

THE MILITARY STATUS OF THE NORTHEASTERN AEGEAN ISLANDS:
THE CONTENTIOUS GREEK AND TURKISH RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

THE MILITARY STATUS OF THE NORTHEASTERN AEGEAN ISLANDS: THE CONTENTIOUS GREEK AND TURKISH RELATIONS

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This thesis deals with the hotly debated issue of the demilitarized status of the Northeastern Aegean Islands. It attempts to examine the subject in question with unconventional approaches to come to the fore as much as it has relied on the original texts. Within this framework, a critique of the literature is undertaken, a new historical framework is established that focuses solely on the issue but does not exclude the variables that are thought to have influenced the development of the issue of demilitarization, and the applicability of various international relations and broader social science theories are discussed within this framework, alongside with practical experiences and developments. It also explores what extent extra-regional actors and other parameters contributed to the development of the issue. It concludes that an unconventional approach, involving IR as well as other branches of social sciences, is necessary to get to the heart of the matter.

Keywords: Demilitarised Status, Geopolitics, International Law, Northeastern Islands, Treaty of Lausanne.

ÖZ

KUZEYDOĞU EGE ADALARININ ASKERİ STATÜSÜ: ÇEKİŞMELİ YUNAN VE TÜRK İLİŞKİLERİ

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Bu tez, Kuzeydoğu Ege Adaları'nın askerden arındırılmış statüsü gibi çok tartışılan bir konuyu ele almaktadır. Söz konusu konuyu, orijinal metinlere dayandığı kadar, geleneksel olmayan yaklaşımları da ön plana çıkararak incelemeye çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede bir literatür eleştirisi yapılmakta, sadece konuya odaklanan ancak askersizleştirme meselesinin gelişimini etkilediği düşünülen değişkenleri de dışlamayan yeni bir tarihsel çerçeve kurulmakta, çeşitli uluslararası ilişkiler ve daha geniş sosyal bilim teorilerinin uygulanabilirliği bu çerçevede pratik deneyim ve gelişmelerle birlikte tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca, bölge dışı aktörlerin ve diğer parametrelerin konunun gelişimine ne ölçüde katkıda bulunduğu da araştırılmaktadır. Çalışmada, konunun özüne inebilmek için uluslararası ilişkilerin yanı sıra sosyal bilimlerin diğer dallarını da içeren alışılmadık bir yaklaşımın gerekli olduğu sonucuna varılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gayri Askeri Statü, Jeopolitik, Uluslararası Hukuk, Kuzey Doğu Ege Adaları, Lozan Antlaşması.

To My Beloved Ones

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DEIK	Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Board
EC	European Community
ECC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
FSRU	Floating Storage and Regasification Unit
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICJ	International Court of Justice
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JEC	Joint Economic Commission
LNG	Liquid Natural Gas
MDCA	Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAVTEX	Navigational Telex
NBDP	Narrow Band Direct Printing
NK	New Democracy Party
ONHO	Office of Navigation, Hydrography and Oceanography
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
R&D	Research and Development
ROPiT	Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SEV	Hellenic Confederation of Enterprises
SEVE	Greek Exporters Association
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance
TİM	Turkish Exporters Assembly
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Subject of Thesis

The North Aegean Islands are stunning landscapes that boast numerous marvels and a diversity of fascinating attractions that any observer would delight in exploring. Such marvels may belong to either nature or the product of genuine human craftsmanship. One famous example is the series of blue and white painted houses, which interestingly stem from the regulations imposed by the former military originated Greek governments. A law passed by the Metaxas Government in 1938 compelled the citizens to paint their houses white. The white composite, containing limestone, was seen as a useful disinfectant against the prevailing cholera during that era. Also, it echoed the pure uniformity of the militaristic regime. Following the era of the Greek Junta of the Colonels in 1967-1974, it was mandated that all Greek residences be painted blue and white as an homage to the blue and white Greek flag to promote Greek nationalism.¹ It is worth noting that such trademark cultural trait of the Aegean islands has its origins in the concerns of security and nationalism within a very context of prevailing militarism. The serene appearance of these islands is deceiving as it masks the ongoing presence of military-related issues, much like the peacefully lying blue and white houses with the background emerged from militarist contexts. Moreover, this concealed militarism in the islands is not solely confined in the domestic parameters of Greece but also geopolitically entangled due to the inevitable involvement of another actor from the other side of the Aegean coastline, the

¹ Niko Dudler, "Why are Greek Island Homes Blue and White?", 16.01.2024, Elxis Real Estate Consultancy, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://elxis.com/why-are-greek-island-homes-blue-and-white/>

neighbouring Turkey. In reality, the islands were formerly a substantial component of the Ottoman Empire, and their status has persisted as a continuous, unsettled matter between Greece and Turkey, specifically with regard to the Greek military presence on these islands which Turkey cannot tolerate on the legal basis that rejected by Athens.

Thus, there is a dispute as to whether or not the islands are demilitarised. Turkey claims that the historic legal basis for the demilitarisation of the noted Greek islands is undeniably present.² Greece, however, follows up a pattern of the remilitarisation on the islands³ like one can put it, as if an observer wants to contrast the practical situation *vis-à-vis* the legal claim. This matter is a prominent cause of tension between Greece and Turkey. It requires comprehensive investigation to analyse the causes of the tension. The initial category encountered are the islands of the Straits Region (Turkish: Boğazönü Adaları, Greek: Porthmos). This category encompasses strategically significant islands and a chain of smaller islands, primarily including Lemnos / Limni and Samothraki / Semadirek.⁴ The second group of islands comprises the Central Aegean Islands, also referred as the Eastern Sporades, Saruhan or the Asian Islands. These include Lesvos/Midilli, Chios/Sakız, Samos/Sisam and Ikaria/Nikaria.⁵ The military status of these islands, although there may be additional ones, has undergone a conflictual history between Turkey and Greece, considering the exogenous involvement as well. In addition, Stephen Mann claims that the

² See, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs , “Background Note on Aegean Disputes, The Demilitarised Status of the Eastern Aegean Islands”, Last Update: Unknown, Republic of Türkiye MFA, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa> ; Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs , “Issues of Greek-Turkish Relations, Turkish claims regarding the demilitarisation of islands in the Aegean Sea”, Last Update: 01.01.2024, Hellenic Republic MFA, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims-regarding-the-demilitarization-of-islands-in-the-aegean-sea.html>

³ See, Euronews, “Tensions after Turkey accuses Greece of militarising Aegean islands”, 29.09.2022, Euronews, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims-regarding-the-demilitarization-of-islands-in-the-aegean-sea.html>

⁴ Nuri Akbayar, *Osmanlı Yer Adları Sözlüğü*, (Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları) p.162, p.212. Semadirek is also addressed as Semendirek.

⁵ Akbayar, “Osmanlı Yer Adları Sözlüğü”, p.172, p.207, p.217, p. 117. Ikaria is also addressed as İkeryoni or Ahikerya

demilitarization/militarization of certain eastern Aegean islands, is apparently “a backseat to the other issues” in the Aegean Basin.⁶ This statement is an admission of a reality that the demilitarisation issue is often less investigated or considered to be carrying lesser importance.

The first historical legal documentation of the apparent demilitarisation claim can be traced back in the era of the Balkan Wars, when the whole status of the North Aegean Islands became the subject of the debate due to the Greek occupation of the islands in the late 1912, which provoked by the Italian occupation of Dodecanese in the same year and by the great powers that sought to manage and confine erupting Italian expansionism in the Aegean context. Following the end of the first Balkan War, the result of the London bargaining was the Treaties of London in May 1913 and Athens in November 1913 which produced the *nota verbal* of the Great Powers on 14 February 1914 that states the very first official references to the demilitarisation of the Northern East Aegean islands.⁷ The same decision also transferred the possession of islands into occupier hands. It is recognised as the Decision of Six Powers in the literature. Furthermore, as discussed in the upcoming chapters, the demilitarisation case has another purpose assigned and exploited by the great powers which ignored by the rest of the literature, causing the current negligence of today’s powers towards Turkish concerns as the former conjuncture changes. Continuing with the very brief historical summarisation, the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 approved the 1914 *nota verbale* of Great Powers in the Article 84. However, this treaty was not put into the force in practice due to the outcome of the Greco-Turkish War in Asia Minor. As so the negotiation from 1922 to 1923 and signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty on 24 July 1923 had to fill its place through the same reference and adding some new features to the context of demilitarisation in the acta and treaty articles of discussion. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the Straits Convention of Montreux in 1936 might possibly bring some fresh updates to the demilitarized status of the islands that later translated into even more conflictual interpretations of Turkish and Greek perspectives, which

⁶ Stephen Mann, *The Greek and Turkish Dispute in the Aegean Sea: Its Ramifications for NATO and the Prospects for Resolution* (Master’s Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001) p.27, p.30.

⁷ Bilal N. Şimşir, *Aegean Question Documents Volume-II (1913-1914)*, (Turkish Historical Society, 1989) p. 394. (In French. Both French and English Translation are available on appendices)

all to be explored in this thesis. Whilst, contrasting to this historical development, the official demilitarisation of the islands by the Greek government began with a royal decree of the Kingdom of Greece dated 4 April 1937. It declares the island of Lemnos was to be established as the fortified surveillance zone.⁸ Practically, however, the more recognizable efforts were escalated with the eruption and continuation of the Cyprus Problem throughout 1950s and 1960's, which produced the bilateral exchanges of official and unofficial notes that including warnings, justifications, and legitimizations related to the de-militarisation. The evolving and preserving dynamics of the Cold War and the fresh opportunities within the new international order then played the major role for the rest of the matter via involvement of the indirect US factor. Although it is possible that currently the US may exploit the demilitarisation issue between Greece and Turkey just like the former great powers designed and exploited the demilitarisation arrangement in regards their own interests and purposes, which are to be explored in the following chapters. Within this multi actor frame, Turkish security may not be the primary or only concern and it might explain the lack of international enforcement of the international law and treaties that do establish demilitarisation regime in the case of Eastern Aegean islands. Whilst, as with the lack of international enforcement of law and within the new international order setting, the UN serves as a platform for the concern regarding the issue. This historical process establishes the current conjuncture of the multipolarized post-Cold War Period in which now Greece actively denounces the demilitarized status on the official international stage and conducts the militarisation although the Turkish protests continue, as a recent hot debate from Summer 2021 to 2024 where the parties need the full-fledged constructive and critical evaluations of the dispute matter in which the outdated and short-coming literature of it must adapt.

1.2. Literature Review

There is a good deal of publications both on the history and legal status of the Aegean islands. The works of Bilal Şimşir and Hüseyin Pazarcı, which are characterized as almost biblical references, dominate Turkish literature, and have a considerable influence on other non-Turkish works as well. Şimşir provides the foundation for

⁸ Necdet Hayta, *Ege Adaları Sorunu 1911'den Günümüze*, (Gazi Kitabevi 2006) p. 262-263.

historical accounting with the assessment and demonstration of some relevant documents, while Pazarcı, also benefiting from the documentation of Şimşir, systematically summarizes legal argumentation of both parties and adds his own commentaries and relevant legal material on the subject in question. Whilst generally adding their own speculation and additional data, the authors such as Gürhan Yellice, Necdet Hayta, Cemallettin Taşkiran, Yaşar Ertürk, Alexis Heraclides, Ferruh Gerçek, Murat Eser, Fuat Aksu, Mustafa Aydın, Mustafa Bostancı, Yüksel İnan, Yücel Acer and S. Gülden Ayman utilized one of them as a base reference.

Bilal Şimşir depicts a multipolar realm of diplomacy concerning the fate of the islands during the Balkan Wars. In this framework, he argues that the Great Powers deliberately favoured Greece over the weakened Ottoman Empire.⁹ He is critical towards the British unilateral imperialistic imposition favouring when the great powers were trying to determine of the fate of the islands, especially considering the possession problem.¹⁰ However, he admitted that such deliberate intention was not sole existing factor of the Ottoman failure regarding the possession and status determination of the islands, but it was also about the infirmities and weaknesses of the Ottoman side as well as the changing international parameters like the incoming dawn of the WWI. He also provides the very first historical and legal documents regarding the demilitarisation.¹¹ However, as has been briefly discussed so far, Şimşir's work focuses specifically on the issue of islands' sovereignty, and the demilitarisation matter in question is often less referred by him.

Hüseyin Pazarcı, on the other hand, through his legal consideration based on his expertise, argues that the Great Powers consciously did compose an international law legislation concerning the islands which assured the security of both Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey via the demilitarisation.¹² He claims that the Greek arguments

⁹ Bilal N. Şimşir, *Aegean Question Documents Volume-I (1912-1913)*, (Turkish Historical Society, 1989) p. L-LV.

¹⁰ Şimşir, "Aegean Question Documents Volume-II (1913-1914)" p. XXIII-XXV.

¹¹ Şimşir, "Aegean Question Documents Volume-I (1912-1913)"
Şimşir, "Aegean Question Documents Volume-II (1913-1914)"

¹² Hüseyin Pazarcı, *Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış Statüsü*, (Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, Basın - Yayın Yüksekokulu Basımevi, 1986) p. 3., p. 15.

are no more than some fallacies or null and void products of legal ignorance and intention fabrication, holds no value of the truth. Therefore, the islands are strictly demilitarized in legal terms according to him. Additionally, Pazarıcı goes into a full historical survey and provides more background documentation and reference about the demilitarisation without just limiting himself with the primal material from the Balkan Wars. Followingly Yüksel İnan provides one of the most concrete and focused summaries on the issue of demilitarisation with his legal expertise and adds original legal comments regarding the subject.¹³ He sees the issue as a paradoxical historic creation of Greece which undermines Greece's own claimed objective of preservation of Lausanne legislature and İnan stresses on the fact that Greece itself was once admitting Turkish legal claims as also noted by Hayta.¹⁴

Necmettin Hayta provides a comprehensive historical account for the Aegean Islands from the Italian Ottoman Wars to 2000's which variety of sources, including Pazarıcı and Şimşir as noted.¹⁵

Gürkan Yellice does a systematic analysis of the general situation of the literature about the diplomatic history of Aegean Islands but still his particular focus was not understanding the demilitarisation as a case but drawing a very detailed diplomatic history framework where internal and external variables meet on a geopolitical playground that is to say for determining the fate of the islands.¹⁶

Murat Eser examines the Greek sources in his historical account regarding Greek PM Venizelos who is critically important for historical development of the matter in which a very considerable amount of information regarding the fate of islands can be found.¹⁷

¹³ Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer, "The Aegean Disputes: Introduction", *Foreign Policy Institute Magazine*, 2003, p. 13.

¹⁴ Necdet Hayta, "Ege Adaları Sorunu 1911'den Günümüze", p. 330.
Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer, "The Aegean Disputes: Introduction", p. 16.

¹⁵ Necdet Hayta, "Ege Adaları Sorunu 1911'den Günümüze"

¹⁶ Gürkan Yellice, *Ege Adaları Meselesi 1911-1914*, (Siyasal Kitabevi 2022)

¹⁷ Murat Eser, *Eleftherios Venizelos Yunan Arşiv Kaynaklarına göre Türk-Yunan İlişkileri*, (Yeditepe Yayınevi 2019) p. 140-142.

Eser particularly emphasizes on the British-Greek relations based on the geopolitical and political objectives of the Greek and British leaderships of that time by going on Venizelos and his associates, but the clear establishment of linkage should be made between the very issue of the militarization and Greco-English geostrategic harmony in which the British concerns and goals are here for providing the proper contextualization for the demilitarization. Since Eser's focus is not on the issue demilitarization but understanding the political world of Venizelos, Eser does not underline the beneficiaries of historically constructed regulation of demilitarization in which Turkey may not be the sole actor of interest from enjoying advantages of the regulation.

Cihat Yaycı provides the most up to date historical survey of the demilitarisation issue. He also offers a good deal of arms, infrastructures and deployment intelligence pertaining the islands. Meanwhile, in relation to his co-author, Osman Paksüt, they may express different set of ideas especially in relation to whether the Convention of Montreux of 1936 abolishes the demilitarised status of the islands of Straits Region and does it truly matter for the rest of legal material. Divergent discourse on the same issue contributes to in the sense that it generates richer discussion. However, his study with Osman Paksüt ignores the theoretical tools and is highly case oriented.¹⁸ This thesis is to benefit from the contributions of the noted previous studies.

1.3. The Research Question and Scope of Thesis

While the Aegean issues between Turkey and Greece range from the extension of continental shelves to the distribution of airspace which might and do relate to the military affairs of the noted countries, this study specifically focuses on the hotly debated issue of demilitarisation. This thesis examines a full historical and current frame of the issue of demilitarisation. It investigates the very dynamics behind the establishment and currently debated violation of the demilitarisation via utilising a fresher historical narrative and contemporary theoretical tools to demonstrate a greater

¹⁸ Cihat Yaycı and Osman Paksüt, *Soru ve Cevaplarla Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi "Nedir, Ne Değildir?"*, (Girdap Kitap 2022) p. 49, p. 239.

picture of it without sacrificing much from the bilateral relations focus which the former literature contain. The objective is to produce a proper analysis of demilitarization issue and to attain causal insights to encourage the future researchers to develop new possible approaches and interpretations for the issue.

1.4. Methodology

While this thesis relies heavily on qualitative methodology, the statistical data about the islands is used to provide evidence for the claims made about them. The texts and records of regarding *nota verbal's*, international agreements, and treaties have been demonstrated to keep up the whole evolution of the military status of the islands and the continuation of the issue. The related variables of other involved actors apart from Turkey and Greece is analysed and the concerning material developments are included. In that sense, the material is ranged from the Treaties of London and Athens to the current notes of Turkey and Greece on the UN, particularly including the concerning sections of the Sevres, Lausanne, and Montreux to the publications related to the relevant multi actor focused geopolitical dynamics. In addition to all these primary source materials, the relevant books, articles, news, memoirs, speeches, reports, think tank papers, relevant statistics, maps and demonstrative graphs are utilized under the scope of the thesis.

1.5. The Organization of the Chapters

After the first chapter that defines the main question, the second chapter focuses on the critical assessment and comparison about the historical and legal accounts and the arguments of both Greece and Turkey in this very issue. The third chapter revisits the history of demilitarisation issue to demonstrate the establishment and continuation of the issue as geo-politicised manner that goes beyond bilateralism through including the other influencing actors, with the basis and conclusion from the critical evaluation of the second chapter. The fourth chapter reveals the concepts and theories attempted to or potentially explain the demilitarisation dispute so far in a larger framework the previous subject-focused studies had done. The fifth chapter displays the current conjuncture and investigates contemporary situation under the light of this whole

survey and new sources or ideas which were not included before. The chapter six is the conclusion of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2

AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1. Introduction

This chapter surveys the relevant literature in order to establish a fresh critical review of the subject that aid in for the further analysis on the following chapters. The chapter provides a grasp of the current situation of literature covering the issue and adds necessary references in order to establish the comparison of the new narrative of this thesis to what has been told for the issue so far. This headline of analysis evaluates on what are the gaps, omitted points and less pointed out variables in the respective literature by thoroughly reviewing it and what the further research of this thesis offers for enhancing it.

2.2. Common Approaches

The common approaches are the entire discourse itself in which the issue is built on. This essence of narrative tells us what the problem is, on which ways and in what means it is defined, constructed and determined by the interest of actors. As so, it is also central for the problem of mis-conceptualization. It reflects two major inter-related but separately considerable perspective to the problem: The historical perspective and legal perspective. These perspectives are driven by their own terms and narratives based on an interactive and evolving reality, involving common readings, perceptions, inclinations and feelings pertaining the military status dispute of the Eastern Aegen Islands.

2.2.1 Historical

Historical accounts vary on the how to interpret the evolution of the matter and issue, reflecting a process in which the statuses of islands being determined both together and independent to each other and how involving parties shape their approach and stance in relation to the others. In that sense, some accounts set emphasis on the whole

historical process itself and evaluate on the process as an initiative for the composition of a diplomatic history in an Aegean-specific geographical scope. These sources usually are not primarily evaluating the demilitarisation but account for it as sub-issue related to the total picture of the given geographical subject matter, which are the Aegean islands. Especially Turkish sources are concerned with historical writing of the islands in comparison to the Greek accounts, where Greek sources seem scarce. Yellice mentions that surprisingly there is no full-fledged book about the diplomatic history of the Aegean Islands pertaining 1911-1914 era written in Greek language. Yellice states that the vast majority of Greek studies about the islands are dedicated to study modern issues of Greek Turkish relations.¹⁹ Yet Turkish historical sources in book format including Yellice's work occupy the landscape which can be considered a positive sum for Turkish readers over Greek readers for specialization on the political history of given region during the new status-quo establishment period of the islands in the early twenty century. Further, it can be argued that this condition of literature reflects more insights and clues about the differences between Turkish and Greek approaches to the general matter of Aegean Islands and sub-matter of the demilitarisation. It indicates the argued picture that there is a Greek tendency for considering the entire matter pertaining the islands as a closed subject which no further questions needed to be asked and answered within the benefit range of Turkey. According to this stance, the history granted Greece with the full sovereignty on a geographical region where Hellenes have been present and dominant in demographical and cultural terms all the way back to the antiquity, particularly thanks to the derived rights from Wilson's principle of national self-determination and the current international law.²⁰ As the result, Greek sources which refer to the history, both unofficial and official, tend to read any Turkish initiative to create a controversy on the subject matter as a challenge to assumed *Greek-ness* of the islands regarding all

¹⁹ Yellice, "Ege Adaları Meselesi 1911-1914", p.22, p.23

²⁰ See, Response of Venizelos to Inonu's opening speech pertaining the future of the islands and Lord Curzon's remarks regarding a potential plebisit attempts. "The Act 6, The Meeting on 25th of November 1922"

Seha L. Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar, Belgeler Cilt-1*, (İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları 2023) p.131, p.132, p.134.

See, Statement of Greek Delegate Member Caclamano pertaining the status of Strait Islands "The Act 7, The Meeting on 29th November 1922"

Seha L Meray, "Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar, Belgeler Cilt-1" p.141.

aspects, from the dimension of sovereignty to the security of the Greek State and People. It can be argued that such picture effectively reduces the chances of producing reason-centered evaluations by Greek party for the legitimate and based Turkish concerns regarding the demilitarization of islands. This bias can be seen within the letter of the United Nations (UN) Greek Representative, Maria Theophili, dated 27 July 2021, in which a Turkish argument regarding geographical vicinity of the Eastern Aegean islands to the Anatolian mainland posing threat is considered as a bad intention towards the Greek sovereignty on the islands.²¹ The letter was a respond to Turkish representative Feridun Sinirlioğlu's letter written to the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and Security Council dated in 13th of the same month. The prior was the official Turkish expression of the concern and denunciation in relation to the long-time ongoing Greek re-militarization on the islands.²² It is clear from the content that the Turkish letter was solely about the demilitarisation and there is any direct remark to the Greek sovereignty on the islands, which falls in line with the Turkish sovereignty of several Aegean islands as they were delivered to Turkey with the same documents that impose demilitarisation, in the article 12 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne.²³ Furthermore, Turkey renounces its sovereignty rights on the islands in the article 16

²¹ Maria Theofili, "Letter dated 27 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", 27.07.2021, UN General Assembly Security Council, Accessed on 11.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/209/60/PDF/N2120960.pdf?OpenElement/>

²² Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu, "Letter dated 13 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", 13.06.2021, UN General Assembly Security Council, Accessed on 11.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/191/06/PDF/N2119106.pdf?OpenElement> (Accessed on 11.06.2024)

²³ See, The Appendices, G. The Lausanne Treaty of Peace – Relevant Articles

Lawrence Martin, "Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923", *The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. II, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1924*, Accessed on 11.06.2024, Available electronic version, [Treaty of Peace with Turkey, 24 July 1923 \(pollitecon.com\)](https://pollitecon.com/Treaty-of-Peace-with-Turkey-24-July-1923)

Seha L. Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar, Belgeler Cilt-IV*, (İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları 2023) p.9.

See, The Appendices, L. Original Texts in French

Jus Mundi, "Traité de paix (traité de Lausanne) 1923", *Jus Mundi*, Accessed on 11.06.2024, Available electronic version, [Traité de paix \(traité de Lausanne\) 1923 \(jusmundi.com\)](https://jusmundi.com/Traite-de-paix-traité-de-Lausanne-1923)

Seha L. Meray, "Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar, Belgeler Cilt-IV", p.172.

of the same Treaty which it demands Greece to compel.²⁴ Contrast this historical base and the prior letter, the bad intention associating Greek response can be read within the commonly asserted Turkish argument which binds the demilitarisation and Greek sovereignty because they exist within the same historical decisions and same articles on the existing legal framework.²⁵ Pazarıcı claims that the historical legislature leans towards the confirmation of Turkish interpretation.²⁶ Meantime, it could be argued that the bad faith about the islands is no more than a mere assumption. As noted, since Turkey demands the absolute loyalty to the demilitarisation clauses and the related international legislature which also implementing distributed Greek and Turkish sovereignty rights on the Aegean islands. The Turkish argument logically assures the Greek sovereignty in itself by insisting on the demilitarisation, rather than attempt to replace the status-quo as the literature particularly misses this despite intensive emphasis on the status-quo exists. Theophili's negative intention argument is not only instance. Another example, Stivachtis, within his article which specifically focuses on the military status issue of the islands, argues that Turkey's stance regarding the whole Aegean issues is initiating negotiations so that it can alter the status-quo in its favour,²⁷ despite Turkey is historically an active proponent of status quo regarding the demilitarization which it perceives as the only legitimate regulation alongside with Greek sovereignty as noted above. Stivachtis again reflects this tendency of reaching the idea of the historically completed process of the status for the islands, which all in Greek favour according to Greek sources but contrary to the apparent status-quo on the historical legislature, due to the practical violation of Greece through the militarisation. As so far articulated, it is completed and undisputable subject in many Greek approaches since they assume the history actually concluded the matter of status of islands within their interest, both in theoretical and practical sense despite its inner contradictions. Meantime, Turkish stance is also conclusive regarding the historical

²⁴ Seha L. Meray, "Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar, Belgeler Cilt-IV", p.10, p.173.

²⁵ Hüseyin Pazarıcı, "Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış Statüsü", p.17-20. See, Çavuşoğlu's Statements in 2021 and 2022, Yayıncı and Paksüt, "Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi", p.223, p. 231.

²⁶ Hüseyin Pazarıcı, "Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış Statüsü", p. 18.

²⁷ Yanis A. Stivachtis, "The Demilitarization of the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands: The Case of Central Aegean and Dodecanese Islands", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 29, Volume XXIX, (1999), p.112.

development of the issue since it stresses on the legal base on the most textually and normatively strict sense. As noted however, Turkish position is logically valid. These stances meet in the common dominator of finalism. The finalist perception of historical process in which the commentators and actors of the demilitarization operate assures the conflictual nature as with difference in interpretation and action holds. Hence, identical to the other cases of the Aegean Dispute, it remains unresolved. The issue of demilitarisation contributes the historical material cost and effectively infuses into the summary of Turkish-Greek Dilemma by Heraclides:

The Greek-Turkish rivalry is one of the few oldest enduring conflicts between neighbours worldwide. From mid-1999 onwards relations are in a state of détente and there have been many attempts to resolve their outstanding differences (Aegean, Cyprus, minority issues) but until now very little has come out of these efforts and the occasional shows of good will, even though both sides are committed to an overall settlement and a final reconciliation. And the rivalry rumbles on at low ebb in spite of its staggering economic and other costs to both sides (armaments, militarization of border regions, costly over-flights of military aircraft and dangerous dogfights in the Aegean, the spending of valuable diplomatic and other capital that could have been spent more productively elsewhere).²⁸

The next chapters will seek causal insights behind why the seemingly costly options has been preferred by both parties. As noted, Turkish historical sources are more concerned with diplomatic history of Aegean islands pertaining the foundation of status-quo, they do reflect a discontent from the historical development despite relying on a strong written legal background on the demilitarization issue. Many Turkish authors and both official and unofficial commentators set emphasis on the fact that the Eastern Aegean islands are geomorphological and historical prolongations of Anatolia, the great land mass in the vicinity of the islands and consisting much of Turkish homeland.²⁹ While this statement is well established in the other domains of natural

²⁸ Alexis Heraclides, “The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity”, *Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe*, No.51, (2011), p.4.

²⁹ Yaşar Ertürk, *Adalar (Ege) Denizinde Türk - Yunan Mücadelesi*, (IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008) p. 30-33.

Ihsan Gürkan, “Realities and dreams in Greek-Turkish relations: A Turkish perspective”, *Lo Spettatore Internazionale*, Volume 17, No 17 (1982), p.352.

See, Inonu’s Opening Speech about the Aegean Islands.
Seha L Meray, “Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar, Belgeler Cilt-1”, p.130.

and social sciences such as the geology, history and geography; it could be claimed that this emphasis is derived from a yearning party among the Turks regarding the islands and it produces controversial politicised stances that even propagated into the literature of plate tectonics in which the tectonic status of islands in relation to Anatolia problematised.³⁰ There were and remain Turk habitants on the Aegean Islands, Turkish or Turkified names for each island even the given island seemingly a small piece of rock, and a history relating to long lasting Turkic rule ranging from the Beylics to the Ottoman Empire. For example, the name Dodecanese (Turkish: Oniki Adalar) derives from the Greek word for "Twelve" and refers to the twelve Ottoman governors who historically administered the Southern Eastern Aegean islands surrounding Rhodes, rather than indicating the actual number of islands including Rhodes. The subject case of thesis, Northern Islands has a sub-category known as Sarukhan which denotes a former Turkic Beylic that once had maritime interests in the Aegean Sea.³¹ The headline of "Ottoman Islands" was also a commonly applied reference for the islands in the official documents. The Lausanne Peace Treaty was criticized by indigenous islanders of Turkish origin during the ratification phase meetings in the Grand Assembly after the signation of Lausanne due to the fact that the Turkish objective of reassuring sovereignty rights over the former Ottoman islands has been failed.³² Before the second phase of Lausanne Conference, Turkish MPs already accused the Turkish Delegate for not committing sufficient effort to render the sovereignty status of islands and fail to hinder the confirmation of the transfer of the most Northern Eastern Aegean islands to Greeks and Dodecanese to Italians in the first official draft of Lausanne.³³ The modern historical studies from Turkish side still eagerly demonstrate such facts and hint their clear sympathy towards the idea that the distribution in Aegean Sea was inappropriate and unjust. The Ottoman counter proposal dated 29th of December 1912 to the Balkan Allies during the 6th meeting of London Peace Conference lied the historical foundation of this sensitivity. The Ottoman proposal stated that the Greek

³⁰ Sırrı Erinç and Talip Yücel, *Ege Denizi Türkiye ile Komşu Ege Adaları*, (Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1978) p.17.

³¹ Ferruh Gerçek, *Ege Adaları*, (Gece Kitaplığı, 2019), p. 18.

³² Ferruh Gerçek, "Ege Adaları", p. 162, p. 163, p.164.

³³ Ferruh Gerçek, "Ege Adaları", p. 157, p. 158.

occupied Aegean islands constituted inseparable pieces of Anatolia and the Babiali cannot abandon them,³⁴ which was the answer to the abandonment demand of Balkan Allies during the 5th Meeting on December 23.³⁵ Yet, with the ultimatum of the Great Powers dated 17th of January 1913,³⁶ the Ottoman resistance is gradually dissolved and the Babiali was convinced to recognise the Great Powers' will to determine the faith and status of the Eastern Aegean islands. The *coup d'état* of Committee of Union and Progress (CPU) dated 23rd of January 1913 facilitated the shift in the Ottoman attitude.³⁷ The result was the *nota verbal* of Six Powers which translated most of the Greek occupation into the Greek possession with the demilitarisation and anti-smuggling clauses as the text analysis will be covered in the chapter regarding legal accounts. The Turkish Press of that period announced this decision of the Great Powers as a declaration of disaster (İlan-ı Felaket).³⁸ These variables indicate an impactful historical development on Turkish psyche and memory. According to numerous Turkish accounts interpreting the historical period, the status regarding Aegean islands was a byproduct of complex and deliberate manoeuvres perpetrated and enforced by the Great Powers that supported the geopolitical ambitions and initiatives of the Greek leadership in a region historically once belongs to Turks.³⁹ The heading of this assumption is correct but there is a problem. The issue is with that within the context of demilitarisation, the historical sympathy towards the idea of once Turkish islands unjustly separated from Turkish sovereignty refrain most of the Turkish inquiry to open a completely separate and solely focused headline for the military status of islands. It results in missing the true goal of the proper verbal investigation and practical achievement of the demilitarized status of the noted Aegean islands. In terms of inter-state diplomacy, this creates a scenery that Greek political chambers can utilize against the legitimate argumentation of Turkey in which Turks are allegedly displayed as the contenders of the Greek sovereignty on islands and as the noted letter of Theofili

³⁴ Necdet Hayta, "Ege Adaları Sorunu 1911'den Günümüze", p. 95.

³⁵ Hayta, p. 92.

³⁶ Şimşir, "Aegean Question Documents Volume-II (1913-1914)" p. XX-XXI.

³⁷ Şimşir, p. XXIX.

³⁸ Hayta, p. 212.

³⁹ Şimşir, Hayta, Yellice, Eser, Gerçek.

indicates, Athens pushes the perception that the Turkish apprehension pertaining Greek commitment to demilitarisation is an abstract excuse, not a sincere concern. Going back to the historical accounts, many Turkish secondary sources in this respect forgets to open a separate parenthesis for the demilitarization issue and focusing on the issue of secession and sovereignty of the islands between Turks and Greeks instead. Therefore, the reasons behind demilitarization are often overlooked and less covered. The track of historical account about the manipulation of Great Powers is correct but the issue of demilitarisation and military status have not been meaningfully integrated into the picture. In that sense for instance Bilal Şimşir mentions about how the island of Lemnos that were gone under Greek rule with other islands was used against the Ottoman Empire by the British during the Allied Operation within Dardanelles in 1915 but he is silent about the possible geopolitical functions of the demilitarisation decision for the others, particularly for the British and Russian Empires.⁴⁰ Like Şimşir, Yellice, Hayta and Bostancı do not provide a brief coverage of why the demilitarisation, or military restrictions were the preference by the great powers in the first place in their diplomatic history narrative. The literature, for instance, fail to evaluate the demilitarisation matter as an offered bargaining chip or card when Russia offered the demilitarisation as a condition for ceding of the Eastern Ottoman islands to Athens in 2nd of January 1913.⁴¹ They do not add further comments on what might be the Russian objective is about regarding Russian demilitarisation proposal. It does not establish sufficient linkages between demilitarisation and its geopolitical functions, lacking in the demonstration who were possible the assumed beneficiaries of it besides Turkey. Without establishing the matter in its historical frame according to the surrounding geopolitical landscape and the other issues particularly related to the problem of Straits, then it is impossible to seize the complete picture pertaining the military status. If more considerations for extracting geopolitical reasons behind the demilitarisation clauses were made, it would be easier to analyse why the current powers of the world politics are neglectful and disinterest towards Greek violations of treaties based on Greek remilitarization. Their interests had changed in respect to the demilitarised status and without a well address of their former interests and objectives

⁴⁰ Şimşir, “Aegean Question Documents Volume-II (1913-1914)” p. XXV.

⁴¹ See the Russian Revised Offer for the Demilitarisation Murat Eser, “Eleftherios Venizelos”, p. 139.

regarding demilitarization on the Northern Aegean islands, it is impossible to stress on the change and evolution of their attitude regarding demilitarisation as the history goes on. This type of new analytic configuration also enhances the ability of an observer to calculate the weight of the considerations for achieving balance in the Aegean region, namely the Lausanne Balance as a contribution to already existing literature. In addition, it gives a chance for articulating on the sincere consideration level of the great powers regarding Turkish Security on the Aegean Sea and Coastline *vis-à-vis* their interest and objectives.

