

THE CHANGE IN THE CHP'S KURDISH POLICY (2002-2015):
THE PARTY GOALS APPROACH

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ÖZLEM GÖLGELİOĞLU KLUJS

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

AUGUST 2023

Approval of the thesis:

**THE CHANGE IN THE CHP'S KURDISH POLICY (2002-2015):
THE PARTY GOALS APPROACH**

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ABSTRACT

THE CHANGE IN THE CHP'S KURDISH POLICY (2002-2015): THE PARTY GOALS APPROACH

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August 2023, 271 pages

This thesis aims to analyse the Kurdish politics of the CHP between 2002 and 2015. For this purpose, the Party Goals approach, which analyses party policy change within the framework of certain causalities and concepts, is adopted. Firstly, the change in CHP policies was analysed based on the data of the Manifesto Research Group. Party documents, leaders' speeches and newspaper reports were analysed to determine the reflections of this change on the party's Kurdish politics. The conclusion reached after this analysis in the terms of the Party Goals approach is the following: Between 2002 and 2008, the Baykal's CHP played an active role as an opposition party within a regime structure that increased the political influence of the party. This active role, in line with the expectations of the theoretical framework, increased the influence of the party's founding ideology in party politics and the party employed adversarial strategies. As a reflection of this general strategy, in these years, the CHP took a rejectionist position on the fundamental issues of the Kurdish question. With the change of the regime features the party, under the Kılıçdaroğlu leadership, began to pursue strategies aimed at increasing its vote share, and this general strategy, again in

line with the expectations of the theoretical framework, led the party to adopt compromising but instable and blurred positions in the issues of Kurdish problem.

Keywords: CHP Party Politics, Party Policy change, Party Goals Approach, Turkey`s Kurdish Problem.

ÖZ

CHP’NİN KÜRT SİYASETİ DEĞİŞİMİ (2002-2015): PARTİ HEDEFLERİ YAKLAŞIMI

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Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ayşe AYATA

Ağustos 2023, 271 sayfa

Bu tez CHP'nin 2002-2015 yılları arasındaki Kürt siyasetini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. 2010'da partide yaşanan lider değişikliğinin parti siyasalarına yansımalarına ilişkin tartışmalar, konunun bir teorik çerçeve içinde değerlendirilmesini zorunlu kılmıştır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda parti siyasa değişimini belli nedensellikler ve konseptler çerçevesinde inceleyen Parti Hedefleri literatürü kullanılmıştır. Öncelikle CHP politikalarındaki değişim, Manifesto Araştırma Grubunun verileri temel alınarak incelenmiştir. Bu değişimin, partinin Kürt Siyasetine yansımalarını tespit edebilmek için parti belgeleri, liderlerin konuşmaları ve gazete haberleri incelenmiştir. Bu analiz sonrasında Parti Hedefleri yaklaşımının terimleri çerçevesinde varılan sonuç şudur: Baykal CHP'si 2002 ve 2008 yılları arasında CHP'nin siyasa etkisini arttıran bir rejim yapısı içinde muhalefet partisi olarak etkin bir rol oynamıştır. Bu etkin rol, teorik çerçevenin beklentisine uygun olarak, parti siyasetinde partinin kurucu ideolojisinin etkisini arttırmış ve parti de stratejisini karşıtlık üzerinden kurmuştur. Bu genel stratejinin bir yansıması olarak, bu yıllarda CHP, ülkenin Kürt sorununu ilgilendiren temel konularında tamamen karşıt bir

pozisyon almıştır. Rejimin bu özelliklerinin ortadan kalkması ile birlikte yeni lideri önderliğinde parti, oy oranını arttırmaya yönelik stratejiler izlemeye başlamış ve bu genel strateji, yine teorik çerçevenin beklentisi doğrultusunda, partiyi Kürt meselesine dair konularda daha koşullu ancak belirsiz ve tutarsız pozisyonlar almaya itmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: CHP Parti siyaseti, Siyasi Parti Değişimi, Kürt sorunu, Parti Hedefleri yaklaşımı

To my little-big world, to Oleg and Deniz

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata for her invaluable moral support and intellectual guidance throughout my long journey of PhD. Her continuous encouragement made it possible for me to complete this dissertation. I also want to thank my jury members Emre Hoca, Kürşad Hoca, Mustafa Hoca and Kerem Hoca for their invaluable contribution which helped me to shape the last version of this thesis.

I would not be able to continue at very difficult times of this thesis without support of my thesis-buddy, Emel. She shared all the struggle and pain through this journey, she always encouraged me. I am more than thankful. I also would like to thank my girls in Nuremberg, to Ivonne, to Georgiana, to Ilona and to Lilya. They have been there for me at times when family and work life were not in harmony. Not only their support, but their friendship made Nuremberg home for me.

I am grateful to my family, my father, my mother and especially to my sister for all their belief, unconditional love, support and encouragement not only during this thesis but during all my life. I always felt their support behind me.

No words can really express my gratitude to my partner, my best friend and my one Oleg. Спасибо тебе, дорогая. He has been the person who always hold my hand and shared best and worst moments in this dissertation journey as well as in life. This thesis is just one of the many things we've achieved together, with more hopefully on the way. This dissertation is dedicated to him and our son, Deniz.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
DP	Democrat Party
DSP	Democratic Left Party
DTP	Democratic Society Party
DYP	True Path Party
HDP	People`s Democratic Party
HEP	People`s Labour Party
HP	Populist Party
IP	Labour Party
KCK	Kurdistan Communities Union
MEB	Ministry of National Education
MGK	National Security Council
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
NPAA	National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis
PKK	Kurdistan Workers` Party
RP	Welfare Party
RTÜK	Radio Television Supreme Council
SHP	Social Democratic Populist Party
SODEP	Social Democrat Party
TCC	Turkish Constitutional Court
YÖK	Council of Higher Education

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In May 2010, Deniz Baykal, the longest-serving leader of the CHP (Republican People's Party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), after Atatürk and İnönü, handed over the party leadership to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu at the end of a process that started with a tape scandal. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who has a bureaucratic background, became the leader of the CHP with great support. On the one hand, Kılıçdaroğlu 's election to the CHP leadership was surprising because there was no specific party faction behind him, as is usually the case with changes of leaders in political parties. On the other hand, it was not so surprising because as a candidate for Istanbul mayorship in 2009, Kılıçdaroğlu had significantly affected public opinion, even though he did not win the election. Behind this support for Kılıçdaroğlu and the great excitement he created was the disappointment of the 1990s for the party. After its re-establishment in 1992, the party's electoral performance had been consistently poor. In the 1999 elections, the party was not even in the parliament, causing Deniz Baykal to resign from the leadership temporarily. Therefore, the arrival of a new leader and the new leader's slogan for the 2011 elections, "New CHP" created excitement in both academic and party circles.

At the same time as such a change was taking place for the CHP, Turkey's Kurdish politics were also passing through a critical period. As the AKP (Justice and Development Party, AKP) was in its second term as the sole government, it had also launched one another opening projects. There were also questions raised about how the new CHP would respond to the Kurdish issue, one of Turkey's most hard problems in the last decade.

This research project aims to reveal the dynamics of party policy change in the CHP on the Kurdish problem. However, the theoretical framework employed in this thesis considers the change of a political party in a policy area concerning the overall programmatic change of the party in that political system. Therefore, from the perspective of this thesis, a study that analyses a party's policy change in any field must also take into account a general change in party strategy. In this sense, to analyze the CHP's policy change in the Kurdish problem, I first focus on the change in the party's leader and the policy change that this change allegedly brought about.

The main research questions of the study are following: How can we conceptualize the CHP's policies under Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu? Is there a change in and between these two periods in the party's policy profile? (If any) Why did the Party's policy positions change in the way it changed? How did this change reflect on the Kurdish Problem?

As the next chapter shows, the party policy change literature highlights many exogenous and endogenous factors that play roles in party change. However, especially in Turkish political literature and the case of CHP, the institutional analysis overemphasizes the ideology's effect on party policies, which is overly static and deterministic. The power of party agency is often neglected. This thesis proposes adopting "Integrated Theory of Party Change" and "Party Goals" approaches to give more place to the party's decisions in the analysis. However, as Helms (2014, p.576) mentioned, all political agency is a "structured agency." The behavior of a rational individual is to use the opportunities offered to him by the institutional structure in which he is embedded within the framework of the limitations given again by this context. The theoretical framework employed in this thesis allows us to examine the relationship between the decisions made by party elites and the structure in which they operate. In the coming sections, I will discuss whether this approach can create an account of CHP's programmatic change. But first, I would like to introduce the main assumptions, concepts, assumptions of the framework in order to understand if these concepts are useful to understand the change in CHP's policies. In the last section, I will present Baykal's CHP as a policy seeking party.

1.1. The Theoretical Approach

Based on Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) central premise that the political parties represent the historical divisions by intergenerational value transfer, the socio-cultural approach conceives political parties as the expressions of their genetic value systems. Then, the party ideology sets limits or provides opportunities for party behavior. As a result, political parties are not so flexible in responding to new issues or new agendas. On the other hand, in Downsian analysis, rather than ideology, electoral market conditions are decisive over party behavior. Party policies are the tools the party uses to maximize its votes. Then, the components of the electoral market, such as shifts in public opinion or rival parties, affect party behavior.

In addition to the findings of Downsian analysis on vote maximizing behavior of political parties, empirical studies have identified other party behaviors associated with other party goals (Laver and Schofield, 1990; Budge and Laver, 1986). The party goals framework identified three different but related party goals: the pursuit of votes, policy, or office. (Wollinetz 2002, Strom 1990, Strom and Müller 1999) This thesis uses this approach as the theoretical framework for analyzing the change in the CHP's programmatic profile. This approach has some assumptions about the formation of party politics and the mechanisms behind it, which I will present in detail in the coming sections. A political party has three interrelated goals: policy realization, vote maximization, and gaining office benefits. Vote-seeking tries to increase a party's votes, policy-seeking aims to shape public policy in the direction of a party's policy preferences, and office-seeking aspires to have their party members in governmental posts. As Strom (1990) rightly puts it, the parties do not seek only vote, policy or office. (p. 579). Votes have an instrumental value for every competitive political party. However, the political parties should decide in favour of one goal during trade-offs where reaching one goal may result in failure in another (Müller and Strom, 1999). These trade-offs can take various forms (Strom, 1990). For example, a party could endanger a broad appeal by focusing on a crucial policy for its core supporters or a political party may sacrifice its policy values to participate in a governing coalition.

The choices parties make affect their entire programmatic profile, policy, and strategy. The party's primary goal, therefore, shapes party politics. Drawing on the

conceptualization of party strategies in party competition literature (Kitschelt, 1994; Meguid, 2005), the works on political Party- Euroscepticism (Vasilopoulou, 2010; Sitter, 2003) indicated this relationship in empirical cases. Studies of party-based Euroscepticism have found that Eurosceptic far-right parties do not oppose all issues in the EU policy area in the same way and with the same discourse. Therefore, ideology could not be the only variable to explain a party's policies and strategies. They emphasized that the party types (which refer to different behavior patterns) and the competitive conditions of the structure in which they competed were more dominant in explaining this difference. Therefore, before looking at the change in a party's policy in a specific policy area, it is necessary to analyze the goal of that party in the system.

Depending on the internal party democracy dynamics, the party leader and party elites decide the party's predominant goal at a particular time. However, they do not decide in a vacuum. A party's competition and institutional context provides obstacles or incentives for this decision. Strom and Müller (1999) define the institutional context of a party with its mechanisms that transfer the votes into office and policy benefits. The electoral gains of a party are translated into policy effect or office takeovers at different levels, such as electoral level, legislative level, and governmental level. These mechanisms define the instrumental value of the votes for the parties. For example, for an opposition party a regime structure that provides a high policy effect would incentivize policy-seeking strategies when a trade-off between these goals is inevitable.

So, when do the parties change their programmatic profiles? In the academic literature, there is a widespread consensus that change does not "just happen" but is driven by a reason. Political parties, as conservative organizations, hardly change for the sake of change. Harmel and Janda's (Harmel and Janda, 1994, Harmel et al., 1995, and Harmel and Tan, 2003, Janda et al., 1995,) highly cited party policy change framework "an integrated theory of party goals and party change" refers to the main driver of change as external shock, such as electoral defeat or leader change or a change in the dominant faction or loss of office. However, political party perceives a shock as an external only when it is directly related to the parties' primary goal (Harmel and Janda, 1995). Electoral failure is a shock for vote maximizers more than for a policy seeker party.

For office seekers, any stimuli affecting their participation in the government, or a collapse of any prospective coalition can be perceived as an external shock. For policy seekers, the shocks directly related to the party's position are very determinant for a party to reconsider its strategies in the means of their correctness or validity. Of course, any change in a party's institutional/competitional environment that provides incentives for goal priorities would motivate the party to reconsider its decision.

To conceptualize multiple goals in a theoretical framework can help us understand and explain some non-rational actions that arise when the winning votes is assumed as the only purpose of a political party. On the other hand, to explain the causal mechanisms behind the party policy change, this approach introduces new variables. It allows us to diversify to the different magnitudes and types of party change according to their particular goals. Still in this model, considering the environment in which a political party operates, the party itself decides and directs the change.

1.2. Setting the Thesis` Problem in a Context

1.2.1. Historical Legacies

CHP is Turkey's oldest political party, which under Kemal Atatürk established the foundations of the modern Turkish Republic. Kemalism was declared an official ideology in the 3rd party convention in 1931 and formulated with six principles: republicanism, secularism, statism, nationalism, populism and revolutionism (for a discussion see, Ciddi, 2009). CHP's genesis ideology is shaped under Kemalist modernizing, secularist, and nation-building tenets. The leaders of the party, first Atatürk and then İnönü introduced revolutionary steps to modernize the state and society, such as the election rights to women, the dissolution of the Caliphate institution, and the adaptation of Western law and system mechanisms (Karpaz 2016, p. 42). In the 1940s, under the one-party regime, the party maintained its hegemony, claiming to be the regime's guardian and the agent of modernizing reforms (Karpaz 2016, p. 42). Although this period witnessed a close integration between the CHP and the state, so the party became a coalition between military officers, civil servants, and local notables (Tachau 2016, Towards a two-party section); it is important to mention that the CHP at its very first years can be represented as a party of 19th-century

liberalism and the ideals of the French Revolution rather than a totalitarian party (Duverger 1993, p.359-360 in Kiriş 2012, p. 399).

Born as a nationalist and a modernist movement, the party adopted a national agenda focusing on secularism and building up the nation-state. However, the transition to the multiparty era, initiated and led by CHP's party leaders after Atatürk particularly İnönü, forced the party to moderate its programmatic profile. From the 1950s onwards, the DP (Democrat Party), established from an inter-party struggle in the CHP, became the preferred choice of the majority of voters. This transition to a multiparty period immediately affected the CHP's discourse at the 7th convention of the party in 1947, starting the party's espousal of a secularist position. As Sunar (1974) emphasized, one of the reasons behind the significant appeal of DP to the masses was DP's framing of secularism as a mechanism of bureaucratic oppression (p.83 in Tachau 2016, Towards a two-party section). In this Congress, motions were accepted for introducing religion classes in primary schools and opening *türbes* and immediately after this Congress, the proposals were implemented, and imam hatip courses, *türbes*, and the faculty of theology were reopened (Bila, 2008, p. 114). CHP responded to the DP's move to authoritarianism (for DP's practices, see Sayarı, 2008, p.65) by the Declaration of Primary Goals (*ilk hedefler beyannamesi*, 1959), which will be later the basis of the Constitution of 1961. This document included a reform package related to the democratization of the system, like freedom of the press and constitutional court, university autonomy, and right of association. In 20 years, CHP became a state party with a modernizing, state-building agenda to a reformist party in defence of liberal democracy's institutions.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the party had another turn. At the 18th convention in 1966, the party started to discuss social democracy, which would reflect on the election manifestos of *Düzen Degisikligi Programi* (1969) and *Ak Günlere* (1973) (for a detailed account please see Bila, 2008, pp.198-228) In these manifestos, the principles of social democracy turned into social policy programs, and "the democratic left" or "social democracy" were added to the party's political outlook in the party program at the 21st party convention in 1974. That was again a response to the country's changing socioeconomic and political context in the 1960s. Within the opportunities the liberal 1961 constitution provided, the divisions between left and right became distinct, and

the political interests of the working class were raised. Ecevit, the leader of CHP after İnönü, in his book *The Left of Centre (ortanın solu)*, stated that the left of centre can be characterized with social democracy, social security, planned economy, social justice. (Kiriş, 2012, p. 400).

After the 1980 military takeover, CHP split into two parties: the Populist Party (HP) and the Social Democrat Party (SODEP). In 1985, HP and SODEP merged under the name Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). The SHP's discourse is upheld on two pillars: a socioeconomic perspective and a democratization perspective. The SHP committed itself to represent the economically poor, unprivileged masses by focusing on policy mechanisms such as economic planning and state enterprises (Mango, 2016, p.176). SHP also emphasized the importance of the egalitarian distribution of resources and welfare practices (Güneş Ayata, 1993, p.42). On the other hand, the party raised the issues of democratization. It emphasized empowering the individual against the state through extensive political, social, and civil rights and advocated for the amendment of the 1982 Constitution. The principle of the rule of law became an essential component of the SHP programmatic profile (Ayata and Güneş Ayata ,2007, p. 217). In SHP, many issues were first discussed based on center-left history, such as Kemalism, the meaning of six arrows, and the Kurdish issue, resulting in the legendary south-eastern report. Even after 1995, when the CHP remained the only representative of this line, the SHP legacy persisted as an essential reference point and had a lasting effect on CHP's policy repertoire.

When CHP was re-established in 1992 and became the only centre-left representative, the party weighed its ideological baggage after passing through all these processes. What kind of a programmatic track Baykal's CHP would follow would be the Baykal's and party elites' *deliberate and conscious choices* rather than *destiny or an obligatory path*.

1.2.2. Defining the Puzzle in its Context.

With the emergence of the AKP in 2001, the electoral hegemony of the party began, which has lasted until today. Except for the 2015 June elections, the party's electoral

performance has shown a steady trend and AKP leader Erdoğan has continued his political career, first as prime minister, then as president and then, with the change of the system, as president. As I mentioned earlier, the CHP was stuck with a certain share of the vote throughout the 2000s. Actually, CHP has never been an electoral machine in its history except for the 1977 elections. Parties from the DP tradition and Islamist parties challenged CHP and succeeded in representing a more extensive section of society. Baykal's CHP was no different in this sense. During the 1990s and 2000s, the CHP failed to become an electoral option and presented an image of a party with poor electoral performance due to the electoral ghettoization and narrow appeal to demographically particular voters, which positioned itself on the edges of competition dimensions (Ciddi, 2008).

Explaining party's low electoral performance has been predominantly structured by institutional or sociological explanations. In Turkey, from the 80s onwards, the erosion of the middle class, inequality and exclusion among diverse groups, rapid social mobilization, cultural polarization, and especially the emergence of identity politics created a different menu of politics. As Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009) stressed, urbanization and market reforms led to masses of urban poor without a social, supporting network. The Islamic networks filled this gap. At the same time, although Turkish society was secular, religiosity and conservatism were rising. In such a context, according to the many works of Turkish politics (Ayata and Ayata, 2007; Turan, 2006; Sayarı, 2007), CHP performed poorly because it could not develop "true responses" to the changing socioeconomic environment and could not break the electoral ghettos of the middle-class, educated, western-located voter group.

Before trying to understand the reasons behind this incapability, I would like to summarize the main characteristics of the competition environment in the 1990s and 2000s, which as expected would have an effect in shaping the policy profile of competing parties. The political parties' competition dimension in the period was defined as centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin, 1973) or as a particular type of left-right dimension, so-called *left-right alla Turca* (Çarkoğlu ad Hinich, 2006) Stemming from Ottoman political heritage, the centre periphery cleavage is defined as a cleavage between the modernizing military and civilian officials (centre) and religious, traditional, and conservative masses (periphery). This cleavage also refers to actually

a *Kulturkampf* (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010) between two world views as one based on science, secularism and progress and the second one based on tradition and religion. CHP as the agent of a political and culture revolution where a science-based image of society integrated with the main principles of secularization and nationalism is defined as the party of centre. On the other hand, *left-right alla Turca* concept refers mainly to two dimensions; a secular vs religious cleavage where the main denominator is the individuals' self-perception in their relationship with religion and a nationalism dimension which based on Turkish and Kurdish identities. More religious people tend to vote for Islamist parties; on the other hand, declining religiosity refers to voting for left parties' secular positions.

The nationalism dimension reflects the main issues of Turkishness and Kurdishness and the positions in matters such as the European Union. The political parties of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s located themselves on these political dimensions (Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006, p. 369-392; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; p.539-560, Schofield and Demirkaya, 2013). The main center-right parties, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) and the True Path Party (Doğruyol Partisi, DYP), have moderate Islamist positions, and they situation themselves on the right of center. The pro-Islamist parties Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) (later Virtue and Felicity Party) and AKP (Justice and Development Party) stand on the extreme-right. The Republican People's Party (CHP), Social Democrat People's Party (SHP), Democratic Left Party (DSP), and Kurdish parties, with their socialist traditions, stand on the left side of the Secular/Islamist tradition. On the Kurdish/Turkish nationalism dimension, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and pro-Kurdish parties stand on two contrary poles. The center-right parties and CHP still position themselves on the right side, although they are not the issue-owners. The pro-Islamist parties are near to the center with sympathy for the Kurdish problem.

The basic patterns of voter behavior also give a lot of insight into the characteristics of a system. One of the critical concepts in analyzing voting behavior in Turkey is economic voting. Economic voting has a growing explanatory power, especially in explaining the electoral success of AKP (Akarca and Başlevent 2009, Akarca 2010). In this concept, it is essential how the voter evaluates both their subjective situation and the general situation in the country. Another denominator of voting behavior is

ideological position (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009b: 204 and Esmer, 2002). The voters' ideological self-definition would indicate which party they will vote for. However, considering the Turkish context, rather than the ideology itself the denominators such as religion and nationalism have significant impact. People who identify themselves as more religious parties position themselves on the right of the policy dimension, while secular parties place themselves on the left (Çarkoğlu, 2005). This pattern of voting behavior creates an electorally advantageous environment for right and center-right parties, considering also the aforementioned increasing tendencies of conservatism in the society. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009c) stated that since the 1990s, approximately two-thirds of the voters are on the right or center in the left-right spectrum (p.116).

The vote shifts between these right and left blocs are also limited. In the Turkish system, the volatility is inter-party rather than inter-bloc volatility¹. Even the inter-bloc volatility may have a limited explanatory power in understanding voter behavior change considering the non-electoral reasons such as new electoral laws, coup d'états, or party closures rather than the transformation of social cleavages (Sayarı, 2008). Since the transition to multiparty systems, the left parties, so to speak, and the center-left parties' average vote potential was around 34.3 percent. These parties passed the 40% only in the 1957 and 1977 elections. On the other hand, the right parties managed to get an average of 60 percent of the votes (Özbudun, 2006, p.129). The 1990s also indicate a similar picture. As Ciddi (2008) points in his model of the parties' vote potential center-right parties and then AKP were the winners of the era where the center left parties seems stuck in the ten to twenty percent vote range (p.447). Political Islam and nationalism appear as the winning formula of the 1990s.

As mentioned above, the voting behavior literature shows that right-leaning voters form the majority in competition setting of Turkey in 1990s and 2000s and the economic performance of parties, clientelistic relationships, and religion are essential in voting behavior. In such a context, it can be expected that the vote maximization of a secular left-wing party, which had not formed the government for a long time, could

¹ Peter Mair (2002, pp28-31) defined inter bloc volatility as vote shifts between the parties of traditional cleavages in a party system. The shifts between the parties of cleavages refer party system changes.

be very poor. Being away from economic benefit distribution mechanisms for a certain period would reduce the party's ability to influence voter behavior through clientelistic ties. At the same time, the party's emphasis on secularism may make it difficult to reach the devout voters. Such a party is expected to tone down its secular outlook, appeal to the devout, and promise an economic program to benefit disadvantaged economic groups' strategies. On the other hand, the profile of CHP's core supporters should also be kept in mind. The CHP voters have a strong party identification, and secularism has an important place in the value set of CHP voters (Çarkoğlu 2005) which could also limit the party's room for maneuver. In such a context, how did Baykal's CHP behave?

Most of the analysis underlines that an ultra-national, ultra-secular policy profile characterize the Baykal's CHP in 1990s and 2000s (Ciddi, 2008; Kömürcü, 2011; Ete and Eşkinat, 2013). Some studies also mention the effect of *ulusalcılık* on the party politics of CHP under Baykal leadership which is a particular form of nationalism as a synthesis of anti-Westernism and secularism (Uslu,2008; Emre, 2015; Riexinger, 2010). This policy profile refers to specific policy positions on specific issues, such as the Kurdish Problem, the EU accession process, or Veiling discussions that dominated the Turkish political agenda in the 2000s (Somer, 2007; Öniş 2009; Gülmez, 2008) From the perspective of rational choice theories, party policies are the product of a strategy of maximizing the vote base of a political party as much as possible by taking public opinion and previous election results into consideration in the first place. From that perspective, the nationalist/secularist policy profile of the CHP party did not seem to serve this goal. Can we argue that the CHP's policy choices were just a miscalculation of party elites?

Previous analysis of CHP policies under Baykal leadership primarily adopted two perspectives. One approach involves the examination of party ideology's effect on the party's programmatic profile. Asking the same question, Ciddi's (2008, 2009) answer focused on the genetic composition of CHP's ideology. According to this explanation, the nationalism and secularism are the important tenets of the party's Kemalist ideology as a state founder party. This profile led country's national development and modernization, but it now faced the challenges of identity politics and the demands of social change. The lack of "revisionist gene" in the ideological profile of the party

narrows alternative policy options that can give way to social democrat or liberal openings which would satisfy these demands². The second set of answer came with the analysis of CHP politics from the perspective of party competition (Kömürcü, 2011; Kiriş, 2012).

These analyses underline the fact that the political position of the party rests on party elites' particular reading of Turkish political system. Kömürcü (2011) argues that the CHP, by defending secularism and Kemalism, was planning to come to power with the support of 80 per cent of the electorate that was outside the 20 per cent support of political Islam. Especially with the ultra-secular outlook, the CHP expected to mobilize the centre right voter who may be distanced from AKP with the fear of an Islamic regime. These two perspectives offer two different reasons set behind the party behaviour of Baykal's CHP, in addition to different analysis in defining party behaviour. While Ciddi (2008) argues that the Baykal's party located itself at the fringes of the party competition, Kömürcü (2011) argues that the CHP under Baykal administration adopted centralised strategies. Here raises one of this research's questions. The analysis focuses on firstly the policy profile of Baykal's CHP and the reasons behind the party behaviour, utilizing Harmel and Janda's (1994) concept of party goals and Müller and Strom's (1999) assumptions about the motivations of party's elite decisions as a guide. The first research question of the thesis is as follows: How can we define the programmatic profile of CHP under Baykal's administration? Why did party behave as it behaved?

As mentioned above, an unexpected scandalous videotape of the previous leader of the party, Deniz Baykal, lit a fuse of a new phase for CHP, which led to Deniz Baykal's resignation and, after a short period Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is elected as a party chairman. After Kılıçdaroğlu came to power, many academic and intellectual circles rushed for an evaluation of the party policy change of the "new CHP" project. However, these studies were either just after the party leaders changed, so they were very hyperopic, or did not rest on systematic, testable comparisons. An endeavour to understand the CHP's party change and its mechanisms must first and foremost determine whether

² For also Insel (2004), the CHP had a double identity as a state building/modernizing party and a social democrat party. In the times of crises, the party responds always from the framework of its primary identity, so called Kemalist ideology. Kahraman(2008) also argues that the CHP *rejoined* its *historical bloc* in 1990s after its broke by the claim of being left-oriented party.

there has been a fundamental change. Such a comparison will help us understand how both periods and each election differ, thus enabling us to identify different policy positions under the same leadership. This prompts another related research questions: Is there a change in the party's programmatic profile between these two periods under two different leadership?

The third puzzle of this thesis is related to the reasons of policy change in the party. As I will discuss later in detail, Harmel and Janda's (1994) model identified leadership change as one of the primary variables that can lead to party change. However, the later evidence about this relationship between party leader change and party policy change is scarce. Harmel et al. (1995) concluded that dominant faction change *may* create some possibilities of party change when it is combined by leadership change. As Ciddi and Esen (2014) rightly put it, when Kılıçdaroğlu came to power, he was not accompanied by a policy team or a particular faction behind him (p. 424) the Baykal's leadership can be characterized as a highly personalistic style that dominates the party's main areas of intra and external life, such as programmatic debates or candidate selections (Ayan 2010, Ayata and Ayata, 2007). However, general secretary Önder Sav considerably influenced the party organization. The factional rivalry in the party first came to the surface when a new party charter was on the agenda, reducing the authority of the general secretary. During Kılıçdaroğlu's candidacy after the tape scandal, the party organization moved with Sav, who withdrew his support from Baykal and sided with the new candidate (Ayan Musil and Bilgin, 2016, p.13). However, Kılıçdaroğlu took advantage of the new charter and side-lined Önder Sav and his faction shortly after his election. The factional rivalry that brought him to power seemed to emerge out of power relations in the party and had no ideological character. Even if the leader change became possible, how did the leadership pave the way to a strategic policy shift without an ideological platform?

The literature mentions that also electoral loss under some conditions is another reason for party policy change. During Baykal's leadership (1992-2010), the party participated in four general and four local elections. The 2007 election is the most successful in terms of vote share among these elections. In 1994, the party mainly competed with another representative of left politics in Turkey; the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and CHP shared the vote potential of the left, 14,6 % and 10,7 %, respectively.

respectively. The 1999 elections were a real shock for the CHP, who were left out of the parliament by being below the electoral threshold. DSP established the government as a head of a coalition with a vote rate of 22,19%. Considering CHP had around eight % of the votes in the 1999 elections, the 2002 election witnessed a jump. In these elections, CHP had 19,4% of the votes and became the main opposition party in the two-party parliament due to the mechanic effect of the threshold. From the perspective of vote share, CHP did not experience a loss (20,84%) in 2007 elections; however, the primary loss came with the seat share in the parliament. Its share in the parliament shrank with the entrance of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and independent Kurdish parliamentarians to the parliament. Baykal, in his own words, evaluated the 2007 elections not as an absolute defeat:

There were parties with more radical lines. And the Republican People's Party started its journey in 1992 with 4.70. And the Republican People's Party continues its adventure. This adventure began at 4.70 percent and jumped to 10 percent. There was a crisis of 1 percent in 1999. When that crisis emerged, I left the chairmanship of the party, I left. For 1.5 years, the administration of the Republican People's Party was managed and directed without me. If the new administration that emerged then had presented a picture that could respond to expectations and needs, it would have taken me along. Then, in 2000, the parties demanded that I return as the General Chairman. I came again in 2000. Now we have been here for eight years. We have gone from 10 percent to 20 percent. (10.04.2008, broadcast on CNN Türk)

Kiriş (2012) also defines the Baykal's CHP's party politics as "no wins but also no defeats" (p.398). CHP managed to be the main opposition party at the end of the 2007 elections without a significant loss and made itself the only alternative for the position of AKP's main rival. Given that the CHP did not experience a significant vote loss and the new leader came into power without an ideological faction, which some literature indicates as the possible source of a party policy shift, then before turning too quickly to look for the influences of new leadership and electoral loss, it is well advised to conduct a deeper investigation about the structural or institutional causes of party change. To answer this question, this thesis will employ also the concepts of "party goals" and an "integrated theory of party change". Here raises the third question of the thesis: What are the dynamics of party policy change for CHP? Is leadership change a sufficient determinant in explaining the reasons for the change?

Regarding the shift in party politics under the new CHP, the party politics literature points to the vote-maximizing strategies of the new CHP. According to these analyses, the new CHP toned down its secularism emphasis made its discourse on minorities more inclusive, and the saliency of poverty and corruption increased (Uysal, 2011; Celep, 2010; Tosun 2010; Kömürçü, 2011; Esen and Ciddi, 2011). The party adopted catch-all strategies and tried to go beyond its electoral ghettos (Esen and Ciddi, 2014; Kiriş, 2012). On the other hand, the new discourse also included a reference to democracy and AKP's civilian autocracy (Esen and Ciddi, 2011). This strategy proved to be successful by broadening its electoral appeal and increasing its vote by nearly 6 percent in the 2011 and 2015 elections. However, the vote-seeking strategies took time to implement, considering the competitive environment of Turkey in this period. The Kurdish problem was the most difficult. The increasing nationalist tendencies of the Turkish public opinion and the region's voters becoming a critical mass of their own, influencing the parliamentary composition, made the Kurdish issue challenging for all parties trying to increase their votes in the system. However, the competitive setting of the period made the problem more challenging for the CHP because of some particular features, which I will summarize below.

The 2007 elections resulted in a parliamentary structure lasting many more years. In addition to AKP, CHP, MHP, and BDP (by the independent candidates) also entered the parliament. The center-right was consolidated under the AKP roof, and the maladies of the Turkish party system, like volatility and fragmentation, stabilized. Another trend that came to the system's agenda was regionalization. The election results of the period indicated a phenomenon where the AKP votes were homogenized nationwide, and the parties other than AKP were confined to specific regions. (Tezcür 2012; Akarca and Başlevent 2011). CHP was confined to western and southern provinces, especially coastal ones. MHP's competition in these regions with CHP made this situation critical for the CHP.

Especially after the 2011 elections, the competition and fragmentation in these regions increased between these two parties. However, where AKP votes were high, other parties had little chance (Tezcür, 2012, p.122). Moreover, the MHP's vote was higher than the CHPs in the Western Black Sea, Central Anatolia, and Northeastern Anatolia regions (Çarkoğlu, 2014, p.176). This *neck-to-neck race* (Çarkoğlu, 2014, p.176). with

the MHP was expected to challenge the CHP, especially on the Kurdish issue. The conservative-nationalist identity of MHP made the party a second choice for the AKP and CHP voters. The voters unsatisfied with the Kurdish openings of AKP or liberal policies of CHP shifted to MHP (Akarca and Başlevent, 2015, p.93), as was the case in the 2009 local elections (Çarkoğlu, 2009, p.15) and in the 2014 elections (Çarkoğlu, 2014, p.5). The competition between MHP and CHP also had strategic results for the parties. In the 2014 presidential elections, both parties decided to compete in the local elections with a joint candidate. Although this decision did not yield good results, it can be said that it was favourable in terms of the dynamics of the party competition (Kalaycıoğlu, 2015, p.162).

The other influential dynamic in effecting Kılıçdaroğlu `s Kurdish politics was the votes of the Southeastern and Eastern regions. In these regions, votes for CHP were below 5 percent. Two parties were competing for the Kurdish region`s votes: BDP/HDP and AKP. AKP's support in the region was not based on ethnic identity issues but on economic evaluations and conservative predispositions (Çarkoğlu, 2008, p.339). The nature of this motivation gave AKP more room for manoeuvring in Kurdish politics (Aslan Akman, 2012, p.84). However, apart from this neck-and-neck competition with MHP, this motivation for voter preferences made it difficult for CHP to gain regional votes. While it was difficult for the conservative Kurdish electorate to vote for the CHP, it was also impossible for the CHP, which had not been in government for a long time, to provide some economic advantages. Therefore, in addition to its general strategy (toned down secularism and the increase in the saliency of economy-politics), CHP could apply the democracy mobilizing process mentioned above to try to gain votes in this region. However, besides the danger of losing votes in the west of the country, these strategies also carried the danger of remaining in a weak position next to the positions of the Kurdish parties, thus not having the desired effect.

The third challenge for the CHP in its Kurdish politics came with the strategy of Kurdish parties to open the party to the left. BDP participated in the 2011 elections already in the leftist bloc of Labour, Democracy, and Freedom, and especially after the 2014 elections, the party aimed to expand the voter base on the left, including other minority and disadvantaged groups (Çarkoğlu, 2014b, p.92). This strategy challenged

mostly CHP's urban votes, which had steadily increased from the 2007 elections. In the 2014 presidential and 2015 June elections, there was an impression that some votes are transferred from CHP to HDP, but such a transfer could not be proven at the data level (Akarca, 2015, p.92).

All these factors put more pressure on CHP's vote-maximizing behaviour in the party's Kurdish politics. A close analysis of the position shifts in Kurdish politics would show the limitations of the party's vote maximization strategy and the relationship between party goals and party policies. In fact, systematic research comparing the Kurdish politics of the CHP under two leadership is very limited. The first of these is Onur Alp Yılmaz's master thesis of 2017. Through analysing party reports and interviews with party elites, he provides valuable comparisons of these two periods. Yılmaz (2017) presents that as the party under Baykal administration came close to the single-party period's understanding of Kurdish problem which evaluates the issue in the borders of feudalism, undevelopment and imperialist plans, Kılıçdaroğlu era has introduced the pluralist democracy framework into the party's glossary by emphasizing human rights, transparency and democratization as key concepts. One of the studies analysing the CHP's approach to the Kurdish question is Altunoğlu's (2014) study. Although the main problematic of the study is whether the change of the party leader leads to a change in party policy, the study also analyses the party's approach to the Kurdish issue based on the group speeches of the leaders. According to Altunoğlu (2014), under the leadership of Kılıçdaroğlu, the party has evolved over time to a more democratisation and freedom-based approach to the Kurdish issue. This thesis also aims to analyse in detail the Kurdish politics of the party under these two leaderships. The Kurdish politics of the party provides both opportunities to trace the projection of the party's overall strategy and a suitable ground for testing the relationship between party goals and party strategies which the related theoretical framework suggests. The last question of this thesis is as follows: What is the CHP's approach and strategies to the Kurdish question under Baykal's leadership and under Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP? Is there a change between these two periods? Is there a relationship between party goals and the party's programmatic profile in this case?

1.3. Setting the Argument

I argue in this thesis that the concepts and relational mechanisms which theoretical framework of Party Goals and An Integrated Theory of Party Change offer, contribute to our understanding of CHP's party policy change. Based on several assumptions that this theoretical framework provides, my argument is outlined below.

From 2002 to 2008, the CHP pursued policy-seeking goals and employed policy-seeking strategies. Like other policy-seeking political parties' policies, the CHP's policies were shaped under the party's genetic ideology rather than its competitive setting. Between these years, the party reflected the interests of its core supporters. Rather than approaching the median voter, the party tried to manipulate and shape public opinion like a protest or an issue party. The regime features especially in the period provided incentives for such a policy-seeking behavior. The party had a disproportionate policy effect compared with its vote share and legislative power. The party joining with the veto players as a member of an oppositional block decreased the political efficiency of the Justice and Development Party. As a result, in the moments of trade-offs in which the party ideology was at odds with public opinion, the party chose to increase its policy effect, not stepping back from its position. The idea that CHP's alliance with veto players affects CHP's policy positions is not new. Based on studies showing the policy influence of veto players, Esen and Ciddi (2014) observed that the alliance of CHP with veto players was influential in the policy preferences of the CHP. In my study, with the tools provided by the theoretical framework of this research, I will measure the existence of this effect and, as a new contribution to the literature, relate it to the change in Turkish party politics.

Beginning with the 2007 elections, the power of veto players was reduced, or they were replaced with pro-AKP actors, as was the case in Sezer's presidency. The change in the actor composition of the regime made it necessary for CHP to reconsider its goal orientation. Here, I argue that the dismissing of AKP's closure case was especially an "environmental shock" for CHP, which immediately directed the party to adopt its goal priorities in favor of vote-seeking motivations. Under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the party continued to act in a vote-maximizing manner. The party aimed to adjust its

programmatic profile to gather support as much as possible from different sections of society.

The effect of the party's policy-seeking goal shaped Baykal's Kurdish policy. From 2002 to 2008, Baykal pursued an adversarial strategy in Kurdish politics by polarizing the debate and adopted a rejectionist position on nearly every issue of the Kurdish problem. However, CHP's vote maximization goal under Kılıçdaroğlu administration resulted in discursive strategies such as avoiding radicalizing the discourse and framing the issue within a framework compatible with the public opinion. Although Baykal's period positions were stable, CHP's new positions became very sensitive to competition settings, situational determinants, and intra-party opposition. That is why the party often stepped back or revised its positions in line with what the theoretical framework suggests.

1.4. Research Design

1.4.1. Methodology and Data

This study uses an in-depth qualitative case study that explores a specific phenomenon within the context of the Republican People's Party Policy Change between 2002 and 2015. Drawing on the literature on party goals and an integrated theory of party change, this thesis tests the assumptions about party policy change in the case of CHP and seeks to address if the theory can explain the phenomena.

This study aims to answer many interconnected sub-questions. I have used several methods and different data types proper to the diverse nature of these questions. One of my research questions was whether the CHP had different programmatic profiles under the leadership of Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu. I employed two approaches to defining the party's policy profile in these two periods. First, this study employed Manifesto Research Group's (MRG) data. A group of researchers developed a coding schema including the political dimensions and issues and coded over 2000 party manifestos by over 600 different parties in 52 countries over the post-war era, including CHP (Budge, Klingemann et al. 2001, 35). I evaluated the results of MRG,

considering my research aims. This analysis is still qualitative, although it provides numerical results and allows comparing two periods of the party.

However, as I will explain in detail in the relevant chapter, this data set may not measure some features of Turkish politics that differ from the Western European context. Similar to "word as data" method, that approach relies on "Reference texts" and "Virgin Texts." to capture these country-specific features and discussions. The analyst has known already the policy positions of Reference texts through independent sources or can be assumed. Virgin texts are the subject of analysis. By comparing the words' frequencies between these documents, the policy position of the virgin text is considered. The 2002 and 2007 manifestos of the IP (İşçi Partisi- Labour Party) are used as reference texts to determine the core concepts of hardliner (*ulusalcı*) policies. These manifestos are taken as Reference texts due to the representativeness of IP of Neo-nationalist policy debate in Turkish Politics in the 2000s (Uslu, 2008, p. 90). I coded these two IP manifestos with the coding schema of MRG research project so that I would have a possibility to compare the MRG results of CHP manifestos and IP manifesto. I identified and compared the frequency of the categories between these two groups of manifestos that will generate a numerical score.

To compare CHP's institutional setting under two leaderships in the means of policy effect, I had to operationalize the term "policy effect." Although the concept had a crucial role in the theory, the theoretical approach itself does not give a proper tool kit to measure the concept in the cases. I benefited from the "oppositional studies" literature which developed a tool to measure the policy effect of oppositional parties in a system. I analyzed the regulatory documents to determine the legal system's mechanisms for opposition parties to increase their maneuverability. In the case of CHP, the most significant difference between the two periods of the party under different leadership lies not in the legal regulations but in the actors' diverse composition and the ruling party's increasing power. Therefore, in this section, I analyzed the cases where the CHP and AKP confronted each other to determine how each encounter progressed and ended. To analyze these cases individually, I evaluate the findings of the literature and also followed the process by relevant news in media.

Another question of the thesis is related with causality relations which was one of the most difficult questions of this thesis for me. Two types of causality questions arise in relation to this thesis. The first, in line with the propositions of the related theoretical framework, is the relationship between a political party's policy influence and its policy seeking behaviour. The theory itself does not propose any instrument to measure this relationship but considers some form of coexistence of variables to be sufficient to prove causality in the empirical cases (Müller and Strom, 1999). Another causality question of how to prove the hypothesis that the changing institutional context of Baykal's CHP after the 2007 elections had an impact on the change of its goal towards vote seeking was also a difficult one. Beach and Pedersen (2013), in their book they introduce the method of process tracing, claim that the process of testing any causal mechanism involves firstly to formulate specific predictions about the causal mechanism's expected manifestations in the case (p.95). To make such deductions, the researcher must draw on her *own contextual knowledge* (p.95). Based on the knowledge derived from my literature research and parallel to the observations of other scholars (Esen and Ciddi 2014, p.422), I started from the observation that this regime change had an impact on the party and began to look for evidence for this. Again, proper to the theoretical framework and the evidence from empirical cases, the institutional change forms a trend and party change occurs especially after a peak point, so called a shock. At that point, another scholar Ihsan Dağı's (2008) expectation that the rejection of the AKP's closure case at Constitutional Court might have some impact on CHP politics led me to look for more specific evidence of this impact. Beach and Pedersen (2013) claim that we can measure the extent to which our observations point to a true causality by some type of evidence. I employed in this research sequence evidence (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp.99-100). Sequence evidence is about the events' temporal and spatial chronology predicted by hypothesized causal mechanism. The timing of events is crucial. In this chapter, I analyzed closely political events of 2008 focusing on CHP and the inquiry of Baykal's statements before and after the dismissal of AKP's closure case to understand if it has any effect on party's strategy.

The third question of this thesis is how the party goal change reflected itself in the party's Kurdish policy. I analysed this change on discourse level and on party behaviour level. This thesis will utilise Hall's (1993) "three orders of change" system to analyse the party's Kurdish politics change at discourse level. First and second

order of change refer to the “normal policymaking” which includes adjustments and/or introducing the new policy instruments. Third level of change, however, refers to a “paradigmatic change” which marked by radical changes in policy discourse. Merkel et.all (2012) adopted Hall’s framework in the analysis of social democrat policies in policy areas such as taxation or social policy. Following this study, this thesis analysed the discourse of the party in Kurdish question under the categories of party's central values in Kurdish problem, the goals based on those values, and the instruments needed to realize those goals. Additionally, to determine the party's strategies in Kurdish politics, this thesis first identified the main debate topics of the period by a literature review on Kurdish problem.

The data for this part of the project is based on raw empirical data such as legislative material (plenary and committee speeches, draft bills, and community reports), internal party documents, and MYK reports, but I mainly used group meeting speeches and soft materials such as television interviews between the period of 2002-2015. Group meeting speeches and television interviews strongly indicate CHP's position at a given time. Party elites frequently use television interviews to inform the public about parties` positions on specific policy issues or to declare the changed positions. These documents are provided from the CHP party archive. I made a thematic analysis using the Qualitative Data Analysis software QDA Miner Lite to categorize, archive, and analyse the relevant texts according to the policy areas to trace the changing policy positions and frames. I then categorised and analysed the texts according to these topics of discussion by the help of this software.

1.4.2. Thesis Scope

The period covered by this thesis is the period between 2002 and 2015. There are reasons why the period starts in 2002 and ends in 2015. This thesis's theoretical background treats the system's regime changes as an independent variable. The post-2015 period has been described by many authors as a period with different characteristics in terms of both the regime and the electoral landscape. Turkey declared a state of emergency following the military coup attempt in 2016. In 2017, Turkey's constitutional referendum on constitutional amendments led to the adoption of a

presidential government system. Therefore, analysing the period after 2015 would have meant including other variables in the analysis, which would not have been possible within the limits of this thesis.

Secondly, 2015 is also an important date for the Kurdish question as it marks when it was taken outside the boundaries of democratic politics. After the 2015 election period, the leader of AKP and prime Minister Erdoğan ended the Solution Process, and the Kurdish problem started to be defined and framed in security and terrorism contexts and was thus expelled from the political arena. This implied a new era in which the dominant discourse in the field of Kurdish politics and the instruments of politics changed dramatically, which would require more space and focus and be beyond the scope of this thesis.

1.5. Outline of the Thesis

Following the introductory chapter, chapter 2 draws upon extensive literature on party policy formation and part policy change to assess the factors contributing to the change and introduce this thesis' theoretical framework. The last section of the chapter sets out how this framework would contribute to a better understanding of CHP's policies under the Baykal administration. Chapter 3 analyses party policy change between two periods of party under two different leaders by using the MRG data set. Chapter 4 examines the party's policy effect during these two periods, considering a relationship between the policy effect of a party and goal orientation, as the theoretical framework suggests. Chapter 5 set outs how the institutional change and closure case of AKP affected party goal orientation, providing sequence evidence. Chapter 6 examines the reflection of party's goal orientation to the party's responses to the Kurdish problem through some specific components of the problem. This chapter also analyses the party's discourse on Kurdish politics and party's positions on the important issues of the peridod.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Political parties have always been a popular focus of political science studies, yet from different aspects, political party studies coupled with the term “party change. Especially after the 1970s, mainly reported cases of the Western European experience³ of party change were surprising, especially given the literature describing these parties as conservative entities. The political parties are described as conservative organizations primarily based on their representation function or aim of winning elections (Janda 1990, p.7).

Why do² the political parties need to change if it is hard to change? Before moving on with the answers to this question in the literature and concerning the content of this study, I would like to briefly define party change. Harmel and Janda (1994) defined party change as "*any variation, alteration or modification in how parties are organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon, what they stand for and what they do*"(p.275). By that definition, any study on party change can refer to party organization, party policies, or party behaviour in elections, parliament, and government. Thus, any analysis of party change deals with a change in either the organizational structure or in the party's identity or behaviour. Leaving the organizational change aside, it is crucial to mention Peter Mair's (1997, p.21) warning about confusion in contemporary political theory about political parties—the differences between political parties' historical-political identities and their current positions in real politics are often over-looked. The identity of the political party is about the party's genesis conditions and relationship with the groups that the party claims to represent. On the other hand, "what parties do" is often more related to the

³ Some examples of these models are Kirchheimer's (1966) catch all party, Poguntke's (1993) party of new politics, Katz and Mair's (1995) cartel party, , Panebianco (1988) the electoral professional party

present dilemmas, conflicts and the party's response to them. In the context of this thesis, party change means the change in the contextual and strategic (Mair & Mudde, 1998) programmatic profile of the party.

To understand party change, it is necessary to understand the factors behind party policy formation. Two main schools address the issue of the degree to which the historical identity of a party and the competition setting of a party affect its policy positions. These two interpretations of party behavior rest on different conceptualizations of the political party and voting behavior. As a result, they express entirely different stories of party policy formation. Do the political parties pursue their policy positions according to their ideological identity composed because of generic/historical developments of a country, or does their policy structure result from so-called strategic imperatives⁴?

2.1. How do political parties determine their policy profiles: The Socio-Structural Model vs. Spatial Model

This model gives the lead role to historical cleavages and ideology in determining party behaviours. It rests on the cleavage thesis (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) that argues modern party families emerged along political and sociological conflicts such as state building, religious identities, or class struggles. Political parties function as representatives of these social groups' interests, and these groups could reach politics via these institutions. Party identification is closely related to social group identification, gained by socialization mechanisms. As an intermediary link between the interests of social groups and political institutions, the actions of political parties are determined by these interests (*logic of representation*, Kitschelt, 1989, p.5). The political parties also respond to actual challenges over these historical orientations, which constitutes an *existing scheme* (Marks & Wilson, 2000, p. 434). This current scheme, so-called ideology, functions as a *prism* through which the political parties see the issues and take a position. Here, it is essential to recall Panebianco (1988), who defines parties as institutions of their history, memory, and culture. Although

⁴ For the term Strategic imperatives, please see Sartori (Sartori, 1976, pp.131-216)

Panbianco described political parties as more than their ideologies, he shares a common assumption with the cleavage approach in the means of the past constraining the present. For an institution, doctrine provides a framework for reaching decisions about policy positions. Hence, the policy directly outputs the party's ideological stance.

Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) freezing hypothesis best exemplifies also the socio-structural party change approach. As mentioned above, this hypothesis begins with the assumption that the historical experiences of society are the sources of the conflicts in society, and these conflicts, interests, and values are transmitted between generations so that even after decades, these conflicts shape party systems and party divisions. This approach conceptualizes party change as relatively static. In times of social stability, voting behaviour and party system dynamics are predictable, such as the party systems of the 1960s that still reflected the dynamics of the 1920s. Party policy change is only possible in the case of societal meta-level trends, such as market changes, demographical changes, or migration.

Empirically, this approach is firstly challenged by the fluctuation of the party system of the 1970s, which was highly volatile. The scholars interpreted this new development as a sign of a new social division, a new cleavage where cultural divisions rather than economic and religious ones would play a role (Inglehart, 1977). Although the emergence of this new cleavage shook the assumption that the old separations had become fixed and frozen, the sociological approach to the relationship between parties' programmatic profiles, cleavages, and social groups was still prevalent in the literature. The catch-all-party thesis raises another empirical objection that would question this relationship. Kirchheimer (1966) argued that the constituency-specific, ideologically dense parties are replaced by more flexible, ideologically less dense parties, which are also searching for new constituencies. This new party type has no programmatic boundaries and therefore has more adaptation power but is more sensitive to the absence of a loyal support base (Mair, 1997, pp.33-41). Parties adapt to the changing conditions by their organization or policy profile, which offers a more dynamic approach to party policy change.

Anthony Downs (1957, p.97), in his famous work "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," challenged the socio-structural assumption about the function

of political parties and put it briefly that parties are autonomous actors who seek office rather than agents of social groups. Here, the objection of Downs is twofold: Firstly, he defines parties not as representative instruments of some groups, but as relatively rational agents composed of professional politicians seeking income and power derived mainly from being in government. To stay in government or for opposition parties to displace the government, the parties should maximize their vote support⁵. The political parties compete to maximize their vote in a market, and policy is a product of the parties to attract as many voters as possible. This need for the parties to be attractive to most voters pushes them to be sensitive to public desires and common sense.

As mentioned above, in the socio-structural model, ideology as the expression of historical cleavages of the society has a very determinative role on the policy profile of a party. So, Downs (1957) argues that ideology function as a shortcut to the policy positions of a party for the voter who cannot evaluate every detail (p.98). Ideology is a general view of the party profile. In Downs` analysis, the model is relatively stable, so this analysis is not as dynamic as it first seems. Breaking the deterministic structure of the socio-structural model, freeing party change from the dependence on large and medium-sized social changes does not give the model the dynamism and flexibility we expected. First, Downs himself makes it clear that policy changes must be gradual. Here he gives room for the *bounded rationality* that redefining existing positions leads to a loss of voter confidence if the party is bound by its previous political positions. For this reason, political change should be slow and steady, and no party should be allowed to overtake the other in ideology (Downs, 1957, p. 109).

2.2. Why do political parties change their programmatic profiles?

2.2.1. The Spatial Model's Approach to Party Policy Change

Both approaches above, which analyse the party policy formation process, offer relatively static concepts. Depending on the assumptions of their system, they describe party policy change as a necessity rather than a choice. As I have already mentioned,

⁵ This model rests on the assumption of a two-party competition in a single policy dimension.

the socio-structural approach looks for meta-level variables behind the change. In other words, this approach suggests that moments of social and economic crisis/change force political parties to change. On the other hand, the spatial models based on Downs' spatial competition model and developed by Budge's works (1994) treat parties as sensitive actors to the environment in which they compete. Here are some assumptions of spatial analysis about motivations for party policy change.

