Critique of studies of the
*Kadro* (Cadre) movement

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Abstract

The study attempts to review major existing studies of the Kadro movement under three major issues. The first is the demagogic charge that Kadro was a communist propaganda tool, and the counter charge that it betrayed the socialist movement in Turkey. The second is the broader question of Kadro’s ideological roots, character and role. The third is Kadro’s place in development literature. The studies reviewed in this article are illuminating in many respects. The variety of approaches, however, makes it impossible to identify a common pattern of discussion. At the same time, it is possible to identify certain characteristic weaknesses in the existing literature, one of which is the lack of proper references to the Kadro journal itself. Another common weakness of many studies is their hasty identification of Kadro with the Galiyevist, Kemalist, fascist and communist views. The study concludes that most of the existing studies on the Kadro movement provide no clear or comprehensive picture of the ideology and economic development strategy of the Kadro movement, thus, suggesting that there is a strong need to work out the ideology and development strategy of the Kadro movement.

1. Introduction

Almost all studies concerning ideological tendencies, the economic and political development of Turkey in general, and the 1930s in particular, make some reference to the *Kadro* movement since it has been a deep-rooted and influential ideological movement. The subject has proved to be fruitful and controversial. It is fruitful because *Kadro* examined many significant subjects, ranging from current

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The movement takes after the name of the monthly journal, *Kadro* (Cadre), which was published in Turkey between January 1932 and November-December 1934. In total, 36 issues came out, the last of which combined the 35th and 36th issues. The average length of an issue was 50 pages. Cem Alpar edited the three volume facsimile copy of *Kadro* journal in 1978.
ideological tendencies of the time to development strategies in Turkey, as well as in the world. It is controversial since arguments of the Kadro writers were interpreted in so many different ways. A number of articles, some books and some M.A. and Ph.D. theses about the Kadro movement have appeared so far. As noted below, each study touched on one or more aspects of the Kadro movement. Examining all aspects of the Kadro movement is not possible in a single journal article. Thus, the present study is limited to the fulfillment of the task of providing a solid ground for my further two articles on the subject: “The Ideology of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey” (Türkeş, 1998) and “A Patriotic Leftist Development Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: the Case of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement” (soon to be published).

Here, the present study attempts to review the previous studies of the Kadro movement in the light of three major issues. The first is the controversial charge that Kadro was a ‘communist propaganda’ tool, and the counter-charge that it ‘betrayed’ the socialist movement in Turkey. The second is the broader question of Kadro’s ideological roots, character and role. The third issue is Kadro’s place in development literature. Finally, the study concludes with an assessment of the contributions and basic weaknesses of the existing studies of the Kadro movement.

2. The writers of Kadro journal

The monthly Kadro journal had a core of regular writers: Şevket Süreyya Aydemir was the ideologue, founder and inspiration of Kadro. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu was the legal licensee (franchise holder), Vedat Nedim Tör was the editor, while Ismail Hüsev Tökin and Burhan Asaf Belge were regular contributors from the very beginning. Mehmet Şevki Yazman became a regular contributor after the 13th issue, but does not appear to have participated in the original decision to publish the monthly Kadro journal. Some other prominent writers of the time also contributed to the journal.

3. Controversial charges

To turn to the first of the issues identified above, Tevetoğlu (1967: 443-460), Sayilgan (1967 and 1968) and Darendelioğlu (1961), pointing to Aydemir, Tökin, Belge and Tör’s involvement in leftist parties in the first half of the 1920s, argue

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2 Ahmet Hamdi Başar, Falih Rifki Atay, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, Eflatun Cem Gülney, Muhlis Etem Ete, İbrahim Necmi Dilmen, Abdurrahman Şefik, Münir İriboz, Münatuz Ziya, Şakir Hazım, Neşet Halil Atay, Hakki Mahir, Mehmet İihan, Tahir Hayrettin and Mansur Tekin were occasional contributors to the Kadro journal. İsmet İnönü, the late former Prime Minister, contributed once.
that Kadro was a continuation of ‘subversive communist propaganda’. This is an ill-founded charge and Kadro cannot be regarded as subversive communist propaganda. Türkeş (1998: 92-119) shows that the Kadro writers were eclectic, patriotic and influenced by Marxism.

