

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES IN INDIA  
AND TURKEY: THE CASES OF THE INC, CHP AND THE BJP, AKP

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AND TURKEY: THE CASES OF THE INC, CHP AND THE BJP, AKP**

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## ABSTRACT

### A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES IN INDIA AND TURKEY: THE CASES OF THE INC, CHP AND THE BJP, AKP

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Recently, the party politics agenda has been occupied by the debates of right-wing extremism and the resurgence of the far-right parties. And the landscape of political parties is witnessing a transformation, one that is characterized not by right-wing extremism but by the rise of anti-establishment sentiments. The prevailing anti-establishment sentiments challenge the conventional party structures and thus catalyze the emergence and rise of anti-establishment parties. In this master's thesis, I present a unique analytical plane, namely the plane of the establishment — anti-establishment, on which the categorization of political parties is possible based on the parties' position within the establishment and anti-establishment dynamics. Following the introduction of the conceptual framework, I compare and contrast earnest examples from India and Turkey to illustrate establishment — anti-establishment relations. In this comparative framework, I provide historical and empirical accounts of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) from Turkey, as well as the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Indian People's Party (*Bharatiya Janata Party*, BJP) from India. Based on the comparative analysis of datasets such as Global Party Survey (GPS), World Value Survey (WVS) and

V-Party of Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), I argue that while the AKP and the BJP, once anti-establishment parties, have transformed into establishment-making establishment parties, the CHP and the INC, once establishment-making establishment parties, have degraded into establishment anti-incumbency.

**Keywords:** anti-establishment party, political parties, datasets, India, Turkey

## ÖZ

### HİNDİSTAN VE TÜRKİYE’DE DÜZEN PARTİLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMASI: INC, CHP VE BJP, AKP ÖRNEKLERİ

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Son zamanlarda parti siyaseti gündemi, aşırılıkçı sağ veya aşırı sağ partiler olarak tanımlanan partilerin yeniden yükselişi tartışmalarıyla meşgul olmuştur. Ancak parti siyasetinin görünümü, sağ aşırılıkçılık tarafından değil, yükselen düzen karşıtı duygular tarafından karakterize edilen bir dönüşüm yaşamaktadır. Egemen olan düzen karşıtlığı duyguları, geleneksel parti yapılarına sorgulamakta ve böylece düzen karşıtı partilerinin ortaya çıkışını ve yükselişini hızlandırmaktadır. Bu yüksek lisans tezinde, düzen ve düzen karşıtlığı dinamikleri içindeki pozisyonlarına dayanarak siyasi partilerin kategorize edilmesini mümkün kılan benzersiz bir analitik düzlem olan düzen — anti-düzen düzlemini sunuyorum. Kavramsal çerçevenin tanıtımını takiben, düzen ve anti-düzen ilişkilerini örneklemek için Hindistan ve Türkiye’den önemli örnekleri karşılaştırıyorum. Bu karşılaştırmalı çerçevede, Türkiye’den Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) ile Hindistan’dan Hindistan Ulusal Kongresi (*Indian National Congress*, INC) ve Hindistan Halk Partisi (*Bharatiya Janata Party*, BJP)’nin tarihî ve ampirik açıklamalarını sunuyorum. Global Party Survey (GPS), World Values Survey (WVS) ve Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) gibi çeşitli veri setlerinin karşılaştırmalı



analizine dayanarak, bir zamanlar anti-düze partileri olan AKP ve BJP'nin *düzen yapan düzen partilerine* dönüştüğünü, ve bir zamanlar düzen yapan düzen partileri olan CHP ve INC'nin ise *muhalif düzen partisi* kategorisine düştüğünü iddia ediyorum.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** düzen karşıtı parti, siyasal partiler, veri setleri, Türkiye, Hindistan

*To great histories of the Republican People's Party and the Congress Party*

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The study of party politics constitutes one of the key components of political science and is very interesting in the sense that this particular area allows us to make sense of one of the most significant agents of practical politics. Political parties, regardless of the regime types they operate in, stand as the central institutions conducting political activity. From China to the United States of America, political parties exist in democracies as well as autocracies. The recent landscape of political parties, however, is witnessing a transformation, one that is characterized by the rise of anti-establishment sentiments. The prevailing anti-establishment sentiments challenge the conventional structures and institutions and catalyze the emergence and rise of anti-establishment parties. In this master's thesis, I present a unique analytical plane, namely the plane of the establishment — anti-establishment, on which the categorization of political parties is possible based on the parties' position within the establishment and anti-establishment dynamics. Following the introduction of the conceptual framework, I compare and contrast earnest examples from India and Turkey to illustrate establishment — anti-establishment relations. In this comparative framework, I provide historical and empirical accounts of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) from Turkey, as well as the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Indian People's Party (*Bharatiya Janata Party*, BJP) from India. Based on the comparative analysis of datasets such as Global Party Survey (GPS), World Value Survey (WVS), and V-Party of Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), I argue that while the AKP and the BJP, which were once anti-establishment parties, transformed into establishment-making establishment parties, the CHP and the INC, which were once establishment-making establishment parties, degraded into establishment anti-incumbency.



The political landscapes of India and Turkey have witnessed significant transformations, with important shifts in the dynamics between establishment and anti-establishment political parties. While these shifts show a broader global pattern where traditional political alignments are being increasingly challenged by anti-establishment parties that capitalize on disaffection with the status quo, the thesis's tracing of these shifts and changes reveals that the Indian and Turkish party politics may act as comparison sources for each other. Although the Turkish case has traditionally been examined in contrast with cases from Latin America, comparative perspectives on India and Turkey are growing in numbers. Both countries are being led by strongly authoritarian governments with populist leaders, and the level of democratic backsliding stands at an alarming rate in both cases. According to the Freedom House (2024), India has been classified "partly free" for the first time under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's authoritarian governance. The same index classifies Turkey as "not free" and reveals the decreasing trend in Turkey's political and civil liberties as well. The populism employed by Narendra Modi's BJP and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's AKP, in this context, has already taken scholarly attention. Rogenhofer & Panievski (2020) is one of those studies comparing Indian and Turkish cases with an emphasis put on populism and authoritarianism. In their article *Antidemocratic populism in power: comparing Erdoğan's Turkey with Modi's India and Netanyahu's Israel*, Rogenhofer and Panievski argue that even though Israel, Turkey, and India vary in their historical and socio-political particularities, there is a neoliberal populist playbook that is comparable and being employed by each country's leader. The leaders of these countries are part of a global populist wave; however, they remain distinct from those in Europe and the Americas as these leaders operate in "deeply divided societies" and "situated in difficult geopolitical neighborhoods." Each leader relies on the neoliberal ideology that is accompanied by populist exploitation of social, religious, and salient political cleavages in society. For instance, while Erdoğan's neoliberal clientelism uses tools such as privatization of public land, public-private partnerships (PPP), labor market deregulation, loyalist charity, seizing businesses, and provides services that are conditioned to being part of a religiously and conservatively defined "the people"; Modi's neoliberal developmentalism uses tools such as privatizations, PPP projects, reductions of labor rights and environmental regulation, state intervention and bases itself on the

entrepreneurial Hindu “people” who are adamant to achieve country’s development vision. According to Rogenhofer and Panievski, this anti-democratic populist playbook constitutes each leader’s attempt to homogenize an intrinsically heterogeneous society through the mobilization of one authentic, ethnoreligiously conceived “people” (2020, 1407).

Rogenhofer & Panievski also contend that the type of populism in Israel, India, and Turkey may construct a new type of populism that is different than populism’s European and Latin American versions (2020, 1408). Şefika Kumral (2022) slightly departs from such a view by making a distinction between *offensive* and *defensive* types of populism. Kumral’s article presents a detailed account of authoritarianism, neoliberalism, and populism in India and Turkey, and it does so by locating such an account in a global context. Kumral starts off by stressing the tendency to overgeneralize the Global North’s experience of populism in academic circles. Many of those accounts, according to Kumral, have to do with neoliberal globalization’s impact on right-wing populist movements and try to explain “the political alienation of working and middle classes from mainstream parties by turning our attention to the effects of the rise of income inequality, decline of welfare benefits, uncertainty and insecurity created by financial crises.” Such accounts are concerned with how neoliberal globalization paved the way for “right-wing populist leaders who began to mobilize masses against the former political and economic elites as well as against ethnic, racial, and religious minorities and political opposition” (Kumral 2020, 1). Kumral contends that the above-mentioned views fall short of accurately addressing the relationship between neoliberal globalization and right-wing populism, which is “far more ambivalent” than those accounts suggest. That is mostly because of the uneven development of capitalism, Kumral argues by indicating its distinctness between the Global North and Global South countries. While we are experiencing an abandonment of the welfare state in the Global North, we see that right-wing populists in the Global South employ neoliberal policies with “selected provisions of welfare” (2020, 2). While core countries of the Global North are trying to recover the decline in their economic supremacy, which is caused by capital’s leaving to Global South countries to find surplus value -resulting in the mitigation of long-time established privileges of labor aristocracies and middle-classes in Global North

countries-, peripheral and semi-peripheral countries takes this as a chance to elevate their countries to their “rightful place” and “to challenge the existing hierarchies of wealth and power.” The uneven development of capitalism, Kumral claims, “unmakes working and middle-classes in the former centers of production while it “produces new working and middle-classes in new emergent economies” (2020, 5).

In the Global North, right-wing populist leaders ally with these declining classes - defensive populism-, the classes aiming to take their privileges back; however, right-wing populists in the Global South ally with newly rising classes in forming a hegemonic bloc -offensive populism- (2020, 6). The Global South's offensive populism, therefore, brings the old elite structure to the foreground and blames them for their inability to take advantage of this new neoliberal conjuncture in order to gain popular support. The Global North's defensive populism, on the other hand, takes advantage of “the backlash against globalization” and blames earlier neoliberal and financial elites “for deteriorating conditions,” considering protectionism and deglobalization as chances to recover from the current condition (2020, 7). Cihan Tuğal (2023) also points out the similarities between Modi and Erdoğan and notes that while Erdoğan's autocratic rule has been able to combine pro-market and statist policies, Modi has been following a less statist and more neoliberal program. The above-mentioned critical economic perspectives and readings of India and Turkey from a “populist leader comparison” lens, however explanatory in their own accounts, fall short of attaching adequate importance to political parties. India and Turkey are countries where the independence and the foundation of Republican regimes are led by parties that dominated their political milieus for decades and that achieved to retain their relevance. Although it is precisely clear that the shifts in class structures of these countries are affected by the global economic conjuncture, the political activities conducted, and policies followed by survivors of long *durée* should not be underestimated. The influence of the positive discrimination policies towards lower castes, known as *Other Backward Classes*, by the INC had no lesser impact on the changing class formations in India than, say, the uneven development of capitalism. This thesis, therefore, takes a different approach and presents a party politics view while incorporating mainstream political science literature and critical economic perspectives. The comparison of the

CHP and the INC, in this context, adds another dimension to the existing comparative studies by both offering a party politics view and including opposition parties. These parties occupy a social democratic stance in their domestic politics and are not independent of the broader ideological issues revolving around social democrats (Mehta 2018; Uğur-Çınar & Açıkgöz 2022). A comparative perspective on the CHP and the INC, therefore, provides insights into the problems of social democrats around the world as well.

In Chapter 2, I offer an explanatory account of the conceptual framework of anti-establishment parties. First, drawing on Schedler (1996) and Abedi (2004), I introduce what Schedler calls “anti-political establishment” and interact with the burgeoning literature on “the rise of right-wing populism,” “the resurgence of the far-right,” “democratic backsliding,” and “authoritarian populism” (Hagtvet 1994; Wodak et al. 2013; Brunazzo & Gilbert 2017; Hanchard 2018; Mushaben 2020). Second, I amend Abedi's (2004) semantic/syntactic errors and bring normative and operational definitions of the “establishment” to the foreground, complementing his and Schedler's (1996) conceptions of anti-establishment. The establishment — anti-establishment dichotomy acts as a plane on which political parties can be classified and better captures what has been happening with the resurgence of certain types of parties. The establishment, in its normative sense, refers to prevailing power relations, constitutional arrangements, state apparatus, and the ideological settlement on which these are built. As far as the operational definition of the establishment is concerned, it is crystal clear that such a definition must encompass the wide array of elements in the normative definition. In the thesis, I suggest using the criterion of *longevity* within the context of salient social cleavages and Giovanni Sartori's governing potential criteria to define the establishment operationally. Anti-establishment, on the other hand, is characterized by the construction of a malicious *political class*, *the anti-establishment self*, and charismatic populism by the anti-establishment actor. Following these normative characterizations of anti-establishment, I resort to Abedi (2004) for the operational definition of anti-establishment. Chapter 2 contains a nuanced elaboration on the conceptual framework underlying the thesis.

In Chapter 3, I present detailed historical accounts of two important establishment parties: the CHP in Turkey and the INC in India. As the oldest, founding parties in their respective countries, both the CHP and the INC have played critical roles in shaping the political trajectories of Turkey and India over the *longue durée*. The resemblances between the dyad are abundant and cannot be confined to being the oldest and founding party. Beyond their age and foundational status, these parties share similarities in their evolution, impacts on national policies, and their adaptive strategies in response to changing political currents. Relying on prominent studies regarding these parties, I explore how these parties have not only initiated key political transformations but have also been instrumental in defining the political identity and policy direction of their nations. The historical accounts, in this sense, highlight parties' historical significance, evolution over time, and the ways in which they still maintain relevance in their increasingly complex political arenas. Chapter 3 also reveals the intra-party fractions within the CHP and the INC and how these intra-party debates have altered the ideological loci of the parties over the course of history.

In Chapter 4, I present detailed historical accounts of two important anti-establishment parties: the AKP in Turkey and the BJP in India. These parties, however, are now *establishment-making establishment parties*, which exemplifies a possible path anti-establishment parties can take. Relying on the burgeoning literature on these parties, I trace the change the parties underwent over the course of history. When read and thought together, the INC-CHP and the AKP-BJP dyads appear to be quite similar both in their ideological and institutional evolutions. Although there exist minor nuances, I argue that these parties are almost like twins, for which argument Chapter 5 brings empirical data to the table.

In Chapter 5, I borrow data from various datasets such as the Global Party Survey (GPS), the World Value Survey (WVS), and the V-Party and employ these to demonstrate the high level of ideological and institutional resemblances within the dyads. I take *disaffection with the political system* as a criterion of demarcation and classification for establishment and anti-establishment, and thus, locate the political parties in India and Turkey on the establishment — anti-establishment spectrum.

Relying on disaffection data and change in party support groups, I argue that the AKP and the BJP, which were once anti-establishment parties in their countries, are now establishment-making establishment parties. On the other hand, I show that the CHP and the INC, which were once establishment-making establishment parties, are now degraded into establishment anti-incumbent positions in their respective countries. And lastly, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and makes general remarks.

## CHAPTER 2

### ESTABLISHMENT AND ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT DICHOTOMY

Currently, there is an increasing number of analyses reading the changes happening in party politics by using concepts such as populism, right-wing populism, neoliberal populism, authoritarian neoliberalism, and so on. Even though these analyses are explanatory in their accounts, most are difficult to operationalize and are cumbersome in the sense that too much meaning is attached to them, which can be called conceptual stretching in the Sartori (1970) sense. A lot has been said, especially on populism, and the term has been given some adjectives to make it more precise, resulting in even more different kinds of populism analyses to be showcased in the literature. On the other hand, we are on the eve of a complete distortion in political parties. The extremist parties that were once the subject of sarcasm in the eyes of many are now gaining power even in the established democracies of Europe. This is why we are at a point where we need to rearrange our relations with the concepts in our toolbox. There is a strong need to resort to more precise concepts without sacrificing much of our explanatory potential. This means rethinking what has been happening differently with different tools and, therefore, replacing what has been at stake so far. For instance, recently, the democratic theory agenda has been occupied by the debates on the crisis of liberal democracy and the incapability of the current system to deal with newly rising demands (Fishkin 1991; Habermas 1994; Benhabib 1996; Habermas 1998; Dryzek 2000; Mouffe 2000; Connolly 2005; Mouffe 2005). The comparative politics literature, on the other hand, dwelled on phenomena such as “the new wave of authoritarianism,” “democratic backsliding”, and the “rise of right-wing parties” (Levitsky & Way 2015; Bermeo 2016; Esen & Gumuscu 2016, Kaul 2017; Çınar 2018; Çınar 2019; Tansel 2018; Kumral 2022). As far as political economic accounts are concerned, the same phenomena have been explained in relation to neoliberalism, neoliberal developmentalism, and the like, with more economic connotations (Hall 1985; Akcay 2018; Rodrik 2018; Rogenhofer &

Panievsky 2020; Akcay 2021; Akram-Lodhi 2021, Kumral 2023). Of course, the content related to the above-mentioned concepts is vast and should never be neglected. However, relying on these dominant concepts as a consensus can be misleading in the sense that it lessens our chances of looking for concepts that explain the outside reality relatively more accurately. Party politics is one of the terrains where the recent phenomenon of the *so-called* rise of far-right, right-wing populism, and so on can be given a fresh look.

In this thesis, I draw on the literature on anti-establishment parties, which has long been disregarded despite its precise and operationalizable content. I argue that the concept anti-establishment party better captures the main drivers of what has been happening with the rise of certain types of political parties. The ideological locus of this momentum-gaining parties may vary from far-left to far-right in spite of the fact that the majority of the literature associates this surge with the far-right. There is, in fact, a character trait that transcends the ideological position of these parties, namely their anti-establishment trait. Now, I will present a general outlook of the recent changes happening in party politics and then introduce both anti-establishment and the establishment as a concept. With the introduction of the main concepts, I will offer my amendments to these frameworks and discuss why the concept of anti-establishment party and establishment/anti-establishment dichotomy span these changes better than the competing terms.

First, this recent change we are talking about is not intrinsic to third-world or developing countries. It is taking place even at the heart of established democracies of the world. For instance, Marine Le Pen's The National Rally, formerly the National Front, became the main opposition party with 89 deputies in the elections held in June 2022 in France. The Sweden Democrats Party, which has Neo-Nazi roots, came second in the September 2022 elections. Italy's Brothers of Italy Party (*Fratelli d'Italia*, FdI) came first in the general elections held in the same month, and recently, Geert Wilders' Freedom Party won the election in the Netherlands. In Spain, the Vox is increasing its influence on local governments. In Belgium, the Flemish Vlaams Belang Party received more than 10 percent of the votes in the elections held in 2019. And the Alternative for Germany Party is receiving 20



percent of the votes in Germany, the recent polls show (Bloomberg 2023). The far-right FdI's victory with 26.2 percent of the total votes in the general elections held in Italy on September 2022 and Wilder's win in Netherlands are especially important in the sense that these particular instances show that these parties do not merely represent a marginalized opposition but are capable of leaping into power as well. The Fdl leader, Giorgi Meloni, became the first far-right prime minister to come to power in Italy after Benito Mussolini. During the election process, Meloni ran a campaign that emphasized conservative values and anti-immigration sentiment, focusing on Christianity and family. Similarly, the far-right Freedom Party of Wilders, which was once a subject of sarcasm in the political arena, came first in the elections held in November 2023 with its anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric.

All of the above-mentioned parties are considered to be far-right and right-wing populists by the literature. Even though its success is new, the resurgence of this so-called far-right is not a new phenomenon. The literature discussing the "resurgence" goes back to the 90s. Bernt Hagtvet, for example, addresses the violence against minorities, foreigners, and the increasing influence of Neo-Nazis by saying, "A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of nationalism, re-emerging and attended by a flurry of right-wing extremist behaviour" (Hagtvet 1994, 291). What is interesting is that some of the political figures and political parties remain the same compared to the current time as Hagtvet (1994) mentions the success of Le Pen in France and the Flemish bloc in Belgium as well. The same spectre seems to be continuing to haunt Europe after almost 30 years, the literature suggests. Ruth Wodak considers the change in the political outlook of Europe in the exact same way: "A spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of radical right-wing populism" (Wodak et al. 2013, 24). Mushaben (2020) examines the challenges of far-right populism in Germany, repeating the spectre metaphor by addressing the rising ethno-nationalism across Europe. Hanchard (2018) offers a historical analysis in his book *The Spectre of Race: How Discrimination Haunts Western Democracy*, emphasizing right-wing nationalism and authoritarian populism gaining momentum in Europe. Examining how Italy's Lega North follows a populist path by opposing the EU, Brunazzo and Gilbert claim that "the spectre of right-wing populism is stalking in Europe" (Brunazzo & Gilbert 2017, 624).

The discussion has not changed a bit. Even the wording remains the same. One might ask, then, the validity of these very similar claims after almost 30 years now, and would be right to do so. There have been times when the so-called right-wing populist parties have lost momentum in the last years and vice versa. This makes it clear that the dynamics behind the electoral performance of the extremist parties need to be reconsidered. More importantly, the discussion needs to be withdrawn from the left-right continuum. Analyzing examples of Syriza, Podemos, and the Five Star Movement in Italy, Hartleb's study on anti-establishment parties demonstrates that this new "provocative spectre is not only right wing" (Hartleb 2015, 39). Some political parties, be it left or right, are acting in similar patterns and driven by the same motivation, namely by dissatisfaction against the establishment.

As far as the political parties are concerned, the central problem with the existing analyses is that they miss the central motive shared by the challenger parties, which is not their right-wing populism but their very anti-establishment attitude. The party politics of the recent years can be read through the dichotomy between the establishment and anti-establishment. An elaboration on anti-establishment parties, in this context, necessitates an elaboration on what is meant by "the establishment" as well. In this thesis, I draw highly on Andreas Schedler's theoretical and Aamir Abedi's empirical accounts. In doing so, I borrow Schedler's and Abedi's conceptions of anti-political establishment parties and employ them while manipulating certain content in these with further enhancements.

## **2.1. Anti-Establishment Parties**

The term *anti-establishment parties*, in fact, is a revised version of what Andreas Schedler (1996) initially called *anti-political establishment parties*. I revised its initial version by removing the word "political" from it as the characteristics attached to anti-political establishment parties in Schedler's account are quite political in the theoretical sense of the term. I relied on democratic theory literature to do so. Chantal Mouffe differs from its counterparts in democratic theory with her strong emphasis on "the political". Mouffe starts her book *On the Political* by making a distinction between "politics" and "the political". She borrows vocabulary from

Heidegger to elaborate these terms and contends that “politics refers to the ontic level while political has to do with the ontological one. This means that while the ontic has to do with the manifold practices of conventional politics, the ontological concerns the very way in which society is organized” (Mouffe 2005, 8). Therefore, by underlining the significance of “the political” as constitutive of “politics”, Mouffe attaches a specific importance on the nature of “the political”.

This emphasis on the nature of “the political” sheds light to a vitally important question: if “the political” is constitutive of “politics”, what constitutes “the political”? Once the claim “the political” is constitutive of “politics” is accepted, the answer to this question, in fact, becomes very crucial to understand one’s orientation towards democracy, since the premises of “the political” will have consequences for democratic politics. For instance, if we envisage “the political” as a terrain of rational consensus, the outcome would be envisaging democracy as a means for public deliberation and dialogue. And the reflection of such an outcome on party politics could well be considering non-rational actors as anti-political. This vision of “the political”, in a nutshell, reflects the general outlook of the liberal understanding of democratic politics and is exactly the point where Mouffe differs from its counterparts. And one should notice that this difference takes place within the realm that is constitutive of politics, namely within the realm of the political. Therefore, what is at stake here is an original cleavage. In other words, if “the political” is envisaged as a terrain of conflict, power relations and antagonism, the outcome would by no means be the same with the one in the liberal vision. The outcome would rather be to envisage democracy as a plane where antagonisms reveal themselves. And the reflection of such an outcome could be that there is no party beyond the political and therefore a party in conventional politics is necessarily political. This is why the term anti-establishment parties, I argue, is superior to the term anti-political establishment parties.

If one thing is certain, anti-establishment actors share Mouffe’s conception of “the political”. Such logical reasoning can also proceed through Rousseau’s conception of *volonté general* (general will) and *volonté particulière* (particularistic will) in the sense that it reveals both a core feature of anti-political establishment parties and the way in which anti-establishment actors perceive the political. In the eyes of the anti-

political establishment actor, the premises of the general will is constitutive of the particular will, which normally is not. While the relationship between the dyad is inductive in reality, meaning that the accumulation of particular wills ends up with the creation of a general will, the anti-establishment actor inverts the relationship and turns the relationship into a deductive one. This way, anti-establishment actors depict and subvert the general will of people as they desire and then impose this distorted version on individuals.

Schedler argues that the party taxonomies that consider the presence of anti-establishment actors generally treat them as a residual category. The labels to classify this phenomenon, the most popular one being populism, “suffer from imprecision” and are “too general and thus conceal the specific target of anti-political-establishment crusades” (Schedler 1996, 292). According to Schedler, although anti-political-establishment parties share the populist resentment against the establishment or so-called “the elite”, the similarity is partial in the sense that the populist critique of the establishment is directed at the economic elite more than it is at the political elite (Schedler 1996, 293). The central pillar of anti-establishment parties is the ordering of the political world as a relationship among *the political class*, *citizens*, and *anti-establishment actors*. In this relationship, the political class represents “the malicious rogue”, citizens represent “the innocent victim”, and anti-establishment actors represent “the redeeming hero”. The political class, the ones who do not represent the citizens, does misuse the rights given to them by citizens, and in fact, there exists a fundamental cleavage between the rulers and the ruled (Schedler 1996, 294). There are *three* key components of anti-establishment and constructing a degenerated political class is one of them.

The first key component of anti-establishment is *constructing a political class*, which demands de-differentiation, irrationality, and authoritarian rule. Anti-establishment actors depict an imaginary and homogenous political class therefore unifying both government and opposition under the same scheme. Giving them nicknames, anti-establishment actors label the whole political class and present them to the citizens within one category. The motive behind the anti-establishment labeling is to reveal that the differences that are claimed to exist between the government and opposition

parties are a facade. These parties are particularly united in one certain thing, and that is confronting any kind of meaningful opposition, which is exactly what anti-establishment parties claim to be (Schedler 1996, 295).