Voters' policy preferences: According to the spatial models, party policies are directly affected by the distribution of voters' policy preferences. It means the parties position themselves on the left-right dimension in the same direction as the public opinion does (Adams et al., 2004, 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011). Systematic and comparative studies widely examine this assumption. In their comparative work, Adams et al. (2004) argued that the political parties re-position themselves only when the public opinion shifts away from their position. However, it is another question if the parties are more sensitive to the shifts of median voter positions or their core partisan constituency's positions. The studies indicate that parties' response depends on the party type. Niche parties respond more to the opinion shifts of their supporters (Ezrow et al., 2011, pp. 283–5); however, mainstream center-right parties are more sensitive to the changes to public opinion in general, compared even with the social democrat parties (Adams et al. 2009, p. 213-5)

Shifts of rival parties: The parties try to maximize their votes in a competitive environment, so the positions of rival parties are inevitably significant. Budge (1994) in his *marker party model*, argues that parties shift their policies according to the *ideologically proximate* rival part. Party policy differentiation is at the core of party competition between ideologically neighbouring parties. Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009, pp. 835-837) support this assumption with empirical evidence from 25 countries. According to this study, parties are more responsive to ideologically familiar parties and the neighbouring party.

Previous Electoral Results: The last electoral results are another factor influencing party policy shifts. Actually, the previous electoral results are important indicators of public opinion shift together with the opinion polls, but the parties' evaluations of these results may change due to some factors. Empirical studies show contrary results

to this assumption. Adams et al. (2004) and Adams et al. (2006) found no support for this assumption. However, introducing the time dimension, Somer-Topcu (2009) and Ezrow et al. (2011) argue that parties' responses to past election results depend on the time interval and the scope of the loss. Parties alter their policies according to the past election results when the elections are recent, and the loss of votes is dramatic for the party.

2.2.2. Harmel and Janda's (1994,1995) Contribution to Party Change

Harmel and Janda's (1994,1995) works are often evaluated as another tradition of analyzing party policy change (Fagerholm 2016) due to their particular and differentiated assumptions. Different from the two approaches above, Harmel and Janda (1994, p. 262,) evaluate the *occurrence* but also the *magnitude* and *type* of the change. Secondly, party change is not a destiny but also not accidental because party change happens as a result of conscious choice. This perspective places party politics and party decisions at the core of the framework. Political parties decide the necessity and direction of the change, so they initiate and direct their own change path. The incentives may come from inside the party or from the external environment of the party.

Harmel and Janda (1994, p. 269-271) have identified three primary variables that can lead to party change, one of which *is a leadership change*. Their research suggests that leadership change is significant but not in every circumstance. Harmel et al. (1995, pp. 12-14) observed that in cases where there are strong leadership traditions, such as those found in British and German politics, leadership change can result in a party change. Studies by Bille (1997) and Meyer (2013), cited in Fagerholm (2016), indicate that it is difficult to argue that the leadership change is a sufficient reason for party policy change. Therefore, it is essential to consider each case's specific conditions when examining the relationship between leadership change and party policy change.

The second variable is related to *changes in dominant factions*. Harmel and Janda (1994, p. 269-271) also found that the effect of prevalent faction change is limited. However, it can create tension over party policies in cases where factions differ on the

most fundamental aspects of party identity and strategy, especially when leadership change coincides with dominant faction change. While Harmel and Tan (2003) did not find enough evidence for the effect of faction change, Budge (2010 in Fagerholm, 2016, pp. 503) argued that examining a party's faction structure is crucial in cases of party policy shift. One faction can choose to represent the core constituency, and the other may aim to attract as many new voters as possible. This differentiation makes the bargaining game even more complex. Considering the particular context, Budge et al. (2010 in Fagerholm, 2016, pp. 504) noted that there is no strong empirical evidence about the relationship between the change of dominant faction and party policy change, the relations between the factions should still be considered in each case.

The third variable related to the party's internal dynamics is party structure. Recent studies about the effect of party organization on party policy shifts find a strong relationship between the structures of party organization and parties' ability to change their policies (Meyer 2013, Schumacher et al. 2013 in Fagerholm, 2016). According to these studies, the political parties with high organizational strength, a strict decision-making process from top to down, and a budget composed primarily of public subsidies are more flexible in party policy shifts.

The fourth variable is related to the external stimuli. However, for the concern of the thesis, Harmel and Janda's (1994) emphasis in "an integrated theory of party goals and party change" on the link between party goals and the change in their external environmental changes is crucial. Environmental change is an event that happens at a particular period, like a war, economic crisis, or strike. Depending on their continuity, this environmental change can be a shock or a trend/modification. Harmel and Janda (1994) state that the most radical changes occur under shock conditions. However, not every event is a shock for every political party. The importance of environmental change for a political party is closely related to the party's goals. An external stimulus is perceived as an external shock only when related to the parties' primary goal. In that sense, the electoral failures have a shock character for vote maximisers rather than for policy seekers. Here, it is essential to note that the party's own perceptions about election failures are at the core of the analysis. In some cases, a 5 percent drop could be considered dramatic, but even 20 percent can be tolerated in others.

Defining defeat as the "mother of change," Janda (1990) tries to clarify the success criteria for the political parties. He argues that a political party would not evaluate the election results solely according to the percentages that the party attained. Even if the shares of previous elections serve as a reference point, the parties' electoral performance patterns are also important. Once this pattern is detected, any deviations may be evaluated as success or failure. Additionally, as a competing agency, the performance of other agents is considered by political parties while they evaluate their own performances. Janda gave the communist parties in the 1970s and 1980s as an example, which suffered by comparison with the performance of non-communist European parties that ultimately contributed to the collapse of communism.

To this point, I have summarized party policy change as strongly linked to the sociological cleavages or the party's ideological orientation—relatively more static components of the party—making it difficult to evaluate the dynamic nature of the party change. Another set of explanations that considers the competition factors presents a model based on the explanatory power of the party system and dynamics of inter-party competition. Although Downs' initial point was to challenge the political parties' dependency on the social structure, his analysis inevitably maintains the structural dependence of parties to a degree (Ware, 1996). Party behaviour is not autonomous, primarily because of its dependency on voter behaviour. The aim of maximizing the vote keeps parties always alert to the needs and beliefs of voters. The parties may depend not on the social groups but on the individuals and rational calculations.

(..)both approaches accept that societal factors determine voters' ideologies, beliefs, and values and are not shaped by political institutions. (...) If parties behave rationally, then the particular kind of party system a country has will reflect the pattern of beliefs and ideologies evident in the society and, in turn, solely the product of social forces. In this approach, the Downsian and sociological approaches are similar. (Ware 1996 p.100)

On the other hand, with these two approaches, the beliefs and values of citizens are considered a "given." They are conceptualized not as political but as socially constructed entities. Here, the contributions of Sartori are worth emphasizing. In his famous article "From the Sociology of Parties to Political Sociology", Sartori opposed conceptualizing political parties and party systems as mere dependent variables. He

argues that to analyse *a political party as a response to and a reflection of a specific social group* is mainly a pure sociologist perspective (Sartori 1969, p.201). He mentioned the need for a political stance. He called attention to parties' persuasion/translation/manipulation role by taking an example of class and class parties. Like all the other cleavages, class interests are not reflected in the political system alone. In that case, the party persuades large masses to be a class that needs a very organized communication network. In his comprehensive analysis of "Parties and Party Systems," Sartori (2005) again emphasized parties' agency in *shaping* and *manipulating* opinions rather than just *expressing, channelling, or reflecting* (pp. 24-25). Thus, political parties choose to politicize some interests and others do not. In that way, some issues become "political" because the parties make them, they are.

2.3. Towards a Reciprocal Model

2.3.1. Party Goals Approach

Downsian models of party behaviour explanations focus on the vote maximization motivation of the parties. As mentioned, political parties are conceptualized as the organizations of professional politicians whose main aim is to get office benefits through vote maximization (Downs, 1957; Riker, 1962). Party policy and party strategy are a product of the parties' vote maximization aim. Relying on the same explanation, which takes party behaviour as a product of party goals, the "party goals" literature, however, demonstrates that political parties can pursue many different aims (Strom, 1990; Strom and Müller, 1999; Wollinetz 2002), such as vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy seeking models. Before offering a detailed analysis of party goals, mentioning that these goals are only ideal categories is essential. No party is exclusively seeking only votes, policy, or office. As Wollinetz (2002) mentions, it is an issue of priority. The party's priority mainly occurs during trade-offs where multiple goals cannot be simultaneously realized (Wollinetz, 2002: p.150; see also Strom, 1990, p. 570). Also, important to mention is that one party would not always follow one goal. The shifts between the aims can occur over time. Different factions and tendencies may pursue different goals in a political party that is divided internally

(Wollinetz 2002, p.153). Then, how can we operationalize these categories? What makes a party a vote/policy or office-seeking party?

Vote-seeking political parties prioritize winning elections as their primary objective, conforming to the classic Downsian model of electoral competition. In the context of a vote-seeking party, it is expected that the party will continually adjust its positions to secure maximum support, with policy formulation to achieve electoral victory rather than vice versa (Downs, 1957, p. 28). As a result, party positions are often unstable. They may even exhibit sharp turns or inconsistencies at the cost of consistency, as argued by Wollinetz (2002, p. 151). Additionally, Wollinetz contends that vote-seeking parties tend to have thinly staffed organizations that primarily consist of professional candidates and volunteers (p. 151).

Policy-seeking parties` priority lies in maximizing their effect on public policies. This model is derived from coalitional studies, which argued that all the parties are feasible for coalitions. The policy-seeking model challenged this assumption by stating that the coalitions would occur only between ideologically similar and spatially connected parties (Axelrod, 1970 in Strom, 1990, p. 567). However, the literature also used this model to explain some aspects of party behaviours that Downsian reasoning might consider as irrational. Pure policy-seeking behaviour is not compatible with the mechanisms of party competition theory. They are generally issue-oriented, and their main priority is to advocate the party`s issues or party`s ideology rather than enlarge their vote bases. Policy-seeking parties reflect the interests of their core constituency, and even like anti-systemic/single-issue or protest parties, they aim to change the voters` preferences. Although these parties can be electorally irrational, Wollinetz (2002) defined them as a *civic book image of a political party* (p. 150). The policy seeking model refers to a specific model of democracy where the citizens actively engage to the issues and support parties which could make difference (Strom and Müller, p. 8). Because their policies are ideology-dominated, these parties` policy positions are usually stable and resistant to environmental challenges. Wollinetz (2002) develops operational measures for policy-seeking parties, such as the extensive devotion of time to the policy discussions at the party congress, the emphasis of policy on electoral campaigns, and the legislation process (p.154). Policy-seeking parties are

expected to have party research bureaus or other structures to discuss or develop policy commitments of the party.

Office-seeking parties are mainly in search of office and office benefits. To gain access to patronage, the office-seeking parties strive to have sole power or, depending on the system, share it with others. These office benefits can range from private goods to cabinet appointments to governmental contracts, which the political parties can benefit from because of their legislative power (Strom and Müller, 1999, p.6). These parties are expected to secure government office, even at the expense of votes or policy goals. These parties generally behave to avoid strategies that would make them an improper coalition partner, such as some policy commitments or fierce attacks on prospective coalition partners (Wollinetz 2002, p.152). Wollinetz finds it especially difficult to operationalize the office-seeking parties. In contrast to the policy-seeking parties, these parties do not have intensive ideological discussions in the intra-party process and pursue relatively low-risk strategies (Wollinetz 2002, p.155).

As Strom (1990) rightly puts it, the parties do not only seek vote, office or policy (p.57). Instead, each political party decides the party's priorities, and these *trade-offs* to satisfy one goal may end with a complete failure of another goal (Müller and Strom 1999). So, there are times when the political parties cannot pursue all their goals simultaneously. In the pattern of interactions, the political parties face the necessity of some trade-offs between these goals, and maximizing the benefit of one goal may mean the renunciation of others. It is essential to be aware of the forms and results of these compromises. For a "unified model of party behaviour" Strom (1990) and then Strom and Müller (1999) focused on the *trade-offs* between these three goals with the as assumption that pure goal seekers do not exist, and all three goals are desirable for the party leaders. So, what forms do these compromises take?

Three general cases of party goal trade-offs can be mentioned (Strom 1990, Strom and Müller 1999). One refers to a tension between electoral considerations and the objectives of policy and gaining vote. Party's commitment to a policy can mobilize its traditional core constituency, but this strategy can create difficulties in extending its voter base. The second type of goal conflict refers to a tension between policy commitments and the aim of holding office. The policy commitment of the party can

conflict with its possibilities of governing via possible coalitions because of the ideological proximity condition. The third type refers to the conflict between the party's office control and its policy commitments or electoral aims. In all these contexts, parties make hard choices.

2.3.2. Determinants of Party Goals

The political parties "make hard choices" in trade-offs between different goals. However, are these choices only elite-driven decisions, as the theory would like to formulate, or do some conditions incentivize party elites while they make their choices? Under what conditions do the party elites make their choices? As discussed above, the party goal approach largely rests on conceptualizing parties as *unitary and unconstrained* actors. A party's programmatic profile is, then, the strategic decisions of the party elites. However, Strom and Müller (1999) clarify that the institutional, organizational, situational, and competition environments incentivize elites to prioritize some goals over others. Even if the parties are conceptualized as autonomous actors and party elites make policy decisions with goals, the *party elites do not decide in a vacuum* (Strom, 1990). The organizational features of the party or institutional, situational, and competition environments may create incentives or restrictions that may influence party policy decisions (Strom and Müller 1990). Although Strom and Müller also introduce organizational, situational, and competition incentives, for the argument of this thesis, the section about institutional determinants is most significant.

Institutional determinants: Using the term "institutional determinants," Strom emphasizes the effect of political regimes on party decision-making processes around goal trade-offs (Strom 1990, p. 573). The regime effects of a political system can be defined as a process where votes are translated into legislative, executive power, and then office benefits. Here it is essential to note the term "*instrumental value of the votes.*" No party would have votes for the sake of votes. The ballots are valuable for contributing to a party's office benefits or policy effect (Strom, 1990, p. 573)

A regime's electoral, legislative, or executive processes determine this convertibility of votes to office and policy benefits (Strom and Müller, 1999). The conversion of

votes into office and policy effects has some steps. The first step is the translation of votes to legislative seats, which is directly related to the electoral system's influence. Electoral laws are the first institutional mechanism that directly affects the conversion of votes to office or policy benefits. In most democracies, more votes mean more seats in the parliament. However, there are also distortions even in many significant systems. The second step includes constitutional mechanisms that translate the legislative seats to legislative power, like *investiture requirements* or the employment of *coalitional formators*. The tools that convert legislative power to executive power, such as the existence of discretionary powers, may lessen the power of electorally victorious parties. The distortions in these mechanisms and the unpredictability of high strategic interaction make the process more unpredictable, lowering the incentives for vote maximization behaviours. With multiparty systems and multi-dimensions of party competition, the possibility of vote-seeking behaviours decreases (Strom, 1990 p. 586). Finally, governmental institutions play a role in converting votes to policy effect and office benefits (Strom and Müller, 1990, p. 288).

As mentioned, this conversion process is not automatic even though a party is already an incumbent party. Some institutional arrangements favour some parties, and some give opposition parties a chance to affect the policy and have office benefits. Strom and Müller (1990, p.288) gave the Westminster system as an example where the winner (in this case, incumbent) has a massive office and policy effect, and the consensus and inclusionary systems in Austria, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark as systems where there are mechanisms for opposition parties to influence policies. All of these system characteristics affect the instrumentality of votes in a system. If the electoral power cannot be translated easily to governmental power or even if the opposition party can influence the policies, the vote-seeking behaviours may be downplayed (Strom and Müller, 1990, p. 288). Here, what makes the model more reliant on the predictions and perceptions of party elites is essential to shaping party behaviours. When the relationship between electoral and legislative weights is unpredictable, then the parties tend less to maximize the votes (Strom, 1990, p. 583).

Here, it is essential to remark that due to the complexity of the factors, Strom and Müller (1999) find it enough to be a *reasonable correlation* rather than a direct

causality between institutional factors and parties' goal decisions for the explanatory power of the framework (p.288).

2.3.3. From Party Goal to Party Policy and Strategy

As I already mentioned, the sociocultural approach, which associates party policy to the sociological cleavages or the party's ideological orientation (relatively more static components of the party life), makes it difficult to evaluate the dynamic nature of the party change. On the other hand, spatial models rest on the assumption that political parties have only one aim, vote maximization. So, the party policy and policy strategy are the products of the party's vote maximization behaviour.

However, the party goals approach introduced differentiated goals of political parties, which would result in different behaviour patterns. As mentioned above, political parties may pursue policy, votes, or office; at a particular time, they may prioritize one or another by trade-offs between these goals. Each of these goals needs different strategies for appealing to the voters. A vote maximiser party would try to appeal to the general electorate by a catch-all strategy, or a policy seeker party would represent more of the interests of its core constituency. According to the party's primary goal at that time, it chooses one of these strategies, which is, in turn, determinative of its policy positions. Some scholars analysing political parties' Eurosceptic positions adopted this framework in which they argue that Eurosceptic positions of political parties are related to parties' broader agenda in the national system and the dynamics of the electoral environment. In this literature, political parties' Eurosceptic positions are generally explained by their ideological profiles (Hooghe and Marks et al., 2006, Hainsworth, 2008). According to these studies, the Eurosceptic far-right political parties are against Europeanization because of their ideological values, such as national identity, nation-state, or state sovereignty. However, recent studies indicate position differences among these parties on the issue of Europeanization. Although they belong to the same ideological family, they differ significantly in conceptualizing Europeanization and which policies they advocate or oppose. This differentiation motivated researchers to search for a new explanation model.

Sitter (2001, 2003) underlines the party goals and strategies to understand the far-right parties' positions on Euroscepticism. These choices affect the party strategy profile, which determines the policy positions. Vasilopoulou (2010), in her study, which analyses far-right parties' Eurosceptic positions, built her work on party types and party goals concept successfully and reached crucial findings. She argues that the far-right parties' Eurosceptic positions are derived from their party type and related party goals. A policy-seeking far right party adopts *adversarial* strategies, which means they *polarize the debate* and *overplay the current party ideology*. On the other hand, a vote-seeking party tends to adopt the *accommodative* strategy, which would mean that they would *avoid radicalizing the discourse* and *employ the issue according to median voter positions*. Office-seeking parties use *dismissive strategies* that direct them to *avoid taking precise positions* on the subject. Policy-seeking parties generally oppose Europeanization (*rejectionist position*), but office-seekers are ready to revise their outlook and compromise (*compromising position*). To understand the position of the vote seekers, the system's competitive structure and the median voter's position become decisive (*conditional position*).

2.4. CHP Policies from Party Goals Perspective

As mentioned before, there is a consensus in the literature that under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the CHP implemented vote-seeking strategies. However, this thesis argument that Baykal's CHP was pursuing policy-seeking strategies have yet to be proven.

The party goals concept is mainly a theoretical concept that is difficult to be operationalized. Müller and Strom (1999) state that there is hardly a common vocabulary to define the phenomenon. The more empirical studies are conducted, the more criteria and features related to the concept start to emerge. Wollinetz (2002) and Strom (1990) developed some indicators to measure the parties' goal priorities, which are generally party organization based, including the following: the frequency of policy discussions at party congresses, the level of the party organizations' involvement in policy debates, whether the debates are issue-focused or not (Wollinetz 2002), the level of democracy, and the role of the activists in the party

(Strom 1990). However, these indicators are developed in the context of Western democracies, where party organizations also function more or less in the democratic process. Especially in parties such as those in Turkey, where internal party processes are leader-orientated and internal democracy is not functioning well (Sayarı, 1976; Özbudun 2000), these indicators' measurement power is less.

To operationalize the definition of a policy-seeking party, I have tried to identify standard criteria in various empirical and theoretical studies. As ideal concepts, it is essential to mention that no party is exclusively and solely a policy-seeking, vote-seeking, or office-seeking party (Wollinetz, 2002; Strom, 1990; Harmel and Janda, 1994). Policy-seeking parties' main aim is to influence public policy in the direction of the groups' preferences they represent. The parties' ideologies greatly influence their policies so that when their policies are evaluated in terms of the conditions of the competition setting, the choices made by the party may be considered even irrational. Examples of such parties are issue parties, protest parties, or mass integration parties.

To argue that the predominant goal of Baykal's CHP between 2002 and 2008 was policy seeking, I would need to take a closer look at the party's political profile and strategies at that time. The central pillar of this strategy is summarized as the following. One of the main tactics which Baykal's CHP employs is creating binary categorizations (Ciddi, 2008, p. 446). For Baykal, society is composed of two sides, as in Ciddi's (2008) words: "*secular or a religious fundamentalist; a republican or a separatist; a Kemalist or a "second Republican; a patriot or a traitor"*" (p. 446). In this conceptualization, "us" so-called CHP supporters are defined as secular, republican Kemalists who are patriots. Against this "us," "they" are traitors who are against the unity of a secular, republican state. Keyman (2010) called this period "friends and foe politics" in a Schmittian understanding of sovereignty (p.105). From that perspective, politics became a decision-making process about who are friends and who are foes of the community. In Baykal's discourse, each and every action of so-called foes of the society was evaluated and reacted to from that perspective. In Özman and Coşar's (2008) words, the party opposed every government policy action *instinctually* rather than having a programmatic inquiry (p.244). Instead of having concrete alternatives and a constructive perspective, the CHP's opposition rested on "criticizing for the sake of criticizing" (Ciddi, 2008, p.447)

Studies pointing to a rise in the party's nationalist leanings refer to the party's changing stance on the EU or Kurdish issue (Gülmez 2008, Keyman 2010). From a rational theory perspective, the rising nationalist tendency of the party could be explained in terms of reaching the right voters. As mentioned before, many studies and public opinion polls have identified the conservative nationalist tendencies of the voters. The 2006 report of Konda provides essential insights about the voters' positions on the critical discussion themes of the 1990s and 2000s political agenda, such as the Kurdish issue or veiling. According to this report, Turkish voters support more socio-economic or security measures than the identity-based democratic rights perspective on the Kurdish issue. In that sense, Baykal's CHP's ultra-nationalist position corresponds to voter positions. However, another pillar of Baykal's discourse, ultra-secularism, seems, in Ciddi's (2008) words, "anachronistic." Before and during the election campaign, Baykal repeated that the AKP government threat the secular state and secularism and now it is time to save secularism by voting (Ciddi 2008, Notes).

With the Welfare Party, religion became a part of party politics discourse (Sayarı, 2007 p.20 in Wuthrich, 2015). In fact, as Wuthrich (2015) points out, religion had been part of the discourse of the center-right parties before (p.94). Nevertheless, the fact that an Islamist party was in government brought a defensive secularist discourse that found a response not only at the party level but also at the social level. Also, as mentioned before, religion became one of the essential denominators of voting behaviour in Turkey and an important indicator of *alaturca left-right positions*. Additionally, the research indicates clearly that religion is in rise in the society. TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Research Foundation) (Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2006) shows that the percentage of people who define themselves very religious and the people who identify themselves primarily as Muslim increased. On the other hand, the research indicates that the support for an Islamic State has fallen and there is no wide support for the idea that secularism is under risk.

On the other hand, for CHP voters' secularism is the most crucial element of party choices (Esmer 2002, p.102) and parallel secularism is the most crucial element defining the CHP's party identity (Turan, 2006, p. 564). As mentioned before, if one of the party's founding objectives was to ensure the country's unity, the other was to integrate and secularise the country. In fact, we can argue that the sensitivity of core

supporters to secularism requires the party to be careful about its positions in this area. Still, it should be remembered that the CHP is the issue owner in this area. In other words, no party can compete with CHP on the secularism dimension. Therefore, the party still seems to have a lot of room to manoeuvre.

Nonetheless, CHP under the Baykal administration adopted a moderate approach in this area by the 2002 elections with the motto “Anatolian Left.” The central discourse of the party at the 2002 elections, the so-called “Anatolian Left,” appeared as a concept of “ethno-religious rhetoric” claiming to be authentic Anatolian (Ciddi, 2008, p.445). Ayata (2002, p. 112-113) defined this discourse as a radical shift from an identity based on universal social democracy with the aim of Westernization to an authentic and Anatolian version of it. The emphasis on humanism, tolerance, solidarity, and love, which, as Baykal argued, are the actual roots of Anatolian culture, is the basis of this new interpretation. Wuthrich (2015) identified some religious phrases in Baykal’s speeches, such as “*if we are not able to make you happy, may God withhold this office from us*” and, for the winners of the election, “*those upon whom God rained down favour*” and similar gestures pause in his speeches during *ezan* (p.96).

CHP also employed religious discourse to overcome the party’s image as an elite party and to place the party with the society in the so-called dichotomy of elite vs. society during 2002 elections. These words by Baykal indicate the aims of this strategy very clearly:

When you say Sheikh Edebali to our well-informed, well-read intellectuals, who think they know everything, their hairs stand on end. Why? Because there is Sheikh in front of his name. So, what (...). They called him Sheikh because he had learned his time's knowledge, wisdom, science, and culture. Why are you afraid of the word Sheikh? He was the enlightened man of his time. He was the most forward-thinking person of his time. The horizon-opening person of his time. Great political men talk to him and open their hearts and minds. (...) The poor person thinks that sheik is today's illiterate, obscure Aczmendi sheik. The sheik of knowledge, the sheik of wisdom, the sheik of culture, the sheik of the richness of heart. (Bilecik Seyh Edebali Festival, 06.09.2001)

In addition to the strategy of moderating the party's religious discourse and re-imagining the party as a *Volkpartei*, in the 2002 elections the party chose to reduce the emphasis on its history. In a television program, Baykal mentioned that the party owns, is proud of, and accepts the party’s history. Still, he went on, the party evaluates today’s

problems with a modern, realistic perspective rather than an outlook dominated by historical references (Trt2 live broadcast, 12.01.2002). Another time, Baykal commented on the historical heritage of the party as a painting of one of its predecessors to be proud of but not necessarily to be followed:

In other words, you probably have photographs from two generations ago of your grandmother, your great-grandmother in your house. You hang them somewhere. They have a style of dressing. You are never uncomfortable with this; how nice it is. You are proud of it; it is there; it is your history, a part of you, your identity. But just because the picture is like that, neither you, nor your daughter, nor your grandchildren would dress like them. It is a part of us, and we are proud of it. But we are constantly re-evaluating our policies in line with contemporary developments and the needs of today and tomorrow. (Baykal's answer to a question about six arrows; Haber Klubü, 17.02.2002)

Responding to a question concerning the secularism discussions in Turkey, Baykal answered that it no longer needed to be emphasized. Turkey has already coped with secularism problems (Deniz Baykal's speech on election manifesto, August 2002). For Baykal, the main problems of the society were now the economy, corruption, and the setbacks of the law of the state (Party Assembly opening speech, 19 Nisan 2001).

In the 2007 elections, nationalism and corruption were the main issues in the campaign (Wuthrich, 2015, p.95). Baykal's CHP also employed some center-right strategies such as calling the center-right voters to merge under the name of CHP or transferred politicians from the centre-right to the party, such as İlhan Kesici (Baykal's press conference, 30 April 2007) at the very eve of 2007 elections. Analysis of CHP politics from the perspective of party competition argued that the CHP expected to mobilize the center-right voter who may be distanced from AKP with the fear of an Islamic regime (Kömürcü, 2011; Kiriş, 2012). According to these analyses, the concern was still electoral. From this perspective, Baykal's CHP was not irrational but just unsuccessful in persuading the centre-right voters of the emergency of the Islamist threat.

However, while this theory may explain the party discourse during the elections, it is insufficient to explain the ultra-secular position of the party on various issues throughout the entire period. Ayata and Ayata (2007) defined center-right conservatism as a “*more liberal attitude to religious practices, being more in contact with religious groups and being more willing to establish alliances with such groups*”

(p. 218). Coming to the 2007 elections, Baykal's CHP had been very distant from such groups and even from their own religious gestures of the previous period. And also at the discourse level, the 2007 elections were overshadowed by the presidential debates (Çarkoğlu, 2007, p.59). As Sezer's term as a member of the secular bloc was ending, the possibility that the new president would be from the AKP made the 2007 elections into a system's crisis, with secularism one of the essential concerns of this crisis.

Uygur Doğan (2013) also noted in her thesis that in this period, the CHP took an ultra-secular position on issues such as the *turban*, *imam hatip* high schools, and Koran courses. Not only in the elections but on many issues that came up in this period, the CHP responded from an ultra-secular position. For example, CHP consistently favoured the Veiling ban in the public sphere, arguing that Veiling in the public sphere is a mechanism of women's oppression and a threat to the secular regime (Uygur Doğan, 2013 p.134-170). This party position was even more incomprehensible in light of public attitudes. In the Konda 2006 report on the ban on headscarves in universities, 78% wanted the ban to be lifted, while 22% favoured continuing the ban. The number of those who do not see the headscarf as an opposition to secularism was 68.4%. The number of those who thought that women civil servants should wear a headscarf had decreased significantly since 2003. In the 2003 survey, this figure was 37.4 percent; in 2007, it was 19.4 percent (also in Çarkoğlu,2010).

This profile of CHP under Baykal leadership carried similarities of policy seeking parties' policy profiles. Like them, also CHP in this period, Baykal had determined a position more distant from the average voter especially regarding secularism. He tried to mobilize public debate in favour of the party ideology and core supporters.

2.5. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I first introduced the concepts such as party goals, party policy change, and determinants of party goals that I have employed in this thesis within a theoretical framework. As explained earlier, this theoretical framework focuses on a relationship between the policy profile of a party in a specific policy domain and the party's general

goal in the system in a particular context. According to this framework, parties prioritize different goals at different times by considering the characteristics of the competition or institutional setting in which they operate, and this prioritization leads to different party positions in different policy areas. Such a perspective helps us to consider party policy change from a more dynamic perspective. On the other hand, it helps us to assess the impact of ideology or competition setting on the political profile of the party within the framework of these party objectives.

The vote maximization priority of the Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP in the 2011-2015 period has been identified by various studies in the literature. However, there is no study on the goal trade-offs of Baykal's CHP after 2002. In this sense, the second part of this chapter is devoted to this debate. Policy seeking is a difficult concept to operationalize. Wollinetz's study, one of the limited studies that have done so, has introduced some criteria based on party organizational structures, but this isn't easy to apply in contexts such as Turkey, where authoritarian party structures prevail. Therefore, I, like most empirical studies using this concept, have considered the characteristics of the party's programmatic profile at the given time.

The studies of Turkish politics argue that the CHP under Baykal leadership employed an ultra-nationalist-ultra secular policy profile and emphasized the effect of Kemalist ideology on the party policies in this era (Ciddi, 2008; Şenyuva 2009, p.55). However, as mentioned above, the party's different attitudes between the two elections under the same leadership and later Kılıçdaroğlu's moderate positions on secularism show that the influence of ideology on parties' policies is only possible through a selective reading by party elites. Therefore, I think the concept of a policy-seeking party better explains the positions of Baykal's CHP, especially from 2002-2008. The concept of a policy-seeking party provides a theoretical tool for analyzing CHP's policy profile where the party prioritizes increasing its effect on public policy decisions and legal regulations in the direction of its ideology rather than maximizing its votes.

In the next chapter, I will focus on measuring CHP's policy change under Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership. Although several studies refer to the policy differences of two periods, no systematic research would evaluate the policy divergence in several

domains. Having confirmed any difference in policy positions, we can explain this change with the concepts given by this theoretical framework.

CHAPTER 3

QUANTIFICATION OF PARTY POLICY CHANGE

Despite the growing literature about party politics in Turkey, the CHP's party policy change with Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership has remained empirically unexplored. Just after the change of leadership, many circles primarily evaluated the direction, inquiry, and causes of the "new CHP" project (Uysal, 2011; Tosun, 2010; Altunoğlu & Eşkinat, 2014; Gökmen and Tosun, 2015). Despite this growing literature, it has not been systematically explored how the policy profile of CHP and the party's positions on specific policy issues evolved after the party's reestablishment in 1992. This section will address this gap using the empirical data from Manifesto Project Dataset⁶ (Volkens et al., 2021). By analysing the data in detail, the chapter aims to have a comprehensive look at the policy change of the party during a nearly 15 years period.

The first of the questions I will try to answer in this section is, in line with my assumption above, that the 2007 elections were also a different election for the profile of the CHP; in this sense, they revealed a different profile from the 1990s. Therefore, I will first try to identify the distinctive features of the 2007 elections. Secondly, I will try to analyse the differences between the 1995-2007 period and the 2011-2015 period in order to understand the differences between the Kılıçdaroğlu and Baykal periods, and thirdly, I will try to understand in what sense the CHP's political profile is shaped under effect of *ulusalcı* than social democratic ideology. Evaluating party politics within the framework of social democracy is easier because of the international references of the ideology, but it is difficult to determine what Ulusalçılık means in terms of party politics. I will use an alternative method to identify the political components to understand to what extent the CHP's policies converge with it.

⁶ In this section, I employed **Manifesto Project Dataset version(s) MPDS2023a**.

3.1. How to Measure Party Policy Change

A party's policy change is measured by three crucial tools: Expert Surveys, Opinion Polls, and Manifesto Research (Castles&Mair, 1984; Huber and Inglehart,1995; Laver and Hunt, 1992). In opinion polls, the voters are expected to evaluate the positions of political parties through direct or indirect questions, such as how they place themselves on policy scales and to which parties, they feel closer. Similarly, the views of experts may also be used to understand party policy change. Either voters or experts provide "second-hand evidence" because they reflect their point of view in their analysis (Benoit and Laver, 2006, p. 89). On the other hand, rather than this second-hand evidence, the data can be political texts such as speeches, interviews, manifestos, party programs, and constitutions. They are available in the public domain, can be analysed using different techniques, and provide an accurate picture of the party's policy profiles (Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003, p. 311).

Although all these texts are the by-products of party elites, I used election manifestos to trace the CHP party policies during the 1990s and 2000s. Compared with the programs, the manifestos are less value-loaded documents (Vasallo and Wilcox, 2006, p. 416). Performing various functions, such as presenting the central values of a political party and serving as a contract between party elites and voters (Kavanagh, 1981, pp. 8-11), they are used as the primary empirical sources of many qualitative and quantitative studies Party programs reflect the historical evaluation of the party, ideological components, and principles, so it is hardly possible to change them as dynamically as to change manifestos.

Unlike party programs, manifestos reflect the party's policy profile at a specific time in a specific historical context. Like party programs, election manifestos are expected to reflect the joint agreement of party forerunners and are ratified in party conventions. Despite this expectation, we do not know very much about the role of intra party democracy in the process (Scarrow et al, 2000, p. 144). Although the manifestos can be composed without the grassroots' direct participation, they are generally carefully analysed by a committee and a leader. Considering the weak internal democracy practices in Turkish political parties and the leader and leadership committee's

significant say over party policies, election manifestos still appear as a proper tool to follow policy changes of a political party.

3.1.1. Saliency Theory of Party Competition Versus Confrontational Approach

The studies on party policy change have focused on two main theoretical approaches. Classical spatial analyses, their theoretical approach based on Downsian analysis and Budge's work (1994), present a mechanistic picture of party competition. In that model, since parties compete, they are expected to take a contradictory position on each issue on a given policy dimension. Thus, once one party takes some stand on some issue (such as taxes), others will directly oppose that stand. On the other hand, according to saliency theory, parties prioritize different policy options rather than confronting each other directly on the same issues. In his analysis of party manifestos, David Robertson (1976) argues that parties rarely take oppositional stances on an issue. The parties decide their policy positions according to their strengths and their weaknesses. They emphasize mainly the policy areas where they believe they can catch as many votes as possible, and they undertone their less popular positions. Stroke's (1966, p. 170-176) concept of valence issues highlight the differences between the nature of some political concepts. By valence issues, Stroke refers to the overwhelming perception among the public that some issues are obviously right or morally superiority. On valence issues for parties, only one position is possible; however, at positional issues, the parties may take pro or con positions.

The measurement method of party policy heavily depends on the relevant political competition theory of the analysis (Budge, 2001, p. 86). The methods built on saliency theories consider the relative emphasis of one position over the whole issue set. The parties' positions on policy dimensions can be estimated by parties 'relative emphases on the issues which differentiate the parties from each other. So, parties often do not directly oppose each other but rather differentiate by their emphasis on the issues. On the other hand, methods in which the positional approach constitutes the theoretical framework, party positions are measured through the "direct pro or contra statements" of the parties to specific policy proposals.

Both approaches are supported or opposed by empirical evidence in many studies. The data set of the MARPOR project showed that very few manifestos directly negate the other parties' words and phrases, especially in regard to issues such as welfare, corruption, peace, or taxes. Instead, the difference between the parties is the degree to which they mention some policy positions (tax cutting position for parties on the left or welfare expansion position for parties on the right) (Budge & Bara et al. 2001, p.7). The computerized analysis also shows that the parties' "selective emphasis" on some keywords differentiates the parties. Each party emphasizes issues and "owns" a set of issues they think can raise their votes (Budge, 2001, p, 82). The other set of issues would be overlooked.

Long digressions on the growth of unemployment are presumably saying it is a bad thing and the party would do something to counter it. Is any party going to say that it is for unemployment? Immediately the question is put, it seems unlikely. A party might, however, say very little about unemployment and devote much attention to the evils of inflation, implying that all other considerations should be subordinated to fighting this problem. (Budge, 2001, p. 79)

According to some critics (Harmel & Tan, 1995), the party's relative emphasis on any issue is measured instead of its substantive position by such a theoretical framework. Two parties may have different positions but still may emphasize the issues to the same extent in their manifestos. The categorization of political issues, such as pure saliency issue positions (non-positional issues) and bipolar issue positions (or positional issues) mentioned above, can overcome these criticisms (Budge, 2001, p. 79). Non-positional categories do not have a direct contrast on the other side. For example, peace's contra category is not anti-peace. As another example, it is assumed that a manifesto emphasizing law and order would mainly advocate law and order. Election programs that speak little of law-and-order advocate less law and order, which indicates party position on the issue.

3.1.2. Manifesto Research Group Dataset

In this dissertation, I will employ Manifesto Research Group's dataset to analyze the evolution of CHP's policy profile. The work of Manifesto research group extends the Robertson coding schema, developed and applied by David Robertson to analyze the

patterns of competition in Britain. The coding schema involves 56 issue categories that, on the one hand, capture all the preferences of the parties and, on the other hand, compare them over time and across countries (Budge and Bara, 2001).

The dataset and the measurement method are criticized by several researchers on the grounds of comprehensiveness (Benoit & Laver, 2007, p. 131) or contextual reliability (Huber and Inglehart, 1995, p. 90). Although the critics might be right (for the replies to the current critics, see Volkens, 2007), it is essential to mention that the MARPOR coding schema is adoptable by new categories or by new definitions of the categories. As a human-coded schema, it is also highly contextual. The human coder is selected among those with specific knowledge of the national context. That means it is still a qualitative method. Compared with other alternative manifesto research techniques, such as expert surveys and voter evaluations, the MARPOR data is still one of the most comprehensive and contextual (For a detailed discussion, see Meyer, 2013, pp29-57).

MARPOR coding schema is based on a specific theoretical framework, the so-called saliency model of party competition. The schema contains both bipolar categories and non-positional categories. The high code records mean the issue has high saliency. Thus, the data describe programmatic changes in the party's salience and positioning on several dimensions such as —socio-economic, socio-cultural, EU integration—and on some particular political issues. In the economy and society scale, the parties' positions on the given scale are calculated by subtracting the quasi-sentences related to each policy axis (right or conservative) from those related to the other policy axis (left or progressive), resulting in a positional scale. In measuring the saliency, an additive method is used. Here, the sum of the quasi-sentence percentage on each issue is calculated.

I will also employ a comprehensive textual analysis of the manifestos in addition to this dataset. This analysis would reveal contextual differences between Türkiye and West European context. In that way, I expect to present a systematic overview of the CHP's manifestos over 15 years.

3.2. The CHP's Programmatic Profile in MARPOR Research Project

The mean percentage distribution of quasi-sentences over policy areas presents a general picture of CHP party policies between 1995 and 2015. As well, comparing social democrat parties' policy packages in OECD countries can provide opportunities to detect similarities and differences between CHP and social democrats of OECD countries.

Table 3. 1. The Most Coded Categories in CHP election manifestos (According to Mean Percentage Distribution of Quasi Sentences over Policy Categories)

Rank	The Most Coded Categories (According to Mean Percentage Distribution of Quasi Sentences over Policy Categories)
1	411 Technology and Infrastructure (9,41%)
2	504 Welfare State Expansion (8,97%)
3	506 Education Expansion (5,60%)
4	202 Democracy (4,89%)
5	410 Economic Growth: Positive (4,58%)
6	706 Non-economic Demographic Groups (4,39%)
7	703 Agriculture and Farmers (4,23%)
8	402 Incentives: Positive (3,72%)
9	304 Political Corruption (3,34%)
10	303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency (3,34%)
11	408 Economic Goals (3,19%)

In the table above, the most rated categories can be observed. The CHP's popular policy profile categories can be categorized into two groups. One is non-positional political issues such as 411 *Technology and Infrastructure*, 303 *Government Efficiency*, 408 *Economic Goals*, and 304 *Political Corruption* categories. The most

coded category 411, Technology and Infrastructure, refers to policy mentions emphasizing the importance of technological development, training, and industry research. This category, with other non-policy categories, does not have a determinative effect on policy dimensions of either left/right or progressive/conservative dimensions. The high saliency of these "technical" policy domains, which do not belong to any policy dimension, might be evidence of the party's desire to be closer to the median voter by minimizing the importance of polarizing issues. On the other hand, the overrated results of this category can be underlined as a response of the CHP to the centre-right discourses (Mert, 2007, pp. 43-45), such as economic growth and service to the people, which implies the development of transportation, communication techniques, and modern industrial techniques. CHP aims to break centre-right hegemony over this policy issue by offering many policy proposals about technological innovation and development. These categories can also be related to the actual context of the party. The high saliency of political corruption is an example of conjuncture's effect on a political party's policy priorities. The Turkish economy witnessed a downturn in the 1990s, characterized by a financial crisis at the end of 1993 and a significant economic crisis in 2001. Also, during these years, Turkey witnessed large corruption scandals backed up by political authorities and the activities of mafia-like crime organizations. The emphasis of the categories like 410 Economic Growth: Positive, 304 Political Corruption, 303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency, and 408 Economic Goals can be evaluated as a CHP's response to the public demand for clean and effective administration and effective management of the economy.

In line with the social democrat parties of OECD countries (Budge et al. 2001, pp.106,107), 504 Welfare State Expansion and 506 Education Expansion are among the most frequently coded policy categories. However, the categories of social justice and environmental protection are under-coded. In the coding schema, social justice references include equality, fair treatment, protection for the underprivileged, and the need to end sexual /racial discrimination. A closer analysis of CHP manifestos shows that social justice references—where they are coded—mainly refer to income inequalities and equality of opportunities in economic terms rather than references to racial or sexual discrimination.

In the economic policy domain, CHP also parallels social democrats with high saliency of market regulation and incentives. Among social democratic policy features, the least rated categories in CHP manifestos are 201 Freedom and Human Rights and 701 Labour Groups: Positive categories. The low saliency in these categories toned down the party's social democratic appeal. A close analysis of the manifestos shows that favourable mentions of women and the need for assistance to women are very high compared with other non-demographic groups such as old and young people, special interest groups and linguistic groups.

As Budge (1993) mentioned, an election manifesto is also essential” for what it leaves out” (p.701). In that sense, equal attention must also be paid to uncoded categories, as indicated in the table below:

Table 3. 2. The uncoded categories in CHP election manifestos (1995-2015)

Uncoded Categories in CHP Election Manifestos (1995-2015)⁷
406 Protectionism: Positive
415 Marxist Analysis
505 Welfare State Limitation
507 Education Limitation
608 Multiculturalism: Negative
702 Labour Groups: Negative

Except for Marxist Analysis, uncoded categories turned out to be bipolar categories, mainly negative. Volkens (2001, p. 108) implies that these bipolar categories function as a control mechanism to see if it is enough to record just saliency on issues. The mention of a policy era on one side, with a lack of mentions on the other, means that this category is recording saliency for that party (Budge, 2001, p. 79) Hence, it can be

⁷406 Protectionism Positive refers to favourable mentions to policy mechanisms like tariffs or quotas to protect internal economy, 608 Multiculturalism Negative refers to negative mentions of cultural diversity or favourable mentions for cultural integration, a homogeneous society. Labour Groups Negative refers to negative references to worker class, trade unions.

argued that party positions in the uncoded bipolar categories became valence issues for the party itself. The party owns these issues and positions and did not change its position. So, it is interesting to note that the CHP between 1995-2015 stands on a liberal open market position that abolishes all means of market protection, and the party is against all restrictions on free trade, such as tariffs, quota restrictions, and export subsidies. The enlargement of the welfare state, the expansion of education and the support for labour groups, at all levels are valence issues for the party. It is also important to note that even in the 2007 elections, where the party put on a relatively high nationalist stance, the category per 608 Multiculturalism: negative is not coded. This category refers to the appeals for cultural homogeneity in society. Here, we can note that cultural diversity and plurality are valence issues for the party.

3.3. CHP's Policy Change in MARPOR Research Project

In this section, firstly, I will conduct manifesto analyses comparing policy areas. On the one hand, the qualitative analysis of election manifestos will help me underline the wording differences between documents. On the other hand, the MARPOR data will provide a more systematic perspective, as it allows me to differentiate between policy domains and particular components of the domains. I will then present the project's qualitative data considering a review of the Turkish political literature.

Firstly, I want to outline the CHP manifestos between 1995-2015 using the MARPOR data set on the RILE index, comprising 26 policy variables. RILE index refers to standard left-right policy dimension categories which is developed by Laver and Budge (1992). They derived these categories theoretically and tested empirically, especially for the west European countries. The scores are aggregated by adding the right categories and subtracting the sum of left categories. As the table below indicates, the 2007 Manifesto has the rightest position the party has ever had after its reestablishment. On this scale, it is essential to note the party's shift to the left under Kılıçdaroğlu 's leadership. The 2015 manifesto's policies are very similar to the 2011 positions. On this measure, saying the party's shift to the left in 2011 also stabilized in the 2015 elections is worth mentioning. The tendency to move to the right under

Baykal's leadership seemed to be stopped by Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, and the new CHP located itself even more left-wing than the 1990s CHP.




Figure 3. 1. The Left/Right score of CHP Policies (1995-2015)

3.3.1. Change in Policy Domains

In this section, I will supplement the MARPOR data with my qualitative comparisons, such as common and different points of the manifestos, to better understand the policy inquiry of the new CHP. After its reestablishment in September 1992 until 2015, the party contested seven general and four local elections. In the 2015 elections, the party contested two general elections, with six months in between. With two manifestos in the same year, I did not expect any policy alteration; however, I chose to include both manifestos in the analysis to capture any possible tone or position differences.

The 1995 Manifesto is one of the shortest, with the 1999 Manifesto, with 282 coded units and 45 pages. The 1995 manifesto *Yeni Hedefler, Yeni Türkiye* (New Aims, New Turkey) opens with the premise that "We will bring Turkey to the modern world." Before introducing party policy proposals, the manifesto has a lengthy introduction written uniquely as a dialogue with voters (p.1-10). This part is significantly negative in tone and attacks the conservative/rightist governments of the past years, and underlines CHP's claim to govern. However, the policy proposals of the 1995

manifesto are designed in a very detailed way. An effort is made to outline a policy agenda, including differentiated policy domains like democracy, infrastructure, environment, and social welfare.

In the 1999 elections, CHP published the election manifesto under the name of *Cözüm 2000* (Solution 2000) for general elections. It is the shortest manifesto, and when compared with other election programs, it is a bland, in-exhaustive document. Contrary to the 1995 election manifesto, this document's opening has the leader's personal voice with his signature below. As a party leader, Deniz Baykal promises an efficient and competitive economy, a social welfare state, clean politics, a secular/democratic state, and social democracy to solve the corrupted social order (p. 6). The policy domains remain consistent between 1995 and 1999, but the policy priorities alter over time due to the day's agenda. The measures against corruption in bureaucracy and politics seem to prioritize primary policy proposals of the 1995 elections, such as democracy and human rights.

Compared with the 1995 and 1999 election manifestos, the 2002 manifesto is large, detailed, and well departmentalized, opening with the optimistic statement, "We Will See Good Days" (*Güzel Günler Göreceğiz*). It begins with a call from Deniz Baykal, "We want to rule alone" (*Tek başına iktidar istiyoruz*), reflecting the will of a strong government in public after the 1990s coalition governments. The manifesto presents the 2002 elections as a cornerstone in Turkish politics that will be a decision between opposites: social justice or inequality; clean politics or corruption; a modern and secular society or fanaticism (religious); and a member of the EU league or an introverted "third world country" (p.3). In that sense, the 2002 elections are presented as a "new beginning" to another order of state and society relations which, till then, suffered from corruption, injustice, and poverty. The 2002 manifesto follows six main policy premises: struggle with political corruption, efficient state, organized/productive and competitive market economy, laic/democratic state, social state, and European Union. The most detailed part of the manifesto is the economy domain. As expected, the 2001 economic crises dominated the party's policy agenda in the 2002 elections.

The 2007 election manifesto is one of the most extensive and detailed one, with 70 pages and 1610 coded units. The name of the manifesto is *Pusulula 07* (Compass 07), symbolizing the manifesto as a compass to show the direction of a promised "new order." The manifesto opens with an aggressive tone, warning of the dangers that the current government (AKP) poses to the territorial and political integrity of the Turkish state and the Turkish Republic (p.1) A crisis environment is presented as corruption, insecurity, anarchy, and poverty among large segments of society (p.2) As an alternative, CHP's new order promises the end of terror, peace in the streets and enforcement against crime, and self-dependent international politics, including the mentions of the Cyprus issue (p.2). The first policy headlines of the manifesto reflect differentiated policy domains compared with previous ones, such as terror and security, secularism, and international relations. While the previous manifestos designed policy proposals around some broad principles, the 2007 manifesto includes conjectural events such as the Annan Plan in Cyprus (p.15), the Attack on the State of Council (p.13) and Note of March 2003 regulating delivery of Turkish troops to Iraq (p.14).

The 2011 Manifesto, the manifesto of the first elections under Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, marks the culmination of the party's effort to develop a policy path distinct from those of the 2007 elections. It is one of the longest, most comprehensive, detailed manifestos, with 135 pages and 2005 coded units. Freedom and hope are the buzzwords of the Manifesto. It opens with a promise: "The country of freedom and hope: Everyone's Türkiye." Each page of the manifesto is marked by this remark "CHP for Everyone." The manifesto includes many policy domains: For free individuals/ A libertarian democracy; For sustainable development/ A productive, growing, just, and environment-friendly economy; For social justice/ Equality and social solidarity; For a happy society and individual/ Qualified public services; For developed, modern and qualified city life/ Urbanized Anatolia, a world metropolitan: Istanbul; and For a secure world/ international relations based on peace, democracy, and development. The mentions like the environment-friendly economy, modern and qualified city life, and libertarian democracy are brand-new concepts for the CHP policy profile. This manifesto shows the traces of a new political agenda, similar to the Western European new left politics.

The 2015 June manifestos are divided into policy areas such as democracy, economy, social justice, public service, nature and urban rights, foreign policy, and information society. The 2015 November manifesto does not contain any differences in its policy proposals, but the composition of the document is different. While the June manifesto came out with the title "A Turkey to live in", the November manifesto came out with the motto "People first, unity first, Turkey first". Although 2015 November manifesto is a shorter document, it contains as much data as June manifesto to codify, indicating compactness. Under Kılıçdaroğlu 's leadership, the manifestos have become longer and the policy proposals more detailed. The proposed policy areas have also diversified.

Policy Domain 1: Foreign Relations

The trend in the below chart indicates an increase and stabilization in the salience of the Foreign Relations domain after the 2007 elections. The foreign relations domain comprises the policy mentions to capture the party's approach to an internationalist foreign policy and the EU. In the 1999 elections, the party gave less space to this area than in other elections.




Figure 3. 2. The Issue Saliency of Foreign Relations Domain in CHP's Policy Profile (1995-2015)

Although the 2007 and 2011 elections witnessed a boom in policy suggestions about international relations, the 2007 election manifesto indicates a substantially different profile in this domain. International politics is not only a privileged policy domain but is also a substantially different domain from those in the 1995,1999, 2011 and 2015 manifestos. To measure the party's internationalist approach and its support of the EU, I used the positional variables below:

Table 3. 3. The Description of categories Internationalism Positive, Internationalism Negative, EU Positive and EU Negative

Variable	Description
Per 107 Internationalism Positive	Support for international cooperation, the UN or other international organizations, and support for global governance.
Per 109 Internationalism Negative	Negative references to international cooperation. Support for national independence and sovereignty
Per 108 EU-Positive	Support for the EU in general
Per 110 EU-Negative	Negative references to the EU

As the table above indicates, Internationalism categories measure the political party's attitude to the international organizations and international cooperation. Internationalism negative category is especially important to measure the political party's positions about the issues of national independence and national sovereignty. Per 108 and Per 109 categories indicates the party's attitude to the issue of European Union and aim to measure the Eurosceptic positions of the political parties in a party system.



Figure 3. 3. Internationalism Score in CHP Manifestos




Figure 3. 4. The EU Support score in CHP's Manifestos

The change in the party's approach to internationalism is very striking. Starting from the 2011 elections, the party has made a significant advance toward internationalism. After 2011, the party stabilized its internationalist approach contrary to Baykal's CHP's more closed and cautious foreign policy.

The abrupt decrease in EU support between 2002 and 2007 is especially noteworthy. In the 2002 elections, the party expressed the highest support for the EU, and in the 2007 elections, the EU support was at its lowest level. A substantial shift in favour of the EU at the 2011 elections and 2015 manifesto again stabilized this trend. Contrary to the literature, which marked the beginning of CHP's critical stance on the EU in 2002's the 2002 election manifesto declared the party's support for the EU. Considering the general attitude of the party to the EU, Baykal's 2007 Manifesto is a striking case deriving from a pro-EU party stance after the 1990s. More than that, the new CHP brought the pro-European perspective back and also maintained it in the elections of 2015, although not as high as in 2002. Here, it is essential to note that the EU issue for the Turkish agenda was not so actual in 2015 as in 2002, after the disappointments which put Turkey's membership to a dead end.

A closer look at the manifestos will show that the statements here also support the above data. In the 1995 elections, the European Union is discussed in parallel with plural democracy, organized-competitive labour, and a market economy sensitive to the environment. The European Union is accepted as a project of Social Democracy (1995 manifesto, p.43). However, the favourable mentions of the EU peaked in the 2002 elections in which the EU was framed as a national target if Turkey had the desire to be a leading country with "its free citizens, strong economy and respectful government" (2002 manifesto, p. 42). The 2007 Manifesto *Pusulâ* changes this overall positive tone. The overwhelming apathy towards the European Union is summed up by the party's statement about the unfair membership process during the reign of the AKP government (2007 manifesto, p.16). The target of the party about the EU is now re-defined as "being a member of the EU as a respected unitary and secular state (2007 manifesto, p.16).

