

SECURITY VS. HUMAN RIGHTS DILEMMA IN THE EU'S MIGRATION
POLICY: UKRAINE AND MENA

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ABSTRACT

SECURITY VS. HUMAN RIGHTS DILEMMA IN THE EU'S MIGRATION POLICY: UKRAINE AND MENA

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This thesis aims to analyze the response of the European Union (EU) to migrations from the Middle East and North Africa and Ukraine. The securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School is utilized in order to find out the differences in the EU's response to these two migration movements. This thesis first illustrates the securitization of migration process at the EU level historically and institutionally. Then this thesis focuses on the response of the EU to the events such as the Arab Spring and invasion of Ukraine. It is argued that the EU's immigration policy is shaped according to the characteristics of immigrants. It asserts that the securitization of the EU's migration and refugee policies contradicts with universal human rights values in some cases. In order to demonstrate differences in terms of securitization of migration within the EU, this research analyzes the press conferences and statements of the European Council and the European Commission.

Keywords: Migration, Securitization, Human rights, European Union

ÖZ

AB'NİN GÖÇ POLİTİKASINDA GÜVENLİK VE İNSAN HAKLARI İKİLEMİ: UKRAYNA VE MENA

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Bu tez, Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika ile Ukrayna'dan gelen göçlere verdiği tepkiyi analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. AB'nin bu iki göç hareketine verdiği tepkideki farklılıkları ortaya çıkarmak amacıyla Kopenhag Okulu tarafından geliştirilen güvenlikleştirme teorisinden yararlanılmaktadır. Bu tez ilk olarak göç sürecinin AB düzeyinde güvenlikleştirilmesini tarihsel ve kurumsal olarak açıklamaktadır. Daha sonra bu tez, Arap Baharı ve Ukrayna'nın işgali gibi olaylara AB'nin tepkisine odaklanmaktadır. AB'nin göç politikasının göçmenlerin özelliklerine göre şekillendiği ileri sürülmektedir. AB'nin göç ve mülteci politikalarının güvenlikleştirilmesinin bazı durumlarda evrensel insan hakları değerleriyle çeliştiğini savunmaktadır. Bu araştırma, AB içinde göçün güvenlikleştirilmesi açısından farklılıkları ortaya koymak amacıyla Avrupa Konseyi ve Avrupa Komisyonu'nun basın toplantılarını ve açıklamalarını analiz etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Güvenlikleştirme, İnsan hakları, Avrupa Birliği

To my precious family...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
EC	European Community
EMSC	European Migrant Smuggling Centre
EU	European Union
EURODAC	European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database
Europol	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
Frontex	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SEA	Single European Act
SIS	Schengen Information System
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TNC	Transitional National Council
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USA	United States of America
VIS	Visa Information System

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War brought changes in approaches to security both in theory and practice. The military based approaches to security prevailed during the Cold War; however, in the aftermath of the Cold War, new security threats emerged other than military ones. Due to the fact that the end of Cold War meant the end of a bipolar world, new challenges had arisen including new issues relating to security. Political, societal, environmental and economic threats can be given as examples amongst the newly emerging issues. Accordingly, migration had come to the fore as being one of the perceived threats to societal security.

Migration as a new challenge has also become an important topic within the European Union (EU). The overall objective of this study is to analyze the securitization of migration and refugee policy of the European Union, to illustrate contradictions of the EU migration policy, which is shaped according to the characteristics of immigrants.

In this thesis, it is revealed that the migration policy of the EU differs towards refugees coming from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and those coming from Ukraine. The speeches of the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission are examined and the EU's approach to refugees from these two places is compared. The manual qualitative coding method is used when conducting this comparative analysis. Through the selection of certain words in the speeches of EU presidents, the difference in approach of the EU for these two migration regions is set forth. The words chosen in these speeches support the arguments put forward in the thesis. The EU, which follows a policy focused on threat perception and securitization when it comes to Middle Eastern and North African refugees, adopts an inclusive attitude that emphasizes European values when

it comes to Ukrainian refugees. These differences in approach of the EU are explained by the presence and absence of securitization . The research discusses how the perception of ‘us and others’ or ‘us vs. them’ causes this difference determining whether securitization will emerge or not.

In this thesis, when researching and developing the study, a descriptive and interpretivist approach will be used. The secondary sources will be used, such as literature survey; official documents of the EU institutions and the United Nations (UN); international legal documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; the reports of the non-governmental organizations, and the news articles in published press.

This study will use a qualitative research technique in data collection. Moreover, in order to improve the research, the statistics, figures and the graphs will be provided from publications of the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

To highlight the limitations of the research, since it is not possible to examine all the speeches of the EU presidents in this study, a comparative analysis is made by examining a certain number of speeches that took place in a certain time period and the use of the coded words in the speeches is assessed.

For the Ukraine part of the analysis, the speeches made by the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council in three different periods, based on the period from Russia's invasion of Ukraine to the present, are examined. Firstly, the speeches were determined by choosing a date close to the start of the war, then a date in the middle of the time period examined, and finally a date close to the present day. Six speeches, three from each institution, are examined in this way.

The dates of the examined speeches of the President of the European Council are as follows: 23 March 2022, 3 February 2023, 30 November 2023. The speeches of the President of the European Commission were made on the following dates: 1 March 2022, 7 March 2023, 13 December 2023.

The speeches of the highest-level representatives of the European Commission and the European Council on migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe between 2011 and 2016 are examined, covering the period from the beginning of the event known as the Arab Spring in the literature and the period called as the migration crisis or refugee crisis. A total of sixteen speeches, eight from each institution, are examined in this way.

The restrictive migration policies of the EU reinforce the idea of Fortress Europe. While the EU is strengthening its border controls many irregular migrants are losing their lives drowning in the Mediterranean Sea during their journeys to reach Europe.¹ The construction of a fortress Europe to prevent the irregular immigration results in the loss of the lives and this creates a discrepancy for the key criteria of human rights largely embraced by the EU. Hence, as stated by den Hertog “the Union’s constitutional values cannot be sacrificed on the altar of fighting irregular immigration”.²

International law ensures the fundamental human rights of migrants and the cause of migration is not important. Moreover, the EU as one of the most significant defender and practitioner of human rights contains human rights in itself. Both the European law and international law oblige a responsive and humanitarian approach towards immigrants. To put it more clearly, the rules of law to which the EU adheres require a humanitarian approach. In Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it is stated that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution and this right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”³. Furthermore, Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees prohibits expulsion or return of a refugee

¹ Del Sarto, R. A., & Steindler, C. (2015). Uncertainties at the European Union's southern borders: Actors, policies, and legal frameworks. *European Security*, 24(3), 360-380, p. 370.

² Hertog, L. den. (2013). Fundamental rights and the extra-territorialization of EU border policy: A contradiction in terms?. In D. Bigo et al. (Eds.), *Foreigners, refugees or minorities? Rethinking people in the context of border controls and visas*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p. 226.

³ The United Nations. (1948). *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

regardless of any situation⁴. Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights confirms the right to asylum⁵ and *refoulement* is prohibited under Article 19⁶.

While conducting the research, questions are asked in order to reveal the EU's approach to security and human rights, which is shaped according to the situation, that is, the characteristics of immigrants. How and on what basis is the European Union's approach to migration shaped? How does the perception of us and others affect the EU's migration policy? In this study, the questions focusing on the role of security on threat perceptions related to migration and asylum policies are analyzed. How political discourses shape the EU's approach to migration based on European values and human rights, how does the EU's moderate stance on migration and refugee policies, as in the case of Ukraine, comply with the EU perspective, how does the EU approach to migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa challenge the EU's commitment to human rights, what are the reasons for the differences in attitudes adopted in the EU's migration policy? These are the questions that are tried to be answered in this thesis.

The EU has always been influenced/affected by migratory movements. However, immigration to Europe has intensified in recent years. These developments have also indicated the dilemma between security and human rights in the EU migration and asylum policy.

While internal security factors and anti-terrorism measures need constraining migration policies and exclusionary borders⁷, humanitarian values, which are important components of the EU, require more tolerant and responsive approach. The asylum seekers from the countries of North Africa and Middle East and Ukraine are significant to analyze this dilemma because differences in attitude are obvious in these two cases.

⁴ The United Nations. (1951). *1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*.

⁵ The European Union. (2000). *The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Karyotis, G. (2007). European migration policy in the aftermath of september 11. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 20(1), 1-17, p. 13.

The significance of this study is that it examines the refugee crisis of 2015, which attracts considerable attention worldwide. Furthermore, because the turbulence in the Middle East and North Africa continues, more people may migrate to the safer countries and may request for refuge in the future and the EU countries will probably be the most preferred ones for refugee protection. The problematic dilemma between security and human rights in European Union migration policy harms the reputation of the EU and puts the lives of asylum seekers in danger that escape from the chaos and it may continue if the EU does not change its policy towards migration. Therefore, the relevance of this study to the current affairs in the world makes it crucial.

In the case of Ukraine, since the beginning of the war between Russia and Ukraine, those fleeing the war have attracted the attention of the EU in particular and the world in general. Ukrainian civilians, who are welcomed in Europe unlike North African and Middle Easterners, reveal the inconsistencies in the EU's immigration policy. This research is important in terms of indicating this contradiction and the factors behind the contradiction.

This thesis consists of six chapters. In the first part, general information about the research is given with an introduction to the subject. The second chapter establishes the theoretical framework. In this chapter, arguments of theorists of the Copenhagen School, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver on securitization are referred. Securitization in the societal sector is the main focus of this study since migration related issues are within the scope of the societal sector. According to Wæver, societal security is about “sustainability” and about “situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms”.⁸

The ‘other’ whose identity is different from the society in question, i.e. non-Europeans, is seen as a threat to the European society itself. Refugees and migrants from the Middle East and North Africa constitute the other in Europe’s case, their presence within the borders of the European Union is perceived as a threat and

⁸ Wæver, O. (1993). Societal security: the concept. In O. Wæver et al. (Eds.), *Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe* (1st ed.). New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., p. 23.

therefore leads to securitization. When it comes to refugees from the same geography and similar identity, that is, European refugees, security and migration discourses are developed under the umbrella of ‘us’. When two different migration cases are examined, it is seen that a perception of security and threat is built in one of them while a perception is built based on human rights and EU values in the other. Moreover, since the EU is an important regional power, regional security complexes are mentioned to make discussions based on securitization in the EU more meaningful. The discursive constructions of migration as a threat and its securitization within Europe are explained by drawing upon the Copenhagen School’s speech act theory.

‘Security’ is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue- not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat... The process of security is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)⁹

The speech act theory of the Copenhagen School brings forward the idea that even presenting something as a threat makes it a security matter. Thereby, the key role of constructing something as a threat, in this case migration, is easily played by the political actors in their discourses. The detailed analysis of those discourses is carried out in the following section of the study.

The objective of the third chapter is to illustrate securitization of migration and asylum policies in the European Union historically and institutionally. First of all, the European Union’s migration and asylum policy is mentioned briefly to clarify migration-security nexus and gradual securitization in the Union from the very beginning. This process introduces the change in the EU’s approach to migration and asylum. From the Schengen Acquis onwards, together with Dublin Convention, the Maastricht Treaty and then the Amsterdam Treaty, the issue of migration has been increasingly institutionalized at the EU level.

⁹ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Rienner, pp. 24-26.

This research will also look at the securitization of migration in the EU particularly after 9/11. The terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001 have been a turning point for securitization of migration policies of the countries notably for the EU and the US. The construction of terrorism and migration nexus can obviously be seen in the European Union's 'fight against terrorism' policy and in the discourses linking terrorism to migration. The reasons that lead the EU to apply restrictive migration policy based on the concerns of security will be analyzed in this study. As one of those reasons, the increasing population of the Muslim immigrants in the EU countries and the rise of radical Islam in the world have strengthened the fears following the 9/11. The terrorist attacks occurred in Europe in the recent decade similar to the 9/11. The Madrid and London bombings, Charlie Hebdo, Paris, Belgium attacks and some others have escalated the fear of terrorism within Europe. Hence, the division of 'us and them' has deepened and the suspicion towards foreigners, the 'others', has increased dramatically.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the securitizing practices and mechanisms have widened and deepened within the European Union and particularly throughout the external borders. The development and institutionalization of SIS II and Europol, VIS (Visa Information System) and FRONTEX illustrate the increasing securitization in the European Union. The entry into force of the Dublin II Convention, the Council Directive on Standards and the Treaty of Lisbon are amongst the other important legal developments on the securitization basis. In the third chapter migration is discussed as a human rights issue by making use of international agreements and the human rights structure in Europe. The restrictive attitude of the EU is criticized by examining legal documents.

As a consequence of the disturbances in North Africa and Middle East, the pace and scale of migration to Europe has changed. The number of asylum seekers requesting asylum has increased drastically in recent years because of the turmoil in the regions of Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Europe encountered another immigration incident. The purpose of the fourth chapter is to examine the response of the European Union to Arab Spring and invasion of Ukraine. The developments during the Arab Spring and Russia's occupation of

Ukraine are mentioned briefly and the legal dimension and the issue of asylum are discussed in the light of the EU response to those developments. Thus, the different attitudes developed by the European Union on immigration are examined.

The turmoil in MENA region and its immediate influence on civilians have become more serious in 2015 and its outcome has been dramatic increase in number of asylum seekers worldwide. Europe was one of those regions affected by the migration movements of 2015 since for most of the asylum seekers the ultimate destination was Europe. In the case of Ukraine, with Russia's occupation of Ukraine, Ukrainians took refuge in Europe and the issue of Ukrainian refugees became one of the migration issues concerning the European Union. Since the future of Ukraine, which is seen as 'us' by the EU, is considered the future of Europe, the EU deals with Ukrainian migration in the context of human rights and European values.

Both the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria had an influence on the increasing securitization in the European Union. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East and North Africa and the increasing numbers of the refugees have contributed to the constructions of migration and refuge as a threat to societal security in the political discourses of the representatives of the member states and the top officials of the significant EU institutions. Hence, securitization of European Union's migration and asylum policy with regard to non-Europeans have gained momentum after 2011 and particularly 2015.

In the rest of the chapter, human rights dimension of the European Union migration policy and the contradictions together with the implications of this securitization on asylum seekers and irregular immigrants will be analyzed. The flexible attitude of the European Union towards asylum seekers is prominent as it is a significant defender of human rights. Considering its contradictory attitudes, the EU, as a human rights defender, in order to ensure the security of Europe, restricts the rights of migrants who are seen as 'others' and trying to reach Europe.

However, when immigrants are one of 'us', the security approach is replaced by a human rights-based approach. Therefore, as pointed out by Munster, there is a

“paradox that the EU, a liberal regime concerned with the promotion of cross-border mobility, increasingly relies on exclusionary and illiberal practices of security”.¹⁰

The human rights of migrants and the protection needs of refugees are accepted as important parts of the EU’s external migration policy; however, the EU tries to prevent irregular migration and return migrants through readmission agreements instead of providing more legal channels for migration or promoting the human rights of migrants and refugees.¹¹ Those people seeking for refuge escape from the war and turbulence to find a safer place to live. Thus, this security-oriented attitude of the EU to secure its borders do not comply with the human rights no matter whether they are irregular migrants or not.

In the fifth chapter of the thesis, security and human rights dimension of migration is examined through a comparative analysis of the EU discourses. The speeches of the political actors representing the European Union, namely, the presidents of two EU institutions, the European Commission and the European Council are reviewed to illustrate the contradiction of the European Union’s refugee and irregular migration policy at the discursive level. Certain words are chosen to demonstrate differences in the EU’s approach to migration.

The discourses on migration from Ukraine to the EU are inclusive, tolerant and based on European values. When a speech is made about Ukrainian immigrants, expressions such as ‘solidarity’, ‘rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘peace’, ‘common values’ are used. In addition, the frequent use of the phrases ‘we’ and ‘our’ proves that the EU sees Ukrainians as part of ‘us’.

In the case of migration from Middle East and North Africa, the term ‘illegal migration’ is often used in the discourses by linking migration to security and introducing it as a threat to societal security. Besides, the connection between ‘illegal

¹⁰ Munster, van R. (2009). *Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 11.

¹¹ Amnesty International. (2014). *The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders*. London: Amnesty International Ltd., p. 13.

immigration' and other types of threats to security, notably terrorism and other criminal activities, are frequently referred in those type of speeches. The wording in the discourses such as 'flood', 'influx', 'wave', 'flow' represent negative connotations to migration and construct fear and threat perception towards immigrants from North Africa and Middle East who are seen as 'others'.

Infantino reaches a conclusion on securitization by making an analogy to Becker's statement on drug users and argues that "securitization of migration leads to the disorganization of migratory movement without eradicating it".¹² This conclusion is quite applicable to this study since it is argued that the security approach of the EU based on threat perception in its asylum policy is inaccurate. Those people are in need of help from the EU, they are the victims of the war, disturbance and terror in their homelands. The restrictive policies of the Union only serve to create a more chaotic situation in which the migration related issues becomes more difficult to deal with.

In the sixth and last chapter of the thesis a general evaluation of the research is made and the findings are presented. The differences in the approaches adopted by the EU towards immigrants of Ukrainian and North African and Middle Eastern origin are set forth. The argument that identity definitions determine the approach towards the refugees and asylum-seekers is elaborated.

¹² Infantino, F. (2013). Bordering at the window: The allocation of Schengen visas at the Italian Embassy and Consulate in Morocco. In D. Bigo et al. (Eds.), *Foreigners, refugees or minorities? Rethinking people in the context of border controls and visas*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p. 240.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. The Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory

Security studies, an important field for International Relations, mainly focused on the state and thus military security until the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the state-oriented focus in security studies underwent a dramatic change due to the emergence of new threats following the end of the bipolar world. These non-military threats ranging in type from environmental to societal became new domains for security specialists.

Unlike the traditional understanding of security in which security is reduced to military threats, the work of the Copenhagen School builds upon different security sectors, namely, military, economic, environmental, political and societal security sectors. Buzan explains those sectors as follows:

Generally speaking, military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. These five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematique, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkages.¹³

¹³ Buzan, B. (1991). *People, States & Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, pp. 19-20.

These five security sectors categorized by Buzan attaches importance to each and every sector. This categorization does not put one above the other; on the contrary, conventional security is combined by unconventional ones such as societal security.

On account of the fact that the migration issues fall under the sphere of societal security, the threats to societal sector are examined for the objective of this study. In case of migration, the referent object is the society. Security of a society is presented by political elites as it is threatened by migration. The other security sectors lie beyond the scope of this thesis because each one of them mentions a particular realm and needs a special focus. The primary goal of this chapter is to mention briefly theoretical framework of securitization in general and securitization of migration in particular by attributing to the propounded arguments of the Copenhagen School's theorists. Securitization, sectors, and regional security complexes are three main concepts for the Copenhagen School.¹⁴ Those three concepts are explained briefly in this section of the thesis in reference to the arguments brought forward by the work of the Copenhagen School.

The Copenhagen School adopting a constructivist approach gave a new meaning to security studies. The main theorists of the Copenhagen School are Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan. They were members of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. The phrase of the Copenhagen School was first used by Bill McSweeney¹⁵. Buzan's book *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*¹⁶ first published in 1983 laid the foundations of the Copenhagen School. The social constructivist conceptualization of security, in other words, 'securitization' was first presented by Ole Wæver in his working paper *Security the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word*.¹⁷ The Copenhagen School defines 'security' and 'securitization' concepts in the following way:

¹⁴ Wæver, O. (2004). *Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, p. 8.

¹⁵McSweeney, B. (1996). Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School. *Review of International Studies*, 22(1), p. 81.

¹⁶ Buzan, B. (1983). *People, states, and fear: The national security problem in international relations*. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books.

¹⁷ Wæver, O. (1989). *Security the speech act: Analysing the politics of a word*. Unpublished manuscript.

“Security” is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).¹⁸

Securitization studies endeavors to have an understanding of “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful).”¹⁹ Those are the questions that must be asked when securitization of an issue is analyzed. In the light of this information, a researcher can establish relationship amongst the constituent components of securitization.

Both security and insecurity phenomena are socially constructed through speech acts made by political actors. The threat construction serves to the aim of the speech acts which is the acquired authorization to decide on what constitutes a threat and to make use of society’s feeling of insecure. Through the discourses, the political actors or elites gain control over societal security related issues like migration and asylum. The issues do not necessarily have to exist crystal-clear out there to be presumed as threats. As Buzan et al. argue, “the senses of threat, vulnerability, and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent.”²⁰

The threat construction is followed by emergency measures taken by the securitizing actors and seen as essential for the survival of the society confronting a challenge to their security. The question of ‘security for whom’ is asked by the scholars of the Copenhagen School to identify the referent object in security studies. The ‘referent object’ is the one threatened by an existential threat and it can be the state,

¹⁸ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., pp. 23-24.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 32.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 57.

incorporating government, territory or society.²¹ The threatened referent object also gives the incentive to the securitizing actor to make provisions to eliminate the danger and to secure the referent object from the threats.

In addition, the audience is another locomotive for the securitization process. The acceptance of the audience is needed for an issue to be securitized. Hence, the securitizing actors must convince the audience that there is a serious threat obligating the actors to take measures to provide security. There is a need of acceptance of the audience for a successful securitization; otherwise, it becomes only a securitizing move in which something as a threat to a referent object is presented.²² The facilitating conditions are also significant for a successful speech act. According to Austin cited in Buzan et al., there are two categories of conditions for a successful speech act, the first one is “the internal, linguistic-grammatical—to follow the rules of the act” and the second one is “the external, contextual and social—to hold a position from which the act can be made”.²³

On the ground that security is a “self-referential practice”, the extraordinary way of handling an issue is justified by the securitizing actors.²⁴ The issues are moved from the realm of low politics to high politics in this way. Thereby, the issues in question are dealt with a consideration of the requirements of high politics. The construction of threat is subjective in nature. As stated by Wæver, “security is a way to frame and handle an issue”.²⁵ The subjective ideas of the political actors or elites are determinative on what is considered as a threat. The risk management is involved in this phase of securitization. According to Rose cited in Munster, risk management is “an ‘attempt to pre-empt or dedramatize conflict by acting upon the physical and social structures within which individuals conduct themselves’”.²⁶ The securitizing

²¹ Ibid., p. 21.

²² Ibid., p. 25.

²³ Ibid., p. 32.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 24.

²⁵ Wæver, O. (1996). European security identities. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 34(1), 103-132, p. 108.

²⁶ Munster, van R. (2009). *Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 40.

actors use a language of risk management to obtain the authorization to respond to the emergencies.

The contested nature of security and accordingly the complexity in its standardization make the security related issues harder to address. According to the security approach of the Copenhagen School, desecuritization is the aim and thus they prefer desecuritization instead of securitization. Yet, this preference is not a 'political stance type' but an effect emerged as a consequence of securitization analysis: it points out the costs of securitization while accepting the view that society may have a chance to cope with the challenges with a focus and mobilization of attention and resources.²⁷ Desecuritization is the opposite of securitization; in other words, it means removing an issue from the sphere of security. Hereby, the reasons providing the basis for securitizing actors to appeal emergency measures disappear and those actors exercise their rule in a normal way since there is no basis for extraordinary measures. Furthermore, as Munster puts it, "measures aimed to increase security in fact may trigger more insecurity".²⁸

2.2. Securitization in the Societal Sector

Until the end of the Cold War the referent object of security was the state. The conflicts among the states and the protection of the state interest constituted the subjects for the research. However, this trend in security studies changed following the Cold War. The emergence of new security threats and consequently new security sectors led to the change in the referent object. The referent object is no longer only the state; on the contrary, each security sector has its own specific referent objects. By virtue of the fact that societal security is analyzed in this study, the referent object is the society and the values attached. The concept of society does not mean a bunch of people. To the contrary, it is "necessarily to some degree more than the sum of its parts, and not reducible to individuals".²⁹ The threat of migration to the society, i.e.

²⁷ Wæver, O. (2011). Politics, security, theory. *Security Dialogue*. 42(4-5), 465–480. p. 469.

²⁸ Munster, van R. (2009). *Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 42.

²⁹ Wæver, O. (1993). Societal security: the concept. In O. Wæver et al. (Eds.), *Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe* (1st ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., p. 18.

to the referent object, gained momentum after this state based security approach changed. The migration related issues were not on the top priority list of the political actors since they were regarded as domestic political issues.

There are two kinds of migration in general: voluntary and involuntary migration. The type of migration is closely linked with when it takes place and under which conditions. The present conjuncture is determinative on the evolution of migration in a sense. In a globalized world like we live in, it is inevitable to be isolated from what happens in the outer world. This global interaction is a social interaction at the same time. The political developments in the world affect the societal ones and vice versa. The role of population movements in this interaction has become more crucial in recent decades. Those movements are significant feature of the contemporary world.

Migration is not a new issue, it has taken place long before. Nonetheless, securitization of migration is a new phenomenon for security studies. After the Cold War, securitization of migration in the member states of the European Union became quite visible. The process of securitization of migration in the European Union started even before the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that the EU securitized migration immediately after the Cold War. By contrast with, the EU started to take measures on migration related issues during 1980s-1990s when it tried to provide free movement to the EU citizens across the member states' territories. While providing free movement along the internal borders, it made some provisions to control external borders of the Union. Although the EU started to securitize migration and asylum before the end of the Cold War, this securitization became more visible following the end of the Cold War.³⁰ This securitization or Europeanization of migration and asylum policies revealed itself in the treaties one after another. In addition to treaties, new mechanisms were incorporated for the objective of securitization of migration in the EU.

The Copenhagen School conceptualizes five sectors for security studies and societal sector is one of them which is as significant as the other security sectors. The

³⁰ Securitization of migration and asylum policies in the European Union is detailed in the following chapter. See chapter 3 for further details on this issue.

importance of societal security was understood immediately after the Cold War. The atmosphere after the end of the Cold War was convenient for this development because state-dominated international politics underwent a radical change and this change came with the consequences. The newly emerging threats to security were among those consequences. The problem of insecurity of the state was no longer the only and the most crucial subject for security studies. The focus on society and its protection against threats became as prominent as security of the state.

The issue of migration is included as one of the most common issues defined as threats to societal security together with horizontal competition and vertical competition in the Copenhagen School scholars' analysis. In this analysis on migration, they mention the effect of mass migration as "X people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people", preservation of the community as "the X community will not be what it used to be", and threat to identity as "X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population".³¹

When the threats to societal security are concerned, identity concept needs to be involved in the research. The perception of threats against societal security as threats against identity and survival of the society forms the basis of securitization. The utmost importance is given to the issue of security with a view that if the way dealing with this issue is not the right one, it will change everything "because then we are not here (as us)".³² The identity of a society and its protection against threats is at the core of societal security. The referent object of societal security is society. Thus, the components of a society such as identity, nation, religion, values may be under threat in case of insecurity.

According to Buzan et al., "society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community".³³ In the same way, "societal insecurity exists when communities of

³¹ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., p. 121.

³² Wæver, O. (1996). European security identities. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 34(1), p. 111.

³³ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., p. 119.

whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community”.³⁴ Immigration of a different group is thought as a threat to sustainability of stability in the community. The closeness to change in terms of identity values, or, to put it differently, the values and traditions intrinsic to a social group entails to an understanding of the outsiders as a threat. This conservativeness with regards to identity tends to see immigrants as a threat beforehand.

The tolerance to existence of foreigners varies from country to country. In fact it differs from person to person in a society depending on political opinion and cultural background. The people adopting a more conservative approach give strong reaction to presence of immigrants. The acknowledgement of immigrants by conservative groups is more difficult. Once the newcomers are of a different race and religion, acceptance by the receiving society becomes harder. Those two notions are amongst the constituent elements of identity and nation. The identification of people with race and religion has effect on threat construction. The immigrants and asylum seekers of a different race and religion from the residents of the receiving society share the same fate. The recruitment of those immigrants is discerned as more problematic than the recruitment of the ones that have a common background. The practices of securitization feeds racism and xenophobia in Europe. The people of a different identity in terms of history, values, language are exposed to xenophobic treatment.

As much as race is significant, religion has an important place in threat perception. The group of people, who are members of a different faith, are more disadvantageous in their struggle against difficulties. For the European immigrants, it is easier to be accepted and integrated to a community within the boundaries of the European Union. Nevertheless, the existence of non-Europeans in Europe is seen by some of the residents as posing a problem to their peace and security. In case where the immigrants or asylum seekers are believers of Islam, their acceptance by the receiving European society is harder. The suspicion towards Muslim immigrants both at the state and societal level leads to securitization.