Turkish sources have tendency to set emphasis on the ancient pre- and non-Greek past of the islands like the historic periods of Sea People and Pelags⁴² while the Greek sources are inclined to emphasize Hellenic and Byzantine past over Turkish and Ottoman parts which disrupting the current debate as the omens of alleged bad intentions or exclusivist and neglectful hegemonic tendencies. These unnecessary emphasises facilitate the escalation of the history utilising identity politics on a multi-dimensional issue with aspects raging from the security to economics, carving the way for the exogenous exploitation. In addition to the relevant diplomatic and social history narrative, the primary historic approach related to demilitarisation is the full pledged evaluation of the relevant historical legislatures, official express of wills and expert interpretations of those.⁴³ This kind of historic literature mostly refrains from going into the fully encompassing details of the historical incidents and rather employs a way analysis and argumentation, mostly in the clear favour of one party, either for Turkish or Greek cause. At the first glance, it reduces the objectivity on the basis of ongoing dispute, but this indication is not necessarily a fact, just like it does not have to in the diplomatic history of the Aegean. On the contrary, the full of insights can be found and they in fact state the legitimate and applicable legal realities. While some of the legal interpretations that were provided are neither legitimate nor applicable. Furthermore, some authors can sometimes refute argumentations of a party whom they belong in terms of nationality. For instance, the former Turkish ambassador Osman

⁴² See: The brief history of the islands by Tansuğ Feyral Tansuğ, *Osmanlının Son Döneminde Adalı Rumlar İmroz Limni Semadirek Taşoz*, (Pan Yayıncılık 2018) p. 23.

⁴³ See: Pazarcı, İnan, Stivacthis

Paksüt consciously rejects one of the Turkish arguments about Montreux and Lausanne Straits Conventions related to the demilitarization but established a different linkage from another demilitarisation clause.⁴⁴ The co-author Cihat Yaycı also implies the same idea as a possibility, although accepts the official Turkish argument for Montreux.⁴⁵ Sevim also expresses the same idea that the Article 12 stands still even the current convention of Montreux totally rules out former convention which agreed on Lausanne.⁴⁶ Greek author Stivachtis deliberately attacks historically one of the most echoing Greek arguments on the matter, which is the fundamental change in the conditions.⁴⁷ According to him, this legal principle is not suitable for the question matter and potentially invokes dangerous interpretations and revisionist situations. This what Turkish scholar of international law, Pazarcı and other Turkish authors stress on too in its detail. While the historic legal attitude from the parties is not completely divided at all and can possibly meet on a mutual ground as which demonstrated so far, they also share more similarities in their historical narratives. Both sides are tended to set some fault on the diplomats of the past as it is a common way for handling the lack of necessary material or argumentation base. Heraclides states on the fact that the silence of Greek delegation in Montreux regarding demilitarized status of Samothrace and Lemnos is a negative contributor to the current Greek stance. As a Turkish commentor, Kızıllkan also sets fault on Metaxas Government regarding these islands and approves the point made by Heraclides without reference.⁴⁸ The Turkish literature tends to view Turkish delegate's lack of reference for Lemnos during the related Lausanne meetings in November 1922 under the negative light but does not touch upon why and on what basis the leading figure of allies in the conference, Lord Curzon proposes such alleged neglect to Turkish side

⁴⁴ Yaycı and Paksüt, "Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi", p. 239.

⁴⁵ Yaycı and Paksüt, p. 49.

⁴⁶ Alaettin Sevim, "Ege Denizi'ndeki Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adaların Silahlandırılması Sorunu", p. 495.

⁴⁷ Stivachtis, "The Demilitarisation of the Eastern Aegean Islands the Case of Central Aegean and Dodecanese Islands", p. 111-112

⁴⁸ Can Kızıllkan, "Türkiye'nin Ege Denizi'nde Deniz Güvenliği ve Gayriaskeri Statüdeki Ege Adalarının Güvenlik Tehdidi", *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güncel Sorunlar*, Edited by Hüsnü Özlü and İzzet Koncagül, (Milli Savunma Üniversitesi Yayınları 2022) p. 167; Heraclides, "Demilitarisation" *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in Aegean Imagined Enemies* (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) p. 203.

and not consider Turkish response to Curzon in that matter. In similar manner, Greek sources are silent about the valid and sound reasons why Nicolaos Politis and Greek delegation were silent or neglecting regarding the Greek security on the demilitarized Greek islands during a conference (Montreux) which dedicated to revise the status of the region of Turkish Straits and aiming for re-defining Turkish security under changing geopolitical conditions. Heraclides describes it as a grave mistake from the Greece's part⁴⁹ but there can be more analyses build on the issue through not considering it as a fault, for example, via making a reference to the positive Turkish-Greek relations in that time period. But first of all, an observer must consider the legal framework behind the classification of the islands related the military status.

2.2.2 Legal

The legal accounts of the military status are more case oriented compared to the historical accounts but in a more normative tone with less reference made to the history in the sense of building up necessary international political picture in its causality, just as the rest of the issues within the Aegean Dispute. The social history and politicized geography determined the existing legal basis, but the core of the dispute lies as a legal issue or case which is investigated in terms of legal validity. Lastly, the classification of the islands pertaining their military status is based on the international legislation which a researcher always needs to keep in mind in order to create a proper contextual approach.

As emphasized, the division of islands in the demilitarisation issue is based on international legislation established by the treaties and does not always necessarily correspond to common geographical classifications or local administrative groupings on the entire Aegean-relevant literature ranging different subjects. For example, Samothrace is geographically classified as an island under the administrative region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, rather than being participant of the Straits Region and the cluster of Northern Aegean Islands unlike what it is treated in the historical and legal accounts of militarisation issue. Another example is that the island of Lemnos is

⁴⁹ Ibid.

governed by the Central Aegean Administration of the Greek State from a separate district, rather than being part of the Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Administrative Region which as noted includes the other Greek island on the considered frontier of Turkish Straits (Samothrace) under the same international legislation umbrella shared by Lemnos. Unlike what an observer might expect, most of these non-corresponding examples is purely coincidental but it should be noted political intentions had always been present and played a critical role in the legal classification and treatment of the islands.

The demilitarisation issue of the Eastern Aegean Islands in general covers two categories that include two sub-categories under one of the noted categories. The primary categories are the Northern Islands and Southern islands. The Northern Islands have been divided into two sub-categories, the frontier islands in relation to Turkish Straits and the Central (or interchangeably referred as the Eastern) Aegean Islands.⁵⁰ However, it is worth to mention to fact that most of the previous scholarship (exceptions aside such as Hazal Pabuçcular and Tarık Demir) often evaluates the subject of demilitarisation of the Northeast Aegean Islands, along with the interrelated subject of demilitarisation in the Southeast Aegean Islands, commonly referred to as Menteşe, Oniki Adalar or the Dodecanese. As the initial and catalysing issue beginning in Ottoman-Italian War of 1911-1912, the problem of Southern Eastern Aegean Islands serves as a provocative launcher and influencer for the problem of Northern Group, the party which is the main subject of this thesis. However, the historical development of the Southern Islands Party took a separate pathway involving a long-lasting Italian sovereignty that eventually led to the Peace Treaty of Paris on 10 February 1947 and actually a different subject of interest both in historical and legal terms. While particularly focusing of Northern islands, this thesis also compares the situation of both. The final military status of Dodecanese is defined in the Article 14 on the noted treaty. In addition, the clear-cut and crafted in detail definition of the *demilitarization* and *demilitarised* is provided in Paragraph D of Annex 13 on the noted treaty in

⁵⁰ Heraclides, “Demilitarisation”, p. 201-205.; Pazarcı, “Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış Statüsü”, p. 7-22.

relation to Article 14.⁵¹ It is a non-military status in the strictest sense according to Turkish State and Turkish observers⁵² due to clarifications made on the Paragraph D. In order to justify the ongoing remilitarization on the Dodecanese, both Athens and Greek observers contend the legal demand of Turkey via arguing for *res inter alios acta*. This principle foresees non-participating parties like Turkey cannot enjoy the rights pertaining the Treaty and Athens adds that the legal and true beneficiary of the demilitarisation provision of Paris Treaty was the former USSR.⁵³ The referenced foundation of this perspective is the Article 34 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties dated 1969, under the tag of general rule regarding the third states: “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.” Both Ankara and many Turkish commentators counter this argumentation with the principle of *erga omnes*,⁵⁴ a legal approach articulates about an objective legal status pertaining all instead of a contract type of legal setting that only encompasses the signatory parties, unlike what the Greek sources advocate for. Furthermore, the circumstance of

⁵¹ See, The Appendices, “K. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, Paris, Relevant Segments, 10 February 1947”, USNWC, “International Law Studies—Volume 45, International Law Documents”, US Naval War College, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, [viewcontent.cgi \(usnwc.edu\)](http://viewcontent.cgi(usnwc.edu))

See, The Appendices, L. Original Texts in French, “Traite' de Paix Avec l'Italie. Signe a Paris, le 10 Fevrier 1947”, 10.02.1947, *United Nations-Treaty Series 1950*, UN, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, documentsdedroitinternational.fr

⁵² “The Convention of the Turkish Straits annexed to the Lausanne Treaty further defined the demilitarized status of the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace. It stipulated a stricter regime for these islands, due to their vital importance to the security of Türkiye by virtue of their close proximity to the Turkish Straits.”

“Background Note on Aegean Disputes, The Demilitarised Status of the Eastern Aegean Islands”, Last Update: Unknown, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa>.; Fuat Aksu, “Preservation of Demilitarized Status of The Aegean Islands for The National Security of Turkey” *Turk Rev Balkan Stud* 7:107–133 (2002), p. 119.

⁵³ “The demilitarized status of the Dodecanese islands was imposed after the decisive intervention of the Soviet Union and echoes Moscow’s political intentions at that point in time”

“Issues of Greek-Turkish Relations, Turkish claims regarding the demilitarisation of islands in the Aegean Sea”, 01.01.2024, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims-regarding-the-demilitarization-of-islands-in-the-aegean-sea.html>

⁵⁴ Pazarcı, “Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış Statüsü”, p.62, p.67-68.; Fuat Aksu, “Preservation of Demilitarized Status of The Aegean Islands for The National Security of Turkey”, p. 122.; Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu, “Letter dated 30 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General”, 30.09.2021, United Nations General Assembly Security Council, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/275/89/PDF/N2127589.pdf?OpenElement>

erga omnes is one of the few exceptional conditions that rules out the noted article 34 in international law.⁵⁵ For providing tangible practices, Turkish legal sources and official accounts offer two cases: the islands of Aaland and Svalbard, which are under demilitarised status based on the Convention of 1856 that annexed to the Paris Peace Treaty of the same year and Svalbard/Spitzbergen Treaty of 1920, respectively. According to statement of opinion provided by the International Committee, Sweden, though not a participatory state actor to the Convention of 1856, had the legal right to announce that the demilitarization provisions must be respected.⁵⁶ Therefore, Turkey possesses the right for insisting on the compliance of Greece to an international treaty as an interested and affected party. Greece contends this approach with Article 89 of 1947 Treaty⁵⁷ which shall not confer any rights or benefits without participation to and ratification of the respective treaty. Still, a third-party state can bind itself to the rights and obligations via another treaties that foresees the provisions of the noted treaty which the third-party state not directly participated in. This approach is known as *accord collateral*.⁵⁸ In fact, the articles 35, 36 and 37 of 1969 Vienna Convention express this approach⁵⁹:

Article 35.

TREATIES PROVIDING FOR OBLIGATIONS FOR THIRD STATES

An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing.

Article 36.

TREATIES PROVIDING FOR RIGHTS FOR THIRD STATES

1. A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides.

⁵⁵ Pazarcı, p. 67.

⁵⁶ Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu, “Letter dated 30 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General”

⁵⁷ See, The Appendices, K. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, Paris, Relevant Segments, 10 February 1947

⁵⁸ Pazarcı, “Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış Statüsü”, p. 68.;

⁵⁹ Pazarcı, p. 67.

2. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with the conditions for its exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty.

Article 37.

REVOCATION OR MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS OR RIGHTS OF THIRD STATES

1. When an obligation has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 35, the obligation may be revoked or modified only with the consent of the parties to the treaty and of the third State, unless it is established that they had otherwise agreed.

2. When a right has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 36, the right may not be revoked or modified by the parties if it is established that the right was intended not to be revocable or subject to modification without the consent of the third State.⁶⁰

On the top of all these, in the article 16 of Lausanne Peace Treaty, Turkey renounces its rights on the related islands and lands for the future settlements done by concerning parties and by this way actually binds itself to those settlements and have to recognise them once they established, including 1947 Paris Treaty of Peace with its demilitarisation provisions covering Dodecanese.⁶¹

⁶⁰ UN, “No.18232 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (with annex). Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969”, 23.05.1969, *United Nations Treaty Series 1980*, p. 341, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf>

⁶¹ The Appendices, G. The Lausanne Treaty of Peace – Relevant Articles



Figure 1: The Map of Aegean Islands and Greece⁶²

⁶² World Atlas, “Maps of Greece”, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/greece?r=1&l=ri&fst=0>



Figure 2: An Infographic from the Turkish Mainstream Media (AA)⁶³

Moving on to the actual focus of this thesis, the island universe of Northeast Aegean Sea is commonly categorized into two major groups based on relevant literature in accordance with the Lausanne settings applied to them. The initial group encountered comprises the Strait Region Islands (Turkish: Boğazönü Adaları, Greek: Porthmos), which consist of strategically significant islands and a chain of smaller islands, namely Bozcaada/Tenedos, Gökçeada/Imroz/Imbros, Lemnos/Limni, Samotraki/Semadirek, Thasos/Taşoz, Agios Evstratios/Bozbaba, and the Rabbit/Lagusai Islands. The noted islands were distributed to Greek and Turkish domains by the wisdom of Article 12 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. The content and details of the demilitarisation regulations in relation to the frontier islands however are present in the Straits Convention of Lausanne, not in the main body treaty itself. The rationale behind this exclusive treatment was that the frontier islands were viewed as an integral component of the Turkish Straits System, which is about to be historically evaluated in the third chapter.⁶⁴ Regarding these islands, Greek commentators and Athens emphasize on the

⁶³ Anadolu Agency, “Greece not hiding Aegean islands' militarization in violation of treaties”, 10.06.2022, AA, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, [https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/28579?_escaped_fragment_ =](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/28579?_escaped_fragment_=)

⁶⁴ See: Lord Curzon’s Remark on Lemnos and other islands close to the Straits
Seha L. Meray, “Lozan Konferansı Tutanaklar Belgeler”, p. 144.

argument that the currently binding Straits Convention of Montreux completely replaces the clauses of noted convention⁶⁵ as this will of involving actors were expressed in Preambles of Montreux and Turkish Drafts, as well as in the Articles 13 and 23 of Turkish and British Drafts, respectively.⁶⁶ The final form of Montreux Preamble does refer a legal replacement with applying French word substituer / replace: “Ont résolu de substituer la présente Convention à la Convention signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires”.⁶⁷ There is no further mention of a replacement throughout the articles in finalized form of the convention. In a much more controversial manner, the Preamble of Turkish Draft utilizes the wording déclarent abrogée / declared to be abrogated for the Straits Convention of Lausanne: ont résolu de remplacer par une nouvelle Convention celle conclue à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 qu'ils reconnaissent et déclarent abrogée, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs”.⁶⁸ Followingly, the Article 13 of Turkish Draft for Montreux Convention proposes a replacement via selecting abrogate / abrogate” and “remplace / replace” as the expressive verbs, “La présente Convention, qui abroge et remplace les dispositions de la Convention concernant le régime des Détroits signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923”. The article 24 of British Draft, which is a draft that was founded on the Turkish Draft, utilises the same verb abrogate/abroge: “La présente Convention abroge la Convention concernant le régime

⁶⁵ Pazarcı, p. 38-39; Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Issues of Greek-Turkish Relations, Turkish claims regarding the demilitarisation of islands in the Aegean Sea”, Last Update: January 1, 2024; Heraclides, “Turkish - Greek Conflict in Aegean: Imagined Enemies”, p. 201-203.

⁶⁶ See, The Appendices, I. Proceedings of the Montreux Conference [concerning the Straits regime], Relevant Segments of Turkish and British Convention Drafts, June-July 20, 1936, J. The Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Relevant Segment) 20 July 1936, Seha L. Meray and Osman Olcay, *Montrö Boğazlar Konferansı Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, (İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları 2020), p. 659, p. 665, p. 679, p. 740.

See, The Appendices, The Original Texts in French, Seha L. Meray and Osman Olcay, p. 716.; Conférence do Montreux, *Actes de la conférence de Montreux [concernant le régime des Détroits]; 22 juin-20 juillet 1936: compte rendu des séances plénières et procès-verbal des débats du comité technique* / [introduction par Th. Aghnides]. 1936., p, 285, p.287, p. 295., Accessed on 06.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k54482237/f306.item>

⁶⁷ Seha L. Meray and Osman Olcay, p. 716.; Pazarcı, p.39.

⁶⁸ Conférence do Montreux, “Actes de la conférence de Montreux [concernant le régime des Détroits] : 22 juin-20 juillet 1936 : compte rendu des séances plénières et procès-verbal des débats du comité technique”, p. 285.

des D troits qui a  t  sign e   Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923.”⁶⁹ The official Greek account (MFA) only mentions the preamble of finalized form for arguing the full replacement rather elaborate on the *travaux preparatoires* of the Montreux Convention unlike these Greek commentators. Moreover, in order to validate the stance of full replacement, Greek commentators utilize some statements of the head of Greek delegation in Montreux, Politis, pertaining the full-fledged repeal of Lausanne Convention by Montreux. While in the official stance, Athens resorts to refer the parliamentary speech of Turkish FM Tevfik R st  Bey (Aras) on 31 July 1936 and Turkish Ambassador to Athens Ru en E ref  naydın’s alleged letter to Metaxas Government, dated 6 March 1936 on the very occasion of the ratification of the Montreux Convention dated 20 July 1936.⁷⁰ Turkish sources claim that those unilateral statements could only be seen under the light of good will⁷¹ or vigorous political expression⁷², only to be treated as the expressions of political sympathy and not plausible for legal application due to lack of sufficient procedures to creation of legal obligation.⁷³ Some sources argue that such non-binding expressions were the reflections of the solidarity between Turkey and Greece against the expansionism of Mussolini’s Italy. The speech of R st  Bey on the Grand National Assembly of Turkey’s Fifth Term, Second Legislation Year, 81st Gathering follows as:

The 1924 Treaty of Lausanne also means that the provision concerning the islands of Limni and Samothraki (Samothrace) belonging to our neighbour and friend Greece, which had been demilitarised by the Treaty of Montreux, has also been abolished, and we are pleased about this. On this occasion, I would like to record one more characteristic of the new Turkish policy. What we see as good for ourselves, we also see as good for our friends, and whatever we

⁶⁹ Conf rence de Montreux, “Actes de la conf rence de Montreux [concernant le r gime des D troits] : 22 juin-20 juillet 1936 : compte rendu des s ances pl ni res et proc s-verbal des d bats du comit  technique”, p. 295.

⁷⁰ Pazarcı, p. 51, p. 52.; Yaycı and Paks t, p. 238; Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Issues of Greek-Turkish Relations, Turkish claims regarding the demilitarisation of islands in the Aegean Sea”, 01.01.2024, Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims-regarding-the-demilitarization-of-islands-in-the-aegean-sea.html>

⁷¹ Ya ar Ert rk, “Adalar (Ege) Denizinde T rk - Yunan M cadelesi”, p. 129.; Alaettin Sevim, “Ege Denizi’ndeki Gayri Askeri Stat deki Adaların Silahlandırılması Sorunu”, p. 496.

⁷² Pazarcı, p. 50.

⁷³ Pazarcı, p. 51.

consider to be a pity for us, we wish not only for our friends, but also for no state.⁷⁴

In addition, Turkish sources which goes against the argument of full-replacement of frontier Greek islands' status-quo through Montreux do not refer the Article 9 of the Lausanne Convention in the case of Rüştü's speech which dictates belligerent parties can render the provisions of demilitarisation as a measure in a case of a broken-up war with the condition of immediate return to the demilitarised regime once the peace concluded. Turkey and Greece were not at war with Italy at that given time, but the possibility of such war was one of the sole reasons the immediate need for Montreux revision in the first place. Furthermore, an observer must mind that these are auxiliary arguments from the Turkish sources. As the primary opposition to this general stance of full replacement, the official and some unofficial legal sources originated from Turkey like Pazarıcı argue for Montreux Convention is a partial replacement to the Lausanne Convention⁷⁵ and this is the direct result of the particular emphasis that made on the region of Turkish Straits and security of Turkey in the aforementioned legal texts, without any given reference to the status of pertaining Greek islands or the security of Greece. According to Turkish sources that particularly referring to Pazarıcı, the final preamble states this as a confirming proof for their approach: "dans le cadre de la sécurité de la Turquie" (within the framework of Turkey's security) and "Animés du désir de régler le passage et la navigation dans le détroit des Dardanelles, la mer de Marmara et le Bosphore, compris sous la dénomination générale de « Détroits »" (Motivated by the desire to regulate passage and navigation in the Dardanelles Straits, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus, generally known as the "Straits"). In other words, the full replacement indicates the abolishment of Lausanne Straits Convention in its totality including the demilitarisation clauses as whole and the Straits Convention of Montreux lacks texts for further demilitarisation. In contrast, a partial replacement which only Turkey can enjoy of the new rights results in the continuation of clauses that determine military status of pertaining frontier Greek islands. The exchange

⁷⁴ See: The Speech of Rüştü Aras
Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi Devre V, Cilt 12 İçtima 1*, (1936), Accessed on 06.06.2024, Available electronic version, [TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ - ANASAYFA \(tbmm.gov.tr\)](https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/turkiye-buyuk-millet-meclisi-anasayfa)
Translated from Turkish:
[tbmm05012081.pdf](https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/turkiye-buyuk-millet-meclisi-anasayfa/tbmm05012081.pdf)

⁷⁵ Pazarıcı, p. 40.

between Greece and Turkey's UN Representatives, Theophili and Sinirlioğlu's letters summarizes this dispute:

This demilitarized status was completely abolished since the above-mentioned Convention was replaced in its entirety by the 1936 Montreux Convention, which governs the same subject. More specifically, the preamble of the said Convention expressly stipulates that the parties thereto "have resolved to replace by the present Convention the Convention signed at Lausanne on the 24th of July 1923". The Montreux Convention does not provide for the demilitarization of or any other military restriction whatsoever on these islands.⁷⁶

The 1936 Montreux Convention established a new regime only for the Turkish Straits: it contains no specific provision as to the termination of any previous demilitarization provision and obligation binding upon Greece. As is apparent from the preamble to the Montreux Convention (and the broader context), the parties to that Convention did no more than to agree, among themselves, on a different regime with regard to Turkey. That is why the preamble refers only to the regulation of passage and navigation in the Straits within the framework of Turkish security and (as regards the Black Sea) of the security of those States that were riparian States in relation to the Black Sea. The reference to the Black Sea excludes Greece and does not address the issue of the security of Greece. Therefore, the 1936 Convention could not in any way terminate or abrogate the demilitarization obligations binding upon Greece as set forth in the 1923 Convention. The 1936 Montreux Convention enables only Turkey to remilitarize the zone of the Straits: it contains no such provision (whether explicit or implicit) for Greece.⁷⁷

However, some Turkish commentators, such as Osman Paksüt, Necmettin Hayta, Fuat Aksu and Alaettin Sevim, assume or accept the validity of the full replacement approach but still argue for demilitarisation directly through the binding texts of Lausanne Peace Treaty and the references which these texts made.⁷⁸ According to

⁷⁶ Maria Theofili, "Letter dated 27 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General".

⁷⁷ Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu, "Letter dated 30 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General"

⁷⁸ See: The Appendices, Athens and London Treaties, The Six Powers Decision and The Article 12 Yaycı and Paksüt, "Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi, p. 239.; Hayta, "Ege Adaları Sorunu", p. 335.; Fuat Aksu, "Preservation of Demilitarized Status of The Aegean Islands for The National Security of Turkey", p. 122.

Turkish sources, the demilitarisation of all the islands in the northern eastern Aegean, including the border islands, is guaranteed because Article 12 confirms Articles 5 and 15 of the London and Athens Treaties respectively.⁷⁹ These treaties enforce the *nota verbale* regarding the demilitarisation, otherwise known as the Decision of Six Great Powers, dated 13 February 1914. In that manner, Turkish sources lean to the assertion that whether Montreux replaces Lausanne is not an defining imperative since The Decision of Six Powers states that the islands which are now given the possession of Greek State must be completely free from the military build-up for ground and naval purposes: “Les six Puissances ont également décidé que des garanties satisfaisantes leur seraient données ainsi qu'à la Turquie par la Grèce que les îles dont elle gardera la possession ne seront ni fortifiées ni utilisées pour un but naval ou militaire” (The Six Powers also decided that satisfactory guarantees would be given to them and to Turkey by Greece that the islands of which it will retain possession will neither be fortified nor used for naval or military purposes). Only a gendarmerie or police force should be kept but in order to deal with smuggling (*prévenir la contrebande*).⁸⁰ The noted powers of the United Kingdom, French Republic, Italian Kingdom, Russian, German and Austrian Empires were the guarantors of this provision. Greek sources prone to omit this legal background lying in the Six Powers Decision and inclusive Article 12 within their counter argumentation. For instance, neither the official website of Hellenic Republic's MFA nor the letters of Greece delivered to the UN Secretariat-General mentions Greek commentators are also silent about it. Instead, Greek sources usually assert another and independent legal frameworks to extract legitimacy for Greek remilitarisation. The Greek pivots are the right of self-defence of article 51 under the umbrella of UN Charter and the legal statements regarding the function of a state that claims once borders are established, it allegedly rules out the treaty within the borders since a new permanent legislation which established with new borders overrides it. The relevant charter article and state functionality argument follow as:

⁷⁹ Alaettin Sevim, “Ege Denizi’ndeki Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adaların Silahlandırılması Sorunu”, *Ege Jeopolitiği Cilt I*, Ed. Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker and Dimitrios Ioannadis (Ankara Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık 2020), p. 495.

⁸⁰Şimşir, “Aegean Question Documents Volume-II (1913-1914)”, p. 394.

“Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”⁸¹

“It is firmly established under international law that when States conclude treaties establishing boundaries or territorial sovereignty, their primary objective “is to achieve stability and finality” (Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 34). This is the reason why once a treaty has established a boundary or fixed a territorial situation; the result is no longer dependent on the treaty. As stated by the International Court of Justice, “the establishment of [a] boundary is a fact which, from the outset, has had a legal life of its own” and “a boundary established by treaty thus achieves a permanence which the treaty itself does not necessarily enjoy” (Case concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 37, paras. 72–73).”

Turkish legal accounts evaluate on the self-defence argumentation by referring the noted article stresses on the fact that for the operationalisation of the self-defence as a natural right, material attack or aggression is required.⁸² The legal experts emphasize this fact. The Turkish sources also resort the Article 51 as the legitimate legal right of deploying counter measures regarding the potential threat displayed by the remilitarised Greek islands. In his statement, the professor of International Law Selami Kuran said, "Greece should be given an official deadline for the demilitarisation of these islands. The government determines the duration of this. If Greece does not take the necessary concrete steps to return to the non-military status despite the deadline, Turkey's right to individual self-defence may come to the agenda as its security will

⁸¹ United Nations, *UN Charter*, (1945), Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [united_nations_charter.pdf \(unmissions.org\)](https://www.unmissions.org/united-nations-charter.pdf)

⁸² Fuat Aksu, “Preservation of Demilitarized Status of The Aegean Islands for The National Security of Turkey”, p. 123.; Alaettin Sevim, “Ege Denizi’ndeki Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adaların Silahlandırılması Sorunu”, p. 505.

be directly threatened under Article 51 of the UN Charter."⁸³ According to Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer, Greece also undermines the international law authority and enforcement with a manner that results in the continuation of the demilitarisation issue. On 20 December 1993, Greece accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in accordance with Article 36/2 of the Statute of the Court, as a consequence of the Western European Union (WEU) Agreement, Article X.41. However, it did so with a reservation, whereby it excluded any dispute relating to defensive military action taken by its government for reasons of national defence from the competence of the ICJ. Consequently, the reservation has the effect of rendering the dispute concerning the demilitarised status of the Eastern Aegean Islands also arguable in relation to the question of whether this case falls outside the jurisdiction of the ICJ.⁸⁴ It displays the fact that Athens refrain from a proper legal resolution. By the virtue of Lausanne Treaty and Convention granting Greece with the sufficient national police and gendarmerie force for providing stability and defence on the remote islands that stand on the open sea, the stability and finality argument does not sound valid either. It can be argued that the official Greek claim confuses being a sovereign power and the militarisation/military force deployment. According to Pazarcı, the right of sovereignty is originated from the international law and therefore it obeys the regulations of the international law.⁸⁵

However, Greek authors, such as Heraclides and Stivachtis, in that respect, responds with claim that Turkish sources lack the dynamic view of legal and practical action when they focus on the demilitarisation issue. For them, Turkish sources prone to narrowly interpret legal basis such as reading the right of self-defence as only expecting the launch of attack or reading related demilitarisation legislation in terms restrictive meaning, not effective meaning as taking countermeasures for developing

⁸³ Selami Kuran, "Silahlandırılan adalar: Türkiye süre tayin edebilir, Yunanistan adım atmazsa meşru müdafaa hakkı doğar", 10.09.2020, Aydınlık, , Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/haber/silahlandirilan-adalar-turkiye-sure-tayin-edebilir-yunanistan-adim-atmazsa-mesru-mudafaa-hakki-dogar-217939>

⁸⁴ Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer, "The Aegean Disputes: Introduction", p. 16.

⁸⁵ Pazarcı, p. 18-19

circumstances such as the foundation and allegedly advanced amphibious assault capabilities of Turkish Fourth (Aegean) Army.⁸⁶ Opposing Turkish sources emphasizes on the fact that there is no militarisation restriction designated on Turkish Aegean Coastline, and they also point out the initial emergence of Greek remilitarisation of islands before the foundation of the Fourth Army.⁸⁷ Moreover, even Greek author Heraclides admits that Greek position pertaining demilitarisation is clearly weak in legal standpoint compared that of Turkey's. While Turkish legal argumentation and sources neglect the second Greek point of the state's function within its borders, it does state that the international legislation with demilitarisation command established by related Lausanne clauses is an objective legal reality that cannot be omitted or bypassed in any means. It means that Turkish position regarding Northern Aegean Islands actually does not need in prove or disprove anything pertaining demilitarisation since the objective legal status of demilitarisation exists for the only legitimate application, actually it is mostly identical to the approach of *Erga Omnes* applied for Dodecanese which the literature does not point out the similarity of both cases. Therefore, the demilitarisation is a crucial element of the status-quo and binding for all. Moreover, the neglected second Greek approach can be criticized according to the Third Clause of Lausanne's Article 13 pertaining the Central Aegean Islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria. The noted article did grant Athens with the right of deploying sufficient gendarmerie type military and police forces proportional to the numbers in Hellen Mainland: "Les forces militaires helléniques dans lesdites îles seront limitées au contingent normal, appelé pour le service militaire, qui pourra être instruit sur place, ainsi qu'à un effectif de gendarmerie et de police proportionné à l'effectif de la gendarmerie et de la police existant sur l'ensemble du territoire hellénique" (The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of

⁸⁶ Stivachtis, "The Demilitarisation of the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands the Case of the Central Aegean and Dodecanese Islands" p.99-108.; Heraclides, "Demilitarisation, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in Aegean Imagined Enemies", p. 204.

⁸⁷ Fuat Aksu, "Preservation of Demilitarized Status of The Aegean Islands for The National Security of Turkey", p. 125. Alaettin Sevim, "Ege Denizi'ndeki Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adaların Silahlandırılması Sorunu", p. 506.

gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory).⁸⁸ An observer can argue that it should be sufficient for achieving stability and finality for the Greek State in its quest aimed for full realisation of a stable state sovereignty. In literature, neither party have evaluated on this possible stance. However, Turkish sources prone to emphasize the claim that the frontier islands on the straits had even a stricter regime of demilitarisation in comparison to Central Aegean Islands, based on the Strait Convention Regulations of Lausanne. This argument is similar to Turkish emphasis pertaining the strictness of the non-military status of the Dodecanese with respect to the Paragraph D of Annex 13 of Paris Peace Treaty as noted above.⁸⁹ While there is no direct reference has been made by the literature to any article or clause from the Strait Convention of Lausanne for this comparative claim, the assertion apparently is based on the second paragraph of the Article 6 on the Convention that even interferes the equipment of police and gendarmerie legally hold on, unlike the Article 13 of Lausanne Peace Treaty which only dealing with the numbers of the police and gendarmerie as noted: “et dont l'armement ne comportera que le revolver, le sabre, le fusil et quatre fusils mitrailleurs par cent hommes à l'exclusion de toute artillerie” (armed only with revolvers, sabres, rifles and four machine guns per hundred men, to the exclusion of all artillery).⁹⁰ As the statement from the mentioned paragraph demonstrates, the artillery possession is not allowed, machine guns must be in very limited number. Only small arms are allowed for the military police. Both articles (13 and 6) respectively from the Treaty and Convention primarily forbid the fortifications and bases in identical manner, reflecting the similar legal intention and objective of disarming all islands despite the separate coverage of frontier and central islands. It can be stated this similarity proves that all Eastern islands were and are supposed to be under demilitarised status in essence, only details differ due to differentiation of geopolitical concerns from Central Aegean to Straits Region. The outcome of this circumstance was the separate treatment of the frontier and central islands in the

⁸⁸ Seha L. Meray, “Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar, Belgeler Cilt-IV”, p.172.

⁸⁹ Yaycı and Paksüt, p. 26.; See, The Appendices, Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, Paris, Relevant Segments, 10 February 1947, Annex XIII. Definitions

⁹⁰ See, The Appendices, Lausanne Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits Relevant Articles, 24 July 1923, Article 6; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “II. Convention Relating to the Régime of the Straits”, (1923), Republic of Türkiye MFA, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [II. Convention Relating to the Régime of the Straits / Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs \(mfa.gov.tr\)](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/II-Convention-Relating-to-the-Régime-of-the-Straits/Republic-of-Türkiye-Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs.mfa.gov.tr)

technical details but under the same legislation, which both actors in the history and legal sources prone to miss. Lastly, as the implication of this argumentation, it might be claimed that the full replacement via Montreux Convention possibly means the details of the execution of the demilitarisation on the frontier Greek islands (Lemnos and Samos) was removed but not the regime of demilitarisation in essence on them due to the Decision of Six Powers and Article 12 of Lausanne Peace Treaty, the article that affirming this decision. As referred, the Decision of Six Powers does not allow the islands to be fortified nor being used in a framework involving military and naval purposes. Only a police or gendarmerie type of force is implicitly present there for prevention of smuggling. In other words, the Article 13 of Lausanne Peace Treaty and Article 6 of Lausanne Convention bear heavy resemblance with the points that made in this decision, not just to each other. In the literature, Turkish sources are usually ambiguous when the question comes to going into the technical and textual comparisons or making clarifications of the existing legal framework. They are too much concerned to refute Greek arguments while the legal stance of Turkey is already factual and legitimate pertaining demilitarisation, all based on the existing legal framework that renders Greek legal arguments for remilitarisation already illegitimate.⁹¹

The textual content of historic legal background is even greater than that what it is covered so far. The aforementioned and explained Article 12 of Lausanne was a modification of Article 84 of Treaty of Sèvres as Ferruh Gerçek points out.⁹² However, the literature is prone to neglect the Treaty of Sèvres as it is being treated to be null and void in comparison to Lausanne, especially and naturally by Turkish accounts. For instance, in his column piece dedicated to the demilitarised Greek islands, Turkish historian Sinan Meydan thoroughly elaborates on the function and relevant articles of the Serves that had demilitarised Turkey on legal basis, alongside with Lausanne and

⁹¹ See: Pazarıcı, p. 37. Pazarıcı sometimes moves away from the textual material and drags into speculations such as the irrelevant discussion regarding the legal effect of NATO's existence and its Article 8 on the demilitarised status. This is based on arbitrarily used legal material and terms which provoked by the Greek Authors.

⁹² Ferruh Gerçek, "Ege Adaları", p. 160.

