SECURITIZING MIGRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN UNION'S ASYLUM AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION

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ABSTRACT

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Climate-induced migration (CIM) has emerged as an important issue because of the adverse impacts of major natural disasters. Despite efforts to explore alternate approaches, such as examining the connection between development and migration, existing policies generally concentrate on giving top priority to the securitization of migration, particularly within the European Union (EU). Such developments have led to a rise in securitization-focused evaluations when studying the EU's migration and asylum policies. Nevertheless, when conducting this study regarding CIM, it is crucial to scrutinize the position of migration within the policies of the Union. Thus, the study comprises two distinct stages: the securitization of migration and the securitization of CIM within the EU. The research uses the qualitative method of process tracing to evaluate the techniques developed by EU institutions, policy documents, legal measures, and discourses pertaining to migration within the EU. The study seeks to ascertain the placement of CIM within the discourse surrounding the securitization of the EU's migration and asylum policies, as well as its compatibility with the securitization process in migration policy. Overall, the main aim of this study is to reveal the complex connection between migration, security,

and climate change by developing the existing scientific literature on migration and CIM in the context of securitization dynamics in EU policies.

Keywords: European Union, Securitization Theory, Climate-Induced Migration, Copenhagen School

ÖZ

GÖÇÜN GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRİLMESİ: İKLİM KAYNAKLI GÖÇE YANIT
OLARAK AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN SIĞINMA VE GÖÇ POLİTİKALARININ
ANALİZİ

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İklim kaynaklı göç, büyük doğal afetlerin olumsuz etkileri sonucunda önemli bir sorun olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Kalkınma ve göç arasındaki bağlantıyı incelemek gibi alternatif yaklaşımları keşfetme çabalarına rağmen, mevcut politikalar genellikle, özellikle Avrupa Birliği (AB) içerisinde, göçün güvenlikleştirilmesine birinci öncelik verilmesi üzerinde yoğunlaşıyor. Bu tür gelişmeler, AB'nin göç ve iltica politikaları incelenirken güvenlikleştirme odaklı değerlendirmelerin artmasına yol açmıştır. Ancak iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik bu çalışmayı gerçekleştirirken göçün Birlik politikaları içindeki yerinin irdelenmesi önemlidir. Dolayısıyla çalışma iki farklı aşamadan oluşmaktadır: göçün güvenlikleştirilmesi ve iklim kaynaklı göçün AB içinde güvenlikleştirilmesi. Araştırma, AB kurumları tarafından geliştirilen yöntemleri, politika belgelerini, yasal önlemleri ve AB içindeki göçle ilgili söylemleri değerlendirmek için süreç izleme yöntemini kullanıyor. Çalışma, iklim kaynaklı göçün AB'nin göç ve sığınma politikalarının güvenlikleştirilmesini çevreleyen söylem içindeki yerini ve bunun yanı sıra göç politikasındaki güvenlikleştirme süreciyle uyumluluğunu tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Genel olarak bu çalışmanın temel amacı ise AB politikalarındaki güvenlikleştirme dinamikleri bağlamında göç ve iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik mevcut bilimsel

literatürü geliştirerek göç, güvenlik ve iklim değişikliği arasındaki karmaşık bağlantıyı ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi, İklim Kaynaklı Göç, Kopenhag Okulu

To my beloved family and friends:
who made it all possible

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative for Germany
CEAS	Common European Asylum Policy
CIM	Climate-induced Migration
COP	Conference of the Parties
CS	Copenhagen School
EC	European Commission
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EURODAC	European Automated Fingerprint Recognitions
FN	Front National
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SEA	Single European Act
ST	Securitization Theory
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN	United Nations

UK	The United Kingdom
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
USA	Change
	The United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WW II	Second World War

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Migration occurs as a natural consequence of temperature increases and rainfall irregularities due to climate change throughout the world. It is entirely possible to say that there will be an increase in human mobility in parallel with the increase in climate-induced imbalances and/or extremes. Upon examining the literature, it becomes evident that numerous research has already been conducted on Climate-Induced Migration (CIM) (Adamo, 2008; Oliver-Smith, 2012; Perch-Nielsen et al., 2008; Warner et al., 2009), and most of these studies show solid examples and offer policies to protect not only people who forced migration due to climate change but also suggest solidarity and responsible sharing activities to mitigate devastating impacts (Huckstep & Clemens, 2023; United Nations Climate Change, 2018; Flavell & Chazalnoël, 2014; Geddes et al., 2012). Although various terms with different backgrounds and political influences are used to describe this phenomenon, this does not change the fact that people migrate or are forced to migrate because of inconsistent climate events. While looking at the studies on the subject of CIM in the literature, it could be summarized that the terminology is mainly discussed under the people who are compelled to displace as a result of the negative consequences of climate change, humanitarian aim with the legal legislation and international protection regarding the situation of these people, and whether climate-induced human mobility perceived as a security problem for other countries (Karayiğit & Kılıç, 2021).

Rather than seeking solutions to disputes regarding the definition of CIM and how it is analyzed, this study will give priority to examining the process of addressing CIM as a security problem within the European Union's (EU) migration policies. In other terms, this thesis will examine how the EU treats CIM as a security threat,

specifically within the broader discussions on the process of securitizing migration in the EU policies. While analyzing this situation, securitization theory and how the tools of the theory are used in the EU's migration policies will be examined first. The primary rationale for this is that comprehending the securitization of CIM under the EU's migration and asylum policies necessitates viewing the broader migration issue through a security lens. Hence, overall, the aim of this study is to analyse the process of securitizing both migration and CIM under the EU's migration and asylum policies. Additionally, the objective of this research is to assess the extent of these securitization processes within the EU by aligning with existing theoretical frameworks.

To start with, while migration researchers examine the reasons people migrate, they commonly categorise these motivations into five main groups: (1) economic factors, including differences in income distribution and the employment search; (2) political factors, including intra-country conflicts due to differences in political views; (3) demographic factors, including population variability in a particular region; (4) social factors, including cultural and customary practices; and (5) ecosystem-related environmental factors (Buzan et al., 1998; Lee, 1966). The content of environmental factors in the last section is expanded to include climate change also (Black et al., 2011). Despite substantial research conducted on this subject since the early 1990s, experts from various disciplines, such as political scientists, economists, environmentalists, activists, and demographers, have examined the connection between climate change and migration; overall, studies in this area agree that climate change is only one of the factors that impacts migration, but not the sole one (Black, 2001; Castles, 2002; Kolmannskog, 2008; Newland, 2011; Yavcan, 2021). Furthermore, the literature on – migration nexus, including environmental issues, has been in existence since the 1990s. During the early studies published on the subject, one side argued that the creation of high policy by establishing a connection between security and the environment would contribute to the development of political awareness and, therefore, lead to the resolution of environmental issues and the assurance of security (Lodgaard & Ornas, 1992); the other side made warnings that associating environmental problems with security would lead to a conflictual situation against cooperative attitudes (Deudney, 1990).

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Despite those debates, the security-CIM relationship has begun to be established. The perception of migration as a possible threat to internal and/or global security has recently come to the fore due to the idea that migration has increased as a result of the increment in frequency and severity of environmental adversities, including extreme weather conditions, drought, and rising sea levels due to climate change. In line with this idea, discussions about CIM being an international security problem are increasingly becoming popular and starting to find a place in both literature and the policy-making process. The debates around the potential security implications of CIM are influenced by two contrasting core ideas similar to the aforementioned discussions. The first one is the *environmentalist*, *alarmist* or *maximalist* approach: those have maintained that large-scale population displacement will directly result from global warming's effects, particularly on sea levels and rainfall patterns. They demand both action to stop these migrations and a broader definition of refugees that takes into account those who are uprooted due to climate change. Here, the overarching presumption is that migration is inherently harmful and ought to be prevented wherever feasible. Their claims mostly depend on estimating huge migration scenarios, which are considered a cause for potential future international insecurity because of the climate change's adverse effects, and their estimations make a claim that the number of persons migrating ranges from ten to hundreds million (Christian Aid, 2007; Myers, 2002; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1996; Stern, 2007; World Bank Group, 2023). To give an example, in particular, NGOs, UN organizations, and Western States call on the rest of the world to predict population displacements and future CIM. Their predictions are that if the necessary precautions are not taken, approximately one billion people will have to leave their homelands by 2050 (European Commission, 2022; Flavell & Chazalnoël, 2014; IPCC, 2023; World Bank Group, 2023).

These studies commonly define the emergence of CIM as a security threat that is the intersection of migration and climate change phenomena by giving maximalist numbers, which are typically discussed separately in the context of security literature, since they consistently emphasise that if precautions are not taken in a timely manner regarding climate change, It will be too tardy to prevent the people's migration (Bettini, 2013; Homer-Dixon, 1994). In this context, in the literature on

migration, it has started that security and climate change are often discussed together due to the interconnectedness of these three concepts. The cause for this is that individuals who seek salvation by moving beyond their own country's boundaries owing to adverse environmental conditions, while recipient countries perceive themselves as being at risk (Choucri, 2002; White, 2012).

Given that this study centres on the EU, an examination of the viewpoint of the Union regarding migration and CIM reveals that it is not only ranks among the foremost organisations that classify climate change as a *threat multiplier*, but also has initiated efforts to address its own security and foreign policy, taking into consideration all other factors stemming from climate change, including CIM. The EU's approach to granting refugee status to migrants under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is based on the refugee definition defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. As in that convention there is no direct or indirect provision regarding CIM in the 1951 Refugee Convention, in a similar manner, the EU is also not bound by any explicit or implicit stipulation concerning the concept of CIM. Nevertheless, in this study is not going into the details of this issue, which is an area of law, and the issue will be discussed through CIM's contribution to the securitization process in the EU. Even though The Directorate General for Home Affairs offers *permanently forced migration* status to people pushed to move as a result of the adverse consequences of climate change, the European Commission's (EC) working document published in 2013 said there is no need to use *refugee-type protection* towards those people (Eur-LEX, 2013). Furthermore, while scrutinising other official documents of the EU, it becomes evident that there is a forecast of an impending rise in CIM, which poses a novel security threat to the EU. Hence, it is explicitly emphasised that conducting thorough studies on migration policy and external measures pertaining to CIM is crucial for resolving this predicament (European Parliament, 2022; Lazarou & Tothova, 2022; Parliamentary Assembly, 2009; Solana & Union Européenne, 2008; Szczepanikova & Van, 2018). Even though these reasons are considered separately and together, the common result of these different discussions is that migrants take away the jobs of EU citizens, threaten national identity because they come from different religions and cultures, and these people are perceived as potential terrorists and criminals as well as disease

carriers (White, 2012). It would not be wrong to say that the reason why the Union has such an attitude towards CIM is security concerns.

The systematic study of addressing a phenomenon and its problems in the context of security is elaborated in the Securitization Theory (ST) of the Copenhagen School (CS) (Waever, 1995). According to CS, security is defined as a specific form of social practice or process. To put it simply, security is a *speech act* expressed by political actors and reciprocated in society rather than a value or condition. It focuses on how any issue or phenomenon is legitimized as an exceptional situation in the process of turning into a security issue. Therefore, political actors transform the relevant concept into an issue of security through a speech act while also using it as a means to address and deal with the problem. The owners of the theory state that two issues need to be studied to understand whether a phenomenon is securitized or not. The first one is to check whether a speech act is uttered by *political actors/elites* that defines an issue as an *existential threat* to a designated reference object. This speech act is not necessarily expected to involve the use of a concrete extraordinary measure for the securitized issue, it is sufficient that this situation is possible. The other is to check whether there are signs that the *target audience* is acknowledging the phenomenon defined in the speech act under securitization. The theory also describes securitization as turning the issue into an existential threat rather than merely using military force, taking it within the scope of exceptional policies rather than through normal political tools, and developing measures in this context (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995). In this context, if going back to the situation in the EU, the perception that phenomena such as migration and climate change, which traditionally do not fall within the scope of security, actually pose an existential security threat and that policies on these issues should be developed to take this into account is increasing day by day and is penetrating EU policies. As far as CIM is concerned, it is discussed that developments at the Union level have the potential to further contribute to the negative conceptualization of migration and to further support the term "Fortress Europe" (Trombetta, 2014).

While analyzing the EU's position towards the CIM issue, it would not be the right approach to discuss the process by reducing it only to the CIM. The reason for this is

that the EU has made many efforts under border security since the early 1990s. There is no single reason or justification behind these efforts, but a mixture of societal, economic and security-oriented. Even though the EU's normative commitments to human rights and justice have influenced the formation of asylum and refugee policies based on humanitarian imperatives (Boswell, 2003), migration is now being seen as a existential threat to the existence of the Union by its members (Huysmans, 2006). Babayan (2010) stated that securitization of migration in the EU commenced with the Single European Act (SEA) since the idea of protecting the internal market of the EU from external interventions would also be one of the reasons for the development of the Schengen Agreement, which regulates cross-border irregular migration under greater control. Hence, it could be concluded that the securitization of migration was first conceptualized as a threat with the SEA, and then the Schengen Agreement supporting the idea of taking urgent measures regarding the entrance procedure of people outside of the EU and aiming to control migration has been legalized. However, over time, more concrete developments in terms of the Union, such as the Eastern Enlargement of the EU - the largest enlargement of the Union including ten states - then terrorist attacks that began with 9/11 and continued with Madrid, London (Bigo, 2008; Luedtke, 2008), Paris attacks, and finally migration flows from Syria, which peaked in 2015 due to the consequences of the 2011 Arab Spring and described as the largest number of people that Europe faced since Second World War (WW II) (Kingsley, 2015), has changed the Unions's perception so that people coming from outside have started to seen as an increasing threat (Yıldız, 2016).

The 2022 report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reveals that over the past decade, almost 22 million individuals globally were forced to migrate within their own nations as a result of climate-related issues (IOM, 2022). It is quite clear that this number will increase in the next ten years because, according to the 2022 report of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the number of people forced to displace due to environmental disasters is 8.7 million from 84 countries, the majority of whom are from Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan regions, and this number is 45% is higher compared to 2021 data (IDMC, 2023). Consequently, the numbers of climate-induced migrants, leading to a significant rate

of internal displacement, are remarkably elevated. Hence, even though displacement caused by climate change could occur either internally or internationally, the data shows that it is mostly internal (Global Migration Data Portal, 2024; IDMC, 2023). Nevertheless, several studies continue to project that the total count of individuals forced to migrate due to significant adverse climate events will range from 44 million to 216 million people by the year 2050 (Seko, 2023; IOM, 2022; Clement et al., 2021; White House, 2021). In a similar manner, the EC forecasts that by 2100, the number of people displaced by natural disasters worsened by climate change will range from 25 million - 1 billion, and between 100 - 200 million of them will be due to rising sea levels. It is stated that those who would be most affected adversely are people with low-income levels in developing countries.

In light of all these estimations, the study forecasts that approximately 1 million people could apply to the EU annually by 2100 (European Commission, 2018). Opponents of this view criticize this approach and show with their studies that the estimates of several hundred million immigrants in these studies, despite human mobility, a large part of which is internal, are maximalist discourse and, therefore, speculative and exaggerated (Brown, 2008; Gemenne, 2011; Jakobeit & Methmann, 2012).

On the other hand, when looking at the forced displacement caused by climate change and disasters, it is seen that studies are not only related to the effect of climate change but rather are generally disaster-wide since forced displacements could be as result of *sudden-onset*, like earthquakes, landslides, and erosion, or *slow-onset*, including drought, flood, cyclones, and sea level rise due to increasing temperature (European Commission, 2022a; Randall, 2019). That means the migration arising from climate change is complex and has multiple aspects, encompassing several sorts and forms. This circumstance presents a complex challenge in determining whether climate change, in its pure state, is a potential factor contributing to the displacement of populations in specific places.

In the light of the above information, on the one hand, there is the migration phenomenon, which is increasingly at the centre of security-oriented policies in the

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EU; on the other hand, there is the CIM phenomenon, although it mostly takes place within the same country (Global Migration Data Portal, 2024; IDMC, 2023) and estimates of its impact on migration are misleading since climate change does not always occur linearly (Gemenne, 2011). The paths of these two phenomena intersect in the securitization of the EU's migration and asylum policies because although the terminology and methodology used to characterize individuals may differ, negative impacts such as changing climate conditions, extreme precipitation, rising sea levels and temperatures will become increasingly felt both cumulatively and individually, which will cause this human mobility to become more visible. While under normal circumstances, people's selection to leave their homes and go to better places due to the adverse aspects that they cannot bear should not be a security threat, the answer to how it is perceived in this way in the EU is tried to be understood within the framework of ST. While doing this analysis, as for the methodological design, process tracing will be used since it is not only one of the fundamental methods for qualitative analysis in the social sciences to identify causalities and their pathways (Beach & Pedersen, 2019) but also it puts important efforts to describe and analyse social and political phenomena (Collier, 2011). The reason for this is that process tracing tries to identify and explain causal pathways between dependent and independent variables (George & Bennett, 2005). In other words, it traces the causal processes that relate causes and their results/consequences (Beach, 2016). Although ST has been mostly examined by using discourse analysis, and apart from a few worthwhile studies, scholars generally do not prefer to use process tracing within the theory (Buzan et al., 1998; Hansen, 2013; Robinson, 2017) nonetheless, suggested that using only one way while identifying securitized issue and finding links between causalities could be difficult (Balzacq, 2010). This method actually overlaps with the ST since, with the process tracing; the aim is to trace the order and sequence of issues or events that cause the securitization of a phenomenon under the theory. However, the key point is that analytical explanations must be resorted to in order to transform the historical narrative of events into analytical causal explanations based on clear theoretical forms (Balzacq, 2010; George & Bennett, 2005).

Therefore, the process tracing methodology will be applied to comprehend the European Union's stance on CIM in the context of migration policies and to trace the

paths leading to the securitization of migration policies within the framework of causality due to processes between causes and effects. Analysing causal processes will clarify the context between cause-effects on the path towards the securitization of the migration policies of the EU. However, the use of process tracing methodology does not mean that the discourse that forms the basis of the ST will not be used, of course, because the discourses in the process would shed important light on how and in what way migration and CIM are securitized within the EU. While doing all these, a literature review, EU's official publications, academic studies, secondary sources, official websites, and information and data obtained from international organizations will be analysed.

In the second part of the thesis, the ST of CS will first be explained in general terms in the context of the subject in order to setup the conceptual framework, and then the securitizsation of migration and CIM will be discussed within the scope of the theory. Afterwards, in the third chapter, the same subject will be examined specifically for the EU's asylum and migration policies. A two-stage analysis will be carried out to understand whether CIM is securitized within the migration and asylum policies. One of these will be the securitization of migration, and the other will be the securitization process of CIM. This is due to the fact that the securitization of the migration phenomenon in the EU began well in advance of the CIM. In addition, considering the CIM subject solely within the scope of securitization of environment and/or environmental security and reducing it to solidarity and cooperation on human-induced factors that negatively affect the climate ignores the notion of migration, which has already emerged as a matter of security concern. Therefore, discussing the concept of CIM with respect to the securitization of migration will help fill the existing gaps. When analyzing the perception of these two issues in the EU, the ST of CS will be used. The reason for this is that by developing ST, CS has also formed tools to explain how a general phenomenon is exceptionalized, in other words, securitized, by taking it out of normal and ordinary procedures and the policies applied to it.

Following examination of the securitization process of migration and CIM within EU policies through process tracing, this time, in the fourth chapter, an evaluation will be

made by considering whether the securitization processes for these two phenomena are compatible with the tools and instruments of ST. During the process of doing this, firstly, the ST mechanisms used by the EU while securitizing migration and the instruments developed will be examined, and later it will be discussed whether this situation is also valid for CIM. The aim here is to search for answers to the questions of which specific tools and mechanisms developed by the ST are used when securitizing the migration within the EU migration policy and to what extent it is compatible with the theory. Finally, it will be examined whether the same or similar situations exist within the scope of the securitization of CIM, and the relationship between the securitization process of migration and CIM in the Union will be tried to be understood.

Overall, this thesis will analyze how and in which direction the EU's migration policy has progressed over time, examine the the EU's migration and asylum policy in the light of the ST and the tools it uses, and, in this context, how the CIM is positioned within the EU's migration policies. The general findings obtained will be evaluated, and it will be argued that the EU has an increasingly security-oriented migration policy and, as a natural result of this, its approach to CIM falls within the scope of irregular migration, aligned with the evolution of the policy of migration.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, first, the ST, which is developed by the CS, is briefly explained. Then, the securitization of migration and CIM is analysed following the theoretical framework. While doing this, it is necessary to first understand the concept of securitization. When considering securitization, understanding the concept of security perception and the methods and tools used to generate it is of utmost importance. Therefore, since this theory forms the framework of the study, the ST is first explained to apprehend both the securitization of migration and CIM. Overall, the purpose is to present the audience with an initial understanding of how and by whom the theory is applied in the securitization of migration and CIM before moving on to the EU.