Anti-establishment actors also attribute an irrational character to the people who are in charge. According to them, the political class and especially those in charge suffer from incompetence. This incompetence of the political class also has to do with their moral credentials. Anti-establishment discourse is aimed at depicting the political class as corrupt, in betrayal, and consisting of self-interested cynical foxes. The interesting part of this constructed political class is that they are given an authoritarian outlook by the anti-establishment. Anti-establishment currents “unfold under democratic conditions” and talk about democratic backsliding (Schedler 1996, 297). Their discourse is similar to those of anti-authoritarian movements as they present their polities as authoritarian ones, in spite of the fact that their reference point in terms of a good society lies in the hierarchical and highly authoritarian societies of the past.

The second key component of anti-establishment is constructing the anti-political self. Let's call this *constructing the anti-establishment self*. The anti-establishment actors are masters at presenting themselves outside of the party system, and they are seen in the same way by the competing actors. This anti-establishment character is not something that is given, but something that is taken by the anti-establishment actor, which requires the use of certain advantages such as being a *hominis novi*, victim, and methods such as attack politics, charismatic populism, and positioning beyond left and right. *Hominis novi* means new man in Latin. Indicating that this newness has more to do with the perception than it has to do with reality, Schedler stresses that establishment actors are not necessarily new faces in the political arena. Anti-establishment parties are small, and their actors make use of this in the construction of the anti-political self, as smallness denotes innocence. These innocent actors are also victims of the political elite. They are excluded from the media and suppressed by the establishment. The reason for their smallness, in this sense, has to do with the establishment's repression of the emerging alternatives, anti-establishment actors argue. The advantages of being new and victim are accompanied by strategies of attack politics and charismatic populism.

Attack politics contains elements of insultation, use of daily language, and undiplomatic salvos. In Schedler's words, "Anti-political-establishment discourses call into question the conventional distinction between (recognized) political adversaries and (violently combated) political enemies" (Schedler 1996, 299). This quotation from Schedler also reveals how appropriate the Mouffean conception of the political that is introduced at the beginning of the chapter. Anti-establishment actors portray 'the political' as an arena where they strongly oppose their contenders as if they were enemies. Anti-establishment parties, in this context, can be considered reflections of the political at its apogee. Not all anti-establishment parties, on the other hand, are this radical in terms of attack politics, there might be more moderate applications of this method as it was in the Fujimori, Berlusconi, and Huffington cases (Schedler 1996, 300). Another strategy in the making of 'the anti-political self' is the positioning beyond left and right. Anti-establishment actors tend to ignore the left-right continuum in conventional politics despite the fact that party competition ensures that they are defined at one side of the spectrum sooner or later. According to Schedler, there exist both left-wing and right-wing anti-establishment parties, which, however, should not allow us to dismiss the fact that anti-establishment actors show "clear elective affinity" with right-wing parties (Schedler 1996, 302). This point needs to be scrutinized further, which I will do in the following pages for the sake of the narrative.

The last tactic in constructing the anti-establishment self is charismatic populism, which contains three points. The first point regarding the charismatic populism staged by the anti-establishment actor is the presentation of anti-establishment as the prime motor of change. Anti-establishment contend that politics is a contaminated activity that causes all the social evil, and they are the only ones offering hope to exit. The second point is the anti-establishment bias against political intermediation, which is accompanied by high levels of personalization around the leader. This stance is especially common in parties who define themselves as movements, and not political parties (Schedler 1996, 301). The third and last point of such charismatic populism has to do with the "confidence-building measures" anti-establishment actors take. The actors of anti-establishment illustrate themselves out of the political class by using several methods such as violating the rules of political language with

translations from colloquial dialect, performing primordial human features like strength and courage, participating in activities that are used to be associated with the pre-modern ruler or elitism. They like being seen in “non-political arenas, above all, fields of culture and entertainment: rock concerts, talk shows, discos, beer tents, soccer games, tennis matches, night clubs, and so on” (Schedler 1996, 302). Maybe in religious sites as well.

The third key component of anti-establishment is to draw the *anti-democratic borderline*. Anti-establishment actors face the dilemma of convincing people that they do not belong to the establishment and making clear that they do pose a threat only to the political elite, not to liberal democracy in general at the same time. Maintaining the dilemma is a hard job considering the fact that a mistake on one side of the dilemma may result in the delegitimation of the anti-establishment actor. This is why anti-establishment actors embark on a semi-loyal stance as far as political opposition is concerned. Political opposition can be thought of in non-binary terms, as well as binary terms. The labels of democratic/anti-democratic, loyal/principled, and intra-systemic/anti-systemic in classifying political opposition might therefore be amended with an intermediary category, Schedler claims (Schedler 1996, 303). Using Juan Linz’s categorization of the semi-loyal party, which occupies a middle ground between democratic and anti-democratic types of opposition parties, Schedler defines anti-establishment parties as semi-loyal except for the semi-loyal parties’ support for illegitimate violence in Linz’s account. Schedler underlines that anti-democratic opposition has lost both its appeal and legitimacy with the so-called end of history. Anti-establishment actors therefore need to veil their anti-democratic attacks in presentable and democratic clothing. Even though they may try to remain in the gray areas of disloyal opposition, it is not possible for them to avoid declaring opposition to fully anti-democratic projects (Schedler 1996, 304).

Relying on Tom Mackie’s definition of ‘challenger parties’ as a starting point, Abedi aims to offer a more operational definition of anti-establishment parties. What’s interesting in Mackie’s account is that the term “challenger parties” includes left-libertarian parties together with neo-fascist populist parties of the right by definition. The motor of the challenger parties lies in the disaffection with the existing political

establishment and what it represents. This is why, Mackie regards “all parties that are not deemed to have a realistic chance of participating in government, either because of their anti-system stance, which is defined as challenging “the status quo in terms of major policy issues or the nature of political activity,” or because the parties of government do not consider them to be acceptable partners to be “challenger parties” (Abedi 2004, 11). This definition of challenger parties, however inadequate, inspires Abedi to come up with a condition list to be considered an anti-establishment party, which are as follows.

- “A party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues;
- A party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment;
- A party that asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all establishment parties be they in government or in opposition are essentially the same” (Abedi 2004, 11).

Abedi also stresses that there might be parties that are classified under neither anti-establishment nor establishment categories. Those parties are, however, not politically relevant in the Sartori sense, Abedi claims. This is a point I highly disagree with for several reasons. Up to now, I have remained descriptive in order to provide an uninterrupted understanding of anti-establishment parties from their theorists. On the other hand, there are certain amendments and enhancements available, especially on the logical formation of the term anti-establishment.

## **2.2. The Establishment**

Schedler (1996)’s introduced conceptualization provides a detailed account of what an ‘anti-political establishment party’ is, however, he does not provide an understanding of ‘the establishment’. Therefore, it would be appropriate to draw on Abedi in defining ‘the establishment party’. Abedi resorts Giovanni Sartori’s criteria of *party relevance*, in other words “governing-potential” criterion, to define the



establishment party (Abedi 2004, 11). In Abedi's study political parties are considered establishment parties if they fulfill the following two conditions. First, parties that have participated in government, or the parties that are regarded as a suitable partner for government formation by the governing parties. Second, the parties that are willing to enter into a coalition with the governing parties. According to Abedi, these "broad definitional features" are clear enough to determine if a political party is an establishment party or not (Abedi 2004, 11). If one can tick off *both* of these conditions for a political party, that political party can be considered an establishment party, according to Abedi.

I contend that even though the above-mentioned criteria are clear in the sense that Sartori used them, the criterion of such, on the other hand, is weak both *semantically* and *syntactically* while defining the establishment party. It is syntactically weak because such a definition of the establishment does not correspond to 'the anti' of the anti-political establishment party Abedi offers. The anti of what is under the establishment party is irrelevant to what is under the anti-political establishment provided by Abedi, which shows the lack of clarity in the offered definition of 'the establishment party'. It is also semantically weak because what anti-political establishment parties are against in Abedi's account does not represent the establishment parties in terms of meaning. For instance, if the definition of the establishment party in Abedi's account is assumed to be correct, the anti-political establishment parties should have been those who are against the following parties. First, the parties that have participated in government or are seen as suitable partners for government formation by the governing parties. Second, the parties that are willing to form a coalition government with the governing parties. An anti-political establishment party, however, is not *necessarily* against a party that fulfills both criteria. An establishment party, moreover, is not *necessarily* a party that complies with both criteria. The fundamental problem with the argumentation here is that in the establishment and the anti-establishment dichotomy, the establishment occupies a *constitutive* position. This means that for a conception of anti-establishment party to be presented in a logically valid structure, it is a *sine qua non* to provide a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the establishment party as the content of 'anti-establishment' is inevitably dependent on 'the establishment'. Abedi, however,

confines himself to offering broad definitional features for establishment parties and goes on to provide a definition for anti-political establishment through the comparison of three anti-political establishment parties, namely the Italian Northern League (*Lega Nord*, LN), Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) and the Green Party of Germany (*die Grünen*, the Greens).

I argue that what should have been done instead is the opposite. That is to say reaching an understanding of the establishment party through a comparison of establishment parties, and then focusing on the anti-establishment parties. This is what this thesis aims to do with comparing two establishment parties, namely Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and Indian National Congress (INC), and dwelling on their interaction with two anti-establishment parties in their respective political environments, namely Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) and Indian People's Party (*Bharatiya Janata Party*, BJP). The interaction between the former and latter dyads exemplifies the trajectories and career paths both for the establishment and the anti-establishment parties.

The establishment itself is a contextual concept, and its content is subject to change depending on the environment it represents. The establishment in China and the US can represent two different opposites of the political spectrum. The anti-establishment, as it is constituted by the establishment, is no exception to this contextuality. The concepts of the establishment necessarily determine the concepts of the anti-establishment. Abedi, in his study, also emphasizes that the three anti-political establishment parties he analyses do not seem to have much in common at first glance (Abedi 2004, 12). This is a consequence of the contextuality of the establishment, meaning that there does not exist a universally valid *content* that crosscuts all establishment parties. On the other hand, there might exist a *form* that crosscuts all establishment parties. For a more accurate understanding of the establishment party, Sartori's above-mentioned party relevance criteria need to be undergirded with further elements.

Indeed, a party has to be relevant in order to be classified in the establishment category. One might, however, think of a new political party that fulfills the

relevance criteria and has no impact on the making of the establishment. Moreover, one might think of a party that fulfills the party relevance criteria while being an anti-establishment party as well. The far-right anti-immigrant Victory Party (*Zafer Partisi*, ZP) in Turkey is a good example of this type of party. This anti-establishment party has signed a protocol with the social democratic main opposition party CHP amidst the presidential election going for a second round and guaranteed positions in the cabinet. This way the party fulfilled both conditions of party relevance. First, it became a party that is seen as a suitable partner for government formation. Second, it showed a willingness to form a coalition with the governing parties. The party never took part in the government as the opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu lost the elections with a total vote of 48%. The party, on the other hand, proved to be relevant, which reveals the problematic nature of using Sartori's party relevance criteria as the criteria of the establishment. The Victory Party case shows that a party can be classified as both an establishment party and an anti-establishment party within the framework given by Abedi.

If we are talking about disaffection with the establishment as the engine of anti-establishment tendencies, we refer to deeper content than content that is measurable using just party relevance. The establishment anti-establishment actors seem to be against is the very existing power relations, constitutional arrangements, state apparatus, and the ideological settlement these are built on. The establishment in the Abedi sense does not encompass such a wide array of elements. The establishment, if defined with the party relevance criteria, is nothing different than describing the centre of the political spectrum in another way. It is true that anti-establishment parties may aim to dismantle the political centre and recruit centre votes by radicalizing the electorate with attack politics. This does not mean that anti-establishment parties are mainly about eradicating the centre. In the eyes of anti-establishment, the emptying of the centre is a means to pose a greater threat to the establishment. Yet this establishment is not the establishment that is simply defined through party relevance criteria.


Establishment parties should be those who align well with and also those who *make* the establishment. The criterion of *longevity* within the *context* of salient social

cleavages in a given country should thus be added into our criteria defining the establishment. If a party is able to survive in the *longue durée* while remaining relevant, we might assume that the same party has inevitably shaped the political environment it is operating in and is a maker of the establishment. It is exactly these kinds of parties anti-establishment salvos are directed at. The establishment parties that do fulfill the criteria offered by Abedi but do not fulfill the criterion of longevity have only secondary priority in the eyes of the anti-establishment as such parties are not the root cause and not the bigger enemy. The category of the establishment, in this account, requires a party to comply with Sartori's party relevance criteria together with the criterion of longevity. Such a requirement, however, makes the classification of newly formed parties in the category of establishment parties impossible, which might seem like a problem at first glance. This is not the case for two reasons. First, the establishment indicates the existing order, working dynamics, and ideological settlement of a political environment, which necessitates durability and permanence to be part of. Second, newly formed political parties can be considered quite open to change in terms of political position during the party identification process and may tend to behave more radical in the initial phase of their foundation than they are in general. This is why they need to be retained out of the establishment category unless they comply with the rule of longevity. The criterion of longevity here can be taken as the criterion for institutionalization proposed by Rose and Mackie (1988). This criterion suggests that a party is institutionalized if it shows candidates in three consecutive national elections.

I also suggest using a third taxonomy that goes beyond the establishment and anti-establishment envision offered by Abedi, namely the category of the 'establishment-making establishment', which makes the difference between certain establishment parties crystal clear. While the term establishment party refers to political parties that align well with the establishment, the category I present, that is *establishment-making establishment parties*, occupy a hierarchically superior position in the dichotomy and refer to parties that both align well with and make the establishment. The establishment-making establishment parties are parts of the establishment but are also the ones giving the establishment its shape. Being state-founding parties, CHP and INC are good examples of such an establishment party group. These parties


were able to survive in the long duration and had consecutive governments in their respective countries. The same parties, on the other hand, currently are the ones in main opposition, losing their establishment-making party status. In our account, *the making of the establishment is possible if and only if the party can actively create and/or influence the policy making, which demands either government or coalition partner position.*

The below figure is the manipulated version of Schedler’s visualization for modes of opposition, showing establishment/anti-establishment dichotomy. This figure does not merely indicate types of opposition in the government/opposition plane but rather locates political parties within the context of establishment/anti-establishment division.



**Figure 1.** Visualisation of Establishment – Anti – Establishment Dichotomy

There are different career paths for anti-establishment parties, some of which have already been described by Schedler. According to Schedler, “they may change their nature (and they are likely to do so), shifting either right to the anti-democratic side (radicalization) or left to the side of mainstream politics (assimilation). In case they remain true to their anti-political identity, their fate may vary. If they are lucky, they survive; if not, they disappear” (Schedler 1996, 304). Ultimately, there are four paths anti-establishment parties may take, which are as follows.



**Figure 2.** Schedler's Visualisation for Modes of Opposition

First, they may *normalize*, meaning that they may move to the position of anti-incumbent opposition by leaving their anti-establishment traits aside. Second, they may *radicalize*, meaning that they go far in their anti-establishment traits and become an anti-democratic opposition. Third, they may *disappear*, which is the most likely endpoint for an anti-establishment party, Schedler claims (Schedler 1996, 305). Resorting to the criterion proposed by Mackie and Rose (1988), they may institutionalize their anti-establishment stances, meaning that they are able to succeed in presenting candidates at more than three consecutive national elections without altering the party characteristics. Schedler denotes that there might be another path for anti-establishment parties, which is the path that they leap into power. In this scenario, anti-establishment parties may follow conventional politics and normalize with the practice of routine politics. They may commit anti-democratic acts and try to “destroy the system”. And lastly, they may keep being loyal to their original discourse and continue the game of “me against the rest” (Schedler 1996, 306). The thesis will demonstrate this kind of trajectory, providing empirical evidence through the change in party support groups. The analysis of the shifts in party support groups will further enable us to exemplify the possible career paths for establishment parties as well.

Abedi’s empirical analysis shows that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties is dependent on several factors as follows.

- country-specific effects
- grand coalition government
- establishment party divergence
- electoral volatility
- the combined vote share of the two largest parties.

In addition to country-specific effects, the existence of a grand coalition government is a positive for anti-establishment parties. The establishment party divergence is also a significant determinant in the sense that the closer these parties are to each other in the left-right continuum, the more anti-establishment parties benefit from them. Another positive factor that increases anti-establishment parties’ electoral fortunes is

the presence of electoral volatility. The availability of the voters, in this context, is a serious determinant. Lastly, the lower combined vote share of the two largest parties is proven to be statistically important for anti-establishment parties. When the combined vote share of the two largest parties is relatively low, anti-establishment parties do better (Abedi 2004, 137).

## CHAPTER 3

### ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES: THE CHP AND THE INC IN PERSPECTIVE

This chapter of the thesis will dwell on the emergence, rise, and alteration of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the Indian National Congress (INC). In doing so, the thesis will present the historical accounts of both parties and, therefore, enable a comparative reading of the dyad.

#### 3.1. *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*

The Republican People's Party is a state-founding political party in Turkey, currently occupying the main opposition position in Turkish politics. The party's roots go back to the Turkish War of Independence that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War. The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic marked the end of the Ottoman dynasty, which needs to be understood in detail to make a complete sense of the modern history of the Turkish Republic (Lewis 1961; Ahmad 1993; Zürcher 2017). Such a task, however, goes beyond the scope and aim of this thesis, which is why historical references to the Ottoman Empire and the transition period will be made only if necessary and within the context of the CHP. In fact, CHP was the natural heir of the Association for the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, the aim of which was to liberate Turkey from the occupiers. The Association "served during the phase of armed struggle" and was later superseded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's People's Party on 6 December 1922, the name of which was changed to the Republican People's Party a year later on 11 September 1923 (Lewis 1961, 381).

The key to understand the CHP's significance lies in the Kemalist modernization process Turkey has undergone following the establishment of the Republic. CHP, in



this context, was the home for both theoretical discussions and practical applications of the Turkish modernization process. The party designed and engineered every aspect of social, economic, cultural, and political life in Turkey and was embodied in the very state apparatus from day one. According to Frey (1965), the party acted “as a mechanism for social control from above”. The central task of this social mechanism was “to disseminate the values and ideas associated with Atatürk modernization and Westernization program”, Sayarı argues (Sayarı 2013, 183). This contention, however very common in the literature, should be scrutinized in the sense that it represents a fallacy with its unquestioned reliance on the existing consensus to define the modernization process as “Westernization.” In Atatürk’s thought, the idea of civilization was a transcendental phenomenon that goes beyond its Western or Eastern representations. In Atatürk’s words, “There may be a great many countries in the world, but there is only one civilization, and if a nation is to achieve progress, she must be a part of this civilization” (Versan 1984, 247). This understanding of the civilization does not necessarily correspond to what is meant by defining the Turkish modernization as a process of Westernization. Even though the West was taken as the model of civilization at that time, the relation of civilization to Western societies was not an essentialist one. Leaving the discussion on civilization aside, it is true that CHP as a political party became a tool to practice and spread the content related to Mustafa Kemal’s modernization program, the process of which is called the Kemalist modernization. The CHP’s duty in its initial years was mainly endorsing and formally legitimizing the government’s action on behalf of the nation, Karpat claims (Karpat 1991, 49). This, however, does not mean that the Grand National Assembly, and therefore CHP, was empty of political debate. On the contrary, the CHP and the Assembly were home to intense discussions on matters varying from local to international matters, and Mustafa Kemal (1989) himself participated in these discussions to present the government’s arguments against those who were vocal in their criticisms.

The CHP established the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923 and enjoyed a dominance in the Assembly with almost no external opposition until 1946. The only exception to this powerful authority were the existence of some remainder groups, who were not very keen on supporting Kemalist premises, from the Association for

the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia and the new political parties that were formed in line with the government's attempts to establish a multi-party democracy. In its initial years, the party elected Mustafa Kemal as the President of the Republic, abolished the caliphate, ratified the Lausanne Treaty, and signed the Turko-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1925. After internal and external peace had been secured, Mustafa Kemal started to prepare the CHP for its reformist mission, which became concrete with Mustafa Kemal giving a six-day speech at the CHP's first convention in 1927 (Karpas 1991, 49). This speech, according to Karpas, was both consisted of the fundamentals of Kemalist understanding of history and somewhat a one-sided history of what happened following the War of Independence. Within the framework of the speech, the new regime was able to judge the Ottoman past from its perspective. The Ottoman state, in this perspective, was the personal patrimony of the Sultan, while the Turkish Republic was a populist state, or in other words the state of the people. The CHP, therefore, was not the representative of certain classes or social groups but of the whole nation (Karpas 1991, 50).

Even though the reformist mission of the CHP was declared symbolically in the party's first convention, it came to operationalize only after the establishment of the Free Party (FP). The party's establishment was due to Mustafa Kemal's personal request from his associate and close friend Fethi Okyar and was in line with Mustafa Kemal's aim to bring a democratic pluralist political system. According to Karpas, Mustafa Kemal also wanted to use the FP as a check mechanism on the CHP, "some of whose members had secured lucrative positions in state monopolies and other economic or semi-economic institutions controlled by the government" (Karpas 1991, 51). The FP gained some level of support, and this triggered the CHP to finally accelerate the reform steps, expanding organizational structure and recruitment efforts. In its next convention in 1931, the CHP reaffirmed the original characteristics of the Republic, that is nationalism and populism, and also endorsed three new principles in its program: republicanism, secularism, and reformism, which etatism later became a part of. These six principles in total became the six arrows of the CHP and took their place in the party emblem. The six arrows are incorporated into the constitution together with the party program and were eventually called Kemalism. In the following, the party decided to spread the logic

behind these principles and established the People's Houses, aiming to popularize the reforms and the ideology around it (Karpat 1991, 53).

The six arrows and Kemalism, despite of the fact that they correspond to the same content in Karpat's above-mentioned account, do not necessarily represent the same set of ideas, especially given the current outlook of Turkish politics. While the former was the guiding principles of both the party and the state in the early republican period, the latter can be considered an ideology, or to put it more appropriately, was taken as an ideology. It still stands as an important phenomenon with different interpretations and is being discussed in academic and political circles. Kemalism and what it connotes need to be understood clearly in the sense that it retains its position to be very relevant to make sense of CHP, the ideology of it, and even its electoral base. This is a point I will dwell on in detail later in this section of the thesis. The six arrows, however, are now essential to see the CHP's location in the ideological spectrum and to further detect the evolution the party later went into.

“During the initial years of the new regime, republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*) was generally cited as the foundation of Kemalist ideology”, Paul Dumont says. The principle of republicanism meant first and foremost the notion of popular sovereignty. It signaled the very change in the regime following the War of Independence, against those who were hoping for the continuation of the Ottoman dynasty and the caliphate (Dumont 1984, 28). Republicanism was the principle that guaranteed Turkish people equal rights before the law and freedom. The CHP's second convention defined the principle of *nationalism* as follows. "A nation is a social and political formation comprising citizens linked together by the community of language, culture and ideal" (Tunaya 1952, 585). The nationalism of CHP was aimed at consolidating the regime and averting the dangers of separation, which was a materialized threat after the Kurdish revolt Şeyh Said looked for an independent Kurdish state within the Turkish borders. This definition of nationalism did not put a strong emphasis on Islam as a cement unifying the nation but rather used it as a secondary supplement under the secular idea of Turkish nationalism.

The *populism* arrow of the six is quite different than how the term is understood today. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the term was simply referring to

the mobilization of the “intelligentsia for the service of the economic, cultural and social progress of the masses”, a widely known example of such movement being the Russian *Narodniki* movement against czarism. The movement inspired several other movements, especially in the Balkans (Dumont 1984, 31). The Kemalist take of populism resembles, but is not limited to this intellectual mobilization definition of the term. The concept has been very popular, especially in theory circles in the last decades, and is used to describe, if we put it crudely, the separation of society into two distinct and antagonistic groups, namely the elite and the people. In the CHP sense the concept did not refer to such separation of society but rather meant the solidaristic ideas of the state and the CHP’s representation of the whole nation, which consisted of a classless society. According to Mustafa Kemal, the development status of Turkish society and industry was so weak that there had been no formation of the class. This is why there was no need for political parties that defend the interests of different social or economic classes as well (Dumont 1984, 28). The CHP was the spokesperson for the whole population and representative of the government by the people and for the people. The term, in this respect, indicated the Kemalist attachment to the ideal of a democratic society. Mustafa Kemal’s conceptualizations of populism and republicanism were also both inspired by Rousseau’s notion of “general will”, and this influence was openly declared by Mustafa Kemal himself in the Assembly (Kemal Atatürk 1989, 231). The influence was also manifested in the words of Atatürk on the People’s Party and the representation of the nation: “In my opinion, our nation does not have various classes that would pursue very different interests and therefore be in conflict. The classes in our country are necessary for each other, complementary, and supplementary in nature. Therefore, the People's Party will work towards securing the rights, uplifting factors, and happiness of all classes” (CHP, n.d.).

Reformism, or more appropriately revolutionism(*inkılapçılık*), was a matter of inter-party dispute. While the moderates in the party were interpreting the word *inkılapçılık* as reformism, the radicals were taking it as revolutionism. The radicals dominated the discussion and revolutionism became the official interpretation of the principle although the moderates kept stressing that the state was only committed to reform (Ahmad 1993, 63). The principle basically meant the devotion to the

modernization of Turkey and continuous reforms to elevate the nation to the contemporary level of civilization. The arrow of secularism is maybe the strongest ideological tenet that the RPP back then had, and Kemalists still have. The term's exact correspondence in the Turkish language is *sekülerizm*, which is different than the arrow's original name laicism(*laiklik*). As Niyazi Berkes denotes, the term secularism has a much more comprehensive meaning compared to laicism, which specifically means the separation of religious and state affairs (Berkes 1964, 6). The young republic faced significant challenges to separate the state apparatus from religious influence. Religion was, however, an important part of all state institutions, education systems, and juridical structures. This is why, a to-the-point term like laicism was chosen to represent the CHP's ideological stance (Dumont 1984, 36). It would not be wrong, however, to take CHP's belief in secularism for granted together with laicism. The secularism of the CHP, in this regard, can be considered an assertive type of secularism, which is a more radical interpretation compared to passive secularism. While the US kind of passive secularism requires the secular state to take a passive role "in avoiding the establishment of any religion" and "allows for the public visibility of religion", the Turkish and French kinds of assertive secularism aim to exclude the religion from the public sphere and confine it to the private domain (Kuru 2007, 571).