The identification through nation is still a valid assessment. According to Gellner cited in Wæver, culture is self-reflective due to nationalism; and Wæver uses this

³⁴ Ibid.

statement to explain the reactions motivated by threats to 'our identity' in case the identity is self-reflective national identity.³⁵ The role of national sentiment in threat construction should not be underestimated. The political orientation of the extreme nationalist groups is based on ensuring that the society sides against the outsiders. In case of migration, immigrants and asylum seekers are seen as putting the integrity of the community in danger. They are perceived as the 'others' not one of 'us'.

Buzan et al. make a remark on the consequence of the threat construction by pointing out the connection between threats to identity and 'we' understanding and this connection's effect as the construction or reproduction of 'us'.³⁶ As it can be inferred from this phrase, threat constructions benefit to close ranks with the members of the community against the 'others'. On the other hand, the distance between residents and newcomers increases as a consequence of securitization practices. The doubts on the presence of the foreigners causes keeping them at a distance. Therefore, integration of the immigrants and asylum seekers gets difficult. In addition to this, it may cause more insecurity due to this distance between the host community and immigrants. The lack of trust and solidarity between those two parties may result in more insecurity.

The European Union and the European civilization consist of a shared history and values. Huntington conceives of civilization as "defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people".³⁷ Europeanness and Christianity are crucial features of the Union. When the immigrants are of a different region and religion, the European community tends to act with suspicion towards them.

Buzan points out the interrelation between competing identities and migration by arguing that mutually exclusive identities lead to outbreak of threats from competing

³⁵ Wæver, O. (1993). Societal security: the concept. In O. Wæver et al. (Eds.), *Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe* (1st ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., p. 40.

³⁶ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., p. 120.

³⁷ Huntington, S. (1993). The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*. 72(3), 22-49, p. 24.

identities; and he gives the example of impossibility of being simultaneously both a Christian and a Muslim or both a Greek and a Turk.³⁸

The believers of Islam migrating from Arab lands are mostly subjected to this kind of suspicion. This situation recalls Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' to mind in which he mentions a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West.³⁹ The dominating source of conflicts foreseen by him are cultural ones that will lead to the clash of civilizations in global politics.⁴⁰ The differences between Islam and the West as two different societal communities pave the way for the skepticism of Europeans. The differentiation on the basis of ethnic and religious terms as being two different camps with dissimilarities inconveniences the acceptance of the Arab-Muslim immigrants by Europeans. Huntington states that as a consequence of defining their identity on the basis of ethnicity and religion, people perceive an 'us' versus 'them' relation existing between themselves and people that belong to another ethnicity or religion.⁴¹

In Ukrainian immigration, there is not a clash of civilizations since Ukrainians are seen as 'us'. The fact that Ukrainians are European and Christian is effective in their acceptance in Europe. Besides these, shared values and history, language, customs, institutions and subjective self-identification of people are also important in welcoming Ukrainian immigrants to Europe. Trust and solidarity between the host community and the immigrants, which is an important factor in the perception of security, is seen in the case of immigration from Ukraine. Thus, the integration of Ukrainian immigrants into the countries they live in becomes easier. To put it differently, Ukrainians enjoy the advantage of being European immigrants. They are not exposed to xenophobia because they have the same background with Europe. Due to all these mentioned commonalities, it is clearly understood that there is no

³⁸ Buzan, B. (1993). Societal security, state security and internationalisation. In O. Wæver et al. (Eds.), *Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe* (1st ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., pp. 43-44.

³⁹ Huntington, S. (1993). The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*. 72(3), 22-49, p. 32.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 22.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 29.

need for securitization in EU policies and discourses when it comes to Ukrainian immigrants. Securitization is not included in speeches when it comes to Ukrainian immigrants since threat perception is required for securitization, Also, migration from Ukraine is not seen as a migration or influx that will change identity.

2.3. Regional Security Complexes

The concept of regional security complex was put forward by Barry Buzan in early 1980s⁴² and it was developed by Buzan and Wæver in their book *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*.⁴³ The significance of the regional level in security analysis exists in the concept ‘security complexes’ itself that presents an analytical framework in which the aggregation of security concerns in a regional formation can be analyzed.⁴⁴ According to Buzan a security complex is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”.⁴⁵

The interaction between the pressures of local geographical proximity and anarchic structure and its balance-of-power consequences leads to establishment of regional security complexes.⁴⁶ As argued by Walt cited in Buzan and Wæver, security interaction takes place among neighbors more than among states which are settled in different places as a consequence of simple physical adjacency.⁴⁷ The

⁴² Buzan, B. (1983). *People, states, and fear: The national security problem in international relations*. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books.

⁴³ Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and powers: The structure of international security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁴ Wæver, O. (2004, March). *Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, p. 9.

⁴⁵ Buzan, B. (1991). *People, States & Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, p. 190.

⁴⁶ Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and powers: The structure of international security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 45.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

interdependence of the states is the crucial *raison d'être* of regional security complexes. Through those complexes, the states have a chance to act in solidarity on affairs that are of particular concern to them.

Buzan conceives the pattern of amity and enmity among states as an important element in definition of regional security and in having a better understanding of the relational pattern and character of insecurity.⁴⁸ He argues that regional security subsystems which are restrained within a specific geographical area can be considered in terms of patterns of amity and enmity.⁴⁹ The principal of keeping the friends close is embraced in this understanding. More precisely, the alliance of friends against mutual enemies brings regional security complexes into existence.

The importance of the regional level is emphasized by the Copenhagen School in its regional security complex theory. The end of the Cold War and bipolar world order changed the focus from global security to regional one. The idea underlying the essentiality of regional security complexes points to a different international system. As stated by Kolodziej and Harkavy the prevailing tendency is the “decentralization of the international security system”.⁵⁰ In this decentralized system, instead of a central power, there is a power distribution among states.

The variety of security problems causes a differentiation of security agendas for each region. The European security complex differs from the Middle Eastern security complex for instance. After the end of the Cold War, security became a hot topic for Europe. The maintenance of peace and security within territory of Europe was a prominent impetus for the formation of a European security community.

Moreover, The European integration process is important in analysis of European security complex. As stated by Buzan, as far as the integration succeeds, the large part of the European security complex will be turned into a single actor being “major

⁴⁸ Buzan, B. (1991). *People, States & Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, pp. 189-190.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁵⁰ Kolodziej, E. A., & Harkavy, R. (1980). Developing states and the international security system. *Journal of International Affairs*, 34(1), 59-87, p. 59.

node” in the complex and “one of several major poles of power” at the international level.⁵¹

2.4. Discursive Constructions of Migration as a Threat

When the chips are down, that is to say, when an environment based upon fear and suspicion is established through the speech acts of securitizing actors, it means that the necessary environment for securitization is provided in a sense. Wæver contemplates of security as a “speech act”:

What then *is* security? With the help of the language theory, we can regard “security” as a *speech act*. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.⁵²

The aforementioned analysis of Wæver illustrates the power and ability of the speech act. The existence of a real threat is not needed to securitize an issue. On the contrary, through the speech acts of the political elites an issue can be transferred into security realm.

The state representatives introduces something as a threat and asks for the authorization to control and eliminate this threat. In this way, the political actors have authorization in return of providing security to society.

It can be argued that the EU’s internal border policy became linked with its external border control. The political discourse contributes to criminalization of migration and asylum in some cases. In the discourses on others, the measures for the sake of fight against terrorism are underlined by the political elites. The entrance of the

⁵¹ Buzan, B. (1993). Introduction: The changing security agenda in Europe. In O. Wæver et al. (Eds.), *Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe* (1st ed.). New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., p. 9.

⁵² Wæver, O. (1995). Securitization and desecuritization. In R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), *On security*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 55.

immigrants and asylum seekers are introduced as a potential threat to security. The affiliation of migration and asylum issues with terrorism are widely used by the state actors in their speeches.

Particularly, after September 11 2001 attacks, the EU policy makers tend to evaluate asylum with suspicion. This skepticism results in increase of border control mechanisms and makes the recruitment of asylum seekers to the EU harder. Thereby, people in need, who are not one of 'us', suffer from those policies in their search for safe places.

The influence of identity in the discourses is unquestionable. The consideration of security as a zero-sum game in identity terms produces skepticism and even hostility among the groups in a society. In this way, the host community defines their survival vis-à-vis the existence of immigrants. The identification of a group as opposed to other groups causes the problematic threat construction.

The division between groups in identity terms; in other words, the creation of the camps of 'us' and 'them' paves the way for act of securitization. The threat perception becomes dependent on how people identify themselves. This situation plays into the state representatives' hands when they securitize an issue.

The anti-immigration discourses apply security argument to mobilize citizens against immigrants. Through this security rhetoric, the feelings of the residents towards the immigrants are tried to be affected. The tension between the receiving society and the newcomers is prompted in this way. The sentiments of the residents for the newcomers; for instance, "the fear of being swamped by foreigners" can easily be activated in the political agenda as a security issue.⁵³ On the issues related with welfare, the politicians use the rhetoric of the abuses of asylum by the asylum seekers. The speech acts illustrating non-European asylum seekers as abusers of the asylum policies of the EU prompts the negative feelings of the residents on the

⁵³ Buzan, B. (1993). Societal security, state security and internationalisation. In O. Wæver et al. (Eds.), *Identity migration and the new security agenda in Europe* (1st ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., p. 45.

asylum seekers. Hence, the discourses portraying asylum as a threat to welfare make the acceptance and integration of the new comers difficult.

2.5. Conclusion

The work of the Copenhagen School explains security and securitization in detail. In doing so, the scholars of the Copenhagen School employ a constructivist approach in their analysis. The multisector security approach adopted by the Copenhagen School put forwards a better understanding of security. In addition to securitization and sectors, inclusion of regional security complexes into security studies contributes to analysis on security. The widening of security sectors to encapsulate societal sector achieves a significant breakthrough in security studies.

The speech act of the Copenhagen School which gives a different point of view on security issues are crucial in analysis on securitization. The threats are constructed through speech acts of the political actors. Moreover, the mobilization of people against existential threats in accordance with the direction of the elites or state actors can be ensured through the speech acts. When those threats are brought forward as threats to security by those actors, they must be persuasive to take people's support. For a speech act to be successful, there should be acceptance of the audience.

Security is basically “the pursuit of freedom from existential threats”⁵⁴ or “freedom from threats to core values”.⁵⁵ The construction of threats is at the same time construction of fears among people. The creation of fear in societies obstructs the achievement of unity and solidarity in a society. The issues of migration and asylum and their evaluation as security matters complicate the acts of the political actors.

The problematique of whether to include or to exclude the incomers is a significant decision for the policy makers. Moreover, the implications of this decision is crucial.

⁵⁴ Huysmans, J. (2006). *The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge, p. 47.

⁵⁵ Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2011). *The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 194.

The effect of insecurity on the society is the creation of a perception that the factors causing threat need to be controlled and countered until eliminated in order to have chances to survive.⁵⁶ The perception of the receiving society of immigrants and asylum seekers as threats to their security is constructed through discourses of the elites. Hereby, securitization is socially constructed.

Securitization of migration and asylum in the European Union through speech acts encouraging a division of 'us' versus 'them' affects the policies of the EU. Furthermore, the treaties and mechanisms generated for the sake of providing security restrict the entrance of the immigrants and asylum seekers. The construction of migration and asylum as threats to societal security of the EU after the Cold War period became more intense following the 9/11. The affiliation of the migration related issues with terrorism and perceiving the asylum seekers as potential terrorists made securitization practices more intense within the EU. Nonetheless, with the migration movement of the Ukrainians fleeing war we have seen that it is not migration per se that causes societal insecurities and securitization. What matters is the way migrants are defined in terms of identity.

⁵⁶ Huysmans, J. (2006). *The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge, pp. 54-55.

CHAPTER 3

SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

3.1. European Union's Migration and Asylum Policy

After the Second World War, the war-torn European states launched the process of reconstruction and economic recovery. To achieve this goal, the European states needed immigrant workforce and there was increasing demand for labor force in the European economies. The labor shortage was filled with 'guest workers' or immigrants in the European countries suffering from severe labor shortages. The recruitment of the immigrants workforce was done through various bilateral agreements in this period since Western European were in need of economic recovery and growth. There have been crucial and fundamental changes in EU migration policy as time went on. Due to the 1970s oil crisis, the guest workers system of 1950s and 1960s experienced restrictions in 1970s. The European countries began to apply restrictive immigration policies in the aftermath of the economic downturn.

In addition to economic migrants, asylum seekers and refugees were adversely affected from the applied restrictions. Since there was absence of large scale refugee mobility as a consequence of impregnability of Iron Curtain in the Eastern Europe, the refugee burden had been considered by Europe as more of a concern for the Third World and the United States until 1980s; and hence there was relative immunity of Europe to the threat.⁵⁷ However, the economic crisis and the increasing level of unemployment led to suspicion towards immigrants. Even the asylum seekers and

⁵⁷ Schuck, P. H. (1997). Refugee burden-sharing: A modest proposal. *Yale Journal of International Law*, 22(2), 243-297, p. 245.

refugees were targeted as one of the causes of the economic crisis by some groups especially by the extreme right. Moreover, technological advancement in the sectors of information and transportation in 1980s had a role in the evolvement of migratory movements. The increasing globalization extended the means of transportation; and thus, the potential immigrants had more opportunities for reaching to the destination countries. Those global developments turned migration into a globalized phenomenon in a sense. In 1980s, there was a crucial increase in the numbers of the asylum seekers from the Third World as well. According to Collinson cited in Marfleet, based on the estimates of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there was an increase in the numbers of refugees worldwide which increased from 1985 to 1991 by 70 percent to 17 million.⁵⁸

After the Cold War, there had been crucial changes in migration and asylum policy of the EU. The hospitality of the EU towards asylum seekers from the Eastern European countries did not last a long time. On the contrary, the entry of the asylum seekers from communist countries were restricted by virtue of the fact that the ideological war between two blocks came to an end. Also, there was a dramatic increase in numbers. In 1990s, the world has witnessed an unprecedented international migration throughout history. The disintegration of the Soviet Union opened the ways for moving to the West for the citizens of the former Soviet republics due to the elimination of the emigration restrictions. This development caught the West unawares though. In addition to immigrants and asylum seekers from the Eastern Europe, the West faced with migration from the Balkans in 1990s. When the war in Yugoslavia broke out, the Western Europe was confronted with another migration movement. The asylum seekers fleeing war at home resorted to help of European countries.

Under the circumstances of increasing migration to Europe, the European countries found the solution in discouragement of the potential immigrants and asylum seekers to reach to the frontiers of Europe. Nevertheless, the number of the immigrants had already increased owing to family reunification. In addition to family reunification,

⁵⁸ Marfleet, P. (1998). Migration and the refugee experience. In R. Kiely, & P. Marfleet (Eds.), *Globalisation and the third world*. (pp. 69-92). London: Routledge, p. 81.

political landscape determined this increase. The political and social developments causing this situation will be touched upon briefly in this section of the study. Both the historical and institutional developments having an impact on securitization of migration and asylum policies of the European Union will be explained. In addition to securitization, migration will also be addressed as a human rights issue.

3.1.1. Abolishment of the Internal Borders: Single European Act

Migration has already been considered as a security matter in consequence of the entry into force of the Single European Act (SEA) on 1 July 1987. It was the revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The role of the SEA in the formation of the common migration policy in the EU is significant. It can be considered as the first major initiative towards securitization of migration and refugee policies of the Union.

The SEA served to the objective of creating a single market by removing the barriers. Thereby, free trade among members of the European Community is aimed together with increasing harmonization. As it was indicated in Article 8 (a), free movement of goods, services, persons and capital is ensured with this treaty which eliminates internal borders.⁵⁹ The repercussion of this treaty on external borders was inevitable. Article 29 of the White Paper on Completing the Internal Market emphasized the control of external borders in case of the abolishment of internal borders of the Community.⁶⁰ The new security concerns arose out of borderless Europe. In this context, more freedom within the European Community (EC) came with increasing controls in external frontiers.

The SEA disambiguated the distinction between internal borders and external borders of the Community. The issues falling into internal affairs of the countries were transferred to foreign policy area. Accordingly, migration that was treated as a

⁵⁹ The Single European Act. Retrieved January 20, 2017 from http://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaties_establishing_the_european_communities_single_european_act_en.pdf

⁶⁰ Commission of the European Communities. (14AD). Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Milan, 28-29 June 1985). *COM (85) 310 final*. Retrieved January 22, 2017, from http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf

domestic issue before became a security concern for the EC members and it was evaluated as a foreign policy matter. The requirements for third country nationals entering the EC area were arranged and the entry of those people were restricted. The migrants were kept out of the regulation of free movement of persons on account of the fact that they are not European Community nationals.

3.1.2. Era of a borderless Europe: The Schengen Agreement

While the SEA disambiguated the difference between internal and external borders of the EU, the Schengen Agreement made this difference certain. The Schengen Agreement which was the predecessor of the Schengen Convention, signed on 14 June 1985 by five of the ten member states of the then European Economic Community – Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, and West Germany – was a crucial step towards the abolition of internal border controls and the creation of the Schengen Area.

The free movement across the internal frontiers came into the picture as the Schengen area and the accession of new members to the Community, which later became the European Union, resulted in enlargement of the EU in the course of time. Consequently, it led to the expansion of the Schengen area to comprise twenty-three of the twenty-seven states of the EU member states – the Republic of Ireland opted out and the other three member states, namely, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus are waiting for joining the Schengen area.

The objective of creating an area in which greater mobility is enhanced for the signatory states brought the security idea in its wake. As Karanja touched upon, the national security considerations instead of gains of free movement come to the forefront despite of the fact that the goal of creation of Schengen was enhancement of free movement.⁶¹ For instance, the path followed by the Community members on the issue of asylum exemplifies the situation quite good. The sovereignty of the state is preserved when the right of asylum comes into question because of the fact that the

⁶¹ Karanja, S. K. (2008). *Transparency and proportionality in the Schengen information system and border control co-operation*. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 50.

member states are held responsible for granting asylum. Besides, the principle of responsibility of one state in dealing with asylum applications is agreed upon by the signatory parties.

The necessary measures in the field of migration and security to control external borders are specified in Article 7 of the Schengen Agreement and worded as follows:

The Parties shall endeavour to approximate their visa policies as soon as possible in order to avoid the adverse consequences in the field of immigration and security that may result from easing checks at the common borders. They shall take, if possible by 1 January 1986, the necessary steps in order to apply their procedures for the issue of visas and admission to their territories, taking into account the need to ensure the protection of the entire territory of the five States against illegal immigration and activities which could jeopardise security.⁶²

The Agreement was also a step for the common visa policy formulation of the Community. The visa policies of the member states for the entries at the external frontiers of the Schengen area were tried to be standardized in a way. The objective of the creation of common standards at the external borders came with compensatory measures, such as Schengen Information System (SIS), European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (EURODAC). The point that draws attention in those regulations is well asserted by Nanz who argues that in the middle of the 1980s, the consideration on compensatory measures required for internal border checks concentrated on the understanding that there had to be a shift in border checks from the controls at the internal frontiers to external ones.⁶³ Thereby, the member states restricted the access to the Schengen area.

The limitations on the entries seem in favor of the citizens of the signatory states since they are subjected to positive discrimination with the rights granted to them for

⁶² European Union, Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, Schengen Agreement, 14 June 1985, Official Journal L 239 , 22/09/2000 P. 0013 - 0018, 42000A0922(01). Retrieved January 21, 2017, from <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddcb75a4.html>

⁶³ Nanz, K. P. (1995). The Schengen Agreement: Preparing the free movement of persons in the European Union. In R. Bieber, & J. Monar (Eds.), *Justice and home affairs in the European Union: The development of the Third Pillar*. (pp. 29-48). Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, p. 33.

their free movement across the Schengen area. The restrictions on the entry into the Schengen area have had a reverse effect on the immigrants and asylum seekers though. Particularly, third country nationals suffered the regulation in question. In addition to this, the signs of criminalization of migration can be found in Article 9 of the Schengen Agreement. It was pointed out in Article 9 that “the parties shall reinforce cooperation between their customs and police authorities, notably in combating crime, particularly illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and arms, the unauthorised entry and residence of persons, customs and tax fraud and smuggling.”⁶⁴ Hereby, irregular migration is criminalized since there is a special emphasis on irregular migration as being one of the threats that requires attention coupled with other transnational crimes.

3.1.3. Dublin Convention

The Dublin Convention was signed in Dublin on 15 June 1990 and entered into force on 1 September 1997. The member states convened in Dublin to consult with each other on the subject of determination of the state responsible for examination of asylum applications. In addition to designation of the responsible state, the prevention of asylum applications to more than one member state was aimed with the Dublin Convention or with the full title ‘Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities’. Another objective of the Convention was ensuring the examination of the asylum applications by a member state; however, this objective is applicable if there is a safe third country that can be responsible for granting asylum to applicants. Furthermore, “asylum shopping” was tried to be prevented by the signatory states. In order to restrict asylum shopping, the first EU country that an individual enters must be the one where asylum is sought according to Dublin Convention.⁶⁵ Hereby, it was intended that an asylum seeker applies only

⁶⁴ The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. Retrieved January 21, 2017 from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:42000A0922%2801%29:EN:HTML>

⁶⁵ Difato, C. (2013). Citizenship and education: Economic competitiveness, social cohesion, and human rights. In A. Profanter, & F. Owtram (Eds.), *Citizenship in transition: New perspectives on*

one country when s/he seeks asylum from the EU Member States. With this practice; in other words, with “first host country” principle, state party becomes responsible for examination of asylum applications and/or the return of (illegal) immigrants to that state in question which is also the one first enabling the entry of the foreigner.⁶⁶ Also, the Convention serves to the interest of the member states favored by the asylum seekers owing to the fact that the pressure on those states alleviates as it brings aforementioned allocation criteria. In the light of this development, it can be argued that the accession of the asylum seekers to the EU countries is restricted with this Convention since it allows access only to the first country that asylum seekers enter; and thus, it restrains the chances of the individuals seeking asylum from the EU countries.

The “safe third country” concept is a result of the London Resolutions of 1992. If there is a transition through a safe country, which is a country regarded as safe, the EU member states can refuse the examination of an asylum request since it was agreed upon by the member states that the safe country that an asylum seeker passes through must be the one asylum is sought in this case. It was stated in Article 3(5) of the Dublin Convention that “Any Member State shall retain the right, pursuant to its national laws, to send an applicant for asylum to a third State, in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, as amended by the New York Protocol.”⁶⁷ It gives Member States the right of sending an asylum seeker to a third State without enforcement of the rules on designation of responsibility to which the Convention touches upon.⁶⁸ Secondly, London Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications

transnational migration from the Middle East to Europe. (pp. 85-108). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, p. 89.

⁶⁶ The term “illegal” was used in order not to disrupt the integrity of the cited statement. Lavenex, S. (2001). Migration and the EU’s new eastern border: between realism and liberalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8(1), 24-42, p. 29.

⁶⁷ Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities - Dublin Convention. Retrieved January 22, 2017 from [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?jsessionid=TTTpTsvTr1VHTFy9MgfSBLjMcpPCKDrm1cPFy6J4JhpSnhcxvrD2!-228044560?uri=CELEX:41997A0819\(01\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?jsessionid=TTTpTsvTr1VHTFy9MgfSBLjMcpPCKDrm1cPFy6J4JhpSnhcxvrD2!-228044560?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01))

⁶⁸ Ericsson, S. (2000). *Asylum in the EU Member States* (European Parliament Directorate-General for Research Civil Liberties Series LIBE 108 EN). Retrieved January 25, 2017, from European Parliament website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/libe/pdf/108_en.pdf, pp. 5-6.

for asylum sets the criteria for manifestly unfounded applications for asylum and accelerated procedures; and it gives Member States the option of using admissibility procedures if there is probability of rejection of applications on objective grounds. Another concept taking part in literature is the concept of safe countries of origin. Conclusions on countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution; stated in different words, Conclusions on safe countries of origin specifies the conditions for the non-EU countries to be regarded as safe; and thus, asylum applications of the individuals from that country may be decided as manifestly unfounded and accelerated procedures may be applied.⁶⁹ As it can be inferred from both the Dublin Convention and the London Resolutions, the chances of the potential asylum seekers diminish by virtue of the procedures applied to those people in line with the institutional developments.

3.1.4. Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty or Treaty on European Union (TEU), was signed on 7 February 1992 by the European Community Member States in Maastricht, and entered into force on 1 November 1993. TEU created the European Union (EU). The European Union comprises of three pillars: the European Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. The cooperation of the Member States in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) is mentioned in Title VI of the Treaty. The issues of common interest are indicated in Article K.1 of Title VI, namely asylum policy; rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon; immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries; combating drug addiction; combating fraud on an international scale; judicial cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matters; police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime.⁷⁰ Migration and asylum policies of the EU are two of the emphasized matters that need cooperation of the Member States together with other criminal matters.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 6.

⁷⁰ Treaty on European Union. Retrieved January 22, 2017 from https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf

The sorting of the issues of cooperation illustrates a significant fact that migration and asylum are perceived as potential threats to the Union which has come to the fore before with other institutional developments. This threat perception acquired a different dimension after the three pillars structure was introduced. It led to the cooperation of the Member States in the field of migration and asylum; however, their cooperation did not result in full cooperation at the EU level. On the contrary, sovereignty of the Member States on migration and asylum related issues continued. This intergovernmental structure created by the Treaty on European Union concerning the justice and home affairs made the entries of the migrants and asylum seekers to Europe more difficult.

The introduction of the concept of European citizenship with this treaty resulted in the increased distinction between the Europeans and non-Europeans. In Title I Article B of the Treaty, this issue is addressed as one of the objectives of the Union by stating that “The Union shall set itself the following objectives: ... to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union.”⁷¹

This underlined distinction creates more barriers for the third country nationals seeking asylum because the Union’s treatment of the citizenship concept as a matter of protection of the nationals of the Member States changes the focus on the non-European individuals who are not included in the scope of the citizenship. The non-European individuals as categorized different from the European citizens who need protection may easily be seen as threatening aliens by the Europeans in this sense.

3.1.5. Amsterdam Treaty

The Amsterdam Treaty amending the Maastricht Treaty was signed on 2 October 1997 and it entered into force on 1 May 1999. The official name of the treaty is the “Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts”. Furthermore,

⁷¹ Ibid.

Schengen cooperation was incorporated into the European Union legal framework by the Amsterdam Treaty. Besides, the opt-outs of two member states, namely Ireland and the United Kingdom preferring to remain outside the Schengen Area, were preserved.

The shift of the issues of the Third Pillar related to migration to Community level with this treaty initiated a new period for the European immigration policy and it also resulted in a pause in the intergovernmental methodology up to this time.⁷² In doing so, all of the issues mentioned in Article K.1 of the Treaty on European Union, except of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, were transferred to the first pillar under Title IV ‘Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons’.

The transfer of migration and asylum issues from intergovernmental to supranational level was a significant achievement for harmonization of asylum policies of the Union. Although the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was an important step towards supranationalization, opened the way for a supranational methodology to be used in European migration and asylum policy, dominance of the sovereign states continued and their national interests prevailed through restrictive policies in practice.

The European Union began to create an area of freedom, security and justice with the Amsterdam Treaty. In the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1999 Tampere European Council continued this process with a program for establishing an area of freedom, justice and security and for the development of common migration and refugee policies.

The significance of this treaty for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) matters is indisputable. The cooperation in the field of JHA is a crucial EU policy which had already been mentioned in the Treaty on European Union. This is an evidence of Europeanization of migration policies of the Union. Thereby, the EU as an institution securitized migration step by step with every institutional development. The

⁷² Kostakopoulou, T. (2000). The ‘protective Union’: Change and continuity in migration law and policy in post-Amsterdam Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(3), 497-518, p. 498.

legislative procedure for JHA issues became more effective and democratic and the legal basis of decisions in this field (i.e. in the field of justice and home affairs) was made clear as a result of the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty.⁷³

3.2. Securitization in the Post 9/11 Period

The so-called linkage between migration and terrorism revealed itself particularly in the aftermath of 11th September 2001 attacks. Tsoukala touches upon the post-9/11 environment and states that there is construction of “terrorism-immigration-asylum nexus” in which immigrants and particularly asylum seekers ‘stand accused of playing a “fifth column” role on behalf of the global terrorist network’ as argued by Bauman cited in Tsoukala.⁷⁴ The terrorist attacks were organized by Al-Qaeda, a terrorist group that uses Islam. The US responded these attacks by launching the “war on terror” initiative. Since those terrorist attacks were organized by a terrorist group using Islam, the suspicion towards the immigrants and asylum seekers especially towards the Muslim ones increased in the West. The response of the US government to launch war on terror and take emergency measures affected the policies of the actors in the EU as well. The EU resorted to restrictive measures in its migration and asylum policy. The fight against terrorism became a crucial parameter in its border management.