Paris clauses that demilitarised the islands of Aegean Sea.⁹³ However, like the rest of the entire literature, he neglects the Articles 177 and 178 of Treaty of Sèvres which were pertaining the military status of the islands. The noted articles were actually designed for the free passage of the Turkish Straits as the heading and content of the articles propose: “Maintenance of the Freedom of the Straits”. In order to achieve this, the Article 178 of Sèvres demilitarizes the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mitylene alongside with Turkish Straits Region, with a statement that declares all fortifications and batteries within this defined zone must be disarmed and demolished.⁹⁴ The re-establishment of them is forbidden according to the same article. It demonstrates that the islands were always supposed to be demilitarised even in the disadvantageous historic period of Turkey after its defeat in the Great War and the Decision of Six Powers had already supposed to be binding, which both Turkish and Greek sources miss out. It is a well-established fact that the relevant military, naval and air clauses in Sèvres were primarily designed for demilitarising Turkey in many aspects ranging from ground and navy to air force. However, the islands that were given Greek possession all the way back to the Six Powers Decision of 1914 were also clearly about be demilitarised under the military framework designed under Sèvres. Not just by the wisdom of the article 84 that implicitly approved the told decision via providing a reference, but a clear regulation of demilitarisation was articulated on the articles 177 and 178. The brief historical and political background of this arrangement is discussed in the third chapter.

⁹³ Sinan Meydan, “Yunanistan, Adalar, Antlaşmalar”, 07.09.2020, Sözcü, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/yazarlar/sinan-meydan/yunanistan-adalar-antlasmalar-6025777/>

⁹⁴ See, The Appendices, F. Treaty of Sèvres, Relevant Articles, Article 177 and 178, Seha L. Meray and Osman Olcay, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Çöküş Belgeleri Sevr Antlaşması Mondros Bırakışması İlgili Belgeler*, (İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları 2021), p.133-134.; Mekki Uludağ, “Treaty of Peace with Turkey” (1920), Academia.edu, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, https://www.academia.edu/84208273/Treaty_of_peace_with_turkey_sevres

See, The Appendices, The Original Texts in French; Jean-Pierre Maury, “Traité de paix entre les Puissances alliées et associées et la Turquie.(Sèvres, 10 août 1920)”, Digithèque de matériaux juridiques et politiques, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Grande Guerre, Turquie, traité de Sèvres 10 août 1920, Digithèque MJP \(univ-perp.fr\)](#)

2.3. Greek Arguments

After the general review of legal literature, Greek arguments are briefly presented in order to achieve a separate elaboration on the general structure of Greek argumentation and misconceptions related to the Greek argumentation. The sources, both Turkish and Greek originated, are inclined to discriminate or converge Greek and Turkish arguments in a manner that does not have to demonstrate the reality. In fact, the literature often fails to point out true differentiations and similarities between Turkish and Greek argumentations. These arguments are often treated as being completely separate while they can meet on the same ground or share possible similarities particularly in regard to the sovereignty. The distinct references and motion points are demonstrated, as a contrast, converging grounds of possible consensus which are disrupted by popular misunderstandings and hostilities are clarified.

2.3.1. The Critic of Official and Unofficial Accounts

Stivachtis is right to argue that Greek argumentation does not bear uniformity.⁹⁵ There are two competing views that apparently same on the surface but fundamentally different. Firstly, these have led partial confusion and obscurity on the literature and media regarding the official Greek position, even the leading figure of the Turkish literature, Pazarıcı does not openly clarify it despite he attributes official and unofficial claims for the Greek party. Secondly, the lack of uniformity generates internal inconsistencies that weakens the official Greek stance. All these points are about to be evaluated. The central feature of this absence of uniformity is argument of the fundamental change in circumstances, also known as the principle of *rebus, sic stantibus*. Within this approach, it is argued that the historic change since from Lausanne period, particularly involving the friendly relations of interbellum period, destructive WWII, the foundation of UN and both Turkish and Greek participation under the same alliance umbrella through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had a lasting legal effect that annulled the allegedly obsolete stipulations of the non-military status. This approach particularly refers the stated objective of Article 13 of

⁹⁵ Stivachtis, p. 110.

Lausanne Treaty pertaining maintenance of the peace: “En vue d'assurer le maintien de la paix”. According to popular Greek argumentation, as once provided, the achieved lasting peace that aimed in the Article 13 annuls the arrangement of demilitarisation itself since the need for such regulation is lifted. Sevim rejects this legal interpretation on the grounds that a subject-related solid change has not emerged for claiming a fundamental change occurred in accordance with Article 62 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.⁹⁶ Especially the second part of the noted article attracts attention through with its statements forbidding the conditions in which a fundamental change cannot be invoked:

2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
 - (a) If the treaty establishes a boundary; or
 - (b) If the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.⁹⁷

This demonstrates a contradiction in the Greek stance because Greece’s violation of the legal obligation of demilitarisation is heavily based on its reference of the other sources of international legislature other than the treaties pertaining demilitarization regulations, as such self-defeating action of breach violates them too. Furthermore, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, the approach of fundamental change, despite referring pacts between Greece and Turkey, NATO and UN, lasting peace and becoming allies, also ironically follows the historic footsteps of aggravating Turkish and Greek tensions. It draws parallel lines with the increasingly explosive and crisis prone Turkish and Greek relations in the history after the period of Mustafa Kemal, particularly rotates around escalating Cyprus Issue and Aegen Dispute while also emphasizes the peace and alliance relations. This contradictory scene potentially causes problems within Greek argumentation, as it is. Whilst, according to the literature, the main problem with the fundamental change claim is that it ascribes non-

⁹⁶ Sevim, p. 503.

⁹⁷ “No.18232 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (with annex). Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969”, p. 347.

existent overriding powers to the founding texts of these arrangements and international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty which on the very contrary confirms the existing stipulations between member states in the Article 8. At the same time, this approach arbitrarily claims that there has been a fundamental change in the absence of a decision by a third international legal authority. Furthermore, the alleged examples of fundamental change should suggest otherwise, even less need for remilitarisation since the UN-based maintained peace and NATO-based permanent alliance among Turkey and Greece define the current conditions. The noted divisive effect of this argument on the Greek argumentation related to non-military status, however, firstly results from the operationalization of *rebus sic stantibus* by whom and secondly due to its correspondence with official Greece policy despite the opposite narrative Athens has, against what the literature argues for.

Despite taken very seriously within the literature in general as a sort of official assertion of Greece about status of the Aegean islands, *rebus sic stantibus* is not the official view of Athens. There is no such particular claim, for instance, exists in the Hellenic Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website, nor apparent Greek letters submitted to the UN General Secretariat. This can be understood as the lack or omission of any mention to the particular legal term or its description, *rebus sic stantibus* despite other legal terms are utilized such as *res inter alios acta*, *erga omnes* or *in excelsis* for Dodecanese in the official foreign affairs narrative. This view of *rebus sic stantibus* is particularly attributed to Praksidis by Pazarıcı but as noted he is not clearly expressing whether it is the official Greek view or not.⁹⁸ Alaettin Sevim, Cüneyt Yüksel and Nesrin Singil do not clearly differentiate the official and unofficial Greek stance either, evaluating *rebus sic stantibus* and self-defence claims together as the totality of official Greek opposition, respectively two primary pillars of entire Greek argumentation.⁹⁹ In another example, Ufuk Alkan reflects this confusion by stating: "Greece argues that fundamental changes in circumstances (*rebus sic*

⁹⁸ Pazarıcı, p. 32.

⁹⁹ Cüneyt Yüksel and Nesrin Singil, "Uluslararası Hukukta Gayri Askeri Statü ve Doğu Ege Adaları'nın Askerileştirilmesi Sorunu" *Public and Private International Law Bulletin*, Vol. 43, Issue. 2 (2023) p. 18.; Alaettin Sevim, "Ege Denizi'ndeki Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adaların Silahlandırılması Sorunu", p. 502-505.

stantibus) have occurred since 1923 and therefore it is no longer obliged to keep these islands demilitarized” via referring the Greek legal expert, Athanasopoulos.¹⁰⁰ Cihat Yaycı also confuses the official and unofficial Greek stance pertaining the usage of *rebus sic stantibus*, claiming the state of Greece argues for this term.¹⁰¹ The official Greek arguments does imply a change in circumstances but not in the way of altering the existing legal framework, but rather a dynamic geopolitical change allegedly coerces to Athens to act so despite the undeniable law body presents. Therefore, Athens utilizes a fundamentally distinct legal arsenal to cope with the geopolitical reality it imagines and perceives instead relying on the principle of *rebus sic stantibus*¹⁰², a term which allegedly could drag the Greek State into a disadvantageous diplomatic position. For instance, if Athens pushed for this stance against Turkey, it cannot subsidy from the existing sources of international status-quo such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) which it utilises for the territorial waters issue on the contested Aegean context at the expense of Turkish interests. It is relied on an assumption that confuses alleged revisionism of Turkey by Greece with sincere Turkish efforts that aimed for convincing Athens to enter an interstate bargaining for resolution of some of the disputes on egalitarian basis. This politicized approach claims Turkey is a revisionist power disrupting regional stability. Therefore, in order to refrain from finding itself in the position which it accuses of, the official Greek verbal argumentation pertaining demilitarisation elasticizes the textual background of the status-quo in its wish instead of openly challenge it for fulfilling Greek geopolitical agenda *vis-à-vis* Turkey on the island cluster of Aegean Sea. In practical terms, Greece challenges the status-quo relevant the non-military status. Whilst Greece actually accepts the status-quo in narrative as much as Turkey does just with a slight difference in the interpretation, as the literature mostly misses. This is the fundamental weakness of Greece stance: The lack of consistency in action and narrative. It is caused by Athens’ action indicates a fundamental change of circumstances while it still refers the status-quo contrasting that the notion of

¹⁰⁰ Ufuk Alkan, “Legal and Political Aspects of The Aegean Dispute and Its Implications For Turkey’s Relations With Greece And The European Union”, *İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol. 29 Issue. 4 (2015), p. 702.

¹⁰¹ Yaycı, “Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi”, p. 48.

¹⁰² Stivachtis, p. 113-115.

fundamental change through coming up reasons why it violates the status-quo in the first place, in other words, producing some justifications of the material breach while embracing a narrative that states a type of demilitarisation does exist, and *rebus sic stantibus* is not legally plausible. Greece is facing the problem of acting in a way provisions related to demilitarisation of the islands dropped their *raison d'être* (the reason of existence) and there is a adjust in circumstances but also arguing for there is a legal status-quo based on the international law covering some demilitarisation regulations. Furthermore, Greece implicitly admits it is violating them via setting the accusation on Turkey for this violation. It is hard to distinguish the implicit reference of disappearance of *raison d'être* from officially never resorted term of *rebus sic stantibus*. These terms do not fit the idea of status-quo at all but drawing parallels to each other, which harms the cohesion of Greek argumentation due to its reference those regulations and status-quo in the first place.

In that regard, the first official Greek claim is about the Central Aegean Islands as it is evaluating the Article 13 of Lausanne. The official Greek stance asserts that there is any mention to non-military or demilitarisation in the Article 13, therefore the regime of demilitarisation does not exist but only some military restrictions provided. In order to establish a convincing backbone for this argument, official Greek approach pushes the third clause of Article 13 forward as the permission of some military force: “Les forces militaires helléniques dans lesdites îles seront limitées au contingent normal, appelé pour le service militaire, qui pourra être instruit sur place”. It is also interpreted as the partial demilitarisation in contrast to full militarisation. The issue is with that, it is a matter of wording and reference which should not confuse the observer and applier. As noted, the official Greek account pertaining solely to demilitarisation issue neglects the Article 12 of Lausanne Treaty which is based on the Decision of Six States, that recognized under the confirmed Treaties of London and Athens. This decision forbids the usage of the islands for military and naval purposes, as the initial confirmation of the Article 13's first clause pertaining the prohibit of fortifications and naval bases. All these textual and analytical connections and references on the diplomatic and legal texts from the different time periods strengthens the idea that the intention was indeed achieving some sort of demilitarisation for decade, rendering the classifications of demilitarisation such as the partial or full slight redundant. C.P.

Economides argues that Article 12 only confirmed a basic principle, and the tangible effects were only realized and could only be understood under the Straits Convention and Treaty of Lausanne, in which the Convention was annulled and left the frontier islands free from demilitarisation.¹⁰³ Pazarıcı argues otherwise as it is not legally plausible.¹⁰⁴ According to him, the legal validity of stipulations that found themselves a place on the international treaties was a different matter than the tangible practice and details of them. For him, what matters in this situation is adhering the legal obligations, which commonly understood under the legal term of *Pacta sunt Servanda*. This can be sum up under this formula: A regime pertaining *the very term of demilitarisation*, regardless of the level and regulation design, undeniably exists as a legal obligation. Just as Turkey, Athens also accepts this fact. The only matter of dispute could be the content and extend of this international non-military, limited military or military restrictive regime, regardless of how it was coined during the conditions and traditions of its time frame. Moreover, Athens itself accepts the violation of those restrictions in the first place for instance in accordance with government spokesman Stelios Petsas' statement which clarifies no Greek government so far has had the intention of dismantling the military build-up on the Eastern islands since alleged Turkish threat with its Fourth Army is existent. It is a justification or defense against an admitted legal breach. In his book covering this issue, the former Turkish Naval Officer Cihat Yaycı also provides a briefing regarding the remilitarisation level on the islands with satellite photographs and intelligence reports.¹⁰⁵ In this briefing, the land, air and naval bases and fortifications armed with long range capable equipment demonstrate that the features of the existing Greek military force still violate the first and second clauses of the Article 13 of Lausanne Treaty, if the third clause regarding the manpower quantity of the Greek forces with an established limit in comparison to normal force contingent in Greek mainland is not violated. After implicitly admitting the material breach, the official website of Hellenic MFA ambiguously states: "Whilst to date Greece has faithfully implemented these

¹⁰³ Pazarıcı, p. 56.

¹⁰⁴ Pazarıcı, p. 57.

¹⁰⁵ See, Cihat Yaycı and Osman Paksüt, *Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi*"

provisions”.¹⁰⁶ In fact, this official expression indicates a relatively recent event, and the official Greek accounts are silent pertaining the exact date which the remilitarisation began. The literature’s extension of the exact date depends on the interpretation of the author under the light of some historical events. Some sources refer to a royal decree of the Kingdom of Greece dated 4 April 1937 which declared Lemnos a fortified surveillance area, but these sources lack the necessary practical evidence, even if the domestic decree itself was a violation of the existing international legal obligation. Cihat Yaycı refers the island of Samos to be remilitarized before the WWII.¹⁰⁷ Turkish authors Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer claim that the demilitarised status of the islands was not contested matter until the Eastern Islands Diplomacy of 1969 simply because Greece was used to respect stipulations beforehand.¹⁰⁸ With a slight ambiguity, the official Turkish statements date the exact violation to be happened in 1960’s during the timeframe of Cyprus Crisis gained the momentum, similar to İnan and Acer. Turkish sources read this claimed change of stance as the emergence of an illegitimate policy and inner contradiction.¹⁰⁹ On the contrary, official Greek accounts seek justification of such evolution, as a noted inclination. Greek sources also resort to the balance of power and security dilemma arguments, claiming Turkey interprets issue narrowly.¹¹⁰ Whilst the referred Turkish Fourth Army which was founded on 1975 functions as one of the key hard-power leverages for Greek argumentation. Sometimes, official sources of Greece refer this threat without a clear identification: “However, Turkey maintains a large military force with an aggressive

¹⁰⁶Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Issues of Greek-Turkish Relations, Turkish claims regarding the demilitarisation of islands in the Aegean Sea, The status of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Ikaria”, Hellenic Republic MFA, Last Update: January 1, 2024, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims-regarding-the-demilitarization-of-islands-in-the-aegean-sea.html>

¹⁰⁷ Yaycı, p. 50.

¹⁰⁸ Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer, “The Aegean Disputes: Introduction”, p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ Alaettin Sevim, “Ege Denizi’ndeki Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adaların Silahlandırılması Sorunu”, p. 497.

¹¹⁰ Stivachtis, “The Demilitarisation of the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands The Case of the Central Aegean and Dodecanese Islands”, p. 106; Heraclides, “Demilitarisation, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in Aegean Imagined Enemies”, p. 204.

posture along its coast facing the Eastern Aegean Greek islands”.¹¹¹ For Athens, this is a result of bad faith part from Turkey that opposes the essential driver of Lausanne which is seeking peace: “Turkey claims that the alleged obligations for demilitarization “were set forth in the interest of the maintenance of international peace and security”, apparently echoing article 13 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Following these statements, the content of this text draws a perspective relating to Turkey in a wider regional context in which Turkey is deliberately depicted as the potential aggressor violating borders of neighbour countries such as Iraq and Syria.¹¹² This is the central idea that holds together the entire official Greek claim, Turkey disrupts the peace in the Aegean Sea, therefore Athens has right to take counter action, which are in synergy with the rest of auxiliary Greek arguments such as resorting the claim of self-defence based on the 51 Article of UN Charter. Via heavily sticking on the alleged threat assumption justified on the grounds of the existence of Turkish Fourth Army, Stivachtis, argues that the “principle of reciprocity” permits Greece to preserve a military deployment in the said islands relative to that of the Turkish forces stationed on the coast of Asia Minor.¹¹³ However, he does not offer tangible evidence for the Fourth Army being an actual threat rather than stressing on the amphibious or offensive feature of this army. Apart from the specialisation, any army could be utilized in a defensive or offensive manner. Furthermore, it can be argued that the “principle of effective” meaning cannot override or overthrow the entire legal body that includes overwhelming amount of demilitarisation clauses unlike what Stivachtis believes.¹¹⁴ Independently from Stivachtis, Pazarıcı argues that principle of effective produces an opposite effect of compliance to the legal obligations.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Theofili, “Letter dated 27 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General”, United Nations General Assembly Security Council, 27th of July 2021”

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Stivachtis, “The Demilitarisation of the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands The Case of the Central Aegean and Dodecanese Islands”, p.99, p. 117-118.

¹¹⁴ Stivachtis, p. 102.

¹¹⁵ Pazarıcı, p. 57.

Another official Greek stance is that no other parties besides Turkey have made demands for the commitment to the provisions of demilitarisation. According to this stance, Turkey is the sole country that demands such commitment. Stivachtis labels this argument as "strange," but he does not provide any further comment on it.¹¹⁶ The rest of the available literature overlooks and under-evaluates this argument. The official Greek stance also does not offer any additional comments. Upon initial examination, this statement appears to be a simple political assertion aimed at delegitimizing Turkey's legal stance and eroding international confidence in the country by demonstrating a lack of support. In that frame, it could be argued that the statement implicitly references Article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty, the Decision of Six States and the Paris Peace Treaty as well – all of which that none of the guarantor parties interfere in Greece's material breach and they do not need to do so as Athens is allegedly more trustworthy in his action and argumentation compared to Turkey. In essence, this argument actually questions the legitimacy of previously imposed demilitarisation arrangements as an international regime based on international law. Converging it with Greek political attempt, this argument challenges the legitimacy of once imposed demilitarisation arrangement as an international regime based on international law and implies the view that now Turkey unilaterally attempts to impose demilitarisation on Greece while the other actors have no visible problem in Greek militarisation on the islands. The issue of this claim is lack of international consideration or outsider support, or inference does not mean the legal obligations do not exist, and this is more of a theoretical and practical problem in essence regarding the enforcement of international law vis-à-vis the application of interest-based geopolitics in multi-state world arena, which are discussed in the next chapters. In addition, as noted previously, it is a historical matter of politic evolution that the guarantor attitude of involving parties had changed in accordance with their objectives and interest, as a sharp contrast to the non-enforced and weak international law based on the inter-state treaties that suffers from keeping up these in a dynamic anarchical world. This historical dimension and possibly plausible realistic approach are demonstrated in the next chapters in order to have a grasp of why the great powers had initially an interest in disarming the islands and how their interest has changed throughout the process of history as their definitions, objectives and calculations have

¹¹⁶ Stivachtis, p. 113.

changed and also why the international legislation pertaining demilitarisation cannot be enforced so easily in comparison to domestic dimension.

Next to this assertion and above the others, the official and unofficial Greek stances both claim that Turkey is deliberately challenging and threatening Greek sovereignty on the Eastern islands. As evident from Mevlüt Cavusoglu's statement in a joint conference with his Romanian in December 2022, Turkey officially establishes a connection between the demilitarization and sovereignty of Greek islands as response to the Greek military exercise in demilitarised Lesbos¹¹⁷ by the wisdom of the Article 12 and 13 of the Lausanne Treaty. The same articles that both determine and confirm the non-military and sovereignty status of the islands. Athens reacts dramatically to this claim as they believe it poses a threat to their primary consideration of territorial integrity and rule just as Turks do. Following Cavusoglu's remark, Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Miltiadis Varvitsiotis levelled accusations against the government in Ankara, claiming that it has repeatedly engaged in "provocative and historically ignorant statements."¹¹⁸ He also denied that his country harbours any "aggressive intentions" toward Turkey. The official Greek and Turkish accounts state those for describing their opposing position:

Regarding the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923, it should be stressed that Greece's sovereignty over the Eastern Aegean Sea islands was officially confirmed in article 12 of the Treaty. Greek sovereignty over the Eastern Aegean islands, according to the said article, is not conditional upon any obligation whatsoever, including any obligation to demilitarize them.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ First Channel News, "Çavuşoğlu threatened Greece to raise issue of sovereignty of Aegean islands", 06.12.2022, FCN, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2022/12/06/Çavuşoğlu-threatened-Greece-to-raise-the-issue-of-the-sovereignty-of-the-Aegean-islands/844622> ; Hellenic News of America, "Greece delivers letter to UN refuting Turkish claims regarding Aegean islands", 27.05.2022, HNA, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://hellenicnews.com/greece-delivers-letter-to-un-refuting-turkish-claims-regarding-aegean-islands/>

¹¹⁸ AP News, "Turkey again threatens Greece for arming Aegean islands", 06.12.2022, AP News, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://apnews.com/article/europe-middle-east-greece-turkey-gun-politics-3341aecb21b76faa4c889e3b1286b1ab>

¹¹⁹ Theofili, "Letter dated 27 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", United Nations General Assembly Security Council, 27th of July 2021"

Article 12 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty unequivocally establishes (in part through the reference made to the 1914 decision) a clear connection between sovereignty and demilitarization for all of the Eastern Aegean Islands.¹²⁰

These expressions demonstrate the real difference but also similarity of the Turkish and Greek stances pertaining the sovereignty status of the islands in relation with the demilitarisation issue, in which the literature and media accounts prone to emphasize difference, not the common ground. Both accounts do connect the Greek sovereignty in the same source and actually both accounts agree on that as the quoted texts from the official letters indicate. The slight but vital difference lies on the interpretation on the conditionality or property of sovereignty. Greek sources advocate a notion of an unbounded state sovereignty based on the general understanding of the sovereignty within borders of the popular and practical mindset, prefer referring more general framework of the international law that stress on the hegemonical will of the state sovereignty. Turkish stance refers to the conditional example based on the arrangement of this sovereignty by the respective treaties, the other primary and undeniable source of the international law. The conditional example ensures that the arrangement is respected by all parties involved. In fact, as Pazarcı's remark concludes,¹²¹ the international law is the sole progenitor and guarantor of the legitimate sovereignty in legal terms.

2.3.2. The Critic of Popular Reception

The Greek arguments and policy for re-armament are usually considered within the scope of bilateral security-related balance in the Aegean Basin between Turkey and Greece. The myth of Turkish Threat over Greece is popular particularly both in the Western World and Greece, especially elaborated in relation to the memory of Cyprus Crisis and aggressive but populist statements of Turkish officials, but there are few exceptions such as the legal expert Raymond Jay's claim of undeniable Greek violation of international law pertaining the demilitarisation. Since Turkish security heavily

¹²⁰ Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu, "Letter dated 30 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General"

¹²¹ Pazarcı, p. 19.

relied on its armed forces and military might as Gülден Ayman rightly guesses,¹²² it is explicitly and implicitly argued that Greece is generally responsive towards the increasing and adapting Turkish military capacity to harass and even cede the islands through use of force. The contest for air space and the dispute over the extension of air space surrounding the islands are usually brought on the table with such claims. However, before questioning Turkish intention, one observer should consider the potential huge costs of an imagined Turkish-Greek War or local conflict, or any potential Turkish attempt to destroy the machinations of the Greek Army on the islands or simply invading the islands, for both parties. Firstly Turkey, as a completely legitimate but an actor in a sensitive position, actually does not bear a true full dimensional capacity of ceding the islands to justify the Greek argumentation and positive popular feedback regarding the sovereignty concerns at all, especially considering Turkey itself assures the Greek sovereignty with the demand of non-military status in its counter-argumentation. Popular advocating approaches pertaining Greek argumentation shows inability of separating the ways the problem could be resolved and emphasizes on the hypothetical situations of potential aggression from perceived threat instead. Whilst Turkish sources agree on that the security threat from Greek remilitarisation based on baseless Greek justifications is an undeniable fact but that could and should be reversed. The popular perception from non-Turkish sources usually does not clearly state that Greek argumentation is lacking in the ability in meeting on the common ground with Turkish apprehensions.

Then an observer could question the Greek claim of bad faith in Turkish intention like there is a mirror reflection from Greece's side as Athens assumably has a bad faith in its desire to replace the existing regulations with no valid reason other than that some assumed appearances like aggressive posture and contradictory actions such as both accepting and rejecting the status-quo at the same time and place frame. The popular understanding in the Greek media does not have a special concern of questioning the structure or validity of Greek argumentation, therefore Turcofobia and demonization commonly echo from them.

¹²²S. Gülден Ayman, "Negotiations and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power Situations: The Turkish-Greek Case", *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, Edited by Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Infantis (Routledge 2004), p. 236.

2.4. Turkish Arguments

Turkish arguments meet on the ground that the islands should be demilitarised based on the simple fact that the regulations and related history are apparent and well documented, cannot be omitted and disrupted legitimately with any means other than Turkey's very unlikely consent for multilateral re-arrangement. Turkish position, within this sense, demonstrates a strong emphasis on the single orthodox interpretation of the issue.

2.4.1. The Critic of Official and Unofficial Accounts

Demilitarisation issue of the Eastern islands is one of the examples consisting of the strongest normative tones in Turkish foreign policy discourse and the relevant literature. It is concerned and restrictive in essence rather being aggressive. Due to the legal standing emphasizing a direct textual interpretation and adherence, the central but often not well summarized main Turkish idea is the *Pacta Sunt Servanda* that states the agreements must be kept by the concerning parties. This stance could be monitored throughout the history of this issue in the related diplomatic texts and the stress Turkish commentators sets on the apparent military related obligations on the treaties. However, Turkish commentators can differ within their focus on which Greek claim they take on and the official Turkish stance prone to attempt not engaging Greek arguments unless Greece pushes forward them, just because of containing the simplicity of Turkish argument and demand. But Turkish argumentation both can fail in its simplicity via losing its true focus or lacks the exact details to demonstrate its strong legal points in comparison to Greece's.

In order to enforce its demand for commitment the legal responsibility, Turkish argumentation particularly emphasizes the geographical features of the said islands in relation to the Anatolian mainland. As noted, both 1969 and 2021 letters describe these islands geographically prolongation of Anatolia. This statement is both geographically and geomorphologically confirmed, although, there is difference in Turkish argumentation in that sense. The official Turkish argument emphasizes on the reality

of very close proximity of the islands which could put Anatolia under danger in a staged attack from the islands and facilities any military operation:

A cursory glance at the map will suffice to illustrate the significance that the Eastern Aegean Islands, lying within a few miles of the coast, have for the security of the Anatolian mainland. To mention but a few examples, the island of Samos is 3 miles, Lesbos 10 miles, Chios 9 miles, Kos 3 miles, Symi 5 miles and Meis (located in the Mediterranean) only 1 mile away from the Anatolian coast.¹²³

Whilst the unofficial Turkish comments and scholarship widely engage in richer theoretical applications, which possibly raise concerns on the Greek observers as well. Tarık Demir for instance utilizes the concept of enclaved islands for the Dodecanese islands in order to explain their isolated situation on the basis of comparison between the ontological geopolitics versus critical geopolitics as the defining causalities.¹²⁴ The same approach is applicable to the northern islands as well. The geographical ontology did not define northern islands' current political reality pertaining to sovereignty but did define their (non)military status due to the close proximity to the Straits and Asia Minor. Turkish sources prone to focus on the geographical ontology and determinism instead of historic critical geopolitics. It can be argued that this inclination distracts legitimate Turkish demand and provide a leverage for the arguments pertaining the assumed challenge to sovereignty. On the contrary, the critical geopolitics sets the dynamic social process of multi actor politics as the independent variables of politics on a geographical background frame that does not necessarily define the political borders and other political realities such as the military status. However, the legal obligation of demilitarisation is clear and loud on the historic and textual content. Turkish points regarding geographical proximity and similarity are also correct. Therefore, the demilitarised status of islands is both confirmed by the dynamic sociopolitical reality and as the official Turkish account rightly states, by the constant geographical reality. But, still, these are more scholar-type approaches for establishing

¹²³ Sinirliođlu, "Letter dated 13 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General"

¹²⁴ Tarık Demir, *Türk-İtalyan İlişkilerinde Mentеше Adalari (1923-1947)* (Master's Thesis: T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü Müdürlüğü, 2010) p.3-10.

some causalities for understanding world better, not the necessary discourses for the resolution of issue. Kilometres do not matter in this age of long-range weapon emplacements and the legal obligations of demilitarisation does not require a further outside reference or data for legitimate application. Another Turkish claim is that Greece changed its stance in 1975 with the admission of the remilitarisation by Karamanlis,¹²⁵ following the Turkish Operation on Cyprus under the provided guarantorship by the Treaty of Guarantee dated 1960, provoked by Turkish massacres by the ultranationalist military junta. Before, despite warned by Turkey for re-arming the islands occasionally, Greece apparently needs creating pardon-type objections for its military activities on the islands. These claims such as the 1969 letters openly embraced the demilitarised status and expressed the very respect which Athens had been showing them but attempted to de-validate Turkish warnings via pretext producing manner. Turkish sources, both official and unofficial, is prone to underline this change in stance but it apparently is not facilitating the resolution of the dispute due to its connection to another unsolved frozen issue of Cyprus, even they are arguably irrelevant. The historical references outside the scholarship and research possibly are distracting while the legitimate points of legal obligation are present for full demonstration rather than weak references.

As Pazarıcı rightly coined it in contrast to Greek position pertaining the article 12 of Lausanne Treaty, the legal approach of loyalty to the agreements (*pacta sunt Servanda*) is the most simple and uniform explanation of the general attitude of Turkish accounts on the subject matter, not just to related to Article 12 but to whole Eastern islands question including the Dodecanese as well.¹²⁶

2.4.2. The Critic of Popular Reception

As mentioned, the Turkish stance is usually taken as a challenge on Greek sovereignty and a threat to its security, but such interpretations depend on the perceptions and discourses the engaging interpreters shape and produce. Like Greek counterparts,

¹²⁵ Yaycı and Paksüt, p. 187.

¹²⁶ Pazarıcı, p. 57.

specific Turkish accounts are often neglected due to the considerations regarding a larger regional frame are preferred in the analysis of Turkish-Greek disputes, which tends to stress on the balance in Aegean Sea, in a bilateral inter-state rivalry setting focusing on Turkey *vis-à-vis* Greece. Sympathies, disliking, hostilities are the primary determinants of how a commentator is going to shape his opinion pertaining the demilitarisation issue just as in Greek case, but Turkey and Turkish accounts suffer from the biased attacks more, most likely due to the more capable and effective Greek lobbies and diasporas in comparison to Turkish counterparts. Meanwhile, Turkey is better known with its hard-power and the overwhelming military might in relation to Greece¹²⁷ due to its emphasis of the strong and vast armed forces for its security, which are easy targets for the negative propaganda and reading than “soft” lobbying. The popular reception pertaining Turkey’s stance heavily lacks meta-perception of the biased variables affecting them.

For instance, some popular Turkish sources such as former Turkish admiral Cihat Yaycı’s related statements in multiple occasions pertaining the assumed loss of sovereignty transfer rights via re-militarisation fed the exaggerations and apprehensions of Greek side both within the Greek media and state authorities.¹²⁸ But official Turkish statement, for instance of Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, dated 20 April 2019, demands a respect to the clauses of demilitarised *status-quo* through a peaceful resolution by asking for recall of the Greek military deployment on the islands because these are violations which does not suit friendly relations Turkey and Greece have.¹²⁹ Sources tend to jump on the hawkish wordings rather than calm constructive demands based on the international law, referring the potentially dangerous military might and coercion instead.

¹²⁷ Fuat Aksu, Preservation of Demilitarized Status of The Aegean Islands for The National Security of Turkey”, p. 114.

¹²⁸ Panagiotis Savvidis, “Cihat Yaycı: “Greece has lost sovereignty rights over the Aegean islands”, 04.11.2022, Greek City Times, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Cihat Yaycı: "Greece Has Lost Sovereignty Rights Over The Aegean Islands" \(greekcitytimes.com\)](https://greekcitytimes.com/2022/11/04/cihat-yayci-greece-has-lost-sovereignty-rights-over-the-aegean-islands/)

¹²⁹ Aydınlik, “Hulusi Akar'dan Yunanistan'a adalar uyarısı”, 20.04.2019, Aydınlik, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Hulusi Akar'dan Yunanistan'a adalar uyarısı \(aydinlik.com.tr\)](https://aydinlik.com.tr/hulusi-akar-dan-yunanistan-a-adalar-uyarisi/)

While as noted, the essence of official Turkish stance is *Pacta sunt Servanda*, Greek accounts, both unofficial and even official in this respect claim that Turkey questions Greek sovereignty on the islands. Turkey questions it not because of the bad faith but due to the violation of the *pacta sunt servanda* principle which confirms Greek sovereignty as well according to the core of Turkish argument emphasizing Article 12 and Six State Decision. It is actually an implicit promotion and incentive for calling a withdrawal, returning from the material breach. If Turkey acts like in a tone that actually challenges the Greek sovereignty and territorial integrity of the islands, not only it contradicts with itself but would face serious trouble due to the reaction of powerful states and international community. So far, it is demonstrated that the internal contradiction of official Greek narrative and action puts it in a weaker legal position. To sum up, popular approaches towards Turkish stance related demilitarisation issue in specific and Aegen Dispute in general do not consider these basic guess-work evaluations, choosing the pathway of popularizing phobic myths and demonization. Due to many reasons that has provided, an armed conflict between Ankara and Athens is very unlikely, even the hardest seeming turning points. The other possible reasons are never searched or discovered for the Greek militarisation and Turkish concerns other than the military security and hypothetical potential of eruption of a war between parties.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter has summarized and criticized the literature for opening another page for further research in a contested issue of demilitarisation on the northern islands. The fresh historical and theoretical dimensions complete this survey, and the conclusions of this chapter are broadly considered, re-utilized or converged with new concepts and possible explanations in the other chapters. It is now demonstrated that the international legal basis is present and contested within Turkish-Greek bilateral relations, it has historical roots which actors possess an evolving stance that have an impact on the subject matter, particularly the outsider great powers.

CHAPTER 3

REVISITING OF THE HISTORY OF DEMILITARISATION ISSUE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

3.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to establish the underlying historical causes of the conflict between Greece and Turkey regarding the status of Northern Aegean Islands. In addition, this chapter demonstrates the historic geopolitical significance of the islands within the regional context and the insightful variables behind this prominence. It is evident that geopolitical and economic factors were always at play, and the demilitarisation was merely a byproduct of tough negotiations which were guided by these factors and calculations of the leaders and other actors of interest. The clause of demilitarisation of the islands, although vital for Turkish security and interests on the Aegean Sea, was also a real concern for the major imperial powers, especially Britain and Russia. It was specifically designed in accordance with the security of British interests in regard to the wider regional context of the Turkish Straits, Black Sea and Asia Minor, which all stand on the larger Eastern Mediterranean frame that connects to the British controlled Egypt, Red Sea and the vast realm of Indian Ocean. The alteration in those interests and political conjuncture in the historical process have resulted in the current negligence and silence of the former great powers in this issue. Instead, as discussed in the following chapters, the new great powers (the United States) of transformed world politics attempt to exploit the demilitarisation issue for extracting the most geopolitical gain like the others have done regarding the status of the islands between Turkey and Greece. In fact, the demilitarisation arrangement was a small concession gifted to Turkey, but it served a greater purpose as noted. The history of the Northeastern Aegean Issue was mostly generated and shaped throughout the Balkan Wars, its roots were laid during the Greek Revolt and Independence Process of 1821-1829 (known as Mora / Peloponnesian Revolt in Turkish literature), then emerged as

an immediate question of distribution with the Ottoman-Italian War of 1911-1912. Therefore, the historical background is profound in the sense of openness both for the indigenous and foreign initiatives of assuming shares from the islands and the region.

