

POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY IN NATO (1949-2023): A BRIEF HISTORY

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A BRIEF HISTORY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY IN NATO (1949-2023): A BRIEF HISTORY**

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NATO was created to provide security and defense against the Soviet threat and has developed various methods of cooperation between its member states within the framework of strategic concepts that have regulated relations between member states on military and political grounds. The US has placed the concept of interoperability at the heart of the methods of cooperation it has developed and has benefited from them militarily, economically and politically. Interoperability, which is the subject of this thesis, has been conceptualized during and after the Cold War as the modernization and standardization of military weapons and equipment and has been regulated in narrow military terms in strategic concepts, but it has not been made clear that this involves all kinds of political compromises in the process leading to cooperation. This thesis examines interoperability with the 8 strategic concepts, 4 of which were prepared during the Cold War, while the other 4 were prepared in the post-Cold War period. Most of them were related to weapons and military equipment, but some were related to interoperability. The thesis attempts to examine the debate, negotiation process and development of interoperability. It suggests that different factions within member states can use any political means to compete for their own interests, citing interoperability as a reason. The thesis concludes that the

possibility of rivalry between member states can be exploited for the benefit of hegemonic states in a future re-polarized world.

**Keywords:** NATO, Interoperability, European Security, Dependency, Rivalry

## ÖZ

### NATO'DA MÜŞTEREK ÇALIŞABİLİRLİK POLİTİKASI (1949-2023): KISA BİR TARİHÇE

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Sovyet tehdidine karşı güvenlik ve savunma sağlamak amacıyla kurulan NATO, üye devletler arasındaki ilişkileri askeri ve siyasi temelde düzenleyen stratejik konseptler çerçevesinde üye devletler arasında çeşitli iş birliği yöntemleri geliştirmiştir. ABD, geliştirdiği iş birliği yöntemlerinin merkezine birlikte çalışabilirlik kavramını yerleştirmiş ve bunlardan askeri, ekonomik ve siyasi olarak faydalanmıştır. Bu tezin konusu olan birlikte çalışabilirlik, Soğuk Savaş sırasında ve sonrasında askeri silah ve teçhizatın modernizasyonu ve standardizasyonu olarak kavramsallaştırılmış ve stratejik konseptlerde dar askeri terimlerle düzenlenmiş, ancak bunun iş birliğine giden süreçte her türlü siyasi tavizi içerdiği açıkça ortaya konmamıştır. Bu tez, birlikte çalışabilirliği 4'ü Soğuk Savaş döneminde, diğer 4'ü ise Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde hazırlanan 8 stratejik konsept ile incelemektedir. Bunların çoğu silahlar ve askeri teçhizatla ilgiliyken, bazıları birlikte çalışabilirlikle ilgilidir. Bu tez, birlikte çalışabilirliğin tartışılmasını, müzakere sürecini ve gelişimini incelemektedir. Üye devletler içindeki farklı grupların, birlikte çalışabilirliği bir neden olarak göstererek, kendi çıkarları için rekabet etmek üzere her türlü siyasi aracı kullanabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Tez, üye devletler arasındaki rekabet olasılığının gelecekte yeniden



kutuplaşacak bir dünyada hegemonik devletlerin yararına kullanılabileceği sonucuna varmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** NATO, Müşterek Çalışabilirlik, Avrupa Güvenliği, Bağımlılık, Rekabet.

*To the Wise Men  
Who are not silent.*

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION .....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	xii
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. The Research Subject of Thesis.....	1
1.2. The Research Question.....	4
1.3. Theoretical Framework.....	6
1.4. Methodology.....	7
1.5. Organization of the Chapters.....	8
2. THE EVOLUTION OF INTEROPERABILITY IN THE COLD WAR ERA.....	10
2.1. Introduction .....	10
2.2. NATO’s Strategic Concepts from 1949 to 1968 during Massive Retaliation Doctrine.....	10
2.2.1. Interoperability during the time of <i>Massive Retaliation</i> (1949-1968).....	12
2.2.2. Interoperability as a Period of Putting the Big Stones in Corners (1949). 15	
2.2.3. The Negotiations .....	18
2.2.4. Interoperability as Consolidation of the Big Stones (1952).....	23
2.2.5. Reorganizing the Deck for Improved Interoperability (1957).....	25
2.3. Interoperability during the period of <i>Flexible Response</i> Doctrine (1968- 1991) .....	29
2.3.1. Interoperability in the period of Stalemate (1968).....	31
2.4. Conclusion.....	34
3. GREAT BARGAIN IN THE BIG CHESS GAME .....	36

3.1. Introduction .....	36
3.2. Great Bargain in the Big Chess Game (1975-1999).....	38
3.2.1. From Leading Nation to the Competing Nation .....	39
3.2.2. Corner Hunt in the New Europe .....	44
3.2.3. The Great Bargain: Transformation.....	49
3.2.4. 1991 Strategic Concept: Rivalry in Cooperation.....	59
3.2.5. A New Europe, New Relations, and New Interoperability.....	62
3.2.6. From Competing Nation to Global Nation and Politics of Interoperability (1999 Strategic Concept).....	70
3.3. Conclusion.....	75
4. THE BILATERAL APPROACH, THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS FOR GLOBAL SUPREMACY AND RETURN TO POLARIZATION .....	78
4.1. Introduction .....	78
4.2. Bilateral Approach .....	80
4.2.1. Second Wave of Enlargement.....	88
4.2.2. Second Wave of Transformation in Command and Force Structure.....	90
4.2.3. Prague Capabilities Commitment .....	93
4.3. Unilateral Actions, the Lust for Global Supremacy .....	103
4.4. From Cooperation to Polarization Amid Return of a Multipolar World.....	106
4.5. Conclusion.....	113
CONCLUSION .....	116
REFERENCES.....	124
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET .....	136
B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU .....	149

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces in Southern Europe
AFNORTH	Allied Forces in Northern Europe
ATGWS	Antitank Guided Weapons
ARRC	European Rapid Reaction Corps
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
Chad/CAR	Chad and Central African Republic
CDI	Conventional Defence Initiative
CESDP	Common European Security and Defense Policy
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE	Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe
C-VR(90)36	Copy of Verbatim Records in 1990
D.C.	Defense Committee
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
DOD	Department of Defense
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEC	European Economic Community
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HQ	Head Quarter
ICBM	Inter Continental Ballistic Missile
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IFOR	Implementation Force

INF	The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
JFC	Joint Force Command
JIC	Joint Intelligence Community
JSTAR	Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System
LOC	Lines of Communication
LWC	Limited Warfare Capability
LWD	Limited Warfare Doctrine
MAP	Membership Action Plan
M.C.	Military Committee
MINUCRAT	UN Mission in Central Africa
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NAGSMA	Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NRC	NATO Russia Council
NRF	NATO Response Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander in Atlantic
SFOR	Stabilization Force
STANAG	Standardization Agreement
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PGMS	Precision Guided Munitions
PJC	NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
RPVs	Remotely Piloted Vehicles

SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TACM	Tactical Missile System
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Air Defense
TMS	Theatre Missile System
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VJTF	Very High (Readiness) Joint Task Forces
WEU	West European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War Two



# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. The Research Subject of Thesis

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military Alliance as of 2023 comprising of 31 European and North American countries. The North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty, was created as a military Alliance on 4 April 1949. It aimed to establish a balance of power against the Soviet armies stationed in central and eastern Europe after World War II.<sup>1</sup> As stated, its primary goal is to ensure the liberty and safety of its members through military and political measures based on the principle of collective defense. This means that if one ally is attacked, it is considered an attack on all Allies.<sup>2</sup> It has been the longest-lived military organization that reformulated itself through time and has a constant pace of evolution to operate initially on a regional and recently global scope since its establishment. It has always been very dynamic and owes its constant evolution to the changing security environments. It has developed over the years to respond to emerging security challenges in a rapidly changing world.

As well as emerging security challenges, it has also evolved through time and reformulated itself because of technological advancements, new scientific discoveries, and notably political changes inside or around its area of responsibility. This evolution has been done through consensus and cooperation. Once the Alliance evaluates, expects, or find a probable military and political threats that will affect to its existence or its operation, then a draft paper is prepared to discuss through

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<sup>1</sup> David G. Haglund, "North Atlantic Treaty Organization", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Accessed on 12.10.2023, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization>.

<sup>2</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's Purpose", Accessed on 12.10.2023, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_68144.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm).

Standing Group, Committees and Working Groups depending on the national and collective priorities. After finishing debates and negotiations, the alliance produces Strategic Concepts, and they promulgate them. To be clearer:

The Strategic Concept sets the Alliance's strategy. It outlines NATO's enduring purpose and nature, its fundamental security tasks, and the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment. It also specifies the elements of the Alliance's approach to security and provides guidelines for its political and military adaptation.<sup>3</sup>

Generally, in the Alliance, all members are working in resonance with nominally equal rights to make decisions to defend their area of interest. All the decisions are to be reached by consensus, which is a key principle. There are some stages that play important roles in reaching a consensus during a decision-making process while producing strategic concepts. These are the regular official stages:

- i. Committees and working groups,
- ii. Consultation and discussion,
- iii. Emergency consultation,
- iv. Military planning,
- v. Secretary-General,
- vi. National ratification or national decision-making,
- vii. Meeting and summits,
- viii. Declarations etc.

As consensus is a key principle so is interoperability, which is the research subject of this thesis, among members plays an essential role in reaching a decision-if not whatever the outcome- can or cannot promote unity. In other words, if the decisions or military and political contingency plans for collective security serves the general reservations of the Alliance, in the meantime support all member's considerations, one can conclude that there is interoperability in the NATO.

One aspect of interoperability is “the condition achieved among communications electronics systems or items of communications electronics equipment when

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<sup>3</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Strategic Concepts”, Accessed on 12.10.2023, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm).

information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users”.<sup>4</sup> The second aspect is “the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives”.<sup>5</sup> According to the US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, it is “the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks”.<sup>6</sup> In most cases however, interoperability is confined to a very narrow scope of military matters because most of the studies conceptualize interoperability as a solid military jargon in their studies. Logistics, communication, and infrastructure are among the proverbs to define interoperability for many scholars.

Studying the importance of interoperability lies in the fact that it not only fills the gap in the literature, but also provides a solid basis for the relationship between member states in the event of actual tensions and conflicts in NATO. This issue has not been a subject that has been investigated much in order to avoid unrest among the member states. To give an example; speaking about the 2011 intervention in Libya, a senior high ranking European officer, who requested anonymity, stated that the operation headquarters under the responsibility of Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples, based in Naples in Italy, was bypassed and the operation planning and execution was carried out only by the American and British military authorities by establishing under the direction of a separate headquarters (which is a mess hall), even though the JFC Naples has several flexible response plans. Since this incident was interpreted as an incident in which members of other countries were not trusted or were prevented from getting a piece of the pie, it was interpreted as damaging the spirit of the Alliance. It should have been done case by case, although the process of European Defense and Security Identity partially hand over some of provisional command authority for EU-led operations by means of a separable command headquarter and some of NATO’s assets. This event neither fits in to non-article 5

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<sup>4</sup> Joint Publication 6-0, “Joint Communication System”, *Incorporating Change 1*, (2019), DOD, G-1-5, Accessed on 14.10.2023, Available electronic version, [https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp6\\_0.pdf](https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp6_0.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operation”, *Incorporating Change 1* (2018), DOD, G-L-10, Accessed on 14.10.2023, Available electronic version, [https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3\\_0.pdf](https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”, *As Amended through 15 February 2016* (2010), DOD, 118, Accessed on 14.10.2023, Available electronic version [https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp1\\_02.pdf](https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf).

operations nor article five operation. Therefore, interoperability cannot be limited and defined solely for military matters. Reaching a consensus among members should be understood as interoperability because all working groups and policymakers from different nations work together and have to reach a consensus. Hence, interoperability is both a broad understanding of working together at every level in politics, economic, and military environments as well as incorporating logistics, communication, and infrastructure for defense planning and integrated command/control structure into the spirit of unity. Even so, in theory, membership in NATO is equal, but in practice, relations between members are unequal.

## 1.2. The Research Question

Interoperability is defined as “the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks” according to the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. The same NATO official document also refers to it as “commonality”, “compatibility”, and “interchangeability”<sup>7</sup> among allies. Moreover, when asked by officials in NATO, their first explanation is coined with the term “standardization”. Although it may be possible to discern the evolution of the concept of interoperability, the subject in question has not properly been studied since the establishment of the alliance.

It is often disregarded or paid little attention to scrutinize discussions behind the Strategic Concepts either because the subject in the matter has been seen as the Achilles heel by scholars or it has been deliberately absented by policymakers. In his book, *White House Years*, Henry Kissinger made it clear that scrutinizing NATO doctrines and forces too closely might well highlight the inconsistencies between policies and rhetoric regarding European security.<sup>8</sup> He also affirms that carrying out a thorough assessment of NATO's conventional strategy could uncover deficiencies in its policies and critical resources.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> AAP-6, “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)”, *NATO Standardization Agency STANAG 3680* (2013), p.2-C-10, Accessed on 03.10. 2023, Available electronic version [https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/Other\\_Pubs/aap6.pdf](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/Other_Pubs/aap6.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston. First Edition 1979), 477.

<sup>9</sup> Kissinger, “White House Years”, 477.

Moreover, it may be put forward that interoperability, which is sharing a common mindset, materials, and commitment, in cohesion, has not yet been elaborately dominated the agenda of NATO until NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept. In other words, literally, interoperability, as a technical military concept, came into being for the first time in 1999 within a larger conceptual framework of transformation and cooperation within the alliance. The debate reached its peak in the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) meeting, as the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was not effective enough to benefit from it. Particularly, how the treaty nations managed to orchestrate consensus and work together under one flag among culturally, politically, and economically different armies is one of the research points. Hence, there is a need to explore the evolution of the concept of interoperability. Initially, it may seem to be no more than rhetoric, however, when the concept of interoperability is examined, it tells more of economic, political, and military dimensions. Therefore, not only military dimensions of interoperability need to be taken into account but also economic and political dimensions too.

Debates and negotiations among Alliance members on issues of military technology transfer, burden sharing, and internal competition for leadership in general are reflected in the various meanings attributed to the concept of interoperability. Hence, meanings of interoperability may differ from one member of the alliance to others.

This thesis is to examine the different meanings attributed to the same concept, interoperability, by different actors within the alliance, and to see if there is convergence or divergence among the members. The policies produced and implemented by different actors in two different particular doctrines of the Massive Retaliation and the Flexible Response during the Cold War are to be laid down as to whether contested groups that have emerged within the alliance are to be worked out in this thesis. These two particular doctrines were employed by the US in order to bolster NATO's defense as a containment strategy in NATO.<sup>10</sup>

This thesis attempts to examine interoperability as a concept through scrutinizing eight strategic concepts:

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<sup>10</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, (Oxford University Press, First edition 1982), 147.

- 1) D.C.6/1 (1 December 1949),
- 2) M.C.3/5 (Final) (03 December 1952),
- 3) M.C.14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision) (23 May 1957),
- 4) M.C.14/3 (16 January 19689),
- 5) 1991 Strategic Concept (08 November 1991),
- 6) 1999 Strategic Concept (24 April 1999),
- 7) 2010 Strategic Concept (19 November 2010),
- 8) 2022 Strategic Concept (29 June 2022).

As the concept interoperability was reinterpreted in the post-Cold War years, this thesis attempts to illuminate when and where divergence and convergence among the NATO members occurred in the post-Cold War years.

Finally, the thesis attempts to point out the consistencies and inconsistencies of the different viewpoints regarding what are the concepts and what are the practices. To answer the questions related to how cooperation is achieved, and the extent of the cooperation in the context of interoperability are explained.

### **1.3. Theoretical Framework**

This thesis assumes that NATO shares several assumptions of two strong mainstream theories, both liberalism and realism, but that realist assumptions have outweighed the former in terms of self-help, survival, and balance of power since the Alliance's inception.<sup>11</sup> Correspondingly, most of the studies converge on the assumption that the Alliance was established to prevent Soviet military and ideological expansionism where a bipolar world is a great contest. Moreover, realist theory focuses on and establishes the in-depth linkage between power and foreign policy practices. In this sense, the thesis is to benefit from the insights given by the framework and perceptions of realism.

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<sup>11</sup> Article 3 of North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949. "In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". Article 3 prevails the Article 5 which is foundation of the Alliance. Accessed on 22.10.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm).

Despite the fact that states are the only rationale actor in international relations and they compete for power for their survival, constant power competitions do not inhibit cooperation though it has limits. The limits of cooperation in the realist view depend on how absolute and relative gain are respectively distributed among them. In this respect, the concept of interoperability took it for granted that all members of NATO would maximize their own security interests. Nonetheless, French withdrawal from an integrated military command structure in 1966 might prove that states are not always in search of absolute gains. In this sense, the concept of interoperability should be assumed that states do not consider only how they do well, but also, they consider how other members or groups in the alliance do well regarding maximizing their interests (relative gains). To give an example: decisions are taken with the consent of each member of NATO. Turkey's security concern in Syria may not occupy priority for Baltic or Nordic members of NATO, in the meantime, crises in East Europe may not present an urgent security problem for Italy, as they are rather concerned with refugees in the Mediterranean.

Realists consider international institutions as necessary to operate in international relations. However, they view international institutions as if they are "created and shaped as a tool for most powerful states in the system so that they can maintain their share of world power". Yet "it was the balance of power, not NATO per se, that brought stability to Europe during the Cold War".<sup>12</sup> In this sense, since NATO is an institution, it should be noted that there is a connection between realism and institutionalism and that this thesis is to benefit from both approaches.

#### **1.4. Methodology**

While surveying and reviewing literature both primary and secondary sources are utilized. Secondary sources, literature review and data mining are carried out to see whether the secondary literature correctly dealt with the concept of interoperability or not. The strategic concepts which are the main official policy document were the main research areas in order to realize the evolution and regularities of the concept.

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<sup>12</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions". *International Security* Vol. 19, No.3 (Winter, 1995), 5-49, 14.

Their contents are analyzed and compared in order to figure out the evolutions, inner competitions and negotiations among them. Published or online essays, related to NATO handbooks other than strategic concepts, are surveyed to realize convergence and to make connections between concepts to its practice. As primary sources published interviews and declarations are surveyed, observations carried out to see why there are significant number of variables between concept of interoperability and in real politics.

While reviewing the strategic concepts, their evolution from the previous ones, political and military developments in the same period and summit declarations are also reviewed to find out if there is convergence and divergence. Articles related to the same period were also taken into consideration to look for different points of view.

### **1.5. Organization of the Chapters**

The organization of this thesis is as follows: after completing the research question, theoretical framework, and methodology of this thesis in the introduction chapter-first chapter, the second chapter is to be devoted on the evolution of interoperability. Here the most important convergence and discussions among them in the literature on the concept of interoperability are pointed out and the historical background of the interoperability concept from 1949 to 1968 falling under the Massive Retaliation versus Flexible Response doctrines is articulated.

Chapter 3 is to examine how the concept of interoperability took a new shape from 1991 and onwards. This chapter analyzes the political and economic dimensions of interoperability of alliance in the context of the dialogues, capacity building, and capability gaps between existing and new members versus underlying causes of NATO enlargement, transformation, and its relations with the concept of interoperability. This Chapter also focuses on the rivalries inside the alliance among “European Pillar” members/organizations against “Atlantic Pillar” members and others in terms of armament, technology transfer, and the incorporation of their economies into the Western system. New members brought a new capacity gap to the



alliance, let alone economic burden placed their nations on the other hand NATO decided to expand with new members via partnership programs. Chapter 4 examines the evolution of the DCI into the PCC and the U.S. desire for global dominance through unilateral action. This chapter focuses on U.S.-Russian relations in the context of NATO, based on the Strategic Concepts of 2010 and 2022. NATO's new roles outside the Euro-Atlantic region, as assigned by the United Nations, are examined through summit declarations and bilateral agreements. Chapter 5 is the conclusion which answers the questions raised in the introduction and lays down logical consequences of the thesis.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THE EVOLUTION OF INTEROPERABILITY IN THE COLD WAR ERA**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

The historical background to the Cold War interoperability debate is discussed in this chapter. It is appropriate to divide this chapter into two subheadings that provide a clearer explanation of the evolution and robust military dimension of interoperability in NATO. These two subheadings are interoperability during the Massive Retaliation doctrine (1949-1968) and interoperability during the Flexible Response doctrine (1968-1991).

#### **2.2. NATO's Strategic Concepts from 1949 to 1968 during Massive Retaliation Doctrine**

There are eight significant strategic concepts which were produced and four of them were put into practice during the Cold War era. The first strategic concept of NATO was prepared by the North Atlantic Defense Committee, which is called D.C.6/1.

US General Omar Bradley, British General William Morgan and French General Paul Ely drafted the first NATO strategic concept. Each strategic concept is dedicated to defining and framing specific duties and responsibilities of certain members as well as their force and resource allocations at the disposal of NATO. Duties and responsibilities of each member, dependence on capabilities and resources of politically, economically and militarily strong members created a line of division such as small, middle and great scale parties because of the disparities among them. These division lines defined their positions to a degree where their policies designed the course of negotiations. In this respect, there happened inner competitions among different actors before and during negotiations. Interoperability

through cooperation and standardization demands developing capable military as well as domestic political wills regardless of their economic conditions in a way that great scale members want. Needless to say, the change from massive retaliation to flexible response was estimated “an additional cost of \$12 billion a year for the US alone”.<sup>13</sup> This amount was several times more than small and middle-scale members GDPs in 1960s. It should be noted that there are certain reasons behind the D.C.6/1 was given a particular attention, which are as follows: Firstly, the duties and responsibilities of each party are defined based on their capacities. However, this has resulted in certain parties occupying significant decision-making roles until now. For instance: in contrast to France's approach of accepting responsibility for managing African Lines of Communication, the UK aimed to protect Atlantic Lines of Communication. Over time, this goal diminished and led the UK to desire to assume command authority as Supreme Commander of Allied Power in the Atlantic. Secondly, this also created emerging contested group controversies over securing and controlling sea and air lines of communication, ports and harbors included, which gave way to enduring existential problems that later on incited France to withdraw from integrated military structure.<sup>14</sup> Thirdly, characteristics of realist views of international relations such as self-help and mutual aid were overwhelmed though Preambles of the first strategic concept articulated the importance of liberalist view.

D.C.6/1 was the first strategic concept, and it was prepared in such a short time period, which was 42 days total. As the M.C.3 was written as draft by Standing Group on 19 October 1949 and D.C.6/1 was finalized on 01 December 1949, it took a relatively short discussion period to evaluate pros and cons among the members. What is more the Standing Group asked members to handle draft with only hard copies by courier inhibited its electronic transfer, it could deem as spent some time to reach officials.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> This estimate made by Henry Kissinger's Staff before the preparation for an NSC meeting in September 1969. Kissinger, “White House Years”, 470.

<sup>14</sup> Beatrice Heuser, “The Development of NATO's Nuclear Strategy”, *Contemporary European History* 4, no. 1 (1995), 46.

<sup>15</sup> M.C.3/1, “The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area 19 November 1949”, *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, 20. Accessed on 01.10.2022, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491119a.pdf>.

In other words, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization had not as yet had time to analyze and establish its ultimate security system” until D.C.6/1.<sup>16</sup> The draft was sent to signatories by courier and did not allow to be handled electronically on 19 October 1949 and accepted on the first day of December 1949 after discussion and revisions. This led each party to depend heavily on military representatives’ decisions other than their national thorough assessments and guidance during drafting, consultation and negotiation phases which is completely different today. Cooperation was encouraged in research and development of new weapons and in the development of new methods of warfare. While preparing the first concept, they relied on bilateral agreements instead of collective policy inside the alliance. The negotiation was done largely by the representatives of the US and the French militaries, and the rest of the members joined the decision.

### **2.2.1. Interoperability during the time of *Massive Retaliation* (1949-1968)**

There have been three strategic concepts adopted during the period of Massive Retaliation doctrine. These are D.C.6/1 in 1949, Strategic Concept M.C.3/5 Final in 1952 and Strategic Concept of MC 14/2 in 1957 successively. It would be meaningful to classify the first three concepts together as an era of massive retaliation doctrine since NATO’s military strategy had relied on containing Soviets by a massive nuclear retaliation. In other words, any attack on Europe would be answered by a prompt all-out American atomic strike. Obviously, there were not big differences between 1949 and 1952 strategic concepts apart from a slight difference in military command structure. The main differences between the former two and the third one was that Soviet technologic stalemate in terms of strategic nuclear weapons, Limited Warfare Capability as well as communist ideology (political dimension). It should be assumed that interoperability was constructed on the limitations of geographical position, industrial capacity, population and the military

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It is very clear that some of the treaty parties had hard times regarding to the interpretation of the draft. To give an example Belgium asked more information about Atomic Bomb about its effect (drawdown, perimeter etc.), Italy also sincerely told that they had not actually known to respond whether they agree or not to the draft.

<sup>16</sup> M.C.3, “Memorandum by the Standing Group 19 October 1949”, *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, Accessed on 03.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491019a.pdf>.

proWess of the treaty nations in the era of massive retaliation. Main objective of these strategic concepts was to unite the strength of the member nations through combined employment of military forces. It was thought that interoperability could only be achievable through standardization of military doctrines and procedures. It was also believed that standardization of military doctrines and procedures would then lead to combined training and exercises, exchange of intelligence, information and other things included: Cooperation in the construction of infrastructures, upkeep and operation of military facilities, Standardization of facilities for maintenance, repair, and servicing, Standardization of military supplies and gears, Cooperation in the research and development of new weapons and the creation of new forms of combat techniques, under each nation's legal and administrative constraints.<sup>17</sup>

At this point, it should be underlined that interoperability was coined with the terms such as cooperation, standardization, and coordination.

The US Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), known for its remarkable intelligence accuracy about Soviet political, economic and military capabilities (particularly Soviet technological developments), was a worldwide distinguished agency by its being analytic estimates and future intentions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).<sup>18</sup> Studies and analyses of its intelligence reports were important to understand the US policies in terms of constructing the new world order after WWII in which NATO occupied a major role as a military, political and economic organization in world politics. Moreover, it should be assumed that not only US decision-makers based their foreign policies (depending on the assessment and proposals of JIC) but also, they constructed NATO's defense posture against Soviets by means of the strategic concepts, which were introduced to Alliance against capabilities of Soviets. However, JIC's studies were comprised of general aspects of Soviet threats; these estimates also clarified NATO's vulnerabilities as well. It would not be wrong to frame two basic defense and security postures derived from US doctrines defined as the massive retaliation and the flexible response.

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<sup>17</sup> M.C.3, "Memorandum by the Standing Group", 7.

<sup>18</sup> Larry A. Valero, "The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947", *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 44 No. 3 (2000), 5.

JIC determined in late 1945 that Soviets were deficient in trained technicians, strategic air force, modern naval forces, rail ways and military transportation systems and most importantly atomic bomb.<sup>19</sup> The Red Army stayed the only remarkable forces against NATO from post war to 1957. During this period, the Soviets were outnumbered by both men under arms and armored vehicles.<sup>20</sup> Soviets main doctrine was based on conventional land forces through speed beside well application of Limited Warfare. Therefore, JIC concluded that Soviets lacked in necessary war industry to wage a general war to the West.<sup>21</sup> For this reason and as a credible deterrence for the West, it was enough to contain Soviets through a massive nuclear missile attack. Matthew A. Evangelista claims that there were a theory plagued from Churchill to Reagan that “an implacably hostile Soviet Union that could be contained only by threat of nuclear annihilation”.<sup>22</sup> However, this doctrine (massive retaliation of three strategic concepts) could not last long after Soviets launched the R-7 Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) accurately and their achievements of orbiting Sputnik artificial satellite in 1957. As well as their existent Limited Warfare Capability (LWC), these new technological developments added new capabilities to the Soviets. Some scholars articulate massive retaliation doctrines as the doctrine of Eisenhower. However, Kennedy was very cautious to this doctrine in his tenure because of the Cuban missile crises. This doctrine was coined with the term “suicide or surrender dilemma”.<sup>23</sup> It meant that the President Kennedy had only two choices: either to start an all-out nuclear war in a matter of minutes or subjugate to Khrushchev in case of military confrontation.

I contend that massive retaliation doctrine lasted from NATO’s creation to France withdrawal from military command structure. The Strategic Concept of 1949 (D.C.6/1), 1952 (M.C.3/5), 1957 (MC 14/2) were prepared in the lights of massive retaliation doctrine.

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<sup>19</sup> Tolgahan Akdan, “A systemic analysis of the Cold War and Turkey’s postwar drive to the West.”, (MSc.diss., Middle East Technical University, 2014), 5.

<sup>20</sup> Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*. (Veso.1983 London), 54.

<sup>21</sup> Akdan, “A systemic analysis of the Cold War”, 5.

<sup>22</sup> Matthew A. Evangelista, “Russia Looks West, The Myth of Hostage Europe”, *The Nation*, (1983), 567.

<sup>23</sup> Francis J. Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in Europe During the 1960’s”, *The International History Review*, Vol.23, No.4 (2001), 848.

### 2.2.2. Interoperability as a Period of Putting the Big Stones in Corners (1949)

Strategic Concept of D.C.6/1 is the first Strategic Concept of NATO. The acronym D.C. represents for Defense Committee of the alliance. In this part, the thesis is to analyze D.C.6/1 and its evolution. While doing this it will also look for whether cooperation in the context of interoperability is achieved or not. It will look for both the technical meaning of the word interoperability and in general cooperation. Since the trio of generals prepared the draft of D.C.6/1, which was called as M.C.3 (Military Committee), and most of the discussions were among them this part (evolution of D.C.6/1 in 1949) of the thesis conceptualized as a period of Putting the Big Stones in corners.

The Standing Group of NATO composed of a number of military representatives from the US, UK and France<sup>24</sup> drafted a memorandum to the North Atlantic Military Committee<sup>25</sup> as to create strategic concept for the defense of North Atlantic Area on 19 October 1949. This was the first (officially disseminated) draft of the first strategic concept so as to create an ultimate security system for NATO. It was requested that treaty nations send their reviews, comments and proposals within a month in order to reach a consensus on issues such as Preamble, Defense Principles, Objectives of Defensive Concept and Military Measures to implement defense concept.<sup>26</sup> After each parties proposals collected, it was planned to consolidate their views for discussions. It was declared that once all parties reconciled, the final draft would be circulated by the military committee on the first day of December 1949. Any aspect of the draft, M.C.3, was open to discussions in the light of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations. As of 19 October, to 01 December 1949, other than M.C.3, four official papers circulated in order to reach a consensus

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<sup>24</sup> The Standing Group's main role was to coordinate information on defence plans and make recommendation to the Military Committee. The Standing Group of M.C.3 was consisting of General Bradley from the United States, General Morgan from United Kingdom, and General Ely from France.

<sup>25</sup> Senior National Military Representatives of each treaty nation. Generally, a three-star general or admiral who represent for their Chief of Defence (CHOD) or equivalent positions.

<sup>26</sup> M.C.3, "Memorandum by the Standing Group 19 October 1949", *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, Accessed on 03.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491019a.pdf>.

consisting of reviews, comments and proposals of all parties. Because of the delicacy of classification, these documents circulated as complete by couriers.

M.C.3 (19 October 1949) was the first one as a draft proposal to the treaty nations with regards to preamble, defense principles, objectives of defensive concept and military measures to implement it. M.C.3/1 (19 November 1949) was the second one from treaty nations to the Standing Group consisting of all comments and proposals based on national concerns. M.C.3/2 (28 November 1949) was the third paper which was consolidated and amended all discussions collected from the treaty nations. D.C.6 (29 November 1949) was the fourth paper in which consolidated everything on it. Through these discussions D.C.6/1 (1 December 1949) was produced as NATO's first strategic concept.

Signed by General Bradley from the United States, General Morgan from United Kingdom and General Ely from France as a memorandum, M.C.3 was a proposal to the North Atlantic Military Committee. It was stated that (based on previous directives) "NATO had not as yet had time to analyze and establish its ultimate security system".<sup>27</sup> Significance, requirements, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and liberal thoughts of international relations such as "democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law" emphasized more at the Preamble chapter.<sup>28</sup> However, when it comes to Defense Principles, Realist thought of international relations such as self-help and mutual aid occupied major roles.<sup>29</sup> Importance of self-help and mutual aid was further supported by application of the Article 3 while core idea in NATO lie on the article 5. Implicitly, Military Measures to Implement Defense Concept title was describing and defining how to establish military dimension of interoperability. The proposals put forward by the Standing Group suggested five important undertakings and cooperative measures to implement military dimension of interoperability.

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<sup>27</sup> M.C.3 is the starting point in this study. However, there were other papers mentioned as directives such as M.C.2, M.C.2/1, etc. Other papers were neither directly addressing to the other members, nor it is assumed an open discussion between the US, UK and France. Moreover M.C.3 stated that NATO had not as yet had time to analyse and establish its ultimate security system.

<sup>28</sup> D.C.6/1, "The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area 01 December 1949", *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, Accessed on 01.10.2022, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491201a.pdf>.

<sup>29</sup> D.C.6/1, "The Strategic Concept", 3.



