CALLICOTT AND THE ISSUE OF PLURALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ANIL ULUTÜRK

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

JULY 2024

Approval of the thesis:

CALLICOTT AND THE ISSUE OF PLURALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

submitted by **ANIL ULUTÜRK** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aret KARADEMİR
Head of Department
Department of Philosophy _____

Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL
Supervisor
Department of Philosophy _____

Examining Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Emre KOYUNCU (Head of the Examining Committee)
Ankara University
Department of Philosophy _____

Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Philosophy _____

Prof. Dr. Murat BAÇ
Middle East Technical University
Department of Philosophy _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fulden İBRAHİMHAKKIOĞLU
Middle East Technical University
Department of Philosophy _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut ÖZER
Aksaray University
Department of Philosophy _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Anıl ULUTÜRK

Signature:

ABSTRACT

CALLICOTT AND THE ISSUE OF PLURALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

ULUTÜRK, Anıl

Ph.D., The Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL

July 2024, 152 pages

J. Baird Callicott is known for his communitarian environmental philosophy adapted from Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic. His ecocentric views advocate a monist approach, particularly supporting a position against Christopher D. Stone's moral pluralism. Although there are various philosophers discussing why his communitarianism does not work well, I instead focus on the similarities between Stone's pluralism and Callicott's supposedly monistic ethic that he modified over the years and claim the viability of pluralism in environmental ethics. I argue that contrary to what Callicott argued, his theory has serious pluralist underpinnings that he failed to avoid throughout his career and discuss why the concept of complementarity is no way out of his troubles. I also look at Leopold's Land Ethic as well as Hume's sentimentalist theory and Darwin's ecological views, all of which were the groundwork of Callicott's philosophy, to underline why his agenda of constructing a holistic and monist environmental ethics might have been doomed from the beginning. To absolve pluralism in environmental ethics, I present the success of pluralist approaches in other

fields like politics, economics, psychology, and bioethics and argue that pluralism is not the boogeyman which Callicott painted it out to be.

Finally, I take a pragmatic stance in the monism vs pluralism debate, preferring pluralism due to its significant advantage in complex domains like environmental ethics, and present a contextualist reading for Christopher D. Stone's pluralist approach, by viewing his ideas under John Dewey's pragmatism. After arguing for contextualism, I come back to Callicott's environmental theory and suggest two ways to redeem Callicott's ethics: either by biting the bullet and labelling his most recent formulation as a theoretically pluralist ethical theory in its current form or going back to its original roots as a holistic—yet slightly eco-fascist or weak anthropocentric—environmental theory.

Keywords: Land ethic, Pluralism, Aldo Leopold, J. Baird Callicott, Christopher Stone

ÖZ

CALLICOTT VE ÇEVRE ETİĞİNDE PLURALİZM SORUNU

ULUTÜRK, Anıl

Doktora, Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL

Temmuz 2024, 152 sayfa

J. Baird Callicott komüniteryanizmi savunan ve Aldo Leopold'un Toprak Etiği'nden yola çıkan çevre etiğiyle tanınmış bir felsefecidir. Komunitaryanizminde tekilci bir yaklaşımı savunmuştur ve özellikle Christopher D. Stone'un çoğulculuğuna karşı kendi tekilci ve çevre merkezci görüşlerini desteklemiştir. Bu tez, Callicott'un tekilciliğinin neden doğru bir yaklaşım olmadığını göstermeye calışmak yerine, Callicott'un ve onun eleştirdiği Stone'un çoğulcu teorisinin, aslında birbirlerine ne kadar yakın olduğunu inceliyor. Callicott'un savunduğunun aksine onun teorisinin ciddi çoğulcu öncüller icerdiğini ve bu özelliklerin, kendisinin de eleştirdiği başka çoğulcu yaklaşımlarda da ortak olarak bulunduğunu iddia ediyor. Bu savı güçlendirmek için, Callicott'un çevre etiği beş ana faza ayrılıyor ve her biri Callicott'un kendi belirlemiş olduğu çoğulcu karakteristiklere dayalı olarak ele alınıyor. Callicott'un tekilci ideolojisinin ve çevre etiğinin aslında baştan beri sorunlar taşıdığını göstermek için Leopold'un Toprak Etiği, Hume'un duygulara dayanan teorisi ve Darwin'in ekolojik görüşleri de yakından inceleniyor. Ayrıca bu argümanlar, çoğulculugun neden etikte uygun bir felsefi pozisyon olduğunu, politika, ekonomi, psikoloji, biyoetik gibi alanlardaki örneklerine başvurarak göstermeyi ve pluralizmin aslında Callicott'un resmettiği bu korkunç figür olmadığını anlatmayı amaçlıyor.

Sonuç olarak, çoğulculuğun çevre etiği gibi karmaşık alanlarda avantajları göz önüne alınarak, tekilcilik ve çoğulculuk tartışmasına pragmatik bir bakış açısıyla yaklaşılıyor ve Stone'un görüşleri John Dewey'in pragmatizminden hareketle bağlamsalcı bir bakış açısıyla yeniden gözden geçiriliyor. Ayrıca, Callicott'un görüşlerindeki sorunları çözümlemek adına iki çıkış yolu öneriliyor: teorisindeki problemleri kabullenerek çevre etiğinin son geldiği hali çoğulcu olarak kabullenmek, ya da—eko-faşist veya zayif-insan-merkezciliği kabullenerek—felsefesinin ilk bütüncül formülasyonuna geri dönmek.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Toprak etiği, Çoğulculuk, Aldo Leopold, J. Baird Callicott, Christopher Stone

To my family,

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to sincerely thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL for his feedback, support and his belief in me. His guidance, persistence and patience had a big impact in completion of this work and set off a final effort to complete this work from an otherwise lazy student.

I am also highly indebted to all committee members, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Emre KOYUNCU, Prof. Dr. Murat BAÇ, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fulden İBRAHİMHAKKIOĞLU and Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut ÖZER for their insightful comments and feedback up until the very end. Improvements to this thesis would not be possible without my supervisor's and the committee's guidance.

I also want to thank my wife Selin ULUTÜRK for her support during this journey. She was there to nudge me in the right direction whenever I was not doing enough for my thesis. I am grateful to all my family for their unwavering support as well, and I cannot thank them enough.

And finally, I want to thank Tuğçe BEKİM for starting this journey with me and reminding me that laziness is my worst enemy, even after her untimely passing. Her passion for environmental ethics was one of the main reasons for this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the past decades, environmental ethics had much controversy due to its inherent complexity within its domain. This complexity is largely due to the variety of subjects it must deal with, such as humans, animals, plants, natural resources, and whole ecosystems of which living beings are also a part. Furthermore, due to the complexity of the domain, environmental ethics has stretched and tested the boundaries of moral consideration probably more often than any other subdivision of moral philosophy. In doing so, it has prompted many environmental philosophers to question whether a single ethical theory can cover all morally significant objects.

Christopher D. Stone, in his work *Earth and Other Ethics* (1987) and in "Moral Pluralism and the Course of Environmental Ethics" (1988) argued that a successful monistic environmental ethic is not achievable and argued that we rather embrace a pluralist theory that incorporates multiple ethical ideas to navigate the complex domain of environmental ethics. While advocating this approach, he makes a prophetic remark: "It seems doubtful that any single framework can make many adaptations without stretching itself so unrecognizably as to jeopardise its original appeal" (ibid., p. 123). J. Baird Callicott, on the other hand, criticised this stance heavily and recommended that we adopt his form of moral monism, a type of holistic communitarianism that was inspired by Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic (1949), instead. While posing this criticism against Stone's pluralism, Callicott (1994a) had mainly three points of argument: he claimed that pluralism, in general, lacks—or monism provides:

1. A coherent moral outlook,
2. A way to balance competing moral duties or multiple options of moral choices,
3. A common vocabulary to discuss multiple principles in a commensurable way,

However, while criticising pluralist or eclectic theories in general and advancing his supposedly monistic theory against Stone's unabashedly pluralist stance, Callicott seems to overlook the traces of pluralism and eclectic characteristics in his theory or to try and avoid tackling these issues head-on.

Although Callicott asserts that he favours monist theories above pluralist ones, the communitarianism he endorses appears to be a potentially problematic perspective against Stone's pluralism. Moreover, while he grounds his monistic position on Leopold's Land ethic and Hume's idea of sympathy, he intentionally overlooks the pluralist characteristics of Leopold's ideas and the individualistic characteristics of Hume's theory. Starting from these already unsteady grounds, his theory adopts more and more of the pluralist characteristics that he argued against over the years, making his supposedly monistic environmental ethics unrecognisable from its original holistic roots.

In this thesis, I first give an account of the landscape of environmental ethics and the main themes relevant to Callicott's theory in §2. Then, I outline the evolution of Callicott's theory over the years and split his ideas throughout his career into five phases in §3. Later, I take a deeper look into his insistence against pluralist ethical theories and his defence for monistic theories in §4.1 and §4.2. Since there are various ways in which various philosophers and environmentalists understand pluralism, I dedicate §4.3 and §4.4 to discuss the types and degrees of pluralism according to different philosophers, and I try to pinpoint the type of pluralism that Callicott is against. After clarifying the monism vs. pluralism debate, I turn my attention to the issues regarding Callicott's categorisation of his version of the Land Ethic as a monistic framework through §4.5 to §4.7. By focusing on both Wenz's (1993) and Callicott's own (1990, 1994a) demarcation criteria for monistic frameworks over the years, I argue that by aiming to avoid eco-fascism accusations, Callicott essentially weakened and undermined the monistic characteristic of his version of the holistic framework, which was a revised version of Leopold's Land Ethic. This discussion

considers the different phases of Callicott's ideas, and I discuss—especially after his first revision, "Naïve Holism"—why he was never able to bring back that monistic characteristic over the years. While making this assessment, I focus on the demarcation criteria that both Wenz articulated and Callicott himself endorsed in his pluralism vs. monism debate. Later, in §4.9, I also extend the pluralism discussion with a quick overview of the concept of complementarity since Callicott relies on this concept heavily, especially in his later works, including "Current Normative Concepts in Conservation" (1999b). I conclude that although Callicott's usage of this concept in a normative sense is unusual and possibly viable, this concept does not save his theory and his ethics from pluralism. At the end of §4, I give a final overview of all the pluralist elements in Callicott's environmental philosophy.

To understand why Callicott's monistic agenda might have failed better, I take a closer look at his Leopoldian, Darwinian and Humean roots in §5. I detail in each section that, contrary to what Callicott claimed, these past thinkers might not be a legitimate ground for Callicott to base his communitarianist, holist and monist theory on. Rather, I argue that the conceptual background of these philosophers might actually conflict with Callicott's theory and his interpretation of the Land Ethic. Then, highlighting the shortcomings of Callicott's monism, I endorse pluralism in §6 and §7 by summarising the possible advantages of pluralist approaches, giving a proper account of Stone's pluralism, and defending why it is a rational approach to the shortcomings I have discussed. In §8, my endorsement of pluralism is backed up by a short overview of applications of pluralism in other fields and a final discussion of why pluralism is a sensible choice within complex fields like environmental ethics in §9.

Overall, my overarching theme is not mainly focused on the validity of Callicott's theory itself or its premises, but instead aimed at criticising the way Callicott essentially still characterises his theory as a monistic ethical theory—or rather, how he avoids properly characterising it as a pluralist one for decades. Finally, I conclude my thesis in §10 by suggesting that either he should accept the only legitimately monistic formulation of his early "Naïve Holism" with its flaws, or he should at least label the latest version of his communitarian ethic properly as a theoretical pluralist framework at best.

CHAPTER 2

MAIN THEMES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

Before discussing the issues that Callicott faces and tries to tackle with his re-interpretation of Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic, I present the main themes in environmental philosophy, such as anthropocentricism, non-anthropocentricism, their varieties, and some extreme positions that environmental ethicists usually try to avoid.

2.1 Anthropocentrism

Anthropocentrism is the view that humans have a privileged position in moral considerability, or they are the primary holders of moral standing. This, in turn, means that only human beings have intrinsic value, and all other things are valued in their relation and utility to humans. Thus, essentially, only humans' interests are considered when measuring right and wrong.

Anthropocentrism has dominated Western ethics and, more specifically, environmental discussions for a long time. According to Lynn White (1967), the idea of maintaining the superiority of humans was largely encouraged by Judeo-Christian thinking. The Bible passages can be given as an example of this, where God supposedly blessed humans to use the earth however they liked:

> God blessed them and said to them, "Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that moves on the ground" (Genesis 1: 28).

The same idea is also perpetuated by Christian thinkers like Aquinas, who claimed that nature is "ordered to man's use" (Aquinas, Ch 112). Thus, White argues, this claimed

superiority of man over nature and associating humans with the image of God caused the human-nature duality that we even experience to this day.

However, we can see this idea being challenged more seriously since the 1950s. Works of environmentalists like Aldo Leopold (1949), Holmes Rolston (1975) and Richard Routley (1973), as well as gaining a better understanding of the nature of nonhuman entities and their recognised value (either instrumental or intrinsic), triggered this shift in worldviews. These pioneers called for a change of values in how we view the environment, which led to the development of environmental ethics as a branch of philosophy. In parallel, by taking a closer look at animals, plants and other beings from different perspectives through the lens of natural sciences, the ethical point of view we have taken towards them also started to change.

Although it's true that humans have developed a culture that's missing from other living things and formed more complex communities, it does not necessarily mean that other living beings which do not display this level of complexity or display these features to a lesser extent are not as important. As Darwin also points out, "the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind." (Darwin, 1871, p. 105), which highlights the apparent similarity between our mental faculties and highlights a strong reason to consider their moral considerability more carefully.

These facts, as well as the apparent practical dangers of going too far with human-centred worldviews, like damaging nature and causing the extinction of other species, became more and more apparent; however, there are still camps that support versions of anthropocentrism, such as weak and strong anthropocentrism, which I summarise in the following sections.

As a closing remark, it should be noted that how anthropocentric a position is not really clear-cut. A good example to this is J. Baird Callicott's interpretation of Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic; according to Callicott, Leopold's views are strongly ecocentric and nonanthropocentric, whereas for Bryan Norton, Leopold's views are weak anthropocentric. Therefore, although anthropocentrism and its adversary non-anthropocentrism can work well for taxonomy purposes, both the real-life

environmental ideas and their interpretations are not that easy to categorize under these well-structured descriptions.

2.1.1 Strong Anthropocentrism

According to strong anthropocentrism, only humans have intrinsic value, and that's why only humans can have a moral standing. This puts everything else in the world in a utility position, a means to an end. Even the preservation of the environment, according to strong anthropocentrism, is for the sake of humans and their benefits. This also relieves humans from any duty to nature or nonhuman entities, as long as these actions do not adversely affect human beings.

The naïve deontologist or the received position of Kant's ethics is such an example. Since human reason and faculties are the demarcation criteria for him, only humans are morally considerable, and all nonhuman beings, as well as nature itself, only have instrumental value as far as it benefits humans.

Early Judeo-Christian thought is also in this category since it incorporates the idea that humans are made in God's image and all nature is a means to humans' ends. This leads to no moral responsibility being attached to the misuse or destruction of natural resources or mistreatment of nonhumans, as strong anthropocentrism allows all of this, as long as human interests are satisfied.

This is obviously not an ideal position to be in since all environmental sustainability becomes nearly impossible to carry out if we can easily discard ecological destruction for the sake of humans. So, some philosophers argued for an alternative position, namely weak anthropocentrism, which somewhat attributes values to nonhumans indirectly, with respect to their connection to human beings and their moral life.

2.1.2 Weak Anthropocentrism

Since anthropocentrism faced many criticisms due to its inability to cope with an increasing number of environmental problems, some environmentalists (instead of going the route of non-anthropocentrism) formulated and defended a moderate version of strong anthropocentrism to handle the environmental problems in a better way.

Weak anthropocentrism, while not giving up on the priority of humans in nature, holds that protecting and preserving nonhumans does not have to rely on the attribution of intrinsic value to them. That is, as far as the intrinsic value is concerned, only human beings do matter, but other nonhuman entities also hold a value in their relation to human existence. This inevitably puts humans in a higher moral status than non-humans while recognising that protecting nonhumans also serves to protect the interests of humans. Thus, weak anthropocentrism objects to the exploitation of nature on the grounds that humans' interests are tightly connected with the non-humans'.

Bryan Norton (1984) is one of the examples of this camp. Weak anthropocentrism, according to Norton, can be separated from strong anthropocentrism by differentiating between "felt preferences" and "considered preferences" (p. 134). Felt preferences are any desire or need that humans might experience that can be at least temporarily sated by a specific experience, while considered preferences are mediated by an adopted worldview or an ideal of the world and are formulated after careful deliberation. After specifying this distinction, Norton argues:

> A value theory is strongly anthropocentric if all value countenanced by it is explained by reference to satisfactions of felt preferences of human individuals. A value theory is weakly anthropocentric if all value countenanced by it is explained by reference to satisfaction of some felt preference of a human individual or by reference to its bearing upon the ideals which exist as elements in a world view essential to determinations of considered preferences (Norton, 1984, p. 134).

Thus, weak anthropocentrism does not strictly rely on felt preferences but also on considered preferences, and this allows Norton to integrate the consideration of nonhumans into his ethical theory. According to him, weak anthropocentrism is a sensible, ethical theory to support for two reasons: firstly, it makes "living in harmony with nature" possible (Norton, 1984, p. 328) and secondly, it paves the groundwork for the formation of values based on the human experience.

To give more detail about the first reason, Norton claims that through the weak anthropocentric worldview, "environmental ethicists can make a case for a world view that emphasizes the close relationship between the human species and other living species" (1984, p. 328), that is, the expression of the relationship between humans and nonhumans is made clearer by weak anthropocentrism. And the second reason

highlights the importance of the role of nonhuman entities in human beings' process of value formation, which is why they have an indirect value. Thus, Norton's argument for weak anthropocentrism rests upon human experience and preferences and their formation.

As I have mentioned in the previous section, according to Norton, Aldo Leopold's views are also in this category, that is, Aldo Leopold also supports a weak anthropocentric position. Whether this is a valid argument or not, I will discuss in §5.1 further.

2.2 Non-Anthropocentrism

Non-anthropocentrism, as opposed to anthropocentrism, which I have discussed earlier, is the view that not only humans but other living and non-living things are intrinsically valuable. According to this worldview, attributing intrinsic value to humans as well as nonhumans is a concern, so it does not exclusively deal with the intrinsic value of non-humans. Then, the reasoning behind the value attribution might change —e.g., sentience, mental capacities, or just being alive—but the common characteristic of these views is expanding the moral considerability from only humans to other living things and possibly to the rest of nature.

Since the amount of how much one would like to go beyond the traditional Western ethics of human intrinsic value and the extent of the moral considerations given to nonhumans can change, there are also different categories that exist under a non-anthropocentrism umbrella. These categories are animal welfare/rights movement, ecocentrism and biocentrism.

While all these approaches are in direct opposition to anthropocentric ethical theories, they have disagreements with each other regarding their granularity or loci of moral considerability. Crudely put, Animal welfare and biocentrism argue that caring for individual beings is good enough for protecting the environment, whereas ecocentrism advocates the value of wholes, like species and ecological communities, over those of individual beings. Going a bit further, deep ecology aims to remove or at least reduce the boundaries between humans and nonhumans, focusing our attention on the

relationship and the harmony between humans and their environment. According to Deep Ecologists, a deeper understanding of nature (somewhat a spiritual journey) is crucial to protecting it.

Still, a question about non-anthropocentrism could be rightfully asked: If humans are always at the centre of valuing, can any approach be truly free from human values; and if not, what exactly is non-anthropocentric evaluation? To answer this question, environmental philosophers like Callicott endorse anthropogenic value, as opposed to anthropocentrism. According to Callicott, his environmental views still suggest values that are generated by humans, but they do not prioritize humans' interests over nonhumans and their nature, contrary to anthropocentric views.

2.3 Extreme Ideologies: Ecological Fascism and Speciesism

Although there is nothing theoretically inconsistent about going in the extreme directions of anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism, supporting such positions comes with the risk of strong criticism from the environmental community. On the anthropocentric end of the spectrum, we have speciesism, and on the other side, we have eco-fascism. Both views are considered to be dangerous extremes to support or to be associated with. This is because speciesism favours humans extremely, and conversely, eco-fascism devalues humans severely.

Mostly, the criticisms that are brought up against such positions are not related to the structure, consistency, or weakness of such views but rather their political aspect and practical implications. The practical implications of applying those ideas to the real world could be devastating, as one would be legitimised to either damage nature or cull the human population if any of these extremes were supported. That's why most of the environmental philosophy tries to get away from these extreme positions.

Taking a strong stance for the preservation of humans or nonhumans may lead to such extremes easily. Thus, it's also very common for people working in environmental philosophy to fall into these pitfalls, either through direct or indirect association of their theories with these extreme positions. Regan's charge of "ecological fascism" to

the holistic approach of Callicott is a good example of this dilemma, as I discuss in the next section (Regan, 1983, p. 262).

2.3.1 Environmental Fascism

Eco-fascism is the category of views which value communities or wholes more than individuals, making individuals dispensable. In this worldview, any individual, no matter if it's human, animal, or any other living thing, can be sacrificed for the wellbeing of the whole. This can also lead to the complete denial of individual rights.

A good definition and discussion of eco-fascism can be found in Orton (2000):

> What seems to have happened with, ecofascism, is that a term whose origins and use reflect a particular form of human social, political and economic organization, now, with a prefix ,eco, becomes used against environmentalists who generally are sympathetic to a particular non-human centered and Nature-based radical environmental philosophy -deep ecology. (Orton, 2000).

According to this quote, Orton sees eco-fascism as a term used against the environmentalist positions which favour certain nonhuman wholes against individuals, especially human beings.

As an example, Regan (1983) blames Aldo Leopold's and consequently Callicott's interpretation of Land Ethic with eco-fascism; he is referring to the fact that wholes have a prioritised position in his environmental philosophy and being primarily morally considerable, unlike the individual humans:

> The implications of [Aldo Leopold's] understanding contain a clear perspective that claims that an individual can be sacrificed in the interest of the great biotic good, in the name of 'the wholeness, stability and beauty of the biotic community.' It is difficult to see how the notion of the right of the individual can find a place in an understanding that can rightly be called *ecological fascism*. (Regan, 1983, pp. 241-256, emphasis added).

Thus, Callicott and other environmental philosophers who lean hard on holism historically needed to modify their theories to avoid this political dilemma or try to defend their position against such charges by reformulating their approach. As we will see in the later sections, Callicott also needed to modify his theory considerably to avoid the same charges.

2.3.2 Speciesism

As Singer (1975) describes, speciesism is "the attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species." (Singer, 1975, p. 6). Although this can theoretically happen for any species, since humans are the only species with ethical systems of thought, speciesism occurs when humans are prioritised over other species. When there's a conflict of interests between humans and other species, according to this worldview, humans' interests always need to be favoured.

Although one can explicitly consider humans to be valuable, one can also put a demarcation criterion so peculiar to humans that, even though, in formulation, a theory does not seem speciesist, it can have similar implications. To give an example, Regan's environmental ethics relies on the concept of 'subject-of-life'; that is, to have an intrinsic value, an animal has to meet this criterion (Regan, 1983). According to Callicott, this view is highly human-centric:

> To be subject-of-a-life involves, among other things, being self-conscious and having the capacity to believe, desire, conceive the future, entertain goals, and act deliberately (Callicott, 1989e, p. 40).

Observing this very strict criterion for moral considerability, one can even suggest that Regan is close to speciesism because he prioritises a set of abilities that are very much human and dismisses moral considerability for other species that might have less rich mental capabilities.

As I have discussed, the speciesism charge mostly applies to positions which favour humans against other living things, which is why Callicott's later formulations of his environmental philosophy also face this criticism by Y.S. Lo (2001a) due to favouring more intimate communities, i.e., human community, as opposed to nonhuman communities.

Still, both the cases of Callicott and Regan can be considered to (indirectly) imply speciesism, while there are other ethical theories that explicitly favour human beings and fit the speciesism definition perfectly, like the example of Kantian deontology that I briefly discussed.

Apart from the obvious human chauvinism in the speciesist positions, there are also other problems that bedevil them. Consider the case where you define rationality as a demarcation criterion for moral considerability as an example. At first sight, this seems to include humans, but at a closer look, we can see that not all humans possess this faculty or possess it to the same degree. For example, people with mental disabilities, people suffering from Alzheimer or fetuses who have not developed any rational faculties yet can be omitted by this demarcation criterion, and this leads to the horrible conclusion that their rights can be omitted in the face of other "rational beings".

Although the problem is obvious in the case of the rationality criterion, as I have tried to outline with the case of 'subject-of-a-life' or the case of sentiency criterion, it is not always easy to spot or get rid of speciesism in our theories completely.

2.4 Extending Moral Standing Beyond Humans

In the light of common themes in environmental ethics I have explored in §2.1 through §2.3, I now summarize notable movements that focus on protecting nonhuman rights and values. There are a number of movements or schools of thought that we can roughly categorize in the scope of environmental ethics, which move away from traditional strong anthropocentrism. However, it is not easy to definitively outline the scope of each movement, because not every philosopher we can categorize under a certain movement has the same ideas, or others (sometimes even themselves) might categorize themselves differently, depending on the context. Even more importantly, it is usually not possible to categorize a certain movement as simply e.g., anthropocentric, or non-anthropocentric due to vagueness of the definitions themselves.

Still, sorting environmental ethics movements according to the narrowness of their value scope involves considering how each perspective defines their scope of moral consideration within nature. At least, we can have a rough ranking from narrower to broader value scopes in environmental movements that advocate the rights or inherent value of nonhumans, so to speak. Therefore, I split the positions that support moral considerability beyond humans into 5 sub-categories:

Animal Welfare and Rights: This movement, with its focus on extending the moral considerability according to sentience (Singer, 1975) or "subject of a life" criteria (Regan, 1983), mainly targets animals. This perspective may broaden ethical considerations beyond immediate human interests but still primarily centres on protecting a limited population of animals or sometimes even domesticated / captivated animals only.

Biocentrism: Focused on the scope of moral consideration to all living organisms, this movement attributes intrinsic value or inherent worth to non-human beings. It is essentially one step beyond animal welfare and rights movements because it acknowledges the inherent worth of other species and ecosystems while recognizing their rights to exist and flourish.

Ecocentrism: Ecocentrism focuses on the value of entire ecosystems or ecological communities, instead of individual living beings. This switch from the value of the individuals to the value of communities, emphasizes the interconnectedness and integrity of natural systems. By viewing nature as having intrinsic value beyond the interests of individual organisms, ecocentrism highlights the health and flourishing of entire ecosystems.

Deep Ecology: Deep ecology shifts the value judgements even further by diminishing the boundaries between humans and non-human entities as well as wholes. It essentially expands the scope of moral considerability by emphasizing the intrinsic value of all life forms and the interconnectedness of all living beings. Deep ecologists advocate for a radical change in how we view other living things in a spiritual way and reforming our behaviour towards recognizing the inherent worth of non-human beings and the nature as a whole.

Environmental Pragmatism: Environmental pragmatism adopts a problem-solving approach that integrates diverse values and interests in environmental decision-making. While not strictly defining a narrow or broad value scope, environmental pragmatism emphasizes flexible, adaptive, and context-sensitive policies for

addressing environmental challenges. These contextual strategies also often involve some form of pluralism, which is why we can call environmental pragmatism as a type of environmental pluralism in the scope of ethics. This approach often involves distancing oneself from anthropocentrism vs. non-anthropocentrism debate and focusing on theories that produce value in solving our environmental moral dilemmas.

Now that I have outlined the scope of environmental movements in a few words, in the next subsections, I will give a short summary of each view. This will give us more context on where J. Baird Callicott's and Aldo Leopold's ideas stand in this large spectrum, furthermore, giving us a glimpse of pluralist approach pioneered by Christopher D. Stone (1987, 1988) and significantly developed by figures like Weston (1992; 2013), Light (2001, 2013), Minteer (1998, 2000, 2004) in the next decades.

2.4.1 Animal Welfare and Rights

Animal welfare and rights views are probably the narrowest of non-anthropocentric views in the sense that they only extend ethical consideration to animals on the conditions of sentiency (Singer, 1975) or being "subject of a life" (Regan, 1983), apart from humans. Unlike some other alternatives (e.g., ecocentrism), these two are individualist positions, as they mainly concern themselves with the elimination of suffering or liberation of individual domestic and captive animals. In this sense, their aim is to reduce and possibly eliminate human-inflicted animal suffering (Singer, 1975) and death or protect their basic rights (Regan, 1983)

A good example of this position is Peter Singer's animal liberation view and his criterion of "sentience" for moral considerability (1975). Singer claims that sentient beings which can feel pain and pleasure are morally considerable, and this roughly coincides with animals that possess a complex enough nervous system. This capability of pleasure and pain, and therefore sentience is the demarcation criteria for Singer.

Another example is Tom Regan's animal rights view (1983), which distinguishes itself from Singer by formulating a deontologist ethic instead of a utilitarian one. His animal rights theory rests upon somewhat Kantian principles as he believes in the blessedness

of life and seeing animals as ends in themselves. He employs an intrinsic value to those beings who are "subject of a life" (Regan, 1983). According to Regan, being "subject of a life" is more than just being alive:

> Individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests (Regan, 1983, p. 243).

There are two problems with this approach, though. First, the value attribution seems very human-centric. Even if aspects like sentiency or being subject of a life seem important characteristics, they are valuable traits according to us humans, but maybe they are not as important for nonhumans if they have been given the chance to devise their own environmental ethics. This begs the question of why we should consider these traits to be valuable as we evaluate other species' intrinsic value or moral considerability in the first place. Secondly, individualistic environmental ethics comes short of conservation concerns for ecological wholes, as Callicott (1989a) also points out:

> Regan is not opposed to saving endangered species so long as we do so for the right reason, which is, ironically, not to save species, but to prevent harm befalling individual rights-holding members of species. Thus, the Greenpeace effort to "save the whales" (my example, not his) is morally worthwhile and laudable from Regan's rights point of view, not as a desperate struggle against the extinction of whales, which apparently is of no moral consequence whatever, but because it prevents individual whales from being brutally harpooned and dying slow agonizing deaths. Species conservation should be regarded essentially as a nonmoral aesthetic and ecosystemic bonus following upon the protection of mammals' rights (Callicott, 1989a, p. 41).

Thus, attributing no moral considerability to ecologic wholes would lead to an environmental catastrophe: for example, if we considered an individual mammal's life (with no extinction threat) at the same level as a member of an endangered species, we would risk a significant loss in biodiversity. I will further discuss whether Callicott's criticism solves the issues he sees in Animal Welfare and Rights movements, in §3-4.

2.4.2 Biocentrism

Biocentrism is the view that argues for the intrinsic value of all living things. It is a significant extension of animal liberation since biocentrism does not only value animals alongside humans but also other individual living beings. This is due to biocentrism's observation that living things are part of a larger set of an interconnected system, which includes humans, animals, plants and many others. Furthermore, each and every one of the individuals has a sort of telos or an aim to realise its potential as a member of a species, according to biocentrism.

Paul Taylor is one of the proponents of biocentrism, and according to him, only individual beings have inherent worth as opposed to wholes, owing to them being alive (1986). This intrinsic value or inherent worth is the result of his somewhat teleological approach, where he claims each living being "is an individual which pursues its own good in its own way." (Taylor, 1986, p. 237)

Since biocentrism is limited to individual living beings, it does not take communities and natural processes into consideration, and it does not attribute any value to them. This is due to communities, species or processes not technically being "alive," so it is hard to attribute any value to them. As Callicott puts it:

> But such a general paradigm, though easily and directly adapted to accommodate sentient animals, as Singer has done, and even all living things, whether conscious or not, as Paul Taylor has done, cannot be adapted to accommodate natural wholes. (Callicott, 1992, p. 104).

Still, as far as attributing value to living things, biocentrism is very thorough, with its four components (Taylor, 1986):

- Humans, as well as nonhumans, are "members of Earth's community of life."
- Earth's ecosystems constitute a "complex web of interconnected elements."
- Each individual has their own way of living; it is a "teleological centre of life."
- Humans have no superiority over nonhumans, either in terms of merit or inherent worth, and such claims are "nothing more than an irrational bias in our favor" (Taylor, 1986, p. 117).

Thus, this broad range of living things that Biocentrism can account for and attributes intrinsic value to, makes this view a few steps ahead of animal liberation movements, as an individualistic environmental ethic.

2.4.3 Ecocentrism / Ecoholism

Ecocentrism, compared to other views, is a holistic approach. Instead of valuing individual members like biocentrism, ecocentrism focuses on the value of species, ecosystems and processes belonging to these.

Considering this holistic approach, ecocentrism is the way out of our traditional Western environmental ethics, according to Callicott. Furthermore, he champions Leopold's Land Ethic as the strongest contender in ecocentric approaches. According to Leopold, "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Leopold, 1949, p. 224), which highlights the holistic and non-anthropocentric characters of his ethic.

Also, since ecocentrism values the ecosystem wholes like communities and species, it also values the relations between individuals and their environment. This interdependency is even more complex than what biocentrism attributed value to in the earlier section. Thus, with this holistic approach to ecosystems, both the health and preservation of natural processes also become a focal point in ecocentrism.

As a result of this variety in moral considerability, questions naturally arise on how wholes can have any value. Although there are other environmental views like Hargrove's weak anthropocentrism that avoid instrumental value while being anthropocentric (Hargrove, 1992), ecocentrism distinguishes itself by attributing intrinsic value to wholes while being non-anthropocentric.

There are two camps which argue on how this intrinsic value is attributed to nature. For objectivists, nature has a value independent of the value that we –humans—give to it. On the other hand, for subjectivists, the value attributed to nature is dependent on the subject, the valuer, yet this does not mean that the value given to nature is merely utilitarian. This latter kind of value is anthropogenic (human-generated), but it is not anthropocentric. Callicott can be placed in this latter category, as he also argues that

there is no value independent of human perspective, although this value does not have to be solely utilitarian (Callicott, 1989d).

The most challenging problem of ecocentrism is the criticism or the charge of eco-fascism. Eco-fascism or "environmental fascism", as dubbed by Regan (1983, p. 362), is the category for the ideas or approaches that value wholes over individuals or particularly devalue human life as a means to protect the environment, and ecocentric views have the risk of falling into that pit. Since ecocentrism values wholes more than individuals in it, this can lead to the rationalisation of sacrificing humans in order to protect the health and integrity of the ecosystem or protect other communities. This is a natural conclusion of the metaphysical shift from an individualistic to a holistic worldview and the ethical shift that comes along with it: if the wholes are more important than the individuals contributing to those, then every individual is dispensable in order to protect the health, balance, and integrity of wholes. If left unchecked, this would inevitably lead to eco-fascism, which Callicott also tries to tackle throughout his career.

