

THE CONCEPT OF NOBILITY IN NIETZSCHE

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE CONCEPT OF NOBILITY IN NIETZSCHE**

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This thesis explores the concept of nobility in Nietzsche. As beings of consciousness human beings possess the potential to create and shape their own lives. How individuals exercise this potentiality reveals their character, their attitude towards themselves and life. They do so by setting purposes, attributing meanings, and thus constructing paradigms of values and ideals for their lives. These paradigms of values serve as the molds or patterns for self-creation. Furthermore, the nature of these molds and patterns—namely, purposes and ideals—reflects individuals' character, and way of life. Human beings may exhibit either a reactive, and degenerative attitude towards life, resulting in purposes and ideals detrimental to existence, or they may adopt an affirmative and healthy stance, leading to aims and ideals conducive to the flourishing of life. The positing of life-negating ideals stems from misconceptions of reason. Overcoming these misconceptions is crucial for the growth of life and self-overcoming. When individuals erroneously view purposes, meanings, and ideals as eternal realities, they become slaves to their illusions. In a world of perpetual becoming, rejecting change and growth impoverishes life itself. Conversely, a correct stance—befitting the creative character of human beings—requires the affirmation of life in all its aspects, including suffering. Only through

perpetual self-overcoming can individuals achieve human greatness, which entails beautifying life by creating it as a work of art. Nobility represents the character and way of life directed towards the attainment of human greatness. Only as creators of aesthetic perfection can individuals justify their existence.

**Keywords:** nobility, truth, beauty, justice, aesthetic justification of existence,

## ÖZ

### NIETZSCHE'DE ASALET KAVRAMI

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Bu tezin merkezinde Nietzsche'nin asalet kavramı yer alır. Bilinç varlığı olarak insan kendini ve tüm gerçekliğini yaratma imkanını üzerinde taşır. Bu imkanı kullanma biçimi insanın kendisine, hayata, varoluşa karşı duruşunu açığa vurur. O bu imkanı kendisine hedefler belirleyerek, hayatına anlamlar atfederek ve bu şekilde değer paradigmaları, idealler yaratarak hayata geçirir. Bu paradigmalar bir nevi insanın kendini yarattığı kalıp ve biçimler olarak hizmet eder. Bir başka açıdan değerlendirildiğinde bu kalıp ve biçimlerin yani, onun amaç ve anlamlarının, hakikat ve ideallerinin doğası insanın kendisinin, karakterinin, yaşam biçiminin yansımasıdır. İnsan hayata karşı ya tepkisel, bıkkın ve özünü yitirmiş bir tutum içinde olur ve bu doğrultuda kendi varoluşuna aykırı ve hayata hasmane amaç ve idealler belirler ya da olumluyucu, güçlü ve sağlıklı bir duruş sergileyerek hayatın gelişip serpilmesine imkan sağlayan amaç ve idealler belirler. Hayatı yadsıyan idealler belirlemek insan aklının kendi yanılgılarının eseridir. Bu insan aklının bir özelliğidir ve esasen hayatın serpilip gelişmesi de ancak bu tür yanılgıların üstesinden gelmekle mümkün olur. İnsan yanılgıya düşüp kendi koyduğu amaç ve anlamları ve ilgili değerleri ezeli idealler olarak görmeye başladığında kendi illüzyonlarının kölesi olmaya başlar. Zira ezeli oluş halinde olan bir dünyada değişimi ve gelişimi yadsımak hayatın



kısırlaştırılmasından başka bir anlama gelmez. Oysa insanın yaratıcı karakterine yakışan duruş her türlü eziyeti de dahil olmak üzere hayatı tüm yönleriyle olumlamaktır. Bir sanat eseri misali hayatın güzelleştirilmesinden başka bir anlamı olmayan insani yüceliğe ancak insanın kendini durmaksızın aşmasıyla ulaşılabilir. Asalet insani yüceliği ulaşmaya yönelmiş insan karakteri ve yaşam biçiminin kendisidir. İnsan sadece bu şekilde, estetik olarak varoluşunu temellendirebilir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** asalet, hakikat, güzellik, adalet, varoluşun estetik yönden temellendirilmesi,

*to the memories of my brother, Zeki Kutan,  
and my father, Hasan Kutan*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AC</i>	: <i>The Antichrist</i>
<i>BGE</i>	: <i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>
<i>BT</i>	: <i>The Birth of Tragedy</i>
<i>CW</i>	: <i>The Case of Wagner</i>
<i>D</i>	: <i>Daybreak</i>
<i>EH</i>	: <i>Ecce Homo</i>
<i>GM</i>	: <i>On the Genealogy of Morality</i>
<i>GS</i>	: <i>The Gay Science</i>
<i>HAH</i>	: <i>Human, All Too Human</i>
<i>KSA</i>	: <i>Samtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe</i>
<i>PTG</i>	: <i>Philosophy in The Tragic Age of the Greeks</i>
<i>TI</i>	: <i>Twilight of the Idols</i>
<i>UM</i>	: <i>Untimely Meditations</i>
<i>WLN</i>	: <i>Writings from the Late Notebooks</i>
<i>WP</i>	: <i>The Will to Power</i>
<i>Z</i>	: <i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i>

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

“*Hat man mich verstanden?— Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigte* (“*Have I been Understood?—Dionysos Versus the Crucified*”<sup>1</sup>) These are the very last two sentences with which Nietzsche terminates his last book *Ecce Homo*. And it would not be wrong to accept the title of the book (together with subtitle) as the very first sentence which reads: *Ecce Homo, How One Become What One Is*. (*Ecce Homo, Wie man wird, was man is*). Between these two set of sentences Nietzsche gives a very interesting exposition of autobiography as a philosopher.

In the Preface to *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche says that for him philosophy means nothing but “visiting all the strange and questionable aspects of existence, everything banned by morality” and that in his dealings with what is “*forbidden*” by moralities he comes to view “the reasons why people have been moralizing and idealizing” as “the *hidden* history of philosophers, the psychology of its greatest names.”<sup>2</sup> Then this means that what the philosophers have expounded as systems of moralities are ultimately nothing more than their proper means for their self-preservation in a broader sense. To put in another way, according to Nietzsche every philosophy, every system of morality is in fact revealing its author’s psychology.

Then, are we entitled to say that Nietzsche while doing philosophy was carving himself out of himself; or was he opening a pathway in the wild forest to find himself? He finishes this book just some twenty days before his mental collapse. If so, we may ask. Had Nietzsche found himself on the way? Had he become what he is? Is it possible for one to become what one is in a world of everlasting becoming?

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<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo, How to Become What you Are in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of Idols and Other Writings*, eds. A. Ridley and J. Norman, trans. J. Norman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.151.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p.72.

In the final sentences above given he is asking whether anyone of us, as students of him, has understood him or not. Why does Nietzsche pose such a question, whether someone understands him or not? What does this question of him, reveal or rather conceal? There seems to be a 'burden' concealed within this question. Is it a demand, or an expectation, or a hope? Or should we take it as a hopeless utterance, a definite assurance of the impossibility of ever being understood. Any way! It is obvious that anyone who utters a piece of word in the air or puts it down on a paper, who draws a picture on the wall of a cave, who sings a song is delivering a kind of message out of himself or herself, and mostly does so in the view of communicating with others. What is communicating a message if not to cause an effect on the receiver of that message! The second half of the sentence conveys this message: Dionysos versus the Crucified! So at least Nietzsche gives us a clue: to understand him we have to understand Dionysos and the Crucified. However, before addressing the relationship between these three, Dionysos, the Crucified and Nietzsche, it would be better first to linger a bit more on the issue of understanding Nietzsche as a philosopher.

It has been a commonplace to divide the development of Nietzsche's thought in three periods, namely as early, middle and late phases of his philosophy. In *Ecce Homo*, referring to his early phase, Nietzsche himself tells us that during this phase of his thought he was sick, he was infected with idealism and romanticism. We understand that he got these 'germs', these "idols" from Schopenhauer and Wagner. Especially in his first book *The Birth of Tragedy* it is not difficult to discern their clear influence. The main focal points of his thought during this first period are the 'culture' and related issues. However, he then says that he had overcome his sickness, regained his health and got hold of himself again. This transition comes when he broke with Wagner. *Human, All Too Human* marks the beginning of the middle period. If Nietzsche calls his idealistic first phase as sickness, as illness then the cure is not difficult to guess. Heidegger, for instance, labels this period of Nietzsche as his positivist period. According to Nietzsche's own recount, he is now dealing intensively and exclusively with natural sciences, psychology, psychology, the problems related to knowledge and moral values. *The Gay Science* marks the culmination of this period. We see a clear shift in his philosophy in many respects;



not only in content or essence but also in his style as well. Different from the previous period where his writings mainly comprise of long essays or short pamphlets, he now uses short or long aphorisms and poems as well. The very last section of *The Gay Science* is in fact an excerpt from already written notes of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. He finishes the book by the words “incipit Zarathustra”, words which mark the beginning of Nietzsche’s last period. With *Zarathustra* we encounter a different style. The book is written wholly in prose style. And in the books that follow *Zarathustra* he uses different styles together. In this period, he distances himself with positivism as well. He again overcomes himself, if we allowed to state in his terms.

Now seeing all these, dealing with such a philosopher who clearly and constantly transforms and “creates” his philosophy and surely himself anew is not an easy task. He mostly avoids philosophizing in a didactic, argumentative style. He resorts to irony, sarcasm, and exaggeration. We should, for instance, note that the subtitle of *Zarathustra* reads: *A Book for All and None* and still more interesting is what he writes about this book: “nobody is free to have ears for Zarathustra.”<sup>3</sup> In addition, this is a philosopher who says there are no facts but only perspectival interpretations of phenomena. This means that at best we can have an interpretation of his philosophy. But what is the relation between an interpretation and an interpreted phenomenon, in our case Nietzsche’s philosophy? Does it point to an open-endedness, an arbitrariness of interpretations? The answer can both be affirmative and/or negative depending on whether one has ears for Nietzsche’s philosophy or not. And if one does not have ears for Nietzsche’s philosophy then arbitrariness necessarily follows. But what does it mean to have ears for Zarathustra, or Nietzsche’s philosophy in general? Where are these ears to procure? Are we not supposed to have ears from birth? The fact that no philosopher has ever been interpreted as arbitrarily as he has been, can serve as a proof that at least some do not have ears for him. It must be an irony of history that his sister was one of the leading figures of this arbitrariness camp of interpretation. Assuming one has ears, at least there is the possibility that the region of arbitrariness can be left behind. However,

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<sup>3</sup> *EH*, p.73.

this does not close the doors for a vast variety of interpretations, even strictly opposed ones.

But in fact, we must pose another question. Why do we have to have ears to understand Nietzsche's Zarathustra? Why not reason instead of ears? Why do we need ears instead of reason to understand a philosophical book? An answer for this question needs a full recount of Nietzsche's philosophy. Therefore, we have to leave such questions unanswered for now. It suffices to say that such riddles and questions are part and parcel of Nietzsche's style and thought. And we have said that even having proper ears does not prevent diametrically opposing interpretations among Nietzsche's researchers. For instance, some call him misogynist others calls him advocate of feminism. Far-right and far-left thinkers alike can find a Nietzsche that speaks to them. Indeed, we can find many seemingly contradictory claims throughout his writings. He praises, for instance, a certain philosopher in a certain context, and vehemently criticizes the same philosopher in another context but due to his deliberate and preferred style of philosophizing never in an overtly systematic, in a clear argumentative style which we are accustomed to see in traditional philosophers. Therefore, not paying due attention to their relevant contexts can easily lead to misconceptions. We should state that Nietzsche puts on the shoulders of his students the responsibility of undertaking a due and arduous preparation to understand his philosophy. And we have to say that there are some real contradictions among his ideas as well, for, as we have said above, his thought had undergone various changes. These few remarks are sufficient to make the claim that reading Nietzsche necessitates an arduous, painstaking preparation for his philosophy.

In a section of *The Gay Science* which he entitled as "we incomprehensible ones" Nietzsche says: "Have we ever complained about being misunderstood, misjudged, misidentified, defamed, misheard, and ignored? This is precisely our lot – ... this is also our distinction; we wouldn't honour ourselves enough if we wanted otherwise."<sup>4</sup> Nietzsche marks it as a distinction even not to be understood easily. For a philosopher who is against universality of values, who instead emphasizes the

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<sup>4</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, ed. Bernard Williams; trans. Josefine Nauckhoff; Adrian Del Caro., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 371, p.236.

priority of personal *tastes*, giving one's character a unique style, 'not to be easily deciphered' would be a sign of distinction and honour. And he mentions other reasons for his taking misunderstandings and misidentification as a sign of distinction: he says that: "for we ourselves keep growing, changing, shedding old hides; we still shed our skins every spring; we become increasingly younger, more future-oriented, taller, stronger."<sup>5</sup> It is no surprise again that for a philosopher whose philosophy is centered around the ideas such as self-overcoming, everlasting creative power of life, growth, shedding his "skins every spring", contradictoriness or inconsistencies in thought seem to be a sign of honor. For Nietzsche tendency for idealizing, ossification and regarding change as something bad is itself a sign of degeneration. Nietzsche's concept of nobility, which entails personal growth and fluidity as necessities aligns with his view on contradictions. Being 'not easily deciphered' reflects ongoing self-creation, and some contradictions might be seen as signs of a dynamic spirit, constantly evolving and rejecting stagnation.

Having said all these, we by no means want to assert that there is not a coherent, unified philosophy of Nietzsche. On the contrary, we can strongly claim that despite all the changes, all different phases that his philosophy has undergone there is no doubt that he has a crystal-clear and a very systematic thought. While Nietzsche's philosophy displays a clear evolution of thought it is not difficult to discern its underlying coherence. Core themes connect throughout his work, even as they are refined and developed. Nietzsche's philosophy allows different interpretations which can appear contradictory at times. Nietzsche who is proud of himself for changing his "skins every spring" in another occasion says the following as well: "In the end, when the work is complete, it becomes clear it was the force of a single taste that ruled and shaped everything great and small – whether the taste was good or bad means less than one may think; it's enough that it was one taste!"<sup>6</sup> Indeed, it is impossible to see, to feel this personal taste throughout his writings. His thoughts seem at first glance to be scattered among seemingly unrelated aphorisms, his style, his use of metaphors does not allow an easy understanding. However, it would not be wrong to say that if one succeeds in removing the veil, which Nietzsche deliberately

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<sup>5</sup> GS, 371, p.236.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 290, p.164.

throws over his thought one can see that a comprehensive, systematic thought begins to radiate. Of course, this is our reading of Nietzsche and we accept the truth and legitimacy of different interpretations so long as they do not disregard the kernel characteristics of his thought. With these remarks at hand, we can now proceed to the content of our thesis.

In this quest, we tried to address the conception of nobility in Nietzsche. The concept of nobility is one of the concepts which stands at the core of Nietzsche's thought. If, for instance, the Kant uses his theoretical philosophy as a springboard for his practical philosophy, if his all his endeavor of the realm of epistemology is in the service of his moral philosophy, the same is true for Nietzsche. Nietzsche contends that after him the era of the "great politics" begins.<sup>7</sup> Regardless his achievements in the so-called theoretical philosophy it seems to be more appropriate to call him rather as a practical or specifically as political philosopher. An artist-philosopher of "great politics."

If we are to define Nietzsche in a few words, we can define him with his own self-conception: Nietzsche seems to be taking himself to be a knight-philosopher who undertakes the task of saving the honor and dignity of human being and his only home, the world, the world in the sense of all existence. In this regard, the concept of nobility refers to the maturity of human being, to a character, a personality of the human being who shoulders his responsibility, who holds on tightly his great freedom. Responsibility for what? Responsibility for the justification of the existence. There can only be aesthetic justification of existence says Nietzsche. Nobility is the existential posture that human beings must exemplify in their person if they are going to justify their existence aesthetically.

Nietzsche thinks that western philosophy and its morality with their misconceptions of human reality have condemned human being to a servile, slavish existence. In this way they have debased humanity, and the earth. They have forced humanity to be slave of their illusions. With pompous words such as God, truth, justice, equality, the moral world order they have debased humanity and negated life. Generations

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<sup>7</sup> *EH*, p.144.

over generations have been wasted as firewood in the furnace of the morality of western metaphysics. According to Nietzsche behind all this illusion there rests the will of a certain type of man. This type is the ascetic priest. Priests of all kind and times have devised ideal worlds, which suit best the condition of their survival. They have disguised their volitions under the cloak of truth and ruled the people as they willed. They have fashioned people, shaped life, and waged war on humanity all with good conscience. In this regard, Christianity has turned the existence of human being itself into the original, existential sin. It has tortured many generations with the feeling of guilt.

Now Nietzsche with his intervention wants to change the course of history once and for all. Under the never ceasing waves of the developments in the sciences, the temple of old values is demolished and human beings are freed from their yoke. Now they are on a crossroad. Whether they will assume a noble stance and endeavor for human greatness or they will search for new yokes is up to them. Nietzsche with his paradigm tries to show the possibility of a noble way. Our quest in this thesis is an attempt to shed a different light on Nietzsche's exposition of the concept of nobility. Of course, the concept of nobility cannot be handled without a through discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy in general. To this end first of all his criticism against traditional western metaphysics is addressed. In this regard especially the concept of subjectivity as established in western metaphysics and the response that Nietzsche gives to this conception and the novelty that Nietzsche brings in regarding the human subject. Again, the metaphysical assumptions of western philosophy regarding conception of being or existence and the different metaphysical assumptions regarding the existence on top of which Nietzsche builds his philosophy are also brought in.

This thesis comprises of tree main chapters. In the first Chapter we try to expose how Nietzsche traces the root of the misconceptions of western metaphysics back to Socrates. According to Nietzsche the advent of Socratism marks the death of the tragic age of the ancient Greece. For him, the tragic age of ancient Greeks is the expression of a robust, life-affirming, healthy society. Their tragedies in which the deity Dionysos has the central role reveal the glorification of their own life. They

were people of self-assurance who welcome even the terrible sufferings of life. Their tragedies are testimonies of their delight, their joy in life in its all aspects. Now Nietzsche claims that, Socrates together with Euripides bring an end to Greek tragedy with their intervention on behalf of reason and rationality as against instincts and passions. With the involvement of Platon, the pupil of Socrates, course of events takes a new turn. With his theory of ideas, and in this regard the idea of good, he changes the life of western world dramatically. He invented a true world of ideas which is perfect, eternal, unchanging and our actual world turn out to be an illusory, deficient, transient and a pale copy of the true world.

Then comes the Crucified, and after his death Christianity was fabricated by Paul. Paul has built a true world more or less after the fashion of Platonism with the addition of the concept of sin and guilt. This tradition that has its beginnings in Socratism has been dominant near two millennia in western world but with the developments in science it gradually begins to shatter. In modern time Europe its main representative was Immanuel Kant and he makes an attempt to save the collapse of temple of Christianity but to no avail. The death of God was proclaimed by a madman in a marketplace. The death of God means the collapse of all values, including, the truth.

Modern Europe now faces with nihilism. All highly esteemed values have lost their meanings. All purposes, all goals are vanished. The true world has turned into a “fable” as Nietzsche puts it. But people are not yet aware of the dramatic consequences of this nihilistic condition.

Chapter 2 deals with the assessment and critique made by Nietzsche over the Nihilistic condition of Europe. In this chapter, moreover the development of the thought of Nietzsche is exposed. As we have said above according to Nietzsche every philosophy is in a sense a personal history of its author and thus reveals the psychology of the philosopher. In line with Nietzsche’s view, we also find it appropriate, and especially in the case of Nietzsche highly valuable to bring some characteristics of his personality and his personal history into the text. Nietzsche more than any other philosopher exposes his philosophy as a personal task. His

personality, his illnesses, his personal relations, such as Wagner, his diet, his personal tastes etc. are the integral parts of his philosophy. In this regard another issue should specifically be mentioned. Nietzsche's language is very powerful in its artistic, rhetorical flavor and in a totally analytical, argumentative discussion there appears the danger of eliminating this flavor. In order not to do injustice to the rhetorical power of his language sometimes long quotations are regarded as inevitable. Moreover, even at times we also feel compelled to adapt our language to his rhythm or his sarcastic tone.

Another topic addressed in this chapter is the concept of subjectivity of traditional western metaphysics. According to Nietzsche, the untenable conception of subjectivity of western metaphysics is in the center of the all illusions of western philosophy. They regarded human being mainly on the basis of his rationality and disregarded all bodily forces, such as instincts, desires, passions, inclinations. Moreover, they take reason to be something like a logical unity, a perfect and universal trait of human beings. They ascribe reason a divinity and find its supremacy over bodily passions legitimate. Body on the other hand is regarded as profane and something base which belongs to physical world. It is thanks to reason that human beings can acquire the knowledge of outer world and the knowledge about divine world order. Senses on the other hand blur the clarity of reason. Therefore, body must obey reason and its irrational, animal desires and impulses must be held under strict scrutiny of reason. Western metaphysics with such assumptions fabricated some divinely entities and divine world orders. If laws of reason, i.e., laws of morality are strictly obeyed human beings can get salvation. In this manner, beginning with the tyranny of reason over body, they shifted to tyranny of moral laws of religion. Beginning from reason which they projected as logical entity over being, they invented the concepts of identity and equality. With this concept of ideal identity, they erased all differences among human beings and things.

Nietzsche totally changes the conception of subjectivity with his concept of will to power. Nietzsche, contrary to traditional philosophers, does not accept a body soul duality and gives priority to the body. After Darwin, it is no surprise that Nietzsche relegates human beings among animals and regards consciousness as a latecomer

with regard to body in line with evolutionary theory. The body is our great reason and from the perspective of life, it has primordial functionality compared to consciousness. Now all living organisms regarded as will to power, each corresponding to a quantum of force. But differences between quantity of forces reflect a qualitative difference. All forces has effects on each other and thus are in a state of constant struggle. In the case of human beings, each quantum of force corresponds to a different level consciousness. The peculiarity of will to power is domination, and growth. It wants to expand its forces and overpower and assimilate its environment.

Now with new conception of subjectivity the formation of knowledge is also changed. The priority is given to senses and body. Most judgments of human beings are taken by unconscious drives of body and only a certain amount of these decisions known by our consciousness. Therefore, the contention that the categories of reason secure the universality our knowledge, i.e., achieve the truth of reality has lost its validity. Knowledge is the outcome of aesthetic appreciation of our body. There is no such thing as objective knowledge and there are no facts out there and therefore truth is not something to be discovered. Knowing is always perspectival and there are no facts but perspectival interpretations of phenomena. Objectivity is a construct, which is achieved only through the confrontation of competing perspectives.

Knowledge is an aesthetic phenomenon and formed in the fashion a work of art. Knowledge is the sign language of the best survival conditions of living organism, condition in which it feels security and sense of power. Moreover, human being is conscious of past and future and he cannot do without purposes and goals and these purposes and goals are formed as an ideal world, a world view, as a paradigm of values which then serves something as categories, as molds and patterns, as values of human evaluations. The creation of ideal world is an aesthetic creation, a metaphysical construction of human being. In other word, our truths are our creations which in turn serve as the categories, values through which we interpret the perceived reality. Therefore, our knowledge can be viewed only as a creation of an artist and only in the service of life. Knowledge is not a phenomenon in itself; and truth is not something out there to be discovered, it is a product of the struggle of will



to power with its surroundings. Truth is a kind of error that human beings cannot do without. It signifies nothing but a “holding-to-be true, a belief that we know something. According to Nietzsche, it is the concept of truth, which serves as the basis of all metaphysical thinking. With the critique of the concept of truth and in general ascribing the priority of aesthetic appreciations/valuations of the body over alleged categories over reason, now art seems to be true metaphysical activity of human being. Accordingly, instead of the concept of truth, the concept of beauty has priority in determining the purposes, and world views. The concept of beauty is associated with the feeling of power, that which is beneficial to the life. Therefore, from the perspective of life art has priority over science and knowledge.

In Chapter 3 the concept of nobility is discussed. Traditional metaphysics starting from the concepts of reason, truth, and being arrives at the concept of equality. By giving priority to reason over body it disregards all multiplicity within body. In a further move, this time by an alleged universality of reason, it sees all human beings as equal and thereby disregards differences among human beings. Thus, what traditional morality tries to establish is the tyranny of reason over the body and tyranny of morality in society. For Nietzsche, however, body comprises a multiplicity of forces and to choose one of them and impose on all the others means nothing but putting the individual in the straitjacket of reason, which would mean the negation of life. It imposes one mask as personality or character to the individual and prevents the creation of a robust and harmonious personality which can be achieved only through constant experimentation and self-overcoming. One cannot not know true strength of his personality a priori. However, moralities offer ready-made and allegedly perfect personalities to every individual.

According to Nietzsche, every human being is unique and the differences among individuals are absolute. By disregarding differences among human beings to impose on them allegedly, universal laws of reason cannot be defended on the pretext of justice. Justice should be a demand to respect all differences and treat human beings according to their capacities. Equality means treating some favorably by committing injustice to the disadvantage others. For Nietzsche western metaphysics proposes a slave morality, in which people are mainly reactive and have resentment against life.

For they kneel down before their illusions which they take to be eternal truth. In this way, they turn themselves into slaves of their own illusions. By such a stance, they escape from confronting the reality, as it is, a reality, which is in constant becoming. The morality of Christianity in this regard is very notorious with its concept of the original sin and the sense of guilt. It negates life from the outset. All this slave morality has its root in the concept of truth, which is purported by Socrates/Platon. Based on the concept of truth, and the theory of ideas they contrived an ideal world and God and debased the actual world as deficient and transitory. Now the Christian God is dead and all moral values of Christianity have lost their efficiency.

Human beings have now broken the yoke but they are faced with a meaningless world of nihilism. Therefore, they need a new meaning. Nietzsche with his philosophy proposes this meaning which he named as overman. Overman is the symbol of hope, of self-overcoming, of creation the future of humanity. Human being has no other choice than to rely on himself and to affirm life with all its aspects, including every kind of suffering. What befits human being is to assume responsibility of his life and create himself and the society in which he lives, the human society as works of art. Only in this way can he justify his existence. Only with a noble stance beauty can be achieved. Nobility means justice, and beauty. There is no other way for human being to live a decent and dignified life without a noble stance. Nobility is the affirmation of life and transforming it in a work of art.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE PROBLEM OF SOKRATES

#### 2.1. The Plot of Reason / (Athens)

In his preface to the second edition of *The Birth of Tragedy* (1871) which entitled as “An Attempt of Self-Criticism” (1886) Nietzsche says “[w]hat I had got hold of at that time was something fearsome and dangerous, a problem with horns, not necessarily a bull, but at any rate a *new* problem; ... it was the problem of science itself, science grasped for the first time as something problematic and questionable.”<sup>8</sup> In this book Nietzsche’s main argument is that it was the phenomenon of the Dionysian<sup>9</sup> which gave birth to the Greek tragedy, and conversely it was “Socratism in ethics, the dialectics, smugness and cheerfulness of theoretical man” which caused its death.<sup>10</sup> Nietzsche thus pinpoints one of the scapegoats of his philosophy and asks: “might not this very Socratism be a sign of decline, of exhaustion, of sickness, of the anarchic dissolution of the instincts?”<sup>11</sup> Although Nietzsche in this late Preface admits how his first book in many respects seems “unpleasant” to him he nevertheless proudly says that he by no means gets “colder” “nor grown any more of a stranger to the task which this reckless book first dared to approach: *to look at*

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<sup>8</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, eds. R. Geuss and R. Speirs, trans. R. Speirs, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 4-5

<sup>9</sup> Walter Kaufmann claims that “[t]he conception of the Dionysian in *The Birth of Tragedy* differs from Nietzsche’s later conception of the Dionysian. He originally introduced the term to symbolize the tendencies that found expression in the festivals of Dionysus, and contrasted the Dionysian with the Apollinian; but in his later thought the Dionysian stands for the creative employment of the passions and the affirmation of life in spite of suffering—as it were, for the synthesis of the Dionysian, as originally conceived, with the Apollinian—and it is contrasted with the Christian negation of life and extirpation of the passions. See, footnote to *The Birth of Tragedy* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kauffman, (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), p.20

<sup>10</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, p.4.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p.4.

science through the prism of the artist, but also to look at art through the prism of life.”<sup>12</sup> And he emphatically points to an assertion that is put forward in that book: “art – and *not* morality – is the true metaphysical activity of man; several time in the book itself the provocative sentence recurs that the existence of the world is *justified* (*gerechtfertigt*) only as an aesthetic phenomenon.”<sup>13</sup>

We now turn to Nietzsche’s last book *Ecce Homo*, where he reiterates “the crucial innovations” of his first book: to understand “the Dionysian phenomenon” “as the single root of the whole of Greek art” on the one hand, and Socratism on the other. “Socrates,” claims Nietzsche, “recognized for the first time as the instrument of Greek disintegration, as a typical decadent. ‘Rationality’ *against* instinct. ‘Rationality’ at any price as dangerous, as a form of violence that undermines life!”<sup>14</sup> Here we will not discuss whether Nietzsche’s conception of Socrates<sup>15</sup> is tenable or not and in this regard whether Nietzsche does him any injustice or not; we will rather take it for granted Nietzsche’s portrayal of Socrates as it is, what he calls Socratism or Platonism. Thus, in this regard, whenever in this discussion any reference is made to Socrates/Socratism or Plato/Platonism it must be taken in the sense that Nietzsche ascribes to these names.

As above mentioned throughout his productive lifespan as a thinker, from his first book down to his last, one of his main focal points is this Socratism. The inventory of predications which Nietzsche somehow brings in relation with the figure of Socrates is quite rich, just to mention some of them: ‘science’, ‘truth’, ‘consciousness’, ‘reason’ ‘rationality’, ‘thought’, ‘theoretical man’, ‘dialectics’,

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<sup>12</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, p.5

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p.8

<sup>14</sup> *EH*, p.108.

<sup>15</sup> It is worthwhile to mention at this stage that Nietzsche’s conception of Socrates as a philosopher is ambivalent. Throughout his writing we encounter many instances where he speaks of Socrates positively and again many others where he speaks of him negatively. Nietzsche’s styles, his use of irony, metaphors and analogies, the context, the evolution of Nietzsche’s own thought are among the factors that should be taken into account for a due assessment of his view of Sokrates. In this regard, see, for example Walter Kauffman who devotes one chapter (entitled “Nietzsche’s Attitude Toward Sokrates”) of his book *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* to this subject. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp.391-411.

‘logic’, ‘discursive thought’, ‘argumentative justification’. For Nietzsche, Socratism signifies the philosophical tendency, which ascribes a certain value to knowledge, to reason, to rationality and thus dressing it up with a moral value, with a morality, which in turn purportedly will bring a good life, that is, happiness.

As quoted above what is brought before the court is science [*Wissenschaft*] itself, the theoretical knowledge, the human consciousness, the conceptual thinking, the conception of *truth*, the *reason*, the *rationality* regarded as true basis of a good life. According to Nietzsche starting from Socrates via Plato and Christianity, through Kant down to the modern-day political movements, which are preachers of equality it has been more or less the same basic tendency, the same value judgment, the same morality that dominates life in Europe or the so-called western world. True, there have been great personalities such as Goethe, Napoleon, Cesare Borgia who, or epochs or cultures like the tragic age of Greece, antic Rome and Renaissance, which raised upon the thick and heavy “cobweb” of morality and breath the clear air of mountains, but these cases arose never as willed but as exceptions.

## **2.2. The Death of Dionysos**

As is stated above Nietzsche depicts Socratic rationality not in isolation but in contrast to the phenomenon of the Dionysian which stands as an expression of a life in instinctive assurance of itself, a life with a feeling of overflowing power, with a feeling joy and eternal delight, which welcomes every kind of suffering and thus never looks around for any sort of values or criterion for its justification, any anchor for its (self-)confidence. According to Nietzsche, the ancient Greek tragedy is a reflection of the life of ancient Greeks itself and thus any change of the performance on the stage regarding its content and/or its artistic form of presentation must have been caused by a change in actual life. Prior to Socrates’ appearance on the stage:

It is a matter of indisputable historical record that the only subject-matter of Greek tragedy, in its earliest form, was the suffering of Dionysos, and for a long time the only hero present on the stage was, accordingly, Dionysos. But one may also say with equal certainty that right down to Euripides, Dionysos never ceased to be tragic hero, and that all the famous figures of the Greek stage, Prometheus, Oedipus etc., are merely masks of that original hero, Dionysos.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, 10, p.51

For a representative of early Greek tragedy Nietzsche picks up Aeschylus's *Prometheus*: "Raising himself to Titanic heights, man fights for and achieves his own culture, and he compels the gods to ally themselves with him because, in his very own wisdom, he holds existence and its limits in its hands."<sup>17</sup> The immeasurable suffering of the fearless "individual" on the one hand, and the divine distress, on the other, compel for a "reconciliation", "metaphysical oneness" in line with *moira* which reins over gods and men alike as sword of "eternal justice."<sup>18</sup> According to Nietzsche, all this reveals perfectly the basic characteristics and the core of the Aeschylean worldview. "The Greek artist" has "an obscure feeling that he and these gods are mutually dependent" and that "he could create human beings and destroy the Olympian gods at least, and that his higher wisdom enabled him to do so, for which, admittedly, he was forced to do penance by suffering eternally."<sup>19</sup> This "bitter pride of the artist", this wonderful "'ability' of the great genius" for which even the eternal suffering falls short in value is the "content and soul" of Aeschylean tragedy.<sup>20</sup> Thus, Nietzsche concludes:

But even Aeschylus's interpretation of the myth does not plumb its astonishing, terrible depths; rather, the artist's delight in Becoming, the serenity of artistic creation in defiance of all catastrophes, is merely a bright image of clouds and sky reflected in the dark sea of sadness.<sup>21</sup>

But Greek tragedy, says Nietzsche with a sigh, commits "suicide" by the hands of Euripides, the mouthpiece of Socrates. Not the deity Dionysos but the "newborn daemon called Sokrates" now speaks out of Euripides' tragedy.<sup>22</sup> Euripides "chased" the Dionysos out of the stage but he did not let in Apollo as well. Neither the "tragic," "Dionysian ecstasies," nor "dramatized epos," "fiery affects" of "Apolline visions" are there, instead "cool, paradoxical thoughts" which are "most realistically imitated" and not those "dipped in the ether of art."<sup>23</sup> One of the peculiarities of

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<sup>17</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, 9, p.48.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 9, p.48-9.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 9, p.49.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 9, p.49.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 9, p.49.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, 9, p.49.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, 12, p.59-64

Euripides is that, says Nietzsche, he “brought *spectator* on the stage.” “Thanks to him people from everyday life pushed their way out of audience and on to the stage, ... the typical Hellene of older art, now sank to the level of the Graeculus<sup>24</sup>, ... a good natured and cunning domestic slave.”<sup>25</sup> New formula of “*aesthetic Socratism*” now reads: “In order to be beautiful, everything must be reasonable;” which, Nietzsche thinks, bears close resemblance to “Socrates’ dictum that ‘Only he who knows is virtuous.’”<sup>26</sup>

With this canon in his hand Euripides measured every single element – language, characters, dramatic construction, choral music – and rectified it in accordance with this principle. What we criticize so frequently as a poetic flaw and a step backwards in Euripides’s work, as compared to Sophoclean tragedy, is mostly the product of that penetrating critical process, the bold application of reason.<sup>27</sup>

“The close affinity between Euripides and Socrates”<sup>28</sup> which is pointed by Nietzsche seems to be a known fact by their fellow Athenians. According to Diogenes Laertius some even believe that Socrates helps Euripides compose his poetry.<sup>29</sup> So it is not without reason, reminds us Nietzsche, that “Socrates, as an opponent of tragic art, refrained from attending the tragedy, and would only join the spectators when a new play by Euripides was being performed.”<sup>30</sup>

Nietzsche regards Euripides’ introducing a ‘prologue’<sup>31</sup> to his dramas as another indication of his “rationalist method”: “That a single person on stage should explain

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<sup>24</sup> “Literally ‘little Greek’ i.e. shifty character; stock figure of contempt in Roman literature.” (Editor’s Note)

<sup>25</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, 11, p.55.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, 11-12, pp.54-64.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, 12, p.62.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, 12, p.65.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, 13, pp.64-5. As rightly pointed in footnote by eds. Geuss and Ronald, Nietzsche’s source is most probably Diogenes Laertius. In the entry on Socrates, (by appealing to the testimonies Mnesilokhos, Kallias and Aristophanes) Laertius says that it was a widespread belief that Sokrates helped Euripides in compiling his tragedies. See Diogenes Laertius, *Ünlü Filozofların Yaşamları ve Öğretileri*, trans. Candan Şentuna (İstanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013), p.74.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 13, p.65.

<sup>31</sup> At this point as a reminder, we should point out that Nietzsche himself opens his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* with a prologue, which stands as a unique case of his books.

at the beginning of a play who he is, what precedes the action, what has happened so far, indeed what will happen in the course of play.”<sup>32</sup> This revealing of the plot of the drama from the outset clearly may seem to be an offence against aesthetic appreciation of many as it does to that of Nietzsche’s. This exposition of the plot from the outset evokes associations of a life, which is proceeding in accordance with a predetermined plan, a conception of life as portrayed by the teleological explanations of traditional western metaphysics. Nietzsche draws a parallel between Euripides and Anaxagoras as well due to latter’s emphasis on *nous*. According to Anaxagoras reason is the “cause of the system of the world, and of the entire harmony of it.”<sup>33</sup> Nietzsche has reasons to introduce Anaxagoras. We learn again from Diogenes Laertius that according to some Socrates was a pupil of Anaxagoras.<sup>34</sup> Euripides must have thought himself as order bringer among “tragic poets”; this is the conclusion that Nietzsche draws:

And if Anaxagoras with his *nous* appeared among philosophers like the first ‘sober’ man in company of drunks, Euripides may well have applied the same image to his relationship to the other tragic poets. As long as the *nous*, the sole orderer and ruler of the world, remained shut out from artistic creation, everything was together in a chaotic, primal soup; this is how Euripides must have judged things; this is why, the first sober man, was bound to condemn the ‘drunken’ poets. What Sophocles said about Aeschylus, namely that he did the right thing, although he did it unconsciously, was certainly not meant in Euripides’ sense, who would only have allowed that what Aeschylus created was wrong *because* he created unconsciously.”<sup>35</sup>

The stance of Socrates, the wisest man of Athen according to Delphic oracle, is no different than that of Euripides, of course this time the stage is the city of Athens and its surroundings. When in agora or on the streets, or at occasions like symposiums he subjects his fellow citizens, “the greatest politicians, orators, poets, and artists” to his dialectical scrutiny, he realizes that none of those prominent figures has “a secure and correct understanding of their profession;” they perform it “only by instinct.

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<sup>32</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, 12, p.62.

<sup>33</sup> Aristoteles, *The Metaphysics*, trans. John. H. McMahon, (New York: CosimoClassics, 2008), 984b, p.11.

<sup>34</sup> Diogenes Laertius, *Ibid*, p.75

<sup>35</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, 12, p.63.



‘Only by instinct’: the phrase goes to the heart and centre of the Socratic tendency: With these words Socratism condemns existing art and ethics in equal measure.”<sup>36</sup> According to Nietzsche, Socrates represents “the archetype of the theoretical optimist whose belief that the nature of things can be discovered leads him to attribute to knowledge and understanding the power of a panacea, and who understands error to be inherently evil.”<sup>37</sup> What kind of a “daemonic force”, Nietzsche invites us to figure out with him, is embodied in this man called Socrates who dares to “negate the nature of the Greeks, which, whether as Homer, Pindar, or Aeschylus, as Phidias, as Pericles, as Pythia and Dionysos, as the deepest abyss or highest peak, is certain of our astonishing worship?”<sup>38</sup> Nietzsche thus detects a “daemonic force” in Socrates which pushes against old taste of Greeks of tragic age, which roughly corresponds to a distinction between instinctive self-assurance on the one hand, and argumentative reasoning on the other.

But before proceeding with the discussion of this “daemonic force” it would be better to take a few further steps and first to invite another figure to the stage; this time the pupil of Socrates: Plato. The main objection that Plato put forward against “older type of art” is that it was “the imitation of an illusory image and thus belonged to an even lower sphere than the empirical world.”<sup>39</sup> In *Republic* Plato says that some poets such as Homeros and Hesiodos with their fabricated fables do not tell the truth and cause confusion. Their portrayal of gods in the image of humans, for instance, at the very best reveals their ignorance of the subject. It is not surprising that they are relegated to the third rung regarding possession of the knowledge of reality. The god who created ideas (and of course together with him, the philosopher who deals with the knowledge of *idea*, the *truth*) comes first; the craftsman who makes the artefacts in the world of appearances (our physical world which is a “pale shadow” of the true world) comes second, and the poet (the artist) who imitates the things of the world of appearances (which is itself a “pale shadow” of the “true world” of ideas) comes

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<sup>36</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, 13, p.65-6.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 15, p.74.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 13, pp.65-6.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, 14, p.68.

third. As the poet, the imitator of shadows, the maker of fables, distorter of truth may very well be pernicious he must be kept under strict surveillance; that is, art must be in the service of reason in the ideal city.<sup>40</sup>

Plato with his theory of ideas posits an ideal world (a “true world”) (which is eternal and never changes and never perishes) as opposed to the sensible (physical) world (which is prone to change and dissolution), and in line with his teacher he purports a morality (conception of justice) in accordance with the tenets of reason. According to Socratic-Platonic cosmogony soul is immortal and partakes via reason to the intelligible realm of ideas. Reason originally was familiar with the knowledge of ideas which it has forgotten due to being mingled with the body, therefore every knowledge is a recollection and the attainment of wisdom will bring the salvation of soul. To this end reason must have the rein over the passions which are emanating from body, the tomb of reason. So there is an original perfect world in contrast to which our actual world seems to be world of deficiency, change and decay, and thus full of sufferings. So the attainment of the knowledge of the original world gains utmost importance. Overall, Socratic-Platonic morality equates the attainment of knowledge with virtue which in turn eventually brings happiness. This “Socratic equation of reason=virtue=happiness”<sup>41</sup> entails the rule of reason in tripartite soul of an individual and the rule of philosopher king in the city.

A perfect, unchanging, eternal, “beyond” was invented. A “true world.” A beyond, without change, without suffering; a beyond, prairie of serenity, free of turmoil, free of effort. Oh, this filthy, burdensome world of degeneration. Oh, this life of suffering. Thus according to Nietzsche what Socrates said before his death is not surprising: “‘living –that means being sick for a long time: I owe Asclepius the Saviour a rooster.’”<sup>42</sup> These are the last words Socrates uttered in his deathbed, surrounded by a few sorrowful friends. Of course, as a good psychologist Nietzsche

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<sup>40</sup> See Plato, *The Republic*, trans. T. Griffith (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Books II (376-8), X (595-8, 600-1).

<sup>41</sup> F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of Idols*, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of Idols And Other Writings*, Eds. A. Ridley and J. Norman, trans. J. Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.163.

<sup>42</sup> *TI*, p.162.

does not hesitate to draw due implications of these words: “Even Socrates had had enough. – What does this *prove*? What does this *demonstrate*? There was a time when people would have said ... : ‘There has to be some truth here!’”<sup>43</sup>

Now that we mention the death of Socrates, a few more words need to be uttered. To take you across the river Acheron, to the “beyond” Kharon now demands this coin of ‘*truth*’ forged by Plato though it has not been ‘demonstrated’ to anyone. We have witnessed that many have since alleged to have seen this precious coin, this philosopher’s stone. As almost no body have doubted that it was forged, but was put some hidden place many philosophers never ceased to mix the words with reason to produce this philosopher’s stone. Many even claimed to have devised new formulas that enable them forging it anew. The truth as the condition of human morality, the truth as the key to human salvation. This conception of truth now begins to serve as the very foundation of western metaphysics. Philosophers never questioned the value of truth. The importance of this concept is that truth lies outside human being, either in an imaginary ‘true world’ which is beyond this world, or just out there in the physical world, in this universe hidden in reality.

In this way Socrates, his teacher Anaxagoras, his friend Euripides, his pupil Plato; these four complicit “conspired” a plot against bodily senses and passions and succeeded in establishing of the tyranny of reason. If the ‘reason’ (the ‘spirit’- the ‘soul’) is taken to be divine and the passions and desires -the body- as something base, as evil then the consequence necessarily follows: the tyranny of reason. The tyranny of an ideal world over the existent one. “People used to fight against the passions because the passions were so stupid: people conspired to destroy them, – all the old moral monsters are unanimous on that score: ‘*il faut tuer les passions*’<sup>44</sup> ...”<sup>45</sup>

We should return to the above questions Nietzsche posed regarding what the dying Sokrates said. Why did Sokrates after drinking the hemlock describe life as sickness? What does this indicate? “There has to be some *sickness* here” says Nietzsche and

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<sup>43</sup> *TI*, p.162.

<sup>44</sup> “It is necessary to kill the passions.” (Editor’s note).

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p.172.

invites us to have a close look at the situation of the “wisest men of all ages: “Perhaps they become a bit unsteady on their feet? Perhaps they were late? doddering? decadent? Perhaps wisdom appears on earth as a raven, inspired by a little scent of carrion?”<sup>46</sup>

It seems that Nietzsche here is making an allusion to Hegel’s metaphor of ‘the owl of Minerva’ which “begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.”<sup>47</sup> If Nietzsche’s raven indicates an impending death, a decay what is that entity which is decaying, dying? The philosopher personally or the society or the culture? Does this mean that reason, thought, philosophy always and necessarily reveals solely what is already decaying, what is belonging to the past? Does this mean that reason, thought as such has only a negative, a reactive, life-threatening characteristics? Or does it have at the same time the creative, formative, transformative, life-enhancing capacity? For the time being suffice it to say that Nietzsche as a ‘physiologist’ thinker who regards consciousness/reason as a late phenomenon with respect to body, who prefers to take psychological phenomena as symptoms of changes in body, is indicating here that thought is somehow an outcome, a reaction to the processes of the material world. Regarding Socrates’ assessment of life as sickness, again by referring to *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche says that there

I recognized Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decay, as agents of Greek disintegration, as pseudo-Greek, as anti-Greek. ...they were in physiological agreement about something, and consequently adopted – *had to adopt* – the same negative attitude toward life. Judgments, value judgments on life, for or against, can ultimately never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they can be taken seriously only as symptoms, -- in themselves judgments like these are stupidities... ... the value of life cannot be estimated. Not by living, who are an interested party, a bone of contention, even, and not by judges; not by the dead for other reasons. – It is an objection to a philosopher if he sees a problem with the value of life, it is a question mark on his wisdom, an un-wisdom.<sup>48</sup>

By describing life as sickness Socrates passes a value judgment on life itself. It is not a critique directed to this or that conception or way of life. A critique, an objection, a

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<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, p.162.

<sup>47</sup> G.W. Friedrich Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.23.

<sup>48</sup> *TI*, trans. R. Speirs, p.161-2.

no-saying to certain ways of life can at the same time mean the affirmation of another way of life. In such a case it would be clear that the critic imposes or invites to his/her way of life; he/she comes with a proposal which he/she believes to be true. Yet, this, in itself does not preclude other ways of life, other proposals. But in Socrates'/Plato's case it is a verdict on life as such, it does not leave any room for a counter argumentation. For such a wholesale, categorical judgment an outside, a disinterested, the so-called objective point of view is needed. Plato's *Theory of Forms/Ideas* provides such an objective, outside viewpoint. Once you posit, for instance, the *Idea* of man, you raise above universal set of actual individual men. As opposed to the world of becoming (world of the individuals) which can bring about only opinions, the "true world" of Ideas bears the absolute, the universal, the unchangeable *knowledge*, the *truth*.

As long as the 'reality', the 'permeance', the truth, the truth as the highest value is posited in/ bestowed to a "*beyond*", a so-called "true world", the actual world, the only world for human being is necessarily seen as flawed, devalued, depreciated and so forth. Assuming the truth is there, yet the question remains: is this truth attainable by human being and how this will be possible? Anyone who can properly make use of his divinely reason which was somehow exiled from this world of ideas, and originally acquainted with the ideas. Practically it is philosopher who deals with the knowledge of the ideas. If at the end of the day Sokrates' view can also be regarded as a view among others, and if the attainment of the truth, wisdom and happiness is open to everyone then why does Nietzsche see in Socratic/Platonic view a danger? For Nietzsche the assertion that there is *the truth*, the God, that is, a perfect, unchanging, eternal reality as against to all transient, deficient realities of the world of becoming is itself problematic but we have to wait for Nietzsche's full response to the questions.

Conceiving of idea as unchanging essence of being, the truth, the true world on the one hand, the transient, deficient, world of change and becoming on the other, leads to a binary logic of qualitative opposites, a logic of either or: Either true or false; either truth or lie; either good or evil. You are either perfect or deficient. How much deficient? Ninety percent? Fifty percent? Ten percent? It makes no difference; you all are deficient.

Looking from the perspective of *the ideal, the perfect, the heaven* everything will be deficient, no matter the differences between their robustnesses, their strength, their “quanta of force”. Again, looking from the perspective of *the truth* every interpretation of the reality will be false regardless of their degree of adequacy. It effaces every kind of differences, rank order of capabilities. According to Nietzsche this view of the truth, the God, the imaginary spectator-judge, is in fact the view of the weak, the view of the incapacity of the degenerated person. The direction of the view of the strong one, the affirmative one is from himself toward outside and thus he stands as the judge, who values things from his point of view. On the other hand, the direction of the view of the weak is from outside, from an imaginary point, from a spectator toward himself and thus he is judged and not the judge.