The response of the US to 9/11 can be described as a strategic move with an expansionist intent. The Bush government used these terrorist attacks as the rationale to make an intervention under the ‘war on terror’ concept. The intervention in Iraq is followed by the intervention in Afghanistan and both were carried out as phases of the so-called war on terror policy of the Bush administration. The repercussions of the 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’ policy of the US on the EU are noticeable. The policy makers of the EU resorted to strict rules regulating the external border control

⁷³ Council of the European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, p. 9. Retrieved October 21, 2023, from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>

⁷⁴ Tsoukala, A. (2008). Defining the terrorist threat in the post-september 11 era. In D. Bigo, & A. Tsoukala (Eds.), *Terror, insecurity and liberty: Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11*. (pp. 49-99). London: Routledge, p. 66.

of the Union on the ground that the measures preventing terrorism necessitated. The deterrence of the terrorist acts along the external frontiers of the EU meant increased level of securitization. As a matter of fact, the European countries faced terrorist incidents several times immediately after 9/11 terrorist attacks.

2004 Madrid train bombings, 2005 London bombings, 2011 Norway attacks, November 2015 Paris attacks, 2016 Nice truck attack, 2016 Atatürk Airport attack, 2016 Brussels bombings, 2016 Munich shooting, 2016 Berlin Christmas market attack, May 2017 Manchester Arena bombing, 2017 Barcelona attacks and 2020 Hanau shootings are among the terrorist attacks suffered by Europe.

As a result of these attacks and security threats, major security operations and plans were launched, namely Opération Sentinelle in France, Operation Vigilant Guardian and the Brussels lockdown in Belgium, and Operation Temperer in the United Kingdom. It should be noted here that while most of these attacks were carried out by terrorist groups associated with Islam, some were organized by European individuals. To put it another way, terrorists consist not only of outsiders, i.e. ‘others’, but also of ‘us’, i.e. insiders.

3.3. Increasing Securitization at the External Borders of the European Union

3.3.1. Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency)

Frontex or European Border and Coast Guard Agency is an EU agency and it was generated in 2004. It contributes to the management of external borders of the EU countries and Schengen associated countries and to the harmonization of border controls across the EU.⁷⁵

It has a role in facilitation of cooperation between border authorities in each EU country and provision of technical support and expertise.⁷⁶ According to Frontex

⁷⁵ European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) (n.d.). Retrieved February 3, 2017, from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en

⁷⁶ Ibid.

data, the number of returnees has increased from 3.500 in 2015 to 14.000 in 2017 and now nearly 10 % of all effective returns from the EU is promoted by Frontex.⁷⁷

Frontex is responsible in several areas namely, risk analysis, joint operations, rapid response, research, training, joint returns and information-sharing. First of all, the assessment of risks to EU border security is made, the picture of patterns and trends in irregular migration and cross-border criminal activity at the external borders, including human trafficking is generated, the sharing of its findings with EU countries and the Commission and those findings are utilized by the agency for planning its activities.⁷⁸

Secondly, it has a duty in coordination of the deployment of specially trained staff and technical equipment (aircraft, vessels, and border control/surveillance equipment) to external border areas in need of additional assistance. Those joint operations are important to address since the EU border policy is extra-territorialized; i.e. immigration control of the EU extended beyond its territories. Thirdly, in case of an extreme pressure at an external border that an EU state is facing, particularly when large numbers of non-EU nationals arrive, Frontex is responsible in coordination of the deployment of European Border Guard Teams.⁷⁹

Fourthly, border control experts are brought together with research and industry to make sure new technology meet the needs of border control authorities. Fifthly, in order to harmonize border guard education in EU and Schengen associated countries, common training standards for border authorities are developed by Frontex; so that travellers meet uniform border control standards wherever they cross an external EU border. Sixthly, best practices for returning migrants are developed and joint return operations are coordinated by Frontex (individual countries decide who should be returned). Lastly, development and operation of information systems that enable

⁷⁷ European Union, Frontex. (n.d.). *Foreword*. Retrieved December 25, 2019, from <https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/foreword/>

⁷⁸ European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) (n.d.). Retrieved February 3, 2017, from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en

⁷⁹ Ibid.

swift exchange of information between border authorities is another responsibility of Frontex.⁸⁰

As it can be inferred from the aforementioned responsibilities of Frontex, border security of the EU was highly underlined. In order to carry out the duty of contributing to border security of the EU, specific measures are taken. The problem with those measures is that they are brought forward on account of a more secure Europe while they are restraining the activities of non-EU nationals. Speaking of non-EU nationals, the question of ‘who are those non-EU nationals?’ should be deliberated. The migrants, refugees or asylum seekers, who are willing to cross to the frontiers of the EU to find a safer place, are mostly affected by those preventive measures. The prevention of access to a Member State by ‘would-be immigrants’ in Frontex joint operations by putting pre-border controls into effect⁸¹; and thereby it generates a ‘policy of non-arrival’⁸²

The extra-territorialization of border checks means extension of immigration control outside of the EU territories and this is one of the preventive measures of the EU to hinder potential immigrants from reaching to EU frontiers. This policy of the EU is also called as outsourcing since it is shifting the responsibility of dealing with the issues of migration to non-member states of the EU, i.e. third states. Along with Frontex joint operations, visa policy, carrier sanctions and ‘safe third country’ concept are other elements of extra-territorialization.⁸³

Den Hertog points out that this form of extra-territorial border control, i.e. joint operations, is implemented mainly in African states and there is a possibility that

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Hertog, L. den. (2013). Fundamental rights and the extra-territorialization of EU border policy: A contradiction in terms?. In D. Bigo et al. (Eds.), *Foreigners, refugees or minorities? Rethinking people in the context of border controls and visas*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p. 209.

⁸² Gil-Bazo, M.-T. (2015). The Practice of Mediterranean States in the context of the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited. *International Journal of Refugee Law* 18 (3-4), 571-600, p. 571.

⁸³ Hertog, L. den. (2013). Fundamental rights and the extra-territorialization of EU border policy: A contradiction in terms?. In D. Bigo et al. (Eds.), *Foreigners, refugees or minorities? Rethinking people in the context of border controls and visas*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p. 210.

geographical peculiarity and power asymmetries underlie this extra-territorial attitude of the EU towards migration from the South.⁸⁴

This claim of den Hertog is quite logical as the developments between 2011 and 2015 are taken into account. The Arab revolts and 2015 migration crisis are crucial examples supporting the argument of den Hertog. To prevent migration to Europe, the EU applied a strict extra-territorialized policy and outsourced migration to third countries via institutional tools and agreements.

3.3.2. SIS II - Second Generation Schengen Information System

The second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) was put into operation on 09 April 2013 and replaced SIS1. SIS II as being the largest information system for public security in Europe serves to exchange of information among national border control, customs and police authorities providing people free movement in a safe environment within the EU.⁸⁵ The alerts on missing persons, especially children, information on certain property like banknotes, cars, vans, firearms and identity documents that may have been stolen, misappropriated or lost fall into its remit.⁸⁶

The countries using SIS II consists of 25 EU Member States and 4 Associated Countries, in total 29 countries. The name of the 25 EU countries are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom; and Associated Countries connected to SIS II are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ SIS II - Second generation Schengen Information System. (2018, November 15). Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/dataset/ds00009_en

⁸⁶ SIS II - Second generation Schengen Information System. (2018, November 15). Retrieved December 5, 2018, from https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/dataset/ds00009_en

⁸⁷ Ibid.

3.3.3. Europol

Europol or the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation is the EU's law enforcement agency which was generated in 1998 in order to deal with criminal intelligence and fight with international organized crime and terrorism. Europol is headquartered in The Hague, the Netherlands. According to the Europol's official website, the biggest security threats come from "terrorism, international drug trafficking and money laundering, organized fraud, the counterfeiting of euros, and trafficking in human beings".⁸⁸ In this sentence, threats to security of the EU is clearly defined.

The European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) was formed in the beginning of 2016 following the increasing numbers of irregular immigrants trying to reach to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea, external frontiers of the EU and beyond into the EU.⁸⁹ Europol determined that criminal organizations helped migrants in their journey and thus the crucial duty of the EMSC is promotion of cross-border investigations to disarray and prosecute organized crime groups.⁹⁰

3.3.4. Visa Information System (VIS)

The Visa Information System is one of the EU's external border management tools and the system favors the practice of common EU visa policy. The implementation of the Visa Information system illustrates that the EU gives importance to technological developments that can assist the EU in its border management effectively. The visa data is exchanged among member states via the VIS. All of the Schengen States use the Visa Information System. The consulates in non-EU countries are connected with all external border crossing points of Schengen States in

⁸⁸ Europol. (n.d.). About Europol. Retrieved December 5, 2018 from <https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol>

⁸⁹ Europol. (2018, April 20). All you need to know about migrant smuggling in the EU. Retrieved April 28, 2018 from <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/all-you-need-to-know-about-migrant-smuggling-in-eu>

⁹⁰ Ibid.

the VIS and data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to transit through, the Schengen Area are processed. In order to identify and verify, the VIS can make biometric matching, mainly of fingerprints.⁹¹

The objectives of the VIS are enumerated as facilitating checks and the issuance of visas, fighting abuses, protecting travelers, helping with asylum applications, and enhancing security. It is argued that the VIS facilitates the designation of the EU State responsible for examining an asylum application while the objectives of the system are being explained; on the other hand, another objective of it is explained as enhancing security since the VIS contributes to prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist crimes and other serious criminal offences.⁹²

Those two objectives are contradictory since increased securitization restrain the entry of asylum seekers to the EU. More precisely, it is for the benefit of the EU's security goals rather than for the advantage of asylum seekers.

3.4. Migration as a Human Rights Matter

3.4.1. International Agreements

The EU Member States are parties to certain international agreements that guarantee the rights of refugees, especially in terms of “*non-refoulement*” principle. Geneva Convention (1951) can be regarded as the key text concerning the issue.

While Geneva Convention defines and unfolds the rights of refugees, in the Article 33 of the convention it is openly declared that “no contracting state shall expel or return (“*refouler*”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.⁹³ Universal

⁹¹ Visa Information System (VIS). (n.d.). Retrieved April 29, 2018, from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-information-system_en

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ United Nations. (1951). *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*. Art. 33

Declaration of Human Rights declare that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” in the Article 14.⁹⁴ In the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) again Article 3 (1) directly prohibits refoulement of the refugees by indicating that “no State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”.⁹⁵ These international agreements articulate that those people in refugee position cannot be sent back to the country where their victimhood results from. As a matter of fact, the problematic issue in this context can be considered as the determination of such refugee position since it is the states that grant these positions to the people they think suitable. In this respect, asylum-seekers are mainly left to the mercy of states.

3.4.2. European Structuring of Human Rights

The EU agreed to make a legislative harmonization in the sphere of asylum and refugee protection in Amsterdam Treaty (1999). The minimum standards would be defined in reference to 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol.⁹⁶ In the context of Tampere Programme in 1999 an initiative was taken to establish a “Common European Asylum System”, which would embrace the Geneva Convention fully while emphasizing the non-refoulement principle.⁹⁷ This initiative was carried forward in 2004 Hague Programme in which the objective became to formulate a common asylum procedure that standardizes administrative procedures and the protection provisions.⁹⁸ Same objective is reiterated in the Stockholm Programme in 2010.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ United Nations. (1948). *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Art.14

⁹⁵ United Nations. (1984). *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*. Art. 3

⁹⁶ Madeline Garlick, “Asylum Legislation in the European Community and the 1951 Convention: Key Concerns Regarding Asylum Instruments Adopted in the ‘First Phase’ of Harmonization,” in *Security Versus Freedom?: A Challenge for Europe’s Future*, ed. Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera (New York: Routledge, 2006).

⁹⁷ European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Retrieved October 28, 2019, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#c.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union defines right to asylum again in reference to Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the Charter indicates that no one can be sent back to a place where his or her life is in danger.¹⁰¹ The Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2007 reiterated the objective of developing a common asylum policy while also indicating subsidiary and temporary protection options for third country nationals but again emphasizing the non-refoulement principle.¹⁰² The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Articles 67 and 78 specifically deal with establishing a common asylum policy among the Member States.¹⁰³ In this respect, while Article 67 emphasizes a fair treatment towards the third country nationals who seek asylum, Article 78 specifically gives reference to Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol as the main sources for determining the common standards with underlining the non-refoulement principle. All these documents show that the aim of standardization of the asylum policy in the Member States should at minimum guarantee asylum seeking right and non-refoulement.

The asylum procedure is handled in more detail in the secondary sources including directives and regulations. Temporary Protection Directive identifies minimum standards for the provision of temporary protection in case of ‘mass influx’ from third countries.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, it should be highlighted that the usage of ‘mass influx’ in the Directive is problematic since it is a politically loaded concept; that is, as if those displaced people invade the host country and exploit their resources.

⁹⁸ European Council. (2005). The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union. *Official Journal of the European Communities* C53, p.1-14

⁹⁹ European Council. (2010). The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens. *Official Journal of the European Communities* C115, p.1-38

¹⁰⁰ European Union. (2000). *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*. Art.18

¹⁰¹ European Union. (2000). *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*. Art.19

¹⁰² European Union. (2007). *Treaty of Lisbon*. Art.63

¹⁰³ European Union. (2012). *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*. Art.67-78

¹⁰⁴ Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof. (2001). *Official Journal of the European Communities* L212, p. 12-23.

The Qualification Directive is a common standard to determine whether a third country national is eligible for the refugee status or subsidiary protection.¹⁰⁵ The directive specifically addresses the Geneva Convention and also The Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union in terms of specifying these standards.

In the Article 21, protection from refoulement is identified. Nevertheless, it should be noted that while it is indicated that the Member State should comply with non-refoulement principle, if the Member States are convinced that the third country national is a security threat, they can remove him or her.¹⁰⁶ Such a clause may cause arbitrary applications since it is in the discretion of the Member States to decide whether a third country national is a security threat or not. A Member State that simply wants to remove the third country national can find a ground for this reason since a security threat can be defined as anything.

Dublin III Regulation specifies which Member State is responsible for examining the asylum application.¹⁰⁷ Reception Conditions Directive sets forth the standards of reception conditions for those under protection.¹⁰⁸ Asylum Procedures Directive presents the common standards for granting and withdrawing protection.¹⁰⁹ In the Article 38 of the Directive, the concept of safe third country is introduced.¹¹⁰ The article lays down certain criteria for a country to be a safe third country. In this

¹⁰⁵ Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted. (2011). *Official Journal of the European Union* L337, p. 9-26.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 21.

¹⁰⁷ Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person. (2013). *Official Journal of the European Union* L180, p. 31-59

¹⁰⁸ Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection. (2013). *Official Journal of the European Union* L180, p. 96-116.

¹⁰⁹ Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. (2013). *Official Journal of the European Union* L180, p. 60-95.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 80.

respect, one of the criteria is that the third country national can request refugee status in there. It can be considered as a critical point since considering the EU-Turkey Statement in which the asylum-seekers who transit Greece over Türkiye will be returned to Türkiye, Türkiye is classified as a safe third country. Nevertheless, in the Turkish case a Syrian asylum seeker cannot request a refugee status since Türkiye maintains geographical limitation which means that non-Europeans cannot make asylum application.

EURODAC Regulation enables the establishment of Eurodac database which consists of fingerprints of the third country nationals.¹¹¹ There is certain level of cooperation between Member States and Europol in terms of operating the Eurodac data. It can be argued that such storage of information related to the third country nationals is labelling them as the potential criminals. This shows that the moment third country nationals enter the European border, they are criminalized and subject to discriminatory treatment.

3.5. Conclusion

In this chapter of the thesis, securitization of migration and asylum policies in the European Union are analyzed. The historical and institutional developments leading to increasing securitization in the EU are mentioned at the beginning. Securitization after 9/11 is pointed out. The border control mechanisms are explained briefly. The perspective of human rights is also included into the analysis.

First of all, the process of evolution and alteration of European Union's Migration and Asylum Policy is contextualized. The Single European Act, the Schengen

¹¹¹ Regulation No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice. (2013). *Official Journal of the European Union* L180, p.1-30

Agreement, the Dublin Convention, the Maastricht Treaty, and the Amsterdam Treaty which have had crucial role in securitization policy of the EU and in the creation of a 'fortress Europe' are mentioned briefly. These institutional developments have generated internal and external borders and thus have securitized migration and asylum policy of the Union step by step.

Secondly, securitization in the post 9/11 period is discussed. The environment in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 attacks, policies adopting more protective approaches, and tendencies to link immigration with other criminal activities particularly with terrorism are addressed. Moreover, 'war on terror' initiative of 2003 and its impacts are stated in the study. The immediate impact of 9/11 on immigrants and refugees has been felt in the West. Due to the fact that a terrorist group using Islam organized those attacks, the perception towards immigrants and refugees who believe in Islam became more suspicious and negative. The migration policies of the European Union have been affected from this environment as well. The EU's migration and refugee policies have become more restricted and 'fight against terrorism' have become a prominent issue in its border management.

Thirdly, increasing securitization at the external borders of the EU is explained briefly by pointing out four crucial bodies which are prominent for security of the external borders of the EU, namely Frontex, SIS II, Europol, Visa Information System (VIS). Lastly, an analysis of migration as a human rights matter is conducted through the research of international agreements and the European structuring of human rights. Through the legal documents, the restrictive attitude of the EU is criticized.

CHAPTER 4

THE RESPONSE OF THE EU TO ARAB SPRING AND INVASION OF UKRAINE

4.1. Arab Spring and Its Repercussions on the European Union

The Arab uprisings, more widely known as ‘the Arab Spring’, were waves of pro-democracy protests occurred in the Middle East and North Africa. The uprisings originated in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and they had a spill-over effect on the region later on in 2011. In those uprisings, the authoritarian regimes were protested by people and some of the governments were overthrown afterwards. The democratic protests, which spread rapidly due to social media overturned the regimes of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. On the one hand the protests resulted in government reshuffle, on the other hand, they brought along civil war in some countries, namely Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.

The reasons behind those uprisings were political and economic problems. The protests extended their sphere of influence through social media sharing and the pace and scale of the revolts increased dramatically throughout the world. The developments in the MENA region astonished rest of the world because of the fact that the world did not expect such reactions in the region since the regimes were authoritarian. The ongoing unrest in the region was known fact; however, such influential and tangible insurrection mesmerized the world and that was an unexpected development.

The protests began in Tunisia in December 2010 and the incident of the self-immolation of young Mohamed Bouazizi, who was a street vendor protesting his treatment by local officials, became the starting point of the Arab revolts. After that heart breaking incident, the protests in Tunisia were named as ‘Jasmine Revolution’

in the media which spread throughout the country. The then Tunisian government tried to oppress the protests by using violence against protesters. However, pro-democracy protests in Tunisia achieved their objective, the corrupt government was overthrown. Then President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, after 23 years in power, fled to Saudi Arabia a month later in January 2011 and a democratic election was held in the country. In December 2011, both a president and prime minister were chosen in democratic elections and they inaugurated.

The spillover effect of the democratic protests in Tunisia extended to other countries in the region. The protests erupted in Bahrain and the release of political prisoners and human rights reforms were requested by people; Jordan; Kuwait, where the dissolution of parliament happened due to public pressure; Libya, where a civil war was triggered because of government oppression; and Yemen, where a political crisis began in company with massive protests and those protests led its president to step down.¹¹²

The phrase ‘Arab Spring’ was first used specifically to refer the revolts in the Middle East and North Africa in an American political magazine ‘Foreign Policy’. Marc Lynch, a political scientist portrayed the phrase of ‘Arab Spring’ as “a term I may have unintentionally coined in a 6 January 2011 article” for Foreign Policy magazine.¹¹³ The Arab revolts also spread to Egypt and Syria. In Egypt, demonstrations at Tahrir Square aimed at stepping down of then President Hosni Mubarak. This objective was accomplished and on February 11, 2011 when Mubarak left the office after 30 years of ruling. In 2012, following the Arab revolts Mohamed Morsi was elected as the first democratically elected president. Nonetheless, the rule of Morsi did not last long since the army made a military coup and seized power.

In Syria, peaceful demonstrations took place and the Syrian government responded harshly. The demonstrations were tried to be suppressed and some of the protesters were imprisoned or killed. That disturbance set up the suitable environment for civil

¹¹² What was the Arab Spring and how did it spread? (n.d.). Retrieved September 1, 2026, from <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/topics/reference/arab-spring-cause/>

¹¹³ Lynch, M. (2012). *The Arab uprising: The unfinished revolutions of the new Middle East*. New York: PublicAffairs, p. 9.

war in Syria. Many people lost their lives and millions of people left their homeland and sought for asylum in other countries.

As long as the success of the ‘Arab Spring’ is discussed, it may be argued that the ultimate goal of the demonstrations could not be achieved owing to the fact that the governments categorized as autocratic ones regained power and most of demands remained just as demands. Besides, when we look on the bright side, those protests raised awareness among the people living in the MENA region and illustrated that well-attended pro-democracy movements might also occur in this region not only in the Western civilizations. The role of social media in those protests was another crucial factor to be addressed. The people could gather together via social media applications and the world witnessed what happened there simultaneously.

4.1.1. The Response of the European Union to Arab Spring

After the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had resigned and went into exile in Saudi Arabia, Tunisian migrants escaping the disorder in their country, began to arrive on the Italian island Lampedusa, whose number reached several thousand within a few days. Italian government declared a humanitarian emergency and brought up the migration issue at the EU level. The skeptical attitude of the European public regarding the inclusion of an increased amount of immigrants and the attitude of media illustrating “European ambivalence”: on the one hand cheap manpower need of European labor market and on the other hand the idea that Europe would be flooded by millions of Arabs and Africans. The developments regarding Tunisian migrants at Lampedusa are evaluated by the media as a fact that might threaten stability and security in the region.¹¹⁴

The EU had to review and reconstruct its policies on the MENA region in the aftermath of the Arab revolts. Until those revolts the EU was a supporter of the regimes in the region since they stabilize the region according to view of the EU.

¹¹⁴ Seeberg, P. (2011, November 27-28). *The Arab Uprisings and the EU. EU migration policies towards the Mediter-ranean: learning to cope with “a Changing Neighbourhood”*. Paper presented at The first year with the Arab Spring. New political and theoretical perspectives on relations between the Middle East and Europe after the Arab uprisings in 2011, University of Jordan, Jordan.

However, along with the revolts of 2011, the authoritarian regimes were overthrown by people and a new phase started. Hence, the EU realized the need for a change in its policy regarding the region for its own security and stability. It can be argued that the EU reshaped its policy for its own security interest.

As a response to the Arab revolts, on March 8, 2011 the EU launched the joint communication of the EU High Representative and the European Commission proposing ‘A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’. This communication underlines the “need for the EU to support wholeheartedly the demand for political participation, dignity, freedom and employment opportunities, and sets out an approach based on the respect of universal values and shared interests” and it suggests the more for more’ principle, according to which “increased support is to be made available, on the basis of mutual accountability, to those partner countries most advanced in the consolidation of reforms”. Later, another joint communication was put into effect by the EU on May 25, 2011. This communication started the launch of ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’.¹¹⁵

4.1.2. Libya Uprising of 2011

Libya was one of the countries captivated by the pro-democracy movements in the MENA region. Unlike what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, Libya experienced civil war and international military intervention. The starting point of the incidents in Libya was the arrest of Fethi Tarbel, who was a human rights lawyer. The protesters, who reacted to the arrest of Fethi Tarbel, held rallies against Libya government.

On February 15, 2011, antigovernment rallies were held in Banghāzī by protesters angered by the arrest of a human rights lawyer, Fethi Tarbel. The protesters called for Qaddafi to step down and for the release of political prisoners. Libyan security forces used water cannons and rubber bullets against the crowds, resulting in a

¹¹⁵ European Union, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. (2011). *Delivering on the Arab Spring*. Retrieved November 7, 2016, from file:///C:/Users/Pcc/Downloads/delivering_on_the_arab_spring%20(1).pdf

number of injuries. To counter the demonstrations further, a pro-government rally orchestrated by the Libyan authorities was broadcast on state television.¹¹⁶

The oppression of the government against the protesters had reactions by the world leaders and some of the Libyan officials in different parts of the world criticized the attitude of the government. There was a disagreement in the world on whether to intervene or not. As the world witnessed that pro-Qaddafi forces was gaining, a measure was approved by the UNSC that included sanctions against the Qaddafi regime, imposing a travel ban and an arms embargo, and freezing the Qaddafi family's assets. Furthermore, the sanctions were applied by the United States, the EU, and some other countries.

Transitional National Council (TNC) was formed by rebel groups. It announced that it would act as the military leadership of the rebellion and as the representative of the Libyan opposition, provide services in rebel-controlled areas, and guide the country's transition to democratic regime¹¹⁷. When the pro-Qaddafi forces gained leverage in Banghāzī and Tobruk in the east and Miṣrātah in the west, the UNSC decided on the military action that comprised no-fly zone. NATO began to control military actions which were carried out by the US, the UK and France on March 22, 2011. The confrontation between pro-Qaddafi regime and the rebel groups had lasted for a while. Qaddafi was killed by insurgents on October 20, 2011. After the end of the reign of Qaddafi, now in Libya there are two parties claiming authority and the turmoil in Libya still continues.

Libya is kind of a port of call where African immigrants pass through on their way to European countries. Most of those immigrants or potential asylum seekers try to reach Europe by passing through the most dangerous and deadliest part of the Mediterranean Sea. It is deadliest point of smuggling routes across the Mediterranean Sea where people lose their lives while trying to cross from Libya to the Italian coast. According to Malström cited in Moreno-Lax, the number of people who fled Libya was 430.000 by April 2011 and despite of the fact that only 20.000 arrived in Malta

¹¹⁶ Libya Revolt of 2011. (n.d.) Retrieved November 7, 2016, from <https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011/Libya-facts-and-figures>

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

and Lampedusa, the EU preferred reinforcement of border controls rather than enhancement of reception capacities.¹¹⁸

4.1.3. Syria Uprising of 2011

Syria has also been affected by the trend of Arab revolts. In 2011, the protests against the government of Bashar al-Assad began. The pro-democracy protests oppressed by the security forces of the country. It is important to note that the ruling party in Syria consisted of members of the country's Alawits which is minority in the country. This was an important problem as it is all over the world because of the fact that when a minority group of people rules the majority, the majority feels uncomfortable. This issue underlies the discontent of the people and that ignited the wick in a sense. The oppressive attitude of the Assad regime has brought the civil war in Syria. Many people were killed or they sought asylum from neighboring countries or the EU countries. The different groups has been fighting in Syria and among the most well-known one is the Free Syrian Army, which claimed leadership of rebels. Neither the initiatives of the neighboring countries nor international organizations could end the civil war; unfortunately it continues. The civil war displaced the Syrian nationals and they escaped from Syria and civil war.

For Syrian asylum seekers, who are running from war and persecution, the most preferred destination countries are the countries in the region and then the EU countries. Although potential Syrian asylum seekers are willing to continue their lives in the Western Europe, Türkiye hosts millions of Syrians. Türkiye currently hosts 3.6 million Syrian refugees.¹¹⁹ In Türkiye, Syrian refugees are under temporary protection. The eastern Mediterranean route has become the main route to reach to the shores of Europe. In order to reach Europe, many of Syrians lost their lives and in 2015 the numbers highly increased. On the other hand, after the implementation of

¹¹⁸ Moreno-Lax, V. (2018). The EU humanitarian border and the securitization of human rights: The 'rescue-through-interdiction/rescue-without-protection' paradigm. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(1), pp. 119-140, p. 125.

