A BERGSONIAN CRITIQUE OF SPATIALIZATION IN HUSSERLIAN TIME CONSCIOUSNESS

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to analyze time consciousness from a phenomenological perspective, within the theories of Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson. In this study, Husserl's tripartite structure of time consciousness (primal impressions, retention, and protention) based on intentionality and immediate givenness and Bergson's distinction between homogeneous time and pure duration grounded on the concept of intuition are discussed comprehensively. In this context, while Husserl holds time in similar characteristics to spatial relations, Bergson examines it as an internal and continuous flow. This study argues that Husserl's conception of time in spatial relations leads to an assumption of distance between different modes of time, and that such a conception deprives time of its freshness and fullness. In this respect, Husserl's consciousness of time does not fully correspond to the fluid and dynamic nature of time. In contrast, Bergson's intuitive model of time, which holds time as an ever-changing and indivisible flow, independent of spatial conceptions and analogies, offers a more coherent and comprehensive understanding than Husserl's theory based on spatial and external properties and is more faithful to the immediate and direct experience of time. In this respect, it can be further argued that Bergson is more faithful to the immediate givenness of time from a phenomenological perspective than Husserl.
Keywords: Husserl, Bergson, Time Consciousness, Spatialization of Time, Phenomenology
ÖZ

HUSSERLCİ ZAMAN BİLİNCİNE MEKANSALLAŞMA ÜZERİNE
BERGSONCU BİR ELEŞTİRI

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Bu çalışma, zaman bilincini Edmund Husserl ve Henri Bergson’un teorileri kapsamında fenomenolojik bir bakış açısıyla incelemeyi hedefler. Çalışmada, Husserl’in zaman bilinci üzerine anlık verilmişlik ve yönelimselliğine dayanan üç parçalı analizi (anlık izlenimler, retansiyon ve protansiyon) ve Bergson’un sezgi kavramı temelinde homojen zaman ve saf süre arasında yaptığı ayrılmı kapsamlı bir biçimde açıklanır. Bu bağlamda Husserl zamanı mekânsal ilişkilerle benzer bir karakterde ele alırken, Bergson ise zamanı içsel ve sürekli bir akış olarak görür. Tez, Husserl’in zamanı mekânsal bir kapsamda ele almasının, farklı zaman modları arasında mesafe olduğu varsayımına yol açtığını ve böyle bir kavrayışın zamanı tazelik ve tamlık içeren karakterlerinden yoksun biraktığını savunur. Bu bakımdan, Husserl’in zaman bilinci, zamanın açıkça ve dinamik doğasıyla tam olarak örtüşmemektedir. Buna karşılık, Bergson’un sezgisel zaman modelinin, zamanı mekânsal kavramlar ve analojilerden bağımsız olarak, sürekli değişen ve bölünemeyen bir akış olarak ele almasını, Husserl’in yönelimsel ve dışsal özelliklere dayanan zaman teorisine kıyasla daha tutarlı ve kapsamlı bir zaman anlamışı sunduğu ve zamanın anlık ve doğrudan deneyimine daha sadık kaldığı öne sürülmür. Bu bakımdan Bergson’un Husserl’e nazaran fenomenolojik açıdan zamanın anlık verilmişliğine daha sadık kaldığı öne sürülebilir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Husserl, Bergson, Zaman Bilinci, Zamanın Mekânsallaştırılması, Fenomenoloji
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In philosophy, we might ask, "What is time?" From a phenomenological perspective, we could address this philosophical question by reframing it as: What does it mean to experience time? And what does that experience tell us about time itself? The creator of contemporary phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, extensively analyzed time consciousness, with his major writings on this topic being found mostly in the collections: *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893-1917), and his Bernau Manuscripts. We might marvel at the technical nuance, insightful elaboration, and remarkable depth and extent of these probing investigations into the experience of time, which are illustrated with Husserl’s elegant, triangular diagrams. Surely these examinations of time consciousness set the standard for this field of study. Around the same time that Husserl got started on his studies of time, Henri Bergson was innovating his own philosophy of temporal experience. It is known that they exchanged just a very brief correspondence, but they never engaged with each other’s ideas. Bergson famously leveled a critique of the commonsense and scientific notion of time that represents it as having certain space-like features that are properly those of space itself. While this conception proves quite instrumental for fields like physics and for our every practical concern, Bergson painstakingly builds a compelling case that this simply is not time at all. It is just space, and when we conceive of time in this way, we have lost sight of what we originally wanted to investigate and instead substituted something entirely unrelated.

As we marvel at Husserl’s ingenious diagrams of time, which use extending lines to represent features of the objective flow of time and the way we constitute and experience the past and future in our present awareness, we might wonder: does Husserl fall victim to what Bergson took so much care to warn us about? What if
Husserl’s account of time is contaminated with conceptions of space? What if Husserl’s phenomenology of time is not even strictly about time but something entirely related? What if Bergson had proven himself the superior phenomenologist on this central matter in phenomenology? This will be the basic line of questioning that guides the following thesis on time experience. It will be largely phenomenological. My driving concern will be the issue of givenness to experience. The better phenomenology, as we will see, should do the most justice and be the most faithful to the way time is given to our awareness and the way we experience it immediately. Does Husserl, or does Bergson, come closer to the truth of time? That is what I aim to learn. What I have found, as we will see, is that, despite what we might expect, Bergson does seem to have better captured the most fundamental features of time experience from a phenomenological perspective. Of course, this is a controversial claim that will require detailed analysis. To provide it, we begin in the second chapter with Husserl’s account of time consciousness.

In this context, in the second chapter of the study, I will explore Husserl’s theory of temporal consciousness and intentional awareness in general, and then I will examine his theory of time consciousness, which, in brief, he founds upon the intentionality of consciousness. I will illustrate how he develops his theory, which he defines in a tripartite structure in terms of his terminological concepts: primal impressions (the present), retention, and protention. I will explain the way in which he formulates his theory in terms of these terminological concepts and will further discuss it critically. Before going into his inquiry, however, it should be noted that Husserl considers time as an integral and constitutive aspect of our consciousness, a main element of subjectivity. For Husserl, phenomenological reduction serves as the key to reaching this subjectivity. In this way, he aims to disclose the structures of consciousness in their purest forms in terms of the intentional acts that characterize them. In Husserl’s theory, we find our temporal experience on the basis of retention of the past, protention of the future, and primal impressions of the present, based on intentional acts between different time modes in this structure. However, for Bergson, as we will later address, Husserl's theory of time leads us to a “spatialized conception of time,” in the sense that, in Husserl’s model, different time-points are in relationship with each other in terms of “proximity” and “remoteness,” which indicates that, for him,
as we will especially see in his diagrams, we find different time-points extended in duration in terms of intentional acts.

Following this, I will turn to Bergson’s views on the experience of duration in the third chapter. Here, our primary concern will be with his critique of the spatialization of time in detail. I will first broadly examine his intuitive theory of time and demonstrate the ways in which he offers us a more coherent conception of time than that of Husserl’s theory involving spatiality and externality, with his fundamental distinction between time and duration. I will further examine the concept of intuition, which Bergson regards as the only way to achieve true knowledge of time, and the essence of time as duration. I will then address the possibility of experiencing time in a full manner by intuition without "spatializing" time or dividing it into different units. Finally, I will address the way in which Husserl's understanding of time, according to Bergson, with its inclusion of external characteristics, leads to a spatial understanding of time, and I will briefly address Bergson's criticisms on this matter. While Husserl’s illustration of time, as we will see, seems to form a spatial-like structure of time with moments juxtaposed in a line, for Bergson, our conscious states in essence permeate one another. As they succeed one another, we perceive them in one another; the whole can be represented in any particular conscious state. According to Bergson’s theory, we will see that the past, present, and future are not necessarily external to each other in terms of spatial relations. Meaning that the past is not an implicit recollection of the present, and the future is not a vague anticipation of what is yet to come. For him, our conscious states permeate each other as time passes. As they succeed one another, we perceive them in one another through pure duration. For Bergson, as we will see, what makes this possible is intuition. As he concludes, only through intuition can we fully grasp time as an inner experience and not solely as an external succession or an indication of spatiality.

The fourth chapter will then address the question: to what extent might Husserl’s model of time consciousness be problematically contaminated with a conception of space? As we begin the third chapter, I will critically evaluate Husserl's and Bergson's theories about time consciousness and compare them in terms of different philosophical issues. I will focus first (intentionality vs. intuition) on the element of
spatialization in Husserl's conception of time awareness. Next, I will consider the possibility that we might find it in Bergson's model too, although in the end we will find that it does not rise to nearly the same problematic level as in Husserl. After that, I will evaluate Husserl's philosophy of time consciousness from his own phenomenological criteria of his "principle of all principles." Here, I will take into account the issues of "freshness" and "fullness" in the immediate givenness of time and conclude that Bergson, at least on the topic of time consciousness, proves to be the superior phenomenologist. In this final chapter, I will explore the paradox inherent in Husserl's portrayal of time as both dynamic and structurally constant, re-examine Bergson's differentiation between time and pure duration, and investigate the interplay between our memory and our current state of consciousness. In this discussion, I will address Husserl's depiction of the 'now-point' as the most "fresh" and concrete element of time consciousness, which appears analogous to the way we perceive a spatial object in its entirety at a single moment. As in this case, each moment is not only interconnected with the past and future but also seems to occupy a space within a temporal horizon. I will also explore the potential issue of Bergson's theory succumbing to the spatialization of time, particularly in terms of his cone diagrams. As such, at first glance, his distinction between habit memory and pure memory might seem to offer spatial characteristics. However, as we will later investigate in detail, the spatial references in his cone diagrams only serve to visualize the mutual interaction between memory and immediate consciousness rather than conceptualizing our immediate temporal perception in terms of extended units, thus falling within the metaphorical domain. Thus, we will find out that, even if it does, to a limited extent, it is not nearly as problematic as Husserl’s does.

Finally, I will examine and compare Husserl's and Bergson's theories in terms of phenomenological immediateness. I will analyze both philosophers’ theories in the context of the qualities of “freshness” and “fullness” attributed to the concept of time. At this point, I will explore the tension between the enduring structure employed by Husserl and the freshness of time he proposes, examining the contradiction that emerges from his attribution of a specific pattern and regularity to immediate perception, which he contends is freshly presented. Finally, I will discuss time within the context of fullness. In this context, as we will see, Husserl’s temporal
model depicts our temporal experiences with many various nested parts, while in Bergson’s illustrations, we do not experience time in such a partialized way. I will conclude that time always gives itself its fullness; we only ever experience time as a whole, while we can divide spatial objects into different parts. In the end, we will ultimately reach the conclusion that Bergson seems to have stuck closer to Husserl’s “principle of all principles” than Husserl did, namely, to give primacy to immediate experience. Now we can ask: is Bergson a greater phenomenologist than Husserl? We will find out in the study.
CHAPTER 2

HUSSERL’S TEMPORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In this chapter, I first investigate Husserl's theory of temporal consciousness and intentional awareness in general, and then I will examine the conception of time in his philosophy. Husserl's framework, primarily built on the intentionality of consciousness, outlines a tripartite structure comprising primal impressions (representing the present), retention (past), and protention (future). I will explore how these terminologies shape his theory and critically analyze their implications. Husserl views time as an integral and constitutive aspect of our consciousness and subjectivity, with phenomenological reduction being the essential approach to understanding this. His method allows for the examination of consciousness in its purest form, focusing on the intentional acts that define our temporal experiences. Husserl's theory posits that our temporal awareness grounds on these interconnected time modes. However, as we will later see, in Bergson's approach, Husserl's theory results in a "spatialized conception of time." According to Bergson's view, Husserl's model spatially arranges time-points in relation to one another in terms of their "proximity" and "remoteness," thus extending their duration through intentional acts. This chapter aims to thoroughly scrutinize Husserl's theory, highlighting its philosophical depth while contrasting it with Bergson's critique, particularly focusing on how Husserl's conceptual diagrams illustrate his temporal understanding.

2.1. Husserl’s Inquiry of Time

To begin with, the primary objective of Husserl, insofar as he explains, seems to reveal the essential bases of our experiences with time and the complex structures that govern our perception and understanding of temporal consciousness. In his inquiry, to put it simply, he argues that time is not an external, objective structure within which our experiences unfold but a fundamental constituent of human
subjectivity itself. He conceptualizes time as an integral and constitutive aspect of consciousness. In this sense, he argues that the temporal passage cannot be deduced solely from external phenomena, as time is subjective and internal. For him, as we will see, time is not something external to consciousness but is an essential part of the way we experience the world. In essence, time is not something we passively observe but is intimately woven into the very essence of our conscious experiences through the activity of apprehension. Husserl emphasizes the intrinsic connection between time and consciousness, emphasizing that our temporal experiences are inseparable from the act of consciousness itself. In this sense, his inquiry can be understood as an attempt to present the inner workings of our consciousness as it engages with the flow of time.

The basis and starting point of Husserl's phenomenological inquiry, in essence, is Husserl's conception that consciousness is inherently directed towards objects. This directedness, or, as Husserl calls it, "intentionality," constitutes the central theme of his philosophy. According to him, intentional awareness is simply the capacity of consciousness to be about something other than itself. Brentano, who played a major role in the development of Husserl's main philosophical ideas, simply formulates: "A mental state or experience is intentional insofar as it is a representation of something other than itself" (Antonelli, 2021, sec. 2). In other words, consciousness is never a mere abstraction but always directed towards particular objects, whether they are physical, mental, or abstract. Husserl's identification of intentional awareness begins with his philosophical method known as phenomenological reduction, also known as "epoche" (from the ancient Greek term meaning “suspension” or bracketing”), which is regarded as a rigorous method that transforms a philosopher into a phenomenologist. In brief, for Husserl, “the epoché has us focus on those aspects of our intentional acts and their contents that do not depend on the existence of a represented object out there in the extra-mental world” (Beyer, 2003, sec. 5). In this way, Husserl aims to disclose the structures of consciousness in their purest forms by emphasizing the intentional acts that characterize them. Indeed, his aim with the suggestion of the method of epoché seems to be to “establish the residuum thesis, according to which the realm of pure consciousness exists independently of the external world” (Beyer, 2003, sec. 5).
Husserl introduces this technique as he believes that the foundations of scientific inquiry are compromised by scientific frameworks and the subjective biases of scientists. By employing phenomenological reduction, however, phenomenologists aim to strip away these biases and return to a pure, unadulterated perspective on the world, serving as a rigorous foundation for scientific inquiry. As addressed in the following statement, “the phenomenological reduction is properly understood as a regimen designed to transform a philosopher into a phenomenologist by virtue of the attainment of a certain perspective on the world phenomenon” (Cogan, 2006). The phenomenological reduction therefore involves a deliberate and disciplined act of setting aside or "bracketing" all preconceived notions and beliefs about the external world. Through this process, we engage in a deep introspection, separating empirical facts from our subjective interpretations and biases. By suspending these external judgments, as Husserl suggests, we gain access to the raw, unmediated data of consciousness.

This process allows the phenomenologist to define the phenomena in themselves and investigate their inherent structures such as intentionality (the directedness of consciousness toward objects), time-consciousness, and the way different phenomena are given to consciousness. Indeed, as elucidated in the following statement: “The phenomenological reduction is at once a description and prescription of a technique that allows one to voluntarily sustain the awakening force of astonishment so that conceptual cognition can be carried throughout intentional analysis, thus bringing the “knowing” of astonishment into our everyday experience” (Cogan, 2006). The reduction, for Husserl, serves as a methodical way to bracket or set aside questions about the existence of the external world. It is a suspension of judgment regarding the existence of an external world while focusing on the phenomena as they appear in consciousness. In this context, Husserl believes that by employing phenomenological reduction, we can achieve a form of philosophical clarity that enables us to better understand the true nature of consciousness and its relation to the external world. This reintegration is often referred to as "the return" or "unbracketing," where one can consider the relationship between the external world and consciousness as this process of bracketing is complete and the essential structures of consciousness have been described.
2.2. Husserl’s Intentionality

Since Husserl's theory of time is intrinsically related to the immediate givenness of objects and our intentional acts upon them, I think it is necessary at this point to address the conception of intentionality in Husserl's philosophy and its phenomenological implications, especially in his theory of time consciousness. For him, the temporal flow of experience over time can be better understood as we take a phenomenological perspective. He argues that, once the phenomenological reduction is applied, it brings us to a state of awareness that is characterized by intentional acts. Indeed, as briefly explicated by Seeburger, “the goal of phenomenology is nothing less than to reveal, through the reduction, the structures of pre-reflective intentional experience” (Seeburger, 1975, p. 217). In this context, intentional acts direct the experiences we obtain in the absence of prejudgments or presuppositions, allowing us to attend to the content of these acts, intentional objects, in the sense of immediacy. We focus on the objects as they are given in consciousness without presupposing anything about their external existence, as we access the pure, unmediated experience of the external objects.

The intentional act, in this context, represents the mental act or experience itself, while the intentional object refers to what the act is directed towards. For example, in the act of perceiving a red apple, the intentional act is perceiving, and the intentional object is the red apple. For Husserl, as formulated in the following: “the perception of a red apple has, as its object, the red apple, and this object is identical with the act’s intentional object” (Hopp, 2020, p. 141). This concept underlines the inseparable link between our conscious experiences and the objects of those experiences in our perception of time. In this sense, intentional objects are what our intentional acts are directed toward; they represent the target of our awareness, and the phenomenological reduction allows us to encounter these intentional objects in their purest form. In essence, Husserl's reduction aims to examine intentional objects as they exist "in themselves" (often referred to as the "things themselves"). In other words, it enables us to engage with the world and its objects without imposing our prior interpretations, meaning that we can access the raw, unmediated reality as it appears in our consciousness.
2.3. Temporality in Terms of Intentionality

Husserl adds that intentional acts inherently have a temporal dimension. He argues that when we engage in any act, it occurs within a specific temporal structure. The act of perception, for instance, unfolds over a duration of time as we process what is immediately given regarding objects of external world. He holds that our conscious experiences are inherently temporal. In this context, he describes the flow of consciousness as a succession of moments, including the “now,” “just-past,” (retention), and “just-about-to-come (protention). For Husserl, as formulated in the following: “the living present—any current moment of experience—includes three phases: the retention of the just-past; the primal-impression which corresponds to the now-point; and the protention, which is a short-term anticipation of what is just about to come” (Jacob, 2019, sec. 1). This temporal unfolding reveals that our consciousness does not merely capture glimpses of experiences but rather weaves them into a linear continuum, where each moment is intrinsically connected to its temporal predecessors and successors. For him, the temporal aspects of our intentional acts are essential to our engagement with intentional objects. When we engage in a perceptual act, the intentional object is not just a static, isolated entity but is experienced in a dynamic temporal context. We retain what we have just perceived (retention), and we project our expectations onto future moments (protention). This continuous interplay of retention and protention thus shapes our perception, forming a cohesive temporal experience. He, however, emphasizes the unity of temporal moments within conscious experience. While our awareness may seem to be divided into past, present, and future, these moments are unified by the continuous flow of consciousness. Thus, intentional acts, intentional objects, and their temporal context are all connected in a coherent structure. In order to describe the dynamic relationship between retention, present awareness, and protention, he introduces the concept of "temporal horizon," the encompassing structure that connects these different aspects of time and gives our experience a coherent sense of time. According to Husserl, our primal impressions, where our immediate perceptions begin to occur, “cannot be thought independently of its temporal horizon” (Husserl 1966b: 315, 337f). It never appears in isolation, and as such, in the analysis, it is treated as an abstract component of a larger structure” (Gallagher, 2014, p. 92).
2.4. Husserl’s Intentionality in Detail

Before examining time consciousness in intentional structure, I will examine how immediate perception expands and directs to different points with the acts of intentionality, according to Husserl's phenomenology. In essence, I will investigate how immediate perception takes place phenomenologically, how it directs our perception to different perspectives in terms of intentional tendencies, and then I will explain the intentionality of perception in a temporal context. In this regard, as we can discern, Husserl brings out a new philosophical attitude on understanding temporal consciousness, which he calls "the phenomenological attitude.” For Husserl, as Sinari points out, “the phenomenological attitude springs up as soon as we question our ordinary consciousness of the world, doubt what is given to this consciousness, and by disconnecting ourselves from it and all that goes with it withdraw inwardly to seek a new foundation for what we are and what we experience” (Sinari, 1972, p. 283). In Husserl’s understanding, perceiving an object is always limited to a single perspective, and perception extends through the intentionality of experience in order to be fulfilled. He holds that “the aspect, the perspectival adumbration through which every spatial object invariably appears,” only manifests itself from one side (Husserl, 2001, p. 39). As he elucidates in the following: “No matter how completely we may perceive a thing, it is never given in perception with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides at once” (Husserl, 2001, p. 39). And he follows: “Every aspect, every continuity of singular adumbrations, regardless how far this continuity may extend, offers us only one side” (Husserl, 2001, p. 39). In this case, when we view a table, for example, in his words, “we view it from only one side” (Husserl, 2001, p. 40). But yet, it has different sides as well: an interior, supposedly, or a non-visible back side. The table we see, as he articulates, “is never limited, merely to the side genuinely seen in the moment; rather, it consists of other sides that are not brought to the genuine perception” (Husserl, 2001, p. 40). However, we can bring them to our unique perception through other intentional perceptions.