This line of reasoning is at least what Nietzsche takes to be the core of Socrates’ dialectical quest. Without himself providing any positive explanation (i.e., the truth) of the subject in question, Socrates leads the opponent in perplexity, which is inevitable. If you are not strong enough you have to use dialectics for “self-defense”, you have to be like Reynard the Fox:

You choose dialectics only as a last resort. You know that it will be viewed with suspicion, that it won’t be very convincing. Nothing is easier to shake off than a dialectical effect: this is proved by the experience of any meeting where people make speeches. Dialectics is a type of *self-defense* used only by people who do not have any other weapons. You would need to be in a position of having to *enforce* your right: you would not use it for anything short of that. That is why Jews are dialecticians; Reynard the Fox was one: what and Socrates was too? - <sup>49</sup>

“When people need reason to act as a tyrant, which was the case with Socrates, the danger cannot be small that something else might start as a tyrant.”<sup>50</sup> The old Athen was disintegrating, “instincts” “turned against each other”, the chaos and anarchy was in reign. So, the raven smelled out the scent of the dying societal order. The thought is a “symptom”, an outcry for a way out of the crises. Nietzsche here is depicting a societal situation which is on the brink of turning to a Hobbesian state of nature, a state of war of all against all. Hobbes devised a fictitious social contract

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<sup>49</sup> *TI*, p.164.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, p.165.

between all individuals arising from rationality but ended up with the absolute submission of every individual will to the monarch.<sup>51</sup> Nietzsche seems to be considering the same pattern when he says “rationality was seen as the *saviour*” by Socratism:<sup>52</sup>

The fanaticism with which all of the Greek thought threw itself on rationality shows that there was a crisis: people were in danger, they had only one option: be destroyed or – be *absurdly rational*... The moralism of Greek philosophers from Plato onwards is pathologically conditioned; the same is true for the value they give to dialectics. Reason=virtue=happiness only means: you have to imitate Socrates and establish a permanent state of *daylight* against all dark desires – the daylight of reason. You have to be clever, clear, and bright at any cost: any concession to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads *downwards*...<sup>53</sup>

Socratic rationalism does not work in the Greek world, nobody regards it a real solution, nor during the long period of Antic Rome. Nietzsche regards antique Rome as one of very rare noble ages of human history, so it is not surprising that such a noble people did not take Socratic/Platonic school seriously. “[E]very respectable spirit in the Roman empire was an Epicurean: *but then Paul came into the picture*... Paul, Chandala, hatred of Rome, against ‘the world’, become flesh, become genius; the Jew, the *wandering Jew par excellence*.”<sup>54</sup> It was the time when the Great Rome entered in a chaos.

### 2.3. The Crucified

Christ died on the cross and Paul, *the priest*, Nietzsche says, founded Christianity and the church. Now the savior, the truth, the reason comes under the cloak of the priest. But of course, he does not come to the people with the dry words of the dialecticians. The priest comes with love, with compassion, with fear, with hope, with redemption; with blood and flesh, with soul does he come; he comes with all the

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<sup>51</sup> See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Noel Malcolm, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012).

<sup>52</sup> *TI*, p.165.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, p.165-5.

<sup>54</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of Idols and Other Writings*, Eds. A. Ridley and J. Norman, trans. J. Norman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 58, p.61.

narcotics under his cloak. He triumphs with the senses, with the feelings, that is with instinct; Christianity, the priest persuaded with *instinct*. Christianity uses more or less the same line of reasoning, in other words, Platonism translated into the language of common people: Christianity is “the Platonism “for people”” as Nietzsche puts it.<sup>55</sup> The *idea*, the truth turns into God, a god in the figure of a father, compassionate towards his children. Of course, a father who at the same time knows how to raise his eyebrows and punish them when needs be. Now the priest says to the people: ‘we keep the *truth* in the church and guard this precious “coin” for your sake; just believe us, just have *faith* in us you will get your salvation.’ The same old formula runs through new faith. The immortality of the soul, and the ideal, perfect beyond, the heaven, the kingdom of God, aspiration for beyond, a world of suffering and sin.

Now the all-encompassing ‘universal eraser’, *the truth* stands behind main Christian tenets: All human beings are “equal” before God, but they are all sinful, that is why they are condemned to this world of suffering; none of their efforts guarantee their salvation; yet from love of his creature humans God sent his son as a sacrifice, to redeem them from their sins; they have to believe in God with absolute obedience (which practically can be fulfilled by obeying his deputy here, namely, the priest) and wait for God’s grace. In short: in order not to perish transfer your will to the priest and wait for orders. Of course, as is said before this is not a persuasion of the dialectical sort. You have to believe unconditionally, by faith, by instinct, in this new order, in priest, in his morality. You have to have faith in truth, in priest so that with in good conscience should the priest perform his cruelty, his discipline on you. If the tyranny is believed in good conscience, it now turns into faith as well. Tyranny and faith are two sides of the same coin. In other words, seemingly tyranny of reason which is a faith, a belief means nothing but the death of reason itself as every criticism, every skepticism of reason is disregarded. This is nothing more than a self-inflicted illusion of reason.

“When the emphasis of life is put on the ‘beyond’ rather than on life itself – when it is put on nothingness – then the emphasis has been completely removed from the

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<sup>55</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kauffman, (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), p.193.



life.”<sup>56</sup> According to Nietzsche, it is the belief in lies, such as personal immorality that brings an end to “all reason” and anything “natural in instincts.” What is life-promoting, useful to life, is now regarded with suspicious eyes. “To live *in this way*, so that there is no *point* to life any more, *this* now becomes the ‘meaning’ of the life.”<sup>57</sup> Every effort in life, any confidence in people, setting any purpose these are detriment to *this way*. By disseminating its “poisonous doctrine” of “‘*equal rights for everyone*’

Christianity has waged a deadly war on every feeling of respect and distance between people, which is to say the *presupposition* of every elevation, of every growth of culture, – it has used the *ressentiment* of the masses as its *main weapon* against us, against everything on earth that is noble, joyful, magnanimous, against our happiness on earth... Granting ‘immortality’ to every Tom, Dick, and Harry has been the most enormous and most vicious attempt to assassinate *noble* humanity -- ... The aristocraticism of mind has been undermined at its depths by the lie of equality of souls; and when the belief in the ‘privileges of the majority’ creates (and it *will create*) revolutions, do not doubt for a minute that it is Christianity, that it is *Christian* value judgments these revolutions are translating into blood and crimes! Christianity is the rebellion of everything that crawls on the ground against everything that has *height*: the evangel of the ‘lowly’ *makes* things lower.<sup>58</sup>

People transfer their will to the priest. Rationality, an ideal world order, the tyranny of reason which is formulated by Socrates/Plato stays in power, its morality has been dominating western life nearly for two millennia. Tyranny is the reign of a type, called priest, Reynard the Fox, with the absolute authority of God, that is as faith in priest, and it is in reality nothing to do with truth and the real capacity of reason. What is called truth, the law are the suitable conditions under which a certain type of men can thrive.

The hero on the stage is now *the Crucified*. The plot organized by the squad of reason, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Euripides, Plato ultimately prove successful. Dionysos was torn to pieces under the blows of the sword of dialectics, and the wreath of victory was placed on the head of the Crucified.

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<sup>56</sup> AC, p.39.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, p.39.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, p.39-40.

Why did God reveal himself to humanity? Would God have done something superfluous? People *cannot* figure out what is good and evil on their own, that is why God thought them his will...Moral: priest do *not* lie, – there is simply no room for lying about ‘truth’ or ‘untruth’ in the sorts of issues priests talk about. This is because you cannot lie unless you can decide *what* is true. And this is impossible for human beings to do; which means that the priest is only a mouthpiece of God, – ... The ‘law’, the ‘will of God’, the ‘holy book’, ‘inspiration’ – All these are just words for the conditions under which priest come to power and maintain the power, – these concepts can be found at the bottom of all priestly organizations, all structures of priestly or philosophical-priestly control. The ‘holy lie’ – this is common to Confucius, the law book of Manu, Mohammed, and the Christian church: and it is not absent from Plato either. ‘The truth is there’: wherever you hear this, it means that *the priest is lying*...<sup>59</sup>

Even as an omnipotent God your power may not be enough to keep the ‘things’ stable although this is a life-death issue for you. *Panta rhei* said Heraclitus, but to no avail: “‘What?’ say the dummies, everything supposed to be in flux?” “Over the river everything is firm, all values of things, the bridges, concepts, all ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – all of this is firm.”<sup>60</sup> Socratism/Platonism is the name of putting an eternally durable dress of being on becoming and thus eternally freezing the river. Yes, *becoming*, out of its modesty, tries to behave like *being* for a while for the sake of its restless, curious yet anxious fellow human beings, to appease them to feel at home. But becoming is becoming, one must not abuse its modesty and good will. Honesty [*Redlichkeit*] pulls one’s ear that one should call a donkey donkey and not a mule. So, the long freezing winter comes to an end and the “thaw wind” begins to melt down the glorious Christian church which the priest built with the firm ice bricks. Sure, the priest makes a lot of effort to show that everything is in order, that “everything stands still”, and indeed, philosophy, as its loyal servant, works really hard to proof of *the truth*, the eternal God, the pillar of the church.

#### **2.4. The Modern Times**

One of the strongest claims of Nietzsche that recurs throughout his writings is that his main task is the overcoming of western metaphysics mostly without mentioning clearly which philosophers fall in the confines of the alleged “western metaphysics.”

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<sup>59</sup>AC, 55, p.55-6.

<sup>60</sup> F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. A. Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), III, On Old and New Tablets, p.161.

An impression radiates throughout his writings as if all western philosophy can be confined to a certain more or less unified approach. Without going through a detailed explanation about what he means and whether or not his claim is tainted with oversimplification considering the variety of approaches within the scope of the so-called western philosophy, we would not commit injustice if we say that Nietzsche's main target is *idealism*. Idealism in its broader sense inaugurated in western philosophical tradition by Plato, its popular version Christianity, and its most eminent branch in Königsberg, Kantianism. In other words, from antic Greece, through mediaeval down to modern Europe idealism, which he alternately calls "traditional western philosophy," "western metaphysics," "dogmatism", "Platonism", the name Socrates being his scapegoat or strawman.

In the above pages Platonism and Christianity were briefly discussed but it would be worthwhile to linger briefly on Kant's version of idealism considering that all prominent German philosophers, figures like, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and notably Schopenhauer who profoundly influenced young Nietzsche, were somehow surfing on the waves of its wake which thus gave color to the milieu in which Nietzsche as a thinker emerged. Kant's influence on Nietzsche was not limited to this indirect one. First via his second-hand readings through Schopenhauer, Kuno Kischer, and Friedrich Lange, and then through his direct readings of Kant, young Nietzsche's thought gains much conceptual and structural marks of Kantian philosophy.<sup>61</sup>

As is well known Kant tries to find a solution to the skepticism posed by David Hume. Hume says "[a]ll the objects of human reason or enquiry" can be divided into two kinds", namely "Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact." Relation of ideas are related to the knowledge of geometry, arithmetic and algebra which are "either intuitively or demonstratively certain" and this type of knowledge can be known a priori. The matters of fact, however cannot be demonstrated in the same manner as for any proposition the submission of a contrary proposition does not lead to contradiction. For instance, "[t]hat the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less

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<sup>61</sup> R. Kevin Hill, *Nietzsche's Critiques, The Kantian Foundations of his Thought*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.13-20. For more on Kant's influence on Nietzsche; Elain P. Miller, "Nietzsche on Individuation and Purposiveness in Nature" in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansel Peerson (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, *that it will rise.*”<sup>62</sup> The proof of such knowledge entails to provide a necessary connection between cause and effect of an occurrence or fact. Hume says when we look at occurrences of the external world, even in a single instance we are not able “to discover any necessary connection, any quality which binds effect to cause” which proves with certainty that the result is caused by the effect. What we see is the “impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the *outward* senses. The mind feels no sentiment or *inward* impression from this succession of objects.”<sup>63</sup>

Hume’s conclusion is that “all inferences from experience” are the effects of habit or “custom, not of reasoning.”<sup>64</sup> In other words, “the validity of the *universal* causal principle” cannot be grounded rationally. This principle is rather “non-rational in character” and “an instrument useful for the organisation of experience; and for that reason nature has determined us to its formation and acceptance.” It “expresses a merely instinctive belief, and is explicable only in naturalistic manner.”<sup>65</sup>

However, quite interestingly Hume ascribes the same ability of inference to animals as well which bears very striking similarities to Nietzsche’s thought on the subject. This will be elucidated more clearly in the coming pages. Hume writes:

It is custom alone, which engages animals, from every object, that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one, to conceive the other, in that particular manner, which we denominate *belief*. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all the higher, as well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which fall under our notice and observation.<sup>66</sup>

It is obvious that Hume here is making no distinction between animal and human being in learning through experience, that is, making inferences through long

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<sup>62</sup> David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1988), p.141.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid*, p.103.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, p.87.

<sup>65</sup> Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Introduction, xxxiv.

<sup>66</sup> *Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, p.141.

repetition of events, through habits. In this way they gradually increase their knowledge of the world. The “inexperience and ignorance” of the human/animal young when compared “uncanny and sagacity of the old” is the evidence of the learning through long experiences. “This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of action, and most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities.”<sup>67</sup> Without any hesitation he draws a direct analogy between animal and human anatomy.

David. C. Hoy points at the similarities between Nietzsche and Hume in their intension of destroying metaphysics and says that Hume, with his “own method of experimental reasoning” tries “to show reason to be the product of bodily instinct. The method allows him to inquire into the origin of moral without assuming [...] that the virtuous dispositions were implanted in all of us by a divine creator.”<sup>68</sup> We will return to Nietzsche’s connection to Hume in the coming pages, for now we have to finish our quest with Kantianism.

Kant says that it was his “recollection of David Hume” which “interrupted” his “dogmatic slumber and gave” his “investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction.”<sup>69</sup> Kant sets out to undertake the critique of ‘pure reason,’ for he knows what is at stake is the fate of metaphysics, more precisely the fate of Christian morality. For, Kant knows that “*Metaphysical Judgments* ... are all synthetic”<sup>70</sup> and so long as their apriority is not secured the universal validity of morality cannot be secured. In *Prolegomena* Kant says, “since the origin of metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing has ever happened which could have been more decisive to its fate than attack made upon it by David Hume.”<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, p.140.

<sup>68</sup> David Couzens Hoy, “Nietzsche, Hume, and the Genealogical Method,” in *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel, (Dordrecht; Boston; Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 1986), pp.20-38.

<sup>69</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Lewis White Beck, (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1997), p.7.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, p.18.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, p.5.

Kant divides reality into two realms, namely thing-in-itself (noumenon) and appearance (phenomenon). As human beings we can experience and have knowledge of the things only in so far as they appear to us however, we cannot attain the knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Human mind (faculty of understanding) is not a passive recipient of knowledge, it organizes all data (which we perceive through our senses) by virtue of the concepts or categories of understanding. It is the unity of consciousness/apperception (the *I*, the subject, ego) which makes experience of the world of appearances, i.e. formation of knowledge possible. And Kant cleverly detects ‘causality’, which Hume could not manage to find anywhere, among these categories of understanding. It is very obvious that from the outset Kant is aware of what he is searching for and where to find it. It wouldn’t be difficult to find a thing in a place where you already put it as Nietzsche would claim.<sup>72</sup> Kant goes further and maintains that Hume has failed to realize that mathematical propositions are synthetic a priori propositions. As metaphysical propositions or principles are also synthetic and a priori, in order to have universally binding moral law (principle) it must be shown that human reason has the capacity of decreeing a priori synthetic judgments. Seeing that human reason is capable of producing propositions of mathematics which are synthetic and a priori and thus universal, morality, which also legislates universally, is secured.

Of course, there was some damage which Kant had to suffer during the whole critical process. Kant had to relegate God to noumenal world and had to accept that any proof of him through knowledge is illegitimate. The supporters of old belief were very much upset but Kant was aware of what was happening and what his ‘duty’ was; the army of natural sciences was mercilessly pushing forward and it was necessary that the defense lines be withdrawn backward. He tries to console the “good” ones in his ranks: “I have ... found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.”<sup>73</sup> ‘Yes, we cannot prove God, but these heathens cannot disprove him either. Let God be our postulate. At least we still have hope’.

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<sup>72</sup> *TI*, p.178.

<sup>73</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965) See preface.

Having secured the dignity of reason with the help of mathematics against Hume's skepticism Kant further argues that purposes like self-preservation or happiness cannot be accepted as proper purposes for the divinely reason. He maintains that if the natural constitution of human being is one that is constituted purposively for *life*, then there would be no need for reason. He continues, "in a being that has reason and a will, if the proper end of nature were its preservation, its welfare, in a word its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose."<sup>74</sup> Because all rules of action that the creature has to perform for this purpose, i.e., for happiness, he contends, would be decided for it "far more accurately by instinct and that end would have thereby been attained much more surely than it ever can be by reason."<sup>75</sup> Kant considers the struggle for survival or purposes like happiness as not befitting to reason and human dignity. But we should note that in this regard Nietzsche is in line with Kant as he repeatedly says that human beings do not strive for happiness only Englishmen do. Kant's argumentation goes on as follows:

[I]f reason should have been given, over and above, to this favored creature, it must have served it only to contemplate the fortunate constitution of its nature, to admire this, to delight in it, and to be grateful for it to the beneficent Cause, but not to submit its faculty of desire to that weak and deceptive guidance and meddle with nature's purpose.<sup>76</sup>

In this way, Kant first makes a distinction between reason and instinct (faculty of desire). As he considers that human-wellbeing is conceived differently by each person and can be known only through experience and thus cannot be a subject of universal law he pulls reason out of filthy works of this life "in order to "contemplate its fortunate constitution" and "be grateful for it to the" benevolent "Cause". We should put a question mark on this "beneficent Cause" and the demand of being grateful to it and to wait and see how Nietzsche will react to this demand. Of course, as reason, being a God given faculty, is taken to be identical for every rational being, when need be, it can legislate universally binding moral laws (granting that it

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<sup>74</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy, the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.50-1.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, p.51.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, p.51.

eliminates all intrusions of the faculty of desire, i.e., all inclinations for various satisfactions). In this way, reason is bestowed with an absolute sovereignty over all bodily desires, over all sensuous impulses. Once more ‘tranny’ is secured. The achievement of this process obviously is the production of the subject of free will. As Kant puts it, the will is deemed free if it perfectly obeys the dictates of reason. This subject of free-will has the capability of choosing what to do or not to do. As there is an objective morality, to be perfect it ought to choose ‘good’ and abstain from ‘evil.’<sup>77</sup> So, there is no way out of absolute universality of morality of reason, which is the very foundation of Christianity as well.

In this way, Kant proudly gets out of the skepticism in which, according to him Hume has fallen due to his misconception of the faculties of human reason. Thus Kant might have thought: ‘Miscalculating the human reason, Hume unreasonably draws analogy between human beings and animals. Given that I have now demonstrated clearly human beings as favored creatures can admire and delight in their fortunate constitution and continue to have faith in God who is the beneficent cause of this constitution.’

“According to Kant there are three possible standpoints in philosophy –the dogmatic, the sceptical, and the critical. All preceding thinkers come under the first two heads.”<sup>78</sup> What are the peculiarities of dogmatisms? Who is this dogmatist? He is the “one who assumes that human reason can comprehend ultimate reality, and who proceeds upon this assumption.” On Kant’s account “Descartes and Leibniz are typical dogmatists.”<sup>79</sup> Kant, who “was educated” in “the rationalist philosophy”<sup>80</sup> is sure that he has overcome dogmatism by his new critical philosophy:

The dictum of all genuine idealists, from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: “All knowledge through senses and experience is nothing

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<sup>77</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. and ed. by Mary Gregor, (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

<sup>78</sup> N. K. Smith, *A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, p.13.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid*, p.13.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, Preface, p. xxxvii.



but sheer illusion, and only in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason is there truth.”

The principle that throughout dominates and determines my idealism, is on the contrary: “All knowledge of things merely from understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, only in experience is there truth.”<sup>81</sup>

However, Nietzsche is sure that Kant has not overcome his dogmatic stance. What Kant does, according to Nietzsche, is nothing but to open a new path to “old ideal.” He is still an enthusiastic devotee of the ‘true’ world, of the Christian morality, in short, he is in the service of the religion. And Nietzsche asks:

why were German so convinced ... that Kant marked a change for the *better*? The theologian instinct of the German scholar had guessed just *what* was possible again... A hidden path to old ideal lay open; the concept of a ‘*true* world’, the concept of morality as the *essence* of the world (– the two most vicious errors in existence!) were once again (thanks to an exceedingly canny scepticism), if not provable, then at least no longer *refutable*... Reason, the *right* of reason, does not extend that far... Reality was made into ‘mere appearance’; a complete lie called ‘the world of being’ was made into reality... Kant’s success is just a theologian success: Kant like Luther, like Leibniz, was one more drag on an already precarious German sense of integrity.<sup>82</sup>

So Kant poses as if he has overcome rationalism but in Nietzsche’s view he is loyal to old ideal. But the army of sciences is pounding fervently, and the defense lines which are already pulled back by Kant begin to unravel and it seems unlikely that the course of events can be changed. The walls of the church have been badly damaged by the relentless artillery fire. There have been sighs in every corner: “in vain”, “in vain”, every effort is in vain. As the bricks of the church have fallen on people’s heads, they have lost their sense of direction. People begin to doubt whether God had died under the collapsing church. The sky is getting darker, a tremendous storm is looming on the horizon.

The time is coming when we have to *pay* for having been *Christians* for two thousand years: the *weight* that allowed us to live is gone – for a while we don’t know which way to turn. We rush headlong into the *opposite* valuations, with the same degree of energy with which we used to be Christians –<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena*, p.123.

<sup>82</sup> *AC*, 10, p.9.

<sup>83</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11[148], p.229.

This is the modern Europe where all values lost their meanings and people have now lost their sense of direction. Of course, whenever there is crisis there exist also an opportunity for new values, for new meanings. Nietzsche himself is personally the battleground this crisis

## 2.5. Sils-Maria

Nietzsche was walking on the shore of Lake Silvaplana by Sils-Maria and was reflecting on the state of disorientation into which modern Europe has plunged. He was feeling an irresistible urge from within that he had a “world historical task” waiting for him to be implemented. He wanted to intervene to the course of the history as a “fate”. He himself, too, had bad times. He remembered Wagner, how the break with him came through. How his ideas have changed, for he, too, was an idealist. He was sick but regained his health, he has overcome himself. In the same way, Europe should overcome itself. He was immersed in old memories; he didn't even notice an elderly couple passing by. Later that day after returning his room he sat to table and wrote down these memories.

## 2.6. The Self-Overcoming – *La Gaya Scienza*

In *Twilight of the Idols*, we see that Nietzsche has already involved in this ‘causality controversy’ that cost Hume and Kant a great time and torment.

*Error of causation.* – People have always believed that they knew what a cause was: but how did we get this knowledge – or, more precisely, how did we get this belief that we have knowledge? From the famous realm of ‘inner facts’, none of which has ever proven factual. We believed that our acts of will were causally efficacious; we thought that here, at least, we had caught causality *in the act*. Nobody doubted that consciousness was the place to look for all *antecedentia* of an act, its causes, and that you would be able to *find* these causes there as well – under the rubric of ‘motives’: otherwise the action could hardly be considered free, and nobody could really be held responsible for it. Finally, who could deny that thoughts have causes? That the ‘I’ is what causes thoughts? ... Of all these tree ‘inner facts’ that together seem to guarantee causation, the first and most convincing is that of *will as causal agent*; the conception of consciousness (‘mind’) as cause, and then that of the ‘I’ (the subject’) as cause are just latecomers that are appeared once causality of the will was established as given, as *empirical*... Meanwhile, we have thought better of all this. Nowadays we do not believe a word of it.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> *TI*, p.177-8.

It seems as if from the Socrates onward the same line of reasoning has been perpetuating itself, of course in modern time the individual has gradually come to the fore. Now the subject, the 'I' is on the stage; yet as a representative of divinity in the old style. One thing is needed, its purity, its desterilization from the senses, from the filth of the body. Once you get this, the doors of the kingdom of heavens will open widely before you.

But at the end of the quote something is catching our attention: Nietzsche is saying that in the meanwhile he has thought better about all these issues, i.e., consciousness, human subject, causality and now he is not believing any word of it. So, before continuing further, it would be worthwhile to linger a bit here to get a glimpse of what Nietzsche with these '*meanwhile*' and '*not believing any word of it*' implies. What do these words convey to us?

It is widely accepted to divide the development of Nietzsche's thought in three stages. This '*meanwhile*' is surely pointing at a time span which begins with his so-called middle<sup>85</sup> or positivistic<sup>86</sup> period. This period comes after a romantic-idealistic period which bears the traces of the influences of Wagner, Schopenhauer, and even Kant. The middle period which follows his break with Wagner marks the shift in his interest towards natural sciences, biology, psychology, physiology, towards life itself. We learn from him that he started looking at the things, life from a different *perspective*. As is stated in the below footnote the beginning of Nietzsche's middle period is marked with the appearance of *Human, All Too Human*. The title of the book already reveals a turn in his interest and in this regard, Nietzsche's own recount of this book in *Ecce Homo* is worth quoting:

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<sup>85</sup> "The generally accepted tripartite division of Nietzsche's career into "early" (pre-1878), "middle" (1878-82) and "late" (1883-8) periods based on phases in the development of his ideas, and to a certain extent such a tripartite division holds for stylistic development, too. More specifically, such a division recognizes that, stylistically as well as philosophically (and the coincidence of the two is entirely *uncoincidental*), *Human, All Too Human* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* mark two great breakthroughs in his career." This quotation is from "General Introduction" to *The Nietzsche Reader*, eds. Keith Ansel Pearson and Duncan Large, (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p.xxvii.

<sup>86</sup> Heidegger's depiction of Nietzsche's middle period is as follow: "Nietzsche went through a period of extreme positivism; these were the years 1879-81, the years his decisive development toward maturity. Such positivism, though transformed, became a part of his later fundamental position also." Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, trans. David Farrell Krell. (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), I, p.154.

*Human, All Too Human* is the monument to a crisis. It calls itself a book for *free* spirits: almost every sentence is the manifestation of a victory – I used it to liberate myself from things that *did not belong* to my nature. Idealism is one of them: the title says ‘where *you* see ideal things, *I* see – human, oh, only all too human!’...I know people *better*...The term ‘free spirit’ does not want to be understood in any other way: a spirit *that has become free*, that has taken hold of itself again. The tone, the sound, has completely changed. ... A certain spirituality of noble taste seems to be constantly fighting... If you look more closely you will find a merciless spirit who knows all the hiding-places where the ideal is at home, – the mountain where its dungeon lies and, as it were, its ultimate security. It is war, but a war without powder or fumes, without belligerent posturing, without pathos and contorted limbs – all this would still be ‘idealism’. One mistake after another is calmly put on ice, the ideal is not refuted, it is *frozen to death*... Here, for instance, ‘genius’ is frozen; in another corner ‘the saint’ is frozen: ‘the hero’ is frozen underneath a thick layer of ice; in the end, ‘faith’ freezes, so-called ‘conviction’, and ‘pity’ is getting cold fast – ‘the thing-in-itself’ is frozen to death almost everywhere...<sup>87</sup>

Nietzsche defines this change that he has undergone as a victory. A victory against whom? Against himself. He overcomes himself. Overcoming in two senses. He himself was a battle ground, he waged war against himself. He gets rid of the things that do not belong to his *nature*. What are these things: idealism is one of them. ‘The thing-in-itself’, ‘pity’, ‘genius’ ‘the hero’; these concepts and many similar are the ornaments of the Nietzsche’s early writings. So, we can justifiably deduce that consciousness can go wrong over the nature. Depending on the truth-value of idealism, or (of his thought as a whole) either his first stance or the new one would be true; and perhaps both are false. However, anyone who reads Nietzsche’s writings can easily get the impression that in each phase of his thought he seems to have an unshakable conviction that he has the right thought. One has faith in one’s errors, and sells this faith as “good will” or “honesty.” In any case, it seems as if consciousness and nature somehow do not stand in accord and the knowledge of nature has to endure a constant change. Or should we say that we are in all cases inescapably in error? What are these so-called ‘nature’, ‘consciousness’, ‘thought’, ‘truth’ and ‘error’? Is there any blood bond between them or are they from different worlds? Nietzsche says he freed himself, was he not free? Does human being not have a free will? Who are these “free spirits”? Who is to blame for his captivity? Wagner? Schopenhauer? The Crucified? Socrates? German Education? His Mother? Who is this man who falls in crisis and wages war on himself? We have to go on to see whether Nietzsche has any convincing answer to these questions.

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<sup>87</sup> *EH*, p.115-6.

In another occasion, we encounter Nietzsche's recount of his 'romantic sickness' he suffered under the influence of Wagner and Schopenhauer. This was because he "approached the modern world with crude errors and over-estimations and, in any case with hope."<sup>88</sup> The reason for this misconception was his taking "the philosophical pessimism of the nineteenth century" as "a symptom of a higher force of thought, of more audacious courage, and a more victorious fullness of life than had characterized the eighteenth century, the age of Hume, Kant, Condillac, and the sensualists."<sup>89</sup> What he means by this nineteenth century pessimism is obviously Schopenhauer's philosophy. He continues: "Similarly, I explained German music to myself as an expression of a Dionysian might of the German soul." Of course, this "German music" signifies Wagner whom Nietzsche regarded as a precursor of the rebirth of a tragic culture in his *The Birth of Tragedy*. Nietzsche tells us that what he "misjudged", "both in philosophical pessimism and in German music was what constitutes its actual character – its *romanticism*."<sup>90</sup>

In the preface to the second edition of *The Gay Science* Nietzsche asks himself a question on behalf of his readers: "what is it to us that Mr. Nietzsche has got well again?" and of course he does provide an answer: "A psychologist knows few questions as attractive as that concerning the relation between health and philosophy; and should he himself become ill, he will bring all of his scientific curiosity into the illness."<sup>91</sup> As someone who has suffered illnesses for a long time he seems to be using his body, his physiological up and downs, change of psychological mood etc. as case studies. In a letter to his doctor in January 1880 he describes his existence as a "*fearful burden*" and continues "I should have thrown it off long ago had I not been making the most instructive tests and experiments in the intellectual-moral field precisely in this condition of suffering and almost complete renunciation."<sup>92</sup> As we shall see these "tests and experiments" on his body, on his health, on his illnesses

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<sup>88</sup> *GS*, 370, p.234.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, 370, p.234

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, 370, p.234.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid*, p.4.

<sup>92</sup> R.J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche, The Man and His Philosophy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.125.

have decisively shaped his philosophy. His giving priority on body as an arena of unconscious over conscious bears very much resemblances to Freud's psychoanalytic theory and Marx' ideas on the structure of the society. In this regard, his defining philosophy "no more than an interpretation of the body and a *misunderstanding*"<sup>93</sup> is revealing. According to Nietzsche, philosophical or moral views with their values profoundly influence human well-being. The false values, which are resulted from their misconceptions of human reality has a tremendous influence on the health of human humanity. Nietzsche continues:

I was seized with an almost burning thirst: and in fact, from that point on, I pursued nothing more than psychology, medicine, and natural sciences, – I do not return, to genuine historical studies, until the *task* forced me to. That is when I first understood the connection between, on the one hand, an activity chosen against your instinct, a so-called 'calling' that you are not *remotely* called to – and on the other hand, the need to *anaesthetize* feeling of hunger and monotony using a narcotic art – the Wagnerian art for example. A careful look revealed me that the same type of distress obtains for a large number of young men: one piece of anti-nature virtually *forces* another. ...to many people are condemned to make up their minds before they are ready, and then to *waste away* under the burden that has become impossible to throw off...<sup>94</sup>

The following is a note from his notebooks he wrote down in the autumn of 1880: "The history of science shows the victory of the nobler impulses: there is *a lot of morality* in circulation in the practice of science."<sup>95</sup> At the end, the victory of science means a victory of noble impulses, which are of paramount importance for Nietzsche. So, we should ask to Nietzsche; do we not come back to the point where we started; to Socrates who says that only knowledge will lead us a good life? Maybe the problem is not with knowledge itself, rather the value we ascribe o it. This issue should wait its turn.

What was Nietzsche looking for in his natural science studies "with an almost burning thirst"<sup>96</sup> and what might he have found, if anything? He is now busier than

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<sup>93</sup> *GS*, p.5.

<sup>94</sup> *EH*, p. 118.

<sup>95</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachlass 1880-1882, Kritische Studienausgabe 9*, (KSA9) eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), p.194.

<sup>96</sup> *EH*, p. 118

before with the meaning of knowledge, truth and morality in human life. In short, he gradually comes to face to face with human being, with human reality. Nietzsche depicts this period of his life as a period of recuperation, a period of “self-overcoming”, a period of coming back to health from a long-lasting sickness, from *decadence*.<sup>97</sup>

Nietzsche says that with *Daybreak* (1881) he starts his campaign against morality.<sup>98</sup> “A morality establishes itself through becoming custom and this is the origin of civilization. Nietzsche proposes two fundamental grounds for why people act according to custom: from fear and from desire for power.”<sup>99</sup> Morality is stripped of its divine origin, and now even the so-called Socratic virtues are seen as deriving from animal origin. In dealing with sciences Nietzsche encounters, for instance, with the ideas of the figures such as Darwin and Feuerbach; sure. Thinking just for a bit of while would be enough to fathom the tremendous impacts which the development of the scientific knowledge as exemplified in these two names had exerted on Nietzsche’s thought. After Feuerbach who says it is man who created God(s) not vice versa, and after Darwin who relegates human being among other animals, as being the outcome of a gradual and long-lasting evolutionary process, after the achievements of scientific knowledge which everyday smashes bit by bit the ‘glorious’ icy-edifice(s) of metaphysics what can be expected from Nietzsche who sees intellectual honesty, as his main virtue. In this way, as a result of his long preoccupation with the natural sciences and historical studies Nietzsche begins his journey of reevaluation of all existing values. It is not surprising when he asks: “What? Is man just God’s mistake? Or is God just man’s mistake?”<sup>100</sup>

Nietzsche gradually come to the conviction that he has diagnosed the real cause of the sickness that brings modern Europe to the state of nihilism, where old values have been fading away toward nothingness. He has first to give a full account the

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<sup>97</sup> *EH*, p.76.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid*, p.120.

<sup>99</sup> Hollingdale, *Nietzsche, The Man and His Philosophy*, p.135.

<sup>100</sup> *TI*, p.157.

diagnosis and then may be a prescription for the remedy of this illness. *The Gay Science* (1882) marks the end of his middle period and heralds the coming of Zarathustra. It bears many traces in the service of this diagnosis. What Nietzsche means by gay science “is not the superficiality of fleeting enjoyment”, but rather “is the cheerfulness that comes of a certain superiority, a cheerfulness that is not dashed by even the most questionable matters, but is rather invigorated by them.”<sup>101</sup> What here science signifies is “*the stance adopted, and the will directed, toward essential knowing.*” Here the word *Wissenschaft* [science] resounds like *Leidenschaft* [passion].”<sup>102</sup> Among these most questionable things are our high esteemed values, and the sciences have been revealing in an accelerated manner what is taking place in the body. “The commitment of a joyful science includes body and mind.” “The reference to the body derives from Nietzsche’s experience of suffering as an adventure in transmutation.”<sup>103</sup> The gay science is now vivisectioning the body bit by bit and astonishingly enough it realizes that at the basic level there seems to be no problem in the body. The bad functioning of the body, its sickness is the result of a sense of inferiority; taking the skin dear but despising that which is beneath the skin. This melancholy, this daydream unfairly and ungratefully lowers the vitality of the body. We “artist” human beings, we dreamer of images, we “sleepwalkers of the day” we fall in “love” with our image of the dream and shun away from our body, the very cause of our dreams with a glance of disgust.

*We artists.* When we love a woman, we easily come to hate nature because of all the repulsive natural functions to which every woman is subject; ... In cases like this one refuses to hear anything about physiology and decrees secretly to oneself, ‘I will hear nothing of the idea that the human being is anything other than soul and form! ‘The human being under the skin’ is an abomination and unthinkable to all lovers, a blasphemy against God and love. Now, the way lovers still feel about nature and naturalness is how every worshipper of God and ‘his holy omnipotence’ formerly felt: in everything that was said about nature by astronomers, geologists, physiologists, and doctors, he saw an intrusion on his choicest property and thus an attack – and

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<sup>101</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, II, p.21.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid*, p.21.

<sup>103</sup> Babet Babish, “Nietzsche’s Gay Science,” in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansel Pearson (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp.97-114.



a shameless one at that! Even the ‘law of nature’ sounded to him like a slander against God.<sup>104</sup>

The human being is indeed a skillful artist. Our artistic ability helps us to beautify our world. This ideal edifice into which we molded our chaotic existence reveals nothing but our tendency of “aesthetic anthropomorphism”. However, our world (and our body) is in constant flux and no ideal dress, no truth as fixation, though hinders it to a certain degree and for a certain time, can ultimately withstand this flux. When we start to worship our ideal image as something fixed with absolute value over above life then this alienation causes life to turn against itself; life thus become degenerated, reactive. As will be clearer in coming pages, the essence of life is in its growing, in its self-overcoming, not in its fixation in an alleged perfection. In nature, there is no perfection, and life has its repulsive and ugly aspects as well. Perfection is only our projection to the nature. Obviously, here Nietzsche is speaking again like Feuerbach. The center of value is now shifted from heaven down to earth. God now is seen as human creation; morality is arising from animality. The whole ideal structure is collapsing; the air is getting thicker; the dawn is looming. People do not understand the real meaning of what is happening, what is coming.

## **2.7. The Death of God**

All wise men turn a blind eye to the coming danger. So, the task of the declaration of the bitter truth falls on a madman; in the bright of the day with a lantern he runs “around marketplace crying”:

I’m looking for God! I’m looking for God. Since many of those who did not believe in God were standing around together just then, he caused great laughter. Has he been lost, then? Asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? Asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid us?... Thus they shouted and laughed, one interrupting the other. The madman jumped into their midst, pierced them with his eyes. ‘Where is God?’ he cried; ‘I’ll tell you! We have killed him – you and I! We are all his murderers.... “God is dead! God remains dead! We have killed him! How can we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers! The holiest and the mightiest things the world has ever possessed has pled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood from us? With what water could we clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what holy games will we have to invent for ourselves? Is the magnitude

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<sup>104</sup> GS, 59, p.70-1.

of this deed not too great for us? Do we not ourselves have to become gods merely to appear worthy of it?<sup>105</sup>

Indeed, who killed Christian God? The main conspirator, we learn from Nietzsche, is Christian morality itself. The Christian morality was self-confident of being the sole beneficiary of the concept of truthfulness, and it followed this practice so rigorously that an unexpected result emerged: “Refinement of the Christian conscience, translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price.”<sup>106</sup> This means that Socrates’ equation turns out to be useful. The quest for truth itself does not pose problem, the problem is when “[k]nowledge *is* opposed to life, but because it expresses a life which contradicts life, a reactive life which finds in knowledge a means of preserving and glorifying its type.”<sup>107</sup>

Maybe an untimely remainder would be appropriate at this moment: Zarathustra on his mountain is with his two animals. The eagle, which symbolizes pride, and the snake, which symbolizes knowledge, are two animals that Zarathustra wants guide him. One day at noon, he beholds “the eagle cut broad circles through the air, and upon it hung a snake, not as prey but as a friend, for the snake curled itself around the eagle’s neck.”<sup>108</sup> Pride and knowledge seems to have high values for Nietzsche. The snake is not on the ground rather up above in the sky, curled himself around the neck of the eagle, the pride. Zarathustra asks: “May I be wiser! May I be wise from the ground up like my snake! / But I ask the impossible, and so I ask instead of my pride that it always walk with my wisdom!”<sup>109</sup> Nietzsche’s criticism against philosophers who esteem knowledge, or reason as highest value, as the gate to *happiness* does not mean that Nietzsche is against knowledge or reason. On the contrary, “Nietzsche himself was a fanatical seeker after truth and recognized no

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<sup>105</sup> GS, 125, 119-20.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid*, 357, p.219.

<sup>107</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, (New York: Columbia University Press, c2006), p.13.

<sup>108</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. A. Del Caro, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2006, p.15.

<sup>109</sup> For a detailed interpretation of Zarathustra’s animals see M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II, Volume II*, 7, pp.43-8.

virtue above intellectual integrity.”<sup>110</sup> He is against dogmatism, against blind *faith* that debases reason as well. Nietzsche demands is in fact the critical method of sciences.

Nietzsche’s engagement with sciences helped him to get hold of him again, to free himself; similarly, life through sciences freed itself from the ‘truth’ of Christianity. However, becoming free, breaking the “yoke” is not sufficient; “freedom for what?” as Nietzsche would ask. The important point is, for Nietzsche, the positive conception of freedom. What would human being do to be worthy of this freedom? As we are going to see the concept of nobility finds its explanation through Nietzsche’s answer to this question.

In the marketplace the madman describes the death of God as the greatest event in history; this event opens up the gates for a “higher history”. The listeners stay silent as if they had an inkling of the results and the meaning of their complicity in the deed. He throws away his lantern, and walks away saying: ‘I come too early’. One of the men asks behind him: Who is this uncanny madman? He is warning people beforehand (“untimely”) of nihilism, the meaninglessness which is looming in the horizon. Because people are not yet aware of the devastating results of this death. The euphoria that sciences cause is yet blurring the horizon; they are cheerful of breaking away the yoke of old values. History has changed thoroughly. From now on, they have no protector, no comforter. Can they become their own gods or do they create new god(s) to worship them?

Nietzsche says that even if with the death of God, Christian morality has not yet lost its total dominance in Europe. Even through the liberal and socialist movements of modern times, Christian morality continues to survive. Therefore, this means that it is Socratism/Platonism that has been dominating western philosophy for more than two millennia. With its theory of ideas Platonism has infected western philosophy with idealism. It purported to have the knowledge of the true structure of whole reality. With Christianity this structure was rebuilt in accordance to its original blueprint under the banner of church.

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<sup>110</sup> Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche; Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, p.16.

Now this Socratic truth turned out to be an error. A long-lasting error. As quoted above Nietzsche warns us the real issue is not ‘truth’ itself, wherever you hear someone saying ‘The truth is there’, beware that “*the priest is lying.*”<sup>111</sup> Yes, there is no ideal, true world, no truth-in-itself beyond life. They are “human-all too human” creations. And according to him, the ideal world is nothing more than the suitable conditions of existence under which a certain type of man thrives. This means that the so-called “truth” attains its value from certain perspectives of life. Socratic rationalism, which with its emergence points to the crisis of the Greece of the tragic age, now with its downfall, reveals the crisis of modern Europe.

It is the age of Darwin and Feuerbach and the “animal origins and utility” of the “old ideals” are no secret anymore, so they have lost their power of “interpreting the whole of what happens.” And this brings the result that: “[t]he whole *idealism* of humanity until now is on the point of tipping over into *nihilism* – into the belief in absolute *valuelessness*, that is, *meaninglessness*.”<sup>112</sup>

Nietzsche overcame his crisis, his sickness and regained his health, because he was basically healthy. He has waged war against the things that are not part of his nature. Now the modern Europe is in the crisis. Its values are no longer believed and people lost their sense of direction. In the same way life also is basically something healthy. Therefore, it can and has to overcome its sickness; a sickness that takes refuge in self-inflicted illusions which further aggravate and perpetuate the sickness. Now a warrior is needed, who has already won a same battle and adamant and determined enough to carry “the destiny of humanity on” his “shoulders.”<sup>113</sup> Nietzsche contends that it is his uncovering of Christian morality that distinguishes him from the rest of humanity. The reason that humanity has turned a blind eye on this fact is “the greatest uncleanness”, and “the crime against life.” This morality which is nothing but sheer “*anti-nature*” has been revered with the “highest honour” and “hangs over humanity as law, as categorical imperative” ordering people “to hate the very first

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<sup>111</sup> AC, 55, p.55-6.

<sup>112</sup> WLN, 7[54], p.138.

<sup>113</sup> EH, p.143.

instincts of life”, “to disgrace the body” and respect the “invented” ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, labeling “sexuality, the presupposition of life” as “unclean.”<sup>114</sup>

Socratic rationalism, western metaphysics, its conception of “truth” has collapsed. Are we then allowed to say that Nietzsche’s philosophy is yet another “raven” that comes to the smell of this enormous *corpse*? “Every art, every philosophy can be considered a cure and an aid in the service of growing, struggling life: they always presuppose suffering and sufferers.”<sup>115</sup> Yet we notice two different kinds of sufferers. There are “those who suffer from a *superabundance of life* – they want a Dionysian art as well as a tragic outlook and insight into life” and those romantic sufferers like Wagner and Schopenhauer who “suffer from an *impoverishment of life* and seek quiet, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through art and insight, or else intoxication, paroxysm, numbness, madness.”<sup>116</sup> Nietzsche, as one of the first type of sufferers, now comes to the fore with a new proposal, with a Dionysian way of life to the modern Europe which seems to have lost its sense of direction. *Zarathustra* is heralding the overman (*Übermensch*), as a new meaning, as a new purpose of this world. “Nietzsche himself,” says Heidegger, understands “his philosophy as an introduction to the beginning of a new age.”<sup>117</sup> In the coming chapters we will try to elaborate the details of Nietzsche’s proposal, but first we have to finalize his reckoning with the Socratism on the issue of truth. Truth, knowledge understood as the true metaphysical activity of human being.

First edition<sup>118</sup> of *The Gay Science*, the last book of Nietzsche’s middle period finishes, with a section heralding Zarathustra. This finishing section opens with the words: “*Incipit tragoedia*”: Tragedy begins. It is in fact an excerpt from parts of *Zarathustra* Nietzsche had already written: “*Incipit tragoedia*. When Zarathustra was

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<sup>114</sup> *EH*, p.148-9.

<sup>115</sup> *GS*, 370, p.234.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid*, 370, p.234.

<sup>117</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volumes III-IV*, trans. J. Stambauch, D.F. Krell and F.E. Capuzzi, (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), IV, p.5.

<sup>118</sup> First edition of *The Gay Science* (1882) comprises of 4 Books, the Book 5 added in new edition in 1887.

thirty years old, he left his homeland and Lake Urmi and went into mountains. There he enjoyed his spirit and solitude...”<sup>119</sup> The whole section is almost one to one copy of already written very first section of the Prologue to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* except changing the word ‘Urmi’ with the words ‘the lake of his homeland.’

What does Nietzsche imply by bringing together the name of Zarathustra with the beginning of tragedy? As Nietzsche does not provide his readers with a clear answer, we have no other choice to attempt an interpretation by referring to some scattered pieces of information from Nietzsche’s different texts and notes. In *Twilight of Idols* Nietzsche says that “[t]he *fundamental fact* of the Hellenic instinct – its ‘will to life’ – expresses itself only in Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the Dionysian state.” By doing so they wanted to achieve an eternal life, a “triumphal yes to life over and above all death and change.” In these mysteries every kind of pain is sanctified with the representation of “the woes of a woman in labour” which signifies “eternal joy of creation.” “The psychology of the orgiastic, as an overflowing feeling of life and strength where even pain acts as a stimulus, gave me the key to the concept of tragic feeling.” Thus, a Dionysian existence which expresses itself by a ‘yes-saying to life’ without taking regard to the harshness and strangeness of the difficulties stands as a “bridge” to the “psychology of the *tragic poet*”. However, as we have seen Socrates depicts life as a temporary sickness. The true and healthy life is therefore out there, in the true world of the beyond. And Christianity, too, regards life mainly as suffering, as a punishment inflicted upon human being due to his original sin, and out of this contempt of life, for instance, it throws filth on the sexuality and defines this very condition of life as unclean. Therefore, a Socratic/Christian existence expresses itself in a feeling of *resentment* against life, of debasement of life and longing for an imaginary, beyond world.<sup>120</sup> It is clear that Nietzsche is inviting humanity to overcome its child-like situation and to shoulder its responsibility by affirming life with all its suffering.

In one of his notes Nietzsche says: “It can be tragedy! Our gentleness and compassion and — our sense of truthfulness in fighting with one another regarding

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<sup>119</sup> *GS*, p.195.

<sup>120</sup> *TI*, p.227-8.

the opinions of others.”<sup>121</sup> In some sense he is describing himself, as a gentle and somber man he, for instance, has to wage war against Wagner, against Schopenhauer, against Socrates, against Christianity. Nietzsche adored Wagner to the point of seeing in him a hero who through his art is paving the way to a new tragic culture. He dedicated his first book *The Birth of Tragedy* to Wagner. And his third *Untimely Meditation* is entitled as *Schopenhauer as Educator* and the fourth one as *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*. With this “utterly belligerent” *Meditations*, he was fighting against “cultural philistines” of his time as the knight of the same front with Wagner and Schopenhauer. In the *third* and *fourth Meditations* Nietzsche uses the figures of Schopenhauer and Wagner, “two images of the harshest *selfishness* [*Selbstsucht*], *self-discipline* [*Selbstzucht*] to point to a higher concept of ‘culture’ to reestablish the concept of ‘culture’.” For him they represent “a sovereign contempt for everything around them called ‘*Reich*’, ‘culture’, ‘Christianity’, ‘Bismark’, ‘success.’”<sup>122</sup> We learn from Nietzsche that the images of Wagner and Schopenhauer are in fact reflections of himself: “The essay ‘Wagner in Bayreuth’ is a vision of my future; by contrast, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ registers my innermost history, my *becoming*. Above all my *pledge*.”<sup>123</sup> Now by distancing himself from Wagner and Schopenhauer, by waging war on them Nietzsche in fact is waging war against himself. A sense of intellectual honesty, uprightness urges him to fight against his friends, which is in fact a war against himself. Specifically, his relation and break with Wagner has some determinative impacts on his life and thoughts. He has to fight this war. For, only in this way, can he overcome himself. Nietzsche depicts his change as if he has gone through an epic journey, an odyssey just one month before his mental collapse:

*What I am today, where I am today – at a height where I have stopped speaking with words and now speak with lightning –, oh, how far from all this I still was at that time! But I saw the land, – I did not deceive myself for a minute about the path, the sea, the danger – and the success! The great calm promising, this happy gaze out onto a future that won’t remain just a promise! – Here every word is experienced, deep, inward; the most painful things are not missing either, there are words here*

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<sup>121</sup> Nietzsche, *Nachlass*, KSA9, p.273. (Our translation.)