¹¹⁹ European Union, European Commission. (2023). European civil protection and humanitarian aid operations. Retrieved April 4, 2024, from https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/europe/turkiye_en

EU-Turkey Deal the numbers of people losing their lives on their way to Europe decreased dramatically. The number of internally displaced people within Syria, corresponds to the world's biggest internally displaced population. More than 7 million people internally displaced in Syria in 2023.¹²⁰ Below in a figure obtained from UNHCR illustrating the distribution of Syrians by countries it is seen that 5.179.561 Syrians are of total concern as asylum seekers.¹²¹




Figure 1. Total persons of concern by country of asylum¹²²

4.2. European Refugee Protection Crisis of 2015

2015 was marked as the year when high numbers of asylum seekers arrived to European soil by sea and land. According to Eurostat data, the asylum applications have gradually risen since 2012 yet increased dramatically in 2015 with 1.3 million applications, which doubles the amount of applications lodged in 1992 with the dissolution of Yugoslavia.¹²³ Asylum seekers were mainly from Syria, Afghanistan

¹²⁰ United Nations, UNHCR. (n.d.). Internally Displaced People. Retrieved April 3, 2024, from <https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people>

¹²¹ United Nations, UNHCR. (2024). Total persons of concern by country of asylum. Retrieved April 4, 2024, from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria#_ga=2.203535897.841886304.1575404654-780838135.1575148842

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ European Union, Eurostat. (2016). Migration and migrant population statistics. Retrieved September 10, 2019, from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

and Iraq, which have been all conflict ridden countries; therefore, many people with these country of origins were escaped from their country and displaced.¹²⁴ Indeed, many tragedies occurred on the road while asylum seekers tried to reach the European shores. In this respect, it is reported that more than 600 people drowned in the Mediterranean Sea when their boat turned upside down nearly 180 km south of the Italy's Lampedusa Island.¹²⁵ The tragedy happened in the way to the Lampedusa Island is not the only one yet it certainly depicts the gravity of the issue. In the process, it is admitted that Europe fell short of policy tools to handle the issue.¹²⁶ This lack of ability also increased the concerns in the society. In this context, Eurobarometer data shows that in 2016 European people thought that the migration is the most significant issue that should be primarily tackled before terrorism, economy and unemployment. Moreover, the results show the Europeans' disaffection towards the third country national migrants.¹²⁷

The number of migrants using the Eastern Mediterranean route on their way to the EU was 885.386 in 2015 – 17 times the number in 2014, which was a record in that year. In order to assist in patrolling the sea and registering the thousands of immigrants who arrived daily, Frontex employed a method of deployment of an increased number of officers and vessels to the Greek islands. When the Greek authorities asked for additional assistance at the borders of Greece, Poseidon Rapid Intervention was launched by Frontex in December 2015. The origin of the immigrants preferring the Eastern Mediterranean route was mostly from Syria, followed by Afghanistan and Somalia.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015. (2016, August 02), *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved August 23, 2016 from <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/>

¹²⁵ Splinder, W. (2015, December 08). 2015: The year of Europe's refugee crisis. *UNHCR*, Retrieved August 8, 2016, from <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html>

¹²⁶ Migration in Europe. (2017, 30 June). *European Parliament*. Retrieved December 9, 2019, from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/priorities/refugees/20170629STO78632/migration-in-europe>

¹²⁷ European Commission 2016, Standard Eurobarometer 85 – Spring 2016 “Public opinion in the European Union, First results”.

¹²⁸ Migratory routes (n.d.) Retrieved November 17, 2019, from <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/eastern-mediterranean-route/>

With respect to the data obtained from the website of the European Parliament, it was argued that there were 2.2 million people who were illegally present in the EU and this number decreased to just over 600.000. It is also stated that ‘being illegally present’ occurs when “a person failed to register properly or left the member state responsible for processing their asylum claim” and this is not, all by itself, a reason to send them back from the EU.¹²⁹

The number of applications for international protection in the EU plus Norway and Switzerland was 634.700 in the year of 2018, this was 728.470 in 2017 and almost 1.3 million in 2016. Almost 333.400 asylum seekers were granted protection by the EU countries in 2018, down by nearly 40% on 2017. Furthermore, among those asylum seekers granted protection from the EU, approximately one in three (29%) were from Syria, while Afghanistan (16%) and Iraq (7%) constituted the other top two countries. Germany was the country from which nearly 70% of 96.100 Syrians granted international protection in the EU, received protection.¹³⁰ The decrease in the number of international protection applications year by year is prominent since the objective of securitized migration policy of the EU is to prevent the increase in the entries to the EU. When this objective is on the table, the tactic of the EU is advantageous in terms of a securitized Europe. On the other hand, restrictive policies of the EU on the entries to Europe put the lives of the displaced individuals at serious risk. Those individuals, who are rendered helpless, are facing with loss of life during their journey throughout dangerous routes.

According to Frontex, there are five migratory routes to Europe, namely Western Mediterranean route, Central Mediterranean route, Western Balkan route, Eastern Mediterranean route, and Eastern borders route.¹³¹ In a map illustrating the current migratory situation in Europe, which is prepared by Frontex, the main migratory

¹²⁹ European Union, European Parliament. (2019). *Asylum and migration in the EU: facts and figures*. Retrieved January 10, 2020, from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/asylum-and-migration-in-the-eu-facts-and-figures>

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Migratory routes. (n.d.). Retrieved December 17, 2019, from <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/western-mediterranean-route/>

routes into the EU is presented. In reference to this map, by the Eastern Mediterranean route, the number of irregular border crossings in 2019 (January-September) is 50.568 and top 5 migrants' countries of origin are Afghanistan (16.631), Syria (10.812), Türkiye (5.036), Iraq (3.060) and Palestine (2.131).¹³² In 2024 (January-February), the number of irregular border crossings is 9.150 while Afghanistan (2.825), Syria (2.507), Unknown (733), Egypt (726) and Türkiye (436) constitute top 5 migrants' countries of origin.¹³³ In this cited document of Frontex, 'illegal border-crossings' term is used when the numbers are given. This is a sign of the attitude of the EU to securitize migration and criminalize irregular migrants.



Figure 2. Dead and missing in 2019¹³⁴

According to a figure provided by UNHCR, the number of total arrivals to Europe is 111.144, of which 90.444 constitutes sea arrivals, 20.700 land arrivals, and 1.148 dead and missing in 2019. In 2014, there were 225.455 arrivals and 3.538 dead and missing; in 2015 the number of arrivals increased dramatically to 1.032.408 and there were 3.771 dead and missing; in 2016 there was a drastic decline in the

¹³² Migratory map. (2019). Retrieved December 17, 2019, from <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/>

¹³³ Migratory map. (2024). Retrieved April 4, 2024, from <https://www.frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/monitoring-and-risk-analysis/migratory-map/>

¹³⁴ United Nations, UNHCR. (2019). Most common nationalities of Mediterranean Sea and land arrivals from January 2019. Retrieved December 5, 2019, from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>

numbers which corresponds to 373.652 and there were 5.096 dead and missing; in 2017 there were 185.139 arrivals and 3.139 dead and missing; in 2018 there were 141.472 arrivals and 2.277 dead and missing.¹³⁵

Previous years	Arrivals *	Dead and missing
2023	270,180	4,110
2022	160,070	3,017
2021	123,540	3,231
2020	95,666	1,881
2019	123,663	1,510
2018	141,472	2,277
2017	185,139	3,139
2016	373,652	5,096
2015	1,032,408	3,771

* Include sea arrivals to Italy, Cyprus, and Malta, and both sea and land arrivals to Greece and Spain (including the Canary Islands). Data are as of 31 December 2023 for all countries.

Figure 3. Dead and missing in 2024¹³⁶

The number of total arrivals is 270.180 in 2023 while there are 40.966 total arrivals in 2024. In addition to this, there are 4.110 dead and missing in 2023 and 383 (estimated) in 2024.¹³⁷

Greece and Bulgaria, both are members of the EU, preferred to build fences and increase security along their borders with Türkiye during the peak of the refugee crisis.¹³⁸ Hungary closed the doors and did not want to accept refugees. The majority of irregular migrants used sea route and some reached Europe through Türkiye and

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ United Nations, UNHCR. (2024). Mediterranean Situation. Retrieved April 4, 2024, from <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Peçanha, S., Keller, J., & Nov, R. L. (2015, November 4). As doors close, Syrian refugees despair. *The New York Times*. Retrieved July 2016, 6, from <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/04/world/middleeast/syria-refugees-europe-crisis-maps-explainer.html>

Albania during refugee crisis of 2015. Due to the disproportionate burden encountered by some European countries namely Greece, Italy and Hungary, the tension in the EU arised.¹³⁹ As a solution to crisis, Hungary built a border fence on its border with Serbia and Croatia and this was criticized by world media. The similar attitude was followed by France. When a hundred migrants who were stranded in Ventimiglia (Italy) and whose entry into France was denied, tension between France and Italy on free movement of migrants to northern Europe increased. This development was criticized by then Italy's Interior Minister, Angelino Alfano. Alfano described the chaotic situation in Ventimiglia, the Italian city where migrants have been sleeping on rocks overlooking the French border, as a 'punch in the face to all the European countries that want to close their eyes' to the migrant crisis. France closed its border to the migrants by arguing that Italy was not processing the refugees smoothly and that escalated the tension between two EU countries.¹⁴⁰

As it can be inferred from those incidents the EU went through, burden sharing became a crucial matter among the EU states. The EU countries tried to evade and transfer responsibility to others. The refugee protection crisis has been a milestone for the reputation of the EU as a cradle of democracy in a negative way. Unfortunately, the EU failed on its migration policy and it also became unsuccessful in being a model as a defender of human rights.

4.3. The Response of the EU to Invasion of Ukraine

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, the Baltic countries and Belarus attracted attention of the Russian Federation and European states. Neighborhood policies of both Europe and Russia have been determined to influence these countries and attract them to their side. The EU's neighborhood policies, especially the EU membership processes of the former Soviet countries, disturb Russia.

¹³⁹ BBC News. (2016, March 4). Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts. Retrieved May 15, 2016, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>

¹⁴⁰ Kirchgaessner, S. (2015, June 16). Italian police forcibly remove migrants stranded near French border. *The Guardian*. Retrieved May 13, 2016, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/16/italy-forcible-removal-eu-mediterranean-migrant-crisis-french-border-refugees>

NATO, which emerged under the leadership of the United States of America (USA) against the Eastern bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union, during the Cold War and continued its existence after the war, occasionally experiences tensions with today's Russia. Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries are targeted by Russia on one side and NATO, the USA and the EU on the other, and there is a competition to dominate these regions on both wings.

Russia has adopted a divide-and-rule approach towards the West, according to a study that analyzed reports from Western secret services, mostly from Northern European ones, about Russia's attempts at political influence. Russia resorts to use of media, social media, minorities, refugees, extremists, human intelligence, cyber operations, energy, business, corruption, allies, front organizations, history and military force for political influence activities. Russia has specific goals regarding each country, but the general goal is to weaken the EU and NATO and lift sanctions.¹⁴¹

It is also possible to define the Ukrainian War as a proxy war between the West and Russia. The east-west conflict from the past and the efforts to establish economic and political superiority in the region are clearly seen in the Ukrainian War. What is witnessed is much more than a war between two countries. The fate of Ukraine does not only concern Ukrainian citizens; on the contrary, great powers, other countries and different nations are also affected by the determination of this fate.

Cafruny et al. argue that although the Putin regime is responsible for the invasion, the Anglo-American motivation to strengthen NATO as an instrument of political and military dominance in Europe is a main underlying parameter in the conflict. Related to this, there is an initiative to decrease the influence of Russia and (especially) China on Western European markets, while hindering the constitution of a security axis and the deepening of economic relations between Berlin, Moscow and Beijing.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Karlsen, G. H. (2019). Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe. *Palgrave Communications*, 5(19), 1-14, p. 12.

¹⁴² Cafruny, A., Fouskas, V. K., Mallinson, W. D. E., & Voynitsky, A. (2023). Ukraine, multipolarity and the crisis of grand strategies. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 25(1), 1-21, p. 2.

After the Russia-Ukraine war, which started in 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. As of 2024, conflicts between these countries still continue. Russia's invasion move had a great impact around the world. It was the first time since the Second World War that a European country was subjected to such a massive attack. The reactions were shown to Russia's invasion move, especially from the EU and the USA. Russia's motivation for invading Ukraine was explained as demilitarization, denazification neutrality of Ukraine by Russian president Vladimir Putin.¹⁴³

4.3.1. Ukraine – Russia Relations

Ukraine, namely Kievan Rus, was becoming the first center of Slavic power and the newly adopted Orthodox religion in the ninth century. However, Mongol invasions in the 13th century prevented Kiev's rise. In the end, power passed north to Russia, to present-day Saint Petersburg and Moscow. Ukraine, whose rich black soil contributed to its status as a major grain producer, was constantly divided between rival powers for centuries. Poland and Lithuania ruled most of the country in the 16th century and Cossack warriors were patrolling Ukraine's border with Poland.¹⁴⁴

In the 18th century, most of Ukraine came under Russian rule. Following First World War and the Russian Revolution of 1917, most of the Ukrainian region became a republic of the Soviet Union, yet parts of western Ukraine were shared between Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia.¹⁴⁵

Described as an unprecedented, man-made demographic disaster in peacetime and resulting from Stalin's policies, the Great Famine (Holodomor) of 1932–33 killed an

¹⁴³ Faulconbridge, G. & Soldatkin, V. (2023, December 14). Putin vows to fight on in Ukraine until Russia achieves its goals. Retrieved April 17, 2024, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-tells-russians-war-ukraine-will-go-unless-kyiv-does-deal-2023-12-14/>

¹⁴⁴ Conant, E. (2014, January 31). How history, geography help explain Ukraine's political crisis. Retrieved March 28, 2024, from <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/140129-protests-ukraine-russia-geography-history>

¹⁴⁵ Britannica. (2024, February 26). Ukraine Summary. Retrieved March 29, 2024, from <https://www.britannica.com/summary/Ukraine>

estimated five million people in the Soviet Union, nearly four million of whom were Ukrainians. The famine, which was a direct attack on the Ukrainian peasantry, which persistently maintained to resist collectivization, was also an indirect attack on the Ukrainian village, a traditionally important element of Ukrainian national culture.¹⁴⁶

Later, in order to help resettlement of the population in the east, Stalin brought large numbers of Russian and other Soviet citizens to the region, most of whom did not speak Ukrainian and had few connections to the region. Former Ukrainian Ambassador Steven Pifer argues that it is just one historical reason that helps clarify why “the sense of Ukrainian nationalism is not as deep in the east as it is in west.”¹⁴⁷ During World War II, Axis armies invaded Ukraine in 1941. Ukraine was further destroyed before the Soviets regained it in 1944. The frontiers of Ukrainian S.S.R. were redrawn to comprise western Ukrainian territory at the end of the war.¹⁴⁸

In 1986, the Chernobyl accident occurred at a Soviet-built nuclear power plant in Ukraine. As a consequence of this incident, large amount of radiation was released into the atmosphere. The Cold War ended in 1989 and led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Thereby, Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. A series of protests known as the Orange Revolution, which caused political upheaval in Ukraine, took place between November 2004 and January 2005. The mantra, which comes out of a sea of orange, emphasized the rise of a powerful civic movement, a capable political opposition group, and a determined middle class coming together to prevent the ruling elite from committing electoral fraud and usurping Ukraine's presidency.¹⁴⁹ It was seen that groups from different nations were affected by these protests during the days of the orange revolution. Belarusians were eager to benefit from the experience of a revolution in progress and bring the lessons

¹⁴⁶ Britannica. (n.d.). The famine of 1932–33 (Holodomor). Retrieved March 30, 2024, from <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-famine-of-1932-33-Holodomor>

¹⁴⁷ Conant, E. (2014, January 31). How history, geography help explain Ukraine's political crisis. Retrieved March 28, 2024, from <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/140129-protests-ukraine-russia-geography-history>

¹⁴⁸ Britannica. (2024, February 26). Ukraine Summary. Retrieved March 29, 2024, from <https://www.britannica.com/summary/Ukraine>

¹⁴⁹ Karatnycky, A. (2005). Ukraine's orange revolution. *Foreign Affairs*, 84(2), 35-52, p. 35.

of that experience to their own country. Kazakh dissidents tried to learn from Ukrainian protesters. Russian civic activists came to Kiev to get together with Ukraine's protest leaders and discuss organizing for change. While Russian retirees were revolting against cuts in social benefits in mid-January, Moscow newspapers were writing that Russia could turn 'orange'.¹⁵⁰ Viktor Yushchenko was declared the winner of Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections and the Orange Revolution ended when Yushchenko took office in Kiev on January 23, 2005.

The Revolution of Dignity (Maidan Revolution or the Ukrainian Revolution) took place in Ukraine between 18-23 February 2014, at the end of the Euromaidan protests. Then President Viktor Yanukovich preferred closer ties with Russia instead of signing a political partnership and free trade agreement with the EU in November 2013. Following this decision, a large-scale protest wave known as Euromaidan began. The Ukrainian parliament approved the conclusion of an association agreement with the EU in 2013. Russia had pressured Ukraine to reject it. During the protests, Yanukovich and the Azarov government was asked to resign. The protests which started as pro-European demonstrations later turned into a broader display of street anger against perceived corruption and debauchery in the country that Yanukovich has ruled for nearly four years.¹⁵¹ Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and his cabinet resigned on January 28, 2014. It was decided in the Ukrainian Parliament to dismiss Yanukovich with 328 votes.¹⁵²

Tensions peaked in 2014 after Ukrainians overthrew a pro-Russian president. Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimea region, claiming to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers from Ukrainian persecution, in a move largely condemned by the international community.¹⁵³ The war between Russia and Ukraine, which began in

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 52.

¹⁵¹ Balmforth, R. (2013, December 12). Kiev protesters gather, EU dangles aid promise. Retrieved March 30, 2024, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-idUSBRE9BA04420131212/>

¹⁵² Kyiv Post. (2014, February 23). Parliament votes 328-0 to impeach Yanukovich on Feb. 22; sets May 25 for new election; Tymoshenko free. Retrieved April 2, 2024 from <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/7028>

¹⁵³ Davis Jr., E. (2024, February 23). Explainer: Why did Russia invade Ukraine? Retrieved April 3, 2024, from <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/explainer-why-did-russia-invade-ukraine>

2014, escalated and Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Martial law was declared throughout the country by Volodymyr Oleksandrovykh Zelenskyy, who has been the President of Ukraine since 2019.

Before the invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the Russian-backed separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, both in the disputed Donbas region, as “independent” people's republics and ordered so-called “peacekeeping” troops into these regions.¹⁵⁴

Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech on February 21, 2022, explaining the reasons for the "special military operation" announced the next day. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the long-simmering discrepancy on the shape of the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe have been mentioned as one of these complaints. Putin's speech included a much more fundamental matter: the legitimacy of the Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. This demonstrated a worldview Putin had long pointed out. He highlighted the deep unity among the Eastern Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians), whose origins lay in the medieval Kyivan Rus community, and argued that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny today and in the future. As a result, an assertion has been raised that the distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities came into existence due to foreign manipulation, and that today the West is following in the footsteps of Russia's imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russian project.”¹⁵⁵

4.3.2. EU's Foreign Policy towards Russia and Ukraine

Analyzing the EU's foreign policy towards Ukraine and Russia is essential to comprehend its approach to Ukrainian refugees. Ukraine's EU membership attempt, the EU's fully supportive attitude towards this membership, Russia-EU conflict of

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Mankoff, J. (2022). *Russia's war in Ukraine: Identity, history, and conflict*. Center for Strategic & International Studies, p. 1. Received March 30, 2024, from https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220422_Mankoff_RussiaWar_Ukraine.pdf?VersionId=tGhbFT.eyo9DdEsYZPaTWbTZUtGz9o2_

interests, power struggles over Ukraine, Russia-USA arch-rivalry are the developments that affect the EU's stance and policy regarding Ukrainian refugees.

The war between Russia and Ukraine is also called the war of dictatorship against democracy. When examining the EU's approach towards Ukrainian refugees, the issue should not be addressed only in the context of refugees. The EU, which sees the war as an attempt by the eastern dictatorship to subjugate European democracy, also justifies its support for Ukraine in the context of EU values.

The EU accepts Ukraine as a part of Europe, that is, 'us', and Russia as one of the others or 'them'. To put it in other words, democratic countries are considered 'us' while autocratic ones are regarded as 'others'. This situation of 'us vs. them' is also evident in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It is emphasized by the EU in the context of European values that Ukraine, which was already recognized as European, should be democratic, independent, free, sovereign, peaceful. Among the arguments voiced in this context are the need to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, its right to its own future, and the implementation of the rule of law. In the eyes of the EU, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is acknowledged a blow to all these European values.

Since Russian natural gas meets a significant portion of Europe's energy demand, Russia is adopting strategies to use this situation to its advantage on the political level. In her speech on July 20, 2022, European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that "Russia is blackmailing us. Russia is using energy as a weapon."¹⁵⁶ The EU is trying to reduce its dependence on Russia to ensure energy security. Therefore, it follows a policy of diversifying its energy supplies.

Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine resulted, along with other things, the largest forced migration in Europe since the end of World War II. One third of the population has been displaced. Nearly two years after the conflict began, ten million Ukrainians still cannot return to their homes. Approximately, there are four million people who are internally displaced in Ukraine, and the number of refugees finding

¹⁵⁶ European Union, European Commission. (2022). *Statement by President von der Leyen on the 'Save gas for a safe winter' Package*. Retrieved March 30, 2024, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_4626

shelter abroad in Europe and overseas is estimated above six million.¹⁵⁷ According to UNHCR data, the number of Ukrainian refugees in Europe is 5.930.400 while 6.471.600 refugees from Ukraine were noted globally as of April 19, 2024. Besides, 541.200 refugees from Ukraine were recorded beyond Europe as of March 27, 2024.¹⁵⁸

Considering the emergency and the extent of humanitarian needs, an inter-agency regional refugee response is being implemented to support the efforts of countries hosting refugees. National authorities, UN agencies, NGOs and civil society organizations get together through the Regional Refugee Response Plan, which concentrates upon supporting host country governments to procure the inclusion of refugees with full access to their rights in line with international standards. It gives precedence to the enabling of critical protection services and humanitarian assistance.¹⁵⁹

Countries featured in the Refugee Response Plan

Country	Data Date	Refugees from Ukraine recorded in country as of date ⁽¹⁾	Refugees from Ukraine who applied for Asylum, TP or similar national protection schemes to date ⁽³⁾	Border crossings from Ukraine since 24 February 2022 ⁽⁴⁾	Border crossings to Ukraine since 24 February 2022 ⁽⁵⁾
Bulgaria	08.03.2024	72.775	179.290	Not applicable	Not applicable
Czech Republic	01.04.2024	339.305	599.355	Not applicable	Not applicable
Estonia	31.03.2024	36.250	58.725	Not applicable	Not applicable
Hungary	21.04.2024	58.995	42.505	4.627.955	3.922.160
Latvia	18.04.2024	48.090	54.420	Not applicable	Not applicable
Lithuania	02.04.2024	41.075	85.150	Not applicable	Not applicable
Poland	15.12.2023	956.635	1.640.510	17.293.665	14.741.500
Republic of Moldova	21.04.2024	118.250	47.285	1.060.615	771.090
Romania	21.04.2024	77.900	161.370	4.319.930	3.694.355
Slovakia	14.04.2024	118.960	142.840	2.209.570	2.083.320
Toplam		1.868.235	3.011.450	29.511.735	25.212.420

Figure 4. Countries featured in the Refugee Response Plan¹⁶⁰

As seen in the UNHCR figure showing the situation of Ukrainian refugees, the number of Ukrainians recorded in the countries featured in the Refugee Response

¹⁵⁷ ReliefWeb, Ukrainian refugee crisis: the current situation [EN/CS]. Retrieved March 30, 2024, from <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukrainian-refugee-crisis-current-situation-encs#:~:text=Russia's%20full%2Dscale%20invasion%20of,cannot%20return%20to%20their%20homes>.

¹⁵⁸ United Nations, UNHCR. (2024). Ukraine refugee situation. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

Plan is 1.865.235 as of April 19, 2024. It is understood that among the mentioned countries, the ones that host the most Ukrainian refugees are Poland (956.635), Czech Republic (339.305), Slovakia (118.960) and Moldova (118.250).¹⁶¹

Other countries neighbouring Ukraine

Country	Data Date	Refugees from Ukraine recorded in country as of date ⁽¹⁾	Refugees from Ukraine who applied for Asylum, TP or similar national protection schemes to date ⁽³⁾	Border crossings from Ukraine since 24 February 2022 ⁽⁴⁾	Border crossings to Ukraine since 24 February 2022 ⁽⁵⁾
Belarus	29.02.2024	42.785	3.695	16.705	Data not available
Russian Federation	31.12.2023	1.212.585	14.970	2.852.395	Data not available
Toplam		1.255.370	18.665	2.869.100	Data not available

Figure 5. Other countries neighboring Ukraine¹⁶²

According to UNHCR data, a total of 1.255.370 Ukrainians are recorded in other countries neighboring Ukraine, namely Belarus (42.785) and the Russian Federation (1.212.585).¹⁶³

Other European countries

Country	Data Date	Refugees from Ukraine recorded in country as of date ⁽¹⁾	Refugees from Ukraine who applied for Asylum, TP or similar national protection schemes to date ⁽³⁾
Albania	07.11.2023	7.495	35
Armenia	17.07.2023	605	605
Austria	01.04.2024	73.585	112.045
Azerbaijan	01.04.2024	4.160	125
Belgium	31.03.2024	78.580	83.085
Bosnia and Herzegovina	31.03.2024	220	220
Croatia	31.03.2024	24.850	25.970
Cyprus	07.04.2024	18.740	21.705
Denmark	01.04.2024	38.025	50.985
Finland	29.02.2024	66.195	67.455
France	29.02.2024	68.780	104.070
Georgia	30.01.2024	26.660	680
Germany	31.03.2024	1.152.640	1.072.035
Greece	31.12.2023	27.365	27.850
Iceland	29.02.2024	4.125	4.125
Ireland	16.04.2024	106.355	106.355
Italy	15.03.2024	172.495	192.760
Liechtenstein	10.04.2024	605	900
Luxembourg	29.02.2024	4.260	6.470
Malta	29.02.2024	2.435	2.710
Montenegro	31.03.2024	64.510	10.730
Netherlands	31.03.2024	122.535	148.640
North Macedonia	22.02.2024	18.915	405
Norway	08.04.2024	70.085	77.330
Portugal	29.02.2024	60.215	67.275
Serbia and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)	31.03.2024	4.580	2.435
Slovenia	03.04.2024	11.240	10.875
Spain	31.03.2024	192.380	203.455
Sweden	27.03.2024	41.670	66.885
Switzerland	12.04.2024	65.185	102.570
Türkiye	15.04.2024	40.235	3.230
United Kingdom	08.04.2024	237.060	1.260
Toplam		2.806.785	2.575.275

Figure 6. Other European countries¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

A total of 2.806.785 Ukrainian refugees are recorded in other European countries, mainly in Germany (1.152.640), the United Kingdom (237.060), Spain (192.380), Italy (172.495) and Ireland (106.355).¹⁶⁵

According to Eurostat, on 31 December 2023, 4.31 million non-EU citizens who left Ukraine due to the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, got temporary protection status in the EU. Germany (1.251.245 people; 29.0% of total EU), Poland (954.795; 22.1%) and the Czech Republic (373.035; 8.7%) were among the main EU countries hosting temporary protection beneficiaries from Ukraine. As of December 31, 2023, Ukrainian citizens accounted for more than 98% of beneficiaries of temporary protection. Almost half (46.2%) of temporary protection beneficiaries in the EU were adult women. Children constituted almost a third (33.2%), while adult males stand for just over a fifth (20.6%) of the total.¹⁶⁶ The European Council decided on 28 September 2023 to extend the temporary protection for people fleeing Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine from 4 March 2024 to 4 March 2025.

The US, UK and EU have agreed to impose sanctions to freeze the assets of President Vladimir Putin and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, as a reaction to the war in Ukraine. The sanctions on Russia's central bank and the removal of some of the country's lenders from the Swift global payments system were also intended in addition to other economic sanctions. Japan, Canada, Australia and South Korea, that are other allies, also adopted sanctions.¹⁶⁷

A resolution rejecting the Russian Federation's brutal invasion of Ukraine and demanding that Russia immediately withdraw its forces and comply with international law was adopted by the UN General Assembly on March 2, 2022.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ European Union, Eurostat. (2024). Over 4.3 million people under temporary protection. Retrieved April 1, 2024, from [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240208-1#:~:text=On%2031%20December%202023%2C%20Ukrainian,20.6%25\)%20of%20the%20total](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240208-1#:~:text=On%2031%20December%202023%2C%20Ukrainian,20.6%25)%20of%20the%20total).