3.2. The Status of the Northeastern Aegean Islands

3.2.1. Diplomatic and Legal Accounts during the Ottoman Empire

The wars in Libya and in the Balkans were not the first occasions where the North Aegean Islands have presented a difficulty for participating powers with regards to their sovereignty and status. The reason is that the islands possessed a significant geopolitical influence on the surrounding geopolitical landscape. It is possible that the raiders with the unknown origin, known as the Sea People, who totally affected the Bronze Age powers and contributing the Bronze Age Crisis, were originated from the Aegean islands and surrounding region. The account of Herodotos mentions the indigenous inhabitants of the islands known as the Pelags, who were active participants of the complex ancient immigration system in the Aegean Sea. One of the most famous and powerful ancient Greek tyrants of the time, Polycrates of the island Samos is said to have a navy consisted of vast amount of ships and handed on a good share of the trade surplus in the region¹³⁰, which later apparently absorbed by the rising Persian power according to the historical accounts. Followingly, the islands became a crucial strategic location for the competing forces of the Athenians, Spartans, and Persians during the Greco-Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, in which the separate political entities of islands pursued diverse and complex policies for managing surrounding hegemonies, involving some great catastrophes by use of military force such as the infamous destruction of Melos by the Athenian Empire, as dramatically demonstrated by Thucydides. The so-called Hellenistic era witnessed the rise of the Alexander's short living Empire and Hellenistic Kingdoms afterwards, therefore, the process resulted in the downhill decline of the noted traditional regional powers of Persians, Athenians and Spartans. Then, the Romans came to the picture as the opposing power to the Hellenistic Kingdoms and Carthage and invaded the historical landscape of the

¹³⁰ Erinç and Yücel, "Ege Denizi Türkiye ile Komşu Ege Adaları", p. 74.

islands over many centuries. This was an era that the Aegean Sea Region with its islands defined within the so-called *Mare Nostrum* of the Roman and transitionally the Eastern Byzantine Empire. The long lasting Roman/Byzantine hegemony on the islands was only seriously challenged and hampered by the Muslim Arabs during the early Middle Ages, however, it was the Italian City States of Venice and Genovese, followed by the other Latins and Francs, which able to successfully conduct *Partitatio Imperii Romanae* (the secession of the weakened Byzantine Empire), rather than Muslims during the late Middle Ages. It was the older European powers, not Muslims Arabs and Turks, who gradually dismantled the Byzantine hegemony over the islands. After the Forth Crusade in 1204 ended up sacking and occupation of the Byzantine Constantinople by Latins, the first distribution of the islands on the Aegean Sea occurred among the feudal Lords of the West, apparently under the tutelage and supervision of Venice and Genovese who were seeking the trade monopoly and military security of the colonial trade routes. While the Byzantines exploited the friction between the Venice and Genovese, practically able to overthrow the Latin occupation on Constantinople in 1268, they were not able to prevent practical secession of the islands among these colonialist republics, Genovese on the Northern Islands and Venice on the Southern Islands respectively.¹³¹ The Byzantine navy especially did not represent any challenge for the most serene republic of Venice¹³² regarding the control over the islands. Therefore, the result of this imbalance was the Treaty of Nymphaeum of 1261, which legitimized the Genovese establishment on the islands *vis-à-vis* Venice. The following incident was the series of wars between them, provoked and interfered by the Byzantines. During the fast-paced ascension of the Ottomans, the remaining Byzantine elements allied with the growing Ottoman power to balance out the Italian supremacy on the Aegean Sea. The Ottomans, pretty much like the Byzantines, were aware that they were less capable than the Italian Sea Powers on the Aegean Sea and utilized the segmented Byzantine nautical elements and prior experience to challenge Latins. Moreover, Ottomans seek exploitation of the division between Venice and Genovese like the Byzantines did, such as in Orhan's period as

¹³¹ Angeliki Laiou and Cecile Morrison, *Bizans Dünyası Bizans İmparatorluğu ve Komşuları (1204-1453)* (Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2023) p. 32.

¹³² Donald M. Nicol, *Bizans ve Venedik Diplomatik ve Kültürel İlişkiler Üzerine*, (Sabancı Üniversitesi, 2000), p. 161

prevailing Ottomanist Halil İnalcık and Byzantine scholarship point out.¹³³ Mehmed II (1432-1481), known as The Conqueror, despite using a title which denotes his claim of sovereignty on the Aegean, was not able to control this region and islands for long decades. The Sultan had to assert to balance of power politics once again as followed by his grandfathers and Byzantines. However, he took steps for imposing control over the islands with the possible cooperation of the famous Byzantine Greek historian and Imbros (today's Gökçeada) landowner aristocrat, Critobulus (1410-1470). He utilised the Ottoman controlled straits to coerce his will on Italian powers in the Aegean Sea through establishing fortifications on the Straits which gave the sultan to abilities of cutting the access of the colonies and shutting down the trade operations of any actor he wishes for. Whilst the Ottoman control was established on the islands of the North Aegean Sea during the period of Mehmed II, the Aegean Sea had not yet become an Ottoman Sea, not until the era of Sultan Suleiman and his impactful conquest of Rhodes. In fact, the true total Ottoman control on the Aegean Sea can only be seen with the consideration of much later Conquest of Crete during 17th century, as this respective landmass stands on the entrance of the whole Aegean waters like a giant castle. From this perspective, an observer must consider the conquest of Crete, which was taken place as late as 18th century. In addition to those, the context of the Aegean Basin as an Ottoman maritime zone was violated by the several actors, such as by the Russian Empire in the Battle of Çeşme dated 1770. Therefore, the Ottoman domination on Aegean Islands had a far less short life span and demonstrated more outsider penetration contrary to what the literature emphasizes and implies. Mirroring the hegemonic counterpart of the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman hegemony on the Aegean also was challenged from the beginning and when these hegemons got weaker due to the material power shifts, the outsider interference and balance of powers politics took the place for reshaping the regional design. However, the motivation has always buried within the geostrategic and economic calculations for the involving actors when it comes to define the status of the islands.

When the Ottoman naval capabilities were shifted in the favour of the European powers during the transformative 19th Century due to lack of Ottoman industrial base

¹³³ Halil İnalcık, *Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği* (İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2023), p. 102, p. 103, p. 104.

and financially destructive naval imports without sufficient knowledge and experience capital of Ottoman naval staff, a newly emergent player on the Mediterranean stage made the true impact pertaining the future of the weakly defended Ottoman islands of the Northern Aegean Sea alongside with the other Ottoman territories around Mediterranean. The unification of Italy was concluded in 1861 with the multiplied efforts of General Guiseppe Garibaldi, Count Camillo Di Cavour and political activist Guiseppe Mazzini who all operated under the idealised notion of European nationalism and unitarianism to dismantle the local Italian states that consisted of papal Rome and its allies. As with the case of Germany, the creation of a unified Italy posed a significant challenge for the European imperial powers. Italy's industrial, capital and population growth in the Mediterranean system, coupled with its own imperial aspirations, placed it in direct competition with the European imperial states. Italy's actions, particularly those related to the occupation of the 12 Islands, provide a clear example of its efforts to gain space in this race. Tarık Demir's study identifies Italy's imperial agenda, which upset the balances in the Mediterranean and pursues a greater geopolitical goal with an aspiration for imitating the ancient Roman imperialism, namely, to make the Mediterranean an Italian lake (the so-called *Mare Nostrum*).¹³⁴ According to İsrail Kurtcephe, following the unification of Italy in the 19th century, the first target of Italy's imperial agenda was the Ottoman province of Tunisia, which was highly suitable for conquest due to the proven Ottoman vulnerability.¹³⁵ However, the loss of this target to France in 1881 led Italy to choose and invade Ottoman Tripoli instead in September 1911.¹³⁶ Although this orientation and the resulting war caused anxiety in European states and protest among the left chambers, the assumption that Italy would have reservations in its expansionism in the eyes of European powers led at least ambassadors, statesmen and the press to believe that Italy would not escalate the war.¹³⁷ However, as Italy entrapped in Ottoman Libya, it attacked various ports, especially Beirut, a port of international demographic character, with the desire to establish international pressure the Ottoman Empire into submission. Through this

¹³⁴ Tarık Demir, "Türk-İtalyan İlişkilerinde Menteşe Adaları (1923-1947)", p.6.

¹³⁵İsrail Kurtcephe, *Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri*, (Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), p. 10, p. 13.

¹³⁶ Kurtcephe, "Türk İtalyan İlişkileri", p. 13.

¹³⁷ Kurtcephe, "Türk İtalyan İlişkileri", p. 148-150.

calculation, Italy seeks to force the great powers to establish a better management regime for Italy's defiant ambitions.¹³⁸ Despite the condemning and furious reaction of the other great powers, particularly of Austria, British, French and Russia over its acts, the bombardment of Beirut was not last great Italian defiance for assuring Ottoman submission and its desire to be accepted into the imperial league. For this purpose, Italy assaulted on the Ottoman controlled Dardanelles Straits on April 1912 through utilisation of the islands (particularly Lemnos and Stampalia) as the base of operations.¹³⁹ It costed thousands of rubles and pounds for Russian and British trade activity and potential since the Ottoman forces blocked the Straits against Italian assault as a countermeasure.¹⁴⁰ Ottomans hoped that the great powers would establish pressure on Italian shoulders thanks to this provocation to end Libyan War but that was a miscalculation on the Ottomans part. Under the condemnations, Italians withdrew their forces and successfully navigated Russian and British pressure on the Ottomans themselves.¹⁴¹ Not only the Ottomans had to abolish the blockade on the Straits but also became a prey for the problem of accommodation of Italy on the Aegean Sea. Giolitti's Italy was proved how Rome was serious to capitalize on the successes of its own military operations and implement itself with its staged second attack on the Straits in September 1912 despite the Ottoman blockade was removed. The Ottoman efforts to exploit domestic Italian struggles proved to be ineffective despite the left-wing pressure on Giolitti Government whilst Italians successfully played the differences among the great powers and even benefited from the anti-Ottoman rebellion of Idris. Through rumoured tricks which they officially denied, Italy also prepared to stage for upcoming war on Balkans against both Austrian and Ottoman interests when it was both inserting itself on the Aegean Basis and Albanian Question, Ahsen Gül Tokay reports.¹⁴² It is noted that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazanov was in total shock and catch in surprise with collapsing Balkan stability and

¹³⁸ Kurtcephe, "Türk İtalyan İlişkileri", p. 107.

¹³⁹ Kurtcephe, "Türk İtalyan İlişkileri", p. 114.

¹⁴⁰ Kurtcephe, "Türk İtalyan İlişkileri", p. 115.

¹⁴¹ Yellice, *Ege Adaları Meselesi*", p. 52, p. 53, p. 60, p. 61.

¹⁴² Ahsen Gül Tokay, "The Balkan Wars, Ottoman Diplomacy and the Question of the Aegean Islands", in *The Centenary of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) Contested Stances I* Edited by Mustafa Türkeş (*Turkish History Society 2014*), p. 221.

endanger of Balkan *status-quo*.¹⁴³ Whilst British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey was initially concerned to preserve existent status-quo and prevent any great power to thrive in the Aegean Sea and Mediterranean. Bilal Şimşir and Ahsen Tokay share the message of Grey during the Ambassadors Conference that in which Grey believes it is vital to none of the Great Powers should possess naval base on Aegean as it would disturb entire *status-quo* on the Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁴⁴ However, as with Rome had been dragged away from the Straits, Italian attention was directed to the Northern East Aegean islands before the Balkan Wars and it posed another alarming issue for the British, Russia, Germany and Austria. Italians were particularly interested with Lesbos and Chios which located on the prominent routes that let Izmir Port and other Anatolian ports to connect the world. For the Russian Empire, these areas were decades long operation zones of one of the greatest capital joint stocks-based Russian companies in the history, Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company (ROPiT, 1856-1918). The emergent Italian military presence endangered the imperial Russian interests of trade and transportation on the Aegean Sea in relation to activities of ROPiT.¹⁴⁵ For the British, as Şimşir argues, Italian presence and ambitions potentially challenged the privileged Ottoman (Izmir-Aydın) Railway Company (1856-1935) of British which was operating on the Aegean and Southern segments of Turkey.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, Italian naval expedition of harassment and invasion threatened the entire network and industrial base of silk products of the joint British-Greek entrepreneurship on Aegean region that export to global markets through the routes surrounding the islands. It may be expected that the British may support the Ottomans against the Italians in all odds, but the British considered Turks unfit for the operations of their globalised industrial base and favoured Greeks instead.¹⁴⁷ The organic political

¹⁴³ Hayta, “Ege Adaları Sorunu”, p. 71.

¹⁴⁴ Tokay, “The Balkan Wars, Ottoman Diplomacy and the Question of the Aegean Islands”, p. 224

¹⁴⁵ See: ROPiT’s Activities in Chios, Lesbos and İzmir

Mesut Karakulak, *Osmanlı Sularında Rus Vapurları Buharlı Çağında Rus Vapur ve Ticaret Kumpanyası*, (Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2020), p. 147.

¹⁴⁶ Şimşir, “Aegean Question Documents Volume-II (1913-1914)”, p. XV-XVI

¹⁴⁷ See: The Report of British Ministry of War

Salahi R. Sonyel, *İngiliz Gizli Belgelerinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri*, (Remzi Kitapevi, 2011), p. 122.

economic bonds between the British - Greek capital¹⁴⁸ furtherly complicated the picture of Italian expansionism against the weak Ottomans. Lastly, Italy's bitter rival Austria possessed the considerable trade and transportation activity in the region of islands and Germany desired its relatively safe lucrative share on the region as a contender of the other great powers. All these actors had to find a path for restricting or balancing out newly emergent Italian ambitions.¹⁴⁹

In the context of this conjuncture, Russia's primary objective was to exercise careful management of Italy, with the intention of leveraging it against the British and the Greeks. The Russian Empire's ambassadors in Rome encouraged Italy to adopt a more assertive stance towards the Ottoman islands in Summer and Fall of 1912 without harming Russian trade interests, while Russia also sought to establish restrictions on Italy through its participation in the collective vocal response to Italian aggression. In this regard, the Russians disapproved of Italian incursions on Straits and Beirut, to assure that the Italians would not cross a set of red lines. In contrast, Britain sought to maintain a balance against Italy and Russia with Greece in the context of the imminent Balkan Wars and the use of Greeks in economic activity. Italy's interest in the islands of Lesbos and Chios shifted towards the Dodecanese islands, particularly Rhodes, due to the guidance of the Russians since the Russians desired to prevent another Ottoman Blockade on the Straits with the possible Italian Invasion of Central Aegean Islands.¹⁵⁰ Ultimately, the Italians invaded the Dodecanese Islands with the objective of establishing a long-term presence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean and to conclude the Libyan War in their favour.¹⁵¹ During the period when the Ottoman Empire was betrayed by Italy in the Treaty of Ushi and lost both the Dodecanese islands and Tripolitania, the established Italian presence in the Dodecanese left the North Aegean islands completely open to occupation within the strategic calculation

¹⁴⁸ Ari Çokona, *20.Yüzyıl Başlarında Anadolu ve Trakya'daki Rum Yerleşimleri* (Literatür Yayıncılık 2016), p. 246, p. 247.

¹⁴⁹ See: How the British desire to restrict Italians
Yellice, "Ege Adaları Meselesi", p. 79.

¹⁵⁰ See: Russian Ambassador Nicolai Charykov's Suggestion to Italian Diplomat Carlo Gabasso in Istanbul
Yellice, "Ege Adaları Meselesi", p. 57.

¹⁵¹ See: Hazal Pabuçcular, "Türkiye ve Oniki Ada"

nexus of the great powers. As previously noted, the Italians had already used these islands to attack the straits. With the fact that imminent danger of Italian expansion and potential challenge was clear, Edward Grey and the British government perceived the necessity to implement Greek plans pertaining to the noted islands in order to balance and confine Italy in the face of the newly shaped regional conjuncture. This is evidenced in the literature by Grey's pro-Greek stance on the sovereignty issue of the islands that came under Greek occupation during the Balkan Wars. Venizelos tried to leverage this British apprehension under the sponsorship of British to realise Greek annexation of the noted islands. The British could not invade the islands themselves not because they were weak or in need of Greeks for achieving the objective but because Grey believed no other great power would give its consent to the other great power to permanently and directly establish itself on Northern Aegean islands since they geolocated so close the Straits region.

The outbreak of the First Balkan War in October 1912 enabled Greece to capitalise on the rapidly evolving balance of power in its favour. Greece was not only supported by the British, who sought to utilise them against the Italians and others on the islands issue, but also by the Italians, who were still at odds with the Ottomans. As a result, Greece rapidly strengthened its navy, which at the time was on a par with the navy of Ottoman Empire, but vastly surpassed it with British and Italian support. As an example, The Italian-built Georgios Averof cruiser was a particularly notorious piece of naval hardware, bringing many Greek victories over the Ottomans in the Balkan Wars and facilitating the Greek capture of the islands in a period of approximately two months. When the First Balkan War reached the ceasefire stage, unlike the other Balkan states, the Greeks did not participate in the peace negotiations and continued to their occupation attempt of Epirus in order to use it as a bargaining chip in the islands issue in December 1912. During the London and Ambassadors' Conference processes, the Ottomans attempted to leverage their rights in Crete as a bargaining chip to regain the islands that had fallen out of their hands. However, this was not accepted by either the Balkan or the great powers. With the ultimatum to the resisting Ottoman Empire and following the Babiali Raid in January 1913, Edward Grey's proposal to link the islands issue to the Epirus issue gained traction. Despite the variety of views pertaining the fate of islands, Grey promotes the notion that the transfer of the occupied islands

to Greece is the price of Greek evacuation from Epirus, which the Greeks captured when the cease fire process already began. Also, Venizelos defended the idea that the issue of Aegean islands was linked to Albanian Issue and had to be resolved in the same basket.¹⁵² Albania was the soft belly of both Austria and Italy. Venizelos and Grey seek to exploit that in order to extract the necessary concessions for possession transfer regarding the future of the Ottoman islands.¹⁵³ Furthermore, it could be argued that Italy already was on tracing the ways in which it could distract the Ottoman attention on the Italian occupied Dodecanese and separation of the rest of Eastern Aegean islands from Turkey provided this chance. The possession transfer of islands to Greeks was also in line with the hidden Italian desire for separating captured islands from the Ottomans as well.

In this context, the transfer of the islands to Greece was made possible by Greek-British machinations and the decision of Six States in February 1914, which the Ottomans unilaterally rejected.¹⁵⁴ However, the full transfer was not realised, and Bozcaada and Imbros have left out for balancing out the Greeks and lessen their word on the Straits Region. Furthermore, it was the result of the fact that both the Russian and German Empires insisted on all prominent islands should be remained under the Ottoman sovereignty. In order to satisfy Russian condition since the British need Russian support against the growing German threat, Edward Grey had to find a common denominator between the British and Russian positions regarding the islands. The demilitarisation clause became a vital segment for this common denominator alongside with the reservations made for the Ottomans pertaining the closest Strait islands, Bozcaada and Imbros. The resolution of the issue however was not easy task both for Venizelos and Grey. The British encouraged Venizelos to conduct talks with Russia to convince them to full legal realisation of Greek possession of the islands. Russia initially secured some rights related to the Mount Athos at the cost of

¹⁵² Eser, p. 172.

¹⁵³ Eser, p. 173.

¹⁵⁴ Hayta, p. 210, p. 211.

confirming transfer of Northern Aegean islands possession,¹⁵⁵ but the Russians later came up with counter proposal through rejecting their first deal. According to their proposal, the Russian Empire would only provide its consent for Greek possession of islands if only the islands were totally discarded as the military assets.¹⁵⁶ The Russian Empire demanded from Venizelos and Grey that only if the realisation and enforcement of disarmament of the noted islands, including the islands that would be planned to be left on the Ottomans, is the sufficient condition for the continuation of the sovereignty transfer process. Both Grey and Venizelos received this development under the positive light. For Grey, he secured the free passage for the British Navy in any crisis situation with discouraging Italian Threat on the Straits and also neutralised most opposition to the increasing Greek influence on Aegean Sea. This British objective and achievement were further confirmed in the Articles 177 and 178 of Sevres Treaty that envision demilitarisation of the Aegean islands alongside with the Straits in order to assure free passage. For Venizelos, it was just another step for the realisation of Megali Idea which includes the objective altering Aegean Sea into a Greek lake in which demilitarised status of the islands became a small ignorable detail. He further implies this thinking of not insisting the military usage of the islands in the much later Lausanne Conference, stated that the islands never utilised as the operation points for invasion of Izmir and Anatolia.¹⁵⁷ The other great powers were satisfied as well particularly France since its attitude regarding the status of islands was almost indistinguishable from the British. With the overall result that ended up with declaration of Six Powers Decisions which was made in accordance with the Ottoman consent in London and Athen Treaties, the Babiali did not embrace the Six State Decision initially and tried to find a bilateral resolution with Greece before the WWI which involving a renting system and an Ottoman sovereignty in the islands on paper, but these negotiations did not generate meaningful outcomes.

With the Entente Defeat at the end of WWI, the Ottomans were forced to accept the Six State Decision as a segment of Treaty of Sevres in Article 84. The further articles

¹⁵⁵ Eser, p. 138.

¹⁵⁶ Eser, p. 139.

¹⁵⁷ Seha L. Meray, "Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar Belgeler Cilt 1", p. 132.

of 177 and 178 of the same Treaty dealt with the Straits Problem and for securing passage, these articles additionally disarm the Northern Aegean islands, representing the spirit of article 84 and the Six State Decision which confirmed by article 84. The British therefore had apparently reached its ultimate plan as the securing region for free passage of its armed navy and maritime latent fleet.

3.2.2. Diplomatic and Legal Accounts at the Lausanne, Montreux, and Post-Montreux Period

The inaugural session of the Lausanne Conference on the future of the islands commenced on the afternoon of Saturday, 25 November 1922, as recorded in Acts 6. It continued with another session on 29 November as recorded in Acts 7, during which the demilitarisation proposal that of being welcomed in the first session was discussed and decided. The opening speech was delivered by İsmet İnönü.¹⁵⁸ İnönü asserted that the Aegean and Mediterranean islands were of great importance for Turkey's peace and security. He asserted that Turkey's rights to Bozcaada and Imbros were granted by the decision of the Six Great Powers in February 1914, as stipulated in the London Treaty of May 1913. Furthermore, he argued that Samothrace should also be given to Turkey. Furthermore, İnönü cited the economic dependence of these islands on Asia Minor as a reason for Turkey's/Ottoman Turkey's rejection of the 6 powers' decision and left the door open for the return of all of them to Turkey in principle at Lausanne. However, İnönü opened a special parenthesis in his opening speech, especially on the issue of the demilitarisation of the islands. According to the minutes, İnönü states that the fortifications and batteries on the islands should be destroyed, the weapons should be dismantled, and no future fortifications should be built.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, none of these islands should be made naval bases. Aircraft should not be brought to these islands and hangars should not be built. Finally, there should only be enough gendarmerie forces to ensure public order on the islands.¹⁶⁰ Additionally, İnönü

¹⁵⁸ Also See: A Summary from Turkish Press
Ali Naci Karacan, *Lozan*, (İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2022), p. 105-107.

¹⁵⁹ Seha L. Meray, p. 131.

¹⁶⁰ Seha L. Meray, p. 131.

proposed that the islands should have a neutral and independent political existence. The speech in the minutes is particularly corresponds to the basic peace treaty of Lausanne and it's the Straits Convention. It demonstrates İnönü's achievement in that regard. However, when assessing on Lausanne Conference, the historical accounts of Hayta and Gerçek did not evaluate the realised demilitarised status of islands under the light of geopolitical calculation of the exogenous actors and merely focused on the fact that it was solely an achieved gain for Turkish side after the tough negotiations. In this case, İnönü himself, the head of Turkish delegate during the Conference, provides the most valuable evidence for the foreign implementation surprisingly without directly citing the islands. Although İsmet İnönü does not provide any information about the islands in his memoirs besides his mention of one remark of Mussolini in which Mussolini states the question of Dodocanese is closed, he does offer a clear summary of the geopolitical priorities of Lord Curzon at Lausanne, who led the British delegation.¹⁶¹ These priorities continued in the second phase of Lausanne after Lord Curzon's departure. According to İnönü, the question of Mosul and the Straits were of greatest and critical importance for Lord Curzon and the British.¹⁶² İnönü, who had previously served as a general, viewed the matter from a military perspective. He believed that Lord Curzon's intention was to remove fortifications from the Straits region in order to facilitate the safe passage of the British navy and to transfer its administration to an international regime for blocking any potential Turkish interference.¹⁶³ The literature on the issue of demilitarisation fails to acknowledge the applicability of İsmet İnönü's interpretation to the demilitarisation matter. The Treaty of Sèvres confirms the Six Powers Decision in Article 84, the decision which reveals the new regime of demilitarisation and Greek possession on regarding the islands.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapters, the Articles 177 and 178 of the Sèvres Treaty assigned demilitarisation applications to the Northern

¹⁶¹ İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar*, (Bilgi Yayınevi, 2020) p. 328.

¹⁶² İsmet İnönü, "Hatıralar", p. 343.

¹⁶³ İnönü, p. 343.

¹⁶⁴ See, The Appendices, F. Treaty of Sèvres, Relevant Articles, Article 84

Aegean islands together with the Turkish Straits. Article 177 in the Chapter 7 about the Fortifications states:

In the zone of the Straits and islands referred to in Article 178 the fortifications will be disarmed and demolished as provided in that Article.”¹⁶⁵

The following first and second clauses of Article 178 which is in the Chapter 8 about the maintenance of the freedom of the Straits states:

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all works, fortifications and batteries within the zone defined in Article 179 and comprising the coast and islands of the Sea of Marmora and the coast of the Straits, also those in the Islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mitylene, shall be disarmed and demolished. “

The territories of the zone and the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos, and Mitylene shall not be used for military purposes.¹⁶⁶

All these evidence and data indicate that the British agenda was to achieve and protect their Straits-related interests under the disguise of acknowledgment of Turkey's security concerns in the Aegean Sea and as so the Meeting Acta of 6 and 7 of Lausanne Conference confirms, Curzon in principle was not going against to discuss the imposition of disarmament of the islands. Furthermore, he distinguished the issue of demilitarisation of Straits Islands and Central Aegean Islands for separate treatment. Confirming the noted clauses in Sevres Treaty and remarks of İnönü, Curzon openly states that the demilitarisation levels of the three islands next to the Straits Zone should be considered in relation free passage of the Straits.¹⁶⁷ Venizelos, a staunch ally of the British and a Greek politician who sought to advance Greek interests through the use of British influence, was aware of this fact. Consequently, Venizelos never goes against the proposal for the disarmament of the North Aegean islands either, an attitude

¹⁶⁵ See, The Appendices, F. Treaty of Sèvres, Relevant Articles, Article 177

¹⁶⁶ See, The Appendices, F. Treaty of Sèvres, Relevant Articles, Article 178

¹⁶⁷ Meray, p. 134.

beginning with the Russian demilitarisation proposal¹⁶⁸ at the London Conference during the era of Balkan Wars and continuing with the Turkish demilitarisation proposal at Lausanne. He always stated that he was not against such arrangement in principle. Because he hoped for the further advancement of Greek interests would have carried out by the preserved British support. Occasionally, this stance became the prevailing attitude of the entire Allied faction during the Lausanne. Mussolini and Italians were eager to accept the realised demilitarisation of the Northern Eastern Aegean Islands since they are located next to the Italian occupied Dodecanese. For the other powers, this would eliminate the risks of British interference through Greek deployment and intervention at least at the first glance. For Turkey as İnönü proposed in his opening speech during the first meeting about the islands, demilitarisation is a necessity to assure safety of Aegean coastline Turkish Asia Minor and Aegean Sea in general if the islands were about to be leave to the hands of Athens. Hayta stresses on the fact that Turkey mostly focused on the bargaining over Samothrace and Greece is focused on capturing the rest of the Ottoman islands, Bozcaada and Imbros.¹⁶⁹ In that manner and in order to advance Turkish rights of possession, İnönü linked the demilitarisation issue with the political possession in relation to the Straits via rejecting the imperative of Wilson's self-determination principle which defended by Venizelos and the British.¹⁷⁰ According to the Act 7, however, both Lord Curzon and Greek delegate member Caclamano claimed that İnönü was confusing the political issues that based on ethnicity and possession with technical issues which is represented by the disarmament and Straits Issue.¹⁷¹ They ultimately rejected Samothrace's return to Turkey but was not able to remove Turkish possession rights which emerged from the Six Powers Decision pertaining Bozcaada and Imbros either as mentioned by the opening speech of İnönü. They argued that Turkey unilaterally generated the problem of possession rights of Samothrace and Lemnos could not be covered by the Subcommittee that is focusing on the Straits Problem, they could be only investigated

¹⁶⁸ Eser, "Venizelos", p, 139.

¹⁶⁹ Hayta, p. 246-247.

¹⁷⁰ Seha L. Meray, p. 140-145.

¹⁷¹ Seha L. Meray, p. 141, p. 144-145.

by the First Committee which not surprisingly favour Greek and British position. On the grounds of the Six Decision, Curzon states that he left the Greek possession of Lemnos and Samothrace out of the question. Further, Curzon claimed that Turkish party have forgotten to mention Lemnos so far which the literature tends to be critical towards Turkish lack of reference. The sources claim it's a negligence for Turkey's part. Whilst according to the Act 6, the Turkish delegate states that Turkey already believes in the idea that the general demilitarisation İnönü proposed at the beginning of the first meeting will effectively alter the islands status safe for the Straits including the first (Straits) party of the Northern Aegean islands, not because the Turkish Delegate forgot Lemnos.¹⁷² What the literature misses there is that Lord Curzon explicitly interpreted Turkish lack of reference to Lemnos as a compromise within the negotiated security regime of the Straits in the Acta since he considered Lemnos as a necessary element for "defending Straits".¹⁷³ His interpretation indicates further evidence for the British obsession regarding the Straits and how the British viewed the demilitarisation issue in relation to securing free and safe passage on the Straits, both in naval and maritime terms. It can be argued that also what Curzon seek is that throwing Turkey into a more stretched out position in its demand of having possession right of Samothrace. He desired to alter Turkey's stance in a way that may generate inner contradictions in terms of the Six State Decision. The Decision granted both Samothrace and Lemnos to Greece and divided the Straits Region islands between Turkey and Greece, but the Turks forgot to demand all the islands that was in the Straits frontier group despite Turkey (İnönü) is intended to claim all of them. The opening speech of İnönü and Greek counter policy of claiming Turkish islands on the Straits Region confirm the existence of this situation. It can be claimed that it was not a product of a Turkish oversight unlike what the sources are prone to claim but rather a political manoeuvre which perpetrated by Curzon. In the first meeting, Lord Curzon also refuted Turkish proposal of autonomous islands on the grounds that the former problematic experience with Samos and Crete would repeat themselves in the new hypothetical context of autonomy.¹⁷⁴ In the second meeting, the present military expert

¹⁷² Seha L. Meray, p. 145.

¹⁷³ Seha L. Meray, p. 144.

¹⁷⁴ Seha L. Meray, p. 134.

General Weygand announced that the demilitarisation of central Northeastern islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Nikaria was investigated, and the details were established by the subcommittee of the specialists. It was also decided that the details of demilitarisation of the Straits Region islands of Northeastern Aegean islands including Lemnos would be evaluated in the Straits issue as Lord Curzon paved the way to this clause to be accepted by the subcommittee of demilitarisation experts. It is another evidence that the British receives the demilitarisation issue of the islands in relation to the general question of Straits in which with İnönü's assessment, the British desired to secure an easy access to the Straits. The second phase of Lausanne Conference resulted in almost little to no changes pertaining the islands demilitarisation after the Conference's disruption over the issue of the Ottoman Capitulations. Meantime, the other weighty actor of the Conference, the Soviets were too distracted to lock down the Straits in military terms¹⁷⁵ against the possible exploitation of the British and therefore they could not stress on the issue of demilitarisation of unlike the imperial Russians. Unlike the Empire, The USSR views that the demilitarisation poses a gap and opportunity for the British to compromise its own security since the Straits are its soft belly. However, the demilitarisation formula of compromising among Turkish, Greek and British Parties transcended over the Soviet apprehensions related to the Straits. Thus, as seen it the Acta of Lausanne, the negotiated and planned demilitarisation regime on the Straits and islands were all together realised. The observer of independent Turkish press, Karacan also reports that the commission decision regarding the demilitarisation of the islands was accepted,¹⁷⁶ confirming the historical factuality of demilitarisation alongside with the Acta of Lausanne.

The issue of demilitarisation gained the historical significance when the geopolitical conjuncture evolved into the condition that required the negotiations of the Straits

¹⁷⁵ See: İnönü's Comment on Chicherin and Chicherin's Debate with İnönü İnönü, "Hatıralar", p. 340, p. 347.

See: Aralov's Debate with Rauf Bey, Chicherin's Speech in Laussane regarding the Straits, the Soviet Offers Semyon İvanoviç Aralov, *bir Sovyet diplomatının Türkiye anıları*, (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019), p.196-210.

¹⁷⁶ Ali Naci Karacan, Lozan, p. 107.

Regime once more since a selection of Greek and Turkish islands were demilitarised in accordance with the imperative of demilitarisation of the Straits Region. The Montreux Revision was designed in accordance to balance out and deter Italian and German expansionism in a manner that favours Turkish Security without actually reconsidering the general international law regime of the Greek islands. Hence, it has generated complications up to this date regarding the demilitarised status of the islands since the demilitarised status of islands had been overlapped with the demilitarised status of the Straits. However, it is clear from the acta and textual body of new Montreux's regime that there is lack of consideration and neglect towards the status of the Greek islands Lemnos and Samothrace alongside with all practically demilitarised Greek islands outside the demilitarised zone of Straits by the wisdom of the Article 12 of Lausanne and Six Powers Decision. The goal was assuring the security of Straits through appeasing legitimate Turkish security concerns, as the preamble of both drafts and official document of Montreux indicate. The Greek representative of Montreux Politis sets any emphasis or no mention pertaining the status of the Straits-frontier Greek islands, a historical record which the Greek commentator Heraclides perceived under the negative light via stating how "grave error" it was on the part of Greece.¹⁷⁷ However, it would appear that this negligence also affected the attitude of a number of Turkish politicians, as was noted in the previous chapter during the post-Montreux era. In their remarks, as one incidence is evidenced in Rüştü Aras's speech to the Turkish Grand Assembly in 1936, they appear to have assumed that the demilitarisation of the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace had been abolished, just as the demilitarisation of the Turkish islands of Bozcaada and Imbros (today's Gökçeada) just had been. They believed that the frontier Greek islands of Lemnos and Samothrace now opened to the militarisation without having the in-depth awareness of the relevant treaty clauses of Lausanne and the Six Powers Decision regarding the demilitarised regime of the entirety of the Eastern Aegean Greek islands. However, Pazarcı points out there is no indication or data that the other parties accept this subjective interpretation as an official stance.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, the practical process of remilitarisation by Greece occurred at a much later point in time

¹⁷⁷ Heraclides, "The Greek-Turkish Conflict in Aegean Imagined Enemies", p. 203.

¹⁷⁸ Pazarcı, "Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış Statüsü", p. 52

in which Athens kept going on insist on the narrative that it continues to keep its compliance to the international law which impose demilitarisation.¹⁷⁹ Greece embraced its breach and provided justifications much later on, not until Turkish Operation of Cyprus in 1974. The period of Second World War and the Greek Civil War surely impacted the frame of the issue between these two countries. These developments resulted in a silent gap in the brief history of this issue since Greece was in total turmoil of global and later civil war.

3.3. The Remilitarisation Period of the Cold War

3.3.1. The Context of the Cold War and the US Factor

The emergence of the demilitarisation issue as a significant concern is linked to the intensification of tensions between Greece and Turkey following the development of the Cyprus problem and the US-promoted armament context of the Cold War. In this context, the armament of the islands is related to the fact that Greece, which was competing with Turkey in terms of hosting American bases and maximising American military aid, was able to create an environment of favourable incentives.¹⁸⁰ Greece and Turkey tried to engage in against each other unilaterally with neglecting the US¹⁸¹ but under the prevailing patronage of the US, they dragged into the identical stance of dependence in which they seek the support of the US against the other. Cihat Yaycı asserts that the islands have been armed since 1950, commencing with Samos. Despite Turkey's expressed concern, Ankara has only protested and warned against the deployment of Greek equipment and troops until diplomatic traffic commenced. The United States' apparent indifference to Greece's armament of the islands and

¹⁷⁹ Hayta, p. 329-330.

