

RETHINKING STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
MAKING THE MODERN STATE AND MORAL ECONOMIC REVOLTS,
1789-1839

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

NECATİ EGE KEKLİK

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

JUNE 2024

Approval of the thesis:

**RETHINKING STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE: MAKING THE MODERN STATE AND MORAL ECONOMIC
REVOLTS, 1789-1839**

submitted by **NECATİ EGE KEKLİK** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of **Master of Arts of History, the Graduate School of Social Sciences
of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Ömer TURAN
Head of Department
Department of History

Prof. Dr. Ferdan ERGUT
Supervisor
Department of History

Examining Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Cenk SARAÇOĞLU (Head of the Examining Committee)
Ankara University
Department of Journalism

Prof. Dr. Ferdan ERGUT (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of History

Prof. Dr. Erden Attila AYTEKİN
Middle East Technical University
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Necati Ege KEKLİK

Signature:

ABSTRACT

RETHINKING STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
MAKING THE MODERN STATE AND MORAL ECONOMIC REVOLTS,
1789-1839

KEKLIK, Necati Ege

M.A., The Department of History

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ferdan ERGUT

June 2024, 231 pages

This study seeks to understand the political intervention of the urban and rural lower classes of the Ottoman Empire in the formation of the “modern state”. The main argument is that the elements and tendencies of capitalist relations of production began to emerge in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 16th century and that each stage of this transformation process was met with the reaction and political intervention of the artisans, who constituted the urban lower classes, and the peasants, who constituted the provincial lower classes. The secondary and tertiary aims of the study are to reveal the political and sociological formation of the Ottoman lower classes and the political agenda they employed in the process, and to present the types of political organization and forms of social movement of the lower classes. The study aims to show that the Ottoman lower classes developed a resistance/counter-action dynamic based on “Moral Economic Principles” systematized by Marxist historian E. P. Thompson and later developed by James C. Scott for village societies against the emerging capitalist elements that can be summarized as private property, exploitation-based labor regimes, and relations of production and distribution based on economic coercion.

Keywords: Transition to capitalism, moral economy, lower classes, state-formation

ÖZ

OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞUNDA DEVLET-TOPLUM İLİŞKİLERİNİ YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK: MODERN DEVLETİN İNŞASI VE AHLAKİ EKONOMİK İSYANLAR, 1789-1839

KEKLİK, Necati Ege

Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ferdan ERGUT

Haziran 2024, 231 sayfa

Bu çalışma, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu kentli ve taşralı aşağı sınıflarının “modern devletin” oluşum sürecine yaptıkları siyasi müdahaleyi anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Temel argüman, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda kapitalist üretim ilişkilerine ait öğelerin ve eğilimlerin 16. yüzyılın sonu itibaren ortaya çıkmaya başlaması ve bu dönüşüm sürecinin her bir aşamasının, kentli aşağı sınıfları oluşturan zanaatkarlar ve taşralı aşağı sınıfları oluşturan köylülerin tepkisi ve siyasi müdahalesiyle karşılaştığıdır. Osmanlı aşağı sınıflarının siyasi ve sosyolojik formasyonunu ve süreç içinde başvurdukları siyasi ajandayı ortaya çıkarmak ve aşağı sınıfların siyasi örgütlenme türlerini ve toplumsal hareket biçimlerini sunmak, çalışmanın ikincil ve üçüncül amaçlarını oluşturur. Çalışma, Osmanlı aşağı sınıflarının ortaya çıkan özel mülkiyet, sömürü temelli emek rejimleri, iktisadi zora dayalı üretim ve bölüşüm ilişkileri olarak özetlenebilecek kapitalist öğelere karşı, Marksist tarihçi E. P. Thompson tarafından sistemleştirilen ve daha sonra James C. Scott tarafından köy toplumları özelinde geliştirilen “Ahlaki Ekonomik ilkelere” dayalı bir direniş/karşı-aksiyon dinamiği geliştirdiğini göstermeyi hedefler

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kapitalizme geiř, ahlaki ekonomi, ařađı sınıflar, devlet-oluřumu

*To my family,
To the labor class of Turkey,
To much better days of our lovely country...*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was written under complex conditions. In the beginning, the COVID-19 pandemic had emerged and stayed in our lives for over two years. In those years, Turkey dragged a political-economic crisis step by step and became a social crisis in terms of poverty, inequality, and injustice. Two serious election processes fit into this frame. Also, on February 6, 2023, our country was shaken by a very destructive earthquake. Many international contestations, including the Russo-Ukraine War and Israel's inhumane intervention in Palestine, have emerged, and the far-right has strengthened all over the world. Into this turmoil, this thesis' unfortunate but enthusiastic author also survived a few political contentions. And had struggled with life issues: Diseases, being an intern, looking for a job, finding a PhD, and so on. As well as making excuses, I am writing those to note down my personal history and challenge myself with the acknowledgments of theses that always try to look happy and strong. Plus, it is important to remember the importance of people if I ever forget. In that way, this will be a "real" thanksgiving to the support of so many people that I was able to engage in this intellectual endeavor while going through the turbulence.

First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Ferdan Ergut. His democratic, insightful, and sharing supervision made things much more manageable. I am so grateful to him for his respect and interest in my views, even if he disagrees. Secondly, I have to thank Professor E. Attila AYTEKIN. He introduced me to historical studies and taught me different Marxist readings during my political science undergraduate years. From my first year to now, he has inspired me and has always been there for me when I needed help. Professor Cenk Saraçoğlu favored accepting to be a part of the examining committee, and he gave me new concepts and helped me refine my “vulgar” sides. Also, I am grateful to Dr. Aytekin Soner ALPAN. His friendly mental support from far away was one of the things that kept me going to complete this work. I will always be in gratitude to him for taking my problems and questions very seriously, giving me his time and warm support. Also, I would like to thank Dr. Çağdaş SÜMER, for their crucial help when I need. He guided me, especially at the beginning of this process,

and helped me a lot (perhaps more than even he realized) to take a certain course. Also many thanks to Professor Recep Boztemur who supported and helped me with any concerns since I came to the Department of History as a political scientist. Especially Recep Hoca has always reassured me as a monument of wisdom whose I first knocked on his door when I was in trouble with the cumbersome bureaucracy and the “deep recesses” of the academia. Lastly, I want to thank the METU and Beyazıt State Libraries laborers who fulfilled my impossible requests.

Of course, I owe everything to my family. My father, Uğur Cem Keklik, is definitely a hero – even if he often criticizes, he tolerated all my vagrancies, including this thesis. From childhood, he sacrificed everything so that I would be strong and not suffer. He did all those things with my supernatural mother, Tülay Keklik. She is a bundle of love that constantly worries about me. I always felt her passion in the most challenging times and was blessed with her support. Vedat Can Keklik, my big brother, has always represented a divine reason and logic for me. His horrible sarcasm, colder-than-iron realism, and "strong presence" are some of the elements that make up my inner voice. Nesime Keklik, my self-sacrificing grandmother, has a special place in my whole life: I will always be grateful for this old teacher's wisdom, ability to love unconditionally, and warmth. She always spoiled me and made me grow up to be a "big baby". And, of course, my fluffy bandits, the smallest members of our house and who save me from this trouble, Mrs. Sütlaç and Mr. Behçet; I like you better when I am not cleaning your litter.

Even though he has not been with us since 2014, my brilliant and handsome uncle, Ahmet Mümtaz Keklik, is always in my heart and with me. I guess, I get my academic inspiration from him. I cannot possibly be as successful as you, but I will do my best with your guidance in both good and bad experiences, and I will be a strong person like you have always instilled in me. Do not worry, and rest in peace because your friends, Professor Hüseyin Özel and Hande Toğrul, became my friends, even though we met late and also did not communicate enough. I sometimes feel as if their help and care come from you; who knows? In addition to his friendship, at a crucial moment Hüseyin Hoca agreed to read this thesis and warned me early on that I needed to make some linguistic corrections. This crucial intervention gave me an opportunity to

eliminate possible risks. I am grateful to him for this. Hande Toğrul, who emailed me from Utah during the years I was writing my thesis and shared her views on life with me with sincerity, helped me to renew my hope for life. She put me in touch with many of her contacts and gave me unmissable opportunities to learn from them. It is an incredible feeling to know that there are still very, very good people in the world despite everything.

My dear friends, Mert Nuri Can and Ozan Yılmaz, you will always be my most vital support in the Moorland of Ankara. You guys are always on the verge of success and have inspired me. More than that, in all those tough times, you are always with me. Kaan Taşlıyar always makes me laugh, even though he is far away. He never changed and kept his sincere and childish spirit, remaining far from affected. We will be in touch and go on adventures again, my first and oldest friend in METU. I also owe a lot to my comrades: I have learned a lot from Oğuzhan Üzel's deep humanity and resilience, Çağatay Altundaş's wisdom and romance, Bekircan Durukan's overhasty soul and juvenile heart, and Eren Orhan's devotion and artistic sincerity. Also, I owe my housemates, Mert Miraç Dünder and Buse Türkan, for my fastidiousness, obsessiveness, and sometimes emotional instability—many thanks to both for their solidarity, spirit-sharing, and forgiveness. If it was not for Mert's help, I would not have been able to organize this thesis in a very limited time. I will remember this favor for the rest of my life. Lastly, I owe another thanks to Bahar Kulaç, who entered my life in the last period of this study and gave me the feeling of being a tedious and talkative big brother.

The last and most important thanks go to the light of my life, Elif Betül Kulaç. Even in the hardest and the easiest days of this turbulence, Betüş was always with me. Her sacrifice, love, and camaraderie always supported me and stirred me up again. She believed and trusted in me when no one, not even myself, did not. Thank you, my love, for all those rainy and shiny days, the darkest nights, the brightest lights, the stormy and stilly seas. I am grateful for all those attentive breakfasts, chic dinners, honorable or farceur hunger, ridiculous drunkenness, and desperate staidness. I am so fortunate because you hold my hand both in steeps and plains. My elixir of life; this thesis is

yours as much as mine because if you were not with me, this would not have been written.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xvi
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Redefining State-Society Relations for the Ottoman Polity: Surpassing Statist Institutionalism through a Strategic-Relational Model	6
1.2. Looking at State-Market-Society Trilemma through the Lens of Moral Economy.....	9
1.3. The Ottoman Lower Classes Against Capitalism: The Moral Economy in Action	15
2. PERSPECTIVES ON OTTOMAN STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS: FROM PAST TO PRESENT	20
2.1. The Classical Period (1930s-1950s): The First Methodological Formation ...	25
2.2. The Neo-Classical Period (1950s – 1980s): Classical Weberianism and Marxo-Weberianism.....	29
2.3. The Institutionalism(s) (1980s – Present): Through a Relational Analysis	44
2.4. Conclusion: Institutional Relationality or Dialectic Relationality?	50
3. MAKING MORE SPACE FOR OTTOMAN SOCIAL CLASSES: THEORY AND CONTEXT.....	51
3.1. Introduction: Approaching the Ottoman Polity with a More Relational Scope	51

3.2. A Critique of SI's Strong State and the Absence of Revolution Theses: The Theory of Transition to Capitalism in the Ottoman Context	54
3.3. Towards a Relational Model: The Literature and Strategic-Relational Approach	71
3.3.1. The Relational Reassessments on the Ottoman History	73
3.3.2. SRA I – The Model: Theoretical Background	77
3.3.3. SRA II – The Historical Background: Privatization and Impersonalization, Localization and Congregation	86
3.4. Conclusion.....	105
4. MORAL ECONOMIC AGENDA AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE LOWER CLASSES AGAINST THE NEW POLITICAL-ECONOMY, 1789–1839.....	107
4.1. Introduction	107
4.2. Foundations of the Ottoman Moral Economy: <i>Customs in the Ottoman Lower Classes</i>	111
4.2.1. Ottoman Rural Society and Peasants: <i>Village, Peasant, and the Empire, Again</i>	114
4.2.2. Moral Economy and Collective Action I: The Patterns of Rural Unrest	120
4.2.3. Urban Societies and Artisans: Living as Producers at the Ottoman Cities.....	140
4.2.4. Moral Economy and Collective Action II: The Patterns of Urban Unrest	149
4.3. Moral Economy and Collective Action: Popular Uprisings and Moral Economy, 1789 – 1839	161
4.3.1. Balkans: Âyâns and Peasants, 1789 – 1808.....	161
4.3.2. Istanbul: Armed Forces of Artisans versus the Political Power.....	166
4.3.3. Anatolia: Swashbucklers of the Aydın Mountains or <i>Celb-i Kulûb-i Avam</i> in 1829	170
4.3.4. Middle East: A Rival “Modernisms” and the Peasant Revolt in Latakia, 1834 – 1835.....	175
5. CONCLUSION	180
5.1. The Ottoman Lower-Classes in Modern State Making.....	180
REFERENCES.....	183

APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET.....219

B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU231

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Deriving State from Class Struggles with Strategic-Relational Approach	85
---	----

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOA	: Başkanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
A. DVNS. AHK. HL. d.	: Halep Ahkam Defterleri
A.DVN.ŞKT.d	: Bab-1 Asafi Divan-1 Hümayun Şikâyet Kalemi
A.DVNS. AHKR. BN	: Bab-1 Asafi Divan-1 Hümayun Sicilleri Bosna Ahkam Defterleri
A.DVNS. AHKR.	: Bab-1 Asafi Divan-1 Hümayun Sicilleri Rumeli Ahkam Defterleri
AE, SABH.I	: Ali Emirî Tasnifi, Sultan Abdülhamid I
AE.SMMD.IV.	: Ali Emirî Tasnifi, Sultan Mehmed IV
C..AS..	: Cevdet Askeriye
C..BH..	: Cevdet Bahriye
C..ZB..	: Cevdet Zabtiye
C.BLD..	: Cevdet Belediye
C.EV	: Cevdet Evkaf
C.TZ	: Cevdet Timar
HAT	: Hatt-1 Hümayûn Tasnifi
TSMA.e.	: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, Evrak

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

*“We’re kinfolk, blood-bound, brothers
With the towns, the tribes of the other side
For centuries, we’ve exchanged brides
We’re neighbors to one another
Our chickens intermingle,
Not out of negligence
But out of need.
We never warmed up to passports
That’s the crime for which we are slain
And brigand becomes our name,
Smuggler,
Bandit,
Traitor...”¹*

Historical sociologist Karen Barkey discusses Ahmed I's attempt to negotiate with a rebel leader named Canboladoğlu during the Celali Revolts at the beginning of her book *Bandits and Bureaucrats*:

Clearly, the sultan was willing to engage in negotiations, quibbling over price rather than dismissing the bandit's demands out of hand. That the state was willing and able to control and manipulate these bandits through such deals, bargains, and patronage attests not to its weakness but to its strength. These bandits were not "primitive rebels," as Eric Hobsbawm romantically described them—just bandits. They were not so much enemies of the state as rambunctious clients.

In assessing the absence of peasant or elite rebellions and the manipulation of banditry, I am analyzing the dynamics of state centralization in the Ottoman Empire.²

Building on this perspective, Barkey further argues that “bandits are real malefactors of rural society”, rather than supporters of peasantry.³ She contends that peasants and

¹ Ahmed Arif, “Thirty-Three Bullets,” trans. David Selim Sayers and Evrim Emir-Sayers, The Paris Institute for Critical Thinking, 2023, <https://parisinstitute.org/thirty-three-bullets/>.

² Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, 1. print., Cornell Paperbacks, The Wilder House Series in Politics, History, and Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1997), x.

³ Barkey, 21

brigands are “analytically different” entities,⁴ with the state consistently consolidating its centralization efforts by negotiating with banditry.⁵ In Barkey’s view, the Ottoman past lacked class-based movements; instead, “banditry” was an ideal-typical phenomenon that the state controlled and used in the process of centralization,⁶ , organizing bandits into "military units."⁷

This perspective, which criticizes Eric Hobsbawm's so-called ‘romanticism’, essentially conveys three main points: i) The Ottoman state maintained a strong patrimonial-bureaucratic order and a prebendal social relations⁸ rooted in Near Eastern and Islamic culture,⁹ ii) Unlike Europe, the Ottoman Empire did not experience class struggles, and state-formation occurred through intra-state elite contention,¹⁰ and iii) While some insurgents could be considered "social bandits," the majority were not "Robin Hoods."¹¹ In general, banditry was seen as a form of ‘betrayal’ because bandits often collaborated with the state for administrative roles.¹² This collaboration distinguished them from the ‘innocent’, ‘loyal to state’ and politically ‘obeyed’ and ‘stagnant’ peasantry.¹³ In this respects, she construct an ‘ideal-typed’ banditry and also peasantry image.

⁴ Barkey, 183.

⁵ Barkey, 189-228.

⁶ She writes “In assessing the absence of peasant or elite rebellions and the manipulation of banditry, I am analyzing the dynamics of state centralization in the Ottoman Empire.” See Barkey, x.

⁷ Barkey, 185.

⁸ Barkey, 9.

⁹ Barkey, 27-28.

¹⁰ She states that “Both traditional elites and various social elements arising from different social structures were incorporated, avoiding much of the contestation assumed in the European model of state making. Despite significant state consolidation and centralization, the Ottoman Empire did not experience the large-scale opposition and class conflict suffered by many western states.” See Barkey, 1-2.

¹¹ Barkey, 179

¹² Barkey, 1-3.

¹³ She explains her “stagnancy” claim as this: “Why didn't Ottoman peasants rebel? Given that the socioeconomic situation of the peasantry had dearly deteriorated under the pressure of population

This narrative, which appears to oppose centralization and support social movements, in fact reinforces a statist perspective by ignoring society's role in transformation processes and undermining society's struggle for livelihood, welfare and security. These efforts are not new. From Halil İnalçık's lifelong development of the "patrimonialism" concept and Şerif Mardin's "strong state" analysis to the Karen Barkey's work, this narrative has persisted within the Statist-Institutionalist tradition¹⁴. As a distinct follower of this tradition and a crystallized example of a contemporary reproducer of it, Barkey's "ultimately reified statist comprehension" is based on an idealist framework.¹⁵ According to Barkey, there were no "elite" or "lower class" uprisings in the Ottoman history; any existing movements were state-centered and non-class based.¹⁶ This tradition is a state-centered one that bases state-society relations on an ontological separation. It can be simply termed "statist-institutionalism" (SI), as will be discussed in Chapter 2.

This thesis focuses on criticizing the statist-institutionalist tradition, identifying class movements and examining their role in the state-formation process in the Ottoman Empire. This requires re-problematizing the goals of the statist-institutionalist tradition: How did the producer lower classes interfere in the Ottoman polity's long transformation process in the early-19th century? The question has two crucial and connected aspects: first, the transforming socio-political order of the Ottoman Empire, reflected in the changing state formation, and second, the perception and impact of the lower classes on this process. To establish an answer, the study employs tools from intersectional political science, history, and economics, suggesting a Marxist

growth, state centralization, and the dramatic increases in the exactions of state and regional power holders, the question begs an answer", pp. 86; "Peasant rebellions did not occur in Ottoman society because of the inherent qualities of the Ottoman social structure and the manner in which the Ottoman state chose to manipulate these qualities under stressful socioeconomic conditions. A combination of state action in the periphery, the structure of society, and the inability to rally other classes to their cause rendered the peasantry unable to act in rebellion against the state." pp. 88-89.

¹⁴ Also, she declares its reliance on a Weberian state-society formulation, see Barkey, 10, footnote 16.

¹⁵ Gabriel Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play*, Studies on the History of Society and Culture 50 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 157–60.

¹⁶ Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, x.

"Historical Political Economic" approach.¹⁷ Specifically, this thesis investigates the social history of the agrarian and urban producer lower classes in the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a period marked by radical political-economic changes that set the polity on an irreversible path toward capitalism.

This study aims to make two key contributions: first, a methodological contribution to the debate on state and society relations in the context of the Ottoman Empire, and second, the development of a Marxist "history-from-below" model for researching Ottoman history. This kind of endeavor is not entirely new. In the 1990s and early-2000s, scholars like John Haldon and Halil Berktaý in "New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History", Donald Quataert in "Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire" (ed.) and "The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922", and Rifa'at Abou-El-Hajj in "Formation of the Modern State" pioneered a new "relational/Marxist" path, contrasting with the "institutionalist/Weberian" paradigm that has dominated mainstream historiography.

These studies examined the "nature" of the state and its relationship with society, aiming to rescue historiography from analyses centered on the state, elite, and "divine personalities", and to highlight the role of social formation in historical processes. They sought to create models explaining the historical roles and positions of producer classes, such as peasantry, craftsmen, and proletariat.

Followers of this path, like Baki Tezcan, expanded the scope by including the non-state actors in historical analysis and developing "the Second Empire" thesis, which took shape in the 17th century.

¹⁷ These approaches are not new, but defining a specific field of study in the name of Historical Political Economy (HPE) is quite a new effort. In general, HPE stands in between political science and history and is concerned with long-term socio-political change dynamics such as "regime types, social orders, revolutions, state formation" etc. and reminds an extended "institutionalist" analysis framework, see Volha Charnysh, Eugene Finkel, and Scott Gehlbach, "Historical Political Economy: Past, Present, and Future," *Annual Review of Political Science* 26, no. 1 (June 15, 2023): 176ff, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102440>; However, HPE's developing framework contains qualitative analysis from other tendencies, such as Marxism. For further information, see Jeffery A. Jenkins and Jared T. Rubin, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024).

The new generation of Marxist scholars, including Fatma Eda Çelik, Çağdaş Sümer, Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, E. Attila Aytekin, and Alp Yücel Kaya, have conducted more "courageous" analyses using Marxist terms, continuing to debate issues such as the character of the Ottoman-Turkish "bourgeois revolution" as a long-term process. Consequently, their focus has shifted to the 18th and 19th centuries, regarded as the primary era for the formation of the modern state and capitalism.

The most common feature of all these studies is their emphasis on the state's class and political-economic interest-based character, despite their differing approaches. These studies commonly focus on examining the "effects of classes" in the Ottoman transformation processes. Thus, the question of the state's nature inevitably comes to the fore, as it does in this thesis. Although these studies employ materialist or historical materialist models and investigate the impact of the masses, they still fall short of fully embodying a history-from-below perspective. These studies tend to discuss the state and order more than they do class dynamics. Specifically, the connection between the 'structure' (mode of production) and the "political actions of the lower classes" remains blurry, often framed as "reaction" rather than "political intervention" in the existing order. This 'deficiency' partially stems from the focus on re-writing Ottoman political history with a 'heterodox' understanding, rather than a society-oriented analysis. While, this newly-emerged literature can be considered 'successful' in re-writing a *general Ottoman history* from a heterodox perspective, it still falls short in addressing from-below social movements and remains largely at a structural level.

This situation is partially due to problematic views on political action that equate class struggles with 'revolutionary violence' within a specific period. A political agenda may not be i) well-defined and codified based on a specified political program, ii) defended in an organized manner, and iii) focused on a specific goal. This narrow view of class struggle overlooks the broader and more nuanced processes of class formation. Scholars such as E. P. Thompson, Ellen Meiksins Wood, and G. E. M de Ste Croix argue that class should be seen as *a process*, much like states and other allegedly "structural" entities, which forms within a historical context.¹⁸ Class finds its form

¹⁸ See Chapter IV.

through daily struggles and ‘learns’ from its practice. While existing political orders and conditions shape it, class also defines itself through its own actions. The class cumulatively emerges from this process and can only be fully understood through the investigation of these actions. The class becomes visible within this action. In this context, *the Moral Economic Agenda* represents the clear manifestation of the producers' class. It is: i) formed within a historical accumulation of daily struggles, ii) driven by an internal logic aligned with class interests, and iii) encompassing a traditionally formed political understanding of mass mobilization.

If the trilemma of modern politics consists of ‘state-market-producers’ triad, then the social order should be examined from all sides, reevaluating the relationship between them through a relational analysis. This task requires a more interconnected model of state and class. In general, this thesis proposes a new critique of the statist-institutionalist approach that dominates historiography, advocating for an ‘integral’ model of the state that includes the lower classes as a fundamental component.

This study consists of three main parts: The first part discusses the existing literature on state-society relations and the dynamics of political-economic change in the Ottoman Empire. The second part introduces a new relational model called the ‘Strategic-Relational Model,’ based on the theories of Marxist state theorist Bob Jessop. The third part mainly focuses on identifying the political anthropology of the lower-class and their political-economic agenda, termed ‘the Moral Economy’. The study then examines the impact of the lower classes on the Ottoman capitalist transformation process through a comparative analysis of various urban and agrarian uprisings in the early 19th century. Following this overview, the introductory chapter will elucidate these three parts and justify their selection and relevance.

1.1. Redefining State-Society Relations for the Ottoman Polity: Surpassing Statist Institutionalism through a Strategic-Relational Model

Historian Gabriel Piterberg identifies the central problem in Ottoman Empire studies as the "reification of the state." He summarizes the theoretical background of this issue as follows:

It is meant to lead to a problem in the conceptualization of the Ottoman state that I wish to address. Accordingly, the underlying theme that runs through the presentation is a critique of the binary way of thinking about the state whereby a line separates state and society into two concrete, identifiable objects.¹ The state as analytical unit was expelled from the study of politics in the 1950s and 1960s in favor of something called the political system, within which both state and society were included. The appearance of this particular trend might be explained, intellectually, by the dissatisfaction with the formalistic emphasis that prevailed at that point and, politically, by the Cold War.

From the 1970s on, the Hegelian-idealist understanding of the state was rejuvenated, especially in American political science, in the form of a school of thought that came to be known as the statist approach, or the approach of “bringing the state back in.” The statist school emerged as a reaction to the fact that the state had vanished in the ubiquity of the political system, hence the need to “bring it back in.” The *modus operandi* of the statist school justifies the view that it is a rejuvenation of the idealist understanding of the state. The state is first grasped as an autonomous agency that lies outside of society, acts upon it, and is in a way independent of it. Then follows the demarcation of a clear boundary that separates the two entities, state and society, which are conveyed as concrete “things” rather than constructed abstractions. To render the boundary more dichotomous and less porous, the domain of the state is finally reduced to decision making.¹⁹

Piterberg identifies the problem in Ottoman studies as state-orientation, whether relational or not. He attributes this issue to the reification of the state and the tendency to interpret all historical developments through the lens of state determination. Defining the state as a *sui generis* actor like a "black box" and treating it as an "explanatory subject" leads to fundamental methodological errors inherent in the "*statist model*". This is particularly evident in Weberian-rooted and New Institutional Economic historiographies, which have recently dominated the field. Mainstream Ottoman historiography often revolves around a similar but increasingly relationalized model and its extensions, such as the " Patrimonial Sultanism" model, which supports the "Strong State Thesis". According to this perspective, the state and society are viewed as two separate and inclusive ontologies. Given the state's decisive and hegemonic nature, society is often seen as inadequate and ‘backward’.

This externalist model has been used to explain why capitalism did not emerge in the Ottoman polity. However, this question itself seems misguided, sacrificing reality for the sake of theory. The establishment of the modern state is not external to capitalist

¹⁹ Piterberg, 136.

development; rather, it is directly linked as an internal factor of the process.²⁰ Contrary to the argument, the Ottoman Empire followed the universal path within its distinctive local dynamics. To move beyond this comprehension, essentialist, closed-circuit models, and *sui generis* analyses should be discarded in favor of a “*relational model*” that captures the complex formation of social entities. This study suggests a model based on Antonio Gramsci's concept of the ‘integral/extended state’, as utilized by Nicos Poulantzas and Bob Jessop, known as *the Strategic-Relational Model*. According to this model, the state should be considered a *social relation* rather than an ‘absolute and in itself subject’. Political power results from the socio-political effects and conflicts among existing social parties. State formation in a given historical era is a contemporary outcome of class conflicts, reconciliations, or transitions. History-specific inter and intra-class confrontations, along with alliances, shape the social formation and the institutional arrangements for surplus distribution in society. For instance, alliances between poor peasants and dispossessed artisans against intra- or extra-state landowners and the resulting conflicts create a political-economic sum, defining new social boundaries and institutional arrangements for surplus sharing. From this perspective, the transition to capitalism is a long process rather than a single historical moment.

Relations between classes have evolved following a series of political-economic developments. The cumulative nature of these processes leads to outcomes that are both quasi-incident and quasi-committal. Capitalism, characterized by private property over means of production, wage labor, market-dependency, and commodification, does not follow a single model because these elements do not emerge simultaneously. Instead, the political-economic strategies of classes are cumulative and learn from past experiences. Additionally, they are continually influenced by international processes.

The process of historical change is not a linear progression; it encompasses both regress and progress dynamics at every stage. However, certain periods, such as the late 17th century to the mid-19th century in the Ottoman Empire, are marked by

²⁰ Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, “1923 Öncesinde Türkiye’de Kapitalizm, Sermaye ve Burjuvazi,” in *100 Yıl Sonra Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2024), 300.

significant intensification. This era was crucial due to the emergence of capitalist elements in the Empire and the subsequent reactions of the lower classes. The period following the French Revolution, spanning the late 18th century to the mid-19th century, can be characterized as a "civil war" era for the Empire. It witnessed the transformation of exploiters and the exploited, reshaping the social order: it was the era of the *embourgeoisement* of exploiters, the *proletarianization* of the producers, and the *development of capitalism* and transformation of the social order in its "modern" sense. Chapter III begins with a critique of the Patrimonial Sultanism Thesis. It then proposes an alternative model by suggesting a new approach to state-society relations, utilizing the Neo-Marxist paradigm. Finally, it examines the political-economic history of the Ottoman polity from the 16th to the 19th century through this new model.

1.2. Looking at State-Market-Society Trilemma through the Lens of Moral Economy

Traditional social theory often fails to allocate sufficient space for the lower classes. Although classical literature may suggest there were no major political upheavals in the Ottoman polity, historical evidence shows multiple transformations throughout its existence. Before examining these transformations, it is essential to understand the formation process of the lower classes' socio-political agenda.

Generally, Ottoman historiography has overlooked the roles and effects of the lower classes in these political processes. Periods of upheaval are typically explained by "crisis, transformation, modernization, transition to capitalism" and are mainly attributed to decisions made by "the aristocratic" class or other royal interests at the political center. At best, the political challenges between local and central elites are considered the "leitmotif" of change. Furthermore, classical historiography often defines these processes based on the personalities and psychologies of Ottoman sultans, rather than focusing on the material conditions that shaped their mindsets.

Ultimately, all three traditional approaches rely on various forms of elitist paradigms that view politics and history as being shaped primarily by elite agendas. However, as with all world history, Ottoman-Turkish historical transformations also involved

interference from different political centers of gravity. In this context, the lower classes, as producers, were significant political subjects and active participants in the political processes.

This study argues that Ottoman dispossessed peasants and artisans had their own political agendas, principles for political action, and a desire to "change" or "preserve" the existing political framework. It asserts that these classes directly participated in and influenced the political transformation processes in the Ottoman Empire.

The discussion here focuses directly on the lower-class interpretations of states and markets. Following the emergence of capitalism, these classes became integral components of production relations. The dynamics of tension or compromise, as well as internality and externality, have directly shaped the political-economic order in all polities. This interest led to the well-known "formalism versus substantivism" debate in the 1960s, particularly concerning the lower-class aspect of this trilemma.²¹ Substantivist Karl Polanyi, in his seminal work "The Great Transformation," argued that the pre-capitalist economy's subsistence-oriented and reciprocal character was fundamentally rooted in the egalitarian values of peasant societies, which prioritized social redistribution along the lines of morality, religion, and culture. In such societies, market relations were "embedded in social relations." However, capitalism re-established the market as an independent institution, leading to increased inequality.²² Conversely, the formalist view, rooted in neo-classical economic theory, posits that market relations have always been based on individualism and utility maximization.²³

The effects of the formalism versus substantivism debate spread to Marxist circles in the 1960s and 1970s, sparking diverse ideas on class formations. During this period, British Marxist historian Edward Palmer Thompson introduced the term "moral

²¹ David Kaplan, "The Formal-Substantive Controversy in Economic Anthropology: Reflections on Its Wider Implications," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 24, no. 3 (1968): 228–51.

²² Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, 2nd Beacon Paperback Edition (1944; repr., Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001).

²³ Justin A. Elardo and Al Campbell, "Choice and the Substantivist/Formalist Debate: A Formal Presentation of Three Substantivist Criticisms," in *Research in Economic Anthropology*, vol. 25 (Bingley: Emerald (MCB UP), 2006), 268, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0190-1281\(06\)25012-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0190-1281(06)25012-1).

economy," providing a valuable framework for defining political agendas and principles of action of lower classes. Thompson first developed this concept in 1971 to explain the anti-market political actions of the urban lower classes in 18th-century England.²⁴ Central to his study were "food riots", particularly over bread prices, which he saw as indicators of rising discontent with the "New Political-Economic" applications of emerging capitalism, which depended on free-market principles. In Thompson's analysis, the term moral economy refers to the economic mentality of the lower classes, formed through fair and egalitarian customary practices, and revealed as a political agenda of lower classes based on *common values* that ensure social maintenance.

Another significant contributor to this concept, James C. Scott, extended Thompson's analysis to peasantry, discussing the daily struggles of Southeast Asian peasants.²⁵ Scott defined peasant society as a *risk society* where the continuity of livelihood must be guaranteed through some short- and long-term practices. Scott's decisive contribution to the term was his emphasis on the daily character of the moral economic struggles, contrasting with mainstream anticipations of political action, which typically narrow them to advanced programs and consciousness-dependent movements. However, Scott's moral economy conception is more 'physiological' rather than ideological and political in a 'Thompsonian' sense. Despite Scott's tendency to reduce these struggles to physiological necessities, which blurs the political environment influencing this mentality, a well-defined relational development of this mindset based on Marxian political-economic analysis could provide a materialist explanation rather than an essentialist approach. Also Scott's framework, while applicable to peasantry, also concerns the urban lower classes and can be extended to cover producer artisans, as Thompson did.

In 1979, Samuel L. Popkin's book "The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam" reintroduced a formalist perspective into the discussion of

²⁴ E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," *Past & Present*, no. 50 (1971): 76–136.

²⁵ James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (Yale University Press, 1976), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bh4cdk>.

the moral economy concept. Popkin criticized Scott's study for romanticizing rural life and argued that the peasantry is not inherently anti-market.²⁶ Instead, he contended that peasants are open to market relations when opportunities arise and actively seek profit-making opportunities. Popkin's critique was widely acclaimed and sparked discussions across different polities.²⁷ The debate between moral economy and political-economy perspectives centers on the trilemma of "lower-classes-market-state" relations.²⁸ Guggenheim and Weller's analysis of this trilemma is particularly important, as it explores the impact of moral and economic agendas on the transformation of political order. They distinguish between "strong" and "mild" interpretations of the concept:

The strong interpretation posits that "peasant ideologies and institutions provide useful building blocks for constructing revolutions". This occurs when landlords fail to meet peasant expectations, prompting the peasantry to "attempt to reassert traditional morality." Mild Interpretation recognizes the moral economy as a set of traditionally sanctioned types of protest. However, it views this thought as "less stable and less unified" for revolution.²⁹ Thus, the concept of moral economy has evolved into a broader political-economy discussion with sociological and anthropological references, rather than being confined to a primitive economic subject.

²⁶ Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*, 1979.

²⁷ See, David Feeny, "The Moral or the Rational Peasant? Competing Hypotheses of Collective Action," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 4 (1983): 769–89, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2054764>; Pierre Brocheux, "Moral Economy or Political Economy? The Peasants Are Always Rational," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 4 (August 1983): 791–803, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2054765>; Hilton L. Root, "The Case against George Lefebvre's Peasant Revolution," *History Workshop*, no. 28 (1989): 88–102; Hilton Root, "The 'Moral Economy' of the Pre-Revolutionary French Peasant," *Science & Society* 54, no. 3 (1990): 351–61.

²⁸ For example, see Michael Adas, "'Moral Economy' or 'Contest State'?: Elite Demands and the Origins of Peasant Protest in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Social History* 13, no. 4 (1980): 521–46; Ariel Salzmann, "Is There a Moral Economy of State Formation? Religious Minorities and Repertoires of Regime Integration in the Middle East and Western Europe, 600–1614," *Theory and Society* 39, no. 3–4 (May 2010): 299–313, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-010-9109-1>; Laurence Fontaine, "Reconsidering the Moral Economy in France at the End of the Eighteenth Century," *Geschichte Und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft* 26 (2019): 45–74.

²⁹ Scott Evan Guggenheim and Robert P. Weller, "Introduction: Moral Economy, Capitalism and State Power in Rural Protest," in *Power and Protest in the Countryside: Studies of Rural Unrest in Asia, Europe, and Latin America*, ed. Robert P. Weller and Scott E. Guggenheim (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982), 4–5, <http://archive.org/details/powerprotestinco0000unse>.

In the 2000s, Marxist sociologist Andrew Sayer proposed a non-eclectic yet reconciliatory approach between formalist and substantivist views. According to Sayer, moral economy can serve as an analytical framework for economic relations. In his analysis, moral economy is a relational concept that explains the mutual rights and responsibilities of individuals and institutions.³⁰ He suggests rethinking moral economy as a political-economic tool for analyzing economic relations, incorporating moral norms and sentiments as well as formal and informal practices. In addition to this political-economic interpretation, culturalist debates in the 1990s also contributed significantly to the understanding of moral economy. One such debate, the Obeyesekere and Sahlins Debate, is particularly noteworthy. Gananath Obeyesekere objected to the substantivist view that included morality, criticizing it for its 'Eurocentric' assumption of natives' 'backwardness about profit-seeking'. Influenced by the critiques of Orientalism prevalent at the time, Obeyesekere argued that the notion of natives being unable to calculate their interests is a Eurocentric fantasy. He sought to overcome this view by equalizing the Western and the non-Western peoples.³¹ In his counter-argument, Marshall Sahlins suggested focusing on the internal "rationalities" of different cultures rather than making comparison or equalizations.³² This debate is crucial for rethinking the moral economy without adopting a "Eurocentric superiority/inferiority" position.

The concept of moral economy continues to be used in contemporary studies, spanning diverse geographies and historical periods,³³ and theoretical and conceptual

³⁰ Andrew Sayer, "Moral Economy and Political Economy," *Studies in Political Economy* 61, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 79–103, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19187033.2000.11675254>.

³¹ Gananath Obeyesekere, *The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European Mythmaking in the Pacific* (1992; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997).

³² Marshall Sahlins, *How "Natives" Think: About Captain Cook, For Example* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

³³ See, Thomas M. Buoye, *Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy: Violent Disputes over Property Rights in Eighteenth-Century China*, Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511551345>; Stephen K. Wegren, *The Moral Economy Reconsidered: Russia's Search for Agrarian Capitalism*, 1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617614>; Valeria Wallace, "Presbyterian Moral Economy: The Covenanting Tradition and Popular Protest in Lowland Scotland, 1707–c. 1746," *The Scottish Historical*

discussions are ongoing.³⁴ The consensus from these debates is that the term “moral economy” as a *political agenda* consists of traditional subsistence principles that have developed over centuries and adapted to specific historical contexts. This agenda, centered on ensuring the continuity of maintenance, fundamentally relies on four interconnected elements: First, minimum subsistence ethic; second, traditional justice understanding; third, valorization of labor, and fourth, embeddedness of political-economic relations to social ties.³⁵ Three key phenomena emerge from these elements: the idea of just price, dependence on traditional political-economic practices, and an embedded anti-market sentiment. This agenda must be evaluated in its historical entirety – moral economy is learned and transmitted through tradition, not codified in the modern sense, but defended, enacted, and transformed *in the form of daily life practices and political action*. Redefining the state's role in the context of current subsistence risks and historical measures is crucial. In this sense, Guggenheim and Weller’s “strong” interpretation of moral economy is more plausible due to the integral relationship between the state and producers. The dilemma of ensuring the “continuity of production” and “redistribution of producers” is a complex and sensitive political agenda, where disruptions inevitably lead to political change.

In Ottoman historiography, classical literature often describes the Ottoman state as a “protectorate of the peasant and artisans”. However, this depiction is part of the state's

Review 89, no. 227 (2010): 54–72; John Bohstedt, *The Politics of Provisions: Food Riots, Moral Economy, and Market Transition in England, c. 1550–1850* (London: Routledge, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315554297>; Mischa Suter, “Moral Economy as a Site of Conflict: Debates on Debt, Money, and Usury in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century,” *Geschichte Und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft* 26 (2019): 75–101; Tanja Skambraks and Martin Lutz, eds., *Reassessing the Moral Economy: Religion and Economic Ethics from Ancient Greece to the 20th Century* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).

³⁴ See, Adrian J. Randall and Andrew Charlesworth, eds., *Moral Economy and Popular Protest: Crowds, Conflict and Authority* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000); Marc Edelman, “Bringing the Moral Economy Back in... to the Study of 21st-Century Transnational Peasant Movements,” *American Anthropologist* 107, no. 3 (2005): 331–45; Norbert Götz, “‘Moral Economy’: Its Conceptual History and Analytical Prospects,” *Journal of Global Ethics*, May 4, 2015, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17449626.2015.1054556>; Jaime Palomera and Theodora Vetta, “Moral Economy: Rethinking a Radical Concept,” *Anthropological Theory* 16, no. 4 (December 2016): 413–32, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499616678097>; Tim Rogan, *The Moral Economists: R.H. Tawney, Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson, and the Critique of Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).

³⁵ This first three proposed by Attila Aytekin. E. Attila Aytekin, see “Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and the Tanzimat Reforms,” *International Review of Social History* 57, no. 2 (August 2012): 211–214., <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859012000193>.

"strategy of inclusion" to ensure the continuity of production. When examining the Ottoman lower classes, their moral and economic agenda cannot be neatly categorized as either a "conservative/reactionary" mentality resisting change or a "revolutionary" program seeking to maximize lower-class interests in a "high-political" sense. Both positions tend to underestimate the complexities of the Ottoman lower classes. The first position, rooted in classical historiography, often portrays these societies as "stable" and disconnected from structural (and predominantly Eurocentric) definitions of class formation, leading to their "humiliation" and "neglect." The second position equates class formation and political struggle with mass mobilization, popular protest, and well-defined political programs and organizations, thereby treating class conflict as an "extraordinary incident" within the Ottoman polity. Consequently, political actions are seen as "ideal-typical mutinies" of specific Ottoman identities, such as janissaries, suites, or Celalis, while ignoring the class affiliations of peasants or artisans. Contrary to these views, class formation should not be seen as a static epistemology subject to ahistorical boundaries or as an existential phenomenon that only appears in moments of action. Like other political concepts and contexts, *class is a process* that evolves through historical actions and conditions. Class struggle primarily manifests in short- or mid-term practices and conditions, such as wealth, subsistence, and living conditions. The concept of *relations of production*, as the primary determinant of these practices and mentalities, highlights the connection between these concerns and the broader political-economic environment. As will be discussed in more detail later, the formation and effects of class can only be fully understood over the long term through the lens of relations of production. The moral and economic mentality of the Ottoman lower classes, from family dynamics to mass political actions, was influenced by and actively transformed these relations of production. This is a complex and intertwined process of interaction, ranging from everyday practices to significant historical events, and back again.

1.3. The Ottoman Lower Classes Against Capitalism: The Moral Economy in Action

This study particularly focuses on the collective reflexes of the Ottoman lower classes during the dissolution of the traditional Ottoman political-economic order. This period

saw the transformation of a moral economy, where economic relations were embedded within social relations, into a system where economic relations became externalized from social relations. Specifically, the study examines the impact of the lower classes during this crucial period, when the path to capitalism emerged, and a "market society" was in its nascent stages, from production to distribution. The primary focus is on understanding how these transitions affected and were affected by the lower classes.

Societies enter significant historical paths under certain conditions, particularly during periods when the existing socio-economic order is in crisis or undergoing transformation, such as transition(s) from antiquity to feudalism and then to capitalism. In this context, the late 18th and early 19th centuries of the Ottoman Empire were marked by concrete moral economic uprisings that both intervened in and resisted these transformations. This period was markedly different from previous ones due to the extensive nature of the transformations, particularly affecting the lower production classes. During this era, the material conditions conducive to significant shifts became more visible, reflecting in the moral economic agenda of the lower classes. The emergence and establishment of market relations were met with reactions from existing classes, which shaped social contrasts and alliances.

The capitalist transition involves three main aspects: transformation in the property regime, the emergence of wage labor, and the rise of market dependency through commodification. In the Ottoman example, these processes began around the late 16th century and accelerated over the next two centuries. Key developments include the proliferation of *the iltizam* system in the early 17th century after the dissolution of the *timar* system, the introduction of *malikane* in 1695, and the birth of *esham* in 1775. These changes represent extensions of a single process meticulously managed by the Sublime Porte. Throughout these stages, the state enhanced its political power and ability to intervene in local affairs, maintaining open revenue sources. The system became increasingly financialized, moving away from in-kind taxation to more fluid and controllable revenue streams. This shift allowed the central government's influence to become more pronounced in all socio-political processes and structures. The state's need for "partners" in localities led to the complexification of political processes in a bureaucratic sense, paving the way for the emergence of a "nucleic"

market society, eventually transitioning to capitalist mode of production. Economic coercion production processes was gradually transferred to local partners while the state retained political control, leading to the emergence of wage labor. This process also corroded traditional commercial relationships, which were previously based on state regulation. For example, by the late 18th century, production for the market and purchasing products at current market values (*rayiç mübayaa*) became prevalent, replacing subsistence-based production and state-determined purchasing (*mirî mübayaa*). This shift marked the adoption of a "free trade" policy by the state, reflecting a series of transformations in the mode of production that began within the production process itself. The relational changes in society, resulting from class confrontations, were institutionalized in a controlled manner. This process reached a political climax in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, especially during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II. These rulers accepted and acted upon these policies as part of the restoration of the Imperial Household's order from the 1780s to the 1840s.

Inter-class relations were as important as intra-class dynamics and transformations during periods of socio-economic change. These alliances or clashes shaped the character of struggles, influencing political programs, expectations, and collective actions. When different social classes shared similar apprehensions in a given socio-economic context, these commonalities bridged distances and sparked widespread social struggle.

During the transformative years, two specific lower classes—dispossessed peasants and poor artisans, both direct producers—were significantly impacted. This led to simultaneous social actions across the Empire. However, these actions were not merely "reaction" or "defense" movements; they also represented suggestions for transformation within the given political-economic atmosphere. This era saw the production chain moving closer from rural to urban areas, coinciding with the formation of an internal market. Using a Polanyian framework, this can be understood as the disembedding of economic relations from social relations. High social mobilization and the movement of labor between rural and urban areas created a backdrop of political vacuum.

The political vacuum resulted from the decay and struggle within the land systems, which thoroughly affected production and extraction regimes. In rural areas, individual interests and private property gained prominence over public production and common property, particularly with the *çiftlikization* process. In line with the direct privatization of the production regime, the urban guild system faced a crisis.

The rising commodification of products, driven by the externalization and privatization of commodity-production from the traditional public production regime, was a key factor. Traditionally, the Ottoman center maintained urban sustenance by establishing public production and distribution lines between producers and consumers. Specific guilds were responsible for identifying needs for raw materials and consumption goods, operating under state authority. Therefore, the state facilitated urban maintenance through a socially embedded system that guaranteed the continuity of basic feudal production. However, as a privately run market system emerged, this embedded relationship dissolved. Dispossessed peasants and artisans were excluded from the traditional system and gradually became free, wage laborers. Both urban and rural dispossessed producers faced the birth pangs of a market society in various ways, being directly affected by the abolition of provisionist regulations.

As the interconnected consequences of the dramatic transformation of the Ottoman system, the lower classes revolted across the Empire. Chapter VI analyzes the Mountain Rebellions in the Balkans from 1789 to 1808 as a peasant uprising and the incidents of 1808 that led to mass protests of urban lower classes, the overthrow of two sultans in Istanbul, and the dissolution of the Janissary Corps in 1826. The study then focuses on the peasant energy in the Aydın Revolution in the Intra-Aegean Mountains, which in 1829 united a wide range of people from the ulema to craftsmen, from male and female peasants to former janissaries. Finally, the Syrian Peasants' Revolt of 1834-1835 highlighted the rivalry between two modernizing dynasties in Northern Syria.

Chapter IV delves into the foundations of the moral economic mentality in the Ottoman Empire, based on the "political anthropology" of producer classes, emphasizing individuality, family, and community bonds formed around production

relationships. It also underscores the political action dynamics of the Ottoman lower classes within the context of a moral economic agenda. Finally, Chapter V includes concluding remarks, synthesizing the findings and implications of the study.

CHAPTER 2

PERSPECTIVES ON OTTOMAN STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS: FROM PAST TO PRESENT

*“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”*³⁶

Karl Marx, 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte

Social formations have been shaped by societies, and in turn, these formations have shaped societies. Therefore, any history of social class cannot be written without discussing social formation and state. As Korkut Boratav emphasizes, "Any historical approach based on class terms cannot limit itself to an investigation of the history of class struggles; it should also aim to cover the interrelationships between social classes/groups and the state."³⁷ Since every social class emerges within specific conditions and becomes a force that influences these conditions, narratives on "society" without context—namely social formation, political power, and the state, lead to fetishism.³⁸ Even daily or so-called "reactionary" social actions, and the resulting transformations (or *vice versa*) occur within a context that comprises "socio-political givens." Socio-political givens refer to the existing social relations in a society, such as modes of production or tangible or intangible institutions. These are created by social relationships, and societies live within them for a while; they also struggle against them and effect change.

³⁶ Karl Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852; repr., New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15, <http://archive.org/details/18thbrumaireoflo00marx>.

³⁷ Korkut Boratav, "Book Review: State and Class in Turkey. A Study in Capitalist Development," *Review of Radical Political Economics* 25, no. 1 (March 1993): 133, <https://doi.org/10.1177/048661349302500107>.

³⁸ Neera Chandhoke, "“Bringing People Back in’: Political and Intellectual Agendas," *Economic and Political Weekly* 25, no. 31 (1990): 1721–27.

Approaching history as context is a complex issue since societies have multi-dimensional structures in terms of politics, economics, and sociology. Therefore, this effort requires a methodology that explains social formation by researching and analyzing socio-political givens. Such methodologies address questions like "How does a society change? What are the socio-political actors in the process? What are the consequences of the tensions between different social forces?" However, these questions are intricately tied to *state-society relations* since they are directly linked to the concept of *political power*. Definitions of state and society formations and models about struggles to seize and "fortify" power determine the remaining issues. For instance, if a model views states as autonomous and the sole actors of political change, then the non-state actors become secondary, and relations of production are seen as instrumental. Conversely, if another approach sees the state as a derivation from class struggles, then the main focus shifts to class relations within a specific society.

In essence, these differing approaches to social transformation dynamics, actors of change, and the contextual outcomes of a specific socio-political actions highlight the importance of socio-political givens. Understanding these givens and the positions and roles of actors within them is essential. Therefore, investigating social formation is an inevitable starting point for understanding the role of the lower classes in social change and their position in Ottoman society.

As Bouquet underlined, mainstream Ottoman historiography intersects "American institutionalism, neo-Weberianism, and developmentalism," which has fused into a fairly simple doxa. This doxa equates modernization with, first, "an institutional affair", and second "positive social change of the state" based on Western values and mindset.³⁹ Of course, not all of the understandings juxtaposed here say entirely similar things, but what they have in common is a consensus on the autonomy (or relative autonomy) of the state and its role as the dominant determinant. This convergence is often Weberian-influenced, but this does not mean that these movements are

³⁹ Oliver Bouquet, "Is It Time to Stop Speaking about Ottoman Modernisation?," in *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey*, ed. Marc Aymes (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2015), 47-48. It should be noted that, Bouquet also underlines at the same place that the interchangeable usages of "modernization" and "Westernization" concepts, especially in between 1950 - 1980 period of the historiography.

completely Weberian. In fact, Weberianism, especially in the context of the Ottoman-Republican studies, is largely a caricature of Weber. And yet, the cumulatively growing literature often excludes new and heterodox interrogations or rejects major changes. Or at least it has no reason to attempt them. Approaches, debates and resources therefore overlap, and a paradigm shift is often not on the agenda. Therefore, although they come from different methodological backgrounds, they share paradigmatic commonalities, briefly “Statism-Institutionalism (SI)”.

Under the effect of the Weberian methodological tradition, the main research field focuses on culture and mentality in SI. The literature continuously discusses the so-called *modernization* process around the same concepts and comparisons, such as the Occidental values and mentality versus Oriental values and mentalities, even in Marxian tendencies. Moreover, the culture and mentality comparison is chiefly made between political elites (essentially individuals) of the two different cultural circles, portraying the lower classes as distinctly passive, with their political effect seen as an exception and anomaly.

In this context, the modernity issue is argued as if it were immanent to elites gathered around state power, namely bureaucracy from different branches. Thus, social transformations are narrowed down to a state-centered and structural process, implying that the transformation of the state *is a starting point*, not an outcome. In his article discussing the historiographical shift from the old "decline thesis" to the newly emerged "transformation paradigm", Olivier Bouquet underlines this "transcendentalist" approach to the state, which places it at the center of historiography and has remained unchanged. He notes that "all reflections continue to start with the State, or come back to it", so "has never needed to make a comeback".

Since the 1980s, “bottom-up” historiographies remain less prevalent because state-oriented narratives dominate the literature.⁴⁰ Therefore, critiquing state-centric analysis is one of the primary tasks of a “truly” social historiography. To overcome this, it is necessary to briefly examine the relationship between Weber, institutions, and the East.

⁴⁰ Olivier Bouquet, “From Decline to Transformation: Reflections on a New Paradigm in Ottoman History,” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 60, no. 60 (December 31, 2022): 46–48, <https://doi.org/10.18589/oa.1223519>.

As Bryan S. Turner implies, what Weber primarily points to as Islam and the Orient is generally the Ottoman polity, with its state and society.⁴¹ This narrative is quite decisive in the analysis of Ottoman state-society relations. It is useful to take a brief look at this framework. Max Weber's economic sociology about the East surpasses the traditionally guarded trivet: the patriarch's absolute command, the local notable's interest maximization tendency, and society's stagnant producer position. These three struggles, in the end, create the portrait of the patriarchal socio-economy. In connection, the notion of "freedom" in Weber's view is essentially about being able to "make contracts": a contractual system contrasting with patrimonialism. Western feudalism, in this sense, resembles relative freedom compared to the unitary Eastern empires. In this system, the autonomy of polities (Western cities) and individuals (civil rights of autonomous cities) relies on a predictable, systematic law known as Christian Canonical Law. According to Weber, this kind of formalization is absolutely and exclusively unique to Europe and cannot be found in non-European countries with their Islamic absolutist patrimonial traditions.⁴² For example, as noted by Curtis, according to Weber, the "coexistence of strict traditionalism and of arbitrariness and lordly discretion," characterizes "*kadi-justice*", which lacks rational rules of decision, leading to minimal predictability of decisions and religious jurisdiction over land cases. This sharply contrasts with Christian Canonical Law, which recognizes informal contracts.⁴³ Furthermore, in Weber's view, "the Eastern individual" is a "non-person"⁴⁴ who cannot pursue a socio-political goal⁴⁵ due to the effect of "irrational ethical systems leaning towards passivity, inactive contemplation or conformism."⁴⁶

⁴¹ Bryan S. Turner, "Max Weber and the Sociology of Islam," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* n° 276, no. 2 (June 2, 2016): 223., <https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.276.0213>.

⁴² Lütfi Sunar, "The Formation of Weber's Sociology of the Orient and Its Reception," in *Marx and Weber on Oriental Societies: In the Shadow of Western Modernity*, Classical and Contemporary Social Theory (Farnham Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 141-147.

⁴³ Michael Curtis, *Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 296. Also, Curtis notes at the same place that, this kind of law prevents emergence of capitalism, according to Weber.

⁴⁴ Sara R. Farris, *Max Weber's Theory of Personality: Individuation, Politics and Orientalism in the Sociology of Religion*, Studies in Critical Social Sciences, volume 56 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 193-213.

⁴⁵ Farris, 207-210.

⁴⁶ Farris, 205.

Also, the only type of state as an "*Anstalt*" is characterized by the "rational embodiment" of restrictive interests, which is culturally specific to the Occident.⁴⁷ In Weber's analysis, prebendal feudalism and patrimonial bureaucracy prevented the emergence of capital accumulation and a free market, namely capitalism, in the Orient. This was crystallized in the tradition of Abbasid, Mamluk, and Ottoman politics,⁴⁸ with Ottoman sultanism being the highest point of this flow, characterized by "arbitrary decisions of the ruler."⁴⁹ Weber's mentality and culture-oriented analysis sees "the decline" of Islam (including the Ottoman rule) in the tensions between "tradition and modernity."⁵⁰ This analysis's main motive is mental "reformation", which implies a liberal order that encompasses free trade, private property, and individualism. According to Weber, the solid traditionalist vein and the lack of these principles were the main causes of the decline and fall of these societies.

This effect spread through the methodological influence of the German Historicist tradition (GHS) in early Republican Turkey's academia and eventually took on a decisively Weberian character following the Americanization of the social sciences between the 1960s and 1980s.⁵¹ They also provided the Early Republican nationalist

⁴⁷ Andreas Anter, *Max Weber's Theory of the Modern State* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014), 189., <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137364906>. These are not limited to the state, however, as Lütfi Sunar listed, Weber's "only in the West" list is highly tumid, see Sunar, 100-101: "(...) professional management, expert officials, citizenship, a monetarized economy, monetary policies, rational accounting, rational law, rational government, political parties, demagogues, cities, rational science, rational historiography, experimentation, rational religion, rational ethics, rational individuals and rational music, factories, rational organization of labor and ultimately, rational capitalism, etc. only exist in the West. And the list is not limited to these."

⁴⁸ Bryan S. Turner, *Weber and Islam*, Max Weber Classic Monographs, v. 7 (1974; repr., London ; New York: Routledge, 1998), 13.

⁴⁹ Turner, 124.

⁵⁰ Turner, 122.

⁵¹ This effect has been discussed in different theoretical bases. For general assesment of this effect, İbrahim Mazman, "Max Weber's ideal types of patrimonialism, sultanism, and bureaucracy: An assessment of their accuracy and utility in the case of rulership relationships in the Ottoman Empire" (Ph.D., Ann Arbor, United States, Boston University, 2005), <https://www.proquest.com/docview/305029156/abstract/5B5D1F09634D48D3PQ/1>; Erdem Sönmez, "Klasik dönem Osmanlı Tarihi çalışmalarında Max Weber etkisi," *Praksis*, no. 23 (2010): 39–62; İbrahim Mazman, "A Review of Weberian Studies on the Ottoman Empire," *Kırıkkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 4, no. 1 (2014): 7–18; Rıdvan Turhan, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyetin Erken Döneminde Max Weber Etkisi ve Bu Etkiyi Anlamak," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi* 3, no. 29 (2014): 259–91, <https://doi.org/doi:10.16917/sd.63083>; In context of methodology (especially in particularism issue), Halil Berktaş, *Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi ve Fuat Köprülü* (Kaynak Yayınları, 1983);

foundation processes with needed discourses, such as the idea of a "transcendental state" and a "high cultured and cohesive society."⁵² Another reason for the prominence of this fusion was the rising anti-Marxism, particularly influenced by American academic hegemony after World War II.⁵³

After the 1980s, the Weberian effect persisted in the form of *American institutionalism*. These manifestations of the same tendency, evolving in form according to the *zeitgeist* but remaining similar in essence, have been persistently transferred and adapted for continuity by scholars studying Ottoman history.

In all periods, approaches to state-society relations became more relational but still institution-oriented. This process can be analyzed in three main periods: The Classical Period (1930s – 1950), the Neo-Classical Period (1950s – 1980s), and the Institutional Turn.