Husserl defines perception as “original consciousness, which holds a curious schism in external perception” (Husserl, 2001, p. 40). In this regard, original consciousness
occurs as the object that is immediately perceived has sides pointing out the other sides, which, in this case, is “co-consciousness.” It is not included in immediate perception but is intended by what is immediately perceived. For Husserl, we can produce intuitive presentations of other sides at any time; “viewing the front side of the table, we can always envisage the intuitive presentational courses of the other sides” (Husserl, 2001, p. 40). According to Husserl, as he articulates, “it is clear that a non-intuitive pointing beyond or what characterizes the side is actually a mere side, and what provides for the fact that the side is not taken for the thing, but rather that something transcending the side is intended in consciousness as perceived, by which precisely that is actually seen.” And he formulates the following statement: “Noetically speaking, perception is a mixture of an actual exhibiting that presents in an intuitive manner what is originally exhibited, and of an empty indicating that refers to the possible new perceptions” (Husserl, 2001, p. 41). So, in brief, we perceive the external world primarily from a particular, immediately given perspective, but what is given in that particular perspective intends to what is not given. All perceptions and all particular perspectives point to the continuity of multiple, possible new perspectives. But these perspectives are always limited ones. In an entirely indicative system, they are the tendencies that point to what is not given. “They are pointers into emptiness,” Husserl argues (Husserl, 2001, p. 42). As he points out in other words, “Everything that appears is an appearing thing only by the virtue of being intertwined and permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo of emptiness with respect to appearance” (Husserl, 2001, p. 42).

However, the emptiness that Husserl speaks of, “in his own words, is “not nothingness, but an emptiness that is to be filled out” (Husserl, 2001, p. 42). He argues that it takes place on an intentional horizon. Everything that a particular perspective intends on this horizon is actually emptily intended and needs to be filled out. He concretizes his theory in the following: “Seeing the front side of a table, I am also conscious of the back side, along with everything else that is non-visible. It is indetermined, through an empty pointing ahead, even though it be rather indeterminate. But no matter how indetermined it may be, it still pointing ahead to a bodily shape, a bodily colouring etc” (Husserl, 2001, p. 42). In summary, as we can
see, a particular perspective of the external world that we perceive creates an empty intention that needs to be filled out through other perspectives outside our field of perception at the moment in question. I think that this process reveals the fundamental characteristic of our experience as a dynamic interplay between what is present and what is absent.

2.5. Temporalized Internal Consciousness

According to Husserl’s theory, as we will see, the temporal points in the past, present, and future moments intend each other in a temporal context similar to that of spatial objects, and this temporal intentionality simply constitutes our perception of time. For him, every intentional experience indeed involves a temporal characteristic, as stated in the following: “Every experience for the intentional conscious has a temporal character or background. We experience spatial objects, both successive and stationary, as temporal” (Kelly, 2017, chap. 1, sec. a). In a phenomenological approach, temporal objects likewise involve temporal characteristics. He holds that our awareness is always directed towards something in the present, past, and future, as our consciousness constantly changes over the course of time while we experience the world. At this point, he begins to examine the temporal character of our intentional consciousness. His concern lies, as we will see, not only in understanding how phenomena manifest in time but also in comprehending the essence of time as it flows. In essence, Husserl's inquiry revolves around what the passage of time signifies with regards to intentionality. That is to say, his inquiry is not only concerned with the way things appear in time as they are but also concerned with them “as passing, past, and enduring” (Michalski, 1997, p. 130). Thus, “it is the question about the meaning of a certain phenomenon: the passage of time” (Michalski, 1997, p. 130). He examines the previous philosophical attempts that consider temporal consciousness as a river, as Dastur and Vallier (2017, p. 107) elucidate, “that of time as a river, into which one can never step twice, as we’ve known since Heraclitus,” in which the flow of time is metaphorically explained, and remarks that the passage of time cannot be discerned from external phenomena because time is not an external, objective entity but rather a fundamental aspect of our conscious experiences. It is I, the subject, that perceives the succession because
we have the “ability to distinguish 'earlier' from 'later,' for we always already have an idea of the past,” he argues (Michalski, 1997, p. 131). Thus, he concludes that the passage of time cannot be solely deduced from external observations or phenomena. Instead, he argues, it is our intrinsic capability to perceive the succession of events in time. In his understanding, as we can understand, it is our innate ability to distinguish between 'earlier' and 'later' moments in time that allows for the perception of the passage of time.

2.6. Intentionality in Accordance with Temporality

According to Husserl’s philosophy, as mentioned earlier, intentionality is inherently temporal, meaning that every conscious act is directed toward a temporal object or content that is situated within a specific temporal context. For Husserl, "consciousness is always a consciousness of something, and a mental process is open to passing from being actional to non-actional" (Karaman, 2021, p. 88). In other words, consciousness is always "about" something that has a temporal location or extension. According to him, consciousness is the medium through which all perceptual activity occurs. Indeed, perception is one of the fundamental modes of consciousness. It is the way in which we become aware of the external world. When we see, hear, touch, or otherwise sense an object, it is our conscious awareness that makes the object meaningful. Consciousness actively structures the sensory data in terms of intentional relations, giving it form and meaning. For Husserl, “the intentional process of consciousness is called noesis, while its ideal content is called noema” (Smith, 2013, sec. 3). Husserl, in this case, refers to the active manner of perception as “noesis.” Noesis is the intentional act of consciousness where the perceiving subject actively directs their attention and awareness toward an object. This act involves an active engagement of the subject with the world, focusing on an intentional object. In the noetic act (noesis), consciousness actively "constitutes" the perceived object. This means that consciousness does not just passively receive sensory data; it structures, organizes, and gives meaning to the object. Husserl, in the same way, refers to the passive aspect of perception as “noema.” The noema represents the object of consciousness—the content that is passively given to consciousness. It is the "what" or "that" which the noetic act (noesis) is directed
toward. In this case, for instance, if we are thinking about a tree, our conscious act (noesis) is directed toward the mental representation or concept of the tree (noema). In short, noesis (activity) and noema (passivity) are inseparable and work together to constitute the full perceptual experience. I think it is important to consider the relationship between noesis and noema in order to fully grasp how we experience the flow of time and construct our temporal consciousness as our immediate consciousness flows continuously from one moment to the next, noesis, interacting with the ever-changing noema, forms the dynamic nature of our temporal experience. It represents the unity of experience, which allows us to experience and understand how temporal flow occurs beyond separate moments of the past, present, and future. In terms of our immediate perception, noesis represents the active, intentional act of consciousness that engages with the noema, the intended object. And through this intentional act, our immediate perception takes place.

In the temporal context, Husserl regards perception as an “immanent-temporal unity with an enduring grasp.” For him, the flow of consciousness “constitutes its own unity in the flowing continuity of retentions-of-retentions, while the continuously enduring immanent temporal objects are constituted in and through this flowing unity” (Bernet, 2009, p. 153). Indeed, for him, a simple apprehension is not a single point in time but exhibits itself as an element of immanent temporal unity. He explains this with the example of the sound of ringing. Supposing that it is continuously the same and invariable, he argues, it sounds in discrete phases, which constitute the modes of appearance of temporal objects. Its duration extends continuously with every moment, as the sound still endures. The now-point manifests itself in the form of a concrete present, with the horizon encompassing the past on one side and the horizon of the future on the other. This phenomenon of the present is in a constant state of flux, constantly moving from the present to a new present, and involves changes in the horizons of other time modes, past and future, in accordance with itself. The sound, as Husserl continues, is given as spatially localized for the most part. It is conceived in terms of spatial proximity and separation, or in terms of specific indications regarding a spatial reference point. When we examine the sound’s active and receptive apprehension, we find the apprehension itself enduring continuously, always taking place at an actual now
point. However, it does not refer to a specific point in time; rather, it refers to the sound of ringing itself. Thus, we find the sound given passively in the duration’s unity. To make such a now, such a duration object for itself, as we will see, we need to examine another kind of apprehensive act.

Husserl argues that, if we apprehend sound as enduring, “we are not turned toward the momentary and continuously changing present; rather, we are turned towards through and beyond this present, towards the sound as a unity by which, in essence, it presents itself in the flux of appearances in its change” (Husserl, 1991, p. 105). More precisely, the activity of apprehension concentrates on presently vivid sound “in such a way that it is apprehended as sound continuously enduring as present” (Husserl, 1991, p. 106). Primary apprehension of the ego traverses the immediate present, meaning that it moves towards the present in its constant transitional flux, as Husserl formulates: “from a now to an ever new now” Husserl (1991, p. 106). However, for Husserl, “a now never remains the same” as “each now becomes just past and then becomes the past of the past,” and so it goes (Husserl, 1991, p. 106). In the continuity of this appearance, the moment in question remains one and the same in “passive self-congruence” in continuously active perception. As Husserl formulates in the following: “Thus, the modified activity of the still-in-grasp constantly traverses the continuum of the pasts according to the way in which it is joined onto the living now, and the modified activity, in unity with the new activity springing up originally, is a flowing unity of activity” (Husserl, 1991, p. 107). It is also “in coincidence with itself in this flux” (Husserl, 1991, p. 107).

The same situation, according to Husserl, holds true for, in his words, “the continuing flux of the horizons of the future,” as it appears in a protentional mode (Husserl, 1991, p. 107). However, he adds that “it does not merely flow off as being still in grasp but as being continuously in an anticipating foregrasp, which cooperates with the still-in-grasp” (Husserl, 1991, p. 107). We therefore see through this activity that the apprehension of a sound has indeed an intricate texture based on the laws of constituting the living duration; as Husserl simply puts it, “a constitution takes place in a specific passivity prior to all activity” (Husserl, 1991, p. 107). A continuous flow of activity essentially involves this structure. Indeed, as he states, “A continuous flow
of activity springs up originally and unites with an activity that continuously flows from it.” It is altered in its own horizon while still being in perception, also bearing a future character that is modified in another way of an anticipatory perceptual activity. In brief, insofar as we actively apprehend a series of sounds in the same manner, for Husserl, it must be “an act of ego, having its source in itself” (Husserl, 1991, p. 107). As he briefly encapsulates, “There is not a passivity prior to activity, it is a passivity which belongs to the act, not as a base but as an act, a kind of passivity in activity” (Husserl, 1991, p. 107).

2.7. Questions Regarding How Time Is Constituted

In his initial inquiry, Husserl first tries to find an answer to the question of what the meaning of time is, as he aims at understanding the “essence and meaning of time” itself. To embark on this philosophical inquiry, in this sense, he distinguishes time at three distinct levels: objective time, subjective time, and the internal time consciousness, and begins to explore the question of what time is. His investigation delves beyond the mere appearance of events in time, as it extends to an examination of these events in their passing, as past occurrences, and in their enduring presence within the continuum of temporal experience. He then focuses on the question of how time is constituted other than in terms of temporal objects, as illustrated in the following: “How, in addition to ‘temporal objects,’ immanent and transcendent, does time itself—the duration and succession of objects—become constituted?” Husserl points out that these are “different lines of description.” To illustrate:

When a tone sound … [we] can make the tone itself, which endures and fades away, into an object and yet not make the duration of the tone or the tone in its duration into an object”. Focusing on the latter, we can observe that the tone appears in “a continuity of ‘modes’ in a ‘continual flow’” – that is, appears in the mode of (as) ‘now’ or as ‘immediately past’ – even though “Throughout this whole flow of consciousness, one and the same tone is intended as enduring, as now enduring”. Because the tone itself is the same but the manner in which it appears is continually different, then description of the tone itself must be distinguished from description of “the way in which we are ‘conscious’ of … the ‘appearing’ of the immanent tone. (Chamberlain, 1998, sec. 2)

Husserl argues that temporal objects are constituted by a variety of immanent external data and apprehensions that lapse as succession, and he questions the way in
which the duration and succession of objects are constituted in addition to the objects, immanent and temporal. He holds that phenomenological analysis of time cannot clarify its constitution without considering the temporal objects that are pregiven to us since objective temporality is always constituted phenomenologically and stands before us in appearance as objectivity. In this sense, he continues, we grasp that temporal objects are not unities in time, but they include temporal extension in themselves. So, when a tone sounds, it is indeed our apprehension that makes the tone itself a temporal object, though it does not make the duration of the tone an object. When we hear a melody, for instance, as Husserl remarks, “we perceive it because hearing is indeed perceiving it” (Husserl, 1991, sec. 7). This, I think, also gives us an insight into the way Husserl's time consciousness presents a spatialized time structure, because when we consider time from this perspective, we see that different temporal modes and our conscious states regarding these modes definitely possess a kind of temporal extension. In this context, we see that just as an object we immediately perceive in a spatial horizon intends to different perspectives and different objects within an intentional act, the past and the future are in a similar spatial-like relationship with the present. Meaning that, unlike the constantly flowing characteristic of time, different time modes seem to intend just like objects on the spatial plane interact with each other. This, I think, constitutes the fundamental problem of Husserl's time consciousness and the main foundation of Bergson's criticisms of Husserl’s theory. (I will discuss this subject in detail in the third chapter of the study.)

2.8. Husserl’s Melody Example

As we go back to Husserl’s theory of time consciousness, he gives us a melody example to further illustrate his temporal perception, where, in a series of cohesive sounds, the second following the first, and so on. As we hear the second tone, we cease to hear the first one. As a matter of fact, we do not hear the whole melody at once; we only hear the present tone. However, the passing part of the melody is in fact objective for us because each tone has its own temporal extension. He elucidates as follows: “When it begins to sound, I hear it now; but while it continues to sound, it has an ever-new now, and the now that immediately precedes it changes into a past”
And he continues, “Therefore, at any given time, I hear only the actually present phase of the tone, and the objectivity of the whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is in part of memory, in smallest punctual part perception, and in further part expectation” (Husserl, 1991, p. 25). In his understanding, as he accentuates, “melody begins and ends, and after it has ended, the whole unity of its duration, the process in which it begins and ends, recedes into the ever more distant past, and we still have it in a retention in this sinking back” (Husserl, 1991, p. 25). Insofar as the retention pursues, Husserl remarks, “The tone has its own temporality, it is the same, and its duration is the same” (Husserl, 1991, p. 25). We are conscious of the tone we hear in a constant flow and the duration it encompasses. What Husserl in fact emphasizes here is that, as he articulates, “the way in which an object in immanent time appears in a continual flow, that is, the way in which it is given” (Husserl, 1991, p. 25). In truth, the same duration simply raises itself and then becomes past. As "elapsed duration" it becomes a duration that is still intended in recollection along with the actual present, as if it were new. Husserl elucidates this in the following: “It is the same tone that now sounds of which it is said in the later flow of consciousness that it has been, that its duration has elapsed” (Husserl, 1991, p. 26). And he adds: “The points of the temporal duration recede for my consciousness in a manner analogous to that in which the points of an object stationary in space recede for my consciousness when I remove myself from the object” (Husserl, 1991, p. 26).

### 2.9. Introduction to the Tripartite Structure of Time

Now, I will examine the tripartite structure of time, which I think offers a concrete depiction of the way in which Husserl's theory leads to spatialization. As we have seen earlier, Husserl, in his inquiry, essentially engages in questions such as how the present moment is continuously constituted in our immediate perception, how we retain the past in our memories, and how we anticipate the future. His temporal consciousness, as Laasik (2019) states, “centers on the idea of an extended or ‘living’ present, which involves not only the momentary now but also retentions and protentions, extending it into the past and into the future.” According to him, "retentions" represent the way we keep the past alive in our consciousness, while
"protentions" are our anticipatory awareness of the future. These concepts, as we will see later in detail, basically form the foundation of his temporal analysis.

In brief, as addressed earlier, he bases his analysis of temporal consciousness on the tripartite structure: retention (past), primal impressions (present), and protention (future). Now, I will examine them in detail. According to Husserl, as is known, everything starts with the immediate perception of the present. Primal impression refers to what is perceived as immediately given, apart from its retentions and protentions. Husserl illustrates it with the example of the beginning of a tone of melody: “the source point with which the 'production' of the enduring object beings is a primal impression” (Husserl, 1991, p. 30). Accordingly, a currently heard tone bears in itself the consciousness of the previously heard tone. Thus, the original impression upholds its retention in its immediate perception. In other worlds, it can be said that, as Michalski puts it, “perception is an indissoluble continuum made up originary impression for a retention could exist independently, they exist only as elements (phases) of a larger whole: a continuum that constitutes the perception (the immediate presence) of something” (Michalski, 1997, p. 134). Husserl considers retention as the aspect of conscious experience that immediately preserves the past within our intentional awareness, serving as the basis for constructing our present consciousness by ensuring continuity between the past and the present. In this case, the just-immediately heard tone of a melody is still perceived in the present perception in an active manner. Although not as vivid as the present perception, it forms the basis for an immediate object to be perceived sufficiently.

2.10. Spatialization of Time in Husserl’s Theory of Time Consciousness

For Husserl, as we can see, the tone maintains its place in time the same way as the object maintains its place in space. Each point of time remains fixed but recedes into the distance of consciousness. As time passes, the distance to the ever-changing now increases accordingly. While the tone is still the same, how it appears changes constantly. I think we can clearly discern here the main implications of Husserl’s spatialization of time as he applies analogies involving spatial notions for explaining temporal relations, indicating that points in time are particular in duration (ever-
changing from anticipatory future to actual present and to retentational past) just as
temporal objects are spatially particular on the perceptual horizon. This concept,
therefore, likens temporal progression to spatial movement, bridging the abstract
with the concrete. In addition, it can be argued that the fact that he expresses that the
distance between different time points becomes greater as time passes shows that
there is a kind of spatial "proximity" between conscious states of different time
modes. (In the following sections of the study, I will also address the fact that there is
a "distance" between different time modes in Husserl's theory and the
phenomenological implications of this distance.)

Going back to Husserl’s explanation, he holds that we can now be sure of the way in
which immanent objects endure and a definite portion of the duration elapses. As he
articulates, “the now-point of tone’s duration grasped in the present sinks back into
the past continuously, and a new point of duration always enters into the present”
(Husserl, 1991, p. 26). The elapsed present, constantly being filled in, recedes away
from the actual present and goes into the ever-distant past, and so on. He holds that
we can now be sure of how we become conscious of all differences related to the
“appearing” of the immanent tone and of its duration content (Husserl, 1991, p. 27).
For him, we can now talk about perception according to the duration of the tone,
which extends into the actual present. He remarks that we indeed perceive the
enduring tone; however, we only perceive the present point in the duration of the
tone in the strict sense. As he explains in the following: “We say of the elapsed
extent that it is intended in retentions; specifically, the parts of the duration or phases
of the duration lying closest to the actually present now-point, and which cannot be
sharply delimited, are intended with diminishing clarity” (Husserl, 1991, p. 27). As
can be seen, we see the intention of the elapsed content of the tone in retentions. The
portions of the duration lying closest to the actual present now-point and exhibiting
inherent indistinctness are intended with less clarity. He elucidates in the following:
“The more remote phases, lying further back in the past, are entirely obscure and
emptily intended. And it is the same after the whole duration has elapsed,” and he
follows, “What lies nearest to the actually present now, depending on its distance
from it, perhaps a little clarity, the whole (then) disappears into obscurity, into an
empty retentional consciousness” (Husserl, 1991, p. 27).
2.11. Retention and Protention in Detail

Now, I will examine retention and protention in Husserl's phenomenology in detail and explain the fundamental implications of these concepts in the construction of his temporal consciousness. As we have seen, for Husserl, “time-consciousness is intentional, as is consciousness in general, and the names for the specific kinds of intentionality that reveal the original past and future are retention and protention” (Huang, 2020, p. 144-145). In this sense, retention acts as the mechanism through which our past experiences are preserved and made accessible to our present consciousness, allowing us to remember and reflect upon past events. Protention, on the other hand, serves as the mechanism through which we anticipate our future experiences and possibilities and engage with future events. Husserl, in brief, forms his theory of temporal consciousness through the dynamic interplay of retention, protention, and primal impressions, which he believes accounts for a continuous experience of time. Now, I will examine the notions of retention and protention from his philosophy in detail.