First, it was stated that as a main principle that common action in defense against armed attacks would be done through self-help and mutual aid.<sup>30</sup> This meant that the parties “separately and jointly will maintain and develop their individual or collective capacity to resist against armed attacks”.<sup>31</sup> However, it was suggested in the military measures section that mutual help would be done by other nations, as they are able to mobilize their units.

Second, the primary responsibility for the deployment and employment of the atomic bomb was entrusted to the United States. If feasible, other countries could provide assistance to the United States in fulfilling this responsibility.<sup>32</sup>

Third, deploying the majority of ground forces, tactical air support and air defense at the beginning of probable war would be a duty of European nations. This would be assisted by other nations if they could mobilize their forces.

Fourth, other than treaty nations own harbor defense and coastal sea lines, securing and controlling sea and Air Lines of Communication and ports and harbors would be primarily a responsibility of US and United Kingdom.<sup>33</sup>

Fifth, research and development of new weapons and in the development of innovative methods of warfare would be possible within the legal limitations and administrative constraints of each country.<sup>34</sup>

It should be assumed that however, these measures would define the military aspect of interoperability, they were indirectly describing and defining all aspects of interoperability<sup>35</sup> because once all parties agreed and accepted this draft, prospective

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<sup>30</sup> M.C.3 “Memorandum by the Standing Group”, 4.

<sup>31</sup> North Atlantic Treaty, “Article 3”, *National Archives and Records Administration* (NARA 1949), 2.

<sup>32</sup> M.C.3 “Memorandum by the Standing Group”, 5.

<sup>33</sup> M.C.3 “Memorandum by the Standing Group”, 6.

<sup>34</sup> M.C.3 “Memorandum by the Standing Group”, 7.

<sup>35</sup> Political, military and economic aspects of interoperability through duties and responsibilities of members as well as prerequisites to implement collective cooperation such as standardization, combined training, and exercises, exchanging of intelligence information etc.

strategic concepts would be constructed on it accordingly by slight changes. After M.C.3 was sent to all parties, the addressees requested to send their comments no later than 15 November 1949. Comments received from each member were compiled and analyzed elaborately by the Standing Group and named as M.C. 3/1 on 19 November 1949 for discussions.

### 2.2.3. The Negotiations

Here are the most important negotiations<sup>36</sup> that took place through comments from all parties. These negotiations would lead each member up to a position where the borders and boundaries of their roles, duties, and responsibilities are specified. Namely, this would also direct some of them to concessions for consensus. If nothing major happened, depending on the national capacity and particular adroit, their positions inside the alliance will define whether they would be a great, middle or small-scale member. To understand these negotiations, it would not be wrong to illustrate concerns and comments from members in alphabetical order depending on the “Enclosure C” of the M.C. 3/1.<sup>37</sup>

Belgium found self-help and mutual aid problematic since “mutual aid by other nations as they can mobilize” meant that this method would be too slow to help others.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, it was suggested to employ rapid response methods for encountering any attack by means of Air Forces.<sup>39</sup> However, it was also important to define which member would control the employment of the Air Force and which members would benefit from this assistance. Moreover, though having little

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<sup>36</sup> The word “negotiations” used in this study since each party of the alliance would wish that suggestions be examined and be adopted that they might appear in the M.C 3. Therefore, members tried to convince the Standing Group to take their concerns into consideration. “Enclosure C” in M.C.3./1.

<sup>37</sup> M.C.3./1, “Enclosure A,B,C Report from the Standing Group to the Military Committee 19 November 1949”, *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*. Accessed on 03.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491119a.pdf>.

<sup>38</sup> Speed has always been the most crucial element of deployment in times of confrontation between the Soviets and NATO. Blitzkrieg tactic used by Germans (Lightning War) means permitting armoured tank divisions to penetrate rapidly and roam freely behind enemy lines, causing shock and disorganization among the enemy defences. Accessed on 28.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/blitzkrieg-lightning-war>.

<sup>39</sup> M.C. 3/1, “23 November 1949. Enclosure C”, 19.

information about the atomic bomb, Belgium believed that in case of its employment of it, mutual assistance would be useless. Other than these suggestions, Belgium agreed on four out of five important undertakings and cooperative measures put forward by the Standing Group.

Canada responded to M.C.3 as a whole as acceptable but asked for more detailed military guidance at a later date and emphasized the importance of regional planning.<sup>40</sup>

Denmark did not oppose to the US's having primary responsibility of employing atomic bombs, but she proposed to replace the word "carrying out strategic bombing" instead of "delivering atomic bomb".<sup>41</sup> It should be understood here the difference between delivering and carrying out rest in the delivery sites. Of course, delivery sites would bring about problems such as open for sabotages and targets at Denmark's soil. What is more, there was the risk of being targeted by another Soviet nuclear weapon before the ground site launched NATO's nuclear weapon. Another suggestion was about clarifying the defense and control of sea and Air Lines of Communication regarding which specific ports or harbors. This suggestion was very important because it would give members in charge of the alliance (US and UK) some kind of privilege over sovereignty and monopoly. Yet, Denmark had a relatively good deal of ports and harbors close to the Northern Sea and the importance of its exclusive economic zones should not be downplayed.

It was remarkably interesting that even though France was one party (trio) of the Standing Group together with the US and UK on drafting M.C.3, she proposed more changes than any other members did. Some of the proposals were related to quick mutual help and the importance of article 5. Mutual help would be carried out with the least possible delay. France's most important concerns and proposals were based on securing and controlling sea and Air Lines of Communication and ports and harbors. France agreed on this task as the US and UK's responsibility but further proposed giving primary responsibility of organization and control of trans-ocean

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<sup>40</sup> M.C. 3/1, "23 November 1949. Enclosure C", 21.

<sup>41</sup> M.C. 3/1, "23 November 1949. Enclosure C", 22.

lines as long as common cooperation while performing this duty on all oceans and seas. Furthermore, France wanted to assume responsibility for the organization and control of African and Metropolitan territories' lines of communication.<sup>42</sup>

Italy showed no objection to the M.C.3 and was excused for late response.<sup>43</sup>

The Netherlands, after citing an informal meeting with several US officials, wanted a change in other nations' responsibility to help the US and UK while executing the duty of defense and control of sea and air lines of communication. She wanted other nations should help the US and UK with the maintenance of other lines of communication in parallel with their capabilities and agreed responsibilities instead of "if their means permit".<sup>44</sup> Another important suggestion made by the Netherlands was to eliminate obscure words of "insofar as practicable" by adding within the legal limitations and administrative restrictions of each country in the research and development of new weapons and in the development of new methods of warfare".<sup>45</sup> At this point, there should have been two points of view for offering this change. First, there might be real unnecessary words, which cause confusion therefore omitting this would make it clearer. Second, the word "insofar as practicable" might be too flexible to share some of the capabilities with other members. This, in turn, might lead to a place where cooperation such as bilateral particular arrangements have limits or conglomerate inside the Alliance.

Norway offered threat assessments of each region by the Military Committee. Therefore, it was necessary to make a study of overall forces and resource allotments at disposal at the beginning or later phases of probable war, which would require successful defence of each area. Furthermore, she insisted that unless a direct threat or attack to Norway, establishing NATO bases manned by non-Norwegian forces was out of question during peacetime.<sup>46</sup> After all suggestions, discussions, and

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<sup>42</sup> M.C. 3/1, "23 November 1949. Enclosure C", 24.

<sup>43</sup> M.C. 3/1, "23 November 1949. Enclosure C", 26.

<sup>44</sup> M.C. 3/1, "23 November 1949. Enclosure C", 26.

<sup>45</sup> M.C. 3/1, "23 November 1949. Enclosure C", 27.

<sup>46</sup> M.C. 3/1, "23 November 1949. Enclosure C", 29.

negotiations via M.C. 3/1, M.C. 3/2 circulated with a corrigendum, which in the end created the D.C. 6/1 as NATO's first strategic concept.

At this point, five important differences in D.C. 6/1 were reconciled by all parties on the military aspect of interoperability. First of all, the main principle is common action in defense against armed attacks would be executed through "self-help and mutual aid" stayed the same; however, to achieve this, other nations had to "aid with the least possible delay". In this sense, it can be concluded that each party was looking for a guarantee to help each other quickly in the time of confrontation with the Soviets.

Second, primary responsibility for the "employment of strategic bombing was given to the US"<sup>47</sup> nonetheless, the suggestion of this duty by the Standing Group was limited to delivering atomic bombs.

Third, the duty of "providing the bulk of the ground forces, tactical air support, and air defense at the beginning" of probable war stayed at the European nations but other nations would "assist with the least possible delay".<sup>48</sup>

Fourth, "securing and controlling and sea<sup>49</sup> and air lines of communication and ports and harbors stayed primarily a responsibility of the US and United Kingdom"<sup>50</sup>. Other nations would be responsible for securing and maintaining their respective harbor defenses and coastal lines of communication. However, while doing this the US and UK would "cooperate with each nation if they are capable of conducting this duty". This part constitutes the most important existential interoperability problem among the trio.

Fifth, "research and development of new weapons and the development of new methods of warfare" would be possible "within the legal limitations and

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<sup>47</sup> D.C.6/1," The Strategic Concept", 5.

<sup>48</sup> D.C.6/1," The Strategic Concept", 6.

<sup>49</sup> Here is the Atlantic and African Lines of Communications (LOC). In other word, LOCs were constructed on the trade routes.

<sup>50</sup> D.C.6/1," The Strategic Concept", 6.

administrative restrictions of each country”<sup>51</sup>. However, D.C. 6/1 stipulated cooperation in “planning and executing psychological and other special operations” (unconventional warfighting) through bilateral particular arrangements. This concluded that technology and doctrine transfers inside the alliance would be possible solely through bilateral special arrangements. At this point, I content that interoperability in its meaning and value after Cold War much more different from interoperability in the first Strategic Concept.

Even though not being spelled in any words, interoperability in this strategic concept tried to “built on the considerations of geographical position, industrial capacity, population and the military capabilities of each treaty nation”.<sup>52</sup> Interoperability is also coined with the terms such as standardization and cooperation. Stipulations of (“stated as possible”) standardizations and cooperation’s exclusively stayed on the construction, maintenance, and operation of military installations, repair and service facilities, military material and equipment”.<sup>53</sup>

At the negotiation phase, though Norway was the only member to refuse collaboration on the establishment of military installations during peacetime, the Portuguese Government also proposed an amendment to refuse the establishment of proper military bases manned by non-Portuguese on 16 January 1950.<sup>54</sup> It must be understood here that the first strategic concept was prepared in a very limited time when treaty parties started to discuss its pros and cons in their parliaments as their means allowed. Yet the Portuguese; gave up this proposal and agreed on collective cooperation for establishment of NATO military bases on her soil during peacetime<sup>55</sup> in March 1950.

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<sup>51</sup> D.C.6/1,” The Strategic Concept”, 7.

<sup>52</sup> D.C.6/1,” The Strategic Concept”, 3.

<sup>53</sup> D.C.6/1,” The Strategic Concept”, 7.

<sup>54</sup> D.C. 6/2, “Note by the Secretary to The North Atlantic Defense Committee, Attachment A, 16 January 1950”, *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, 10. Accessed on 17.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a500116a.pdf>.

<sup>55</sup> M.C.3/3. “North Atlantic Military Committee decision on M.C. 3/3 a Report by the Standing Group on Portuguese objection to paragraph 8 g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1) 28 March 1950” *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, 26. Accessed on 17.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a500328a.pdf>.

In the first strategic concept, interoperability is defined as cooperative measures that must be taken in advance for defense planning. These measures were included standardization of military doctrine and procedures, joint training, standardization of maintenance, repair and services, standardization of military materials, vehicles and equipment, research and development of new weapons within the legal limitations of the countries, and development of new warfare methods. Although the first strategic concept defined interoperability as measures of cooperation, it confined them to military technical jargon which created two problems. The first problem is the answer to the question according to which and whose standards the standardization should be achieved. Optimum standardization should be aimed at eliminating this capacity gap by taking the most capable one as an example. In this sense, this necessitated technology or armament transfer from those who have optimum standardization. The second problem is that if this standard is to be achieved, why is it intended to be done by taking into account the legal limits of the countries. The US had the best standard, and wanted them to upgrade themselves accordingly, if US congress and national laws allow it to share. This provision has enforced small and medium-scale members dependent on not only to the US nuclear arsenal but also to the US's armament transfer and sale.

#### **2.2.4. Interoperability as Consolidation of the Big Stones (1952)**

The Strategic Concept of M.C.3/5 is the second Strategic Concept of NATO. M.C. represent for Military Committee of the alliance. It was disseminated within similar means after endorsement by the Standing Group and Military Committee on 03 December 1952. In this part, the thesis is to analyze M.C.3/5 and its evolution. M.C.3/5 was a revision of D.C. 6/1 as a second strategic concept of NATO. Since there were not more changes from the previous Strategic concepts, this study conceptualizes this period as consolidation period of the big stones. As Norway offered a detailed threat assessment of each region by Military Committee in D.C 6/1, NATO decided to divide its territory into five regions under two major NATO commanders in 1950.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, Regional Planning Groups to develop Defense plans of each region engendered with this strategic concept. These regions were.

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<sup>56</sup> M.C. 14/1, "North Atlantic Military Committee decision on M.C.14/1 a Report by the Standing Group on Strategic Guidance, Enclosure A, 9 December 1952", *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-*

- i. Western European Region,
- ii. Southern European-Western Mediterranean Region,
- iii. Northern European Region,
- iv. Canada-United States Region,
- v. North Atlantic Ocean Region.<sup>57</sup>

There were no major changes in it when it is compared with D.C 6/1 other than two Major NATO commanders who were Supreme Allied Commandant in Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Commander in Atlantic (SACLANT). However, it seems there was no change in the second strategic concept, there was a great deal of negotiations in terms of nationality for withholding the leadership position of the major NATO commander SACLANT (Norfolk).

The significance of this period lies in the interoperability discussions between the US and the UK. During the creation of the first strategic concept, just as France wanted to take responsibility for the African lines of communication due to the Algerian connection and could not do so, the UK could not take responsibility for the Atlantic lines of communication during the negotiation phase of this concept. It was agreed in the first strategic concept that the duty of “securing and controlling sea and air lines of communication and ports and harbors” given to the US responsibility as well as UK. No matter how France wanted to control a predominant share of African, she could not take it in the first strategic concept. This duty was not only important for NATO’s defense and military dimension of interoperability but also it had tremendous effects for economic and political aspect of interoperability. Controlling ocean, sea and air lines of communication meant controlling whole trade routes. That could create a possibility of demise for UK’s crown as an empire of sun never set. Correspondingly, it should be understood that conducting this duty would definitely provide sovereignty over the oceans and trade routes in question. Therefore, NATO divided its command structure into two major commanders. Since US, General

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1969, 10. Accessed on 17.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a521209a.pdf>.

<sup>57</sup> D.C.13, “North Atlantic Military Committee decision on D.C.13 a Report by the Standing Group on NATO Medium Term Plan, 01 April 1950”, *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, 13-14. Accessed on 17.10.2023. Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a500328d.pdf>.



Eisenhower was acting as SACEUR, UK tried to put an English admiral to command SACLANT in Norfolk. Truman administration refused to give this position to the UK. After long discussions and bilateral negotiations, US admiral Lynde D. McCormick became the first commanders of SACLANT. Most historian believes this dispute brought an end to British hegemony around the globe. Steve Marsh explains this as one of the three biggest event that caused the questions about their bilateral relations and created clashes of national interest between US and UK after WWII.<sup>58</sup> Churchill tried to divide Atlantic between US Navies and Royal UK Navies by means of two-command in charge in SACLANT, however he could not manage. The second strategic concept was supported by a strategic guidance called M.C.14/1 for details of the defense plans.

### **2.2.5. Reorganizing the Deck for Improved Interoperability (1957)**

Strategic Concept of MC 14/2 in 1957 is the third strategic concept of NATO. Its revised version accepted as final decision on 23 May 1957.<sup>59</sup> The significance of this strategic concept lies in two major political and military developments. The very first one is that of reaching nuclear parity with Soviets. The second one is to convince the middle and small-scale members to establish nuclear delivery sites in Europe. Since the Algeria has given to France's integral part of economy, this thesis claim that it has given up for something in return for something. Therefore, this part of the thesis conceptualized as reorganizing the deck for improved interoperability.

One reason for revising and changing strategic concepts is to meet the new security requirements of the alliance. Industrial and technological developments, alongside scientific advancements and sudden sociological events may direct or divert priorities of security requirements. In order to better overcome such security requirements, the planning process to counter them begins with intelligence reports, technical assessments and scientific research.

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<sup>58</sup> Steve Marsh, "Anglo-American Relations 1950–51: Three Strikes for British Prestige", *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 23:2, (2012), 308.

<sup>59</sup> M.C.14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision), "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 23 May 1957, *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, 9. Accessed on 17.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf>.

Contrary to scholars' common belief that NATO established against Soviet threat (depending on JIC reports), it is clear that there was not an impending Soviet military threat after post WWII. Then why NATO was established is another area of study. Nonetheless, to fully understand the reason, one should take a look at the report related to necessary recovery time to venture major armed conflict after WWII for Soviets.<sup>60</sup> The reports reveal that Soviets needed:

- a. "5 to 10 years (probably less) for atomic bomb,
- b. 15 years for fully developed industry,
- c. 5 to 10 years for technicians,
- d. 15 to 20 years for navy to conduct a naval operation,
- e. 5 to 10 years for strategic air forces".<sup>61</sup>

In this regard, it should be understood that there needed at least 10 to 15 years to reach military stalemate between US military superiority and Soviets. Even though Soviets designed their atomic bomb in 1949 and it was in use as of September 1951, magnitude of impending threat for NATO only realized when Sputnik was orbited. The US lagged behind the USSR regarding space research as proved by the Soviet Sputnik in 1957. Moreover, outnumbered land forces, LWC and Soviet influence in non-NATO area made an "Oscillatory Antagonism"<sup>62</sup> between NATO and Soviets. Therefore, it was necessary to renew strategic concept in 1957 since scientific and technical developments such as Sputnik, Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles and achieving nuclear parity added new advantages for Soviets.

As of 1957, Soviets were not militarily weak as it was estimated by JIC.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, middle and small-scale members were dependent on the US information support, intelligent reports for threat assessments emanate from Soviets scientific

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<sup>60</sup> Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised." *International Security* 7, no.3 (1982): 133-134.

<sup>61</sup> Larry A. Valero, "The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947", *Studies in Intelligence Summer 2000 No.9, Unclassified Edition* (2000), 71.

<sup>62</sup> Fred Halliday illustrates 1953-1969 as "Oscillatory Antagonism" while highlighting phases of Cold War.

<sup>63</sup> Valero, "The American Joint Intelligence Committee", 74.

developments. Other than these, delivery means of US nuclear weapons were of their particular interests. The main focus was to develop defense plans by distracting the Soviets from their focus on NATO's center of gravity in case Soviets venture a surprise nuclear attack. To do this, the US must have relocated ground nuclear delivery systems in different regions. In other words, as well as France, middle and small-scale members should be convinced to concur establishment of new nuclear bases in their soils. This gave way to a mutual dependency among great, middle and small-scale treaty parties. Yet the argument put forwarded by treaty members based on as whatever the expectations of the future probable war occur between Soviets and NATO, it was highly possible that there would be a massive nuclear exchange where it could cause a maximum destruction in the European continent. Moreover, though the US was a leading NATO member and steering defense planning and policies, continent of the North America seemingly far from having a preliminary havoc. However, ever since the first strategic concept reconciled it had been defined that.

A basic principle of the North Atlantic Treaty planning should be that each nation should undertake the task, or tasks, for which it is best suited. Certain nations, because of the geographic location or because of their capabilities, will appropriate specific missions<sup>64</sup>

Now that, Soviets reached nuclear equity: NATO's expectation of probable general war substantiated on two different calculations. First, a massive nuclear offensive from Soviets by surprise would conclude the armed confrontation. This was less probable because of the two different counter courses of action assessed by M.C. 14/2. Although delivery of the nuclear and thermonuclear sites on the ground could be devastated by Soviets, once mobilized there would be still likelihood retaliation from un-intercepted countries of Europe. Moreover, this course of action would prevent Soviets from a secondary aerial, naval and land forces operations to seize Europe because of the nuclear drawdown. This was the primary reason why a massive nuclear offensive from Soviets by surprise is less likely. Secondary reason for not expecting a surprise massive nuclear attack was that as well as ground delivery systems of a nuclear respond from NATO (here in US missiles), first

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<sup>64</sup> D.C.6/1, "The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area 01 December 1949", *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, 4.

strategic concept delineated this duty for US by all means possible with all types of weapons. Consequently, it should be assumed that there must have been nuclear delivery systems through submarines and warships, which were hard to locate and destroy by Soviets.

Second calculation on the expectation was primarily based on “through miscalculation, misconstruction of Western intentions by Soviets and a particular Soviet tactics of military operation of limited nature”.<sup>65</sup> These two expectations from Soviets were main focal planning points to the NATO and became corner stones for future defense planning by which dominated the agenda of NATO strategic concepts until the end of Cold War. Therefore, M.C. 14/2 was prepared with a detailed Area Planning Guidance in which it included strategic objectives for each region. These regions were Western Europe, Scandinavia, Southern Europe, the British Isles, North America, the North Atlantic Ocean, Iceland, the English Channel and North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, Portugal, and finally Algeria.

One exclusive attention in 1957 strategic concept was related to France. Algeria recognized as an integral part of the economy of France for its being a very important NATO support area regardless of France’s offer to take the responsibility of securing its line of communication in the first strategic concept. At this point, I contend that the 1957 strategic concept ought to be perceived as reorganizing the deck for improved interoperability.

To sum up, leaving aside the Soviets achievements of being a militarily potent power and achieving tangible technological improvements, which placed her, as a formidable opponent against NATO, there was a period of interoperability by means of rivalry and mutual dependency among members during the massive retaliation era. Since the main deterrent against Soviets was solely US nuclear weapons, middle and small-scale members were dependent on the US nuclear weapons as a shield for them. By means of providing information, threat assessments, and resources -most

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<sup>65</sup> M.C.14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision), “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 23 May 1957, *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, 9. Accessed on 17.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf>. Limited nature means Limited Warfare Capability. This capability overlaps unconventional warfare. This concept has been evolved significantly as “Hybrid Warfare Concept” currently.

importantly nuclear shield, the US steered policies thus its leadership was indispensable for NATO. This dependency was two ways by which from middle and small-scale members to great scale members and reverse. Moreover, interoperability in cooperation is achieved through rivalry among great scale members because of two reasons. First, it was inevitable that Europe would heavily suffer from havoc and drawdown in case there would be a devastating nuclear exchange. Therefore, it should be assumed that some members were unwilling to agree on establishments of NATO bases (in particular US nuclear bases) in their soils during peacetime (Norway and Portugal). Second, having control of ocean lines of communication would provide further privileges over the geo-strategic trade routes in and out of the North Atlantic areas. For this reason, though France tried hard to take African lines of communication by pretexting Algeria, this duty was given to the US and UK.

### **2.3. Interoperability during the period of *Flexible Response Doctrine* (1968-1991)**

One of the important points brought into the light in 1957 strategic concept was that as well as Soviet's achievement of nuclear stalemate with the West, Limited Warfare Doctrine (LWD) of Soviets accepted as number one alternative threat to NATO security.<sup>66</sup> Thus, LWD became NATO's vulnerability. Through 1957 strategic concept, NATO tried to explain LWD as:

infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions in the NATO area, covertly or overtly supported by themselves, trusting that the allies in their collective desire to prevent a general conflict would either limit their reactions accordingly or not react at all.<sup>67</sup>

Even though the 1957 strategic concept stated that NATO was lacking in limited warfare capability, the Alliance could not sophisticate its definition of LWD until the 1968 strategic concept. Apart from infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions in NATO area, it was also accepted that Soviets were trying to gain influence over certain non-NATO nations so that they would take the advantage of disagreements

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<sup>66</sup> M.C.14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision), "Overall Strategic Concept", 11-12.

<sup>67</sup> M.C.14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision), "Overall Strategic Concept", 12.

among members through inner competitions in or out of NATO area.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, NATO introduced new doctrine of the Flexible Response. The Flexible Response was a mixture using conventional and unconventional tactics together as well as nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Kissinger claims that Flexible Response doctrine officially adopted by NATO in 1967 because of the American pressure.<sup>69</sup> In spite of discussions among academicians regarding to its origin and explanation, Flexible Response Doctrine made it clear that there was a change from Eisenhower's suicide or surrender policy, which meant a deviance from excessive reliance on nuclear power to stronger conventional forces.

At this point, I contend that flexible response doctrine started in early 1960's in order to defy LWC of Soviets in the lights of several issues emanated from both European members and US. Some of these issues were such as tactical usage of nuclear missiles, idea of increasing US conventional forces in Europe. Correspondingly US economic problems to sustain military presence in Europe, the US's having dilemma whether to support France's and British nuclear programs, the question of if US supports and shares nuclear programs with France and British, would Germany deserve the same treatment? and command and control issues of tactical nuclear forces".<sup>70</sup>

To overcome these issues US encouraged Belgian Foreign Minister Mr. Pierre Harmel to work on a comprehensive report in which it would create an environment to achieve interoperability. The Flexible Response doctrine finalized by 1968 strategic concept after famous Harmel Report. Ever since the 1968 Strategic Concept, the doctrine of Flexible Response never became obsolete till the collapse of Soviets, but it was revised in several aspects. What is important throughout the Flexible Response Doctrine was that negotiations inside the Alliance took a new shape and even middle and great scale countries affected by the nature Soviets Limited Warfare capability.

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<sup>68</sup> M.C.14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision), "Overall Strategic Concept", 12.

<sup>69</sup> Henry, Kissinger, *White House Years* (Little, Brown and Company, Boston. First Edition 1979), 391. He also claims that official strategy of Flexible Response was pushed through NATO by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

<sup>70</sup> Francis J. Gavin, "The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in Europe During the 1960's", *The International History Review*, Vol.23, No.4 (2001), 848.

### 2.3.1. Interoperability in the period of Stalemate (1968)

There happened so many political, economic and military turmoil around the World after 1957 strategic concept. Since “nuclear weapons have been seen as a symbol and effective guarantee for deterrent, beside NATO, the US assumed, fortified and sustained leadership position in capitalist World”.<sup>71</sup> However, Soviets also made substantial progress. In his book, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, Fred Halliday describes these years (from 1957 to Detente) as *The Decline of US Military Superiority*.<sup>72</sup> When comparing the military strength of the US and Soviets in Europe during the 1960s, there was equal nuclear delivery systems, warhead numbers, and mega tonnage. However, the US had advantages in the accuracy and mobility of their tactical nuclear forces, whereas the Soviets had larger conventional forces with more men under arms and tanks.<sup>73</sup>

Having realized this figure and the lack in LWD, NATO faced several other security problems. These included the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the Soviet Union's concentrated attention on the LWC, specifically Eastern Europe and other regions, France's refusal to agree to policies advocated by US leadership in order to meet the Flexible Response doctrine requirements, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and so on. Considering these security issues, NATO endeavored to identify its forthcoming security challenges. After nearly 20 years from its establishment, NATO was the first time put itself into a question as of 1966 France's withdrawal from military command structure. Therefore, under the supervision of Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, a report was prepared and unanimously approved by the defense ministers on 14 December 1967.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, 2 days prior to Harmel Report, NATO Defense Planning Committee adopted a new strategic concept called M.C. 14/3. Yet, it could not put into practice this renewed strategic concept until 16

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<sup>71</sup> Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, (Veso.1983 London), 48.

<sup>72</sup> Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, 51.

<sup>73</sup> Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, 53.

<sup>74</sup> The Future Tasks of the Alliance, “Report of the Council, The Harmel Report”, 13 December 1967. Accessed on 15.10.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_26700.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm).

January 1968 because of the three interoperability problems in the Alliance. These problems included the confusion resulted from wording and interpretation of certain passages of Ministerial Guidance,<sup>75</sup> negotiations inside the Alliance related to the question of how to share 7,000 tactical nuclear war heads in Europe,<sup>76</sup> and objections regarding to force proposals and allocations from member states to NATO force structure disposition.<sup>77</sup>

Therefore, the 1968 strategic concept, called MC 14/3 (Final), was put into effect on 16 January 1968 and supported by M.C. 48/3, which included measures for its implementation.

What made M.C. 14/3 (Final) unique from the previous three strategic concepts were the threat assessments. Though established in early 1955, the Warsaw Pact and its capabilities laid on for the first time in MC 14/3 (Final). Previously lacked in LWC, NATO added its threats portfolio newer threat assessments emanated from Soviets. To sum up these were included: Soviets not only achieved a nuclear stalemate between NATO but also they added new capability to use chemical and biological weapons with the help of technologic developments and armaments transfer through Warsaw Pact,<sup>78</sup> “As well as the conventional military improvements in tactics, Soviets improved their LWC in terms of subversion, propaganda and covert actions by mixing politico-military pressures, ultimatums, military demonstrations and deployment of forces”,<sup>79</sup> “Communist ideology”, “Economic solidarity among

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<sup>75</sup> M.C.14/3 (Final), “A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee On Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area, 16 January 1968”, i. Accessed on 17.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf>.

<sup>76</sup> Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, *The Future Tasks of the alliance: NATO's Harmel Report, 1966/1967*, (PHP Publications Series, Washington, D.C./Zurich July 2004), 2.

<sup>77</sup> Document DPC/D (67)23, “Decisions of Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session, Annex I, 11 May 1967 “, 2-4. Decisions taken at the meeting of the defence planning committee in ministerial session, held on 9th May 1967.

<sup>78</sup> M.C.14/3 (Final), “A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area, 16 January 1968”, 5.

<sup>79</sup> M.C.14/3 (Final), “A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee On Overall Strategic Concept “, 6.



Warsaw pact in particular eastern Europe”,<sup>80</sup> and The Soviet Union's use of every chance to undercut NATO's cohesiveness.

At this point, it can be argued that NATO encountered a formidable adversary as an organization that was militarily robust, politically backed, ideologically perplexing, and economically thriving than ever before. Therefore, MC 14/3 (Final) recognized and mentioned Soviets interchangeable as the Warsaw Pact leaders though Warsaw Pact established more than 10 years earlier<sup>81</sup>. It took NATO 11 years to fully comprehend Limited Warfare Capacity and to define it as “Covert Actions”, “Incursions”, “Infiltrations”, “Hostile Local Actions”, and “Limited Aggression” through its 1968 strategic concept.

As of strategic concepts, nonetheless they are broad guidance for NATO by means of which defining all parties' contributions to defense, cooperation, resource allocations and burden sharing, they are important official documents in terms of understanding roles, duties, responsibilities and obligations of each member. These concepts were drafted by Standing Group, discussed and approved by North Atlantic Defense Committee, North Atlantic Council and North Atlantic Military Committee respectively. Although, these strategic concepts had been classified as secret because they were overall defensive concepts that assumed to provide security to the North Atlantic Territory, they became open resources today. Yet the main classification was embedded to the Defence Planning Committee and Regional Planning Groups for detailed plans and actions. Moreover, there is a strong relationship between strategic concepts and interoperability of the members. Since political, economic and military capabilities as well as geographic locations are the tools to define roles inside the alliance, it would be more commensurate to classify parties as Great Scales (the US, the UK and France), Middle Scales (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Norway), Small Scales (Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Greece). Turkey has never been fit this classification benchmark because Turkey has special conditions during the Cold War years. Even though Turkey is militarily

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<sup>80</sup> M.C.14/3 (Final), “A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept “, 4.

<sup>81</sup> M.C.14/3 (Final), “A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept “, 9.

second biggest in terms of quantity and land forces and comes after power projection capabilities right after Great Scales members, it has not been able to develop an autonomous multilateral policy and has not been able to establish itself in the European defense and security architecture. What is more, since it could not carry out these policies, it stayed as dependent on the US and was at times let down to the eastern bloc.

Obviously, interoperability is achieved through dependence on the US nuclear shield and its delivery means in the regions. On the one hand, middle and small-scale parties were dependent on US leadership and nuclear arsenal. On the other hand, the US was dependent on ground delivery sites at the soil of the middle and small-scale parties. Other than this, dangers of Soviets exploitation to break NATO's unity brought about cooperation by mutual dependency in the alliance. Yet, there were fierce debates, among great scale treaty parties over the security and control of air and sea lines of communication in and out of Atlantic zones. This added negotiations to take a new shape, epitomized France withdrawal from integrated military structure, by which some of them placed advantageous position and rivalry. Objections to establish NATO bases during peacetime (particularly nuclear bases to evade Soviet retaliations) took new shape on the negotiations among other members too. Nonetheless, interoperability in cooperation is achieved by means of interdependency.

#### **2.4. Conclusion**

When NATO's security and defense system was first established, the US, the UK, and France based it on their own pool of capabilities (massive retaliation) and constructed the post-World War II order in the Euro-Atlantic region according to their own desires. In this context, as NATO's first Secretary General Lord Ismay clichéd, "Russia out, the US in, Germany down", to which it should be added that France and the UK were the corner stones of the system. It may be said that since the Strategic Concept of 1949 there has been a clear rivalry for leadership. In this rivalry, the U.S. possession of nuclear weapons made the rivalry less overt, but the debate over the division of economic benefits continued.