2.4.4 Deep Ecology

Deep ecology is a movement originally formulated by Arne Naess and is focused on changing environmental ethics and people's ecological perspectives from a shallow to a deeper type of worldview. In some sense, Deep Ecology could be considered as a spiritual movement, which fosters a deeper connection with the environment and all living things in nature. This implies a holistic approach while relying on the interconnectedness between the individuals.

The significant difference of Deep Ecology from its predecessors is the latter's focus on solely "fight against pollution and resource depletion" (Naess, 1994, p. 2) vs. the former's holistic "biospheric egalitarianism" (ibid., p. 1). Therefore, narrower concerns on sentient beings, animals, or nature are replaced with a deeper concern and understanding of all living things, and those living things being intrinsically valuable. As for how this egalitarianism and deeper understanding could be cultivated, Deep Ecologists' answer is a radical change in "policies and economic, technological and ideological structures" (Naess and Sessions, 1986, p. 5), and this shift only comes with

giving up on our existing material lives. Arne Næss and George Sessions outline 8 principles for Deep Ecology (Naess and Sessions, 1986):

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human Life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.

2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.

3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy *vital* needs.

4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non- human life requires such a decrease.

5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.

6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.

7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating *life* quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to a n increasingly high standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.

8. Those who subscribe to the forgoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

As these principles point out, Naess and Sessions advocate a deeper connection with nature and this deeper connection requires an intrinsic value of life and rejection of individualism. The idea that human essence is separate from nature is mistaken, and it creates a boundary between man and nature that is hard to overcome. Instead, we should view humans as “knots” in a large net of dependencies and interactions in the biosphere. By extending the boundaries of ourselves outside of what is beyond our skin, we would be inclined to take a better care of nature and ecosystems around us.

In a way, this approach is self-identification with nature, and it improves one's life quality, apart from its environmental benefits.

Observing one as part of an interrelated web of connections also opens a way to Self-realization. As Naess puts "a process of deep questioning" (Naess and Sessions, 1986, p. 4) is the path towards an "ecologically conscious self" (Jamieson, 2008, p. 243), hinting towards a spiritual process of equating oneself with nature. After such a realization, any harm we exact on nature would be equivalent to harming ourselves, and the environmental problems that originate from human – nature distinction would disappear.

Consequently, compared to other environmentally aware approaches that rely on human – nature duality, Deep Ecology avoids supporting either total domination of nature, or a complete human extinction. Diversity and the fact that humans, like any other living thing, are members of a complex web of connections in the nature presents them with an opportunity to be in harmony with nature and coexist with it.

2.4.5 Environmental Pragmatism

Environmental pragmatism is a movement that mainly originated from frustrations with theoretical ethical discussions lacking practical applications and philosophy itself becoming alienated from laws and policy making regarding environmental problems. Its roots can be tracked back to pragmatist like John Dewey and with a focus on pluralism as well as contextualism (2002). Although there is no single pragmatist view, philosophers like Anthony Weston, Bryan Norton and Andrew Light have one thing in common: rejection of foundationalism and principlism, or rather, arguing that there are no ultimate ethical rules in environmental philosophy to govern the discourse.

John Dewey's moral philosophy has a strong focus on context. Dewey viewed the dogmatism in traditional ethics and philosophy as a shortcoming and tried to suggest an experience-based approach instead. He rejected apriori or purely theoretical methods of determining the moral "right" and "wrong". He argued, instead that like any hypothesis, the moral judgements should also be tested against the real world and defended that moral "right"ness of a view can only be decided on practical grounds.

Furthermore, as Dewey had an instrumentalist view of the value judgements, he argued that they should be open to testing and experimentation, i.e., an empirical process to determine their worth. According to him, *apriori* or dialectical value judgements are gravely mistaken.

More importantly, even these value judgements tested and validated by experience are only correct in the interim, i.e., provisionally. He argued that the changes in the "right"ness of our environmental values are always driven by the change in context and surrounding circumstances. This, of course, does not mean that general value judgements are impossible. Rather, there are value judgements that are valid in broad range of circumstances, again dependent on their common context; their usefulness still resides within the scope of practice.

Thus, environmental pragmatism criticizes the insistence of traditional environmental ethics with first principles and foundations, i.e., principlism and foundationalism, while focusing on a bottom-up approach. It endorses particular cases and situations driving the policymaking as well as making these particulars and contexts the main objective of environmental ethics. According to environmental pragmatists, the traditional ethics focused too much on findings ultimate principle or principles and became distant from actual environmental everyday issues that ethics should deal with. Their suggestion promotes a shift towards a more practical ethic, instead of the aim of finding the ultimate principles driving and slowing down the everyday environmental discussion.

For example, Andrew Light (2010) argues that the aim of finding a single moral rule or principle to embrace all moral duties and solve all moral dilemmas is doomed from the beginning. He suggests a pluralist and particularly a pragmatic approach as an alternative and urges environmental philosophers to think of a multitude or context-dependent moral truths. He believes that committing to a single (or a limited set of) moral theories or principles is not a reasonable way to tackle moral dilemmas, and he instead argues for plurality of "correct" solutions that might apply to a moral scenario, which might not be necessarily compatible with each other.

This endorsement of pluralist approaches to environmental issues also brings the denial of dogmatism. While traditional environmental movements rely on ultimate principles to guide everyday moral dilemmas, pragmatists hold that the search for such principles, and even the assumption of them is mistaken. They challenge the idea that environmental philosophy all about finding all governing rules, and instead endorse mainly dealing with real problems and concrete cases on the environment, i.e., a bottom-up approach, as I stated earlier.

However, focusing on practical cases does not mean that theoretical studies or trying to ground our ethical theories should be abandoned. Light argues, for instance, that the core philosophical worldview brought by an ethical theory can still be kept, and pragmatism does not mean "principle nihilism", i.e., the lack of a single governing principle does not mean the lack of any principles (Light, 2001). Furthermore, Light does not suggest a particular anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric worldview as the source of pragmatism, depending on the scenario, either theory could be applicable to protecting the environmental interests. Bryan Norton (1991) goes one step further and postulates his "convergence hypothesis", which suggests that anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric positions will converge into a common worldview in the future, and the current state of duality is only transient.

While most pragmatists argue against intrinsic value, it might seem as if their position supports anthropocentrism, one way or another. However, according to Anthony Weston, just because pragmatism suggests a non-fixed value theory based on individual perspectives, this does not mean endorsing an anthropocentric worldview:

> Pragmatism is a form of subjectivism —it makes valuing an activity of subjects, possibly only of human subjects— but subjectivism is not necessarily anthropocentric. Even if only humans value in this sense, it does not follow that only humans have value; it does not follow that human beings must be the sole or final objects of valuation. Subjectivism does not imply, so to say, subject-*centrism*; our actual values can be much more complex and world-directed (Weston, 2013, p. 285).

Since pragmatism rejects a monist approach while preferring a case-by-case approach to environmental ethics, it can be categorized under pluralism, in a normative sense. Not only does pragmatism argue for a descriptive pluralist approach to the

environmental ethics where multiple theories can explain the inner workings of the environmental issues, it also advocates multiple (and possibly inconsistent) theories shaping the environmental policies and environmental discourse. This case-by-case approach also highlights the context, such as culture and time being very much relevant to environmental decisions, and thus it can also be dubbed as a type of contextualism, as we will discuss in §10 further.

CHAPTER 3

CALLICOTT'S EVOLUTION: BETWEEN ECO-FASCISM AND SPECIESISM

Callicott is a prime example of an environmental philosopher who struggled with the debates of speciesism and eco-fascism while trying to develop a brand-new monistic paradigm in environmental ethics. The paradigm he aims to develop is strongly based upon Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic, which deems "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Leopold, 1949, p. 224). On top of his strong focus on the biotic community as a whole, Leopold, according to Callicott, supports a sentimentalist ethical approach for the whole environment, including humans and nonhuman entities. For Callicott, this approach also highlights the Darwinian roots of Leopold's Land Ethic:

> It is a century now since Darwin gave us the first glimpse of the origin of species […]: that men are only fellow-voyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of evolution. This new knowledge should have given us by this time a sense of kinship [i.e., it should have excited our sentiment of sympathy or fellow-feeling] with fellow creatures; a wish to live and let live; a sense of wonder over the magnitude and duration of the biotic enterprise (Leopold, 1949, p. 109).

Overall, according to Callicott's interpretation of the Land Ethic, Leopold borrows a lot from the evolutionary perspective and changes the role of humans "from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it" (Leopold, 1949, p. 204). Furthermore, he argues that Hume's ethics based on sentiment is also essential

to the philosophy of Aldo Leopold, making his communitarian ethics also grounded in a similar way.

> In wrestling with this problem, which was first posed by David Hume in the eighteenth century, it occurred to me that in Hume's ethics might be found a value theory that could transcend anthropocentrism.
>
> […] I explore a number of historical approaches to value theory in the Western tradition and suggest that, among existing alternatives, the Hume-Darwin-Leopold approach is the best suited for an ecocentric environmental ethic (Callicott, 1989, pp. 8-9).

Therefore, according to Callicott's reading, Leopold's Land ethic has its grounds in a Darwinian sense of community and Hume's ethics of sentiment, which allows Callicott to formulate a holistic (as opposed to individualistic approaches like Peter Singer's) and non-anthropocentric (as opposed to anthropocentric theories like Bryan Norton's) approach on top of Land Ethic. Thus, taking inspiration from Leopold, Callicott also bases his environmental ethics on similar grounds and dubs his theory essentially a "Hume-Darwin-Leopold approach" (Callicott, 1989, p. 8) to ecocentric environmental ethics.

Starting from these roots, I can divide Callicott's career into five phases, all of which are characterised by strong turning points as reactions to his critics. At each step, Callicott's aim of formulating a holistic environmental ethic faced some issues and criticisms, and his theory either needed additional elements accreted into it or his theory needed to be modified in some way to accommodate its shortcomings. Whether he succeeded in his attempts or not, I discuss it in the later sections. This will eventually lead us back to the discussion regarding the feasibility of monist perspective that Callicott tried to paint over his career.

3.1 Naïve Holism

Holism, in the environmental sense, is the idea that the earth's ecosystems cannot be considered separate from each other, which forms a large network of individuals and processes that are all related to each other (Hendry, 2012). Thus, the value is attributed to the wholes rather than the individuals, for the most part. For early Callicott, the concept of holism is important because it distances him from individualistic ethical

theories. According to Callicott, traditional Western ethics is usually anthropocentric and prevalent environmental discussions are individualistic. Thus, any additional elements being added to these existing approaches, such as animal rights, which is an extension of deontological ethics to include animals, do not lead to a single holistic framework that embraces all living things –or the biotic community, which embraces the land. So, he argues that there is a need for a new environmental ethic that gathers the whole biotic community under one umbrella and solves the problems with traditional Western ethical views by attributing value to the land as a whole rather than specific communities (i.e., human community as the focal point of traditional western ethics) or individuals.

To achieve this, he resorts to the concept of community, which also has hints in Leopold's Land Ethic: community membership is a type of limitation on freedom of action (Leopold, 1949, p. 202). According to Leopold, these limitations can manifest themselves as ethical principles imposed upon its members, or as he puts it, ethics is "a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence" (ibid. p. 202). Observing the similarity between this definition and the Darwinian concept of community, Callicott points out that according to Charles Darwin's Theory of Evolution, "Ethics and other systems of social restraint, according to Darwin, have evolved through natural selection" (Callicott, 1989c, p. 65), which indicates that being a part of a group requires giving up on certain things and integrating oneself tightly within a community. Callicott, combining this concept of the Land Ethic and Darwinian community, argues that the ethic changes as the community changes, or as he puts it, when "society undergoes transition from one form to another, its ethical precepts will undergo parallel transformations" (Callicott, 1989c, p. 67). Thus, Callicott claims that Leopold's Land Ethic supports that our moral precepts would also expand with an extended sense of kinship, capturing the new members of our community, i.e., non-human members. This approach would give us a larger concept of community and make the biotic community the main subject of land ethic, saving us from individualism.

However, this holism comes with a cost. When humans are considered plain members of a community, the same as any other being, then their value becomes the same as

other individuals, which means that individual humans would be as dispensable as any other individuals of nonhumans. Furthermore, humans can be sacrificed for the integrity and stability of the land, legitimising the reduction of the human population for the sake of the environment or the land. Once again, the switch from valuing individuals to valuing the whole biotic community is important here because what is morally permissible is determined by the moral value of the community as a whole (or, as Nelson (2010) puts it, "intrinsic value" of the wholes), and no individual has a greater moral considerability than the whole.

Overall, Callicott's initial attempt at banishing individualism from environmental ethics results in a strong holism; however, it also severely devalues humans to the point that they become dispensable. This attempt unsurprisingly got much strong criticism from his adversaries for promoting ecological fascism, for example, from Tom Regan (1983), which needed to be tackled by Callicott.

3.2 Tree Rings Model

To deal with eco-fascism accusations, Callicott had to introduce some human-centred or individualistic elements to Land Ethic so that not all communities would have the same weight when making moral decisions. When demonstrating this, Callicott compares two models, balloon and tree rings. As previously noted, according to him, society and ethics are parallel: when society expands, an ethical theory that is bound to it also expands in parallel. However, the expansion of his Land Ethic does not resemble a balloon when expanding because when a balloon expands, it gains a new homogenous form and leaves its old form behind, not unlike an ethical theory that distances itself from its previous (smaller) antecedents. If this were true, one's moral obligations toward his family or kin would meld in the larger picture of his nation, ecosystem, and the world while giving no priority to the closer or more intimate groups.

On the contrary, in the tree-rings model, the expansion of community brings new moral obligations that accrete over the previous ethical theory, forming a larger ethical theory that still keeps its roots. Thus, the rules imposed by those close to us (inner circles) do not disappear under the newcomers (outer circles), giving us a model with weights or

priorities assigned to different groups of the community we belong to. Therefore, according to Callicott, his environmental ethics are more akin to the tree-rings model rather than the balloon model because our duties towards the environment do not undermine our duties towards human beings; they are rather "social-ethical accretions" (1989a, p. 59).

He further attempts to posit a prioritisation among multiple duties by saying, "the outer orbits of our various moral spheres exert a gravitational tug on the inner ones" (Callicott, 1989a, p. 58). This means rules pertaining to family or our kin take precedence over fauna or flora, while our duties for the latter do not disappear, for instance. Callicott also gives a good example of this, stating that our duties to the state do not overrule our duties to e.g. family or closer kin; conversely, more intimate or close communities would have a moral priority over the more distant ones, so to speak:

> So, the acknowledgement of a holistic environmental ethic does not entail that we abrogate our familiar moral obligations to family members, to fellow citizens, to all mankind, nor to fellow members, individually, of the mixed community, that is, to domestic animals (Callicott, 1989a, p. 58).

This assumed priority given to humans and close communities lends itself to the difference between "respect" and "right", as he states that other nonhuman individual members of our biotic community deserve respect. While our human fellows have rights in this tree-rings model, they are separated from the nonhumans who deserve our respect, yet respect does not equal rights: that is, respect for nonhuman individuals and rights for wholes and human individuals.

The dilemma here is that, while trying to avoid eco-fascism, Callicott turns his theory into a weak anthropocentric one: a theory that might get charged with speciesism by his adversaries, and for a good reason. Overall, avoiding eco-fascism charges from his contemporaries like Regan (1983) comes at the cost of giving up on the strong rights of nonhuman individuals in ecosystems, significantly undermining their importance and giving preference to the human community for the most part.

Apart from these issues with balancing competing moral duties, Callicott seems to overlook the main issue he introduced, which would continue to haunt him in later

stages of his career: multiple communities' responsibilities and essentially different bodies of ethical considerations (mixed community vs. biotic community) existing in a single, and supposedly monistic theory. Here, the mixed community only consists of humans and other living beings integrated with our daily lives, e.g., domestic animals, and the Leopoldian biotic community consists of all organisms interacting with each other in an environment including humans and all wildlife, being a superset of the mixed community. As I discuss this later in §4, after these changes, it is debatable whether Callicott's supposedly monistic theory is still monistic, considering his unending attempt to unify contradicting moral duties into a single communitarian ethics.

3.3 Second-Order Principles

Callicott's attempt to avoid the charges of eco-fascism previously led to speciesism, which does not offer a satisfactory set of rules for regulating the duties against multiple community memberships that humans have. Callicott states that each community and membership come with its own rules (Callicott, 1999a); however, we also need to weigh and prioritise them against each other while not prioritising a specific community all the time. This seems only possible with another set of rules or principles that govern our duties for multiple communities.

To accomplish this, Callicott comes up with Second-Order principles, which can be summarised as SOP-1 of preference for "intimacy" and SOP-2 of preference for "stronger interests." (1999a, p. 73) To detail these, he argues that SOP-1 gives precedence to our obligations regarding more intimate or closer communities, compared to the duties regarding more distant ones. Note that this is very similar to the Tree-Rings model. To balance this out and to avoid prioritising humans each time, SOP-2 conversely argues that the duties generated by stronger interests outweigh the weaker ones. According to Callicott, these two second-order principles allow us to construct a ranking system under which both individualistic and holistic ethical principles can be satisfied.

A question might arise about how and when to decide between SOP-1 and SOP-2 when they both apply to a subject or a moral decision. On this topic, Callicott argues that if

SOP-1 and SOP-2 are in harmony, we should decide with respect to SOP-1; otherwise—if SOP-1 and SOP-2 conflict instead—, then we should decide in favour of SOP-2. Callicott gives the following example:

> While duties to one's own children, all things being equal, properly take precedence over duties toward unrelated children in one's municipality, one would be remiss to shower one's own children with luxuries while unrelated children in one's municipality lacked the bare necessities (food, shelter, clothing, education) for a decent life. Having the bare necessities for a decent life is a stronger interest than the enjoyment of luxuries, and our duties to help supply proximate unrelated children with the former take precedence over our duties to supply our own children with the latter (Callicott, 1999a, p. 73).

In other words, when duties generated by SOP-1 and SOP-2 align, we should make our choice by considering the obligations of the more intimate moral community; however, when they contradict, we should decide based on whose interests are stronger, or in other words, we should decide based on *what is at stake*. Another good example, which Callicott also utilises, is the following: when the tree loggers' economic well-being is at one side and preserving the homes of a rare bird species is on the other side, if the birds are not at risk of extinction, we should make decisions towards allowing tree-loggers to cut down the trees (decision towards SOP-1); otherwise, we should prefer preserving the homes for the rare birds while giving up on tree-loggers' economic concerns (decision towards SOP-2). Later in his career, he named this implicit intermediate principle that allows us to decide between SOP-1 and SOP-2 as the Third-Order Principle (TOP) (Callicott, 2013).

However, these examples Callicott tackles seem like trivial cases, and in most real-life cases, it might not hold that either holistic/environmentalist interests or individualistic interests will be significantly stronger. As a third alternative case, it is unclear what would happen if the severity or the importance of both choices turned out to be the relatively similar, both by taking intimacy and strength of the interests into account. That is, in the cases where it’s not obvious or trivial to balance our conflicting duties, this evaluation might not be as straightforward as the case with tree loggers and bird populations, and Second-Order principles might come short of determining a single outcome in complex real-world settings. Unfortunately, Callicott does not provide a detailed analysis for applying this ordering to any possible scenario and just assumes

that his intuitions for weighing and deciding between competing moral duties will simply work for everyone.

On a separate note, when we take a closer look, Second-Order principles suffer from the same issue as the Tree-Rings model approach Callicott suggested earlier, which is the risk of straying away from the monistic agenda Callicott had. Not only does balancing multiple duties introduce a multiplicity that is hard to reconcile into a single moral theory, but also the origin and the implications of Second-Order principles are somewhat foreign to his usual communitarian concepts. While SOP-1 and SOP-2 seem to introduce a way of weighing more important moral duties, the concepts of "intimacy" and "importance" are conceptually unrelated to each other: "intimacy" relies on the concept of community, whereas "importance" urges us to apply a sort of egalitarian calculus on how severe the results of certain moral duties or choices are. Thus, the sentimentalist and communitarian approach Callicott endorsed earlier is now mixed and somewhat aggregated by a general principle of equality and rational calculation of the importance of competing moral situations, not unlike how Peter Singer, a utilitarianist, approached environmental concerns. This obvious shift from a single principle to a combination of multiple principles, apparently originating from distinct ethical grounds (Darwinian community and duties vs. an egalitarian approach), working in tandem to balance moral duties is further opening doors to pluralism, as Lo (2001a) also a decade later points out.

3.4 Synthetic Approach: Compositionalism and Functionalism

As I tried to summarise in the earlier sections, while bridging the gap between individualistic and holistic ethics or between mixed and biotic communities, Callicott's main concern became avoiding eco-fascism and speciesism in his theories. To accomplish this in his later writings, Callicott suggests a synthetic approach combining compositionalist and functionalist vocabularies in conservation (1999b). Crudely described, compositionalism is the approach that mainly takes individuals (species, communities) into consideration, whereas functionalism is the approach that focuses on processes and relations between the individuals in Callicott's environmental context. This separation of vocabularies somewhat stems from Leopold's arguments regarding health and conservation, where he argues: "Health is the capacity of the land

for self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity" (Leopold, 1949, p. 221). Then, the question becomes how one could actually evaluate the health of the biotic community or the wilderness. Thus, preserving the wilderness poses some limitations on human activity, creating an ontological separation, and how well this split is made directly influences the status of the wilderness and how well it is maintained. This ontological separation leads to different approaches in conservation when humans are present in an environment (mixed community) and when they are not (wilderness). Consequently, Callicott argues, a process-based approach like functionalism is more suited towards mixed community, and an individualist approach like compositionalism is more suited for biotic community or wilderness.

Using these Leopoldian grounds, Callicott asserts two main conservation concepts or norms, which are health and integrity (Callicott, 1999b). Health applies to human-inhabited areas where mixed communities exist, whereas integrity is related to the human-uninhabited areas where biotic communities (or wilderness) reign. If one were to position these concepts under the respective approaches, Callicott argues that health is a part of the functionalist approach, whereas integrity is a part of the compositionalist approach. While these two approaches might seem separate or contradictory at times, he also proposes that they are not mutually exclusive. Parallel to the concepts of health and integrity, instead, they (functionalism and compositionalism) are actually part of the same whole. He summarises that we should not "distinguish community and ecosystem as different hierarchical levels but rather as complementary ways of viewing the same system" (Callicott, 1999, p. 27).

To compare and contrast these two approaches, Callicott mentions that functionalism is process-oriented, whereas compositionalism is entity-oriented; in some sense, functionalism is holistic, whereas compositionalism is individualistic. It should be noted that individualism in this context refers to species and ecological wholes rather than individual living things. Furthermore, holistic functionalism is suited for investigating human activity in a larger chain of energy flow; from a thermodynamic viewpoint, compositionalism excludes human beings as external factors which "defile and destroy pristine Nature" (Callicott, 1999, p. 22).

In Callicott's synthetic approach that aims for a holistic explanation –same as all of his earlier ventures–compositionalist and functionalist methods or paradigms are supposedly able to work together while simultaneously avoiding eco-fascism and speciesism charges. Observing the apparent pluralist nature of his suggestion, Callicott instead argues that "for the purposes of conservation, neither the evolutionary nor the ecosystem orientation by itself is adequate" (ibid., p. 31), opening the door to his later claim that functionalism and compositionalism are "in fact constitute two ends of the continuum" (Callicott, 1999, p. 24). Although this duality and complementarity might seem only descriptive or explanatory at first sight, Callicott goes on to suggest that the practical applications of each of these approaches are incomplete without the other, and they should fill in the gaps where one approach falls short. Thus, he does not only assert descriptive but normative complementarity of these two approaches in the conservationist landscape.

How these two approaches might work together is also addressed by Callicott, as he states that both approaches will need to be used within "cooperative and coordinated conservation strategies" in which "reserves and other protected areas are integrated into their humanly inhabited and economically exploited matrices" (Callicott, 1999, p. 32). According to Callicott, this synthetic approach leads to the satisfaction of both health and integrity as two complementary conservational terms (alongside functionalism and compositionalism as two complementary conservational approaches), both on descriptive and normative levels.

When looking at this duality of compositionalism and functionalism, even though Callicott claims their complementarity, it is not hard to see the pluralism in both theoretical and practical sense. Even if these two approaches are perfect complements of each other and they lead to a coherent, unified theory –although we have no reason to believe that they do, and Callicott does not provide any arguments for proving their complementarity–it is hard to imagine the combination of them avoiding a practical pluralism. That is, when applied to real-world situations, these two viewpoints inevitably lead to conflicting decisions that are hard or impossible to reconcile. One good example is the different approaches of concepts of health and integrity, leading to different sustainability goals in the environment: while the health concept might

endorse the elimination of a certain species for the sake of overarching processes in an ecosystem, integrity might endorse protecting existing species at all costs instead. Considering this inevitable duality, similar to the issues with SOPs, Callicott brings a pluralist tendency that is hard to reconcile with his aim of constructing a monist environmental theory.

3.5 Earth Ethic

The last stage of Callicott's philosophy is on the formulation of an Earth Ethic, which is supposed to be an additional ethic that extends the Land Ethic and deals with environmental concerns on a planetary scale instead of focusing on smaller-scale communities of the Land Ethic. According to Callicott, Leopold's ideas presented in Land County Almanac and his Land Ethic are still significantly relevant today, but the scope that the Land Ethic deals with is relatively small, i.e., local ecosystems. Due to this limited scope, he reformulates Leopold's maxim for limited context of the Land Ethic to state "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the beauty of the biotic community and to disturb it only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Callicott, 2013, p. 97). Callicott then turns his attention to the larger environmental challenges like global climate change that threatens the environment in a larger scale in today's world and claims that the Land Ethic's scope is too limited to tackle and make normative claims on such topics. Consequently, he argues that "in light of the paradigm shift that occurred in ecology after Leopold's death in 1948, [this revised maxim] seems no more adequate than the original to address the anthropogenic changes now befalling the *global* atmosphere and *global* ocean for the same reason" (2013, p. 150), pointing out the need for a more comprehensive ethic targeting a larger temporal and spatial scale.

In *Thinking Like a Planet*, Callicott attempts to build a new "Earth Ethic" utilizing the ideas that Leopold first hinted at in his "Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the Southwest" essay (Leopold, 1979). According to Callicott, such larger-scale problems need to be tackled with a separate ethic, and Leopold presented some pointers to this new ethic while discussing biblical examples regarding the value of the earth:

> [T]he privilege of possessing the earth entails the responsibility of passing it on, the better for our use, not only to immediate posterity, but to the Unknown

> Future, the nature of which is not given us to know. It is possible that Ezekiel respected the soil, not only as a craftsman respects his material, but as a moral being respects a living thing (Leopold, 1979, p.139).

Thus, according to Callicott, a separate Earth Ethic is necessary because "the land ethic is … a poor fit with the most urgent and dire environmental concern of our time" (Callicott, 2013, p. 300). Unsurprisingly, Callicott's inspiration is once again Leopold's same essay, for tackling planetary scale issues like global climate change. Since Leopold points out one of the preliminaries for such all-encompassing ethics is respect for the earth and considering it as a larger "being", Callicott utilises James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock and Margulis, 1974) as the best basis for the Earth Ethic. Yet, thinking that the attribution of consciousness or moral standing to the earth itself goes too far, he settles with an anthropocentric Earth Ethic that also takes future generations as its subject. He wants to avoid other alternative formulations of Earth Ethic, such as a deontologist or a Kantian version by claiming that this would be "a leap beyond […] the spatial and temporal limits of ethics" (ibid. p. 301).

Considering these aspects, we can say that the Earth Ethic has a similar sentimentalist and communitarian formulation of Leopold's Land Ethic but instead expands its scope from the local communities on a smaller scale to the present global human civilisation and the present biota of the earth in general. Callicott legitimises this expansion or the attempt of Earth Ethic by arguing that "to have some chance of confronting global climate change successfully, we need to be equipped with an environmental ethic that is commensurate with its spatio-temporal scale" –aka, the Earth Ethic (Callicott, 2013, p. 300).

Furthermore, Callicott claims that the Earth Ethic is complementary to the Land Ethic, so it is not an accretion or eclectic part on top of the Land Ethic. It is supposed to be part of the same continuum of communitarian ethics that works in tandem with the Land Ethic: while the Land Ethic is relatively shorter and narrower on temporal and spatial scale, the Earth Ethic is planetary in scale, concerning the next generations of global human population as well.

Overall, in *Thinking Like a Planet,* the Synthetic Approach that Callicott defended a decade ago seems to be completely abandoned. While the duality between a

compositionalist and functionalist outlook seems gone, Callicott instead introduces a duality between a shorter temporal and spatial scale (the domain of the Land Ethic) and a larger or a longer one (the domain of the Earth Ethic). With this addition, the communitarian ethics he developed and tried to strengthen with Second-Order principles earlier are now slightly revised and extended with (or complemented by) his newly formulated Earth Ethic.

CHAPTER 4

MONISM VS. PLURALISM DEBATE

The main point of debate between J. Baird Callicott and Christopher Stone, as I briefly mentioned in §1 is the monism vs pluralism in environmental ethics. Monism, simply put, is the view that there is a single ultimate ontological, ethical, epistemological, or alethic (modality of truth) view or theory. Pluralism, on the other hand, claims that there may be multiple irreducible theories of these kind in a specific field. For the sake of limiting our discussion to the scope of environmental ethics, monism could be summarized as the view that there exists only a single ultimate ethical theory that is "correct", while pluralism claims that there are multiple environmental ethical theories that are "correct" and there may not be a decisive way of selecting a single one among them. The correctness in this scope, as far as foundational theories such as Callicott's environmental ethics is concerned, seems to indicate an ethical theory being able to answer our moral questions in a clear, consistent and coherent manner. While monism argues for a single theory to be able to answer all our questions, pluralism concedes that there may be multiple such theories and they may be able to solve our problems equally well or may work in tandem within a designated scope.

Let us apply this to the debate of Callicott vs. Stone: Callicott argues that a single holistic ethic is the way out for our environmental dilemmas, while Stone argues that no single ethical theory can account for the apparent complexity of our everyday environmental issues. The success or the lack thereof is intended to lead us towards the monism vs pluralism discussion in §9 and §10. However, before diving into this

duality, the reasons for which these two environmental philosophers support the monist vs. pluralist positions will be discussed in the following sections.

4.1 Callicott's Argument for Monism

J. Baird Callicott is probably one of the most prominent environmental philosophers who oppose moral pluralism persistently, and in "The Case Against Moral Pluralism" (1990, pp. 143-169) and "Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended" (1994a, pp. 171-183), he provides his arguments against it. However, his argument for a monist ethic was formulated way before his arguments against Christopher Stone.

One of such earlier examples is Callicott's argument against Mary Anne Warren's ideas on animal rights as an extension to human rights (1983). Callicott claims that since Warren suggests human rights and animal rights rest on different foundations (human rights do not equal animal rights), her approach would be eclectic and would not be a satisfying solution.

> However reasonable, there is something philosophically unsatisfying in Warren's ethical eclecticism. Moral philosophy historically has striven for theoretical unity and closure—often at considerable sacrifice of moral common sense (Callicott, 1989a, p. 50).

Thus, for Callicott, at least during his early career, it seems as though an eclectic approach would not be a satisfying answer to our problems in environmental ethics. This is important to note because, as I discussed in §3.3 through §3.5, this somewhat contradicts his views when he criticised Warren. I later detail this discussion and my views on Callicott's own theory in terms of its eclectic and pluralist characteristics in §4.6 and §4.7.

Let us move to the discussion of pluralism in Callicott's later works (1990, 1994a). According to Callicott, a pluralist is unable to mediate between the contradicting decisions or conclusions that his viewpoint will inevitably generate. When multiple moral theories embraced by the pluralist simultaneously command and prohibit the same course of conduct, the pluralist is constrained because the contradicting decisions or judgments bear equal weight. He further gives the example of the bison trapped in the ice. On the one hand, animal welfare ethics may require that we interfere and save

the animal from the ice; on the other hand, ecocentric environmental ethics may advise that we refrain from interfering with the lifecycles of wild animals (1990). Since the pluralists would subscribe to both theories equally *and* simultaneously, they would be unable to make any decision, so Callicott claims.

Moreover, according to Callicott, pluralism disregards our need for a logically sound and consistent moral philosophy that is stable and free of contradictions and provides a coherent basis. Callicott asserts that the adoption of an ethical theory also comes with many moral implications:

> When an agent adopts an ethical theory, an ethical 'intellectual framework' as Stone defines his neologism, he or she adopts a moral psychology, a notion of the supreme good, a criterion of moral considerability, among other foundational ideas (Callicott, 1994a, p. 172).

Following his claim of ethics as an "intellectual framework," Callicott goes on to argue that a moral agent "wants a coherent outlook – the one that looks correct" (Callicott, 1994a, p. 172). Thus, Callicott assumes that pluralism is psychologically unacceptable or unpleasant, and when someone adopts and continually switches between contradicting ethical theories, they would be accepting a moral outlook that contradicts human psychology or mental life. Relying on this deduction, Callicott concludes that pluralism not only fails to provide a means of mediating between contradictory theories, but it also compels us to accept a repugnant and implausible moral philosophy.

Lastly, Callicott argues that by allowing pluralism to reign over environmental ethics, we are throwing the possible discussion between competing theories out of the window. This is largely due to Callicott's (1990) assumption that pluralism does not endorse moral discourse and leads to an "anything goes" attitude—a terminology coined by DesJardins (2006, p. 266). This, in turn, does not allow us to properly discuss the viable alternatives within environmental theories and find the most correct one. Therefore, Callicott believes pluralism should be avoided in environmental ethics.

Yet, Callicott's stance against pluralism comes with a specification. Callicott distinguishes between interpersonal and intrapersonal pluralism and argues that he is

only against intrapersonal pluralism. To clarify, Callicott only argues against an individual subscribing to multiple inconsistent moral theories at the same time (i.e., argues against an internally pluralist position), but he accepts that it is completely reasonable for different people to have different choices for selecting the most acceptable moral theory for them (i.e., endorses an externally pluralist view). When it comes to his environmental philosophy, Callicott feels communitarianism is the most acceptable choice, but he invites us to think on our own in accordance with our reason and choose the ideology one finds most sensible. For intrapersonal pluralism, however, he is not very welcoming:

> Indeed, for persons of good will who still find intrapersonal pluralism tenable [...] I uphold their right to choose to suffer from the intellectual equivalent of a multiple personality disorder if that is what they think is best for them (Callicott, 1994a, p. 175).

Overall, Callicott is open to rational persuasion and philosophical discussions when it comes to environmental ethics. He seems to only argue against intrapersonal pluralism, which leads an agent to accept multiple and possibly conflicting ethical theories at the same time. At the end of the day, his reason for criticising Christopher Stone's intrapersonal pluralism is due to ideological differences and how he envisions human ethical life to be. As far as other monist theories are concerned, Callicott hopes that "intelligent people of good will should eventually reach agreement if they take the time to thrash out their initial differences" (Callicott, 1994a, p. 175).