2.11.1. Retention

Going back to retention, as we have seen, it refers to the aspect of consciousness that retains what has just passed into the immediate past. It functions as a bridge between the just-passed and the now, allowing us to perceive the continuity of an object from the external world through time. Retention, as Gallagher briefly formulates, “provides an awareness of the object or event as it sinks into the past” (Gallagher, 2014, p. 92). In order to fully comprehend retention in Husserl’s philosophy, however, we must consider it in contrast to two other temporal modalities, primal impression and protention. Primal impression, as its very name signifies, represents the immediate, present moment of consciousness. It is our direct apprehension of an object or event as it unfolds before us. The primal impression is the "now" of our awareness. It is the singular point in time where we experience the object in its unmediated immediacy. For Husserl, as he describes in the Bernau Manuscripts, the primal impression is “the boundary between the retentions and protentions” (Husserl, 2001, p. 4). On the other hand, we find protention on the opposite end of the
temporal horizon, which is basically the anticipation of what will come in the immediate future. For Husserl, protention involves the projection of our consciousness forward in time as we anticipate the unfolding of the object or event. It is the "not-yet" of our awareness. Retention, in this case, plays a crucial role in connecting the primal impression and protention. It ensures that our consciousness maintains a coherent and continuous flow despite the fleeting nature of each moment. While primal impressions and protention pull us in opposite temporal directions, retention, I think, serves as the binding force that weaves these temporal moments into a seamless and unified experience. Let us consider that we are listening to a piece of melody. In that case, as we hear the melody, the tones that have just sounded, which we immediately perceive, will constitute the primal impression, while the tones anticipated hearing next will be protention. The tones that have just passed but continue to resonate in our consciousness, allowing the melody to be recognized in continuity, are precisely what the main characteristic of retention signifies.

In addition, Husserl recognizes that the notion of retention is not a simple one, as it includes a complex interplay of consciousness and time. He then asserts several key characteristics to understand its structure. He distinguishes between primary and secondary retention. According to him, primary retention refers to the immediate retention of an object as it passes from the primal impression into the past. It is the initial act of holding onto what was just experienced. Secondary retention, on the other hand, involves the synthesis of primary retentions into a temporal continuum, creating a coherent sense of the past. In this context, Husserl remarks on how past experiences come together to form a single, connected timeline. Consciousness, as Husserl aptly puts it, is not a static entity but a dynamic flow. Retention, in this context, serves as a bridge between the gap between the transient moments of primal impression and protention within this flow. It maintains the unity of the object across fleeting moments of time.

2.11.2. Protention

As for protention, Husserl argues that it is essentially the anticipatory aspect of our conscious experience. Just as retention serves to immediately retain the past,
protention anticipates the future in the same way. Protention reveals the determination of expected moments in the continuing flow of consciousness. In order to comprehend the significance of protention in Husserl's time consciousness, it is necessary to first understand its interaction with primal impressions and retention in his triadic structure and examine how this interaction shapes our future time consciousness. Retention, as mentioned earlier, serves to preserve the immediate past in consciousness and provides the basis for the construction of present consciousness. Protention, on the other hand, serves as the anticipatory aspect of our conscious experience in a way that is always directed towards the future. It is a future-oriented act of consciousness. As Gallagher formulates, “Protention is an implicit and unreflective anticipation of what is just about to happen as experience progresses” (Gallagher, 2014, p. 92). Husserl argues that our consciousness actively creates our perception of time through retention and protention. He holds that the future is not simply a projection based upon the past and present but rather an active totality shaping our perception of the present as well. In this context, the main argument emphasized by Husserl's theory of retention and protention is the dynamic and repetitive function of our time consciousness. For him, we do not passively experience time as a series of isolated moments; rather, we experience it actively, holding onto the immediate past and anticipating the future.

However, Husserl does not consider protention as a precise anticipation of the future based upon past and present experiences. He rather considers it a vague anticipation of the future in accordance with the immediate sensation of what is presently perceived. To illustrate, protention can be regarded as an empty intention of the subsequent tone based on preceding retentions and an immediate perception of the tone of a melody. Thus, protention represents the aspect of temporal consciousness that pertains to the anticipation of the future, serving as the other end of the temporal horizon that connects our immediate present with our forthcoming experiences in an intentional structure.

2.11.3. Summary of Retention and Protention

In short, Husserl considers retention as “primary memory, which is an originary act, retaining what just-was immediately present for consciousness” (Rodemeyer, 2006,
Thus, the just-immediately heard tone of a melody is still perceived in the present perception in an active manner. Although not as vivid as the present perception, it forms the basis for an immediate object to be perceived sufficiently. As for protention, however, Husserl considers it a vague anticipation of the future, based on the immediate perception of what is presently perceived. It can be regarded as an anticipation of the subsequent tone based on preceding retentions and an immediate perception of the tone of a melody. In this sense, Husserl defines time as a sequence of moments that never go away. Thus, even the oldest memories, although not as intense and vivid as the present consciousness, can be recalled through these ever-present sequences of moments, and the future can also be anticipated accordingly since all perceptions at different moments of time imply and intend each other. Laasik illuminates the role of retentions and protentions in Husserl’s philosophy in the following statement: “When I sensuously experience an object, the appearance it presents now is not sufficient for me to experience an object; instead, roughly, I must always have retained some of the previous appearances and have some tacit anticipations (or protentions) in regard to the appearances to come” (Laasik, 2019). Nevertheless, we can conclude that present consciousness is constituted over the past perceptions, and the future, in the same manner, is anticipated from the past and the present perceptions, according to Husserl’s understanding of temporal consciousness.

2.12. Husserl’s Temporal Diagrams

Now I will analyze Husserl's time consciousness by employing some temporal diagrams to better understand his inquiry based on the intricate interplay of the actual now as a reference point for temporal objects and the extension of it as retentions and protentions. Before going into that, however, we should note that Husserl avoids referring to the phenomena forming immanent temporal objects as appearances, as he elucidates, “for these phenomena are themselves immanent objects and are appearances in an entirely different sense” (Husserl, 1991, p. 29). For him, although they are immanent objects themselves, they are appearances in a completely different manner. He instead refers to “running-off phenomena” as the modes of temporal orientation and speaks of their running-off characters as past, present, or future in terms of immanent objects themselves. Running-off phenomena, in this sense, are the
continuation of constant changes, forming an indivisible unity of extended sections and phases through the points of constant continuity. The individual parts distinguished through abstraction can only exist within the entirety of the running-off, and this holds true for every individual phase in the temporal continuity. The phases cannot contain the same phase mode twice because each point in time is distinct in its individual nature.

**Figure 1.** Husserl’s time diagram, illustrating the sinking of moments into deeper levels of retentional consciousness. Adapted from “On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1991)” (p. 29)

In the diagram above, we see that AC represents the series of now points, and CA’ represents the continuum of phrases. A is the primordial now-point, B is just before now, and C is the present now-point. C, in this diagram, is the reference point of the running-off modes of immanent temporal objects in which they begin to exist, defined as the present. AA’ and BB’ represent sinking into the past, with the present now point C involving the retention of A (A’) and B (B’) in its horizon of the past. It can be noticed in the above graphic that each running-off mode itself bears a constantly expanding continuity. Husserl draws a distinction between the continuity of the object's duration's running-off modes and the continuity of the modes that pertain to each point of the duration. In this continuity of time points, as he formulates, “a new now is always coming on the scene; the now changes into the
past, and as it does so, the whole running-off continuity of the past belonging to the preceding time point moves downwards uniformly into the depths of the past” (Husserl, 1991, p. 30). So, the ever-new now always involves the retention of previous nows. The perception of present time implicitly includes the perception of past presents. Only the present now is fully grasped. While the points closest to the present are remembered more vividly, the perception becomes vaguer as it moves back into the past. This is how, according to Husserl, perception of the present includes the past present. According to Husserl, while perceiving the immediate givenness of the present, we implicitly recollect the perception of past presents within the perception of present now. While only the immediate givenness of the present is fully grasped, the retentional perception of the past serves as a basis for building our perception of the present now.

Now, in another temporal diagram, I will explain how Husserl examines retention, protention, and immediate given primal impressions of the present together, and how the recollective retentions of the past are implicitly involved in the perception of the present, as well as the anticipatory protentions of the future.

Figure 2. Shores’ diagram, illustrating Husserl's retention and protention in a single continual line. (From Corry Shores' philosophy lectures at Middle East Technical University.)
In the temporal diagram above, A represents a point in the distant past, B represents a point in the recent past, C represents the present now, D represents a point in the near future, and E represents a point in the distant future. As Husserl argues, immediate perception occurs within this immanent temporal unity, represented as a concrete present-now point, which is symbolized as C in this diagram. It goes from the now moment to an ever-new now; in this example, it is seen that it will move from C to D in the next phrase, involving a relative change in the horizons of the future and the past. It is spatially localized and approached in terms of proximity and remoteness, continuously enduring and taking place in the constantly changing now point. Each now, in this case, becomes “just past and then becomes the distant past of the past,” and so it goes (Husserl, 1991, p. 106). In this example, the distant past point A, while in the present, receded into the past and is replaced by the recent past point B. And the recent past point B, which was at the present time in the former phrase, has sunk into the past and has been replaced by the present now point C. The point B that takes the place of point A when the point A sinks from the present to the past and involves the retention of it, that is, A-¹. As stated in the previous diagram, only the present is fully grasped, which is represented as present now, point C. However, the perception of the fully grasped point C, the present time in question, at the same time implicitly involves B-¹ as the retention of point B and A-² as the retention of point A-¹ and A. B-¹ is remembered more vividly at the present now point C than A-² because the distance from the ever-changing new now becomes greater as the time passes. And as we move towards a point in the ever-distant past, the retention of the past becomes more and more obscurely intended.

Likewise, the present now point C involves the near future point D and the distant future point E as a vague anticipatory protention. In other words, points D-¹ and E-², which are protentions of points D and E intended at the immediately given point C, express a vague prediction of the future in the perception of the present. Our consciousness of the future, that is, our expectations of future experiences and future events, are implicitly included in our fully grasped perception of the present. Our anticipatory protentions about the future become vaguer as we move away from the present. While our anticipatory protentions about the near future are clearer than those of the distant future, as we
move further away from the present and into the future, the expectations regarding the distant future involved in our present perception become more obscure. In summary, according to Husserl, retention and protentions are the implicit inclusion of our consciousness of past moments and future moments in the immediate given perception of the present. As we move further into the past and the future, our recollective or anticipatory perception becomes vague, becoming emptily intended. While the retentions of the past serve as a basis for the formation of our perception of the present, the protentions of the future are a manifestation of the expansion of this perception and extending it towards the future. According to Husserl, this is how our perception of time works.

2.13. Conclusion

In brief, as we examined Husserl's theory, we have discerned that, for him, time is not an external or objective entity but a core aspect of our consciousness and human subjectivity. Through phenomenological reduction, Husserl reveals a new dimension to understanding immediate experiences, emphasizing that consciousness is inherently characterized by intentional acts. Each of these acts, according to Husserl, is intrinsically temporal in nature. He grounds his analysis of time into three components: retention (the past), primal impressions (the present moment), and protention (the future). Retention involves our memory of past experiences; primal impressions focus on our current perceptions; and protention reflects a vague anticipation of the future, of what is yet to come. However, as Bergson will later criticize, Husserl’s conceptualization leads to a spatialized understanding of time. In Husserl's framework, temporal points across the past, present, and future are in relation to each other in a manner akin to spatial objects, based on notions of "proximity" and "distance." This approach, Bergson argues, distorts the dynamic and fluid essence of time, instead rendering it as a series of points in a spatial continuum. Husserl's diagrams further reinforce this spatial portrayal, positioning time points in relation to each other, enduring through continuous change. Such a portrayal, as opposed to capturing the seamless flow of time, seems to suggest a spatial-like relationship among our various temporal states. Thus, Husserl’s theory, while pioneering in its introspective examination of consciousness and its temporal aspects,
appears to impose spatial characteristics onto time, contrasting sharply with the more fluid, interconnected nature of temporal experience as proposed by Bergson.
CHAPTER 3

BERGSON’S TEMPORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In the third chapter of this study, I will broadly examine Bergson's understanding of time, contrasting it with Husserl's spatially-inclined theory. Bergson’s approach to temporal consciousness is grounded in the critical distinction he makes between time and duration. Contrary to Husserl, who depicts time with spatial characteristics, Bergson views time as a fluid continuum where moments of consciousness seamlessly interweave. In this context, the concept of intuition serves as the sole means to truly comprehend time in Bergson’s theory. He argues that intuition allows us to experience time in its entirety as a continuous flow or 'duration,' free from spatial constraints. Through intuition, we perceive time not as a series of external, separate events but as an integrated whole where past, present, and future coexist and permeate each other. In this framework, the past is not merely a recollection, nor is the future a distant anticipation; instead, they are dynamically interlinked within our conscious experience. Bergson's approach criticizes Husserl’s theory for its reliance on spatial metaphors and external characteristics to explain time. He contends that such a view distorts the intrinsic nature of time by imposing a structure more akin to space. In contrast, Bergson's model portrays time as an indivisible unity, where each moment is not isolated but part of an ongoing, interconnected process. His conceptualization of time challenges traditional views by suggesting that time's true essence is revealed through subjective, internal experience rather than objective, quantifiable measures. Through a detailed examination of Bergson's philosophy, I aim to present his coherent and holistic representation of time. His perspective offers a profound insight into how we experience time internally, emphasizing the interconnectedness of our temporal consciousness, which is shaped and understood in terms of intuition. This chapter will thus explore Bergson’s argument that a true understanding of time emerges not from external divisions but from an intuitive grasp of its continuous and interpenetrating nature.
3.1. Bergson’s Inquiry of Time

First of all, Bergson argues that time can be explained more clearly and consistently without the inclusion of spatial notions. While traditional approaches often treat time simply as moments on a juxtaposed line, Bergson argues that such a limited definition cannot fully grasp the nature of temporal consciousness. According to him, time is independent of any boundaries of space and can only be grasped from a non-spatial perspective. In this case, he emphasizes that the only way to achieve true knowledge of time and duration is “intuition.” In this sense, intuition, according to him, as we will see, is the key concept to experiencing and understanding time, free of spatial restrictions, as he suggests that it is only possible to fully experience time in an intuitive context without “spatializing” or dividing it into different modes. This, I think, will help us grasp the complexity and constant flow of time.

In this context, contrary to Husserl, Bergson argues that our subjective experience of time is not a series of discrete moments or a continuous flow like clock time suggests. Rather, he argues that our consciousness experiences time in the sense of a constantly changing, undividable flow of experience, with “each moment melting into and permeating one another” (Bergson, 2001, p. 110). Thus, time, as pure duration, is an uninterrupted flow; it cannot be fully captured by any rigid conceptual or mathematical structure. In order to understand this flow, we need to grasp it not through any kind of thought or analysis but through intuition, a process of direct, non-conceptual perception that allows us to grasp the inner flow of reality. For Bergson, as Dolson formulates in the following, “The instrument of knowledge is not intellect but intuition, through which we have an immediate grasp of ultimate reality which can be obtained in no other way. When we cease to reason and to analyze, when we turn to inner experience as it appears in feeling and volition, then we become conscious of the nature of true duration, which is constant, never-ending change” (Dolson, 1910, p. 580-581). Bergson sees intuition as the primary source of direct experiential insights beyond mental thinking and analysis. According to him, understanding time only through logical thinking limits the true nature of time and offers only a superficial conception of it. Intuition, however, helps us overcome these limitations. It allows us to better understand the nature of pure and continuous time.
through what he calls "pure duration," which represents time as a continuous flow that is not divided into spatial elements. Intuition thus allows us to experience and understand this constant flow.

As mentioned in the second chapter, Husserl contends that experience is not an internal, objective phenomenon but rather a subjective product of intentional acts of consciousness, involving an intrinsic relationship between "retention" (the past), "protention" (the future), and the "present" in our conscious awareness. He argues that our perception of time is constructed through our subjective consciousness, with the present now-point continuously shifting in relation to the recollection of the past and the anticipation of the future. For Bergson, however, such a structure of time consisting of the past, present, and future moments that coexist together would lead to significant misconceptions in terms of the passage of time. It would also lead to the perception that the unity of time and the transition between different modes in such a structure arise from an act of mere intentionality, just like between the objects in the spatial horizon, thus causing the spatialization of time. Indeed, as Hoy (2009, p. 70) puts it, “Husserl’s diagram spatializes time into a series of moments, however interlaced they are, in the very act of trying to overcome the spatialization of time.”

At this point, I will first examine Bergson's understanding of space and time and then address his critique of what he calls 'spatialization of time'. As he starts examining space, he argues that there are two kinds of multiplicity one can think of. As he points out, “Now, if this conception of number is granted, it will be seen that everything is not counted in the same way, and that there are two very different kinds of multiplicity” (Bergson, 2001, p. 86). The first one regards physical, material objects on the spatial horizon, and the second one is, as he differentiates, states of consciousness. Although one can think of material objects separately and simultaneously on a spatial horizon, the same is not possible for states of consciousness; hence, there is a need to build a symbolic representation of states of consciousness. For instance, consecutive musical tones are represented in musical scores in the sense that they all follow each other on a concrete plane. Therefore, a musician playing a song would represent the tones of the melody symbolically in space.
For Bergson, however, such representative sensations are purely qualitative, but in reflective consciousness, we perceive them through the medium of extensity, assign them new forms, and transform them into quantity, therefore making it possible to think of them as discrete multiplicities. In this way, Bergson proves that consciousness and time are bound indissolubly together because, as Michalski (1997, p. 115) puts, “it is impossible to understand what time is without an analysis of consciousness; still more, consciousness is incomprehensible without a reflection on the essence of time.” In this case, Bergson argues that we regard time as we regard our states of consciousness. That is, time becomes a homogenous medium in reflective consciousness, where we can count and organize our conscious states in space. In this case, time becomes nothing but mere space. So, duration must be something different.

3.2. Bergson’s Temporality

Bergson states that “time, in so far as it is a homogenous medium, and not concrete duration, is reducible to space” (Bergson, 2001, p. 99). Indeed, as Bergson argues throughout Chapter 2 of *Time and Free Will*, if space is to be defined as homogenous, then every homogenous and unbounded medium will be space. However, as homogeneity consists in the absence of every quality, it becomes harder to see two forms of homogeneity, space and time in this case, being distinguished from each other. Yet, as Bergson argues, time is generally regarded as an unbounded medium, although homogenous like space, somehow different from it. Therefore, we must agree that homogeneity takes two forms in terms of its content: the first, whose contents co-exist, and the second, whose contents follow each other. When time is considered a homogenous medium in which we find conscious states manifest themselves, we abstract it from duration as we take it to be given all at once. However, this simple consideration actually appears to be the implication that shows us we are giving up time as we are inadvertently falling into space. In this case, we can understand that material objects, existing independently of us and from each other, receive their external characteristics from the homogeneity of a medium that clearly separates them and determines their boundaries. The states of consciousness, as we will see, permeate one another, although they are successive, and the whole can be represented even in the simplest, particular conscious state.
At this point, examining time as a homogeneous medium with spatial notions would be an incorrect definition of it because externality is the distinguishing characteristic of objects that occupy space. The same, however, is not true of states of consciousness, as they are not necessarily external to each other in the same manner. We can only discuss it when we represent them symbolically on a line that represents time in order to perceive temporal differences and transitions, that is, when we treat time as a homogenous medium. At this point, we can think that spatiality, in a sense, is the basis of everything; however, reducing time to space would be no different than attributing extension to duration. Thus, perceiving time in the form of an unbounded and homogeneous medium will give us nothing but a simple reflection of space. Bergson clarifies this as follows: “When, with our eyes shut we run our hands along a surface, the rubbing of our fingers against the surface, and especially the varied play of our joints, provide a series of sensations, which differ only by their qualities and which exhibit a certain order in time” (Bergson, 2001, p. 99). This series of sensations, for him, “differ only in quality and their order in succession” (Bergson, 2001, p. 100). Thus, we perceive the surface's extent more temporally than spatially. We can at the same time reverse this movement and experience the same sensation in the opposite way. In this case, spatial relations can be defined as “reversible relations of succession in time” (Bergson, 2001, p. 100.) According to Bergson, however, such a definition of time provides “a very superficial idea of time,” because examining moments in terms of succession means that we are already spatializing them (Bergson, 2001, p. 100). Thus, for Bergson, it is a mistake to attempt to derive relations of extensity from those of succession.

3.3. Time vs. Pure Duration

At this point, Bergson holds that there are two possible ways to interpret time: one is a pure duration stripped of all spatial characteristics, and the other is an understanding of time that can only be explained by spatial relations. The first one is pure duration. As Bergson simply defines, “pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states,” and he continues: “For this purpose, it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea;
for then, on the contrary, it would no longer endure” (Bergson, 2004, p. 100). In this context, he defines temporal transition and the relationship between present and former states in terms of the concept of pure duration. Indeed, as he illustrates in the following: “Nor need it forget its former states; it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another” (Bergson, 2004, p. 100).

Simply put, when we think about our past conscious states, our consciousness moves back to the past; thus, they will not endure. When we recall our past conscious states, we do not simply compare them to the present, as each one points the other alongside in a symbolic representative line. Rather, we form, in Bergson’s words, “both the past and present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another” (Bergson, 2001, p. 100). Although we hear each note in succession, we perceive each in one another. We may compare the totality of their structure to “a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected” (Bergson, 2001, p. 100).