<sup>122</sup> *EH*, p.112.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid*, p.114-5.

that would almost curdle your blood. But a wing of *great* freedom blows over everything; even wounds do not have the character of objections. – The way I understand the philosopher, as a terrible explosive that is a danger to everything, how remote my idea of a philosopher is from anything that include even a Kant, let alone academic ‘ruminants’ and other professors of philosophy.<sup>124</sup>

It seems that for Nietzsche tragedy signifies an inherent character of human life which bases on a constant war. This never ceasing war is the very possibility of the enhancement of life. Only in this way does life overcome itself. One front of this war reveals itself as war of ideas. New tragic age is an age of wars of different world views. This entails multiplicity of ideas. Only where there are conflicting parties can there be wars. “Around 1881 or 1882 Nietzsche jolted in his notebook: “The time is coming when the struggle for world dominion will be carried on – it will be carried on in the name of *fundamental philosophical doctrines*.”<sup>125</sup>

Western morality or idealism in general does not accept this plurality; it purports that there is essentially one truth, one way of life and any deviation from this truth is a sign of degeneration, deficiency. It thus seeks for peace under the banner of the truth, of the morality and regards conflicts and wars as something essentially evil. Whereas, as Deleuze puts it, “[t]he tragic is only to be found in multiplicity, in the diversity of affirmation as such. ...What defines the tragic is the joy of multiplicity, plural joy”<sup>126</sup> But we should state that for Nietzsche “the tragic belongs to the “aesthetic” domain” and he regards art as “the metaphysical activity” of life.”<sup>127</sup> According to Heidegger, “[w]hen the thought of eternal return is thought, the tragic as such becomes the fundamental trait of beings. Viewed historically, this marks the beginning of the “tragic age for Europe””<sup>128</sup> On this account Europe is in its tragic age since the appearance of Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* and it is an age of constant wars of world views.

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<sup>124</sup> *EH*, p.115.

<sup>125</sup> Cited by Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, p.190. Originally cited (XII, 207, KSA9).

<sup>126</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, (New York: Columbia University Press, c2006), p.17.

<sup>127</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, II, p.29.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, II, p.28.



We have said that in his middle period Nietzsche was very much preoccupied with sciences. Yet this does not mean that he accepts all claims of sciences. On the contrary, he finds some scientific interpretations equally problematic as idealistic interpretations of human reality. As we have stated before, for Nietzsche science is not the highest authority of decision-making process of human beings.

## **2.8. The War: Reversal of the Plot / Sils Maria**

Nietzsche was sitting at the table and reading Herbert Spencer's book. From his making a grimace it was clear that something bothered him and he jotted some notes in his notebook. Then he began to reflect about sciences, he was of the opinion that some scientists had gone too far with their "prejudices" like idea of scientific interpretation of the world:

Thus, a 'scientific' interpretation of the world ... might still be one of the *stupidest* of all possible interpretations of the world, i.e. one of those most lacking in significance. This to ear and conscience of Mr. Mechanic, who nowadays likes to pass as a philosopher and insists that mechanics is the doctrine of the first and final laws on which existence may be built, as on a ground floor. But an essentially mechanistic world would be an essentially meaningless world! Suppose one judged the value of a piece of music according to how much of it could be counted, calculated, and expressed in formulas – how absurd such a 'scientific' evaluation of music would be! What would one have comprehended, understood, recognized? Nothing, really nothing of what is 'music' in it!<sup>129</sup>

Interpreting all existence with the laws of mechanic would mean stripping existence of all its meaning. This would be more or less the same as assessing a piece of music by its signs and mathematical formulations which definitely falls short of appreciating the real value of music. The human reality is too rich to be explained by mechanical laws.

And there are also those advocates of "*laisser aller*" who after breaking the "yoke" do not accept giving themselves any laws whatsoever. Freedom for what? murmured Nietzsche. He felt himself very distant from them with their idea of *laisser aller*. 'No', said he, while reflecting in the quiet of the night, 'we do not just let everything

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<sup>129</sup> GS, p.238-9.

go'. If there is to be "freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, and masterly sureness, whether in thought itself or in government, or in rhetoric and persuasion, in the arts just in ethics" on the earth then there must be some sort of "tyranny of such capricious laws" but not *laissez aller*.<sup>130</sup> Thus went on his reflection: When we criticize the dogmatism, the idealism we do not mean that all laws, all self-discipline should be abolished altogether. On the contrary, for us, freedom means taking responsibility of our own life, creating ourselves and molding our lives. We cannot be the spectators of our lives anymore, we have to be the artists, the creators of our lives. So we have to demolish everything that prevents us to become masters of our own lives. This is the nobility of human being; only with a noble stance, a noble existence can human being and humanity achieve the greatness. Our freedom and our pride set before us the task of creating a noble existence of human being and the task of creating human perfection. Only through such a perfection human existence can be justified.

Christian morality, however, with its illusions had been degrading human being, negating life and the world for millennia. With these considerations a sense of responsibility possessed Nietzsche to shoulder this task on behalf of humanity. For he is the first one who revealed to the world the scent of the intestines of Christian morality. Thus decided he that it is high time to declare a war on Christianity. He grabbed his lantern and went to the marketplace and pronounced the death of God. He then delivered his public speech to the gathered crowd and announced the principles of the war against Christianity. Here is his declaration of war:

#### Law against Christianity

Given on the Day of Salvation, the first day of the year one (– 30 September 1888 according to the false calculation of time)

*War to death against vice: the vice is Christianity*

*First proposition.* – Every type of anti-nature is a vice. The priest is the most vicious type of person: he *teaches* anti-nature. Priests are not to be reasoned with, they are to be locked up.

*Second proposition.* – Any participation in church services is an attack on public morality. One should be harsher with Protestants than with Catholics, harsher with

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<sup>130</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kauffman, (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), 180, p.290.

liberal Protestants than with orthodox ones. The criminality of being Christian increases with our proximity to science. The criminal of criminals is consequently the *philosopher*.

*Third proposition.* – The execrable location where Christianity brooded over its basilisk eggs should be razed to the ground and, being depraved spot on earth, it should be the horror of all posterity. Poisonous snakes should be bred on top of it.

*Fourth proposition.* – The preacher of chastity is a public incitement to anti-nature. Contempt for sexuality, making in unclean with the concept of ‘uncleanliness’, these are the real sins against the holy spirit of life.

*Fifth proposition.* – Eating at the same table as a priest ostracizes: you are excommunicated from the honest society. The priest is our Chandala, – he should be ostracized, starved, driven into every type of desert.

*Sixth proposition.* – The ‘holy’ history should be called by the name it deserves, the accursed history; the words ‘God’, ‘saviour’, ‘redeemer’, ‘saint’ should be used as terms of abuse, to signify criminals.

*Seventh proposition.* – The rest follows from this.<sup>131</sup>

*The Anti-Christ*

Nietzsche then sent a text message to Zarathustra who was living in a cave in the heights of his mountain. He wrote him that God had passed away, that the herd was now left without any shepherd, that it was high time for a move, and that he should go down [*Untergehen*] to the valleys where people live and speak to them all about the truth. The message ended with this sentence: “Oh Zarathustra, whoever has mountains to move must also move valleys and hollows.”<sup>132</sup>

## **2.9. Appearance of Zarathustra**

With this call started Zarathustra’s down-going. He went down to the valley to a city called Geuru and spoke to the people in the market place. He gave them the news of the death of God and told them all about his truth. Thus spoke Zarathustra:

*“On the Hiterwordly”*<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> AC, p.66-7.

<sup>132</sup> Z, II, p.116.

<sup>133</sup> All quotations in this section are referenced at the end of the sequence. The same is valid for other sections as well.

Zarathustra told the crowd that he, too, formerly “cast his delusion beyond humans like all hinterworldly” and that he viewed the world as a creation of a god, then the world seemed him like a “dream” and “the fiction of a god”,

“Good and evil and joy and suffering and I and you” – all these seemed to him like “a colorful smoke” that a “dissatisfied” divine creator created in order to “look away from himself and so created he the world”

And “it is drunken joy to the suffering one and to look away from one’s suffering and to lose oneself”

As an “eternally imperfect”, “the mirror image and imperfect image of an eternal contradiction” seemed to him this world.

But Zarathustra said that he “overcame” himself, his “suffering self”, and that for “the convalesced one to believe in such ghosts” would itself seem as “suffering and torture”, as “humiliation.”

And now he come to understand that it is “suffering and incapacity” that creates “all hinterworlds and a brief madness of happiness that only the most suffering person experiences”, and that it is “weariness that wants its ultimate with one great leap, with a death leap; a poor knowing weariness that no longer even wants to will” that creates “all gods and hinterworlds.”

Zarathustra said he have learned “a new pride” and now he wants to “teach it to mankind” that they “no longer bury” their “head in the sand of heavenly things, but bear it freely instead, an earthly head that creates meaning for the earth!”

He continued to his speech and told them that he now wants to “teach mankind a new will: to *want* the path that human beings have travelled blindly, to pronounce it good and no longer sneak to the side of it like the sick and the dying-out.”

-‘Too much is demanding from us indeed this Zarathustra’ roared the gathered crowd.

Zarathustra remained silent for a while looked at them with a bit frustrated eyes but continued to his speech, saying ‘my brothers’: “it was the sick and the dying-out who despised the body and the earth and invented the heavenly and its redeeming drops of blood. But even these sweet and shadowy poisons they took from the body and the earth!”

-‘Why do they despise the body and the earth?’ asked one among the listeners. Directing his look to the one who asked, thus replied him Zarathustra: Because “[t]hey wanted to escape their misery. ... So they sighed “Oh if only there were heavenly paths on which to sneak into another being and happiness!” – Then they invented their schemes and bloody little drinks!”

-‘Do they find these heavenly paths shouted’ one listener and continued ‘if so, we, too, indeed would like to walk these paths’. Zarathustra drunk a sip of water and suppressed his urge to sigh and went on: “Now they fancied themselves detached from this earth, these ingrates. But what did they have to thank for the fits and bliss of their detachment? Their body and this earth.”<sup>134</sup>

-‘You say so Zarathustra’, shouted a man, ‘but recently this old guy, Immanuel Kant was here and he said that we should not forget that reason was given to us by God and that we have to “contemplate” “fortunate constitution of our nature” and “admire” this and “be grateful” to God. So which one of you should we believe? Enough is enough, stop messing with our mind’. Zarathustra looked him with empty eyes and murmured quietly: ‘Oh this old child of Konigsberg!’ and continued:

*“On the despisers of the Body”*

““Body am I and soul” – so speaks a child.” said Zarathustra and asked: “should we stay like children?”

-‘By no means’ cried one among the crowd, ‘and we are no children. What do you mean? Do we not have the soul?’

Zarathustra said that man must grow and awaken and to see that “body” is he “through and through, and nothing besides; and the soul is just a word for

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<sup>134</sup> Z, I, p.20-2.

something on the body.” And man has to know that “[t]he body is a great reason, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, one herd and one shepherd.”

-‘Oh Zarathustra I didn’t understand who is this shepherd and where is this herd?’  
shouted a seller.

Never forget my brothers that “[b]ehind your thoughts and feelings” “stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise man – he is called self. He lives in your body, he is your body.”

-‘I see this self is the shepherd, but who dares to be his own shepherd! You know the lone sheep is in danger of wolf.’

“There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. And who knows then to what end your body requires precisely your best wisdom.”<sup>135</sup>

At this very moment, an old lady entered in market place cursing and swearing. She then realized the crowd and Zarathustra and approached him with a sad face and said: Clever and wise seems to me the face of this lofty man. I want to give you this one rose that I have, the last rose I picked up from my field which is my own light and my only friend of this hard times. This morning a gazelle came to the front of my door and I went out, guess what I see. There were many motley cows in my wheat field. They cropped up all my wheat. Tell me, what shall I do. I am very sad and furious. I wonder if you know whose cows are these motley cows?

Zarathustra thanked for the rose and murmured: “motley cows?” He was amazed by the old woman's devotion to her land. He pointed his finger to the lady and continued:

Remain faithful to the earth, my brother, with power of your virtue! Let your bestowing love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the earth! ...

Like me, guide the virtue that has flown away back to the earth – yes to the body and life: so that it may give the earth its meaning, a human meaning! ...

...the value of all things will be posited newly by you! Therefore, you shall be fighters! Therefore, you shall be creators!

Knowingly the body purifies itself; experimenting with knowledge it elevates itself; all instinct becomes sacred in the seeker of knowledge; the soul is elevated one become gay. ...

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<sup>135</sup> Z, I, p. 22-4.

There are a thousand paths that have never yet been walked; a thousand healths and hidden islands of life. Human being and human earth are still unexhausted and undiscovered. ...

Indeed, the earth shall yet become a site of recovery!<sup>136</sup>

The old woman seemed perplexed. She did not understand any words of Zarathustra, and frustrated she left the market place toward the court.

A man shouted: -‘The wisest of our town, the priest and the philosopher say otherwise Zarathustra. The truth, they say, is not in this world and that we should remain faithful to the truth.’ ‘Let me say a few words to these wisest guys’ replied and thus finished his Zarathustra his speech:

*“On Self-Overcoming”*

“Will to truth” you call that which drives you and makes you lustful, you wisest ones?

Will to thinkability of all being, that’s what *I* call your will.

You first want to *make* all being thinkable, because you doubt, with proper suspicion, whether it is ever thinkable.

But for you it shall behave and bend! Thus your will wants it. It shall become smooth and subservient to the spirit, as its mirror and reflection.

That is your entire will, you wisest ones, as a will to power; and even when you speak of good and evil and of valuations.

You still want to create the world before which you could kneel: this is your ultimate hope and intoxication. ...

Wherever I find living, there I found the will to power.<sup>137</sup>

## **2.10. Meeting – Sils-Maria**

Zarathustra went down six times to the valleys, however with no avail. As Zarathustra’s efforts remained fruitless, he returned to his mountain in despair and instead of informing Nietzsche by a messenger, he decided to go to Sils-Maria. There

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<sup>136</sup> Z, I, p.57-8.

<sup>137</sup>Z, II, p.88-9.

he told Nietzsche all about his efforts, he was looking sad. Nietzsche tried to console him and said: “Nobody is free to have ears for” you, my friend.<sup>138</sup> The conversation went on as follows:

+Z- “As of yet my words have moved no mountains, and what I spoke did not reach mankind. I went to human beings, to be sure, but I have not yet arrived among them.”

-N- “What do you know *of that!* The dew lands on the grass when the night is most silent.”

+Z- “They mocked me when I found and walked my own way; and in truth my feet trembled at that time. And thus they spoke to me: “You have forgotten the way, and now you are forgetting how to walk.””

-N- “What does their mockery matter! You are the one who has forgotten how to obey; now you shall command!”

+Z- “I lack the lion’s voice for all commanding.”

-N- “The stillest words are those that bring the storm. Thoughts that come on the feet of doves steer the world.”<sup>139</sup>

You know, values of thousands of years have become flesh of the people. We need time, we are “untimely”. At this moment Nietzsche grabbed his notebook and began to jot down something. Zarathustra looked out of the corner of his eye and read the note:

*New battles.* After Buddha was dead, they still showed his shadow in a cave for centuries – a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. – And we – we must still defeat his shadow as well!<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> *EH*, Preface, p.73.

<sup>139</sup> *Z*, II, p.116-7.

<sup>140</sup> *GS*, 108, p.109.



Zarathustra then said that maybe they should change their approach to people. ‘We should appeal to their emotions; dry words of reason do not suffice.’ You are absolutely right’ replied him Nietzsche and continued. ‘You know what’:

[-N-] ‘I am thirsty for a master composer’, ... ‘who can learn my thoughts from me and hereafter speak them in his language: that way I will better penetrate into people’s ears and hearts. With tones one can seduce people into every error and every truth: who could *refute* a tone? –

[+Z-] ‘So you would like to be considered irrefutable?’ ...

[-N-] ‘I wish for this sprout to become a tree. For a teaching to become a tree, it has to be believed for a good while; for it to be believed it has to be considered irrefutable. The tree needs storms, doubts, worms, and malice in order to reveal the nature and strength of its sprout; may it break if it is not strong enough! But a sprout can only be destroyed—not refuted!’

[+Z-] ‘But I believe in your cause and consider it so strong that I will say everything, everything that I still have on my mind against it’.

... [Nietzsche] laughed to himself and wagged a finger at him.

[-N-] ‘This kind of [friendship]’ ... ‘is the best, but it is dangerous and not every kind of teaching can withstand it’.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, 106, p.103-4.

## CHAPTER 3

### WILL TO POWER

#### 3.1 Nietzsche's Intervention: Some Basic Features

As we have seen in the previous chapter Nietzsche's main target is traditional metaphysics that has been dominating western world from the Socrates onward. Of course, for Nietzsche this is not a quest after knowledge or wisdom. He vehemently repudiates such conceptions as 'art for the sake of art', 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge'. He rejects the idea that there are such things called 'pure objectivity', 'disinterested knowledge', 'beauty in itself'. Whether we know it or not, whether we accept it or not there is always a 'will', an intentionality behind any human effort whatsoever. For him the highest value is life itself. The highest 'instance' before which every human effort must be brought is life. The sole criterium for the assessment of any human 'work', any philosophical idea is to look at it from the optic of life and to see whether it is life promoting, life enhancing or life negating.

According to Nietzsche, western metaphysics with its conception of truth, which purports the possibility of the attainment of objective, ideal knowledge, has been dominating life through its values. This presupposition, which sanctifies the attainment of the *truth*, of the objective knowledge has its origin in the absolute faith in reason. It is no wonder that this faith, in turn resulted in absolute tranny of reason. Traditional metaphysics, basing on the authority of reason devised the truth, the idea, God. Allegedly being the sole holder of this truth, the mouthpiece of God it has been dominating people, molding life after its fashion. But according to Nietzsche the real motivation is not truth as such, the truth is only a face value. For he thinks that behind all philosophies, all moralities, all conceptions of truth, there is always a type of assessing, value giving will. The so-called ideal world, the morality of western

metaphysics reveals nothing but the conditions under which a certain human type can flourish. In other words, a certain human type, a certain type of life imposes itself as the truth itself.

Nietzsche contends that despite all its anthropomorphisms western morality is nothing but ultimately a degradation of human being. Human being created an ideal world, a cosmos and put himself in the center of this cosmos. In this regard, he contrived a kingdom of God as a place for his future residence; he wants to feel safe, feel at home. And he somehow preferred to forget being the creator of this fictitious world order. However, by creating a cosmos out of chaos, by humanizing the nature, and then by taking this cosmos as an eternal truth, by worshipping his illusion human being debased himself and degenerated his life. He became a slave of his illusion.

Now things have changed, new truths of reality have overcome the old *truth*. The ship that set out to sail under the captaincy of Socrates has now run aground. All values have lost their credibility and human being is now faced with the danger of losing the meaning of his existence altogether. It should be stated that for Nietzsche the real problem with this morality is not its conception of truth, its propensity of idealization as such, the problem is that this morality is a degenerative, life negating morality. For this reason, it must be replaced.

the philosopher, being of necessity a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, has always found himself, and had to find himself, in contradiction to his today: his enemy was ever the ideal of today.

...Facing a world of “modern ideas” that would banish everybody into a corner and “specialty,” a philosopher—if today there could be philosophers—would be compelled to find the greatness of man, the concept of “greatness,” precisely in his range and multiplicity, in his wholeness in manifoldness. He would even determine value and rank in accordance with how much and how many things one could bear and take upon himself, how *far* one could extend his responsibility.<sup>142</sup>

Nietzsche as a philosopher “of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow” comes forward with a new philosophy, a life affirming, noble morality which, he thinks, goes beyond the traditional morality of “good and evil” and is worthy of human “greatness.” In this regard, his emphasis on a correlation between greatness of human

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<sup>142</sup> BGE, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 212, p.327-9.

being and “his range and multiplicity”, “his wholeness in manifoldness” is telling. However, the traditional morality with its dogmatic insistence on truth, on identity, on ideality tries to eliminate all differences and thus strips life of all its richness. The concept of *nobility*, as *human greatness*, is one of the main pillars on which Nietzsche built his philosophy. This becomes clearer when this concept is evaluated in the context of his criticism of western metaphysics.

As we are going to see, Nietzsche grounds his philosophy on a totally different conception of human being and his reality. We have heard some basic tenets of his philosophy from the mouth of Zarathustra. He is now putting an end to the tyranny of reason, and giving the body its due honor and bringing philosophy back to the earth. The alleged ‘true world’ is now regarded as an illusion of human reason, and stripped of its divinity. A philosophy, according to him, must do justice to all characteristics of human existence. It has to take into account all richness and possibilities, all aspects of life. Human nobility, human greatness necessitates the affirmation of life in its totality including every kind of hardship and suffering. Nietzsche defines his task as follows: “My task: the dehumanization of nature and then the naturalization of man after he has gained the pure concept of “nature.””<sup>143</sup>

In this regard, it is not surprising that the first proposition of Nietzsche’s war against Christianity reads: “Every type of anti-nature is a vice. The priest is the most vicious type of person: he *teaches* anti-nature.”<sup>144</sup> Nietzsche’s emphasis on nature and labeling Christianity as against nature is crucial for understanding his philosophy. Many Nietzsche scholars consider naturalism to be the essential characteristics of his thought.<sup>145</sup> Christa Davis Acampora, for instance, maintains that “Nietzsche’s conception of the subject largely follows from his naturalism.”<sup>146</sup> However it should

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<sup>143</sup> Nietzsche, *Nachlass*, KSA9, 11 [211], p.525.

<sup>144</sup> See footnote 116 above. *AC*, p.66-7.

<sup>145</sup> For Nietzsche’s naturalism, see for, example: Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, “The Naturalisms of *Beyond Good and Evil*”, pp.148-167, and Christopher Janaway, “Naturalism and Genealogy”, pp.337-352. Both articles in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansel Peerson (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche*, (London; Boston : Routledge & K. Paul, 1983), pp.52-6.

<sup>146</sup> Christa Davis Acampora, “Naturalism and Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology”, in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansel Peerson, pp.314-333.

be noted that his naturalism is not taken to be a reductionist one.<sup>147</sup> According to Nietzsche, it is due to failing to grasp human nature and nature in general in their totality that Socrates and Christianity fail to offer a real purpose for human being, a real meaning to life. Again, there is a particular warning of Nietzsche directed to philosophers that they should cease to be the valet of religion. They should be the ones to correct the long-lasting error. As loyal mouthpiece of Christianity, “criminal of criminals”, philosopher is now summoned to a duel by Nietzsche. What is at stake is a two thousand year’s reckoning, “a ‘revaluation of all values’, a *living* declaration of war on and victory over old concepts of ‘true’ and ‘untrue’.” For thousands of years, says Nietzsche furiously, they have regarded “[a]ll the methods, *all* the presuppositions of our present scientific spirit... with the greatest contempt.”<sup>148</sup>

We remember that Raphael, in his ‘School of Athens’ fresco depicts Plato with his finger pointing upward to the sky and Aristotle with a hand pointing downward to earth, in an allusion to their respective philosophies. Though in the fresco Aristoteles’s hand is pointing to the earth he still maintains the dualities, namely, earth and heaven, body and soul. Seeing that Nietzsche is now giving a conception of human reality in which dualities vanish altogether one cannot help but ask the question ‘how would Rafael place Nietzsche in his fresco?’ But we should leave this already anachronical question to the plays of our imagination and return to the subject.

In a note from 1871 Nietzsche depicts his philosophy as upside down inverted Platonism.<sup>149</sup> What he means by this reversal is that what Plato takes to be illusory, that is our actual, sensible world is now regarded as true and conversely, the Platonic, ‘true world’ now turns to be an illusion.<sup>150</sup> We remember, however, that Nietzsche

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<sup>147</sup> Peter R. Sedgwick, *Nietzsche’s Justice Naturalism in Search of an Ethics*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013), p.10.

<sup>148</sup> AC, p.11.

<sup>149</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachlass*, KSA7, p.199. The note reads: “Meine Philosophie *umgedrechter Platonismus*: je weiter ab vom wahrhaft Seienden, um so reiner schöner besser ist es. Das Leben im Schein als Ziel”( My philosophy is inverted (upside down) Platonism: the further away from what true beings, purer, more beautiful and better it is. Life in appearance as a goal.) (Our translation).

<sup>150</sup> Michel Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, trans. Michael Gendre, (Albany: State University of New York Press, c1996), p.50.

himself recounts how his early thoughts were 'infected' by idealism. But his ideas concerning the true reality of human existence has in the meantime undergone a tremendous transformation and the dualities that have given western philosophy its basic characteristics altogether disappear. Everything now is emanating from the earth, from the body. In the dualities as purported by idealism, though these dualities are always and necessarily constructed anthropo-centrally or anthropo-morphically, there is always an alienation of human being to his construction, to his thought, to his illusion. Nietzsche believes that by putting an end to these dualities and by bringing the "meaning" back to the earth, he will also put an end to this illusion, this alienation as well. In this way, humanity will overcome its sickness and regain its health, its nobility.

Now as is said, after nearly two millennia Nietzsche is trying to bring philosophy back to the earth. Of course, here by earth he means all universe, all existence. Yes, there is heaven but this heaven is earth's heaven, its extension; it has meaning only as its parts and parcel. There is only one whole and nothing besides the whole. And this totality, which is at the same time a multiplicity within itself, is in constant flux, all existence is an everlasting becoming. "The total character of the world" says Nietzsche "is for all eternity chaos, not in the sense of the lack of necessity but lack of order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called."<sup>151</sup> Once the world assumes the character of chaos, of an eternal becoming then the human being ceases to be a mere apparatus which is destined to play his role toward a preestablished goal. Human being thus reasserts its freedom.

In the same manner there remains no more a body-soul/(mind/reason) duality; there is only body with its capabilities/characteristics defined traditionally under different concepts such as senses, passions, instincts, desires, soul, mind, reason, consciousness, intellect. Yes, there are thoughts, imaginations, dreams which cannot be deemed as physical entities in the sort of substances that form the body, however this does not mean that these thoughts, imaginations are produced by reason independently of the body, as, for instance, innate ideas of the rationalist

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<sup>151</sup> GS,109, p.109.

philosophers. In this regard, we have to mention also English empiricist philosophers John Locke and David Hume, who in the formation of our thoughts gave priority to our senses as against reason.<sup>152</sup> And Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* seems to find a balanced solution by paying tribute to both senses and reason for their respective contribution to the formation of knowledge. However, according to Nietzsche, Kant's intention, from the outset, is to pull reason without further injury out of this turmoil caused by empiricism. Nietzsche maintains that a real critique of philosophy necessitates a critique of all concepts and values, which philosophers take for granted without any real examination as the foundation stones of their philosophical systems. In this regard Nietzsche is of the opinion that Kant's critique is not an adequate critique of reason let alone a critique of all values and concepts of metaphysics.

Nietzsche believes that with his intervention history of philosophy begins to take a new course and the tragic stage of Europe theater whose curtains was closed by the rationalistic plot of Socrates and his squad now enables to open its curtains once and for all. As we have said, Nietzsche comes forward with a new conception of (human) existence which bases on "de-deified", or more truly de-humanized nature and de-mystified humanity. Put differently, a naturalized humanity with "a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature."<sup>153</sup> With this "world historical task" Nietzsche aims to restore the dignity of human being and of his lovely home, the earth after a very-long lasted period of slander inflicted by western metaphysics and its morality. This "blasphemy" against earth, life and human being must be ended and his nobility be restored.

It should be noted here that Nietzsche's war, though he baptized it with the name "the war against Christianity", is in fact a war against idealism or dogmatism in its all forms, of which Christianity represent a special type. What is peculiar, and decisive to the case of Christianity is its wide and long dominance over western life.

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<sup>152</sup> David C. Hoy points to the similarities drew by philosophers like Arthus Danto and Mary Warnock over Nietzsche's and Hume's epistemological views. See David C. Hoy, "Nietzsche, Hume, and Genealogical Method" in *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*.

<sup>153</sup> GS, 109, p.110.

It has been dominating, molding life by its moral values in Europe for thousand years. Moreover, modern movements of politics, seemingly different conceptions of moralities, the tendency of democratization in every realm of society, even in sciences are bearing in this or that respect the same Christian moral values. According to him, even the so-called materialistic, mechanistic conceptions of the universe, which are mingled with ideally depicted being(s), atoms perpetuate same values.<sup>154</sup> That is why Nietzsche's war against Christianity should be regarded as a war that aims at a wide range alliance of 'enemies.'

In what is coming we are going see how Nietzsche tries to put an end to the classical western metaphysics. At the outset of our quest, we cited Nietzsche's recount of the task undertaken by him in *The Birth of Tragedy*, which reads: "to look at science through the prism of the artist, but also to look at art through the prism of life."<sup>155</sup> From all what have been said in the previous pages we are now clear about Nietzsche's contention which can be summarized as follows: only by responding to the problem of Socrates which, Nietzsche believes to be the poisonous kernel of idealism, would philosophy be put back on its track and cease to negate life. Only through a restored tragic conception of life which human nobility necessitates, will the life be affirmed in its total richness and the way to human greatness be secured. In order to understand how Nietzsche undertakes his task, he invites us to follow with him the same sequence and try to look at the concept of knowledge through the prism (optic) of artist, to look at art and through the prism of life.

It is obvious that for such an endeavor first of all a clarification of the prism is needed. However, we should not forget that now the prisms of artist and of life are themselves totally new prisms. Only through these new prisms can we come close to discern the blurry contours of the concepts of knowledge, human being and life depicted by Nietzsche. This means that we need first to handle this prism of life, to have a closer look at it. What does this new prism look like? What is the difference between the old and new prisms? What Nietzsche means by the concept of "artist" is human being in general. So the right questions are now: What is this *human being*?

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<sup>154</sup> *TI*, p.178.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid*, p.5.



How does he acquire knowledge? Why does he need this knowledge? These questions bring us to the conception of human being as knowing subject. Obviously, we cannot not understand Nietzsche's new conception of human subject without his critique of the concept of subjectivity purported by western metaphysics. Obviously we follow Nietzsche and do not go to the details about exactly which philosopher in western tradition proposed which conception of subjectivity.

### **3.2. The Subject of Old Philosophy**

Putting it simply in a traditional way, knowledge requires a knowing *subject* as the holder, producer of knowledge on the one hand, and an object of knowledge, that is, an object or a 'fact' about which knowledge is produced on the other hand. As bearer, producer of knowledge the subject develops self-consciousness (knowledge of inner-world, if the term goes) on the one hand, and consciousness of outer-world (knowledge of outer world) on the other.

In the history of philosophy there have been various and challenging thoughts about the nature of knowledge; but there is a consensus that attainment and communication of knowledge is one of the distinguishing characteristics of human being. And the main vehicle for the communication of knowledge is language. Of course, this feature of human being is attributed to his rationality. Being a creature adorned with reason human being is somehow affiliated in myths, religious and philosophical narratives with divinely powers. Through his reason human being can unravel the secrets of existence and avoid the troubles and sufferings of this world and secure a better life.

Human being, however, is not solely a being of reason. He has a living body which withers away in a certain span of time. He dwells in a world full of beings and happenings. Some of these beings are like him living creatures some others are motionless entities. Some beings perish in a short period of time, some beings seem to be eternal and unchanging, like heavenly bodies. There are regularities like the sun that rises and goes down in a constant fashion and there are always unexpected events of surprise. Human being is in a constant struggle of survival and in this

struggle, he seemingly excels other living beings in figuring out what is going on around him. He has knowledge of himself and of the world around himself. He has consciousness.

Thinkers mostly never doubted the ability of intellect in the process of the formation of knowledge. Any error that occurs in this process is attributed mostly to the deficiencies or inadequacies of the senses that fall under the authority of the body. In other words, the incapacity and/or even mostly deceiving interferences of the senses (body) are deemed as the real source/cause of any deception and error in the attainment of knowledge/thought. So for example, (an example which is dear to Nietzsche), Parmenides blamed the senses for being the cause of the misconception about the reality of world (Being), which is one and unchanging. Senses cause us to misconceive Being as many beings in a constant change. Heraclitus, on the other hand, blamed the same senses for perceiving the reality, which according to him, is in a constant flux as being comprised of “permanent and unified things.”<sup>156</sup>

So as opposed to a divine, perfect reason there are the deceiver senses and the body. The conceptions of epistemology are formed in accordance with the ontological conceptions/assessments of human subject. On the one hand there is the physical world of which human body is also a member, on the other hand there is an intelligible world, accessible by reason/mind/spirit/soul. Needless to say, this intelligible world is the divine world of gods/God. This ‘beyond’ world is an eternal, perfect, harmonious world of serenity. And the physical world of our body is a deficient, chaotic world of continuous change; an uncanny well of everlasting suffering. Our body with its insatiable desires and appetites is the cause of our unending suffering, of our calamity.

The outcome of such valuations is not difficult to guess, and in fact, it is no secret. Thus began the long reign of reason and the “curse” on the body. The body must be held under the yoke of reason. Philosophers were certain: reason will furnish us with the “truth” of reality.

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<sup>156</sup> *TI*, p.167.

As we have seen Plato ties ‘salvation’ of human beings to the knowledge of ideas. Descartes overcomes its existential skepticism via thinking: *Cogito ergo sum*. Again, Immanuel Kant in his undertaking of critique of human reason contends that human reason/understanding has a capacity of producing synthetic *a priori* judgments, which serve as its credential to legislate universal laws of reason. human being, thanks to his “fortunate constitution” of being adorned with reason can legislate laws binding every rational being in universe. Of course, among these rational beings included God as well which is nothing but a proof of absolute sovereignty of reason.

### 3.3. Critique of Subjectivity

According to Nietzsche one of the fundamental errors of the western metaphysics is its conception of human being in general, and human reason in particular. In this regard, it is not surprising that one main aspect of his attack on western metaphysics is his critique of the traditional conception of subject. Starting from human subject philosophers contrive their conceptions of whole existence. They regard human subject a certain, clear object of knowledge and use it not only as a foundation but also as a springboard to some elevated ‘true’ worlds. “The world as object of rationality is an artefact of transcendental activity. The world is work of art produced by the transcendental ego, which is of course not a person... but the world-constituting activity of thinking and perceiving.”<sup>157</sup> Nietzsche thinks that by demonstrating the untenability of the concept of subject he will overcome traditional western metaphysics. While criticizing the traditional approaches Nietzsche comes up with his own physiological conception of subjectivity as “the will to power” which accepts no priority of consciousness over the body and instead tries to eliminate body/soul distinction.

The main reason of this misunderstanding, according to Nietzsche, is the philosophers’ “lack of historical sense” together with “their hatred of the very idea of becoming, their Egypticity. They think that they are showing *respect* for something when they dehistoricize it, *sub specie aeterni*,<sup>158</sup> – when they turn it into something a

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<sup>157</sup> Stanley Rosen, *The Mask of Enlightenment*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.86

<sup>158</sup> From the standpoint of eternity.

mummy.”<sup>159</sup> For thousands of years philosophers have been regarded “mummified concepts” as eternal realities, as heavenly ideas, as something given. And conversely “death, change, and age, as well as procreation and growth” were deemed as “objections”, as “refutations.” They have tried to get the body, “the miserable *idée fixe* of the senses” out of the equation and have refuted it by the standards of logic, for in their view the body “was full of” error in this regard.<sup>160</sup>

Nietzsche’s reasoning is clear enough here. He is not criticizing logic or rules of mathematics as such. This is a very useful ability of human reason. The problem at first seems to be the application of the rules of mathematics/logics to the beings themselves. In fact, this, too, per se would not pose a problem so long as this application is not taken to be reality itself. For in nature there are never identical cases. The problem arises when, for instance, starting from the idea of man (as an ideal rational being, something like a logical entity) it is claimed that a universally valid judgment about all human beings can be made.

Nietzsche maintains that “the concept “reality,” “being” is derived from our feeling of the “subject” and this subject conceived as a constant, atom-like entity.<sup>161</sup> But reality never shows us such a case, in every sphere of existence, including human subject there is constant change; growing, or decreasing. Nietzsche’s attack against reason tyranny obviously goes hand in hand with his defense of our senses: Our senses are “excellent tools for observation”, “nose for instance”, says Nietzsche, never was taken seriously and never mentioned “with admiration and gratitude” by any philosopher “even though it is the most delicate instrument we have at our disposal: noses can detect tiny differences in motion that even spectroscopes do not notice.”<sup>162</sup> However, if sciences have proved successful it is basically due to their reliance on the “testimony” of our senses. The rest, that is, “metaphysics, theology,

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<sup>159</sup> *TI*, p.166.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid*, p.167.

<sup>161</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, trans. W. Kauffman and R. J. Hollingdale, (New York: Random House, 1968), p.270-1.

<sup>162</sup> *TI*, p.168.

psychology, epistemology” is “deformity and pre-science”.<sup>163</sup> And other formal sciences i.e. logic, mathematics have nothing “to do with reality, not even as problem; they are equally distant from the question of whether a sign-convention like logic has any value at all.”<sup>164</sup>

Nietzsche says formerly people considered “change alteration, and becoming in general as proof that appearances were illusory, a sign that something must be misleading us.”<sup>165</sup> So they decided not to believe the testimony of senses and to leave the stage to the reason unconditionally. But Nietzsche warns us that this decision lead them “*necessarily*” to another “error, precisely to the extent that prejudice of reason forces us to make use of unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, objectification, being; we ... are sure that this is where our error lies.”<sup>166</sup> And the main cause of this error, according to Nietzsche, is our language. He gives an evolutionary explanation of the development of language. It has its beginning at a time when human psychology “was in its most rudimentary form: we enter into crudely fetishistic mindset when we call into consciousness the basic presuppositions of metaphysics of language – in the vernacular: the presuppositions of *reason*.”<sup>167</sup> This means that before the advent of the philosopher we already had a vast pool of rudimentary metaphysics in which they would play later. How is this metaphysics of language working? “It sees doers and deeds all over: it believes that the will has causal efficacy: it believes in the ‘I’, in the I as being, in the I as substance, and it projects this belief ...onto all things.”<sup>168</sup> Language, with such an operation, “*creates* the concept of ‘thing’ in the first place... Being is imagined into everything – as a cause; the concept of ‘being’ is only derived from the concept of ‘I’.”<sup>169</sup> Human being recourse to this fixation, which is an indispensable and inescapable

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<sup>163</sup> *TI*, p.168.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid*, p.168.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid*, p.169.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid*, p.169.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid*, p.169

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid*, p.169

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid*, p.169

falsification for life, for communication. In this way, Nietzsche gives the root cause, the psychology of the human endeavors to create an anthropomorphic world order for the sake of life, to feel at home. And this psychology which reveals itself in language as ossified words, things, deeds, doers, with its grammatical operations in certain categories provides thus a pool where philosophers pick up relevant concepts to build their metaphysical systems. However, they seem to disregard the origin of these concepts and various operations of language and attribute it to reason.

Much, much later in a world more enlightened in thousands of ways, philosophers, to their great surprise, become conscious of a *certainty*, a subjective *assurance* in the way the categories of reason were applied: they concluded that these categories could not have come from the empirical world, – in fact, the entirety of the empirical world stood opposed to them. *So where did they come from?* – And in India people made the same mistake they made in Greece: ‘we must have lived in a higher world at some point’... ‘we must have been divine, *because* we have reason!’... In fact, nothing has ever had a more naïve power of persuasion than the error of being, as formulated by Eleatics, for example: after all, every word we say, every sentence we use, speaks in its favour! – Even the Eleatics’ adversaries succumbed to the seduction of the Eleatic conception of being: Democritus, for instance, when he invented his *atom*... ‘Reason’ in language: oh, what deceptive old woman this is! I am afraid that we have not got rid of God because we still have faith in grammar...<sup>170</sup>

So our language provides philosophers with “certainty” and “assurance” of the operations of our reason so much so that Nietzsche does not hesitate to maintain that our faith in God has also its root in our faith in language. Thus, if metaphysics has its root in the logical operations of reason which reveals itself in our language, then the focal point of Nietzsche’s target would not be difficult to guess. As rightly pointed out by Michel Haar Nietzsche’s critique of the subjectivity “first involves a critique of logic upon which the rationalist doctrines of the ego rest.”<sup>171</sup> Nietzsche says that all logic is tied with an assumption that “there are identical cases.”<sup>172</sup> Without this assumption any logical inference is impossible. This means that “the will to logical truth can be carried through only after a fundamental *falsification* of all events assumed.”<sup>173</sup> This is hinting at a drive, which first needs such a falsification as a

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<sup>170</sup> *TI*, p.169-170.

<sup>171</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, p.85.

<sup>172</sup> *WP*, 512, p.277.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid*, 510, p.276.

means in order to implement “its point of view.” Nietzsche concludes: “logic does *not* spring from will to truth”<sup>174</sup> it is rather a falsification in the service of life itself. In the final analysis someone is determining the rules of play for a game. If the rules of game are applied equally to everybody then what is the problem with the rules or with the game itself? The problem is that from the start the rules can be beneficial to certain (especially to those who determine the rule) and be detrimental to others. Therefore, so long as all parties do not participate in the determination of the rules, there remains always the danger that rules be in favour of some and against some others. There may even be case where one party without letting any participation of others decides the rules, which are in its favor and impose the game as the sole allowed game.

We have seen above that Nietzsche criticizes philosophers for their lack of sense of history. What Nietzsche means by historical sense is not only the conscious history of human being. He has in mind a much broader sense of history. We know that he uses a genealogical approach when, for example, in his *Genealogy of Morality* he makes speculations about the origin of the morality. Nietzsche seems to have in mind the whole evolutionary history of human being. In this regard, when he, for instance, says that with respect to body consciousness is a late phenomenon he is making an assessment from an evolutionary point of view. Of course, the lack of historical sense itself is regarded by Nietzsche as a sign of intellectual deficiency, which leads to the acceptance of the existing realities as ossified realities from the time immemorial, as eternal realities. If you lack the sense of history, how can you assess accurately the development of human conscious history let alone his biological evolutionary history.

Nietzsche makes a comparison between formation of moral laws and categories of reason. “A morality, a mode of living tried and *proved* by long experience and testing, at length enter consciousness as a law, as *dominating*.”<sup>175</sup> Once this process is completed many other “related values and states” also join in this paradigm, in this system of morality. In this way it acquires firmness, gains holiness, and become

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<sup>174</sup> *WP*, 510, p.276.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid*, 514, p.277

authoritative, “unassailable.”<sup>176</sup> And with time its origin is “forgotten” and it seems as if it has been there from eternity, as a given. “Exactly the same thing could have happened with the categories of reason: they have prevailed, after much groping and fumbling, through their relative utility—There came a point when one collected them together, raised them to consciousness as a whole” they come to be taken as a capacity already at hand prior to any experience “as irrefutable.”<sup>177</sup> When Nietzsche says “yet they perhaps represent nothing more than the expediency of a certain race and species—their utility alone is their truth” he is obviously describing a biological process.<sup>178</sup> So the functioning of our reason, such as forming certainties, fixing unities is determined by the utility of these operations for our survival.

Here Nietzsche draws an analogy between a historical fact which can be known by historical studies and the formation of human consciousness, human reason, a fact, which cannot so easily be proven, at least in his time. Nietzsche is not a natural scientist and needs not to be to make philosophical speculations about human realities as all philosophers do. Given the Darwin’s evolutionary theory Nietzsche’s coming up with a new conception of human subject is not surprising. Though it has been something like a commonplace, let us not hesitate to utter once more that like every other philosopher Nietzsche is also the child of his time. After Feuerbach, killing God would not be a difficult deed for Nietzsche and after Darwin restoring somehow the ‘dignity’ of the body. True, Nietzsche is also constructing his concepts, his philosophy by metaphysical speculations, yet this construction must adjust itself to the *Zeitgeist* which permeates in every realm of life. Of course, saying all these does not diminish the importance of what Nietzsche says. He in fact believes to be the first thinker who recognizes the tragic horror that the collapse of this millennia old edifice of meaning has triggered and at the same time a tremendous opportunity for human being for new horizons, for new hopes. Yet we have to bear in mind that Nietzsche mostly ignores the contribution of other thinkers probably because he thinks that those thinkers do not provide any full fetched explanation.

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<sup>176</sup> WP, 514, p.277

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid*, 514, p.277

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid*, 514, p.277.



Nietzsche contends that it was ‘need’ that compels the formation of “reason, logic, and, the categories” but not as a need to ‘know’ rather “to subsume to schematize for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation.”<sup>179</sup> Of course, calculability or intelligibility for the purpose of domination, that is for their utility in the service of life. There is nothing like a “pre-existing idea” in reason, but it is the necessity that takes “things coarsely” by stripping them of their differences and makes them “equal” to other similar things in order to make them “calculable”, manageable.<sup>180</sup> Thus, human reason under the constant struggle of survival have devised logical entities of language. This means that “the finality in reason is an effect, not a cause,”<sup>181</sup> that is, reason itself is a product of human evolution. As Heidegger puts it: Western metaphysics is based on this priority of reason. Insofar as illuminating and determining reason may and, in fact, must be called “logic,” we can also say Western “metaphysics” is “logic”; the essence of being as such is decided in the scope of thinking.”<sup>182</sup> Of course confining what is ontological to the limits what is logical is nothing but stripping the existence of its vitality, complexity, diversity and richness.

### **3.4. The Abyss of Nihilism**

It is said before that Nietzsche introduces an altogether new conception of human reality. It would not be wrong to say that the essence of the Nietzsche’s philosophy is his conception of the *will to power*. We have seen also that his main objection to traditional metaphysics is centered around the concept of subjectivity. Philosophers almost always started from a knowing subject. Who is this self-conscious subject? For what purpose is this knowledge? Starting from knowledge, from consciousness they arrived at the divinity of reason as a perfect entity as opposed to the body and senses. They attributed order to the world, situated themselves within this order and assigned some roles for themselves. As Nietzsche puts it:

People used to see consciousness, ‘spirit’, as proof that humanity is descended from something higher, that humanity is divine; people were advised to become perfect by

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<sup>179</sup> *WP*, 515, p.278.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid*, 515, p.278.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid*, 515, p.278.

<sup>182</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume III-IV*, III, p.50.

acting like turtles and pulling their senses inside themselves, cutting off their contact with worldly thing and shedding their mortal shrouds: after this, the essential element would remain, the 'pure spirit'<sup>183</sup>

At base the gist of the discussion is revolving around the question: What is human being? Or what is the nature of human being? In fact, all different types of philosophies can be reduced to their respective answers to this basic question. Nietzsche's answer to this question also shapes his philosophy. Already from the sarcastic tone of his explanation in the above quotation one can guess what his answer would be: "We have changed our minds. We become more modest in every way. We have stopped deriving humanity from 'spirit', from 'divinity', we have stuck human beings back among animals."<sup>184</sup> However, he adds that being conscious animals they are "the strongest", "the most cunning" animals.<sup>185</sup> When Nietzsche says we relegate man back among animals, we should not mistake his intention. He does not think that he is degrading humanity; he rather believes that he is restoring the dignity of human being without distorting his reality. According to him western metaphysics and Christianity debase human being. If their all endeavor is not to escape from human reality as it is what is it then? They take refuge in divinity because they were ashamed of man as he is. As is well known, Kant defines 'enlightenment' as the emergence from self-inflicted childhood and we have no ground to doubt that he regards himself as enlightened. However, Nietzsche seems to be considering that Kant has never emerged from his childhood when he makes Zarathustra say:

*On the despisers of body*

"Body am I and soul" – so speaks a child. And why should one not speak like children?

But the awakened, the knowing one says: body am I through and through, and nothing besides; and the soul is just a word for something on the body.

The body is a great reason, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, one herd and one shepherd.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> AC, 14, p.12.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid*, 14, p.12.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid*, 14, p.12.

<sup>186</sup> Z, p.22-3.

It is obvious from Zarathustra's account that Nietzsche is regarding philosophers who make a body-soul distinction as a child, and Kant, too, is among these philosophers. In this regard, it would not be wrong to say that hardly any philosopher before Nietzsche deserves to be treated as "the awakened", "the knowing" one. In a sense, Nietzsche's war against dogmatism of every kind seems to be really a personal issue. He takes every word of them as an "insult" against himself, personally and against humanity in general. According to him, the crucial problem that stands before humanity is to decide "what type of human should be *bred*, should be *willed* as having greater value, as being more deserving of life, as being more certain of future" and adds that this more "valuable type has appeared often enough but often as a stroke of luck, as an exception, never as *willed*."<sup>187</sup> Obviously, Nietzsche is putting blame on western morality which prefers to breed "the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick animal: man, – the Christian."<sup>188</sup> He is no less angry with Kant than with Socrates. In the following sentences it is impossible not to feel his furious anger against Kant:

When the instinct of life compels us to act, pleasure proves that the act is *right*: and this nihilist with the intestines of a Christian dogmatist saw pleasure as an *objection*... What could be more destructive than working, thinking, feeling, without any inner need, any deeply personal choice, any *pleasure*? As an automaton of 'duty'? It is almost the *recipe* for decadence, even for idiocy...Kant became an idiot.<sup>189</sup>

According to Nietzsche, those who are despising the body does not have the right of speaking on behalf of humanity and life. It seems to Nietzsche no less than madness to see pleasure as objection, to treat body as the cause of evil. Kant, for instance, with his morality, which is nothing but a "*recipe* for decadence" wants to breed a human type who ought to behave like "automaton of 'duty.'" The human nobility necessitates overcoming of such idiocies.

Western philosophers do not only misrepresent the so-called inner world (the body) of human being, they, at the same time, misrepresent his outer world, the earth, this

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<sup>187</sup> AC, p.4.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid*, p.4.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid*, p.10.

universe which is his sole home and the very condition of his life. Zarathustra invites human beings to stop to behave like ostriches about “heavenly things”: “My ego taught me a new pride, I teach it to mankind: no longer bury your head in the sand of heavenly things, but bear it freely instead, an earthly head that creates a meaning for the earth!”<sup>190</sup> This is a question of pride now. A noble pride. Western metaphysics has been breeding a human type who behaves like ostriches. It turns a blind eye to human reality. This is nothing but cowardice against human reality. How and why did philosophers invent these “otherworldly” delusions? It is because of their frenzy and *faith*, and they take ‘doubt’ to be sin. This shows that philosophers slander not only body, but also reason itself and the earth. They misconceive human reality in all its aspects by abusing reason itself. This means that despite all their advocacy of reason, in reality they do not respect reason, they disregard its doubts, and without any evidence whatsoever they believe a ‘beyond world’ and some illusional entities like god(s).

In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche talks about issues concerning nutrition, location, climate, recuperation and says one may ask what is the point of speaking about these trivialities. Nietzsche’s reply is telling: “these petty concerns. the whole casuistry of selfishness – are far more important than all the concepts people have considered important so far. This is exactly where people have to start re-educating themselves.”<sup>191</sup> Nietzsche says humanity must to deal with these petty things more seriously, instead of dealing with empty “figments of imagination, or to put it strongly lies from bad instincts of sick natures who are harmful in the deepest sense – all concepts of ‘God’, the ‘soul’, ‘virtue’, ‘sin’, the ‘beyond’, ‘truth’, “eternal life””<sup>192</sup> And he asks: “Why did humanity have to take the brain diseases of sick cobweb-weavers so seriously? – It has certainly paid the price!”<sup>193</sup> Seeing that humanity did take it seriously for a long time it must also be sick. The problem is how and whether humanity can overcome this sickness and thus overcome itself.