Furthermore, Callicott considers other ethics which aim to construct a sound philosophy and attempt to embrace humans, non-humans, and ecosystems under the same umbrella as reasonable. Domsky (2001) summarises:

> Though pluralism is ruled out because it fails to meet these criteria, Callicott believes that there are many possible alternative theories. He cites, for instance, the conative theories advanced by such philosophers as Holmes Rolston III or Robin Attfield as fairly plausible and coherent, and the Self-realisation theories advanced by deep ecologists such as Arne Naess and Warwick Fox as similarly worthy candidates (Domsky, 2001, p. 398).

Although Callicott recognises these alternatives in environmental ethics, of course, his preference is towards his communitarian ethics based on Leopold's Land Ethic. His formulation relies on various memberships and duties (or responsibilities) that we have

towards different communities that we belong to, on a sentimentalist basis. This might initially seem like a pluralist approach. However, as I outlined earlier, because all of our moral concerns and duties can be presented in the same language and are commensurable, resolving the conflicts that might arise between them should be feasible—although how to compare and prioritise these competing duties is not entirely clear.

Later, via Second-Order principles, Callicott gives us a glimpse of how these competing moral considerations can be weighed. As I mentioned in §3.3, his overall suggestion for resolving possible conflicts between multiple moral spheres or duties is through SOP1 and SOP2. Combined, these two Second-Order principles allow Callicott to weigh and prioritise the duties enforced by different community memberships by resorting to intimacy (SOP1) and the importance/severity (SOP2) of those duties. Overall, Callicott argues that his environmental ethics leads to a theory in which the resolution is possible within a common vocabulary. According to Callicott, this resolution and commensurability between multiple community memberships allow his environmental ethic to be free from conflicts and to stay clear of pluralism.

4.2 Stone's Argument for Pluralism

Let's move on to the alternative of Callicott's monism, namely the theory suggested by Christopher D. Stone. In "Moral Pluralism and the Course of Environmental Ethics" (1988), Stone presents a convincing case for moral pluralism in environmental ethics. He claims that due to the complexity of our ethical domain, no single moral theory would be able to properly address all of our moral dilemmas.

> First, the monist's mission sits uneasily with the fact that morality involves not one, but several distinguishable *activities*—choosing among courses of conduct, praising and blaming actors, evaluating institutions, and so on.
>
> Second, we have to account for the *variety of things* whose considerateness commands some intuitive appeal: normal persons in a common moral community, persons remote in time and space, embryos and fetuses, nations and nightingales, beautiful things and sacred things.

> […] Trying to force all these diverse entities into a single mold—the one big, sparsely principled comprehensive theory—forces us to disregard some of our moral intuitions, and to dilate our overworked person-wrought precepts into unhelpfully bland generalities (Stone, 1988, pp. 145-146).

Due to this apparent complexity and multiplicity—both in the *activities* and the *variety of things* that environmental ethics needs to consider—Stone asserts that for moral actors to act appropriately, they must appeal to the best applicable moral theory in each case. The applicability of the various current moral theories changes parallel to the circumstances (or contexts, as I will discuss in §10) surrounding the moral objects.

The crucial part of Stone's theory is its formulation of planes in a landscape of ethics. Planes represent "intellectual frameworks that support the analysis and solution of particular moral problems" (1987, p. 133). He draws parallels between these planes and fields like algebra and geometry, mentioning how they are suited to different problems. He points out two main points that are peculiar to these planes: ontological commitments and governance. First, if one invests in a specific plane, one must also invest in the ontological commitments that come with it, e.g., the field of geometry comes with the commitment to the points, lines, and angles. Secondly, governance represents the rules that apply, which essentially come with the plane and the ontology, e.g., axioms and theorems that are peculiar to the domain of geometry. Overall, both properties give the planes some constraint on where they can be applied, and what kind of worldview one would adopt, if one “chipped in” this specific plane. In the ethics sphere, the same examples can be given for deontology, for instance, where the ontology that comes with it contains reason, duties, and virtues. The set of rules that apply are moral maxims that are postulated by human reason, which represents their governance: the set of constraints which apply to our moral lives.

Although many such planes may exist in a domain like environmental ethics, and they may even be incommensurable—as they may contain radically different ontologies and vocabularies—Stone contrasts his position strongly against moral relativism and claims that pluralism, as he sees it, does not lead to or reduce to moral relativism. He seems to have an objective view of the “right” when formulating his pluralist perspective:

> There may be 'really right' and not just relatively right answers, but the way to find them is by reference not to one single principle, a constellation of concepts, etc., but by reference to several distinct frameworks, each appropriate to its own domain of entities and/or moral activities (evaluating character, ranking options for conduct, etc.) (Stone, 1988, p. 146).

Contrary to Callicott's view of pluralism, Stone further claims that conflicts between decisions should not appear often, they should rather be rare. Firstly, consideration of multiple theories would not be necessary for the majority of our moral decisions, and conflicts would not be commonplace. Secondly, even when several explanations are required, diverse theories would frequently lead to the same moral result. And lastly, in the rare case of conflicts where pluralism might fail to give us a single ultimate solution to every moral dilemma, it is "either because a single answer does not exist, or because our best analytical methods are not up to finding it" (Stone, 1988, p. 153). Thus, Stone argues that finding a single "right" answer for a minority of our moral concerns might not be possible, but this should be expected.

To exemplify how one can navigate within this ambiguity between conflicting moral decisions, Stone gives the map vs. world/field analogy, discussing how the planes are established and how their domain can change over time. The planes over the landscape are akin to maps we draw over the world, which highlight and describe different aspects of it. However, the maps are plastic, malleable, and can change over time. He explains:

> Another distinct attraction of the map analogy is that maps are provisional. One reason is that territory being mapped may change. Over time, coasts recede, deltas form, rivers meander, lakes dry up, continents even drift. Other changes owe to a filling in of detail as our knowledge of what has always been out there advances and the focus of our interests shifts (Stone, 1987, p. 140).

Still, although the application of the planes is rule-based, according to Stone, they are prone to changes and revisions. When describing how this change occurs, Stone stresses that changes in these preferences and applications happen over time in a community, not in a way that promotes self-interest or an "anything goes" attitude, unlike the picture Callicott painted. The changes in these prevalent moral planes, instead, relies on intuitions:

> Fabricating and selecting the right moral plane cannot be disposed of by reference to the principles and other elements that endow a plane with its

> character, enabling us to carry out an internal analysis. [..] All the more in morals should we expect truth to be supplemented with other, overlapping notions: from coherence, perspicacity, fittingness, and elegance, all the way to *intuitions about fairness and justice* (Stone, 1987, p. 255, emphasis added).

Thus, according to Stone, the selection of which moral plane suits which purpose relies on intuitions, but we should not dismiss this intuitive approach "as a conversation stopper, the introduction of a barrier that further analysis cannot penetrate" (Stone, 1987, p. 256), although his formulation of how these choices should be made and enforced by a larger community is rather unclear. Although concepts like "elegance" or "intuitions about fairness and justice" seem reasonable as guiding principles, Stone does not specify how they can be extended to apply to and to be agreed upon by a larger community.

Overall, according to Stone, the moral plane is vastly complex to be compressed into a single coherent moral theory. Due to this complexity, only moral pluralism can properly tackle the domain of environmental ethics, and "monism's ambitions, to unify all ethics within a single framework capable of yielding the one right answer to all our quandaries, are simply quixotic" (1988, p. 145). Thus, both in the theoretical and practical sense, environmental philosophers should embrace the pluralist perspective.

4.3 Interpersonal vs. Intrapersonal Pluralism

As I have discussed earlier, Callicott is against the type of pluralism where an individual chooses among multiple, incompatible moral standpoints as they see fit, depending on the situation. This type of pluralism, he calls "intrapersonal" (Callicott, 1994a, p. 175). On the other side, he supports interpersonal pluralism, which corresponds to different people holding different ethical beliefs or theories and the most reasonable one triumphing over the others:

> I am fully committed to moral pluralism in another sense. I uphold everyone else's right to explore or to adopt a moral philosophy and ethical theory that seems persuasive to them. In other words, while I find intrapersonal pluralism objectionable for the reason stated, I am wholeheartedly committed to interpersonal pluralism (Callicott, 1994a, p. 175).

At first sight, it seems like Callicott is eliminating the type of pluralism that is unviable or unproductive for the sake of a holistic environmental ethics, and he instead opens a

way for or endorses a pluralism that is viable, which is interpersonal pluralism. So, one might be inclined to think that while he is open-minded regarding the concept of pluralism, haphazardly applying pluralism to specific cases of environmental ethics is unacceptable for Callicott, which would be very reasonable. However, his distinction between interpersonal vs. intrapersonal pluralism is worth a closer look.

4.3.1 Interpersonal Pluralism Demystified

While Callicott's selective argument against one type of pluralism seems plausible, if we take a closer look, it is hard to see why interpersonal pluralism is even mentioned as a positive aspect of his views. According to Callicott's definition of interpersonal pluralism, it only endorses different people having different moral beliefs or opinions. I think one should be surprised to see this as an important feature of his view—or of any other environmental view, for that matter— because for every philosopher, environmentalist (maybe even every human being with common sense), accepting the variety of opinions and respecting them should be a bare minimum, not something to be boasting about. As Andrew Light also points out:

> Surely our method of interacting as philosophers must push the envelope of Callicott's interpersonal pluralism, beyond what we would expect it to be for any well-trained philosopher working on any topic. Any philosopher who thought it appropriate to censure the work of his colleagues only because it is different from his own, or failed to give it a fair hearing, would simply be a bad philosopher. We need not theorize about varieties of pluralism to get to that conclusion (Light, 2001, p. 237).

So, it feels like Callicott is promoting merely a minimum requirement, a necessity for a healthy discourse in any philosophical discussion. Yet, I imagine anyone discussing their opinions in philosophical discourse would have already adopted this attitude without any need for Callicott's recognition for interpersonal pluralism.

Furthermore, it is questionable how one would subscribe to interpersonal pluralism without also accepting intrapersonal pluralism. Accepting plurality of worldviews in different people assumes that we all have the capacity towards understanding and accepting others' moral outlooks, as well as our own. And if we are open to rational arguments and persuasion to another theory, e.g., a deontologist becoming a utilitarian after an open discussion, why is it so unbelievable that a person can *utilize* multiple

theories in their environmental challenges? I discuss this topic more in the next subsection §4.3.2 and in §10. As I will outline, it all seems to boil down to how one views the Self and the theories that one adopts: internally or externally.

Apart from these open questions, mentioning one's approval of this type of pluralism is redundant and we better turn our attention from the main problem, which is, in the simplest terms, value pluralism, dubbed as "intrapersonal pluralism" by Callicott (ibid., p. 175).

4.3.2 Intrapersonal Pluralism Clarified

Intrapersonal pluralism, where each individual can hold multiple and possibly incompatible beliefs, is Callicott's main point of concern. Although, as I discussed in the previous section, it is also the only type of pluralism that he should have discussed in the first place. This is plain and simple value pluralism, and in ethics, once it is used in the individual sphere, it coincides one-to-one with the intrapersonal pluralism definition of Callicott.

While this is such a well-known and articulated position in ethics, why does Callicott invent a new terminology for it? It might appear as if intrapersonal pluralism is an unsupported, unconventional or unreasonable idea that goes against "mainstream" monistic approaches that Callicott views with sympathy. However, value pluralism, just like value monism, is a strong attitude or a movement that has been discussed outside the circle of environmental ethics for decades, which is where Stone's suggestion of multiple planes or maps being applied to the field of environmental ethics comes in.

One might feel puzzled why interpersonal pluralism is viewed as a beneficial position whereas intrapersonal pluralism is indefensible, according to Callicott. Kronlid (2003) suggest that this is due to how Callicott views the relationship between the Self and the theories that someone subscribes to. While Callicott views the ethical theories as internal to self, pluralists like Stone views them as external to the self. Thus, Callicott argues that the theories that one subscribes to have to be in harmony with this already-consistent self. This indicates two hidden assumptions in Callicott's worldview: that

the individual self is already consistent and without any internal contradictions, and that theories being internal (or being subsumed under) the self. There is considerable empirical argument supporting incoherence of the self and the plurality of systems contributing to moral decisions, contrary to Callicott's views, as I will discuss in §8 and §10.

4.4 Theoretical vs. Practical Pluralism

In a field like environmental ethics, one might be tempted to think that the pluralism discussion is mostly focused on applications, i.e., practical aspects. However, Callicott's argument against Stone mostly seems to rely on the foundations and the theory of his theory. Thus, Callicott seems to mostly disagree with Stone's approach in theoretical grounds.

Still, according to Andrew Light (2001), Callicott's attack on Stone's pluralism is a bit vague, since he might be targeting either the assumption that multiple conflicting theories exist together in an ethical framework, or he might be arguing against multiple theories working together in a practical setting to achieve the same goal. In other words, "theoretical pluralism," as defined by Light (2001), is the view that endorses "the diverse set of values that must be covered in an environmental ethic." "Practical pluralism," on the other hand, supports "multiple divergent ethical theories working together in a single moral enterprise, despite their theoretical differences" (Ibid.). Light later uses the term "pragmatic pluralism" for this approach, which makes more sense, since the distinct moral approaches are utilised to achieve the same goal, rather than trying to devise a combined theoretical framework from these distinct ethical theories.

Thus, taking these definitions into account, Light argues that Stone is definitely a theoretical pluralist, as well as a practical pluralist, because he both endorses multiple theoretical frameworks existing in a larger pluralist ethical framework *and* suggests applying these different approaches to real problems in the world, to achieve some environmentalist agenda (Stone, 1987). Callicott, when arguing against Stone's pluralism, seems to be critical of him from a theoretical pluralist perspective but not from a practical pluralist perspective that may somehow be accepted by him:

> [Stone] points out, that a multiplicity of independent principles might just as well converge on a single course of action. The practical necessity of such a plurally mandated course of action would be reinforced, rather than frustrated or negated. […] Why, he asks, should we expect several overlays ["planes"] to yield interference patterns more usually than sympathetic patterns? (Callicott, 1994a, p. 154).

After glossing over the case where multiple theories can work to achieve the same end, Callicott goes back to discussing different approaches or ethical frameworks leading to conflicting decisions. This somewhat indicates that their utilization when they "converge on a single course of action" does not bother him as much.

Overall, it seems legitimate to claim –just as Light (2001) points out—that Callicott was mainly against theoretical pluralism advocated by Stone, not against a type of practical pluralism that would be advocated by Brennan (1992) and Light (2001). Thus, throughout my pluralism discussions in the next sections, unless I explicitly mention "practical pluralism," I will be referring to "theoretical pluralism," which is clearly the main point of contention for Callicott (1990, 1994a).

4.5 Degrees of Pluralism

Even for the theoretical pluralism we have discussed, it seems like different philosophers use the term in different strengths or scales, and they might mean different things. Peter Wenz has an analysis of different degrees of pluralism in the context of environmental ethics, and he also attempts to categorise both Christopher Stone's and Callicott's environmental ideas with respect to his scale.

According to Wenz (1993), there are three degrees of pluralism: minimal, moderate, and extreme. For minimal pluralism, a theory should just simply "lack a universal algorithmic decision procedure" (Wenz, 1993, p. 63). One example of this can be a theory that is as monist as utilitarianism. Keeping Wenz's demarcation criteria for minimal pluralism in mind, if multiple paths of decision lead to overall the same summum bonum, utilitarianism does not provide a clear-cut way of deciding between these actions, as they are of equal value. In this sense, a seemingly monistic theory like utilitarianism can even be called minimally pluralist.

However, for extreme moral pluralism, entirely different (and presumably distinct) metaphysical grounds are needed between the two theories and an alternation between them is required for the combining moral theory. Wenz suggests that Stone's theory of deciding between deontology (e.g., Kantian ethics) and utilitarianism is such an extreme example, as their metaphysical bases are distinct.

Lastly, there's moderate pluralism in between, when alternating between different theories is not necessary, but rather, the different principles can be alternated within a single theory.

Contrary to Wenz's demarcation criteria and his categorization, not all philosophers seem to agree that the difference between moderate and extreme pluralism is as clear as Wenz paints it to be. Domsky (2001) argues that differentiating between different theories versus different principles might not be very much different. Although it does not really change the point I am trying to make in this paper, I summarise both Wenz's categorization and Domsky's criticism in the next section.

4.5.1 Callicott and Stone in Pluralism scale

According to Wenz (1993), Callicott's argument against Stone relies on the assumption that pluralist theories do not prescribe any action regarding making decisions between competing moral values when it is needed. Wenz calls this type of pluralism minimal pluralism, which he suggests exists in nearly every ethical theory. As we discussed, according to Wenz, even Kantian deontology or Bentham's utilitarianism, which seem to be monistic, can be minimally pluralist if they do not provide a deterministic procedure or algorithm that leads us to a single answer every time.

Since Callicott (1990, 1994b) also initially denies Stone's suggestion of pluralist environmental ethics on the same grounds—i.e., not leading to a single result for us every time—then he would simply be arguing against minimal pluralism while discussing Stone's theory, which is not in the same category. Thus, according to Wenz, Callicott's initial reason for dismissing Stone's pluralism somewhat misses its mark. Furthermore, according to Wenz, Stone does give an account (based on types of events

that a lawyer/senator might encounter) of a way to decide between competing ethical theories. Therefore, Callicott misinterprets Stone's pluralism as an "indeterminacy" and an "anything goes" attitude, which Stone does not suggest.

However, according to Wenz, Callicott's earlier interpretation of the Land Ethic (Callicott, 1986a; 1989) could be *formulated* in such a way that it adheres to moderate pluralism. He further goes on to claim that the moderate pluralism interpretation/formulation of Callicott's early Land Ethic does differ from Stone's extreme pluralism, as it does not rely on two distinct theories but rather a single theory with multiple principles (i.e. different types of communities to which we belong). While discussing Callicott's views, he formulates his own moderate pluralist position to be on the same page with Callicott as well.

Responding to the moderate vs. extreme pluralism differentiation, Domsky (2001) does not seem to agree that they are very much different:

> I do not believe that the structural aspects of Stone's and Wenz's [also Callicott's] points of view are at all different. Even when Stone does not consider a principle at all because it is not relevant to the current framework or domain, I believe that his decision is structurally indiscernible from Wenz's decision to discount a principle because it is not relevant to the current situation.
>
> When it comes down to it, Stone and Wenz [transitively, Also Callicott] seem to be making the same kinds of decisions in the same kind of way and with respect to potentially the same sets of ethical principles (Domsky, 2001, p. 412).

Yet, whether this formulation is successful or not does not need to be covered here in detail. For the sake of our discussion, let us assume that it is successful and Callicott's communitarianist interpretation that Wenz reviewed (which corresponds to the Tree-Rings Model in my categorisation) is indeed moderately pluralist.

Overall, taking the analysis of Wenz (1993) at face value, we can say that Callicott is largely against the extreme pluralist position where multiple distinct theories are used in tandem in a single environmental ethics. According to the type of moral theories that Callicott argues against, at least it is clear that he does not (and should not) target minimal pluralist and moderate pluralist theories in his criticisms, as his

communitarian ethics is also basically a moderate pluralist theory, at least at the time of Wenz's analysis in 1993. Whether this categorisation of moderate pluralism for Callicott's ideas still holds or not, I will further investigate in §4.7.

4.6 Pluralist Elements in Callicott's Philosophy

As I have discussed in the previous sections, Callicott is against pluralism (or only a certain type of pluralism) because it promotes certain ideas and attitudes in ethics. This type of pluralism is what he dubs as "intrapersonal pluralism" (1994a, p. 175). So, if we even find any traces of pluralism in Callicott's ethics, we should consider them problematic only if they align with these types of pluralist traits that Callicott warned us about. However, he does not see other pluralist approaches, namely "interpersonal pluralism", as an immediate danger to environmental philosophy.

There are many points in his career he seems to contradict these limits he put on monistic approaches, but a good example is his Synthetic Approach I have explored in §3.4. Within the compositionalism and functionalism duality, he accepts the pluralism in a sense but avoids the "pluralism issue" by suggesting their complementarity, i.e., if two approaches are complementarity, the pluralism disappears, or at least does not present itself in the same risky sense as Stone's theoretical pluralism.

Now that I covered the types of pluralism that Callicott accepts and the types that he eschews, I will investigate the pluralist elements in Callicott's philosophy in detail.

This investigation will firstly focus on the monism criteria that he employs against pluralist approaches like Christopher Stone's (1987; 1988), i.e., criteria for coherence. Since Callicott seems adamant that the criteria he sets out against pluralist approaches are maintained by his views, I take a look at his own philosophy and demonstrate that Callicott's philosophy fails in the same aspects that he criticized other pluralist theories.

Secondly, I will turn our attention to the degrees of pluralism suggested by Wenz (1992), namely minimal, moderate and extreme pluralism, and demonstrate that

Callicott's philosophy has been moving towards extreme pluralism that he once criticized heavily.

Overall, the next sections §4.7 and §4.8 will present us a holistic overview and a critical analysis of Callicott's evolution over the years, and will allow us conclude whether his aim of creating a monist environmental ethics has succeeded. More often than not, we will see that Callicott's monism ideal is like a mirage, the deeper we go in his environmental theories, the monism appears even further.

4.7 Evaluation of Callicott's Philosophy: Monism Criteria

When arguing against pluralism and advocating monism, Callicott seems to focus on a few aspects where pluralism is unsuccessful, and monism is a better-suited option. I already glossed over these arguments in §4.1 but let us outline these three types of argument with brief descriptions. These are demarcation criteria upon which Callicott built his supposedly monistic environmental ethics. I use these arguments in the later sections to investigate Callicott's different phases or different formulations of his environmental ethics:

1. **Single governing principle or Coherent Moral Outlook:**

According to the Naïve Holism view of Callicott, monistic theories provide a coherent moral outlook to moral agents while only having a single master principle which multiple ethical concerns or decisions can be derived from.

> I argued […] that all our actions should be guided by a single moral principle, the summary moral maxim of the Land Ethic—even our actions in relation to other people. Of course, such extreme monism, monism at the level of principle, yielded repugnant misanthropic indications, and thus was utterly unacceptable (Callicott, 1994a, p. 181).

However, he later revises this view and replaces single master principle with a uniform moral philosophy, grounded in communitarian sentimentalism.

> I later argued […] that the Leopold land ethic is part of a family of theoretically unified communitarian ethics. And I attempted to show how our duties and obligations to domestic animals, as well as to other

> human beings, could also be grounded by a communitarian theory (Callicott, 1994a, p. 181).

The important part here is the common ground for evaluating these derived concerns so that they represent a coherent moral theory, albeit leading to different moral duties. Callicott's communitarian ethic relies on humans' being members of multiple communities, from which a set of rules and duties can be derived. Since the common ground is community membership, every single duty gets derived from a common ground, which provides a coherent moral outlook to the adaptor of this ethical view. Pluralist theories, on the other hand, may contain multiple conflicting ethical theories under one umbrella, and they do not have a common ground for all of their moral concerns, which goes against this principle of Coherent Moral Outlook.

2. **Balancing contrary duties or providing single answers to ethical concerns (avoiding extreme relativism):**

Somewhat similar to the "single governing principle" claim but a bit more relaxed, balancing contrary duties or concerns is an important part of Callicott's discussion. He outlines monism's advantage here as its ability to evaluate multiple duties or choices against each other and make a rule-based decision on them. Compared to pluralist approaches, where, in some cases, our ethical viewpoint might not lead us to a single "right" moral choice or decision, monistic approaches have a way of comparing multiple competing duties against each other. So, by resorting to sentiments, our intimacy with those communities, intuition or something else, we can reach a single conclusion for what is ethically correct. As Callicott points out, "communitarianism allows one to weigh one's duties on a single scale, calibrated in a single metric, and attempt to balance them fairly" (Callicott, 1994a, p. 173). Pluralist theories, on the other hand, fail to make a decisive argument against one theory (or idea) against another and leave us at an impasse. This, in turn, might lead to extreme moral relativism and subjectivism through an "anything goes" attitude. As we discussed in §4, this uncertainty and the slippery slope to moral nihilism is what Callicott is mainly trying to avoid in environmental ethics.

3. **Common vocabulary (commensurability):**

When discussing multiple duties and how they can be reconciled, one important aspect comes down to the common vocabulary. Because even before creating some sort of rules or principles to weigh differing moral choices against each other, they must be able to be expressed in the same vocabulary in the first place. Otherwise, the comparison and prioritisation of these principles would be unlawful or haphazard.

Again, taking the example of Callicott's communitarian ethical view, he argues that although we are members of different communities, expressing these moral obligations by using the same terms allows us to discuss and decide between them. For instance, the concept of duty, membership, obligation, intimacy and nearly every terminology that we derive from Land Ethic is shared between multiple community memberships and duties we have. He points out:

> The ethical obligations generated by our many community memberships often conflict, but, since all our duties—to people, to animals, to nature—are expressible in a common vocabulary, the vocabulary of community, they may be weighed and compared in commensurable terms (Callicott, 1994a, p. 173).

Thus, when constructing rules or principles on top of them or comparing and prioritising them, we are able to do this effectively in a monistic approach. Contrasting this with a pluralist approach, where multiple ethical theories might consist of radically different vocabularies, makes a possible discussion or a prioritisation among these theories very impractical, i.e., incommensurability between the competing theories.

These three principles constitute the heart of Callicott's argument for monism and against pluralism. Although Callicott argues that these properties are what separates monistic theories from pluralist ones and while he promotes his own environmental views, let us also investigate if his litmus test works well for distinguishing his own environmental ethics from the pluralist alternatives like Christopher Stone's. While

investigating this, I focus on each stage of Callicott's theory that I summarised in §3, as different phases of his views certainly have different characteristics.

4.7.1 Coherent Moral Outlook

Starting with Callicott's first formulation of (or re-formulation of Leopold's) Land Ethic, one sees a theory that rests only on the community concept and humans being plain members of it instead of its masters. Furthermore, this naïve interpretation rests on the Darwinian sense of community, which declares humans as "fellow voyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of evolution" (Leopold, 1949, p. 109) and a holistic ethic that's supposed to extend its boundaries from humans to biotic wholes or communities. Since this view considers only a single moral principle, which is valuing the biotic community or the land as a whole, and it does not posit any secondary principles to oversee and balance these duties, it seems very coherent. As I discuss in the later section, the competing moral duties would have caused a moral dilemma, but the Naïve holism of Callicott fortunately avoids it.

Both in terms of its ontology and its ethical outlook, Naïve holism seems very much focused on a single principle and a single ontological entity, namely the biotic community. According to this naïve yet simple formulation, I see no reason to suspect that this theory would be incoherent or would have inconsistencies within it, as long as one does not mind misanthropy or eco-fascism charges. The only normative part of it relies on the community concept, which includes the whole ecosystem, without empowering any group within it more than others and provides a sentimentalist approach without any external additions to its main holistic argument, originally formulated by Leopold and improved by Callicott with Darwinian concepts.

However, when one looks at the Tree-Rings Model, it's not hard to see coherence slowly withering away. Callicott argues that there is no single ethical set of rules anymore, and instead, his theory contains human ethics followed by accretions of other theories on top, forming a larger whole of an ethical framework. Still, it relies on the community concept mainly, which originally gave it coherence, but this coherence is somewhat tainted by the multiplicity of moral duties or sets of rules that get accrued onto each other. Although Callicott argues for the internal coherence of this resulting

ethical framework, his theory still begs the question of how individualistic and holistic ethics can be combined into one while avoiding any kind of serious conflict.

Second-Order Principles, on the other hand, are a breaking point for coherence. His theory no longer consists of a single ethical ground from which all duties originate. Callicott postulates something very external to his set of communitarian duties (first-order principles, as he calls them), which imposes limits and priorities on them in case two duties compete with each other. One might still argue that SOP1 merely relies on the community concept while providing prioritisation based on another common vocabulary, intimacy, and thus, it does not taint the coherence of Callicott's ethical framework. While this might be argued for SOP1, SOP2 is an entirely different story. SOP2 relies on concepts outside of the communitarian ethics of Callicott and taps into the egalitarian environmental ethics of Singer as an example (Lo, 2001a). By suggesting a prioritisation based on importance or severity, he is bringing an external metric or value that does not align with the pure Land Ethic that Callicott defended for a long time. Thus, after this point, Callicott's theory somewhat loses its claim as a "fully" coherent moral framework.

Then, let us consider the Synthetic Approach. Functionalism and compositionalism are definitely separate as far as their ontologies are concerned, i.e., the entity and process ontologies are very different from each other when it comes to merging them in a single ethical theory. Unlike earlier versions of Callicott's communitarianist ethics, these supposedly complementary worldviews make his theory quite heterogeneous, regardless of how strongly Callicott tries to argue that they are part of the same continuum. His earlier insistence on a single ethical principle to ground our moral concerns seems lost here, as these worldviews seem orthogonal; they are radically different ways of viewing the world, although their subject matter might be the same. If Callicott is adamant that utilitarianism and deontology, for instance, do not lead to a coherent moral theory when they are combined (which was his attack against Christopher Stone (Callicott, 1990; 1994a)), it is hard to imagine how functionalism and compositionalism can lead to a different and a coherent result, even if their synthetic approach allegedly would work in real-world scenarios. These competing worldviews' application to our day-to-day environmental dilemmas would

be practically pluralist, at best. It is important to note that Callicott's considerations when it comes to pluralism and monism debate mostly focus on the theoretical side of the picture, and as far as the theoretical side of these ontologies is concerned, functionalism and compositionalism are very far from working as a coherent whole.

Evaluation of Earth Ethic and Callicott's philosophy beyond that is somewhat similar, as he not only relies on two different ontologies but endorses two separate ethical theories, namely Land Ethic and Earth Ethic, which need to be applied to different scales of the world. This compartmentalisation of the world and applying different theories to each case hinders the coherence of this outlook, as much as it did during the formulation of his synthetic approach.

4.7.2 Balancing Competing Duties and Avoiding Extreme Relativism

Again, let's investigate this criterion while starting with Naïve Holism. By looking at this approach and considering the holistic core of his formulation in one single principle, which is the moral considerability of a community as a whole, it allows us to determine moral right and wrong. If something "tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community" (Leopold, 1949, p. 224), we mark it as right, otherwise we deem it wrong, very simple. For this reason, there is no room for relativism, we are members of a single holistic biotic community without separating a human community from the rest, and while doing so, we are weighing every action against the "good" of that single community. Overall, Callicott's initial naive formulation, although it might be problematic in many other ways, avoids the charge of relativism with ease, and does not need to deal with competing moral duties.

The Tree-Rings model, on the other hand, is aimed towards a more anthropocentric ethic. Although "the outer orbits of our various moral spheres exert a gravitational tug on the inner ones" (Callicott, 1989a, p. 58), there is a clear distinction between individual humans having rights and individual nonhumans deserving respect. That's why, for nearly all cases where human interests are at stake, for instance, the Tree-Rings model compels us to act in accordance with our more intimate community duties and larger communities exerting a "gravitational tug" (Callicott, 1989a, p. 58), with the order of self, family, nation, global human community, and only then, nonhumans.

This makes balancing our duties somewhat easy as well, as long as we prioritise the communities which are more intimate to us. In that sense, the tree-rings model is also passing our test for balancing and deciding between our conflicting moral duties.

However, when Callicott adds a formal way of prioritising and deciding between conflicting duties and provides it in such a way that requires significant precision in Second Order Principles, things start to get messy. While SOP1 is mainly an encapsulation of the Tree-Rings model (ordering the competing duties according to the intimacy of the communities that we belong to) and is very clear on prioritisation, SOP2 adds a counterweight when the importance of the matter at stake is higher, more important or severe duties gain higher priority.

Still, when investigated a bit closer, SOPs seem somewhat vague and imprecise, considering that the examples he tackles in his earlier work (Callicott, 1999a) are very simple decisions that would be easy to resolve, even without resorting to Second-Order principles. Domsky (2001) also points out the vagueness of these principles as he discusses the tough task of determining the intimacy or closeness (SOP1) and the strongness or importance (SOP2) of two communities' interests:

> First, we are left to somehow rank our communal memberships. Although family will likely (but not obviously) place first, it seems quite difficult to determine the rest of the order […] Worse, it is not even clear that our memberships can be ordered […]. Second, in order to determine when our ranking is trumped, we must determine when an interest counts as a 'stronger' interest, a rather difficult task given the variety and kinds of interests that humans, animals, plants, species, and ecosystems have. As it stands, Callicott's formula clarifies neither of these crucial points, and so we are left with a formula that is painfully vague. It leaves a communitarian to rely on his intuitions just as much as before (Domsky, 2001, p. 414).

Also, when Callicott presents these principles with some examples, he throws softballs at himself in order to back up the precision of his ethical theory with the SOPs' help. In his examples, we see the following pattern: when considering two non-critical interests between humans vs. animals, SOP1 wins, and we act towards the more intimate community's (e.g., humans') interests; however, when the distant community has a more severe risk, e.g., possible extinction, while the more intimate community has a less severe or less important concern, e.g., economic issues, then we, of course,

side with the more severe concern and act in accordance with SOP2, saving the more distance species from a horrible fate. However, not all real-life examples are this easy to manage. As Lo (2001a) aptly puts it, "If moral choices were always like that: providing one's family members with 'luxuries' versus helping strangers with 'bare necessities', then [Callicott's theory] might work quite well. But that is not so" (Lo, 2001a, p. 352), drawing our attention to the complexity of moral dilemmas we might face, compared to the watered-down scenarios provided by Callicott. The more important question is, when both more intimate and less intimate communities have a non-critical concern, yet if the less intimate community is faced with a relatively harsher consequence, how do we decide, and do we act in accordance with SOP1 or SOP2? For instance, this might be the case of education of one's children vs. saving starving children on the other side of the world. Hunger is a heavy consequence, but if it does not lead to a life-threatening case, how do we make our choice, and where do we draw the line between the concerns of our intimate community vs. the distant community? Callicott presents his SOPs as if their application were common-sensical or intuitive, but as the cases get closer in terms of severity, it becomes harder and harder to find a satisfying "right" answer to our conundrums (Lo, 2001a).

When faced with possible inconsistencies or indeterminate cases in his philosophy, Callicott, instead of providing an account of how these could be resolved, warns us against asking for too much precision from the demands of the Land Ethic (Callicott, 2013). Overall, it feels like avoiding relativism or balancing comparing duties is not very clear for Callicott's theory with the addition of Second-order principles, or even after his postulation of a Third-order Principle (Callicott, 2013), after criticisms by Y. S. Lo (2001a).

And thirdly, the Synthetic Approach. While Callicott had an answer for how to balance competing duties or different moral choices against each other in the case of SOPs, it is very unclear how this is supposed to work in the synthetic approach. What we get from Callicott in this formulation is mere promises that these differing ontologies are a continuum of the same whole, that they are complementary, and that they can work together in real-life cases (Callicott, 1999b). However, we are not given any indication of success for these attempts or how to decide if health and integrity, for instance—

two differing terms in competing vocabularies—present us with conflicting choices. His claims on descriptive compatibility of these worldviews do not translate well into their real-life compatibility, and even if they practically worked perfectly with one another for the most part, it does not give us a way of deciding between them if they do conflict at some point. And just by observing the metaphysical differences of these worldviews, it's a safe bet that they will clash a lot. Thus, since Callicott does not present us with a clear set of rules or principles to prioritise or weigh conflicting duties or dictates these theories might lead to, it is hard to see how his latest formulation can escape relativism.