Naci Bostancı, in his book, *Kadrocular ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Görüşleri* (The Kadroists and their Socio-Economic Views), which is one of the books specifically devoted to Kadro, puts Kadro in a Marxist category and criticizes the Kadro writers for being imperfectly prepared. Bostancı (1990: 43) notes that:

“had the Kadro writers attempted to formulate an ideology, first they should have known contemporary thinkers well, such as Maks [Max] Weber and Werner Sombart”.

It is true that the Kadro writers did not refer to Weber’s works in their Kadro articles, or in any of their other works, and presumably were not familiar with Weber’s works, but this was not peculiar to them. In general, Turkish intellectuals were not familiar with the studies of Weber during the period in question. To this extent, Bostancı’s criticism is unfair.

Bostancı’s assertion that the Kadro writers did not know of Werner Sombart is bizarre. The regular Kadro writers, with the exception of Karaoğlan, were perfectly familiar with Sombart’s writings: Tör had attended Sombart’s lectures when he studied at the University of Berlin (Tör, 1976: 8 and 1983: 18, 60), and he referred to Sombart’s writings in the Kadro journal (Kadro 1932:1/2, 37-38). Tökin frequently cited Sombart’s writings in his book *Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı* (Turkey’s Rural Economy), published in 1934 4, and as shown by Ertan (1992: Appendix 1-13), Tökin subsequently acknowledged that he had been familiar with Sombart’s writings when he studied in Moscow (1922-1925). Belge presumably had heard of Sombart’s writings when he studied at the University of Berlin in the early 1920s. Above all, Aydemir quoted from Sombart’s writings (Kadro 1932 1/5: 8-9, Kadro 1933 2/18: 29) and wrote a review of Tökin’s book on *Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı* in the 34th issue of Kadro (Kadro 1934 3/34: 34-39), in which he argued that Tökin’s approach was similar to that of Sombart.

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3 I have come across a reference to Max Weber only once during the period from 1923 to 1935, in Celal (1934: 7, Footnote 1): Max Weber, *Die Objectivity der Sozialwissenschaftlichen Erkennens. Archiv f. Sozialwissenschaft*, 19, 1904. Sayar (1986: 6) notes that Sabri Ulgen started to read Weber’s writings in 1935. It appears that no Turkish student studied under Max Weber, nor were any of Weber’s writings translated into Turkish in the period from 1923 to 1935.

4 Ismail Hüseyin Tökin (1990) cited the following works by Sombart: *Die Ordnung des Wirtschaftslebens*, 1927; *Das Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus* (Der Modene Kapitalismus, III. I) T.I. 1927; Der Modere Kapitalismus, I. 2; and *Gewerbevesesen*, II. These formed *Der Moderne Kapitalismus* (Modern Capitalism), 3 vols., (Munich and Leipzig, 1924-1927).
Evidently, there is neither rhyme nor reason for Bostancı’s complaint that the Kadro writers should have known Sombart’s views well. It may be suggested that Bostancı himself failed to go through all the issues of Kadro, for otherwise, it would have been impossible not to see references to Sombart.

From a somewhat leftist perspective, Küçük (1985: 148, 1988: 321-421), Şişmanov (1978: 89-145), Yanardağ (1988: 77-109) and İleri (Preface to Yanardağ 1988: 5-10) emphasize that the regular writers of Kadro journal who had been involved in left-wing parties (except for Karaosmanoğlu who had never been involved with any left-wing political party), and in particular Tör, ‘betrayed’ the Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Socialist Party (TWSP) by handing over secret party documents to the police in 1927. It appears that these authors approach the question of Kadro from a standpoint of ‘socialist revolutionary morality’, arguing that during the split of 1925 in the TWSP, those who remained within the TWSP, such as Şefik Hüsnü Deymer, Nazım Hikmet and some others, were faithful to socialism, and thereby deserved more credit than the Kadro writers, who rejected class analysis and adopted Kemalist principles. Such an approach is not very illuminating, and in any case, the purity of the TWSP’s ‘socialism’ has also been questioned. Tunçay (1978: 336-7) and Harris (1976: 130), for example, argue that although the TWSP was socialist in form, and employed Marxist terminology, it was, at the same time, nationalist in outlook. It is not clear whether or not ideological differences played a crucial role in the split of 1925 and whether the TWSP developed an argument based on class struggle. The fact is that there is so far no serious study as to exactly what the TWSP in particular, and the ‘Turkish Communist Party’ in general, argued and advocated in the 1930s.