The distribution of economic benefits has always been problematic since the creation of the NATO defense and security system, and France has remained skeptical of the intentions of the U.S. leadership most of the time. This is why France was so concerned about the deployment of NATO military bases and U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory. It can also be said that France has gone beyond rhetoric in this debate and has itself left the command structure by rejecting the US nuclear presence and NATO military bases on its territory. In this case, interoperability is achieved through cooperation and leadership competition.

According to the 1957 Strategic Concept, with the Soviet Union as the Euro-Atlantic threat, the dependence of the small and medium-sized members on the security provided by US nuclear weapons, combined with US military superiority, made the US the sole dominant actor within NATO. It is also true that the U.S. has at times sought the consent of small and medium-sized powers to ensure the continued presence of the U.S. in Europe.

Faced with Soviet superiority in unconventional warfare tactics and the possibility of using them at the first opportunity, the United States, concerned that the unity of alliances with France might be disrupted. In this respect, the US commissioned the Harmel Report in 1968 and announced that it would take into account the concerns of small and medium-sized countries, and the doctrine of flexible response was adopted. In addition, small and medium-sized countries seeking each other's security in the context of mutual assistance in conventional warfare and seeking refuge under the U.S. nuclear umbrella led to the nominal interdependence and cooperation of interoperability, but ultimately to dependence on the United States.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **GREAT BARGAIN IN THE BIG CHESS GAME**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

This chapter focuses on post-Cold War interoperability, taking into account the two different strategic concepts. They are the Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999. The significance of this period lies in the debates on the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the transformation of NATO and the relationship with non-NATO members and their accession process to the Alliance.

The possibility of the Cold War turning into a hot war, and the realization that the consequences of this possibility would be more than both the Eastern and Western blocs could bear, pushed both sides to take several confidence-building measures between 1969 and 1975, leading to a process of cooperation with the emergence of the Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the mutual signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. This process of cooperation, together with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War questioned the future role of NATO and ultimately led to debates within NATO's European allies about whether a separate European Defense and Security Policy feasible or not. Throughout these debates, different contested groups in NATO by forming separate Alliances in Europe put forward different points of view. However, the US's stance together with the UK, overwhelmed other claims by instilling the idea of a European Security and Defense Policy that is not separate but separable from NATO. In the end, NATO was transformed by direct involvement of the US and enlarged after the 1991 strategic concept was accepted.

In this sense subject in question, the politics of interoperability evolved and adapted to changing needs by twisting, bending, devising and reshaping political modules.

On the one hand, the US and the UK's claim was to look for a way to access central and eastern Europe at the London Summit before the 1991 strategic concept. On the other hand, it established a controlled relationship with Russia through the Founding Act, initiated a different program with Ukraine through Distinctive Membership, and tried to bring the rest of the newly independent states from the Soviets under the umbrella of NATO and European Security Policy employing Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue programs in 1994. In this process, the US, which did not seek standardization in the previous strategic concept and employed flexibility for interoperability conditions, initiated the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) for the current members and those who signed the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as well as for PfP members in the 1999 strategic concept. The following point should be made here. Although a detailed procedure called "Study on NATO Enlargement"<sup>82</sup> was put into practice in 1995 for the purpose of enlargement, this procedure did not receive sufficient attention due to the lack of sufficient desire and willingness of candidate states through the PfP program, so a supervisory structure was established under the name of "High Level Steering Group" (HLSG) under DCI. To use NATO within the framework of UN decisions and Article 5 of NATO out of continental Europe, the US invented the Mediterranean Dialogue program and wanted to use its existing position to gain NATO's support and legitimacy to sustain its global power. In this sense, this chapter is named "Great Bargain in the Big Chess Game".<sup>83</sup> Therefore, 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts and policies implemented constitute the most important process of politics of interoperability throughout NATO history. Hence, the politics of interoperability should be understood in the context of US hegemony, the leadership competition among European member states to become a regional power center, the transfer of eastern capital to the West through Western armament companies due to the standardization and modernization requirements of the armies of medium and small-scale member states.

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<sup>82</sup> NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement", (1995), Accessed on 11.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_24733.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm).

<sup>83</sup> I borrow this concept from two distinctive scholars in the similar field of study. First, Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy NATO's Companion-or Competitor*, RAND (2002), 13. He conceptualized ESDI, NATO discussions as "The Grand Bargain of Berlin and Brussels". Second, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York (1997), 30. In his book, Brzezinski depicts Euroasia as chessboard.

### **3.2. Great Bargain in the Big Chess Game (1975-1999)**

The Great Bargain in the Big Chess Game has been conceptualized to better grasp the political maneuvers more comprehensible on how the Western allies engaged in a leadership competition, sometimes forming groups of two, with the intention of turning these conditions in their favor due to the situations they were in. To make it comprehensible for the reader of this thesis, I will explain this period in stages. It is hypothetical that the political outcome of a bipolar world would be that the competition for supremacy between the two sides might continue for an unpredictable period. The other possibilities were that one of the two sides might give up, the two sides might destroy each other, or, as a third option, tensions would ease for a while and the political situation would calm down. Since competition for supremacy was unsustainable, and since the option of destroying each other had very severe consequences, after the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union under Russian hegemony and the Western alliance under American hegemony decided to take some confidence-building measures. France's getting out integrated command structure not having her in a disadvantageous position or not adversely affecting its security coupled with these confidence-building measures literally led European members of NATO to consider whether a separate security and defense policy is feasible. While this feasibility was in question, their stance was constructed on the idea of a security system in which only concerns of European nations could be taken into account outside of direct American involvement with or without using NATO assets. The great bargain in the big chess game should be considered as phases in the series of events that led a political debate among contested groups both inside the Alliance and outside including Russia. Through this stage some European member states have taken the lead in this matter, believing that by taking the appropriate measures, they could be placed not only as a regional power but also as a prominent leader in Europe. In the second stage, different power centers formed alliances among themselves and participated in this debate by developing policies that would prioritize their national interests. Namely, different contested groups put forward their claim to overpower others in order to rationalize their claim by using different European institutions. It also encompasses convincing the rest of the members of the Alliance. Some extended their claim to reiterate "separate and separable" defense

and security architecture from NATO while others partially support this point of view so long as it is “separable but not separate”.<sup>84</sup> This understanding was even put to the test during the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the wars of Bosnia and Kosovo. When EU members of NATO realized that they could not alone create a defense and security architecture because of the capacity gaps between armies, they reconsidered taking the position that they were previously in. The third stage involves the United States of America's policies to try NATO members inside the Alliance while creating some spaces to take some of the security responsibilities in continental Europe by incorporating European institutions. It also includes the transformation of NATO to take on new tasks through the promulgation of the 1991 strategic concept. This includes enlargements to reach out to old adversaries by means of new programs such as PfP, the Distinctive Membership, and Special conditions between Russia and NATO. The final stage is for the US to use the system it has designed for its benefit by means of redefinition of interoperability and bring it back to the agenda as of 1995 through the 1999 strategic concept.

### **3.2.1. From Leading Nation to the Competing Nation**

Once the political and military balance in Europe shifted in favor of the Western block, it was at least inevitable that NATO must change some of its policies including reducing its conventional forces and accordingly downsizing its nuclear arsenal or reshaping its structure to suit the needs of the NATO's collective defense policy which is in origin -to a larger extent- designed mainly by the US and the UK. Before all this transformation started, some of the political developments that took place in Europe in the period, starting from the detente to the collapse of the Soviet Union were the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the Unification of Germany, and the withdrawal of Soviet Forces. It was certain that these political developments did not bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union, but paved the way of contemplating the feasibility of establishing a new security system that was unique to European members of the Alliance, in which only they could take part in

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<sup>84</sup> Stuart Croft, “the EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The Return of Architectural Debate”, *European Security*, Vol.9, No.3 (Autumn 2000), 8. Press Communiqu M-NAC-1(96)63, “Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council Berlin 3 June 1996”, para, 7. Accessed on 12.11.2023 Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>.

and design their systems, and in which they will divide the leadership among themselves. In this sense, NATO and the US's "undisputed leadership" played a central role in these developments due to the dependency on the US for providing mixed conventional and nuclear shields from the inception of NATO until these issues started to voice through the CSCE process. In the course of the time, all scholars accepted that NATO, after the collapse of Soviet Russia and the Cold War, should definitely change partially but the extent of this change and new tasks depended heavily on how skillfully use the magic wand to sustain leadership in the Alliance.

Having stated in Chapter 2 that NATO was created against the threat of Soviet Russia, it is necessary to make a second statement that NATO became a threat to Eastern Block from their point of view. Throughout the Cold War, even though there were not any military confrontations between NATO and the Soviet Union – other than Limited Warfare<sup>85</sup> such as Shows of Force, Covert, and Clandestine Operations, there was a period of predictability for the worst-case scenarios.<sup>86</sup> However, the Cold War era was full of anxiety and danger with high tension between the two blocs, it was simple and predictable for both sides.

It was simple because Soviet ideology and the Warsaw Pact's military threats were the only threats for Western bloc. It was predictable because Russia was not thought to be the first user of nuclear weapons for the Alliance because western bloc was way ahead in military matters and also capable of carrying its nuclear arsenal through vessels, submarines and unpredictable ground sites, which gives an advantage in second retaliation as it creates a variety of delivery means that eastern bloc could not take this risk to annihilate itself.

Similar threat perception was also valid for the eastern bloc or at least should be valid because the world was bipolar, and no one declared a direct or a de-facto defeat

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<sup>85</sup> See the components of Limited Warfare. M.C. 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision) "A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area, 23 May 1957", *NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969*, 15. Accessed on 20.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf>.

<sup>86</sup> It should be understood that all out nuclear exchanges or a linear conventional confrontation can be deemed as the worst-case scenario.



until Cold war ended. Russia kept its hegemonic position and imitated same control measurements in the arm race until Cuban missiles. When both sides realized that they would destroy each other, they believed that this pace had to slow down and started to take some confidence-building measures. The Harmel report and Cuban Missile crises taught lessons, led to easing the tension between two sides, and gave way to a number of political developments in Europe. Additionally, the effect of the détente and Harmel report incited members on both sides to take bilateral initiatives.<sup>87</sup>

Among these political developments the most significant was the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975. In this act, all NATO members, every European country except Albania<sup>88</sup> as well as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agreed to refrain from any acts that constitute a threat or direct or indirect use of force against signatories<sup>89</sup>. All signatories agreed on ten principles. This act was so important that it affected NATO at the core besides it molded security discussions of Europe in its course in two perspectives.

First of all, apart from having been a base for Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), in which through time evolved and became Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it led European members of NATO to think likelihood of establishing a separate security system that the US supremacy was not directly involved in. Because the first four principles of the act which were “Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, Refraining from the threat or use of force, Inviolability of frontiers, Territorial integrity of States”<sup>90</sup> apparently a challenge to the NATO’s collective defense policy.

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<sup>87</sup> Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee On International Relations House of Representatives*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington: 1975, 4.

<sup>88</sup> US Department of the State, “Office of the Historian, Milestones:1969-1976, Helsinki Final Act, 1975”, Accessed on 21.10.2023. Available electronic version, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/helsinki>.

<sup>89</sup> Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Hearing Before the Subcommittee”, 2.

<sup>90</sup> Helsinki Decalogue (1 August 1975), “OSCE Documents 1973 – 1997”, 2. Accessed on 24.10.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.evce.eu/content/publication/2005/7/12/1bccd494-0f57-4816-ad18-6aaba4d73d56/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.evce.eu/content/publication/2005/7/12/1bccd494-0f57-4816-ad18-6aaba4d73d56/publishable_en.pdf).

The question was collective defense against who? As long as the signatories stuck to the agreement, there was no room for seeking out an adversary. Answer was so simple because all nations in Europe included Russia were the signatories of this agreement. Secondly, by attending this conference, one way or another the US political leaders implicitly agreed to this condition. By the same token, it paved the way thinking probability of revitalization of Russia's Concert of Europe stance on European security policy when different point of views starts to be voiced in late 1980's and aftermath of 1991 strategic concept. In this regard, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act were the corner stone that marginalized NATO partially as it proposed to create an autonomous security framework peculiar to Europe.

Another important political development that caused the idea of American leadership within NATO does no longer hold a place or are desired in Europe's security architecture was that of “Declaration by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which were members of the Western European Union”<sup>91</sup> in treaty of Europe in 1992. In this treaty, better known as Maastricht Treaty, the US only given an observer status while taking decision on a separate military operational planning cell as well as “enhanced cooperation among them in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency”.<sup>92</sup> In his doctorate dissertation, Tolgahan Akdan conceptualized the US as “undisputed leader of the West”<sup>93</sup> from 1949 to present day. However, the US being leading nation was relegated and seen as the competing nation by European members of the Alliance.

Because meanings and concepts are intertwined, it would be meaningful to open a separate section as to the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) and give brief information on this subject. Although there are many studies on this subject, it is necessary for a good understanding of its relations with NATO. In this

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<sup>91</sup> Treaty on European Union 29.07.1992, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No.C 191/1, 107. Accessed on 24.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT>.

<sup>92</sup> Treaty on European Union, “Official Journal of the European Communities”, 107.

<sup>93</sup> Tolgahan Akdan, “U.S. Strategies for accommodating Russia in the post-cold war order and NATO (1989-1999): a Gramscian analysis of the role of Neoconservatives.”, (Doct.diss., Middle East Technical University, 2023), 236.

respect, I contend that foundation of the CESDP was laid in as European Defense and Security Identity (ESDI) in 1975 Helsinki Final ACT as CSCE and later OSCE. It later on evolved through Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and finally culminated at Anglo-Franco defense partnership by Saint-Malo declaration in December 1998.<sup>94</sup> France and the United Kingdom agreed to act in the framework of “separate and separable” security system from NATO and unique to the European Union. On the eve of becoming a norm for the rest of the European members of the NATO, this policy tested in the Bosnian war and proved nothing more than speculation because the US did not let France to use NATO assets without US direct involvement. In the course of time, this policy was limited to working in the framework of non-Article 5 operations. These operations included humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations where NATO does not want to involve as a whole in the continent of Europe. This process as a norm became European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). To elaborate the process, on the one hand, it was apparent that the French, German, Czech, Belgian and Russian stances were always to establish a “separate and separable” security system from NATO or totally pass over it. On the other hand, the US’s, together with British, stance was to keep status quo or at least “separable but not separate” from the North Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, the US took into consideration this process as European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) because diminishing its value and prominence was easier than the policy. However sometimes accepted as European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) even though the European members defined themselves so. Namely, it has been a process in which Europe and the Atlantic eventually reach a minimum common consensus because it created a space for all parties to exploit this leadership race to some extent. To give an example, leaving aside Soviets, in case there is a resurgence from it, the NATO members were still dependent on the US strategic nuclear arsenal as deterrent. In this sense, ESDP always became a headache for the US. The establishment of Euro Corps by French and German governments caused great concern for the US administration. Additionally, Kori Schake, in a personal interview with General Powell, described this as a “stiletto in NATO’s back-it

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<sup>94</sup> Franco–British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998), Accessed on 25.10.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/3/31/f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/3/31/f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f/publishable_en.pdf).

wouldn't be fatal, but it would weaken NATO in important ways".<sup>95</sup> However, the British established a similar Multinational Joint Task Force named as European Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in 1992 depending on Maastricht Treaty at the same time with Franco-German Corps. In his book, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, Robert Hunter, the US ambassador to the NATO during the Clinton administration, relates the British as the only key European ally for acting with them on all policies and sharing the leadership.<sup>96</sup> Much of his book relates discussions about whether ESDP is a companion or competitor. However, it concludes as competitor. In this context, the UK has played America's Trojan horse against the European members of NATO in the leadership share. Similarly, the establishment of a separate security architecture by France and Germany was perceived as a "stiletto in the back", whereas the similar corps that the UK established based on the Maastricht Treaty did not pose a threat to the US.

In this respect, the European move from contemplation of ESDI to CESDP was a partial challenge to unipolar world. It certainly posed a challenge to US hegemony. This part of the chapter finalizes the emergence of discourses suggested by European members of the Alliance that American hegemony and leadership within NATO does no longer hold a place or are desired for some members in Europe's security architecture.

### **3.2.2. Corner Hunt in the New Europe**

At this point, examining the European security architecture debates that emerged near and after the end of the Cold War sheds light on how the NATO's 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts were produced or what diplomatic maneuvers were undertaken. All diplomatic developments were made in complementary integrity, as if playing chess, calculating a few moves ahead. The mastery is undoubtedly the result of American hegemony, British move and the conundrum of the European states. Although some member states have tried to renegotiate the situation in their favor

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<sup>95</sup> Kori Schake, "NATO after the Cold War, 1991–1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative." *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 3 (1998): 388.

<sup>96</sup> Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy NATO's Companion-or Competitor*, RAND (2002), xix.

under changing circumstances, with a desire to be a leader and to produce autonomous policies, this has been nothing more than a vain attempt.

These different architectural debates were put forward by different actors. Four different points of view were prominent in the European security discourse in the post-Cold War era. Two out of four failed to attract interest because of making NATO as too much subordinate. The other of the second is a dormant, wobbly view that is occasionally warmed up and tried to be brought to the agenda, but when it comes to action, it languishes due to lack of capacity. The last one, managed with skillful maneuvering and wisdom, is still viable and paying off for designers.

First discourse has been presented by German-Czech advocacy by claiming the idea of European security should have been organized around CSCE. It would have established an all-encompassing procedure grounded in collective security measures. It could have established a foundation for pan-European security, encompassing not only NATO members, but also Russia, Ukraine, and other post-communist nations. It would have allowed for representation of smaller nations, as they were concerned about being disregarded by more dominant states in any potential coalition of powers.<sup>97</sup>

In other words, German-Czech stance was literally regardless of their ideology, power and capacity, all European must have been taken into consideration when decision are to be taken. All should be given equal rights to vote in Europe. This discourse has been abandoned because of the two reasons from both the US and the UK' perspective from one side, and France from other side. The first reason was to not being as inclusive as position of trio in NATO. The second reason was that NATO was going to be subordinated while taking decision. Although the proposal was not rejected by the former members of Eastern Bloc, it was rejected by the American and British unity in the Western Bloc because it undermined US hegemony and British interests. Additionally, France rejected the proposal due to its lack of inclusion his position in leadership of Europe. It was not a feasible plan because Germany was loser of the WWII, and it was impossible to allocate its army

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<sup>97</sup> Stuart Croft, "the EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The Return of Architectural Debate", *European Security*, Vol.9, No.3 (Autumn 2000), 5.

without the consent of NATO and US. Similarly, Czech Republic was old Warsaw Pact member and there was huge military disparity when it compared to the rest of the European member of the NATO.

The second discourse put forward by the Russian Federation. However, the Russian Federation went a little further and argued that European security should be discussed and decided only by the great powers in Europe including the US and the UK. This was similar to the concert of Europe vision of 1815 Vienna Congress. However, this time it envisaged a restructuring of the OSCE in military matters. In other words, the security considerations of small-scale members in NATO and other countries in Europe would be disregarded. Literally, Russia was going to have a veto power in military matters regarding to European security. This discourse was strongly refused all parties in particular by Scandinavians because it would be “such a proposal that would be undemocratic and be profoundly lacking in legitimacy”.<sup>98</sup> This policy put forward by Russia did not find a response outside of the Moscow. Two of the debates on the shaping of European security, which we have listed so far above, have already been shelved and have not found any response.

The third discourse is the one put forward by Belgium and France partnership, which, in contrast to the German-Czech view, argues that instead of a pan-European system, the Western European Union (WEU) should decide on the shaping of European security. In this view, Belgian and French cooperation have neither completely excluded the pan-European view, nor have they excluded the current state of NATO. Instead, much of the impetus behind this vision was enmeshed in the Maastricht process. This was elaborated in detail in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Namely, non-European members of NATO were invited together with other members of the European Union, emphasizing that they could become associate members. In this point of view, it was advised to establish a separate WEU military operation cell. In the meantime, the WEU leaders accepted lacking in some capabilities such as logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Croft, “the EU, NATO and Europeanisation”, 7.

<sup>99</sup> Treaty on European Union 29.07.1992, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No.C 191/1, 106. Accessed on 22.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT>.

The subtle distinction here is that in terms of the security of Europe, the WEU would lead EU in military operations without marginalizing NATO. In other words, the countries in central and eastern Europe would be excluded from decision making process as well as the non-European NATO members which were not a WEU member. Another distinct point advocated by the Belgian-French duo is a security architecture that does not exclude NATO but is based on a view that is “separate and separable”<sup>100</sup> from NATO, which wants to use its separate assets, and that places NATO's existing decision-making system on the back burner. This view found a meaning and after its construction, it was put into test during Yugoslavian dissolution of Bosnian war. In this regard, the Big Chess Game begins as rivalry among middle and great scale members.

While these ongoing debates persist, it is crucial to acknowledge the significant inadequacies that European members face in establishing a reliable security system. The first shortcoming that European allies in NATO see in American military power was their limited intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Lack of actionable intelligence capability by reconnaissance aircraft at both tactical and strategic levels also affects operational plans, as intelligence always guides operations. The second shortcoming is the limited mobile communication capabilities of the units that will conduct operations. This interferes with military operations, either because communication over fixed wire lines takes time or because the power of short-range radios only allows communication up to a certain distance. The third shortcoming is the lack of a strategic lift, which is necessary for the delivery of troops to the theater of operations, both from the seaport of debarkation and from airport of debarkation. The United States primarily utilized helicopters for military deployments in the dense jungles of Vietnam, providing necessary mass for each battalion level. However, there is not currently widespread use of helicopters or military cargo aircraft for strategic lift in Europe. The last and most important shortcoming is that in an operational environment, the most important capability is the ability of soldiers from different countries to have the same training and operational capability and speak the same language. However, during the Korean

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<sup>100</sup> Croft, “the EU, NATO and Europeanisation”, 6.

war, the US tested this capability by combined forces. These were important shortcomings of NATO's European members. If they had such a capability, NATO would not have been invited to the Maastricht Treaty, where the US joined as a partner member from a leading member. What France meant by separate and separable from the security debate was that it aimed to build a separate security architecture in Europe by acquiring the capabilities to fill these gaps.

The fourth and final perspective was from the US and the UK. They believed that any architectural debate that places NATO as subordinate institution and ideas must be prevented before they become flesh and blood. They conducted such diplomacy that the bird neither flew away scared nor bored to death. The best solution was to suit NATO by necessary transformation in its essence. It was possible to create a system that responds to the demands of most actors without undergoing much change. Nevertheless, the American and British initiative came out of the NATO with more than it was defended and planned for. The purpose of introducing the concept of the Big Chess Game in this chapter is to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the broad transformation process. In this sense, it should be understood that all parties come to terms with the idea that replacing the existing system with another system is creating another problematic for the interests of the others. Realizing this, it became rational to transform the existing system.

In this respect, signing Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990 meant NATO's transformation in command and force structure. However, as an institution, still some argued that the Alliance should have been terminated its function and must have been disbanded, as happened to Warsaw Pact. In the light of these developments, there were several distinct probabilities of the fate of NATO. It would be either terminated, reformulated or preserved.<sup>101</sup> Under these provisions, NATO neither terminated nor left its place for another security organization. Instead, the Alliance chose to transform itself as the only security apparatus. The rest of the European institutions were relegated to complementary institutions apart from non-article 5 operations in the continent of Europe.

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<sup>101</sup> Michael E. Brown, "A Wise Alliance Knows When to Retrench", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999, 2.



### 3.2.3. The Great Bargain: Transformation

As the architectural debates of establishing separate European defense and security architecture that were put forward by different actors were in infancy, there happened several agreements and treaties that would necessitate by CSCE in the course of the time. However, these agreements were supported by indirect US involvement partially because the European members of the Alliance were still dependent on NATO's nuclear security shield. These political developments were:

- i. Stockholm Conference of Disarmament Europe Agreement of 1986,
- ii. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987,
- iii. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 1990.

Thanks to these treaties, both Eastern bloc and Western bloc reduced their military presence in their respective parts of Germany, as well as central and eastern Europe. Both sides guaranteed to refrain from use of force and promised to inform each other 42 days earlier warning time in case their military units changed their positions or quantity of their weapon increased.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, they assured themselves to observe certain military facilities and activities of each side. This necessitated to change NATO's command and force structure. To give an example "Cold War command structure was reduced from 78 headquarters to 20 with two overarching Strategic Commanders, one for the Atlantic, and one for Europe; there were three Regional Commanders under Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and two under Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)".<sup>103</sup>

Regarding institutional transformation, NATO needed to redefine its mission through a new strategic concept. At this point, to make logical consequences behind the discussions from different stakeholders, verbatim records of the heads of states and government provides a wide array of insights. Heads of states and governments from NATO member states held a meeting at Lancaster House in London on 5<sup>th</sup> of July

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<sup>102</sup> OSCE, "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (19 November 1990)", *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*, Accessed on 26.10.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.osce.org/library/14087>.

<sup>103</sup> NATO, "Allied Command Operation ACO evolution", Accessed on 26.10.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52091.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52091.htm).

1990 to discuss and finalize the 1991 strategic concept. Even though, Foreign and Defense Ministers as well as Permanent Representatives from each members reflected their concern to the draft process, the heads of the states and governments from the highest and most authoritative voice discussed and decided on the policies for their countries were going to pursue. Because of the delicacy, only a few people were able to reach correct information inside the debates during that time. Therefore, their speech is of utmost importance and was collected in a confidential report called C-VR (90) 36 at the London meeting. This report is of significance because the head of each member state voiced their stance and addressed their perspective regarding the transformation of the Alliance. In this sense, understanding the overarching concepts of the debates at the highest level is the most reliable way to gather information.

The most fundamental issues discussed in this meeting to answer the question outlined as; could the CSCE replace NATO or could WEU replace NATO? On what basis should the relationship between NATO and these two organizations and European security be based? On what basis should NATO communicate with the countries of eastern and central Europe? Should NATO use CSCE and WEU as a platform for ESDP or should CSCE and WEU use NATO as a platform? To begin with, it was widely agreed upon by all NATO parties preceding and during the 1990 London meeting that the Western bloc should establish contact with the Eastern bloc and form new relationships. Every member held this unanimous understanding. The question at hand is whether NATO or other European institutions such as CSCE or WEU will be utilized to orchestrate the formation of a new relationship toward eastern and central Europe. It was apparent earlier than this meeting that CSCE took some initiatives to take some responsibility to tackle security and defense issues of the Europe. In this sense, regardless of their acceptance to handle East-West relations for security matters, both institutions should be changed one way or another. Once another question among members whether NATO would be replaced, what mission should it assume? If CSCE would take some parts of the missions, what kind of task were CSCE or WEU would have given. Therefore, each president or prime ministers' speech gives very important clues about preparation of a new strategic concept.

NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner chaired the meeting and the British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher made opening remarks. In her speech, she pointed out that NATO's defense policies have been instrumental in redirecting eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from government of dictatorship towards democracy.<sup>104</sup> She continued her constructive conversation as mentioning about alliance unity in collective defense and suggesting that NATO should resolute to show “willingness to extend the hand of friendship to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union”.<sup>105</sup> She also made it clear that she had messages from “President Gorbachev and President Havel who were interested in the results of this Summit”.<sup>106</sup> In this respect, I can conclude that during the draft of the strategic concept, the British had already established a strategic dialogue with Russia before this meeting.

Regarding to France, President Mitterrand was mainly concerned by the nuclear strategy adopted and implemented by the member states through CFE and explained France was hoping this treaty would put into effect as soon as possible in Europe. According to him, the CFE treaty had already been discussed in European Economic Community and CSCE.<sup>107</sup> President Mitterrand mainly focused on the importance of CSCE and European Economic Community (EEC) as these two institutions should have played the main role for creation of new security order in Europe. The reason behind the France’s diplomacy to make it quicker for CFE into effect was that with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Russian military forces from eastern Europe, NATO could finally eliminate its dependence on theater nuclear forces.<sup>108</sup> In other word, France determined that the short-range nuclear forces of NATO could be completely removed if the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty were to take effect, due to the absence of the Warsaw Pact military threat and the increased warning time for any harmful developments. The withdrawal of the

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<sup>104</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC meeting with the participation of heads of the state and government 5th July 1990”, Part I, 3.

<sup>105</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 3.

<sup>106</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 3.

<sup>107</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 6.

<sup>108</sup> Kori Schake, “NATO after the Cold War, 1991-1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative.” *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 3 (1998), 387.

Russian military forces from eastern Europe dependent on the CFE treaty. In this regard, dependency to the US supremacy partially would be removed from Europe so that there would be a place for France to follow its national policy.

Regarding to the US, President Bush delivered a speech, and he talked about the importance of the NATO as,

The Europe that we all hope for is really here, it's upon us, and some ask whether NATO is still necessary, and our answer is unequivocally yes, because free nations must stand together in an uncertain world, and yes because collective security is better than national rivalry, and yes because the pursuit of our common ideals has never been more relevant or more hopeful. But NATO has got to change, and we must build a transformed Alliance for the new Europe of the 21st century<sup>109</sup>

Judging by his speech, he criticized the members for pursuing national interest and national rivalry against American leadership. In the meantime, he assured that the US would transform NATO to conform common interest of the members. However, in his journal article to the Contemporary European History, Kori Schake claims different story that President Bush told as if United States were to leave Europe as soon as possible if European members explicitly requested the US to leave Europe when tensions ran so high between the USA and its European allies at the November 1991 Rome summit.<sup>110</sup> President Bush also made it known by the members that the US suggested four important tasks for Alliance which were “Reaching out to the all adversaries, Changing future character of NATO's conventional defence, Making nuclear forces weapons of last resort, and helping to establish through the CSCE a Europe whole and free”.<sup>111</sup> He further stated that Soviet and other Warsaw Pact member must take this goodwill of the intent by inviting President Gorbachev to one of the NATO meetings and opening a liaison office at NATO headquarter. By doing so, he would dispel the image of NATO as an enemy, an image so deeply ingrained in the minds of the Soviet public. Related to the “reaching out to all adversaries”, he emphasized the situations that Soviets and Warsaw Pact countries were in.

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<sup>109</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 7.

<sup>110</sup> Schake, “NATO after the Cold War”, 389.

<sup>111</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 8.

According to him, they were navigating through a tumultuous landscape of societal, economic, and political upheaval, and their future remains uncertain. For the US perspective, Soviets were surrounded by unpredictable obstacles, including ethnic tensions and economic instability, make it difficult to discern where this path would ultimately lead.<sup>112</sup> Nonetheless, the western bloc continue to strive for progress and a brighter future for them. Judging by this emphasizes, he signaled that the Soviets and Warsaw Pact countries either accept what NATO gives them or they live their unknown destiny. Regarding to first task, NATO and Russia signed a treaty called Founding Act in Paris in 1997. What is more NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council established as a venue to discuss problems and to find solutions in 1997. This thesis will further explore the background of the Founding Act by comparing and contrasting how it was exploited by employing double standards. For other Warsaw pact member, the US stance was to employ open a gate policy for them to be a member of NATO depending on the criteria in the meantime NATO established a Partnership for Peace mechanism in order to make them under western bloc control. Regarding to the second task of “changing future character of NATO's conventional defence”, the US stance was to arrange NATO’s defence posture depending on the progress of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as an effective military alliance, the prospective withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces to their homeland and the conclusion of the CFE Treaty. In relation to the third task of the “making nuclear forces weapons of last resort, he basically made it clear that short range nuclear forces were prepared to eliminate nuclear artillery shells from Europe by the time all Soviet stationed forces in Europe have returned home. However, he specified two points. One for the rest of the nuclear posture and one for the France’s stance on the US nuclear posture in Europe. Related to the nuclear posture, the US would keep its nuclear arsenal, but it won’t be the first user. Related to France, the French could be free to arrange its posture depending on their arrangements with other European members.<sup>113</sup> The US nuclear posture in Europe created friction between France and the US the tensions culminated in 1990 and 1991. Therefore, France initially abstained from contributing to drafting the 1991 strategic concept. However, after

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<sup>112</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 9.

<sup>113</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 11.

realizing other allies had come to a consensus on an extended range of political and military operations, France claimed its right to be included.<sup>114</sup> Regarding to the third task of “helping to establish through the CSCE a Europe whole and free”, the US stance was to, (unlike French-Belgium, German-Czech, and Russia for a separate defense and security institution in Europe) place CSCE as an institution of regulating “free and fair elections, upholding the rule of law and protecting economic liberty” of Europe.<sup>115</sup> What is more the US wanted CSCE like institution located at the eastern Europe. By saying so President Bush apparently minimized the CSCE’s value in the context of being autonomous defense organization and diminished importance of other European institution when it comes to compare them with American superiority in NATO. The closing remark of the president Bush was very important because it summed up the great bargain of the US therefore, I directly quote it as follows.

It may be our last chance to indicate the changing nature of our Alliance before the Soviets and Eastern Europeans and others make their decisions on German unity and CFE and for the CSCE summit. Our Summit declaration should demonstrate unmistakably that our Alliance will play a positive part in Europe's future; that the Alliance is adapting to new realities and really helping to shape a new Europe. Our Declaration should be a political document coming directly from us, the political leadership of this Alliance<sup>116</sup>

Mrs. Thatcher from the UK, when it came to her row to speak, she completely supported the US stance. Further, she made it known the British claim as the new NATO strategy must have been built around Germany. The British stance was to support continued American presence with their nuclear weapons in Germany.<sup>117</sup> She also offered to add more British troop and other members would add too in Germany. The British completely supported the US policies in the new strategic concept. Since there was limited diplomatic person who attended this meeting, the draft of the

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<sup>114</sup> Kori Schake, “NATO after the Cold War, 1991-1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative.” *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 3 (1998), 388.