If it is necessary to make a summary in order to give an idea about the theory, the first idea of securitization was to be proposed by the CS. The ST raised the idea of security by emphasizing the socially constructed understanding of threats as opposed to traditional realist approaches to security that primarily concentrate on the relationships between states. The founders of the theory, Wæver and Buzan, define securitization as a *linguistic action* or *speech act*, which is its most used form, distinguished by a particular rhetoric of *urgency* and *priority*. However, according to them, speaking security by actors is a strategy for influencing policies in addition to providing a particular representation of a problem or issue. In literature, Bigo and Huysmans have extensively examined the connection between security and migration. Their analysis is primarily rooted in the sociology of power and critical role of this in the institutionalisation of a specific discourse (Bigo, 2001, 2002, 2008a, 2008b, 2017; Huysmans, 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2006; Huysmans & Squire, 2009).

On the other hand, the literature began to discuss the relationship between CIM and securitization much later. The primary reason for this is that the effect of human mobility caused by climate change is slower than other situations that cause people to migrate or seek asylum, and The securitization of climate change is the primary context in which CIM is examined. The primary research conducted in the field of climate change securitization and CIM are carried out by Baysal & Karakaş, 2017; Brzoska, 2009; John, 2023; Oels, 2012; Perch-Nielsen et al., 2008; J. Warner & Boas, 2019; Warner et al., 2009; Boas, 2015.

Apart from the framework of climate change and securitization, the majority of studies on CIM focus on human mobility (Adams & Kay, 2019; Afifi et al., 2016; Baldwin et al., 2019; Boas et al., 2022; Cattaneo et al., 2019; Hahn & Fessler, 2023; Scissa, 2024) analysis of the link between environmental - climatic trends and migration (Adger et al., 2015; Warner et al., 2010; Wood, 2001; Yavcan, 2021), analysing the migration patterns caused by climate change and environmental factors in the region of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Balsari et al., 2020; Burger et al., 2014; Waha et al., 2017; Wodon, Burger, et al., 2014), adaptation (Gemenne & Blocher, 2017; Gioli et al., 2016; International Organization for Migration, 2023; McLeman, 2018; McLeman & Smit, 2006; Mortreux & Barnett, 2009; Vinke et al., 2020). When looking at the literature studies on CIM within the framework of migration's securitization, this number is quite low (Bettini, 2014; Mai, 2022; Trombetta, 2014; White, 2012). Therefore, this study aims both to benefit from all previous studies and contribute to the literature on CIM, particularly within the EU, in relation to the securitization of migration. Firstly, the concept of the ST by CS will be elaborated upon in this context.

2.1. Copenhagen School - Securitization Theory

Prior to commencing, it is worth noting that this study does not focus on the theory itself in detail. Rather the theory has been presented in a manner that allows the examination of the process of securitizing migration and CIM. The CS was formally revealed the ST in the 1990s. According to the CS, which is a theoretical framework put forward by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan in the mid-1980s and helps to analyze

security issues, security can neither be reduced solely to the state-military axis nor can every situation or thing that threatens the existence of the individual be considered as a security issue (Akgül-Açikmeşe, 2011).

In this sense, the aim of the school is to save security from the context of state-military politics only from a realistic perspective by introducing additional security sectors, including economic, political, sociological, and environmental and to prevent the concept from becoming incoherent by emptying itself (Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 1998). If these sectors are briefly stated, security threats related to the *military sector* are the classical sense of external threats, terrorism, intra-state conflict and separatism and are at a level that can affect all components of the state. Potential security threats to the political sector are intra-state ideological competition and diplomatic issues such as non-recognition. It is not easy to determine the security threats of *economic sector* because of the nature of the economics itself. However, security concerns in the economic sector may be attributed to the banking system and the challenges encountered in accessing external resources, production, and trade. Security threats in the *societal sector* are issues that are concerned with harming the identity or sense of "us" of the nation-state, such as differences between identity, culture, migration, language, and ethnicity. Lastly, natural disasters, climate change, global warming and all other anthropogenic environmental problems are the main security threats to the *environmental sector* (Buzan, 1983; Waever, 1999; Stone, 2009).

According to CS, securitization is defined as a *speech act* that is constructed through an inter-subjective understanding of the necessity of taking extraordinary and urgent measures to eliminate what is securitized by ensuring that something is perceived as a threat to the existence of another subject. In other terms, securitization refers to the process of framing a problem or situation as a serious threat to existence. This involves removing it from standard policy processes and justifying its management through emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998). With the securitization action, whatever is securitized (issue, situation, thing, phenomenon, etc.) is transformed -is constructed- into a new threat issue and prioritized by being elevated to a level above all other issues. While prioritization is made, all extraordinary tools and measures to

be used, based on the perception that if a solution cannot be found for the securitized issue, the remaining issues will become meaningless, are legitimized (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan & Waever, 2003).

Nevertheless, securitization is not a *speech act* that merely states that a fact or issue poses a threat to the referent object. Therefore, there are three main elements of successful securitization: *referent object & existential threat, extraordinary measurements* and *the audience* (Buzan et al., 1998). The referent object could consist of several entities such as the state, nation (in terms of military security), national sovereignty, ideology (in relation to political security), national economy, economic crises (pertaining to economic security), rain forests, species, habitats (related to environmental security), or collective identities (in the context of societal security) (Buzan & Waever, 2003; Emmers, 2017). Hence, it could be seen that the referent object varies based on the sectors explained above. As a result, it can be said that there is a relative relationship between existential threat and referent object and that the existence of one is positioned as a threat to the existence of the other.

Figure 2. 1. The summary of security sectors and related referent objects (own design)

The summary of security sectors and related referent objects is seen in Figure 2.1. The second element is the *emergency action/measure/situation*. Emergency actions could be a military force, intelligence, taxation, compulsory military service, etc., that are going to be used when combating the existential threat identified in the first

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stage (Buzan & Waever, 2003; Kurniawan, 2017). To sum up, the motto of this stage is that extraordinary circumstances require extraordinary decisions. Thirdly, the security threat expressed by the actors and the emergency actions/measures taken to overcome it must be accepted and approved by *the audience*. If these three situations do not exist, there can be no question of securitization (Akgül-Açikmeşe, 2011; Baysal & Lüleci, 2015; Buzan et al., 1998; Taureck, 2006).

2.2. Securitization of Migration

Following an overview of the ST, now it is examined how the phenomenon of migration is securitized within the framework of this theory. There is ongoing debate in the literature regarding whether migration poses a threat towards security or merely presents a challenge to it. Additionally, there is an argument among theorists and practitioners regarding whether irregular and uncontrolled migration alone or migration, in general, poses a security risk (Yıldız, 2016). The idea of the migration-security nexus in this context concentrates on the relationship and effects of human movement on internal security, cultural identity, demographic security, social security, and welfare state philosophy (Kicinger, 2004).

The relationship between human mobility and state security, in other words, the security-migration nexus, is one of the important topics discussed and analyzed in the literature (Faist, 2004). The perception of nuclear war as a threat occurred immediately after the outbreak of the Cold War (Castles et al., 2019) since during that time, the state perceived threats using the framework of the traditional security approach, which served as an example of a military-defence-based system (Marchesin, 2001). In this process, the principles of realism were predominantly included in mainstream security research. From this perspective, migration appeared to have little impact on security. This view was also influenced by the widespread belief in Western Europe, also during the guest worker period, that post-war migrations would be primarily temporary in nature (Castles et al., 2014). Especially with the end of the Cold War, a new understanding of non-military security emerged, and other threats (non-military) came to the fore (Marchesin, 2001). The phenomenon of migration has managed to find a place for itself within the new

understanding of security and has begun to be addressed within the scope of security threats.

In order to grasp the securitization of migration, it is crucial to understand CS's viewpoint on societal security, which is one of the five sectors where CS broadens the notion of security threats beyond the traditional security approach. Societal security is linked to sociocultural security and is related to situations perceived by society as a threat to its collective identity (see Figure 2.1). As per Buzan and his colleagues, what constitutes society are the thoughts and practices put forward by its members as a sign of belonging. Here, CS places identity, defined as including religion, culture, national identity, traditions, customs and ethnic communities, at the center of societal security, not state security. Thus, in accordance with this circumstance, societal security is defined as the eradication of possible threats that may emerge against all components that form societal identity and are connected to the survival of the society itself (Wæver, 1993). In parallel, if any change, such as people coming from outside, is perceived by the society as a threat or danger that will prevent the survival of that society or weaken its identity, social distrust arises.

According to CS, politicians, those in close cooperation with the media, and leaders of private organizations are the securitizing actors in the securitization process of the migration phenomenon (Wæver, 1993). Nonetheless, CS emphasizes that the state's effectiveness and dominance should not be totally omitted because migration could occur for a wide range of reasons, from economic to religious, from war to environmental factors, and it should always be taken into consideration that the state will act to protect its population homogeneity (Buzan et al., 1998). Therefore, although migration is examined more under the context of identity, it could not be separated from the context of the state's own security. Once again, in accordance with Buzan and his friends, speeches by state officials typically declare that any existential threat to the designated referent object is categorized as a security issue requiring extraordinary measures to resolve (Buzan et al., 1998). While the EU's perspective on the subject is evaluated in the next section, as can be seen from both the examples given and the different dynamics affecting the process, the contribution to the securitization of migration does not come from just one field.

In summary, since the migration has been constructed to compromise a nation's internal stability and economic integrity through the securitization of migration, migration has come to be perceived as a threat to both the state and collective identity of society. Since migration has been securitized and is now seen as a threat, action is mentioned as necessary to safeguard society. Due to issues with their countries' political systems, economic disparities, social structures, environmental issues, and structural policies, most people would rather immigrate to Europe, which worries those receiving countries. As a result of this, migrants who are unhappy with their living conditions may be seen as a threat to societal security by the host countries. Kaya and Kentel claim that this is one of the main reasons for the securitization of migration (Kaya & Kentel, 2005). By this means, migration is no longer viewed as a human rights issue but rather as a security threat that jeopardizes social integrity, both in rhetoric and in practice.

2.3. Securitization of Climate-Induced Migration (CIM)

After securitizing the migration, it is explained how CIM is securitized in the light of ST since the intricate interaction between environmental, political, and security dynamics in the context of global climate change is reflected in the securitization of migration caused by climate change. However, in order to better understand the securitization of CIM, first, it is focused on the concept of CIM and its development.

Although academic studies on CIM gained momentum, especially after the 2010s (Milán-García et al., 2021), the first definition regarding those people was made in 1985 by Essam El-Hinnawi with the "*environmental refugees*". This term was explained as people *"who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.*" (El-Hinnawi, 1985; Piasentin, 2016). Later, the same definition has been started to use for the terms of "*climate refugee*" also. Moreover, there are other terms used in academic papers and non-governmental organizations such as *environmental refugee, environmental migrant*, mostly used by IOM, *environmentally/climate displaced* person and *climate-induced migrant (CIM)* or,

shortly, *climate migrant* (Apap & Du Perron de Revel, 2021). It could be seen that for all those terminologies, although the cause of human mobility is the same, there is no single agreed-upon definition regarding these people since human migration due to climate change is still a contested topic. The root cause comes mostly from the original definitions of migrant and refugee since UN agencies with IOM claim that adding new categories of people into the refugee term defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and widening the meaning of it is not appropriate, so using the word of *migrant* instead of *refugee* is more accurate. On the other hand, opponents claim that since those people have been forced to leave their land, in other words, they are fleeing not willingly and voluntarily but because of necessity; the *refugee* term is more coherent than the word *migrant*. In this framework, within this study, the term *climate-induced migration (CIM)*, one of the terminologies to define people in the literature, will be used to explain and discuss the climate change migration phenomenon. This term could actually be interpreted as a perfect mixture of all terms mentioned above in such a way that the definition of a refugee also gives the criteria of being a *refugee*; therefore, people who are not counted under this legal definition could not be seen as refugees either. In addition, because the definition of *migrant* itself consists of willingness and voluntary movement, an addition of *induced* has been made in front of the migrant to indicate that these people migrated due to a driving force and push factors of the adverse effects of climate change.

Reuveny (2007) summarises the three fundamental ways people cope with environmental problems: they either continue (1) to live where they are by bearing the costs and doing nothing and (2) to live where they are by mitigating the problems or (3) to leave their homelands. Studies conducted are compatible with this analysis. The most recent studies consider the direct and indirect effects of environmental distress regarding human mobility, emphasising how these effects impact habitability through factors like decreased agricultural yield that leads to droughts, rising sea levels, and rapid urbanization (Yavcan, 2021). In addition, the research conducted by the World Bank shows that the core problems are loss of employment, water security, and food security. Furthermore, people who lived in a region negatively impacted by climate change made an effort to adjust to their new environment and only moved when those efforts failed (Wodon, Liverani, et al., 2014). In a similar

manner, according to research by the EC, the only people who will be able to migrate permanently are those who have the actual financial means (Vág, 2009).

Other research is about the sudden onset (earthquakes (excluding), hurricanes, landslides, erosions, etc) and slow onset (flood, sea level rise, increasing temperatures, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity, desertification, etc.), aggravated by the effect of climate change and human mobility and stated that it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion due to the high data uncertainty, however, they stated that human mobility associated with sudden onset is observed better since both analysing and realising the impact of slow onset events take a lot of time. However, they also mention that the data in the literature regarding the onset vs. migration nexus are not coherent with each other (Neumann & Hilderink, 2015).

Another study led by Yavcan (2021) has yielded results that align with other studies in the literature examining the connection between slow and rapid/sudden onset and migration. In the same vein, the study asserts that there is a stronger correlation between rapid/sudden onset and human mobility. Furthermore, the study highlights the significant impact of factors such as agricultural dependency, low-income distribution, economic growth, and urbanization on CIM. Additionally, it reveals that climate characteristics, such as low-temperature anomalies in the destination country, contribute to increased international migration. As all these studies indicate, it is impossible to make a direct generalization about the CIM since all of these studies are at the empirical and case study levels. Moreover, they show that evaluating CIM is not as easy as evaluating other migration types since analysing the push and pull factors is much more complicated. This complexity is because, as seen from the studies above, there is no single way, method, or factor to understand the motivation of people migrating to escape the adverse impacts of climate change.

Furthermore, a significant issue arises from a lack of data pertaining to both climate change and its effects on migration. Gemenne (2011) emphasizes this situation since the current forecasts and evaluations of environmental migrants are subject to significant debate due to the absence of reliable evidence about the fundamental assumptions, uncertainties, and possible inaccuracies involved. Consequently, the

common point of all studies highlights the need to conduct more comprehensive and multi-component scientific research, including GDP distribution, climate characteristics of countries, frequency of rapid and slow onset events, economic growth, cultural and colonial connections among nations, geographical location of the country and mobility of people, agriculture dependency, urbanization of both origin and destination countries in this field. Therefore, the multi-causal conception has gained importance in literature and has become the prevailing and widely adopted study approach in contemporary migration and CIM studies (Brettell & Hollifield, 2014; Castles et al., 2014; Massey et al., 1999; Yavcan, 2021).

On the other hand, the main consensus regarding CIM in the literature is that migration will be mostly limited to the country or a local region (Burzyński et al., 2022; IDMC, 2023; IOM, 2023; Newland, 2011). According to a study conducted in 2022, 80% of people who had to relocate due to climate moved within their own country (Burzyński et al., 2022). Moreover, the case studies performed on the CIM reveal a level of complexity that surpasses initial expectations. The decisions made by individuals in response to adverse climatic conditions extend beyond mere migration or displacement. They encompass individuals who desire to leave but are unable to do so, individuals who are trapped population, and individuals who choose to remain in their original place, voluntarily immobile.


Figure 2. 2. The summary Mobility outcomes of environmental change (own design) (Foresight U.K., 2011; Ionesco et al., 2016)

In summary, empirical studies confirm that climate change has a substantial influence on the determinants of mobility of people, although migration is not necessarily the ultimate consequence. The figure (Figure 2.2) above provides a concise overview of four distinct migration outcomes: migration, displacement, being trapped, and voluntary immobility.

Even though the aforementioned empirical studies highlight the challenges in analysing the relationship between CIM and migration, these findings did not hinder the formation of a perception that views CIM as a security threat. There are various reports examining national security and CIM relations. The most famous ones are as follows. The Center for Marine Analysis (CNA) report warns that CIM poses an emerging risk to the national security of the USA. It emphasizes that the primary issue lies in the movement of individuals, particularly towards Europe and the USA, as a consequence of ecological destruction. Furthermore, it suggests that CIM has the capacity to exacerbate the scenario of conflict within the state, given the increased challenge of mitigating the adverse impacts of climate change in already vulnerable locations, the weakened situation in these areas will further deteriorate, leading to the emergence of additional waves of refugees and infectious diseases (The CNA Corporation, 2007). Likewise, according to the Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Security, the report claims climate change and its inherent result, CIM, are causing governments to fail and will continue to challenge state sovereignty in the 21st century (Dryzek et al., 2011). Especially in studies conducted after the 2000s, statements that if the combat against climate change is delayed, this will lead to global wars and, as a natural consequence, mass migration, and therefore CIM will pose a much more security threat than ever, have become more widespread (Brzoska, 2009; Lustgarten, 2020; Mai, 2022). As can be understood, studies claiming that CIM will gradually increase in the coming years and the use of these studies as a security threat have been mutually reinforcing situations.

Scholars studying migration, on the other hand, have noted in response to alarming claims that millions of people are being displaced by environmental change, especially since the 1980s, that migration is rarely caused by a single type of change, such as climate change, but rather is influenced by various interrelated factors. They

consequently advised micro-level research on firsthand accounts of how communities dealt with changes in their standard of living and employment prospects as a result of climate change (Black, 2001; Castles, 2002; Castles et al., 2014; Trombetta, 2014).

Additionally, migration academics criticize studies that make a fuss about CIM on the grounds that they do not reflect reality. The main reason for this is that empirical data is generally accepted, and it is assumed that people who have to migrate due to climate change will always follow the same path. In addition, since CIM is a movement that is likely to be observed more in the future, it would not be right to be concerned based only on empirical data. In fact, the scientific study conducted by Gemenne (2011) states that major differences in CIM can only be observed when the world's temperature rises above 4 °C (Baldwin, 2012, 2013; Gemenne, 2011). In support of this, it is stated that in the Emissions Gap Report 2023, the latest report published by UNEP, the world is predicted to warm 2.5 to 2.9 °C compared to the pre-industrial period, instead of 4 °C (UNEP, 2023). Therefore, based on scientific data, it is possible to conclude that much fewer people will migrate than current estimates.

Critics also point out the intricacy of the CIM phenomenon. Empirical and case studies have demonstrated that the decision to migrate is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses economic and cultural factors. It is hard to isolate one single environmental element in this process. In addition, environmental deterioration might impede the feasibility of migration as individuals impacted by it may lack the means to relocate (Trombetta, 2014). Another criticism is that, as mentioned above, 80% of CIM is displaced within their own country borders, against the suggestion of long-distance south-to-north route migration, which is one of the CIM routes in studies indicating that CIM poses a security threat (Burzyński et al., 2022; Geddes & Somerville, 2012; Trombetta, 2014). Although these arguments have shown that populations displaced due to environmental problems are unlikely to pose a threat to international security, as mentioned above, the CIM-security nexus is increasingly finding a place in both the literature and EU policies. Here, as Morrissey (2012) points out, it seems that those who advocate environmentalist or alarmist views are

actually effective in the context of CIM-security threats, especially within the EU. Given the Union's longstanding work on these security themes in its migration and refugee policies, it is unsurprising that it employs similar measures against CIM. Hence, this finding is consistent with each other. After all these details, the securitization process of CIM will be discussed below.