In this sense, as Bergson would argue, our past, present, and future mental states do not exist in a successive line where they are external to each other. For Bergson, as we can see “the time we measure is not the real duration that we experience inwardly but the spatial representation of it” (Özyurt, 2013, p. 2). As Fell formulates in the following: “For Bergson, real time equals pure duration with all of its elements permeating each other. According to him, regarding it as a homogeneous medium in which elements succeed one another is a false picture of time and is its spatialization” (Fell, 2007, p. 17). Thus, the past, present, and future are not external to each other. The past is not an implicit recollection of the present on a side-by-side horizon, and the future is not a vague anticipation of the present in the same way. In other words, our conscious states do not take part in such a structure as Husserl’s famous comet tail analogy, in which, as Husserl illustrates, the present is the body of the comet and the past is the tail of it, “belonging to every perception like a comet’s tail.” (Husserl, 2001, p. 459). However, for Bergson, our conscious states, in this
sense, are not extended entities where the past haunts the present, just as in Husserl’s analogy, the comet’s tail haunts the comet's body; that is, the past is not an extension of the living-present. According to Bergson, our conscious states permeate each other as time passes because, even if they succeed one another, we perceive them in one another. In other words, when we consider our consecutive conscious states, we actually find the totality of this consciousness in each state. As Taşdelen formulates: “All our psychic states co-exist. They are not to be separated from one another but permeate one another. When our consciousness recalls its former states, it rather makes them permeate with its actual states. All conscious states, according to Bergson, are in a succession without a distinction which implies that every conscious state represents the whole conscious life” (Taşdelen, 2003, p. 12).

Bergson illustrates it with the following example: When we press a note longer than necessary in a musical tune, what will signal our mistake is not the fact that the note is pressed longer than the others (its exaggerated length), but the change in the overall qualitative flow of the music. In other words, the error we are talking about is not caused by the quantitative aspect (length), but by the qualitative disruption in the coherent and continuous flow of the music because, according to Bergson, time or pure duration is not merely a sequence of discrete moments but rather a continuous flow where past, present, and future form an organic totality. He summarizes it in the following: “We can thus conceive of succession without distinction and think of it as a mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought,” and he concludes: “Such is the account of duration which would be given by a being who was ever the same and ever changing, and who had no idea of space” (Bergson, 2001, p. 101). This is, as we call it, pure duration. Therefore, for Bergson, as we experience our conscious states this way, we are, in his own words, "a being who was ever the same and ever changing, and who had no idea of space" (Bergson, 2001, p. 101).

However, in order to plan and organize our daily lives for our practical needs, we divide pure duration into certain subdivisions that are assumptively external to each other in a juxtaposed line, use different temporal modes simultaneously, and
conceive it, as Bergson puts it, “no longer in one another but alongside one another” (Bergson, 2001, p. 101). In other words, as we conceive of duration in terms of extension, we inadvertently contaminate time with spatiality. For Bergson, as stated in the following, “We rarely experience our duration because we live in the everyday world of spatialized and symbolic (represented) time” (Jones, 2016, p. 107). At this point, temporal succession takes on structure in the same way as a mere continuous line or chain. Indeed, if we examine our conscious states on a spatially extended line, it would make us perceive them in terms of their precedence and succession, in the sense that one comes before or after another, making it impossible for there to be “a succession which is only a succession and which nevertheless was contained in one and the same instant,” for Bergson (Bergson, 2001, p. 101). As well formulated in the following: “By separating pure duration from its spatial representation, Bergson provides a way for the philosophical intuition of real time in its original purity prior to the derivative time, which consists of measurable units that are reflected in space” (Yılmaz, 2022, p. 8).

Bergson argues that if we somehow eliminated the superficial psychic states, however, we would no longer perceive homogenous time and measure duration, as in that case, we would feel them in terms of their quality. Indeed, as he argues, our ordinary perception of time depends on space moving into the realm of pure consciousness. However, taking away the outer circle of psychic states that the ego uses as a balance wheel is all we need to stop it from perceiving a uniform time. These conditions take place, for example, when we dream, as dreaming alters the communication between the ego and external objects. He elucidates it in the following: “Here (when we sleep), we no longer measure duration, but we feel it; from quantity, it returns to the state of quality; we no longer estimate past time mathematically; the mathematical estimate gives place to a confused instinct, capable, like all instincts, of committing gross errors, but also of acting at times with extraordinary skill” (Bergson, 2001, p. 101).

Thus, we would receive nothing but the idea of pure space in terms of a temporal structure in which we perceive our conscious states of past, present, and future simultaneously in a juxtaposed line or chain. In this sense, we can no longer perceive our states in pure duration, as they would only be manifestations of themselves in
space. Here, Bergson’s overall idea is to conclude that, in a general sense, although some philosophers “erroneously reduce space to time and argue that pure duration is somehow similar to space,” for him, “duration has a far simpler nature than that of space” (Shores, 2009). Nevertheless, as Shores puts it, “to make their case, they place psychic states side-by-side to form a chain, which spatializes moments,” and “they do not notice that in order to perceive the succession of moments as a line” (Shores, 2009). However, being located side-by-side on an extended horizon with references to other objects around them is a unique characteristic of spatial objects. As Bergson puts it, “It is necessary to take up a position outside it and take account (consider) the void which surrounds it, and consequently to think of space in three dimensions” (Bergson, 2001, p. 103).

As for pure duration, for Bergson, it is therefore simply the succession of qualitative changes that “melt into and permeate one another” (Bergson, 2001, p. 104). The moments of such a succession would not possess any kind of external relation to one another because, for Bergson, “it would be a pure heterogeneity” (Bergson, 2001, p. 104). Bergson illustrates that the perception of time is qualitative, not quantitative. He gives the example of the clock as follows: His inattentive ear does not perceive the ticking of the clock in his room until the fourth pendulum oscillation. However, even though he has not counted them, he turns his attention back and perceives how many times the clock has oscillated. Here he realizes that the first four beats affected his consciousness, but that instead of the juxtaposition of sensations produced by each sound, he perceives the sensations in a holistic manner. This means that the perception created by the four clock oscillations has an integral character, just like a musical tune, rather than being a series in which different sensations are added and juxtaposed one after another. The sensations of each oscillation had melted into one another instead of being set side-by-side in an extended temporal structure because, in his imagination, he combines them into a holistic sensation and realizes that the total effect was qualitatively different. In brief, he perceives the number of oscillations qualitatively, not quantitatively. Bergson concludes that it is the manner in which duration is presented to immediate consciousness, and that duration retains this form unless examined in terms of a spatially symbolical representation derived from extension.
He, however, argues that “even the least attribution of homogeneity to duration would attribute spatiality to it” (Bergson, 2001, p. 104). Pure duration, as he defines it, is wholly qualitative. Unless represented in terms of spatial notions, it cannot be measured in any way. Time, on the other hand, appears to be measurable, as we often count it in different ways, such as by counting seconds. However, it involves a departure from the pure experience of duration. We symbolically represent time as a linear succession of moments. When we think about all sixty beats of a clock's pendulum oscillation, for instance, we represent them in our minds on a straight line, each point symbolizing one pendulum oscillation. In such a successive, straight line, each moment-point has to be simultaneous with others so that we can count them. This, in fact, is a departure from the manner in which moments actually occur in reality. At this point, Bergson holds that we can understand time in a way that is more authentic to how moments relate to space in reality. As space does not retain past moments, however, it is indeed problematic to think of moments in such a sense. Each moment disappears from space as it passes; hence, we would exclude each prior moment from our consciousness, which would make us forever stuck in the present and unable to consider the succession or duration of time.

However, given that we do recollect the previous pendulum oscillations and perceive them in juxtaposition with the image of the present oscillation, for Bergson, one of two scenarios would happen: in the first one, we set the previous and present images side-by-side in a spatialized structure. We perceive moments simultaneously and do not consider them in terms of their duration. Or, in the second one, as he puts it, we would perceive “one in another, each permeating the other and organizing themselves like the notes of a tune, so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number” (Bergson, 2001, p. 105). Thus, if we do not spatialize these mental images and instead perceive them “one in another,” we would find them organized as in the notes of a musical tune. This in fact creates a continuous and qualitative multiplicity, a kind of time flow with no resemblance to any kind of numerical measurement. As we lose the concept of a homogeneous temporal medium or measurable quantity of time, this way of perceiving time indeed gives us the image of pure duration. When we attempt to represent duration symbolically (using symbols or measurements), we tend to
spatialize it, which limits our understanding of its true nature. When we refrain from using symbolic representations and simply experience time intuitively, however, we attain the direct and pure sense of duration.

3.4. Bergson’s Critique of Spatialization of Time:

Now, I will address Bergson's critique of the spatialization of time in terms of Husserl’s theory of temporal consciousness.\(^1\) I believe that Bergson's critique, especially when applied to Husserl's theory, constitutes the core of this study, so I think that this discussion should be addressed with greater attention and focus. As we go back to Husserl’s time-consciousness, we see that Husserl’s phenomenological inquiry of time seems to illustrate the transition between different modes of time in terms of a spatial notion of intentionality, which, as we concluded, reduces the structure of temporal consciousness into mere spatiality. Bergson, however, strongly opposes this doctrine, which he calls 'spatialization of time,' for he holds that there is an essential difference between objective time and duration (lived time). I think that the following analogy from Hoy (2009) could help us better understand the attribution of spatiality to time and the boundness of the present to extensions of the past and future:

When I see a box, I automatically presuppose, and even perceive, the hidden sides and corners of the box. Husserl maintains that if one did not in some sense perceive the hidden (or absent) corners of the box, one would perceive

\(^1\) Similar themes can be found in Zahavi and Overgaard's Time, Space, and Body in Bergson, Heidegger, and Husserl. But their focus on space in relation to Husserl's time consciousness is focused more on the issue of embodiment and not directly on whether Husserl's model specializes time the way Bergson warns us about. Zahavi and Overgaard also remark that Bergson's primary argument is that time and space are fundamentally different. Bergson criticizes the common understanding of time as a homogeneous medium, akin to space. For him, time should be seen as 'pure duration,' characterized by the intermingling and continuity of conscious states, rather than a sequence of distinct events laid out spatially. He suggests that spatializing time (i.e., viewing it as a series of discrete moments) distorts its true nature, which is a continuous flow. They also briefly mention Husserl, who, in contrast to Bergson, sees temporalization and spatialization as interdependent and equally primary. This perspective is more in line with later French phenomenology, suggesting a more integrated approach to understanding time and space. Husserl's approach emphasizes the embodiment of perception and the integration of time and space as experienced by a perceiving subject. His focus lies on how time is perceived and experienced through bodily movements and spatial relations. This integration suggests that Husserl, to some extent, accepts the interrelation of spatial and temporal aspects in our conscious experience. In this context, in Zahavi and Overgaard's work, compared to Bergson's strict separation and opposition of time and space, Husserl's views can be seen as allowing for a certain degree of spatialization of time, at least in how we perceive and interact with the world.
simply a complex two-dimensional shape for which we do not even have a name. I will call it an intersection of horizons, noting that even the shape of intersecting horizons has another side that I cannot see. In any case, the moral of this story for present purposes is that just as the box would not be perceived as a box if one perceived the hidden corners as not being there, so the present could not be experienced as a presence without the adumbrations of the past and the future. (Hoy, 2009, p. 71)

For Husserl, as we see, the present can only be perceived in terms of its simultaneously existing extensions of the past and future. For Bergson, however, given that perception takes place in the form of an extensive homogeneous surface, every homogeneous and unbounded medium must be space. If time is to be turned into a homogeneous medium in which all conscious states unfold themselves, then it has to be given all at once, which means that duration is abstracted from it. In this case, as seen in the illustration above, time inevitably involves the notion of externality, although Bergson characterizes it as the distinguishing mark of things occupying space because the states of consciousness are not essentially external to one another. In this context, we can argue that Husserl's understanding of time, which stems from the retentions and protentions of the present, seems to attribute a sense of ‘outsideness’ to time, which I will examine in detail in the last chapter of the study with its phenomenological implications.

At this point, however, Bergson argues that, for sensations that are not extensive, it is not possible to form co-existent extensity or space through their act of synthesis. For him, as he argues, there should instead be a synthetic act of mind that takes them all at the same time and orders them in juxtaposition (Bergson, 2001, p. 92). As he elucidates, “If we now seek to characterize this act, we see that it consists essentially in the intuition, or rather the conception, of an empty homogenous medium;” therefore, space becomes “what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another; it is thus a principle of differentiation other than that of qualitative differentiation” (Bergson, 2001, p. 95). When we are to place two identical sensations, we do not infer their locations from them, but our mind puts them in different locations based on the intuition of a homogenous medium. In this case, as we have seen earlier, the perceptions of extensity and space must be distinct from each other because, although we position things in space, we
perceive extensity from them. Therefore, we end up having two different kinds of reality: heterogenous sensible qualities and homogenous space. For Bergson, homogeneity consists of the absence of every quality, so it is hard to distinguish its different forms. Time, like space, is generally considered homogenous and unbounded. He concludes that making time a homogenous medium in which conscious states unfold themselves, in this case, means giving up time, as it adds up to abstracting it from duration and making it the same as space. However, as he formulates, “externality is the distinguishing mark of things which occupy space, while states of consciousness are not essentially external to one another;” thus, “states of consciousness, even when successive, permeate one another, and in the simplest of them, the whole soul can be reflected” (Bergson, 2001, p. 99).

He illustrates his fundamental distinction between space and duration with the example of a musical phrase. We experience successive notes lined up simultaneously, separately, and side-by-side in a reversible order, and there is only a certain amount of them. However, we project what we hear in our reflective consciousness; in a way, we project time into space. As Bergson formulates, “we express duration in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another” (2001, p. 101). While at the same time, in pure duration, we experience notes in an interconnected and organized way, without a distinct number of elements. Each note follows the next one in terms of their succession, none of them being distinguishable from each other but forming an organic whole. As articulated in the following: “In contrast to the static configuration of the external objects, there is continuity in our inner states manifested through qualitative changes” (Yılmaz, 2022, p. 11). Thus, for Bergson, contrary to being a homogenous medium such as space, duration is the succession of heterogenous qualitative change. As Tapınç (2014, p. 169) puts it, “Bergson also mentions of homogeneous time, but homogeneous time is only possible when we think of time in terms of space. Duration is never homogeneous; thus, homogeneous time will be spatialization of time. Then, if we divide time into hours, days, months, etc., that will be understanding of time in terms of space not in terms of duration. The difference in kind is between homogeneous space and heterogeneous duration.”
Bergson's distinction between space and duration, as illustrated in the metaphor of a musical phrase, reveals how the segmentation of time into discrete units—as when we project a succession of musical notes into a spatial arrangement—alters the fundamental nature of our temporal experience. This spatialization of time transforms the heterogeneous flow of duration into a homogeneous series of moments. It is in this conversion that the true essence of time, the qualitative and interconnected continuity, is compromised. In this context, Martineau (2017) reinforces the idea that spatialization not only distorts our perception of time but also represents a deeper philosophical misapprehension: the quantification of what is inherently a qualitative experience. He summarizes the discussion of the spatialization of time in the following:

For Bergson, when we liken moments of durée to spatial points, and time to homogenous space, we lose the qualitative character of our inner experience. Required for its measurement, this spatialization of time occurs in time’s very representation, since [s]pace is the matter with which the mind builds the number, the milieu in which the mind places it. The very idea of an order of succession implies not only consciousness, memory, as pointed out above, but also, and crucially, spatial representation. Such a spatialization of time implies an alteration of its fundamental qualitative nature. In other words, for the French philosopher, there is a profound temporal deception at work when we perceive of time as a quantity, rather than as a quality: and this deceiving operation originates from our tendency to measure time by representing it in space. (Martineau, 2017, p. 34)

Simply put, Bergson here attempts to differentiate homogenous time from heterogenous space and examine pure duration without externality, the distinguishing characteristic of things occupying space. As can be seen, his time-consciousness in no way includes any characteristics of spatiality. Therefore, we can conclude that his theory provides a more coherent understanding of the experience of time than that of Husserl in terms of its inherent continuity and qualitative nature.

As we see, Husserl's theory suggests a model of internal time consciousness where the present is inherently connected to both the past and the future. When we look from Bergson's perspective, we see that Husserl, in a way, considers time as a linear, sequential, and extended entity for consciousness. Therefore, according to Husserl’s framework, we can regard our experience of time in the same manner that we regard
any other object of our consciousness. For Bergson, time does not possess any external characteristics; rather, it is an essential, dynamic course of our interior experience. Consequently, Bergson's method opposes Husserl's theory for objectifying and externalizing time, arguing that it leads to a distorted view of the true nature of time.

3.5. Conclusion of Bergson’s Spatialization Critique

Bergson, as pointed out above, asserts that it is indeed problematic to attribute spatial characteristics to time. He maintains that sensations that lack extensiveness cannot form a co-existent extensity or space by their mere synthesis. In contrast to Husserl's notion of spatial intentionality, where the present exists as a spatialized now-point that encompasses past and future, Bergson asserts that in order to unify sensations simultaneously, what we need is a synthetic mental act, which takes place in our pure intuition involving the conception of an empty, homogenous medium. In this context, he clearly distinguishes space from time, as he emphasizes that space is a principle of differentiation, not the result of qualitative differentiation. When we place two identical sensations in space, we do not infer their locations from them; instead, our mind positions them in different locations through the intuition of a homogenous medium. In this way, the perception of extensity and space must be separate because, while we position objects in space, we perceive extensity from them.

In brief, Bergson's argument results in the assertion that time, when regarded as a homogenous entity like space, loses its distinctive characteristic because, in that case, duration is abstracted from it. In this context, he points out that external relations are characteristic of objects occupying space. States of consciousness, however, are not fundamentally external to one another. States of consciousness, even when we examine them as a homogenous succession, in fact permeate each other, forming a unified whole. Thus, we see that Bergson's critique of the spatialization of time is fundamentally contrary to Husserl's temporality, which incorporates elements of spatial intentionality and implies a sense of 'outsideness' to time. Bergson's understanding emphasizes the unique qualitative nature of time and the distinction between space and duration. Eventually, as I will argue in more detail later, his
theory offers a more coherent understanding of the structure of time compared to Husserl's phenomenological understanding.

3.6. Bergson’s Intuition

In this section, I will finally examine intuition and its philosophical implications in Bergson's philosophy because, according to Bergson, the only way to grasp time as pure duration without spatial characteristics and free from external quantification is through intuition. (And later, we will also compare it to Husserl’s intentionality in our critical comparison of the two’s philosophies of time.) Intuition, in Bergson’s philosophy, is a form of our inner understanding that allows us to grasp the essence of pure duration and the true nature of time. Through intuition, he argues, we can overcome the limitations of traditional, dogmatic thinking methods. As explained earlier, pure duration represents the constant flow and dynamic character of time in his philosophy. In this sense, intuition is inherently related to pure duration because, according to Bergson, only through intuition can we fully grasp time as an inner experience and not merely as an external succession or an indication of spatiality. Now, I will examine the role of intuition in Bergson's philosophy, its intrinsic relationship with pure duration, and address its role in the nature of our understanding of temporal consciousness.

Bergson raises intuition to the level of a philosophical method. Intuition, although causing some sort of confusion, is still, according to him, the most appropriate of all terms that determine the mode of knowing. While philosophers such as Schelling and Schopenhauer defined intuition as a concept opposed to intelligence, as he critiques, their concept of intuition was in fact an immediate search for the eternal. He elaborates: “Whereas, on the contrary, for me it was a question, above all, of finding true duration,” indicating that intuition is indeed the only way to achieve true duration, a sense of temporal flow purified from any spatial characteristics (Bergson, 1946, p. 32). Thus, although numerous philosophers believed that intelligence worked within time, for him, “they have concluded that to go beyond the intelligence consisted in getting outside of time” (Bergson, 1946, p. 33). However, Bergson disagrees with this idea, as he asserts that intellectualized time is essentially space. In
other words, when we use our intelligence, we work on a symbolic representation of time, not the dynamic reality of time itself. Our usual comprehension of time thus obscures the true nature of time, rendering our knowledge of the mind relative and inadequate. To transition from conceptual thought to real insight (vision), we do not escape from time; on the contrary, we immerse ourselves in the dynamic flow of time and capture the essence of reality in this pure duration, free from the constraints of spatialized time. He criticizes the conception of intuition that reaches the eternal because it remains limited to the intellectual realm. He argues that intuition offers a complete understanding as it simplifies complex concepts by unifying them into a single, overarching concept. He also underlines that, rather than being taken for granted as a starting principle, the unity of the world should be derived from experience. This unity should be a rich, full continuity and not an abstract, empty concept based on generalization.

In essence, Bergson implies that internal duration refers to the manner in which we experience time subjectively through our own consciousness and stands in contrast to external or objective time, which can be measured or subdivided into units such as seconds or minutes. Internal duration refers to our subjective perception of the passage of time. For him, internal duration is a continuous flow in which each moment emerges from the previous one without definite boundaries or distinctions, rather than being a linear progression of discrete moments that succeed one another. It reflects a development and progress in this flow where the past merges with the present and continues towards the future. Bergson argues that our mind has the ability to perceive internal duration directly, without the need for any external intermediary. Internal duration is, therefore, a direct form of consciousness in which the mind and the object of perception interact. In this context, there is no distortion of spatial concepts (space) or linguistic structures (language). Rather than dividing our experiences into discrete states or moments of consciousness, Bergson argues that there is an indivisible continuity in our inner lives. For Bergson, as Lovejoy remarks, “Our inner life, from the beginning to the end, is thus an indivisible continuity,—and it is this that I call our duration. It is succession, but succession without distinct and numerical multiplicity, that is to say, pure succession” (Lovejoy, 1961, p. 185). Intuition, in this case, refers to our immediate awareness of the constant flow of
experience. It refers to a form of consciousness that is so closely connected to the object of perception that it is almost a single form of consciousness.