Finally, when we come to the Land Ethic and Earth Ethic distinction, it becomes problematic to balance the dictates of different theories and apply them to the correct domains further. Callicott (2013) does not provide a clear-cut definition or suggestion on where the application of Land Ethic should end and where the reign of the Earth Ethic should start. Although he assumes these two theories to be complementary, they have different approaches to how they operate and evaluate our different duties, so they are bound to clash in some cases. Therefore, without specifying a way of demarcating between these multiple theories and deciding between them, it seems hard to imagine that the combined application of them would not have any issues when balancing their competing judgements and value claims.

4.7.3 Common Vocabulary

Starting with the Naïve Holism, the vocabulary utilised seems to be very simple. As Callicott notes, his reformulation of Leopold's Land Ethic is grounded on the sense of community in a holistic way, and it has no other principle that relies on different sets of vocabulary: it has one single master principle. As far as Callicott's common vocabulary criterion goes, Naïve holism is as monistic as it can be.

Going forward with the Tree-Rings model, the holistic sense of duties and membership is replaced with multiple communities, all of which generate a larger set of principles by accretion. Although multiple principles are in place, as Callicott also points out, "all our duties—to people, to animals, to nature—are expressible in a common vocabulary, the vocabulary of community" (1994a, p. 129). Apart from the common

vocabulary of community, they depend on a common ground to resolve our environmental moral dilemmas: communities with a clear ordering and priority and their respective duties. Based on these, it seems easy to compare and contrast our competing duties, and there seems to be no incompatibility in sight.

However, once we get to the Second-Order Principles, it gets slightly problematic, the same as what we discussed in the "Coherent Moral Outlook" section. Although the main set of principles that Callicott postulated in the Tree-Ring model remains, we are bringing something external to the community and duty vocabulary, namely the Second-Order Principles, into the equation—which are supposed to prioritise and decide upon the first-order ones. Still, if the vocabulary utilised by SOPs aligns with the first principles, the monistic characteristic can still be saved.

Looking at SOP1, it relies on the intimacy of our memberships and giving priority to the inner circles, so to speak, which is very similar to how the Tree-Rings model is structured. So, we are still talking about communities and their intrinsic value, how close we are tied to them or our intimacy towards them. SOP1 itself seems to rely on a very similar set of communitarian vocabulary as our first principles. However, SOP2 relies on the severity or importance, which does not at all seem to be related to communitarian vocabulary. As Lo (2001a) points out, SOP2 seems mainly formulated in egalitarian terms, similar to Singer's theory.

> SOP-2, as it stands, is a quite independent thesis from the communitarianism advocated by Callicott to found the land ethic. Indeed, if SOP-2 can be 'derived' from anything, an obvious candidate is Peter Singer's utilitarian egalitarianism, which proposes equal moral consideration for equal interests, a position which Callicott constantly attacks and distances from his own communitarianism (Lo, 2001a, p. 349).

The vocabulary it utilises is radically different from the other principles in this form of Land Ethic, and it seems hard to weigh and consider this principle in the same terms as the other principles. Here, we see traces of pluralism seeping into Callicott's Land ethic.

When it comes to the synthetic approach, the picture of Callicott's pluralist approach is even clearer. The separation of the world into two parts, utilising completely

different sets of vocabularies for managing each, is apparent. Callicott himself even accepts the plurality in them:

> We suggest that all these current normative concepts in conservation are useful, and the more narrowly and precisely they are interpreted the more useful they will be. Our approach is pluralistic. We recommend the preservation of conceptual diversity in conservation philosophy, by parity of reasoning with arguments for the preservation of both biological and cultural diversity (Callicott, 1999, p. 23).

Furthermore, the difference in vocabularies of these alternative worldviews becomes more obvious as he is only able to match a single term, "keystone-species" (ibid., p.30), which is the common ground for compositionalist and functionalist ontologies/approaches. Callicott's earlier insistence on having a common vocabulary to sort things out between different principles and posing this as a main characteristic of monistic theories seems to crack, especially when we consider this latest formulation.

Lastly, Earth Ethic seems to be a step back from the Synthetic Approach in the sense that Callicott might have realised the trouble he ran into when combining multiple vocabularies in the compositionalism vs functionalism debate. Instead, he now suggests that the Earth Ethic is also a communitarian ethic, but on a larger scale, so even though it operates on a planetary scale, its subject matter is still ecological wholes, and it can utilise a similar vocabulary as the Land Ethic. I think this is a step in the right direction, at least in terms of what Callicott wanted to accomplish, because both theories share the community concept and having similar vocabularies to discuss their claims makes them somewhat more commensurable. It should be noted that since we do not throw SOPs and TOP during the formulation of the Earth Ethic, and we still keep the egalitarian elements we discussed for SOP2, the common vocabulary issue within the Land Ethic goes on, but as far as the formulation of Earth Ethic is concerned, Callicott's position seems in a better spot, and at least satisfies his requirement of a shared vocabulary between Land Ethic and Earth Ethic.

The table below outlines the overview of how the different phases of Callicott's ideas and Stone's own pluralism fare against Callicott's own monism criteria.

Table 1: *Categorization of Stone's theory and Callicott's phases against Callicott's own demarcation criteria.*

Monist Characteristics	Single master principle	Coherent Outlook	Balancing competing duties	Common vocabulary
Stone's pluralism	✗	✗	?	✗
Naïve Holism	✓	✓	✓	✓
Tree-rings model	✗	✓	✓	✓
2 SOPs + TOP	✗	✗	✓	✗
Synthetic Approach	✗	✗	✗	✗
Earth Ethic	✗	✗	✗	✓

4.8 Evaluation of Callicott's Philosophy: Degrees of Pluralism

As we mentioned in §4.5, Wenz (1993) splits the types of pluralism into three, namely minimal, moderate, and extreme pluralism. And while Stone's theory could be identified as extreme pluralist (as it contains multiple theories and an alternation between them), Callicott's early communitarianist ethics can be identified as moderate pluralist, as it only contains a single theory with multiple principles, according to Wenz. Whether a minimal pluralist formulation would be as monistic as Callicott aimed his theory to be is a topic of another discussion, though. Still, according to Wenz, even theories such as Kant's deontology or Bentham's utilitarianism that one

might assume to be monist could be categorised as minimal pluralist, so considering Callicott's Tree-Rings model as moderate pluralist does seem fair.

It should be noted that Wenz only considers a rather early phase of Callicott's theory, up until the Tree Rings model (1987, 1989, 1990) and does not comment on the earlier phase I mentioned as Naïve holism or later phases of Secondary Principles, Synthetic Approach, and the Earth Ethic. Instead, Wenz assumes that Callicott's ethics has a rough idea of how to balance multiple communities' duties, although it might lack a clear algorithm to lead us to a unique answer in every case (1993), which aligns with the phase I've mentioned as Tree-Rings Model. This, according to him, is a good enough reason to assume that Callicott is advocating a moderate pluralist theory. But this analysis is worth a second look, as Wenz only evaluates and categorises a single phase of Callicott's ethics and does not evaluate his earlier or later ideas in his "Degrees of Pluralism" scale.

4.8.1 Categorization of Callicott's Phases

When we look at Naïve holism, Callicott seems to endorse a single ethical theory while only relying on the concept of community and weighs everything according to this apparently single principle. When we consider the simplicity of his approach in this earliest phase, we can go a bit further than Wenz's categorisation for the Tree-Rings Model and say that the Naïve holism phase of Callicott seems to fit the description of a minimally pluralist theory, as it did not employ multiple theories or did not even utilise multiple distinct principles (or those originating from different main principles). His theory, in this first phase, seems as close as it could be to a monist position, as I think Wenz would also agree.

Not much else could be said about the Tree-rings approach, which was already analysed and categorised by Wenz as a moderately pluralist theory. In this theory, Callicott employs a single coherent ethical theory but has multiple principles not necessarily originating from the same base, to balance multiple community memberships and duties and to formulate his ethics. The fact that Callicott still has a coherent single theory as his base and relies on the concept of community as the common ground indicates that this is a moderately pluralist theory.

When we look at the Second-Order principles, things change, however. As we discussed earlier, Callicott not only employs communitarian/sentimentalist theory to balance competing duties, but also gives weight to the severity or the importance of environmental concerns of different communities, opening the door to a more egalitarian view like Singer's. "Secondary Principles" tries to find a balance between our concern for our fellow beings, genetically or proximately closer to us (e.g., for a person, their family comes first, then the rest of humanity, then animals, etc.), and this brings an eclectic nature to his theory. Even though Callicott's theory is very much heterogenous by the roots of different principles he employs, I think Callicott's theory is still closer to moderate pluralism at this point, since he does not explicitly suggest employing different ethical theories to make ethical decisions.

However, what is more important to us is Callicott's later formulation of his environmental philosophy and ethics (1999a, 1999b). As I discussed, Callicott's later Synthetic Approach is based on dividing the world into two somewhat arbitrarily and applying different ethical theories to manage the two. Just to reiterate Stone's position, his suggestion was to use deontological ethics when a specific law case requires it and use utilitarian ethics when another case needs it, which in turn means that he splits the types of court cases and categorises them so that a (more) suitable ethical theory might be used to resolve disputes in them. Because of this compartmentalisation, Wenz called Stone's pluralism an extreme position and pointed out that Stone employed different ethical theories in different compartments or domains.

Furthermore, according to Wenz (1993), choosing between two different theories with two different metaphysical bases was a ground for extreme pluralism, and Callicott was right to argue against such an extreme form of pluralism. However, when we look at Callicott's late theory, which revolves around combining compositionalism and functionalism, two clearly metaphysically distinct theories, we can see that he unfortunately does the same thing that he criticised Stone for. While Stone advocates deciding between two moral theories based on the case at hand, Callicott advocates deciding between functionalism and compositionalism based on the type of community we have (mixed vs biotic community). In this sense, Stone's senator example of changing ethical theories "over lunch" (1990, p. 160) is not too far from

Callicott's attempt at separating the world with respect to two ontologies (1999b). Therefore, if we follow Wenz's categorisation, Callicott's theory, which combines compositionalism and functionalism into a single normative framework, does exactly the same division and compartmentalisation in other extreme pluralist positions.

Considering these, if Stone's pluralist theory (1987; 1988) provides a way of deciding between competing moral actions and considerations, Callicott's late theory and his suggestion of deciding between compositionalism and functionalism are no different: they are both extreme pluralists.

This trend continues with Callicott's latest addition to his communitarian ethics, Earth Ethic. Although Callicott seems to have eliminated the need for a separate ontology and no longer needs to utilise a duality like compositionalism and functionalism, this time, he resorts to splitting the world according to temporal and spatial scales. For shorter time spans and smaller communities, Callicott (2013) applies the Land Ethic, which is, under Callicott's view, essentially an anthropocentric and a non-anthropocentric ethic combined under a single umbrella. On the other hand, for longer timespans and for planetary-scale communities, e.g., the global human community, he applies the Earth Ethic, which is primarily anthropocentric. So, not only do the Land Ethic and Earth Ethic differ in terms of their focal point, i.e., being human-centred or not, but they also have a distinct application area, divided by Callicott's somewhat vague temporal or spatial divide. The methodology of this approach is very similar to his Synthetic approach, as it utilises multiple theories (not multiple principles) to manage different domains. Again, according to Wenz's categorisation, this is not much different from Stone's compartmentalisation of the world and distinct application of different ethical theories and should be an extreme pluralist position.

Overall, when looking at the evolution of ideas I have observed in Callicott, we see that Naïve Holism was a minimal pluralist position, the Tree-Rings model and the introduction of Second-Order principles definitely made him a moderate pluralist, but the combination of multiple theories with a guise of complementarity made his position an extreme pluralist position.

Seeing that throughout his career, Callicott's theories only got extended or appended

with new ones, and they never got melded into a minimal pluralist position like Naïve holism after the 1980s, it is safe to think that Callicott's position might always stay as an extreme pluralist position for the rest of his career. And observing his consistent switch to more of a pluralist position throughout the years, I think the gap between Stone's extreme pluralist stance and Callicott's own views is very slim or non-existent in the final picture.

Same as my earlier summary table for the monism criteria, the table below outlines the categorisation of the different phases of Callicott's ideas, as well as Stone's own pluralism in Wenz's pluralism scale.

Table 2: *Evaluation of Stone's theory and Callicott's phases against Wenz's demarcation criteria and degrees of pluralism.*

Wenz's Pluralism Scale	Minimal pluralism	Moderate pluralism	Extreme pluralism
Stone's pluralism	-	-	✓
Naïve Holism	✓	-	-
Tree-rings model	-	✓	-
2 SOPs + TOP	-	-	✓
Synthetic Approach	-	-	✓
Earth Ethic	-	-	✓

4.9 Does Complementarity Solve Callicott's Issues with Pluralism

Callicott mainly starts using the term complementarity in his "Current Normative Concepts in Conservation" (1999b) and continues his use in *Thinking Like a Planet: The Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic* (2013). Although there are only a few mentions of complementarity in his 1999 paper, he claims that "Earth Ethic complements the Land Ethic" fifteen times in his book, and he is definitely trying to emphasise the importance of this point many times. In both cases, though, he omits a definition or an explanation of what complementarity means and just assumes that the reader is on the same page with him –most of the time, even omitting a justification on why two theories or concepts could be complementary at all. Considering his increased

utilisation of this term after 1999 and his heavy repetition of the same term in his later works, I think it is worth a closer look.

4.9.1 Concept of Complementarity

The concept of complementarity, in general, seems to be adopted from mathematics and physics. For mathematics, two sets or two angles are denoted as complementary if they form a larger whole as a set or an angle when combined. For example, if R represents the set of real numbers, and Q is the set of rational numbers, then the set R \ Q (or R – Q) represents irrational numbers. According to the complementarity in set theory, then the set of irrational numbers (R \ Q) complements the set of rational numbers (Q) in the context of R, the set of real numbers. However, this does not seem extremely useful for the discussion of environmental philosophy.

If we look at physics for a better definition, we can see that the term complementarity is used when two or more entities, definitions or theories provide a fuller or richer context than when only one of them is utilised, i.e., they complement each other when describing a certain phenomenon. Consider, for example, the topic of light and its material properties. In quantum mechanics, depending on the experimental conditions, such as the double slit experiment, the light can either behave as a wave or as a particle and seems to hold properties of both. Thus, if we want to describe or predict the behaviours of light, one description might be missing certain pieces that other descriptions can accurately represent. Hence, on the topic of light, two theories that have been devised only provide partial pictures of reality, and their combination can describe the full capabilities or full possibilities for the behaviour of light. So, if we are to formulate a set of preliminaries for complementarity in physics at least, we can say that complementarity requires two theories or worldviews that:

- operate on the same thing or have a claim on the same phenomenon, e.g., light.
- do not contradict or falsify each other. e.g., the wave theory does not say that light can only behave in wave form, neither does the particle theory. So, they leave an opening for each other in defining alternative behaviours of this same ‘thing’.

- whose combination reveals something valuable, rich, or novel compared to the implications of a single one of them. Thus, if we combine them under the same reality, we will have something new in our hands, not just accretion or summation of multiple things. i.e., the fact that light can behave both as wave and particle is very novel, it is unexpected and opens the door to quantum explanations and superimposed states.
- are descriptive or predictive. e.g., wave and particle theories allow the behaviour of light to be described based on environmental conditions, or to be predicted, given the environmental conditions. In other words, they aim to represent an objective reality.

When all of these are taken together, at least when we consider the positive sciences such as physics, we have some guidance on what could be called complementary or not.

For both of these complementarity examples, this nuance, which is complementarity being used in a descriptive sense, is important. That is because many other fields, such as social sciences also started to use this term in the recent decades heavily, yet their usage varies significantly from what we are used to in other positive sciences like physics.

4.9.2 Complementarity in Callicott

In their "Current Normative Concepts in Conservation," as I have summarised before, Callicott et al. first argue that compositionalism and functionalism are complementary in a descriptive sense (1999b). I think, when we take a look at the complementarity definition, which I have derived from physics, Callicott's use of the term complementarity for the duality of compositionalism and functionalism (in a descriptive sense) seems very much legitimate:

- Functionalism and compositionalism operate on nature or when describing the environment in general.
- They do not falsify each other, one accepts that individuals are the focal point when describing the environment, and the other one focuses on processes

instead. Although the relative value given to individuals vs. processes might be different in each, they could be reformulated to accept both entities at the ontological level, at least.

- Their combination in the topic of sustainability, as Callicott argues, allows a novel outlook into environmental conservation activities. Let's take Callicott's word for it, although his examples are very scarce.
- They are both descriptive in the sense that they describe the environment in terms of certain vocabularies and provide evaluation based on these.

So far, so good. Thus, these two concepts can be said to be complementary in the same sense as complementarity in positive sciences. It is really valuable that we can describe the environment using these distinct but equally valuable lenses and voice environmental concerns based on them. And, arguably, their combination provides a fuller or richer picture of the environment that utilising only one of them would fail to capture.

However, Callicott goes one step further and argues that they are practically or normatively complementary as well, just because he shares a few examples of their joint application.

> The theoretical complementarity of evolutionary ecology and ecosystem ecology suggests a corresponding complementarity in application. If the two historically disparate approaches to ecology become fused, as present trends suggest, into a single, synthesised approach, then that would suggest a corresponding unity in application (Callicott, 1999b, p.31).

Since the topic itself is environmental ethics, and Callicott mentions the normative concepts in the context of environmental policies and regulations, he definitely means a normative context here: that is, the application of compositionalism and functionalism in a normative context. Yet, there seems to be a big explanatory gap here. How can Callicott claim that while two theories or approaches are complementary when describing the state of things in the real world, one can also postulate value judgements out of them and enforce those in practical applications in the same complementary way? In other words, how can Callicott derive a practical or normative complementarity out of descriptive complementarity, which seems to be a leap too far?

Callicott's answer to this dilemma is the common concepts between the two ontologies that might bridge the gap between them, i.e., keystone species. According to Callicott, this term is used in the same sense for both functionalism and compositionalism so that it can be the groundwork for these two ontologies being combined in a practical and normative sense. However, while arguing for the benefit of this common keystone species concept, Callicott seriously undermines the benefits of combining these two ontologies on a practical scale. On the one hand, if two ontologies operate on completely different domains, there would be no need for a common vocabulary. This would eliminate any benefit of attributing complementarity to them: common vocabulary would be redundant, and plain old pluralism would be just as good in a practical sense. On the other hand, if these theories needed to work together on the same domain and diverged into different moral decisions in the real world (e.g., the functionalist approach and compositionalist approach caused conflicting preservation or sustainability goals that need to be reconciled), then Callicott would need to address how the normative conflicts arising from these two theories could be resolved, similar to his Second Order principles. But we see no trace of such auxiliary or helper principles. Thus, any benefits that might be brought upon by the alleged complementarity seem lost by the lack of clarity on how this combination should work out in the real world.

For now, let us pause this question regarding the Synthetic Approach and take a look at the formulation of the Earth Ethic instead, which also relies heavily on the concept of complementarity. We see a similar picture in *Thinking Like a Planet*, where Callicott (2013) argues that two environmental ethical theories are complements of each other, or rather that the Earth Ethic complements the Land Ethic. His reason for arguing for the complementarity is the fact that one theory works at a micro level (i.e., Land ethic works at smaller scales, both temporally and geographically) and the other works at a macro level (i.e., Earth ethic works at larger scales), so their combined application would lead to a better environmental perspective and thus be complementary. However, this seems, in an ontological context, somewhat different from the compositionalism and functionalism synthesis: while compositionalism and functionalism essentially had ontologies that had descriptive benefits so that we can view the world in a richer way, the Land and the Earth Ethic are simply normative,

they do not describe competing ontologies. Reiterating the scientific or conceptual background behind the Land Ethic and Earth ethic does not make them any less normative either, and they seem to be ethical theories, through and through. Thus, in the case of Earth Ethic, Callicott does not even start from a descriptive complementarity between two theories; he just assumes that they are normatively complementary from the beginning. Apart from the lack of proof on why these two theories could be normatively complementary, Callicott still fails to provide some intermediary principles when deciding between the moral decisions that Land Ethic enforces on a local scale vs. the ones that Earth Ethic enforces on a global scale. Therefore, the same issue with the usefulness of complementarity arises in the Land Ethic vs. Earth Ethic dichotomy, namely the lack of clarity on which theory to prioritise and in which cases.

Most of the examples of complementarity in sciences that I have been able to find were similar to my complementarity examples in the previous section, but I am not aware of other claims of multiple ethical or normative theories being complementary in environmental ethics, especially when their real-world applications would cause obvious conflicts or provide different dictates—except for the bio-ethics discussion in the next section. Thus, it is hard to pinpoint the definition Callicott had in mind when he utilised it heavily in the past decades; it seems like a niche usage. Still, let us try to understand what Callicott might have meant by his normative usage of the concept of complementarity.

Luckily, Callicott previously had some other usages of this concept in the past, which might give us a clue. One example is when he discussed the environmental philosophy of Mary Anne Warren (1983), who claimed "that ecocentric environmental ethics and animal welfare ethics were 'complementary', not contradictory" (Callicott, 1989a, p. 49). After stating this categorisation of her ideas from Warren, Callicott does not present any arguments against it; he obviously does not agree with her environmental approach, but at least he does not reject the claim that the word "complementary" is in direct opposition to "contradictory". That is not much to go on, but at least we can say that if it turned out that there was a contradiction between two theories which could not be resolved, it would jeopardise their claim on complementarity. In a separate

discussion, he contrasts the foundations of the animal liberation movement with the Leopold's Land Ethic and states:

> The neat similarities […] between the environmental ethic of the animal liberation movement and the classical Leopold land ethic appear in light of these observations to be rather superficial and to conceal substrata of thought and value which are not at all similar. The theoretical foundations of the animal liberation movement and those of the Leopold land ethic may even turn out *not to be companionable, complementary, or mutually consistent*. (Callicott, 1989f, p. 18, emphasis added).

Again, a basic conceptual analysis indicates that he finds the words "complementary" and "mutually consistent" quite related. Combining these two hints, we can roughly conclude that Callicott thinks complementarity stands in opposition to inconsistency and contradiction in the field of environmental ethics.

Backtracking to the compositionalism vs. functionalism debate, it seems rather clear that, just as animal liberation and the Land Ethic had practical conflicts and inconsistencies according to Callicott, the compositionalist and functionalist normative implications have serious inconsistencies as well. They are quite contradictory in their real-world application to the point that Callicott could only find a single normative concept (i.e., keystone species) that they might agree on and can collaborate on; for the rest of their concepts, the normative implications of these two worldviews did not align at all and led to conflicting real-life decisions. As for the difference between the Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic, they are two very distinct ethics that only have commonality in their vocabularies and communitarian roots. Apart from that, just like the holistic outlook of functionalism conflicts with the individualistic approach of compositionalism, the conservation goals of the Land Ethic on a micro-level definitely have normative conflicts with the macro-level dictates of the Earth Ethic on certain occasions, while the Land Ethic endorse the preservation of local ecosystems, the Earth Ethic instead prioritises the long-term existence of global communities in an anthropocentric way. Although this crude analysis does not definitively rule out the normative complementarity claims of Callicott when it comes to his Synthetic Approach and the Land Ethic vs. the Earth Ethic dichotomy, it at least undermines the viability of his claims. Two ontologies or two theories that Callicott tried to reconcile in his late career do not seem to match the definition of normative

complementarity perfectly, and Callicott fails to provide enough reasons for us to believe that they indeed complement each other.

Overall, I observed and discussed two issues with the concept of complementarity in Callicott. Firstly, if this concept mostly applies in a descriptive sense to other sciences and if Callicott attempts to use the same concept mostly with the same force and purpose for his ethics (i.e., two theories providing a richer understanding, when combined), then Callicott's utilisation of this concept seems unwarranted in the normative sense. Although the definition of the concept of complementarity is so fuzzy and changes significantly between different fields and even different authors, Callicott does not present enough reasons to prove the normative complementarity in his theories.

Secondly, and more importantly, I think it makes more sense to evaluate the problems with this word in a more pragmatic sense, i.e., whether it is useful to utilise this concept when discussing environmental ethics. In this section, I briefly argued that complementarity does not provide any benefits over plain old pluralism and does not make the practical/normative application of the two theories any easier. To back this up further, I want to take a look at the concept of complementarity in the light of another field, namely bioethics, which sheds light on whether it is even useful to apply the concept of complementarity to ethics in general. Thus, I want to explore the following: even if we successfully applied the concept of complementarity to environmental ethics, would it provide any positive impact? And, if it does not provide any useful benefits over the plain old pluralism of Stone's, what would even be the point of promoting it?

4.9.3 Complementarity in Bioethics

It is interesting to see that another field, bioethics, has seen similar approaches from different scientists and philosophers on how to approach the apparent plurality of their ethical domain and moral dilemmas. In "Bioethical pluralism and complementarity" (2002), Grinnell et al. discuss the issues with irreducible moral principles or theories that they need to reconcile, and they propose complementarity as a novel solution to

meld or combine these approaches together and use them in tandem, instead of trying to reconcile these multiple principles or theories into a holistic theory.

> The methodological program of complementarity is holistic thinking. Unlike conventional approaches to bioethical pluralism, which attempt in one fashion or another to isolate and choose between different perspectives, complementarity accepts them both. Complementarity takes seriously the potentially radical implications of pluralism in bioethics, as a result of which it no longer makes sense to speak of singular or final moral judgments (Grinnell et al., 2022, p. 348).

Their reasoning, as we can see, is very similar to what Callicott saw in the environmental ethics sphere: monism or a single theory was unable to answer all their moral dilemmas, so a more pluralist approach that did not fall into the pits of extreme pluralism (as dubbed by Wenz (1993)) was needed. Thus, the bioethics field has faced a similar fork in the road: to have an extreme pluralist approach like Stone's or have a complementarity-based approach.

Fitzpatrick (2004), however, arguing against these arguments by Grinnell et al., has a different take on this. He argues that complementarity does not provide a positive explanatory power, at least in the normative sense, and it does not have any benefits compared to regular pluralism; thus, we have no reason to prefer the complementarity approach.

> To take an example that is currently very pressing: how could the thesis of complementarity help further the debate over embryonic stem-cell research? Once properly formulated, it would not in fact have the potentially comforting implication that the two extreme positions, for example, are "complementary perspectives" that can "both be right" after all. […] At most, we might say that each "perspective" […] has some truth in it that needs to be taken account of in a complete moral picture. But that is nothing new.
>
> In other words, it is unclear how we would be better off with a holism of incommensurable complementary perspectives than we are with an ordinary pluralism of ethical considerations (FitzPatrick, 2004, p. 187).

Overall, throughout his discussions, FitzPatrick has two points. Firstly, he seems confused by the application of this word in a normative sense, and he cannot seem to put the complementarity in a sensible or useful definition to benefit the ethical discussions in bioethics, which aligns with my confusion after the rough definition for the term complementarity I have provided in §4.8.1. As I discussed, it might be

unusual or even meaningless to ask for any benefits from the complementarity in a normative scale, but since we have no definitive arguments for why complementarity may not work in a normative scale, let us skip this line of inquiry for now. Secondly, it seems as though FitzPatrick is also not convinced that postulating the alleged complementarity of two theories on a normative scale would provide any benefits, and accepting theoretical pluralism is already good enough, which leaves us with a rational choice to balance and decide within the multiplicity. Simply labelling two ethical theories that give us conflicting answers or directions for a moral decision as complementary, does not really help us in resolving them, according to FitzPatrick.

At this point, it is worth asking the same question in environmental ethics: does Callicott's complementarity in the Synthetic Approach or in Earth Ethic provide any real benefits? Similar to Stone's pluralism, Callicott's supposedly complementary approach of compositionalism and functionalism fragments or compartmentalises the world into two and applies two radically different ontologies to it to derive normative results from them, very similar to how Grinnell et al. (2002) suggested. The same goes for the Earth and Land Ethic dichotomy, where different temporal and spatial scales divide the moral domain and force us to utilise two different and supposedly complementary theories. This complementarity, though, does not provide any explanatory power or any benefit, just like Fitzpatrick argued; it just provides us with a seemingly empty assumption and a relief that these two ontologies *might* work in tandem successfully. I think, just as Fitzpatrick claimed, that this hope and supposed success of two ontologies in practical and normative plane is not a good enough reason to accept complementarity, especially when Callicott provides no structural way to resolve the conflicts that might arise in their application: while SOPs provided a way to resolve the conflicts within the Land Ethic, Callicott does not have such a tool to mediate the discussions and conflicts between Land Ethic and Earth ethic.

4.9.4 Implications of complementarity in environmental ethics and its misuse

Although we explored why complementarity would not be useful in environmental ethics, we did not discuss possible reasons why Callicott might have resorted to using it. I think the answer to that lies in Callicott's evolution throughout the years.

Whenever Callicott introduced a multiplicity or a hint of pluralism in his theory, he seems to have introduced it with a subtext of "complementarity". Thus, it seems like complementarity, or the claim that both theories can work in tandem in a harmonious way, undermines pluralism in some way or another, according to Callicott. And it is not hard to see why: if there is an inherent division or compartmentalisation that you introduce to your system, the easiest way to circumvent this would be to claim that they are part of the same continuum and they are not different theories, ideas, or ontologies in essence. At first sight, it seems like a good approach to solve the problems in environmental ethics or in any kind of philosophy that has a problem with a multiplicity of theories or principles.

Yet, the discussion of all this uncertainty on the definition of complementarity should urge us to ask a legitimate question: Is complementarity a "get-of-out-jail-free" card? If complementarity gives a free pass, then whenever the attempt to reconcile multiple theories or to accept theoretical pluralism does not seem acceptable for an ethicist, one can just formulate a workaround or a patch that solves the issues with the original theories externally and can claim that this new separate theory complements the shortcomings of the initial one, expecting the reader to be more than happy to drop their concerns and their cynicism.

I think there are two challenges to such complementarity claims in philosophy, as I hinted in previous sections: *benefit* (or utility) and *indication of reality* (or proof).

To briefly reiterate the point regarding *indication* or proof, Callicott does not provide any reasons why the ontologies of compositionalism and functionalism or theories of the Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic should be normatively complementary. Even though the burden of proof is on Callicott for these cases, he simply assumes that the complementarity between these two ontologies is just a fact. Although this is crippling enough for his argument, it does not undermine his whole theory: compositionalism and functionalism may very well be normatively complementary; we just do not know. For the purposes of limiting this discussion to a pragmatic evaluation, I think it is more productive to discuss the *benefit*s instead.

We already discussed the lack of *benefit* for complementarity in the field of Bioethics,

and the same argument can be applied to environmental ethics. As far as the explanations go, complementarity does not seem to offer any extra benefits over plain old pluralism. While the application of two competing ontologies can be reconciled and possible conflicts could be resolved in a pluralist approach, claiming that they are part of the same continuum or that they are complementary does not really have any positive effect on resolving these conflicts better. The possible issues in their real-world application (e.g., the tension between the health and integrity of a community) need to be carefully evaluated to find a resolution between the two in either case. Furthermore, we might rightfully ask: will this complementing and patching up our inadequate ethics ever end? This trump card of complementarity seems to be the approach Callicott took over the years, and I, for one, cannot, in good conscience, believe that his ethics will ever be complete. The whole point of complementing is that it leads to a whole: If Callicott never seems to get to a whole, why not just bite the bullet, accept the inherent complexity of the ethical domain and be a pluralist?

Regarding the attempt of Callicott to achieve monism still ongoing for so long, Gary Varner (1991) and Andrew Light (2001) actually expressed the same question that occurred to me, decades ago, in a clear way:

> If Callicott's communitarianism is enough to get us an answer to the problem of valuing all types of things in an environment under one ethical system, then why has the monism-pluralism debate continued? The answer may be that the original concerns of the pluralists was […] the extent to which the body of moral theories developing in the field were adequately responding to the practical dilemmas of forming a moral consensus around environmental issues (Light, 2001).

To follow up, more importantly, if the monism was ever enough, or the complementary theories or ontologies were the end of the discussion, why did Callicott ever need to combine multiple ontologies, or need to extend his environmental ethics? It seems like this approach of fixing what's been missing from Callicott's ethics with the guise of complementing or finally completing his theory was not very fruitful, and accepting the pluralism inherent in his theory's shortcomings would have been simpler, *à la* Occam's Razor.

Furthermore, as I have discussed in §4.8.2, we do not have any reason to assume the combination of two different ontologies in the Synthetic Approach or two different

theories, namely the Land Ethic and Earth ethic, would work out –i.e., would result in a successful monist philosophy. In the past, even for two communitarian principles (not even different ontologies or theories), Callicott had to introduce Second-Order principles to manage and decide between them, and I think it is crystal clear that different ontologies or theories would need this mediation a lot more than two conflicting communitarian principles that originated from the same base principles. Yet, Callicott assumes that the real-world application of two ontologies or two distinct theories would work out without providing any way to prioritise or choose between the possibly conflicting moral decisions that these two sources might lead us to.

Overall, I think this deep dive into the concept of complementarity clarifies the reasons why Callicott consistently utilizes and endorses this concept in his discussions (i.e., due to his long-standing war against pluralism) and why the complementarity concept does not make a good case to save him from a pluralist position regardless. I further continue this discussion of why plain old pluralism makes a better case for environmental ethics in §7 and §8.

4.10 Overview of Pluralist Elements in Callicott

Now that we have briefly discussed why complementarity might not be an easy way out for Callicott when he attempts to avoid his environmental ethics from being pluralist, I want to turn our attention to discuss why his theory became pluralist in the first place.

Callicott's aim at the beginning of his journey was to save environmental ethics from the individualist grounds that it got stuck on. He argued that nearly all examples of environmental ethics had been somewhat human-centred, and the value of the environment and nonhuman beings were determined with respect to humanity; either in utilitarian terms or sentience and deontological grounds, both of which were individualistic. To accomplish this, his environmental ethics took inspiration from Aldo Leopold's Land ethic that "changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it" (Leopold, 1949, p. 204), and Callicott's theory can be considered a successor or an interpretation of Leopold's Land Ethic in this sense. While it is possible to find other theoretical shortcomings in his

theory, he truly posited a single governing principle—community-based rules or duties—in which humans took no precedence and were treated as any other being. Furthermore, individuals had no value; only the communities did.

On all accounts, I believe this is a truly monistic approach that does not have the Achilles heel of anthropocentrism or individualism. If he kept sticking to this theory, his agenda, albeit undermining the human value of our current moral setting severely, would have been a truly holistic and monistic theory with nothing to spoil its univocal approach. However, the concern for the political correctness of the environmental ethics came up against his "ideal" theory, and it had to be modified.