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<sup>190</sup> *Z*, p.21.

<sup>191</sup> *EH*, p.98

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid*, p.98.

<sup>193</sup> *TI*, p.169.

Nietzsche's all endeavor seems to depict the human reality as correctly as possible. The gist of this endeavor is to do justice to every aspect, to every capacity, to every possibility of human being without doing any injustice to any bit of his *cosmic* (or more appropriately his '*chaotic*') reality. This is his conception of the justice [*Gerechtigkeit*]. And this conception of justice, Nietzsche is very sure, smashes every type of mediocre, stealthy, churchly, priestly, Königsbergian, Platonian conceptions of justice to pieces. If these types are the mouthpiece of the *truth*, of God, so is Nietzsche the mouthpiece of the truth of eternal becoming, the advocate of cosmic/chaotic justice. Justice versus justice. Truth versus truth. Morality versus morality. Ideal versus ideal. According to Nietzsche, this is ultimately a question of mediocrity/slavery versus nobility.

At this point one may ask: Kant postulates God as a hope, because God's non-existence is not provable and so is Nietzsche's assertion of atheism. Then if for both assertions there is a non-demonstrable and a non-refutable base what would be the criteria to decide about their tenability, or soundness? Nietzsche repeatedly warns us that all these godly words, moralities, truths have nothing to do with the truth-in-itself, nothing to do with God. Here a physiology, a type, a worldview is speaking. Ultimately it is a question of your truth, your taste, a question of your aesthetic values, a question of your *Redlichkeit* (honesty, sincerity) for Nietzsche. But as will be elucidated in the coming pages every truth, every consciousness corresponds to a quantum of power. Ultimately it is power relations, i.e., the struggle of powers which is decisive.

Prior to Nietzsche there were many thinkers who also do not see any divinities behind the *human affairs* like him. In this regard, we have mentioned, for instance, Feuerbach. Being aware of this fact Nietzsche gives an explanation what separates him from other non-believers of ideals:

The fact that we have not rediscovered God, either in history or in nature or behind the nature: this is not what separates us: Rather, we are separated by the fact that we view the thing worshipped as God as pathetic, absurd, and harmful, not as 'divine'; the fact that we do not treat it as a simple error but as a *crime against life*... We deny that God is God...If someone were to prove this Christian God to us, we would believe in him even less. – In a word: *deus, qualem Paulus creavit, dei negation*.<sup>194</sup> –

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<sup>194</sup> God, as created by Paul, is a negation of God. (Editor's note.)

A religion like Christianity, which is completely out of touch with reality which immediately falls apart if any concession is made to reality, would of course be mortally opposed to the ‘wisdom of this world’, which is to say *science*, – it will approve of anything that can poison, slander, or *discredit* discipline of spirit, integrity or spiritual rigour of conscience, or noble assurance and freedom of spirit. The imperative of ‘faith’ is a *veto* on science, – *in praxi*, the lie at any cost. Paul understood that lying – that ‘belief’ is necessary; later, the church understood Paul. The ‘God’ that Paul invented for himself, a God who ‘confounds all worldly wisdom’ ... is in truth just Paul’s firm decision to do it himself.<sup>195</sup>

This excerpt reveals Nietzsche’s intention very clearly. It is not the problem of positing God, positing ideal as such, after all it seems that human beings (at least certain party of them) need such idealizations. But the ideal itself, the God, for instance, that is proposed by Christianity seems problematic. This God does not represent a divine being worthy of respect. This means that the problem, for Nietzsche, is the type of values, the type of world views that are proposed. How much do these values promote “discipline of spirit, integrity or spiritual rigour of conscience, or noble assurance and freedom of spirit” if we put it in Nietzsche’s terms. It would not be wrong to say that Nietzsche’s sole criterion is the ‘*outcome*’, the result as type of ‘human being’ that is proposed, cultivated, “bred” by any world view, any idealization, any morality. As Heidegger puts it, his “decisive valuations have as their standards enhancement and securement of life.”<sup>196</sup> Therefore all world views must be weighed on the scale of life. It is ultimately the opposition between a certain way of life, against another way of life. A quantum of force against another quantum of force. This is the everlasting war of life. The very fuel of its self-overcoming.

“The antagonism between the true world,...and the world capable of being lived in: one must test the claims of *truth*, the meaning of all these ‘ideal drives’ must be measured against *life* if we are to understand what that antagonism really is: the struggle of the sickly despairing life which clings to the beyond, with the life which is healthier, more stupid, more mendacious, richer, more intact. Not then ‘truth’ struggling with life, but one type of life struggling with another. – But it wants to be the higher type! – Here one must begin with the proof that an order of rank is needed – that the problem is the order of rank among the types of life.”<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> AC, 45-6.

<sup>196</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.121.

<sup>197</sup> WLN, 7[42], p.136.

By this criterion Christian God, the Christian moral values, which according to Nietzsche, are nothing but Paul himself fail to be regarded as divine. Nietzsche says that even if such a god were proven, he would believe in him less. For his sense of human dignity, of human freedom, of honesty compels him not to believe in such a undivine God. The issue with Christianity is its ‘veto’ on science, its assertion of being the truth, sole truth; it is a *faith*. So it is a curse not only on the body, but on the reason as well. In *Genealogy of Morality* Nietzsche discusses this propensity of idealization under the concept of “ascetic ideal.” The value of truth itself determined by this ascetic ideal and even today, he says, the “free, very free spirits” of sciences have “*faith in truth*.” In this regard Nietzsche also criticizes the stance of this so called “intellectual stoicism” “which ultimately refuses not only to affirm but also to deny.”<sup>198</sup> According to Nietzsche, “faith in truth” in science or the stance which insists on the “truth at any price” is no different from the faith of Christianity. For what purpose do human beings need sciences? The answer cannot be ‘for truth’s sake’. The question ‘Why science?’, says Nietzsche, lead us back to the moral problem: *Why morality at all*, if life, nature, and history are ‘immoral’? <sup>199</sup> So, for Nietzsche every search for truth, all scientific endeavor, every sort of idealization is in fact nothing but a struggle in the service of life, nothing but a sign of will to power.

What happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy community: the ruling class identifies itself with the successes of the community. In all willing it has simply to do with commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure of many “souls”: which is why a philosopher should take the right to consider willing as such within the horizon of morality: namely, morality is understood as the doctrine of the power relations under which the phenomenon “life” arises.<sup>200</sup>

Here Nietzsche’s recount resembles that of Marx who defines life as the power struggle of classes within society. Thus, for Nietzsche, all efforts of idealization, all moralities can be assessed only through the prism of life. As is said above Nietzsche rejects the stance of the thinkers who seemingly abstain to take side, on the pretext of

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<sup>198</sup> *GM*, III, 24, p.584-9.

<sup>199</sup> *GS*, 344, p.201.

<sup>200</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, *KSA5*, 19, p.33-4 (Our translation.)

being loyal to truth. Such claims would mean nothing but to perpetuate the exiting paradigm of values. In Nietzsche's view, there is no such thing as 'absolute truth' and his intellectual integrity compels him to intervene; for him taking action is not an act of free choice, but rather a necessity, a necessity that is the expression, the outcome of power struggles. The necessary acts of a force cannot be viewed as issues of free choice.

All philosophers starting with their conceptions of human being devise a world order, a system of values, a paradigm, a strait jacket which then form the people, their body, their character, their personality, in short, their life as a whole. Nietzsche gives an account of western metaphysics in terms of the paradigms, the ideals, the 'true worlds' which are proposed from Plato onward as follows:

How the 'true world' finally became a fable- *The history of an error*:

1. The true world attainable for a man who is wise, pious, virtuous, – he lives in it, *he is it* (Oldest form of the idea, relatively coherent, simple, convincing. Paraphrase of the proposition 'I, Plato, *am* the truth.')

2. The true world, unattainable for now, but promised to the man who is wise, pious, virtuous ('to the sinner who repents'). (Progress of the idea: it gets trickier, more subtle, less comprehensible, – *it becomes female*, it becomes Christian...)

3. The true world, unattainable unprovable, unpromisable, but the very thought of it a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (Basically the old sun but through fog and scepticism; the idea become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.<sup>201</sup>)

4. The true world – unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And as unattained also *unknown*. Consequently not consoling, redeeming, obligating either: how could we have obligations to something unknown? ... (Gray morning. First yawn of reason. Cockcrow of positivism.)

5. The 'true world' – an idea that is of no further use, not even as an obligation, – now an obsolete, superfluous idea, *consequently* a refuted idea: let's get rid of it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of *bon sens*<sup>202</sup> and cheerfulness; Plato blushes in shame; pandemonium of all free spirits.)

6. The true world is gone: which world is left? The illusory one, perhaps? ... But no! *we got rid of the illusory world along with the true one!* (Noon; moment of shortest shadow; end of longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.<sup>203,204</sup>)

<sup>201</sup> "Königsberg is the Prussian city where Kant lived." (Editor's note)

<sup>202</sup> Good sense. (Editor's note.)

<sup>203</sup> Zarathustra begins. (Editor's note.)

<sup>204</sup> *TI*, p.171.



For Nietzsche each of these conceptions of life corresponds to an idealization of life as a system of “cosmological values”. The above historical sequence depicts in a sense the decline of these cosmological values. Nietzsche presents this allegedly history of ‘absolute truths’ as the history of an error. This error has resulted in nihilism. In a note, which is entitled as “Decline of Cosmological Values” Nietzsche says that as an “psychological state” nihilism emerges for three reasons. First when we are not able to find a meaning in the events of the world, a meaning that we have already ascribed to all of these events. “Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long *waste* of strength, the agony of the “in vain”, insecurity, the lack of any opportunity to recover,” the feeling of shame “as if one had deceived oneself all too long.”<sup>205</sup> In the second place, it emerges “when one has posited a totality, a systematization, indeed any organization in all events, underneath all events”, in other words when one ascribes “some sort of unity, some sort of monism” in the view of being a part of this unity as a psychological need of consolation.<sup>206</sup> “At bottom, man has lost the faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him.” And the “*third* and *last* form” of nihilism: “to pass sentence on this whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world. But as soon as man finds out how that world is fabricated solely from psychological needs,... the last form of nihilism comes into being.”<sup>207</sup>

So what is really taking place with the collapse of these “cosmological values”? “The feeling of valuelessness was reached with the realization that the overall character of existence may not be interpreted by means of the concept of “aim,” the concept of “unity”, or the concept of “truth.””<sup>208</sup> Now the existence seems to have no “goal or end”, not “a comprehensive unity in the plurality of events”, and its essential “character” “is not “true,” but *false*.” In short when one has lost all grounds in believing that there is a “true world” nihilism as psychological state emerges.<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> *WP*, 12, p.12-3.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid*, 12, p.12.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid*, 12, p.12-3.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid*, 12, p.13

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid*, 12, p.13

Nietzsche calls these cosmological values as categories of reason and says “the faith in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism. We have measured the value of the world according to categories *that refer to a purely fictitious world*.”<sup>210</sup> Obviously to overcome nihilism Nietzsche has to demonstrate that the faith in these categories of reason is baseless. He thus concludes that “Once we have devaluated these three categories, the demonstration that they cannot be applied to the universe is no longer any reason for devaluating the universe.”<sup>211</sup> In other words, there is no truth in itself, no unity, no cosmic, divine world order, and not any inherent aim of humanity directed towards this alleged world order. These are assumptions, “cosmological values” of westerns metaphysics, which serve as the fundament of its justification of the existence. For a new justification of life Nietzsche has to come to terms with this fundament.

Now this long-lasting error comes to an end with the advent of Zarathustra. The tragic age is heralded by Nietzsche at least for western world. This means in the first place the elucidation of the meaning of the cosmological values for human being and in the second place setting new purposes, new values, new meanings, in short, new paradigms through which life would manifest and shape itself. According to Nietzsche a real critique of philosophy can be properly undertaken only by revaluation of all existing values and thus determining new meaning for life. This new meaning is now set by Nietzsche as *Übermensch* (overman). Who is this overman? Zarathustra says:

*I teach you the overman. Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? ...*

The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman *shall be* the meaning of the earth!

I beseech you, my brothers, *remain faithful to the earth* and do not believe those who speak to you of extraterrestrial hopes! They are mixers of poisons whether they know it or not.

They are despisers of life, dying off and self-poisoned, of whom the earth is weary: so let them fade away!<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> *Ibid*, 12, p.13

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid*, 12, p.12-3.

<sup>212</sup> Z, p.6.

As we have said before the meaning is now brought back down to the earth, the meaning is the human being himself; but human being in his openness to new possibilities as an everlasting self-creation. “The overman is the type that embodies the new meaning of this world, the new great values that are ever becoming, that are ever newly appropriated by oncoming generations.”<sup>213</sup> In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche complains about misconceptions of overman which take ‘overman’ as an “idealistic type of the humanity, half ‘saint’, half ‘genius’” and says that these values represent the values “that are the opposite from the ones appearing in the figure of Zarathustra.”<sup>214</sup> However, these misconceptions are not without reason given his oscillating language between a positive stance towards a morality beyond good and evil on the one hand and a radical negative stance of demolishing morality altogether on the other; seeing idealization tendency as a human artistic creativity on the one hand, labeling it a big danger on the other. We should note that there is a similar tension in his stance regarding the concept of truth which in fact originates from the same root. In this regard for instance in *The Genealogy of Morality* Nietzsche says:

“What are you really doing, erecting an ideal or knocking one down?” I may perhaps be asked.

But have you ever asked yourselves sufficiently how much the erection of every ideal on earth has cost? How much reality has had to be misunderstood and slandered, how many lies have had to be sanctified, how many consciences disturbed, how much “God” sacrificed every time? If a temple to be erected a temple must be destroyed: that is the law.<sup>215</sup>

As is clear from the cited excerpt Nietzsche himself uses a language as if he is erecting an ideal, a new temple. Nietzsche in his first *Untimely Meditations* criticizes David Strauss who says that he is proposing a new religion without an intension of demolishing the older one.<sup>216</sup> Assuming Nietzsche is erecting a new temple, new questions arise. What are the differences if any, between these temples? Is it not

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<sup>213</sup> Yunus Tuncel, “Zarathustra in Nietzsche’s Typology” in *Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Before Sunrise*, ed. James Luchte, (London: Continuum, c2008), p.60.

<sup>214</sup> *EH*, p.101

<sup>215</sup> *GM*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, II, 24, p.531.

<sup>216</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer” in *Untimely Meditations*, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.3-55.

possible that two or more temples stand side by side? It seems that Nietzsche's rhetorical, aphoristic style sometime causes misunderstandings. He is quite confident that his new temple, if it can be called a temple, has totally new characteristics.

Anyway, it seems a life/death issue for Nietzsche to take a stance in the face of nihilism which is hovering in the sky of western world. As Heidegger describes it thinking "nihilism means to stand in that wherein every act and every reality of this era in Western history receives its time and space, its ground and its background, its means and ends, its order and justification, its certainty and its insecurity—in a word, its "truth.""<sup>217</sup> For Nietzsche the decisive move is to go beyond nihilism, to reject idealism or dogmatism which is the real cause of nihilism, and to accept a new reality of human being which finds its "truth", its "justification" in a tragic interplay of the forces, in an existence of constant struggle of world views using method of sciences and demarcation criteria of aesthetics for the enhancement of life.

### **3.5. The Will to Power**

With these considerations in mind, Nietzsche steps forward to the battleground with his conception of human being. He uses the concept of the *will to power* as a designation for living beings without making any special emphasis on human beings. At the outset it would be appropriate to start with a few remarks about Nietzsche's use of word 'will'. In his writings, we sometimes encounter remarks such as "there is no will", 'free will does not exist' and so on. By such remarks Nietzsche is confronting and rejecting traditional conceptions of will. Therefore, when he says 'there is no will' he "means that there is no such will as the one previously known and designated as "a faculty of the soul" and as striving in general."<sup>218</sup> The same goes for many other terms as well, for instance, for the concepts of truth, justice etc. When he says for instance, there is no "truth" what he means is the absolute truth, the truth-in-itself in the sense of the traditional metaphysics. In Nietzsche's philosophy both '*destruction*' and '*construction*' go hand in hand. On the one hand we see a

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<sup>217</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume III-IV*, IV, p.10.

<sup>218</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.38.

criticism of old values, on the other we see him coming to the fore with new values; most of the times without even changing the concepts, yet the old concepts assume new senses, new meanings. Thus, it is usual to encounter in his writings where the same concept is used with a pejorative, negative connotation in a case and with an affirmative, positive meaning in another.

We should note that the concept of the will to power has not a full fetched explanation in Nietzsche's text. In *Zarathustra*, for instance, he introduces the concept with the following words: "Wherever I find living, there I found the will to power; and even in the will of the serving I found the will to be master."<sup>219</sup> And in *Beyond Good and Evil* he provides another brief explanation:

Suppose... we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment –it is one problem—the one would have gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as –will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its "intelligible character"—it would be "will to power" and nothing else.<sup>220</sup>

According to these definitions every living organism is now regarded as a will to power and, and "viewed from inside" the will to power "defines" and "determines" the world's "intelligible character." All living organisms, including human beings are now subsumed under an umbrella concept, namely 'life'. Life is now an interplay of all living organisms.

As is known Nietzsche in his early philosophical life was influenced by Schopenhauer, and Schopenhauer is well known for his depiction of 'will' as the metaphysical essence being. However, Nietzsche's use of will is different from that of Schopenhauer's. Nietzsche considers Schopenhauer's conception to be inadequate. Schopenhauer takes on Kantian view of regarding the reality as divided in the realm of appearances and the thing-in-itself. By equating thing-in-itself with the will he thinks he can overcome the deficiencies that he purportedly identified in

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<sup>219</sup> Z, p.89.

<sup>220</sup> BGE, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 36, p.236.

Kant's philosophy. Schopenhauer says that all philosophers have erroneously related "metaphysical, indestructible, and eternal" in human being to the intellect, instead of the will "which is completely different from the former and alone primordial."<sup>221</sup> Both in the blind forces of nature and in the "deliberate action of man" there is the same will. Their essence is same only their degree of appearance is different. "Every look at the world... confirms and testifies that the will to live is the only true expression of its innermost being. Everything pushes and drives towards existence, where possible towards organic, i.e. towards life."<sup>222</sup> In *Zarathustra* we read the lines:

Indeed, the one who shot at truth with the words 'will to existence' did not hit it: this will does not exist!  
For, what *is* not cannot will; but what is in existence, how could this still will to exist.!  
Only where life is, is there also will; buy not will to life, instead –thus I teach you—will to power!<sup>223</sup>

Here Nietzsche seems to be targeting Schopenhauer's conception of will as the term 'will to existence' is used by the latter. In another note Nietzsche directly addresses Schopenhauer: "How poor the will must have become to misunderstand the world as "will" in Schopenhauer's way! The will is missing in the philosopher, no matter how much is said about the will."<sup>224</sup> In Schopenhauer's account, human existence is conditioned by suffering and only through self-consciousness, through detachment or resignation can will overcome its suffering. After a successful detachment from its object of desire (the world) the will remains as pure will. According to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer with his "hatred against willing" tries to strip will of what is valuable in it, namely willing.<sup>225</sup> In this regard, for Nietzsche Schopenhauerean detachment of will is impossible, because will always wills something; it even wills *nothingness* as in the case of the Schopenhauerian resignation. Nietzsche says "[t]here is no such

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<sup>221</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), p.575. (Our translation.)

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid*, p.410.

<sup>223</sup> *Z*, p.90.

<sup>224</sup> Nietzsche, *Nachlass*, *KSA13*, 16[23], p.488. (Our translation.)

<sup>225</sup> *WP*, 84, p.52.

thing as “willing”, but only a willing something: one must not remove the aim from the total condition—as epistemologists do.” They understand it something like “thinking”, but it “is part of willing that something is commanded.”<sup>226</sup> Every willing necessarily is intentional and necessarily produces an effect. As a quantum of force, every will to power necessarily influences all other forces in the world. According to Heidegger, “Nietzsche is convinced that Schopenhauer’s fundamental error is his belief that there is such a thing as pure willing, a willing that becomes purer as what is willed is left more and more indeterminate and the one who wills left more and more decisively out of the picture.”<sup>227</sup> As Nehamas puts it, in Nietzsche’s conception “things are, and not that they have, the will to power.”<sup>228</sup> In other words, the will to power is not an attribute, a characteristic that a living organism has, it is rather the essence of the living organism.

A second reason for Nietzsche’s objection is that by designating human existence as will to existence, or as will to self-preservation one misrepresents the human creativity and freedom. Human being is a creator who in this capacity always overcomes himself, always grows. He is open to new possibilities and not predetermined by any divine power. The increase in consciousness, for instance corresponds to an increase in power. Human creativity can be performed only by domination, by assimilation that is, will to power is in an active existence towards its environment, not in a sneaky passive contentment of self-preservation. For these reasons, the idea of self-preservation, may perhaps seem suitable for other living beings, but surely fall short of explaining human being. Hollingdale supports the view that Nietzsche has borrowed the notion of the priority of the will from Schopenhauer. However, he maintains that the former’s conception of the “will to power is so different from Schopenhauer’s will that the two principles have virtually nothing in common except the word ‘will’, and that “if Nietzsche had been more careful with his terminology he might have employed some other expression.”<sup>229</sup> As

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<sup>226</sup> WP, 668, p.353.

<sup>227</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.40.

<sup>228</sup> Alexander Nehamas, *Life as Literature*, (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 1985), p.76.

<sup>229</sup> Hollingdale, *Nietzsche, The Man and His Philosophy*, p.67.

will be elucidated in the coming pages it would be unfair to think that Nietzsche has chosen the concept of the will to power without due care. On the contrary, he seems to have devised the concept quite deliberately with the prospect that by this concept he can expose human reality more accurately.

In this same manner, Nietzsche also criticizes Darwin for defining the main endeavor of living organism as survival and adaptation to its environment. Nietzsche thinks, however that the emphasis must be put on the domination, the overpowering and assimilation, and not on survival or self-preservation. He therefore warns physiologist to be cautious against “*superfluous* teleological principles” “before positing “instinct of preservation” as the cardinal drive in an organic creature. A living thing wants above all to *discharge* its force: “preservation” is only a consequence of this.”<sup>230</sup> “The influence of “external circumstances””, say Nietzsche “is overestimated by Darwin to a ridiculous extent: the essential thing in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form-creating force working from within which *utilizes* and *exploits* “external circumstances.””<sup>231</sup> According to Nietzsche, self-preservation is only an exceptional case of the will to power.<sup>232</sup>

We should reiterate that Nietzsche is not a scientist. He is giving a speculative, metaphysical explanation of human being. For this reason, there is no point to continue for further details to examine in what way Nietzsche’s explanations are compatible or in conflict with scientific explanations of his time. Nietzsche already knows what he is going to find in the will to power as life, as it is his speculative creation, his premise, his presupposition. Of course, this does not mean that Nietzsche’s depiction has no connections with the scientific explanation of his time about human reality. On the contrary it is a conception of human being carried out with the intention to represent human reality as perfect as possible with due regard to the successes of the sciences.

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<sup>230</sup> *WP*, 650, p.344.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid*, 647, p.344.

<sup>232</sup> For a discussion of Nietzsche’s overall relation to Darwinism see for example Gregory Moore, “Nietzsche and Evolutionary Theory” in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansel Pearson, p.517-531.



Nietzsche is against any depiction of ‘*human reality*’ which is based on a teleological, or a predesigned scheme of any kind. There is no such a thing as a divine world-order toward which human being has to strive. Such explanations, he thinks will reduce human being mere to a mechanical apparatus or a puppet of the alleged divine power and thus strip him of his creative power, his freedom. Human being only in his creative power, in his freedom as being a unity of inner multiplicity, only in his dominating and assimilating capacity of his power can create a meaning, which is nothing but his self-overcoming and flourishing. The whole existence is an everlasting chaotic interplay of these forces. Only human being through his creative capacity can give a form to this world of becoming.

*Error of causation.* –Of all these tree ‘inner facts’ that together seem to guarantee causation, the first and most convincing is that of *will as causal agent*; the conception of consciousness (‘mind’) as cause, and then that of the ‘I’ (the subject’) as cause are just latecomers that are appeared once causality of the will was established as given, as *empirical*.<sup>233</sup>

As we have seen Nietzsche always emphatically emphasizes that it is through the concepts ‘I’ and “causality”, through the separation of “doer” from its deeds that western metaphysics reaches the idea of being and God and free will. This line of argumentation ultimately resulted in a fabrication of a world as a deed, and a human like God as its doer, creator. The world as a deed of God’s free will. Nietzsche, therefore, by introducing his conception of the will to power, wants to transform this ‘doer (causality) deed’ duality into a process, a necessity, in short, into a *becoming*. Thus, instead of a world which seems to be a creation, a product of a preexisting, original doer (Demiurge, or God) and thus an intentional design, a cosmos, the world now is regarded as an everlasting process of self-becoming, a *chaos*.

Nietzsche says that “there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything.”<sup>234</sup> When we separate the lightning from the flash, when we say “force moves”, “force causes” we commit the mistake of presenting a single event as two

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<sup>233</sup> *TI*, 177-8.

<sup>234</sup> *GM* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, I, 13, p.481.

separate facts. An effect of a cause, a doer and its deed as if a force has a free will of choosing between more options, let's say, to move or to stand still. "A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect, – more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting."<sup>235</sup> This means that a human being as the will to power, as a quantum of force is necessarily performing what he does and is not an agent of 'free will' who chooses between different alternatives. Human being must therefore see himself as a "fate", a further "law" among other laws.

With such a move Nietzsche also frees God from his moral responsibilities. Together with God, of course, the concepts of guilt and punishment, the torture room of the priest also disappears. Now *becoming*, *life*, and *human being* reestablish their innocence. There is no instance which can pass judgment on becoming, on life, on human being. Everyone is his own judge. Becoming does not have any purpose, neither does life. It is human beings who forge purposes and together with them moralities and values. Human beings legislate law and ascribe them to divine beings. For they demand absolute obedience to their laws. Nietzsche says that neither God nor society, nor parents or ancestors, nor *people themselves* can give people their qualities. "Nobody is responsible for existing people in the first place, or for the state or circumstances or environment they are in. The fatality of human existence cannot be extricated from the fatality of everything that was and will be."<sup>236</sup> Human beings "are *not* the products of some special design" and are not here for any final "purpose" or to "achieve ideal of humanity".

A person is necessary, a person *is* a piece of fate, a person belongs to the whole, a person only is in the context of the whole, – there is nothing that can judge, measure, compare, or condemn our being, because that would mean judging, measuring, comparing, and condemning the whole ... *But there is nothing outside the whole!* – The fact that nobody is held responsible any more, that being is not the sort of thing that can be traced back to a *causa prima*, that the world is not unified as either a *sensorium* or a 'spirit', *only this can constitute the great liberation*, – only this begins to restore the *innocence* of becoming ... The concept of 'God' has been the biggest objection to existence so far... We reject God, we reject the responsibility in God: this is how we begin to redeem the world.<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> *Ibid*, I, 13, p.481.

<sup>236</sup> *TI*, p.182.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid*, p.182.

It seems that Nietzsche who regards the disappearance of God from the scene as the liberation of human being and world does not share Dostoyevsky's worries that without God everything will be permissible. On the contrary, Nietzsche calls the rejection of God, of responsibility toward any pre-determined purpose "great liberation." It is with this great liberation that human being gets hold of the possibility of asserting his nobility. Otherwise, every morality that purports a pre-established world order, that effaces the innocence of becoming and life, and thus tried to lead human beings toward an already determined goal would be a disgraceful morality.

Morality prescribes the codes of conduct allegedly with universal validity. On the other hand, Nietzsche says that a "person is a piece of fate" which implies the uniqueness of every human existence. Obviously, this emphasis on uniqueness is the rejection of the claims of universal validity of moral codes; thus, the rejection of morality. Nietzsche thus relegates morality to individuals, yet, as we have seen, he does not accept a *laissez aller* stance neither. So, one may ask, what is the point of reading Nietzsche or listening to Zarathustra's speeches if morality is a personal issue? After all Zarathustra says that he does not want believers, and not to be a shepherd to a flock. Yet he says the meaning of the world is overman. Human being is the will to power which in his essence has the possibility of overcoming himself. There is no purpose in nature but human being sets purposes? Why?

Nietzsche depicts every individual as a fate, and this individual is not the individual of traditional metaphysics with its free will. In traditional conception individuals stand as separate atoms within society and regarded as fully responsible for their actions. But in Nietzsche's conception individuals as will to power are quantum of forces which are interdependent within the whole. The individual cannot be regarded as separate from the whole. And no one can pass any judgment on the whole. So life is innocent, individual is innocent. However, as is said before, individuals are not separate atoms. All forces within the whole are interdependent of each other and this means that the outer world of an individual (human beings, society and physical world) is the constitutive part of individual being, so to say, the outer world is an extended body of the individual. Individual body viewed as a political structure and

political structures viewed as an organic body.<sup>238</sup> So, Nietzsche depicts body as a harmonious organism, a multiplicity of forces under the direction of the same will to power. In the same vein, a society viewed as an organism, a will to power and all acting forces within it act harmoniously as part of the same will. This does not mean that every will to power is necessarily a harmonious unity. This merely indicates its capacity, its potentiality; it either actualizes its potentiality or falls short of it. It depends on the coordination of the competing forces within the will to power. Its harmony reflects its strength and health, and conversely its disharmony, anarchy mirrors its weakness, its degeneration and sickness.

As we have said earlier, by introducing the concept of the will to power Nietzsche aims also to abolish body soul duality. Body is now a great reason, with its unconscious drives and consciousness.<sup>239</sup> The following long quotation reveals how exactly Nietzsche understands human being with his all characteristics:

In the tremendous multiplicity of events within an organism, the part which becomes conscious to us is a mere means: and the little bit of “virtue” “selflessness,” and similar fictions are refuted radically by the total balance of events. We should study our organism in all its immorality—

The animal functions are, as a matter of principle, a million times more important than all of our beautiful moods and heights of consciousness: the latter are a surplus, except when they have to serve as tools of those animal functions. The entire conscious life, the spirit along with the soul, the heart, the goodness, and virtue—in whose service do they labor? In the service of the greatest possible perfection of means (means of nourishment, means of enhancement) of the basic animal functions: above all, the enhancement of life.

What one used to call “body” and “flesh” is of such unspeakably greater importance: the remainder is a small accessory. The task of the spinning on the chain of life, and in such a way that the thread grows ever more powerful—that is the task.

But consider how heart, soul, virtue, spirit practically conspire together to subvert this systematic task—as if they were the end in view! The degeneration of life is conditioned essentially by the extraordinary proneness to error of consciousness: it is held in check by instinct the least of all and therefore blunders the longest and the most thoroughly.

To measure whether existence has value according to the pleasant and unpleasant feelings aroused in this consciousness: can one think of a madder extravagance of vanity? For it is only a means—and pleasant or unpleasant feelings are also only means!

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<sup>238</sup> See *WP*, 660, p.348; 784, p.411-2; 786, p.413-6.

<sup>239</sup> For a discussion of Nietzsche’s new conception of body and reason see Volker Gerhardt “The Body, the Self, and the Ego” in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, Ed. Keith Ansel Pearson, pp. 273-296.

What is the objective measure of value? Solely the quantum of enhanced and organized power.<sup>240</sup>

The body is home to a tremendous multiplicity of events which takes places without giving any notice. But this organized whole performs most of its functions without any intervention of consciousness. Taking into account evolutionary theory, consciousness is rather a late phenomenon with regard to other bodily functions, including sense organs, instincts, urges and desires. Nietzsche's emphasis on unconscious is not without reason. For thousands of years philosophers regarded senses as deceiver and evil. However, it is obvious that human animality is primordial and whether we notice them or not, nearly all vital functions of life are performed by unconscious forces of the body.

Now physiology is regarded by Nietzsche as the decisive substratum, and psychology only as a symptom, as a sign language of this substratum. He says that we have "to start from the body and employ it as a guide. It is much the richer phenomenon, which allows the clearer observation. Belief in the body is better established than belief in spirit."<sup>241</sup> Through body's kinship to the physical can an organism survive in the physical world. Its self-preservation and growth are possible only through body's being part of nature. Nietzsche says that in "human body... the most distant and the most recent past of all organic development again becomes living and corporeal, through which and over and beyond which a tremendous inaudible stream seems to flow: the body is astonishing than the old "soul.""<sup>242</sup> Through this organic development/evolution body acquires mastership (various capabilities) which enables him for the domination over and assimilation of its environment. One of these capabilities is consciousness, which begins "quite externally, as coordination and becoming conscious of "impressions"—at first at the furthest distance from biological center of the individual; but a process that deepens and intensifies itself, and continually draw nearer to the center."<sup>243</sup> Nietzsche in his

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<sup>240</sup> *WP*, 674, p.355-6.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid*, 533, p.289.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid*, 659, p.347-8.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid*, 504, p.274.

later years seems to be ascribing the will to power not only to living organisms but also to physical world: “will to accumulate force is special to phenomena of life, to nourishment, procreation, inheritance – to society, state, custom, authority. Should we not be permitted to assume this will as a motive cause in chemistry, too? – and in the cosmic order?”<sup>244</sup> But he never gives an elaborative explanation of this cosmic dimension of the will to power. (In the way Schopenhauer does.) However at least we know that he has such a thought in his mind and in this vein, he jotted down some notes.

In Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power every living being is a quantum of force. And the subject is described not as a rigid, uniform unity but rather as a unity that comprises a multiplicity of forces.<sup>245</sup> Our body is a communality and parts within it work on the basis of division of labor. Being a quantum of force, every organism is necessarily in relation with all other organisms. Their relation takes place under rules of relation of forces. In this regard there never arises communication problem between individual organisms. In traditional conceptions of metaphysics that which enables communication between atom like individuals is consciousness. These individuals are regarded equal on the basis of their rationality, their having consciousness. On the other hand, in the case of individual as will to power communication takes place in accordance with power relations and both within individual and outside of individual, there is a rank order of forces with regard to their quanta of force. The interplay of forces reveals itself in feelings of pleasure and displeasure, in feelings of love and hate. It should be added that these forces are not constant forces, they continually change and the interplay of the forces is therefore an ever-changing dynamic process. Traditional metaphysics always tries to represent subject under strict hegemony of reason. But for Nietzsche this multiplicity of forces, i.e., drives, impulses etc., within the body is the very condition of its strength. Only through different combinations and coordination of these competing forces, that is only through continuous experiments can an individual come to know itself and become what it is.

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<sup>244</sup> *Ibid*, 689, p.367.

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid*, 490, p. 270.

In contrast to the animals, man has cultivated an abundance of *contrary* drives and impulses within himself: thanks to this synthesis, he is master of the earth. – Moralities are the expression of locally limited orders of rank in his multifarious world of drives, so man should not perish through their contradictions....

The highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed, where the plant “man” shows himself strongest one finds instincts that conflict powerfully... but are controlled.<sup>246</sup>

Man has become master of the earth thanks to the cultivation of his “contrary drives and impulses” and the “highest man” says Nietzsche is the one who harbors the greatest manifoldness of “drives.” Through the conflict of drives, through the constant struggle of forces the strength of the organism arises. So the multiplicity, difference, conflict and strives are the necessary conditions of growth and strength. It is important to recognize that Nietzsche puts emphasis on multiplicity, difference, war, change, becoming. From the aridity/monotony of logical unity and sameness of reason emphasis is now shifted towards the richness of the bodily desires, towards abundance, multiplicity of life forces, toward uniqueness and difference of these forces.

These are the essential features of Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power. As we have seen without doubt, he gives a totally new depiction of human being and his reality. His conception of the will to power dramatically changes the human subject. Needless to say that this depiction is Nietzsche’s own construction in the same way other philosophers construct their conception of human subject. What is philosophy if not the endeavor of metaphysical construction of human being and his reality? The vast majority of philosophers never doubted the primacy of human rationality. Human being is regarded as a being of body and soul/reason and his rational ability by far taken to be more precious an ability than his bodily abilities, senses and desires, passions etc. Obviously in accordance with such a qualitative difference in estimation they regarded human reason as a unity (a superior unity) in contrast to a bundle of bodily desires and stimulations (an inferior bundle). This characteristic of being a rational unity is ascribed to all human beings alike. Thus, human beings are regarded as equal and same on the basis of their perfect rational ability.

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<sup>246</sup> WP, 966, p.506-7.

However, in Nietzsche's conception of the will to power human body is regarded as a great reason without any qualitative differentiation between body and reason in the traditional sense. Now human individual, or subject is posited as unity of multiple desires and impulses (forces). And human reason is something like an executive director of these multiple forces. It has only executive and coordinative power what the assembly of bodily forces (desires, passions), as a legislative organ legislates. The discussion within this assembly of desires mostly takes place in closed sessions. In other words, human being is mostly unconscious of the struggle of forces within himself. Only after the struggle has ended with a decision that he becomes conscious of the decision which leads to the wrong inference as if the decision is made by the reason (small reason in Nietzschean terms). It should be noted that not all decisions of bodily forces are known by consciousness. That is, as is said before, psychology is an expression, a symptom of physiology but not as the totality of it. Psychology reveals at best some indications about body but could not explain the whole of it. This overall process reflects the functioning of the great reason of the body. In the course of our evolutionary history the well-established decisions of our body have been stockpiled as instincts; they become 'parts' of our body. Instincts are the decisions of the great reason that becomes as tools of the body. They are the accumulated valuations of our body, of our great reason.

As executive and regulative center of certain decisions (thoughts) consciousness develops an illusion of being the real legislator of the decisions. Nietzsche's position on this issue seems to be somehow ambivalent which may cause confusion. He repeatedly reiterates that consciousness is a useful tool in the service of great reason (of life) however in some other times he depicts the intervention of consciousness as an act of conspiracy when he says for example: "But consider how heart, soul, virtue, spirit practically conspire together to subvert this systematic task—as if they were the end in view! The degeneration of life is conditioned essentially by the extraordinary proneness to error of consciousness."<sup>247</sup> Again in *Twilight of Idols* Nietzsche identifies reason as the culprit of our error: "we see ourselves mired in error, drawn *necessarily* into error, precisely to the extent that the prejudice of reason

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<sup>247</sup> WP, 669, p.353-4.



forces us to make *use* of unity, identity, permanence, substance, objectification, being.”<sup>248</sup> According to Nietzsche strength is something physiological, something that body possesses. And the intervention of consciousness is a symptom of relative imperfection. He says:

We see consciousness, ‘spirit’, as a symptom of precisely the relative *imperfection* of the organism, as an experimenting, a groping, a mistaking, as an exertion, that is sapping an unnecessarily large amount of strength away from the nervous system, – we deny that anything can be made perfect as long as it is still being made conscious. ‘Pure spirit’ is a pure stupidity: when we discount the nervous system and the senses, the ‘mortal shroud’, we miscount – nothing more! <sup>249</sup>

As we have said before, Nietzsche’s main objection is the rationalistic propensity, which equates logic with ontology. In this regard what disturbs Nietzsche is the idealistic misconception that imposes logical unities on beings and thereby conceals all differences; it reduces all multiplicity to unity. As is said above, Nietzsche defines individual or human subject as a multiplicity of forces in a unity. On this account the concept of “unity” that is posited by idealism in itself does not seem to be a problem for Nietzsche. Then what is the danger that Nietzsche sees here? As Haar puts it; “[t]he danger does not lie in this unity as such, but in the veiling, and hindering, of the free expression of internal multiplicity that such a unity produces.”<sup>250</sup> But Haar seems to be mistaken when he says multiplicity is produced by unity. It should be the other way round; for Nietzsche multiplicity, or plurality is essential feature of will to power in particular and of the world as becoming in general. It is this multiplicity that produces the whole, but there is no whole as such, that is, there is not such a thing as an original unity, original whole. All is eternally becoming and chaos. Unity, (i.e., individual, culture, state, society) originates from multiplicity. Its multiplicity is its essence. However, in order for this unity to be a firm unity, in a robust, healthy sense, the harmony of this multiplicity is essential. This is what Nietzsche calls ‘style’, or ‘great style’.<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> *TI*, p.169.

<sup>249</sup> *AC*, p.12.

<sup>250</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, p.89.

<sup>251</sup> *TI*, p.198, *CW*, p.245.

Again, we have to state that Nietzsche's critique against idealistic conception of human consciousness does not mean that he is advocating irrationality<sup>252</sup> or bare sensuality. On the contrary, he accuses traditional western metaphysics (dogmatism) for not showing intellectual honesty and criticize its conception of truth which has nothing to do with the method of science but is a bare outcome of faith. He invites his adversaries to accept the method of science and to leave dogmatism on the one hand, and to see the human capacities in its fullness and to accept the importance of all bodily forces which are essential to the flourishing of life. His conception of truth is different from that of traditional metaphysics. As Heidegger puts it the "negation of reason does not exclude thought (*ratio*); rather it relegates thought to the service of animality (*animalitas*). Yet animality too is likewise already inverted. It no longer passes for mere sensuality and what is base in man."<sup>253</sup> Body is now great reason with its creative desires, feelings, passions etc.; with its dominating, assimilating forces.

Human being has within himself multiplicity of urges, desires, passions, many inclinations, and each of them represents a quantum of force and these forces are dynamic; they grow or diminish. These forces compete constantly with each other to be dominant. As we have stated before, only a harmony of these forces brings forth a healthy unity. So, this unity, the harmony of forces is also dynamic, in constant becoming and is prone to changes and degeneration. Yet, this dynamism itself is the very possibility of the self-overcoming, of flourishing of human being. In accordance with the quanta of forces, which are in constant change the outcome, the 'peace', the 'reconciliation' of the struggle of forces also changes; human being with this experimentation/struggle of inner forces finds his strength and weaknesses. So, according to Nietzsche, only through respecting differences in harmony, only with due justice to each force (to multiplicity) in a unity, only by not imposing a unity (imaginary logical unity, equality) on differences can life make use of its full power, its full creative capabilities.

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<sup>252</sup> Robert C. Solomon, *Living With Nietzsche, What the Great "Immoralist" Has to Teach Us*, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.63-4.

<sup>253</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume III-IV*, III, p.218.

Nowadays, to *destroy* the passions and desires just to guard against their stupidity and its unpleasant consequences strikes us as itself a particularly acute form of stupidity. We have stopped admiring dentists who *pluck out* people's teeth just to get rid of the pain. ... The church combats the passions by cutting them off in every sense; its technique, its 'cure', is *castration*. It never asks: 'how can a desire be spiritualized, beautified, deified?' – it has always laid the weight of its discipline of eradication (of sensuality, of pride, of greed, of the thirst to dominate and exact revenge). – But attacking the root of the passions means attacking the root of life: the practices of the church are *hostile to life*.<sup>254</sup>

Idealism commits yet another mistake. After positing a false unity within individual, a logical unity which it identifies with reason or ego it then moves to transpose this unity, and identity to all human beings. It can do this only by stripping human being of all his characteristics that exhibit differences. Thus, in the first step the simplification of individual (as a logical entity of reason), and then in the second step the universalization of this simplified individual. Of course, dogmatism does this with bombastic moral terms such as equality, fraternity, etc. In this way by disregarding the differences of forces morality of western metaphysics turns a blind eye both to multiplicity within individual and to multiplicity within human society.<sup>255</sup> However every individual, as will to power is unique and represent different quantum of force. As discussed above within individual as an outcome of continuously changing power relations between different desires/inclinations a constant change in power, a dynamic equilibrium takes place, and this is the case for every individual. So, every individual in a universal level must be regarded not as equal but as absolutely different, as irreducibly unique.

These are basic characteristics of the Nietzsche's conception of the will to power. We have said before that Nietzsche's critique of traditional western metaphysics centers around its conception of subjectivity. Nietzsche's contention is that by introducing the concept of the will to power he successfully overcame western metaphysics. There is a general agreement among prominent Nietzsche scholars that his new conception of human subjectivity is without doubt a breakthrough. However, scholars have different opinions regarding the issue whether Nietzsche overcomes

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<sup>254</sup> *TI*, p.171-2.

<sup>255</sup> See in this regard Micheal Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, Chapter 5, "Critique and Subversion of Subjectivity", pp.83-111.

metaphysics or not. The most famous one of these scholars is Martin Heidegger. His reading of Nietzsche has been very influential, especially in 1960s and 1970s, and many other commentators take stances on this issue by responding his interpretation of Nietzsche.

“In order to grasp Nietzsche’s philosophy as metaphysics,” says Heidegger, “[w]e must grasp [his] philosophy as the metaphysics of subjectivity”, for his “metaphysics” “may now be more clearly delineated as a metaphysics of the absolute subjectivity of the will to power.”<sup>256</sup> Heidegger refrains to use the term “absolute subjectivity” in order to avoid confusions with Hegel’s metaphysics. He reminds us that throughout the history of philosophy the “essence of man is universally and consistently established ... as *animal rationale*.”<sup>257</sup> In Hegel, “a speculatively-dialectically understood *rationalitas* becomes determinative”, whereas in Nietzsche “*animalitas* is taken as the guide.” According to Heidegger “the essence of metaphysics” is nothing but “*the secret of the promise of Being itself*.” On his view Nietzsche’s philosophy consists in the interpretation of “Being as a pure value in terms of beings and in accordance with the essence of the will to power.” He contends that in Nietzsche’s philosophy metaphysics “is brought to its essential completion” namely, subjectivity as understood will to power with its animality and rationality.<sup>258</sup> Thus for Heidegger Nietzsche does not overcome metaphysics, he is rather the last metaphysician of western philosophy.

Michel Haar opposes Heidegger by contending that such an “interpretation obscures all the objections, as well as all the mutations, that Nietzsche brought into the classical concept of the subject.” Haar goes on to assert that Heidegger overlooks the critical dimension of the Nietzschean theory of the subject and fails to recognize the ruptures that such a theory introduces into the traditional sense of the subjectivity.<sup>259</sup> However “critical dimension” of Nietzsche’s conception of subjectivity as the will to

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<sup>256</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume III-IV*, V, p.147.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid*, p.147

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid*, pp.147-9, pp.150-250.

<sup>259</sup> See Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, Chapter 5.

power does not necessarily mean that it brings metaphysics to an end. Moreover, it seems an unfair claim that Heidegger overlooked the critical dimension of Nietzsche's new conception. In fact, Nietzschean subjectivity can be regarded not only in its humanity and animality, as conceived by Heidegger, but also its cosmological dimension should be taken into account.

For Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche, together with Kierkegaard represents, an objection, a rupture "against the basic tendency of Western thought to transform everything non-rational or counter-rational into rationality and to ground reason on its own basis." According to Jaspers, Western philosophy before Nietzsche and Kierkegaard was "marked by the domination of the logos and the admonition "Know thyself," which culminated in Hegel" and by Nietzsche's and Kierkegaard's intervention it has entered in a "period characterized by the radical disillusionment with the self-confidence of reason, the dissolution of all boundaries, and the collapse of all authority."<sup>260</sup>

In fact, Nietzsche himself admits that as long as we determine certain goals to lead our actions we are bound to do metaphysics. So metaphysics seems to be an unescapable human condition for Nietzsche:

*On the genesis of the nihilist*,— It is only late that one musters the courage for what one really knows. That I have hitherto been a thorough-going nihilist, I have admitted to myself only recently: the energy and radicalism with which I advanced as a nihilist deceived me about this basic fact. When one moves toward a goal it seems impossible, that "goal-lessness as such" is principle of our faith.<sup>261</sup>

This means that Nietzsche seems to be doing metaphysics in order to overcome western metaphysical tradition. It would not be wrong to say that Nietzsche's main objection is his refutation of any kind of idealism/dogmatism as the faith in truth as eternal realities. As we are going to see in the following section, he admits that truth, idealization is a kind of error that human being cannot dispense with. The main

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<sup>260</sup> Ernst Behler, *Confrontations: Derrida, Heidegger, Nietzsche*, trans. Steven Taubeneck (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991), p.21. Behler here refers to Jaspers' *Vernunft und Existence* (Reason and Existence) (Munich: Piper, 1973) and his quotations of Jaspers' are used here.

<sup>261</sup> *WP*, 25, p.18.

problem is to ignore the instrumentality of the goals of human beings, taking them as divine, eternal realities means rendering life to instrumentality.

### 3.6. Science or The Will to Truth

We remember that Nietzsche's depiction of the task he had undertaken in *The Birth of Tragedy* was: *to look at science through the prism of the artist, but also to look at art through the prism of life.*<sup>262</sup> Of course, what he means by the term 'science' is knowledge in its widest sense; strictly speaking he means the "will to truth". And he asserts that "art – and *not* morality – is the true metaphysical activity of man; [and] that the existence of the world is *justified* only as an aesthetic phenomenon."<sup>263</sup>

As we have said before in his middle period, we witness Nietzsche's increasing interest, among other things, in the questions of sciences or knowledge in general and the concept of truth in particular. In this regards we see that Nietzsche, too, involved in the controversy between Hume and Kant concerning the formation of knowledge with universal validity. Nietzsche clearly favours Hume's empiricist approach, which was an important blow to dogmatic rationalism. And he does not seem to believe that Kant has ever woken up from his "dogmatic slumber" considering that he still accuses him of "theological prejudice" and of "unconscious dogmatism" in the discussion on knowledge issues. Nietzsche writes:

"In the case of Kant, theological prejudice, his unconscious dogmatism, his moralistic perspective, were dominant, directing, commanding.

The *proton pseudos*:<sup>264</sup> how is the fact of knowledge possible? ... what is knowledge? If we do not know what knowledge is, we cannot possibly answer the question whether there is knowledge... But if I do not already "know" whether there is knowledge, whether there can be knowledge, I cannot reasonably put the question "what is knowledge?" Kant *believes* in the fact of knowledge: what he wants is a piece of naiveté: knowledge of knowledge! ...

The legitimacy of belief in knowledge is always presupposed.

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Necessity and universality can never be given in experience! Thus they are independent of experience, prior to all experience! That insight that occurs a priori,

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<sup>262</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, p.5.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid*, p.8.

<sup>264</sup> First falsehood or original error. (Editor's note.)

therefore independently of all experience, out of sheer reason, is “a *pure* form of knowledge”!