<sup>115</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 12.

<sup>116</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 13.

<sup>117</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 15.

strategic concept and classification of the documents in order not to reveal until the present day, Judging by the debates, one thing for sure created a friction most probably between France and the United States, in the context of delivery sites in the Europe for providing strategic balance. The discussion topic was the usage of strategic nuclear weapons. What they disagreed on was the substitution of the word “last resort” for “no first use”. In this regard, the UK’s motive was to take pro-strict measures. “No first use” meant, I do not use if you do not. However, “last resort” meant, I use nuclear if I find necessary ground on British part. The British claimed that if the Alliance were ever to say “no first use we would remove the flexibility and gravely weaken the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons.”<sup>118</sup> Regarding to the role of the European institutions, the British strongly opposed CSCE to take the position of NATO. For British perspective CSCE should be stayed as a forum where political and security matters affected Europe and CSCE “can never replace the defense guarantee provided by NATO”.<sup>119</sup> Mrs. Thatcher finished her remark by expressing that NATO would continue to act as Western blocs defense shield, but it needed to adapt itself for the changing world.

Regarding to Germany, President Kohl, after mentioning about the gratitude to the US, the UK and France for assuming big role of the German unification. He further expressed that Germany strictly refused to forge nationalist desires and well understood of the values of democracy and Western values. What is interesting from his speech, he mentioned about the same progress gone through by Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. As they showed similar progress after unification and eastern Germany was also became member. According to Germany, now it was time to set an example to convince members to endorse these three countries membership. Therefore, it is very important to look into his speech:

I am particularly glad - and this again shows a dramatic change within Europe -that our immediate neighbors in the east (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) share this view. Others - and we have already raised this issue - have yet to be convinced that a united Germany as a member of NATO,

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<sup>118</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 16.

<sup>119</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 17.

which we all desire, will also enhance their own stability and offer them a new opportunity for partnership<sup>120</sup>

At this stage, I contend that in the process of enlargement, accepting these three states in 1999 at the first row was not a coincidence or their capacities to fit in identified criteria. It had already been decided to take them in 1990, which is 9 years earlier even though Romania applied earlier than these three countries for PfP membership of the NATO.<sup>121</sup> It should be stressed in here that even though PfP membership does not guarantee the permanent membership regardless of the application time order, the membership acceptance granted depending on the geopolitical positions of the applicants that is establishing a line of security periphery to Germany. After all, Germany's suggestion for membership of these three countries was accepted at the first wave of enlargement process. Some may put forward that Romania failed to meet MAP criteria but when geographic positions of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary taken into consideration, he or she will easily discern that the Germany's priority was to construct a security belt outside of Germany. NATO's transformation process starts with the unification of East and West Germany. Germany is here the point at which the knot is untied. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe mentioned in all academic studies is primarily the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany.

The process would work as follows: first East Germany and West Germany would unite, then NATO would guarantee that there would be no troops in eastern Europe, then Russia was going to withdraw its troops, East Germany would not be a member of NATO for a certain period of time, then Russia, which followed this process as a friendly approach, would withdraw all its troops from Eastern Europe as of 1994. In this sense, in March 1990, President Kohl held the so-called 4+2 formula talks in Ottawa in February 1990, with the participation of the US, UK, France and Russia. Germany pledged to lower its manpower from 470.000 soldier to 370.000 at ceiling. However, President Kohl achieved this success not only by diplomatic manner but

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<sup>120</sup> C-VR (90) 36, "Verbatim record of the NAC", Part I, 19.

<sup>121</sup> NATO, "Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document", Accessed on 02.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_82584.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm).



also paying \$150 million of aid in for foodstuffs. What is more he promised \$10 billion in aid to Moscow.<sup>122</sup>

Regarding to Portugal, President Cavoca Silva, he complained about the reaching out old adversaries because Portugal sees the parameters of this new relationship have not yet been clearly established.<sup>123</sup> What is more, the Portugal government believed that the relationship with central and eastern Europe must have been established upon the political and economic considerations.

Regarding to Spain, Prime Minister Mr. Gonzalez made a remarkable speech. He emphasized that the need for the new peace in Europe cannot be met by talking about reducing the military forces. He argued that the CSCE was almost only institution that could bring peace and stability. He further outlined that all “legitimate interests should be kept in mind”.<sup>124</sup> He claimed that NATO must change, and this change should be done through debates. In this sense, I contend that Spanish stance on the new security architecture of Europe was to prefer that CSCE should undertake the roles. It was the only country that openly expressed her stance. However, Spanish point of view did not resonate in the following years as Germany and Czech partnership did not for ESDI.

Regarding to Greece, Prime Minister, Mr. Mitsotakis argued that CSCE should only be a complementary<sup>125</sup> institution in Europe and should never replace the NATO. The Greek stance was placing CSCE as a consultation institution for conflict prevention among Europeans however it should not overlap other security institution. The Greek prime minister conducted his speech in French. As we know there was a strife between France and the US and the UK, having made his speech in French both blinking France and a green light to the US. The Greece neither bothered France nor were in favor of establishing a separate defense organization as France put forward earlier.

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<sup>122</sup> Gregory F.Treverton, “Elements of a New European Security Order”, *Journal of International Affairs*, 2001, 94.

<sup>123</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 23.

<sup>124</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 35.

<sup>125</sup> C-VR (90) 36, “Verbatim record of the NAC”, Part I, 36.

Regarding to Turkey, Prime Minister Akbulut expressed Turkey's stance, as CSCE should not replace NATO and never given NATO's tasks. Instead, CSCE should stay as an institution very carefully handled by means of taking lessons from the past, however, Turkish prime minister also expressed Turkey's desire to integration with WEU. Turkey has always been a special party in NATO. It is the only non-European country apart from Canada and the US. Turkey always supported the US stance until US intervention to Iraq in 2003. However, the US left Turkey alone in non-article five operations in continental Europe by creating a controversial process between Turkey and the European Union after WEU transformed into European Union.

There have been other heads of the states from member countries but most of the important debates turned around the above-noted countries except for Nordic Countries. Prime Minister Mr. Schlüter from Denmark offered to include maritime area for arms control measurements. Prime Minister Syse from Norway expressed his concern related to land based naval aircrafts that are carrying nuclear weapons should be included to the arms control measurement. Because Soviets appealed for these aircraft to be excluded. However, Soviets deployed some of them near to the Norwegian border and this situation created dangerous loophole for Norwegians. The Norwegian also put forward that the new strategic concept must include environmental problems. Iceland Prime Minister Mr. Hermannsson also made a speech and expressed his concern to naval forces of the NATO ship. He expressed his deep condones that CFE must have included the warship carrying capability of nuclear weapons. The biggest concern raised from the members was Iceland. He argued that arms control measurement to the naval forces should be taken into account. According to Mr. Hermannsson, they expressed their opinion about this issue but somehow their proposal was disregarded.<sup>126</sup> Iceland and Norway bothered by CFE was not included the sub marines and vessels.

Judging from the debates, it should be understood that regional priorities matter for preparing strategic concepts too. Some are taken into consideration while others are overlooked by great scale members, in particular the US and the UK. One day after when Iceland proposed for including naval forces to arms control measurement, the

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<sup>126</sup> C-VR (90) 36, "Verbatim record of the NAC", Part I, 40.

UK strongly refused on the ground that the UK was a maritime power.<sup>127</sup> There happened a fierce debate between Iceland and the UK. The Nordic countries' claim emanated from the ongoing increase of the Soviet naval forces. If the UK carry nuclear weapons in their submarines so the Russia too. Their aim was to regulate this situation. According to the Icelandic prime minister, there was an increasing influx of Soviet nuclear submarines in the Atlantic and it was necessary for them to address this matter. They had gone through multiple accidents in both the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, which pose a significant environmental problem for Scandinavian countries. Therefore, they strongly object to these incidents. When it comes to British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher opposed Iceland's proposal with a bit higher voice. She claimed British stance, as they cannot allow any restrictions or involvement of British maritime forces in this negotiation. Therefore, British could not agree the proposal put forward by the Prime Minister of Iceland because it was too late to introduce anything new that would necessitate immense consideration, which, upon close examination, would impact British nuclear arsenal.<sup>128</sup> Other than important discussion among the Alliance, the rest of the head of the states made a buttressing expression of their concerns. After these debates, it took 16 months to finalize the 1991 strategic concept. It was France who made this draft to drag it out and made it prolonged, because of the disagreement between the US.

#### **3.2.4. 1991 Strategic Concept: Rivalry in Cooperation**

1991 Strategic Concept was an official document that outlined the Alliance's strategic vision and objectives in the post-Cold War era. It was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of NATO members at the Rome Summit on 7-8 November 1991. It consisted of 5 parts. These were Strategic Context, Alliance Objectives and Security Functions, A Broad Approach to Security, Guidelines for Defense, and Conclusion.

It defined the new strategic environment by defining all the nations that "once opposed NATO have dissolved and renounced ideological animosity towards the

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<sup>127</sup> C-VR (90) 36, "Verbatim record of the NAC meeting with the participation of heads of the state and government 6th July 1990", Part II, 6.

<sup>128</sup> C-VR (90) 36, "Verbatim record of the NAC", Part II, 7.

West”. It mentioned that ex-Warsaw Pact members have, to varying degrees, “adopted and initiated policies with the objective of attaining pluralistic democracy, upholding the rule of law, respecting human rights, and establishing a market economy”. Consequently, the political partition of Europe that generated the armed confrontations of the Cold War era has been surmounted.<sup>129</sup> In this sense, strategic context described as a depiction of the victory of the cold war and the progress that followed. Regarding to the Security Challenges and Risks, risks to the security of Alliance were more likely to stem from the negative outcomes of instability, which might arise from severe economic, social, and political challenges, such as ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, confronted by numerous countries in central and eastern Europe, rather than from deliberate aggression against Alliances territories.<sup>130</sup> Therefore, it necessitated NATO was to develop a strategy that aligns with a comprehensive approach to European security. In this sense, 1991 strategic concept placed CSCE as complementary institution<sup>131</sup> and it defined its role as promoting peaceful and friendly relations and support democratic institution. In this regard, some of the security debates that aimed to establish without direct US involvement at the “Corner Hunt” put forward from German- Czech partnership completely collapsed because CSCE was given to a political tool to organize dialogue and cooperation in a new Europe. When it comes to Franco-Belgian partnership, it was also partially collapsed because the WEU as an other European institution was assigned to act their respective responsibilities and purposes in the fields of establishing strategic balance within Europe and reinforce transatlantic solidarity.<sup>132</sup> However, 1991 strategic concept did not directly authorize France and Belgium to develop a separate security policy under the WEU, but it implicitly did so in paragraph 51 by defining it as practical arrangements. In spite of this, developing practical arrangements emphasized to be done with mutual transparency and complementary of the NATO. However, France acted in her security policies by taking this responsibility through Petersberg Tasks in 1992.

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<sup>129</sup> NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991)”, para,1. Accessed on 28.10.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_23847.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm).

<sup>130</sup> NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, para, 9.

<sup>131</sup> NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, para, 27.

<sup>132</sup> NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, para, 27.

Regarding to Protecting peace in a new Europe, 1991 strategic concept stipulated establishing dialogue with Soviet Union and other countries of central and eastern Europe.<sup>133</sup> By doing this, there opened liaison offices at NATO headquarters. In this regard, this thesis assumes that NATO started to enlarge in terms of membership. Regarding cooperation, the alliance committed to pursue cooperation with all European states, based on the principles outlined in the Charter of Paris for a new Europe. They endeavor to develop effective patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation across all relevant fields of European security. Their objective includes preventing crises and managing them efficiently when they emerge. In this sense, it should be understood that NATO as of 1991 started to treat the continent as a whole included all states. Therefore, one can mention NATO's geographical enlargement. However, Alliance moved itself beyond the European continent by means of taking new mission for global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.<sup>134</sup> However, it mentions "Allies" instead of "Alliance". This meant that some of the members of NATO. This was the earlier phase of using NATO for global operations. Regarding to alliance new force posture, it kept the flexible response doctrine by reducing its size directed by CFE. Contrary to Iceland and Nordic countries stance which was restriction of the naval-based nuclear weapons and submarines which were capable of nuclear weapons, the British stance (was not including them) recognized by all parties in 1991 strategic concept.<sup>135</sup> Apart from these developments, the establishment of multinational corps and their inclusion in the force structure was explicitly stated. In the analysis above, it can be stated that the member states of NATO accepted and declared three important points through 1991 strategic concept. First, NATO has made it clear that it wants to expand both in the area of interest and in the area of influence. The Alliance declared that it would play a global role beyond Europe and the Atlantic as its area of interest. It stated that Alliance envisioned a new partnership that would include East/Central Europe, Russia, and former Soviet Republics, which it defined as the new Europe as its area of affect. Therefore, it devised a new plan for reaching out old adversaries for their controlled membership (PfP) of the NATO, as well as special relations with Russia

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<sup>133</sup> NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", para, 28.

<sup>134</sup> NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", para, 41.

<sup>135</sup> NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", para, 48.

and Ukraine. Regarding the Franco-Belgian claim for a separate defense and security architecture, it was partially left unresolved due to implicit reasons. The US was facing both the impending conflict in Iraq and the need to gain support from NATO allies, while Yugoslavia was on the brink of dissolution. Here, France's architecture of European security strategy was linked to NATO's defense strategy. The presence of North American conventional and US's nuclear forces in Europe was thought to be critical to European security, which is inextricably linked to North American security. As the development of a European security identity and defense role progresses, and its reflection in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance wanted to shoulder the responsibility for the defense of Europe for humanitarian operations. Therefore, some of the military operations are assumed as practical arrangements that support Alliance defense. These arrangements provide crucial political, military, and resource advantages without compromising the allies' sovereignty, while also preventing the renationalization of defense policies. These arrangements dictated planning, coordination with multinational formations at integrated military structure. However, when it comes to military interoperability, it did not dictate. It was only seen common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics co-operation.<sup>136</sup> As Robert Hunter wrote in his article, "A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach"<sup>137</sup>, President Bush's statement of "Reaching out old Adversaries" as a first task of NATO at the 1990 London meeting, 1991 strategic Concept found its response almost 1.5 years later. In this sense, everything was constructed by US hegemony. 1991 strategic concept has later attached M.C.400 Military Directives for its detailed military plans and forces.

### **3.2.5. A New Europe, New Relations, and New Interoperability**

NATO military authorities re-designed integrated command structure and force structure after the approval of the 1991 strategic concept. The Supreme Allied Command in Europe added three subordinate commands under it. Allied Forces

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<sup>136</sup> NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", para, 37.

<sup>137</sup> Robert E.Hunter, "A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June1999, 191-203.

Northwest was located in Northwood/England, Allied Forces Center was located in Brunssum/Netherlands, and Allied Forces South was located in Naples/Italy. Regarding to command structure, they reduced some of the headquarters and their staff by twenty per cent within six months after strategic concept promulgation.<sup>138</sup> The aim was to establish unity of command and to prevent competition for resource allocation. Regarding the force structure, they established new multinational corps. The aim was to hinder the renationalization of defense. However, France objected this by complaining military authorities were taking too much initiative and they were presiding over the politicians. Therefore, France forced the WEU to take some decision about autonomous European Force. A year after 1991 strategic concept endorsed by all parties in NATO, Maastricht Treaty was signed in September 1992. Depending on Maastricht Treaty, the WEU Council of Ministers promulgated a separate European defense structure, which is known as Petersberg Declaration on 19 June 1992. Through this declaration, the WEU established a new Headquarter in Brussels. Italian Maj. Gen. Caltabiano was assigned to its first Director. The significance of Petersberg Declaration was that of a new force structure from the WEU member states would be established by withdrawing forces from NATO asset (if necessary) and would be commanded by the WEU. Their mission was going to be “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” by the planning cell of the WEU.<sup>139</sup> The force structure was based on a multinational and joint force structure from European countries. The WEU also created a satellite cell to provide intelligence to the WEU. Having known this military developments, the US pressured Germany and France, opposed German Forces not to be withdrawn from NATO force structure and made an agreement which is Euro corps would be employed under NATO command for Article V operations.<sup>140</sup> In the meantime, as British Prime Minister Thatcher statement at the opening remarks of the London Summit regarding Alliance should

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<sup>138</sup> Kori Schake, “NATO after the Cold War, 1991-1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative.” *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 3 (1998), 392.

<sup>139</sup> Western European Union, “Petersberg Declaration” *Council Of Ministers*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, Accessed on 29.10.2023, available electronic version, [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/petersberg\\_declaration\\_made\\_by\\_the\\_weu\\_council\\_of\\_ministers\\_bonn\\_19\\_june\\_1992-en-16938094-bb79-41ff-951c-f6c7aae8a97a.html](https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/petersberg_declaration_made_by_the_weu_council_of_ministers_bonn_19_june_1992-en-16938094-bb79-41ff-951c-f6c7aae8a97a.html).

<sup>140</sup> Kori Schake, “NATO after the Cold War, 1991-1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative.” *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 3 (1998), 392.

extend “hands of friendship” became a policy put into practice. Therefore, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in December 1991. The NACC made significant advancements in several areas. It cultivated confidence through multilateral political consultation and cooperation in the early 1990s, which paved the way for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994. The PfP program gave participating countries the chance to engage in practical bilateral cooperation with NATO and select their desired cooperation priorities. For example, while one partner country needed training for dealing with land mines another country might choose logistic planning. Main duty was to military-to-military contact between NATO and formerly Soviet affiliated countries at tactical level however, it furthered to political collaboration on various security and defense-related matters. Through time, military collaboration within PfP focused primarily on peacekeeping operations, given that they are less demanding than high-intensity combat. Such operations would offer a shared mission for the military forces of both NATO and non-NATO nations. Therefore, an International Coordination Cell has been set up at integrated command structure in Brussels to offer briefing and planning facilities to all non-NATO nations that contribute troops to NATO-led peacekeeping operations in 1995.<sup>141</sup> The core of PfP was the collaborative bond between NATO and a partner nation, which was established on an individual basis that caters to each country's particular requirements. The approach is executed jointly and promptly at a level selected by the participating government of each country. The PfP in essence was a preliminary stage to gain access to the regular NATO membership without guaranteeing them a collective defense. However, situation for Russia and Ukraine was different from other eastern Europe countries as it was impossible to transform their armies into the Western one. Both the US and France, through PfP, have sought to benefit from non-NATO member states in Europe, the former in the context of NATO and the latter in the context of ESDI. NATO under the US steering moved this perspective one-step ahead by inviting Central Asian countries to the PfP.

At this stage, French leadership WEU devised a plan to by-pass NATO take similar role NACC did. They added new membership criteria for accession to the WEU.

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<sup>141</sup> NATO, “Partnership for Peace program” Accessed on 31.10.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50349.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm).



the member States of WEU proposed that States which are members of the European Union be invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wished. Simultaneously, other European member States of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU in a way, which would give them a possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU<sup>142</sup>

France intended to establish a PfP like module to use this for humanitarian operations in European border. Robert Hunter describes this as “the devil is in the details” because France both wanted to create a separate European Defense and Security structure and it wanted to use this by exploiting NATO’s resources. Having known this situation, General John Shalikashvili, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), proposed a plan to establish Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) consisting of non-NATO members. The concept was to construct a separable command center within current NATO headquarters dedicated to planning and directing combined and joint operations in non-NATO areas. The US intent was to prevent any idea to establish “separate and separable” system in exchange for “separable but not separate” from NATO. In this sense, the US accepted all claims of France apart from the exact location of CJTF headquarter. The US declared that it could only support as long as their HQs were located in one of the NATO subordinated commands, which were located at Northwood, Brunssum, or Naples NATO HQ. The CJTF would typically be accessible for missions accepted and executed by NATO in its entirety, which includes the non-European members. Nevertheless, the CJTF could also suffice for missions undertaken by the NATO European allies who are members of the Western European Union. In this case, the commander of the CJTF would wear a WEU hat and report through a WEU command structure.<sup>143</sup> This would be directed by the WEU Council of Ministers, rather than receiving orders and reporting through NATO channels. This necessitated allocation NATO asset for operational control of the WEU. In this respect, Turkey by far the most loser of this concept because it was the only non-European member in the same continent. Turkey's significant existing rights were used in NATO, and it

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<sup>142</sup> Western European Union, “Petersberg Declaration”, 8.

<sup>143</sup> Stanley R.Sloan, “Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and New Missions for NATO”, *The Library of Congress*, 1994, 94-249S.

would be more vulnerable to the security challenges due to the geography in the course of time. This case should be brought to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and should be endorsed case-by-case. However, CJTF was not tested and success of the WEU led operations could forever erase NATO and direct US involvement in the security matters of Europe. Therefore, it put into test during Bosnian war. At the beginning of the war, the US refused to use NATO led US involvement because of two reasons. First, Yugoslavia was a non-NATO area and in the backyard of the EU. Moreover, direct intervention of the NATO could provoke Russia and jeopardize NATO's friendly reaching out the old adversary. In the meantime, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) comprised of 20.000 troop commanded by French General Bernard Janvier had already taken the duty of humanitarian operation. The US wanted France to take lead and see their WEU led military disparity against NATO in general, US military in particular. Second, the Russian Federation was still a military giant and US did not want to take direct hostile action. It means if the things screwed up, it was the Frances responsibility to sort out the mess of the non-article 5 operations. In this sense, Russia was a great European power, and a humanitarian conflict took place in its previous backyard.<sup>144</sup> Having realized the interoperability problems among WEU led countries, the French claimed to take command of the NATO's AFSOUTH Naples so that it could plan, resource and fill disparity gaps. However, the US refused to allocate the HQ for France's disposal. In the course of the time France became clumsy preventing refugees and displaced people as well as Serbian massacre in front of the UN and WEU led operational forces, the European felt unable to prevent a humanitarian crisis at the center of Europe and thus accepted the US primacy. Notable to mention, when French General Janvier ordered Russian Battalion of 400 soldier from Croatia eastern sector to deploy Sarajevo to protect city, the Russian defense Ministry told battalion commander not to follow WEU led UN orders.<sup>145</sup> The US waited direct intervention until Dayton Accord put into effect, however NAC took decision to disarm Serbian and this took an ultimatum toward Russia. Finally, the US killed three birds with one stone. First, the PfP program proved well, and this brought new prospective members

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<sup>144</sup> Jim Headley, "Sarajevo, February 1994: the first Russia NATO crisis of the post-Cold War era", *Review of International Studies* (2003), 223.

<sup>145</sup> Headley, "Sarajevo, February 1994: the first Russia NATO crisis", 225

for enlargement. Second, it diffused separate and separable European security system by offering separable but not separate CJTF plan. Third, it assured Russia to open new platform to enhance its relations with NATO. In this sense, the US devised new agreement called Founding Act as new charter with Russia in 1997.

Having partially resolved its disagreement with France, which had argued that there was no room for direct American involvement in European defense and security policy and had developed various policies to that end, the US began to implement a number of policies in eastern and central Europe during the enlargement process of NATO. To this end, the United States, seeking to resolve possible conflicts that might arise from the expansion by making a deal with Russia without delay and pulling it into its favor, developed a special formula to regulate its relations with Russia, which was the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union era. In this respect, the US-led NATO signed the Founding Act Treaty with Russia in Paris on 27 May 1997. The term “American-led NATO” is appropriate because the United States was the only state in Europe that could provide or use nuclear security umbrella for Western allies against Russia. The US is therefore the only state that can negotiate this. A similar agreement was made with Ukraine on 09 July 1997, with a slightly lower strategic importance but higher implied meaning, whereby Ukraine waived its right to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, the American-led NATO is an appropriate concept.

The purpose of the Founding Act was to establish the objectives and procedures for consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making, and joint action, which encompassed the fundamental basis of the mutual relationship between NATO and Russia.<sup>146</sup> However, different meaning attributed to Founding Act by two sides. Regarding to Russia, first, it was getting a promise that there would be no military expansion in the new member and partner states that would join NATO. This would minimize the damage from NATO's expansionism toward east. Second, the Act would approve NATO's commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states. Regarding to NATO (other than the US and the British) it

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<sup>146</sup> NATO, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation”, 1997. Accessed on 01.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_25468.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm).

meant stability in continental Europe so that this would allow countries to cut military expenditures and create space for trade, economic and infrastructure investments, but it was also considered that representation rights outside the NAC would be renounced since Russia has given the similar right out of NAC business. Regarding to US and (partially British) first, to keep Russia under control so that the US could be global leader in the unipolar world. Second, it would bring the eastern bloc into the capitalist system. Third, in the short term, if not militarily, then through the technology and disparity gap, to ensure that eastern capital flows to the west. Therefore, in the fourth chapter of the Founding Act, it was stated in the political - military matters section that:

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces<sup>147</sup>

It is possible to understand here that interoperability was only required for members states of NATO at necessary level. In other words, NATO never necessitated a compatibility with Russian arms and their standardization in the Founding Act. However, Russia was planned to work in CJTF with other non-NATO member of European countries to work side by side. When it comes to other details in the Founding Act, Russia was planned to employ a role when there is a peacekeeping operation where it would be done under the responsibility of UN or the responsibility of OSCE. However, each situation would be assessed on a case-by-case basis. NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was going to be a principal venue for running of this Founding act. Both sides would increase each other's security and all parties going to act in order not to diminish the security of each other. Political consultation and cooperation were going to be the main tool. It would be a joint decision in NATO Head Quarter (HQ) and joint action would be taken for decision taking mechanism. In the event that a council member perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security, it would be resolved through the joint council. Russia would be represented in an ambassadorial level to the NATO HQ and there was going to be military staff. Both sides would provide

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<sup>147</sup> NATO, "Founding Act on Mutual Relations", "Political-Military Matters", IV.

information with each other related to the defense policy, military doctrines, infrastructure development programs, budget, nuclear safety issues, nuclear strategy doctrines and strategies. The devil in the detail was that both sides would cooperate for conversion of the defence industries. NATO particularly assured Russia that (as long as the situations of the PfP countries accepted to NATO) in no circumstances, no intention, no plan, no reason to deploy nuclear forces to the new members' soil. In addition, same conditions guaranteed for not to establish nuclear storage in the territory of central and eastern Europe. Each parties agreed to reduce their force levels or deployments even though this was their legitimate security interest. They even assured not to add permanent station of the combat forces.

Once signing by Founding Act with Russia, the US led NATO must have solve another issue which was the position of Ukraine. Ukraine was a nuclear power apart from Russia in continental Europe as well as NATO members of France, British and the US.

Therefore, relations in Ukraine necessitated clarification to establish stable cooperation. In this sense, NATO signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership on 09 July 1997. The significance of this charter lies in Ukraine gave up the ability to use its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees. This security guarantee was given by France, Britain and the United States on the NATO side and Russia on other side, so Ukraine ceased to be a nuclear power.<sup>148</sup> When comparing two agreements with each other, both Russia and Ukraine in about 2 months, regulation of relations with Ukraine was contemplated to complementary political development like solving a problem before reconciling bigger problem. Other differences are as follows: First of all, Russia was seen as a more strategic and equal structure to NATO, while Ukraine is considered at a lower level as if Russia was conceived as a

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<sup>148</sup> NATO, "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine", 1997, para, 16. Accessed on 01.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_25457.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm). It should be taken into consideration that this guarantee was given by Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America to Ukraine in 1994. However, the process of the CSCE, the France was also part of this agreement unilaterally. United Nations, "Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", Budapest, 5 December 1994, No. 52241. Accessed on 12.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/v3007.pdf>.

bigger bite that is hard to chew and Ukraine was conceived as a smaller bite that is easy to digest. Second, in the areas of consultation and cooperation, standardization was not requested from Russia, while standardization in interoperability was specifically emphasized for Ukraine.<sup>149</sup> This situation has raised the suspicion that NATO, which promised to Russia in the Founding act not to expand militarily, would seek NATO standards in Ukrainian weapons and military equipment in the future. Third, both Russia and Ukraine deemed to be welcome in PfP program, in this context, in case of a peacekeeping operation, Russian troops was placed to the CJTF which is more related to the US and NATO tie while Ukrainian troops placed under Implementation Force (IFOR)/Stabilization Force (SFOR) which was more tied to WEU and France's active bonds. Fourth, Poland and Ukraine are tied together to establish a peacekeeping battalion and it was urged to conduct PfP exercises in Ukraine. Therefore, "promotion of the defence cooperation between Ukraine and its neighbors" meant in the long run once another containment of Russia.<sup>150</sup> NATO has signed Partnership for Peace Framework Document with 28 countries (included Russia) from declaration of 1991 strategic concept to 1999 strategic concept.<sup>151</sup> Except from Czechia, Hungary and Poland, no country has been given to permanent membership until 1999 strategic concept. Among these PfP countries, 8 countries (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) were not in the geographical area of continental Europe.

### **3.2.6. From Competing Nation to Global Nation and Politics of Interoperability (1999 Strategic Concept)**

One of the reasons for replacing the 1991 strategic concept was that "need for NATO to adapt its plans and approaches to meet evolving challenges"<sup>152</sup> according to

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<sup>149</sup> NATO, "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership", para, 3.

<sup>150</sup> NATO, "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership", para, 8.

<sup>151</sup> NATO, "Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document", Accessed on 02.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_82584.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm).

<sup>152</sup> Lionel Ponsard-David S. Yost, "Is it time to update NATO's Strategic Concept?", *NATO Review*, 2005, Accessed on 01.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2005/09/01/is-it-time-to-update-natos-strategic-concept/index.html>.

scholars from the NATO defense College in Rome. This explanation, which is very appropriate for briefly summarizing and introducing this topic to some extent, actually depends on how to underline it. This thesis assumes another reason for adapting the 1999 strategic concept as, because the world became unipolar and the US became sole power on the globe, it wanted to use NATO's assets across the globe. Through this, the US intended to legitimate its actions by deploying multinational forces on the ground in the framework of UN decisions outside of continental Europe. The threat perception back to the 1990 and 1999 period were ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, border disputes, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the fate of the newly independent countries from Soviets, and the problem of rogue states around the Globe. Therefore, the use of force in NATO must have been connected to WEU, OSCE, EU, and UN so that the US has a flexibility to arrange the tasks, collective defense, strategic balance, and alliances assets depending on the situation and location.

In this sense, when two consecutive strategic concepts are compared, the very first thing that stands out is the tasks of the Alliance. While 1991 strategic concept clearly defines the Alliance's third fundamental task as "to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state"<sup>153</sup>, 1999 strategic concept underlines its task as "to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty".<sup>154</sup> In the meantime, Article 6 defines NATO's territory as "territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer", Mediterranean sea included.<sup>155</sup> Therefore, NATO's operational territory was changed in the 1999 strategic concept. Although this territorial expansion is often viewed as a parallel enlargement with NATO's expansion among allied nations

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<sup>153</sup> NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991)", para, 20. Accessed on 02.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_23847.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm).

<sup>154</sup> NATO, "Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)", para, 24. Accessed on 02.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm).

<sup>155</sup> NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)", article, 6. Accessed on 02.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm).

(prospective members included), a closer analysis reveals that the true driving force behind this change was the United States' pursuit of global dominance, rather than NATO's expansion. This change means nothing when someone thinks alone but when puzzle pieces fit together, it means different. As a general principle the risk that is affecting one of the members also affects the others' security. In this regard, if French vessel is attacked in Algerian coast, it would evidently call for Article 5 response of NATO.

The second change was, unlike previous strategic concepts, the 1999 strategic concept highlighted the United Nations' primary responsibility to ensure international peace and security.<sup>156</sup> This shift in emphasis opened opportunities for NATO to take on tasks assigned by the United Nations. Assignment of missions to NATO under United Nations resolutions was tested in Bosnia under French command and WEU leadership for UNPROFOR and enforcement of non-flight zone. However, the 1999 strategic concept was designed for taking global missions. Nevertheless, the United States tested it in Kosovo within NATO without implementing it globally.<sup>157</sup>

The third change in the task was the clause in the tasks of 1991 strategic concept “to preserve strategic balance within Europe”<sup>158</sup> omitted. However, although this task has not been abandoned, it has been accomplished through other means. The US, the British, NATO, WEU and EU separately or combined preserved Strategic balance through mixed conventional and nuclear forces. For nuclear forces, the US and the British assumed this duty “with adequate sub-strategic forces of the US” “consisting of dual-capable aircraft and small number of the UK’s Trident warheads based in Europe.”<sup>159</sup> Regarding to conventional forces to preserve strategic balance, NATO

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<sup>156</sup> NATO, “Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999)”, para, 15. Accessed on 03.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm).

<sup>157</sup> NATO, “The Situation in and around Kosovo, Statement issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Brussels”, Belgium, 12 April 1999, para, 4. Accessed on 03.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_27435.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27435.htm?selectedLocale=en)

<sup>158</sup> NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991)”, para, 20. Accessed on 03.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_23847.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm).

