1959 yılında AET'ye ortaklık başvurusunda bulunmuştur. Türkiye ile AET arasındaki ortaklığı kuran Ankara Anlaşması 1963 yılında imzalanmıştır. Birleşik Krallık, AT üyelik sürecinde Türkiye'nin en önemli ortaklarından biri olmuştur. İngilizler Türkiye'nin tam üyelik başvurusu yapması için erken olduğunu düşünse de bu görüşünü çok dikkatli bir şekilde dile getirmiş ve Türkiye'nin üyeliğine hiçbir zaman açıkça karşı çıkmamıştır. Tıpkı Birleşik Krallık gibi, Türkiye de kendisini Avrupa'ya yabancılaşmış ve kendini izole edilmiş hissetmiştir ve Türklerin Birleşik Krallık'ı oradaki tek güvenilir dostlarından biri olarak gördükleri iddia edilmiştir. Bu

arada İngilizler, Türkiye'nin Avrupa'nın yaşamında rol oynaması gerektiğini ve Türkiye'nin AT ile Ortaklık Anlaşması'nın İngiliz çıkarlarına uygun olduğunu düşünüyorlardı. Türkiye demokrasiye döndükten sonra AT'nin Türkiye ile ilişkilerinin yeniden başlatılması gündeme geldiğinde, Yunanlar ve Danimarkalılar buna karşı çıkmışlardır. Birleşik Krallık, Türklerden demokrasi konusunda ilerleme kaydetmeye devam etmelerini isteyerek bu anlamda yapıcı bir rol oynamaya çalışmış ve bu konuyu Danimarka ve Yunanistan ile görüşmelerde çözmeye gayret etmiştir. Benzer şekilde, 1985 yılında Türkiye'nin bir yıl süreyle Avrupa Konseyi başkan yardımcılığı söz konusu olduğunda, başlangıçta Türkiye'nin ilk destekçisi İngilizler olmuştur. Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık arasında Avrupa meselelerine ilişkin iyi ilişkiler Avrupa güvenliğine ilişkin konulara da yansımıştır. Örnek vermek gerekirse; 1990'ların başında Avrupa güvenliğinin geleceği konusunda Avrupa ülkeleri arasında bir bölünme olmuştur ESDP ile ilgili tartışmalar devam ederken, Birleşik Krallık'ın da aralarında bulunduğu bazı ülkeler Avrupa savunma politikasının NATO çerçevesinde ele alınması gerektiğini savunmuş ve Atlantikçiler olarak adlandırılmışlardır. Onların Avrupa güvenliğine ilişkin görüşleri NATO merkezli iken, 'Avrupacılar' olarak adlandırılan diğer grup Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ABD'nin aşırı etkisini dengeleyecek bir Avrupa dış ve güvenlik politikası öngörmüştür. Atlantikçilerin çabaları sonucunda yeni Avrupa güvenlik mimarisi NATO'nun Avrupa ayağı olarak işlev görmüş ve AB üyesi olmayan NATO üyelerinin AB operasyonlarına katılımı meselesi Amerikalılar ve İngilizlerin yardımıyla çözüldükten sonra Türkiye gelecekte Avrupa güvenliğine daha kolay dahil olabilmıştır.

Türkiye'deki 1980 askeri darbesinden sonra, Türkler Birleşik Krallık ile istikrarlı bir ilişki sürdürmeyi başarırken, diğer batılı müttefikleriyle ilişkileri demokrasinin ortadan kalkması ve askeri rejimin insan haklarını ihlal etmesi nedeniyle kötüleşmiştir. Türk demokrasisinin restorasyonu ve Turgut Özal'ın 1983 yılında Başbakan olmasıyla birlikte, Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık arasındaki siyasi ve diplomatik ilişkiler İngiliz diplomatlara göre tüm zamanların en iyi seviyesine ulaşmıştır. Turgut Özal iktidara geldiğinde, tıpkı Margaret Thatcher'ın ilk günlerinde Falkland Savaşı ile karşılaşması gibi, Kıbrıs sorunuyla ilgili önemli bir gelişmeye tanık olmuştur. Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti (KKTC), 1983 yılında Turgut Özal'ın seçimi kazanmasından sadece bir hafta sonra bağımsızlığını ilan etmiştir. Adadaki garantör güçlerden biri olan Birleşik

Krallık bu ilanı kınamış ve KKTC'nin bağımsızlığını tanımamıştır. Hatta Margaret Thatcher Kıbrıslı Türklerin hükümetini "yasadışı rejim" olarak nitelendirmiştir ancak bu gelişmeler Turgut Özal'ın Türkiye'de Başbakan olmasından sonra Türkiye ile Birleşik Krallık arasında ciddi bir soruna yol açmamış, daha sonra ilişkilerdeki ivme hızlanmıştır. Kıbrıs sorununa gelince, İngilizlerin geleneksel politikası, adadaki herhangi bir tarafa karşı hareket ederek ikili ilişkileri tehlikeye atacak şekilde Türkiye veya Yunanistan'ı yalnızlaştırmamaya özen göstermek şeklinde olmuştur. İngilizler krizin müzakereler yoluyla çözülmesini ve uluslararası toplumun Türkiye ve Yunanistan üzerinde baskı kurmasını istemiş, NATO ve BM'yi bu süreçte önemli bir aktör olarak görmüştür.