At this point, it may be useful to examine the linked issue of Kadro and fascism. Although no study categorically claims that Kadro advocated fascism, a few (e.g., Keyder, 1987: 98-110; Ahmad, 1993: 65-6) hint at parallels between the Kemalist regime and Kadro’s ideas, on the one hand, and Italian fascism on the other. They, however, suggest no evidence, except for stressing, in general terms, the similarly authoritarian characters of Italian fascism and the Kemalist regime. As to the alleged similarities between some Italian fascist publications and Kadro, Carretto’s (1985: 344-8) article is worth mentioning. Carretto does not directly claim that Kadro or the Kemalist regime can be classified as fascist, but he discerns some parallels between Italian fascist publications and Kadro; he suggests that firstly, Italian fascist publications and Kadro both advocated authoritarianism as opposed to democracy, and secondly, that both put emphasis on national leadership. Apart from these parallels, Carretto refers to a controversy between Ettore Rossi, an Italian Turcologist, and Kadro. In 1923 Rossi had published an article, “Nuova Turchia” (New Turkey) in which he argued that the Kemalist regime was an imitation of Italian fascism. As Carretto informs, similar analogies were repeatedly
drawn by the Italian press between 1923 and 1932. In 1932, in a reply to Rossi, Belge challenged such analogies in the pages of Kadro. Belge (Kadro 1932, 1/8: 36-39) asserted that fascism and Kemalism were different in their origin and objectives, arguing that Italian fascism was a movement peculiar to a semi-capitalist structure, which aimed to ease class conflicts by means of fascist corporations, and that Italian fascism sought territorial expansion. Belge argued that Turkish society was not divided into warring classes, that the Kemalist regime would not allow the emergence of such warring classes, and that the Kemalist regime rejected expansionism. In the following years, as Carretto informs (1985: 344-8), Rossi, probably as a matter of courtesy, changed his views and in his later writings, Rossi acknowledged that Kemalism had its own ideology even though he carried on pointing to analogies with fascism.

Carretto’s exposition of Kadro’s interpretation of fascism is not complete, for he refers to only one of the articles which dealt with fascism. In fact, Kadro changed its interpretation of fascism in 1933. In 1932, Belge suggested that fascism was a movement peculiar to a semi-capitalist structure, and that fascism in Italy was a movement to save semi-capitalist Italy from capitalism’s class conflict by means of corporations (see Kadro, 1/8, 1932, 36-9; Kadro, 1/4, 1932, 26-30; Kadro, 1/12, 1932, 27-32; and Kadro, 1932, 1/5: 3). In 1933, this line of analysis changed, and Aydemir and Tökin argued that Fascism in Italy, and Nazism in Germany, both strove to consolidate the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie. Tor and Belge then followed this line of analysis. No matter that Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany appealed to and received support from the man on the street, Aydemir claimed, they were the representatives of and worked for the interest of the industrial bourgeoisie. In 1933 and 1934, Kadro repeatedly stressed that Fascism was a movement to ease the problem of the class struggle and internal anarchy by means of corporations at the expense of the working classes. In addition, Aydemir and Tökin warned that fascism meant imperialism, since the Italian fascists sought to gain colonies in order to gain an outlet for Italy’s surplus population, while Nazism in Germany was racist and asserted that the white races, and in particular the Germanic race, were superior to other races. From 1933 onwards, all Kadro

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5 Why such a shift took place is not clear. Is there a link between the shift of Kadro’s argument with that of Comintern? This is an open question that is yet to be worked out.

6 While analyzing Italian fascism, the Kadro writers looked at Italian Fascist Labour Law and fascist corporations, and with regard to Nazism, they examined the German press and Hitler’s speeches (see Kadro 2/18, 1933, 8-12; Kadro, 2/24, 1933, 17-21; Kadro, 3/25, 1934, 24-30; Kadro, 3/26, 1934, 20-6).

writers consistently rejected fascism and Nazism.