<sup>159</sup> NATO, “Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999)”, para, 64. Accessed on 03.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm).



made organizational adjustments with EU institutions in line with military adjustments. In terms of organizational adjustment with EU institutions, the OSCE was the primary institution when Russia involved any military and political matters, it was WEU as primary institution when France involved such matters. Similarly, when British and other permanent members involved, European Union as institution was the primary institution to regulate relationship. Regarding to military adjustment in WEU and European Union, 1999 strategic concept designated a European NATO Commander and NATO headquarters for EU-led operations<sup>160</sup> in the framework of CJTF by including PfP countries.<sup>161</sup> Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (DSACEUR) stationed to command for non-article 5 operations (crises response, peace-keeping and humanitarian aid operations).<sup>162</sup> DSACEUR was “assured to access NATO planning capabilities”, “defence planning system”, and “available assets on his disposal”.<sup>163</sup> What is more, the 1999 strategic concept placed great importance on ensuring the most complete possible participation of non-EU European allies in EU-led crisis response operations, by means of utilizing existing consultation arrangements within the WEU.<sup>164</sup> In this respect, Canada desired to participate in such operations through appropriate modalities, however, Turkey was excluded.<sup>165</sup>

In fact, the drafter of the 1999 strategic concept was actually planning to do the following these:

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<sup>160</sup> Some official text reference this as WEU-led operations. however, other official text reference it as EU-led operations. Even though this may create confusion among reader, both are true. The WEU roles in security and defence matters were faded in the course of the time when EU became an overarching institute.

<sup>161</sup> Washington Summit Communique, “Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, Washington, D.C., USA 24 April 1999, para, 8.

<sup>162</sup> This position was belonged to British General Sir Rupert Smith. Taking this decision is so brave and a milestone for US leadership. However, the US conceptualize the British as a handful key ally.

<sup>163</sup> Washington Summit Communique, “Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, Washington, D.C., USA 24 April 1999, para, 10.

<sup>164</sup> Washington Summit Communique, “Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, Washington, D.C., USA 24 April 1999, para, 9.

<sup>165</sup> This meant that Turkey was deprived of having equal representation and veto power in EU or WEU-led operation. All decision in NATO, should have been brought into the NAC and Alliance should approve each operation case-by-case. The US detoured and sacrificed the system for focusing on global interest.

- i. To keep Russia in controlled cooperation through the Founding Act and OSCE,
- ii. To de-nuclearize Ukraine by Distinctive Membership, and standardization of armament through PfP membership,
- iii. To open up space for European members of the Alliance to conduct operations in Europe, exposing their capacity gaps and enabling them to fill these gaps through armament and standardization of the military equipment.<sup>166</sup>

To achieve this end, the Alliance launched Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and Membership Action Plan (MAP) through 1999 strategic concept. Regarding the DCI, the initiative highlighted the significance of the resource aspect and the need for improved coordination among defense planning disciplines. In this respect, the DCI took into account the capability of the European Allies to conduct WEU-led operations with regard to their deficiency for training, concept development, and standardization.<sup>167</sup> Therefore, it was decided to establish a “Multinational Joint Logistics Centre, development of Command, Control, Communication architecture to allow interoperability with national system”.<sup>168</sup> DCI particularly focused on improving interoperability for Permanent Members for their increased capability of deployability, mobility, sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and command and control and information system. The DCI would lead to spend a good portion of money out of their national budget. In other words, flow of money from Europe to the West because had they preserved it by their national armament companies and current technologies, they would not have required to do so.

Regarding MAP, as an open-door policy to NATO permanent membership it is required to solve resource issues by each PfP countries as well as political, economic, defense/military, security, and legal issues. It necessitated each aspirant countries to

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<sup>166</sup> NATO, “Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999)”, para, 59. Accessed on 12.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm).

<sup>167</sup> Defence Capabilities Initiative, “The Way Ahead” Washington D.C., USA 25 April 1999, para, 5.

<sup>168</sup> Washington Summit Communique, “Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, Washington, D.C., USA 24 April 1999, para, 11.

maintain sufficient budgetary resources to meet the Alliance's commitments, ensuring that national structures were in place to effectively manage budget resources, and necessitated participating in the common-funded activities of the Alliance at mutually agreed cost shares.<sup>169</sup> One of the criteria for PfP members to become permanent members was that aspirant members must pursue standardization and interoperability. In his thesis for Naval Graduate School, Mertl Miroslav explains how Army of the Czech Republic achieved interoperability by changing defense legislation because of the military structure, organization of the Czech Armed Forces, and conscripted soldier.<sup>170</sup> In this respect, the non-investment defense expenditure of Czech Republic more than doubled in order to achieve interoperability objectives while investment defense expenditure multiplied 140 times more between the years of 1997 and 1998.<sup>171</sup> What is more; after joining NATO on 12 March 1999, Czech Republic again had to change its defence legislation in order to allocate 2.2 % GDP for defence expenditure<sup>172</sup>. It should be understood in this thesis that the politics of interoperability played very important role from and after 1999 strategic concept since it meant flow of cash from weaker to stronger.

### **3.3. Conclusion**

The confidence-building measures of the Cold War period led to a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and European states from 1975 onwards, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought with it a debate among European NATO allies about whether direct American involvement in NATO should continue to exist or there would need a completely different security and defense system peculiar to Europe. In this process, 4 important views, including the complete abolition of NATO were put forward by different actors including Russia and Czech,

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<sup>169</sup> Membership Action Plan (MAP), "Resource Issues", Washington, D.C., USA 24 April 1999.

<sup>170</sup> Mertl, Miroslav, "Army of the Czech Republic in achieving interoperability with NATO", (MS Thesis: Naval Post Graduate School, 1998), 86.

<sup>171</sup> Miroslav, "Army of the Czech Republic", 103.

<sup>172</sup> Armed Forces of The Czech Republic, *A Symbol of Democracy and State Sovereignty 1993-2012*", Published by the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic Public Diplomacy, Tychonova, 44.

and only two of them were advocated by the France-Belgium duo and the British-American duo was accepted regarding to sustaining European security system. The concept of establishing a new ESDI, separable from NATO yet utilizing NATO's resources, was proposed by France and Belgium and underwent trial during the Bosnian conflict. However, it was ultimately dismissed due to insufficiency in capabilities and opposition from the US. However, in later periods, this point of view was restructured for conducting non-article 5 operations only within Europe as separable but not separate from NATO in the direction that the United States wanted by the leadership of the WEU first, then under the leadership of the EU. In the shaping of this process, discussions peaked at the 1990 London Summit, the Maastricht agreement, and the Petersberg Task. In the course of the time, the US and the UK, which prepared the draft of the 1991 strategic concept, made all member states accept the transformation and enlargement of NATO. Throughout these debates, the US became a competing nation from leading nation and sustained cooperation in rivalry with European members of NATO until 1999 strategic concept officially declared. This rivalry culminated at St. Malo's declaration when British and France agreed to resourcing WEU and EU on the principles of an autonomous to European Armed Forces. In the meantime, these debates continued, the American-led NATO, which decided in favor of transformation and enlargement in the same period of time and declared this in its 1991 strategic concept launched the partnership for this program as of 1994 by introducing open door policy for permanent membership to the states that newly independent from Soviets throughout central Europe, eastern Europe and central Asia. Similarly, it concluded a Founding Act with Russia in 1997 to keep it under its control and signed a distinctive membership agreement with Ukraine by giving security guarantees with the nuclear-armed states in NATO and Russia. Therefore, Ukraine was denuclearized.

The US, which developed a policy to prevent European member states from seeking a separate and separable security and defense system from NATO, tried to make them understand that they will not be able to fill capacity gap between them and the US if they seek to do so, did not mention interoperability in any way or other in the 1991 strategic concept. Same was valid to attract as many candidate states as possible into the system through the PfP program. In order not to scare Russia and

Ukraine the US followed a flexibility for standardization and interoperability procedures. However, when it comes to 1999 strategic concept this flexibility changed to a rigid policy by introducing DCI for permanent members and MAP for Russia, Ukraine and PfP members. All these new procedures for interoperability meant to renewal through modernization or replacement of old doctrines, military equipment, communication systems, flight gears etc. which cost a good sum of money from Eastern bloc to the Western bloc security and defense companies via armament and technology transfer. This was a necessity from standardization.

In this regard, the politics of interoperability literally consisted of Grand Bargain in the Big Chess Game. Through this, some of the things that the US achieved by means of bending and reshaping 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts. It defused the idea of a separate and separable European defence and security system by means of mounting CJTF to the European led operations for non-article V operations. This also left space for European members of NATO to take lessons in terms of their capacity gap and they tried to fill in. In this regard, the US freed itself from the burden of maintaining strategic balance with its own conventional forces in Europe because this burden was taken by European members of NATO.

When it comes to nuclear strategic balance, it has provided this by British and American nuclear missiles thanks to distinctive membership of Ukraine as it was denuclearized. The US planned to save these resources allocated from here to be used in other geographies as the 1999 strategic concept dictated UN to take primary responsibility to provide peace and security in the world. It kept Russia in controlled cooperation through the Founding Act. By launching DCI and MAP, it paved the way for the flow of Eastern capital to West due to standardization and armament requirements. It made European Union integrate its institutions with NATO in a way that puts NATO in a higher position. After 1999, in order to be able to use NATO in the out of area, NATO modified 1999 strategic concept that would place it in a higher position with the foresight that the UN would be weak.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE BILATERAL APPROACH, THE UNILATERAL ACTIONS FOR GLOBAL SUPREMACY AND RETURN TO POLARIZATION

#### 4.1. Introduction

This chapter examines NATO's strategic concept for 2010 and 2022. It is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the bilateral approach of the U.S. along with the political and military developments between the strategic concepts of 2010 and 2022. It should be noted that the United States, the leading actor in NATO, engaged in bilateral coordination with regional actors in order to consolidate its position for lasting global supremacy. In this regard, the first section attempts to explain different approaches through bilateral cooperation with each party within NATO. One such cooperative regional approach has been regulatory coordination with NATO members through the DCI and the adoption of the 2010 and 2022 strategic concepts. This took the interoperability discussions to a different level, as DCI evolved into the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), which elaborated the modernization and armament process for allied forces by adding impetus to European members to be more competitive to take initiative for the defense industry. Second, the PCC governed the transformation of command and force structures for EU-led operations, as well as those conducted in Afghanistan (known as Article 5 operations) and Iraq. This approach was intended to gain the consent of European members for the use of NATO assets outside the European region by the United States. Moreover, it would add to their legitimacy of actions conducted by the US outside the Euro-Atlantic region.<sup>173</sup> However, both sides used this transformation process to their advantage. The U.S. position was to use it for global perspective, especially for Afghanistan and Iraq, while the EU wanted to benefit from operational

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<sup>173</sup> Emel G. Oktay, "NATO'nun Dönüşümü ve Kamu Diplomasisi'nin Artan Rolü", *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 9, sy. 34 (Haziran 2012): 125-149.

experience to use it for non-article 5 operations besides the U.S. war on terrorism. With this approach, the problem of leadership competition in the Alliance was not totally solved but eased to a certain extent, as the focus of the U.S. became more on global primacy. In this sense, the bilateral approach includes the logic of adopting strategic concepts, the second wave of NATO enlargement, transformations of command and force structure in the context of interoperability discussions.

In the second section, this chapter looks at the global actions that the United States unilaterally decided to undertake. These were, first, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and its relationship with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq, where NATO's first ever Article 5 was activated. As this study argued, the US was preparing to play a global role outside the Euro-Atlantic region, where NATO was a candidate for the tasks to be assigned for implementation by the UN decisions. In this regard, it was quite possible that NATO was ready to use some of its assets in different geographies as dictated by the war on terrorism and the training mission in Iraq. In this respect, unilateral actions include the operations conducted by the US for outside the Euro-Atlantic region.

In the third section, the evolution and new dimension of NATO-Russia relations are to be examined because both unilateral decisions for global supremacy and bilateral approach in the Alliance brought Russia NATO relations to a point where both with convergence and divergence in the course of time. Therefore, NATO-Russia relations on the basis of the establishment of the Russian Council and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Nuclear Reduction, NATO-PfP relations on the basis of the MAP in particular in Georgia, and NATO enlargements in Central Europe should be taken up in this context. All these relations were directly related to the policy of interoperability, as these relations defined and left space for the US to take global action. Meanwhile, the US insistence on deploying a theatre missile defense system in Europe and the unilateral US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as well as NATO's statement on the Georgian elections in 2008, provoked Russia in return, which felt constrained by NATO's expansionism and took military action against Georgia. Moreover, the bilateral actions coordinated by the US for NATO made Ukraine a prey for Russia, just as it happened to Turkey for the EU-led

operations. While explaining all the relationships with each other, this chapter tries to draw logical consequences of bilateral approaches, unilateral actions<sup>174</sup> for global supremacy backfired as world politics evolved to multipolar world as China became a new competitor actor according to Strategic Concept 2022. However, interoperability always played a central role, as it was the reason for cooperation on the ground that NATO's probable mission against containment of Russia and China. In this context, the return of polarization paved the way for the backlash of the actions of the United States while trying to lust for global supremacy.

## **4.2. Bilateral Approach**

Strategic concepts can be seen as the most important guidelines for the policies of member states. They define the general framework for the alliance to take necessary precautions by comparing and contrasting past political and military developments. They assess the security environment depending on the intelligence report and drives member states to take actions by means of military and political planning. While doing this, it sometimes gives clues by embedded explanations even though some of the measures would be taken in the future elaborately discussed and negotiated indeed sometimes among all members sometimes among great scale members. However, strategic concepts prepared during the cold war period were more explanatory in military matters when compared with the strategic concepts after cold war. In this sense, post-1999 strategic concepts fall short behind NATO summit declarations and bilateral agreements in order to establish interoperability relationship. In other words, post-1999 strategic concepts are embedded in summit declarations. Among them were Prague Summit Declaration 2002, Rome Summit in 2022, Bucharest Summit 2008, and Warsaw Summit in 2016. Therefore, someone who tries to figure out NATO's future stance should take into consideration that 2010 and 2022 strategic concepts are sequentially and tacitly providing information on its future roles.

To give an example, in the 1991 strategic concept, the Mediterranean was included in NATO's new and possible area of operations, by adding article 6 of the treaty for

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<sup>174</sup> Emel G. Oktay, "NATO'nun Dönüşümü ve Kamu Diplomasisi'nin Artan Rolü", *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 9, sy. 34 (Haziran 2012): 125-149.



changing area of responsibility then Mediterranean Dialogue program enacted. Unlike 1991 strategic concept in which terrorism was only dealt with in the context of security challenges, the 1999 strategic concept dictated that NATO must establish a force posture in order to deal with terrorism since it creates Alliance's infrastructure systems vulnerable.<sup>175</sup> Away from conspiracy theories in this thesis, these embedded explanations meant a lot for future tasks of NATO since after the 9/11 attacks NATO focused on new threat by relatively intense overhaul of NATO command structure to force structure.

Accordingly, while studying 2010 strategic concept, paragraphs 13, 15 and 19 state that energy security is important for NATO.<sup>176</sup> When the strategic concept gave us this clue in 2010, Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine and had not declared that it would restrict gas supplies to Europe. Likewise, in 2020, the world had not yet experienced an energy crisis due to the Covid19 pandemic. In the 2022 strategic concept, paragraphs 13, 14, 18, and 43 emphasize that Peoples Republic of China (PRC) threatens the interests of the West.<sup>177</sup> It mainly tells that China has been using a broad range of tools as a coercive measure to challenge the West. Therefore, partially or to some extent of its assets, NATO must be ready to tackle some duties to conduct.

In the light of the information given above, NATO Summit Declarations, have taken precedence over strategic concepts in terms of bilateral agreements, NATO-Russia relations, NATO member states regulations and relations with other institutions and PfP members. The Prague Summit Declaration in 2002, the Rome Summit Declaration in 2002, and the Bucharest Summit Declaration in 2008 are the most important of these Summit Declarations that deal extensively with interoperability.

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<sup>175</sup> NATO, "Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)", para. 24. Accessed on 19.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm).

<sup>176</sup> Active Engagement, Modern Defence, "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon on 19-20 November 2010. Accessed on 14.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_82705.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm).

<sup>177</sup> NATO, "2022 Strategic Concept", Accessed on 22.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_210907.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_210907.htm).

Correspondingly, since NATO Summit Declarations have taken precedence over strategic concepts, there is need to pay particular attention to summit declarations listed some of them important as: Riga Summit Declaration in 2006, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration in 2009, Chicago Summit Declaration in 2012, Wales Summit Declaration in 2014, Warsaw Summit Communiqué in 2016, Brussels Summit Declaration in 2018, Brussels Summit Communiqué in 2021, Vilnius Summit Communiqué in 2023. Through these summit declarations, NATO has extended its duties far more than it had been imagined, which is impossible to sustain in terms of policy production. With the exception of the 2006 Riga Declaration, in all other summit declarations interoperability has evolved to regulate very broad and comprehensive relationships and partnerships. In the Riga summit declarations, apart from Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which regulates relations with the Gulf States, NATO has become more global by adding Contact Countries (Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Japan). What is more the US connected this relations with NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system which is an important step in improving the protection of deployed NATO forces.<sup>178</sup> Some summit declarations such as Warsaw Summit deal with so many broad issues that consisting of 139 paragraph, each member state should allocate too many international military staff to track and keep abreast of the events and policies.<sup>179</sup> However, both 2010 and 2022 strategic concepts do not mention about the extent of these summit declarations. Therefore, in order to understand the interoperability relationships, it is necessary to evaluate the strategic concepts of this period together with the summit declarations. In this sense, it should be noted that small and medium-scale members have been used as tools in the US global power game in the context of NATO under the pretext of interoperability. At the end of this power game, NATO has only issued a statement of condemnation against Russia, baiting Ukraine, and this statement was made similar to US foreign policy statement.

“Russia bears full responsibility for this conflict”. “It has rejected the path of diplomacy and dialogue repeatedly offered to it by NATO and Allies”. “It has fundamentally violated international law, including the UN Charter”.

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<sup>178</sup> NATO, “Riga Summit Declaration” 2006, para, 24. Accessed on 05.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_37920.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_37920.htm).

<sup>179</sup> NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué” 2016, Accessed on 05.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm#npa](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm#npa).

“Russia’s actions are also a flagrant rejection of the principles enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act: “it is Russia that has walked away from its commitments under the Act”. “President Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine is a terrible strategic mistake, for which Russia will pay a severe price, both economically and politically, for years to come. Massive and unprecedented sanctions have already been imposed on Russia”.<sup>180</sup>

The primary importance of the NATO strategic concepts lies in its objective and validity. The objective of the NATO strategic concepts is to revise security perceptions to meet the demands of evolving security conditions and to maintain the continuity of the current system through the formulation of suitable strategies. In this context, both past events and the operational environment envisaged for the future are determined. Strategic concepts are like a kind of mandatory, essential guidelines. Under normal circumstances, the points set out in the strategic concepts cannot be deviated from. If it is necessary to do so, a new strategic concept should be drawn up and accepted by all members. However, as this thesis deals with previous strategic concepts prepared during or immediate after Cold War period, it is clear that they all have been prepared in draft form with the direction of the US. They were not stretched until they were signed, but after they were accepted, they were used for different purposes due to the expressions they contained, or they all have been staged and the only thing necessary was to approval from all members. Therefore, it is necessary for scholars to careful reading of the statements in the strategic concepts and making logical consequences emanated from political developments and military events in the course of the time. For example, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was seen as the threat for NATO and the Euro-Atlantic region was assumed as an area of operation. While preparing strategic concepts, the United Nations as an institution emphasized the need to act within the framework of its principles, and in all strategic concepts prepared during the cold war period, the United Nations was defined as an institution whose principles should be followed. However, in the post-Cold War strategic concept of 1991, the United Nations was identified as an actor that could play an important role for “defusing crises and preventing conflicts”<sup>181</sup> for

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<sup>180</sup> NATO, “Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government on Russia’s attack on Ukraine”, 2022, Accessed on 05.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_192489.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_192489.htm).

<sup>181</sup> NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991)”, para, 33. Accessed on 05.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_23847.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm).

NATO operations in Europe. However, in the 1999 strategic concept, it was completely updated the UN's role as it "has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security".<sup>182</sup> Here we can see that the embedded statements and clues in strategic concepts lead to important policy changes. The objective of the 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts were evolved or deliberately changed because the norm established and used for the US benefits. To explain it, Kosovo intervention of the US is a clear case in point. Whether it was not legal but legitimate or vice versa, one thing for sure valid which was the US bypassed UN security council and intervened in Kosovo.<sup>183</sup> When the US administration realized that its relations with Russia was to suffer, the US offered Russia to take responsibility of Pristina international airport. This posed a potentially instructive lesson for Russia in the future, while also posed a manipulable issue for the United States. After this event, the US has always pursued a policy of keeping the UN weak, making decisions in its favour, and bypassing it in case of opposition.

The validity of the strategic concepts is of importance too. One validity problem is that a security problem that is important in one period may be a security requirement in another period. For example, the Russian Federation, which was defined as an enemy in the period during the Cold War, became a necessity for security needs for the stability of Europe after the Cold War. Another validity problem is that either misleading or benefiting from it. In other words, those who securitize the issue deliberately mislead the public as well as partners in order to gain benefits. If we give an example to this situation again, one of the reason for US to authorize the use of US forces against Iraq was "Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles".<sup>184</sup> As of 1991 strategic concept, "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage" accepted as a

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<sup>182</sup> NATO, "Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)", para, 15. Accessed on 05.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm).

<sup>183</sup> Mustafa Türkeş and Sait Akşin, "International Engagement, Transformation of the Kosova Question and Its Implications", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 38, 2007. pp. (79-114).

<sup>184</sup> President George Bush, "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq", October 2, 2002. The White House, para, 4. Accessed on 13.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html>.

risk and deemed to respond by article 5 and article 6 of the Washington Treaty. Both 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts designated some precaution means and these two strategic concepts arranged Alliance's force posture by means of filling response capability which necessitated interoperability for its members. However, the post-9/11 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) thought to be in Iraq's possession have still not been found yet. What is more, the British Prime Minister confessed that there was no WMD in Iraq. He later on blamed one of the most prominent intelligence agencies that provided wrong intelligence.<sup>185</sup> In fact, an entire war was fought on the existence of these WMD, and academics and experts kept the world public busy for a long time on this issue. In the end, however, those who planned and executed this war admitted that Iraq had no such WMD, but intent was to overthrow regime. Ironically enough, in his speech to 2002 Rome Summit for NATO Russia Council, Tony Blair stated that “And it is proof that statesmanship can lie not just in changing reality but also in giving expression to a reality that already exists”.<sup>186</sup>

In this sense, both objective and validity are important for strategic concept because they vary. The only thing that does not play a variable role is the interoperability of the military forces and interoperability of politics that occupy the existence of a role to regulate relations among Alliance members by creating cooperation and divergence problems. These two major problems were the leadership contest and burden share. It is clear both create benefits for some members.

One thing should be noted here. When preparing strategic concepts, the general framework of the measures to be taken in parallel with the threat perceptions is also determined. This is a natural process. However, what is unnatural is that some of the focuses are sometimes implicitly explained in NATO strategic concepts. We can infer this through consequences of events. Because events have happened, time has passed, and there is no room for interpretation but predicting the next move in the conditions of the day was nothing more than speculation.

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<sup>185</sup> Jethro Mullen, “Tony Blair says he’s sorry for Iraq War mistakes but not for ousting Saddam”, 26.10.2015, CNN, Accessed on 13.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/25/europe/tony-blair-iraq-war/index.html>.

<sup>186</sup> NATO, “NATO-Russia Joint Council, 28 May 2002”, p.26. Accessed on 13.11.2023, available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50091.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm).

For small and medium-scale member states in the Alliance, this may be difficult to understand at the beginning, but by the time it is understood, it has already been too late, and it does not matter. As it happened Ukraine event, denuclearizing it by assuring for its security do not fix Europe's strains gone through by means of instability and does not bring back Ukraine's human and infrastructure lost. To give another example, one of the reasons for devising Mediterranean Dialogue program was to link NATO to the Mediterranean. Therefore, unlike previous strategic concepts, NATO's area of operation changed by adding definition of "any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty"<sup>187</sup> in paragraph 24 of the 1999 strategic concept. Similarly, paragraph 38 has been made compatible with previous area of operation and emphasized NATO's interest in the Mediterranean, where developments and instability affect the security of member states.<sup>188</sup> In fact, this statement for security assessment is true but incomplete for its objective. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty can only be invocational in the event of a direct, open and an outside attack on any member state in the NATO area of operations. In this period, there are two countries that can be attacked in the Mediterranean. One is the United States of America, and the other is France. France has already been in an open debate with the United States (for leadership share since Alliance tried to prepare its first strategic concept on the ground of the responsibility for African Lines of Communication was not given to her) within the Alliance to take the lead in non-article 5 operations in Europe and to establish an autonomous European army in Europe. This leaves out only option of a possible US intervention in Iraq from the Mediterranean and the use of NATO assets in this plan. The US had already tested this by bypassing UN in the 1999 Kosovo intervention. In this sense, when comparing strategic concepts with their predecessors, the statements embedded in them need to be evaluated in a reason and outcome relationship. However, since this thesis infers logical consequences, and assess military and political developments in its current proximity, there is less room for interpretation, which increases the validity of the thesis. To this end, bilateral approach should include comparing 2010

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<sup>187</sup> NATO, "Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)", para, 24. Accessed on 14.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm).

<sup>188</sup> NATO, "Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)", para, 38.

strategic concept with previous strategic concepts that was prepared immediately after Cold War (1991 and 1999 strategic concepts) and to make logical predictions for 2022 strategic concept as it has just accepted.

In this respect, much attention is to be given regarding NATO's 2010 strategic concept because 2022 strategic concept has relatively new and gives negligible insights, at the same time, it is in short of drawing on logical consequences.

When we examine the 2010 strategic concept, one of the first important things that catches our eye is the explanation of the "2010 strategic concept commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union"<sup>189</sup> at the Preface section. Stabilizing post-conflict situations including by working more closely with our international partners is related with US's Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Following the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, the United States and the United Kingdom launched an operation against Afghanistan in October 2001 without a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). For the US, this action was taken in self-defence.<sup>190</sup> The US has based these operations on bilateral agreements with the Afghan government at the later stages.<sup>191</sup> The bilateral agreements are dubious in legitimacy because the government in charge was also brought to the action as part of the military operation. To be more precise, as a part of full spectrum military operation, (after finishing offensive and defensive military operation) military operation proceeds to the next phase called stability operation. During the stability operation, one of the tasks that military authorities together with interagency main duty is to supporting governance which consist of "supporting elections".<sup>192</sup> In this

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<sup>189</sup> Active Engagement, Modern Defence, "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon on 19-20 November 2010. Accessed on 14.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_82705.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm).

<sup>190</sup> Jan, Wouters, and Tom Ruys. "The Legality of Anticipatory Military Action after 9/11: The Slippery Slope of Self-Defense." *Studia Diplomatica* 59, no. 1 (2006): 45-67.

<sup>191</sup> Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, *NATO, Geçmiş, Günceli ve Geleceği*, Orion, 2023, 98.

<sup>192</sup> Field Manual No. 3-07, "Stability", Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 2 June 2014, 1-4.

respect, both military operation itself at the beginning of OEF and the legitimacy of the agreement with Afghanistan interim or permanent government doubtful because those elections done under the shade of dubious legitimate constitution. To be more specific, it could be self defense but there is no state to wage war. Only states can wage war against each other. Both the interim Karzai government and the elections were doubtful because the elections were prepared under the supervision of the military forces not because of the free will of citizens decisions. However, the UN took decision to send International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan in 2003. The second important change that stands out is that it is stated that the probability of a conventional attack in the Euro Atlantic region was very low because of the peace. This could lead to the conclusion that a compromise was reached on the condition that the leadership contest within NATO would be terminated so long as controlled by the United States. The third thing that stands out is the emphasis on the energy dependence of the member states and the problems that the interruption of energy supply and the blockage of energy supply routes would cause to the member states would affect NATO plans and operations.<sup>193</sup> This was related to the NATO's counter-piracy operations between 2008 to 2016. It started first to naval escort UN's world food program but later evolved to NATO's first naval out of area operation to secure trade and energy routes. This necessitated development of capacity to increase naval interoperability among Alliance.

#### **4.2.1. Second Wave of Enlargement**

After the 1999 strategic concept, two most important events that shaped the interoperability debates among the members within NATO were, in time order, firstly the amendment of the Founding Act treaty governing NATO-Russia relations and its replacement by another treaty called "A New Quality" on 28 May 2002. This will be discussed in detail in the next sections of this chapter. The second most important event is the Prague Declaration, which was adopted by the heads of state of the member states in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic in November 2002. In this respect, these two political developments are directly related to the September

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<sup>193</sup> Active Engagement, Modern Defence, "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", para, 13.



11 terrorist attacks and the United States push's NATO for filling capacity gaps and countering terrorism in distant geographies of Afghanistan.

Although Prague declaration, which consists of 19 paragraphs in total, does not set aside new mission areas and future working frameworks for the allies as a new strategic concept, it has shown itself as a characteristic of a new strategic concept because it includes a comprehensive package of measures as a result of the invocation of Article 5 as a result of the September 11 attacks. In addition, member states aimed to transform NATO with new members by inviting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to commence accession period to join NATO.<sup>194</sup> It was stated that “the accession of these new members will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and help achieve our common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace and by common values”.<sup>195</sup> An explanatory point is needed here. Under normal circumstances, the requirements for NATO membership are described in article 10 of Washington Treaty. However, from the inception, this matter discussed elaborately and made it clear that there are three criteria for membership. First, invitation must be done through unanimous decision. Second, the candidate must be capable of advancing the principles of the Treaty and contributing to the security of the North Atlantic region. Third, the candidate must be a state in Europe.<sup>196</sup> Therefore, when using the term, the “whole and free Europe” means only a European country become a member. Therefore, while the fate of non-European countries under the PfP program that are waiting in the wings for candidacy depends on the roadmap drawn by the US and the definition of what constitutes the borders of Europe, it is highly unlikely that they will be accepted. “Common values” mean democratic values. “Strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area” means void in this enlargement because these candidate countries can only strengthen two things instead of strengthen security of Euro-Atlantic Area.

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<sup>194</sup> Prague Summit Declaration, “issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague”, Czech Republic, (2002). Accessed on 15.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_19552.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm).

<sup>195</sup> Prague Summit Declaration, “issued by the Heads of State and Government”, para, 2.

<sup>196</sup> Richard H. Heindel, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, and Francis O. Wilcox. “The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate.” *The American Journal of International Law* 43, no. 4 (1949): 655.

Their membership could only serve to protect Western Europe, in particular Germany, from the fear of escalating tensions by unconventional warfighting based on Russia's limited warfare doctrine, to protect them by creating a belt from conventional attacks, or to create legitimacy to approve US Global actions at the UN. Already in 1949, before the treaty entered into force, when the issue of new membership was discussed in the US Congress, the importance of the geographical location of countries was seriously debated. As a serious example, it was emphasized that although Portugal is not a democratic country, she was decided to be accepted for membership because it was a country with significant geographical advantages.<sup>197</sup>

In this respect, 2002 Prague Declaration was a coercive declaration to show solidarity to the US because after this there has yet a bigger surprise in the store for new members. In this sense, this thesis claim that membership of the NATO was decided not depending on achieving certain criteria but because of how receptive to spend money in order to achieve their interoperability capabilities. As well as their geographic positions, their economic conditions and purchasing power of technological military equipment of the prospective members were mattered to have invitation. In the lights of all events, 2010 strategic concept came out of the discourse of “active engagement, modern defence”. That means NATO is actively taking part in regional and global operations with its, transformed, modernized, well equipped military. To achieve this, countries need to set aside capital which is to spend their %2 of GDP for military spending.<sup>198</sup>

#### **4.2.2. Second Wave of Transformation in Command and Force Structure**

Now that the invitation for full membership had been sent to the new candidate members, their military structures had to be reformed, upgraded with new technology and equipped with adequate equipment. For this purpose, a change in the NATO command and force structure was inevitable. This structure change was intended to contribute to both the US operations in Afghanistan and its operations in Iraq at the

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<sup>197</sup> Heindel, Richard H., Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, and Francis O. Wilcox. “The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate.” *The American Journal of International Law* 43, no. 4 (1949): 655-656.

<sup>198</sup> NATO, “Funding NATO”, Accessed on 16.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_67655.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm).

beginning. However, it aimed to transform military forces by means of armament and new technologies. Therefore, it was necessary to open a debate for interoperability justification. There was a resentment from US side that NATO could not support them. However, European allies attributed this to capacity gap. They were lack in “strategic lift, and air-to air refuelling aircraft, long-range strategic air transport capability, and none have long-range bombers as well as precision guided munitions (smart bombs)” at the initial stage of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).<sup>199</sup> However, according to Congressional Research Service, Carl W. Ek, made it clear that the US was hesitant to share sensitive technology and encryption codes.<sup>200</sup> Prior to the 1991 strategic concept, the CJTF structure was created in order to make the NATO command and force structure separable but not separate, and it was allowed to be used in non-article 5 operations, which were called humanitarian aid operations and crisis prevention operations that would take place in the Euro-Atlantic area. The CJTF had been devised as an EU-led force with a European commander from the same headquarters in NATO, but European member states were going to provide the troops and allowing the use of some of NATO's assets. A similar transformation, this time in a second wave was put forward in the Prague Declaration of 2002. The new command structure called NATO Response Force (NRF). According to New York Times “Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld told his NATO colleagues in Warsaw, if NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile that can deploy in days or weeks rather than months or years, then it will not have capabilities to offer the world in the 21st century”.<sup>201</sup> The US urged NATO members to take action to respond crisis area less than a month. According to Steven Erlanger, the US Secretary of Defense proposed a permanent force of 5,000 to 20,000 troops that could be deployed within 7 to 30 days. Therefore, NATO declared to establish a NRF through 2002 Prague Summit.<sup>202</sup> For some, it is said that this

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<sup>199</sup> Brian Collins, “Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO.” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2002): 53.