It can be argued that EU membership threatened the unitary state from being a social democratic party project for CHP. This reactionary attitude also endured during the Cyprus issue. Both the 1995 and 2002 manifestos evaluate the Cyprus issue from the perspective of "rights of people in Cyprus" and "peace among two societies" (1995 manifesto, p.44 and 2002 manifesto, p. 41). In both manifestos, the party commits itself to maintaining peace between two societies by the people's rights of self-determination principle. The 2007 election manifesto represents a break in this

position for the party (2007 manifesto p. 15). The support of the Turkish Cypriot Community for the United Nations Annan Plan in the wake of April 2004 is stated because of the encouragement of the current government. The Turkish Republic of North Cyprus is accepted as a part of the sovereignty rights of Turkey.

Qualitative analysis of the 2011 manifesto indicates a return to a pre-2007 position of the party about the EU. Although the tone of the EU politics of the party is still under the shadow of disappointment from the slowing down of negotiations, the Copenhagen criteria are declared as a route of democratization in Turkey in the 2011 manifesto (2011 manifesto, p.125). European Union is accepted as a social project referring to values such as democratization and information society. The 2011 manifesto offers that collaboration with social democrats to develop a universal discourse is necessary to overcome the obstacles in front of Turkey's membership (2011 manifesto, p.125).

Also, the 2015 manifestos share this approach. Although the party's opposition to "unfair unilateral concessions" is mentioned, the party's primary mission is stated as "to take the necessary steps to complete the membership process with the EU" (2015 manifesto, p. 177-178).

Policy Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy

The Freedom and Democracy domain is composed of the policy mentions capturing the party's approach to democracy, freedom, and constitutionalism as a bipolar category. These categories refer to positive mentions of freedom, civil rights, right to freedom of speech, support of individual rights against state, democracy and the institutions of democratic regimes. The 2007 election manifesto shows that in this election, the party gave much less space to policy proposals in this area than it did in other elections. The saliency of this policy domain in 2007 elections is strikingly less than 1995, 2011 and 2015 elections. The downtrend started with 1999 elections, so that 2007 elections is the peak point of this downtrend with a particular decrease in the saliency of the domain.




Figure 3. 5. Issue Saliency of Freedom and Democracy domain in CHP’s Manifestos (1995-2015)

Starting with the 2011 elections, the party has made more policy proposals and evaluations in this area. In the 2015 elections, the section devoted to this area in the election manifestos reached a relatively high level. To measure the party's approach to the issues of democracy and freedom, which are according to the literature the critical components of the new CHP policy, I used the variables below:

Table 3. 4. The Description of Categories “Freedom and Human Rights” and “Democracy”.

Variable	Description
Per 201 Freedom and Human Rights	Positive mentions of freedom, civil rights, the right to freedom of speech, individualism
Per 202 Democracy	Support for democracy, the citizen involvement in decision-making, support for agents of democracy and institutions of the democratic regime




Figure 3. 6. Issue Saliency of category Freedom and Democracy in CHP manifestos




Figure 3. 7. Issue Saliency of category Human Rights in CHP Manifestos

As expected, the 2007 election manifesto gives very little priority to favourable mentions for democracy and freedom/human rights despite the more admirable coverage of the 1995 elections. The downtrend in both areas started with the 1999 elections and had a low in the 2007 elections. Kılıçdaroğlu's new CHP managed to reverse this downward trend. While in the 2015 elections the issue of democracy received the most references, the 2011 manifesto has the highest salience of the category "freedom and human rights."

A text analysis of the manifestos indicates similar results. In the 1995 manifesto, the "new aims" of the party start with the institutionalization of democracy with a particular emphasis on the "state of law" (1995 manifesto, p.11). The international agreements are taken as a basis for the institutionalization of democracy. Freedom and human rights are conceptualized with democracy by references to freedom of thought, speech, and justice (1995 manifesto, p.12-13-14). In the 1999 manifesto, the party replaced its policy proposals about democracy with corruption references. The 2011 manifesto defines human rights and freedoms in the broadest terms, from labour rights to environmental rights. The 2015 manifestos continue this trend of a broad definition

(2011 manifesto, p.11). It can be argued that although the 1995 manifesto has the highest saliency rates in democracy and human rights, 2011 enlarges the human rights conceptualization of the party. The 2015 manifesto defines the issue of freedom as a problem of the political and economic system. Therefore, both the political system and the economic system should be designed in such a way that the individual can realise his/her freedom at the highest level. (2015 June manifesto, pp.18-36)

Policy Domain 3: Political System

The political system domain comprises the policy that captures the party's approach to the system and the government's general features. This domain includes the variables that measure the party's approach to centralization or federalism and variables such as political corruption and efficiency, which are generally valence issues for political parties.

The 1999 elections indicated a high saliency of the political system policy variables, but the party did not manifest high up and downs in this area. Considering the CHP policy change discussions, I want to measure the party's approach to the issues of centralization and decentralization. I chose the variables below:




Figure 3. 8. Issue Saliency of Policy Domain “Political System in CHP Manifestos (1995-2015)

Table 3. 5. The Description of Categories Decentralization and Centralization

Variable	Description
Per 301 Decentralization	Favourable mentions of federalism or decentralization. Support for local customs, sub-national areas
Per 302 Centralization	Favourable mentions of unitary government and centralization




Figure 3. 9. Issue Saliency of category Decentralization in CHP Manifestos (1995- 2015)

Figure 3. 10. Issue saliency of category Centralization in CHP Manifestos (1995-2015)

As expected, the 2007 election manifesto showed significant support for centralization and unitary government, although the 2011 manifesto reversed this trend suddenly. A high saliency of decentralization in the 1999 election manifesto deserved attention.

A closer look would reveal the peculiarities in these categories. Now, it is crucial to refer to one of the contextual limitations of this category in the Turkish case. Although the decentralization category includes references to federalism, one of the most heated political themes of recent Turkish politics, the coding of this variable in CHP manifestos refers mainly to the delegation of authority to local units. It should be emphasized that in all CHP manifestos, the "unity of the country territory" is one of the fundamentals of the policy profile. However, one can still observe the shift in the

meaning of "delegation" between the manifestos. The 1999 election manifesto had favourable mentions of "participatory local democracy," "local administration reform," and "regulations proper to the European Charter of Local self-government" (1999 manifesto, p. 16). In the 2007 election manifesto, favourable references to power delegation in previous manifestos are entirely replaced by a sceptical attitude towards decentralization/regionalization. It is stated that the decentralization project is a primary threat to the unitary and secular state of its pro-federalism accent. In this regard, the manifesto suggests de-concentration policies which would increase the authority of appointed state organs locally from the cities to the villages (2007 manifesto, p. 60).

The 2011 election manifesto proposes an extensive reform in local politics of the party, promising to remove reservations to the European Charter of Local Self Government, which favours local self-government practices in a country (2011 manifesto, p. 108). The party further commits itself to develop a new financial system in which municipalities can rely on their independent/income resources and provide a stronger administrative structure for municipalities (2011 manifesto, p.108). The favourable mentions of the appointed organs in the 2007 manifesto are replaced by favourable mentions of municipalities in the local in the 2011 manifesto. The 2015 June manifesto had a more cautious tone on the issue of local administration. The party promised "service integrity" between central and local administrations by "consulting" local organs in centralized decision-making processes. On the other hand, the party announced that it would prevent the central administration from abusing its authority over local governments (2015 manifesto, pp. 164-165).

Policy Domain 4: Economy

The space allocated to the economy in election manifestos does not vary much between elections. In this domain, considering the discussions about CHP party policy change in the literature, I would like to measure the saliency of the following variables of, *Ulusalcı* economy-politics⁸.

⁸ The studies about *Ulusalcılık* refer to the relationship between *Ulusalcılık* and 1930s *Kadro* movement /1960s *Yön* movement. The ideological components are often defined by the terms of Third world




Figure 3. 11. Issue saliency of policy domain „Economy” in CHP Manifestos (1995-2015)

Table 3. 6. The description of categories “economic planning”, “controlled economy” and “nationalisation”

Variable	Description
Per 404 Economic Planning	Favourable mentions of planning, long-term strategies
Per 412 Controlled Economy	Favourable mentions of the government's control over the economy
Per 413 Nationalisation	Positive mentions of state ownership of industries and also of the land

The categories above measure the party’s positions on the state’s role in an economy and the emphasis about categories such as planning, state ownership of industry and long-term economy strategies of the state. The figure 3.12 below indicates the results per election.

leftism. (See Gürpınar,2011). The variables 406 Protectionism and 415 Marxist Analysis are excluded. They are not coded in any of the manifestos.




Figure 3. 12. The saliency of “ulusalci economic politics” categories in CHP Manifestos (1995-2015)

The category of nationalization entered the political agenda of CHP in the 2007 elections, but the new CHP gave minimal prominence to supporting nationalization. Contrary to expectations, it is in the 2002 elections, instead of the 2007 elections, that we see an apparent rise in a preference for economic planning. After a sharp decline in the 2007 and 2011 elections, economic planning had the most significant coverage in the 2015 elections.

Fair distribution, sustainable growth, and an efficient economy are the regulative principles of CHP's economic policies in the 1995 elections (1995 manifesto, p.31-32). The 1999 manifesto has a more liberal inquiry emphasizing the need for a productive and competitive market economy (1999 manifesto, p.8,9,10). In the 2002 elections, the party's main premises are shaped around the budget deficit reductions, support and regulation for the banking system and retrenchment crisis, and the importance of savings (2002 manifesto, p.8-21). In the 1995 and 1999 manifestos, privatization references include enthusiastic and cautious judgments. Mentioning the beneficiaries of privatization, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and competitiveness, the manifestos warn of privatization's dangers to the labour groups and the "public interest." Interestingly, although the 2002 manifesto gave economic planning much more prominence, the party strategists were more willing to employ privatization as an instrument of efficiency (2002 manifesto, p.20).

In the 2007 election manifesto, the reduction of budget deficits and a strong currency, as well as growth led by industrialisation are emphasized (2007 manifesto, pp.22-25). The key words of the 2015 election manifestos` economy domain are economic growth, economic stability and employment. (2015 June manifesto, p.47-86)

Policy Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life

This political system domain is composed of the policy mentions capturing the party's approach to the concepts such as equality and social justice, which are critical for a social-democratic policy profile.




Figure 3. 13. Issue Saliency of policy domain “Welfare and Quality of Life”.

On the issues of welfare state and equality, the figure above indicates an evident rise in saliency from the 2011s onward, including the 2015 manifestos, compared to not only the 2007 elections but to all the CHP policy profiles in the 1990s. I used the following variables⁹ in order to develop a detailed insight: Per 503 Equality positive, per 504 Welfare State Expansion and per 506 Education Expansion.

⁹ I excluded the variables per 505 Welfare State limitation and 507 Education limitation, which are not coded in any of the manifestos.

Table 3. 7. The description of categories “equality positive”, “welfare state expansion” and “education expansion”

Variable	Description
Per 503 Equality: Positive	Favourable mentions of the social justice concept, opposition to class barriers, opposition to racial and sexual discrimination
Per 504 Welfare State Expansion	Positive mentions of the government's direct control over the economy
Per 506 Education Expansion	Favourable mentions of expanding the education at all levels.




Figure 3. 14. The issue saliency of categories Equality positive, Welfare State and Education Expansion Positive.

Since the 2011 elections, we can clearly see that the references to equality and the welfare state, which were at minimum levels in the 2007 elections, have increased significantly. The 1995 elections are similar to the 2011 elections regarding the equality, but in categories of equality and education expansion, 1995 manifesto has fallen behind.

Despite this high saliency, the policy proposals can differ in tone and inquiry. The 1995 (p. 25) and 1999 manifestos` (p.15) policy project in this domain is to unite all

insurance systems under a national security institution umbrella, which brings to mind the Justice and Development Party's regulation today. Additionally, high-quality health and educational services, social housing, and good management of the urbanization process are defined as an inevitable part of a welfare state and promised to every citizen. The development differences among the regions are stated as a fundamental social justice problem, so agriculture policies are mentioned as essential instruments to reduce these inequalities (1995 manifesto, p.37-38). Agriculture policies are replaced with incentives for the regional industry in the 1999 elections (1999 Manifesto, p.12). The 2011 election manifesto makes social welfare and social justice a cornerstone of its campaign and election strategy. The policies of family insurance, social adaptation programs, payments for the care of older people in the family, and support for the children during their education are underlined in the manifesto and during the campaign of the 2011 elections.

However, the most significant difference considering the previous election manifestos is the definition and the scope of the term “social justice.” Women-men equality, opportunities for youth, the rights of the retired, and the rights of disabled people are parts of social justice policies. Not only in the means of income but also in the means of life quality issues, the party presents a more comprehensive approach in the 2011 manifesto (p.50-54). The 2015 election manifestos formulate their policies in this domain around the 2011 manifesto concept of social justice and equality. Family insurance is again mentioned as one of the primary mechanisms to ensure social justice. While the 2015 manifestos identify the fight against poverty as one of the main objectives of this field, they emphasize that social support mechanisms should be rights or employment-based, which differs from the AKP's social support conceptualization (2015 June Manifesto, p. 73-75).

Policy Domain 6: Fabric of Society

This domain includes mentions of nationalism, conservatism, and multiculturalism, which are the main issues of Turkish politics after the 1990s. Therefore, the number of references to these categories in the election manifestos will give important clues about the change in the political profile of the party.




Figure 3. 15. Issue Saliency of Policy Domain “Fabric of Society”

On issues of the fabric of society, there are some striking observations. First, it is essential to note a significant increase in the 2007 elections regarding the number of domain categories. The issues about the fabric of society had the most significant coverage in the 2007 elections. In Kılıçdaroğlu's political agenda, these issues feature less prominently, especially compared with the previous domain, "welfare state and social equality.” In the two graphics about nationalism and secularism above, note that although the frequency of nationalism issues in 2007 peaked and the 2011 elections indicated a big dive, the 2015 June elections returned to the 2007 level. In that sense, it is difficult to indicate any position change in the party's approach to nationalism.

However, the code which measures the saliency of secularism is noteworthy. Beginning with the 1999 elections, we can see an apparent rise in a preference for secularism, which peaked in the 2007 elections. The sudden decline in the 2011 elections manifesto and no coverage of this category in 2015 manifestos mark a significant policy break with the era of Baykal, with much weaker attention to secularism. Another indicator, multiculturalism +, tends not to feature very much in any of the manifestos, with a slight upward movement in the 2015 elections. However, despite its unpopularity, this category is a valence issue for CHP by no mentions of multiculturalism -. The indicator "Law and Order" witnessed a boom during the 2007 elections. As one can observe, this policy category differs from the traditional themes of the policy profile of CHP. The high coding of this category in the 2007 elections is one of the examples of the contextual effects on the policy choices of the party.

Table 3. 8. The description of categories National Way of Life Negative, Traditional Morality Negative, Law and Order and Multiculturalism Positive.

Variable	Description
Per 601 National Way of Life: Positive	Favourable mentions of the nation's history, national ideas, patriotism, nationalism
Per 602 National Way of Life: Negative	Opposition to nationalism, patriotism
Per 604 Traditional Morality: Negative	Opposition to religious values; may include divorce and abortion; favourable mentions for the separation of church and state
Per 605 Law and Order	Favourable mentions of internal security and law enforcement
Per 607 Multiculturalism: Positive	Favourable mentions of state ownership of industries and also of the land




Figure 3. 16. The issue saliency of category “nationalism” in CHP manifestos (1995-2015)




Figure 3. 17. The issue saliency of category “secularism” in CHP Manifestos (1995- 2015).



Figure 3. 18. The issue saliency of category “Multiculturalism positive” in CHP manifestos (1995-2015)



Figure 3. 19. The issue saliency of category “Law and Order” in CHP in CHP Manifestos (1995-2015)

How to measure party approach to secularism with MRG data?

As mentioned, one of the criticisms of the MARPOR's coding schema and data is that it does not cover cultural diversity and contextual differences sufficiently. While working with MRG data on the political issue of secularism, I encountered a problem that can be evaluated in this regard. In 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, the secularism became the main axis of political and societal tensions. Being the AKP which had its roots in political Islamist National Outlook movement, a single government and CHP which established a modern and secular state and society a main opposition party in the parliament brought this tension to the highest level. This tension was realised not only at the level of discourse but also in the policy areas where the parties tried to put these world views into practice. This tension had results also in the issues like the lifting of the ban on the turban in state institutions, solving the problems faced by *Alevi*s or protecting the secular character of education. Therefore, for any study that analyses the parties in Turkish political life during this period, it becomes crucial to measure the position of these parties in this area.

However, to measure the party's position in the issue of Secularism in Turkish context is quite challenging. In MARPOR data, the favourable mention of secularism is measured by the code per 604 Traditional morality: Negative. This category also includes the mentions of the pro-abortion and pro-divorce approach, which can be seen

as the components of the progressive pole at the progressive-conservative dimension. First, the diversity of mentions covered by this category makes it challenging to identify pro-secularism stance in manifestos of countries like Turkey where secularism has systemic meanings beyond progressive values. Relatedly, this relatively narrow definition of the term also makes other frames of the concept complex. In Turkey, secularism can be conceptualized with its relation to the political system, individual rights and freedoms, the constitution, and social values.

In the table presented above on the references to secularism in the CHP manifestos, I was struck by the fact that the 1995 and 2015 manifestos did not contain any references to secularism, which was surprising since it is one of the central values of the party. For this reason, I wanted to take a closer look at how the MARPOR coded the manifestos. Some manifestos were available in coded form on the MARPOR website; others were not. Through our communication with the research group, I obtained coded versions of these manifestos.

In the 1995 manifesto, the references to secularism are defined by the category 201 Freedom and Human Rights rightly. Secularism is defined as a guarantee of every religion and belief freedom in the country, and it is emphasized that only within secularism is the freedom of belief possible (1995 manifesto, p.16). For the first time in the 1999 election manifesto, secularism was emphasized as one of the institutions of the constitution that should be guaranteed and secured, and references to it were coded with 203 Constitutionalism: positive. As well, the definition of laicism as the separation of religion and state also was apparent in the 1999 manifesto and coded with 604 Traditional Morality: Negative. The number of mentions related to the definition of secularism as the non-interference of religion in state affairs increased in 2002 and peaked in the 2007 elections, as seen in the analysis above. On the other hand, the framing of secularism and individual freedoms remained very marginal in the 2007 elections. In the 2011 elections, references to the separation of state and religion continued but lost their former intensity.

Instead, references linking secularism with social justice are noteworthy. The statements like to prevent the hate crimes against citizens belonging to minority religions, to prevent discrimination among our citizens on the basis of religious beliefs

and to realise the demand of Alevi citizens for equal citizenship in all areas is also organized within the framework of secularism and coded under category 503.Social Justice. In the 2015 manifesto, one can observe the increase of secularism frames concerning democracy. Secularism is defined as a "necessity" for democracy and social peace: "democracy cannot be secured without secularism, and secularism cannot be secured without democracy" (2015 manifesto, p. 22). Another new frame in the 2015 elections conceptualizes secularism with equal citizenship, especially for minorities. Secularism is seen as a guarantee of equal citizenship and is coded under the 503 social equality code (2015 manifesto, p.22). In the 2015 manifesto, no references to secularism are directly related to the separation of religion and state. The most frequent references to secularism are coded under the variables of 607 Multiculturalism: positive and 201 Individual rights and freedoms.

Policy Domain 7: Social Groups

This domain includes favourable mentions of several social groups but only when no specific, relevant policy position can be classified in other categories such as 503, 504, or 607. The references here might provide a snapshot of the change in the groups the party claims to represent. However, the prioritization of other categories prevents this analysis from being done.




Figure 3. 20. The Issue Saliency of Policy Domain “Social Groups”

The tables above show that after the 1995 elections references to social groups and related policy proposals began to decline, and the mentions of social groups were almost never included in the 2015 elections manifesto's policy statements. However, a textual analysis will show that starting with the 2011 elections, references to social groups took place in a way that can be matched with the categories of social justice and the welfare state. Therefore, the coding related to these groups was evaluated vis-à-vis other policy domains, mainly Social Justice. As mentioned, the increase in statements in these policy areas during the Kılıçdaroğlu period can be related to this issue.

The 1995 manifesto is prominent, especially with its favourable mentions of labour groups. As well some good wage and tax regulations, the most special measures are working conditions. The 1995 and 1999 manifestos present significant regulations about "democratizing" working life by revising working law articles such as strikes, collective bargaining agreements, and job security (1995 manifesto, p.19; 1999 manifesto, p. 16). In the 1999 elections, the privatization process is criticized, especially for its unfair results for labour groups (p.10). The 2002 election manifesto has a striking decrease in the mentions of labour groups.

Table 3. 9. The description of categories Labour Groups positive, labour groups negative, Agriculture and Farmers Positive. Middle Class and Professional Groups, Underprivileged Minority Groups, Non-economic Demographic Groups.

Variable	Description
Per 701 Labour Groups: Positive	Favourable mentions of a trade union, working class
Per 702 Labour Groups: Negative	Opposition to trade unions, working class
Per 703 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive	Favourable mentions of farmers and agriculture as a sector
Per 704 Middle Class and Professional Groups	Positive mentions of professional/white-collar groups and new middle class
Per 705 Underprivileged Minority Groups	Favourable mentions of underprivileged people such as homosexuals, the handicapped
Per 706 Noneconomic Demographic Groups	Positive references to university students, women, old-young people




Figure 3. 21. The Issue Saliency of Categories “Labour Groups positive, labour groups negative, Agriculture and Farmers Positive. Middle Class and Professional Groups, Underprivileged Minority Groups, Non-economic Demographic Groups.” In CHP manifestos (1995-2015)

Also, the submitted policy proposals are far from suggesting recovery of working life or worker rights. Instead, wages or retirement payments are stated as the main mechanisms of the policies (2002 manifesto, p.32). The 2007 election manifesto presents a distinguished picture compared with the manifestos of the 1990s and 2000s. References to the category 701 Labour Groups: Positive is at its lowest level in contrast to the mentions of 703 Agriculture and Farmers. Farmers are the most favourable social group in the manifesto. The favourable mentions of agriculture policies about all varieties of field works, including forest villagers and fishermen. Direct and indirect economic incentives are promised as a part of the "reconstruction of agriculture" (2007 manifesto, p.34-p.38).

After agricultural groups, noneconomic demographic groups are the party's policy targets at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000s. The party's 1995 and 1999 election manifestos present policy proposals under two different sections: Youth and Equality of Women and Men (1995 manifesto, p. 21-24; 1999 manifesto p. 21-22). Policies about youth generally refer to the right to education and the aim to regulate educational provisions. In regard to gender issues, in addition to equality measures in law, working life regulations that will advance "women in work" are proposed. Despite

these preeminent regulations, positive discrimination is still not mentioned in party's glossary. Favourable discrimination policies became a part of the policy proposal package by the 2011 elections. While the agriculture category lost its popularity in this manifesto, it employed the most pre-eminence references of non-economical demographic groups. As well, the category 704 Middle Class and Professional groups were added in the 2011 elections. Favourable references about the new middle class and professional groups like architects, academicians, and consultants are noteworthy (2011 Manifesto, p.84, p.114). The 2015 elections broaden the range of social groups in this sense. In addition to groups such as tradesmen and artisans, artists, and athletes, policy proposals were developed for children, elderly and people with disabilities.

3.4. How to specify *ulusalcı* policy components?

Beginning with the Justice and Development Party government, a particular form of nationalism—a synthesis of official nationalism emphasizing anti-Westernism, and secularism became prominent in Turkish politics (see Uslu, 2008). Students of Turkish party politics mention the effect of *Ulusalcılık* on CHP politics under the leadership of Baykal. Although there are studies about the ideological profile of *Ulusalcılık* it still needs to be determined which policy components it refers to. In this section, I tried to delineate the components of *Ulusalcılık* as a party policy. I will investigate the party policy change of CHP from the perspective of this policy set.

Similar to the "word as data" method, I chose a "Reference text" and a "Virgin Text." Here, the analyst has known already the policy positions of Reference texts from independent sources or can be assumed. Virgin texts are the ones which are the subject of analysis. By comparing the words' frequencies between these documents, the policy position of the virgin text is determined. The 2002 and 2007 manifestos of the Labour Party (Isci Partisi-IP) are used as reference texts to determine the core concepts of hardliner policies. However, rather than observing the frequency of the words that generate a numerical score as the Word as Data approach suggests, I applied the MARPOR coding schema to these manifestos. The table (3.10)) presents the mean percentage distribution of programmatic quasi-sentences over 76 policy categories in both IP and CHP manifestos after the 1990s.

In this analysis, I compared the mean percentages of the categories in IP manifestos and CHP manifestos to specify hardliner positions in Turkish Politics. Among the most frequent IP categories, those whose mean percentages in IP manifestos exceeded their mean percentages in CHP manifestos are specified. These categories refer to policy positions that do not belong to the CHP policy profile in general, and they define the policy particularities of the hardliner position. In Table 3.11 these categories are presented in bold.

Table 3. 10. CHP's calculated policy statements considering ulusalçı emphases in manifestos.

(Years)	Ulusalçı policy emphases in CHP manifestos (percentage)
2015 ¹⁰	7,627%
2011	3,892%
2007	10,434%
1999	6,118%
1995	7,802%

Firstly, when both bipolar categories' mean percentages are over CHP values, it means this policy dimension has a priority in IP political agenda compared with CHP. For example, the IP policy agenda has a priority for International Relations domain in comparison with CHP. In these cases, the more coded category in the reference text is picked as a particular component of policy position (Among the categories 101 and 102, 102 is picked following this rule).Second, the categories which do not refer to an ideological policy position (non-policy factors), such as the categories Noneconomic, Demographical Social Group: Handicapped, and Government Effectiveness, are not taken into consideration even if their mean percentages are over the CHP rates. Thirdly, the categories that were not coded in any of the CHP manifestos but have high saliency in IP manifestos are not chosen for the simplicity of measurement. The added

¹⁰ In 2015, the two election manifestos gave very close results in terms of ulusalçı categories. Therefore, they were not shown separately in the final table, only the results of June 2015 elections is presented.

percentages of these categories below are used to calculate the total amount of ulusalci emphasis in manifestos. As can be observed from the diagrams above, the year 2007 witnessed a jump in the number of ulusalci emphasis, and the Manifesto 2011 represents a sharp turn with a significant decrease.

Table 3.11. Mean Percentages of ulusalci policy categories in CHP election manifestos

	2015(2)	2015	2011	2007	2002	1999	1995
102 Foreign Special Relationship: Negative	0,16614286	0,968	2,294	0,186	0,475	0,483	4,61
103 Anti Imperialism	0,10128571	0,155	0,2	0,062	-	-	-
104 Military: Positive	1,59	1,471	0,249	1,491	0,238	-	-
109 Internationalism: Negative	-	-	-	0,186	-	-	-
110 European Community: Negative	-	-	0,2	0,994	-	-	-
203 Constitutionalism: Positive	0,58	0,542	-	0,062	-	0,483	-
302 Centralization	0,03	0,039	-	0,124	-	-	-
407 Protectionism: Negative	0,97	0,929	-	-	-	-	-
409 Keynesian Demand Management	0,26	0,194	-	0,248	0,238	0,644	0,355
412 Controlled Economy	0,26	0,348	0,2	0,062	-	-	-
413 Nationalisation	0,19	0,232	0,15	0,497	0,238	-	-
414 Economic Orthodoxy	1,2	0,813	-	1,18	-	0,966	1,064
601 National Way of Life: Positive	1,49	1,936	0,1	1,988	1,069	2,254	1,773
604 Traditional Morality: Negative	-	-	0,499	3,354	1,425	1,288	-

3.5. Findings

A comparison between the social democratic parties of OECD countries and the CHP's policy priorities reveals that the CHP has a similar policy orientation to these parties in terms of welfare state expansion and universalisation of education. However, reminding the criticisms in the literature, freedom and human rights, labour rights, social justice, and environmental protection are not on the CHP's policy agenda as much as other social democratic parties have. Instead, more non-ideological issues, such as technology and infrastructure, government efficiency, economic goals, and political corruption, come to the fore for the CHP. This is a consequence of the competition with the centre-right parties, which also heavily emphasizes such issues. Which topics are not coded at all can also give information about the programmatic profile of the party. Marxist categories, categories related to protectionism and market restrictions, were not coded at all. This implies that a liberal free economy is the dominant economic view of the party.

The MARPOR analysis measures party change on the L-R axis. The CHP moved steadily to the Right between 1995-2007 on this axis. 2007 elections is the peak point of the process. In the 2011 elections, the party took its most left-wing position in this period. It maintained this leftist position in the 2015 elections. Since the explanatory power of this L-R axis for Turkish politics is questionable, the party positions in specific policy areas are analysed.

The 2007 elections differed in many respects from the CHP's average program profile. This confirms the thesis that the 2007 elections were different. In the 2007 elections, EU support, democracy, and human rights/freedoms saliency were at their lowest level from 2002-2015. 2007 elections are the ones where the party emphasized centralization the most. The 2007 elections were also the period in which the most significant area on the structure of society was allocated, while the areas of secularism and law and order were coded the most in the 2007 elections. Thus, in the 2007 elections, CHP was at anti-EU position, silent on democracy and human rights issues, and more willingly wanted to regulate the fabric of society. In the 2007 elections, the policy era of secularism and the category which indicates the law, order, and security measurements are the ones that were coded over the average of what they usually are.

MARPOR data also makes it possible to compare CHP periods under Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu administrations. Under Baykal, the CHP took a very closed and anti-internationalist position. This is one of the policy areas that has changed most radically under Kılıçdaroğlu. Since the 2011 elections, the party changed this position and supported internationalism in foreign politics. Other policy areas where the party changed its saliency radically are the area of democracy and excluding 1995 elections, human rights, and freedom area. In the human rights area, Baykal's CHP presented a downward trend that changed radically by the 2011 elections. Another policy area that presented a different saliency between Baykal's and Kılıçdaroğlu's period is Welfare and Quality area. The 1995-2007 period has a distinctively lower-level degree pattern than the 2011 and 2015 elections.

In the fabric of society, the 2007 election manifesto presented quite a change profile. It is difficult to say that Kılıçdaroğlu and Baykal administrations have particular trends in the means of nationalism. However, secularism saliency shows an increasing tendency where the peak is the 2007 elections. The saliency of this issue decreased radically in the 2011 elections. However, it can be challenging to understand the peculiarities of Turkish politics by MARPOR data which is also one of the complaints raised in the literature. One of the problematic places is secularism itself. Secularism, in the coding schema, is defined as a very loose category that includes issues from abortion to church/state relations. In the Turkish context, secularism has a particular meaning. When I reviewed the texts coded by the MARPOR data, I realized I was not wrong in my assumption.

Moreover, this kind of analysis gave me a great insight into the change of meaning that secularism has undergone. In 1995, the party defined secularism as guaranteeing every religion and belief. However, in the 1999 elections, secularism was emphasized as one of the institutions of the constitution that should be protected. Therefore, the secularism emphasis in the 1995 elections was coded by the 201 Human Rights and Freedom code but in the 1999 elections, 203 Constitutionalism: Positive. By the 2002 elections, secularism was framed as the guarantee of separation of religion and state, and these mentions peaked in the 2007 elections. By the 2011 elections, the party started to frame the concept with social justice and equal citizenship concepts.

Secularism is defined as one of the necessary components of equal citizenship, especially for minorities which reminds us of the party's perspective in 1995.

By the words as data method, I defined the policy components of Ulusalçılık. In the quantified analysis of the coding, the 2007 elections presented an unprecedented change in the policy character. Nearly eleven percent of the CHP policy package is dominated by Ulusalçılık emphases in the 2007 elections. The 2011 elections also presented a sharp drift, which rose again in 2015. Still, the 2007 election manifesto is distinguished by its high hard-liner policy emphasis.

3.6 Concluding Remarks

This section is devoted to measuring the differences in the policy profiles of Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu using two different analysis methods. Whether there are differences in political profiles between these two periods is essential for the argument of this thesis. The first finding group is related to the peculiar character of the 2007 elections policy profile. My data analysis reveals that, in line with my expectations, the 2007 elections differed from the overall CHP policy profile in many respects. In the 2007 elections, the party had a more pro-secularist and pro-centralization position compared with the other elections in the 1999-2015 period.

Additionally, the EU-Support is at its lowest level in these elections, and the party's policies toward regulating society by law and order are at their highest level in this period. In this sense, the 2007 elections differentiated from other elections in the period by a more security-oriented, ultra-secularist, centralist, and Euro-sceptic policy profile. On the other hand, nationalism appears as a steady component of the party profile during the 1990s and 2000s. Although the 2011 election manifesto indicates a very low saliency in the nationalism area, in the 2015 elections party's emphasis on nationalism seems to be on the rise again. In this sense, the 2011 elections did not create a stable change.

The second question closely related to the argument of this thesis was to what extent the policies of the Kılıçdaroğlu era differed from those of the Baykal era. In my search for an answer to this question, I paid attention to two criteria: that the pre-2011 period

already followed a pattern in a related policy domain and that the change in 2011 was stable and continued in the 2015 elections. The first policy domain that fulfils these criteria is democracy. Under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, it is possible to say that a more pro-democracy party political profile has emerged. Again, suppose we put aside the excessive saliency in the 1995 elections, the reason for which seems to be contextual. In that case, we can say the party has a more emphasis on freedoms and human rights domain under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership.

On the other hand, in the field of internationalism, the CHP under the Kılıçdaroğlu administration is making a big leap in terms of emphasis and showing a more pro-globalization and pro-international cooperation profile. Regarding the welfare state, the CHP has always had a consistent emphasis. With Kılıçdaroğlu, this emphasis is again increasing, but it should be noted that the difference is not as significant as in other areas. In this sense, it is possible to say that under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the party has become a party that has more emphasis on democracy, internationalism, human rights and freedoms, and welfare state policies.

In the last part, I analyzed if the ideological discourse of Ulusalçılık was practical on party policies during this term. The studies about Ulusalçılık analyze generally actors and discourse characteristics of the ideology. However, which policy component the term may refer to still needs to be investigated. By applying MARPOR data on Labour Party manifestos, I specified some policy positions relevant to the ideology. In this sense, the 2007 election manifesto of CHP also indicated the highest score, which means in the 2007 elections, the party employed ulusalçı policy components in its programmatic profile.

Identifying the CHP's 2007 elections' policy profile differs from the general profile of the party strengthens the thesis' argument that the CHP implemented policy-seeking strategies in the 2007 elections, and identifying the differences between the two leaders shows that a policy change has occurred in the party. My theoretical approach in this thesis emphasizes that some institutional incentives may influence party elites' decisions prioritizing specific goals. The following chapter analyses the institutional structure that paved the way for the Baykal's CHPs to implement policy-seeking strategies.

CHAPTER 4

INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF CHP (2002-2015)

As mentioned in the theoretical framework chapter, the party elites decide on party goals under some conditions, limitations, and incentives. Likewise, party system characteristics and conditions of the electoral market and the legal/institutional setting provide specific motivations for political parties to evaluate their opportunities and gains in their party goals trade-off. Schlesinger (1985) calls these conditions, limitations, and incentives as the *structure of political opportunities*. These structures refer to the general environment of a party including the rules attaining them. (in Strom, 1990, p. 579). This concept is also extensively applied in "Opposition Studies." This literature analyses the systemic factors affecting the opposition parties' manoeuvre room, which Helms (2008, 2013) calls "institutional opportunity structure." The idea is that the political institutions and legal regulations provide a framework with possibilities and limitations in which the political agents' actions are familiar.

There is more or less consensus in the literature on what we should look for when considering the institutional factors that influence party decision-making. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, Strom and Müller (1999) point to electoral/legislative and governmental mechanisms that translate votes to office and policy benefits. In theoretical approaches, it is widely assumed that the party that controls the office has direct access to policy effect, and the office benefits more than any opposition party. However, in many cases, opposition parties can affect policy outcomes strongly and may have office benefits (Strom and Müller, 1999, p.23). In these cases, the *instrumentality of the votes* which means *translation of votes into policy and office benefits* may not be as high as expected, and this environment creates a strong incentive for opposition parties to policy-seeking strategies.

4.1. Electoral Regime

Electoral laws are the first institutional mechanism that directly affects the conversion of votes to office or policy benefits. In most democracies, more votes mean more seats in the parliament. However, there are also distortions, and in many systems, the distortions are significant. Strom (1990, p. 582) mentions that proportional representation systems translate votes more directly into the seats than single-member districts, depending on other tools in the system, such as thresholds, extra seats, or district magnitude. Where the distortions are significant, the relationship between electoral and legislative power is unpredictable for the party elites. It means there is less incentive for parties' vote maximization behaviour (Strom, 1990, p. 583). Another feature of the electoral regime that affects party elites' trade-off decisions is competitiveness. In a competitive electoral system, the parties expect to gain more electoral outcomes, and the parties have more tendency to maximize their goals (Strom, 1990, p. 582).

What kind of incentives and limitations does an electoral system provide for Turkish political parties in their decision-making processes? Although Strom underlines that the proportional systems' positive effect on translating the votes to seats, a proportional system with D'Hondt formula is the least proportional one (Lijphart, 1990 in Arslantas, et al 2020, p. 132) combined with the high national threshold. Although such a system works in favour of large parties (Farrell, 1997 in ibid p. 132) and against small ones (Anckar, 1997 in ibid, p.132), the system created contradictory effects on the elections in Turkey (Hale,2008; Arslantaş et al., 2020). After the high fragmentation in the Turkish Parliament and the emergence of coalition governments in the 1970s, the majoritarian plurality system has been accepted as the main reason for instability in the country. That is why the electoral law in 1983 aimed to establish majority governments and introduced the 10 percent of electoral threshold. In the 1980s, the system managed to produce one-party governments; however, in the 1990s, the fragmentation stayed high, and many parties obtained vote rates between 10 and 20 percent, leading to unstable coalitional governments¹¹. In the 2002 general elections, however, fundamental features of the 1990s system tended to change. A

¹¹ For a detailed analysis of the reasons, Arslantas et al. (2020).

single party came to the government, and only two parties entered to the parliament. The fragmentation in the society continued, but this time threshold did its job, and 46 percent of votes remained out of parliament. Political parties and the voters derived essential lessons from the 2002 elections, so a new trend began (Hale 2008, p. 238). The minor parties formed alliances with larger parties or ran as independent candidates free from the 10 percent rule.

Table 4. 1. The Features of Turkish Party System (1983-2015) (Tezcür o. J.) in (Arslantaş, Arslantaş, und Kaiser 2020, p. 133)

Election	Turnout	Volatility	Fragmentation	Competition
1983 6.7	88	-	2.8	85.4
1987 22.3	91	38.5	4.1	88.5
1991 11.3	81	16.6	4.6	97.0
1995 9.7	82	17.9	6.1	97.8
1999 9.4	83	20.2	6.7	95.8
2002 27.0	76	41.7	5.4	85.1
2007 11.9	82	18.6	3.4	74.3
2011 7.4	81	11.6	2.9	76.2
2015/Jul 4.9	81	11.4	3.6	84.1
2015/Nov. 6.7	84	9.8	2.9	75.8

As mentioned above, the party system features such as competition rate and disproportionality, are the key concepts to evaluate the translation of votes into parliamentary seats in a system. In theory, the party elites are expected to consider this effect when deciding their trade-offs between party goals. The theory assumes, as we have already mentioned, that the more distortions there are in a system, the less incentive that party has for vote maximization. The 2002 elections were a very critical election in the post-1990 period. Both in terms of the political and the parliamentary

structure and in terms of the characteristics of the party system, the 2002 elections were characterized by great distortions. In the 2002 elections, this distortion effect allowed the party to have an unproportional parliamentary power compared with the party's electoral power. CHP became the second party in the parliament by obtaining 20 percent of the valid votes. Therefore, in terms of expectations, based on the 2002-2007 period, I would expect party elites to be more motivated towards policy seeking rather than vote maximization.

However, starting after 2007 until 2015, in terms of competition and disproportionality, the system has become stabilized. High competition rates and the low distortion effect of the 2007 and 2011 elections may encourage party elites for more vote maximization strategies. However, I wanted to pay attention to another concept of *deification of elections and votes*, which would have more effect on the trade-off decisions of party elites in the 2010s. The literature indicates an emergence of this concept in the 2010s Turkey (For the term, Kubicek and Erişen 2016), which can be another factor behind the vote maximization behaviour. Kubicek and Erişen (2016, p.125) uses this term for democracies where the ballot box is expected to provide all the functions of a liberal consolidated democracy. In these democracies, obtaining the majority in the elections is the only way to have governmental power, to have the policy effect, and to check the governmental activities of the previous period. To have the majority in the elections provides the ability and ways to legitimate every action the incumbent party takes, even in universal rights and freedoms.

As mentioned, these channels, such as civil society organizations or the free media requiring fundamental civil rights, are necessary in Turkey as the only legitimate way for any political activity to become voting; without them, the opposition movements lose any ground to influence the decision-making process. Secondly, as I will analyze now, Turkey's institutional setting also lacks principal institutional means to check the performance and policies of the government and alternative ways for opposition to hinder the abuse of power. This deficit in this area contributes to the deification of elections and votes for the parties in the system. Also, it decreases the policy effect of the opposition, especially the parliamentary opposition parties such as CHP, which encouraged decisions in favour of vote-seeking strategies beginning from 2007 elections.

4.2. Investiture Requirements (Vote of Confidence)

As introduced in the previous chapter, the second set of regulations influencing the translation of votes to policy and office benefits are a system's investiture requirements and coalition formation procedures. Investiture requirements (vote of confidence) can constrain government take-over and coalition formation. Until the 2017 constitution amendments, the Turkish Constitution regulated an investiture requirement to gain the right to establish government as an ordinary majority. (Article 110) The Constitution also regulates another investiture requirement for constitutional amendments as three-fifths and two-thirds (Article 175). Between 2002-2015, Turkey had single-party majority governments formed by AKP. However, after the 2010s, the constitutional amendment became a critical discussion point in the political agenda, so obtaining the qualified investiture for constitutional amendments may be a factor for all political parties, including CHP, which would encourage vote maximization behaviour. For all of the political parties competing in the system, to obtain “the critical mass” or to prevent the other parties reaching it became the main goal. This created certain incentives for political parties for vote maximization behaviour.

4.3. Legislative-Executive Relations

The third stage in converting votes to office and policy benefits refers to the government's policy effect and office benefit. It is typical to assume that the governments have a policy effect and office benefits, and only they do. However, it is also important to note that the non-incumbent parties could also have benefits and effects depending on the particularities of the political system and current government structure. Minority governments are very typical examples of the phenomena where the policy effect and, to some extent, office benefits are shared with the parties in opposition. So, the translation of votes into policy effect and office benefits for the parties is directly related to the power of opposition, legislation-executive relations, and checks/balances regulations in a system that refers to the political regime.

Lijphart (1977), in his study, analyzes types of democracy according to their features of power sharing and decentralization of power into two types, consensual and

majoritarian ones. This categorization depends on the parliamentary opposition parties' power to affect policy outcomes. In majoritarian democracies, holding the executive power means capturing both office benefits and policy effects. In consensual democracies, on the other hand, opposition parties may also benefit from office or have policy effect without holding power. To operationalize this relationship, Strom and Müller (1999, p.23) offers a concept of "*policy influence differential*," which refers to the power relationship between the opposition party and the government. A higher policy differential in the regime indicates more power for the government party vis-a-vis opposition parties. In an environment with a lower policy differential, opposition parties have more power, and pay-offs for policy-seeking strategies are higher. Based on this definition, Strom (1990, p. 587) defined four regime types (Westminster, consensus, proportional and inclusionary) according to their policy/office differentials between government and opposition parties. Consensus, proportional and inclusionary regimes also incentivize opposition parties to have a policy effect and office benefit.

4.3.1. How to measure "Power"?

In recent years, the "opposition studies" literature contributed to a better understanding of and constructed major indices to measure the power of the opposition in different regimes and found that even in the same regime types the power of opposition may differ (Garrizmann 2017; Wegmann, 2022) In this section, I will apply these variables to evaluate the opposition power in the Turkish political regime.

Firstly, I would like to summarize these indicators. Beginning from Dahl, the tasks of a parliamentary opposition are defined as to alternate, to criticize, and to control (in Helms 2008, s.9). Garrizman (2017, p.2) rightly puts that criticism is not a goal itself per se but instead contributes to the other functions of opposition. In order to fulfill these obligations, the opposition makes use of specific mechanisms provided by the system. Although these mechanisms are organized under similar names in democracies, their content can differ. Opposition parties demand information from governments in order to control them. *Interpellations* are a very effective tool for oppositional control (Wiberg 1995 in Garrizmann, 2017, p.13) and can be done in writing or orally. The second set of variables is related to presenting alternative power

of the opposition. Wegmann (2022) operationalizes Strom's policy differential concept and specifies indicators of the policy-making process' stages: Initiation, Discussion, and Veto. At the initiation process stage, it is essential to specify the degree of access for opposition actors to initiate the policy-making process. The opposition players often have access to bill initiation at the stages of *bill introduction* and *plenary agenda decisions* (Wegmann, 2022, p. 6). Agenda setting power of the opposition parties are also essential since the opposition bills can be kept out of the agenda by the government (Döring, 1995, p.224 in Wegmann, 2022, p.7).

After the initiation stage, the debate stage takes place (Wegmann, 2022, p. 9), in which committees are significant actors in the process. The power of opposition parties at this stage depends on the structures of the committee, the procedures of the committee's decision-making process, and how the opposition parties' initiate amendments. Often, the legislation process continues after parliamentary processes. The legislation may take place in a broader context where actors outside of the parliament would also participate. Actors who may exert veto power are part of this environment. However, if the veto power may increase or decrease, the power of the opposition actors is very contextual. Depending on the context, they may grant or limit the opposition parties' power (Wegmann, 2022, p. 10).

Additionally, the veto actors may exert their power to favour the status quo or to change it, allowing us to differentiate between reactive and proactive veto power (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, p. 464 in Wegmann, 2022, p.10) The possibility of a referendum also enlarges the manoeuvring room for opposition parties, depending on the questions of who can initiate the referendum and who can decide the agenda of the referendum (Wegmann, 2022, p. 11). In parallel with the current literature, I also want to add constitutional courts as an essential veto power. Although the issues at the constitutional court are usually related to the constitutional provisions, which do not necessarily lead to an extension of oppositional power, in contexts such as Turkey's where the constitutional provisions became the issues of daily politics and politicization, the constitutional courts would function as an essential veto agent.

Table 4. 2. The defining indicators of Opposition Party Power

Control Power	Written Questions
	Oral Questions
	Parliamentary Question Time
Initiation Power	Bill Introduction
	Agenda Setting Power
Debate Power	Committees
	Amendments
Veto Power	Executive Power
	Referendum
	Constitutional Court

4.3.2. The Legal Framework in Turkey

Regarding Lijphart conceptualization, Turkey's regime was always majoritarian¹². In her analyses of the Turkish governmental system through Turkish political history, Ceren Lord (2012) shows how the majoritarian logic has survived. Despite several institutional changes, the imbalance between execution and legislation persisted in favour of execution, leading to resistance to the minority's demands, including power sharing. The constitutions of 1921 and 1924 endowed the then parliament with extraordinary powers where the assembly could be a super parliament endowed with extraordinary powers (Özbudun 2011, Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009). The governments were parliamentary governments, and only one party then dominated the legislation and execution functions. The separation of powers principal checks and balances system, and horizontal accountability were introduced into Turkish

¹² However, as Kubicek (p.140, notes 3) rightly puts, the term majoritarian democracy which is used for Turkish democracy is not really used in the terms which Lijphart once conceptualized. Lijphart's example of a majoritarian democracy is UK government style which is still a book example of a liberal democracy with its strong commitment of rule of law and human rights. However, the scholars who define Turkish democracy as a majoritarian one usually refer to the ballot box reductionism and a tendency to dictatorship of majority. (see Kubicek 2016) Here, I will firstly introduce the institutional regulations of 1980 constitution which paved the way for the domination of execution over legislation and increased majoritarianism. . However, AKP's period particularity is its long term-durable power periods what makes its majoritarianism especially a strict one

democracy by the 1961 constitution. Not only the functional clarity between execution and legislation is maintained but also legislation is split into two, the general assembly and the senate—bills and proposals should be approved in both.

Additionally, the institutions like Supreme Council of Judges, National Security council and constitutional court are introduced mainly to limit the power of execution. However, the limitations on execution caused many complaints about the slow-going legislation process and reviews of Constitutional or high courts (Gözübüyük, 1997, p. 129-130 in Kabasakal, 2019, p. 177). These complaints resulted in the amendment of the 1961 constitution after the 1971 military coup. The amendments reduced the control of the judiciary over execution, and the power of execution over legislation was increased by a tool of "decrees"(Kalaycıoğlu, 1990). By the 1982 constitution, the trend of increasing the power of execution was enforced by introducing a strong presidency.

The legal framework of the opposition's and the government party's activities in parliament is regulated by Rules of Procedure¹³ (RoP) or Standing Orders. Mechanisms like oral questions, parliamentary investigations, interpellations, and questions provide the control of the opposition party over the government. Many regulations may limit the control power of the opposition in RoP. RoP and also the Constitution listed prohibited matters to be asked (Hazama et.al. 2007, p. 542), such as if this matter could be learned quickly from other sources or if it has similarities with an interpellation submitted earlier or just needed to be consulted. The "case under trial" or "confidential information" under Banking Law also cannot be asked. General debate is more efficient, but at the end of the debate, there is no "vote of confidence," which would endanger the current government. From this perspective, the most efficient way for opposition is interpellation (Özbudun, 2011 p. 67). Opposition party groups or 20 deputies can put interpellation in motion. At the end of the debate, the vote of confidence can be put forward.

RoP regulated the bill initiation stage so that either MPs or the Council of Ministers were authorized to initiate bills. There was no specific numerical restriction; however,

¹³ The parliamentary by-laws in force at the time I have analysed came into force in 1973. Today, a revised parliamentary statute of 2017 is in force.

no other actors had the right to submit the bill. The formal legislation process started with the introduction of bills to the Parliament, in the form of *teklif* (bills introduced by cabinet) or *tasarı* (bills introduced by members of parliamentarians.) These bills are sent to related committees where the main report is prepared, and the information about related articles is submitted. After plenary discussions in the Parliament, the bills pass with a simple majority.

However, in the Turkish legal framework, the legislation also continues after parliamentary procedure. In the pre-2017 process, the presidency with veto powers, appointment authority, and the right to refer to constitutional court was introduced to the system by the 1982 constitution. Among the legislative powers, the presidency position is strengthened by the mechanisms such as promulgating laws, sending laws back to the parliament when it is necessary to be reconsidered, submitting laws and decrees to the Constitutional Court for the review of constitutionality, or submitting amending Constitution laws to referendum (Gönenç, 2008, p. 499).

Another veto actor, the constitutional court and its constitutional review, was first formulated in the 1961 Constitution and again in the 1982 Constitution. According to Article 169 of the Constitution, the court has the duty to review the constitutionality of laws, the decrees which have the force of law and the Rules of Procedure of Assembly both in form and substance to rule on the cases of state officials and to close the parties in situations defined in Article 169 of the Constitution (Aslan, 2002, p.13). Among them, the court has widely practiced party closure and amendment mechanisms throughout Turkish political history. The right and duty of reviewing the constitutionality of laws and decrees make the TCC an active part of the policy-making process, as the court then has a chance to review and decide to repeal the law. However, the Constitutional Court can function to annul or make a plea of unconstitutionality through the application of other actors, such as the main opposition party or the parliamentary groups of the party in power or a minimum of one-fifth of the assembly members. That means this open access was a primary mechanism for the main opposition party and the presidency to maintain control over the legislative body. In Turkey, referendums can be compulsory or voluntary and can only be held for constitutional amendments. In order to hold a mandatory referendum, the amendment proposal must be adopted by a vote of between 3/5 and 2/3 of the parliament, and the

president must not return the law to parliament. In the case of a voluntary referendum, the president must send the law back to parliament, and parliament must again adopt it by 2/3 of the total number of members. In this case, the president can send the proposal to a referendum. In that case, referendums strengthen the presidency's power rather than opposition parties.

4.3.3. How it really works

Although the 1980 constitutional structure was based on the legislature's supremacy, the legal infrastructure provided essential tools for the opposition. However, in this period, we still see the government behaving in a way, such as taking shortcuts, especially in law-making, that prevents opposition parties from exercising these rights. As will be seen in the examples below, the single-party government of the AKP has led to a further weakening of the opposition.

As already mentioned, the majority of AKP in the parliament guaranteed the passage of AKP's proposals and the rejection of opposition parties' proposals. The widely used mechanisms to marginalize opposition in the parliament occur during law-making procedures. The executive agencies may exclude opposition parties in legislation by skipping some steps of formal legislation. The only stages the opposition parties may affect in the legislative process are these formal stages of legislation, such as being in committees or during plenary debates. However, during Baykal's leadership, it was noted by the CHP parliamentarians that the opposition was prevented from participating in discussions by adding new provisions to the bill after committee or plenary sessions or by including different regulations into the bills with other content (Aslan Akman 2005, pp.29- 30). Such methods restrict the opposition's participation in the law-making process. AKP also used a decrees and omnibus bills method to skip this deliberation process and shorten the time needed for the legislation.

Omnibus bills are the art of legislation that covers unrelated topics simultaneously in the same legislation document. It came into the agenda of Turkish parliamentary politics in 1991 and aimed to regulate the same bill in different policy areas. They were used especially after 2002 as the primary mechanism of the delegation of authority

from legislation to execution by compensating many stages such as the governmental, committee, and plenary stages where the parliamentary opposition may perform an impact on the process (Hazama and Iba 2017, Haspolat 2006). For example, suppose components are submitted to the parliament as an omnibus bill. In that case, only one committee and a limited number of secondary committees are involved in the preparation stage, which would be separate committees for separate components.

Alternatively, new articles can be submitted to the bill, although the plenary or commission stages are already done. Additionally, when omnibus bill techniques are combined with basic law techniques, the bill is discussed not by individual articles but by a section that includes many articles. The deliberation time is reduced while the discussion is conducted for fifteen minutes per section instead of ten minutes for every article for an ordinary bill. The primary mechanism of opposition-initiated amendments is also limited, while a maximum of two motions for each article is possible instead of seven for each (Hazama and Iba, 2017, p. 318). By skipping the stages of the legislation process, the government avoids any public scrutiny or parliamentary opposition to its policy proposals. Besides the risk of technical errors or violations of constitutional regulations, this mechanism neglects consensus and deliberation in the parliament (Hazama and Iba, 2017, p. 320). These bills are used in Turkey's EU access process, and Nine Eu harmonization packages are legislated in this manner.