“The basic laws of logic, the law of identity and the law of contradiction, are forms of pure knowledge, because they proceed all experience.” But these are not forms of knowledge at all! They are regulative articles of belief. ...

Hume had declared: “There are no synthetic a priori judgments.” Kant says: “But there are! Those of mathematics! And if there are such judgments, perhaps there is also metaphysics, a knowledge of things by pure reason!” ...

If there are to be synthetic a priori judgments, then reason must be in a position to make connections: connection is a form. Reason must possess the capacity of giving form.<sup>265</sup>

As reason is not regarded anymore as a divine ‘gift’ Nietzsche’s argumentation follows more or less in the same line with Hume who finds no difference between animal and human inferences concerning the knowledge of occurrences of life experiences and rejects any causal necessity in these inferences. These inferences are the outcome of human psychology, i.e., of long habitual practices.

I notice something and seek a reason for it; this means originally: I seek an intention in it, and above all someone who has intentions, a subject, a doer: every event a deed—formerly one saw intentions in all events, this is our oldest habit. ...

The question “why?” is always a question after *causa finalis*, after the “what for?” We have no “sense for the *causa efficiens*”: here Hume was right; habit (but not only that of the individual!) makes us expect that a certain often-observed occurrence will follow another: nothing more!<sup>266</sup>

Human consciousness and phenomenon of knowledge is now traced back to human animality and in this regard priority of the bodily urges and senses is inevitable. Body as a whole has developed the proper apparatus in the service of its life, its survival and growth; i.e., its struggle for domination over, assimilation of its environment. In this regard, it is obvious that the functionality of the senses and consciousness cannot be explained by taking knowledge as an end in itself. In other words, these human faculties are not directed to knowledge as such but knowledge in so far as it is in the service of life of the organism. To put it differently, as the apparatus of human knowledge senses and consciousness are the very tools created by the living organism in the constant struggle for its security and flourishing, and not for knowledge as if there exists human independent knowledge, knowledge-in-itself, the attainment of which is regarded as vital for human well-being.

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<sup>265</sup> *WP*, 530, p.286-8.

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid*, 550, pp.294-5.

For Nietzsche, knowledge is a tool for life and nothing more. So if knowledge does not have an independent existence what is this concept so-called truth and why is it so highly valued by philosophers?

Nietzsche says that “[t]ruth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive.”<sup>267</sup> This aphorism of Nietzsche sounds like a riddle. A riddle that once unraveled the whole meaning of Nietzsche’s philosophy would also unravel.

In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche asks: “Suppose we want truth: *why not rather* untruth? And yet another question: “How could anything originate out of its opposite? for example, truth out of error? Or the will to truth out of will to deception? Or selfless deeds out of selfishness?”<sup>268</sup> Nietzsche says that philosophers of all ages deemed such questions as foolishness with the argumentation that the origin of something precious or good cannot be something base or evil. Nietzsche contends that the important part of our thinking has its roots in our unconscious level: “After having looked long enough between the philosopher’s lines and fingers, I say to myself: by far the greater part of conscious thinking must still be included among instinctive activities, and that goes even for philosophical thinking.”<sup>269</sup> Nietzsche contends that “being conscious” does not necessarily mean to be the “*opposite*” of “what is instinctive.” The roots of “all logic” also are in our “valuations”, our “physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life.” From the perspective of life, the deceive issue, the starting point is not the truth value of an argument or soundness of knowledge. The knowledge arises as the knowledge of the proper conditions out of which life thrives, life finds its satisfaction. Therefore, concludes Nietzsche, the original “question” is not the truth or “the falseness of a judgment” but “to what extent it is life-promoting, species preserving.”<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>267</sup> WP, 493, p.272.

<sup>268</sup> BGE in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 1-2, p.199-200.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid*, 3, p.201.

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid*, 4, p.201.



Nietzsche gives his definition of truth by answering the question: What is a judgement? It “is our oldest belief, our most habitual-true... a certainty that something is thus and not otherwise, a belief that here we really “know.””<sup>271</sup> In other words, “Nietzsche understands truth as holding-to-be-true.”<sup>272</sup> But this belief that we “know” something, this “holding-to-be true” originates from a feeling of power, it is not an arbitrary, capricious belief. If we put it in other terms, truth as “holding-to-be true”, as a “belief” that we here really “know” is the sign language of a physical condition which produces a feeling of power. “The criterion of truth resides in the enhancement of the feeling of power.”<sup>273</sup>

This means that truth cannot be conceived independent of human being, as something lying out there in reality which is waiting for its discovery. Truth is a continual creation of human being with the sole criterion of feeling of power.

Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable an abolition of false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. “Truth” is therefore not something there, that might be discovered—but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end—introducing truth, as a processus in infinitum, an active determining—not a becoming conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the “will to power.”<sup>274</sup>

The feeling of power arises only through the continues struggle that living organism is subjected to in its environment, which is a total chaos of becoming. That is, there takes place a continual play of forces which allows only a transitory dynamic equilibrium. Only in the relation of an outer world and only from the perspective of the organism is truth created. Out of this constant struggle emerges the knowledge which is nothing but a registration of the experience of life enhancing conditions of the living organism. Knowledge, truth is the expression, the reflection of what human being actively creates. “All events, all motion, all becoming” are “determination[s] of degrees and relations of forces, as a struggle.”<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>271</sup> *WP*, 531, p.288.

<sup>272</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume III-IV*, III, p.139.

<sup>273</sup> *WP*, 534, p.290.

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid*, 552, p.297.

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid*, 552, p.299.

However, this is fixing, making “durable”, making steady of something which is in a constant flux, in constant becoming. It is therefore from the start and unavoidably an “error” and “illusion”. But this is an error, an illusion which human being cannot dispense with.

Now from the standpoint of life Nietzsche defines truth as error, as illusion. Conversely “from the standpoint of morality, the world is false. But to the extent that morality itself is part of this world, morality is false.”<sup>276</sup> In Nietzsche’s language it seems as if everything is false. What does Nietzsche mean by “the standpoint of morality”? Why from the standpoint of morality does life seem to be false. Let’s see what he means:

*In what way we, too, are still pious. – This unconditional will to truth – what is it? Is it the will not to let oneself be deceived? Is it the will not to deceive? ... Consequently, ‘will to truth’ does not mean ‘I do not want to let myself be deceived’ but – there is no alternative – ‘I will not deceive, not even myself’; and with that we stand on moral ground. ... Charitably interpreted, such a resolve might perhaps be a quixotism, a slight, enthusiastic folly; but it could also be something worse, namely a principle that is hostile to life and destructive. ‘Will to truth’ – that could be a hidden will to death. Thus the question ‘Why science?’ leads back to the moral problem: Why morality at all; if life, nature, and history are ‘immoral’? No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in science presupposes thereby affirm another world than that of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this ‘other world’, must they not by the same token deny its counterpart, this world, ‘our world’? ... it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests – that even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the thousand-year old faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth; that truth is divine.<sup>277</sup>*

Now in an essentially ‘false’ world, in order to live, we human beings have to construct a ‘true’ world for ourselves. And we have to stick to this ‘true world’, its truth, and this ‘sticking to’, ‘this loyalty’ is our truthfulness, our morality. In other words, our constructed ‘true world’ is the very condition of life for us and being truthful to this ‘true world’ is our ‘good’, our morality. This is a fact that has its origin in the communal characteristic of human life. Human beings live as “herd animals” in Nietzsche’s terms. Nietzsche here clearly admits that even as “godless anti-metaphysicians” “we knowers of today” cannot escape from morality, from

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<sup>276</sup> *Ibid*, 552, p.298.

<sup>277</sup> *GS*, 344, p.200-3.

doing metaphysics. This is the very possibility of our survival that we cannot dispense with. However, there is a qualitative difference that should not be overlooked. From a dogmatic point of view, life is regarded as being in the service of morality, of the truth. In other words, our fictitious ‘true world’ is believed to be absolutely precious than our actual ‘false’ world, which means that we worship our illusions and contempt our actual life. However, “free thinkers” regards ‘truth’ or ‘morality’ as an instrument in the service of life. That is, ‘truths’ and moralities do not have an absolute value; they are at base errors which temporarily are taken to be ‘truths.’

Human being is a social animal and Nietzsche says consciousness and thus knowledge and morality as well belong to the communal aspect of human beings:

Consciousness actually belongs not to man’s existence as an individual but rather to the community and herd-aspects of his nature; that accordingly, it is finely developed only in relation to its usefulness to community or herd; and that consequently each of us, even with the best will in the world to understand ourselves as individually as possible, ‘to know ourselves’, will always bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is ‘non-individual’, that which is ‘average’; that due to the nature of our consciousness... our thoughts themselves are continually as it were outvoted and translated back into the herd perspective.<sup>278</sup>

That is, if human beings lived in isolation, if there were no need for a social life, then there would probably be no need for consciousness either. Our knowledge, our consciousness is the herd aspects of our existence and this always tends to represent the average of the herd view. In other words, the knowledge, the morality, the values are the values of herd, the values of society in us. Human being as a self is always and necessarily stands in conflict with this ‘average’, ‘truth’, ‘morality’ within himself; that is he is in a constant struggle with its herd aspect. According to Nietzsche, forgetfulness is the primordial active capacity of human being. Human being, he asserts, is a “necessarily forgetful animal in whom “forgetting represents a strength, a form of robust health.” It is only through social communication that an “opposing faculty, a memory”, (“with the aid of which forgetfulness” is in certain cases suspended) has developed.<sup>279</sup> What consciousness and language do is to

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<sup>278</sup> *GS*, 354, p.213.

<sup>279</sup> *GM in Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, II, 1, p.495.

transpose the ego (the body) into non-individual terms. In other words, the individual ego, through consciousness and language is somehow brought into accord with, or “translated back into the herd perspective.”<sup>280</sup> By virtue of this translation, (this accord) the individual is rendered to be useful to society and of course it is not in the individual’s “interest to let out in front of the collectivity the impulsive and non-logical originality”<sup>281</sup> of its individuality. Through a long history of social life, it is only with the use of great tyranny and cruelty (i.e., “by means of the morality of custom and the social strait-jacket”) that “man was really made calculable.”<sup>282</sup>

Of course, the final product of this process, the ripest fruit of the tree emerges as the sovereign individual. For Nietzsche the genealogy of morality, is nothing but the genealogy of consciousness, and genealogy knowledge as well. “As soon as we see a new picture”, says Nietzsche, “we immediately construct it with the help of all the old experiences we have had depending on the degree of our honesty and justice. There are no experiences other than moral ones, not even in the realm of sense perception.”<sup>283</sup> So the standpoint of morality means our old set of values, our ‘true world’, our paradigm on the scale of which we weigh every new piece of information. We have our conception of truth as a system of values and assess every new piece of fact that enters to our vision by means of our existing values. This means that our truth conception is interwoven, is blended with our sense of “honesty and justice”, with our conception of ‘good’. Our values determine our assessments of realities which means, for instance, that there is not such a thing as ‘pure’ reason which after a critique of itself can legislate universally without any intervention of old experiences, feelings, desires, etc. In Nietzsche’s view all our assessments within the realm of knowledge are inescapably value-laden; there is no exception. Our ‘system of values’, our paradigms, our ‘true worlds’ are our categories in Kantian sense by means of which we assess outer world.

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<sup>280</sup> GS, 354, p.211.

<sup>281</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, p.92.

<sup>282</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), II, 2, p.40.

<sup>283</sup> GS, 114, p.114.

In *The Gay Science* we see Nietzsche rebuking ‘realists’ who, he says, take themselves to be “armed against passion and fantastical conceptions” and contend that in this way reality would stand “unveiled” before them.<sup>284</sup>

But aren't you too in your unveiled condition still most passionate and dark creature... all too similar to an artist in love? And what is ‘reality to an artist in love! You still carry around the valuations of things that originate in the passions and loves of former centuries! Your sobriety still contains a secret and inextirpable drunkenness! Your love of ‘reality’, for example—oh, that is an old, ancient ‘love’! In every experience, in every sense impression there is a piece of this old love; and some phantasy, some prejudice, some irrationality, some ignorance, some fear, and whatever else, has worked on and contributed to it. That mountain over there!... What is ‘real’ about that? Subtract just once the phantasm and the whole human *contribution* from it, you sober ones! Yes, if you could do *that*! If you could forget your background, your past, your nursery school—all of your humanity and animality! There is no ‘reality’ for us—and not for you either, you sober ones—<sup>285</sup>

So according to Nietzsche the ‘knowing subject’, the individual with all its “humanity and animality” is part and parcel, and what is more, itself is the product of this so-called ‘reality’. Human being can evaluate the so-called ‘facts’ only through a prism; a prism which is made up of his past experiences, values. Of course, when Nietzsche says there is no ‘reality’ he does not mean that there is not a real world outside of human consciousness or more generally human existence. In this regard there is no doubt about his realism. What Nietzsche means is that there is no such thing as human independent knowledge, as knowledge of reality.

Concerning the process of formation of knowledge Nietzsche mentions a problem that poses him “greatest trouble”: “to realize that *what things are called* is unspeakably more important than what they are” and this is the moment where Nietzsche reveals the gist of the concept of truth.

The reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and weight of a thing—originally always something mistaken and arbitrary, thrown over things like a dress and quite foreign to their nature and even their skin—has, through the belief in it and its growth from generation to generation, slowly grown into the thing and has become its very body: what started as appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and *effectively acts* as its essence! What kind of a fool would believe that it

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<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*, 57, p.69.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, 57, p.69.

is enough to point to this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to *destroy* the world that counts as 'real', so called 'reality'! Only as creators can we destroy!—But let us also not forget that in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create new 'things'.<sup>286</sup>

Now from the very beginning of the formation of language, starting from giving names to the things, our all thought of reality, all these are our arbitrary acts, our creations. Every given name is also a moral valuation; it points at an agreement (a social contract) between people. In order for a name to be settled, a belief, an acceptance, an agreement is needed. Truth value and moral value (good) are blended in the same act. Language is the elementary expression of this contract. So our system of values, our paradigms has their origins in seemingly arbitrary acceptances which necessarily contains distortions of realities, delusions to a certain degree. The name 'tree', for instance, is accepted for all trees as if they are identical even though there are no identical cases in actual world. From there the way to Plato's '*idea*' is not so far, and to the mediaeval problem of the nominals and universals.

Now this is how the conception of truth originates. Truth is nothing but "holding-to-be-true", a belief that something is 'so and so', a delusion from the outset. And this conception of truth is not an isolated one as some so-called 'disinterested' 'objectivist' believe; it is blended with all our values. Truth is now regarded also as our 'good'. It is our morality, our paradigm, our set of values. Our truth is our justice, our honesty. Nietzsche says that "whatever philosophical standpoint one may adopt today, from every point of view the erroneousness of the world in which we think we live is the surest and firmest fact that we can lay eyes on."<sup>287</sup> And our values which are our own creations now become a yardstick and passes judgment on life itself. And the danger of truth, 'true world', the morality begins here: "in a radically false world it is the will to not let oneself be deceived that becomes inauspicious, dangerous and harmful."<sup>288</sup> Because from the point of morality, from the point of truth life necessarily seems to be false. But if from your loyalty, from your so-called truthfulness to the 'true world' you begin to despise the real, the

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<sup>286</sup> *Ibid*, 58, p.69-70.

<sup>287</sup> *BGE*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 34, p.235-7.

<sup>288</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.95.

actual world which from the stand point of your 'true world' is definitely false you begin to negate life itself. This is what all dogmatic philosophies do. The consciousness which is nothing but the product of the body now despises body. The thought, the morality which is the product of life now tries to negate life itself.

*Idealist and liar.* – One should not allow oneself to be tyrannized by the most beautiful ability – that of raising things to the ideal – otherwise one day the truth will separate from us with the evil word “You liar from the bottom up, what do I have to do with you.”? <sup>289</sup>

The ability of human being for abstraction is the most precious ability, but this ability should not turn against life itself. The reason legitimately can set goals on life which means nothing but to criticize the life in its existent conditions in a view of its enhancement, its growth, its flourishing, but it cannot take these goals as absolute truths and use them against life destructively.

If truth, understood in traditional way, is an error, is an illusion, then does Nietzsche dispense with the concept of truth altogether? This is not the case; Nietzsche instead proposes a new conception of objectivity, of truth. But he warns us from the outset that what he means by objectivity is not an objectivity which is devoid of interest as there is no “pure” knowing, no “knowledge-in-itself”. As we have seen, for Nietzsche all valuations are necessarily value-laden. So according to him, every claim of objectivity, every claim of knowledge, every claim of truth must take into account the interest of the claimer:

to see differently..., to *want* to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its ... “objectivity”—the latter understood not as “contemplation without interest” (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability *to control* one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a *variety* of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject”; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as “pure reason,” “absolute spirituality,” “knowledge in itself”: these always demand that we should think of an eye that completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing *something*, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a

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<sup>289</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, KSA2, II, 345, p.519. (Our translation.)

perspective knowing; and the *more* affects we allow to speak about one thing, the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity,” be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to *castrate* the intellect?<sup>290</sup>

The concept of perspectivism constitutes the gist of Nietzsche’s conception of truth. For Nietzsche there is only a perspective seeing through an active interpreting force. There are no facts out there; we have only interpretations. And this interpretation is at the same time an active creation, a constant becoming, a constant self-overcoming. For human being “knowing” is at the same time a “doing”. Human being constantly creates himself and his world; this constant creation finds its expression also in knowledge; knowledge is in a sense a reflection and also a precept of his overcoming himself. Through knowledge he gives shape to himself and to the world. The decisive thing is the feeling of power, the growth, the enhancement of power, i.e., the life itself. Knowledge is the knowledge of the conditions under which the organism enjoys its power; the joy, which is the pleasure felt as a result of feeling of self-assurance, is concomitant to every truth of an organism. Therefore, to demand that will must be eliminated in the formation of knowledge would mean nothing but the castration of intellect. Our struggle for knowledge is only a reflection of our struggle for life.

This world comprises of human beings each as a quantum of force, a will to power, and to different quantum of forces correspond different consciousnesses, different perspectives and different interpretations. And there is a constant struggle among these interpretations; this competition can weaken one’s strength or augment it. Objectivity, truth is nothing but the optimum, the harmony of these competing interpretations. Nietzsche says the more eyes see an object the more “complete”, more objective our knowledge of it becomes. This makes the other’s eyes the very possibility of the enhancement of our life. Therefore, every possible interpretation is precious for our life. In this regard every other force, every other individual is at the same time the possibility of the enhancement of our health, our strength. Nietzsche’s insistence on perspectivism on the one hand and his emphasis on objectivity on the

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<sup>290</sup> *GM in Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, III, 12, p.555.



other hand reveals his real intention. The emphasis on the uniqueness of any interpretation blended with self-interest implies/guarantees the right of individual. But at the same time the perspectival character of any interoperation shows its limitedness and partiality. Therefore, under the banner of ‘equality’ or identity/sameness of reason to exercise the tyranny of one capacity within the self, and/or to impose one perspective outside of the self, i.e., to the society as universal (moral) law would be nothing but the negation of life itself. That is why, says Nietzsche, “to demand that our human interpretation and values should be universal and perhaps constitutive values is one of the hereditary madnesses of human pride.”<sup>291</sup> The objectivity, the meaning of a fact is a common product, an outcome of free play, of a perpetual war of competing forces. This perpetual war of ideas/perspectives/interpretations is the very ground/condition of the objectivity or truth. Therefore, preventing any of these competing forces for any reason would be preventing the enhancement of life. Only in a free play, can competing forces express themselves and legitimately check each other.

In the following quotation, Nietzsche points out the importance of each singular perspective in the determination of the meaning of any piece of reality. Every involvement of new interpretation changes the meaning of a thing and this increases the possibility for the enhancement of life.

A ‘thing-in-itself’ just as wrong-headed as a ‘meaning-in-itself’, a ‘significance-in-itself’. There is no ‘fact-in-itself’; *instead, for there to be a fact, a meaning must always first be projected in.*

The question ‘What is that?’ is the *positing of a meaning* from the viewpoint of something else. ‘Essence’, ‘essential being’, is something perspectival and presupposes multiplicity. At bottom there is always the question ‘What is that for *me?*’ (for us, for everything that lives, etc.).

A thing would be determined only when all beings had asked of it, and answered, their “What is that?” If just one being, with its own relations to and perspectives on all things, were missing, then the things, were missing, then the thing wouldn’t yet be ‘defined’.<sup>292</sup>

As is said before, within individual there are multiplicity of affects, inclinations, desires etc. as well. Therefore, for an individual allowing different affects,

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<sup>291</sup> *WP*, 565, p.305.

<sup>292</sup> *WLN*, 2[149], p.90.

inclinations and desires within itself to have their say means seeing an object or life from different perspectives which would amount to grasping the reality, the life more objectively. The quiddity of a being can fully be understood only when all possible perspectives have their say. However, the interpretation itself is not a static phenomenon; every change in a force (a will to power), or in the conditions of a force brings a new level of consciousness and thus a new interpretation. The process of interpretation is, therefore, a continuous dynamic process, a never-ceasing process of creation. This means that the truth, the objectivity as the outcome of the competing interpretations is also a dynamic process of creation, an everlasting becoming. Thus, for Nietzsche multiplicity and difference/uniqueness of each interpretation are of paramount importance, in as much as they are the necessary conditions for the enhancement of life.

Nietzsche not only refutes ideal world of traditional metaphysics he does reject also the mechanistic explanation of positivism, which he equates with *faith*, with belief as well. Thus, he says, “it is with the faith with which so many materialistic natural scientists rest content: the faith in a world that is supposed to have its equivalent and measure in human thought, in human valuations – a world of truth that can be grasped” with reason.<sup>293</sup> He insists that the existence should not be devalued with the calculations of mathematics, and its “ambiguous character” should not be disregarded. In this vein he maintains that:

Thus a ‘scientific’ interpretation of the world ... might still be the stupidest of all possible interpretations of the world... This to the ear and conscience of Mr. Mechanic, who nowadays likes to pass as a philosopher and insists that mechanics is the doctrine of the first and final laws on which existence may be built, as on a ground floor. But an essentially mechanistic world would be an essentially *meaningless* world! Suppose one judged the value of a piece of music according to how much of it could be counted, calculated and expressed in formulas- how absurd such a ‘scientific’ evaluation of music would be! What would one have comprehended, understood, recognized? Nothing, really nothing of what is ‘music’ in it!<sup>294</sup>

Nietzsche’s designating life as the will to power is not without reason. He thus wants to secure human creativity, human freedom, life’s qualitative difference from the

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<sup>293</sup> *GS*, 373, p.238-9.

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid*, 373, p.238-9.

inorganic world of quantities. Nietzsche says that “all quantities” are the “signs of qualities” and different levels of power represent different levels of consciousness or different perspectives and interpretations. “[G]rowth itself is a desire to be more; the desire for an increase in quantum grows from a *quale*;<sup>295</sup> in a purely quantitative world everything would be dead, stiff, motionless.”<sup>296</sup> A desire to be more, to growth, to overcoming is a peculiarity which belongs solely to life as will to power. For Nietzsche an essentially mechanistic world is a world without any meaning. However, the human existence, life cannot be accounted for without positing a meaning. This meaning can be given or attributed to existence only by human beings. The mechanistic view of the science has its root in Socratism/Platonism which imposes the logical unities of reason to the beings themselves. By taking the feelings, the desires, in short, the body out of equation, it does the same thing as valuing “a piece of music according to how much of it could be counted, calculated and expressed in formulas.” However, in this way it would never be able to value what music is, what life is. A life which is stripped of feelings, desires, instincts and meanings would be nothing but an arid wasteland. Nietzsche points at the kinship between the idealistic conception of truth of science and ascetic ideal of priest as follows:

This pair, science and the ascetic ideal, both rest on the same foundation— I have already indicated it: on the same overestimation of truth (more exactly: on the same belief that truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized). Therefore they are *necessarily* allies, so that if they are to be fought they can only be fought and called in question together. A depreciation of the ascetic ideal unavoidably involves a depreciation of science.<sup>297</sup>

To regard the truth with “overestimation,” to reject any criticism toward it, is the common behavior of every dogmatic/idealistic worldview, be it in science, or in morality, or else in politics. So the truth, cannot be the idealistic conception of truth of reason, but the truth of great reason, i.e., body which is not an absolute, unchanging truth, but an outcome of competing views of all human beings.

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<sup>295</sup> How constituted? Or of what quality? (Editor’s note.)

<sup>296</sup> *WP*, 564, p.304.

<sup>297</sup> *GM in Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, III, 25, p.589.

Therefore, only body can sanctify what is true, what is truth in its real richness. Only through the prism of life can truth/knowledge come to have a meaning. Life cannot be justified or explained by means of idealistic conceptions of knowledge or morality. Only as a work of art, that is only aesthetically can life or human existence be justified. This is the tragic affirmation of life in all its manifoldness, in all its aspects, including wars of competing parties and thus ensuing sufferings. This is the great health, great style.

### **3.7. Human Being as a Creator Artist: Aesthetic Justification of Existence**

As we have seen all philosophers envisaged a cosmic world-order, and accordingly a world-view, a system of values on the basis of their conception of human being. These values, these worldviews then serve as molds and templates that give form to the people, their body, their character, their personality, in short, their life as a whole. However, Nietzsche is of the opinion that by starting a false conception of human being western metaphysics arrived at false values, which have been detrimental to human being and life. In the previous pages we saw his exposition of the history of the conceptions of 'true world' purported by philosophers from Plato onward, which have turned into a "fable." The "cosmological values" of western metaphysics have lost their meanings altogether and modern Europe now faces with nihilism.

But as these moralities, paradigms are human creations, Nietzsche says in the long run they are prone to change. But he warns us not to be naïve. Those who purport objectivity of knowledge, who think that truth is something out there to be discovered and just by pointing to the origin of error the delusion can be eliminated, are foolish. He says "only as creators can we destroy." But what does it mean to be a creator and how can we be creators? We have to "create new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create new 'things.'"<sup>298</sup> However, according to Nietzsche, there is no "thing-in-itself", "no 'fact-in-itself; *instead, for there to be a fact, a meaning must always first be projected in.* The question 'What is that?' is the *positing of a meaning* from the viewpoint" of human being which means that "[a]t bottom there is always the question 'What is that for *me?*' (for us, for everything that

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<sup>298</sup> GS, 58, p.69-70.

lives, etc.).”<sup>299</sup> However, “[t]here are no isolated judgments! An isolated judgment is never “true”, never knowledge; only in the connection and relation of many judgments is there any surety.”<sup>300</sup> This means that we understand the things, the beings not isolated but only in their relation with totality. Of course, in this totality there should be also meanings, goals, values of human beings. This means that we have to create new paradigms, new set of values, new worldviews. In other words, we have to create our “valuations” and “appearances of truth.” Only a new paradigm/ morality can destroy an old paradigm/morality. Only a new truth can kill the old truth. It is in this way that human being creates and overcomes himself, increase his power. And it is in this way that life overcomes itself and flourishes; in its destructive creation, in its creative destruction. Human being as an artist creator creates himself and his life.

Now every conception of ideal world, “true world” is an attempt, an experimentation of changing chaos into cosmos. Human being affirms life by assigning meanings and purposes to his life, to his existence. In this way he feels confident of his power, security and flourishing. As we have said above every conception of ideal world is a paradigm, a system of values. These ideals, these values serve as patterns and molds by means of which human being perpetually creates himself and his world. They are, as it were, *architectural or cosmological categories* of human life, human existence.

The paradigm of ‘true world’ has its origin in what Nietzsche calls ‘ascetic ideals’. “What is the meaning of these ascetic ideals?” Many answers can be provided, he says, depending on the person who will answer the question. For philosophers, for instance, “something like a sense and instinct for the most favorable preconditions of higher spirituality”, for priests “the distinctive priestly faith, their best instrument of power, also the “supreme license for power.” Nietzsche maintains that ascetic ideals reveal “the basic fact of human will, its *horror vacui*,<sup>301</sup> *it needs a goal*—it will rather will *nothingness* than *not* will.”<sup>302</sup> Human consciousness has sent human being

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<sup>299</sup> *WLN*, 2[149], p.90.

<sup>300</sup> *WP*, 530, p.287.

<sup>301</sup> Horror of a vacuum. (Editor’s note.)

<sup>302</sup> *GM* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, III, 1, p.533.

to the exile land of 'time' with one way ticket. Being conscious of past and future human being needs goals, purposes and meanings; he needs security, power and growth. A perpetual, self-creation, self-overcoming is the inescapable peculiarity of the human being as will to power. He creates himself, overcomes himself in time; for this he needs values, ideals and truths. In other words, he needs to situate himself a cosmic world-order of his creation that makes him feel at home. This a cosmic world-order is the paradigm which, he thinks, enables him in a best way to increase his power. "For Nietzsche art is the essential way in which beings are made to be beings. Because what matters is the creative, legislative, form-grounding aspect of art."<sup>303</sup>

Nietzsche asks: "what does it mean when a genuine *philosopher* pays homage to the ascetic ideal?" and then proposes us to "consider... the remarkable and ... fascinating attitude Schopenhauer adopted toward *art*: for it was obviously for the sake of this that Richard Wagner *initially* went over to Schopenhauer." Schopenhauer gives priority to music contending that it is "the language of the will itself, directly out of the "abyss" as its most authentic, elemental, nonderivative revelation" as against "all the other arts" which offer "images of phenomenality." So continues Nietzsche:

With this extraordinary rise in the value of music that appeared to follow from Schopenhauerian philosophy, the value of the *musician* himself all at once went up in an unheard-of-manner, too: from now on he became an oracle, a priest, indeed more than a priest, a kind of mouthpiece of the "in itself" of things, a telephone from the beyond—henceforth he uttered not only music, this ventriloquist of God—he uttered metaphysics: no wonder he one day finally uttered *ascetic ideals*.<sup>304</sup>

It is not difficult to guess why Wagner adopted Schopenhauer's views of art. In fact, Nietzsche, too, throughout his philosophical life puts a special emphasis on music by relating the rapture, the intoxication that arises from music with the feeling of power as we are going to see in the coming pages. Nietzsche here is pointing at the role of music and musician. Music is now seen as a metaphysical activity. An amazing, unspeakable exemplification of divine harmony, divine order; a voice from beyond,

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<sup>303</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.131.

<sup>304</sup> *GM in Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, III, 5, p.539.

from 'noumenal world', 'true world'. The musician is now regarded as the revealer of the ascetic ideals. However, Nietzsche says that Schopenhauer on his part is influenced by Kant's conception of aesthetics "although he ... did not view it with Kantian eyes":

Kant thought he was honoring art when among the predicates of beauty he emphasized and gave prominence to those which establish the honor of knowledge: impersonality and universality.... Kant like all philosophers, instead of envisaging the aesthetic problem from the point of view of the artist (the creator), considered art and the beautiful purely from that of the "spectator," and unconsciously introduced the "spectator" into the concept of "beautiful." It would not have been so bad if this "spectator" had at least been sufficiently familiar to the philosophers of beauty—namely, as great *personal* fact and experience, as an abundance of vivid authentic experiences, desires, surprises, and delights in the realm of the beautiful! But I fear that the reverse has always been the case; and so they have offered us, from the beginning, definitions in which, as in Kant's famous definition of beautiful, a lack of refined first-hand experience reposes in the shape of a fat worm of error. "That is beautiful", said Kant, "which gives us pleasure *without interest*."<sup>305</sup>

Nietzsche thus repudiates Kant's conception of aesthetics which explains beauty with disinterested pleasure. Kant's big mistake, according to Nietzsche, is to approach the work of art from the perspective of the spectator instead of the perspective of the artist. As Euripides brought the spectator to the stage, Kant now evaluates work of art from the point of view of the spectator. Nietzsche instead brings Stendhal's stance as a counter example who defines beauty as the promise of happiness. Nietzsche thus emphasizes the inherent connection between interest and beauty. Kant obviously is giving an aesthetic definition of beauty in accordance with his moral philosophy. Moral laws, the universality and necessity, i.e., the purity of which necessitates the exclusion of every sort of personal interest.

Nietzsche says that only in the case of priest the ascetic ideal finds its true representative. Together with his "faith" the "ascetic priest" possesses "his will, his power, his interest. His *right* to exist stands or falls with that ideal: no wonder we encounter here a terrible antagonist...one who fights for his existence against those who deny that ideal."<sup>306</sup> So the priest's ideal is the very conditions of his existence, as is the case for every human being.

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<sup>305</sup> *GM in Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, III, 6, p.539-42.

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid*, III, 11, p.552.

Above we have mentioned Nietzsche's depiction of a history of different paradigms, as 'the history of an error'. Now the error (or truth) is overcome by the advent of Zarathustra. The tragic age which is characterized by the continual struggles of competing world views is heralded by Nietzsche at least for the western world. "The magic of these struggles is such, that he who sees them must also take part in them."<sup>307</sup> In *The Birth of Tragedy*, he writes:

At present ... science, spurred by its powerful delusion, is hurrying unstoppably to its limits, where the optimism hidden in the essence of logic will founder and break up. For there is infinite number of points on the periphery of the circle of science, and while we have no way of foreseeing how the circle could ever be completed, a noble and gifted man inevitably encounters, before the mid-point of his existence, boundary points on the periphery like this, where he stares into that which cannot be illuminated. When, to his horror, he sees how logic curls up around itself at these limits and finally bites its own tail, then a new form of knowledge breaks through, *tragic knowledge*, which, simply to be endured, needs art for protection and medicine.<sup>308</sup>

Nietzsche points at the limits of the scientific knowledge where its "optimism" is shattered. These limits resemble Kantian scope and limits of the knowledge of the phenomenal world. Beyond these limits a "new form of knowledge", tragic knowledge emerges that needs art for its "protection." This is obviously the realm of metaphysical speculation whose outcome is nothing but an artwork of aesthetic creation, therefore it needs the protection of art because in this realm the ordinary practice of scientific knowledge becomes useless. The artwork of this aesthetic creation is the cosmos, the paradigm, the ideal world order, in short, the ascetic ideal.

As a philosopher for Nietzsche, ascetic ideal represents the "optimum conditions for the highest and boldest spirituality and smiles", the affirmation of "his existence, and only his existence, and this perhaps to the point at which he is not far from harboring the impious wish: *pereat mundus, fiat philosophia, fiat philosophus, fiam!*<sup>309</sup> "<sup>310</sup> Nietzsche does not accept even generality of aesthetic appreciation let alone its

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<sup>307</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, 15, p.75.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid*, 15, p.75.

<sup>309</sup> Let the world perish, but let there be philosophy, the philosopher, *me!* (Editor's note.)

<sup>310</sup> *GM* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, III, 8, p.543-4.



universality. Nietzsche calls this unique, personal aesthetic appreciation *taste*. For him this is a unique experience and only by way of analogy, as an example for inspiration does a work of art stand before other people. An inspiration that evokes in the work of art is the creator, the artist of this work of art. The work of art thus, as Stendhal says, is a promise of joy, for the eventual, potential creator; for the spectator as an artist. This joy is the joy of the feeling of power which is the essence of the will to power. This means that the beautiful that evokes intoxication, rapture is directly related with self-interest.

As we have said above this is obviously against Kant's conception of aesthetics in general and of *taste* in particular which he defines as follows: "**Taste** is the faculty of judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction **without any interest**. The object of such a satisfaction is called **beautiful**."<sup>311</sup>

Heidegger maintains that Schopenhauer "thoroughly misunderstands" Kant and "plays the leading role in the preparation and genesis of that misunderstanding of Kantian aesthetics to which Nietzsche too fell prey."<sup>312</sup> We however think that Nietzsche understands quite well the real intention of Kant's aesthetics. For Kant, aesthetics, as faculty of judgment, is a mediator between the faculty of desire (will) and the faculty of cognition (reason/ understanding). Art ultimately is in the service of morality. There is a pre-established perfect world order, which, in a sense, is the artwork of God. The beautiful, the sublime in nature, the purposiveness in organic world all imply this perfect design emanating from the creator God. Main duty of human being, according to Kant, ought to be the endeavor toward this perfection, which is universal source of taste for every rational being. Viewed from the standpoint of God, from the standpoint of ideal every particular human being and life in this world necessarily seem to be imperfect. According to Nietzsche, this is the dogmatic view, which looks at life not from the standpoint of the artist/creator but from the standpoint of the spectator. This morality has a reactive, life-negating characteristic inasmuch as it plays the role of a judge over above life from the

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<sup>311</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of The Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 96.

<sup>312</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.107.

standpoint of a pre-designed ideal, an absolute, never changing ideal. The following long quotation is needed to show clearly how Nietzsche very well understood and why he rejected Kant's conception of aesthetics.

*Let us beware.* – Let us beware of thinking that the world is a living being. Where would it stretch? What would it feed on? How could it grow and procreate? After all, we know roughly what the organic is; are we then supposed to reinterpret what is inexpressibly derivative, late, rare, accidental, which we perceive only on the crust of the earth, as something essential, common, and eternal, as those people do who call the universe an organism. This nauseates me. Let us beware even of believing that universe is a machine; it is certainly not constructed to one end ... The astral order in which we live is an exception; this order and the considerable duration that is conditioned by it have again made possible the exception of exceptions: the development of organic. The total character of the world, by contrast, is for all eternity chaos, not in the sense of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called. ... How could we reproach or praise the universe! Let us beware of attributing to it heartlessness or unreason or their opposites: it is neither perfect, nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it want to become any of these things; in no way does it strive to imitate man! In no way our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to it! It also has no drive to self-preservation or any other drives; nor does it observe any laws. Let us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities: there is no one who commands, no one who obeys, no one who transgress. Once you know that there are no purposes you also know that there is no accident; for only against a world of purposes does the word 'accident' have a meaning. Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life. The living is only a form of what is dead, and a very rare form. Let us beware of thinking that the world eternally creates new things. There are no eternally enduring substances; matter is as much of an error as the god of the Eleatics. But when will we be done with our caution and care? When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to *naturalize* humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?<sup>313</sup>

This passage seems to be a hammer blow on the Kant's philosophy in general, his conception of aesthetic in particular. For Nietzsche any pre-determined end, any eternal cosmic order, with the claims of necessity/absoluteness and universality is nothing but the rejection of human freedom, of human being's creative capacity. According to Nietzsche, human nobility necessitates grasping tightly the responsibility that human freedom imposes on human being. The world is eternally a world of becoming, a chaos, and there is nothing outside this world. Life, therefore, is innocent and not teleologically directed to any final purpose; a final purpose that stands as a judge with absolute authority over above life. Only human being gives a

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<sup>313</sup> GS, 109, p.109-10.

meaning (if we put it in the traditional terms; ‘the form of a cosmos’) to this everlasting chaos by creating himself as a work of art. In this regard, human being cannot stand as a spectator of an imaginary perfection; he should be the creator/artist of his own perfection. As Heidegger clearly puts it, “Nietzsche does not inquire into art in order to describe it as a cultural phenomenon or as a monument to civilization. Rather, by means of art and a characterization of the essence of art, he wants to show what will to power is.”<sup>314</sup> The essence of the will to power is everlasting self-overcoming. Nietzsche, therefore, rejects Kant’s putting art in the service of morality which strives for a mummified ideal. For Nietzsche, art is the main metaphysical activity of human being.<sup>315</sup>

Why does Nietzsche think that tragic knowledge needs help of art? We remember that according to Nietzsche only through new creation can one destroy old truth. Now with his conception of human reality he proposes a new meaning, a new ideal. The tragic age which was brought to an end by Socrates now begins anew. Nietzsche describes the new ideal of this tragic age as great health. This ideal is totally different from all ideals hitherto. In the view of such prospects, says Nietzsche, “with such a burning hunger in our conscience and science how could we still be satisfied with *modern-day-man*?”<sup>316</sup> A new health that is “stronger,” “tougher, bolder and more cheerful than any previous health.” This is the ideal of overman; and it is with such an ideal that “the great seriousness really emerges; that the real question mark is posed for the first time; that the destiny of the soul changes; the hand of the clock moves forward; the tragedy begins.”<sup>317</sup> We should repeat the question: why does knowledge need art?

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<sup>314</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.77.

<sup>315</sup> For the purpose and scope of my thesis, I do not consider it necessary to give a full elaboration of Nietzsche’s conception of art in relation to that of Kant. However, in this regard reader among others can consult to the following writers: Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, especially Chapter 15: “Kant’s Doctrine of the Beautiful. Its Misinterpretation by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, pp.105-14; R. Kevin Hill, *Nietzsche’s Critiques*, Paul Guyer (Ed.), *Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, Critical Essays*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, c2003), John H. Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

<sup>316</sup> *GS*, 382, p.246.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid*, 382, p.246.

We have need of lies... in order to *live*. ...Metaphysics, morality, religion, science... [are] various forms of lies: with their help one can have *faith* in life. "Life ought to inspire confidence": the task thus imposed is tremendous. To solve it, man must be a liar by nature, he must be above all an *artist*. And he *is* one: metaphysics, religion, morality, science... are only products of his will to art, to lie, to flight from "truth." This ability itself, thanks to which he violates reality by means of lies, this artistic ability of man *par excellence*. ...

That the character of existence is to be misunderstood—profound and supreme secret motive behind science, piety, artistry.... So many subtleties of ultimate self-deception, so many seductions to life, so much faith in life! In those moments in which man was deceived, in which he duped himself, in which he believes in life: oh how enraptured he feels! What delight! What feeling of power! How much artists' triumph in the feeling of power!... And whenever man rejoices, he is always the same in rejoicing: he rejoices as an artist, he enjoys himself as power, he enjoys the lie as his form of power.<sup>318</sup>

This means that the paradigms, the 'true worlds' that are proposed by metaphysics, morality, religion, science are themselves works of art. In other words, Nietzsche does not mean that solely the paradigm that he proposes is a beautiful work of art, and those, for instance, proposed by metaphysics and religion are not works of art. And according to him, the thinkers who propose such paradigms, such "cosmological values" are artists. However, the "spectator" of these works of art, too, inasmuch as he adopts one of them turns into an artist. For by the act of adoption he assimilates it, he reproduces the world for himself, and makes it his property, his work of art. It makes no difference whether the spectator adopts the new paradigm as a believer (by faith) or as a 'free thinker' (after critical scrutiny, with due changes); they both now have their own paradigm, and they are both artists.

Heidegger asks "why [for Nietzsche] is art of decisive importance for the task of grounding the principle of the new valuation?" and in this regard why does Nietzsche put emphasis on "the phenomenon "artist"?" and he provides the following answer: "To be an artist is to be able to bring something forth. To bring forth something that yet does not exist. It is as though in bringing-forth we dwelled upon the coming of to be of beings and could see there with utter clarity their essence." And Heidegger draws a conclusion by saying that "[b]eing an artist is a way of *life*."<sup>319</sup> However, this triggers the question: is "being an artist" only a way of life, and thus a matter of

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<sup>318</sup> WP, 853, p.451.

<sup>319</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.69.

choice, or is it an unescapable characteristic of human existence as will to power? Put it another way, is human being necessarily an artist? In the above-cited note, Nietzsche says that human beings are necessarily artists. Yet another note: “If one is a philosopher as men have always been philosophers, one cannot see what has been and becomes—one sees only what *is*. But since nothing *is*, all that was to left to philosophers as his world was the imaginary.”<sup>320</sup> This means that, human beings, as artists, as philosophers are necessarily living in certain paradigms, in certain set of “cosmological values.” This is their way of being; they always construct their cosmos; they are Demiurges of their lives. So it would not be wrong to say that in Nietzsche’s view, human beings are necessarily artists, and there are good and bad artists. Not that there are those who chose art as a way of life and those who choose other fashions of life other than art.

Nietzsche says that the essential aspect of art is “its perfection of existence, its production of perfection and plenitude, art is essentially affirmation, blessing, deification of existence.”<sup>321</sup> As we have said above Nietzsche puts a special emphasis on the difference between artist’s and spectator’s standpoints. He insists that work of art must be estimated from the standpoint of the artist rather than that of the spectator. Because in artist the will to power is in its affirmative condition. Artist is the creator and as creator he rejoices in the act of creation. It is through this feeling of joy, which at the same time is his feeling of power that artist, as creator affirms life. Thus, it is impossible to stay uninterested for the artist in the act of creation. “According to Nietzsche we have not yet understood what the life of an artist means: the activity of this life serves as a stimulant to the affirmation contained in the work of art itself, the will to power of the artist as artist.”<sup>322</sup> However, in the case of a spectator who adopts a worldview as a believer there is not an active stance of the will to power toward life; the believer, with his passive adaptation, just satisfies his feeling of security not a joy of his creative power. But the essence of the will to power is its growth, its overpowering, not just securing its existence, which is rather

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<sup>320</sup> *WP*, 570, p.307.

<sup>321</sup> *Ibid*, 821, p.434.

<sup>322</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.102.

a case of exception for the will to power. For this reason, the “guiding principle of Nietzsche’s teaching on art” says Heidegger, is that “art must be grasped in terms of creators and producers, not recipients.”<sup>323</sup>

This means that science cannot present us with the knowledge of a world in its totality and continuity. For instance, that the world continues to exist tomorrow cannot be proven by theoretical knowledge. Again, science cannot provide us with the knowledge of feeling through which human being undergoes during hearing a performance of music. And the meaning that human being attributes to life, to a purpose, to a goal cannot be a subject of sciences in an adequate manner. But in the architecture of a true world, in a system of cosmological values all these issues play a vital role. These issues can duly be subject of aesthetic appreciation.

Man projects his drive to truth, his “goal” in a certain sense, outside himself as a world that has being, as a metaphysical world as a “thing-in-itself,” as a world already in existence. His needs as creator invent the world upon which he works, anticipate it; its anticipation (this “belief” in truth) is his support.<sup>324</sup>

A metaphysical world, an illusory, ‘true world’, an imagined world order can be regarded only as a construct of human imagination and thus subject matters of aesthetic estimations. And conversely our sensuous world, the world of semblance in Platonic sense is rather an aesthetically perceived phenomenon. “Art,” says Heidegger, “particularly in the narrow sense, is yes-saying to the sensuous, to semblance, to what is not “the true world,” or as Nietzsche says succinctly, to what is not “the truth”.<sup>325</sup> As Heidegger puts it, in Nietzsche’s conception of art, in its broader sense every human creation is an artistic creation:

Art, thought in broadest sense as the creative, constitutes the basic character of beings. Accordingly, art in the narrower sense is that activity in which creation emerges for itself... it is not merely one configuration of will to power among others but the *supreme* configuration. Will to power becomes genuinely visible in terms of art and as art. But will to power is the ground upon which all valuation in the future is to stand. It is the principle of new valuation, as opposed to the prior one which was dominated by religion, morality and philosophy. If will to power therefore finds its

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<sup>323</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.70.

<sup>324</sup> *WP*, 552, p.299.

<sup>325</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.74.

supreme configuration in art, the positing of the new relation of will to power must proceed from art. Since the new valuation is a revaluation of the prior one, however, opposition and upheaval arise from art.<sup>326</sup>

Nietzsche says that “the *profundity of the tragic artist* lies in this that his aesthetic instinct surveys the more remote consequences, that he does not halt shortsightedly at what is closest at hand, that he affirms *large-scale economy* that justifies the *terrifying, the evil.*”<sup>327</sup> So the evaluation of the outcome, the future prospect of every deed, evaluation and affirmation of the large-scale economy of life with all its consequences is a work of aesthetic instinct; it cannot not be the work of a logical computation, or of scientific knowledge.

Nietzsche tells us that, he is more in agreement with the artists than with the philosophers, because artists “have not lost the scent of life, they have loved the things of “this world”—they have loved their senses. He contends that only by clinging to this world with great pleasure that “he holds firmly to the great conception of man, that man becomes the transfigurer of existence when he learns to transfigure himself.”<sup>328</sup> Those philosophers who, according to Nietzsche have lost “the scent of life” are “nihilistic philosophers of morality”, yet this does not prevent them to be artists. But new philosophers of tomorrow will be “artist-philosophers” as Heidegger puts it:

The artistic creates and gives form. If the artistic constitutes metaphysical activity pure and simple, then every deed, especially the highest deed and thus thinking of philosophy too, must be determined by it. The concept of philosophy may no longer defined according to the pattern of the teacher of morality who posits another higher world in opposition to this presumably worthless one. Against the nihilistic philosopher of morality... must be deployed the philosopher who goes counter, who emerges from a countermovement, the “artist-philosopher.” Such a philosopher is an artist in that he gives form to beings as a whole, beginning there where they reveal themselves, i.e., in man.<sup>329</sup>

Nietzsche thinks that by his conception of will to power he has provided the tragic explanation of an artist philosopher. The urge, the driving force of every creation is

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<sup>326</sup> *Ibid*, I-II, I, p.72.

<sup>327</sup> *WP*, 852, p.451.

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid*, 820, p.434.

<sup>329</sup> Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Volume I-II*, I, p.73.

within the constitution of the will to power itself. It uses its fuel in its creation. Nietzsche says that “one physiological precondition is indispensable for there to be art or any sort of aesthetic action or vision: intoxication. Without intoxication to intensify the excitability of the whole machine, there can be no art.” There are many types of intoxication but the “most ancient and original form” is “the intoxication of sexual excitement.” Another intoxication that follows “all great desires, all strong affects”; yet another the intoxication of “the festival, the contest, ... of victory”. What is “essential about intoxication is the feeling of fullness and increasing strength. This feeling makes us release ourselves onto things, we force them to accept us, we violate them, – this process is called *idealizing*.”<sup>330</sup> In this state one has the adequate “fullness to enrich everything.” Everything that he encounters he bestows with strength, he “transforms” them so that at the end they reflect his strength and “perfection”. “This *need* to make perfect is —art.”<sup>331</sup> The opposite of this condition is an “anti-artistry of the instinct” a condition in which one “impoverishes all things, dilutes them, makes them waste away.” Nietzsche mentions Christianity as an example of “anti-artistry instinct” and says: “This is the case with genuine Christians like Pascal: a Christian who is also an artist just *does not happen*.”<sup>332</sup> However, we have to note that this last claim of Nietzsche does not square with his views presented above. According to his description of “ascetic ideal” all sorts of idealization including Christianity must be regarded as artistry. Of course, from a normative point of view this artistry may very well be deemed as poor artistry. In this regard, his claim that a Christian cannot be an artist should be regarded as one of his rhetorical normative assessments. After all Nietzsche himself repeatedly says that Christianity, priest represents a certain type of life and life itself is an artist who creates itself. Moreover, as is said above, according to Nietzsche the ascetic ideal is the original form of all artistic creation which finds its origin in mythological artworks of human imagination.