¹⁶⁷ Nolsøe, E. & Pop, V. (2022, March 4). Russia sanctions list: What the west imposed over the Ukraine invasion. Retrieved March 31, 2024, from <https://www.ft.com/content/6f3ce193-ab7d-4449-ac1b-751d49b1aaf8>

¹⁶⁸ European Union External Action. (2022). UN General Assembly demands Russian Federation withdraw all military forces from the territory of Ukraine. Retrieved April 3, 2023, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/un-general-assembly-demands-russian-federation-withdraw-all-military-forces-territory-ukraine_und_en

The International Court of Justice called upon Russia to immediately suspend its attacks and halt all military operations.¹⁶⁹ The Council of Europe cancelled Russia's membership on March 16, 2022.¹⁷⁰

Massive and unprecedented sanctions have been imposed by the EU against Russia since February 24, 2022, when the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia began. These sanctions follow measures imposed on Russia since 2014 after the annexation of Crimea and lack of implementation of the Minsk agreements.¹⁷¹ In order to weaken Russia's economic capacity and limit its ability to finance its war of aggression, the EU has imposed 12 sanctions packages against Russia since February 23, 2022 in total. In addition to certain individuals and organizations, the finance, industry, transportation and energy sectors are also targeted with these sanctions.¹⁷²

As of the end of 2023, the EU and its Member States have provided nearly €85 billion in total aid to Ukraine and its people since the start of Russia's war of aggression. Total military assistance provided to Ukraine by the EU and its Member States to date exceeds €27 billion, including €5.6 billion allocated through the European Peace Facility. It comprises the joint supply and immediate delivery of ammunition to Ukraine agreed in March 2023, with approximately 313.600 rounds of ammunition and 3.315 missiles delivered by the end of the year. The European Peace Facility also supports the improvement of the capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces via the EU Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine, with an allocation of €362 million conducted by the Council of the European Union.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ United Nations. (2022). International Court orders Russia to 'immediately suspend' military operations in Ukraine. Retrieved April 3, 2023, from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114052>

¹⁷⁰ Council of Europe. (2022). The Russian Federation is excluded from the Council of Europe. Retrieved April 3, 2023, from <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/the-russian-federation-is-excluded-from-the-council-of-europe>

¹⁷¹ European Union, European Council and the Council of the EU. (2024). EU sanctions against Russia explained. Retrieved April 2, 2024, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#sanctions>

¹⁷² European Union. (2024). *The EU in 2023 – General Report on the Activities of the European Union*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 12. Retrieved April 2, 2024, from <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ea6b0987-dd66-11ee-b9d9-01aa75ed71a1>

¹⁷³ Ibid, p. 9.

4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, the Arab Revolts and European migration crisis are examined. First of all, the so-called Arab Spring is looked through in the light of the developments beginning from the end of 2010. The reasons that led to revolts in the Middle East and North Africa are figured out and the spread of the wave of the revolts are explained briefly.

Then, the events that occurred in Libya and Syria during the uprisings are touched upon. The reasons that caused civil war in both countries, immigration to Europe from those countries are mentioned. Later, 2015 European refugee protection crisis is pointed out in this chapter. Together with statistics the situation is tried to be depicted. The dramatic increase in the number of the asylum seekers drew attention of the world. The countries facing this issue, especially the EU countries had followed restrictive measures and this put the people's lives at danger unfortunately.

Next, the Russia-Ukraine War, which has been ongoing since 2014, Russia's large-scale occupation of Ukraine and the EU's reaction to this situation are discussed. Russia, which claims rights over Ukraine as a piece of land that used to belong to Russia, bases its invasion of Ukraine on historical reasons. This war in Ukraine has caused the largest refugee movement in Europe since the Second World War. The importance of the energy issue in EU-Russia relations is also mentioned. In this part, it is explained that the issue is not only about refugees, but there is also an evaluation based on European values.

CHAPTER 5

THE SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION OF MIGRATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU DISCOURSES

Europe's immigration policy is being adapted as the security perception develops depending on the historical process. Whether immigrants are welcomed or perceived as a threat in their destination countries also develops accordingly. Unfortunately, events that confirm the saying that “geography is destiny” are encountered today. While immigrants with similar characteristics and historical background are welcomed by the European Union, those with different characteristics coming from geographies outside Europe are treated with suspicion.

The two recent events that best reflect this difference in Europe's approach are the migration from Ukraine to Europe and the migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe. While there is a tolerant and hospitable attitude towards Ukrainian migration in the European Union, there is a restrictive and threat-perceiving attitude towards migration from the Middle East and North Africa. This situation, which can be based on the perception of ‘us vs. them’, is also valid in EU institutions. This perception can be seen in the discourses of the high-level officers of the EU institutions.

While the identity of Ukrainian immigrants, that is, being European and Christian, causes them to be seen as one of ‘us’, the identity of Middle Eastern and African immigrants, that is, being non-European and Muslim, leads them to be accepted as ‘others’. In this chapter of the thesis, it is examined how the ‘us versus them’ perception is constructed in the discourses. To do this, press conferences and statements on the European Commission and the European Council's own websites are examined. In these documents, the speeches of the heads of those EU institutions are selected for the analysis.

In this comparative study, the manual qualitative coding method is used. By selecting some words from the speeches of the heads of EU institutions, the difference in the EU's approach to these two migration regions is revealed. How the perception of 'us vs. them' leads to this difference in approach is ascertained in the research.

While those speeches are assessed in the study, a date limitation is set due to the fact that it is not possible to examine all the speeches. For the case of Ukrainian refugees, a total of six speeches are examined by selecting three speeches each made by the highest representatives of the European Commission and the European Council in three different periods, within the determined date range from the Russian invasion of Ukraine to the present day. To put it more explicitly, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The period examined in the study was determined as the period starting from the occupation until December 2023. First of all, a date close to the start of the occupation is chosen and the statements made by the EU presidents at the outbreak of the war are discussed. Secondly, speeches made on a date in the middle of the examined period are used. Lastly, analysis is made by selecting speeches that took place recently. The dates of the selected speeches of the President of the European Council are as follows: 23 March 2022, 3 February 2023, 30 November 2023. The examined speeches of the President of the European Commission took place on the following dates: 1 March 2022, 7 March 2023, 13 December 2023.

The second subject examined by the study is migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe. In this section, a time period is determined and the research is conducted accordingly. The date range corresponding to the years 2011-2016, covering the period from the beginning of the events known as the Arab Spring in the literature to the period called the migration crisis, is selected for the research. Eight speeches each made by the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council during this time period are identified and examined.

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the EU has been trying to stand by the Ukrainians with literally all its means. The EU, which provides political and social support as well as economic and military support to Ukraine, considers this as its duty and tries to stand by the Ukrainians. It sees the situation of Ukrainians

who flee from the war in Ukraine and take refuge in Europe as a humanitarian issue and takes action in this direction, opens its borders to Ukrainian immigrants. Ukrainian immigrants are not seen as a threat to the security of Europe, on the contrary, their existence as a community in need of help is approved in the EU and they are mentioned positively in the discourses. The humanitarian approach towards Ukrainian immigration shown by both the European Commission presidents and the European Council presidents, whose speeches are examined in this thesis, draws attention.

When it comes to Middle Eastern and North African immigrants, the heads of EU institutions tend to make statements about border security, the threat of terrorism and the concerns of European citizens while for Ukrainian immigrants they resort to inclusive, embracing and welcoming statements. This exactly reflects the perspective of 'us vs. them'. Different immigration policies apply to European Ukrainians and non-European others. It shows the contradiction that the European Union is experiencing within itself. In the speeches analyzed in the study, it is clearly seen that EU leaders assess the Ukrainians' asylum in Europe in terms of human rights and European Union values and make evaluations in this direction.

In their discourses regarding Ukrainian immigrants, EU presidents use words such as 'support, solidarity, common values, European family, democracy, freedom, peace, rights, rule of law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, welcoming, opening hearts and homes'. Besides, with words like 'our, we', Ukrainian immigrants are considered as one of 'us'. 'Security and defense' are also included in the speeches, based on the idea that Ukraine's security and future are linked to the security of Europe. These words are selected for the research, and with the help of them, the way the heads of EU institutions evaluate migration from Ukraine to the EU is analyzed.

In the examined speeches of the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council, it is seen that migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe is discussed from a security and threat-perceiving perspective rather than an approach in the context of human rights and European values. Heads of EU

institutions, who prefer to use words that have negative meanings regarding migration from these regions, evaluate immigrants originating from these regions within the scope of 'others' or 'them'.

The words whose usage is discussed in the research are 'influx, flow, inflow, wave, legal, illegal, irregular, security, insecurity, threat, fear, terror, human trafficking, migration or refugee crisis, border control or management'. Among them, the use of the word 'irregular' is appropriate, and in some discourses it is seen that this word is used instead of the term 'illegal' when talking about immigrants. The 'others' attitude adopted towards immigrants coming to Europe from these regions and distinguishing them from Europeans is an issue that draws attention in the speeches.

The detrimental effect of anti-immigration discourses and policies made by the political elite is a stubborn fact, i.e. they have a crucial impact on society. The politicians draw upon the issues that justify their anti-immigration policies as threats to well-being of the European residents. Those subjects ranging from terrorism to effects of globalization are held out by politicians as being interrelated to immigrants in order to obtain permission for securitization.

The security discourses referred in this research link migration to other types of criminal activities causing insecurity to the Union. Through those discourses, immigrants and refugees are also associated with the threats to security of the European societies. According to Kaya, the use of the terms like 'influx', 'invasion', 'flood' and 'intrusion' to indicate the high numbers of migrants has a racist tone, and the use of racist and xenophobic terminology dehumanizing migrants strengthens the tendency to link migration with other problems.

The threat formation through security discourses causes trouble for the immigrants and refugees. Hence, the authorities are supposed to be attentive in their discourses in order not to cause threat construction. The European Union, being one of the most outstanding supranational institutions and even being *sui generis*, needs to be more careful and use the correct wording in its official documents.

5.1. Analysis of the Press Releases of the European Commission and the European Council on Migration from Ukraine

5.1.1. Press Releases of the European Commission

Thousands of people fleeing from bombs, camped in underground stations – holding hands, crying silently, trying to cheer each other up. Cars lined up towards Ukrainian Western borders, and when many of them ran out of fuel, people picked up their children and their backpacks and marched for tens of kilometres towards our Union. They sought refuge inside our borders, because their country was not safe any longer.¹⁷⁴

Von der Leyen talked about the situation of Ukrainians who were victims of the war. She stated that people escaped from the bombs, left their countries that were no longer safe and took refuge in the EU. The humanitarian attitude of one of the senior officials representing the EU towards Ukrainian refugees draws attention in this speech.

This is a moment of truth for Europe. Let me quote the editorial of one Ukrainian newspaper, the Kyiv Independent, published just hours before the invasion began: ‘This is not just about Ukraine. It is a clash of two worlds, two polar sets of values.’ They are so right. This is a clash between the rule of law and the rule of the gun; between democracies and autocracies; between a rules-based order and a world of naked aggression. How we respond today to what Russia is doing will determine the future of the international system. The destiny of Ukraine is at stake, but our own fate also lies in the balance. We must show the power that lies in our democracies; we must show the power of people that choose their independent paths, freely and democratically. This is our show of force.¹⁷⁵

In the quote above, a call for unity and solidarity against Russia and autocracy was made referring to EU values such as the rule of law, democracy, freedom and independence. She said that the reaction to Russia's actions will determine the future of the international system and that the fate of both Ukraine and the EU is at stake. It can be deduced from these expressions that Ukraine is seen as a part of ‘us’ and the

¹⁷⁴ European Union, European Commission. (2022). *Speech by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary on the Russian aggression against Ukraine*. Retrieved December 22, 2023, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_22_1483

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

EU casts lot with Ukraine. Besides, the expression of the clash of two worlds, two polar sets of values, mentioned in the speech brings to mind Huntington's work 'Clash of Civilizations'. This war emphasized the conflict between two different civilizations, namely the EU and Russia in a way.

Today, a Union of almost half a billion people has mobilised for Ukraine. The people of Europe are demonstrating in front of Russian embassies all across our Union. Many of them have opened their homes to Ukrainians – fleeing from Putin's bombs. And let me thank especially Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary for welcoming these women, men and children. Europe will be there for them, not only in the first days, but also in the weeks and months to come. That must be our promise altogether. And this is why we are proposing to activate the temporary protection mechanism to provide them with a secure status and access to schools, medical care and work. They deserve it. We need to do that now. We know this is only the beginning. More Ukrainians will need our protection and solidarity. We are and we will be there for them.¹⁷⁶

Stating that the Ukrainians who fled the war and took refuge in the EU were welcomed by the EU and that the Europeans opened their homes to them, the President argued that these people should be provided with temporary protection, so that they can be safe and have access to school, medical aid and job opportunities. She said that Europe would support Ukrainians not only in the early days but also in the future. All these words show the EU's approach to Ukrainian refugees has developed within the framework of humanitarian values.

We are resolute, Europe can rise up to the challenge. The same is true on defence. European security and defence has evolved more in the last six days than in the last two decades. Most Member States have promised deliveries of military equipment to Ukraine. Germany announced that it will meet the 2% goal of NATO as soon as possible. And our Union, for the first time ever, is using the European budget to purchase and deliver military equipment to a country that is under attack. EUR 500 million from the European Peace Facility, to support Ukraine's defence. As a first batch, we will now also match this by at least EUR 500 million from the EU budget to deal with the humanitarian consequences of this tragic war, both in the country and for the refugees.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

In this part of the speech, security and defence policies of the EU are included. She claimed that European defence and security had improved more with this war than in the last 20 years. She underlined that most member states promised to deliver military equipment to Ukraine and that for the first time the EU used the European budget to purchase and deliver military equipment to a country under attack. The amount to be allocated from the EU budget in the first stage to deal with the humanitarian consequences of the war both in the country and for the refugees had also been stated. As can be understood from all these words, the Ukrainian War had a significant impact on the defence and security of the EU. The EU committed itself to provide humanitarian aid to Ukrainian refugees and military equipment to Ukraine. It can be concluded that Ukrainian refugees are not seen as a threat but rather as one of 'us'.

In these days, independent Ukraine is facing its darkest hour. At the same time, the Ukrainian people are holding up the torch of freedom for all of us. They are showing immense courage. They are defending their lives. But they are also fighting for universal values and they are willing to die for them. President Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people are a true inspiration. When we last spoke, he told me again about his people's dream to join our Union. Today, the European Union and Ukraine are already closer than ever before. There is still a long path ahead. We have to end this war. And we should talk about the next steps. But I am sure: Nobody in this hemicycle can doubt that a people that stands up so bravely for our European values belongs in our European family.

And therefore, Honourable Members, I say: Long live Europe. And long live a free and independent Ukraine.¹⁷⁸

In this part of the speech, there were statements supporting Ukraine and on the theme of European values such as free, independent and freedom. In addition to this, our European values and our European family phrases were used as symbols of 'us'. In the speech, it was pointed out that the EU and Ukraine are closer than ever. It was stated that Ukrainians fight for European values and belong to the European family. This is proof that Ukraine's EU membership is welcomed.

If we need to evaluate the whole of this speech, it can be set forth that the Ukrainian War is one of the important turning points for the EU. Addressing the issue of

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

Ukrainians seeking asylum in the EU within the framework of human rights and European values and welcoming Ukrainians in European countries were among the prominent topics. In President von der Leyen's speech, it was considered reasonable for these people to escape from the war in their country and take refuge in Europe, and we encountered an EU that strives for their protection and security. Ukrainian refugees were welcomed by the EU and were not perceived as a threat. Another important point was the impact of the Ukrainian War on the security and defense policies of the EU. From this speech, which corresponded to the beginning of the war, it was understood that the EU had made rapid progress in terms of defence and security. The frequent mention of European values such as freedom, independence, solidarity, democracy and the rule of law showed that the EU handled the Ukraine incident positively. It was also important that the EU adopted this approach at the very beginning of the war and that the authorities stated that they would continue it in their statements.

The date of the second speech of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen analyzed for this research is March 7, 2023. One year after the war, it seems that the EU continues its supportive and inclusive attitude towards Ukraine and welcoming Ukrainian refugees, just like a year ago. Similarly, expressions regarding European and human rights values were included in this speech.

But today, the very values that unite us are challenged like never before. One year ago, Russia sent tanks, drones and missiles against a sovereign and peaceful country. Since then, countless lives have been shattered. Countless families separated. Hundreds of thousands of young Ukrainians had to kiss their loved ones goodbye and left to the front to fight for freedom. Millions more had to leave not only their homes but all their dreams behind. All of this because Putin refuses to recognise their freedom and their independence. And this we simply cannot accept. We will never accept that a military power with fantasies of empire rolls its tanks across an international border. We will never accept that Putin denies the very existence of Ukraine, as a state and as a nation. We will never accept this threat to European security and to the very foundation of our international community. And I know that Canada's commitment is just as adamant as ours. Canada and the European Union will uphold the UN Charter. We will stand up for Ukraine to be the master of their own future. Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. And we will keep supporting Ukraine, for as long as it takes.

...Everything we did for Ukraine, we did together. Because we believe that Ukraine and the values that it strives for must prevail in this war¹⁷⁹

The President stated that Russia attacked Ukraine, a sovereign and peaceful country and asserted that the Ukrainian War was an unprecedented experience against the values that bind Europe together. She highlighted the values that the EU believes in, using expressions such as freedom, sovereignty, peaceful, fight for freedom, solidarity, being the master of their own future. Noting that Russia's move poses a threat to the security of Europe and the international community, the President announced that they will not accept it. She added that Europe will continue to support Ukraine no matter how long it takes.

First, we believe that Ukraine deserves our steadfast military and economic support. The support package that Europe has put together, worth almost CAD 100 billion, is unprecedented in living memory... And third, we believe that Ukrainians must be the masters of their own future. They have a right to choose their association. Ukraine has made its choice. They want to be a member of the European Union. But Putin wants to force Ukraine to be part of Russia. He has achieved the opposite. Today, Ukraine is a candidate to join the European Union. And Europe is leading the effort to help Ukraine rebuild their country. And Canada is a key partner for this, focusing not only on infrastructure, but on healing the physical and mental wounds of Ukrainian victims. We cannot ease their pain and suffering, but we can ease the healing.¹⁸⁰

In the speech, it was mentioned that Ukraine needs the EU's military and economic support and that the support package is unprecedented in size. This part of the speech was important as it exemplified the EU's supportive attitude towards Ukraine. It was underlined that Ukrainians must determine their own future.

It can be inferred from the speech that Ukraine's decision to become a member of the EU was considered positive. In other words, Ukraine is welcomed by the EU. The word victim was used when talking about Ukrainians. This statement shows the EU's humanitarian approach towards Ukrainians.

¹⁷⁹ European Union, European Commission. (2023). *Address by President von der Leyen at a joint session of the Canadian parliament*. Retrieved December 20, 2023, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_1528

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

Think about the way Canadians and Europeans welcomed Ukrainian refugees. When Ukrainian refugees knocked on our door, Europeans did not hesitate for one moment. And today, four million Ukrainians live and work inside our Union. The people of Europe opened their hearts and their homes. And the same is true for the people of Canada. You are now hosting more than 165,000 Ukrainians – an incredible amount for a country on the other side of the ocean. But beyond the numbers are the stories, your stories. Stories of heart-wrenching separation, dangerous flights to safety. And finally, a warm embrace here in Canada. I know that some of you are with us today, in the gallery. So please join me in honouring them, and all the Canadians who make this country a land of solidarity and hope.¹⁸¹

In the above quote, it is briefly mentioned that Ukrainian refugees are welcomed in Europe and Canada. Pointing out that 4 million Ukrainians live in Europe, the president said that Europeans opened their hearts and homes to them. It was emphasized that Canadians similarly hosted Ukrainian refugees.

Based on this, it can be concluded that Ukrainians are seen as one of ‘us’. The dangerous flights of Ukrainian refugees to safety and the difficulties they experience show that the situation is handled from a humanitarian perspective by the EU. In addition to these, concepts such as solidarity and hope also found a place in the speech.

After the two World Wars, the world declared that all human beings are entitled to equal and inalienable rights. But today, some powers are explicitly trying to destroy this basic principle. I was in Bucha, right after its liberation by Ukraine's army. I saw the body bags lined up by the side of the streets. I heard the stories of rape and executions in cold blood, carried out by Russian troops. And Russia continues to commit atrocities, bombing civilians, striking the most vulnerable. The UN says Russia is using rape and sexual violence as part of its ‘military strategy’ in Ukraine. This is not only a war on Ukraine. It is also a war on human rights. It is a war on women's rights.¹⁸²

President used some expressions related to human rights at the end of the speech. Stating that all people have equal and inalienable rights, she criticized the human rights and war crimes committed by Russia. It was claimed that this war was not only on Ukraine but also on human rights and women's rights. As can be seen in this part

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

of the speech, while evaluating the Ukraine incident, explanations were made in terms of EU values such as human rights, women's rights, equal rights.

In the general evaluation of this speech of the president, it is noteworthy that Ukrainians are seen as one of us and are not perceived as a threat. Demonstrating an approach based on human rights and European values, the EU defends the necessity of supporting Ukraine. The speech includes freedom, sovereignty, independence, their own future, etc. which refer to European values. One of the most striking parts is that Ukrainian refugees are welcomed by Europeans. This is proof that they are not seen as a threat but rather as one of 'us'.

The third speech of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen selected for research took place on 13 December 2023. It was shaped around European values, support for Ukraine and emphasis on 'us'.

We remember the siege of Kyiv, the people taking refuge in subway stations, the maternity ward in Mariupol, the body bags in Bucha. We remember all the pain that Putin has inflicted on innocent Ukrainians, as well as on Europeans with his energy blackmail. But besides the pain, we must also remember the light that has shone through these dark days, the courage of the Ukrainian resistance, the joy of those who were liberated from Russian occupation, the solidarity of an entire continent standing at Ukraine's side. None of this seemed plausible or even possible two years ago. So let me first of all thank all of those who made it happen. Above all, the amazing people of Ukraine, but also Europe that stood tall and united. Ukraine has resisted also because of the people of Europe who have opened their hearts and their homes, because of the Member States' financial and military aid, and because of this Parliament's unwavering support. You have empowered Ukraine's resistance and you have kept hope alive.¹⁸³

Referring to the humanitarian drama that Ukrainians experienced in the war and Russia's energy blackmail to Europe, President von der Leyen placed particular focus on Ukraine's resistance. The unity of Europe and the solidarity of the entire continent with Ukraine were mentioned. It can be concluded that Ukrainian refugees are

¹⁸³ European Union, European Commission. (2023). *Speech by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 14-15 December 2023*. Retrieved April 4, 2024 from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_6581

welcomed in Europe from the statement that Europeans opened their homes and hearts to Ukrainians.

In addition, the fact that Ukrainians are welcomed in this way is also a sign that they are seen as 'us'. There is no marginalization in this text, on the contrary, there is an inclusive and adoptive approach of the EU. Speaking of military and financial aid, the President referred to the role of EU support in the Ukrainian resistance. While discussing the Ukraine incident in the speech, the use of words such as support, liberate, solidarity, unite, open hearts and homes attracted attention. It was observed that migration from Ukraine to the EU was evaluated in the context of human rights and EU values and Ukrainian refugees were not seen as a threat to the EU but were accepted as one of 'us'.

And further away from the battlefield, Finland has become a NATO member. Sweden soon will be. Ukraine is on its way to EU membership.

...As the war drags on, we must prove what it means to support Ukraine 'for as long as it takes'. Ukraine is not only fighting against the invader, but for Europe. Joining our family will be Ukraine's ultimate victory. And for this, we have a decisive role to play.

Ukraine is making great strides to pass the reforms that will lead to our Union. Our enlargement report from last month showed clear progress on all steps that we had identified. Over 90% of those reforms had been completed at that time...I think Ukraine is showing us by this hard work and the speed how much they care about our Union and our values. And we should match their determination.¹⁸⁴

In this part of the speech, it was mentioned that Ukraine was on the way to EU membership. The President claimed that support for Ukraine would continue no matter what, and that Ukraine was fighting not only against the invader but also for Europe. She described Ukraine's accession to the EU as joining our family. Ukraine's efforts to join the EU were appreciated.

The use of the expressions 'our family' and 'our values' when talking about Ukraine indicates that Ukrainians are seen as one of 'us'. The fact that the concepts of

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

support, value, fight for Europe were mentioned in the speech show that the issue was discussed around European values.

Besides our political support, Ukraine also needs our sustained financial support. And this will also be discussed, of course, in the next two days at the European Council. When we shaped the current EU budget in 2020, no one could predict an all-out war on European soil. Its shockwaves have spread well beyond Ukraine. The Union's budget had to deal with an energy crisis, with a global food crisis, and with the arrival of millions of Ukrainians fleeing Russian bombs.

...We must give Ukraine what it needs to be strong today so that it can be stronger at the table tomorrow when it is negotiating a just and lasting peace for Ukraine.¹⁸⁵

In the quote above, it was argued that Ukraine needs financial as well as political support from the EU. It was reported that the war was an unpredictable development. In her speech, President von der Leyen mentioned that the EU's budget had to concern itself with the energy crisis, food crisis and millions of Ukrainians fleeing the Russian bombs. From this part of the speech, it was understood that the EU provides support to Ukraine in every sense.

The statement that a budget should be allocated for Ukrainians who fled from war and took refuge in the EU shows that Ukrainian refugees are evaluated within the framework of humanitarian and European values and they are seen as one of 'us'. The President said that it is necessary to support Ukraine for a just and lasting peace. The expression 'just and lasting peace' used here is one of Europe's values and shows the way the Ukraine issue is handled.

The third speech of the President of the European Commission selected for the research is current. It also included the necessity of supporting Ukraine in every way, militarily, financially and politically just like the speeches examined before. The statements were made regarding Ukraine with expressions such as solidarity, support, values, our family, our Union. Another prominent issue is that Ukrainian refugees are welcomed by Europeans. In brief, Ukrainians are seen as refugees who need a helping hand and are seen as one of 'us'.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

5.1.2. Press Releases of the European Council

While the speeches of the President of the European Council regarding Ukraine were discussed, the first speech about Ukraine after the start of the occupation was selected for analysis. In his speech dated March 23, 2022, European Council President Charles Michel referred to European values regarding Ukrainian immigration and stated that Ukrainians are welcome in the EU.

We are not alone in condemning this brutal war. Far from it. The EU — alongside our partners and allies — is rock-solid in our solidarity for Ukraine. For one month, an international coalition has risen up to denounce this war — nations, businesses, citizens, the United Nations. Together, we have one common goal: to defeat Vladimir Putin. Putin thought he would conquer Ukraine in a few days and he was wrong. He thought he would divide the EU and our allies and he was wrong, because the people of Ukraine are fighting bravely, defending their homes and the future of their children. Defending their democracy and defending our European common values.¹⁸⁶

As seen in the quote above, the concept of ‘we’ was emphasized, the spirit of solidarity, democracy and common European values were mentioned. It was underlined that the EU was on the side of Ukraine and against Putin in the Ukrainian War, and that Ukrainians are a part of ‘us’.

In the continuation of the same speech, he said that the EU would not abandon Ukrainians in this war in which they were fighting for their freedom, and that this was the political and moral responsibility of the EU. When the President asserted that they are fighting not only for their own freedom but also for ‘our common values and principles’, he again included the perception of ‘us’ and European values in his speech. Pointing out that more than 3 million people, mostly women and children, fled to the EU, he stated that these people, namely Ukrainian refugees, were welcomed with dignity.

As we speak, the Ukrainian people are battling for their freedom. We will not

¹⁸⁶ European Union, European Council. (2022). *Report by President Charles Michel to the European Parliament plenary session*. Retrieved July 3, 2023, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/23/report-by-president-charles-michel-to-the-european-parliament-plenary-session/>

abandon them. Because this is our political and moral duty. They are fighting not only for themselves, but for our common values and principles. In Versailles, two weeks ago, we decided to increase our humanitarian, political, financial and material support to Ukraine. Over 3 million people have fled to the EU, mostly women and children, and we are welcoming them with dignity. We will continue to offer them any assistance they need and to show solidarity with the countries on the front line.¹⁸⁷

...We have proposed to launch a Ukraine Solidarity Trust Fund and an international donors' conference to provide support to Ukraine for its immediate needs and to help rebuild a free and democratic Ukraine. We will have the opportunity to discuss these issues tomorrow at the G7 and European Council meetings.¹⁸⁸

He also touched upon the EU's attempts to assist Ukraine for the reconstruction of a free and democratic Ukraine. While talking about the struggle of Ukrainians, he referred to the concepts of democracy and freedom, which are important values of the EU. When the general evaluation of this speech of the President is made, it is obvious that Ukrainians are seen as 'us', Ukrainian immigrants are welcomed, and support for Ukrainians is explained in the context of human rights and EU values.