Even after the negotiations with the EU were frozen around 2006, the government continued to apply this method in different policy areas beyond harmonization, such as social security law. Baykal criticized this process on several platforms, arguing that the AKP government downplayed the active role of the parliamentary where the deliberation should take place. Instead, the parliament is employed just as a notary. Omnibus bills prevent the possibilities of deliberation and violate the freedom of expression in parliament (Breakfast in TBMM on 3.07. 2005), For Baykal, the obligation to discuss the bill sections but not articles de facto weakens the parliamentary authority to check the government so that the legislation's primary function is strictly harmed under AKP rule (Baykal's Group Speech on 13.06.2006). During the law packages about social security, the law bills were passed without the

opposition party CHP, thanks to the incumbent party's parliamentary majority and the omnibus bill's special technics.

Governmental decrees are one of the ways that increases the legislative power of execution. Until 2011, AKP did not issue any KHKs but with the authorization act in April 2011, the Council of Ministers had the right to issue decrees for the time of six months. In these six months, the AKP issued 35 KHKs, most related to the structural changes in the institutions and the introduction of new mechanisms (Taş 2015 p.780). CHP applied to the constitutional court to refer authorization law, but it was rejected. Kılıçdaroğlu, on Mar 29, 2011, stated briefly that KHKs are the result of a mentality that wants to dissolve the parliament. He declared that the executive was trying to replace the legislation without any opposition. Kılıçdaroğlu accused the Constitutional Court of ignoring the unconstitutionality of the authorization law, which he suggested discredits the court (Kılıçdaroğlu's Group Speech on 04.09.2011).

One of the government's strategies to prevent the opposition's legislative efficiency is to ignore the oral and written questions of the opposition or not to answer them in time. One CHP Party Assembly Report notes that in only the second half of the 24th Legislation period, among 282 written questions, only 52 were answered in the scheduled time (*yasal süre*), so-called 15 days. 62 written questions were answered much later than 15 days, and the prime minister and the cabinet members did not answer 162 of them at all (in 5 Ocak 2013 PA Report, p.118). The government employs other tactics to weaken the parliamentary opposition's control over the legislation process, including not taking the censor motion to the agenda or passing the bill in the parliament very early in the morning without the participation of opposition parties (As an example the legislation process of Municipality Law, in PA report in 5 January 2013, p. 218)

One of the few works about the opposition parties' efficiency in the legislation process of Turkey, is Reppell's master thesis (2015) which analyses the opposition parties' role in policy making process between 1983 and 2015. Parliamentary debates are used by opposition parties to challenge the policy-making process commonly dominated by the incumbent party. Single majority parties argue they slow down the process. So, in line with expectations, Reppell's analysis compared the incidents of debate of the 17th

to 24th legislation periods, during which the opposition parties initiating parliamentary debate at much higher rates.

However, significantly especially in the 23rd (2007-2011) and 24th (2011-2015) legislation periods, the opposition-introduced debate numbers significantly decreased (Reppell 2015 p. 20). One reason behind this was the government's blocking. However, more interestingly, the opposition parties appear to have less faith in the legislation process. This comment is also supported by the interviews with the opposition parties' deputies (Reppell, 2015, p.39). According to one of these interviews, the parliamentary debate is a "non-functioning" mechanism that means diminishing participation at the parliamentary level. The other interviews also support my observation about the legislation politics under the AKP government. In summary, they suggest that compared with previous governments, the current one does not answer questions, the budget cannot be controlled by the legislation anymore, and the commission stages do not function for the opposition as they should, all resulting in a lack of trust in all of these mechanisms for the opposition parties (Reppell 2015, p. 41).

Table 4. 3. The Percentage of accepted motions to received motions. Compiled from (Gençkaya, 2020), calculated by author.

	2002-2007	2007-2011	2011-2015
General Debate	8%	3,8%	4,8%
Parliamentary Inquiry	15%	12%	3,4%
Parliamentary Investigation	50%	0	7,7%
Oral Questions	38%	72%	30%
Written Questions	63%	58%	22%

Both Baykal's and Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP tried to fulfil their opposition duties when the AKP was a single government. For this reason, they faced similar difficulties as summarized above. Nevertheless, there were differences in actors and the way the AKP governed that distinguished the two periods. These differences, therefore, had some consequences in favour of Baykal's CHP and some against Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP.

In this sense, I will argue below that the regime characteristics of the 2002-2007 period created some incentives for the main opposition party, CHP, by affecting the instrumentality of votes for the party. The party had a strong policy effect and could change policy outcomes without being a part of the government through strong veto players of the era. That reduced the instrumentality of the votes for CHP, and the party's primary goal became increasing the policy effect rather than maximize its vote potential.

4.4. The Power of the Looser: The Policy Effect of Baykal's CHP

In this section, I will argue that despite all the disadvantages of a single majority government, the CHP's policy effect was relatively high thanks to a specific, contextual collaboration with institutions like the presidency and constitutional court. The characteristics of the regime at the time made such cooperation possible. As I will indicate in the coming section, the AKP government had to retreat from making many crucial bill proposals, not even attempting to bring them up again, although it had a right to do so.

28th February Process: The Turkish democracy always had the characteristic of a protected democracy (Bardakçı, 2013, p. 411) or tutelary democracy (Esen and Gümüştü, 2016, p. 1598), in which the guardian veto players intervene in civil politics to protect the national integrity and secular regime of the country. The political crisis of Feb 28, 1997, one of these interventions, characterized the Turkish regime of the 1990s and 2000s. The election success of the Islamist RP (Welfare Party) alarmed the army beginning from the 1994 local elections, where the party won the mayorship of 29 big cities, including Istanbul and Ankara. However, in the 1995 general elections, the RP's vote share was around 21 percent and more than the centre parties' vote share. A coalition government was formed by RP and centre right DYP (True Path Party).

After a long-tension-filled process, the Turkish military made an ultimatum to the coalition after the National Security Council (MGK) meeting on Feb 28, 1997. Erbakan the leader of RP, was forced to sign a list of measures against political Islam; he then, resigned and handed the office to the coalition partner, Ciller. This process

differed from previous military interventions because of the social and political environment it created. First of all, the military acted as a political party for the first time, mobilizing cadres in the bureaucracy, academia, and the media which led to tension and division in social segments. (Waldman and Caliskan, p.56-57). The 28 February process also represented a break with the 1980 regime's understanding of religion as the building block of society and represented a radical return to secularism (Cizre-Sakallioğlu 1996; Birtek and Toprak 1993 in Çınar 2008, p.110). In this context, AKP's rise to power in 2002 evoked the secular block's reaction.

AKP had common roots with the National Order parties, which had been accused of anti-secular activities and closed by the Constitutional Court. Secular blocks were concerned about the "hidden agenda" or "true intentions" of AKP and suspected that the AKP's main agenda was infiltrating the state and transforming the state into an Islamic republic. The reforms and constitutional changes already initiated by the previous government as meeting the requirements of the EU negotiation process were interpreted as just a safe cover that concealed AKP's intentions in the name of democracy (Gürsoy, 2012, p. 749). Significantly, the achievement of this reform process created a "bandwagon effect" (Zaras, Faidon. 2013, p.357) that consolidated a broad alliance of different social segments against the Kemalist coalition. This alliance included differentiated elements such as radical Islamists, leftists, liberals, and second republicans. The political era of the 1990s and especially the 2000s became a battlefield for these two camps.

Presidency of Sezer: As mentioned above, the presidency having rights such as veto power, appointment authority, and the right to refer to the constitutional court, is an essential mechanism of executive dominance. Together with the strong figure of the prime minister as the head of the cabinet and the government, this situation created a *dual structure of execution* (Lord 2012, p.236) or, in other words, the *structural anomaly of execution* (Aslan-Akman and Akçalı 2017, p. 581). Although the Constitution gave such extensive powers to presidents of the post-1980 era, the presidents did not exercise their powers similarly. The ideological affinity and relations between the president and prime minister became crucial and could create crises and deadlocks (Aslan Akman and Akçalı 2017, p. 581). In 2002 and 2007, the presidency of Sezer acted very effectively as a member of the Kemalist bloc. He was

very active in exercising his veto power (Gönenç 2008, p. 513) using it 72 times, including constitutional amendments, Constitutional Court applications for review of the laws, or submitting the laws back to Parliament, which he did when he vetoed 55 laws of AKP's 800 law bills (Bahçeci 2008 in Gönenç 2008, p.513). Additionally, President Sezer sent more referrals to the Constitutional Court (TCC) than all other presidents combined since 1973. He filed 25 petitions to the TCC, whereas Evren did 6, Özal 2, and Demirel 4. Six of Sezer's petitions were against the Democratic Left Party (DSP) government, and the rest were filed against the AKP government.

Constitutional Court: Another agent which contributed to CHP's policy effect, especially in the first period of AKP's government, was Constitutional Court. TCC was always an active player in Turkish politics as the guardian of the Republic's territorial integrity and secular regime. With military and high-level bureaucrats, the judiciary always accepted the political elite as the defenders of particularistic interests. Against this, they claim to be the guardians of national interest. The president appoints the judiciary panel based on nominations by other state organs, such as the Council of Higher Education and civil and military high courts (Shambayati and Sütçü, 2012, p.110). This increased the tension and ideological gap between elected and judicial supreme organs. The 1982 constitution introduced two mechanisms for TCC to keep the political arena in control: the right to close the political parties that violate the constitutional principles and to review the laws and decrees. The Court ordered the closure of 24 parties from his establishment. In the 1990s alone, the court closed 15 political parties (Sayarı, 2008, p. 412).

On the other hand, the right to review the constitutionality of laws and decrees opened the way for oppositional groups to be effective in the legislation process. As mentioned above, the Constitutional Court can enact annulment or plea of unconstitutionality by applying other actors, such as the main opposition party or the parliamentary groups of the party in power or a minimum of one-fifth of the assembly members. This open access appeared as a primary mechanism for the main opposition party and the presidency to maintain control over the legislative body. CHP often preferred this low-cost strategy (Shambayati and Sütçü 2012, p.112) during the term 2002-2007. With the election results of 2002, the CHP became a leading opposition party in the two-

party parliament and also, like AKP, had extensive legislative power compared with its electoral performance.

However, its main power was related to this mechanism of the Constitutional Court. Güleler and Haşlak (2011), in their article examining the relations between the constitutional review and politics through the CHP's referrals to the TCC, Güleler and Haşlak (2011) identified the frequent use and analysed the inquiry of the annulment action by the CHP between 2002 and 2010. Nearly half of these annulment actions were about laws concerning "the rules of the state," mainly Article 2 of the Constitution (Güleler & Haşlak, 2011, p.8), which regulates the general principles of the Republic such as being democratic, secular, social, and the rule of law state. According to Article 2, the state should respect human rights and be loyal to Atatürk nationalism.

The second most cited article in CHP's referrals is article 11, which mentions that the constitutional rules are fundamental rules that bind all the legislative and executive actors and processes (Güleler and Haşlak, 2011, p.9). Only 12 percent of referrals mention the constitution Articles about fundamental rights and duties; interestingly, nearly half of them are about property rights (Güleler and Haşlak, 2011, p.10). As Güleler and Haşlak also conclude, Baykal's CHP often used this mechanism not to protect individual rights and freedoms, as is the function of constitutional review in many democratic countries, but more to defend the Constitution and constitutional definition of state and nation.

However, although there was a high increase in the TCC referrals between 2003-2007, 27 compared with only 14,5 in the previous period of 1984-2002, the number of nullity decisions remained the same (Shambayati, Sütçü, 2012, p. 114). In 1984 and 2000, the court annulled 76 percent of the law bills, whereas in the AKP's first government years, the court decided in favour of the petitioner in 75 percent of the cases. Based on this evidence, Shambayati and Sütçü (2012) argue that contrary to the expectations and a common observation of high tension between the legislation and judiciary, the TCC activism was not exceptionally high in the AKP's government period. Considering that the judiciary and military were always the active guardians of the state and Kemalist

principles, what made this period incredibly convenient for CHP to apply policy-seeking strategies?

First, as mentioned above, the Feb 28 process shaped a political environment in which political cleavages were reshaped around nationalism and secularism—not only in the political sphere but also society is highly politicized into these camps. Civil society, bureaucracy, academy, and politicians side-lined these camps. This politicized political environment, which mobilized the active parts of society, easily increased the CHP's policy effect. Secondly, as I will analyze in the coming section in detail, the AKP behaved in its first period, contrary to the other years of its government, in a reconciliatory way. It withdrew its demands or retreated at critical conflict times with the secular bloc (Shambayati and Sütçü, 2012 p.116). The AKP's non-confrontation strategy also increased the CHP's policy effect. Thirdly, the presidency style of Sezer enforced the policy effect of secular blocs.

As I mentioned above, being the most active president after the 1980 period, he used his constitutional veto powers and did not refrain from having direct conflicts with the government. Considering the AKP's strategy mentioned above, Sezer's attitude increased the intervention power of the seculars on AKP policies. Fourthly, the elections of November 2002 introduced a two-party parliamentary structure in which the CHP was the only main opposition party, and thus the only representative of the social and political opposition on the legal-political scene. That also increased the visibility and policy effect of the party. Although the Turkish regime is a majoritarian system that enforces the government's policy effect and limits the moving area of the Constitution, the ideological closeness- a distance of the actors could change the incumbent's/opposition parties' policy effect. In the coming section, I will present examples of how CHP influenced policy outcomes and policymaking through especially Sezer's active presidency.

4.4.1. The Case of The Prayer Leader and Preacher School Controversy

In the then-existing system, Vocational and Religious High School graduates were very disadvantaged when they wanted to gain access to university departments that

were not related to their high school. On May 2004, to appeal to its religious constituents the AKP drafted a law bill that would equalize the chances of the graduates of these schools (For the process see, Heper, 2005, p. 225-226). However, this attempt met with intense controversy from CHP, the military, and some universities. (Baykal Group Speech on 11.05.2004). Baykal mentioned that such authorization would transform the Prayer Leader and Preacher schools into a more mainstream educational unit. As well, the military also raised its voice with the then office of the Chief of General Staff, Özkök, implying that the spirit of the demanded regulation was contrary to what it really aims. The students at these high schools are educated for a specific occupation. He briefly warned that to support such regulation is unacceptable¹⁴. Parallel to CHP's arguments, another objection was raised from YÖK (Council of Higher Education) arguing that this law means opening universities to Islamist influence and transferring authority from YÖK to Ministry of National Education (MEB). Erdogan Tezic, then chairman of YÖK, succinctly stated that "the government has no right to touch the educational system" (in Patton, 2007, p.352).

Sezer used its veto right and sent the bill again to the parliament. Despite all the reactions, the AKP government drafted the law bill. The government did not push the proposal although, according to the constitution, the president should sign it when the government insists on enacting the law. Erdogan confessed that the party did not want to pay the price and the government withdrew the law proposal¹⁵.

4.4.2. Public Administration Basic Law

Turkey's strong centralized unitary state and centralized policy-making process are one of the main features of Turkey's state tradition with the rising fear of ethnic separatism and the rise of Islam. However, beginning in the 2000s, the administrative system's decentralization became one of the hot topics of the Turkish political agenda with the effect of EU and local-level partnerships requirement for the implication of EU funds (Ertugal,2010).

¹⁴ Hürriyet, May 2, 2004. In Heper, June 2005, p. 225

¹⁵ 'Erdogan: YOK'u zorlamayız', Radikal, 4 July 2004. In Shambayati and Sütçü, 2012, p. 116

In July 2004, the AKP government drafted the Basic Principles and Restructuring of Public Administration law. This proposal was designed according to New Public Administration (NPA) principles, such as productivity, transparency, accountability, and participation. This regulation mainly aimed to delegate some authority for local resources and developmental coalitions to the local governments (Şengül 2003, p.203) The Baykal CHP's reaction was immediate and harsh. This reaction was surprising considering the SHP's and the CHP's previous proposal in 1999 local election manifesto, "The Local Solution 2002 (Yerel Çözüm, 2000).

The Local Solution 2000 (Yerel Çözüm, 2000) proposed not only the mechanisms that would strengthen participation in local governments but also a delegation of authority to these organs in the essential public services' infrastructure and personnel¹⁶. In the 2002 election manifesto, the restructuring of local governments by increasing resources and responsibilities is one of the election promises. In addition to a general democratization discourse, Baykal advocates the empowerment of local governments with the arguments of administrative efficiency.

Empowering the local governments in Turkey is a must. We should not evaluate the local governments just within the borders of a municipality. And not only for this region but also for the whole country, we should give the responsibility of solving our own problems to the local people. It means that the people you choose should solve your problems. (As an example) A bridge will be built. Iller Bankasi should approve it. It is not very meaningful. We should make an essential opening about it¹⁷.

However, this time, Baykal's CHP positioned itself against the new law draft. The party's arguments had a dual structure in such a position. The CHP named it the Ömer Dincer's draft, after the ministry counsellor who prepared it. According to CHP, one of his scientific works questioned the possibility of Islamic Sharia in Muslim countries. CHP insisted that this draft was enacted to decentralize Turkey to give way to the implications of Sharia (Baykal's interview in CNN Türk Café Siyaset on 25.01.2004.)

A scientific work of Ömer Dincer came out some time ago. We saw there that the ministry counsellor asked why the Sharia cannot be implied in Muslim

¹⁶ Party's 1999 local elections manifesto, Local Solution 2000.

¹⁷ Baykal's interview in Diyarbakir ART television on 03.07. 2001. For the similar arguments, also see Baykal's Speech in the Meeting of *Siyasetin Yeniden Yapilandirilmesi* Vakfi on 18-05.2002

countries. Why is Algeria not successful? Why is the Sharia not stable enough in Iran? (..) He offers religious nationalism, religious republicanism, and religious secularism. He argues that a government appointing its cadres has no meaning. (..) What should be done now is, in his words, to break up the central government. (..) (Ömer Dincer argued) If I decentralize secularism, take it from Ankara, and give it to Anadolu, Erzurum, Konya, and Kütahya, we will see what will happen to secularism. He wrote his intention before. (..) Furthermore, now he drafted a new law. Why is this governing mechanism carried to Anadolu? What is the aim of it? Our impression is this draft is prepared to change republicanism and secularism (Baykal's Interview in CNBC-E News on 12.01.2004).

Another pillar of the opposition to the new draft favoured the social state and public service. Baykal's CHP followed the leftist critics of the NPA, which mentioned the marketization of public services as a central pillar of NPA.

The draft aims to abolish public service. It is prepared by the mentality that wants to abolish publicity. It aims to abolish the social state. It aims to abolish public service and public servants. (..) The draft will replace a state-citizen relationship with the client-employer and privatize the state. (..) This draft is prepared by a mentality that thinks public service can be bought with money, and for the ones who have no money, the state also has no responsibility. This draft is against the people, publicness, the inspection of the people's money, the public servant, and the citizens. (Baykal's Group Speech on 10.02.2004).

Parliament adopted the draft law, but Sezer vetoed it. He argued that this law means a violation of the unitary and central character of the state. (Eliçin, 2011, p.116) The government then attempted to pass the law by separating the components. However, only some parts of the law were adopted; the president again vetoed some.

4.4.3. Article 301

Parallel to the EU harmonization process packages, a new Penal Code was introduced in June 2005. Article 301 is a new version of old Article 159, revised in 2002 and 2003, as a requirement of harmonizing Turkish Law with the EU criteria (Algan, 2008 p. 2237). In the new Penal Code, Article 301 still provided a legal ground to imprison those who insult Turkishness and denigrate the Republic, military and security forces, Parliament, or judiciary. Especially in the 1990s, many journalists and writers were indicted for violating these provisions. The criminal investigations of novelists Orhan

Pamuk, Elif Safak, and journalists like Hrant Dink were processed according to Article 301, mainly because of their remarks related to the Armenian and Kurdish questions.

In 2006, the revision of Article 301 became one of the hot topics due to the cases above and the questions about freedom of thought and expression. More crucially, the 2006 EU progress report mentions that Article 301 restricts freedom of expression and should be revised (Algan 2008 p.2239, dipnot14). The so-called planned revision of 301 also occupied Baykal's CHP's agenda. In the group speeches and television interviews in the last period of 2006, Baykal denounced the party's opposition to the revision. He argued that similar provisions exist the law systems in European countries such as Italy, Germany, and Holland. (Baykal's interview in TV program Genc' Bakis, 27.09.2006; Group Speech on 26.09.2006; Baykal's meeting with NGOs on 19.10.2006) He mentioned that the insult and lampoon could not be assessed as freedom of expression (Baykal's Group Speech on 26.09.2006). Erdoğan's proposal about searching for a consensus in the parliament to amend the related articles in the penal code was stringently rejected by Baykal (Baykal's Group Speech on 26.09.2006). He accused Erdoğan to be aware of the 'shame of insulting Turkishness' and to share this shame.

The Prime Minister is asking for help on 301. (...) I mean, 301 is a law. If he wants to change 301, the Prime Minister can change it, he has a comfortable majority in the Parliament, but he wants help (...) Does he need numerical support; no, he does not need numerical support. He is looking for a partner to share the shame of allowing insulting Turkish identity in Turkey, that is what he is looking for. (...) He needs someone to share the shame of this. He thinks he cannot carry it and is looking for a partner to share that shame. My answer is clear, knock on someone else`s door, there is no one from the Republican People`s Party who will support you in this matter, knock on someone else`s door. (Applause)

Given the rising nationalist reaction and the strong reaction of CHP, AKP postponed the revision to the after-election period, and the new Article came into force in May 2008¹⁸.

¹⁸ For a detailed introduction of the amendments, please see Algan,2008, p. 2241

4.4.4. Foundations Law

Non-Muslim foundations and their property rights were among the enduring debates on the minority question in Turkey (in Grigoriadis, 2008, p. 33-34). These non-Muslim foundations had no proper foundation constitution in the Ottoman period, but the Treaty of Lausanne guaranteed to these foundations every facility guaranteed to other private institutions of the same category. However, in the new Law on Foundations in 1935 and 1936, they needed to introduce the power of selling and acquiring property. In 1974, the Court of Cassation decided non-Muslim foundations did not have the same right as Turkish ones, and all the property transactions were annulled. As a result, most of these properties are owned by the state. As a part of the EU reform process, the government amended the parliament for minority foundations to regain their property rights in 2004. However, a period of fierce discussions also started.

Baykal's CHP was one of the opponents of the Bill. His first point of objection was that the new law includes provisions against Lausanne's reciprocity principle (Baykal's group speech on 19.09.2006 and 26.09.2006). Neither Turks in Thrace nor in Germany have rights of property acquirement or trade through foundations. On the other hand, the demand for returning goods from the state treasury will provoke compensation demands in European Human Rights Court. Legalizing all the activities of the foreigners' foundations will give way to Turkey being a post-colonial country. (Baykal's Group Speech on 26.09.2006).

Although the law passed on November 2006, Sezer vetoed and returned the bill a few weeks later. Similar to Baykal, he argued that the new law's provisions were incompatible with the regulations of the Lausanne treaty¹⁹. CHP was insistent on its opposition to the law, so the party applied to TCC for the annulment of the new Law. It was the next legislation year, with a new President and a new parliament, that the Law of Foundations was adopted with slight changes²⁰ CHP was insistent about its

¹⁹ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/sezer-vakiflar-yasasi-ni-veto-etti-5524895>

²⁰ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/vakiflar-kanunu-yasasi-kabul-edildi-8275108>

opposition to the law so that the party applied to TCC for the annulment of the new law²¹

4.4.5. Presidential Crisis of 2007

2007 was a year of crisis, mainly beginning with the election of the presidency. The tension about the presidential candidacy was already on the parties' agenda in 2005. Considering AKP's majority in the Parliament, Erdogan was the first candidate that came to mind.

However, the secular blog started to express their disapproval relatively early. One of the opponents of Erdogan's candidacy, Baykal, mentioned the crucial importance of presidential elections in a party congress speech in 2005. In this speech, he underlined the position of the President vis-a-vis the government as a protector of Republican values, defender of the Republic, and the essential power of the country (Baykal's speech to Party Congress, on 19.11.2005). He argued that the President has great authority in his hands, such as appointing the judges of TCC and Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) (Baykal's Interview in NTV, on 08.05.2006).

According to Baykal, a president should own and defend national integrity, believe in the Constitution, and internalize and act in harmony with Constitutional principles—based on these, he suggests, Erdogan is not a proper candidate (Baykal's Group Speech on 20.03.2007). The reactions peaked when the election date, 27 April, got closer. The military and President Sezer also expressed their reactions one after another (For related news, please see Gönenç, 2008, p. 518-519). General Chief Staff Büyükanıt referred to a president committing himself to the values of the Republic substantively as the military's preferred presidential candidate. In his speech Sezer warned against the biggest threat to the secular regime, referring to the presidential elections. Additionally, in April 2007, mass demonstrations (republican rallies) were organized in the metropolitan cities of Turkey with the participation of several NGOs against the government's possible candidates. Baykal stated that it should be clearly understood

²¹ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/vakiflar-kanunu-anayasa-mahkemesinde-8528432>

that secularism is not the concern of constitutional institutions like the military and presidency but also of society itself (Baykal's Group Speech; 17.04.2007).

Because of these strong reactions, Erdogan retreated and declared Abdullah Gül, one of the party's founding members, the AKP's presidential candidate. However, the reactions did not cease. Gül's headscarved wife and his previous comments about secularism made him an inappropriate presidential candidate in the eyes of the secular blog (Gönenç, 2008, p. 519). Baykal was also not convinced. On the one hand, the candidacy of Gül was interpreted by Baykal as a victory of democracy (Baykal's Group Speech on 24.04.2007). The nation's power forced Erdoğan to retreat, although he had the majority in the Parliament. On the other hand, for Baykal's CHP, there was no difference between Erdogan and Gül in their connections with National Outlook Movement (Baykal's interview at CNN Türk on 27.04.2007). However, AKP insisted on Gül's candidacy.

The formal procedure of presidential elections was regulated as a four-round system by the 1982 constitution to avoid the 1970s situation where no candidate could get the majority to win. In the first two rounds, the candidate should take two-thirds of the entire members of the Assembly; in the third and fourth rounds, an absolute majority is enough for the candidate to declare victory (Özbudun und Gençkaya 2009). Although the Constitution did not necessitate a special quorum for the parliamentary meeting in the presidency election, CHP boycotted the elections and argued that there was not a quorum for the meeting²². In the end, CHP application to the Constitutional Court resulted in favour of the CHP, which led to the failure of Gül in the elections (For processes, see Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009). The AKP, the government, called for an early election and simultaneously proposed a law that shortens the legislative period and the popular election of the President and regulates the quorum for the meeting. At the end of the 2007 elections, AKP gained a larger share of votes and, with the constitutional referendum, changed the procedure of the presidential election to a popular election.

²² CHP behaved on the Sabih Kanadoglu's interpretation of the related articles so that two thirds quorum is not necessary only for taking decision but also meeting of the Assembly.

4.5. The Power of the Loser: Kılıçdaroğlu 's Policy Effect (2011-2015)

As I have already mentioned regarding the legal framework regulating parliamentary procedures and the relevant articles of the Constitution, Baykal's CHP and Kılıçdaroğlu 's CHP functioned as opposition parties within the same institutional setting. On the other hand, the AKP has gained the necessary majority to govern alone for the third time. However, some factors differentiated these two periods in terms of policy influence. As we will analyse in the following case studies, the political influence of Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP was considerably reduced.

The AKP period, mainly after 2011, is marked by scholars as a time where power shifted significantly at the cost of the legislation body's efficiency in law-making and controlling execution. Kabasakal (2018) argues that a modern tendency called de-parliamentarization became evident in the Turkish political system in the AKP era. The decline of parliaments is a recent phenomenon that can be observed in many recent democracies. In departmentalized democracies, the parliament is losing its power, and the line between the executive and legislative organs is blurring (Kabasakal 2018, p.273). Not just the opposition parties but the role of the parliament itself needs to be improved in the policy-making process. Modern parliaments have increasingly lost their primary function of legislation and need to be more effective in controlling the execution. Implying the common indicators of deparliamentarization, such as government stability, government responsiveness, the Parliament's role in government change, and the government's legislative initiative; Kabasakal argues that in recent Turkish politics, deparliamentarization is an explanatory theoretical framework. This raises two questions: what are the characteristics of AKP's era of majoritarianism, and what is the reason for this particularity? As mentioned before, the institutional regulations of the 1980 constitution gave the way for the execution domination and increased majoritarianism. However, AKP's particularity is its long-term-durable power periods, which makes its majoritarianism especially strict.

The Presidency of Gül: As stated, the President is defined as a part of an execution with the veto power and the power of appointment in critical bureaucracy positions. In this dual structure, executive-legislation relations depend mainly on the "*existing balance of power*" between these two positions (Aslan-Akman and Akçalı 2017,

p.581). During Sezer's presidency, the opposition party and the President were from the "same camp." However, during Gül's presidency, the AKP captured both the presidency and the majority in the parliament so that the system's majoritarian character was intensified as it was between 1989 and 1991 (Lord 2012, p.236).

The durability of a one-party government: The most distinguished characteristic of AKP's period was the existence and durability of a one-party government. (Waldman and Çalışkan 2017, p.90) According to Lijphart's theory of consensual/majoritarian democracies, compared with coalition governments, long-lasting, stable one-party governments generally lead to the power concentration, especially in the lack of necessary mechanisms of power sharing. Deparliamentarization literature also argues that stable single-party governments indicate a weakening trend of legislation bodies. (Kabasakal 2018) It is essential to note that the coalition-building process is simultaneously a consensus-building process among different political parties. Additionally, the coalition governments nearly always function as a check and balance system for the leading party, which is valuable, especially in a structure favouring a strong executive. So, the single majority government period of AKP was turned into a stable but authoritarian rule under the legal frameworks of the post-1980 period.

Erdoğan's personalized type of power: Starting in November 2011, Erdoğan did not hesitate to say that he wishes a "Turkish type of presidential system" and mentioned that the separation of powers is the main obstacle to efficiency. Actually, with the popular election of the President in the 2007 elections, a transition from parliamentarian to semi-presidentialism was adopted (Gönenç 2008, p.521). In 2014 Erdoğan is elected as president and it created a de facto presidential system, with him being at the same time president and the leader of the party Erdoğan guaranteed that he would not be a passive president and led cabinet meetings and campaigned in favour of his party, contrary to the Constitutionally neutral position of the President (Aslan-Akman, Akçalı, 2017, p.588). This total shift of executive powers to the presidency gained legal ground through the amendments in the Constitution in April 2017 by a referendum.

Unfair access to media: Beginning in the 2010s, the AKP's control over media has increased significantly (Waldman and Çalışkan 2017, p.126). The Doğan Group

incident is a very striking example. In the first term of the AKP government, Doğan Media Group bought Çiner and Uzan media groups, which TMSF (Saving Deposit Insurance Fund) took. However, the news about Deniz Feneri in the media organs of the group was strictly punished by imposing a financial penalty as a result of tax inspection of Doğan media companies. The publisher, chief co-editor, and other managers were also held responsible. This complex interaction between media companies and the incumbent party led to unaccountable capital flow and a severe problem of free speech, free expression of ideas, and freedom of information through censorship and firing the journalists.

In the coming section, I will present examples of how CHP in 2011 and 2015 failed to influence policy making process and how AKP skipped the mechanisms in the parliament which would give the possibility of an influence on public policy for opposition parties.

4.5.1. December 2013 Corruption Scandals

The December 2013 corruption scandals and the subsequent legislative process are striking examples of AKP's preventing any parliamentary and judiciary investigation despite all the opposition's efforts (Sayarı, 2016, p.181, Özbudun 2016). In December 2013 the sons of cabinet members and certain bureaucrats were charged with the various allegations such as bribery and money laundering. Erdogan argued that it was just an "ugly method" of "dark circles" who could not reach their aim through the ballot box. To whom Erdogan referred was clear: the dispute between the Gülen movement and Erdogan had been known for a while as it surfaced many times on different occasions. Gülen's influence on several state institutions, guaranteed by Erdogan's party for a time, was also in the public eye. So, the government immediately interpreted the accusations against family members as a dirty plot rather than a corruption scandal and refused to investigate it against all the opposition's objections.

The government took various steps to cover up the allegations and prevent further investigations²³. Firstly, the party tried to intervene in the investigation process by

²³ <https://www.birgun.net/haber/17-25-aralik-nasil-yargilanamadi-98162>

dismissals and assignments in the police department and judiciary organs. Secondly, the government tried to prevent any parliamentary investigations by some tactics on the plenary and commission stages. Although the four ministers involved in the incident had to resign, they could not be prosecuted. For a long time, the government prevented the proceedings from coming to the parliamentary agenda²⁴ or sent them back to the prosecutors' office with the excuse of "incorrect procedure"²⁵. When it did come before the Parliament, the entire reading of the summary of proceedings that would introduce the details and the scope of the corruption to the public was prevented, with the argument that it went against the confidentiality of the investigation²⁶. It was May 2014 before the Parliamentary approved setting up an inquiry commission; however, in this process, AKP employed tactics such as delaying nominating the members for the commission²⁷ or vetoing the opposition parties' members²⁸. With such tactics, the commission could not start to work until just after the presidential elections of 10 August.²⁹

From the beginning of the crisis, Kılıçdaroğlu called Prime Minister Erdoğan the head of thieves (Başçalan) and argued that not only these four ministers and their relatives but also the Erdogan government was part of this corruption scandal³⁰. The CHP used all parliamentary mechanisms possible to resist the government's tactics. They filed a censure motion against justice minister Bozdağ for not sending the proceedings to the parliament³¹. During parliament discussions, CHP presented a motion for a complete

²⁴ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/legal-proceedings-for-four-former-ministers-sent-to-turkish-parliament-63215>

²⁵ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/row-over-reading-of-graft-allegations-marks-extraordinary-legislative-session-63799>

²⁶ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/row-over-reading-of-graft-allegations-marks-extraordinary-legislative-session-63799>

²⁷ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akp-warned-to-assign-members-to-graft-inquiry-commission-67253>

²⁸ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/parliaments-graft-inquiry-panel-goes-back-to-square-one-67310>

²⁹ <https://www.birgun.net/haber/17-25-aralik-nasil-yargilanamadi-98162>

³⁰ <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/30683/kilicdaroglu-bascalan-da-hesap-verecek.html>.

³¹ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-main-opposition-set-to-file-censure-motion-against-justice-minister-bozdag-62125>

reading of the proceedings again. However, it was rejected with the votes of AKP parliamentarians. Another motion by CHP demanding a parliamentary inquiry about Erdoğan's relationship with corruption was also returned by Cemil Çiçek, the parliamentary speaker from AKP³². At the end of parliamentary discussions, AKP's motion to establish a parliamentary investigation commission was accepted. CHP also submitted their own motion, which differed from AKP's content and wording. While AKP defined the accusations as "taking advantage of unauthorized service," CHP's motion was based on the demand for an inquiry into the accusation of "bribery" for the four ministers³³. Moreover, AKP's motion included the rights of privacy for the four ministers. In the end, AKP's motion was again accepted in Parliament.

CHP also used its right to apply to the Constitutional Court with the request of annulment about the AKP's regulations on the legislation level regarding the judicial and law enforcement agencies (For these regulations, see Özbudun, 2015, pp 46-47). The first was about the Judicial police, who would be obliged to inform the administrative authorities about criminal investigations with the new changes. By this Law, the government has the possibility to have information about of ongoing investigations and take measures against them. The second focus of restructuring was the HSYK. The AKP deputies had presented a bill to reduce the authority of the Plenary of HSYK on behalf of the Minister of Justice, which was unconstitutional because of Article 159. So, any regulation which changes the structure of HSYK should be a constitutional amendment. The AKP did not have a constitutional amendment majority, so they preferred to present a bill. The law was immediately sent to Constitutional Court by CHP with the request for annulment—actually three times: first just after the legislation, the second after the presidential approval, and the third time when the first two were returned due to procedural problems³⁴. In the end, the

³² <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/parliamentary-speaker-rejects-opposition-motion-for-inquiry-against-turkish-pm-over-graft--67383>

³³ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ruling-akp-deputies-parliament-motion-for-inquiry-lacks-bribery-63881>

³⁴ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-main-opposition-takes-law-on-judiciary-to-top-court-before-presidential-approval-62695> and <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-main-opposition-takes-judicial-bill-to-constitutional-court-62977> and <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-main-opposition-takes-judiciary-bill-to-top-court-63100>

Constitutional Court found the transfer of the authority of the Plenary of HSYK to the Minister of Justice unconstitutional. However, Constitutional Court decisions could not influence the bill's results due to what Özbudun (2016) calls “two radical surgical operations” (p. 154). Through these operations, the members of the Plenary of the HSYK council had already been replaced by pro-government members. Since the Constitutional Court decisions are not retroactive, the dismissed personnel could not return to their previous posts. So actually, the annulment of the Court could not bring any change in implementing the law.

Outside parliament, the channels for any opposition to reach the masses were also limited. Just after the scandal erupted, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) prepared a report including eight television channels that accused of breaching the principle of "privacy of individuals" ³⁵. Journalists started to be fired from newspapers over any comment critical of the government's role in the corruption process³⁶. Social media, another channel by opposition to the government could influence public opinion, also faced severe threats in this process.

As I have emphasized, December 2013 shows that AKP intervened in a corruption scandal during the forensic and parliamentary investigations with some tactics and law-making mechanisms. Both Özbudun (2014) and Sayarı (2016) call this period a turning point, showing how the government could threaten the separation of powers by its domination of the judiciary and how it could limit freedom of expression. Additionally, AKP's response to the December 2013 accusations indicates that the parliamentary opposition could be ineffective despite its efforts. It is important to note that in this period the Constitutional Court gained a perspective based more on rights and freedoms than regime protection (Özbudun, 2016, p.155). However, even the court decision remained ineffective in changing the result of regulations, as I already stressed in the HSYK case.

³⁵ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-media-watchdog-may-fine-tv-channels-for-reporting-graft-probe-60771>

³⁶ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/journalist-from-pro-government-daily-fired-over-tv-comments-60943> and <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/-turkish-journalist-ilicak-fired-after-calling-on-ministers-to-resign-59816>

4.5.2. Fundamental Changes to the State Intelligence Services and National Intelligence Organization Law

During the political turmoil of the December 2013 corruption scandal, the government drafted a new bill to enlarge the Turkish Intelligence Service's (MIT) authority and grant immunity to MIT workers from legal prosecution during their work³⁷. Erdoğan indicated that the revelation of wiretappings of people is the main reason behind the bill. However, it is known that the law also provided immunity for MIT agents in contact with PKK leader Öcalan.

All the opposition parties, including BDP, strictly opposed, with different arguments, the regulation brought by this law. The MHP underlined that the provision is related to the legalization of the talks between the parties of the process. The BDP and the CHP introduced the provisions that gave expanded powers to the Turkish Intelligence Service, such as assigning MIT operational duties on issues related to external security, counterterrorism, and national security, compulsory information supply to the MIT, or blocking the dissemination of any information concerning the MIT. Both parties opposed these provisions based on individual rights, freedoms, and the state of Law. They both argued that the way to an authoritarian regime was being designed by this draft.

By this law, MIT could collect information from all public institutions. That is different from something proper to the state of Law. The fundamental human rights and freedoms are restricted in that way. In an environment of such restrictions, we cannot say there is still a state of Law in the country but rather a process heading toward an authoritarian regime that wants to establish a "spy state ". (...) This law aims to block any investigation of MIT and, on the other hand, to give expensive authority in intelligence. The main issue is to provide the security of the party in power. However, it means shooting in the foot by restricting the superiority of Law, democracy, and human rights. Each person in the country is assigned to fulfill the orders of MIT. It is created a supervision and control society. By this Law, the principle of the superiority of Law is replaced by the superiority of intelligence³⁸.

³⁷ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-to-expand-powers-of-national-intelligence-agency-62735>

³⁸ CHP deputy Mahmut Tanal's parliamentary Speech on 15.04.2014, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b07601h.htm>

At the commission stage, the AKP retreated and changed draft provisions, such as a provision that proposed intelligence coordination under the prime minister³⁹. Moreover, due to the pressure, the bill was postponed until after the election period⁴⁰. However, the last bill was drafted without any radical reconsideration⁴¹

4.5.3. Domestic Security Package

After Gezi protests in May 2013 and Kobani events in October 2014, AKP placed „public order" as a priority of internal security. The law proposal was prepared to consist of 132 articles in the form of an omnibus bill. This proposal also included articles not directly about internal security. In November 2014, this draft bill The Law on Amending the Police Powers and Duties Law, the Law on the Gendarmerie's Organization Duties and Authorities, and other laws known as the Domestic Security Package (İç Güvenlik Paketi)⁴² were submitted to the Parliament. The draft bill enlarged the police authority, and it contained articles that limited the freedom of demonstration. This bill caused extensive public and parliament discussion from the moment it was submitted.

The package contained articles against democracy, human rights, and freedom of expression. HDP and CHP argued that this law represented a transition to an authoritarian police state⁴³ and warned about the institutionalization of the "police state". The government refused to consider the criticisms of the law. Even when the parliamentary debate descended into physical violence, Erdoğan stated that "the draft will pass in one or another way"⁴⁴. In addition to the fist fighting, the legislation

³⁹ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/parliament-commission-passes-bill-granting-excessive-power-to-turkeys-intel-body-62884>

⁴⁰ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/intel-bill-postponed-until-after-elections-63065>

⁴¹ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-approves-controversial-intel-bill-65214>

⁴² <https://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/163348-15-soruda-ic-guvenlik-paketi-ne-getiriyor>

⁴³ Mehmet Akif Hamzacebi's parliamentary speech on 18 February 2015, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil5/ham/b05701h.htm>

⁴⁴ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/security-bill-to-pass-one-way-or-another-erdogan--78646>

processes also witnessed intra-parliament protests. From the beginning, the CHP declared they would use all the rights in Procedural Law provided for opposition parties. These mechanisms are for the participation of opposition parties in the legislative process; however, these mechanisms are used to extend the process like presenting motions during deliberation or prolonging speeches not on the parliamentary agenda (Iba,2004, p. 67). Couple with formal ways, the CHP also resorted to protests in the Parliament, such as staging a sit-in⁴⁵ or shouting "down with fascism" 237 times for 5 minutes during a speech⁴⁶. After the bill was legislated, CHP applied to Constitutional Court, but except for one Article, the Court rejected the demand for nullity.

As well as the inquiry of the law, the draft bill's legislation process is worth analysing regarding how AKP decision-makers rejected any possibility of reaching a consensus in the legislation process. Additionally, the intra-parliamentary politics and tactics of CHP indicate that protests in the parliamentary became a mechanism of opposition.

4.5.4. Constitution Reconciliation Commission

The need for a new constitution was already on the agenda of the political parties in the 2011 elections. In those elections, the AKP had won 326 out of 550 seats; however, it still needed more seats to make it possible to ratify the new Constitution by itself. In their campaigns, both AKP and CHP declared that the 1982 constitution of Turkey is limited in the means of individual rights and freedoms. Most parties in the parliament still agreed on the necessity of a new constitution. They immediately gave members to the new commission, the "Constitutional Conciliation Commission," which AKP authorized to prepare a new constitution draft.

⁴⁵ <http://www.diken.com.tr/muhalefetten-tbmmde-oturma-eylemi-ic-guvenlik-paketi-maddeleri-soz-hakki-verilmeden-geciriliyor/>

⁴⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XE33fdv2yp8>

Initially, the process was hopeful in involving in several segments of society. Erdoğan made a statement in January 2011 to underline the importance of the participation of society in the Constitution making process (Gönenç, 2011, p.1)

Despite several conflicting views between the parties of the commission, the members agreed on many provisions. For the members who could not agree, it was decided to include all the alternative formulations in the Constitution's final draft. Despite the ongoing process, in December 2012, when the commission work was expected to end, the draft still needed to be prepared.

One of the most shocking facets of the process was Erdoğan's sudden demand for presidentialism. Although CHP objected to the presidential regime, the party continued discussions in the commission. However, it was Erdoğan's statement that ended the commission process. On 6 February 2013, Erdoğan declared that if the Constitution Reconciliation Commission could not reach a consensus by the end of March, the draft would be presented to the parliament as a group bill. The first option would be a joint bill of AKP and BDP; if not, then a referendum on the AKP's proposal⁴⁷. Kılıçdaroğlu immediately accused Erdoğan of blackmail: "*A country's constitution cannot be changed by blackmailing. This can be frightening for anybody else but not for the CHP*"⁴⁸.

4.6. Concluding Remarks

Within the argument of this study's theoretical framework, I have asked the question whether we can talk about an institutional setting that facilitates the CHP's policy-seeking choices and provides incentives for this decision. In this sense, the party goals approach suggests that a party, especially an opposition party, having more policy influence in the regime will encourage it to adopt policy-seeking strategies. In this section, I have analyzed the policy influence of the CHP between 2002 and 2015.

⁴⁷ <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/mart-sonuna-kadar-bir-anayasa-mumkun-1120746/>

⁴⁸ <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/santajla-anayasa-degistirilemez>

The party goals approach employs the term "instrumentality of votes," which refers to the translation of votes to policy effect and office benefits in a system. This translation occurs in different stages. The theory suggests that converting votes into seats is essential at the electoral stage. Any distortion in this process would create uncertainty in party elites' decision-making and offer fewer incentives for vote-seeking orientation. In this sense, the 2002 elections were perhaps the most distorted in Turkish history. The AKP and the CHP had acquired more seats in parliament than the vote they obtained. Therefore, proper to the theoretical frameworks' argument, Baykal's CHP had less incentive to seek votes at the electoral level.

On the other hand, when we come to the 2011 elections, there is a more stable system in terms of fundamental indicators and a more predictable system regarding the vote /seat rate. Another reason the instrumentality of the vote was higher for Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP is the *deification of elections and votes* (Kubicek and Erişen 2016) in Turkish politics. The regime after post-2010 is defined as a democracy where obtaining the majority in the elections is the only way to have policy effect or office benefits. The reasons for this trend are the erosion of the regime's checks and balances and the narrowing of other channels of social participation. This trend provides another motivation for political parties to focus on vote maximization.

Another stage of translation occurs in the legislation process. I borrowed some indicators from opposition studies to measure the power of opposition in a regime. In general, intra-parliamentary mechanisms allow the opposition party to exercise control and scrutiny over the ruling party while at the same time influencing the legislative process. Although the legal framework regulating this process was the same during Kılıçdaroğlu's and Baykal's terms, my comparison shows that beginning in 2007, the opposition parties could use these mechanisms less and less. The especially post-2011 process is especially low. So, we can argue that, especially before 2007, the opposition parties have more possibilities to affect policymaking or control the government, providing incentives for policy-seeking goals.

However, the mechanisms that increased the political influence of CHP in the pre-2007 period were the presence of veto players, which confirms the findings of the literature. To show their role in strengthening the CHP's political influence, I have

analyzed some critical legal processes during this period and found that in the Baykal period. Although the CHP was in opposition, both Sezer's active presidency and the AKP's relatively cautious attitude increased the CHP's political influence. On the contrary, a close examination of some of the legislative processes during Kılıçdaroğlu's term showed the strategies and tactics the AKP could bypass the legal framework that allowed the opposition parties to have influence. This is in line with the expectations of the theoretical framework, which argues that the high policy effect of a party may motivate the party to prioritize policy-seeking strategies, as it happened in Baykal's case in the 2002-2007 period.

In the following chapter, I will examine how this institutional setting, which enhanced the CHP's political influence, began to change with the 2007 elections and how the Constitutional Court's rejection of the AKP's closure case influenced the party to revise its goal priorities.

CHAPTER 5

TRANSFORMATION OF CHP'S INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The main research question posed in this thesis, “Why did CHP change its programmatic profile?” is related to a broader literature on the relationship between the reasons for party change and party goals. According to Harmel and Janda's model (1995), an external stimulus, a radical change, or an environmental shock directs political parties to revise their policy positions. The meaning and power of environmental alterations depend on the party's primary goal. For vote seekers, election results are vital. For policy seekers, any change to question policy efficiency is very crucial.

On the other hand, any change in the institutional structure that provides constraints and opportunities for the political parties has critical importance. Harmel and Janda (1994) define this environmental change that can trigger party change as a shock; however, they also imply that the incremental changes in the environment can create a trend and then produce party change. The events that move in the same direction can compose a coherent and measurable shift over time are called trends.

As mentioned above, the CHP's party policies can be characterized as policy-seeking policies with highly effective veto players due to the CHP's relatively high policy effect. At the same time, after 2007, a series of events created a trend that resulted in so-called regime change. Although it was through the 2010 constitutional referendum that AKP finally eliminated the veto players of the regime, I will argue the dismissal of the closure case of AKP by constitutional court was *an environmental shock* for the CHP and motivated the party to a programmatic change.

This section will first draw a brief picture of regime transformation with its central institutions. Later, the so-called 2009 elections and CHP's campaign will be marked as one of the turning points in the means of party policy change.

5.1. The Beginning of an End (2007-2010)

The alteration of CHP's institutional environment did not happen overnight. Political parties' and Anti-terror laws affected veto players' policy-making mechanisms (Zaras, 2013). However, the 2007 election results gave legitimacy and self-reliance to the AKP government to alter the central dynamics of the regime.

5.1.1. 2007 Elections' Defeat

In the literature on political party change, elections are the natural causes of the change, especially the ones that have vote maximization goal orientations. Particularly after the elections such as the 2007 elections, which Çarkoğlu (2007) defined as a phenomenal success for AKP, the *losers* are expected to re-examine their party positions and strategies. For the argument of this thesis, the institutional consequences of the 2007 elections are specifically critical. It was not the electoral defeat but the alteration of the institutional environment that forced the party to reconsider its primary goals and policies.

These elections also had crucial institutional results because of how the actors framed the polls. The main theme of the competition between two parties was the “nature of the regime” (Çarkoğlu 2007, p.507) AKP's 2007 election campaign was based on a promise of a new constitution as a new civilian contract with the claim of being more democratic and liberal than the existing one. (Özbudun and Hale 2010, p.23) In contrast, during its election campaign, CHP pronounced AKP's “promise” as an indication of a "hidden intention" to weaken secularism and introduce an Islamic state.

The AKP's victory at 2007 elections created long-lasting results for the regime and also for CHP. Firstly, the election results were interpreted as a reaction to the constitutional court's decision to block AKP from appointing Abdullah Gül as president (Wuthrich 2015, p.232). Secondly, even if the AKP did not meet the required quorum for the first parliamentary session according to the constitutional court decision; however, it created a political atmosphere where the new parties of the parliament supported AKP by participating in the parliamentary session and supported the presidential election of Gül. The AKP government had a significant gain in the appointment power of the presidency to critical positions in the bureaucracy such as the High Council of Education and Higher Courts. Additionally, the party could bring the constitutional amendments as party proposals through the legislation only with the support of its parliamentary group. This enabled them to conduct a referendum for these amendments in 2007 and 2010. The 2007 referendum provided the legal grounds for the popular election of the president which will transform the regime to semi-presidentialism (Kalaycıoğlu 2022 p.424). In 2014, Erdoğan became Turkey's first popularly elected president and the change to a de facto semi presidential system occurred.

5.1.2. Ergenekon and Balyoz Investigations

Although the army acted in Turkish political history as a veto power over the elected officials for a long time, entering the 2000s this military role was reduced because of EU pressure regarding the civilianization and democratization of the political system. These reforms were mainly about the National Security Council's structure and the military's jurisdiction (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011). Additional to the institutional changes, many studies also refer to a transformation in civil-military relations beginning with the early 2000s. (Aydınlı 2009, Satana 2011, Heper 2011) where the support for the military's guardianship role in the public eye began to be diminished.

Ergenekon and later Balyoz (Sledgehammer) investigations were a turning point. The basis for the investigation is that the weekly *Nokta* published excerpts from a former naval commander's diary, which allegedly contained detailed plans for a military coup. In 2010, another trial has been started by another alleged coup, the Balyoz. (Gürsoy

2012, pp735-736) For first time in Turkish history high ranking military officers were charged with an accusation to overthrow the government, and the interventions of the army were criminalized (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016, p.1585). According to Cizre and Walker (2010, p.95) Ergenekon investigations and the statute regarding the punishment of officers who committed crimes in civilian areas due to the extensive investigations that reached the highest ranks of the army were a "critical setback" for the military's political and social reputation (p. 95).

After the presidency of Gül, the Ergenekon investigations disrupted the balance of power between the Kemalist camp and AKP. They radically contributed to the change of CHP's environment radically. However, maybe more than that, the Ergenekon investigations contributed to a new democratic discourse for CHP, which I will analyse in detail in the coming sections. In the process, the claim of "being a struggle with the deep state of Turkey" was not anymore strong because of the ongoing process's transparency deficiencies. The long detention durations and the arrest of many journalists and civil activists enforced the impression that the case became a tool of the government to pressure and punish the media and opposition (Gürsoy 2012, p.748).

From the beginning of the procedure, Deniz Baykal was distanced himself from the allegations of a coup or deep state. He preferred to criticize the system, the fair judgment deficits, and the relationship between the judiciary and the government. In his speeches (Baykal's press conference on 03.07.2008 before the PA meeting), he pointed out that the investigation had become a political rather than a judicial issue. He argued that the period could be characterized as a regime change period and, in such periods the governments tend to take revenge on the cult figures of the old period. The Ergenekon investigation is a tool of the government. Baykal used the term "empire of fear" for the AKP period, which he frequently used later. The basic tenets of Baykal's discourse about the Ergenekon investigations laid the foundations of the new democracy discourse for CHP.

5.1.3. 2010 Constitutional Amendments

The 2010 constitutional amendments brought articles that affected the military judiciary and judicial system. These amendments introduced the judicial review of the decisions of the High military council and enabled the civilian courts to criminal charge military members (Gürsoy, 2012 p.749) As well as restructuring the military courts, the amendments reorganized the composition of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and Constitutional Court (Kalaycıoğlu 2010, p.5). Liberal circles and international bodies thought these regulations would create a more pluralistic and independent judiciary. However, developments have shown that the court has increasingly come under the influence of the AKP government. In the next elections in October 2014⁴⁹, the judges and prosecutors who were members of the Gülen movement and close to the AKP were elected for the HSYK and affected the investigations of Ergenekon and Balyoz. (Özbudun 2014, p.163-164; Özbudun 2015, p.48).