Margaret Thatcher Birleşik Krallık'ta ikinci kez başbakan seçildiğinde, "1979-83 Muhafazakâr Parti hükümeti Türkler tarafından Batı Avrupa'daki en yakın müttefik olarak görüldüğünden, böyle bir seçim sonucu Türk halkı tarafından memnuniyetle karşılanmıştır. Muhafazakârların Avrupa Konseyi Parlamenter Meclisi'nde Türkiye'ye verdiği destek, Muhafazakâr Parti hükümetinin Türkiye'deki popülaritesinde çok önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığı'ndan bazı yetkililere göre Birleşik Krallık, ABD'den sonra Türkiye'nin en yakın müttefikiydi ve Muhafazakârların ülkelerindeki zaferi ilişkilerin daha da gelişmesine yardımcı olacaktı. İngiliz Büyükelçiliği'nden Birleşik Krallık Dışişleri Bakanlığı'na gönderilen bir mektupta, Thatcher ve Özal'ın politikaları arasındaki benzerliklerin Türkiye'de Muhafazakârların ve İngilizlerin olumlu bir imaja sahip olmasında rol oynadığı belirtilmektedir. Ancak mektuptan, İngilizlerin Türkiye'deki popülaritesinde Birleşik Krallık'ın Türkiye'ye yönelik tutumunun daha öncelikli bir etkiye sahip olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, İngiliz-Türk ilişkileri Türkiye'deki askeri rejim altında bile gelişmeye devam etmiş ve Birleşik Krallık tarafından Türkiye'deki mevcut askeri yönetimin İngiliz çıkarlarına iyi hizmet ettiği düşünülmüştür. Bunda Türklerin İngilizlerden aldığı destek ve Türkiye'nin batı için stratejik önemi rol oynamıştır. İngiliz Büyükelçi Sir P. Laurence'ın 'Türkler ve Bizim İçin Anlamı' başlıklı veda yazısında, Türkiye'de insan haklarına ve demokrasiye önem veren iyi bir hükümet gerektiği, çünkü Türklerin yurtdışında çok eleştirildiği ve Türkiye'nin batının yanında olmasının her iki tarafın da yararına olduğu belirtilmiştir. Turgut Özal Türkiye'de iktidara geldiğinde, yaptığı

reformlar Türkiye'nin batıdaki imajına katkıda bulunmuş ve bu da Türkler ile İngilizler arasındaki ilişkilerin daha da iyileşmesine yol açmıştır.

1983'teki ilk demokratik seçimlerin ardından Türkiye'de yeni hükümetin seçilmesinden sonra Birleşik Krallık, özellikle Türkiye'ye yönelik özel yardım programının önündeki engelin kaldırılması yoluyla Türkiye ile AT arasındaki ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi için lobi faaliyetlerinde bulunmuştur. Birleşik Krallık, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Konseyi Parlamenterler Meclisi'ne yeniden kabul edilmesinde önemli bir rol oynamış ve bunun sonucunda İngiliz Milletvekili Sir F. Bennett'e İstanbul Üniversitesi'nden fahri doktora unvanı verilmiştir. Haziran 1984'te Türkiye'yi ziyaret eden İngiliz Parlamentosu'ndaki İngiliz-Türk Parlamenter Grubu'nun Türkiye'deki eşdeğerinin kurulmasına ilişkin görüşmeler de aynı yıla rastlamıştır. Birleşik Krallık'ın Muhafazakar hükümeti ve parlamenterleri, Türkiye'deki askeri rejim döneminde yaşanan insan hakları ihlalleri konusunda İşçi Partisi'nden gelen baskılara rağmen Türkiye ile iyi ilişkilerini sürdürmeyi ve Türkleri uluslararası arenada desteklemeyi başarmıştır. İşçi Partisi'nin Türkiye'deki insan hakları konusundaki eleştirileri Muhafazakârların Türkiye'ye yönelik tutumunu değiştirmemiş olsa da, ikili görüşmelerde insan hakları konusu her zaman ele alınmış ve İngilizler, Türkleri eleştirmeden insan hakları konusunda ilerleme kaydetmeleri için teşvik etmiştir.

