EU’S ACTORNESS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: UNEASY ALLIANCE OF NORMATIVE POWER WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE-BUILDING

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Research Article

Abstract

The success of the EU in the South Caucasus region is limited due to the lack of insufficient commitment, inefficient tools, lack of comprehensive policy design taking into account the needs and priorities of the regional actors. The EU seems to restore its image and increase its visibility in the region after the II. Karabakh War in 2020. Post-war geopolitical context necessitates a durable security-building as a result of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The EU’s efforts show that it is in the process of re-defining a pro-active role in shaping the mediation and peace-making processes. The outcome will not only determine the nature of the EU’s involvement into the region but also the efficiency of its normative power in the future.

Keywords: The EU, South Caucasus, Conflict Resolution, Peace-building, Good Governance.

Güney Kafkasya’da Bir Aktör Olarak Avrupa Birliği: Normatif Güç ile Çatışma Çözümü ve Barış İnşasının Zorlu Birlikteliği

Öz

Avrupa Birliği’nin Güney Kafkasya’da başarı yetersiz ilgisini, etkisiz araçları ve bütüncül bir siyasa yapımın olmaması sebebiyle sınırlı kalmaktadır. Bölge ülkelerinin ihtiyaç ve önceliklerinin dikkate alınmaması ile siyasal seçimlerin farklı beklentileri de bu başarısızlığı etkilemektedir. AB, Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan

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The EU is not fully successful in designing its policy towards the South Caucasus which resulted in its relative ineffectiveness, invisibility and lack of credibility. This overshadowed its normative power which could have strong potentials to have a transformative effect on both political and civil society in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It envisaged partnership and cooperation agreements which included the South Caucasian countries to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) first and then to the Eastern Partnership. While doing so, the region is treated as a holistic and homogenized entity instead of initiating tailor-made policies towards the individual countries, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The outcome and the implications of its policies are also determined by the perceptions of political leadership at the local level. In cases where, the EU is not particularly welcomed or Europeanization with reference to its normative principles are not necessarily in the agenda of the domestic actors, transformative impact of the EU remains extremely limited. Consent is the precondition for extending web of the relations that individual countries have with the EU; and commitment is essential for the implementation of the EU-designed policies. In a geographical setting like the South Caucasus security and stability are the main priorities of the foreign and domestic politics whereas the political reforms for the consolidation of democracy in the post-Soviet transformation are not necessarily considered as emergent needs.

As of 2023, the EU seems to be eager to restore its image and role in the South Caucasus particularly with reference to conflict resolution and peace-making in the region. The aim of this article is to discuss the potential role of
the EU in peace and security-building in the region with reference to the Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia by questioning its actorness not only in terms of mediating between the two parties but also by exploring its ability to assert its normative power for democratic governance. It argues that after the 2nd Karabakh War in 2020, the EU is in the process of converting an already regionalized peace-building process to an internationalized one for future security building in the region. EU re-defines and restores its actorness as a mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia challenging if not confronting with Russia and Turkey whose engagement in regional matters are much more pro-active during and after the 2nd Karabakh War. Moreover, both countries are very much enjoying regionalization of the conflict sealed by their “competitive cooperation”. In this re-definition and restoration, the EU seems not having a direct consultation with these two regional actors; reluctant to have their inclusion yet keen on not very much disturbing Russia who is occupied with its war with Ukraine. The EU, which remained rather timid but “concerned” with regards to the Karabakh conflict since its beginning reacts quite anxiously towards the Russo-Ukrainian war, shows a real engagement and strong commitment to end the Russian aggression. This resulted in the re-definition of its role in the South Caucasus through increased visits and activities of the Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia; providing roof for holding up meetings with leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. One should also add that the success of the EU in its attempt of restoring its actorness is largely dependent to the willingness of and consent shown by the ruling elite of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Their commitment will not only provide a ground for peace-making and sustain stability in the region but also may have an impact on the positionality of Russia and Turkey whose moves and attitudes have a significant impact in regional matters.