As far as the principle of etatism is concerned, the dates etatism was brought to the foreground should be of careful consideration. The Great Depression's devastating impact on world economies ensured the Ankara government to look for ways to empower the state's role in the national economy. The principle was defined in the CHP convention: "Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible" (Lewis 1964, 286). The term basically indicates an economic policy choice, the extent of which does not refer to a socialist model but rather a social democratic one. The expression of *the father-state* was common in the Kemalist Republic in the sense that the state was the leader of economic initiatives and was a provider (Dumont 1984, 39). These six guiding ideological principles were accompanied by the practice

of reforms and revolutions in every field of social life. The CHP pioneered the reform of the law, the removal of religious courts, the Romanization of the language, the transition to the Gregorian calendar, rapid industrialization and economic development, education and university reforms, recognition of women's rights, establishment of peace and security on both national and international levels and the like.

The CHP's endorsement and galvanization of the Kemalist reforms were possible due to the simple fact that the early years of the republic witnessed a one-party rule with Mustafa Kemal's overwhelming prestige. This did not change very quickly after the death of Mustafa Kemal, as İsmet İnönü, who was Mustafa Kemal's associate and the second man of the young republic, came to power. İsmet Pasha was also a unique character with a high reputation, and his prestige was marked by the title of National Chief (*Milli Şef*) that was given to him during the Second World War. Nonetheless, the politics of the one-party rule and maybe the Kemalist elite has ended forever with the transition multi-party rule and democracy in real terms. It was no secret that the Kemalist elite and Mustafa Kemal always aimed and looked for ways to establish a pluralist democracy. İnönü, for instance, formed an Independent Group (*Müstakil Grup*) in the Assembly to function as a loyal opposition and Mustafa Kemal himself also made attempts even though these were abused by the anti-regime circles. On the other hand, it was no secret that this never happened as the Republican elite did prioritize the consolidation of the regime rather than risking the young republic in the political catastrophe. With the CHP reaching its nadir and the global conditions that are in line with the Kemalist ideal of pluralist democracy arising, the CHP domination in Turkish politics came to an end, and it came to an end forever.

The establishment of multi-party rule Turkey symbolically can be dated back to the speech İsmet İnönü gave for the opening session of the Assembly in November 1945. The very reason for this speech to symbolize the establishment of multi-party rule and the transition to democracy is twofold: (i) it consisted of a clear message formally recognizing the lack of an opposition party, (ii) it acted as a declaration to the world, confirming Turkey's intention to follow the liberal macro trend in its

democratization process. One important point to note is that the lack of an opposition party is recognized in reference to a comparison between Turkey and the liberal democracies at that time. Once we see that in the same speech Inonu states Turkey always had the democratic character as a principle since its foundation and that the lack of an opposition party is recognized within a comparison between Turkey and liberal democracies, we can infer that the establishment of multi-party rule is mainly due to external conditions. According to Feroz Ahmad (1993), the result of the second world war was considered the victory of democracies over fascism in ruling-party circles. Even though Ahmad accepts the significance of external factors, he contends that main dynamic of the political change was internal, indicating the erosion of the political alliance amongst the different power fractions such as the military-bureaucratic elite, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie (Ahmad, 1993, 102). This contention also has truth validity. Mustafa Kemal's absence in the party also meant the absence of a superior arbiter that resolves the issues between different ideological, inner-party, and any sort of political fractions. In fact, the very idea of permitting the formation of political opposition parties caused a significant dispute within the CHP. On one side were hardliners who preferred maintaining the single-party system, while on the other were moderates advocating for liberalization (Tachau 1991, 101). There was, however, widespread acknowledgment of the necessity to address the frustrations and long-held grievances that had built up during the extended period of unopposed rule by the CHP, especially under the strains of war. Furthermore, the authoritarian regimes in Europe had faced a humiliating defeat in the war, highlighting the importance for Turkey to forge closer ties with the victorious democratic nations in the post-war global landscape to avoid encountering challenges (Tachau 1991, 102).

The CHP hardliners, after the heavy years of the Second World War for the Turkish people, wanted to amend its relations with the people and to continue the reform program. In line with this, a Land Reform Bill was introduced in the Assembly. "The objects of the law, as stated in the first paragraph, were to provide land and means for peasants with none or too little, and to ensure the full and effective use of the arable lands of the country. The method was to grant land to such peasants, together with twenty-year, interest-free loans for development, and other material help. The

land was to come from unused state lands and pious endowments, municipal and other publicly owned land, reclaimed land, land of unknown ownership, and land expropriated from private individuals” (Lewis 1961, 474). The reform faced harsh criticism from both left and right while its advocates stated that the reform had nothing to do with the ideologies of the Left or Right and only endeavored to free the Turkish peasants from feudal landowners. Only one day after the land reform was passed, the motion with four signatures (*Dörtlü Takrir*) was presented in the Assembly by four CHP deputies. The signees Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Adnan Menderes, and Fuat Köprülü demanded wider political freedoms with the motion, which was denied in the Assembly as the party was already taking democratizing steps. Although the intention behind the motion was vague, it was already known that the signees had decided to form their own party following the Land Reform Bill, Hilmi Uran the Minister of Internal Affairs at the time claims (Uran 1959, 435). The growing resentment among the magnates accelerated the establishment of the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP), one of the founders of which was himself a landowner. President İnönü ended the discussions of multi-partyism by declaring that “the opposition must be permitted to operate under the same conditions as RPP” and that “as President ... he would serve both parties impartially” (Tachau 1991, 103). It is very crucial to note that the second man of the young Turkish Republic became the guarantor of the multi-party regime and paved the way for his own party CHP’s decline, which reveals the strength of normative ideals among the Kemalists.

The DP successfully mobilized both magnates and the peasants and soundly defeated the CHP in the 1950 elections. Due to the absence of the proportional representation system, the CHP ended up being a minority party in the Assembly. The CHP’s explanation for this failure had to do with CHP’s strong commitment to reform and secularism, which no longer appealed to the less educated peasant voters. The explanation suggested that the Turkish voters were split into two opposing groups: one characterized as enlightened, progressive, civic-minded, and altruistic, while the other was depicted as uneducated, narrow-minded, and led by a self-serving elite willing to pander to the most backward and conservative views among the populace (Tachau 1991, 105). The pro-CHP sections of the society were mainly bureaucrats and intellectuals, while the masses were supporters of the DP’s liberalization policy



against the state-centered policies of the CHP (Tachau 1991, 106). Regardless of the CHP's take on the failure, the political power passed from the bureaucratic elite to the economic elite, which was in fact the very DP itself (Turan 1984, 113). The initial years of the DP governments witnessed a certain level of economic and social improvements in the form of liberalization. However, the DP was expecting the bureaucracy to become the party's servant as they were for CHP in the single-party era (Turan 1984, 114). This obviously was an unreasonable demand, as the multi-partyism, which allowed the DP to take charge, also necessitated bureaucratic neutrality. Plus, the bureaucratic elite maintained its ideological settlement with the republican values, therefore with the CHP. Later in the 50s, the political decline of the DP was followed by economic decline, and the DP tried to overcome the crisis through repressive measures. The DP became increasingly authoritarian, and to keep its hold among the masses, it performed excessive anti-state, anti-secular, anti-republican attack politics, which was bothering the military and the bureaucracy of the republic. In 1960, a group of military officers under the name of the National Unity Committee did a coup d'état in the name of restoring democracy, and did overthrow the government.

The coup marked the CHP's return to power, but this return was a tenuous one and the CHP votes in the 1965 elections proved it with the worst electoral performance in the CHP history. Such a performance resulted in the resignation of İsmet İnönü from prime ministership and the party underwent a change process again. The declaration of "Our Ideal of a Progressive Turkey", a declaration that was written by Bülent Ecevit and Turhan Feyzioğlu, who were intellectual stars of the CHP, has been adopted in the party congress. The declaration put a strong emphasis on themes such as "land reform, social justice, social security, economic development, democratic etatism, education, secularism, fine arts, nationalism and youth" (Tachau 1991, 107). In the meantime, the Turkish Workers Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP) also emerged as a left party and the CHP needed to differentiate itself from both the TİP and the DP's heir Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP). "İnönü set forth the maxim 'left of centre' to describe the party's position; but this slogan boomeranged with the JP's mocking slogan, 'Ortanın solu, Moskova yolu' (left of centre is the road to Moscow)", Tachau says (Tachau 1991, 108). This major change in the ideological

and rhetorical orientation brought “the widening of its support base to workers, peasants, and low-income groups in the urban centers, and finally the replacement of the decades-long chairpersonship of İnönü with the energetic Bülent Ecevit in 1972” (Çınar et al. 2022, 3). Under the leadership of Ecevit and maxim of left of centre, the CHP turned into a mass party and attained the best election result in the party history with the 1977 general election (Çınar et al. 2022, 4). The evolution of the CHP was also reflected in its electoral demographics, with the party becoming the strongest in the most developed provinces, in which it had been the weakest.

During the 70s turbulent political atmosphere, the CHP failed to consolidate its success. Following 1980 the military coup, the junta banned the party and its cadres from politics, which stayed in effect until the 1987 referendum. The CHP cadres joined the Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti*, HP) and Social Democratic Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Parti*, SODEP) during 1983-1985, and the Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*, SHP) until 1995. All these three parties remained as the heirs of the pre-coup’s Republican People’s Party until Deniz Baykal, who was a popular figure in the CHP political milieu, reestablished the CHP and merged it with SHP (Çınar et al. 2022, 3). As Ecevit lost its energy and charm in the eyes of the electorate, the reestablished CHP reassumed its position to be the sole heir of the pre-coup CHP and became the main opposition party. The leadership around Deniz Baykal mostly remained loyal to the core principles of the party tradition, indicating an amalgam of the six arrows of the early republican period and left-of-centre social democracy of the Ecevit period. Such stance, however, came to an end as Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu became the party leader in the 2011 party congress. Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP toned down the emphasis on the early republican period’s guiding ideology. After 2011, the party tried to become a complete center party and made certain sacrifices from its core values. This CHP was, for instance, way closer to post-secularism than it was in the past, and nationalism was interpreted in the most amicable way possible. In this context, social democracy and the original guiding principles in general were tried to be given a reconciliatory and friendly clothing in the eyes of the electorate, with the aim to attract votes from the right and expand the party’s electoral base.

In 2019, the CHP won 7 out of the 8 largest municipalities in Turkey, marking a significant momentum for the opposition led by the CHP against the AKP, Turkey's ruling party for the past two decades. As accurately pointed out by Çınar et al. (2022), the 2023 presidential election was going to be a pivotal test for the CHP-led opposition in ending the AKP's two-decade-long rule in the country. However, this opportunity was missed due to frictions within the opposition alliance and Kılıçdaroğlu's insistence on nominating himself as the opposition candidate despite his lack of popularity among the masses, and the significant popularity of newly rising figures within the CHP such as Mansur Yavaş and Ekrem İmamoğlu. Consequently, Kılıçdaroğlu and the CHP-led opposition alliance lost the election, securing 48% of the vote share against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Following the election defeat, Kılıçdaroğlu also lost his intra-party leadership battle against Özgür Özel, who used the word "change" as his slogan, during the party's 38th Congress. Özel won the intra-party battle with the support of the cadres around the CHP's Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, who also called for a change in the party following the historic election defeat. Özel's tenure began at a time when municipal elections were imminent. The CHP cadres around Özel placed a significant focus on selecting candidates for 2024 municipal elections and it paid off quite well as the CHP became the first party by taking 37.81% of the total votes casted. Although it is yet to be known whether Özel's tenure will bring a *paragmatic* shift at the party or not, the slogan of change will likely to remain facade as Özel retained most of the key figures from Kılıçdaroğlu era and did not went to an adjustment in the party discouse that might suggest an ideological transformation. Considering the differences in voting behaviour between local and general elections, it is now a question mark whether the CHP's success in the local elections will translate into a success in the general elections or not.

### **3.1.1. Two Dogmas on CHP and Kemalism**

The importance of CHP in Turkish politics indispensably entails the importance of Kemalism, which is a deep-rooted political tradition both in CHP and Turkish state. This political tradition was living its heydays and at the same time was the major determinant of Turkish political agenda up to 1980s which amounts to the years that

Kemalist tradition fell into decline. Regardless of the changes in the government, the tradition of the republican elite was keeping its position in the state apparatus. From this date on, however, there happened a wide range of structural changes in Turkish politics. The cruciality of the 1980s, in fact, does not *only* come from the 1980 military coup d'état and the new nationalist constitutional settlement that followed the coup. 80's importance for Turkish politics also has to do with the rise and adoption of neoliberal policies and structural crisis that came with it for the social democrat parties. In the Turkish context, the rise of neoliberalism in world was tantamount to the decline of the tradition and values represented by the CHP. The rise of neoliberalism and its penetration into the national politics of the countries prevent the local dynamics of Turkey itself to be enough in considering the changes in the Turkish politics. This is why one should never turn a blind eye to the social democratic parties' decline around the world. The international developments for social democrats were "manifested in the adoption of Blairism" and CHP also tried to devise and identity around this newly rising Third Way politics after its reestablishment (Özman and Coşar 2008, 234).

Simten Cosar and Aylin Özman, in their article *Representation Problems of Social Democracy in Turkey*, emphasize the conflict between Kemalism and Blairism-social democracy at that time- by saying that CHP was lagged because it was stuck to the Kemalist *doctrine* (Ozman & Cosar 2008, 247). In this perspective, the newly reestablished CHP presented an ideological incoherence and incompatibility with social democracy due to its loyalty to the Kemalist principles. This contention, however may seem like a reasonable claim at first glance, is based on a dogmatic belief that was prevalent in the Turkish intelligentsia, especially after the 1980s. Once we scrutinize the underlying assumption of the claim, which is attributing a *doctrinal* character to Kemalism by default, the need for refutation becomes crystal clear. This particular refutation, I think, is pretty crucial in the sense that the arguments that will be refuted correspond to a general tendency that treats CHP as a static and monolithic entity. The inaccuracy of such tendencies has been proven in the recent empirical analysis revealing that the CHP altered itself over the course of Turkish political history in terms of the salient social cleavages in Turkey (Çınar et al. 2022, 21). Even though the empirical data itself is quite adequate for the

falsification of the CHP and Kemalism's static depiction, the depiction also is not based on historical facts and presents an incoherence and incompatibility with Mustafa Kemal's approach in the party ideology.

The problem with attributing Kemalism to a doctrinal form is that a doctrine necessarily consists of *unchangeable* premises, which means a doctrine, in fact, indicates a static content. The arguments attributing CHP and Kemalism with a foundationalist structure, in this sense, assume that the principles consisting of the foundation of CHP and Kemalism are static. The question, therefore, should be the following: does Kemalism have static content? I argue that Kemalism has a dynamic nature, and hence cannot have content made up of unchangeable premises. First, Mustafa Kemal rejected the formulation of an ideology for the Turkish state in a doctrinal form at first hand by saying that "it would freeze the change" (Aydemir 2007, 424). This provides us with strong evidence for why Kemalism or the six guiding principles cannot be taken into consideration as a doctrine.

Second, the attribution of stasis is also in contradiction with the very Kemalist principle of revolutionism. In the CHP conventions held during the 1930s, the party continuously stressed its commitment to reform (Ahmad 1993, 63). Once we accept the dynamic nature of Kemalism, we also accept the fallibility of arguments attributing CHP to a static character. A doctrine necessitates an unchanging structure, which is in direct conflict with dynamism. Here, even if we have defined Kemalism as doctrine, it would be a paradoxical one: The only static element of Kemalism would have been its dynamism. The problem with taking Kemalism for granted as a doctrine in Coşar and Özman's article is that it results in accusation of Kemalism and, therefore, of CHP for being incompatible with social democracy or more generally incompatibility with any modern democratic thought (Coşar and Özman 2008, 245).

Third, the guiding principles of Kemalism were not a party program for the future but were a "post de facto summing-up of achievements" (Rustow 1994, 13). In the foundation of Kemalism and CHP, no doctrinal cement was present. It is the Kemalist belief in reformism that can be considered the motor of change in CHP. In

today's political atmosphere, it would not be a bold claim to say that Kemalists are way more democrat than they were before, so is CHP. Therefore, both arguments claiming that CHP wants to change but Kemalism prevents it, and that CHP was unsuccessful because of its foundationalist tradition are wrong. We can further undergird this approach by resorting to the state of left-wing, especially social democrat parties on a global scale. The situation of left-wing parties was more or less the same all around the world, so the problem with CHP should be read with specific reference to neoliberal populism's influence on the left in a global context; the CHP was not unique in its crisis (Mehta 2018). What's more is that the CHP's task was even further compounded by various factors such as "its leader-centric political culture, a strict party discipline that favors party leadership over party organization, clientelism, and the exploitation of social cleavages, especially under the conditions of a weak civil society and an unorganized working force" (Uğur-Çınar and Açıkgöz 2022, 12). Even though Coşar and Özman recognize the significance of neoliberal economic policies, they confine themselves to just showing that the AKP and CHP presented a similar economic policy, which means commitment to the neoliberal economic model (2008, 246). The discussion and arguments presented by Uğur-Çınar and Açıkgöz also undergird the counterargument here against the dogmatic reading of the CHP and Kemalism. The fundamental problem was not related to some sort of foundationalism but rather was a reflection of the social democracy's struggle against the postindustrial style of politics, the impact of which was even more severe due to the local dynamics of the Turkish case.

The second dogma of CHP and Kemalism studies reveals itself in arguments defining Kemalism as the official ideology of the Turkish Republic (Coşar and Özman 2008, 241). The Kemalist revolution, in fact, is the only revolution in the last millennium of Turkish politics that has both succeeded in achieving its aims and created a tradition. This sui generis characteristic of the Kemalist revolution, indeed, inevitably makes Kemalism a *reference point* for any group claiming to be progressive, which once again demonstrates the inaccuracy of the contention that the foundationalist structure of CHP prevents her from adopting social-democratic policies. Kemalism, as it stands as a reference point for progressivism in the Turkish case, cannot be an obstacle to social democracy's advancement; it might rather drive

such advancement. The official ideology argument is also wrong due to the fact that there are no institutions left in the state apparatus that could enforce Kemalism's permanence as the official ideology. Even though Kemalism has created a political tradition in the form of a bureaucratic elite, its interaction with society was a top-down one. Therefore, the tradition was not always voluntarily protected and supported by the masses. Rather, governments in charge and state institutions were the main reproducers of the Kemalist tradition, which means that Kemalism, to sustain itself, needed those institutions to be Kemalist. Here, we must take the significant change into consideration that has happened in the Turkish political milieu after the 1980 coup d'état and the new constitutional arrangement that followed. Once we accept this change, it would no longer be appropriate to claim that the official ideology of the Turkish Republic has stayed as it was. The problem with this dogma is that it creates an illusion that makes researchers focus too much on Kemalism when the CHP is the case. In the post-1980s, identity politics and neoliberalism's entrance into the political arena resulted in the generation of new social demands. In this respect, Kemalist and/or social-democratic stances were unable to meet and accumulate the newly rising demands in society. This made the protection of the Kemalist state by people impossible. Rising anti-establishment right-wing populism, which was, in fact, neoliberalism fed with Islamic credentials, took power in Turkey by responding to demands developing within the context of salient social cleavages and global economic conjuncture (Coşar and Özman 2004, 60). This made protection of the Kemalist state by the state itself impossible, as these right-wing anti-establishment parties gradually re-structured state institutions that reproduced the Kemalist tradition. That is why, Kemalism and the CHP have lost their position to be the central locus of Turkish politics. Kemalism was the official ideology of the state, and the CHP was the party of the state until the 1970s- despite the fact that the CHP was not in power-; however, these were replaced with Turkish-Islamic synthesis and new neoliberal center-right parties, respectively (Özman and Coşar 2007, 201).

### **3.2. Indian National Congress**

The Indian National Congress (INC), or simply the Congress, is a state-founding political party in India, currently standing in the main opposition in Indian politics.

The 139-year-old Congress' roots date back to the Indian Independence Movement, which emerged against the British Raj in India. Founded in 1885 and turned into a mass organization in the early twentieth century, the Congress led the independence efforts and freed the country from the colonial rule of the United Kingdom. Despite experiencing several breaks, especially in 1967 and 1978, the Congress has governed India for the majority of the past 77 years (Chiriyankandath 2016, 3). In its initial years, the Congress consisted of the country's elites and educated middle classes and was entirely aimed at securing constitutional reforms from the British government in India. The party's birth, in this sense, can be read as the direct result of the colonial exploitation of India by the British, creating high levels of disaffection among the population, in particular among the Western-educated elite (Belmekki 2008, 32). The country witnessed recurrent disastrous famines, large-scale deaths, outbreaks of cholera, and smallpox under the British government, which were concomitantly accompanied by the taxes and commissions put on the Indian people (Kumar 1985, 382).

The historical background of the Indian National Congress is also the background of India's struggle for freedom and independence. The British East India Company, a company formed in 1600 to exploit the commercial activities in Southeast Asia and India, had the ruling power in most of India back then. "As the commercial aspect of its activity had gone more and more into the background and the political aspect come more and more into the forefront", the program and the misdeeds of the East India Company came under scrutiny even in the British parliament (Sitaramayya 1935, 5). The economic drain and the establishment of foreign rule had given birth to major discontent and resentment among the Indians, bringing about the armed Revolt of 1857. Even though the revolt failed in its intention to throw off the British yoke, the East India Company became history with it and the governance of India has passed directly into the British Crown. This assumption by the Crown, however it brought a period of no war, did not resolve the administrative defects in British rule, which were "pointed out and sought to be remedied by sympathetic British officials" like Allan Octavian Hume, who later took the initiative to establish the Indian National Congress together with educated intellectuals of India (Sitaramayya 1935, 7).



### 3.2.1. The Congress Before the Independence 1885-1947

During its initial two decades, the Indian National Congress pursued a 'moderate' agenda by focusing on obtaining greater political power *within* the British Empire rather than advocating for immediate independence or self-rule. The early Congress was highly influenced by figures like Dadabhai Naoroji, known as the "Grand Old Man of India", who emphasized moderate demands through constitutional means and was one of the firsts to write on the economic exploitation of India by the British. Gopal Krishna Gokhale, another prominent moderate, also advocated for gradual reforms, aiming to achieve self-governance *within* the British Empire through dialogue and petitions (Wolpert 1989, 45). However, the moderation of the Congress came to an end with the Partition of Bengal in 1905 and the Congress intensified its efforts for political autonomy. Following the partition, the INC became more vocal in demanding political reforms, which by time turned into calls for complete independence from the British raj. The founding members of the Congress, in fact, had either been educated in Britain or had lived there, particularly prominent figures like Allan Octavian Hume, Badruddin Tyabji, W. C. Bonnerjee, Surendranath Banerjea, Pherozeshah Mehta, and Manomohun Ghose and Lalmohan Ghose. The Congress had a British committee based in London, which was established in 1889 and acted as a lobbying group. Dadabhai Naoroji, while serving as the first Indian member of the parliament in London, participated in the meetings of this group and was associated with their efforts to put pressure on the British Parliament. In 1890, the committee began publishing *India*, a monthly journal that was summarizing India news and views for the British press and politicians. Gradually, India journal evolved into a weekly publication that lasted from 1898 to 1921. The journal became a valuable source for the increasing number of Indians and Indian students in Britain. It was 72 of these English-educated Indians that came together in Bombay to form the Indian National Congress (Majumdar 1961, 368).

The Indian National Congress used to hold annual meetings in its early phase. The Congress passed tens of resolutions in these annual sessions between 1885 and 1905 and presented its requests across various different domains including civil rights, administrative and organizational reforms, constitutional amendments, and economic

policies. First of all, it would be appropriate to restate that the Congress leaders were influenced by the Western thought currents, especially by the Liberal Party in the British parliament. Many of the early leaders of the Congress, such as Dadabhai Naoroji, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, and W.C. Bonnerjee, were in a sense products of the British education system in India. They were deeply influenced by the norms of British liberalism, which promoted constitutional reform, civil liberties, and self-governance within the framework of the British Empire (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006, 82). The resolutions of the INC were characterized by their moderation and humble tone, thus pursuing collaboration with the British for the welfare of the Indian people. The INC leaders tried to remedy the administrative injustices and invited the British to implement welfare reforms. They put emphasis on the need for Indian representation in government positions and proposed the establishment of agricultural banks to aid the rural population. One of the earliest and most important resolutions was the resolution on the reform of the Indian Civil Service (ICS). The Congress demanded that the selection exam for entry into the ICS be held simultaneously in England and India to ensure higher Indian participation, addressing the issue of underrepresentation of Indians in their own country's administration (Majumdar 1961, 353). The ICS and the ability of Indian people to participate in the ICS was a major theme in the early Congress. The attempts for Indian entrance into the ICS, however, was later proved to be futile. "Despite the promises confirmed in the Queen's Proclamation of a non-discriminatory recruitment to the civil service, admission to the ICS became harder, not easier, in these years. Examinations were held only in London, not in India, and the maximum age for taking the examination was lowered in 1878 to nineteen. Under such restrictions no more than a tiny handful of Indians were even able to compete", Metcalfs claims (Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, 137).