5.2. A Shock for CHP: Closure Case of AKP

On May 2008, the Constitutional Court initiated a case against AKP at the demand of the Court of Appeal's prosecutor. The indictment was that the AKP was the "center of anti-secular activities," the most critical evidence being AKP and MHP's constitutional amendments to lift the university's headscarf ban. Although this amendment was already annulled, it is the most substantial evidence of AKP's indictment. Erdoğan and AKP declared that this case was raised not only against them but also against the democratic order and the people of Türkiye. (Dağı, 2008, p.2) There were some options on the table from the beginning of the case for AKP (for the process and AKP's responses see Dağı, 2008, pp. 3-5), like changing some articles of the constitution, making the closure of parties more difficult. However, as I already highlighted, the quorum for meeting for a constitutional amendment was put at 367 by the constitutional court decision in the presidency crisis. Thus, because it did not have enough seats in the parliament, AKP's only options were to have the support of other

⁴⁹ https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/10/141012_turkiye_hsyk

parties or hold a referendum. Ultimately, the party chose to submit its defence and await the decision. In July 2008, the court decided that the party was guilty of anti-secular activities but ruled against a ban. Instead, the court agreed on a financial penalty.

The then discussions of closure cases reflect the main concerns of the internal and external actors. The "Economist" noted that the concept of closure is a "dangerous mistake" and "bizarre" for a modern democracy. The EU argues that such a "dangerous mistake" could disqualify Turkey from the EU. Some civil society organizations published a declaration referring to the necessity to make everything related to the closure case to avoid a political and economic crisis.

From the beginning of the case, Baykal expressed the party's support for the judicial process. Baykal underlined that AKP persisted in a struggle with the institutions of the secular regime. That is why it is AKP itself that should be primarily accused. Additionally, for Baykal, the alleged democracy versus law controversy is improper. They are the two sides of the same coin. The most significant assurance of democracy is the law system in the country (Baykal's group speech on 18.03.2008 and Baykal's interview on 17.03.2008). When the court declared its verdict, Baykal highlighted its decision that AKP was engaged in anti-secular activities. According to Baykal, the Court acted in good faith to avoid any possibility of a political crisis; however, this court decision underlined that the AKP caused a problem with its steps against the secular order. Now the government party should, Baykal suggests, behave responsibly (Baykal's public declaration after the court's verdict on 30.07.2008).

This decision created an environmental shock for CHP and led the party to alter its positioning on the eve of March 2009. The Constitutional Court was one of the critical actors in Sezer's presidency in the pre-2007 period and blocked many legislative activities of the government. However, this court verdict showed that the post-2007 political environment and electoral legacy of the AKP government limited the court's manoeuvring capabilities. One more hint about the decreasing power of veto players in this era also appeared during the closure case. The military remained silent during the case. Chief Officer Büyükanıt avoided any comment after the verdict by saying that the army had learned its lessons from past experiences of interfering with politics.

(Dağı 2008, p.9) The party`s environment seems to be transformed radically and now the party now should respond to this new environment in another way as Dağı (2008, p.19) rightly presumed.

Such an end of the closure case created a cornerstone in CHP's politics. As a peak point at the environmental change of CHP, the closure case signalled the old institutional structure change as irreversible. As mentioned before, to analyse a causality relation, some kind of evidence can be employed. (Beach and Pedersen 2011, p.108) Sequence evidence is the one which I employed in this research. Sequence evidence is related with events' *temporal and spatial chronology*. In this chapter, I focus on the analysis of the political events of 2008 and examine Baykal`s statements testimony before and after the dismissal of the AKP's closure proceedings. The first evidence is the differences in tone and policy saliency of two-party congresses, one is just before, and one is just after the closure case. The second piece of evidence is again remarkably differentiated political discourse about headscarves just before and after the closure case. Although they cannot be counted as evidence, I would like to draw attention to the new democracy discourse of the party and the 2009 election campaign, which give clear signals of a new period of party discourse.

5.2.1. One Year, Two Congress

How the decision of the Constitutional Court affected the party policy can be observed by the difference between the discourses of the 32nd Ordinary Congress in April 2008 and six months later at 14th Extra-Ordinary Congress in December 2008. Baykal's speeches at these two congresses present a different policy saliency and tone profile.

CHP's 32nd conventional party congress (April 28, 2008) was held to elect a leader, according to the legal requirements. Although there were other candidates, it was clear from the beginning that Baykal would be re-elected. Baykal's 32nd Ordinary Congress` opening speech shared similarities with the 31st Ordinary Congress in 2005. Both addresses referred to a "*yol ayrımı*" (a junction) for Türkiye between a Democracy and a Republic, between a secular or an Islamic state. Most of the speeches were devoted to secularism. The speeches in both congresses are very similar in not

only saliency but also direction. They had a Eurosceptic stance and pointed out that "the West" urged them to choose between a secular and an Islamist state. The party's mission is "to protect the Republic" against the political project of AKP, so-called "to establish the Islamic Republic." Baykal declared his leadership as recognizing CHP's aim to protect Republican Turkey. As mentioned, Baykal had complained about the Western imposition of the conceptualization "secularism versus democracy". In this speech, he put his position on behalf of secularism.

Would there be a democracy after abandoning secularism? Would there be democracy in a non-secular regime? Would there be equality between men and women? When beliefs, sects, and religion are determinative, what would be the meaning of politics, debate, and opposition? Look, there are elections everywhere. There are elections in Egypt too. There are elections in all Middle Eastern and Arab countries. Is there democracy? Democracy is based on secularism. Those who say throw secularism away first know democracy will follow, and our peace, togetherness, and cement will be lost. If we want Türkiye not to turn into Iraq, we have to protect secularism.

Just six months after the closure case and the 32nd conventional party congress, the 14th Extra Ordinary Congress was held on December 21, 2008, to declare a new program and constitution for the party⁵⁰. The speech in this Congress represents (with Keyman's 2010 terms) the shift from polity to policy. The speech contains mostly actual developments and political agendas of the time, such as the world economic crisis and corruption. Baykal, for the first time in a while, criticized the government not based on the principles of the republic but on the grounds of economic management and corruption. Under the effect of the then financial crisis, Baykal's speech also included a critique of the neo-liberal economy. Again, for the first time in a long time, social democracy is referred to as an antidote for the neo-liberal damage witnessed especially during the last economic crisis. Another pillar of Baykal's speech was AKP's democratic understanding. Baykal strongly criticized the media restrictions and underlined the importance of freedom of expression and information, which would later be one of the cornerstones of Kılıçdaroğlu 's discourse.

Dear friends, they would establish a media monopoly in Türkiye if possible. Only what they see correctly will be written and said on TV, in the media, and in the press: no complaints, criticism, or allegations of corruption against

⁵⁰ In the second half of 2008, the party declared a new program and a party decree at the extra-ordinary extraordinary party congress in December 2008 and a completely new image of the party campaign especially compared with the 2007 elections.

them. Broadcasting will be done as they allow. This is the picture of their ideals. They do whatever possible to neutralize the groups resisting them. They say they do not buy their newspapers. They threaten them to close down their newspapers.

Moreover, today in Türkiye, a communication organization created by the personal appointment of the Prime Minister has the technical means to listen to the telephone communications of everyone all over Türkiye. This is neither compatible with human rights, law, or freedom.

On the other hand, contrary to the previous Baykal speeches, he did not highlight secularism in this speech at all. Although he stressed the importance of secularism, he underlined that "the principle of secularism should not be an excuse to exclude each other, which may be a cultural conflict." This new emphasis in Baykal's discourse prepared the ground for the coming "carşaf opening."

What is the essence, the foundation? That Türkiye is a secular, democratic republic. We will not forget that. We have never forgotten it, and we will never forget it again. However, even though that basic principle is in force, it should not lead us to exclude each other unnecessarily because I am not too fond of this or that. We should avoid falling into that trap, so let's summarise. I want to avoid going into this more comprehensively. We have talked a lot about this.

5.2.2. Carşaf Opening: One Tone Down for Secularism

Historically, although the debates appeared to begin at the end of the 1960s, it was in the 1980s that the headscarf issue became a problematic theme of the political agenda. (For the process, see Kalaycıoğlu 2005) Beginning in the middle of 1981, the military junta imposed various limitations on head covering in public. It implemented the clothing and appearance standards for males as well as the 1982 laws about the personal appearance of state employees, which prohibited female government servants from covering their heads. Additionally, the Constitutional Court's ruling in 1989, which struck down a rule permitting headscarves on campuses, served as the foundation for the headscarf ban at universities. The TCC once more said in 1991 that headscarves could not be permitted under the law's description of the freedom of clothing at colleges. However, because there was no clear legislation in place between 1989 and 1998, this restriction was never really put into force.

The issue once more came to the surface with the February 28 process. (in Şentop 2008 pp.2-3) The MGK (National Security Council) declaration issued to the RP (Welfare Party-Refah Partisi) served as a warning regarding the need to prevent clothing practices that convey an outdated appearance. This declaration, which was made one year prior to the Constitutional Court's decision to dissolve RP, highlighted the significance of addressing this issue. Following the declaration, the military conducted a briefing for rectors and judges regarding the interpretation of the headscarf ban in universities. This briefing led to the de facto implementation of the ban, which had significant implications for the country. As a result, universities began enforcing the ban on headscarves, aligning with the military's interpretation.

In the first period of the AKP government, between 2002-2007, the party preferred to keep silent about the subject. The debate about the ban became intense when AKP tried to lift the ban in its second term. Erdogan triggered the discussion in a press conference in Madrid when he declared that the ban on the headscarf should be lifted even if it is a political symbol. To solve the problem, he referred to a constitutional amendment as a way to cancel the Constitutional Court decisions. Later on, the AKP, with the support of the second opposition party of the Parliament, MHP (Nationalist Action Party), amended articles 10 and 42, respectively, to emphasize the "principle of equality" in all activities of provision of public services and "the right to higher education (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009, p.31).

During the process, the CHP strongly criticized and opposed the proposal. Baykal argued that lifting the ban on headscarves would cause discrimination and separation based on being pious or not in universities. (Baykal's Group Speech on 05.02.2008). Being religious became a criterion for social and administrative relations in universities. On the other hand, to accept the wearing of headscarves in the framework of human rights would give way to the expressions of other religions in the public sphere, which would contradict the secularism principle of the Constitution. (Baykal's interview in CNN Türk TV, Ankara Kulisi on 23.01.2008). According to Baykal, the headscarf has nothing to do with authentic Turkish culture but is more a tradition adopted from Arabic traditions. Baykal criticized the liberal discourse on this issue at the beginning of 2008 by giving Iran as an example and describing liberals as those who were deceived:

This has happened not only in our country but also in the world, the most recent example being Iran. Before Khomeini, there was a broad spectrum of liberals, social democrats, socialists, and communists who complained about Shah's rule, who longed for democracy, who longed for liberalism, who longed for freedoms, who longed for freedom, who wanted to respect everyone's rights and laws, who wanted to create a beautiful, democratic society, and who followed Khomeini, believing that he would ensure this. They marched together, fought the struggle, removed the Shah, and brought Khomeini together. (Baykal's speech on plenary discussion, 05.02.2008)

After the amendments were accepted, the CHP reacted immediately, applied to the TCC and demanded the amendments be annulled. (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 31) They argued that these amendments were against the unamendable principle of the Constitution, which states the Republic of Türkiye is a secular state. However, according to the Constitution, the TCC had the authority to examine the constitutional amendments according to their compliance with procedural rules, not substantively. In an interview with Fikret Bila, Baykal argued that the TCC has the authority to examine the amendment substantively (Baykal's interview in CNN Türk TV, Ankara Kulisi on 23.01.2008):

I wonder what the Constitutional Court does when a constitutional amendment is brought before it that is in flagrant contradiction not to any article of the constitution, but to an article that cannot even be proposed to be amended? Because, in fact, such a constitutional amendment proposal should not have been made. According to what? According to the constitution. And thus, the Constitutional Court may perhaps, I don't know, include it in the concept of substantive irregularity.

At the same time, the Court also argued that it has a right to review the amendments substantively because the incompatibility of amendments with the Constitution's three unamendable articles is also an issue of the form. Expectedly, the Court examined the inquiry of the amendments and decided that these regulations violate Article 2 and, therefore, are null which is called by Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009, p.32) as the examples of "juristocracy".

Just a few months after the Supreme Court of Appeals rejected the closure of the AKP, in November 2008, Baykal's CHP surprised many by welcoming some women wearing *Çarşaf* to the party and pinning party buttons on their dresses. Even the party supporters did not criticize this move except for very few negative comments. Gürsel

Tekin (İstanbul branch leader of CHP), in an interview with the daily Milliyet⁵¹ said that “Many party officials from Anatolia declared their support by stressing that "now we can enter everywhere" or "our support increased at least five percent.”” Baykal also implied the vote-seeking motive behind this strategy. He demonstrated that a Turkish party also needed support from conservative circles to succeed in a secular state where 99 percent of people are Muslim. In his speech at a group meeting (25.11.2008), Baykal defended the new position with these words:

Sir, he is a conservative, has a modest life, and is pious. What do you care if he is pious? He maintains his morals, customs, and traditions as a righteous person; of course, he will; what is it to you? Instead of being a liberal like you, let him be a righteous person who loves his country, homeland, and honesty with great pleasure. (Applause) Dear friends, we will overcome these issues. We will separate cultural conservatism from political preference. Everyone has their moral values, way of life, and relationship with their spouse and children; we will respect this. He will do as he wishes and then pursue the proper politics. We do not have the right to tell anyone to leave such and such tradition, to give up such and such customs; there is no such thing. Everyone will live according to their own understanding, and we will respect this, and we do.

5.2.3. 2009 Elections Campaign

The CHP's 2009 local elections campaign had two main pillars: corruption and socioeconomic problems (Eligür 2009, p.480) The 2009 election campaign differed radically from the 2007 election campaign. First of all, Baykal did not mention secularism at all in his election speeches and party elites expressed on various occasions that they were open to engaging with more religious groups during the election period (Eligür 2009, p. 481). Another theme of the campaign was the fight against socio-economic difficulties and economic packages were announced during the campaign, differently than 2007 elections. On the other hand, Kılıçdaroğlu, then the party's candidate for mayor of İstanbul, became the face of the party's fight against corruption. In those days, Türkiye was shaken by a corruption case associated with Erdoğan. (Eligür 2009, p. 482) A Turkish charity organization based in Germany was accused of collecting funds from Turkish workers and transferring millions of Euros

⁵¹ <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/baykal-rozeti-takti-chp-anadolu-da-rahatladi-1019929>

to AKP supporters and media close to AKP. By the public appearance of Kılıçdaroğlu in TV and newspapers, CHP became the symbol of “clean politics”.

In such an environment, CHP started its election campaign with the slogan "Democracy needs a break." At first glance, this slogan seems to imply the limitation of democracy, but Baykal was trying to criticize the AKP's majoritarian understanding of democracy. During the campaign, Baykal emphasized the need to limit the AKP's absolute power and the importance of checks and balances in the system (Baykal's interview at Sky Türk, “Meclis Kulisi”, 17.09.2008).

In democracies, governments must be controllable. Both politics and the judiciary should exercise this control. To neutralize the judiciary and political control institutions such as the press and the media by using the state's power to politicize the judiciary, staff the judiciary, and intimidate the media does not serve democratic legitimacy. (...)For the journey of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, which started eighty-nine years ago with the concepts of national will and national sovereignty, to reach the goal of true democracy, there seems to be a need for regulations that will bring politics under effective legal and public scrutiny. The essence of the matter is to move the law from being at the command of politics to a point where it can control politics. Real democracy can be achieved not if the law uses politics, but if the law controls politics. (Baykal's Speech on 23.04.2009, General Assembly)

By highlighting the AKP's majoritarian practices within the framework of an authoritarian regime, the CHP demonstrated an understanding of the potential dangers of concentrated power and the need for checks and balances in a democratic system especially in Kılıçdaroğlu period.

5.3. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have first analysed how the institutional structure that increased the political influence of the CHP in the 2002-2007 period started to change after the 2007 elections. With the AKP victory in the 2007 elections, many actors of this institutional structure were changed. President Gül, one of the founders of the AKP, replaced President Sezer as president, the Ergenekon investigations led to the first trials of prominent members of the military class, and with the 2010 constitutional amendments, the structure of many judicial institutions was changed in favour of the AKP. However, in line with the arguments of the party goals approach about party

policy change, the rejection of the AKP's closure case by the Constitutional Court triggered the CHP to reconsider its policy priorities.

In my analysis, I found that the CHP's discourse, policy priorities, and positions on some issues changed radically before and after the closure case of AKP. This strengthened my observation of the impact of the closure case on party politics. The new discourse of the party reflected itself on the party's 2009 election campaign with another set of strategies and discourse with references to corruption or economic crises.

In the coming section, I will analyze the reflection of party goal change on the party's positions on the Kurdish problem, and I will analyze if the theoretical framework's assumption about the relationship between the party goals and the party positions can also explain the CHP's responses to the theme of Kurdish problem of the 2000s.

CHAPTER 6

CHP'S KURDISH PROBLEM

The Kurdish problem stands at the center of establishment years and then in the Republic's domestic and regional developments. In his article, Mesut Yeğen (2010) develops a time framework for how the state conceptualizes the Kurdish issue and how it has deals with it. From the 1920s to the 1950s, rather than an ethnic problem the Kurdish problem was a unitary state`s centralization problem. The state conceptualized the problem as pre-modern, tribes` resistance to a central state. By the 1950s, for the state, the problem was turned into a problem of the economy, so the problems of regions were interpreted as a lack of economic integration of the region and economic backwardness. The perception of the Kurdish problem as social, security, and economic issues led the state to cope with the problem with mechanisms such as financial packages and significant state investments like GAP (South-eastern Anatolia Project) or oppressive military/security measures and actions aimed to erode the regional social structure such as *Şark Islahat Planı*. A new actor, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, Kürdistan İşçi Partisi), was established in November 1978, resulting in severe consequences in terms of internal security in Turkey and leading to clashes between the PKK and the army.

In the middle of the 1990s, a new position, a moderate one, occurred with the premise that the Kurdish problem is a democracy problem in which the Kurdish population is faced with problems in expressing their cultural and ethnic identity, and the state is unable to meet these demands. Except for the period between 1993 and 1999, when the state revisited the military/security measures, the Kurdish problem was defined as an ethnic-politic problem. It became an essential agenda in Turkey`s democratization process.

Initially, the EU had an influential role in determining the dominant discourse and tools of the policy era. However, in time more and more middle eastern dynamics and intra-political conditions began to play role in Kurdish politics.

In the section below, I will delineate the pillars of the period's framework for the Kurdish Question.

6.1. New Kurdish Politics (1989-1993)

The 1980s represented a turning point in the Kurdish problem in Turkey. During this time, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) intensified its violent activities, causing significant unrest in the region. In response to the escalating violence, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency (OHAL) to restore order and stability. To further enhance security measures, the usage of tools like the village guardian system by civilian Kurds and commando units became more prevalent. These security tools aimed to provide protection against the PKK and maintain law and order in the affected areas. However, amidst these turbulent times, there was a shift in the political landscape. Political actors began to adopt a more moderated view of the Kurdish problem. This change in perspective sought to find out the causes of this conflict and find a peaceful resolution. The DYP-SHP coalition played a significant role in addressing the problem's ethno-political dimension.

Why did the state need to revise its discourse on the problem? The 1980s is often defined as an era of rising identity politics for Turkey, the challenge of Alevi, Kurdish, and Islam identities on the official religious/ethnic understanding of the state (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997, Keyman and İçduygu 2005, p.8, Somer 2004, p.238) Secondly, another crucial international actor, the European Commission (EC), became a significant political and economic influence on intra politics, especially in human rights and democratization sphere, by Özal's decision to apply for membership of the EC in April 1987 (Bardakçı, 2007, p.137). Thirdly, the Kurdish awakening in Europe, which raised issues including Kurdish history, language, culture, and history, and the entrance of the People's Labour Party (HEP), supported mainly by the Kurdish electorate, stirred up debate in the Turkish parliament about the Kurdish question

(Barkey, 2019, p.115). Due to these reasons, the ethnopolitical perspective of the problem came to the agenda for all of the political parties in the 1990s.

For the recognition of the Kurdish problem's ethnic dimension, the government partners' visit to Diyarbakır in 1993 was a cornerstone (Barkey and Fuller, 1997, p.67) The coalition protocol between the parties DYP and SHP already referred to "Kurdish reality" and proposed the "democratic solution." The coalition first visited South-eastern Anatolia, including the cities Diyarbakır, Mardin, and Siirt. Prime Minister Demirel announced the recognition of Kurdish reality in one of these visits:

Kurdish identity... We cannot deny it anymore. Turkey should recognize the Kurdish reality. We cannot say anymore that one is not Kurd, but Turk or "you became Turk on the way from Middle Asia. We established this state together. When the Ottoman collapsed, just two states were left, Kurds and Turks. Our state is unitary; there is no minority. We all are the owners of this state. The citizen who speaks Kurdish is also the owner of everything in this country. It should be our perspective."⁵²

As we can observe from Demirel's words, the framework referred to the recognition of Kurds as an ethnic group other than Turks and their cultural rights. Proper to this framework, the legal regulations concentrated on cultural rights, for instance publishing in the Kurdish language, establishing Kurdish institutes or allowing private Kurdish lessons. This era is interrupted by the sudden death of president Özal. Again, international developments were on the scene. As an unexpected outcome of the US invasion of Iraq, the Kurds established a new Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, and the PKK launched bases near the border (Gunther 2010, p. 89). Although the PKK declared a cease-fire at the beginning of 1993, suddenly the PKK executed 33 unarmed soldiers (Çalışlar, 2013, p. 36). In these lost years of human rights and democratization, as Murat Somer (2016, p.196-197) named them, the following Ciller government revisited the security policies with village guards and special units. In addition to thousands of soldiers and militants, many leaders of the Kurdish community were killed, later named "mystery killings. This period reinforced mafia-

⁵² Bila, 09.12. 1991 Milliyet in (Yayman, 2011, p.40)

politics-security forces connections, which would have other results on Turkish politics.

February 1999 started a new chapter in the Kurdish question. The leader of the PKK, Öcalan, captured and by his call, the PKK declared a ceasefire, again raising hopes for a solution. However, the real motivation was Turkey's membership declaration of EC. After the Helsinki Summit, Mesut Yılmaz, who was responsible for EU-Turkey relations, stated in a speech in Diyarbakır, "A road to European Union passes through Diyarbakır" (Yavuz 2011, p.16). Kirişçi (2004,) evaluated the Chief Judge of the High Court Appeals Sami Selcuk's speech in September 1999 as historical in terms of the Kurdish question, where Selcuk emphasized a constitution and a legal system would open the way to a genuinely democratic and pluralist society with complete freedom of expression(p.282). Although he did not highlight the Kurdish problem directly, in such a climate, it was clear that he thought the ideal solution lay in the free expression of cultural identity. This speech can be accepted as the beginning of a political reform period for a pluralist democracy.

6.2. The Kurdish Problem and EU Effect (1999-2004)

At the Luxemburg Summit in 1997, Turkey was recognized as "eligible to membership." Türkiye became an official candidate at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. It was a turning point for Turkey, where with the trigger effect of the EU (Kirişçi 2011, p.345), several reform packages passed in the legislation between 1999-2004, most directly or indirectly related to the Kurdish issue.

6.2.1. The Concept of Democratization and human rights

Most of the reforms in this period were driven by the European Union's Copenhagen political criteria, which formulated economic and political requirements such as attachment to democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law and the protection of minorities (Keyman & Düzgit 2007, p.71). However, The Council of

Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of Minority Rights in 1995 became the primary instrument to regulate this sphere (Yılmaz, 2011).

The first progress reports about Turkey frame the Kurdish problem in the democratization agenda by underlining the necessity of "a political and non-military solution to the problem" (Kirişçi 2011, p.338). It urged Turkey to solve its Kurdish conflict by political and democratic means with an interest in human rights and the rule of law. In March 2001, Turkey's National Programme for the Adaptation of the Acquis (NPAA) was declared to set out Turkey's means and priorities, including political and economic areas. Following NPAA, a set of reform packages and constitutional amendments came to the agenda in 2001 and 2002 (for the reforms see Kirişçi 2011, p.338). A set of critical constitutional amendments, primarily focused on the important principles of freedom of thought and freedom of expression, were successfully approved during the tenure of Ecevit's coalition government. These amendments specifically addressed the regulations pertaining to fundamental human rights and freedoms, aiming to ensure their protection and promotion. Notably, the amendments significantly expanded the scope of freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom of organization. Between 2000 and 2004 nine reform packages were passed: three under the DSP and MHP coalition government (1999-2002) and six under the AKP government. The further amendments came in 2004.

In every report, the EU mentioned the human rights abuses against Kurds, especially in the areas of freedom of expression and association; however, the EU was cautious about limiting itself to protecting human rights and individual cultural rights. The EU especially distanced itself from violence and secession. It was distanced about collective group rights and territorial rights due to the PKK violence and global terrorism discussions (Tocci, 2006, p. 135). For example, the NPAA of 2001 noted especially that the official language and education language is Turkish. (Kirişçi 2011, p. 339) This EU framework weakened the hardliner's arguments, which always referenced national security and integrity when discussing the Kurdish problem (Kirişçi, 2011, p. 338). Özdemir and Sarigil (2015) noted that the reform process under EU effect represents a radical shift from the strictly homogeneous, difference-blind notion to a plural one in the sense that it requires the acknowledgment of the presence of multi-ethnic groups by the state (p.287). Polat (2009) stated that the reform process

de-securitized these discussions and brought them to the political agenda. Reforms concerning issues such as freedom of expression or association, which were the national threats to unity before, became part of the democratization agenda.

6.2.2. Change of the Kurdish Politics` Glossary: Minority or Constituent People?

The 2004 Progress report opened a considerable debate about the status of *Kurds and Alevi*s with its statement about them as minorities. The EU reforms made it possible to discuss the plurality and diversity of the society; however, now the question was about the constitutional identity of Kurds. The term "minority," in that sense, demands juridical and constitutional recognition. Committee of "Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights," prepared a report which argues in the official view, national identity is defined with references to ethnic nationalism (Grigoriadis, 2007, pp.427-431). Many other ethnic identities are ignored, and in that way, it is undemocratic. This report opened discussion around the terms "primary state identity" and "secondary ethnic/religious identity". The state identity of "Turkishness" defines all the citizens as Turk, whatever their ethnic and religious identity.

According to the report, this situation alienated all the citizens who are not ethnically Turk. In that manner, the report suggests national civic citizenship based on the territory of *Türkiyeli* (from Türkiye). This report and the discussions afterward polarized society to a large extent. The report's opponents argued that accepting such a view would mean the end of the unitary Turkish republic. It is just a stage for a federal, binational state.⁵³ Others argued Atatürk's famous word "How happy is one who says I am a Turk" expresses civic citizenship. Being Turk or Turkishness is beyond any ethnic identity, which integrates all the ethnic and religious differences.⁵⁴

⁵³ Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Radikal 29 Oct.2004 in (Grigoriadis, 2007, p. 430)

⁵⁴ The Chief of the Staff General Hilmi Özkök, Radikal 29 Oct.2004 in ((Grigoriadis, 2007, p. 431)

However, the Kurdish question now began to be discussed not anymore in terms of recognition or democratic rights but in terms of legal entities such as minority or constituent people.

The discussions of *Türkiyelilik* gained momentum in Erdogan's Diyarbakir speech, where he proposed a solution to the Kurdish problem by more democracy, more rule of citizenship, and economic prosperity (Kirişçi, 2007). His comments about the Republic's nation-building history made Erdogan's words critical. He argued that the Turkish Republic made mistakes in the establishment stage. One of these mistakes was about the Kurdish problem. Erdogan clarified his words in his following speeches in different cities. He problematized the official narrative "Turkishness as a national identity." He argued that Turkishness is a sub-identity like the other identities, such as Kurd, Laz, or Abkhaz, and the primary identity should be the "Citizenship of the Republic of Türkiye." Experienced journalist Fikret Bila interpreted these words in an interview with Baykal:

The claim is that there is something wrong with the establishment process of the Turkish Republic. It is claimed that to build the Turkish Republic as a nation-state and to build it on one nation was a mistake. Atatürk's project tried to unite all the ethnic elements under one nation, and it was oppression, they say. (Fikret Bila, Ankara Kulisi in CNN Türk, 22.09.2005.)

6.3. The AKP's Kurdish Problem

As mentioned, AKP government followed the path of previous government and introduced many reforms of democratization to satisfy EU accession requirements so that the years between 2002 and 2004 were a "golden era of reform" (Bahcheli and Noel, 2011 p. 106). The conditions were also ideal for the government so that there was strong support from the public and bureaucracy for the EU process. Öcalan was already in prison, and the PKK's cease-fire, declared in 1999, was still in force.

Beginning in 2004, several shifts occurred, leading to a rise in Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms. Several factors contributed to the peak, including the slowing down of the EU reform process more radically in 2006 and 2007 (Narbone & Tocci, 2007, p. 235) and the declaration of Iraq's new constitution in 2005 that recognized Kurds'

autonomous status (Özdemir ve Sarıgil, 2015, p.189). Additionally, on June 2004, the PKK ended the ceasefire and argued that the Turkish state will not guarantee full political and cultural rights (Bahcheli and Noel, 2011 p.108). And with the military's new general İlker Başbuğ, who was distanced from the AKP government; the army also started to voice its criticisms, especially in the sphere of minority rights (Yeğen, 2010, p.76).

The environment of rising nationalism and growing criticism pushed Erdoğan to reconsider his position in his Diyarbakır speech 2005. During his speech at a congress of AKP in 2006, he made a complete U-turn and did not even mention the word "Kurd" (Kirişçi, 2011, p. 341). Under the shadow of PKK attacks on Dağlica in 2007 and Aktütün in 2008, Erdoğan declared that "*We have said, one nation, one flag, one motherland, and one state . . . Those opposed to this should leave*" (quoted in Karabat 2008 in Bahcheli and Noel 2011 p. 115). However, at the beginning of 2009 a new perspective was brought to the political agenda by AKP.

6.3.1. Democratic Opening

Beginning in 2009, surprising developments took place. In July 2009, interior minister Beşir Atalay declared the "Kurdish Opening."⁵⁵ There were important geopolitical (Çiçek, 2013, pp.16-17) and domestic reasons (Kirişçi, 2011, p.344) behind this step. For the US strategy to remove its soldiers from the region, a stable region was required. Second, resolving the Kurdish issue was necessary as part of the AKP's drive for a new foreign policy that made bold regional promises like "zero problems with the neighbouring countries." Thirdly, a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue became a must due to Türkiye's assertions that it would become a crucial transit nation for the region's energy assets. As well as these geo-politic dynamics, the results of the March 2009 elections motivated the AKP to formulate a solution to the Kurdish question. By winning the majority of the municipalities in the eastern area, the Kurdish DTP emerged victorious from the local elections. AKP lost more than 15% of the local vote

⁵⁵ For an evaluation of the demands of the related parties see (Çiçek, 2013)

as compared to the 2007 elections which forced the AKP to change its stance on the Kurdish issue.

What was meant by Kurdish Opening remained relatively unclear until the end of the process (in Bacık and Coskun, 2013 p.146 and Bahcheli and Noel, 2011 p. 117). The policy suggestions about the Kurdish issue were similar to those from the previous years' reform process, which had a democratization and cultural rights perspective. The immediate policy measures of the opening were primarily, using Kurdish in all media campaigns, restoring the Kurdish names that had been changed to Turkish names, introducing Kurdish as an elective subject in schools, and teaching Kurdish in universities. Establishing a parliamentary commission to investigate human rights abuses and a new pluralistic constitution were promised as long-term policy aims.

However, there was a considerable gap between the government's plan and the actors of Kurdish political movement's demands. Öcalan submitted a roadmap in August 2009 (for the roadmap see, Yeğen, 2015, p. 7) suggesting the resolution of the Kurdish question based on three staged mechanism including principles like "Democratic Constitution, Democratic Republic, Democratic Nation, and Common Motherland". A general amnesty and constitutional changes regulating collective cultural rights and local and regional self-governance were the necessary steps of Öcalan's road map. According to this plan, PKK's permanent announcement of a ceasefire would be followed by establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The PKK would be expected to withdraw its armed forces, and the dissolution will be realized with a democratic constitution. The government, however, recognized the need to uphold Turkey's unitarist state structure and Turkish as an official language with legal standing, and it announced that a broad amnesty was not even an idea for policy. (Bahcheli and Noel, 2011 p. 117).

In the end, the life of the Opening was not long. This time the Habur incident was the trigger (in Kayhan 2014, p. 8). A video was made of PKK members entering Turkey at the Habur Gate on the roofs of buses while spectators cheered. Public outcry over these pictures led to the closing of the opening because of the intensely negative response they elicited. Later, in December 2009, the constitutional court closed the DTP, and more than a thousand KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union), the PKK's

urban/administrative organization, members were detained. The PKK ended that the cease-fire in June 2010. There were several reasons behind the fragility of the Opening. First of all, different from the EU reform process, the various actors of the Kurdish movement were on the scene, and they voiced their demands loudly. However, as mentioned, there was a huge gap between the policy agendas of the AKP and the Kurdish movement this time (Çiçek, 2013, p. 20). Secondly, the absence of the EU affected the process negatively. The EU was giving a prospect of membership and clear boundaries for a liberal definition of the problem. (Kirişçi, 2011, p.345)

6.3.2. The Solution Process

In October 2012, the newspaper Zaman declared the preparations for a new initiative for the Kurdish Problem. Again, some international (Gunther, 2013, p. 93) and domestic motivations were on the table. The Assad regime in Syria decided to pull its troops out of the Kurdish-populated regions of Syria, which may lead to de facto autonomy of the region. There were also some inner motivations, such as the 2014 elections. The AKP needed to renew its support in the region in the 2014 local elections, considering the decreasing numbers of AKP votes in the region in the previous three elections of 2009, the 2010 referendum, and the 2011 elections against the Kurdish Party (Yeğen, 2011). Moreover, Erdoğan's personal/political agenda motivated the AKP to seek an immediate and strong solution. Erdoğan's desire for a presidential system, contrary to the then-existing structure of the Turkish state, which depended on a ceremonial presidential status, needed a constitutional amendment. However, the AKP's parliamentary majority was far from providing such a majority. A peace process ending with the dissolution of PKK in peaceful terms would mean nationwide support for Erdoğan.

The negotiations between the state officials and the PKK became another discussion issue in the period. Actually, starting in 2008, the state officials and PKK met in different European cities. Later, when the meetings were leaked to the public, they were called "Oslo meetings⁵⁶." According to the leaked documents (Kadıoğlu, 2019,

⁵⁶ In fact, the meetings with the authorities of the Kurdish entity are not something entirely new. In Özal period in 1991 and by contrast to Demirel who is strongly against the idea of meeting with the

p.924; Yeğen 2015, p.7) the talks agreed on themes such as amendments in the constitution articles that refer to Turkish identity and ethnic discrimination—the establishment of several commissions such as the Constitution Council, Peace Council, and Justice Commission, releasing people arrested from KCK allegations and halting military operations, establishing several commissions in the parliament.

However, in December 2012, Erdoğan announced in a TV program that there were ongoing talks between the state and Öcalan and between Öcalan and PKK through BDP. According to Yeğen (2015, p. 8), this time the negotiations were not kept behind the curtains because the talks seemed near to producing some results for a democratic solution. After that, the visits of deputies and the ongoing negotiations between state officials and Öcalan were reported in the media. As a more radical step, on June 2014, the AKP submitted a framework bill titled "*Draft Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social Integration*."⁵⁷ This law provided a legal framework for negotiations.

As Yeğen (2015, p. 9) puts it, the framework which the government set up for the process was proper for Öcalan's road map of 2009. According to the government statement, the peace process will be composed of three stages: withdrawal of PKK, democratization, including the amendments in the constitution related to the political and cultural rights of Kurds, and normalization, which means the dissolution of PKK and integration of the cadres in the system. Proper to the plan, following the PKK's unilateral ceasefire in March 2013, the government announced a democratization package⁵⁸.

The package included some measures that are directly related to the Kurdish issue, such as the removal of the oath to the Turkish State in schools, the availability of instruction in languages other than Turkish in private schools, the acceptance of election campaigns conducted in languages other than Turkish, or the use of the x, q, and w letters, which are found in the Kurdish language, in official language document. The process continued against many challenging moments such as the Gezi events and

representatives of PKK, during Welfare Party (RP) government, through some mediators, the contact with Abdullah Öcalan is made (Günter, 2010, p. 89)

⁵⁷ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-submits-bill-to-boost-kurdish-peace-bid-provide-legal-framework-for-pkk-talks.aspx?pageID=238&nID=68306&NewsCatID=338>

⁵⁸ <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/basbakan-erdogan-demokratiklesme-paketini-acikladi-1153198/>

the corruption scandals related with AKP. In the 2014 local elections, AKP won nearly 45 percent of the electoral support and remained the strongest party in the party system. The parties of the Solution process accepted it as an approval of the public. Concrete steps like the law that provided a legal framework for negotiations as mentioned above, establishing the wise man commission, and releasing arrested KCK members, followed.

However, the first problem in the Solution Process came with the Kobane incident (Güneş and Lowe, 2015, p.6). A battle broke out between IS (also known as Daesh or ISIL, a jihadist militant group that aimed to establish an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) militants and YPG Kurdish forces (People's Protection Units, the militia branch of PYD) in late 2014 where IS forces attacked Kobane. Many Kurds crossed the border into Turkey escaping an ISIS attack that it is required a security corridor in southeast Turkey for Kurdish forces to reach Kobane. For a long time, Turkey resisted allowing the corridor. In October 2014, encouraged by HDP, protests were raised in the country's southeast region against Turkey's attitude.⁵⁹ Although the government opened the corridor under increasing pressure, it created considerable distrust among the actors in the process.

The second crisis came with the bargaining process between HDP and AKP (Yeğen, 2015, p. 14). AKP, tried to disarm the PKK through negotiation but were unsuccessful. Erdogan appeared to be sure that the Solution Process would not help the AKP win elections anymore. As well, HDP's new strategy, "Turkification" (Gisselbrecht 2014, p. 3), also destroyed Erdogan's presidential plans.⁶⁰ In the June 2015 elections, the HDP based its campaign on Demirtas' promise "Seni Baskan Yaptirmayacagiz" (We shall not make you president). This campaign meant that the HDP would not provide any facilitation for AKP's plans to introduce the presidential system by a constitutional amendment. This reassured the secular-left elite, who believed that the Opening process was a bargaining process in which the rights of Kurds would be provided at

⁵⁹ <http://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/159169-kobane-eylemlerinde-ne-oldu>

⁶⁰ The BDP deputies who took part in the HDP in April 2014 announced a new strategy and left-wing platform that included social policy, identity politics, liberal democracy, and gender equality. With his "New Life-Yeni Yasam" action plan, Selahattin Demirtas, the presidential candidate of the common platform, claimed to speak for all of Turkey's persecuted groups, including peasants, women, young people, ecologists, and LGBT people.

the expense of their support for Erdoğan `s presidential system (Grigoriadis, 2016, p.41). In light of these factors, Erdoğan intervened in March 2015 and the process was put on hold.⁶¹

The June 2015 elections were a significant defeat for Erdoğan and AKP; however, the three parties, HDP, MHP, and CHP, could not form a non-AKP government, primarily due to the MHP`s refusal to take part in any government from the very beginning of the process (for a very detailed analysis of the process see Öymen,2016). The period between June and November elections witnessed major unrest and ISIL terrorist activities in Diyarbakir, Suruç, and Ankara. PKK declared that the government also had responsibility and ended the ceasefire This gave an excellent opportunity for the AKP to start its post-election strategy on two pillars: to emphasize the importance of stability and to argue that the HDP has organic ties with PKK. (Grigoriadis, 2016 p. 43; Bardakçı 2016, p.13) s. After six months of rising violence, AKP was victorious in “snap elections” in November 2015, resulting in a return to security politics in regard to the Kurdish problem.

6.4. SHP`s Heritage of Kurdish Policy

As mentioned above, SHP was one of the main actors in the “New Kurdish Politics” period. Not only with the party`s discourse but its behaviour, strategy, and critical decisions at critical moments became part of CHP`s heritage about Kurdish politics. The Kurdish population of the country was always crucial for parties to win elections. With the multi-party regime, the parties attempted to build alliances with the Kurdish feudal leaders. That was, in fact, one of the factors why the tribal structure of the region preserved itself for years (Esen, 2005, p.79). The Kurdish nationalist movement was politicized with a demand for social, cultural, and economic rights recognition in the 1960s and 1970s (Bozaslan,2009). The Kurdish movement sought closer cooperation

⁶¹ At a meeting held in February 2015 at Dolmabahce Palace, representatives from the government and HDP discussed the ten-article draft of discussions that Öcalan presented to HDP members in December 2014. The process had reached a critical point, according to both parties, and Öcalan had called on the PKK to disarm. Despite all the efforts, a disarmament timetable could not be agreed upon. Erdogan claimed that the AKP government's reforms were the reason the Kurdish issue in Turkey was resolved shortly after this meeting. Additionally, he expressed his displeasure with the February 2015 meeting and said he disagreed with the 10 items that were produced at the meeting.

with the leftist groups and allied with the Turkish Workers' Party (TIP). Before the 1973 elections, Ecevit promised special attention to the east region; in the 1973 elections, most of the Kurdish population voted for him. However, by the 1977 elections, both parties understood that it was impossible to reach meaningful cooperation with Ecevit's veto of Kurdish candidates who ran independently in the 1977 elections (Somer, 2016, p.187).

After the 1980 coup, when the political parties tried to establish their new institutional identities, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) was established with a strong emphasis on social democratic ideology (Kömürcü, 2009, pp. 11-12 and Kömürcü,2010, p.13). Its new program accommodated the social democrat economic and political promises. In the political sphere, among these promises were the annulment of the 1982 constitution, the establishment of the European trade union system, and the abolishment of obstacles blocking freedom of expression. Regarding the Kurdish question, the party stated that the citizens' unease in the region should be abolished with a realistic and democratic perspective.⁶² This liberal view of freedoms made the party attractive in many intellectual circles so that Nicole Watts (1990) defines SHP as an *unhappy marriage* between center-left intellectuals and workers on the one hand and less mainstream Marxists and Kurds on the other (p.641).

However, primarily through the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the intra-party raised conflict between, in Kömürcü (2009) terms, rightist and leftist elements in the party (p.19). The left wing of the party argued that the primary political agenda of the party should be defending human rights and freedoms. To do that, the party should criticize the 12 September regime and the political and social restrictions of the regime. On the other hand, the right wing of the party, under the leadership of Baykal, defended the electoral alliances by excluding "radical leftist" and ethicist groups from the party⁶³ As will be the case later, the Kurdish problem became the source of an

⁶² İnönü, kurultay konuşmaları 1998b, 166-169 in Kömürcü, 2009 , p.12.

⁶³ Kömürcü argues that the intra party politics during this period should be analysed in relation with the critical junctures of Turkish politics. Through the end of the 1980s, it was clear that ANAP was no more an option. Considering the victory of SHP in municipal elections, the party became the most powerful candidate. However, the party needed to come closer to the centre to give proper messages to the various sections of Turkish society. This electoral climate strengthened the rightists' hand. (Kömürcü, 2009, p.16-18).

intra-party crisis for the party. The first crisis was a speech in parliament by Mehmet Ali Eren, SHP's Istanbul deputy (Esen, 2005 p.82). He argued that laws were not executed equally in the country's every region and this speech caused crisis in the party. At first, İnönü defended it; however, later, increasing criticisms forced İnönü to change his position, and he recommended disciplinary punishment for Eren.

In 1989, an even more serious conflict emerged in SHP. Seven Kurdish deputies participated in the first international conference on the Kurdish issue in Paris (Esen, 2005, p.83). This created a big divide in the party and significant media and party discussions. The deputies did not make any speeches at the conference, but on 17 October due to the provocative words of others, according to İnönü⁶⁴, the seven SHP deputies were expelled from the party. Many regional SHP administrators and about 3000 rank-and-file party members protested and quitted the party as well, including twelve SHP deputies. In addition to ideological differences, Ayata (1993, p. 45 in Esen 2005, p.83) refers to an organizational problem that emerged between these new immigrant groups and old networks from the CHP tradition. These new immigrant groups greatly influenced local organizations thanks to their cooperation and close bond. This unique style of local politics representing "urban-based eastern ethnicity" had clashed with the old style of clientelistic networks of the party. As a result, the HEP (People's Labour Party) was founded on 7 June 1990 by eleven members of Parliament who had been expelled from or had left the SHP. It was the first legal party of Kurdish politics and contributed to the tradition of long-lasting Kurdish political parties.

However, another step signalling a possible rapprochement between HEP and SHP came with the 1991 elections as an electoral alliance (Watts, 1990, p.637). Turkey's Supreme Electoral Board has not allowed HEP to participate in the next elections. The SHP formed an electoral coalition with HEP and HEP politicians could enter to parliament. As mentioned earlier, when the political climate hardened around 1993, the first victims as the Kurdish party. As well the events in the swearing in ceremony in the parliament,⁶⁵ the 1992 Nevroz celebrations, caused a general riot leaving 92

⁶⁴ İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler*, p.273 in Watts, 1990, p. 642.

⁶⁵ In the televised ceremony, Hatip Dicle, the newly elected Diyarbakir deputy, made a significant announcement. He stated that he and other members of the HEP (People's Labor Party) were taking the oath of office under pressure. Furthermore, during the ceremony, Leyla Zana, another HEP member,

dead and resulting in HEP's closure. In March 1994, the parliamentary immunities of seven DEP MPs (HEP's successor party) were discussed and voted on. All center-right deputies voted in favour of exempting DEP deputies from immunity. Kurdish deputies were arrested in parliament in front of the media. (Somer, 2015, p.237)

This period created a kind of trauma that left traces on the Kurdish politics of CHP even years after. The most common accusation CHP faced was "harbouring separatists" and "carrying the separatists into the parliament." Ecevit said that being separatist or "Kürtçü" is a label which then a politician must carry all his life (Cemal, 2003 in Somer, 2015, p. 232). Also, later, in periods of rising nationalism, CHP was accused of cooperating with the PKK in a manner equating the PKK with HEP.⁶⁶ Baykal always denied this and declared his discontent openly with the SHP-HEP alliance.

I was elected as an SHP Parliament Group Chair on 15 December 1987, and my office continued until 27 June 1987. On 27 1988, I became SHP general secretary till 10 September 1990, when I resigned. When was this election alliance between SHP and HEP? One year later, on the eve of the 1991 elections. These are facts, historical facts. Now the prime minister argues that I was at the office responsible for this alliance. That time I declared my position for this alliance, later repeating it many times. But he is trying to make me part of this. (Baykal's Group Speech on 25.04.2006)

During my political career, I was always susceptible to this and against this HEP-SHP alliance. I left the party just after this alliance. I established CHP. In 1992, the CHP was established. It was 1991 when the SHP made this alliance. From then on, we are CHP. The central perspective of the CHP is clear. My view is clear. I never participated and was always against the movements whose main aim was to endanger the state's integrity. (Baykal's Interview in CNN Türk, on 22.03.2000)

Although both Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu always owned SHP's democratization report, Baykal not only refused any continuity with the SHP as the quotation above indicated but also labelled SHP as an ethnic identity party and refused any possibility of an

added a sentence in Kurdish to her oath. (Watts, 1990 p. 655).

⁶⁶<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/chp-ye-dep-suclamasi/siyaset/haberdetayarsiv/10.04.2006/152853/default.htm> and also <http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2009/01/22/baykal-pkk-ile-isbirligi-yapti.html>

electoral alliance in the 2007 elections. However, the other centre-left party, DSP, was warmly welcomed.

Now, I do not really want to emphasize the principles that differentiate us(..), but our near past is very educative. I think that any ethnic relation of a social democrat movement is not proper. That was not beneficial for the left; it was a mistake. That was a wrong alliance. (..) I must say that from that perspective. DSP has nothing which disturbs us so far. We will embrace this opportunity if DSP has such an institutional change (Baykal`s Interview in Kanal 1 on 2.5.2007)

SHP contributed mainly to the change of the discourse in the 1990s. As a statist, center-left descendant of Atatürk`s Republican People`s Party, the SHP normalized pro-Kurdish politics in the eyes of the masses and invited the Kurdish question to be on the political party agenda. The meaning of the SHP`s alliance with Kurdish political actors` legacy also varied for the CHP, depending on the critical junctures of Turkish politics. Although this alliance is often carried as a burden on the party`s shoulders, a natural source of prestige came with the democratization report of SHP, which I will analyse in detail in the coming sections.

6.5. The Discursive Heritage of Reports Period

The SHP-CHP issued several reports between 1989 and 2001 about many policy areas, especially Türkiye`s democratization process. Although at the end of the 1990s, the reports became very detailed and comprehensive evaluations of the policy areas, the SHP`s report about the Kurdish question called “The Perspective of SHP for the East and Southeast Region`s Problems and the Proposal of Solution” (1989) dominated the Party`s discourse about the Kurdish problem even after many years. As mentioned above, seven Kurdish deputies who were expelled from the party in 1989 formed HEP. The party was, then, compelled to build up its image in the region again. Regardless of its motivation, this report constituted one of the cornerstones in the framework of the Kurdish question in Turkish political history and the CHP`s Kurdish politics. Both Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu appreciated the democratization report of the SHP and

emphasized it as a part of CHP history⁶⁷. The many recent CHP speeches in terms of party politics on the Kurdish question are derived from this report. Many statements are employed in the actual speeches of the party and constitute the backbone of the CHP's Kurdish politics.

In 1992, the SHP published the Newroz Report. A party commission party reported their observations about the events in a Kurdish city (Şırnak) during Newroz celebrations, resulting in many lives lost. Another report issued by CHP in 1996 about Tunceli again reflected a party commission's observations about the food embargo of the state in another Alevi/Kurdish city, Tunceli. Both reports, resting on the fundamental conceptions of the SHP's report, analyzed the actual problems of the cities with a historical dimension (For a detailed analysis of both reports Yayman, 2011). At the end of the 1990s, CHP issued several reports by its intra-party working groups and commissions which evaluate, contribute, or comment on political conditions of the EU process. These commissions were headed by Algan Hacaloğlu (deputy from Istanbul) and composed of some party deputies, mainly the southeastern cities' party organizations' chairs and social scientists. In 1999, the CHP issued two complementary reports about the Kurdish question. The East and Southeast Report and Democratization/Human Rights Report framed the party's view on the Kurdish question and designed policy mechanisms. CHP's 2001 democratization and human rights report was issued as a party response to the "inadequacies" of the current government's National Programme for the Adaptation of the Acquis (NPAA).

As mentioned above, by the 1990s and early 2000s, the Kurdish question was being discussed in light of specific frameworks under the influence of the EU and the Kurdish political struggle as mentioned above. The SHP/CHP discourse used these frameworks at different times and at different contexts. One particular tension I have identified in the CHP was between the discourses of democracy and national integrity and democracy and terrorism/security. Specific discursive strategies were used to overcome this tension.

⁶⁷ Kılıçdaroğlu's Group Speech on 26 March 2013 available at <http://chp.org.tr/Haberler/36/26-mart-2013-tarihli-tbmm-grup-konusmasi-923.aspx>. In Baykal period, the 1989 report is published again as an official report of the party on 2008 with a new introduction..

I will present the CHP's perceptions of the Kurdish Question and policy instruments by following continuities and divergencies. The discursive heritage of the party about the Kurdish problem is mainly composed of these reports, which were the first examples of party policy analysis of the Kurdish question.

Kurdish Problem as a Plural Democracy Problem

The Kurdish problem, beginning from the 1989 SHP report, was conceptualized as a political problem stemming from the deficit of plural democracy. And thus, the Kurdish question must be solved parallel with the democratization of Turkey (SHP Report 1989, p.30).

Within a democracy discourse, one objective of the policy era is the establishment of the *rule of law*. The reports indicated that the state's conceptualization of the problem as a security and terror problem leads to fundamental human rights violations and extrajudicial practices. The SHP did not refrain from calling it "State Terror" (SHP Report, 1989, p. 159-160). Hence, the party mentioned firstly and foremost abolishing the *state of emergency* in the region as a policy mechanism (SHP Report, 1989, p. 27 and Unification Protocol, 1995 p.5.). The reforms in the judiciary, according to the superiority of the rule of law, are another essential part of the party's policy mechanisms (SHP report, p. 185). The second policy mechanism to establish the rule of law is removing the village guard system (SHP Report, 1989, p.47). The Turkish state should provide legal institutions for the protection of local people rather than relying on local clans.

The party's second objective, related to the value of democracy, was to *maintain individual human rights* as an inevitable part of a pluralist democracy. The SHP report refers to *the right to the mother tongue* as fundamental. Before the EU reforms, the SHP Report emphasized that the obstacles to broadcasting, teaching, and learning in the mother tongue should be removed (SHP Report, 1989, p. 45). The reports mentioned that, especially in the Southeastern region, fundamental human rights like the right to life or the protection from torture or inhuman treaty, the freedom of expression, the release of organization, and the right to work are being massively violated (The CHP's Democratization and Human Rights Report, 1999, pp.6-12). For example, beginning with the Newroz Report, the party reports called attention to the

internally displaced villages (IDV)⁶⁸. During the 1990s, the Turkish state used village displacements as a security mechanism whereby many villagers were forced out of their homes and required to live in other cities, especially metropolises of several regions. The party also pronounced the IDVs and the 1990-1996 period of unsolved murders and tortures as the systematic violation of fundamental human rights, including those of life, education, health, and work. It proposed *eliminating IDVS* and further detailed investigations as policy mechanisms (CHP Report, 1999, p.11). The legal reforms about the right to life, freedom of speech, freedom of demonstration, and organization became one of the most critical policy mechanisms:

The individuals in democracies have no obligation to accept and approve of the political system or to think appropriately about that. The individual as a citizen is responsible for behaving correctly according to the law and constitution. With this principle, the expression of ideas cannot be limited in modern democracies. (The CHP Report 1999, p.6)

Citizenship provides a vital instrument to maintain citizens' individual political/civil and cultural rights. Here, the universalist understanding of citizenship offers a critical mechanism to overcome this dilemma, so to speak. Here, the assumption is that universal, equal civil and political rights for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic or religious group identities, would contribute to solving the Kurdish problem (SHP Report 1989, p.176). Thus, citizenship is conceptualized as neutral regarding ethnic, religious, and cultural differences.