The first part of the article discusses the concept of Normative Power Europe. The second part of the article provides an overview of the EU’s policies in the South Caucasus while analyzing the content and implications of the Eastern Partnership, European Neighborhood Policy and Actions Plans. In the third part, the EU’s policies after the 2nd Karabakh War will be analyzed in terms of its outcomes. The final part explores the potential impact of these policies in building up peace and sustaining security and stability in the region and concludes with policy recommendations.

I. Normative Power Europe

The concept of “normative power Europe” introduced by Ian Manners offers an answer to the fundamental questions of what (distinctive) role is to be defined for the European Union (EU) in the world and whether the EU has strong potentials to become an effective actor in international politics. Accordingly, it attributes a norm diffusor/changer role to the EU, and this role characterizes its identity, capabilities, agenda, and actorness in the international society. Most scholars tend to find the origins of the conceptualization of the EU as normative power or of the term “normative power Europe” in François Duchêne’s description of the European Community (EC) as a “civilian power”. Duchêne suggests that the EC has differed from the two superpowers of the Cold War; it has projected a civilian form of power, which has been replacing traditional military power to exert influence in international politics. Several others later rest on Duchêne’s description, found it promising yet “unsystematic” and “vague”, to conceptualize the role of Europe in world politics. Instead, Manners identifies three primary elements in the operationalization of the term “civilian power” in the works of Kenneth J. Twitchett and Hanns W. Maull which are “the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems; and the

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His concept of “normative power Europe” revolves centrally around the normative or ideational capabilities of the EU. He states that the EU is constructed on a normative basis, characterized by the five core norms of peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by the norms of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good government. All can be considered as the basis of the good governance. He argues that “this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics”, and the EU behaves and should behave as a norm diffusor/changer in the international system/society through contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filter. Furthermore, Manners later examines the relationship between the EU’s strategy of militarization and its normative power. He argues that while its militarization has undermined the normative claims and power of the EU, the former does not necessarily lead to the weakening of the latter. In his account, if the EU acts like a great power, such as the US and China, and prioritizes “military intervention over non-military conciliation”, its militarization decreases the receptiveness of its addressees to its norm diffusion. He concludes that the sustainability of its normative power under and through militarization can only be achieved “under a UN mandate, in a critically reflexive context, on a clear, normative basis”.

Several others follow Manners’ work in operationalizing the concept of “normative power Europe”. Simon Lightfoot and Jon Burchell, for instance, employ sustainable development, one of what Manners calls four minor norms of the EU, in explaining the EU’s foreign policy. Examining how the EU acted at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, the authors show that the EU effectively championed its norm of sustainable development even in the case of other states’ harsh opposition while it did not integrate this norm and policy into a broader sustainability perspective. Similarly, Storey examines the presence of a normative agenda in the EU’s economic partnership agreements with a set of African countries.

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10 Ibid., 238.
and conclude that “normative power Europe” is in action in the negotiations of economic partnership, particularly in relation to the minor norm of good governance. He also highlights the simultaneous prioritization of neo-liberal, commercial goals of the EU, which may not “correspond to the developmental needs of African economies”. In a similar vein, examining the processes of the institutionalization of the International Criminal Court and of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurell argue that “the EU is able to fulfil its role as a normative power in a successful and credible way even if it falls short of possessing a reflexive dimension”. In so doing, they also show that the US as the “other” substantially defines the EU’s projection of its identity as a normative power.

On the other hand, several scholars criticize the concept and policy of “normative power Europe”. In the first place, a group of scholars question the empirical existence and consistency of the EU’s normative power. Michelle Pace pays attention to the constructed nature of “normative power Europe”. In her analysis of the performance, legitimacy and production of the EU’s normative power in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Pace shows that the EU’s construction of normative power “has disempowered the EU’s political role as a global actor” due to its ineffectiveness. In other words, if we employ Diez’s distinction, the EU may act as a normative power, but “whether it has normative power” is questionable. Pace does not devalue the concept of “normative power Europe” in that she argues that its successful construction would “secure a role for the EU globally and deliver ensuing gains in legitimacy for its liberal values and norms”. In a similar vein, Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme P. Herd do not find consistency in the exercise of the EU’s normative agenda. In their examination of the European-Russian relations in the case of Chechnya, the authors claim that

16 Ibid., 1043.
17 Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others,” 616.
although the EU has insistently underscored a normative dimension, particularly human rights, in its external relations, it “has sacrificed a coherent and systematic advancement of its normative agenda in favor strengthening its relations with the Russian Federation.”