2.3.1. Securitization of CIM

As mentioned before, since ST focuses on the process of securitization of the relevant phenomenon rather than discussing whether it is actually a security problem, the same will be valid for CIM. Therefore, this section focus on how CIM is securitized. However, before linking CIM with theory, it is necessary to discuss the initiation of the securitization process for CIM briefly. The prevailing perspective on this matter is as follows. The research indicates that anthropogenic climate change would lead to a rise in environmental disasters, thereby resulting in an increase in human mobility. These studies want to serve two primary objectives. One is that the impacts of climate change would not just affect people in faraway places but also the industrialized societies in the West, especially the EU. It is also necessary to address the ongoing issues in vulnerable areas as a humanitarian matter (Morrissey, 2012; Trombetta, 2014). Therefore, as (White, 2012) states, although the initial desire of academics and environmental activists was to encourage governments to combat possible humanitarian crises associated with climate change by gaining the support of societies for climate-induced catastrophes, specifically in Europe, a deliberate relationship has been constructed between CIM and security, particularly due to the right-wing populist politicians and anti-immigration groups which are becoming increasingly visible within the EU, government representatives and official representatives of EU institutions. They have managed to create great prejudice and fear in developed societies against North African immigrants, who are in the grip of poverty and drought, through the perception that many immigrants will come and invade their countries, therefore, the EU.

In the meantime, these efforts contributed to the rising opposition against immigration in Western cultures. The fundamental premise is that migration poses a

threat to the security of Western host societies. This viewpoint is primarily influenced by the rationale of national security, which prioritizes the protection of the state and its citizens. In this approach, states are considered as entities that population and adopt a zero-sum approach to security, where one's security comes at the expense of another's insecurity. Hence, it encourages a confrontational strategy, which is harmful to collaboration. Since security is linked to a mindset focused on defending against threats, migrants are being seen as a problem that needs to be countered, including military actions if necessary (Trombetta, 2014). Therefore, the subject of CIM has evolved towards a negative axis compared to the original purpose of its emergence.

In the 1970s, Lester Brown, environmentalist/alarmist, was the first to mention formally that people may migrate due to environmental degradation. This approach, commonly employed by neo-Malthusian groups prevalent during that period, was coupled with factors like resource scarcity and limited access to raw materials that arose during the 1973 oil crisis. Consequently, it sparked controversy within the context of the notion that migration resulting from environmental issues was primarily a natural outcome of the human population surpassing environmental limits (Black, 2001; Morrissey, 2009). Later, with the influence of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was established in 1988 on studies on climate change, various studies began to emerge since the 1990s against migration movements that may occur due to environmental degradation and climate change, and thus, interest in this field began to increase. But still, while migration has been increasingly viewed as a security threat, intensively after the 1990s, the same cannot be said for CIM. CIM was not perceived as a national or societal threat from societies during that period. In the 2000s, however, the emergence of adverse impacts of climate change, especially in Africa, increased the acceptance of numerous international assessments. Here, the IPCC's 4th evaluation report in 2007 (IPCC, 2007) and the 15th COP of UNFCCC in 2009 (UNFCCC, 2010) are considered significant policy documents in which CIM was implied.

In a similar manner, it is briefly mentioned that the EU's perspective on CIM is security-oriented (details in the next chapter). The security threat perspective

proceeds through three types of transition models. The first is internal migration occuring within the country itself, contributing to political tension and causing positive and negative economic turmoil, thus distracting attention from other issues in the country. The second type is crossing international borders. Environmental degradation in less developed countries can contribute to the displacement of people, which in turn might result in political conflicts between nations. This demographic shift could have significant ramifications on the economy and political situation of the region within the destination country that experienced the largest influx of migrants. Consequently, it increases tensions and conflicts between the native population and the migrants. Another type of migration entails traversing national boundaries and relocating across extensive areas: south to the north axis. Since the 1960s, even if the reason for people migrating to Europe is not climate change, Europe tends to express that it underwent a significant south-to-north migration phenomenon characterized by a substantial influx of immigrants from Africa and Asia. Hence, in this context, it is seen that discussions are being carried out with the focus that the southern part of the world will experience the negative effects of climate change more and that migration will take place to the EU, as in the past (The CNA Corporation, 2007). One of the clearest examples on this subject is migrants attempting to enter the EU, especially from the MENA region since the visibility of the CIM (from Northern Morocco to Andalusia- Spain, from North Africa to Ceuta and Melilla- Spain), etc.) in the EU has resulted in the formation of unfavourable narratives about CIM as Europe's response has been notably forceful (European Commission, 2005; White, 2012). Furthermore, even though the data indicate that CIM has happened predominantly as internal displacements (Burzyński et al., 2022; IDMC, 2023), when looking at both the international studies financed by the EU and the official documents published by the EU itself, it could be seen that according to those documents, there will be migration from MENA, which is one of the regions that will be most affected by the adverse impacts of climate change and is very fragile, towards the EU, which is right next door, due to both geographical proximity and historical ties. They emphasize that the EU will be the destination for many climate-induced migrants in the future (Apap & Du Perron de Revel, 2021; European Commission, 2024b; European Parliament, 2022; IOM, 2024a; Newland, 2011). As can be understood from what has been explained so far, although it is not possible to make

definitive and clear judgments about neither the integrity of the data nor the scope of the transition when it comes to CIM, such precise statements are an indication that the EU handles CIM in a security-oriented manner.

Literature on the securitization of CIM includes security studies that assert that CIM would not only result in migration but also have significant both global ramifications and inter-state, such as exacerbation of conflict and war (Baechler, 1999; Barnett & Adger, 2007; Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1999; Kaplan, 1994; J. R. Lee, 2009; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1996). When CIM's securitization process is examined, first of all, a successful speech act is encountered. ST of CS asserts that any problem that is not fundamentally a matter of security could be framed as a security threat and effectively presented to the public through a successful speech act. If there is a favourable reaction from the public, this situation allows for exceptional measures to be implemented that go beyond the usual policies in response to the securitized occurrence. This process is applicable to the securitization of CIM as well. It is observed that through successful speech acts, the attention is shifted from the usual concerns of verifying or disproving the existence of the CIM phenomenon, addressing climate change, or mitigating its negative impacts on people. Instead, the focus is redirected towards potential future developments such as migration. The act of establishing a new perception of threat through a speech act is observable.

At this point, the widespread distribution and continuous expression of alarming and authoritative data that predicts the displacement of millions of people owing to environmental degradation and climate change, as well as a significant migration towards Europe, leads to the perception that CIM poses a security threat to especially the EU. In a similar way, NATO has alerted the EU about the CIM issue, cautioning that CIM could increase the likelihood of Europe experiencing destabilising and reactive behaviours (Hugh & Sikorsky, 2022). According to ST, security is perceived as a means of coping with an issue rather than a circumstance or a value; hence, it finds a place in this context in CIM (Trombetta, 2014). As stated above, those claiming that CIM is a security threat are mostly alarmist researchers who exaggerate the potential dangers. As an alternative illustration, Myers and Kent projected in their 1995 study that around 200 million people will migrate predominantly to the

European region by 2050 as a consequence of both climate change and population growth. According to their analysis, the movement is driven by a combination of factors, including environmental degradation leading to a decline in agricultural land and water supplies, as well as population growth resulting in more people residing in arid, semi-arid and low-lying regions (Myers & Kent, 1995).

Currently, Morrissey highlights the subsequent point. The second assessment report published by the IPCC in 1995 was authored by Myers and Kent, who were influential figures in promoting alarmist viewpoints (Morrissey, 2009). Similar remarks may also be found in that report. As EU policies are determined based on the research conducted and the reports prepared, the approach to CIM has begun to develop from a maximalist perspective in the EU also. In fact, the process of impact of these studies, especially since the 2000s, has led to an increase in the perception of security threats towards CIM, which is the intersection of both issues, with the increase of not only migration - security discourses but also climate change - security nexus (Trombetta, 2014).

The reasons for these are that studies and published reports since the mid-1990s have projected an increase in migration due to climate change and population growth. These projections indicate that climate change would lead to water scarcity and food shortages and that there would be a risk of infectious diseases spreading globally due to increased migration. These securitizing discourses have started to find a place together with other anti-immigration narratives that threaten societal security, such as crime and violence (Morrissey, 2009).

In addition, the CIM issue, as Black (2001) points out, is frequently used by anti-immigrant groups or anti-asylum lobbyists to demonize both people currently migrating north, especially towards Europe, and future climate-induced migrants, whose numbers will allegedly exceed millions. According to those groups, since most of the people who migrated to the north stated that they migrated due to insufficient water and agricultural resources and related poverty, and they do not have any status according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, this situation is used both by anti-immigrant groups to intensify border security and by nation states to evade

international responsibilities easily and could be interpreted as a successful speech act. The current form of this circumstance is already being formally articulated within the EU. According to the EU's official document, CIM cannot be officially included in EU documents because these people are not defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, which is also the basis of the EU's own migration legislation (European Parliament, 2022). Furthermore, in some documents, the reason why CIM does not find a place in the EU is discussed from a different perspective, but the result does not change. It is stated that after the slow-onset events, people would like to seek support for searching for alternative livelihoods instead of being under refugee-type protection and that refugee-type protection will not fully serve the content of this kind of slow-onset event; similarly, for the sudden-onset since developments of these events are rapid, it is incompatible with the definition of refugee-type protection as the sudden-onset events cause temporary displacement (European Commission, 2013).

As it is known, the concept of general migration within ST found itself a more space within societal security, although it would be more accurate to examine state security and societal security together while understanding the securitization of migration. Those are explained in detail in the relevant section. Concerning the CIM phenomenon, the prevailing body of literature on CIM predominantly regards it as a matter of state security (White, 2012). Therefore, the challenges and remedies for dealing with CIM are generally framed within the context of the state. The issues of dangers, risks, and vulnerabilities associated with CIM are mostly covered by the state itself rather than individuals within states. Consequently, policies are formulated to address the concerns of the state level. These measures encompass strengthening borders, quantifying and controlling the influx of migrants, counting the number of migrants and classifying their specific categories into society, and safeguarding perceived societal security, constructed by the successful speech act, from the impact of immigration (Castles, 2017; White, 2012).

Climate-induced migrants, within the context of a state security framework, are constructed as potential threats to the well-being and security of the destination country's population, societal security, as well as to the nation's economy and overall

national security. The state security discourse argues that climate-induced migrants normally benefit from the public resources provided by legitimate citizens, such as healthcare, education, and job opportunities. It also suggests that they may spread not only diseases but also ideologies or underlying issues from their country of origin to their destination country. Climate-induced migrants also expose vulnerabilities in the destination country's border control since the state is exposed to vulnerabilities caused by climate-induced migrants, such as permeable borders in which climate migrants may intervene. The state perceives this situation as a weakening of itself, both through the lens of its own citizens and in the international arena. Climate-induced migrants, when analyzed from a state security perspective, consider migration as a threat to its territorial integrity, which undermines its core concept of sovereignty. The use of language referring to possible waves of immigrants evokes the concept of an invasion, which subsequently encourages militarized reactions (Castles, 2017).

While CIM is considered within the scope of state security in the securitization process, the state's point of view on the perception of security is as follows. The state primarily prioritizes the potential negative impact that so called outsiders would place on its resources and systems. Many countries in this environment have implemented securitizing rhetoric and policies concerning CIM (Detraz & Windsor, 2014). Several primary ones are given as examples. In the report published by the USA in 2003, CIM is referred to, and a warning is made that the USA may face a mass migration in this context, as climate change caused by global warming would exceed the tolerance level for some regions and countries (Schwartz & Randall, 2003). Another example is from the UK; the Office for Science of the United Kingdom Government examines the connection between migration and climate change in its Foresight Report. The study asserts a correlation between the environment, migration, and security. It employs securitizing literature such as Homer-Dixon (1991, 1999) and Kaplan (1994) to demonstrate that environmental changes would not only lead to migration but also potentially give rise to conflicts and wars in the future (Foresight U.K., 2011).

In a similar manner, the EU (details of which will be given in the next chapter) states in its official documents that the regions located on the geographical periphery of the

EU, such as MENA, are very quite vulnerable to climate and, therefore, will be affected adversely by climate change in the future. Emphasizing the importance of structuring the EU migration and asylum policies to include climate change and the security nexus, it is urged that in order to prevent future migration, fragile regions should be strengthened in the infrastructural context and help to adapt to climate change. Additionally, they underline policies related to migration management should be developed both at the EU level and international level (Apap & Du Perron de Revel, 2021; Commission of the European Communities, 2009). Hence, the EU, similar to the USA and the UK, officially proclaims to its citizens and other international entities that it considers CIM as a security concern for the Union, as shown in the official publications it releases. In this view, the implementation of increasingly stringent border control measures is a result of both the state's view of outsiders as a potential threat to national security and public health, as well as citizens' social concerns about migrants posing a risk of invading their country and undermining their culture. The most concrete example of this situation is given as the EU's EUROPOL, FRONTEX, VIS and SIS systems (White, 2012).

Securitization is thought of as making exceptions for issues that would normally be handled through policy regulations, thereby reflecting the authority of the governing body (Williams, 2003). As a result of such a restrictive perception, the securitized phenomenon is problematic because it is positioned above politics to safeguard state or societal security. As Trombetta (2012) states, since the potential for massive migration flux is inherently regarded as a matter of security due to its potential to generate instability and conflict, the idea of migration population due to adverse effects of climate change is also perceived as a security threat. Nevertheless, it is crucial to critically examine the underlying assumptions of these seemingly obvious statements and question whose security is at stake. According to ST, the discourse regarding the phenomenon that is attempted to be securitized is essentially fixed, independent of the securitizing actor and context. In other words, the more successfully the security threat reproduces itself in the speech act, the more successful the security construction becomes (Waever, 1995). So, as Trombetta points out, there is no difference between securitizing the migration due to climate change and increasing military spending to ensure more soldiers patrol the border.

While measurement variations may occur, the primary goal is to eventually identify and mitigate the threat (Trombetta, 2011).

Another point stated by ST is that the securitization of the phenomenon is political (Buzan et al., 1995). States make their policy choices depending on historical heritage, bureaucracy within the state, internal and societal pressures and geopolitical location. This situation is also seen in the securitization of CIM because it is the common cluster of two sensitive areas of environment and migration (White, 2012). According to White (2012), building fences on the border is considered a politically successful choice. Similarly, Morrissey (2009) is among those who find the securitization of CIM political. According to him, since the maximalist/alarmist perspective attracts society's attention more, it is always maximalist discourses that politicians express more. In a way, this situation coincides with the perspective of the increasing right-wing populist parties, especially within the EU. Although this issue will be examined in detail in the next EU chapter if it is briefly touched on, it can be understood that the discourses of right-wing populist parties are maximalist, and they use this in the securitization of migration and CIM (Bonansinga, 2019; Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021).

White (2012), on the other hand, draws attention to the development process of CIM, which has been exponentially increasing in securitization in migration policies since the late 1980s, but especially in the 2000s. One could argue that this assertion is correct; although the development of the CIM phenomenon is related to the fact that climate change became more noticeable in the 2000s, the increasing anti-immigrant movement has incorporated CIM into its structure, as stated above.

To summarize, people who leave their countries due to climate change and migrate to developed countries to live in better conditions, although their numbers are small in the current order, are perceived by the host countries as a threat to both their national and societal security and are seen as a source of possible conflicts. This situation could be considered as the construction of CIM as a threat in the securitization process. In this construction process, official and social discourses and alarmist/maximalist reports prepared by international organizations and official

institutions, including the EU, appear as speech acts. Therefore, with these efforts, it could be thought that CIM is trying to be positioned above politics. Finally, if there is one more thing that needs to be added as the securitization process for CIM is slower compared to general migration, these findings indicate that the security threat perception of CIM could be mostly noticed through reports and limited actual experience. Consequently, it may not always be as unambiguous and straightforward as the securitization of general migration.

SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION AND CIM IN THE EU POLICIES

While explaining the ST, Waever (2014) emphasizes that it is very important that ST brings a difference to the classical concept of security threat and points out that it is important to provide scholars with the opportunity to ask themselves new questions about different issues, such as escalation of the conflict about climate change or religion, which were not previously considered within the scope of security threat. Thus, the question of what happens when something transforms from being secure to not being secure is starting to be asked. When working on securitization, the goal is not whether an issue is actually a security issue; it is about examining through discourse and political groups how an issue or phenomenon (threats) is put forward, for whom (reference object), how, by whom (securitizing actor) and the process of acceptance of extraordinary practices (emergency measures) that the target group (audience) would not accept under normal conditions (Buzan et al., 1998). Hence, the focus of this study is not on whether CIM is a security threat but rather on analysing the securitization of CIM in the EU's migration policies compared to the migration by using the ST tools explained above. As explained in the previous chapters, the securitization process of the EU's migration and asylum policies in general also sheds light on the securitization process of the CIM. Within the framework of the EU, firstly, the securitization of migration and asylum and then the securitization process of CIM constitute the content of this section.

3.1. Background: Securitization of Migration and Asylum Policies in the EU

While looking at the reasons for migration to Europe from past to present, four main topics emerge the need for labour/economic immigrants, economic inequalities between European countries, decolonization of countries such as the UK, France, and

the Netherlands, and fleeing of people because of violation of human rights and freedoms. Going back to the beginning of the story, after WW II, the need for migrants for economic development purposes European countries arose. Hence, Western European countries were motivated to make bilateral labour agreements with the relatively less developed countries in their periphery to grow economically. The labour migration flux continued exponentially from the 1950s until the 1970s (Boswell, 2005). As a result of these reasons, Western European countries became the main destination point of migration, receiving approximately 10 million labour migrants – *Guest Workers* - between 1950 and 1973 (Kaya & Cattacin, 2002). Although the recruitment of migrants for employment purposes paused in those years due to the oil crisis occurring in 1973, immigration to Western Europe continued due to not only the continuation of the family reunification process but also asylum applications and irregular migration (Içduygu & Gören, 2023; Olesen, 2002). In the same period, the increase in rights demands of immigrant workers, in other words, their demand for more social and economic rights, caused the European Economic Community (EEC) to act more cautiously (Joppke, 2011). Because of both the reasons mentioned above and crises that occurred later within continental Europe such as Kosovo, Bosnia and near regions such as the Iraq war and Arab Spring, European countries later called EU member states became more and more attractive centers for those who are not only labour migrants but also seeking international protection and irregular migrants (Boccardi, 2007). With these developments, the phenomenon of migration has begun to be perceived within the security nexus not only internationally but also in the EU since the 1980s, and the policies developed getting more and more aggressive regarding migration and asylum have been negatively constructed as a security risk towards identity and welfare of the EU (Lavenex, 2001).

In this chapter, the process tracing of the EU's migration and asylum policies is applied historically, and how migration has been constructed as a security threat in the context of ST is analysed. Hence, although the initial perception of migration in the EU was positive and seen as important for the progress of the continent, this chapter aims to understand how ST and migration became an important security concern for the EU over time. While looking at literature, it could be seen a

significant amount of literature was produced on the process of securitizing migration in Europe (Bigo, 2001, 2017; Boswell, 2007; Huysmans, 1995, 1998a, 2000; Nyers, 2003). In addition to these scholars, McDonald (2008) also considers that the securitization framework serves as a legitimizing element in European migration research, particularly in the period following 2001. He rightfully argues that politicians deliberately chose to portray migration as a threat in order to rationalize the implementation of emergency measures and the suspension of standard norms (McDonald, 2008). Moreover, Huysmans enhances the ST theory by introducing three additional themes to elucidate the formation of security threats through migration in the EU as reference objects: *internal security, cultural identity*, and the *welfare state* since, according to him, the securitization of migration in the EU is constructed with the securitization of the common market, developments of Europeanness and the welfare state (Huysmans, 2000). Lastly, there is one more tool that needs to be mentioned when discussing the process of securitization of migration in the EU. According to the ST, there are three facilitating conditions affecting the securitization move to be completed successfully. Therefore, both the components of securitisation and the facilitating factors need to be considered when analysing securitisation processes (Balamir Coskun, 2011; Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 2000). Facilitating conditions being described as conditions whose existence influences the successful securitization act. It is these conditions that determine whether a speech act or a securitising move is effective enough and will be accepted by an audience (Does, 2013). In essence, a securitising actor must persuade the audience of the necessity to implement extraordinary measures Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan & Waever, 2003). The equivalent of this in the EU according to Bigo (2001a) is the start of free movement policies and the crisis that security policy experienced after the Cold War. These two developments ran parallel to each other - both began in the 1980s - and are facilitating conditions that helps to construct migration as a security threat successfully in the EU, since according to him, following the Cold War, the militarist strategy encountered a crisis, leading to the emergence of new antagonists from different sectors, as explained in the theory section. In this context, from now on, the securitization of the EU's migration policies is explained first in the historical flow by keeping these background developments in mind.