¹⁸⁰ Eirini Karamouzi, "Negotiating the American Presence in Greece: Bases, Security and National Sovereignty", *The International History Review*, 44:1, (2022) 129-144

¹⁸¹ Sotiris Rizas, "Managing a conflict between allies: United States policy towards Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute, 1974–76", *Cold War History*, 9:3, (2009) p. 372.

militarisation of the Aegean region with promoting the idea that the constant Soviet threat of invasion is imminent suggests that the United States has overlooked these developments as it suits its interests. The Lemnos Military Airport for instance became the greatest defiant example in which the demilitarisation clause is clearly violated within the benefit of the US against the Soviet military influence as covered in the next chapter. This is despite the United States' purported commitment to contribute to the Aegean balance. The proportionality of the interests of the American arms and defence industrial complex to the growing military capacities of the American allies is a particular incentive for the militarisation of the islands, as evidenced by the predominant origin of Cihat Yaycı's demonstration of military equipment portfolio on the islands. This attitude contradicts the United States' discourse wise emphasis on the observance and maintenance of international law and suggests that a more strategic calculation is at work, which will be explored in the final chapter but with expansion into the civilian economic realm. Nevertheless, there is no famous Johnson's letter in the case of demilitarisation which states the American made military equipment cannot be deployed in the islands where the US arms and weapons contribute the largest share in the militarisation.

3.3.2. The Conflictual Remilitarisation Period

This is the historic timeline in which the Greek efforts of remilitarisation surfaced and mostly evidenced. Athens shifted its attitude during this process from denying its conduct of remilitarisation to embrace it on the grounds of pushed justifications. The non-military status of the Greek-administered Eastern Aegean Islands was not a source of contention until the first half of the 1960s. This was after it was finally determined by the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 23 July 1923 and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. Turkey first protested against Greece for militarising some of Dodecanese islands on 29 June 1964.¹⁸² In response to this protest, Greece denied that it had militarised the islands and asserted that it was following the non-military status. On 2nd of April 1969,

¹⁸² Yaycı and Paksüt, "Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi", p. 187.

Turkey issued a nota to Greece noting that Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Nikaria possessing an armed force exceeds the levels of which was envisioned by 13th Article of Lausanne Peace Treaty. The Turkish Nota also stressed on the claim that there are militarised civilian airports and maritime ports, which now operating as airbases and naval operation centres with stationed airforce hardware and navy vessels including heavy weapons and advanced electronic technologies for military purpose. Turkey asserted that it is an undesirable breach of international law and wished for the continuation of recovering friendly relations since 1968.¹⁸³ In its response dated 10th of May 1969, Athens cited that all these developments are designed for introducing infrastructural and economic modernisation to the underdeveloped Eastern Aegean islands, including creation of more effective police force and commercial aviation means on the islands.¹⁸⁴ The evidence and the content and concern of Turkish Nota indicate that it was a civilian disguise of the illegal remilitarisation and contrastingly Greece was also accepting there is a demilitarisation regime regarding the islands while conducting the remilitarisation.

In the following period, Turkey continued to protest against Greece's violations of the status of these islands, while Greece claimed that the non-militarised status had ended in violation of international law. While denying that it had militarised the islands in those days, nearly Twenty years later, the then Greek Minister of Defence, Petros Garaufalias, revealed the policy of the Georgias Papandreou Government in 1964 to militarise the Eastern Aegean Islands in a one-page report. In April 1975, the Turkish Government sent a note to the UN Secretary General for protesting against Greece's militarisation of the Dodecanese Islands and the islands of Chios, Samos, Lesbos and Nikaria which Ankara said it threatens Turkey's security. A few days later, the then Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis announced for the first time that they had taken various defence measures in the islands. The issue of the Eastern Aegean Islands' non-military status was once again brought to the fore in August 1976. Greece lodged a formal complaint with the UN Security Council, citing the intrusion of the

¹⁸³ Yaycı and Paksüt, p. 195.

¹⁸⁴ Yaycı and Paksüt, p. 197.

Turkish research vessel *Sismik* into its territorial waters. In response, the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangıl, informed the Security Council that the militarisation of the islands constituted a significant threat to regional peace and security and expressed hope that international organisations would take steps to address the issue with Greece.¹⁸⁵

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide a renovated historical background of the issue of demilitarisation within a proper geopolitical context, and to demonstrate the limitations of perspectives that look at the issue solely through the framework of bilateral relations or the development of textual legislation. Whilst it also drew on useful and faithful interpretations of the source texts from these relevant previous perspectives. The next section will now build on this foundation and historical introduction to explore what approaches have and have not been applied to uncover the dispute and dissect it to the pieces of analytical and intellectual inquiry.

¹⁸⁵ Yaycı and Paksüt, p. 187.

CHAPTER 4

The Theories Attempted to Explain the Tension

4.1. Introduction

This chapter is intended for providing an elaboration of the theoretical frameworks that have been applied or possibly applicable to the issue of military status. This examination benefits from the IR Theory originated perspectives in order to demonstrate the theoretical application on the issue, in which ways it fell short or under-applied and what have been applied so far for portraying the demilitarisation issue of the Eastern Aegean islands. Since the literature is legal dispute and historical survey loaded and the theoretical applications are largely neglected, it is fruitful and resourceful to discover the theories and concepts that can be utilisable or made suitable for analysing the very problem itself, but not just hovering on the basic military and security dimension but also other dimensions as well.

4.2. The Theoretical Concept of Demilitarisation

Despite the dispute is being an issue of demilitarisation, the consideration and application of the very concept and the studies pertaining to demilitarisation are almost non-existent within the military status problem of Eastern islands. The prevailing operationalisation of the term demilitarisation is the legal texts-based restrictive definitions and regulations of demilitarisation as demonstrated in the previous chapters. This can be explained via the legal nature of the matter but like the other various issues of social life, it cannot be condensed into a single domain of science or

social inquiry. As being very indicative feature of IR, multidisciplinary consideration is required for catching up the multi-dimensional occurrences like this problematisation. Furthermore, even being contested for decades in terms of achieving a universal definition, some terms and concepts are the exact gateways and keys for having a truly corresponding grasp of a complex matter if it outlines driving features of the very problem itself via providing some generalizations, which are resourceful for extracting insights in order to track on the dimensions, relations and causes of the issue in a cognitive map. Therefore, a demilitarisation problem cannot be thought separate from the studies regarding the demilitarisation in the sense of analytical application, which as noted above the current literature regarding the issue of the Eastern islands intensively struggles due to apparent lack of interest or available sources within the given timeframe. Andrew Bickford provides an illustration in that regard:

Many analyses of demilitarization conceptualize it as a process occurring within international politics and treaties—that is, as a process occurring between states, but not as an internal process within a state, or as an internal process within a state that entails much more than the production of weapons or maintaining a military (for example, the SALT I and II Treaties between the United States and the USSR). While this is of course an important component, it fails to recognize how culture and everyday life are militarized. As such, these definitions—and the programs and projects defined and delineated by these definitions—take a very narrow view of demilitarization, restricting it to questions of military weapons and hardware, but leaving out a consideration of military mind-sets, culture, and worldview.¹⁸⁶

So far, the concept of demilitarisation is applied in a specific meaning which is aimed at the objective of the disarming the islands and in relation to this, prohibiting military build-ups on the islands in accordance with the particular criteria of the force deployment pertaining to the land, sea and air via considering the geopolitical balance and security-intensive interests between Turkey, Greece and outsider actors. However, the term of demilitarisation covers not only the simple action and following legal status-quo of permanent and full sense of disarmament on a certain region, in fact, the disarmament is a distinct concept from the demilitarisation even it might be used

¹⁸⁶ Andrew Bickford, “Chapter I: Demilitarisation: Unraveling the Structures of Violence”, *Demilitarisation in the Contemporary World*, Ed. Peter N. Stearns (University of Illinois Press 2013).

interchangeably depending on the context. The common description of disarmament actually resembles and infers what was intended to be established on the Eastern islands and provides us some clues and insights why it has failed in practice in the first place pertaining to the difference between the narrowed down understanding of disarmament and a broader initiation of demilitarisation. The most common notion of disarmament primarily features the design and act of the arms reduction and control, which is removing, dismantling, disposing of weapon systems, operators, munitions and related layouts possibly both in particular or general, preventing them to be re-accumulated and stockpiled. It also implies the modification of the national strategy and cuts in the military expenditure. In the general terms of arms reduction and control, the purpose of the demilitarisation of the Eastern islands is partially achieving such type of local and permanent disarmament regime via stressing on the ban of fortifications, naval bases, heavy equipment and force concentrations more than the normal contingency or beside of police and gendarmerie types. Therefore, the simple affiliation of disarmament with the arms reduction and control expands into the broader dimensions of the military or defence policy:

There are many forms of disarmament, such as a reduction in military spending, reduction or destruction of the stocks of certain weapon systems, a ban or limitation on the production of some types of military equipment, reduction in the numbers of military personnel, limitations on arms transfers, control of defence R&D, and the monitoring and verification of weapon disposals and troop reductions (Hartley and Sandier, 1995:260-283).¹⁸⁷

Therefore, it indicates a military policy alteration which compels the state of Greece and Greek society to make some adjustments pertaining to defence industry, military budget, military equipment, conscription and so in relation to the Eastern islands due to the existence of demilitarisation clauses pertaining the islands. Meantime, it does not necessarily reduce defence and offense capabilities of Hellenic Armed Forces, nor the essential militarisation and war readiness of Greece. In theory, Athens still obey the international demilitarisation legislation without sacrificing its national military potential. Susan Willet clarifies this in her assessment:

¹⁸⁷ Susan Willett, "Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa", *Review of African Political Economy*, 25:77, (1998), p. 411.

A disarmament process usually implies a modification of a nation's military strategies. For instance, the reduction or abandonment of certain types of weapons or defence capabilities such as nuclear weapons, or inter-continental ballistic missiles, may constitute a conscious effort to reduce nations offensive capabilities, thereby reducing the tensions created by an arms race. There is, however, no automatic association between the reduction in the number of arms and the reduction in offensive capabilities. The present shift from large conventional forces to smaller but high-tech rapid deployment forces, is a case in point.¹⁸⁸

Therefore, it can be argued that it is important to have a flexible and more generalised grasp of the concept of demilitarisation in relation to the concepts of disarmament and arms reduction. The narrower normative approaches can be useful to trace the violations but might limit the deeper analyses and the further theoretical application.

4.3. IR Accounts for the Subject Issue

4.3.1. Realist Accounts

By far, the realist accounts are the most utilized contemporary theoretical IR approach to this issue. The usage of the very term realism varies from discipline to discipline and teaching from teaching. In philosophy of science, for instance, the term refers to an approach of confirmation of the objective existence outside of the human mind whilst not necessarily going hard in terms of empirical validity or mathematical rigidity as the positivism and empiricism push forward. In political science, the term refers to power politics based on the status and resources to engage in the activity of assumed benefit or point of interest maximization. In this quest, the rationality and self-help are the key concepts. However, within the scope of IR Theory, realism covers a particularly separate political domain of international stage based on some quintessential assumptions that defines theory and the international ontology. In the simplest form, it “emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest.”¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, it is defined by the states in the

¹⁸⁸Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa”, p. 412.

¹⁸⁹ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 9.

role of impenetrable and prevailing unitary actors who are seeking survival and last but not least the balance of power pertaining to the interactions and capabilities of the states. The absence of international government translates into the most critical defining component of realism, the notion of anarchy as the absence of greater and enforcing authority among multiple state environment in which actors try to thrive with no proper security assurance. Hence, the military-intensive security is the other quintessential driving feature of this world approach. These primary conceptual pillars of IR realism are the products of intellectual evolution of the realism throughout the recent history with the notable rise of classical realism under the guidance of Hans Morgenthau and Edward H. Carr, the structuralist or neo-revision by Kenneth Waltz and critical convergence of the classical and neo elements under the neo-classical tradition represented by the figures such as Randal L. Schweller and Glenn Snyder. In prescriptive sense, realism offers a route of policy making for the decision makers of the state apparatus and when normatively suggested, it is proponent for a type of morality that an actor should act in realist manner in order to thrive in the described world. In analytical sense, it is a theoretical tool with a claim of explaining particular social phenomena which do not necessarily require the realistic suggestions for resolution of an issue but rather helping out a distinct solution instead via diagnosing the primary problem. Making this separation is crucial as the realist prescription might potentially lead undesirable outcomes of negative feedbacking cycles rather than providing a proper resolution. In more rigid theoretical terms, defining a system as non-adjustable zero-sum game is different than pointing out zero-sum inclined domains of struggle that can be resolved in other means and possibly generate a positive sum environment. Making these separations can help out making sense of the current recovery in the Greek-Turkish relations without completely ruling out realism as analysis tool and apply it to the unresolved issue of demilitarisation.

Realist approach of IR theory implicitly presents in the wide range of the accounts that covering the issue before the theory itself is matured and popularised over time. The terms of realism are not directly utilized by these authors, commentators and wide range of other actors due to the lack of proper terming that time, but the reflecting mind setting in their discourse indicates the realist measurement and assumptions. Particularly older sources and historical accounts of diplomatic history demonstrate

this attitude of implicitly embracing realism due to the variety reasons, ranging from belonging to a non-IR discipline to unfamiliarity towards the coining concepts. In other words, the echo of realism prevails but the terminology of realism often lacks in the issue of Eastern islands. Within the realist understanding, the balance between Turkey and Greece gain prominence and become the particular focus of analysis alongside with the capabilities each actor armed with. This balance defined in the general context of Aegean Dispute and in connection to this general frame, specifically applied to the question of Eastern islands. Furthermore, it is also a common and practical way of the involving and engaging state actors for reading the general situation. A declassified US intelligence report dated 1987 for instance essentially reads contestation of Greece and Turkey on the Aegean Sea in a realistic framework in which it is claimed that the militarisation of Eastern islands is an element of achieving balance in the Aegean Sea and both Turkish and Greek parties are prone to overestimate their military capabilities in a mutual deterrence producing manner.¹⁹⁰ However, not all sources refer a realistic deterrence. In fact, the most realism-relevant literature tends to read this under the term of security dilemma via referring the historical development and allocation of Greek and Turkish military force concentrations *vis-a-vis* each other. In this frame, Cyprus Issue folds the political background and sufficient incentive for the Greeks to remilitarise the islands throughout 1960's and alleged Turkish response after the Peace Operation on Cyprus was the foundation of the Fourth Army in 1975, which claimed to a be final catalyser for the issue and seals the problem up to this date. Greek authors, such as Heraclides and Stivachtis, proposes this approach, as it also relatively justifies the Greek remilitarisation and opens a space for it based on a supposedly legitimate concern. Heraclides describes the demilitarisation issue as “a textbook definition of security dilemma” and sets responsibility on the bilateral parties for engaging in non-constructive but dilemma feedbacking policy.¹⁹¹ Then concluding that full dismantle of Greek and Turkish deployments in the region are not feasible, Heraclides offers a controlled arms reduction through diplomacy identical to the USA and USSR had in

¹⁹⁰ Department of Army United States Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, AIAIT-N (381a) Addressing for the TOR Greco-Turkish Balance NIE, CIA-RDP93T00837R00400080009-3 Declassified and Approved for Release: 24/10/2013 (4 November 1987)

¹⁹¹ Heraclides,” “Demilitarisation, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in Aegean Imagined Enemies” p. 205-206.

the Cold War.¹⁹² Stivachtis other hand openly sets fault on Turkey for underestimating the effects of security dilemma which apparently coercing Greece to act in favour of remilitarisation. Identical to official Greek statements, Stivachtis argues that the Turkish Fourth Army possesses a large scale amphibious offensive capability despite the official Turkish claim of this army's primary designation for training and defence, not offense and assault. Furthermore, Stivachtis argues that Greek forces stationed on the demilitarised Eastern islands do not possess offensive capabilities, opposite of his reflection on the Fourth Army. This claim contradicts with Cihat Yaycı's more recently dated demonstration of the Greek military equipment pertaining the islands since variety of artillery pieces and long-range missiles are apparent. Whilst Stivachtis himself mentions about some Greek press reports according to which MM-40 EXOCET guided missile batteries are to be deployed on the Aegean islands.¹⁹³ It should be noted that these weapons systems are mostly the US originated aside from exceptions with European origin. This may indicate the involvement of a third party in the Aegean balance scheme, despite the apparent and argued reservations of the United States and NATO regarding the Aegean dispute. The absence of open involvement can therefore be defined in the terms of security dilemma, which is a concept also derived from the game theory. In this context, it is not advisable to become entrapped in a situation that serves only to support an ally or basic interest, as this could prove to be a costly engagement for the involving actor.¹⁹⁴ The active and open foreign involvement to Greek militarisation on the Aegean islands potentially costs an actor with the strict condemnation of Turkey and results in losing valuable geopolitical assets related to Turkey. Then an apparent abandon in relation to and within an issue is more viable option since the partnership of Turkey in the Aegean Sea might be needed for future if the conflict of interest erupts with Athens. In fact, the US abandoned Greece in its quest of the East Med Project due to the relative expense, a decision which is in the interest of Turkey. If Washington decides for more rapprochement between Ankara and itself regarding the Mediterranean or Aegean

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Stivachtis, "The Demilitarisation of the Eastern Aegean Islands", p. 103.

¹⁹⁴ Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics", *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984), p. 463-465.; Jack Donnelly, "Prisoners Dilemma, Realism and International Relations", p. 36.

matters, then the political ground should be at least minimally suitable. Greece might remilitarise the islands with the western weaponry as partial result of NATO membership as it for Turkey, but Athens is voicing alone in the demilitarisation dispute, as a mirror version of noted Greek claim of none of the parties aside from Turkey demands demilitarisation. Last but not least, both Turkish and Greek concerns alternatively could be viewed a rather sophisticated version of the structural realism, which is the balance of threat as formulated by Stephen Walt.¹⁹⁵ Within the balance of threat conceptualisation, some other primary variables other than the aggregate power are included. These are the offensive capabilities as the amount and quality of offensive weaponry, the offensive intentions as the inclusion of the perception and the geographical proximity as the ranging ontology of space-time that lets the power projection in different levels. According to this approach, these four interactive components shape the threat calculations and balancing dynamics among the state actors. It is noted in the previous discussion that both the Greek forces stationary on the islands and the Turkish Fourth Army on the Aegean coastline of Turkey allegedly possess offensive capabilities in the form of long-range weapons and amphibious capabilities, respectively. As for the offensive intentions, although arguably and currently eroded on surface by the Declaration of Athens when Erdoğan paid a visit to Athens on 7 December 2023, is a large spectrum covering all the clue-alike variables regarding the possibility of the offensive action or armed aggression in the cognitive world of actor's constant monitoring and imagination. The offensive intentions might be concluded from the existence offensive type of weapon platforms. However, primarily, they could be assumed from the discourses, narratives and in particular of the rhetoric and statements of state elites. In that sense, Erdoğan's statement claiming the Turks can come suddenly in one night without referring the exact object in his sentence could be provided as the example. It is not about Erdoğan or any other actors' calculated intention or what the actor actually refers to in which later on Erdoğan claimed he was referring the terrorists, but it is about the generated perception which invokes the human reactions and measures towards the threat as they call it until it ceases to exist, for instance like the dissolution of the Soviet Union for the capitalist states. The liberal and many other accounts argue that it was a downfall for the realism

¹⁹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985), p. 6-13.

as it lacks the prediction of this event based on the inner or domestic social dynamics and insights, but realists argued that it would eventually lead a replacement or reconfiguration on the world of states. In the Aegean context, the logic of this view suggests that balancing of threat is always present but only changing appearances or degrees depending on the adjustments of the components. The last component of the balance of threat analysis is a perfectly fixed case: the geographical proximity which particularly does correspond the case of demilitarisation issue since “the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away”.¹⁹⁶ Many illegally re-militarised Greek islands are in very close proximity to Turkey, only few miles away from the coastline. The diplomatic historical process pertaining both demilitarised and sovereignty status of the islands is heavily involved with the discussions of the geographical locations the islands have in relation to Anatolia and Straits, as discussed in the previous chapters. Both the Turkish letters of 1969 and 2021 refers the fact of islands being in the vicinity of Anatolian mainland.

Therefore, the ontology of geography is clearly one of the most fundamental foundations of this issue and attaches well to scope of Walt’s extended version of structural realism. However, advanced balance of threat type of balancing still neglects variables regarding why these islands are designated demilitarised in the first place. It does not explain, or it is hard to explain the historical Greek concession¹⁹⁷ for demilitarisation which is lying in Venizelos’ compromising stance in both London and Lausanne discussions with Walt’s advanced realism. Disarming the islands geographically next to historically hostile considered state’s territory struggles with the very premise of balance of threat. Why would a state actor provide its permanent consent for its territory to be designated as a more threat vulnerable status in the material terms of balance of threat even though it later on re-militarises them based on justifications? Therefore, it seems that this approach misses more sophisticated diplomatic and geopolitical dynamics there. It misses the relations between the hegemonic British Empire and its proxy Greece in relation to the maintenance of the free passage on the Straits as discussed. The British theoretically posed much more

¹⁹⁶ Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.”, p. 10.

¹⁹⁷ See, The Chapter 3

threat to Greece and islands in comparison to weak Ottoman Empire. Hence, these complex variables indicate the partial limitations of the structural realist accounts such as Walt's. The perception of Venizelos, at least in Lausanne period when the Great Catastrophe in Asia Minor against Ankara occurred was clearly not driven by a balancing of threat dynamics regarding the demilitarised status of islands. He was ready to accept to demilitarised status for the islands and always confirmed it in principle. He did not have offensive or proximity concerns regarding the islands, at least not dominated or distracted by these considerations.

To sum up, if the general comparison of capability is about to be made, Turkey reflects a superiority in the aggregate military power *vis-à-vis* Greece.¹⁹⁸ However, the only type of power is not solely and necessarily the hard power itself. It is the ability of influence the others to do something an influencing actor wishes for. Furthermore, the realist approach involves changing alignments and hostilities among state actors depending on the change in the international conditions and the reflex of power balance is assumably present for rendering the stances of governments. In that sense, Greece has some edge over Turkey in soft or lobbying power department via its better integrated, better organised and more powerful lobbies and diaspora¹⁹⁹, particularly that of established in the EU and the US, the political centres of the most power accumulation in the world, both in hard and soft terms. Athens can seek support for vastly elevating its hand over a militaristically superior and initially more compelling Ankara. For instance, the numerical and firepower superiority of Russian Federation's Armed Forces in comparison to the Ukrainian Army was rendered much less effective with the Western support to Kiev when the Ruso-Ukrainian War erupted in the February 2022. The Western leverage that reduces the chances of potential Russian success currently results in an ongoing frozen armed conflict. It is not for stating that the war between Turkey and Greece is inevitable or if it will freeze once it emerged like in Russo-Ukraine Case. However, realist approaches in general deem the military-based coercions and the outbreak of war are always present feasible possibilities and

¹⁹⁸ Fuat Aksu, "Preservation of Demilitarized Status of The Aegean Islands for The National Security of Turkey", p. 114.

¹⁹⁹ Tayyar Arı, *Amerika'da Siyasal Yapı Lobiler ve Dış Politika* (Dora, 2015), p. 239-243, p. 302-318.

dominant systemic features, so the realist analysis always establishes an analytical ground with the possibility of inter-state war or arms race type of balance friction. The balance of arms power segment intensively applies to the Turco-Greek case in the Aegean context. The special ratio of 7:10 that was established between two actors by the US epitomizes the profound complexity of Greco-Turkish balance on the Aegean Sea, where the apparent Turkish hard-power superiority could be turned upside down as it was argued:

Regarding the maintenance of the regional balance, the Greeks seem to have been more successful. Since 1978 it became an accepted practice for the US Congress to allocate military aid for Greece and Turkey in the ratio of 7: 10. In other words, the US gave the Greeks 70 percent of the military assistance attributed to the considerably larger Turkish armed forces despite Turkish protests and the occasional unwillingness of the US administration.²⁰⁰

The historical accounts also demonstrate a shift of balance has been feasible and a relatively frequent occasion due to uneven distribution of the foreign aid. During the first Balkan Wars, the relative identity between Ottoman and Greek Navies were radically altered in the favour of Greece due to the generous donations and aids of the British and Italians while the Ottomans failed to achieve receiving the same amount of outsider support for the naval platform and equipment. The Ottomans were not even able to convince the US Congress for passing the naval vessel purchases despite the US was arguably more neutral and geopolitically has more distant stance in that era of the Aegean Issue.²⁰¹ This indicates a Greek advantage of lobbying power over the Ottoman / Turkish counterpart even in such an old date for translating lobbying power into a greater military power. Currently, Greece seems to outclass Ankara in the air force department with the sales of F-35s, Rafal and F-16 Block 70 whereas Ankara only receives F-16 Block 70's in a quite stiff process of diplomacy, involving the other issues such as the Swedish ascension to NATO. In this process, Bob Menendez, the former head of Foreign Affairs Wing of the US Senate, openly accused Turkey of

²⁰⁰ Hasan Ünal, Theodora Kalaitzaki and Eylem Altunya, "Greek and Turkish Perceptions of US Mediation Efforts for Conflict Resolution from 1950s to Mid-1990s", *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 33;3-4 (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Historical Research 2005), p. 97.

²⁰¹ Şimşir, "Aegean Question Documents Volume-I (1912-1913)", p. LV.

violating Greek Air Space and sovereignty on the islands.²⁰² His formal statement echoes the vibrating sound of Greek lobbying activity within the US Congress. Menendez tied this accusation with Turkish demand of the F-16's and utilized this argument in order to prevent procurement of F-16 Block 70's to Turkey. Even after the deal was about to be concluded in the governmental process from the time of the forced resignation of Menendez and succession of more moderate Ben Cardin, the independent Senator Rand Paul drafted a bill that opposes the sale of F-16's to Turkey.²⁰³ This situation indicates the influencing capacity of Greek lobbying in relation to the generated negative images about Turkey, even after the effective veto of Greek lobbying was lifted with the alleviation of Greek-Turkish relations.²⁰⁴ The second dimension of realism after the balance of arms-intensive power dynamics is the possibility of the interstate war as stated. Kenneth Waltz formulated the argument that there is no reason that would prevent the war but a systemic reason that the war may emerge, in other words, the war is feasible as it is non-restricted.²⁰⁵ But as discussed, it is argued in the previous the subchapter of anthropology that the war is not an inevitable necessity and being a penetrable and preventable social construction and product in itself. As it is for so the militarism, which previously demonstrated. Furthermore, realism realised through a geopolitical context involving the grand strategy thinking.

²⁰² Congressional Research Service, *Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations In Brief* Updated January 19, 2023.

²⁰³ Bill Kouras, "US Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) Proposes Bill to Block F-16 Military Sale to Turkey", 08.02.2024, Greek City Times, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [US Senator Rand Paul \(R-KY\) Proposes Bill To Block F-16 Military Sale To Turkey \(greekcitytimes.com\)](https://www.greekcitytimes.com/news/us-senator-rand-paul-r-ky-proposes-bill-to-block-f-16-military-sale-to-turkey) ; Bradley Devlin, "Paul to Force Vote on Biden's Sale of F-16s to Turkey", 29.02.2024, The American Conservative, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Paul to Force Vote on Biden's Sale of F-16s to Turkey - The American Conservative](https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/paul-to-force-vote-on-biden-s-sale-of-f-16s-to-turkey/)

²⁰⁴ Hellena Smith, "Greece and Turkey sign 15 deals during 'groundbreaking' Erdoğan visit to Athens – as it happened", 07.12.2023, The Guardian, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Greece and Turkey sign 15 deals during 'groundbreaking' Erdoğan visit to Athens – as it happened | Europe | The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/07/greece-and-turkey-sign-15-deals-during-groundbreaking-erdogan-visit-to-athens-as-it-happened)

²⁰⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, (1988)

4.3.2. Geopolitical Accounts, Strategy and Foreign Policy Making

The realist framework provides inner mechanisms that are attributable to the system of nations. However, in order for a social system such as an inter-state system to be established and realised, it requires a context and content that is in relation and reference to its geographical existence. This is the point where politics and geography intersect, shaping Turkish-Greek relations within a broader geopolitical context. Followingly, the Aegean Sea and its islands are defined and operationalized by the participating actors in accordance with their grand strategic outlook. The approaches relating the explanations and models of these grand play calculations are considered as the geopolitical accounts. As a branch of science, geopolitics determines the general policy, planning and strategies to be followed according to the geographical location and elements of national power in order for a state to protect and develop its interests.²⁰⁶ Geopolitics is an attempt to understand national political issues on the basis of physical geography, but it can also be interpreted as a decision emphasizing the relationship between political actions and the geography in which these actions occur. The population, social texture, psychology, political tendency and economy of a country are the elements of geopolitics that are open to change; parameters such as borders, underground and above-ground wealth and geographical population constitute the elements of geopolitics that are closed to change. The relationship of these elements with each other falls into the field of interest of geopolitics. In this direction, the Russian geopolitical theorist Dugin defines geopolitics as a discipline that studies humanity in its profitable relationship with the space factor.²⁰⁷ There are also opinions that connect the term geopolitics with interstate relations. According to Muzaffer Özdağ, geopolitics is the discipline of knowledge that determines the influence of the spheres of life and activity of countries, space, nature and geographical location in inter-state relations, the formation of state power, the formation of the length of power, therefore, the geopolitical cornering of a state that cannot evaluate the value of a strategic place that it has, by an another global or regional power, is a

²⁰⁶ Yunus Karaağaç, “Ege Denizi için Jeopolitik ve Jeostrateji Kavramlarının Oluşumu”, *Ege Jeopolitiği Cilt 1*, Ed. Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker and Dimitrios Ioannadis (Ankara Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık 2020), p. 512.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

fact of geographical laws.²⁰⁸ Meanwhile, geopolitics divides into to the classical and modern traditions of geopolitics as Tarık Demir evaluates. The classical understanding pinpoints the geographical ontology as the independent variable of the politics.²⁰⁹ The modern critical tradition stresses on the evolution of the dynamic political landscape in relation to the geography in which for instance the relative value or status of a given geographical location could be altered depending on the political climate and factors. Therefore, classical geopolitics is “traditionally understood as the scientific assessment of geographic conditions that underlies the power or security of a particular state, or the balance of power in the global configuration of continents and oceans”.²¹⁰ Critical approach goes beyond this ontological chessboard understanding and inserts the social dimension of strategy and policy making as a true independent variable. Therefore, the critical approach suits better to explain Greek sovereignty on the islands despite their ontological geographical being as the prolongation of Anatolia while their ontological interference to Turkey and Turkish Straits still produced the demilitarised status, resulted in a restrictive and conditional sovereignty according to Turkish viewpoint. The Greek challenge to this de jure status therefore can be articulated from the critical geopolitical account in which transformation of the geopolitics in history shaped Greek action and of course Turkish reaction. Changing politics therefore produced the justifications for the geopolitical initiative as it is evident by Greece’s late dated militarisation that draws chronological parallels with Cyprus Crisis, strikingly contrast with pre-WWII era of honeymoon of Turkish-Greek relations. Neither actor took hawkish stance to the other in that arguably golden era, despite Greece decided to declare fortified zone in Lemnos and Turkish Party is apparently ready to welcome it according to the speech of Aras, apparently due the increasing tensions in the interbellum Europe.²¹¹ It indicates that the geographical ontology is not

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Tarık Demir, “20. ve 21. Yüzyılda Ege Denizi’nin Jeopolitik ve Jeostratejik Durumu”, *Ege Jeopolitiği Cilt I*, Ed. Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker and Dimitrios Ioannadis (Ankara Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık 2020), p. 531-535.

²¹⁰ Gertjan Dijink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions Maps of Pride and Pain*, (Routledge, 1996), p.3.

²¹¹ See; The Chapter 3

the primary variable albeit still prominent, but the political and social variables prevail in the net result.

With the involvement of the other actors, the grand strategy has played a huge role shaping of the Aegean dynamics pertaining the status of the islands. The associated powers perceive and value geographic setting of the islands in relation to its surroundings and to their own existences vis-à-vis the contenders but as argued the geographical stage only served in the context of the evolution of politics and change of the state action. In the Aegean case, it is a complex amalgam in which layer of neighbouring Turkey and Greece surrounded by a greater regional and global layer of the great powers. There lie many geopolitical schemes and thinking in these layers. Firstly, in the Turkish example, geopolitics of this first party involving state could be divided into two main historical branches, namely the Ottoman and Republican periods. The Ottoman period was characterised by the intensive attempt of usage of the balance of power dynamics for exploiting rivalries among the great powers and extracting the best outcome. The preservation of the *raison d'etat* in this manner was crucial for a declining, indebted, non-industrialised empire actor vis-à-vis the great powers and following emergent band wagoners which Greece tried to establish itself as one in relation to that dying empire. In the Greek case, expansionist irredentism of a growing Megali Idea vision followed the increasingly struggling Ottoman imperial self-preservation after the emergence of the new Greek State during the Revolt of Greek Independence. It resulted in the clash the existing and declining imperialism with new and sponsored one in the Aegean context. Following the fallout both of the empire and Megali Idea, the re-vitalization of Turkish State under the Republican Regime of Atatürk, Turkey kept the attitude of balancing and rather introduced two-legged stance known as the isolationism and Westernism. Greece opted for the similar stance due to the identical limited material capabilities and status they had through twentieth century. However, Greek irredentism at smaller extend gained momentum with the emergence of Cyprus Crisis in 1950's through the movement of Enosis, particularly escalated during the Junta of the Colonels between 1964 and 1974. It lastly met with decisive Turkish response during the coalition government of Ecevit and Erbakan under the light of decades ongoing discrimination and destruction attempt on Cyprus Turks in 1974. It practically realised the long-standing Turkish argument for

the crisis solution (Taksim, in Turkish: Division) in Cyprus since from Menderes period. Greek initiative of re-armament of the islands become a case during such political climate. Meanwhile, Greek re-militarisation of the islands according to the discussed evidence²¹² was long before the rise of neo-Ottomanism respectively in Ozal and JDP periods, so it could not be asserted to increase of contemporary Turkish grand strategic ambition. In that case, it would be seen under the light of Greek foreign policy making in relation to Turkish foreign policy making in which the evolving perceptions, calculations, individual leaders and institutions earns the emphasis for the analysis. It is clear that the political and military leaders from both political institutions of both respective countries perceive threat from the other in pertaining to the act, discourse and capability of the other and pertaining to the domestic demands they have to meet. Therefore, the insights can be extracted from the behavioural foreign policy making depending on the evolving context since as demonstrated the grand strategy analysis application could fail to meet achieving convergence of the general strategy and actual politics in indigenous cases like the status of the Aegean islands. Turkish politics before the neo-Ottoman era and general characteristic of the Republican does not indicates a Turkish expansionist ambition as Greece claimed. In order to understand to micro dynamics beyond and in relation to the structural and systemic levels, foreign policy analysis in the behaviouralist context might provide aid with its components of focus:

Operational code analysis as a neo-behavioural approach to politics focuses on the explanation of foreign policy decisions and their consequences by reference to two political worlds: “(a) the external world of events, generated by the presence, power, and behaviour of other actors; (b) the internal world of beliefs, generated by the cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes of leaders. A leader’s operational code or belief system connects these two worlds by representing the external world of events as philosophical beliefs about the nature of the political universe and by prescribing strategies, tactics, and moves based on instrumental beliefs for making decisions about the exercise of power vis-à-vis other actors in the political universe.”²¹³

²¹² See; The Chapter 2

²¹³ Stephen G. Walker, “Foreign Policy Analysis and Behavioral International Relations”, *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations* Edited by Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici, and Mark Schafer, (Routledge 2011) p. 6.