India's economic problems were also a major issue in the Congress's agenda, especially in the late 1880s. The party highlighted the highly negative impact of British economic policies on Indian economy, particularly on agriculture and industry. In 1886, under the presidency of Dadabhai Naoroji, the Congress passed resolutions that criticized the heavy land revenue system brought by the British, which exacerbated the burden on the peasants' shoulders. Naoroji's work, "Poverty

and Un-British Rule in India," provided a scholarly foundation for these critiques and became influential in the Congress circle with its emphasis on the economic drain from India to Britain (Naoroji 1901, 237). Furthermore, the Congress wanted the British to reduce military expenditures and to implement protective tariffs that could support indigenous industries. These economic resolutions, in a sense, indicated the Congress's shift towards a more comprehensive reform agenda that span every realm related to Indian society. For instance, the INC passed resolutions that can be considered under education and social reforms category. These reforms requested the enlargement of primary education in vernacular languages, therefore aiming to increase literacy rates among the Indian population. The resolution passed in the 1892 session under the presidency of W.C. Bonnerjee, for instance, brought the importance of improving public health services and sanitation to the foreground, as such services were in terrible conditions under the British rule. The need for higher technical and scientific education was also stressed by the Congress resolutions. These resolutions overall highlight the Congress' raising concerns and interest in the social welfare of the Indian people and reflects the party elites' comprehensive vision of the modernizing and self-sufficient India (Chandra et al. 2016, 97). This shift towards a more comprehensive consideration of India in the Congress at the same time reveals the party's changing structure from a simple 'congress' demanding reform to a complete political party for Indian people.

The party aged and matured, and the resolutions passed by the Congress consequently began to reflect a more assertive tone on political representation as well as on other topics. The INC demanded the expansion of the Indian legislative councils and greater Indian participation in governance. The resolution for simultaneous ICS selection exams was reiterated, together with the demands for reforms in judicial and police services to ensure just treatment of Indian people. The reform of the legislative councils resolution, in this respect, was passed in the 1895 session and asked for transparent and comprehensive electoral representation, including formation of federations and the direct election of Indian representatives. This indicated a significant step towards a more federative governance structure, albeit under the roof of British colonial rule (Copland 2002, 88). The early 20th century, however, witnessed the rise of the extremists within the INC, who were

dissatisfied with the moderates' gradual and humble approach. INC leaders like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai, and Bipin Chandra Pal started to put pressure on the party for a direct action against the British and became influential in the Swadeshi Movement, which began as a reaction to the partition of Bengal in 1905. The partition of Bengal, in this regard, was a pivotal event in British India, drastically altering the Indian National Congress (INC) and its attitude concerning independence movement. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India back then, divided Bengal into two parts for allegedly administrative reasons. However, many Indians saw this as a tactic to weaken the national movement by creating a dichotomy between Hindu and Muslim. The western part of Bengal province had a majority of Hindus, while the eastern part had a majority of Muslims populations (Chandra et al. 2016, 175). This decision led to protests and marked a change in the INC's methods from discussions and petitions to more active resistance. The extremists within the INC started to gain more power after the partition and the events that followed the partition.

The Swadeshi Movement also resulted in a growing tendency towards self-reliance within the Congress, with boycotts of British goods and the encouragement of indigenous industries (Chandra et al. 2016, 101). The period after Bengal partition was characterized by a more *aggressive* stance against British rule, and the partition in a sense set the foundation for future mass movements. While encouraging Indians to boycott British goods and use local products instead, the Swadeshi Movement at the same time became a tool to recruit more people in the fight against British rule and was turned into the first big push towards economic and political independence (Chandra et al. 2016, 173). The dissatisfaction with the partition brought leaders within the INC who supported more direct action against British rule to the foreground. Figures like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Lala Lajpat Rai, known as the Extremists in the party, started to gain influence as mentioned. They argued for *Swaraj*, or in other words self-rule, as the only goal, in contrast to the Moderates who had previously dominated the Congress with a more cautious and gradual strategy (Chandra et al. 2016, 178). The British government eventually revoked the decision that brought the partition in 1911 and reunited Bengal. The techniques and momentum from the Swadeshi Movement, on the other hand,

continued to change the INC's strategies in the following years. The incident also revealed the enduring problem of maintaining Hindu-Muslim unity within the movement as the Muslim delegates started to decline in numbers with Muslim League founded by Aga Khan in 1906 starting to dominate Indian Muslims (Krishna 1996, 420).

Although the Congress became vocal in demanding political reforms through resolutions, petitions, and dialogue in its first 33 years, the party's connection with the masses was actually very weak. The early Congress, in this context, was a movement from *within* and lacked mass organization with a strong social base (Majumdar 1961, 374). After the Swadeshi Movement and particularly World War I, the political positioning, and the moderate tone of the INC underwent crucial changes. By 1918, thanks to its three decades of political efforts, the party made the countrywide circulation of newspapers and the adoption of certain representational enhancements possible, and the INC politics opened deeper pathways into Indian society. The ambitions of the Indian political class had moved from mere representation in state apparatus to demanding complete autonomy and involvement in the administration of India. The 1918 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms that aimed at addressing these rising political demands were far from meeting the desires and passions of the Congress members and were vehemently categorized as "disappointing and unsatisfactory." Faced with post-war dissatisfaction, the British authorities at the time preferred suppressive measures rather than looking for a peaceful consensus with Indians, which sparked high levels of unrest that had not been witnessed since 1857 (Krishna 1966, 412). While the extremist fractions of the INC dominated the intra-party leadership, it would be more than necessary to note that this extremism was relatively less extremist compared to what it was after the Bengal partition in 1905. This new INC can, in a sense, be read as a synthesis of the moderates and the extremists in the first two decades, as some formerly left extremists returned to the party by leaving their insistence on unpeaceful means aside. "In this changed situation the Congress adopted as its new objective the attainment of Swarajya by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means, and along with it a program designed to develop the capacity for self-government among the Indian people. The non-cooperation movement launched in 1920 produced

unprecedented political awakening and transformed the Congress organization” (Krishna 1966, 414).

The Rowlatt Act, passed in March 1919, enabled the British government in India to imprison any person suspected of terrorism without any kind of court trial. This act once again created widespread unrest and was followed by the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre in April 1919, where British troops killed hundreds of weaponless Indian civilians who had gathered in Amritsar. The massacre was a turning point in the sense that it radicalized many Indians against British rule and considerably strengthened the independence movement (Chandra et al. 1971, 265). In the meantime, Mahatma Gandhi returned from South Africa and started to dominate the Congress leadership. The Gandhi-led INC gave start to the Non-Cooperation Movement in 1920, and urged Indians to boycott British institutions, products, and services. This was Gandhi's first major national movement, advocating for peaceful non-cooperation with the British as a means to achieve Swaraj. The movement gained massive support but was later called off by Gandhi in 1922 following the Chauri Chaura incident, where a violent clash led to the death of policemen. The period after the incident immediately saw a decline in mass mobilization and a shift towards institutional politics within the framework of the reforms introduced by the Government of India Act in 1919 (Sarkar 1983, 206).

In 1930, the Congress started a civil disobedience movement with the Salt March under Gandhi's leadership. This resulted in acceleration in the Congress' mobilization against British rule, while directly challenging the salt tax imposed by the British government. The movement witnessed national participation across India and significantly damaged British authority (Wolpert 1989, 200). The Quit India Movement, another civil disobedience movement started by the Congress in 1942, represented the apogee of the Congress' struggle for independence. The Congress passed a resolution in Bombay calling for an immediate end to British rule. This call was unanswered, on the contrary, the movement resulted in a massive suppression and extreme measures by the British authorities, as most of the pioneering Congress leadership was arrested. Despite the arrest of the Congress leadership, the movement galvanized Indian public and demonstrated the unfeasibility of continuing the British

rule. With the end of World War II, the British acknowledged their inability to maintain control over India. Negotiations between the British government, the INC, and the Muslim League, which demanded a separate nation for Muslims, led to the decision to divide India. On August 15, 1947, India gained independence and was divided into two nations: India and Pakistan. The partition was accompanied by massive violence, displacement, and the loss of up to a million lives, marking a tragic end to the struggle for independence (Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, 221).

### **3.2.2. The Congress After the Independence 1947-Present**

The Indian National Congress transitioned from a mass national independence movement to the governing political party of a newly sovereign nation following India's independence. The INC naturally emerged as the biggest and the strongest political party in the Indian territory. In the general elections of 1951-52, which was the first election in the post-independence era, the party won a landslide victory and gained full political control. This marked the beginning of a single party dominance in Indian politics. Although the Congress gained 364 of the 489 seats in the Lok Sabha, the party could only secure 45% of the total votes cast, which is an important nuance showing the Congress limited support amongst the masses. The remainder of the votes was divided amongst an array of opposition parties from different ideologies, or regions. The Congress highly dominated the legislature despite its limited popular appeal, which became a feature of the future Indian politics (Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, 235). The election system in India, which was, and still is, based on a first-past-the-post voting, was obviously in advantage of the Congress. The dominance of the INC continued until 1977 when the Congress was defeated by the Janata Party coalition. The Congress enjoyed no interruption in its dominance in the first twenty-five years except certain splits within the party. The party regained power in 1980 and stayed in power until it lost the general elections of 1991. From 1991 onwards, the Congress was only able to form coalition governments, one in 1991 and two in 2004 and 2009 as the leader of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The INC went into a decline especially after it was defeated by Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party in both 2014 and 2019 general elections with the worst electoral performances in its history. In the 2014 general elections, the INC

could only gain 44 seats out of 545 in the Lok Sabha with 19.31% of the votes. The 2019 general election was not any different, the INC won 52 seats with 19.49% of the votes.

The INC under Jawaharlal Nehru's leadership was a unified entity driven by the vital tasks of nation-building, economic and social development. Nehru's tenure in the INC was characterized by a commitment to secularism in social and cultural spheres, socialism in economic sphere, and non-alignment in the international arena. It is important to note that this secularism was not an assertive type of secularism explained in the previous section of the thesis. The Indian secularism was neither aimed at exclusion of the religion from public sphere or nor does refer simply to the separation of church and state. The Indian understanding of secularism had to do with engaging with, and therefore sustaining, all different religions in the Indian borders (Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, 233). The party committed itself to building a democratically governed India where citizens of different religions and ethnic backgrounds could live harmoniously and enjoy equal rights under the law. The Congress' commitment, in this respect, was also put in the Indian Constitution, which the Congress-led enacted in the transition period following the independence (Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, 231).

Jawaharlal Nehru pursued state-planned developmentalist economic policies during his tenure, which was quite similar that of the socialist models at the time. The party defended a state-led economic model, where the state would play a significant role in key sectors rather than a liberal one. In this context, the INC tried to address the challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, and inequality through state-led industrialization and land reforms. One of the INC's early focuses was on agrarian reform, which was aimed at the redistribution of land to the landless and improving agricultural productivity (Gupta 2009, 2). While the success of these reforms varied across the country, they represented a central aspect of the party's efforts to cope with rural poverty. The motive behind the Congress' particular emphasis on agrarian reforms and villagers can be thought of the impact of Gandhian views on modern society. According to Gandhi, it was the 'competition' in the industrial society that corroded the Indian society and resulted in economic exploitation and class conflict



even in the village life. The return of the village life was, in this sense, the cure to the perils of industrial societies, and such cure was present in the India's hundreds of thousands villages that endured over the course of history. Even though Nehru and the Congress were never deviated from their main aim to establish a modern industrial India, the economic orientations were inevitably impacted from Gandhian perspectives as well (Frankel 2005, 12).

The INC ultimately followed a policy of industrialization with a particular emphasis on creating and developing the public sector. Nehru formed a planning commission, which published continuous five-year plans, the first one being on agriculture and the second one on industry. In line with these plans, the Congress either established under state ownership or nationalized most of the large-scale industries including steel, mining, and energy, which reflected the party's belief in the state's role to ensure economic development (Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, 243). The INC government also focused on education reforms to increase literacy and access to education, as education was seen as one of the keystones to nation-building and national development. Health, housing, and social security conditions were also tried to be improved, although these efforts faced major hardships given India's vast needs and very limited resources.

The 1967 general election under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, who was Nehru's daughter, revealed crucial internal conflicts and factions within the Congress party after Nehru's death. This instability within the INC resulted in the party losing over 100 seats in parliament and a four-percentage-point drop in the popular vote. Furthermore, the Congress was defeated in eight state elections, which was the first real challenge to its previously unchallenged dominance. Despite these setbacks, the party managed to maintain its status as the most dominant political force in India. After the death of incumbent Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, the leadership issue within the party was resolved with the election of Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister of India in 1966. However, internal tension between the two opposite factions continued. This internal tension eventually resulted in a split within the party. The majority sided with Indira Gandhi and joined the Congress (I), (I) was representing Indira. Indira Gandhi with the slogan "Garibi Hatao", which means

“eradicate poverty”, and with her pro-poor stance enjoyed an increase in the Congress support in the 1971 general elections. The party added 69 more seats in Lok Sabha and increased its vote share by 3%, securing a total of 352 seats and 43.68% votes. The elections settled the leadership issue once and for all, as Indira Gandhi assumed a great prestige, which was even equated with the Indian goddess Durga, and opened a new chapter in Indian politics known as the cult of personality (Rai and Kumar 2017, 3). Indira's tenure saw the purge of second-tier political leaders and the sidelining of critical voices within the party. Gandhi replaced the regional leaders of the Congress with a strong support base of people who lacked grassroots support. Instead of restoring discontent and democratic resolution of conflicts of interest, the INC imposed Gandhi's authoritarian will and command. The process of centralization of power, in fact, weakened the party system, which in the absence of internal democracy, resulted in the Congress' alienation from mass politics. The need for the creation of alternative modes of political expression became apparent in this period. Indira's falling popularity ratings, combined with the High Court verdict on election malpractices, led to the declaration of emergency in 1975. Indira bypassed the Lok Sabha and ruled the country by concentrating all the power in her hands (Rai 2023, 3).

The 1977 general elections witnessed one of the rare events in the country's political history when opposition parties came together to end the Congress dominance by forming the Janata Party. The Congress lost more than 200 seats and nine per cent of its popular vote, marking the party's worst electoral defeat since its formation. Indira's Congress could further decline, but internal rivalry within the Janata Party and the following split ensured the Congress to regroup itself. Lack of unity among the opposition parties, a witch hunt by Congress leaders for emergency excesses, and the repositioning of the Congress according to the stabilization plan all together brought the party back to power with a huge majority in the 1980 national elections. Following the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the INC leadership was passed over to Rajiv Gandhi, who led the party to a landslide victory in the 1984 General elections. Rajiv Gandhi won with a record 415 seats and 48% vote share, mainly due to the wave of sympathy created by Indira Gandhi's assassination. The party lost its political supremacy and single-party dominance period came to an end in the 1989

General election as the party could only gain 197 of the total 543 seats in the Lok Sabha. This defeat was mainly a result of the Bofor fraud, which was a fraud allegation based on a weapons contract between the Indian and Swedish states, and the accusations of INC politicians receiving kickbacks, Rai and Kumar argue (Rai and Kumar 2017, 4). Several other factors contributed to INC's diminishing dominance in Indian politics such as the non-collaborative decision-making, the party leaders' isolation from grassroots workers, the decline in the party reputation as a result of the election losses.

The period between 1992 and 1996 could be seen as a period of transition for the party as the leadership changed hands. This was the first instance in the party history where the Congress president was not from the Nehru-Gandhi family. During this period, the rise and growth of identity-based regional parties and the rise of Hindutva-centric BJP further damaged the party's political fortunes. The Lok Sabha formed following the 1996 general elections was against the Congress, and the BJP appeared as the strongest party in seats if not in vote share. The BJP party also won 182 seats in the 1999 general elections and emerged as the single largest party again. As the need for coalition was clear, the BJP formed an alliance with ideologically similar parties under the name of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and formed the country's first right-wing government at the centre, although the INC had the highest vote share. Following the election loss, the Congress invited Sonia Gandhi, who had been staying away from practical politics after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination in 1991, to take the lead (Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, 288).

According to Kohli and Basu (1997), a process of what they call a "deinstitutionalization" of the Indian state was obvious by the 1990s with the weakening not only of the INC, but also of the bureaucracy, together with the normative institutions in place since independence such as secularism, socialism, and democracy. The growing influence of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party was further fueling fears on India's secular tradition and the vitality of religious pluralist India in the nineties (Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, 266). The Lok Sabha election in 2004 was a battle between the NDA and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. The NDA government, in fact, performed reasonably well but the riots in

Gujarat, where a fire outbreak in a railway carriage killed sixty Hindu pilgrims and caused a series of terrible occurrences targeting Muslims throughout the BJP-ruled state, and India Shining campaign were not well received by the voters, and the party lost the elections to its main rival the INC. Manmohan Singh assumed the role of Prime Minister leading the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government (Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, 300).

In the meantime, the leadership structure of the INC shifted from being centered around a single individual to a collaborative one involving Manmohan Singh, Sonia Gandhi, and Rahul Gandhi together, which proved to be effective during the UPA's 2004-2009 first term in government. In the 2009 national elections, this new leadership structure further enabled the Congress to gain more than 200 seats independently in the Lok Sabha. This electoral performance of the Congress had to do with the joint leadership of Singh, Sonia, and Rahul Gandhi, as well as important initiatives such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), the farm loan waiver scheme, and various other policies aiming to support the lower segments of the society. Moreover, the UPA government special emphasis on stability and secularism contributed to its success (Rai and Kumar 2017, 5). According to Varshney, "until the mid-1980s, Congress was an umbrella party drawing substantial support from all segments of society, but the BJP and its coalition have since come to represent the socially privileged, the educated, and high-income groups. The upper segments of society constitute no more than 25-30 percent of India's population. Given the kind of support they have given the BJP and its allies over the last ten years, getting them back under the Congress umbrella is not as electorally promising as consolidating gains in the much larger middle and lower segments-especially given the latter's higher rates of voter turnout. It is therefore no surprise that targeted antimarket interventions on behalf of the lower social orders form the centerpiece of Congress' new political strategy" (Varshney 2007, 104).

Even though the Congress made certain gains with its troika of Gandhi, Sings, and Sonia, the gains are lost in the UPA's second term in power. In its second term, the UPA government was accused of political scams, high inflation, rising unemployment rates, and so on. According to Praveen Rai, "the Congress kept

oscillating throughout the second term between a pro-poor position and a neo-liberal policy in matters of state policy. As a result, it could neither win new supporters nor retain the middle class that had supported it in the 2009 national elections. The issue of reorganization of the party was perhaps an even more complex issue, as it kept repeating reformist platitudes while indulging in routine pragmatism. This not only made the party's claims rather hollow, but also created internal tensions in the party and made it less cohesive” (Rai 2023, 11). Such a problem of ideological inconsistency, in fact, is very in line with the social democratic currents of the time and does actually refer to a more general problem regarding social democracy’s crisis to deal with neoliberal populism.

## CHAPTER 4

### FROM ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHMENT-MAKING ESTABLISHMENT: THE BJP AND THE AKP IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

This chapter of the thesis will dwell on the emergence, rise, and alteration of the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party) and the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP). In doing so, the thesis will present the historical accounts of both parties and, therefore, enable a comparative reading of the dyad.

#### 4.1. Bharatiya Janata Party

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is one of the major political parties in India, currently occupying the government position in Indian politics. The BJP is part of *Sangh Parivar* (Family of Organizations), which is an overarching community of Hindu nationalists, with more than 100 million party members. The BJP's roots can be traced back to early post-independence India, despite the party's formal appearance happening only after the split of the Janata Party in 1980. The Bharatiya Janata Party, in fact, evolved from the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), which was founded in 1951 as a political branch of the National Volunteer Organization (*Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*, RSS), a right-wing Hindu nationalist umbrella organization with roots in the early 1900s. In the post-independence era, the BJS' birth came as a reaction by the Hindu nationalists to the secularist policies of the Indian National Congress, in which there was no place for extreme ethnic nationalism. During its initial years, the BJS struggled to gain traction in the highly Congress-dominated political milieu of Nehruvian India. This struggle, however, came to an end with the tremendous political opportunities that arose as a result of

the declaration of the Emergency under Indira Gandhi's tenure. The 1975-1977 Emergency was a pivotal event in Indian political history in the sense that the results were decisive for years to come.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took draconian measures allegedly to overcome prevailing "internal disturbance," and this further contributed to growing discontent with the Congress' authoritarian government. The Bharatiya Janata Sangh saw this newly opened window for opposition parties and joined forces with several other political parties to form the Janata Party (JP). The JP defeated the Congress in the 1977 general election by securing 41.32% of the total votes, successfully accumulating anti-incumbency sentiments caused by the strictly authoritarian regime of Indira Gandhi. The JP, on the other hand, did not last long in the government as the party was dissolved due to internal conflict in 1980, resulting in the formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party by the past BJS members. Although the newly formed BJP was unsuccessful in its initial years, the party gained momentum during the 1990s. The party won the most seats in the 1996 general elections, in which no single party could gain a majority to form a government. The BJP repeated its success in the 1998 early elections, this time also forming the government under the BJP-led coalition known as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Under the leadership of BJP's popular President Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the NDA secured a majority in the newly renewed Lok Sabha elections in 1999 and served a full term in the government. The 2004 election, however, saw a setback in the electorate's support for BJP and the party lost government position to its archrival the Indian National Congress. After representing the opposition against the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) during 2004-2014, the BJP won a landslide victory with Narendra Modi by attracting 31.34% of the total votes cast. The 2019 elections marked another landslide victory for Narendra Modi's BJP as the party increased its vote share to 37.46%.

#### **4.1.1. Bharatiya Janata Party: A Historical Overview**

The BJP's emergence and its following transformation necessitates a more nuanced outlook at the party history. First, the BJP initially tried to moderate Janata Sangh's extreme Hindu nationalistic stance following its emergence and put more emphasis

on the Gandhian socialism, which brings forward the perils of modernization and the traditionalism. The early 1980s under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee was therefore marked by moderatism and the party's efforts to present itself as a secular alternative to the Indian National Congress (Saleem 2021, 12). This strategy, however, failed as the party could only gain 7.74% of the total votes and two seats in the Lok Sabha. The failure in the 1984 elections were partially due to the rising sympathy wave against the Congress following the assassination of Indira Gandhi few months before the elections as well. From the 1984 election on, the party left its moderatism strategy and began to pursue a hardline Hindu nationalistic agenda with the new party president Lal Krishna Advani. The most important events that characterized Advani's tenure as BJP president revolved around Ram Janmabhoomi, which is an historical site and allegedly is the birthplace of the Hindu deity Rama. The BJP made the Ram Janmabhoomi and the movement around the place a big part of its electoral campaign, fully supporting the idea to construct a temple at the site. Capitalizing on the movement, Advani's highly Hindu nationalist BJP gained 85 seats and 11.36% of the total votes, which meant an increase in both Lok Sabha seats and vote percentage compared to moderatism of the previous elections.

The BJP gave outside support the National Front government, which was a coalition against the INC led by Janata Dal. Following the elections, Advani continued to capitalize on Ram Janmabhoomi and led a religious rally called *Ram Rath Yatra*, mobilizing the masses around the campaign to construct a temple at the disputed site in Ayodhya, where there was the mosque that had been constructed by the Mughal Emperor Babur, the Babri Mosque (*Babri Masjid*). In the renewed elections of 1991, the BJP increased its electoral fortunes even further by securing 120 seats in the Lok Sabha with 20.11% of the total votes. The Ram Rath Yatra movement, organized jointly by the BJP and the RSS, escalated with mass participation, and ended with the demolition of the Babri Mosque by the participants, resulting in the death of more than two thousand people as the demolition triggered violent conflict between Muslims and Hindus. The report of the commission of inquiry, the content of which later became known as a result of leaks, revealed that the BJP, the governing party of the region at the time, was involved in activities orchestrating the demolition (Jaffrelot 2021, 21).



In the meantime, “balance of payment crises at the end of the 1980s, IMF pressures, and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet bloc led to a decisive neoliberal shift in the India of the 1990s. Service and technology became the drivers of growth after these changes. Agriculture and industry suffered. Reliance on services and technology started to institutionalize a pattern of jobless growth, which would bedevil India for several decades” (Chacko in Tuğal 2023, 46). The Congress introduced a new economic program of liberalization in 1991, which had been negotiated with IMF, and started a process of neoliberalization by opening-up of the Indian economy, privatization, deregulation, and removal of strict tariffs to foreign trade. The BJP’s stance on this was welcoming. This stance, however, was later modified and turned into a self-reliance stance following the pressures from the RSS (Hansen 1999, 171). The problems regarding economy and the side effects of neoliberalization process also paved the way for the BJP to gain traction during the 1990s.

The radical stance of the BJP and the presentation of the destruction of the Babri Mosque as a triumph of Hindus, who had been long disregarded-supposedly- in the name of equal rights under the Congress dominated post-independence era, paid off quite well as the party won the 1996 elections. Although the BJP secured 160 seats in the Lok Sabha, the BJP leader A.B. Vajpayee couldn’t form the government, failing to reach the majority. The problem of reaching the majority to form a government resulted in the end of the BJP’s hardline Hindu nationalism once again as the coalitions were necessary with parties, some which had no desire to alienate Muslim voters (Jaffrelot 2021, 22). In the 1998 elections, the party became the first party once again with 178 seats in the Lok Sabha, this time also forming to government by agreeing on a common agenda, in which the ideas of Hindu extremism like constructing a temple in Ayodhya and radical changes in the constitution were absent, with coalition partners. This NDA government, on the other hand, did not last long as one party withdrew support and elections were renewed in 1999. In the 1999 elections, “the one established together with their NDA partners contained none of the contentious issues mentioned above, and the Vajpayee government did not try to revisit them” (Jaffrelot 2021, 23).

In this new term with NDA, the BJP focused on non-ideological arenas of politics, and pursued neoliberalization policies with a specific emphasis on good governance.

In the 1999-2004 term, The BJP-led NDA government under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was characterized by its moderate approach to both economic reforms and foreign policy. Vajpayee's tenure as the BJP President revolved around the initiatives such as the National Highway Development Project, which aimed to upgrade India's aging infrastructure, and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, which sought to universalize primary education, and nuclear initiatives (Kainth 2006, 3289; Chaulia 2002, 223). Vajpayee's government also made certain maneuvers in foreign policy, particularly with respect to improving relations with the United States and initiating a peace process with Pakistan, which famously begun with the Lahore Summit in 1999. However, the period was also marked by the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2002 Gujarat riots, and these posed important challenges to the BJP's image and raised questions about its handling of tensions and capacity to offer stability as hundreds of people died in the protests (Varshney 2014, 157).