3.1.1. From 1985 to 2000

When looking at the securitization process of the EU's migration and asylum policies, the late 1980s was considered as the beginning. In other words, the initial efforts to securitize migration commenced with the formation of the common market in the EU, which was founded on the principles of unrestricted movement of goods, services, capital, and labour. Following the signing of the SEA in 1986, the significance of the common market became apparent. The focus shifted towards safeguarding external borders and controlling migration as a means to maintain the internal market and stability (Babayan, 2010; Bigo, 1994; Geddes, 2000; Lavenex, 2001). Similarly, the Schengen Agreement unrestricted the movement of citizens of member states within the Union, coherently with the SEA. Consequently, in these official documents, there has been a growing emphasis on the necessity to combat *illegal immigration* and *organized crime* as a means to preserve internal security and safeguard external borders (Eur-LEX, 1985b, 1987). Following the Schengen, there has been an increased emphasis on not only the importance of safeguarding external borders but also preventing the *illegal migration* and *organized crime* in order to maintain internal security. Subsequently, with The Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) in 1992, the immigration topic was brought together with the concepts of national security threats such as terrorism and organized crime under the newly created intergovernmental pillar JHA (Eur-LEX, 1992). With these fundamental legislations being fully in force since 1995, the EU has now fully begun to control the free movement of four freedoms: goods, capital, services and people among its member states. Therefore, in order to protect this system, it has become necessary to develop a common policy for individuals who want and/or have to enter regions of the EU from outside the borders. As a result, the expected development took place with the Treaty of Amsterdam dated 1997 so that immigration and other accompanying topics were transferred to the community status. In other words, the first step of the common migration and asylum policy at the EU level has been taken (Eur-LEX, 1997). Many scholars rightly argue that these developments could be interpreted as the securitization of migration under internal security since especially with the integration of The Schengen Agreement into the JHA pillar with the Treaty

of Amsterdam, EU's one of the main agenda topics has become the protection of its external borders not only for goods but also for people coming from outside by maximizing the security control policies at the EU level (Joppke, 2011; Kirişci, 2006; Trombetta, 2014). The subsequent developments show that, as expected, increasingly security-oriented immigration policies are being implemented throughout the EU. The important precursor of this development is seen as the emphasis on concepts such as monitoring migration and migration management at the Tampere European Council in 1999. After this date, securitizing terminologies related to migration such as *migration flow*, *migration infux* and *illegal migration*, although this definition has been using before the submit, have become inherent in all EU documents escalating the the negative perception towards migration (Babayan, 2010; Bigo, 2001a; Eur-LEX, 2004). Immediatelly after, in 2000, the EU initiated efforts to create a CEAS with the aim of developing a legal framework that would reduce inequalities between member states and set minimum criteria for the asylum system in order to maintain solidarity and burden-sharing mechanisms (European Commission, 2024b).

3.1.2. From 2000 to Today

When looking at the literature on the securitization of migration in the EU, it is concluded that essential developments have strengthened this negative construction since the 2000s. These are listed as; the EU's 2004 eastern enlargement, terrorist attacks on 9/11, Madrid, London (Bigo, 2008a; Luedtke, 2008), and Paris attacks in the 2000s since these developments; the Union has begun to see irregular immigrants coming from outside as potential terrorists (Ferreira, 2018; Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2016; Yıldız, 2016). These terrorist attacks, even before the Arab Spring, strengthened the perception of the issue as a threat, especially in terms of national security and the EU's border security, and thus intensified the securitization of the migration issue (Pinyol, 2006; Yıldız, 2016). The securitization of migration by associating it with terrorism was first formalized at the Seville European Council, because in the statement published it was emphasized that *urgent* political measures should be taken to combat both illegal migration and terrorism at the same time (Babayan, 2010; Eur-LEX, 2002). Therefore, especially after 9/11, securitization of

migration began to intensify in the EU. In other words, the excessive securitization of migration began with the direct intervention of the state (Chebel D'appollonia & Reich, 2008). Moreover, with the 2004 enlargement which is the largest one of the EU with the participation of 10 new member states, the EU has to get closer to the relatively problematic regions it has kept on its periphery for many years. These regions have become areas where economic and political instability, religious and ethnic conflicts, intense ideological differences, human smuggling, human trafficking, and irregular migration are common after the disintegration of the USSR and have posed a significant threat to the EU since their migration management system is weaker than the centre (Gruszczak, 2010; Yıldız, 2016a). Lastly, the recent 2015 migration crisis after the Arab Spring and the emergence of far-right parties employing anti-immigrant rhetoric in member states are contributing to the already present securitized policies (Bonansinga, 2019; Ferreira, 2018) because, in 2015, the EU experienced a significant increase in both asylum applications and fatalities during efforts to enter its borders (International Organization for Migration, 2016). At the beginning, although the EU promised to act in line with the values of solidarity and sharing responsibility while responding to the migrants coming from Syria (European Commission, 2015c), later, the Union moved far away from a solidarity-based approach, and member states, especially Greece, have begun to address the migration issue within a security context to protect their own identity and country's borders (Eriksson, 2016; Gotev, 2016; Konstantinidis, 2016; Meier, 2016). This reaction of the EU is very different from what was expected and hoped for because the Union did not try to solve the problem within its borders and chose to follow the path of burden shifting rather than burden sharing (Kale, 2017). At the end of all these conflicts within the EU, a readmission agreement was signed with Türkiye in 2016 in order to prevent the migration flux from coming to its borders (European Council, 2016).

All these developments contributed to the strengthening of the mechanisms that play a role in the securitization of migration within the Union. Put simply, each development has led to the EU's discussions and communications around migration to focus more on security. This shift has also influenced the formulation of policy. The Treaty of Lisbon which came into force within the framework of all these

developments is seen as one of the most important policy documents of EU's asylum and migration policy by focusing particularly on the determination of a common migration policy including Visa Information System, Custom Information System, modified FRONTEX; EUROPOL, EU Asylum Agency, Schengen Information System Regulation etc (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 2009). The reason for this is that the Treaty of Lisbon reinforced the responsibilities of the supranational bodies of EU in all areas of migration such as migration, asylum, visa, border security, passport system, irregular migrants, workers, third country citizens, etc and therefore normalized the securitization of the EUs migration and asylum policies by regulating and clearly declaring the authorities regarding them (Sargı, 2023). In addition, since with the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has taken a decision-making position at the Union level in the fields of migration, asylum and border security, thus the effectiveness of member states and their authority to make regulations on this issue has been also restricted. This development is also considered within the scope of securitization of migration because it positions the decision-making mechanism above normal policies at some point (Blocher, 2016). Although there have been many secondary regulations after 2009, perhaps the most important of these is the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which has been worked on for many years and is gaining momentum, especially after 2015. This legislation aims to revise previous policies in the fields of migration, asylum, border management and integration and to introduce extra measures for these areas (Eur-LEX, 2020; European Commission, 2023a, 2024c). The main criticisms of this new legislation are that both policy and institutional tools for the securitization of migration are clearly declared, and the concept of Fortress Europe becomes increasingly concrete (Chatty, 2020; Stępka, 2022). In addition, since the new legislation is completely focused on securitization, human rights become less and less important (Häkli et al., 2024), and migration is externalized from the Union (Kirişci et al., 2020), which is essentially a kind of securitization. Therefore, it would be true to interpret this new regulation as a clear statement that the bond between migration and security is stronger than before.

So far, it has been shown that the securitization of migration has been shaped within the scope of internal security, which is located under state security in accordance

with the ST. However, as stated in the previous chapter, the phenomenon of migration is also discussed within the context of societal security since, according to ST, outsiders (immigrants) are perceived as a risk to the collective identity and homogeneity of the receiving country's society (Bigo, 2002; Buzan et al., 1998). The main reason for this is that immigrants who come from outside and do not have a language, religion, culture, customs and tradition, which are the are components of collective identity according to the CS, perceived as those who will ignite the destructive fuse against the existence of collective identity and homogeneity in society, and then these people begin to be seen as a threat to those who are different from them (Bigo, 2002; Wæver, 1993). Therefore, in line with the description of societal security, migration causes the construction of an *us* vs *them* dichotomy between those who previously formed their own collective identity and those who came from outside. In addition to this, Huysmans, one of the leading scholars who has made many contributions to this field, expands this classification for the EU and states that the concepts of cultural identity and welfare state contribute to the securitization process (Huysmans, 2000, 2006). The first official reflections of this in the EU, in other words, the first beginning of the process of the formation of the European identity and thus perceiving those outside this identity as a threat, can be seen as the Maastricht Treaty. The main reason for this is that the concept of EU citizenship emerged with the Treaty, and a European identity started to be constructed (European Council, 2023). Therefore, the dichotomy of *us vs them* has formed naturally and has made the securitization of those left out normal. Kaya (2009) interprets this situation as the concept of citizen is created through identity and belonging, and therefore, the phenomenon of anti-citizen finds its counterpart in the EU as the concept of antimigration. In addition, Boswell (2007) and Luedtke (2008) state that the increasing fear of terrorism, especially after 9/11, combined with the perception that outsiders will be potential terrorists, in addition to the above-mentioned internal security, has led to an increase in xenophobia in society. Kaya (2009) takes this further and states that an intense perception of securitization, especially towards Muslim migrants, has developed in the EU through the collective culture that includes religion. The studies of Doty (1998) and Kaya (2021) show those claims are right for the EU since, according to their studies, immigrants are positioned alongside unemployment, drugs, and all other offences, including

terrorism, as outsiders in the EU. Of course, at this point, while examining the securitization of migration in the EU through collective identity, not mentioning the rising right-wing populist parties will prevent the process from being fully rhetoric quite frequently (Issel-Dombert & Wieders-Lohéac, 2019; Noda, 2018). The speech act using by the rigt-wing polulist parties on securitization process of migration in the EU is discussed next chapter.

The last area that contributes to the securitization of migration in the EU's policies is the welfare state. As Huysmans (2000) states, the process that started with the establishment of SEA is a development that directs not only the internal security context but also the protection of the welfare state. Thus, the securitization of migration has strengthened in this context, too. According to him, the perception of the welfare state within the EU is making it increasingly difficult for immigrants and refugees to benefit from social rights (Huysmans, 2006). Ceyhan reads the main reason for this is that immigrants and refugees are perceived as a threat to the destination country's economy, both in terms of employment from citizens and a burden to the state from the state itself (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002). Huysmans (2000) defines these developments as welfare chauvinism, in which national citizens are prioritized in accessing social services, thus illegitimately accessing these rights by those outside them. Therefore, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, while immigrants were perceived as the saviours of Europe's welfare state in the 1950s, and countries have created migration policies in this environment to encourage and impress labour migration for economic transformations (Huysmans, 2000), especially after the 1980s gradually moved the perception of immigrants within the Union to the threat axis (Gigliogi, 2016; Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021; Vogt Isaksen, 2019). On the other hand, paradoxically, since the Union is aware of the decreasing workforce, it has also focused on attracting brain drain in order to eliminate this situation and sustain the welfare state level globally. When looking at these regulations, in this context, the EU made a new classification for migrants using the definition of highly qualified migrant and released policy documents at various levels within this scope, mainly GAMM (Eur-LEX, 2011), the European Agenda on Migration (Eur-LEX, 2015), Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 (Eur-LEX, 2020) The EU Blue Card Directive (Eur-LEX, 2021) and the

Pact on Asylum and Migration (European Commission, 2024e).

Through an examination of both the framing and content of all these official documents, it has been seen that they include some encouraging advancements and numerous practical initiatives that are in line with the efforts of minority rights, inclusion, integration and equality. As a result, they seem to be a positive move forward. However, those documents are also criticized for being a security-focused strategy to manage diversity and view integration and inclusion as a unidirectional process. For example, some scholars have interpreted these developments within the framework of securitization - migration nexus and criticize those documents for actually implicitly devaluing individuals based on their qualifications and skills, only including those who will bring the most benefit to the EU (De Genova, 2018; Frongia, 2023; Häkli et al., 2024).

If further elaboration is provided regarding these so-called development-nexus documents, scholars rightly criticise what is seen on the surface as both attracting people with high skills to work in the EU and facilitating their legal status to have stayed in the EU. Still, the reality is the classification of migrants (Häkli et al., 2024). For instance, official EU documents related to the Pact on Migration of Asylum, the speech act of identifying, screening, and counting migrants, have been used constantly (Eur-LEX, 2020b; European Commission, 2024e). Additionally, this could be perceived as also a typification of migrants since it explicitly acknowledges that various migrants have distinct effects on the EU's migratory system, necessitating diverse responses from the EU (Häkli et al., 2024). Furthermore, similar criticisms are raised regarding the Blue Card Directive, asserting that unless the obstacles to entry are resolved, the directive merely serves as a means of facilitating admission that is truly inclusive only for individuals who possess shared ethnic and cultural backgrounds with "Europe" (De Genova, 2018; Frongia, 2023). Moreover, terminology such as combating illegal migration is frequently included in the relevant texts to emphasize the EU's perception of migration (Babayan, 2010; Häkli et al., 2024; Üstübici & Ergün, 2021). Lastly, similar criticism levelled against the Action Plan is that it supports the EU's security-oriented negative approach towards Islam and immigration, arguing that integration is essentially assimilation. In summary, the common evaluation of these documents is that the main focus is on the

security of the EU, rather than migrants (Berry & Taban, 2022) In summary, while there have been excellent achievements in the Greens–European Free Alliance in the European Parliament and development-focused documents regarding integration, equality, and minority rights inside the EU, it is fair to assert that the migrant-security framework holds greater influence. Regarding this aspect, Figure 3.1 summarises the securitization process of the EU's migration and asylum policies.

Foundation of CEAS

- Temporary Protection Directive,
- Eurodac Regulation,
- Reception of Asylum Seekers Directive,
- Dublin Regulation replacing the 1990 Dublin Convention,
- Qualification Directive,
- Asylum Procedures Directive,
- Return Directive
- FRONTEX Regulation

2000 - 2013

Single European Act signed in 1986 — **1987**
Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 — **1995**
Tampere European Council (Programme) — **1999**

2001 9/11 Attack
2004 EU Enlargement
2005 London Attack
2010 Arab Spring

European Agenda on Migration — **2015**
Schengen Information System Regulation — **2018**
Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 — **2020**
New Pact on Migration and Asylum — **2024**

1992 — Maastricht Treaty
1997 — Amsterdam Treaty
2002 — Seville European Council (Programme)
2004 Madrid Attack
2005 — The Hague European Council (Programme)
2009 — Treaty of Lisbon
2011 — GAMM
2015 Paris Attacks
2015 Refugee Crisis
2021 — EU Blue Card Directive
2022 — The EU Asylum Agency replaced the EASO (2013)

Figure 3. 1. Summary of Securitization of EU's Migration & Asylum Policies (own design)

3.2. Securitization Implications of CIM in the EU Policies

The EU's political actions against CIM began to take shape, especially after the 2000s, as the impact of climate change was addressed more on the international platform because of the more visibility of the climate change phenomenon (White, 2012). In line with this argument, scholars also state that the EU's approach to CIM does not include concrete policy actions towards the negative aspects of climate change, mainly considering immigrants mostly independent of the climate (Petrillo, 2015; White, 2012). As stated in the previous chapter, the securitization process of CIM through both state and societal security also takes place in the EU. The interpretation of this situation from the CIM perspective is that citizens of underdeveloped or developing countries who have to escape the negative effects of climate change are trying to be restricted by very harsh border security and reception

conditions regulations. The reinforcers of this situation are seen as anti-immigration formations considering societal security and public officials considering state security, which increasingly influence society. Thus, a fear is created among EU citizens that there are millions of people who will invade the EU, especially from poor and arid MENA countries, and CIM is constructed as a security threat (White, 2012). In addition, as noted in the previous section, the EU's policy documents are based on data provided by environmental maximalists, making them potential facilitators of the securitization of CIM in the EU since, according to the CS, facilitating conditions are described as conditions whose existence influences the successful securitization act. It is these conditions that determine whether a speech act or a securitising move is effective enough and will be accepted by an audience (Does, 2013). Therefore, the maximalist data associated with the worst-case scenario of CIM are considered in this manner due to their contribution to the formation of security threat perception in EU official documents.

While doing this, the EU, one one hand, implements regulations that go beyond the speech act and strengthens its institutions with the latest technological equipment to protect its borders from migrants, on the other hand it builds migration with discourses of insecurity with the wide range of foreign categories it has created for non-EU citizens. In other words, the migration-security-focused policies built by the Union have become increasingly complex, and new victims have begun to be needed in order to feed this system itself. At this point, CIM also finds a position (Trombetta, 2014; White, 2012).

3.2.1. From 1999 – 2015

In the EU, the CIM topic is climate change on the one hand and migration on the other. However, when looked at as a whole, the basis of this situation lies in the undesirability of immigration in the EU. The EU's possible studies within the scope of CIM were first reported in 1999 in the European Parliament's Environment, Security and Foreign Policy Report, which called for a greater focus on the impact of climate-induced migrants on EU migration policies and on the impact of regional instabilities, including climate, on a security issue for the EU (European Parliament,

1999). Until 2007, there was no official document on the link between climate change, migration and security at the Union level. However, with the Green paper on Adaptation to Climate Change in Europe published in 2007, it became clear in which direction the developments in EU policies would evolve, because the document stated that (forced) migration that could occur due to natural disasters that would be worsened by climate change should be prevented and the Union's capacity to cope with these possible situations should be increased by modifiying the EU's migration policy (Eur-LEX, 2007). In the same year that the report titled "Climate Change and International Security" was published, the EU acknowledged climate change and related conflicts, migration, and crises as a security challenge. It emphasised the need to review both security and migration policies in light of this challenge. The paper highlights that migration from Northern Africa, which is vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, could increase, and the European Union may face additional risks from vector-borne diseases (Council of the European Union, 2008).

Before continuing, it is necessary to mention an important detail here, since 2008 climate change has been described as a *threat multiplier* in the EU's official documents. The recurring theme in these reports, namely European Security and A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, is the explicit assertion that climate change will progressively intensify pandemics, conflicts, poverty, energy challenges, *illegal migration*, and natural disasters. It is emphasised that all of these issues pose security concerns for the European Union, particularly due to its proximity to the Mediterranean region, where these events have occurred and all those issues are counted as the internal security problems of the Union as well (Council of the European Union, 2008; European Commission, 2016; European Union, 2008). It is not a coincidence that this report is published, as the studies carried out since 2007 are the period when security-oriented discussions on climate change including migration has began (Trombetta, 2008). Following these, first in 2009 the White Paper of EC regarding the adaptation of climate change was released. The paper states that climate change impacts must be considered on the EU's security, development, and migration policies (European Commission, 2009).

Then, in the Stockholm Programme, which was signed a year after this striking

report and entered into force in 2010, it was stated that there was a need to increase studies on the connection between climate change and migration and to address the potential impact of this migration on the EU (Eur-LEX, 2010). Therefore, it could be stated that The Stockholm Programme was the premier initiative to acknowledge the correlation between climate and migration. In 2011, the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) was signed including the climate change - migration - displacement - development quartet, ccoperation with the developing countries to mitigate negative impacts of climate and their potential impacts on the EU (Eur-LEX, 2011).

Two years later, the EC was published in 2013 in the document Climate Change, Environmental Disruption, and Migration. This document addresses CIM more concretely than other policy policies; perhaps for the first time, CIM, with its technical and theoretical issues such as disaster, risk analysis, resilience, mitigation activities and cooperation, are addressed. This document is essentially a report in response to the Stockholm Programme (European Commission, 2013). Same year, although the Greens and European Free Alliance group in the EP's position paper on CIM stated in 2013 that the EU's asylum and migration policy would use the provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon to develop a humanitarian path for CIM and hope that the EU would set an example in this manner (Lambert et al., 2013) since the European Council and the European Commission's approach to migration was security-centred, it remained only as a criticism (Petrillo, 2015). As can be seen, documents contain mostly decisions, recommendations and suggestions regarding the general examination of the climate-migration relationship, cooperation, and its potential effects on the Union.

3.2.2. From 2015 - Present

The vast majority of documents published after 2015 belong to the European Parliament (EP). Before moving on to the EP documents, in the European Migration Agenda document published in 2015, the EC generally addresses the refugee crisis and demands the strengthening of EU migration policies. It is stated that climate change is only the driving factor of this crisis (Eur-LEX, 2015). In the Global

Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union published in 2016, climate change is expressed as a threat multiplier, as mentioned above, and problems related to climate change, such as displacement and degradation, are counted among the security problems of EU such as terrorism, conflict, organized crime, regional conflict, energy crisis (European Commission, 2016). In addition, in the proposal prepared by the EC within the scope of the Asylum and Migration Fund in 2018, climate change was included in irregular migration's root causes (Eur-LEX, 2018). Then, in 2019, in the European Green Deal studies, the EC mentioned climate change among the factors that will cause migration, instability, and conflict (Eur-LEX, 2019b).