2.1. The Classical Period (1930s-1950s): The First Methodological Formation

The first Weberian historiographical approaches to the Ottoman state-society relations had started by Ömer Lütfi Barkan and Halil İnalçık, and developed by their followers during the 1940 – 1960 period. In general, while Barkan took an empiricist position, İnalçık adopted a sui generis idealism in historiography. Ultimately, their analyses converged on methodological particularism and social- theorized "internal Orientalism."⁵⁴ This conclusion is largely due to the GHS influence that permeated

Haldun Gülalp, "Universalism Versus Particularism: Ottoman Historiography and the 'Grand Narrative,'" *New Perspectives on Turkey* 13 (1995): 151–69, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600002399>; Oktay Özel, *Dün Sancısı: Türkiye'de Geçmiş Algısı ve Akademik Tarihçilik*, 1. basım, İnsan ve Toplum Dizisi 46 (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2009), 27; For state analysis and bureaucracy, Demet Dinler, "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi," *Praksis*, no. 9 (2003): 17–54; Cenk Reyhan, "İlim-Kılıç-Kalem: Osmanlı Kamu Personeli Rejiminde Üçlü İşlevsel Ayırışma," *Belleten* 72, no. 263 (April 1, 2008): 95–122, <https://doi.org/10.37879/belleten.2008.95>.

⁵² Büşra Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)* (1992; repr., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 39-45.

⁵³ Sönmez, "Klasik dönem Osmanlı Tarihi çalışmalarında Max Weber etkisi," 57-58.

⁵⁴ For a detailed assessment on "Internal Orientalism", see Hakem Al-Rustom, "Internal Orientalism and the Nation-State Order: Turkey, Armenians, and the Writing of History," *Ariel: A Review of International English Literature* 51, no. 4 (2020): 1–31, <https://doi.org/10.1353/ari.2020.0026>; Also, Fatma Tütüncü's imply on relations between the concept of Oriental Despotism, state-centrism and

their academic environment. Both Barkan and İnalçık were influenced by Köprülü's methodological impact, encountering Weberianism and GHS during their academic pursuits. The arrival of German scholars in İstanbul and Ankara universities after "the University Reform" of 1933, as political refugees from Nazi Germany, played a significant role in shaping Turkish academia. Some became Barkan's colleagues, while others were İnalçık's professors. At İstanbul University, GHS economists and sociologists such as Gerhard Kessler (founder of Economics and Sociology Institute under the Faculty of Law), historian and economist Alexander Rüstow, and economist Wilhelm Röpke introduced Weber and Tönnies,⁵⁵ to Turkish academia under the influence of ordoliberal thought, which actively drew on Weberian methodology.⁵⁶ They had very active and influential professorships at Istanbul University,⁵⁷ shaping their academic environment.

Although Barkan's methodology mainly focuses on French *Annales* in a non-contextual empiricism form, his state-society reading is rooted in strong state formation and prebendal feudalism, concepts derived from Weberian analysis.⁵⁸ While he directly criticizes and rejects GHS and Weberian methodologies based on mentality frameworks⁵⁹, he accepts Weberian findings such as the East-West differentiation and Orientalist state-society conceptualizations, while rejecting the

"self-orientalism" is critical, see Fatma Tütüncü, "The National Pedagogy of the Early Republican Era in Turkey" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ankara, Middle East Technical University, 2007), 14–30, 44–78., https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezDetay.jsp?id=gJpsCecgm39Zm_RC9v5QuA&no=g6VQN_Y-CqhN2Jfpi-FmgSw.

⁵⁵ Andreas Hänlein, "Gerhard Kessler: Türkiye'de Sürgün Bir Alman Sosyal Politikacı," trans. Alpay Hekimler, *Çalışma ve Toplum Dergisi* 2, no. 9 (2006): 31–47; Turhan, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyetin Erken Döneminde Max Weber Etkisi ve Bu Etkiyi Anlamak," 269.

⁵⁶ Isabel Oakes, "Max Weber and Ordoliberalism: How Weber's Kulturkritik Contributed to the Foundation of Ordoliberal Socio-Economic Thought," *Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch* 140, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 177–204, <https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.140.2.177>.

⁵⁷ Ziyaeddin Fındıkoğlu, "Türk Sosyolojisinde İki Alman Sosyoloğu: Prof. Kessler ve Prof. Rüstow," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 23, no. 3–4 (1963): 33–50; Levent Ünsaldı and Ercan Geçgin, *Sosyoloji Tarihi: Dünyada ve Türkiye'de*, 5th ed. (Ankara: Heretik Yayıncılık, 2015), 247–250.

⁵⁸ Sönmez, "Klasik dönem Osmanlı Tarihi çalışmalarında Max Weber etkisi," 44–46.

⁵⁹ Barkan's understanding of this can be easily seen in his critique of Kessler's student, Weberian Sabri Ülgener's study. In the critique, he unceasingly points out to "lack of sources" and "idealization problem" in this method, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, review of "İktisadî İntihat Tarihimizin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Meseleleri," by Sabri F. Ülgener, *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 12, no. 3–4 (1951): 163–73.

methodology of knowledge production. This reflects the environmental influence of the period's atmosphere and the dominance of his German colleagues at Istanbul University. This influence was even more evident in his students such as Sabri Ülgener, known as "The Turkish Weber". Ülgener's analysis mirrored Weberian sociology in an "Oriental" context; he accepted the corruption and backwardness analysis of Islamic and the Ottoman civilizations due to strong traditionalism and sought to understand this character through a mentality analysis. Ülgener was also a founding figure in economic sociology, and direct references to Weberian analysis deeply affected the entire field of economics and sociology.⁶⁰ In addition to Ülgener, significant Classical Ottomanists who worked in different fields of Ottoman history, such as İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı,⁶¹ economic historian Mehmet Genç,⁶² historian Kemal Karpat⁶³ and sociologist Cahit Tanyol⁶⁴ studied or worked at İstanbul

⁶⁰ Since his direct reference to Weberian methodology, Ülgener's works will be discussed below in detail.

⁶¹ As another founding figure who studied in the Darülfünûn in "the Revolution" years between 1909-1912, Uzunçarşılı was a professor at İstanbul University, Department of History between 1932-1938. His "Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatına Medhal" (Introduction to the Ottoman State Organization) book has a special place in the state-society relations-based historiography, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtına Medhal: Büyük Selçukîler, Anadolu Selçukîleri, Anadolu Beylikleri, İlhanîler, Karakoyunlu ve Akkoyunlularla Memlûklerdeki Devlet Teşkilâtına Bir Bakış*, tpk. bs., Türk tarih kurumu yayınları 10 (Ankara: Türk tarih kurumu, 1988) In this book, he draws a genealogy the Ottoman state formation from the Central Asian polities to the Islamic roots. This book is probably the first detailed study of the "continuity thesis" which sees the Turkish state as one, unified institution that only changed regimes. However, this is not an original idea; as discussed before, the Orientalist/GHSist/Weberian tradition also reads the history from the same point.

⁶² Genç was a student of Barkan. More than a Classical Weberian understanding, Ariel Salzmänn evaluates Genç's approach closer to the Douglas North's "New Institutional Economics" understanding which has a Weberian essence in the sense of economy and society relationality, see Ariel Salzmänn, "Mehmet Genç, Economic Historian," in *Türk Tarihçiliğinde Dört Sima: Halil İnalcık, Halil Sahilliođlu, Mehmet Genç, İlber Ortaylı*, ed. Erol Özvar (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A.Ş. Yayınları, 2006), 122–31.

⁶³ As a student of Faculty of Law, Karpat directly reflects similar points. For instance, in his "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908" article, Karpat uses Weber's capitalism definition in the context of "rational bureaucracy" and emphasizes that the Ottoman traditional order did not liquidate for the sake of the establishment of this kind of rational bureaucratic order, see Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3, no. 3 (1972): 257; Also, Karpat defines the Ottoman government as a "patrimonial bureaucracy" until the 19th century, see Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, Studies in Middle Eastern History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 93. However, Karpat underlines that only Mahmud II fits Weber's sultan definition in the same book, see p. 224.

⁶⁴ Tanyol graduated from the Department of Philosophy at Istanbul University and worked in the Department of Sociology after 1946. According to a Weberian analysis of Tanyol that claims the absence

University. They were affiliated with the Faculty of Literature or the Economics and Sociology Institute under the Faculty of Law during the same years and were influenced by this GHS/Weberian atmosphere.

Classical Ottomanism's determinant figure, Halil İnalçık, has a more complex route and a more explicit character in his alignment with the GHS. At the School of Language and History-Geography (DTCF), he became a student of Fuad Köprülü and Enver Ziya Karal, who worked at İstanbul University for a while after 1933,⁶⁵ the same year the German scholars arrived. After his years at DTCF with Köprülü and Karal, İnalçık went to SOAS in London, where he met and worked with historian Paul Wittek.⁶⁶ As Colin Heywood mentions, Paul Wittek is known for his Weberian "Gaza Thesis" in his book "The Rise of the Ottoman Empire", published in 1938, and was committed to Austrian tradition. Wittek was influenced by Max Weber and Russian orientalist V. V. Barthold,⁶⁷ who had a profound influence over Fuad Köprülü, Halil İnalçık, and general Ottoman historiography. İnalçık describes Wittek's main contribution to Ottoman studies as *the textkritik* method,⁶⁸ a fundamental tool of the hermeneutic approach, and defines this as a "path-breaking service."⁶⁹ İnalçık was deeply influenced by Köprülü's materialism and Karal's "half-idealist" empiricism, which approached history methodologically, the GHS intellectual environment of

of social classes and class struggles because of the "sui generis" character of Ottoman-Turkey tradition, and putting the central contradiction between bureaucracy and people, see Cahit Tanyol, "Şahsi Teşebbüs İmkânı," *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*, August 17, 1962 This article was challenged by sociologist Behice Boran in Marxist YÖN Dergisi, see Behice Boran, "Metod Açısından Feodalite ve Mülkiyet I: Marksist Metod Nedir?," *Yön Haftalık Gazete*, no. 50 (November 1962), http://behiceboran.net/aa/yazilar_pdf/0508.pdf; Behice Boran, "Metod Açısından Feodalite ve Mülkiyet II: Osmanlılarda Mülkiyet Meselesi," *Yön Haftalık Gazete*, no. 51 (November 1962), http://behiceboran.net/aa/yazilar_pdf/0512.pdf.

⁶⁵ Tuncer Büyükkibar, *Enver Ziya Karal'ın Hayatı, Eserleri ve Faaliyetleri* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2017), 85-87.

⁶⁶ Wittek was also a supervisor of an important figure, Stanford Shaw, and then, Shaw also supervised another influential name, Heath Lowry. Wittek's methodological impact is predominantly based on the caliber of the whole Ottoman historiography.

⁶⁷ Colin Heywood, "Wittek and the Austrian Tradition," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, no. 1 (1988): 10.

⁶⁸ Halil İnalçık, "IV. Bölüm: Modern Türk Tarihçiliği," in *Doğu Batı: Makaleler II*, Doğu Batı Yayınları (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2008), 294. İnalçık notes at the same place that, he met with "Bernard Lewis, V. Menage, V. Parry and E. Zachariadou" in Wittek's these seminars.

⁶⁹ İnalçık, 295.

early Turkish academia, and Paul Wittek's Weberian mindset. Throughout his academic life, despite his numerous usages and discussions of Weberian concepts such as patrimonialism⁷⁰ or rationalization⁷¹, his analysis methodologically converges with Weberianism in terms of hermeneutic methodology.⁷² Indeed, on the social-theory side, some scholars evaluate İnalçık within the Weberian tradition due to his strong references to state tradition in social change processes, such as sociologist Fatma Müge Göçek⁷³. According to the view that İnalçık maintained throughout his academic life, the state, state elites (primarily the *sultan*), and the given form of state ideology were the main determinants of social change, rather than general socio-economic material conditions. The methodological igniting effect of this period paved the way for the persistence of a decisive Weberian effect, especially in subsequent historical-sociologic analyses.

2.2. The Neo-Classical Period (1950s – 1980s): Classical Weberianism and Marxo-Weberianism

In 1950s, the focus turned to the question of modernization and the East-West dichotomy.⁷⁴ In this context, Max Weber's literature was almost rediscovered in the

⁷⁰ For instance, Halil İnalçık, "Comments on "'Sultanism'": Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity," ed. Charles Issawi and Bernard Lewis, *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies* 1, no. 1 (1992): 49–72; İnalçık, "IV. Bölüm: Modern Türk Tarihiçiliği," 284.

⁷¹ For example, Halil İnalçık, "Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Modernleşmesi," *Belleten* 52, no. 204 (1988): 990–92, <https://doi.org/10.37879/belleten.1988.985>.

⁷² For a more literal and genealogical reading, see Halil İnalçık, "Hermenötik, Oryantalizm, Türkoloji," *Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi: Oryantalizm - I*, Ağustos, Eylül, Ekim 2002; For a methodological debate of him on hermeneutics and defining it's gaining importance as "auspicious development", see İnalçık, "IV. Bölüm: Modern Türk Tarihiçiliği," 313-314.; İnalçık also refers to hermeneutical concepts like "semiotic" and "contingency", see İnalçık, 304-305.

⁷³ Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 14.

⁷⁴ Likewise, the 1950-1970 Era has been defined with "Modernization Approaches" in Cem Emrence's periodization. According to him, the causal mechanism of change had taken as "the West," the turning point was "Tanzimat," the process had been acknowledged as "the Westernization," and the trajectory was "nation-state," see Cem Emrence, "Three Waves of Late Ottoman Historiography, 1950-2007," *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 41, no. 2 (2007): 138. However, it should be noted that Emrence does not focus on the general historiographic atmosphere of the eras; instead, he focuses on primary themes and tools and periodizes the tradition according to these criteria. I argue that, even if Emrence's periodization is fair enough in that sense, his analysis does not acknowledge the mentality

US⁷⁵ as it provided a "helpful" theoretical framework for emphasizing Eastern cultural backwardness, embedded authoritarianism, and the superior cultural foundations of Western modernity. The period between 1950 and 1980 saw these efforts unfold in global academia, including Ottoman-Republican Studies.⁷⁶

With the influence of the established literature, Weberian tendencies not only maintained their effect but also enhanced it. The so-called "Neo-Classical Period" (1960-1980) created two main academic approaches: *the Classical Weberian* and *the Marxo-Weberian* traditions. These two approaches were significantly influenced by three important books: Firstly, German-American Marxo-Weberian scholar Karl A. Wittfogel's "The Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power" published in 1957,⁷⁷ secondly, "The Emergence of the Modern Turkey" by British Orientalist Bernard Lewis, published in 1961,⁷⁸ and thirdly, the 1963-dated "The Political System of Empires" by Israeli Shmuel Eisenstadt as a "dynamic reinterpretation of Weberian historical institutionalism."⁷⁹

In the Classical Weberian tradition formed during this era, Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper⁸⁰ are important founding figures. As notable contributors to the Turkish

behind the usage of these themes and tools. The Self-Orientalist, GHSist, and Weberian character spread to all the historiography, independently from themes or tools.

⁷⁵ This "rediscovery" and its conclusions can be read in Robert Antonio's "monumental" article, see Robert Antonio, "Max Weber in the Post-World War II US and After," *Ethics & Politics* 7, no. 2 (2005): 1–94.

⁷⁶ Because Turkey is an important Near Eastern country, those years also witnessed the emergence and revival of Ottoman-Republican Studies in the US academia. Most of the well-known names discussed in this study have been connected to this field in the US in recent years. For a detailed general assessment, see Robert Zens, "Turkish Historiography in the United States," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, no. 15 (2010): 149–77.

⁷⁷ In the foreword of the 1981 edition, even if it has been known and discussed many times, Wittfogel directly expresses his synthesis intention of both thinkers, see Karl August Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, 1st Vintage Books ed (1957; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1981), xxvii–xxviii.

⁷⁸ Göçek puts Lewis into Weberian analysis quite rightly because of his emphasis on Islamic tradition's preventive role in the Western-type social change of the Ottoman Empire, as in the case of Weber's analysis, see Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, 13.

⁷⁹ Seth Abrutyn, *Revisiting Institutionalism in Sociology: Putting the "Institution" Back in Institutional Analysis*, 1st Edition, Routledge Advances in Sociology ; 116 (New York: Routledge, 2014), 3, 48-54.

⁸⁰ It should be noted that, he was 1963-graduate of the Istanbul University Faculty of Law.

Weberian tradition, Mardin and Heper directly regenerated the Weberian narrative and conceptual set in Ottoman history. Şerif Mardin, influenced by "German philosophy",⁸¹ as he himself stated, utilized Weberian methodology⁸² since he viewed the Ottoman transformation as a "Weberianization" process.⁸³ He approached Ottoman history through Weberian mentality analysis⁸⁴ and employed the Weberian "methodological individualist" approach.⁸⁵ Socio-theoretically, Mardin saw the Ottoman system as similar to Weber's *Herrschaft*,⁸⁶ characterized by a "patrimonial bureaucratic" nature.⁸⁷

These methodological and social theoretical emphases on the Ottoman social structure led Mardin to establish an "ideal type" model explaining the Ottoman-Republican social tradition: *Center-Periphery Analysis*. He developed this approach by borrowing elements from the works of Shils,⁸⁸ Karl Polanyi, Eisenstadt,⁸⁹ and Gellner.⁹⁰ In

⁸¹ Şerif Mardin, *İdeoloji*, Bütün eserleri / Şerif Mardin (İstanbul: İletişim, 1993), 12.

⁸² Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri: 1895-1908*, 4. bsk, Bütün eserleri / Şerif Mardin 1 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1992), 27.; Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji*, 17. baskı (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 7-9.; See also, E. Fuat Keyman, "Şerif Mardin, Toplumsal Kuram ve Türk Modernleşmesini Anlamak," *Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi - Türk Düşünce Serüveni: Geç Aydınlanmanın Erken Aydınları*, no. 16 (2001): 13, 14, 18, 20-21.; Ateş Altınordu, "Şerif Mardin 1927–2017," *Review of Middle East Studies* 52, no. 1 (April 2018): 167., <https://doi.org/10.1017/rms.2018.18>.

⁸³ Şerif Mardin, "Şerif Mardin'le Din ve Devlet Sosyolojisi Konusunda Söyleşi," in *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset: Makaleler 1*, ed. Mümtaz'er Türköne and Tuncay Önder, Bütün Eserleri / Şerif Mardin (Ali Bayramoğlu, Dün ve Bugün Felsefe, Kitap 1, Bilim/Felsefe/Sanat Ya-yınları, 1985, s.140-166.; repr., İstanbul: İletişim, 1990), 115.

⁸⁴ For example, see Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*, SUNY Series in Near Eastern Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 14, 31, 165.

⁸⁵ Mardin, 232.

⁸⁶ Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11, no. 3 (1969): 259-260.

⁸⁷ Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, ed. Mümtaz'er Türköne and Tuncay Önder, 1. baskı, Bütün Eserleri 4 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 178–81; Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," 259-264.

⁸⁸ Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," *Daedalus* 102, no. 1 (1973): 187, see 1st footnote.

⁸⁹ Ahmet Çiğdem et al., "Şerif Mardin'le Merkez-Çevre Analizi Üzerine," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 105 (2006): 7.

⁹⁰ Şerif Mardin, "Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century," in *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives*, ed. Peter Benedict, Erol

essence, the center and periphery have symbolic meanings that define the ruler and the ruled strata, which are classified culturally.

According to Mardin, there has been a strong centralization tradition in Middle Eastern politics, and the formation of the modern state in Turkey followed a similar development.⁹¹ Unlike Western polities, the Ottoman state culture, even during transitions from Leviathan to nation-state formations (approximately from the 16th century to the 20th century), lacked reconciliation tendencies with peripheral powers. The Ottoman center continuously struggled with them, granting "de facto" autonomy without institutional foundations. These tensions manifested as conflicts such as "nomads versus urbanites," "rural elite versus central elite," and "religious heterodoxy versus orthodoxy" in traditional rule.⁹² The Ottoman center never "recognized" the non-central status but retarded possible tensions with "loose ties" politics.⁹³

In this context, the "kul" bureaucrat, meaning the Sultan's loyal civil servant, played a vital role in Mardin's narrative. The patrimonial state, which controlled the economy and society by restricting trade and property, vested property rights in the Sultan.⁹⁴ Bureaucrats were crucial in maintaining this order, acting as intermediaries between the ruler and the ruled, particularly within the military fief system. Their main objective was "implementing the goals of the dynasty" in the periphery, residing in a foreign cultural circle as the Sultan's agents.⁹⁵ Mardin explained the historical hostility of bureaucrats towards peripheral identities, emphasizing that patrimonialism was not sustained by pure material bureaucratic force; cultural fundamentals of political supremacy played a significant role.

Tümertekin, and Fatma Mansur, vol. 9, *Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia* (Brill, 1974), 407, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004491106_020 see 7th footnote.

⁹¹ Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," 169.

⁹² Mardin, 169-171.

⁹³ Mardin, 171.

⁹⁴ Mardin, 172-173.

⁹⁵ Mardin, 171.

According to Mardin, the Ottoman society was divided into two monolithic and closed-circuit cultural circles: "little" and "great."⁹⁶ The "myth of the sultan's majesty," exclusion of the masses from the official cultural circle, and the Eastern (specifically Persian) narrow and closed high bureaucracy tradition legitimized Ottoman patrimonialism.⁹⁷ The periphery developed its own closed-circuit counter-culture, recognizing their "secondary" position in this system⁹⁸ and rejecting political action due to the Sultan's "tyrannic" authority.⁹⁹ In the Classical Age, a "master-servant" relationship existed, with the Sultan's paternalistic *noblesse oblige* being "vital" for the peasantry's livelihood.

However, as the traditional order degenerated and the military fief system (timar and zeamet) collapsed, another ideal type, the local notables (eşraf), gained prominence.¹⁰⁰ These notables were locally powerful, sought to share the Sultan's economic authority. The degeneration of the traditional order made local notables centers of gravity for the peasantry. Mardin suggested that "Oriental despotism" arose to prevent the rise of local notables and alliances with the peasantry, leading the center to adopt stricter decentralization measures.¹⁰¹ Simultaneously, urban lower classes defended their traditions against Western-influenced reforms.¹⁰² Mardin argued that this authoritarian and absolutist political formation prevented the development of "civil society" in the Hegelian sense. The absence of self-governing powers, secured property rights, freedom of organization, and incorporation into market mechanisms was due to central dominance.¹⁰³ He used the Weberian concept "Rechtsgemeinschaften," meaning a

⁹⁶ Mardin, 179.

⁹⁷ Mardin, 173.

⁹⁸ Mardin, 173.

⁹⁹ Mardin, 174.

¹⁰⁰ Mardin, 172-173.

¹⁰¹ Mardin, 174.

¹⁰² Mardin, 175. Mardin gives the "Patrona Revolt" (1730) as the first example of this kind of uprising. According to him, this revolt caused a pattern against the Western-oriented reformist officialdom that sometimes "burst" around the lower classes of Istanbul.

¹⁰³ Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," 264-265.

social formation based on legal personalities with autonomous rights as essential elements of civil society, according to Weber.¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, Mardin noted the lack of impersonal rules of law and the reliance on "Kadi-justice" (as Weber also underlines)¹⁰⁵ and the tradition of presenting petitions to the Sultan as remedies.¹⁰⁶ Thus, the Ottoman state contrasted sharply with Western institutional bodies¹⁰⁷ Similar to Weber's understanding, Mardin viewed political change as linked to worldview transformation. His first book, based on his doctoral thesis published in 1962, "The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought," exemplifies his Weberian mentality analysis within the Ottoman polity, discussing 19th-century reformists' changing mental microcosms in response to Western political influences.¹⁰⁸ He later more clearly defined the modernization of the Empire through the transformation of mentality based on the "Westernization of the bureaucrat."¹⁰⁹

Metin Heper's analysis does not generally differ from Mardin's in essence, but his focus is on the Ottoman-Turkish administrative body with a statist-institutionalist perspective.¹¹⁰ His work can be characterized as transitional literature from Classical Weberianism to Institutional Theory¹¹¹ reflecting a Neo-Weberian approach. His doctoral thesis, "Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Tradition," encapsulates his general framework. In this study, in reference to Michel Crozier, Heper approaches

¹⁰⁴ Mardin, 264.

¹⁰⁵ See introduction of this chapter.

¹⁰⁶ Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," 269.

¹⁰⁷ Mardin, 258.

¹⁰⁸ Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962).

¹⁰⁹ Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," 179-187.

¹¹⁰ For a deeper assessment of Heper's approach, see Safiye Yelda Kaya, "Premises and Assumptions of the Ottoman State Tradition Paradigm: A Critical Evaluation of Metin Heper's Contribution" (Unpublished Master Thesis, Ankara, Middle East Technical University, 2005).

¹¹¹ Ayten Seven Hasdemir, "A Critique of the Histories of European and Ottoman States: 'From Modernization Revisionism' and 'State Tradition' Towards an Alternative Reading" (Unpublished Master Thesis, Ankara, Middle East Technical University, 2011), 40.

bureaucracy as an analytical object, viewing it as an "empirical-institutional" body rather than an "ideal-institutional" in a Weberian sense.¹¹²

Heper aligns the Ottoman Empire with Eisenstadt's definition of "historical bureaucratic empires", asserting that bureaucratic institutions became "increasingly autonomous," and that intra-bureaucratic struggles were decisive.¹¹³ In this sense, Heper supports Mardin's "bureaucracy versus people" model for the Ottoman-Turkish polity.¹¹⁴ Heper also emphasizes substantial differences between Western state traditions and the Ottoman-Turkish one.¹¹⁵ He argues that the Ottoman state had a patrimonial character¹¹⁶ and could not transform "into norms of a merit bureaucracy."¹¹⁷ In the West, however, there was a "harmony between the bureaucratic norms and the overall formal political and administrative system,"¹¹⁸ with the religious worldview playing a foundational role.

According to Heper, the Ottoman state tradition was deeply embedded in the "static, prescriptive value system of Islam,"¹¹⁹ which served as a unifying framework, keeping state and religion intertwined. Heper notes that the Western state gained a "differentiated" and "politically fragmented" character from the very beginning, with "the Western religious value system being the foundation stone" of this process.¹²⁰

¹¹² Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 3ff, <http://archive.org/details/bureaucraticphen00croz> as cited in Metin Heper, "Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Tradition" (Authorized Facsimile of PhD Thesis, Syracuse, N.Y, Syracuse University, 1971), 1. However, this does not mean that Heper uses the term bureaucracy in a "positive" meaning.

¹¹³ Metin Heper, "Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Tradition" (Authorized Facsimile of PhD Thesis, Syracuse, N.Y, Syracuse University, 1971), 1.

¹¹⁴ Heper, 2-3.

¹¹⁵ Heper, 13ff.

¹¹⁶ Heper, "Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Tradition," 7.

¹¹⁷ Heper, 7.

¹¹⁸ Heper, 7-8.

¹¹⁹ Heper, 18.

¹²⁰ Heper, 20.

From Eisenstadt's perspective, Heper argues that the Ottoman-Turkish state underwent such differentiation; "neither a secular norm of the reason of state, nor a norm of mercantilism developed until the twentieth century,"¹²¹ resulting in a monolithic structure. Heper also contends that medieval estates did not constitute "Weberian-sense" social classes¹²² in the Ottoman state, contrary to the West.¹²³ Closely related to this framework, Heper posits that the Ottoman-Turkish state was never "instrumentalized" and remained "a valued object in itself."¹²⁴

It should be noted that Mardin's and Heper's influence represents a "peak point" within a specific academic atmosphere shaped by the enduring legacy of Weberian thought and the contributions of their contemporaries. For instance, American historian Roderic Davison's 1963 book, "Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876," carries a Weberian essence. In his book, Davison revisits "the decline thesis," attributing the Ottoman Empire's stagnation to the non-rationality of the Ottoman mentality. Davison's connects this to "tradition-mindedness and conservatism" concluding that the lack of intimate contact with Western life reflected in the Ottoman's corrupted absolutist political organization committed to the "Faith, State, and Way" principle.¹²⁵ Moreover, John Weiker's often-cited article by Heper and Mardin at that time, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," analyzes the Ottoman bureaucracy as a variable of rationalization that deserves attention.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Heper, 29.

¹²² Heper, 8.

¹²³ Heper, 16-17.

¹²⁴ Heper, 6, 11.

¹²⁵ Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, Second Edition (1963; repr., New York: Gordian Press, 1973), 14-15.; Plus this, in a review of Davison's essay compilation book covers his critical essays from all his academic life, Engin Akarlı also underlines Davison's strong emphasis on "the West and the Islamic East dichotomy" which can be seen in his general writings, see Engin Deniz Akarlı, review of *Review: Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West by Roderic H. Davison*, by Roderic H. Davison, *The History Teacher* 26, no. 1 (1992): 127-28, <https://doi.org/10.2307/494108>.

¹²⁶ Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (1968): 451-70, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2391053>.

Lastly, about the Neo-Classical Period, the Marxo-Weberian¹²⁷ tendency should be underlined: As mentioned above, Marxo-Weberianism in Turkey is not a eclectic analysis contrary to popular opinion. Rather, Marxo-Weberianism is directly a Weberian approach; while some concepts can be derived from Marxism, the essence of Weberianism, such as culturalism, mentality analysis, and worldview-oriented change definition, remains unchanged. As in the case of Classical Weberianism, socio-cultural exceptionalism and particularism are central motifs in the Marxo-Weberian agenda.¹²⁸

Accordingly, the so-called "mode of production" specific to Asia, the *Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP)*, was the conclusion of Asiatic despotism culture, not about the class struggles and sociologically material conditions. In conclusion, Marxo-Weberianism is thematically Marxist but methodologically Weberian. The fact that Marx developed the term AMP in his early career¹²⁹ does not change this situation; how the concept is coined and implemented is decisive. Even if AMP started from a materialist analysis, Marx's understanding ultimately reached an idealist and Orientalist portrait, mostly due to his unfamiliarity with the East and reliance on

¹²⁷ As Löwy pointed out, the concept (in the form of "Weberian Marxism") belongs to French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, see Michael Löwy, "Figures of Weberian Marxism," *Theory and Society* 25, no. 3 (1996): 431–46.

¹²⁸ Çağdaş Sümer and Fatih Yaşlı, "Marx, Weber ve Türkiye'de Sosyal Bilimler," in *Bilim Üzerine Marksist Tartışmalar: Marksizm Bilime Yabancı mı?*, ed. Alper Dizdar, First Edition (İstanbul: Yazılama Yayınevi, 2014), 183.

¹²⁹ Marx discussed the concept of "Asiatic Despotism" for the first time in 1853-dated "The British Rule in the India" article in New York Herald Tribune. He used this term and AMP in his letters in the following years. Mainly, he developed the concept in "Grundrisse" (1857-58) in a specific chapter called "Formen die der Kapitalistischen Produktion vorhergehen." Then, this chapter was published separately in the name of "Formen" several times. For this background of the term, see Kimio Shiozawa, "Marx's View of Asian Society and His 'Asiatic Mode of Production,'" *The Developing Economies* 4, no. 3 (1966): 299–315, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1966.tb00480.x>; Heniz Lubasz, "Marx's Concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production: A Genetic Analysis," *Economy and Society* 13, no. 4 (November 1984): 456–83, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085148400000018>; Bruce McFarlane, Steve Cooper, and Miomir Jaksic, "The Asiatic Mode of Production: A New Phoenix? (Part 1)," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 35, no. 3 (January 2005): 283–318, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472330580000181>; In 1964, this pamphlet was published in English as "Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations," see Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, ed. Eric John Hobsbawm, trans. Jack Cohen (New York: International Publishers, 1964); After this translation, these concept discussed by intellectual circles, including academia in 1970s political atmosphere. For detailed examples, see Lawrence Krader, *The Asiatic Mode of Production: Sources, Development and Critique in the Writings of Karl Marx* (Assen : Van Gorcum, 1975), 80–177, <http://archive.org/details/asiaticmodeofpro0000krad>; Paul Q. Hirst and Barry Hindess, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production* (London ; Boston : Routledge and K. Paul, 1975), 178–220, <http://archive.org/details/precapitalistmod0000hind>.

mainstream Orientalist sources. Namely, he did not lie about "mentality analysis" in AMP formation; more than that, he emphasized concrete political processes and class analyses while reaching AMP. Later, he abandoned this approach when he developed a seated materialist view of the East. He did not base the AMP formation on "mentality analysis"; instead, he emphasized concrete political processes and class analyses. However, his limited understanding of Eastern politics led to gaps in his analysis. Later, he abandoned this approach when he developed a more grounded materialist view of the East.

After Marx, ex-Marxist and late-Weberian Karl Wittfogel had taken and developed it as an "eclectic" theory, but he did not depart from a Marxist materialist analysis.¹³⁰ His model claims a Marxist conception of Asian societies, focusing on Oriental institution-making processes.¹³¹ Rather than that, Marxism is an "ideal type" in Wittfogel's analysis.

In Turkey, influenced by Marxist discussions, some social scientists and thinkers connected with *Marxian* thought. However, this did not mean rejection of the existing literature; on the contrary, these individuals, mostly within academia, sought to engage with and contribute to it. The foundations of this approach, including primary and secondary sources, were rooted in Orientalist, GHS, and Weberian studies. As a result,

¹³⁰ Marx's intellectual personality had developed into the Western cultural circle. Oriental Despotism and AMP were two concepts that bear these effects and are undoubtedly Eurocentric. For the relationship between the Western intellectual effect on Marx and Eurocentric soul in these concepts, see Dmitry Shlapentokh, "Marx, the 'Asiatic Mode of Production,' and 'Oriental Despotism' as 'True' Socialism," *Comparative Sociology* 18, no. 4 (2019): 489–521, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341505>; However, while he developed historical materialism and less lie on German idealism, broken up from this essence, especially after 1860s. According to Kolja Lindler, the historical push behind this mental transformation was the Irish case against the capitalist British state: The two polities were comparable because both India and Ireland were under colonial suppression and were pre-capitalist village societies based on communal formations. As Lindner points out, Marx seemed to tend to evaluate this social formation as a nucleus of the struggle against British imperialism and sympathized with it; see, Kolja Lindner, *Marx, Marxism and the Question of Eurocentrism*, Marx, Engels, and Marxisms (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022), 13-18., <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81823-4> At the end of the day, Marx's analysis sharply separated from Wittfogel's culturalist idealism-based approach, both in the meaning of materialist theoretical background of Marx's AMP and later historically critical transformation of him. In the Ottoman case, the Marxo-Weberian circle had primarily adopted Wittfogel's approach.

¹³¹ See Karl A. Wittfogel, "Results and Problems of the Study of Oriental Despotism," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 28, no. 2 (February 1969): 357–65, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2943008>.

they gravitated towards Wittfogel's interpretation rather than Marx's. Scholars such as İdris Küçükömer, Sencer Divitçioğlu, Stefanos Yerasimos, Huricihan İslamoğlu, and Çağlar Keyder¹³² formed the Marxo-Weberian social historiography around the *Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP)* analysis in the 1970s.¹³³

Firstly, the concept of the AMP was adopted into the Ottoman historiography by Sencer Divitçioğlu, who studied Economics at İstanbul University and was significantly influenced by the GHS culture, which emphasizes understanding the economy through economic thought. He was also affected by Marxist political currents, mainly around the "development and underdevelopment" issue, which gained traction in Turkish politics between 1960 and 80. Thus, Divitçioğlu occupied an "intermediated" position between academia and politics. The mental and cultural inputs like Oriental despotism and stagnant sociology made AMP's content appear highly relevant and purposeful to him.

In his work "Asya Tipi Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumunu" (In Eng., *Asiatic Mode of Production and the Ottoman Society*), Divitçioğlu argued that AMP held a constant and continuous place in Marxist theory,¹³⁴ likely exaggerating its significance. By doing so, he sought to abstract "the peculiarities" of Ottoman society in terms of AMP.¹³⁵ He referenced Louis Althusser's concept of "sur-determination", which defines the role of economy "in the last instance."¹³⁶ This allowed Divitçioğlu to credit economic thought as a transformative power with an idealist meaning. In his book, Divitçioğlu depicted a society divided strictly into "state" and "society" (*devlet-reâyâ*)

¹³² Keyder's subsequent analysis in the post-1980s is closer to the Classical Weberian paradigm; see Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London ; New York: Verso, 1987).

¹³³ In addition to these names, Asaf Savaş Akat and Selahattin Hilav should be mentioned in AMP discussions. Also, different from whose, although she does not lie on AMP, Fatma Müge Göçek has a meritocratic view in her analysis, and this approach is only the real "eclectic" approach in the sense of unifying Marxist and Weberian methodologies, not Weberian interpretation of Marxist concepts. Unfortunately, this was also a "compelling" effort.

¹³⁴ Sencer Divitçioğlu, *Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumunu - Marksist Üretim Tarzı* (1967; repr., İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), 3–21, 116-118.

¹³⁵ For a general but also concrete analysis of Divitçioğlu on this issue, Divitçioğlu, 179-184.

¹³⁶ Divitçioğlu, 81. By the way, of course, this approach is a misunderstood of Marxist economics and mostly degrades/equalizes it to a "neo-classical" understanding rather than a political subject.

without any intermediary class or status. He emphasized the state's absolute power over economic life and thought, excluding every other social power from this position.¹³⁷ While referring to Ülgener in his emphasis on economic thought in the Empire,¹³⁸ Divitçioğlu argued that the primary reason for this division was the "fetishistic" formation of Ottoman society, rather than permanently suppressing socio-economic mechanisms.

For example, the Ottoman being does not experience "economics," even if she/he had kept in contact with material life. Their economic lives are not transparent. She/he is a member of a rabble called *reâyâ* under the state's supreme authority and the Sultan's almighty presence. The Ottoman beings were alienated from the state, religion, and customs and could not see real economic life. The fetishism of Ottoman beings has shifted from material economic life to state and Islam.¹³⁹

Like Weber himself and other Weberian analysts, Divitçioğlu also acknowledges this situation through the lens of the strong state tradition inherited from "Abbasid, Great Seljuks, Moghul, Oghuz and Seljuk Sultanate of Rum."¹⁴⁰ Thus, he argues that the Ottoman social structure differs fundamentally from European feudalism,¹⁴¹ mainly due to the social thought shaped by the Eastern tradition.

Küçükömer focused more on the "sub-structural" elements and the formation of the AMP than Divitçioğlu. He mainly utilized Wittfogel's concept of "hydraulic society", which refers to limited resources and the climate conditions of Eastern societies, leading to the formation of a centralized bureaucratic system in Asiatic societies.¹⁴² According to Küçükömer, the Ottomans also emerged from this tradition due to their "Turanic" past:¹⁴³ During the nomadic period of state formation, Asiatic geographical difficulties necessitated the development of a military-like authoritarian political body

¹³⁷ Divitçioğlu, 83.

¹³⁸ Divitçioğlu, 57.

¹³⁹ Divitçioğlu, 83. Translated by the author of this thesis. Italics also belong to the author of this thesis.

¹⁴⁰ Divitçioğlu, 84.

¹⁴¹ Divitçioğlu, 84.

¹⁴² İdris Küçükömer, "Asyagil Üretim Biçimi, Yeniden Üretim ve Sivil Toplum," *Toplum ve Bilim*, Yaz 1977, 8. Küçükömer did not refer to him, but Wittfogel coined this concept in "Oriental Despotism."

¹⁴³ Küçükömer, 8.

to ensure resource redistribution. In such societies, as Küçükömer argues, resource mobility was restricted, mercantile ties were neutralized, and artisanal/industrial production was tied to military logistics due to its conquest/pillage-dependent character.¹⁴⁴ As a result, horizontal relations narrowed, while vertical hierarchies became dominant,¹⁴⁵ leading to the formation of a "diverged society" over the producers.¹⁴⁶

Even though Küçükömer's analysis seems more materialistic, his framework was based on a strict generalization which implies the uniformity of the Ottoman system across all regions, which turns the materialistic analysis into idealistic. Küçükömer seemed to find the "ideal-typified" Imperial ideology's concrete basis in a vulgar materialistic way, rather than providing a historical materialistic analysis of the Ottoman polity.

In addition to fundamental elements, i.e., restrictions on private property, a strong-central state, and rural-urban differentiation, Yerasimos' AMP definition has similarities with Küçükömer's, particularly in emphasizing irrigation issues and land inadequacy for the emergence of this formation,¹⁴⁷ rooted in the Turkish-Ottoman AMP.¹⁴⁸ Yerasimos, however, highlighted the global comparative notion of "development" in terms of "developing capitalist mode of production" and "socio-economic formation that created the society," defining Ottoman society as underdeveloped by these criteria.¹⁴⁹ With these perspectives, AMP became an actual global layer rather than a comparison of two different social systems. Yerasimos, even as he defined social strata as an inflexible character, such as rural society, in terms of both mentality and mode of production, emphasized the emergence of different power groups and political actions in Ottoman society, making different social formations,

¹⁴⁴ Küçükömer, 13-14.

¹⁴⁵ Küçükömer, 3.

¹⁴⁶ Küçükömer, 14.

¹⁴⁷ Stefanos Yerasimos, *Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye*, trans. Babür Kuzucu, vol. 1 (Gözlem Yayınları, 1974), 92-93.

¹⁴⁸ Yerasimos, 111-79.

¹⁴⁹ Yerasimos, 18ff.

such as feudalism, possible.¹⁵⁰ This nuanced view challenged the "stagnant and inured" sociological imagination often associated with AMP, highlighting the dynamic and complex nature of social structures within the Ottoman context.¹⁵¹

Huri İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder extended the "global comparison possibility" in Yerasimos' analysis: Their groundbreaking article "Agenda for Ottoman Historiography" article criticizes İnalcık, Gibb and Bowen, and Lewis from the Classical historiography for reading the Ottoman history through so-called independent and "privileged" institutions (such as central bureaucracy and land tenure), and for "idealist" attributions to these institutions' "essential character" formed on the basis of "the Near Eastern society ideal."¹⁵² They argue that the essentialist Classical explanation relies on "legal and philological" analysis,¹⁵³ focusing on the ideological repercussions of cultural essentialism rather than understanding the "changing or actual functions" of these institutions.¹⁵⁴

İslamoğlu and Keyder claim that, according to the Classicists, the specific function of the state was the "perpetuity of the eternal order" (*ebedi nizam*) and "protecting the interests of the subject population." They argue that the "essential ideological corruption" of these institutions was linked to general decline, explained by "external effects" such as demographic changes, price revolution, commercialization, and military developments.¹⁵⁵ They criticize this "hybrid-institutionalist-functionalism"¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁰ Yerasimos implies that in the 15th and 16th the Ottoman ruling class' pushed for "Asiaticization" policies on the mode of production; however, he says that this goal was not realized even in these centuries, see Yerasimos, 454. For continuous feudalization "risk" and these attempt's conclusions, see Yerasimos, 33, 95-96, 100-102, 201.

¹⁵¹ Yerasimos, 97-98, 105-106.

¹⁵² Huri İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 1, no. 1 (1977): 31-37.

¹⁵³ İslamoğlu and Keyder, 37.

¹⁵⁴ İslamoğlu and Keyder, 33-34.

¹⁵⁵ İslamoğlu and Keyder, 32, 33-34

¹⁵⁶ İslamoğlu and Keyder, 37.

that always refers to “embedded ideology” inherent to “particular elements of superstructure.”¹⁵⁷

Against this understanding, İslamoğlu and Keyder embrace AMP and Marxo-Weberian tendencies and connect this framework with the rising "World-Systems Theory" by Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank.¹⁵⁸ They argue that the Ottoman "world empire" was a robust regulatory institution that directed commodity flows and capital controls to maximize the interests of the ruling class that seized the surplus.¹⁵⁹ In Ottoman AMP, the ruling class had a prevalent effect on the economy. It commanded all socio-economic relations to their benefit, such as securing a specific rural and urban division of labor.

According to İslamoğlu and Keyder, the production process in AMP did not cause a struggle between producers and confiscators since the production processes were "free" and the exploitation relationship began after production; tax collectors and producers interacted after the "free" production process. Therefore, the main contradiction was not "inter-class" but "intra-class".¹⁶⁰ They argue that whenever this system integrated with foreign trade and external socio-politics became effective in domestic policy, the central command became weakened, and other power structures such as *âyâns* found a competitive opportunity.

At the end, the shift resulted from becoming a part of the global division of labor and dependence, ceasing to be a self-reproducing unit, which means *peripheralization* in the world economy.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ İslamoğlu and Keyder, 36.

¹⁵⁸ İslamoğlu and Keyder, 32.

¹⁵⁹ İslamoğlu and Keyder, 40-44.

¹⁶⁰ İslamoğlu and Keyder, 45.

¹⁶¹ İslamoğlu and Keyder, 53-55.

2.3. The Institutionalism(s) (1980s – Present): Through a Relational Analysis

New Institutionalism (NI) can be defined as an analytical and more relational interpretation of the social theory, which emerged as a new approach in global academia. It became a strong vein in social scientific historiography in the 2000s and maintained this position through the 2010s and early 2020s. In the context of Ottoman studies, this approach represents a form of negation and articulation. The historiographical sources are nearly similar but the Institutionalism paradigm suggested a more theoretical and relational approach to the historiography.

Basically, NI seeks to understand socio-economic change through the lens of tangible or intangible institutional transformations, such as the transformation of states, markets, law or tradition, religion, and ideology. According to this approach, social development is determined by institutions, which are viewed as the "rules of the game."¹⁶² From traditions to states, institutions are formal, decided, or prespecified "ways of doing" that inevitably shape social action, including the actions of individuals, who are seen as outputs of cultural institutions.

Marxist scholar Paul Cammack notes that this approach began to take shape in the 1970s, with significant contributions from American political scientists and sociologists Alfred Stepan, Stephen Krasner, Theda Skocpol, and Eric A. Nordlinger.¹⁶³ The approach gained a methodological identity with the influential study "Bringing the State Back In" in 1985 with the major contributions of Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, and Charles Tilly.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, Michael Mann's "institutional statism,"¹⁶⁵ an approach defined as a "re-interpretation

¹⁶² Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3.

¹⁶³ Paul Cammack, "Statism, New Institutionalism, and Marxism," *Socialist Register* 26 (March 18, 1990): 147., <https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5578>.

¹⁶⁴ Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1985), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511628283>.

¹⁶⁵ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power - Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914*, vol. II (1993; repr., New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 52, 54–63.

of Weber's state definition in a neo-institutionalist perspective"¹⁶⁶ also falls within this paradigm. James C. Scott's focus on lower-class institutions, such as his approach to the "moral economy" concept and state inclusion issues, contributes to this paradigm.¹⁶⁷ According to Cammack, there are six essential principles in this tradition:

(...) the polity is a relatively autonomous institutional sphere; institutions tend to persist over time; institutional codes and constraints invalidate interpretations of behavior as rational maximization; change is path-dependent, hence not predictable; and as a consequence, the particular history of processes of change must be explored; and functional explanations for outcomes are ruled out.¹⁶⁸

This institutionalist turn directly affected global historiography, including the study of Ottoman history. In this literature, the Ottoman-Republican experience has been placed within the global context of the "Great Divergence." The emerging Institutional Tradition became a driving force in historiography during the 1980s and 1990s. Within this tradition, some scholars have critically examined Ottoman institutional transformation from an economic perspective.

Şevket Pamuk, a founding figure in this scope, explores the relationship between Ottoman political-economic transformation and institution-building processes.¹⁶⁹ Like Pamuk, Ariel Salzman analyzes Ottoman politics through the lens of state capacity,

¹⁶⁶ Filipe Carreira Da Silva, "Time Is of the Essence: Remarks on Michael Mann's The Sources of Social Power," *Análise Social* XLVIII, no. 209 (2013): 961.

¹⁶⁷ Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*.

¹⁶⁸ Cammack, "Statism, New Institutionalism, and Marxism," 160. Even if Cammack generalizes these elements to NI, they are indeed owned by HI. For further info, see; Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon C. Stimson, "Historicizing the New Institutionalism(s)," in *Modern Political Science: Anglo-American Exchanges since 1880*, ed. Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon C. Stimson, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 259–89; Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 369–404, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369>; Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms."

¹⁶⁹ For a theoretical article, see Şevket Pamuk, "Economic History, Institutions, and Institutional Change," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 3 (2012): 532–35; On the Ottoman economy, see Şevket Pamuk, "Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1800," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35, no. 2 (2004): 225–47; Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Economy and Its Institutions*, Variorum Collected Studies Series CS917 (Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009); Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820 - 1913: Trade, Investment and Production*, Dig. print. vers. 2010, Cambridge Middle East Library (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010); Şevket Pamuk, *Uneven Centuries: Economic Development of Turkey since 1820*, The Princeton Economic History of the Western World (Princeton, New Jersey; Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2018).

focusing on tax-farming-based institutional building processes and central inclusion of the periphery.¹⁷⁰ Linda T. Darling investigates Ottoman financial institutions and examines changes in Ottoman state capacity concerning tax collection issues.¹⁷¹

Onur Yıldırım, adopting an economic institutionalist perspective, focuses on the guild system to understand the development of Ottoman market relations. Similarly, Seven Ağır examines market formation and specific sectors like grain, analyzing the transformation from guilds to corporations, with a particular emphasis on the *gedik* system.¹⁷² Eunjeong Yi's recent studies on state-society relations through guild dynamics directly reflect the institutionalist approach, framing political relations as a collective bargaining case between producers and the state.¹⁷³

In this historiography, dichotomies such as centralization/decentralization, dependence/autonomy, and democracy/authoritarianism hold central positions. Karen Barkey's analysis can be evaluated within this framework. Ferdan Ergut relies on Charles Tilly's thesis and Michael Mann's concepts of "despotic" and "infrastructural power," focusing on state inclusion and Ottoman bureaucratic institutionalization.¹⁷⁴ Additionally, more culture and mentality-centered studies have emerged. Inspired by

¹⁷⁰ Ariel Salzmänn, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics & Society* 21, no. 4 (December 1993): 393–423, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329293021004003>; Ariel Salzmänn, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State*, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, v. 28 (Boston: Brill, 2004).

¹⁷¹ Linda T. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660*, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage 6 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996).

¹⁷² Seven Ağır, "The Evolution of Grain Policy: The Ottoman Experience," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 43, no. 4 (April 2013): 571–98, https://doi.org/10.1162/JINH_a_00462; Seven Ağır, "The Rise and Demise of 'Gedik' Markets in Istanbul, 1750–1860," *The Economic History Review* 71, no. 1 (February 2018): 133–56, <https://doi.org/10.1111/chr.12492>.

¹⁷³ Eunjeong Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage* (Brill, 2004), <https://brill.com/display/title/8196>; Eunjeong Yi, "Artisans' Networks and Revolt in Late Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: An Examination of the Istanbul Artisans' Rebellion of 1688," in *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi et al., 1st ed, İstanbul Bilgi University Press ; History, 368. 39 (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2011), 105–26; Eunjeong Yi, "Rich Artisans and Poor Merchants? A Critical Look at the Supposed Egalitarianism in Ottoman Guilds," in *Bread from the Lion's Mouth: Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi, International Studies in Social History, vol. 25 (New York: Berghahn, 2015), 194–216.

¹⁷⁴ Ferdan Ergut, "State and Social Control: The Police in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Republican Turkey, 1839-1939" (PhD. Thesis, New School for Social Research, 1999).

the "Great Divergence" literature, Timur Kuran seeks to understand the so-called "Middle Eastern backwardness," including the Ottoman context, through the lens of traditionalist Islamic thought and its strict institutional order.¹⁷⁵ Kristin Fabbe examines religion as an institution and the roles of Ottoman religious elites in modern state-making processes. She assesses state capacity and social inclusion through Ottoman-Republican interventions in the religious domain. Fabbe's analysis reproduces the "modernizing versus traditionalist elites" dichotomy and discusses the political strategies of modernizing elites to intervene in the religious institutional sphere.¹⁷⁶

With more socio-political-oriented studies or culture-oriented readings, this analysis allows for a more relational approach. In response to rising critiques, particularly after the 1980s, contemporary social theoretical approaches have increasingly problematized structuralism. By the mid-1980s, the Historical Institutionalism (HI) branch of the statist-institutionalist school, which scrutinizes such social theories, shifted toward a more historical and society-oriented approach. This new model reestablished *the state as a socially embedded institution* that changed in subject orientation, contrasting with ahistorical, monolithic, and "unmanned" structural explanations.

Indeed, Peter B. Evans' "embedded autonomy" and Joel Migdal's "state-in-society" approaches emerged from these discussions within the statist-institutionalist paradigm,

¹⁷⁵ Timur Kuran, "The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic Underdevelopment in the Middle East," *The Journal of Economic History* 63, no. 2 (June 2003): 414–46, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050703001840>; Timur Kuran, "Why the Middle East Is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18, no. 3 (2004): 71–90; Timur Kuran, "The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence," *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 53, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 785–834, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/53.4.785>; Timur Kuran, "The Scale of Entrepreneurship in Middle Eastern History: Inhibitive Roles of Islamic Institutions," in *The Invention of Enterprise*, ed. David S. Landes, Joel Mokyr, and William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship from Ancient Mesopotamia to Modern Times (Princeton University Press, 2010), 62–87, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7t7h2.9>; Timur Kuran, *The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Timur Kuran, *Freedoms Delayed: Political Legacies of Islamic Law in the Middle East*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2023), <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009320009>.

¹⁷⁶ Kristin E. Fabbe, *Disciples of the State? Religion and State-Building in the Former Ottoman World* (Cambridge New York, NY Port Melbourne New Delhi Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.1017/978-1-108-296878>.

tending to develop a social orientation in state-making processes.¹⁷⁷ Migdal's approach quickly influenced Ottoman-Turkish studies, especially with the pioneering steps of Reşat Kasaba¹⁷⁸ and the current interventions of Marc Aymes and others.¹⁷⁹ Later, Şerif Mardin also converged toward this approach.¹⁸⁰

Another scholar who studies Ottoman political transformation and actors from a relatively relational position, Ali Yaycıoğlu, claims the abolishment of the old "vertical" and hierarchical structures and the emergence of a new "horizontal" institutional body in the Empire in the early 19th century. Yaycıoğlu's analysis, which focuses on the interconnected political actions of local and central powers within the state, appears highly influenced by the state-in-society approach and re-forms the Ottoman state's relative autonomy more relationally.¹⁸¹

Lastly, the newly emerged "Environmental History" branch should be considered within the Statist-Institutionalism (SI) tradition. The influence of Elinor Ostrom's institutional analysis on commons, such as land, water, air, and food, led to a new historiographical tradition focusing on the institutional analysis of commons.¹⁸² This tradition emphasizes the relationship between the seizure of commons by states and inclusive state-making processes. The historical process of society's exclusion from

¹⁷⁷ Peter B. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613067>.

¹⁷⁸ Reşat Kasaba, "A Time and a Place for the Nonstate: Social Change in the Ottoman Empire During the 'Long Nineteenth Century,'" in *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, ed. Atul Kohli, Joel Samuel Migdal, and Vivienne Shue, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 207–30, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174268.011>.

¹⁷⁹ Marc Aymes, Benjamin Gourisse, and Elise Massicard, eds., *Devlet Olma Zanaatı: Osmanlı'dan Bugüne Kamu İcraatı*, trans. Ali Berktaş (Karthala, 2013; İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016).

¹⁸⁰ See, Şerif Mardin, "Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (University of Washington Press, 1997), 64–80, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvewnnwt.9>.

¹⁸¹ Ali Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016).

¹⁸² Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1990), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807763>.

the common usufruct of grazing, farming, and irrigation sources, alongside the emergence of private property and modern political power, is a central theme in this literature.¹⁸³ It can be said that this literature reproduces SI's state-society relations analysis over the domain of commons.¹⁸⁴

This new tendency recalls Marxo-Weberian Wittfogel's Weber-inspired concept of *hydraulic empires*, which refers to establishing social authority and control through the seizure of power over water resources. However, it is also influenced by the contemporary "state-in-society" update to Weber's absolutist state-society dichotomy. This approach has also emerged in Ottoman historiography.

For instance, Alan Mikhail's "Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt" examines the Ottoman central penetration of Egypt by establishing infrastructural power over commons, particularly through irrigation projects. Unlike Wittfogel's "one-way" analysis, Mikhail shows the Egyptian peasantry's influence on the Ottoman center through political clashes over the commons, leaning towards a relational analysis.¹⁸⁵

Another foundational study, Sam White's "The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire," focuses on climate change and transformations in the production chain. White's analysis highlights the Little Ice Age's direct effect on the Celali Rebellion, linking environmental conditions with early modern politics and the

¹⁸³ For a general assessment, see Derek Wall, *The Commons in History: Culture, Conflict, and Ecology, History for a Sustainable Future* (Cambridge, MA London: The MIT Press, 2014).

¹⁸⁴ A crystal clear effect can be seen in the founding texts. James C. Scott's autonomous state definition has ultimately affected from SI tradition, see James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, Yale Agrarian Studies (New Haven, CT London: Yale University Press, 1998); Joachim Radkau directly lies on Weberian paradigm in environmental history methodology, see Joachim Radkau, *Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment*, 1st English ed, Publications of the German Historical Institute (Washington, DC : Cambridge ; New York: German Historical Institute ; Cambridge University Press, 2008); For a concise assessment of him, Joachim Radkau, "Religion and Environmentalism," in *A Companion to Global Environmental History* (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2012), 493–512, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118279519.ch27>.

¹⁸⁵ Alan Mikhail, *Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977220>.

political participation of lower classes empowered by production, especially during times of environmental deterioration.¹⁸⁶

Faisal H. Husain's approach is more aligned with Wittfogelian analysis. According to Husain, the Ottoman central power was reflected in Mesopotamia through the seizure of the Tigris and Euphrates basins and effective politics over water and land commons. He underscores the direct relationship between disruptions in environmental conditions, loss of power over commons, and the decline in Ottoman central inclusion.¹⁸⁷ Another study, "Seeds of Power," edited by Onur İnal and Yavuz Köse, gathers commons-based institutionalist analyses within the Ottoman context. It focuses on political struggles over resources between the state and society and the socio-political consequences of these struggles.¹⁸⁸

2.4. Conclusion: Institutional Relationality or Dialectic Relationality?

In fact, there is more than one thing that can be taken from the many names that have been written, especially in recent decades. Although increasing level of relationality is a positive development, the fact that it does not take the form of a dialectical relationality leads to the continuation of difficulties. Even SI has given up reading history in terms of binaries, this time it tries to read history in terms of the relationship of multiple ontologies-in-itself. However, the main problem is not the multiplication of sui generis ontologies, but the elimination of them. In reality, no social entity is a more or less “cagey” and nothing leaks into each other but moves and transforms together in the process. If this critique is not made, social theory will remain a relation between ontologies that are still separate from each other and interact only externally. A dialectical understanding of relationality will take a critical role in replacing this problematic view.

¹⁸⁶ Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511844058>.

¹⁸⁷ Faisal H. Husain, *Rivers of the Sultan: The Tigris and Euphrates in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

¹⁸⁸ Onur İnal and Yavuz Köse, eds., *Seeds of Power: Explorations in Ottoman Environmental History* (Winwick, Cambridgeshire: The White Horse Press, 2019).