Some other scholars pose a set of questions regarding the “side-effects” of “normative power Europe”. Beyond the empirical question of whether the EU is a normative power, Thomas Diez questions what this discourse does. He employs a poststructuralist lens to show the discursive mechanisms of “normative power Europe”, which generate an exclusive benign identity for the EU and construct third parties as “others”. While defining the identities of both the EU and its “others”, this representation leads European actors “to disregard their own shortcomings”. In this sense, the othering strategy may include the representation of the “other” as an “existential threat”, “inferior”, “violating universal principles”, and “different”. In a similar vein, building on a Foucauldian approach to norms and power, Michael Merligen demonstrates the double-edged effect of the EU’s normative power. On the one hand, “normative power Europe” seeks to protect, promote and strengthen “the basic exercise of human agency”, and is aimed at humanizing and improving the life of local populations. On the other hand, its projects also “subject local orders to Europe’s normativizing universalist pretensions”, and includes superordination, subordination and subjection by generating “patterns of arbitrary domination between internationals and locals.”

Finally, Adrian Hyde-Price builds his critique of the concept on the mainstream realist-liberal debate in International Relations. From a neorealist perspective, Hyde-Price argues that the EU is a collective vehicle or instrument of its member states, primarily its most influential powers, to shape its external milieu or near abroad by “a combination of hard and soft

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20 Ibid., 455.
22 Ibid., 627.
23 Ibid., 628-629.
25 Ibid., 443.
26 Ibid., 449.
power” under the structural conditions of “a unipolar world and a multipolar Europe”. In this sense, Hyde-Price develops an instrumentalist understanding of the concept. Similarly, Richard Youngs criticizes the analytical prioritization of the normative dimension of the EU’s external relations, and emphasizes how strategic calculations and normative elements inform each other. Building on his examination of the EU’s human rights policies abroad, he argues that “instrumentalist security-oriented dynamics persist within the parameters set by norms defining the EU’s identity”.

The EU’s policies in the South Caucasus provide a good case for analysis in order to explore the potential of its normative power in a context where security and stability are main concerns of domestic actors.

II. The EU’s Policies in the South Caucasus

The EU’s engagement to the South Caucasus with varieties of policies and instruments provides a good case to question its actorness. The EU’s actorness can be assessed not only in terms of its performance as an intergovernmental organization promoting good governance through its normative power but also in terms of its role in peace-making and security-building in the region. It can be analyzed with reference to its effectiveness and responsiveness of the regional actors to address to the frames of reference provided by the EU. As of 2023, one can observe a great shift in the EU’s policies in the region. From being an actor with a need for energy resources and transportation corridors for trade and communication; it now becomes an active promoter of regional peace and security targeting post-war peace-making negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia after the Second Karabakh War in 2020.

The EU initiated its first encounters with the South Caucasus through Cooperation and Partnership Agreements (1999). This has been followed by the appointment of the special representative for South Caucasus (2003). It later provided a more concise tool by designing Action Plans (2006). The region was then included to Eastern Partnership (2009) and to European Neighborhood Policy (2010). The major criticism to the EU’s policies in the region was the fact it rather offered a “one-size-fit-all” approach rather than