The EP documents were published between 2020, 2021, and 2022, respectively, and are fairly recent. What these documents have in common is that they mention the lack of a legal definition for people forced to migrate due to climate change and recommend the protection of these people, so they appear to have a humanitarian perspective. However, when the details of the reports are examined, it is clear that this situation has changed and a security-oriented CIM approach has emerged. The report published in 2020, it is emphasized that the EU's exposure to the CIM issue, on which the Union currently focuses relatively less, will increase in the coming years, and the necessity of proactive policies towards this vulnerability is emphasized (Kraler et al., 2020). The document published in 2021 states that the Western Sahel region within the MENA region will be negatively affected by climate change and that this may cause migration to the EU, and emphasizes that it will not be possible for the EU to tackle this challenging situation alone (Apap & Du Perron de Revel, 2021). Lastly, the report published in 2022 recommends that migration policies be included in the EU's external actions to counter security threats posed by climate change, including migration and forced displacement (Lazarou & Tothova, 2022).

According to Trombetta, in a way that contributes to these criticisms, the securitization process of CIM within EU policies continues. Namely, it is the public perception that millions of people will immigrate to the EU, which has developed especially after 2015, and that the Union is faced with a security threat due to the mass influx of immigrants. The emphasis on the need to take urgent measures in the

determination process of these people as an existential threat to the EU strengthens the perception of a security threat (Trombetta, 2014). In addition, as Geddes and Somerville rightly state, it is quite possible for the EU to expand the scope of its *fight against illegal immigration* in their own words to include the CIM, because the Union's attitude towards the migration and asylum policies so far has security-oriented basis; otherwise the asylum and migration legislation would have been updated to improve and cover the CIM. Instead, the aim is mostly to reduce the number of refugees entering the Union as much as possible (Geddes & Somerville, 2012). The most important indicator of this situation is the number of asylum seekers trying to enter the EU irregularly, announced by FRONTEX at regular intervals. For example, in the latest announcement, the management of migration is defined as an *evolving challenge* for the EU (FRONTEX, 2024).

In addition to these, CIM is not defined officially in the EU in the immigrant or refugee legislation. The reason for this is understood from the EU's official documents. The EU's definition of refugee is based on the 1951 Refugee Convention, and since there is no statement or reference to climate change in the relevant agreement, the Union does not take any steps in this regard (Kraler et al., 2020). Although studies have been carried out in this context, it was stated in 2013 by EC officials that there was no need for protection within the scope of climate-induced migrants. In this document, the reason is also explained why a protection status for CIM is not appropriate (European Commission, 2013), and there has been no development since then. Nevertheless, climate change and, in its context, CIM are defined as a security threat in many official documents, although not to the primary level of post-2000s legislation. Another indicator is that people who have to migrate as a result of natural disasters are excluded from the scope of the Temporary Protection Directive. Thus, climate-induced migrants are pushed out of the system (Eur-LEX, 2022; European Parliament, 2011). This situation is also considered a part of the securitization of CIM (Trombetta, 2014). Supporting this, Blocher (2016) states that the CIM is not advertently included in migration and asylum policies in the EU and interprets this situation as not wanting a refugee protection regime for CIM. Geddes & Somerville (2012) similarly state that the reason why CIM is not included in EU migration and asylum policies is that the Union does not want a

softening of the common migration and asylum policy, which is already very restrictive.

Furthermore, it is possible to evaluate that the rising populist right-wing parties in the EU have a negative impact on the general migration phenomenon, and similar developments will also be valid in the CIM. As stated, CIM is the intersection point of climate change on the one hand and migration on the other. It is seen that the increasing right-wing populist parties in Europe have an anti-immigration discourse and the process is continued in the context of societal security with the *us vs them* dichotomy (Kaya, 2023; Khory, 2012; Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021). In addition, populist parties are also against issues such as climate change and pluralism (Lübke, 2022). Although the evaluation of these issues is beyond this study, since CIM is a common area, it could be seen that the securitization of CIM will be the target of right-wing populism in the EU in the coming years, as (Moran, 2022b) also predicts. In addition, scholars studying populism recognise that although they acknowledge the weakness of the connection between CIM and security nexus, any migration from the MENA region, which is highly fragile in terms of both climate and regional stability, to the EU due to its geographical proximity and economic stability, will result in the exclusion of these individuals based on their ethnicity and culture. This exclusion is driven by a *us vs them* dichotomy perpetuated by anti-immigration populist parties and their supporters in society (Kaya, 2021, 2023). The society tends to associate immigrants with terrorism, crime, and invasion, as these are typical rhetoric used by populist parties and anti-immigrant groups in the EU. Therefore, scholars caution that in this context, migration and asylum policies at the EU level will become more security-oriented basis (Moran, 2022a, 2022b; Telford, 2018).

As can be seen from the CIM-related documents of the EU above, CIM-related studies have been addressed in both the environment and migration contexts but have yet to be directly incorporated into a primary regulation to date. However, this should not mean the Union's perception of CIM does not carry out a securitization process. There are two tools that are effectively used in the securitization process of CIM within the EU. The first of these are think tanks and politicians revolving around maximalist ideas, and the aim is to raise awareness by warning about these issues.

The other is to legitimize the extraordinary measure to securitize CIM. This second option is the most used method today, as it is frequently preferred not only by the EU but also by MENA countries that turn it into a financing source (Trombetta, 2014; White, 2012).

Academics correctly criticise these developments on the grounds that the EU's approach to the CIM issue is considered as security-oriented rather than humanitarian-oriented because the emphasis in the relevant documents is on irregular migration and voluntary return, and this situation is considered within the scope of securitization due to the EU's method of preventing a possible migration wave before it reaches its borders (Trombetta, 2023; White, 2012). Thus, even though the primary documents do not explicitly address CIM, it could not be inferred that the approach towards CIM in the referenced policy documents is positive. Supporting these ideas in literature, the focus of criticism on these documents published by the EU, which center on the climate change – migration - security relationship, is the securitization of both the environment and migration (Hartmann, 2010; Huysmans, 2006). The summary of the securitization process of CIM within the EU is giveb in figure 3.2.


Figure 3. 2. Summary of the securitization process of CIM within the EU (own design)

Considering that migration and climate change are increasingly addressed within the scope of a security-oriented policy in the EU, it can be argued that CIM, the intersection of both, will face similar treatment in the future. However, in order to

arrive at an assessment on this matter, it is necessary to thoroughly examine the CIM theory-specific perspective. This in-depth analysis is conducted in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

COMPARISON OF SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION AND SECURITIZATION OF CIM IN THE EU POLICIES

This chapter examines the application of ST tools in the securitization of migration and CIM in the EU. It explored the compatibility of these tools with the theory and discussed whether the securitization of migration and CIM in the EU are converging or not. There are three fundamental components of successful securitization. These are the (1) existential threat and referent object, (2) emergency measurements, and (3) the audience.

The first of these is the identification of *existential threat* and *referent object* (Buzan et al., 1998; Taureck, 2006). What is meant by existential threat is that a threat is given more meaning than other issues, rather than its philosophical background, and is placed in a much more important position than others and gaining absolute priority among others. This is such a threat that it is aimed at the existence of something (Kurniawan, 2017). According to Waever, although the speech act is used to construct a phenomenon as a threat, it is only a securitizing move in the process (Wæver, 1997). The referent object, on the other hand, is the thing affected negatively by the existential threat since it is actually the one that is threatened existentially and is put in a claim for a right to survive (Buzan et al., 1998). Then come the *emergency measures* for the reference object. In essence, emergency actions involve supra-political actions to ensure that the reference object, which must survive in the face of existential threat, does not encounter an irreversible situation or eliminate whatever threatens its existence (Buzan & Waever, 2003). Lastly, as detailed above*, the audience* must be convinced in this process that the referent object already faces an existential threat. Put simply, there exists a connection between the audience and the securitizing actor. In order for the actor to successfully complete the

securitization process, it is crucial to garner the support of the audience and entice them to adopt extraordinary measures (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan & Waever, 2003).

To conclude, since the goal of securitization studies is not whether an issue is actually a security issue; it is about analysing through discourse and political groups (speech act) how an issue or phenomenon (existential threats) is put forward, for whom (reference object), how, by whom (securitizing actor) and the process of acceptance of extraordinary practices (emergency measures) that the target group (audience) would not accept under normal conditions (Buzan et al., 1998). In this context, it is first examined whether both tools and fundamental elements of ST have a counterpart in the EU within the scope of the securitization process of both migration and CIM. Then, the process is tried to be understood by examining the three securitization instruments used by the EU while performing this securitization and comparing them in terms of migration and CIM. Thus, the securitization migration of CIM in the EU is argued under three main headings of the theory.

4.1. Tools of Securitization Theory

According to CS, security is a speech act used by the securitizing actor to start the securitization move rather than an objective condition (Waever, 1995). The securitizing actor's goal is to convince the audience that the referent object is under existential threat. The speech act used by the securitizing actor is examined under five types in accordance with the aim of the act by Vuori (see Figure 4.1).

No.	Types of the speech act	Forms of the speech act
1.	Assertive speech act	Statements, explanations, and assertions
2.	Directive speech act	Orders, requests, and commands
3.	Commissive speech act	Vows, threats, and quarantines
4.	Expressive speech act	Apologies, thanks, and congratulations
5.	Declarative speech act	Declaring a war, pronouncing wedlock, and adjuring a meeting

Figure 4. 1. Types and forms of speech act (Kurniawan, 2017; Vuori, 2008)

When the securitization process of migration in the EU is examined, it is seen that many types of speech acts, both written and discourse, are used. If starting from

official documents of the EU since 1885, securitization of migration process with the speech act is clearly observed. Since that time, the matter of migration has been assessed within the framework of the same articles in the EU acquis, alongside terrorism and organized crimes and the phrase of *illegal immigration* has started to be used. According to Babayan (2010), conceptualizing immigrants as a threat through the terminology of *illegal immigration* instead of *irregular immigration* is the first stage of securitization of migration in the EU. *Illegal immigration* content is frequently encountered in official EU documents. As stated previous chapter, *speech act* covers all kinds of transfers created by the securitizing actor, including not only discourses, but also official reports, documents, statements and legislations, anouncements etc (see Figure 4.1). Huber (2015) draws attention to the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament, which are the among main EU institutions, shape public opinions on the securitization of migration through official documents, public pronouncements, and media discourses. If examples are given regarding speech act of securitization process of migration, in the TFEU, it has been stated that the EU aims to prevent *illegal immigration* with the efficient readmission and return policies while respecting human rights (Eur-LEX, 2012), and the following official documents explicitly express that urgent policies to combat the *terrorist threat* and *illegal immigration* together is necessary: Tampere Programme (Eur-LEX, 2004), Seville Programme (Eur-LEX, 2002), The Hague Programme (Eur-LEX, 2005), The EURODAC Regulation (Eur-LEX, 2013), The FRONTEX Regulation (Eur-LEX, 2019a). In addition, since one of the important aims of the EU states in the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 2 & Article 63) is the establishment of an internal-external security link (Eur-LEX, 2009), security measures for migration have become even more important after 2009 since the linkage between *illegal immigration – combating crime – external border control* could be easily seen. Although it is not directly the primary document, another document that contributes to the speech act presented by the EP is regarding Pact on Migration and Asylum. The relevant document emphasizes that although the EU already has a CEAS, what happened during the 2015 crisis revealed that existing procedures could not ensure equal treatment and that new legislation was needed to avoid the same *mass influx* and *crisis management* problems again. It is also emphasized that to prevent such a crisis from happening again, readmission

agreements need to be made in the context of external cooperation (Dumbrava et al., 2024). As can be clearly seen from EU official documents, it is seen that the EU prefers to use the terms *illegal*, *mass influx, crisis, urgent* regarding migration and addresses this issue together with the titles of *terrorism*, *crime*, *border security* and therefore considers migration as a security threat.

Similarly, upon examining the discourses, the securitization of migration is also observed especially after the 2015 migration crisis. If examples of this situation are to be given, the following can be given, respectively: The European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs, and Citizenship from 2015 to 2019, Dimitris Avramopoulos, stated the difficulties posed by migration as challenging for the EU (European Commission, 2015a). Jean-Claude Juncker, who served as the President of the EC from 2014 to 2019, stressed the need for immediate actions to manage the influx of migrants towards the EU and that defending the external border of the EU was a necessity (European Commission, 2015b). Similarly, in 2016, Martin Schulz, who served as the President of the European Parliament from 2012 to 2017, expressed his belief that immigration to the EU should be halted. He emphasised the importance of prioritising asylum for those who really require it and announced the rapid installation of new border security equipment (European Parliament, 2016). Moreover, the declaration made by Antonio Tajani, who served as the President of the European Parliament from 2017 to 2019, admitted that migration was perceived as a peril in the EU and mentioned the necessity of ongoing implementation of measures (European Parliament, 2018).

While Donald Tusk, the former President of the European Council from 2014 to 2019, utilized phrases that underscored internal security, such as instability and disorder discourse, in his 2018 speech on the issue of migration by asserting that migration poses a security risk (European Council, 2018). Another example is from the European Council. During the 2021 Council meeting, leaders stressed the need for the EU to implement stricter measures in order to effectively manage the EU's external borders to prevent the migration flux (European Council, 2024). Last but not least, European Commission President von der Leyen also emphasised the need for unity and solidarity in addressing migration and the implementation of concrete

action plans to fight illegal migration is EU's one of the main priorities (European Commission, 2023e). As Altunbaş & Memişoğlu (2024) rightly argued all those official statements of the representatives of main administrative bodies of EU regarding the migration could be regarded as instances of securitizing speech act. After the construction of migration as a security threat with the speech act – here they are official documents –, the phase of taking urgent and extraordinary measures to neutralize the threat begins. Then, in the next stage, there is a transition to the continuity of a management discourse focusing on the need to manage and control the already securitized migration problem (Babayan, 2010). All these policy processes that have taken place over the years clearly show, as Babayan stated, that the securitization process of migration continues. On the other hand, the EC member responsible for internal affairs, Ylva Johansson, has positive statements stating that the us vs them approach is not a correct approach towards migrants and that migrants will increase the added value of the EU with a successful integration policy (*Inclusion for All: Commission Presents Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027*, 2020). Although such positive examples emerge within the Union, the general discourse seems to be focused on securitization.

Turning to the theory, the second component of securitization is then the *securitizing actor* realizing the securitization move, and it mostly refers to the person or people group, such as bureaucrats, politicians, political leaders, pressure groups, lobbies, and governments themselves performing the speech act (Buzan et al., 1998). As can be seen from both the written and discourses official statements of the EU institutions above, the EU institutions and their representatives are the securitizing actors. However, EU institutions and representatives are not the only securitizing actors in the EU. This situation can be understood based on the theory since, According to scholars of CS, focusing on the organizational logic of the speech act is the best way to determine who the securitizing actor is. Moreover, Huysmans, one of the biggest contributors to the field of securitization of migration, states that migration is securitized also through political tools and methods that emphasize that it is a threat to the social distrust in the EU (Huysmans, 2000, 2006). In a way that enhances what Buzan and his colleagues say, he states that speech acts of those who hold power as securitizing actors are accepted as such by the audience of the speech

act – the electorate. Societal distrust triggered by migration manifests itself in the political radicalization of societies, as evidenced by the rising influence of populist radical right parties and become the security issue of the state itself. As it has been mentioned above, the migration issue is constructed as a societal security threat through the speech act by these securitizing actors, stating that immigrants are a threat to societal peace, welfare and collective identity, that is, what has been built in society by the people who were there before. Here, society itself is the referent object since it is the focus of the securitizing actor and move. To give an example to understand the situation more clearly, the speech acts expressed by securitizing actors aimed at societal security are as follows: "As a result of the influx of people from y (outsiders), the people of x (receiving country) will be diluted, people of x are invaded by people of y, people of x are now much different than before, identity of people from x will be crushed under y people's identity and the collective identity of society of x will change, etc." By this, it is aimed to be perceived as a security issue by society, which is the referent object (Buzan et al., 1998). Expressions such as *invasion*, *dilution*, *identity*, *outsiders*, and *others* have been used in anti-immigration discourse.

When looking at the EU, the literature describing the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and right-wing populism is quite extensive and is not the direct subject of this study. For this reason, it does not go into details of this big issue here. However, it is obvious that it also contributes to the securitization process of migration in the EU. In this context, ST's tools are examined with various examples where the speech act and the securitizing actor coexist within the scope of societal security. For example, the Orban government in Hungary creates an opposing identity against refugees and immigrants from the Middle East and Africa through Christianity vs Islam and frequently states that Hungary does not want Muslim invaders (Schultheis, 2018). Another example is former Italian Deputy Prime Minister Salvini saying that Italy belongs to Italians, refusing to think of 10 million migrants instead of Italians and that the borders are closed to immigrants (Giuffrida, 2021). Furthermore, Marine Le Pen (the leader of the French populist far-right party Front National) emphasizes in almost all her speeches that the French are under threat from immigrants, especially from Africa, and defines the 2015 crisis as an

invasion of barbers (Agnew & Chassany, 2017; Le Point, 2015). Lastly, the anti-Muslim rhetoric of the German extreme populist right party AfD, where migrants are defined as a threat to both German culture and security (Zhou, 2024). It is evident from the information provided here that the party representatives who perform the speech act are in the securitizing actor position.

Nevertheless, according to ST, in order for these to be considered tools, they must have a counterpart in the audience. Only then does the securitization process continue (Buzan et al., 1998). These discourses of populist parties in the EU are considered successful in the securitization of the migration process because these parties have an impact on the audience with the discourses they develop within the cultural, security and economic framework defined by Huysmans (Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021). This success is seen from on the one hand, the increase in the number of seats of anti-immigration parties according to the 2019 EP election results, and on the other hand, the significant number of votes received by these parties in their own national elections (Güler, 2023). Therefore, the fact that the voting rates are at the highest level in recent years shows that the speech act and securitizing actors are successful. Some researchers attribute the reason behind the preference of this discourse to the fact that the securitizing speech act of immigration is a useful tool in elections (Güler, 2023). The reason is demonizing migrants as potential enemies incites fear and gives the impression that ontological security is in danger, far in excess of actual events. Thus, migrants began to be constructed in a way that threatened the collective identity as well as the state's own security and economy especially in Western countries.

As a result, the reaction of these discourses in society means that the potential to vote for politicians who focus especially on the immigration-security relationship increases. Populist right-wing parties, which are already interested in these issues, have also begun to benefit from this situation (Faist, 2004). This situation gradually started to spiral. The more anti-immigration discourse developed, the more politicians began to take notice, exacerbating society's fear of foreigners. Society, whose fear increased, began to believe in these discourses more and more. The best example is the increase in voting rates of those parties in both the EU and national

elections mentioned above. To summarize, the phenomenon of migration in the EU is securitized both by EU institutions at the Union level and by populist parties at the national state level. Here, it is concluded that the increasing power of right-wing parties with anti-immigration discourses in the Europan Parliament will reinforce the securitization process of migration at the EU level more.

The third tool of the ST is *the audience*, who has to be persuaded by the securitizing actor using a speech act. In other words, overall, the audience is the target group of the securitization act itself. A general evaluation is made through Eurobarometer surveys to examine the impact of these securitizing discourses in the EU on society. There are many surveys on this subject that take the pulse of EU citizens. If the years 2022 and 2023 are exemplified, the results are as follows. According to the Eurobarometer in 2022, 68% of participants tended to overestimate the number of immigrants in their own society (European Commission, 2022c), while in the survey in 2023, approximately 69% of the participants expressed support for a unified European policy on migration, and 68% endorsed the establishment of a unified European asylum system. Simultaneously, 75% of respondents support strengthening the external borders of the EU by increasing the number of European border guards and coast guards (European Commission, 2023a). Furthermore, migration is seen as one of the EU's top challenges (European Union, 2024a, 2024b). Evidently, the EU society holds a predominantly unfavourable opinion towards immigration. This circumstance unequivocally demonstrates that migration, which is portrayed as an existential threat by the securitizing actors, is also perceived as such by the audience.

To conclude, securitizing actors play an essential role in shaping the discourse around immigration. They assert that immigrants pose a threat to social peace, prosperity, and the collective identity established by the existing population. Their speech act effectively frames the issue of migration as a dual threat to both the EU and societal security. The first one is an existential threat to the very existence of the EU, as top policy documents consistently highlight the illegality of unauthorised migration and stress the need for stringent measures to prevent it. Here, the EU is positioned as a referent object and must be protected one against the threat with extraordinary measures. ST suggests that the actor and referent object may overlap,

particularly in matters related to terrorism and conflict (Buzan & Waever, 2003; Wæver, 1996). In this context as well, EU institutions are securitizing actors, and the EU itself is a referent object. Therefore the audience is the EU societies. The other is the societal threat constructed through collective identity. In this context, society serves as both the referent object and the audience of the speech act since it is the central focus of the actor and movement seeking to address security threats. Lastly, it could be considered that the extraordinary measurements proposed by the actors have gained legitimacy among the audience.