CHAPTER 3

MAKING MORE SPACE FOR OTTOMAN SOCIAL CLASSES: THEORY AND CONTEXT

While this may not be a problem of the methodology itself, in some cases SI can give rise to a problematic narrative. Despite increasing relationality and infrastructural analysis, there is still not enough space for lower classes. To avoid the holistic analysis—namely, the stereotyped state-society and center-periphery dichotomy based on cultural circles—should be overcome, and the state must be redefined as a relational domain. Day-to-day and long-term interests shared by common social groups and their intended and unintended reunions mobilize societies. For instance, *the state as an ideology* is a useful political discourse for ruling groups who want to preserve power, while *tradition as an ideology* is another proper discourse for ruled groups who want to conserve and improve their social position. Concrete expectations and a suitable discourse constitute a political agenda for a given time; groups' agendas constantly change. Each of these correlates with given conditions and the ideological zeitgeist. The imagination of the state's stagnancy can be withered away by centering not on fluid identities but on the historically emerging political agendas of different social classes. The ever-changing relational character of the Ottoman polity, as a means of different classes' given agendas emerging from a social clash *over power*, can be revealed. Only in this kind of relational model can society's complex transformation process, which emerges as a cumulation of consequential but not "global" agendas, be understood. This is encapsulated in the *Strategic-Relational Model*.

3.1. Introduction: Approaching the Ottoman Polity with a More Relational Scope

If not Weber himself, his followers like Talcott Parsons created a simplistic state and society imagination based on a sharp distinction between two 'independent' social ontologies – *center and periphery*. This approach permeated Turkey from the 1960s

onwards and significantly impacted Ottoman-Republican studies. Even recent approaches like ‘embedded autonomy’ and ‘state-in-society,’ which are based on a certain degree of negation and updating of this tradition, tend to theorize the state and society as autonomies. Particularly in the 1990s, this approach influenced Ottoman studies and brought relationality into focus. However, the literature still needs to understand the objective complexity and intimacy of social processes because these approaches often fail to escape a horizontally comprehensive and infrastructurally separated state imagination, including in the Ottoman context.

The definition continues to assume that the state is just another ontology to a certain extent. As a result, social groups and non-governmental strata are often considered only as elements of collective bargaining or habitual conflict, rather than as effective agents within politics. Politics is still monopolized by a sphere called the state, more or less. This way of thinking about the state as an institutional ontology separate from the ‘social domain’ can have ahistorical consequences, even if it is not always the case.

The idea of a structural separation between state and society should be questioned and advanced by a relational model. On a theoretical level, which contrasts with Statist Institutionalism (SI), political and cultural institutions, including the state, have formed as a result of consequential social struggles. In other words, the state cannot be an abstraction with an independent existence and history separate from given social relations. Social struggles between different interest groups, namely classes, mold the given form of the state. The institutional set historically changes to meet the needs of power relations.

In this sense, politically, there is no seizure of such a domain, but rather class struggles for power to realize a political agenda embodied in the classes' historical existence. Class struggles mean the clash of strategic agendas for classes' welfare, interest, and advocacy. This analysis of the definition of the state aligns with British state theorist Bob Jessop's *Strategic-Relational Approach*. At the historical level, however, the processes of *state formation* (*cf. state-making* in SI) still need explanation.

At this point, Jessop's analysis is compatible with the *State Derivation* literature, also known as *the German Debate*, which views the state as a derivation of class struggles. If the state is defined as a relational formation, then its formation is the result of

ongoing class struggles and their historical accumulation. At the political level, the explanation of given institutional sets of political power can be clarified using the *French Regulation School's* two concepts: ¹⁸⁹ *Regime of Accumulation* (RoA) and *Mode of Regulation* (MoR). Accordingly, in a given phase of class struggles, the power-holder class constitutes a regime for the accumulation of social surplus product (such as *timar*, *iltizam*, or *malikane*) and constructs a politico-legal body (such as *absolutist*, *relativist*, or *bureaucratic*) around this regime to regulate it. Historical reflexes and the daily interests of classes overlap in the regime-building process.

Reversely to Patrimonialist analysis, Ottoman society had a high level of transitivity based on temporo-spatial relations. For a relational view in historiography, Ottoman (and Republican) historiography needs a *paradigm shift* to a new, *relational approach* focusing on historical processes with a materialist base. Neo-Marxist discussions that do not treat classes and social bodies as structural categories but as relations and processes offer new opportunities in this way. These are discussed and offered in the name of the *Strategic-Relational Approach* by Bob Jessop, and a new Neo-Marxist social-theoretical approach is suggested that allows a historiography from the *perspective of class struggles*.

Accordingly, this chapter problematizes the class analyses of both social theoretical positions and re-discusses the role of social classes in transformations, particularly refuting Weberian-rooted exclusionary analyses of the Ottoman lower classes and their political effects. This exploration crosses from social theory to labor historiography to propose a new perspective on Marxist theory, called the *Moral Economic Agenda*, as a contemporary re-evaluation of E. P. Thompson's moral economy concept.

First and foremost, this chapter focuses on the confrontation and critique of the mainstream Ottoman-Republican literature's embedded SI ethos and dependent "Patrimonialism thesis," which fetishizes the role of institutional structures and

¹⁸⁹ By the way, some scholars rightly claim that this school also has a "structuralist" and "institutionalist" character, see. Fatma Eda Çelik, *Kişisel İktidardan Millet Meclisine*. However, the Regulationist framework is not used here as it is, to explain the whole social order in terms of these concepts. As will be shown below, it will often be emphasized that it is the class struggles that establishes the social formation. On the other hand, I think that the concepts of RoA and MoR is quite useful in explaining the "given" institutional set and its internal relations that emerged as a conclusion of class struggles, because I borrow these concepts.

excludes social relations. It then briefly examines the Ottoman social transformation from the 16th century to the early 19th century within the context of the Strategic-Relational model.

3.2. A Critique of SI's Strong State and the Absence of Revolution Theses: The Theory of Transition to Capitalism in the Ottoman Context

Ottoman historiography, from the Classical to the Neo-Classical approaches, is based on the degraded dichotomy between state and society inherent in Statist Institutionalism (SI) and the ahistorical continuity claim of the Patrimonialism framework rooted in culturalism. However, social relations are not as simple as those approaches suggest, and polities have not been sharply divided into two differentiated "closed-circuit systems" like state and society. The SI framework that influences Classical historiography is inadequate due to this degradation. Neither was the state a "black box," nor was society a "stagnant sociology" as a constant body.

The "hypostasis of state" has been a discursive political strategy, materialized with concrete force, for structuring, re-establishing, and imposing political power on societies. The discussion and emphasis on the state as a "thing" rather than as a relational existence of "power" is a political preference, re-emerging in various periods of social transformation, especially during political restorations.¹⁹⁰ Consequently, the political sphere has been reduced to the concept of a far-reaching strong state, with the main actors being the political elites, while all other social classes and their effects on the transformation processes have been ignored.

This aim consists of methodological, social-theoretical, and historiographical spheres. Regarding methodology, SI's main problem is defining an economic and non-economic sphere division and attributing an imaginary absoluteness to this distinction. According to Kaya and Peker's critique of NIE's economic history, applicable to the

¹⁹⁰ Simultaneously, the emergence and rise of statist-institutionalism to neo-liberalism, which aims to "restrict state". If one pays attention, "bringing the state back in" is a call to read the social change over the lens of state analysis, and the conclusion of this call is re-defining the state as an "extra-economic (see Ch. II) minimal but more effective and powerful thing". See, John L. Campbell and Ove Kaj Pedersen, eds., *The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001).

general SI tradition, “*Wealth and Development*” and “*Mode of Production*” histories constitute two different tendencies in economic history. The NIE adherents of the Weberian tradition in *Wealth and Development* historiography¹⁹¹ read social formation with the division of "economic" and "non-economic" domains.

In this view, the non-economic domain includes geographic, religious, cultural, social conflict, and other elements, while the economic domain refers to production and distribution mechanisms. *The non-economic* domain constitutes the "ultimate causes" of growth and determines economic "proximate causes," such as short-term increases in input quantity and productivity.¹⁹² Following the neo-classical economic understanding, this division brings up the issue of "natural and artificial institutions." Accordingly, institutions arise from *artificial* non-economic domains such as governance, politics, and culture, which affect *natural institutions* like the *economic sphere and market*. As Kaya and Peker retrieve from North, these institutions form the "incentive structure" of a society, meaning their interaction, emerging into given political-economic relations, determines the existing social formation.

However, following the *Mode of Production* approaches, Kaya and Peker argue that economy and politics are not independent ontologies with homogeneous absoluteness in themselves, nor is there a superior relationship between them. Even if SI assumes "absolute opposition" and "inner homogeneity," perceptions about both domains—economy and politics—have an inevitable integrality. The "Political Marxism" tradition exemplifies the Mode of Production Approach, emphasizing this integrality. E. M. Wood, from this tradition, defines "Marx's radical innovation on bourgeois political economy" as revealing the social roots of the "mode of production" and "economy of laws."¹⁹³ Hereunder, modes of production are "social" phenomena rather than merely "economic" terms. For example, "money" or "goods" exist in other modes

¹⁹¹ Alp Yücel Kaya and Ali Onur Peker, “Yeni Kurumsal İktisat, İktisat Tarihini Nasıl Yazıyor? Eleştirel Bir Bakış,” *Praksis*, no. 54 (December 2020): 37.

¹⁹² Kaya and Peker, 41.

¹⁹³ Ellen Meiksins Wood, ed., “The Separation of the ‘Economic’ and the ‘Political’ in Capitalism,” in *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 24, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558344.002>.

of production but constitute "capital" only in a specific social formation called capitalism, and it is an abstract expression of a social contradiction between appropriator and producer. As such, "the social" denotes a given contradiction of a political agenda, which imposes itself as an economic consequence. *Wealth and Development* historiography constructs an ahistorical narrative by rejecting "the political" in the economic and vice versa, defining economics as an independent domain with transcendental pecuniary laws of its own. Economics has no authenticity without the given politics; it is an abstract expression of the given socio-political formation.

SI's illusion about the division (and the inopportune approximation effort in the form of "political economy") arises from the absolutization of the seizure of "the political" and "the economic" coercion power by the same group/individual in feudalism, contrary to capitalism. As Wood states, the "difference" in capitalism is a kind of division of labor among ruling classes. In capitalism, "economic mechanisms" such as private property and waged labor phenomena are already effective in surplus extraction, whereas, in feudalism, the same process relies on "traditional bonds and duties" enforced through "political, judicial, military" coercion.

However, the fact that newly emerged private property owners were not using "political" coercion *alone* does not mean they do not need "political" coercion. As Wood notes, this class has gained "unprecedented" power in regulating the production process and the direct seizure of surplus with the organization of "political" coercion according to its own principles. The capitalist state is a crystallized expression of this historical organization. Therefore, a capitalist transformation without state power was impossible. This means that the given form of a state reflects the ruler appropriator class's agenda.

On the social-theoretical side, this methodology generates a flawed social theory that confuses "extraction of surplus product" with "distribution of surplus," and consequently "social classes" with "social groups." In all SI branches, including NIE, the economic sphere consists solely of "intra-capital competition and conflict of interest," reducing it to "individual ownership efforts" or "competition of property

owners." Profit as the source of growth is the primary concern, while distribution and distribution-dependent issues are out of focus. This reduction leads to a misunderstanding of social struggle (and transformation) as merely intra-capital competition.

As Kaya and Peker underline, "although property rights are central to the analysis of NIE, it does not problematize the property relations due to its ideological focus on growth and thus capital."¹⁹⁴ SI's over-focused analysis of individual property ownership and competition between property owners, due to its absolutist approach, evaluates capital and labor as strictly independent and merely contractual exchange relationships. According to Marxist critique, this approach negates the "conflict dynamic" between classes, which is primarily based on the "practice of dispossession."¹⁹⁵ Distribution is narrated as a non-exploitative and contractual competition between two independent subjects. However, neither "individuals" present in the market as "equal actors" nor are market relations conflict-free: The ruling classes dominate the production process and continuously create policies to appropriate the surplus product from producers. Capital, as a relation, has been accumulated in this way.

There is a symbiotic relationship between capital and labor: In reality, capital owners dispossess the non-owners and economically and politically force them into production. This deviancy has reflected in social class and social group definitions. In Boratav's critique of Çağlar Keyder's "State and Classes in Turkey," this issue is elaborated in the context of the social theory of Ottoman-Turkish politics. According to Boratav, the SI tradition in Ottoman-Republican historiography mistakes the use of *social classes* and *social groups*, and Keyder's analysis maintains this mistake. While social classes historically form "dualities in the mode of production" and the seizure of surplus product (primary), social groups form in the redistribution of the surplus process (secondary).¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Kaya and Peker, 53.

¹⁹⁵ Kaya and Peker, 53-55.

¹⁹⁶ Boratav, "Book Review," 130-133.

For example, socially ruling *classes* refer to the community that dominates the economy (*rentiers*), and socially ruling *groups* are their intermediaries in the ruling circles, which *distribute* surplus flows through market mechanisms or the state (i.e., *bureaucrats* and *professionals*). Boratav argues that Keyder uses these terms interchangeably, leading to several problems. Confusing "ruling classes" and "public administrators" with each other creates a fictitious, monolithic, absolute distinction between social relations and obscures complex power relations. Power relations, determined by the ruling class, extend from top to bottom and encompass broad and intersectional issues. While the economically sovereign class from top to bottom constitutes power by seizing social surplus, the "changing balance of power" among sub-groups of the sovereign class effective in surplus distribution determines the form and content of political power.¹⁹⁷

Specifically, Keyder's and generally SI's analysis's "obsessive" focus on distribution relations without reference to production relations reflects Weberian socio-economy analysis. If handled this way, there cannot be any institution or actor other than the state and bureaucrat in Ottoman history. Accordingly, on the surface, a "*social group*" (which Keyder takes as "class") dominates relations of distribution from the 14th to the 20th century uninterruptedly, and an "almost eternal ruling class" determined the Ottoman polity. However, following Boratav's critique, both the ruling class and its social groups had transformed, sometimes overthrown, or restored in a changing political context, and completely different bodies constituted the beginning and the end.¹⁹⁸ In sum, the leading social-theoretical problem is the exclusion of production relations and taking the class as a "consumption-dependent" cultural variable while discussing the Ottoman state or the lack of discussing the Ottoman state as a relation of production.

In historiography, this methodology and social theory have confined Ottoman history to a *statist narrative*, focusing primarily on the *state as an institution*. This confinement leads us to perceive the state and state-oriented developments as central,

¹⁹⁷ Boratav, 134-135.

¹⁹⁸ Boratav, 135-137.

often considering the Ottoman state as strong, comprehensive, and absolute. Demet Dinler criticizes this thesis and identifies the roots of this distortion. She critiques the SI from Weberian roots to Modernization Theory and then the Institutionalist tradition that interprets history as a "history of absences" in comparison to the West.

Dinler argues that this historiography reads history through absolute dualities such as "state/bourgeoisie," "state/economic sphere," "state/society," and "center/periphery."¹⁹⁹ She begins with a critique of the comparative form between the West and the Ottoman Empire: SI historiography incessantly searches for Ottoman equivalents of Western *distribution relations* and their actors, constructing a narrative through the perceived absences on the Ottoman side. As Dinler, Kaya, Peker, and Boratav underline, the mode of production and social formation are not about who and *specifically how* surplus is confiscated but rather about the characteristics of the exploitation relationship in terms of production and confiscation of the surplus product.²⁰⁰

Accordingly, the West and the Ottoman examples are naturally different in the *form of exploitation*, but this does not result in a "fundamental" difference between the polities: Central or local, there was a coercion-based confiscation relationship in essence. Dinler critiques the notions of stagnancy, omnipotence, and a "single line" view, suggesting a perspective shift towards understanding different state policies in different historical cross-sections. She critiques the absolute division of "rulers and ruled" as necessary for this narrative and emphasizes the relational constitution of political power.²⁰¹

Contrary to the mainstream narrative, Dinler suggests focusing on the inclusion strategies of rulers and the "bottom-up" effect in the political center. Political power is significantly about the power of source distribution, inclusion, and leveraging local dynamics. Even if the Ottoman ruling class's power did not lie in popular support,

¹⁹⁹ Dinler, "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi," 18.

²⁰⁰ Dinler, 21-22.

²⁰¹ Dinler, 22.

excluded-from-power classes and groups could still limit it. In this context, the changing Ottoman ruling classes sought inclusion strategies.

Thirdly, Dinler problematizes the claim of "homogeneity" within the Ottoman political structure.²⁰² She highlights regional differences and questions the periphery's "absolute" commitment to the center, framing this as a "relationality" question rather than an "autonomy" problem. She discusses the changing political relationships between centric and non-centric powers, indicating that a period's non-centric group could become a centric power in another period's formation. Not all non-centric groups were directly related to the "search for autonomy," as suggested by SI, but "*kapılanma*"²⁰³ or "segregation" was about the given political-economic *zeitgeist*.

Dinler links all three issues to the "history of absence" understanding inherent in the SI tradition, which claims that no "social contract" emerged from "civil society" and that a tyrannical state dominated all aspects of society and economy.²⁰⁴ According to this view, in the "patrimonialism trap," capitalist accumulation became impossible because power and property were entirely seized by the state. SI argues that the "periphery" was politically mobilized, effective, and decisive in the West, leading to the birth of modernization and capitalism from this "civil contract." Even though the Western state supported the bourgeoisie with mercantilist policies, the Ottoman Empire did not experience this kind of agreement and process. This approach, aside from the "reality" of this "democratic" Western "utopia," constructs an imaginary and composite West rather than writing Ottoman history. While underlining the sui generis character of the Ottoman polity, SI's emphasis is not on the Ottoman's own dynamics but on the Western model, effectively ignoring the Ottoman past from a self-orientalist/Eurocentric, culturalist perspective.

²⁰² Dinler.

²⁰³ "*Kapılanmak*" (related to the "gate" word in English), the meaning of "entering the service of a powerful social circle, a household," was a highly important concept of Ottoman politics. The Ottoman center, usually called "the Sublime Porte" (*Bâb-ı Âli*), means "royal gate" refers to the state. Also, local powers had named with the "gate" metaphor, i.e. "paşa kapısı" (pasha household). With this concept, the Ottomans expressed a political metaphor for establishing a political connection with this circle or seizure of posts within the given power formation.

²⁰⁴ Dinler, 23.

Against this narrative, Dinler echoes E. M. Wood's argument that "the state versus civil society is a capitalist ideological enforcement" and emphasizes that capitalism was born from class struggles, not from a reconciliation of a so-called social contract.²⁰⁵ She specifically refers to the role of the state as part of property relations, particularly in the transition to the capitalist process, asserting that it is not a "distinctive" concept. From these perspectives, Ottoman historiography is "possible" in itself, allowing for a genuine comparative analysis.

SI's stereotypical transformation and revolution model prevents understanding the Ottoman polity's dynamic political evolution process and falls short of explaining the dynamics of Ottoman change. As discussed in Chapter II, the concept of "change" in SI has been equated with institutional change, specifically the transformation of the state. The domain of politics is highly conflated with the state, and politics is narrowed to "state affairs" in SI. Thus, the transformation of the state in SI is seen as an *internal issue* of "the institution of politics" or the *state mechanism*, meaning the same thing. In this sense, only state elites from different branches of the state apparatus engage in and conduct this process.

According to SI, in cases where state elites, especially the sultan, are deemed "inadequate" in the change process due to reasons like conservative political culture, the state faces a threat of decline and dissolution. Social movements are viewed as incidental, reactionary, and inconclusive extremisms or are associated with dissident state elites. Rioting people are seen as lacking complex political-economic motivation and having only ideological/cultural inconsistencies with the state or momentary discontent, such as dismissal from the army, deprivation of state resources, or acts of revenge.

For instance, in her well-known "Bandits and Bureaucrats," Weberian Karen Barkey absolutely distinguishes between Ottoman peasants and bandits, trying to detect differences between banditry as a *specific* socio-cultural identity or occupation and (for her, *unbeing*) peasant politics. Barkey imposes an incidental meaning by redefining banditry as a non-peasant (and non-artisan) category. Otherwise, the

²⁰⁵ Dinler.

Ottoman lower classes, including peasants and artisans, are defined as culturally engaged in state ideology, stagnant, chronic, and constituting a multicultural "mass" in front of the state and the "bureaucratic class." At most, they can be seen as "exceptions" like banditry according to Barkey's narrative, predictably denying revolutions and dependent change dynamics.

Önder Uçar's article, which criticizes this "history of absences" regarding the late Ottoman transformation, can be generalized to all political transformation historiography. As Uçar identifies, revolutions have been reduced to a "single moment" in this literature, and the absence of "single moment(s)" is interpreted as the absence of revolutions.²⁰⁶

According to Uçar, revolutions are *processes* that encompass the intersection of multiple political-economic vectors. He incisively borrows Tilly's distinction between "revolutionary process" and "revolutionary situation": While *revolutionary processes* create multiple foci of political power, *revolutionary situations* are born out of these processes and involve the confrontations of these foci and shifts in power. These confrontations could last for years, or the processes may not lead to any "direct" confrontation and could be absorbed by the ruling class, not causing a direct overthrow of the existing class but a "forced transformation" due to changing power relations. From the late 18th century to the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire witnessed a revolutionary process and *more than one* revolutionary situation that concluded with serious changes in power relations.²⁰⁷ By the mid-19th century, the Ottoman polity was

²⁰⁶ Önder Uçar, "Türkiye'de Tarih yazımı ve Burjuva Devrimleri: Bazı Gereksiz Kıstaslar," *Tarih ve Toplum - Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 16 (2013): 148.

²⁰⁷ In those years, the process of liquidation of *the Second Empire* or *Republican Order* (nearly in between *the early-17th and late-18th centuries*) with its subjects, institutions and relations had taken place and also the establishment of *the New Order*: 1789 – 1808 Period, specifically after the Establishment of *Nizam-ı Cedid Agenda* in 1792, constitutes the first peak point with serious political struggles in between the two transitive parties called *the Bureaucratic Reformists* and *the Republicans*. Political events, including the Edirne Incident (1806), the British Operation to Istanbul and the Kabakçı Mustafa Rebellion (1807), the Overthrown of the Mustafa IV and the Enthronement of Mahmud II (1808), and the Alemdar Incident (1808) constitutes the first peak of the struggle. Then in the second peak of the process included the disbandment of Janissaries and dependent socio-economic network with the so-called "Auspicious" Incident (1826), the Competition and Civil War with Egypt (mostly in the 1830s), and finalized with the Edict of Gülhane in 1839. In the end, the Imperial Household that reunified the political power under the banner of a "modern state" got rid of the "still dead" feudal political-economic relations and started to be market-oriented, bureaucratic (*means politically*

on the path to becoming a rule-based bureaucratic polity, in line with the agenda of the victorious property owners' *bureaucratic reformist party*.

Secondly, Uçar criticizes the reductionist view that sees revolution only as a radical social movement.²⁰⁸ He notes that radicalization occurs within the process, and the limited nature of demands and actions cannot disqualify a process as a revolution. "Destructiveness" may also be part of the process: Despite numerous revolutionary situations in the Empire, these were usually the results of accumulated contradictions. In the 1789-1839 period, significant reckonings (e.g., Kabakçı Mustafa Rebellion) and reconciliations (e.g., the "1808-1826 Truce" between two parties) occurred. However, the transformation lasted nearly fifty years, marked by shifts in the balance of power between the parties.

Thirdly, Uçar points out the insignificance of "professional affiliation" in determining radicalism; what matters is political action.²⁰⁹ The transitions between roles were frequent, and professional affiliation did not inherently determine radicalism. SI's quest for a clichéd and Eurocentric "bureaucracy versus bourgeoisie" opposition and the dependent transformation model based on "absolutism versus liberalism" is a myth, according to Uçar. Such definitions confuse social groups and classes, attribute a culturalist essence to affiliations, and ignore transitions. For example, *âyâns*, an important *social group* in provincial areas, continuously changed sides in the 17th-18th centuries' conjuncture to protect their social class positions. Depending on the political situation, *âyâns* took *bureaucratic reformist* or *republican* positions to safeguard their property rights and position within the ruling class, forming various

depersonalized), and the path of institutionalization polity. For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 3.4.

²⁰⁸ Uçar, 152ff.

²⁰⁹ Uçar, 156-157. Uçar's "professional affiliation" definition is a bit unclear in the meaning of the mentioned point of Boratav. Hereunder, Uçar may intend to interpret Boratav's "social group" concept in terms of the position in the given redistribution relations. Being a bureaucrat or artisan may not mean belonging to a "social class". As a broader and relational concept, social classes have expressed themselves as producers or rentiers by the distance to ownership of means of production. As they move up in redistribution relationships, rentierism increases, and eventually, they become the owner of the means of production with the effect of capital accumulation. However, Uçar notes that "professional affiliation" does not directly refer to ownership status.

relationships with different social groups in urban and rural areas. This group sometimes radicalized to protect or elevate their class position, as in the case of the *Yaran* (*assembly of âyâns*) of Russe/Rusçuk's political intervention in Istanbul under the leadership of Alemdar Mustafa in 1808.

Fourthly, Uçar underlines that class consciousness is the result of revolutions, not the cause.²¹⁰ In contrast to the SI perspective, the formation of the bourgeoisie or labor class in contemporary terms occurred through the process, not before political action. For instance, the term "bourgeois revolution" can be *post-naming* point to a transformative process that led to the formation of the bourgeois class and their social order with specific principles. Additionally, it is not necessary for the bourgeoisie to directly rule or significantly increase their power immediately after a revolutionary condition. This over-empiricist interpretation reduces revolutions to a singular moment and attributes an overly idealist/culturalist essence to social existences, neglecting the sociological origins of political consciousness.

For example, there is a strong link between the *esnafization*²¹¹ of the janissaries and their support for anti-Imperial Household parties. Janissaries had access to vast resources when they were members of the ruling class as an elite military group. As the Ottoman ruling class changed, the Janissary Hearth (*Yeniçeri Ocağı*) transformed and lost its military significance, driving its members to various occupations, such as artisanship, thus becoming producers and merchants. Consequently, janissaries became a popular class and advocated for the interests of the producer classes, with the Hearth becoming a focal point for opposing ruling class policies, popular protests, and rebellions.

Fifth, Uçar challenges the mainstream claim that the "absence of anti-statism" in the Empire implies no revolution.²¹² He argues that revolutions do not aim to "destroy the state" but rather to "rescue the state." States often collapse before revolutions, not by

²¹⁰ Uçar, 159-160.

²¹¹ Cemal Kafadar, "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman İstanbul: Rebels without a Cause," *International Journal of Turkish Studies: IJTS* 13 (2007): 113–34.

²¹² Uçar, 162.

or after them. Revolutionary agendas emerge as "exit" projects. Using state power was a practical means of *political accumulation*, especially under pre-capitalism conditions, involving "surplus extraction by extra-economic or politico-legal compulsion." Drawing from Heide Gerstenberger, Uçar notes that states have a *capacity for integration*; when inclusiveness and surplus allocation weaken, state power is destabilized.²¹³ Revolutionary agendas thus propose new integration policies and bear a re-establishment claim.

Indeed, the Ottoman polity reached this point several times, including the early 19th century. Following Tezcan's "Second Empire" ascription, the Ottoman polity from the early 19th century should be defined as *the Third Empire*, with its new class dynamics and integration strategies. The most distinctive and crucial aspect of the Third Empire was its *capitalistic features*, which recognized capital owner classes and facilitated capital accumulation, driven by the global revolutionary conjuncture and the strengthened dynamics of capital owner groups from the Second Empire. Uçar emphasizes that the state formation process aided the transition to capitalism by "creating new positions in itself and paving the way for capital accumulation with specific policies" to facilitate "surplus-value transfers and increase the capacity for integration."²¹⁴

Uçar lists these policies as "standardization; integration of peasants to market with incentives, private property, and high prices; legitimization of capitalism in political thought, i.e., interest and profit issues; depersonalization; evaluating economics and politics as separate from each other; and ideological configurations for creating a bourgeoisie". These features, excluding the last one, emerged in the late-18th and early-19th century Ottoman polity. They were imposed on the ruling class through internal and external class struggles, culminating in the transformation of the state. Uçar notes that this development aligns with Colin Mooers' observation that such measures were typically carried out *by states, not despite them*, with the exception of the English example.

²¹³ Uçar, 165.

²¹⁴ Uçar, 169.

As a sixth critique, Uçar problematizes the "degree of revolutionism" of the masses for this kind of transformation.²¹⁵ In the SI historiography, as exemplified by Barkey and mentioned in Chapter II, the argument is that the Ottoman masses were strongly bound to classical monarchy culture and ideology, making them less revolutionary compared to the European lower classes. To support this claim, SI's main method is *discourse analysis*. Accordingly, mainstream historiography often refers to the masses' traditionalist discourse in political processes to prove Ottoman society's conservativeness or non-revolutionism.

However, as Uçar expresses, *discourse* does not diminish the characteristics of a revolution and does not directly reveal the political purpose. Essentially, Uçar's approach indicates the difference between *popular politics* and *popular ideology*: popular politics is directly linked to people's analysis, critique, program, and action against the given circumstances, while popular ideology refers to a mobilizing discursive expression type. SI's culturalist view tends to ignore the difference or precise nesting between them and frequently dwells on popular ideology. Additionally, this approach treats popular ideology as a *pure ideal category* disconnected from material conditions. At this point, Uçar applies George Rude's definitions of the formation of popular ideology.²¹⁶ According to Rude, popular ideology takes *inherent* and *derived* forms. While the inherent form refers to traditionally obtained experiences and memory, derived forms include contemporary political critique and the production of new political concepts. These two are strongly linked: the mass derives current political concepts formed in given conditions while also reproducing the traditional in the contemporary for its discursive power. Indeed, especially in "pre-modern" politics, traditionalism was the strongest ideology, and contemporary derivations frequently referenced tradition. However, these references eventually become strong ideological tools.

Society's ideological reference to tradition cannot be directly linked to "political conservativeness"; what matters in political analysis is the political action itself, the

²¹⁵ Uçar, 174-176.

²¹⁶ Uçar, 173-174.

essence of political demands, and the political conclusion. For instance, aside from the lower classes, even the ruling class discourse in the Selim III and Mahmud II periods referenced tradition to control rising popular politics. Interestingly, all parties embraced and referenced the same tradition.

Lastly, Uçar criticizes the mainstream historiography's argument about the revolutions' character, which suggests that revolutions cannot be defined as such if they did not generate *liberal democracies* characterized by popular political participation, elections, etc.²¹⁷ In this context, Uçar underlines two points:

First, he reminds us that democracy is not inherently a "bourgeois" concept. On the contrary, this kind of democracy emerged in contravention of the bourgeoisie after a long-term historical struggle. Of course, Ottoman capitalism and its "liberal democratic" transformation constituted a process with phases. For instance, the period covered here should be considered a struggle to liquidate the *Second Empire* relations. By the end of the Mahmud II era, nearly all socio-economic relations and classes of the *Second Empire* had been eliminated, setting the stage for re-organization in the following era. In other words, the Tanzimat, as the *second phase* of the *Third Empire*, owed its "legal-rational-bureaucratic" reorganization to the fifty-year liquidations of the Selim III – Mahmud II era. The *third phase* of the Third Empire, under Abdülhamid II, witnessed struggles for "constitutional monarchy," already born into Tanzimat's constitutionalist pursuits. From this aspect, it did not represent a "conservativeness/traditionalist *analepsis*" but a modern "checks-and-balances" dispute on the form of the Empire's constitutional monarchy – the constitution or the monarch? This chronology can be extended forward to the Republican Era. As can be seen, Ottoman capitalism and its "democracy" gradually transformed through these historical processes; like other examples globally, each era created new political possibilities, and Ottoman-Republican capitalism and "democracy" developed in the form of "one step forward, two steps back."

As a related point, Uçar also criticizes the mainstream argument that equates democracy with the existence of the bourgeoisie, a view systematized Barrington

²¹⁷ Uçar, 176.

Moore Jr. According to this view, democracy emerges after the defeat of the aristocratic landowner class by an urban bourgeoisie.²¹⁸ However, Uçar reminds us that if there is a "democracy," its determinant should be popular participation and decision-making. Historically, this basic "democratic" feature is not essential to bourgeois revolutions. Conversely, this feature had to be added due to strong popular pressure after the revolution. The "level of democracy" in terms of popular participation in such "early democracies" is also disputable. This kind of "popular electoral democracy" emerged globally much later than the bourgeois revolutions. The Ottoman example, where this kind of "democracy" developed much later than the beginning of the bourgeois revolution process, is not an exception but nearly dovetails with the global pattern. However, mainstream Ottoman historiography compares the Ottoman transformation process with the European example and writes a "history of absences."

For instance, France is often cited in mainstream historiography, but even France does not meet the "ideal" criteria in reality: besides their "liberal democratic" level, the first "popular" elections in France took place in 1848, fifty-nine years after the Revolution, and the second one was only realized in 1873 due to Napoleon III's "re-issuance" of the emperorship from 1852 to 1870. Another example is the first German federal election for the Frankfurt National Assembly, held in 1848, with the whole parliament disbanded in 1849. The second election took place in 1867. However, Germany's complex bourgeois transformation process dates back to changes in the 18th century and the global effects of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Noteworthy here is that "popular elections" could only happen after the Revolutions of 1848, when popular classes ravaged the whole of Europe, not "immediately after" the bourgeois revolution. Furthermore, the statement "immediately after" is quite wrong in examining a historical *process*.

In sum, statist-institutionalism is a theoretically *far-fetched* and empirically *impracticable* model: in theory and practice, economy and politics are not two

²¹⁸ Uçar also refers to the difference in SI tradition: As an early SI theorist, Moore Jr.'s argument has been rejected by late members of the tradition and points to Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens' argument, see pp. 176.

independent domains that can be either near, as NIE claims, or far, as Classical Weberianism argues. This approach makes a mistake by using the connotations of "economy" and "economics" interchangeably. The SI tradition correctly claims that human relations cannot be understood solely through economic transactions and treated as the technical/mechanical relationality of these transactions, as *economics* does.²¹⁹ However, subsistence and livelihood issues, dependent production, and distribution contradictions are directly political and historically determining issues from the emergence of humanity, as the concept of *economy* explains. First and foremost, Marxists refer to the *economy* while generating and referring to economic concepts,²²⁰ but some experts may focus on the economics of the economy. In that sense, politics and economy are intertwined without further specifications.

Due to this distinction, politics becomes only about cultural, ideological, and sociological fetishisms and the ahistorically discrete ontology of state and political parties. However, all of them have relationally embedded concepts. For instance, culture has an economy, and the economy continuously affects culture. At the end of the day, politics (and also the economy) cannot be narrowed down to disjunctive areas. As a direct conclusion, the SI tradition ceaselessly forces these ahistorical separations by defining the state as an independent actor.

Empirically, societies, including the Ottomans, do not consist of constant divisions, and cannot be understood through "continuously stressed" relations. There is no specific "border" between state and society, but rather a perpetual struggle for political

²¹⁹ In that sense, NIE's presupposition of divergence in politics and economics and attempt to bring them together in the form of "political economy" is "stillborn".

²²⁰ The imputation of "economism" or "economist degradation" to Marxist approaches is a cliched refutation, especially by marginalist and culturalist traditions, which also see politics and economics as different domains. Marx himself faced this kind of criticism and was occasionally confronted with it. However, Marx's most explicit opposition to economism has found its crystal clear explanation in his critique of "Ricardian socialism" as this kind of abstract economist approach, see Simon Clarke, *Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991), 96ff, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21808-0> In pp. 97, Clarke states that "Thus Marx does not provide an external socio-historical critique of political economy, which leaves intact the field of the 'economy' as the object of analysis, alongside 'society' and 'history', for the 'economy', the world of quantitative relations between things, can only be understood as the alienated social form of the reproduction of social relations of production. Marx's critique of political economy does not create a space for a Marxist political economy since political economy can never do more than describe the alienated forms of social existence."

power and hegemony between social classes. More clearly, a "neutral" mechanism called the state does not exist, nor do social groups struggle to seize this neutral mechanism, which is impossible. The above discussion shows that establishing hegemony over society through political-economic coercion is a model closer to reality. Social realms are relational complexities that cannot be explained by such simplification.

Additionally, the structured political formula and "ideal" judicial order of the Ottoman upper classes, as in other polities, aimed to establish a "controllable" social formation, and this understanding has been continuously imposed by force and reproduced discursively. Accordingly, the Ottoman ruling classes sought to consolidate power in the central body and fully exclude and suspend others politically; the eras of consolidation under risk have been seen as "anomalies" since the Ottoman norm is that power consolidation lies in a strict state-society division. Attila Aytekin defines this historiographical fallacy as "legal formalism." While Aytekin discusses the 1858 Land Code's formalist readings, he underlines the concept as "they assume that legal fictions correspond to social reality."²²¹ The critique of legal formalism can be used in this context and in all Ottoman historiography since it is an "intrinsic" fallacy in the Classical tradition that points to a problematic relation with the empirical domain.

Indeed, social theorists and historians from the SI tradition mostly rely on this state discourse and take it as historical reality due to their hyper-focus on the state. Against the legal formalist reading, official records do not constitute reality; more than that, they show the ruling classes' "ideal" society design and political prospects. The Ottoman state's ever-changing character would be seen more easily in a historiographical relationship with the empirical domain. In this context, the sharp distinction between state and society as political discourse was a political program of the Ottoman ruling class. As will be discussed, even though the ruling classes expected that, the Ottoman class formations were always too complex relationally from the bottom-up to allow a sharp distinction. In fact, this is a universal status. The real "distinction" was between classes.

²²¹ E. Attila Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (2009): 936.

Regarding the last point, SI's methodological absoluteness on the state's ontology prevents a comprehensive understanding of the Ottoman classes' and groups' ever-changing, intertwined, and complex relational social structure. First of all, classes are also relations and cannot be evaluated as non-relational, *sui generis* "black boxes" like SI's state theory. Inter-class and intra-class struggle continuously change the formation of political power, sometimes affecting the whole class or just a part of it. Secondly, SI, as a simplification, makes a fundamental mistake by using class and group concepts interchangeably and attributing a continuity image by focusing on the group's cultural features. More clearly, this kind of social theory is blind to the difference between discourse/ideology and political agenda. Cultural, ideological, or discursive appearances and claims do not provide information about the political-economic strategy but rather mask it to establish mass hegemony. Claims such as classlessness, state-centrism, stagnancy, non-revolution, etc., enter the historiographical agenda because of the mainstream tradition's predominantly state-centric discourse analysis methodology.

Even though they are relational efforts, as can be seen, these theses still lack a defined historical-sociological model for Ottoman historiography. It is evident that this kind of model may provide a solid foundation and clarify the path forward. The following sections of this chapter focus on this subject by reassessing the existing relational studies and suggesting a Strategic-Relational Model.

3.3. Towards a Relational Model: The Literature and Strategic-Relational Approach

When the issue is "sending the state back in," the main problematic conception in this discussion is state power. The critical question is, "Does the state have an existence independent of human influence?"²²² Undoubtedly, the state does not possess this kind of transcendental nature. The state as an institution cannot have its own mind or agenda

²²² It would be unfair to say that SI is not asking this question. For instance, in response to relationality challenge, the question posed by Joel Migdal and Peter Evans, which problematizes the lack of *dialectic* relationality in SI approach, is apt. However, their answers are inevitably flawed due to the foundational principles of particularist Weberian social theory. At its core, this is a social theoretical crisis rooted in a vague understanding of society's influence on social processes. See Chapter 2.

without a group of people behind it. Thus, the state is fundamentally about human relationships—a consequence of social relations. It cannot gain an ontology independent of these social relations; if social relations were to cease, the state would cease as well. This underscores that the primary focus should be on social formation or, more concretely, the organization of society.

On the other hand, there remains the concept of "state power," which suggests the state's relative autonomy. Soviet legal scholar Evgeny B. Pashukanis posed the question, "Why does class rule not remain what it is, the factual subjugation of one section of the population by another?" He concluded that emphasizing state power without class domination is an "ideological smoke-screen" of the ruling class.²²³ Furthermore, the concept of state power is a "juridical interpretation" of what was once "theological." Whether theological or juridical, the "divine raison d'état" provides a false unifying image to society and reduces class-based "hazards" for sovereigns. In reality, society maintains its class structure, and changes in this structure are decisive in politics. The state, therefore, is just an ideological fiction that mediates political-economic coercion. However, as discussed, Weberianism and Weberian-oriented approaches have mystified the state unfairly, attributing it a transcendental ontology. Overemphasis on the state may be related to the dominant state ideology in Germany and later the neo-liberal state theory, which aimed to reconstruct the state as "minimal" but "strong."

Locating the logic of social change around a *sui generis* state and an ontologically independent society (whether near or far) exacerbates this crisis. Therefore, the coercion of this artificial distinction must be abandoned. To move forward, middle and near-term Marxist debates on social theory, state-society relations, and class analysis offer sufficient methodological tools. As the central social-theoretical claim of this study suggests, the methodological focus should be on writing the history of the Ottoman *polity*, not just the Ottoman *state*. There are already studies that approach this understanding. These studies should undoubtedly serve as cornerstones for developing a well-defined relational model.

²²³ Evgenii Bronislavovich Pashukanis, *The General Theory of Law & Marxism* (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 139–40.

3.3.1. The Relational Reassessments on the Ottoman History

One of the first and most comprehensive steps towards a relational approach to the state came from John Haldon and Halil Berktaý. In the 1992 book "New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History," John Haldon brought the Marxist debate on the autonomy of the state into the Ottoman context, revealing different approaches beyond the statist-institutionalist narrative. Although he concluded with a "relative autonomist" stance, the crucial point is his correct preference to initiate a class discussion by redefining the state.²²⁴ In the same book, Berktaý identifies three main issues in the existing literature: "nationalism, state-fetishism, and document fetishism." He explores the conjunctural causes behind state-fetishism within the historiography's formation process.²²⁵ Berktaý's primary concern is "de-fetishizing" the state through comparative historiographical analysis. He focuses on feudalism as a matter of comparison, conceptualizes the "central feudalism" approach, and concludes that the secondary condition of the "who is the extractor?" question is pivotal in this discussion.

Beyond Haldon's and Berktaý's theoretical and historiographical claims, it can be argued that this argumentation was first deepened in a historical sense with Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj's studies. He enabled this kind of relational historiography for the Ottoman realm with his trailblazing work, "Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries." In the book, Abou-El-Haj begins with a critique of the particularistic methodology and continuity thesis that had become mainstream in Ottoman studies. He then criticizes the lack of discussion on the formation of the state, society, and politics within Ottoman studies. Subsequently, he suggests four models to initiate this discussion:

Anyone studying the early modern European state should consider at the very least the following alternative approaches. (1) The state is class-based and functions to all intents and purposes as an extension of the ruling class; (2) The state is class-based

²²⁴ John Haldon, "The Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy: Comparative Perspectives," in *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, ed. Halil Berktaý and Suraiya Faroqhi, 1st ed. (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1992), 18–108.

²²⁵ Halil Berktaý, "The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography," in *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, ed. Halil Berktaý and Suraiya Faroqhi, 1st ed. (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1992), 109–84.

but autonomous; that is, while it represents the interests of the ruling class as a whole, the interests of subsections within the ruling class may be sacrificed 'for the good of society,' and left with no alternative but to comply; (3) The state is part of the ruling class, but for its own advantage forges alliances with local or regional elites; (4) The state is autonomous and not based upon any particular class; to the contrary, the officials serving the state perceive themselves as transcending class divisions in the area they govern.²²⁶

Abou-El-Haj's study focuses on analyzing the relationship between the state and social classes to understand the Ottoman transformation. He attributes central importance to the 17th century as the period when significant changes began. Although he does not use the term "decline" and actively confronts it, Abou-El-Haj perceives the transformation from the timar to the malikane regime as a loss of control in production relations and an inevitable dissolution.²²⁷

In his model, the crisis of the Ottoman Empire in this century stemmed from the ruling elite's interventions in the pre-17th century surplus extraction regime, which was based on the direct taxation of the reâyâ (peasants). Additionally, the abandonment of the "liva kanunnameleri," which regulated the provincial order, marked another turning point. The ruling elite aimed to "increase surplus product and resources," as Abou-El-Haj suggests. These actions led to a decrease in the centralization level achieved in the 15th and 16th centuries. As he underlines, "the Ottoman subjects did not remain passive spectators of the struggle for revenue collection"²²⁸; rather, the increasing tax burden became a reason for uprisings, especially among the peasantry. Rightly so, these actions of social conflict were also effective in the formation of a new social order.

Abou-El-Haj also investigates "nasihatname literature" as admonitions to the Sultans, detecting their character as reflecting intra-class conflict between proponents of the Old Regime and the New.²²⁹ The Old Regime supporters, who benefited from the

²²⁶ Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, 2nd Edition (1991; repr., Syracuse (N. Y.): Syracuse University Press, 2005), 6–7.

²²⁷ Abou-El-Haj, 16-18.

²²⁸ Abou-El-Haj, 14.

²²⁹ Abou-El-Haj, 23-58.

previous system, identified this transformation as a process of "corruption." Abou-El-Haj suggests that this conflict should be seen as the rise of "grandee politics" extending to the provinces.²³⁰ These politics were centered around "vizier and pasha households" that increased in the 17th and 18th centuries.²³¹ His follower, Baki Tezcan, took this analysis further by explaining this process as a "proto-democratization."²³² According to Tezcan, power foci, including âyâns (local notables), began to limit the sultanic authority and share political power, marking a significant departure from the previous "patrimonialist" order. He argues that the Ottoman Empire transitioned to "the Second Empire" in the 17th century. This approach is not a directly class-based analysis but offers a different perspective against Classical historiography.

Tezcan's non-Marxist but relational approach has inspired further studies, particularly those focusing on the capitalist transformation and modern state formation. Fatma Eda Çelik's Marxist analysis traces the transformation of the Ottoman administrative system from its establishment in the 14th century to the Early Republican Period, referencing Gerstenberger's analysis.²³³ Çelik defines a "Third Empire" emerging in the late-18th century²³⁴, identifying a feudal crisis in the Second Empire during the fourth quarter of the 18th century as the birthplace of this new formation. This crisis concluded with the resolution of the malikane system, which strengthened vizier-pasha households and initiated long-term class struggles between 1793-1826.²³⁵

In the transition to capitalism, this resolution led to property-sharing challenges between Istanbul-centered pasha-vizier households and local âyâns. Mahmud II's

²³⁰ Abou-El-Haj, 45-46.

²³¹ Abou-El-Haj, 56-57. For another analysis of him, see Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 94, no. 4 (1974): 438-47, <https://doi.org/10.2307/600586>.

²³² Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10, 13.

²³³ Fatma Eda Çelik, *Kişisel İktidardan Millet Meclisine Saltanattan Cumhuriyete* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2022).

²³⁴ Çelik, 219-316.

²³⁵ Çelik, 248ff.

reforms aimed to liquidate âyâns and consolidate power within the households, focusing on creating a modern, public, autonomous state.²³⁶ These state-making efforts were oriented towards unification and control over surplus and capital accumulation, transforming the property regime from actual private property to a de jure one, accompanied by harsh marketization.²³⁷

Similarly, according to Çağdaş Sümer, the New Order that formed in the early-19th century emerged as a response to a geopolitical accumulation crisis in the Second Empire. This crisis was characterized by the centralization of power among vizier-pasha households ("grandee politics") and its expansion to the politics of local notables by âyân households.²³⁸ Sümer qualifies the period between 1768 and 1839 as a "civil war" between these power-holders.²³⁹ He explains this political turbulence, referencing Gramsci, as a "passive revolution" that concluded with the Tanzimat Reforms, laying the foundations for a new regime.²⁴⁰

Taking this analysis one step further, Alp Yücel Kaya, using E. P. Thompson's definition of bourgeois revolution, discusses the same processes that began in the late-18th century as a phase of long-term bourgeois revolution.²⁴¹ He views the formation of grandee and local notable politics as "embourgeoisement," emphasizing çiftlikization, which represents the privatization of production relations and the expansion of commodity production.

Attila Aytekin shares a similar position to these scholars regarding changing production relations.²⁴² Aytekin analyzes both rural and urban dynamics. In rural

²³⁶ Çelik, 275ff.

²³⁷ Çelik, 288-301.

²³⁸ Çağdaş Sümer, *Düzenini Arayan Osmanlı: Eski Rejimden Meşrutiyet'e Osmanlı'da Siyasal Çatışma ve Rejimler*, Birinci Basım, Yordam kitap 440 (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2023), 72ff, 113–25.

²³⁹ Sümer, 113ff.

²⁴⁰ Sümer, 178ff.

²⁴¹ Alp Yücel Kaya, "Bourgeois Revolution in Turkey (1908-1923)," *Revolutionary Marxism: A Journal of Theory and Politics*, 2023, 57–65.

²⁴² Erden Attila Aytekin, "Son Dönem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 1703-1908: Kapitalistleşme ve Merkezileşme Kavşağında," in *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atılğan,

areas, he prioritizes the transformative effect of malikanization, which caused a network of subcontracting from the center to the local, representing interlocking economic interests and culminating in political associations around different agendas. In urban areas, he focuses on the janissary-craftsmen alliance protecting the traditional guild system, such as the "gedik" practice. However, the privatization of production relations inevitably spread to urban production in the form of free market applications, leading to political conflict. Both rural and urban lower classes resisted these policies, impacting state-formation processes. According to Aytekin, during the long process of Ottoman capitalization, these struggles constituted important political milestones, such as the liquidation of the janissary corps as the armed forces of the Ancien Régime.

As can be seen, a relational literature for the transformation of state-society relations has emerged with the efforts of the Marxist/materialist circle. However, even though they subject the lower classes, these analyses still do not fully explain the lower class's impact on political transformation. Besides focusing on the state and upper classes, lower-class uprisings are often discussed at the level of "reaction" rather than as political actions that affected political formation. While the analyses strengthen the "state and market" sides of the trilemma, the "producers" side remains insufficiently addressed. Therefore, this narrative should be integrated with the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) model, enabling a tripartite analysis that includes the role of producers in shaping political transformations.

3.3.2. SRA I – The Model: Theoretical Background

This growing literature reveals the need to break the SI's vicious cycle with an approach that is i) de-mystified/non-ideological, ii) relational, and iii) society-oriented to redefine the Ottoman polity. Marxist debates on the state and approaches to state-society relations seem to provide these three essential elements.

A relational approach to state analysis first crystallized with Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's "extended/integral" state definition, which challenged state-centered

Cenk Saraçoğlu, and Ateş Uslu (Yordam Kitap, 2015), 39–87, <https://open.metu.edu.tr/handle/11511/86561>.

historical analysis. Gramsci referred to the “dialectical nexus (unity-distinction) between state and civil society,”²⁴³ emphasizing two main points: the mutual relationship between economy and politics and the relations and overlaps between "political" and "civil society." Due to strong reciprocal determination and overlapping, these distinctions are "methodological but not organic"; civil and political societies are mostly the same thing.²⁴⁴

In this context, the state is an expression of the economic domain (and vice versa, the political domain) but is "fetishized" as if it represented non-economic values. Gramsci's main intention with this approach is to "de-fetishize" the state²⁴⁵ by revealing the dialectical webs of societies and the deterministic role of social struggles in transforming formations. His analysis opposes views on social transformation that read them as a conclusion of specific social groups' desire and push for change. A critical Gramsci expert, Martin Carnoy, notes that the state is more than a coercive apparatus of a class; broader than that, the state refers to the "hegemony" of a class over others²⁴⁶, resulting from continuous class struggles.

Greek Marxist theoretician Nicos Poulantzas advanced Gramsci's initial systematic attempt to overcome the vulgar distinction between state and society. Poulantzas defines the state as neither an instrument nor a subject but as *a social relation*. In his 1978 work "*State, Power, Socialism*," he explains state formation as follows: "the State, too, is a specific material condensation of a given relationship of forces, which is itself a class relation."²⁴⁷ For Poulantzas, the state is not an "intrinsic entity"; it is a relationship, "like capital."²⁴⁸ “Condensation” refers to the temporal

²⁴³ Guido Liguori, *Gramsci's Pathways*, Historical Materialism Book Series, Volume 102 (Leiden;Boston: Brill, 2015), 1.

²⁴⁴ Liguori, 1-4.

²⁴⁵ Carlos Nelson Coutinho, *Gramsci's Political Thought*, trans. Pedro Sette-Camara, Historical Materialism Book Series, Volume 38 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012), 79.

²⁴⁶ Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984), 66.

²⁴⁷ Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, Verso Classics Edition, Verso Classics 29 (1978; repr., London: Verso Books, 2000), 73.

²⁴⁸ Poulantzas, 178–79.

institutionalization of a given “unstable equilibrium of compromise among contending class forces,”²⁴⁹ not to being a "unitary political subject."²⁵⁰

The "equilibrium" in the form of an institutional body reflects a compromise between various social classes and groups capable of ruling – *a power bloc*. A power bloc is necessary for ruling because no single class can represent most of society or be an absolute monopolistic power at a given time, thus generating consent for its agenda. However, the ruling class attempts to promote itself as the "unified agenda of the whole nation" and tries to appear as a "cohesive" actor²⁵¹, aided by the fetishistic neutral/public state ideology. This transcendental cohesive state imagination creates an "isolation effect" that obscures class affiliation and class processes with class-neutral concepts like identity and group membership.²⁵²

Poulantzas' definition of “relationality” does not imply *the neutrality of the state*; rather, he seeks to reveal that the state's formation is based on class struggles, manifesting as a kind of institutional ensemble²⁵³ agreed upon by a power bloc's members and imposed by force to exclude those outside the bloc. Similar to Gramsci's definition, the hegemonic class is hegemonic because it establishes political dominance over others, and the state's given political and ideological character reflects the hegemonic class. Thus, in short, the state, as a given power relation, is a conclusion of ongoing social struggles for social hegemony.

At this point, Poulantzas' problematic concept of "relative autonomy of the state" overemphasizes the bourgeois claim of the state's neutrality and social transcendence. Even though he acknowledges that the state is a social relation and defines it as a condensation of social relations, he sees this condensation as more political than an economic conclusion. Consequently, Poulantzas became a proponent of the bourgeois

²⁴⁹ Bob Jessop, *Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy* (London: Macmillan Education UK, 1985), 99, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17950-3>.

²⁵⁰ Jessop, 337.

²⁵¹ Jessop, 61-64.

²⁵² Jessop, 63-64.

²⁵³ Jessop, 337.

fictive claim on the economics-politics distinction. Rejecting the mutual and equal determination and integral relation between these two spheres leads to the mistaken view of a possibly "trans-class" state, suggesting that the state can be a genuinely neutral entity when, in reality, it is quite the opposite. Moreover, this view, which separates class formations from the state itself, seriously undermines the thesis of the state as a social relation; it essentially falsifies itself. To overcome this problem, the "State Derivation Debate," also known as "The German Debate," focused on a political-economic state derivation approach within a relational tradition. The leading thinker of the debate, John Holloway, explained the debate's main goal was to surpass the fictitious perception of the economy-politics distinction and polemicized with Poulantzas, Claus Offe, and Jürgen Habermas, who held similar views.²⁵⁴

In the second phase, Derivationist thinkers, who shared views on the economy-politics integrality, diverged on the degree and determination of the power of economy and politics. They were divided into "capital-oriented" and "class-oriented" groups based on the weight they attributed to forming the state.²⁵⁵ The first group, including Elmar Altvater, derived the state from the "externalist" and "functionalist" relationship between the state and the mode of production. In contrast, the second group, such as Heide Gerstenberger and Joachim Hirsch, focused more on the political balance of power between different classes and its reflections on state power.

Another group, including John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, favored an eclectic unity of both approaches. They argued that the starting point is class domination in the form of a capital relationship, and the dominant class then tries to establish itself as an impersonal and neutral authority through law, everyday politics, and coercion. This explanation became more significant in the relational approach and was adopted and developed by Bob Jessop as the "false dichotomy" between capital and class.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁴ John Holloway, "The State and Everyday Struggle," in *The State Debate*, ed. Simon Clarke (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991), 227ff, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21464-8>.

²⁵⁵ For the most comprehensive miscellanea of the debate, including all the approaches mentioned here, see John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, eds., *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate* (London: E. Arnold, 1979).

²⁵⁶ Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place* (Cambridge: Polity press, 1990), 253–54.

From the Gramscian-Poulantzian legacy to Holloway-Picciotto's significant contributions, society-oriented relational reading efforts have found their most advanced stage in the Strategic Relational Approach (SRA) by Bob Jessop. Even though their studies focus on the capitalist state, Poulantzas and Jessop underline that their approaches can be applied to historical analyses.²⁵⁷ Rather than generally relational or direct Gramscian readings about the Middle East-Ottoman/Turkey historiography²⁵⁸, SRA-based historical-sociological studies on a global scale are still few.²⁵⁹ However, there are particular historical-sociological studies based on SRA. For instance, in a historical approach to SRA, Carvajal Castro and Tejerizo-Garcia define five steps of SRA-based state-society analysis as follows and use this framework in the analysis of early-medieval state characteristics:

First, it departs from a complex view of the articulation between the economic and the political realms, drawing attention to the material basis of the social formation. Second, it situates the dialectics of class struggle at the core of the concept of the state, and acknowledges the analytical relevance of the agency of the subordinate groups in the articulation of the state in all its different dimensions, including the economic, the political, and the ideological – an idea that could be further pursued theoretically by

²⁵⁷ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (1968; repr., London: NLB, 1975), 168–83; Bob Jessop, *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach* (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2007), 9–11.

²⁵⁸ John Chalcraft is a pioneer author in this field, see John Chalcraft, “Engaging the State: Peasants and Petitions in Egypt on the Eve of Colonial Rule,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no. 3 (2005): 303–25; John Chalcraft, “Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: Protest, the State, and the End of the Guilds in Egypt,” in *Bread from the Lion's Mouth*, ed. Suraiya Faruqi, 1st ed., Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities (Berghahn Books, 2015), 278–92, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qcx4k.19>; John Chalcraft, *Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511843952>; John Chalcraft, “Middle East Popular Politics in Gramscian Perspective,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 41, no. 3 (December 1, 2021): 469–84, <https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201X-9408015>; There are also compilation studies that address a broad geography in the Middle East, including the Ottoman, see John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani, *Counterhegemony in the Colony and Postcolony* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230592162>; Stephanie Cronin, ed., *Subalterns and Social Protest: History from Below in the Middle East and North Africa*, First issued in paperback, SOAS-Routledge Studies on the Middle East 7 (London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2011).