As noted earlier, Carretto does not claim that the Kadro movement was fascist. However, he rightly draws attention to the authoritarian character of Kadro’s ideology, and it may be added that the Kadro writers, Karaosmanoğlu in particular, expressed admiration for the well-disciplined fascist youth organizations in Italy, and for the enthusiasm to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in Soviet Russia. This, however, does not necessitate the conclusion that Kadro advocated either fascism or communism.

4. Ideological roots of the Kadro movement

The second major issue touched on by existing literature is the ideological roots, character and role of Kadro. Most authors focus, in one way or another, on the question of Marxist influences on the Kadro writers, most of whom had been involved in leftist groups in the early 1920s. Harris (1976: 146) argues for a fundamental continuity in the ideas of the Kadro writers:

“The Kadroists—with few exceptions—all former members of the Aydınlık [TWPS] group had not deviated far from their earlier ideas expressed as Communist Party members. Their central idea remained that the elite in Turkey must awaken to its historic role as the revolutionary force in society. They urged this elite to evolve a comprehensive plan for state-directed development to overcome the inertia of the masses and the impediment of foreign capital.... They hoped that by formulating this economic programme in a nationalist framework they could elaborate a revolutionary doctrine suitable not alone for Turkey but for other underdeveloped countries as well”.

Tunçay (1978: 336) shares this view, adding that Turkish leftists had been attracted by the cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Ankara government during the War of Liberation, and that in their writings in the pages of Aydınlık, the publication of the TWPS, they were preoccupied with national economic development. Stressing the nationalist character of the TWPS, Tunçay concluded that the Kadro writers, in general, did not change their earlier ideas. However, neither Harris nor Tunçay go into closer analysis and definition of the type of nationalism with which they identify Kadro. Rather, they appear to be chiefly, and justifiably, concerned with using the Kadro writers’ nationalism as an argument for questioning their earlier commitment to communism.


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* Kadro, 1/6, 1932, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and Kadro, 2/13, 1933, 14, 15.
bringing the dichotomy between the metropole and the colonies to the centre of its
discussions, and suggests that it was but a step from Kadro to Galiyevism.
However, Yanardağ (1988: 179-185) bases his argument on a conspiratorial
assumption: he asks whether any Turk was involved in Sultan Galiyev’s alleged
secret organization. As to this alleged secret organization, Bennigsen, Alexandre
and Quelquejay (1967: 154-156) do not specify any Turkish names, and their
source for the alleged secret organization of Galiyev is an unsupported assertion
made by Soviet historians.10

Yanardağ wrongly interpreted Bennigsen, Alexandre and Quelquejay’s
argument on this matter. Although Yanardağ does not specifically mention that it
was Aydemir who was a member of the secret organization, he clearly implies it.
Bennigsen, Alexandre and Quelquejay do not mention any Turkish names, though
they refer to émigrés in Turkey. Aydemir and the other Kadro writers cannot be
regarded as émigrés. Yanardağ does not offer any evidence to prove a direct link
between Galiyev’s alleged secret organization and Aydemir, and nor does any other
source. Yanardağ seems to have mixed two different issues: ideological similarities
and the alleged secret organization in question. Behind such a linkage, it seems,
Yanardağ looked for an explanation for Aydemir’s opposition to the Comintern’s
decisions in 1924 and 1925, which eventually led to a split within the TWPS. Nor
does his conspiratorial explanation offer any clear guide to possible Galiyevist
intellectual influence on Kadro. Yanardağ is not alone in suggesting Galiyevist
influence on the Kadro movement: Ayşe Trak (Buğra) (1985) also asserts such an
influence on Aydemir, particularly with respect to his views on the dichotomy
between developed and underdeveloped countries, though she fails to produce
convincing evidence.11 In a similar fashion, Özveren (1996: 571) touches on the
same point, but in vain.

With regard to the world-view of Kadro, Boratav12, and Tekeli and İlkin (1984:
53) note that the Kadro writers applied historical materialism in their analysis,
although they do not tell us how Kadro interpreted historical materialism. Having

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10 Bennigsen, Alexandre and Quelquejay (1967: 154) cited this claim from A. Arsharuni and Kh.
Gablidullin, Ocherki Panislamizmi: Panturkizm v Rossii, (Moscow, 1931).