When examining the CIM, it is seen that there is no direct inclusion in the EU's migration and asylum policies; this does not mean that there is no speech act regarding the securitization of CIM. Therefore, when official EU documents are examined, it is seen that the migration issue caused by climate change began to be perceived as a security problem between 2008 and 2009. Then it may be stated that before 2013, the EU made efforts to securitize, specifically by using information on CIM. Subsequently, it could be observed that the speech act evolved into a more contentious and confrontational exchange of ideas. Given the evolving global circumstances such as the Arab Spring, first characterised by a deterministic and negative outlook on the phenomena and its consequences, there was a gradual shift towards a more pragmatic perspective over time (Wirthová, 2024). Especially after 2015, as the EU's general perception of migration has become much more security-oriented, although the scope of studies and legislation has progressed accordingly, the emphasis includes taking proactive measures to avoid a process like 2015, this time in the context of climate (Apap & Du Perron de Revel, 2021; European Parliament, 2020, 2022). The most common and key elements of those documents are the emphasis on the concept of resilience in the context of providing general recommendations to the EU to improve their ability to adapt to the negative effects of climate change, including migration.

The EU has become overly controlling, especially regarding border security, and desires to keep under control any security threats that may come from outside (Boswell, 2003; Yıldız, 2016a). Therefore, the expressions of *adaptation, resilience, cooperation with countries, combating illegal migration, and multiplier threat*

constantly appear in these documents, as well as the official documents stating that there is no legal acceptance of CIM (European Parliament, 2011; Karayiğit & Kılıç, 2021; Kraler et al., 2020), can be interpreted as an adaptation to this desire to take control. Furthermore, if the securitization of CIM in the EU with the speech act is examined from a larger framework, it is seen that there is diversity. Nevertheless, the speech act here is within the scope of the link to environmental degradation, climate change and migration rather than directly to CIM.

It is important to note that although these speech acts have not yet spread to the primary policies of the EU, they have an impact in two respects. The first of these is the emphasis on adaptation, cooperation, risk mitigation activities, reinforcing infrastructures, environmental measures and precautionary approaches included in EU policy documents which are just mentioned above (Trombetta, 2014). However, what is targeted here is an approach that will serve to prevent migration by limiting local actions, rather than a policy in which local development can be achieved for countries that are negatively affected by climate change and where it is known that this negative effect will increase gradually (Duffield & Evans, 2011). The details of this process are discussed in the instruments section below. Another development that the speech act contributed to is that, while on the one hand, underlining the EU is open to new CIM waves through numbers, on the other hand, it is constantly emphasized in all texts as a potential threat in the future rather than the near future. Although, at first glance, this does not fall directly within the speech act definition of CS, what Huysmans (2006) says in the context of ST is essential. According to him, one method of elevating an issue above politics by constructing it as a security threat and then intervening in an authoritarian manner is to diversify policies with speech acts (Huysmans, 2006). Therefore, although these developments are not such a speech act defined by the CS, they are interpreted as a kind of speech act, establishing the CIM as a future security threat to the EU and revealing the need to take proactive measures against it since these are also contributing to the mobilization of action against CIM (Trombetta, 2014). Similarly, according to Blocher (2016), classical speech acts are seen primarily in response to sudden turmoil, such as in Syria, Libya and Egypt, or after terrorist attacks, and this discourse used against CIM is also a speech act, since the its role here contributes to

the complexity of the process by bringing together different dynamics such as migration, security, climate change, adaptation, resilience, cooperation, etc. (Trombetta, 2014).

Moreover, although a direct speech act cannot be seen at the level described by the ST of CS, the absence of a definition and general acceptance of climate-induced migrants at the Union level and even the statement that there is no need for both such a definition and protection (explained previous chapter) can be interpreted as an implicit speech act. The reason for this, according to White (2012), is that while there is more than one terminology for third-country citizens in the EU, on the other hand, the lack of any direct definition regarding CIM causes people to feel increasingly trapped in the system, and the EU does it consciously.

While determining the securitizing actor, if going by the statement that the logic of the speech act stated by CS is the best way to determine who the securitizing actor is, it can be concluded that the EU's own institutions are the securitizing actor for CIM, because the EU institutions themselves are the owners of the policy documents on this subject just like securitization of migration. However, as discussed, the actors affecting the securitization process of migration are not only EU institutions, but far-right populist parties in the EU also contribute to the process, especially within the scope of societal security, and their discourses are reciprocated on the societal side. Whether the right-wing populist parties for CIM are securitizing actors or not is discussed on the axis of Hungary, Italy, France and Germany in order to be compatible with the securitization of migration.

The far-right populist party led by Orban, who is in power in Hungary, stated that there is a relationship between climate change and induced migration, poverty and terrorism and that the EU may face an enormous flood of migration from the MENA region, which is currently struggling with all these problems. He argues that the EU cannot overcome this problem alone (Website of the Hungarian Government, 2015). In another statement, it is stated that the resilience of African countries can be increased to stop illegal migration from Africa to the EU (Website of the Hungarian Government, 2018).

Furthermore, when examining France, it is worth noting that while Le Pen has not explicitly addressed CIM, her highly discriminatory rhetoric against immigrants and her determination that national interests should take precedence in combating climate change suggest that her stance on CIM will align with these views (Rassemblement Rational, 2015). In Italy, a country also affected by the far-right populist movement, the government has stated that the Italian coast, which is already receiving immigrants due to its proximity to the MENA region, will now also become a destination for climate refugees as a consequence of climate change, which is defined as a threat multiplier. The government emphasises that this will lead to instability in the country (Andrea, 2022). Finally, the AfD in Germany differs from the other three parties. The AfD expresses scepticism about the scientific facts about anthropogenic climate change and argues that initiatives to address climate change are pointless. Denying climate change also includes denying the fact of the existence of CIM, although there is no direct discourse on this subject yet (Pfeifer, 2023; Pötter, 2020).

In summary, the securitizing discourses of the growing far-right populist discourse on CIM in the EU exist, albeit they are less conspicuous compared to the overall migration crisis. Given the explanation of the specifics of the populist speech, it is expected that it will employ its anti-immigration rhetoric more efficiently for CIM in the future, as accurately pointed out by Moran (2022b). The main reason for this prediction is that these actors have already contributed to the securitization of the EU's immigration policy, especially after 2015, and their visibility in the EP (Uberoi et al., 2019) and, therefore, within the EU is gradually increasing. Furthermore, scientific studies anticipate that climate change would have adverse consequences on the EU itself, leading to internal migration within the Union (European Parliament, 2022; World Bank Group, 2023). Given this scenario, it is highly likely that the Union will respond by further restricting its relationship with the outside world and strengthening the 'Fortress Europe' concept.

While the actors in the EU engage in a discourse that emphasises security threat towards CIM, it is crucial, as per ST, to accurately and consistently provide the reference to the audience in order to effectively achieve securitization (Buzan & Waever, 2003). Securitizing discourse and related terminology towards immigrants

can be observed directly in the EU. So much so that it is at the centre of the EU's institutionalization against immigration. When examining the climate-induced migrants, it is seen that the discourse is mostly discussed as a result of climate change and its negative effects. In other words, the discourse regarding CIM is indirect in EU documents and appears to be based on those who are negatively affected by climate change and the negative reflection of this situation on the EU. Although the discourses of the actors are more direct than the written texts, it would not be wrong to say that the perception of an existential threat is not as intense as in general migration. Moreover, at this moment, it is not possible to affirm that the actors' endeavours to maintain a persistent threat to general migration are legitimate for CIM; for instance, the EU's financial spending on border security for general migration and related matters is not observed for the CIM or unlike general migration, no information about CIM is officially made public by FRONTEX.

The securitizing discourse around immigrants is evident in the speech act of the EU. In fact, migration holds such significance that it is the focal point of the EU's efforts to establish policies and structures to address immigration. However, when analysing climate-induced migrants, it becomes apparent that the discussion primarily revolves around the consequences of climate change and its adverse impacts, as Wirthová (2024) also evaluates. Put simply, the discussion of CIM in EU documents is not direct and seems to focus on the individuals who are adversely impacted by climate change and the detrimental consequences this has on the EU. While the discourses of the actors may be more straightforward than written materials, it is accurate to argue that the sense of an existential threat is not as strong as in general migration. Furthermore, at this moment, it is not possible to affirm that the actors' endeavours to maintain a persistent threat to general migration are legitimate for CIM. Therefore, the audience's reaction has not yet been measured in any way, unlike the general migration in securitization. In other words, this situation can be interpreted as the securitization movement towards the audience not being measured by the actor. Therefore, the inter-subjective relationship that ST builds between the actor and the audience could not be established for now. Nonetheless, as Trombetta (2014) states, emphasizing and referring to the need for more research on this issue, adaptation and

resilience in policy documents can be considered as implying a non-traditional speech act on CIM.

Furthermore, the EU has extensive expertise in the securitization of migration. As Geddes & Somerville (2012) highlighted, the EU's inclination to maintain a lower profile in this particular aspect of migration can also be explained by the desire to take on less responsibility in the future. When looking at whether there is a response from the audience, Eurobarometer research does not appear to include any research specific to CIM (European Union, 2024c).

Despite recognising climate change and migration as one of the leading security threats for the EU, studies on CIM are not incorporated into migration or climate change research (European Union, 2024a). According to EU citizens in their surveys conducted in 2019, the two most challenging themes facing the Union are migration and climate change (European Commission, 2019). Similarly, the 2022 survey shows climate change is seen as one of the EU's most challenging issues, along with forced migration (European Commission, 2022b). If continued in the same way, according to the July 2023 EU citizens survey, a significant majority (77%) of EU residents consider climate change to be an extremely pressing issue. The fundamental cause of this issue stems from economic and energy-related factors (European Commission, 2023a). Thus yet, there has been no assessment of the audience's response, in contrast to the overall movement in securitization. Put simply, this scenario can be seen as the lack of measurement of the securitization moves towards the audience by the actor. As a result, the inter-subjective relationship that ST establishes between the actor and the audience has not been constructed yet compared to the migration. Therefore, when considering the tools and elements of ST of CS, it would be more precise to refer to these actions as securitization initiatives for CIM. As a result, it cannot be said that securitization at the level defined by ST of CS is fully successful. Until now, the securitization process of migration and CIM in the EU, has been examined with the tools and elements of ST. Furthermore, the EU's approach to migration and CIM is also analysed through securitization instruments to grasp the entire process comprehensively.

Based on the analysis carried out, it is not possible to conclude with certainty that the securitization of CIM in the EU has clearly occurred using theoretical tools. Although migration and climate change are separately mentioned as the ones of the main challenges in surveys, as well as discourses obtained from actors' written and verbal speech acts, there is still a need to examine the relationship between motivations for voting for right-wing populist parties and CIM, as well as to conduct general public opinion studies on CIM. Therefore, it would be wrong to conclude that the securitizing actor-speech act-the audience relationship is absolutely established at this stage.

4.2. Use of Instruments

As mentioned in detail in the Securitization of Migration and CIM in the EU Policies chapter, there is a relationship between the removal of internal borders in the EU and the strengthening of external borders, as Huysmans states (Huysmans, 2006). In support of this idea, Mlambo argues that the EC considers robust external borders to be essential for the long-term viability of the Schengen system (Mlambo, 2020). In other words, the negative correlation between these issues is that stronger external borders mean more invisible internal borders. As a result, the EU began to develop various instruments to prevent unwanted human mobility towards external borders and gradually has strengthened them over time. In this process, the EU has implemented two different strategies in the securitization of migration. These tools could be evaluated as internal and external. At the internal level, the EU has made significant efforts to strengthen border security and establish its own strong policies and mechanisms to prevent or control restrictions on irregular movements.

Added to that, on an external level, the EU has started to compel periphery countries to actively participate in addressing irregular migratory movements (Üstübici & İçduygu, 2019). All these EU strategies aimed at preventing or making it more difficult for people coming outside to enter the Union are defined as externalizing migration control. The externalizing approaches towards migration in the EU are actually a direct consequence of the securitization of migration. The objective is to create tools to address irregular immigration and enforce controls and measures

against such migration. Thus, the process is advanced by incorporating the notion of security threat in securitization theory (Özkan & Yavcan, 2022). Hyndman and Mountz argue that the EU has employed the strategy of externalizing borders to reduce border permeability (Hyndman & Mountz, 2008). These developments are considered partial results of turning points (2004 EU's eastern enlargement, terror attacks that occurred after 9/11 and Arab Spring) regarding the securitization of migration of asylum policies of the EU since, under this framework, the EU has implemented a strategy of externalisation by shifting certain migrant control functions to periphery countries (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022; Pollak & Slominski, 2009; Üstübici & İçduygu, 2019).

In the literature, when examining the EU's institutionalization process towards migration and especially the externalization process of migration, the remote control vs root cause approach, first introduced by Boswell (2003), is frequently used to describe the EU's point of view (Yıldız, 2016a). Since the EU's securitization process brings with it extremely strict border security, an increasingly rigid and institutionalized administrative structure, cooperation with third countries for immigrants, and ultimately, externalization of migration, it would not be wrong to follow the traces of securitization through these approaches. This idea is not fundamentally incorrect. The remote control, which is explained below in detail, and the securitization theory are interconnected through the mechanisms of framing, audience acceptance, and the execution of exceptional measures since the EU frequently justifies and uses remote control strategies by framing migration as a security threat. Therefore, this enables the Union to effectively manage perceived risks without direct involvement. According to scholars, the securitization and externalization process of migration in the EU go hand in hand (Benam, 2011; Özkan & Yavcan, 2022). This is because the externalization instruments used enable both the protection of the internal security of the Union and the collective monitoring of persons and the shifting of responsibility to third countries that are relatively underdeveloped in economic and democratic terms, thus being considered as an indicator that people coming from outside are perceived as a security threat. These developments regarding the protection of internal security and external border security are compatible with the securitization process (Benam, 2011). Nonetheless,

since externalisation is a very comprehensive field, the focus is on areas that are compatible with securitization, just like populism. Therefore, this time, a different path is taken to examine whether the instruments used in the securitization of migration in the EU are also valid for CIM and whether the instruments used in the securitization of migration are compatible with CIM.

Boswell (2003) defines the remote control approach as security-oriented to restrict people's movement, while the root cause approach is development-oriented. The EU mostly has positioned migration as security-oriented within its own policies and has built its institutions accordingly. There are three main remote control instruments that the EU has been using for migration: (1) visa policy, (2) cooperation with countries outside the EU: readmission agreements and partnerships, (3) instruments for controlling migration and asylum flows such as FRONTEX, EUROPOL etc. To start with, the current stringent EU visa policies demonstrate the prevalence of a securitization perspective in migration policies. This confirms that visa policy is used as a securitization tool to control migration flows like a reflection of internal security concerns since with visa control policies such as VIS, SIS the movement of non-EU citizens is limited (Boswell, 2003; Yıldız, 2016). The present rigid EU visa policies strongly indicate the presence of a securitization viewpoint in migration policies. This confirms also that visa policy is used as a proactive measure to manage migration flows, with internal security concerns influencing the aspect of visa policies (Yıldız, 2016a, 2016b)

Secondly, readmission agreements have been signed with 18 countries so far on the condition of providing technical and financial support by the EU (European Commission, 2024a). Lastly, the EU has established institutions to treat migration as a security threat through the (CEAS), which includes such as FRONTEX, EUROPOL, SIS, VIS, etc. As a result, it has increasingly tended to solve the border security of member states by including technology. The intensity of this process is steadily increasing as the EU budget dedicated to border security and migration, which was €13 billion between 2014 and 2020, has already risen to €34.9 billion for the period of 2021-2027 (EU Monitor, 2018; European Commission, 2018a). As Altunbaş & Memişoğlu (2024) rightly agree, diversification and development of

these instruments are the legitimizing and normalization of extraordinary measures against the management of migration. Therefore, tightening entry procedures to the Union, increasing cooperation with non-EU countries to mobilize irregular migrants, and increasing budget expenditures for institutions and tools built to prevent irregular migration are other expressions that the EU's approach to migration is becoming more and more security-oriented since, as Kale (2017) states, the EU is escaping from its responsibility, especially after the Arab Spring and describe this backlash as not burden sharing but burden shifting. Yıldız (2016b) also says similar things, stating that what the EU has committed to with readmission agreements is ostensibly a promise to support the development of the countries with which it has signed an agreement by providing technical and financial assistance, but in essence this is a clear indication of the security-oriented migration policy of the Union, stating that the real aim is the exclusion of irregular migrants who are seen as a threat.

What is seen from the EU's actions is that the EU prioritises non-traditional security strategies like mitigation actions, resilience, and development promotion when addressing the nexus between migration caused by climate change and security. Thus, the aim is to prevent a possible migration wave before it reaches its borders by making direct development investments (Trombetta, 2014). It is important to consider exactly what is intended here. For example, Ursula Von Der Leyen stated that the EU needs qualified migrants and that they will continue strengthening cooperation with African countries in the fight against climate change and related issues (European Commission, 2023a). Moreover, in a way that supports this, readmission agreements, which are common in migration, are being replaced in CIM by cooperation with MENA countries that are likely to migrate to the EU, which is frequently included in its policy documents. In other words, the EU focuses on cooperation strategies with climate-vulnerable third countries in securitizing migration policies. The EU provided 4.9 billion euros fund to projects involving climate change resilience and risk mitigation measures, especially in North Africa, until 2020, and the published report called "*The EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and Addressing Root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*" stated that the voluntary return of 90 thousand climate-induced migrants was supported (European Union, 2020). It has been announced that with the new package

implemented in 2024, a fund of 150 billion euros will be allocated to Africa for climate, infrastructure and risk mitigation areas until 2030 (European Commission, 2024b).

The emphasis that security will be achieved by developing fragile regions and strengthening the fight against climate change is seen as a securitization instrument because it creates a belief in the society that there will be no need for these people to migrate, that there are alternative solutions and that what is necessary is being done. This situation also allows the EU to select only qualified migrants it deems appropriate, as in the above statement (Trombetta, 2014). Moreover, according to Duffield & Evans (2011), these proactive policies are not only for the elimination of adverse impacts of climate change but also for the prevention of possible CIM towards the EU. Hence, the EU's strategy is primarily focused on security rather than humanitarian concerns. In other words, these developments are the evidence in the EU's policies of a remote control intervention mechanism aimed at safeguarding its own security interests because if the aim is humanitarian and development-oriented - the root cause - then addressing human security issues requires more than just financial resources, as it is necessary to control also underlying challenges such as regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment (Boswell, 2003). Therefore, in terms of the remote control approach, the securitization process followed by general migration and CIM is compatible as expected.

If a comparison is made in terms of the institutions - instruments - constructed by the EU based on migration and asylum policies, it cannot be fully claimed at this stage that CIM does not or will not have any participation in these institutions. Trombetta (2014) states that the securitization process continues within the EU as well and that institutions such as FRONTEX, VIS, EURODAC, EUROPOL, and EUROSUR, which the Union has formed over the years, have very strong mechanisms against migration management. These institutions make the securitization process less visible than before because institutionalization means that extraordinary actions become normalized and become part of the routine. Therefore, it is possible that CIM will also have its share of these institutions. (White, 2012). On the other hand, it relates the issue differently but attributes the result to the securitization of CIM and

claims that the continuation of institutionalisation against immigration in the EU will contribute to the securitization process of CIM also. According to him, new victims are needed for a system in which so much has been invested to be sustainable. This situation actually overlaps with ST of CS's arguments, even though the securitizing discourse about CIM is not traditional. So classically, one person's security or insecurity feeds each other in the context of the other person's security or insecurity. The other is that the threat can only emerge with the presence of the other. In other words, there is no point in talking about someone else's security without knowing and defining the other (Balamir Coskun, 2011). In fact, Waever expresses this situation as there will be no security when there is no one else (Wæver, 1997). In this context, securitization addresses the consolidation position or process of a state or society against the enemy-other (Fierke, 2007).

In summary, the existence of so many institutional structures against the common enemy in the EU will lead to the emergence of new common enemies since the system will only be able to perpetuate itself with the existence of a threat or threats. If considering whether institutions are instruments for the securitization of CIM or not in the EU, it can be concluded that there is no obstacle to their not being.