²⁵⁹ See, Miriam C. Heigl, “Social Conflict and Competing State Projects in the Semi-Periphery: A Strategic-Relational Analysis of the Transformation of the Mexican State into an Internationalized Competition State,” *Antipode* 43, no. 1 (2011): 129–48, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2010.00814.x>; Tuba Eldem, “Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces,” in *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies: Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness in Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 171–92, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53189-2_9; Nader Talebi, “State Power and Revolution: Toward a Strategic-Relational Analysis of the 1979 Revolution in Iran,” *PQDT - Global* (Ph.D., England, Lancaster University (United Kingdom), 2018), ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global (2473444516), <https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/state-power-revolution-toward-strategic/docview/2473444516/se-2?accountid=13014>.

resort to a relational approach to agency (Poulantzas, 1978, pp. 12-13, 45). Third, it overcomes the instrumentalist view of the state as a tool in the hands of the dominant classes (Engels, 1902 [1884]; Lenin, 1992 [1917]; Miliband, 1969; cf. Barrow, 1993, pp. 13-50; Jessop, 1982, pp. 12-16). As a condensation of conflictive relationships, the state becomes an arena of struggle in which different groups, including fractions of the dominant class, confront their interests. Fourth, the reproduction of the state over time is problematized, in as much as it is addressed in relation to changes in social relationships (Gallas, 2017). In this regard, Jessop insists that changes overtime must be addressed in terms of 'contingent necessity', that is, bearing in mind the impossibility of determining both how the multiplicity of causal chains that necessarily condition each conjuncture may combine and interact, and the outcomes that will result from these combinations and interactions (Jessop, 1982, p.212;2007, pp.225-233).²⁶⁰

In short, as a social theoretical approach, Jessop's Strategic Relational Approach (SRA) focuses on the resultative, *componential formation* of politics. Accordingly, all phenomena in politics are the result of *given* social powers. Social powers reflect themselves in different types of power and hegemony claims depending on their social interests—a *strategic agenda*. In politics, this strategic agenda is relationally confronted, and politics emerge as a result of this confrontation in a *temporal form*. More clearly, politics cannot be narrowed to any restricted area or closed-circuit definition of the state as an in-itself existence; rather, given politics is the output of different vectorial forces (meaning *social groups with different political agendas*). Even obtaining social hegemony over other social groups means having political power; however, the continuity of hegemony is also dependent on constantly changing vectorial effects. In the last instance, according to SRA, the main interest of the research is polity as an aggregate of different social forces' effects and its ever-changing character. All of them lie on the state's *strategic selectivity*, which Jessop defines as:

This approach highlights two aspects of the state system. First, the state form has a structural (or strategic) selectivity which reflects and modifies the balance of class forces. Thus the nuances of class power in different types of state and/ or political regime can be seen in terms of the structurally inscribed possibilities that each state form offers for the successful pursuit of specific class interests.⁶ And, secondly, it highlights the constitution of class forces. This involves issues such as the self-identification, organization, and mobilization of different class (-relevant) forces and their interaction on the terrain constituted by the state system and outside and beyond it.²⁶¹

²⁶⁰ Álvaro Carvajal Castro and Carlos Tejerizo-García, "The Early Medieval State: A Strategic-Relational Approach," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 35, no. 4 (December 2022): 550–51, <https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12392>.

²⁶¹ Jessop, *State Theory*, 256.

Therefore, the emergence of closed-circuit systems is impossible; such "fetishistic imaginations" are merely *ideological or discursive claims made by parties within the order*. Ultimately, as an outcome of struggles among social groups united by their interests (i.e., social classes), the "state" in SRA is an explanatory term for the *given political situation*. In other words, the state, rather than being an entity in itself, is a *temporal derivation* of the social struggles among different political agendas.

It is important to note that this reading subordinates so-called "structures" without ignoring them; on the contrary, SRA rejects the notion of a stagnant, unmanned sociology as claimed by structuralism. Contrary to structuralism, SRA examines social bodies through a society-centered relational perspective, emphasizing the rapidly changing nature of power struggles. More concretely, while prioritizing class, SRA views the state as *institutional sets*—actually, it views all claims of stagnancy and continuity—as outcomes of all political action, a ground, a *social formation*, and an output of class struggles. As the changing nature of class struggles suggests, SRA examines states in the context of their ever-changing character and defines them as power relations—*power as a relation and process*.

The conclusion of this theoretical assumption is as follows: First, class struggles are the primary determinant of the given social formation. Second, class struggles manifest as the challenging political agendas of different social classes. Third, classes pursue their political agendas, and these struggles constitute a polity as an overall output of these political agendas. As relationships between social groups constantly change according to the shifting vectorial effects, this changing character generates new (but not independent from the previous) historically evolving political domains. This means that polities are history-specific entities that *derive from class struggles*. Jessop underscores this mutual and recycling relationship by defining the state as *the site, the generator, and the product* of the political strategies of classes:

First, the state system is the site of strategy. It can be analysed as a system of strategic selectivity, i.e. as a system whose structure and modus operandi are more open to some types of political strategy than others. Thus, a given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power; and it will be more suited to the pursuit of some types of economic or political strategy than others because of the modes of intervention and resources which characterize that system.²⁶²

²⁶² Jessop, 260.

Secondly, the state is also a site where strategies are elaborated. Indeed, one cannot understand the unity of the state system without referring to political strategies; nor can one understand the activities of the state without referring to political strategies. (...) At best, they establish the formal unity of the state system (e.g., a sovereign state with a centralized hierarchy of command), but this cannot guarantee its substantive operational unity. For the state is the site of class (-relevant) struggles and contradictions as well as the site of struggles and rivalries among its different branches. This poses the problem of how the state comes to act, if at all, as a unified political force.²⁶³

Thirdly, the structure and modus operandi of the state system can be understood in terms of their production in and through past political strategies and struggles. These strategies and struggles could have been developed within that system and/or at a distance from it; they could have been concerned with maintaining it and/or transforming it. In this sense the current strategic selectivity of the state is in part the emergent effect of the interaction between its past patterns of strategic selectivity and the strategies adopted for its transformation. In turn the calculating subjects which operate on the strategic terrain constituted by the state are in part constituted by the strategic selectivity of the state system and its past interventions.²⁶⁴

Revealing the ontological conclusions of this relationality and explaining the mechanism by which class struggles produce temporal institutional sets, given the historical contingencies of these sets, is another important point. Simply put, how does SRA explain institutions? To understand institutional sets as concrete outputs of this derivation process, the Marxian approach to the *Parisian Regulation School's* conceptual tools, developed by Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, and Robert Boyer, can be integrated into SRA's analysis. Jessop explains the Regulationists' goals as follows:

(...) regulation theorists share four goals: (1) describe the historically specific institutions and practices of capitalism; (2) explain the various crisis tendencies of modern capitalism and likely sources of crisis resolution; (3) analyze different periods of capitalism and compare their respective accumulation regimes and modes of regulation; and (4) examine the social embedding and social regularization of economic institutions and conduct through their articulation with extra-economic factors and forces.²⁶⁵

As can be seen, the vital concepts of this approach are *the Regimes of Accumulation (RoA)* and *Modes of Regulation (MoR)*. According to the analysis, the power-holder

²⁶³ Jessop, 261.

²⁶⁴ Jessop 261-62.

²⁶⁵ Bob Jessop, "Regulation Theory," in *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, ed. George Ritzer, 1st ed. (Wiley, 2015), 1, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosr042.pub2>; Even if their concepts has been generated for capitalism, regulation theory is a "historical-economic theory" in essence which tries to explain history-specific forms of capitalism. So, it can be expanded for pre-capitalist social formations, and this kind of approach already exists. For an assessment of this, see Robert Brenner and Mark Glick, "The Regulation Approach: Theory and History," *New Left Review*, no. 1/188 (August 1, 1991): 45–119.

class claims and establishes an RoA to seize the surplus product and regulates this seizure regime "legally" with a social framework called MoR. Accumulation strategies of the producer lower classes, as a surplus saving and increasing policy, constitute *a counter agenda* that can allow, limit, or make impossible the power-holder strategy, depending on the given power relations.

In the original theory, especially in the institutionalist interpretation by Boyer, RoA and MoR have been defined as transcendental structural bodies that determine all other social relationships in a given historical period. Here, as a Marxist SRA-oriented comprehension of social theory, those conceptual tools are used to imply the temporal character of structural bodies because of their class struggle-determined essence. This means that these ever-changing class-struggle-dependent power relations constitute the state itself as a phenomenon of RoA and MoR—a *strategic-relational formation of the state from class struggles*. It is conceivable that, in the Ottoman case, social surplus extraction regimes such as timar, iltizam, and malikane, and the struggles over their economic borders, constitute RoAs, while their legal and political bodies reveal themselves as MoRs. Overall, as the state derivation approach argues, the main actors of history are social classes, and the state has been derived from their struggle. All social classes represent themselves with a political agenda or, more clearly, represent an innate strategic-relational agenda for political economy. Class struggles, in the sense of the contention of different strategic agendas, culminate in a political-economic output, which manifests itself as temporary RoA and MoR. Institutional sets and preferences are ever-changing in that historical tunnel. From this perspective, rather than status and continuity, history as a cycle of "crisis-reformation" is full of rapid and consistent transformations—sometimes slow and steady, sometimes in the form of ruptures.




Figure 1. Deriving State from Class Struggles with Strategic-Relational Approach

This historical-sociological model allows us to see the socio-political effects of the lower classes on the transformation of given social formations.

3.3.3. SRA II – The Historical Background: Privatization and Impersonalization, Localization and Congregation

Like other historical and contemporary societies, Ottoman society was also divided into two main classes: property owner exploiters and dispossessed producers with different identities and belongings. These classes were further divided into *social groups* that determined their status and position within their social class. Throughout the Ottoman past, different surplus extraction policies of the exploiting ruling classes and the counter-attacks or defensive strategies of the ruled producers produced varied outcomes. Additionally, inter-class relationships, such as short-term or long-term alliances and status/social group transitivity between different divisions of classes, were outcomes of the periodical needs of this ongoing struggle.

This division lies in a political-economic constant called surplus extraction. However, surplus extraction did not follow a specific or absolute method; it changed to balance the social classes. Additionally, the division between exploiters and producers needed to be justified for the sake of continuity. The surplus extraction regimes and their justification politics, or Regimes of Accumulation (RoAs) and Modes of Regulation (MoRs), represent a given spatiotemporal institutional formation.

Of course, the Ottoman social classes cumulatively learned from the past and constructed Regimes of Accumulation (RoAs) and Modes of Regulation (MoRs) as part of a cyclical accumulation process, rather than a linear one. For example, while the forms of application constantly changed over time, the Ottoman upper classes consistently revolved around a so-called "transcendent" state ideology and law as an MoR. This strong state ideology fortified the given political-economic agenda and aimed to: i) decrease the political involvement of other classes and ii) defuse the intra-class conflict.

Throughout history, rulers attempted to rally all social classes around the concepts of the "eternality of the state" (as seen in the motto *devlet-i ebed müddet*) and the

"survival of the state" (*devletin bekâsı*) discourse. Ultimately, the Ottoman state was ideologically glazed and fetishized by a typical "civitas eterna" ideology. If this discourse is taken as reality, it may indeed be assumed to be so: SI-oriented historiography often assumes continuity and absolutist divisions in state-society understandings. This means restricting politics to the existing rulers and persistently fetishizing the state.

New RoAs create new MoRs, or vice versa, and the ideology is reproduced in various ways. From this point of view, if the ideological program of the Ottoman rulers is not taken as the only model for reading the Ottoman past, it becomes evident that there was not always a strong, authoritative, and determinant Ottoman "state" in the sense of a ruling class.²⁶⁶ Throughout all periods of Ottoman history, the balance between subjects and rulers-exploiters shifted in response to material conditions or inter-class relations, positively or negatively. The political-economic agenda of the state derived from these class relations and concluded with a new political composition. More clearly, the absolute power or political limitation of sultans was a result of bottom-up political-economic compromises among the power foci.

a. From the Late-16th to the Late-17th Century: The Moment of Privatization – From Timar to Iltizam System

In a specific part of the early modern period, roughly from the 1580s to the 1710s, the Ottoman social formation was undergoing a process of "*privatization*," signifying an intra-exploiter-class re-formation. The following period, from the mid-18th century to the mid-19th century, witnessed the political reorganization of this economic tendency and the evolution of "pre-capitalist" elements. Particularly, the 17th century became an "arena of clash," characterized by power struggles over political authority. Both

²⁶⁶ In analysis, the division of economics and politics as different domains as SI historiography is done, and then the taking of the state as the autonomous conclusion of the political sphere enables the maintenance of this kind of distorted imagination. As a natural consequence of this, SI historiography tends to use concepts of "state" and "rulers" interchangeably. However, the state as a political network, an integral power relation of a given society, does not only reflect the administrative elite on the top; more than that, this administrative elite's bottom-up political-economic relations are the power that got these groups here. Undoubtedly, this selection is a conclusion of continuous class struggles between producers and exploiters. This kind of relationship causes both class transivities and intra-class exclusion–inclusion. In conclusion, a state is a broader thing than a social group – a social relation.

political and material conditions compelled the ruling class to establish new production and extraction regimes during these centuries. These fluctuating conditions forced the ruling class to continually adjust their political-economic strategy. It can be argued that the ruling class responded to the changing objective and subjective material conditions, often with an increase in power through a co-option-based accumulation system and its corresponding political structures.

This transformation was a result of the power shifts following the political-economic expansions of the 16th century. During the long 16th century, particularly under the reign of Suleiman I, the Ottoman Imperial Household increased its political capacity and influence over subordinates, constructing a widespread power network through successful military operations in both the East and West. Extensive legal codification activities and relative economic stability were also achieved during this period. The Ottoman power bloc expanded and spread, both internally and in its ability to include external foci. Through inclusive politics, the power bloc engaged with local extensions using a *co-option policy*.

According to Ariel Salzman's well-known thesis of "*Malikanization*," this shift provided a political maneuvering area for the redistribution of wealth and the renegotiation of political rights.²⁶⁷ Salzman's argument implies a "restoration" process, suggesting a reorganization of order rather than a crisis and decline. Essentially, the growing Ottoman power network was no longer governed by a

²⁶⁷ Salzman, "An Ancien Régime Revisited." However, even if the process-dependent restoration thesis is quite comprehensible, this analysis does not lie on class analysis but a statist reading, as she boldly pointed out to Ronald Coase's institutionalist framework, see pp. 385. As a conclusion, all process seems to be institutional transformation cycle, whereas these were only temporal outputs of the "evolutionary" change of the institutions. On the other hand, as discussed below, historical processes are conclusive and temporal aggregates of human groups' actions, as in the case of 16th-century Ottoman political transformations. More historically, in that sense, the late-16th century's conditions created a new phase in class struggles. Different actors' political weights constituted a new *temporal* status quo with some systematized relationalities such as iltizam. As surplus extraction strategies, neither iltizam nor malikane was sequent closed-circuit systems; rather than that, they were temporal regimes of accumulation for surplus-extraction fits given conditions in the meaning of class struggles and political weight of struggling classes and new relational social body (new classes, law, politics, etc.) surmounts on were modes of regulations to guarantee continuity of accumulation. As discussed, regimes of accumulation and modes of regulations are dependent on each other and temporally changing variables and constitute a class strategy into given class struggle processes, as in the case of iltizam and following ones, which means they were historical conclusions of given class struggles, and as this subtopic suggests, Salzman's institutionalist malikanization approach should be reconsidered in this strategic-relational framework.

centralized authority but became privatized. Initially, this meant two things: first, a political-economic foundation for off-center powers began to form, giving rise to new power centers; and second, the "old" political-economic relations of the *Timar system* and its institutional compositions began to be liquidated along with their elite proponents.

In short, a social group within the ruling class adopted a Regime of Accumulation (RoA) based on power-sharing and co-option policies to address surplus accumulation problems after political-economic expansions. This RoA led to a localized and congregated Mode of Regulation (MoR) that extended from the center to local intra-class networks, resulting in more impersonal and systematized institutional arrangements.

On the MoR side, the first quintessential principle was the power-sharing strategy based on co-option.²⁶⁸ This strategy, while politically risky, was nearly necessary for a polity that had grown to such a scale. Indeed, these risks materialized during unstable periods. However, the new Ottoman system managed to overcome these crises through increasing *systemization*. Thus, the late-16th-century crisis environment marked a turning point: the Ottoman political-economic order and power, previously based on a non-systemic and almost personal character, began to be *impersonalized* and gained a more systemic character.

This transformation manifested itself most clearly in increasingly complex surplus extraction and allocation relations. At the basic level, from this era onwards, the Ottoman ruling class preferred "co-option" applications in surplus extraction rather than direct intervention. Consequently, on the Regime of Accumulation (RoA) side, the Ottoman economy shifted to a new *monetization and financialization process*. This shift meant that in-kind taxation began to give way to in-cash systems. Tax-farming, or the *iltizam system*, was based on renting out operating rights of specific land (*mukataa*) to an individual (*mültezim*) in exchange for a lump-sum payment. This system was a crystallized form of the changing ruling class's political-economic

²⁶⁸ For the SI historiography that fixed to state and state's indisputable power, this was a "decline and collapse" process, but in reality, it is a "dissemination and impact amplification" process of the strengthening Ottoman power bloc.

regulation, representing a more effective surplus-extraction strategy in the 17th century. As Coşgel and Ergene imply, the new surplus extraction regime based on tax-farming arrangements displaced the past strategy based on "traditional forms of prebendal revenue extraction" and led to a "money- and market-based economy in various Ottoman domains."²⁶⁹

In actual terms, this transformation was both a "dictate" of the changing political-economic conditions and a response to the needs of the power bloc in the late 16th century. The beginning of the liquidation of central *feudal* ties depended on two main principles: a subsistence-based economy founded on socially embedded economic relations and the absolute unity of political-economic coercion within a given political subject. These relational features gradually disappeared in the Ottoman polity, as they did across the world during the Early Modern Era. There could be more than one reason for this, but the main reason should be the severe deterioration of the land/labor ratio. This ratio is the foundation of the feudal system, and "abnormal" changes in the numerator or denominator put the system in crisis. As Sam White highlights in his *Climate of Rebellion*, a climate crisis could have caused a severe disruption in this system, restricting arable land and limiting crops, making living conditions more difficult, reducing social immunities and bringing production as a whole into crisis. As a result, all the legal ties binding producers to the land were dissolved and they tended to leave the land as a whole (*Büyük Kaçgun* and *Celali Revolts*). Although the inability of the producers to bound to the land put the political picture into a total crisis, the Imperial Household, that still retains his influence, was able to overcome this crisis by activating the *iltizam* system as a kind of system of tenancy that mobilizes local actors for guaranteeing continuity of production. However, this became the trigger of privatization process. As will be discussed later, this was very similar to the process at English countryside between 13th and 14th centuries, as Ellen Meiksins Wood argues.

At the end, The Ottoman power bloc increased their adaptability to this environment through the *iltizam* system, providing a quick response to the crisis. Consequently, the

²⁶⁹ Metin Coşgel and Boğaç A. Ergene, *The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and Trial in the Sharia Courts*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1.

Empire gradually began transitioning towards an *agrarian capitalist polity*.²⁷⁰ Of course, this was not a "peaceful" transition: During this period, Ottoman politics was shaped by two main political agendas shared by different social classes and groups. The first agenda was *Conservative*, rooted in the timar system. This agenda was primarily defended by the 'Imperial Household,' including the palace, timariot sipahis, and janissaries,²⁷¹ who were proponents of the classical order. They mainly organized around traditional Regimes of Accumulation (RoA) and Modes of Regulation (MoR), emphasizing the monopolistic power of the sultan over the surplus-extraction process. Within this group, some advocated for restoring the sultanic power, even if it meant changing the sultan or central elite, but maintaining the existing institutions. As F. E. Çelik explains, this regime relied on a surplus-extraction strategy over state-owned lands²⁷² that involved direct "extra-economic coercion," consisting of centralized "livelihood grants and land dispositions."²⁷³ Taxation was also based on "direct" or in-kind "collective liabilities" and "indirect" or in-cash forms (*öşür, çift-resmi, ispence, etc.*).²⁷⁴

The second group consisted of *Reformists*, representing a "civil oligarchy" engaged in grandee politics.²⁷⁵ This hierarchy had primary and secondary members: *primary mültezims*, who were members of the military class with higher ranks (*mansıb*) in the central and provincial hierarchy, had extensive surplus-extraction organizations from the local to the center. Their bottom-up proxies, forming households, functioned almost like a "bureaucratic" body for surplus accumulation.²⁷⁶ Generally, Istanbul-centered viziers and pashas were the political heads of these networks and were among

²⁷⁰ This was not a spontaneous or "determined" transformation; quite the contrary, subsequent and calling each other political answers in the meaning of new accumulation strategies after a series of crises and advancements.

²⁷¹ Sümer, *Düzenini Arayan Osmanlı*, 74.

²⁷² Called *miri arazi* or a kind of *demesne*.

²⁷³ *Dirlik tevcihi* (in forms of *has, zeamet, timar*) and *mülk temliki* (in forms of *waqf* and *mülk arazi*).

²⁷⁴ Fatma Eda Çelik, "Türkiye Modern Devleti'nin Osmanlı'daki Kökenleri – Toprak Yönetiminde ve Yönetimsel Organlarda Dönüşüm," *Memleket Siyaset Yönetim* 17, no. 37 (June 30, 2022): 7.

²⁷⁵ Sümer, 74.

²⁷⁶ Murat Çizakça, *İslam Dünyasında ve Batı'da İş Ortaklıkları Tarihi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), 125–29.

those who secured bids on *mukataa*. The *secondary mültezims*, local notables called *eşraf* and *âyâns*, also participated in the iltizam system. Unlike the primary group, the secondaries had direct ties with land and peasantry, acquiring wealth through usury-debt relationships with the peasantry. They could also take part in the iltizam system, accumulating wealth from positions they held under the timar system, sometimes as tax-collectors (*tahsildar*) or trustees (*mütevelli*) of a specific waqf. As intermediaries in rural accumulation processes, their main source of wealth was their local agency within the state hierarchy.²⁷⁷

As a result, both groups were born into a specific political-economic program primarily based on privatized and monetized social formation. The Conservative agenda was supported by those benefiting from an absolutely central accumulation regime, while the Reformist agenda was shared by rising vizier-pasha and âyân households from the center to the local levels.²⁷⁸ The Reformist party ultimately emerged victorious in this struggle, paving the way for *localization and congregation*. Consequently, power foci outside the Imperial Household, from the bottom up, constituted vizier-pasha households and âyâns, forming broad congregations and networks around common interests.

The entire process bears a striking resemblance to the analyses by Robert Brenner and E. M. Wood on the British transition to capitalism between the 14th and 15th centuries.²⁷⁹ In Britain, the collapse of feudal tenure following various political disturbances led landlords, who had lost their direct control, to rent out their lands to *tenants*—a social class analogous to the Ottoman *mültezim*. Although the Ottoman situation resulted from different historical circumstances, the core dynamics were

²⁷⁷ Çelik, *Kişisel İktidardan Millet Meclisine*, 164-173.

²⁷⁸ Baki Tezcan prefers to define this diversity as "Absolutist versus Constitutionalists", see *The Second Empire*, 48-59. However, this kind of definition narrows down the challenge between the two as a "democracy versus authoritarianism" struggle. I guess the 17th-century political turmoil was more than a "search for democracy or autonomy" and a political-economic interest-seeking of the political-economically conservatives and reformists.

²⁷⁹ T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin, eds., *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe*, Past and Present Publications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511562358>; Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999).

fundamentally similar in terms of power-sharing, privatization, and the emergence of a political alternative.

b. From the Early-18th Century to the Early-19th-Century: Malikane System and Çiftlikization

The Ottoman polity in the 18th century was marked by significant political and economic crises. A primary symptom of this was the Imperial Household's urgent need for cash, which arose in the late 17th century due to several factors, including production shortages and the economic impacts of the rising global market system.²⁸⁰ Additionally, prolonged wars placed a substantial fiscal burden on the Ottoman treasury. Notably, the war between the "Holy League" (comprising the Holy Roman Empire, Tsardom of Russia, Poland-Lithuania, and Venice) and the Ottoman Empire, known as "The Great Turkish War," began in 1683 and lasted fifteen years.

Following the military "fiasco" at the Battle of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Imperial Household confronted a shifting internal and external *status quo*. The Treaty of Karlowitz, signed in 1699, marked the affirmation of this failure. These devastating international developments prompted a political shift within the Imperial Household: the acceptance of European powers and a redefinition of the Ottoman polity as a "peaceful, secure, and stable" country, abandoning imperialist ideology and prioritizing border security.²⁸¹ This shift indicated the collapse of the *Second Empire's* RoA and MoR. Consequently, the 18th century became an era of acceptance, adaptation, and reformation.

As a result of internal and external political developments, the rivalry between the Imperial Household and the Grandee Households escalated. This led to an urgent search for solutions. The *malikane* system was structured in this context between 1695 and 1793. Essentially, this model aimed to lease tenure for life in exchange for a pre-specified annual tax revenue (*muaccele*) from specific lands. The primary purpose of

²⁸⁰ Salzmann, *An Ancien Regime Revisited*, 398-399.

²⁸¹ Ali Yaycıoğlu, "Karlofça Ânı: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 18. Yüzyıla Nasıl Başladı?," *Tarih ve Toplum - Yeni Yaklaşımlar* 18 (2021): 54.

this transfer was to resolve the cash flow problem.²⁸² However, it also represented a new combination of the RoA and MoR. The level of privatization and monetization increased further, and the political autonomy of the grandee households was significantly enhanced.

Above all, the malikane system was a political acquisition for the vizier-pasha households and *âyân* families. The number of attendees at the malikane auctions varied between 1,000 and 2,000 throughout the 18th century, consisting of high-ranked members of the military, bureaucracy, or jurisdiction/ilmiye organizations.²⁸³ As can be seen, the malikane holders were not local agents and did not directly operate the cultivation and tax-collection processes. Instead, they leased their tenures to local *mültezims* for these operations, effectively becoming *rentiers* through this "re-lease" relationship.²⁸⁴ Consequently, the privatization process shifted to a more hierarchical form, granting its members even more autonomous power. The system spread due to the tempting conditions for both parties, and by the end, 40% of the iltizam lands had integrated into the malikane system.²⁸⁵

After this period, grandee households began to take more active roles in Ottoman politics. By the end of the 17th century, they also became a significant source of finance; the *âyân*s were among the most important "partners" of the Sublime Porte in the face of heavy war reparations to be paid to European powers and revenue shortfalls due to territorial losses. However, they did not only perform a financial sponsorship role but also cooperated with the state in the fulfillment of various public services in localities. By 1726, the Imperial Household had stopped appointing governors (*vali*) trained in *Enderun*, choosing instead to select local administrators from among the

²⁸² Fatma Öncel, "Land, Tax and Power in the Ottoman Provinces: The Malikane-Mukataa of Esma Sultan in Alasonya (c.1780–1825)," *Turkish Historical Review* 8, no. 1 (May 10, 2017): 55, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18775462-00801004>.

²⁸³ Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 11. Basım (2000; repr., İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2014), 115.

²⁸⁴ Genç, 107.

²⁸⁵ Linda Darling, "Public Finances: The Role of the Ottoman Centre," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi, vol. 3, Cambridge History of Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 127, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620956.007>.

âyâns.²⁸⁶ Thus, local notables became a central power focal at the local level. Moreover, the local notables began to take over some of the Imperial Household's financial, administrative, and military burdens in certain cases.

However, it is not accurate to view the âyân-center relations as straightforward alliances, condemnations, or hostilities. Contrary to this, the Imperial Household did not always cooperate with local notables due to a loss of power. Often, the state tried to extend its influence over localities by “integrating” (or attempting to integrate) local elites into the administration. At times, the state sought their help, while in other instances, autonomy could become a point of contention between the parties. This relationship took various forms between the 16th and 18th centuries, reflecting a complex and dynamic interaction rather than a static or uniform relationship. However, the relationship between the âyâns and the Imperial Household became increasingly complicated and strained as the âyâns emerged as an alternative political power, especially after the 18th century. The process of *çiftlikization* exemplifies this complexity.²⁸⁷ *Çiftliks* were almost completely privatized units of production held by âyân families and other local notables. They resembled vast plantations, encompassing many villages and large populations in some instances.²⁸⁸ This trend was a contingent

²⁸⁶ Mustafa Akdağ, “Genel Çizgileriyle XVII. Yüzyıl Türkiye Tarihi,” *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 4, no. 6 (May 1, 1966): 244.

²⁸⁷ For çiftlik debate, see Alp Yücel Kaya, “On the Çiftlik Regulation in Tırhala in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Economists, Pashas, Governors, Çiftlik-Holders, Subaşı, and Sharecroppers,” in *Ottoman Rural Societies and Economies: Halcyon Days in Crete VIII: A Symposium Held in Rethymno 13-15 January 2012*, ed. Ēlias Kolovos (Halcyon Days in Crete (Symposium), Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2015); Zafer Karademir, “Statüleri ve Mahiyetleri Açısından Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Büyük Çiftlikler (18. Yüzyıl),” *Cihannüma Tarih ve Coğrafya Araştırmaları Dergisi* 4, no. 2 (December 30, 2018): 15–43, <https://doi.org/10.30517/cihannuma.505363>; Aysel Yıldız, “Politics, Economy, and Çiftliks: The History of Four Çiftliks in Larissa (Yenişehir-i Fener),” *Turkish Historical Review* 11, no. 1 (November 5, 2020): 28–65, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18775462-BJA10009>; Yücel Terzibaşoğlu and Alp Yücel Kaya, “19. Yüzyılda Balkanlar’da Toprak Rejimi ve Emek İlişkileri,” in *İktisat Tarihinin Dönüşü: Yeni Yaklaşımlar ve Tartışmalar*, ed. Ulaş Karakoç and Alp Yücel Kaya, 1. baskı, İletişim yayımları Araştırma - inceleme, 2962 482 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2021), 49–105; Fatma Öncel, “Imperial Landed Endowments (Vakıf Çiftliks) in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire: The Case of Pertevniyal Valide Sultan’s Endowments in Thessaly,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 65, no. 4 (May 24, 2022): 648–73, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685209-12341578>; E. Attila Aytakin, *Üretim - Düzenleme - İsyân: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Toprak Meselesi, Arazi Hukuku ve Köylülük* (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2022); Fatma Gül Karagöz and Uğur Bayraktar, eds., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Toprak Sahipleri ve Çiftliğe Farklı Bakışlar*, Birinci Basım (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2023).

²⁸⁸ Halil İnalçık, “The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlords and Tenants,” in *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History*, Variorum Reprint CS214 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 114.

outcome of the iltizam and malikane regimes, symbolizing the peak of the privatization process and representing the high-level economic autonomy of the local grandees.

As these developments unfolded, the political turn inward prompted the Imperial Household to abandon previous attempts to avoid meddling and initiate transformations to counter the massive loss of political-economic control. However, these efforts also resulted in political defeat. The *Edirne Incident* in 1703 was a direct confrontation between the Imperial Household and the coalition of vizier-pasha and âyân households. Mustafa II aimed to consolidate absolute monarchy by declaring Edirne the capital city and establishing another "official" household to control others. However, an alliance of vizier-pasha households and janissaries marched on Edirne and defeated this attempt.²⁸⁹

Additionally, the attempt to reorganize monarchical rule during the "Tulip Age" (1718-1730), which can be defined as "comprehensive but superficial," drastically collapsed with a mass uprising in 1730. This politics of inclusion prepared a historical conflict dynamic between the expanded power blocs. From the 1750s to the 1830s, strengthening factions within the bloc acted to eliminate each other from the bottom up, resulting in a prolonged civil war within the Ottoman polity. This civil war culminated with the Edict of Gülhane (or Tanzimat Reforms) in 1839, marking a completely new phase for the Ottoman state.

c. the Ottoman “White Revolution”: Consolidation of the Agrarian Capitalism within “the Modern State”

*“If there’s to be a revolution, it is better that we should make it rather than be its victims.”*²⁹⁰

Otto von Bismarck, the First Chancellor of the German Empire

²⁸⁹ Rifa‘at Ali Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics*, 52 (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te İstanbul, 1984).; Çelik, Kişisel İktidardan Millet Meclisine, 201-206.

²⁹⁰ Bulst, Neithard, Jörg Fisch, Reinhart Koselleck, and Christian Meier. “Revolution, Rebellion, Aufruhr, Bürgerkrieg.” In *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon Zur Politisch-Sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, edited by Werner Conze. Vol. 5: Pro-Soz. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1984: 744 as cited in E. J. Hobsbawm, *Echoes of the Marseillaise: Two Centuries Look Back on the French Revolution*, Mason Welch Gross Lecture Series (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2019), 35; Friedrich Thimme, *Bismarck: Die gesammelten Werke*, vol. 6: Politische Schriften Juni 1866 bis Juli 1867 by Bismarck, Otto Fürst von (Berlin: Otto Stollberg Verlag, 1929), 120 as cited in Otto Pflanze, “Bismarck and German Nationalism,” *The American Historical Review* 60, no. 3 (1955): 552, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1845577>. The translation belongs to Eric J. Hobsbawm.

The 1780s marked a transformative period for the Ottoman Empire. Global politics compelled the rulers to adopt a consolidation agenda and reform the power bloc. This specific interval, from the beginning of Selim III's reign to the end of Mahmud II's, witnessed the thorough liquidation of the Second Empire, including its political, economic, and sociological foundations, and the efforts to establish a new order. Contrary to the claims in classical/mainstream historiography, this period's liquidation and establishment efforts were not merely the result of Selim III's and Mahmud II's "revolutionary" or "enlightened" personalities, nor were they simply a struggle between "Traditionalists versus Modernists" or a stark contrast between "centralists" and "decentralists."²⁹¹ Instead, the entire transformation process was the outcome of

²⁹¹ While the "Tradition versus Modernization" antagonism belongs to Early-Classical, the Mid- and Neo-Classical Weberian historiography urges upon a "center" and "periphery" opposition on the character of the early-19th century struggles. The first was widely criticized, but the second still needs criticism. According to this view, this century became a *ground* of the political clash between local elites and the center proponents of centralization and decentralization. However, as a *type of challenge*, centralism-decentralism tension cannot be taken as *noumenon*, but only a *phenomenon*: Moves around this political center of gravity had shaped short-term leitmotif of the Ottoman politics as always, and not only "democracy versus authoritarianism" challenge. Centralism and decentralism notions imply different surplus extraction regimes in the pre-modern world. This means centralism or decentralism were *answers* to the question of "How will production be organized, and how will the resulting surplus product be shared?" The answer has determined the shape of the "production chain" in terms of both economic and political meanings; the economic system and its given application form create its own political ground and atmosphere for perpetuity. The system's institutional and dependent legal framework was shaped on this economic basis. Besides, the Ottoman polity did not have a unified and single political-economic base; the Ottoman aristocracy had different political-economic intercourses with different territories at different times. In post-16th century politics, the Ottoman ruling class overwhelmingly preferred an alliance with non-central powers, especially for penetrating huge territories using fewer economic and military resources. In conclusion, this was an enlarging attempt of the Ottoman state with complex political and judicial co-opting processes. The co-option relationship between local elites and the center became new shapes and depths depending on changes in the political atmosphere but was generally saved through the late 18th century for the sake of maintaining the regime. In the early-19th century, as argued, in order to consolidate the aristocratic power, which was clearly endangered under the given circumstances, the Ottoman center took two fundamental reflexive steps at the local and global levels in close succession: a) to end the alliance with the local powers which had begun to shape politics and share power, and b) to adapt in a "controlled" manner. The center's main goal with this political program was realizing a transformation to the Western type of government, without intervention and effect of any other social class, a "controlled transition", as mentioned. The meaning of "control" in that sense was establishing and protecting the central power in this "new" political-economic ground while eliminating the "older" system. Undoubtedly, there were proponents of the older system both at the center and periphery, and the center's intention was not directly eliminating such a "periphery" but an economic domain that consisted of resister classes of the new political-economic environment. This domain had strong boundaries from the center to the periphery or vice versa: The central proponents who benefit from it, such as traditional landowner administrative bureaucracy, merchant and producer guilds' high bureaucracy, religious bureaucracy (ulema), and traditional military groups (janissaries at first sight). Of course, it cannot be argued that those classes resisted the new regime as a whole, but it is evident that all these classes had firm political-economic boundaries with the oldest agenda and tried to save it in a general sense. This means, the Ottoman high aristocracy clashed with the proponents of them and their political agenda, both in central and local means.

the Ottoman social classes' multi-dimensional reactions to the ongoing political-economic shift and the global conditions precipitated by the French Revolution.

Above all, the trend toward privatization and monetization continued in the pre-1789 period. Grandee households defended their political-economic power, even increasing it throughout the 18th century, despite several failed liquidation attempts by the Imperial Household. A significant milestone in this process was the introduction of the *esham* system. Following a long war with Russia between 1768-1774, the Imperial Household faced the burden of heavy compensation. To fund this debt, a new system of domestic borrowing, *esham*, was introduced alongside the *malikane* system. Unlike land tenure, *esham* was based on cash transactions.²⁹²

In the *esham* system, the Imperial Household sold the annual part (*faiz*) of specific taxes, known as "mukataa."²⁹³ This system did not involve a direct relationship between land and the shareholder; it was purely a financial transaction. Tax revenues expected to be collected in the future were quickly transferred to the treasury through this system. Shareholders received a predetermined annual return, proportional to their investment, known as *muaccele*. Like *malikane* contracts, *esham* agreements were also lifelong. The financialization of the *esham* system introduced many flexibilities, such as the inclusion of women and children, simplification in the partition of shares, and the elimination of natural limits on the number of shareholders.²⁹⁴

As Şevket Pamuk asserts, the primary political-economic expectation of the Imperial Household was to limit the large financiers' monopoly over the *malikane* auctions. Additionally, the Imperial Household sought to reduce the power of grandee circles that derived from land-based production relations by establishing a system based on the financial distribution of accumulated revenue, rather than leasing authority over land. However, the broadening pool of financiers also introduced many challenges. According to Pamuk, "the inability of the state to control or limit the sales of *esham*

²⁹² Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 187.

²⁹³ Genç, 184. As Mehmet Genç notes, neither *faiz* nor *mukataa* have the popular meanings in these contexts. *Faiz* means a specific part of a tax called *mukataa*, rather than "interest" and "a piece of land".

²⁹⁴ Genç, 187-188.

between individuals and the difficulties in preventing the heirs of the deceased from continuing to receive payments”²⁹⁵ caused another avenue for accumulation, even for wider sections of the population. It is clear that the Imperial Household was unable to block alternative ways of accumulation and the rise of new economic foci, thus paving pathways to a market economy and capitalism.

Indeed, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca concluded with Russia in 1774²⁹⁶, another war with Russia between 1787-1792, and finally the French Revolution in 1789 caused profound disruptions in the Ottoman Empire and directly triggered the survival instincts of the Imperial Household. The Empire faced an economic crisis, the rise of alternative political circles, popular uprisings of the poor, nationalist movements, and unstable foreign relations.²⁹⁷ In response, the ruling elite's primary reflex was to navigate and mitigate these effects while capitalizing on them where possible. The first step in this strategy was the consolidation of the regime under the banner of a "modern state," inspired by the French Revolution. Essentially, the Ottoman Imperial Household aimed to accomplish what the French Imperial Household could not: the reorganization of diffused political power. The political-economic impact of the French Revolution on Europe propelled the Ottoman ruling class towards what can be described as a "White Revolution."²⁹⁸

²⁹⁵ Şevket Pamuk, “Changes in Factor Markets in the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1800,” *Continuity and Change* 24, no. 1 (May 2009): 130, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0268416009007048>.

²⁹⁶ In fact, Kemal Beydilli claims that the Küçük Kaynarca was much more effective than the Karlowitz (1699) in the Imperial Household's political transformation, see Kemal Beydilli, “Küçük Kaynarca'dan Tanzimat'a Islahat Düşünceleri,” *İlmî Araştırmalar: Dil, Edebiyat, Tarih İncelemeleri*, no. 8 (September 1999): 26.

²⁹⁷ Aysel Yıldız, *Crisis and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The Downfall of a Sultan in the Age of Revolution*, Library of Ottoman Studies 58 (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 1–14.

²⁹⁸ In social theory, the concept of “White Revolution” has been generally used for defining “bloodless” and “from above” social transformations. Historically, this concept has been ascribed to Bismarck's policies in the late-19th century and Shah Reza Pahlavi's modernization attempts in Iran between 1963-1979, see Henry A. Kissinger, “The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck,” *Daedalus* 97, no. 3 (1968): 888–924; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, “Iran's ‘White Revolution’: A Study in Political Development,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, no. 2 (April 1974): 124–39, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800027781>; Lothar Gall, *Bismarck: The White Revolutionary 1871–1898*, 1st ed. (1986; repr., Routledge, 2019), <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781000000887>; Ali M. Ansari, “The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, ‘Modernization’ and the Consolidation of Power,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 3 (2001): 1–24. I suggest the concept for the

c.1. Selim III and Nizam-ı Cedid: A Quest for Reconciliation

The Ottoman "White Revolution" agenda included three significant turning points: the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms, Mahmud II's consolidation policies, and the Tanzimat.

Firstly, the "*Nizam-ı Cedid*" (*the New Order*) initiative aimed at a fundamental, concrete, and drastic transformation. This agenda involved the creation of a new army under the same name. Two key reasons underpinned this desire. First, the *malikane-mukataa* system favored the vizier-pasha households, representatives of the military. Privatization meant the army fell under the influence of these households rather than the Imperial Household. Additionally, the strengthening of the *âyân*s led them to raise their armies, with their troops called *sekbans* being called upon for military operations due to the Imperial Household's incapacity.²⁹⁹ In the subsequent process, *âyân*s demanded positions and status within the central hierarchy.³⁰⁰ They also maintained special treasuries for their armies, representing an independent financial source. Selim III aimed to establish the '*İrad-ı Cedid Treasury*' to control military expenditures. However, neither the army nor the treasury aimed to liquidate the grandee circles. Instead, Selim III sought to integrate and include them, representing a quest for *reconciliation* with the older structures.³⁰¹ The Imperial Household, represented by Selim III, began finding ways to establish a partnership with other power centers and to control them if possible.

One step further, Selim III expanded the *Meclis-i Meşveret* (Advisory Council), formed during the reign of Abdulhamid I, to bring together the scattered power-holder circles. This was a crucial development towards a modern capitalist state in terms of representation and congregating different interest groups under the state's banner and at a "public" level instead of their autonomous power domains. Interestingly, Selim III and his bureaucrats used the term Nizam-ı Cedid to describe the post-revolutionary

Ottoman polity to for emphasizing the transformation's aristocratic, "royal" character as in cases of Bismarck and Pahlavi.

²⁹⁹ Çelik, *Kişisel İktidardan Millet Meclisine*, 261.

³⁰⁰ Çelik, 253.

³⁰¹ Çelik, 257, 261.

political order of France. In an August 1792 document informing the sultan of France's new order, Selim III and the reporting bureaucrat referred to the new order of Revolutionary France as the Nizam-ı Cedid.³⁰² Thus, the term Nizam-ı Cedid must have signified a deeper and more comprehensive transformation for the Imperial Household, rather than just basic reforms.

Rain or shine, the aim to integrate the grandee circles was ultimately frustrated. Although some grandees in Anatolia accepted this role, most, especially those in Rumelia, were unwilling to relinquish the influence they had gained in the localities.³⁰³ The army, specifically the *esnafized* janissaries, who constantly shifted allegiances among grandee circles, could not be contained. They were forced to give up their economic autonomy with the Nizam-ı Cedid and the Irad-ı Cedid reforms.³⁰⁴ This autonomy was not limited to small and medium-sized businesses; the janissaries were expanding their power by capturing local posts sold by âyâns and, in some instances, they had taken control of political accumulation power.³⁰⁵ Inevitably, they continued to defend the Second Empire's political-economic autonomist structure under the banner of the 'Old Regime' and 'traditionalism'.

In the end, the Nizam-ı Cedid and Âyân armies confronted each other in Edirne in 1806. To prevent a civil war, the Nizam-ı Cedid Army was forced to retreat, marking the *Second Edirne Incident*.

The situation was similar at the international level. Initially, the Imperial Household saw the 1789 French Revolution through a lens of opportunity. Royal Privy Secretary

³⁰² BOA, HAT, 240-13419. Selim III wrote on the top of document those "Cevab yazılmak için nameler Orduy-ı Hümayunuma irsal olunub France nizam-ı cedidinin bir suret-i tahriri dahi hümayunuma irsal oluna".

³⁰³ Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of Empire*, 165.

³⁰⁴ As Çelik underlines, janissaries had gained vast economic sources except military service, such as from land i.e. timar and zeamet revenues, various artisanal occupations or sales of janissary salary documents called *esame*. The Imperial Household tried to prevent this economic activities, see Çelik, 270.

³⁰⁵ Çelik, 271; Kadir Ustun, "The New Order and Its Enemies: Opposition to Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1789 - 1807" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2013), 163, 185ff, <https://doi.org/10.7916/D80Z79P1>.

(*Sırkâtibi*) of Selim III, Ahmed Efendi, noted the Ottoman rulers' "positive" remarks about the Revolution.

The avenging [and] agonizing [God] Almighty reversed the precautions in the hearts and minds [of the Europeans] and caused the revolution of the nations that had arisen in Europe and the strife and disputes that arose from all sides [and] of course, many fierce fights and many rising turmoil. In a little while, when war is foreseen in the midst of the states, may God Almighty make the Western disease like the French Revolution spread to those who are traitors to the State and turn them against each other many times, and grant good results to the State, Amen.³⁰⁶

However, the initial positive attitudes towards the French Revolution shifted negatively after Napoleon's campaign in Egypt. Following this failed intervention between 1798 and 1801, the Russian-Ottoman-British alliance continued for a while but eventually collapsed in 1806. During this era, Napoleon attacked various European countries, and both he and Selim III sought to capitalize on the situation by forming an alliance. However, these efforts for an Ottoman-French partnership fell apart after the British Naval Operation in Istanbul in 1807.³⁰⁷

These internal and external political alliance failures culminated in the overthrow of Selim III's administration by a janissary uprising known as the *Rebellion of Kabakçı Mustafa* in 1807. Following this, the Grandee Households installed Mustafa IV as the new ruler. This administration lasted only fourteen months but played a decisive role in reversing the transformations initiated by Selim III. The Nizam-ı Cedid reforms were dissolved, Selim III's administration was exiled, and the janissaries' status was restored. Antonie Juchereau de Saint-Denis (1778-1842), a French military engineer employed by the Ottoman state, witnessed the 1807-1808 events in Istanbul and described them as 'revolutions'.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁶ Ahmed Efendi, *III. Selim'in Sırkâtibi Ahmed Efendi Tarafından Tutulan Rûznâme*, trans. V. Sema Arıkan, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları. II. Dizi, sa. 30 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1993), 60. The original statement is as follows: "Cenâb-ı kakhâr-ı müntakim mâ-fi'z-zamîrları olan tedbirlerini ber aks eyleyüp Avrupa'da bu def'a ez-ser-nev zuhûr eyliyen ihtilâl-i milel ve her tarafından baş kaldıran nizâ'ü cedel elbette nice germiyyetlü gavgâları ve nice evc-gîr hengâmeleri muktezî olup bir âz zemân miyân-ı düvelde ceng ü cidâl melhûz olmağla hemân hazret-i hak Frânçe ihtilâlini misâl maraz-ı Frengi hâin Devlet-i Aliyye olanlara dahi sirâyet itdirüp ve çok zemân birbirlerine düşürüp Devlet-i Aliyye'ye hayırlû netîceler müyesser eyliye Amin." English translation belongs to me.

³⁰⁷ Fatih Yeşil, *Trajik Zafer: Büyük Güçlerin Doğu Akdeniz'deki Siyasi ve Askeri Mücadelesi (1806-1807)* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2017).

³⁰⁸ Antoine de Baron Juchereau de Saint-Denis, *Révolutions de Constantinople En 1807 et 1808*, 2 vols vols. (Paris: Brissot-Thivars, 1819); For an assessment of this source, see Ali Yaycıoğlu, "Révolutions

c.2. Mahmud II and the White Revolution: A Civil War

The reign of Mahmud II was marked by a decisive military intervention led by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and the Rusçuk Yaranı. Unlike Selim III's reign, which sought compromise and reconciliation with the Second Empire's agenda, Mahmud II's period was characterized by a rejection of such consensus, having seen that it did not yield positive results. The âyân party, which played a crucial role in enthroning Mahmud II, was also not interested in a political alliance. Instead, they sought to control the Imperial Household and extend their political influence throughout the Empire, ensuring their autonomy.

To secure their position, the âyân party eliminated enemies of the Imperial Household, enthroned Mahmud II, signed the Sened-i İttifak, and ensured that their leader, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, was appointed as grand vizier. Additionally, Mahmud II attempted to reorganize the army by creating the *Sekban-ı Cedid* in September 1808, similar to the earlier *Nizam-ı Cedid*. However, this new army lasted only one month and twenty days before being disbanded in November 1808. The Imperial Household did not attempt to reestablish such a force until 1826, when they finally solidified their power base. In 1826, the Imperial Household completely abolished the Janissary Hearth through an intervention known as the 'Vakay-i Hayriye' (*the Auspicious Incident*).

During this period, the fears of the Imperial Household materialized in various parts of the Empire. In Egypt, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha seized power by 1805, establishing a dynasty that ruled Egypt until the 1950s. Born in the Sanjak of Kavala in the Ottoman Balkans, Mehmed Ali was appointed deputy commander to Egypt in 1801 when the region was under French occupation since 1798.³⁰⁹ Throughout his rule, Mahmud II spent considerable effort dealing with Mehmed Ali's political interventions, which often escalated into international crises. Mehmed Ali played a

de Constantinople: France and the Ottoman World in the Age of Revolutions," in *French Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories*, ed. Patricia M. E. Lorcin and Todd Shepard, France Overseas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 21–51.

³⁰⁹ Khaled Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt*, Makers of the Muslim World (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009), 3.

crucial role in shaping the modern Middle East with his influence over Egypt, Syria, and Eastern Anatolia.

Similarly, Ali Pasha of Ioannina established another power network in Ottoman Greece. A member of an Albanian noble family recently converted to Islam³¹⁰, Ali Pasha gained favor within the Ottoman ruling network due to his noble background and successful military operations against rebellious *âyâns*.³¹¹ He became the governor of Ioannina in 1788 and extended his control over all of Rumelia by 1802. Ali Pasha built an Albania-centered *çiftlik* network, establishing an economic system based on the *timar* and *zeamet* revenues of local notables. This allowed him to create a centralized surplus-extraction regime in Ottoman Rumelia³¹², granting him high-level autonomy. He even maintained independent relations with international powers, acting as an international player in certain situations.³¹³ His political-economic independence lasted until 1820, when the Imperial Household deemed him an insurrectionist. Despite his resistance, Ali Pasha quickly lost significant territory, was captured, and executed in 1822.³¹⁴ However, the political vacuum left in his wake contributed to the *Greek Revolution* between 1821 and 1832.³¹⁵

Nevertheless, under the administration of Mahmud II, the Imperial Household managed to eliminate or incorporate the grandee circles.³¹⁶ These efforts were costly in both financial and territorial terms, but they marked a significant turning point on the road to a modern state. This transformation involved the creation of a regulatory, public, and universal law-oriented state apparatus. These elements were integral to the newly emerging capitalist mode of regulation.

³¹⁰ Katherine Elizabeth Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 23.

³¹¹ Sümer, *Düzenini Arayan Osmanlı*, 130.

³¹² Sümer.

³¹³ Sümer.

³¹⁴ Sümer, 132.

³¹⁵ Sümer.

³¹⁶ Yayıoğlu, *Partners of Empire*, 242ff.

What truly transpired was the monopolization of the economy and law, and the reorganization of the state as a "neutral," relatively autonomous, and inclusionary domain referred to as *the public sphere*.³¹⁷ Undoubtedly, these developments represented the highest stages of systematization and impersonalization, essential components of capitalist state formation. The Tanzimat Edict, promulgated in 1839, signaled the irrevocability of this White Revolution's path, solidifying the transition towards a modern, capitalist state.

3.4. Conclusion

Ultimately, the Tanzimat Decree of 1839 marked the culmination of a transformative process that began in the 16th century, representing a clear victory for the *White Revolutionist* circle. This transformation resulted from a combination of complex political processes, which can be seen as the "pains" of the transition. In Marxist terms, this shift at the center essentially signifies the "acceptance" of rapidly transforming regimes of accumulation and adapting the mode of regulation to this transformation.

At the basic level, early capitalistic features were already developing within the Ottoman polity, both in rural and urban contexts. This included: a) the emergence of various forms of private ownership of the means of production (land, in Early Modern world), b) the emergence of wage labor regimes, and c) the separation of the enforcers of economic and political coercion. In addition, Ottoman politics witnessed the emergence of a "market society," characterized by the externalization and imposition of trade on social relations alongside agrarian capitalism. Representatives of the Ottoman aristocracy, especially Selim III and Mahmud II, closely followed similar transformative processes in Europe. They understood that failure to manage this transformation could lead to the overthrow of the aristocracy in a tremendous social revolution, similar to the French Revolution they had witnessed.

Therefore, ensuring a "smooth" transition through a "controlled revolution" became the Sublime Porte's agenda during this period. The summary of this agenda is as

³¹⁷ For a detailed assessment on rethinking the modernization as a formation of public space, see Cengiz Kırılı, *Sultan ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde "Havadis Jurnalleri" 1840-1844*, 1. baskı, Tarih (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009).

follows: eliminating autonomous power foci to pave the way for forming a "European-type" publicized and centralized political economy under the banner of a "modern state." Centralization, systemization, and impersonalization were seen as the only shields for the existing power composition. Whether or not anyone was explicitly pursuing this, it marked a significant milestone in the foundation of a modern capitalist social formation in Turkey.

Despite the relational approaches to the Ottoman political-economic formation that explain the market and state sides of the trilemma, the historiography still lacks an adequate explanation of the producer lower classes' effects on this political transformation. Producers, peasants, and artisans constituted the foundations of the political-economic system. Their resistance or acceptance directly determined the success of a given agenda. The next chapter will focus on this subject.

CHAPTER 4

MORAL ECONOMIC AGENDA AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE LOWER CLASSES AGAINST THE NEW POLITICAL-ECONOMY, 1789 – 1839

4.1. Introduction

In early May 1789, a twenty-five-year-old man named Hafız Molla Kara Salih Efendi departed from *Ankara* and made his way to Istanbul. Upon arrival, he strategically positioned himself to catch the Sultan during the Friday salute and, as soon as he saw him, began to shout demands for a reduction in the taxes known as *salyane* imposed on the people by the *âyâns*.³¹⁸ Later that summer, four armed men named Zekeriya, İsmail, Mehmed, and Sami entered a mosque in the *Mukataa of Esbkeşân, north of Konya*, during conscription. They tried to persuade the people not to pay taxes and to refuse to join the army for the recent campaign.³¹⁹ In September of the same year, Baltacı Arnavudlu, who had been causing disruptions in many *zeamet, malikane, and mukataa* lands in Rumelia, was arrested and executed in Bozcaada.³²⁰ Alongside these numerous uprisings, a popular revolt known as the Dağlı Rebellion continued to spread across a vast geography around the Rhodope Mountains.³²¹ This was the turbulent social and political landscape that Selim III inherited when he ascended to the throne in April 1789: an economic crisis, political turmoil, and widespread social unrest.

³¹⁸ BOA, AE.SABH.I, 10-871.

³¹⁹ BOA, C.ZB., 62-3055

³²⁰ BOA, HAT, 204-10585

³²¹ Çağdaş Salih Öztaş, “The Agrarian Background to the ‘Dağlı’ Rebellion in the Rhodope Mountains (1780-1810)” (Unpublished Master Thesis, İstanbul, Boğaziçi University, 2022), 42–43.

The discussed conflicts between different households were not the sole determinants of the Ottoman state-formation process. Social movements from below also played a direct and significant role. Binding the peasants to the land and integrating artisans into the new political economy presented a serious political challenge for the ruling class. However, neither peasants nor artisans were merely reactionary forces. They possessed a political-economic program akin to those of the Imperial, Grandee, or Âyân households. This program, known as the *Moral Economic Agenda*, was shaped by their historical and sociological experiences.

At that point, the discussion in Chapter 1 should be revisited. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Moral Economic Agenda was fundamentally based on two main principles: guaranteeing subsistence and ensuring economic justice. These principles required the continuity of four elements: a minimum subsistence ethic, a traditional understanding of justice, and the embeddedness of the political-economic order in social relations, along with the valorization of labor.³²² The concrete manifestations of this agenda included the sense of a just price, reliance on traditional political-economic practices, and opposition to market-oriented thought. As can be seen, these elements bases on a in itself “rationality” for guaranteeing subsistence. It can be argued that, these principles has suggest an equal RoA and a just MoR combination in itself. This means, moral economic principles were mainly constituting a social and political design.

But, what kind of a political design is this? Is that a sign of ‘rationality’ or is it all ‘zealotry’? The mentioned discussion between Popkin and Scott seems to suggest some unnecessary criterion for moral economy. Moral economy cannot simply be taken as a system of values accepted as they are, also rationality is not the equivalent of profit maximization understanding. As ‘rationalist school’ argues, moral economic emphasis of the lower classes has not defended for ‘revive the past’. Most of the time, this discourse emerges as a current political agenda for current challenges. The ‘past’ is a very powerful source of legitimacy, and it is also the most powerful one available to lower classes, especially in crisis periods. Because of Scott’s analysis draws a physiologic framework based on analysis of risk society, the moral economic agenda

³²² Aytekin, Peasant Protests in the Late Ottoman Empire, 211-214.

seems as a 'restless reaction' and nurtures the reactionary imagination. Of course, physiology is the basic level of subsistence analysis, but it should be noted that, lower classes had many subsistence crises before capitalism but sharp inequality in front of the crisis was new. While all lower classes equally effected by the same crisis such as inflation or famine, a privileged group emerges in capitalism and gets through the process much more easily. This is a more serious cause for a political anger than the physiologic one, and the moral economic discourse became an agenda in those conditions. Physiologic shortcoming could be solved in subsistence economy, which is exactly what this economy formed for. However, inequality is a new and political condition especially in the transition to capitalism. Here, the lower classes reference this understanding of equality while they struggle for moral economy, not for revival of past. In a more political analysis, like E. P. Thompson has done, the lower classes' political and ideological references to past for daily challenges can be seen more easily. Turning to these elements is a sign that the lower-classes have a strong political wise in itself, means a quite 'rational' approach.

Then, how is moral economic understanding produced and used? In "The Invention of Tradition," edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Hobsbawm argues that "traditions" which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.³²³ However, he distinguishes between "tradition" and "custom" (*görenek*), defining the latter as "common law" (*örf* in Turkish), a concrete fact, while the former is ideologically loaded and takes meaning within the historical process. Hobsbawm adds:

What it does is to give any desired change (or resistance to innovation) the sanction of precedent, social continuity and natural law as expressed in history. 'Custom' in traditional societies has the double function of motor and fly-wheel. It does not preclude innovation and change up to a point, though evidently the requirement that it must appear compatible or even identical with precedent imposes substantial limitations on it. Students of peasant movements know that a village's claim to some common land or right 'by custom from time immemorial' often expresses not a historical fact, but the balance of forces in the constant struggle of village against lords or against other villages.³²⁴

³²³ E. J Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric John Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, Canto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1.

³²⁴ Hobsbawm, 2.

Custom, then, serves as *a fictional reference* to a set of *historical practices*, crafted to create legitimacy for contemporary struggles. Moreover, moral economic thought transforms into 'the Moral Economic Agenda' at this very juncture. As shown in the discussion below, the 'ethereality' of the past becomes a potent weapon in the hands of Ottoman society. Both ruling classes and lower classes relentlessly compete to acquire this weapon. However, it often becomes a more powerful tool for the lower classes, who possess an astonishing ability to invent the past and connect the masses to it. Gossip, rituals, folk tales, and popular legends can be generated instantaneously from all parts of society and spread faster than a sultanic *ferman*. In the end, these narratives likely become more effective in influencing society. At the end, it becomes an intended political agenda of lower classes.

Every lower-class society produces its own *Moral Economic Agenda* in unique ways. The Ottoman society's historical experience led to the creation of a distinctive agenda. Additionally, the political defense of this agenda is directly related to the essence of social movements. Undoubtedly, every society has performative patterns and sources of legitimization, which develop within certain processes. The Ottoman lower classes often took direct action, even shedding blood, to implement their agenda, which was formed through daily struggles against political power.

As discussed in Chapter 3, processes are integral relationalities. In the Ottoman case, the Imperial Household's co-option policy under certain conditions led to a long-term privatization and marketization process. This resulted in the emergence of autonomous political-economic circles, a development that was ultimately negative for the lower classes. While the Imperial Household also exploited the lower classes, the distance between the Imperial Household and the producers was advantageous for the latter. Previously, producers could more easily evade paying taxes, their usufructs over land were less subject to direct intervention, and economic conditions were more predictable due to regulations. Additionally, they dealt with a single political entity rather than multiple political and economic claims. However, the producers sometimes took advantage of this "multi-party" politics by pitting different forces against each other.