11 Trak (1985, 98. Footnote 25) refers to Aydemir’s book (1979) as proof of Sultan Galiyev’s
influence. However, Aydemir’s book does not offer any evidence to prove Galiyev’s influence. It
contains Aydemir’s private correspondence with his two friends from the KUTVI (Komunisticheskii
Universtitet Trudyashikhsya Vostoka) (The Communist University of the Workers of the East): Pavel, a
Russian, and Liu Shao-chi, a Chinese.

12 See Boratav’s preface to the second edition of Ismail Hüsev Tökin’s book Türkçe Köy
İktisadiyatı, (İstanbul, 1990).
acknowledged that Kadro’s world-view was historical materialism, Gülälp (1985: 72-73) and Sadiq (1986: 329-330), however, argue that Kadro was selective in applying historical materialism, and ignored certain hypotheses basic to a materialistic view of history, though they fail to note in what respect Kadro was selective.

Not all previous studies focus exclusively upon the Kadro writers’ relationship with Marxism. Sadiq (1986: 329), for example, points to a number of similarities and dissimilarities between the ‘Young Turks’, or Unionists, and Kadro. Sadiq rightly draws attention to the point that Kadro distanced itself from the Unionist legacy of nationalism. Whereas intellectuals of the Unionist period put much emphasis on the history, culture and ethnicity of the Turks, Kadro’s emphasis was on economic development.

The question of similarities and dissimilarities between Unionist intellectuals and Kadro is also taken up by Tekeli and Şayian (1978: 44-110). They suggest that the narodnik movements in Russia in the nineteenth century might have influenced populist views in Turkey. However, they argue that Ziya Gökalp, the chief ideologue of the Unionists, and his contemporary Kör Ali İhsan Bey’s solidarist-corporatist proposal for ‘representation by profession’ (mesleki temsil) were more obviously influenced by Durkheim’s solidarist views, while Kadro was influenced by historical materialism. Therefore, they rightly suggest that intellectuals of the Unionist and Kemalist periods ought to be put into different categories.

Tekeli and Şayian (1978: 85) also argue that in the early 1930s there appeared a need to combine the Kemalist understandings of populism and étatism, and that this was the task Kadro undertook, though they do not explain why such a need appeared and how it was met.

The question of populism in relation to Kadro’s ideology is also taken up by Nur Betül Çelik (1984). Çelik argues that Kadro ideologically advocated populism, and bases her argument on Kadro’s call for land reform. It is true that Kadro called for land reform, but this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Kadro advocated populism in general, even though it remained formally loyal to the (Republican People’s Party) RPP’s six principles, which included populism. Indeed, Kadro rarely referred to populism outside the narrow context of the land reform question. Kadro was elitist in the sense that Kadro advocated leadership of a small cadre. Therefore, Kadro can hardly be characterized as populist.

The question of Kadro’s role within the Kemalist regime is touched on by Sadiq. He suggests that the Kemalist regime had to seek a new press to define its identity and a new framework in which to evolve its ideology. It is true that in 1931, the Kemalist regime had closed down the Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları) organization, which had been set up by the Unionists and served as the principal centre for the dissemination of Turkish nationalism, replacing it with People’s
Houses (Halk Evleri). The People’s Houses, together with the daily newspapers, *Hakimiyyet-i Milliye*, *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* and the monthly journal *Muhit* (Milieu), all publicized Kemalist regime’s reforms, and contributed to the creation of the ‘new framework’ referred to by Sadiq. The future Kadro writers contributed to these daily newspapers, and also to *Muhit*. Evidently, the Kemalist regime did not lack media attention to define its identity, nor a framework in which to evolve its ideology. Why, then, did it specifically require Kadro?

The question of the role of Kadro is taken up by Tekeli and Ilkin (1984: 66) who argue:

“Kadro represented the struggle of a group of intellectuals to become the dominant political elite. To this end, the Kadro intellectuals sought to provide the theoretical basis for the single party regime of the early Republic. In doing this they, however, came into conflict with the ruling elite of the Republican People’s Party (RPP). In this struggle, Kadro was not successful. Instead they were used by the RPP elite in eliminating other elite groups within society, most notably, the liberals that [had] gathered in the Serbest Fırka (Free Party).”