Overall, as I discussed in the previous sections, while Callicott was arguing for several properties that he allegedly saw in his philosophy as a monistic approach, he compared this monism to the pluralist approaches out there, which lacked the same properties. Stone's pluralism was one such example. As an "extreme pluralist" theory, as Wenz describes it (1993), Stone's theory lacks a single consistent moral principle –it contains multiple of them, and it sometimes accepts the indeterminacy between multiple duties or moral choices. Or it happens to be objectively pluralist, as Wolf describes it (1992), and it does not enforce a common vocabulary, as Stone himself agrees:

> […] In selecting between courses of animal-affecting conduct, the society is increasingly committed to minimize their pain (in a utilitarianist sense). In dealings among Persons, we also seek to minimize pain; but we blend into our judgements an additional, sometimes conflicting consideration, what a Kantian would call respect-for-persons. What we have here, in terminology presently examined, are two separate worlds (Persons and animals) across which separate rules (moral governances) are in operation (Stone, 1987, p. 135).

However, when looking at various forms of Land Ethic that Callicott formulated over the years, it seems like while he faced criticisms and had to modify his theory to better cope with charges of eco-fascism and anthropocentrism, or to make it more comprehensive with respect to conservation concepts, his philosophy eventually evolved to contain the same pluralist elements that he initially reprimanded the other pluralist ethical approaches for. Overall, I think while Callicott's approach is sensible in terms of making it a more holistic and all-embracing theory that accounts for multiple communities at once, and in a supposedly Darwinian and Humean way in its

core (I further discuss if these roots that Callicott relies on are really valid in §5), we should label its final form properly, as a pluralist environmental ethics. While Callicott still aims to label his philosophy coherent within itself, with diversions like complementarity debate, his formulation of multiple constituents of his ethical theory has eventually become more like how Christopher Stone (1987; 1988) or Mary Anne Warren (1983; 1997) initially formulated their own theories, which were essentially pluralist or eclectic in Callicott's view. Seeing the progression or evolution of Callicott's theories, it certainly feels like he is now in the same boat, although he does not want to label himself as such.

In §4.7 and §4.8, and in Table-1 and Table-2, I tried to summarize the direction and provide a checklist for the various stages of Callicott's environmental ethics and the monistic demarcation criteria that he provided, as well as degrees of pluralism that Wenz (1993) provided. Taking another look at Callicott's progression in both of these checklists and taking Stone's theory as a paradigmatic case for pluralism —where all of Callicott's monistic demarcation criteria fail according to Callicott—, it is not hard to visualise Callicott's own ethical theory going in the same direction and starting to fail the same demarcation criteria that he criticised Stone's pluralism against. At this point, we might be tempted to ask whether the monist ideal of Callicott is really achievable at all, or a pluralist alternative is more realistic: I will discuss this in more detail in §9 and §10.

CHAPTER 5

CALLICOTT'S ROOTS REVISITED

As I have discussed in §3, Callicott's environmental ethics supposedly has its roots in Aldo Leopold (1949) and David Hume (1739-40, 1751). Let us consider again the aim of Callicott, which is formulating a monistic ethic and considering the environment in a holistic way, and note that it's possible to be individualistic, as opposed to holistic, while still having a monist theory —like Regan's deontological approach). Apart from whether he is successful in these endeavours in his career or not, I believe Callicott's roots need a second look. This investigation is important, because if the roots he started with are not reliable for the aim of his environmental ethics since the beginning, one would not expect him to succeed in his ultimate goal —or one would not be surprised if his goal of formulating an ethic failed.

In this Section, I take a look at Callicott's Leopoldian and Humean-Darwinian roots and try to elaborate if the ideas of his predecessors would actually support the kind of environmental ethics that Callicott was defending. It is not my aim here to elaborate on the philosophical or practical issues with Callicott's ethics per se, but rather try to discuss whether his monistic environmental ethics was doomed from the beginning while considering the problems with Callicott's interpretation of previous philosophers and environmentalists.

5.1 Is Leopold's Land Ethic Truly Monistic?

Looking at the roots of Callicott's communitarian ethic, the main focus is unmistakably Aldo Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac*. Callicott argues that

Leopold's environmental approach is strongly monistic; however, there are other interpretations in the literature that delve into the details of Leopold's Land Ethic and instead paint a completely different picture. This different perspective stems from the observation that Leopold was very much aware of the difficulties that might arise from the application of his Land Ethic, especially when trying to convince a variety of audiences of his expansive notion of community.

Observing this difficulty, according to Dixon (2017), for instance, Leopold's theory can be interpreted as having strong pluralist roots. Considering the objections made by Callicott's critics, such as Regan (1983) and Sober, who fails to understand why someone "would save a mosquito, just because it is rare, rather than a human being" (2003, p. 186), Dixon argues that their criticism regarding the holistic nature of the Leopoldian Land ethic is "wrongheaded" mainly because Callicott's interpretation is a skewed one:

> In contrast, my forthcoming assessment of Leopold entails that land holism is not to be invariably privileged over other moral concerns, because Leopold applies a number of values both to individuals and to groups, and he touts a consistency maximisation of those values in their real-world realisation. That is to say, Leopold's writings, evidencing, as they do, a respect for values inclusive of utility, virtue and even moral agency, also demonstrate a concern that actions taken on behalf of these values do not come at each other's expense, or, if so, that a reconciliation of these values should be forthcoming (Dixon, 2017, p. 275).

While Dixon (2017) argues that the holistic interpretation by Callicott is misguided, he cites the quotes of Leopold that Callicott utilises and claims that Callicott was using Leopold's quotes out of their context. For example, while Callicott strictly focuses on Leopold's statement that "all ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts" (1966, p. 219), Dixon points out the other parts of the same "Land Ethic", where Leopold explains the complex dynamics that contribute to the construction and the change in ethics. Leopold argues:

> An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from antisocial conduct. These are two definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of *interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation*. The ecologist calls these symbioses. *Politics and economics*

> *are advanced symbioses in which the original free-for-all competition has been replaced*, in part, by co-operative mechanisms with an ethical content (Leopold, 1949, p. 168, emphasis added).

Thus, Leopold seems to suggest that not only the structure and the nature of the community was the determining factor for the ethics, but the human culture, including economics and politics, was influencing this process. So, Callicott's attempt to reduce the evolution of ethics to only an expansion in the size and the extent of the community seems misplaced.

Furthermore, Dixon argues that Leopold accepts the natural evolution of ethics progressively from "Mosaic Decalogue" and implies the irreducible complexity of its parts:

> Despite the common origin of all ethics, this naturalised [emerging complexity of ethics] explanation as to the origin of ethics – when framed against the background of Leopold's overall thought – does not allow for a reduction of ethics to a single value scheme (e.g., Callicott's community memberships and the positive emotion-tickling humans ultimately will feel at the sight of well-functioning communities) (Dixon, 2017, p. 283).

Overall, according to Dixon, Leopold's ethical view already contained pluralist characteristics that go beyond the pragmatist pluralism, yet Callicott tries to attach Humean characteristics to Leopold's theory, which "largely banishes the land ethic from being front-and-centre in persons' moral thinking to the margins of persons' moral sentiments and their fluctuations" (Dixon, 2017, p. 293). According to him, Leopold's theory puts a lot of importance on moral characteristics and virtues pertaining to human society, which directly conflicts with Callicott's oversimplification of communitarian concerns under a sentimentalist theory. Considering Leopold's aim of making the Land Ethic an intellectual currency for a variety of different groups, such as philosophers, the religious, and conservationists, and his approach of integrating these multiple moral concerns into one, Dixon concludes that Callicott's monistic interpretation is somewhat un-Leopoldian (Dixon, 2017).

Ozer (2012) also points out a similar pragmatist undertone in Leopold's philosophy when he argues that Leopold's attitude takes the complexity of multiple views within

the community into account, instead of relying on the minority who are "more heedful of nature" (2012, p. 79):

> [Leopold suggests that] a system which only takes care of the wishes of some minority would not work. For it could not get sufficient support which it needs for the realization of its hopes. *Thus, Leopold seems to endorse a more realistic, public opinion based, result oriented, in short a more pragmatist attitude in order to solve environmental problems*. And his attitude was strongly shaped in accordance with human interests (Ozer, 2012, p.158, emphasis added).

In Ozer's analysis of the multi-faceted background and career of Leopold, we also see the highlights of important aspects of Leopold's environmental outlook, and he notes that Leopold would agree "to endorse a broader and pluralist perspective and to persuade this wide variety of people by taking into account their diverse conceptions, understandings, value systems" (2012, p. 125). This pluralist approach becomes clearer when Leopold considers urging or convincing people with multiple backgrounds to agree on the same environmental goals regarding the preservation of National Parks while promoting Pinchot's (1910) utilitarian views based on "highest use":

> *The Parks merely prove again that the recreational needs and desires of the public vary through a wide range of individual tastes, all of which should be met in due proportion to the number of individuals in each class*. There is only one question involved – highest use. And we are beginning to see that highest use is a very varied use, required a very varied administration, in the recreational as well as in the industrial field (Leopold, 1921, p. 720, emphasis added).

Thus, it is not hard to observe that contrary to Callicott's interpretation, Leopold seems more akin to a pragmatist and suggests that environmental policies or attempts should take a somewhat pluralist approach to be successful in the practical sense.

Furthermore, considering the compositionalism and functionalism distinction of Callicott, and the concepts of health and integrity being strongly separated by an ontological barrier in this Synthetic Approach, one might ask how Leopold envisioned the same concepts. According to Ozer (2012), Leopold's view of health and integrity

were intertwined and strongly depended on each other, contrary to how Callicott envisioned them:

> [To Leopold] land is not only soil, but also water, plants, and animals, but furthermore it is an organism which is able to renew itself all together with its components so that it preserves its "functional integrity". Leopold earlier pointed out that land health means land stability. Now he also says that land health means functional integrity of the land. If we think Leopold's dictum in "The Land Ethic" that "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the land", we see that first two conditions (i.e. integrity and stability) of rightness are satisfied by the land health. Needless to say, a healthy land is also beautiful. In other words, it will not be wrong to say that according to Leopold's dictum "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the health of the land, it is wrong otherwise" (Ozer, 2012, p.171).

Lastly, if we look at the latest formulation of Callicott, namely Earth Ethic, we see yet another divide between Callicott and Leopold's own ideas. As I mentioned in §3.5, Callicott prefers formulating the Earth Ethic on the communitarian basis he had formulated on top of the Land Ethic without presenting too many convincing arguments. Although this coherence initially seems like a step in the right direction, it feels like Callicott is adding yet another component to his supposedly unified theory while rebranding it in Aldo Leopold's name. Even the communitarian extension does not seem to follow Leopold's ideas, as Callicott admits:

> Following up on Leopold's hints, *a theoretically coherent non-anthropocentric Earth ethic might be constructed on philosophical foundations originating with Kant, not Hume*. […] I myself am convinced that the leap from the spatial and temporal scales of the biotic communities and the attendant land ethic to the spatial and temporal scales of the whole earth *is a leap too far* (Callicott, 2013, pp. 299-300, emphasis added).

So, it is even debatable if this perspective presented by Callicott can even be called an extension of Leopold's ideas anymore. In this case, Callicott further admits that having a Kantian Earth Ethic based on duty and respect for earth would have been a coherent, non-anthropocentric ethic, but he just dismissed the idea solely on the grounds that it is "a leap too far" (ibid., p. 301). Probably observing this divide himself, in the "Introduction" section of *Thinking Like a Planet*, he points out the reasons for him still using Leopold's name in Earth Ethic:

> First, the personal answer: my work has long been associated with the Leopold legacy. While I suppose that I could develop a biosphere-scaled environmental

> ethic with only passing reference to Leopold, I want to establish continuity between such an ethic and my older exposition of the biotic-community-scaled land ethic in numerous essays […]
>
> Second, Leopold has street cred in the environmental-movement 'hood like nobody else, not Thoreau, not Muir, not Pinchot. When Leopold talks, people listen.
>
> Third, Leopold deserves credit for first speculating about an Earth ethic however fleetingly.
>
> Fourth, the philosophical and the most important answer: the most compelling Earth ethic is built upon the same essentially Humean theoretical foundations that ground the land ethic (Callicott, 2013, p. 12).

The first three reasons seem somewhat arbitrary and openly accept the divergence between his views and Leopold's original formulation of Land and Earth ethics. The fourth one, however, is interesting because, for the rest of the book, Callicott does not provide any reasons for not favouring or completely dismissing Leopold's suggestions for a Kantian Earth ethic other than his intuitions regarding the benefits of a Humean and communitarian ethic. Considering how much he insists on the concept of complementarity throughout the book, I can imagine the most compelling reason to avoid a Kantian ethic would be to avoid more pronounced pluralism charges.

Considering these different evaluations and analyses of Leopoldian ethics along with how Callicott modified his own theory over the decades, it seems like Callicott's initial monistic formulation (Naïve Holism) did not survive the test of time for a reason. Similar to Leopold, Callicott also became more and more conscious of multiple theoretical obligations of environmental ethics that needed to be taken into consideration, as well as the practical implications of directing his theory to a diverse set of audiences, which might be why we can see many pluralist characteristics in the later formulations of his theory, regardless of how he still characterises his theory (mistakenly) as a monistic one.

5.2 Does Hume's Sentimental Theory Support Holism?

As I already touched on in §3, when formulating his communitarian and holistic ethic, Callicott takes inspiration and support from both Leopold's supposedly monistic theory and Hume's sentimentalist and sympathy-oriented philosophy. I discussed the

alleged Leopoldian support he claims in the previous section, and here, I want to elaborate on whether Hume's philosophy can actually be used as a groundwork for Callicott's community-based ethics.

Callicott outlines his agenda of a holistic environmental ethic and his separation from the existing individualist theories while drawing similarities from Hume as follows:

> [T]wo mainstream modern philosophical accounts [...] grant moral standing to individuals only, while the natural history account [of morality] makes possible moral status for *wholes*. Hume, for example, recognizes a distinct sentiment which naturally resides in human beings for the "publick interest" (Callicott, 1986b, p. 151).

This public sentiment or interest, according to Callicott, is a reason to support his holistic ethic. Yet, the difference of this public interest is different from any other sentiment that we might have for other individuals; it is aimed towards society, as Callicott interprets it:

> [T]here exists a certain sentiment which *naturally* resides in us for what he frequently calls the "publick interest," that is, for the commonweal or for the integrity of society *per se* (Callicott, 1989g, p. 124).

If this were true, Callicott would have a historical antecedent in his holistic account, which is also rooted in sentiments of sympathy and public interest or affection. By utilising these sentiments, it would be possible to deny the alternative individualistic ethical theories and instead support a holistic approach, which encompasses our sentiments towards society or ecological wholes. Callicott argues that such a Humean approach would be the groundwork for holism:

> The Humean biosocial moral theory differently applied to larger than-human communities by Midgley and Leopold has, unlike the more familiar approach of generalizing egoism, historically provided for a holistic as well as an individualistic moral orientation. We care, in other words, for our communities per se, over and above their individual members—for our families per se, for our country, and for mankind (Callicott, 1989a, pp. 57-58).

However, as Lo (2001b) also points out, it seems doubtful that Hume's account of sentiments towards others could easily be extended to 'society per se'. Also considering the reductionist account of Hume in the context of senses, affections and

sentiments, Lo argues that individuals, not wholes are the main focal point of Humean sentiments:

> As [Hume] himself puts it, we 'sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us'. But who are these 'others'? Other *individuals*, of course. So in the case of 'sympathy with public interest', the objects of our sympathy are the sentiments of those individuals who constitute the public.
>
> […] Putting this another way, society per se, over and above its individual members, is not the kind of entity capable of having any such sentiments as uneasiness or satisfaction regarding its interest. So we cannot have any Humean sympathy with the interest of society per se (Lo, 2001b, pp. 117-118).

Considering the apparent individualist terms Hume argues, it seems far-fetched to derive holism from Hume's single mention of 'publick affection'. Also, evaluating other passages from *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* and *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Lo concludes that Hume's theory of sentiments and sympathy cannot legitimately be used for holistic grounds in Callicott's environmental ethics. This is also similar to how Varner argued that "sympathetic concern for communities as such has no historical antecedent in David Hume" a decade ago (Varner, 1991, p. 179)

Overall, similar to the way Leopold's environmental ideas were somewhat inadequately represented by Callicott, it seems like Hume's sympathy and public affection approach to the community has not been considered in its full context, either. My point is not to argue that a sentiment-based holistic environmental ethics is or is not viable, but rather to point out that the origin of how Callicott started his ethical formulation was missing its mark from the beginning. After all, starting with individualistic approaches like Hume to construct a holistic theory did not go well, and it's no surprise that Callicott's theory needed a lot of patchwork to adjust after the challenges that came his way.

5.3 Are Darwin's Ethical Views at the Root of Land Ethic?

As I summarised in §3, according to Callicott, Leopold heavily employs Darwin's "proto sociobiological perspective on ethical phenomena" (Callicott, 1987, p. 191) in his environmental views. This claim stems from the passages in *A Sand County*

Almanac where Leopold attributes moral considerability to biotic communities and his attempt to shift from an individual perspective to a holistic perspective for the Land Ethic. This shift, combined with a community-based approach, would be a strong basis for Callicott's later communitarian views, if it were to succeed.

Callicott, while interpreting the statement, "An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the *struggle for existence*" (Leopold, 1949. p. 202, emphasis added), argues that this is a clear indication of Darwinian ideas being expressed through Leopold, or that Leopold is hinting at a Darwinian understanding of community:

> The phrase 'the struggle for existence' unmistakably calls to mind Darwinian evolution as the conceptual context in which a biological account of the origin and development of ethics must ultimately be located. And at once it points up a paradox: Given the unremitting competitive "struggle for existence" how could "limitations of freedom of action" ever have been conserved and spread through a population of *Homo sapiens* or their evolutionary progenitors? (Callicott 1987, p. 189).

Callicott argues that the answer to this dilemma was found by "Darwin–who had tackled this problem 'exclusively from the side of natural history' in *The Descent of Man*– [and] the answer lies in society" (p. 190). Then, he reiterates that the communities whose members were able to extend their familial affection to other members of the community had a better chance at survival, thereby promoting these feelings of affection and sympathy.

Overall, Callicott takes both Leopold's delineation of ethic as "a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence" (1949, p. 202) and Leopold's suggestion that ethics naturally extend as the communities develop and extend accordingly, and infers that Leopold relies on the community perspective laid out by Darwin in the *Descent of Man.* Consequently, Callicott's own interpretation of the Land Ethic can also be labelled as a communitarian ethic with Darwinian roots.

Millstein (2015) challenges this view that the link between Leopold and Darwin is not as clear as Callicott paints it to be, especially concerning Callicott's jump from the phrase "struggle for existence" to Darwin's *Descent of Man*. He argues:

> Is it plausible to think that Leopold meant his audience–and this essay, unlike many of his others, was meant for a general audience–to understand "limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence" as an elliptical reference to the evolutionary role of moral sentiments? It is not even clear that Leopold was familiar with Darwin's *Descent of Man* – he never cites the book in his writings, as far as I can tell– and it seems unlikely that he would expect a general audience to be familiar with it (Millstein, 2015, p. 304).

Apart from this missing link between Leopold and Darwin's *Descent of Man*, Millstein points out that Callicott does not have a strong case for sentiments playing a special or a central role in Leopold's Land Ethic:

> It seems plausible that Leopold was simply inferring from his own experience, that love of the land tends to go hand in hand with a desire to treat it with respect. If emotions such as love and affection were supposed to play a *special* role in grounding ethics, Leopold gives no indication of that (Millstein, 2015, p. 304).

Thus, Millstein provides an alternative interpretation of Leopold based on *Origin of Species,* where the "struggle for existence" is widely discussed instead of *Descent of Man*. He further argues that the main focus of the Leopoldian Land Ethic is instead the relations and the web of interdependencies between individuals and communities in the environment and how the extension of ethics from human communities to non-humans is an intellectual process. As Leopold emphasises his approach in *A Sand County Almanac* similarly:

> Conservation is paved with good intentions which prove to be futile, or even dangerous, because they are devoid of critical understanding either of the land or of economic land-use. I think it is a truism that as the ethical frontier advances from the individual to the community, *its intellectual content increases* (1949, p. 225; emphasis added).

This passage hints that Leopold was most likely aware that conservation efforts or ethics that originated mainly from the sentiments were doomed to fail, and they instead needed to be preceded by an intellectual process to improve our understanding of the environment and our place within this complicated web of interdependencies. Thus, a change in culture, community outlook and intellectual content need to take the central stage in the Land Ethic. Millstein summarises this succinctly:

> Leopold sees the accretion of ethics as part of an evolutionary process, but it is a process of *social* (i.e., cultural) evolution, not biological evolution, and not an

> "automatic triggering" of sentiment towards the land upon learning of our interdependence with it, as Callicott maintains.
>
> [...] Thus, sentiments are not the *basis* of the land ethic; rather, the intellectual recognition of ourselves as part of a biotic community is (Millstein, 2015, p. 307).

All in all, it seems as though the Darwinian ethical views that Callicott took as the basis of his interpretation of Land Ethic is not as clear as he claims them to be. Leopold seems to draw inspiration from the ecological views of Darwin instead and emphasises the complexity of the structure and interdependencies between the members of a biotic community. This, in turn, brings doubt into how the Darwinian roots that Callicott relied upon could actually support his communitarian ethics, especially when his starting point –Leopoldian Land Ethic—didn't seem to give sentiments a central role in the development of environmental values and ethics in the first place.

CHAPTER 6

STONE'S PLURALISM REVISITED

As I discussed in §3, Callicott, in his later writings, tries to divide the world into two, compositionalist part, i.e. wilderness or biodiversity reserves, vs functionalist side i.e., mixed communities and apply different (and supposedly complementary) ontologies with their corresponding ethics onto them. However, after a closer look, Stone's approach is not very dissimilar to Callicott's, as he also argues for the multiple ethical theories being applied to different parts of the landscape (i.e., different planes being applied to the same land, depending on the circumstances); only how they divide the landscape differs. If Callicott has the right to say compositionalism and functionalism are complementary, a part of the same continuum, I do not see why Stone cannot argue that Kantian deontology and Bentham's utilitarianism are also complementary. For all intents and purposes, they both operate on the same subject, e.g., environmental domain, but while Callicott makes the distinction of mixed community vs. biotic community (Callicott, 1989a) or functionalist glossary vs. compositionalist glossary (Callicott, 1999b), Stone makes the distinction of human communities vs. nonhumans having different planes, and applied different ontologies, along with their respective ethical boundaries to each subset (Stone, 1987). Stone's division of the world might not be as clear-cut as Callicott's definition, but the end of the day they both have guiding principles of how to divide the world and apply different moral theories (or principles) to each. Compared to Callicott's dualistic approach, which seems to divide the world somewhat horizontally (two communities having two different principles), Stone's approach might appear more complex, dividing the world vertically (within each subset of community, the particular cases might call for different principles or

planes to operate). However, considering the boundary between mixed communities and biotic communities becoming less and less clear in today's world, it seems this slight difference in their division is not very important. Regardless of the type of division, their approach to compartmentalizing the world seems very similar. Stone also points out the compartmentalisation he had in mind, which seems pretty much the same as what Callicott would suggest in his Synthetic Approach and Earth Ethic, as previously quoted in §4.2:

> There may be 'really right' and not just relatively right answers, but the way to find them is by reference not to one single principle, constellation of concepts, etc., but by reference to several distinct frameworks, each appropriate to its own domain of entities and/or moral activities (evaluating character, ranking options for conduct, etc.) (Stone, 1988, p. 146).

Stone is also well aware that his approach needs to be distinct from extreme relativism that leads to principle nihilism. He recognises the "anything goes" attitude of the relativism criticized by Callicott and wants to avoid it. Instead, his theory of maps and planes being applied to a landscape is presented as a rule-based, compartmentalised approach, where each theory would have its own domain, although determining which domains would have which theory applicable is an empirical process, according to him. Thus, it is still a rule-based approach, while the humans, as arbiters, decide how the moral landscape is mapped to the respective ethical theories, i.e., which theory applies to a specific case. Coming from a background in Law, Stone's view of environmental decision-making is similar to a judge: one needs to consider the case at hand in detail, evaluating pros and cons for each party involved, and deciding based on how the facts align with possible principles that we could apply to this particular situation. In some sense, this is a principled relativism.

According to Stone (1988), there are multiple scenarios that might happen when we try to match an ethical decision with a plane: first, only one plane could be a good fit; secondly, multiple planes might have the same judgement on the topic (although their reasons might be different, they lead to the same moral decision), and lastly, they might have conflicting judgements on the decision. In the first two cases, as Stone also points out, the solution seems to be trivial. As long as the ultimate decision is the same, we could reliably make a decision using whichever plane we want; it would not matter.

However, for the last case, where multiple planes have a conflicting or opposite claim on a moral decision, Stone argues that the decision is not trivial, yet it is possible:

> One possibility is to formulate a lexical ordering role. For example, our obligations to neighbor-persons, as determined on a framework built on neo-Kantian principles, might claim priority up to the point where our neighbor-persons have reached a certain level of comfort and protection. But when that level has been reached, considerations of, say, species preservation as determined per another framework, or of future generations per another, would be brought into play (Stone, 1988, p. 152).

Eventually, it is up to our intuitions, previous experiences and balancing short- and long-term benefits of deciding in favour of each plane and making a decision accordingly. What is crucial here is that Stone believes this process to be empirical, remarkably similar to the evaluations made by a judge, who considers duties, motivations, and the end result of these decisions with utmost care and decides only after this. He also believes that this process is not one-size-fits-all kind of a process, unlike what Monist approaches suggest:

> Under monism, a problem is defined appropriately for evaluation by the relevant standard, in such a way that all the "irrelevant" descriptions are left behind from the outset. The problem, so defined, is worked through to solution without further distraction. Under pluralism, a single situation, variously described, may produce several analyses and various conclusions. If a master rule is to be introduced, it is to be introduced only after the separate reasoning processes have gone their separate ways to yield a conflicting set of conclusions (Stone, 1988, p. 152).

If we had a universal arbiter rule that could be applied to all moral dilemmas of choosing between multiple moral planes, that would be somewhat equivalent to the monistic characteristics of SOPs that Callicott claimed. However, the real world and the moral dilemmas we face in it are so complex that the indeterminacy –multiple moral choices being the correct ones, or us not being able to select a single moral truth in some cases—is inevitable, according to Stone. So, it is up to us humans to decide on the best moral plane that fits our case by carefully considering the pros and cons, and this is not an exact science. These moral choices and the selection of planes are also malleable to the point that significant events might shift the stance we have on them and change our choices over time. Thus, Stone argues for certain principles when choosing moral planes, but accepts that these are also open to change.

As I will discuss in §10, Stone's flexibility in changing moral stances and his vision of pluralist ethics as an empirical and malleable system appears to be very close to contextualism. That is why, when discussing Stone's pluralist approach, it is important to keep in mind his pragmatic and contextualist attitude towards selecting an ethical theory (or a "plane") to apply to a specific environmental issue.

Stone is also quite aware that pluralism may not sometimes lead to a single theory/decision, and multiple applicable theories might conflict, but he mentions that this only happens when there is a moral indeterminacy, in rare cases (Stone, 1988). Indeterminacy is very much possible in exceptional cases, and this is not sufficient reason to give up on the pluralist worldview:

> This prospect illustrates one of the principal monist-pluralist dividing lines referred to earlier: How fatal is it to a system of moral rules if it fails to furnish a single unambiguous answer to each choice we recognize as morally significant?
>
> As I have already indicated, such a standard […] would cramp the range of morals significantly. Better to come right out and consider the alternative: that we may have to abandon the ambition to find perfect consistency and the "one right answer" to every moral quandary, either because a single answer does not exist, or because our best analytical methods are not up to finding it (Stone, 1988, pp. 153-154).

Overall, being aware of the limitations and boundaries of a pluralist framework, Stone still aims for an objective theory, even the indeterminacy of multiple choices resulting from the objectively pluralist nature of their domain, i.e., multiple choices being viable in their application, being equivalent in a moral sense (Stone, 1988; Wolf, 1992). This goes to show that pluralism formalised by Stone is radically different from the picture that Callicott painted of him, where Callicott claims that pluralism would result in an "anything goes" attitude, and it would amount to a "multiple personality disorder" (Callicott, 1990, p. 175). Instead, we see a level-headed take from Stone on possible scenarios of conflict that the pluralist stance might encounter and hints on how to possibly resolve them, also accepting the dilemmas that it cannot resolve with the tools of the same framework.

CHAPTER 7

ACCEPTING OPTIONS FOR MONISM

After discussing Callicott's supposedly monist approach and how it significantly diverged from the monism criteria that he suggested, as well as the monism criteria in the literature, I would like to investigate how his environmental agenda could be remedied. I simply try to draw some conclusions on what would make a relatively more consistent monist environmental philosophy if we had the chance to reform different phases of Callicott's environmental ethics right now. Obviously, these will be crude attempts to patch or modify small portions of Callicott's ethics or merely defend one version or phase of Callicott's ethics over another to provide his theory "a way out," so to speak.

Firstly, let us tackle the trivial case where there are no political pressures on our philosophy or ethics, and no one forces our theory to be revised purely based on political correctness. In this ideal scenario, I think the answer is simple: Naïve holism, in its ecocentric and non-anthropocentric formulation, is the best monist version of Callicott's theory –although this would lead to some harsh decisions against human communities. If there was no Tom Regan to accuse us of eco-fascism, we could use a holistic approach we borrowed from Leopold to prioritise ecological wholes and de-prioritize human communities' unnecessary needs. I think, from a philosophical perspective and from Callicott's expectations from a monist approach, that would be ideal.

If, on the other hand, we had to be politically correct and had to take at least a weak anthropocentric position, I think both the Tree-Rings model and Second-Order

principles would somewhat do. Albeit imprecise, the Tree-Rings model provided us with a decision procedure for our duties pertaining to various communities: If there are conflicting interests, we just weigh them according to our intimacy or closeness to that specific community. It is not always easy to resolve these decisions in the real world, but the formulation is simple and free of any internal contradictions or multiplicities. For a monist and politically correct environmental ethic, this is as holistic as one can get.

Also, note that there is no reason to prefer the Second-Order principles over the Tree-Rings model phase of Callicott here, as the only way to make it truly monistic is to drop SOP2, which contains egalitarian elements. This would allow every principle we utilise in Callicott's formulation to originate from the same base of communitarianist ethics, but it would also reduce this new formulation essentially to the Tree-Rings model.

Then, if we had to reconcile conflicting conservational goals in a monist outlook, I would need to marginally restructure the Synthetic Approach. This is the approach that even Callicott abandoned years later, and I think the only way to reform this approach is to reduce or subsume one ontology under another. It is true that both compositionalism and functionalism are, in themselves, valuable approaches when evaluating the world, but it does not make sense to expect them to work without a hitch (similar to a monist approach) in the real world. If, on the other hand, one ontology was hierarchically under another and would be given less priority than the other, it would be sensible to derive a monist approach from this. This is basically because the conflicts between multiple ontologies could be formulated into a single theory, and with an assumed hierarchy, the lexicographical decision procedure would be trivial.

Finally, if we had to formulate a monist ethic on a global or planetary scale, I would refrain from postulating another theory like the Earth Ethic. I would either try to extend the boundaries of the supposedly monistic interpretation of the Land Ethic as much as possible and accept the consequences. This could go both ways: if this extension becomes unabashedly anthropocentric yet manages to stay holistic, that would still be better than compartmentalising the world among two competing holistic theories of Land vs. Earth Ethic. On the other hand, if the resulting ethics became non-

anthropocentric with a harsh holistic attitude like Naïve holism, I think that would also be better than the pluralism that Callicott now endorses, in terms of the monistic characteristics that Callicott is essentially aiming for.

Overall, there are definitely ways to make Callicott's theories more monistic, if we need them to be, and satisfy his long-standing agenda of a monistic environmental ethic. The only caveats are the political concerns, as well as Leopold's positive and somewhat preferential attitude towards human communities, which constrained Callicott's views frequently, and he had to shift his views throughout his career accordingly.

CHAPTER 8

PLURALISM IN OTHER FIELDS

Apart from the discussion of pluralism in environmental ethics in particular, the concept or the methodology of pluralism had a lot of traction in other fields. I have already named one of these fields, namely bioethics. In this field, although there is a disagreement between the benefits and applicability of complementarity, both Grinnell et al. (2002) and FitzPatrick (2004) were proponents of pluralist approaches. Considering their pluralist approach was considered somewhat novel by Grinnell et al. (2002), it seems like bioethics, a field that is relatively younger than environmental ethics, has also resorted to the concept of pluralism when attempting to deal with and resolve the allegedly inherent multiplicity in their domain. Considering Fitzpatrick's response (2004) and his positive attitude towards pluralism as well, it seems like pluralism had a chance to make a positive impact in the field of bioethics in recent years.

This picture is also present in other fields. Observing the complexity of their domain and realising the failure of monistic approaches, many other fields embraced pluralist approaches in the last decades and tried to integrate their approaches with a pluralist perspective. I try to summarise a couple of examples in the fields of politics, psychology, and economics where pluralism had positive effects in recent years and continues to do so.

In the political sphere, Isaiah Berlin defended the viability of pluralism and argued for a liberalist approach by highlighting irreducible moral values that people might have (1969). George Crowder emphasises the benefits of pluralism in the context of

diversity and defends Berlin's libertarian views while arguing for the strong connections between liberalism and pluralism further (2002; 2015). Kyle Johannsen later focuses on the topic of interpersonal vs intrapersonal pluralism, and argues that the multiplicity and the diversity of conceptions in the community regarding justice and good inevitably lead to a richer moral idea for an individual, thereby highlighting the importance of intrapersonal pluralism (2021).

In the field of psychology, the nature of moral judgements has been explored in a pluralist outlook. Shaun Nichols (2004) starts by exploring the effects of multiple emotions playing an important role in moral judgements. Michael B. Gill and Shaun Nichols then brings more focus on their pluralist approach in their "Sentimentalist Pluralism" by exploring the effects of a variety of emotions over our everyday decisions and arguing for both descriptive and prescriptive moral pluralism in the context of these multiple emotions' effects on human beings (2008). Ron Mallon and Shaun Nichols later extend this pluralism to both unconscious (sentiments) and conscious (reasoning) processes to argue for a dual process approach to how we make and justify our moral actions (2011).

The viability of pluralist approaches has also been explored in the domain of economics. Robert Garnett et al. (2009) take a look at the problems with universal and one-size-fits-all economic approaches in recent decades and discuss the viability of pluralist approaches. Sheila C. Dow (2004) explores whether the economic approaches should be classified as pluralist or not based on her findings regarding the variety of categories and meanings peculiar to different economic schools of thought. John Reardon (2009) instead focuses on the benefit of using different approaches and ideologies for the educational aspect of economics and highlights the benefits of reducing monism and promoting pluralism in classrooms. Claudius Gräbner (2017) once again highlights the inherent complexity of economics and the accumulation of knowledge in the domain while arguing for the viability of pluralism and pointing out the epistemological advantages of pluralist approaches against the monistic ones, especially for the field of economics research.