The 19th century marked a sharp turning point for the lower classes in the Ottoman Empire. Marketization and financialization of the economy reached unprecedented levels. Numerous political factions vied for control of this process. European political and economic powers directly or indirectly penetrated the Empire, destabilizing economic development both internally and externally. Political factions that had gained economic autonomy pushed for further marketization and pressured the state to follow this direction. Unlike previous economic crises, famines, or shortfalls, the impact of these developments was uneven; former neighbors ascended the social ladder, becoming rich and powerful.

In response to these changes, the producer's political-economic agenda focused on re-embedding the economy within social relations. The trilemma of the Imperial Household, the Grandee Circles, and the Lower Classes produced different RoAs and MoRs throughout this period. The modern state emerged from this integral movement, shaped by the complex interactions and struggles among these three groups.

This chapter focuses on the formation of the Moral Economic Agenda and the patterns of popular social movements in the Ottoman Empire. It will analyze how these movements were not merely reactive but played a transformative and politically effective role, particularly in the early 19th century.

4.2. Foundations of the Ottoman Moral Economy: *Customs in the Ottoman Lower Classes*

Like the concept of the state, the notion of class should not be seen as a fixed, well-defined, and transcendental framework.³²⁵ Instead, class is a dynamic relation shaped by the processes of experience and mutual interaction. Theoretically, treating class as a static structure negates the historical processes that constitute it. Class is both a product of these historical conditions and processes and a form of relationship that evolves over time. E. P. Thompson captures this idea in his work "The Poverty of

³²⁵ Geoffrey E. M. De Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*, Cornell Paperbacks Edition Reissued (1981; repr., Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 32ff.

Theory," where he states, "Class formations (I have argued) arise at the intersection of determination and self-activity. The working class 'made itself' as much as it was made."³²⁶ Thompson illustrates this by examining the conditions that shaped the English working class and their political-economic responses³²⁷, highlighting the cyclical tension between determination and self-activity that creates the phenomenon of class over the long run.

Ellen Meiksins Wood further elaborates on her own approach to this framework as follows:

The concept of class as *relationship* and *process* stresses that objective relations to the means of production are significant because they establish antagonisms and generate conflicts and struggles; that these conflicts and struggles shape social experience 'in class ways', even when they do not express themselves in class consciousness or in clearly visible formations; and that over time we can discern how these relationships impose their logic, their pattern, on social processes. Purely 'structural' conceptions of class do not require us to look for the ways in which class actually imposes its logic, since classes are simply there by definition.³²⁸

What, then, were the two dimensions of experience? The conditions of determination have already been discussed in Chapter 3.3.3. The second dimension, which concerns the making of class itself, revolves around tradition and custom in pre-capitalist societies. In "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," E. P. Thompson evaluates the tension between classes through the emergence of the capitalist market and the collapse of customary pricing.³²⁹ As a result, urban lower classes rioted for bread, with their discourse rooted in *tradition*.

This phenomenon was similar to the experiences of the Ottoman urban and rural lower classes, especially during the 18th and early 19th centuries. This was an era in which economic relations became increasingly privatized and capitalized. Tradition and

³²⁶ E. P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory & Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 106.

³²⁷ Edward P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, 1. Vintage Edition, Vintage Books - History 322 (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).

³²⁸ Ellen Meiksins Wood, ed., "Class as Process and Relationship," in *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 82, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558344.004>.

³²⁹ Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century."

custom were central to the discourse of widespread uprisings in both rural and urban areas. However, this should not be interpreted as a sign of ‘fundamentalism’ or a ‘desire for the revival of the old,’ as the classical narrative suggests. Quite the opposite, the discourse of tradition was put forward as a means of legitimacy in resolving daily struggles.

Eunjeong Yi, a specialist in the Ottoman guild system, argues that the adherence to tradition and the *kadim discourse* was not aimed at ‘restoring the past’ but rather served as a way to address contemporary political-economic issues.³³⁰ Yi references Hobsbawm and Ranger, associating this adherence with the “invention of tradition” for specific political goals on a daily basis. A strong piece of evidence that the discourse of tradition is shaped by circumstances can be seen in the popular reference to religion. Even though religion is a powerful source of tradition and custom in Ottoman society, its weight in discourse varies according to the given conditions.

Attila AYTEKIN observes a similar situation regarding Ottoman peasants: Interestingly, the peasant moral economy had less religious emphasis in the 19th century, with more focus on law and political reforms during the century's political turmoil.³³¹ Both observations support the argument that moral economy was, first and foremost, a political-economic agenda of the lower classes.

From this basis, it is understood that the Ottoman lower classes had an ever-changing and evolving moral economic agenda and collective action culture. However, Classical literature often provides a stagnant outline for the lower classes, and their followers continue to update this narrative. The primary reason they perceive the lower classes this way is due to their narrow theoretical framework. Recent studies, however, show the opposite.³³² They reveal that by trying to fit peasants into a narrow framework

³³⁰ Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 114.

³³¹ E. Attila AYTEKIN, “Negotiating Religion, Moral Economy and Economic Ideas in the Late Ottoman Empire: Perspectives of Peasants and the Intelligentsia,” in *Reassessing the Moral Economy: Religion and Economic Ethics from Ancient Greece to the 20th Century*, ed. Tanja Skambraks and Martin Lutz (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023), 201-202.

³³² For a general assessment on both rural and urban uprisings in the early-19th century, see Joel Beinin, *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East*, The Contemporary Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612800> Especially see

called ‘institution’ and defining them as a Platonic form, this leads to an ahistorical analysis. This section aims to present a historical analysis of the Ottoman class formation and social action patterns by emphasizing the relational character of class.

4.2.1. Ottoman Rural Society and Peasants: *Village, Peasant, and the Empire*, Again

The rural society of the Ottoman Empire is a topic that still remains to be clarified. In general terms, the discussion has started from the question of mode of production and social formation. Halil İnalçık’s “*Village, Peasant and Empire*” article has widely accepted as main model of the Classical historiography on the Ottoman peasant society – *çift-hane* system.³³³ He crystalized his analysis on this article, but it can be said that he developed it throughout his career. His early articles titled “*Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüşümü*” and “*The Nature of Traditional Society*” can be accepted as the core studies of this framwork.³³⁴ Above all, İnalçık’s narrative bases on Russian agrarian economist Alexander Chayanov’s “traditional peasant household” model. According to this, *çift-hane* (*peasant family farm*) refers to land that includes a house and the land that could

Chapter 1 called “The world capitalist market, provincial regimes, and local producers”, 1750–1839, pp. 21-43. Attila AYTEKİN focuses to rural unrest, see Erden Attila AYTEKİN, “Land, Rural Classes, and Law: Agrarian Conflict and State Regulation in the Ottoman Empire, 1830s–1860s,” *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses* (Ph.D., United States -- New York, State University of New York at Binghamton, 2006), ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global (304944252), <https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/land-rural-classes-law-agrarian-conflict-state/docview/304944252/se-2?accountid=13014>; E. Attila AYTEKİN, “Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and the Tanzimat Reforms,” *International Review of Social History* 57, no. 2 (August 2012): 191–227, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859012000193>; E. Attila AYTEKİN, *Üretim - Düzenleme - İsyân: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Toprak Meselesi, Arazi Hukuku ve Köylülük* (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2022); For urban revolts of this period, see Aysel Yıldız, *Crisis and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The Downfall of a Sultan in the Age of Revolution*, Library of Ottoman Studies 58 (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017); Suraiya FAROQHI, ed., *Bread from the Lion’s Mouth: Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities*, International Studies in Social History, vol. 25 (New York: Berghahn, 2015); Betül BAŞARAN, “Selim III, Social Control and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century: Between Crisis and Order,” in *Selim III, Social Control and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century* (Brill, 2014), <https://brill.com/display/title/19201>.

³³³ Halil İnalçık, “The Çift-Hane System: The Organization of Ottoman Rural Society,” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 1300 - 1600*, ed. Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 143–54.

³³⁴ Halil İnalçık, “Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüşümü,” *Belleten* 23, no. 92 (1959): 575–610; John Whitney Hall and Halil İnalçık, “The Nature of Traditional Society,” in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton University Press, 1964), 14–63, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183pjfz.5>.

be plowed by a pair of oxen within a day. As can be seen, İnalçık evaluates this unit as “indivisible whole of land, peasant labor and a pair of oxen” and as “the basis of production, social organization and taxation” in the rural. The Ottoman state recognized each çift-hane as a single tax unit rather than taxing individuals separately. The state granted the usufruct of *miri* (state-owned) lands to these units, ensuring the continuity of small-scale production and guaranteeing peasant subsistence. According to İnalçık, there were no intermediary classes between the state and the peasants; the state directly engaged with the rural population through this organizational structure. Thus, Ottoman society was broadly divided into two main classes: the ruling *askerî* (military-administrative class) and the tax-paying *reâyâ* (peasantry). According to İnalçık, this social formation remained largely unchanged until the Tanzimat Era in the 19th century.

In the Neo-Classical Period, Şerif Mardin examined the class formations of Ottoman society using İnalçık’s approach.³³⁵ According to Mardin, while the peasantry bore the tax and production burdens of the polity, it never developed a class consciousness akin to European peasantries. Mardin argued that this was due to the political structure of the Ottoman Empire, which functioned as a "zero-sum game" where political and economic power was concentrated exclusively in the hands of the sultan and his administrative mechanism, known as the prebendal system. Unlike European examples, the Ottomans never established a contractual and deliberative feudalism in a Weberian sense (see definition of “contractual feudalism versus totalizer patrimonialism” in Weber), and naturally never transited to capitalism.

This lack of a contractual framework, according to Mardin, meant that non-state groups, including peasants, were perpetually oppressed with no intermediate or contractual mechanisms to protect their interests or facilitate upward mobility. The Ottoman social structure emphasized "everyone keeping his proper place," which inhibited the development of class consciousness among the peasantry and prevented them from revolting against their lords. This hegemonic political culture ensured that social transformations were typically the result of conflicts within the ruling class

³³⁵ Şerif Mardin, “Historical Determinants of Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness in Turkey,” *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi / Ankara Üniversitesi* 22, no. 4 (1967): 111–42.

rather than peasant revolts. Mardin also contended that significant uprisings, such as the Celali rebellions, were not genuine peasant movements. Instead, they were led by *former sipahis* who had lost their small landholdings and turned to banditry, fighting against new landholders known as *mültezims*. This perspective aligns with an ideal-typical view of Ottoman society.

Both İnalçık and Mardin placed the Ottoman peasantry within a context that ranged between idleness and satiety, portraying them as inherently stagnant. This perspective is also reflected in the Marxo-Weberian analysis. For instance, Sencer Divitçioğlu argued that Ottoman peasant families were relatively free compared to their European counterparts because they had free usufruct rights over their lands. Furthermore, the relationship between the sipahi and the peasant was "structural" rather than directly coercive, suggesting that the peasantry did not feel oppressed. According to this view, because the peasantry did not perceive the exploitation and contradictions within the structure.³³⁶

To redefine the rural society, which is often seen as the root cause of perceived stagnation, two tasks are essential: redefining the village and rethinking the village as a production unit. The perception of stagnation and immutability in these areas contributes to distorted views of the peasants' mental and sociological worlds.

First and foremost, Ottoman villages were not isolated enclaves of agricultural production.³³⁷ Most villages were interconnected and vast areas with sub-divisions like *mezra*, *oymak* etc. Village networks also constituted local fairs (*panayır*) for commercial activities. These interwoven relationships often paved the way for the formation of towns (*kasaba*). Moreover, villages were vibrant spaces featuring houses of worship, coffeehouses, fountains, warehouses, waqf buildings, and sometimes government structures. Especially in Anatolia and Rumelia, many of these structures

³³⁶ Divitçioğlu, *Asya Tipi Üretim Tarzı*, 41ff.

³³⁷ Suraiya Faroqhi, "16. Yüzyıl Boyunca Anadolu ve Balkanlar'da Kırsal Toplum-II," in *Osmanlı Şehirleri ve Kırsal Hayatı*, trans. Emine Sonnur Özcan (İstanbul: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2006), 100–151.

had passed from one civilization to another, resulting in a multicultural demographic in many cases.

Due to centuries-old taxation and commercial traditions, financial relations were not new to Ottoman peasants. However, their economic logic was not based on commodity production and private property but on mutualist lifestyles that fostered strong inner traditions and social structures. For instance, family structures varied according to material conditions, with wide or narrow families. Communal practices such as *imece*, communal kitchens, living in proximate or adjoining houses for protection, and the tradition of collaborative construction were common.

Village representation was typically managed by a council composed of the most respected community members, often the elderly. Contrary to popular thought, the peasant family did not live in the middle of a large field but resided within the village and went to their fields each morning.³³⁸ Peasants engaged not only in husbandry but also in artisanal and simple commercial activities based on the purchase and sale of agricultural surplus. These activities likely did not involve a sharp and demarcated division of labor as seen today; there were individuals who excelled in certain occupations, such as barbers, shoemakers, and weavers, who also participated in agricultural work.³³⁹

Essentially, rural societies were organized to be self-sufficient without external intervention. It was precisely these external interventions, the relations of production carried out under political-economic compulsion, that caused crises. The moral economic understanding of the Ottoman peasantry was formed in these kinds of habitats, not in a bigoted, remote, slothful, or solely work-focused piece of land. The Ottoman village was a dynamic, interconnected, and multifaceted social and economic entity.

In terms of production relations, Ottoman villages were not organized such that a limited number of individuals were allocated specific parcels of land. As highlighted

³³⁸ Mehrdad Kia, *Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (Santa Barbara, Calif: Greenwood, 2011), 96.

³³⁹ Kia, 100.

by Aytekin, the legal framework based on households that the state used for organizing taxation did not necessarily reflect the reality on the ground.³⁴⁰ In actuality, ownership and usufruct rights were often quite chaotic, even in the smallest villages, leading to frequent conflicts.

As the following examples also illustrate (see Chapter 4.2.2), the structures in these areas consisted of the privately owned land and common resources. More than that, some production units, for example *çiftlik*s, were large enough to include more than one village, and they were completely changing the labor regime in certain villages. As a result, the Ottoman peasants were either laboring around on a common land, private property or atelier, living as subsistence peasants, wage laborers or partially artisans. In fact, there was no clear framework until the Land Code promulgated in 1858. The absence of a specific system and complexity in the land created the material conditions for rural conflict.

The critical question here is whether the Ottoman peasantry was genuinely ‘deceived’ or ‘protected’ by the state or whether peasant society was really as free as it is portrayed in the Classical narrative. The mainstream narrative imagines the peasantry in a specific way, attributing their condition to the ‘freedom’ or ‘protectionism’ inherent in the organization of production. According to Attila Aytekin, the portrayal of the peasantry as relatively free is inaccurate. Ottoman peasants were subject to forced labor obligations, bound to their lands, and dependent on *sipahis* for decisions about crop cultivation.³⁴¹ This situation gave them more than enough reasons to conflict with the Imperial Household, rather than feeling protected by it.

According to Huricihan Islamoğlu, the peasantry was the main class that needed to be engaged by the state due to its crucial role in production, rather than being merely ‘deceived’ and convinced as traditionally depicted. She argues that the discourse and practice included a "right to subsistence" and a moral view of economics, which were essential to the state's legitimacy. The political agenda of rulers on peasant politics

³⁴⁰ Aytekin, Üretim-Düzenleme-İsyân, 19.

³⁴¹ Aytekin, 235-236.

consistently transformed to adapt to new conditions while maintaining this moral and ‘protectionist’ stance, which was also adopted down to society’s micro levels.

İslamoğlu does not fully accept the protectionism thesis but interprets this process as state-centered, viewing the peasantry as free³⁴² due to the state's moral economic politics. She suggests that the independent peasantry was a source of “the justice of the sultan.” Moreover, she argues that the moral economic agenda was utilized despite the class structure, and the state’s implementation of this agenda revealed its institutional autonomy.³⁴³

While İslamoğlu is correct that the moral economic agenda was actively used as a tool of legitimacy and was fundamentally aimed at maintaining continuity in production, attributing this agenda solely to the Imperial Household and claiming that the state acted autonomously is highly debatable. Donald Quataert³⁴⁴, who also supports the idea of a moral economic agenda, concurs that it was integral to the state's strategy.

Above all, there is no inherent contradiction between *what the state did* and *what it should have done*. The moral economic agenda can be seen as the feudal equivalent of the capitalist minimum wage, essential for the continuity of production, and achieved through struggles, much like the minimum wage. Political power was therefore obliged to implement such an agenda, not out of a genuine desire to protect the lower classes, but because it was necessary for maintaining stability and production.

Secondly, while İslamoğlu and Quataert acknowledge that the moral economic order was shaped by class conflicts and the need for conviction, they appear mistaken in attributing the development and implementation of this agenda solely to the state. In essence, the Moral Economic Agenda belongs to the producers and was imposed on the Imperial Household by them. The moral economic agenda was not framed within the Imperial Household but emerged from everyday resistances. This agenda was

³⁴² Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Köylü* (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, 2010), 90.

³⁴³ İslamoğlu-İnan, 96.

³⁴⁴ Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914,” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914*, ed. Donald Quataert and Halil İnalçık, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), 876–79

either accepted by the Imperial, Vizier-Pasha, or Âyân households, or faced opposition from them.

All this reveals that there was no inherent 'structural' reason for peasant society to be static. In sharp contrast, the peasantry was highly mobilized and politically active, particularly between the late 16th and early 19th centuries.

4.2.2. Moral Economy and Collective Action I: The Patterns of Rural Unrest

The question then arises: through what strategies did the peasantry acquire political power and form this agenda? Above all, peasants brought their movements to the political stage by emphasizing custom with the discourse of *kadim* (ancient) practices within tradition. The discourse of tradition served as the main tool for legitimization and political action. While *kadim* was the ideological discourse of the Moral Economic Agenda, "subsistence ethics, a notion of justness, and valorizing labor" formed its political side.³⁴⁵ Political turmoil and class conflicts led peasants to adhere to the discourse of ancient customs.³⁴⁶ Therefore, this agenda became visible in the historical process, with the period since the end of the 16th century providing the most vivid examples of this politics.

In his article analyzing the uprising in Vranje (1840), Cengiz Kırılı explores the theme of "from petition to rebellion"³⁴⁷ and provides a framework for analyzing peasant mobility. Kırılı illustrates that the rising anger of the peasants—stemming from a failure to meet minimum subsistence needs, the deterioration of justice, and the devaluation of labor—first manifests as complaints and eventually escalates into movements. This analytical method is also adopted here to understand the dynamics of peasant uprisings.

a. The Complaint: Privatization Trend and Emphasis on *Kadim* Discourse

As discussed in Chapter 3, the privatization process emerged as a response to a crisis that began in the late 16th century. This crisis primarily affected Anatolia and had

³⁴⁵ Aytekin, *Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 211.

³⁴⁶ Aytekin.

³⁴⁷ Cengiz Kırılı, "Tyranny Illustrated: From Petition to Rebellion in Ottoman Vranje," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 53 (November 2015): 3–36, <https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2015.17>.

multiple dimensions. According to Oktay Özel, the crisis was due to "economic deterioration, rapid population growth or pressure, or the military needs of the state,"³⁴⁸ which resulted in a vast peasant movement characterized by mass abandonment of villages. Subsequently, the peasants armed themselves, formed large armies, and engaged in conflicts with officials—events known as the Celali Revolts. Environmental historian Sam White also highlights climate fluctuations and the ensuing production crises as contributing factors.³⁴⁹ These developments led to a significant exodus of peasants and the evacuation of villages, a phenomenon referred to as the "Great Flight" (*Büyük Kaçgun*). Özel's detailed examination of the Amasya Region shows that a "newly emergent rural gentry of mostly askeri/kapıkulu origins"³⁵⁰ benefited from this process and established local sovereignties.

The emphasis on the discourse of *kadim* (ancient practices) was particularly evident in property and usufruct (*intifa hakkı*) disputes. Processes of enclosure and exclusion movements highlighted the objections of the peasants based on ancient practices. Various reasons for enclosures included "tax avoidance" and "security reasons," such as protection from raid attacks. However, as Zafer Karademir points out, another significant reason was dispossession/acquisition aimed at increasing productivity.³⁵¹ Especially after the *Celali Revolts*, enclosures and the process of çiftlikization (transformation into large agricultural estates) accelerated, posing a significant threat to traditional peasant production. Mustafa Akdağ describes this period as follows:

When the scarcity of money so suffocated the peasants, another economic phenomenon that would make them weary of their villages was the establishment of farms on a large scale by "military" (askeri) and "local notables" (yerluden kudretli olanların) who, despite the contradiction with the Ottoman mîrî land system, seized the lands of the reaya at a nominal cost. (...) After the middle of the 16th century, in addition to the "grandee farms", it is observed that the kapıkulları (mostly janissaries, sipahs and armed guards) and those who could raise money, such as kadıs and muderris, seized land in the villages and engaged in production through "farms". The

³⁴⁸ Oktay Özel, "The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576–1643," in *The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia* (Brill, 2016), 137, <https://brill.com/display/title/32664>.

³⁴⁹ White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*.

³⁵⁰ Özel, 188.

³⁵¹ Zafer Karademir, *Osmanlı Yeni Çağı'nda Tarımsal Gelişim: Ziraat, Hasılat, Ticaret*, 1. baskı, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi yayınları Tarih, 713 74 (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2023), 136ff.

effect of these farm owners in harassing the peasants was through "drudgery" and the infestation of the farmer's crops with their herds of animals. Thanks to the occasional famine and the constant shortage of money, land-loving individuals who owned farms could easily buy the "right of disposal" of the land from the distraught peasant for a few batman of flour or 100-200 akça. Even though the villages were insecure and open to all kinds of attacks during both the Interregnum (Fetret Devri) and the Great Flight, the poor people fled and found plenty of people who bought their fields for nothing and added them to their farms.³⁵²

Ultimately, peasants were excluded from commons such as lands, pastures, grazing lands, and water resources they had utilized for decades, which then became private properties of individuals. The initial step in converting common land into privately regulated land involved ending the open-source nature of these resources through physical measures like fencing, walling, or trench digging. This act of enclosure was not just a physical barrier but also a political move to eliminate traditional uses and beneficiaries of these commons. The main objective of legal and political enclosures was to liquidate the traditional uses and displace the beneficiaries of these commons. Consequently, peasants faced the risk of exclusion from their subsistence systems, forcing them into the role of wage laborers. This subsistence risk triggered local resistance from traditional beneficiaries.

The commons were not areas that could be accessed and exploited without limits. An ethic of use had formed around the commons through a traditional process spanning centuries, encompassing both the limitation of users and the regulation of their forms of use. This understanding was integral to peasant tradition. However, the private property movement, which intensified in the Ottoman Empire particularly from the late 17th century to the early 19th century, primarily aimed to dismantle this ethic.

In response to this attempt at liquidation, beneficiary peasants adhered strictly to the traditional ethic. They even viewed violations of use coming from within their own ranks as crimes, resorting to legal action. This adherence underscores the deep-rooted nature of the communal ethic among peasants. This section includes a few disputes from different regions to illustrate this point. The conflicts over the use of pasture and water resources are clearly documented in records from the late 17th century to the

³⁵² Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası: "Celalî İsyamları,"* Kültür Dizisi (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995), 490–91. The parantheses belongs to me.

early 19th century, reflecting the continuation and increase of enclosure and exclusion activities alongside the trend of privatization. This period was marked by considerable complexity.

Archival sources, especially *Âtik Şikayet Defterleri* and later *Ahkâm Defterleri*, reveal that conflicts over the commons were very common in the Ottoman Empire from the late 17th century to the early 19th century. Examination of these documents shows various forms of restriction of usage rights. Two prevalent methods were the *forcible removal of people* and the *attempt to sell usufruct* rights. The primary discourse of the Ottoman peasants against such actions was rooted in the notion of ancient usage. Peasants frequently accused those attempting to privatize common resources of acting "adverse to ancient usage" (*kadime mugayyir*).

Here, we examine examples from the three main regions where the Ottoman Empire was founded: the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Middle East. In all these cases, disputes escalated into formal complaints because individuals or groups attempted to assert private ownership over communal resources.

One notable example of exclusion by force and the subsequent ban of entry comes from Göynük, as documented on April 27, 1774.³⁵³ In this document, the peasants of Koyunlu, one of the villages belonging to the "Müteveffa Nişancı Mehmed Pasha Waqf" in Göynük, part of the "Mukataa of Alâ Mihail Bey" in the Hüdavendigâr Sanjak of the Anatolian Province, reported an enclosure issue. These peasants had traditionally used the lands of Ak Village for grazing their cattle and accessing water. However, some residents of Ak Village, acting against ancient customs (*kadime mugayyir*), seized these pastures independently (*müstakilen zabt*), constructed a building (*ihdas eyleyüb*), and forcibly prevented the Koyunlu peasants from grazing their animals there. Despite several prosecutions, the residents of Ak Village continued their oppressive actions (*taaddi*), putting the Koyunlu peasants in a difficult situation.

The Koyunlu peasants, invoking the ancient discourse, requested that the Söğüt judge be appointed as an expert (*muvel্লা')* and that their case be heard in the sharia law

³⁵³ BOA C.EV. 482/24351

(*şerren*) with attendants (*hazirun*). The notable point here is that the peasants, who use the ancient discourse, want to have their cases heard according to the principles of the sharia law in order to protect their usufruct rights, in contrast to the individual seizure (a kind of enclosure) of the pastures that are used jointly – *the traditional understanding of justice*. This aligns with the concept of minimum subsistence ethics, as argued by Scott.³⁵⁴ Unable to sustain themselves due to the restricted grazing and water access, the peasants developed a *moral economic objection*, emphasizing traditional sharia law and ancient customs. Here, religion shaped morality insofar as it reflected the peasants' ideological mentality. This suggests that morality, rather than being purely religious, referred to a traditional understanding of justice in which religion was one determinant among others.

Of course, exclusion did not rely solely on physical coercion or the ban of entry. An example from Bosnia illustrates exclusion through economic force. In a complaint dated March/April 1791 from Azgur, Bosnia,³⁵⁵ it was noted that an inhabitant of the village attempted to sell the grazing rights of a pasture. This pasture had been used "from its land and water" to feed their animals since ancient times (*vâki kadîmden berü...üstünden ve suyundan intifa' idegeldikleri*) without outside interference (*aherin alakası yoğiken*). Some villagers tried to monetize this usufruct right, prompting objections from the peasants.

This can be seen as a typical example of exclusion through the monetization of usufruct. While in Göynük, peasants were excluded by physically barring them from joint agricultural land, in Bosnia, the right to use common land was being closed off through commercialization (*hilaf-ı kanun akçe mutalebesi*). In both cases, the peasants opposed these initiatives, invoking the discourse of *kadim* to assert their traditional rights.

³⁵⁴ James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*, Nachdr. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2000).

³⁵⁵ BOA, A.DVNS. AHKR. d. 44, HK. 738 retrieved from Gizem Tunç, "44 Numaralı Rumeli Ahkâm-ı Şikâyet Defterinin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirmesi" (Unpublished Master Thesis, Akdeniz Uygarlıkları Araştırma Enstitüsü, Akdeniz Yeni ve Yakınçağ Araştırmaları Ana Bilim Dalı, Antalya, Akdeniz Üniversitesi, 2017): 522.

In a complaint dated 1689,³⁵⁶ it is mentioned that the *sipahis* named al-Hac Osman and Mehmed, who were the governors (*mutasarrıf*) of a *çiftlik* in Pervariçe, one of the villages of the "Merhum Sultan Bayezid Han Waqf," had seized lands that peasants had used since ancient times for pasture. The *sipahis* claimed that the pasture was "within the borders of their *çiftlik*" and drove the peasants' animals away. According to the document, following a court hearing in Istanbul, the *sipahis* were charged, and the land was returned to the peasants' use. Similarly, in another complaint dated June 19, 1819,³⁵⁷ it is stated that a timar land, used as "ancient winter quarters" in one of the villages of Dömeke Subdistrict of İnebahtı, whose grass and water were used by the native people, began to be used by others without proper "quarters authorization" (*kışlak resmi*). It is reported that despite demands for authorization, the peasants faced opposition. The peasants, while expressing their demands, stated that they sent *one-tenth* of what they obtained to the sultan and used the rest for themselves, but this intervention disrupted the whole process. This indicates that the peasants placed the minimum subsistence ethic at the center of their traditional policies.

A similar theme can be traced in another complaint sent on December/January 1790/1791 from the town of Cısr-i Mustafa Pasha in Bulgaria:³⁵⁸ A person known as Haji Halim claimed confiscation of the lands which the peasants had been using for pasture and irrigation since ancient times and cites "his bought the land for *mültezim* with one *kuruş mukata'a* per year" as a reason for this. In the reply sent by the sultan to the *naib (regent)* of the district, he wrote that "it is against the law to give a land title (*tapu*) and sanjak in this way" and ordered the end of the seizure of the pasture and the forcibly preventing the grazing of sheep and cattle. Of course, such oppositions were not only based on the right to use the land. The water commons were also often the subject of conflict. For instance, in a complaint dated January/February 1791 from

³⁵⁶ BOA, A.DVN.ŞKT.d 13 - HK. 390 retrieved from Hasan Basri Türk, "13 Numaralı Atık Şikayet Defteri (VR.1-142) Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin (H.1100/ M. 1689)" (Unpublished Master Thesis, Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, Türk Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, Yeniçağ Tarihi Bilim Dalı, İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2019): 230.

³⁵⁷ BOA, C.TZ. 49/2446

³⁵⁸ BOA, A.DVNS. AHKR. d. 44, HK. 502 retrieved from Tunç, "44 Numaralı Rumeli Ahkâm-ı Şikâyet Defterinin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirmesi." 364

Dermiye,³⁵⁹ the objection regarded the enclosure of the water common and the forcible denial of the right of joint use. It is mentioned that, this resource, a water spring has been in the use since ancient times (*kadîmden berü*) by the native peasants without any intervention (*şer'an ber veile müdahale olunmak icab etmez iken*), was started to use by those expellers who came from another village (*şakî intifâ' idüb*), and also the expellers started to viticulture and gardening activities (*bağ ve bağçe*) were carried out on it. The native peasants demand that the incident be resolved on the spot and with sharia law, and they want their water resources back. In another complaint about water commons written in June 1780 from Aleppo.³⁶⁰ This time the people complaint about an unjust share of a water common in Naqshbandi lodge in Aleppo. In this interesting case, the dervish lodge claims that the underground water source has been used by this lodge since ancient times (and also it is understood that it was shared with those in need: *her-kesin menziline kifayet mıkdarı câri*) but some of the people thought that an amount of water was used “contrary to ancient” and they have not consented to this kind of usage because of the lodge's doing so unfairly. Then lodge claimed that people “overstepped the mark” (*taaddi*) and complained about those people to Istanbul. Interestingly, in this case, both sides rely on their ancient discourse and both parties claim that the other acted contrary to the ancient.

As can be seen, the moral economic references of the Ottoman peasantry revolve around four key principles: First, minimum subsistence ethic was always the main concern. Actions that threatened the subsistence economy or conditions likely to cause shortages were always a major concern and source of dispute. Second, there was a clear emphasis on traditional justice. Peasants frequently referenced the fairness inherent in traditional practices and their equalizing approaches, as seen in the case of Aleppo (*her-kesin menziline kifayet mıkdarı câri*). Third, embeddedness is a central comprehension in the moral economic agenda. The statement of “*vâki kadîmden berü...üstünden ve suyundan intifa' idegeldikleri*” evokes existence of a social-

³⁵⁹ BOA, A.DVNS. AHKR. BN. d. 44, HK. 713 retrieved from Tunç, “44 Numaralı Rumeli Ahkâm-ı Şikâyet Defterinin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirmesi.” 505.

³⁶⁰ BOA, A. DVNS. AHK. HL. d. 4 – S12 – B46 retrieved from Canan Kuş, “1780–1784 Tarihli ve 4 Numaralı Halep Ahkâm Defteri (S.1–53) Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme” (Unpublished Master Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Anabilim Dalı, Elazığ, Fırat Üniversitesi, 2008): 68.

relationally determined economic understanding based mutual benefit. However, privatization and possession directly undermine this kind of understanding, replacing it with a rational political-economic model centered on individual utility and ownership (*müstakilen zabt*). Lastly, as Aytekin notes, valorization of labor is also an indispensable element. As in the case of Pervariçe, the peasants of a previous waqf land objected to their land being turned into a *çiftlik*. This fundamentally involves appropriating their existing labor regimes and narrowing their rights to land.

Depart from the examples here, it may be argued that the Imperial Household's attitude was 'protective'. However, as discussed earlier, for the upper-class circles, which were committed to the continuity of production, addressing the complaints of the peasants not only served this purpose but also provided a framework that could be used politically to gain legitimacy. When 'matters begin to be difficult', the upper classes do not hesitate to intervene, and the upper classes developed a counter-strategy to peasant displeasure and complaints: *the criminalization of custom*.³⁶¹ This policy began to take shape following a change in the understanding of land and property law. According to Yücel Terzibaşoğlu's study, land disputes in the second half of the 18th century in Anatolia predominantly involved miri land and focused on "rights of tasarruf." The concept of tasarruf refers to a series of use rights on miri lands, such as rights of cultivation in return for tax, inheritance, and transfer under certain conditions.³⁶²

Terzibaşoğlu emphasizes that the notion that "all land in the empire belonged to the Sultan" was a "legal fiction" designed to counter privatization attempts. In reality, there were many privatized lands and properties under the guise of "land grants and religious or family endowments." However, for Terzibaşoğlu:

³⁶¹ Yücel Terzibaşoğlu, "Privatisation of Land, Criminalisation of Custom, and Land Disputes in 19th-Century Anatolia," in *Les Acteurs Des Transformations Foncières Autour de La Méditerranée Au XIXe Siècle*, ed. Vanessa Guéno and Didier Guignard, Collection L'atelier Méditerranéen (Paris : Aix-en-Provence: Karthala ; Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l'homme : Institut de recherches et d'études sur le monde arabe et musulman, 2013), 25–47.

³⁶² Terzibaşoğlu, 29.

The cliché at the same time concealed the fact that the contents and strength of the bundle was very much determined in different locations according to custom, time-honoured practice and consequently by power struggles between would be landlords, peasants, and different state agencies.³⁶³

The trend toward privatization, driven by disputes and class struggles, led to the concept of *tasarruf* gradually acquiring new meanings. Initially, *tasarruf* referred to a series of use rights on *miri* lands, such as rights of cultivation in return for tax, inheritance, and transfer under certain conditions. However, over time, it began to be treated as "individual and exclusive ownership" rather than merely usufructuary rights over the land. According to Terzibaşoğlu, the primary disputes over usufructs were centered on pastures. In the micro-historical examples he studies, the "proof of property ownership" became a contentious issue between different parties. Property owners typically relied on a "legal" vocabulary to assert their claims, whereas nomads principally referred to their "time-honored customs," similar to the examples analyzed here. However, the Ottoman legal system increasingly viewed the nomads' customary references as insufficient and, more significantly, as a criminal endeavor on the land.³⁶⁴

Even though Terzibaşoğlu analyzes this turn primarily in the context of the twentieth century, the examples above indicate that this tendency began much earlier, at least as initial attempts. Moreover, these disputes did not merely remain as complaints; they often escalated into significant political confrontations, as will be revealed in the next sub-chapter.

b. The Revolt: Coping with the State in Daily Basis

The peasants did not just resort to complaints; they often took significant political action in their daily lives. When the central authorities failed to address their grievances, mere complaints would escalate into rebellion. Disregard for the subsistence ethic, distrust in the justice system, and the devaluation of labor could trigger a shift from complaint to revolt. Indeed, conditions often deteriorated for various reasons, posing a serious threat to the upper classes: *monetary crises* and taxation, *political subjugation* such as confiscation and conscription, and

³⁶³ Terzibaşoğlu, 29.

³⁶⁴ Terzibaşoğlu, 43-44.

physiological causes like starvation, famine, and disease. In rural life, each of these factors could either cause or result from production downturns and poor harvests. Because feudal economies are based on the land/labor ratio, any imbalance in this could lead to economic collapse. Throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries, as discussed, the abandonment of subsistence economies and the mass privatization and marketization of rural relations exacerbated exposure to these crises.

The second important point is the types of social action. When worsening conditions led to numerous revolts of varying extents, general peasant uprisings, which will be examined in this chapter, became more common. In such situations, several tactics of resistance stand out, primarily rooted in the power derived from production. Peasants sometimes acted collectively and on a daily basis, while at other times they formed small, armed groups. However, as James C. Scott also argues, armed uprisings or mass rebellions were high-cost actions.³⁶⁵ Therefore, resistance at a more 'everyday level' was more common in Ottoman rural society. Yet, there is no reason to consider these actions as apolitical or indicative of stagnation. On the contrary, everyday movements concerning land tenure, rights of use, tax avoidance, desertion, and other political-economic disputes were continuous, unlike 'incidental' movements, and they always kept society in action. In the resistance stage, two main political action patterns leading to revolt seem apparent: first, mass mobilization (armed or unarmed) on the land, and second, taking up arms and leaving the land as small groups, sometimes labeled as banditry.

First of all, contrary to the mainstream view, mobilization in various forms was very common. Both archival documents and contemporary accounts provide evidence of these uprisings. For example, the French entomologist and naturalist Guillaume-Antoine Olivier (1756-1814), who traveled around the Ottoman Empire between 1792 and 1798, mentions an incident in Urfa. While he was in Urfa, the governor of Diyarbakir launched a military campaign against Urfa due to armed resistance stemming from high taxes and persecution.³⁶⁶ Olivier reports rumors that the governor

³⁶⁵ Scott, *the Moral Economy of Peasant*.

³⁶⁶ Guillaume-Antoine Olivier, *Türkiye Seyahatnamesi: 18. Yüzyılda İstanbul ve Türkiye*, trans. Oğuz Gökmen (1800; repr., İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2024), 357.

came with two thousand soldiers and planned to massacre the populace. Interestingly, the Imperial Household supported the people of Urfa against the previously rebellious governor as a form of punishment. The size of the governor's army and the preparedness of the region suggest this was a mass armed rebellion.

Olivier also mentions another incident involving a French naval architect named Toussaint, who worked in Gemlik, Bursa. Toussaint was violently attacked by a group of fifty to sixty mountain villagers for cutting timber from a local forest and transporting it to the shipyard. He fought back with a gun and managed to escape.³⁶⁷

There is a conceptual confusion regarding the term "banditry" as used by the Imperial Household. While small armed groups typically come to mind when thinking of banditry, the Imperial Household also labeled larger mass movements, such as the Dağlı Rebellions in the Rhodope Mountains, as banditry. These rebellions involved thousands of peasants and lasted for years.³⁶⁸ For instance, 3,000 peasants participated in the uprisings in Gümülcine, requiring 8,000 soldiers to suppress them. In another document, the Imperial Household acknowledged the class character of the Dağlı rebels, describing them as "the men of cultivation and agriculture (*erbab-ı hars ve ziraat*)" who left their children and livestock due to increasing atrocities and attacks³⁶⁹, rather than labeling them merely as mavericks, robbers, or vagrants. In some cases, the Imperial Household used the term "peasant bandits" (*reaya eşkiyası*) to describe the masses, indicating a failure to distinguish between different types of resistance.³⁷⁰ Smaller actions that were nonetheless significant were sometimes called "*ihtilal*" (revolution/revolt). For example, a document from 1789 mentions that persecution by a person named İsmail Bey caused a mass *ihtilal* in the Sanjak of Serez/Siroz in today's

³⁶⁷ Olivier, 225.

³⁶⁸ Öztaş, The Agrarian Background to the "Dağlı Rebellion in the Rhodope Mountains (1780-1810), 63.

³⁶⁹ Öztaş, 65.

³⁷⁰ For example, see BOA, HAT, 1315-51279.

Greece.³⁷¹ In another document from 1791, the royal admiral (*kaptan-ı derya*) reported a local ihtilal in Canik, Samsun.³⁷² Therefore, the issue of the "size" of banditry should be scrutinized carefully, as the term encompassed a range of actions from small armed groups to large-scale peasant uprisings.

Regarding the concept of 'banditry' in small armed groups, as understood by Barkey, there are several incomplete treatments and oversights. Indeed, after the 16th century, such activities took place in many regions, especially in Anatolia and Rumelia. As discussed previously, Barkey claims that these bandit troops were merely local marauders and looters who attacked peasants. She argues that they cooperated with the Imperial Household, mediating the process of inclusion by negotiating with them. Barkey dismisses Eric Hobsbawm's arguments in "Primitive Rebels"³⁷³ by accusing him of "romanticism," but there are newer and more analytical approaches that align more closely with Hobsbawm's perspective.

First, as Baris Cayli underlines, there is indeed a "dilemma" and "paradoxical" situation at first glance.³⁷⁴ However, these contradictions are inherent in the formation of rural societies. Cayli notes that "crime, violence, and social exploitation were constant variables that became embedded in the everyday lives of rural communities." Expecting a degree of 'democracy' or 'deliberativeness' from these societies might not be an objective view. Because of this inherent character of rural society, the relationship between peasants and bandits did not merely criminalize the rural communities. Moreover, as Cayli highlights, "the perplexing relationship between the

³⁷¹ BOA, AE, SABH.I., 13-1184. The person reporting the situation asks when this persecution will end (*ne zaman cezasını bulacak*), and adds, those who support the oppressors will suffer the oppression of God. (*Cenab-ı Hâk zalimlere sahib çıkanları kahr-eyleye*).

³⁷² BOA, C..BH., 68-3244

³⁷³ See E. J. Hobsbawm, *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebel: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959).

³⁷⁴ Baris Cayli, "Peasants, Bandits, and State Intervention: The Consolidation of Authority in the Ottoman Balkans and Southern Italy," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 18, no. 2 (2018): 16, <https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12228>.

peasants and the bandits did not just criminalize the rural communities."³⁷⁵ All these 'democratic' features are values that have emerged over a historical process, and their existence is still debated. Overall, there was a tendency to use force, armed propaganda, and mobilization by instilling fear against the unremitting coercion of different exploiter classes.

Regarding the issue of 'state-bandit' relations, it might be more realistic to approach the matter by considering that the Imperial Household developed a source of legitimacy to intervene in these local communities under the guise of a 'fake protective' role against banditry. As long as the infrastructural problems in these communities were not addressed, security-centered interventions against bandit troops did not produce significant results.³⁷⁶ Moreover, in some instances, peasants were forced into conflict with bandit troops; however, when the peasants refused to fight the bandits and tried to escape, they were banished by the Imperial Household.³⁷⁷

There is little doubt that bandits were inhabitants of the same communities, meaning they knew each other well. This suggests that the possibility of negotiation between them was also stronger. Indeed, in some cases, peasants joined bandit groups, as illustrated in Karaferye: according to the document, a bandit named "Yamandı" revolted in 1821, and the people of "Agostos/Ağustos" joined his band. The Imperial Household then sought the help of the âyân.³⁷⁸ This case reveals that there was not always confrontation between peasantry and banditry; on the contrary, there could be pressure from above.

³⁷⁵ Cayli.

³⁷⁶ Cayli.

³⁷⁷ For example, see BOA, C.ZB., 28-1389. This 1804-dated document reveals that villagers of İnöz, Edirne had escaped by disobeying the center's call for resistance and exiled.

³⁷⁸ BOA, HAT, 880-38934. "Karaferye kazasında (...) isyân iden Yamandı (...) -nâm melunun nadi-i etrafı dahi sirayet iderek Ağustos (...) dahi ayaklanmış olduğundan, Paşa Sancağı dahilinde olan âyândan Manastır Kaim-makamına..."

Lastly, the negotiation between bandits and the Imperial Household does not necessarily imply reaching an agreement. Armed action was often undertaken to achieve certain goals and might involve a negotiation process eventually.³⁷⁹ As Cayli agrees, banditry was a source of significant problems for the Imperial Household in the long-term analysis, and serious efforts were made to eliminate them. Negotiations did not always result in agreements. For instance, in a document, Selim III warns his vizier that Ali Pasha's policy of patronizing the bandits would not stop the "disorder" (*fesad*) and orders for a new consideration of the issue.³⁸⁰

Class belonging is another distorted matter in the context of banditry. Often, examples suggest that bandits were not peasants but disbanded, vagrant ex-soldiers. This misses the point that military service was a professional occupation for a very limited group of people in the Early Modern Era. In the case of banditry, most bandits were peasants who had abandoned their villages due to poverty, tax suppression, or other hardships, and had entered the military service of a local notable. These individuals were known as *sekban* and *sarıca*. Those of peasant origin could become bandits, for instance, when they were frustrated by the military service of a notable.

Rebellions involving thousands of people cannot be attributed solely to groups that number only a few thousand. It is evident that there was local support from the inhabitant peasantry, as seen in the Celali Revolts, the Dağlı Rebellion, or the Aydın Revolt. For example, one witness of the Celali Revolts, *Vasiti*, describes the preparation of the peasants during the uprisings. According to him, "rich or poor, old or young, the most of the *reaya* and *beraya* have sold their lands and oxen and bought horses, also sold their pillows and bought rifles, also they were giving up their goods

³⁷⁹ BOA, HAT, 83-3437. In the proposal sent in 1801, it suggested that to negotiate with bandits (*müzakere*) in order to peacefully end (*sulhen*) the Dağlı Rebellion.

³⁸⁰ BOA, TS.MA.e, 786-4. Selim III says these in summary: "These men rebelled before and continued to do so even in the face of executions and exiles, they escape and come together again. How does the Ali Paşa feed these men? As long as these men are alive, they will not stop being bandit, and they will not be a lesson/warning to other bandits, but they will be an encouragement." In Ottoman Turkish, "(...) Fesadları selefte dahi eyleyenler, idam-izaleleriyle dahi eylemişler (...) firar eyleyüb yine cemiyete başlarlar (...) Ali Paşa bir sürü eşkiyayı ne ile besler, (...) madem ki bu herifler sağdır, Dağlulukdan vazgeçmezler ve sair müfsidlerî dahî ibret olmaz, belki kuvvet-i kalblerine yol olur (...)"

and taking up spears. Some of them as horsemen, some of them as infantry (*sekban*), peasants put on a sword, they were building forts and redoubts everywhere, and they were resisting.”³⁸¹

To idealize the peasant rebels with local nomenclatures (*Celali, Kırçali, Hajduks, Zeybek, Fellahin, etc.*) and then describe these actions as mere mutiny rather than as peasant movements is to deny reality.

As can be seen, there have also been mass movements. Apart from that, how did the peasantry resist on a daily basis? Documents, travelogues, and secondary studies show that three types of daily resistance were very common in rural life: farm-breaking (*çift-bozanlık*), avoiding paying taxes, and sabotage. Additionally, rural banditry (*eşkiyalık*) emerged as a type of peasant politics precisely due to these problems.

First of all, *çift-bozanlık*, meaning “farm-breaking,” was a very common method of resistance. Especially after the late-16th century, the fragmentation of land due to privatization and enclosure processes was the main reason for *çift-bozanlık*.³⁸² Economic reasons such as inflation, money shortages, and adulterations (*tağşiş*) contributed to this action. Moreover, due to the climate crisis, arable lands shrank, and the land became insufficient in relation to the population pressure, even if the population did not increase.³⁸³ As a result, the deterioration in the land/labor ratio and the hardening of subsistence pushed peasants out of the system. As Oktay Özel notes, villages would become inhabited and prosperous again (*re’âyası perâkende ve perişân hâlî*).³⁸⁴

³⁸¹ Gökür Çelik, “Vâsîfî’nin ‘Gazâvât-ı Murad Paşa’ Adlı Eserinin İncelenmesi” (Unpublished Master Thesis, Istanbul, Marmara University, 2006), 55. In Turkish, “(...)memleketler harâb ve re’âyâ ü berâyâ dağlar başında ıztırâbda olduğundan gayri, niçeleri çiftin ve çubuğun dağıdıp öküzün satup at edinüp, saban demürin tufenge değışüp ögendere kullanırken gündüz kullanmağa başlayup, bi’l-cümle ganî ve fakîr ve civân ve pîri kimi atlı ve kimi segbân olup, ata binüp kılıç kuşanup semt semt kal’alar ve palankalar ihdâs edüp ve ba’zı mahallerde tırkâz dimekle ma’rûf olan yerlere tehassun eyleyüp, serhadlerde düşmen vilâyetlerine teveccühle akın edülüp ise bunlar dahi irak ve yakîn etrâf ü eknâfa akın edüp, bu tarikle dâ’ire-i salâh u sedâddan hurûc ve evc-i ‘isyân u tuğyâna ‘urûc eylemişler idi”

³⁸² Emine Erdoğan Özünlü and Osman Gümüşçü, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İç Göç Aktörleri Olarak Çift-Bozanlar,” *Amme İdaresi Dergisi* 49, no. 1 (2016): 47–48 Especially see the table.

³⁸³ Özünlü and Gümüşçü.

³⁸⁴ Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 129.

This action caused serious problems for the system.³⁸⁵ According to İnalçık, leaving the land was a kind of “passive resistance” that harmed the Imperial Household as much as active uprisings because it directly disrupted the military system.³⁸⁶ İnalçık notes that the center was forced to take action by the peasantry who left the record (*haymana* or *defter harici reaya*), such as “condemning abuses” and “lightening taxes.”³⁸⁷

This was a more significant development than one might think, and it cannot be defined as "passive" in respect to this action pattern's long-term consequences. A similar process took place in Europe after the 13th century. As Kerem Nisancıoğlu and Alexander Anievas underline, feudal tenure collapsed due to a radical change in the land/labor ratio, leading to mass peasant mobilizations³⁸⁸ similar to çift-bozanlık. As it became increasingly impossible to bind peasants to the land, lords had to resort to local intermediaries called 'tenants' and leased their land for cultivation. In those lands, instead of a subsistence economy, free and wage-based labor emerged because tenants no longer bound them to the land after the general crisis of feudal production. Silvia Federici defines this process as the "golden age of labor" due to the rising collective bargaining power of the peasants.³⁸⁹

Even if the Ottoman case might not have been as advantageous for the Ottoman peasantry, it seems they had a moral superiority against the Imperial Household. In that sense, they turned çift-bozanlık into a political weapon. For instance, peasants sometimes threatened the sultan with not cultivating the land. Being nomadic (*göçebe*)

³⁸⁵ For example, see BOA, AE.SMMD.IV., 28 – 3167. According to the document dated 1664, many of peasants of Sigetvar left their villages and settled in suburbs of Segedin, Budin and Istolni Belgrade. However, the peasant did not pay the çift-bozan akçesi, (çiftbozan virmeüyü) there were problems in recruiting army.

³⁸⁶ Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy*, Collected Studies ; CS87 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978), 350.

³⁸⁷ İnalçık.

³⁸⁸ Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism* (Pluto Press, 2015), 80, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183pb6f>.

³⁸⁹ Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation* (New York: Autonomedia, 2004), 45–46.

was always a choice for peasants, and as Faroqhi underlines, there were no strict borders between sedentary and nomadic lifestyles, in contrast to many other places. The "possibility to evade" was a very powerful aspect of this weapon.³⁹⁰ Barkey also confirms this idea and underlines the concept of "renomadization":

Therefore, before embarking on drastic confrontation with the oppressor, the oppressed may pursue avoidance ploys. Among the most prominent are flight, renomadization (with accompanying changes in the mode of production), and migrations to distant highlands inaccessible to power holders. In the Ottoman Empire, migration to the cities, temporary employment opportunities, and religious schooling became attractive possibilities, especially for young unattached men. Peasants also made use of periodic settlements and the extra land these offered for occasional cultivation, and when conditions worsened they reverted to nomadism. They tried to adapt, but a rapacious state often caught up with them, registered them on other settlements, and forced them to pay additional taxes. For every peasant alternative, state agents, tax collectors, and officials with various claims devised a novel response. Alternatives, then, became temporary solutions practiced by some in the game of one-upmanship with the state and its officials.³⁹¹

As a result, *çift-bozanlık* can be regarded as a significant political catalyst in the transition to the *iltizam* system. It is evident that peasants had a tendency to leave their land en masse during this period. The issue of binding peasants to the land arose in the Ottoman Empire after the 16th century, but classical solutions failed to work. Traditionally, when a peasant abandoned their land, production was disrupted, and revenue was lost, leading to the potential dissolution of the system. To counter this, the Imperial Household imposed a fine called the "*çift-bozan akçesi*" to prevent such actions. Additionally, the *sipahi* had the authority to bring back escaped peasants on *timar* lands. However, those who had lived in a city for more than ten years could not be removed, and if one had resided there for twenty years, their residence was considered permanent. Despite these measures, the system collapsed as a whole by the late 16th century. The expansion of the Empire's borders made the old methods untenable, and a new approach became inevitable. Consequently, the sultan (as the landlord) had to lease (*iltizam*) *miri* land to tenants (*mültezims*) to ensure the continuity of production. This shift was driven by the need to maintain agricultural

³⁹⁰ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London : New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 55.

³⁹¹ Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 90.

productivity and revenue, reflecting the peasantry's significant influence on the political and economic strategies of the ruling elite.

Avoiding paying taxes was another common form of daily resistance among Ottoman peasants. Tax refusal or evasion was a frequent practice, and the peasants employed various tactics to achieve this. Political scientist Necmi Erdoğan coined the term "popular metis" to describe these "heterological" actions of subalterns against the law.³⁹² According to Erdoğan, the Ottoman lower classes exhibited creativity in "bypassing the state" (*devleti idare etmek*) and "coping with" it (*devletle başa çıkmak*). Their methods included cunning, trickery, disguise, pretense, simulation, dissimulation, evasion, vigilance, and cynicism.³⁹³ "Eschewal and escape" from state control were primary actions for the peasantry, manifesting in forms like tax avoidance and evasion of military drafts, which were seen as indirect taxation through compulsory service. As Faroqhi asserts:

However different arrangements by which devir might be avoided nonetheless are also recorded in the Mühimme registers. Thus in 1056/1646-47 villagers of Siravolos on the Aegean coast had agreed to a yearly payment of one hundred thousand akçe to the sultan's kitchen, on condition that they would not be asked to provide irregular soldiers for the governor's service, and the devir remained forbidden. This exemption was disregarded by certain governors, whereupon the villagers had it confirmed; whether this second attempt at enforcement was more successful remains unknown. Much more problematic were negotiations which took place in the sub-povince of Bolu about 1046/1636-37. 5 Here villagers and tribesmen of the districts of Bolu, Dodurga, Samakov, Ova, Ulus and Bartın protested the tax-collecting tours which the governor's commanders undertook once every three months. Large groups of people participated in this protest; unfortunately, the rescript does not describe the way in which they were convoked and organized.³⁹⁴

As Aytekin underlines, the notion of justness or traditional justice understanding revealed itself in issues related to direct and indirect taxation.³⁹⁵ According to him, "tax strikes were a frequent method of protest," and "withholding the taxes" was a

³⁹² Necmi Erdoğan, "Devleti 'İdare Etmek': Mâduniyet ve Düzenbazlık," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 83 (2000): 8.

³⁹³ Necmi Erdoğan, 8-9.

³⁹⁴ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Coping with The State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1720* (İstanbul: Gorgias Press, 2010), 59.

³⁹⁵ Aytekin, "Negotiating Religion, Moral Economy and Economic Ideas in the Late Ottoman Empire", 201.

common practice in this regard. Similarly, military service and conscription, seen as a form of direct taxation, were also issues of evasion. Veysel Şimşek notes that "the Ottoman military and civilian population quickly realized that conscription meant forceful indictment," leading to about 20,000 Mansure soldiers deserting between 1826 and 1837.³⁹⁶ Joel Beinin reveals that Egyptian peasants similarly resisted Mehmed Ali Pasha's rule by resisting conscription.³⁹⁷

Desertion manifested itself in various forms of non-participation in military campaigns, especially during 'the Classical Age.' Being conscripted into the army meant being away from their land and, naturally, losing revenue. In some cases, the Imperial Household received requests for exemption from military service,³⁹⁸ or soldiers deserted. These acts of evasion and escape from taxation can be evaluated as a '*politics of surplus-saving*' against the surplus-extraction agenda imposed by different households.

Sabotage was another mode of resistance. In her work focusing on the Palestinian peasantry, Amy Singer reveals their sabotage practices against surplus-extraction policies:

The formulae of "rebellion" and "oppression" which appear over and over again in the sijills reinforce a mythology of peasants revolting against evil exploitative officials. Reading beyond the standard phrases, however, the details of individual incidents show that peasants acted against officials or contrary to the laws in ways which could not be construed as collectively rebellious. They punched holes in water lines, stole grain from the threshing floor, beat up officials, and tried to cheat the tax collectors by various artifices.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁶ Veysel Şimşek, "The First 'Little Mehmeds': Conscripts for the Ottoman Army, 1826-53," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 2014, 282, <https://doi.org/10.18589/oa.562133>.

³⁹⁷ Joel Beinin, *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East*, The Contemporary Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 27, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612800>.

³⁹⁸ For instance, see BOA, C..AS., 336-13932. In this example, because the people of Üsküb, Koçana and Kratova were generally niter and miner (*güherçile ve madenci*), they were asked to be exempted from military service and compensation for their protection (*sıyaneten*).

³⁹⁹ Amy Singer, *Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 116–17.

In addition to those methods, according to Singer, the peasants also attempted to undermine the system by cultivating remote or unsurveyed lands that were not included in the current tahrir.⁴⁰⁰ Egyptian peasants were not only sabotaging the means of production but also themselves. According to Khaled Fahmy,

(...) most common techniques employed were chopping off the index finger, pulling the front teeth and/or putting rat poison in one's eye so as to blind oneself hopefully only temporarily. When the extent of these practices became "very common" the Pasha resolved to punish the mutilated men and their accomplices severely by sending them to prison for life, as well as conscripting their relatives instead of them.⁴⁰¹

Beinin points out that “the combination of peasant resistance/avoidance” led to a “shortage of labor and declining revenue,” compelling Mehmed Ali to abandon the monopoly system and devise a new decentralized rural administration, among other reasons.⁴⁰²

Despite all this, most scholars define these practices as “passive” and attribute them to “peasant stagnancy” and a “lack of mass peasant protest.”⁴⁰³ This perspective is often rooted in a false comparison with Europe, where mass political action is frequently based on ‘revolutionary’ violence. This common view overlooks the nature of social movements and politics. However, the Ottoman peasant’s social actions align more closely with what James Scott calls “infrapolitics.”⁴⁰⁴

According to Scott, moving everyday forms of resistance closer to the center of the analysis of class relations challenges the notion that such activities are marginal because they are: 1) unorganized, unsystematic and individual; 2) opportunistic and

⁴⁰⁰ Singer, 93.

⁴⁰¹ Hālid Fahmī, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 1. publ. in Egypt (Cairo: the American Univ. in Cairo Pr, 2003), 102.

⁴⁰² Beinin, 27.

⁴⁰³ Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914,” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914*, ed. Donald Quataert and Halil İnalcık, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), 876–79; Erdoğan, “Devleti ‘İdare Etmek’: Mâduniyet ve Düzenbazlık”; Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan*, 55.

⁴⁰⁴ James C. Scott, “Everyday Forms of Resistance,” *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 4 (May 5, 1989): 33, <https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v4i1.1765>.

self-indulgent; 3) have no revolutionary consequences and/or 4) imply in their intention or logic an accommodation with".⁴⁰⁵

Scott argues that these are unnecessary and non-compulsory criteria in class movements. The important criteria are whether these actions form a "pattern of resistance" and whether they lead to a general conclusion.⁴⁰⁶ "Unity of purpose" is decisive in this sense, such as tax resistance and desertion, as discussed.⁴⁰⁷ Like the bourgeois revolution, lower-class struggle is also a long-term process. The everyday struggles of the peasants led to political results in the long term, such as the degradation of the upper-class agenda or the issuance of protective policy sets. The examples examined in this sub-chapter, spanning almost the entire geography of the Empire, support this view. Peasants who had never seen each other resisted and made gains around a common Moral Economic agenda and with similar methods.