28 Ibid., 217.
30 Ibid., 415.
“tailor made policies” which neglected the special concerns of the regional countries\textsuperscript{31} not only in terms of security but also in terms of their commitment to the goals of the EU’s normative power, namely democratization, good governance and promotion of human rights. For Simão and Freire, “regional labeling does not reflect considerably distinct realities of each country”\textsuperscript{32} and “reasoning for regional cooperation with multi-dimensional and multi-level format” should be such designed in a setting instead of using “artificial labeling of the South Caucasus” as a “cohesive regional group”\textsuperscript{33}. Delcour and Duhot suggest that the “EU should avoid a one size fits all approach to South Caucasus, pay increased attention to each countries’ specificity and primarily focus on the bilateral relations”\textsuperscript{34}. In addition to the EU’s weakness and ineffectiveness in its approach to the region; the attitudes of the regional countries to the EU should not neglected. According to Delcour and Wolczuk “… the EU’s engagement with those countries needs at least to certain extend to reflect what they want from the EU”\textsuperscript{35} particularly taking into account that “some of the norms and policies are regarded as unsuitable to partner countries’ needs and expectations”\textsuperscript{36}. Due to the lack of country-based needs assessment for developing bilateral ties; reluctance in taking account national priorities and more importantly varying degrees of commitment and responsiveness on part of the ruling elite to address to the normative principles, the EU’s actoriness remained rather contested.

The appointment of EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus by the Council of the European Union on the 7\textsuperscript{th} July 2003 showed that the EU paid a special attention to the region.\textsuperscript{37} Delcour and Duhot argues that


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 226.

\textsuperscript{34} Laure and Duhot, “Bringing South Caucasus Closer to Europe: Achievements and Challenges in ENP Implementation,” 46.


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 161.

such appointment “can be considered as promising act in the improvisation of the region-based policy”\textsuperscript{38}. Moreover, it was a good move to increase the EU’s visibility in the region. As a “security strategy”\textsuperscript{39}, it was not only important to show the EU’s commitment for security-building in the region but also facilitated face-to-face contact through an interlocutor. The role attributed to the Special Representative was “to contribute to the implementation of the policy objectives of the EU in the South Caucasus” including assistance to carry out political and economic reforms to foster the EU’s normative power in the “fields of rule of law, democratization, human rights, good governance, development and poverty reduction”\textsuperscript{40}. It was also remarkable to observe the EU’s willingness to promote regional cooperation in the fields of “economic, energy and transport issues”\textsuperscript{41} and more importantly its commitment to engage in conflict resolution and peace building.\textsuperscript{42} This was a multi-level strategy aiming at ensuring the contact with “governments, parliaments, judiciary and civil society”\textsuperscript{43}. Frequent visits of the Special Representatives in the early years of the appointment were well received by the individual countries hoping that such initiative could make the EU as a security provider through its efforts of mediation. Yet lack of success in conflict resolution in a way discredited the potential role which has been later revived after the 2nd Karabakh War.

The Action Plans for regional countries of the South Caucasus can be considered as remarkable initiatives to overcome “one size fits all” bias and showed the commitment of the EU to develop bilateral relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Each plan was “a political document laying out the strategic objectives of the cooperation” between individual countries and the EU and “its implementation will help fulfil the provisions in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and will encourage and support” their objectives “of further integration into European

\textsuperscript{38} Laure and Duhot, “Bringing South Caucasus Closer to Europe: Achievements and Challenges in ENP Implementation,” 115.


\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., Article 3.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
The main focus in all three texts promote the EU’s actorness in good governance and security building and envisage its normative power in the region. The main priority areas addressed to the need for political and economic reforms particularly in the fields of democratic governance and economic development as well as in security building. The priority areas were identified as “peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”; “strengthening of democracy through free and fair elections in line with international standards”, “protection of human rights and respect to the rule of law”, “initiation of economic reforms” and “strengthening regional integration. The action plans were followed by the inclusion of all three countries to the ENP which underlines “a clear link between democracy and security”.