The second speech of the President of the European Council selected for the research is dated 3 February 2023. It shows the EU's discourse nearly a year after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As can be understood from the speech in question, the EU continues its inclusive approach based on human rights and European values regarding the occupation of Ukraine and Ukrainian immigrants.

This Summit has made two things absolutely clear. The first is a message for you and for the people of Ukraine. The European Union will support you in every way we can, for as long as it takes. We are not intimidated and will not be intimidated by the Kremlin. Because Ukraine and the EU we are family.

And my second message: the future of Ukraine is within the European Union. Ukrainian people, you have made a clear choice for freedom, democracy, and rule of law. And we in the EU have also made a clear decision: your future is with us, in our common European Union, your destiny is our destiny.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ European Union, European Council. (2023). *Remarks by President Charles Michel at the press conference of the EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv*. Retrieved April 3, 2024, from

In the speech, it was stated that the EU, which stood by Ukraine against Russia, will continue to support Ukraine. The President referred to Ukraine as part of the EU and thus part of ‘us’ by saying that the EU and Ukraine are family. He emphasized that the EU casting lot with Ukraine since Ukraine's future lies in the EU. He also referred to freedom, democracy, and rule of law, which are amongst the principles of the EU.

Our support has been rock solid since day one, and that will continue. Our overall support amounts to nearly 50 billion euros, from weapons to military support, from generators to transformers, supporting your schools, hospitals, and critical infrastructure.

We are determined to help you win on the battlefield. So far, Team Europe has mobilised nearly 12 billion euros of military support, including lethal military support. And we are training an initial 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers this year.¹⁹⁰

Afterwards, the EU's support in different sectors was highlighted and it was stated that Ukraine has been supported since the first day and this support will continue. Considering the nature of the support provided in different sectors, it can be seen that the EU is in solidarity with Ukraine and provides assistance in every field, from military support to social one.

The EU has also secured 18 billion euros of Macro-Financial Assistance for 2023. We also provide strong humanitarian and civil protection assistance. Millions of Ukrainians have fled the war, seeking safety and protection. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all Europeans who have stepped up to help these women, children, and families with housing, education, healthcare, and childcare. This is an emblem of our European solidarity, and that will continue.¹⁹¹

In the above quote, the humanitarian aid provided to Ukrainians is mentioned, the search for safety and protection of millions of Ukrainians fleeing the war is touched upon and gratitude is expressed to the Europeans who helped Ukrainian people. This speech is proof that Ukrainian refugees are seen as one of ‘us’ in the EU and are welcomed in Europe.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/03/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-press-conference-of-the-eu-ukraine-summit-in-kyiv/>

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

Both Ukraine and the EU share the common goal of ending this war — based on respect for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We therefore support Ukraine's Peace Formula initiative and will actively work with Ukraine on the 10-point peace plan. We also back the idea of a Peace Formula Summit to launch this plan.

Last June, the 27 EU Member States decided to grant candidate status to Ukraine. This was a major step. Since then, Ukraine has made considerable efforts and progress — especially on judicial reform and fighting corruption. We encourage Ukraine to continue strengthening the rule of law, because it benefits every Ukrainian citizen. We will be at your side every step of the way.¹⁹²

The respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty and the importance of the rule of law were also mentioned in the speech. As a matter of fact, territorial integrity, independence and the rule of law are among the EU values and it is significant to reference these values in the Ukraine case. Additionally, attention was drawn to the positive attitude of the member states regarding Ukraine's membership in the EU. It has been noted that Ukraine is seen as part of the EU, that is, 'us'.

Dear President, dear Volodymyr (Zelenskyy), the EU is with you today. The EU will be with you and your people tomorrow and for as long as it takes. We will be right by your side to rebuild a modern, prosperous Ukraine firmly anchored on our common European path. Because there can be no safe and independent Europe without a safe and independent Ukraine. Ukraine is the EU, the EU is Ukraine, let's make it happen. Slava Ukraini! Vive l'Europe!¹⁹³

At the end of his speech, President Michel emphasized common European values and solidarity. By saying that "Ukraine is the EU, the EU is Ukraine" he explained that they see Ukraine as 'us'. When the overall evaluation of this speech is made, it is seen that the EU's support to Ukraine continues in the same way. Ukrainian refugees are welcomed and a human rights-based understanding is adopted nearly a year after the beginning of the war in Ukraine.

The date of the third speech selected for the thesis is November 30, 2023. In this speech, the EU's current approach to the Ukraine issue can be clearly seen. As in the

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

previous speeches, there is a tendency towards an inclusive understanding based on common EU values.

History will judge, but I sincerely believe our defence union was born in the hours after Russian tanks rolled over the Ukrainian border. In those first hours, we took the historic decision to send weapons to Ukraine, a decision that was impossible to imagine just a few days before. And we have not looked back. Now we must build on this momentum.¹⁹⁴

As can be inferred from the quote above, the perception of ‘us’ was used by the President Michel in his expression of "our defense union" when talking about aid to Ukraine.

For almost 20 years, you, the EDA, have spearheaded European defence cooperation. The idea of European defence is not new. Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the increasingly unstable security environment, have injected a new urgency. So we must confront today’s changing security paradigm. With war on our doorstep, our ambition must match the urgency.

These collective decisions have launched our union into a new era of enhanced security and defence. Our European awakening is just beginning to take shape. I feel that the time has come to create a real union of defence, coupled with a true defence single market.¹⁹⁵

Pointing out the importance of being a defence union, Michel stated that Russia's war against Ukraine has created a new urgency and that they have to face today's security paradigm. The speech, which contained nuances on the theme of acting jointly on security and defence issues and focusing on what the EU can do as a union, showed that the EU acknowledges Russia as a security threat and that the actions to be taken regarding Ukraine are necessary for the security of the EU.

It should focus on two goals moving forward. First, our ironclad military support for the people of Ukraine, because Ukraine’s security is our security, the security of all of us. Second, we must make our European defence stronger. Now, tomorrow, and in the future.

¹⁹⁴ European Union, European Council. (2023). *“A European Defence for our Geopolitical Union”*: speech by President Charles Michel at the EDA annual conference. Retrieved April 4, 2024, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/30/a-european-defence-for-our-geopolitical-union-speech-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-eda-annual-conference/>

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

The people of Ukraine are fighting for a free and sovereign homeland. But we know that they are also fighting for our shared values – for a peaceful, democratic and prosperous European continent.¹⁹⁶

In his speech, Michel argued that EU defence should be strengthened. The statement "Ukraine's security is our security, the security of all of us" proves that the idea of Ukraine as one of 'us' was adopted by the EU. The words 'free and sovereign homeland', 'our common values' and 'peaceful and democratic' demonstrate that the EU evaluates the Ukraine issue in the context of human rights and European values.

So far, with our member states, we have provided unprecedented military assistance to Ukraine: €27 billion through our European Peace Facility and our EU military assistance mission and with the EU Member States. But we need to do more. More missiles, more ammunition, more air defence systems. And faster. This is an obligation: an obligation towards the Ukrainian people and towards our own citizens. By protecting Ukraine, we protect ourselves. Our continued strong military support also sends a signal to our partners – especially our American allies – a clear signal that we take our security more seriously than ever.

We have broken countless taboos since Russia invaded Ukraine. We have done what would have been unthinkable only a few weeks before: jointly procuring military equipment, using the EU budget to support the increase in our military production, and funding joint research and development in defence. All this without changing the treaties.¹⁹⁷

President Michel explained the military support given to Ukraine as an obligation in the context of EU security stating that "By protecting Ukraine, we protect ourselves". He brought forward that the EU carried out unprecedented joint work in the military field when Russia invaded Ukraine. When the speech is examined in general, it can be argued that it is a security-oriented speech.

The speech, which touched upon the common security measures of Ukraine and the EU against the common enemy, Russia, is also important in terms of revealing the relationship between security and threat perception. Apart from security, another noteworthy detail in the speech is the evaluation of the Ukraine incident within the scope of human rights and European values.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

The other speeches examined in this study regarding Ukraine are those of the President of the European Commission. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced in her speech dated March 1, 2022 that the EU stands by Ukraine. This speech, made very shortly after the start of the war, indicates that Ukraine gained EU support from the very beginning.

5.2. Analysis of the Press Releases of the European Commission and the European Council on Migration from Middle East and North Africa

In this section of the research, the press conferences and statements of the European Commission and the European Council between 2011 and 2016 are analyzed. In order to conduct analysis, certain words chosen and the misuse of those words are criticized on the basis of the universal European values. The reason for designation of the period of 2011-2016 is to present increased securitization of migration and refugee policy of the EU since the Arab revolts have begun.

5.2.1. Press Releases of the European Commission

Thirdly, FRONTEX is developing contingency planning to handle a possible large influx of migrants. We are ready to mobilise additional funds, including for air and maritime assets. I have made the point that we need a true spirit of solidarity and burden sharing on this issue. I am happy to see that the European Council endorsed this approach of solidarity among Member states because some of them will probably be more affected.

The call for change, we have to be clear about this, is coming from within, from those Arab countries themselves. It is not imposed from outside. Those who seek their own path to democracy should be able to count on greater support from the international community and the European Union saying "We are present, we want to work with you. We support you in your fight for democracy."¹⁹⁸

Then President Barroso made a statement following the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on the Southern Mediterranean on March 11, 2011 in Brussels. He assessed migration to Member States and the need for solidarity among them. While

¹⁹⁸ European Union, European Commission. (2011). *Statement by President Barroso following the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on the Southern Mediterranean*. Retrieved September 13, 2016, from https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-168_en.htm

he was stating this issue, he used the word ‘influx’ to indicate the amount of possible immigrants. The use of burden sharing and solidarity expressions when talking about migration also reflected the EU’s way of evaluating migration. All these expressions indicate that immigration was used in the discourse as a negative incident.

In this speech on the internal turmoil in Libya, Barroso referred to European values such as freedom and democracy and used expressions supporting those who were against the Ghadafi regime. The statement ‘We are present, we want to work with you. We support you in your fight for democracy.’ draws attention to the distinction between us and others, albeit in a positive sense. Arabs were referred to as ‘them’ and Europeans were referred to as ‘us’.

There are also areas where, by pooling our powers, we can achieve better results, for example in justice and security; in the smooth running of the Schengen area, and the fight against illegal immigration.

Things cannot go on as they are now. Whenever there is a very serious problem of illegal immigration people look to Europe and ask what Europe is doing about it. But as we all very well know, Europe does not have the resources to tackle this problem unless we share national powers in this area...

For example, I recently visited a Syrian refugee camp in Jordan where UNICEF's Executive Director told me that without European Union aid none of these young girls and boys would have access to education at all. The girls I saw there were studying in tents. Their towns had been destroyed by the Assad regime. They are pouring across the borders in their hundreds of thousands. And Europe is there to help. Are we going to cut back our efforts now, in the face of such tragedies?¹⁹⁹

Mr. Barroso made a speech on the ‘Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 at the European Parliament’s debate ahead of the European Council’ on November 21, 2012 in Strasbourg. He included immigration as a theme to his discourse and he used the ‘fight against illegal immigration’ serious problem of ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘pour across’ themes. The conceptualization of migration as a security issue and its

¹⁹⁹ European Union, European Commission. (2012). *Speech by President Barroso on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 at the European Parliament’s debate ahead of the European Council*. Retrieved September 3, 2016, from https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-848_en.htm

criminalization can be seen in this discourse. The sentence that it is necessary to fight against illegal immigration for security was used, creating the perception that immigration is a problem against the security of the EU.

Later, illegal immigration was stated as a serious problem that needed to be overcome and the expectation that Europe would take action against it was mentioned. While describing the conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Syrians crossing the borders are described with the phrase ‘pouring across the borders’. The use of these expressions by former President of the European Commission reflects the EU's approach to migration and causes migration to be associated with security and considered a crime.

Regarding Lampedusa and the issues of illegal migration and refugees in Europe: that was probably the most substantive discussion on a political level we had during this European Council. As I saw for myself, when I visited Lampedusa at the invitation of the Italian government, the scale of the human tragedy in the Mediterranean means we have to act now. The European Union cannot accept that thousands of people die at our borders.

Sadly, this is not a new problem, and we have been working on this issue for many years. But I believe now there is a sense of urgency that will make things happen. Now Member States asked the European Commission to lead a task force on the issue. We will present a report to the Council in December, we will discuss this matter also again at the European Council and today I have called for a stronger response from the European Union in several areas, namely four areas that are now already in the agenda of this task force that already met once:

Reinforce search and rescue operations to save lives.

To help the frontline member states, namely the countries of the European Union that are more exposed to this situation.

Thirdly, the need to work with the countries of origin and transit so that we can manage migration flows.

And fourth but not the least in importance, the fight against organised crime and human trafficking. These were the priorities that were extensively discussed by the European Council.²⁰⁰

²⁰⁰ European Union, European Commission. (2013). *Statement by President Barroso following the European Council meeting*. Retrieved September 4, 2016, from https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-858_en.htm

On October 25, 2013 in a press conference in Brussels, by referring to the situation in Lampedusa then President Barroso highlighted loss of lives at the borders of Europe and need to act to prevent that human tragedy. Nonetheless, he used the term ‘illegal migration’ when he addressed that issue.

That statement of Mr. President was criminalizing immigrants and this also made the EU's approach to immigration contradictory since there was evaluation of migration both from a humanitarian perspective and from a criminal one. In the speech, seeing migration as a problem, using the expression ‘influx’, and counting it as a priority and needing a strong response, along with the fight against organized crime, set an example of the securitization of migration.

We also want Europe to remain a free, secure and just place to live for our citizens...

We must deal with our asylum and humanitarian challenges. Some member states are significantly affected by migration flows into Europe, Italy being one of them. I was in Lampedusa. I remember what I saw in Lampedusa. The European Commission's position has always been one of asking for more cooperation between Member States.

The situation of sea refugees in search of a better future remains a source of deepest concern.

Thus we must pursue our goal of a genuine common European Migration Policy with equitable "burden sharing" between countries most exposed to migratory pressures.

So we must strengthen the tools we have and use them to their full capacity, and we should :

- fully enforce the recommendations of the Mediterranean Task Force;
- assure the exchange of information with third countries to tackle irregular migration flows;
- strengthen the Schengen area;
- defend the principle of free movement and at the same time tackle all kind of abuses; and
- address the new and serious challenges related to cybercrime, cross-border organised crime, trafficking in human beings, violent extremism and terrorism.²⁰¹

²⁰¹ European Union, European Commission. (2014). *Introductory Remarks on the Italian Presidency*. Retrieved September 5, 2016, from https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-519_en.htm

Former President Barroso made introductory remarks on the Italian Presidency on July 2, 2014 in Strasbourg. ‘Us’ and security concepts were emphasized in the speech. He talked about immigration to Europe particularly to Italy. He defined migratory movements as ‘migration flows’, named asylum as a challenge, called the situation of sea refugees a concern; on the other hand, he preferred to use an appropriate phrase ‘irregular migration’ in his speech. Referring to burden sharing on migration, the President talked about strengthening the tools. The need to strengthen the Schengen area, the importance of preventing abuse, and sharing information with third countries were listed in the speech and crimes such as terrorism and human trafficking were also included. Immigration associated with security was mentioned alongside criminal acts.

Whatever work programmes or legislative agendas say: The first priority today is and must be addressing the refugee crisis.

Since the beginning of the year, nearly 500,000 people have made their way to Europe. The vast majority of them are fleeing from war in Syria, the terror of the Islamic State in Libya or dictatorship in Eritrea. The most affected Member States are Greece, with over 213,000 refugees, Hungary, with over 145,000, and Italy, with over 115,000.

It is Europe today that represents a beacon of hope, a haven of stability in the eyes of women and men in the Middle East and in Africa. That is something to be proud of and not something to fear.

Let us also be clear and honest with our often worried citizens: as long as there is war in Syria and terror in Libya, the refugee crisis will not simply go away.

Common asylum standards are important, but not enough to cope with the current refugee crisis...

To me, it is clear that the Member States where most refugees first arrive – at the moment, these are Italy, Greece and Hungary – cannot be left alone to cope with this challenge.

A united refugee and asylum policy also requires stronger joint efforts to secure our external borders. Fortunately, we have given up border controls between the Member States of the Schengen area, to guarantee free movement of people, a unique symbol of European integration. But the other side of the coin to free movement is that we must work together more closely to manage our external borders. This is what our citizens expect. The Commission said it back in May, and I said it during my election campaign: We need to strengthen Frontex significantly and develop it into a fully

operational European border and coast guard system...

A truly united, European migration policy also means that we need to look into opening legal channels for migration. Let us be clear: this will not help in addressing the current refugee crisis. But if there are more, safe and controlled roads opened to Europe, we can manage migration better and make the illegal work of human traffickers less attractive. Let us not forget, we are an ageing continent in demographic decline. We will be needing talent. Over time, migration must change from a problem to be tackled to a well-managed resource. To this end, the Commission will come forward with a well-designed legal migration package in early 2016.

To facilitate Federica's work, today the Commission is proposing to establish an emergency Trust Fund, starting with €1.8 billion from our common EU financial means to address the crises in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, the Horn of Africa, and the North of Africa. We want to help create lasting stability, for instance by creating employment opportunities in local communities, and thereby address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and illegal migration. I expect all EU Member States to pitch in and match our ambitions.

I do not want to create any illusions that the refugee crisis will be over any time soon. It will not. But pushing back boats from piers, setting fire to refugee camps, or turning a blind eye to poor and helpless people: that is not Europe.²⁰²

Then President Juncker discoursed on State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity on September 9, 2015 in Strasbourg. In his speech, which comprehensively addressed migration from the Middle East and Africa to Europe, the President defined migration as a challenge and frequently used the concept of refugee crisis. Stating that the first priority is to address the refugee crisis, the President noted that most of the people who came to Europe in 2015 were from Syria, Libya and Eritrea. As seen in the quote above, the expressions terrorism and Islamic state were used together. The juxtaposition of these two words is problematic because a usage has been chosen that could lead to the association of Islam and terrorism. By mentioning the migration movements that took place at different times in history, he reminded that Europe is a continent where almost everyone was once a refugee. A positive approach based on human rights was adopted in these parts of the speech. He made a positive statement by saying that the fact that people in the

²⁰² European Union, European Commission. (2015). *State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity*. Retrieved September 6, 2016, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_15_5614

Middle East and Africa see Europe as a beacon of hope is something to be proud of, not to be afraid of. On the other hand, the distinction between Europeans and others, in other words, 'us and them' is also noticeable. Referring to the necessity of securing external borders, the President stated that Frontex should be strengthened. Hereby, he securitized migration. The usage of the term 'legal' and 'illegal' when talking about immigration and considering immigration as a problem are among the striking expressions in the speech. This usage is inappropriate since it labels immigrants as criminals committing a crime. Besides, the EU as one of the crucial institutions for human rights, should pay special attention to the wording chosen in institutional affairs.

The only way to restore order to the situation is to slow down the uncontrolled flows of people. The policy of waving through people to neighbouring countries has to stop. I want to be clear: people must be registered. No registration, no rights.

Leaders meeting today all committed, first of all, to sharing information about flows and, second of all, to refrain from taking unilateral decisions whose effects are inevitably borne by others. To facilitate this, all will appoint by tomorrow national contact points to exchange information and achieve the gradual, controlled and orderly movement of persons along the Western Balkans route.

To safeguard Schengen, we also need to strengthen border management.²⁰³

The above quotations are from speaking points of then President Juncker – Press Conference on Western Balkans Route Leaders' Meeting on October 26, 2015 in Brussels. The President assessed increasing migration to Europe and to remark the increasing numbers of immigrants trying to reach to Europe he utilized the words flow and wave. Three challenges were mentioned in the speech: providing shelter, managing the migration flows together and border management. In his speech, the President touched upon the connection established between border management and migration. Schengen, which provides ease of movement in Europe, was linked to the strengthening of border management, reflecting the security-oriented attitude of the EU.

²⁰³ European Union, European Commission. (2015). *Speaking Points of President Juncker – Press Conference on Western Balkans Route Leaders' Meeting*. Retrieved September 5, 2016, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_15_5905

We are living in different times now. When I became President of the European Commission, it was already clear to me that we were living in a time of multiple crises. But I could not have imagined that it would become so serious, even though I raised the issue of refugee flows and migration in my address to the European Parliament at my hearing.

We now face a crisis – the refugee crisis – that we never thought would beset us. On taking office, the Commission devoted considerable space to the issue of migration, because we already sensed – sensed rather than knew – that something was coming. Anyone who has kept a careful eye on the world situation, anyone with a real concern for Africa rather than just talking about Africa, anyone who has observed the veritable exodus under way there over the years – there are 60 million refugees in Africa, 60 million of them – must have known something was coming. That it would happen on such a scale, in such concentration – that we never imagined... As a result, some countries have to bear a very heavy burden: Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands too – last year the Netherlands took in 57,000 refugees. That is twice as many as the year before. And this year the number will not be any lower unless we frame our policy to prevent it from happening. So we will have to focus hard on this issue all the time, making it clear to refugees – above all the genuine ones, not the economic migrants but the genuine asylum seekers who make their way to Europe to escape from war and violence – that it is not up to them to decide where to go, that it is up to the governments to decide where to assign them a home...

We urgently need to strengthen the protection of our external borders, as is currently being done...However, if we fail to better protect our external borders, especially the border between Greece and Turkey, we will never manage to overcome the crisis. This is why, in Turkey and at its border with Greece, we have to bring the flow of refugees heading from Turkey to Greece, and then onwards to northern Europe under control.

...It is because there is not enough Union in the European Union and not enough Europe in the European Union, with Member States thinking that the refugee crisis can be solved by working alone, as nations. But only a European response can solve a Europe-wide problem that has been imported to Europe from other parts of the globe. Isolated national action, although sometimes understandable, is not welcome because when one country secures its own borders, this (a) does not solve the refugee problem and (b) will destroy the internal market completely.

...The internal market will not survive the refugee crisis if we do not manage to secure our external borders jointly and if we do not move away from this senseless policy of countries doing whatever they want, without any thought for the impact of their actions on the neighbouring Member States.

We could talk for hours about the refugee crisis...I would like to thank you, Léon, for saying that without Turkey, there is no solution to the crisis...However, on the matter of stemming the flow of refugees, Turkey is the European Union's most important partner – although in principle I am not

in favour of pushing back the flow since it is my view, based on the Christian values adhered to in the European Union, that we are duty-bound to offer a new home to those fleeing war and violence.

What has become of us? The richest continent in the world, with 500 million inhabitants, and yet to say from the outset that we would be unable to accept one or two million refugees. Talking to the King of Jordan and the Lebanese Prime Minister, as I do on a regular basis, leaves me feeling ashamed. And we, as Europeans, say we can't manage. What must the others think of us? This is 'reputation damage' we are inflicting on ourselves: people around the world who have always looked at Europe with great hope are suddenly discovering that we are mired in our own egoism, unable to agree with one another in order to tackle the refugee crisis decently.

...Likewise, we must not trivialise the refugee crisis. This is why I have said that there are also obligations for refugees. We need to see the overall picture, look at everything that is happening, with a sense of solidarity...²⁰⁴

Former President Jean-Claude Juncker gave a lecture called '14th Norbert Schmelzer lecture – The European Union – a source of stability in a time of crisis' on March 3, 2016 in Hague where he touched upon current affairs. Stating that they are in a time of crisis, the President chose to use the term 'refugee flows' in the same paragraph. Regarding the situation he called the 'refugee crisis', he referred to Africa and stated that it was unimaginable for migration to occur on this scale. Arguing that some countries are under heavy burden, the President said that governments will decide where the refugees will go, not them. It can be inferred from those words that a distinction was made between 'us' and 'them'. African refugees were seen as them while European hosts were mentioned as us.

Pointing out that the protection of external borders should be strengthened, he touched upon the importance of protecting the border between Greece and Türkiye in order to cope with the crisis, and included the expression of 'flow of refugees' in this part of his speech. It was emphasized that a European response should be given instead of national action to the situation defined as 'refugee crisis' and 'refugee problem'. It was claimed that protecting one's own borders will not be a solution and it will harm the internal market. There is also a security tendency in those statements.

²⁰⁴ European Union, European Commission. (2016). *14th Norbert Schmelzer lecture – Lecture by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, 'The European Union – a source of stability in a time of crisis'*. Retrieved September 8, 2016, from https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-583_en.htm

Stating that Türkiye is an important partner, the President again used the expressions ‘refugee crisis’ and ‘flow’. The President, who made a self-criticism on behalf of Europeans, used the word refugee crisis when he said that he was ashamed that Europe received fewer refugees compared to other countries and that this damaged Europe's reputation. He wanted Europeans to act in solidarity without underestimating the refugee crisis.

This European Union has faced its worst economic, financial and social crisis since World War II. And it is still struggling with the consequences. I have often used the Greek word 'polycrisis' to describe the current situation. Our various challenges – from the security threats in our neighbourhood and at home, to the refugee crisis, and to the UK referendum – have not only arrived at the same time. They also feed each other, creating a sense of doubt and uncertainty in the minds of our people...

And modernising the State also means a Greece that carries out its European duties when it comes to managing EU borders and receiving refugees. Today, I want to recognise this country's response to the refugee crisis, and pay tribute to the women and men, who have opened their hearts, opened their doors, helped to save lives and helped to restore dignity.

But this generosity needs solid institutional backing. We expect a lot from Greece, just as we expect a lot from the other Member States to stand behind European commitments to manage the refugee crisis...

Take the refugee crisis, where within the past year, the European Union funded more than 850 additional staff and equipment to help the Greek authorities manage the flows, providing food, shelter and basic needs for more than 50 000 migrants arriving to Greece.

I mentioned funding but our support goes further and includes hands-on technical assistance: for reforms under the programme; for the management of the refugee crisis; and for new investment projects...²⁰⁵

Then President Jean-Claude Juncker gave a speech at the Annual General Meeting of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV) on June 21, 2016 in Athens. In his speech, while explaining that the European Union is facing the worst crisis after World War II, he listed security threats and the refugee crisis among the challenges. Besides, he argued that these fed each other and created a feeling of doubt and

²⁰⁵ European Union, European Commission. (2016). *Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Annual General Meeting of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV)*. Retrieved September 8, 2016, from https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2293_en.htm

uncertainty in European people. It had been observed that refugees were associated with security, and the refugee issue was problematized by showing it as one of the difficulties. The phrase 'our people' also included the emphasis of 'us'. Appreciating Greece's response to the refugee crisis, the President also thanked the people who opened their homes and hearts. In this part of the speech where Greece was mentioned, the expression refugee crisis was used.

Pointing to the financial support provided by the European Union to Greece regarding migration, the President referred to the word 'flow' to describe the amount of the immigrants reaching to Greece and thus the frontiers of the European Union. In summary, the speech included expressions that associated migration with security, perceived it as a challenge to be overcome, and attributed negative meanings.

5.2.2. Press Releases of the European Council

What is happening right across the Mediterranean has a huge impact on Europe. Even if you are in a City Council or Regional Parliament in Poland or Finland, events in Tunis or Benghazi are of concern -- not least since we have a common European border. It really is about our neighbours!

I am aware as well of your concerns, shared by many regions and local authorities, especially in the South of Europe, about the potentially high numbers of migrants and refugees. This will feature as one of the main items for discussion for a strategic discussion at the next European Council meeting, end June.

...Recently, even the free movement of persons, one of the main European achievements for citizens guaranteed by the Schengen system, was under pressure. This was triggered by an influx of irregular migrants and asylum seekers coming especially from Tunisia and Libya to Italy and Malta, raising the question of how and when (and when not) a Member State may respond to exceptional circumstances.

Following the joint letter of President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Berlusconi to the Commission President and myself on the current migratory challenges (26 April), I have explained in a written reply (6 May) how I envisage the Heads of State and Government to work on this issue in June.

Limiting our reflections to the internal borders is of course not enough. We also need to tackle the problems (if I may say) both outside our borders and at the outside borders. For the latter, we need to improve our border management: here FRONTEX and EUROPOL play key roles. For the former, the new partnership with states in our Southern Neighbourhood, which we are developing, has to include the migration aspects. The best way to reduce

migratory pressure on ourselves, is by helping young people in Northern Africa to build a future in their own country!²⁰⁶

Former President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy touched upon the developments in North Africa and the Middle East in his speech to the Plenary Session of the Committee of the Regions on 11 May 2011. He said that what happened right across the Mediterranean had a great influence on Europe and referred to the common European borders. He problematized immigration by saying that the potentially high number of immigrants and refugees worried the authorities. Emphasizing that free movement was under pressure, he specifically mentioned immigrants and refugees from Tunisia and Libya and used the words ‘irregular’ and ‘influx’.