Bergson begins by asserting that what we commonly call "facts" are not a direct representation of reality as it appears through immediate intuition. Rather, they are adaptations of reality that correspond to our daily needs and practical interests. In other words, what we perceive as facts is often shaped by our practical concerns. At this point, he emphasizes pure intuition, as it represents undivided continuity, an unbroken and seamless experience of reality, whether it is external or internal. Indeed, as he states in the following: “That which is commonly called a fact is not reality as it appears to immediate intuition, but an adaptation of the real to the interests of practice and to the exigencies of social life. Pure intuition, external or internal, is that of an undivided continuity” (Bergson, 2004, p. 183). He points out that we tend to dissect this continuous experience into separate elements or parts, which we then lay side-by-side. They can be distinct words, or we can regard them as independent objects. This dissection and categorization disrupt the unity of our original intuition. We feel the need to establish external and additional bonds between these terms, as we have separated the elements that constitute the original unity of our intuition. This further leads to the formation of what Bergson calls "factitious unity," which is like an empty diagram that holds together lifeless parts.

3.7. Empiricism vs. Dogmatism

In order to further elucidate the role of intuition in understanding reality, Bergson, at this point, distinguishes between empiricism and dogmatism. Although both start with observable phenomena, empiricism tends to emphasize the material aspects of experience (matter), while dogmatism focuses on the formal aspects (form). Bergson criticizes empiricism, stating that it still focuses on the terms themselves and neglects the importance of the relationship between them, although empiricism is well aware of the nature of the relations that unify terms together. As he indicates, “Empiricism, feeling indeed, but feeling vaguely, the artificial character of the relations which unite the terms together, holds to the terms and neglects the relations. Its error is not that it sets too high a value on experience, but that it substitutes for true experience,
that experience which arises from the immediate contact of the mind with its object, an experience which is disarticulated” (Bergson, 2004, p. 184). He argues that empiricism arises from the immediate relation of the mind with its object, presents a divided and distorted version of true experience, and fails to pursue the internal structure of things as it subdivides what is continuous into discrete elements due to practical concerns. As a result, empiricism cannot address fundamental philosophical questions and, when fully aware of its limitations, refrains from touching upon them.

As for dogmatism, Bergson argues that while it is better at pointing out the problems that empiricism overlooks, it also acts in the same manner as empiricism, as it accepts the separate and discontinuous phenomena that are identified by empiricism and tries to bring them together. However, this synthesis seems arbitrary for him as it is not based on intuition. He holds that if we regard metaphysics as something made up of the divided experiences that empiricism and dogmatism present, then there can be numerous equally plausible metaphysical systems that are at odds with each other, which further leads to the idea that the ultimate truth, or "last word," must belong to a critical philosophy that regards all knowledge as relative and the nature of things as inaccessible to the human mind. Indeed, as Marrati also remarks in the following: “The solution provided by critical philosophy, which holds all knowledge to be relative an ultimate nature of things to be inaccessible to the mind, should not be the last word of philosophy” (Marrati, 2005, p. 1100). Bergson concludes that the conventional path of philosophical thinking starts with our experiences. Philosophers, in this sense, attempt to arrange and synthesize these divided experiences into coherent philosophical systems. However, when they recognize the fragility and limitations of the systems they constructed, they often give up on their effort altogether.

However, he holds that there might be one last enterprise, which is assuming to seek the experience at its very source. He holds that this source, which he calls "properly human experience," could offer us an unmediated understanding of reality. As he articulates in the following: “But there is a last enterprise that might be undertaken. It would be to seek experience at its source, or rather above that decisive turn where, taking a bias in the direction of our utility, it becomes properly human experience”
In this context, similarly, Kant's demonstration of the impotence of speculative reason may be due to the intellectual faculties being constrained by the necessities of bodily life and focused on material concerns. In essence, our thinking has been shaped by practical and utilitarian needs. So, the relativity of our knowledge may not be definite. Indeed, as he argues, rather than being intrinsically tied to the structure of the mind, knowledge must be more related to our superficial and acquired habits. He concludes that “by unmaking that which these needs have made, we may restore to intuition its original purity and so recover contract with the real” (Bergson, 2004, p. 184). Therefore, we can achieve a direct and unmediated relationship with reality.

Bergson admits that giving up certain manners of thinking or perceiving is indeed challenging. However, once we manage to do this, he says, we will reach “the turn of experience,” where there's a transition from immediate and unmediated experience to a more practical and utilitarian comprehension. This transition, for him, represents the dawn of human experience. There is a need to reconstruct the true nature of experience beyond this transition. He argues that the practical functioning of our mind, especially when it comes to understanding our inner life, involves a kind of "refraction" of pure duration into space. As Kumar articulates, Bergson illustrates this as follows: "Since even language has a tendency to present all states of consciousness in crystallized forms, we fail to realize the original emotion that struggles to reach us through the refracting medium of conventional words and symbols" (Kumar, 1962, p. 21). Essentially, this refracting process allows us to make these inner experiences more in tune with our lives and communication. He also criticizes empiricism and dogmatism for their approaches to understanding inner states. Empiricism regards identity as a succession of immediate, juxtaposed facts, while dogmatism attempts to find relations in external factors. Both, according to Bergson, fail to grasp the true nature of inner experience. As he concludes in the following:

Hence, the two opposing points of view as the question of freedom: for determinism, the act is the resultant of a mechanical composition of the elements; for the adversaries of the doctrine, of the adhered strictly to their principle, the free decision would be an arbitrary fiat. It seemed to us that a
third course is lay open;” this is, as he follows, “to replace ourselves in pure
duration, of which the flow is continuous and in which we pass insensibly
from one state to another; a continuity which is really lived, but artificially
decomposed for the greater convenience of customary knowledge. (Bergson,
2004, p. 186)

In this way, for Bergson, our free acts are not reduced to spontaneity; rather, they are
seen as a synthesis of feelings and ideas. This synthesis is a result of the continuous
and flowing nature of pure duration, as he distinguishes between the point of view of
customary or useful knowledge, where elements are dissociated and juxtaposed, and
the point of view of true knowledge, where mental states melt into each other. As he
concludes in the following: “The duration wherein we see ourselves acting, and in
which it is useful that we should see ourselves, is a duration whose elements are
dissociated and juxtaposed. The duration wherein we act is a duration wherein our
states melt into each other. It is within this that we should try to replace ourselves by
thought, in the exceptional and unique case when we speculate on the intimate nature
of action, that is to say, we are discussing human freedom” (Bergson, 2004, p. 188).

In brief, Bergson argues that intuition is the means through which we access and
understand the nature of pure duration. As pure duration is a non-conceptual, non-
representational reality, it cannot be grasped by the discursive, analytical methods of
intelligence; rather, it can be achieved through intuition, which provides us with an
immediate, non-discursive awareness of the flow of time and the qualitative manner
of our experiences. Intuition, for Bergson, allows us to be in direct connection with
the ever-changing, creative, and dynamic nature of pure duration. We become fully
aware of the continuous, fluid, and evolving nature of our experiences and the
external world as we engage in intuition, which contrasts with the spatialized and
static representation of reality that is the main characteristic of intelligence.
According to Bergson’s philosophy, intuition is the mode of understanding that
enables us to access and make sense of pure duration, which is the foundational,
 experiential reality of time, encompassing and unfolding without spatial elements.
Thus, only through intuition can we grasp the dynamic and qualitative nature of our
experiences and regard time as a continuous and non-measurable flow rather than a
series of discrete moments.
3.8. Conclusion

In brief, as we have seen, Bergson's interpretation of time positions itself against Husserl's model, which tends to incorporate spatial elements into its conceptualization of time. Bergson emphasizes the seamless continuity of time and challenges the notion of time as a series of spatially distinct moments. Bergson’s theory, in brief, revolves around the distinction between time and duration, with duration being the core aspect of our temporal experience. He argues that time, when understood as duration, is not fragmented or externalized but is a fluid, continuous process that cannot be spatially delineated. This view, as we have seen, contrasts with Husserl’s, where time is often presented with spatial characteristics, leading to a segmented understanding of the temporal experience. At the heart of Bergson's theory is the concept of intuition, which he posits as the only authentic means to grasp the essence of time. Intuition, as per Bergson, transcends the conventional, analytical understanding of time, allowing us to experience it as an unbroken flow, stripped of all spatial constraints. Through intuition, Bergson suggests that we perceive time as an integrated whole, where the past, present, and future are not isolated entities but are interwoven within our consciousness. This approach presents time as an indivisible continuum where each moment is interconnected with others, forming a unified, dynamic process. Bergson’s critique of Husserl centers around the latter's reliance on spatial metaphors to describe time, which he argues misrepresents time's true nature. In contrast, Bergson’s depiction of time as a cohesive unity challenges the notion of time as a series of discrete, spatially-arranged points. His understanding provides a coherent and holistic insight into our internal experience of time, emphasizing the intrinsic interconnectedness of our temporal consciousness. Bergson’s philosophy advocates for an intuitive understanding of time, suggesting that a true comprehension of time arises from recognizing its continuous and interpenetrating nature rather than from any spatially-derived divisions. Thus, as we have seen, Bergson's argument for an intuitive, continuous grasp of time diverges significantly from Husserl's spatially influenced interpretation.
CHAPTER 4

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF HUSSERL’S AND BERGSON’S THEORIES ON TIME CONSCIOUSNESS

In the fourth chapter of this study, I will make a critical evaluation of Husserl's and Bergson's theories on time consciousness in various aspects. I will first examine the elements of spatialization in Husserl's conception of time awareness, contrasting it with Bergson's approach to intuition. I will also investigate the potential spatial characteristics within Bergson's model, particularly through his cone diagram, and discuss whether it implies a similar spatialization as found in Husserl's theory. However, as we will see, I will conclude that Bergson's approach does not exhibit the same level of problematic spatialization as Husserl's. I will further address Husserl's philosophy from the perspective of his own phenomenological principles, particularly the "principle of all principles," which emphasizes the primacy of immediate perception. In this context, I will explore the concepts of "freshness" and "fullness" as they pertain to the immediate givenness of time. Through this examination, I conclude that Bergson, especially in the realm of time consciousness, emerges as the superior phenomenologist. I will also address the paradox present in Husserl's portrayal of time, which is characterized as both dynamic and structurally constant. This inquiry leads to a re-examination of Bergson's differentiation between time and pure duration and an exploration of the interplay between memory and our current state of consciousness. While addressing Husserl's depiction of the 'now-point' as the freshest and most concrete element of time consciousness, I will explain its similarity to the perception of spatial objects. Through this exploration, I will demonstrate that each moment, in Husserl's model, is not only interconnected with the past and future but also occupies a 'space' within a temporal horizon. In contrast, Bergson's illustrations suggest that we do not experience time in a fragmented manner, as Husserl proposes. Instead, Bergson posits that time is always experienced in its entirety, as a whole, which challenges Husserl's model, which depicts time as
composed of various nested parts. This analysis results in the assertion that time, in its phenomenological essence, is experienced fully and immediately rather than being divisible into spatial segments. Through this comparative study, I aim to uncover the nuances of each philosopher's understanding of time and its implications for phenomenological inquiry, emphasizing Bergson's interpretation for its adherence to the immediacy and fullness of temporal experience.

4.1. Husserl’s Intentionality vs. Bergson’s Intuition

I think it would be useful to start this discussion by examining the methodological differences between Husserl's intentionality and Bergson's intuition due to the different conceptions and approaches they offer towards immediate perception and both their philosophical implications for temporal consciousness. As we also discussed earlier, Husserl, by making his analysis through his conception of intentionality, falls into the spatialization of time. Even though his intentionality is the way to put a reference on immediate experiences, the "abiding structure" on which he defines constant temporal change occurs seems especially contradictory. But Bergson, by intuition, separates time and duration and shows us the true character of time, which is a unity: memories shaping the present and the present being shaped at the same time. In Husserl's phenomenological inquiry, as is known, every act of consciousness is intentional, that is, directed towards an object. His schematic representation of time on a tripartite structure with retention, primal impression, and protention leads to a model in which time is spatially extended, with the 'now' being just one point among many juxtaposed points in the temporal expanse. This, I think, also contradicts the notion of the immediacy of experience, for each moment is not only linked to the past and future but also appears to occupy a 'space' within a temporal continuum. I will explore this in more detail in the following parts of the study.

Bergson's intuition, on the other hand, resists the attribution of a spatial structure to time by offering the pure duration conception, as it presents an attempt to grasp flow and the indivisible nature of duration. In this context, duration is not regarded as measured or divided into units; rather, it is a directly felt experience. It is an ever-
changing process, a flow that cannot be divided into different moments without losing its main character. Bergson distinguishes between time and space to address the immediate data of consciousness, which he defines as duration (la durée). In duration, as we have seen earlier, there's no juxtaposition of events. This allows for immediate experience within the qualitative multiplicity of duration, a temporal heterogeneity where conscious states interpenetrate, contrary to the quantitative multiplicity that externalizes items in a homogeneous space. As well formulated in the following:

For Bergson, we must understand the duration as a qualitative multiplicity — as opposed to a quantitative multiplicity. As the name suggests, a quantitative multiplicity enumerates things or states of consciousness by means of externalizing one from another in a homogeneous space. In contrast, a qualitative multiplicity consists in a temporal heterogeneity, in which “several conscious states are organized into a whole, permeate one another, [and] gradually gain a richer content. (Lawlor, 2021, sec. 2)

In brief, Bergson suggests, by intuition, that the past is neither a fixed point behind us nor the future a separate point ahead; rather, both are always intertwined in the continuous process of becoming. Thus, as we can see, Husserl's intentionality, although based on immediate and lived experiences, presents time in a spatialized structure when describing temporal consciousness. Bergson's intuition, by contrast, preserves the integrity and continuity of time and offers a temporal experience that remains closer to the pure immediacy of lived experience. In brief, although Husserl regards intentionality as the fundamental characteristic of consciousness in his phenomenological inquiry, I think, at one point, the spatial representations in his diagrams and his tripartite structure of time contradict the immediacy of lived experiences and temporal continuity. Bergson, however, aims to comprehend time with its fluid and indivisible nature through the concepts of intuition and pure duration he proposes. I believe these concepts more accurately reflect the continuous and instantaneous nature of our temporal experience by avoiding the spatialization of time.

4.2. Critiques on Spatialization of Time

As we examine the temporal diagrams of Husserl’s temporal consciousness in the final parts of the second chapter of the work, it seems evident to us that, on many
levels, his account falls into the spatialization of time. Indeed, there are a number of ways that Husserl’s model of time consciousness suggests a spatialization of time, in Bergson’s sense. They are: {1} the outside vs. inside distinction, including Husserl’s notion of horizons; {2} the element of "distance" between moments; and {3} the geometrical features of the diagrams, along with their exclusion of the "freshness" of the primordial present and the “fullness” or temporal experience.

We have seen that his theory, in essence, suggests temporal experiences as objectified within the now-point. Given that he describes the now-point as the "fullest" and most concrete aspect of time consciousness, it seems analogous to the manner in which a spatial object is apprehended in its entirety at a single moment. He stretches the now-point across a temporal continuum as he examines the interplay of retention and protention in time consciousness. In this sense, retained past moments are connected to the now-point, and anticipated future moments also find their place within this continuum. This temporal extension closely resembles the way in which spatial objects are extended in space. Indeed, as Shores (2009) puts it, “Husserl seems to confirm that consciousness happening now is found along an unbroken continuum along which are acts of consciousness not happening now. For example, in regard to a perception of a tone, he explains that the tone appears intuitively as temporally extended, but which at only one point has the character of sensation, and, in being continuously shaded off, has a modified character for the rest of the points.”

Husserl argues that the clarity of retention and protention diminishes as we move away from the present. Indeed, as we have seen, Husserl argues in the following: “We say of the elapsed extent that it is intended in retentions; specifically, the parts of the duration or phases of the duration lying closest to the actually present now-point, and which cannot be sharply delimited, are intended with diminishing clarity” (Husserl, 1991, p. 27). In this case, we can grasp that his inquiry includes considerations of proximity and remoteness in time, thus mirroring how objects in the distance become less distinct in our spatial perception. In that sense, the "near" and "distant" past or future are concepts that mirror our spatial understanding of closeness and distance, leading to the idea that time, just like space, can be localized,
as evidenced by the way he positions moments in proximity to the now-point on a juxtaposed temporal line. His analysis likewise involves a continuous transition from one now-point to another. This constant movement in time is akin to how spatial objects transition from one point in space to another. The notion of the horizon of time points, as Husserl describes it, parallels our understanding of how we perceive objects in space, making it evident that he adopts a spatial outline for temporal phenomena. The past and future moments, found in retentions and protentions, are experienced within the temporal horizon, similar to how objects on the periphery of our field of vision are situated in a spatial horizon. Indeed, for Husserl, as illustrated in the following: “Retention is a continuous intentional modification constitutive of the original temporal horizon by holding its implicated original at an increasing distance from itself” (Huang, 2019, sec. 4). Now, I will broadly examine how Husserl’s explanations lead to the spatialization of time.

**4.3. Outsideness and Insideness in Husserl’s Theory**

For Husserl, the objective past and future are outside the present. Also, the retentional and protentional modifications are horizontally outside the primordial impression. (And even if it blends in at some region like a “comet tail,” there is an outside to that transitional zone.) This parallels the horizontal structure that is a part of all visual perception of spatial objects: there is always a horizon of empty intentionality that can be fulfilled, like the invisible backside that we cannot now see but are aware of now as another side to experience. Similarly, any present moment has on its horizon its retentional and protentional modifications. Furthermore, he temporalizes spatial perception just as he spatializes temporal awareness: the unseen backside is one that we anticipate as a possible future experience. And if we have seen it already, we might be able to partly fill out that temporal horizon with our retentional awareness of past experience of it. Additionally, the very structure of intentional awareness, when applied to moments of time-consciousness, implies an inside/outside structure with regard to what our consciousness is directed toward and what it is not directed toward. I will now explore these issues in more detail.

To begin with, according to Husserl’s conception, we can consider the retentions and protentions of his time-consciousness as a relationship between different temporal
modes based on a spatial exteriority. In other words, just as material objects constitute different places from each other in the spatial horizon, different time modes seem to be located in different places one after the other in the temporal horizon in terms of their precedence and recency. As Turchi formulates in the following: “We tend to experience time as a collapse of retentions and protentions. Even though past, present, and future do not possess any particular quality per se, Husserl recognized that the entire structure of this phenomenon has a strong spatial character” (Turchi, 2020, p. 1428). Thus, as we can see, Husserl suggests “a kind of temporal perspective (within the originally temporal appearance) analogous to spatial perspective. As the temporal object moves into the past, it is drawn together on itself and thereby also becomes obscure” (Husserl 1991, p. 29). Yet again, we may think that the relationship between just-was perceived and just-now perceived in a temporal sense is established by a similar characteristic of the intentionality of spatial objects, just as the immediate perception of an object on the spatial horizon expands the perception by intending to other objects. Husserl, in part, grounds these dimensions on perceptual experience: the spatial horizon, the emptily given, holds out a future perception as an anticipation. In addition to his spatial horizons holding out temporal ones, his accounts, seen especially in his diagrams of time consciousness, evidently portray the present as having a temporal ‘outside’ to it. Thus, in this sense, time seems to be contaminated with the notion of space. Now, let us look more closely at these claims.

Husserl's model, in a way, implies that the past is somehow "behind" us, the present is where we are, and the future is "ahead" of us, much like spatial objects in front, around, and behind us. His model introduces the notion of temporal extension beyond the present moment. Instead of time being a continuous flow, it suggests that the present moment has a connection to temporal states beyond itself in terms of intentionality, much like an object in space is connected to other spatial objects in the same manner. To clarify, our perceptions of spatial objects expand, as we know from Husserl’s earlier explanations, by fulfilling the empty intentions of our immediate consciousness towards different perspectives. However, Husserl's temporal model also suggests that there is an intentional interaction between different time modes juxtaposed simultaneously in a concrete line. For example, there is a certain
proximity between a past time point and a present now-point, however, as we know, simultaneity and proximity are the distinguishing characteristics of spatial objects.