Türkiye 1985 yılında Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu'nda Falkland meselesiyle ilgili olarak İngiliz çıkarları aleyhine oy kullandığında, İngilizler bu gelişme karşısında hayal kırıklığına uğramışlardır. Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığı Türk oyu için özür dilemiş ve bunun Ankara'nın konuyla ilgili tutumunu temsil etmediğini açıklamıştır. Böylece olayın ikili ilişkiler üzerinde büyük bir etkisi olmamıştır. Kasım ve Aralık 1985'te Türkiye'den yedi heyet Birleşik Krallık'ta çeşitli alanlarda araştırma yapmak üzere Londra'yı ziyaret etmiştir. Aynı günlerde TBMM'deki Türk-İngiliz Dostluk Grubu'ndan bir heyet de Birleşik Krallık'a gitmiştir. Turgut Özal, 1985 yılında New York'ta BM'nin 40. Yıl Kutlamaları çerçevesinde verilen bir öğle yemeğinde Margaret Thatcher ve Herr Kohl'ün arasında oturmuştur. Turgut Özal, Thatcher ile konuşmaktan keyif aldığını ve çok iyi anlaştıklarına inandığını ifade etmiştir.

Özal'ın 1986 yılında KKTC'ye yaptığı ziyaret Birleşik Krallık'ta geniş yankı uyandırmıştır. İngilizler Kıbrıs sorununa temkinli yaklaşıtları için her iki taraftan da itidalli olmalarını istemekle yetinmişlerdir. Bunun üzerine Birleşik Krallık'ın Atina Büyükelçisi Yunan Dışışleri Bakanlığı'na çağrılarak İngilizlerin Özal ziyaretini protesto etmedeki başarısızlığı şikayet edilmiştir. Aynı yıl içinde Turgut Özal Birleşik Krallık'a çok başarılı bir ziyaret gerçekleştirmiştir. Özal, Adnan Menderes'ten bu yana Birleşik Krallık'ı ziyaret eden ilk başbakan olmuştur. Ziyaretle ilgili tek sorun Margaret Thatcher'ın Özal'la yediğı yemekte farkında olmadan 'Türk düşmanı' olarak bilinen Lord Byron'dan alıntı yaparak yaptığı gaftır. Sonunda İngiliz Büyükelçiliğı sözcüsü Chilcott yaşananlardan üzüntü duyduklarını açıklamış ve Thatcher'ın gafı ikili ilişkilere herhangi bir zarar vermeden unutulmuştur. Aslında Thatcher, Özal'la yediğı yemekte çok sıcak bir konuşma yapmış ve politikalarının Thatcher'cı değil Özal'cı olduğunu iddia eden bir gazete haberinden bahsetmiş, bunu bir iltifat olarak kabul ettiğini söylemiştir.

1986 yılında, Bulgaristan doğumlu Türk kökenli Dünya Halter Şampiyonu Naim Süleymanoğlu, Avustralya'da yarıştığı sırada iltica etmiş ve kendisine Türkiye'de sığınma hakkı verilmiştir. Süleymanoğlu Ankara'ya Londra üzerinden gitmiş ve İngiliz yetkililer Süleymanoğlu Heathrow Havaalanı'ndayken Türk Büyükelçiliğı'ne protokol ve güvenlik düzenlemeleri konusunda yardımcı olmuştur. Bulgaristan'daki Türk azınlığın yaşadığı sorunlar Türkiye'de önemli bir mesele olduğundan, Süleymanoğlu'nun ilticasına yönelik İngiliz yardımı Türkler tarafından takdirle karşılanmıştır. Birleşik Krallık'ın Süleymanoğlu'na yardımı aynı zamanda Bulgaristan'daki Türk azınlığa destek olarak da algılanmıştır. Nitekim ilerleyen yıllarda Bulgaristan'daki Türk azınlığın hakları İngiliz yetkililer için önemli bir konu haline gelmiş ve Birleşik Krallık'ın bu konudaki politikaları Türk-İngiliz ilişkilerini olumlu yönde etkilemiştir.

Birleşik Krallık'ın Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun Ermenistan kararına ilişkin açıklaması da Türkler tarafından büyük takdirle karşılanmıştır. İngilizler Ermenistan konusunda Türkiye'ye sempati duyuyorlardı, çünkü Kuzey İrlanda gibi hassas konularda kendileri de bazı kararlarla yüzleşmek zorunda kalıyorlardı. Birleşik Krallık Dışışleri Bakanı Howe'a göre Halefoğlu, Türkiye'yi bu konuda doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak

destekleyecek her türlü sözün takdir edileceğini ve Türk hükümetine içeride çok yardımcı olacağını savunmuştur. Aslında, Türkiye ile Topluluk arasındaki ilişkilerin yeniden başlatılması aşamasında Birleşik Krallık'ın Dönem Başkanlığı rolü, İngilizlerin Türkleri Avrupa'nın yanında görmek istediklerini, ancak katılım konusunda Türkiye'ye karşı dürüst olmayı tercih ettiklerini göstermektedir. Thatcher ve Özal, Uluslararası Demokratlar Birliği toplantısı için Berlin'de bir araya geldiklerinde, Thatcher bu görüşlerini bir kez daha açıkça ortaya koymuştur. İngiliz Büyükelçisi Sir Timothy Daunt'a göre ikili ilişkiler bu yıllarda 'yeni bir zirveye' ulaşmıştır.