In the light of the above analysis, it can be concluded that the securitization of migration in the EU is securitized in accordance with ST tools and elements. In addition, it can be seen that instruments that are a result of externalization and, therefore, securitization are used quite successfully in this process. On the other hand, the evaluation that emerges from examining the securitization of CIM within the Union with ST tools and elements is that securitization is not as concrete as in the general concept of migration. However, this does not mean that there is no securitization move towards CIM; because it would be appropriate to take into account both the discourses within the EU and the steps taken within the scope of externalization tools are actually the securitization initiatives for CIM.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this analysis has its limits, such as the relationship between climate change and migration, dynamics and motivations behind people while choosing migration because of the adverse impact of climate change,

As explained in detail in the CIM chapter, it is still a big question mark how many of the people forced to migrate due to climate change will be able to migrate. Research by scholars such as Yavçan et al. (2021) shows that CIM is affected not only by climate change but also by the socio-economic situation, stability of the country, differences between slow-onset and sudden-onset disasters, etc. Moreover, as White (2012) points out, Western countries, which are developed countries, are actually responsible for anthropogenic climate change. Therefore, the question is whether it is the EU that defines itself as affected by migration and under threat or the climate-induced migrants who contribute to anthropogenic climate change in a very small but will be most negatively affected. Nonetheless, all of this will, of course, be the subject of other studies.

Considering that the EU's remote control approach, which reduces migrants to a number without going into the root cause, is also valid for CIM, it can be said that the securitizing move has started to serve Fortress Europe rather than a humanitarian-oriented approach. In addition, looking at the securitization process of migration that the EU has been constructed for many years and especially the developments after 2015, it can be predicted that it will not have a positive approach towards CIM. Although the securitization of CIM has not occurred exactly as ST stated, the securitizing process has been started.

Overall, there is still significant progress needed in the fields of both natural and social sciences regarding the examination of migration and the underlying climate change factors that contribute to it. The subject of CIM is going to undoubtedly stay relevant as a result of ongoing climate change and its adverse impact on the environment. Nonetheless, there is confusion regarding whether the EU will continue to recognise CIM as a distinct form of human movement, and the future actions of the EU are still unclear. The main hindrances could be the challenge of demonstrating a direct linkage between climate change and migration, a definitive method of identifying these migrants as well as the not easy forecast of the adverse impact of climate change both globally and within the EU. All those uncertainties would cause the EU to change its methods while securitizing the CIM and adopt more governance and adaptation strategies since the phenomenon is not as direct as

what is with migration. Therefore, more work needs to be done not only to analyze and understand the factors affecting CIM by using the holistic approach, including the researchers from different branches but also to modify and stretch the perspective of the ST to trace the securitization of CIM within the EU policies. The topic of CIM is expected to remain significant due to the persistent climate change and its detrimental effects on the ecosystem. However, there is uncertainty still continues over whether the EU will maintain its recognition of CIM as a separate type of human migration and the future course of action by the EU. The primary obstacle may include the difficulty of establishing a clear connection between climate change and migration, the lack of a conclusive approach to identifying these migrants, and the challenging task of accurately predicting the negative effects of climate change on a worldwide scale and within the EU. Let there be no misconception here; it is certain that there will be adverse impacts, but it is very difficult to predict its magnitude, where and how those will occur. The uncertainties surrounding the CIM would prompt the EU to modify its approaches in terms of securitization towards implementation of more governance and adaption strategies with the developing countries. This is because the phenomenon is not as straightforward as the general migration. Hence, further efforts are required to comprehensively examine and comprehend the elements influencing CIM through a holistic approach including scholars from other disciplines. Additionally, it is necessary to adjust and expand the perspective of the ST in order to trace the process of securitization of CIM within EU policy.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The objective of this study was to evaluate the process of securitization of EU's migration and asylum policy, specifically focusing on the climate-induced migration (CIM) using the Securitization Theory developed by the Copenhagen School. During the research process, it was seen that the securitization of CIM is the intersection of policies that treat climate change and migration as matters of security. However, since the study primarily focuses on the migration and asylum policies of the EU, the flow of the study is aimed to examine the process of securitizing migration, subsequently the securitization securitization of the CIM. Therefore, to fully comprehend the various aspects of how the securitization of CIM is implemented in EU migration policies, one must adopt the EU's attitude to migration.

The inclusion of literature and dicsussions on securitization theory, as well as the securitization process of migration and CIM, is necessary to establish a theoretical and conceptual framework prior to examining the EU. Then, the discussion focuses the EU. However, these are not the main purpose of this study because the main point to be shown is whether the securitization processes of the general migration phenomenon and CIM in EU policies are successful by making a comprehensive comparison with the tools, mechanisms and instruments of the ST after analyzing the securitization process of both migration and CIM within the scope of EU policies. Therefore, the thesis looked at whether the securitization of migration and/or CIM has been achieved and to what extent it has been achieved and it is also aimed to evaluate these two phenomena from both theoretical (ST) and practical (process tracing) perspectives.

Within this particular framework, according to the scholarly literature traces the origins of constructing fences to migrants in the EU as far back as the 1980s since

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EU has started to implement the SEA during that time to facilitate the unrestricted movement of goods, services, capital, and labour force. This measure helped safeguard the internal market, maintain stability within the EU, and establish policies to enhance security at external borders. Consequently, a two-way security shield was built against immigration. The adoption of the Schengen Acquis in the same years marked the beginning of the securitization movement towards migration too alongside the SEA since the official document explicitly mentions the aim is to combat illegal immigration and organised crime by prioritising internal stability and protection of external borders oft the Union (Bigo, 1994; Geddes, 2000; Lavenex, 2001).

According to ST, the use of speech acts played a crucial role in this movement since these are fundamentally a strategic actions aimed at enhancing security. Hence, in this study, since that time, the securitizing approach to migration has been identified through process tracing within the EU's asylum and migration policies. While the securitization of migration within the EU's policies is examined by process tracing, it is seen that there are breaking points that play a key role in the securitization of migration in the EU: the terrorist attacks that occurred within the EU following 9/11, largest ever enlargement of the Union in 2004, and the migration process that transpired in 2015 following the Arab Spring (Boswell, 2007; Faist, 2004; Yıldız, 2016a). These factors contributed to the societal approval of the securitizing speech act about immigration.

It can also be argued that these events do not contribute to securitization alone; in addition, the EU develops various securitizing approaches against migration such as such as the EU's cultural identity, specifically the concept of European identity have been constructed by the EU since the 1990s. This fundamentally impacts the building of the dichotomy between "us" and "them" and the exclusion and even vilification of individuals who are not part of the Union. Lastly, it is understood that the perception of the welfare state, which turns into chauvinism at many points, also contributes to the securitization process of migration. This perception portrays migrants as illegal beneficiaries of the welfare state's benefits (Huysmans, 2006).

The securitizing discourses and actions of these actors regarding migration have become more accepted in the EU society over time. Since this accepted view further encouraged the EU to invest in this field, highly migratory institutional structures were established over time. In all these processes, it has been observed that different securitizing actors play role about the construting the migration as a existential therat regarding the existence of EU, and in this context, many speech acts including written and discourse to eliminate migration with the extraordinary measurements have been observed within the EU. One of the biggest contributers apart from the EU institutions, is burgeoning presence of right-wing political parties in Europe, as their rhetoric proved to be electorally advantageous. The emergence of identity threat narratives surrounding immigration has prompted a societal response since in light of these factors above, securitizing discourses have gained increased attention. Consequently, the intensity of securitizing discourse has escalated, leading to heightened fear within society. This fear has, in turn, resulted in political parties garnering more votes. It has nearly evolved into a recurring pattern (Faist, 2004; Güler, 2023). Thus, the securitization of migration and the effective implementation of a fences against migrants within the EU involve multiple individuals and institutions, rather than a single person or entity.

The speech act and policies of these actors in relation to migration have gained increasing acceptance in EU society over time. Since this accepted view further encouraged the EU to invest in this field, highly complex and technologic institutional structures has been established over time. Therefore, according to this study, when evaluated from the ST perspective, the EU has had an approach towards the securitization of migration for many years. It does this through both EU institutions, representatives and politicians in the member states. In addition, the discourses and policies of these actors find a response and even support in the audience. Moreover, over the course of those years, tthe EU has also developed instruments while securitizing migration. Although these instruments are especially regarding the externalization process of migration since the motivation behind those is actually the security-oriented approach, they also help to securitize migration more and more. These are very restrictive visa policies, cooperation with countries outside of the Union by funding, and EU migration authorises and systems such as

FRONTEX, EUROPOL, VIS, SIS, etc (Boswell, 2003; Yıldız, 2016a). Therefore, this study contributes to what most scholars state about the objective of the EU, which is to prevent the entry of migrants from outside the Union before they reach the Union's exterior frontiers. Furthermore, this study states that these interventions regarding migration is actually the extraordinary measurement appied by the securitizing actor to eliminate the existential threat in accordance with the ST. Thus, it may be inferred that the securitization of migration in the EU is observable.

When it comes to the securitization journey of CIM within EU policies, it is important to note that it is a much newer phenomenon than general migration both globally and within the EU. Therefore, the securitization process is quite new compared to general migration. According to ST, in a successful securitization process, a clear and repeated securitization move - speech ach - should be made against the existential threat, and it is aimed to be accepted by the audience because only in this way will extraordinary measurements to eliminate the threat be legitimized. Upon closer examination of CIM, it becomes evident that this is not entirely accurate. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the absence of a securitization movement.

From a theoretical perspective, which is ST of CS, the maximalist and security threat-oriented approaches in the EU's discourse that millions of climate-induced migrants will come to the EU and bring both security and disease threats are interpreted as the speech act. However, here it is understood that the speech act is more indirect than being direct towards the existential threat - CIM - as defined by ST. For example, in the EU documents, CIM is not specifically addressed but rather is located next to the general environment, climate change, food and energy insecurity, helping developing countries to combat adverse impacts of climate change, resource shortages, etc (Eur-LEX, 2019b; European Commission, 2016). Aside from documents, while the discourse has been analysed in general, it is seen that the securitization discourse regarding the CIM has been used mostly by the right populist parties in the EU.

The representatives of the official EU institutions are focused especially on improving the capacities of the MENA region, which is seen as the most potential

origin of irregular migration by the EU with the funding mechanisms. This situation is essentially similar to readmission agreements within the scope of general migration, which keep at bay migrants arriving at the EU borders. Here, monetary agreements with the MENA region, which has the potential for immigration to the EU and will be negatively affected by climate change, are aimed at adapting to the climate. This situation is considered essentially a securitizing move, as the aim here, as stated by scholars, is to maintain the security of the EU by preventing migration from the MENA region because, as the latest development in the EU has shown which is New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the Union wants to choose the immigrants who will come to it. Therefore, this study also contributes to the fact that the EU has designed a CIM policy with a remote control approach, which has a totally security-oriented basis rather than a humanitarian one.

The EU's stance on CIM, as scholars point out, is hence security-oriented since, as it has been shown in the Comparison of Securitization of Migration and Securitization of CIM in the EU Policies chapter, the developments in tracing the securitization process of CIM in the EU show this. For example, despite it being stated that their number will reach millions and that there is a possibility of migrating to the EU in EU official documents, the same EU lacks a definition for these individuals and its responsibilities in this regard. This lack of definition is so pronounced that these migrants are not even covered by the Temporary Protection Directive (Duffield & Evans, 2011; Trombetta, 2014). It also follows that, when considering the securitization of CIM, it is important to take into account that the EU has such strong institutional structures and instruments for migration since investing so much in such powerful systems such as FRONTEX, EUROPOL, VIS, SIS etc means that CIM is also the subject of these mechanisms, which do not have any criteria or regulation to separate CIM. According to Boswell (2003), in the securitization process, externalization tools have been institutionalized; hence, this makes it easier to integrate the CIM into the existing mechanism (Trombetta, 2014).

Rather than saying that there is a direct successful securitization process for CIM in this 20-year period compared to ST, it would be more accurate to say that there have been securitization initiatives within the EU for CIM since there are actors, the

audience, securitizing move existential threat and externalization instruments but those are not as concrete and obvious as securitization of migration. Although it is concluded that the securitization process of CIM is forecasted to worsen in the future in the EU, many more studies, both empirical and theoretical, are needed on this subject. There is no single reason for this. Namely, while the migration-security nexus is already a problematic relationship, the climate change-migration-security nexus is much more complicated and complex. Recent studies on this are still trying to understand the dynamics that trigger CIM because human mobility related to climate-induced is shaped by many different parameters, and many of CIM have so far occurred within the same country.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Günümüzde göç, dünya genelinde iklim değişikliğine bağlı sıcaklık artışları ve yağış düzensizliklerinin doğal bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkabilen bir olgudur. İklim kaynaklı düzensizliklerin ve aşırılıkların artmasına paralel olarak bu olumsuzluklar neticesinde insan hareketliliğinde de artış olacağını söylemek oldukça mümkündür. Bu konudaki literatür incelendiğinde, iklim kaynaklı göç konusunda halihazırda çok sayıda araştırmanın yapıldığı ve bu çalışmaların pek çoğunda somut veriler sunularak konuya dikkat çekildiği görülebilmektedir.

Literatürde, araştırmacılar insanların göç etme nedenlerini (1) gelir dağılımındaki farklılıklar ve iş aramayı içeren ekonomik faktörler; (2) siyasi görüş farklılıklarından kaynaklanan ülke içi çatışmalar da dahil olmak üzere siyasi faktörler; (3) belirli bir bölgedeki nüfus değişkenliği de dahil olmak üzere demografik faktörler; (4) kültürel ve geleneksel uygulamaları içeren sosyal faktörler ve (5) ekosistemle ilgili çevresel faktörler olacak şekilde beş temel grup altında tanımlamaktadır. İklim kaynaklı göç olgusu üzerine ise 1990'lı yılların başından bu yana siyaset bilimci, iktisatçı, çevreci gibi farklı disiplinlerden uzmanlar, araştırmacılar ve demograflar iklim değişikliği ile göç arasındaki bağlantıyı incelemekte olup genel olarak, bu alandaki çalışmalar iklim değişikliğinin göçü etkileyen faktörlerden yalnızca biri olduğu ancak doğrudan tek faktör olmadığı konusunda hemfikirdir. Konuyla ilgili yayınlanan ilk çalışmalarda bir taraf, güvenlik ile çevre arasında bağlantı kurularak yüksek politika oluşturulmasının siyasi bilincin gelişmesine katkı sağlayacağını ve dolayısıyla çevre sorunlarının hem çözümüne hem de güvenliğin sağlanacağını savunurken diğer taraf ise çevre sorunlarının güvenlikle ilişkilendirilmesinin işbirlikçi tutumlara karşı çatışmalı bir duruma yol açacağı uyarısında bulunmuştur. Bu tartışmalara rağmen güvenlik ile iklim kaynaklı göç arasındaki ilişkisi kurulmaya başlanarak son

dönemde aşırı hava koşulları, kuraklık, kıtlık, iklim değişikliği gibi çevresel olumsuzlukların sıklığı ve şiddetinin artması sonucu göçün arttığı düşüncesi nedeniyle göçün iç ve/veya küresel güvenliğe olası bir tehdit olarak algılanması gündeme gelmektedir. Bu fikir doğrultusunda, iklim kaynaklı göçün uluslararası bir güvenlik sorunu olduğuna ilişkin tartışmalar giderek popüler hale gelmekte ve dolayısı ile hem literatürde hem de politika oluşturma sürecinde kendine yer bulmaya başlamaktadır. İklim kaynaklı göçün potansiyel güvenlik tehdidine yönelik tartışmalar, yukarıda bahsedilen tartışmalara benzer iki zıt temel fikirden etkilenmektedir. Bunlardan ilki çevreci/ maksimalist yaklaşımlar olup büyük ölçekli nüfus hareketliliğinin doğrudan küresel ısınmanın, özellikle deniz seviyeleri ve yağış düzenleri üzerindeki etkilerinden kaynaklanacağını ileri sürerek bir yandan bu göçlerin durdurulması için harekete geçilmesini diğer yandan ise iklim değişikliği nedeniyle yerlerinden edilenleri de hesaba katan daha geniş bir mülteci tanımı talep etmektedirler. Bu yaklaşımdaki genel varsayım, göçün doğası gereği zararlı olduğu ve mümkün olan her yerde engellenmesi gerektiğidir. Diğer yaklaşıma göre ise iklim kaynaklı göç maksimalist düşüncenin aksine büyük ölçekli olmayacaktır.

Bu tez çalışması kapsamında, iklim kaynaklı göç olgusu ve bu olgunun nasıl ele alındığından ziyade Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) göç ve sığınma politikaları kapsamında iklim kaynaklı göçün bir güvenlik sorunu olarak ele alınma süreci incelenmektedir. Bu analiz gerçekleştirilirken Kopenhag Okulu'nun Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi ve onun araçlarından faydalanılmaktadır. Güvenlikleştirme teorisi, normal şartlar altında güvenlik tehdidi olmayan bir olgunun, durumun ya da grubun güvenlikleştirici aktörler tarafından güvenlik tehdidi olarak inşa edilmesi ve bu tehdidin ortadan kaldırılması ya da etkisiz hale getirilmesi için politika üstü tedbirlerin meşrulaştırılması sürecinin incelenmesidir. Teoriye göre güvenlik, belirli bir sosyal uygulama veya süreç biçimi olarak tanımlanır. Bir diğer ifade ile güvenlik, bir değer veya koşuldan ziyade, siyasi aktörler tarafından ifade edilen ve toplumda karşılığı verilen bir konuşma eylemidir. Teoride herhangi bir konu veya olgunun güvenlik meselesine dönüşme sürecinde nasıl istisnai bir durum olarak meşrulaştırıldığı üzerinde durulmaktadır. Dolayısıyla siyasi aktörler herhangi bir kavramı konuşma eylemiyle güvenlik meselesine dönüştürürken aynı zamanda sorunu ele alma ve çözme aracı olarak da kullanmaktadır. Bir olgunun güvenlikleştirilme sürecinin

anlaşılabilmesi için iki konunun incelenmesi gerektiğini ifade edilmektedir. Bunlardan ilki, bir konunun, belirlenmiş bir referans nesnesine yönelik varoluşsal bir tehdit olarak tanımlayan bir konuşma eyleminin siyasi aktörler/seçkinler tarafından dile getirilip getirilmediğini kontrol edilmesi gerekliliğidir. Diğeri ise hedef kitlenin güvenlikleştirme kapsamındaki söz ediminde tanımlanan olguyu kabul ettiğine dair işaretlerin olup olmadığını kontrol edilmesidir. Teori aynı zamanda güvenlikleştirmeyi, konunun sadece askeri güç kullanmak yerine varoluşsal bir tehdide dönüştürülmesi, normal siyasi araçlar yerine istisnai politikalar kapsamına alınması ve bu bağlamda tedbirlerin geliştirilmesi olarak da tanımlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda AB'deki duruma geri dönüldüğünde, geleneksel olarak güvenlik kapsamına girmeyen göç ve iklim değişikliği gibi olguların aslında varoluşsal bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak inşa edilerek bu konulara ilişkin politikaların geliştirilmesi gerektiği algısının ortaya çıktığı gözlenmektedir. AB'nin iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik güvenlikleştirici tutumunu analiz edilirken süreci sadece iklim kaynaklı göçe indirgeyerek tartışmak doğru bir yaklaşım olmamaktadır çünkü birliğin 1990'lı yılların başından itibaren sınır güvenliği konusunda birçok güvenlikleştirici çabası sarf söz konusudur. Bu çabaların arkasında ise tek bir neden ya da gerekçeden ziyade toplumsal, ekonomik ve güvenlik odaklı bir birleşimin olduğu anlaşılmaktadır zira göç üye devletler tarafından Birliğin varlığına yönelik varoluşsal bir tehdit olarak görülmektedir.