The party entered into the 2004 elections with the *India Shining* campaign, which was a complete media campaign that included television commercials, printed advertisements, and billboards all over India. These advertisements portrayed India as a fast modernizing and developing country with vibrant images of urban development, technological advancements, and a burgeoning middle classes. The campaign's slogan aimed to remind a sense of national pride and confidence in the economic and social steps India had taken under the NDA government. In fact, India has been experiencing growth in its GDP and incoming Foreign Direct Investments after the neoliberalization that started in early 1990s. This growth was further bolstered by the liberalization policies that had been continuing since the 1990s regardless of the governing party. The Vajpayee government wanted to capitalize on these positive sentiments. While the campaign was initially considered successful in generating a positive buzz about India's economic development, it later faced criticism in the sense that the campaign was not representing the reality in India. The campaign's depiction of India was disconnected from the reality of many Indian citizens, particularly those in rural areas or in lower socioeconomic strata who had not felt the benefits of the economic boom, the opposition argued. Issues such as unemployment, rural distress, and social inequalities were still prevalent, and the

campaign was presented by the opposition as it was turning a blind eye to India's long-lasting challenges (Wyatt 2005, 470).

The India Shining campaign ultimately did not translate into an electoral success for the BJP in the 2004 elections. Contrary to the expectations created around the campaign, the BJP-led NDA lost the elections and the INC-led UPA came to power. After losing power in 2004, the BJP entered into a period of introspection and ideological balancing. The party struggled to position itself against the resurgent Congress, which had gained popularity under the leadership of Manmohan Singh, particularly for its social democratic reform agenda containing crucial packages such as the Right to Information Act and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (Gupta 2012, 89). During these years in opposition, the BJP kept directing criticisms at the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government's policies, particularly attacking its handling of corruption. This period also saw the BJP's gradual shift towards a more obvious Hindu nationalist rhetoric accompanied by a personalization of the party, a shift that was accelerated with the rise of Narendra Modi as a prominent party leader. The personalization of the BJP's election campaign was evident in the reduced emphasis on the party structure and the dynamics of coalition politics. The slogans were full of Modi such as "Har har Modi" (Everyone is Modi), "ghar ghar Modi" (Every house has Modi), and "Abki bar, Modi sarkar!" (This time, Modi government), which focused on the persona of Narendra Modi rather than the party as an institution. The campaign centered primarily on highlighting Modi's leadership qualities, portraying him as an efficient 'doer'(Jaffrelot 2015, 157). This strategy aimed to popularize the individual over the party or the party program, emphasizing Modi's personal capabilities and track record especially when he was serving as Chief Minister in Gujarat. Modi presented himself as the *Vikas Purush* (Development Man), and regularly compared his "Gujarat model" with the Congress governance (Jaffrelot 2015, 152). Modi showed the Congress, the Nehru-Gandhi family, and non-BJP governments as the reason for backwardness in the other regions, further capitalizing on the Gujarat model discourse in his statements like "while Gujarat is growing at 11% plus rate. In the field of agriculture, they are not able to cross 2.5–3% whereas Gujarat is not coming below 10%" (Narendra-modi.in, 2012). Presenting himself as a unifying leader and a champion of "the people",

Narendra Modi ensured a distinct and direct connection between him and the public, embodying a key feature of populist leadership. This approach was initially tried by L.K. Advani during his Rath Yatra, although he was unable to maintain it and ultimately did not succeed over A.B. Vajpayee in the long term. Modi's success in this endeavor was particularly notable as it contradicted the RSS ethos, which traditionally opposed the concentration of power around a single individual.

#### **4.1.2. Bharatiya Janata Party, the RSS, and the Hindutva Ideology**

The Hindu nationalistic ideology of the BJP, or simply *Hindutva*, is, or maybe was, basically the ideology of Hindu cultural and religious supremacy. Hindutva, which means "Hindu-ness," originated in the 19th century as both a political ideology and a movement against the British colonial rule. However, rather than primarily acting as a uniting cement against colonial oppression, Hindutva distinguished Hindus from Muslims, labeling the latter as "foreigners" and "invaders" and embedding them in the British strategy to divide and rule, thereby polarizing identities based on religion (Leidig in Leidig and Mudde 2023, 362). This division intensified with the Muslim political groups like the All-India Muslim League seeking greater representation back then, resulting in the intensification of Hindu-Muslim tensions. Early Hindutva thinkers, such as Golwalker, portrayed being Hindu as an ethnic identity that has to do with race and blood, beyond just a matter of cultural affiliation (Casolari in Leidig and Mudde 2023, 362). Hindutva encompassed all Indic religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism as Indic religions were all originated in the Hindustan geography. The essentials of Hindutva were three: (i) common nation (*rashtra*), (ii) common race (*jati*), (iii) common culture (*sanskriti*), according to the term's ideologue Vinyak Damodar Savarkar. Savarkar's formulation of Hindutva highly influenced Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, who later founded the RSS with the aim to create a Hindu nation. This is why it is very important to scrutinize the relationship between the BJP and the RSS as the RSS has been the main carrier of Hindutva.

The RSS, established in 1925 by K. B. Hedgewar, was, and in fact still is, the leading Hindu nationalist organization in India. The organization's primary focus has been on fostering unity and character among Hindus, who had become disorganized and

weakened under colonial rule. According to the RSS, the main threats to Hinduism come from the religions of Islam and Christianity. The organization, in this context, attributes the disorganization and fragility of Hindus to a lack of understanding or appeal to *dharma*. And the roots of this lack of understanding is viewed as a long-term issue that dates back to historical Muslim invasions and authority over “Hindustan” (Andersen and Damle 1987, 72). The RSS, however, was not originally a direct political organization. The RSS’ entrance into practical politics happened with the BJP’s ancestor BJS, and happened “when, after being banned after Gandhi’s assassination, RSS realized that it could not remain completely aloof from politics and needed protection in case a situation such as 1948 arose again” (Saleem 2021, 10).

The RSS, since its foundation, does not function merely on populist premises to enlarge its support within the masses but rather follows a structured hierarchic organizational strategy. The RSS operates through the establishment of local branches called *shakhas* across various different levels of Indian society, including states, towns, and cities. Such organizational structure, in this respect, reflects the RSS’ structured approach to spreading its influence and ideology (Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007). In the 1990s, the RSS experienced significant growth and became one of the largest and most active non-governmental organizations worldwide. Currently, the RSS has nearly 57,000 shakhas that conduct daily meetings across numerous locations within India and internationally (Andersen and Damle 2019, xi). Even though the *ideological* bond between the BJP and the Hindutva represented by the RSS has not always been consistent, this relationship is still very significant in the sense that many of the BJP’s critical party positions are occupied by the top RSS leaders. This significance also becomes clearer when one considers the fact that current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, himself was suggested to BJP leadership by the RSS when he was an active RSS member. According to Saleem (2021), the BJP and the RSS cannot be called populist because the advocates of both identified more with these institutions than with a specific leader, which again demonstrates the strength of the organizational structuration of the RSS. This point, however, will be scrutinized in detail later in this section as Modi’s personal charisma has started to prevail the RSS and the party itself as far as the BJP’s recent

successes are concerned. The changes in the BJP since its emergence, on the other hand, is not limited with the Modi's personalistic style superseding the BJP's institutional success.

The BJP's roots in Hindutva enables the party to appeal the Hindu majority's sentiments, the process of which includes the utilization of the important figures in Hinduism such as Lord Rama (Austin and Lyon 1993, 39). The utilization of Lord Rama centers on the disputed site in Ayodhya, a place believed by many Hindus to be the birthplace of Lord Rama. The long-standing disagreement over the Ayodhya site has been a symbolically important issue for the BJP and BJP voter base. The Modi government, in line with the demands of the BJP voters, has supported the construction of the Ram Temple at this site, a move seen as fulfillment of one of the fundamental promises to his Hindu nationalist base. The BJP's special emphasis on the ancient India and Hinduism also reveals itself in the form of a critique of "pseudo-secularism". The party locates itself as the sole defender of authentic Indian values in line with Hindutva ideology against Western influences. In this context, the BJP's emergence and rise by keeping its roots in Hindutva represents not simply a political change but also an ideological challenge to the secularism of the Indian state. According to Austin and Lyon (1993), the BJP's success suggests deeper societal changes and a reconfiguration of political identities based on religious lines.

Carsten Busch (2009) offers one of the finest studies that examines the evolution of the BJP from its origins as a champion of Hindu nationalism to its current role as the governing political party in India. Busch's study dwells on how the BJP's Hindu nationalistic ideology has determined and shaped its policy-making and political strategy since the party's foundation. The analysis, in this context, starts off with a historical outlook of the BJP's rise to power in 1998 and emphasizes the party's unchanged commitment to its original Hindu nationalistic character despite its evolving political strategies. Busch here argues that the BJP's foundational ideology has constantly influenced its policies, although the practical application of these policies has been moderated by structural reasons such as politically diverse and the federal structure of India, which necessitates coalition formations and tactical moves in different states (Busch 2009, 2). One of the key points stressed in Busch's study is

the BJP's strategic use of Hindu nationalism to offer a unique nationalistic identity, which has been a key element in the party's electoral success. This identity does not only appeal to a broad array of voters who already feel a cultural affiliation with Hinduism but also serves to differentiate the BJP itself from other political parties in India. However, Busch concomitantly notes that the structural need to form coalitions in the Indian party system ensured the BJP to moderate its rhetoric time to time and adapt its policy goals to accommodate the political realities of India (Busch, 2009, p. 5). Busch also presents a discussion on the internal and external factors influencing the BJP's policy decisions. Internally, the party's leadership and core ideologues push for policies that resonate with their Hindu nationalist base. Externally, again the structural dynamics of Indian politics, which includes the rise of regional parties and the pressures of governing in a coalition, generally compel the BJP to adjust its strategies (Busch 2009, 8).

The term 'populism' has often been used with economic connotations in India (Varshney et al. 2021, 197). The academic study of populism as a form of politics, however, has also been showing interest in India and its populist president Narendra Modi by focusing on both Modi's personality and his party. For instance, demonstrating "right-wing" populism of India's BJP, Duncan McDonnell and Luis Cabrera contend that "the BJP has been excluded from studies of right-wing populist parties" while presenting the BJP's fit for comparative research on populism (McDonnell and Cabrera 2018, 484). The analysis presented in this work undergirds the argument of the thesis by revealing both the right-wing populism of the BJP and its comparability with other cases of populism. Relying on Erdem Aytaç and Ezgi Elçi (2018)'s work examining populism in Turkey, the thesis will argue that the BJP type of populism shows considerable resemblances with the Justice and Development Party's populism in Turkey. The thesis, however, will locate the cases mainly under the concepts of establishment parties, which are not mutually exclusive with the employment of populist strategies by these parties.

One of the key characteristics of populism is the existence of an unmediated relationship between the leader and 'the people', which is constructed by the leader and stands in contradistinction to some other group. Another key aspect, for instance,

is the Manichean form of antagonism between the “people” and the “other”. We can name many other traits such as anti-elitism along with these. Varshney et al (2021) provide us with evidence for the existence of such notions through the first-ever conducted survey on populism in India. A scholarly consensus now has been established recognizing the populist type of politics in India, which is accompanied by a rising authoritarianism (Ruparelia 2015; Manor 2015; Jayal 2016; Sen 2016). While these accounts point out the “dissent under the BJP government and Modi’s personalistic, centralized, technocratic style of leadership that bypasses representative institutions and uses the media and symbolism in populist ways”, Priya Chacko argues that such analysis falls short of explaining the source of authoritarian populist practices in India, which himself sees as the “authoritarian statism” caused by neoliberalization (Chacko 2018, 542). According to Chacko, the conjunctural crisis of 1970s and 1980s resulted in the fragmentation of “dominant modes of political incorporation”, which entailed “a long-term organic crisis of the state”. Such crisis of the state later enabled governments to employ “authoritarian populist” and “authoritarian statist” policies in the process of neoliberalization, which creates an antagonism between the “Hindu people” and “corrupt elite” (2018, 560). Priya Chacko’s account draws highly on Nico Poulantzas’ state theory, a theory that is recently used by Ümit Akçay (2021) to make sense of authoritarianism-neoliberalism nexus in Turkey.

According to the literature dwelling on the ideology and type of politics the BJP represents, we can conclude that the party’s ideological foundations lie at the Hindu nationalism, or in other words Hindutva. This ideological stance of the party, on the other hand, is overshadowed by the employment of populist, authoritarian, and neoliberal types of politics especially under Narendra Modi’s highly personalistic leadership. The party’s employment of these strategies is also fed through the domestic conjuncture, say, for instance, through the anti-secularism against the Congress as a champion of secularism.

#### **4.2. Justice and Development Party**

Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) is one of the most significant political parties in the Turkish politics, currently occupying the



government position with more than 11 million official members. Since its foundation on 14 August 2001, the AKP has been enjoying a win streak with comfortable margins in every general/local election. This streak of being the first party started with the 2002 general elections and came to an end only with the 2024 local elections, in which the AKP lost most of the metropolitan cities to the main opposition CHP. The AKP conducted three different referendum campaigns in 2007, 2010, 2017 and defeated the opposition in all of them. The AKP electoral successes crosscut every domain of elections, from local elections to referendums, which shows the extent of the AKP's dominance. In the multi-party period of the Turkish democracy, there was no other party that could exert its dominance for such a long period of time, and it is indeed quite interesting that the AKP's tenure in government matches the war-winning and the state-founding party of Turkey, the CHP's experience in the single-party era. This relatively long duration of the AKP in government position prevents us offer holistic analyses that is valid for the party's all terms in government as the party ideology and policies kept changing over time.

#### **4.2.1. The AKP: A Historical Overview**

The AKP was established in August 2001 by a group of politicians led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had been banned from being involved in politics by the Turkish Constitutional Court. Tayyip Erdoğan and the cadre around him had previously been members of the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP), an Islamist political party that belonged to *Milli Görüş* (National View) movement, members of which had occasionally been restricted from politics as their extreme Islamist ideological stance allegedly undermined the secular foundational values of the Turkish state. The cadre around Erdoğan, however, were representing a supposedly moderate faction within the FP, and it was this moderate faction that turned into the AKP with the closure of the FP by the Turkish Constitutional Court in June 2001. This, in fact, was not the first time a *Milli Görüş*-related political party was closed as the FP's ancestor the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) was also closed few years back in 1998 with the same reason, reactionism and being a threat against the secular Turkish Republic. The problem of party closure, on the other hand, was not something intrinsic to parties of *Milli Görüş* movement but rather was a broader

characteristic trait of the Turkish electoral democracy until the 2000s, with several military interventions and the following bans being the most important causes. According to Sayarı, “the recent history of party politics in Turkey is notable for the disappearance of what were once major parties and their replacement by new ones, as well as by the frequent changes and rotation of party names and acronyms” (Sayarı 2012, 184). This is why a decent understanding of the AKP’s historical development requires the reading of the RP, the FP, and the AKP in continuum, as the AKP, however it later transformed into a mass centre-right party, was a product of the Milli Görüş tradition, which was represented by Islamist National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*, MNP) and its successor the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP) in the 1970s, the RP and the FP in the post-1980 period.

The MNP and MSP were explicitly religious parties, and they became influential especially in the 1970s. The MSP, for instance, instrumentalized its coalition partner position in the National Front governments and made certain impacts on government policies such as “the introduction of mandatory ethics and religion courses to the elementary and secondary school curricula, construction of 1,000-odd new mosques around the country, recruitment of 5,000 imams and Quran teachers” (Çınar 2019, 23). Both MNP and MSP, however, were banned by the Constitutional Court for their allegedly reactionist activities that were threatening the secular republic. By the 1980s, Turkish political Islam was given formal status through an ideological setup called the *Turkish-Islamic Synthesis*, “a rather incongruous mix of religiously oriented moral instruction and Turkish nationalism. The 12 September regime championed it as a way to leverage religion to ‘inoculate’ the population against leftist thought in the waning years of the Cold War, but also to become an instrument under their control as the military remained suspicious about political Islam” (Christofis 2022, 133). The RP was established in 1983 following military rule and emerged as a prominent Islamist party during the 1990s (Çınar 2019, 23). A significant indication of the increasing influence of Islamist parties was evident in the 1994 local elections, where RP candidates secured crucial mayoral positions in over a third of Turkey's provinces, including its largest and most influential cities, Istanbul and Ankara (Esmer in Çınar 2019, 24). The RP's success in the 1994 local elections was attributed to its effective municipal services and its distance from the

corruption scandals that tainted the ruling parties. This clean image helped to make the RP an alternative choice in the 1995 parliamentary elections, and the party became the leading party with 21.4% of the votes (Altınordu 2010, 526). The party capitalized on the failures and ineffective governance of centrist parties, as well as significant economic and social issues like inflation and pervasive corruption (Sayarı 2002, 19).

Under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the Milli Görüş ideology of the RP positioned Islam as a robust alternative to Western influences in Turkey and promoted Islam as a unifying cement for the Turkish society. As far as the economic policies are concerned, the party supported state control and suggested creating an Islamic common market, called the *adil düzen* (Just Order). The RP was highly anti-Western. The party consistently underscored the necessity of an independent foreign policy, which requires Turkey's withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Yeşilada 2002, 172). The RP and Necmettin Erbakan, who had been serving as the Turkish Prime Minister since 1996, were forced to agree to a 20-point program set forth by the National Security Council, and this resulted in the end of Erbakan's tenure as the Prime Minister. The RP's successor, the FP, was also short-lived and shared the destiny of its ancestor as the Turkish Constitutional Court once again ruled in favor of the demands to close the party (Sayarı 2002, 19). Following the ban, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, who were young members of both the RP and FP, called themselves Reformers and emphasized the need to transform into a "system-oriented party" while challenging the traditionalist party cadres (Çınar 2019, 24). The challenge resulted in the appearance two distinct fractions and therefore two different parties, the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*, SP) of Erbakan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Erdoğan. The AKP became the locus of attention as the AKP's centre-right cadres and Erdoğan's personal charm superseded Erbakan's Felicity Party. The support to Erdoğan within the Milli Görüş was matching the Milli Görüş leader Erbakan, mostly because of the sympathy wave Erdoğan's imprisonment created. The strict interpretation of assertive secularism by the Turkish state, in this context, was leading to grievances among the non-secular and anti-assertive secularist segments of the society, which was further accelerating the sympathy wave around the newly formed AKP.

#### **4.2.2. The AKP in 2002-2013: A Product of Post-Kemalist Consensus**

The mainstream political science literature tends to examine the trajectory of the AKP in three different stages. From 2002 to 2007-2010 was the stage where a democratic reform agenda could be observed, especially with the leverage of the EU candidacy, and 2011-2013 was the stage where an authoritarian turn could be observed. According to Esen and Gumuscu (2015), the stage of the authoritarian turn can be extended until 2015 and the 2015 elections can be recognized as a watermark in terms of Turkey's complete shift to competitive authoritarianism. Even though with certain nuances, Ziya Öniş follows a parallel path by categorizing 2002-2007 as the golden age of the AKP, 2007-2011 as a stage of relative stagnation, and post-2011 as a stage of authoritarianism, respectively (Öniş 2015, 23). In fact, the initial AKP period marked a critical juncture not just for Turkish Islamism but also for the evolution of political Islam across Muslim-majority societies (Gumuscu and Sert 2010, 55). The momentum around the AKP resonated especially in the Middle East circles. For instance, the leader of the Islamist Ennahda Party in Tunisia, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, mentioned the AKP as a source of inspiration for his party (Çınar 2019, 17).

The conservative democrat AKP secured a plurality of votes in its initial general election in 2002. The party garnered 34 percent of the votes and won 366 out of 550 parliamentary seats, bringing the AKP to power without the need to form a coalition. In 2004, in its first municipal elections, the party increased its vote share to 42 percent. And the 2007 general elections witnessed the AKP achieving remarkable political success as the party boosted its vote percentage to 46.6 percent. In line with the literature, the period between 2002-2013 might be considered the heydays of the AKP government, as the party enjoyed both domestic and international prestige during this period. The AKP employed a pro-EU and pro-West stance in its foreign policy and used the Turkey's EU membership process as a leverage. This liberalism of the AKP, however it was façade, was not only limited to issues in foreign policy as the party seemed to attach specific importance to minority rights in domestic politics with its "Kurdish Opening", removal of the bans on headscarf and so on. The party, in its initial period, became home to pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist deputies in

line with its policies (Esen and Ciddi 2011, 3). The AKP back then was a single party, but this single party was essentially a coalition among the liberal, Kurd, and Islamist fractions. This *post-Kemalist* coalition of such was, in fact, long in the making.

Post-Kemalism, in this context, refers to an intellectual perspective and academic paradigm that diagnoses the Turkey's long-lasting problem of democratization (Aytürk 2022, 2). Although Turkey has a good track record of regular elections, the Turkish electoral democracy was interrupted by several military interventions in its multi-party period. And in order to legitimize their rule and interventions, the generals were "adopting and elevating Atatürk and the Kemalist Revolution into incontrovertible topics by means of militant sanctification, while making Atatürk and the early republic distasteful, whittling away at what prestige these symbols still held" (Aytürk 2022, 2). Especially with the 1980 military coup d'état and the general's imposition of "Atatürkist System of Thought", a reaction amongst the certain segments of the society started to gain impetus. These segments were mostly those who were out of the so-called Kemalist centre such as Islamists, Kurds, and liberals. The cure to the tyranny of military, the problem of political tutelage and non-democratization, according to the post-Kemalist thinkers, was to criticize and deconstruct the official narratives on the foundation and development of the Turkish state. A holistic critique of the Turkish revolution and "facing with" the CHP and Atatürk is the only way to emancipate the Turkish society and put an end to the above-mentioned problems, post-Kemalists argued. For instance, Talha Parla (1989) and Levent Köker (1990) "demonstrated just how tutelary, Jacobin, top-down, and elitist Kemalism – up until that point thought of as a very successful model for national development – could be when seen from another vantage point" (Aytürk 2022, 3).

According to İlker Aytürk, "in the period extending from the late 1980s through the 2000s and as a result of the growing power of the Kurdish Movement as well as the Islamic- Conservatives' opposition to Kemalism as the republic's founding ideology, the wave of post-Kemalist thought grew beyond merely a topic of academic debate and began to be popularized among both an ever widening public and among

Turkey's academics. Scholars on the liberal left once again took the lead in the post-Kemalist movement, producing new jargon, fundamental arguments and critiques. But this time they were not alone. From this point forward, the liberal-leftist academics were joined by the conservative, Islamist right and the Kurdish political movement, turning into a broad coalition" (Aytürk 2022, 4). The name of this coalition on the political arena was the very AKP itself. In the so-called "golden age" between 2002-2010, the party's intellectuals capitalized on the post-Kemalist critique of the CHP-dominated early Republican period and galvanized post-Kemalist arguments, some of which have already been discussed in the CHP chapter, big part of the party's official discourse.

According to the post-Kemalist narrative, the democratization was set to be realized only when the Kemalist center's long-disregarded identities such as Kurds and conservative Muslims moved to the center of Turkish politics from their place in periphery. The first part of the narrative became a reality with the AKP forming majority government in 2002, the most important part, the democratization part in other words, unfortunately never became a reality. The AKP's policies such as eradication of the military impact on politics, annihilation of the ban on languages except Turkish, arrangements to comply with the EU standards, and the use of liberal discourse in general were read as either reform steps or developments by the literature (Öniş 2013; Çınar and Sayın 2014; Esen and Gumuscu 2016; Çınar 2019). All of these "developments" ensured the AKP to consolidate its power in the government while attracting political and economic interest from the West. In the absence of military threat and the veto mechanisms, which were present in the period between 2002-2007 as the military was still strong and the President was a famous secularist Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the AKP did not hesitate to exert its power on the state apparatus, civil society, and media to transform these fields in AKP-oriented ways. The first signs of authoritarian turn came with the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) cases through which the AKP accused hundreds of high-ranking military officers, journalists, several activists, and professors of conspiracy against its government and of preparing a military coup. The mainstream political science literature welcomed these developments in the sense that the cases "signified the military was no longer untouchable", although concomitantly accepted the illiberal

and undemocratic nature of the trials (Esen and Gumuscu 2016, 1585). The cases and the following referendum win in 2010 enabled the AKP to remove or restructure any institution that could act as a checks and balances mechanism. The cases contributed to the growing discontent with the AKP government in the secular sections of the society, which later proved to be right as the cases understood to be without foundation and dismissed years later.

The Gezi Park protests marks an important threshold for representing the Erdoğan's and his party AKP's authoritarianism. The Gezi demonstrations began as a small-scale environmental protest aimed at protecting the Gezi Park from being converted into a shopping mall. However, the scope of the protests rapidly expanded into a wider demonstration wave against the AKP and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on issues related to authoritarianism, freedom of speech, and civil liberties. The escalation of the protests was marked by the government's harsh-handed reaction, which included the use of tear gas and water cannons against demonstrators, further contributing to support for the protests across the country. The reaction also showed the state's intolerance of protests and sparked widespread concern about the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey (Yörük and Yüksel 2014). The academic literature cited the Gezi Park protests as a manifestation of civic discontent in a regime that has increasingly displayed authoritarian tendencies. The protests were read from various dimensions including class, identity, and party politics (Can Gürcan and Peker 2015; Gençoğlu Onbaşı 2016; Yardımcı-Geyikçi 2014).

The following years revealed more authoritarianism to come as “the AKP under Erdoğan's leadership aspired to transition Turkey into a presidential system, which would equip the party leader with even more extensive powers as the president, similar to the Azeri and Russian cases” (Çımar 2019, 121). The intention to end the parliamentary system in Turkey became clearer especially after Tayyip Erdoğan's election as the President in 2014 with 51.79% of the votes. The aspirations for the presidential system, in fact, have been in public circulation for many years, the intention was being expressed by pioneering party officials and time to time Erdoğan himself.