1988 yılında Türk sığınmacıların ülkelerini terk ederek Avrupa ülkelerine gitmeleri özellikle Almanya'da büyük bir soruna yol açmıştır. Bunun üzerine AT düzeyinde Türk vatandaşlarına vize rejimi uygulanması önerisi yapılmış ve Alman yetkililer Türklere vize uygulaması için İngilizlere baskı yapmaya başlamıştır. İngilizler ilk başta vize uygulamasının AT ile ilişkilerini yumuşatmaya çalışan Türklere yanlış bir mesaj vereceğini ve İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerine zarar vereceğini düşünmüşlerdir. Ancak sonunda, Türk sığınmacılar için en popüler destinasyonlardan biri olan bir ülke olarak Türk vatandaşlarına uygulamak zorunda kalmışlardır. Buna karşılık Türkiye de aralarında Birleşik Krallık'ın da bulunduğu ülkelere misilleme olarak vize rejimi uygulamaya başlamıştır.

Margaret Thatcher, Winston Churchill'den bu yana Türkiye'yi ziyaret eden ilk İngiliz Başbakanı olarak 1988 yılında Türkiye'ye gelmiştir. Thatcher ziyaretinden önce ünlü Türk televizyon sunucusu Mehmet Ali Birand'a bir mülakat vermiş, mülakat sırasında ziyaretinin Türkiye ile Birleşik Krallık arasındaki dostluğun canlı ve gelişmekte olduğunu göstermeyi amaçladığını söylemiştir. Thatcher ayrıca Birand'a Özal'ın politikalarına hayran olduğunu ve ikisinin birbirine çok benzediğini ifade etmiştir. Birleşik Krallık Başbakanı ziyareti sırasında İstanbul Belediye Başkanı Bedrettin Dalan ile de bir araya gelmiş ve bir İngiliz firmasının üzerinde çalıştığı Ankara doğalgaz santralinin temel atma törenine katılmıştır.

Margaret Thatcher 1990 yılında Çanakkale anma törenleri için Türkiye'yi ziyaret etmiş, Cumhurbaşkanı Özal ve Başbakan Yıldırım Akbulut ile görüşmelerde

bulunmuştur. Bu Özal ve Thatcher arasındaki son karşılıklı ziyaretir. Thatcher'ın ziyareti Türk basınında büyük yankı uyandırmış, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi Thatcher'ın Türkiye ziyaretini 21 Nisan'da "Thatcher ile baş başa" başlığıyla duyurmuştur. Londra'daki British Museum'da 1987 yılında düzenlenen 'Muhteşem Süleyman' Sergisi, İngiliz-Türk kültürel ilişkilerinde bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Sergi Margaret Thatcher, Prenses Charles ve Prenses Diana tarafından da ziyaret edilmiştir. Sergi Prenses Diana tarafından açılmış ve Cumhurbaşkanı Özal'ın eşi Semra Özal açılışta bir konuşma yapmıştır. Semra Özal'ın sergiye katılımı ve konuşması TBMM'de tartışmalara neden olmuştur. Turgut Özal'ın Cumhurbaşkanı olması ve yeni hükümetin kurulmasının ardından Dışişleri Bakanı SHP'li Hikmet Çetin, 1992 yılında Birleşik Krallık Dışişleri Bakanı'na, Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı François Mitterrand ile Galatasaray Üniversitesi'nin kurulması için yapılan anlaşmaya atıfta bulunarak Türkiye'de bir İngiliz üniversitesi kurulmasını teklif etse de, İngilizler, Türkiye'de bir İngiliz üniversitesi kurulması için henüz erken olduğunu belirtmişlerdir.

1980'li yıllarda zirveye ulaşan siyasi ve diplomatik ilişkiler, savunma ve ekonomi alanlarındaki ilişkilere de yansımıştır. Turgut Özal döneminde Türk ordusu modernize edilmiş ve İngilizler bu konuda Türklere destek olmak istemiştir. İngilizler, mali yardım sorunu nedeniyle Türklere Almanya kadar askeri teçhizat ihraç edemese de Türk savunma sanayinin gelişmesine büyük katkılarda bulunmuşlardır. Ekonomik ilişkilerde ise Türkiye ile Birleşik Krallık arasındaki ticaretin düzenli olarak arttığı, her iki ülkede karşılıklı yatırımlar yapıldığı ve dünyanın farklı bölgelerinde ortak iş birliği arayışına girildiği görülmektedir.