In this respect, Husserl's account, as mentioned above, presents a kind of "outsideness" between different temporal modes, in the same manner as different spatial objects are external to each other. According to his understanding, past moments and future moments are experienced as less immediate and more distant compared to the present. This temporal distance contributes to their "outsideness" in terms of our conscious experience. Past moments, found in retentions, are recollected in our consciousness but in a modified and less vivid form. Future moments are likewise encompassed in protentions, implying that they are anticipated but in a vague manner. These acts of retention and protention occur outside the "inside" of our immediate perception of the present moment. The past and future moments are located in what Husserl refers to as the "temporal horizon," where these moments are acknowledged but in a way that is more peripheral and less vivid compared to the "inside" of the present. Contrary to the vivid and immediate experiences in the present, the experiences of the past and expectations of the future, being less "inside" our conscious awareness, often lack the same degree of clarity and intensity. Besides, we can argue that Husserl's model describes a sort of layered structure of temporality, where the present represents the innermost layer and the past and future moments are situated in the outer ones, implying their "outsideness" in relation to the central "inside" of the present. The past and future are still connected to the immediate present through intentionality, although they are temporally "outside." This means that our consciousness has an intentional relationship with these moments, even though they are not as immediate or vivid, which, I think, seems to reduce the temporal passage into a simple act of intentionality. (I will explain this in detail in the later parts of the study.) For Husserl, however, this intentional connection is what allows us to maintain a sense of continuity and coherence in our experience of time.

Likewise, in the same manner, Husserl's model offers us a degree of temporal "insideness" as well. We see this especially in this intentional understanding where he defines the present moment, which he often refers to as the "now-point," as the
place where our consciousness is most sensitively directed. As a matter of fact, as Kelly puts it, “Husserl considers the now as conscious life’s absolute point of orientation from which things appearing as past and future alter” (Kelly, 2017, chap. 1, sec. a). It is the center of our temporal awareness, where we perceive events, thoughts, and experiences as they unfold, and our consciousness intends to new perspectives. This present moment is the "inside" of our temporal experience, the core of our consciousness. It is where we have the most immediate and direct awareness. It is in this "inside" that we experience events and phenomena with the greatest precision and vividness. We experience our sensory perceptions vividly in the present. The present moment is where our conscious intentions find their fulfillment. It is in this "inside" that our conscious acts are fully realized. Indeed, for Husserl, “an intention is fulfilled when the intended object is genuinely presented to us in just the way it is intended” (Bentzen, 2020, sec. 1). Our intentions to perceive, think, or feel are most completely fulfilled in the present. Indeed, Husserl places great emphasis on the "now-point" as the center of temporal experience, where all other temporal moments—past and future—are related and connected. This now-point embodies the "insideness" of our temporal experience, containing all the elements of the present, just as the way spatial objects in our immediate focus are more internal to us than objects outside our focus. While Husserl's model acknowledges the existence of past and future moments, these moments are considered to be less vivid and immediate compared to the present. The past recedes into "retention," and the future is anticipated through "protention." These elements contribute to the temporal depth of our consciousness but are less "inside" compared to the fully lived present. Thus, for Husserl's understanding, the present moment is the center of our temporal experience, where we experience time most intensely and intimately. It is the "inside" of our consciousness where our experiences emerge and where all other temporal elements find their meaning and relevance. The past and future moments, in contrast, are less immediate and vivid, representing an "outsideness" in the temporal horizon of our conscious experience.

I believe that examining time in a structure that suggests perceptions involving certain degrees of insideness or outsideness will inevitably misrepresent the nature of time. Firstly, because portraying the past and future as being "outside" the immediate
present inadvertently suggests a static relationship between these temporal modes, akin to the fixed relations between objects in space. However, time, by its very nature, is dynamic and unidirectional, not subject to the spatial relations of proximity and distance. It flows continuously, with no actual discrete outside or inside; it is rather an ongoing process guided by our consciousness. This spatial analogy of insideness and outsideness we see in Husserl's inquiry, I think, reduces the complex nature of temporal experience. Time is not an entity that can be divided into different parts like space; rather, it intertwines our experiences in ways that do not set distinct boundaries. When Husserl suggests that the “now-point” is the place where consciousness is most “inner” to temporal experience, he is, in a sense, privileges the present moment over the past and the future in a way that does not fully represent the dynamic and fluid nature of time. Temporal experience, I think, is not just a series of now-points with extensions of some kind, but a holistic concept consisting of memories, expectations, and the continuous emergence of the present.

Husserl's definition, in this sense, could be said to reduce the continuity of temporal experience to a series of discrete moments that either recede into the background or extend to the periphery of consciousness, which stands contrary to the fluid nature of temporal passage in which past, present, and future are not subdivided but flow into each other. In particular, the idea of temporal outsideness implies a notion of separation that contradicts the interconnectedness of our temporal experience. Our expectations of the future and our memories of the past are not merely remote or external to our present experiences; however, they actively shape and integrate with our current understanding of self and world.

If we look at Husserl's idea of temporal consciousness again, which includes retentions and protentions, we can argue that sometimes a retention that is farther away can be intended and recollected more vividly in our present awareness than a retention that is closer. That is, a recollection from a more distant memory should not always necessarily be more obscure than that of a recent one. A farther memory can influence the relative particular mood of our present consciousness more effectively than that of a closer one and shape it more efficiently. When we examine time as a mechanical structure made up of retentions and protentions in relation to the present
now-point, we can argue that the manner in which different time modes interact with each other inevitably becomes static and unavoidably determined. Meaning that, for instance, a retention that is closer to the present now-point would be more strongly intended in our present consciousness than a distant one and be more likely to shape our present state. In such a mechanical system, I think the unique characteristics of our conscious states in different time modes are ignored in the sense that our farther consciousness states can actually influence and shape our present state more intensely. But Husserl's time structure seems to exclude this assumption.

When we go back to Husserl’s diagrams (p. 36 and p. 38), we see that point C (present now) being depicted as closer to point D in the future indicates a spatial proximity, which is not necessarily a temporal indication. In this sense, the movement from one point to another (e.g., from C to D) in the diagram we saw in the second chapter reflects a spatial transition rather than a pure temporal passage, suggesting a spatialized understanding of time's progression. Indeed, in the diagrams, retentions and protentions are positioned relative to the present moment (C), implying a spatial-like relationship. To illustrate, while the past, present, and future of an object are found in its temporal characteristics, Husserl's understanding of time based on retentions and protentions seems to depict the past, present, and future just as three discrete objects eternally standing side by side on the spatial horizon, which, as I mentioned earlier, reduces the temporal passage into a simple act of intentionality. A retentional point in this axis of abscissa, for example, is followed by a previous one, and the whole continuum proceeds this way. Retentions, in this case, can be characterized as ‘double’ intentionality in terms of Husserl's time-consciousness because a retention both intends to the following temporal point and is being intended by a preceding one. In this case, if we consider the present and all of its retentions and protentions as points in an axis of abscissa representing a continuum of perception, indeed, as Michalski (1997, p. 135) argues, all the points of this ordinate must be simultaneous. However, as Bergson will later argue, simultaneity is a characteristic of spatiality. There are indeed different separate objects in space, each intending to the others simultaneously. Only time as duration, however, is a unity in itself; thus, it cannot be divided into particular instants or separate particular points that intend to each other. Thus, analyzing time as a spatial
structure composed of eternally existing retentions and protentions, while reducing temporal transition to merely an act of intention, contradicts the concept of the unity of time.

4.4. Notion of Distance in Husserl’s Conception of Time

Even without the diagrams, I think spatialization seems evident in Husserl's conception of time consciousness, as he argues that moments in the past have different degrees of "distance" from the present. As he states in the following: “This sinking-back is an original phenomenological modification of consciousness through which an ever-growing distance forms in relation to the actually present now, which is always being freshly constituted. This growing distance comes about by virtue of the continuous series of changes leading away from the actual now” (Husserl, 1991, p.65-66). I think the notion of "distance," however, implies a spatial analogy. For instance, a moment four seconds ago is considered more distant in the sequence than a moment two seconds ago, resembling the spatial concept of distance. Likewise, his distinction between the "now" and the "outside of now" creates a dichotomy that can be likened to the inside and outside of a spatial object. The "now" is fully grasped, while the "outside of now" is less clear, analogous to the way we perceive objects more vividly when they are in our immediate spatial vicinity. For Husserl, the moments of time consciousness are arranged not just with the past and future being outside the present, but also sequentially with intervening moments (A, B, C, ...). Such that distance extends between separated points. As time flows, so increases this distance between a present point and some A in the past that "runs-off" further and further away from the primordial present. Thus, because Husserl's model maintains a strict sequence, he has spatialized the temporal flow. I will now explore these issues in more detail.

Husserl’s idea of intentionality involves a directedness towards different moments in time, which inadvertently leads to the spatialization of time. This directedness can be viewed as analogous with a spatial orientation, as if we are navigating a spatial horizon of temporal events. Intentionality, as applied to time consciousness, is the directedness of our awareness toward various temporal modes, such as retention,
protention, and the present. By directing awareness to these temporal modes, Husserl introduces a spatial-like orientation within the passage of time. This is further exemplified by the nature of intentionality itself, which implies a certain directedness from one state to another. Husserl's descriptions often involve a movement of consciousness from one temporal mode to another, analogous to navigating through different spatial locations. In this context, intentionality is employed as a bridge connecting these distinct temporal moments, inadvertently portraying time as a spatial continuum with temporal moments arranged in a linear sequence. In contrast to thinkers like Bergson, who emphasize the organic flow of time, Husserl's approach tends to spatialize time by representing it as a linear progression.

4.5. Is Bergson’s Model Spatial in Any Way?

We have seen that Husserl's understanding of time contains a highly spatialized character in many different aspects. Indeed, as his temporal consciousness suggests implicit intentional recollection and anticipation acts in which different time consciousnesses are internal or external to each other, it reminds us of a form of perception in which objects are extended one after another in space. However, at this point, one might question whether Bergson's understanding of time, which is based on the intrinsic relationship of pure duration and intuition, also has a spatial character to a certain degree, especially when examined in terms of what exactly memory signifies according to him. At this point, I will first examine the concept of memory according to Bergson and evaluate the different memory types represented in his cone diagrams, and then discuss whether a similar spatialized conception of time can be seen in this understanding as well.

In his explanation, Bergson first makes a distinction between habit memory and pure memory. Habit memory, according to him, symbolizes a mechanized kind of memory that embodies our learned behaviors. It is grounded in the body and functions in accordance with our practical concerns. Habit memory in essence “consists in obtaining certain automatic behavior by means of repetition; in other words, it coincides with the acquisition of sensory-motor mechanisms” (Lawlor, 2021, sec. 4). Meaning that basic motor activities such as riding a bicycle or playing
an instrument without conscious thought are actions rooted in this memory. Pure memory, on the other hand, seems to be more intense and transcendent. It does not pertain to the learned abilities or motor skills, but rather to the experiences and events of our past. This type of memory encompasses the vivid, personal recollections that shape our identity and subjective experience of the world. Bergson believes that pure memory is independent of matter. It’s not stored in our brain; rather, it’s an ever-present part of our consciousness. Indeed, as Nakatomi puts it, “pure memory, independent memory, exists in brain cells independently. We cannot find this notion of memory in psychology and brain physiology” (Nakatomi, 2017, p. 166). In this sense, Bergson's concept of pure memory challenges the conventional understanding of memory as a mere retrieval of fixed past events. For Bergson, pure memory is about a process of 'recreation' rather than recalling a fixed past. When we utilize pure memory, we are not simply retrieving a memory from the past; we actually reconstitute the experience in our minds. This reconstitution allows for a dynamic interaction with past experiences, enriching our present understanding.

Bergson visualizes memory as a spectrum, with pure memory on one end—rich, undistorted, and reflective of our inner experiences—and habit memory on the other—functional, automatic, and bodily. Between these poles, we find a mixture of the two, through which we access in our daily lives. For him, as stated in Shores (2014, p. 210): “If we were to memorize a series of spoken lines for a play, each time we practice it, we create a new individual memory. When it comes time to perform, we merely begin with the first word, and the rest seem to follow automatically, without our needing to recall any single rehearsal. All the previous times were contracted into that present moment of automatic habitual bodily performance. But after the show, someone might ask us about how we memorized the lines. Then we could relax and daydream about those moments, seeing them in their vivid detail.” In his formulation, pure memory consists of vivid, conscious recollections of past experiences—each practice session is a new, distinct memory. Over time, with repetition, these individual memories melt into an automatic sequence, manifesting as habit memory or motor memory during the performance. It is a more mechanical memory and requires little to no conscious effort to activate. Now, I will illustrate Bergson’s memory conception in his famous cone diagram.
The structure of the cone we see above can be interpreted as a spatial representation of time in terms of Bergson’s philosophy. In the diagram, we see memory not in a linear form but in a multidimensional one. As we move from the base to the tip of the cone, we move from pure memory to where actions take place. In other words, from the past to the present. The point S represents the present moment, or "now." It's where the past, as represented by the cone, intersects with the present moment. It is a point of interaction where memory and perception coincide within consciousness. At this point, all of our memories come together and influence our actions and perceptions in the present. These memories, however, do not immediately take action in our immediate consciousness; they are rather the recollected parts of it. We can
define A’ to B’ as actionable memories or practical pasts. The memories in this section become more practical and less detailed. They are memories that concern our actions rather than our vivid recollections. We can think of these memories as shaped by our past experiences that are more readily accessible. As for A” to B”, the narrowest section of the cone, we can notice that they are the closest ones to the present moment. They are the memories that have been distilled down to our motor mechanisms and habits. We do not consciously retrieve these memories, but we act upon them. They affect our immediate actions to a greater extent. The main idea Bergson proposes with this diagram is that the past is not something behind us. It is not something we left behind; instead, it is always with us. It always affects our present actions and perceptions on different levels. The cone illustrates how memories transform from pure recollections to habits as they get closer to the present moment.

In this context, Bergson considers ‘pure memory’ to be a collection of all past experiences and knowledge which is not active in consciousness until it is called upon by our present, practical needs. This process of memory engaging in the present involves what Bergson describes as “contraction” and “rotation.” Through these terms, Bergson aims to demonstrate how memories from the past are not just remembered but actively selected according to our practical needs and adapted in the most appropriate way to our current circumstances. As McNamara points out, for Bergson, “to the extent that memory can contract the moments of duration into one moment, one decision, it increases the organism’s powers of action” (McNamara, 1996, p. 221). For Bergson, memory also performs a ‘translation' movement, meaning that it positions all of our past experiences in response to a freshly emerging experience in our current state. It carries out a “rotation” and presents the aspect of our past that is most beneficial to our current situation. Indeed, as he formulates in the following: “Memory, laden with the whole of the past, responds to the appeal of the present state by two simultaneous movements, one of translation, by which it moves in its entirety to meet experience, thus contracting more or less, though without dividing, with a view to action; and the other of rotation upon itself, by which it turns toward the situation of the moment, presenting to it that side of itself which may prove to be the most useful” (Bergson, 1991, p. 168-169).
So, memory is not something we can fully sense or recall at will; it is recollected according to what is required for the current state of affairs. As James Burton says in the following: “Pure memory cannot be experienced as such, for it marks the limit of experience; yet it remains virtually present in that any aspect of the past existence of the body-image may in theory be produced in the form of memory-images, by the contracting and filtering of that past that is the body-image’s continuous activity” (Burton, 2008, p. 329). The essential point for Bergson here is that, I think, our pure memory is not an archive of static recollections but a dynamic resource that constantly interacts with the present, being shaped by it and at the same time shaping our actions in return. It is not merely a record but an active instrument that our consciousness makes use of in order to process the present. Thus, as we have seen, the base of the cone, where all points converge, represents pure memories that are not currently in use. As you move up the cone, the circles represent memories closer to the present moment, which are more accessible to our immediate consciousness. The point of the cone that intersects with the plane symbolizes the present moment, where active memory meets perception. Memories are being retrieved from the depths of consciousness, from the base of the cone, to the moment where the cone intersects with a plane. In this sense, when we recall a memory, it is akin to moving up the cone gradually, bringing it closer to our perception and actions.

We can admit that Bergson’s circuit diagram has slight implications that time can gather and increase in some way, which might remind us of Husserl's conception of time with extended parts. The circuit diagram might suggest an exteriority of each new layer, although they are all passed through in the same motion, so to speak. His cone diagram has a notion of expansion where memories evoked at the wider part are expanded and set more apart in distinction from one another, reminding us of the spatial conception, like his example of separating clock bell tolls to count them. However, Bergson’s use of the cone metaphor, in essence, aims to highlight that our experience of the present is not solely limited to a single point on a timeline. It is affected by all our experiences, which are represented by the expanded base of the cone. This spatial representation therefore only helps us comprehend the manner in which memories and immediate perception dynamically interact, rather than examining them as static entities. Indeed, in the same way, Bergson’s concept of
duration emphasizes that moments in time—past, present, and future—are not entities but intertwine within our experience. The cone diagram effectively depicts how different moments in time (memories) are interconnected yet distinct within our consciousness. In Bergson's understanding, as stated earlier, time, especially in its pure sense, is simply an abstract and intangible concept that constitutes a holistic unity. Since human cognition can visualize and comprehend time for its practical needs only with spatial divisions, Bergson likewise visualizes it with spatial notions in his diagram. Thus, Bergson’s cone representation simply falls within a metaphorical domain as it helps us visualize the mutual interaction between memory and immediate consciousness rather than conceptualizing our immediate temporal perception with intrinsically extended units. His cone example, I think, should be interpreted as a simple visual tool to represent layers of memory, where he illustrates the complexity of memory recall.

In sum, although Bergson's model in a way implies a spatialized notion of time to some extent in terms of his cone diagram, it is not as philosophically problematic as Husserl's depiction of time with his extended, divided representations of temporal modalities. Now I will elucidate it from different perspectives. To begin with, as Husserl's account presents a static relationship between the past, present, and future, I think it does not adequately capture the unidirectional and dynamic flow of time. Bergson, in contrast, places importance on the flow and continuous interpenetration of memories and perceptions. His cone represents not static points but varying intensities and intermingling layers of experiences that reflect the ongoing dynamism of temporal experience. Husserl suggests that moments of time have a sort of extension, in the sense that the past and future are points on a line that stretches out from the present. However, this might be misconstrued as attributing to time a static, extended character similar to that of spatial objects. While according to Bergson, the concept of "duration" simply proposes the idea that we do not leave behind the past; rather, it is a dimension that permeates and influences the present. Contrary to a series of distinct points, his depiction suggests a flow, implying that past events are integrated into the moment, maintaining motion as an uninterrupted element.

Moreover, Husserl bases his understanding of temporal experience on intentionality, which, I think, leads to the reduction of lived time into strings of discontinued
intentional acts that cannot sufficiently capture the sense of continuous passage of time, while Bergson focuses on intuition as a way to grasp the continuity of time and to realize duration. In his representation of the cone, Bergson does not cut time into different, separate modalities. He shows how intuition blends past, present, and future in a coherent, lived experience, while Husserl’s model implies the present as privileged over the past and the future. Thus, in Bergson’s theory, we can see that the past memories are truly inside of our present consciousness, while in Husserl’s theory, our past recollections seem to be mere intentions coming from an extended unit of the past. Bergson's cone theory proposes that multiple memories can exist simultaneously and have an impact on the present moment without privileging any now-point. His theory implies that each moment is composed of past experiences that significantly shape and influence the present in a diverse and intricate way. He admits that although time, in its purest form, is an indivisible experience, we understand it through pragmatic spatial analogies. In this regard, his cone diagrams bridge an abstraction (the concept of time) with our everyday experience. Accordingly, one can argue that Husserl's conception of the past may imply a certain detachment from present experiences, as retentions and protentions are regarded as vivid and somewhat external. For Bergson, however, as we especially see in his cone diagram, memory is not an external archive or unit of recollections to be accessed. It is a mutual process that actively shapes the present and, at the same time, is shaped by it.

4.6. Phenomenological Examination

Since this project is essentially an examination and critique of Husserl's time consciousness with the application of Bergson's theory to make a philosophical comparison and evaluation, and given that Husserl is the founder of the phenomenological approach based on subjective experiences and Bergson, although not a phenomenologist in the strict sense, involves phenomenological elements in his philosophy, particularly in his focus on immediate experience and intuition, I think we can finally examine the views of these two philosophers on spatialization of time with a phenomenological approach. Husserl, as is known, is considered more traditionally to be a real phenomenologist, in the sense that his philosophy focuses on
the intentional analysis of lived experiences and emphasizes the primacy of immediate perception as the foundation for all knowledge. However, Bergson can also be considered a pioneer of phenomenology because his philosophy shares common concerns and interests with phenomenologists in many respects, especially in terms of consciousness and subjective experiences, and in this respect, he examines phenomenological time consciousness in a broader sense. Indeed, as stated in Kim (2016, sec. 1), “Bergson, as one of the proto-phenomenological forerunners, reveals the core connections of the phenomenological concept of temporality to a wider range of philosophy.”