Nietzsche depicts “concepts of Apollonian and Dionysian” “as types of intoxication” of which “Apollonian ... stimulates the eye above all, so that it gets the power of

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<sup>330</sup> *TI*, p.196

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid*, p.196.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid*, p.195-6.



vision. Painters, sculptors, epic poets are visionaries *par excellence*.” As for Dionysian type of intoxication, where the whole “system of affects” is in rapture, “exited and intensified: so that it discharges all its modes of expression at once, releasing the force of presentation, imitation, transfiguration, transformation and all types of mimicry and play acting, all at the same time.” Music is a descendant form of a “much fuller world of expressive affects, just a *residuum* of Dionysian histrionics.”<sup>333</sup>

Nietzsche then introduces the concept of architecture and says that it is neither Apollonian nor Dionysian.

*Architects* do not represent a Dionysian or an Apollonian state: for them it is the great act of will, the will that moves mountains, the intoxication of the great will that demands to be art. Architects have always been inspired by the most powerful people, architects have always been under the spell of power. Buildings are visible manifestation of pride, the victory over gravity, the will to power; architecture is a way for power to achieve eloquence through form, sometimes persuading, even coaxing, at other times just commanding. The highest feelings of power and self-assurance achieve expression in a *great style*. Power that does not need to prove itself; that scorns to please; that does not answer lightly, that does not notice the presence of witnesses; that is unaware of any objections to itself; that rests fatalistically within *itself*, a law among laws: *this* is how the *great style* expresses itself.<sup>334</sup>

We have arrived at an interesting moment. Architecture is not Apollonian, and not Dionysian. But it is the rapture, the intoxication of the great will that wants to be art itself. The will to power wants to be art itself and it finds its satisfaction only in perfection. And this architecture, the will to power which transforms itself in a work of art, achieves this “eloquence through form.” Form means a unity. An enclosed horizon. But this eloquence is reached through the acts of persuading, coaxing, commanding. Persuading-coaxing-commanding whom? We know that the will to power, the body as great reason comprises of multiplicity of affects or inclinations each of which represents a quantum of force. So persuading, coaxing, commanding is related to the struggle between these inner forces within the body. Only by a harmony of these forces can the great style be achieved and can this architecture

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<sup>333</sup> *Ibid*, p.196-7.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid*, p.197-8.

assume its form of great power. However, this form is not something like a separate, predetermined idea, a mold as in the case of Plato's idea. The matter itself takes a form; the free play of the competing forces acquires a harmony which is nothing but the unity, the form of the multiplicity of forces. The form emerges from the arrangement of the multiplicity. In other words, there is no form and matter distinction only the arrangement of various forces. However, this is a continual process of war and peace. Every achieved state of harmony/peace is bound to be destroyed and overcome. The decadent, dogmatic type, out of weakness, tries to impose an allegedly finished, eternal ideal form on existence.

In *The Case of Wagner* Nietzsche explains question of *style* through "literary decadence." The idiosyncrasy of literary decadence, he says, is "the fact that life does not reside in the totality any more. The word becomes sovereign and jumps out of the sentence, the sentence reaches out and blots out the meaning of the page, the page comes to life at the expense of the whole." What does this mean? "The whole is not whole any more." Nietzsche says that we find this "image" in every decadent style: "there is always an anarchy of the atom, disintegration of the will... Life, *equal* vitality, the vibration and exuberance of life pushed back into the smallest structures, all the rest impoverished of life." The result is "paralysis", "hostility and chaos."<sup>335</sup>

We have seen that for Nietzsche there is only perspectival "knowing." All desires within the self aims at their satisfaction. If the harmony of these different desires cannot be established a degeneration takes place within the organism. "Their profound antagonism is so great... that where they all seek satisfaction a man of profound mediocrity must result."<sup>336</sup>

There is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a perspective knowing; and the *more* affects we allow to speak about one thing, the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity" be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to *castrate* the intellect?"<sup>337</sup>

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<sup>335</sup> *CW*, p.245.

<sup>336</sup> *WP*, 677, p.359.

<sup>337</sup> *GM in Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, III, 555.

Nietzsche says that “all “purposes,” “aims,” “meaning,” are only modes of expression and metamorphoses of one will that is inherent in all events: the will to power. To have purposes, aims, intentions, willing in general” means nothing but to will to “be stronger”, will to “grow”. And of course, to find relevant means for this purpose. Now within the self those different forces are the configurations of the same will to power. All valuations of this multiplicity of forces within the same will “are only consequences and narrow perspectives in the service of one will: valuation itself is only this will to power.”<sup>338</sup> To understand those different perspectives, those different valuations, the reconciliation, harmony of these different valuations is something achieved only through great reason, which is body. Because many of these forces remain hidden to the consciousness. “For the longest time, conscious thought was considered thought itself; only now does the truth dawn on us that by far the greatest part of our mind’s activity proceeds unconscious and unfelt.”<sup>339</sup> This objectivity is the harmony in which the will to power finds its satisfaction in great style.

The appreciation, the determination of “objectivity,” of “purpose,” of “meaning”, of the paradigm, of the “true world” “of the ideal” therefore is an aesthetic appreciation, a value estimation of body. It is the spatial-temporal, the aesthetic appreciation of the will to power of itself. Our love of beauty is nothing but the appreciation of the conditions in which we are joyful of our feeling of power. The beautiful, the perfection signifies a feeling, a “promise” of power. This means that the objectivity, the ideal, the truth is our beautiful. “In beauty, human beings posit themselves as the measure of perfection; in select cases, they worship themselves in it.”<sup>340</sup> This means that the higher instance is not knowledge, it is art. Perspectival interpretations, perspectival knowledge now viewed from the prism of the artist acquires its beauty, its perfection in “objectivity”, in “meaning”, in “purpose”, in “ideal”. And this beauty is perceived through the prism of the will to power, through the prism of life. In this creation of its act, which is nothing but giving shape to chaos, it finds its joy and satisfaction.

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<sup>338</sup> *WP*, 675, p.356.

<sup>339</sup> *GS*, 333, p.185.

<sup>340</sup> *TI*, p.201.

In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche says that despite all apparent anti-Dionysian tendency of Socratic rationality “we must also ask ourselves what a phenomenon like Socrates points to, for the Platonic dialogues do not permit us to view him solely as a disintegrative, negative force.” There is no doubt, he continues, that the “first effect which the Socratic drive aimed was the disintegration” of the Dionysian tragedy, yet we feel compelled to quest “whether the relationship between Socrates and art is necessarily and exclusively antithetical, and whether the birth of an ‘artistic Socrates’ is inherently contradictory.” Nietzsche then recounts that in prison Socrates tells his friends that “the same figure kept appearing to him in the dream time after time, and always said the same thing: ‘Socrates, make music!’” Until his last day Socrates never heeds this call with the conviction that “philosophizing was the highest art of Muses”, but at the end, he accepts to play the music in the prison.<sup>341</sup> After this account, Nietzsche asks: is the “*music-making Socrates* possible?” Nietzsche, with his conception of the will to power and with his depiction of the artist-philosopher of the future as the value-giver of the humanity, gives an affirmative response to this question. The “music-making”, the artist philosopher of the future has to affirm life in its manifoldness. He is open to all possibilities of life without falling prey to dogmatism and anarchy. He rejects the tyranny of reason and every type of conviction, faith on the one hand, and the disintegration of reason, atomism and chaos on the other. The artist philosopher of future has a task of achieving human greatness. Human greatness can be achieved only through a perpetual strive for perfection, through a continual creation of human life as a work of art. This is the task, which emanates from human freedom, from the innocence of life and becoming. Nobility is the perpetual strive toward human greatness. It is assuming of the responsibility for the perfection, the “great health” of life.

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<sup>341</sup> *BT*, trans. R. Speirs, p.70-1.

## CHAPTER 4

### NOBILITY

“What is Noble?” This is the title that Nietzsche has given to the last chapter of his book *Beyond Good and Evil*. This seems not to be without purpose. He might have thought that the culminating words should be about that which stands “beyond” of a morality of “good and evil”, a morality, which has been dominating life for thousands of years. This culminating chapter (chapter 9), which deals with the concept of nobility (*Vornehmheit*), is said to be “the most beautiful and subtle exposition of” Nietzsche’s conception of “politics.”<sup>342</sup> In Nietzsche’s own account of it, this book is essentially a “critique of modernity, including modern science, modern art, ... modern politics -, along with indications of an opposite type who is as un-modern as possible, a noble, affirmative type.”<sup>343</sup> Of course this is not the sole place where Nietzsche deals with the concepts of “nobility”, “nobel taste”, “nobel type”. For students of Nietzsche, it is impossible not to realize the importance that Nietzsche attributes to the concept of nobility. In this regard, it would not be wrong to say that the concept of nobility is one of the main pillars on which Nietzsche’s whole edifice of moral and political thought arises. It can be argued that “nobility”, “the noble type”, “the artist philosopher”, the “overman” (*Übermensch*) is, in a sense, “a newly conceived ideal” that he sets before humanity.<sup>344</sup> But not as an ideal that is “extra-terrestrial”, finished, immutable but rather as “meaning” as a “purpose” which is this worldly, self-created from the infinite possibilities of human experience and can be achieved through the affirmation of, (a “Yes” saying to) life in all its aspects.

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<sup>342</sup> Robert Eden, *Political Leadership and Nihilism: A Study of Weber and Nietzsche*, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1983, p.99, quoted from, Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche’s Task, An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil*, London, Yale University Press, 2001, p.263.

<sup>343</sup> *EH*, p.35.

<sup>344</sup> Laurance D. Cooper, *Eros in Plato, Rousseau, and Nietzsche, the Politics of Infinity*, University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, p.284.

In what follows, we will try to elucidate the meaning of the concept of nobility in Nietzsche's thought. For this purpose, we will first try to give a brief account of Nietzsche's evaluation of the morality of western metaphysics and then try to examine how he grounds his conception of a "new morality", or rather "immorality" as an aesthetic phenomenon on the concept of nobility that goes beyond the good-evil dichotomy.

#### **4.1 Nietzsche's Critique of traditional morality**

When nobility and thus aristocracy is advocated by Plato or by any medieval thinker almost nobody would perceive this advocacy as something strange or disturbing. The same is true when Aristotle claims that some men are slaves by nature. But when aristocracy is openly and fiercely advocated, and claimed to be necessary for the greatness of humanity by a philosopher of late nineteenth century, it would cause no astonishment that this advocacy would be viewed as something *out-of-date*, as something disturbing or even something *evil*. Especially when the developments after the French Revolution are taken into account: It is a well-known fact that since the overthrow of French aristocracy, the strong belief in equality of all human beings has been prevailing as an unassailable truth. The optimism of enlightenment, the political movements of modern times have knocked down almost all privileges and prerogatives associated with mediaeval aristocracy, as symbols of infringements against equality of all human beings. The concept of equality is estimated highly almost as a taboo. It derives its unassailable legitimacy from the natural rights of human being that are inalienable to him as a free being.

Concepts such as, "free will", "equality of rights," "dignity of man" have been in wide circulation. Obviously, in such a climate, advocating "rank order" among human beings would face accusation of *despising* humanity. Yet to the great surprise of many, Nietzsche openly and vehemently advocates an aristocracy, a rank order among human beings, for the sake of humanity, for the greatness of human being and for the enhancement of life. He goes further and even accuses these champions of "equality of human beings", "of equal rights", of "free will" as the "*despisers of life*," or the advocates of the "*degeneration*" of human *being*. He seems to be a modern

time Don-Quixote. But this Don-Quixote is not a chevalier of old times, purportedly an untimely wanderer coming from the *future of humanity*, holding a “hammer” in his hand, and attacking to the ‘windmills’, named as, “equality,” “eternal truth”, “freedom,” “good and evil,” “justice-in-itself” and the like; the “idols” of the morality of western metaphysics. He is a destructor of the “idols” in the name of a new creation, in the name of a new life. Nietzsche is very confident that he is carrying out a world historical task with his war against western morality when he writes: “I am carrying the destiny of humanity on my shoulders.” A revaluation of all values is needed, that have been “believed, demanded, held sacred so far.” That is my formula” says Nietzsche, “for an act of humanity’s highest self-examination... I am the first *decent* human being” who opposes “the hypocrisy of millennia...”<sup>345</sup> As we have seen in the previous chapters Nietzsche seems to be very confident of himself that with his intervention the world history would take a totally new direction when, for instance, with his sarcastic style he says:

I am a *bearer of glad tidings* as no one ever was before... And yet I am necessarily a man of disaster as well. Because when truth comes into conflict with lies of millennia there will be tremors, a ripple of earthquakes, an upheaval of mountains and valleys such as no one has ever imagined. The concept of politics will have then merged into entirely a war of spirits, all powers structures from the old society will have exploded – they are all based on lies: there will be wars such as the earth has never seen. Starting with me, the earth will know *great politics*.<sup>346</sup>

It is remarkable that rather than mentioning morality Nietzsche speaks of “great politics” and points at the merging of politics into a “war of spirits.” As we have seen he repeatedly mentions about wars, conflict, enemies; war on Christianity, wars of spirits; wars of tragic knowledge, to be enemy of one’s friend, even his own. If the concepts like ‘equality’, ‘identity’, ‘unity’, and ‘peace’ etc. are in the foreground of the philosophies of many thinkers of modern age, the concepts such as ‘war’, ‘struggle’, ‘difference’, and ‘multiplicity’ are in the centre of Nietzsche’s thought. It would not be an exaggeration to say that one hears the sounds of clashing swords almost everywhere between the lines of his writings. It is obvious that for Nietzsche, the wars of spirits, that is, the wars of worldviews take a prominent role in the self-

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<sup>345</sup> *EH*, p.144.

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid*, p.143-4.

creation efforts of individuals and the societies that they are part of. Only through these everlasting confrontations, struggles, wars can life flourish. The truth, the justice, the perfection of human life is believed to emerge out of these wars and struggles. Of course, this stance has its reasons as will be clear in the coming pages. For now, it suffices to say that according to Nietzsche war and conflicts are the essential driving forces of the life itself. If there are wars of spirits, then there should also be spiritual swords, hammers, and explosives as well. To demolish old temples and values one needs explosives or even more one can turn himself into explosive: “I am not a human being, I am a dynamite.”<sup>347</sup> If Plato with his *Politeia* proposes an order for the city of Athens, we can say that Nietzsche now proposes an order for the whole world; with the advent of Zarathustra the world is now on the verge of “*great politics*.”

Nietzsche criticizes Christianity, liberal and socialist movements of modern times mainly because of their advocacy of equality of all human beings. By so doing, according to him, they miss the very reality of human beings, human life. Under the cloak of justice, with their equality principle they all try to repress the rare ones, the outstanding ones; in this way, they try to efface all differences among men and thus breed “*mediocre types*”, “*herd animals*.” But this would lead to nothing but the “*degeneration*” of human species and negation of life. However, says Nietzsche, “[e]very enhancement so far in the type of “man” has been the work of an aristocratic society- and this will be again and again, since this society believes in a long ladder of rank order and value distinctions between men, and in some sense needs slavery.”<sup>348</sup> Of course, all apologies of equality ground their legitimacy on the administration of justice. Nietzsche, however, thinks differently: “human beings are not equal: thus, speaks justice.”<sup>349</sup>

Laurence Lampert says that nothing discredits Nietzsche than his open advocacy of slavery, which “sounds like a criminal desire to return to conditions that modern

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<sup>347</sup> *EH*, p.143-4.

<sup>348</sup> *Ibid*, p.151.

<sup>349</sup> *Z*, p.99.



ideals worked hardest to eliminate”<sup>350</sup> But he warns us that Nietzsche’s advocacy of slavery “must be understood in the most spiritual sense. It belongs to our species to live enslaved to “truths” or opinions that define the horizon within which life is experienced.”<sup>351</sup> Lampert seems to be missing the point. What Nietzsche means by slavery needs not to be confined to the spiritual sense. Literally in every moment of life under constant struggle of forces life reveals itself as commanding and obeying. Obeying means slavery for Nietzsche. In this sense slavery is not used in a pejorative sense. There can be no force, no will to power that lives its life solely by commanding. Every force is subjected to other forces and in this regard, it has somehow to accept obeying, which Nietzsche calls as slavery. We even obey our own laws. Slavery, thus means to react as functionary, as a means for certain ends, and in this regard, it is an unescapable characteristic of human life when, for instance, human body conceived as a political structure.<sup>352</sup> In the same manner in human society always necessitates obeying and commanding. Some organs, some functionaries necessarily behave like slaves, however they themselves need not to be in a character of slave, only as their functions.

It is slave morality that Nietzsche uses in pejorative sense, in which a negative, reactionary stance towards life becomes main characteristic of human being. When Nietzsche attributes supremacy to the nobles it is not because of their physical strength but rather because of their psychic strength: He says that “humanitarian illusions” cannot help us to understand how an aristocratic society originates. The harshness of truth should not make us “be deceived about how every high culture on earth has *begun!* ... The noble caste always started out as the barbarian caste. Their supremacy was in psychic, not physical strength- they were complete people.”<sup>353</sup> For Nietzsche the main issue with utmost importance is that human beings should bear responsibility of their lives and not be slave of any other person or institution.

Nietzsche thinks that all these wrong moral or political beliefs originate from faulty conception of Socratic rationality. He contends that he was the first person to

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<sup>350</sup> Lampert, *Nietzsche’s Task*, p.266.

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid*, p.266.

<sup>352</sup> See for instance, *WP*, 660, p.348-9.

<sup>353</sup> *BGE*, p.151.

recognize Socrates “as the instrument of Greek disintegration, as a typical decadent. ‘Rationality’ against instinct. ‘Rationality’ at any price as dangerous, as a form of violence that undermines life.” Nietzsche maintains that from the phenomenon of Socratic rationality arises the morality of western metaphysics, which, too, is a “symptom of decadence.” He believes that seeing morality as a symptom of degeneration “is an innovation, a unique event of the highest rank in the history of knowledge.” The new tendency of morality that has its beginning in Socratic rationalism, achieves its full expression in Christianity. The “real opposition” is now between the *tragic* conception of life of Greeks on the one hand, and the *nihilistic* conception of life of Christianity on the other. Dionysos versus The Crucified:

The degenerate instinct that turns against life with subterranean vindictiveness (Christianity, ... in a certain sense even Plato’s philosophy, the whole idealism as typical forms) and a formula of highest affirmation born out of fullness, out of overfullness, an unreserved yes saying even to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything questionable and strange about existence. ... This final, most joyful, effusive, high-spirited yes to life is not only high insight, it is also the most profound... Nothing in existence should be excluded, nothing is dispensable.<sup>354</sup>

These two types of moralities Nietzsche calls as slave and noble moralities respectively. On the one hand a morality which posits a world beyond, a ‘true world’ as reality itself, and ascribes it high value than our actual world which, it takes to be deficient, transient, prone to change and decay, and the cause of unceasing suffering. In this way, it tries to justify the existence. The life on this world is a temporary life and the salvation of human being is in the beyond world. Therefore, the basic idiosyncrasy of this morality is the feeling of *resentment* toward life. Life is blameworthy for being the cause of suffering. And in the case of Christianity due to the original sin, which stirs the feeling of guilt, the resentment turns toward inside and become *bad conscience*. This is slave morality in which life alienated from itself.<sup>355</sup>

In the noble morality on the other hand, life is perceived with a feeling of fullness, with a feeling of overabundance of power. The noble one is sure of himself and

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<sup>354</sup> *EH*, p.109.

<sup>355</sup> *AC*, p.54.

affirms life in its all aspects, including suffering, with joy. The valuations of these two moralities differ accordingly.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Nietzsche calls this conception of a ‘true world’ “*ascetic ideal*” and says that man has found no meaning other than ascetic ideal so far. Human “existence on earth contained no goal; “why man at all?”—was a question without answer. ...*This* is precisely what the ascetic ideal means: that something was *lacking*, that man was surrounded by a fearful *void*.”<sup>356</sup> The ascetic ideal is a response to the justification of life, to the affirmation of existence. “Human being suffered problem of his meaning.” However, the real cause of the problem was that “he was in the main a sickly animal.”<sup>357</sup> By positing the ascetic ideal, the sickly one finds a substitute for his desperate situation. This is an escape from the suffering of life.

Nietzsche contends that we have reached to a moment where “the priest knows as anyone that there is no ‘God’ anymore, that there is no such thing as ‘sin’, or the ‘redeemer’, – that ‘free will’ and the ‘moral world order’ are *lies*.” And he adds that “the seriousness, the profound self-overcoming of spirit does not *allow* people *not* to know this any more.”<sup>358</sup> The seriousness of the issue puts the responsibility on the shoulders of human beings not to stay as children anymore, take their life into their hands, and mold it however they want it. From now on human beings cannot disregard the fact that God is dead and the yoke is broken. There are no anchors anymore; will this boat be tossed adrift in the sea or will it manage to sail to new destinations? Human beings have to assume the captaincy of their boat and decide about the destination where they want to sail.

In fact, as the paradigm of the church began to collapse Thomas Hobbes comes to the fore and proposes to go back to the state of nature to see what can we bring back for human being. He comes back with a ‘social contract’ which entails the transfer of

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<sup>356</sup> *GM* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, III, 28, p.598-9:

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid*, III, 28, p.598-9:

<sup>358</sup> *AC*, p.34.

every individual will to the monarch. Then in the same vein John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau went to the state of nature and Rousseau, too, came back with a social contract which brings forth a republic based on the collective will of all individuals based on the principle of their equality.

Nietzsche says “I talk about a ‘return to nature’ too, although it is not really a going - back as much as a coming-towards – towards a high, free, even terrible nature and naturalness, the sort of nature that plays, that can play, with great tasks.” Before discussing what he means by these “nature and naturalness” it would be better first to see his critique of Rousseau’s return to nature.

I still hate Rousseau *in* the Revolution; it is the world-historical expression of this duality of idealist and rabble... what I hate is its Rousseauian *mortality* – the so-called ‘truths’ that give the Revolution its lasting effectiveness, attracting everything flat and mediocre. The doctrine of equality! But no poison is more poisonous than this: because it *seems* as if justice itself is preaching here, while in fact it is the end of justice... Equality for equal, inequality for unequal – that is what justice would *really* say: along with its corollary, ‘never makes unequal equal’. – But the doctrine of equality was ushered in with such horror and bloodletting that this ‘modern idea’ *par excellence* acquired a type of glory and radiance, so that even the most noble spirits were seduced to the Revolution as a piece of *theatre*. But at the end of the day, there is no reason to keep treating it with respect – I see only one person who perceived it correctly: with *disgust* – Goethe.<sup>359</sup>

It is obvious that Nietzsche is plainly against the idea of equality of *all* human beings that has become dominant in the modern world. He even says that this is the “poisonous” of all ideas. We should pay attention where he says “equality for equal, inequality for unequal”. In other words, Nietzsche finds no problem in the cases where there is actual equality. So, we have to question why does Nietzsche feel so irritated against the idea that takes the equality of all human beings for granted? Again, we should notice that Nietzsche rejects the idea of equality in the name of justice; justice conceived as giving to everyone his due share. Nietzsche points at the responsibility of philosopher: “the philosopher, being of necessity a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, has always found himself, and had to find himself, in contradiction to his today: his enemy was ever the ideal of today.”<sup>360</sup> Here

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<sup>359</sup> *TI*, p.221-2.

<sup>360</sup> *BGE* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 212, p.327.

we should think that Nietzsche's philosopher, as an "artist", "creator" philosopher of tomorrow, represents the value-creation aspect of human life itself. According to Nietzsche, human life is a continual process of self-overcoming, of growth through the creation of new values. As there is no reality outside of the world, life cannot tolerate any value, any paradigm that plays the role of a judge over above itself.

So if the ideal, the dominant paradigm of his time is grounded on the idea of "equality of human beings" then Nietzsche as an artist philosopher of future has to come with a different idea of justice which he grounds on his new conception of human being. Of course, this does not guarantee that any arbitrary criticism of today's ideal would prove successful. Any criticism which is not grounded in reality would produce no real difference. According to Nietzsche, one of the necessary requirements of the enhancement of life is the possibility of a constant criticism of the existing reality. This possibility of struggle of worldviews is the very ground and stimulant of the self-overcoming of life. Nietzsche says that "[t]he vigour, the *freedom* that comes from the strength and super-strength of spirit *proves* itself through scepticism. Where basic issues about value or lack of value are concerned, people with convictions do not come into consideration. Convictions are prisons."<sup>361</sup> It is clear that Nietzsche is advocating an open society, a culture of freedom in which all possible perspectives, worldviews can express themselves freely. This is the sole possibility for the creation of new values. Only through the conditions that enable the free creation of new values, can life flourish and attain strength and 'health'. "A spirit who will greatness and also will means to it is necessarily a sceptic. The freedom from every sort of conviction, being *able* to see freely, is part of strength."<sup>362</sup> The world is a perpetual becoming, an everlasting chaos. In such a world fixing something, to view becoming as being, means distorting reality. As we have discussed in the previous chapter, Nietzsche says that this is an error that human being cannot dispense with. We call this error the truth. In order to live human beings needs this error. However, such convictions, truths should be regarded merely as "means" not as eternal truths. Idealism/Dogmatism with its conception of truth,

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<sup>361</sup> AC, p.53

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid*, p.53-4.

‘true world’ tries to sell an error as truth itself. Obviously, this is nothing but mummifying the ‘*becoming*’ and thus preventing the enhancement of life. The idealism/dogmatism bases its concept of equality on the assumption of freedom of human being as a rational being however, in reality, it suffocates this freedom/reason itself by demanding faith to its truth:

A faithful person is not free to have any sort of conscience for the question of ‘true’ or ‘untrue’: honesty on *this* point would be his immediate downfall. People with convictions have pathologically conditioned optics, which makes them into fanatics – Savonarola, Luther, Rousseau, Robespierre, Saint-Simon, – the antithesis of strong spirits who have become *free*. But the grand poses struck by these *sick* spirits, these conceptual epileptics, can affect the great masses, – fanatics are picturesque, humanity would rather see gestures than listen to *reasons*.<sup>363</sup>

Nietzsche criticizes the values championed by traditional metaphysics, which he sees as rooted in conviction and faith rather than a critical examination of human reality. He argues that the idealistic underpinnings of western metaphysics prevent a genuine evaluation of human existence. This aligns with his broader critique, as discussed previously, of unexamined assumptions about human nature. Nietzsche says: “my truth is *terrible*: because lies have been called truth so far. – *Revaluation of all values*: that is my formula for an act of humanity’s highest self-examination, an act that has become flesh and genius in me.”<sup>364</sup>

At the heart of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics lies its concept of subjectivity. He argues that this concept leads to fundamental misconceptions about human existence. In traditional metaphysics, human beings are depicted as rational beings with a dichotomy, namely, a ‘divine reason’ governing their action on the one hand, a ‘profane body’ harboring their irrational desires on the other. Reason holds absolute power as the sole legitimate authority, while bodily urges are seen as detrimental to human well-being. Furthermore, reason is often conceived as a perfect, unchanging entity, like an atom, and assumed to be universally identical across all individuals. Building on this flawed notion of reason as divine, free will is then reduced to absolute obedience to reason's commands. In essence, human being, as a subject of

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<sup>363</sup> AC, p.54

<sup>364</sup> EH, p.144.

free will, is expected to conform his actions to divinely ordained precepts. Through this process, Nietzsche thinks, western metaphysics commits two key errors: a simplification within the individual (reducing human being to his rationality) and a universalization across humanity (assuming a uniform reason for all human beings.)

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We now come back to Nietzsche's expedition to nature. What did Nietzsche bring back from his 'expedition to nature'? We know from the points discussed earlier that Nietzsche comes back with a radically different understanding of human existence and its realities. With his concept of the will to power, Nietzsche now defines every living organism as a unity of multiplicity, a quantum of force, which comprises of multiple forces. And differences in the levels of the quantity of forces reflect their qualities and these differences (qualities) are irreducible.

Might all quantities not be a sign of qualities? A greater power implies a different consciousness, feeling, desiring, a different perspective; growth itself is a desire to be more; the desire for an increase in quantum grows from quale, in a purely quantitative world everything would be dead, stiff and motionless. The reduction of all qualities to quantities is nonsense.<sup>366</sup>

Qualities are insurmountable barrier for us; we cannot help feeling that mere quantitative differences are something fundamentally distinct from quantity, namely that they are qualities which can no longer be reduced to one another. ... Qualities are an idiosyncrasy peculiar to man; to demand that our human interpretations and values should be universal and perhaps constitutive values is one of the hereditary madness of human pride.<sup>367</sup>

Nietzsche clearly puts emphasis on the difference between quantum of forces which mirrors the qualitative distinctiveness. And the logical consequence of such a reasoning is obvious: an absolute uniqueness and distinctiveness of every human being. Nietzsche underlines the concept of radical human difference, characterized by a "multiplicity" within the individual and within society as a whole. This "multiplicity" refers to the existence of diverse drives, capacities, and experiences that shape each unique self. By emphasizing on the notions of difference and

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<sup>365</sup> See M. Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, Chapter 5.

<sup>366</sup> *WP*, 564, p.304.

<sup>367</sup> *Ibid*, 565, p.304-5.

manifoldness Nietzsche tries to ensure a proper respect for the lived reality of human existence. It's important to note that he does not advocate for a complete atomization of human beings as will to powers.

Social contract theorists like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and even Kant, by portraying humans as atomic rational subjects with free will, strip human beings, societies, and all human values of their historical development. They suggest that human beings possess an eternal, rational capacity to establish civil society, akin to a divinely designed world order. In contrast, Nietzsche rejects the notion of human beings as isolated, identical, atomic entities. As will to powers, each with a unique quantum of force, they all exert influences on all others, forming a complex interconnectedness akin to an organism. Their relationship is based on power dynamics and no single one of these powers can be thought in isolation. That is, human beings are “herd animals”, they live in society. The human society is not a frictionless unity, a harmonious society. It is an arena of conflict of interests and in this vein, in order to increase their powers, individuals form different kinds of alliances. In other words, there is a perpetual confrontation of conflict of interests and thus a perpetual struggle for power. This constant confrontation is, in a sense, a continuous process of war and peace. Through constant struggles of forces somehow emerges a state of relative harmony and peace, which, viewed historically, is ultimately transient and precarious by nature.

Obviously only through these constant struggles of competing forces come values of human being into existence. In other words, the cultural categories such as truths, paradigm of values, moralities, worldviews are the products of struggles of competing interpretations of realities. The dominant paradigm of values or morality of a given time in the society shape the life within the society. These paradigms, cosmological values serve, in a sense, as ‘cosmological categories’, cultural categories’ of life that give form to human beings, i.e., determine their character and personalities. These values, moral laws are inherently “herd” values imposed on every individual within society and they tend to bring closer the different perspectives. If we put it differently, the notions of truth, objectivity, morality belong to societal (herd) values. It is these values that mainly shape human beings. Put it



differently, human beings create themselves by means of the values which are their own creations. This means that, the ‘human being’, i.e., the eternal rational subject of free will as purported by western metaphysics is a fiction. By this fiction western metaphysics eliminates all human history, all its evolutionary and cultural background. Nietzsche rejects the notion of a free will that allows for sudden and absolute change. He argues that individuals, their characters, human culture, and life itself are all shaped by a long history of power relations. These deeply ingrained human values cannot be simply erased by an act of will. Only through a fundamental shift in paradigms, a dramatic change in our way of thinking, can human character and life acquire new forms and determinations.

As we have said, the herd values necessarily tend to erase differences and to make individuals similar. The state of peace, in a sense, is an enforced treaty for the obedience of certain moral codes. Of course, this act of enforcement is not a frictionless process and the state of relative peace does not mean that the struggles of conflicting parties come to a halt. These struggles take place continuously though in varying intensity and ways. Depending on the balance of power, new values, new paradigms can always emerge in society. Although the scope and time span of the change of values, of the paradigms may vary, this is a never ceasing process. According to Nietzsche, these constant wars are the very possibility of the enhancement of life. This is the way life overcomes itself, human being creates himself.

Traditional metaphysics and a variety of modern political movements on the other hand often disregard all real differences between human beings. They instead champion the principle of equality, deriving it from abstract categories such as human being as ‘rational being’ or ‘citizen.’ It is important to acknowledge, however, that their conception of equality typically refers to formal equality before the law. This is exemplified by the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”<sup>368</sup> This article reflects the influence of the

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<sup>368</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights> (Viewed:25.02.2024).

classical Socratic formula, which posits that all humans are equal by virtue of their reason. However, Friedrich Nietzsche offers a starkly contrasting perspective. He argues that such abstract categories, like the ‘rational human being’, do not correspond to any real entities. He insists that these abstractions which are contrived to represent actual individuals in fact distort the true nature of human existence. What we encounter in reality is the absolute difference among human beings. As Deleuze puts it:

Nietzsche is never interested in the irreducibility of quantity to quality; or rather he is only interested in it secondarily and as a symptom. What interest him primarily, from the standpoint of quantity itself, is the fact that differences in quantity cannot be reduced to equality. Quality is distinct from quantity but only because it is that aspect of quality that cannot be equalized, that cannot be equalized out in the difference between quantities. Difference in quantity is therefore, in one sense, the irreducible element *of* quantity and in another sense the element which is irreducible *to* quantity itself. Quantity is nothing but difference in quantity and corresponds to it each time forces enter into relation.”<sup>369</sup>

One of the basic tenets of Nietzsche's philosophy is the concept of absolute difference among human beings. He emphasizes the multiplicity of drives within individuals and the existence of multiple, distinct ‘selves’ within society. As we have discussed in the previous chapter the notions of inherent difference and multiplicity form the foundation for his concept of the will to power, the driving force behind all human actions and societal dynamics.

However, it is important to acknowledge the speculative nature of both claims of absolute equality and absolute difference. Nietzsche clearly favors the latter. He seems to believe that positing a fundamental sameness in all human beings means to reduce them to mere automatons controlled by a supreme being. This emphasis on difference leads us to a crucial question: what significance do these distinctions hold? Are they merely superficial variations, or do they reveal a fundamental truth about human existence? For Nietzsche, this is an issue of utmost importance, as it shapes his entire philosophical perspective.

For Nietzsche, true justice hinges on an unflinching recognition of reality as it is, including the inherent differences among human beings. These differences, he

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<sup>369</sup> Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 43-4.

demands, should not be erased or ignored, but rather acknowledged and accepted. It's crucial, however, to distinguish this emphasis on difference from a rejection of common ground. Nietzsche does not advocate for the elimination of shared experiences that foster cooperation and communication. On the contrary, he envisions a "perfect communality" that respects and celebrates individual variations. Nietzsche argues that humanity's social nature, i.e., its "herd" aspect, necessarily leads to the establishment of shared values. These common (herd) values, however, ultimately prove insufficient. The everlasting process of becoming, central to Nietzsche's philosophy, necessitates the creation of new values. These new values, he contends, can only emerge from the very differences that distinguish human beings from one another. Power disparities are a frequent catalyst for conflicts of interest, which in turn, form the ground of struggles and wars between competing forces.

Nietzsche repudiates the notion of bestowing perfect reason and free will upon everyone, arguing that this alleged justice disregards the significance of human effort and the development of diverse psychic capacities for various responsibilities. Many human capabilities and crafts, he argues, are the fruits of generations of accumulated experience, not only at the individual level but also at the level of society. Human beings are not simply logical entities or empty vessels; each individual embodies a unique history of experiences, abilities, perspectives, and preferences. Furthermore, societal division of labor has fostered the emergence of diverse competencies and specializations, which are necessarily products of collective experience passed down through generations. These years of dedicated effort have resulted in certain inescapable functional 'privileges,' and disregarding them could disrupt the functioning of society. Nietzsche, in essence, opposes any form of 'arrogance' that presumes entitlement to every type of honor without any prior exertion.

Granting 'immortality' to every Tom, Dick, and Harry has been the most enormous and most vicious attempt to assassinate *noble* humanity -- ... The aristocraticism of mind has been undermined at its depths by the lie of equality of souls; and when the belief in the 'privileges of the majority' creates (and it *will create*) revolutions, do not doubt for a minute that it is Christianity, that it is *Christian* value judgments these revolutions are translating into blood and crimes! Christianity is the rebellion of everything that crawls on the ground against everything that has *height*.<sup>370</sup>

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<sup>370</sup> AC, p.39-40.

Today, conversely, when only the herd animal receives and dispenses honors in Europe, when “equality of rights” could all too easily be changed into equality in violating rights—I mean, into a common war on all that is rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, and the abundance of creative power and masterfulness—today the concept of greatness entails being noble, wanting to be by oneself, being able to be different, standing alone and having to live independently.<sup>371</sup>

Nietzsche’s rejection of the notion of equality by emphasizing instead the uniqueness of every individual has another important reason. According to him, it is the principle of equality that paves the way for the ‘tyranny of reason.’ When human beings are viewed universally as equals, it becomes tempting to establish universal laws based on reason alone. This emphasis on the idea of a universal reason is precisely what allowed Kant to propose moral codes applicable to all rational beings, his God included. Thus, a central aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy is the defense of human uniqueness against this ‘tyranny of reason,’ which he traces back to the ideas of Socrates and Plato. Concerning the multiplicity within the individual Nietzsche says that:

We contain within ourselves the sketch of several persons: ...Circumstances extract from us a certain figure [Gestalt]; when circumstances change a great deal, one discovers within oneself two, three figures. From each instant in our life, there are numerous other possibilities: randomness always contributes something to it!<sup>372</sup>

Nietzsche argues that human being as will to power is not a pre-designed, static entity but undergoes constant transformation. Furthermore, he contends that within each individual exists a ‘plurality of persons,’ a dynamic interplay of drives and desires that constantly compete for expression and dominance. Metaphysical morality, according to Nietzsche, presents a significant problem by its demand that we choose a single “mask” from our internal repertoire and suppress the rest.<sup>373</sup> This approach disregards the inherent multiplicity within individuals and imposes a singular, supposedly universal morality. In essence, it stifles the richness and dynamism of the “will to power,” the fundamental drive for self-expression within all living things. Projecting a view of humans as identical and forcing a uniform moral

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<sup>371</sup> *BGE* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 212, p.328-9.

<sup>372</sup> *WP*, quoted in Haar, p.95.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid*, quoted in Haar, p.96.

code upon everyone would be, for Nietzsche, a negation of life itself. Such a conception of subjectivity denies the openness to infinite possibilities that characterizes human existence.<sup>374</sup>

Nietzsche argues that metaphysical morality is an invention of the weaker individual, the "slavish type" as he terms it. As an outcome of a complex interplay of power relations, slave morality, as Nietzsche argues, can achieve dominance within a society. This concept sheds light on the historical rise of Christian morality, which has held sway in the Western world for centuries. Through this ingenious creation of slave morality, the weak can disguise their limitations and even present them as a virtue, i.e. they try to sell their way of conduct as a matter of free choice. They achieve this by constructing a moral system that values abstinence from life and impotence as positive qualities for the 'moral subject.' This morality, according to Nietzsche, is a form of self-deception, where the weak convince themselves that their limitations are freely chosen strengths. Nietzsche explains it as follows:

[T]hanks to forgery and self-deception of impotence, clothed itself in the magnificence of self-abnegating, calm, and patient virtue, exactly as if the weakness of the weak men itself ... were a free achievement, something willed, chosen, a deed, a merit. Bound to do so by his instinct of self-preservation and self-affirmation, an instinct which habitually sanctifies every lie, this kind of man discovered his faith in the indifferent, freely choosing 'subject'. The subject (or, to adopt a more popular idiom, the soul) has, therefore, been perhaps the best article of faith on earth so far, since it enables the majority of mortals, the weak and downtrodden of all sorts, to practice that sublime self-deception—the interpretation of weakness itself as freedom.<sup>375</sup>

According to Nietzsche's, the invention of metaphysical morality by the weak, or, the mediocre, the *slavish type*, represents a strategic response to the existence of the strong, or the *noble type*. That is, it is a cleverly invented tool for the slavish type to cope with (or to react to) the strength of the strong, noble type or more generally, with the sufferings of life. Now, the inherent strength of the noble type is deemed *evil* within this framework, while the suffering and weakness characteristic of the slavish type, the abstinence from life are regarded as *good*. From a Nietzschean

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<sup>374</sup> See Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, Chapter 5.

<sup>375</sup> *GM*, trans. Douglas Smith. I, 13, p.30.

perspective, the essence of metaphysical morality lies in its articulation of *ressentiment* towards the strong type, and by extension, towards the very essence of life itself. This moral system, far from being an objective arbiter of *good* and *evil*, functions primarily as a self-preservation strategy for the weak. Its values, ideals, and truths represent the conditions necessary for the weak to thrive at their best. However, achieving these conditions requires a reduction in life's overall vitality, essentially slowing it down to a pace more manageable for the weak. Consequently, it fosters a life-negating outlook, promoting withdrawal from life's challenges rather than embracing its inherent dynamism. Nietzsche calls this state of physiological exhaustion decadence:

Whenever the will to power falls off in any way, there will also be physiological decline, decadence. And when the most masculine virtues and drives have been chopped off the god of decadence, he will necessarily turn into a god of the physiologically retrograde, the weak. They do not call themselves the weak, they call themselves 'the good'... There is no great mystery as to when, historically, the dualistic fiction of good and evil gods become possible. When the same instincts they use to reduce their god to 'goodness in itself', they subjugated scratch out the good qualities from their conquerors' god. They take revenge by *demonizing* their masters' god. The *good* God as well as the devil: both are rotten fruits of decadence.<sup>376</sup>

Metaphysical morality, framed by the lens of *ressentiment*, perceives a fundamental lack in life. The weak type refrains from shouldering responsibility for its own existence, instead adopting the role of a passive observer, scrutinizing life from the perspective of its ideal and finding it deficient. This morality of decadence defines its ideal, its God, as good-in-itself while labeling anything outside its paradigm as evil. Nietzsche vehemently repudiates this interpretation, asserting that life is not deficient but rather teeming with power, constantly striving for dominance and mastery. Nietzsche's concept of the will to power stands in stark contrast to the deficiency narrative that underpins metaphysical morality. He contends that human essence as will to power lies in ceaseless self-expression, overpowering, and expansion. Nietzsche argues that values and ideals, as products of life, cannot judge life itself. Their failing to serve life and enhance its vitality is due to alienation of human being to his life and purposes. This alienation breeds a perverse consequence. The morality

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<sup>376</sup> AC, p.14.

of decadence, with its emphasis on self-denial, now seeks to impose its values on everyone, including the strong, the noble, and the naturally exceptional. It demands that they reject their inherent nature and act according to the standards of the weak. Nietzsche considers such a demand which is a form of enslavement as illegitimate and responds it in the following way:

To demand of strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it should not be a will to overcome, overthrow, dominate, a thirst for enemies and resistance and triumph, makes as little sense as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength. A quantum of force is a quantum of drive, will, action—in fact, it is nothing more than this driving, willing, acting, and it is only through the seduction of language (and through the fundamental errors of reason petrified in it)—language which understands all actions as conditioned by an actor, by a ‘subject’— that it can appear otherwise. Just as the common people distinguish lightning from the flash of light and takes the latter as doing, as the effect of a subject which is called lightning, just so popular morality distinguishes strength from expressions of strength, as if behind the strong individual there were an indifferent substratum which was at liberty to express or not to express strength. But no such substratum exists; there is no ‘being’ behind doing, acting, becoming; the ‘doer’ is merely a fiction imposed on doing- the doing itself is everything.<sup>377</sup>

From the Socrates onward morality of western metaphysics has endeavored to mold human life to fit its notions of ideal, truth, and perfection. This perspective has portrayed its idealized vision as the ultimate reality, while regarding life itself as an imperfect, deficient imitation. In this way, it has despised life from the perspective of its illusion. Nietzsche instead demands that reality should be conceived “*as it is.*” The human type that Zarathustra wants “has the strength to do this.” Because this type “is not alienated, removed from reality, it is *reality itself*, it contains in itself everything terrible and questionable about reality, *this is the only way someone can achieve greatness.*”<sup>378</sup> Does this mean that Nietzsche is against the human propensity for idealization? On the contrary Nietzsche calls this human ability, i.e., “raising things to the ideal” “the most beautiful ability” but makes a warning that “[o]ne should not allow oneself to be tyrannized by” it. “[O]therwise,” says he, “one day the truth will separate from us with the evil word “You liar from the bottom up, what do I have to do with you.”?”<sup>379</sup> For Nietzsche, positing ideals, purposes, and meanings

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<sup>377</sup> *GM*, trans. Douglas Smith. I, 13, p.29.

<sup>378</sup> *EH*, p.147-8.

<sup>379</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, KSA2, II, 345, p.519. (Our translation.)

is not in-itself problematic. The issue arises when we forget that these are tools we create, not eternal truths. We fall into error by seeing them as end in-themselves, transforming them into judges that stand above life itself, when in reality, they should serve life's ongoing process of growth and expression. Nietzsche repudiates this idealistic or dogmatic conception of setting values and purposes. As human beings we need to set purposes, bestow meaning to the existence and contrive ideals. This is the artistic, creative capacity of human beings. Our “*need* to make perfect” is called art. By beautifying, idealizing things we satisfy our feeling of power. “Intoxication is the feeling of fullness and increasing strength. This feeling makes us release ourselves onto things, we force them to accept us, we violate them, – this process is called *idealizing*.”<sup>380</sup> According to Nietzsche, our ideals and purposes are not pre-existing truths, but rather our own aesthetic creations. These ideals and purposes represent the conditions in which we believe we thrive best. They are expressions of our will to power, shaping the world around us into conditions that empower us and make us feel most at home. As we have discussed in the previous chapter only aesthetically do human beings justify the existence. Therefore, our ideals reflect our ways of justifying the existence.

We have stated before that Nietzsche repudiates traditional conceptions of free will. He contends that there is no such thing as free will, there are only strong and weak wills which corresponds to the outcome, the quantum of forces that arises out of the struggle of inner forces within individuals. The more harmonious these inner forces are—the more aligned with the will to power—the more health and strength an organism possesses. This suggests that individuals can cultivate their wills and strive towards greater self-mastery and power through understanding and harnessing their inner drives and desires. As Nietzsche puts it: “The multitude and disintegration of impulses and the lack of any systematic order among them result in a weak will, their coordination under a single predominant impulse results in a strong will.”<sup>381</sup>

Nietzsche rejects the notions of a fixed personality or constant character traits. Instead, he argues for a dynamic self with a multiplicity of impulses and drives. A

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<sup>380</sup> *TI*, p.196.

<sup>381</sup> *WP*, 46, p.28.



never-ceasing interplay of inner forces shapes the self in a continuous way. Our experiences and desires are in constant flux. Nietzsche believes that true strength and health come from bringing these inner forces into harmony and unity. This requires individuals to engage in a process of self-overcoming, where they confront and integrate their various impulses and desires. By doing so, individuals can establish their own unique strength and vitality. In this regard, any demand for the imposition of universal moral codes would mean disregarding the multiplicity within individual and the related internal struggle. Such a demand can weaken individuals by forcing them to conform to external standards that may not fit their unique situation. Since these inner conflicts often occur on an unconscious level, it is ultimately the individual who must navigate this complex process and forge a path towards a strong and healthy self. This shows the complexity of human psychology and the challenges involved in achieving self-awareness and self-mastery. For Nietzsche, “there is no rational will without emotion and conversely no emotions, nor even sensations that do not contain judgments.”<sup>382</sup> He thus rejects the Kantian notion of an autonomous will by arguing that our choices are not solely the product of conscious reason. Instead, they are the outcome of a complex interplay of forces within us, both conscious and unconscious. These internal forces, often operating in unconscious realm, compete and determine our actions. The ‘real’ cause of any action, according to Nietzsche, often lies hidden in this unconscious realm which makes it difficult to pinpoint a single, free-willed choice as the sole explanation. “The ‘I want’ appears to consciousness when ‘hesitation’ (the conflict between several tendencies) has been surmounted at the unconscious level, i.e., when a certain provisional hierarchy of impulses has been established.”<sup>383</sup>

Nietzsche puts emphasis on the individual's journey to find and establish their own strength and health and rejects the idea that moral guidance from external sources or adherence to rational principles is sufficient for this task. Instead, Nietzsche believes that true self-discovery (i.e., how one become one is) and self-overcoming can be possible only through continual personal experimentations and explorations. He says

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<sup>382</sup> Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, p.93.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid*, p.94.

that “becoming what you are presupposes that you do not have the slightest idea *what* you are.” One can become what one is only in a personal way, only by personal *taste*; in other words, the “masterpiece in the art of survival” is “selfishness.”<sup>384</sup> One becomes what one is by experimenting on one’s unique desires and forces, a process that requires constant self-overcoming.

By describing the world as everlasting becoming, Nietzsche highlights the dynamic nature of human existence, where individuals constantly evolve and assume new traits in response to changing circumstances. In this regard, the internal struggle of competing desires and impulses are essential to vitality, growth, and health. However, he also warns that failure to achieve harmony among these forces can lead to weakness or sickness.

Nietzsche's concept of objectivity and truth differs from traditional conceptions of objectivity and truth, as he sees them as a relatively harmonious state emerging from competition of diverse perspectives. He argues that the more viewpoints one considers, the more comprehensive and objective their understanding becomes. Therefore, he values the contributions of others and believes that interacting with different individuals and forces should be regarded as the very possibility for the enrichment of one's own life and for the enhancement of one’s strength and health. That is why, Nietzsche says, “to demand that our human interpretation and values should be universal and perhaps constitutive values is one of the hereditary madneses of human pride.”<sup>385</sup>

The possibility of ‘sickness’ or disharmony within the self does not justify the eradication or suppression of competing forces within the self. Therefore, under the guise of ‘equality,’ imposing the tyranny of a singular and unchanging personality within the self and accordingly imposing a single perspective on all individuals within society, would amount to the denial of life itself. Sickness itself is not problematic; it can even serve as an opportunity for greater resilience and vitality.

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<sup>384</sup> *EH*, p.96-7.

<sup>385</sup> *WP*, 565, p.305.

Nietzsche himself acknowledges experiencing an idealistic period as a form of sickness, but he also emphasizes that he overcame this sickness. For Nietzsche, the issue lies not in being sick, but in embodying a state of “sickliness”—a reactive stance that resists health and makes no genuine effort to achieve it.