The Republic of Turkey is not a republic of religion, sect, race, or kafatasi. The society has a multi-ethnic, plural character. The main feature of our Republic is a republic of political consciousness. (...) The existence of different ethnic groups, sect mentalities, and languages is an undeniable sociological reality. That is why the Republic is established as a republic of political consciousness. (SHP Report 1989, p.175)

According to the reports, the successful implication of the citizenship concept in the area of rights would first require the state to be blind to ethnic, cultural, and religious differences (SHP Report 1989, p.177). As the state is expected to be neutral, the citizens too must go beyond their individual identities and contribute to this shared

⁶⁸ The several thousand people are displaced in the Southeastern region during the 1990s because of the armed conflict between Turkish security forces and PKK. The migration wave was towards the big cities like Adana, Antalya, Istanbul, Ankara. (Ayata and Yüksek, 2005)

culture and ideals which is called as political consciousness. (SHP report 1989, p.179). So, then the citizenship entity could provide an integrative bonding function.

Kurdish Problem as a National Unity Problem

One of the ultimate values of the party in the Kurdish question is stated in the SHP report as national unity (SHP Report 1989, p. 27). The party emphasized that *all the problems can be (should be) solved by protecting national unity and integrity*. The report accepted the racial diversity of the society; however, it mentioned that this is not an obstacle to establishing “togetherness.” It is essential to neither underline nor erase the social differences in society. This ultimate value is repeated in many documents of the era, such as mentioning that the borders of Misak-i Milli are non-negotiable and national integrity is one of the necessary conditions for the solution of the problem (Unification protocol, 1995, p.1, CHP 1994 program, p. 17). Here, national unity refers to a unitary state composed of one nation and territorial unity.

In the reports during the 1990s, a hypothetical conflict between the terms of democracy and national unity was accepted several times tacitly in several official party documents such as the unification protocol and party program. In the unification protocol of CHP and SHP, the party defined itself as both⁶⁹ a ulusalci party which is for national independence, and the social democrat party, which is for equality, freedom, and solidarity, the common principles of social democracy (Unification Protocol, 1995, p.3). It is stated as We are a political movement which took its strength from yesterday with the republican values of laicism and democracy; on the other hand, one which embraces tomorrow and the modern world with the common principles of social democracy.

The party formalized the concept of “the democratic solution to ethnic sensitiveness” in the unification protocol and then in the 1994 CHP program. The Solution is formulated to reflect the central values first and then the limits of democratization in the Kurdish issue.

The problem can be solved only by the perspective of a “democratic solution to ethnic sensitives” in the frame of social democratic plural policies and universal values but by securing the country`s and the nation`s integrity. The solution can only be provided on the grounds of tolerance, human rights, respect for Kurdish culture and identity, equality, and socio-economic development. (Unification Protocol, 1995, p.3)

⁶⁹ Such a formulation, "both and" "hem..hem" reflects a supposed conflict of the terms in the minds.

Concerns about making a compromise between democracy and the republic resulted in such statements as the below:

The values which established the republic, the principles such as Secularism identified with the republic are simultaneously the cornerstones of the democratization process. To isolate democracy from the republic means ignoring the aspirations of most of our society. To protect the republic while deepening the democracy and to consolidate the republic while enhancing the plural democracy is the main aim of our society. (CHP 1999 Report, p.14).

Hence, the party aimed to solve the Kurdish problem in a democratic framework with absolute protection of national unity.

By the 1990s, the concept of citizenship was emphasized more within the national unity and security framework. Rather than the need for the state to be neutral, in the public sphere the individual was urged to leave their identity behind. The CHP, parallel to state discourse⁷⁰, defined the Kurds as one of the cultural clusters and differentiated ethnic minorities from Kurds whose rights are guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty (CHP 1994 Party Program. P.51). The rights of Kurds are based on citizenship rights, the result of being a citizen of the Republic of Türkiye. In this sense, Kurdishness is not a national identity but rather a cultural one. According to this formulation, individuals could perform their cultural rights in their private sphere (read as a cultural sphere). In contrast, the political sphere represents the foundation of national unity, and the individuals come with their *primary/official/common/political* identities. In Turkey, citizens' common/political/official identity is “The citizenship of the Republic of Turkey” (The CHP’s Democratization, Human Rights and Social State Report 2001, p.20).

The limits of cultural pluralism are set as *micro-nationalisms or violating the nation-state’s order* (The CHP’s Report 2001 p. 19). In democracies, the states have no right to ignore cultural identities. At the same time, a cultural group has no right to demand a political identity (read as a constitutional entity) other than being a citizen of the

⁷⁰ In the Treaty of Lausanne, where the modern Turkish state was established, only non-Muslims such as Greeks, Armenians, and Jews are recognized as minorities and only they were granted minority status and so-called minority rights (Oran 2015). So, the international definition of the minority concept which is based on religious, linguistic or racial differences is rejected considering Muslim minorities such as Kurds and Alevites.

Turkish state, as it states in reports, *no right to demand any rescued political spheres* (The CHP Report 1999, p.21).

Kurdish Problem as a Regional Development Problem

The SHP report additionally emphasized the region's poor economic status as a reason for regional unrest (SHP report 1989, p. 154). The report analysed the regional socio-economic situation and concluded that compared with the country-wide indicators, the region had a low personal and regional GDP, high unemployment rates, inadequate health and education services, and an agriculture-based economy (SHP Report 1989, p. 161-174). Once framed as a socio-economic problem, the aims are set as industrialization, regional development, qualitatively and quantitatively increasing public services, and eliminating feudalism in the region. Similarly, the party proposed the elimination of feudalism through land reform, which is expected to contribute to democracy in the area. *It (economic independency) is an inevitable condition of being a citizen* (SHP Report 1989, p. 181). The SHP report implies a need for a more active state. Here, the state is the leading actor in compensating the regional economic backwardness via state entrepreneurship through regional development plans and state investments (SHP Report 1989, p. 180). Planning is also the primary mechanism in agricultural reforms. Industrialization and agricultural reforms are expected to solve the region's unemployment problem. To that end, the party announced that The South-eastern Anatolian Project (GAP) is significant and realizing GAP's goals is one of the party's priorities (SHP Report 1989, p. 181).

In CHP reports, feudalism is listed as a reason behind socioeconomic backwardness (CHP 1999 report, p.9). Accordingly, the state intended to lead cooperatives to be modern agriculture enterprises, reminding us of Ecevit's economic policies. Another of Ecevit's policies that was taken into the party's policy agenda is a village-town model. The 1999's reports introduced the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project to compensate for the socio-economic results of the policy of "Internally Displaced Villages" (CHP 1999 Report, p.3). These new centres were conceptualized for the resettlement of the villagers. The CHP mentioned that the Return to Village project is not compulsory. Quite the contrary, the party especially put that *the state should trust its citizens. The state has no right to approach its citizens as if they are potential*

criminals. That is why the citizens will decide which village they will return to, not the security forces (CHP 1999 Report, p.23).

Kurdish Problem as a Terror/Security Problem

Although the terror dimension of the problem is always emphasized in the report periods, it is always noted that the initiative to solve the Kurdish question should belong to civil authorities. A common political will and a sensitive public opinion are the primary conditions for a solution (CHP 1999 Report, p.280). Although the mechanisms to provide such commonality are unclear, it is worth mentioning as a principle of a political solution. In the struggle with special terror units, institutions such as the research institute of domestic security or a new civil intelligence service are stated as policy mechanisms (CHP Party program, 1994, p.113,114). A general amnesty was acknowledged as one of the policy mechanisms in the early period, although the conditions are not clarified. The reports proposed general amnesty for the people who “are not directly associated with the terror” (Tunceli report, 1996). However, this policy mechanism was later omitted from the reports.

6.6. Baykal’s Kurdish Problem: Republic vs. Democracy a *cul-de-sac* (2002-2010)

In this section, I will delineate the main pillars of Baykal’s conceptualization of the Kurdish problem. The party published the last report that was directly about the Kurdish problem in 1999. The party then did not publish any further reports about the subject until 2010. Just before the 2009 elections, the party re-published the SHP East and Southeast report. I assessed mainly the campaign’s interviews, speeches, and statements to understand the main pillars of Baykal’s discourse on the Kurdish problem.

National Unity

As mentioned in the SHP/CHP Reports, national unity is an inevitable value of the policy sphere. A possible controversy that may emerge between democracy and national unity is mentioned, but these reports offer insights to solve the “dilemma” in

favour of both. The party always declared that the values of the Republic are also the values of democracy, which means both are inevitable, necessary, and essential. However, in the middle of the 2000s, although the party carried on its discourse on the dispensability of both, it started to emphasize republicanism as the base of democracy. Baykal often declared that the institutions of the Republic were a pre-condition for maintaining democracy

One can establish democracy on a base of a Republic. What is the assumption of democracy? A human who is rescued from the blockade and embargo of the human`s mind. A citizen who is not the slave of a theocratic thought system is a base for a healthy democracy. (Applauses) (..) The citizen who democracy rests on, the one who already went beyond any belonging to any belief, sub-identity, tribe, clan, or ethnic identity. If he could manage, it would be possible to reach a democratic system. If not, it is not possible. (Baykal`s Group Speech on 22.04.2003)

Baykal emphasized the inevitability of republicanism for democracy in his speeches as "a strong democracy can be built only on a strong republican ground " (Baykal`s speech at the 10th Party Congress, 23.10.2003). A citizen, according to Baykal, *is the one who overcomes the attachments of ethnic identity. It is only then possible to build up a healthy democracy.* (Baykal`s Group Speech on 22.04.2003). Republicanism, in that sense, gives an individual this required prior identity:

The ideas of democracy and republicanism are not controversial. A strong democracy can be built only on strong Republican ground. It is not possible for a country that does not have strong republicanism to have a strong democracy. Because democracy requires citizenship equality and juridical equality, it requires a consciousness of being a citizen. You cannot establish a Republic, giving political power to local identity groups (yerel aidiyetler) like clans. If you cannot establish Republic, you cannot reach democracy. (Baykal`s speech on 10th Party Congress on 23.10.2003)

Security

In this period, the party elites isolated the Kurdish problem from the democratization process. Like the duality of national unity and democracy, Baykal established in his speeches a controversy between democracy and security: where the security concerns are highest, any democratic demand is already secondary. According to the discourse, "the expansion of human rights and freedoms" and "the realization of individual`s democratic rights" are already achieved, and individual cultural rights are already provided. Any demand further than this is the political project of terrorists, the so-

called “*republic with two nations*” With this emphasis, the Kurdish problem is now a problem of security and terror:

Democratization is now something beyond the expansion of human rights and freedoms. If it is about negotiations with the people who use violence or an alliance with them, it is far beyond the individual democracy problem. It is about an ethnic group imposing itself on law, constitution, and state. Of course, if there is still something problematic about rights and freedoms, it is in the compensation process. It should be done so. But if one says that it is not enough. (...) It means support for the political project of terrorists. (Baykal's interview with Yigit Bulut and Bilal Cetin on CNN Turk on 19.08.2005)

This discourse evolved to an understanding that rests on an assumption of a relationship between terror and democracy. To set Weimar`s Germany as an example, Baykal implied that anti-systemic political movements might ensue from a very liberal political environment.

In the situation of rising terror in Turkey, is it normal to accept the people associated with terror as democratic political actors? What is the relationship between terror and democracy? (..)In Germany, in the Weimar Republic, there was such a period. A party organized its militants and manipulated hostilities. Democracy was so widespread that it was normal for a political party to have security forces. Weimar Period was the most liberal period in Germany, and then what happened? The fascism of Hitler! (Baykal`s Press Conference on 12.09.2005)

In such a view, Baykal problematized so-called supporters of terrorism, the unarmed ones supporting and legitimizing terrorism. He gave Spain as an example where, according to Baykal`s words, the disarmed supporters of terrorism were confined. However, the limits of the struggle with the disarmed supporters are unclear. Baykal argued that any legitimization, safeguarding, and defence of terror should be punished, whether or not it had violent methods.

There is one military dimension of the struggle with the terror, the struggle with the armed ones. There is also one political struggle with the one which legitimates, protects, and favours the armed ones. (..) We are very optimistic and tolerant about such issues. In Spain, not the terrorists but the 46 people who protect them are sentenced to 527 years in prison. They were not terrorists, they did not have guns, and they did not kill anybody. (..) What did Spain do? It behaved properly to the main political principle of the “struggle with the terror” concept: to insulate the terror. I do not kill anybody; however, I can support terror. I can say bravo! No, you can't! (After the cross-border operation) Baykal`s Group Speech on 25.12.2007)

The 2007 election manifesto indicated the political formulation of this frame, addressing the terror problem as the most critical problem of Turkey and specified security measures as the policy mechanism for the problem (2007 election manifesto, p. 7-9). The manifesto promised a domestic struggle, international interventions, and border security against terrorism.

Regional Development

In the 2007 manifesto, besides these polarized and dichotomized concepts, the socio-economic framework was also employed for the Kurdish problem. Like the past party policies, state-led industrialization through regional planning was regarded as the main actor of the regional development for the southeastern region.

With the dichotomy between terror and democracy, CHP's conceptualization of politics is narrowed down. Identity politics, by the reports' terms, ethnic groups' political demands, were always one of the party's red lines. However, Baykal's discourse overemphasized this narrow definition of the political realm so that identity politics stayed outside politics. By such a definition, politics should address social and economic problems as well as welfare concerns. According to this view, welfare politics is the only policy area for a legitimate, progressive social democrat agenda.

In old times, progressivism/modernism/reformism meant solving social and economic problems, struggling with poverty, feeding the starving, caring for the helpless, and providing education and health opportunities for all. And now, what is it? What is your ethnic identity? What are your ethnic belongings? Can you speak your language? I will give you what you want; that is what being a progressivist means. It is not correct. It means to be deceived by the one who wants to govern all the world according to his will. We do not accept that. (Applause) Real progressivism is to solve social and economic problems, contribute to this process, create a future for the people, and provide an education opportunity for all. (Baykal's Group Speech on 06.03.2007.)

6.7. Kılıçdaroğlu's Kurdish Problem: Back to the Past or Even a Step Further? (2010-2015)

When Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as a chairman in 2010, the Kurdish question was also at its critical turning point. As mentioned above, in 2009 AKP initiated a democratic

opening about Alevi, Kurdish, and Roma questions; on the other hand, CHP also attempted to adopt an old/new political discourse to the political realm by the claim “New CHP.” To overcome the dualities left over from the Baykal era, Kılıçdaroğlu developed different strategies, both rhetorically and tactically. The party succeeded in building a discourse centred on plural democracy (Yılmaz,2017).

Bringing back democracy

The party entered the 2011 elections with the concept “Third Way.” In a manner reminiscent of the discourse at the time of the reports, Kılıçdaroğlu referred to the “Third Way” as the party’s official approach to “the Problem,” including the economic, political, and cultural aspects. He refused to address the issue only as a southeastern problem and as an ethnic problem, which would remind one of the “group rights” and “federalism” dimensions of the concept. The party framed the issue at the borders of liberal democracy and individual human rights terminology.

The CHP represents a third way to solve the East, Southeast, and Kurdish Problem. The way the party represents accepts that ethnic identity is an honour of a person. However, it opposes ethnic-religious-based politics. The Third Way depends on the claim that the problem is multi-faced. The problem is cultural or economic, or political. Many measures should be taken in a variety of policy spheres. On the one side, some ignore the existence of the Question, and on the other side, some cannot provide an integrative solution. They both cannot compose a common platform for an answer. The CHP will provide this common platform, accepting the existence of the Question and finding solutions in the framework of liberal democracy, and establishing an integrative discourse for all of the country. (CHP 2011 Democracy Report, p. 251)⁷¹

This eclectic conceptualization of the problem gave Kılıçdaroğlu enough manoeuvring space as a new leader. Still, the complex nature of the problem was there from the beginning of his leadership. The party issued many reports about political areas like democracy, the economy, or a new constitution. Kılıçdaroğlu, just a few months after his leadership, emphasized the necessity of a new Kurdish question report (Ete and Eşkinat, 2013, p.23). To ensure a report about the Kurdish problem was assigned to a Kurdish human rights activist, Sezgin Tanrıku, who became a party member in 2010, was elected to the party’s executive board and appointed as a deputy chairman of the

⁷¹ Demokrasi, Eşit Yurttaş, Özgür Toplum Report.

party. After being a deputy chairman of human rights in the party, he became the public face of the party and the symbol of progressive policies on the issues of human rights violations and the Kurdish problem. Party elites, and civil society organizations, gathered in Van in a workshop called " The Strategy of Peace in Politics" to delineate the main lines of the party's policy (Ete and Eşkinat, 2013, p.23). The news and media about the Workshop showed intra-party discussions about issues such as elective Kurdish lessons, the teaching of Kurdish in state schools, and a new citizenship definition based on equal citizenship (Ete and Eşkinat, 2013, p.23). After the Workshop, Kılıçdaroğlu emphasized that identity politics was still not acceptable, particularly for the CHP.

The Third Way and the Kurdish Question are different, my dear friends. The Kurdish question is a part of the problems here. (In the Workshop) the Kurdish Question is discussed, but the economic, political, social, and cultural parts are also discussed. We see the problem in a Third Way, and in the Third Way, our aim is this: The politics of ethnicity or belief is not right. (...) The politics of ethnicity evaluates the problem only from this perspective; the politics of religious belief do from that perspective. But the issue has many dimensions. The many faces of the problem are discussed, such as economic, social, violence, religious, administrative reform, reform in municipalities, and party organizations.⁷²

As a result of discussions, an official and specific policy report about the Kurdish question could not be issued before the 2011 elections. Instead, the party declared its approach in reports of various policy spheres, as mentioned above. After disappointing election results, another attempt at a prospective Kurdish report by Sezgin Tanrıkuş sparked a debate in the party's Central committee (Ete and Eşkinat, 2013, p.23). The most controversial issues were an education in Kurdish and a citizenship definition without referencing Turkishness. This draft was not issued as an official party report due to intra-party conflicts, and the party did not have a policy report directly about the Kurdish question itself until 2013.

2013 was a very crucial year in which a three staged plan was on the agenda of process participants. The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in March 2013, and the government declared a democratization package in September 2013. It seems the new CHP's leadership could not afford to look less progressive than AKP on the Kurdish

⁷² <http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/kilicdaroglu-anadilde-egitim-ama-sonra,SLXvGLoYxEi9R5BVzcduAw>

issue. In March 2013, the CHP published a brochure introducing CHP's activities in the parliament (Yılmaz, 2017, p. 69). This bill included CHP's bill proposals about the detention on remand, the possibility of suing the actors of the 12 September regime, and removing the time limit for the unsolved murders, which would also benefit the Kurdish movement. Additionally, Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP did not criticize the measures about the headscarf, the abolition of the requirement of taking the oath in the schools, or the education in Kurdish which could have created a significant reaction by Baykal's CHP. Even during the discussions in the parliament about the bill, the CHP did not bring any objection to the means of national unity or security. On the contrary, the new elites of the CHP underlined that the democratization package, in its actual form, did not bring comprehensive democratization in fundamental political rights.⁷³

This bill has very many shortcomings. The CHP demands to secure the freedom of expression and belief, lower the electoral threshold, investigate the unidentified murders, provide the freedom of religion and consciousness, maintain Cemevis as places of worship, change the law of political parties, declare the Diyarbakir prison as a museum, to clear the minefields and provide these lands to farmers, to end the shame of students, journalists, politic prisoners, to maintain the freedom of media, to enlighten the Uludere. If not, our democracy will be deficient.⁷⁴

The party shared this set of goals and tools with the public once more in May 2013 as the process progressed and again in November 2014 as the 2015 elections approached⁷⁵. In the run-up to the 2015 elections, these items were again shared with the public in the form of a report.

Regional Development

Framing the Kurdish problem as a socio-economic problem was still favourable in the Kılıçdaroğlu era in the 2011 elections. Regional backwardness and economic underdevelopment were still evaluated as the problematic spheres of the policy in economic terms in the Southeast and Eastern Anatolian Development and Strategic

⁷³ <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/150328-chp-liler-paketi-degerlendiriyor>

⁷⁴ Levent Gök's parliamentary Speech on 1 March 2014, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b07101h.htm>

⁷⁵ <https://t24.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglundan-12-maddelik-cozum-sureci-onerisi.278783> and <https://www.odatv4.com/guncel/iste-kilicdaroglundan-cozum-paketinin-tam-metni-1005131200-36381>

Aims report⁷⁶. The traditional policy mechanisms of the party, such as state investments, the incentives for the private sector in the region, and the completion of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) are essential in the documents (The CHP 2011 Southeast and East Report, pp.139.158)⁷⁷. However, there were also some new policy instruments. One of them proposed regional economic integration of the southeastern region with Turkey's neighbours in the Middle East. Since global countries who do business with the Middle East are generally located in the western part of Turkey, the report evaluated it as an excellent opportunity for the region. The party also adapted its "Family Insurance" policy mechanism in the Kurdish problem context. (The CHP 2011 democracy Report, p.251) Family insurance was expected to be a solution to the widespread poverty:

During the AKP government, we see insufficient care for the south and southeast region. There were not enough investments and no economic and social measures. (...) The problem in the Black Sea region is not different from the one in Urfa. There are both unemployment and earning living problems. (Kılıçdaroğlu's Group Speech on 6 July 2010, (emphasis is mine

De-securitization of the Kurdish problem

Kılıçdaroğlu and Baykal had different perspectives about army-party relations (Ete and Eşkinat, 2013 p.21-22 and Altunoğlu, 2014, p. 79). With the changing attitude in the society and relatively reformist actions and discourse of the army, the Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP distanced itself from the rhetoric based on the guardianship mission of the military. The new CHP's reactions to the 27 April military declaration reflected this new conceptualization of civil-military relations. Although he expressed his deep concerns about this declaration, Baykal argued that the institutions of the state—not only the army but also the university and the judicial bodies—had felt it necessary to give a warning. (Baykal's Press Conference on 30 April 2007) Baykal stated that no state institution has an aim or a plan to occupy the power; what happened on 27 April was just "an expression of dissatisfaction." However, Kılıçdaroğlu criticized that in the past, the CHP also supported such declarations as the one in April 2007.

⁷⁶ Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu Ekonomik Kalkınma ve Stratejik Hedefler Report.

⁷⁷ For this report, please also see (Yılmaz, 2017, p.66)

My dear friends, if there is a democracy, we should accept freedom of criticism. Every institution should tolerate criticism. Without criticism, there is no democracy. Without many differentiated opinions, there is no democracy. (...) I wanted to do self-criticism. In the past, some of our friends were silent or even applauded the army's declarations. That is the biggest handicap for our democracy. In the CHP, you will have a problem if you publish a declaration; whoever you are, you can also be chief of the Turkish Army Forces. (...) This country is not Patagonya. Everybody should know his rank and should recognize his power. Everybody should do his duty within the borders of democracy. (Kılıçdaroğlu's Group Speech, 8.05.2012)

From this perspective, Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP removed the duality between democracy and terror, one of the main pillars of Baykal's Kurdish policy discourse discursively. It was again emphasized that the security dimension of the problem still existed. However, it cannot be a reason for human rights violations and democracy deficiency. (The CHP's 2011 Freedom Report, 2011, p.364)⁷⁸ *Taking the Kurdish problem as a security problem led to the rejection of our citizens' democratic demands.* (The CHP's 2011 Freedom Report, p.363) The only way to restrain the use of weapons is to develop democratic mechanisms. In that way, the CHP promises a "country where no one must use weapons." (The CHP's Freedom Report, p.365) Kılıçdaroğlu also declared that the military would be in its barracks with its honour. He promised to leave the military outside of the struggle with terrorism. (Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu speech on Meeting of Party Organizations on 12 March 2011) On the eve of the 2015 elections, Kılıçdaroğlu announced once more that the Kurdish problem could not be solved with security measures.⁷⁹ In the 2015 election manifesto, the security-dominated perspective was criticized as leading to oppression and damaging the psychological ties between the citizens and the state:

Evaluating the Kurdish problem only as a security problem resulted in rejecting our citizens' humanitarian and democratic demands. The incorrect practices stemming from the security-dominated perspective resulted in the suppression of the opposition, which resulted in the pressures that aggrieved and damaged the belonging feelings of most of our citizens. (2015 election manifesto, p. 29).

⁷⁸ Özgürlük, Hukuk Devleti ve Demokrasi Report.

⁷⁹ <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglu-diyarbakirda-konustu-kabahat-bizim>

In a television program, Kılıçdaroğlu answered experienced anchorman Ahmet Hakan's allusive question about the resources of the family insurance policy as follows (Kılıçdaroğlu's Interview in Tarafsız Bölge on 23.02.2011)

K.K: The budget (for the family insurance program) will be 1,7% of the national budget. One can reduce the budget of the National Defence Ministry. One can say that the spending on weapons should be less.

A.H: Will you say this?

K.K: Why not? It will be our political preference. When we will come to power, for whom will we use the money? For the poor. Won't I favour the poor in the budget?

Similarly, before the elections, one of the promises was to reduce the military service to six months and offer the option of paying for exemption from military service. The money received from this payment would be used in the National Education budget or YÖK budget. (Kılıçdaroğlu's interview with Ali Kırca on 08.05.2011, ATV Channel.) Additionally, there was a promise to reduce the duration of the military service from 15 months to 9 months and then finally to 6 months. (The CHP's 2011 Democracy Report, p. 204) Further, in contrast to Baykal's position, Kılıçdaroğlu supported one of the EU's demands. The EU demanded that the army's General Staff work under the minister of defence and be accountable to the government (Celep 2011, p.431.)

The CHP's reaction in the Uludere case exemplified the party's new relationship with the military and the different sections of the society, in this case, Kurds in the region. In December 2011, the Turkish air force bombed the Iraqi-Turkey border, mistaking 34 smugglers as PKK terrorists. It then came to light that they were primarily teenage villagers from the Uludere district of Şırnak. From the very first moment, the CHP displayed a very active attitude on the matter. Immediately following the incident, Kılıçdaroğlu himself visited Uludere to offer the victims' family's condolence.⁸⁰ As well, the CHP issued a report asking who determined the targets and who ordered the bombing. The CHP demanded a deep investigation naming those responsible for the decision related to the killing of 34 people. Not only the government but also the military were the targets of the CHP. Kılıçdaroğlu's criticisms of the army were harsh.

⁸⁰ <https://www.cnnturk.com/2012/turkiye/01/01/kilicdaroglu.uludere/642819.0/index.html>

He accused the general staff of being unreliable and being the press agent of the Prime Minister. Kılıçdaroğlu, in his speech, emphasized the responsibilities, duties, and limits of the military in democracies:

The parliamentary commission informed us, and the general staff sent a report to the commission for Uludere. He said, "We provided all the information from local sources." I have been asking questions for three months, for five months. I am asking the Prime Minister, and the General staff is replying three months later. I am just curious, why does the General Staff reply to my questions? Is he the Prime Minister's press agent? The political authority, the Prime Minister, should answer these questions. (..) In democracies, there is no such thing. In democracies, everybody has a responsibility, but primarily political authority and bureaucrats. (Kılıçdaroğlu's Group Speech on 22 May 2012)

The party kept the incident on the agenda for a long time. After the long-awaited parliamentary sub-commission report about Uludere in which no one is named as being responsible for the order and no further investigation is required, the CHP declared the report as garbage.⁸¹ The BDP and CHP added opposition annotations to the report and the party kept making motions of inquiry on Uludere⁸² and bringing to the agenda in several speeches in the parliament⁸³ in the framework of democracy and state of law.

Bringing the "Politics" Back: Social Peace

One of the aims of the party for Kurdish politics is to realize a social consensus, firstly in society and among the political actors. This understanding radically changed the dominant discourse from that of the Baykal's period, which declared some participants in the problem as illegal or terrorist. Rather than a security problem that requires an armed struggle with the terror organization and its agents, the problem is defined as a "political" problem that requires nothing but the consensus of the parties of the question. The term "social consensus" redefined the parties of the problem by developing a more inclusive approach where every part of society can contribute to

⁸¹ http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/03/130307_uludere_rapor?print=1

⁸² The Parliamentary Research Proposal for a Parliamentary Research Commission to be Established to Investigate Uludere-Roboski on 28.12.2012 in was Submitted to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 06.06.2013. It was discussed in the General Assembly of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and rejected with AKP votes. (8 July 2013 MYK report)

⁸³ As an example, Oguz Oyan's parliamentary speech on bill "Terörün sona erdirilmesi ve toplumsal bütünleşmenin güçlendirilmesi" <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b11301h>.

the solution. In that sense, the process of "Democratic Opening" politicized the Kurdish problem for Turkey, and Kılıçdaroğlu politicized the Kurdish problem for the CHP itself.

We left the problem-solving to the military somewhere else; we tried to solve the problem with the gun, and we tried for forty years. We say that we should reach a social consensus. (...) Who will solve this problem? Politics will solve it. We already said our solution. Let's establish a parliamentary commission with a social consensus. If it is not enough, then the second one, out of the parliament this time. It will be again the people who the political parties selected; opinion leaders will be there. They will be in contact with all the parts of the society. We will establish a dialog: the society, parliamentary, deputies, and political parties. (Kılıçdaroğlu`s Group Speech on 22 May 2012)

One of the mechanisms of social peace, the social consensus, was specified even just before the 2011 elections. (Kılıçdaroğlu`s Interview in Kanal Türk Live on 2 June 2011). The first step of social consensus is political consensus, and the agents of the political consensus are political parties in the parliament. Social reconciliation was another mechanism to provide social peace by the 2011 elections. It was the first time since the SHP report that the party made a call to face the illegitimate state practices during the 1980 coup and the Çiller government of 1994-1999. The "Truth Commissions" were designed as a policy instrument, derived from the experiences of several countries that experienced intra-war or military interventions⁸⁴. As official bodies of the state, they explore the human rights abuses in the country`s past and can be considered a part of social reconciliation policies. As mentioned before, in the İmralı process, it is again stated by Öcalan as one of the essential nine commissions. The party emphasized once more the Truth Commissions at party report about Kurdish Problem in 2015 (The CHP`s outlook to the Kurdish Question, 2015, p.5)⁸⁵. The party also offered social reconciliation policies such as turning the Diyarbakir prison into a museum, declaration of Nevroz as a national fest (The CHP`s outlook to the Kurdish Question, 2015, pp.19, 20).

⁸⁴<https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/tanrikulu-hakikat-komisyonu-kurulsun,PhRO0g8dIUCoogkW9jTinA>

⁸⁵ <https://chp.org.tr/yayin/chpnin-turkiyenin-kurt-sorununa-bakisi-cozum-cercevesi-22-soru-22-cevap/Open>

6.8. Kurdish Problem in Public Opinion

Similar to most political issues, the Kurdish Problem also has an ideological space. When Pippa Norris (2005) defines the components of radical right ideology, she defines an ideological space for political issues of radical right (p. 198). In every political issue, some policy alternatives can be too far-right for the public, and some can be too far left. In between, some policy alternatives are relatively acceptable to a large percentage of the people. Norris called them valence issues, where most voters cluster around and where vote-maximizing parties aim too.

In this section, I will set the policy issues of the Kurdish problem in such a dimension. As mentioned, the Kurdish problem touches on several areas related to citizenship, democracy, autonomy, and sovereignty. What is the public's reaction to these components? Which issues are acceptable so political parties can manoeuvre without fear of their impact on electoral performance? Which aspects of the problem are challenging for political parties to deal with? I analysed three public opinion research reports to understand the public's acceptance range for the Kurdish issue from 2002-2015. One is „The Kurdish Question and Public Opinion in Turkey (2012),“ prepared by the A&G research organization for the party. This report was completed in June 2012 based on face-to-face interviews with 6500 respondents in 48 cities in 7 regions. The second is the "Kurdish issue perception and expectations report" prepared by the KONDA research organization in 2010. This report was conducted in 59 provinces with around 10300 participants and published in 2011. The third report is the section on CHP voters in the "Konda voter clusters" study conducted by Sevinc Dogan based on data collected by Konda between 2010-2017. Here, I have mainly analysed the section on the Kurdish issue. The data in this section was organized in 2016. Although it does not fit my study in terms of time interval, it will help determine a tendency in terms of orientation.

The most important conclusion of the Konda research report (2011) is that there is a massive difference between Turks and Kurds in terms of their understanding of the definition of the problem and, accordingly, of the mechanisms for solving it. It is this difference that makes this issue so problematic. According to the Konda report, the Turkish public still defines the Kurdish question as a problem of terrorism,

backwardness, or the Kurds' desire for a separate state. As such, the policy package for solving the Kurdish problem ensures the region's economic development and eliminates terrorism. How difficult a problem the Kurdish question is for a party trying to maximize its vote becomes even more apparent when we look at the Kurds' thoughts and preferences on the problem. The Kurds' definition of the Kurdish problem differs from that of the Turks. Kurds define the Kurdish problem as backwardness, discrimination, and a demand for identity. Therefore, the proposed solution package for this problem suggests that in addition to regional development mechanisms, policy alternatives such as constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity, education in the mother tongue, the right to broadcast in the mother tongue, and increased powers of local governments. However, there is little, if any, public support for such mechanisms in public opinion. The A&G research report (2012) also repeats this finding as the economic developments are the only policy mechanism on which both Kurds and Turks agree. Fifty-seven percent of Turks and sixty-five percent of Kurds agree that the Kurdish problem can be solved through the region's economic development.

On the other hand, it is essential to note that security measures are supported by Turkish respondents by sixty-three percent, while seventy-three percent of Kurd respondents are against military and police actions, with 63 percent of Turks in favour of such. Public opinion also refers to the concepts of peace, consensus, and tolerance as a solution framework for the problem when formulated as an open question (Konda 2011). This may open an area for democratic mechanisms. However, interestingly, the opposition of Turks continues even on an issue that can be considered within the realm of democratic rights and freedoms, such as teaching Kurdish as an optional language in schools. Sixty-nine percent of Turkish respondents are against it; however, the demand is still high among Kurds, with eighty percent in favour.

The gap between Kurds and Turks in what we can define as ethnocultural rights, which require constitutional recognition, is noticeable (A&G research report, 2012). The Kurdish demand here is too high to be ignored. Ninety-seven percent of Turkish respondents are against Kurdish as a second official language. On the other hand, 55 percent of Kurdish respondents express their demand for Kurdish to be the second official language. There is also a common Kurdish demand in the provision of public services in Kurdish. However, here too is a huge gap. as 82 percent of Kurdish

respondents are in favour, but 83 percent of Turkish respondents are strictly against it. The right to education in the mother tongue is also a problematic issue. Ninety percent of Turks say no to education in a language other than Turkish. Among Kurds, however, the demand for education in Kurdish is apparent with 65 percent wanting it. On the issue of autonomy/federation, 95 percent of Turkish respondents are against it. Interestingly, the Kurds are divided in supporting local autonomy, as 56 percent favour it and 44 percent are against it.

As mentioned above, during the EU harmonization process and later, many steps have been taken for democratic rights and freedoms. Therefore, it is possible to expect a more liberalized opinion on this issue. Regarding democratic rights and freedoms, the gap between Turks and Kurds is vast. When asked what would happen if the Kurds were given more rights, about 80 percent of Turks say it would lead to a Turkish-Kurdish conflict, which they claim would lead to division (A&G research report,2012). Twenty percent say that democracy would improve, and the Kurdish issue would be easier to resolve. The opposite is true among Kurds. Approximately 70 percent of Kurds believe that democracy would improve and the solution to the Kurdish issue will become easier. Seventy percent of respondents, in general, say that there will be conflict and division.

Another crucial finding for this study is the definition of citizenship. According to the Konda survey (2011), 61 percent of Turk respondents and 82 percent of Kurds do not consider Turkishness a condition of Turkish citizenship. Therefore, as stated in the evaluation section of the report, there does not seem to be any objection in public to defining Turkish citizenship on an ethnic identity-neutral basis. There is also a big difference between the responses regarding support for talks and Kurdish openings (A&G Research, 2012). Sixty-six percent of Kurd respondents express that the state should meet with Öcalan; among Turks, there is only 11 percent support.

Another critical point for my thesis is whether or not the CHP electorate differs from the electorate of other parties on the Kurdish question and in what matters. The tendencies of CHP voters are in line with the prevailing public opinion. Like MHP voters, CHP voters think the issue can be resolved predominantly within a security or economic framework (KONDA, 2011). To a lesser extent than MHP voters, CHP

voters also have strong objections to constitutional recognition, mother tongue rights, and the powers granted to local governments. In that sense, it is essential to note the similarities between MHP and CHP voters.

On the other hand, the CHP is much more favourable to an inter-party compromise than the MHP, but the main actors are still seen as state institutions and armed forces (KONDA 2011). However, I would like to emphasize that another report compiled by Konda (2016), based mainly on data from 2016, notes that CHP voters are more democratically inclined than AKP and MHP voters. According to this report, 47 percent of CHP voters support negotiations as a mechanism, while 40 percent of CHP voters favour education in the mother tongue. While this report does not provide a detailed picture of the changing perception of CHP voters, it does provide evidence of a trend toward a more liberal position.

The society is deeply divided on the Kurdish issue. Other than the BDP-HDP party and its supporters, Turkish society is positioning itself on the far right on the Kurdish issue. At this point, the "valence issue" for Kurdish and Turkish voters only appears by defining Kurdish politics as economic backwardness. Strategies seem limited for a party trying to maximize votes and have a secular constituency. I expect the CHP positions on the Kurdish issue to be shaky and inconsistent. I also expect complex issues to be framed within the framework of democracy, which society will perceive as relatively less dangerous. Since the Turkish electorate conceptualizes the topic more in terms of security, I expect that the party will evaluate the components of the problem in the framework of democratic rights and freedoms, which seems to be a grey area considering the ethnocultural dimension referring to group rights. Under Kılıçdaroğlu's administration, the CHP is expected to avoid ethnocultural emphasis as much as possible.

And thirdly, the party is expected to focus more on areas where the risk is less, or the profit is more. For example, there is no unified Kurdish demand for Kurdish as a second mother tongue or local autonomy. On the other hand, the need for public services and cultural rights in the mother tongue is high. The CHP is expected to be brave in these issues.

6.9. Baykal's Rejectionist Policies vs. Kılıçdaroğlu's Conditional Policies

As mentioned in the introduction part, the parties' trade-offs about their goal priorities had also effect on their strategies, and party strategies determined parties' positions in specific policy areas, depending on the competition setting of the country. In this chapter I will analyse how the policy seeking strategies of the Baykal's CHP and the vote maximising strategies of the Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP influenced their positions on the issues of Kurdish problem. In order to do this, I reviewed the literature and the current events of the time to identify the main questions of debate.

6.9.1. Electoral Threshold

At the end of 2001, an election law amendment came to the political agenda. Baykal opposed the elimination of the 10 % electoral thresholds not only for the stability of the political regime but also for the unity of the country. According to Baykal, the electoral threshold is the primary mechanism to avoid fragmentation in the parliament, which should be read as instability of the political regime.

Turkey should preserve the 10 % electoral threshold. Turkey's political stability needs this. Today, Turkey had a three-party government. Reducing or eliminating the threshold results in the fragmentation of the Parliament. And then Turkey will have to live with four- or five-party coalitions. (Baykal Speech on the meeting of Baykal and Ciller, on 20.11.2001)

Baykal evaluated the electoral threshold also as a mechanism to provide national unity in the political regime. According to him,

(...) eliminating the threshold will bring ethnic and religious politics into national politics. Identity politics, as a significant threat to unity, will have a chance to get a voice in parliament. Turkey did not achieve being a nation-state yet. The electoral threshold forces all the parties to take the support of all the sections of the society. This will help Turkey to overcome identity politics. It is beneficial to protect this (electoral threshold). To eliminate the electoral threshold will end very dangerously with fragmentation, with a political atmosphere where the subcultures can perform their own identity politics". (Deniz Baykal's Interview with Serpil Cevikcan in Café Siyaset, CNN Türk on 25.11.2001)

In 2005, when the subject came to the political agenda again, Baykal maintained his position. This time, the elimination of the electoral threshold was brought to the table by the EU with the support of TÜSIAD and President Sezer. For Baykal, a "real democracy" is a political arena in which the political divisions stem from ideologies but not ethnicities. The frozen, fixed, and untouchable character of identity makes identity politics undemocratic. In that sense, the electoral threshold is crucial as a barrier to identity politics: This quotation is an important example of how Baykal evaluates identity politics and its place in a democracy.

We are trying to build Turkish politics on a national ground. This (eliminating the electoral threshold) may endanger our efforts and give way to a political structure on ethnic identities. This would bring massive instability to Turkish politics. (..)If Turkey could behave more patiently, it would be widely accepted that ethnicity-based politics is not meaningful. And we will have a chance to live together in the borders of national politics, as before the 1980s. It is real democracy. If ethnicity enters democracy, then democracy is drained. (..) Ethnicity (ethnic identity) is not disputable. It is it, over. (However) in a democracy, every position may be disputable and changeable. But national politics will suffer if one puts ethnicity as a political position. (..) Eliminating the electoral threshold is a way to build new ethnic identities. (...) That, of course, changes when things settle down in Turkey. We are not at that point yet. (Deniz Baykal`s Interview with Enis Berberoğlu in CNN Türk Parametre, on 21.12.2005.)

In terms of electoral threshold, Kılıçdaroğlu`s leadership in the party after 2010 period represents a fundamental break. In his 2011 election campaign, Kılıçdaroğlu promised to lower/eliminate the electoral threshold. Rather than framing the discussions in a created national politics/identity politics duality, the new CHP legitimated his position with plural democracy, political representation, and national will.

Another principle of libertarian democracy is pluralism. Pluralism, in a political sense, necessitates the right of organization and representation of all political groups, independent of their vote rates, the equal competition facilities, and the institutions which will inhibit the monopoly of the political power who has the majority. In Turkey, the mechanisms like the ten percent electoral threshold, a large definition of prohibitions for political parties, the party aids which favour the big parties and the regulations which complicate the being independent candidate damages political pluralism. (The Party`s Democracy Report, 2011, p.245)

Another discursive framework where Kılıçdaroğlu discussed the issue of electoral threshold was the famous center-right term "nation`s will." (Mert, 2007) The emphasis

on the "elected" and "the national will" increased, which requires particular attention considering the importance of the nation's discourse in the center-right politics in Turkey. The center-right's democracy discourse underlined that the elections showed the will of the nation. Through elections in which the center-right parties had majorities, they could speak in the nation's name⁸⁶. With the new period, the Kılıçdaroğlu CHP started to employ this term more in its discourse, as with the oath crisis⁸⁷:

There is a shame of democracy, the captivity of the "national will." That is one of the most critical problems of Turkish Democracy. If there is a democracy struggle in this country, the parliamentary should reflect the national will. If the national choice is under arrest, democracy cannot function on a healthy base. One period, we said, "Enough, the nation has a say"(yeter, söz milletin). Ok, we are saying the same also now. The nation will not accept tutelage; it is correct. The political parties should struggle if the national will is under tutelage. We don't want the judiciary under custody, but we also don't want the legislation under tutelage. (Kılıçdaroğlu 's Interview in CNN Türk on 09.07.2011.)

Kılıçdaroğlu also emphasises that in the D'Hondt system with a threshold, the votes of the political party that is below the threshold usually leads to the largest party being elected to more parliamentary seats which is also against to the principle of nation's will.

For God's sake, say me, you vote for a party, but your vote is counted for another party's deputy. And it is declared as a national will. We will eliminate this (the electoral threshold). We argue that the nation's will should be represented completely in parliament. It is our aim. It is our aim here. No one should apply a threshold to a nation's will. (Kılıçdaroğlu Speech in the Party Organization's Meeting on 12.03. 2011.

To empower the parliament, lowering the electoral threshold is necessary. According to the new CHP, the power of a parliament is mainly about its representation power. By this argument, the party opposed the stability argument, which was actually one of the main pillars of the party's past discourse against eliminating the electoral threshold. If there is such a duality between representation and stability, the new CHP changes its position on this axis:

⁸⁷ Two MPs of the CHP, the six MPs of the BDP and one MP from the MHP were imprisoned under the respectively the Ergenekon, KCK and Balyoz investigation. The CHP MPs refused to take inaugural oaths.

One of the most important steps to empower the parliament is to increase the representation capacity of it. If a parliament can adequately reflect the people`s demands, it can function as a legitimization and execution organ. For that reason, the CHP will eliminate the ten percent electoral threshold, which was a remedy from the 12 September regime and does not exist in Europe. It will be a maximum of 5 percent. (Kılıçdaroğlu Speech in the Party Organization`s Meeting on 12.03. 2011)

The CHP`s emphasis on representation also manifests itself in the discussions of KCK arrests. KCK`s (Kurdistan Communities Union) structure was established around a communal-federal system with administrative and governance units, (Bilgin, 2013, p.15) which covers the populated Kurdish region. Between 2009 and 2010, over 1000 people were detained on charges of being members of the KCK. Most were municipality leaders from DTP (Democratic Society Party) or human rights defenders. Kılıçdaroğlu, during his election rally in Batman, criticized the arrest of the Batman municipality leader. Later in his speech, he strongly opposed the arrests by underlining that these leaders are the elected representatives of the nation`s will. Compared with Baykal`s silence about the issue, Kılıçdaroğlu's words were noteworthy:

We have respect for the nation`s will. (...) One will vote for and select these people as his municipality leaders; you will arrest him. It is not fair. We promise the superiority of law; we promise respect for different ideas.⁸⁸

When Baykal's CHP defended the electoral threshold, it conceptualized it as a measure against identity politics. Later, CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu`s leadership changed its position on this issue and addressed it with the concept of national will. It even opposed the KCK arrests with this concept. Thus, he protected himself from the electoral risks while changing the party's position on this issue.

6.9.2. Local Autonomy

Although in SHP/CHP reports empowerment of local government is conceptualized as an essential policy mechanism, Baykal showed strong opposition when AKP`s bill proposal “Fundamental Law Draft for the Public Administration” came to the parliament. At a first look at the proposal context, AKP emphasized the principles of

⁸⁸ http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/242050/Kilicdaroglu_ndan_KCK_elestirisi_.html

a New Public Administration, such as efficiency, productivity, transparency, accountability, and participation. However, the clause "delegation of authority to local governments" caused many discussions in several parliament and public commissions. The bill proposal did not define the municipalities as local governments, and the delegation of authority is only for the local organs of the central government such as the city governor or sub-governor.

Even so, the CHP's resistance was harsh. In his public speeches, Baykal insisted that the draft is enacted to decentralize Turkey to give way to Sheria. (Baykal's interview in CNN Türk Café Siyaset on 25.01.2004). The 2007 election manifesto discussed the issue in terms of national unity and the Kurdish problem. The manifesto also promised to realize a public administration reform proper to the national unity principle (2007 election manifesto, p. 58-59) The actual reform is criticized as endangering national unity by aims of federalism. The local administration units are promised financial independence on the condition of supervision, but municipalities who misuse their authority against the republic and secularism and commit a crime will be discharged.

The issue of local autonomy came to the political agenda once more with the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ECLSG), opened to signatures in 1985. It includes the main principles of local autonomy in finance, organization, and administrative inspection. Turkey signed it in 1988. However, this convention is ratified by Turkey with several reservations about especially local governments' autonomy regarding their organizations or resources. (Sayan and Övgün 2014). These reservations were mainly on the articles which emphasize the share of the local organs in the decisions about themselves, such as the consultancy to local organizations, their financial autonomy, or their independent decisions about national and international alliances.⁸⁹ The promises of the charter offer Kurds financial independence and, to a degree, decisional freedom, which raised suspicion because of national unity concerns.

At the beginning of the 2000s, lifting the reservations to the charter was primarily a neo-liberal or secular question rather than a Kurdish question for the party. Kılıçdaroğlu, in his election campaigns in the east region of Turkey, promised to lift

⁸⁹https://serdargunes.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/turkiyenin-avrupa-yerel-yonetimler-ozerklik-sarti_na-uyumu-ozerklik-miti-pdf.pdf, p.17

the reservations to the European Charter of Local Self-Government.⁹⁰ In the 2011 Democracy report, the elimination of the reservation to the ECLS is designed under the section on social differences and pluralism. (The CHP's 2011 democracy Report, p. 252) Although this section is devoted to the policy set for the Kurdish question, and this promise is mainly declared in the Kurdish-populated eastern regions, the position is justified in the framework of the principles of the efficiency of administration or the quality of public service rather than democratization based frameworks like local participation or the demands of provincial autonomy, which is directly related with the ethnic dimension of the problem. Still, compared with the Baykal period, the promise of eliminating the reservation is a progressive step. To alleviate the tension stemming from the doubts about federalism, Kılıçdaroğlu had to re-voice his arguments, this time, to include the western cities of the country. Kılıçdaroğlu mentioned that not only the southeastern part but also the western part of the country needs the delegation of authority. Kılıçdaroğlu emphasized especially financial independence of the municipalities in his campaign speeches:

What do we understand from local autonomy? If it means that the people should choose the municipality leaders, it is already like that in Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Edirne, or Izmir. (...) We have a second question here, what is that? They do not have enough financial resources. Most of the time, the municipality leaders run after the money in Ankara. It is also one of the AKP's promises. (...) If we mean by local autonomy a kind of another system, federalism out of central government, then no, we are not for that. (Kilicdaroglu's interview with Ali Kirca in ATV on 08.05.2011).

Why do we want local autonomy? Because the municipalities would like to make investments, the governments should not restrain them; if you remember, there was a water problem in Izmir. He (mayor) says, "Let me, I will build a dam." No, (they say) don't do that. Then it is normal that the locals have water problems. What can he (mayor) do? He is limited to the existing procedures. (...) If the leader makes investments, if he would solve the problems of local people, then let him. Not only for Izmir but also for Antalya. And for Eskisehir. Our Eskisehir municipality leaders wanted to extend the railway system, but it is not allowed for months or years. (Kılıçdaroğlu's Interview with Uğur Dündar in Arena Program on 4.10.2011)

Kılıçdaroğlu kept emphasizing the necessity of local autonomy in the coming years, even though the elimination of these reservations became one of the most important

⁹⁰ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/hakkari-de-ozerklik-cikisi-17856690>

and

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/251318/Guneydogu_da_Kilicdaroglu_na_buyuk_ilgi_.htm

articles of the democratic opening process and the ongoing talks.⁹¹ So, although framing the policy only in terms of efficiency became difficult, Kılıçdaroğlu renewed his promise of enforcing local autonomy through the elimination of the reservations in a very critical speech at the 34th Party Congress in 2012. He underlined that his pledge to eliminate reservations should be evaluated in terms of efficiency. He once again argued that this promise is for every municipality, east and west in the country.⁹²

Additionally, in the Declaration of Freedom and Democracy, prepared by some parliamentarians and representatives of each 81 cities and accepted unanimously by all the party delegates, the empowerment of local organizations is stated as one of the main policy mechanisms in democratization.⁹³ There it is noted that the authority of the local organizations should be increased as a necessity of democratic pluralism. However, the 2015 election manifesto was silent about eliminating the reservations to ECSL. The manifesto arranged the local organizations under the banner of the Reform of Public Administration. The manifesto referred to the "redistribution of authority" between the local and central organs of the administration " to increase the efficiency in administration." (CHP's 2015 election manifesto, p.129) It also promises to eliminate the regulations limiting local administrative or financial autonomy." (CHP's 2015 election manifesto, p.130) However, the manifesto did not acknowledge the ECSL or reservations to this treaty.

This silence should be associated with the "democratic autonomy" discussions of the previous years.⁹⁴ PKK leader Öcalan's project includes a set of organs such as village communes or city parliaments. According to this project, including the Kurdish autonomous region, Turkey comprises 25-26 autonomous self-government regions with their health, judiciary, and educational systems. Although the Democratic Autonomy project was backed in 2007, it came to the agenda again with the 2014 elections. The HDP (The People's Democratic Party) announced it as a part of their

⁹¹ <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/yerel-yonetimlere-iliskin-talep-ve-adimlar>

⁹² <http://www.haberler.com/kilicdaroglu-partisinin-18-olaganustu-kurultayi-6451923-haberi/>

⁹³ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/chp-den-ozgurluk-ve-demokrasi-bildirisi-siyaset-1568283/>

⁹⁴ For a detailed analysis, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/pinar-ogunc/kurtler-demokratik-ozerklikle-ne-istiyor-1devletin-el-degistirmesiyle-ozg-1188942/>

2014 election manifesto. The People's Democratic Congress, a platform of various leftist parties, declared that eliminating the reservations to the ECLSG is an important step for realizing autonomy, self-government, and local autonomy.⁹⁵ For CHP, it became more challenging to frame the local autonomy issue on the borders of "efficiency" or "democracy," ignoring the strong demand rising from Kurdish representatives.

6.9.3. The Mother Tongue Rights

The case of mother tongue discussions is beneficial to understand the limits of CHP's democratization discourse on Kurdish politics.

The military prohibited the publication of Kurdish material in October 1983. However, as mentioned above, the EU harmonization process removes this ban. The issue of use of mother tongue rights was always controversial, especially in broadcasting and education. Radio and television broadcasting in Kurdish was also not permitted according to the High Council for Radio and Television (RTÜK) law and the law on the organization and Broadcasts of Radio and Television Stations (Statute 3984). However, constitutional amendments gave way to legal changes with the harmonizing packages. By the third harmonizing package on 2 August 2002, The Law on Radio and TV Establishing and Broadcasting (Law no. 3984) was changed to permit Kurdish radio and television broadcasting.

Regarding private media broadcasting, by January 2004 it is allowed that private national television and radio channels broadcast in minority languages. SHP's policy report on the Kurdish Problem called for rescinding the Kurdish language ban. Proper to the central paradigm of the SHP report, language is counted as the primary tool for cultural expressions, and it stated that "*the ban on the use of mother tongue is inhuman and primitive.*" (SHP report 1989, p.4) It also added that this ban is a mechanism for assimilation and promised the abrogation of the article. 1999 Reports of CHP proposed fundamental reforms in broadcasting and publishing in the mother tongue (The CHP's 1999 Report). This report counted broadcasting and publishing in the mother tongue

⁹⁵ <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/dtkdan-oz-yonetim-deklarasyonu>

as primary cultural rights and the main mechanism for developing its ethnicity. As mentioned, citizens are free to perform their rights, like using their mother language (the abrogation of the related Law article), to broadcast, learn, write, and read *through their initiatives*. (SHP Report, 1989, p.186.)