While irregular is a correct usage, the expression influx has a negative meaning. In the speech, immigration was described as a problem with the expression ‘migratory challenges’. Referring to border management, the President mentioned the role of FRONTEX and EUROPOL. He said that they should help North African youth to reduce migration pressure. It is possible to clearly see the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘others’ here.

Thirdly, we have discussed how to deal with the continued influx of irregular migrants from the Southern Neighbourhood caused by the ongoing crisis. In preparation of the next European Council we commonly analysed the different topics to be discussed, namely the management of external borders, the importance of the right to free movement and the Schengen area, asylum and the launching of a dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean countries.²⁰⁷

Former President Rompuy addressed the current developments in North Africa and the Middle East in his remarks after his meeting with Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio

²⁰⁶ European Union, European Council. (2011). *Speech by Herman Van Rompuy President of the European Council to the Plenary Session of the Committee of the Regions*. Retrieved September 2, 2016, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/26730/121954.pdf>

²⁰⁷ European Union, European Council. (2011). *Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council following his meeting with Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi*. Retrieved September 2, 2016, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/26697/122386.pdf>

Berlusconi on June 2, 2011. When talking about migration, he used the expressions ‘influx’ and ‘irregular’, and also touched upon the management of external borders and mentioned security and migration in the same sentence. The expression ‘influx of irregular migrants’ in the statement was quite contradictory because the adjective ‘irregular’, which is an appropriate usage, was combined with the word ‘influx’.

We want to continue to address the root causes of illegal migration flows – working with countries of origin and transit. This includes EU development support and a wider political dialogue with third countries. We want to step up the fight against trafficking and smuggling of human beings – on our own territories and in countries of origin and transit. As regards protecting lives, we called for swift implementation of the new European border surveillance system Eurosur. It will help detect vessels and protect and save lives. We called for reinforcing the action of our joint border agency Frontex in the Mediterranean and along the Southeastern borders of the EU.

Migration flows are complex phenomena, so we also will have a longer-term reflection on these policies, during our wider strategic debate on upcoming legislative and operational work in the field of freedom, security and justice, at the June 2014 European Council.²⁰⁸

In his speech to the European Parliament on November 5, 2013, former President Rompuy touched upon migration from the Mediterranean and the south of Europe. Pointing to cooperation with origin and transit countries, he used the phrase ‘illegal migration flow’. He also touched upon Eurosur and Frontex and talked about the measures at the borders. He securitized migration by using the words ‘migration flows’ and ‘security’ in the same sentence. Consequently, words that make migration negative and expressions that associate it with security were used in this speech.

When I took up office last December, my external priorities were:

To protect the fundamental values of the European Union from external threats;

To make the Union strong internationally, starting with securing our borders and supporting those in the neighbourhood who share our values...

Securing our borders is the most immediate and toughest test facing us. It is safe to assume that we will see over half a million irregular arrivals at Europe's external border this year, who are in part genuine asylum seekers

²⁰⁸ European Union, European Council. (2013). *Speech by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy at the European Parliament*. Retrieved September 4, 2016, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/25940/139342.pdf>

from Syria and elsewhere. To rise to this challenge, the Union must mobilise all available tools - internal and external. We are fulfilling and will fulfil our responsibilities under the UN refugee convention. But that cannot be done if we sacrifice public order in the process. I am now working with the Presidency and with leaders to build a new consensus between governments on how the Union responds to sudden influxes of asylum seekers...Some member States are thinking about containing the wave of migration, symbolized by the controversial Hungarian fence...

Coping with mass population movements must become a de facto theme of both Europe's neighbourhood policy and its global agenda. First, we need new strategic alliances in our wider neighbourhood on migration and asylum. I recall that the European Council, already in June 2014, agreed that the key to dealing with many of our migration challenges "lies in relations with third countries, which calls for improving the link between the EU's internal and external policies"...

Our first goal is to ensure that people in need of international protection receive it, preferably as close to their home country as possible. Second, we must gain more control over mass population flows...

I have just returned from the Balkans, which has become the new route for the people smugglers. We should accelerate the parts of the enlargement process related to immigration and asylum so that these countries have a better infrastructure for handling migration challenges...²⁰⁹

Former European Council President Donald Tusk made evaluations about migration to Europe in his speech at the annual EU Ambassadors' conference on September 3, 2015. Touching on his foreign priorities, he mentioned protecting the EU's core values from external threats and securing borders. He mentioned the difficulty of ensuring the security of the borders and talked about the expected migration to Europe, especially from Syria. He described this situation as a challenge and reminded that public order must be observed while fulfilling the responsibilities.

Regarding the responses to migration, he gave an example from the Hungarian fence and stated that some states adopted a restrictive approach. In this part of the speech, an appropriate choice was made by using the concept of irregular arrivals when talking about Syrian asylum seekers. Nevertheless, migration has been turned into a negative phenomenon by using the expression 'influx of asylum seekers' and 'wave

²⁰⁹ European Union, European Council. (2015). *Address by President Donald Tusk at the annual EU Ambassadors' conference*. Retrieved September 6, 2016, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/03/tusk-conference-eu-ambassadors/>

of migration'. Stating that it is necessary to gain control over the migratory movements, which he calls the mass population flows, the President also used the expression migration challenges when talking about the situation in the Balkans. It was a speech in which border protection and migration went hand in hand, and securitization-themed statements were made. Next, migration movement was identified as a challenge to be tackled.

We will meet on Thursday against the background of refugee pressure that has been increasing in recent months. We agreed in September that our priority should be strengthening of the EU's external borders, as well as increasing our support for the countries in the neighbourhood and the refugees there.

Our natural reaction was to seek solutions to the refugee crisis, not only internally, but also by addressing the root causes through cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. As a result, the EU has engaged in an intensive dialogue with Turkish leaders as the biggest transit country. The goal of my talks in Ankara was to stem the wave of refugees to Europe. An agreement with Turkey makes sense if it effectively reduces the inflow of refugees. Concessions will only be justified when this goal is achieved.

Even if the influx of refugees slows down during winter, we must be ready for spring and the threat of bigger waves flowing to Europe. In fact, all the leaders I met in the region spoke about millions of potential new refugees. As exaggerated as this opinion may sound, it is our obligation to be prepared for all scenarios. We must ask ourselves if the decisions we have taken so far, and the ones we are going to take on Thursday, are sufficient to contain a new migratory wave. We need to face real challenges and answer serious questions concerning our methods of action.

Let us be clear about one thing. The exceptionally easy access to Europe is one of the main pull factors. In this context we should consider:

...The strengthening of our external borders, including a possible EU border guard.

We will continue over dinner with the international aspects of the migratory crisis which I have listed above.²¹⁰

President Donald Tusk made statements about migration to Europe in his invitation letter to the members of the European Council dated October 13, 2015. He described

²¹⁰ European Union, European Council. (2015). *Invitation letter by President Donald Tusk to the members of the European Council*. Retrieved September 8, 2016, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/13/tusk-invitation-letter-european-council/>

migration as refugee pressure and talked about strengthening the external borders of the EU. The President pointed to cooperation with origin and transit countries as a solution to what he described as the refugee crisis, and preferred the words ‘wave and inflow of refugees’ in his speech. Talking about the possibilities, he described the events as challenges, using the expressions influx of refugees, the threat of bigger waves, and a new migratory wave.

He argued that easy access to Europe is one of the main pull factors, and that strengthening external borders, including EU border guard, should be considered. He later used the phrase ‘migratory crisis’. When the general evaluation of the speech is made, it is seen that words describing migration as a negative situation are included, migration is accepted as a situation that must be overcome and securing borders are thought as essential.

In short, to me the aim of the Bratislava summit is to bring back the political control of our common future. We need to come up with a diagnosis of the Union's current shortcomings. And more importantly, the Union and its Member States must demonstrate our strong determination and ability to address the major concerns and worries of its citizens. Based on my consultations so far, I have no doubt that the three main challenges are uncontrolled irregular migration, terrorism, and the fears of globalisation. These three challenges are not unique for Europe but they are essential for understanding the increasing lack of trust in the European Union...

For me it is clear that our first priority must be to secure our external borders. This is also a necessary precondition for a common European asylum policy. In Bratislava I would like to see a critical number of Member States sending border guards and equipment to help Bulgaria protect its border with Turkey. This would be a concrete example of support to an EU country that is seeing more migrants trying to cross illegally into the EU. And it would be an important signal that we are serious and will not hesitate to act if and when needed. Never again can we allow our borders to be overrun by waves of irregular migrants as in 2015.

Fighting the threat of terrorism in Europe and elsewhere is another priority, and where there is no alternative to greater European cooperation and coordination. In Bratislava I want us to pledge that all persons, including EU citizens, that cross the Union's external borders are checked against the relevant databases. It is a question of our security.

In a wider sense we also need to bring back control of globalisation to make sure that it is an opportunity and not a threat. We need to find a way to

safeguard the interests of our citizens while remaining open to the world.²¹¹

On September 9, 2016, then-President Donald Tusk evaluated the developments regarding migration before his meeting with Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven. In his remarks, securitization discourse was highly practiced and the perception of 'us' and the concerns of the citizens were included. The president linked migration, terrorism, and the fears of globalization as the main setbacks and causing the lack of trust for the citizens of the Member States. Arguing that the first priority is to ensure the security of external borders, he stated that this is also a necessary precondition for a common European asylum policy. Thus, by linking migration and security, he displayed a securitizing attitude towards migration. He criminalized migrants by saying that more migrants trying to cross illegally into the EU.

The border control was urged upon by Mr. Tusk and he stated that they could not let the waves of irregular migrants that happened in 2015 once again. He made a contradictory statement. The contradiction arises from the fact that although an appropriate expression such as irregular migrant is used, the use of the words 'overrun' and 'wave' has added a negative perspective to migration. Later, he mentioned fighting the threat of terrorism as another priority and promised to check everyone who cross the external borders of the Union and claimed that this was a security question.

The threat of terrorism and the control of external borders have again demonstrated a security-oriented approach. Arguing that it is necessary to bring back control of globalization to ensure that globalization is an opportunity, not a threat, the President said that it is necessary to find a way to protect the interests of their citizens while remaining open to the world. There is also a perception of threat in this statement.

The migration crisis was the tipping point. Last year's chaos on our borders, new images every day of hundreds of thousands of people moving across our continent without any control, created a feeling of threat among many

²¹¹ European Union, European Council. (2016). *Remarks by President Donald Tusk before his meeting with Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven*. Retrieved September 9, 2016, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/09/tusk-meeting-lofven-stockholm/>

Europeans. They had to wait too long for action to bring the situation under control, such as the closure of the Western Balkan route and the EU-Turkey deal...

We do not have too much time to spare. Bratislava will have to be a turning point in terms of protecting the Union's external borders. We must demonstrate to our citizens that we are willing and able to protect them from a repeat of the chaos of 2015. This will require the full cooperation of all the governments and European institutions.

It is equally important to combat terrorism effectively. In principle we all agree, and yet there are still too many practical and legislative obstacles. Someone must give back to Europeans their sense of security. The question is who and by what means... At external borders, we must ensure that everybody is checked against our databases, so that potential terrorists cannot enter the EU unhindered. And in each of our countries we must do more to fight radicalisation. Without genuine determination to fight terrorist threats, we will fail to stem radical and increasingly aggressive behaviour and attitudes...

I am aware that the future of Europe will depend not only on how we handle the migration crisis, terrorism, and the fears associated with globalisation. Bringing back the feeling of security and order, the trust of EU citizens in their political leadership as well as rebuilding the reputation of the Union as a synonym of protection and stability, are all crucial and indispensable, but they are insufficient.²¹²

In a letter from Former President Donald Tusk before the Bratislava summit on September 13, 2016, he mentioned migration and terrorism. The President talked about what he called the migration crisis and stated that what happened at the European borders last year created a feeling of threat in many Europeans. Regarding protecting external borders, he argued that they must show their citizens that they are willing and able to protect them. The president drew attention to the feeling of threat among Europeans and the need to give Europeans sense of security.

He argues that everyone should be checked at external borders and potential terrorists should be prevented from entering, and that more should be done to fight radicalization. It is understood from this part that a threat perception has been formed and terrorism and border protection are evaluated together. In addition, there is a

²¹² European Union, European Council. (2016). *Letter from President Donald Tusk before the Bratislava summit*. Retrieved September 9, 2016, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/13/tusk-invitation-letter-bratislava/>

distinction between ‘us and others’, such that those who cross the borders and are not citizens are seen as others while the term of our citizens used as the ones who need protection. While terrorism, fears related to globalization and the migration crisis were listed as issues to be overcome, the importance of ensuring the feeling of security and order and the trust of EU citizens was pointed out.

As a historian, I know why the League of Nations failed in its mission to protect peace and international security. It was paralysed by inertia, fatalism and, finally, by cowardice. As a politician, I can see similar phenomena everywhere today. This is due to the rise of fear. Fear of war, fear of terrorism and the fear of strangers. Globalisation makes fear more contagious and more potent. It dangerously links together the anxieties of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe, and America. Take one example that can stand for others: the radical Islam of Da'esh that spreads terror from Jakarta to Nice; from Tunis to Brussels, from Sirte to Orlando.

When fear takes over, nations increasingly turn away from each other. What we need to do here and now is to regain a sense of security, which is a fundamental need for every human being, as important as the need for freedom.

No challenge shows this so clearly as the issue of refugee protection and the mass displacement of persons across borders. In the last months, Europe has been confronted by the refugee crisis to a particularly large degree. Nevertheless, in all our actions aimed at solving the problem of refugees, the European Union is driven by empathy and the readiness to offer help to those in need, even if the world turns its back and pretends not to see. And still today, when we restore order on our external borders and take back control from the smugglers, the readiness to assist refugees in their plight remains our top priority.

...In light of this, we support the work that has now begun under the New York Declaration to find a sustainable and fair rulebook for global migration. This declaration gives us hope that the principles which have been at the heart of our response, will also form the foundation of the global response to the refugee crisis.

This year we have also witnessed a rising wave of terror worldwide, also against the people of Europe, carried out by many terrorist organisations, in particular by Daesh. Building a global strategy and network against terrorism is key, including in preventing radicalisation and confronting the issues of foreign fighters and terrorist financing. Europe is working with partners from Asia to the Gulf and the Sahel on building up global capacities against violent extremism. We are upgrading our borders to ensure that terrorists cannot pass, or re-enter, and are working with communities to prevent young people from becoming infected with hatred...

...The Sustainable Development Goals can drive reform of the international system by offering an opportunity to address many problems in one process: namely insecurity, poverty, under-development, climate change and uncontrolled migration. And, ultimately, we seek a system that ensures that everybody gets his or her fair share of the benefits of globalisation.²¹³

President Donald Tusk made a speech at the 71st United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 2016 and he mentioned the current problems in the world. Referring to the reasons for the failure of the League of Nations, he claimed that these are still valid today and listed the fear of war, fear of terrorism and fear of foreigners among the reasons. Islam and 'terrorism' were used together when talking about the terrorist organization Da'esh. It was emphasized that the feeling of security is as significant as the need for freedom.

The President showed the protection of refugees and the mass displacement of people across borders as challenges, used the expressions 'refugee crisis' and 'refugee problem', and made a connection between the order at external borders and the issue of refugees. He chose to use the expression refugee crisis again when talking about the New York Declaration. He addressed the topics of foreign fighters, Daesh, radicalization and extremism and stated that Europe's borders should be made inaccessible to terrorists. Then, he listed many problems, including insecurity and uncontrolled migration. He talked about 'fear of terrorism' and 'fear of strangers' in the same sentence. So, it can be inferred that migration was criminalized because it was exemplified as being one of those problems arising at the present time. Security and migration were linked in many parts of the discourse.

5.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, a comparative analysis is conducted in which the manual qualitative coding method is used. By selecting certain words from the speeches of the heads of EU institutions, the differences in the EU's approach to migration from Ukraine to Europe and migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe are

²¹³ European Union, European Council. (2016). *Address by President Donald Tusk at the 71st United Nations General Assembly*. Retrieved September 9, 2016, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/21/tusk-speech-unga/>

analyzed. By examining the speeches of the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council, obtained from press conferences and statements on their institutions' websites, how the perception of 'us vs. them' leads to this difference in approach is determined.

The securitization of migration and asylum in the European Union through speech acts at the European Union is clearly seen in the speeches related to migration from Middle East and North Africa. On the other hand, the same security approach is replaced by an EU policy based on human rights and EU values when it comes to Ukrainian immigrants. These contradictory approaches are the subject of this chapter, and some inferences are reached based on certain words selected through manual coding.

Since it is not possible to examine all the speeches, a time period is designated for the research. For Ukrainian migration, three different periods starting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine to the present day and six speeches of presidents of the European Commission and the European Council are selected.

The speeches of the presidents of the institutions related to the issue of migration from Middle East and North Africa are reviewed, which were published between the years of 2011 and 2016. The motivation behind the designation of the time period used in this research is the analysis of the process beginning from the Arab revolts of 2011 up to the 2016.

The words chosen for the Ukraine case are as follows: 'support, solidarity, common values, European family, democracy, freedom, peace, rights, rule of law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, welcoming, opening hearts and homes, our, we, security, defense'. Ukrainian immigrants are seen as one of 'us' by the EU leaders. It is seen in the speeches that the future of Ukraine and the EU are evaluated together and that the future of Ukraine means the future of Europe.

In discourses on migration from the Middle East and Africa to the EU, the words 'influx, flow, inflow, wave, legal, illegal, irregular, security, insecurity, threat, fear,

terror, human trafficking, migration or refugee crisis, border control or management' were chosen. Those words have negative connotations when they are incorporated into the discourses on immigration to the EU and security in the EU. However, it is significant to note that the wording in some publications has improved in the course of time. For instance, the term 'irregular' has come into use rather than the term 'illegal' when the issues concerning migration are mentioned. The labelling of irregular migration as illegal migration implies that there is a criminal situation. The people migrating through irregular ways are called as illegal immigrants in some discourses and by this way they are claimed as criminals committing illegal act. Therefore, the use of the term irregular when talking about migration is important.

Securitization is directly proportionate to racism and xenophobia. To put a finer point on it, increasing securitization brings further racism and xenophobia in its train. On the other hand, the 'change' of something in their lives generally scares people. The reason for this fear is desire to preserve stability. The sustainability of stability concept stimulate the fears of change.

The most important finding obtained in this research is that the EU's approach to immigration varies depending on the nature of immigrants. To explain, the distinctive aspects of immigrants such as their origin, race and religion shape the approaches and perspectives towards them. Its securitization tendency, which increased dramatically after the 9/11 terrorist attack, has increased significantly after the Arab Spring and especially as of 2015. On the other hand, it has adopted a humanitarian approach rather than a security-oriented policy regarding the Ukrainian refugees who emerged with the occupation of Ukraine.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, security and human rights dimension of migration and asylum policy of the European Union is examined. The responses of the EU to asylum seekers from Ukraine and the ones from North Africa and Middle East are analyzed. Also, how threat perceptions related to migration and refugee policies are formed is examined. Questions such as what leads to securitization of migration and asylum policies and what the consequences of securitization of migration are examined here.

Together with the end of the Cold War, security approaches changed both in theory and practice. New security threats gained attention other than the military ones after Cold War. Since new realms for security emerged, migration arose as a threat to societal security.

Although migration is not a new phenomenon, immigration to Europe has increased dramatically in recent years and due to the disturbances in North Africa and Middle East, the pace and scale of migration has changed and those developments make migration to the EU different. The dilemma between security and human rights in the European Union migration and asylum policy can be seen easily in the light of those developments. The refugees from the countries of MENA region and the ones from Ukraine are significant to analyze this dilemma.

This thesis argues that the Copenhagen School theorists use a constructivist approach in their analysis to explain security and securitization. In doing so, the scholars of the Copenhagen School argue that in utilizing a constructivist approach speech acts become important as tools for securitization. Through those speech acts, migration can be constructed as a threat or not by the political actors. The threat

construction creates fear among society and ‘us versus them’ logic is reinforced. Securitization at the EU level is generated through institutional mechanisms. Those mechanisms restrict the entry of the immigrants and asylum seekers. It can be argued that securitization has increased following the 9/11 attacks in Europe. The tendency to link migration with other types of crime make the situation harder for immigrants who are seen as ‘others’. On the other hand, when people migrate to European Union countries from a place that is considered a part of Europe, i.e., one of us, the EU's attitude is human rights oriented.

This research also looks at how securitization of migration and asylum policies in the European Union has evolved. The historical and institutional developments leading to increasing securitization in the European Union are explained. The Single European Act, the Schengen Agreement, the Dublin Convention, the Maastricht Treaty, and the Amsterdam Treaty which have had crucial role in securitization policy of the EU and in the creation of a ‘fortress Europe’ are touched upon. Through those institutional mechanisms internal and external borders are drawn and immigration and asylum policy of the Union is securitized gradually.

Securitization in the post 9/11 period is important. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 attacks, policies adopting more protective approaches, and tendencies to link immigration with other criminal activities particularly with terrorism lead to securitization. This thesis demonstrates arguments to show that migration and refugee policies of the EU have been affected from these changes as well. The EU migration and refugee policies have become more securitized and ‘fight against terrorism’ have become a critical issue in its border management. The increasing securitization at the external borders of the Union illustrate the practices of the EU to restrict immigration to Europe. Frontex, SIS II, Europol and Visa Information System can be demonstrated as examples of these practices. Through the international agreements and the European structuring of human rights, migration as a human rights matter is explained.

Following these discussions, this thesis analyzes the response of the EU to Arab Spring and the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. First of all, the Arab revolts are

examined in the light of the developments beginning from the end of 2010. The reasons that led to revolts in the Middle East and North Africa are presented and the spread of the wave of the revolts are explained. European refugee protection crisis of 2015 presented to the world the sudden movement of irregular migrants and the dramatic increase in the number of the asylum seekers. The EU member states responded with disproportionate restrictive measures to deal with the increase in the flight, which in turn put people's lives during irregular crossings at danger and violated their human rights. For the Ukraine case, information about the occupation process and the EU's reaction and immigration from Ukraine is included. It is explained how Ukrainian immigration is handled through European values.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent Russia-Ukraine War are much more than a war between two countries. With the Euromaidan protests and subsequent Russian intervention in Ukraine, the east-west divide was reignited. Energy supply and security have been one of the prominent parameters in EU-Russia relations, which became even more strained after Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Russia-Ukraine War. The EU has been imposing sanctions on Russia since 2014. This war is seen as a war against European values and Europe, therefore the EU is trying to support Ukraine in various ways, including by welcoming the Ukrainian refugees.

Overall, securitization of migration and asylum in the EU through speech acts shows that securitization happens at the EU level if the migrants are seen as 'others' while it does not happen in case of the migrants are seen as 'us'. Furthermore, a selection of words is chosen to conduct this study and those words are ascertained in order to illustrate the use of language in the press conferences and statements of the European Commission and the European Council. The press releases that are open to public access are attained from the institutions' websites. In those press releases, only the speeches of the presidents of the aforementioned institutions of the European Union are examined.

For the Arab Spring part, which are published between the years of 2011 and 2016, some specific words are chosen showing securitization and criminalization of

migration in the European Union. Those words are ‘terror’, ‘influx’, ‘flow’, ‘threat’, ‘illegal’, ‘wave’ which have negative connotations when they are incorporated into the discourses on immigration to the EU and security in the EU. Thereby, the construction of migration as a threat in discourses at the EU level is tried to be demonstrated. The words chosen in the discourses about Ukraine consist of words such as 'solidarity, peace, values, rights, freedom' and reflect the positive attitude of the EU towards immigration.

The research tries to put forward the increased securitization of migration in the EU with regard to non-Europeans and its negative correlation with human rights. The securitization of migration and refugee policy of the EU is explained by addressing the institutional and historical developments leading to restrictive and exclusionary migration policies of the Union.

The restrictive securitization practices stain the reputation of the EU. The EU, with its sui generis nature, has been known for its liberal stance. However, the security oriented policies conducted by the EU unveil that the illiberal implementations are carried out by the EU. The stance of the EU is altering from “liberal Europe” to “fortress Europe”. Even that expression, i.e. fortress Europe, supports the idea being argued in this thesis. This idea is that the EU is creating borders excluding non-EU citizens and these borders are checked with various practices preventing the entry and stay of the migrants and refugees. On the other hand, as one of the prominent defender of human rights, securitization practices do not comply with the EU’s humanistic approach.

The objective of the research is to put forward contradicting policies of the EU and their adverse impacts. In order to do so, a theoretical framework is used, the historical and institutional process of securitization is touched upon, prominent developments in the MENA region and Ukraine are mentioned to support the assessment that there is an increasing securitization and this is contradicting with human rights when the migrants are seen as ‘others’, while there is tendency to pursue an inclusive attitude based on human rights and EU values if the migrants are accepted as ‘us’, and lastly a comparative analysis is made to illustrate contradictory

consequences of the EU policies on migration. In conclusion, the securitization of migration is at odds with human rights principles and as an important defender of human rights, the EU needs to review its policies and should take a more liberal stand in order to take up the challenges it is going through.

According to the findings of the research, the European Union's migration approach is shaped depending on the characteristics of immigrants. The perception of 'us vs. them' dominates when it comes to whether immigration policy will be based on security or human rights. While Middle Eastern and North African immigrants are seen as a threat, Ukrainian immigrants are considered part of Europe. It can be argued that there is a positive development in the use of the correct wording to some extent. To illustrate, the evolvement from the use of 'illegal migration' to 'irregular migration' is quite significant. However the EU needs to improve its policies towards non-European migrants and refugees so that these comply with human rights.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi güvenlik yaklaşımlarında hem teoride hem de pratikte değişiklikleri beraberinde getirmiştir. Soğuk Savaş sırasında askeri temelli güvenlik yaklaşımları hüküm sürerken savaş sonrasında askeri tehditler dışında yeni güvenlik tehditleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinin iki kutuplu dünyanın sonu olması nedeniyle güvenlikle ilgili yeni konular da dâhil olmak üzere yeni zorluklar belirlemiştir. Ortaya çıkan yeni sorunlar arasında siyasi, toplumsal, çevresel ve ekonomik tehditler örnek olarak verilebilir. Göç toplumsal güvenliğe yönelik algılanan tehditlerden biri olarak öne çıkmıştır.

Göç yeni bir zorluk olarak Avrupa Birliği (AB) içinde de önemli bir konu haline gelmiştir. Bu tez, AB'nin göç ve iltica politikasının güvenlik ve insan hakları boyutunu analiz etmektedir. AB'nin göç politikasının göçmenlerin özelliklerine göre farklılaşması ele alınmakta, göçün güvenlikle ilgili bir konu olarak nasıl yapılandırıldığına odaklanmaktadır. Bu inşa edilmiş yapıda Ukrayna ile Kuzey Afrika ve Orta Doğu'daki (MENA) çatışmalardan kaçarak Avrupa'ya gelen göçmenlerin rolü incelenmektedir. Çalışmanın genel hedefi, Avrupa Birliği'nin göç ve mülteci politikasının göçmenlerin özelliklerine göre farklılaşma eğilimini, göçün güvenikleştirilmesini analiz etmek, insan hakları ilkeleriyle çelişkilerini, zulüm ve savaştan kaçan mülteciler için olumsuz sonuçlarını ortaya koymaktır. Araştırma, 'biz ve onlar' algısının bu yaklaşım farklılığına nasıl sebep olduğunu tartışmaktadır.

Tez çalışmasının araştırılması ve geliştirilmesinde betimleyici ve yorumlayıcı bir yaklaşım kullanılmaktadır. Literatür taraması, AB kurumlarının ve Birleşmiş Milletlerin (BM) resmi belgeleri, İnsan Hakları Evrensel Beyannamesi, 1951 tarihli Mültecilerin Hukuki Durumuna İlişkin Sözleşme, AB Temel Haklar Şartı gibi

uluslararası belgeler, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının raporları ve basında çıkan haberler gibi ikincil kaynaklardan yararlanılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada veri toplanırken nitel araştırma tekniğinden istifade edilmektedir. Ayrıca araştırmayı geliştirmek amacıyla hükümetlerarası kuruluşlar ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının yayınlarından istatistikler ve rakamlar sağlanmaktadır.

Araştırmayı gerçekleştirirken göçmenlerin özelliklerine göre şekillenen AB'nin güvenlik ve insan hakları yaklaşımını ortaya çıkarmak amacıyla sorular sorulmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği'nin göç yaklaşımı nasıl ve hangi temelde şekillenmektedir? Biz ve diğerleri algısı AB'nin göç politikasını nasıl etkilemektedir? Bu çalışmada göç ve sığınma politikalarına ilişkin tehdit algılamalarında güvenliğin rolüne odaklanan sorular analiz edilmektedir.