4.2.3. Urban Societies and Artisans: Living as Producers at the Ottoman Cities

Even though not all artisans were members of the lower class or poor, urban lower classes were primarily composed of artisans from various occupations, such as blacksmiths, carriers, shoemakers, grocers, and tailors. In addition to these professionals, people from other occupations also engaged in commercial activities and artisanry. For instance, many poor janissaries became integrated into the artisan community (*esnaf*) and had largely abandoned their military service.

Artisans were required to be members of guilds to obtain the title of 'artisan' and a work permit, allowing them to operate in their respective fields. Similar to the peasantry's *çift-hane* system, the production relations in Ottoman cities are often explained through the institutional framework of the guild system (*lonca sistemi*). Due

⁴⁰⁵ Scott, 50-51.

⁴⁰⁶ Scott, 36.

⁴⁰⁷ Scott, 39-43.

to the abundance of data on this system and its institutions, the urban social structure is much clearer than that of rural society, leading to a vast literature on the subject.

In general terms, guilds were occupation-oriented monopolistic organizations of artisans and maintained a close relationship with political power, serving as one of the main institutions of Ottoman urban life. These bodies had an internal hierarchy, including wardens (kethüda or kâhya) as official representatives of a guild, foremen (yiğitbaşı), and regulatory masters (nizam ustaları) who acted as quality control experts. Ideally, a candidate for a profession would progress from apprentice (çırak) to journeyman (kalfa) and finally receive a diploma (icazetname) to become a master (usta) of the profession. It is not wrong to think of them as pre-capitalist enterprises in a way. Beyond spatial unity, they were bound by a common legal framework, and their pricing, profits, and revenues were regulated and determined by political power. The officially fixed prices on specific products and services, known as narh, presented the legal framework of this system. Ideally, the guilds aimed to i) regulate the market, ii) guarantee subsistence and wealth, and iii) maintain the quality of products at a certain level.⁴⁰⁸

In Classical historiography, one of the most prominent works on guilds is the economic historian Sabri F. Ülgener's "İktisadi İnhitat Tarihimizin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Meseleleri" (The Moral and Mental Issues of Our Economic Decline History).⁴⁰⁹ This study is significant as it showcases the general understanding of Classical historiography regarding artisanry as a class. Ülgener establishes a socio-economic analysis focusing on the dichotomy between the West and the East, basing his arguments on moral and mental frameworks that directly determine economic activities. Following the lines of Max Weber and Werner Sombart, he attributes the reasons for the East's backwardness to the lack of values identified by Weber and Sombart in their analyses of capitalism.

⁴⁰⁸ See Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı'da Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 43, 57, 292. This view closely related to Genç's theory on Ottoman economic thought consist of 'provisionism, traditionalism and fiscalism' principles, see 39ff.

⁴⁰⁹ Sabri F. Ülgener, *İktisadi İnhitat Tarihimizin Ahlâk ve Zihniyet Meseleleri* (İsmail Akgün Matbaası, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Yayınları no. 55, 1951).

Ülgener begins by narrating the evolutionary emergence of “Medieval Morality” and its socio-economic outputs in both Eastern and Western civilizations.⁴¹⁰ These outputs have two dimensions: a “Stagnant-Enclosed Artisanry Understanding” (durgun-kapalı sanat kavrayışı), which relies on well-defined, fortified rules designed to suppress profit motives and limit sociological mobility, and “Custom and Authority” (görenek ve otorite), which aims to stop individual initiative and embed economic activities within a collective structure resistant to innovation and change. This structure, in collaboration with the tasavvuf (Sufism) discourse and organization, tightly closes its doors to all kinds of change.

Ülgener's analysis aligns significantly with Bernard Lewis's study on Islamic guilds, particularly in its orientalist emphasis on stasis, immutability, immobility, and reactionary tendencies.⁴¹¹ According to Ülgener, production forms based on “austerity” and “traditionalism,” codified in the ethics of futüvvat, inevitably became reactionary. While European powers transcended “Medieval Morality,” fostering a mentality of entrepreneurship and establishing a rational system based on “rational calculation”⁴¹² in the 19th and 20th centuries, the East rejected these transformations and failed to progress, resulting in narrowing and shallowing socio-economic structures.

As Western powers constructed a capitalist economy, even the notion of “making a profit” was pejoratively regarded in the East. Ülgener characterizes the economic life in the East, even after the Medieval times, as closed systems and criticizes this harshly (often contemptuously) as backward due to its resistance to capitalist logic. According to him, the most critical factor contributing to this backwardness was the closure of the Eastern trade routes, which caused the previously emergent “mentality of profit

⁴¹⁰ Ülgener, 44-91.

⁴¹¹ Bernard Lewis, “The Islamic Guilds,” *The Economic History Review* 8, no. 1 (1937): 20–37, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2590356>.

⁴¹² Ülgener, *İktisadî İnhitat Tarihimizin Ahlâk ve Zihniyet Meseleleri*, 205-206. At that point, he quotes Weber's “Die protestantische Ethik under Der Geist des Kapitalismus, p. 8, 1934” here.

and enterprise” to become obsolete, leading the Ottoman Empire to “medievalize” again after a period of ascendancy.⁴¹³

As 'esnafization' intensified and grew, the corresponding shrinkage of raw material resources and narrowing of release possibilities led to a “moral degradation” among artisans: “(...)cutting back on raw materials, seducing journeymen and apprentices, swindling customers with false oaths and false guarantees.”⁴¹⁴ Ülgener describes the economic subject as “trapped in the mold of the narrow bazaar” with “the inertia instinct, lack of spontaneity, and lack of intelligence and mental observation,”⁴¹⁵ focused not on production but on profiteering, embodying a “low morality” in contrast to the “bourgeois morality” of Europe.⁴¹⁶

Another founding figure, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, reviews Ülgener's emphasis on “the consciousness of overseership (ağalık) and masterdom (efendilik) as a continuation of the feudal mentality,” suggesting it caused “a laxity of spirit and nerve” that hindered the development of a capitalist economic mentality. This “moral and mystical upbringing” was seen as an obstacle to creative economic activities.

Barkan goes further than Ülgener, attributing the absence of a class of capitalists and entrepreneurs, who could rise above this “morality” and position themselves above the artisans, as the primary reason for their “degeneration” (soysuzlaşma). According to Ülgener's analysis, the "values of feudal morality" were not embraced by the secular or religious upper classes but remained as “normative moral and sectarian rules” belonging to the lower classes. Both Barkan and Ülgener emphasize that this moral framework eventually “overflowed,” leading the lower classes to emulate the upper classes by degenerating the “fütüvvet” morality, manifesting a desire for wealth, greatness, and titles, expressed through the lust for gold and silver.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹³ Ülgener, 109-110.

⁴¹⁴ Ülgener, 149.

⁴¹⁵ Ülgener, 200-209.

⁴¹⁶ Ülgener, 209.

⁴¹⁷ Barkan, ““İktisadî İntihat Tarihimizin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Meseleleri,”” 168.

This analysis shared by Ülgener and Barkan, although it may not seem apparent, is fundamentally an arrogant modernist discourse that is completely disconnected from an analysis of capitalism and imperialism. It adopts an entirely anti-people stance in its class analysis, presenting a bizarre and anachronistic view that reduces the complex issue of transitioning to capitalism to a political decision or a change in mentality. This perspective blames the people, whom it characterizes as “slothful,” for “not having thought about capitalism.” Barkan concludes his review article with high praise for Ülgener and his work, but his own contributions are largely rooted in modernist, orientalist, and patrimonialist emphases similar to those of Ülgener.

For instance, in Barkan’s posthumously published lecture notes, he suggests that artisan organizations, which had influenced the state’s establishment processes, had declined and become a “conservative” power hindering innovation and advancement. According to Barkan, this dissolution and degeneration progressed in tandem with the economic and financial crises the state was experiencing. Following the dissolution of the traditional “corporative system” and the emergence of a class that produced according to “capitalist” methods, these classes, who lost their status, privileges, and rights, were actually trying to protect their own interests behind the defense of “morality, religion, and the public interest.”⁴¹⁸ Barkan's modernist perspective depicts a composite “lower strata” that suddenly becomes “reactionary” and untenable when a new power emerges.

The study by Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, which surveys the class and institution of craftsmanship through the ideas of futüvvet and Sufism, aligns with Ülgener and Barkan on many points. According to Gölpınarlı, the primary reason for the collapse of the craftsmanship system was “the invasion of the Ottoman market by European big industry.” In addition, similar to Ülgener and Barkan's perspectives, Gölpınarlı cites the invasion of trades by non-taxpaying military classes as another contributing factor to the collapse. With these developments, customs such as “banality” and “cheapness” began to prevail, leading to a decline in craftsmanship. The “fusion with Europe” also

⁴¹⁸ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Esnaf Cemiyetleri,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 41, no. 1–4 (1985): 45-46.

brought profound changes in the way of living and thinking, further dissolving the traditional system.⁴¹⁹

Nor do these studies tend to focus on the various regions of the Empire, often generalizing mostly from the order in Istanbul. However, during the same period, there are significant studies on tradesmen and guild organizations in other regions of the Empire. For instance, Nikolay Todorov's 1967 study delves into Bulgarian wadmâl (aba) and cotton cord (kaytan) craftsmanship in the 19th century,⁴²⁰ offering a structural analysis of these trades. Todorov demonstrates that within the social pyramid of artisans, there existed a segment that became wealthy and bourgeois in character, fundamentally altering the relations of production from urban to rural areas.

In a relatively nationalist interpretation, Todorov attributes the inability of this class to fully abandon the guild system and establish free trade and capitalism to the Ottoman Empire's failure to support these Bulgarian entrepreneurs. He argues that since the Ottoman Empire did not recognize the artisan organization as an economic class in its own right but rather as a “feudal appendage,” it only nurtured those within the existing system. Consequently, the emerging bourgeoisie had to clash with this institution to create economic space for itself. However, Todorov contends that Bulgarians, as an “oppressed and foreign” nation, did not attempt such a transformation, being constrained by their status within the Empire.⁴²¹

This classical narrative share three common elements: Guilds were a i) closed-circuit and static, ii) strongly religious and ethnicity-based, and iii) completely under state control systems. Thus, artisans were considered as people who share these values. According to the perception established by Ülgener, Barkan, and Gölpınarlı, slackness and engrossing, anti-entrepreneurship and anti-innovation, religious fanaticism and

⁴¹⁹ Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, *İslâm ve Türk İllerinde Fütüvvet Teşkilatı*, ed. Fritz Neumark, Sabri F. Ülgener, and Ömer Lütfi Barkan (İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası, 2011), 82. Facsimile of the first edition published in İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, vol. 11, no. 1-4, October 1949-July 1950.

⁴²⁰ Nikolay Todorov, “19. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Bulgaristan Esnaf Teşkilatında Bazı Karakter Değişmeleri,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 27, no. 1-2 (1967): 1-36.

⁴²¹ Todorov, 30-36.

traditionalism were the character of the artisans. Also, this character was defined as embedded and stagnant. Bernard Lewis claimed that this stagnancy lasted 700 years between 12th century 19th century.⁴²²

Undoubtedly, this approach represents a typical Early-Republican historiography, also tinged with Orientalism, which fetishizes Ottoman institutions as a broken-down structure and an obstacle to reforms. However, new studies on artisanry and artisans reveal a more nuanced and relational picture. Like other types of organizations, guilds also evolved over time, adapting to new circumstances and gaining new forms.

Suraiya Faroqhi suggests four periods of transformation for guilds: The first period involved artisan brotherhoods imbued with the *fütüvvet* ethos in Anatolia and Bosnia before the 1500s. The second period, from 1500-1600, saw the guild system becoming a ‘classical’ formation by embracing and transforming these brotherhoods. The third period, from the 1720s to the early 1800s, marked the emergence and rise of the *gedik* system. Finally, the fourth period, from the 1800s to the early 20th century, was characterized by the decline and disappearance of the guilds.⁴²³

According to Onur Yıldırım, the initial institutionalization of the guild system in the 1600s was largely a response to the wave of mass migrations to cities and following subsistence crisis in the cities after the Celali Revolts.⁴²⁴ The second transformation pertained to the changing attitudes of the state towards pious foundations (*ewqaf*) that typically held ateliers and commercial buildings. In the 18th century, facing fiscal crises, the political power began to confiscate foundation properties and appropriate their tax-exempt revenues, often against Islamic law.

The emergence of the *gedik* system, as both Faroqhi and Yıldırım highlight, represented another significant transformation. *Gedik*-holders could practice their

⁴²² Lewis, “The Islamic Guilds,” 27.

⁴²³ Suraiya Faroqhi, ed., *Bread from the Lion’s Mouth: Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities*, International Studies in Social History, vol. 25 (New York: Berghahn, 2015), 20.

⁴²⁴ Onur Yıldırım, “Transformation of the Craft Guilds in Istanbul (1650-1860),” *Islamic Studies* 40, no. 1 (2001): 50-51, 52ff.

crafts exclusively and benefit from the usufruct of the tools and implements in their ateliers. Artisans interpreted the gedik system as an opportunity for privatization, stretching the classical framework of the guild system.⁴²⁵ For instance, Nalan Turna reveals that the gediks of barbers became a means of acquiring private property in the 18th century, with these gediks being bought, inherited, and even owned by women.⁴²⁶

As these rights were increasingly enjoyed by more artisans, the guild system began to weaken and eventually disappear. In essence, the steps toward privatization, such as the establishment of gediks and other privileges,⁴²⁷ contributed to the disruption and eventual dissolution of the guild order.

Secondly, although the state's practices are often associated with full command over the economy and an understanding of economic justice in classical historiography,⁴²⁸ both of these claims are disputable. First and foremost, artisans were mainly poor and lacked prosperity.⁴²⁹ Moreover, the political power typically tried to restrict their profitability levels.⁴³⁰ This aspect of the relationship is often overlooked, and definitions of "urbanites" are based on a self-proclaimed position, but the poor and artisans were nearly the same group. In 17th century Istanbul, there were 1,109 guilds and 260,000 registered craftsmen. Similarly, Cairo had 262 guilds and 119,000 registered members.⁴³¹ Including their families and the unregistered, such as Janissaries, these numbers increase significantly. According to a recent demographic

⁴²⁵ Onur Yildirim, "Ottoman Guilds in the Early Modern Era," *International Review of Social History* 53, no. S16 (December 2008): 73–74, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859008003611>.

⁴²⁶ Nalan Turna, "Ondokuzuncu Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında İstanbul'da Berber Olmak, Berber Kalmak," *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, no. 9 (October 23, 2012): 171–88.

⁴²⁷ Faroqhi, 19.

⁴²⁸ See Mehmet Genç, *Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 47.

⁴²⁹ Faroqhi, 3–6.

⁴³⁰ James Grehan, *Everyday Life & Consumer Culture in 18th-Century Damascus*, Publications on the Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 8–10.

⁴³¹ Beinlin, *Workers and Peasants*, 17.

study, the population of Istanbul was almost 370,000-400,000 in the 1690s.⁴³² Based on this, the overwhelming majority of the city were artisans. In that sense, the question of 'who the political power was protecting from whom' becomes critical.

Additionally, contrary to the classical argument, the political power was not regularly intervening in the guild system and the market, especially after the 17th century. As Şevket Pamuk reveals, the political power did not promulgate *narh* (price controls) with systemic frequency but did so when it deemed necessary.⁴³³ In this context, the political power appears to be looking out for its own interests. Furthermore, artisans' efforts to break out of the system should also be considered, and protectionism should be viewed in this light.

Here the issue of state-society relations should be considered around given political balance. In this sense, a 'game-changer' input into this relationship was *esnafization* of Janissaries. It seems this process was a destabilizing impact factor from below in favor of lower-classes. In contemporary historiography, Janissary-esnaf relations has been emphasized by Cemal Kafadar in a comprehensive way. Kafadar's first thesis pointed out a limited transitivity between two groups and a small impact of Janissaries on commercial life.⁴³⁴ Subsequent studies, however, revealed a strong tie and reviewed Janissary effectiveness in the guild system. Kafadar also changed his views on Janissary penetration to system and also their political effect.⁴³⁵ Following studies expanded this framework. For instance, Diko identified, Istanbul was a city of consumption rather than a center of production. Because of this character, Istanbul always needed merchandise flows. The countrywide network of Janissaries as a mobile

⁴³² Yunus Koç, "Osmanlı Dönemi İstanbul Nüfus Tarihi," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, no. 16 (September 1, 2010): 189.

⁴³³ Şevket Pamuk, "Seçici Kurumsal Değişim ve Osmanlının Uzun Ömürlülüğü," in *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Kurumları*, 1. baskı, Seçme eserler / Şevket Pamuk 1 (2007; repr., İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2020), 11.

⁴³⁴ Cemal Kafadar, "Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations: Solidarity and Conflict" (Unpublished Master Thesis, McGill University, 1981).

⁴³⁵ Cemal Kafadar, "On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 15, no. 2 (1991): 273–80; Kafadar, "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman İstanbul: Rebels without a Cause."

party made them stand out in this supply system.⁴³⁶ A very recent study “Payitaht Yeniçerileri” (*Janissaries of the Capital*) by Aysel Yildiz, Yannis Spyropoulos and Mert M. Sunar has revealed this vast network in detail and showed that the Janissaries had seized an almost indispensable role in this system.⁴³⁷ Their commercial position should be considered together with political position of them. In this context, Baki Tezcan claimed that Janissaries as a sociopolitical corporation became representatives and ultimate armed guardians of social forces in the Second Empire.⁴³⁸ This fusion turned into an alliance against the political power over time. Quataert underlines, “the Janissaries participated in a mutually-advantageous alliance and protected Ottoman urban workers of all kinds against the encroachments of the state.”⁴³⁹ However, all these do not mean the political power had no effect over them. Joel Beinin points to a balance:

Guilds were neither islands of civil society in an ocean of Oriental despotism nor merely administrative units that served the state by collecting taxes and supervising the urban population. Under certain circumstance they exercised a high level of autonomous regulation over their crafts and their members. Guilds were linked to the state through the conrmatation of masters in o ce by a state-appointed judge. This allowed considerable room for maneuver between the practices of election, imposition by governmental authority, and hereditary accession. Ottoman authorities tended to control certain strategic guilds more tightly than others.⁴⁴⁰

With this interest, it may be possible to get closer to the historical fact by looking at the rhetoric and political action.

4.2.4. Moral Economy and Collective Action II: The Patterns of Urban Unrest

Ottoman artisans changed their political tactics in every transformation period. However, their agenda always continued to feed on a Moral Economic Agenda. The

⁴³⁶ Gülay Yılmaz Diko, “Blurred Boundaries between Soldiers and Civilians: Artisan Janissaries in Seventeenth Century Istanbul,” in *Bread from the Lion’s Mounth: Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 175–94.

⁴³⁷ Aysel Yildiz, Yannis Spyropoulos, and Mehmet Mert Sunar, eds., *Payitaht Yeniçerileri: Padişahın “Asi” Kulları 1700-1826*, 1. basım, Tarih ve Coğrafy Dizisi 118 (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2022).

⁴³⁸ Baki Tezcan, *the Second Empire*, 191ff. For artisanry-janissary relations, see pp. 198-202.

⁴³⁹ Donald Quataert, “Janissaries, Artisans and the Question of Ottoman Decline 1730-1826,” in *Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914* (1993; repr., Gorgias Press, 2010), 202,

⁴⁴⁰ Beinin, *Workers and Peasants*, 18.

agenda had a strong reference to tradition of *fütüvvet tradition* for socio-political legitimization.

The concept of *fütüvvet* or *futuwwa* ' has deep Islamic roots that can be traced back to the 8th century.⁴⁴¹ Later on, the concept linked to *Alawites* and/or *Shiism* especially after the 15th century.⁴⁴² The word has its origin in the same word in Arabic, meaning “the qualities of young man”.⁴⁴³ The same word has been used as “*jawanmardi*” in Persian,⁴⁴⁴ and this has transferred to Turkish as “*civan-mert*”. In all forms, the concept evokes a kind of “brotherhood” based on high-level morality and sedateness. Indeed, the concept developed within heterodox Sufi tradition as movements that strongly emphasized these values. The value system has been defined by Wilson Chacko Jacob as follows:

(...) al-futuwwa originated as a mystical path of enlightenment and righteous conduct elaborated by Sufi masters, but it could also have been the label for urban social formations of various kinds: some with highly ritualized practices focused on enhancing fraternity and conviviality, others possibly related to guilds and the artisanal trades, and still others associated with the policing of particular neighborhoods or even the distant borders of dar al-islam. As a concept, al-futuwwa is contradictorily capacious, accommodating such notions as chivalry, courage, generosity, brotherhood as well as thuggery, banditry, criminality, and depravity; furthermore, it might signify a warrior, an ascetic, or a gift.⁴⁴⁵

In the Ottoman case, the *fütüvvet* is considered to be closely related to Akhi tradition (*Ahi geleneği*)⁴⁴⁶ as a customary system of thought and economic institution which formed as a political organization in the 13th century's Central Anatolia.⁴⁴⁷ Basically,

⁴⁴¹ Rachel Goshgarian, “Beyond the social and the spiritual: Redefining the urban confraternities of late medieval Anatolia” (Ph.D., Ann Arbor, United States, Harvard University, 2008), 22, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/304597393/abstract/6F671955B7394893PQ/1>.

⁴⁴² Rıza Yıldırım, “Shī'itisation of the Futuwwa Tradition in the Fifteenth Century,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 53–70, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2012.734958>.

⁴⁴³ Goshgarian, 11.

⁴⁴⁴ Goshgarian, 22.

⁴⁴⁵ Wilson Chacko Jacob, “Eventful Transformations: Al-Futuwwa Between History and the Everyday,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 3 (July 2007): 693, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417507000679>.

⁴⁴⁶ Goshgarian, 159ff.

⁴⁴⁷ Rukiye Şahin, Şafak Öztürk, and Mehmet Ünalımsız, “Professional Ethics and Moral Values in Akhi Institution,” *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, World Conference on Educational Sciences:

Akhi culture was an egalitarian economic thought based on the Islamic principles. Mainly, the system of principles “celebrating living under morality and discipline, reflecting this discipline and morality in one’s work, and contributing to society by working”.⁴⁴⁸ According to Goshgarian, the ultimate goal of akhi brotherhoods was “the preservation of a stable urban environment”⁴⁴⁹ In this sense, it is not surprising that they appeared as a consolidative and peace-centered political movement after the destructive Mongol Invasion.

Goshgarian explains their organization under four principles:

(1) their leaders were generally known as akhis (who sometimes operated under the tutelage of a shaykh); (2) their associations were based on codes of futuwwa; (3) participation in their associations was based on a structured hierarchy; (4) they convened in lodges (generally in urban spaces)⁴⁵⁰

Similarly, Hüseyin Yılmaz also defines Akhi order as “Mystics who were called begs were Ahi leaders who managed to organize futuwwa fraternities into autonomous organizations in Anatolian towns with no political overlordship.”⁴⁵¹ As Yılmaz notes, sometimes Akhi polities called as “Akhi republics” because of their non-hierarchical political system.⁴⁵²

As can be seen, the four principles previously that referred for the moral economic principles, minimum subsistence ethic, traditional justice understanding, socially embeddedness of economic relations and valorizing the labor, have been fully adopted in this understanding. It is not possible to claim that the Ottoman guild and gedik structures were formed in 16th century on fütüvvet or ahi tradition basis, but it is clear

New Trends and Issues in Educational Sciences, 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 800–804, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2009.01.143>.

⁴⁴⁸ Gökçe Cerev, Doğa Başar Saripek, and Bora Yenihan, “Revisiting the Akhi Order: Research on Akhi Values Perception of Anatolian People,” *Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları Dergisi / Journal of Social Policy Conferences* 0, no. 0 (May 10, 2022): 289, <https://doi.org/10.26650/jspc.2022.82.1014972>.

⁴⁴⁹ Goshgarian, 174.

⁴⁵⁰ Goshgarian, 164.

⁴⁵¹ Hüseyin Yılmaz, *Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 123.

⁴⁵² Yılmaz, 308.

that this history was translated by the artisans into a very powerful discourse and moral economic political agenda. Following sub-chapters focuses to Istanbulite artisans' usages of it.

a. The Complaint: Bread and *Words of Wisdom*

Living in Istanbul such a serious responsibility, even today. Conditions are always though and survival needs a continuous effect. From the past to present, the political-economy of feeding Istanbul has been the most important factor determining the politics of the city itself, and even the whole Empire.⁴⁵³ Namely, the capital city-based lower-classes were 'privileged' in that way: Determining the political power without indirect effects. Their objections might represent the objections of the whole Empire.

The lower-classes which presents the majority of the population of Istanbul they often complained about three basic things: Inflation, food insecurity and poor-quality products. As it turns out, they were both political and economic, and were occasionally cause of uprisings. By the 18th century, privatization and marketization trends were added to this complex table and radically changed the meaning of all these crises. This process can be followed over grain market very clearly. This was a highly sensitive market because included staple feed stocks like wheat required for bread processing. The slightest change here could cause the people to become restless.

Costs, inflation and difficulty in accessing products were always problem for Istanbulites. These was frequently mentioned by observers. Sometimes the Sultan also complaint about it. In 1789, Selim III wrote a note for his vizier and complaint about enflation. According to him, the main cause of the increase are hoarders (*saklayub pahaliya satanlar*) and engrossers (*ihlikar*).⁴⁵⁴ According to a document dated to 1801, while Selim III was in incognito trip, he came across a queue at a bakery on the Divanyolu, he heard people shouting that they could not find bread and said to his

⁴⁵³ Candan Turkkay, *Feeding Istanbul: The Political Economy of Urban Provisioning*, Studies in Critical Social Sciences, volume 186 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2021).

⁴⁵⁴ BOA, HAT, 174-7554.

vizier that he was very impressed.⁴⁵⁵ A similar situation took place in 1810: According to Cabi Ömer Efendi, crowds would gather in front of bakeries in Asitane, people would fight over breads, and soldiers would be deployed in front of these places to keep order. Because of this situation, bakers were selling breads at a loss.⁴⁵⁶ Only twenty-three days after this incident, a bakery was looted, a soldier and a baker were killed in a similar brawl. Ömer Efendi also reports that there is a shortage of grain after the eight days of this incident.⁴⁵⁷ Two year later, in 1812, the crisis still continued in the same form.⁴⁵⁸ Apart from that, the quality of bread was very low. As reflected in many documents, the different ingredients (mostly barley and millet) mixed into bread caused to darken (esmer or siyah) it and caused a public anger. Bakers who made this kind of low-quality breads were exiled: For example, Ekmekçi Ali and Ekmekçi Osman who had previously exiled to Seddülbahir for baking dark breads demanded to be allowed return and promising to make white breads.⁴⁵⁹ In an *Hatt-ı Hümayun*, Selim III seems to be feared from a ‘crisis’ and complained the quality of bread and likened it to “mud”.⁴⁶⁰

Indeed, grain was a politically decisive product. The political power was adopting specific measures for this. Tevfik Güran draw attention to establishment of the Grain Administration (Zahire Nezareti) in the context of Nizam-ı Cedid reformations in 1793.⁴⁶¹ This institution established as a regulatory institution that supported

⁴⁵⁵ BOA, HAT, 174-7558. In Turkish, “(...)Divanyolu’nda furun önünde galabalık gördüm. Herifin biri dahi yiyecek ekme bulamıyoruz deyu feryad eder. Alimallah, mükedder oldum. Şunun bir çaresine bakasız.(...)”

⁴⁵⁶ Cabi Ömer Efendi, *Câbî Tarihi: Târih-i Sultan Selîm-i Sâlis ve Mahmûd-ı Sâni*, ed. Mehmet Ali Beyhan, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), 590.

⁴⁵⁷ Cabi Ömer Efendi, 599.

⁴⁵⁸ Cabi Ömer Efendi, 840-841.

⁴⁵⁹ BOA, C.BLD., 110-5468.

⁴⁶⁰ Fahrettin Tızlak, “III. Selim ve İstanbul’un Ekmek Problemi,” in *XVI. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildiri Kitabı*, vol. VI (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2015), 20. In Turkish “kaymakam paşa nân-ı aziz deyü tabh olunan itmekler haşa hürmetine hemân çamurdan ibaret bir şeyi kesb sebebi un dirheminden tenzil olunduğundan maada nev-i ben-i adem değil kelbler dahi ekl idemez.”

⁴⁶¹ Tevfik Güran, “The State Role in the Grain Supply of Istanbul: The Grain Administration, 1793-1839,” *International Journal of Turkish Studies: IJTS - University of Wisconsin*, no. 3 (1984): 27-41.

producers in finding cheap goods, transporting, preventing smuggling, regulating prices by arbitrating between tradesman and producer, and helping collection of revenues from bakeries. But more importantly, the political power started to buy grain at market price (*rayiç mübayaa*)⁴⁶² instead of state-determined prices (*miri mübayaa*) after the establishment of the Administration. In the second part of the 18th century, the miri price of grain had fallen to a symbolic level and was even below costs, but in all localities the right of price determination was delegated to the local authorities. Güran does not give any clear information on this, but it is likely that a system similar to iltizam in the sense of advance payment and then free price determination may have emerged in localities. The Administration, however, seems to have been established to ensure centralization here. A second result, as Güran points out, the political power had tried to liberalize the market with accepting market prices. The center bought grain in this way, stocked them in *Tersane-i Amire* and distributed it to bakeries in case of need.

With this practice, the political power tried to support both producers and consumers. At the first sight, this practice may be seen as in favor of the people. However, the traders took the advantage of the fact that the center was already buying these products and resorted to profiteering (*ihlikar*) practices. Also, the intervention of state must have angered those who benefit from the process from the land to the bakery. The sharp decline in the quality of the grain and bread was the important result of it. Moreover, the political power's acceptance of the free market price in its exchanges may have led to possible hikes, which is another consequence. For these reasons, the Administration was abolished along with Nizam-ı Cedid.

However, this crisis on foods seems to be general. In his note of November 20, 1810, Ömer Efendi reveals the prices of some products such as price of 320 grams of ekmek (equals to 100 dirhem nân) was 4 pare or 1 vakıyye of Mudurnu cheese was 70 pare. He complains about the high costs of goods and refers to the social turmoil and even murders caused by the high cost of goods. There were also complaints from other

⁴⁶² However, Güran also points out that, the political power did not accept the price directly but determined a price that was suitable for market conditions, called "rayiç-i mutedile", see Güran 31.

sectors. For example, 1808 and 1809 were witnessed to a shoe crisis. According to Cabi Ömer Efendi the shoemakers had raised the price of shoes due to a shortage of raw materials and the political power issued a *narh* on shoes.⁴⁶³ In the same year, this happened again.⁴⁶⁴ A few months later, a certain number of shoes were brought to Istanbul at a *miri* price, but the Janissaries who most probably do not sell the shoes according to the *narh*, threatened the shopkeepers not to buy and sell them.⁴⁶⁵

The Moral Economic Agenda was still in progress against these very bad socio-economic social conditions. The *kadim* discourse was a central part of the struggles in cities. Eunjeong Yi's study covers 17th century practices reveals a comprehensive framework on this issue. As aforementioned, Yi argues that the artisans used a traditionalist discourse for a source of legitimacy. According to Yi,

While we need to analyze what is behind the traditionalist rhetoric that guildsmen commonly used, we must also seriously consider the likelihood that many of them might have regarded tradition as a positive thing and tried to maintain it for as long as possible.⁴⁶⁶

This kind of usages could be seen in many internal and external disputes, such as disputes over allocation of raw materials, when someone tried to work without guild membership or sharing of tax-burden.⁴⁶⁷ Also, the emphasize on customs and traditions came from *fütüvvet* understanding became a “shield” against the interventions of the state. For example, the political power sometimes could not get the tax because it is not customary.⁴⁶⁸ In some cases, representative of the political power had been rejected because of the same rationale.⁴⁶⁹ Also courts accepted what the guild leaders said about the customs of the guilds as true until proven otherwise.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶³ Cabi Ömer Efendi, Tarih, 268.

⁴⁶⁴ Cabi Ömer Efendi, 384.

⁴⁶⁵ Cabi Ömer Efendi, 417.

⁴⁶⁶ Yi, Guild Dynamics, 113

⁴⁶⁷ Yi, 116.

⁴⁶⁸ Yi, 117.

⁴⁶⁹ Yi, 118.

⁴⁷⁰ Yi, 119.

Indeed, the discourse of *kadim* provided a power and artisans tried to solve their problems with refereeing to it. For example, in ‘the unfair competition’ cases, artisans explain these kind of attempt as ‘adverse to *kadim*’ and so that they could make it a matter of trial. According to a 1805-dated document, even the transportation of drovers’ (*sürekci ve celep*) livestock came from Rumelia between Beşiktaş and Üsküdar had always (*ötedenberi*) belonged to a group called *duacı çavuşları*, a man named Pehlivan Ağa from sergeants of mukataa intervened this process.⁴⁷¹ The complaints expressed their wish for the protection of the old practice (*hal-i kadim*). In another example, the laundrers of Istanbul complaint about the newly emerged laundries in 1810.⁴⁷² According to complainants, there were only eighty-nine laundries vouched for each other (*yekdiğerine kefil*) from since the ancient (*kadimden berü*) but new launderers had emerged outside of this network lately. The launderers said that they were used dirty and evil-smelling soaps (*pis ve fena kokulu*) and caused to waste (*ziyan*) of laundry.⁴⁷³

Apart from complaining, it seems, artisans have developed fewer daily practices of struggle. The main reason might be that the option of overthrowing the sultan, grand vizier or other officials was always more obvious and possible method rather than the avoiding or refutation. However, as Engin Akarlı points out, *gedik* was the main method of daily resistance in itself.⁴⁷⁴ According to him, artisans had claimed the practice of *gedik* as the institutional form of a “special right” to do crafting and trading. It is clear that there was a strong emphasis on customs and Islamic tradition. Because of the workshops or other production places were subjected to the law of waqfs, there

⁴⁷¹ BOA, C.BLD., 5-230.

⁴⁷² BOA, C.BLD., 7-319.

⁴⁷³ It is also understood that there are other examples that had really stuck to tradition and futuwwa. Bosnian guilds were the examples of this, see Ines Aščerić-Todd, “The Noble Traders: The Islamic Tradition of ‘Spiritual Chivalry’ (Futuwwa) in Bosnian Trade-Guilds (16th–19th Centuries),” *The Muslim World* 97, no. 2 (April 2007): 159–73, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2007.00168.x>.

⁴⁷⁴ Engin D. Akarlı, “Gedik: Implements, Mastership, Shop Usufruct, and Monopoly among Istanbul Artisans, 1750 - 1850,” *Wissenschaftskolleg Jahrbuch*, 1986, 223–32; Engin Deniz Akarlı, “Gedik: A Bundle of Rights and Obligations for Istanbul Artisans and Traders, 1750–1840,” in *Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things*, ed. Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy, Cambridge Studies in Law and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 166–200, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493751.006>.

had an economic immunity against procurements, confiscations, and also embezzlements. As also Akarlı underlines, artisans extended this understanding and religious practice to the gediks, even though this was not legally the case. They tried to justify it on the basis of customs, means in moral economic understanding.

Finally, the question of who belongs these customs comes up in the context of guilds and artisans as it is in peasantry. For instance, Mehmet Genç thought that the state was sensitive to the customs in common because the state may be embodied these traditions.⁴⁷⁵ Yi answers this approach as this:

It is true that the government used and was receptive to traditionalist rhetoric, but it might also have been only practical in reality. The Ottoman state did not want any form of social disturbance, and therefore had to respect social customs⁴⁷⁶

Indeed, Yi's emphasis on the state of necessity is crucial, much like in the case of the peasantry. The continuity of production was paramount, and political power implemented policies to ensure its stability and guarantee it.

This exploitation of common rhetoric by the political power is the most evident example of state's practical usage. It is conceivable that, the tradition reveals itself in the urbanites' political discourse that contains many proverbs, idioms, didactic and exemplary narratives. Indeed, the British merchant and traveler Thomas Thornton (1762-1814) underlines the powerful effect of these countless narratives over the Ottoman people. According to him, the Ottoman morality was based on these narratives.⁴⁷⁷ The interesting point is that the state is also aware of it and had used them to legitimize the modernization politics where appropriate. For instance, in a treatise called "Treatise of Koca Sekbanbaşı: Rejection of the Thought of the Common People" (*Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi: Hulâsatü'l-Kelâm fî Reddi'l-Avâm*), the ruling

⁴⁷⁵ Mehmet Genç, "Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century: General Framework, Characteristics and Main Trends," in *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1950*, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 59.

⁴⁷⁶ Yi, 119.

⁴⁷⁷ Thomas Thornton, *Bir İngiliz Tacirin İzlenimleriyle Osmanlıda Siyaset, Toplum, Din, Yönetim (1793 - 1807)*, trans. Ercan Ertürk, 1. baskı (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015), 269.

class tried to address the people and imitated their traditional jargon.⁴⁷⁸ Until recently, there were different opinions about the author of this treatise,⁴⁷⁹ but it has been confirmed that it was not written by “a very old janissary commander called Koca Sekbanbaşı” as claimed in the work. However, most probably, the book had written by state chronicler Ahmed Vasıf Efendi,⁴⁸⁰ by order of the Selim III in 1803. The reason for such a choice must have been the desire to create an image that would be respected by the public when addressing them. In brief, treatise praises *the Nizam-ı Cedid* and explains why it is necessary in a colloquial language. For example, proverbs like “even if your opponent is an ant, consider her a valiant”, religious tales from Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali, popular exclamations like “be hey, bre” and didactic dialogues.

b. The Revolt: Negotiation or Check and Balance?

Where words and advice ended, then rebellion began. Thomas Thornton, who stayed in Turkey for fourteen years between 1793 and 1807, explains the ways in which urban lower classes resort to oppression and persecution: “The most common method, and one that I have witnessed a stubborn effort to see through the end, is the setting of fires in different part of the city”⁴⁸¹ Thornton notes that, revolts are too dangerous for the sultan because they are unstoppable events. If once started, they had resulted in the abdication of the sultan and if he was not killed but locked in in a cage, then “he should consider himself lucky”.

In what circumstances and how did these subversive and transformative actions emerge and what kind of political stance was at their core? More clearly, what was the

⁴⁷⁸ Koca Sekbanbaşı, *Koca Sekbanbaşı risâlesi: Avamın düşüncelerinin reddedilmesi (Hulâsatü'l-keîâm fî reddi'l-avâm)*, ed. Abdullah Uçman, 1. baskı, Büyüyenay Yayınları ; Siyasetnâme, 233. 19 (Fatih, İstanbul: Büyüyenay Yayınları, 2017).

⁴⁷⁹ Ethan L. Menchinger and Aysel Yıldız, “On the Identity of a Reformist Intellectual: The Koca Sekbanbaşı Debate Revisited,” in *Ottoman War and Peace* (Brill, 2019), 208–33, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004413146_014.

⁴⁸⁰ Menchinger and Yıldız, 225.

⁴⁸¹ Thornton, 159.

pattern of the urban revolt? Above all, Aysel Yıldız has made the most cogent assessment on patterns of urban revolts:

- a. Petition phase: expression of discontent, usually via petitions.
- b. Outburst phase: a triggering incident that precipitates the event.
- c. Diffusion phase: increase in the number of participants with the invitation of urbanites and the military corps.
- d. Bargaining phase: initial contact between the rebels and the centre.
- e. Congregation in meeting places: Et Meydanı (“the Meat Square”), the Hippodrome or in some cases in the vicinity of the palace.
- f. Legitimation phase: the rebels invite the ulema to participate.
- g. Negotiation phase: the rebels demand that the centre abolish a practice or punish culprits.
- h. Revenge phase: the functionaries held responsible for the fault are murdered.
- i. Deposition phase: [in some cases] the throne is claimed.
- j. Settlement phase: issue of an amnesty for the rebels.⁴⁸²

For urbanites, this cycle was almost daily and very common. As aforementioned, the revolt and popular uprising was a possibility and there did not seem to be much reason for another measures. As Yıldız suggests, there were not any ‘mid-phase’ between petition and outburst phases.

The pattern that revealed by Yıldız was nearly traditional; this line repeats itself almost exactly in different political movements. Not every stage had to happen; sometimes several stages were completed, and the urbanites got what they politically and economically. Therefore, unlike with peasants, there is almost no historical aspect that needs to be particularly exposed. It might be because, the historiography of urban revolts is very lively unlike in many other fields, and it seems that such cases are favorite subjects to write about.

The part that needs explanation is more political and sociological. According to Einjeong Yi, revolts are “an extended form of negotiation”.⁴⁸³ Similarly, Aysel Yıldız adopts this view and states that the main characteristic of rebellions or mutinies in polities without revolution is this extended negotiation with political coercion.⁴⁸⁴ These explanations seem to be related to the fact that the Ottomans did not have a

⁴⁸² Aysel Yıldız, *Crisis and Rebellion*, 18.

⁴⁸³ Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 213.

⁴⁸⁴ Yıldız, 20-21.

regular and legalized negotiation regime like Europeans. According to the claim, in such polities politics always appears as a relationship of use of coercion rather than a codified negotiation process.

In fact, this seems like a problematic view, even for the West. First of all, it is a myth that there was such a functioning deliberative system in the West. The Western feudalism was also based on coercion and oppression like the Eastern societies. The frequency of revolutions can be seen as the most serious evidence of this. Secondly, the majority of social movements were not based on specific goals in pre-capitalist societies. These movements were almost a result of accumulation of everyday problems, and they happened because of a certain triggering incident, just like in Ottomans. Almost no revolution initially aimed at a change of order, but they ended up somewhere like this. The French Revolution is a typical example of this. As Baki Tezcan points out, there were revolutionary changes of order in the Empire, but often historiography does not see them because the political power's claim and discourse is reflected in documents, witnesses and later in monographs.

It is true that there is a negotiation between popular classes and the political power. However, it cannot be narrowed down to an understanding that ends with the acquisition of rights and then retreat. More than that, the most of revolts were interventions of political "check and balance" relationship. Especially after the late-16th century, the Ottoman political power had determined by different households and their political extensions. As discussed, the Second Empire was found over this political fact. In cities, the Janissaries and other popular classes perceived the guild system as an element of checks and balances within the urban political economy. Despite representing different political-economic agendas, they were often integrated into this system. Here the controlled subject appears as the Imperial Household, especially before the 19th century.

Here the struggles of the early-19th century had a different character. The main reason behind this is that the Imperial Household had developed a will to reverse these relations, called the White Revolution. Like other households that claimed power, the Imperial Household had declared a war on the people as another political-economic

circle. In this era, the issue of the redistribution of power has come to the fore in a serious way after nearly 200 years.

4.3. Moral Economy and Collective Action: Popular Uprisings and Moral Economy, 1789 – 1839

It can be argued that, after the 16th-17th century Celali Revolts, one of the most widespread lower-class movements took place from the beginning to the end of the 19th century. In both periods, the Ottoman political-economic system had started to transform and caused a series of popular reactions. It is clear that, those mass movements were not ‘reactionary’ in a fundamentalist sense; more than that, the lower-classes wanted to defend and update their place in the changing order by becoming more and more privatized and obtain improvements in order of the right and justice. This pursuit affected the whole process and Ottoman polity. The uprisings that are examined in here were born in the political environment described earlier and constitute a unity within themselves. Namely, the Dağlı Rebellion in Rumelia (1790-1810), the Incidents in Istanbul (1807-1826), Aydın Revolt (1829) in Anatolia and the Peasant Revolt in Syria (1832) are the lingering edges of an objection to the development of capitalism under the form of modern state formation.

Although each of them contains different dynamics within themselves, the main issue is the privatization, marketization and political regulation dynamics that permeated the Ottoman polity as a whole. This process has already been named as the White Revolution. All of these popular uprisings will be examined with its class dynamics within the framework of the Moral Economic Agenda. The main concern is revealing the popular effect on this process, instead of the Imperial, Vizier-Pasha, or Âyân-centered readings.

4.3.1. Balkans: Âyâns and Peasants, 1789 – 1808

The nearly two-thousand-year lasted privatization trend had reached a peak point in the late-18th century, especially in the Ottoman Balkans. In the early-19th century, the Ottoman Balkans were almost full of *çiftlik*s (*large estates*) belonged to âyâns. In some examples, these *çiftlik*s consist of many villages, towns and extensive agricultural lands. The âyâns seemed to have set up their own seigniorial authority or “statelets”

over lands.⁴⁸⁵ For example, they had a decisive role in determining the labor regime, tax collection and formation of new taxes, and daily administrative concerns. Also, âyâns had their own armed troops and they were maintaining ‘public’ order.

The conditions were politically favorable for âyân households but the Imperial Household and also peasantry was disgruntled. The Imperial Household had frightened its decreasing authority in Balkans, and the nationalist and political-economic uprisings under the effect of the global political conjuncture. Because of this the Imperial Household acted on the aforementioned logic of security. The political program of establishing a centralized, regulatory and transcendental public state was one of the results of this instinct.⁴⁸⁶ Also, more daily intentions were effective: The Balkan plains on the Black Sea coast were most productive and regular source of agricultural production and referred to as granaries. Indeed, the Imperial Household met their cheap grain for subsistence of armed forces and also keeping the price of bread in Istanbul low. A contrary situation were direct threats to the political power.

The inhabitants, means peasants, was liked a crowd that trampled while the elephant’s fight and they were crushed under pressure from both sides. Above all, the feudal tenure was abolished, and subsistence economy had disappeared almost completely.⁴⁸⁷ Because of similar reasons, Aysel Yıldız examines the *çiftlikization* as a process of development of capitalism.⁴⁸⁸ Indeed, the âyâns executes different labor regimes in their *çiftliks* such as contractual, waged, seasonal, corvee or sharecropping or

⁴⁸⁵ M. R. Palaret, *The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914: Evolution without Development*, Cambridge Studies in Modern Economic History 6 (Cambridge, UK. : New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 37. As Palaret mentions, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha in İönnia an his son Veli in Tesselia and Tirnovos, and Pazvantoğlu in Vidin were most powerfull âyâns of the Balkans.

⁴⁸⁶ In fact, this “instinct” also points to a kind of politics of inclusion and unification. In other words, Imperial Household was also based on a prima facie “legitimate” agenda of gathering large sections of society around this and “resisting” to threatening powers. And yet, it is inappropriate to think that this has anything to do with “statehood” or “state reason/ reason d’etat”. A similar quest for inclusiveness could very well have been claimed by the other grandee circles, if they were possible and if they could have transformed political power.

⁴⁸⁷ Palaret, 34ff.

⁴⁸⁸ Aysel Yıldız, *Crisis and Rebellion*, 50.

inhabiting-based types of labor could be seen in those lands.⁴⁸⁹ However, the main problem of âyâns were always finding new labor resources. First of all, all those types of labor included economic or extra-economic coercion. Even âyâns seized a vacant land (*mahlul*), they usually captured regions by force and tried to make there their *çiftlik*s.⁴⁹⁰ Similarly, Bruce McGowan also draws attention to “the seizure of land or of village commons by powerful individuals” in çiftlikization processes.⁴⁹¹ In these conditions, peasants of these lands were leaving the land, and settling to remote and mountainous lands where could not be çiftlik. As Michel Palairret reveals, peasants accustomed to attacks by the troops consisted of extorted armed people by the âyâns, and they built huts (*kolibi/kulübe*) on mountains for hiding there in a case of attack. In those view, labor was always a problem for âyâns: As Aytakin underlines, finding a labor power, bounding them to land and trying to pay low wages were always a challenge.⁴⁹² On the other hand, the Imperial Household constantly tried to re-bound them their land and village. For example, in 1794, the Governor of Silistre had been ordered to bringing back the peasants who fled to Walachia.⁴⁹³

This cycle must have overwhelmed the peasants, but they did not have much choice. As mentioned, the *çiftlik*s were generally a kind of ‘hell’ for peasants. Even the worst working conditions based on extra-economic coercion, low incomes and high taxes were in *çiftlik*s. The concern of being exploited under the regime of wage labor and surplus-extraction seemed to prevail. As can be seen, they could not escape from the pressure of âyâns or the political power in their villages. In those conditions, leaving the land and resisting became the only way out. Even joining the âyâns’ armed troops were a sensible choose. This had led to a vicious circle, just like in Celali Revolts: The peasants had leaved their lands in various reasons, stopped producing and tried to

⁴⁸⁹ Aytakin, *Üretim-Düzenleme-İsyân*, 53-55.

⁴⁹⁰ Aytakin.

⁴⁹¹ Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600 - 1800*, Reprint, Studies in Modern Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press [u.a.], 1981), 138.

⁴⁹² Aytakin, 62-63.

⁴⁹³ Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Dağlı İsyânları, 1791-1808*, 2. baskı (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 2020), 25.

become a member of a notable's household. This was exacerbating the crisis in the production cycle and increasing the violence. In the Balkans, this had happened and the productive plains were almost empty. However, according to Palairet, âyâns was found a way to break this cycle: The âyâns had started to offer more reliable contracts and promises to ensure security. As Palairet writes, this was becoming a chance to peasants and partial solution for âyâns who suffered from the labor shortages.⁴⁹⁴

Apparently, this was not the case in everywhere and the pattern of peasant rebellions in the Empire was reproduced itself in the Balkans, and this is what happened in the case of the Mountain Rebellion. These people are called as *Kırcalı/Kırcaali Bandits* or *K'rdzhalijas* or *Dağlı/Mountaineers*. The Rhodopes was the center of this movements. As mentioned before, some movements of them consisted of thousands of peasants.⁴⁹⁵ Even though they were commonly described as bandits by the political power and âyân, according to local historiography there were peasants. For example, Bulgarian historian Vera Mutafchieva (1929-2009), the peasants of Rhodopes revolted because of the poverty.⁴⁹⁶ The poverty should be considered as multicated. In his article discussing the participation of Albanians in the Rebellion, Frederic Anscombe mentions other related factors of poverty such as epidemics, shortages of food.⁴⁹⁷ He relates a striking anecdote from a document:

In the case of Matlı Osman and the various brigands encamped around Pirlepe, described above, it was by no means incidental that food was one of their primary demands, and that the local population quickly faced the specter of starvation themselves. A decade later, the vali (governor) of Rumeli, who enlisted Albanian highlanders to track down mountain bandit groups, was shocked by his recruits' abject poverty, describing them as little better than naked.⁴⁹⁸

According to Anscombe, the *çiftliks* caused to “aggravation” of starvation. As Anscombe discusses, especially the çiftlikization of “already-worked land” by force

⁴⁹⁴ Palairet, 39.

⁴⁹⁵ See Ch. 4.2.2, Section B.

⁴⁹⁶ Véra Moutaftchiéva, *L'anarchie dans les Balkans à la fin du XVIIIe siècle*, Les Cahiers du Bosphore, XXXVI (Istanbul: éd. Isis, 24), 105.

⁴⁹⁷ Frederick Anscombe, “Albanians and ‘Mountain Bandits,’” in *The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830*, ed. Frederick Anscombe (Princeton, U.S.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006), 92–95, http://markuswiener.com/catalog/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=607.

⁴⁹⁸ Anscombe, 93-94.

was very harmful for peasants. Especially in the conditions of lack of the Imperial authority, the powerful people could seize power and the peasant could not deny both economic and extra-economic framework that dictated by them. The rural indebtedness had therefore risen to very high levels within Balkan peasantry.⁴⁹⁹

Their profile and capacity had changed. According to Öztaş, one of the first group was formed by leaders called Hacı İbrahimoğlu, Ak Osman and Kıvırcıklı Halil before 1787 and they controlled 700 or 800 men.⁵⁰⁰ Their target was sometimes another villages or caravans; sometimes they clashed Âyâns or the forces of political power. Even the political power and âyâns collaborated against the rebels. For example, against the Dağlıs deployed a town Called ‘Cuma’ in July 1794, Hacızade Hacı Ömer, the âyân of Hezargrad had sent 300 soldiers to Ali Pasha for forming an army against the Dağlıs.⁵⁰¹ Sometimes they were at Âyâns’ command⁵⁰² and also, they were asking for forgiveness from Istanbul.⁵⁰³ However, as Özkaya underlines, they were continuing their activities at the first chance. Thus, because of the non-stop participations, the rebellion could not be extinguished.

For preventing unstoppable popular participation to *Dağlıs*, the Imperial Household had started to a widespread surveillance and recording activities. For example, in an order that given in 1796, the Imperial Household warned the Governor Rumelia for recording the villages of Çirmen. Accordingly, the report should consist how many houses, how many neighborhoods exists in here, and also the names of the inhabitants. The Imperial Household aimed to facilitate the identification of those who participated, tended to participate or helped to Dağlıs.⁵⁰⁴

⁴⁹⁹ Anscombe, 95; AYTEKİN also points out the similar issue, see E. Attila AYTEKİN, “Cultivators, Creditors and the State: Rural Indebtedness in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire,” *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 35, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 292–313, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150802151041>.

⁵⁰⁰ ÖZTAŞ, the Agrarian Roots, 46.

⁵⁰¹ ÖZKAYA, 24.

⁵⁰² ÖZKAYA, 27.

⁵⁰³ ÖZKAYA, 26.

⁵⁰⁴ ÖZKAYA, 41.

Of course, all of these was a result of clash of agenda of Imperial Household and the Âyân. According to Özkaya, instead of a few, the Balkan Âyân continued to provoke the Rebellions from Nizam-ı Cedid to Mahmud II's reign. As Özkaya notes, this situation had end during the Grand Vizier Alemdar the Âyân of Ruse's period and especially with Charter of Alliance (*Sened-i İttifak*) in 1808.⁵⁰⁵ However, Mahmud II organized it as an operation to eliminate them. This would soon spell their doom, both in the rural and in the urban.

4.3.2. Istanbul: Armed Forces of Artisans versus the Political Power

While the British Navy occupied the Canakkale and Gallipoli under the admiralty of Sir John Duckworth, and then moved forward to the Bosphorus in 1807, the Istanbulite might considered that their long-standing problems must be taken more seriously. Even food shortages, inflation, poverty and even the Imperial Household's centralization and regulation efforts only bearable for a certain period of time, but the fall of Constantinople was not. Here, the Imperial Household experienced it's the longest couple of years. In fact, Selim III had been dethroned (May 29, 1807) by Kabakçı Mustafa and his comrades exactly one hundred days after the British Intervention (February 19, 1807). His successor Mustafa IV had only ruled the Ottoman state only one year and two months. His era had ended after the Yârân of Russe's intervention. Their leader Alemdar became grand vizier, but he could only stay in office for one hundred and ten days (July 29, 1808 – November 15, 1808). While Alemdar's corpse was being searched all over Istanbul, Mahmud II must be breaking all preconceptions about Ottoman state-society relations.

While Kabakçı Mustafa and other yamaks had revolted with other Istanbulites, the living conditions were seriously bad: the Ottoman subject were almost flocking to Istanbul. As Yıldız suggest, this movements were like a "Second Great Flight" like in the 17th century.⁵⁰⁶ Main reasons of mass migration were the Empire-wide political-economic problems. Bad harvests, unfair taxes, political pressures and social disorder in the Ottoman countryside made Istanbul a hideout in the eyes of rural people.

⁵⁰⁵ Özkaya,109-113.

⁵⁰⁶ Yıldız, 52.

However, the situation was far from this ideal and very dramatic. In the late-18th century, many people overcrowded Istanbul and it has deeply shaken the infrastructure of the city. Above all, they had to make a life here. First of all, the migrants were trying to infiltrate guilds, and this threatens the existing order of them. Despite this, unemployed people were everywhere, provision system had nearly collapsed and inflation was so high. Epidemics were part of the daily life, especially plague was widespread. For instance, the situation was so dire that Selim III even felt ‘sympathy’ for his own rivals, Janissaries. In one of his trips in the city, he saw thirteen elderly janissaries begging. He was saddened by this situation and asked for a pension for them.⁵⁰⁷

As this case reveals, janissaries were looking for solutions to make a living like everyone else. However, janissaries were only one of several groups in this situation. As discussed before, they were *esnafized* and engaged in various crafts. On the other hand, this transitivity was bidirectionally; ordinary people also had been tried to be janissary. Both groups were not soldiers in real terms; most of them was needed to a regular income and they probably bought and janissary identity document (*esame*). This was a quite widespread fact, in between there were 23,000 new janissaries had been added to the list between 1805-1826.⁵⁰⁸ This network provides financial flows, but they were also wanted to benefit from fear that military service evokes in ordinary people and the economic privileges that come with it. Also, fake descendants of prophet (*seyyit*) were emerging. Seyyits paid less tax than the other people. People forged documents and benefited from tax privileges.⁵⁰⁹ Another privileged group called *Phanariots* or *Fenerli Rumlar* grown rapidly. According to Christine Phillou, the new group consisted of the Christians who wanted to switch to protégé (*beratlı*) status to avoid the *jizya* and obtain the right to free trade. As can be seen, the people were looking for ways to increase their revenues and resorting to means of the state.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁷ BOA, HAT, 1397-56138.

⁵⁰⁸ Yıldız, 57.

⁵⁰⁹ Yıldız, 60.

⁵¹⁰ Christine Philliou, “Mischievous in the Old Regime: Provincial Dragomans and Social Change at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 25 (October 2001): 103–21, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600003629>; Yıldız, 61-62.

And yet, the Ottoman social order had nearly collapsed and classical social titles, social roles and positions were hollowed out. Therefore, it was not possible to say that the upcoming uprisings here belonged to the Janissaries because the janissaries were also artisans, but artisans also a sacred title or bureaucrat ostensibly. It is most prudent to say that there is an ‘popular movement’ in the broadest sense.

Their livelihood was under the risk, and Selim III’s Nizam-ı Cedid was a direct threat to because the disorder was enabling to reach resources and fiscal flows. Any change centered on status of Janissaries would mean a change in Istanbulite’s livelihood. At the same time, the privatization trend was also perceived as another threat. Namely, price liberalizations and deregulation of certain sectors was unacceptable for the people. Therefore, Sultan Selim and Nizam-ı Cedid Agenda were in the crosshairs.

Under those conditions, a general displeasure and rally started in May, 1807. According to general opinion, the May Revolt had started with a rumor: Correspondingly, a group of Janissaries deployed on Black Sea Cost, called ‘*Boğaz Yamakları*’ hear a rumor that they were being asked to wear Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms in French-type.⁵¹¹ According to Yıldız, although the sources of the period point to this, there is no conclusive evidence of existence of such an endeavor;⁵¹² however, apparently there is no need for it. The Istanbulites who sufficiently overwhelmed by circumstances seeking their rights rationally⁵¹³ and they legitimized this move with a moral economic discourse.

Among the sources narrating the events, one is especially useful for an history-from-below. Namely, Georg Oğulukyan was an author from Istanbulite Armenians from Ortaköy and witnessed the events up close and his *ruzname* (a kind of diary or agenda) is invaluable in providing a view from below. According to Oğulukyan, the leaders

⁵¹¹ Georg Oğulukyan, *III. Selim, IV. Mustafa, II. Mahmud ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa: Georg Oğulukyan Ruznamesi - 1806-1810 İsyamları*, trans. Hrand D. Andreasyan (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1972), 2–3.; Cabi Ömer Efendi, 126-127.

⁵¹² Yıldız, 23.