Tekeli and Ilkin view the struggle between the ‘liberals’ and Kadro as central in defining the role of Kadro, and proceed to invoke George Lenczowski’s concept of an ‘organizational elite’. It is true that the Kemalist regime used Kadro against the remnants of the Free Republican Party, notably Ahmet Ağaoğlu. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the relationship between Kadro and the Kemalist regime was reciprocal: both gained something. Kadro, and in particular Aydemir, gained access to the bureaucratic-intellectual circles close to the regime, but this does not necessarily imply that the Kadro writers wanted to come to power by manipulation or force, which, in Lenczowski’s definition of the organizational elite, is a precondition. Although the term ‘cadre’, which Aydemir first introduced, might seem to imply something about power, and although Aydemir clearly argued that the revolution required a conscious cadre, in the final analysis, there is no evidence to show that the Kadro writers specifically pursued a strategy to achieve power for themselves. Rather, they attributed responsibilities to intellectuals. It should be stressed that they surely wished to influence the Kemalist leadership. In any case, the Kadro writers were politically dependent upon the Kemalist leadership; they had no power base of their own, and their small theoretical journal could scarcely hope to command a wide public audience.

Timur (1971: 219), Boratav (1982: 151-160), Tekeli and Şaylan (1978: passim), Tekeli and Ilkin (1984: passim) define the Kadro writers as ‘petit-bourgeois radicals’, and their ideological approach as petit-bourgeois radicalism, in the sense that Kadro tried to interpret Kemalist views in a more radical way than

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13 For the definition of organizational elite see Lenczowski (1975: 5).
any of the RPP bureaucrats. The term petit-bourgeoisie makes sense, at least as far as the social position of the Kadro writers were concerned: they were intellectuals, coming from the middle class, and were more radical than many of intellectuals at the time. Obviously, this point needs further exploration.

From a more strictly economic perspective, Hale (1980: 100-17, 1981a: 55-6 and 1981b: 705-26) draws attention to differences between ‘liberals’ and Kadro, arguing that Kadro advocated ‘ideological etatism’ as opposed to the liberals’ advocacy of ‘pragmatic etatism’. Hale, like many others, hastily puts Kadro in the same category with that of Recep Peker and İsmet İnönü. They ignore the fact that there are important differences between the two in terms of ideology and development strategy proposals (see Türkç (1998) for details).

Yalçın Küçük looks at the issue from a completely different perspective: Küçük (1981: 79-115) argues that in the 1930s the Soviet Union passed through a successful planning experiment, which had a powerful influence on the Turkish experience of planning in the inter-war period, and that Kadro helped to introduce the planning experience of the Soviet Union to Turkey. However, Küçük adds that Kadro distorted the Soviet experience, arguing that Kadro, and Turkish economists in particular, adapted the Soviet concept of planning to Turkish conditions, and “worked hard in order to deprive planning of its socialist birth-marks and class basis”. Elsewhere, Küçük (1983: 140) goes further, saying that it was Kadro that hammered the Kemalist concept of creating a ‘classless society’ into the minds of Turkish intellectuals, who then eliminated the class character of the Kemalist regime from their analysis. It appears that Küçük ignores the fact that Kadro was eclectic in its inspirations, thus, it justifiably borrowed ideas, not necessarily totally but partially, from the current experiences. Secondly, his accusation is not fair because such discussion about the creation of a classless society was not peculiar to the Kadro writers, but it was common at that time in Turkey.

Finally, in this category, Ertan (1992), deserves mention. Ertan’s study is an informative one insofar as the Kadro writers’ polemics with ‘liberals’ and their activities after the closure of Kadro are concerned. However, Ertan fails to give a clear picture of the ideology and economic development proposals of Kadro, but insists on arguing that Kadro produced an ideology of ‘third way’ by rejecting socialism and capitalism (Ertan, 1992: 301). He repeats earlier discussions and his conclusion of a ‘third way’ is misleading. Although Kadro rejected socialism and capitalism, and called itself, as well as the Turkish revolution, an original and third way, the validity of its claims remains open to question (see Türkç, 1998).