Siyasi söylemler AB'nin Avrupa değerleri ve insan hakları temelinde göçe yaklaşımını nasıl şekillendiriyor, AB'nin göç ve mülteci politikaları konusunda Ukrayna örneğinde olduğu gibi ılımlı duruşu AB perspektifiyle nasıl örtüşüyor, AB'nin Orta Doğu ve Afrika'dan gelen göçmen ve mültecilere yaklaşımı AB'nin insan haklarına olan bağlılığıyla nasıl çelişiyor, AB'nin göç politikasında benimsenen tutum farklılıklarının sebepleri nelerdir? Tez çalışmasında bu sorulara yanıtlar aranmaktadır.

Her çalışmada olduğu gibi bu çalışmanın da sınırlılıkları bulunmaktadır. Araştırma esnasında AB başkanlarının tüm konuşmalarını incelemek mümkün olmadığından belirli bir zaman diliminde gerçekleşen belirli sayıda konuşma incelenerek karşılaştırmalı bir analiz yapılmaktadır. Konuşmalardaki kodlanmış kelimeler üzerinden değerlendirmeler ortaya konulmaktadır.

Avrupa Komisyonu ve Avrupa Konseyi'nin en üst düzey temsilcilerinin MENA bölgesinden Avrupa'ya göç konusunda 2011-2016 yılları arasındaki konuşmaları, literatürde Arap Baharı olarak bilinen olayın başlangıcından bu yana geçen dönem ile göç krizi ya da mülteci krizi olarak adlandırılan dönemi kapsayacak şekilde incelenmektedir. Her kurumdan sekizer tane olmak üzere toplam on altı konuşma bu şekilde analiz edilmektedir.

Analizin Ukrayna kısmında ise Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı işgalinden günümüze kadar geçen süre temel alınarak Avrupa Komisyonu ve Avrupa Konseyi başkanlarının üç farklı dönemde yaptıkları konuşmalar incelenmektedir. Öncelikle savaşın başlangıcına yakın bir tarih, ardından incelenen zaman diliminin ortasında bir tarih ve son olarak da günümüze yakın bir tarih seçilerek konuşmalar belirlenmiştir. Her kurumdan üçer tane olmak üzere altı konuşma bu şekilde incelenmektedir. Avrupa Konseyi Başkanının incelenen konuşmalarının tarihleri şu şekildedir: 23 Mart 2022, 3 Şubat 2023 ve 30 Kasım 2023. Avrupa Komisyonu Başkanının konuşmaları şu tarihlerde yapılmıştır: 1 Mart 2022, 7 Mart 2023 ve 13 Aralık 2023.

AB'nin kısıtlayıcı göç politikaları "kale Avrupası" fikrini pekiştirmektedir. AB sınır kontrollerini güçlendirirken pek çok düzensiz göçmen Avrupa'ya ulaşmak amacıyla çıktıkları yolda Akdeniz'de boğularak hayatlarını kaybetmektedir. Düzensiz göçü önlemek için ortaya çıkan Avrupa kalesinin inşası can kaybıyla sonuçlanmakta ve bu da AB tarafından büyük ölçüde benimsenen insan hakları temel kriterleri için bir tutarsızlık yaratmaktadır.

Uluslararası hukuk, göçmenlerin temel insan haklarını güvence altına almakta olup göçün nedeni önemli değildir. Dahası insan haklarının en önemli savunucusu ve uygulayıcısı olarak AB kendi içinde insan haklarını barındırmaktadır. Hem Avrupa hukuku hem de uluslararası hukuk göçmenlere karşı duyarlı ve insani bir yaklaşım benimsemektedir.

AB her zaman göç hareketlerinden etkilenmiştir. Ancak Avrupa'ya göç son yıllarda önemli ölçüde artmıştır. Bu gelişmeler AB göç ve iltica politikasında güvenlik ve insan hakları arasındaki ikilemi de göstermiştir. İç güvenlik faktörleri ve terörle mücadele önlemleri kısıtlayıcı göç politikaları ve dışlayıcı sınırlara yol açmaktadır. AB'nin önemli bileşenleri olan insani değerler ise daha hoşgörülü ve duyarlı bir yaklaşım gerektirmektedir. MENA bölgesi ve Ukrayna'dan gelen göçmenler bu ikilemi analiz etmekte önemlidir.

Bu çalışmanın önemi, dünyada büyük ilgi gören Arap Baharı ve 2015 mülteci koruma krizi ile Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı işgali sonrası ortaya çıkan göçün

incelenmesidir. MENA bölgesinde halihazırda karışıklık devam ettiği için daha fazla insanın daha güvenli ülkelere göç etmesi ve gelecekte sığınma talebinde bulunma ihtimali vardır. AB ülkeleri sığınma için en çok tercih edilen ülkeler olacaktır. Avrupa Birliği göç politikasında güvenlik ve insan hakları arasındaki sorunlu ikilem AB'nin itibarını zedelemekte ve kaostan kaçan sığınmacıların hayatını tehlikeye atmaktadır. AB göç konusundaki politikasını değiştirmezse bu durumun devam etme ihtimali bulunmaktadır.

Ukrayna örneğinde Rusya ile Ukrayna arasındaki savaşın başlangıcından bu yana savaştan kaçanlar özelde AB'nin, genelde ise dünyanın dikkatini çekmektedir. Kuzey Afrikalı ve Ortadoğululardan farklı olarak Avrupa'da hoş karşılanan Ukraynalı göçmenler, AB'nin göç politikasındaki tutarsızlıkları ortaya koymaktadır. Araştırma, bu çelişki ve ardındaki etkenlere ışık tutması açısından önemlidir.

Kimliği söz konusu toplumdan farklı olan, yani Avrupalı olmayan “diğerleri”, Avrupa toplumunun kendisine yönelik bir tehdit olarak görülmektedir. Avrupa örneğinde diğerlerini Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'dan gelen göçmenler oluşturmakta, bu kişilerin Avrupa Birliği sınırları içindeki varlıkları tehdit olarak algılanmakta ve dolayısıyla güvenlikleştirmeye başvurulmaktadır. Aynı coğrafyadan ve benzer kimlikten gelenler yani Avrupalı sığınmacılar söz konusu olduğunda güvenlik ve göç söylemleri “biz” çatısı altında gerçekleştirilmektedir. İki farklı göç vakası incelendiğinde birinde güvenlik ve tehdit algısının inşa edildiği, diğerinde ise insan hakları ve AB değerlerine dayalı bir algının oluşturulduğu görülmektedir.

Tez altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde konuya giriş yapılarak araştırma hakkında genel bilgi verilmektedir. İkinci bölüm teorik çerçeveyi oluşturmaktadır. Bu bölümde Kopenhag Okulu teorisyenlerinden Barry Buzan ve Ole Waever'in güvenlikleştirme konusundaki iddiaları ele alınmaktadır. Göçle ilgili konular toplumsal sektör kapsamında olduğundan toplumsal sektörde güvenlikleştirme bu çalışmanın ana odağıdır.

Göçün bir tehdit olarak söylemsel inşası ve Avrupa'da güvenlikleştirilmesi Kopenhag Okulu'nun söz edim kuramından faydalanılarak açıklanmaktadır.

Kopenhag Okulu'nun söz edim kuramı, bir şeyi tehdit olarak sunmanın bile onu güvenlik meselesi haline getirdiği fikrini ortaya koymaktadır. Böylece bir şeyi tehdit olarak inşa etmenin anahtar rolü, bu durumda göç, politik aktörler tarafından söylemlerinde kolayca kullanılmaktadır.

Kimliğin söylemlerdeki etkisi tartışılmazdır. Güvenliğin kimlik açısından kazanımı olmayan bir oyun olarak görülmesi, toplumdaki gruplar arasında şüpheciliğe hatta düşmanlığa neden olmaktadır. Bu şekilde ev sahibi topluluk, göçmenlerin varlığına göre bekasını tanımlamaktadır. Bir grubun diğerlerine karşı olarak tanımlanması sorunlu tehdit inşasına neden olmaktadır. Kimlik bakımından gruplar arasındaki bölünme, yani “biz” ve “onlar” kamplarının oluşması, güvenikleştirme eyleminin önünü açmaktadır. Tehdit algısı insanların kendilerini nasıl tanımladıklarına bağlı hale gelmektedir. Bu durum bir konuyu güvenikleştirirken siyasi aktörlerin işine gelmektedir. Bu söylemlerin ayrıntılı analizi çalışmanın sonraki kısımlarında gerçekleştirilmektedir.

Üçüncü bölümün amacı, tarihsel ve kurumsal olarak Avrupa Birliği'nde göç ve iltica politikalarının güvenikleştirilmesini göstermektir. Her şeyden önce, göç-güvenlik bağı ve Birlik'te başından beri var olan kademeli güvenikleştirmeyi açıklamak için Avrupa Birliği'nin göç ve mülteci politikasından kısaca bahsedilmektedir. Bu süreç AB'nin göç ve sığınma yaklaşımındaki değişikliği ortaya koymaktadır. Schengen Müktesebatından itibaren Dublin Sözleşmesi, Maastricht Antlaşması ve ardından Amsterdam Antlaşması ile birlikte göç konusu AB düzeyinde giderek kurumsallaşmıştır.

Bu araştırma, özellikle 11 Eylül'den sonra AB'de göçün güvenikleştirilmesine de değinmiştir. 11 Eylül 2001 tarihinde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde düzenlenen terör saldırıları, özellikle AB ve ABD için ülkelerin göç politikalarının güvenikleştirilmesi adına bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Terörizm ve göç bağlantısının inşası, Avrupa Birliği'nin “terörizmle mücadele” politikasında ve terörizmi göçle ilişkilendiren söylemlerde açıkça görülmektedir. AB'yi güvenlik endişelerine dayalı kısıtlayıcı göç politikasını uygulamaya iten nedenler bu çalışmada analiz edilmektedir. Bu nedenlerden biri olarak AB ülkelerindeki Müslüman göçmenlerin

artan nüfusu ve dünyada radikalleşmenin yükselişi 11 Eylül'den sonraki korkuları güçlendirmiştir. Son yirmi yılda 11 Eylül'e benzer şekilde Avrupa'da terör saldırıları meydana gelmiştir. 2004 Madrid tren bombalamaları, 2005 Londra bombalamaları, 2011 Norveç saldırıları, Kasım 2015 Paris saldırıları, 2016 Nice kamyon saldırısı, 2016 Atatürk Havalimanı saldırısı, 2016 Brüksel bombalamaları, 2016 Münih saldırıları, 2016 Berlin Noel pazarı saldırısı, Mayıs 2017 Manchester Arena bombalaması, 2017 Barselona saldırıları ve 2020 Hanau saldırıları Avrupa'nın uğradığı terör saldırıları arasında yer almaktadır. Fransa, Belçika ve Birleşik Krallık'ta büyük güvenlik operasyonları ve planları başlatılmıştır. Bu saldırılar Avrupa'da terörizm korkusunu artırmıştır. Böylece "biz ve onlar" arasındaki bölünme derinleşmiş ve yabancılara, "diğerlerine" olan şüphe önemli ölçüde artmıştır. Burada şunu belirtmek gerekir ki bu saldırıların büyük bir kısmı İslam bağlantılı terör grupları tarafından gerçekleştirilirken bir kısmı da Avrupalı kişiler tarafından organize edilmiştir. Başka bir ifadeyle anlatmak gerekirse, teröristler sadece dışarıdakilerden yani 'diğerlerinden' değil aynı zamanda içeridekilerden yani 'biz'den de çıkmaktadır.

11 Eylül sonrasında güvenlikleştirmeye uygulamaları ve mekanizmaları Avrupa Birliği içinde ve özellikle dış sınırlar boyunca genişleyip derinleşmiştir. SIS II ve Europol, VIS (Vize Bilgi Sistemi) ve FRONTEX'in geliştirilmesi ve kurumsallaştırılması Avrupa Birliği'nde artan güvenlikleştirmeyi göstermektedir. Dublin II Konvansiyonu, Standartlara İlişkin Konsey Direktifi ve Lizbon Antlaşması'nın yürürlüğe girmesi güvenlikleştirmeye bağlamında diğer önemli yasal gelişmeler arasındadır. İlaveten uluslararası anlaşmalar ve insan haklarının Avrupa yapılanması üzerinden göçün bir insan hakları meselesi olduğu anlatılmaktadır.

Kuzey Afrika ve Orta Doğu'daki karışıklıkların bir sonucu olarak Avrupa'ya göçün hızı ve ölçeği değişmiştir. Sığınma talebinde bulunan sığınmacıların sayısı, MENA bölgesindeki kargaşa nedeniyle son yıllarda önemli ölçüde artmıştır. Dördüncü bölümün amaçlarından biri Avrupa Birliği'nin Arap Baharı'na tepkisini incelemektir. Arap Baharı'ndaki gelişmeler kısaca anlatılmış ve AB'nin bu gelişmelere verdiği tepki ışığında yasal boyut ve iltica konusu tartışılmıştır. Bölgede yaşanan karışıklıklar ve bu durumun siviller üzerindeki yıkıcı etkisi 2015 yılında daha ciddi

hale gelmiş ve bunun bir sonucu olarak dünya genelinde sığınmacı sayısında çarpıcı bir artış yaşanmıştır. Avrupa'nın sığınmacıların çoğu için nihai hedef olması 2015 yılında yaşanan mülteci koruma krizine yol açmıştır.

Arap Baharı'nın başarısı tartışılacak olursa, otokratik olarak sınıflandırılan hükümetlerin yeniden iktidara gelmesi ve taleplerin çoğunun talep olarak kalması nedeniyle gösterilerin nihai amacına ulaşamadığı ileri sürülebilir. Ayrıca iyi tarafından bakıldığında bu protestolar, MENA bölgesinde yaşayan halkta farkındalık yaratmış ve sadece Batı medeniyetlerinde değil, bu bölgede de geniş katımlı demokrasi yanlısı hareketlerin oluşabileceğini göstermiştir. Protestolarda sosyal medyanın rolü ele alınması gereken bir diğer önemli faktördür. İnsanlar sosyal medya uygulamaları aracılığıyla bir araya gelebilmiş ve orada yaşananlara tüm dünya aynı anda tanık olabilmıştır.

Hem Arap Baharı hem bölgede yaşanan diğer karışıklıklar artan güvenlikleştirme üzerinde etkili olmuştur. Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'da süregelen çatışma ve mültecilerin sayısının artması ile AB kurumlarının önemli yetkililerinin siyasi söylemlerinde göçü toplumsal güvenliğe bir tehdit olarak göstermeleri güvenlik inşasına katkıda bulunmuştur. Böylece Avrupa Birliği'nin göç ve iltica politikasının güvenlikleştirilmesi hız kazanmıştır.

Bölümde Avrupa Birliği göç politikasının insan hakları boyutu ve bu güvenlikleştirmenin sığınmacılar ve düzensiz göçmenler üzerindeki etkileri ile birlikte çelişkiler incelenmektedir. Avrupa Birliği'nin sığınmacılara karşı tutumu, uluslararası bir yapıya sahip olduğu için önemlidir. AB insan haklarının bir savunucusu olarak güvenliğini sağlarken Avrupa'ya ulaşmaya çalışan göçmenlerin haklarını kısıtlamaktadır ve bu durum AB'nin çelişkili tutumunu göstermektedir.

Göçmenlerin insan hakları ve mültecilerin korunma ihtiyaçları AB'nin dış göç politikasının önemli parçaları olarak kabul edilmektedir. Ancak AB göç için daha fazla kanal sağlamak veya göçmenlerin ve mültecilerin insan haklarını teşvik etmek yerine düzensiz göçü önlemeye ve göçmenleri geri kabul anlaşmaları yoluyla geri göndermeye çalışmaktadır. Sığınma arayanlar, daha güvenli bir yer bulmak için

savaştan ve çatışmadan kaçan insanlardan oluşmaktadır. Dolayısıyla AB'nin sınırlarını güvence altına alma konusundaki bu güvenlik odaklı tutumu, düzensiz göçmen olup olmadıklarına bakılmaksızın insan haklarına uymamaktadır.

Dördüncü bölümde AB'nin Ukrayna'nın işgaline tepkisi de incelenmiş, Ukrayna-Rusya ilişkileri, AB'nin Rusya ve Ukrayna'ya yönelik dış politikası ele alınmıştır. Rusya ile Ukrayna arasında 27 Şubat 2014 tarihinde başlayan savaş 24 Şubat 2022'de Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı büyük ölçekli işgali ile ivme kazanmıştır. Ukrayna ve Belarus'un ayrı kimlikleri olmasının yapay bir icat olduğunu ileri süren Putin; Rusya, Ukrayna ve Belarus'un birliğine inanmakta, bu kimliklerin inşa edildiğini ve tarihsel gerçeklikten uzak olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Avrupa Birliği ise Ukrayna'yı çok önceden Avrupalı kabul ederek bu işgali demokrasiye indirilmiş bir darbe olarak görmektedir. Bu çerçevede savaş; doğulu bir diktatörün Avrupa demokrasisini dize getirme, etkisiz kılma hamlesi olarak kabul edilmektedir. AB kendisinden biri olarak kabul ettiği Ukrayna'yı ve Ukraynalı sığınmacıları desteklemekte, Ukrayna'dan olan göçü güvenlik bağlamında ele almayıp insan hakları kapsamında değerlendirmektedir. Ukrayna'daki bu savaş, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana Avrupa'daki en büyük mülteci hareketine neden olmuştur.

Enerji konusu da AB-Rusya ilişkilerinde önemli bir yere sahiptir. Rus doğal gazının Avrupa'nın enerji ihtiyacının önemli bir kısmını karşılaması nedeniyle Rusya, siyasi düzeyde bu durumu kendi lehine çevirmeye yönelik stratejiler benimsemektedir. AB ise enerji güvenliğini sağlamak amacıyla Rusya'ya olan bağımlılığını azaltmaya çalışmakta ve enerji arzını çeşitlendirme politikası izlemektedir. Ukrayna Savaşı'nı Batı ile Rusya arasında yaşanan bir vekalet savaşı olarak da tanımlamak mümkündür.

Geçmişten gelen doğu-batı çatışması ve bölgede ekonomik ve siyasi üstünlük kurma çabaları Ukrayna Savaşı'nda açıkça görülmektedir. Tanık olunan durum, iki ülke arasındaki savaştan çok daha fazlasıdır. Ukrayna'nın kaderi sadece Ukrayna vatandaşlarını ilgilendiren bir husus değildir. Aksine Ukrayna'nın geleceği; büyük güçler, diğer ülkeler ve farklı milletleri de etkilemektedir. Bu bölümde konunun

sadece mültecilerle ilgili olmadığı, Avrupa değerlerine dayalı bir değerlendirmenin de olduğu anlatılmaktadır.

Tezin beşinci bölümünde manuel kodlama yöntemiyle bir çalışma yapılmakta, göçün güvenlik ve insan hakları boyutu AB söylemlerinin karşılaştırmalı analizi üzerinden incelenmektedir. Avrupa Birliği'ni temsil eden siyasi aktörlerin konuşmaları, yani Avrupa Komisyonu ve Avrupa Konseyi başkanlarının konuşmaları, Birliğin göç ve sığınma politikasının söylemsel düzeyde farklılaştığını göstermek için incelenmektedir. Bazı ifadeler, Avrupa Birliği göç ve mülteci politikalarının güvenleştirmesini incelemek için seçilmiştir.

Yasadışı göç terimi söylemlerde genellikle göçü güvenliğe bağlayarak ve toplumsal güvenliğe tehdit olarak tanıtarak kullanılmaktadır. Ayrıca, 'yasadışı göç' ile güvenlik, özellikle terörizm ve diğer suç faaliyetlerine yönelik diğer tehdit türleri arasındaki bağlantı bu tür konuşmalarda sıklıkla dile getirilmektedir. 'Sel', 'akın', 'kitle', 'akış' gibi söylemlerdeki ifadeler göç için olumsuz çağrışımları temsil edip göçmenlere karşı korku ve tehdit algısı oluşturmaktadır.

Ukrayna'dan AB'ye olan göçe ilişkin söylemler kapsayıcı, hoşgörülü ve Avrupa değerlerine dayalıdır. Ukraynalı göçmenler hakkında konuşma yapılırken 'dayanışma', 'haklar', 'özgürlük', 'barış', 'ortak değerler' gibi ifadeler kullanılmaktadır. Ayrıca 'biz' ve 'bizim' ifadelerinin sıklıkla kullanılması AB'nin Ukraynalıları 'biz'in bir parçası olarak gördüğünü kanıtlamaktadır.

Rusya'nın 24 Şubat 2022 tarihinde Ukrayna'yı işgal etmesinden bu yana AB, tüm imkânlarıyla Ukraynalıların yanında olmaya çalışmaktadır. Ukrayna'ya ekonomik ve askeri desteğin yanı sıra siyasi ve sosyal destek de sağlayan AB, bunu görev olarak görmektedir. Ukrayna'da yaşanan savaştan kaçarak Avrupa'ya sığınan Ukraynalıların durumunu insani bir mesele olarak kabul edip bu doğrultuda harekete geçmekte ve sınırlarını Ukraynalı göçmenlere açmaktadır. Ukraynalı göçmenler Avrupa'nın güvenliğine yönelik bir tehdit olarak görülmeyip aksine yardıma muhtaç bir topluluk olarak varlıkları AB'de onaylanmakta ve söylemlerde olumlu bir şekilde anılmaktadır. Bu tezde konuşmaları incelenen Avrupa Komisyonu ve Avrupa

Konseyi başkanlarının Ukrayna göçüne karşı sergiledikleri insani yaklaşım dikkat çekmektedir.

Bu araştırmada elde edilen en önemli bulgu AB'nin göçe yaklaşımının göçmenlerin niteliğine göre farklılık göstermesidir. Açıklamak gerekirse; göçmenlerin köken, ırk, din gibi ayırt edici tarafları onlara yönelik yaklaşım ve bakış açılarını şekillendirmektedir. 11 Eylül terör saldırısı sonrasında dramatik şekilde artan güvenlikleştirme eğilimi, Arap Baharı sonrasında ve özellikle 2015 yılı itibarıyla ciddi oranda artış göstermiştir. Öte yandan AB, Ukrayna'nın işgali sonucunda ortaya çıkan Ukraynalı sığınmacılara yönelik güvenlik odaklı bir politika yerine insani bir yaklaşım tarzını benimsemektedir.

Tezin altıncı ve son bölümünde araştırmanın genel bir değerlendirmesi yapılmış ve ilgili bulgulara yer verilmiştir. Araştırma boyunca ele alınan konular, AB'nin göç politikasının tarihsel ve hukuki gelişimi ile AB'nin Ukrayna ve MENA kökenli göçmenlere yönelik yaklaşımındaki farklılıklar bu kısımda özetlenmektedir.

Kopenhag Okulu'nun çalışması güvenlik ve güvenlikleştirmeyi ayrıntılı olarak açıklamaktadır. Bunu yaparken Kopenhag Okulu akademisyenleri analizlerinde yapısalcı bir yaklaşım benimsemişlerdir. Kopenhag Okulu tarafından benimsenen çok sektörlü güvenlik yaklaşımı, güvenliği daha iyi anlamayı sağlamaktadır. Güvenlikleştirme ve sektörlere ek olarak bölgesel güvenlik komplekslerinin güvenlik çalışmalarına dâhil edilmesi güvenlik analizine katkıda bulunmaktadır. Güvenlik sektörlerinin toplumsal sektörü kapsayacak şekilde genişletilmesi, güvenlik çalışmalarında önemli bir atılım gerçekleştirmektedir.

Güvenlik konularına farklı bir bakış açısı katan Kopenhag Okulu'nun söz edim kuramı, güvenlikleştirme analizinde çok önemlidir. Tehditler, siyasi aktörlerin söz edimleri aracılığıyla inşa edilmektedir. Ayrıca söz edimlerle, seçkinlerin veya devlet aktörlerinin yönlendirmesine göre var olan tehditlere karşı insanların seferber edilmesi sağlanabilir. Söz konusu tehditler bu aktörler tarafından güvenliğe yönelik tehditler olarak ortaya konulduğunda insanların desteğini kazanmak için ikna edici olmalıdır. Bir söz edimin başarılı olabilmesi için seyircilerin kabulü gereklidir.

Avrupa Birliđi'nde göç ve sığınma politikalarının güvenlikleştirilmesiyle “biz” ve “diđerleri” bölünmesini teşvik eden eylemler AB politikalarını etkilemektedir. Ayrıca güvenliđi sağlamak amacıyla oluşturulan antlaşmalar ve mekanizmalar göçmenlerin ve sığınmacıların Avrupa'ya girişini kısıtlamaktadır. Sođuk Savaş döneminden sonra AB'nin toplumsal güvenliğine bir tehdit olarak göç ve iltica inşası 11 Eylül saldırılarından sonra daha yoğun hale gelmiştir. Göçle ilgili konuların terörizmle bağlantısı ve bazı sığınmacıların potansiyel terörist olarak algılanması AB içinde güvenlikleştirme uygulamalarını daha yoğun hale getirmiştir.

Araştırma, AB'de göçün artan güvenlikleştirmesini ve insan hakları ile negatif bağlantısını ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. AB'nin göç ve mülteci politikasının güvenlikleştirilmesi, Birliđin kısıtlayıcı ve dışlayıcı göç politikalarına yol açan durumlar, kurumsal ve tarihi gelişmelere değinilerek açıklanmaktadır. “Kale Avrupası” fikri; AB kurumları tarafından hazırlanan kontrol uygulamaları ve hukuki belgeler aracılığıyla ortaya çıkmaktadır. Dış sınırlardaki kontroller ile göçü engellemek için bazı ülkelerle imzalanan anlaşmalar AB'nin kabuđuna çekildiđinin işaretleridir.

Kısıtlayıcı güvenlikleştirme uygulamaları AB'nin itibarını zedelemektedir. AB, kendine özgü doğasıyla, liberal duruşuyla bilinmektedir. Lâkin AB tarafından yürütölen güvenlik odaklı politikalar; AB'nin özgürlükçü olmayan uygulamaları yürüttüğüne işaret etmektedir. AB'nin tutumu “liberal Avrupa”dan “kale Avrupası”na doğru değışmektedir. Bu ifade, yani kale Avrupası, bu tezde tartışılan fikri desteklemektedir. Bu fikir, AB'nin Avrupalı olmayanlar için sınırlar oluşturduđu ve söz konusu sınırların göçmenler ve sığınmacıların girişini ve kalışını önleyen çeşitli uygulamalarla kontrol edildiđidir. Öte yandan insan haklarının önde gelen savunucularından biri olarak güvenlikleştirme uygulamaları AB'nin insancıl yaklaşımına uymamaktadır. Bu araştırmada, hem AB hem de uluslararası düzeydeki çelişkilerden yola çıkarak AB'nin kısıtlayıcı politikalarının insan hakları ilkelerine aykırı olduđu öne sürölmektedir.

AB'de göç ve ilticanın söz edim yoluyla güvenlikleştirilmesinin göçmenlerin “öteki” olarak görölmesi durumunda gerçekleşirken göçmenlerin “biz” olarak görölmesi

durumunda ise gerekleşmediđi alıřmada ortaya konulmaktadır. Orta Dođulu ve Kuzey Afrikalı gmenler AB tarafından tehdit olarak grlrken Ukraynalı gmenler Avrupa'nın bir parası olarak grlmektedir. Bu alıřmayı gerekleřtirmek iin bir kelime sekisi oluřturulmuř ve Avrupa Komisyonu ve Avrupa Konseyi'nin basın toplantıları ve aıklamalarında dilin kullanımını gstermek amacıyla bu kelimeler tespit edilmiřtir. Kamu eriřimine aık olan basın bltenlerine kurumların internet sitelerinden ulařılabilmektedir. Sz konusu basın bltenlerinde yalnızca Avrupa Birliđi'nin adı geen kurumlarının bařkanlarının konuřmaları incelenmektedir. İfade tarzında bir lde olumlu geliřme olduđunu sylemek mmkndr. rnek vermek gerekirse, “yasadıřı g” kullanımından “dzensiz g”e geiř olduka anlamlıdır. Ancak AB'nin Avrupalı olmayan gmenlere ve sıđınmacılara ynelik politikalarını insan haklarına uygun hale getirecek řekilde geliřtirmesi gerekmektedir.

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