Türkiye ile Birleşik Krallık arasındaki askeri ilişkiler 1983 yılından sonra daha iyi bir seyir izlemeye başlamıştır. Thatcher hükümeti için Türkiye önemli bir NATO müttefikiydi, dolayısıyla Birleşik Krallık, Türkiye'nin savunma sanayi altyapısını kurma çabalarını her zaman destekleyecekti. Kıbrıs müdahalesi ve 1980 askeri darbesinin ardından yaşanan insan hakları ihlalleri nedeniyle Türkiye, batılı müttefikleriyle savunma sanayii konusunda birçok sorun yaşamıştı. Aynı zamanda Türkiye, ordusunu modernize etmesi gereken bir NATO ülkesi olduğu için İngilizlerin askeri teçhizat sattığı önemli bir pazardı. Diğer batılı ülkelerle karşılaştırıldığında Birleşik Krallık, Türklere askeri teçhizat satışı konusunda daha ticari ve pragmatik bir yaklaşım

benimsemiştir. Dolayısıyla 1983 yılı hem Türkiye'nin savunma sanayii hem de Türk-İngiliz askeri işbirliği için bir dönüm noktası olmuştur.

Türkiye ilk olarak 1983 yılında Birleşik Krallık'tan Rapier ve Sea Skua sipariş etmiştir. Bu siparişlerin toplam değeri 164 milyon sterlindir. Türk ve İngiliz yetkililer arasında, İngiliz savunma ve teknoloji sistemlerinin Türk savunma üretim kabiliyetine nasıl katkıda bulunabileceği konusunda görüşmeler de başlamıştır. BAe, Rapier satışında tüm ekipmanı tedarik etmek ve teknik destek sağlamak için ana yüklenici olmuştur. Aynı yıl Türkler Tornado satışı için de İngiliz yetkililere başvurmuş ve sınırlı sayıda Türk askeri personeli İngiliz fonlarıyla Birleşik Krallık'ta çeşitli eğitimlere katılmıştır. Türkiye'nin askeri harcamaları, özellikle de Tornado uçaklarının alımı için mali yardıma ihtiyaç duymasına ve bu konuyu İngiliz yetkililerle görüşmesine rağmen, Birleşik Krallık Tornado'lar için Türkiye'ye kredi verme konusunda isteksiz davranmıştır. Birkaç yıl süren görüşmelerin ardından Türkler mali zorluklar nedeniyle Tornado uçaklarını satın alamamıştır. ABD ve Almanya'nın askeri yardım programları nedeniyle, bu ülkeler Türk savunma sanayinde Birleşik Krallık'a göre avantajlıydı ve Birleşik Krallık aynı mali desteği sağlayabilseydi çok daha iyi bir konuma sahip olabilirdi. Yine de Birleşik Krallık'ın Türkiye'ye yaptığı savunma satışları 1986 yılına kadar 350 milyon dolara ulaşmıştır. Türkiye'ye Rapier füzelerinin satışına ilişkin ikinci sözleşme 1985 yılında yapılmıştır. Rapier için yapılan her iki sözleşmenin toplam maliyeti, 72 ateşleme bataryası da dahil olmak üzere 300 milyon pound civarındadır.

Türkiye ayrıca İngilizlerle Marconi BlindFire gözetleme ve atış kontrol radarlarının tedariki için de bir sözleşme imzalamıştır. Bu alımı, Otokar'ın 1987 yılında Land Rover lisansı altında taktik araç üretimine başlaması ve Scimitar H Telsiz setlerinin teknoloji transferi ve yerli üretimi izlemiştir. 1990'da imzalanan bir başka sözleşme ile Türk Ordusu için 2784 adet HF-SSB telsiz seti üretmek üzere ortak girişim şirketi MKAŞ kurulmuş ve Türkiye ayrıca acil ihtiyaçları karşılamak üzere Birleşik Krallık'tan HF-SSB telsiz seti satın almıştır. Bu arada 1990'lı yıllarda kritik savunma sistemleri tedarik faaliyetleri, Preveze Sınıfı denizaltılar için TigerFish Mod II ağır torpidolar, helikopterler için SeaSkua havadan karaya füzeler, gözetleme ve hava/su üstü arama radarları, fırkateynler, FPB'ler, ECM sistemleri ve denizaltılar ile devam

etmiştir. 1990 yılına gelindiğinde İngilizler Türkiye'nin en büyük beşinci askeri teçhizat tedarikçisi olmuştur. 1992 yılında İngiliz Dışişleri tarafından, Türk hükümetine Browning ağır makineli tüfekleri, SALCO bomba atarları ve Saxon Zırhlı Personel Taşıyıcıları satmak için yapılan lisans başvurularını onaylaması istenmiştir. Türk savunma sanayinin en büyük tedarikçilerinden biri olan Almanya, muhtemelen Kürt sorunu nedeniyle Türkiye'ye silah satışını yasaklarken, İngilizler, Türkiye'nin resmi bir baskı politikası benimsediğini düşünmediklerini ifade etmiştir.