When PM Karamanlis openly admitted that Greece is engaging the militarisation of the islands in 1975 after the Peace Operation (which Greece call Turkish Invasion), he apparently believed in an existing threat regardless of the actuality or validity of the threat because the altered political conditions and unexpected Turkish assault on Cyprus on the behalf of indigenous Turks skyrocketed Greek threat perception. Following the worsening of Turkish relations with US in the aftermath, it gave sufficient space for Karamanlis to openly cite Greek militarisation effort.²¹⁴ It sharply contrasted with the official Greek rebuttals of re-militarisation practice in 1969 because the calculations and threat perceptions of Greek statesmen were considerably distinct from the post-Cyprus Intervention era. The Greek realisation of how Turkish capacity has reached to a point of initiating a remote island occupation was a delayed comprehension and it shocked political-military-economic elite of that nation. In order to balance this shocking capacity, Athens utilised a wide range of strategic cards and legitimisations which were welcomed by the Western Bloc, particularly brought NATO and the US into the picture as outsider actors once more. NATO and the US neglection towards to re-militarisation of the island could be attributable to their interests and strategy application as some authors point out, later followed by their inclination and promotion of the establishment of the military infrastructure for the alleged NATO purposes which Greece utilised for the legitimisation of its re-militarisation. In that sense, the strategic demilitarised island of Lemnos occupies the general scene of this tension. Despite the relevance of Turkish objections against Greek justifications under the disguise of NATO objectives, the US became a participatory of a regulation that grants the USAF aircraft access to Lemnos in the potential moments of crisis.²¹⁵ Additionally, independent satellite images and map applications of the island of the Lemnos confirms indeed there is a considerable military air base lying just next to the Lemnos International Airport as a breach of the Lausanne Demilitarisation Regime.²¹⁶ However, the NATO rejected the participation

²¹⁴ Yayıcı, “Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi”, p. 187.

²¹⁵ Soner Karagül and Gülşah Özdemir, “Ege Denizi’ndeki Sorunlar ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Ege Denizi Politikası”, *Ege Jeopolitiği Cilt II*, Ed. Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker and Dimitrios Ioannadis (Ankara Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık 2020), p. 1054.

²¹⁶ Lemnos Air Base is an aerodrome in Lemnos. The air base is situated nearby to the villages Kallithea and Livadochori. Mapcarta, “Lemnos Airbase”, Accessed on 09.07.2024, <https://mapcarta.com/W629227685>

of Lemnos to its infrastructure projects under Turkey's opposition²¹⁷ in order to avoid taking a clear stance which can aggravate tensions between Turkey and Greece. To overcome this, the US bypassed NATO and still show presence on those islands as the observer²¹⁸ of illegal remilitarisation. This situation can be viewed from a grand strategic account of geopolitics.

Contemporarily, intellectual dimension of the Greek and Turkish geopolitical thinking is rather complex and interactive. For instance, Ioannis Mazis, a great indigenous influencer of Greek geopolitical thinking and a Greek realist scholar, was also a keen intellectual critic of Ahmet Davutoglu, the former Turkish PM and scholar who known for his work, *The Strategic Depth*. Mazis is an effective and respected organic academic intellectual in Greece with his realism and geopolitics-oriented writings while Davutoglu represents the most nuanced and well-known voice of the pro-active neo-Ottomanism.²¹⁹ While it was the former non-SYRIZA member FM of SYRIZA-formed Government, Nikolaos Kotzias that left the true impact on the contemporary Greek Foreign Policy Making. Kotzias, similar in the discourse, although less ambitious and more realist than Davutoglu in his assessments and objectives, both intellectually and practically fleshed out the current Greek posture in the Turkish-Greek relations, and Aegean dynamics within the neo-frame of the US interference. At the helm of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kotzias sought to realise his concept of a "Greek multidimensional, energetic, patriotic and bold foreign policy" - to be understood as the opposite of a passive, stagnant foreign policy or a foreign policy with very few dimensions or facets.²²⁰ According to Kotzias, the world has entered the second phase of globalisation after 2006. For him, the USA is still the most

²¹⁷ Dinçer Bayer, "NATO'nun Ege Denizi Politikası", *Ege Jeopolitiği Cilt II*, Ed. Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker and Dimitrios Ioannadis (Ankara Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık 2020), p. 1130.

²¹⁸ Soner Karagül and Gülşah Özdemir, "Ege Denizi'ndeki Sorunlar ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Ege Denizi Politikası", p. 1054.

²¹⁹ See; Mazis investigated Davutoglu's Strategic Depth
Ionnis Mazis, XLVI. Theoretical Perception of Geopolitics in Davutoğlu's Work: A Critical Presentation [Published first in: *Civitas Gentium* 3:1 (2013), 9-50

²²⁰ Zuhul Mert Uzuner and Konstantinos Gogos, "Greece's Geopolitics of the Aegean Sea during the SYRIZA-led Government (2015-2019)", *Ege Jeopolitiği Cilt I*, Ed. Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker and Dimitrios Ioannadis (Ankara Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık 2020), p. 871.

powerful country in the world, but its power seems to be relatively reduced; the world is experiencing a transition from a unipolar world to either a bipolar (USA and China, G2) or a multipolar world, the characteristics of which have not yet been clearly defined.²²¹ In this context, new countries are emerging as significant powers in the international system, such as China, India, Russia and Brazil. Kotzias considers China, India and Brazil as countries that support the status quo and stability, while he sees Russia as a country with revisionist tendencies; Iran and Turkey are also considered as revisionist powers. Kotzias observes that the future role of the EU in a multipolar or bipolar world does not seem to be as powerful as initially thought. It is in this context that Kotzias foresees a multidimensional and energetic Greek foreign policy. Followingly, he stresses on the importance to the United States and China after the long era of Europeanisation of Greek Foreign and Domestic Policy.²²² Uzuner and Gogos argue that the main focus of the SYRIZA Government therefore designated as the US and China. However, in addition to their point, having close stance both with China and US could be argued as non-feasible option for Greek Foreign Policy making due to the US-Chinese hegemonic clash. Furthermore, Russian and Chinese indifference towards Greek debt crisis despite the efforts of Tsipras to secure their financial and geopolitical leverage proved to be unfruitful.²²³ It totally left Greece with the austerity imposing coercion of Troika as the form of re-arranged European integration hegemony over the heavily indebted Greece.

In accordance with Kotzias' reference points and displayed arguments above, the SYRIZA-led government became the mastermind behind the rapprochement between Greece and US administration. Under this depiction of the world stage and critical situation of Greece, it could be argued as a desperate but counter-productive attempt to balance German-led European influence and also traditional contender Turkey. As so Washington was ready to exploit the situation and open geopolitics of Kotzias. The US ambassador in Athens and US ministers have spoken many times about the

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Uzuner and Gogos, "Greece's Geopolitics of the Aegean Sea during the SYRIZA-led Government (2015-2019)", p. 873.

²²³ James Heneage, *Kısa Yunanistan Tarihi*, Translated by Mukadder Şahin (Say Yayınları 2023), p. 191-192.

advantage that Crete (and the naval base near Chania) gives to the US and NATO.²²⁴ In recent years, the US has shown interest in using the ports of Thessaloniki and Alexandroupolis to transport military equipment and other material to Balkan countries. In recent years, the US has shown interest in using the ports of Thessaloniki and Alexandroupolis to transport military equipment and other material to the Balkan countries. From a geopolitical and security point of view, it is clear that the US needs to control the sea routes from Crete to Thessaloniki and Alexandroupolis; this seems necessary if it wants to control the Rimland and block the Eurasian powers' access to the Mediterranean. According to news and reports in the Greek press in March 2018, the US has decided to upgrade the geopolitical and geostrategic role of Greece and the military cooperation with Athens; this is seen as a development that aims to counterbalance Russian and Turkish involvement and activity in the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East.²²⁵ While this plan of intra-Bloc trajectory change Kotzias had implied has realised with the prevailing New Democracy Party under the Prime Minister Mitsotakis. His government initiated the formalisation of US-Greece rapprochement within the framework of re-vitalised and re-visioned MDCA, welcomed by both Trump and Biden Administrations respectively in 2019 and 2021.²²⁶ These developments provide the US with full usage rights of Alexandroupolis and expanded access to other military bases in Greece. These examples indicate a grand strategy scheme seeking in the political complex regardless of which domestic faction holds the office. In the grand geopolitical sense, the calculation of the US is far beyond Greek and Turkish aspirations due to its hegemonic superpower capacity. As followingly, some grand strategic thinkings on the global scale is argued to be

²²⁴ Uzuner and Gogos, p. 872

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Bill Kouras, "US signs extended Defense Agreement with Greece", 07.10.2019, Greek City Times, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://greekcitytimes.com/2019/10/07/signs-extended-defense-agreement-greece/> ; Bill Kouras, "Greece ratifies major military expansion with US", 31.01.2020, Greek City Times, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/01/31/greece-ratifies-major-military-expansion-with-us/> ; Ellen Knickmeyer, "Greece, US Expand Defense Pact in Face of Turkey Tensions", 15.10.2021, military.com, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/10/15/greece-us-expand-defense-pact-face-of-turkey-tensions.html#:~:text=Thursday%27s%20US-Greece%20agreement%20builds%20on%20one%20signed%20in.and%20one%20at%20Alexandroupolis%2C%20near%20the%20Greek-Turkish%20bor>

applicable to evaluate on the actions such as the US, also the former superpowers like the British Empire. The most relevant approaches from classical geopolitics pertaining the Aegean Sea and islands were Nicholas J. Spykman's (1893-1943) Rimland Theory and Alfred T. Mahan's (1840-1914) Theory of Sea Power from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. According to the Theory of Rimland, the countries that surrounds the Heartland of Eurasia is the geopolitical centrifuge of the globe in which the control over them assures the domination of Eurasia. The domination of Eurasia through control over the Rimland therefore materialises the global hegemony.²²⁷ In that frame, the Aegean Region sits as an integral segment of the Rimland particularly in relation to the Straits, the confluence of between Europe and Asia and between Mediterranean and Black Sea. Further, due to the given maritime nature of Aegean environment, the conceptualisation of sea power matters and the history proves the significance of being sea power in the Aegean context. The historical significance was discussed and referenced in the previous chapters. The founding intellectual figure of this theory, Mahan distinguishes the maritime power and sea power but obligates the first in order to achieve the later. The concept of maritime power pertains the military power; in other words, the necessary military, naval and relative installations and infrastructures for securing the sea routes and regions. While, the sea power is a more comprehensive term, not only including the maritime power but also the merchant fleet and trade and sea linkages. It can be argued that the last term stands for the economic and cultural dimension in the space time context of the world seas, but the sufficient military dimension is required for preservation of those dynamics. According to Mahan, the general prowess in the maritime terms is the primary necessity for the geopolitical domination through realisation of the sea power. Mahan also outlines the conditions that influence the emergence and scale of a sea power, which are geographical location, physical structure of the country, landmass, population, the character of the people, the structure and character of the government.²²⁸ All these parameters form themselves in relation to the sea, for instance, the character of people is measured through their inclination to the sea trade and maritime economic activity in Mahan's analysis while the geographical location being a primal ontological requirement.

²²⁷ Yunus Karaağaç, "Ege Denizi için Jeopolitik ve Jeostrateji Kavramlarının Oluşumu", p. 514.

²²⁸ Yunus Karaağaç, p. 515-516.

Applied to the Aegean case and demilitarisation issue, the demilitarised status stands as a potential risk and soft belly for the US and Greek strategic calculus because it leaves Aegean Sea compromised to the enemy military interference and also deprive this intra-NATO region from the capability to launch operations. In theoretical terms, it comprises the Rimland in maritime power terms *vis-à-vis* the so-called Heartland that has been thoroughly dominated by the incumbent Soviet Union and Russian Federation. This conjuncture leaves an empty point on the world map where the mentioned powers inside NATO could not operate freely, arguably weakens the military leg on the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea through Straits as a sharp contrast to their self-defined interests. Where the US seeks its agenda of the global hegemony through eliminating the weak points on the strategic regional joints either by itself or using the proxies, Greece sought to realise its own national agenda of desired Aegean hegemony under the disguise of self-defence and benefits the US negligence towards the Greek violation as the US desires have a ready-to-use military infrastructure in a moment of crisis. The friction between Greece and Turkey therefore is a balance issue for the US where it is managed in accordance with American interests and objectives of meta regional control. However, a parenthesis could be opened for the Greek geopolitics in classical sense independently, where Greek mentality possibly extracts its motivation of action. Dugin establishes a historical tradition narrative for Greece by arguing it has a dual inherited tradition of thalassocracy (sea power) and the tellurocracy (continental land power), one in relation to the ancient Athenian Empire, the later in regard to the ancient Sparta.²²⁹ In the Aegean case, the relevant one is the term thalassocracy and Delos League of Athenians was indeed an Aegean Hegemony in practice. As with nationalism and followingly Greek national state emerged out via challenging the Ottoman hegemony with Greek sailors and traders on the Aegean Sea with the support of Great Powers, Greece sought to achieve the total control over Aegean up to this day.

Stratfor, an US originated influential think tank organisation that deals with geopolitical assessments cements a powerful rhetoric for echoing a discourse that

²²⁹ Uzuner and Gogos, p. 869.

deterministically binds Greece and Aegean Sea through a must-have “expensive defensive capability with no other possible alternatives”.²³⁰ It is a provocative articulation of Greek objective pertaining being the unrivalled hegemon on the Aegean Sea and implies the continuation of the de facto re-militarisation of the islands. It also indicates a mutually confirming climate between the US and Greek geopolitical thinking vis-à-vis Turkish interests and stance on the Aegean Sea that supports more egalitarian solutions based on the inter-state negotiation:

Greek Core: The Aegean

Despite the limitations on its capital generation, Greece has no alternative but to create an expensive defensive capability that allows it to control the Aegean Sea. Put simply, the core of Greece is neither the breadbaskets of Thessaly and Greek Macedonia, nor the Athens-Piraeus metropolitan area, where around half of the population lives. The core of Greece is the Aegean Sea — the actual water, not the coastland — which allows these three critical areas of Greece to be connected for trade, defense and communication. Control of the Aegean also gives Greece the additional benefit of influencing trade between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Without control of the Aegean, there simply is no Greece.²³¹

Unsurprisingly, this paper also calls the Aegean Sea a “Greek Lake” due to its control over the key islands such as Rhodes and Crete, as well as the Dodecanese Archipelago.

4.3.3. Liberal Accounts

Liberal approaches are the large collection of ideas which sought to carve a way of international functioning that sets itself apart from the realist pessimism and critical activism. It derived from the emergent political liberalism of the Western Thinking, an extension of this tradition to the realm of international relations. Influential scholars Keohane and Nye were the leading architects of the modern extension of the contemporary IR liberalism. What Keohane and Nye intellectually build up is a way of conceptualisation and operationalisation for the political liberalism through

²³⁰ Aris Messinis, “The Geopolitics of Greece: A Sea at its Heart”, 22.12.2018, Stratfor, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.anixneuseis.gr/the-geopolitics-of-greece-a-sea-at-its-heart/>

²³¹ Ibid.

establishing emphasis on the transborder linkages, organizations and institutions apart from the states and armed forces, in which the complex interdependence embodies the key for trans-nationalisation of what was once deemed international, and once ultimately state dominated. Their notion of complex interdependence therefore briefly summarised as: “the centerpiece of their work was the concept of complex interdependence— an ideal type constructed to analyse situations involving transnational issues. In a situation of complex interdependence, where multiple channels connect societies, there is an absence of hierarchy among issues, and military force is not used by governments against other governments involved in the interdependent relation”.²³² While the so-called channels embrace a comprehensive meaning transcend the state borders, the emphasis of modern interdependence theory is particularly concentrated on the free exchange of goods, services and ideas, free flow of people and the removal of the economic barriers. Then, these would sum up into the surrounding and mutually enforcing sides of liberalism which are the development of facilitatory non-governmental or governmental sponsored autonomous bodies that will aid in governing of the ideal liberal world of maximised absolute sum. The vast array of concepts and theories then are proposed for this objective of the globalised integration to work such as Mitrany’s functionalism as well as the regime and intuitionist theories of Keohane and Nye.²³³ These theories echo the belief and desire of a practice that the states eventually prefer to serve or even transform themselves to fit into this new outlook of the globe and invest in it rather than devoting into the relative gain struggles.²³⁴ In liberal assumption, the deemed positive sum gains and the convergence of interests and combined efforts would provide the sufficient incentives and followingly generate the established obligations to act in accordance with the escalating momentum of allegedly peaceful liberal world order. In order to achieve this objective, liberals argue that the regulatory mechanisms such as institutions that are expected to enhance predictability and set constraints on state behaviour within the anarchical order of realism are required, the mechanisms which

²³² Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, “Liberalism: Interdependence and Global Governance”, *International Relations Theory (Sixth Edition)*, (Rowman & Littlefield 2020), p, 88.

²³³ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V, p. 69-79.

²³⁴ Scott Burchill, “Liberalism”, *Theories of International Relations Third Edition*, (Palgrave Macmillan 2005), p.57-62.

ultimately define the course of states through the allegedly overall inclination towards the absolute gain over the relative gain.²³⁵ Thus, it demonstrates the liberals deem importance to anarchy and power just as the realists do.²³⁶ Whilst, in literature, this theory family and tradition is considered in line with the tradition of realism in the sense of establishing the mainstream narrative or “the Orthodox” IR but also rather conflictual with realism and following critical traditions with its normative tone that calls for how the things should work.

As a local application, the premise of practice of liberalism within the Turkish Greek relations for mitigating tensions has a long-standing history that heavily stresses on the mutual economic relations and the emergence of the liberal international order after the Second World War which both Turkey and Greece proactively committed through the participation to the Western Bloc. Therefore, the facets and practices of liberal ideas reveal themselves in the international context of NATO and the EU in Turkish-Greek relations on the Aegean Sea that also include the bilateral liberalised dimension between two societies and states. Despite that, the practical picture is very far from what the conclusive predictions of liberal theories imply regarding the harmonisation of the inter-societal relations and conflict prevention in relation to the positive sum understanding. The practical results are deemed to be rather mixed but also considered to be effective in the sense that two states cannot become total blind-eye to each other due to the increased complex inter-dependence which binds them more. The problem lies within the fact that these theories are actually not suitable for the clarification of the existing tensions despite the prescription of liberal ideas has been practiced over the decades due to the economic and international necessities of evolving social structures within two states and societies in international economic order.²³⁷ The literature tends to view that liberalism is prone to be over-shadowed by the terms and

²³⁵ Robert O Keohane and Lisa L. Martin. “The Promise of Institutional Theory.” *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, The MIT Press, (1995), p. 44-46.

²³⁶ Burchill, p. 64-65.

²³⁷ Mustafa Türkeş, Elif Uzgören & Coşkun Soysal: “A Historical Materialist Reading of the Contested Relations between Greece and Turkey”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* (2024), p. 5-7.

interfering practices of the realist dynamics and ideational politics²³⁸ in the Greek-Turkish case, particularly regarding any potential challenge to the influence on Aegean Sea and to the practical sovereignty and status on the islands.

For instance, Tsarouhas elaborates on the resurgence of the high politics that negates the yearly increasing win-win gains for both parties after the change of external and internal dynamics from 2008, a realist notion that overdrives or blockades any beneficial initiative in which liberal understanding involved.²³⁹ In a given case, it appears that Athens has a concern over the food supply of islands in relation to Turkey despite the concern is being irrational in liberal terms of comparative advantage. The agricultural products, fruit and vegetables from Turkey cannot be exported directly to the Aegean islands. Products have to undergo tests in Athens or Thessaloniki to be approved, as no full-fledged testing laboratories exist in the islands that can verify compliance with EU health and safety standards. This hampers Turkish exporters as a controversial form of non-tariff barrier, who have to transport products to the mainland first and then re-sell them on the island markets.²⁴⁰ Despite unsuccessful attempts by the Turkish side to pressure Greece into opening a suitable laboratory in Rhodes, Greece has refused to move on the issue, citing concerns of possible economic dependence of the East Aegean islands on Turkish producers. It occurs in a context where the trends in trade and tourism as well as the last decades' establishment of collaborative institutions indicate an increasing development in line with the liberal trajectory. However, even though he pinpoints the limitation of the interdependence theory, Tsarouhas views the actions as high political turbulences or fluctuations in a consistent-deemed liberal development rather than considering these as a theoretical falsification and refutation of the ideal liberal approach pertaining Turkish Greek relations in the Aegean Sea.²⁴¹ He implies a re-utilisation of a liberal recipe for the

²³⁸ For instance, Heraclides.” The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity”

²³⁹ Dimitris Tsarouhas, “Greek–Turkish economic relations in a changing regional and international context”, *Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation*, Edited by Alexis Heraclides and Gizem Aliođu akmak (Routledge 2019), p. 202-206.

²⁴⁰ Tsarouhas, p. 197.

²⁴¹ Tsarouhas, p. 207.

resolution of Greek Turkish relations such as the increase in the institutionalisation based on the past experience that overlaps with the periods of friendly relations but he misses how the uneven economic capacity between the islands and Turkey produced the non-liberal measures in the first place despite confirming such economic imbalance exists.²⁴² The liberal solution would result in a competitive failure for Greek agriculture and transportation capital which is relying on the protected and uncontested food supply on the islands. The bilateral tension between two national producers and states would then only be translated into the domestic context of Greece and increase disapproval towards both the Greek Government and Turkey as their business would be axed by their own government in favour of others. Therefore, assessment of Tsarouhas overlooks the failure of liberalism in more general outlook of theoretical application. Not only in this instance, but the most prominent family of liberal theories also have issues regarding predicting the outcomes between Turkey and Greece in and outside the Aegean context, fail to deliver satisfactory explanations to Turkish Greek bipolarity and actually those fluctuating imbalances within the bilateral relations. Furthermore, it does not truly discover the twin-going development of both liberal and realpolitik dimensions between Turkey and Greece via coherent manner. It cannot clearly depict the dragging towards increasing power politics dynamics vis-à-vis the development of the ideal liberal dynamics such as the trade, tourism and investment cooperation in Turkish Greek relations.

Firstly, the Turkish-Greek case demonstrates a strong example of de-validation of the democratic peace theory from the liberal theoretical family. Democratic peace theory has both structural and normative aspects. Some liberals highlight the institutional constraints on liberal-democratic states, such as public opinion, the rule of law, and representative government. Others emphasize the normative preference for compromise and conflict resolution that can be found in liberal democracies.²⁴³ As a normative compass, Owen also argues democracy produces a particular established

²⁴² Tsarouhas, p. 197.

²⁴³ Burchill, p. 60.

ideology (liberalism) which rejects resorting violence against any regime that is also democratic with shared values of democratic practice and does not trust illiberal regimes.²⁴⁴ If the sufficient requirement of the normative aspect is equivalent to the degree of commitment to the regime of democracy, national cases of Greece and Turkey reveal a mixed historical record. But both nations have been institutionally committed liberal democratic states through decades though they have been so far flawed due to historical coups, authoritarian tendencies and wide-spread corruption in common politic science and liberal jargon. In Greek-Turkish Case, it would be expected to foresee an improvement in relations and effective issue resolutions since from the institutionalised democratisation in the post-WWII era if the democratic peace theory is valid, but the exactly opposite picture of conflict escalation has taken the place. In fact, the most positive era of Turkish-Greek relations corresponds to Ataturk's Kemalist Single Party Regime and Hellenic Democracy under the guide of Venizelos, followed by both authoritarian regimes of Inonu and Metaxas in Turkey and Greece. Greek case was even more dramatic in that analysis of frame since the first Hellenic Republic collapsed in 1935 and left the ground a militaristic dictatorial right dominated Kingdom in 1936 under the iron grip of General Metaxas, as the revitalisation of the Hellenic Monarchy in the climate of rising fascism. It is that era in which Turkey and Greece were farthest from engaging into a war with each other and tend to cooperate on the issues, which also altered Turkey as a safe harbour for Greek refugees during the Second World War and Greek Civil War. Turks also aid Greece in this period.²⁴⁵ This background of good relations also laid the foundations for the development of the second phase of the good relations between Greece and Turkey in the post WWII period during 1950-1954, until the emergence of Cyprus Issue on the international stage. During these periods, high ranking military officials and political decision maker elite of both countries paid visits to each other and negotiate variety of external issues in a cooperative manner, for instance, the Turkish and Greek military staff discussed possibility of a feasible security scheme not just in Aegean Sea but also

²⁴⁴ John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994), p.101-103.

²⁴⁵ James Heneage, "Kısa Yunanistan Tarihi", p. 191-192.

the whole Mediterranean Region through out early 1950's.²⁴⁶ These variables indicate that the type of regime at least was not primary independent variable that define the relations between two respective nations unlike what the democratic peace theory proposes for. In response to the liberal notion of democratic peace, realist critics argue that the idea of liberal democracy and the question of action pose definitional problems. They argue that democratic peace theory, at best, identifies a correlation in international politics rather than an 'iron law' or theory based a grounded causality.²⁴⁷ For instance, realist scholar Stephen Walt pinpoints the effect of ideological solidarity in the peace preservation and alliance formation but rejects the notion that it can play a primary role in the emergence of international power balance arrangement, relying on the alliance complexity in the world history where the random alliances with members of random affiliations can fill the ranks of the international order.²⁴⁸ In regard to the demilitarisation issue, this liberal notion clearly constitutes any impactful result that redeem the issue neither in normative nor institutional sense. As noted, in fact, it could be argued that the cases like the demilitarisation issue which therefore sum up into the negative oscillation of Greek Turkish relations is the refutation of the democratic peace theory since those countries are democratic though flawed in their own terms as the potential liberal contestation to this claim.

Second, as the form of broader and unifying realisation of interdependence and alleged harmony, the liberal notion of institutions alongside with regime theory arguably demonstrate the most relevance with the demilitarisation matter since it is based on the international law and therefore presumes an institutional foundation between the participating parties. The concept of regime is defined as:

The term regime was borrowed from domestic politics, where it refers typically to an existing governmental or constitutional order (democratic, authoritarian, or otherwise). In its international context, given the absence of a superordinate

²⁴⁶ Serra Yazıcı Özel, *Basında Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1950-1954)* (Master's Thesis: Trakya Üniversitesi, 2018), 79-84.

²⁴⁷ Burchill, p. 60.

²⁴⁸ Walt, Stephen M. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." p. 18-22.

or overarching central authority, these rules are voluntarily established by states to provide some degree of order in international relations. Thus, there is a strong Grotian strain in liberal thought, particularly when talk turns to managing interdependence through the construction of regimes.²⁴⁹

As the literature echoes, the demilitarisation regulation established a regime between Greece and Turkey, where in particular Greece shares the greatest responsibility in this case due to the considerably larger volume of military obligations on the legal texts and acts. However, this is where the international regime also fails, as the institution that stuck on the paper practically fails. The case matter manifests itself as a de jure situation but not to realised materially and also violated for decades in de facto terms. Keohane personally believed that the regime theory that derived from domestic politics standalone is insufficient to elaborate on the conditions that produce international cooperation. He designed the more expansive concept of institutions to reinforce and enhance his previous approach, as he understood the fragility of enforcement of a standalone regime which is not truly institutionalised. He defines the institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations".²⁵⁰ While liberal institutionalism does share the notion of anarchy and importance of state just like the realist tradition did, it seeks establishment and continuation of special conditions that mitigate and even ultimately render them. The international statute that establishes the demilitarisation regime could be understood in Keohane's two forms of international institutions out of the given three forms. The first coined as the international regimes:

International Regimes: Institutionalized rules explicitly agreed upon by governments that deal with a particular set of issues. Examples would include the international monetary regime established in 1944 but adapted to changing circumstances since then, the Law of the Sea regime developed in the 1970s, and the various arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War 3.²⁵¹

²⁴⁹ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V, p. 74.

²⁵⁰ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V, p. 77.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

The demilitarisation regime is based on the international agreement between Turkey and Greece with involvement of the participant external states of interest during the Lausanne Process. Its primary and official objective is to draw a security management and balance setting in Aegean Sea in relation to Turkey that directly faces with extreme close proximity Greek islands. The rules come in sight in the demilitarisation case with the presence of the demonstrated texts and historical background.²⁵² The problem lies in the application. Whilst the demilitarisation could be seen under the light of the ideal type of the second term, conventions:

Conventions: Informal institutions (or customary norms and practices) with implicit rules and understandings. These implicit understandings allow actors to understand one another and coordinate their behaviour. Not only do they facilitate coordination, but they also affect actors' incentives not to defect in those situations where at least in the short term it might be in their interest to do so. "Reciprocity" is an example of a convention; political leaders expect reciprocal treatment in international dealings, both positive and negative, and anticipate costs of one kind or another if they violate the convention. Diplomatic immunity is an example of a convention that existed for centuries before it was codified in formal agreements in the 1960s.²⁵³

The demilitarisation regime does also imply a mutual understanding between Greece and Turkey which ended up the composition and signation of Lausanne Treaty. Although his motivations are varied and pertaining the islands were demonstrated in the previous chapters, Venizelos for instance was not against the establishment of demilitarised order since from the London Conference all the way to the Lausanne Conference. On the contrary, he stated many times he is open this type of an initiative. First Russian and later Turkish demand for the demilitarisation of the islands therefore did find correspondence in the counter party and did not float on a unilateral plane. When Greece began to violate the demilitarisation, it later implied the act of reciprocity derived from the Turkish Operation of Cyprus in 1974 as a form of justification. Turkish response of formation Fourth Army constituted the act of reciprocity as well. In the calculation of both, the cost would be much higher if the necessary considered

²⁵² See; The Chapter 2 and The Appendices

²⁵³ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V, p. 77.

reciprocity steps have not been taken or continued. With this brief elaboration, though liberal notions and prospectuses may arguably limit their behaviours, its solution on the institutional basis and therefore the continuation of demilitarisation practically fails. The regimes and institutional cooperation which is expected to bring higher levels of regularity and predictability to international relations according to the liberal approach does not result in regularity and predictability in this case, on the contrary, the tensions escalated and relativistic approaches ultimately outweighed totalist approaches of gain. Despite this picture of high politicisation that favours realism and other critics, the liberal accounts do argue for the sufficient reinforcement and expansion of institutions as well as more improvement of trans-national linkages among states are required for the realisation of the cooperation and regimes. Therefore, the demilitarisation issue could be a sub-product of a missing integral parts in the general Turkish-Greek relations, particularly in relation to insufficient economic relations and lack of trade which in turn result in the so-called high politization. However, the picture demonstrates considerable level of institutionalism and general improvement trend in those departments despite the tensions pertaining demilitarisation simultaneously present. Although it also could be argued that economics and military security are the separate domains of the institutionalisation, and the independent monitoring body is required for the demilitarisation independent from the economic institutions. But it still does not provide a tangible basis for enforcement of the demilitarisation regime since there is lack of clearly defined persuasion or coercion element to make Greece respect the demilitarisation status. Thus, it can be argued that the institutionalisation in economic domain is required as the first step for the proper liberal resolution of the issue but the evidence of improvement in economic domain both in numerical and institutional terms suggests otherwise.

Modern trade relations between Greece and Turkey had been continued within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) until Greece's accession to the European Community (EC). Following Turkey's application to the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1959, the Ankara Agreement signed in

1963 and the Customs Union Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1996.²⁵⁴ This process established a customs union between the EU and Turkey within the scope of industrial goods. In 1999, a new policy on bilateral trade relations between Turkey and Greece was introduced to encourage co-operation between the two countries and 9 different agreements were concluded within this framework, which entered into force in 2001. Among the main ones are the Economic Cooperation Agreement, the Agreement on Economic Cooperation in the Field of Tourism, the Agreement on Bilateral Assistance and Cooperation in the Administration of Customs, the Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments and the Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation.

The most important pillar of the economic relations between Turkey and Greece is the mutual trade relations between the two countries which may subject the negative fluctuations occurred due to the crises and monitored under the concept of trade volume which refers to the sum of exports and imports. Turkey's exports and imports with Greece increased from 1990 to 2008 from \$260 million to \$3.5 billion, up until the global financial crisis and Greek debt crisis that led a temporary stagnation period.²⁵⁵ Although there was a decline in the volume of foreign trade between 2015 and 2016 primarily because of Turkish domestic political instability, the volume of trade tended to increase again to \$3.5 billion in 2017. The total volume of trade continued its upward trend and reached \$4.18 billion in 2018. It is expected to grow in 2019.²⁵⁶ After another negative fluctuation with the Covid-19 Pandemic, it hit the significant number of \$5.8 billion by 2023. Turkish and Greek officials expressed their

²⁵⁴ Hanife Bıdırdı, "Ege Denizi Ekonomi-Politığı ve Türk-Yunan Ticari İlişkileri", *Ege Jeopolitiğı Cilt II*, Ed. Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker and Dimitrios Ioannadis (Ankara Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık 2020), p. 1707-1708.

²⁵⁵ Bıdırdı, p.1707.

²⁵⁶ Hürriyet, "Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki ticaretin artırılması hedefleniyor", 02.02.2019, , Hürriyet Bigpara, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/turkiye-ile-yunanistan-arasindaki-ticaretin-artirilmasi-hedefleniyor-41102848>)

desire to even surpass this number and set the objective of \$10 billion volume.²⁵⁷ Tourism sector followed an identical development path in relation to the negative vibrations caused by the political and economic crises, which primarily excluded from the Greek Turkish tensions on the Aegean Region. Another noteworthy development in foreign trade in the period under consideration is that Turkey started to run a foreign trade deficit with Greece, especially after 2010, as imports increased more than exports. Furthermore, this imbalance was also misleading in the terms that Turkish exports are more diversified compared to Greece's²⁵⁸ and also misleading in the sense that Turkish export capacity easily reached and could overtake the levels where the import from Greece stands, respectively in 2019 and since from the Covid Pandemic. Hanife Bıdırdı argues that the increase in Turkish imports from Greece between 2011-2014 is the partial result of political negotiations, diplomatic contacts and the meetings of High-Level Cooperation Council. However, Bıdırdı does not point out the Greek economic fragility as the true cause of low level of Turkish exports to Greece during this period despite claiming competitive advantage of Turkey and dependency of the islands.²⁵⁹ The financial turmoil and debt crisis which Greece stuck in hindered Greece's capability for extracting more Turkish exports rather than demonstrating Turkish competitive weakness *vis-à-vis* Greece.

Furthermore, the considerable level of specialised institutionalisation in Turkish Greek political economic relations does not produce the outcome of alleviated tensions in the frame of Aegean issues. In 1988, Athenian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) signed an agreement to establish the DEİK / Türkiye-Greece Business Council.²⁶⁰ After several years of cooperation, the

²⁵⁷ Gökhan Ergocun, "Türkiye, Greece look to higher trade volume", 03.02.2024, Anadolu Agency, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkiye-greece-look-to-higher-trade-volume/3126516#>

²⁵⁸ Tsarouhas, "Greek-Turkish economic relations in a changing regional and international context", p. 196.

²⁵⁹ Bıdırdı, p. 1708-1710, p. 1714.