The inclusion of the South Caucasus to the ENP (2010) aimed at “advocating political and economic reform, supporting conflict prevention and resolution and enhancing intra-regional cooperation” without necessarily offering a prospect for membership. According to Alieva, the South Caucasian countries were included to the ENP due to the region’s oil and gas resources since the EU found the region “convenient” due to “its location on the crossroads of major East West transportation roots.” In other words the EU’s energy dependency and its need for a transportation corridor made the region attractive for trade, stability and security are the main priorities since “energy represents one of the most important aspects of growing


significance of the region and the EU has a keen self interest in stability and security.\textsuperscript{49}

Both ENP and EaP promote regional cooperation\textsuperscript{50}, through addressing political and economic issues in order “to promote EU norms within the neighborhood” albeit providing “the attractive membership perspective”\textsuperscript{51}. Inclusion of the region to the framework provided by the EU, “is supposed to reinforce and encourage further developments of regional networks by designing various cross border initiatives which include local and regional authorities and non-governmental actors\textsuperscript{52}. According to Simão and Freire, “the EU sought to stabilize the South Caucasus through economic integration, institutional cooperation and by playing a growing role as a security actor in the region” through the ENP\textsuperscript{53}. Although support for economic and political assistance is remarkable, the EU remained “as an observer”\textsuperscript{54}; addressed to conflict resolution “indirectly”\textsuperscript{55}.

To conclude, the sake of the European countries in the fields of energy and transportation provoked the EU’s engagement in the South Caucasus. The need for security and stability to secure the EU’s interests in the region where it remained rather reluctant to show a concern and active engagement in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulted in the EU’s willingness to establish a presence. The already existing frames such as Partnership and Cooperation agreements were utilized to build up rapport and relationship with the regional countries through providing them with technical assistance. The appointment of special representative and then the action plans can be considered as initiatives with a regional focus and they were followed by their inclusion to Eastern Partnership first and The ENP next. In all policies the promotion of the principles of good governance and

\textsuperscript{49} Gelman, “Visibly Invisible: EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus,” 359.
\textsuperscript{50} Nelli Babayan, “Fear or Love Thy Neighbour”? The EU Framework for Promoting Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus” Journal of the Contemporary European Research 8, no 1 (2012): 40.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{53} Simão and Freire, “The EU’s Neighborhood Policy and the South Caucasus: Unfolding New Patterns of Cooperation,” 228.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 228.
conflict resolution and security building were the main concerns. Yet the ineffectiveness of the EU to promote its actorness and the varying degrees of responsiveness on part of the regional states created a gap among the involved actors resulted in the decreasing credibility of the EU in the region. However, the new geopolitical context after the Second Karabakh War offers to the EU a good chance to restore its image and its role in the region whereas its actorness as a normative power will probably remain contested since its success is heavily dependent to the willingness of the regional countries.

III. The EU is back to the South Caucasus: A Peace-Broker after the II: Karabakh War?

In the post-war situation and a potentially peace-building process in the South Caucasus, the EU’s engagement to the negotiation between Armenia and Azerbaijan seems to be a test case for its restoration as a reliable and efficient actor in conflict resolution.

The South Caucasus has been a turbulent region in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Territorial conflicts in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia were particularly challenging in the context of simultaneous regime change, nation- and state-building, and the restructuring of the economic system. It was not an easy task for respective governments to handle the situation due to the fact that conflicts which started as bilateral went on to draw in regional, and later international interventions. International involvement was crucially important, and necessary for stability and security, yet proved to be unpromising and widely discredited through the failure of the OSCE Minsk Group in dealing with conflict resolution in Karabakh conflict.

After almost three decades of occupation of the Karabakh region, Azerbaijan has successfully managed to re-consolidate its territorial integrity with its victory in July 2020 as a result of the Second Karabakh War. During the war, Turkey acquired a more pro-active stance through continuously providing political and moral support to Azerbaijan and Russia as the main peace broker led mediation resulted in the signing of the Trilateral Statement between Armenia and Azerbaijan on 10 November 2020. Until the end of 2021, the post-war setting was rather a regional one rather than international where peace and security building seem to be based on how the bilateral relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia evolves and the sustainability of the cooperative relationship between Turkey and Russia. The main themes
that have dominated discussions in the year following the war have been a new format for regional cooperation, confidence-building, recovery, dialogue, and normalization of the relationships (if not reconciliation). The core ideas are establishing regional connectivity, promoting economic cooperation, underlining the importance of and necessity for transportation projects, building up trade relations, demining of conflict-affected territories, and ensuring the stability and well-being of the countries concerned.