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14 The former three studies are primarily devoted to the Kemalist regime’s economic development policy and the ideology, and Kadro was not a primary focus.
5. Kadro and development literature

The third issue to be considered here is Kadro’s place in development literature. Although almost all the above-noted studies touch upon Kadro’s emphasis upon the dichotomy between developed and underdeveloped countries, Ayşe Trak, Haldun Gülalp and Eyüp Özveren specifically bring this point into development literature. Trak (1985: 89-102) identifies two basic arguments in Kadro. First, Kadro drew attention to qualitative differences between developed and underdeveloped countries; second, Kadro drew attention to the role of the state in development strategy. Gülalp further discerns some parallels between Kadro and the neo-Marxists, arguing that both based their ideas on a common observation:

“the neo-Marxist ‘dependency’ theory, virtually reproducing the Kadroist argument, states that ‘the principal contradiction in the (capitalist) system ... is not within the developed part but between the developed and the underdeveloped parts’ ... the Kadro theory had anticipated the essential elements of the current underdevelopment/dependency theory associated with the names of Baran, Frank, Amin and others, including the use of the term such as the ‘world-system’ and ‘metropolis-colony’... [Kadro] remarkably anticipated contemporary dependency theory, with one major difference: it argued in favor of a statist/classless society while the dependency theory argues in favor of ‘socialism’. Despite their overriding similarities-in both cases the main concern was development-the difference originated from the historical context ... political conclusions [of the Kadro theory] were internally more consistent than the dependency theory (Gülalp, 1985: 69-81)”.

In addition to Gülalp’s comparisons and contrasts of Kadro with that of the dependency school, one point must be strongly emphasized: the starting point for both Kadro and the dependency school is identical. Both assumed that world economic crises provide an important opportunity for underdeveloped countries to develop their economies.

Gülalp’s second point in the same article, that Kadro believed development could only take place through independence from the world-system, is more debatable. Depending on the interpretation of Kadro’s use of the word ‘autarky’, it may be said that in 1932, Kadro argued that development could take place only through independence from the capitalist-imperialist system. But from 1933 onwards, the Kadro writers abandoned the term ‘autarky’ in favor of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-sustained economic development’, and from 1933 onwards, Kadro used the term ‘autarky’ in the narrow sense of a protectionist foreign trade policy. Kadro’s argument, or its optimistic assumption was that the capitalist-imperialist status quo established after the First World War would fall victim to the inherent and inevitable rivalries between the imperialist powers. From this assumption, Kadro further argued that politically and economically independent states, based on national units, would determine the international development of the twentieth century. Therefore, it would be misleading to conclude that Kadro assumed that
development could only take place through independence from the world-system. The context is different in that Kadro assumed that the existing world system would virtually collapse.

As for the class analysis of Kadro, Trak (1985: 89-102) and Gülalp (1985: 79) assert parallel arguments: Trak’s argument that “the Kadro writers avoid providing any analysis of classes in pre-capitalist societies with reference to Turkey”, and Gülalp’s argument that Kadro failed to see the existence of classes in Turkey, are misleading. The Kadro writers, especially Tökin, clearly identified pre-capitalist classes in Turkey. Tökin divided them into two categories: urban and rural. He divided the urban classes into medium and small shopkeepers, who employed their own family members, and merchants. As for the rural class structure, Tökin (Kadro 1934, 3/25: 34-37, Kadro 1934, 3/26: 20-26) defined this as consisting of big landowners, rural entrepreneurs, small landowning farmers, share-croppers, farm workers and landless peasants and slaves. Here, it should be underlined that Kadro clearly identified social classes in Turkey and put emphasis on the weaknesses of the existing social classes. It is a direct reference to Kadro’s assumption that the state could not and should not rely on any particular class in evolving a development strategy.

The study by Özveren (1996: 565-576), also attempts to compare the Kadro movement with that of the dependency school. Özveren repeats similar points made by previous studies—in particular those of Trak and Gülalp—but in a peculiar way he ignores them. Nor does he explain why he ignores them. Secondly, Özveren asserts that ‘Kadro achieved linking two approaches: the interdisciplinary civilizational approach and the dependency school’, though he does not show how this is so.