²⁶⁰ Foreign Economic Relations Board, "Türkiye - Greece Business Council" (2024), DEİK, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Türkiye - Greece Business Council - DEİK | Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler K... \(deik.org.tr\)](https://www.deik.org.tr/turkiye-greece-business-council)

partnership was also continued with the Hellenic Confederation of Enterprises (SEV). The main areas of cooperation are banking, stock exchange, environment, shipping, construction, SMEs, industry and trade, insurance and tourism. The Council is said to be organising various events²⁶¹ to promote bilateral relations and encourage joint projects. For instance, on March 4, 2020, Turkish and Greek business leaders signed a memorandum of understanding to enhance bilateral economic relations.²⁶² The trade pact was concluded between Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) and Greek Exporters Association (SEVE) as a part of a roundtable meeting between the countries' business communities, as announced by the DEİK. Levent Sadık, the head of the DEİK's Turkey-Greece Business Council, asserted that the agreement constituted a significant step towards doubling the bilateral trade volume of the two countries. The Council and SEVE also involved in and facilitates the re-animated meeting terms and protocol creation process of the Türkiye-Greece Joint Economic Commission (JEC). The fifth term of JEC meeting held in Athens in January 2022 “despite the tensions”.²⁶³ It was planned in the Economic and Trade Cooperation Meeting held on 26 October 2021 which produced Fourth JEC Protocol of Turkish-Greek Working Group on Trade and Economic Cooperation under the initiative of Turkey Exporters Assembly (TİM) and Trade Ministry of Republic of Turkey.²⁶⁴ The

²⁶¹ Hürriyet, “Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki ticaretin artırılması hedefleniyor”, 02.02.2019, , Hürriyet Bigpara, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/turkiye-ile-yunanistan-arasindaki-ticaretin-artirilmasi-hedefleniyor-41102848>)

²⁶² A News, “Turkish, Greek business leaders sign trade pact”, 04.03.2020, A News, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.anews.com.tr/economy/2020/03/04/turkish-greek-business-leaders-sign-trade-pact>

²⁶³ Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “5th Session of the Greek-Turkish Joint Economic Committee / Signing of Protocol (Athens, 24 January, 2022)”, 24.01.2022, MFA, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statements-speeches/5th-session-of-the-greek-turkish-joint-economic-committee-signing-of-protocol-athens-24-january-2022.html>; Daily Sabah, “Turkey, Greece sign protocol to develop bilateral trade, co-op”, 26.01.2022, Daily Sabah, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkey-greece-sign-protocol-to-develop-bilateral-trade-co-op> ; Kosta Papadopoulos, “Despite tensions, Greece and Turkey re-activate economic committee after 11 years”, 25.01.2022, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, https://greekcitytimes.com/2022/01/25/despite-tensions-greece-and-turkey-re-activate-economic-committee-after-11-years/#google_vignette

²⁶⁴ Doğu Anadolu İhracatçılar Birliği, “Türkiye-Yunanistan Karma Ekonomik Komitesi (KEK) 5. Toplantısı Hk.”, 2021, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://daib.org.tr/Page/turkiye-yunanistan-karma-ekonomik-komitesi-kek-5-toplantisi-hk-7000>

Sixth Meeting Term and Protocol of JEC was surfaced in 2024 February.²⁶⁵ All these developments in the dimension of economic relations occurred with the increasing demilitarisation tensions at the same time considering Demilitarisation Debate on the UN in 2021-2022 and 2022 September Drone Surveillance Crisis²⁶⁶ regarding the demilitarised islands, which had following years of warnings and protests despite the economic relations were and are improving as an overall trend. It indicates the liberal assumption of positive effect of trade on the international disputes is either missing the integrals for explaining this contradictory situation, like critical accounts argue for; or there lies a difference between high and low politics of security and economics, a stance which realism promotes. In fact, the demonstrated data so far shows Greece as a whole system of business capital initiative and economic activity engaging nation state society is in an insecure position pertaining to more competitive and capable Turkish Business Capital and production base. In relation to Northern Aegean Islands case, this imbalance or unevenness further increases by the geographical proximity of noted islands to Turkey's Asia Minor in comparison to mainland Greece. Moreover, the islands are also touristic magnet but non-self-sufficient, a fatal combination that necessitates having an external trade input in which Turkish Business Capital potentially enjoys the greatest advantage, which apparently Greek State and Entrepreneurship cannot tolerate. Like the assessment on the lack of laboratories in the islands from Tsarouhas, Hatice Nur Germic elaborates on the entrepot or customs warehouse issue on the Greek islands which causes further troubles for Turkish exporters.²⁶⁷ The unavailability of entrepots on the islands and coercion on Turkish export material to the customs check point on relatively more distant Athens before engaging the commercial operation on the islands pose a considerable challenge for

²⁶⁵ Naftemporiki, "Greece and Turkey sign 15 agreements, memoranda and joint declarations", 08.12.2023, Naftemporiki English, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.naftemporiki.gr/english/1545003/greece-and-turkey-sign-15-agreements-memoranda-and-joint-declarations/> ; Ekotrent, "Bakanlık duyurdu! Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında protokol imzalandı", 02.02.2024, Ekonomi.haber, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://ekonomi.haber7.com/ekonomi/haber/3387835-bakanlik-duyurdu-turkiye-ile-yunanistan-arasinda-protokol-imzalandi>

²⁶⁶ See, Chapter 2 and Chapter 5

²⁶⁷ Hatice Nur Germir, "Ege Denizi'nde Ekonomik İşbirliği Girişimleri", *Ege Jeopolitiği Cilt II*, Ed. Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker and Dimitrios Ioannadis (Ankara Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık 2020), p. 1722.

the Turkish producers in their race with Greek and foreign suppliers that operating from the mainland Greece. Germic mentions about the feasible transformation of Chios into the transit port and customs entrance and storage center for the facilitated and leveraged distribution of Turkish exports on the islands but clearly this is not the case so far. She proposes it as a solution for the issue²⁶⁸, but it could be argued that why ever this type of an arrangement has not been established yet up to the present. In theoretical terms of liberal institutionalism and its variants, the facilitating *de novo* type of organisations between Turkish and Greek bilateral relations apparently cannot assure the full mitigation the unevenly distributed production capacity or economic power which generated Greek economic countermeasures and de-balancing handicaps against Turkish economic capacity of hegemonic competitiveness. The convergence of interests therefore was not realised since they could not meet on the same logical set as the national and business interests differ. It indicates the flaw of institutional and intergovernmental forms of liberalism as it is criticized by the realist and critical schools of thought. Economic interdependence is arguably insufficient in the sense of the components in the systems are not evenly matching and uneven development of system dominates the ground, therefore the calculations of the actors. As the critics of liberal tradition pinpoints:

Economic interdependency will never take precedence over strategic security because states must be primarily concerned with their survival. Their capacity to explore avenues of economic cooperation will therefore be limited by how secure they feel, and the extent to which they are required to engage in military competition with others. Secondly, the idea of economic interdependence implies a misleading degree of equality and shared vulnerability to economic forces in the global economy. Interdependence does not eliminate hegemony and dependency in inter-state relations because power is very unevenly distributed throughout the world's trade and financial markets.²⁶⁹

While it is clear that an independent institution for monitoring and regulating demilitarisation regime is non-existent, it is very suspicious that under the conjuncture of uneven development of the capacities it would operate effectively and be able to

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Burchill, p, 66.

override the breaching policies of the Greek State. The presence of military on demilitarised islands is not just assuring the high political security on the Aegean Sea in Greek mind setting *vis-à-vis* amphibious assault capable Turkish Armed Forces but it is also a fact that the militarisation necessitates the economic development of the islands due to the vast variety of requirements generated by the army. In Greek calculation, it potentially balances out or at least diminishes Turkish center of mass on the enclaved islands. This policy creates a demand curve for the trans-nationalised business elite of Greece who are heavily tied with ruling political elite of Greece, which consists of powerful families. Therefore, more political economy centered accounts are to be examined to point out the profound insights into the societal-state dynamics in relation to the existing economic structures and systems which actors try to operate.

4.3.4. Critical Accounts

The critical accounts are by far the least operationalized approaches within the study of demilitarisation status, as another indication of rarity of IR theoretical accounts on this subject issue with the arguable exception of realism. None of the accounts touches upon the critical accounts due to the separative consideration of demilitarisation under two domains: Law and Security. Therefore, the political economic considerations are severely lacking while the multi-dimensionality could be present and applied more in analytical inquiry since it can be assumed that legal and security frameworks rise above on the shoulders of the political economic social dynamics and structures, generated to suit them and with later on due to the social evolution, may not suit them. Therefore, the demilitarised status of Eastern Aegean islands is not an exception. But first, those under-utilized accounts must be briefly covered. The critical accounts reveal many aliases in the literature ranging from the term of the unorthodox accounts to even neo-Marxist accounts, though not all of them utilizes Marxist kind of structural economic analysis and therefore are post-structuralist or sometimes post-modern in

nature.²⁷⁰ In addition, Marxist type of analysis utilization is heavily modified in the related critical material. This coining of “critical” is the result of an attempt that generates a theoretical umbrella that encompasses all the ideas and theoretical frames that intent to challenge the traditionally prevailing accounts of realism and liberalism. One of the primary and quintessential features of the critical approach is the dynamic social change that is capable of altering the existing system for replacing it with alternative, not focused only the change of the arrangements in the given system. This analytical feature within the critical studies is regarded as the product of historical progress and evolution, based on class focused social struggle. This is why the formerly discussed traditional approaches of IR is the indication of only *problem solving* but not truly *critical* with a chronic tendency to legitimize prevailing social and political structures, regardless and independent form their theoretical consideration as the inevitable ontological or socio-ethical obligation:

Problem-solving theory, as Cox (1981: 128) defines it, ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. It does not question the present order but has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. Its general aim, says Cox (1981: 129), is to make the existing order ‘work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’. Neo-realism, qua problem-solving theory, takes seriously the realist dictum to work with, rather than against, prevailing international forces.²⁷¹

With their more normative tuned and constructivist positive tone in comparison to the realist approaches, liberal accounts are also no different according to the critical vision:

Cox points out that neo-liberal institutionalism also partakes of problem-solving. Its objective, as explained by its foremost exponent, is to ‘facilitate the smooth operation of decentralized international political systems’ (Keohane 1984: 63) Situating itself between the states-system and the liberal capitalist global economy, neo-liberalism’s main concern is to ensure that the two

²⁷⁰ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, “Positivism, Critical Theory, and Postmodern Understandings, International Relations Theory (Sixth Edition)”, p.178-182.

²⁷¹ Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory”, *Theories of International Relations Third Edition*, (Palgrave Macmillan 2005), p. 141-142.

systems function smoothly in their coexistence. It seeks to render the two global systems compatible and stable by diffusing any conflicts, tensions, or crises that might arise between them (Cox 1992b: 173).²⁷²

Followingly, the very idea of social systemic evolution and change, regardless of being gradual or sudden, establishes these approaches closer to the social constructivism and as noted Marxism, since the rigid positivistic models for describing the perpetual-considered systems are discarded for an approach that is favouring the focus on social change. But the change is still depending on the proactive interaction of social structures and auxiliary social variables in the most utilized versions of the critical accounts, economic structuralist and neo-Gramscian approaches. These are particularly shaped by the intellectual output of Immanuel Wallerstein and Robert Cox, respectively. They did recognise the systemic anarchy and some realist features pertaining to the material power and capacity but underlined the international capitalism as the all-defining and all-embracing system with its determining feature of uneven development, not the inter-state system:

For the realist, anarchy leads one to examine international political stability, war, and balance-of-power politics involving major states. For the economic structuralist, the economic ramifications of political anarchy are paramount. The political anarchy of the interstate system facilitates the development and expansion of world capitalism because no single state can control the entire world-economy. The result is an economic division of labour involving a core, a periphery, and a semi-periphery that is the focal point of economic-structuralist analysis. Political anarchy becomes a backdrop for an extensive analysis of capitalist dynamics.²⁷³

Wallerstein and his followers pictured a heavily deterministic world order in which the subordinate periphery provides the raw material in the exchange of value-added manufactured goods and services of the dominant core in a non-egalitarian and hierarchical manner. Sooner, the term of semi-periphery added to this world

²⁷² Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory", p. 142.

²⁷³ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, "Economic Structuralism: Global Capitalism and Postcolonialism", *International Relations Theory* (5th Edition), p. 108.

understanding between of those two opposite extremities of global capitalist system. States and politic have their gravitas but in the frame of globalised capitalism.

Capitalism has been the defining attribute of the international system since the sixteenth century. It is capitalism that helps to account for a core, a periphery, and a semi periphery. It is capitalism that provides the critical environment in which states and classes operate by constraining, shaping, and channelling behaviour. Some states and classes are rewarded. Others are doomed to play subordinate roles in a worldwide division of labour determined by the dictates of capitalism. So, although states and politics are certainly important to the economic structuralist, they must be analysed in the context of the capitalist world-system. To Wallerstein and his followers, material structure clearly matters more than agency.²⁷⁴

The result is distribution and division of the state capabilities and relative position in accordance within which states represent the concentration of political power, will and application:

In Wallerstein's modern world-system approach states are classified according to two overlapping criteria. First, they are divided according to their relative strengths into strong or weak and secondly, they are categorised according to their structural positions in the world-economy as core, periphery and semi-periphery.²⁷⁵

At first glance, it is relatively hard to apply an economic structuralist approach to a demilitarisation question. In fact, the hardness of the application stems from the locality of the issue in comparison to the global scale but it does not mean that the terms and assumed dynamics are not viable for developing a theoretical inquiry on the issue. Islands in the question constitutes the periphery in relation to the core, currently the mainland Greece. Before the Greek rule, that economic core concentration which the islands dependent on was Anatolia itself. The secession of the eastern islands to

²⁷⁴ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, p. 109.

²⁷⁵ M. Fatih Tayfur, *Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Greece and Spain* (Ph.D.: Department of International Relations London School of Economics and Political Science, 1997) p.47.

Greece in the first Balkan War and loss of political ties with Turkey re-defined the economic core for the islands over passing years but in a vaguer and lose manner due to lesser economic potential and farther distance of Greece mainland in comparison to Western Asia Minor. It resulted in a historic trend of losing population and leaking migrants for seeking better life standards since the periphery islands are not self-sufficient and dependent on the historical cores in a way that Greek mainland seems much less effective to hinder loss of blood in this dependent periphery. With numerical data, the relative demographic fragility of Northern islands surfaces in comparison to Dodecanese and Greek mainland between 1971-2011. While Dodecanese doubles up in the population size between those years, the population of Northern Aegean islands is deteriorated from 1971-2011 despite there are some signs of floating or rising, only reveals a slight but considerable trend recovery from 2016. Furthermore, the administrative region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace which includes the islands of Samothrace and Tassos is in decline trend in terms of population. The concentration of high-level productive forces by successive Greek governments on the mainland core cities of Athens and other urban centres has resulted in the underdevelopment of raw material based-peripheral island economies. This, in turn, has led to historical decline trends in the island population due to emigration, which apparently be addressed only in the recent years.

Turkish geographers Sırrı Erinç and Talip Yücel emphasize and explain this demographical fragility as well within the very comprehensive geographical account they provide for the Aegean islands.²⁷⁶ According to Erinç and Yücel, the islands' peripherality and demographic fragility are not only merely a consequence of deliberate political choice; but it is also a consequence of their unique land and climate.²⁷⁷ The inland of islands is even poor in terms of raw materials and is also agriculture-hostile supported by the harsh arid climate with distinct severities. Furthermore, the fertile and accommodable land size is not abundant due to the geographical structures, which has contributed to the economic underdevelopment of

²⁷⁶ Sırrı Erinç and Talip Yücel, "Türkiye ile Komşu Ege Adaları".

²⁷⁷ Sırrı Erinç and Talip Yücel, "A/3-İklim Şartlar ve Neticeleri, A/4-Adaların Vejetasyon Hususiyetleri, Türkiye ile Komşu Ege Adaları". p. 19-23.

the islands. This underdevelopment is conducive to the exploitation of the islands by the surrounding core on the Aegean Sea.




Figure 3: The Population Graph of Northern Aegean Islands, Dodecanese Islands and Greece 1971-2011²⁷⁸

²⁷⁸ Data From: Can Kızılkın, “Türkiye’nin Ege Denizi’nde Deniz Güvenliği ve Gayriaskeri Statüdeki Ege Adalarının Güvenlik Tehdidi”, p. 158.

Resident population and its related trend, balance of nature and migratory balance, birth rate, death rate, growth rate and migration rate in **Province of NORTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS**

INHABITANTS TREND		
Year	Inhabitants (N.)	Variation % on previous year
2014	197,695	-
2015	196,654	-0.53
2016	203,700	+3.58
2017	211,137	+3.65
2018	221,098	+4.72

Average annual variation (2014/2018): **+2.84**

Average annual variation (2016/2018): **+4.18**




Figure 4: The Population Trend of Northern Aegean Islands (2014-2018)²⁷⁹

²⁷⁹ UrbisStat, "Maps, analysis and statistics about the resident population, Province of Northern Aegean Islands", Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version <https://ugeo.urbisat.com/AdminStat/en/gr/demografia/popolazione/eastern-makedonia-and-thraki/3/3>

Resident population and its related trend, balance of nature and migratory balance, birth rate, death rate, growth rate and migration rate in **Province of EASTERN MAKEDONIA AND THRAKI**

INHABITANTS TREND		
Year	Inhabitants (N.)	Variation % on previous year
2014	606,490	-
2015	604,504	-0.33
2016	602,799	-0.28
2017	601,175	-0.27
2018	599,723	-0.24

Average annual variation (2014/2018): **-0.28**

Average annual variation (2016/2018): **-0.26**




Figure 5: The Population Trend of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace (including Samothrace and Tassos)²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ UrbisStat, "Maps, analysis and statistics about the resident population, Province of Eastern Macedonia and Thraki", Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://ugeo.urbisat.com/AdminStat/en/gr/demografia/popolazione/northern--aegian-islands/7/3>

In other words, despite the dominant core intensifications were replaced historically on the Aegean sphere due to the political developments as noted, the potential cores including the region of Straits encircles these exploitable islands in way that can lift the interests of the core, through providing a secure route or defensive shell in relation to the core. Then the question becomes securing those core-related interests in an effective manner in which the demilitarised status can effectively serve, as a means for assured security. As discussed in the previous chapter,²⁸¹ in relation to the maintenance and securing the free trade and naval passage on the Straits, the peripheral islands played a key role, especially for the British and Russian Empires. Since by this wisdom, the Russian Empire proposed the complete demilitarisation as the only viable condition of the offered swap of most of islands between Greece and Ottomans during the post-Balkan Wars diplomacy. The British confirmed the Russian demilitarisation request since both powers have learned in Italian-Ottoman Wars that any possible military distraction on and from the islands in relation to the Straits could damage their trade interest, costing their regional trade structure millions of pounds and rubles. The same potential threat from the militarisation of and war on the periphery islands as understood from the experience of Ottoman-Italian Wars also endangered the global supply chain interests of advanced British capital and Rum-Greek sub-contractors, which were stationed and operating on the Western Anatolia on the Aegean Coastline.²⁸² To sum up, it can be argued that the interests of the dominant economic core layout in relation to the periphery Greece and Greek islands and the pertaining central core weight of the and European Empires, Straits Region and Western Anatolian Coastline defined the demilitarised security status of periphery islands without open resistance from disadvantageous periphery Greece. With its agriculture based weak industrial base with heavy debts and one side dependence, the Greek state could not resist the demilitarisation demand of imperial core powers particularly the British in relation to the free passage on Straits and Aegean Sea²⁸³ because “there is a hierarchy in the structural positions of states in the world-economy, and at the top of

²⁸¹ The Chapter 3.

²⁸² See, Economic Life in İzmir and Aydın
Ari Çokona, “Ekonomik Yaşam, Batı Anadolu, 20.Yüzyıl Başlarında Anadolu ve Trakya’daki Rum Yerleşimleri”, p. 237-238, p. 246-251.

²⁸³ The Chapter 3

this hierarchy are core states. Core states are those in which production is most efficient and other economic activities are most complex” and “they are divided according to their relative strengths into strong or weak”.²⁸⁴ As the concentrations of the industrialised efficient economic base hence political and military power, the last word in the political matters was up to them in the most incidents and the demilitarisation as a form of procurement of security might not be an exception under the light of the noted variables. As a contrast this more contemporary picture, during the age of ancient Greeks on Aegean Sea, the powerful Tyrant of Samos Polycrates is said to be partially dominating the Aegean Sea with his large naval fleet and accumulated considerable trade sources,²⁸⁵ when the Ancient Greek World became a hegemonic powerhouse in the ancient Mediterranean World with the rising sea powers like Polycrates’ Samos, later followed by the example of Aegean centered Athenian Empire. But as the world and emergent empires became more globalised and oceanic throughout ages of discovery and industrialisation, the layout of core and periphery distribution was altered, and significance of Aegean Sea alongside with Mediterranean partially diminished and their once *global* core status were abolished. The above noted current structural dictation of the core on these reduced islands continued even after the Six State Decision which initially rejected by the Ottomans but confirmed in the the Articles 177 and 178 Treaty of Sevres once more after the WWI Ottoman defeat. The Treaty of Serves considered most of the islands alongside with Straits to be demilitarised for the good of the core-serving Straits System, designed in accordance with the trade exchange and military security structural dictation of the core by the most enigmatic representative of the dominating capital concentration, the British power. After the Greco-Turco War, Turkish delegate leaded by Ismet Pasha on the Conference of Lausanne again stressed out and actually demanded a greater clarification about the demilitarised status pertaining to the islands even he genuinely asked for a complete return of the islands to Turkey. Ismet Pasha’s voiced out resolution draft was again for serving the security interest of the core Anatolia but this time from the Turkish perspective. This Turkish approach based on the wisdom of the Six States Decision reconciled with the noted British desire for the complete

²⁸⁴ M. Fatih Tayfur, “Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Greece and Spain”, p. 47-48.

²⁸⁵ Erinç and Yücel, p. 74.

demilitarisation of the islands as a part of London's calculation on the Straits. The Turkish party had surely not shared the same opinions and objectives with the British about the issue of Straits but nevertheless the Lausanne Peace Treaty was composed and signed in which the British seemingly gave a concession to Turkey regarding the military status of the islands whilst the core-driven British objective and structural core dictation were achieved at the end, confirmed and more systemically produced a demilitarised status on the islands as the partial element of core related British design on the Straits. As a sideline from the relative periphery in comparison to British-lead Allies, Venizelos understood that he would not be able to pose a challenge to the aimed structure which the core powers wished to impose and polish up, so he never engaged to challenge the proposed and assigned demilitarised status in the first place since from the post Balkan Wars diplomacy. The Russians meanwhile lost their interests in the demilitarised status of the islands this time because their new socialist entity on the ideologically and structurally marginalized semi-periphery, the Federal Soviet Republic was about to be destroyed by the powers from the core in a Civil War which had intense connection with the easily established Allied Control on the Straits and Black Sea. Therefore, unlike the Russian Empire, newly founded Soviet Republic obsessed with their offer of complete Turkish remilitarisation on the straits, opposed the general British demilitarisation design and way too far speculative for the weak Turkish side to embrace without completely alienating the core powers. In total of these, the core extended its economic, political, militaristic structural mass to dominate the general picture to shape the demilitarised status of the islands, which a periphery Turkey could hope to enjoy in a reduced status shared with rest of the periphery. When the political economic landscape evolved and interests of the core and related structures are institutionally re-defined particularly in relation to the expansion of NATO and rise of the US power, the practical enforcement of the demilitarised status disappeared because the once existing world systems of the post WWI British Hegemony era had changed in a way that no longer supporting it. As Italian example illustrated, the inter-clashing Core stabilised itself after the WWII under even more enigmatic US influence and focused on the strategic containment of the potentially disruptive Soviet Union, which structurally suggested a complete remilitarisation from which Greeks could hope to exploit. Once they had political opportunity with the Turkish Operation on Northern Cyprus under the guarantorship, they did. Greeks

announced and openly confirmed the remilitarisation in 1975. The islands were and are still armed with the advanced US and other core-manufactured weapon systems and munitions by the Greek authorities that periphery Greece could not manufacture by its own. It added another layer against the potential Soviet assault or vice versa provided a secure line with a sufficient military infrastructure on the Aegean Sea to enforce a conducted allied assault against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Members within the close-range geographies. In that sense, for instance, the island of Lemnos had a considerable dual-purpose (civilian and military) international airport known as *Hephaestus* that initiated its first flight operations in 1959 and located 18 km away from the city of Myrina, in order to accommodate modern made-in-core fleets of commercial and military type.²⁸⁶ The Greek owned-private and military fleets of course were bought with Greek finance and depths that based and pressuring on the relatively underdeveloped developing economy of Greece which assumably demonstrates its structural inability as an example periphery to produce them in the first place but still expanding the related infrastructures which necessitate the high-tech value-added aerial fleets within the systemic context of manufacture and exchange superiority of the core world. With the islands in question in relation to the globe, it sounds like a drop in the ocean, but it is clear that what made an ocean are those drops, nevertheless. Under this example, it means one more step further for expanding the aerial market size and demand for the commercial and military giant companies of the core West such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Airbus, the hyper aerospace conglomerates which Greece being periphery customer as it is. In the context of Greek-Turkish rivalry and also the Turkish dependency to them, it gains more valid ground, especially considering the Turks would likely response the Greek remilitarisation via being a more eager customer of the advanced Western / core weaponry for the sake of balancing. The demilitarisation is therefore systemically discardable and structurally unsustainable. As noted, the assumed truth or accepted insight within the World System approach is that the globalized interests and uneven development of the capitalist system inflicts through the international anarchy and balance of powers, generating a social economics-wise determinist environment primarily benefiting the core capital in terms of uneven production relationship.

²⁸⁶ <https://mapcarta.com/24944674>
<https://alchetron.com/Lemnos-International-Airport> (Accessed on: 09.07.2024)

Although insightful and never utilized in the problem of the demilitarised status of the islands before, the inner issue and faced criticism regarding this approach as it confines the international relations into a rigid economic determinism and leads a self-circulating and self-confirming theoretical dogmatism. It does not touch upon the wider dimensions of social reality, treating capitalism more like a machine, not a truly organic and super complex development of historic progress. This is where neo-Gramscian accounts begin to fill the overlooked gaps.

Aside from Wallerstein, Robert Cox and other neo-Gramscian analysts attempted to evaluate the international system in order to create a new hegemony definition that differs from the realist and liberal understandings of the hegemony. This understanding of the hegemony stresses on the convergent psychological-sociological dynamic of consent and coercion in a dominant production mode-defined and socially constructed world,²⁸⁷ that is shaped in accordance with the interacting hierarchical social forces of production within the range of converging dimensions of that emergent hegemony based on. Unlike state-domination focused mechanical hegemony of realism, this socially manufactured hegemony consists of the organic parameters like intellectualism, discourse, knowledge, material capacity and leadership. Like a regenerating organic cellular being consisted of social fabric of production process, the penetrating and state-above trans-national phenomenon called World Hegemony is designed by itself for serving itself to generate an assured continuity of social domination of the capitalistic elites on the way of forming Historic Blocs, while the current prevailing classes could be replaced or upgraded by another rising social force in the progress of the class-clash based history. Contrarily, realism is prone to imply the assertion that militaristic coercion is the stable source of domination and hegemony, the critical Gramscian account differs it from the sense that a proper hegemony can only be assured by the achieved consent of the lower social hierarchy of classes and nation state of state-society complexes: “hegemonic position relies mainly on consent rather than mere coercion. Dominant classes provide a social vision that supposedly is in the interests of all. This vision can be articulated and reflected in

²⁸⁷ Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory”, p. 150.

popular culture, education, literature, and political parties. If subordinate social groups buy into this vision, then the ruling classes will not have to rely on coercion to stay in power”.²⁸⁸

It has been argued that whether it is feasible to clarify the lines between the consent and coercion, but it could be also argued that the difference does clearly reveal itself in the degree of discourse and action but most prominently regarding the notion of legitimacy. Within this description, the concept of consent involves legitimacy or legitimate action. Whilst, in comparison, coercion is a far desperate or last but hard attempt when there is assumably a lack of consent on a legitimate basis. In other words, the generated legitimacy in screening discourse and action of dominant social element produces consent and its active consent seeking produces the legitimacy, for its stable hegemony. Coercion alone is deemed insufficient for the hegemonic stability. Therefore, this basis of consent production is the vital backbone of hierarchical World Hegemony which structured around social class relations of production. If a given actor or social group decides to not give his consent to be ruled, used or exploited, then the hegemonic receivers of the consent face with greater trouble pertaining to their social authority or function within the historical social struggle. The leaders may easily lose their financial back-up and political support if they alienate the capital holding groups via ignoring their prevailing class interests, could lose the popular votes if they also alienate the people and could cause an inter-state dispute if they do not take consent of the other national enterprise. When applied to the demilitarisation case, this approach reveals the huge problems of the actors have faced so far, particular in the part of Greece. The following leaderships in Athens and Ankara so far have not considered the issue as the problem of consent yet but instead actively seek the coercively imposition of their stance up to this date regardless of being the actually legitimate or not in legal terms. This only means instability regardless of their true political-economic-military convergent leadership objective is the establishment of hegemony in Aegean Region. Furthermore, this hard coercive stance was the deliberate choice of these mutual adversaries while they simply did not and still do not

²⁸⁸ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, “Economic Structuralism: Global Capitalism and Postcolonialism“, p. 111.

possess sufficient tools for a working imposition of their interpretation of military status of the islands. Despite being disadvantageous legal position due to the existing legal material regarding demilitarisation, Athens never once demanded from Turkey the remilitarisation of the islands in a demonstrated good faith unlike it once tried to accomplish only with NATO. It could once try to take the consent of Ankara based on Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for seeking legally legitimized ways of remilitarisation based on the legitimate general security concerns and even could consider inviting Turkey as its NATO partner for monitoring and participating in the remilitarisation as sort of exemplary building up confidence, which is a recognised way for the establishing mutual trust in the international law. As an example, the Turkish Greek rapprochement of 2000 after the earthquake diplomacy witnessed a potential for defense cooperation and the suggestion of de-escalation.²⁸⁹ 150 Turkish naval troopers and a squadron of F-16 aircraft landed in Greek soil during NATO's operation DYNAMIC MIX 2000. This was the first such deployment since 1974. Turkish ADM (Ret) Govan Erkaya, former Chief of Naval Operations and advisor to the Prime Minister, even suggested to his peers that the Turkish 4th Army to be pulled back.²⁹⁰ But despite these rare cases of potential cooperation and demonstration of good faith, the historic unilateral coercion and activity of Athens for pushing remilitarisation of the islands so far clearly resulted in an absolute lack of consent in Turkish party. Instead, Athens attempted to justify remilitarisation as discussed in previous chapters but nevertheless without consent seeking manner that grants Turkey with legitimate objection and throws Greece into a controversial position in the first place. This unilateral Greek attitude has also forced Ankara to attempt using a coercive language and adopting coercive stance. Furtherly, it has feedbacked Greek argumentation particularly pertaining to the Greek sovereignty and auxiliary claims on islands like EEZ, thanks to the utilisation of a deliberate Greek challenge to the demilitarised status-quo via instrumentally inserting a provoked Turkey in the discourse and perception as a valid threat on the legitimate Greek sovereignty and claims pertaining the islands. Under this issue headline, Athens has not yet attempted

²⁸⁹ Alexis Heraclides.” The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity”, p. 25.

²⁹⁰ Stephen Mann, “The Greek and Turkish Dispute in the Aegean Sea: Its Ramifications for NATO and the Prospects for Resolution”, p.71.

to bargain Ankara even Turkey could be a potential consent giver in order to modify legal status regarding the military regulations if a confidence building path followed which involves observation and even the common defense. Instead, Greece established and assured the tensions through its coercion regarding the demilitarisation issue to extract leverages for its assumed larger share-based hegemony on the Aegean Sea and also for seeking external support, but Athens simultaneously axed its own potential effort of establishing hegemony on the Aegean Sea due to the elaborated coercion-instability intensification dynamic of Neo-Gramscian account. As noted, the emphasis on the alleged threatening violation of Greek sovereignty fatherly reveals this provocative calculation. This is why Greek demand of this kind have never been proposed in the first place and seeking for Turkish consent for remilitarisation was never truly considered. Whilst, paradoxically at the initial glance, the assumed imperialistic hegemonic desires of the involving powers require the generation of friction in order to sustain the hegemonic order, which brings the US and European Influence on the general picture since Turkish-Greek friction serves the Americano-European Atlantic Order through keeping two regionally locked countries at that chained bay of problems. In addition to these, it is argued that the stability is actually vaguely and barely existent in an imperialistic context even through the consent exists, since the consent is also an omen of the imperialistic manipulation for the friction and therefore imperialist order making is considered systemically fragile and crises prone on the instability plagued international level, which in sum reflects the localization of the feature of crisis-leaned global capitalism and its constantly suppressed social struggles in the divided Aegean context. As the representatives of largest share of the global capitalism, the Western actors did not interfere the demilitarisation issue despite their intensive emphasis on compliance to the international law, observing how Greek violation drives Ankara and Athens into an unproductive loop in which neither produce their hegemony that may possibly harm the interests of expanding Americano-European imperial hegemony.

4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, it has been discovered that variety of approaches could be applied to the demilitarisation issue, not just legal and historical approaches of case coverage

which are dominating the literature but also approaches from the variety of disciplines, typically from the multi-disciplined inquires of IR for progressing the research on the subject issue in relation to the greater frame it stands and interacts. It provides not hard fact-based causalities but some resourceful insights as the potential candidates for taking the role of independent variables in order to fill the mind puzzle that constitutes the perception of the researcher on the subject.

CHAPTER 5

The Current Conjuncture of Demilitarisation: New Take on the Issue and Political Economic Factors

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discovers the most up to date developments under the light of the potentially related variables and parameters in a manner of the articulation of the information. It seeks to extract valuable insights to illuminate the current evolution of the subject matter in relation to the evolution of the surrounding geopolitical and economic landscape without losing the sight, for encouraging traditionally narrower approaches towards the subject to expand.

5.2. The Struggle Reimagined

5.2.1. The Escalation of 2020s: The NAVTEX Broadcasts and Exchange on the UN

The year 2020 witnessed the NAVTEX announcements from the Turkish side, indicating escalating tensions between the two countries regarding the issue of demilitarization. Cihat Yaycı mentions only the 15 September 2020 NAVTEX announcement about the demilitarized islands²⁹¹, but in fact Turkey has spread a variety of NAVTEX messages in specific times and for each individual or partial group of islands. Originally, the International Maritime Organization has designated NAVTEX as the primary means of transmitting urgent marine safety information to

²⁹¹ Yaycı and Paksüt, "Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi, p. 208.

ships worldwide.²⁹² TRT provides an expanded definition: “NAVTEX is a maritime communications system that allows ships to inform other vessels about their presence in an area, as well as other information”.²⁹³ According to Seafarer’s World Maritime Dictionary, NAVTEX is a “telegraphy system for transmission of maritime safety information, navigation and meteorological warnings and urgent information to ships”.²⁹⁴ It utilises Narrow-Band Direct Printing (N.B.D.P) as Automated Telegraphy. Turkey installed four NAVTEX Stations in respective order of Istanbul, Izmir, Samsun and Antalya in which the temporal but salient broadcasts from Izmir Station does matter for the subject issue. In the demilitarisation issue, it is apparent that NAVTEX became a vessel for announcing clear political stance and denouncing of the other on the behalf of its action which does not obey the international law and maintenance of good bilateral relations. For instance, even without mentioning the islands and demilitarisation issue, Izmir Station of Turkey issued a NAVTEX Warning under the tag of 0580 AEGEAN SEA, and it stresses on the frequent violations of international law by Greece:

Notice to all mariners. Greece has repeatedly endangered lives of the mariners in the Aegean Sea with practices contrary to international law. Therefore, NAVTEX number 20051/20 is still effective and valid. Turkish Navy and Coast Guard stand ready to protect life at Sea, safeguard the freedom of navigation and prevent any illegal activity of Greek Coast Guard at Sea. İzmir and Antalya NAVTEX stations will continue to promulgate NAVTEX messages for the sake of navigational safety. Caution advised.

As noted, the political and legal messaging through NAVTEX extended into the demilitarisation issue. Turkish Navy’s Office of Navigation, Hydrography and Oceanography (ONHO)²⁹⁵ has issued a NAVTEX claiming that the Greek islands of

²⁹² Navigation Center, “NAVTEX Maritime Safety Broadcasts”, United States Coast Guard U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/navtex-maritime-safety-broadcasts>

²⁹³ Trtworld, “What is a NAVTEX and why did Turkey issue one to Greece?” (2020), TRTWORLD, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [What is a NAVTEX and why did Turkey issue one to Greece? \(trtworld.com\)](https://www.trtworld.com/news/what-is-a-navtex-and-why-did-turkey-issue-one-to-greece/)

²⁹⁴ *The Seafarer’s Word a Maritime Dictionary* (Ranger Hope, 2007)

²⁹⁵ ONHO Website, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Office Of Navigation, Hydrography and Oceanography - 2020 \(shodb.gov.tr\)](https://www.shodb.gov.tr/)

Chios, Psara and Samos are violating the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The initial report by Turkey's Service of Navigation, Hydrographic and Oceanographic Research was released on 30 April, followed by a second report on 15 May. It has been alleged that the Greek islands are in violation of the demilitarised status stipulated by the 1923 Peace Treaty. In particular, Greece conducted military exercises in Samothrace on 4 May, in Lemnos on 6 and 20 May, and in the area west of Psara on 5 May.²⁹⁶ On Thursday night, Turkey issued a NAVTEX, in which it accused Greece of violating the treaty.²⁹⁷ In the September of the same year, Izmir Station broadcasts an NAVTEX announcing the demilitarised status of Chios has been breached:

15 September

“TURNHOS N / W: 1149/20

AEGEAN SEA

1. NAVTEX MESSAGE NUMBER LA08-206 / 20 IS VIOLATION OF DEMILITARIZED STATUS OF CHIOS ISLAND SET BY THE 1923 LAUSANNE PEACE TREATY.