The suggested ‘3+3’ format – the six-party cooperation platform with pacts among Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, seemed to be the only proposed option, although to what extent its realization would be possible remained unknown. Moreover, the substance, terms, and conditions of the format should be presented in detail. No Western initiative, either on the part of the EU or the USA, was on the table up until the end of December 2021. Yet, there was an emergent need for a new vision for the South Caucasus to ensure post-conflict stability and security in the region.

This section provides an analysis of the EU’s involvement to the post-war peace building process by particularly focusing on its actorness, the content of the mediation through providing a common platform by setting up the principles to regulate stabilization and then to determine the principles of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It will then discuss the potential of the EU to assert itself as reliable actor as well as its possible effectiveness in issues related to regional cooperation. It argues that the EU follows a gradually evolving approach in the mediation process.

The EU’s role in conflict resolution during the Karabakh conflict remained “peripheral” over the last three decades other than issuing statement of concerns during the entire process of the 2nd Karabakh War\(^5\). It not only decreases the reliance of the conflicting parties but also leads to question of its possible commitment with regards to the peace-making in the region. The fact that the EU does not offer any prospects for membership with the EaP and the ENP, decreases the potential role of its normative power which is not very welcomed by the reluctant leaders to initiate political reform process particularly with regards to democratization and

principles of good governance. In the aftermath of the 2nd Karabakh War, the EU started to activate itself through revitalizing the activities of the Special Representative of the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia through regular visits to the regional countries. This smooth and easy interaction can be considered as the expression of interest by the EU to nominate itself as an international player who previously remained reluctant and inactive.

First meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia was held on 14 December 2021 at Brussels is considered to have “important outcomes” and “focusing on the economic cooperation, delimitation and demarcation of the state borders, demining and humanitarian issues including the release of the POWs”\(^{57}\). The president of the European Council, Charles Michel stated that the EU was committed to create “cooperation and an atmosphere of trust” and particularly stressed on the need for addressing humanitarian issues such as “release of further detainees and the fate of missing persons” adding that the EU continuously support humanitarian de-mining efforts\(^{58}\). With this first meeting the EU managed to create a platform to provide a milieu of interaction for the political leadership and nominated itself for a limited mediation role. The fact that President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan agreed to meet under the auspices of the EU shows that they were keen on the involvement of the Western actors to the post-war context probably due to the fact that it may decrease already existing Russian involvement in the region. It can be argued that the EU acted “cautious and low profile” in order to disturb Russia\(^{59}\) with its emphasis on the humanitarian issues so that it will “minimize any perceptions of competition by emphasizing that it is not replacing but building up existing Russian brokered agreement”\(^{60}\). The


\(^{59}\) Broers, “Perspectives: Beyond Minsk? The remaking of the Armenia-Azerbaijani peace process.”

\(^{60}\) Ibid.
regular meetings during 2022 shows that the EU followed an evolving pattern in dealing with the matters regarding the peace-building policies. It also shows that in the post-war stabilization, it is in the process of setting up the principles evolved from a rather non-touchy issues such as economic cooperation and humanitarian ones to a more political ones including the recognition of the territorial integrity and the status of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians.

Second meeting was held on 6 April 2022 again in Brussels with participation of both presidents where the EU underlined its focus and intension in the amelioration of the humanitarian issues including the release of remaining detainees and the fate of missing persons along with demining and assistance to “conflict-affected populations and, rehabilitation and reconstruction”\(^{61}\). What was remarkable as an outcome was convene a Joint Border Mission to “delimit the bilateral border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and ensure a stable security situation along, and in the vicinity of, the borderline”\(^{62}\). The particular focus on the restoration of connectivity for furthering regional cooperation was also essential and desirable for both parties.

3\(^{rd}\) meeting was held on 22 May 2022 where Brussels promoted post-conflict agenda\(^{63}\). There the EU emerged as “a significant platform for negotiations comes as Russia’s role is declining”\(^{64}\) where 5 points plan is formulated where both Azerbaijan and Armenia are happy to counterweight against Russia. The five-points plan suggested by the Azerbaijani side included “the recognition of each country’s territorial integrity, border demarcation, open transportation links between the two territories, and an


\(^{62}\) Ibid.