<sup>200</sup> Carl W.Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment”, *CRS Report for Congress* (2006), 6.

<sup>201</sup> Steven Erlanger, “Rumsfeld Urges NATO to Set Up Strike Force,” *New York Times*, 25 September 2002. Accessed on 16.11.2023, available electronic version, <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/25/world/rumsfeld-urges-nato-to-set-up-strike-force.html>.

<sup>202</sup> Prague Summit Declaration, “issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague”, Czech Republic, (2002). Accessed on

transformation would serve Alliance the emerging threats to be responded by means of quick deployment wherever it might be needed, regardless of the intensity and geographical position of the conflict. For this reason, the NRF thought to be “technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force which should be able to carry out operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats”.<sup>203</sup> It would increase the effectiveness of NATO, which will enable long-term missions in distant geographies. But for others, the NRF could be utilized for showcasing purposes, as exemplified by the European Rapid Reaction Force's action in Rwanda in June 2003.<sup>204</sup> However, deployment in scenarios that involve a distinct combat risk was improbable.<sup>205</sup> In its essence, two of the operational command under SACEUR, AFSOUTH Naples and AFCENT Brunssum planned to be transformed as NRF. NRF envisaged to command CJTF's Combined (consisting of two or more country) Joint (including two or more services like Land Forces, Navy and Air Forces), Task Force (includes all mission of expertise like infantry, artillery etc. and support groups). The significance of these two NRF were special forces command added to operate with them. Previous geographic area of responsibilities abolished. Instead, they planned to work on-call duty for 12 months of rotation. It was intended to deploy up to 13.000 troops in initial stage of 0 to 30 days and later stage 15.000 troops from the pool. This response time reduced to 7 days at later progress. Currently, NATO devised Very High Joint Task Forces (VJTF) with 5000 strong troops in 2 to 3 days response as of 2014. In this respect, NATO's readiness increased, special forces added, geographic responsibilities abolished, and they worked on call duty. Having said all this, the subject of this thesis seeks out how command structure and force structure transformation is affected in terms of politics of interoperability. One thing for sure was necessary to spend a good some of fund

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15.11.2023, Available electronic version,  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_19552.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm).

<sup>203</sup> David Gompert, “Is NATO Serious? An American Perspective on Prague.” *Atlantisch Perspectief* 26, no. 7/8 (2002): 34–36.

<sup>204</sup> UNMAIR could not prevent genocide because of the weak mandate and poor resourcing. John Borton and John Eriksson, *Assessment of the Impact and Influence of Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, Ministry of foreign affairs Denmark (2004), 58.

<sup>205</sup> Michael Mihalka, “NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force?” *Connections* 4, no. 2 (2005): 78.

since it necessitated up to date military build-up and its benefits of NATO because changing command structure without modernising its military build-up seemed to get a skeleton without muscles.

### **4.2.3. Prague Capabilities Commitment**

Before the end of the Cold War, both military and political leaders from the US tried to reduce dependence on the nuclear weapons. The flexible response doctrine necessitated to envisioning the utilization of both, however during this era their relative weight changed to more conventional side. Therefore, SACEUR, General Bernard W. Rogers suggested to make use of technological development such as reconnaissance, target acquisition and interdiction as well as modernization of military vehicles in order gain superiority against a conventional attack in Europe in 1982.<sup>206</sup> He tried to strengthen NATO's conventional warfare to counter Warsaw Pact. He further supported his arguments by means security studies and finally approved his stance by Defence Planning Committee in 1984. His point of view was including application of emerging technologies to mainly land weapon system. Of course, most of the system that he wanted member countries to procure was from the American origin. To give example to these system were listed as: Antitank guided weapons (ATGWS), Precision guided munitions (PGMS) and submunitions, Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), Joint anti-tactical missile system (Patriots and Hawk system), Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), Joint surveillance and target acquisition radar system (JSTAR), Tactical missile system (TACM), Joint tactical fusion programme.<sup>207</sup> This modernisation process named as Conventional Defence Initiative (CDI).<sup>208</sup> In the meantime, President Reagan launched a new doctrine complementary to the modernising NATO's conventional forces in 1985. The new doctrine better known as Star Wars. Both these complementary doctrines intended to

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<sup>206</sup> Fen Osler Hampson, "NATO's Conventional Doctrine: The Limits of Technological Improvement." *International Journal* 41, no. 1 (1985): 159–188.

<sup>207</sup> Osler, "NATO's Conventional Doctrine", 161-163.

<sup>208</sup> Conventional Defence Initiative (CDI) used by the US Colonel James A.Thomson as Conventional Defence Improvement (CDI). Both of them are the same notion. James A.Thomson, "NATO's Strategic Choices Defence Planning and Conventional Force Modernization", *the Rand Paper Series*, 1986, 16.

relax the flexible response doctrine with regard to lessen its nuclear dependence in order to establish a new perspective of strategic balance against Russia. This doctrine aimed to intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached to the US and Europe.<sup>209</sup> It can be described as an intermediate doctrine, although it is not strictly speaking a separate doctrine. The US poured \$55 billion on missile defense in the 15 years since Reagan launched this doctrine.<sup>210</sup> Some important physicists working for the project resigned on the ground that the program was fraudulent and dangerous.<sup>211</sup> The US aviation companies Boeing and Lockheed Martin were the main contractor and both companies benefited greatly from conducting research on Star Wars. However, this project could not be implemented because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. This doctrine was named as Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Even though, Star War project could not put into effect, research program kept going by Pentagon. It should be thought that both CDI and SDI were complementary to each other, and they were established a ground for 1999 Defense Capability Initiative (DCI). Therefore, DCI is the continuation of CDI and SDI. However, there was one continuation from the US side. The US Defense Minister Rumsfeld worked closely with the Center for Security Policy, a pro-Star Wars think tank managed by Frank Gaffney, a former Pentagon official in the Reagan administration who has dedicated his post-government career to spreading the Star Wars ideology.<sup>212</sup> What is more, Center for Security Studies had received over \$1 million as a donation from companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin when Rumsfeld came into office as defence secretary. There was no wonder that as soon as President Bush and Defence Secretary Rumsfeld insisted on establishing Theatre Missile System (TMS) both in the US and Europe starting from Poland and Czech Republic.<sup>213</sup> The important thing is that it does not matter whether the money will come from allied countries or from taxpaying citizens in the US, but it was clear that it would go to American arms companies in any case.

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<sup>209</sup> Howard G. Dewolf, "SDI and Arms Control", *The Institute for National Defence Strategy National Defense University*, Washington (1989), 4.

<sup>210</sup> William D. Hartung, "Reagan Redux: The Enduring Myth of Star Wars." *World Policy Journal* 15, no. 3 (1998): 18.

<sup>211</sup> Hartung, "Reagan Redux: The Enduring Myth of Star Wars", 18.

<sup>212</sup> Hartung, "Reagan Redux: The Enduring Myth of Star Wars", 21.

<sup>213</sup> Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, *NATO, Geçmişi, Günceli ve Geleceği*, Orion, 2023, 96.

Since the US could not be satisfied with the outcome of DCI to modernize and equip allies with western military gears even tracking and monitoring the members, it pushed Alliance to meet demands of wide-range missions outside of Europe. In this sense, NATO proclaimed Prague Capabilities Commitment in 2002 through which led them to second wave of transformation, enlargement, and established new relationship with Ukraine, Russia and Georgia. The US resentment of its European allies' insufficient support in the Afghanistan campaign and the lack of capabilities of the European Union states in the Kosovo and Bosnia wars were cited as reasons for this decision. On the European members view, they attribute not supporting the US at the initial phase of OEF to not having enough capacity to fight against different threat like terrorism in different geography. Therefore, at the initial phases, countries like Germany allocated their special forces units for the usage of the US. However, some European members explained their concern related to operation as it should only cover terrorism not to collateral damage to civilian even though NATO invoked article 5 unanimously. This was two sided questions and should be scrutinized through different studies as this study will detail it below. Under the Prague Capabilities Commitment, member countries agreed to enhance abilities in over 400 specified areas, encompassing eight fields crucial to modern-day military operations.<sup>214</sup> Among the prospective capacity gaps to be filled up were air-to air refueling (tanker planes), air transport (strategic lift), sea lift, precision guided munitions, high technology military gears that was necessary to quick respond and triumph over terrorists in distant geography. Within the scope of the DCI program with NATO permanent members, the way was paved for armament transfer through modernization and standardization under the pretext of filling the capacity gap and burden sharing. The US intention in the DCI was to provide European member states and PfP member states with capabilities close to its own military capacity, including Russia, but without spooking it, and one way to do this was to make them dependent on it through US's foreign military sales. In this context, once a member state procures specific military system, its costs of training, maintenance and spare parts for the sold system make them dependent on this cooperation for many years of

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<sup>214</sup> NATO, "Prag Capabilities Commitment", Accessed on 16.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50087.htm#:~:text=At%20the%202002%20NATO%20Summit,armed%20forces%20individually%20and%20collectively](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50087.htm#:~:text=At%20the%202002%20NATO%20Summit,armed%20forces%20individually%20and%20collectively).

programs.<sup>215</sup> To give example, Turkey procured F-16 aircrafts as of 1980's, however, Turkey still dependent on the spare parts. In times of Turkey and the US have debate over any political issues, US congress always use it as stick and carrot issue for deterring Turkey to turn the US side.

When the DCI was replaced by the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), the DCI entered a new phase. Things gone out of the hands of the US, because European members had been in search of a peculiar armament agency that exclusively belongs to Europe as of 1991 Maastricht declaration. PCC used as catalyst that European members of the Alliance finally established European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004.<sup>216</sup> EDA was a desire for European members of NATO as of Saint Malo declaration however its origin dates back to France's claim that the EU must have established its own military organisation. However, the capacity gap of strategic airlift in PCC was the main motive establish a consortium and main driving points for EDA to produce A-400M aircraft. Even though Turkey was not a member of EDA at initial phase, Turkey joined the consortium to procure A-400M and became a member of it in 2014.<sup>217</sup> The leadership of Germany, consortium decided to produce 180 A-400M aircraft by the membership of Germany, France, Spain, United Kingdom, Turkey, Belgium, and Luxemburg.<sup>218</sup> The US always disdained this program because it was urging to US C-17 aircraft to replace this program by voicing over as unnecessary duplication. So, why the US let armament program slipped from the US companies to EDA was because of the US's Afghanistan and Iraq war. Therefore, most of the politics focus on these areas. The US also wanted make use of this capabilities in the future since its main driving force to be a Global power in distant geographies and using NATO's assets out of Euro Atlantic region would increase its ability and legitimacy. In the meantime, European members tried to increase their capacity by means of EDA consortiums. However, some small-scale

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<sup>215</sup> Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Mission, Vision, Values", Accessed on 19.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.dsca.mil/mission-vision-values>.

<sup>216</sup> European Defence Agency, "the Birth of Agency", Accessed on 19.11.2023, <https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html>.

<sup>217</sup> Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, *NATO, Geçmişi, Günceli ve Geleceği*, Orion, 2023, 90.

<sup>218</sup> John Shimkus (United States Rapporteur), "Progress on the Prague Capabilities Commitment", 2005, 4.



countries used their mission of expertise for PCC, for example, Czech Army brought its niche capability of using a battalion size unit for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) need for NRF. It also used its expertise in NBC capability for the operational standby.<sup>219</sup>

As a politics of interoperability, since the establishment of NATO, 4 important issues have been publicly discussed and occupied major role among the member states and these 4 important issues have been partially resolved and partially still under debate. The first and most important controversial issue has been leadership contest within NATO. As a result of this debate, the successful side has achieved economic development and prosperity for their country and some advantages in world politics. This was partially because of the military umbrella has a clear advantage in securing trade routes due to security policies. For example, since the member state that ensures the security of the Atlantic Lines of Communications also secured the security of the trade routes. Therefore, it has received its share of income in maritime trade and has acted in line with priorities of its own country's interests.

The second important debate is the conduct of relations with the Russian Federation and the former members of the Warsaw Pact, which were considered enemies during the Cold War. Through these states the US kept monopoly that have established good relations with these countries and have benefited economically, first through arms sales and then through economic relations.

The third important debate is that Greece has always seen as belonging to the West, and as a member of the European Union, it has been under the umbrella of both the Europeans and the United States in its relations with Turkey and has benefited from it. Greece has moved beyond Turkey in the use of exclusive economic zones in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Cyprus and in its incorporated laws emanated from European institutions. Here, despite Turkey's high level of trade relations with Europe, the current US-led policies have pushed Turkey into isolation. At the same time, due to the inability to produce multilateral diplomacy in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey is being marginalized as belonging to the eastern society. However, in recent times, Turkey has been trying to pursue a balanced policy, which has inevitably led it

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<sup>219</sup> Shimkus, "Progress on the Prague Capabilities Commitment", 2005, 10.

to develop bilateral relations with Russia from time to time. In this respect, the UK was used as “trojan horse” by the US against European’s leadership discourse in Saint Malo declaration to establish autonomous European defense industries. Similarly, Greece has the same position used by European members against Turkey. The US took initiative from European members because of benefiting from interoperability discussions through arm sales to and modernisation of Greece military looks lucrative. To give a contemporary example, according to Matthew Miller who is in charge for Spokesperson of US Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis had phone conversation for bilateral relations. The Secretary and Prime Minister affirmed their dedication to enhancing the U.S.-Greece partnership while also endorsing American support for Greece's modernization of its defense in accordance with NATO's interoperability standards.<sup>220</sup> In this sense, interoperability played central role to regulate bilateral relationship inside the Alliance.

The fourth and most important debate is how to benefit from the money spent on security within the allied countries. This sometime became a burden sharing issue by pretexting free riders. During the Cold War, this issue did not come to light much because of the continued U.S. presence in Europe and the protective shield of European allies based on U.S. nuclear weapons. However, due to the commercial benefits of the relations with Russia and the states that gained independence from Russian Federation, the US has tried to recover some of the money it has spent on security, primarily through weapons modernization and standardization, selling military equipment, and providing training. After the September 11 attacks, the UK provided the most important support to the US operation in Afghanistan and joined the operation by acting with the US. Even though some scholars and government officials complain about British military officials not being honest for the cost of the money spent on immediate operational needs, it was estimated that the war in Afghanistan costs each year between £3 to £4 billion each year.<sup>221</sup> However, former

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<sup>220</sup> Matthew Miller, “Readout Office of the Spokes Person: Secretary Blinken’s Call with Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis”, Accessed on 18.11.2023, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-greek-prime-minister-mitsotakis-6/>.

<sup>221</sup> Frank Ledwidge, *Investment in Blood, the Real Cost of Britain’s Afghan War*, Yale University Press New Haven and London, 2013, 125.

British ambassador to Afghanistan, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, stated that the UK's military spending was £6 billion in a year as of 2010.<sup>222</sup> In order to close its capacity gap for strategic lift, the UK bought eight C-17 Globemaster aircraft in addition to 38 C-130 Hercules aircraft.<sup>223</sup> What is more, the British Ministry of Defence paid £800 million for the lease of four C-17 Globemaster aircraft for seven years before procuring them as well as procurement of 14 new Chinook helicopters for £1 billion for Afghanistan.<sup>224</sup> Due to the lack of immediate involvement of European states in the operation and the enlargement of NATO, the states that were to become members were asked to meet certain standards in the area of interoperability, which paved the way for eastern capital to flow to Western arms companies. Aware of this from the beginning, the US introduced the DCI program after the strategic concept of 1991, and when the DCI plan did not yield much, it pushed European allies to accept PCC. However, the European states, having resolved the leadership debate on the issue of European Union-led operations being commanded by Europeans and decided under their responsibility, are involved in an open debate here as well. Since the flow of the money is majestic, not only the US military arms companies, but also the European defense agency tried to take the share in the modernization of the armies.

In this sense, PCC occupies major role in its essence of Alliance and can be attributable to the European members effort to contest with US arm market. It was not a coincidence that President Bush eloquently started to advertise Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) at every opportunity in front of the media. The intent was to enforce its allies to procure US made patriot PAC-3 missiles and the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) systems to NATO members. The pretext was “to defend the U.S., deployed forces, allies, and friends”.<sup>225</sup> What is more, his intend was to establish this missile system at the soils of Poland and Czech Republic. This issue is going to be discussed at NATO-Russia relations below. One point should be made

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<sup>222</sup> Ledwidge, “Investment in Blood, the Real Cost of Britain’s Afghan War”, 107.

<sup>223</sup> Ledwidge, “Investment in Blood, the Real Cost of Britain’s Afghan War”, 110.

<sup>224</sup> Ledwidge, “Investment in Blood, the Real Cost of Britain’s Afghan War”, 119.

<sup>225</sup> Philip Coyle, “Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense Under Bush”, Arms Control Association, Accessed on 12.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-05/features/rhetoric-reality-missile-defense-under-bush>.

here, which was that member states, either individually or collectively, could create a talent pool and benefit from it.<sup>226</sup> But it was clear that the European defense agency was financially and technologically inferior to the United States when two sides compared. Even if they produced a new airplane, they would still have to receive technology transfer, spare and complementary parts from the United States. Even in this case, the US was not keen on European member states coming together to form a consortium. Robert Hunter, ex-US ambassador to the NATO, claimed in his book that “unnecessary duplication” for production of A400M cargo planes.<sup>227</sup> For him, while the US-made C-17 or C-130J aircraft still at hand and proved its capacity, the European consortium's A-400M cargo planes remain dysfunctional. Instead of production of A-400M, renting Antonov AN-124 cargo plane from Ukraine was logical to him.

Interoperability which requires not only military capabilities but also necessitates same mindset. On the one hand, this is essential for two or more countries to combine them together and conduct joint military operation, to give an example of the importance of interoperability. The quest for European Military Capabilities, Bjorn Seibert deals with an EU-led crises management operations led by French Government as a case study. The European council depending on the UN Security Council Resolution 1778, issued an authorization to conduct bridging operation for one year mandate in Chad and Central African Republic (Chad/CAR) after insisting suggestion by France. It took 3 and half months to pull-up soldier from pledged countries. When the operation was almost abandoned, the initial troop set off to deploy in January 2008 and arrived in the theatre of operations in mid-March 2008. After their arrival, they were unable to carry out their mission due to the lack of helicopters, so the operation commander requested 11 utility helicopters from Euro corps. In December 2008, Russia, having out of pity for the operational commander, sent the helicopters that the European Union could not. Meanwhile, since the

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<sup>226</sup> NATO, “Prag Capabilities Commitment”, Accessed on 16.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50087.htm#:~:text=At%20the%202002%20NATO%20Summit,armed%20forces%20individually%20and%20collectively.](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50087.htm#:~:text=At%20the%202002%20NATO%20Summit,armed%20forces%20individually%20and%20collectively.)

<sup>227</sup> Robert E. Hunter, “Defense Capabilities and The Defense Capabilities Initiative.” In *The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion - or Competitor?* 1st ed., 45–52. RAND Corporation, 2002, 51.

mandate of the operation was over, the French handed over mission to UN Mission in Central Africa MINUCRAT operation with an embarrassment.<sup>228</sup> In this sense, While French government were leading a crises management operation, they became the victim of the very crises. Therefore, interoperability is important on the ground of sharing the same mindset.

On the other hand, the price to be paid for interoperability discourse since it is just as high. For example, the total defense expenditure amount in Europe as of 2007 was €204 billion.<sup>229</sup> This money will flow somewhere after extracting personnel, operations, infrastructure investment and procurement, but where it will flow is very important. Under normal circumstances, member states have committed to spend 2% of total GDP on defense expenditure. However, the amount was relatively high as the new members of the Alliance had brought many gaps to fill in and more to modernize and procurement for their armed forces. For example, in 2007, Bulgaria used 6.74% of its total GDP for defense spending.<sup>230</sup> Since the European defense agency is still in its infancy, the US has taken the lion's share here too. When compared with the US arm companies, the European defense agency or the defense companies, it is a fact that the US will take the lion's share of interoperability and armament transfer in the future, since the US makes 10% of its total defense expenditures for defense and technology research expenditures and this rate is around 2% in European member states.<sup>231</sup>

To make an objective evaluation of the PCC, this thesis suggests that it was an initiative of European members striving to gain independence from American reliance, even though it was a push from the US by Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush. Judging by assessment reports written by both sides (through CRS Reports for US Congress, US rapporteur to the US NATO Parliamentary Assembly,

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<sup>228</sup> Bjorn Seibert, "The Quest for European Military Capabilities", *European Defence Capabilities*, London (2010), 8-11.

<sup>229</sup> Braddon Derek, "Operational, Structural and Procurement Expenditure in European Defence Budgets: Trends, Patterns and Reform", *European Defence Capabilities*, London (2010), 17.

<sup>230</sup> Derek Braddon, "Operational, Structural and Procurement", 17.

<sup>231</sup> James Fanshawe CBE, "Effective Partnering between Government and Industry", *European Defence Capabilities*, London (2010), 25.

and points of view from ex-ambassador to NATO from the US on the one side, and officials and scholars from European Defence Agency on the other side), taking more initiative made the US to take extra precautions. In this sense, the US devised a new strategy to make NATO Parliamentary Assembly involve more on the US side. To gain more, NATO Council and Parliamentary Assembly met in special session. The session was held in Venice Italy on 13 November 2004. 300 parliamentarians from North America and Europe discussed a wide spectrum of topics, including Afghanistan, Iraq, terrorism, NATO's capabilities, partnerships, the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, and the relationship between NATO and the European Union.<sup>232</sup> Through this pressure, the European members enforced to procure C-17 aircraft<sup>233</sup> in November 2006 Riga summit. In the meantime, it was advised to leave A-400M project as it was seen as unnecessary duplication. The US tracked the progress of PCC and always kept it under pressure. Once PCC overweight to procure European consortium, it criticized for. John Shimkus, as a US Rapporteur to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly made it clear that even though specific items that the European Defense Agency produce through national consortium it was useless because the US wanted them to interdependence with their product. To give an example, Netherland led a group to buy conversion kits to transform conventional bombs into Precision Guided Munitions (PGM).<sup>234</sup> This was not sufficient because NATO Parliamentary Assembly insisted that procuring large amount of PGM “was not very useful unless the Alliance has the intelligence resources to know what to target”.<sup>235</sup> For this reason, The US established NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency (NAGSMA) in 2009 by means of its Global Hawk and Predators to gather intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance through unmanned drones.<sup>236</sup> In this sense, the US made members to sign a memorandum in order to

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<sup>232</sup> NATO, “NATO Council and Parliamentary Assembly meet in special session”, 13 November 2004. Accessed on 18.11.2023, <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/11-november/e1113a.htm>.

<sup>233</sup> Carl W.Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment”, *CRS Report for Congress*, January 24, 2007, 4.

<sup>234</sup> Carl W.Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment”, *CRS Report for Congress*, November 7, 2003, 4.

<sup>235</sup> John Shimkus (United States Rapporteur), “Progress on the Prague Capabilities Commitment”, 2005, 1.

<sup>236</sup> NATO, “Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)”, Accessed on 18.11.2023, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_48892.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48892.htm).

provide intelligence. After all, it established a NATO intelligence infusion center in the UK by means of Riga Summit Declaration.<sup>237</sup> In this regard, some countries took a position of being a “handful key ally” in order to drive operations since operations are carried out within the framework of information provided by intelligence. Therefore, filling capacity gap meant spending money on it.

### **4.3. Unilateral Actions, the Lust for Global Supremacy**

In the 1991 strategic concept, the Mediterranean was included as NATO's new and possible area of operations, while WMD and terrorism were included as possible security challenges and risks.<sup>238</sup> Unlike 1991 strategic concept in which terrorism was only dealt with in the context of security challenges, the 1999 strategic concept dictated that NATO must establish a force posture in order to deal with terrorism since it creates Alliance's infrastructure systems vulnerable.<sup>239</sup> In this sense, NATO was prepared to a terrorist attack only in a notion, but the extent and form of its seriousness as well as the action to be taken against it never been seriously studied. And yet, for the first time in NATO's history, all the alliance agreed to invoke NATO's Article 5. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack by al-Qaeda in the United States changed the global security environment and led to revival of the US's global power. In the 2010 strategic concept, terrorist attacks are now seen as a threat to the security of the citizens of allied countries and to international stability, and the new strategic concepts have been designed to take measures to shift to a military force structure capable of countering threats arising from terrorism.<sup>240</sup> Therefore, Alliance took decision to transform NATO's command and force structure to counter against terrorism. What is more, it has made it necessary to go a step further and take

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<sup>237</sup> NATO, “Riga Summit Declaration”, para, 24. Accessed on 18.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_37920.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_37920.htm).

<sup>238</sup> NATO, “The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991)”, para, 12. Accessed on 19.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_23847.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm).

<sup>239</sup> NATO, “Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)”, para, 24. Accessed on 19.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm).

<sup>240</sup> Active Engagement, Modern Defence, “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon on 19-20 November 2010, para, 10. Accessed on 19.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_82705.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm).

measures against terrorism by training local security elements where they deployed. There has been a lot written and debated the American war on terrorism. The first debate voiced over the legitimacy of the operation. Some expert defined this issue as the US, together with the UK, started the war without the need for a UNSC resolution.<sup>241</sup> This created an environment to study whether this was an invasion to further US interest to make the world as unipolar by containing Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The US first tried this during the Kosovo war in 1999 by bombing the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the pretext of China's embassy was providing info for Serbs.<sup>242</sup> In this regard, the US officially started to contain China as of 2001 as shown in the pages of Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report. While defining regional security development, the QDR mentioned the Asia as susceptible to large-scale military confrontation. The US tacitly described China as "it is possible that a military rival with a substantial resource base may arise in the area".<sup>243</sup> Right after, this description, the QDR also put forward that the US, its allies and friends is going to make use of energy resources in Middle East. Therefore, if the US needs energy resources at the region so the China too. Some claimed that Al- Qaeda was not a state therefore the launch war on terrorism does not fit the international armed conflict.<sup>244</sup> In the same manner this action does not fit the self-defence since there must be an armed attack without making any doubt. There must have been misinterpretation of these debate on what constitute an armed attack, the US did not want to lose time and accordingly acted together with UK. Within 24 hours of the terrorist attack, NATO decided to invoke article five, but it was too hasty since summoning article five would be legal after consultation of NATO and this decision must be declared to UN Security Council.<sup>245</sup> Even the US was surprised that article 5 could be released so soon. There were two issues here that would delay the United States from launching an operation in Afghanistan without acting as soon as possible. First the invocation

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<sup>241</sup> Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, *NATO, Geçmişi, Günceli ve Geleceği*, Orion, 2023, 98.

<sup>242</sup> The Guardian, "Nato bombed Chinese deliberately", Accessed on 19.11.2023, available electronic version, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/17/balkans>.

<sup>243</sup> Donald H.Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Secretary of Defense, September 30, 2001, 4.

<sup>244</sup> Akbar, Muqarrab, and Mahdi Zahraa. "War against Terrorism: Legality of the US Invasion of Afghanistan." *Pakistan Horizon* 68, no. 3/4 (2015): 81–103.

<sup>245</sup> Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, *NATO, Geçmişi, Günceli ve Geleceği*, Orion, 2023, 26.



of the article 5 consequences of such a quick decision could be to its detriment because it must be proven that the terrorist attack on the United States was an external attack. If there is a dispute that the attack was not carried out from outside, the legality of the operation will be questioned before it even begins. The other thing is that after the Secretary General of NATO notified the United Nations, there was a possibility that the Security Council would decide that the United Nations would investigate this attack. In this case, again the operation could even be suspended until the commission decide that it was a clear an open attack that the US could use its rights emanated from article 51 of UN. Although some senior US military officials said they did not want to wait because the terrorist attack would damage US pride, all NATO member states opened their airspace and immediately made NATO's AWACS aircraft available to the US.<sup>246</sup> In this sense, NATO's operation "Eagle Assist" to support US lasted from 9 th October 2001 to 22 th May 2002 by means of "830 crew members from 13 NATO nations have patrolled US skies in the NATO AWACS for nearly 4300 hours in over 360 operational sorties".<sup>247</sup> When an interim government established on 5th of December 2001, Hamid Karzai became Chairman of the interim administration.<sup>248</sup> From 19 December 2001 to 11 August 2003, the UK took the command of International Security Assistance Force by means of UN decision resolution number 1386. After that NATO took the command authority of ISAF. Some members actively took part in combat operations while others only joined to reconstruction of Afghanistan. It took 13 years, American war on terror together with NATO. Considering China's probable big economic power for the next decades, the US's war on terrorism in close proximity of China should not be disregarded as both 2010 and 2022 strategic concepts deals with China as emerging threats. What is more, energy routes became important issue, we can draw on a weak conclusion that the US tried to contain China to reach energy rich countries both from Central Asia and Middle East. As of 2017, China became the world's largest

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<sup>246</sup> Brian Collins, "Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Summer/Fall 2002, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2002), 51-56.

<sup>247</sup> NATO, "Statement by the Secretary General on the conclusion of Operation Eagle Assist", Accessed on 19.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/04-april/e0430a.htm>.

<sup>248</sup> United Nations, "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 2001, resolution number 1154.

oil importing country and half of its import was from the Middle East.<sup>249</sup> It has been already known that the US made research about it. To sum it up, the US war on terrorism intended to lust for Global superiority by means of which necessitated transformation of NATO and its use in distant geographies. Both 2010 and 2022 strategic concepts revealed that NATO may be engaged to contain China as an emerging power.

#### **4.4. From Cooperation to Polarization Amid Return of a Multipolar World**

As of London Summit in 1990, there was a period of rapprochement between Russia and NATO. This rapprochement culminated to a mutual signing of the first post-Cold War agreement between Russia and NATO through 1997 Founding Act. It was thought to be building trust brings stability in Euro Atlantic region. According to the West, this agreement, which was described as “extending a friendly hand” to the former Cold War enemies, spared Russia time to recover from the destruction of the Soviet Union, and instead of dealing with crises, it prepared an environment where Russia found time and economy to return its internal dynamics and resurrection for international politics for a while. In fact, the circumstances of that day, other options other than accepting what was given to Russia did not seem possible because it was under the rubble of a collapsing wreckage. In the course of the time, Founding Act signed in 1997 provided such a big assurance that convinced Russia, NATO would not deploy nuclear weapons (under no circumstances) in the countries where Russia withdrew its troops.<sup>250</sup> However, Russia and NATO first began to have a rift in Kosovo crisis in 1999. The US's intervention in Kosovo, through bypassing the United Nations Security Council resolution, can be described as the first event for Russia to begin to approach relations with scepticism. In order to regain Russia's trust in this incident, the United States gave Russia the responsibility for the security of the international airport in Pristina. However, NATO-Russia relations have been better than ever before in history after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. At the same time, the unilateral policies of the United States on NATO grounds marked

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<sup>249</sup> Frank Umbach, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its Energy-Security Dimensions.” *S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies*, 2019, 17.

<sup>250</sup> NATO, “Founding Act”, *IV Political and Military Matters*, 1997, Accessed on 20.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_25468.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm).

the beginning of the rupture in Russia-NATO relations in the process of the annexation of Crimea and Ukraine being dragged into the war. Here, of course, the dependence of European NATO allies on US nuclear protection for interoperability and the security guarantees for Ukraine and the denuclearization of Kazakhstan and Moldova due to the START agreements have been the triggers. The unilateral policies and development that followed by the US, eventually brought Russia back into world politics as a Global power. This actually started at the very beginning with the decisions taken at the Rome summit in 2002. By means of the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has turned its attention to the search for a Global superpower, and in order to avoid another crisis in the European region, tried to regulate NATO Russia relations by abolishing NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council, which regulated relations in the Founding Act, and replaced it with the NATO Russia Council.<sup>251</sup> Here, too, the Founding Act has undergone a change, returning to a new program which was called “NATO-Russia Relations: a New Quality”. In this sense, NATO Russia Council (NRC) replaced to the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 2002. The individual Allies and Russia have met as equals in the NRC, rather than meeting bilaterally in the “NATO+1” format under the PJC. This meant that Russia was to be treated as if it were a member of NATO as of 2002 when 19 NATO members signed an agreement with Russia in Rome Summit in 2002. Therefore, NATO member states issued a declaration on the establishment of the Russian NATO Council in Rome on 28 May 2002. The heads of state of the member states as well as Russian President Putin attended the meeting. It was stated that NATO and Russia were united by a common goal, and that goal was to defeat terrorism in the world. The issues of security and terrorism between the member states and Russia were discussed. Some of them were the identification of problems that would arise for preventing nonstate actors to gain WMD, joint decision-making, joint action, unanimous decision-making, and equal responsibility in the measures to be taken.<sup>252</sup> In addition, the heads of the member states emphasized their own interests in assessing their countries' relations with Russia during this meeting. For

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<sup>251</sup> NATO, “NATO-Russia Joint Council, 28 May 2002” Accessed on 20.11.2023, available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50091.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm).