Margaret Thatcher'ın 1988 yılında Türkiye'ye yaptığı ziyaret sırasında Birleşik Krallık Başbakanı'na Türkiye'nin savunma alanındaki eksiklikleri ve ihtiyaçları hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. İngilizler tarafından herhangi bir yardım sağlanıp sağlanamayacağını görmek için bir çalışma başlatılmıştır. Bu olayda da mali yardım seçeneği dışlanmış olsa da, DPF fonunda yapılan bir düzenleme, daha önce UKMTAS rejimi altında tahsis edilen fonların kullanılabilirliğini artırmıştır. UKMTAS rejimi kapsamında İngilizler 1986 yılında Türkiye'den gelen eğitim taleplerini karşılamak için 240.000 sterlin ayırmıştır. Türkiye'nin tahsisatını tam olarak kullanamaması nedeniyle bu miktar, Müfreze komutanları kursu, patlayıcı mühimmat imha kursu, fotoğrafik yorumlama kursu ve istihbarat ve güvenlik kursu gibi kurslar için 150.000 sterline düşürülmüştür.

Türkiye ile Birleşik Krallık arasındaki askeri ilişkilerin zirvede olduğu bu yıllarda Türkiye, Körfez Savaşı sırasında koalisyon güçleri için önemli bir üs haline gelmiştir. Türkiye'nin güneyinde üslenen operasyonlar kapsamında İngiliz Tornado uçakları keşif görevleri üstlenmiş ve bunlara VC10 tankerleriyle desteklenen diğer Kraliyet Hava Kuvvetleri uçakları da eşlik etmiştir. İngilizlerin diğer konuşlanmaları arasında İncirlik Hava Üssü'nden görev yapan 8 adet RAF Jaguar da vardır. Bu arada, Irak'a konuşlandırılan İngiliz tugaylarını desteklemek üzere Birleşik Krallık ve Türkiye arasında düzenli uçuşlar gerçekleştirilmiş ve operasyonlar sırasında İngiliz nakliye uçakları ve helikopterleri Türkiye'de konuşlanmıştır. 12 Temmuz 1991 tarihinde Londra'daki Türk Büyükelçiliği teröristler tarafından işgal edilmiş ve teröristler İngiliz hükümeti tarafından tutuklanmıştır. Olayların ardından İngiliz hükümeti Türkiye'ye tazminat ödemeyi de kabul etmiştir. İngilizler ayrıca Türk İçişleri Bakanlığı heyeti ile yaptıkları bir oturumda terörle mücadele deneyimlerini Türkiye ile paylaşmışlardır.

Türkiye'de 1983 yılında yeni bir sivil hükümetin kurulmasının ardından, İngiliz firmalarının Türkiye pazarına artan ilgisi sonucunda Birleşik Krallık'ın Türkiye'ye ihracatı %11 oranında artmıştır. Birleşik Krallık'ın Türkiye'ye ihraç ettiği başlıca ürünler karayolu taşıtları, ulaşım ekipmanları, makineler ve kimyasallar olurken, Türkiye'den ithal ettiği ürünler arasında tarımsal ürünler yer almıştır.

Birleşik Krallık'ın Türkiye'ye ihracatı 1984 yılında %40, 1985 yılında ise %30 oranında artmıştır. Ayrıca, Irak petrolünün Türkiye üzerinden ihracatı nedeniyle Türkiye'nin Birleşik Krallık'a ihracatı 1985 yılında "iki kattan fazla" artmıştır. İngiliz firmaları, İkinci Boğaz Köprüsü ihalesi de dahil olmak üzere Türkiye'deki büyük ihalelere katılmak istemişlerse de, mali sorunlar sorunu nedeniyle bu tür hamleler İngilizler için hayal kırıklığı ile sonuçlanmıştır. Akkuyu nükleer enerji santrali projesi de İngilizlerin katılmak istedikleri bir diğer projedir. Finansman sorunu ve Türk hükümetinin yap-işlet-devret modelinden beklediği kar konusunda şirketlerin tereddütlü yaklaşımı nedeniyle bu proje için herhangi bir anlaşmaya varılamamıştır.

1987 yılında İngilizler, Ankara doğalgaz dönüşüm projesi de dahil olmak üzere büyük kamu sektörü projelerinin ihalelerini kazanmaya başlamış ve Türkiye'nin Birleşik Krallık'a ihracatı %42 oranında artmıştır. 1989 yılında Türkiye'deki bir numaralı yabancı yatırımcı haline gelen İngilizler, aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin beşinci büyük ticaret ortağı olmuştur. Türkiye'de faaliyet gösteren İngiliz firmalarının sayısı da 1989'un ilk yarısında 104'e sıçramış ve üç yıl içinde %70 oranında artmıştır .Bu arada İngilizler, Türksat Haberleşme Uydusu Projesi, Bodrum Havaalanı Projesi, Çerkezköy-Kapıkule Demiryolu Elektrifikasyon Projesi ve İzmir Su Temini Projesi gibi Türkiye'deki farklı projeler için tekliflerini sunmuşlardır.