### **4.2.3. The AKP After 2013: Hegemony Building Under Erdoğan's Personal Rule**

In the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests and Tayyip Erdoğan's election as the President, the AKP entered the June 2015 general election under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was previously Minister of Foreign Affairs. Erdoğan was looking for a clear AKP majority in the parliament to equip his presidency with executive powers. The outcome was, however, disappointing for the AKP as the party lost its majority while securing the 40.87% of the votes and 258 seats in the parliament. The result was indicative of a significant drop both in percentage and seat numbers, 8.96% drop in percentage and 69 in seat numbers. Erdoğan was not content with the results, although Davutoğlu held formal talks to form a coalition government. Erdoğan acted against the common law by not granting the opposition leader the right to form a coalition government and declared early elections. On September, two months before the November early elections, one of the deadliest terrorist attacks took place in Dağlica. The Kurdish separatist group PKK's attack wouldn't have been the case, if the voters had given the majority in the June elections, Erdoğan said in his electoral campaign (Cumhuriyet 2015). The AKP won the November snap elections by gaining 49.50% of the total votes and a majority in parliament with 317 seats. The AKP also formed an alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP), which secured 11.90% votes in the election. The extreme nationalist MHP's backing of the AKP and Erdoğan is still ongoing today. It represents a pretty unusual partnership in the sense that the MHP receives nothing in formal terms for its support. The MHP-AKP alliance is also significant in understanding the complete abandonment of the AKP's pro-Kurdish and pro-Western stance.

On 15 July 2016, a military faction in the Turkish Armed Forces related to the Gülen movement or, in official terms, Fethullahist Terror Organization (FETÖ), an organization that had a strong presence in the AKP until 2013, attempted a military coup. The broader structure of the military averted the coup attempt, but the results were drastic. A state of emergency was declared by President Erdoğan, and more than 125.000 state officers linked with the movement were expelled from public duty



in the following process (Euronews 2020). The referendum for Turkey's transition to a presidential system came under a state of emergency. The presidential system proposal of the AKP contained "no institutional mechanism of checks and balances exists between the branches of the government" (Kalaycıoğlu in Çınar 2019, 138). The AKP and its alliance partner MHP won the referendum with 51.41% yes votes against 48.59% no votes. The Erdoğan-made presidential system marked the apogee of the AKP's transformation into a personalistic party under Erdoğan and represented the general character of the post-2013 era.

Not all of the literature, however, shares the above-mentioned dominant periodization of the AKP era. This mainstream conception of the AKP era has been criticized, especially by scholars of critical political economy. Tansel (2018), for instance, rejects the above-mentioned readings of the era and considers AKP in a continuum through which one can retrace its authoritarian neoliberal practices. Ümit Akçay similarly questions the explanatory abilities of the dominant periodization regarding AKP and contends that "AKP rule can be analyzed in two periods: the establishment of authoritarian neoliberalism and the structural crisis of Turkish capitalism" (Akçay 2021a, 3). According to Akçay, the establishment of neoliberalism in Turkey corresponds to the period between 2002 and 2013, and the authoritarian consolidation efforts accompanied by the structural crisis of Turkish capitalism corresponds to the period after 2013. This indeed is an original cleavage between different readings of the AKP era and very interesting in the sense that the critical economy periodization of the AKP politics seems quite synchronized with the global financial conjuncture. The critical political economy view apprehends the AKP more comprehensively and suggests that despite its zigzags in the last few years of its term, the AKP has remained loyal to its commitment to neoliberal economic policies from 2002 until 2020. (Akçay 2021b, 3). The literature seeing a strong connection between authoritarianism and neoliberalism centers on two main pillars, which also characterizes the current hegemonic economic system: capital accumulation and financialization. The first is to emphasize the idea that "understanding neoliberalism as a mode of accumulation and its adoption in different contexts, as responses to capitalism's economic and political crises, also offers a contextualization of why neoliberal governance increasingly embodies an

authoritarian rule, underpinned by the erosion of democratic politics and the deployment of coercive state power" (Tansel 2017, 10). The embodiment of the authoritarian rule, in this regard, has to do with the FED doing away with expansionary monetary policies in May 2013, which resulted in capital flying "from the peripheral economies to the advanced capitalist ones". The FED put an end to the market-friendly environment offering cheap credits and entered into a disciplinary phase from 2013 onwards. This had specific consequences especially on the Global South countries, which Turkey, and also India, are parts of. Bedirhanoglu argues that when International Financial Institutions losing their key disciplinary role especially on Southern states in international borrowing practices after 2000s and the debt cycle caused by the availability of cheap credits are thought hand in hand, there appears a better picture of the authoritarian transformation processes (Bedirhanoglu 2021, 78). These Global South states, according to Bedirhanoglu, have become "stronger vis-à-vis labor, but more subordinate, thus weaker, vis-à-vis capital" since financial markets started to set the rules of the game (Bedirhanoglu in Bedirhanoglu 2020, 28). In the post-2013 period, the AKP tried to overcome the combined effects of the global financial condition and the domestic crisis of Turkish capitalism through authoritarian consolidation efforts (Akçay 2020, 3).

The AKP's significant successes, in this respect, have much to do with the legacy of the 2001 financial crisis back then. In the early 2000s, the successive governments' failure to realize the conditionalities put by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has entailed the 2001 financial crisis, and the AKP came power as an outcome of this (Bedirhanoglu 2021, 79). Successfully making use of the fertile global financial atmosphere between 2002-7 through its pro-West and pro-EU policies, the AKP government has managed to take certain steps in "neoliberal transformation of agriculture, large-scale privatizations and legislation of neoliberal social security and labor laws" (Bedirhanoglu and Yalman 2010, 120). In the aftermath of 2013, the devaluation of the Turkish lira against foreign currencies, concomitantly the existing negative influences in the global financial regime as a result of the FED's disciplinary policies, created a critical situation in which "the AKP government pushed the class limits drawn by the rule of money to the bitter end to remain in power" (Bedirhanoglu 2021, 80). Therefore, Turkey's radical trajectory towards

authoritarianism has been analyzed comprehensively in a continuum “with the Islamist AKP’s powerful integration to the global neoliberal agenda” since 2002 (Bedirhanoğlu 2021, 80).

The mainstream political science and the critical economic readings of the AKP, in fact, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. While the political science accounts have more *political* connotations than those of the critical economic accounts, the critical economic accounts have more *economic* connotations than those of the political science accounts. The political science literature dwelled mostly on the detection of the regime characteristics and relied mostly on Levitsky and Way’s conception of competitive authoritarianism (Özbudun 2015; Esen and Gumuscu 2016; Somer 2016; Castaldo 2018; Çalışkan 2018). These accounts also emphasized the populist type of politics in Turkey; however, they varied in the degree of authoritarianism. Pointing out the illusionary competitiveness in Turkey, Uğur-Çınar (2023) contends that Turkey has passed the threshold of competitiveness and turned into an electoral autocracy. Çınar (2019) also presented a comparative analysis of the hegemonic parties and argued that the Turkish case can be better defined as a hegemonic authoritarian rather than competitive authoritarian. The mainstream political science readings of the AKP, intentionally or not, did not focus on the casual or deterministic relations in their detection of the differences between the initial AKP and the AKP now. The critical economic readings, on the other hand, brought macro-economic explanations to the fore and found correlations between the global economic conjuncture and the AKP’s shift towards, and its intensifying authoritarianism with specific emphasis on the class relations (Yalman 2010; Tansel 2017; Akçay 2020; Bedirhanoğlu 2021). However, these accounts, intentionally or not, lacked categorical tools that were very appropriately used by the mainstream political science literature, revealing the alteration of the AKP in categorical terms.

## CHAPTER 5

### EMPIRICAL PRESENTATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AND RESEMBLANCES AMONG THE CASES

This chapter of the thesis will present the empirical findings on the CHP, INC, AKP, and the BJP. In doing so, the chapter will undergird the contentions with empirical data and elucidate the resemblances between the parties.

#### 5.1. Presentation of Empirical Findings

In order to offer a comparative account of the establishment-antiestablishment dichotomy in Turkey and India, a presentation of the resemblances in the political positioning of the sample parties is necessary. The thesis borrows and employs data from various sources as follows. Pippa Norris' *The Global Party Survey 2019* (GPS), an expert survey drawing on 1861 political parties across the globe; *The World Value Survey* (WVS), a research program dwelling on political, economic, religious, cultural, and social values of people in the world; *Varieties of Democracy* (V-Dem) and *Varieties of Party Identity and Organization* (V-Party), data collection projects measuring democracy-democratization and party identities and organizations around the world, respectively.

First, the GPS data enables us to argue that the CHP-INC dyad and the AKP-BJP dyad reveal high ideological resemblances within themselves. According to the party value typology of the GPS, while the AKP and the BJP are categorized as right-conservative parties, the CHP and the INC are categorized as left-liberal parties. The GPS uses economic and social values scaling to detect the ideological location of the parties on the left-right spectrum. Regarding the economic left-right (1-10) scaling, while the AKP and the BJP are located on the right with 7,3 and 7,7 points, the GPS

locates the CHP and the INC on the left with 3,1 and 4,6 points, respectively. GPS's social values indicator also shows a high resemblance between the dyads. While the data places the CHP and the INC on the social-liberal side with 2,9 and 2,8 points, the AKP and the BJP are placed as conservative with 9,3 and 8,9 points, respectively. These points denote that the incumbent and the anti-incumbent parties have highly similar ideological positions in India and Turkey. Second, the GPS provides empirical ground for the populist appeals of the AKP-BJP dyad and the pluralistic appeals of the CHP-INC dyad. Between the pluralistic rhetoric and the populist rhetoric, the CHP scores 3,8, the INC scores 3,2, the AKP scores 9,7, and the BJP scores 8,6. Below is the tabulation for the scores.

**Table 1.** Tabulation for Party Ideology

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Economic Position (1-10)</b>	<b>Social Values (1-10)</b>	<b>Pluralist - Populist Rhetoric (1-10)</b>
Turkey	AKP	7,3	9,3	9,7
India	BJP	7,7	8,9	8,6
India	INC	4,6	2,8	3,2
Turkey	CHP	3,1	2,9	3,8

The resemblances between the dyads are abundant and are not just limited to economic and social values. The GPS data reveals further similarities in its nationalism-multilateralism scale. The binary categories of the dyads in this dichotomy are the same, and exact scores are also very close again. The AKP favors nationalism over multilateralism with 1,26; the BJP similarly favors nationalism over multilateralism with 2,20. The CHP and the INC, on the other hand, favor multilateralism over nationalism with 5,88 and 7,04 points, respectively. The binary categorization under women's rights heading again is consistent with previous resemblances. While the AKP and the BJP oppose women's rights with 8,00 and 6,58, the CHP and the INC favor women's rights with 1,41 and 3,48, respectively. This point deserves further elaboration as the deepening of the AKP and the BJP's ethno religiously supported neoliberalism goes hand in hand with the deteriorating conditions of women in the social realm. According to the Global Gender Gap

Report, Turkey ranks 129th out of 146 countries, while India ranks 127th (World Economic Forum 2023). Under the AKP, there has been a clear promotion of a "neoliberal-religious/conservative mode of patriarchy," where women are primarily seen in the role of family caregivers responsible for children and the elderly, with minimal visibility in the public sphere (Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2011). In this context, Turkey's withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, a Council of Europe Convention opposing violence against women, marks the extent AKP's patriarchic politics has reached. The withdrawal becomes more intriguing especially when one considers the fact that Turkey was the first country to ratify the Convention, which Turkish scholars wrote. The literature on India also shows how the status of women has been negatively influenced by the BJP's Hindutva politics, which incorporates "neoliberalism, ethnoreligious nationalism, and populist strategies" (Chacko 2020, 218). Following the BJP's rise to power with a combination of political Hinduism and capitalist mode of production, the violence against women across different states of India spread forth and intensified as the years unrolled (Bannerji 2020, 542).

As far as ethnic minority rights are concerned, while the AKP and the BJP stand on the strongly opposing side with 8,31 and 8,84, the CHP and the INC stand on the favoring side with 4,31 and 2,55. Concerning commitment to liberal democratic norms and principles, the dyads prove us to be correct again, as the scores are almost the same as the previous ones. While the AKP and the BJP undermine liberal norms and principles with 9,59 and 8,34, the CHP and the INC are on the respecting side with 2,19 and 2,85 points. One interesting resemblance lies in the dyads' position concerning clientelism. When asked whether these parties favor universal distribution of public goods or distribution mainly to their supporters, the experts place the dyads on opposite sides with similar scores. While the AKP and the BJP favor distribution mainly to their supporters with 9,72 and 6,45, the CHP and the INC stand on the universal distribution side with 3,07 and 2,96, respectively. Although the binary categories confirm the existing correlation once again, one should not turn a blind eye to the fact that this time the BJP looks slightly more programmatic compared to the AKP. This might be an outcome of the declining role of brokers in the implementation of welfare schemes, as the BJP has intensified the use of technology in the distribution of welfare benefits. The BJP and Modi strongly

emphasize the “technology-enabled reforms to governance,” claiming that it eradicates corruption and improves welfare program delivery (Deshpande et al. 2019, 223). While the technological reforms might explain why the BJP appears more programmatic in the GPS, it is important to note that not all the literature agrees with the declining role of clientelism in the delivery of welfare schemes. Maitra et al. (2024) fails to find evidence for the argument that the new welfare programs introduced after 2014 were better targeted than traditional programs or that the targeting of these new programs improved after 2014. Lastly, when asked whether these parties favor strongman rule over checks and balances on executive power, the experts place the AKP and the BJP again at the edges of strongman rule with 9,06 and 8,04. On the other hand, the CHP and the INC appear to favor checks and balances on executive power with 2,35 and 4,00, respectively. Below is the visualization of the data. All of the scores are on a scale between 0-10.

**Table 2.** Tabulation for Party Positions Across Various Dimensions

Country	Party	Dimension	Score
Turkey	AKP	Nationalism vs. Multilateralism	1,26
India	BJP	Nationalism vs. Multilateralism	2,2
Turkey	CHP	Nationalism vs. Multilateralism	5,88
India	INC	Nationalism vs. Multilateralism	7,04
Turkey	AKP	Women’s Rights – Favors / Opposes	8
India	BJP	Women’s Rights – Favors / Opposes	6,58
Turkey	CHP	Women’s Rights – Favors / Opposes	1,41
India	INC	Women’s Rights – Favors / Opposes	3,48
Turkey	AKP	Ethnic Minority Rights – Favors / Opposes	8,31
India	BJP	Ethnic Minority Rights – Favors / Opposes	8,84
Turkey	CHP	Ethnic Minority Rights – Favors / Opposes	4,31
India	INC	Ethnic Minority Rights – Favors / Opposes	2,55
Turkey	AKP	Commitment to Liberal Norms – Respects / Undermines	9,59
India	BJP	Commitment to Liberal Norms – Respects / Undermines	8,34
Turkey	CHP	Commitment to Liberal Norms – Respects / Undermines	2,19
India	INC	Commitment to Liberal Norms – Respects / Undermines	2,85
Turkey	AKP	Distribution of Public Goods – Universal / Own Supporters	9,72

Table 2. (continues)

India	BJP	Distribution of Public Goods – Universal / Own Supporters	6,45
Turkey	CHP	Distribution of Public Goods – Universal / Own Supporters	3,07
India	INC	Distribution of Public Goods – Universal / Own Supporters	2,96
Turkey	AKP	Strongman Rule vs. Checks/Balances	9,06
India	BJP	Strongman Rule vs. Checks/Balances	8,04
Turkey	CHP	Strongman Rule vs. Checks/Balances	2,35
India	INC	Strongman Rule vs. Checks/Balances	4

Overall, the GPS data demonstrates the parties' current position in the political spectrum in various subjects, including the parties' economic, social, and ideological preferences. The GPS data, therefore, renders the resemblances and differences between the parties visible, especially with regard to the specified subjects, some of which are mentioned above. Based on the presented GPS data, this thesis contends that the dyads of CHP-INC and AKP-BJP are almost twins in different countries. This contention is very central in the thesis and reflects one of the core contributions of the thesis in the literature in the sense that the thesis not only matches these parties on normative grounds but also brings empirical evidence to the table. The empirical support is very crucial for further argumentation on these parties as well, as it also undergirds the arguments revolving around these parties, which are mentioned in the related chapters of the thesis, such as appeal to populist rhetoric, personalization of the party, clientelist relations, and so on. More importantly, the GPS presents the very reason why for the comparison of the parties by providing a fertile empirical ground.

Although the empirical ground provided by the GPS data is supportive of the general arguments of the thesis, this set of data is not directly related to the establishment-anti-establishment conceptual frameworks given. Locating the CHP-INC and the AKP-BJP dyad on the establishment-anti-establishment dichotomy requires the presentation of other sets of data, which this thesis ensures by relying on the V-Party datasets regarding party support groups and the World Value Survey. The WVS and V-Party contain quite relevant data for us to argue that while the AKP and the BJP, which were once anti-establishment parties, are now establishment-making



establishment parties, and the CHP and the INC, which were once establishment-making establishment parties, are degraded into establishment parties.

The WVS question “*How satisfied are you with how the political system is functioning in your country these days?*” is an appropriate measure to locate the political parties on the establishment-anti-establishment dichotomy line when voting preference is used as a crossing variable. As noted in the conceptual framework, dissatisfaction and satisfaction with the political system are the main drivers of anti-establishment sentiments. In this respect, the WVS question measuring the dissatisfaction with the political system is an earnest indicator that can be used to back the thesis’ reading of the sample political parties. In Turkey, the WVS data shows that among those who are not satisfied at all with the functioning of the political system, the AKP voters have the lowest share, with only 0.3% of the total AKP voters. The AKP’s coalition partner MHP has the second-lowest share; the CHP has the third-lowest share; the CHP’s previous alliance partner, the Good Party (*İyi Parti*, IYIP), has the fourth-lowest share; and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP) has the highest share as the 18,7% of the party voters being completely unsatisfied with the political system.

**Table 3.** Voter Satisfaction Levels in Turkey Based on the WVS 7 Data

		CHP	HDP	MHP	AKP	IYIP
Not satisfied at all	<b>3.8% (84)</b>	5	18,7	3,5	0,3	7,1
2	<b>2.8% (61)</b>	5,2	9,6	1,6	0,3	6,2
3	<b>6.2% (136)</b>	10,8	13,6	5,5	2	14,2
4	<b>11.6% (254)</b>	21,9	21,7	11,8	3,6	22,1
5	<b>14.1% (310)</b>	20,3	13,1	13,7	10,8	19,5
6	<b>14.9% (327)</b>	16,1	5,6	16,1	15,4	17,7
7	<b>16.2% (356)</b>	10,6	8,1	20	20,8	3,5
8	<b>19.5% (428)</b>	7,4	6,1	20,4	28,8	9,7
9	<b>6.1% (133)</b>	2,3	2	5,9	9,4	0
Completely satisfied	<b>4.7% (103)</b>	0,4	1,5	1,6	8,7	0
(N)	<b>2192</b>	<b>517</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>1086</b>	<b>113</b>
Mean	<b>6,06</b>	<b>4,91</b>	<b>4,03</b>	<b>6,07</b>	<b>7,15</b>	<b>4,57</b>
Std Dev.	<b>2,19</b>	<b>1,91</b>	<b>2,31</b>	<b>2,01</b>	<b>1,68</b>	<b>1,88</b>
Base mean	<b>2192</b>	<b>517</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>1086</b>	<b>113</b>

Regarding social classes, satisfaction with the political system is very high in the lower and working classes, and dissatisfaction is very high in the upper and upper

middle classes, which is compatible with the parties' traditional voter bases. The CHP, for instance, has higher support in the urban upper and middle classes, while the AKP's voting base consists of predominantly lower and working classes, especially in rural areas.

Below are the tables that show the distribution of party preferences based on social class in urban and rural areas. The table sample does not contain the following two: (i) those who did not prefer a social class and (ii) those who voted for minor political parties.


**Table 4.** Cross Tabulation of Party Preferences and Social Class in Urban Turkey

	TOTAL	Social Class [Urban-Rural=Urban]				
		Upper Class	Upper-middle	Lower-middle	Working Class	Lower Class
CHP	24,7	55	27,8	30,9	15,9	12,4
HDP	7,4	0	4,4	7,4	9,4	13,3
MHP	10,4	5	13,1	10,5	8,7	6,2
AKP	51,4	30	46	45,6	62,2	62,8
IYIP	5,2	10	7,7	4,1	3,6	4,4
<b>(N) Urban</b>	<b>1591</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>447</b>	<b>113</b>

**Table 5.** Cross Tabulation of Party Preferences and Social Class in Rural Turkey

	TOTAL	Social Class [Urban-Rural=Rural]				
		Upper Class	Upper middle	Lower middle	Working class	Lower Class
CHP	20,2	33,3	22,2	23,3	20	3,7
HDP	13,6	0	8,7	11,9	16,8	20,4
MHP	15,4	0	13,5	16,7	11,6	29,6
AKP	44,3	66,7	48,4	43,3	42,6	42,6
IYIP	5,1	0	5,6	3,3	7,4	3,7
<b>(N) Rural</b>	<b>583</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>54</b>

An asymmetric reading of the satisfaction levels is also valid. Among those who are completely satisfied with the political system, the AKP share is the highest. While the AKP's coalition partner, the MHP, has the second-highest share, the sum of CHP-IYIP-HDP shares in this category cannot even reach this share together. When brought together with the conceptual framework offered, the AKP and the MHP stand as establishment-making establishment parties (EMEP); the CHP stands as an establishment party (EP); the IYIP stands as an anti-establishment party (AEP); and the HDP stands as an extreme anti-establishment party (EAEP). Below is the visuals for the distribution of the political parties in Turkey on the establishment-anti-establishment dichotomy line based on the satisfaction data.



**Figure 3.** Party Locations on the Establishment – Anti – Establishment Dichotomy in Turkey

The results of the WVS for the same question in India correlate with the arguments and overlap with the Turkish case regarding the parties' distribution on the establishment-anti-establishment spectrum. In the Indian case, the WVS data shows that among those who are not satisfied at all with the functioning of the political system, the BJP voters have the lowest share, with only 4.8% of the total BJP voters. The INC has the second-lowest share, and the Indian left has the third. Regarding social classes, satisfaction with the political system is highest among the upper and upper-middle classes, which are the government party BJP's traditional voting bases. Contrary to the Turkish case, the BJP performs better in the upper and middle classes, primarily in the urban areas, and the INC relatively performs better in the lower and working classes in rural areas. The existence of a caste system in India, however, might have affected the class understanding of the respondents in the WVS, as the higher castes in India mostly support the BJP.

According to Cristopher Jaffrelot (2021), the socio-economic context underlying the BJP's rise to power in India is particularly important to understand higher castes'

support for the BJP. Initially, the social elite support in India was predominantly in favour of the Congress Party. This support, on the other hand, began shifting towards Hindu nationalism as a response to the Congress' empowerment of lower castes through positive discrimination policies in the 1990s. The shift also saw the Other Backward Classes (OBC), who constitute over half of the population, gaining socio-economic mobility through new job quotas in the public sector introduced in 1992. The emergence of Narendra Modi's BJP, in this sense, can be seen as a reactionary movement by the upper castes, leveraging Hindu nationalism as a means to counteract caste-based politics. By emphasizing a Hindu identity over caste distinctions, and portraying external threats from minorities and Pakistan, the BJP appealed to all segments of society, including OBCs. This was especially convincing given Modi's own OBC background and roots in a poor family. This strategy of the BJP proved to be effective, allowing the upper castes to regain their importance. which they used to enable large-scale privatizations and downsizing of the public sector, therefore weakening the public welfare system. Unlike the CHP, the INC has been able to pursue a social democratic reform agenda, and this resulted in the loss of social elite support for the INC.

Below are the tables that show the distribution of party preferences based on social class in urban and rural areas. The regional/state parties are excluded.

**Table 6.** Cross Tabulation of Party Preferences and Social Class in Urban India

	TOTAL	Social Class [Urban-Rural=Urban]				
		Upper Class	Upper middle	Lower middle	Working Class	Lower Class
Other	11,5	3,1	8,2	9,6	19,3	28,3
INC	15,9	5,7	11,1	21,4	18,3	14,9
BJP	53,4	62,5	68	46,6	40,3	41,9
Left (CPI, CPI(M) etc)	2,6	0,7	1,3	3,8	4,7	0
<b>(N) Urban</b>	<b>474</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>31</b>

**Table 7.** Cross Tabulation of Party Preferences and Social Class in Rural India

	TOTAL	Social class (subjective) [Urban-Rural=Rural]				
		Upper Class	Upper middle	Lower middle	Working Class	Lower Class
Other	8	5	5,5	7,5	11,7	7
INC	25,5	13,5	22,2	24,3	30,1	28,1
BJP	40,5	58,2	47,4	42,7	28,4	42,2
Left (CPI, CPI(M) etc)	4,2	9,4	6,3	3,1	4,2	5,1
<b>(N) Rural</b>	<b>897</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>441</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>88</b>

The asymmetric reading of the data is again valid. Among those who are completely satisfied with the functioning of the political system, the BJP has the highest share, with 16.5% of the party voters being completely satisfied. The INC, the left parties, and others follow the BJP respectively. In this case, the BJP stands as an establishment-making establishment party; the INC stands as an establishment party; minor left parties stand as anti-establishment parties; and the sum of others represent the extreme form of anti-establishment parties. Below are the visuals for the political system satisfaction -regional/state parties are excluded- and distribution of the political parties in India on the establishment-anti-establishment dichotomy line based on the system satisfaction data.