<sup>252</sup> NATO, “NATO-Russia Joint Council, 28 May 2002” Accessed on 20.11.2023, available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50091.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm).

example, President Chirac emphasized the importance of a European Union-based approach in Russia-NATO relations, while Polish President Kwasniewski emphasized the need for Ukraine to become a NATO member.<sup>253</sup> Ironically, Germany, at 1990 London summit, had proposed that Poland should join NATO together with the Czech Republic and Hungary. In fact, each country tried to encourage a country closer to Russia to become a member of NATO in order to create a safety belt to protect them in case relations get worse and Russia acts offensive. The United States has emphasized the importance of cooperation in missile defense and air space control.<sup>254</sup> As a result, an agreement was made with Russia under the title of “A New Quality” under 9 headings.<sup>255</sup> Among these nine headings, two agreements were of great importance. These were “struggle against terrorism”, “theater missile defense”. In this respect, “struggle against terrorism” was the only point where the United States, Russia and the European Union have met in their interest by means of establishing common ground on NATO respect because, in the same period, there was a similar terrorist attack during a parade held on Great Patriotic Day in Kaaspik Russia, although not on a large scale.<sup>256</sup> Here, by creating rapprochement, the US wanted to prevent Russia from blocking possible future decisions on terrorism in the UN to take. However, Theater Missile Defense heading created a slippery slope. Although it offered to provide security to member states in the context of interoperability, it meant insecurity for Russia. Not knowing the extent of missile defense in particular Russia, both sides tried to trick each other. However, in any case it was the US insistence on establishing Theatre Missile Defence. First of all, the US and Russia signed an agreement called Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in Moscow just four days before NATO Rome declaration of the NATO Russia Council on 28 May 2002. Russia and the United States pledged to reduce

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<sup>253</sup> NATO, “NATO-Russia Joint Council, 28 May 2002” p, 21-22. Accessed on 20.11.2023, available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50091.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm).

<sup>254</sup> NATO, “NATO-Russia Joint Council, 28 May 2002” p, 19. Accessed on 20.11.2023, available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50091.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm).

<sup>255</sup> NATO, “NATO-Russia Relations: A new Quality”, Accessed on 20.11.2023, available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_19572.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19572.htm).

<sup>256</sup> Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O’Brien, William Rosenau, *Beyond al-Qaeda the Global Jihadist Movement*, RAND, 2006, 106.

their operationally deployed stockpiles of nuclear warheads in the next decades from 1700-2200 warheads.<sup>257</sup> After this agreement, the US declared that it withdrew from 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Agreement (ABM) because article 9 of the ABM treaty dictates both sides do not deploy or transfer ABM systems out of their national borders.<sup>258</sup> In order to establish theater missile defense in Europe, the US chose detoured relations.<sup>259</sup> Correspondingly, when a question raised to president Putin related to Ukraine's membership for NATO in Rome summit, he responded as "Ukraine is independent, sovereign country it will define her part for her peace and security".<sup>260</sup> Both were in their deed were not honest in particular the US. Because, in principle, it is not suitable for a country under a shared defense obligation within the NATO alliance to independently create a defense mechanism, disregarding the terms of others. When it comes to Russia, Ukraine could not choose its own path for joining NATO. However, it was not Ukraine's mistake since the policies that followed by US brought the situation to annex Crimea and war in Ukraine. It should be better to take a look at background of the Theatre Missile Defense and its relation to Russia in order to understand better.

After Cuban Missile crises of 1962, it was meaningless to threaten two sides (west and east) for annihilation, therefore two sides tried to establish confidence against each other and limit their nuclear and ballistic missiles. In this respect, there have been several treaties between Soviet Union and US. Since most of the sources to identify which one which, this study relates as IBM, SALT series and START series agreement. Some of them prepared for specific time periods and once they expired the new one put into practice by means of negotiating technical details such as counting, demolishing and verifying them that they were no longer in service. All presidents in the US as well as Russian Federation aware of this and followed a

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<sup>257</sup> Deryl G.Kimball, The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) At a Glance, Accessed on 21.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance>.

<sup>258</sup> Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on The Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), Accessed on 21.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm#text>.

<sup>259</sup> Cole Harvey, "Obama Shifts Gear on Missile Defense, Arms Control Association", Accessed on 21.11.2023, Available electronic version, [Obama Shifts Gears on Missile Defense | Arms Control Association](https://www.armscontrol.org/oc/obama-shifts-gears-on-missile-defense).

<sup>260</sup> Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, *NATO, Geçmiş, Günceli ve Geleceği*, Orion, 2023, 104.

balanced policy until the insistence of President Bush's new theatre missile defense project.

When President Bush and President Putin met in Genoa, Italy, for the G-8 summit in July 2001, President Bush offered to reduce nuclear offensive force reductions from both sides out of blue. Accepting this offer, Russia suggested to make an official process that would necessitate each side to limit 1500 nuclear weapons.<sup>261</sup> President Bush announced a unilateral reduction of US forces without formal agreement with Russia since the US does not want to waste time for endless talks and wanted to put in to practice by shaking hands of Russia or writing down on a piece of paper was enough to agree.<sup>262</sup> Realizing that once reduction of the nuclear forces would create irreversible results, Russia insisted to have a legally binding document. In the aftermath of the negotiations the US insisted to limit only deployed weapons. When they agree to count all nuclear warheads, this time the US pretexted that some of the submarines would overhaul for maintenance.<sup>263</sup> The bottom line is that the US has put in place all the devious ways that would not be sincere in this agreement during the negotiation phase. Some of these were, for example, the destruction of the warheads must be included destroying them together with launchers and delivery means which was proposed by Russia in order to prevent them from being reintroduced into the system. However, the US opposed this by converting some of the Tridents submarines and heavy bomber aircrafts. According to Russia, only this way could both side would be honest to their promise for radical real and irreversible elimination of nuclear war heads.<sup>264</sup> After reaching the agreement, there was one another prerogative that bonded two sides. In the meantime, the US assured Russia that the US's theatre missile defense Project would not be target at or diminish Russia's strategic nuclear deterrence.<sup>265</sup> At the end two side agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons to 1700 to 2200 warheads by December 31, 2002. After

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<sup>261</sup> Amy F. Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control: the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty", *Congressional Research Service*, 2010, 1.

<sup>262</sup> Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control", 2.

<sup>263</sup> Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control", 5.

<sup>264</sup> Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control", 6.

<sup>265</sup> Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control", 8.

signing this treaty, it was not a coincidence that, NATO met in Rome to declare establishment of NATO Russia Council. However, the US's unilateral withdrawal from ABM treaty on 13 June 2002 caused a deeper rift than Kosovo event. Because right after this withdrawal the US declared that missile defense would include in missile interceptor field in Poland and radar facility in the Czech Republic.<sup>266</sup> Even though the US tried to convince Russia that the missile shield intent was against rogue states as "some terrorists will be able to capture intercontinental missiles and will be able to use them" against the US and its allies.<sup>267</sup> With this agreement, As of July 2009, the US Nuclear force structure were outlined as, "500 Minuteman III ICBMs that could allocate 3 warheads maximum, 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs which were attributed with eight warheads each, 18 Trident submarines equipped with 24 ballistic missiles which were attributed with six or eight warheads each, 141 B-52 H bombers, 47 B-1 bombers; and 18 B-2 bombers. The B-52 H bombers could be equipped with up to 20 long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles which were each could allocate for 10 warheads under START's counting rules".<sup>268</sup>

In this sense, there is direct relations between interoperability and high-tech armament in the Alliance. It was no secret that President Bush voiced over his one of the biggest ambitions to establish a Missile Defense Program as of its campaign to run for Presidential election.<sup>269</sup> His Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had affiliation with Lockheed Martin Company which is the top one armament company. As of 2017 its arm sale was \$44.9 billion.<sup>270</sup> The US insistence on Missile Shield for Europe created second rift between Russia and US in the context of NATO after Kosovo.

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<sup>266</sup> Cole Harvey, "Obama Shifts Gear on Missile Defense, Arms Control Association", Accessed on 21.11.2023, Available electronic version, [Obama Shifts Gears on Missile Defense | Arms Control Association](#).

<sup>267</sup> Lynn F. Rusten, "U.S. Withdrawal from the Antibalistic Missile Treaty", *Case Study Series*, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University, 2010, 6.

<sup>268</sup> Amy F. Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control: the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty", *Congressional Research Service*, 2010, 11.

<sup>269</sup> David P. Auerswald, "The Domestic Politics of National Missile Defense Under the Bush Administration", *The George Washington University*, 2001, 2.

<sup>270</sup> Amanda Macias, "American firms rule the \$398 billion global arms industry: Here's a roundup of the world's top 10 defense contractors, by sales", Accessed on 21.11.2023, available electronic version, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/10/top-10-defense-contractors-in-the-world.html>.

Regarding to Georgian relation with NATO and Russia. Georgia, which was included in the PfP program within the scope of NATO's open-door policy in 1994 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, supported combat operations in Afghanistan within the scope of ISAF, and was the country that provided the most support to the USA in terms of army size within the scope of coalition forces. After this support, the US did not leave Georgia alone in terms of political, economic and military support. It is also important for the United States to use Georgia as a forward base both for the US to enter the Black Sea within the scope of bilateral relations and for the possible war with Iran to be carried out through Azerbaijan. However, Georgia was also important for Russia because of the Russian tie in Abkhazia and Ossetia. Because of the Rose Revolution in 2003, Russia felt uncomfortable to spread this revolution to the other parts of its regional effects of influence, Russia became over cautious. Tensions reached their peak after NATO's membership declarations about Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit of 2008. In this declaration, NATO made statements about the upcoming elections in Georgia.<sup>271</sup> In response, Georgia's President Mikheil Saakashvili who was enraged simply ordered to clash Russian peacekeeper contingent troops in Abkhazia and Ossetia.<sup>272</sup> After this event Russia started an operation against Georgia for five days.

This event was the third rift between Russia and NATO. Political developments such as utmost importance Annexation of Crimea, 2016 Warsaw Summit declaration for Russia paved the way of War against Ukraine. After all, those countries who promised to give security guarantees to Ukraine now left Ukraine as a prey for Russia. The destruction of the security order by both sides and finally Russia's withdrawal from CFE <sup>273</sup> is a sign of the end of the security order that had been established at the end of Cold War.

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<sup>271</sup> NATO, "Bucharest Summit Declaration, 03 April 2008", para, 23. Accessed on 22.11.2023, available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8443.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm).

<sup>272</sup> Michael Kofman, the August War, Ten Years on: A Retrospective an the Russo-Georgian War, *War on the Rocks*, Accessed on 22.11.2023, Available electronic version, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-russo-georgian-war/>.

<sup>273</sup> NATO, "North Atlantic Council statement on the Allied response to Russia's withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe", Accessed on 22.11.2023, Available electronic version, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_219811.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_219811.htm).



#### **4.5. Conclusion**

After the 1999 strategic concept, the strategic concepts adopted by NATO have been embedded in the NATO Summit Declarations in providing detailed information on military and political developments and explaining interoperability. Within the NATO summit declarations, the Rome summit in May 2002, Prague declaration in November 2002, and the Bucharest summit declaration in April 2008 are important political developments that regulated relations among members and interoperability of member states among different actors. In this period, the United States provided nuclear protection to NATO member states as it happened during Cold War era. After 1999 strategic concept the US initiated bilateral coordination with regional actors in order to consolidate its position for lusting global supremacy. As 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts mentioned about getting ready for out of area mission for NATO and prediction terrorism as one of the future security challenges, 9/11 terrorist attack added catalyst to this ambition. The 9/11 attacks catalysed to transformation of NATO and necessitated filling capacity gaps to help US war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other than UK, rest of the European members were unwilling to participate as warring factions in the out of area operations. Most of them were holding stationary forces only capable of defending their homeland. They have a partial experience for non-article five operations in Kosovo and Bosnian humanitarian operations. They attribute not joining the US and the UK at the initial phase of OEF for their inability for strategic air lift, air-to-air refuel, sea lift and precision guided munitions. What is more, the US could not be satisfied with the DCI to modernize and equip allies with western military gears. With the push of US, Alliance accepted PCC, and this let them to second wave of transformation, enlargement, and established new relationship with Ukraine, Russia and Georgia.

In this regard, the US could not pressure more to the European members not to procure from their own armament agencies. Because, it would add to its legitimacy of actions conducted by US outside of the Euro-Atlantic region. Some members, including Turkey, grouped, and formed up consortiums to produce their aircrafts to provide modern day strategic lift for their armed forces in the context of European Defense Agency. Some of them provided their expertise to allocate alliances usage

such as NBC units. During these periods, the US have been focused on Global supremacy and it wanted to benefit from interoperability.

In the meantime, the US sought for regional regulative arrangements to dictate its missile defense program. Before NATO revised Founding Act by replacing it with “A New Quality” platform to regulate its relationship with Russia, the US made a treaty to limit both sides strategic nuclear arms. In the negotiation phase, the US employed several tricky methods to make Russia get rid of nuclear warheads. Searching for a legally binding document, and radical limitation of both sides, Russia agreed to sign this treaty under the provision of not to change Russian strategic deterrence in Europe by means of US’s missile defense project. As soon as two side agreed to limit their strategic offensive nuclear to a level of 1500 to 2200 war heads in each side, NATO met in Rome and declared to establish NATO-Russia council to accept Russia as if one of its members. Not elapsing time, in 2002 the US took decision to withdraw from ABM treaty which was in effect since 1972. After that the US declared that it would establish missile site in Poland and Czech Republic. This meant that the US tacitly return from its assurance not to target Russia’s strategic deterrence in Europe. This created a rift between Russia and the US in the context of NATO after Kosovo distrust. Georgia and Ukraine were two important country that occupies special place for Russia. Therefore, when Ukraine’s membership came into force, Ukraine specially treated and NATO’s relations regulated by “distinctive membership” agreement. In this sense, the US, the UK, and Russia (later on unilaterally France) gave security assurance to Ukraine in the process of denuclearization. Georgia was also occupying special position for Russia. Through its membership to PfP, the US’s interest was to use Georgia as a forward base to the prospective operation to Iran through Azerbaijan. In this sense, the US could use black sea and involve in relationship with Georgia. NATO, in its Bucharest summit in 2008, declared to involve election process. This created a third rift with Russia, feeling from contained by NATO in particular the US intervened Georgia. At the end Russia, recognized two Russian enclaves as independent entity from Georgia. In the course of the time, loosing trust between two side pawed the way of Crimean annexation in 2014 and Ukraine war in 2022. Interoperability has been used as a reason at the heart of both relationships.

While explaining above-noted relations, this chapter infers that within NATO the US's bilateral approaches and unilateral actions aimed at reviving US's global supremacy, however that backlashed as the world entered into a new phase of war in Eastern Europe and further polarization that tend to evolve into multipolar world order. No matter how the US tried to prevent China, a rising rival, from accessing energy resources in Central Asia and the Middle East through OEF, China became the most challenging competitor according to 2022 strategic concept. However, interoperability always played central role since it played existence cause and justification for cooperation on the ground that member and candidate states relations regulated and benefited from it. In this respect, according to 2022 strategic concept, Alliance would increase interoperability for NATO's probable mission against containment of Russia and China.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which by its own admission was created to provide security and defense for its members against the Soviet threat. NATO owes its long-term survival to its ability to renew and restructure itself in response to the evolving security environment by developing strategic concepts in a rapidly changing world. During the Cold War, NATO adopted four strategic concepts, three under the doctrine of massive retaliation and one under the doctrine of flexible response. Since the end of the Cold War until today, it has adopted four more strategic concepts without changing the doctrine of flexible response. In this regard, NATO has developed various methods of cooperation among its member states within the framework of strategic concepts. Thus, NATO, under the leadership of the United States of America, has regulated the military and political relations between member states by placing the concept of interoperability at the center of cooperation.

In general, in the Alliance, all members work in resonance with nominally equal rights to make decisions to defend their area of interest as well as to contribute to the collective defense.

All decisions in the NAC are made by consensus, which is a key principle. Since consensus is a key principle, so is interoperability, which is the subject of this thesis. The importance of studying interoperability lies in the fact that it not only fills a gap in the literature, but also provides a solid foundation for the relationship between member states in the event of actual tensions and conflicts in NATO. This issue has been largely avoided in NATO to avoid potential tensions among member states. It has not been the subject of much academic research and has been deliberately limited to its military significance. Moreover, different competing views have assigned different meanings and values to the issue of interoperability.

On the one hand, interoperability should include cooperation in all areas of relations between members since the existence of collective defense requires members to support each other in the context of mutual assistance. At the same time, there must be an optimal level of preparedness. Members should act in good faith and reach the maximum common ground to fill capacity and capability gaps and maintain them through political and military cooperation. In this context, the value of interoperability should also include negotiations, debates and the achievement of political consensus, as it can only be meaningful to explain the extent of cooperation in the context of the adoption of eight strategic concepts. On the other hand, the intention of limiting interoperability to technical military terms was to create dependency on the US military and technology transfer and arms sales, as the small and medium-sized members had to reach the standards of US military superiority. Over time, the U.S. has used this dependency to its advantage, using it as a carrot and stick, pretexting its internal laws restricting foreign sales. Correspondingly, this dependence has helped to maintain the US hegemonic status in the alliance. In this sense, this thesis proposes that NATO has achieved interoperability amid competition for leadership, which has led some members to benefit from interoperability. Meanwhile, it is possible to draw the logical conclusion that interoperability has created a dependency of medium and small members on the United States.

The narrative that NATO was created to counter the Soviet threat is incomplete, though not false. According to US Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), in an intelligence analysis conducted before the signing of the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, estimated that the Soviets would need at least a decade or more years to wage a general war against the West. This fact is supported by the adoption of the organization's first strategic concept on 01 December 1949. The proposal was drafted by the United States, the United Kingdom and France and sent by courier to the representative offices of the member states. It was then adopted after relatively short debate process.

When the draft of the first strategic concept was sent to each party, the defense of Europe and the Atlantic against the Soviet threat was based on massive retaliation

with American nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear weapons were the only option for strategic balance. However, a land power formed by European conventional forces in mutual aid to respond to Soviet threats was also considered, but never tested in times of Soviet intervention. Although mutual assistance had its drawbacks and created a trust problem among the Allies, it was the only solution. While the small and medium-sized members tried to solve this trust problem among themselves by adding mutual assistance as a legally binding document, which was the first strategic concept, other negotiations took place among the trio of the United States, Great Britain, and France. Taking over the security of the Transatlantic Lines of Communication (LOC) and the African Lines of Communication (LOC) was a major debate among France, the US and the UK. Apparently, taking over the security of the LOCs meant having sovereignty over the trade routes of merchant ships, and therefore it could provide some economic advantages over controlling them. Once the US and UK agreed on the principle of sharing transatlantic responsibility, France claimed to take over the African LOC under the pretext of its Algerian connection. The U.S., with the support of the U.K., initially ousted France because the U.K. wanted to assume this responsibility. However, the U.S. did not let the U.K. take this responsibility. In the course of time, realizing that the UK would be left out of the leadership race, it tried to take over the command of SACLANT. However, after France was dropped from the leadership competition, the United States' negative response to the United Kingdom's request to take command of SACLANT caused the United Kingdom to fall behind in the leadership competition. This was the beginning of the unchallenged leadership of NATO by the United States, which had massive nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Norway and Portugal refused to host the US nuclear launch sites and NATO bases on their soil. Although Portugal later agreed to it, the Nordic members of the alliance were cautious of the US nuclear weapons sites because it was not Washington that should suffer if the Soviets fired nuclear missiles on their soil after 1957. The feeling of not having partial advantage in the leadership competition, coupled with France's search for an autonomous policy for US nuclear delivery sites, culminated in 1966 in the withdrawal of the integrated command structure. France not only withdrew from the military wing, but also forced all NATO and US forces out of its soil. As a result, NATO headquarters moved from France to Belgium. During this period, the Soviets reached a stalemate by having

nuclear weapons, orbiting Sputnik 7 as well as their existing capability on Limited Warfare Doctrine (Unconventional Warfighting Capability). The U.S. realized that the doctrine of massive retaliation was lagging behind the Soviet response. Moreover, the unity of the Alliance was in question and the Soviets could use any means to gain an advantage. Therefore, the U.S. motivated Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel to work on a comprehensive report that would create an environment to achieve interoperability so that NATO could respond to the Soviets. NATO's threat assessment was renewed by incorporating various points brought by the Harmel report, taking into account the use of flexible response doctrine in 1968 MC 14/3 (Final) Strategic Concept. In this respect, this process created an environment of dependency within the Alliance. The Alliance was dependent on the US nuclear shield. Correspondingly, the US was dependent on the consent of the European members to maintain its existence in Europe by allowing it to deploy nuclear launchers.

As this process unfolded, the United States and the Soviets found themselves in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The potential escalation of the Cold War into a hot conflict, and the recognition of the devastating consequences for both the Eastern and Western blocs, motivated the implementation of confidence-building measures from 1970 to 1975. This resulted in a process of cooperation with the Soviets that led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 1972, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1973, and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990. These political developments, together with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, raised questions about NATO's future role and eventually led to debates within NATO's European Allies about the feasibility of a separate European Defense and Security Policy. Throughout these debates, various competing groups in NATO have taken different positions by forming separate alliances in Europe. However, the position of the United States, together with the United Kingdom, overwhelmed other claims by promoting the idea of a European Security and Defense Policy that was separate but inseparable from NATO. In the end, NATO was transformed by the direct involvement of the United States and enlarged after the adoption of the 1991 Strategic Concept.

In this sense subject in question, the policy of interoperability has evolved and adapted to changing needs by attributing different meanings and values as reshaping policy modules. There was another leadership contest among four different points of view on the architecture of European security. The intention was to design a new autonomous security organization specific to the European members. In this sense, different contending groups such as the German-Czech view, the Russian view, the Belgian-French view, and finally the British-American view were debated to take the lead in redesigning European security. Only two of them found serious response, the rest of them were shelved. However, interoperability in the alliance should not have been achieved at that time, because if France was successful for Bosnia and Kosovo intervention, the US undisputed leadership and hegemony in Europe would be left in vain forever.

In this sense, the US has transformed NATO and partially left the responsibility of conducting non-article 5 operations to the EU members. Meanwhile, before the Strategic Concept of 1991, the US and the UK tried to enlarge NATO through Central and Eastern Europe by means of the London Summit in 1990. NATO, under the hegemony of the United States, established a controlled relationship with Russia through the Founding Act, initiated a different program with Ukraine through a Chart, and tried to bring the rest of the former members of the Warsaw Pact under the umbrella of NATO and the European Security Policy through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean Dialogue programs in 1994.

In this process, the United States, which did not seek standardization in the previous Strategic Concept and used flexibility for interoperability conditions, initiated the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) for the current members and those who signed the Membership Action Plan (MAP), as well as for the PfP members in the 1999 Strategic Concept. In this context, interoperability politics has literally been conceptualized as a Grand Bargain in the Big Chess Game. Thus, the politics of interoperability should be understood in the context of U.S. hegemony, the leadership competition among European member states to become a regional power center, the transfer of Eastern capital to the West by Western defense contractors due to the standardization and modernization needs of the armies of small and medium-sized member states.



After the 1999 Strategic Concept, the United States initiated bilateral coordination with regional actors in order to consolidate its position for aspiring global supremacy. While the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts mentioned preparing for out-of-area missions for NATO and predicted terrorism as one of the future security challenges, the 9/11 terrorist attack added catalyst to this ambition. The 9/11 attacks also catalyzed the transformation of NATO and necessitated the filling of capacity gaps to support the US war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. Except for the United Kingdom, the rest of the European members were unwilling to participate as warring parties in the out-of-area operations. Most of them had stationary forces capable only of defending their homelands. They have partial experience of non-article 5 operations in Kosovo and humanitarian operations in Bosnia. They attribute their failure not to join the US and UK in the initial phase of OEF to their inability to provide strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, sealift, and precision-guided munitions. In addition, the US could not be satisfied with the DCI to modernize and equip the allies with Western military equipment. Under the pressure of the US, the Alliance accepted the PCC, and this enabled it to undertake the second wave of transformation, enlargement and the establishment of new relations with Ukraine, Russia and Georgia. In this regard, the US could not put more pressure on the European members not to procure from their own armament agencies. The intent was to gain legitimacy of the actions carried out by the US outside the Euro-Atlantic region. Some members, including Turkey, grouped and formed consortiums to produce their aircraft to provide modern strategic lift for their armed forces within the framework of the European Defense Agency. Some of them provided their expertise to allocate alliance use such as NBC units.

During this period, the US focused on its global supremacy and wanted to benefit from interoperability. Meanwhile, the US sought regional regulatory arrangements to dictate its missile defense program. Before NATO revised its Founding Act by replacing it with a "New Quality" platform to regulate its relations with Russia, the US made a treaty to limit both sides' strategic nuclear weapons. In the negotiation phase, the US used several tricky methods to make Russia get rid of nuclear warheads. Looking for a legally binding document and radical limitation of both sides, Russia agreed to sign this treaty under the provision that the US missile

defense project would not change Russian strategic deterrence in Europe. As soon as both sides agreed to limit their strategic offensive nuclear weapons to the level of 1500 to 2200 warheads in each side, NATO met in Rome and declared to establish the NATO-Russia Council, which upgraded Russia's status to an extraordinary strategic partner, better known as 19+1. In 2002, the USA decided to withdraw from the ABM treaty, which had been in force since 1972. After that, the US declared that it would build a missile base in Poland and the Czech Republic. This meant that the U.S. tacitly returned from its assurance not to target Russia's strategic deterrence in Europe. This created a rift between Russia and the US in the context of post-Kosovo NATO mistrust.

In this respect, by creating a rapprochement, the US wanted to prevent Russia from blocking possible future decisions on terrorism to be taken in the UN. However, the direction of Theater Missile Defense created a slippery slope. Although it offered security to member states in the context of interoperability, it meant insecurity for Russia. It created insecurity both in Eastern and Central Europe because the backlash from Russia could cause unrest from Estonia to Serbia and its proxies because of soft power and the Limited Warfighting Capability. Russia could escalate tensions by using unconventional warfare capabilities. In this regard, Georgia and Ukraine were two important countries that held a special place for Russia. Therefore, when Ukraine's membership came to the fore, Ukraine was treated specially, and NATO's relations were regulated by the "distinctive membership" agreement. In this sense, the USA, Great Britain and Russia (later unilaterally France) gave security assurances to Ukraine in the process of denuclearization.

Georgia also held a special position for Russia. Through its membership in the PfP, the U.S. was interested in using Georgia as a forward base for the prospective operation to Iran through Azerbaijan. In this sense, the US could use the Black Sea to expand the frequency of its relations with Georgia. NATO declared at its Bucharest summit in 2008 that it would expand to include Georgia. This created a third rift with Russia, which felt contained by NATO. Russia responded by recognizing two enclaves as independent entities from Georgia. Russia then annexed Crimea in 2014, and the war in Ukraine began in 2022.

While explaining the above-mentioned relations, this thesis concludes that the U.S. bilateral approaches and unilateral actions in the context of NATO were aimed at reviving U.S. global supremacy beyond its hegemony in the Alliance, but this backfired with the start of a new war in Ukraine and further polarization that tends to evolve into a multipolar world order. No matter how the U.S. tried to prevent China, a rising rival, from gaining access to energy resources in Central Asia and the Middle East through OEF, China became the most challenging competitor according to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Report as well as the 2022 Strategic Concept. However, interoperability has always played a central role, as it has been the reason and justification for cooperation on the basis that it regulates and benefits relations between member and candidate states. In this respect, according to the 2022 Strategic Concept, the Alliance would enhance interoperability for NATO's likely containment mission against Russia and China.

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## APPENDICIES

### A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü (NATO), kendi deyimiyle 1949 yılından bu yana Sovyet tehdidine karşı üyelerine güvenlik ve savunma sağlamak amacıyla kurulmuştur. NATO, uzun vadede varlığını sürdürebilmesini, hızla değişen bir dünyada stratejik konseptler üreterek gelişen güvenlik ortamına yanıt verecek şekilde kendini yenileme ve yeniden yapılandırma yeteneğine borçludur. Soğuk Savaş döneminde 4 stratejik konsept benimseyen NATO; bunlardan 3'ünü Kitlesele Misilleme Doktrini birini de Esnek Mukabele Doktrini kapsamında yapmıştır. Bu doğrultuda NATO, stratejik konseptler çerçevesinde üye devletler arasında çeşitli iş birliği yöntemleri geliştirmiştir. Bu nedenle, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin liderliğindeki NATO, üye ülkeler arasındaki askeri ve siyasi ilişkileri, müşterek çalışabilirlik kavramını iş birliğinin merkezine yerleştirecek şekilde düzenlemiştir.

Genel olarak, İttifak'ta tüm üyeler, kendi ilgi alanlarını savunmak için karar alma konusunda nominal olarak eşit haklara sahip olarak çalışmaktadır. İttifak'ta tüm kararlar, kilit bir ilke olan “fikir birliği” ile alınmaktadır. Konsensüs nasıl kilit bir ilke ise, bu tezin araştırma konusu olan müşterek çalışabilirlik de kilit bir ilkedir. Müşterek çalışabilirliğin önemi, sadece literatürdeki boşluğu doldurmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda NATO'da gerçek gerilim ve çatışmalar olması durumunda üye devletler arasındaki ilişkiler için sağlam bir temel oluşturmasında yatmaktadır. Bu konu, üye devletler arasında huzursuzluk yaşanmaması için çok fazla araştırılan bir konu olmamıştır. Müşterek çalışabilirlik ya da karşılıklı çalışılabilirlik olarak NATO jargonunda sıklıkla karşılaşılan interoperability çok fazla araştırılan bir konu olmamasının yanında bilerek sadece dar askeri manalara gelecek kavramlara indirgenmiştir. Halbuki NATO uzun süreli olan varlığını askeri ve politik bir işbirliği temelinde değişen tehdit durumlarına göre kendini yenileme ve yeniden yapılandırma yeteneğine borçludur. Bu tez; müşterek çalışılabilirliğin öncelikli olarak tanımının



hangi zeminde olması gerektiğini, üyeler arasında müşterek çalışılabilirlik zemininde iş birliğinin nasıl sağlanabildiği, varsa ittifak içinde baskın ve hegemon devletlerin küçük ve orta ölçekli devletlerden ordularının standizasyonu ve modernizasyonu vasıtası fayda sağlayıp sağlamadıklarını araştırmak üzere hazırlanmıştır. Söz konusu müşterek çalışılabilirliğin sadece askeri terminoloji ve askeri yönergelerde geçmesi, yapılan anlaşmaların gizliliğinin tamamen ya da kısmen devam ediyor olması ve araştırma konusu ile ilgili akademik yayınların kısıtlı olması sebebiyle stratejik konseptler, konuşma tutanakları, zirve deklarasyonları ile dönemin şartlarında yazılmış makaleler kullanılarak kıyaslamalar yapmak suretiyle sebep sonuç ilişkileri kurulmaya çalışılmıştır. Dar ve konu ile ilgili daha açıklayıcı bilgi vermesi sebebiyle makaleler öncelikli başvuru kaynağı olarak kullanılmış, objektif sonuç alabilmek maksadıyla da NATO'nun kendi kaynaklarını kullanmaya özen gösterilmiştir. Kabul edilen her bir stratejik konsept ve alınan kararlar daha önceki dönemlerle kıyaslanarak, o dönemde meydana gelen askeri ve politik gelişmeler ışığında araştırmalar yapılmıştır. Yapılan çalışma her ne kadar uzun bir dönemi kapsasa da müşterek çalışılabilirlik felsefesini ve bunun suistimalini büyük resimden okumak daha anlamlı olmaktadır.

Öncelikle, NATO'nun Sovyet tehdidine karşı kurulduğu söylemi yanlış olmamakla birlikte eksiktir. Zira, ABD eski Müşterek İstihbarat Komitesi (JIC) yeni Merkezi İstihbarat Ajansı (CIA) ittifak anlaşması imzalanmadan önce yapmış olduğu istihbarat analizinde, Sovyetler' in Batıya karşı genel bir savaş açabilmesi için 10 ile 15 yıllık bir zamana ihtiyacı olduğunu değerlendirmiştir. Nitekim, 4 Nisan 1949 da kurulan örgütün ilk stratejik konseptinin de (D.C.6/1) 1 Aralık 1949 da 10 üye devlet tarafından kabul edilmesi bunu doğrulamaktadır. Söz konusu konsept ABD, İngiltere ve Fransa'dan müteşekkil üç devlet tarafından taslak olarak hazırlanmış, kuryeler ile üye ülkelerin temsilciliklerine bildirilmiş ve 42 günlük hızlı bir tartışma süreci ile kabul edilmiştir.