İngilizler ayrıca Türk tekstil endüstrisinin AT'ye daha fazla ürün ihraç etmesine de yardımcı olmuşlardır. 1990 yılında Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal, Birleşik Krallık Başbakanı'na bir mektup yazarak Türkiye'nin Avrupa ülkelerine tekstil ithalatını sınırlayan politikalar hakkında yardım istemiştir. Bunun sonucunda İngilizler, Avrupa Komisyonu'ndan serbestleşme için öneriler getirmesini istemişlerdir. Aynı zamanda İngilizler, Türkiye'deki büyük kamu projelerini kazanmakta başarılı olamadıklarından yakınmaya devam etseler de Ankara Metrosu gibi projeleri kazanmışlardır. Ayrıca

Yenikapı Su Arıtma Tesisi projesi de önemli bir İngiliz katkısı ile tamamlanmış ve 1988 yılında Margaret Thatcher tarafından ziyaret edilmiştir. Özal ve Thatcher'ın Başbakanlık dönemleri sona erdikten sonra, Süleyman Demirel ve John Major hükümetleri döneminde de ikili ilişkiler olumlu bir seyir izlemeye devam etmiştir. Bu dönemde PKK sempatanlarının Londra'daki Türk Büyükelçiliği'ne yönelik saldırıları ve İngiliz iş adamı Andrew Blake'in Türkiye'de öldürülmesi dışında İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerinde göze batan kötü bir gelişme olmamıştır.

Bu tezde "1983-1993 yılları arasında Türk-İngiliz ilişkilerinin gelişiminde temel etken nedir?" sorusu ele alınmaktadır. Tezde İngiliz Ulusal Arşivleri'ndeki resmi yazışmalar, kabine toplantısı sonuçları ve diğer belgeler, Cambridge Üniversitesi'ndeki Churchill Arşivleri Merkezi'nden Thatcher Belgeleri ve Julian Amery Belgeleri Koleksiyonu, Margaret Thatcher Vakfı tarafından yayınlanan çevrimiçi belgeler, İngiliz ve Türk parlamentolarındaki tartışmalar, iki ülkenin medyasında yayınlanan haberler, akademik makaleler ve dergi makaleleri, kitaplar ve köşe yazıları kullanılmıştır. Bu tezin yazarı, Türkiye'de merkez sağ gelenekten gelen siyasetçilerin yanı sıra Birleşik Krallık'taki Muhafazakâr Partili siyasetçiler, eski diplomatlar ve akademisyenlerle yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler gerçekleştirmiştir. Ulusal Arşiv'deki arşiv araştırmaları yazarın kendisi tarafından fiziksel olarak yürütülmüştür. Bu tez, neoklasik realizmin temel varsayımlarını inceledikten sonra, İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerinin tarihi hakkında bilgi vermiştir. Sonraki bölümlerde Turgut Özal ve Margaret Thatcher'ın kişilikleri, liderlik özellikleri, dünya görüşleri, iç ve dış politika tercihleri incelenmiştir. İki ülkenin dış politikasını doğrudan etkileyen dış faktörler ve kısıtlamalar olan Körfez Savaşı, Avrupa meseleleri ve Soğuk Savaş dönemi ve bunların ikili ilişkiler üzerindeki etkileri bu tezde incelendikten sonra son olarak 1983-1993 yılları arasındaki Türk-İngiliz ilişkileri analiz edilmiştir. Tezin araştırma amacı, ikili ilişkilerin zirve yapmasının ardında liderler arasındaki ideolojik ve kişisel benzerliklerin mi, iç politikanın mı yoksa dış faktörlerin ve kısıtlamaların mı daha etkili olduğunu analiz etmektir.

Bu tezin yazarı, 1983-1993 yılları arasında Türk-İngiliz ilişkilerini belirleyen temel etkenin dış kısıtlamalar olduğunu savunmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş Dönemi, hem Türkiye'nin hem de Birleşik Krallık'ın ulusal çıkarlarını iki kutuplu, anarşik bir

dünyada güvenliklerine öncelik veren bir anlayışla belirlemelerine yol açmıştır. Böylece Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık, bazı durumlarda Atlantikçi olarak da tanımlanabilecek batı yanlısı bir dış politika yürütmüştür. Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık ABD ile ilişkilerine büyük önem vermiş ve NATO'nun Avrupa güvenliğinde ana aktör olması gerektiğini savunmuş, AT ile ilişkilerinde psikolojik bir yabancılaşma psikolojisi içinde olmuştur. Bu durum Birleşik Krallık ve Türkiye'nin Avrupa politikalarında işbirliğine gitmelerine ve ikili ilişkilerin daha da gelişmesine yol açmıştır. Körfez Savaşı iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin zirvede olduğu bir dönemde gerçekleşmiş, Birleşik Krallık Irak'a karşı oluşturulan koalisyonun ana aktörlerinden biri olurken, Türkiye'nin sağladığı lojistik destek yürütülen operasyonların başarıya ulaşmasını sağlamıştır.