Surely, as Gülalp and Trak point, the dependency school reproduced some of the arguments of the Kadro movement. It may also be added that there are some similarities between some of the economic development proposals of the Kadro movement in the 1930s and economic policies implemented in South Korea in the 1960s. In her extensive study, Asia’s Next Giant, Amsden (1989: 52) analyzes the Korean case as follows:

“The Korean state was able to consolidate its power in the 1960s because of the weakness of the social classes. Workers were a small percentage of population, capitalists were dependent on state largesse, the aristocracy was dissolved by land reform, and the peasantry was atomized into small holders. The behavior of the Korean state became influenced by two forces outside the class structure: the student movement and the American occupation forces (first the U.S. army, then the U.S. aid administration). The student movement kept the new government relatively honest. The American occupation forces drove the Korean military toward developmentalism, the only realistic course to reduce dependence on American support.”
Kadro also argued that existing social classes in 1930s Turkey were weak: workers were small in number, and the bourgeoisie was weak and dependent on state subsidies. Similar to the Korean case, Kadro advocated and urged the Kemalist regime to carry out substantial land reform, seeing the rural structure as a hindrance to social transformation and proposed a comprehensive industrialization plan, and indicated ways in which capital could be generated. Moreover, both strove for the achievement of a strong state. All these may suggest analogies between the two cases, but caution is needed before drawing conclusions. Firstly, Kadro developed its arguments in an atmosphere of the 1930s Great Depression while Korea’s strategy developed in the 1960s, which was a period of expansion for the world economy. More specifically, Kadro developed its arguments when foreign capital influx to Turkey was shrinking, whereas, it was expanding in the case of Korea. Secondly, Kadro consistently argued that the bourgeoisie should not be given any influential position in decision-making bodies, seeing this as self-seeking. Thus, Kadro ideologically opposed the bourgeoisie whereas, in the case of Korea, the intention was to keep the bourgeoisie under state control. Thirdly, while the Kadro writers were not within the policy implementation circle, in the Korean case those who developed the policies were in power.

Briefly, it may be suggested that there are similarities between the two cases. However, in the final analysis, they must be put in two different historical contexts: the inter-war and the Cold War years. Ideologically too, both were patriotic, but with a clear and important difference: while Kadro did assume and ideologically advocated that the capitalist-imperialist status quo would sooner or later break down, in the case of Korea, such an argument did not exist and, indeed, the objective was to accommodate Korea in an expanding world economy. This indicates the difference of ideological characteristics of the both cases.

6. Conclusion

As shown above, the existing studies highlighted not all, but most of the possible sources of inspiration of the Kadro movement, though it should be noted that some of them are demagogic charges and, thus, can be put aside. Others need to be explored further. Needless to say that the studies reviewed here are illuminating in many respects. They contribute much by shedding light on the ideological roots of the Kadro writers and comparing the arguments of the Kadro movement with that of the dependency schools. Each study highlights a new dimension to be studied further. The variety of approaches, however, makes it impossible to identify a common pattern of discussion. At the same time, it is possible to identify certain characteristic weaknesses in the existing literature. One is a lack of proper references to the Kadro journal itself. Instead, most studies refer mainly to the second edition of Aydemir’s book *Inkilap ve Kadro* (The Revolution
and the Cadre) (Aydemir, 1968), in which Aydemir updated his views to some extent, or rely upon citation from one another. In any case, *İnkilap ve Kadro* is a poor guide to *Kadro*: it is devoted to theoretical matters, and says little about policy implementation, class analysis or rural development. Another common weakness of many studies reviewed here is their overhasty identification of *Kadro* with the Galiyevist, the Kemalist leadership, fascism and communism. The most important weakness of the previous studies is that none of them provide a clear or comprehensive picture of the ideology and economic development proposals of *Kadro*, though each study touches on one or more aspects of these issues. Nor do they put the *Kadro* movement in its historical context. Hence, there is a strong need to work out the ideology of *Kadro*, its economic development proposals, its sources of inspiration and its dilemmas.

The present study, as noted above, is intentionally limited for practical and functional reasons. It is beyond the scope of this article to review the existing literature and elaborate on the ideology and economic development proposals of the *Kadro* movement. For functional reasons, such a review is designed to provide a solid ground for further studies on the subject. Thus, the weaknesses of the previous studies are indicated and, the problematic issues pointed here are left for further articles. The issues raised will be elaborated further in my studies: “The Ideology of the *Kadro* (Cadre) Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey” and “A Patriotic Leftist Development Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: the Case of the *Kadro* (Cadre) Movement”.

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Özet