Nietzsche's ultimate aim is indeed clear: he seeks to promote human greatness for both individuals and humanity as a whole. To achieve this greatness, he believes, every aspect of human capacity should be utilized to its fullest potential, without any unnecessary restrictions or limitations imposed by moral or political forces. His emphasis on embracing differences should be understood within this context. In this vein, Nietzsche vehemently opposes any moral or political intentions that unjustly impose restrictions on human capabilities. His goal is to establish a genuine culture of freedom for individuals and humanity—a cultural climate of freedom that obliterates all forms of oppression. He particularly criticizes the constraints placed on human potential by Christianity, labeling any philosopher as mouthpiece of its morality who seeks to perpetuate such constraints as the “criminal of criminals.”<sup>386</sup>

Central to Nietzsche's philosophy is his opposition to the tyranny of reason within the individual and the tyranny of moral and political authority in society. He believes that these forms of tyranny stem from various misconceptions that posit a pre-established harmony or ideal world order, and claim to hold the key to truth. According to Nietzsche, this leads to a belief that individuals must conform to certain codes of reason and morality unconditionally to attain rewards such as eternal happiness, or the right to reside in the kingdom of God. Of course, deviating from these codes has its consequences as well. Throughout history, countless individuals have been wasted due to adherence to such moralities. Nietzsche's critique of these moralities is, in a sense, deeply personal, as he sees himself responsible for all existence. As a ‘chevalier’, he feels obligated to confront all ‘enemies’ of humanity that threaten life and human potential. Thus, Nietzsche's opposition to conventional moralities stems from his commitment to promoting human greatness and liberation from all kind of oppressive forces.

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<sup>386</sup> AC, p.66-7.

## 4.2 Nobility

According to Nietzsche the death of God and the collapse of “cosmological values” of western morality signify a pivotal moment for humanity, the moment of the “greatest freedom.” The “true world” of metaphysics has now turned into a “fable” and human beings are liberated from the constraints of dogma and divine authority. This radical liberation is restored by “the innocence of becoming”; now it is up to individuals to embrace the life with all its aspects without the constraints of predetermined truths or moral absolutes. Nietzsche writes: “The absolute necessity of a total liberation from ends: otherwise we should not be permitted to try to sacrifice ourselves and let ourselves go. Only the innocence of becoming gives us the *greatest courage* and the *greatest freedom!*”<sup>387</sup> However, Nietzsche poses a crucial question: Do human beings possess “the greatest courage” which would be necessary to fully embrace this newly achieved freedom? The “greatest courage” refers to the willingness to confront the inherent chaos and unpredictability of existence, to accept the responsibility of creating meaning and value in a world which is devoid of any transcendent truths.

This courage entails the willingness and due effort to confront all the challenges and uncertainties of life without relying on external sources of guidance or validation. It requires individuals to manage their existential fears and insecurities, to embrace the complexity and ambiguity of life, and to assert their autonomy and creative potential in the face of every kind of adversity and to affirm life with all its aspects.

Ultimately, Nietzsche invites human beings to shoulder the responsibility of their lives, to exhibit the “greatest courage” in the pursuit of becoming what one is, self-overcoming, and the affirmation of life. Only through the exercise of this courage to affirm life in its fullness can individuals transcend the limitations of the past and forge their own path towards human greatness and self-realization. The exercise of this courage, the assumption of the responsibility of “the greatest freedom” is nobility. In other words, only through nobility can human being achieve *human greatness, human perfection*.

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<sup>387</sup> WP, 787, p.416.

Nietzsche believes that, by effectively demolishing the temple of western metaphysics and breaking the yoke it imposed on humanity, his philosophy offers a way that goes beyond the traditional morality of good and evil. In this way, after restoring great freedom human beings have arrived at a crossroad. However, at this very moment of a decision, Nietzsche is also aware of the fact that with the demolition of traditional morality, there emerged also the advocates of *laissez-faire* attitudes, in other words, those who champion a *laissez-aller*, i.e., letting go approach to life. This attitude emphasizes freedom from all sorts of moral and social constraints, but Nietzsche cautions against the dangers of embracing such an attitude without a sense of direction or purpose. Nietzsche celebrates the liberation of human being from the yoke of traditional morality on the one hand stresses the importance of exercising this restored freedom with responsibility on the other. In other words, according to Nietzsche only those who can create their own values deserve freedom. It is for this reason that Zarathustra asks: free for what?

*On the Way of the Creator*

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Oh, there are so many great thoughts that do nothing more than a bellow: they puff up and make emptier.

You call yourself free? Your dominating thought I want to hear, and not that you escaped from a yoke.

Are you the kind of person who had the *right* to escape from a yoke? There are some who threw away their last value when they threw away their servitude.

Free from what? What does Zarathustra care! But brightly your eyes should signal to me: free *for what?* ...

Can you give yourselves your own evil and good and hang your will above yourself like a law?...

Lonely one, you go to the way yourself...

You must want to burn yourself up in your own flame: how could you become new if you did not first become ashes!

Lonely one, you go the way of the creator: you will create yourself a god out of your seven devils! <sup>388</sup>

People should create their “good and evil” that stands above them as laws. But there is now a difference in the characteristics of these laws: he says that one walks alone the way that goes to oneself. This means that these new laws are not universal laws of rationalistic dogmatic philosophers any more. One should create one’s own law and one should become what one is in his own way, in his own taste, after his own

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<sup>388</sup> Z, I, p.46-7.

fashion. If there is an absolute difference among human beings there can be no talk of universal laws.

Then what is it that one is supposed to find on this way that leads to oneself? Nietzsche says this is a way of “the creator.” One will create oneself “a god” out of one’s “seven devils.” Why Nietzsche after the death of God proposes the creation of new god. We have seen that for Nietzsche ideals, purposes do not pose any problem in themselves. The problem is whether this ideal or purpose is life enhancing or not. We remember from the very beginning of the thesis that Nietzsche finishes his book *Ecce Homo* with the following sentences: “Have I been understood? *Dionysos versus the crucified.*”<sup>389</sup> Nietzsche clearly reminds us that in order to understand his philosophy we have, at least, to clarify the distinction he makes between the two deities. Again, we remember from the first chapter that Socrates together with Euripides and his other friends chased Dionysos away out of stage of the Greek tragedy. Their rationalistic approach which signifies the end of the tragic culture of ancient Greece, culminated in Christian God. However, as we have seen, this God is also chased away by the sciences from the stage of modern Europe. Nietzsche with his intervention tries to bring back Dionysos to the stage and he boasts of being “the first *tragic philosopher* – which is to say the most diametrically opposed antipode of a pessimistic philosopher: Nobody has ever turned the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos before: *tragic wisdom* was missing.”<sup>390</sup> So, we have to ask what is the peculiarity of this ideal, this god of Greek tragedy. Nietzsche explains “the concept of ‘tragic’ and “the psychology of tragedy, in short what he called Dionysian with the following words: “Saying yes to life, even in its strangest and harshest problems; the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the *sacrifice* of its highest types.”<sup>391</sup> Now the main difference between Christian God and Dionysos becomes clear; on the one hand an ideal that symbolizes the negation of life, and on the other, an ideal that symbolizes an unconditional affirmation of life. As there is no such thing as a ‘true world’ behind this world, and life cannot be judged from outside and thus innocent in its fullest sense, human being you are left with nothing but to

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<sup>389</sup> *EH*, p.151. (I preferred Dionysos instead of Dionysus, for the sake of uniformity in text).

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid*, p.110.

<sup>391</sup> *TI*, p. 228.

embrace life in all its aspects, “*in order for you yourself to be the eternal joy in becoming.*”<sup>392</sup> You have to give laws to yourself in order to create yourself and your life in your fashion.

The affirmation of passing away *and destruction* that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, *becoming* along with a radical rejection of the very concept of ‘being’—all these are more closely related to me than anything else people have thought so far.<sup>393</sup>

If there remains no ground for universal laws, we have to accept also the oppositions and wars which the necessary corollary of idea of absolute difference. From these wars and contradictions, a reconciliation and peace will emerge. The objectivity is not anymore an allegedly absolute truth but the optimum, the outcome as the reconciliation of the competing forces. Now every single force, every single individual becomes the constitutive partner of objectivity, truth, of the objectivity of course in proportion to its own influence.

However, we should notice that Nietzsche makes this peace, this objectivity conditional by saying yes to “*becoming* along with a radical rejection of the very concept of ‘being’”<sup>394</sup> This means that every ideal, every objectivity, every truth, every reconciliation and peace is only instrumental and not an end in itself. Until now, dogmatism has imposed its own truth as the absolute truth on everyone, based on the principle of equality. In political terms, each individual will be a founding partner in the constitution of the state in proportion to his or her power, but this constitution is not an absolute constitution. The right of individuals to rebel against the constitution is reserved.

On the one hand we see that Nietzsche rejects all forms of morality, but at the same time it is clear that he does not recommend *laissez aller* attitude. For Nietzsche, freedom is not the setting aside of all values. He believes that without some guiding values that give direction to oneself, that bring mastery to oneself individuals fall prey either to nihilism or hedonism. Nietzsche says that:

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<sup>392</sup> *EH*, p.109-110

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid*, p.110.

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid*, p.110.

Every morality, as opposed to *laissez aller*, a bit of tyranny against “nature”; also against “reason”;” but this is in itself no objection as long as we do not have some other morality which permits us to decree that every kind of tyranny and unreason is impermissible. What is essential and inestimable in every morality is that it constitutes a long compulsion: to understand Stoicism or Port-Royal or Puritanism, one should recall the compulsion under which every language so far has achieved strength and freedom—the metrical compulsion of rhyme and rhythm.

How much trouble the poets and orators of all peoples have taken ... “for the sake of some foolishness,” as utilitarian dolts say, feeling smart – submitting abjectly to capricious laws,” as anarchists say, feeling “free,” even “free-spirited.” But the curious fact is that all there is or has been on earth of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, and masterly sureness, whether in thought itself or in government, or in rhetoric and persuasion, in the arts just in ethics, has developed only owing to the “tyranny of such capricious” laws; and in all seriousness, the probability is by no means small that is precisely this is “nature” and “natural”—and not that *laissez aller*.

Every artist knows how far from any feeling of letting himself go his “natural” state is.<sup>395</sup>

Here we see Nietzsche making a clear defense of morality against utilitarians and anarchists. He says that morality cannot be set aside as long as all the cultural values that have been dear to humanity abandoned, since all these values have been formed under a long discipline of morality. Nietzsche seems to be advocating all these cultural values and accordingly morality as our nature and naturalness. Our values are the very conditions of our life on earth. Our culture with all its values is our nature that we cannot dispense with. To put it differently culture has become something like an atmosphere of meanings for human beings and with such a characteristic, it has become the very condition of life for humankind.

What is essential “in heaven and on earth” seems to be, to say it once more, that there should be *obedience* over a long period of time and in a single direction: given that, something always develops, and have developed, for whose sake it is worth while to live on earth; for example, virtue, art, music, dance, reason, spirituality—something transfiguring, subtle, mad, and divine.<sup>396</sup>

Now we human beings are the artists, the creators of this culture. And we have been able to create this culture and our values only with the discipline of an artist. In other words, whatever cultural value there is in the world, thanks to which we consider life as “worth while” has emerged as a work of this long discipline. This means that all

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<sup>395</sup> BGE in *Basic Writing of Nietzsche*, 188, p.290.

<sup>396</sup> *Ibid*, 188, p.290.



precious values for human kind is the product of long organized effort of human being. This organized effort is nothing but obeying certain set of rules. The infamous practices of Christian or any other similar moralities does not alter this reality. Every morality, every paradigm of values is a way of self-discipline of human being. With such a self-discipline human being has created his values and through these values he has created himself. In this regard, as we have said in previous chapter, human being is an artist, a creator. A creator of his culture and himself. He cannot do otherwise. Nietzsche continues:

Consider any morality with this in mind: what there is in it of “nature” teaches hatred of the *laissez aller*, or any all-too-great freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons and nearest task—teaching the *narrowing of our perspective*, and thus in a certain sense stupidity, as a condition of life and growth.

“You shall obey—someone and for a long time: *else* you will perish and lose the last respect for yourself”—this appears to me to be the moral imperative of nature, which to be sure, is neither “categorical” as the old Kant would have it (hence the “else”) nor addressed to the individual (what do individuals matter to her?), but to peoples, races, ages, classes—but above all to the whole human animal, to *man*.<sup>397</sup>

Nietzsche thus, on the one hand, rejects the morality of dogmatism, i.e., the slave morality of the *good and evil*, on the other hand, defends morality against the utilitarians, anarchists or advocates of *laissez aller*. It would not be wrong to say that Nietzsche is the moral philosopher of a world whose God is dead. We know from the previous chapter that one of Nietzsche’s main tasks is to “de-deify” nature when he says: “When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to *naturalize* humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?”<sup>398</sup> After having secured a “de-deified” nature with his concepts of the will to power and the world as eternal becoming (chaos with no pre-determined end) Nietzsche now proposes a morality, which he thinks best suit this “de-deified” nature.

This is the noble morality as against the slave morality of western metaphysics. If there is nothing outside the world, then according to Nietzsche, there remains only one possible choice for human being. Given that life is absolutely innocent,<sup>399</sup> there

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<sup>397</sup> BGE in *Basic Writing of Nietzsche*, 188, p.290.

<sup>398</sup> GS, 109, p.109-10.

<sup>399</sup> TI, p.182

remains no legitimate ground for the feeling of resentment. Human being has to stop blaming the life or his existence on earth and to embrace life, to affirm life in all its aspects. Human being has to accept life with its all multiplicity, all contradictions, all wars and suffering. Human nobility is thus taking full responsibility of life and molding it, creating it as a beautiful work of art. As an artist, as a creator human being has to achieve perfection. Because only perfection, beauty can be a proof of a flourishing life. Life as will to power enjoys its feeling of power in its fullest sense only in beauty, in perfection. Only by nobility, by a noble stance toward life can “great freedom”, great emancipation of human being acquire its real sense. In fact, rather than morality it seems better to call it “great politics.” “Starting with” him, says Nietzsche, “the earth will know *great politics*.”<sup>400</sup>

It is clear from what has been said that, Nietzsche's main purpose is to encourage individuals to embrace their freedom that they have restored by breaking away the yoke traditional moralities. Thus, he now asks: Seeing that you have broken the yoke and are now free, are you then going to be the one that throws away your last value or do you have the courage to give yourself your own law. Are you going to create yourself from your own ashes? Are you going to be what you are or are you going to let everything go? For Nietzsche freedom is to give oneself law, or more accurately to become a law, a necessity, a “*fate*”. Different from other animals, which necessarily live in the present, human beings carry their past and future as feelings of resentment and fear, i.e., as burden, with themselves and cannot do without positing a meaning, a purpose for their existence in order to go on living. This idiosyncrasy of human beings, which is the very cause of their sufferings, serve also as the horizon of their hopes and the very possibility of a blissful joy of a creator artist.

The now and the past on earth—alas, my friends—that is what most unbearable to *me*. And I would not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which must come.

A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge to the future—and alas, at the same time a cripple at this bridge: all that is Zarathustra.<sup>401</sup>

Zarathustra says that only as “a seer of that which must come” would he “know how to live.” Only by positing a future goal, a purpose human being holds on living. Only

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<sup>400</sup> EH, p.144

<sup>401</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p.110.

as “a seer”, “a willer”, “a creator”, “a bridge to the future” can he bear the present. This means that human being needs purposes and meanings in life. As we have said the cosmological values of western metaphysics all lost their meanings, they cannot serve as purposes any more. Now *Übermensch* (overman) is the meaning of the world. Nietzsche clarifies what he means by overman.

The problem I am posing is not that what should replace humanity in the order of being (the human is an *endpoint*): but instead what type of human should be *bred*, should be *willed* as having greater value; as being more deserving of life, as being more certain of a future. This more valuable type has appeared often enough already: but only as a stroke of luck, as an exception, never as *willed*. In fact, he has precisely what people feared most; so far, *he* has been practically the *paradigm* of the terrible.<sup>402</sup>

The overman is not a different species that will replace human species. He is just human being of tomorrow; no one knows how he will look like. He must represent human greatness of tomorrow. Nietzsche says the problem is about the type of human that will be “willed” and “bred”. In the history, there have been great human beings but these types were there just as a matter of chance. They were never willed; they appeared despite the moralities that bred the opposite type, the mediocre type.<sup>403</sup> This type that Nietzsche means are those who affirm life in every respect. Those who never complain, never resent. Thus, these great human beings of history will serve as paradigm for us. They stand there, as it were, both as artists and as works of art for us. They are artists who created themselves, who become what they are. Today’s humanity has the responsibility to create circumstances that help emergence of such great type of human beings.

We remember from the beginning of our quest that according to Nietzsche, “art—and *not* morality—is the true metaphysical activity of man”, and “the existence of the world is *justified* (*gerechtfertigt*) only as an aesthetic phenomenon.”<sup>404</sup> How is existence of the world justified as an aesthetic phenomenon? And in this regard why instead of morality art is “the true activity of man?”

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<sup>402</sup> AC, p.4

<sup>403</sup> TI, p.217-8

<sup>404</sup> BT, trans. R. Speirs. 5, p.8

Nietzsche contends that the beautiful and ugly are perceived as “relative to our most fundamental values of preservation.”<sup>405</sup> The origin of the feeling of beautiful and ugly is rooted in our long biological history. According to him “that which is instinctively repugnant to us, aesthetically, is proved by mankind’s longest experience to be harmful, dangerous, worthy of suspicion: the suddenly vocal aesthetic instinct (e.g., in disgust) contains a *judgment*.” Conversely, the beautiful corresponds to the “biological values of what is useful, beneficent, life-enhancing.”<sup>406</sup> Our instinct that reacts the beautiful and ugly are deep-rooted judgments of our body, our great reason. Those judgments though “shortsighted” are “persuasive in the highest degree; they appeal to our instincts where they decide most quickly and pronounce their Yes and No before the understanding can speak.”<sup>407</sup> The beautiful arouses the feeling of joy, which is related to feeling of power within individual. Conversely, ugliness triggers a feeling of displeasure, of disgust, which evokes resistance and struggle for a new equilibrium. Nietzsche says that our senses achieve a spiritualization through their evolutionary history. “The spiritualization of sensuality” find its expression through love and hate.<sup>408</sup> The effect of beautiful find its expression in us through love, in its most intense case, sexual rapture and the ugly triggers the hate, the hostility.<sup>409</sup> The states of peace and war correspond to the feelings of love and hate respectively. As the state of beauty is not an everlasting state, any dissolution of harmony triggers feeling of unease, hate, and the situation is perceived as ugly. The ugliness triggers destruction of existing state as the very condition of a new creation. It is through this constant struggle that life-overcomes itself. Thus, it would not be wrong to say that our enemies are, in fact, the very possibility of our self-overcoming.

In this regard an example that Nietzsche gives will help us to understand what he means with aesthetic justification of world.

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<sup>405</sup> *WP*, 804, p.423

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid*, 804, p.423

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid*, 804, p.423

<sup>408</sup> *TI*, 171-3, 201-202

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid*, p.195.

I myself have attempted an *aesthetic* justification: how is the ugliness of the world possible? – I took the will to beauty, to persist in like forms, for a temporary means of preservation and recuperation: fundamentally, however, the eternally creative appeared to me to be, as the external compulsion to destroy, associated with pain. The ugly is the form things assume when view them with the will to implant the meaning, a new meaning, into what has become meaningless: the accumulated force which compels the creator to consider all that has been created hitherto as unacceptable, ill-constituted, worthy of being denied, ugly!<sup>410</sup>

So the beautiful for us is what we associate with our sense of preservation/feeling of power. We want to conserve this beauty, i.e., our enjoyment of feeling of power. But life is in a constant flux and there is a constant struggle of forces. Therefore, the preservation of beauty, i.e. the enjoyment of power, always necessitates efforts and struggle in order to respond constant interferences of other forces. Therefore, the transitory peace moments of beauty are exposed to danger in every moment. The peaceful condition, the beautiful state comes to an end, when harmony no longer holds among the competing forces. Then from the viewpoint the will to power things seem to be transformed into a new “form”, into the ugly state, which arouses the feeling of hate. In this way, ugliness, which means disturbed harmony, triggers resistance and struggle. The struggle continues until a new equilibrium, a relative state of peace is reached. In fact, this is a never-ending dynamic process, oscillation between ugliness and beauty is always eminent within becoming.

Obviously only in the eyes of human beings as artists, otherwise there is no beauty in nature, only creations of human beings, including themselves can be beautiful. Nietzsche says: “Beauty in itself” is an empty phrase, not even a concept. In beauty, human beings posit themselves as the measure of perfection; in select cases, they worship themselves in it. In this way, a species cannot help but say yes to itself and only itself.”<sup>411</sup> This means that only human beings can give their life a “great style”, harmony, beauty otherwise all becoming is chaos. The sole artist, the sole creator is human being. Thus whenever there is a lack of beauty, imperfection in human life it should be regarded as the self-inflicted ugliness, imperfection. Nobility is the assumption of full responsibility for beauty in human life.

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<sup>410</sup> *WP*, 416, p.224.

<sup>411</sup> *TI*, p.201

In this regard, as the cosmological values, true world, paradigm of western metaphysics are not perceived as beautiful any more, human beings have to establish a new beautiful state. To ensure this beautiful state, the individual must create itself and the society in which he lives as works of arts. Only in this way can he justify his existence. Human being must assert himself and create himself as a work art, which means a harmonious personality with an absolute self-assurance, as a “law”, as a “fate.”

Nietzsche emphasizes a plurality within the self and a plurality within the society. However, Zarathustra say to his disciples that alone he goes now and they also should go alone. How then will it be possible for human being to create himself? In isolation? The answer is both yes and no. Only through self-creation one can “become what one is”, this is his isolation, no one can help him in this regard. However, he cannot be in isolation otherwise, there is no solitary sanctuary for him on earth. He is within the whole and there is nothing other than whole. Only when Zarathustra’s disciples deny him, he will return to them.

*On the Bestowing Virtue*

Alone I go now, my disciples! You also should go now, and alone. Thus I want it. ...  
The person of knowledge must not only be able to love his enemies, but also to hate his friends too. ...

You say you believe in Zarathustra? But what matters Zarathustra! You are my believers, but what matters all believer!

You had not sought yourselves, then you found me. All believers do this; that’s why all faith amounts to so little.

Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves, only when you have all denied me I will return to you.

Indeed, with different eyes, my brothers, will I then seek my lost ones; with different love will I love you then.

And one day again you should become my friends and children of a single hope; then I shall be with you a third time, to celebrate the great noon with you.

And that is the great noon, where human beings stand at the midpoint of their course between animal and overman and celebrate their way to evening as their highest hope: for it is the way to a new morning.

Then the one who goes under will bless himself, that he is one who crosses over and the sun of his knowledge will stand at noon for him.

‘*Dead are all gods: now we want the overman to live.*’ – Let this be our last will at the great noon!”<sup>412</sup>

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<sup>412</sup> Z, I, p.58-9

Zarathustra says to his disciples that when they find themselves he will return to them. But how can one find oneself? How does one become what one is? In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche says that ‘becoming what one is’ “presupposes” that one does not “have the slightest idea that *what*” one is. “If you look at it this way, even life’s mistakes have their own meaning a value.”<sup>413</sup> As one does not have the faintest idea of oneself, one must be his own creation. There is no other alternative. One has to find his way by experiencing the unknown paths. Only by experimentation of his different inclinations can one find his true strength, true self and not by dressing up a ready-made cloak of some moralists. Every human being is a will to power and thus a quantum of force. Every quantum of force is in a constant struggle with all other forces. It influences all other forces and is influenced by all others. And we should not forget that there is also a constant struggle within the body as it also comprises of multiplicity of forces. Why Zarathustra advises that one should love his enemies and hate his friends. For both enemies and friends are part of ones very body. They are competing forces one’s inner body. Every individual is a body, which comprises multiplicity of forces; and yet as an individual, it is itself within a big body, humanity.

Every will to power wants to increase its power, domination and a constant growth. For a will to be strong, to be able to growth it must have harmony inside and outside. Only through life and experience, only with experimentation can one become what one is. In this regard, even one’s failures, one’s mistakes, one’s sufferings form the very soil that nourishes one’s life. One’s experimentation is nothing but a way to oneself. One is like a child, who plays with all his innocence, who creates and destructs.<sup>414</sup> With experimentation, one overcomes himself. A noble stance towards life necessitates that one has to bear all responsibility for one’s doings and never feel resentment against anybody or against life. There is no one to blame. In every moment one has to affirm life, any feeling of resentment means to blame the existence. However, as we have said existence is innocent. Life is innocent.

*The heaviest weight* – What if day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have

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<sup>413</sup> *EH*, p.146.

<sup>414</sup> *Z*, p.16-7.

to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence – even this spider and this moonlight between the tress, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust! Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: ‘you are a god, and never have I heard I anything more divine.’ If this thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly crush you; the question in each and every thing, ‘Do you want this again and innumerable time again? Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life *to long for nothing more fervently* than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?’<sup>415</sup>

In every moment we live, we either affirm, and thus justify existence in all its aspects, or we resent and try to find a substitute, i.e., a world beyond, for the justification of life. Resenting anything within life means denying all existence, including yourself. If you accept the past as it is, with all its suffering and “evils”, you will accept all existence including yourself. When you affirm life as it, if you want the moment you live in repeats eternally then all world history become your history, your biography. You affirm all the past as if it were the product of your will. This is the moment you bring the necessity with your freedom together. At this moment, by accepting all history as your biography, as a creation of your will, you raise yourself to the level of creator. Now the world is waiting your intervention as a creator, you yourself is now creator of all history. And your look is directed toward future, you cannot change past, the necessity, the fate, but by your intervention you yourself stands there as a creator. You give shape to life, your life. How would you act at this very moment? It is up to you, you are an artist child, or an artist god. You can shape your life, create yourself however you want. However, create yourself or act in such a way that you will ensure its eternal repetition. “My teaching says: live in such a way that you have to wish to live again: this is the task.”<sup>416</sup> This means that however you choose, your freedom becomes your necessity, your fate. Therefore, you must act as if you are a “fate”, a “law”. According to Nietzsche, this is possible when we shape our life as a work of art: “We want to experience a work of art again and again! You should shape your life in such a way that you have the same desire

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<sup>415</sup> GS, 341, p.194-5.

<sup>416</sup> KSA9 11[163], p.504-5 (Our translation)



for its individual parts! This is the main idea!”<sup>417</sup> Only by giving “style to one’s character”, which is “a great and rare art” can one achieve harmony within himself and transform his life in a work of art:

*One thing is needful.* – To ‘give style’ to one’s character – a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer and then fit them into an artistic plan until each appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a great mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of first nature removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed. Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and employed for distant views – it is supposed to beckon towards the remote and immense. In the end, when the work is complete, it becomes clear it was the force of a single taste that ruled and shaped everything great and small – whether the taste was good or bad means less than one may think; it’s enough that it was one taste! ... For one thing is needful: that a human being should attain satisfaction with himself – be it through this or that poetry or art; only then is human being at all tolerable to behold!<sup>418</sup>

In the end, says Nietzsche, you realize that “it was the force of a single taste that ruled and shaped everything great and small.” However, as we have said before human being does not live in isolation. Human being on the one hand is a multiplicity of forces from within and a part of human society on the other. For individual human being the establishment of his harmony is intertwined with the ensuring of harmony within society in which he lives. And individual evaluations, interpretations are necessarily perspectival. Yet this individual perspective acquires its color unescapably through power relations with other perspectives. In other words, the perspective has its characteristics, its quality, its meaning only within the whole, only through its relations with other perspectives. In fact, taking into account all power relations the whole is nothing but the external body of the individual. The individual cannot have any meaning in isolation of the whole. Therefore, individual cannot create itself as a work of art in a perfect way so long as the society in which he lives is not created as a work of art. “A person is necessary, a person is a piece of fate, a person belongs to whole, a person only is in the context of the whole.”<sup>419</sup> That

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<sup>417</sup> *Ibid*, 11[165], p.505 (Our translation)

<sup>418</sup> *GS*, 290, p.163-4

<sup>419</sup> *TI*, p.182.

is why Zarathustra goes down repeatedly to the valley, to the society. So this is a perpetual effort of creating oneself and shaping, the society and outer world, the becoming.<sup>420</sup> This society is in fact all humanity. Nietzsche's argumentation entails to accept what he calls the whole, the life as humanity itself. And it seems to be the reason behind his claim that after him the age of "great politics" begins. Nietzsche says:

"beauty" is for the artist something outside all orders of rank, because in beauty opposites are tamed; the highest sign of power over opposites; moreover, without tension: — that violence is no longer needed; that everything follows, obeys, so easily, so pleasantly—that is what delights the artist's will to power.<sup>421</sup>

This is the joy of human being. Nietzsche is obviously relating beauty with the harmony within the human being. Human being creates this harmony only through the constant struggle within the humanity. The greatness of human being lies in shaping life in its totality as a work of art, in beauty, in great health. The greatness of human being lies in giving life a great style, a great health, to bring in it all opposites in reconciliation, in harmony. Of course, harmony not as a stable state, always destructed and created anew; a perpetual oscillation of beauty and ugliness, war and peace. This is the truth, this is the beautiful, the great justice. And nobility is assuming the responsibility for the creation of this beauty and justice. Nobility is the affirmation of life as a beautifying intentionality. Nobility is the giving humanity a grand style, a great health. Nobility is the establishment of a beautiful humanity, which is nothing but the unity and harmony of multiplicity. It is being a real artist and creator of oneself and one's life.

### **4.3. Star Friendship - Sils Maria**

Zarathustra and Nietzsche were on the way back to the pension where they stay in Sils-Maria. They had a long walking all around the lake Sils. They had a lot to discuss. Nietzsche was talking about eternal recurrence and Zarathustra about his plan to go down to the valley, to the people again. Then Zarathustra brought up the

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<sup>420</sup> See *WP*, 660, p.348.

<sup>421</sup> *Ibid*, 803, p.422.

subject of Socrates that they had discussed earlier during the walk. Zarathustra was of the opinion that Nietzsche was unfair to Socrates. Then Nietzsche replied him:

*The dying Socrates:* – I admire the courage and wisdom of Socrates in everything he did, said – and did not say. This mocking, love-sick monster and piper of Athens, who made the most audacious youths of Athens tremble and sob, was not only the wisest chatterer of all time; he was equally great in silence. I wish he had remained silent also in the last moments of his life – perhaps he would then belong to a still higher order of minds.<sup>422</sup>

When they came close to the pension, they heard someone's singing. It seemed there was a gathering inside the pension. They already stopped talking and in a curious and cheerful mode they entered the pension. 'What a beautiful scene,' said Nietzsche. There was a symposium. Socrates was playing the kithara and all around him a group of men. Nietzsche and Zarathustra gave them hand salutes cautiously with smiling faces and sat down next to them. They recognized Plato and Euripides among them. An older guy seemed to be Anaxagoras. They ate, drank and talked. The symposium continued cheerfully throughout the night. When the sun rose in the morning, they went out and walked towards the lake. Nietzsche made the following speech by the lake:

*Star friendship.* — We were friends and became strangers. But that is right and we do not want to hide it and obscure it from ourselves, as if we should be ashamed of it. We are two ships, each with its destination and its course; We can perhaps cross and have a feast together, as we did, - and then the good ships lay so calmly in one harbor and in one sun that it might seem that they had already reached their destinations and had one goal. But then the almighty power of our task drove us apart again, into different seas and sunny patches, and perhaps we will never see each other again - perhaps we will, but will not recognize each other: the different seas and suns have changed us! That we have to become strangers to one another is the law *over* us: for this very fact we should become more honorable to one another! For this very fact the thought of our former friendship should become more sacred! There is probably a tremendous invisible curve and star orbit in which our very different roads and destinations may be *included* as small stretches - let us rise to this thought! But our lives are too short and our eyesight too meager for us to be more than friends in the sense of that sublime possibility. — Let us then *believe* in our star friendship, even if we have to be earth enemies.<sup>423</sup>

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<sup>422</sup> GS, 340, p.193-4

<sup>423</sup> KSA3, *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, p.523-4, (Our translation)

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

The focal point of this thesis is the concept of nobility. We consider this concept as one of the main pillars on which Nietzsche builds his philosophy. To elucidate the concept of nobility we have started with Nietzsche's main critique against traditional western metaphysics. Nietzsche's main contention is that he has overcome the traditional metaphysics, which with its delusions debased humanity and life for millennia. According to him, the main root of this delusion is the misconception of truth and knowledge, which are ascribed to an allegedly divine reason. Western metaphysics contends that there is out there an eternal truth, and by achieving this truth, human beings can secure happiness. We tried to show how Nietzsche relates the source of the delusion of western metaphysics to the name of Socrates. We have traced back to the intervention of Socrates both through Euripides and Plato which according to Nietzsche marks the end to Greek tragic culture. Nietzsche contends that the advent of Socratism is a symptom of degenerating Greek society. Socrates' pupil Plato is another decisive moment in the history of western philosophy. With his theory of ideas (forms) Plato is the initiator of a logical world of ideas which is presented as the true, eternal, perfect and unchanging world. The actual world on the other hand is depicted as a deficient, transient world, which is prone to change and decay and is a pale copy of the 'true world'. This illusion of true world as having more reality and being more valuable than our actual world has costed dear to humanity.

With the intervention of Christianity, this illusion has lasted for millennia. The concept of true world as a beyond world is taken over by Christianity which Nietzsche labels as popular Platonism. Down to modern time western philosophy stayed in the service of the Christian morality. This morality with its conception of

original sin and guilt have been debasing the human life and torturing humanity with good conscience.

One of the main characteristics of western philosophy is its giving priority to reason and thus debasing the body. In this vein it also debases the actual world and the life in this world. This morality has shaped the life of people through millennia. Then as a result of the developments in the sciences this paradigm of Christianity has come to an end. Its values gradually lost their power over the life of people. There seems to be a sense of euphoria and relief but Nietzsche maintains that this sense of euphoria is deceptive and ultimately this will bring Europe to nihilism.

We then traced Nietzsche's critique on the conception of subjectivity as purported by western metaphysics which according to him is the fundamental error of the traditional philosophy. Nietzsche's basic claim is that western philosophy starting from reason conceives the subject, self, or ego as a logical entity; a perfect, divine unity and thus gives the reason the credential to rule in an absolute manner on the bodily desires. In this way, the tyranny of reason is justified. The body, senses, desires, passions and inclinations are regarded as deceptive and evil. Reason as a divine and perfect unity in human being is accepted universally identical for all human beings and thus universally binding moral laws are prescribed. With this ingenuity all differences, both within the self and between human beings, are disregarded and suppressed. In this way, according to Nietzsche, ascribing absolute priority to rationality resulted in debasement of humanity and the impoverishment of life.

Reason regarded as the main authority in the acquisition of knowledge and truth, and accordingly for revealing the secrets of existence which ultimately brings happiness. From Plato onward western metaphysics purported that 'the truth' is out there somewhere in reality and only through reason we can acquire it. We saw how Nietzsche confronts these claims with his conception of knowledge, which purports that the ultimate goal of human being is not the attainment of knowledge. Truth is an illusion, an error which human species needs for survival. That is knowledge or truth is not something which has its origin in a divinely world order but it is an instrument

in the service of life. Human being, in the struggle of survival, and overpowering, registers the suitable conditions and the knowledge is the sign language, is the expression of these conditions. To value knowledge over above life, itself, is the sign of degeneration for Nietzsche. This impotency against the suffering and hardships of life wants to a leap to truth, to a true world. The endeavors of this world are seen as futile.

For Nietzsche knowing is necessarily perspectival, and there can never be a disinterested objective point of view. There are only perspectival interpretations of phenomena and these are necessarily value laden. Human beings can not get rid of these values, therefore, our perspectival interpretations cannot produce objective knowledge. Only through confrontation with other perspectives, does human being realize other's perspectives and interpretations and only through struggle of forces can objectivity be achieved. However traditional metaphysics purports that objectivity can be achieved prior to and without this confrontation which actually means nothing but the imposition of a certain perspective as the universally valid truth. Nietzsche says that knowledge is the knowledge of the survival conditions of human being and therefore always conditioned by life itself. And body perceives only as aesthetic appreciation that which is beneficial to it, that which is empowering the will to power, that which arouses the feeling of joy. This can be possible only through the appropriate conditions, which is sanctified as beauty, or beautiful. Only those truths (our truths are always and necessarily errors) that are beneficial to the body (which perceived through aesthetic appreciation as beauty) are raised to the level of consciousness and conceived as knowledge and truth as if these are acquired by consciousness. However, the decision is made by bodily forces and in unconscious level.

Then we discussed how Nietzsche with his new conception of human subjectivity tries to establish a new philosophy. With his concept of will to power, Nietzsche eliminates all dualisms pertaining to traditional metaphysics. Now every organism is conceived as a will to power and each represents a certain quantum of force. These forces are in a state of constant struggle for domination, overpowering, assimilation etc. In Nietzsche's new approach, reason is not regarded as divine and reduced to a

capability of body, which now stands as the great reason of individual. And within the body most of the vital decisions are produced in unconscious level and only after a decision is made it becomes known by consciousness. However, many decisions stay in unconscious level. And for human vitality and survival the decisions that arise out of struggle within bodily forces are more precious than the allegedly pure decisions of reason. Only through this constant struggle of inner forces come human beings to know their personalities, strengths and weaknesses of their characters. Therefore, the plurality of the forces within the body has to be taken dear and thus not be suppressed, as is the case for traditional morality. The inclusion of many perspectives into decision-making process ensures the enrichment and enhancement of the life. This alleged unity, which begins with the false assumption of absolute identity of a perfect reason, culminates in the tyranny of monism of every kind on the one hand, God, monarch etc., and the anarchy of atomism on the other.

The notion of identity brings forth the notion of equality. All approaches of western metaphysics, including its modern versions such as political movements of modern Europe, rely on the principle of equality in the belief that equality is a necessity of justice. Nietzsche, on the other hand, regards these doctrines of equality as forming the base for the tyranny and anarchy. Nietzsche maintains absolute difference and absolute uniqueness of every human being. For him there is a rank order of capacities. To eliminate the differences among human beings and thus render them equal, which is not the case in real life, is in fact injustice. According to him, justice necessitates taking reality as it is. With his insistence on the differences among human beings Nietzsche wants that every bit of human capacity should be included in the service of the human greatness and not be wasted away due to faulty conceptions of justice.

According to Nietzsche, the principle of equality is the result of an impotency, a sickliness of a degenerate type of human being. This is a reactionary, slavish view of human reality. With the doctrine of equality, they actually want to impose their will as a universally binding law on the whole of humanity. To secure the universality they posit a true world, a divinely world order which is set as ultimate goal of humanity. This slavish morality with its doctrine of equality disregards all kind of

differences and thus suppresses many human capacities, which can be used in the service of human greatness. Now this true world of metaphysics is collapsed and human beings are left without any meaning. However, human being cannot live without a purpose, without a meaning as he is conscious of his future. So Nietzsche now sets before humanity a new goal, overman. Overman is the symbol of a perpetual self-overcoming of human being. There is no beyond; there is no outer world. Human being is alone with himself. He must awaken and show the courage to shoulder his responsibility. He can do this only with a goal, with his greatness, with the greatness of human being, with the greatness of humanity. Greatness means beautifying himself, beautifying humanity. This, in turn, means that human being must perpetually create himself as a work of art, and in this way act as a perpetual artist, as a perpetual creator. This act of taking responsibility for the greatness of humanity, this act of being a creator artist is nobility. Nobility is the affirmation of life as a beautifying intentionality. Nobility is the giving humanity a grand style, a great health. Nobility is the establishment of a beautiful humanity, which is nothing but the unity and harmony of multiplicity. However, this harmony is not a stable harmony, rather it is a dynamic process. The wheel of becoming never stops. The harmony is constantly broken and restored anew; this is a perpetual process. When harmony breaks down, the human being feels ugliness with a sense of hate to ugliness the struggle for restoring beauty begins anew as love to beauty. The hate, the war, this suffering is our possibility of self-overcoming. Therefore, we love our enemies, and hate our friends. This is a perpetual struggle of rejuvenation. This is the joy of life, even in the suffering. This is the rebirth of Dionysos from his death.

+ *“Hat man mich verstanden?— Dionysos Gegen den Gekreuzigte”*<sup>424</sup>

- *Thus habe Ich dich verstanden.*

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<sup>424</sup> *EH* in *KSA6*, p.374.



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## APPENDICES

### A. CURRICULUM VITAE

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#### RESEARCH INTERESTS

Philosophy of Politics • Philosophy of Right • Philosophy of Ethics

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Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
PhD	METU Department of Philosophy	2023
MA	METU Department of Philosophy	2010
BSc	METU Department of Civil Engineering	1991
High School	Tunceli Trade High School	1985

#### WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2003 – 2024	General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works	Auditor
1994 – 2003	Türkiye Emlak Bankası A.Ş.	Auditor
1992 – 1994	Çankaya Municipality	Civil Engineer

#### THESES

Ph.D. Thesis: “The Concept of Nobility in Nietzsche” METU Department of Philosophy, September 2023. Ankara, Turkey. Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ahmet İNAM

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## **ACADEMIC AWARDS**

The most successful student in the M.A. Program of Philosophy in the academic year 2012–2013 with cum. GPA. 3,93/4,00.

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English, German, French



## B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez Nietzsche'nin asalet kavramını konu edinmektedir. Bilinç varlığı olarak insan kendini ve tüm gerçekliğini yaratma imkanını üzerinde taşır. Bu imkanı kullanma biçimi insanın kendisine, hayata, ve bir bütün olarak varoluşa karşı duruşunu açığa vurur. O bu imkanı kendisine hedefler belirleyerek, hayatına anlamlar atfederek ve bu şekilde değer paradigmaları, idealler, 'ideal dünya'lar yaratarak hayata geçirir. Bu paradigmalar bir anlamda insanın kendi kendisini yaratmada kullanmak için ürettiği kalıp ve biçimler olarak hizmet eder. Bir başka açıdan değerlendirildiğinde bu kalıp ve biçimlerin yani, onun amaç ve anlamlarının, hakikat ve ideallerinin doğası insanın kendisinin, karakterinin, yaşam biçiminin bir nevi yansıması gibidir.

Nietzsche'ye göre insan hayata karşı ya tepkisel, bıkkın ve özünü yitirmiş bir tutum içinde olarak kendi varoluşuna aykırı ve hayata hasmane amaç ve idealler belirler, ya da olumlayıcı, güçlü ve sağlıklı bir duruş sergileyerek hayatın gelişip serpilmesine imkan sağlayan amaç ve idealler belirler. Hayatı yadsıyan idealler belirlemek insan aklının kendi yanılgılarının eseridir. Bu insan aklının bir özelliğidir ve esasen hayatın serpilip gelişmesi de ancak bu tür yanılgıların üstesinden gelmekle mümkün olur. İnsan yanılgıya düşüp kendi koyduğu amaç ve anlamları, değer paradigmasını, 'hakikat dünyalarını', ideallerini ve bu idealler çerçevesinde ürettiği tüm değerleri ezeli gerçeklikler olarak görmeye başladığında kendi illüzyonlarının kölesi olmaya başlar. Zira ezeli oluş halinde olan bir dünyada değişimi ve gelişimi yadsımak, hayatın dondurulup kısırlaştırılmasından başka bir anlama gelmez.

Bu ideal dünya özlemi hayatın yükü ve zorluklarından bir kaçıştır. İnsan emek vermeksizin, çaba göstermeksizin belli bazı ritüellerle tanrı krallığında ikamet izni arayışında olagelmıştır. Esasen her idealleştirme bir insan tipinin, mesela papazın, kendi güç arayışında, yaşam mücadelesinde, kendisi için en uygun olarak gördüğü yaşam koşullarına karşılık gelir ve bunlar öz olarak güç ilişkilerine göre belirlenir. Başka türlü söylenecek olursa, insana dayatılan değerler toplumsal güç ilişkilerinin

sonucu olarak ortaya çıkar ve bu güç mücadelesine bağlı olarak sürekli olarak değişim içinde olur.

Nietzsche'ye göre Sokrates'ten bu yana batı metafiziğinin değerleri dejenere olmuş, kendine yabancılaşmış bir hayatın değerleri olagelmıştır. Sokrates Antik Yunan trajik çağının içine düştüğü krize, her yönden avarı kaçmış toplumsal düzene bir çeki düzen verme arayışı olarak ortaya çıkar. Kontrolden çıkmış tutkuların zaptı rapta alınması için aklın tahakkümü tek çıkış yoludur. Sokrates'in öğrencisi Platon hocasının izinde, aklın tahakkümü için gerekli teorik çerçeveyi kurar. Kaynayıp duran bu karmaşanın üzerinde, görünen dünyanın, görünen şeylerin ötesinde bir idealar dünyası vardır. Bu idealar ezeli-ebedi gerçeklikler olarak, mükemmel olup her türlü değişimden aridirler. Görünen dünya ve onun varlıkları ise idealar dünyasının ancak birer silik kopyalarıdır. Mesela, bu yokoluşlar dünyasında türlü çeşit vücut bulan ağaçların ötesinde değişmez, mükemmel bir ağaç ideası vardır. Bu dünya ise bir eksiklikler, bozulmalar, yok oluşlar dünyası olarak sürekli bir değişim içindedir. Akıl ile donatılmış varlıklar olarak insanların da bu idealar dünyası ile akılları üzerinden bir akrabalık bağı vardır. Ancak akıllarının mezarı durumundaki bedenleri üzerinden de bu eksiklikler ve bozulmalar dünyası ile akraba durumundadırlar. İşte bu eksilik, bozulmalar, yokoluşlar dünyası ile akrabalıkları nedeni ile başları dertten kurtulmaz, türlü eziyet ve acı çekerler. İdeaların bilgisi acı çeken insana gerçek dünyanın, dertlerden uzak dünyanın kapılarını açacak anahtardır. Bilgi, erdemi, erdem, mutluluğu, iyi yaşamı getirecektir. Ancak bunun için idealar dünyası ile akrabalık bağı olan tanrısal aklın mutlak hakimiyeti esastır. Bu idealar bilgisi ile ilgilenmek ise filozofun işidir. Şehri filozof kral, bedeni akıl yönetirse, "iyi" ideasına uygun olarak adalet, erdem tesis edilecek, erdem ise mutluluğa götürecektir.

Böylece bilgi, erdem, mutluluk özdeşliği kurulmuş oldu. Ancak Platon Antik dünyada pek bir etki gösteremedi. Ne antik Grekler ne de antik Romalılar Platonizm'i ciddiye aldılar. Bunun için çarmlıha gerilmiş İsa'dan sonra aziz Pavlus'un Hristiyanlık öğretisini kurması gerekiyordu der Nietzsche. Onun Platonizm'in halk versiyonu olarak tanımladığı Hristiyanlık umutsuz durumdaki alt tabakalarda tutunmayı başarır ve antik Roma'nın kriziyle birlikte iktidarı ele geçirir.

“Ayaktakımının” gücünü arakasına alan papaz iktidara gelmiştir. Kurgu aynıdır, bu dünya yalan ve eziyet dünyasıdır, gerçek dünya tanrının krallığı olan öte dünyadır. Hristiyanlık fazladan ilk günah kavramını eklemiştir. İnsan günahkar olarak bu dünyaya gelmiştir. Tanrı alicenaplığı nedeniyle insanları lanetten kurtarmak için oğlunu feda etmiştir. İnsanlar, Tanrı’nın oğlunun, İsa’nın öğretisine (ki Nietzsche’ye göre bu esasen Pavlus’un kendi öğretisinden başka bir şey değildir) riayet eder, kilisenin kurallarına harfiyen uyarlar ise Tanrı’nın inayetine erişme şansını elde ederler. Bunun için elbette bedenlerinin şeytani isteklerini, özellikle şehevi duygularını köreltmeleri, yine bedenin boş tutkularının tatmininden öte bir anlamı olmayan dünyanın nimetlerine yüzlerini çevirmeleri gerekmektedir. Hristiyanlık ahlakı bu şekilde asırlar boyu batı dünyasının belirleyici yaşam biçimi olur. İnsanların hayatı, karakteri Hristiyanlık değerleri tarafından belirlenip durur.

Sokrates ile başlayan akılcı gelenek bu şekilde Hristiyanlık ahlakında zirveye ulaşarak, bu dünyayı, insan hayatını ve insan bedenini lanetleyip durur. Deyim yerindeyse insana dünyasını dar eder. Ama elbette şu yok oluş dünyasında her şeyin bir sonu olduğu gibi Hristiyanlık ahlakının da bir sonu olacaktır. Bir deli güpegündüz elinde tuttuğu feneri ile pazaryerinde insanlar arasına karışarak Tanrı’yı aradığını, bir görenin olup olmadığını sorar. İnsanların bu delinin dediklerine karşı pek neşeli oldukları görünür. Laf atıp dururlar Tanrı’ya. ‘Yoksa bizden çekinip gizleniyor mu’ der biri. ‘Size söyleyeyim Tanrı’ya ne olduğunu’, der deli. ‘Tanrı öldü, onu biz insanlar öldürdük. Ama insanlar bu işledikleri cürmün ağırlığının henüz farkında değiller’ diyerek uzaklaşır.

Devir bilimsel gelişmelerin hız kazandığı bir devirdir. Sorgulamaların yapıldığı, kuşkuların dile getirildiği, nedenlerin arandığı devirdir. David Hume insan deneyimlerinde neden-sonuç zorunlu bağlantısının nereden geldiğini, bilimizdeki zorunlu yargılara nasıl vardığımızı sorgular. Bir olayın başka bir olayın zorunlu sonucunu olduğunu gösterir hiçbir ipucu bulamadığını, bu zorunluluk ilişkinin insan alışkanlıklarının bir sonucu olduğunu, güneşin her gün doğuyor olmasından onun yarın da zorunlu olarak doğacağı sonucuna varılamayacağını, bu nedenle metafizik önermeler gibi insan deneyimleri hakkında yargı taşıyan önermelerin evrensel geçerlilik iddialarının temelsiz olduğunu söyler.