İlk stratejik konseptte müşterek çalışılabilirlik; askeri doktrin ve prosedürlerden standardizasyon, müşterek eğitim, istihbaratın birleştirilmesi, bakım, tamir ve hizmetlerde standardizasyon sağlanması, askeri materyal, araç ve ekipmanlarda standardizasyonun sağlanması, ülkelerin yasal limitleri çerçevesinde yeni silahlar

için araştırma ve geliştirme ve yeni savaş yöntemlerinin geliştirilmesi olarak ele alınmıştır. İlk stratejik konsept, müşterek çalışılabilirliği, iş birliği tedbirleri olarak tanımlamasına rağmen, bu tedbirleri askeri teknik jargona hapsederek iki sorun ortaya çıkarmıştır. Birinci sorun, hangi kalıba göre standardizasyonun örnek alınması gerektiği sorusunun cevabıdır ki burada olması gereken optimum standardizasyon, en kapasiteli olanın örnek alınarak yapılmasıdır. Kapasite farkı bir sebep olduğundan, orduların müşterek çalışmalarında bu açığın ya teknoloji transferi ya da silahlanma yoluyla kapatılması bir tedbir olarak kullanılmıştır. İkinci sorun, eğer bu standart sağlanacaksa neden ülkelerin yasal limitleri göz önüne alınarak yapılmak istendiği soru işaretleri doğurmuştur. Bu, şuna benzemektedir; en iyi standart bende, tüm üye devletler benim standardıma göre kendini yenileştirecek ancak, benim kendi ülke kanunlarım buna müsaade ederse bu teknoloji transferini ya da silah satışını yaparım demektir. Bu durum küçük ve orta ölçekli devletleri bir bağımlılık içine itmiştir. Bu duruma ülkelerin iş birliği için uzlaşmaya varma sürecinde çok yönlü politika üretebilme kabiliyetlerindeki eksiklikler de ilave edildiğinde müşterek çalışılabilirliği, büyük ölçüde hegemonu bağımlı üyeler olarak tanımlayabiliriz. Halbuki müşterek çalışılabilirliğin uzlaşmaya varılması için gerekli her türlü politik iş birliği çabalarını kapsamaması beklenir. Bu bağlamda müşterek çalışılabilirlik sadece dar teknik askeri kavramlara indirgenmemesi gerekmektedir. Bu durumda müşterek çalışılabilirlik; üye devletlerin birbirleri ile olan ilişkilerinde, içerisinde en iyisi ile arasında oluşan yetenek ve kapasite farkının en aza indirmek için üretmiş olduğu çok yönlü politikalar ile kendi milli çabaları, herhangi bir ülkeye bağımlı kalmadan ya da işbirliği içerisinde, askeri doktrin, prosedür, silah, teçhizat ve iletişim araçlarının ortaklaşa kullanılabilmesi ve müttefik ülkelerle aynı dili konuşabilme, aynı kafa yapısına sahip olma da dahil, alınacak her türlü tedbirleri içeren kapsamlı bir yetenek arayışı ya da hedefi olarak tarif edilebilir. Bu bağlamda, birlikte çalışılabilirliğin daraltılması, NATO üyelerini ABD'nin askeri teknoloji ve silah transferine bağımlı hale getirmiştir. Dolayısıyla, müşterek çalışılabilirliğin tanımlanmasında sadece askeri boyutun değil, siyasi boyutun da büyük rol oynadığı unutulmamalıdır. Yukarıda belirtilen sebepler ile NATO'da müşterek çalışılabilirliğin ilk defa nasıl oturtulduğunun, yapılan ilk müzakerelerin detaylı olarak anlatılması, bundan sonraki süreçte müzakerelerin nasıl yapılacağına ışık tutması ve sorunlara nasıl temel teşkil ettiğini göstermesi bakımından önem arz etmektedir.

Müşterek çalışabilirliğin gelişimi, soğuk savaş döneminde D.C.6/1 stratejik konseptinin taslağı olan M.C.3 planının ABD, İngiltere ve Fransa tarafından hazırlanarak üye ülke devletlerinin görüşünün alınması maksadıyla kuryeler tarafından götürülmesi üzerine başlamıştır. Taslak plana göre Sovyetler Birliği'nden gelecek müdahale karşısında genel hareket tarzı olarak, üye devletlerin kendi ülkelerini korumaları ve birbirlerine yardım etmeleri prensibine dayandırılmıştır. Avrupa kıtasında nükleer silahların kullanılması sorumluluğu ABD'ye verilmiş, nükleer silahların kullanılmasında da üye ülkelerin ABD'ye yardım etmesi gerektiği kararlaştırılmıştır. Sovyetler'e karşı koymak maksadıyla oluşturulacak kara gücünün Avrupalı üye devletlerden müteşekkil olması planlanmıştır. Savaşla ilgili yeni taktik ve stratejiler geliştirilmesi yeni icat edilen silahlar ile ilgili araştırma ve geliştirme hususları ülkelerin kanunlarının müsaade ettiği kadar üye devletler arasında paylaşılabilirdiği kararı alınmıştır. Ayrıca müşterek çalışabilirlik, standardizasyon ve modernizasyon ile askeri prosedürlerde yeknesaklık, eğitim, bakım ve alt yapı çalışmalarında iş birliği olarak tarif edilmiştir. Buraya kadar belirtilen hususlar aslında ABD, İngiltere, Fransa üçlüsü büyük ölçekli ülkelerin dışındaki diğer ülkelerin, birbirleri ile olan ilişkilerini düzenlemenin yanında büyük ölçekli ülkelerin bu durumdan nasıl faydalanacakları üzerine kurgulanmıştır. Zira, aynı taslak plana göre, Atlantik iletişim hatlarının güvenliğinin sorumluluğu ABD ve İngiltere arasında paylaşılmış, Afrika iletişim hatları güvenliğinin sorumluluğu Fransa'ya verilmiştir. Söz konusu iletişim hatları aynı zamanda deniz ticaret yollarının emniyete alınması anlamına da gelmektedir. Fiiliyatta müzakereler liderlik çekişmesine dönüşmüş, ABD önce İngiltere ile birlikte hareket ederek Fransa'ya Afrika iletişim yollarının güvenliği sorumluluğunu vermemiş, böylece Fransa'yı NATO içerisinde ekonomik avantaj sağlayacak liderlik çekişmesinin dışına atmıştır. Sonradan yapılan müzakerelerde ABD, İngiltere'ye de Atlantik deniz aşırı iletişim hatlarının güvenliği sorumluluğunu vermemiştir. Bu durum da İngiltere, ABD'de konuşlu NATO Atlantik Komutanlığının İngiltere tarafından yapılması gerektiğini müzakere etmiş ancak ilerleyen süreçlerde bunu da alamamıştır. Bu durum ABD ile İngiltere arasında yaşanmış en büyük görüş ayrılığı olarak tarihe geçmiş, bazı siyaset bilimcilere göre İngiltere'nin üzerinde güneş batmayan imparatorluk benzetmesinin son bulduğunun tescil edildiği olay olarak tarihe geçtiği yorumlarına sebep olmuştur. Müzakerelerde ayrıca, Norveç ve Portekiz gibi ülkeler topraklarında NATO askeri

üslerinin kurulmasına ve ABD nükleer silahlarının konuşlanmasına itiraz etmesine sebep olmuştur. Dolayısıyla NATO'nun kuruluşundan itibaren kabul edilen 2 stratejik konseptini büyük taşların yerine oturtulması ve yerlerinin sağlamlaştırılması kavramı ile açıklamak mantıklı olur. Bu dönemde üye devletler arasındaki müşterek çalışabilirlik, karşılıklı bağımlılık ve liderlik çekişmeleri çerçevesinde sağlanmıştır. Ancak 1957 stratejik konseptinden sonra Sovyetler Birliği'nin nükleer güç olarak NATO'ya eşitlik sağlaması, kara ordusunu güçlendirmesi, Sınırlı Askeri Harekât yapabilme yeteneği (Gayri Nizami Harp) ve Fransa'nın da ABD nükleer askeri üslerini kendi topraklarında istememesi üzerine yeni bir stratejik konsept yapılması ihtiyacını doğurmuştur. 1966 yılında Fransa, NATO askeri komuta yapısından çıkmış, bu sebeple ertesi yıl NATO karargâhı Belçika'ya taşınmıştır. ABD, NATO içerisinde birlik beraberliğin bozulduğunu, sadece Kitleli Misilleme Doktrininin Sovyetler Birliği'ni engellemeye yetmeyeceğini anlayınca, Belçika Dış İşleri Bakanı Pierre Hamel'e küçük ve orta ölçekli üye devletlerin kaygılarının da göz önüne alındığı kapsamlı bir rapor hazırlatmıştır. Harmel Raporu ışığında 1968 stratejik konseptini kabul eden NATO, ABD'nin yeni savunma planı olan Esnek Mukabele Doktrinine geçmiştir. Bu doktrine göre ABD, konvansiyonel ve nükleer silahların aynı anda fakat esnek kullanılması anlamına gelen savunma planını devreye sokmuştur.

Küba krizinde, Doğu ve Batı arasında yaşanacak herhangi bir nükleer savaşta her iki tarafın da nükleer kriz ortamının kendisine fayda sağlayamayacağını ve olası nükleer savaşın sonuçlarının her iki taraf için de katlanılabileceğinden ağır olmasını anlamaları üzerine, 1972 yılında ABD ile Rusya Federasyonu arasında Anti-Balistik Füze (ABM) anlaşması yapılmış, Avrupa'da da güven arttırıcı önlemler çerçevesinde, 1973 yılından itibaren Avrupa Savunma İşbirliği Konferansları düzenlenmiş, yapılan konferanslar neticesinde 1975 yılında Helsinki Nihai Senedi anlaşması imzalanmıştır. Bu anlaşmaya göre ülkeler birbirlerinin egemenliğine ve devlet sınırlarına saygı gösterecek, birbirlerine karşı tehdit veya güç kullanımından uzak duracak, anlaşmazlıkların barışçıl yoldan çözümünü için gayret göstereceklerdi. Rusya federasyonu ile yaşanan gerilimi prensipte azaltması ve karşılıklı güven arttırıcı tedbir olması sebebiyle bu anlaşma Avrupalı NATO üyesi ülkelerin Avrupa kıtasında doğrudan Amerikan varlığı olmadan ayrı bir savunma ve güvenlik örgütü

kurulabilmesi fikrinin ortaya çıkmasına sebep olmuştur. Soğuk savaş yıllarından başlayarak soğuk savaşın bitimine kadar olan süreçte bu fikir filizlenmiş 1990 yılında imzalanan Avrupa Konvansiyonel Kuvvetler (CFE) anlaşmasından sonra Avrupa'da artık yeni bir güvenlik mimarisi tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu tartışmalarda Almanya-Çek Cumhuriyeti tüm Avrupalı devletlerin söz sahibi ve eşit haklara sahip olduğu ayrı bir Avrupa savunma ve güvenlik kimliği tezini savunmuş, ancak büyük ölçekli devletlerin itirazı sebebiyle yeterli karşılık bulamamıştır. Diğer bir tez, Rusya tarafından ortaya atılmış, 1815 yılında oluşturulan ve Avrupa Uyumu diye tabir edilen sisteme, sadece Avrupa'da konuşlu büyük devletler arasında tartışılması kaydıyla güvenlik meselelerine çözüm bulunacağı Avrupa Güvenlik Konseyi adıyla bir savunma ve güvenlik politikası tezini ortaya atmış, ancak bu da karşılık bulamamıştır. Fransa ve Belçika birlikte, Batı Avrupa Birliği'nin (BAB) liderliğinde oluşturulacak savunma ve güvenlik politikasının hayata geçirilmesini, akabinde geri kalan Avrupa ülkelerinin güvenlik ve savunma politikalarında batı Avrupa devletlerince yönetildiği bir güvenlik mimarisi tezini ortaya atmış ve bu tezin hayata geçirilmesi için çok yönlü politikalar üretilmiştir. Fransa, ABD'nin dahil olmadığı Avrupa ordusunun kurulmasını savunmuş, bu sebeple ABD ile arasında ciddi politik gerilimler yaşamıştır. 1990 yılında Londra'da toplanan NATO üye devlet başkanları bu durumu etraflıca tartışmışlar, Fransa'yı ikna edemedikleri için 1991 yılına kadar stratejik konsepti deklere edememişlerdir. Bu gerginlik, ilerleyen dönemlerde 1992 yılında Maastricht anlaşması, Petersberg Görevi ile birlikte İngiltere ve Fransa'nın BAB ve AB'nin Avrupa savunmasında özerklik ilkesi temelinde kaynak sağlama konusunda anlaşmışları 1998 St. Malo Deklarasyonu ile doruğa ulaşmıştır. 1991 stratejik konsepti kabul edilmeden yaşanan müzakere sürecinde ABD ve İngiltere beraber hareket ederek NATO komuta yapısını, Belçika'da konuşlu bir stratejik komutanlık ve ona bağlı Hollanda Brunsum ve İtalya Napoli'de iki operatif komutanlık karargahı olarak dönüştürmüş, kuvvet yapısını ise Birleşik Müşterek Görev Gücü (CJTF) adı altında dönüştürerek, Fransa'ya NATO'dan kuvvet yapısı olarak ayrılabilir ancak komuta yapısı olarak ayrılamaz bir güvenlik politikası teklif ederek uzlaşmaya varılmıştır.

Yapılan yeni dönüşüm, Bosna ve Kosova müdahalelerinde Fransa'nın önderliğinde denenmiş ancak, başarısız olmuş, yaşanan kriz her seferinde ABD'nin NATO

üzerinden müdahalesi ile durdurulmuştur. Denenme sürecinde Bosna ve Kosova'da insani krizler yaşanmıştır. Bu dönemde müşterek çalışabilirlik Fransa'nın NATO imkânlarını kullanarak ayrı ve ayrılabilir bir güvenlik organizasyonu kurmasını engelleyebilecek şekilde dizayn edilmiştir. Gelinen süreçte ABD, Bosna Savaşı'nda Belgrad'da bulunan Çin Büyükelçiliğini vurmuş ve bunu yanlışlıkla yaptığını bildirmiştir. Kosova'da ise Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi kararı olmaksızın müdahalede bulunmuş, böylece soğuk savaş sonrası Rusya'yla arasındaki ilk güven krizi patlak vermiştir. Söz konusu güven krizini aşmak için Kosova'da bulunan Priştine Uluslararası Havalimanının kontrolünü Rusya'ya vererek durumu yatıştırmaya çalışmıştır. Büyük ölçekli üye devletlerinin arasında geçen liderlik çekişmelerinde ortak çalışılabilirlik Avrupa Birliği'nin; Batı Avrupa Birliği, San-Malo Deklarasyonu, Petersberg Görevi, Avrupa Savunma ve İş Birliği Organizasyonu kurumlarının birbirlerini tamamlayıcı kararlarının da etkisi ile Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasında, Avrupa kıtasında meydana gelebilecek insani kriz ve yardım operasyonlarında (5'inci madde kapsamı dışındaki görevler) NATO'nun imkanları kullanılarak yönetmesi üzerinde uzlaşıyla sonuçlanmıştır.

ABD ve İngiltere 1990 Londra zirvesinde ortaya atmış oldukları dostluk elinin Sovyetler ve Doğu Avrupa'ya uzatılması fikri, 1991 stratejik konsepti ile birlikte hayata geçirilmiş, 1991 yılından itibaren NATO genişleme sürecine girmiştir. Müşterek çalışabilirlik kavramı çeşitli siyasi modülleri yeniden şekillendirilerek evrim geçirmiştir. Bu kapsamda; 1994 yılında Barış İçin Ortaklık (BİO) programı, 1997 yılında Rusya ile Kurucu Senet anlaşması yoluyla kontrollü bir ilişki kurulmuş, 1997 yılında Ukrayna ile Ayrıcalıklı Üyelik yoluyla NATO'nun kontrolünde kalması için program başlatılmıştır. NATO bu programlar ile Varşova Paktı'nın dağılması üzerine yönelim arayışına giren devletleri NATO şemsiyesi altına almaya çalışmıştır. 1999 yılına kadar olan süreçte, 1991 stratejik konseptinde esnek bir politika izleyen, Rusya ve Ukrayna ile birlikte üyelik için aday ülkelere standardizasyon aramayan ve askeri birlikte çalışabilirlik koşulları için esneklik uygulayan ABD, 1999 stratejik konseptinde mevcut üyelerin yanında, BİO üyelerinden Üyelik Eylem Planı'nı (MAP) harekete geçirmiş, bu programa da Savunma Yeteneği Girişimi (DCI) adı verilmiştir. Burada şu hususu da belirtmek gerekir, genişleme amacıyla 1995 yılında NATO Genişleme Çalışması adı altında detaylı bir prosedür uygulamaya konulmuş

olmasına rağmen, BİO programı aracılığıyla aday devletlerin ordularının dönüşümü ve modernizasyonunda Batıdan silahlanma konusunda yeterli istek ve iradeye sahip olmamaları sebebiyle bu prosedür yeterli ilgiyi görmemiş, bu nedenle Savunma Yeteneği Girişimi'nin altında, Üst Düzey Yönlendirme Grubu (HLSG) adıyla denetleyici bir yapı oluşturulmuştur. ABD, BM kararları ve NATO'nun 5. Maddesi çerçevesinde NATO'yu kıta Avrupası dışında kullanmak için Akdeniz Diyalogu programını devreye sokmuş ve bunu NATO'nun desteğini meşruiyet zemininde araç olarak kullanmak ve küresel seviyede güç arayışını sürdürmek için kullanmak istemiştir. Bu dönemde stratejik konseptlerde Birleşmiş Milletlerin sorumluluklarına aşama aşama atıfta bulunularak, NATO, Birleşmiş Milletler'in vereceği görevlere hazırlanılmak istenmiştir. Daha önceki stratejik konseptlerde Birleşmiş Milletler sadece prensipleri içerisinde hareket edilmesi gereken bir kurum olarak belirtilmesine rağmen, genişlemenin başlamasından itibaren Birleşmiş Milletler'in vereceği görevlere NATO'nun aday olabileceğinin sinyalleri verilmiştir. Burada NATO için Avrupa Atlantik alanı dışı görevlere hazırlanması yönünde bir öngörüle bulunulduğu anlamı çıkarılmalıdır. Bu sebeple, bu tez, 1991 ile 1999 yılları arasında gelişen müzakere süreçleri ile alınan kararları “Büyük Satranç Oyununda Muhteşem Pazarlık” olarak kavramsallaştırmıştır. Dolayısıyla 1991 ve 1999 stratejik konseptleri ve uygulanan politikalar NATO tarihi boyunca müşterek çalışabilirlik politikasının en önemli sürecini oluşturmaktadır. Aynı sebeplerle, birlikte çalışabilirlik politikası; ABD hegemonyası, bölgesel bir güç merkezi olmak için Avrupalı üye devletler arasındaki liderlik rekabeti, orta ve küçük ölçekli üye devletlerin ordularının standardizasyon ve modernizasyon gereksinimleri, üyeliğe aday devletlerin ise sermayelerinin Batılı silah şirketleri aracılığıyla Batı'ya aktarılması bağlamında anlaşılmalıdır. Doğrudan Amerikan varlığının olmadığı bir Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikası tartışmaları boyunca ABD, lider ülkeden rakip ülkeye dönüşmeye razı olmuş ve 1999'da stratejik konsepti resmen ilan edilene kadar NATO'nun Avrupalı üyeleriyle rekabet içinde iş birliğini sürdürmüştür. Bu rekabet, İngiltere ve Fransa'nın BAB ve AB'nin Avrupa savunmasında özerklik ilkesi temelinde kaynak sağlama konusunda anlaştıkları St. Malo Deklarasyonu ile doruğa ulaşmıştır. Avrupalı üye devletlerin NATO'dan ayrı ve ayrılabilir bir güvenlik ve savunma sistemi arayışına girmelerini engellemeye yönelik bir politika geliştiren ve bunu yapmaya kalkışmaları halinde ABD ile aralarındaki kapasite boşluğunu

dolduramayacaklarını anlamalarını sağlamaya çalışan ABD, 1991 stratejik konseptinde askeri olarak birlikte çalışabilirlikten şu veya bu şekilde bahsetmemiştir. Aynı durum, BİO programı aracılığıyla mümkün olduğunca çok sayıda aday ülkeyi sisteme çekmek için de kullanılmıştır. ABD, Rusya ve Ukrayna'yı ürkütmemek için standizasyon ve müşterek çalışabilirlik prosedürlerinde bir esneklik izlemiştir. Ancak 1999 stratejik konseptine gelindiğinde bu esneklik, daimî üyeler için Savunma Yetenekleri Girişimi, Rusya, Ukrayna ve BİO üyeleri için Üyelik Eylem Planının uygulamaya konulmasıyla katı bir politikaya dönüşmüştür. Ancak burada, NATO'nun genişlemesine ilişkin olarak 03 Eylül 1995 tarihinde tüm NATO üyeleri tarafından kabul edilen Kapsamlı Bir Çalışma sözleşmesi Washington Antlaşması'nın 10. Maddesi ile ilgili olduğunu belirtmek gerekir. Bazıları NATO'nun genişlemesine ilişkin çalışmanın diğer aday üyeler için de geçerli olduğunu iddia etse de Kapsamlı Bir Çalışma sözleşmesinin 77'nci paragrafı bu gereklilikleri kısmen isteğe bağlı olarak açıklamaktadır. 1999 stratejik konsepti ile birlikte uygulamaya konulan yeni prosedürler, silahlanma ve teknoloji transferi yoluyla eski doktrinlerin, askeri teçhizatın, iletişim sistemlerinin, uçuş araçlarının vb. modernizasyonu veya değiştirilmesi yoluyla yenilenmesini şart koşturmuştur. Bu bağlamda, müşterek çalışabilirlik politikası tam anlamıyla Büyük Satranç Oyunundaki Muhteşem Pazarlıktan ibaret olmuştur.

1999 stratejik konseptinden sonra NATO tarafından benimsenen stratejik konseptler, askeri ve siyasi gelişmeler hakkında ayrıntılı bilgi vermek ve birlikte çalışabilirliği açıklamak için NATO Zirve Bildirgelerine yerleştirilmiştir. NATO Zirve Bildirgeleri içerisinde Mayıs 2002'deki Roma Zirvesi, Kasım 2002'deki Prag Bildirgesi ve Nisan 2008'deki Bükreş Zirve Bildirgesi üyeler arasındaki ilişkileri ve üye devletlerin farklı aktörlerle birlikte çalışabilirliğini düzenleyen önemli siyasi gelişmelerdir. Bu dönemde ABD, Soğuk Savaş döneminde olduğu gibi NATO üyesi ülkelere nükleer koruma sağlamıştır. 1999 stratejik konseptinden sonra ABD, küresel üstünlük arzusuyla konumunu sağlamlaştırmak için bölgesel aktörlerle ikili koordinasyonlar yaparak NATO dışında küresel çaplı tek taraflı NATO'yu da bağlayacak şekilde hareket etmiştir. 1991 ve 1999 stratejik konseptleri NATO için alan dışı görevlere hazırlanmaktan bahsederken ve terörizmi gelecekteki güvenlik sorunlarından biri olarak öngörmüş, 11 Eylül terör saldırısı, NATO'nun alan dışı görevlerde



kullanılmasına katalizör etkisi yapmıştır. 11 Eylül saldırıları NATO'nun dönüşümünü hızlandırarak, ABD'nin Afganistan ve Irak'ta terörizme karşı yürüttüğü savaşa yardımcı olmak için kapasite boşluklarının doldurulmasını gerekli kılmıştır. Afganistan'da yapılan Kalıcı Özgürlük Operasyonunun (OEF) başında İngiltere dışında, Avrupalı üyelerin geri kalanı alan dışı operasyonlara savaşan taraflar olarak katılmaya isteksiz kalmışlardır. Kosova ve Bosna'daki insani yardım operasyonlarında beşinci madde dışı operasyonlar için kısmi bir deneyime sahip olmalarına rağmen çoğu Avrupalı üye devletlerin, sadece anavatanlarını savunabilecek sabit güçlere sahip olduğu bilinen bir gerçektir. Operasyonun başında Almanya gibi bazı devletler sadece özel kuvvetlerini ABD ile birlikte Afganistan'a müdahale için görevlendirse de ABD ve İngiltere'ye katılmamalarının sebebini stratejik hava ikmali, havadan havaya yakıt ikmali, deniz ikmali ve güdümlü mühimmat konularında eksikliklerine bağlamış, bu da ABD'nin ilk defa 5'inci maddeyi çalıştırması sebebiyle işine gelmiştir. Üstelik, daha önceden kabul edilen savunma yetenekleri girişimi programı ABD'nin müttefiklerini modernize etmek ve batılı askeri teçhizatla donatmak için tatmin edilecek etkiyi göstermemiştir. ABD'nin zorlamasıyla İttifak, bu sefer 2002 yılında Prag'da toplanarak yeni bir yetenek taahhüdünde bulunmuştur. NATO, Prag Yetenek Taahhüdü (PCC)'nü kabul ederek ikinci dönüşüm dalgasını başlatmış, genişleme yoluyla yeni ülkeleri üye yapmaya karar vermiş, Ukrayna, Rusya ve Gürcistan aracılığı ile müşterek çalışılabilirliği doğrudan merkeze alan ilişkiler kurulmaya başlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda ABD'nin Afganistan ve Irak'a yoğunlaşmasının, Avrupa-Atlantik bölgesi dışında gerçekleştirdiği eylemlerin meşruiyetine katkı sağlaması sebebiyle, üye ülkeler tarafından ittifakta çatlak çıkmasını diye Avrupalı üyelere kendi savunma şirketlerinden modernizasyon kapsamında alım yapmaları için fazla baskı yapamamıştır. Bu durum, aralarında Türkiye'nin de bulunduğu bazı üyelerin, Avrupa Savunma Ajansını geliştirmelerine, stratejik hava desteği sağlamak üzere kendi A-400M projesi gibi uçaklarını ve gemilerini üretmek için gruplaşarak konsorsiyumlar oluşturmalarına sebep olmuştur. Bu dönemde ABD, Küresel üstünlüğe odaklanmış ve müşterek çalışılabilirlikten faydalanmak istemiştir. Bu arada ABD, füze savunma programını dikte etmek için bölgesel altyapı düzenlemeleri arayışına girmiştir. ABD, aslında 11 Eylül saldırılarından önce tasarladığı Füze Kalkanı Projesini, Afganistan ve Irak'a yoğunlaşmasından dolayı üye devletlere ısrarcı olamamıştır. ABD Başkanı

Bush, Savunma Bakanı Rumsfeld ve Paul Wolfowitz gibi önemli ekibi, bu Füze kalkanı Projesiyle aslında eskiden beri ilişki içerisinde bulunduğu uluslararası toplum ve kamuoyu tarafından bilinmektedir. ABD buradaki nihai hedefini, soğuk savaş ve sonrasında bedava olarak sağladığı “free rider” eleştirilerine sebep olan nükleer şemsiyeyi, Füze Kalkanı Projesi altına alarak üye ve dost devletlerden ekonomik fayda sağlamak üzerine tesis etmiştir. NATO'nun Rusya ile ilişkilerini düzenlemek için imzaladığı Kurucu Senedi “Yeni Bir Kalite” platformu ile değiştirerek revize etmesinden önce ABD, her iki tarafın stratejik nükleer silahlarını sınırlandırmak için bir anlaşma yapmıştır. Müzakere aşamasında ABD, Rusya'nın nükleer başlıklardan kurtulmasını sağlamak için çeşitli diplomasi oyunları ve yöntemlerini kullanmıştır. ABD Başkanı Bush'un, yeni füze kalkanı projesini hayata geçirebilmek için Rusya'ya, “prosedürle uğraşmayalım el sıkışalım ve nükleer silahlarımızı azaltalım” önerisine Rusya, “bunu bir anlaşma zemininde yapalım ve yaptığımız anlaşmaya sadık kalalım” önerisi ile gelmiştir. Yasal olarak bağlayıcı bir belge arayışında olan ve her iki tarafı da radikal bir şekilde sınırlamak isteyen Rusya, ABD'nin türlü oyunlarına rağmen füze savunma projesi aracılığıyla Rusya'nın Avrupa'daki stratejik caydırıcılığını değiştirmemek şartıyla bu anlaşmayı imzalamayı kabul etmiştir. Her iki taraf da stratejik saldırı amaçlı nükleer silahlarını 1500 ile 2200 savaş başlığı seviyesiyle sınırlandırmayı kabul ettikten 4 gün sonra, 28 Mayıs 2002'de, NATO Roma'da toplanmış ve daha çok 19+1 olarak bilinen, Rusya'yı adeta üyelerinden biri olarak kabul ettiğini, bunun için de NATO-Rusya Konseyini kurduğunu ilan etmiştir. Bu adımdan sonra, ABD, 1972'den beri yürürlükte olan Rusya ile arasında imzalamış olduğu ABM anlaşmasından çekilme kararı aldığını Rusya'ya bildirmiştir. Daha Rusya ne olduğunu anlamadan, ardından Polonya ve Çek Cumhuriyeti'nde füze ve radar tesisleri kuracağını açıklamıştır. Bu durum, ABD'nin Rusya'nın Avrupa'daki stratejik caydırıcılığını hedef almayacağına dair verdiği güvenceden zımnen geri dönmesi anlamına gelmiştir. Her ne kadar, Kosova güvensizliğinden sonra NATO bağlamında Rusya ve ABD arasında bir güvensizlik ortamı oluşsa da bu durum daha derin ve ikinci bir çatlak yaratmıştır. Burada şunu da belirtmek gerekir, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'nın, Rusya için özel bir yere sahip iki önemli ülke olduğu unutulmamalıdır. Bu nedenle, 1991 stratejik konseptinden sonra Ukrayna'nın NATO'ya üyeliği gündeme geldiğinde, Ukrayna'ya özel muamele yapılmış ve NATO ilişkileri “Ayırt Edici Üyelik” anlaşması ile düzenlenmiştir. Bu anlamda ABD, İngiltere ve Rusya

(daha sonra tek taraflı olarak Fransa) Ukrayna'ya 1994 yılında güvenlik garantisi vererek nükleer silahlarından arındırmıştır. Rusya için diğer özel bir konuma sahip olan ülke Gürcistan'dır. ABD, BİO üyeliği sayesinde Karadeniz'e kıyısı olması sebebiyle Gürcistan'ı Azerbaycan üzerinden İran ile ilgili politikalarında ileri üs olarak kullanılabilmesi ihtimali, Rusya'nın kendini çevrelenmiş gibi hissetmesine sebep olacak jeo-stratejik öneme sahiptir. NATO, 2008'deki Bükreş zirvesinde Gürcistan'da gerçekleştirilecek seçim süreci ile ilgili açıklamalarda bulunmuş, zaten Gül Devrimi ile iktidara gelen hükümeti cesaretlendirerek işi, Abhazya ve Acarya'da bulunan Rus barış gücü askerlerine küçük çaplı müdahaleye kadar götürmüştür. Bu durum, NATO'nun, Gürcistan'a dolaylı müdahalesi ve Rusya'nın kendini çevrelenmiş hissetmesi ile birlikte göz önüne alındığında Rusya ile ilişkilerde üçüncü bir çatlak yaratmış, sonunda Rusya, Gürcistan'a askeri müdahalede bulunmuştur. ABD'nin yapmış olduğu bu bölgesel yaklaşım, ikili koordinasyonlar NATO zemini kullanılarak üçüncü en büyük krizi yaratmıştır. Zaman içinde iki taraf arasındaki güven kaybı, 2014'te Kırım'ın ilhakına ve 2022'de Ukrayna Savaşı'na giden yolu açmıştır. Her iki ilişkinin temelinde de müşterek çalışabilirlik bir gerekçe olarak kullanılmıştır.

ABD'nin küresel üstünlük arayışını; kimi zaman NATO'yu kullanarak, kimi zaman da bölgesel ikili ilişkiler zemininde yapması ve küresel anlamda tek taraflı hareket etmesi ters teperek, Doğu Avrupa'da yeni bir savaş evresine girilmesi ve çok kutuplu dünya düzenine evrilme ihtimalini ortaya çıkarmıştır. ABD Afganistan'a düzenlediği Kalıcı Özgürlük Operasyonu ile birlikte Dört Yıllık Savunma Değerlendirmesi (QDR) yapmış ve 30 Eylül 2001 de yayımlamıştır. 11 Eylül saldırılarından 19 gün sonra yayımlanan kapsamlı raporda zımni olarak Çin enerji kaynaklarına ulaşabilmesi ve paylaşılması zemininde ABD'ye rakip ülke olarak tanımlanmış, bu sebeple 2001 yılı itibarıyla Asya'nın büyük ölçekli askeri çatışmalara açık olduğunu belirtilmiştir. Çin'in enerji kaynaklarına ulaşması her ne kadar Kalıcı Özgürlük Operasyonu aracılığıyla engellenmeye çalışılmışsa da 2022 stratejik konseptine göre Çin'in zorlu rakip haline geldiği vurgusu yapılmıştır. Bu bağlamda hem 2001 yılı ABD Dört Yıllık Savunma Değerlendirmesi hem de NATO 2010 ve 2022 stratejik konseptleri, enerji yollarının güvenliği ve ABD'nin, müttefikleri ve dostları ile birlikte Orta Doğu'daki enerji kaynaklarına bağımlı olduğunu ortaya koymuştur.

2017 yılı itibariyle Çin, dünyanın en büyük petrol ithalatçısı ülkesi haline gelmesi ve ithalatının yarısını Orta Doğu'dan gerçekleştirmesi göz önüne alındığında, Kalıcı Özgürlük Operasyonunun Çin'i hem Orta Asya'dan hem de Orta Doğu'dan enerji zengini ülkelere ulaşmak için kontrol altına alınmaya çalışıldığı, ancak yeterli başarı sağlayamadığını göstermektedir. Bu bağlamda, 2022 stratejik konseptine göre NATO'nun, müşterek çalışabilirlik kapsamında Rusya ve Çin'in çevrelenmesine yönelik rol alabileceği sonucuna ulaşılabilir.

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