Birleşik Krallık'ın Türkiye'nin Avrupa Topluluğu'na tam üyelik başvurusuna temkinli yaklaşması, Thatcher'ın Özal ile kişisel temasına rağmen Türkiye'deki büyük kamu projelerinin çoğunun mali yardım sorunları nedeniyle İngilizlere verilememesi ve ikili ilişkilerin aslında iki ülkenin ABD ile ilişkilerinin gölgesinde kalması da İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerinde dış faktörlerin, liderlerden daha önemli bir rol oynadığını gösterebilir. Aynı zamanda, Özal ve Thatcher'ın seçimleri kazanarak başbakan olmalarının ve ülkelerinde neoliberal ekonomi politikaları izlemelerinin nedenlerinden biri de 1970'lerde ülkelerinin karşı karşıya kaldığı iç ve dış sorunlardır. Ayrıca, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasındaki yıllarda muhafazakâr bir ailede yetişmenin de bu iki liderin kişiliklerinin ve ideolojilerinin oluşmasında büyük etkisi olmuştur. Süleyman Demirel'in Türkiye'de, John Major'ın da Birleşik Krallık'ta Başbakan olmasından sonra ikili ilişkiler gelişmeye devam etmiş ve 2000'li yıllarda farklı hükümetlerle yeni bir zirveye ulaşmıştır. Özal'ın Cumhurbaşkanı olmasının ardından Süleyman Demirel tarafından kurulan yeni hükümetin bir koalisyon hükümeti olması ve Türkiye'de Dışişleri Bakanı'nın sosyal demokrat Hikmet Çetin olması ikili ilişkilerin gidişatında bir değişiklik yaratmamıştır.

Bu tez, neoklasik realist bir çerçeve içerisinde dış politika yapımında dış politika elitlerinin gelişmeleri nasıl algıladığının çok önemli olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Thatcher ve Özal dönemindeki İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerinde görüldüğü üzere, önemli olan sadece liderlerin ve elitlerin güvenlik ikilemine ve dış dinamiklere yönelik algıları

değil, aynı zamanda iç politikaya yönelik algılarıdır. Ancak bu gibi unsurlar sadece onlar önemli olduğunu düşündüklerinde önemli hale gelmektedir. İç politikanın İngiliz-Türk ilişkileri üzerindeki etkisi sadece Thatcher ve Özal'ın iç politikada eleştirilmelerini ve güç kaybetmelerini önlemek açısından önemli olmuştur ve iç teşvikler ikili ilişkilerde iki lider tarafından çok fazla dikkate alınmamıştır. Ancak Turgut Özal'ın Cumhurbaşkanı olarak yetkilerinin kısıtlanması nedeniyle Türkiye'nin Körfez Savaşı'nda daha aktif bir rol oynayamaması ve Özal ile Başbakan Demirel arasındaki temsil sorunu, neoklasik realistlerin de savunduğu gibi liderlerin koalisyon dönemlerinde ya da pozisyonlarının kırılma olduğu durumlarda dış politika hedeflerinde başarısız olabileceklerini gösterebilir. Bu da dolaylı da olsa iç politikayı dış politika yapımında önemli kılan bir diğer faktördür. Tüm bu örnekler, İngiliz-Türk ilişkilerinde dış faktörlerin ideoloji, liderlik ve iç politikadan daha etkili olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

1983-1993 yılları arasındaki İngiliz-Türk ilişkileri neoklasik realizm paradigmasını uygulamak için uygun bir örnektir, çünkü ikili ilişkilerin ana itici gücü dış faktörler ve kısıtlamalardır ve liderler de her iki ülkenin birbirlerine yönelik dış politikalarını belirlemede etkili bir rol oynamaktadır. Ayrıca, 1983-1993 yılları arasındaki İngiliz-Türk ilişkileri örneğinde, neoklasik bir realistin tahmin edeceği gibi, iç teşviklerin sınırlı da olsa bir önemi vardır. Ancak, diğer uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri gibi neoklasik realizm de fazla genelleme içerebilir. Bu nedenle, teorinin olası eksiklikleri hakkında varsayımda bulunmadan önce diğer devletlerin dış politikalarına ilişkin daha fazla araştırma ve daha fazla vaka çalışmasına ihtiyaç duyulacaktır. Bu aynı zamanda neoklasik realizmin varsayımlarını güçlendirmeye de yardımcı olacaktır.

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