**Table 8.** Voter Satisfaction Levels in India Based on the WVS 7 Data

		INC	BJP	Left (CPI, CPI (M), etc.)	Other
Not satisfied at all	<b>8.7% (117)</b>	8,2	4,8	13,4	24
2	<b>3.9% (52)</b>	6,1	2,7	8,4	1,9
3	<b>6.3% (85)</b>	8,5	5,3	9,3	7
4	<b>5.8% (78)</b>	5,1	6,3	6,9	6,2
5	<b>9.3% (125)</b>	10,8	8,1	9,2	10,8
6	<b>14.7% (197)</b>	15,3	14,8	11,6	7,7
7	<b>14.9% (200)</b>	14	14,6	9,7	16,8
8	<b>14.0% (187)</b>	13,6	15,6	13,6	11,6
9	<b>10.4% (139)</b>	9,3	11,3	11,8	5,5
Completely satisfied	<b>12.0% (161)</b>	9,3	16,5	5,9	8,6
<b>(N)</b>	<b>1340</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>611</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>117</b>
Mean	<b>6,23</b>	<b>5,95</b>	<b>6,75</b>	<b>5,44</b>	<b>5,19</b>
Std Dev.	<b>2,69</b>	<b>2,67</b>	<b>2,51</b>	<b>2,9</b>	<b>3,03</b>
Base mean	<b>1340</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>611</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>117</b>



**Figure 4.** Party Locations on the Establishment — Anti-Establishment Dichotomy in India

Restressing the operational criteria defining the EP and the EMEP would be appropriate for further elaboration. The EMEP and EP are both parts of the establishment. However, the EMEP occupies a hierarchically superior position over the EP. While the EP refers to parties that meet Giovanni Sartori’s governing potential (GP) criteria and the criterion of longevity, the EMEP refers to EP parties in either government or coalition partner positions. Please see the second chapter for further discussion on the conceptual framework. One should note that while the EMEP category represents the incumbency, the EP, the AEP, and the EAEP *all* signify anti-incumbency. In this context, thinking of these categories as categories of quality or severity of the opposition would be misleading, as an establishment party can do much more effective opposition compared to an anti-establishment party and vice versa. The taxonomies of the establishment have to do with the political parties’ relation vis-à-vis “the establishment.” Although these taxonomies can encompass most existing parties, they do not aim to label every existing party. Being state-founding parties and having stayed in government for more than decades in the short history of their countries, the CHP and the INC were earnest examples of the EMEP. Having challenged the ideological foundations of their state and having their ancestor parties been banned from politics several times, the AKP and the BJP were earnest examples of the AEP. While the former have lost their position as EMEPs and became EPs, the latter successfully achieved the best scenario for AEPs and became EMEPs.

**Table 9.** Tabulation for Party Classifications in Turkey and India Based on the Operational Criteria of Establishment Party

Party	Country	Criteria: GP 1	Criteria: GP 2	Criteria: Longevity	Criteria: Position	Classification
CHP	Turkey	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Establishment Party


Table 9. (continues)

INC	India	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Establishment Party
BJP	India	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Establishment-making establishment party
AKP	Turkey	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Establishment-making establishment party

Not only did the AKP and the BJP get rid of their anti-establishment straitjacket, but they also became the makers of the establishment by achieving consecutive terms in government. When scrutinizing the career paths for anti-establishment parties, the possibility of a leap into power was mentioned. The AKP and the BJP could, first, follow conventional politics and normalize with the practice of routine politics; second, they could commit anti-democratic acts and try to destroy the system; or third, they could keep being loyal to their original discourse and continue the game of me against the rest. The AKP and the BJP followed the third path, although they reconfigured the establishment in their own ways. Under Erdoğan's and Modi's personalistic governance, the parties consistently brought imaginary enemies to the fore and addressed themselves and their parties as the solution, paving the way for polarization (Erdoğan and Semerci 2018; Somer 2018; Aytaç & Ezgi 2019; Sahoo 2020). The AKP, for example, still mentions bureaucratic tutelage after more than 20 years of restructuring the state as the governing party. Nevertheless, specific nuances exist in these parties' trajectories to make the establishment. The V-Party data, in this regard, is quite essential in the sense that it reveals the support groups behind the political parties. A party's support groups can say a lot about the party's relationship with the establishment. Whether a party attracts support from military and business elite groups or not can say a lot about the party's relationship with the establishment. This is why a comparative outlook of the AKP-BJP and the CHP-INC can be fruitful in detecting the nuances both within and between the dyads.

**5.1.1. Party Support Groups of the Dyads in Comparative Perspective**

When the AKP first came to power in 2002, the party’s core membership and supporters were from religious groups, business elite, urban middle class, and agrarian elites. The party had the most minor support among the military, aristocracy, ethnic/racial groups, regional groups or separatists, and women. This formation, in fact, affirms the thesis’ reading of the 2002 AKP as a product of post-Kemalist consensus, which was discussed in detail in chapter four. The AKP’s neoliberal agenda took the full support of the business elite, and the part cadres’ ideological roots in the Milli Görüş attracted religious voters. The AKP also enjoyed particular support among the working classes. Considering the importance of religion among the Turkish population and the existence of decently organized religious groups, the AKP has made way for the conservative segments of the society. The support for the AKP among religious groups has always remained at its peak and is still the same. However, the party’s support groups have precisely altered after consecutive terms in government. Below is the visual for AKP’s support groups in 2002.




**Figure 5.** Support Groups of the AKP in 2002

The support for the AKP among business elites has reached its nadir following the AKP’s authoritarian turn in 2013 and the decrease in capital inflows in the same year



due to global financial conditions. The AKP's authoritarian practices further harmed the country's international image and contributed to the intensity of the forthcoming economic depreciation. In its economic preferences, the AKP used its maneuver room in favor of its voting base working classes and, therefore, lost its relative appeal in the urban middle classes. The party's increasing nationalism and partnership with extreme nationalist MHP consolidated specific support within military and racial groups, signifying the strengthening position within the establishment.


Below is the visual for the AKP-led People's Alliance's support groups in 2018.



**Figure 6.** Support Groups of the AKP-led People's Alliance in 2018


The decline of the AKP among the urban middle classes allowed the CHP to further capitalize on this group. As of 2018, the CHP-led Nation Alliance increased its support in the urban middle class to 0,83, while it was at 0,66 when the AKP first came to power in 2002. Deteriorating economic conditions after 2013, which were even more severe in metropolitan cities, helped the CHP garner support from urban working classes.

Below are the support groups for the CHP-led National Alliance.




**Figure 7.** Support Groups of the CHP-led Nation's Alliance in 2018

While getting traction among the middle classes, the CHP lost its appeal in the military and aristocracy, the second and third support groups where the CHP enjoyed the most support. This, in fact, indicates the CHP's declining status within the establishment under Erdoğan's tenure. The CHP, on the other hand, garnered support from women as the party put more emphasis on women's rights against Erdoğan's extremely conservative approach to women's rights. Below are the CHP support groups when the AKP first came to power in 2002.



**Figure 8.** Support Groups of the CHP in 2002


The BJP support groups were almost the same as the AKP when the party came to power in 2014. While Modi's neoliberal developmentalism agenda took the support of the business elites, the party's Hindutva ideology attracted religious groups. As the AKP also was, the BJP was popular among the agrarian elite and the urban middle class. While the BJP did quite well among the aristocracy, the AKP lacked the support of this group, which seems to be the only difference between the initial support groups of these parties. The BJP had the least support among the military, ethnic/racial groups, local elites, regional groups or separatists, women, and rural classes. Below are the BJP support groups in 2014.



**Figure 9.** Support Groups of the BJP in 2014

After completing one term in the government, Narendra Modi's BJP further consolidated its support among religious groups, business elites, and aristocracy. The BJP has continuously increased its appeal among business elites for the last two decades. While the party's support among the business elites stood at 0,28 in 2004, it went to 0,57 after two consecutive INC governments. According to the 2019 V-Party data, the support for BJP among the business elite reached its apogee with 0,71. Interestingly, the AKP's peak amongst business elites was back in 2002 and gradually declined, which is the opposite of the BJP case. However, while the AKP lost its appeal, the CHP did not gain. Although there has been little change in other


groups' support levels for the BJP, this may not be the exact case as the Congress lost its appeal in certain groups during Modi's tenure. The INC lost power among rural working classes, local elites, rural middle classes, and religious groups. Given that Indian urban middle classes traditionally vote for the BJP, the BJP can be seen as a composition of business/aristocracy/urban middle classes/local elites, which can attract enough support from the working classes as well. This composition aligns well with the BJP's neoliberal developmentalism agenda that uses selected welfare provisions to galvanize its support among the lower classes. Below are the BJP support groups in 2019.




**Figure 10.** Support Groups of the BJP in 2019

According to V-Party data, the INC was very strong among rural voters until it came to power in 2004. However, the party gradually lost its support from this group, especially after the BJP had completed one term in government. The Congress now lacks a stronghold as far as support groups are concerned. The INC back then, interestingly, enjoyed a certain level of support from most of the groups but did not have a stronghold. Not having a stronghold, the Congress now witnesses a setback as well. After serving two consecutive terms in government, the party lost its relative charm among the urban middle classes. The Congress' social democratic reform agenda between 2004-2014 seems to have accelerated the business elite's increasing

support for the BJP. The corruption scandals further empowered the anti-Congress sentiments among every group. Below are the support groups for the INC in 2004 and 2019.



**Figure 11.** Support Groups of the INC in 2004



**Figure 12.** Support Groups of the INC in 2019

The V-Party data provides evidence for the diachronic reading of the populist politics of the BJP and change in the Congress support groups. The Congress started to gain

votes from groups that BJP politics excludes, which refers to women and ethnic/racial groups. It loses the support of groups BJP politics targets, which refers to business elites, religious groups, rural and urban middle classes, and local chefs/elites. Such a similar trend can be seen in the Turkish case. While there has been a decrease in the support CHP gets from the military, the AKP support in this group has been on the rise. The AKP's abandonment of the liberal democratic premises gave a similar result by empowering the women's support for the CHP. Most importantly, one can observe that the CHP and the INC could not retain their support levels for groups that could be reflective of the establishment, such as the military and business elite. The CHP and the INC instead capitalized on the groups that the establishment did not include, such as women and the urban middle class.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

The concept of anti-establishment framed by Schedler (1996) and Abedi (2004) proves to be a useful framework for understanding the dynamics underlying the rise of extremist parties. The framework dissects the characteristic features of what literature calls the resurgence of the “right-wing” and “far-right extremism” and shows that the motor of these resurgences is not right-wing movements but disaffection with the establishment. Anti-establishment actors capitalize on this disaffection and drive the anti-establishment sentiments through the employment of certain techniques. Anti-establishment actors *construct a homogenous political class*, in which there is incompetence, irrationality, and authoritarianism. Introducing themselves as friends of the people against the political class, anti-establishment actors act as if they are outside of the system, and thus take advantage of the constructed victimhood position. Furthermore, these actors make use of attack politics and charismatic populism, putting the building blocks of the *anti-establishment self*. Anti-establishment actors also draw an *anti-democratic borderline* to convince people for that their anti-establishment is only against the political elite, not against the liberal political system as a whole. The literature defined anti-establishment actors and their behavioral patterns in detail; however, it did not fulfill a key linguistic and logical requirement, which is a definition of the establishment that is complementary to anti-establishment. In this context, this thesis provided a normative and operational definition of the establishment that is complementary to anti-establishment and thus presented the establishment—anti-establishment dichotomy as a spectrum on which political parties can be categorized.

On the normative side, the thesis amended the concept in two ways: (i) by removing the term “political” from the wording of anti-establishment, (ii) by alluding to the

precise context of the establishment. In its initial form, anti-political establishment party as a term was contradictory in the sense that there can be no party beyond “the political” -see Chapter 2 for further discussion on this-. Its revision to anti-establishment by the thesis, in this respect, purified the term from its contradictions. The term was also erroneous both semantically and syntactically. It did not have its syntactic equivalent, “the establishment,” in Schedler (1996), and when it did in Abedi (2004), the term this time did miss a semantic consistency as the definitions under establishment and anti-establishment were irrelevant. The thesis’ counter-case of the Victory Party briefly corroborated that a party could be categorized as both establishment and anti-establishment according to Abedi’s operational criteria. The thesis, in this context, offered the use of the criterion of *longevity* within the context of salient social cleavages along with Sartori’s governing-potential (party relevance) criteria and therefore corrected the syntactic inaccuracy. Such use also rendered the irrelevance problem invalid, as the criterion of longevity ensured compatibility between the normative and operational definitions of the establishment and anti-establishment. The thesis thus amended the operational problems regarding the concept as well. Disaffection with the establishment as the engine of anti-establishment tendencies refer to a deeper content than content that is measurable using just party relevance. The establishment, if defined with the party relevance criteria, is nothing different than describing the center of the political spectrum in another way. It is true that anti-establishment parties may aim to dismantle the political center and recruit center votes by radicalizing the electorate with attack politics. This does not mean that anti-establishment parties are mainly about eradicating the center.

In the eyes of anti-establishment, the emptying of the center is a means to pose a greater threat to the establishment. Indeed, the establishment anti-establishment actors seem to be against is the very existing power relations, constitutional arrangements, state apparatus, and the ideological settlement these are built on. When added with the criterion of longevity within the context of salient social cleavages, Sartori’s party relevance turns into an appropriate operational definition of the establishment. Based on this logic, this thesis argued that a party could be considered an establishment party if it fulfilled party relevance criteria together with



the criterion of longevity. One should note that there is a difference between those who did and those who do. The making of the establishment is, therefore, different than aligning well with and/or being a product of the establishment. This is why the thesis brought the category of the establishment-making establishment for establishment parties that are in government positions. The CHP and the INC, in this context, appeared as earnest examples of the establishment-making establishment parties. State foundation, decades in government position, social engineering, modernization processes, and survival in the long durée were common features between the CHP and the INC. These parties, however, were challenged by anti-establishment parties, namely the AKP and the BJP, and lost their government positions, degrading into the establishment party category. While the establishment values in Turkey were manifested in the form of Kemalism, this manifestation in India appeared in the form of Nehruvian socialism. These parties have loosened their strict identities following the introduction of neoliberalism and transitioned to relatively more market-oriented social-democratic center parties. However, while the assertive secularism of the CHP was generating grievances among the larger religious segments of the society, the passive form of secularism in India was generating grievances amongst the Hindus, which consisted of around 80% of the population. The inability of the establishment structures to digest the demands of the masses entailed unsatisfied demands, which fueled the anti-establishment movements in India and Turkey.

Rooted in the extremist movements of the RSS and the Milli Görüş, the BJP and the AKP appeared as earnest examples of anti-establishment parties. Facing constitutional bans, challenging strict secularism and modernization, bringing traditional values to the foreground, and then coming to power after a phase of moderation acted as common features between the BJP and the AKP. One should note that although secularism differed in type between India and Turkey, strict implementations of secularism remained common. In this context, a constitutional ban stands as a very strong indicator of the anti-establishment postures of these parties. While a total of four Milli Görüş-based parties have been banned in Turkey, the BJP's parent organization, the RSS, has been banned thrice in India. These parties retained their anti-establishment stances and later became the loci of the

disaffection with the establishment. These parties, however, succeeded in their challenge against the establishment and became the incumbent parties that were able to form consecutive governments. Indeed, the AKP has been in power for more than 20 years now, and the BJP has just guaranteed another five years in government after staying in power for 10 years.

The thesis resorted to the GPS, the WVS, and the V-Party datasets to undergird the above-mentioned conceptual reading. A comparative perspective of the parties based on the GPS data revealed the exceptional similarity between the dyads. The thesis, therefore, argued that these parties are almost identical twins. The parties' binary classification across various dimensions, such as nationalism, ethnic minority rights, women's rights, liberal democratic institutions, strongman rule, populism, economic values, social values, and clientelism, have remained the same in all the above metrics. In this context, the thesis ensured empirical ground for its argument of identity and provided empirical accounts of these parties' general topography. Furthermore, the thesis took the WVS question "*How satisfied are you with how the political system is functioning in your country these days?*" as the measure of the parties' transition and location on the establishment – anti-establishment dichotomy plane as the "political system functioning" can be taken as another way of asking how the establishment is functioning. When distributed according to the highest and the lowest satisfaction levels, it becomes obvious that those who are most satisfied with the political system functioning are the establishment-making establishment AKP and BJP voters, supporting our claim that these parties have upgraded from anti-establishment to the establishment-making establishment. When the parties' ordering according to satisfaction levels is reflected on the establishment – anti-establishment plane, the result confirms this thesis' party classification and overlaps in both countries. The asymmetrical reading of the satisfaction data, that is, reading based on *dissatisfaction* levels, gives the same results and brings the same classification.

The V-Party data further confirmed the thesis' arguments. Tracing the change in the parties' support groups revealed that while the support of establishment groups for the AKP and the BJP has increased, the INC and the CHP gradually lost the support

of such groups. While the military support for the CHP, for instance, gradually decreased after the AKP completed one term in the government, the support for the AKP among this group started to increase. Similarly, the business elites fully supported the AKP when the party first came to power in 2002. On the other hand, groups that are not core parts of the establishment, such as women, started to support the establishment anti-incumbents CHP and the INC after the AKP and the BJP governments. One obvious counterargument to our reading was the urban middle classes' extreme support for the CHP and the BJP, which, in our case, should have been the CHP and the INC. However, unlike the INC, the CHP has not experienced a government position for the last 40 years and hence did not pursue policies that could alienate urban middle classes from the party, which Congress did. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Congress lost its traditional support from social elites due to the party's positive discrimination policies during the 1990s favoring lower classes against upper and middle classes. These classes increasingly favored the BJP over Congress, and the support of the groups declined even more after the INC-led UPA governments introduced new welfare schemes between 2004 and 2014. Except this nuance, the V-Party data undergirded the argument of thesis together with the WVS data.

From a broader lens, the state of social democrats around the world has been desperate, and it remains as it was for the last three decades. The introduction of neoliberalism and the concomitantly rising anti-establishment movements in India and Turkey drastically increased the burden on the Congress and the CHP. Capitalizing on the growing grievances and aligning well with the neoliberal policies, the BJP and the AKP governments have enjoyed quite a time in government posts. But their heydays are left behind, and there might be light around the corner for social democrats. Neoliberal globalization's inevitable consequences are here and India and Turkey are no exception to the crises generated by neoliberalism. While inequalities are rising and crises are becoming more frequent than ever, a new variant of neoliberalism that gives more room for state-led industrial policies and green transformation is in the making. The social democrat CHP and the Congress are well-positioned against their authoritarian partners. There is no reason not to think

that the survivors of the *longue durée* will adapt to changing circumstances and take their place in the new establishment as well.

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## APPENDICES

### A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Parti siyaseti çalışmaları siyaset biliminin temel bileşenlerinden birini oluşturur ve bu özel alan pratik siyasetin en önemli aktörlerinden birini anlamamıza olanak sağlaması açısından çok ilginçtir. Siyasi partiler, faaliyet gösterdikleri rejim türü ne olursa olsun, siyasi faaliyet yürüten merkezi kurumlar olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Çin'den Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne kadar demokrasilerde ve otokrasilerde siyasi partiler mevcuttur. Ancak siyasi partilerin son dönemdeki görünümü, düzen karşıtı duyguların yükselişle karakterize edilen bir dönüşüme tanık olmaktadır. Hakim düzen karşıtı duygular, bir yandan geleneksel yapılara ve kurumlara meydan okurken bir yandan da düzen karşıtı partilerin ortaya çıkışını ve yükselişini katalize etmektedir. Bu yüksek lisans tezinde, siyasi partilerin düzen dinamikleri içerisindeki konumlarına göre sınıflandırılmasının mümkün olduğu, adına düzen - düzen karşıtlığı dikotomisi diyebileceğimiz bir analitik düzlem sunuyorum. Kavramsal çerçevenin tanıtılmasının ardından, düzen - düzen karşıtlığı ilişkilerini göstermek için Hindistan ve Türkiye'den ciddi örnekleri karşılaştırıyorum. Bu karşılaştırmalı çerçevede, Türkiye'den Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)'yi ele alırken, Hindistan'dan da Hindistan Ulusal Kongresi (*Indian National Congress*, INC) ve Hindistan Halk Partisi (*Bharatiya Janata Party*, BJP)'ni ele alıyor ve bu partilerin hem tarihsel hem ampirik değerlendirmelerini sunuyorum. *Global Party Survey* (GPS), *World Value Survey* (WVS) ve *Varieties of Democracy* (V-Dem) gibi veri setlerinin karşılaştırmalı analizine dayanarak, bir zamanlar *düzen karşıtı partiler* olan AKP ve BJP'nin *düzen kuran düzen partilerine* dönüştüğünü, bir zamanlar düzen kuran düzen partileri olan CHP ve INC'nin ise *muhaliif düzen partilerine* dönüştüğünü iddia ediyorum. Devam etmeden önce belirtmeliyim ki bu tez İngilizce yazılmıştır ve okuyucu zorunlu olmadıkça aşağıda sunulan kaba ve çok özenli olmayan özet yerine tezin aslını okumayı tercih etmelidir.



Hindistan ve Türkiye'nin siyasi görünümü, düzen ve düzen karşıtı siyasi partiler arasındaki dinamiklerde dikkate değer değişimlerle birlikte önemli dönüşümlere tanık oldu. Bu değişimler, statükoya duyulan hoşnutsuzluktan yararlanan düzen karşıtı partilerin geleneksel siyasi gruplara giderek daha fazla meydan okuduğu daha genel bir küresel trendi yansıtırken, tezin bu değişim ve dönüşümleri izlemesi, Hint ve Türk parti politikalarının birbirleri için karşılaştırma kaynağı olarak hareket edebileceğini ortaya koyuyor. Her ne kadar Türkiye örneği geleneksel olarak Latin Amerika örnekleri ile birlikte inceleniyor olsa da, Hindistan ve Türkiye'ye yönelik karşılaştırmalı bakış açıları giderek artıyor. Her iki ülke de popülist liderlere sahip güçlü otoriter hükümetler tarafından yönetiliyor ve her iki durumda da demokratik gerileme endişe verici bir oranda seyrediyor. Freedom House'a (2024) göre Hindistan, Başbakan Narendra Modi'nin otoriter yönetimi altında ilk kez "kısmen özgür" olarak sınıflandırıldı. Aynı endeks Türkiye'yi "özgür değil" olarak sınıflandırıyor ve Türkiye'nin siyasi ve sivil özgürlüklerindeki gerileme eğilimini ortaya koyuyor. Bu bağlamda, Narendra Modi'nin BJP'si ve Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın AKP'sinin kullandığı popülizm, halihazırda akademik ilgiyi çekmiş durumda. Rogenhofer ve Panievski (2020), popülizme ve otoriterliğe vurgu yaparak Hindistan ve Türkiye örneklerini karşılaştıran çalışmalardan biridir. Erdoğan'ın Türkiye'sini, Modi'nin Hindistan'ını ve Netanyahu'nun İsrail'ini birlikte ele alarak karşılaştıran makalelerinde Rogenhofer ve Panievski, İsrail, Türkiye ve Hindistan'ın tarihsel ve sosyo-politik özellikleri farklılık gösterse de, ortak olarak ele alınabilecek her ülkenin lideri tarafından takip edilen bir neoliberal popülist oyun kitabının bulunduğunu savunuyorlar. Bu ülkelerdeki liderler küresel popülist dalganın parçalarıdır; ancak, bu liderler "derinden bölünmüş toplumlarda" siyaset yapmaları ve "zor jeopolitik alanlarda konumlanması" nedeniyle Avrupa ve Amerika'dakilerden farklı kalıyorlar. Her lider, toplumdaki sosyal, dini ve göze çarpan siyasi bölünmelerin popülist sömürsünün eşlik ettiği neoliberal ideolojiye güveniyor. Örneğin, Erdoğan'ın neoliberal kayırmacılığı kamu arazilerinin özelleştirilmesi, kamu-özel ortaklıkları, işgücü piyasasının deregüle edilmesi, sadık yardım kuruluşları, işletmelere el konulması gibi araçları kullanarak dini ve muhafazakar bir şekilde tanımlanan 'halk'ın parçası olmaya koşullanmış hizmetler sunarken; Modi'nin neoliberal kalkınmacılığı, özelleştirmeler, kamu-özel ortaklık projeleri, işçi haklarının ve çevresel düzenlemelerin azaltılması, devlet müdahalesi

gibi araçları kullanıyor ve kendisini, ülkenin kalkınma vizyonunu gerçekleştirme konusunda kararlı olan girişimci Hindu "halkı" üzerinden temellendiriyor. Rogenhofer ve Panievski'ye göre, bu anti-demokratik popülist taktik kitabını, her liderin otantik bir biçimde etnik-dinsel olarak tasarlanmış belirli bir "halkın" mobilize edilmesi yoluyla doğası gereği heterojen bir toplumu homojenleştirme girişimi oluşturuyor (2020, 1407).