Overall, it is not hard to see that pluralism, both as a methodology and an ontology, had a significant effect on the formation and development of new theories in many

fields, often allowing for richer outlooks to emerge. In this sense, I think pluralism is an approach that day-by-day proves that it can survive the test of time. We do not have to accept it as the last word in all the discussions, but considering the success of pluralist approaches in fields like politics, psychology, bioethics, and economics, I think we can safely argue that it is a viable alternative for environmental ethics to explore as well. In the next section, I discuss why pluralism can be a more viable alternative than monism in environmental ethics and claim that the shift towards a pluralist approach is inevitable, and why monism fails to solve our current problems in inherently complex fields like environmental ethics.

CHAPTER 9

PLURALISM AS A METAPHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

Before discussing why pluralism in environmental ethics might be a viable option and *might* be inevitable, let us get one thing out of the way: I really see the benefit of a monistic theory and what it would bring to the table. The possibilities opened by such a strong foundation for environmental decision-making would be immense. If we had a single body of knowledge or a single theory to answer all our questions in a satisfying way or to provide a way for us to tackle these questions in a reasonable way, it would be end to all environmental debates. I think that is what the traditional philosophy or ethics, in general, strived towards: not finding particular answers but trying to find universal answers to our problems. The question is: did such a monistic theory decisively triumph in practical field in the past decades, or did the monistic approaches have to limit themselves to theoretical discussions while failing practical feasibility?

Furthermore, while we are discussing the prospect of monism, since Callicott was a big proponent of evolution and natural selection (due to his supposed Darwinian roots), I think it makes sense to quote an opinion on the survival and sustainability of theories themselves. In his most thoroughly philosophical book, *Some Influences in Modern Philosophic Thought,* Arthur Twining Hadley says:

> The criterion which shows whether a thing is right or wrong is its permanence. Survival is not merely the characteristic of right; it is the test of right (Hadley, 1913, p. 71).

I agree with this apparently pragmatic approach, and it makes sense to take a look at both scientific and non-scientific theories in this way. If a theory does not survive the

test of time, it will either get falsified, or the original ideas will almost disappear as a result of radical modifications, so that the next iterations even barely resembling the roots they originated from. Thus, if an ideal of a monistic and universal theory becomes a utopia, accepting pluralism would be a lot more sensible. We can call this approach *metaphilosophical* or *metaethical pluralism.* It is different from pluralism in purely metaphysical or epistemological sense because pluralism in a meta level argues for accepting the theory (among multiple competing theories) that proves to be successful in the given circumstances, and survives the test of time. The distinction should be clear, as we are suggesting pluralism as an overarching approach in environmental ethics to decide between competing theories, rather than arguing for a plurality of ontologies or values in the environment.

So, let us go back to Callicott's theory and give a historical account of his environmental ethics to see the path he took more clearly and to evaluate whether the monistic theory he suggested really survived the test of time.

Starting with Leopold's Land Ethic (1949), we have an idea of a biotic community bonded by humans' sentiments and duties towards the nature. Although Leopold's ideas formed the foundation for Callicott's philosophy, originally, they were not formal enough to constitute a monistic moral philosophy on their own.

Afterwards, Callicott's initial attempt to turn these ideas into a comprehensive and monistic theory was undertaken (1990, 1994a). Although the success of this endeavour is questionable, still, connecting humans to ecological wholes through a sentiment-based ethics would constitute a truly monistic philosophy –with only a single governing major principle. It is not hard to imagine the appeal of this theory, when other philosophers were also aiming to develop a coherent approach which encompasses all living things.

Later, after the accusation of eco-fascism toward his theory appeared and his theory's limitations to manage wildlife became clearer, he had to separate the world into two ontological categories, namely wilderness and mixed communities (1989a). By doing so, he was able to dictate different sets of rules to each of these subsets of the world;

however, once again, he faced the same difficulties as the theories he heavily criticised for "compartmentalising" the moral space.

However, even after this differentiation, the complexity of the world was not as easy to capture as Callicott initially thought, and he could not rely on a single principle anymore. Conflicting moral sentiments or duties needed us to make decisions and balance them against each other, and that is where Callicott had to make additions to his theory, namely the Second Order Principles (1999a). His supposedly holistic philosophy thus became more eclectic (although the Second-Order principles initially aimed to resolve this eclectic state of separating the world in the first place), not unlike the adversaries he was initially criticising.

Furthermore, more recently, to draw legitimacy from the current vocabularies in environmental ethics, he categorised functionalism and compositionalism as two stepping stones for his ethics (1999b). Although these two theories are mostly incommensurable and had very distinct vocabularies as well as different sets of principles, he argued that they are complementary instead. According to Callicott, now the multiplicity of these worldviews or theories could be reconciled by postulating that they complement each other, thus resulting in a holistic theory once again.

And finally, his last stand with the Earth Ethic (Callicott, 2013) was another attempt to resolve the issues with his pluralist approach by labelling the Earth Ethic as complementary to the Land Ethic. This Earth Ethic he proposed is clearly anthropocentric due to its focus on human population and future generations to resolve for global environmental issues. Compared to the nonanthropocentric roots of the Land Ethic, this secondary theory not only created another gap between two theories that need to be reconciled whenever they came into conflict, but it also made Callicott's stance closer to the extreme pluralist positions that he argued so heavily against.

Now that we have this historical account of Callicott's argument, we can go back to the beginning of the thesis, where I noted that Stone made a prophetic remark in his *Earth and Other Ethics* (1987). He speculates:

> Monism's second weakness stems from the diversity of entities that have at least a colorable claim to moral recognition […] when we consider the diverse

> and peculiar properties that the entire range of Nonpersons presents, it seems doubtful that any single framework—not one of the conventional frameworks certainly—can make many adaptions without stretching itself so unrecognizably as to jeopardize its original appeal (Stone, 1987, p. 123).

It is not hard to see how Callicott's philosophy turned out exactly the same as what Stone speculated. A single theory that aims to be monistic, namely the initial formulation of Leopold's Land Ethic, trying to tackle with complexity of the whole world of living beings, eventually became so unrecognisable that we can hardly see even the pieces of Callicott's original communitarianism we discussed in §3.1 anymore.

I think this is even more visible when we contrast the initial aim of Callicott's communitarian ethics, e.g., in the Naïve holism and Tree-Rings model with the Earth Ethic. The ideal of a single governing body of ethical theory solving our environmental dilemmas is completely abandoned, and the world, split up either temporally or spatially, is supposed to be managed by different theories: essentially isolating the Land Ethic and the Earth ethic to their own domains.

Furthermore, when I look at Callicott's career and the evolution of his ideas, I am reminded of this cynical view again and again: nothing is ever "complete" or "final", especially in the ethical domain. At each step, Callicott tries to assure us that this specific set of principles, or this theory, will be the final answer to all our environmental concerns on a specific scale that he set out for us. But, in a few years, we see his opinions shifting and leading him into another rabbit hole to modify his views. And when I say "modify," I do not mean minor revision to overcome his inconsistencies: for one reason or another, Callicott had to seriously reformulate or restructure his views that his newer theory barely resembles the original. I think this is a good indication that in a complex field such as environmental ethics, maybe no single monist theory is ever "complete."

Thus, I argue, while completely agreeing with Stone, that monistic theories seem bound to the same fate: eventually stretching themselves so thin that the initial appeal of their coherent and holistic outlook completely disappears, and they eventually seem no different than the pluralist theories that they strongly criticise.

I think all these problems should suggest Callicott that theoretical pluralism (more specifically, extreme pluralism), became a viable option—perhaps the only option—to accept, especially his theory after Second-Order principles. To further outline this reasoning, following corollaries could be pointed out:

- There is an inherent complexity in the domain of environmental ethics, which makes pluralism more viable.
- Complementarity is not a way out of pluralism, even if it could be held in a normative sense. It lacks any explanatory benefits compared to the theoretical pluralism advocated by Stone.
- Pluralism is significantly different from extreme relativism that Callicott argues against; it does not confine us to a lack of judgement or decision via uncertainty of an "anything goes" attitude. Instead of ethical decision-making being "reduced to a sort of a grand Gallup poll" (Stone, 1987, pp. 132-133) for matching the public opinion—as relativism usually seems to aim—, Stone argues that "[p]luralism conceives realm of morals to be partitioned into several planes [, which] are intellectual frameworks that support the analysis and solution of particular moral problems." (Stone, 1987, p. 133). Thus, as opposed to extreme relativism, pluralism aims to draw the boundaries of exactly when a single "right" answer might not be available to environmental decisions while proposing an objective ethical outlook for the decision process, rather than trying to find the right answers solely on the grounds of individual or public opinion.
- Similar to the Synthetic Approach of Callicott, pluralism's application can be formulated similarly to Stone's theory to make decisions rule-based, compartmentalising the world in a non-arbitrary way.
- The process of determining which theories would be applied to which domains would be an empirical process and could be guided by a combination of our character, culture, intuitions, or pragmatic concerns, depending on how we formulate our pluralist approach. This is different from Callicott's compartmentalization, because it does not limit environmental ethics to the application of a limited set of ultimate theories or principles (possibly with

> some secondary principles) in a rigid way. It is also different from extreme relativism because it does not discredit the formulation of moral principles or theories for managing environmental ethics: it only promotes a flexible approach where the compartmentalization and the application of different theories to the domain of environmental ethics may evolve over time.

Although these general guidelines are very crude, I think they align with the pluralist attempts of Stone (1987, 1988), Varner (1991), Brennan (1992), Wenz (1993), Weston (1996), Domsky (2001), Light (2001) and FitzPatrick (2004). Determining details of a pluralist approach is not an easy task, but my overall point is this: a well-formulated pluralist approach is essentially better than betting on a supposedly monistic and communitarian ethic that did not survive the test of time.

Still, considering that general pluralist approaches like Stone's theoretical pluralism might appear vague and underspecified, it is best to be clearer on what type of pluralist approach I am endorsing. To answer this question: I specifically endorse a contextualist approach, as I will outline in the next section. I believe a contextualist view also aligns well with Stone's argument that different planes could be utilized at different scenarios or real-life cases, and that there is no prescription or a perfect solution to every environmental problem. I dedicate the next section, §10, to discussing Contextualism in the scope of environmental pluralism.

CHAPTER 10

CONTEXTUAL PLURALISM AS A PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

Until now, I have been trying to taxonomize different types of pluralism to try and make sense of it, e.g., interpersonal vs. intrapersonal pluralism, minimal vs. extreme pluralism. However, the most important aspect of pluralism and pragmatist approach in ethics seems to be its endorsement of variety in worldviews and experiences. So, if we are to formulate a pluralist approach to challenge the monist alternatives, it should focus on this aspect –richness of everyday moral experiences. As Scott Pratt pointed out "pluralism is better understood as a matter of what lies between [the aspects of human experience], the boundaries that mark interaction and the possibility of growth and change" (2007, p. 112). In this sense, as I briefly hinted in the previous section, a contextualist approach presents itself as a realistic and feasible worldview. Instead of formulating first principles and rigid definitions of moral principles, the complexity of our environmental challenges calls for a more fluid and flexible approach that focuses on interactions, relations and "what lies between" (ibid., p. 112).

Contextualism is the view that the evaluation of a certain event, action or situation cannot be made separately from its surrounding context. The most well-known application of contextualism is in epistemology, and epistemological contextualism claims that truth claims of statements are dependent upon their context, although truth values are fixed (i.e., alethic pluralism). In other words, contextualism is in strong opposition to absolutism–where the truth claim of a statement is ultimately unique and independent of any context.

If we talk about contextualism in the scope of environmental ethics, we can say that

moral standing (rightness or wrongness) of an action, decision or a duty is dependent upon its surrounding context. Again, this could be contrasted with an absolutist view in ethics, in which a moral duty would be applied to every real-life case uniformly, without any modification on the context such as the environment, time or other relevant or considerable factors.

Many absolutists or foundationalist philosophers would argue that if relativism is unquestionable acceptance of all ideas, given that they are particular to a subject, then this would be a slippery slope to accepting principle nihilism. Although I do not think that relativism equates to making arbitrary decisions or leaving any moral accountability—it rather accepts different moral truths pertaining to each subject—, it is also important to note that contextualism in the ethical sense does not mean principle nihilism and it does not absolve us of any moral accountability. It is important to note that, even within the scope of relativism, there are consistent rules within a specific schema and there may be absolute rules within that schema. Although it is not hard to understand Callicott's worry when he talks about extreme relativism leading to haphazard and unconstrained moral decisions, it seems unfair to equate the relativism with moral promiscuity or moral nihilism. In many relativist contexts, such as Bernard Williams' "relativism of distance" (1985), this position does not lead to moral nihilism. On the contrary, Williams' views support a consistent ethical approach within a moral schema, similar to other foundationalist alternatives; the only difference is the acceptance of the variety of schemas. When we talk about contextualism, the difference is even clearer: Theories' application might change according to the surrounding context, but the selection procedure is not indeterminate or ad-hoc in contextualism. Contrarily, the context itself is very much a determining factor on the moral standing of a theory, which in turn leads to similar situations or contexts being evaluated and morally considered in the same way. One might be tempted to ask at this point, where the context comes from: the process to determine which context maps which specific principle or theory to apply is an ever-evolving empirical process, and similar to what Stone argued (1987, 1988), it does not rely on rigid and ultimate foundations.

Therefore, this context-dependent decision relies on the culture, time and assumptions or prejudices of the moral agents and their communities, according to contextualist

approach. As Dewey also points out, the correctness of a theory depends on its ability to outperform its rivals, not on some correspondence to a metaphysical "reality" or "truth" in an absolutist sense:

> We know that some methods of inquiry are better than others in just the same way in which we know that some methods of surgery, farming, road-making, navigating or what-not are better than others. It does not follow in any of these cases that the "better" methods are ideally perfect, or that they are regulative or "normative" because of conformity to some absolute form. They are the methods which experience up to the present time shows to be the best methods available for achieving certain results, while abstraction of these methods does supply a (relative) norm or standard for further undertakings (Dewey, 1938, pp. 103-104).

On the other hand, the traditional environmental philosophy assumes the idea that the aim of environmental ethics is finding the first or ultimate principle(s), and the practical applications comes after these initial formulations (Weston, 1992). One of the obvious cases for this type of foundationalism is ethical monism, where a single ultimate principle to govern all ethics should be formulated, before we even talk about day-to-day moral issues. As Callicott points out, "reasons come first, policies second" (1999d, p. 32). Even more importantly, these foundationalist ideas sometimes even go so far as to eliminate the discussion of particulars apart from (and sometimes irrelevant to) the universal ethical norms that they want to build.

This caricaturized view of philosophy seems dangerous, as Minteer (2003) also argues:

> [I]n environmental ethics, such an understanding of the complexity and variability of the valuation process and its relationship to concrete policy and management circumstances has not made many inroads into the field's axiological schemas and analytic discourse. J. Baird Callicott, for example, one of the more prominent environmental ethicists (and principle-ists) writing today, has rather boldly admitted to "ignoring" the social sciences in his work (Minteer, 2003, pp. 141-142).

Thus, the apparent complexity in environmental discourse seems unnoticed, or even worse, ignored by the focus on foundations and ultimate principles. This further leads to the misconception that philosophy should be solely dealing with these aspects, just because "in comparison with Johnny-come-lately disciplines like economics, sociology, and political science, which, as such, have been around scarcely a century, philosophy is an ancient discipline that goes back 2,500 years or so" (Callicott, 1999c,

p. 513). Callicott seems to think that ignoring social sciences or social aspects is the point of environmental philosophy, because philosophy as a purely theoretical enterprise has been around since ancient times, and only such a formulation of philosophy would be able to deal with prescriptive or normative concepts:

> […] Plato is the only philosopher I can think of who seems actually to have proposed that he and his ilk should rule their communities and impose their bizarre foundational notions on their fellow citizens. But for the same reason, these unconventional conceptual constructs of the Ancient, Medieval, and Modern philosophers expanded the minds of their contemporaries and subtly undermined conventional ideas because, as I just noted, they presented an alternative point of view.
>
> Finally, I address the most important difference between the roles of philosophy and the social sciences in public, democratic discussion and debate. The social 'sciences' are - or at least classically claim to be - descriptive. Moral philosophy is not only frankly foundational, it is also frankly normative. […] Honestly normative moral philosophers, in any case, do not pretend to characterise things as they are, but as they ought to be (Callicott, 1999c, pp. 512-513).

So, Callicott seems to think that environmental ethics' agenda would be on a good track by ignoring particulars and social sciences that are "descriptive", and normativity is only possible by foundational endeavours and first principles. However, I think this ideal picture or view of philosophy is skewed: answers can be objective, simple, and universal without accepting this foundationalism or monism. It might have been sensible to build a central theory to govern everything back in Ancient Greece, where sciences, medicine, mathematics, and geometry had astronomically smaller bodies of knowledge compared to what we have today. Seeing the level of specialisation in every science and people dedicating their entire lives to only a small subset of a research field fills me with doubt that such a single governing body of knowledge could ever be found. As Stone argued, "monism's ambitions, to unify all ethics within a single framework capable of yielding the one right answer to all our quandaries, are simply quixotic" (1988, p. 145). Observing this level of complexity and compartmentalisation in sciences, pluralism —and more specifically contextual pluralism— shines as a sensible alternative.

While categorizing environmental worldviews in this absolutism / foundationalism vs. contextualism debate, it is not easy to pinpoint which ethical standpoint or which

philosopher stands at what side of this duality. Instead, we can probably try to place prominent ideas such as Callicott's monism, on a scale or on a spectrum between absolutism and contextualism. Monism, in particular, claims that a single theory would be able to account for all environmental dilemmas in our real world. This does not automatically mean that every monist approach is also absolutist (one can hold multiple duties or sub-principles that originate from a single master principle, and support contextualism in the scope of application of its sub-principles) but trying to formulate a first ultimate principle that is hardly flexible in its applications is still a good indicator of a theory being close to absolutism. In this sense, we can roughly place a monist like Callicott in a place close to absolutism, and in a slightly opposed position to contextualism. This is simply because functionalism vs compositionalism, or sentimentalist Land Ethic and its extension i.e., Earth Ethic being only two available options in Callicott's toolset when dealing with a large variation of environmental issues. This assumed duality forces Callicott to ground every environmental moral issue onto a fixed set of principles and introduces rigidity. Furthermore, Callicott's formulation of duties (1989c) seem highly foundationalist, as I have discussed previously, so an extension or a modification on their application depending on the surrounding context seems highly unlikely to many environmental philosophers (Light, 2013). Considering Stone's position however, we see a variety of utility and nonutility planes that he formulated, with a clear focus on intuitions, virtues and reasoning affecting where they might be applied the best. Thus, Stone clearly seems to think that the application of each of these theories depends on the surrounding context and their viability or their suitability depends on the context that we evaluate them and the situation to which we try to apply these planes. Notice that this contextual worldview is nearly the same argument made by Stone (1987; 1988) as I also discussed in §4.2 and §6.

Because of these reasons, it seems sensible to think that Callicott's monistic approach is closer to a foundationalist and absolutist position as far as the environmental ethics is concerned, whereas Stone's position seems thoroughly contextualist in the sense that it allows a context-sensitive application of different ethical theories and considering their viability in a case-by-case basis.

Considering this categorization of Callicott's and Stone's positions in a contextualist spectrum, we can say that the pluralist approach that I suggested in §7-9 rests on a contextual pluralist view. The philosophy formulated by contextualist ethicists align well with the agenda that Christopher Stone (1987; 1988) laid out decades ago, and it also paints a reasonable and democratic picture of environmental ethics that aims to bridge the gap between theory, practice, and politics.

When talking about contextual schemes and moral claims, we might rightfully ask if concepts we subscribe to within a schema also indicate an ontological pluralism, in some sense. This seems to be the case if we take a closer look at the following example: an individualist in environmental ethics vs. an ecocentrist. While an individualist (e.g., Paul Taylor) would talk about moral considerability of individual non-humans and our duties towards them, an ecocentrist (e.g., Callicott) instead would focus on moral considerability of ecological wholes and preserving biotic communities. Apart from being a purely epistemic difference, this highlights a difference in their ontological commitments as well. So, in the scope of contextualism, I should note that contextual switches we make between different theories also might entail a switch in ontological commitments. But how easy is it to jump from a conceptual pluralism / contextualism to ontological or metaphysical pluralism? According to Michael P. Lynch, "metaphysical pluralism is compatible with the pluralism about truth" (1998, p. 101) and he dedicates a large portion of his *Truth in Context* to discussion. Although I am far from discussing or defending ontological pluralism in this thesis, it seems like the plurality of values in the scope of ethics is also compatible with metaphysical or ontological pluralism, as Stone also seems to hint in his moral pluralism discussions:

> [I]n doing plane geometry we make an ontological commitment to a world that consists of points, lines, and angles. Solid geometry posits a less flat citizenry of spheres and cubes and their surfaces. Arithmetic posits numbers. In the same vein, each moral plane embeds its own posits as to what things are to be deemed morally considerate within that framework (Stone, 1987, p.133).

In the context of environmental ethics, Ben A. Minteer is one of the figures who advocate for pluralism in a contextualist way. Similar to Weston (1992) and Norton (1991), Minteer (1998, 2004) argues that the foundationalist and monistic tendencies of traditional environmental ethics is not realistic and instead suggests contextualism

as an alternative. This approach boils down to considering our ethical dilemmas in the context of time, culture, and many other factors. This implies that the way we resolve ethical dilemmas can change from geography to geography, or culture to culture, but even more importantly, it implies that the ecological worldview is plastic and can change over time, even within the same community. Yet, this fluidity does not prevent us from resolving our environmental conflicts: according to Minteer, the public opinion and people's environmental intuitions shape environmental policymaking. Combined with the acceptance of pluralism in environmental discourse, his contextualist approach suggests a democratic and an empirical method of dealing with environmental problems.

To back up this contextualist agenda, Minteer et al. (2000) conducts several polls to evaluate both the pluralist and contextualist tendencies within a community and tries to debunk the view that without a governing non-anthropocentric ultimate principle, the rights of nature and nonhumans could not be protected. The result of their research indicates that, unlike what monists like Callicott argued, a single individual might hold incompatible ethical theories at the same time and might apply these different theories to different environmental issues, depending on the context. Furthermore, the results indicate that the public opinion converges toward protection of nature, regardless of the variety of environmental outlooks (e.g., anthropocentric, non-anthropocentric) that an individual might adopt (Minteer et al 2000; 2004)

This result, of course, seems only descriptive, as far as their published analysis is concerned. It simply indicates that individuals might hold conflicting (but publicly convergent) views of environmental theories in their daily environmental decisions, not that this should be the case, i.e., *is*, not *ought*. However, this still works towards debunking the view that ethical theories come with their ideology and that humans expect a complete consistency and coherence from their ethical views (i.e., the coherent self that Callicott argued). It seems rather that, as individuals, we can be very much inconsistent with a variety of worldviews we hold in tandem, and we try to find our way in everyday moral dilemmas by mixing and matching these theories with the real-life cases we encounter. So, the practical environmental challenges that an individual faces seem very much incomplete, imperfect, and fuzzy than Callicott

assumes them to be, and our mental lives seem to reflect that. Even more, these challenges do not seem to accept rigid moral theories and expect a more flexible and pluralist approach in resolving them. This picture once again highlights the feasibility of contextual approaches over foundationalist, and more specifically, monist ones. Thus, although Callicott is adamant that social sciences only claim to be descriptive, this is at least one aspect where they can be implicitly prescriptive; they can show us that our —obviously misconstrued—ideal characterizations of human moral life and mental states are unrealistic, such as those formulated by Callicott.

The individual's moral outlook that got uncovered by Minteer et al.'s research (2000; 2004), also seems parallel to Chris J. Cuomo's (2002) and David Kronlid's (2003) analysis of the monism vs pluralism debate between Callicott and Stone. As I have discussed earlier, according to Kronlid (2003), monists and more specifically Callicott sees the ethical theories as internal to self, and thus have to be in harmony with this already-consistent self. This indicates two hidden assumptions in Callicott's worldview: that the individual self is already consistent and without any internal contradictions, and that theories being internal (or being subsumed under) the self. However, by looking at Minteer et al.'s results (2000; 2004), both of these assumptions seem questionable. Firstly, individuals are probably not the consistent and coherent wholes that easily get disturbed by external factors, they rather welcome and integrate the inconsistencies to their daily lives. Secondly, individuals seem to view ethical theories as tools, rather than integral parts to their selves, i.e., external, rather than internal to self.

Going back to Stone's characterization of the pluralist worldview, he was suggesting that we use maps or planes as tools in our disposal to traverse the terrain of environmental issues and concerns; this is how he viewed the environmental ethics as an enterprise. In the context of Cuomo's analysis, Stone is therefore seeing the moral theories as tools, rather than outlooks that we devote our 'selves' to. Therefore, to fix Callicott's framing of pluralism (1990; 1994a), the Senator in his example does not change his *worldview* or his *self "*over lunch" (1990, p. 160), but he switches his *toolset*, according to the *context* that he is in. When we reconsider Stone's approach in

this external view of ethical theories (as per Cuomo's analysis) and contextualism, the viability of his position and the misrepresentation of Callicott seems more obvious.

Overall, contextualism seems to provide a way out of extreme relativism and nihilism that Callicott accused Stone of supporting (1990; 1994a). Instead, as Stone argued (1987; 1988), and many other pluralists like Weston (1992; 2013) and Light (2001, 2010, 2013) suggested, the ethical theories are tools in our disposal: depending on context, one chooses which theory to resolve which ethical dilemma with. But, more importantly, this process is not ad-hoc, it does not entail to principle nihilism. Rather, the context-dependent choices are very much specific to time, culture, politics, and many other factors that we evaluate our moral dilemmas under. And finally, these context-dependent choices do not reduce to extreme subjectivism and relativism, because the community in general (and even humanity globally) seem to have common grounds and a common understanding when applying this contextualism in environmental ethics. This context-utilization is not static, it can change over time, and it is imperfect—but no moral theory is perfect and complete— and that is the beauty of environmental ethics. The complexity of the domain calls for a democratic, pluralist, and ever-changing methodology to resolve our day-to-day problems and guide our policymaking, and we cannot expect to do this alone in our theoretical chambers. More than anything else, environmental ethics is an applied ethic, and the complexity that comes with it should be welcomed, rather than forced to be unified under an ultimate and static principle or set of principles. As Leopold aptly put decades ago:

> the land ethic [is] a product of social evolution. ... Only the most superficial student of history supposes that Moses "wrote" the Decalogue; it evolved in the mind [and surely also in the practices!] of the thinking community, and Moses wrote a tentative summary of it. ... I say "tentative" because evolution never stops (Leopold, 1949, p. 225).

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

As we attempted to take a bird's eye view of Callicott's theory over the years, one sees that he starts with his Naïve Holism, making it progressively more complex and well-established with the Tree-rings model. With Second-Order principles, he manages to give an account of how to prioritise between multiple principles or duties that his theory encapsulates. Then, integrating different ontologies into it with a synthetic approach, he aims to deal with the variety of environmental concepts in a holistic way, the same as his earliest formulation of the Land Ethic. And lastly, noticing the importance of global environmental issues like climate change and the limitations of the Land Ethic, he formulates the Earth Ethic to oversee the environmental issues on a planetary scale, which is supposed to complement the Land Ethic.

However, this evolution comes with a cost, as I have discussed in §4, which is the cost of eclectic and pluralist characteristics in his theory. While a single communitarian moral principle initially provided him with a purely monistic theory, the elements of pluralism seep into his theory as he accepts more variety of principles, vocabularies, and ontological concepts into his Land Ethic. The grounds on which he defended monism and criticised pluralism slowly became the essential arguments which can be directed at his own theory. This is not to say that his theory fails in dealing with environmental challenges or leaves its holistic characteristics aside. I believe, stemming from the Leopoldian Land Ethic, Callicott's adaptation of his environmental views always tried to keep a holistic outlook and did a good job dealing with a variety of environmental concerns in a diverse set of communities that every environmental

ethics program needs to take into account. But I also think that the characterisation and labelling of his interpretation of the Land Ethic (and later with the addition of the Earth Ethic) as a monistic approach may not be justified. Looking at the criteria on which he criticised pluralism and defended monism over the decades, one sees how his environmental philosophy came to contain pluralist characteristics, losing its initial monistic sense from his first "Naïve Holistic" approach. This is also compounded by how Callicott's theory changed drastically from the moderate pluralist position that Peter Wenz initially categorised it as, becoming very close to Christopher Stone's unabashedly pluralist stance.

I also extended my discussion of pluralist characteristics in Callicott's theory by looking at the Humean-Darwinian roots of his philosophy and taking a critical look at his interpretation of Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic (1949) in §5. As we have seen, there were some challenges to Callicott's interpretation of David Hume, Charles Darwin, and Aldo Leopold, which seriously undermined the monistic and holistic characteristics that he relied on heavily. These past figures he took inspiration from while formulating his communitarian ethics were either not in support of a holistic ethic (e.g., David Hume supported individualistic theory of sentiments) or not in support of a monist approach (e.g., Aldo Leopold was most likely in favour of a pragmatic approach in Land Ethic and had somewhat pluralist undertones in his environmental outlook). Considering these factors, it was not such a surprise that Callicott's agenda of formulating and defending a holistic and monistic environmental approach did not survive in its initial Naïve Holism formulation and required significant changes over the years, ending up with significant pluralist characteristics.

After this much critical view of the trajectory of Callicott's theory over the years, where was his assumptions correct, and where his theory could use a revision? I believe Callicott's intuition of his modifications over his initial Naïve Holism is correct: no single holistic principle seems to capture the complexity of environmental ethics universally. This is also the stance adopted by pluralists and contextualists in the field of ethics. Firstly, his theory envisioned a separation between mixed communities and biotic communities in terms of applied principles, and finally a separation of scope he introduced for The Land Ethic vs. The Earth Ethic. Thus,

Callicott also aimed to cover this complexity in a duality that he labelled as complementary, although he did not want to accept an unashamed pluralism in principles and theories. Up until this point I agree with Callicott in his intuitions of how to capture the complexity, however, his insistence on this complementary duality and his view of nonanthropocentric worldview as the only way to deal with environmental issues are where we part our ways. I do not see pluralism as something to be feared and kept out of well-structured theories, rather, I find it crucial in dealing with complex applied fields such as environmental ethics. I do not stop at this strict number of 2 (i.e., The Land Ethic vs. The Earth Ethic) to cover all environmental domains; I accept all theories which can prove that they can be useful in a specific context, and I endorse selecting the most successful one in solving our environmental dilemmas. This is plain and simple contextualist pluralism many pragmatists would also agree upon. Furthermore, like Minteer (1998, 2000, 2004), Norton (1984, 1991) and many others, I endorse a principled pluralism, which hangs on multiple theories proving their ground and usefulness, and this process being democratic, empirical, and public-facing. And finally, I do not think this approach is much different than how Christopher D. Stone (1987, 1988) envisioned his pluralism decades ago, although his ideas were harshly criticized because of how they were misrepresented.

At this point, it would be useful to highlight the difference between Callicott's dualistic approach in using a strictly limited principles of theories to manage the environmental domain, the extreme relativist "anything goes" attitude, and the contextualist approach I suggest. Firstly, contextual pluralist approach should not be conflated with Callicott's dualistic approach, because although both argues for multiple theories or principles to manage the environmental discourse, Callicott's approach is based on ultimate foundations and is rigid, whereas contextualist approach argues for an empirical process to determine the set of theories or principles to govern environmental ethics, and furthermore, it argues for flexibility of how we apply these different principles. For example, as the environmental science advances more and more, we might argue for different ways to tackle a subset of environmental problems differently, and evolving our environmental outlook is a very much democratic, empirical and naturalist process. Secondly, contextual pluralist position is different from extreme relativism that Callicott argued against, because contextualism endorses development

and adoption of principles, but argues against rigidity of their application to the real-world and the criticizes the dogmatism that might arise when formulating them. As I discussed in §9-10, what I am supporting is a principled approach when formulating our environmental ethics, a middle position between strict foundationalist approaches like Callicott's and extreme relativist positions that might reduce to principle nihilism. This approach goes beyond Callicott's strict set of ultimate principles or theories and promotes flexibility, while avoiding the principle nihilism that might come with most relativist positions.

Of course, whether pluralism itself is preferable or superior to monism is a separate discussion on its own, and there is much literature (Brennan, 1992; Wolf, 1992; Weston, 1992; Light, 1996, 2001) on classifying different types of pluralism with its advantages and disadvantages. This is a debate I cannot comprehensively tackle in this thesis. Instead, I tried to briefly gloss over the arguments for pluralism, as Christopher Stone and many others stood up for the advantages of it (Stone, 1987) in their works, mainly citing the complexity of the environmental domain and the variety of different approaches available in the field of ethics that do not seem to be reducible to each other. But, for the sake of brevity, and for the sake of keeping the focus on properly labelling Land Ethic, I avoided discussing more of a systematic defence of pluralism. Instead, I mentioned in §8 and §9 that pluralism practically appears to be a better approach, especially when a field contains much complexity and uncertainty. So, if I had to categorise my views on environmental ethics, I would call my stance as a metaphilosophical pluralism (§9) in the larger scope of environmental debates –to foster a pragmatic approach in selecting an environmental theory that works in the long run—, and contextual pluralism (§10) in the type of theory that I endorse as an environmental value theory or axiology –as I argue for an irreducibly plural set of environmental values that we can only weight against each other, depending on the context.

First part of my stance was a metaphilosophical method of preferring pluralist alternatives over monist ones because monism's lack of success in trying to cope with the complexity of environmental challenges. In "The Case Against Moral Pluralism" (1990), after citing the supposed advantages of pluralism given by Stone, Callicott

asks the rhetorical question: "Why? Why don't we all just become merry moral pluralists?" and his main answer is that "human beings deeply need and mightily strive for consistency, coherency and closure in our personal and shared outlook on the world, and on ourselves in relation to the world and to one another" (Callicott, 1990, p. 160). I wholeheartedly agree that this might be the case for many people, but I do not believe that one could generalise this as a necessity for everyone. Ironically, decades later, Light (2001) asks the exact opposite question to Callicott's "merry moral pluralism" challenge, in a similar light: "If Callicott's communitarianism is enough to get us an answer to the problem of valuing all types of things in an environment under one ethical system, then why has the monism-pluralism debate continued?" (p. 233) I would extend this question by asking why, if monism is so natural and deeply engrained in our psyche, have the pluralist positions—like the ones I have discussed in §8—kept cropping up? Also, in many other sciences, and why pluralist approaches become more popular throughout all these years? I think the answer to these questions lies in the success and richness of pluralist approaches and the failure of the monist approaches to accommodate the complexity inherent in many domains.