However, a problem came out of the issue *state broadcasting* in Kurdish. In June 2003, the state had already announced that under certain conditions it will programs in minority languages. (For a detailed discussion, please see Grigoriadis,2007). In June 2004, the TRT (The Turkish Radio Television Institution) launched its programs for five hours of radio and four hours of television in Bosnian, Arabic, Kırmançî, Kurdish, and Circassian. On 5 January 2009, TRT 6/TRT ŞEŞ, a public channel broadcasting only in Kurdish, was launched. Although broadcasting in Kurdish became possible with constitutional amendments and harmonization packages, a public TV channel broadcasting in the Kurdish project brought the issue to a head.⁹⁶ CHP was one of the objectors, Baykal declaring Kurdish TV is against the state's fundamental principles.⁹⁷ According to Baykal, any private person or private institution can establish television and broadcast in any language they want, within the borders of the constitution and specified laws. In this case, the state's only mission can be to control and provide physical infrastructure equally, but the state should not broadcast in languages other than Turkish. The party's perspective is framed by different approaches, mainly derived from a civic understanding of the public sphere. According to this conceptualization, the *state should be blind to ethnicity*. " (Baykal's Press Conference on 09.06.2004)

Baykal's CHP framed its language policies with the terms of *fair redistribution of the budget and public resources*. In that manner, a just distribution of public resources cannot include, in his words, the *ethnic demands* of some citizens. His formulation rests on a particular republican definition of public service (for the term see Fraser, 2001):

There is an RTÜK order in Turkey. Some private broadcasting institutions are in that order; like them, any institution can broadcast in Kurdish. But it is not right to spend state money, state resources, the money of 70 million for ethnic

⁹⁶ <http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/44055.asp#BODY>, available at 11/01/2017

⁹⁷ <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/devletin-temel-anlayisina-ters-10690619>

demands of some of our citizens(..)Sometime later, it will result in a very bad way. The state will also have to behave in the same way for the other demands. And then, the state should educate personnel about that. Or and then, the state will take responsibility for education in another language as a state duty. They are very big decisions. (Baykal`s Press Conference on 09.06.2004)

Money should be spent for our common needs, not for the points that distinguish us. It should be spent on education, development, welfare, employment, and public service. It cannot be paid for the improvement of subculture identities. (Baykal`s Public Conference after Party Assembly Meeting, on 07.06.2002)

The state must teach our common language, give our education, and provide a consciousness of citizenship. Everybody can broadcast in his own language, learn or teach it. It is a right. The state and the constitution should allow it, and modern democracy requires it, but instead of the people who need it, if the state would be the one who provides it, then it is not right. The state cannot spend its money on the needs of a specific ethnic group. (Baykal`s Group Speech on 08.06.2004.)

One reflection of this attitude is expected to reveal itself in another problematic theme, the teaching of the mother tongue. According to Article 42(9) of the Turkish Constitution, it is not allowed to teach any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any training or education institution. With the third harmonizing package in 2002, the Law on Learning and Education in Foreign Languages and Dialects other than Turkish (Law No 2923) is changed. By this regulation, Turkish citizens can learn other languages and dialects as mother tongue in private courses. The past reports of CHP already stated that learning the mother tongue is a fundamental cultural right. In these terms, the state is assigned *to provide suitable conditions for the Kurdish people to learn their mother tongue by their own initiatives.* (The CHP`s 2001 Report, p.20)

During Baykal`s leadership, the party argued that the demands of education in the mother tongue challenged the principle of “Turkish as an official language.” It was difficult to frame the issue on the borders of the democratization framework. Baykal`s CHP declared that the demands related to education in the mother tongue are a part of the political project of terrorists and thus a threat to national integrity. The party closed all the doors to possibly reformulating any other discourse. (Baykal`s interview in CNN Türk News on 20 October 2006).

Later, under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the party supported the using of public resources in teaching of mother tongue. Kılıçdaroğlu mentioned that learning one's mother tongue is a fundamental human right, (Kılıçdaroğlu Interview in Türkiye'nin Nabzı in Haber Türk on 28.01. 2011) and public resources can be spent for that reason by the demands of the citizens. (Kılıçdaroğlu Interview with Ali Kırca in ATV on 08.05.2011). (Also, CHP 2011 Democracy report, 2011, p.251 and 2011 election manifesto, p.17)

Kılıçdaroğlu also repeated that education in the mother tongue, and for that matter in any other language except the official language, is not acceptable for Turkey (Kılıçdaroğlu Interview in Türkiye'nin Nabzı in Haber Türk on 28.01. 2011). However, as the 2015 elections approached, the party added a "pedagogical perspective" to the party discourse repertoire. The party report (The CHP's outlook to the Kurdish Question, 2015, p.9) states that *education in the Kurdish language should be discussed without any political prejudices, on behalf of the children, and by employing pedagogical evaluations*. Kılıçdaroğlu, in the 2015 election campaign in Diyarbakır, repeated the pedagogical perspective. He mentioned that a commission composed of specialists would evaluate the theme, and they would accept the commission's decision as an official party view.⁹⁸

Language Rights came to the political agenda at the end of 2012 with a law proposal. In September 2012, thousands of KCK prisoners started a hunger strike which continued 68 days. Among the demands of these prisoners was the right to use the Kurdish language in the courts. Following the crisis, the government presented a draft law to parliament allowing Kurdish to be used by defendants during their verbal defence in Turkish courts. Under the bill, it is proposed that the defendants be allowed to make their oral defences in court hearings in a language they say allows them to better express themselves. The current permitted legislation allowed the defence in one's mother language only when the defendant cannot speak Turkish. In the meeting with the representative of socialist parties and groups to stop the hunger strikes, Kılıçdaroğlu stated that there is no legal obstacle to such a demand.⁹⁹ He promised the

⁹⁸ <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/kilicdaroglu-diyarbakirda-ittifaka-kapi-araladi-1241985/>

⁹⁹ <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/141929-kilicdaroglu-aclik-grevleriyle-ilgili-gerekeni-yapacagiz>

party's support in the legislation process of the draft. However, Kılıçdaroğlu's support created an extensive discussion in the party.¹⁰⁰

The party's new elites supported the draft and framed the problem regarding democracy and human rights. The opposition argued that this law would establish a bilingual state. The bilingualism in the public sphere would lead to the removal of Turkish as an official language. Thus, the issue is directly related to national unity and security. This intra-party division emerged both in the commission deliberations and in the parliamentary debates on the relevant legislation.

Bülent Tezcan clearly stated that this would mean legitimizing another language in the judiciary process in the so-called public sphere.¹⁰¹ Therefore, Tezcan emphasized the necessity of a statement in the proposed article that one should declare that he cannot speak Turkish. A legal regulation making defence possible in another language for those who cannot speak Turkish already exists. He argued that, by this form, this draft is an expression of a group rights demand against the related articles of the constitution, such as Article 4, that puts the country's official language as Turkish.

On the other hand, CHP's new elites framed the issue in human rights discourse and as a defence of the right of the individual. Sezgin Tanrıku implied that the "official language is for the state. However, the mother language is for the citizens":¹⁰²

As a human rights defender, I always believe in the sacredness of the right to defence. If the people who can speak the official language will state that they would express themselves better in another language, if they cannot use Turkish well or think in Turkish even if they can speak it, we should respect their right of defence. If they say they know another language better, we should respect that.

Kılıçdaroğlu, in a similar manner, framed the problem in human rights discourse (Altunoğlu, 2014, p. 76) Trying to avoid the group rights discourse or minority rights, he presented a motion concerning the Europe Human Rights Convention as follows:

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/chpde-seyit-riza-ve-anadil-gerginligi-1108848>

¹⁰¹ Bülent Tezcan's speech at TBMM on behalf of CHP group, 23.01.2013, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil3/bas/b056m.htm>

¹⁰² Sezgin Tanrıku's speech in Justice Commission, 28 November 2012, available at https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_tutanaklari.goruntule?pTutanakId=163

A draft came to the parliament called the Defence in the mother tongue. The name of the draft is not right; it should be the right of defence. In Germany, there are lots of Turkish children in education. (...) How would they defend themselves when they are in Turkey? Their Turkish is not enough. The ones who came from England, in English. It is not right to address this problem in terms of ethnicity. We did not evaluate this subject with these terms. We evaluated this problem in terms of the Europe Human Rights Convention evaluates. We are clear. (Kılıçdaroğlu's Group Speech on 29 January 2013)

The reformist perspective was expressed as an official party view in official party documents. It stated that the CHP framed the issue as a defence right and noted that the individual should defend herself in a language, she can express best.¹⁰³ :

Defence right is sacred; it is part of proper jurisdiction. It cannot be limited. Without a debate on the official language of jurisdiction, one should have the opportunity to use the language which is proper for her. It is not right to treat differently in each stage of jurisdiction. AKP's judicial power destroyed the right of defence.

6.9.4. Negotiations

If one of the pillars of the opening was the recognition of cultural and political rights, the other was the negotiations between the state officials and the PKK. (Yeğen 2015, p.2) As mentioned above, the meeting had already started in Özal's period, and from September 2008 the state officials and PKK had several meetings in different European cities— later when leaked to the public, they were referred to as the “Oslo Meetings”. All opposition parties, including the CHP, were firmly against such meetings, saying that "the state cannot negotiate with the terrorists." In 2005, a group of intellectuals called on PKK for a ceasefire, and Erdoğan met them before visiting Diyarbakir. Baykal harshly criticized this meeting:

What did the government for a while ago? It will go to the region, but before this visit, they met with some people who evaluate the struggle of the Turkish state with the terror as something equal to the terror organization. The government tried to give messages to the terror organization. The government wanted to encourage them. It tried to seem as sympathetic to them. It tried to speak with their words. You cannot struggle with Terror by being lenient, keeping a foot in both camps, slapping on the back, or trying to win one's favor. It would be best if you were determined. It would be best if you wanted to

¹⁰³ The Central Committee Report (MYK), Jan 2013, p.204.

dismantle them. You should stand against them like a man. (Baykal's speech on Party Congress on 19.11.2005. For similar arguments, Baykal's group speech on 04.04.2006)

The Baykal's CHP argued that any negotiation would mean the legitimization of the Terror. Addressing the terror leader as a party of the solution has no other explanation than legitimizing the terror organization.¹⁰⁴ Baykal argued that the negotiation with PKK cannot be accepted as a solution mechanism for the problem. Contact with the local agents that protect PKK in the region would be more beneficial.¹⁰⁵ For the Baykal's CHP, the only good reason for being in contact with PKK would be the PKK's promise to give up their armed struggle before the negotiations.¹⁰⁶

No government would negotiate with one who is armed; no government ever did it. (...)Now for the first time, a government negotiates with a terror organization, tries to ingratiate itself with the organization, and violates the law. However, this organization points a gun and declares it won't cease the fire. It is something wrong. You should not negotiate with terror; you should struggle with it.

Under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the party followed another path about negotiations. (for a detailed discussion Altunoğlu 2014, pp. 71-72) Kılıçdaroğlu, in his interview with journalist Ali Kırca, stated that the negotiations with Öcalan could take place to solve the Kurdish problem. (Kılıçdaroğlu's Interview with Ali Kırca in ATV, on 08.05. 2011). He argued that even in the Ecevit period there were negotiations with the Kurdish movement. This new attitude to the talks was tested when the meetings between the PKK's leadership cadre, the Prime Minister's under-secretary, and the National Intelligence Organization were leaked to the newspapers in September 2011. Kılıçdaroğlu, both in a press conference and a group speech, specifically emphasized that the CHP is not against the negotiations between the state and Öcalan but criticized the actual meetings on several points. Firstly, he argued that the leak of the meetings indicated that not the state but the Prime Minister himself was the party of the negotiations. Hakan Fidan, one of the parties in the talks, was then the prospective

¹⁰⁴ Onur Öymen's speech in Parliamentary General Debate on 10.11.2009, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem23/yil4/bas/b015m.htm>

¹⁰⁵ Deniz Baykal's speech in Parliamentary General Debate on 13 November 2009, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem23/yil4/bas/b018m.htm>

¹⁰⁶ Deniz Baykal's speech in Parliamentary General Debate on 13 November 2009, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem23/yil4/bas/b018m.htm>

undersecretary of MIT. He doubted personal and political engagements and suggested the agenda of the negotiations should be clarified:

During elections, a journalist has asked me if it is acceptable for the CHP to make negotiations with İmralı. I said, "Of course. If the terror will end, then of course. The state officials do this. In the past, there were also negotiations." (..) However, here there is completely another picture. The Prime Minister is having private meetings abroad. They say it is the meetings between MIT and PKK. No! Once, we should underline that it is not a meeting between MIT and PKK. The Prime Minister's private counsellor is in the meetings, not the state's intelligence service. (..) Your private counsellor says there is 95% consensus in the negotiations between the parties. What is this consensus about? Now come and tell it! (Kılıçdaroğlu's Group Speech on 4 October 2011)

Kılıçdaroğlu 's support of the negotiations disturbed once again the intra- party opposition (Ete and Eşkinat, 2013, p. 24). Even after the party's general secretary Haluk Koç declared a document named a "consensus between the AKP and the PKK," Kılıçdaroğlu maintained his position. The party opposition declared that any kind of negotiation with the terror organization PKK is not acceptable. Kılıçdaroğlu made another statement to the press, again indicating his support for negotiations: "To limit the bloodshed, it is possible to negotiate with anyone."¹⁰⁷ He referred to increasing violence in the country and asked the inquiry of the negotiations. Kılıçdaroğlu, in a Party Assembly on 6 January 2013, declared that his party issued the prime minister conditional credit over the talks with Öcalan.¹⁰⁸

What made the CHP more challenging to preserve its position about negotiations was presidency discussions¹⁰⁹. On 23rd February 2013, the documents of the meeting of three BDP deputies and Öcalan in İmralı were leaked to the press.¹¹⁰ The leak of the meeting's papers to the media contributed to the image of a new constitution by the

¹⁰⁷<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/kilicdaroglu-teroru-durdurmak-icin-herkesle-gorusulur-siyaset-1599984/?v=1> (in Ete and Eşkinat, 2013, p.24)

¹⁰⁸ <http://www.gazetevatan.com/-akp-ye-yeni-kredi-aciyoruz---504179-siyaset/>

¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, constitution reconciliation commission was working on a possibility of a new constitution. On 6 February 2013, Erdogan declared that if the Constitution Reconciliation Commission cannot reach a consensus till the end of the March, then the draft will be presented to the Parliament as a group bill. The first option would be a common bill of AKP and BDP if not then a referendum on the AKP's proposal. Kılıçdaroğlu immediately accused Erdogan of blackmailing as it is mentioned in the previous chapter.

¹¹⁰ <http://t24.com.tr/haber/iste-imralidaki-gorusmenin-tutanaklari,224711>

alliance of AKP and BDP. Öcalan reveals his three-staged road map for the solution in the recorded minutes. Öcalan's statement that he would support Erdoğan's presidency caused a great fuss. The demand for a system change came from time to time to the political agenda and during the new constitution negotiations like the one in November 2012, where the AKP proposed a formula for the system change and brought it to the Commission of Constitution Reconciliation agenda.¹¹¹ The CHP was always against the presidential regime. For the CHP, the parliamentary regime was the heritage of modern Türkiye's history and an inevitable part of the founding principles. (Kılıçdaroğlu's group speech on 12.02.2013) The "founder's will" struggled and established Türkiye's regime; the AKP had no authority to change it. Kılıçdaroğlu also emphasized that the presidency system is a totalitarian regime type. The parliamentary regime is the most suitable for democracy, including checks and balances or separation of powers. This time, when the presidency regime came to the agenda, the CHP framed it as a bargaining item, between the AKP and Öcalan, aimed at changing the parliamentary regime and amending the constitution in favour of the demands of Kurdish political actors. The objections were raised once more in the party.

For the party, support for the negotiations became an electoral risk that would alienate the CHP constituency contributing to Erdoğan's presidency. Kılıçdaroğlu was now in the line of the fire. On 5 March 2013, in Kılıçdaroğlu's first group speech after the leak of the documents, he accused Erdogan of being silent about the inquiry of negotiations. He called the process "bargaining over the destiny of the people." (Kılıçdaroğlu's Group Speech, 05.03.2013) He referred to Erdogan's previous group speech, where he kept his silence about the negotiations and demanded the party members' unconditional trust for the sake of the process.¹¹² Kılıçdaroğlu argued that such a demand is very non-proportional and now the people had only one explanation for all of this—Öcalan. On 8 April, Kılıçdaroğlu declared the CHP's withdrawal of its support from the negotiations process¹¹³

¹¹¹ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ak-parti-anayasada-baskanlik-sistemi-onerdi-siyaset-1622641>

¹¹² For Erdogan's group speech on 5 March 2013, please see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q7WjwkYdHxk>

¹¹³ <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/fikret-bila/kilicdaroglu-kredi-bitti-1690585>

On June 2014, the AKP submitted a framework bill titled "Draft Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social Integration." This draft aimed to provide a legal ground for negotiations and indicated the parliament as an active partner through the commissions with the participation of all the parties. This would also prevent the parties from "secret bargaining," which is the Achilles heel for CHP's conditional approval.¹¹⁴ Kılıçdaroğlu, in a group, declared the party's support for the draft, justifying his support by saying that he wanted a presence in the region and did not want to be in a more backward position than the AKP.

Now, the AKP is making propaganda in the east. (They say) "we will solve the problem, but the CHP is an obstacle." We believe in the superiority of the law; we are against unidentified murders and don't want new ones. (..) I only want our citizens to know we are for the solution. Here is the solution, let's do it; we do not have any problem with it. But after all, if you put new mechanisms which may conclude new unidentified murders, we are against it. (Kılıçdaroğlu Group Speech on 1 July 2014)

However, during the parliamentary discussions about the bill, the party was represented by two contradictory views. Tanrıkulu declared that the CHP was now here for the solution, peace, to the Kurdish problem with justice, equality, democracy, and freedom.¹¹⁵ Another CHP deputy, Engin Altay, mentioned that CHP wants peace for all and now.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, another party deputy Dilek Akagün Yılmaz declared that her vote would be against the draft.¹¹⁷ Celal Dincer, in the name of the group, argued that this draft is full of controversies and that the solution process is a product of a self-interested bargaining mentality.¹¹⁸ This controversy is reflected in the party's parliament's attitude toward the voting process of the law. Although from the beginning one of the CHP's conditions were that the negotiations should proceed on

¹¹⁴ <http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/151696-bdp-den-cozum-sureci-onerileri>

¹¹⁵ Sezgin Tanrıkulu's speech in parliament on 8 July 2014, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b11301h.htm>

¹¹⁶ Engin Altay's speech in Parliament on 10 July 2014, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b11501h.htm>

¹¹⁷ Dilek Akagün Yılmaz's parliamentary speech on 9 July 2014, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b11401h.htm>

¹¹⁸ Celal Dincer's speech in parliamentary on 9 July 2014, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b11401h.htm>

legal grounds, the party did not vote for the draft. Only eight CHP deputies of the 130 were in the parliament during the voting session, and two of them were against the current draft. Çevikcan, an experienced journalist, argued that the CHP supported the draft by not attending the voting session.¹¹⁹

6.9.5. Citizenship

As mentioned above, during the EU harmonization process, Kurds' legal status was often discussed. Baykal argued that the ethnic plurality of the society is already recognized. Turkey established a legal framework to protect these “sociological differences” against any discrimination regarding universal human rights. However, he argued, minority status will inevitably result in sovereignty claims:

To call sociological differences a minority means giving them a juridical status. It has a meaning in international law. Nobody needs to be the same. Everybody is different from each other. Ethnic identity, mother language, and sect can be distinct. But if one calls these differences a minority, then he claims that ethnic and sociological differences are not enough. Then he claims that a public law identity is needed. If one wants to name our identical differences, which we have lived together for centuries as a minority, then it means he had sovereignty claims. (Baykal's interview in programme “Yakin Takip”, on 11.04.2005)

Baykal mentioned that a common public law and a common judiciary system are the basis of a "nation." Constitutional identity provides this common ground for various ethnic identities. Another juridical status in a constitution reserved for just a specific part of society would inevitably threaten the idea of a nation:

Who is Nation? Who is Nation? How will we define it? The people who belong to a specific race? The people who belong to a particular religion or sect? The people who belong to a specific social class, kinship, tribe, or family? The people who have a specific gender? The nation belongs to all of the people who live in our territory. They are all part of the same national sovereignty, in the same juridical system with equal rights. It is unimportant that some have a university degree or great wealth or men or women. It is not vital to belong to any religion, ethnicity, or tribe. That happened the first time and was a significant transformation in ideas. (Baykal's Group Speech on 22.04.2003)

¹¹⁹ <http://www.koseyazisioku.com/milliyet/serpil-cevikcan/12-07-2014/chpnin-cozumle-sinavi>

As mentioned once more above, Baykal referred to “nation” as an entity beyond all the other identities. Citizens are expected to go beyond and even abandon their subjective attachments. In such terms, the republican understanding of the Public/Private sphere is also at the core of the idea of "nation":

The way to integrate the differences is developed by the ones who established this nation and named as Atatürk nationality. (Applauses) Not a race nationality, not a micro nationality, or an ethnic nationality. It is an integrative nationality. Nationality is a relationship between people at the nation's level. Under that, there is another level in which other kinds of relations between people exist. Kinship, ethnicity, sectarian identity, and blood relationship are all parts of sociological life; they all live; however, if we stay at this level, we cannot provide national unity. We respect everybody's family, ethnicity, and kinship relations, but for us, the way of agreement is to declare that we are a nation. (Baykal's Group Speech on 06.03.2007).

When a discussion about a new constitution arose, CHP was in the opposition camp. Baykal's CHP read this discussion as an attempt to recognize an ethnic community (Kurds) constitutionally. In that sense, any demand for a new constitution was just a part of a political project of terrorism.

For example, Uğur Bey, there is a new constitution project. (...) We will see the signs of the PKK's political demands in the new constitution. For example, ethnicity is not a constitutional term. It is not a public law term. It is a sociological term. Be sure, if any term meaning somehow ethnicity will be put in the beginning part of the constitution or any other article; any term which refers to the multi-ethnic structure of the society or ethnic identities are the richness of society, then it means they want to support terror organization's political project. (Baykal's interview with Uğur Dündar, Arena Program in CNN Türk on 24.12.2007).

If in this new constitution, the term “ethnicity” becomes a constitutional term, a public law term, then it means the constitution will give way to the country's disintegration. (...) There is just citizenship in the constitution, just citizenship. There is just a Nation in the constitution. There is just Turkish Nation in the constitution, nothing else. (Baykal's Group Speech on 25.12.2007).

Turkishness is a neutral entity that serves as a civic-republican identity for all the ethnicities in the country. To conceptualize Turkishness as one of the identities in a society is part of a political project in which a bi-national state legalizes Kurds' status

as a constituent people of the state. According to Baykal, such thinking cannot be acceptable.¹²⁰

The citizenship of the Republic of Türkiye is not a primary identity. One should tell the prime minister. This identity is juridical. This cannot substitute the Turkish Nation. It would help if you accepted the Turkish Nation term. You should not be afraid of or ashamed of saying the Turkish Nation. You should know the term the Turkish Nation is not the violation of others` ethnic identities. (Baykal`s Group Speech on 22.11.2005)

Later, under Kılıçdaroğlu`s leadership, one of the thornier issues of the new constitution in 2011 was again the definition of citizenship. To define civic, inclusive citizenship was one of the main concerns of the new constitution discussions. Article 66 of the constitution describes Turkishness rather than a citizenship entity: "Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk." Therefore, the discussions concerned the "Turkishness of the citizenship." Kılıçdaroğlu clearly stated that the only red line of the party in the constitution conciliation process is the first three articles of the current constitution. In that manner, a new citizenship definition can be negotiable.¹²¹ Also, in the 2011 election manifesto, the party promised ethnically neutral and plural citizenship (2011 election manifesto)

During the Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission meeting, which was set up to compose Turkey's new constitution, the parties presented their citizenship proposals. The BDP was against terms such as "Turkish nation" or "Turkish" in the new constitution¹²². Instead, "the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey" or "the citizenship of Turkey" were suggested by the party. The AKP also supported a similar formulation. However, AKP tried to avoid discussing what the term "Turk" indicates. Instead, the party defined citizenship as a bond between the individual and the state. Therefore, in a new formulation of citizenship, the state's name, the Republic of Turkey, should be employed.¹²³ The AKP proposal states that "the people who are

¹²⁰ For the examples please see Baykal` interview with Yigit Bulut and Bilal Cetin in CNN Türk on 19.08.2005 and Baykal`s interview with Yavuz Oghan in Cnn Türk, on 20 10 2006.

¹²¹ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/kilicdaroglu-vatandaslik-tanimi-on-sartlarimiz-arasinda-degil-siyaset-1448141/>

¹²² Altan Tan`s speech in the Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission, 23 October 2012, available at <http://t24.com.tr/haber/tbmm-anayasa-yazim-komisyonu-2012-tutanaklarinin-tam-metni,245141> p.18-19,

¹²³ Mustafa Sentop`s speech in the Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission, 23 October 2012,

bound to the state with citizenship are citizens of the Republic of Türkiye.¹²⁴ The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) strongly opposes the BDP's proposal. The term "Turkish nation" should remain in the Constitution to maintain unity according to the party. They emphasized that a nation is not the same as an ethnic identity, meaning that a nation is usually made up of various ethnic groups.¹²⁵ In that sense, Turk is an entity of a nation, not an ethnic group. These different perspectives reflected themselves in the written formulations of the related article. The AKP and the BDP's proposal entitled the article "Citizenship."¹²⁶ In BDP's article, it is especially emphasized that acquiring the "citizenship of Turkey" cannot be associated with any religion, ethnic identity, gender, or culture. MHP's proposal preserved the entity "Turkish citizenship" and the current formulation of Turkishness with a remark, "*The child of a Turkish father or Turkish mother is Turk.*"¹²⁷

The CHP's lack of consensus about the formulation of the article was evident from the beginning of the commission negotiations.¹²⁸ About the headline of the article, which sparked considerable debate, the CHP member of the commission, Atilla Kart, stated that all of these three concepts, "citizenship, Turkish citizenship, and the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey," are acceptable to the party.¹²⁹ He stated that the party had no specific decision about the name of the looming article. This already indicated disagreement about one of the hottest topics of the citizenship discussions, and during

available at <https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak.aspx> (1 nolu yazim komisyonu), p. 421.

¹²⁴ Mustafa Sentop's speech in the Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission, 22 October 2012, available at <https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak.aspx> (1 nolu yazim komisyonu), p. 390.

¹²⁵ Oktay Öztürk's speech in the Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission, 22 October 2012, <https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak.aspx> 81 nolu yazim komisyonu), p.361

¹²⁶ The AKP's constitution proposal, p.5, available at <http://t24.com.tr/haber/iste-tbmm-anayasa-uzlasma-komisyonu-tutanaklarinin-tam-metni,245108>

¹²⁷ The MHP's proposal of new constitution, p. 5, available at <http://t24.com.tr/haber/iste-tbmm-anayasa-uzlasma-komisyonu-tutanaklarinin-tam-metni,245108>

¹²⁸ During the commission negotiations, Altan Tan (BDP) and Mustafa Sentop (AKP) implied that the citizenship article is beyond the schedule due to the CHP's demand of the adjournment. (Altan Tan, 22. October 2012, Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission, available at <https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak.aspx>, p. 347.

¹²⁹ Atilla Kart's speech in the Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission, 22 October 2012, p. 351, available at <https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak.aspx>

the negotiations in the commission, this attitude was criticized.¹³⁰ Atilla Kart emphasized "the need for social consensus and dialog." He stated that the party would clarify its preference in the case of a consensus and a general agreement. However, about the inquiry of the article, Kart emphasized that the CHP based its policy perspective about citizenship on the "European Convention on Nationality" article 5/1, which states that "*The Rules of a State Party on nationality shall not contain distinctions or include any practice which amounts to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, color or national or ethnic origin.*"¹³¹ Kart offered that equality, non-discrimination, and equal citizenship are inevitable for a new citizenship formulation. From that perspective, he mentioned that the statement "The child of a Turkish father or mother is a Turk" is not democratic and should not be in new citizenship regulation. According to Kart, the term "Turkish citizenship" is not against the principle emphasized above, so it is still an option for the party proposal.¹³² For that reason, the CHP's final proposal includes both terms: "Turkish citizenship means the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey on the grounds of equality without any requirements like religion, language, gender or ethnicity."¹³³

However, during the process, the party factions began expressing themselves loudly and publicly. One of them was Deputy Birgül Ayman Güler's speeches in the parliament during the negotiations about the right of defence in the mother tongue on 23rd January 2013. She stated, "The Turkish nation cannot be held equal to that of the Kurdish peoples."¹³⁴ She referred to citizenship discussions and a new citizenship formulation that does not include Turkishness. In the following few days, she clarified her arguments in a press conference by pointing out that Kurdishness is an ethnicity. Still, Turkishness is an entity of a nation that includes many ethnicities, like

¹³⁰ For the details of the discussion, please see Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission, 22 October 2012, <https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak.aspx>, pp 351-354

¹³¹ Atilla Kart's speech in the Parliamentary Reconciliation Commission, 22 October 2012, <https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak.aspx>, p. 359.

¹³² Ibid, p.360.

¹³³ CHP's proposal, https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/tam_metin.docx, p. 14.

¹³⁴ Birgül Ayman Güler's speech at TBMM, 23.01.2013, available at <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil3/bas/b056m.htm>, in Ete and Eskinat, 2013, p. 25

Kurdishness. Just after Güler made her case, in the middle of the heavy criticisms and declarations of different wings of the party, Kılıçdaroğlu's position was not clear. In the first group speech of Kılıçdaroğlu, where he was expected to answer the criticisms, he declared the media as the main offender in the events and accused the press of interfering with the CHP by government order (Kılıçdaroğlu Group Speech, on 29.01.2013). He just warned the party members against the media and did not mention any controversy in the party. To the contrary, he declared that the party was both social democrat and *ulusalcı* by references from the party program's section about nationalism:

We are a social democrat party. We are the party that introduced social democracy to this country. The word "social" is used for the people. If you put a human in the centre, then your way of politics is a social democracy. If you enlarge the freedoms, then it is a social democracy. (..) We are, at the same time, nationalist. We love our country. Ulusalcılar? Is there anybody who is not ulusalcı? It is one of our six arrows. (Kılıçdaroğlu Group Speech, on 29.01.2013)

In this speech, Kılıçdaroğlu read the CHP's program's section about nationalism and began with a statement that CHP supports Atatürk nationalism. Kılıçdaroğlu especially emphasized his view in statements such as "*The Republic of Turkey is not established in the religion, language, race or ethnicity but on the political consciousness and common ideals*" and "*Our nationalism accepts the pluralism and has respect for all ethnic and cultural identities*" and "*The state has no race*" and "*The state should stand at an equal distance to all ethnic identities.*" Again, this speech did not clarify CHP's position and the party's new elites' approach in the general discussion. Instead, Kılıçdaroğlu chose to emphasize the importance of nationalism for the party.

The CHP's final constitution proposal designed the citizenship article under three optional headings, as it was during the negotiations.¹³⁵ However, it notes that citizenship should be discussed under the constitution's introduction and the Republic's fundamental principles because citizenship is closely related to the term "nation." It is also stated that citizenship should be regulated, considering that it is a judicial entity and depends on the "desire to live together." As mentioned, the party

¹³⁵ CHP's final proposal of constitution available at, https://anayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/calismalara_iliskin_belgeler.aspx, p.9.

had a moderate position at the beginning of the discussions. Now, placing the concept in the introductory part of the constitution and emphasizing the link between citizenship and the term “nation” signalled a change in the position, parallel to the process of the end process, as mentioned above. Finally, in an interview with Fikret Bila,¹³⁶ Kılıçdaroğlu clearly emphasized that the new constitution should inevitably include the term "Turkishness," but in the introductory part.

6.9.6. General Amnesty

As stated above, one of the signals about the “de-securitization of the Question” was the new party elites’ attitude toward a general amnesty. This policy mechanism can be considered a part of the disarmament of the terror organization. It was being discussed as a policy mechanism beginning from the 2000s as a part of repentance laws. Baykal strongly opposed these policy measures and evaluated them as a part of negotiating with terrorism and integrating terrorists into Turkish politics:

The fight against terrorism is a must; it is universal. It cannot be negotiated with terrorism. There cannot be cooperation with terrorism. (...) But now, the USA wants us to forgive them and integrate them into Turkish Politics and society. It is what this law brings. (Baykal’s Group Speech on 29.07.2003).

Baykal also warned about the possibility of Öcalan’s release because of a general amnesty. He argued that the domestic juridical process continued because of the demands of the European Human Rights Court, and amnesty may also include Öcalan’s release. (Baykal’s Interview with Murat Akgün in NTV News on 08.05.2006). However, the general amnesty again became a debate with the Democratic Opening. Baykal here repeated his assessment that repentance laws could not be evaluated as a part of the struggle with terrorism:

To use amnesty as a method in the fight against terror is confusing. Turkey has done this several times. Amnesty is not a struggle mechanism. Amnesty can be discussed when terror is no more on the agenda. It is a brotherhood project when there is a vital observation that there will be no more terrorist attempts. Amnesty is, of course, on the agenda. When? When we see that terror is no more on the agenda, when we are ready to forget our woes, when we see a

¹³⁶<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-yeni-anayasa-genis-uzlasmayla-olmali-siyaset/siyasetyazardetay/12.02.2013/1667706/default.htm>

possibility of peace in the future, then amnesty is on the agenda as a real brotherhood, love, and solidarity project. (Baykal's Group Speech on 12.05.2009).

Kılıçdaroğlu already expressed his contrary views about amnesty and KCK (Union of Kurdish Communities) arrests even when he was not a party leader. During the ongoing discussions of the Democratic Opening, Kılıçdaroğlu announced that the party could administer general amnesty.¹³⁷ Baykal immediately forged and repeated that general amnesty was only possible after the terror threat ended.¹³⁸ He renounced his statement¹³⁹ during his campaign rallies at referendum meetings of 2010, but the party did not present a general amnesty as a policy mechanism in the 2011 elections.

6.10. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I analysed if the party's goal change has reflections on party's Kurdish politics. In doing so, I have also included the SHP period in my analysis because the SHP period has a very important place in the formation of party's Kurdish question framework after the 90s. Therefore, I compared this period with the Kurdish politics of both the CHP under Baykal's leadership and the CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership. In making this comparison, I used Peter Hall's tool that allows to analyse a policy area at three levels of analysis and to determine the level of change. I can argue that the Kurdish politics of the CHP under Baykal's leadership points to a paradigmatic (macro level/third order) change when compared to the other two periods.

The party's definition of the nature of the problem has completely changed, and accordingly the party's instruments in this field and the policy mechanisms appropriate to these instruments have also completely changed. In the Baykal era, the party framed the problem mainly as a problem of terrorism and socio-economic backwardness. The Kılıçdaroğlu era, on the other hand, represents a return to the SHP legacy with its

¹³⁷ <http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/03/07/kilicdaroglu.genel.af.istedi/566643.0/index.htm> in Ete and Eskinat, 2013, p. 23

¹³⁸ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/baykal-genel-afla-ilgili-sozler-yanlis-14055181>

¹³⁹ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kilicdaroglundan-genel-af-aciklamasi-14057940> in Ete and Eskinat, 2013, p.23

definitions of the nature of the problem, but the aims and the means are enriched by the debates of the period. Concepts such as social cohesion and social reconciliation have entered the party's policy vocabulary, thus indicating a richer policy repertoire than the SHP period.

Table 6. 1. CHP's Kurdish Policy Analysis according to the Peter Hall's 3-Level Framework

Nature of the Problem	-Kurdish problem is a problem of democratic deficit, human rights abuses, and socio-economic backwardness -Terror is a result of anti-democratic state practices. -The problem is a political problem, rather than a security problem	-Kurdish problem is a security problem. --Kurdish problem is a problem of economic backwardness	-Kurdish problem is a problem of democratic deficit, human rights abuses. -Kurdish problem is a socio-economic problem (mainly till 2011 elections)
Aims	-Democratization -Establishment of Rule of Law. -Providing political/social/civil/cultural rights on the status of citizenship -Economic Independency of Individual	-An effective struggle with terror inside and out of borders. -Regional development	-Social Peace -Social consensus -Social reconciliation -Democratization -Establishment of Rule of Law -Economic Independency of Individual -Providing political/social/civil/cultural rights on the status of equal citizenship
Instruments	-Elimination of OHAL -Reforms on Judiciary -Reforms on articles of legal regulations about individual human rights - Industrialization -State led development by planning	-Industrialization, planning -Cross border operations - Strengthening of security organs	-Legal organs such as commissions -Neutral and Equal citizenship - Family insurance -Social reconciliation policies

Table 6. 2. CHP's positions on the issues of Kurdish Problem

	Baykal's CHP	Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP
Elimination of Electoral Threshold	Against (Identity politics has no space in democracy)	In favour (Nation's will, for the representation in duality of representation vs stability)
Local Autonomy	Against (Local autonomy can endanger national unity and secularism)	In favour (Accommodative strategy: Party discourse packed the issue with pluralism, however in real politics the issue brought with references to efficiency of administration, quality of public service) Dismissive position at 2015 elections (Effect of Democratic Autonomy Discussions)
Private Broadcasting and Publishing/ Teaching of mother Language by private agents	In favour	In favour
State Broadcasting and Publishing/ Teaching of Mother Language by state	Against (Civic understanding of public sphere, fair distribution of the budget and public resources)	In favour (Framed with fundamental human rights)
Education in Mother Language	Against (National unity)	Against (National unity) Conditional Support at 2015 elections (Accommodative Strategy: framed with the pedagogical arguments, designed as a technical issue)
Defence in Mother's Language	(Possibly) Against (National unity)	Blurred Position One Party, two views (National unity argument vs individual freedoms and right of defence)
Negotiations	Against (The state cannot negotiate with terrorist)	Blurred Position One Party, two views Conditional in favour (Jan 2013-April 2013) (Effect of the claimed constitution bargaining)
A New Citizenship Concept	Against	Blurred Position
General Amnesty	Against	Against

Having identified such a difference at the level of discourse, I have analysed how the party took positions on the main debates of Kurdish politics. Parallel to this thesis' theoretical framework's expectation, Kılıçdaroğlu's vote seeking motivation and Baykal's policy seeking strategies led to different positions of the party on Kurdish politics. The CHP under the leadership of Kilicdaroglu took a different position from the Baykal CHP on almost every issue related to Kurdish problem. Whereas the Baykal's CHP polarised the debate and promoted an ultra-nationalist perspective on the issue, the CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu administration avoided radicalising the issues and tried, whenever possible, to frame them around a democratic discourse that would be more easily acceptable to the public. But this strategy made Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP more susceptible to both the electoral market, the actual agenda and to internal party disputes, and there were frequent retreats and ambiguities in the positions of the party. These two tables above summarize the findings of this chapter.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis aims to explain the party policy change in Republican People's Party from 1995-2015. The intention has been to analyze how the programmatic profile of the party changed during this period under two different leaders, Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu, and how (if any) this change reflected itself in the party's Kurdish politics.

This thesis has been built on extensive quantitative literature reflecting party policy change. The literature provides essential insights into how and why political parties change. However, in Turkish party literature, analysis of CHP party policy is dominated by a socio-structural approach that tended to limit the explanation of policy change to ideological/genesis factors. This type of approach downplays the significance of other factors, such as the effect of institutional/competitional setting and the decision-making process of party elites. In applying an approach that systematically includes these factors and the relations between these factors as variables contributing to the party policy change, this thesis provides a dynamic, flexible, and wide-ranging analysis of party policy change.

This thesis has used the "Party Goals" and "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change" frameworks to develop a more relational and dynamic explanation of the programmatic changes of CHP, concentrating on missing factors and mechanisms in the literature on CHP's policy change. Such an approach would enable us to understand the policy change process as a complex process that takes place in a structured setting but is still a result of party elites' decisions.

This approach presents some assumptions about the relationship between factors and processes. The first assumption is the relation between party goals and party policy.

Party politics as a product of ideology or of the competition setting is a question of the party's predominant goal at that particular time. In contrast to rational theories, the party's sole goal may not be vote maximization. Especially when goals conflict with each other, the goals a party prioritizes are closely related to the institutional setting in which the party is located. The existence of mechanisms that increase a party's policy influence incentivizes that party to seek policy. The strategies of these parties are more rejectionist, and their discourse is more polarising, while vote-maximizing parties have more conciliatory but less stable positions on critical political issues.

Based on the concepts provided by the theoretical approach of this thesis, I set the argument of party policy change as follows: Turkey's state-building and modernizing party CHP changed leaders in 2010 not by choice but by necessity. Under the leadership of Baykal, the CHP was criticized for its unsuccessful election results and policies that were far from understanding and representing the social reality. The policies of the time are evaluated as irrational and unable to make themselves independent from the party's history. However, I here argued that, the CHP adopted policy-seeking strategies between 2002 and 2008. This strategy increased the influence of party ideology on party policies, in line with the definition of policy-seeking parties. Behind Baykal's choice were the institutional features of the regime of the period. The 2002 elections and Sezer's presidency increased the policy effect of the party, which in return motivated party elites to decide in favour of policy-seeking strategies in times of trade-off between policy effect and vote maximization, as in the case of the Veiling issue. The 2007 election campaign also operated under these strategies, differently from the campaigns and policy priorities of the 1995, 1999, and 2002 elections. Especially after the AKP's victory in the 2007 elections, Sezer's handover of the presidency to the pro-AKP candidate Gül and the structural reforms in the system, the CHP's political influence decreased. However, the culmination of this change, the environmental shock, as Harmel and Janda (1994) describe it, was the rejection of the AKP's closure case. When it became clear that the AKP would not be dissolved, signs of a revision in the CHP's political line began to emerge. However, it was only under the leadership of Kılıçdaroğlu that the CHP became a vote-seeking party. As indicated in the literature, the new CHP started to pursue vote maximization strategies to open the party to other social groups and break the party's electoral ghettoization. The reflection of these two different aims in the party's policies can be followed by closely

observing the party's Kurdish policy. Parallel to the theoretical assumptions, as a policy-seeking party, CHP adopted adversarial strategies such as polarizing the debate and embracing rejectionist positions on the Kurdish issue. Kılıçdaroğlu's vote maximization strategies provided a moderate discourse but unstable positions.

To see whether the theoretical framework can explain this case, I have divided the above argument into parts and used different methodological tools for each part. Chapter 3 is dedicated to understanding the inquiry of CHP's party policy change. Although there is consensus in the literature that the party transformed its programmatic profile under the Kılıçdaroğlu administration, there is no systematic research on this subject. In Chapter 3, the data of Manifesto Research Project is employed in order to understand the party policy change in the given period.

The result of the analysis indicates that while similar to social democratic parties in OECD countries in their support of the social welfare state and the expansion of education, CHP, unlike these parties, lags behind on issues of human rights and freedom, and social justice. Instead, the CHP emphasized in its election manifestos mostly non-political positions. This can be considered as one of the party's strategies to move toward the center. Regarding the political economy, the CHP is further to the right than its European counterparts, predominantly favouring liberal market conditions, and rejecting any policy of protectionism or restrictions on the market.

The data indicates that the 2011 elections reversed the trends of Baykal's CHP on some policy issues and normalized the CHP's marginal positions in the 2007 elections. Research has shown that the CHP in the 2007 elections took very different positions on many issues than the party's previous positions. In the 2007 elections, the CHP's support of the EU was at its lowest level, and the party had the least focus on issues of democracy, human rights, and freedoms. At the same time, the 2007 elections emphasized secularism above the CHP average and increased the salience values of internal security and law enforcement policies. Also, the results of the second analysis highlight the peculiarities of the 2007 elections. The 2007 elections presented the highest saliency of hardliner policy components since 1995. Thus, it confirms my claim that the effects of ulusalçı ideology were felt the most in the 2007 elections, and

in this sense, they exhibited a departure from the general political tendency of the 1995-2007 period.

Also, on some issues, Baykal's CHP presented a consistent up or down trend, and the 2011 elections reversed this trend. The new CHP had made the most significant political change in the field of democracy, human rights and freedom, and internationalism. Leaving aside the high emphasis on the 1995 elections, Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP reversed the downward saliency trend of the CHP on these issues. The second change that took place was in the politics of the welfare state. The new CHP focused on this issue more than the CHP under the Baykal administration. In addition, the theme of secularism was framed entirely differently in the new CHP. Instead of the CHP's frame of secularism as the separation of religion and state, the new CHP framed it as a human rights and freedoms issue, representing a return to the 1995 conceptualization. Moreover, a new concept was added to CHP's discourse—equal citizenship. Now, secularism was also framed as an inevitable guarantee of equal citizenship in the party's discourse.

After identifying that the new CHP had changed the party's policy positions, particularly on some policy issues, this thesis examines the existence of relation between party goals and institutional change as the theoretical framework suggest. In Chapter 4, I specified the factors which caused the high policy effect of Baykal's CHP between the period of 2002-2008. The ability of an opposition party to influence the law-making process in a system is closely related to the existence of specific mechanisms in that system. The AKP has increasingly tried to restrict the use of such mechanisms especially in its third term (2011-2015, 24th legislative period). For example, the number of written and oral questions answered, and the rate of parliamentary inquiries being put on the agenda have decreased considerably. In the period of 2002-2007 (22nd legislative period), except for oral questions, more written questions were answered, and more parliamentary inquiry and investigation motions and general motions were accepted compared with the 23rd and 24th legislative periods. Especially in the 24th period, the acceptance rates of the motions decreased significantly. This shows that the CHP had more policy and supervision influence during the Baykal period, especially in the 22nd period.

However, the conditions that remarkably increased the political power of the Baykal CHP in the 22nd period were shaped by the characteristics of the regime at that time as many works of Turkish studies have already presented. In democratic countries, contrary to popular belief, the legislative process continues after the parliamentary process. The influence of the actors and whether or not they strengthen the opposition is contextual. In the period 2002-2007, veto actors played a role in strengthening the CHP's political influence. In particular, the active presidency of President Sezer blocked many laws of the AKP. CHP also appealed to the constitutional court more in this period than in the other periods. Nevertheless, the nullity decisions of the constitutional court remained the same. Therefore, it was primarily Sezer's active presidency that empowered Baykal's CHP policy effect between 2002 and 2007.

From 2011-2015, when Kılıçdaroğlu became the party's leader, the CHP's policy affect radically decreased. As emphasized before, the mechanisms that allow the opposition party in parliament to exercise its supervision power had not been used efficiently in this period. In the means of motions or questions, the government either did not put the opposition's motions on the agenda or did not respond to them. In addition, as can be seen from the examples in the chapter 4, the AKP employed tactics such as preventing investigation mechanisms, delaying nominating the members, and vetoing opposition members for commissions to prevent the CHP from using these mechanisms. Although the CHP also resorted to tactics such as protesting in the parliament and prolonging speech during plenary, its political influence remained weak. In most tense cases, AKP's legislative bills were enacted without significant problems. It can be said that the relationship that the theory establishes between party strategies and the effect of the institutional structure of the party on the political power of that party also existed in CHP's case. Owing to Sezer's presidency and AKP's relatively hesitant attitude, the institutional setting of CHP contributed to the policy effect of the party in the period 2002-2007, providing the incentives to pursue policy-seeking objectives.

As mentioned before, this thesis aims to understand the institutional reasons behind CHP's change. As the literature has established, the change of party leaders has been influential in contributing to party change. In the context of CHP, this thesis expands upon it to include environmental changes. While the question of what the CHP's

programmatic profile would have been had the AKP been dissolved remains speculative, the radically changed discourse and saliency profile of the party in the immediate aftermath of the closure case's dismissal suggests that this case had an impact on the party elites' policy decisions.

Starting with the 2007 elections, the process created, in Harmel and Janda's (1994) terminology, a *trend* that led to fundamental changes in the institutional environment of the CHP. The AKP changed the institutional structure that contributed to the CHP's political influence. When Sezer's term as president ended, Abdullah Gül, one of the founders of the AKP, was elected by the people as president. Nevertheless, reflecting this change in CHP's party politics was only possible after the dismissal of the closure case of the AKP proper to the term "environmental shock." By the end of 2008, there was a change in the programmatic profile of the CHP, which was reflected in the congress speeches and the 2009 election campaign. Due to the context, the party based its 2009 election campaign on the economy and corruption. It reduced its saliency on secularism, which is the soft underbelly of the party for the medium voter. Moreover, with the impact of the Ergenekon investigation, a new discourse about the democratization of institutions and putting a brake on the AKP's anti-democratic practices entered the party repertoire. This change showed that already in 2008 Baykal and the party elites had started to shift from policy-seeking strategies to vote-maximizing strategies. However, a more comprehensive change came under the leadership of Kılıçdaroğlu. While emphasizing corruption, the economy, and the tendency to move away from rigid secularism, the party increased its saliency in welfare politics and social justice to enlarge its voter base. This was a good strategy for a party competing in Turkey's party system and trying to maximize votes, especially considering the economic voting tendency of the average voter, as already mentioned.

However, the most critical feature of Kılıçdaroğlu's period in the party, distinguishing it from previous leadership, was its willingness to open the party to the Kurdish voter. On the one hand, it was necessary for a vote maximiser party that had been completely wiped out from the southeastern region and were competing with a government party that initiated a Solution process to the Kurdish problem. On the other hand, however, the nationalist tendencies of the CHP's core supporters and the fact that the CHP was

actually competing with a nationalist party like MHP in the regions where CHP had received the most votes left the CHP with a tough electoral dilemma. Despite these difficulties, Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP had shown a will to change the politics of the Baykal era on almost every issue that has become a part of the Kurdish problem. The findings in Chapter 6 show that, in line with the assumption of the literature, the Baykal's CHP adopted a very polarising discourse on the Kurdish problem. It had always taken a rejectionist position on issues related to the Kurdish issue. However, its positions remained consistent and stable. Kılıçdaroğlu's era is shaped around a more compromising strategy. The party employed the strategies of avoiding radicalizing the discourse and framing the "hard issues" in a way that median voter would approve—democracy, human rights, national will and even efficiency. Especially on ethno-political issues which would demand the recognition of group rights, the party faced a great reaction from the average voter and its own core supporters although the party elites framed the issues with democracy and human rights. On the other hand, the party's position on the Kurdish problem was heavily influenced by the internal party opposition and the context. Thus, at times, a dual-party discourse came to the fore, and at other times the party's new elites had to take a step back.

This thesis also analysed the party discourse and the change of party discourse on Kurdish politics using Peter Hall's (1993) analytical framework. The party's discourse on Kurdish problem underwent a significant change in the 2000s. In Hall's terms, it was a macro-level/third-order change, which refers to a paradigmatic shift in the party's discourse. With the SHP, the Kurdish problem was defined as a democracy deficit and a human rights problem; the political dimension of the problem was emphasized instead of the security dimension, and terror was defined as a result of unjust practices of the state. Therefore, the aim of solving this problem was defined as democratization, the establishment of the rule of law, the strengthening of the status of citizenship with rights, and the economic independence of the individual. By the 2000s, the nature of the problem had begun to be defined in a completely different way, reducing it to a problem of terrorism and the economy. Therefore, fighting terrorism and the region's economic development became the main objectives. In this sense, the policy mechanisms of the era were minimal in regard to the Kurdish problem. Under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the party returned to the SHP's discourse on democracy and human rights. While the Kurdish issue had started to be defined as

a democracy and human rights issue again, the party placed less emphasis on the security and socio-economic dimensions of the issue. As well, we should consider that the period's vocabulary had expanded, and new political instruments had come to the agenda. Thus, compared to the discourse of the 1990s the CHP's discourse of the 2010s, had experienced a second level of change. The policy objectives and the policy aims were redefined considering this new vocabulary.

I would argue that the party goal approach and an integrated theory of party change approach are helpful frameworks for understanding the CHP's Kurdish politics under the leadership of Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu and the changes in their political positions. This framework allowed us to look at the relationships between the goals of political parties and their policy positions and between them and their behaviour. It gave me two important variables to explain the policy differences in the two periods of the CHP: the regime structure of the party in which the party is embedded and the trade-offs between the different party's goals. These two new variables, in addition to the change of leader, allowed me to explain the political differences between the Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu periods. However, I also encountered some difficulties when applying this theoretical framework to my case. The theory does not provide a mechanism for operationalizing the term policy seeking party and measuring a party's policy influence. I tried to overcome these challenges, firstly by following empirical studies using this framework and secondly by borrowing concepts from other areas of studies.

Additionally, in this study, I was concerned with causality problems as well as measurement problems. Some of the hypotheses presented in the theoretical framework were based on causal relationships. In explaining the effect of a "shock" on party goals and the effect of the character of governmental institutions on party behaviour, the theory did not provide a tool that I could use. In my case, the relationship between the closure case of the AKP and the programmatic profile of the CHP was analyzed using the tools of the process tracing method. As for the relationship between the structure of the CHP's regime and CHP's party behaviour, I had to settle for a *reasonable correlation*, as Strom and Müller (1999) did for the empirical cases in their study. I hope that this thesis can help other studies in this area

with its ways of dealing with these methodological difficulties and the novelty of its theoretical framework.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

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EDUCATION

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science August 2023

Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
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Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
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Thesis Title: "Deciding Which Party to Vote for" in 3 November 2002 Elections: The Case of Tire,

Bachelor in Public Administration September 2002

Department of Public Administration
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RESEARCH and TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Graduate Research Assistant January 2004- August 2014

Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical Uni.

Guest Researcher

Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences (BGSS), Humboldt University
Berlin/Germany

September 2009-September 2010

PUBLICATIONS

Ayata, A. and Ö. Gölgeioğlu Klujs. (2016). Siyasi Kültür (Political Culture) in Siyaset Sosyolojisi: Temel Yaklaşımlar, Yeni Tartışmalar (Handbook of Political Sociology: Fundamental Approaches, New Discussions), ed.by F. Acar and H.F. Uslu, Dipnot Pub., p. 299-329.

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Ayata, A. and Ö. Gölgeioğlu. (2010). Fırsat Eşitliği mi Sonuçta Eşitlik mi? 2000'li yıllarda Kadın kotası tartışmaları (Equality of Opportunity or Equality of Results? The Discussions of Electoral Quota in 2000s in Turkey) in Türkiye'de Toplumsal Cinsiyet Çalışmaları: Eşitsizlikler, Mücadeleler, Kazanımlar. (The Gender Studies in Turkey: Inequalities, Struggles and Acquisitions), ed.by H. Durudoğan, F. Gökşen, B. Emrah Oder and D. Yüksekaker, Koç Üni. Pub., Istanbul, s. 137-159.

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Ayata, A and Ö. Gölgeioğlu. (July 2009) "Withering Away of the Center-Right in Turkey". IPSA Santiago 2009 World Congress of Political Science, 12-16 July, Chile.

Ayata, A. and Ö. Gölgeioğlu. (January 2009) "New Conservatism, New Representatives: Limits of Women's Representation" The First European Conference on Politics and Gender, 21-23 January, Belfast.

Ayata, A. and Ö. Gölgecioglu. (2007) "Local reasons of the loss of power of center-right parties: A case analysis in the small town of İskilip (Çorum)" in Les Parties Politiques en Turquie: Conference Internationale a Paris, 7-8 December, Paris/France.

Gölgecioglu, Ö. (2004) "Alevi's Political History in Turkey" Free University (Berlin) - METU (Ankara) Common Seminar, June, Metu/ Ankara.