\(^{63}\) Jafarova, “Can European Union Succeed in Facilitating Armenia-Azerbaijan Normalization?-Anlysis.”

agreement to abstain from threats. This 3rd meeting can be considered as an important achievement in the EU’s policies since a minimum basis for the EU designed a peace treaty. Charles Michel particularly promoted the delimitation of borders and restoration of connectivity (unblocking the transport links) and more importantly a peace agreement “to advance discussion on the peace treaty governing inter-state relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia it is necessary that the rights and security of the ethnic Armenian population in Karabakh”.

The meeting on the 14th May 2023 as a remarkable achievement since Azerbaijan and Armenia reached unequivocal commitment to the 1991 Almaty Declaration of the respective territorial integrity and Karabakh Armenians as citizens of Azerbaijan. It also addressed to the issue of connectivity through “unblocking transport and economic links in the region” and re-opening of the railway connection to and via Nakhchivan. Dealing also with the humanitarian issues including captured soldiers, fate of missing persons and demining and “comprehensive and fair peace agreement and right of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians” was seemingly important.

On 31 May 2023 Charles Michel also “stressed the need to prepare populations for peace and the paramount role of the public rhetoric plays in this regard”.

65 Arzu Geybullayeva, “Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity”, October 10, 2022, Last Updated Date: October 11, 2023, https://globalvoices.org/2022/10/10/armenia-and-azerbaijan-recognize-each-others-territorial-integrity/
68 “Statement by the spokesperson of Charles Michel, President of the European Council, regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan”, May 31, 2022, Last Updated Date:
can be considered as a signal to consider a peace treaty will be achievable by the end of this year. June 2023 at Moldova, normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia are discussed in a roundtable meeting with the by President Ilham Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Emanuel Macron, Charles Michel and Scholz. Main issues were again connectivity, border delimitation and peace treaty.

To conclude, in its involvement to the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the EU has managed to achieve a considerable success in dealing with the issue regarding peacebuilding starting with rather a timid initiative to host the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Brussels showed that it could offer a platform to both parties to talk and negotiate starting with the issues that they could potentially agree including economic connectivity and humanitarian issues. The first one offers prospects for future regional cooperation initiatives whereas the second one addresses to the current and more emergent concerns. These two would potentially would not disturb neither of them and can provide strong basis for the endurance of stability and security in the aftermath of a would-be peace treaty. Within this context the only issue which should be addressed cautiously and remains contested is the rights of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. President Aliyev openly expressed at numerous occasions that no particular status would be granted and they would be treated as ordinary citizens of Azerbaijan, Armenia seems to be keener on to the promotion of the international mechanism. It can be argued that the Azerbaijan’s continuing commitment to the EU negotiated process could only be secured if the EU would not be insistent in promoting the idea of granting special status to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, otherwise it will be blocked. Moreover, the EU should also consider that the process also needs a blessing by Russia and Turkey who do seem to enjoy their competitive cooperation and regionalization of conflict along with the status quo in the post-war setting which seems to be more appealing for their active engagement. The need for their implicit and/or explicit approval is undeniable both for Azerbaijan and Armenia.

To what extent the pro-activization of the EU as a peace broker will result in increasing its normative power is yet to be seen since it requires not
only a comprehensive scheme by the EU but also and more importantly willingness of the domestic actors to receive it. The EU’s commitment for consolidating post-treaty societal interaction seem to foster prospects for dialogue of different segments of society including civil society, academia and media. If the EU successfully manages to have a clear and well trusted mandate in the region, it can also contribute to the political reforms to a certain extent.