Hume bunu biraz sesli söylemiş olacak ki kanalın öteki yakasında, Königsberg’de, Immanuel Kant’ı dogmatik uykusundan uyandırır. Kant tehlikenin farkına varır. Metafiziğe ait önermelerin, ahlak yasalarının deneysel dünyaya ait yargılardan oluştuğunu, eğer zorunluluk koşulu temellendirilemez ise evrensel bağlayıcı ahlak normlarından bahsedilmeyeceğini, dolayısı ile Hristiyan ahlakının da temelden çökeceğini anlar. Aklın eleştirisine girilerek insan anlayışının kategorilerinin deneyden bağımsız olarak bilginin formunu belirlediğini, bilginin içeriğinin duyular üzerinden edinildiğini ancak aklımızın deneye önsel kategorileri (kavramlar) vasıtasıyla şekil kazandırılıp düzenlendiğini söyler. Ama bilginin sadece deneysel (fenomenal) dünya ile sınırlı olabileceğini, deney ötesi alana, numenal dünyaya, kendinde şeylerin dünyasına dair bilginin mümkün olmayacağını söyler. Bu son hüküm Tanrıyı bilgi yoluyla kanıtlama konusunda oldukça fazla mesai harcamakla maruf rasyonalizmin pek hoşuna gitmez. Tanrı inancı olan birinden bunu beklememişlerdir. O ise savunma hattını biraz geri çekmenin zorunlu olduğunu farkındır. Bilgiye sınırlar koyup inanca yer açtığını söyler. Ruhun ölümsüzlüğünü, Tanrının varlığını ve insan özgürlüğünü çürütmek mümkün olmadığına göre bunları postulat olarak koymasını engelleyecek bir durum da olmadığını belirterek ahlak yasasını bu varsayımlar üzerine inşa eder.

İşte Nietzsche bu modern Avrupa’nın kriz anına denk gelmiştir. Son kitabı *Ecce Homo*’yu (*İşte İnsan*) şu cümlelerle bitirir: “Anlaşıldım mı? – Çarmıha gerilene karşı *Dionysos*.” Yani kendisini anlamak için Dionysos’ta ve çarmıha gerilmiş olanda sembolleşmiş değerleri anlamamızı salık verir. Nietzsche’nin bu kitabı her bakımdan çok ilginç olan felsefi bir öz yaşam öyküsüdür. Kitabın Önsöz’ünde her felsefenin esasen filozofun bir yaşam öyküsü olduğunu ifade eder. O halde bu, filozofların ahlak sistemleri olarak açıkladıkları şeylerin nihayetinde daha geniş anlamda kendi kendilerini korumaları için gerekli olan araçlardan başka bir şey olmadığı anlamına gelir. Başka bir şekilde ifade etmek gerekirse, Nietzsche’ye göre her felsefe, her ahlak sistemi aslında yazarının psikolojisini açığa vurmaktadır. Nietzsche bu nedenle kendi felsefisini bir öz yaşam öyküsü olarak sunmaktan çekinmez.

Nietzsche’yi birkaç cümleyle tanımlamak gerekirse, onun kendi benlik algısına başvurmamız daha uygun olur: Nietzsche kendisini, insanın onurunu korum ve onun

hayatının ve biricik evi niteliğinde olan dünyanın (tüm varoluş anlamında dünyanın) mutlak masumiyetini tesis etme gibi ‘tarihsel’ görevleri üstlenmiş bir şövalye-filozof olarak görüyor gibidir. Bu bağlamda onun felsefesinde *asalet* kavramı, insanın Batı metafiziğinin / Hristiyan ahlakının boyunduruğunu kırarak tekrar tesis ettiği özgürlüğünün bir gereği olarak, varoluşunun sorumluluğunu üstlenmekten kaçınmayan, ona sıkı sıkıya sarılan bir karaktere, bir kişiliğe, insan olgunluğuna işaret eder. Neyin sorumluluğudur bu? Evet, bilimdeki gelişmeler Hristiyan kozmolojisinin sonunu getirmiştir. İnsanlar Hristiyan ahlakını boyunduruğundan kurtulmuş görünüyorlar. İnsan şimdi bir yol kavşağında durmaktadır. Eski değerler hızla hükmünü yitirirken yeni değerler henüz belirlenmiş değildir. Nietzsche’ye göre insan ancak yeni değerler yaratarak, yeni amaçlar belirleyerek, varoluşunu bir sanat eseri misali güzelleştirip estetize ederek varoluşunun sorumluluğunu üstlenmiş olduğunu kanıtlayabilir. O halde bu sorumluluk insan varoluşunun ya da genel olarak tüm varoluşun gerekçelendirilmesi sorumluluğudur. Varoluşun ancak estetik bir temellendirmesi olabilir, diyor Nietzsche. Asalet, varoluşunu estetik olarak gerekçelendirmek isteyen insanın kendi kişiliğinde örnekleme gereken varoluşsal duruştur.

Yukarıda Nietzsche’nin kendi felsefesinin anlaşılması için Dionysos ile Çarmıha gerilmiş olan arasındaki farka işaret ettiğini söylemiştik. Dionysos Antik Grek toplumunun trajik dünya görüşünü simgeler, Çarmıha gerilen ise Sokrates’le başlayan aklın tanrısal bir kökeni olduğu varsayımını temel alan dogmatik ya da idealist Batı metafiziği ve onun ahlakını simgeler. Daha önce de değinildiği gibi Hristiyanlık ahlakının özü bu dünyanın, insan hayatının ve insan bedeninin lanetlenmiş olduğu temel fikri üzerine kuruludur. Kısacası aklın kutsallığına dayanılarak çıkarılan yolda insana dair ne var ise hor görülmüş. İnsanın evrimsel gelişiminin bir ürünü olan akıl insanın kendisine karşı dönmüş, insanı kendisine yabancılaştırmış, şimdi içinden çıktığı bedene tiksintiyle bakar hale gelmiştir.

Nietzsche, Batı felsefesi ve ahlakının insan gerçekliğine ilişkin bu yanlış kavrayışlarıyla insanı kölece bir varoluşa mahkûm ettiğini düşünür. Bu ahlakın yaptığı en nihayetinde insanlığı ve yeryüzünü alçaltmaktan başka bir şey değildir. Onlar insanlığı kendi yanılısamalarının kölesi olmaya zorladılar. Tanrı, hakikat,

adalet, eşitlik, ahlaki dünya düzeni gibi şatafatlı sözlere sığınıp insanlığı küçük gördüler, bedeni kirli diye lanetlediler; kısaca, yaşamın kendisini yadsıdılar. Bu şekilde nesiller boyunca sayısız insan batı metafiziğinin ahlak fırınında yakacak odun misali heba edildi. Nietzsche'ye göre tüm bu yanılsamanın ardında belli bir insan tipinin iradesi yatmaktadır. Bu tip, çileci, münzevi rahiptir. Tarih boyunca farklı çağlardan ve kültürlerden rahipler, söz konusu kültürlerin değer yaratıcıları olarak kendi hayatta kalma koşullarını en uygun şekilde temsi ettiğini düşündükleri 'ideal dünya'lar tasarlamış, buna uygun hedefler belirleyerek, insanlara davranış kodları dayatmışlardır. İradelerini, uydurdukları 'hakikat' cübbesi altında gizlemişler ve insanları istedikleri gibi yönetmişlerdir. İnsanları biçimlendirmiş, yaşamı şekillendirmiş ve vicdanları rahat bir şekilde insanlığa savaş açmışlardır.

Nietzsche'ye göre, batı metafiziğinin insan gerçekliğini yansıtmayan özne anlayışı, batı felsefesinin tüm yanılsamalarının merkezinde yer alır. Bu metafizik insanı esas olarak rasyonel, akıl varlığı temelinde ele almış ve içgüdüler, arzular, tutkular, eğilimler gibi tüm bedensel güçleri ise göz ardı etmiştir. Dahası, akılı mantıksal bir büyüklük ya da bir mantık varlığı olarak adeta insanoğlunun mükemmel ve evrensel özü mahiyetinde bir şey olarak var saymıştır. Akla atfettiği ulvilik ile onun bedeninin tutku ve arzuları üzerindeki mutlak hakimiyetini meşru görmüştür. Beden ise fiziksel dünyaya ait, bayağı, kirli bir şey olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu görüşe göre insanoğlu akıl sayesinde dış dünyanın ve ilahi dünya düzeninin bilgisini elde edebilir. Öte yandan duyular aklın berraklığına, keskinliğine engel olurlar. Hal böyle olunca bedeninin akla mutlak olarak itaat etmesi ve onun irrasyonel, hayvani arzu ve dürtüleri aklın sıkı denetimi altında tutulması gerekli görülmüştür. Batı metafiziği bu tür varsayımlarla birtakım ilahi varlıklar ve ilahi dünya düzenleri üretmiştir. Aklın yasalarına, yani ahlak yasalarına sıkı sıkıya uyulduğu takdirde insanoğlu kurtuluşa erebilecektir. Bu şekilde, aklın beden üzerindeki zorbalığı ile, dinin, ahlak yasalarının insanlar üzerindeki zorbalığı bir arada yürütülmüştür. Bu anlayış esas olarak gerçek dünyanın varlık düzeni üzerine mantıksal dünyanın varlık kategorilerini empoze etmiştir. Mantık varlığı, entitesi olarak tasarladığı akıldan hareket ederek özdeşlik ve eşitlik kavramlarını icat etmiştir. Bu ideal özdeşlik kavramı ile insanlar ve eşyalar arasındaki tüm farklılıkları silmiştir.

Nietzsche'ye göre bu hatanın ana kaynağı dilimizdir. Bu, filozofun ortaya çıkışından önce, daha sonra oynayacakları geniş bir ilkel metafizik havuzuna zaten sahip olduğumuz anlamına gelir. Bu dil metafiziği nasıl işliyor? Nietzsche dilin gelişimine evrimsel bir açıklama getirir. İnsan dilinin kökeni öznenen, Ben'den gelen şeylere teşmil edilmiş adlardan oluştuğunu, her yerde fail ve edimlerini gördüğünü söyler. İnsan, yaşam için, iletişim için vazgeçilmez ve kaçınılmaz bir yanlışlama olan sabitlemeye başvurur. İnsan, dilinin yapısı gereği hep metafizik alanda kalacaktır. Böylece Nietzsche, insanın yaşam uğruna, kendini evinde hissetmek için insan merkezli (*antropocentric*) bir dünya düzeni yaratma çabasının kök nedenini, psikolojisini verir. Ve kemikleşmiş kelimeler, şeyler, eylemler, failer olarak dilde kendini gösteren bu psikoloji, belirli kategorilerdeki gramatik işlemleriyle filozofların inşa etmek için ilgili kavramları topladıkları bir havuz sağlar.

Nietzsche, “akıl, mantık ve kategorilerin” oluşumunu zorunlu kılan şeyin “ihtiyaç” olduğunu, ancak bunun bilmeye yönelik bir ihtiyaç değil yaşam için çevrenin koşullarını kayıt altına almaya yönelik bir ihtiyaç olduğunu ifa eder. Hesaplanabilirlik ya da anlaşılabilirlik tahakküm amacıyla, yani yaşamın hizmetindeki yararları için istenmektedir. Akılda deneyden bağımsız bir şey yoktur. Algılanan şeyleri “hesaplanabilir”, yönetilebilir kılmak için “şeyleri kaba bir şekilde” farklılıklarından sıyrarak alan ve onları diğer benzer şeylerle “eşit” kılan zorunluluktur. Böylece, sürekli hayatta kalma mücadelesi veren insan aklı, bu zorunluluk altında dilin mantıksal varlıklarını icat etmiştir.

Nietzsche müdahalesiyle tarihin akışını değiştirmek istemektedir. Bilimsel gelişmelerin sürekli büyüyen dalgaları altında eski değerlerin tapınağı yıkılır ve insanoğlu eski değerlerin tahakkümünden kurtulur. Şimdi bir yol ayrımında olan insanın asil bir duruş sergileyip insani yücelik için mi çabalayacağı, yoksa yeni boyunduruk peşinde mi koşacağı kendisine kalmış bir durumdur. Nietzsche için Batı dünyasının semalarını kaplayan nihilizm karşısında bir duruş sergilemesi bir ölüm kalım meselesi gibi görünür. Nietzsche için belirleyici hamle nihilizmin ötesine geçmek, nihilizmin asıl kaynağı olan idealizmi ya da dogmatizmi reddetmek ve “hakikatini”, “haklılığını” çatışma halindeki güçlerin trajik etkileşiminden üreten, yaşamın ilerletilmesi için bilimlerin yöntemini ve estetiğin değerlendirme ölçütlerini

kullanan dünya görüşlerinin sürekli mücadelesinin varlığında bulan yeni bir insan gerçekliğini kabul etmektir.

Nietzsche, *güç istenci* kavramıyla batı metafiziğinin özne kavramında tamamen farklı bir özne kavramı geliştirir. O, geleneksel filozofların aksine beden ruh ikiliğini kabul etmez ve önceliği bedene verir. Darwin'den sonra Nietzsche'nin de evrim teorisine uygun olarak insanı hayvani kökenlerinden hareketle ele alması, bu çerçevede bilinci bedene kıyasla sonra gelişen bir özellik olarak görmesi şaşırtıcı değildir. Ona göre beden bizim büyük aklımızdır ve yaşam perspektifinden bakıldığında bilince kıyasla daha özsel bir işlevselliğe sahiptir. Şimdi tüm canlı organizmalar, her biri bir kuvvet büyüklüğüne karşılık gelen güç istenci olarak kabul edilir. Ancak kuvvetlerin nicelikleri arasındaki farklar niteliksel bir farkı yansıtır. Tüm güçlerin birbirleri üzerinde etkileri vardır ve bu nedenle sürekli bir rekabet ve mücadele halindedirler. İnsanoğlu söz konusu olduğunda, her bir kuvvet büyüklüğü farklı bir bilinç düzeyine karşılık gelir. Güç istencinin özelliği tahakküm, büyüme, gücünü artırma, kendini aşma gibi edimlerde ifadesini bulur. Güç istenci olarak her organizma gücünü artırmak, çevresini tahakküm etmek ve asimile etmek ister.

Nietzsche her bireyi bir kader olarak tasvir eder ve bu birey, özgür iradeye sahip geleneksel metafiziğin bireyi değildir. Geleneksel anlayışta bireyler toplum içinde ezelden yetkin olarak yaratılmış ayrı atomlar misali varlıklar olarak resmedilir ve mutlak anlamda özgür iradeye sahip varlıklar olarak eylemlerinden tamamen sorumlu kabul edilirler. Ancak Nietzsche'nin güç istenci kavramına göre bireyler bütün (toplum) içinde birbiriyle zorunlu bağlantı içinde olan, birbirleri üzerinde sürekli olarak etkide bulunan güç kuantumlarıdır. Birey bütünden ayrı düşünülemez. Ve bütünün (dünyanın) dışında başkaca bir varlık olmadığı için bütün hakkında bir yargıda bulunacak bir otorite de yoktur. O halde hayat mutlak anlamda masumdur, birey masumdur. Ancak, daha önce de söylendiği gibi, bireyler ayrı atomlar değildir. Bütünün içindeki tüm güçler birbirine bağımlıdır ve bu da bireyin dış dünyasının (insan, toplum ve fiziksel dünya) bireysel varlığın kurucu bir parçası olduğu, yani dış dünyanın bireyin genişletilmiş bir bedeni olduğu anlamına gelir. Bireysel beden politik bir yapı olarak görülür ve insan toplumsal bir varlık olarak görülür, onun da uyum içinde. Dolayısıyla, Nietzsche bedeni uyumlu bir organizma, aynı güç



istencinin yönetimi altında bir güçler çokluğu olarak tasvir eder. Aynı şekilde, bir organizma olarak görülen bir toplum, bir güç istenci ve onun içinde hareket eden tüm güçler aynı istencin bir parçası olarak uyumlu bir şekilde hareket etme imkanına sahiptir. Bu, her güç istencinin mutlaka uyumlu bir birlik olduğu anlamına gelmez. Bu sadece onun kapasitesini, potansiyelini gösterir ya potansiyelini gerçekleştirir ya da bunun altında kalır. Bu husus elbette kendi içindeki rekabet halinde bulunan güçlerin koordinasyonuna bağlıdır.

Beden, hiç farkına varmadan gerçekleşen muazzam bir olaylar çokluğuna ev sahipliği yapar. Ancak bu organize bütün, işlevlerinin çoğunu bilincin herhangi bir müdahalesi olmadan yerine getirir. Evrim teorisi dikkate alındığında bilinç, duyu organları, içgüdüler, dürtüler ve arzular da dahil olmak üzere diğer bedensel işlevler açısından oldukça geç bir olgudur. Nietzsche'nin bilinçdışı yaptığı vurgu sebepsiz değildir. Filozoflar binlerce yıl boyunca duyuları aldatıcı ve kötü olarak görmüşlerdir. Bununla birlikte, insanoğlunun hayvansal boyutunun daha öncel, daha temel olduğu ve farkına varalım ya da varmayalım, yaşamın neredeyse tüm hayatı işlevlerinin bedeninin bilinçdışı güçleri tarafından yerine getirildiği açıktır.

Nietzsche fizyolojiyi belirleyici temel, psikolojiyi ise yalnızca fizyolojik boyutta olup bitenlerin bir semptomu, bu temelin bir işaret dili olarak görür. Bu nedenle bedenden hareket ederek onu bir kılavuz olarak kullanmak gerektiğini söyler. Beden ruhu kıyasla çok daha karmaşık, zengin bir olgudur. Bedenin fiziksel olanla akrabalığı sayesinde bir organizma fiziksel dünyada hayatta kalabilir. Kendini koruması ve büyümesi ancak bedeninin doğanın bir parçası olmasıyla mümkündür. Her organizma, organik gelişimi, yani evrimi sayesinde, çevresine hükmetmesini ve onu özümsemesini sağlayan ustalık (çeşitli yetenekler) kazanır. Bu yetilerden biri de "izlenimlerin" koordinasyonu ve bilincine varma olarak başlayan bilinçtir.

Nietzsche'ye göre çokluk ya da çoğulluk, özel olarak bir organizma olan güç istencinin ve genel olarak ise oluş halindeki dünyanın temel özelliğidir. Bütünü meydana getiren bu çokluktur, ancak kendinde bir bütün, parçalardan ayrı ve onları önceleyen bir bütün yoktu; yani orijinal birlik, orijinal bütün diye bir şey yoktur. Her şey ebediyen oluş ve kaostur. Birlik (yani birey, kültür, devlet, toplum) çokluktan

kaynaklanır. Çokluğu onun özüdür. Ancak bu birliğin sağlam, sağlıklı bir birlik olabilmesi için bu çokluğun uyumu esastır. Nietzsche'nin 'üslup' ya da 'büyük üslup' dediği şey budur.

Yine belirtmeliyiz ki Nietzsche'nin insan bilinciyle ilgili dogmatik açıklamalara yönelttiği eleştiri, onun irrasyonelliği ya da sansüalizmi savunduğu anlamına gelmez. Aksine, geleneksel batı metafiziğini (dogmatizm) entelektüel dürüstlük göstermemekle suçlar ve onun bilimsel yöntemle hiçbir ilgisi olmayan inançtan türetilmiş 'hakikat' (*truth*) anlayışını eleştirir. Muhaliflerini bir yandan bilimin yöntemini kabul etmeye ve dogmatizmi terk etmeye, diğer yandan da insan kapasitelerini bütünüyle görmeye ve yaşamın gelişmesi için gerekli olan tüm bedensel güçlerin önemini kabul etmeye davet eder. Bu çerçevede onun hakikat anlayışının geleneksel metafiziğin hakikat anlayışından farklı olmasına şaşırılmaması gerekir.

Daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi, insan bedeni çok sayıda dürtü, arzu, tutku, çok sayıda eğilim barındırır ve bunların her biri bir kuvvet büyüklüğünü temsil eder. Bu kuvvetler dinamiktir; büyür veya küçülürler. Bu güçler baskın olmak için birbirleriyle sürekli rekabet halindedir. Daha önce de belirttiği üzere, yalnızca bu güçlerin uyumu sağlıklı bir birliği ortaya çıkarır. Dolayısıyla, bu birlik ve güçlerin uyumu da dinamiktir, sürekli oluşum halindedir, değişime, gelişmeye ve yozlaşmaya açıktır. Yine de bu dinamizmin kendisi, dahilde kuvvetlerin savaşı insanın kendini aşmasının, gelişmesinin imkânının ta kendisidir. Sürekli değişim halinde olan güçlerin kuantumuna uygun olarak, güçlerin mücadelesinin sonucuna göre şekillenen 'barış', 'uzlaşma' durumları da değişir. Nietzsche'ye göre, insan, ancak içsel güçlerin bu deneyimlemesi ve mücadelesi ile gücünün ve zayıflıklarının ayırıcısına varır. Dolayısıyla, ancak farklılıklara uyum içinde saygı göstererek, ancak bir birlik içinde her bir güce (çokluğa) gereken adil davranışı göstererek ve tam da bunun gereği olarak farklılıklara bir birlik (hayali mantıksal birlik, eşitlik) dayatmayarak yaşam tüm gücünü, tüm yaratıcı yeteneklerini kullanabilir.

İdealizm bir başka hata daha yapmaktadır. Birey içinde sahte bir birlik, akıl ya da ego ile özdeşleştirdiği mantıksal bir birlik ilan ettikten sonra, bu birliği ve özdeşliği

tüm insanlara aktarmak için harekete geçer. Bunu da ancak insanı farklılıkların kaynağı olan tüm özelliklerinden sıyrarak yapabilir. Böylece, ilk adımda bireyin basitleştirilmesi (aklın mantıksal bir varlığı olarak) ve ikinci adımda bu basitleştirilmiş bireyin evrenselleştirilmesi hataları işlenmiş olur.

Nietzsche'nin yeni öznellik anlayışı ile, yani güç istenci ile birlikte bilginin oluşumu süreci ve anlamı da değişmiştir. Öncelik duylara ve bedene verilmiştir. İnsanların kararlarının çoğu bedeninin bilinçsiz dürtüleri tarafından alınmakta ve bu kararların sadece belirli bir kısmı bilincimiz tarafından bilinmektedir. Bu nedenle, Kant tarafından öne sürülen aklın kategorilerinin bilgimizin evrenselliğini güvence altına aldığı, yani hakikate ulaşmanın mümkün olduğu iddiası geçerliliğini yitirmiştir. Bilgi, bedenimizin estetik değerlendirmesinin bir sonucudur. Nesnel bilgi diye bir şey yoktur ve dışarıda, bir yerlerde saklı duran gerçekler yoktur ve bu nedenle de hakikat keşfedilmeyi bekleyen bir olgu değildir. Bilmek her zaman perspektifle koşulludur ve olgular yoktur ama olguların perspektif temelli yorumları vardır. Nesnellik, yalnızca rakip perspektiflerin karşı karşıya gelmesiyle elde edilen bir uzlaşmayı ifade eder. Bir nesne ne kadar farklı perspektiften görülürse nesneye dair bilgimiz o derece yetkinleşir. Bu nedenle her tekil perspektifinde hakikat bilgisinin oluşumuna katkısı engellenmemelidir.

Bilgi estetik bir olgudur ve bir sanat eseri gibi biçimlendirilir. Bilgi, canlı organizmanın en iyi şekilde hayatta kalabildiğini düşündüğü koşulların, kendini güvende ve güçlü hissettiği koşulların işaret dilidir. Ayrıca insan geçmişin ve geleceğin bilincindedir ve amaçlar ve hedefler olmadan varlığını sürdüremez ve bu amaçlar ve hedefler ideal bir dünya, bir dünya görüşü, bir değerler paradigması olarak oluşturulur ve daha sonra kategoriler, kalıplar olarak insan değerlendirmelerinin ölçütleri olarak hizmet eder. İdeal dünyanın yaratılması estetik bir yaratımdır, insanın metafiziksel bir inşasıdır. Başka bir deyişle, hakikatlerimiz bizim yaratımlarımızdır ve bunlar da algılanan gerçekliği yorumladığımız kategoriler, değerler olarak hizmet eder. Bu nedenle, bilgimiz sadece bir sanatçının yaratımı olarak ve sadece yaşamın hizmetinde bir anlam ifade edebilir. Bilgi kendi başına bir olgu değildir; hakikat de dışarıda keşfedilecek bir şey değil, güç istencinin çevresiyle mücadelesinin bir ürünüdür. Nietzsche'ye göre hakikat, insanoğlunun

onsuz yapamayacağı bir tür hatadır. Yine ona göre tüm metafizik düşüncenin temelini oluşturan da bu hakikat kavramıdır. Hakikat kavramının eleştirisi ve genel olarak beden estetik yargılarına anlağın/akılın sözde kategorilerine göre öncelik atfedilmesiyle birlikte, artık *sanat*, insanın gerçek metafizik etkinliği haline gelmiştir. Nietzsche, “bilinçli olmanın” ille de “içgüdüsel olanın” “karşıtı” olmak anlamına gelmediğini iddia eder. Bilgi, yaşamın geliştiği, yaşamın tatmin bulduğu uygun koşulların bilgisi olarak ortaya çıkar. Bu nedenle, Nietzsche'ye göre, asıl soru bir yargının doğruluğu ya da yanlışlığı değil, onun yaşama ne şekilde faydalı olduğudur. İnsan bilgisi bu ölçütlerin imbiğinden geçerek birikir.

Nietzsche hakikat tanımını şu soruyu yanıtlıyarak verir: Yargı nedir? Yargı bir şeyi bildiğimize dair inancımızdır. Ancak bir şeyi “bildiğimize” dair bu inanç, bir güç hissinden kaynaklanır, bu keyfi, kaprisli bir inanç değildir. Başka bir şekilde ifade edecek olursak, burada gerçekten “bildiğimize” dair bir “inanç” olarak hakikat güç hissi üreten fiziksel bir durumun işaret dilidir. Bu, hakikatin insandan bağımsız olarak, gerçekliğin içinde yatan ve keşfedilmeyi bekleyen bir şey olarak düşünülemeyeceği anlamına gelir. Hakikat, tek ölçütü güç duygusu olan insanın sürekli bir yaratımıdır.

Güç hissi ancak canlı organizmanın tam bir oluş (kaos) halinde olan çevresinde maruz kaldığı sürekli mücadele sayesinde ortaya çıkar. Yani, sadece geçici bir dinamik dengeye izin veren sürekli bir güçler oyunu gerçekleşir. Sadece dış dünya ile ilişki içinde ve sadece organizmanın bakış açısından hakikat yaratılır. Bu sürekli mücadeleden, canlı organizmanın yaşam koşullarını iyileştiren deneyiminin kaydından başka bir şey olmayan bilgi ortaya çıkar. Bilgi, hakikat, insanın aktif olarak yarattığı şeyin ifadesi, yansımasıdır.

Hakikat sürekli akış halinde, sürekli oluş halinde olan bir şeyi sabitlemek, “dayanıklı” kılmaktır. Dolayısıyla daha en başından ve kaçınılmaz olarak bir “yanlış” ve “yanılsama”dır. Ancak bu, insanın vazgeçemeyeceği bir yanlış, bir yanılsamadır. Nietzsche yaşam açısından hakikati ‘yanlış’, yanılsama olarak tanımlar.

Şimdi, özünde 'yanlış' olan bir dünyada, biz insanlar yaşamak için kendimize ‘doğru’ bir dünya inşa etmek zorundayız. Ve bu ‘hakiki dünyaya’, onun hakikatine bağlı

kalmak zorundayız ve bu ‘bağlılık’, ‘sadakat’ bizim doğruluğumuz, ahlaklılığımızdır. Başka bir deyişle, inşa ettiğimiz ‘gerçek dünya’ bizim için yaşamın koşuludur ve bu ‘gerçek dünyaya’ sadık kalmak bizim ‘iyi’imiz, ahlakımızdır. Bu, insan yaşamının toplumsal özelliğinden kaynaklanan bir gerçektir. İnsanlar Nietzsche'nin terimleriyle “sürü hayvanları” olarak yaşarlar. Nietzsche ahlaktan, metafizik yapmaktan kaçınılamayacağını açıkça kabul eder. Bu, vazgeçemeyeceğimiz hayatta kalma olasılığımızın ta kendisidir. Ancak Nietzsche'nin bu kabulünde gözden kaçırılmaması gereken niteliksel bir fark olduğunu görmek gerekir. Dogmatik bakış açısına göre, yaşam ahlakın, hakikatin hizmetinde olarak görülür. Başka bir deyişle, kurgusal ‘hakiki dünyamızın’ gerçek, ‘sahte’ dünyamızdan kesinlikle daha değerli olduğuna inanılır, bu da yanılısamalarımıza tapındığımız ve gerçek hayatımızı küçümsediğimiz anlamına gelir. Oysa olması gereken ‘hakikati’ ya da ‘ahlaki’ yaşamın hizmetinde birer araç olarak görmektir. Yani, ‘hakikatler’ ve ahlaklar mutlak bir değere sahip değildir; bunlar temelde geçici olarak doğru varsayılan hatalardır.

Geleneksel şekilde anlaşılan hakikat bir hata, bir yanılısama ise o zaman Nietzsche hakikat kavramından tamamen vaz mı geçiyor diye sormamız meşrudur. Durum böyle değildir; Nietzsche bunun yerine yeni bir nesnellik, hakikat anlayışı önerir. Ancak bizi en başından itibaren nesnellikten kastının “saf” bilme, “kendinde bilgi” olmadığı için çıkardan yoksun bir nesnellik olmadığı konusunda uyarır. Gördüğümüz gibi, Nietzsche için tüm değerlemeler zorunlu olarak değer yükliüdür. Dolayısıyla ona göre, her nesnellik iddiası, her bilgi iddiası, her hakikat iddiası, iddia sahibinin çıkarını hesaba katmak zorundadır.

Perspektivizm kavramı Nietzsche'nin hakikat anlayışının özünü oluşturur. Nietzsche için yalnızca aktif bir yorumlayıcı güç aracılığıyla görülen bir perspektif vardır. Dışarıda hiçbir gerçek yoktur; sadece yorumlarımız vardır. Ve bu yorumlama aynı zamanda aktif bir yaratım, sürekli bir oluş, sürekli bir kendini aşmadır. İnsan için “bilmek” aynı zamanda bir “yapmaktır”. İnsan sürekli olarak kendini ve dünyasını yaratır; bu sürekli yaratma bilgide de ifadesini bulur; bilgi bir anlamda onun kendini aşmasının bir yansıması ve aynı zamanda bir ilkesidir. Bilgi aracılığıyla kendisine ve dünyaya şekil verir. Belirleyici olan şey güç hissi, büyüme, gücün artması, yani

yaşamın kendisidir. Bilgi, organizmanın gücünün tadını çıkardığı koşulların bilgisidir; kendine güven duygusunun sonucu olarak hissedilen haz olan neşe, bir organizmanın her gerçeğine eşlik eder. Dolayısıyla bilginin oluşumunda iradenin ortadan kaldırılmasını talep etmek, aklın iğdiş edilmesinden başka bir anlama gelmez. Bilgi için verdiğimiz mücadele, yaşam için verdiğimiz mücadelenin sadece bir yansımasıdır.

Bu dünya, her biri bir güç kuantumu, bir güç istenci olan insanlardan oluşur ve farklı güç kuantumları farklı bilinçlere, farklı bakış açılarına ve farklı yorumlara karşılık gelir. Ve bu yorumlar arasında sürekli bir mücadele vardır; bu rekabet kişinin gücünü zayıflatabilir veya arttırabilir. Nesnellik, hakikat bu rekabet halindeki yorumların optimumundan, uyumundan başka bir şey değildir. Nietzsche, bir nesneyi ne kadar çok göz görürse, onun hakkındaki bilgimizin o kadar “tam”, o kadar nesnel hale geldiğini söyler. Bu, ötekinin gözlerini hayatımızın zenginleşmesi için bir imkân haline getirir. Dolayısıyla mümkün olan her yorum hayatımız için değerlidir. Bu bakımdan her başka güç, her başka birey aynı zamanda sağlığımızı, gücümüzü artırma olasılığıdır. Nietzsche'nin bir yandan perspektivizmde ısrar etmesi, diğer yandan nesnelliğe vurgu yapması onun asıl niyetini ortaya koyar. Kişisel çıkarla harmanlanmış her yorumun biricikliğine yapılan vurgu, bireyin hakkını ima eder/garanti altına alır. Ancak aynı zamanda herhangi bir karşılıklı etkileşimin perspektifsel karakteri, onun sınırlılığını ve taraflılığını gösterir. Bu nedenle, ‘eşitlik’ ya da aklın özdeşliği/aynılığı bayrağı altında, benlik içinde tek bir kapasitenin tiranlığını uygulamak ve/veya benlik dışında tek bir perspektifi, yani evrensel (ahlaki) yasa olarak topluma dayatmak, yaşamın kendisinin olumsuzlanmasından başka bir şey olmayacaktır.

Nesnellik, bir gerçeğin anlamı, rakip güçlerin sürekli savaşının ortak bir ürünü, serbest oyunun bir sonucudur. Fikirlerin/bakış açıların/yorumların bu sürekli savaşı, nesnelğin ya da gerçeğin tam da zeminidir/koşuludur. Dolayısıyla, bu rekabet halindeki güçlerden herhangi birini herhangi bir nedenle engellemek yaşamın gelişmesini engellemek olacaktır. Sadece özgür bir oyunda, rakip güçler kendilerini ifade edebilir ve birbirlerini meşru bir şekilde kontrol edebilirler.

Filozoflar kozmik bir dünya düzeni ve buna bağılı olarak bir dünya görüşü, kendi insan anlayışları temelinde bir değerler sistemi öngörmüşlerdir. Bu değerler, bu dünya görüşleri daha sonra insanlara, bedenlerine, karakterlerine, kişiliklerine, kısacası bir bütün olarak yaşamlarına biçim veren kalıplar ve şablonlar olarak hizmet eder. Nietzsche, Batı metafiziğinin yanlış bir insan kavrayışından yola çıkarak, insana ve yaşama zarar veren yanlış değerlere ulaştığı görüşündedir. Bu ahlak anlayışları, paradigmlar insan yaratımları olduğu için vadede değışmeye açıktırlar.

Her ideal dünya, “hakiki dünya” tasavvuru bir girişimdir, kaosu kozmosa dönüştürme denemesidir. İnsanoğlu yaşamına, varoluşuna anlamlar ve amaçlar yükleyerek yaşamını olumlar. Bu şekilde gücünden, güvenliğinden ve gelişmesinden emin olur. Yukarıda da söylediğimiz gibi her ideal dünya anlayışı bir paradigma, bir değerler sistemidir. Bu idealler, bu değerler, insanın sürekli olarak kendisini ve dünyasını yarattığı kalıplar ve şablonlar olarak hizmet eder. Bunlar, deyim yerindeyse, insan yaşamının, insan varoluşunun mimari ya da kozmolojik kategorileridir. Nietzsche ‘hakiki dünya’ paradigmasının kökeninin ‘çileci idealler’ dediği şeye dayandırır.

Nietzsche metafizik, ahlak, din ve bilim tarafından önerilen paradigmların, ‘hakiki dünya’ tasavvurlarının esasen birer sanat eseri olduğunu söyler. O yalnızca kendi önerdiği paradigmanın güzel bir sanat eseri olduğu ve örneğın metafizik ve din tarafından önerilenlerin sanat eseri olmadığı iddiasında bulunmaz. Ona göre, bu tür paradigmları, “kozmojik değerleri” öneren düşünürler sanatçıdır. Ancak bu sanat eserlerinin “izleyicisi” de, bunlardan birini benimsediği ölçüde sanatçıya dönüşür. Çünkü benimseme eylemiyle onu özümser, dünyayı kendisi için yeniden üretir ve onu kendi malı, kendi sanat eseri haline getirir.

Nietzsche sanatçı ve izleyici bakış açıları arasındaki farka özel bir vurgu yapar. Sanat eserinin izleyici açısından değil, sanatçı açısından değerlendirilmesi gerektiğinde ısrar eder. Çünkü sanatçıda güç istenci olumlayıcı durumdadır. Sanatçı yaratıcıdır ve yaratıcı olarak yaratma eyleminden haz duyar. Bu sevinç duygusuyla, ki bu aynı zamanda onun güç duygusudur, sanatçı yaratıcı olarak yaşamı olumlar.

Nietzsche, güç istenci anlayışıyla sanatçı bir filozofun trajik açıklamasını sağladığını düşünür. Her eserin itici gücü olan dürtü, güç iradesinin kendi bünyesinde. Yakıtını eserinde kullanır. Nietzsche şöyle diyor: Sanatın önkoşulu esrime (sarhoşluk, *intoxication*) duygusudur. Tüm bedeni harekete geçirebilecek güç olarak esrime olmadan yaratıcılık, sanat olmaz. Esrimede esas taşma hissidir, dolmuş bir pınarın, bolluk içindeki bir şeyin taşması gibi, bollaşıp taşan bir güç hissidir harekete geçirici olan. Bu durumda kişi temasta olduğu şeye bolluğunu aktarır, onları kendini kabule zorla ve başkalaştırır, idealleştirme bu durumda ortaya çıkar. Sanatçının yansıttığı esasen kendi gücü ve “mükemmelliği”dir. Kısaca sanat bu “mükemmelleştirme ihtiyacı”na verilen addır.

Nietzsche tüm eserleri boyunca sürekli olarak savaşımlardan, çatışmalardan, düşmanlardan; Hıristiyanlığa karşı savaştan, ruhların savaşından; trajik bilginin savaşından, dostunun, hatta kendisinin düşmanı olmaktan bahseder. Modern çağın pek çok düşünüründe ‘eşitlik’, ‘özdeşlik’, ‘birlik’, ‘barış’ vb. kavramlar ön plandaysa, Nietzsche'nin düşüncesinde ise ‘savaş’, ‘mücadele’, ‘farklılık’, ‘çokluk’ gibi kavramlar ön plana çıkar. Yazılarının satır aralarında hemen her yerde çarpışan kılıçların şingirtisi duymamak mümkün değildir. Nietzsche için dünya görüşleri arasında cereyan edecek savaşların, bireylerin ve parçası oldukları toplumların kendilerini yaratma çabalarında önemli bir rol oynadığı açıktır. Yaşam ancak bu sonsuz yüzleşmeler, mücadeleler, savaşlar sayesinde gelişebilir. Nietzsche, hakikatin, adaletin, insan yaşamının mükemmelliğinin bu savaşlar ve mücadeleler sonucunda ortaya çıktığına inanır. Savaş ve çatışmalar yaşamın temel itici güçleridir. Eğer tinsel savaşlar, dünya görüşü savaşları varsa, o zaman tinsel kılıçlar, çekiçler ve patlayıcılar da olmalıdır. Eski tapınakları ve değerleri yıkmak için patlayıcılara ihtiyaç vardır, hatta insan kendini patlayıcıya dönüştürebilir. Bu nedenle Nietzsche'nin kendini dinamit olarak tanımlaması şaşırtıcı gelmez. Platon *Devlet*'inde Atina şehri için bir düzen öneriyorsa, Nietzsche'nin de artık tüm dünya için bir düzen önerdiğini söyleyebiliriz; Zerdüş'tün gelişiyle dünya artık "büyük siyasetin" sahnesi haline gelmiştir. Büyük siyaset büyük özgürlük ve estetik kültürüdür. Büyük siyasetin kültür iklimi insanların her türlü yaratıcılıkları, kendilerini bir sanat eseri olarak yaratmaları için gerekli olan koşuldur. Burada tüm güçler açık bir rekabet içinde er meydanına çıkarlar, Burası centilmence yürütülen savaşlar alanıdır.



Nietzsche'nin felsefesinin ayırt edici özelliklerinden biri de insanlar arasındaki mutlak farklılık kavramıdır. Bu farklılık bireylerin içindeki dürtülerin çokluğuna ve toplum içinde çoklu, farklı 'benliklerin' varlığını vurgu yapar. İçsel farklılık ve çokluk kavramları, onun tüm insan eylemlerinin ve toplumsal dinamiklerin ardındaki itici güç olan güç istenci kavramının temelini oluşturur. Hem mutlak eşitlik hem de mutlak farklılık iddialarının spekülâtif olduğu açıktır. Nietzsche açıkça ikincisini tercih etmektedir. Tüm insanların temel olarak aynı olduğunu varsaymanın, onları yüce bir varlık tarafından kontrol edilen salt otomatlara indirgemek anlamına geldiğini düşünüyor olmalıdır. Farklılığa yapılan bu vurgu bizi can alıcı bir soruya götürür: bu ayrımların ne önemi vardır? Bunlar yalnızca yüzeysel farklılıklar mıdır, yoksa insan varoluşuna ilişkin temel bir gerçeği mi ortaya koymaktadır? Nietzsche için bu, tüm felsefi perspektifini şekillendirdiği için son derece önemli bir meseledir. Nietzsche'ye göre gerçek adalet, insanlar arasındaki içsel farklılıklar da dahil olmak üzere gerçekliğin olduğu gibi kabul edilmesine dayanır. Nietzsche'ye göre bu farklılıklar silinmemeli ya da görmezden gelinmemeli, aksine kabul edilmeli ve onaylanmalıdır. Bununla birlikte, farklılığa yapılan bu vurguyu ortak zeminin reddedildiği şeklinde yorumlamamak çok önemlidir. Nietzsche işbirliği ve iletişimi teşvik eden ortak deneyimlerin ortadan kaldırılmasını savunmaz. Aksine, bireysel farklılıklara saygı duyan ve bunları kutsayan açık bir toplumsallık öngörür. Nietzsche, insanlığın sosyal doğasının, yani "sürü" yönünün, zorunlu olarak ortak değerlerin oluşmasına yol açtığını savunur. Ancak bu ortak (sürü) değerler nihayetinde yetersiz kalır. Nietzsche'ye göre varlık sonsuz oluş sürecidir. Hayat da sürekli bir şekilde kendi aşarak, yenileyerek gelişip serpilir. Bu oluş sürekli olarak yeni değerlerin yaratılmasını gerektirir. Ona göre bu yeni değerler ancak insanları birbirinden ayıran farklılıklardan ortaya çıkabilir. Güç eşitsizlikleri, çıkar çatışmaları için sık sık katalizör görevi görür ve bu da rakip güçler arasındaki mücadelelerin ve savaşların zeminini oluşturur.

Nietzsche herkese kusursuz akıl ve özgür irade bahşetme fikrini reddeder ve bu sözde adaletin insan çabasının önemini ve çeşitli sorumluluklar için farklı bilişsel kapasitelerin gelişimini göz ardı ettiğini savunur. Ona göre pek çok insani yetenek ve zanaat, yalnızca bireysel düzeyde değil, aynı zamanda toplum düzeyinde de nesiller boyu birikmiş deneyimin meyveleridir. İnsanlar basitçe mantıksal varlıklar

veya boş kaplar değildir; her birey benzersiz bir deneyimler, yetenekler, bakış açıları ve tercihler tarihini bünyesinde barındırır. Dahası, toplumsal iş bölümü, nesiller boyunca aktarılan kolektif deneyimin ürünü olan çeşitli yetkinliklerin ve uzmanlıkların ortaya çıkmasını teşvik etmiştir. Yıllar süren bu adanmış çaba, kaçınılmaz bazı işlevsel 'ayrıcılıklar' ile sonuçlanmıştır ve bunların göz ardı edilmesi toplumun işleyişinde aksamayla sonuçlanır. Nietzsche, esas olarak herhangi bir çaba sarf etmeksizin kendine her türlü onura layık gören her çeşit kibre karşıdır.

Nietzsche'nin eşitlik kavramını reddederek bunun yerine her bireyin biricikliğini vurgulamasının bir nedeni de eşitlik ilkesinden hareketle 'aklın tiranlığına' geçişin sanıldığından kolay olmasıdır. İnsanlar evrensel olarak eşit görüldüğünde, yalnızca akla dayalı evrensel yasalar oluşturmak cazip hale gelir. Evrensel akıl fikrine yapılan bu vurgu, Kant'ın Tanrı da dahil olmak üzere tüm rasyonel varlıklar için geçerli ahlaki kurallar önermesini mümkün kılan şeydir. Dolayısıyla, Nietzsche felsefesinin merkezi bir yönü, Sokrates ve Platon'un fikirlerine kadar izini sürdüğü aklın tiranlığına karşı insanın biricikliğinin savunulmasıdır.

Nietzsche'ye göre, güçsüz, vasat tipin metafizik ahlakı, kendi tanımlamasıyla köle ahlakı, güçlü ya da soylu tipin varlığına stratejik bir yanıttır. Yani, zayıf tipin güçlü, asil olanın gücüyle ya da daha genel olarak hayatın zorlukları ile başa çıkması (ya da bunlara tepki vermesi) amacına yönelik zekice icat edilmiş bir araçtır. Şimdi, soylu tipin doğuştan gelen gücü bu çerçevede *kötü* olarak kabul edilirken, köleci tipin karakteristiği olan zayıflık, hayattan uzak durma, iyi olarak kabul edilir. Nietzsche'ye göre, metafizik ahlakın özü, güçlü tipe ve dolayısıyla yaşamın özüne yönelik hıncı (*ressentiment*) ifade etmesinde yatar. Bu ahlaki sistem, iyi ve kötünün nesnel bir hakemi olmaktan uzak, öncelikle zayıflar için bir kendini koruma stratejisi olarak işlev görür. Değerleri, idealleri ve doğruları, zayıfların en iyi şekilde gelişmeleri için gerekli koşulları temsil eder. Bununla birlikte, bu koşulların sağlanması, yaşamın genel canlılığında bir azalma gerektirir, esasen onu zayıflar için daha yönetilebilir bir hıza yavaşlatır. Sonuç olarak, yaşamın doğasında var olan dinamizmi kucaklamak yerine yaşamın zorluklarından geri çekilmeyi teşvik ederek yaşamı reddeden bir bakış açısını besler. Nietzsche bu fizyolojik tükenme durumunu çöküş (*decedance*) olarak adlandırır

Hınç (*ressentiment*) bakış açısıyla koşullanan metafizik ahlak, yaşamda temel bir eksiklik algılar. Zayıf tip, kendi varoluşunun sorumluluğunu üstlenmekten kaçınır, bunun yerine pasif bir gözlemci rolünü benimser, hayatı idealinin perspektifinden inceler ve eksik bulur. Bu çöküş ahlakı, idealini, yani Tanrısını iyinin kendisi olarak tanımlarken, paradigmasının dışındaki her şeyi kötü olarak yaftalar. Nietzsche bu yorumu şiddetle reddeder ve yaşamın eksik değil, aksine güçle dolup taşıdığını, sürekli olarak hakimiyet, bir gücünü dışa vurma çabasının sürüp gittiğini ileri sürer. Nietzsche'nin güç istenci kavramı, metafizik ahlakın temelini oluşturan eksiklik anlatısıyla taban tabana zıttır. Güç istenci olarak, insan özünün, durmaksızın kendini ifade etme, üstün gelme ve genişlemede yattığını iddia eder. Nietzsche, yaşamın ürünleri olarak değerlerin ve ideallerin yaşamın kendisini yargılayamayacağını savunur. Bu değerlerin hayatın hizmetinde olamamaları ve onun canlılığını artıramamaları, insanın kendi hayatına ve amaçlarına yabancılaşmasından kaynaklanır. Bu yabancılaşma sapkın bir sonuç doğurur. Kendini inkâra vurgu yapan çöküş ahlakı, artık güçlüler, asiller ve doğal olarak istisnai olanlar da dâhil olmak üzere herkese kendi değerlerini dayatmaya çalışmaktadır. Onlardan kendi doğalarını reddetmelerini ve zayıfların standartlarına göre hareket etmelerini talep eder.

Nietzsche'ye göre ideallerimiz ve amaçlarımız önceden var olan, ezeli gerçeklikler değil, kendi estetik yaratımlarımızdır. Bu idealler ve amaçlar, içinde en iyi şekilde geliştiğimize inandığımız koşulları temsil eder. Bunlar, etrafımızdaki dünyayı bize güç verecek ve kendimizi evimizde hissetmemizi sağlayacak tarzda şekillendiren güç istencimizin ifadeleridir. İnsan varoluşunu bu idealler vasıtasıyla ve yalnızca estetik olarak haklı çıkarır. Dolayısıyla ideallerimiz varoluşumuzu meşrulaştırma yollarımızı yansıtır.

Nietzsche'nin nihai amacı gerçekten de açıktır: hem bireyler hem de bir bütün olarak insanlık için insani yüceliği teşvik etmeye çalışır. Bu yüceliğe ulaşmak için, ahlaki veya siyasi güçler tarafından dayatılan gereksiz kısıtlamalar veya sınırlamalar olmaksızın, insan kapasitesinin her yönünün en yüksek potansiyeline kadar kullanılması gerektiğine inanır. Farklılıkları kucaklamaya yaptığı vurgu bu bağlamda anlaşılmalıdır. Bu doğrultuda Nietzsche, insan kapasitelerine haksız yere kısıtlamalar getiren her türlü ahlaki veya siyasi niyete şiddetle karşı çıkar. Onun amacı, bireyler

ve insanlık için gerçek bir özgürlük ortamı olan bir iklimin, bir kültürün tesis edilmesidir.

İnsanoğlu artık boyunduruğu kırmıştır ama anlamsız bir nihilizm dünyasıyla karşı karşıyadır. Bu nedenle yeni bir anlama ihtiyaç duymaktadırlar. Nietzsche üstinsan (*Übermensch*) kavramı ile bu anlamı önerir. Üstinsan umudun, kendini aşmanın, insanlığın geleceğini yaratmanın simgesidir. Bitmiş, önceden belirlenmiş, mükemmel bir ideal değil tam tersine, sonsuz ihtimallere açık, kestirilemez, insanın yolda yaratacağı, kendisinin de içinde olduğu bir idealdir. Yaklaşıldıkça uzaklaşan bir gökkuşağı, bir ufuk çizgisidir. İnsanın kendine güvenmekten ve her türlü eziyeti de dahil olmak üzere hayatı tüm yönleriyle olumlamaktan başka seçeneği yoktur. İnsana yakışan, yaşamının sorumluluğunu üstlenmek ve kendini ve içinde yaşadığı toplumu, insan toplumunu bir sanat eseri olarak yaratmaktır. Ancak bu şekilde varoluşun haklı çıkarabilir. Ancak asil bir duruşla güzellik elde edilebilir. Asalet, adalet ve güzellik demektir. Asil bir duruş olmadan insanın onurlu ve saygın bir yaşam sürmesinin başka bir yolu yoktur. Asalet, yaşamı olumlamak ve onu bir sanat eserine dönüştürmektir.

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