If we go back to Callicott's monistic views, his stance in postulating the necessity for a monistic ethical view is debatable, and it seems highly dogmatic: he simply assumes that monism is engrained in the human psyche. This is, of course, not to say that pluralism is free of dogmatism in general, and everyone should just embrace it without question. My point is that Stone seems to be very cognizant of the monist background in ethics, the possible advantages and viability of pluralism, and he is very careful not to impose any assumptions on the nature of human beliefs and psyche, unlike Callicott. He believes that the pluralist approach itself is theoretically and practically more embracing of diverse opinions, and that's about it. Overall, Stone's take on pluralism seems like a healthier approach for progressing environmental ethics as an enterprise.

Second part of my environmental stance was suggesting a contextualist view of environmental ethics and policymaking. This involves an alignment with pragmatic worldview of American pragmatists, mainly John Dewey, and rejecting a foundationalist approach in environmental ethics that was usually adopted by monist environmental philosophers like J. Baird Callicott. Their misconception lies in the

assumption that "reasons come first, policies second" (Callicott, 1999d, p. 32), and an unproductive insistence on finding first principles to environmental dilemmas, which attempts to silence any pragmatic or cases-first approach in ethics. Just as the Ancient Greeks perceived all branches of science as a holistic entity to be gathered and studied under a single umbrella a long time ago, environmental ethics made the same assumption, hoping that the complexity of the real world would be easily compressed into a single governing theory (or a body of theories that have the same common ground, like the Land Ethic). However, just as the compartmentalisation and specialisation of the sciences we have today accepted the complexity of the domain itself, many ethicists in the landscape also accepted that it is impractical to condense all our ethical concerns under a single theory. Yet, unlike what Callicott feared, while many people accepted the multiplicity of approaches and possible shortcomings of each, they learned to live with the inconsistencies in our moral spheres, and people did not suffer from a multiple-personality disorder as a hysteria. Instead, they succeeded in adapting to this multiplicity and seeing ethical theories as what they are: tools that can be utilised, compared, and replaced with each other based on the given circumstances. Whether this is the best solution or not, time will tell, depending on how successful this approach will be in both the theoretical and practical landscape. But, at least from a pragmatic point of view, accepting a variety of theories to govern our moral landscape seems like a more agreeable solution in the foreseeable future, rather than dedicating ourselves to the "quixotic" (1988, p. 145) ideal of a single coherent moral theory answering all moral questions reliably one day.

Overall, just as the current compartmentalisation of the sciences may not be the final word, the current conception of pluralist approaches in environmental ethics does not need to be the final word. What contextualist and pluralist approaches inspired by Dewey's pragmatism suggest is that environmental ethics should be an experimental and democratic endeavour that accepts change of values both depending on context, and through the test of time. I think Stone was also aware of this as he argued for an empirical approach to how we tackle our environmental problems. Following the footsteps of Hadley (1913) and Weston (1992) as well, I also argue that even if we cannot ultimately prove that environmental ethics is an inherently pluralist field through and through, we should aim for a metaphilosophical pluralist outlook in how

we approach pluralism vs. monism debate. This is simply embracing the most sensible view that survived the test of time and accepting that the "necessary period of ferment, cultural experimentation and this *multi*-vocality is just the *beginning*" (Weston, 1992, p. 333) in the field of environmental ethics. Thus, especially in these times of uncertainty during the youth of a field like environmental ethics, expecting a single ultimate answer would be too much to ask, and pluralism, more specifically a contextualist pluralist position would be a better fit.

And finally, if we come back to Callicott's ethics as the focal point of this thesis, there seem to be only two ways out if we want to make his theory consistent: accepting that it is a theoretically pluralist theory while giving up on the ideal of monism; or going back to its roots as an eco-fascist (Naïve holism formulation) or as a weak anthropocentric (Tree-Rings model formulation) theory while giving up on the political charges against or concerns of a holistic Land Ethic. As Stone (1987) once argued, "it seems doubtful that any single framework—not one of the conventional frameworks certainly—can make many adaptions without stretching itself so unrecognizably as to jeopardize its original appeal" (Stone, 1987, p. 123). Callicott's theory seems to be facing a similar fate, as any attempt to make his theory more accommodating and more balanced unfortunately came with the cost of adding at least some pluralist characteristics to his ethics, which threatened its original appeal.

REFERENCES

Aquinas, T., 1975. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, trans. V. J. Bourke, London: University of Notre Dame Press.

Berlin, I., 1969. *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brennan, A., 1992. Moral pluralism and the environment. *Environmental Values*, *1*(1), pp.15-33.

Callicott, J. B., 1986. The Search for an Environmental Ethic, in Tom Regan (ed) *Matters of Life and Death*, 2nd ed., pp. 381–424. New York: Random House.

Callicott, J.B., 1986b. On the intrinsic value of nonhuman species. *The preservation of species*, *142*.

Callicott J. B., 1989. In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy. Suny Press.

Callicott, J. B., 1989a. Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again, in *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, pp. 49–62. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B., 1989b. On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species, in *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, pp. 129–56. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B., 1989c. Elements of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability and the Biotic Community, in *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, pp. 63–74. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B., 1989d. Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic, in *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, pp. 63–74. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B., 1989e. Review of Tom Regan, in *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, pp. 39–47. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B., 1989f. Animal liberation: A triangular affair, in *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, pp. 15–38. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B., 1989g. Hume's is/ought dichotomy and the relation of ecology to Leopold's land ethic, in *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, pp. 117–128. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B., 1990. The Case Against Moral Pluralism, *Environmental Ethics* 12: 99–124.

Callicott, J. B., 1992. Can a theory of moral sentiments support a genuinely normative environmental ethic?. *Beyond the Land Ethic*, pp.99-114.

Callicott, J. B., 1994a. Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended, *Journal of Philosophical Research* 19: 51–60.

Callicott, J. B., 1994b. *Earth's Insights*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Callicott, J. B., 1999a. Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofascism, in *Beyond the Land Ethic*, pp. 59–78. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B., Crowder, L. B., & Mumford, K. 1999b. Current normative concepts in conservation. *Conservation biology*, *13*(1), 22-35.

Callicott, J. B., 1999c. Silencing philosophers: Minteer and the foundations of anti-foundationalism. *Environmental Values*, *8*(4), pp.499-516.

Callicott, J. B., 1999d. Environmental Philosophy Is Environmental Activism, in *Beyond the Land Ethic*, pp. 27–43. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Callicott, J. B., 2013. *Thinking like a planet: The land ethic and the earth ethic*. Oxford University Press.

Cheney, J., 1991. Callicott's 'Metaphysics of Morals', *Environmental Ethics* 13: 311–25.

Crowder, G., 2002. *Liberalism and value pluralism*, Continuum: London.

Crowder, G., 2015. Value pluralism, diversity and liberalism. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, *18*, pp.549-564.

Cuomo, C., 2002. *Feminism and ecological communities*. Routledge.

Darwin, C. 1964. *On the Origin of Species*. Harvard University Press.

Darwin, C. 1981 (Originally published 1871). *The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

DesJardins, J. R., 2006. *Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy.* USA: Thomson Wadsworth.

Dewey, J., 2002. *Human nature and conduct*. Courier Corporation.

Dewey, J., 1938. *Logic: the theory of inquiry.* Holt.

Domsky, D., 2001. Evaluating Callicott's attack on Stone's moral pluralism. *Environmental Values*, *10*(3), pp.395-415.

Dow, S. C., 2004. Structured pluralism. *Journal of Economic Methodology*, *11*(3).

FitzPatrick, W. J., 2004. Ethical pluralism without complementarity. *Perspectives in biology and medicine*, 47(2), 181-188.

Garnett Jr, R.F., Olsen, E. and Starr, M. eds., 2009. *Economic pluralism* (Vol. 122). Routledge.

Gill, M.B. and Nichols, S., 2008. Sentimentalist pluralism: Moral psychology and philosophical ethics. *Philosophical Issues*, *18*, pp.143-163.

Gräbner, C., 2017. The complexity of economies and pluralism in economics. *Journal of Contextual Economics–Schmollers Jahrbuch*, *137*(3), pp.193-225.

Grinnell, F., Bishop, J. P., and McCullough, L. B., 2002. Bioethical pluralism and complementarity. Perspectives in biology and medicine, 45(3), 338-349.

Hadley, A. T., 1913. *Some influences in modern philosophic thought*. Yale University Press.

Hargrove, E. C., 1992. Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value. *The Monist*, *75*(2), pp.183-207.

Hendry, R. F., 2012. The chemical bond. In *Philosophy of Chemistry* (pp. 293-307). North-Holland.

Hume, D., 1739–40. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.

Hume, D., 1751. *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. T. L. Beauchamp, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Jamieson, D. ed., 2008. *A companion to environmental philosophy*. John Wiley & Sons.

Johannsen, K., 2021. Species of pluralism in political philosophy. *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, *55*(3), pp.491-506.

Kronlid, D., 2003. *Ecofeminism and environmental ethics* (Doctoral dissertation, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis).

Leopold, A., 1921. The wilderness and its place in forest recreational policy. *Journal of Forestry*, *19*(7), pp.718-721.

Leopold, A., 1949. *A Sand County Almanac*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leopold, A., 1966. *A Sand County Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from Round River*. New York.

Leopold, A., 1979. Some fundamentals of conservation in the Southwest. *Environmental ethics*, *1*(2), pp.131-141.

Light, A., 1996. Callicott and Naess on Pluralism, *Inquiry* 39: 273–94.

Light, A., 2001. The Case for Practical Pluralism, in Andrew Light (ed) *Environmental ethics: An anthology*.

Light, A., 2010. Methodological Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Environmental Ethics, in D. R. Keller (ed.), *Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions*, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell.

Light, A., 2013. Environmental Pragmatism as Philosophy or Metaphilosophy?: On the Weston–Katz debate. In *Environmental pragmatism* (pp. 325-338). Routledge.

Lo, Y. S., 2001a. The land ethic and Callicott's ethical system (1980-2001): An overview and critique. *Inquiry*, *44*(3), pp.331-358.

Lo, Y. S., 2001b. Non-Humean holism, un-Humean holism. *Environmental Values*, *10*(1), pp.113-123.

Lovelock, J. E. and Margulis, L., 1974. Atmospheric homeostasis by and for the biosphere: the Gaia hypothesis. *Tellus*, *26*(1-2), pp.2-10.

Lynch, M. P., 1998. *Truth in context: an essay on pluralism and objectivity*. Mit Press.

Mallon, R. and Nichols, S., 2011. Dual processes and moral rules. *Emotion Review*, *3*(3), pp.284-285.

Millstein, R. L., 2015. Re-examining the Darwinian basis for Aldo Leopold's land ethic. *Ethics, Policy & Environment*, *18*(3), pp.301-317.

Minteer, B. A., 1998. No experience necessary? Foundationalism and the retreat from culture in environmental ethics. *Environmental Values*, *7*(3), pp.333-348.

Minteer, B. A. and Manning, R. E., 2000. Convergence in environmental values: An empirical and conceptual defense. *Ethics, Place & Environment*, *3*(1), pp.47-60.

Minteer, B. A., Corley, E. A. and Manning, R. E., 2004. Environmental ethics beyond principle? The case for a pragmatic contextualism. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, *17*, pp.131-156.

Naess, A. and Sessions, G., 1986. The basic principles of deep ecology. *The Trumpeter*, *3*(4).

Naess, A., 1994. The shallow and the deep, long-range ecological movement. *Inquiry*, *16*, pp.130-140.

Nelson, M. P., 2010. Teaching Holism in Environmental Ethics. In Environmental Ethics, Vol. 32: 33-49.

Nichols, S., 2004. *Sentimental rules: On the natural foundations of moral judgment*. Oxford University Press.

Norton, B. G., 1984. Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism. In *Environmental Ethics*. Vol. 6, No. 2: 326-338.

Norton, B. G., 1991. *Toward unity among environmentalists*. Oxford University Press.

Orton, D., 2000. Ecofascism: What Is It? Retrieved November 10, 2023, from http://home.ca.inter.net/~greenweb/Ecofascism.html.

Özer, M., 2012. On the possibility, necessity, and practicability of Leopold's land ethic. Dissertation, Middle East Technical University.

Pinchot, G., 1910. *The fight for conservation*. Doubleday, Page.

Pratt, S.L., 2007. The experience of pluralism. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, *21*(2), pp.106-114.

Reardon, J. ed., 2009. *The handbook of pluralist economics education*. Routledge.

Regan, T., 1983. *The Case for Animal Rights.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rolston, H., 1975. Is There an Ecological Ethic?. *Ethics*, 85: 93–109.

Routley, R., 1973. Is there a need for a new, an environmental ethic? *Proceedings of the 15th World Congress of Philosophy*, 1: 205–10, Sophia: Sophia Press.

Singer, P., 1975. *Animal Liberation*, New York: Random House.

Sober, E., 2003. Philosophical problems for environmentalism, in *Foundations of Environmental Philosophy: A Text with Readings*, ed. by Frederik A. Kaufman. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Stone, C. D., 1987. *Earth and Other Ethics*. New York: Harper & Row.

Stone, C. D., 1988. Moral pluralism and the course of environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, *10*(2), pp.139-154.

Taylor, P., 1986. Respect for Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Varner, G. E., 1991. No Holism Without Pluralism. *Environmental Ethics* 13: 175–79.

Warren, M. A., 1983. The Rights of the Nonhuman World, in Robert Elliot and Arran Gare, *Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 109-131.

Warren, M. A., 1997. *Moral status: Obligations to persons and other living things*. Clarendon Press.

Wenz, P. S., 1993. Minimal, Moderate, and Extreme Moral Pluralism, *Environmental Ethics* 15: 61–74.

Weston, A., 1992. Before environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics* 14 (4):321-338.

Weston, A., 2013. Beyond intrinsic value: Pragmatism in environmental ethics. In *Environmental pragmatism* (pp. 285-306). Routledge.

White, L., 1967. The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis. *Science*, 155: 1203–7; reprinted in Schmidtz and Willott 2002.

Williams, B., 1985. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. Routledge.

Wolf, S., 1992. Two levels of pluralism. *Ethics*, *102*(4), pp.785-798.

APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

ANIL ULUTÜRK

EDUCATION

2009-2013 B.Sc. Computer Engineering
Middle East Technical University

2013-2014 B.A. Philosophy
Middle East Technical University

2014-2015 MSc. Artificial Intelligence (Informatics)
The University of Edinburgh

2018-2024 PhD. Philosophy
Middle East Technical University

WORK

2019-2021 Bol.com, Software Engineer
Utrecht, Netherlands

2021-2022 Ebay, Senior Software Engineer
Amsterdam, Netherlands

2022-2023 Microsoft, Software Engineer
Dublin, Ireland

2023-Present Google, Software Engineer
Dublin, Ireland

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Çevre etiği, içerdiği karmaşıklık ile uzun yıllardır tartışmaları üzerine çeken bir alan olmuştur. Bu karmaşıklık hem ele aldığı konuların çeşitliliğinden hem de regüle etmeyi amaçladığı varlıklar ya da toplulukların çokluk ve zenginliğinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, karmaşıklığın nasıl kontrol altına alınabileceği ya da karmaşıklığın içinde nasıl kurallar ya da etik normlar üretilebileceği ile ilgili iki ana kamp görmek mümkündür: tekilcilik (monism) ve çoğulculuk (pluralism). Bu kamplarda çokça farklı felsefeci ve çevreci figür yer almasına rağmen en belirgin tartışmaların odağı 1980lerden bu yana J. Baird Callicott ve Christopher D. Stone olarak görülebilir. Christopher Stone bir hukukçu olarak çevre etiğine baktığında gördüğü karmaşıklığı, politik ve hukuki düzlemdeki sorunları fark etmesi sonucunda 1987 yılında *Earth and Other Ethics* adlı kitabında çoğulculuğu savunmuş ve tekilciliğin çevre etiğindeki sorunlara yetersiz kaldığı iddiasında bulunmuştur. Callicott ise 1990 yılndaki "The Case Against Moral Pluralism" ve sonraki birçok yazısında da bu görüşe karşı çıkmış, tekilciliği savunmuş ve önermiştir. Tekilciliği savunma sebeplerinden en önemli ikisi de ona göre çoğulculuğun göreciliğe (relativism) düşme riski ve çoğulculuğun birden fazla teori arasında karar vermede başarısızlığıdır. Callicott, bu eleştiriyi baz alarak kendisi Aldo Leopold'un Toprak Etiği (Land Ethic) üzerine kurduğu bütünsel (holistik) ve toplumcu (communitarian) teorisini alternatif olarak sunar. Callicott'a göre onun Toprak Etiği üzerine kurduğu bu tekilci teori, çoğulcu teorilere kıyasla şu kriterler sebebiyle tercih edilmelidir:

- Tutarlı bir etik bakış açısı,
- Birbiriyle rekabet içinde olan ahlaki sorumlulukları dengeleme ve önceliklendirme becerisi,
- Tartışmaların üzerinden yürütülebileceği ortak bir kelime haznesi ya da terminoloji, ve buna bağlı olarak eşölçümlülük (commensurability).

Bu sebeplere dayanarak, Callicott tekilci etiğin diğer çoğulcu etiklere, özellikle de Christopher Stone'un savunduğu çoğulcu teoriye üstün olduğunda ısrar etmektedir.

Ben ise bu tezde Callicott'un sunduğu tekilci etiğin zaman içinde evrimine ve kökenlerine bakarak, aslında kendisinin eleştirdiği çoğulcu teorilerden çok da uzak bir noktaya gelmediğini savunuyorum. Bu savımı öne sürerken, Callicott'un kendisinin belirlediği tekilcilik kriterleri (ya da çoğulcu teorilerde eksik olarak gördüğü) özelliklere odaklanıyorum ve Callicott'un kendi etiğinin de bu kriterler çerçevesinde ne durumda olduğunu inceliyorum. Bunun dışında, Callicott'un, teorisinin mihenk taşı olarak gördüğü Aldo Leopold'un Toprak Etiği, David Hume'un duyumsayışçı felsefesi ve Charles Darwin'in evrimci görüşlerini mercek altına alıyorum.

Bu incelemeler sonunda vardığım kanı ise Callicott'un kendi etiğinin, zaman içinde evrilerek kendi eleştirdiği çoğulcu karakteristiklere giderek daha fazla büründüğü oluyor. Ayrıca, Callicott'un iddiasının aksine, onun etiğini üzerine kurdugu diğer düşünürlerin aslında tekilci, bütünsel ve sadece duyumsayışçılığa dayanan bir etiği aslında açıkça desteklemediğini, hatta bu görüşlere karşı olabileceklerini ele alıyorum.

Tezi bu tarihsel analizle bitirmemek adına hem Callicott'a teorisini gerçekten tutarlı bir hale nasıl getirebileceğimizle ilgili önerilerde bulunuyorum, bunlar: Callicott'un ilk naif bütüncül etik formülasyonuna geri dönmek, ya da Callicott'un etiğinin son geldiği hali çoğulcu olarak kabullenmek.

Bu tekilcilik ideali yerine ise daha gerçekçi olduğunu düşündüğüm pragmatist bir yaklaşımı öneriyorum. John Dewey'den ödünç alınan fikirlerle ve onun pragmatizmini örnek alarak (çevre etiğinde de benzer bir tavırla), çoğulculuk-tekilcilik tartışmasını ele alıyorum. Tekilci teorilerin zaman içindeki evrimi, çoğulculuğun birçok alanda artan popularitesi ve başarısı, çoğulcu yaklaşımların gerçekçiliği de göz önüne alındığında, çevre etiğinde de çoğulculuğun daha ılımlı ve gelişime açık bir yaklaşım olduğu savunuyorum. Ayrıca, Callicott'un tekilci teorisinin karşısında Bryan Norton ve Ben A. Minteer gibi çevre etikçilerinin savunduğu bağlamsalcı (contextualist) çoğulculuğu daha başarılı bir alternatif olarak öneriyorum.

Tezin içeriğine gelirsek, ilk bölümlerde çevre etiğinin genel bir özetini yaptıktan ve tarihsel geçmişini ele alıyor, sonrasında Callicott ve Stone arasındaki tekilcilik-çoğulculuk tartışmasına geçiyor, hemen ardından Callicott'un etiğini yine kendisinin belirlediği tekilci kriterlere göre değerlendiriyorum. Bu değerlendirmenin sonucuna

dayanarak etiğinin ve felsefesinin geldiği noktayı çoğulculuğa daha yakın bulduğumu işaret ediyor ve Stone'un etiği ile Callicott'un etiğinin geldiği son noktayı karşılaştırıyorum: bu karşılaştırma sonunda Stone'un etiği ile Callicott'un etiği arasındaki farkların giderek azaldığını ve Callicott'un 2013 yılındaki Dünya Etiği (Earth Ethic) ayrımlardan sonra ise neredeyse yok olduğunu işaret ediyorum ve çoğulculuğun nasıl albenili bir alternatif olduğuna da dikkat çekiyorum. Bu önerileri yaparken de biyoetik, hukuk, politika, ekonomi gibi alanlardaki çoğulculuk uygulamalarının başarılarına da dikkat çekmeye özen gösteriyorum. Son olarak da tartışmamı tekilcilik-çoğulculuk konusuna ve benim nasıl bir çoğulculuğu çevre etiğinde önerdiğime getiriyorum. Hem Callicott'un teorisini tutarlı bir tekilci teoriye çevirme yolunda önerimi, hem de çoğulculuğu kabul ettiğimizde ne tür bir çoğulculuğun daha gerçekçi ve çevre etiğine uygun olduğunu irdeliyorum: bana göre bu olası alternatif "bağlamsalcı çoğulculuk" (contextual pluralism).

Tarihsel çevre etiği incelemesi tezimin ilk kısmını oluşturuyor. Bu bölümde insan merkezci ve insanmerkezci-olmayan yaklaşımları özetlemeye çalışıyorum. Öncelikle insanlara içsel değer atayan insanmerkezci teoriler ve bunun karşısında insan dışı varlıklara veya topluluklara da içsel deger atayan insanmerkezci-olmayan teorilerin kabaca tanımlarını veriyorum. Çevre etiğine baktığımızda çeşitli düşünce akımlarının insanmerkezci ya da insanmerkezci-olmayan kamplara yerleştirilmesi çok da kolay degil, bunu da not etmek gerekiyor. Bu sebeple Ekomerkezci ya da Derin Ekoloji gibi akımları bu tanımlara sığdırmaya çalışmaktansa çeşitli ana akımları bir spektrumda incelemeyi daha uygun buluyorum. Bu incelemede Hayvan Refahı ve Hakları, Biyomerkezcilik, Ekomerkezcilik, Derin Ekoloji ve Çevre Pragmatizmi akımlarını ayrı başlıklarda inceliyorum. Bu spektruma bakıldığında kabaca söylenilebilir ki, Hayvan Refahı ve Hakları gibi düşünceler sadece hayvanlara karşı ahlaki sorumluluk üretirken Derin Ekoloji ya da Ekomerkezci yaklaşımlar tüm doğayı kucaklama ve insanların tüm canlılara ya da topluluklara karşı ahlaki sorumluluğunu savunma taraftarılar. Dolayısıyla insanmerkezcilikten uzaklaşmak bu spektrumda çeşitli derecelerde ya da güçlerde oluyor denilebilir.

Bu spektrumun en uç noktalarına baktığımızda ise Türcülük ve Eko-Faşizm denilen iki tehlikeli ideolojiyi görüyoruz. İdealde her çevre felsefecisi bu uç noktalardan

kaçınmaya çalışsa da aslında kurulan teoriler bir şekilde bu noktalara yaklaşıyor olabilir ya da başka felsefeciler / çevreciler tarafından bu noktaları savunuyor olarak görünebilirler. Bunun en güzel örneklerinden biri Aldo Leopold'un Toprak Etiği ve Callicott'un bu etik üzerine kurdugu toplumsalcı ekomerkezci etiği denilebilir. Tom Regan tarafından bu iki etik de insanları doğadaki diğer varlıklarla aynı seviyede değerlendirdiği için, ve daha da önemlisi, insanları tekil olarak değil bir topluluğun parçası olduğu ölçüde değerli bulduğu için Eko-Faşist olarak nitelendirilmişlerdir. Aslında bu uç noktalardaki kategorizasyon Leopold'un ya da Callicott'un teorilerine ilk bakışta net olarak fark edilemese de, ekomerkezci teorilerinin temeline oturttukları kurallar, insanların doğa için feda edilmesini engelleyen herhangi bir öncül içermemektedir. Dolayısıyla en masumane görünen çevreci etik bile Türcülük ya da Eko-Faşizm yargılarından tamamıyla korunmuş sayılmaz.

Bu tarihsel incelemenin önemi ya da asıl amacı, Callicott'un tarihsel olarak çözümlemeye çalıştığı sorunlara ya da kaçınmaya çalıştığı durumlara dair bir öncül olmaktır. Bir sonraki bölümde Callicott'un tarihsel evrimini ele aldığımda, çevre etiğinin üzerine kurulduğu bu sorunsal daha anlamlı hale gelmektedir.

Bir sonraki bölümde ise Callicott'un tarihsel evrimini ele alıyorum. Callicott'un yazılarını ya da kitaplarını tam olarak kategorize etmek zor olsa da düşüncesinde belirgin kopma ya da kırılma noktaları görülebilmektedir. Bu kopmalar ya kendisine gelen eleştiriler sonucunda, ya da kendi çalışmaları sonucunda teorisinde fark ettiği açıkları ya da sorunları çözümleme çabalarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bir örneği, önceki bölümde de bahsettiğim gibi Eko-Faşizm tartışmalarıdır. Başka bir örneği ise Toprak Etiği'nin kısıtlı kapsamını genişletme ve Toprak Etiği üzerine kurdugu kendi etiğini 21. yüzyıla daha uygun hale getirme çabası sonucudur. Tarihsel olarak teorisine ve etiğine baktığımızda Callicott'un kariyerini 5 ana faza ayırmamız mümkündür:

Naif bütüncülük: Bu ilk fazda Callicott, Aldo Leopold'un Toprak Etiği'ni yorumlayarak kendi toplumsalcı ve bütünsel etiğini oluşturuyor. Leopold'dan ödünç aldığı "insanların doğayla eş" olması fikrini Leopold'un maximiyle de birleştirerek felsefesini tüm ekosistemi kapsayan homojen bir hale getiriyor. Felsefesinde tek bir prensip var, o da biyotik komunitelerin içsel degeri ve korunması. Bu korunma

argümanını da insanların diger canlılarla olan evrimsel geçmişine ve bundan ötürü olan evrimsel süreçteki yoldaşlığına bağlıyor.

Ağaç halkaları modeli: İnsanları bütün diğer canlı topluluklarıyla aynı kefeye koyması ve bu sebeple gözden çıkarılabilir kılması Callicott ve Leopold'a Eko-Faşizm eleştirilerine yol açıyor. Bu sorunu çözümlemek için Callicott bu ikinci fazda farklı komunitelerin yol açtığı farklı çevresel sorumlulukları derecelendirmeye çalışıyor. Örneğin bir insan için hem hayvan toplulukları hem de kendi türü sorumluluklar getirdiğinde, insan sorumluluklarını ilk olarak en iç çeperden (yani kendi türünden) sağlamaya başlıyor. Bu durum yeni gelen sorumlulukların, yani hayvanlara olan sorumluluklarımızın, insanlara olan sorumluluklarımızı ezmesini önlüyor. Bir ağacın gövdesindeki halkalar ya da çeperler gibi her yeni gelen komunite bize yeni bir sorumluluk halkası ekliyor, fakat içlerdeki halkalar ve dolayısıyla da önceki çeperdeki sorumluluklar asla yok olmuyor.

İkinci derece prensipler: Önceki fazla ilgili sorun görülebileceği üzere, bizi insanmerkezciliğe, hatta türcülüğe yeniden götürmesi, çünkü insanlar ya da bize en yakın komunitelerin öncelikleri her zaman önce değerlendirilecekse, o durumda insan olmayan komunitelerin gereksinimleri hep ikinci plana atılacak demektir. Dolayısıyla Callicott Eko-Faşizm eleştirilerinden kaçmaya ve felsefesini daha ılımlı hale getirmeye çalışırken insanmerkezciliğe doğru kayıyordu önceki fazda. Bununla ilgili sorunları çözümlemek için de bu fazda, farklı komunitelerin getirdiği sorumlulukları sıralamak ve önceliklerini belirlemek adına 2 tane yeni prensip ortaya atıyor, bunlara da ikinci dereceden prensipler (Second-Order Principles) diyor. Bu prensiplerin ilki daha eski ya da bize daha yakın komunitelerin sorumluluklarını öncelemeyi kurallıyor. İkinci prensip ise daha ciddi veya önemli sorunları öncelemeyi kurallıyor. İki prensip bir araya geldiğinde ise farklı komunitelere olan sorumlulukları sıralamada eğer problemlerin önem sırası aynıysa yakınlık derecesine göre karar vermeyi, değilse de önem sırasına göre karar vermeyi kural haline getiriyor diyebiliriz. Bir örnek vermek gerekirse, eğer bir hayvanın türünün tehlikesi ile insanların ekonomik kârı arasında seçim yapmamız gerekirse, daha önemli olan sorumluluk bir hayvanın tür tehlikesi olduğu için bunu koruma yoluna gitmemiz gerekmekte. Ama eğer insanların varoluş sorunları ile başka bir hayvan topluluğunun varoluş sorunları arasında seçim

yapmamız gerekiyorsa bu durumda insanları, yani bize daha yakın olan komuniteyi tercih etmemiz gerekmekte. Bu sonuca bakıldığında Callicott önceki fazdaki taraflı (biased) sıralama sorunu bir şekilde daha az sorunlu hale getirmiş görünüyor.

Sentetik yaklaşım – Kompozisyonalizm ve Fonksiyonalizm: Bu faz, Callicott'un komuniteler arasındaki farklar sebebiyle farklı kuralların daha uygun olacağını gözlemlemesi sonucu ortaya çıkıyor. Önceki fazda komuniteler bir ana ve 2 yardımcı prensiple yönetilmeye çalışılıyordu, ve genellikle insanların bir komunitenin parçası olduğu varsayımı vardı. Callicott'un bu fazda ayrımını yaptığı şey ise insan komunitelerine entegre olmamış doğal ya da izole alanlar ile insan komunitelerinin entegre olduğu alanlar: Callicott bu ayrımı biyotik komuniteler ve karışık komuniteler şeklinde yapıyor. Ona göre bu iki komunite için aynı komunitaryen etik kuralları geçerli olamaz, bu sebeple bu iki kategoriyi farklı ontolojilerle değerlendirmeyi ve farklı prensiplerle yönetmeyi öneriyor. Bu ontolojiler fonksiyonalizm ve kompozisyonalizm: fonksiyonalizm canlılar arasındaki enerji döngüleri ve süreçlere / ilişkilere odaklı iken, kompozisyonalizm tekil komunitelere odaklı. Bu çerçevede, fonksiyonalizm karışık komunitelere uygulanırken, yani insanların entegre olduğu alanlarda süreçlerin korunması esas iken, kompozisyonalizm biyotik komunitelere uygulanıyor ve burada canlı toplulukları ve türlerin korunması esas hale geliyor. Callicott'a göre bu yaklaşım çoğulcu gibi görünse de aslında degil, çünkü bu iki yaklaşım ve ontoloji aslında birbirini tamamlar (complementary) durumda.

Dünya Etiği: Bu faz ise yine Aldo Leopold'un eserlerinde önceledığı, Toprak Etiği'nden daha geniş bir etiğe olan ihtiyaca cevap olarak geliyor. Toprak Etiği daha kısıtlı kapsamda, yerel komuniteler ve bunların birkaç yıl içindeki süreçlerini ve sağlığını ele alıyordu. Callicott Toprak Etiği'nin, ve dolayısıyla onun üzerine kurduğu kendi komunitaryanist etiğinin de kapsamının kısıtlı olduğu, dünyanın 21. yüzyılda baş etmesi gereken küresel ısınma gibi daha büyük çevresel sorunlara bir yorum getiremediğini düşünüyor. Bu sebeple de kapsamı daha geniş ve insanmerkezci ya da insan odaklı başka bir etik oluşturuyor: Dünya Etiği. Bu etik yine Aldo Leopold'un izlerini takip ederek oluşturulan bir etik, ve Leopold'un kendi eserlerinde insanmerkezci bir yönlendirmesi olmasa da Callicott'un gerçekçi bulduğu yaklaşım insanmerkezci bir Dünya Etiği. Bu etik hem global insan populasyonunu, hem de

yakın zamandaki sonraki jenerasyonu subjesi olarak alıyor. Bu sebeple, Toprak Etiği'nden farklı olarak daha geniş bir alanda çevre etiğiyle ilgili sorunları cevaplamayı amaçlıyor. Callicott'a göre, önceki fazdaki gibi, bu fazda da bir çoğulculuk yok, çünkü Dünya Etiği, Toprak Etiği'ni tamamlar durumda.

Bu 5 ayrı faza baktığımızda Callicott'un felsefesinin zaman içinde çeşitli eklentiler ya da düzeltmelerle eksikliklerini kapamaya çalıştığını görüyoruz. Bunda başarılı olup olamadığını sonraki bölümde inceliyorum.

Sonraki bölümde ise tekilcilik-çoğulculuk tartışmasına dönüyorum. Bu tartışmayı genel olarak Callicott ve Stone'un argümanları üzerinden inceliyorum. Callicott'a göre insan doğası tekilciliğe daha uygun, çünkü insan zihni tutarlı bir ahlaki teoriyi tercih eder ve birden çok teoriye ya da ahlaki norma aynı anda kendimizi adamak ona göre "çoklu kişilik bozukluğu"na yol açar. Stone'a göre ise dünyanın karmaşıklığı ve çevre sorunlarının karmaşıklığı, tek bir teorinin ya da etiğin tüm sorunları çözmesine imkan vermiyor, ve tek bir teori bunları çözmeye çalıştığında bozulup ilk çekiciliğini kaybediyor ya da tanınmaz hale geliyor.

Bu tartışmaya değindikten sonra da farklı çoğulculuk kategorilerini inceleyip Callicott'un özellikle kişi-içinde (intrapersonal) çoğulculuğa ve teorik (theoretical) çoğulculuğa karşı çıktığını, diğer çoğulculuk kategorilerine açık bir argümanı olmadığını not ediyorum. Sonrasında ise literatürdeki çoğulculuk seviyeleri ya da derecelerini Peter Wenz'in kategorizasyonuyla ele alıyorum: bunlar minimal, orta ve ekstrem çoğulculuk olarak 3e ayrılıyor. Wenz'e göre Callicott'un teorisi Ağaç Halkaları fazında en azından orta seviye çoğulculuk içeriyor denilebilir. Bu seviyede aynı kökenden gelen birden fazla prensip teoride bulunsa da bunlar arasında sıralama yapacak bir kural sunulmus olmalı, ve önceki bölümde incelediğimiz gibi, Callicott'un Ağaç Halkaları Modeli tam da bu ayrımı yapıyor. Stone'un çoğulculuğu ise Wenz'e göre ekstrem çoğulculuk kategorisinde, çünkü birden fazla farklı kökenden gelen teoriyi aynı anda etiktee kullanmayı amaçlıyor.