Çalışmada metodoloji olarak ise süreç takibi kullanılmaktadır çünkü süreç takibi ile bağımlı ve bağımsız değişkenler arasındaki nedensel yollar belirlenmektedir. Böylece teori kapsamında çünkü süreç takibi yaparak, bir olgunun güvenlikleştirilmesine neden olan konuların veya olayların sırası takip edilerek AB içerisindeki hem genel göç olgusuna hem de iklim kaynaklı göç olgusuna bütünsel bir şekilde bakılmaktadır. Bu yöntem güvenlikleştirme teorisi ile de örtüşmektedir çünkü süreç takibi ile amaç, teori kapsamında bir olgunun güvenlikleştirilmesine neden olan konu veya olayların sırasını ve sırasını takip etmektir. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada süreç takibi, AB'nin göç politikaları bağlamında iklim kaynaklı göçe yaklaşımını kavrayabilmek maksadı ile nedenler ve sonuçlar arasındaki ilişki, AB'nin göç ve sığınma politikalarının güvenlikleştirilmesi sürecinin izini sürmek maksadı ile uygulanmaktadır. Tüm bunlar yapılırken literatür taraması, AB'nin resmi

yayınları, akademik çalışmalar, ikincil kaynaklar, resmî web siteleri ve uluslararası kuruluşlardan elde edilen bilgi ve veriler analiz edilmektedir. Süreç takibi ile AB'de göçün güvenlikleştirilme sürecine neden olan dört ana gelişme olduğu görülmektedir. AB'de göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinin Tek Avrupa Senedi ve Schengen Anlaşması ile iç pazarının dış müdahalelerden korunması fikrini ile başladığı görülmektedir. Buradan hareketle, göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinin öncelikle Tek Avrupa Senedi ile bir tehdit olarak kavramsallaştırıldığı, daha sonra AB dışından gelen kişilerin giriş prosedürlerine ilişkin acil önlemler alınması fikrini destekleyen ve göçün kontrol altına alınmasını amaçlayan Schengen Anlaşması'nın ile sınır güvenliğine yönelik tedbirlerin uygulanmaya başlandığı görülmektedir. Bu gelişmelerin ardından Birliğin on devleti kapsayan en büyük genişlemesi olan AB'nin Doğuya doğru genişlemesi, ardından 9/11 ile başlayan ve Madrid, Londra ve Paris saldırıları ile devam eden terör saldırıları gibi Birlik açısından daha somut gelişmeler yaşanmıştır. Son olarak ise 2011 Arap Baharı'nın sonrası yaşanan göç, dışarıdan gelen insanların giderek artan bir tehdit olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. Buna ek olarak Birlik içerisinde giderek etkinliğini artıran aşırı sağ popülist partilerin göç karşıtı söylemlerinin toplumda yukarıda sayılan gelişmeler ışığında bir karşılık bulması göçmenlerin politik açıdan ötekileştirilmesini de beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu gelişmeler neticesinde AB, sınır güvenliğinin artırılmasına, göç akışlarının geri kabul anlaşmaları ve daha birlik sınırına gelmeden engellenmesine odaklanarak son derece güçlü göçle mücadele sistemine sahip olmaya başlamıştır. İklim değişikliği kaynaklı göçe gelindiğinde ise, AB'de 2000'lerin başında giderek daha fazla ele alınmaya başlanan bir olgu olduğu görülse de genel göçün güvenlikleştirilme sürecinde önemli noktalar olarak ifade edilen olayların göç türü ayırt etmeksizin Birlik genelinde göçün bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak görülmesine neden olduğu ve bu durumun iklim kaynaklı göçü de etkilediği görülmüştür.

AB'nin genel göç kavramına yönelik güvenlikleştirme süreci analiz edildiğinde 40 yıla yaklaşan bir süre içerisinde göç ve göçmenlerin giderek terör, organize suç, toplumsal düzenin bozulması gibi kavramlar ile özdeşleştirildiği ve bu kapsamda politikalarının şekillendiği görülmektedir. İklim değişikliği kaynaklı göçe yönelik güvenlikleştirme sürecinin ise genel göç kavramına göre daha yavaş ilerlediği

anlaşılmaktadır. Bunun temel sebebi ise iklim kaynaklı göçün daha az tecrübe edilmesi ve bu meselenin hala geleceğin bir parçası olarak görülmesidir.

Bu tezin ikinci kısmında ise AB'nin genel göç ve iklim kaynaklı göç kavramlarının güvenlikleştirilme süreci güvenlikleştirme teorisinin araçları ile ele alınmaktadır. Bu çalışma yapılırken genel göç ile iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik güvenlikleştirme sürecinin, teorinin araçları ile uyumlu olup olmadığını ayrı ayrı ele alınmakta ve hem bu iki kavramın teori ile uyumlarına hem de her iki olgunun birbiri ile kıyası yapılmaktadır. Kopenhag Okulu'nun geliştirdiği güvenlikleştirme teorisinde ifade edildiği şekli ile güvenlikleştirici aktör tarafından herhangi bir olguya yönelik ifade edilen söz edimlerinin izleyici tarafından kabul görmesi sonucu olağanüstü tedbirlerin alınması süreçleri genel göç ve iklim kaynaklı göç başlıkları için ayrı ayrı değerlendirildiğinde genel göç kavramına yönelik güvenlikleştirme teorisi araçlarının Birlik göç ve sığınma politikaları kapsamında somut bir şekilde inşa edildiği görülmektedir. Teoriye göre söz edimleri salt söylemlerden oluşmamakta yazılı beyanlar da söz edimi olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu kapsamda AB'nin birlik düzeyindeki göç ve sığınma politikalarına yönelik yazılı resmî belgeleri (kanunlar, düzenlemeler, yönetmelikler, tavsiye kararları vs.) ile resmi kurum temsilcileri tarafından göçe yönelik sözlü ifadelere bakıldığında düzenli aralıklar ile göç ve göçmenlerin AB'nin mevcut bütünlüğüne ve geleceğine yönelik bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak inşa edildiği görülebilmektedir. Buna ek olarak Birlik içerisinde yer alan ve bilhassa Almanya, İtalya, Fransa ve Macaristan'da yükselişte olan sağ popülist parti söylemlerinde de göç ve göçmenlerin benzer şekilde olumsuz konumlandırıldığı ve hem kendi ülkeleri hem de AB için birer tehdit olarak görüldüğü anlaşılmaktadır. Ancak güvenlikleştirmeden bahsedilebilmesi için bu söz edimlerinin izleyici tarafından kabul görmesi gerekmektedir. Aksi halde olağanüstü tedbirlerin ortaya konulabilmesi oldukça zordur. Bu kapsamda hem birlik genelinde hem de aşırı sağın yükselişte olduğu dört üye devlet özelinde izleyici algısına bakıldığında görülmektedir ki her iki durum için de izleyicinin – ki burada kamuoyudur – vermiş olduğu tepki göçün güvenlik tehdidi olarak algılanması ile uyumludur. Sonuç olarak genel göç kavramı özelinde güvenlikleştirme teorisinin araçları AB'de gözlemlenebilmektedir.

İklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik de aynı analiz gerçekleştirildiğinde ise sonuçların genel göç teorisi kadar kesin ve net olmadığı anlaşılmaktadır. Bir diğer ifade ile, teorinin araçlarından söz edimine göçte olduğu gibi birincil kaynaklarda olmasa da tavsiye kararlarda, Avrupa Parlamentosu raporlarında ve anlaşmalarda rastlanmaktadır. Buna ek olarak genel göç olgusunda olduğu gibi aşırı sağın yükselişte olduğu dört birlik üyesi özelinde de (Almanya, İtalya, Fransa, Macaristan) iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik güvenlikleştirici söylemler görülmektedir. Söylemlerin izleyicide bir karşılığı olup olmadığına bakıldığında ise doğrudan kesin bir yargıya varmanın doğru olmadığı görülmektedir zira her ne kadar iklim değişikliği ve göç ayrı ayrı AB vatandaşları tarafından birer tehdit olarak görülse de iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik doğrudan bir araştırma bulunmamaktadır. Benzer şekilde sağ popülist partilere oy verme motivasyonu ile iklim kaynaklı göç bağlantısının da bu aşamada sağlıklı bir şekilde kurulamamaktadır. Dolayısı ile her ne kadar güvenlikleştirici söylem ve aktörler mevcut olsa da iklim kaynaklı göç özelinde başarılı bir güvenlikleştirmeden teorinin araçları kapsamında bahsedilememektedir.

AB'de iç sınırların kaldırılması ile dış sınırların güçlendirilmesi arasında bir ilişki mevcuttur. Başka bir deyişle, bu konular arasında negatif korelasyon olduğundan daha güçlü dış sınırlar demek daha görünmez iç sınırlar anlamına gelmektedir. Bunun sonucunda AB, Ortak Avrupa Sığınma Sistemi adı altında dış sınırlarına doğru istenmeyen insan hareketliliğini önlemek için çeşitli araçlar geliştirmeye başlamış ve bunları zaman içinde giderek güçlendirmiş ve güçlendirmeye de devam etmektedir. Bu süreçte AB, göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinde iki farklı stratejiyi uygulamaya koymuştur. Bu araçlar iç ve dış olarak değerlendirilmektedir. İç düzeyde AB, sınır güvenliğini güçlendirmek ve düzensiz hareketlere yönelik kısıtlamaları önlemek veya kontrol etmek için kendi güçlü politikalarını ve mekanizmalarını oluşturmak için önemli çabalar sarf etmiştir. Buna ek olarak, dış düzeyde ise Birliğin, çevre ülkeleri düzensiz göç hareketleriyle mücadeleye aktif olarak katılmaya zorlamaya başladığı görülmektedir. Dışarıdan gelen insanların Birliğe girmesini engellemeyi veya zorlaştırmayı amaçlayan tüm bu AB stratejileri, göç kontrolünün dışsallaştırılması olarak tanımlanmakta ve AB'de göçe yönelik dışsallaştırıcı bu yaklaşımlar esasında göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinin doğrudan bir sonucudur. Amaç, düzensiz göçü ele alacak araçlar oluşturmak ve bu tür göçe karşı kontrolleri ve

önlemleri uygulamaktır. Böylece güvenlikleştirme teorisine güvenlik tehdidi kavramı dahil edilerek süreç ilerletilmektedir. Bu gelişmeler, 2004 Birliğim doğu genişlemesi, birlik içerisinde 9/11 sonrasında meydana gelen terör saldırıları ve Arap Baharı gibi AB'nin göç ve sığınma politikalarına yönelik göçün güvenlikleştirilmesine ilişkin dönüm noktalarının kısmi sonuçları olarak değerlendirilmekte ve belirli göçmen kontrol işlevlerini çevre ülkelere kaydırarak dışsallaştırma gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bu kapsamda AB'nin göç için kullandığı üç ana uzaktan kontrol aracı vardır: (1) vize politikası, (2) AB dışındaki ülkelerle iş birliği: geri kabul anlaşmaları ve ortaklıklar, (3) FRONTEX, EUROPOL, EURODAC, EUROPOL, VIS, SIS gibi göç ve sığınma akışlarını kontrol etmeye yönelik araçlarıdır. Bu kapsamda AB şimdiye kadar 18 ülke ile geri kabul anlaşması imzalayarak ekonomik ve teknik kapasite geliştirme karşılığı göçmenler hususunda bu ülkeler ile anlaşmış durumdadır. Buna ek olarak, sınır güvenliği ve göçe ayrılan AB bütçesi 2021-2027 dönemi için şimdiden 34,9 milyar avroya yükselmesiyle bu sürece yönelik yatırımların da giderek arttığı sonucuna varılmaktadır. Bu araçların çeşitlendirilmesi ve geliştirilmesi, göçün yönetimine karşı olağanüstü tedbirlerin meşrulaştırılması ve normalleştirilmesidir. Bu nedenle Birliğe giriş prosedürlerinin sıkılaştırılması, düzensiz göçmenleri harekete geçirmek için AB dışı ülkelerle iş birliğinin artırılması ve düzensiz göçü önlemek için oluşturulan kurum ve araçlara yönelik bütçe harcamalarının artırılması, AB'nin göçe yaklaşımının giderek daha güvenlik odaklı hale geldiğinin de göstergesidir. İklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik geliştirilen uzaktan kontrol araçlarına bakıldığında ise adaptasyon, dayanıklılık ve iş birliği üzerinden ilerleme çalışıldığı görülmektedir. Birlik kendisini, halihazırda hem iktisadi hem de iklim değişikliği bağlamında kırılgan olan Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesinden gelebilecek göçün varış noktası olarak tanımlamakta olduğundan bu bölgeden gelebilecek göçü engellemek için de az gelişmiş ülkelerle dayanıklılık ve iklim değişikliğine yönelik adaptasyon çalışmaları kapsamında iş birliği yapma yoluna gitmektedir. Bu kapsamda 2024 yılında hayata geçirilen yeni paketle Afrika'ya 2030 yılına kadar iklim, altyapı ve riskli alanların azaltılması için 150 milyar avroluk fon ayrılacağı açıklanmıştır.

İklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik bu proaktif politikalar, yalnızca iklim değişikliğinin olumsuz etkilerinin ortadan kaldırılmasına yönelik değil, aynı zamanda AB'ye

yönelik olası iklim kaynaklı göçün de önlenmesine yöneliktir. Bu nedenle, Birliğin stratejisi öncelikle insani kaygılardan ziyade kendi güvenliğe odaklanmaktır. Bu gelişmeler göstermektedir ki AB'nin esasında uyguladığı bu uzaktan kontrol politikaları kendi güvenlik çıkarlarını korumaya yöneliktik özünde çünkü eğer amaç insani ve kalkınma odaklı olsa idi maddi yardımdan çok daha fazlasını yapmak gerekirdi. Bunun temel sebebi ise bölgesel çatışmalar, yoksulluk ve az gelişmişlik gibi altta yatan ana zorlukları azaltabilmek için finansal yardım tek başına yeterli değildir. Dolayısıyla iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik bu yaklaşım iklim kaynaklı göçün güvenlikleştirilme süreci ile de uyumludur. Buna ek olarak, analiz sonucu göstermektedir ki birlik içerisindeki güvenliğin, hassas bölgelerin geliştirilmesi ve iklim değişikliğiyle mücadelede adaptasyonun artırılması ile sağlanacağı vurgusunun bir güvenlikleştirme aracı olarak görülmektedir çünkü birlik içerisinde kamuoyunda bu insanların göç etmesine gerek kalmayacağı, alternatif çözümlerin var olduğuna dair inanç yaratılarak AB'nin bu konuda elinden gelen her şeyi yaptığına dair bir algı da oluşturulmaktadır. Böylece doğrudan kalkınma yatırımları yapılarak olası bir göç dalgasının sınırlarına ulaşmadan engellenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Ancak yine de iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik somut bir güvenlikleştirme yerine bir güvenlikleştirme girişimi ya da güvenlikleştirme hareketi olduğunu söylemek bu çalışmaya göre çok daha doğru olmaktadır.

İklim kaynaklı göçü tetikleyen unsurlara bakıldığında insanların göç etme motivasyonlarının arkasında her daim tek başına iklim değişikliğinin bir itici güç olmadığı; buna ek olarak hızlı (deprem, volkanik patlama, heyelan, ani sel gibi) ya da yavaş etki eden iklimsel olayların (deniz seviyesi yükselmesi, aşırı sıcaklık, okyanus asitlenmesi, buzulların erimesi, arazi ve orman bozulması, biyolojik çeşitliliğin kaybı, çölleşme gibi), sosyo-ekonomik ve coğrafya gibi unsurların da göz önünde bulundurulması sonucu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Dolayısı ile iklim değişikliği kaynaklı göçe yönelik daha fazla akademik çalışmanın yapılmasına ihtiyaç duyulmakta ve bu çalışma ile, göç, güvenlik ve iklim değişikliği arasındaki karmaşık ilişki ortaya konularak, AB politikalarında güvenlikleştirici dinamikler bağlamında hem genel göç hem de iklim kaynaklı göç ile ilgili mevcut akademik literatüre katkıda bulunma hedeflenmektedir. AB göç ve sığınma politikalarının giderek güvenlik odaklı hale gelmesi nedeniyle bu durumun gelecekte iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik de bir ayrıcalık

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kalmayacağı şeklinde yorumlanabilmektedir. Bunun bir diğer sebebi ise AB, yatırımlarla göçe ilişkin kurumsal altyapısını ve teknolojisini her geçen gün artırmaktadır. Sistemin istenmeyen göçmenlerin ayrıştırılması üzerinden çalışması nedeniyle bu durumun gelecekte iklim kaynaklı göçü de içerisine alacak şekilde geliştirilmesi olasıdır. Son olarak ise, yakın gelecekte iklim değişikliğinin olumsuz etkileri tüm dünyada olduğu gibi Avrupa'da da giderek daha görünür hale gelecektir. Bu durum büyük olasılıkla AB içinde giderek daha fazla seçmen tarafından desteklenen sağ popülist partiler tarafından topluma bir güvenlik sorunu olarak sunulacaktır. Böylece güvenlikleştirme teorisinin tanımladığı gibi güvenlikleştirici aktör ile izleyici arasındaki etkileşim çok daha görünür olacaktır. Tüm bunlara ek olarak bir diğer önemli husus ise AB'nin esasında iklim kaynaklı göçmene yönelik resmi bir tanımlamayı mevzuat seviyesinde hala yapmamış olmasıdır. Buna gerekçe olarak ise 1951 Mültecilerin Hukuki Durumuna Dair Sözleşmesi kapsamındaki mülteci tanımı içerisinde iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik bir ifade ya da açıklamanın yapılmadığı gösterilmektedir. Ek olarak iklim kaynaklı göçmenlere yönelik mülteci tipi korumaya da ihtiyaç olmadığı ayrıca belirtilmektedir. Güvenlikleştirme analizi göstermektedir ki iklim kaynaklı göçmenlere yönelik doğrudan bir tanımlamanın olmaması da bu kişilerin görmezden gelinerek esasında geleneksel olmayan bir şekilde güvenlikleştirme olarak yorumlanabilmektedir. Ancak iklim değişikliği yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi küresel olarak her yeri ayrı ayrı ve farklı şekilde olumsuz etkilemektedir. Dolayısı ile bu konuda nasıl bir tanım yapılmasına yönelik daha fazla çalışmanın da yapılması önemlidir. Yine de iklim değişikliğinin olumsuz etkileri sebebi ile göç etmek zorunda kalan insanlara yönelik daha fazla sorumluluk alınması gerektiği de bir gerçektir çünkü bu insanlar, insan kaynaklı iklim değişikliğine katkı sağlamadıkları halde iklim değişikliğinin olumsuz etkilerinden en fazla etkilenenlerdir. Dolayısı ile burada belki de esas sorulması gereken soru tıpkı genel göç olgusunda olduğu gibi kimin güvenliği daha önemlidir sorusudur.

Sonuç olarak AB'nin göç ve sığınma politikaları kapsamında hem süreç izleme hem de güvenlikleştirilme teorisinin araçlarına göre genel göç ve iklim kaynaklı göç ayrı ayrı ele alındığında görülmüştür ki genel göçe yönelik güvenlikleştirme süreci çok uzun yıllardır devam etmekte olup teorinin araçları ile de uyumludur. Bunun yanında iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik doğrudan bu tespiti yapabilmek bu aşamada doğru

olmayacaktır. Bunun temel sebepleri ise şu şekilde tespit edilmiştir: öncelikle genel göç Birliğin daha önce karşılaştığı bir durumdur. Dolayısı ile yaşanan bir duruma yönelik olağanüstü tedbirlerin alınması güvenlikleştirici aktör açısından çok daha kolaydır zira izleyici olan kamuoyundan daha hızlı bir şekilde reaksiyon alabilecektir. Bunun ile uyumlu olacak şekilde iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik her ne kadar maksimalist veri milyonlarca insanın 2050'ye kadar AB'ye göç edebileceğini belirtse de bu durum halihazırda gerçekleşmiş değildir. Bu durum Birliğin iklim kaynaklı göçe karşı bir güvenlikleştirme süreci yürütmediği anlamına gelmemektedir zira geliştirmiş olduğu politikalar iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik proaktif tedbirler olduğundan güvenlikleştirme süreci genel göç olgusunun güvenlikleştirilmesi sürecinden daha farklı ilerlemektedir. Yine de iklim değişikliği gibi analiz edilmesi ve tahminler yapılması zor bir kavrama yönelik göç hareketi ve bu hareketin AB göç ve sığınma politikaları içerisinde güvenlik ile ilişkilendirilmesi sürecine yönelik daha fazla çalışmaya yakın gelecekte ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, geleneksel anlamda güvenlikleştirme teorisinin de genel göç olgusunda olduğundan daha geniş perspektiften yorumlandığı göz önüne alındığında teoriye yönelik de daha farklı çalışmaların yapılması iklim kaynaklı göçün AB içerisinde güvenlikleştirilme sürecine ışık tutacaktır. Dolayısı ile bu aşamada göç olgusundan farklı olarak iklim kaynaklı göçe yönelik Birlik içerisinde doğrudan somut bir güvenlikleştirmeden ziyade güvenlikleştirme girişimi ya da bir güvenlikleştirme hareketinin olduğu sonucuna teorinin araçlarına göre inceleme yapıldığında varılmıştır.

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