⁵¹³ Yıldız, 99.

were six people in the names of Oduncu Süleyman, Bekir, Çili, İbiş, Memiş and also Kabakçı Mustafa. These were declared their principles at the very beginning of the uprising: “1) Not drinking wine until the job is done, 2) Not harming the poor, 3) Not laying hand on reaya and foreigners, 4) Smashing those who oppose these decisions, 5) To be judged according to Quran in Etmeydanı”⁵¹⁴ 1500 rebels had met in May 15, and marched with calls for people to join them. According to Oğulukyan, their total was 8,000 by the time they arrived in Etmeydanı. Shayk al-Islam Ataullah Efendi asked for their demands when he came for trial and the dialog here is an example of a moral economic discourse:

“For whom did God create millet?” The latter replied, “For the birds.” “And the corn?”, “For the animals.” Finally, the leader asked about wheat. Shaikh al-Islam Ataullah Efendi answered that wheat was created “for human beings”. The chief then brandished a meager loaf, and declared that the poor were forced to consume bread made “of not even corn or barley.”⁵¹⁵

Then, the chief took out the two breads from his cheesecloth and he shouted that the black one was eaten by the crowd, while state officials eat white and high-quality one. After execution of a few officials and large demonstrations, Selim III abdicated and invited his cousin Sehzade Mustafa. Mustafa ascended the throne and on the following Monday, he announced the abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid, return to “Order of Sultan Hamid’s era”.⁵¹⁶ It seemed to the order have been restored for a while, but the rebels did not leave the control of the city. And on top of that, the economic causes of rebellion were as they were and various events kept happening. As Oğulukyan reports, in May 1808, the women marched to house of “Master of Istanbul” (most probably the Kadi) with spears with candle and liver attached its top, and they said “*Papaz herif* (in meaning of ‘you, bastard’), while you are fed with sumptuous repasts, we are starving, with a liver costing us five paras.”⁵¹⁷

The Âyan of Ruse, Alemdar Mustafa was the power who intervenes in this political turmoil. According to Oğulukyan, he came to Istanbul in July, and he executed Kabakçı Mustafa. Then, the Janissaries and Pasha’s troops confronted in Fener.

⁵¹⁴ Oğulukyan, 3.

⁵¹⁵ Yıldız, 56.

⁵¹⁶ Oğulukyan, 14-15.

⁵¹⁷ Yıldız, 56.

Oğulukyan defines this conflict as “indescribably horrible”.⁵¹⁸ Alemdar defeated the Janissaries and went to Palace and demanded Mustafa IV’s abdication. Mustafa rejected that and attempted to execute Selim III and Sehzade Mahmud. Indeed, Selim was executed but Mahmud escaped and enthroned (July 28, 1808).

Although the partnership between the two seems to represent a new “alliance”, this should be read more as an attempt by two sides to intervene in each other. Means, an Âyân Household tried to control the Imperial Household, and the Imperial Household’s centralist faction tried to reorganize political power with an armed force of the Âyâns. At first it also served their common interests, such as eliminating their common enemies. *Sened-i İttifak*, however, was the result of Alemdar’s political agenda that imposing recognition of âyân’s legal status. Contrary popular belief, Mahmud II did not pay attention to this, but with this support he was implemented policies that he saw as continuation of Nizam-ı Cedid. The establishment of the *Sekban-ı Cedid* army was the main part of this agenda. Likewise, Mahmud II’s position during the massacre of Alemdar by janissaries and not defending *Sened-i İttifak* after Alemdar’s death might be seen as signs. During the Alemdar Incident in November 1808, indeed, Mahmud got rid of Alemdar as a powerful âyân, Mustafa IV as another heir of the throne, and also *Sened-i İttifak* and legal status of âyâns.

Even Mahmud II gives *Sekban-ı Cedid*, he had taken something bigger: The opportunity to eradicate âyâns. That would be pave the way for many of his future moves, such as abolition of Janissaries in 1826. The elimination of this institution, which was no longer an military or cultural identity but served a very important social role like reaching the resources, was a great loss for the society. It was also the dismantling of a vast traditional economic network, and it echoes were heard far a wide. The lower-classes continued to intervene the process.

4.3.3. Anatolia: Swashbucklers of the Aydın Mountains or *Celb-i Kulûb-ı Avam* in 1829

The Aydın Rebellion in 1829 was a concrete reaction of the Western Anatolian lower classes to the 1826. The leader of this revolt was Atçalı Kel Mehmed (Bald Mehmed

⁵¹⁸ Oğulukyan, 25.

of Atça). According to Çağatay Uluçay, who has written the largest monograph on Aydın Rebellion, Mehmet known as a farmhand and also son of farmhand Hasan Agha in Aydın region.⁵¹⁹ The general view is that he was a child of a poor family, and he was also poor. Mehmed was known as an *efe* means ‘young man’ in Greek (near-synonymous of *swashbuckler* in English), and this term has been used for defining the leaders of ‘*zeybek*’ and ‘*kızan*’ groups of the Aegean Region. However, they were also characters embedded in rural society. *Zeybeks* were living in villages of Aydın and mostly rural guardians, owners of coffeehouses in villages or served as soldiers in the local notables’ or pashas’ retinues. These people were sometimes village guard against bandits, carriers of caravans, shepherds; or sometimes provides rest and road assistance to passers-by. In short, they earned their livelihood through these means and they had a role in rural political-economy.⁵²⁰

According to Uluçay, the tension between political power and zeybeks started precisely because of the political power’s efforts to prevent these activities. In first step, As Uluçay refers, Istanbul tried to shut down coffeehouses and prevent zeybek’s economic activities in 1821. The important point that should be remembered, the coffeehouses were like janissary headquarters, especially in Istanbul.⁵²¹ All of economic and political activities had been planned and executed in these places by Janissaries. Because of this, the Ottoman political power had defined coffeehouses as hotbeds (*fesad yuvaları*) and ‘genetically’ against these places. Most probably, it became a security concern to eliminate all these coffeehouses that were run by armed people, whether they belonged to janissaries or not. However, Janissaries were like representatives of this kind of spaces and as Uluçay points out, the political power’s effort to abolish zeybek coffeehouses was frustrated by the influence of Janissaries.⁵²²

When the political power and the zeybeks were in tension, the economic conditions in the region were becoming increasingly difficult. The ten-year period encompassing

⁵¹⁹ Çağatay Uluçay, *Atçalı Kel Mehmed* (İstanbul: AS Matbaası, 1968), 27.

⁵²⁰ Uluçay, 19

⁵²¹ Ali Çaksu, “Janissary Coffee Houses in Late Eighteenth-Century Istanbul,” in *Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Dana Sajdi (I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), 117–32, <https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755608393>.

⁵²² Uluçay, 19.

this rebellion is quite complex for Istanbul and the financial burden was being borne by the people. This period had opened with the Greek War of Independence in 1821 and continued with the ‘Defeat’ of Navarino (1827) and the Second Russo-Turkish War between 1828-1829. The abolition of the Janissaries happened within this context, and new army called “Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (*The Victorious Soldiers of the Muhammad*) formed at the same time. Not only the financial burden of the political turmoil, but also the military burden was on the people. Recruitment offers had increased and the time spent under arms had lengthened.

In these conditions, the fiscal and military pressure over Aydın Region became unbearable levels. At that time, Sanjaks of Aydın and Saruhan were added to İzmir, and mukataa’s of Aydın had ruled by mültezims and voyvodas. These officials had taken orders from Trustee of İzmir.⁵²³ Mültezims and voyvodas often raises taxes and demanded taxes incessantly, disregarding the legally prescribed frequency of payment set at six months. These demands called *ara tevzii* means interlude allocation of tax.⁵²⁴ In the meantime, and after the Janissaries were abolished, Istanbul requested 1527 new person for *Asakir* troops.⁵²⁵ All this was adding to the unrest, but the last two moves of Istanbul that caused to rebellion were i) limitation of the armies of vizier-pasha households that zeybeks were generally member of them, and ii) the second attempt to abolish coffeehouses of zeybeks in 1828. Indeed, dozens of coffeehouses had burned by armed force and thousands of zeybeks became ‘idlers’.⁵²⁶

The nearly inevitable happened in 1829 and thousands of ‘idle’ zeybeks, poor peasants, yörüks and deserters were hide to Aydın Mountains. In this chaotic environment, Atçalı Kel Mehmed revolted in October 1829. At the beginning, his company consisted of only seven or eight comrade of him and they attacked to Kuyucak. After they captured here, they attacked to Nazilli. The movement continued

⁵²³ Uluçay, 21.

⁵²⁴ Uluçay, 16.

⁵²⁵ Uluçay, 17.

⁵²⁶ Mehmet Başaran, Aysun Sarıbey Haykıran, and Ali Özçelik, *Atçalı Kel Mehmed Efe: Batı Anadolu’da Eşkıyalık ve Zeybeklik*, 1. basım, İnsan ve Toplum Dizisi 87 (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2018), 186–87.

to grow and third target became Aydın. After seven hours of resistance, Haşim Ağa, Mütesselim of Aydın could not resist and fled the city. Only the center of sanjak, Güzelhisar was able to resist. After that, Mehmed he took over the administration and divided his kızans into troops to take over other towns. Although the authorities of some towns offered on the people to resist, people did not accept and declared that they were on the side of the Mehmed's troops, according to Uluçay. At the end, the Rebellion captured a vast region including Tire, Bayındır, Turgutlu, Atça, Arpaz, Birgi, Bozdoğan, Buldan, Alaşehir, Koçak, Köşk, Ödemiş, Sard, Yenipazar, Yenişehir and Kula.⁵²⁷

Of course, the political power defined this movement as banditry. On the other hand, Atçalı Mehmet explained his reason as:

My humble intention and action to save the inhabitants and the poor people from the encroachments of some ruthless mültezims, and also conquest the hearts of people and protecting them. Otherwise, I would not act against the people, the State and the will of God.⁵²⁸

As can be seen, Mehmed wanted to start a popular movement against the notables. He intended to establish an equal, fair and labor-oriented order in the mentioned moral economic principles. Indeed, Istanbul also understood Mehmet's mission as '*celb-i kulûb-ı avam*' means 'to attract the hearts of the common people'.⁵²⁹ Indeed, it seems to Mehmed have set up such an order in Aydın: The Earl of Albemarle, soldier and politician George Keppel (1799-1891) was one of the witnesses of the Revolt, and he described the established administration as follows:

When he entered a village, he left in office all persons against whom no complaint had been lodged, but was particularly observant that they did, not exceed the bounds of their duty, It was generally supposed that the roads would be unsafe: this was not the case during the whole of my journey in the disturbed district, I did not hear a single complaint. The Zebeks now began to call a for free trade, protection to agriculture, better laws, and more equal taxes.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁷ Uluçay, 35-36.

⁵²⁸ Uluçay, 17.

⁵²⁹ Ahmet Lütü Efendi, *Vak'anüvis Ahmed Lütü Efendi Tarihi*, vol. 2-3 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı - Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 442.

⁵³⁰ George Keppel, *Narrative of A Journey Across the Balcan in the Years (1829-1830) [Vol. II]*, vol. II (London: Henry Colburn And Richard Bentley, 1831), 127.

In Mehmed's rule war taxes were abolished, reduced the taxes directly collected by mültezims and zabits. However, he had not pretense of not paying taxes to the political power. Reversely, he pledged to pay the tax demanded within the limits of justice. More than that, he founded courts for prosecution of guilty mültezims, voyvodas, müftüs and naibs.⁵³¹ The inhabitants of Aydın expressed their gratification of Mehmed's practices.⁵³²

The moral economic understanding was clearly reflected not only in his practice but also in his discourse. His moral economy discourse mainly lied on a religious framework. Above all, he was using a religious title called *seyyid*. This title was used for the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. He used this title in his seal in the form of "Bende-i Huda Seyyid Mehmed".⁵³³ Obviously Mehmed had no such a genealogy. More than that, he patronized Bosniak madrasa scholar Sabri Efendi who exiled for his opposition to Mahmud II's clothing reform in Eyüp, Istanbul mosques.⁵³⁴ This was a direct sign of a search of legitimacy source. Meanwhile, he continued to use a popular language in his rule. Accordingly, he used other seals that engraved his title as "Keleş Mehmed el-me'mur min indullah"⁵³⁵ (*Bald Mehmed, Officer in the sight of God*). Accordingly, he continued to call himself by a 'village nickname' bald. In addition to religious, egalitarian folk discourse was also adopted by him. According to a popular tale, he inscribed on a fountain these verses in Turkish: "Başımı kaşımağa eli değmezdi Kelin/Su ilin, çeşme ilin, tekne kelin".⁵³⁶

This 'fairytale' of the lower classes did not last long. In December, Mahmud II rule strongly intervened to Aydın and this movement resulted in Mehmet's escape and the massacre of many of his comrades.⁵³⁷ Later, Mehmed had not seen for a long time and

⁵³¹ Başaran, et.al, 213, 214.

⁵³² Uluçay, 37-38.

⁵³³ Başaran et. al, 212.

⁵³⁴ Uluçay, 22.

⁵³⁵ Ahmet Lüfti Efendi, 442.

⁵³⁶ Uluçay, 30. These may be translated as "The bald wouldn't even scratch his head / The water and fountain belongs to county, but the tank is his."

⁵³⁷ Uluçay, 44-51.

seen in Sarayköy, Denizli on June 6, 1830. He tried to start a movement again but was unsuccessful. Then he was killed after a four-hour battle in Village of Tepecik, Aydın in June 10, 1830.⁵³⁸ Keleş Mehmed's tragic death would not be a deterrent factor to lower-classes; on the contrary, even today Mehmed and his comrades are in the hearts of the ordinary people as a heroes to be remembered for centuries, not as a thief, looter, vagrant or an underdog.

4.3.4. Middle East: A Rival “Modernisms” and the Peasant Revolt in Latakia, 1834 – 1835

In 1834, the Syria had witnessed mass peasant revolts. The peasants revolted against the Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mehmed Ali, Khdiv of Egypt. Ibrahim's rule could not be traced very back, it had established after the 1831-1833 Egyptian Ottoman War. In this clash, the Egyptian forces had reached to Kütahya, Western Anatolia and nearly threatened Istanbul. the Sublime Porte immediately call for help and the Western powers had intervened to conflict. The army of Mehmed Ali had stopped but this was a highly expensive for Istanbul: The political control had passed to Mehmed Ali in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. More clearly, the Sublime Porte had lost their hegemony over Levant including the Adana and these regions occupied by Egypt.⁵³⁹ After this, Mehmed Ali sent his son İbrahim for structuring the Egyptian regime in these regions.

As mentioned before, Muhammad Ali's Egypt was a modernizing polity. In that sense, it was a rival power against the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East politics. More than that, it can be argued that Mehmed Ali's reforms were more effective than the Mahmud II's in some respects. Above all, Mehmed Ali could be more courageous because he eliminated his internal political rivals at the beginning of his reign. Namely, after the elimination of Mamluks as possible opposition focal, there were a few daily political disturbances that could be balance him. Secondly, he had taken supports of some Western polities, such as Revolutionary France. Main reason behind this support was the intention of control Mehmed Ali's new political weight against other rival polities.

⁵³⁸ Uluçay, 56.

⁵³⁹ Yvette Talhamy, “The Nusayri and Druze Minorities in Syria in the Nineteenth Century: The Revolt against the Egyptian Occupation as a Case Study,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no. 6 (November 1, 2012): 973–74, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723624>.

The Western powers had seen his autonomous reign in Egypt as a chance, especially for their struggle over Suez Canal. Thus, Mehmed Ali could reach more fiscal and intellectual sources; thus, he had more instruments to realize political and economic reforms.

However, the lack of upper class/elite rivalry did not mean to lack of any opposition. Pasha's main opposition was lower-classes, especially the peasants. Mehmed Ali's aggressive reform program and inhumane political practice of it caused many rebellions against the Pasha. The same repeated in Greater Syria: According to Khaled Fahmy's analysis, Pasha's economic policy mainly relied on monopolistic practices.⁵⁴⁰ According to this strict policy, most of sectors had united under a monopoly. Pasha had started this policy in his early periods of reign and achieved to include most of agricultural product, such as grain and sugar. In 1816, all worthy agricultural products had monopolized. Thus, the Pasha could buy the products cheaper from peasantry, then sell to internal or international clients. It is obvious that, this policy was so profitable for Pasha, but highly harmful for the peasantry. In second stage, Pasha had easily achieved a policy that Mahmud II done after a dozen of years: Since he got rid of Mamluks, there were not any ordered local notables, and the Pasha was easily appropriated a hegemony over land and became single and centralized political power. More than that, he also surpassed the agricultural and pious waqfs and also seized their revenues. With this, Mehmed Ali had established an undisputable control over land property, tax collection and trade of agricultural products. More than that, he imposed new products and techniques to peasantry. Poor peasants were exploited as never before.

While Kenneth Cuno discusses the Middle Eastern societies, he complaint about that the peasant economy pictured as "subsistence economies" means the villages self-enclosed, only form of economic contract was taxation, cash-crop production and other money-based exchanges had a little part of economy. The "isolation" image also central in that picture, according to Cuno. However, in referencing Peter Gran's "agrarian capitalism" thesis for Egypt, Cuno rejects this analysis implies existence of

⁵⁴⁰ Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali*, 42ff.

a stagnant sociology.⁵⁴¹ The Middle Eastern peasants were able to protect their economic interests and even do so in the most violent and international ways, as the following example shows. Although he narrows concept of subsistence economy, Cuno's criticisms to state-centered analysis' stagnancy thesis is right: The events of 1834 proofs the peasantry's highly mobilized political understanding.

Here, after 1833, the similar system had been started to constitute in the Levant. Above all, Mehmed Ali abolished the Ottoman's traditional taxes but "demanded new taxes, recruited some of the young men as corvee and declared mass conscription in order to fortify his northern border with the Ottoman Empire".⁵⁴² Plus, he proposed a military policy including the disarming the local communities and demanding their weapons. However, as Talhamy remarks, "carrying weapons a regular matter" for mountaineer and villager people because they use these weapons for protecting from both bandits and wild animals or hunting, and carrying weapon was a matter of social status. As Omar points out, weapon was a "tradition that they had been accustomed" hundreds of years.⁵⁴³ While this was an enough to regress, Ibrahim Pasha called a mass conscription in Spring, 1834. According to Talhamy, this was new for Syrians. Besides, Ibrahim was resorting to inhumane methods, and this caused "distress and fear" of people.⁵⁴⁴ The heterodox Islamic minorities such as Nusayrites and Druzes also included to conscription and especially these two extremely against those dictates come from a Sunni political power.

And of course, this caused a series of peasant movements. In 1834, a really vast peasant revolt had started including Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli and Beirut.⁵⁴⁵ Among them, the Nusayrite/Alawi rebellion has a special feature to show the 'international'

⁵⁴¹ Kenneth M. Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*, Cambridge Middle East Library 27 (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 42ff.

⁵⁴² Talhamy, 974.

⁵⁴³ Yousef Hussein Omar, "Alawites Rebellion in Syria Against Egyptian Rule (1834-1835)," *Journal of Alevism-Bektashism Studies*, no. 22 (December 27, 2020): 68, <https://doi.org/10.24082/2020.abked.285>.

⁵⁴⁴ Talhamy, 975-976.

⁵⁴⁵ Talhamy, 981.

impact of peasantry. According to Stefan Winter “the first major revolt against Ibrahim took place in Alawi mountains in the autumn of 1834.”⁵⁴⁶ In this confrontation, nearly 4,000 Nusayrite peasants attacked a Egyptian cavalry regiment.⁵⁴⁷ After a few confrontations in which Egyptians failed to make an real resistance, the peasants gained self-confidence and even decided attacking Latakia where under control of Egypt. In this successful operation that freed Nusayrite prisoners, stolen miri money and horses of mütesellim, Nusayrites declared that they under the service of the Ottoman sultan, dismissed the Egyptian mütesellim and appointed a new.⁵⁴⁸ Indeed, Winter’s archival finding proven that this relation between Nusayrites and the Ottomans continued:

Whatever the case may be, the fact of the ‘Alawis’ secret contacts with the Ottoman government appears to be substantiated by a remarkable archival letter from 5 December 1834 in which the anonymous writer describes the ‘Alawi revolt in some detail and asserts that all the people of the region are waiting for Mehmed Reşid to come deliver them from Ibrahim Paşa’s tyranny. “The Egyptian side is losing because the Nusayris are very numerous and powerful. They are looking toward your honor and declare openly that they will rise up collectively when you set out.”

As Talhamy provides, the Ottomans had remained to support Syrian peasantries, including Nusayrites. The Ottoman support never came as a form of army and the revolt subdued by the Egyptians in 1835. However, when the revolt subdued, they were still partially disarmed, and Ibrahim could not capture the Mountain as a whole.⁵⁴⁹ The revolt was successful in that sense. This politics shows that the peasant politics became highly complex forms. In this case, they threatened Egypt with the Ottomans as showing their traditional rule in this place. According to the document published by Winter, Nusayris openly threatened Egypt with Ottomans. In summary, “The people of Haleb ve Ayıntab are fed up with the oppression of İbrahim and his soldiers and looking forward to the arrival of your highness. They are all publicly say

⁵⁴⁶ Stefan Winter, *A History of the 'Alawis: From Medieval Aleppo to the Turkish Republic* (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 182.

⁵⁴⁷ Talhamy, 982

⁵⁴⁸ Talhamy, 983.

⁵⁴⁹ Talhamy.

that when we leave here, we will cross over”.⁵⁵⁰ However, they had not a peaceful past with the Ottoman administration. In 1808, 1816 and 1854, Nusayrites also revolted to the Ottoman rule because of nearly the same reasons.⁵⁵¹ In that sense, Nusayrite peasants had done a tactical selectivity.

Behind the Nusayrite peasantry’s complex political tactics and wise practice of it may be the pre-revolt networks. According to Joel Beinin, Levantine peasants were strong political-economic ties among them.⁵⁵² These networks were a kind of less regulated non-guild and non-state economic connections; with these, peasantry, Bedouins and townsmen could by-pass given regulatory practices and adopt their own embedded relations in agriculture, crafts and trade. Also “new organizational techniques” and “ideologies” also a part of their political understanding. These networks and political capacities, Beinin underlines, were probably mobilized in the 1834 rebellion: According to Beinin, the mobilization ability that demonstrated in the 1834-35 should be closely related to these networks. Thus, the moral economic principle of embeddedness of economic relations to social relations became a relational tool in making Levantine labor class. These ties led to the ability to act together, and from there to the idea of pursuing common class interest. The peasant networks must have continued to diversify and deepen: according to Aytekin, for example, *The Peasant Commonwealth* had declared in Kisrawan, Mount Lebanon in 1859 was built on the experience of such a networking, organizing and administrating.⁵⁵³

⁵⁵⁰ Stefan Winter, “La Revolte Alaouite de 1834 Contre L’occupation Egyptienne: Perceptions Alaouites et Lecture Ottomane,” *Oriente Moderno* 79, no. 3 (August 12, 1999): 71, <https://doi.org/10.1163/22138617-07903006>. In Turkish “Haleb ve Ayntab ahalisi İbrahim’in ve askerlinin zulmünden usandı ve efendimizin teşriflerine müntazırlardır. (...) Efendimize bakıyorlar, buradan çıkınca cümlesi karşıya gideriz diyü alenen söylüyorlar”

⁵⁵¹ See Ali Capar, “İsmail Hayr Bey İsyanı Işığında Osmanlı-Nusayri İlişkileri,” *Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bektaş Veli Araştırma Dergisi*, no. 91 (September 23, 2019): 43–64.

⁵⁵² Beinin, *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East*, 34.

⁵⁵³ Aytekin, *Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 204-208.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1. The Ottoman Lower-Classes in Modern State Making

The story becomes clearer not when history is adapted to theory, but when theory is derived from history. The Ottoman lower classes were always a part of politics and possessed a strong ability to object and be creative. This fact becomes even more evident when structural analysis is set aside and society-oriented relational analyses are put at the forefront. This approach may be possible by highlighting social processes, patterns, and accumulations. In other words, it involves focusing on what repeats itself, and on opposition and tensions in social processes, by focusing on a process rather than a structure as conclusions of social processes. Structural views are like ‘photographs’ of historical conclusions, inevitably evoking a sense of stasis. In contrast, social processes are complex and ever-changing, more akin to a ‘video’ record. Institutional, Marxist, and Neo-Marxist studies have made significant progress in this sense but have partially neglected the impact of the lower classes in historical processes.

Undoubtedly, societies also exhibit patterns. The concept of class is a wise approach to analyze these patterns. As E. P. Thompson, E. M. Wood, and Ste. Croix suggest, class is a kind of relation and process that both imposes on its members and is transformed by them. This pattern also produces politics and ideologies. The concept of *moral economy* is a crystal-clear marker of these dynamics. Formed over centuries and developed through class experience, the moral economy framework consisted of egalitarian, fair, and assured principles for the continuity of subsistence. It is unnecessary to look for a ‘complex intellectual process’ behind it; survival instinct and the mentality to eliminate risks nurtured this framework.

Initially, solidarity, mutuality, and equality were ways of life, and humanity likely formed its mentality within this process. As inequalities increased, this framework also became a political agenda. This means that the moral economy was not only a system of values but also a guide to action, as E. P. Thompson reveals. The tension between politics and ideology took on a new aspect in each new confrontation, and each stage was transferred through custom. The emphasis on tradition became a powerful ideological weapon against upper-class politics. Both urbanites and rural people knew very well the purpose and content of using it. In the Ottoman case, the discourse of *kadim* and references to the egalitarian ancient past were typical indicators of this high political level.

Especially after the emergence of capitalism, the significance of this feature has become more prominent. Commodification, the disembedding of economic relations from social relations, dispossession, and subsequent proletarianization paved the way for the politicization of the moral economic mentality. This was a global process, and naturally, the Ottoman lower classes experienced it similarly. As new Marxist and some Institutionalist studies reveal, the transition to capitalism was a relational and time-spanning process shaped at each stage by various social forces. Not surprisingly, lower classes were one of these forces and always had an impact through their actions. They were acutely aware of the possible consequences and implications of their actions. As Attila AYTEKIN and Aysel YILDIZ have demonstrated, there were patterns of daily struggles and mass uprisings among the lower classes. This portrait presents a stark contrast to the notions of backwardness, stagnation, and even ‘slothfulness’ and ‘idiocy’ often attributed to them.

In the Dağlı Rebellions, the peasantry resisted both orders imposed upon them, challenging the âyâns and the Imperial Household for years, ultimately contributing to the destruction of both sides. These rebellions became a focal point in the power struggles between the âyâns and the Imperial Household, with the peasantry serving as a crucial counterbalance. Employing customary methods, the peasants left their land, armed themselves, and confronted both sides. The Dağlı's struggle was intricately linked to the Incident of 1808, with the chaos and mayhem they created playing a

decisive role in escalating the conflict between the political agendas of the âyâns, Vizier-Pasha Households, and the Imperial Order.

As production in Rumelia halted and the crisis deepened, the lower classes in Istanbul, particularly artisans and janissaries, revolted. They used tradition as their discourse but were driven by immediate economic needs, such as securing bread. This uprising resulted in the overthrow of two sultans and one âyân-grand vizier, paving the way for the abolition of the âyâns and the elimination of the *Sened-i İttifak*. This pivotal movement could have led to an alternative path of state formation, but it sustained its influence until 1826, when the Abolition of the Janissary Hearth diminished the people's power.

However, the spirit of resistance continued with Atçalı Kel Mehmed and his associates in 1829. The Imperial Household viewed Atçalı's egalitarian movement as a significant threat, accusing him of organizing the people against the established order. Atçalı's movement demonstrated that neither the Imperial Household nor any other upper class could implement their agenda unchallenged. This resistance extended beyond internal agendas; for instance, the great resistance in Mount Latakia highlighted a peasantry capable of leveraging internal relations when necessary. The peasants of the Nusayri community provoked two great powers against each other, utilizing customary networks and invoking tradition, underscoring the persistent and adaptive nature of lower-class resistance.

Of course, all this required much more than the capacity of a group of bandits, brigands, outlaws, robbers, or kidnapers. According to the development curve observed here, it might well be that other minor political bodies, such as households and political powers, would have earned these titles for their offenses against the masses.

REFERENCES

ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

BOA, A. DVNS. AHK. HL. d. 4 – S12 – B46 retrieved from Canan Kuş, “1780–1784 Tarihli ve 4 Numaralı Halep Ahkâm Defteri (S.1–53) Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme” (Unpublished Master Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Anabilim Dalı, Elazığ, Fırat Üniversitesi, 2008): 68.

BOA, A.DVN.ŞKT.d 13 - HK. 390 retrieved from Hasan Basri Türk, “13 Numaralı Atık Şikâyet Defteri (VR.1-142) Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin (H.1100/ M. 1689)” (Unpublished Master Thesis, Türkiye Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, Türk Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, Yeniçağ Tarihi Bilim Dalı, İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2019): 230.

BOA, A.DVNS. AHKR. BN. d. 44, HK. 713 retrieved from Tunç, “44 Numaralı Rumeli Ahkâm-ı Şikâyet Defterinin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirmesi.” 505.

BOA, A.DVNS. AHKR. d. 44, HK. 502 retrieved from Tunç, “44 Numaralı Rumeli Ahkâm-ı Şikâyet Defterinin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirmesi.” 364.

BOA, A.DVNS. AHKR. d. 44, HK. 738 retrieved from Gizem Tunç, “44 Numaralı Rumeli Ahkâm-ı Şikâyet Defterinin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirmesi” (Unpublished Master Thesis, Akdeniz Uygarlıkları Araştırma Enstitüsü, Akdeniz Yeni ve Yakınçağ Araştırmaları Ana Bilim Dalı, Antalya, Akdeniz Üniversitesi, 2017): 522.

BOA, AE, SABH.I., 13-1184.

BOA, AE.SABH.I, 10-871.

BOA, AE.SMMD.IV., 28 – 3167.

BOA, C..AS., 336-13932

BOA, C..BH., 68-3244

BOA, C..ZB., 28-1389.

BOA, C.BLD., 110-5468.

BOA, C.BLD., 5-230.

BOA, C.BLD., 7-319.

BOA, C.EV. 482/24351

BOA, C.TZ. 49/2446
BOA, C.ZB., 62-3055
BOA, HAT, 1315-51279
BOA, HAT, 1397-56138.
BOA, HAT, 174-7554.
BOA, HAT, 174-7558.”
BOA, HAT, 204-10585
BOA, HAT, 240-13419
BOA, HAT, 83-3437.
BOA, HAT, 880-38934.
BOA, TS.MA.e, 786-4.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Abou-El-Haj, Rifa‘at Ali. *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics*. 52. Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te İstanbul, 1984.
- . “The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report.” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 94, no. 4 (1974): 438–47. <https://doi.org/10.2307/600586>.
- . *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*. 2nd Edition. 1991. Reprint, Syracuse (N. Y.): Syracuse University Press, 2005.
- Abrutyn, Seth. *Revisiting Institutionalism in Sociology: Putting the “Institution” Back in Institutional Analysis*. 1st Edition. Routledge Advances in Sociology ; 116. New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Adas, Michael. “‘Moral Economy’ or ‘Contest State’?: Elite Demands and the Origins of Peasant Protest in Southeast Asia.” *Journal of Social History* 13, no. 4 (1980): 521–46.

Adcock, Robert, Mark Bevir, and Shannon C. Stimson. "Historicizing the New Institutionalism(s)." In *Modern Political Science: Anglo-American Exchanges since 1880*, edited by Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon C. Stimson, 259–89. Princeton Paperbacks. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Ađır, Seven. "The Evolution of Grain Policy: The Ottoman Experience." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 43, no. 4 (April 2013): 571–98. https://doi.org/10.1162/JINH_a_00462.

———. "The Rise and Demise of 'Gedik' Markets in Istanbul, 1750–1860." *The Economic History Review* 71, no. 1 (February 2018): 133–56. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12492>.

Ahmed Efendi. *III. Selim'in Sırkâtibi Ahmed Efendi Tarafından Tutulan Rûznâme*. Translated by V. Sema Arıkan. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları. II. Dizi, sa. 30. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1993.

Ahmet Lütü Efendi. *Vak'anüvis Ahmed Lütü Efendi Tarihi*. Vol. 2–3. 8 vols. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı - Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999.

Akarlı, Engin Deniz. "Gedik: Implements, Mastership, Shop Usufruct, and Monopoly among Istanbul Artisans, 1750 - 1850." *Wissenschaftskolleg Jahrbuch*, 1986, 223–32.

———. "Gedik: A Bundle of Rights and Obligations for Istanbul Artisans and Traders, 1750–1840." In *Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things*, edited by Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy, 166–200. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493751.006>.

———. Review of *Review: Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West* by Roderic H. Davison, by Roderic H. Davison. *The History Teacher* 26, no. 1 (1992): 127–28. <https://doi.org/10.2307/494108>.

Akdađ, Mustafa. "Genel Çizgileriyle XVII. Yüzyıl Türkiye Tarihi." *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 4, no. 6 (May 1, 1966): 201–47.

———. *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası: "Celali İsyanları"*. Kültür Dizisi. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995.

- Al-Rustom, Hakem. "Internal Orientalism and the Nation-State Order: Turkey, Armenians, and the Writing of History." *Ariel: A Review of International English Literature* 51, no. 4 (2020): 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.1353/ari.2020.0026>.
- Altınordu, Ateş. "Şerif Mardin 1927–2017." *Review of Middle East Studies* 52, no. 1 (April 2018): 166–68. <https://doi.org/10.1017/rms.2018.18>.
- Anievas, Alexander, and Kerem Nişancıoğlu. *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism*. Pluto Press, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183pb6f>.
- Ansari, Ali M. "The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, 'Modernization' and the Consolidation of Power." *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 3 (2001): 1–24.
- Anscombe, Frederick. "Albanians and 'Mountain Bandits.'" In *The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830*, edited by Frederick Anscombe, 87–113. Princeton, U.S.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006. http://markuswiener.com/catalog/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=607.
- Anter, Andreas. *Max Weber's Theory of the Modern State*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137364906>.
- Antonio, Robert. "Max Weber in the Post-World War II US and After." *Ethics & Politics* 7, no. 2 (2005): 1–94.
- Arif, Ahmed. "Thirty-Three Bullets." Translated by David Selim Sayers and Evrim Emir-Sayers. The Paris Institute for Critical Thinking, 2023. <https://parisinstitute.org/thirty-three-bullets/>.
- Aščerić-Todd, Ines. "The Noble Traders: The Islamic Tradition of 'Spiritual Chivalry' (Futuwwa) in Bosnian Trade-Guilds (16th–19th Centuries)." *The Muslim World* 97, no. 2 (April 2007): 159–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2007.00168.x>.

Aston, T. H., and C. H. E. Philpin, eds. *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe*. Past and Present Publications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511562358>.

Aymes, Marc, Benjamin Gourisse, and Elise Massicard, eds. *Devlet Olma Zanaatı: Osmanlı'dan Bugüne Kamu İcraatı*. Translated by Ali Berktaş. Karthala, 2013. Reprint, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016.

Aytekin, E. Attila. "Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 6 (2009): 935–51.

———. "Cultivators, Creditors and the State: Rural Indebtedness in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 35, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 292–313. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150802151041>.

———. "Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and the Tanzimat Reforms." *International Review of Social History* 57, no. 2 (August 2012): 191–227. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859012000193>.

———. *Üretim - Düzenleme - İsyan: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Toprak Meselesi, Arazi Hukuku ve Köylülük*. Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2022.

———. "Negotiating Religion, Moral Economy and Economic Ideas in the Late Ottoman Empire: Perspectives of Peasants and the Intelligentsia." In *Reassessing the Moral Economy: Religion and Economic Ethics from Ancient Greece to the 20th Century*, edited by Tanja Skambraks and Martin Lutz, 195–218. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29834-9_10.

———. "Son Dönem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 1703-1908: Kapitalistleşme ve Merkezileşme Kavşağında." In *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*, edited by Gökhan Atılğan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, and Ateş Uslu, 39–87. Yordam Kitap, 2015. <https://open.metu.edu.tr/handle/11511/86561>.

Barkan, Ömer Lütfi. Review of "'İktisadî İntihat Tarihimizin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Meseleleri,'" by Sabri F. Ülgener. *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 12, no. 3–4 (1951): 163–73.

———. “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Esnaf Cemiyetleri.” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 41, no. 1–4 (1985): 39–46.

Barkey, Karen. *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*. 1. print., Cornell Paperbacks. The Wilder House Series in Politics, History, and Culture. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1997.

———. “The Ottoman Empire (1299–1923): The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority.” In *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, edited by Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons, 102–26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316694312.006>.

Baron Juchereau de Saint-Denys, Antoine de. *Révolutions de Constantinople En 1807 et 1808*. 2 vols vols. Paris: Brissot-Thivars, 1819.

Başaran, Mehmet, Aysun Sarıbey Haykıran, and Ali Özçelik. *Atçalı Kel Mehmed Efe: Batı Anadolu’da Eşkıyalık ve Zeybeklik*. 1. basım. İnsan ve Toplum Dizisi 87. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2018.

Beinin, Joel. *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East*. The Contemporary Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612800>.

Berktaş, Halil. *Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi ve Fuat Köprülü*. Kaynak Yayınları, 1983.

———. “The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography.” In *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, edited by Halil Berktaş and Suraiya Faroqhi, 1st ed., 109–84. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1992.

Beydilli, Kemal. “Küçük Kaynarca’dan Tanzimat’a Islahat Düşünceleri.” *İlmî Araştırmalar: Dil, Edebiyat, Tarih İncelemeleri*, no. 8 (September 1999): 25–64.

Bohstedt, John. *The Politics of Provisions: Food Riots, Moral Economy, and Market Transition in England, c. 1550–1850*. London: Routledge, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315554297>.

- Boratav, Korkut. "Book Review: State and Class in Turkey. A Study in Capitalist Development." *Review of Radical Political Economics* 25, no. 1 (March 1993): 129–41. <https://doi.org/10.1177/048661349302500107>.
- Bouquet, Oliver. "Is It Time to Stop Speaking about Ottoman Modernisation?" In *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey*, edited by Marc Aymes, 45–67. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2015.
- Bouquet, Olivier. "From Decline to Transformation: Reflections on a New Paradigm in Ottoman History." *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 60, no. 60 (December 31, 2022): 27–60. <https://doi.org/10.18589/oa.1223519>.
- Brenner, Robert, and Mark Glick. "The Regulation Approach: Theory and History." *New Left Review*, no. 1/188 (August 1, 1991): 45–119.
- Brocheux, Pierre. "Moral Economy or Political Economy? The Peasants Are Always Rational." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 4 (August 1983): 791–803. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2054765>.
- Buoye, Thomas M. *Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy: Violent Disputes over Property Rights in Eighteenth-Century China*. Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511551345>.
- Büyükkibar, Tuncer. *Enver Ziya Karal'ın Hayatı, Eserleri ve Faaliyetleri*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2017.
- Cabi Ömer Efendi. *Câbî Tarihi: Târih-i Sultan Selîm-i Sâlis ve Mahmûd-ı Sâni*. Edited by Mehmet Ali Beyhan. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003.
- Çaksu, Ali. "Janissary Coffee Houses in Late Eighteenth-Century Istanbul." In *Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century*, edited by Dana Sajdi, 117–32. I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755608393>.
- Cammack, Paul. "Statism, New Institutionalism, and Marxism." *Socialist Register* 26 (March 18, 1990). <https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5578>.

- Campbell, John L., and Ove Kaj Pedersen, eds. *The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Capar, Ali. "İsmail Hayr Bey İsyanı Işığında Osmanlı-Nusayri İlişkileri." *Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bektaş Veli Araştırma Dergisi*, no. 91 (September 23, 2019): 43–64.
- Carnoy, Martin. *The State and Political Theory*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Carvajal Castro, Álvaro, and Carlos Tejerizo-García. "The Early Medieval State: A Strategic-Relational Approach." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 35, no. 4 (December 2022): 547–66. <https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12392>.
- Cayli, Baris. "Peasants, Bandits, and State Intervention: The Consolidation of Authority in the Ottoman Balkans and Southern Italy." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 18, no. 2 (2018): 425–43. <https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12228>.
- Çelik, Fatma Eda. *Kişisel İktidardan Millet Meclisine Saltanattan Cumhuriyete*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2022.
- . "Türkiye Modern Devleti'nin Osmanlı'daki Kökenleri – Toprak Yönetiminde ve Yönetimsel Organlarda Dönüşüm." *Memleket Siyaset Yönetim* 17, no. 37 (June 30, 2022): 5–48.
- Çelik, Gökür. "Vâsî'tî'nin 'Gazâvât-ı Murad Paşa' Adlı Eserinin İncelenmesi." Unpublished Master Thesis, Marmara University, 2006.
- Cerev, Gökçe, Doğa Başar Sarıipek, and Bora Yenihan. "Revisiting the Akhi Order: Research on Akhi Values Perception of Anatolian People." *Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları Dergisi / Journal of Social Policy Conferences* 0, no. 0 (May 10, 2022): 0–0. <https://doi.org/10.26650/jspc.2022.82.1014972>.
- Çetinkaya, Y. Doğan. "1923 Öncesinde Türkiye'de Kapitalizm, Sermaye ve Burjuvazi." In *100 Yıl Sonra Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 295–312. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2024.

- Chalcraft, John. "Engaging the State: Peasants and Petitions in Egypt on the Eve of Colonial Rule." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no. 3 (2005): 303–25.
- . "Middle East Popular Politics in Gramscian Perspective." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 41, no. 3 (December 1, 2021): 469–84. <https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201X-9408015>.
- . "Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: Protest, the State, and the End of the Guilds in Egypt." In *Bread from the Lion's Mouth*, edited by Suraiya Faroqhi, 1st ed., 278–92. Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities. Berghahn Books, 2015. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qcx4k.19>.
- . *Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511843952>.
- Chalcraft, John, and Yaseen Noorani. *Counterhegemony in the Colony and Postcolony*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230592162>.
- Chandhoke, Neera. "'Bringing People Back in': Political and Intellectual Agendas." *Economic and Political Weekly* 25, no. 31 (1990): 1721–27.
- Charnysh, Volha, Eugene Finkel, and Scott Gehlbach. "Historical Political Economy: Past, Present, and Future." *Annual Review of Political Science* 26, no. 1 (June 15, 2023): 175–91. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102440>.
- Çiğdem, Ahmet, Fethi Açıkel, Necmi Erdoğan, and Tanıl Bora. "Şerif Mardin'le Merkez-Çevre Analizi Üzerine." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 105 (2006): 7–10.
- Çizakça, Murat. *İslam Dünyasında ve Batı'da İş Ortaklıkları Tarihi*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999.
- Clarke, Simon. *Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21808-0>.

- Coşgel, Metin, and Boğaç A. Ergene. *The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and Trial in the Sharia Courts*. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Coutinho, Carlos Nelson. *Gramsci's Political Thought*. Translated by Pedro Sette-Camara. Historical Materialism Book Series, Volume 38. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012.
- Cronin, Stephanie, ed. *Subalterns and Social Protest: History from Below in the Middle East and North Africa*. First issued in paperback. SOAS-Routledge Studies on the Middle East 7. London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2011.
- Crozier, Michel. *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. <http://archive.org/details/bureaucraticphen00croz>.
- Cuno, Kenneth M. *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*. Cambridge Middle East Library 27. Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Curtis, Michael. *Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Da Silva, Filipe Carreira. "Time Is of the Essence: Remarks on Michael Mann's The Sources of Social Power." *Análise Social* XLVIII, no. 209 (2013): 959–64.
- Darling, Linda. "Public Finances: The Role of the Ottoman Centre." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*, edited by Suraiya N. Faroqhi, 3:118–32. Cambridge History of Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620956.007>.
- Darling, Linda T. *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660*. The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage 6. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996.

- Davison, Roderic H. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*. Second Edition. 1963. Reprint, New York: Gordian Press, 1973.
- De Ste. Croix, Geoffrey E. M. *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*. Cornell Paperbacks Edition Reissued. 1981. Reprint, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Dinler, Demet. "Türkiye’de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi." *Praksis*, no. 9 (2003): 17–54.
- Divitçioğlu, Sencer. *Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumunu - Marksist Üretim Tarzı*. 1967. Reprint, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010.
- Edelman, Marc. "Bringing the Moral Economy Back in... to the Study of 21st-Century Transnational Peasant Movements." *American Anthropologist* 107, no. 3 (2005): 331–45.
- Elardo, Justin A., and Al Campbell. "Choice and the Substantivist/Formalist Debate: A Formal Presentation of Three Substantivist Criticisms." In *Research in Economic Anthropology*, 25:267–84. Bingley: Emerald (MCB UP), 2006. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0190-1281\(06\)25012-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0190-1281(06)25012-1).
- Eldem, Tuba. "Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces." In *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies: Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness in Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, 171–92. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53189-2_9.
- Emrence, Cem. "Three Waves of Late Ottoman Historiography, 1950-2007." *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 41, no. 2 (2007): 137–51.
- Erdoğan, Necmi. "Devleti ‘Idare Etmek’: Mâduniyet ve Düzenbazlık." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 83 (2000): 8–31.
- Erdoğan Özünlü, Emine, and Osman Gümüşçü. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İç Göç Aktörleri Olarak Çift-Bozanlar." *Amme İdaresi Dergisi* 49, no. 1 (2016): 29–56.

- Ergut, Ferdan. "State and Social Control: The Police in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Republican Turkey, 1839-1939." PhD. Thesis, New School for Social Research, 1999.
- Ersanlı, Büşra. *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*. 1992. Reprint, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003.
- Evans, Peter B. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. *Bringing the State Back In*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 1985. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511628283>.
- Fabbe, Kristin E. *Disciples of the State? Religion and State-Building in the Former Ottoman World*. Cambridge New York, NY Port Melbourne New Delhi Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1017/978-1-108-29687-8>.
- Fahmī, Hālid. *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt*. 1. publ. in Egypt. Cairo: the American Univ. in Cairo Pr, 2003.
- Fahmy, Khaled. *Mehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt*. Makers of the Muslim World. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009.
- Faroqhi, Suraiya, ed. *Bread from the Lion's Mouth: Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities*. International Studies in Social History, vol. 25. New York: Berghahn, 2015.
- . *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire*. London : New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005.
- . "16. Yüzyıl Boyunca Anadolu ve Balkanlar'da Kırsal Toplum-II." In *Osmanlı Şehirleri ve Kırsal Hayatı*, translated by Emine Sonnur Özcan, 100-151. İstanbul: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2006.

- Farris, Sara R. *Max Weber's Theory of Personality: Individuation, Politics and Orientalism in the Sociology of Religion*. Studies in Critical Social Sciences, volume 56. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
- Federici, Silvia. *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*. New York: Autonomedia, 2004.
- Feeny, David. "The Moral or the Rational Peasant? Competing Hypotheses of Collective Action." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 4 (1983): 769–89. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2054764>.
- Fındıkoğlu, Ziyaeddin. "Türk Sosyolojisinde İki Alman Sosyoloğu: Prof. Kessler ve Prof. Rüstow." *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 23, no. 3–4 (1963): 33–50.
- Fleming, Katherine Elizabeth. *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Fontaine, Laurence. "Reconsidering the Moral Economy in France at the End of the Eighteenth Century." *Geschichte Und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft* 26 (2019): 45–74.
- Gall, Lothar. *Bismarck: The White Revolutionary 1871–1898*. 1st ed. 1986. Reprint, Routledge, 2019. <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781000000887>.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Nachdr. Cornell Paperbacks. 1983. Reprint, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1997.
- Genç, Mehmet. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*. 11. Basım. 2000. Reprint, İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2014.
- . "Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century: General Framework, Characteristics and Main Trends." In *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1950*, edited by Donald Quataert, 59–86. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

Göçek, Fatma Müge. *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Gölpınarlı, Abdülbaki. *İslâm ve Türk İllerinde Fütüvvet Teşkilatı*. Edited by Fritz Neumark, Sabri F. Ülgener, and Ömer Lütfi Barkan. İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası, 2011.

Goshgarian, Rachel. “Beyond the social and the spiritual: Redefining the urban confraternities of late medieval Anatolia.” Ph.D., Harvard University, 2008. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/304597393/abstract/6F671955B7394893PQ/1>.

Götz, Norbert. “‘Moral Economy’: Its Conceptual History and Analytical Prospects.” *Journal of Global Ethics*, May 4, 2015. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17449626.2015.1054556>.

Grehan, James. *Everyday Life & Consumer Culture in 18th-Century Damascus*. Publications on the Near East. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007.

Guggenheim, Scott Evan, and Robert P. Weller. “Introduction: Moral Economy, Capitalism and State Power in Rural Protest.” In *Power and Protest in the Countryside: Studies of Rural Unrest in Asia, Europe, and Latin America*, edited by Robert P. Weller and Scott E. Guggenheim, 3–12. Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 1982. <http://archive.org/details/powerprotestinco0000unse>.

Gülalp, Haldun. “Universalism Versus Particularism: Ottoman Historiography and the ‘Grand Narrative.’” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 13 (1995): 151–69. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600002399>.

Güran, Tevfik. “The State Role in the Grain Supply of İstanbul: The Grain Administration, 1793-1839.” *International Journal of Turkish Studies: IJTS - University of Wisconsin*, no. 3 (1984): 27–41.

Haldon, John. “The Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy: Comparative Perspectives.” In *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, edited by Halil Berktaş and Suraiya Faroqhi, 1st ed., 18–108. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1992.

- Hall, John Whitney, and Halil İnalçık. "The Nature of Traditional Society." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, edited by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, 14–63. Princeton University Press, 1964. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183pjfz.5>.
- Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44, no. 5 (December 1996): 936–57. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x>.
- Hänlein, Andreas. "Gerhard Kessler: Türkiye’de Sürgün Bir Alman Sosyal Politikacı." Translated by Alpay Hekimler. *Çalışma ve Toplum Dergisi* 2, no. 9 (2006): 31–47.
- Hasdemir, Ayten Seven. "A Critique of the Histories of European and Ottoman States: ‘From Modernization Revisionism’ and ‘State Tradition’ Towards an Alternative Reading." Unpublished Master Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2011.
- Heigl, Miriam C. "Social Conflict and Competing State Projects in the Semi-Periphery: A Strategic-Relational Analysis of the Transformation of the Mexican State into an Internationalized Competition State." *Antipode* 43, no. 1 (2011): 129–48. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2010.00814.x>.
- Heper, Metin. "Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Tradition." Authorized Facsimile of PhD Thesis, Syracuse University, 1971.
- Heywood, Colin. "Witteck and the Austrian Tradition." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, no. 1 (1988): 7–25.
- Hirst, Paul Q., and Barry Hindess. *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production*. London ; Boston : Routledge and K. Paul, 1975. <http://archive.org/details/precapitalistmod0000hind>.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. *Echoes of the Marseillaise: Two Centuries Look Back on the French Revolution*. Mason Welch Gross Lecture Series. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2019.

Hobsbawm, E. J. "Introduction: Inventing Traditions." In *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric John Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, 1–14. Canto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Hobsbawm, E. J. *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebel: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959.

Holloway, John. "The State and Everyday Struggle." In *The State Debate*, edited by Simon Clarke, 225–59. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21464-8>.

Holloway, John, and Sol Picciotto, eds. *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate*. London: E. Arnold, 1979.

Husain, Faisal H. *Rivers of the Sultan: The Tigris and Euphrates in the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.

İnal, Onur, and Yavuz Köse, eds. *Seeds of Power: Explorations in Ottoman Environmental History*. Winwick, Cambridgeshire: The White Horse Press, 2019.

İnalçık, Halil. "Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Modernleşmesi." *Bellekten* 52, no. 204 (1988): 985–92. <https://doi.org/10.37879/bellekten.1988.985>.

———. "Comments on "Sultanism": Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity." Edited by Charles Issawi and Bernard Lewis. *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies* 1, no. 1 (1992): 49–72.

———. "Hermenötik, Oryantalizm, Türkoloji." *Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi: Oryantalizm - I*, Ağustos, Eylül, Ekim 2002.

———. "IV. Bölüm: Modern Türk Tarihçiliği." In *Doğu Batı: Makaleler II*. Doğu Batı Yayınları. Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2008.

———. "Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüsûmu." *Bellekten* 23, no. 92 (1959): 575–610.

- . “The Çift-Hane System: The Organization of Ottoman Rural Society.” In *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 1300 - 1600*, edited by Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert, 1:143–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- . “The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftlik: State, Landlords and Tenants.” In *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History*, 105–26. Variorum Reprint CS214. London: Variorum Reprints, 1985.
- . *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy*. Collected Studies ; CS87. London: Variorum Reprints, 1978.
- İslamoğlu, Huri, and Çağlar Keyder. “Agenda for Ottoman History.” *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 1, no. 1 (1977): 31–55.
- İslamoğlu-İnan, Huri. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda devlet ve köylü*. Gözden geçirilmiş ve genişletilmiş yeni baskı. İletişim yayınları Araştırma inceleme dizisi, 127 27. İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, 2010.
- Jacob, Wilson Chacko. “Eventful Transformations: Al-Futuwwa Between History and the Everyday.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 3 (July 2007): 689–712. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417507000679>.
- Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Jared T. Rubin, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024.
- Jessop, Bob. *Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy*. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1985. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17950-3>.
- . “Regulation Theory.” In *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, edited by George Ritzer, 1st ed. Wiley, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosr042.pub2>.
- . *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach*. Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2007.
- . *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place*. Cambridge: Polity press, 1990.

Kafadar, Cemal. "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman İstanbul: Rebels without a Cause." *International Journal of Turkish Studies: IJTS* 13 (2007): 113–34.

———. "On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries." *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 15, no. 2 (1991): 273–80.

———. "Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations: Solidarity and Conflict." Unpublished Master Thesis, McGill University, 1981.

Kaplan, David. "The Formal-Substantive Controversy in Economic Anthropology: Reflections on Its Wider Implications." *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 24, no. 3 (1968): 228–51.

Karademir, Zafer. *Osmanlı Yeni Çağı'nda Tarımsal Gelişim: Ziraat, Hasılat, Ticaret*. 1. baskı. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi yayımları Tarih, 713 74. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2023.

———. "Statüleri ve Mahiyetleri Açısından Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Büyük Çiftlikler (18. Yüzyıl)." *Cihannüma Tarih ve Coğrafya Araştırmaları Dergisi* 4, no. 2 (December 30, 2018): 15–43. <https://doi.org/10.30517/cihannuma.505363>.

Karagöz, Fatma Gül, and Uğur Bayraktar, eds. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Toprak Sahipleri ve Çiftliğe Farklı Bakışlar*. Birinci Basım. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2023.

Karpat, Kemal H. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. Studies in Middle Eastern History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

———. "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3, no. 3 (1972): 243–81.

Kasaba, Reşat. "A Time and a Place for the Nonstate: Social Change in the Ottoman Empire During the 'Long Nineteenth Century.'" In *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, edited by Atul Kohli, Joel Samuel Migdal, and Vivienne Shue, 207–30. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174268.011>.

- Kaya, Alp Yücel. "Bourgeois Revolution in Turkey (1908-1923)." *Revolutionary Marxism: A Journal of Theory and Politics*, 2023, 57–104.
- . "On the Çiftlik Regulation in Tırhala in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Economists, Pashas, Governors, Çiftlik-Holders, Subaşıs, and Sharecroppers." In *Ottoman Rural Societies and Economies: Halcyon Days in Crete VIII: A Symposium Held in Rethymno 13-15 January 2012*, edited by Ēlias Kolovos. Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2015.
- Kaya, Alp Yücel, and Ali Onur Peker. "Yeni Kurumsal İktisat, İktisat Tarihini Nasıl Yazıyor? Eleştirel Bir Bakış." *Praksis*, no. 54 (December 2020): 29–60.
- Kaya, Safiye Yelda. "Premises and Assumptions of the Ottoman State Tradition Paradigm: A Critical Evaluation of Metin Heper's Contribution." Unpublished Master Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005.
- Keppel, George. *Narrative of A Journey Across the Balcan in the Years (1829-1830) [Vol. II]*. Vol. II. II vols. London: Henry Colburn And Richard Bentley, 1831.
- Keyder, Çağlar. *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London ; New York: Verso, 1987.
- Keyman, E. Fuat. "Şerif Mardin, Toplumsal Kuram ve Türk Modernleşmesini Anlamak." *Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi - Türk Düşünce Serüveni: Geç Aydınlanmanın Erken Aydınları*, no. 16 (2001): 9–29.
- Kia, Mehrdad. *Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire*. Santa Barbara, Calif: Greenwood, 2011.
- Kissinger, Henry A. "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck." *Daedalus* 97, no. 3 (1968): 888–924.
- Kırlı, Cengiz. *Sultan ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde "Havadis Jurnalleri" 1840-1844*. 1. baskı. Tarih. Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009.

- . “Tyranny Illustrated: From Petition to Rebellion in Ottoman Vranje.” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 53 (November 2015): 3–36. <https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2015.17>.
- Koç, Yunus. “Osmanlı Dönemi İstanbul Nüfus Tarihi.” *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, no. 16 (September 1, 2010): 171–200.
- Krader, Lawrence. *The Asiatic Mode of Production: Sources, Development and Critique in the Writings of Karl Marx*. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1975. <http://archive.org/details/asiaticmodeofpro0000krad>.
- Küçükömer, İdris. “Asyagil Üretim Biçimi, Yeniden Üretim ve Sivil Toplum.” *Toplum ve Bilim*, Yaz 1977.
- Kuran, Timur. *Freedoms Delayed: Political Legacies of Islamic Law in the Middle East*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009320009>.
- . “The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence.” *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 53, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 785–834. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/53.4.785>.
- . “The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic Underdevelopment in the Middle East.” *The Journal of Economic History* 63, no. 2 (June 2003): 414–46. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050703001840>.
- . *The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- . “The Scale of Entrepreneurship in Middle Eastern History: Inhibitive Roles of Islamic Institutions.” In *The Invention of Enterprise*, edited by David S. Landes, Joel Mokyr, and William J. Baumol, 62–87. Entrepreneurship from Ancient Mesopotamia to Modern Times. Princeton University Press, 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7t7h2.9>.
- . “Why the Middle East Is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation.” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18, no. 3 (2004): 71–90.

Kuş, Canan. “1780–1784 Tarihli ve 4 Numaralı Halep Ahkâm Defteri (S.1–53) Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme.” Unpublished Master Thesis, Fırat Üniversitesi, 2008.

Lewis, Bernard. “The Islamic Guilds.” *The Economic History Review* 8, no. 1 (1937): 20–37. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2590356>.

Liguori, Guido. *Gramsci's Pathways*. Historical Materialism Book Series, Volume 102. Leiden;Boston: Brill, 2015.

Lindner, Kolja. *Marx, Marxism and the Question of Eurocentrism*. Marx, Engels, and Marxisms. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81823-4>.

Löwy, Michael. “Figures of Weberian Marxism.” *Theory and Society* 25, no. 3 (1996): 431–46.

Lubasz, Heniz. “Marx’s Concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production: A Genetic Analysis.” *Economy and Society* 13, no. 4 (November 1984): 456–83. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085148400000018>.

Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power - Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914*. Vol. II. III vols. 1993. Reprint, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Mardin, Şerif. “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” *Daedalus* 102, no. 1 (1973): 169–90.

———. *Din ve İdeoloji*. 17. baskı. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008.

———. “Historical Determinants of Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness in Turkey.” *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi / Ankara Üniversitesi* 22, no. 4 (1967): 111–42.

———. *İdeoloji*. Bütün eserleri / Şerif Mardin. İstanbul: İletişim, 1993.