Rogenhofer ve Panievski ayrıca İsrail, Hindistan ve Türkiye'deki popülizm türünün, popülizmin Avrupa ve Latin Amerika versiyonlarından farklı yeni bir popülizm türü inşa edebileceğini de iddia ediyor (2020, 1408). Şefika Kumral (2022), popülizmin *saldırgan* ve *savunmacı* türleri arasında bir ayırım yaparak bu görüşten biraz ayrılıyor. Kumral'ın makalesi her iki ülkedeki otoriterlik, neoliberalizm ve popülizmin ayrıntılı bir açıklamasını sunuyor ve bunu bu açıklamayı küresel bir bağlama yerleştirerek yapıyor. Kumral, Küresel Kuzey'in popülizm deneyiminin akademik çevrelerde aşırı genelleştirilme eğilimini ifade ederek başlıyor. Kumral'a göre bu tip yaklaşımların çoğu, neoliberal küreselleşmenin sağcı popülist hareketler üzerindeki etkisiyle ilgililer ve dikkatimizi gelir eşitsizliğinin, sosyal yardımların azalmasının, finansal krizlerin yarattığı belirsizlik ve güvensizliğin etkilerine çekerek “çalışanların ve orta sınıfların ana akım partilere siyasi olarak yabancılaşmasını” açıklamaya çalışıyorlar. Kumral'a göre bu tür açıklamalar, neoliberal küreselleşmenin “kitleleri eski siyasi ve ekonomik elitlerin yanı sıra etnik, dini azınlıklara ve siyasi muhalefete karşı harekete geçirmeye başlayan sağcı popülist liderlerin” önünü nasıl açtığıyla ilgilidir (Kumral 2020, 1). Kumral, yukarıda bahsedilen görüşlerin, neoliberal küreselleşme ile sağ popülizm arasındaki ilişkiyi doğru bir şekilde ele almakta yetersiz kaldığını ve bu ilişkinin, açıklamalarında öne sürdüklerinden "çok daha belirsiz" olduğunu ileri sürüyor. Bunun nedeni ise, Kumral'a göre, çoğunlukla kapitalizmin Küresel Kuzey ve Küresel Güney ülkeleri arasındaki farklılık gösteren ve eşit olmayan gelişimidir. Küresel Kuzey'de refah devletinin terk edilmesini deneyimlerken, Küresel Güney'de sağcı popülistlerin “seçilmiş refah hükümleri” ile neoliberal politikaları birlikte uyguladığını görüyoruz (2020, 2). Küresel Kuzey'in merkez ülkeleri, sermayenin artı değer bulmak için Küresel Güney ülkelerine ayrılmasının neden olduğu ekonomik üstünlüklerindeki düşüşü telafi etmeye çalışıyor, ki bu da işçi aristokrasilerinin ve orta sınıfların uzun

süredir yerleşik ayrıcalıklarının Küresel Kuzey’de gerilemesiyle sonuçlanıyor. Çevre yarı çevre ülkeleri ise bunu ülkelerini "hak ettikleri yere" yükseltmek ve "mevcut zenginlik ve güç hiyerarşilerine meydan okumak" için bir şans olarak değerlendiriyorlar. Kumral, kapitalizmin eşitsiz gelişiminin “eski üretim merkezlerindeki işçi sınıfları ve orta sınıfların çözülmesine sebep olurken, yeni ortaya çıkan ekonomilerde yeni işçi ve orta sınıflar yarattığını” iddia ediyor (2020, 5).

Küresel Kuzey’de sağcı popülist liderler, ayrıcalıklarını geri almayı amaçlayan bu gerileyen sınıflarla (savunmacı popülizm) ittifak kuruyor; ancak Küresel Güney’deki sağcı popülistler, hegemonik bir blok (saldırgan popülizm) oluşturmak için yeni yükselen sınıflarla ittifak kuruyor (2020, 6). Küresel Güney’in saldırgan popülizmi bu nedenle ülkelerindeki eski elit yapılarını atış tahtasına koyuyor ve halk desteğini kazanmak için bu yeni neoliberal konjonktürden yararlanamamalarından onları sorumlu tutuyor. Öte yandan, Küresel Kuzey’in savunmacı popülizmi, küreselleşmeye karşı tepkiden yararlanıyor ve korumacılığı küreselleşmeden ve mevcut durumdan kurtulma şansı olarak değerlendirerek, eski neoliberal ve finansal elitleri "kötüleşen koşullar için suçluyor" (2020, 7). Bu bağlamda, Türkiye ve Hindistan birer Küresel Güney ülkesi olarak popülizmin savunmacı halini örneklemeleri anlamında ortaklaşıyorlar. Cihan Tuğal (2023) da benzer şekilde Modi ile Erdoğan arasındaki benzerliklere dikkat çekerek Erdoğan’ın otokratik yönetiminin piyasa yanlısı ve devletçi politikaları birleştirmeyi başardığını, ancak Modi’nin daha az devletçi ve daha neoliberal bir program izlediğini belirtiyor.

Hindistan ve Türkiye’ye yukarıda değinilen eleştirel ekonomi politik bakış açıları ve “popülist lider karşılaştırması” perspektifinden okumalar, her ne kadar kendi anlatımlarında açıklayıcı olsalar da, siyasi partilere yeterince önem vermekte yetersiz kalıyorlar. Hindistan ve Türkiye, bağımsızlık mücadelelerinin ve Cumhuriyet rejimlerinin kuruluşunun, siyasi ortamlarına onlarca yıl hakim olmuş ve güncelliğini korumayı hala devam ettiren partiler tarafından yönlendirildiği ülkelerdir. Bu ülkelerin sınıf yapılarındaki değişimlerin küresel ekonomik konjonktürden etkilendiği kesin olsa da, uzun süre hayatta kalan kurucu partilerinin yürüttüğü siyasi faaliyetleri ve izlediği politikaları da hafife almamak gerekiyor. INC’nin Diğer Geri

Kastlar (*Other Backward Castes*, OBC) olarak bilinen alt kaslara yönelik pozitif ayrımcılık politikalarının etkisi, Hindistan'daki değişen sınıf oluşumları üzerinde, örneğin kapitalizmin eşitsiz gelişiminden daha az etki yaratmadı. Dolayısıyla bu tez farklı bir yaklaşım benimsiyor ve ana akım siyaset bilimi literatürünü ve eleştirel ekonomik perspektifleri birleştirerek bir parti siyaseti görüşü sunuyor. CHP ile INC'nin bu bağlamda karşılaştırılması hem parti siyaseti görüşü sunması hem de muhalefet partilerini de kapsamı açısından mevcut karşılaştırmalı çalışmalara başka bir boyut kazandırmaktadır. Bu partiler iç siyasette sosyal demokrat bir duruş sergiliyorlar ve sosyal demokratların etrafında dönen daha geniş ideolojik meselelerden sorunlardan da bağımsız değiller (Mehta 2018; Uğur-Çınar ve Açıköz 2022). Dolayısıyla CHP ve INC'ye karşılaştırmalı bir bakış açısı, dünya çapındaki sosyal demokratların sorunlarına da ışık tutuyor.

İkinci Bölüm'de düzen karşıtı partilerin kavramsal çerçevesine ilişkin açıklayıcı bir açıklama sunuyorum. İlk olarak, Schedler (1996) ve Abedi'den (2004) yararlanarak, Schedler'in "siyaset karşıtı düzen" olarak adlandırdığı şeyi tanıtıyorum ve "sağ popülizmin yükselişi", "aşırı sağın yeniden dirilişi", "demokratik gerileme", "otoriter popülizm" üzerine gelişen literatürle etkileşimde bulunuyorum (Hagtvet 1994; Wodak ve diğerleri 2013; Brunazzo ve Gilbert 2017; Hanchard 2018; Mushaben 2020). İkinci olarak, Abedi'nin (2004) anlamsal/sözdizimsel hatalarını düzeltiyorum ve bununla birlikte Schedler'in (1996) "düzen karşıtı parti" kavramlarını tamamlayacak şekilde "düzen" in normatif ve operasyonel tanımlarını ön plana çıkarıyorum. Düzen - düzen karşıtı ikilem, belirli parti türlerinin yeniden canlanmasında olup bitenleri daha iyi anlayabileceğimiz ve üzerinde siyasi partilerin sınıflandırabileceği bir düzlem görevi görüyor. Normatif anlamda düzen, hakim güç ilişkilerini, anayasal düzenlemeleri, devlet aygıtını ve bunların üzerine inşa edildiği ideolojik altyapıyı ifade eder. Düzenin operasyonel tanımı söz konusu olduğunda ise, böyle bir tanımın normatif tanımdaki bu çeşitli unsurları kapsamı gerektiği çok açıktır diyebiliriz. Tezde, düzenin operasyonel olarak tanımlanması için belirgin sosyal bölünmeler bağlamında *uzun ömürlülük* kriterinin ve Giovanni Sartori'nin *yönetme potansiyeli* kriterlerinin kullanılmasını öneriyorum. Düzen karşıtlığı, kötü niyetli ve homojen olduğu öne sürülen bir siyasi sınıfın, düzen karşıtı benliğin, karizmatik popülizmin düzen karşıtı aktör tarafından *inşa edilmesiyle* karakterize

edilir. Düzen karşıtlığının bu normatif nitelendirmelerini takiben, düzen karşıtlığının operasyonel tanımı için Abedi'ye (2004) başvuruyorum. Bölüm İki tezin temelini oluşturan kavramsal çerçeveye ilişkin ayrıntılı bir incelemeyi içermektedir.

Üçüncü Bölüm'de iki önemli düzen partisinin ayrıntılı tarihsel anlatımını sunuyorum: Türkiye'deki CHP ve Hindistan'daki INC. Kendi ülkelerinin en eski ve kurucu partileri olan CHP ve INC, uzun süre boyunca Türkiye ve Hindistan'ın siyasi gidişatını şekillendirmede kritik roller oynadılar. İkili arasındaki benzerlikler çok fazladır ve sadece en eski ve kurucu parti olmakla sınırlı değildir. Bu partiler, yaşlarının ve kurucu olma durumlarının ötesinde, evrimleri, ulusal politikalar üzerindeki etkileri ve değişen siyasi akımlara yanıt verme yöntemleri açısından da benzerlikler paylaşıyor. Bu partilerle ilgili öne çıkan çalışmalara dayanarak, bu partilerin yalnızca önemli siyasi dönüşümleri başlatmakla kalmayıp aynı zamanda uluslarının siyasi kimliğini ve politika yönelimini tanımlamada nasıl etkili olduklarını inceliyorum. Bu anlamda tarihsel açıklamalar, partilerin tarihsel önemini, zaman içindeki gelişimini ve değişimi, giderek karmaşıklaşan siyasi arenalarında hâlâ geçerliliklerini korumak için kullandıkları stratejileri vurguluyor. Üçüncü Bölüm ayrıca CHP ve INC içindeki parti içi fraksiyonlar ve bu parti içi tartışmaların tarih boyunca partilerin ideolojik konumlarını nasıl değiştirdiği ortaya koyuyor.

Dördüncü Bölüm'de iki önemli düzen karşıtı partinin ayrıntılı tarihsel anlatımını sunuyorum: Türkiye'deki AKP ve Hindistan'daki BJP. Ancak tezime göre bu partiler zamanla *düzen kuran düzen partileri* haline geliyor ve düzen karşıtı partilerin izleyebileceği olası bir yolu da örneklimiş oluyorlar. Bu partilerle ilgili artan literatüre dayanarak partilerin tarih boyunca geçirdiği değişimin izini sürüyorum. INC-CHP ve AKP-BJP ikilisi birlikte okunup düşünüldüğünde hem ideolojik hem de kurumsal evrimleri açısından oldukça benzer görünmektedir. Küçük nüanslar olmasına rağmen, ben bu partilerin neredeyse ikiz gibi olduklarını ileri sürüyorum ve bu iddiaya dair Bölüm 5'te ampirik veriler masaya getiriliyor.

Beşinci Bölüm'de Küresel Parti Araştırması (*Global Party Survey*, GPS), Dünya Değer Araştırması (*World Value Survey*, WVS) ve V-Parti (*Varieties of Democracy*, V-Party) gibi çeşitli veri kümelerinden veri alıyorum ve bunları ikililer arasındaki

yüksek düzeydeki ideolojik ve kurumsal benzerlikleri göstermek için kullanıyorum. Siyasal sisteme duyulan hoşnutsuzluğu, düzen ve düzen karşıtlığı için bir sınır ve sınıflandırma kriteri olarak ele alıyorum ve buna bakarak Hindistan ve Türkiye'deki siyasi partileri düzen - düzen karşıtı yelpazeye yerleştiriyorum. Sisteme karşı hoşnutsuzluk verilerine ve parti destek gruplarındaki değişime dayanarak, bir zamanlar kendi ülkelerinde düzen karşıtı partiler olan AKP ve BJP'nin artık düzen kuran düzen partileri olduğunu savunuyorum. Öte yandan, bir zamanlar düzen kuran düzen partileri olan CHP ve INC'nin artık kendi ülkelerinde muhalif müesses nizam partileri yani muhalif düzen partileri konumlarına gerilediğini gösteriyorum. Ve son olarak Bölüm 6'da tez sonuçlandırılıyor ve genel açıklamalar yapılıyor.

Sonuç olarak, Schedler (1996) ve Abedi (2004) tarafından çerçevelenen düzen karşıtı kavramı, aşırı partilerin yükselişinin altında yatan dinamikleri anlamak için yararlı bir çerçeve olduğunu kanıtıyor. Çerçeve, literatürde "sağ" ve "aşırı sağ"ın yeniden dirilişi olarak adlandırılan şeyin karakteristik özelliklerini inceliyor ve bu yeniden dirilişin motorunun sağcı hareketler değil, düzene duyulan hoşnutsuzluk olduğunu gösteriyor. Düzen karşıtı aktörler bu hoşnutsuzluktan yararlanıyor ve belirli teknikleri kullanarak düzen karşıtı duyguları harekete geçiriyor. Düzen karşıtı aktörler, içinde beceriksizliğin, mantıksızlığın ve otoriterliğin olduğu homojen bir siyasi sınıf inşa ediyor. Siyasi sınıfa karşı kendilerini halkın dostu olarak tanıtan düzen karşıtı aktörler, sistemin dışındaymış gibi davranarak, oluşturulan mağduriyet konumundan faydalanıyorlar. Üstelik bu aktörler, saldırı siyasetini ve karizmatik popülizmi kullanarak düzen karşıtı benliklerinin yapı taşlarını koyuyorlar. Düzen karşıtı aktörler aynı zamanda insanları, düzen karşıtlığının bir bütün olarak liberal siyasi sisteme karşı değil, yalnızca siyasi seçkinlere karşı olduğuna ikna etmek için anti-demokratik bir sınır çizgisi çiziyor. Literatürde düzen karşıtı aktörler ve onların davranış kalıpları ayrıntılı olarak tanımlanmıştır; ancak, düzen karşıtlığının tamamlayıcı bir düzen tanımı sunulmamıştır. Bu bağlamda bu tez, düzen karşıtlığının tamamlayıcısı olan normatif ve işlevsel bir düzen tanımı sunmuş ve böylece düzen-düzen karşıtlığı ikilemini siyasi partilerin kategorize edilebileceği bir spektrum olarak tanıtmıştır.

Normatif açıdan bakıldığında tez, kavramı iki şekilde değiştirmiştir: (i) "siyasi" terimini düzen karşıtı ifadelerden çıkararak, (ii) düzenin bağlamına daha net şekilde

atıfta bulunarak. Başlangıçta, literatürde yer alan “siyaset karşıtı düzen partisi” terimi, “siyasi olanın” ötesinde bir partinin olamayacağı anlamında çelişkiliydi - bununla ilgili daha fazla tartışma için Bölüm 2'ye bakınız-. Tezin literatürde yer alan kavramı daha açık hale getirmesi, yani onu *anti-political establishment* değil de *anti-establishment* olarak ele alması, terimi çelişkilerinden arındırmıştır. Terim aynı zamanda hem anlamsal hem de sözdizimsel olarak hatalıydı. Schedler'de (1996) terimin sözdizimsel eşdeğeri olan “düzen” yoktu ve Abedi'de (2004) olduğu zaman da, bu kez terim anlamsal bir tutarlılığa sahip değildi çünkü düzen ve düzen karşıtlığı kapsamındaki tanımlar birbiriyle alakalı değildi. Zafer Partisi örneğinin sunulması, Abedi'nin operasyonel kriterlerine göre bir partinin hem düzen partisi hem de düzen karşıtı parti olarak sınıflandırılabilceğini kısaca doğruladı. Bu bağlamda tez, uzun ömürlülük kriterinin Sartori'nin yönetme potansiyeli kriteriyle birlikte belirgin toplumsal bölünmeler bağlamında kullanılmasını önerdi ve bu şekilde de sözdizimsel ve anlamsal problemleri düzeltti. Bu tür bir kullanım aynı zamanda tanımlar arasındaki alakasızlık problemini de geçersiz kılıyordu; çünkü uzun ömürlülük kriteri, düzen ile düzen karşıtlığının normatif ve operasyonel tanımları arasındaki uyumluluğu sağlıyordu. Böylece tez, kavrama ilişkin operasyonel sorunları da iyileştirmiştir. Düzen karşıtı eğilimlerin motoru olarak düzene duyulan hoşnutsuzluk, literatürde önerildiği gibi sadece yönetme potansiyeli kriterleri kullanılarak ölçülebilen içerikten daha derin bir içeriğe işaret ediyor. Düzen, eğer Sartori'nin yönetme potansiyeli kriterleriyle tanımlanırsa, siyasi yelpazenin merkezini başka bir şekilde tanımlamaktan farklı bir şey değildir. Düzen karşıtı partilerin saldırı politikalarıyla seçmeni radikalleştirerek siyasi merkezi parçalamayı ve merkez oyları kazanmayı hedefleyebilecekleri doğrudur. Ancak bu, düzen karşıtı partilerin asıl amacının merkezi ortadan kaldırmak olduğu anlamına gelmiyor.

Düzen karşıtlarının gözünde merkezin boşaltılması, düzene daha büyük bir tehdit oluşturmanın bir yoludur. Aslında düzen karşıtı aktörlerin karşı olduğu görünen yapı, mevcut güç ilişkileri, anayasal düzenlemeler, devlet aygıtı ve bunların üzerine inşa edildiği ideolojik yerleşimdir. Belirgin toplumsal bölünmeler bağlamında uzun ömürlülük kriteri de eklendiğinde Sartori'nin kriterleri, düzenin daha uygun ve mantıklı bir operasyonel tanımı haline geliyor. Bu mantığa dayanarak bu tez, bir partinin uzun ömürlülük kriteriyle birlikte parti uygunluk kriterlerini de karşılaması

durumunda düzen partisi olarak kabul edilebileceğini savunuyor. Bir de, düzeni yapanlarla düzenle iyi geçinenler arasında fark olduğunu belirtmek gerekir. Bu nedenle düzenin yapısı, düzenle iyi uyum sağlamaktan ve/ya onun bir ürünü olmaktan farklıdır. Bu nedenle tez, hükümet pozisyonunda bulunan düzen partileri için düzen yapan düzen partisi kategorisini getirmiştir. CHP ve INC bu bağlamda bu tipten müesses nizam partilerinin ciddi örnekleri olarak karşımıza çıktı. Devlet kuruluşu, onlarca yıllık hükümet pozisyonu, toplum mühendisliği, modernleşme süreçleri ve uzun süre hayatta kalma, CHP ile INC arasındaki ortak özelliklerdi. Ancak bu partilere, düzen karşıtı partiler, yani AKP ve BJP tarafından meydan okundu ve hükümetteki konumlarını kaybederek muhalif düzen partisi kategorisine gerilediler. Türkiye'de düzen değerleri Kemalizm biçiminde tezahür ederken, Hindistan'da bu tezahür Nehrucu sosyalizm biçiminde ortaya çıktı. Bu partiler, neoliberalizmin gelişiyle birlikte katı kimliklerini gevşettiler ve nispeten daha piyasa odaklı sosyal demokrat merkez partilere geçtiler. Ancak CHP'nin *dışlayıcı* laikliği toplumun geniş dini kesimleri arasında şikâyetlere yol açarken, Hindistan'daki pasif laiklik biçimi de nüfusun yaklaşık %80'ini oluşturan Hindular arasında şikâyetlere yol açıyordu. Düzen yapılarının kitlelerin taleplerini sindirememesi, taleplerin karşılanamamasına neden oldu ve bu da Hindistan ve Türkiye'de düzen karşıtı hareketleri ateşledi.

Köklerini RSS ve Milli Görüş'ün aşırı hareketlerinden alan BJP ve AKP, düzen karşıtı partilerin ciddi örnekleri olarak ortaya çıktı. Anayasal yasaklarla yüzleşmek, katı laikliğe ve modernleşmeye meydan okumak, geleneksel değerleri ön plana çıkarmak ve parti içerisinde belirli bir ılımlılaştırma sürecinden sonra iktidara gelmek BJP ile AKP arasında ortak özellikler olarak hareket etti. Hindistan ve Türkiye arasında laikliğin türü farklılık gösterse de laikliğin katı uygulamalarının ortak olduğunu belirtmek gerekir. Bu bağlamda anayasa yasağı bu partilerin düzen karşıtı duruşlarının çok güçlü bir göstergesi olarak karşımıza çıkıyor. Türkiye'de Milli Görüş merkezli toplam dört parti yasaklanırken, BJP'nin ana kuruluşu RSS Hindistan'da üç kez yasaklandı. Bu partiler düzen karşıtı duruşlarını sürdürdüler ve daha sonra düzene karşı hoşnutsuzluğun odağı haline geldiler. Ancak bu partiler düzene karşı mücadelede başarılı oldular ve ardı ardına hükümet kurabilen iktidar



partileri haline geldiler. Gerçekten de AKP 20 yılı aşkın süredir iktidarda ve BJP 10 yıl iktidarda kaldıktan sonra beş yıl daha hükümette kalmayı garantiledi.

Tez, yukarıda bahsedilen kavramsal okumayı desteklemek için GPS, WVS ve V-Party veri kümelerine başvurmuştur. Tarafların GPS verilerine dayalı karşılaştırmalı perspektifi, ikili arasındaki olağanüstü benzerliği ortaya çıkardı. Bu nedenle tez, bu partilerin neredeyse tek ikizler olduğunu savundu. Partilerin milliyetçilik, etnik azınlık hakları, kadın hakları, liberal demokratik kurumlar, diktatörlük yönetimi, popülizm, ekonomik değerler, sosyal değerler ve kayırmacılık gibi çeşitli boyutlara göre ikili sınıflandırması, yukarıdaki tüm ölçütlerde aynı kaldı. Bu bağlamda tez, ikizlik iddiası için ampirik bir zemin sağladı ve bu partilerin genel topografisine dair ampirik açıklamalar sundu. Ayrıca tez, WVS'nin "Bugünlerde ülkenizdeki siyasi sistemin işleyişinden ne kadar memnunsunuz?" sorusunu da içeriyordu. Partilerin konumlarının ölçüsü olarak düzen - düzen karşıtı dikotomi düzlemindeki konumlarının anlaşılması için "siyasi sistemin işleyişinden memnuniyet", düzenden memnuniyeti sormanın bir başka yolu olarak ele alınabilir. En yüksek ve en düşük memnuniyet düzeylerine göre dağıtıldığında, siyasal sistemin işleyişinden en çok memnun olanların düzen kuran düzen partileri AKP ve BJP seçmenleri olduğu ortaya çıkıyor ve bu partilerin düzen karşıtlığından, düzen kurucu kategorisine yükseldikleri yönündeki iddiamızı destekliyor. Tarafların memnuniyet düzeylerine göre sıralaması düzen – düzen karşıtlığı karşıtı düzlemine yansıdığına bu sonuç, tezin sınıflandırmasını teyit etmekte ve her iki ülkede de örtüşmektedir. Memnuniyet verilerinin asimetrik okunması yani memnuniyetsizlik seviyelerine göre okunması da aynı sonuçları vermiş ve aynı sınıflandırmayı getirmiştir.

V-Party verileri tezin argümanlarını daha da doğrulamıştır. Partilerin destek gruplarındaki değişim izlendiğinde, düzeni temsil eden grupların AKP ve BJP'ye desteği artarken, INC ve CHP'nin bu tür grupların desteğini giderek kaybettiği ortaya çıkmıştır. Mesela AKP'nin iktidarda bir dönem tamamlamasının ardından CHP'ye verilen asker grubu destek giderek azalırken, bu kesimde AKP'ye verilen destek artmaya başlamıştır. Benzer şekilde, iş dünyası elitleri, parti 2002'de ilk kez iktidara geldiğinde AKP'yi tam anlamıyla desteklemiştir, ki bu da partinin “düzen” unsurları tarafından desteklendiğinin bir diğer göstergesidir. Öte yandan, kadınlar gibi

müesses nizamın temel parçası olmayan gruplar da giderek artan şekilde iktidar karşısı CHP ve INC'yi desteklemeye başladı. Okumalarımıza karşı bariz karşı argümanlardan biri ise şehirli orta sınıfların CHP ve BJP'ye aşırı desteğiydi; bizim durumumuzda bunların CHP ve INC olması gerekirdi. Ancak belirtmek gerekir ki INC'nin aksine CHP bir hükümet pozisyonu deneyimlemedi. Son 40 yıldır Kongre'nin yaptığı gibi şehirli orta sınıfları partiden uzaklaştıracak politikalar izlemedi. Bölüm 4'te tartışıldığı gibi, partinin 1990'larda üst ve orta sınıflara karşı alt sınıfları kayıran pozitif ayrımcılık politikaları nedeniyle Kongre, toplumsal seçkinlerden gelen geleneksel desteğini kaybetti. Bu sınıflar BJP'yi Kongre'ye karşı giderek daha fazla tercih etti ve INC liderliğindeki UPA hükümetlerinin 2004 ile 2014 yılları arasında yeni refah planları uygulamaya koymasının ardından grupların desteği daha da azaldı. Bu nüansın dışında, WVS verileriyle birlikte V-Party verileri de tezin argümanını desteklemiştir.

Daha geniş bir perspektiften bakıldığında, dünya çapında sosyal demokratların durumu pek iç açıcı gözükmemekte ve son otuz yıldır olduğu gibi kalmaya devam etmektedir. Hindistan ve Türkiye'de neoliberal politikaların güç kazanması ve buna paralel olarak yükselen düzen karşısı hareketler, Kongre ve CHP'nin üzerindeki yükü büyük ölçüde artırmıştır. Bu süreçte, artan hoşnutsuzluklardan yararlanan ve neoliberal politikalara iyi uyum sağlayan BJP ve AKP hükümetleri, hükümet görevlerinde oldukça keyifli vakit geçirdiler. Ancak bu partilerin parlak günleri geride kaldı ve sosyal demokratlar için tünelin sonunda ışık gözüküyor olabilir. Neoliberal küreselleşmenin kaçınılmaz sonuçları her yerde ciddi şekilde hissediliyor ve Hindistan ve Türkiye, neoliberalizmin yarattığı krizlerin bir istisnası değil. Eşitsizlikler artarken ve krizler her zamankinden daha sık hale gelirken, devlet öncülüğündeki sanayi politikalarına ve yeşil dönüşüme daha fazla yer veren yeni bir neoliberalizm türü yapım aşamasında. Sosyal demokrat CHP ve Kongre, otoriter hükümetlerinin aksine bu yeni gelişen süreçte daha iyi bir konumda ve *longue durée*'nin survivorlarınının değişen koşullara uyum sağlayarak yeni düzende yerlerini alacaklarını düşünmemek için hiçbir neden yok.

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