Conclusion

Starting from the early 2000s, the EU’s interest in the South Caucasus was inspired by the region’s geographical intersection of the East-West corridor; trade and transportation and oil and gas energy resources. The policies are designed on the basis of the EU’s priorities including shared values of democratization, good governance, promotion of rule of law for security and stability as well as economic prosperity. Although the framework provided by the Eastern Partnership and European Neighborhood Policy had good intentions, their contents were not necessarily fit into the priorities of the regional countries. Apparently, the EU’s actorness in conflict resolution and peacebuilding was expected, particularly when the only international mechanism, the OSCE Minsk Group, failed to address the conflict for about three decades and decreased the reliance to any other type of international involvement.

In its recent engagement in the regional matters of the South Caucasus with reference to the peace and security building, the EU appears to be potentially promising actor. Its success and effectiveness as well as its durable impact largely rely on its capacity as a mediator; domestic actors’ receptiveness and embracement of its policies and attitudes of the two regional power, namely Russia and Turkey. The EU initiated hosting of both countries’ leaders showed that it has the potential to provide a roof for communication and interaction in a relatively unbiased setting. It manages to overcome perceived biased of the individual countries through re-setting up itself as an intergovernmental organization for the sake of good governance, security and peace-building. It successfully managed not to disturb much both Turkey and Russia in its way of converting a regionalized post-war situation to an international one. It also increased its visibility and credibility and managed to distance itself to the member states’ political preferences. Although the existing system is not totally tailor-made, it can be argued that a regional tailoring is one on the table.
There is yet a delicate balance to be sustained in the South Caucasus. Although Azerbaijan and Armenia are reciprocally recognized each other’s territorial integrity, there are still violations of the ceasefire in the bordering regions which harm the normalization of bilateral relations and prevent the building up of trust. Moreover, The Russian troops’ presence in all three countries of the South Caucasus is a significant threat for all regional countries although not explicitly expressed. Any regional cooperation initiative should accommodate the Russian factor but preferably in a more balanced way. Although Russia is heavily occupied with its war in Ukraine, it does not mean that it will distance itself when its hegemonic power as a game maker and peace-broker will be challenged or will have an alternative. Turkey on the other hand distances itself from the EU and is being distanced by the EU for quite a while. It will surely be in constant cooperation with Azerbaijan whose alliance with Turkey is well consolidated and not at all questionable. On the other hand, the future of normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey is yet be seen and also heavily dependent on the bilateral relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Last but not least, the EU’s restoration of its role and image as a mediator and the consolidation of its role as a regional actor are largely dependent on the domestic ruling elite’s choices and preferences. They should not feel disappointed by its ineffectiveness and will be no more satisfied with a “the EU is concerned” message which may result in making of the process regionalized one again.

To achieve a more elaborated, extensive, comprehensive cooperation for peace-making and security building in the region as well as economic development, the following recommendations can be considered. First, there should be agreed terminology on the existing situation. The territorial integrity and the principles of inviolability of the borders should be respected by all parties involved. The violation of territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine constitutes biggest challenge for the regional cohesion and stability. Moreover, Russia’s war against Ukraine resulted in an escalated perception of threat for regional countries. Second, trade and transport appear to be the most relevant areas to initiate regional cooperation. Yet the discourses of nation and state-building as well as the definition of friends and foes will have a decisive role in the implementation of any type of joint projects. Overcoming the hatred may take much longer than expected. In this respect the EU has strong potentials to encourage societal dialogue among various actors of the respective countries including academia, civil society and media. Youth in particular should be targeted whose memories of war rather than co-existence are persistent. Third, there is a need to promote
mechanisms and tools to contribute to the peace-making and its preservation. Restoration of credibility as well as its sustainability should also be addressed to prevent Euroscepticism. The EU is still an important actor because of the values that it represents namely, democracy, human rights, economic development and modernization. It seems that restoration of peace and fostering security in the region will be a test for the EU to re-define and potentially restore its actorness in global governance as well. Therefore, it has to come up with a new and revised action plan. Last but the least, one of main preconditions of regional cooperation is the issue of the regime type. The EU successfully manage to address the political and societal transformation of East and Central European countries through internationalization of democratization in the early 1990s. Noting that democratic governments are essential for the sustainability of the stability and security, the EU’s policies and projects should be revisited to contribute to democratization as well.

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