TECHNICAL SKILLS

Qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA and QDA Miner

LANGUAGE SKILLS

Turkish (Mother Language)

English (Fluent)

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B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

2010 yılında Türkiye'nin kurucu partisi CHP bir lider değişikliği yaşadı. Partinin en uzun süre liderlik yapan genel başkanı Baykal beklenmedik bir skandalla yerini 2009 yerel seçimlerinde belediye başkan adaylığı olan, seçilemese de kamuoyunda büyük bir popülerlik kazanan Kılıçdaroğlu'na bıraktı. CHP liderliğinde bunlar yaşanırken, Türkiye'nin en zor konularından birisi olan Kürt problemi de önemli dönemeçlerden geçiyordu. Tek başına ülkeyi ikinci kere yönetme hakkı kazanan AKP, Kürt problemine demokratik çözüm iddiası ile bir açılım projesi başlatmıştı. Bu tezin de temel araştırma sorusu Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Kürt siyasetini odak noktasına almaktadır. Bu tez, 2010 yılında yaşanan lider değişikliğinin, partinin Kürt sorunu alanındaki siyasetine etkisini yani partinin bu alana yönelik strateji, söylem ve siyasalarında bir değişikliğe yol açıp açmadığını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Parti siyaseti değişim literatüründe siyaset değişiminin nedenleri, temel mekanizmaları ve bu değişimin nasıl ölçüleceğine dair sorulara verilen cevaplar, iki ana okul altında gruplanabilir. Bunlardan birincisi Lipset ve Rokkan'ın (1967) toplumsal yarılmalar (social cleavages) teorisidir. Bu teoriye göre, devletlerin kuruluş dönemlerinde ortaya çıkan toplumsal bölünmeler, modern siyaset sahnesinde siyasi partiler vasıtasıyla temsil edilmektedirler. Siyasi partiler, bu toplumsal grupların çıkarlarını temsil ederlerken, siyasi parti politikaları da bu temsiliyet ilişkisinin bir ürünü olarak ortaya çıkar ve bu grupların değer ve yargıları etrafında şekillenir. Sosyalizasyon süreçleri bu grupların çıkar ve değer anlayışlarını kuşaklar boyu aktarırken, siyasi partilerin de bu grupları temsiliyeti yine kuşaklar boyu devam eder. Bu noktada Panebianco'nun (1988) partileri kendi tarihlerinin, hafızalarının ve kurum kültürlerinin bir devamı olarak tanımlayan anlayışını hatırlamakta fayda vardır. Bu iki yaklaşımda da, bir anlamda partinin geçmişi, partinin bugününde tümüyle belirleyici olmaktadır. Takdir edilmelidir ki, bu yaklaşım parti siyaset değişimine dair dinamik bir resim sunmaktan uzaktır. Öyle ki, bir siyasi partide gözlemlenen herhangi bir politika değişikliği, ya partinin temsil ettiği grup değerlerindeki bir değişimle ya da daha geniş çaplı toplumsal düzeydeki değişimlerle ilişkilendirilir. Ekonomik değişimler, göçler ya da

demografik sarsıntılar gibi olaylar neticesinde toplumsal gruplar deęişime uğramakta, bu da temsil ilişkisi içinde bulunulan siyasi partileri ideolojilerini ve buna baęlı olarak da parti politikalarını gözden geçirme yönünde zorlamaktadırlar.

Siyasi partilerin parti politikalarını nasıl belirlediğine dair daha farklı bir yaklaşımı rasyonel seçim (rational choice) teorisi ortaya koymaktadır. Bu yaklaşım siyasi partileri, profesyonel siyasetçilerin hükümette olmaktan kaynaklanan belli başlı yararları elde etmeye yönelik olarak örgütlendikleri bir yapı olarak tanımlar. Siyasi partiler, seçmenlerin kendi yararlarını maksimize etmeye çalıştıkları bir yarışma ortamında, maksimum oya ulaşp , iktidara gelmeye çalışırlar. Bu amaç için siyasi partiler, siyasa önerilerini de en çok seçmene hitap eder şekilde düzenlerler. Yani siyasi parti politikaları, en çok seçmene ulaşacak şekilde dizayn edilir. Sosyo yapısal yaklaşımlarda parti ideolojisi, partinin temsil ettiği grupların değerlerini yansıtırken, rasyonel tercih yaklaşımına dayanan teoriler için ideoloji, seçmene parti pozisyonları hakkında bir kısayol (shortcut) sağlar. Parti siyaseti üzerinde etkili olan asıl öęe, seçmen davranışı ve partinin dięer partilerle yarıştığı zemindir. Bu anlamda, parti siyaseti deęişimi de seçmen davranışının deęişimi ya da partilerin yarışma şartlarındaki deęişimle yakından ilgili şekilde değerlendirilmektedir. Buna dair rasyonel seçim teorileri belli başlı hipotezler ortaya koymuşlardır. Buna göre siyasi partilerdeki politika deęişimi, kamuoyundaki deęişimle paraleldir. Partiler kamuoyu eğilimlerine göre, siyasa profillerini, stratejilerini ve söylemlerini yeniden gözden geçirirler. Aynı okul içindeki dięer bir yaklaşım ise, parti siyasalarındaki deęişimi ideolojik olarak karşıt ya da komşu partilerin deęişimleri ile ilişkilendirmektedir. Buna göre siyasi partiler, birbirlerindeki siyasa deęişimlerine karşı hassasdırlar ki, çoęu zaman siyasi partiler, birbirlerine kendi siyasa tutumlarını ‘bulaştırabilirler’ (contagion).

Yine rasyonel seçim teorileri okulunun içinde olmakla birlikte parti hedefleri yaklaşımı, bu okula önemli bir katkı yapmaktadır. Rasyonel seçim teorileri, oy maksimizasyonunu siyasi partilerin tek amacı olarak tanımlamaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla, daha önce de belirttiğim gibi, parti siyasaları da partinin bu yönde geliştirdiği stratejilerin ürünü olarak kavramlaştırılır. Fakat özellikle koalisyon çalışmaları göstermiştir ki, partiler deęişik zamanlarda deęişik motivasyonlar ile hareket edebilmektedirler. Oyları maksimize etme amacının yanında siyasi partiler bazı

hükümet görevlerine sahip olmak saikiyle (office seeking) ya da kamu siyasaları üzerinde etkilerini arttırmak amacı ile (policy seeking) hareket edebilirler. Teori şu noktanın altını çizmektedir, siyasi partiler sadece ve yalnızca tek bir motivasyonla hareket etmezler. Çoğu zaman bu amaçlar arasında bir tür takas (trade off) yapmak zorunda kalırlar. Zaman zaman partilerin bu çeşitli hedefleri birbirleri ile çelişmektedir. Oyunu maksimize etmeye çalışan bir siyasi parti, kamuoyuna çok da sempatik gelmeyen bazı politika önerilerinden taviz vermek ya da bu önerileri gündeme getirmemek zorunda kalabilir. Ya da benzer şekilde oy kayıplarını göze alarak, parti pozisyonlarında ısrar edebilir. Öte yandan, örneğin, bir parti bir koalisyon hükümetinde yer alabilmek için daha önce kamuoyuna açıkladığı bazı politikalarından vazgeçebilmektedir. Bu örnekler partilerin davranışlarının her zaman oy artırma motivasyonu tarafından belirlenmediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Kısaca partiler oy yanında siyasa etkilerini arttırmak ya da hükümette olmaktan kaynaklanan görevlere sahip olmak motivasyonu ile hareket edebilirler.

Bu takas zamanlarında parti elitlerinin verdiği kararlarla birlikte partiler, bu hedeflere uygun stratejiler geliştirirler. Bu stratejiler de partilerin politika paketleri ve söylemleri üzerinde etkili olur. Partinin çeşitli hedefleri ve partilerin siyasa profilleri arasındaki ilişkiyi kuran teorik ve ampirik katkı, Avrupa'nın sağ radikal partilerinin Avrupa siyasetini inceleyen çalışmalardan gelmiştir. Bu çalışmaların hareket noktasını şu gözlem oluşturmaktadır: Radikal sağ partilerin Avrupa karşıtı siyasetleri incelendiğinde, aralarında hem söylem hem de parti pozisyonu anlamında önemli farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, parti ideolojileri dışında parti siyasetini etkileyen başka faktörlerin bulunduğunu kabul etmek gerekmektedir. Partinin diğer partilerle rekabet ettiği sistemin ülkeye has özelliklerinin yanında, partinin hedefleri de parti siyasalarında ve parti söyleminde etkili olmaktadır. Öyle ki siyasa etkisini arttırmaya çalışan aşırı sağ partilerin Avrupa Birliği politikalarında ideolojileri etkili olurken, oy maksimizasyonu yapmaya çalışan aşırı sağ partiler söylemlerinde ve stratejilerinde kutuplaştırmaktan ve radikalleştirmekten kaçınmakta ve EU konusunu ortalama seçmenin pozisyonuna yakın gelecek bir şekilde ele almaya çalışmaktadırlar. Siyasa etkilerini arttırmaya çalışan siyasi partiler daha reddedici (rejectionist) ama istikrarlı pozisyonlar sergilerlerken; oylarını arttırmaya çalışan partilerin pozisyonları koşullu (conditional) ama çok da stabil olmayan pozisyonlar olarak ortaya

çıkılmaktadır. Oy maksimizasyonu yapan partiler, rekabet koşullarından, kamuoyu görüşlerinden ya da örgütsel tartışmalardan yoğun olarak etkilenirler.

Partilerin bu hedefler arasında verdiği kararlar, parti elitlerinin kararları olsa da , bu kararları etkileyen bazı faktörler önce Strom (1990) ve daha sonra Strom ve Müller (1999) tarafından teorileştirilmiş ve bu hipotezleri test etmeye yönelik empirik çalışmalar eşliğinde sunulmuştur. Bu çalışmalara göre parti elitleri, parti hedeflerine dair kararlarını bir boşluk içinde almazlar. Yani partinin öncelikli hedefi hakkında verilecek kararı etkileyen bazı faktörler vardır. Bu faktörler arasında, tezimin temel argümanı açısından, rejim özellikleri önem taşımaktadır. Buna değinmeden önce ise 'oyun araçsal değeri' (instrumental value of vote) terimi özellikle açıklanmalıdır. Partilerin oy maksimizasyonu yanında başka hedeflerinin de olduğu tezine ilk itiraz, oy dışındaki hedeflerin zaten oyların maksimize edilmesiyle elde edilebileceğine dairdir. Bir siyasi partinin elde ettiği oyun , o sistemde siyasa etkisine ya da bakanlıklar gibi hükümette olmaktan kaynaklanan yararları dönüşmesi, o oyun araçsal değeri ile doğru orantılıdır. Temel olarak şu vurgulanabilir; bir sistemde, oy, bir siyasi parti için diğer getirilere ne kadar doğrudan dönüşürse, o zaman siyasi partinin siyasi hedefleri arasında seçim yapması sürecinde oy maksimizasyonu o kadar öncelik kazanır. Bu dönüşüm sürecini belirleyen özellikle, o siyasi partinin içinde yer aldığı siyasi rejimin kurumlarıdır.

Bir rejimin seçim, yasama veya yürütme süreçleri bu dönüştürülebilirliği belirler. Oyların siyasa etkisine ya da hükümet makamlarına dönüştürülmesi sürecinin ilk adımı, oyların parlamento sandalyelerine dönüştürülmesidir ki bu doğrudan seçim sisteminin etkisiyle ilgilidir. Seçim yasaları, oyların makama veya politika etkisine dönüşmesini doğrudan etkileyen ilk kurumsal mekanizmadır. Çoğu demokraside daha fazla oy, parlamentoda daha fazla sandalye anlamına gelir. Ancak birçok sistemde bu süreçte bozulmalar (distortion) mevcuttur. İkinci adım, parlamentodaki sandalye sayısını, yasama gücüne çeviren anayasal mekanizmaları içerir, örneğin güvenoyu uygulamaları veya o sistemde koalisyon kurmaya yönelik yasal düzenlemeler ve sayısal gereklilikler gibi. Son olarak da bazı kurumsal düzenlemeler, bir parti iktidara gelse bile mutlak bir siyasa etkisine sahip olmasını ya da bazı makamlarda tamamen söz sahibi olmasını kısıtlayabilir. Bazı kurumsal düzenlemeler muhalefet partilerini kayırırken, onlara politikayı etkileme ve ofis avantajlarına sahip olma şansı verir.

Strom ve Müller (1999) Westminster sistemini kazananın (bu durumda iktidar partisinin) büyük bir makam ve politika etkisine sahip olduğu sistemlere; Avusturya, İsveç, Norveç ve Danimarka'daki uzlaşmacı ve kapsayıcı sistemleri ise muhalefet partilerinin politikaları etkilemesine yönelik mekanizmaların bulunduğu sistemlere örnek olarak vermişlerdir. Tüm bu sistem özellikleri bir sistemdeki oyların araçsallığını etkilemektedir. Eğer seçim gücü kolaylıkla hükümet gücüne çevrilemiyorsa veya muhalefet partisi politikaları etkileyebiliyorsa sistemdeki tüm partiler için oyun araçsal önemi azalabilir; değiş tokuş anlarında partiler tercihlerini oy maksimizasyonundan yana kullanmaktan kaçınabilirler. Ya da bir muhalefet partisinin muhalefette olmasına rağmen sistemsal bazı özellikler sebebi ile siyasa etkisi yüksekse, daha çok oy kazanma ile siyasa etkisini artırma arasında doğabilecek çelişkiyi, tercihini siyasa etkisinden yana kullanarak çözebilir. Burada, modeli parti elitlerinin algılarına daha bağımlı kılan şey, öngörülebilirlik faktörüdür. Seçim ve yasama ağırlıkları arasındaki ilişki öngörülemez olduğunda, oyların araçsal değeri partiler nezdinde azalır.

Bu teorik yapının parti siyasalarındaki değişimi açıklamaya yönelik varsayımları da kaçınılmaz olarak partinin amaçları arasındaki değiş tokuşu etkileyen kavramlarla ilişkilendirilmiştir. Yani, özellikle tezin konusunu merkeze alarak, oyun araçsal önemini bir parti için azaltan rejim kurumlarının değişmesi, o partinin hedef önceliklerini tekrar gözden geçirmesiyle sonuçlanabilir. Hedeflerdeki değişiklik kaçınılmaz olarak partinin stratejilerini ve söylemini de etkileyecektir. Harmel ve Janda (1994) parti amaçları teorisini, siyasa değişimine entegre ettikleri çalışmalarında partinin çevresinde yaşanan şokların, partinin siyasa değişiminde en büyük etkiyi yarattığını iddia etmektedirler. Bu hipoteze göre, parti siyasaları özellikle partinin çevresinde meydana gelen savaş, ekonomik kriz, büyük seçim yenilgileri gibi değişikliklerden çok etkilenirler. Parti politikalarındaki radikal değişimler özellikle böyle koşullar altında gerçekleşir. Ancak, çevresel her değişiklik her parti için aynı etkiyi doğurmaz. Bu değişim, partinin öncelikli hedefini etkilediği ölçüde partide bir değişikliği tetikler. Örnek olarak, seçim başarısızlıkları özellikle öncelikli hedefi oy maksimizasyonu olan partileri, diğer partilerden daha radikal biçimde etkiler.

Görüldüğü üzere bu yaklaşım, siyasi partilerin siyaset oluşturma süreçlerine daha yakın bir bakış açısı getirmektedir. Parti Amaçları yaklaşımı, parti ideolojileri dışında parti kararları üzerinde etkili olan faktörleri de ele almakta, partilerin rasyonel seçim teorileri vasıtasıyla irrasyonel olarak nitelendirilebilecek davranışlarını açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bununla birlikte partinin aktörlüğünü odak noktasına almasına rağmen, partinin içinde olduğu rejim özellikleri gibi yapısal faktörleri de yoksaymamaktadır. Bu tezde de bu teorik çerçevenin sunduğu kavramlar ve nedensellik ilişkileri çerçevesinde CHP'nin değişimi analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

CHP, Kemal Atatürk yönetiminde modern Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin temellerini atan, Türkiye'nin en eski siyasi partisidir. CHP ideolojisi Kemalist modernleştirici, laik ve ulus inşacı ilkeler çerçevesinde şekillenmiştir. CHP bu uzun tarihi içinde parti rekabeti açısından 1977 seçimleri dışında çok da başarılı sonuçlar elde edememiştir. Demokrat Parti geleneğinden gelen ve kendilerini merkez sağda tanımlayan partiler ve sonrasında İslamcı gelenekten gelen partiler CHP'ye meydan okumuş ve toplumun daha geniş bir kesimini temsil etmeyi başarmışlardır. 1990'lar ve 2000'ler CHP'si de seçim başarısı anlamında çok farklı bir performans sergileyememiştir. Dolayısıyla, bu dönem CHP'sini ele alan çalışmalar özellikle partinin başarısız seçim sonuçlarına odaklanmakta ve bu başarısızlığın nedenleri üzerinde durmaktadırlar. Bu analizlerde Türkiye'de 1980'lerle başlayan bir toplumsal değişim tarif edilmektedir. Türkiye'de 80'lerden itibaren orta sınıfın erozyona uğraması, farklı gruplar arasındaki eşitsizlik ve dışlanma, hızlı toplumsal mobilizasyon, kültürel kutuplaşma ve özellikle kimlik siyasetinin ortaya çıkışı, farklı bir siyaset ajandası yaratmıştır. Hızlı kentleşme, köyden kente göç ve piyasa reformları kentli yoksul grupları yaratmış, destekleyici sosyal yapıların yokluğundan doğan boşluğu İslami ağlar doldurmuştur. Bu ağların da etkisiyle dindarlık ve muhafazakarlık yükselişe geçmiştir. Sosyo-yapısal geleneği takip eden analizlere göre bu dönemdeki Baykal CHP'si işte bu sosyo ekonomik değişime uygun, gerçekçi yanıtlar geliştirememiştir. Aksine, bu dönem CHP'sinin siyasi profili ultra milliyetçi ve ultra seküler pozisyonlarla tarif edilmekte; Batı karşıtı bir milliyetçiliğin ve laikliğin bir bileşimi olarak dönemin sol düşünce dünyasında kendine yer edinmeye çalışan ulusalcı ideolojinin, bu dönemde, parti siyasaları üzerindeki etkisi vurgulanmaktadır. Böyle bir siyasa profili, özellikle bu dönemdeki oy verme davranışının temel özellikleri göz önüne alındığında daha açıklanmaya muhtaç hale gelmektedir. Türkiye'de oy verme davranışının analizinde kritik

kavramlardan biri ekonomik oy verme kavramıdır. Ekonomik oy verme, özellikle AKP'nin seçim başarısını açıklamada giderek artan bir açıklayıcı güce sahiptir. Bu kavrama göre seçmenin hem kendi öznel refah seviyesini ve/veya ülkedeki genel ekonomik durumu nasıl değerlendirdiği ve yarışan siyasi partilerin bu duruma etkisi, seçmenin oyunun yönünü etkiler. Oy verme davranışının bir diğer bileşeni ise seçmenin ideolojik kimliğidir. Buna göre seçmenler, kendileri ile aynı dünya görüşünü ve değer sistemini paylaşan partilere oy vermektedirler. Ancak Türkiye bağlamı göz önüne alındığında, genel ideolojik bir profilden ziyade din ve milliyetçilik gibi faktörlerin parti seçiminde önemli bir etkisinin olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Kendilerini dindar olarak nitelendirenler, İslami gelenekten gelen partilere oy verme eğilimindeyken, seküler hayat tarzına sahip seçmenler oylarını verirken partinin bu anlamdaki pozisyonuna dikkat etmektedirler. Dindarlık, milliyetçilik gibi öğelerin parti seçiminde sınıfsal aidiyetlerin önüne geçtiği böyle bir yapı da kendi alaturka sağ ve sol tanımını yaratmıştır. Kendilerini daha dindar partiler olarak tanımlayan kişiler kendilerini politika boyutunun sağında konumlandırırken, laik partiler kendilerini solda konumlandırmaktadır. Benzer şekilde Türklük ve Kürtlüğün ana meselelerini ve Avrupa Birliği gibi konulardaki tutumları yansıtan milliyetçilik de partilerin kendilerini tanımladıkları, seçmenlerin oy verirken göz önünde bulundurdıkları haliyle alaturka sağ ve sol siyasetin bir ögesidir. CHP sekülerlik anlamında kendini solda tanımlarken, milliyetçilik açısından merkeze daha yakın bir yerde konumlanmıştır. Türkiye siyasetini toplumsal bölünmeler teorisi çerçevesinden inceleyen çalışmaların odak noktasını ise merkez-çevre teorisi almaktadır. Osmanlı siyasi mirasından gelen, merkez çevre bölünmesi, modernleşen askeri ve sivil yetkililer (merkezi) ile dini, geleneksel ve muhafazakar kitleler (çevre) arasında bir bölünme olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu bölünme aynı zamanda iki ayrı dünya görüşüne işaret eder; bilim, laiklik ve ilerlemeye dayalı bir anlayış ile gelenek ve dine dayalı bir dünya görüşü. Bu gruplar arasındaki Kulturkampf'da CHP, laikleşme ve milliyetçiliğin temel ilkeleriyle bütünleşmiş, bilim temelli bir toplum kurmayı amaçlayan bir siyasi ve kültür devriminin ajanı olarak merkezin, merkezi oluşturan kitlelerin partisi olarak tarif edilir. Bu oy verme davranışı örüntüsü, toplumda artan muhafazakarlık eğilimleri de göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, sağ ve merkez sağ partiler için seçimsel açıdan avantajlı bir ortam yaratmaktadır. Yapılan araştırmalar

da, bu olguya uygun olarak, 1990'lerden bu yana seçmenlerin yaklaşık üçte ikisinin sol-sağ yelpazesinde sağda ya da merkezde yer aldığını belirtmektedir.

Dolayısıyla Baykal CHP'sinin literatür tarafından ultra seküler ve milliyetçi olarak tarif edilen politikaları, ne dönemin sosyo-ekonomik gelişmelerine ne de Türkiye toplumunun seçmen davranışına uygun bir cevap gibi görünmektedir. Parti davranışının nedenlerini anlamaya yönelik çalışmalar iki farklı yaklaşım çerçevesinde konuyu incelemişlerdir. Bunlardan birinci, ideolojinin parti siyasaları üzerindeki etkisi üzerinden hareket etmektedir. Kemalist ideolojinin kendine özgü özellikleri sebebiyle CHP, kendisini değişen toplumsal ve siyasal koşullara uyum sağlayacak şekilde yenileyememekte; CHP, yeni toplumsal meselelere, ideolojik reflekslerle cevap vermektedir. Partide zaman zaman ortaya çıkan, yenileşme ve değişmeye dair irade ise partinin kurucu hikayesi ve ideolojisi sebebiyle başarılı olamamaktadır. Ülkeyi kuran ve toplumu modernleştiren bu ideolojik yapı, şimdi değişen toplumsal koşullara başarılı şekilde cevap veren bir siyasi program geliştirmekte zorlanmaktadır. İkinci grup çalışmalar ise, CHP siyasetini parti rekabeti perspektifinden analiz etmektedirler. Bu analizlere göre partinin siyasi pozisyonları, ideolojik etkiden ziyade parti elitlerinin siyasi sisteme ve güncel parti rekabetine ilişkin özel okumalarına dayanmaktadır. Bu yaklaşıma göre, CHP'nin özellikle katı seküler siyasetinin sebebi CHP'nin laikliği ve Kemalizm'i savunarak, siyasal İslam'ın yüzde 20'lik desteğinin dışında kalan seçmenlerin yüzde 80'inin desteğiyle iktidara gelmeyi planlamasıdır. CHP, İslami bir rejim korkusuyla AKP'den uzaklaşabilecek merkez sağ seçmeni harekete geçirmeyi ummuştur. Bu iki yaklaşıma ek olarak, bu tez, Baykal dönemi siyasetini yukarıda kısaca özetlediğim 'Parti Amaçları' literatürünün sunduğu kavramlar çerçevesinde bir kez daha değerlendirmeyi önermektedir.

Parti davranışının arkasındaki dinamikleri tespit etmeye çalışan her çalışma, öncelikle bu dönemim özelliklerini tanımlamak zorundadır. Yukarıda bahsedilen çalışmalar, bu dönemin siyasa özellikleri hakkında birçok noktada fikir birliği içinde olsa da, dönemle ilgili sistematik bir analiz yapılmamıştır. Bu dönemin siyasa özelliklerinin tespiti aynı zamanda tezin ana sorularından birisi olan parti liderliği değişimi ve siyasa değişimi arasındaki ilişki ile de yakından ilgilidir. Daha önce belirttiğim gibi, Kılıçdaroğlu'nun parti yönetimine gelmesi ile birlikte yeni parti yönetimi parti siyasalarında değişiklik vaadeden yeni CHP iddiasını Türkiye siyasetine taşımıştır. Bu

iddiayı arařtıran alıřmaların oęu ya lider deęiřiklięinin hemen sonrasında ya da 2011 seimleri sonrasında yapılan alıřmalardır. Dolayısıyla, bu tez ncelikle Baykal ve Kılıdaroęlu dnemleri arasındaki siyasa farklılıklarını tespit etmek amacını tařımaktadır.

Bu analiz iin Manifesto Arařtırma Grubunun veri seti kullanılmıřtır. Manifesto Arařtırma Grubu, 50’den fazla lkede 600’den fazla siyasi partinin seim bildirgelerini bir kodlama řeması vasıtasıyla incelemiřtir. Bu analizin sonuları siyasi parti pozisyonlarını ve bu pozisyonlardaki deęiřimleri konu edinen birok alıřmada kullanılmıřtır. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin de manifestoları 1950 seimlerinden bařlayarak bu grup tarafından incelenmiř ve tm arařtırmacıların ulařımına aılmıřtır. Bu tezde de , kodlama řemasının dizaynını temel alarak, belli bařlı konular temelinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin 1995-2015 arasındaki pozisyonları analiz edilmiřtir. Bu analiz iki temel sonu ortaya koymaktadır, bunlardan birincisi 2007 secimleri, 1995-2015 arası secimlerdeki parti siyaseti gz nne alındıęında parti genel profilinden bazı noktalarda farklılık teřkil ederken, bazı noktalarda da 1990’larda bařlayan bazı trendlerin tepe noktasını oluřturmaktadır. 2007 seim manifestosu demokrasi, zgrlk ve insan hakları alanına en az atıf yapıldıęı, AB’ne desteęin en alt dzeyde olduęu , merkezileřmeye olan vurgunun radikal řekilde ykseldięi, toplum yapısı ile ilgili kategorilerin en fazla kodlandıęı seimlerdir. Literatrdeki analizlerin aksine 2007 seimlerinde milliyetilik vurgusu partinin genel ortalamasından daha yksek deęildir. 2011 seimleri ile milliyeti pozisyon zayıflarken, 2015 seimlerinde tekrar ykselmiřtir. 2007 seimlerinin bir bařka zellięi de hukuk ve gvenlik alanına seim manifestosunda ayrılan byk alandır. Dięer seimlerin aksine, 2007 seimleri, partinin gvenlik talebinin en ok olduęu seimlerdir. Dikkat eken bir bařka nokta da 2007 seimlerindeki yksek laiklik vurgusudur. Yakından bir analiz, aslında CHP’nin tm seim manifestolarında laiklik vurgusunun olduęunu ancak farklı seimlerde farklı laiklik tanımlarının parti tarafından ne ıkarıldıęını gstermektedir. 1995 manifestosu laiklięi, lkedeki tm inanlar iin zgrlk teminatı olarak tanımlarken, 1999 ile bařlayan srete bir anayasal kurum olarak laiklik vurgulanmıř, ve bununla birlikte daha ok dinin devlet iřlerine karıřmaması gerektięine dair vurgu manifestoların bu blmne egemen olmuřtur. 2011 seimleriyle birlikte laiklięin bu tanımını hala manifestolarda yer almakla birlikte, terim daha bařka bir dzleme daha tařınmıř; laiklik 1995 vurgusuna benzer řekilde ama bu sefer farklı terimlerle, azınlık

dinlerine karşı nefret suçlarıyla mücadelede ve Alevi vatandaşların eşit vatandaşlık taleplerinin hayata geçirilmesinde çok önemli bir kavram olarak altı çizilmiştir. Bu eğilim 2015 seçimlerinde de devam etmiştir.

2007 seçimlerinin kendine özgü niteliğini tespit etmek için kullandığım bir başka yöntem de dönemin bir başka tartışmasına ilişkindir. Yukarıda da belirttiğim gibi, Baykal CHP'si özellikle 2002 sonrası süreçte, AKP karşıtı sol çevrelerde yükselen ulusalcı reaksiyonun bir parçası olarak değerlendirildi. Tezin bu bölümünde, bu değerlendirmeyi test etmek amacıyla, yine MRG verisi ve kodlama şeması kullanılarak CHP'nin 1995-2015 dönemindeki seçim bildirgelerindeki ulusalcı öğeler tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Literatürdeki değerlendirmeler temel alınarak, İşçi Partisinin 2002 ve 2007 seçim bildirgeleri referans metin olarak alınmış ve MRG kodlama şeması ile kodlanmıştır. Bu analiz ile ulusalcılığın bir siyasi parti programı olarak hangi siyasa kategorileri içerdiği tanımlanmış ve bu kategorilerin CHP seçim bildirgelerinde ne kadar vurgulandığı araştırılmıştır. Bu analizin sonrasında da 2007 seçimlerinin bu etkinin en fazla olduğu seçimler olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Öte yandan, Yeni CHP'nin siyasa değişikliği iddiası 2011 ve 2015 seçimlerinde özellikle bazı alanlarda gerçekleşmiş görünmektedir. Parti Kılıçdaroğlu liderliğinde demokrasi, insan hakları ve özgürlüklere yönelik vurgusunu, özellikle 2007 seçimlerine nazaran önemli ölçüde arttırmış, enternasyonalizm anlamında 1990'lar ve 2000'ler CHPsinden çok daha destekleyici bir profil ortaya koymuş, AB desteği konusunda 2002 seçimleri kadar olmasa da partiyi eski AB yanlısı pozisyonuna döndürmüştür. Parti özellikle eşitlik ve refah devletinin genişlemesi kategorileri ele alındığında sosyal devlet vurgusunu 2011 ve 2015 seçimlerinde önemli ölçüde arttırmış görünmektedir. Öyle ki, parti çoğu meseleyi de toplumsal eşitlik kavramı çerçevesinde ele almıştır.

2007 seçimlerinin CHP açısından kendine özgülüğü ve iki farklı liderin önderliğinde CHP'nin farklı siyasa profilleri tespit edildikten sonra birinci soru, 2007 döneminin nasıl değerlendirilmesi gerektiğine dair sorudur. Baykal CHP'si, 2007 seçimlerine yaklaşırken, Parti Amaçları literatürünün siyasa etkisini arttırmayı amaçlayan parti (policy seeking) tipolojisi ile benzerlikler göstermektedir. Bu tür partiler, parti politikalarında parti ideolojisinin etkisinin fazla olduğu partiler olarak

tanımlanmaktadır. Kamu siyasetini kendi ideolojileri doğrultusunda etkilemeye ve biçimlendirmeye çalışmak, bu partilerin temel özelliği olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Oy ve siyasa etkisi arasında seçim yapılması gereken anlarda, bu partiler tercihlerini oy kaybetme pahasına siyasa etkisinden yana kullanmaktadırlar. 2007 seçimlerinde Baykal merkez sağ seçmene de seslenmiş, merkez sağdan da isimler transfer etmiştir ancak hem dönemi inceleyen literatür hem de bu tez kapsamında 2007 seçimleriyle ilgili yapılan analiz, milliyetçi ve seküler bir söylem ve siyaset tarzının partiye hakim olduğunu göstermektedir. Partinin bu dönemdeki katı milliyetçi siyaseti ortalama seçmenin giderek milliyetçileşen eğilimleri göz önüne alındığında anlamlı görünse de, bu dönemde ön planda olan ve seçmen davranışının genel eğilimi ile uyuşmayan laiklik vurgusu özelinde partinin türban politikası, bu parti tipolojisinin davranış özellikleri ile açıklanabilmektedir.

Bu dönemde parti davranışının neden böyle biçimlendiği sorusu da tezin sorularından birisidir. Literatürde CHP ile ilgili çalışmalarda, partinin bu dönemde siyasa etkisinin yüksek olduğuna dair bir gözleme sık sık yer verilmektedir. Bu gözlem 'Parti Amaçları' literatürünün partinin içinde bulunduğu rejimin yapısı ve partinin amaç öncelikleri arasındaki ilişkiye dair önermesi ile örtüşmektedir. Daha önce de değindiğim gibi, bir rejimin kurumları, o rejimdeki muhalefet ve iktidar partilerinin elde ettikleri oy oranının araçsal değerini yani bu oyun parti açısından kamu siyasaları üzerinde etkiye dönüşmesini belirler. Beşinci bölümde de literatürdeki CHP'nin siyasa etkisine dair gözlem ölçülmeye çalışılmıştır. Tezin teorik çerçevesi kapsamında bir ölçme yöntemi tanımlanamamaktadır. Dolayısıyla CHP'nin bu dönemki siyasa etkisini ölçmek için öncelikle „muhalefet çalışmaları“ literatüründen faydalanılmıştır. Bir muhalefet partisinin bir sistemde yasa yapım sürecini etkileyebilmesi, o sistemdeki belirli mekanizmaların varlığıyla yakından ilişkilidir. Baykal ve Kılıçdaroğlu dönemlerinin bu mekanizmalar açısından karşılaştırılması bize ilginç sonuçlar vermiştir. Her iki dönemde de bu mekanizmaların işleyişini düzenleyen yasal zeminde bir değişiklik olmazken; AKP'nin meclis içi anti demokratik tutumları sebebiyle muhalefet partisi bu mekanizmalardan giderek azalan şekilde yararlanabilmiştir. Örneğin, cevaplandırılan yazılı ve sözlü soru önergelerinin sayısı ve meclis araştırması önergelerinin gündeme alınma oranı önemli ölçüde azalmıştır. 2002-2007 döneminde (22. yasama dönemi) 23. ve 24. yasama dönemlerine kıyasla sözlü sorular dışında daha fazla yazılı soru önergesi yanıtlanmış, daha fazla Meclis araştırması ve soruşturması

önergesi ile genel görüşme önergesi kabul edilmiştir. Hem literatür okumaları hem de bu dönemin önemli yasama süreçlerinin incelenmesi göstermiştir ki Baykal CHP'sinin siyasa etkisini bu dönemde asıl güçlendiren mekanizma Anayasa mahkemesi ile birlikte Cumhurbaşkanı Sezer'in aktif cumhurbaşkanlığıdır. AKP'nin meclise getirdiği birçok yasanın yasalaşma süreci bu aktörler eliyle kesintiye uğramıştır. 22. Yasama dönemini, daha sonraki yasama dönemleri ile karşılaştırmak da çarpıcı sonuçlar ortaya koymaktadır. Kılıçdaroğlunun parti liderliğini yaptığı, AKP'nin üçüncü kez tek başına iktidar olduğu dönemde, iktidar muhalefetin önermelerini ya gündeme almamış ya da yanıtlamamıştır. Ayrıca bu bölümdeki örneklerden de görüleceği üzere AKP, CHP'nin bu mekanizmaları kullanmasını engellemek için araştırma mekanizmalarını engelleme, üye belirlemeyi geciktirme ve komisyonlara muhalefetten üye veto etme gibi taktiklere başvurmuştur. CHP de mecliste protesto ve genel kurulda konuşma süresini uzatma gibi taktiklere başvurursa da siyasi etkisi zayıf kalmıştır. Kamuoyunda ve mecliste en çok tartışılan konularda bile AKP'nin yasa tasarıları önemli sorunlar yaşanmadan yasalaşmıştır. Sonuç olarak, bu tezin teorik çerçevesinin ülke rejimi, partinin siyasa etkisi ve amaçları arasında yaptığı ilişkiye dair varsayımı CHP örnek olayında da sağlanmış görünmektedir. 2002-2007 döneminde CHP muhalefette olmasına rağmen, kamu siyasaları üzerinde etkili olabilmiş; bu etki onun oy ve siyasa etkisi arasında yaptığı tercihte, seçimini siyasa etkisi yönünde kullanmasında belirleyici olmuştur.

Yine Parti Amaçları literatürünün yukarıda özetlediğim varsayımlarına uygun olarak, CHP'nin içinde bulunduğu rejimin özelliklerinin değişmesi partideki siyasa değişimini tetiklemiştir. AKP'nin 2007 seçimlerini kazanmasıyla birlikte bu kurumsal yapının birçok aktörü değişmiştir. AKP'nin kurucularından Cumhurbaşkanı Gül, Cumhurbaşkanı Sezer'in yerine cumhurbaşkanı olmuş; Ergenekon soruşturmaları askeri sınıfın önde gelen üyelerinin ilk kez yargılanmasına yol açmış ve 2010 anayasa değişiklikleri ile birçok yargı kurumunun yapısı AKP lehine değişmiştir. Dolayısıyla, CHP'yi siyasa etkisini arttırmayı hedefleyen stratejilere teşvik edici bir rejim yapısı da ortadan kalkmıştır. Harmel ve Janda'nın terminolojisiyle bu gelişmeler, partinin çevresinde bir değişim trendine işaret etmektedir. Yine bu terminoloji çerçevesinde işaret edilmesi gereken bir diğer kavram da çevresel şok kavramıdır. CHP için de bu değişim trendinin tepe noktasını, bir tür şok etkisini AKP'nin kapatma davasının reddi oluşturmuştur. Tezin bu bölümünde test edilen bu argümanın çıkış noktasını yine,

CHP'yi konu alan çalışmalarda buna dair yapılan gözlem oluşturmuştur. Bu iki olay arasındaki nedensellik ilişkisinin kurulması için, süreç takip (process tracing) analizlerinde kullanılan kanıt türü ardışıklık kanıtı (sequence evidence)) kullanılmıştır. Ardışıklık kanıtı, gözlemin varsaydığı nedensellik ilişkisine dair olayların birbirlerini takip edişini nedensellik ilişkisine dair bir kanıt sayar. Temmuz 2008'de anayasa mahkemesi, AKP'nin kapatılması iddiası ile açılan davayı reddetti. AKP laiklik karşıtı odak olarak bazı yaptırımlara uğradı ancak mahkeme partinin bu sebeple kapatılmasını reddetti. Anayasa Mahkemesi kararının CHP parti politikasını nasıl etkilediği, Nisan 2008'deki 32. Olağan Kongre ile altı ay sonra Aralık 2008'deki 14. Olağanüstü Kongre'deki söylemler arasındaki farktan gözlemlenebilir. Nisan 2008'deki Baykal konuşması, önceki dönemin parti politikası özelliklerini devam ettirmekte olup, demokrasi ve cumhuriyet arasında doğabilecek çelişkilere işaret eden; Türkiye'nin içinde bulunduğu anı İslami bir devlet ile seküler bir devlet arasında seçim yapmak üzere olduğu bir an olarak tanımlayan bir konuşma olarak sunulmuştur. Bu konuşmadan yalnızca 6 ay sonra Baykal kurultay konuşmasını bambaşka bir siyasi ton ve içerikte hazırlamıştır. Konuşma daha çok dünya ekonomik krizi ve yolsuzluklar gibi dönemin güncel gelişmelerini içermektedir. Baykal, uzun bir aradan sonra ilk kez hükümeti cumhuriyet ilkeleri üzerinden değil, ekonomi yönetimi ve yolsuzluk üzerinden eleştirmiştir.

O dönemde yaşanan finansal krizin de etkisiyle Baykal'ın konuşmasında neo-liberal ekonomiye yönelik bir eleştiri de yer almıştır. Yine uzun bir aradan sonra ilk kez sosyal demokrasi, özellikle son ekonomik krizde tanık olunan neo-liberal tahribatın panzehiri olarak ortaya konulmaktadır. Baykal'ın konuşmasının bir diğer ayağı da AKP'nin demokrasi anlayışıdır. Medyaya yönelik kısıtlamaları sert bir dille eleştiren Baykal, daha sonra Kılıçdaroğlu'nun söyleminin de temel taşlarından biri olacak ifade ve haber alma özgürlüğünün önemini altını çizdi. Bu kongreden hemen sonra partinin bu dönemde medyada çarşaf açılımı olarak nitelendirilen, partinin muhafazakar ve inançlı kesimlere karşı pozitif bir söylem geliştirmesi ve 2007 seçim stratejisinden radikal bir biçimde farklılaşan, ekonomi, yolsuzluklar ve demokrasi üzerine odaklanan 2009 seçim kampanyası, rejim değişikliğinin ve özelde AKP'nin kapatılma davasının reddedilmesinin parti üzerinde yarattığı değişimin kanıtları olarak sunulabilir.

Buraya kadar olan bölümde tezin temel argümanı şu şekilde ortaya konulabilir: CHP 2002'den 2008'e kadar siyasi etkisini arttırmaya yönelik hedefi diğer hedeflere nazaran öncelemiş ve teorik çerçevenin önerdiği gibi CHP'nin politikaları da rekabet ortamından ziyade partinin kurucu ideolojisi altında şekillenmiştir. Parti, bu dönemde 2007 seçimlerindeki birkaç merkezci strateji dışında ortalama seçmene yaklaşmak yerine kamuoyunu fikrini ideolojisi yönünde şekillendirmeye çalışmıştır. Tezin teorik çerçevesinin önerdiği üzere, bu dönemin rejim özellikleri partinin bu seçimi doğrultusunda teşvik edici bir ortam sağlamıştır. Partinin muhalefette olmasına rağmen , oy oranı ve yasama gücüne kıyasla güçlü bir siyasa etkisine sahip olması; amaç önceliklerini oy kaybını göze alarak siyasa etkisini arttırmaktan yana kullanması yönünde uygun koşulları sağlamıştır. Partinin, muhalif bir bloğun üyesi olarak veto oyuncularıyla birlikte hareket etmesi, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin siyasi etkinliğini azaltmıştır. Sonuç olarak, parti ideolojisinin kamuoyu eğilimleri ile çeliştiği anlarda, parti pozisyonundan geri adım atmak yerine politika etkisini arttırmayı tercih etmiştir.

2007 seçimlerini AKP'nin tekrar kazanması ile birlikte veto oyuncularının gücü azalmış ya da yerlerini AKP yanlısı aktörlere bırakmak zorunda kalmışlardır. Rejimin aktör kompozisyonundaki değişim, CHP'nin amaçları açısından yaptığı seçimleri yeniden gözden geçirmesini gerekli kılmıştır. Bu tezde, AKP'nin kapatılma davasının anayasa mahkemesince reddedilmesinin, teorik çerçevenin kullandığı terminolojiyle, CHP için özellikle bir "şok" olduğu ve partiyi derhal hedef önceliklerini oy arama motivasyonları lehine değiştirmeye yönelttiği iddia edilmektedir. Daha önce belirttiğim üzere, 2009 seçim kampanyası ve 2007 seçim kampanyası arasındaki fark, oy maksimizasyonu yapan bir CHP ile siyasa etkisini arttırmaya çalışan CHP arasındaki söylem ve strateji farklarını da ortaya koymaktadır. Kılıçdaroğlu'nun liderliğinde parti oy maksimizasyonuna dayalı bir şekilde hareket etmeye devam etmiştir. Bu dönemde parti, Türkiye siyaseti üzerine çalışmaların da tespit ettiği üzere, söylem ve stratejilerini toplumun farklı kesimlerinden mümkün olduğunca fazla oy toplayacak şekilde kurmuştur.

Tezin ikinci kısmı , tezin diğer bir sorusunu incelemeye ayrılmıştır. Teorik çerçeve, partideki bu amaç önceliği değişiminin, partinin siyasa pozisyonlarına da etki edeceği hipotezini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu çerçevede, CHP'nin amaç önceliklerinde tespit edilen bu değişimin partinin Kürt sorunu siyasetine yansımaları nasıl olacaktır? Kürt

sorunu hem Türkiye'nin demokrasi tarihi için hem de Türkiye'nin ana akım partileri için zor bir konu haline gelmiştir. Türk kamuoyunda artan milliyetçi eğilimler ve bölge seçmeninin kendi başına kritik bir kitle haline gelerek parlamento kompozisyonunu etkilemesi, Kürt meselesini, oylarını arttırmaya çalışan tüm partiler için zorlu bir hale getirmiştir. Ancak 2000'li yılların seçim sonuçları, CHP için , diğer partilere nazaran daha zorlu bir tablo ortaya koymaktadır. CHP, bu dönemde giderek sadece sahil kesimlerinden ve büyük şehirlerden oy alan bir parti haline gelmiştir. Üstelik batı ve güney bölgelerinde ve sahil kesimlerinde milliyetçi parti ile yoğun bir rekabet halinde olmuştur. Bu da Kürt meselesini parti için hassas bir konuma getirmiştir. Bununla birlikte, yine aynı yıllarda, Türkiyelileşen HDP'nin, büyükşehirlerdeki CHP oyu için bir alternatif haline gelmesi CHP'yi demokratikleşme politikaları yönünde teşvik etmiştir. Fakat Kürt meselesi gibi bir konuda HDP ile demokratikleşme siyaseti çerçevesinde yarışmak, CHP'nin bu konuda atacağı her adımın zayıf kalma (weak positioning) ihtimaline yol açacaktır. Böyle bir ortamda oyunu maksimize etmeye çalışan bir CHP birçok zorlukla karşılaşacaktır.

Daha önce değindiğim gibi, bu tezin teorik çerçevesini belirleyen parti hedefleri yaklaşımı ve bu yaklaşımın temel varsayımları üzerine bina edilen çalışmalara göre parti hedefleri ile parti stratejileri ve parti pozisyonları ilişkilidir. Avrupa sağ partilerinin AB ile ilişkili pozisyonları böyle bir ilişkinin varlığına işaret etmektedir. Bu bölümün sorusu şu şekilde ortaya çıkmıştır: Baykal ve Kılıçdaroğlu dönemleri arasındaki parti amacındaki farklılaşmanın CHP'nin Kürt sorunu siyasetine etkisi nasıl olmuştur? Yani siyasa etkisini arttırmaya çalışan bir CHP ile oyunu maksimize etmeye çalışan bir CHP'nin Kürt siyaseti, teorik çerçevenin öngördüğü şekilde mi farklılaşacaktır?

Bu soruları cevaplandırmak için, CHP'nin Kürt siyasetinde değişimi tespit etmek gereklidir. Bu değişimi anlamak için Peter Hall'ın üç aşamalı metodu kullanılmıştır. Bu metoda göre, bir siyasa alanında değişim üç düzeyde gerçekleşmektedir; birinci ve ikinci düzey değişimler siyasa alanlarında sıkça görülmektedir. Bu değişimler politika araçlarının yeni koşullara göre ayarlanmasını ya da yeni politika araçlarının kullanılmasını içeren 'normal politika yapımı' süreçleridir. Üçüncü düzey değişim ise politika alanına ait söylemde daha radikal bir değişimi işaret eder. O siyaset alanının temel değerlerinin değişmesi, o alanda paradigmatik bir değişim anlamına

gelmektedir. Bu sistemi takiben bu tezde de partinin Kürt sorunundaki söylemi, partinin bu alandaki merkezi değerleri, bu değerlere dayanan hedefleri ve bu hedefleri gerçekleştirmek için ihtiyaç duyulan araçlar kategorileri altında analiz edilmiştir. Bu analiz için öncelikle partinin bu alan ile ilgili raporları, daha sonra lider konuşmaları taranmıştır. Bu analiz sonrasında ortaya çıkan temel bulgu, Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (SHP) geleneği ile birlikte değerlendirildiğinde, Baykal döneminde partinin Kürt siyasetinin paradigmatik, Hall'un terminolojisiyle üçüncü dereceden bir değişikliğe uğradığıdır. Öyle ki SHP ile Kürt sorunu bir demokrasi sorunu olarak tanımlanmış, çözüm sürecinin siyasi düzeyde olması gerektiği ortaya konulmuştur. Terör ise devletin haksız uygulamalarının bir sonucu olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu değerler çerçevesinde, amaç demokratikleşme, hukukun üstünlüğünün tesis edilmesi, vatandaşlık statüsünün haklarla güçlendirilmesi ve bölgedeki bireyin ekonomik bağımsızlığı olarak saptanmıştır. Buna yönelik politika araçları ise Olağanüstü Halin kaldırılması, yargı sisteminde reformlar, insan hakları alanında yasal düzenlemeler ve bölgede sanayileşmedir.

Baykal dönemi CHP'si ise, özellikle 2002 sonrasında giderek artan bir şekilde sorunun tanımını radikal şekilde değiştirmiş, parti Kürt sorununu terörizm ve ekonomi sorunu olarak tanımlamıştır. Sorunun tanımındaki bu radikal değişim, sorunun amaçları ve araçlarını da radikal şekilde değiştirmiştir. Siyasa amaçları terörizmle mücadeleye ve ekonomik gelişmeye indirgenirken; araçlar da bu çerçevede güvenlik güçlerinin güçlendirilmesine ve sınır ötesi müdahalenin genişletilmesine indirgenmiştir. Kılıçdaroğlu döneminde ise SHP dönemi değerlerine dönüldüğü söylenebilir. Bu da yine, Baykal dönemi ile karşılaştırıldığında, üçüncü derecede bir değişimi temsil etmektedir. Kürt meselesi yeniden demokrasi ve insan hakları meselesi olarak tanımlanmaya başlanmış, konunun sosyo ekonomik bir sorun olarak tanımlanması ise söylem içinde ağırlığını kaybetse dahi devam etmiştir. SHP dönemi ile karşılaştırıldığında yeni amaçlar ve araçların tanımlandığı ikinci düzey bir değişimin yaşandığını söyleyebiliriz. Kılıçdaroğlu döneminde, SHP dönemine nazaran, Kürt sorunu, yeni aktörler ve yeni politika araçları zemininde tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Partinin bu alandaki politika repertuarına sosyal barış, sosyal mutabakat, eşit vatandaşlık, sosyal konsensüs gibi terimler dönemin tartışma zeminine paralel olarak bu dönemde girmişler, meclis komisyonları, aile sigortası gibi yeni politika araçları da parti sözlüğünde yeni politika araçları olarak tanımlanmışlardır.

Parti söyleminde politika alanının temel değerleri, amaç ve araçları tespit edildikten sonra, bu alanının önemli konularında nasıl pozisyon alındığının ve bu pozisyonların sürekli olup olmadığının anlaşılması, tezin teorik çerçevesinin argümanlarının bu örneği açıklama gücü açısından önem taşımaktadır. Tezin bu bölümünde, dönemin Kürt sorunu ile ilgili önemli olayları medya taraması yoluyla tespit edilmiş, partinin bu konularda aldığı pozisyon partli liderlerinin grup konuşmaları, mülakatları ve parti dokümanları vasıtasıyla tespit edilmiştir. Bu analiz sonucu ortaya çıkan bulgular, tezin teorik çerçevesinin argümanlarını destekler niteliktedir. Siyasa etkisini arttırmayı amaçlayan Baykal CHP'si, bu konuda kutuplaştırıcı bir söylem belirlemiş, bu sorunu ilgilendiren hemen her mevzuda retçi (rejectionist) bir pozisyon almıştır. Ancak bu pozisyonlar tutarlı ve istikrarlı kalmıştır. Kılıçdaroğlu'nun CHP'si ise Kürt sorununun bir parçası haline gelen hemen hemen her konuda Baykal dönemi politikalarını değiştirme arzusu göstermiş ve terminolojiye uygun olarak adlandıırırsak koşullu (conditional) bir pozisyon geliştirmiştir. Bu pozisyon, yer yer konunun niteliğine, AKP'nin hamlelerine ya da daha sık olarak örgüt tepkisine bağlı olarak zaman içinde değişmekte; bazen de netleşmemektedir. Parti, Kürt siyaseti alanında söylemini radikalleştirmekten kaçınmış, ve kamuoyu için 'sert meseleleri' seçmene daha yakın gelecek şekilde demokrasi, insan hakları, milli irade ve hatta verimlilik söylemleri içinde ele almıştır. Buna rağmen ortaya çıkan gerilimlere bağlı olarak, partinin yeni seçkinleri sık sık geri adım atmak zorunda kalmışlardır.

Sonuç olarak bu tez, CHP'deki siyasa değişimi sorusunu Parti Amaçları teorisinin sağladığı terimler ve ilişkisellikler üzerinden değerlendirmeye çalışmış ve CHP'deki siyasa değişikliğini ve bu değişikliğin partinin Kürt meselesindeki pozisyonlarını nasıl etkilediğini bu kavramlar ve ilişkisellikler içinde incelemiştir. Bu çerçevede, siyasi partilerin oylarını maksimize etmek dışında başka amaçlarının da olabileceğini, bu amaçların birbirleriyle çelişki halinde olduklarında partilerin bu anlamda yaptıkları seçimlerin aynı zamanda onların siyasalarını da etkileyeceğini göstermiştir. Dolayısıyla bu teorik çerçevede, CHP'nin Kürt siyasetindeki değişimini hem tespit etmiş hem de bu alanda lider değişikliği dışında nedensellik ilişkisinin kurulabileceği bir başka değişken de tanıtmıştır; partinin içinde bulunduğu rejimin yapısı ve buradaki değişim. Bu yeni değişken, lider değişimine ek olarak, Baykal ve Kılıçdaroğlu dönemleri arasındaki siyasi farklılıkların nedenini açıklamada başka bir perspektif sunmuştur.

Ancak, bu teorik çerçeveyi CHP örnek olayına uygularken bazı metodolojik zorluklarla karşılaşmıştır. Teorik çerçevenin bu anlamda bazı eksiklikleri tespit edilmiştir. Bunlardan ilki ölçme sorunlarıyla ilgilidir. Teori, bir partinin ‘siyasa etkisi’ terimine çok merkezi bir yer verirken, bu etkinin nasıl ölçüleceği ile ilgili bir mekanizma sunmamıştır. Bu çalışma, bu zorluğu muhalefet çalışmaları literatürden ölçme yöntemleri ödünç alarak aşmaya çalışmıştır. Metodolojik sorunlardan ikincisi ise kurduğu nedensellik ilişkilerinin tespiti ile ilgilidir. Teori, iki değişkenin birarada bulunmasını, nedensellik ilişkisinin kurulması için yeterli saymaktadır. CHP rejiminin yapısı ile CHP'nin parti davranışı arasındaki ilişki ile ilgili, bu tez de, bu teoriye dayanan diğer empirik araştırmalar gibi makul bir korelasyon ile yetinmek zorunda kalırken, kapatma davasının reddinin parti için yarattığı şok ile ilgili olarak süreç takibi metodundan aldığı yöntemlerle bu iki olgu arasındaki ilişki gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır.

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