The diagrams we examined earlier are aids for him to elaborate on certain structural features of his model of time consciousness. As such, the fact that they include features of geometrical space does not necessarily mean that he thinks time consciousness itself should be seen as having such spatial features too. However, we still might detect such a contamination of space in his time model on the basis of the diagrams, on account of the way he designs them. Because moments are metrically spaced out and separated, and because the flow of objective time is given the standard time line format, even though the present moment that encompasses all others is a single act of consciousness, still the protentional and retentional modifications are conceived as being nested in an order of exteriorities following that of the objective timeline-like sequence. Furthermore, the freshness of the present, which is the primordial source of all contents of time consciousness, is assumed in the diagrams and what they model, but they do not include it as something being explained. In fact, what is displayed is something like the "anti-freshness" of time-consciousness, as it models whatever is retained and anticipated and not what adds newness to the flow. Let us look more closely at this matter.

4.6.1. Freshness of Time

In terms of the phenomenological method, as is known, we are supposed to give primacy to the immediacy of experience. In this respect, we can say that Husserl also gives privilege to immediate perceptions as the reference point of perception. Regarding the primacy of the immediate given consciousness, we can consider his
own “principle of principles” from Ideas I. As he describes in the following: “No theory we can conceive can mislead us in regard to the principle of all principles: that every primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in "intuition" in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality) is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself” (Husserl, 1982, sec. 24). He basically argues that the most reliable source of our knowledge is our direct, immediate experience. Things should be taken as they are presented to us in our conscious perception, without adding any interpretation or theoretical assumptions. For him, temporally speaking, our immediate perceptions are always given in a fresh manner. As he argues in the following: “This sinking-back is an original phenomenological modification of consciousness through which an ever-growing distance forms in relation to the actually present now, which is always being freshly constituted. This growing distance comes about by virtue of the continuous series of changes leading away from the actual now” (Husserl, 1991, p.65-66). However, what is most immediately given in a temporal sense, in Husserl’s terms, is not a complex structure of nested retentional and protentional modifications of temporal awareness but rather the "freshness" of the ever-changing present moment of awareness.

I think, however, how compatible a spatialized time conception in an abiding structure containing the notion of distance will be with the fresh occurrence of immediate perception yet raises another problem. Indeed, we can see a tension between the structure and the freshness, in Husserl’s own words:

As a matter of principle, however, no concrete part of the flow can make its appearance as nonflow. […] The change of its phases can never cease and turn into a continuance of phases always remaining the same. But does not the flow also possess, in a certain manner, something abiding, even if no concrete part of the flow can be converted into a nonflow? What abides, above all, is the formal structure of the flow, the form of the flow. That is to say, the flowing is not only flowing throughout, but each phase has one and the same form. This constant form is always filled anew by "content," but the content is certainly not something introduced into the form from without. On the contrary, it is determined through the form of regularity-only in such a way that this regularity does not alone determine the concretum. The form consists in this, that a now becomes constituted by means of an impression and that a trail of retentions and a horizon of protentions are attached to the
impression. But this abiding form supports the consciousness of constant change, which is a primal fact: the consciousness of the change of impression into retention while a fresh impression continuously makes its appearance; or, with respect to the "what" of the impression, the consciousness of the change of this what as it is modified from being something still intended as "now" into something that has the character of "just having been. (Husserl, 1991, p. 117-118)

Husserl acknowledges that time is inherently a flow, with its dynamic and ever-changing character. A single phase cannot simply remain constant and become "nonflow." This is the main character of freshness—the unceasing change and the newness of each present moment as it comes into being. Yet he speaks of an "abiding form" within this flow. For Husserl, in content, this form is not static and presents a continuous structure in which the flowing time occurs in consciousness. Through this structure, we experience ever-new content (the freshness) in a coherent manner. Husserl describes the enduring structure of time consciousness, consisting of retention, primal impression, and protention, a synthesis of immediate givenness. This structure is constantly filled with new content, that is, fresh impressions and experiences. The structure itself does not change; it remains the same as different contents pass through it. Actual experiences and impressions constantly shift and never remain the same. Husserl refers to them as "contents of change," as they bring freshness to each moment. Yet Husserl emphasizes that we comprehend them only within the frame of the abiding form, which, I think, seems to contradict the notion of complete freshness since it imposes a pattern or regularity upon the immediate experience. For Husserl, the primal fact of consciousness is the constant change—the transition from the present impression to retention as a new impression emerges. This process involves the freshness of the immediate experience, but it is situated within the constant form, which is the structured experience of time. The tension here lies in the fact that while the content of the impression is fresh and continuously becoming something that has just passed, it is always apprehended within a structure that does not change. The freshness of immediate perception is understood through a form that remains the same.

Therefore, I think that Husserl’s last statement essentially involves a paradox: the abiding form provides the consciousness with constant change. This means that
although the freshness in every moment is always in flux, we owe our capacity to understand this change through a static structure of time consciousness. The tension arises here because, while this structure is necessary for grasping the flow of time, it appears to impose a fixed pattern on what is inherently a fluid and fresh experience. In phenomenological terms, Husserl points out that our lived experience of time is both structured and fresh. The freshness is never lost, but it is always mediated by a form that makes the flow of time intelligible to our consciousness. This, at the end, creates a tension between the immediateness of time and the structured consciousness that allows us to reflect upon and understand this immediacy.

At any rate, the freshness represents the immediately given reality of time. Husserl, however, at the end, seems to go astray, looking for structures that homogenize and spatialize time. His structured understanding of time seems to be driven by his desire to grasp and articulate the continuity of experience. The "freshness" of the immediate present is instant; it slips away the moment we try to reflect upon it. His retentional-protentional structure might be regarded as an attempt to account for how the fresh present moment transitions into the immediate past and how the anticipated future shades into the new present. However, as we have seen, by any means, Husserl’s depiction spatializes time. He imposes a form, a kind of static, spatial framework, into what is fundamentally a dynamic, non-spatial process. The immediate reality of time and the pure freshness of the now seem to resist this spatialization. The lived experience of time is not something that can be neatly divided into the retentions of the past, the impression of the now, and the protentions of the future. These divisions suggest a certain homogeneity and continuity that the actual immediacy and uniqueness of each moment may not possess. On the contrary, Bergson’s viewpoint on time, also known as durée, presents a perspective that resonates more with the notion of freshness. According to Bergson, our experience of time is qualitative and remains indivisible. It cannot be divided into units that can be measured or organized in the same manner as Husserl suggests. Durée highlights the dynamic and ever-changing nature of our inner experiences, which would lose their essence if they were defined in spatial terms. Thus, as we can conclude, Husserl's model of time assumes that the present is ever-refreshing itself; it is always new and in distinction from all else. However, his tripartite model and temporal diagrams display the
structural features of time, in the sense that does not include anything at all of “freshness.” In fact, the Husserl’s structure itself is a sort of anti-freshness of temporal consciousness; it is what is not new in the diagonal retentional/protentional horizons. If Bergson is right that the newness of the givenness of the temporal flow is what is the primary character of time, which is something Husserl is willing to acknowledge as well, we may conclude that Husserl goes astray with his model by excluding it from his depiction.

4.6.2. Fullness of Time

Husserl’s model of time consciousness paints a picture of time experience as one with many various nested parts. And the horizontal structure leaves much of it in the darkness while at the same time never losing its content or structural integrity. But as Bergson’s many accounts and illustrations may have us believe, we do not experience time in such a partialized way. Time always gives itself in its fullness, whether we daydream or act with motor habits. Time, he shows us, is an unbroken, dynamic whole that does not admit of separable, distinct segments, like Husserl’s model might suggest. In this respect, we can define the first point of contention as phenomenology’s commitment to describing experiences in the sense that they present themselves to us in their immediacy. If we hold phenomenology indeed as a return “to the things themselves,” as Husserl proclaims, then any theoretical structure that abstracts time into a series of static frames or positions runs the risk of distorting the very nature of temporal experience. Immediate experience does not present time as divisible; rather, it is felt as a continuous flow, a kind of flux that is not inherently fragmented. As we have seen, unlike space, time is not inherently composed of juxtaposed, extended parts. Spatial entities still retain their identity, although we divide them into different parts. A piece of land, for example, can be split into different terrains, yet each remains land. However, the present moment cannot be separated from the flow of time without losing its essence as time. Thus, any attempt to divide time into separate, extended units would be a misinterpretation of the holistic and indivisible nature of temporal experience as we live it. Bergson’s perspective underlines that understanding time requires embracing its continuous, indivisible nature, rather than dissecting it into synthetic divisions or points.
As we have seen earlier, while Husserl’s theory provides an intentional examination of time, Bergson, on the other hand, believes that a genuine understanding of time or durée can only be achieved through non-intellectual intuition. According to Bergson, we perceive the blending or interpenetration of moments rather than their separation. Husserl's model, with its retentional-protentional structure, suggests that even the present moment is shaped by consciousness's structure of time. For Bergson, on the other hand, the immediate experience of time is unmediated and direct. As phenomenological inquiry in essence is a return to immediate experiences, according to Bergson's theory, we can argue that Husserl's model nevertheless imposes a mediated structure on immediate experiences. At this point, Bergson’s concept of durée presents a contrasting perspective to Husserl's intertwined temporal units. Durée, as we have seen, represents the qualitative experience of time that cannot be quantified or divided. In this sense, Husserl's phenomenology tends to quantify and segment time rather than acknowledging its continuous, lived nature. Moreover, Bergson emphasizes that memory is not a mere retention of past 'nows.' It is instead a dynamic force that shapes present experience and, at the same time, is shaped by it. In his view, time is indivisible because the past is not behind us but within us; it affects and informs the present in a constant, flowing movement. Thus, we can comprehend time in its fullness. Husserl's model, however, does not seem to fully account for the role of memory as an active, present force that binds time into a coherent totality.

Our present experience is always given in terms of what has just passed (retention) and what is about to come (protention) in Husserl's retentional-protentional structure. In a sense, this implies that the present is never given in isolation. Indeed, as Shores states in the following:

From this description of the method of arriving at an awareness of the unified stream of consciousness, it would seem, that in this way, Husserl considers consciousness happening now to happen not in an isolatable and momentary act of consciousness; but, he seems instead to view it as spanning a temporal duration that is so interconnected with its past and future temporal backgrounds that it cannot be taken in isolation from these backgrounds without the sacrifice of some part of its constitution. In other words, consciousness happening now shares its constitution with consciousness happening previously and subsequently. (Shores, 2009)
When we consider time from this viewpoint, we see that our immediate perception always occurs within a structure that fundamentally assumes both the recollected past and the anticipated future. Husserl's present, therefore, is not given in its own right. However, for Bergson, as we have seen, our experience of time is instant and immediate. For him, the quality of the moment is unique and irreducible. It is experienced directly, without the mediation of any mental structure that divides time into different units.

As phenomenology's task is to get back to 'the things themselves,' which in the case of time would mean experiencing it as we live it, then Husserl's model seems to offer a departure from phenomenology’s foundational principles by imposing an abiding structure on time. This structure is seen as a kind of mediation that distances us from the directness of lived experience. In contrast, Bergson's emphasis on immediate experience, I think, is more faithful to the phenomenological spirit. His philosophy recognizes the immediacy of our experience of time as it flows, undivided by the reflective act, into different units. I think Bergson's durée seems like a real attempt to describe this experience as closely as possible to the way it is actually lived. Thus, a Bergsonian critique of Husserl brings us to the conclusion that the true nature of time—its continuous, flowing, unmediated experience—is somewhat obscured by Husserl's spatial analysis. Phenomenology, as we know it, is always and profoundly grounded in immediate experience. Spatialized conceptions of time, however, separate us from the immediate givenness of time. Time is not given partially, like a slice with other parts in different places. Time is given fully. We only ever experience time as a whole. Therefore, Husserl's theory of temporal consciousness does not fully capture the immediate experience and fullness of time as we live it. I think that Bergson's model, compared to that of Husserl's, consistently resists the spatialization of time, and this resistance is crucial for understanding the indivisibility of time. In conclusion, although Husserl is the founder and developer of phenomenological inquiry that references lived experiences, I think Bergson's view, in the case of phenomenological inquiry, remains more faithful to the immediacy of lived experience. His model of time consciousness, by avoiding spatializations, remains closer to the immediate givenness of the flow of time. As such, it can even be claimed that Bergson, in the end, proves to be the superior phenomenologist.
4.7. Conclusion

In the fourth chapter of my thesis, I critically evaluated the theories of Husserl and Bergson regarding time consciousness, focusing on their philosophical divergences. My analysis begins with Husserl's concept of intentionality and how it inadvertently leads to the spatialization of time. Husserl views time as an essential aspect of consciousness, defined through a tripartite structure: retention (past), primal impressions (present), and protention (future). He, however, explains these elements in spatial terms of 'proximity' and 'remoteness', suggesting a spatial-like relationship between different temporal modes. This approach, as I conclude, contrasts starkly with the fluid and dynamic nature of time, suggesting instead that different time modes are akin to spatial objects in an extended temporal horizon. Bergson, in contrast, differentiates time from duration using the concept of intuition. He perceives time not as a series of spatially discrete moments but as an indivisible flow where past, present, and future interpenetrate in a continuous process. His understanding of time consciousness emphasizes the unity of time, where memories shape the present, and the present shapes memories at the same time. Bergson's model resists the spatialization apparent in Husserl's theory, advocating for a conception of time as a non-segmented, flowing experience. In examining Bergson's theory, especially through his cone diagrams, it becomes clear that his representation of habit memory and pure memory does not spatialize time in the same manner as Husserl's. These diagrams serve more as metaphorical tools for visualizing the interplay between memory and immediate consciousness than dividing time into spatial units. Thus, Bergson's approach to memory is dynamic, constantly interacting with and shaping the present moment.

Upon phenomenological examination, Bergson's approach adheres more closely to the immediacy of lived experience compared to Husserl. While Husserl acknowledges time as a flow characterized by freshness, he nonetheless constrains this dynamic character within an 'abiding form', a static structure of consciousness. This creates a paradox in his theory, as he attempts to articulate the continuity of temporal experience within a framework that spatializes and homogenizes time. In contrast, Bergson's theory portrays time as a whole, uninterrupted experience,
emphasizing its indivisible and immediate nature. Memory, according to Bergson, is not just a retention of past events but a dynamic element that continuously shapes and is shaped by the present. In conclusion, Bergson's approach to time consciousness emerges as superior in capturing the essence of temporal experience. His resistance to spatializing time and his focus on the continuous, unmediated nature of time align more faithfully with the core principles of phenomenology. Bergson's perspective underscores the immediacy and fullness of time, presenting a more coherent understanding of temporal experience as a unified and evolving phenomenon. Thus, Bergson's interpretation of time, with its emphasis on intuition and the non-spatial nature of duration, provides a more accurate phenomenological account of time consciousness compared to Husserl's model.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the second chapter, as we examined Husserl’s theory of time consciousness, we have seen that, for him, time is neither an external entity nor an objective structure in which we see our experiences unfold. It is an integral and constitutive aspect of our consciousness, a fundamental constituent of human subjectivity. In order to better understand the nature of time, we saw that Husserl brings a new perspective to our understanding of immediate experiences: the phenomenological reduction. For him, once it is applied, it brings us to a state of awareness that is characterized by intentional acts. He holds that every intentional experience involves temporal characteristics. As we have seen, he bases his temporal analysis on the tripartite structure of retention, primal impressions, and protention. Retention serves as our recollection of what we have just perceived, or our distant past experiences; primal impression corresponds to the now-point, our present perception; and protention serves as a vague anticipation of the future. However, as Bergson argues, Husserl’s theory of time leads to the spatialization of time and our temporal experiences, along with his spatial analogies such as “distance” or “proximity,” indicating that points in time are extended in duration in terms of intentional acts. In Husserl’s theory, as we have seen, temporal points in the past, present, and future intend each other in the same way as spatial objects in an extended temporal horizon, and this temporal intentionality constitutes our temporal consciousness. Even in his diagrams, we saw that time-points are spatially localized and approached in terms of proximity and remoteness, continuously enduring and taking place in terms of the constantly changing now point. Therefore, we see that just as an object we immediately perceive in the spatial horizon intends to different perspectives within an intentional act, the past and the future are in a similar spatial-like relationship with the present. Thus, it is evident in Husserl’s theory that, contrary to the fluid and dynamic nature of time, different time modes seem to intend each other just like spatial objects on the spatial horizon.
In the third chapter, as we have seen, Bergson illustrates that time, without the inclusion of spatial notions, can be explained more clearly and consistently. While Husserl depicts time as a spatial-like structure of different moments on a juxtaposed line, our conscious states in fact permeate one another, creating a seamless unity rather than discrete segments. For Bergson, although our conscious states are successive, we can find the representation of the whole in any particular one. According to Bergson’s understanding, considering time as a homogeneous medium with spatial characteristics misrepresents the nature of temporal experience because externality is the distinguishing characteristic of spatial objects. However, the same is not true for the states of consciousness, as they are not necessarily external to each other in the same sense. We can only speak of it when we represent them symbolically on a juxtaposed line, that is, when we treat time as a homogenous medium. From this point of view, Bergson holds that there are two possible ways that we can interpret time: as a pure duration stripped of all spatial characteristics, and as an understanding of time that we can only explain by spatial relations. In order to plan and organize our daily lives for our practical needs, as we know, we divide pure duration into certain units that are assumptively external to each other in a juxtaposed line. In other words, as we conceive of duration in terms of extension, we are inadvertently contaminating time with spatiality. According to Bergson’s theory, however, the past, present, and future are not necessarily external to each other in terms of spatial relations. The past is not an implicit recollection of the present, and the future is not a vague anticipation of what will happen. For him, our conscious states permeate each other as time passes. As they succeed one another, we perceive them in one another. He argues that the sensations that are not extensive cannot form co-existent extensity. As he argues, there should instead be a synthetic act of mind that takes them all at the same time and orders them in juxtaposition, which is intuition. In this sense, intuition is inherently related to pure duration because, according to Bergson, we can fully grasp time as an inner experience and not merely as an external succession or an indication of spatiality only through intuition. As we can see, his understanding of time consciousness does not involve any kind of spatiality. Therefore, we can conclude that his theory offers us a more coherent understanding of the experience of time than that of Husserl in terms of its inherent continuity, its qualitative nature, and its immediate givenness.
In the fourth chapter, I broadly examined and elucidated Husserl's temporal consciousness and its resulting spatialization of time. His grounding of analysis in the conception of intentionality, while considering intentionality a reference for immediate experiences, presents a contradiction. This is particularly noticeable in conjunction with his concept of the "abiding structure," which he defines as the medium of constant temporal changes. Bergson, on the other hand, by intuition, distinguishes time and duration and presents us with the true character of time, which is unity, in the sense that memories shape the present and the present is being shaped at the same time. Husserl’s representation of time in his tripartite structure, as we have concluded, leads to a spatially extended model of time and contradicts the immediacy of experience. Because, in this case, each moment is not only linked to the past and future but also occupies a 'space' within a temporal horizon. Bergson's theory, however, resists such a spatialized structure of time, as he argues that duration cannot be divided into different extended units. For him, pure duration is a flow that cannot be divided into different moments without losing its main character. As for Husserl, however, it is evident to us that, to many degrees, his account falls into the spatialization of time. Firstly, the fact that he describes the now-point as the "fullest" and most concrete aspect of time consciousness seems analogous to the manner in which a spatial object is apprehended in its entirety at a single moment. As he describes, retained past moments and anticipated future moments are connected to the now-point and find their place within this continuum. This temporal extension, as we have concluded, closely resembles the way in which spatial objects are extended in space and thus perceived in a similar manner to physical objects. Likewise, as we have seen, Husserl argues that the clarity of retention and protention diminishes as we move away from the present. As we can see, he applies proximity and remoteness in time in the same manner as spatial objects in the distance become less distinct in our perception. In that sense, for Husserl, the "near" and "distant" past or future are concepts that simply mirror our spatial understanding of distance, leading to the idea that time can be localized just like space. Likewise, as we have seen, Husserl’s model presents a degree of temporal outsideness and insideness, in the sense that past moments and future moments are experienced as less immediate and more distant compared to the present because, for Husserl, the "now-point," is the place where our consciousness is most sensitively directed.
In this chapter, we have also examined the possibility of whether Bergson's theory falls under the spatialization of time. His distinction between habit memory and pure memory, as we saw in his diagrams, might seem to involve spatial characteristics at first glance. However, as we have concluded, the spatial depictions in his cone diagrams only serve to visualize the mutual interaction between memory and immediate consciousness, rather than conceptualizing our immediate temporal perception with extended units. In this case, our pure memory is not an archive of static recollections but a dynamic resource that constantly interacts with the present, being shaped by it and at the same time shaping our actions in return. Lastly, when we made a phenomenological examination between Husserl’s and Bergson’s theories of time consciousness, we concluded that Bergson, at the end, stays truer to the phenomenological givenness than Husserl. Although Husserl acknowledges that time is a flow with its dynamic character that always remains "fresh," for him, the newness of each present experience occurs in terms of an "abiding form," which creates a paradox in the sense that it is the abiding form, a static structure of our consciousness that provides our consciousness with the constant change. Thus, as we have seen, even though Husserl attempts to articulate the continuity of our temporal experience, at the end, as we have concluded, he goes astray looking for structures that homogenize and spatialize time. In the same manner, as we have seen, Husserl’s temporal model depicts our temporal experiences with many various nested parts. But as we see in Bergson’s many accounts and illustrations, we do not experience time in such a partialized way. Time always gives itself in its fullness, we only ever experience time as a whole. Indeed, Bergson remarks that memory is not a mere retention of past nows, it is instead a dynamic force that shapes present experience and, at the same time, is shaped by it. Time is indivisible because the past is not behind us but within us; it affects and informs the present in a constant, flowing movement. Thus, we can comprehend time in its fullness. In terms of full experience of what is immediately given, Bergson’s inquiry stands faithful to the immediacy of our lived experiences.