Bu ayrımları yaptıktan ve Callicott'un nasıl türden çoğulculuğa karşı olduğunu keskinleştirdikten sonra Callicott'un teorisinin değerlendirmesine geçiyorum. Bu değerlendirmeyi öncelikle Callicott'un kendi tekilci teori kriterlerine göre, sonra da

Peter Wenz'in çoğulculuk dereceleri kategorizasyonuna göre yapıyorum. Tablo-1'de gösterildiği üzere Callicott'un ilk fazı yani Naif Bütüncül etiği kendi tekilci kriterlerinin hepsini karşılarken, sonraki fazları yavaş yavaş bazı özellikleri, örneğin "farklı sorumlulukların dengelenmesi" ya da "ortak bir terminoloji" gibi kriterleri yavaş yavaş kaybediyor. Özellikle Callicott'un Sentetik Yaklaşım fazı ve Dünya Etiği fazına baktığımızda, çevreyi farklı alt gruplara bölmesi, ve bu gruplara farklı kökenlerden yola çıkan prensipleri ya da teorileri uygulamaya çalışması onu çoğulcu başka teorilere giderek yaklaştırılıyor, kendisi kabul etmek istemese bile. Bu fazları Stone'un teorisiyle karşılaştırdığımızda ise Stone'un teorisinin karşılayamadığı kriterleri (yani çoğulculuğa kaydığı açıları), Callicott'un etiğinin son 2 fazının da karşılayamadığını gözlemliyoruz.

İkinci olarak ise Callicott'un her fazını, bu sefer de Wenz'in çoğulculuk derecelerine göre inceliyorum. Wenz'in kriterlerine bakıldığında da Callicott'un ilk fazları minimal ya da orta derece çoğulculuk denilebilirken, özellikle son 2 fazı, farklı kökenlerden gelen teori ya da prensipleri, herhangi bir önceliklendirme yoluna gitmeden aynı anda kullanmaya çalıştığı için ekstrem çoğulculuk kategorisinde değerlendiriliyor. Bu durum göz önüne alındığında, Callicott'un son dönemdeki etiğinin Stone'un ekstrem çoğulculuğundan pek bir farklı kalmadığını gözlemliyoruz.

Bu iki inceleme göz önüne alındığında, aslında Callicott'un başka çoğulcu teorilere olan eleştirilerinin, şu anki geldiği noktada kendi kurduğu etiklere de aynı derecede uygulanabilir ya da yönlendirilebilir olduğunu görüyoruz. Sonuç olarak kendisinin çoğulculuğa dair yaptığı eleştiriler ve bundan kaçma çabaları, bana göre, istediği etkiyi yapmış ve onu çoğulculuktan azat etmiş gibi görünmüyorlar. Bu sebeple, sonraki bölümlerde çoğulculuğun neden daha gerçekçi bir alternatif olduğunu, Callicott'un tarihsel süreçlerinin de onu buraya ittiğini aklımızda bulundurarak inceleyeceğim.

Sonraki bölümde ise Callicott'un dayanak olarak aldığı Leopold, Hume ve Darwin'in görüşlerini inceliyorum. Callicott'un teorisi hem Toprak Etiği hem duyumsayışçılık hem de evrim kökeninden beslendiği için, bu üç kökenin aslında Callicott'u destekleyip desteklemediğini ele alıyorum. Bunlardan ilki Leopold'un çevreci görüşleri. Her ne kadar Callicott, Leopold'un bütüncü ve tekilci bir etiği savunduğunu söylese de Leopold'un eserlerine baktığımızda, daha çoğulcu, daha pragmatism

çağrışımları içeren bir dil görüyoruz. Leopold, Callicott'un aksine çevre sorunlarını sadece duyumsayışçılık bazında bir prensiple çözmek yerine kültürün ve insan değerlendirmesinin de ağır bastığı bir etik yaklaşımı öneriyor gibi görünüyor, yani aslında insanın doğaya karşı olan duyguları Leopold'a göre formülün sadece bir parçası. Bu açıdan Callicott'un argümanlarının aksine, Leopold, daha çoğulcu ve pragmatic bir figür olarak ortaya çıkıyor, ve bu sebeple Toprak Etiği'nin de kökenleri, aslında Callicott'un kurmak istediği toplumcu etiği tam olarak desteklemiyor gibi görünüyor.

Bunun dışında hem Hume'un duyumsayışçı görüşlerine, hem de Darwin'in evrimci görüşlerine baktığımızda daha tekilci bir duygu teorisi ya da etik görüş fark ediyoruz. Callicott'un etiği toplumsal duygulara ve komunitelere dayalı bir etiğe odaklanmasına ragmen, Hume'un duyumsayışçı teorisi tekil canlılara duyulan yakınlığı ele alıyor, Darwin'in etik görüşleri ise bireylerin bireylere karşı olan etik sorumluluklarını tartışıyor. Bu açılardan bakıldığında, hem Hume hem de Darwin'in görüşlerinin, Callicott'un kurmaya çalıştığı duyumsayışçı ve toplumcu etiğe uygun olma ihtimali giderek azalıyor.

Önceki bölümlerdeki analizleri ele aldığımızda Stone'un çoğulcul yaklaşımına daha az önyargıyla ve sorunları nasıl çözmeye çalıştığına odaklanarak tekrar bakma zamanı geldiğini düşünüyorum. Bir sonraki bölümde de bu sebeple Stone'un kurmaya çalıştığı çoğulcu etiğin, aslında kurallara dayanan, rölativizmden uzak durmaya çalışan ve farklı teorileri kullanarak tek bir çözüme varma amacı taşıyan bir çoğulculuk olduğunu vurguluyorum. Bu açıdan, Callicott'un eleştirileri aksine, Stone'un teorisi aslında bizi "her şeyin makbul" olduğu bir çoğulcu çıkmaza değil, sorunların rasyonel olarak çözümü için tek bir noktaya bizi götürmeye çalışan, birden fazla teorinin ya da prensipin ölçüp tartıldığı bir çoğulculuğa işaret ediyor. Stone ayrıca her sorunun tek bir kesin çözümü olamayacağını, ama bu durumların azınlık olduğunu belirtiyor. Ona göre, bir durumla ilgili birden fazla prensip ya da teori bize farklı şeyler söylüyorsa, ama iki teori de eşit derecede makul ve uygulanabilir ise, kararı sezgilerimize, elimizdeki bilgilere, karakterimize göre (nasıl bir yargıç karar veriyorsa) yapmamız gerektiğini söylüyor. Dolayısıyla Stone, sunduğu etiğin her soruna tek bir çözüm sunamadığının farkında. Fakat bazı durumlarda ortaya çıkan belirsizliğin, yani birden

fazla teorinin aynı anda uygulanabilirliğinin doğal olduğunu, ve çevre etiğinden daha fazla bir kesinlik beklenmemesini öneriyor.

Stone'un görüşlerini detaylandırdıktan sonra ise çoğulculuğun diğer alanlardaki başarısını ele alıyorum. Bunun en belirgin örneği biyoetik alanı olarak göze çarpıyor. Bu alana bakıldığında tamamlayıcılık (complementarity) terimine gerek duymadan, tam anlamıyla ekstrem bir çoğulculuk uygulandığında daha başarılı bir teori elde edildiğini Fitzpatrick'in yazısında görmek mümkün. Detaylarına bu özette girmesem de, benzer olumlu süreçler politika, ekonomi ve psikoloji gibi alanlarda da benzer durumlar görülebiliyor. Bu alanlarda da tekilci teorilerin ya da modellerin tam olarak açıklayamadığı ya da tahmin edemediği durumların, çoğulcu teorilerle daha başarılı şekilde yapıldığını gösteren araştırmalar ve yayınlar mevcut. Bu trendlere bakıldığında ise, özellikle son yıllarda çoğulcu yaklaşımların, çevre felsefesi dışında alanlarda da başarısı yadsınamaz. Elbette bu durum aynı trendi sorgusuz sualsiz çevre etiğine uygulamak için bir sebep değil, ama en azından çoğulculuğa karşı Callicott'un sunduğu argümanlara kritik bir bakış açısıyla yaklaşmak, ve ardından çoğulcu yaklaşımları gerçekçi olarak değerlendirmek için bir fırsat niteliğinde.

Bundan sonraki bölümde ise pragmatik bir bakış açısıyla neden çoğulcu yaklaşımların çevre etiğinde daha uygun olabileceğine göz atıyorum. Amerikan pragmatist gelenekten de yola çıkarak, uzun süreç içinde bizim işimize daha fazla yarayan, ya da alternatiflerinden daha başarılı çözümler sunan yaklaşımların tercih edilmesi gerektiğini savunuyorum. Bu açıdan, Callicott'un önerdiği ekomerkezci tekil yaklaşımların zaman içinde evrimini tekrar hatırlatıyorum ve çoğulculuğa doğru zaman içinde çekildiklerini tekrar gözlemliyorum. Bu duruma bakıldığında, çevre problemlerinin de kompleksliği göz önüne alındığında çoğulcu yaklaşımların daha gerçekçi çözümler sunabileceğini, daha açık görüşlü ve farklı alanlarla beraber çalışmayı da desteklediğini belirtiyorum. Benim sunduğum bu pragmatik yaklaşım, tekilci yaklaşımlara tam olarak bir alternatif olmadığı, daha ikincil bir seviyeden onların alternatiflerine dikkat çektiği için bundan Meta-felsefi çoğulculuk olarak bahsediyorum.

Neden tekilcilikten öte başka çoğulcu teorilerin değerlendirilmesi gerektiğine dair düşüncellerimi belirttikten sonra, tekilciliğe karşı olarak nasıl bir yaklaşımın daha

uygun olduğunu bir sonraki bölümde ele alıyorum. Bu yaklaşım bana göre bağlamsalcılık ya da bağlamsalcı çoğulculuk. Temelselcilik (foundationalism)'e karşı duran bu yaklaşım, soyut kuralların ya da ilkelerin somut durumlara uygulanmasına bir eleştiri olarak ortaya çıkıyor ve özellike John Dewey'in pragmatik görüşlerine dayanıyor. Bunun tam tersine, aslında kuralların ya da ilkelerin, ancak bir bağlamda (context içinde) anlamlı olduğunu, dolayısıyla ilkelerin de formülasyonlarının aslında somut durumlardan yola çıkması gerektiğini savunuyor. Bu açıdan bakıldığında bağlamsalcılık aşağıdan-yukarıya (bottom-up) bir yaklaşım olarak kendini sunuyor. Tabii ki bu yaklaşım tekil durumlara odaklandığı için ahlaki görecelik ya da rölativism ile eşleştirilme riski taşıyor, fakat bunlar iki farklı yaklaşım. Callicott'un çekindiği ya da eleştirdiği ekstrem rölativism "her şey makbul" ya da kuralsızlık yaklaşımına yol açtığı için sorun oluşturuyorken, bağlamsalcılık ise context ya da bağlam açısından genellemelerle kuralların ve prensiplerin oluşturulmasını ve prensiplerin durumlara bakılarak uygulanması gerektiğini savunuyor. Bu açıdan rölativizm bazı durumlarda kuralsızlık olarak görülse de (ki bu kategorizasyon da esasen tartışmaya açık ve rölativistlerin kabul etmediği bir durum), en azından bağlamsalcılığın özünde prensiplerin kurulmasını destekleyen, fakat prensiplerin bağlamdan bağımsız uygulanmasına karşı çıkan bir yaklaşımdır. Bu sebeple, Stone'un çoğulculuğunun da benzer bir okumasını yapmak mümkün: Stone'a göre farklı etikler, prensipler ya da teoriler, karşılaştığımız durumlara göre seçilip uygulanıyordu, bağlamsalcı çoğulcu yaklaşıma göre de bu durum farklı değil. Stone'un çoğulcu yaklaşımında hangi teorilerin hangi durumlara uygulanabileceği sezgi, karakter, bilimsel veriler gibi durumlara dayanırken, bağlamsalcılıkta da kabaca durumlar yine benzer faktörler tarafından değerlendirilip uygun teoriler buna göre belirleniyor denilebilir. Bunlar göz önüne alındığında Stone'un çoğulculuğu, bağlamsalcılık ile ortak karakteristikler taşıyor ve benzer etik yaklaşımlar olarak görünüyorlar. Özetle, benim tekilci yaklaşımlara alternatif olarak sunduğum da bu türden bir çoğulculuk.

Çevre etiği bağlamında Ben A. Minteer çoğulculuğu bağlamsalcı bir biçimde savunan isimlerden biridir. Weston ve Norton'a benzer şekilde Minteer, geleneksel çevre etiğinin temelci ve tekilci eğilimlerinin gerçekçi olmadığını ve bunun yerine bir alternatif olarak bağlamsalcılığı ileri sürüyor. Bu yaklaşım, etik ikilemlerimizi zaman, kültür ve diğer birçok faktör bağlamında ele almayı öneriyor. Bu, etik ikilemleri çözme

şeklimizin coğrafyadan coğrafyaya veya kültürden kültüre değişebileceği anlamına geliyor; ancak daha da önemlisi, ekolojik dünya görüşünün değişken olduğunu ve aynı topluluk içinde bile zaman içinde değişebileceğini ima eder. Ancak bu değişkenlik ve fleksibilite bizi çevresel çatışmalarımızı çözmekten alıkoymuyor: Minteer'e göre kamuoyu ve insanların çevresel sezgileri, çevresel politikaların ve teorilerin belirlenmesini de şekillendiriyor. Bu sebeple çevresel tartışmalarda, bağlamsalcı ve çoğulcu yaklaşımı çevre sorunlarıyla mücadelede demokratik ve ampirik bir yöntem öneriyor.

Bu bağlamsalcı ajandayı desteklemek için Minteer bir topluluk içindeki hem çoğulcu hem de bağlamsalcı eğilimleri değerlendirmek için çeşitli anketler gerçekleştirdi ve insan merkezli olmayan temel bir nihai ilke olmadan doğanın ve insan olmayanların haklarının korunamayacağı görüşünü çürütmeye çalıştı. Araştırmalarının sonucu, Callicott gibi tekilcilerin savunduklarının aksine, tek bir bireyin aynı anda uyumsuz etik teorilere sahip olabileceğini ve bağlama bağlı olarak bu farklı teorileri farklı çevresel sorunlara uygulayabileceğini gösteriyor. Ayrıca, sonuçlar, bir bireyin benimseyebileceği çevresel bakış açılarının çeşitliliğine (örneğin, insan merkezli, insanmerkezli-olmayan çelişkili görüşlerin çeşitliliğine) bakılmaksızın, kamuoyunun doğanın korunması yönünde benzer kararlar verdiğini ve birçok açıdan ortak noktaya çıktığını gösteriyor.

Bu sonuç, elbette, Minteer'in analizleri dikkate alındığında yalnızca tanımlayıcı ya da deskriptif görünmektedir. Bu sadece bireylerin günlük çevresel kararlarında çevre teorileri hakkında birbiriyle çelişen (ancak toplumsal açıdan da ortak bir noktada birleşebilen) görüşlere sahip olabileceklerini gösterir; durumun böyle olması gerektiğini degil. Ancak bu yine de etik teorilerin ideolojileriyle birlikte geldiği ve insanların etik görüşlerinden (yani Callicott'un savunduğu tutarlı benlikten) tam bir tutarlılık bekledikleri görüşünü çürütmeye dair iyi bir adım. Buradan anlaşılıyor ki, Callicott'un söylediğinin aksine, bireyler olarak bir arada tuttuğumuz çeşitli dünya görüşleriyle çok tutarsız olabiliyoruz ve bu teorileri karşılaştığımız gerçek hayattaki vakalarla karıştırıp eşleştirerek günlük ahlaki ikilemlerde yolumuzu bulmaya çalışıyoruz. Dolayısıyla, bir bireyin karşılaştığı pratik çevresel zorluklar, Callicott'un varsaydığından çok daha eksik, kusurlu ve belirsiz görünüyor ve zihinsel yaşamlarımız

da bunu yansıtıyor gibi görünüyor. Dahası, bu zorluklar katı ahlaki teorilerle yönetilemiyor gibi görünüyor ve bunların çözümünde daha esnek ve çoğulcu bir yaklaşım bekleniyor. Bu çizilen resim bir kez daha bağlamsal yaklaşımların temelci ve daha spesifik olarak tekçi yaklaşımlara göre uygulanabilirliğini de vurguluyor. Bu nedenle Callicott, sosyal bilimlerin yalnızca tanımlayıcı olma iddiasında olduğu konusunda ısrarcı olsa da, bu onların aynı zamanda bize yol gösterebilecegi olabileceği en az bir yönünü ortaya koyuyor, bu da Callicott iddasının aksine, insanın ahlaki yaşamına ve zihinsel durumlarına ilişkin ideal tanımlamalarımızın gerçekçi olmadığı.

Özetle, genel olarak bağlamsalcılık, Callicott'un Stone'u desteklemekle suçladığı aşırı görecelik ve nihilizmden bir çıkış yolu sağlıyor gibi görünüyor. Bunun yerine Stone, Weston ve Light gibi çoğulcuların önerdiği gibi, etik teoriler elimizdeki araçlar olduğunu işaret ediyor: bu da demektir ki bağlama bağlı olarak kişi karşılaştığı etik ikilemi çözebilmek için teoriyi seçer. Ancak daha da önemlisi, bu bağlamsalcı görüş, kuralsızlığı ya da ilkesel nihilizmi gerektirmez. Aksine, bağlama bağlı seçimler zamana, kültüre, politikaya ve ahlaki ikilemlerimizi değerlendirdiğimiz diğer birçok faktöre dayanmaktadır. Ve son olarak, bu bağlama bağlı seçimler aşırı öznelciliğe ve göreciliğe indirgenmiyor çünkü genel olarak topluluk (ve hatta küresel olarak insanlık), bu bağlamsalcılığı çevre etiğine uygularken ortak zeminlere ve ortak bir anlayışa sahip görünüyor. Bu bağlamın kendisi ise statik veya değişmez değil, zamanla değişebilir ve evrilebilir, çünkü ancak hiçbir ahlak teorisi mükemmel ve eksiksiz değildir; çevre etiğinin güzelliği de budur. Alanın karmaşıklığı, günlük sorunlarımızı çözmek ve politika oluşturma sürecimize rehberlik etmek için demokratik, çoğulcu ve sürekli değişen bir metodolojiyi gerektirmektedir ve bunu teorik odalarımızda tek başımıza yapmayı bekleyemeyiz. Her şeyden öte, çevre etiği uygulamalı bir etiktir ve nihai ve statik bir ilke veya ilkeler dizisi altında birleştirilmeye zorlanmak yerine, onunla birlikte gelen karmaşıklık memnuniyetle karşılanmalıdır.

Sonuç bölümünde ise yapılan tartışmaları özetliyor ve Callicott'un teorisi ile ilgili bahsettiğim olası revizyonları tekrar not ediyorum.

Yıllar boyunca Callicott'un teorisine kuşbakışı bakmaya çalıştığımızda, onun Naif Bütüncülük ile başladığını, Ağaç Halkaları modeliyle onu giderek daha karmaşık ve köklü hale getirdiğini gördük. İkinci Dereceden ilkelerle, teorisinin kapsadığı birden

fazla ilke veya görev arasında nasıl öncelik verileceğinin bir açıklamasını yaptığını inceledik. Daha sonra farklı ontolojileri sentetik bir yaklaşımla içine entegre ederek, ilk Toprak Etiği formülasyonunda olduğu gibi, çevresel kavramların çeşitliliğini bütünsel bir şekilde ele almayı hedeflemişti. Ve son olarak, iklim değişikliği gibi küresel çevre sorunlarının önemini ve Toprak Etiğinin sınırlamalarını fark ederek, çevre sorunlarını gezegen ölçeğinde ele almak için Toprak Etiğini tamamlaması beklenen Dünya Etiğini formüle etmişti.

Ancak bu evrimin bir bedeli olduğunu da inceledik; Callicott'un teorisinin ilerki fazlarında gördüğümüz eklektik ve çoğulcu özellikler. Tek bir toplulukçu ahlaki ilke başlangıçta ona tamamen tekilci bir teori sağlamış olsa da, Toprak Etiğine daha çeşitli ilkeleri, sözcük dağarcığını ve ontolojik kavramları kabul ettikçe çoğulculuğun unsurları teorisine sızıyor. Tekçiliği savunduğu ve çoğulculuğu eleştirdiği zeminler yavaş yavaş kendi teorisine yöneltilebilecek temel argümanlar haline geliyor. Bu, teorisinin çevresel zorluklarla baş etmede başarılı olmadığı veya bütünsel özelliklerini bir kenara bıraktığı anlamına gelmiyor. Callicott'un Leopoldian Toprak Etiği'nden yola çıkarak kendi çevresel görüşlerini uyarlamasının her zaman bütünsel bir bakış açısı sağlamaya çalıştığına ve her çevre etiği programının dikkate alması gereken çeşitli topluluklardaki çeşitli çevresel kaygılarla başa çıkmada iyi bir iş çıkardığına inanıyorum. Ancak aynı zamanda onun Toprak Etiği (ve daha sonra Dünya Etiği'nin de eklenmesiyle) artık etiğinin tekilci bir yaklaşım olarak nitelendirilmesinin ve etiketlenmesinin haklı olmayacağını düşünüyorum. Uzun yıllar boyunca çoğulculuğu eleştirdiği ve tekilciliği savunduğu kriterlere bakıldığında, kendi çevre felsefesinin nasıl çoğulcu özellikler içerdiğini ve ilk Naif Bütünsel yaklaşımından itibaren başlangıçtaki tekçilik duygusunu kaybettiğini görüyoruz. Bu durum aynı zamanda Callicott'un teorisinin, Peter Wenz'in başlangıçta kategorize ettiği orta çoğulcu konumdan büyük ölçüde değişmesi ve Christopher Stone'un belirgin çoğulcu duruşuna çok yaklaşmasıyla da daha da artıyor.

Callicott'un teorisinin yıllar içindeki gidişatına dair bu kadar eleştirel bakış açısının ardından, sormamız gereken soru: varsayımları nerede doğruydu ve teorisinin nerede revizyona ihtiyacı vardı? Callicott'un başlangıçtaki Naif Bütüncülüğü üzerinde yaptığı değişikliklere ilişkin sezgisinin doğru olduğuna inanıyorum: hiçbir tek bütünsel ilke

çevre etiğinin karmaşıklığını evrensel olarak yakalayamıyor gibi görünüyor. Çoğulcuların ve bağlamsalcıların etik alanında benimsedikleri tutum da budur. İlk olarak teorisi, uygulamalı ilkeler açısından karışık topluluklar ve biyotik topluluklar arasında bir ayrım öngördü ve son olarak Toprak Etiği ve Dünya Etiği için getirdiği kapsam ayrımını öngördü. Böylelikle Callicott, ilke ve teorilerde belirgin bir çoğulculuğu kabul etmek istemese de, bu karmaşıklığı tamamlayıcı olarak nitelendirdiği bir ikilik içinde çözümlemeyi amaçladı. Bu noktaya kadar karmaşıklığın nasıl yakalanacağı konusundaki sezgileri konusunda Callicott'a katılıyorum, ancak onun bu tamamlayıcı ikilik üzerindeki ısrarı ve insanmerkezli-olmayan dünya görüşünü çevresel sorunlarla baş etmenin tek yolu olarak görmesi farklı düşündüğümüz nokta olarak ortaya çıkıyor. Çoğulculuğu korkulacak ve tutarlı etiklerin ya da teorilerin dışında tutulacak bir şey olarak görmüyorum; bunun yerine çevre etiği gibi karmaşık uygulamalı alanlarla uğraşırken çoğulculuğu çok önemli bir yaklaşım olarak buluyorum. Tüm çevresel alanları kapsamak için hep başvurduğu 2 (yani Toprak Etiği ve Dünya Etiği) sayısında takılıp kalmamayı öneriyorum; Belirli bir bağlamda yararlı olabileceklerini kanıtlayabilecek tüm teorileri kabul ediyorum ve çevresel ikilemlerimizi çözmede en başarılı olanın seçilmesini destekliyorum. Bu, pek çok pragmatistin de hemfikir olacağı sade ve basit anlamda "bağlamsalcı çoğulculuk"tur. Ayrıca, Minteer, Norton ve diğer birçok çoğulcu çevre felsefecisi gibi zeminini ve yararlılığını kanıtlayan birden fazla teoriye dayanan ilkeli çoğulculuğu destekliyorum ve bu sürecin demokratik, ampirik ve toplumsal olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ve son olarak, fikirleri tam olarak doğru şekilde sunulamadığı için sert bir şekilde eleştirilmiş olsa da, bu bağlamsalcı yaklaşımın Christopher D. Stone'un onlarca yıl önce düşündüğü çoğulcu etiğinden çok da farklı olduğunu düşünmüyorum.

Elbette, çoğulculuğun tekçiliğe en sonunda tercih edilip edilmeyeceği veya üstün olup olmadığı başlı başına ayrı bir tartışmadır ve farklı çoğulculuk türlerinin sınıflandırılmasına ilişkin, avantajları ve dezavantajları ile de görüşler bildiren pek çok literatür de mevcuttur. Bu derin konu, bu tezde kapsamlı bir şekilde ele alamayacağım bir tartışma. Bunun yerine, Christopher Stone ve diğer pek çok kişinin çalışmalarında çoğulculuğun avantajlarını öne çıkardığına dikkat çektim ve esas olarak çevre etiğinin karmaşıklığına ve mevcut farklı yaklaşımların çeşitliliğine atıfta bulunarak, çoğulculuk argümanlarını kısaca açıklamaya çalıştım. Bu tartışmayı kısa tutmak adına

ve Toprak Etiği'ni doğru bir şekilde categorize etmeye odaklanmayı sürdürmek adına, çoğulculuğun sistematik bir savunmasını daha fazla tartışmaktan kaçındım. Bunun yerine, özellikle de bir alan çok fazla karmaşıklık ve belirsizlik içeriyorsa son bölümlerde çoğulculuğun pratikte daha iyi bir yaklaşım gibi göründüğünü belirttim. Dolayısıyla, çevre etiğine ilişkin görüşlerimi kategorize etmem gerekse, uzun vadede işe yarayan bir çevre teorisi seçerken pragmatik bir yaklaşımı teşvik etmek amacıyla, çevre tartışmalarının daha geniş kapsamındaki duruşumu meta-felsefi çoğulculuk olarak adlandırırdım. Cevresel değer teorisi veya aksiyoloji olarak desteklediğim teori türünde ise bağlamsal çoğulculuğu belirttim.

Çoğulcu yaklaşımımın ilk kısmı, tekilciliğin çevresel zorlukların karmaşıklığıyla başa çıkmada başarısız olması nedeniyle çoğulcu alternatifleri tekçi alternatiflere tercih etmeye yönelik meta-felsefi bir yöntemdi. Callicott, Stone tarafından verilen çoğulculuğun varsayılan avantajlarından bahsettikten sonra şu retorik soruyu sorar: “Neden? Neden hepimiz neşeli ahlaki çoğulcu olmuyoruz?” ve yine kendi verdiği cevabı şudur: "İnsanlar dünyaya ve birbirimize karşı kişisel ve ortak bakış açımızda tutarlılık ve anlama derinden ihtiyaç duyar ve bunun için güçlü bir şekilde çabalarlar". Bunun birçok insan için geçerli olabileceğine yürekten katılıyorum ama bunun herkes için bir zorunluluk olarak genellenebileceğine inanmıyorum. İronik bir şekilde, onlarca yıl sonra Andrew Light, Callicott'un ahlaki çoğulculuk sorusuna ironic bir bakış açısıyla tam tersi soruyu sormuştur: "Eğer Callicott'un toplulukçuluğu, her tür şeye bir toplum içinde değer verme sorununa bir yanıt almak için yeterliyse, o zaman tekçilik-çoğulculuk tartışması neden devam etti?” Bu soruyu, eğer tekilcilik bu kadar doğalsa ve ruhumuza derinlemesine işlemişse, neden çoğulcu fikirlerin ya da teorilerin (başka alanlarda çoğulculuğun başarısını tartıştığım gibi) ortaya çıkmaya devam ettiğini sorarak genişletmek istiyorum. Eğer tekilci görüşler her şeye çözüm bulabildiyse, pek çok bilim dalında neden çoğulcu yaklaşımlar bunca yıldır daha popüler hale geliyor? Bu soruların cevabının, çoğulcu yaklaşımların başarı ve zenginliğinde, tekçi yaklaşımların ise pek çok alanın doğasında var olan karmaşıklığa uyum sağlamadaki başarısızlığında yattığını düşünüyorum.

Çoğulcu duruşumun ikinci kısmı ise çevre etiği ve politika oluşturma konusunda bağlamsalcı bir bakış açısı önermekti. Bu, başta John Dewey olmak üzere Amerikalı

pragmatiklerin dünya görüşüne uyum sağlamayı ve J. Baird Callicott gibi tekilci çevre felsefeclieri tarafından genellikle benimsenen çevre etiğindeki temelci yaklaşımı reddetmeyi içeriyor. Bana kalırsa, özellikle Callicott'un problemli varsayımı "nedenlerin önce, politikaların ikinci sırada geldiği" düşüncesinde yatmaktadır ve çevresel ikilemlere ilk ilkeleri bulma konusundaki ısrar, etikteki her türlü pragmatik veya somut durumlara öncelik veren yaklaşımın önünü kesmektedir. Nasıl ki Antik Yunanlılar uzun zaman önce bilimin tüm dallarını tek bir çatı altında toplanıp incelenecek bütünsel bir varlık olarak algılıyorduysa, çevre etiği de aynı varsayımı bu yüzyılda yapıyor ve gerçek dünyanın karmaşıklığının kolayca tek bir çatı altında toplanabileceğini umuyordu, bunu da tek bir nihai teori (veya Toprak Etiği gibi aynı ortak zemine sahip teoriler bütünü) ile yapmayı amaçlıyordu. Ancak, bugün bilimlerin bölümlere ayrılması ve uzmanlaşması, ve bilimsel alanların karmaşıklığını kabul ettiğimiz gibi, pek çok felsefeci de etik alanında tüm etik kaygılarımızı tek bir teori altında toplamanın pratik olmadığını kabul etti. Ancak Callicott'un korktuğunun aksine, pek çok kişi yaklaşımların çeşitliliğini ve her birinin olası eksikliklerini kabul ederken, ahlaki çevrelerimizdeki tutarsızlıklarla yaşamayı öğrendiler ve insanlar bir histeri gibi çoklu kişilik bozukluğundan muzdarip olmadılar. Bunun yerine, bu çeşitliliğe uyum sağlamayı ve etik teorileri, verili koşullara göre kullanılabilecek, karşılaştırılabilecek ve birbirleriyle değiştirilebilecek araçlar olarak görmeyi başardılar. Bu çoğulcu bakış açısının en iyi çözüm olup olmadığını, bu yaklaşımın hem teorik hem de pratik ortamda ne kadar başarılı olacağına bağlı olarak zaman gösterecek. Ancak, en azından pragmatik bir bakış açısından bakıldığında, kendimizi Stone'un da dediği gibi gerçekçi olmayan bir ideale adamak yerine, yani bir gün tüm ahlaki soruları güvenilir bir şekilde cevaplayacak tek ve tutarlı bir ahlaki teori beklemek yerine, çevre ile ilgili ahlaki sorunlarımızı cevaplayabilecek çeşitli teorileri kabul etmek, öngörülebilir gelecekte daha kabul edilebilir bir çözüm gibi görünüyor.

Genel olarak, tıpkı bilimlerin mevcut bölümlendirmesinin son söz olmaması gibi, çevre etiğindeki mevcut çoğulcu yaklaşım anlayışının da son söz olması gerekmez. Dewey'in pragmatizminden esinlenen bağlamsalcı ve çoğulcu yaklaşımların önerdiği şey, çevre etiğinin, değerlerin hem bağlama bağlı olarak hem de zamana göre değişmesini kabul eden deneysel ve demokratik bir çaba olması gerektiğidir. Sanırım Stone, çevre sorunlarımızla nasıl başa çıkacağımıza dair empirik bir yaklaşımı

savunurken bunun da farkındaydı. Hadley ve Weston'un izinden giderek, çevre etiğinin doğası gereği çoğulcu bir alan olduğunu nihai olarak kanıtlayamasak bile, çoğulculuk ve tekçilik tartışmasına yaklaşımımızda meta-felsefi çoğulcu bir bakış açısı hedeflememiz gerektiğini savunuyorum. Bu sadece zamanın testinden geçmiş en mantıklı görüşü benimsemek ve çevre alanında Weston'ın belirttiği gibi "gerekli mayalanma döneminin, kültürel deneylerin ve bu çok sesliliğin sadece başlangıç olduğunu" kabul etmekle başlar. Bu nedenle, özellikle çevre etiği gibi bir alanın gençlik dönemindeki kesinlikten uzak zamanlarında, tek bir nihai yanıt beklemek çok fazla olabilir ve çoğulculuk, daha spesifik olarak bağlamsalcı çoğulcu bir konum daha uygun bir alternatif olarak görünmektedir.

Ve son olarak, bu tezin odak noktası olarak Callicott'un etiğine geri dönersek, eğer onun teorisini tutarlı kılmak istiyorsak, sadece iki çıkış yolu var gibi görünüyor: Etiğinin son geldiği noktayı çoğulcu olarak kabul etmek ya da bütünsel bir Toprak Etiğine yönelik politik suçlamalardan ya da kaygılardan vazgeçerek Eko-Faşist (Naif bütüncülük formülasyonu) ya da zayıf insanmerkezci (Ağaç-Halkalar modeli formülasyonu) teorisi olarak köklerine geri dönmek. Stone'un bir zamanlar iddia ettiği gibi, "herhangi bir teorinin, orijinal çekiciliğini tehlikeye atacak kadar tanınmayacak şekilde kendini esnetmeden tüm çevre sorunlarını karşılayabileceği şüpheli görünüyor". Bu açıdan, Callicott'un teorisi de benzer bir kaderle karşı karşıya gibi görünüyor, çünkü teorisini daha uzlaşmacı ve daha dengeli hale getirmeye yönelik herhangi bir girişim, ne yazık ki, onun etiğine en azından bazı çoğulcu özellikleri eklemeyi beraberinde getirdi ve bu da etiğinin başlangıçtaki tutarlı ve homojen yapısını tehdit etti.

C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

(Please fill out this form on computer. Double click on the boxes to fill them)

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences ☒

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences ☐

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : ULUTÜRK
Adı / Name : ANIL
Bölümü / Department : Felsefe / Philosophy

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English):
CALLICOTT AND THE ISSUE OF PLURALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☐ **Doktora** / PhD ☒

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. /** Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide. ☒
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years. *** ☐
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. ***** ☐

***** *Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.*

Yazarın imzası / Signature ..... **Tarih** / Date .....
(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)
(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)

Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.