- . *Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri: 1895-1908*. 4. bsk. Bütün eserleri / Şerif Mardin 1. İstanbul: İletişim, 1992.
- . “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11, no. 3 (1969): 258–81.
- . “Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science.” In *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, edited by Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, 64–80. University of Washington Press, 1997. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvcwnnw.9>.
- . *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*. SUNY Series in Near Eastern Studies. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.
- . “Şerif Mardin’le Din ve Devlet Sosyolojisi Konusunda Söyleşi.” In *Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset: Makaleler 1*, edited by Mümtaz’er Türköne and Tuncay Önder, 101–35. Bütün Eserleri / Şerif Mardin. Ali Bayramoğlu, Dün ve Bugün Felsefe, Kitap 1, Bilim/Felsefe/Sanat Yayınları, 1985, s.140-166., Reprint, İstanbul: İletişim, 1990.
- . “Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century.” In *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives*, edited by Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin, and Fatma Mansur, 9:403–66. Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia. Brill, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004491106_020.
- . *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- . *Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset*. Edited by Mümtaz’er Türköne and Tuncay Önder. 1. baskı. Bütün Eserleri 4. Çağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990.
- Marx, Karl. *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*. Edited by Eric John Hobsbawm. Translated by Jack Cohen. New York: International Publishers, 1964.

- . *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. 1852. Reprint, New York: International Publishers, 1975.
<http://archive.org/details/18thbrumaireflo00marx>.
- Mazman, İbrahim. “A Review of Weberian Studies on the Ottoman Empire.” *Kırıkkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 4, no. 1 (2014): 7–18.
- . “Max Weber’s ideal types of patrimonialism, sultanism, and bureaucracy: An assessment of their accuracy and utility in the case of rulership relationships in the Ottoman Empire.” Ph.D., Boston University, 2005.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/305029156/abstract/5B5D1F09634D48D3PQ/1>.
- McFarlane, Bruce, Steve Cooper, and Miomir Jaksic. “The Asiatic Mode of Production: A New Phoenix? (Part 1).” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 35, no. 3 (January 2005): 283–318. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472330580000181>.
- McGowan, Bruce. *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600 - 1800*. Reprint. Studies in Modern Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press [u.a.], 1981.
- Menchinger, Ethan L., and Aysel Yıldız. “On the Identity of a Reformist Intellectual: The Koca Sekbanbaşı Debate Revisited.” In *Ottoman War and Peace*, 208–33. Brill, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004413146_014.
- Migdal, Joel S. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613067>.
- Mikhail, Alan. *Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977220>.
- Moutaftchiéva, Véra. *L'anarchie dans les Balkans à la fin du XVIIIe siècle*. Les Cahiers du Bosphore, XXXVI. Istanbul: éd. Isis, 24.

- North, Douglass C. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Oakes, Isabel. “Max Weber and Ordoliberalism: How Weber’s Kulturkritik Contributed to the Foundation of Ordoliberal Socio-Economic Thought.” *Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch* 140, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 177–204. <https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.140.2.177>.
- Obeyesekere, Gananath. *The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European Mythmaking in the Pacific*. 1992. Reprint, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997.
- Oğulukyan, Georg. *III. Selim, IV. Mustafa, II. Mahmud ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa: Georg Oğulukyan Ruznamesi - 1806-1810 İsyamları*. Translated by Hrand D. Andreasyan. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1972.
- Olivier, Guillaume-Antoine. *Türkiye Seyahatnamesi: 18. Yüzyılda İstanbul ve Türkiye*. Translated by Oğuz Gökmen. 1800. Reprint, İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2024.
- Omar, Yousef Hussein. “Alawites Rebellion in Syria Against Egyptian Rule (1834-1835).” *Journal of Alevism-Bektashism Studies*, no. 22 (December 27, 2020): 59–88. <https://doi.org/10.24082/2020.abked.285>.
- Öncel, Fatma. “Imperial Landed Endowments (Vakıf Çiftlik) in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire: The Case of Pertevniyal Valide Sultan’s Endowments in Thessaly.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 65, no. 4 (May 24, 2022): 648–73. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685209-12341578>.
- . “Land, Tax and Power in the Ottoman Provinces: The Malikane-Mukataa of Esmâ Sultan in Alasonya (c.1780–1825).” *Turkish Historical Review* 8, no. 1 (May 10, 2017): 54–74. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18775462-00801004>.
- Ostrom, Elinor. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 1990. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807763>.

Özel, Oktay. *Dün Sancısı: Türkiye 'de Geçmiş Algısı ve Akademik Tarihçilik*. 1. basım. İnsan ve Toplum Dizisi 46. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2009.

———. “The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576–1643.” In *The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia*. Brill, 2016. <https://brill.com/display/title/32664>.

Özkaya, Yücel. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Dağlı İsyancıları, 1791-1808*. 2. baskı. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 2020.

Öztaş, Çağdaş Salih. “The Agrarian Background to the ‘Dağlı’ Rebellion in the Rhodope Mountains (1780-1810).” Unpublished Master Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2022.

Palairot, M. R. *The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914: Evolution without Development*. Cambridge Studies in Modern Economic History 6. Cambridge, UK.: New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Palomera, Jaime, and Theodora Vetta. “Moral Economy: Rethinking a Radical Concept.” *Anthropological Theory* 16, no. 4 (December 2016): 413–32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499616678097>.

Pamuk, Şevket. “Changes in Factor Markets in the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1800.” *Continuity and Change* 24, no. 1 (May 2009): 107–36. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0268416009007048>.

———. “Economic History, Institutions, and Institutional Change.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 3 (2012): 532–35.

———. “Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800.” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35, no. 2 (2004): 225–47.

———. “Seçici Kurumsal Değişim ve Osmanlının Uzun Ömürlülüğü.” In *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Kurumları*, 1. baskı., 1–18. Seçme eserler / Şevket Pamuk 1. 2007. Reprint, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2020.

———. *The Ottoman Economy and Its Institutions*. Variorum Collected Studies Series CS917. Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009.

- . *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820 - 1913: Trade, Investment and Production*. Dig. print. vers. 2010. Cambridge Middle East Library. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010.
- . *Uneven Centuries: Economic Development of Turkey since 1820*. The Princeton Economic History of the Western World. Princeton, New Jersey ; Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2018.
- Pashukanis, Evgeniï Bronislavovich. *The General Theory of Law & Marxism*. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2002.
- Peet, Richard. "Introduction to The Life and Thought of Karl Wittfogel." *Antipode* 17, no. 1 (April 1985): 3–21. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.1985.tb00642.x>.
- Pflanze, Otto. "Bismarck and German Nationalism." *The American Historical Review* 60, no. 3 (1955): 548–66. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1845577>.
- Philliou, Christine. "Mischief in the Old Regime: Provincial Dragomans and Social Change at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 25 (October 2001): 103–21. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600003629>.
- Piterberg, Gabriel. *An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play*. Studies on the History of Society and Culture 50. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003.
- Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. 2nd Beacon Paperback Edition. 1944. Reprint, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001.
- Popkin, Samuel L. *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*, 1979.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. *Political Power and Social Classes*. 1968. Reprint, London: NLB, 1975.
- . *State, Power, Socialism*. Verso Classics Edition. Verso Classics 29. 1978. Reprint, London: Verso Books, 2000.

- Quataert, Donald. "Janissaries, Artisans and the Question of Ottoman Decline 1730-1826." In *Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914*, 197–205. 1993. Reprint, Gorgias Press, 2010. <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.31826/9781463229993-016/html?lang=en>.
- . "The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914." In *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914*, edited by Donald Quataert and Halil İnalcık, 2:759–943. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994.
- Radkau, Joachim. *Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment*. 1st English ed. Publications of the German Historical Institute. Washington, D.C. : Cambridge ; New York: German Historical Institute ; Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- . "Religion and Environmentalism." In *A Companion to Global Environmental History*, 493–512. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2012. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118279519.ch27>.
- Ramazani, Rouhollah K. "Iran's 'White Revolution': A Study in Political Development." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, no. 2 (April 1974): 124–39. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800027781>.
- Randall, Adrian J., and Andrew Charlesworth, eds. *Moral Economy and Popular Protest: Crowds, Conflict and Authority*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000.
- Reyhan, Cenk. "İlim-Kılıç-Kalem: Osmanlı Kamu Personeli Rejiminde Üçlü İşlevsel Ayrışma." *Bellekten* 72, no. 263 (April 1, 2008): 95–122. <https://doi.org/10.37879/bellekten.2008.95>.
- Rogan, Tim. *The Moral Economists: R.H. Tawney, Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson, and the Critique of Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017.
- Root, Hilton. "The 'Moral Economy' of the Pre-Revolutionary French Peasant." *Science & Society* 54, no. 3 (1990): 351–61.

Root, Hilton L. "The Case against George Lefebvre's Peasant Revolution." *History Workshop*, no. 28 (1989): 88–102.

Şahin, Rukiye, Şafak Öztürk, and Mehmet Ünalnış. "Professional Ethics and Moral Values in Akhi Institution." *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, World Conference on Educational Sciences: New Trends and Issues in Educational Sciences, 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 800–804. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2009.01.143>.

Sahlins, Marshall. *How "Natives" Think: About Captain Cook, For Example*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Salzmann, Ariel. "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire." *Politics & Society* 21, no. 4 (December 1993): 393–423. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329293021004003>.

———. "Is There a Moral Economy of State Formation? Religious Minorities and Repertoires of Regime Integration in the Middle East and Western Europe, 600–1614." *Theory and Society* 39, no. 3–4 (May 2010): 299–313. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-010-9109-1>.

———. "Mehmet Genç, Economic Historian." In *Türk Tarihçiliğinde Dört Sima: Halil İnalçık, Halil Sahillioğlu, Mehmet Genç, İlber Ortaylı*, edited by Erol Özvar, 122–31. İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A.Ş. Yayınları, 2006.

———. *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State*. The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, v. 28. Boston: Brill, 2004.

Sayer, Andrew. "Moral Economy and Political Economy." *Studies in Political Economy* 61, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 79–103. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19187033.2000.11675254>.

———. "Moral Economy as Critique." *New Political Economy* 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 261–70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460701303008>.

Scott, James C. "Everyday Forms of Resistance." *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 4 (May 5, 1989): 33. <https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v4i1.1765>.

———. *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Yale Agrarian Studies. New Haven, CT London: Yale University Press, 1998.

———. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press, 1976. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bh4cdk>.

———. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2000.

Sekbanbaşı, Koca. *Koca Sekbanbaşı risâlesi: Avamın düşüncelerinin reddedilmesi (Hulâsatü'l-kelâm fi reddi'l-avâm)*. Edited by Abdullah Uçman. 1. baskı. Büyüyenay Yayınları; Siyasetnâme, 233. 19. Fatih, İstanbul: Büyüyenay Yayınları, 2017.

Shiozawa, Kimio. “Marx’s View of Asian Society and His ‘Asiatic Mode of Production.’” *The Developing Economies* 4, no. 3 (1966): 299–315. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1966.tb00480.x>.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry. “Marx, the ‘Asiatic Mode of Production,’ and ‘Oriental Despotism’ as ‘True’ Socialism.” *Comparative Sociology* 18, no. 4 (2019): 489–521. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341505>.

Şimşek, Veysel. “The First ‘Little Mehmeds’: Conscripts for the Ottoman Army, 1826-53.” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 2014, 265–311. <https://doi.org/10.18589/oa.562133>.

Singer, Amy. *Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem*. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Skambraks, Tanja, and Martin Lutz, eds. *Reassessing the Moral Economy: Religion and Economic Ethics from Ancient Greece to the 20th Century*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023.

Sönmez, Erdem. “Klasik dönem Osmanlı Tarihi çalışmalarında Max Weber etkisi.” *Praksis*, no. 23 (2010): 39–62.

Sümer, Çağdaş. *Düzenini Arayan Osmanlı: Eski Rejimden Meşrutiyet'e Osmanlı'da Siyasal Çatışma ve Rejimler*. Birinci Basım. Yordam kitap 440. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2023.

Sümer, Çağdaş, and Fatih Yaşlı. "Marx, Weber ve Türkiye'de Sosyal Bilimler." In *Bilim Üzerine Marksist Tartışmalar: Marksizm Bilime Yabancı Mı?*, edited by Alper Dizdar, First Edition., 180–200. İstanbul: Yazılama Yayınevi, 2014.

Sunar, Lütfi. "The Formation of Weber's Sociology of the Orient and Its Reception." In *Marx and Weber on Oriental Societies: In the Shadow of Western Modernity*, 69–84. Classical and Contemporary Social Theory. Farnham Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014.

Suter, Mischa. "Moral Economy as a Site of Conflict: Debates on Debt, Money, and Usury in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century." *Geschichte Und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft* 26 (2019): 75–101.

Talebi, Nader. "State Power and Revolution: Toward a Strategic-Relational Analysis of the 1979 Revolution in Iran." *PQDT - Global*. Ph.D., Lancaster University (United Kingdom), 2018. ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global (2473444516). <https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/state-power-revolution-toward-strategic/docview/2473444516/se-2?accountid=13014>.

Talhamy, Yvette. "The Nusayri and Druze Minorities in Syria in the Nineteenth Century: The Revolt against the Egyptian Occupation as a Case Study." *Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no. 6 (November 1, 2012): 973–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723624>.

Tanyol, Cahit. "Şahsi Teşebbüs İmkânı." *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*, August 17, 1962.

Terzibaşoğlu, Yücel. "Privatisation of Land, Criminalisation of Custom, and Land Disputes in 19th-Century Anatolia." In *Les Acteurs Des Transformations Foncières Autour de La Méditerranée Au XIXe Siècle*, edited by Vanessa Guéno and Didier Guignard, 25–47. Collection L'atelier Méditerranéen. Paris : Aix-en-Provence: Karthala ; Maison méditerranéenne des sciences de l'homme : Institut de recherches et d'études sur le monde arabe et musulman, 2013.

Terzibaşođlu, Yücel, and Alp Yücel Kaya. “19. Yüzyılda Balkanlar’da Toprak Rejimi ve Emek İlişkileri.” In *İktisat Tarihinin Dönüşü: Yeni Yaklaşımlar ve Tartışmalar*, edited by Ulaş Karakoç and Alp Yücel Kaya, 1. baskı., 49–105. İletişim yayınları Araştırma - inceleme, 2962 482. İstanbul: İletişim, 2021.

Tezcan, Baki. *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Thelen, Kathleen. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 369–404. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369>.

Thompson, Edward P. “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century.” *Past & Present*, no. 50 (1971): 76–136.

———. *The Poverty of Theory & Other Essays*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978.

———. *The Making of the English Working Class*. 1. Vintage Edition. Vintage Books - History 322. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.

Thornton, Thomas. *Bir İngiliz Tacirin İzlenimleriyle Osmanlıda Siyaset, Toplum, Din, Yönetim (1793 - 1807)*. Translated by Ercan Ertürk. 1. baskı. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015.

Tızlak, Fahrettin. “III. Selim ve İstanbul’un Ekmek Problemi.” In *XVI. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildiri Kitabı*, VI:17–35. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2015.

Todorov, Nikolay. “19. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Bulgaristan Esnaf Teşkilatında Bazı Karakter Değişmeleri.” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 27, no. 1–2 (1967): 1–36.

Tripp, Charles. *Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617614>.

- Tunç, Gizem. “44 Numaralı Rumeli Ahkâm-I Şikâyet Defterinin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirmesi.” Unpublished Master Thesis, Akdeniz Üniversitesi, 2017. <https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezSorguSonucYeni.jsp>.
- Turhan, Rıdvan. “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyetin Erken Döneminde Max Weber Etkisi ve Bu Etkiyi Anlamak.” *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi* 3, no. 29 (2014): 259–91. <https://doi.org/doi:10.16917/sd.63083>.
- Türk, Hasan Basri. “13 Numaralı Atik Şikayet Defteri (VR.1-142) Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin (H.1100/ M. 1689).” Unpublished Master Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2019. <https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezSorguSonucYeni.jsp>.
- Turkkan, Candan. *Feeding Istanbul: The Political Economy of Urban Provisioning*. Studies in Critical Social Sciences, volume 186. Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2021.
- Turna, Nalan. “Ondokuzuncu Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında İstanbul’da Berber Olmak, Berber Kalmak.” *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, no. 9 (October 23, 2012): 171–88.
- Turner, Bryan S. “Max Weber and the Sociology of Islam.” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* n° 276, no. 2 (June 2, 2016): 213–29. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rip.276.0213>.
- . *Weber and Islam*. Max Weber Classic Monographs, v. 7. 1974. Reprint, London ; New York: Routledge, 1998.
- Tütüncü, Fatma. “The National Pedagogy of the Early Republican Era in Turkey.” Unpublished PhD Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2007. https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezDetay.jsp?id=gJpsCecgm39Zm_R C9v5QuA&no=g6VQNY-CqhN2Jfpi-FmgSw.
- Uçar, Önder. “Türkiye’de Tarihyazımı ve Burjuva Devrimleri: Bazı Gereksiz Kıstaslar.” *Tarih ve Toplum - Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 16 (2013): 145–78.
- Ülgener, Sabri F. *İktisadî İnhitat Tarihimizin Ahlâk ve Zihniyet Meseleleri*. İsmail Akgün Matbaası, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Yayınları no. 55, 1951.

Uluçay, Çağatay. *Atçalı Kel Mehmed*. İstanbul: AS Matbaası, 1968.

Ünsaldı, Levent, and Ercan Geçgin. *Sosyoloji Tarihi: Dünyada ve Türkiye’de*. 5th ed. Ankara: Heretik Yayıncılık, 2015.

Ustun, Kadir. “The New Order and Its Enemies: Opposition to Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1789 - 1807.” Unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.7916/D80Z79P1>.

Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtına Medhal: Büyük Selçukîler, Anadolu Selçukîleri, Anadolu Beylikleri, İlhanîler, Karakoyunlu ve Akkoyunlularla Memlûklerdeki Devlet Teşkilâtına Bir Bakış*. Tpk. bs. Türk tarih kurumu yayınları 10. Ankara: Türk tarih kurumu, 1988.

Wall, Derek. *The Commons in History: Culture, Conflict, and Ecology*. History for a Sustainable Future. Cambridge, MA London: The MIT Press, 2014.

Wallace, Valeria. “Presbyterian Moral Economy: The Covenanting Tradition and Popular Protest in Lowland Scotland, 1707–c. 1746.” *The Scottish Historical Review* 89, no. 227 (2010): 54–72.

Wegren, Stephen K. *The Moral Economy Reconsidered: Russia’s Search for Agrarian Capitalism*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Weiker, Walter F. “The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform.” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (1968): 451–70. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2391053>.

Wheeler, William. “The USSR as a Hydraulic Society: Wittfogel, the Aral Sea and the (Post-)Soviet State.” *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space* 37, no. 7 (November 2019): 1217–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654418816700>.

White, Sam. *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2011. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511844058>.

Winter, Stefan. *A History of the 'Alawis: From Medieval Aleppo to the Turkish Republic*. Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016.

———. “La Revolte Alaouite de 1834 Contre L’occupation Egyptienne: Perceptions Alaouites et Lecture Ottomane.” *Oriente Moderno* 79, no. 3 (August 12, 1999): 61–71. <https://doi.org/10.1163/22138617-07903006>.

Wittfogel, Karl A. “Results and Problems of the Study of Oriental Despotism.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 28, no. 2 (February 1969): 357–65. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2943008>.

———. *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*. 1st Vintage Books ed. 1957. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1981.

Wood, Ellen Meiksins, ed. “Class as Process and Relationship.” In *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism*, 76–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558344.004>.

———. *The Origin of Capitalism*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999.

———, ed. “The Separation of the ‘Economic’ and the ‘Political’ in Capitalism.” In *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism*, 19–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558344.002>.

Yaycıoğlu, Ali. “Karlofça Ânı: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 18. Yüzyıla Nasıl Başladı?” *Tarih ve Toplum - Yeni Yaklaşımlar* 18 (2021).

———. *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016.

———. “Révolutions de Constantinople: France and the Ottoman World in the Age of Revolutions.” In *French Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories*, edited by Patricia M. E. Lorcin and Todd Shepard, 21–51. France Overseas. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016.

Yerasimos, Stefanos. *Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye*. Translated by Babür Kuzucu. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Gözlem Yayınları, 1974.

Yeşil, Fatih. *Trajik Zafer: Büyük Güçlerin Doğu Akdeniz'deki Siyasi ve Askeri Mücadelesi (1806-1807)*. İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2017.

Yi, Eunjeong. "Artisans' Networks and Revolt in Late Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: An Examination of the Istanbul Artisans' Rebellion of 1688." In *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi*, edited by Suraiya Faroqhi, Eleni Gara, M. Erdem Kabadayi, and Christoph K. Neumann, 1st ed., 105–26. İstanbul Bilgi University Press ; History, 368. 39. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2011.

———. *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage*. Brill, 2004. <https://brill.com/display/title/8196>.

———. "Rich Artisans and Poor Merchants? A Critical Look at the Supposed Egalitarianism in Ottoman Guilds." In *Bread from the Lion's Mouth: Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities*, edited by Suraiya Faroqhi, 194–216. International Studies in Social History, vol. 25. New York: Berghahn, 2015.

Yildirim, Onur. "Ottoman Guilds in the Early Modern Era." *International Review of Social History* 53, no. S16 (December 2008): 73–93. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859008003611>.

———. "Transformation of the Craft Guilds in Istanbul (1650-1860)." *Islamic Studies* 40, no. 1 (2001): 49–66.

Yildirim, Riza. "Shī'itisation of the Futuwwa Tradition in the Fifteenth Century." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 53–70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2012.734958>.

Yildiz, Aysel. "Politics, Economy, and Çiftlik: The History of Four Çiftlik in Larissa (Yenişehir-i Fener)." *Turkish Historical Review* 11, no. 1 (November 5, 2020): 28–65. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18775462-BJA10009>.

———. *Crisis and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire: The Downfall of a Sultan in the Age of Revolution*. Library of Ottoman Studies 58. London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017.

Yildiz, Aysel, Yannis Spyropoulos, and Mehmet Mert Sunar, eds. *Payitaht Yeniçerileri: Padişahın “Asi” Kulları 1700-1826*. 1. basım. Tarih ve Coğrafya Dizisi 118. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2022.

Yılmaz Diko, Gülay. “Blurred Boundaries between Soldiers and Civilians: Artisan Janissaries in Seventeenth Century Istanbul.” In *Bread from the Lion’s Mounth: Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities, 175–94*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2015.

Yılmaz, Hüseyin. *Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Zens, Robert. “Turkish Historiography in the United States.” *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, no. 15 (2010): 149–77.

APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu kentli ve taşralı aşağı sınıflarının “modern devletin” oluşum sürecine yaptıkları siyasi müdahaleyi anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Temel argüman, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda kapitalist üretim ilişkilerine ait öğelerin ve eğilimlerin 16. yüzyılın sonu itibaren ortaya çıkmaya başlaması ve bu dönüşüm sürecinin her bir aşamasının, kentli aşağı sınıfları oluşturan zanaatkarlar ve taşralı aşağı sınıfları oluşturan köylülerin tepkisi ve siyasi müdahalesiyle karşılaştığıdır. Osmanlı aşağı sınıflarının siyasi ve sosyolojik formasyonunu ve süreç içinde başvurdukları siyasi ajandayı ortaya çıkarmak ve aşağı sınıfların siyasi örgütlenme türlerini ve toplumsal hareket biçimlerini sunmak, çalışmanın ikincil ve üçüncül amaçlarını oluşturur. Çalışma, Osmanlı aşağı sınıflarının ortaya çıkan özel mülkiyet, sömürü temelli emek rejimleri, iktisadi zora dayalı üretim ve bölüşüm ilişkileri olarak özetlenebilecek kapitalist öğelere karşı, Marksist tarihçi E. P. Thompson tarafından sistemleştirilen⁵⁵⁴ ve daha sonra James C. Scott tarafından köy toplumları özelinde geliştirilen⁵⁵⁵ “Ahlaki Ekonomik ilkelere” dayalı bir direniş/karşı-aksiyon dinamiği geliştirdiğini göstermeyi hedefler.

Aşağıda tartışılan şikayet ve toplumsal hareketlerde gösterildiği gibi, Osmanlı üretici sınıfları temelde dört prensiple hareket etmişlerdir: Gündelik ihtiyaçların ve geçimliliğinin sürekliliğinin garanti altına alınması anlamında *asgari geçim etiği*, üretim ve bölüşüm süreçlerinde eşitliğin sağlanması anlamında *geleneksel adalet anlayışı*, çatışma dinamiklerinin ortaya çıktığı koşullarda emeğin savunulabilmesi için *emek*

⁵⁵⁴ E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” *Past & Present*, no. 50 (1971): 76–136; E. P. Thompson, *Customs in Common* (New York, NY: New Press, 1991), <http://archive.org/details/customsincommon00thom>.

⁵⁵⁵ James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2000).

*süreçlerinin kıymetlendirilmesi*⁵⁵⁶ ve son olarak görenek içinde oluşan eşitlikçi ve dayanışmacı iktisadi ilişkilerin yine bahse konu geleneksel sosyal ilişkilere içkinliğinin korunması anlamında *ekonomik ilişkilerin toplumsal hayata içkin/gömülü formalarını savunmak*.⁵⁵⁷

Ne var ki, bu iddiaların ispatı kimi pratik ve teorik kısıtlarla karşı karşıyadır. Birinci pratik sınırlılık, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda üreten ve yaşayan aşağı sınıfların belge üretme, bir başka deyişle “kalıntı bırakma” hususundaki somut eksikliğidir. Aşağı sınıfların tarihi hakkındaki çalışmaların tamamında olduğu gibi, bu çalışma da birincil muhatapların “sınırlı” kalıntıları üzerinde çalışmak kısıtıyla karşı karşıyadır. Buna binaen, ikincil pratik sınırlılık, aşağı sınıfların tarihini “devlet/yönetici sınıf” merkezli “kalıntılar” üzerinden takip etme zorunluluğudur. Bu durum, özellikle belge üzerinde yapılacak analizlerde “üst sınıf” görüşlerinin arındırılması ve somut olayın aşağı sınıflar penceresinden, “objektif” bir biçimde değerlendirilmesi sorununu gündeme getirir.

Çalışmanın teorik sınırlılıkları arasında, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarih yazımı geleneğine “gömülü” hale gelmiş “devlet-merkezci/kurumsalcı” paradigmanın hakimiyetidir.⁵⁵⁸ Çalışmada tartışıldığı gibi, bu paradigma “güçlü ve etkili” bir devlet olarak görülen Osmanlı Devleti'nin temel siyasal aktör olduğu ön kabulüne yaslanarak Osmanlı Devleti'nin dönüşüm süreçlerini “devlet-içi” elitin karar, çatışma ve uzlaşma dinamikleri üzerinden okumaya; üretici aşağı sınıflar ya da bu üretimden doğan artığı temellük etmeye çalışan diğer “devlet-dışı” aktörlerin ve üreticilerin sürecin ikincil belirleyicileri ya da pasif izleyicileri olduğunu düşünmeye eğilimlidir. Bu durumda, aşağı sınıfların etkisi daima göz ardı edilir ya da yadsınır. Bu anlamda, “diyalektik”

⁵⁵⁶ E. Attila AYTEKİN, “Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and the Tanzimat Reforms,” *International Review of Social History* 57, no. 2 (August 2012): 191–227, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859012000193>.

⁵⁵⁷ Karl POLANYI, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, 2nd Beacon Paperback Edition (1944; repr., Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001).

⁵⁵⁸ Gabriel PITERBERG, *An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play*, Studies on the History of Society and Culture 50 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); Oliver BOUQUET, “Is It Time to Stop Speaking about Ottoman Modernisation?,” in *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey*, ed. Marc AYMES (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2015), 45–67; Olivier BOUQUET, “From Decline to Transformation: Reflections on a New Paradigm in Ottoman History,” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 60, no. 60 (December 31, 2022): 27–60, <https://doi.org/10.18589/oa.1223519>.

anlamda ilişkisel bir paradigmanın eksikliği, Osmanlı siyasasının karmaşık formasyonunu anlamayı neredeyse imkânsız hale getirir.

Tüm bu nedenlerle, Osmanlı siyasasına odaklanan bir sınıf çalışması devlet-toplum ilişkilerini yeniden tartışma zorunluluğuyla karşı karşıyadır. Bir sınıfın formasyonu sadece kendisine bakarak anlaşılmaz;⁵⁵⁹ sosyal formasyon toplumsal bir olgudur ve toplumun tüm katmanlarının birbirleriyle girdiği etkileşim, her bir özne üzerinde ayrıca dönüştürücü bir etki bırakır. Ve fakat, yukarıda da sözü edilen hâkim paradigma nedeniyle Osmanlı tarih yazımında “devlet-dışı” aktörlere olarak tanımlanan alt sınıflar için yeterince yer olmayışı örneğin bürokratların, âyânlar ve mültezimler gibi yerel üst sınıfların ve üretici aşağı sınıfların etkileşiminin ve karşılıklı dönüştürücü etkilerinin yeterince anlaşılabilmesini engeller. Bu manada, devleti “kendinde bir nesne”, bir “ontolojik mutlaklık” olmaktan ziyade bir toplumsal formasyon dahilinde yeniden tartışmak gerekmektedir. Esasında devlet, belirli bir tarihsel andaki toplumsal oluşumu açıklayan bir modeldir. Bu model, toplumsal oluşumun temel ilkelerinin, öznelerinin ve değişim dinamiklerinin adıdır. Devletin ele alınışına ilişkin yaklaşımlar aslında birer ilke modelidir; toplumun nasıl hareket ettiği ve hangi dinamikler üzerinde değiştiğine dair kabul edilmiş ilkelerin bir dışavurumudur. Yani, devletin tanımı, en temelde devletin nasıl dönüştüğüne (ya da dönüşmediğine) dair bir görüşü ortaya koyar. Devletin “kendinden menkul” bir nesne, “kapalı-devre” bir sistem gibi tahayyül edilmesi ve “dış” olarak tanımlanan alanla bir karşıtlık ya da uzlaşma ilişkisine giriyormuşçasına düşünülmesi, esasında devletin “şeyleştirilmesi” sonucunu yaratır.

Çalışmanın üç hipotezi bulunmaktadır. Birincisi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu sınıfsal bir yönetimdi ve sınıf mücadeleleri tarafından belirlenen bir dönüşüm çizgisi izledi. İkincisi, alt sınıflar bu sürecin pasif izleyicileri değil, doğrudan müdahilleriydi. Özellikle üretim ilişkilerinde kapitalist unsurların ortaya çıkması ve gelişmesi sürecinde bu etki daha da belirginleşti. Üçüncüsü, ahlaki ekonomik ajanda bu

⁵⁵⁹ Karl Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852; repr., New York: International Publishers, 1975), <http://archive.org/details/18thbrumaireoflo00marx>; E. P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory & Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978); Neera Chandhoke, “‘Bringing People Back in’: Political and Intellectual Agendas,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 25, no. 31 (1990): 1721–27; Korkut Boratav, “Book Review: State and Class in Turkey. A Study in Capitalist Development,” *Review of Radical Political Economics* 25, no. 1 (March 1993): 129–41, <https://doi.org/10.1177/048661349302500107>.

eylemliliklerin temel ajandasını ve izleğini oluşturdu. Bu ajanda, yönetici sınıflara dayatıldı ve yönetici sınıflar tarafından üretimin sürekliliği adına gözetilmek zorunda kalındı. Hipotezler, bu çalışmanın cevabını aradığı üç temel soruyu gündeme getirir: Osmanlı’da devlet-toplum ilişkilerini yeniden düşünmek üzere, Osmanlı yönetiminde sınıf mücadeleleri devlet oluşum süreçlerini nasıl karakterize ediyordu? İkincisi, toplumsal formasyonun dönüşümünü yeniden düşünmek üzere Osmanlı toplumsal formasyonu bu mücadeleler bağlamında nasıl dönüştü? Son olarak, alt sınıfların etkisini yeniden düşünmek üzere Aynı süreçlerde alt sınıflar hangi günlük ve uzun vadeli mücadeleleri verdiler?

Daha önce “devlet-merkezci/kurumsalcı” olarak ifade edilen gelenekte iki ana eğilim olduğu göze çarpar: Weberyанизm(ler) ve Kurumsalcılık(lar). Alman sosyolog Max Weber’in ve takipçilerinin görüşlerini içeren ilk eğilim, özellikle 1930 ve 1980 arasındaki süreçte Osmanlı-Cumhuriyet tarih yazımı üzerinde oldukça etkilidir. Nazi rejiminden kaçarak Türkiye’ye sığınan, bu geleneğe bağlı pek çok sosyal bilimci akademisyenin “kurucu” etkisiyle bu eğilim yerleşiklik kazanmıştır. 1930’larda Alman Tarihselci Geleneğinin yönetsel çerçevesinin etkisiyle, özellikle Ömer Lütfi Barkan ve Halil İnalçık gibi kurucu isimlerin bu metodolojik çerçeveye yer yer sadece yaklaşan ama yer yer çoğunlukla örtüşen bir tarih yazımı geleneği oluşturdukları gözlemlenmektedir.⁵⁶⁰ Bahse konu kurucu birikimden beslenerek oluşturulan bir diğer eğilim, 1950’lerden sonra özellikle Amerikan akademisindeki yeni Weberyen yorumun bir uzantısı olarak gelişen “Modernleşme okulunun” etkisinde kalan Şerif Mardin ve Metin Heper gibi isimlerin etkisiyle Weberci geleneği Türkiye’de görece olarak daha “kuramsal” bir düzeye taşımıştır.⁵⁶¹ 1970’lere gelindiğindeyse yönetsel

⁵⁶⁰ Erdem Sönmez, “Klasik dönem Osmanlı Tarihi çalışmalarında Max Weber etkisi,” *Praksis*, no. 23 (2010): 39–62.

⁵⁶¹ Bakınız Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?,” *Daedalus* 102, no. 1 (1973): 169–90; Şerif Mardin, “Historical Determinants of Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness in Turkey,” *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi / Ankara Üniversitesi* 22, no. 4 (1967): 111–42; Metin Heper, “Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Tradition” (Authorized Facsimile of PhD Thesis, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University, 1971); Metin Heper, “Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century,” *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 1, no. 1 (1980): 81–105; Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Beverly, North HumberSide : Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Eothen Press ; Distributed in the U.S.A. by Humanities Press, 1985); Ayrıca bakınız Ali Rıza Güngen and Şafak Erten, “Approaches of Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper on State and Civil Society in Turkey,” *Journal of Historical Studies* 3 (2005): 1–14.

bir eklektizm olarak adlandırılabilir ve literatürde “Weberci Marksizm” olarak nitelenen bir başka eğilim açığa çıkmış; çalışmalarıyla 1960’ların sonu ve 1970’lerin başında etkili olan Karl Wittfogel’in katkı yaptığı “Asya Tipi Üretim Tarzı” (ATÜT) modeli bu sürecin belirleyicisi olmuştur. Sencer Divitçioğlu, İdris Küçükömer, Stefanos Yerasimos gibi isimler adı geçen son eğilimin Türkiye’deki temsilcileri olarak gösterilmektedir.⁵⁶²

1950’lere kadarki *Klasik* geleneğin temsilcileri olan İnalcık ve Barkan’daki devlet-toplum analizine göre, Osmanlı’da Batı’da olduğu gibi sınıflar oluşmamıştı; sosyal tabakalaşma kültürel statüler üzerine kuruluydu. Bu gelenekte, Weber’in tanımından hareketle, devlet, toplumsal ilişkilerin içinde oluşmuş olsa da siyasal süreçler içinde toplumdan ayrı bir organizasyon olarak gelişmiş ve kendine ait bir ajandaya sahip olan bir yapı teşkil etmiştir. Ekonomi ve siyaset tamamen birbirinden ayrı iki alandır ve devlet, siyaset alanının temsil edildiği yegâne zemindir. Siyasi ayırım monolitik devlet ile uyumlu bir kitle olarak toplum arasındaydı. Karizmatik bir liderin kişiliğinde somutlaşan devletin toplum üzerinde mutlak bir egemenliği vardı ve toplum statikti. Şerif Mardin ve Metin Heper’in *Neo-klasik* olarak adlandırılabilir analizleriye devlet ve toplumun monolitik ikiliğini kabul etmekle beraber, iki blok arasında belirli sosyal çatışma dinamikleri arar. Mardin ve Heper’in modeli, modernleşme ekolünün baskın etkisiyle, devlet ideolojisiyle donanmış bürokratik ve güçlü bir merkezin, siyasal bilinçten ve devletin yaygınlığı nedeniyle hareket kabiliyetinden yoksun, dağınık ve zayıf bir çevre üzerinde hakimiyeti anlamında bir “merkez-çevre” ikiliğiyle Osmanlı Devleti’ni açıklamaya çabalar.

Bu geleneğin üçüncü yorumu olarak kabul edilebilecek Küçükömer, Divitçioğlu ve Yerasimos’un ATÜT modelinde, devlet ve toplum arasındaki ilişki “Doğu toplumlarına özgü” bir siyasal iktisadi anlayışa dayanır. Bu anlayışa göre, devlet, toplumu sahiplenici, “kerim” bir devlettir; devlet ve toplum arasında bir çatışma dinamiği değil bir uzlaşma dinamiği söz konusudur.

⁵⁶² Stefanos Yerasimos, *Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye*, trans. Babür Kuzucu, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Gözlem Yayınları, 1974); İdris Küçükömer, “Asyagil Üretim Biçimi, Yeniden Üretim ve Sivil Toplum,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, Yaz 1977; Sencer Divitçioğlu, *Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplum Yapısı* (Kırklareli: Sermet Matbaası, 1981).

1980’ler itibariyle, özellikle Amerikan kurumsalcı geleneği içinde, Charles Tilly ve Theda Skocpol gibi isimlerin öncülüğünde oluşan⁵⁶³ ve Weberyen devlet tanımından etkilenen “Yeni Kurumsalcı İktisat” ve “Tarihsel Kurumsalcı” gelenek, 1990’lar ve 2000’ler boyunca Osmanlı devlet-toplum ilişkileri hakkındaki tarih yazımı üzerinde etkili olmuştur. Kendi gelenekleri içindeki devlet-toplum ikiliğinin toplumu anlamada yetersiz bir ilişkisellik düzeyinde olduğunu iddia/kabul eden Peter Evans ve Joel Migdal tarafından daha ilişkiyel bir model olarak ortaya atılan “toplum içindeki devlet” (*state-in-society*) yaklaşımı⁵⁶⁴ da kısa süre içinde aynı tarih yazımı geleneğince Osmanlı-Türkiye örneğine de uyarlanmıştır.

Osmanlı tarih yazımı bağlamında Şevket Pamuk, Onur Yıldırım, Seven Ağır gibi isimler iktisadi bir kurumsalcılık yaklaşımını benimserken⁵⁶⁵ Karen Barkey ve Ali Yaycıoğlu gibi yazarlar süreçleri bu gelenek içinde okur.⁵⁶⁶ Faisal Hussain, Sam White ve Alan Mikhail gibi “çevresel tarih” geleneğinden gelen isimlerin de⁵⁶⁷ Karl Wittfogel’in “hidrolik toplum” tanımını güncelleyerek müşterek kaynakların (arazi, su, gıda vb.) organizasyonu ve bu süreç içinde yaşanan çatışmalar üzerinden analiz ettikleri görülmektedir. Kurumsalcı modele göre, toplumda sosyal statülere dayalı

⁵⁶³ Bakınız Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1985), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511628283>.

⁵⁶⁴ Peter B. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995); Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613067>.

⁵⁶⁵ Bakınız Onur Yıldırım, “Transformation of the Craft Guilds in Istanbul (1650-1860),” *Islamic Studies* 40, no. 1 (2001): 49–66; Şevket Pamuk, “Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35, no. 2 (2004): 225–47; Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Economy and Its Institutions*, Variorum Collected Studies Series CS917 (Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009); Seven Ağır, “The Rise and Demise of ‘Gedik’ Markets in Istanbul, 1750–1860,” *The Economic History Review* 71, no. 1 (February 2018): 133–56, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12492>; Şevket Pamuk, “Seçici Kurumsal Değişim ve Osmanlının Uzun Ömürlülüğü,” in *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Kurumları*, 1. baskı, Seçme eserler / Şevket Pamuk 1 (2007; repr., İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2020), 1–18.

⁵⁶⁶ Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1994); Ali Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016).

⁵⁶⁷ Alan Mikhail, *Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977220>; Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511844058>; Faisal H. Husain, *Rivers of the Sultan: The Tigris and Euphrates in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

farklı çıkar grupları vardı. Siyasi gerilim toplu pazarlık ve siyasi gücün sınırlandırılmasıyla ilgiliydi. Toplumun siyasi platformlar bulduğu anlar vardı, ancak sürekli bir geçişkenlik ve etki yoktu. Pazar ve değişim ilişkilerinde somutlanan ekonomiyle, devlette somutlanan siyaset alanı ayrı iki ontoloji olmakla beraber birbiriyle yakın ilişki içindeydi.

Geçmişten günümüze *hâkim paradigmada* ilişkisellik düzeyi artsa da devletin ve toplumun arasındaki ontolojik ayrım korunmaktadır. Bu da siyaset ve toplum arasındaki “fiktif” bariyerin korunması anlamına gelmektedir. Bariyerin aşılması için diyalektik bir ilişkiselliğin uyarlanması bir çözüm yolu sunabilir. Daha açığı, Marksist metodolojiye yaslanan bir ilişkisellik, Osmanlı toplumunun sınıflar-arası ve sınıf-içi mücadelelere dayanan ve bunların kümülatif bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan toplumsal formasyonun açıklanmasında daha etkili olabilecektir. Böylece, hâkim paradigmada genellikle reddedilen Osmanlı’da sınıfların varlığı ve etkisi yeniden değerlendirilmeli, siyasi mücadelenin üretim ilişkileri ve toplumsal artığın paylaşımı üzerinden yürüyen karakterine vurgu yapılmalı ve toplumsal dönüşümlerin dinamikleri ele alınırken sınıfsal açıdan karşıt eylemlerin hem kısa hem de uzun vadede yeni siyasi-ekonomik oluşumlar doğurduğu göz önüne alınmalıdır.

Bu amaç doğrultusunda metodolojik, sosyal-teorik ve tarih yazımsal olmak üzere üç aşamada bu tartışmanın açılması mümkündür. Metodolojik aşamada, hâkim paradigmanın yaklaşımının aksine, ekonomi ve siyaset birbirinden bağımsız değil, tam aksine sürekli olarak birbirlerini belirleyen, iç içe geçmiş insan faaliyetleridir.⁵⁶⁸ Siyasal faaliyetler ve ekonomik ilişkiler birbirlerine dışsal değil, içseldir. Sosyal-teorik aşamada, sınıf kavramını yerli yerine oturtmak gerekmektedir. Hâkim paradigmada, toplumsal artığın üretimi ve temellükünde taraflaşma anlamında “sosyal sınıf” kavramı, temellük sürecindeki paylaşımın verili iç hiyerarşisindeki pozisyonlanma anlamındaki “sosyal statü” kavramıyla birbirine karıştırılır.⁵⁶⁹ Daha da fazlası, sosyal statü, sosyal saflaşmada temel belirleyen haline getirilir (bürokrat, mültezim veya köylü gibi). Statü temelli bir anlayışın doğuşu, büyük ölçüde devletin tek siyasal özne

⁵⁶⁸ Alp Yücel Kaya and Ali Onur Peker, “Yeni Kurumsal İktisat, İktisat Tarihini Nasıl Yazıyor? Eleştirel Bir Bakış,” *Praksis*, no. 54 (December 2020): 29–60.

⁵⁶⁹ Boratav, “Book Review.”

kabul edildiği hâkim paradigmada bürokratin oynadığı rolün mutlaklaştırılması üzerinden gerçekleşmiştir. Oysa, asıl sosyal tabakalaşma mülk sahipliği üzerinde yürür. Toplumsal artığı üretenler ve onu sömürenler arasındaki ayrım çok açıktır fakat temellük edilen artığın bölüşümü hususunda sosyal statü devreye girer. Bu açıdan bakıldığında bürokratin kadiri mutlak bir özne olarak tarif edilmesi imkansızdır. Hâkim paradigma, temelde bu metodolojik ve sosyal-teorik analiz üzerinden hareket eder ve bir “güçlü devlet geleneği” tezi öne sürer. Bu yaklaşım, tarihi “devlet/burjuvazi”, “devlet/ekonomik alan”, “devlet/toplum” ve “merkez/çevre” gibi mutlak ikilikler üzerinden okur ve her aşamada devleti ana belirleyen haline getirir.⁵⁷⁰

Öte yandan, tarihin hiçbir aşamasında Osmanlı siyasasının dönüşümünü açıklamada tek bir belirleyenden veya “asıl çelişkiden” söz etmek mümkün gözükmemektedir. Bu kavrayışın arkasında, hâkim paradigmanın Batı ve Osmanlı örneklerini yanlış bir karşılaştırmaya tabi tutmasının da etkisi vardır. Bu paradigmaya özgü yaklaşımlar, Batı’da “olan veya olmayan” pek çok elementi Osmanlı’da ararlar ve bunun sonucunda ortaya bir “yoklar tarihi” çıkartırlar. Bu sorunlar esas olarak başlangıçta belirtilen ilişkisellik eksikliğine işaret eder. Hâkim paradigma, Osmanlı siyasi yapısı hakkında bir tür “homojenlik” iddiasında bulunur. Oysa, örneğin bölgesel farklılıklar ya da “çevrenin” “merkeze” mutlak bağlılığı sürekli olarak sorgulanmalı ve bunu bir “özerklik” sorunundan ziyade bir “ilişkisellik” sorunu olarak çerçevelemek gerekir. Bazen “merkezi” kuvvetler çeşitli “çevresel” kuvvetlerle ittifak yaparlarken bazen de çatışırlar. Ne çevre daima “özerklik” talep eden bir ontolojidir ne de merkez durmaksızın bu eğilimi bastırmaya çalışan, değişmez bir öznedir.

Marksist analiz bağlamında modern devlet oluşumu, temelde kapitalist üretim ilişkilerine dayanan siyasal-iktisadi toplumsal formasyonun düzenlenmesi, gayri şahsileştirilmesi ve sistemleştirilmesi edilmesi sürecini ifade eder. Osmanlı Devleti’nin yapısını böylesine bir diyalektik ilişkisellik temelinde ele alan heterodoks bir literatür de oluşmuştur. Bu literatür, devleti mistifiye eden anlayışları reddeder, toplumsal mücadeleler temelinde ilişkiyel bir model kurar ve toplum merkezli bir yaklaşıma kapı aralar. Halil Berktaş’ın devletin mistifikasyonunun tersine

⁵⁷⁰ Takip eden görüşler için, bkz. Demet Dinler, “Türkiye’de Güçlü Devlet Geleneği Tezinin Eleştirisi,” *Praksis*, no. 9 (2003): 17–54.

döndürülmesi adına yaptığı teorik müdahale;⁵⁷¹ Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Hajj'ın Osmanlı'da modern devletin oluşumu ve farklı çıkar gruplarının saflaşması üzerinden yürüttüğü analiz;⁵⁷² Baki Tezcan'ın, 17. yüzyılda emperyal merkezi gücün farklı çıkar çevreleri eliyle sınırlandırılmasına dair geliştirdiği “İkinci İmparatorluk” tezi;⁵⁷³ Fatma Eda Çelik'in toplumsal artığın temellükünde kurumsallaşan/sistemleşen sömürü mekanizmalarının ortaya çıkışı anlamında devletin dönüşümünü ele aldığı çalışması;⁵⁷⁴ Çağdaş Sümer'in merkezi hanedan dışında, vezirlerin ve paşaların etrafında oluşan “kapıların” alternatif siyasal iktisadi odaklar olarak ortaya çıkışları ve siyasal dönüşümün kapılar arasındaki mücadele dinamikleri bağlamında ele aldığı çalışması;⁵⁷⁵ Alp Yücel Kaya'nın özel mülkiyete dayanan üretim birimleri olarak “çifliklerin” yaygınlaşması bağlamında yaptığı “Osmanlı Burjuva Devrimi” analizi;⁵⁷⁶ Y. Doğan Çetinkaya'nın kapitalizme geçişte devletin rolünü gösterdiği çalışması⁵⁷⁷ ve E. Attila Aytakin kapitalist üretim tarzının kimi öğelerinin ortaya çıkışına alt sınıflardan gelen tepkiyi tartıştığı çalışması,⁵⁷⁸ bu literatürün temel metinlerini oluşturur.

Her ne kadar böyle bir literatür oluşmuşsa da bu literatür hâkim paradigma kadar sistemli bir teorik çerçeveye kavuşmuş değildir. Yanı sıra, tartışma çoğunlukla

⁵⁷¹ Halil Berktaş, “The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History/Historiography,” in *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, ed. Halil Berktaş and Suraiya Faroqhi, 1st ed. (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1992), 109–84.

⁵⁷² Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Hajj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, 2nd Edition (1991; repr., Syracuse (N. Y.): Syracuse University Press, 2005).

⁵⁷³ Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁵⁷⁴ Fatma Eda Çelik, *Kişisel İktidardan Millet Meclisine Saltanattan Cumhuriyete* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2022).

⁵⁷⁵ Çağdaş Sümer, *Düzenini Arayan Osmanlı: Eski Rejimden Meşrutiyet'e Osmanlı'da Siyasal Çatışma ve Rejimler*, Birinci Basım, Yordam kitap 440 (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2023).

⁵⁷⁶ Alp Yücel Kaya, “Bourgeois Revolution in Turkey (1908-1923),” *Revolutionary Marxism: A Journal of Theory and Politics*, 2023, 57–104.

⁵⁷⁷ Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, “1923 Öncesinde Türkiye'de Kapitalizm, Sermaye ve Burjuvazi,” in *100 Yıl Sonra Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2024), 295–312.

⁵⁷⁸ Erden Attila Aytakin, “Son Dönem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 1703-1908: Kapitalistleşme ve Merkezileşme Kavşağında,” in *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atılğan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, and Ateş Uslu (Yordam Kitap, 2015), 39–87, <https://open.metu.edu.tr/handle/11511/86561>.

devletin ve toplumsal formasyonun karakteri üzerine yürütüldüğünden aşağı sınıfların etkisi yeterince vurgulanmamaktadır. Üst sınıfların birikim stratejilerinde temsil edilen sınıfların ortaya koyduğu sınıfsal kompozisyon üzerinden yapılacak bir sınıfsal analize ihtiyaç olduğu görülmektedir. Bu soruya verilmiş anlamlı yanıtlardan biri olarak, Antonio Gramsci'nin "integral/genişletilmiş devlet" analizi, devlet ve sivil toplum arasındaki integral ilişkiye odaklanır.⁵⁷⁹ Gramsci'nin bu tanımından ilham alan Nicos Poulantzas, kendisi de bir sınıf ilişkisi olan verili bir güçler ilişkisinin özgül bir maddi yoğunlaşması olarak devleti tanımlar.⁵⁸⁰ Ancak onun "görelî özerklik" yaklaşımı, yine devletin şekleştirelmesi riskini taşır. Bu noktada, John Holloway ve Sol Picciotto ve Hiede Gerstenberger gibi "Alman Tartışması" adı verilen literatürün içinde tanımlanan yazarlar devletin sınıf mücadelelerinden türetilmesi yaklaşımını geliştirirler.⁵⁸¹ Bu literatüre bağlanan Bob Jessop'ın stratejik-ilişkisel yaklaşımı, kabaca sınıfların her birinin bir siyasal ajandada temsil edildiğini öne sürer ve bu ajandaların çatışmasından doğan bir kurumsal set olarak devleti bir sınıf mücadeleleri zemini olarak tarif eder.⁵⁸² Her ne kadar bu literatür sınıfların merkezi alınması hususunda anlamlı bir katkı sunmuş olsalar da ortaya çıkan kurumsal yapıyı açıklamakta eksik kalmaktadırlar. Parisyen Düzenleme Okuluna ait "Birikim Rejimi" ve "Düzenleme Şekli" kavramları, sınıf mücadelelerinin sonucunda ortaya çıkan verili kurumsal sistemi açıklaması açısından bu literatüre eklenmelidir.

Osmanlı siyasasının durmaksızın değişen devlet düzenini bu bağlamda açıklamak mümkündür. Geç 16. yüzyıl itibarıyla ortaya çıkan iltizam, vergi toplama hakkının belli bir süre için mültezim adı verilen araçlara devredilmesi ve bu yolla araziye dair verginin nakit olarak hazineye girmesini hedefler. Süreç içinde iltizam, bir birikim rejimi olarak geleneksel temellük biçimi olan tımarın yerini almaya başladı ve çeşitli

⁵⁷⁹ Carlos Nelson Coutinho, *Gramsci's Political Thought*, trans. Pedro Sette-Camara, Historical Materialism Book Series, Volume 38 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012); Guido Liguori, *Gramsci's Pathways*, Historical Materialism Book Series, Volume 102 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015).

⁵⁸⁰ Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, Verso Classics Edition, Verso Classics 29 (1978; repr., London: Verso Books, 2000).

⁵⁸¹ John Holloway, "The State and Everyday Struggle," in *The State Debate*, ed. Simon Clarke (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991), 225–59, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21464-8>; Hiede Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State*, Historical Materialism Book Series, v. 15 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2007).

⁵⁸² Bob Jessop, *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach* (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2007).

Osmanlı bölgelerinde para ve piyasa temelli bir ekonomiye giden yolu açtı.⁵⁸³ Eda Çelik'in açıkladığı gibi, bu rejim devlete ait toprakların tahsisi ve tasarrufundan oluşan, doğrudan “ekonomi dışı zorlama” içeren bir temellük stratejisine dayanırken vergilendirme de “doğrudan” veya aynı kolektif yükümlülüklerle veya dolaylı ve nakdi formlara (öşür, çift-resmi, ispençe, vb.) dayanıyordu.⁵⁸⁴ İltizamla başlayan özelleştirme trendi, 18. Yüzyıl başlarında, arazinin haklarının ömür boyu devrine dayanan malikane sistemiyle başka bir aşamaya ulaştı. Malikane sistemiyle beraber, merkezden yerele uzanan çıkar ağları toprak üzerinde daha fazla tasarruf hakkı elde ettiler. “Çiftlik” adı verilen ve bazen birkaç köylük geniş arazileri içine alabilen üretim birimleri de bu trendin bir ürünü olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Çiftlik sahipleri bu araziler üzerinde emek sürecini belirleme ve üretim rejimine karar verebilecek kadar geniş tasarruf haklarına sahiptiler. Genellikle Vezir-Paşa kapılarının ve Ayanların elde ettiği bu ayrıcalık, bu çevrelerin devlet düzeni içinde belirleyici bir güç haline gelmelerine de neden olmuştur. 19. yüzyıla gelindiğinde, uluslararası düzende yaşanan kırılma Osmanlı siyasasında var olan tüm çevreleri iktidar üzerindeki bir kavgaya sürüklemiş, merkezde sultanın etrafında toplanan siyasi çevre tüm bu gelişim eğrisini “modern devlet” başlığı altında bir araya getirdiği bir “Beyaz Devrim” gerçekleştirmiştir.

Tüm bu süreç içinde kentlerdeki üretici zanaatkarlar ve taşradaki köylüler, sistemin giderek kapitalistleşmesi karşısında bir dizi kayba uğramıştır. Fiyatların piyasa koşullarına göre belirlendiği, yaşam koşullarının giderek daha da güvencesiz hale geldiği bu koşullarda, Osmanlı kent ve kır emekçileri çeşitli gündelik ve/veya kitlesel eylemlere kalkışmıştır. Hâkim paradigmanın iddiasının aksine köylüler ve zanaatkarlar, ‘yenilikler karşısında muhafazakâr, durağan ve kabullenici’ bir pozisyonda değildir. Tam aksine, incelenen örnekler bu sınıfların verili dönüşüm süreci karşısında oldukça hareketli bir siyasal tepki geliştirdiklerini ortaya koymaktadır. Özellikle geleneğe ve göreneğe verilen referanslar, ‘kadim’ uygulamalara referansla siyasal mücadele içinde meşruiyet arayışı her iki sınıfın da

⁵⁸³ Metin Coşgel and Boğaç A. Ergene, *The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and Trial in the Sharia Courts*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

⁵⁸⁴ Fatma Eda Çelik, “Türkiye Modern Devleti’nin Osmanlı’daki Kökenleri – Toprak Yönetiminde ve Yönetimsel Organlarda Dönüşüm,” *Memleket Siyaset Yönetim* 17, no. 37 (June 30, 2022): 5–48.

siyasal hareket biçiminde belirleyicidir. Her iki sınıf da gündelik hayatta direnmenin çeşitli örüntülerini yaratırlar: Üretim alanını terk etmek, vergiden kaçınmak, asker altına alınmayı reddetmek, üretimi sabote etmek ve uygun koşullarda kitlesel biçimde direnmek gibi. Ahlaki ekonomik ajanda adı verilen ve geleneksel bir eşitlikçi siyasal iktisadi mantaliteye işaret eden bu formasyon, 1) Rumeli'de Dağlı İsyanı (1790-1810) sırasında çiftlikleşmeye bir direniş olarak kendini göstermiş, 2) İstanbul Olayları (1807-1826) sırasında Hanedan çevresinde örgütlenen merkezi hizbin dayattığı yeni siyasal iktisadi programa karşı bir isyan biçimini almış, 3) Atçalı Kel Mehmed'in liderliğindeki Aydın İsyanı'nda (1829) köylülerin üst sınıflara ve dayattıkları doğrudan ve dolaylı vergilere karşı bir direniş olarak ortaya çıkmış, son olarak 4) Suriye'deki Büyük Köylü İsyanlarının bir ayağı olarak Lazkiye'deki Nusayri köylülerinin isyanında (1834 – 1835), Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın zorunlu askere alma girişimine karşı geleneksel bir köylü ağının devreye alınması biçiminde belirmiştir.

Bu çalışmanın ortaya koyduğu veriler ışığında şu sonuçlara varılabilir: Devlet ve toplum arasında keskin bir ayrım tahayyülü gerçekçi değildir; her siyasa oldukça karmaşık ilişkilerin bir bileşimi olarak oluşur ve dönüşür. İktidar, içindeki farklı eğilimlerin çelişkilerinin bir sonucu olarak verili bir formasyona ulaşır. Bu durumda, bu oluşum temel çıkar gruplarından oluşan sınıflar arasındaki gerilim ya da uzlaşma dinamikleri tarafından belirlenir. Verili devlet formasyonu (hukuk gibi) sınıf mücadelelerinden türemiştir. Özelleşme/kapitalistleşme dinamikleri bu süreçteki temel gerilimdir. Küresel konjonktürün bir sonucu olarak 16. yüzyıldan beri gelişen kapitalist ilişkiler, 19. yüzyılın başlarında iç savaş ölçeğinde bir siyasi çatışmanın düğümlenmesine yol açmıştır. Aşağı sınıfların müdahaleleri, İmparatorluk Hanedanı ve Vezir-Paşa Kapılarını geriletken ya da ilerleten çeşitli hamleler yapmaya zorladı. Üretimden elde edilen güç, alt sınıfların her zaman belirleyici bir siyasi özne olmasını sağlamıştır. Küçük ölçekli/günlük ve kitlesel siyasi eylemler diğer sınıfları farklı eylem ve hareket tarzlarına zorlar.

B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

(Please fill out this form on computer. Double click on the boxes to fill them)

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics
- Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Keklik
Adı / Name : Necati Ege
Bölümü / Department : Tarih / History

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English): Rethinking State-Society Relations in the Ottoman Empire: Making the Modern State and Moral Economic Revolts, 1789-1839

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master Doktora / PhD

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır.** / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years**. *
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. *

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date

(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)
(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)

Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.