Thus, as we have seen, Husserl exhibits a tendency toward relying on spatial features in his conception of time consciousness. From Bergson, we learn the danger of this: it fundamentally misrepresents the real nature of time, which we directly experience.
intuitively in its fresh givenness. While Husserl's analyses of time consciousness are a true marvel to behold and have taken the study of time and time consciousness to new levels of depth and specificity, we cannot really say they are without their problems. It would seem from our studies here that Bergson stays truer to the phenomenal givenness of time somewhat more than Husserl does. Considering what might have occurred had they sustained their philosophical correspondence, this remains an open and intriguing speculation. But perhaps Husserl would have been inspired to follow his own dictum more closely and go “back to time itself.”
REFERENCES


APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY/ ÖZET


Bergson'un saf süre ve sezgi kavramlarına dayanan zaman anlayışı, Husserl'in mekânsallık ve dışsallık içeren teorisinden daha tutarlı bir zaman kavramı sunmaktadır. Buna karşılık, Husserl'in zaman modeli ise, zamanı bir mekânsal kapsamda ele almaktadır ve Bergson "zamanın mekânsallaşması" olarak adlandırdığı bu sorunu çeşitli açılarından eleştirmektedir. Araştırmanın sonucunda, Bergson'un zamanın mekânsallaştırılmasına karşı koyarak Husserl'in "her şeyin prensibi" olarak adlandırdığı anlık deneyime ve verilimsiliğe Husserl'e nazaran daha bağlı olduğunu gösterecek ve nihayetinde, Bergson'un sezgi ve saf süre kavramları üzerinde inşa ettiği...
zaman anlayışının, Husserl'in mekânsal ve dışsal özellikleri içeren teorisinden daha tutarlı bir zaman kavrayışı sunduğuunu ortaya koyacağım. Bu çalışmayı, Bergson'ın Husserl'den daha üstün bir fenomenolog olup olmadığı sorusunu inceleyerek sonuçlandıracığım.


Algılanan bir nesnenin farklı perspektifleri, anlık olarak algılanmayan ancak algılanan perspektif tarafından niyetlenilen bir "eş-bilinci" oluşturur. Örneğin, bir masanın ön yüzüne baktığımızda, masanın arka yüzünü ve görünmeyen diğer


Husserl, yukarıda da değindiğim üzere) zaman bilincini "retention" (geçmişi muhafaza etme), "primal impression" (anlık izlenim) ve "protention" (geleceği öngörme) olmak üzere üç bölümü ayırır. Retansiyon, geçmişını bilincimizde saklı tuttamamızı ifade ederken, protansiyon ise geleceğe yönelik bekleniçimizizi ifade eder. Husserl, zaman noktalarının sürekli değişen bir şimdiye göre uzaklaştıklarını vurgular. Bir ses tonunun sürekliliği nasıl algılanırken, zamanın sürekli akışının ve mekânsal yapılarla benzerliklerinin farklı zaman modları arasındaki ilişkileri nasıl etkilediğini vurgular.

Az önce de belirttiğim üzere, Husserl'e göre zaman bilinci yönelimseldir. Bu bağlamda esas geçmiş ve geleceğin ortaya çıkan yönelimselliğin türleri retansiyon (geçmişi muhafazası) ve protansiyon (geleceğin bekleniçimiz)dir. Retansiyon, geçmiş deneyimlerimizi koruyan ve şu anki bilincimize erişilebilir kılan bir mekanizma olarak işlev görür, böylece geçmiş olayları hatırlamamız, üzerinden düşünmemize ve şimdi ile olan ilişkileriyle ilgili almamızı sağlayan bir temeldir. Protansiyon ise, geleектekini deneyimlerimizi ve olasılıklarımızı öngörmemizi ve anlık algımızda


Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde son olarak Husserl’in zaman bilincini, iki farklı zamansal diyagram özelinde inceledim. İlk diyagramda (s. 26) her aks modu, daimi olarak genişleyen bir süreklilik taşır. Husserl, nesnenin süresinin aks modlarının sürekliliği ile her süre noktasına ait modların sürekliliği arasında bir ayrım çizer. Ona göre


Görüldüğü üzere Husserl’in teorisinde, geçmiş, şimdiki zaman ve gelecek, uzamsal nesneler gibi birbirlerine yönelir ve bu yönelimsellik, zaman bilincimizi oluşturur. Zaman noktaları, sürekli değişen ‘şimdi’ noktasında yakınlık ve uzaklık açısından uzamsal olarak yerleştirilir, böylece farklı zaman modları da uzamsal nesneler gibi
birbirlerine yönelir, yani zaman, mekânsal bir kavram olarak ele alınır. Bu durumun ortaya çıkardığı problemleri ve Bergson’un bu konu hakkındaki eleştirilerini ise, çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde inceleyeceğim.


Bergson, zamanı anlamın iki yolu olduğunu belirtir: biri, zamanı tüm mekânsal özelliklerden arındırılmış saf süreklilik olarak; diğeri ise mekânsal ilişkilerle açıklanabilen bir kavraysı olarak alımaktadır. Saf süreklilik, bilinciminz ardışık durumlarının, egomuzun sınırları aşarak iç içe geçmesi ve sürekli bir dönüşüm içinde olmasıyla kendini gösterdiği bir formudur. Geçmiş ve şimdi dörtlümz, saf süreklilikte birbirile bir organik bir bütün oluşturur, birbirlerine "karşırlar." Bergson'a göre, geçmiş, mevcut ve gelecek zihinsel durumların birbirlerinden ayrı bir diziliş oluşturur, birbirlerine “nüfuz eder.” Saat zamanı gibi ölçülen bir zaman kavramı,

Demin de belirttiğim üzere, Bergson'un felsefesinde mekânsal özelliklerden ve dışsal niceliklerden arıyrımsaf sürekliliği kavramının tek yolu sezgiden geçer. Bu yüzden sezgi kavramına ayrı bir parantez açmak gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Bergson'a göre, sezgi aracılığıyla, zamanı dışsal ve mekânsal bir sıralanış olarak değil; içsel bir deneyim olarak, tam anlamıyla kavrayabiliriz. Bergson, sezgiyi zamansal bilinçimizin doğasını anlamamızda temel bir yöntem olarak ele alır. Bu yöntem, zamana ilişkin geleneksel ve dogmatik düşünce yöntemlerinin sınırlamalarını aşamamıza yardımcı olur. Bergson, sezgiyi gerçek sürekliliğe, yani zamanın mekânsal


Görüldüğü Bergson'a göre, zaman, mekânsal kavramlar olmadan daha net ve tutarlı bir şekilde açıklanabilmektedir. Husserl zamanı mekânsal bir yapı olarak tasvir
ederken, Bergson’a göre bilinç durumları birbirine nüfuz eder ve her biri diğerlerini içinde barındırabilir. Zamanımekânsal bir düzlem olarak ele almak, zamanın öznünün yanlış bir temsilini ortaya koyar; çünkü mekânsallık, uzamsal nesnelerin ayırt edici özelliğidir. Bergson'a göre, zamanı saf süreçlik olarak, mekânsal özelliklerden arındırılmış bir şekilde ya da yalnızca mekânsal ilişkilerle açıklanabilir bir anlayış olarak ele alabiliriz. Sezgi, zamanı içsel bir deneyim olarak tam anlamıyla kavramamız sağlar. Bu noktada Bergson'un teorisi, zaman deneyiminin sürekli, niteliksel doğasını ve anlık verilmişliğini daha tutarlı bir şekilde sunmaktadır.

Çalışmanın son bölümünde ise, Husserl ve Bergson’un zaman bilinci teorilerini eleştirel bir biçimde inceleyecek ve her iki filozofun görüşlerini zaman bilinci konusunda farklı felsefi noktalara değinerek karşılaştıracığım. İlk olarak Husserl’in zaman bilincinde karşılaştığımız zamanın mekânsallaşması sorununu inceleyecek, sonrasında ise Bergson'un sezgisel modelinde de benzer bir durumun olup olmadığını sorgulayacağım. Nihayetinde, her iki filozofun zaman bilincine dair teorilerini, anlık verilmişlik açısından, özellikle "tazelik" ve "tamlık" kavramları çerçevesinde fenomenolojik olarak analiz edeceğim.

Bu bölümde öncelikle, Husserl’in yönelimsellik ve Bergson’un sezgi kavramları arasındaki metodolojik farklar ve bu farkların zaman bilinci üzerindeki felsefi etkilerini inceleyeceğim. Önceki bölümlerde gördüğümüz üzere Husserl’in yönelimsellik kavramıyla ele aldığı zaman bilinci, zamanın mekânsallaşması sorunu ile karşılaşıyoruz. Bergson’un sezgi kavramında ise zaman ve süreçliği birbirlerinden ayırarak ve anı şekillendiren hataları bütünsel bir açıdan vurgulayarak zamanın gerçek karakterini görebiliyoruz. Önceki bölümde gördüğümüz üzere Husserl, bilincin her eyleminin yönelimsel olduğunu belirterek, zamanı geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecekten oluşan bir sıralı yapıda ele alırken; Bergson ise süreçliliği doğrudan hessedilen bir deneyim olarak tanımlamaktadır. Bu durumda Bergson, zaman ve mekâni net bir biçimde ayırarak, bilincin anlık verilerini bir sürekli olarak tanımlar. Böylece, zamanı mekânsal bir yapı olarak görünen kacınırdan ve bilinç durumlarını birbirine nüfuz ettiği zamanın bir çeşitlilik olarak tanımlar. Husserl’in zaman bilinci modeli, önceki bölümlerde de belirtildiği üzere, zamanın mekânsallaştırılması içerir. Örneğin, 'şimdi' noktası zamanın sürekli

deneyimin sürekli ve bütünsel yapısını mekânsal bir düzleme indirger ve zamanın sürekli doğasını ve iç içe geçmiş yapısını göz ardı eder. Husserl'in zamanın akışını, birbiri ardına sıralanan, birbirinden ayrı ve bağımsız anlar dizisi olarak ele alan bu yaklaşımı, zamanın birliğini ve sürekli yapısını anlamamızı engeller. Yani Husserl'in zaman bilinci modeli, bize zamanın doğasını yanlış bir yorumunu sunar ve zamanın sürekli ve dinamik doğasını mekânsal ilişkilere indirger. Bu nedenle, Husserl'in zaman bilinci modeli, zamanın gerçek doğasını yeterince yansıtmaz ve zamansal deneyimin sürekli yapısını ve bütünlüğünü anlamamızı engeller.

belirtir. Bergson'un teorisi, her anın geçmiş deneyimlerden oluştuğunu ve bu deneyimlerin şimdiki zamanı cinsel açıdan şekillendirildiğini gösterir. Bergson, zamanın saf biçimi itibariyle bölümmeyen bir deneyim olduğu ortaya koyarken, zaman kavramını günlük deneyimlerimizle bir köprü görevi gören mekânsal benzetmelerle somutlaştırmak ve anlamamızı sağlar. Husserl'in geçmiş anlayışı, şimdiki deneyimlerden belirli bir ayrılımsızlık ve dışsallık içerirken, Bergson için hafıza dışsal bir arşiv veya bir anlar birimi olmaktan ziyade, şimdiki zamanı etkileyen ve aynı zamanda ondan karşılıklı olarak etkilenen bir süreçtir.

Husserl, genel itibariyle yaşanan (lived) deneyimlerin yönlensel analizi üzerine odaklanan geleneksel bir fenomenolog olarak kabul edilirken, Bergson ise özellikle sezgi kavramına ve anlık deneyimlere önem veren, fenomenolojik unsurlar içeren felsefesiyile, dolaylı yoldan fenomenolojinin öncüleri arasından yer alabilir. Husserl'in zaman diyagramları, ortaya koyduğu zaman bilincinin yapısını tasvir etmek için bir araç görevi görür. Bu diyagramlar geometrik ve uzamsal özellikler içersel de Husserl'in zaman bilincinin kendisinin tamamen uzamsal karakterlere dayandığını anlamına gelmezler. Ancak, diyagramların tasarımını nedeniyle Husserl'in zaman modelinde uzamsal bir kavrışa rastlarız. Diyagramlar, her ne kadar zaman bilincinin içeriğinin temel kaynağı olan şimdiki zamanın tazeliğini varsayarak da, bunu detaylı olarak açıklamazlar. Aslında diyagramlar, akiş yenilik katan olnuvların değil, sadece muhafaza edilendi (retansiyon) ve beklenenleri (protansiyon) modeller, bu da bir bakıma Husserl'in zaman bilincinin "anti-tazeliğini" ortaya koyar.

Husserl'in zaman bilinci, aslında her anın tazeliğini vurgulayan fenomenolojik bir yaklaşıma dayanır. Ancak, zamanın sürekli değişen karakterini sabit bir yapı içerisinde varsayarak, zamanın "tazelik" niteliği ile örtüşmeyen bir paradoks içerir. Husserl'e göre, zamanın akiş içindeki her safha, bir değişim içerisinededir. Ancak, ona göre bu sürekli değişim bilincinin sabit ve formal bir yapısı vardır ve zamanın değişken içeriği ancak bu yapı içerisinde yenilenebilmektedir. Bu yapı, yeni içeriklerle sürekli olarak dolarken, zamanın akişını anlamamızı yardımcı olur. Ancak, Husserl'in zaman bilincinin öngörüdüğü bu yapı, zamanın doğasına aykırı olarak zamanı homojen ve sürekli bir düzleme dönüştürür ve böylece zamanın canlılığını ve tazeliğini belirli bir çerçeveyle hapseder. Bergson'un zaman anlayışı ise,

bu noktada fenomenolojik açıdan baktığımızda Bergson’un daha üstün bir fenomenolog olduğunu bile kabul edebiliriz.

Sonuç olarak Husserl, zaman bilinci modelinde yönelimselliğe dayalı analizyle mekanik bir zaman kavrayışı ortaya koyar ve her anın geçmiş ve gelecek ile bir tür “uzamsallık” içinde bağlanılsa olduğu one sürer. Bu durum da zamanın bildiğimiz anlamda bir anlık deneyimiyle çelişir. Bergson ise, sürekli bir akış olan saf sürenin bölünemez olduğunu savunarak zamanın mekânsallaştırılması karşısında çıkar. Bergson’un saf hafıza ve alışkanlık hafızası arasındaki ayrımı ise, zamanın direkt ve doğrudan deneyimine daha sadık kalırken, Husserl’in ortaya koyduğu ve statik bir yapida incelediği zaman bilinci ise yaşanan annın tazelik ve tamlığını tam olarak yakalayamaz.

Bu tezde, öncelikle Husserl’in zaman bilincine dair görüşlerini inceledik ve Husserl açısından zamanın, bilincimizin ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğunu gördük. Ancak sonrasında Husserl’in yönelimsel eylemler bağlamında ortaya koyduğu zaman deneyiminin, geçmiş, şimdiki zaman ve gelecek arasındaki ilişkileri "yakınlık" ve "uzaklık" kavramları üzerinden açıklaması nedeniyle Bergson'un zaman bilincine nazaran zamanı mekânsallaştırdığını ve zamanın aşıran ve dinamik doğası ile örtüşmediğini gördük. Nitekim Bergson, Husserl’e kıyasla zamanın saf süre olarak anlaşılması gerektiğini ifade etmektede ve farklı bilinç durumlarının birbirinden mekânsal bir biçimde ayrı olmaması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bergson, Husserl’in bir dizi mekânsal analogi yardımı ile bir tür ayrıntı dizi dişisi olarak betimlediği zaman kavrayışı yerine, zamanın saf süre olarak deneyimlenmesi gerektiğini ve zamanda geçmiş, şimdiki zaman ve geleceğin birbirinden ayrılmayacağını vurgulamaktadır.

Bu bakımdan Bergson’un saf hafıza ve alışkanlık hafızası arasındaki ayrımı, zamanın doğrudan ve aracılık deneyimine sadık kaldığını görürüz. Buna karşılık Husserl’in zaman bilincinin mekânsal karakteri, zamanın gerçek doğasını temsil etmede yetersiz kalmaktadır. Husserl ve Bergson’un zaman bilinci teorileri fenomenolojik bir perspektiften incelediğimizde ise, Husserl’in teorisinin zamanın "tazelik" ve "tamlik" yönlerini tam olarak kavrayamadığını, buna karşılık Bergson’un zamanın mekânsallaştırılmasına karşı koyduğu görüür. Bu açıdan bakıldığında Bergson, zaman bilinci konusunda Husserl'den daha üstün bir fenomenolog olarak.
değerlendirilebilir. Husserl'in zaman bilinci üzerine çalışmaları, her ne kadar zamana
dair derinlikli ve teknik açıdan çok yönlü bir anlayış ortaya koysa da, zamanın
gerçek doğasını tam olarak yansıtmamaktadır. Ancak Bergson'un zaman deneyimi
hakkındaki çalışmaları, Husserl'e kıyaslta zamanın doğrudan verilmişliğini daha
doğru bir biçimde betimlemektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığımda, eğer bu iki filozof
felsefi ilişkilerini ve etkileşimlerini sürdürmüştler olsaları, belki de Husserl'in, kendi
ilkelerine daha yakından uyarak 'zamanın kendisine' geri dönebileceğini
söyleyebiliriz.
B. MERLEAU-PONTY ON SIMULTANEITY OF RETENTION AND PROTENTION

Examining the theory of another phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty, who shares convergent yet distinct perspectives on time consciousness with Husserl and emerges from the same phenomenological tradition, we find notable similarities in philosophical interests and concerns. Merleau-Ponty incorporates the concepts of retention and protention to explain temporal consciousness and examines time within an intentional structure akin to Husserl's. In doing so, he effectively concretizes Husserl's views, as he essentially claims that the perceptual structure of spatiality can equally be applied to the temporal one. Indeed, he illustrates the spatialization of time and the attribution of an intentional transition included in Husserl's account between past, present, and future perceptions with concrete examples. In this context, he argues that “time should not be seen not so much as a line but as an intentional weave” (Michalski, 1997, p. 136). According to the phenomenological understanding, as mentioned earlier, perception grounds on subjective and lived experiences; although perception is always limited to a single perspective in terms of the spatial object-horizon structure, it expands from the object of present perception towards the unperceived ones as it creates an empty intention to be fulfilled by what is unknown. In this case, according to Merleau-Ponty (1986, p. 79), every object would be the mirror of all others; therefore, to see an object would be to grasp it in terms of all the aspects that they present to it, which remain abodes open to the vision. He argues that “any seeing of an object by me is instantaneously reiterated among all those objects in the world which are apprehended as co-existent, because each of them is all that the others ‘see’ of it” (Merleau-Ponty, 1986, p. 79). Then, a particular house, for instance, is not a house seen from nowhere but a house that is seen from everywhere.

He holds that the spatial perspective can equally be applied to the temporal perspective, as if time also had some sort of spatial horizon, as he describes in the following statement: “If I contemplate the house attentively and with no thought in my mind, it has something eternal about it,” and he follows: “Even if it should
collapse tomorrow, it will remain for ever true that it existed today: each moment of
time calls all the others to witness” (Merleau-Ponty, 1986, p. 79). In this sense,
different moments in the structure of the temporal horizon seem to intend each other
permanently in the same way as different objects do in the spatial horizon.
Furthermore, he illustrates another scenario as follows: “If I walk along a shore
towards a ship which has run aground, and the funnel or masts merge into the forest
bordering on the sand dune, there will be a moment when these details suddenly
become part of the ship, and indissolubly fused with it” (Merleau-Ponty, 1986, p.
20). In this regard, the different details seen while approaching the shore suddenly
transform into a ship at a certain moment, meaning that it is the past moment in
which the details in question are seen, intending to the present as an act of
intentionality in which the perception of the ship is constituted, and this transition of
such details turning into a ship, according to Merleau-Ponty, takes place in terms of
temporal relations. Thus, it seems to lead to an understanding of temporal
consciousness in the sense that different moments in time simultaneously exist and
point each other in the temporal horizon in an intentional way, just as spatial objects
do in the spatial horizon. In brief, all these differences offer an understanding of time
in the sense that the past and the future exist simultaneously as well as the present,
though they exist only in a temporal sense. This conception, as stated in the study,
brings about many problems. For Merleau-Ponty, for example, the relation between
different moments of time would be reduced to the level of an act of intentionality,
which further leads to a consideration of temporality as a spatial structure. In this
case, the transition between the different modes of time taking place between
retentions and protentions would be no different than navigating through the
intentional structure of spatial objects.
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