2. CANCEL THIS MESSAGE 160001Z SEP 20.²⁹⁸

The Turkish NAVTEX is a counter-NAVTEX to the one issued by Greece, which announced the exercise of the Land Forces in the sea of Chios with live ammunition.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ Neos Kosmos, “Turkey issues NAVTEX for the demilitarisation of Chios, Psara and Samos”, 18.05.2020, Neos Kosmos The Hellenic Perspective since 1957, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Turkey issues NAVTEX for the demilitarisation of Chios, Psara and Samos - Neos Kosmos](#)

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Bianet, “Turkey issues new Navtex for Chios Island”, 15.09.2020, Bianet English, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://bianet.org/haber/turkey-issues-new-navtex-for-chios-island-230913>; Cumhuriyet, “Türkiye'den Sakız Adası için yeni NAVTEX: Yunanistan, Lozan'ı ihlal etti”, 15.09.2024, Cumhuriyet, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiyeden-sakiz-adasi-icin-yeni-navtex-yunanistan-lozani-ihlal-etti-1766157>; Keep Talking Greece, “Turkey demands demilitarization of Chios with a ...NAVTEX!”, 15.09.2020, Keep Talking Greece, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Turkey demands demilitarization of Chios with a ...NAVTEX! \(keeptalkinggreece.com\)](#); Ajans Haber, “Türkiye'den yeni NAVTEX ilanı”, 15.09.2020, Ajans Haber, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.ajanshaber.com.tr/turkiyeden-yeni-navtex-ilani-haber-460850>; Memurlar.net, “Türkiye yeni bir Navtex yayımladı ve 'Yunanistan, Lozan'ı ihlal ediyor' dedi”, 15.09.2020, Memurlar.net, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.memurlar.net/haber/926919/turkiye-yeni-bir-navtex-yayimladi-ve-yunanistan-lozan-i-ihlal-ediyor-dedi.html>; Star, “Türkiye, Ege Denizi'nde yeni NAVTEX ilanı yayımlandı”, 15.09.2020, Star, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.star.com.tr/guncel/turkiye-ege-denizinde-yeni-navtex-ilani-yayimlandi-haber-1572706/>

²⁹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Türkiye Chart, “12 Eylül - 20 Ekim 2020 tarihleri

It is followed by another NAVTEX which pinpointed the breach on Lemnos on 22 September 2020.³⁰⁰ On 10 November 2020, Turkey issued two additional NAVTEX, announcing the violation of the demilitarised status of four Greek islands: Samothrace, Lemnos, Chios, and Samos. The Greek media and state interpreted these as provocative demands from Turkey with the intention of demilitarising Greek soil and coercing the departure of Greek forces. The two NAVTEX from the Smyrna (Izmir) naval station are as follows:

TURNHOS N/W : 1398/20 (İzmir NAVTEX Station) (Published Date: 10-11-2020 19:24)
TURNHOS N/W : 1398/20
AEGEAN SEA
1. NAVTEX MESSAGE NUMBER LA41-236/20 IS A VIOLATION OF DEMILITARIZED STATUS OF SEMOTHRACE AND LEMNOS (LIMNOS) ISLANDS SET BY THE 1923 LAUSANNE PEACE TREATY.
2. ADDITIONALLY, SOME PART OF THE AREA MENTIONED IN LA41-236/20 OVERLAPS WITH İZMİR TURK RADIO NAVTEX NR. IA11-0032/20 MESSAGE.
3. CANCEL THIS MESSAGE 111100Z NOV 20.

TURNHOS N/W: 1397/20 (İzmir NAVTEX Station) (Published Date: 10-11-2020 19:24)
TURNHOS N/W : 1397/20
AEGEAN SEA
1. NAVTEX MESSAGE NUMBERS LA42-237/20 AND HA67-673/20 ARE THE VIOLATION OF DEMILITARIZED STATUS OF CHIOS AND SAMOS ISLANDS SET BY THE 1923 LAUSANNE PEACE TREATY.
2. CANCEL THIS MESSAGE 111100Z NOV 20.³⁰¹

arasında Yunanistan'ın gerginliği artırıcı eylemleri (Güncel Versiyon)" (2020), Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Yunanistan-in-12-Eylul-2020-tarihinden-itibaren-Dogu-Akdeniz-ve-Ege-Denizi-nde-Gerginligi-Artirici-Adimlari.pdf \(mfa.gov.tr\)](#)

³⁰⁰ Duvar, "Türkiye'den Lozan atıflı ikinci Navtex", 27.09.2020, Gazete Duvar, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Türkiye'den Lozan atıflı ikinci Navtex \(gazeteduvar.com.tr\)](#); Paul Antonopoulos, "Turkey announces new illegal NAVTEX around the Greek island of Lemnos", 23.09.2020, Greek City Times, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Turkey Announces New Illegal NAVTEX Around The Greek Island Of Lemnos \(greekcitytimes.com\)](#)

³⁰¹ Newsroom, "Provocative Turkish Navtex demand demilitarisation of 4 Greek islands", 10.11.2020, Protothema, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Provocative Turkish Navtex demand demilitarisation of 4 Greek islands - ProtoThema English](#)

Following these mutual military exercises and the NAVTEX escalation on the issue, the letter-writing debate on demilitarization at the UN level began in the summer of 2021 and lasted until May 2022, including four official letters to the UN General Secretariat, which were in fact argumentative debates between the parties involved. These diplomatic texts were simultaneously addressed the general secretary for the issue resolution and summarised both Turkish and Greek points on an official diplomatic scheme.³⁰² It can be argued that these letters triggered further comments on the issue especially in Turkish side. It provides some valuable insights regarding the official Turkish stance, discourse and monitoring of the subject matter which are in relation to the Greek counter accusations and justifications for the initially apparent violation of international law. Furthermore, these comments stay in line and consistent with the discovered legal textual base so far as a positive point for Turkish side and highlights the clear-cut validity of Turkish legal position pertaining the demilitarised status based on treaties. On discourse wise, the implicitly referenced The Six State Decision which is based on Treaties of London and Athens lies within the Lausanne Treaty on Turkish comments (The Article 12). This two-treaty legged decision within the Lausanne Peace Treaty confirms the Turkish position regarding the linkage between Greek possession and demilitarisation on the islands, since it also confirms the secession of the islands from Turkey to Greece after the first Balkan Wars. On 27 May 2022, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu's states that "Greece's violation of the status of the islands given to it as a condition within the framework of the 1923 Lausanne and 1947 Paris Treaty of Peace is against international law. Greece has armed the islands since 1960, and the Turkish Governments have opposed this situation since then."³⁰³ As displayed in the previous chapters, Çavuşoğlu stressed on the mainstream Turkish argument that the islands were transferred to Greece under the condition of non-military status and that the violation of the status would eliminate the condition of transfer of sovereignty. Before that instance, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu also made the following statement on 11 February 2022 "Lausanne and other international treaties stipulate that the islands in the Aegean should be demilitarised. However, Athens has piled heavy weapons on these islands. Ankara has

³⁰² See, The Chapter 2.

³⁰³ Yayıncı and Paksüt, "Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi", p. 230, p. 231.

repeatedly warned, but the lawlessness has not stopped.” He then pointed out that the Athens administration violated the condition of demilitarisation of the islands in the Aegean despite warnings and, repeated the same challenging but also assuring Turkish argument, "If Greece does not give up, the sovereignty of these islands will be questioned."³⁰⁴ On the same date, when asked whether Turkey would open a discussion on the sovereignty of the islands if there was no response from the UN to Turkey's letter and if Greece continued to violate, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu said, ‘Of course we will. There are parties to these treaties. The Treaty of Lausanne, the Paris Peace Treaty... We will of course initiate this discussion on the international platform". He underlined Turkey's legal and diplomatic measures once more. Through underlining the Treaties of Lausanne and Paris, Foreign Minister Cavuşoğlu said: “The Treaty of Lausanne and other international agreements stipulate that the islands in the Sea of Islands must be unarmed. The treaties stipulate that a gendarmerie unit should be kept on the islands only for the purpose of public order. However, Greece has been arming the islands in the Sea of Islands, especially Limni and Samothrace, since 1960. Most of the 23 islands in the Sea of Islands have been turned into pontificated armouries by Greece. Even airports were built on the islands of Limni, Lesbos, Istandoy and Rhodes for jet operations against Turkey. Fighter jets were deployed there. Turkey sent a note and stated that it wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. However, the Athens administration deployed troops at the level of one division each in Lesbos and Rhodes Islands and one brigade each in Chios, Samos and Kos Islands. There are six land bases, two naval bases and two Greek helicopter bases on the islands. A battalion of troops is deployed at the land base on Koyun Island.”³⁰⁵ These remarks and references of Cavuşoğlu correspond to the existent legal base and its historical acts. They indicate clear cut violations according to the noted international legislature which limits the arms and equipment including air force and naval capabilities with only allowing police and gander marine force on the islands. Also, Çavuşoğlu's summary of the Greek deployment shows the Turkish threat perception regarding the militarized islands and also indicates the Turkish intelligence gathering

³⁰⁴ Merve Aydoğan, “Turkiye calls on Greece to demilitarise Eastern Aegean Islands”, 10.02.2022, Anadolu Agency, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Turkiye calls on Greece to demilitarize Eastern Aegean islands \(aa.com.tr\)](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/10022022-turkiye-calls-on-greece-to-demilitarize-eastern-aegean-islands)

³⁰⁵ Yaycı and Paksüt, p. 231.

capability on the islands to build or confirm this threat perception. Whilst these statements were received as the provocations and groundless claims by the Greek media and government which in turn utilise them as the further justifications for the disputed militarisation.

Despite the cool down of Turkish-Greek relations between Summer 2023 to the early 2024, tensions once again have arisen in the Aegean Sea at the first quarter of 2024. Turkey has announced upcoming military exercises as a response to Greece's "TRIAINA" Exercise in Northeastern Aegean and has reasserted its legal claim regarding the demilitarisation of pertaining Greek islands. On 14 February 2024, Turkey issued a NAVTEX announcing large-scale air exercises covering a significant portion of the Aegean Sea.³⁰⁶ According to the Greek media, the designated area extends from the island of Samos to Andros and Tinos, has prompted concerns on Greek side due to its size and proximity to Greek territory. In a separate NAVTEX, Turkey reiterated its long-standing claim that several Greek islands, including Chios, Limnos, Samos, and Rhodes, should be demilitarised in accordance with historical treaties. This NAVTEX of February 2024 demonstrates greater amount of direct address to the demilitarised Greek islands among the so far noted all NAVTEX's despite the bilateral relations are supposed to have been mitigated and to be reset by the respective governments of two countries with the Declaration of Athens.³⁰⁷ Turkey released another NAVTEX on 9th of July 2024 that repeats the NAVTEX of February.³⁰⁸ These developments display a sharp contrast with the recent efforts to improve relations between the two states, which has led to apprehensions about its potential impact on recently improved bilateral dialogue under the frame of Athens

³⁰⁶ Bill Kouras, "Turkey Conducts Exercises, Claims Demilitarisation of Greek Islands", 14.02.2024, Greek City Times, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://greekcitytimes.com/2024/02/14/turkey-conducts-exercises-claims-demilitarisation-of-greek-islands/>

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ ONHO, "Navigational Warnings Cumulative List" (2024), Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Office Of Navigation, Hydrography and Oceanography - All Stations \(shodb.gov.tr\)](https://shodb.gov.tr/Navigation/Hydrography-and-Oceanography-All-Stations) ; ONHO, "TURNHOS N/W : 0645/24", 09.07.2024, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Office Of Navigation, Hydrography and Oceanography - TURNHOS N/W : 0645/24 \(shodb.gov.tr\)](https://shodb.gov.tr/Navigation/Hydrography-and-Oceanography-TURNHOS-N-W-0645-24)

Declaration. The emergent demilitarisation issue also corresponded the maritime park issue between Turkey and Greece which escalated in April 2024.³⁰⁹ Whilst as the thesis have argued so far, the further expansion of the analytical viewpoint beyond bilateral interactions and legal disputes is required. As the literature is prone to dismiss or exclude, the problem is a source of exploitation for the outsider interference for the geopolitical and even economic benefits. The following subchapters attempt to construct a greater picture in which the demilitarisation is argued to play a role in a more general framework in the world of geopolitics and political economy.

5.2.2. The Current Geopolitical Scheme and the US Factor Reimagined

The US is considered as a redeemer actor between the tensions Turkey and Greece. Meanwhile, the US politicians have cared the integrity and functionality of NATO within the gravity of American interests, it could be argued otherwise with the correct evidence and assessments of the US actions in the respective region, especially in relation to the NAVTEX and UN Letter Exchange Tensions in Turkish-Greek Relations. Furthermore, the demilitarisation regime is also widely regarded as a pure bilateral and legal issue between Turkey and Greece with the reluctance of outsider interferences, the US-sourced parameters are usually precluded out of the evaluations on the subject matter. As it was discovered in the previous chapters, the demilitarisation issue could be articulated as a far more complex subject involving the great powers' role and geopolitical interests.³¹⁰ This design of law by the great powers was even instrumentalized by them in accordance to their threat perceptions and maritimately interests, particularly as seen in the British desire of assuring the free passage on the Straits especially for the Royal Navy and contrastingly as seen in the imperial Russian and German desire to weaken rising Greece on the Aegean Sea in order to balance this British proxy in relation to the Turks, all under the disguise of

³⁰⁹ The Maritime Executive, "Turkey Disagrees with Greece's Marine Park Plans in the Aegean Sea", 11.04.2024, The Maritime Executive, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Turkey Disagrees with Greece's Marine Park Plans in the Aegean Sea \(maritime-executive.com\)](https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/turkey-disagrees-with-greece-s-marine-park-plans-in-the-aegean-sea); Nektaria Stamouli, "Turkey-Greece tensions flare (again) over marine park plans", 10.04.2024, Politico, Accessed on 10.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Turkey-Greece tensions flare \(again\) over marine park plans – POLITICO](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/10/turkey-greece-tensions-flare-marine-park-plans/)

³¹⁰ See: The Chapter 3 and The Chapter 4

prioritization of Turkish security *vis-à-vis* Greece on the archipelago type Aegean region. This trend was continued during the Lausanne Conference, and it resulted in the outcome of the confirmation and wider clarification of the demilitarisation order which firstly underlined by the Six State Decision. For the British, the demilitarised status of the islands was understood as the necessity for securing passages on Straits as this interest presents in Sevres and Inonu's own commentaries about the British objectives and also once a way for not alienating the Russian Empire when London contests with a rising Germany in the fatally failing power balance system of Europe. The Russian Empire was eager to take side of the Ottoman Stance regarding the status of the islands but slowly dragged into the pro-Greek line of the British and French against Germany but the government of Tsar envisioned that the demilitarisation could be proposed as a resourceful consensus to make a compromise in terms of the sovereignty status and of the islands without making Greece too much powerful *vis-à-vis* the Ottomans, even against the Russian Navy and common capital stock based Russian Trade Troupe. Whilst, Austrian-Hungarian Empire had a share on the Aegean Sea particularly in relation to Chios and Italy was established itself on the Southern Flank of the Aegean Sea with the occupation of Dodecanese islands, which neither prefer a powerful Greece on the Northern Flank guided by the British. Most of these interests, especially regarding the British and Italian objectives were still standing on the Lausanne Conference as well. Both the Ottomans and The Republican Turkey tried to extract these apprehensions and strategic ambitions as an opportunity to get back or at least to demilitarise the islands if they could not reverse the secession of islands to Greece for securing the coastline Anatolia's safety and a tangible balancing element on the Aegean Sea. Turkey therefore succeeds in its demand of demilitarisation status by the conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. However, since, the history of demilitarisation had evolved into an issue between Greece and Turkey due to Greek remilitarisation with the historical development and series of crisis events, it become a magnet subject for the exploitation of the outsider interference to extract geopolitical utility again. In this current time frame, the US plays a pivotal role of shaping Aegean dynamics in the form of outsider interference and its role is aggravating the tensions between Greece and Turkey under the thick curtain of cooperation, to cement its current enhanced position in Greece pertaining both Russia and Turkey.

On 5 October 2019, Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State of the Trump Administration,

and Nikolaos Dendias, Foreign Minister of the Mitsotakis Government, met in Athens to sign the first protocol of amendment to the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA).³¹¹ This protocol came into force on 13 February 2020, following the ratification of the revised and updated version of the 1990 agreement by the Greek Parliament on 30 January 2020. The events were already unfolding with considerable promise for Greece in terms of advancing its own strategic agenda. In the meeting, both Pompeo and Dendias expressed their disapproval of Turkish drilling activities in the East Med, characterizing them as "illegal".³¹² However, this promising beginning would not end well for Athens when the US withdrew its diplomatic support from the Greek-advocated East Med Pipeline Project on the grounds of inefficiency in January.³¹³ Despite the apparent common condemnation of Turkish unilateralism and the promotion of Greek claimed rights, this represented a shift in American policy that was always likely to be met with distrust by both Greeks and Turks. The initial revision of the MDCA permits the United States to maintain and operate all military bases of the Greek Army, despite the specified reservations and prioritizations of Larissa, Stefanokivio, the Souda Air Base, and Alexandroupolis Port. I) Larissa Air Base II) Stefanovikio Army Aviation Base (Stefanovikio Airport) III) Other Hellenic Armed Forces installations, as mutually agreed by the Parties or their designated representatives, in accordance with their respective internal procedures. The most noteworthy and attention-grabbing example within this protocol amendment of the MDCA is the utilisation of the port of Alexandroupolis, which will be discussed in this paper. In accordance with the revised MDCA, Washington is granted priority status

³¹¹Protocol Of Amendment To The Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of The Hellenic Republic, *Treaties And Other International Acts Series 20-213* (2019), Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [20-213-Greece-Defense-TIMS-62163.pdf \(state.gov\)](#)

US Embassy, "U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo participates in a signing ceremony of the U.S.-Greece Mutual Defense Agreement with Greek Foreign Minister Nikolaos Dendias in Athens, Greece, on October 5, 2019.", 05.10.2019, US Embassy and Consulate in Greece, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Secretary Michael R. Pompeo and Greek Foreign Minister Nikolaos Dendias - U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Greece \(usembassy.gov\)](#)

³¹³ Sarantis Michalopoulos, "Greece fumes as Washington loses interest in EastMed gas pipeline", 19.01.2022, Euractiv, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/greece-fumes-as-washington-loses-interest-in-eastmed-gas-pipeline/>

(unimpeded use and access) to Alexandroupolis.³¹⁴ This implies that the port, located in Evros, Western Thrace, next to the Turkish border, is to be used without hindrance. It is a strategic transition and logistics point lying between the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe and Europe and Asia. It should be noted that Alexandroupolis is not officially recognised as a military base. However, it has become a vital logistics and military equipment station center under the Atlantic Resolve Operation. This has involved welcoming a significant amount of equipment and US army task groups, with the intention of allocating them in Eastern European NATO countries such as Bulgaria and Romania. Despite the presence of US military bases in Turkey, which are subject to certain restrictions, the country's response to this development has been negative. However, it is important to note that there is a discrepancy between the Turkish public and media perception of the issue and the official stance of the government. Some sources in Turkish media have argued that this military build-up in Alexandroupolis is in contradiction with the Lausanne Treaty. However, apparently this is not the case, as the Lausanne did not cover the military status of Alexandroupolis, and the 30-kilometre depth demilitarisation agreement regarding Thracian borders effectively ended in 1936. Furthermore, the Turkish government has stated that the ongoing US-Greek initiative has the potential to violate both the London (as noted Article 5) and Lausanne Treaties (Article 12, 13) due to its proximity to the non-militarised zone of the islands.³¹⁵ Indeed, while Athens has been conducting military exercises based on its own arguments over recent years, the Turkish concern regarding Alexandroupolis is clearly verified by the fact that the port of Alexandroupolis is beginning to host American-made military equipment donated to the Greek Military with the intention of distributing it among the Eastern Aegean Islands of Lesbos and Samos. The transfer of American-made military equipment to the ports of Midilli and Samos provides a clear example of the United States' involvement in a provocative act that has the potential to further exacerbate tensions in Greek-Turkish relations.³¹⁶ As previously

³¹⁴ Protocol Of Amendment to The Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of The Hellenic Republic

³¹⁵ The Appendices and Chapter 2

³¹⁶ Emre Karaca and Burak Bir, "Türkiye protests unlawful deployment of armored vehicles on Aegean islands", 26.09.2022, Anadolu Agency, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Türkiye protests unlawful deployment of armored vehicles on Aegean islands \(aa.com.tr\)](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/2022/09/26-turkiye-protests-unlawful-deployment-of-armored-vehicles-on-aegean-islands)

analysed, these islands are covered Lausanne demilitarisation regulations, respectively in the Articles 12 and 13 of the Treaty. However, the militarization of these islands only serves to reinforce the Greek stance in a Turkish response, which in turn would only deliberately exacerbate the Turkish-Greek dilemma in the Aegean through the US involvement.

The recent incident of militarisation was revealed by the use of Turkish-made drones and the photographs of the US-donated equipment taken by the drones were distributed by Turkish military officials to state-owned media channels and later spread to the international mainstream media in late September of 2022.³¹⁷ In February 2022 and again in June 2022, Erdogan issued a warning to Greece regarding the armament of Aegean islands by Greece. He called for a halt to this process in a threatening manner. It has been interpreted as a provocation on the part of an aggressor. Furthermore, Turkey has been accused of conducting spying activities and violating a significant number of airspace regulations, as well as undertaking a number of illegal sorties in the Aegean. Meanwhile, Erdogan denounces the Greek-US military cooperation as "the occupation-looking military build-up which should disturb Greek people" and not Turkey.³¹⁸ In response, Greece's PM Mitsotakis asserts imperial desires and a bullying attitude towards the Turkish side, without explicitly referencing Turkey.³¹⁹ Turkey has simultaneously continued to violate the airspace of the region which Greece unilaterally expands, while also demanding the de-militarisation of 16 of the 23 islands in the Eastern Aegean. In a further development concerning the drone footage incident of 25 September, the Turkish government summoned the Greek ambassador and sent

³¹⁷ Sarp Özer, "Footage shows Greece's unlawful deployment of armored vehicles on Aegean islands", 25.09.2022, Anadolu Agency, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Footage shows Greece's unlawful deployment of armored vehicles on Aegean islands \(aa.com.tr\)](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkiye-denounces-foreign-military-buildups-in-greece/2695225)

³¹⁸ Diyar Güldoğan, "Türkiye denounces foreign military buildups in Greece", 26.09.2022, Anadolu Agency, 26.09.2022, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkiye-denounces-foreign-military-buildups-in-greece/2695225>

³¹⁹ Euronews, "Tensions after Turkey accuses Greece of militarising Aegean islands", 29.09.2022, Euronews., Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.euronews.com/2022/09/29/tensions-after-turkey-accuses-greece-of-militarising-aegean-islands>

a protesting note to the US Embassy in Ankara.³²⁰ This was in relation to the militarisation of the Eastern Aegean Islands through Alexandroupolis and the supply of US-made weapons to zones that were supposed to be demilitarised. The note called for the necessary measures to be taken. The dispute between the two countries has been escalating since the ratification of the first amendment at the beginning of 2020. This was followed by a series of military exercises, including the Greek-US joint land drills in Pieria, Litochoro, and Mount Olympus in February 2020. In Western Thrace, Xanthi (İskeçe) and Petrochori (Kayalar Köyü) were the sites of Greek military exercises in September 2020. In October of that same year, similar exercises were conducted in Chios (Sakız) and Lemnos (Limni).³²¹ A joint US-Greek naval drill in the Aegean took place in November 2021. In response, in addition to the aforementioned exercises, there were further Turkish military exercises in June 2022, as well as a joint drill between the Greek and US militaries, which was conducted under the name "Olympic Cooperation-22" and took place in Western Thrace, Xanthi, and Petrochori in October 2022. Furthermore, there were triple drills involving the Greek, American, and French militaries in Crete in November 2022.

The escalation of Greek-Turkish tensions through the military exercises and by supporting the militarisation of the supposedly non-militarised zone for the Turkish party in the Eastern Aegean (as the drone footage incident of September 2022 shows), the persuasion of Greece through the seeming promotion of Greek theses in the Aegean against Ankara, proves beneficial for the US party to expand and better clarify the strategic access to Greece. By exploiting Turkish-Greek issues and dragging Greece to its strategic line, the US could capitalise on the realisation of its grand strategy regarding the control over the sub-regional system of Aegean Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean region in relation to the Balkans and antagonist Russian Federation. These developments followed by the Biden administration's achievement of securing another protocol and revision of the MDCA between Greece and US on 14 October 2021 after the Trump Administration did secure first protocol in 2019, when Secretary

³²⁰ Emre Karaca and Burak Bir, "Türkiye protests unlawful deployment of armored vehicles on Aegean islands", 26.09.2022, Anadolu Agency, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Türkiye protests unlawful deployment of armored vehicles on Aegean islands \(aa.com.tr\)](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/2022/09/26/turkiye-protests-unlawful-deployment-of-armored-vehicles-on-aegean-islands)

³²¹ See, The Chapter 5, The Escalation of 2020s: The NAVTEX Broadcasts and Exchange on the UN

of State Anthony Blinken and Greek FM Nikolaos Dendias met in Washington DC and signed the second amendment.³²² The second protocol of amendment to the 1990 MDCA concludes a 5-year duration for the new agreement from the date of its entry into force (24 May 2022) and, as foreseen in the 2019 revision of the MDCA between the Trump administration and the Mitsotakis government, it unveils and openly grants the US access to four additional bases: "Camp Georgoulas (Volos), Litochoro Range (Pieria, Mount Olympus), Souda Naval Base (Crete) and Camp Giannoulis (Alexandroupolis)".³²³

What is critical that with the deepening of Greek American defense relations concerning Turkish-Greek Tensions on the Aegean Sea, the economic footprint of the US through Greece followed up. The US - stationed Alexandroupolis is not only become a source for arming the demilitarised islands, but it also become an LNG import, stockpile, and transportation hub.³²⁴ Greek LNG imports increase is measured among the world highest (12th) on an international list that consists of 45 registered countries with the greatest LNG increases between January and October 2022, in which the Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) stands for the greater potential of LNG imports, as once the full storages of port which under the construction completed. The Alexandroupolis FSRU promises to carry a regasification capacity of 4 million tons and a storage capacity of 153,500 cubic meters, figures making it Europe's fourth biggest FSRU.³²⁵ Whilst the US turned out

³²² Second Protocol Of Amendment To The Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of The Hellenic Republic, *Treaties And Other International Acts Series 22-524* (2021), Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/22-524-Greece-Defense-MDCA-Second-Protocol-of-Amendment-TIMS-62950.pdf>

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ David Glass, "Port of Alexandroupoli eyed as LNG hub", 29.09.2022, Seatrade Maritime News, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Port of Alexandroupoli eyed as LNG hub \(seatrade-maritime.com\)](https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/port-of-alexandroupoli-eyed-as-lng-hub)

³²⁵ Energypress, "Greek LNG imports increase ranked among world's highest", 30.11.2022, Energypress Greek Energy News Portal, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://energypress.eu/greek-lng-import-increase-ranked-among-worlds-highest/>

to be the world's largest LNG exporter by 2022 via surpassing Qatar and Australia.³²⁶ The US kept its position of the largest LNG throughout 2023 and it even added on. US LNG exports increased in the first half of 2023, following the return to service of Freeport LNG in February and the subsequent ramp-up to full production by April. The relatively strong demand for LNG in Europe, coupled with the high international natural gas prices, supported the increased US LNG exports during the year. U.S. LNG exports set monthly records late last year, with 12.9 billion cubic in November and 13.6 billion cubic in December. It is estimated that the utilisation of US LNG export capacity averaged 104% of nominal capacity and 86% of peak capacity across the seven US LNG terminals that were operational in 2023. The LNG imports of Greece were doubled in 2022³²⁷ with the US being the largest LNG importer in Greece with 45.57% share³²⁸ but Greek LNG imports were dropped in 2023.³²⁹ However, the US remained the largest LNG supplier to Greece with a 37.69 percent share of all its LNG imports in 2023. Furthermore, Greece's first FSRU with the capacity of 153,600-cbm (named *Alexandroupolis*) arrived in Alexandroupolis by the end of 2023 with LNG firm Gastrade's initiative and commissioned in January 2024.³³⁰ The initial FSRU is

³²⁶ Theodore Reed-Martin, "EIA: The US the world's largest LNG exporter in 2023", 03.04.2024, LNG Industry, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.lngindustry.com/liquid-natural-gas/03042024/eia-the-us-the-worlds-largest-lng-exporter-in-2023/>

³²⁷ Newsroom, "Greece doubled US LNG imports in the first half of 2022", 20.07.2022, Ceenergy News, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://ceenergynews.com/oil-gas/greece-doubled-us-lng-imports-in-the-first-half-of-2022/>

³²⁸ Shipnerd News, "Greek LNG imports boosted by US supplies in Q1", 14.04.2022, Shipnerd, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://shipnerdnews.com/greek-lng-imports-boosted-by-us-supplies-in-q1/>; Hellenic News of America, "GREECE – LNG imports up sharply in January-June", 14.07.2022, Hellenic News of America, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, https://hellenicnews.com/greece-lng-imports-up-sharply-in-january-june/#google_vignette

³²⁹ LNG Prime Staff, "Greek LNG imports drop in 2023", 17.01.2024, LNG Prime, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://lngprime.com/lng-terminals/greek-lng-imports-drop-in-2023/102485/>; Newsroom, "Greece doubled US LNG imports in the first half of 2022", 20.07.2022, Ceenergy News, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://ceenergynews.com/oil-gas/greece-doubled-us-lng-imports-in-the-first-half-of-2022/>

³³⁰ LNG Prime Staff, "Greece's first FSRU arrives in Alexandroupolis", 17.12.2023, LNG Prime, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://lngprime.com/europe/greeces-first-fsru-arrives-in-alexandroupolis/100296/>; LNG Prime Staff, "Greece's first FSRU to receive commissioning LNG cargo on January 20", 04.01.2024, LNG Prime, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version <https://lngprime.com/europe/greeces-first-fsru-to-receive-commissioning-lng-cargo-on-january-20/101367/>

situated in the Aegean Sea, approximately 17.6 km southwest of the port of Alexandroupolis and 10 km from the nearest coastline at Makri. Additionally, the FSRU will be connected to a high-pressure subsea and onshore gas transmission pipeline. According to Gastrade, upon completion of the pipeline, natural gas will be transported to the Greek transmission system and subsequently distributed to final consumers in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, Ukraine, Hungary, and Slovakia. The Alexandroupolis LNG terminal is planned to have a capacity of 5.5 billion cubic metres. Gastrade is also planning to install the second offshore RFSU Alexandroupolis. Within the context of Greek American MDCA's, Gastrade and its trans-nationalised partners in LNG industry from Balkans (Copelouzou, DESFA, DEPA, Bulgartransgaz, and GasLog) run their operations under the military shield and promotion of the globally first ranking LNG supplier, the US. Meantime, the US-Greek defense cooperation and the US deployment moving in line with the US LNG operations via Alexandroupolis is elevated through Greek-Turkish tensions over the issue of demilitarised islands as demonstrated.

This case analysis of the contrasting relation between demilitarised islands and militarising Alexandroupolis illustrates that the issue of demilitarised islands in the context of Turkish-Greek tensions in the Aegean Sea still could be a strategically exploitable asset for extracting and enhancing military and economic benefits by external factors, such as the US by the wisdom of indicators and sources. However, the existing literature tends to intensively focus on the legal and historical dimensions of the issue and trying to understand normative stances, rather than considering the potential strategic value extraction of the third-party involvement from the existing issues and why it reaches beyond a mere bilateral issue between Turkey and Greece.³³¹ Also, with some notable exceptions, it receives the involvement of US and NATO to Turkish Greek dynamics in a positive light but with this type of evidence, it could be argued it is a mere bias and disregards the possibility of strategic calculations hiding deliberate intentions.

³³¹ See, The Chapter 2

Contrast to the general historic picture, the recent positive developments of Turkish-Greek relations in 2023 indicate that seeking consent and dialogue have always been feasible probabilities at least on the discourse but also a possible indication that a neo-Gramscian approach can account for why and how the conditions are rendered in that noted matter due to dynamism of the evolving social framework. After a long period of struggling on the context of Aegean and islands, with the upcoming year of 2023, the Greek-Turkish relations began the cool down. The humanitarian Seismic Diplomacy pertaining to Turkey-Syria Earthquakes in February made an alleviating impact on the negative images on the minds, just it did in 1999 Earthquakes of Izmit and Athens. Later on, two leaders of respective countries, Erdogan and Mitsotakis agreed on having an unofficial talk in NATO Summit of Vilnius, dated 12 July 2023, which was credit for its positive atmosphere.³³² In the meeting, Mitsotakis and Erdogan agreed on that their problems have not been magically resolved but today's meeting confirmed their intention to reset Greek Turkish relations. They later met in New York on 20 September as the step of the intended rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, in a trio meeting setting which included Netanyahu of Israel as well for the reinforcing a more comprehensive rapprochement among parties.³³³ The last but not least with the release of bilateral Declaration between the governments of Erdoğan and Mitsotakis on 7 December 2023, the reset of Turkish-Greece is officially

³³² AP News, "NATO members Greece and Turkey pledge to 'reset' ties and bypass longstanding disputes", 12.07.2023, AP ,Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [NATO members Greece and Turkey pledge to 'reset' ties and bypass longstanding disputes | AP News](#); Athens Bureau, "NATO Summit: Mitsotakis and Erdogan meet on the sideline – it lasted almost an hour", 12.07.2023, Greek City Times, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [NATO Summit: Mitsotakis And Erdogan Meet On The Sideline - It Lasted Almost An Hour \(greekcitytimes.com\)](#); Daily Sabah, "Erdoğan, Mitsotakis seek fresh start at NATO summit", 12.07.2023, Daily Sabah, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Erdoğan, Mitsotakis seek fresh start at NATO summit | Daily Sabah](#)

³³³ Athens Bureau, "Mitsotakis and Erdoğan meeting in New York has ended – It lasted an hour, see video and photos", 21.09.2023, Greek City Times, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Mitsotakis And Erdoğan Meeting In New York Has Ended - It Lasted An Hour, See Video And Photos \(greekcitytimes.com\)](#) ; Burhanettin Duran, "Erdoğan's Netanyahu, Mitsotakis meetings: New stage at normalization", 24.09.2023, Daily Sabah, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Erdoğan's Netanyahu, Mitsotakis meetings: New stage at normalization | Column \(dailysabah.com\)](#) ProtoThema, "Mitsotakis & Erdogan meeting has ended – A step up from Vilnius, but The Hague is further away (Upd.)", 20.09.2023, ProtoThema, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Mitsotakis & Erdogan meeting has ended - A step up from Vilnius, but The Hague is further away \(Upd.\) - ProtoThema English](#)

documented.³³⁴ However, the same leaders were in charge when tense warnings on 2019 and mutually accusatory UN Diplomacy on 2021-2022 regarding the military status of the islands were taken place. Erdogan vowed that he would not personally recognise and never ever meet Mitsotakis³³⁵ when the Greek PM gave a speech to the US Congress on 17 May 2022 in an opposing manner that going against the F-16 sale to Turkey, reinforcing negative Congress MP feelings behind the veto on Turkish F-16 deal.³³⁶ Moreover, going back to the more distant history demonstrates a contrast with this current picture as well. The issue of demilitarisation is apparently solved or thrown under the carpet like the other issues of the Aegean dispute, while contrarily burning in the even very recent past memory. In that regard, why it was still an issue then in 2000's and 2010's after the long time passed over on the hardest days of Cyprus Crisis? Could the dispute not be solvable or mutually checkable beforehand? The answer is lying in all related hegemonical forces and parties of concern pertaining to this issue. The 2023 rehabilitation of Greek-Turkish relations is a result of many calling factors which a neo-Gramscian reading can accounts for. Since from the Turkish removal from F-35 programme due to the Russian S-400 purchase, Erdogan struggles with finding modern arsenal and upgrades for the aging Turkish Air Force. In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials announced that they have requested to purchase 40 new generation F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 older generation F-16s from the fleet of Turkish Air Force. The Biden Administration promised that the deal of modernized F-16 Fighting Falcons would be realised but the Congressional notification was required as the constitution of the US forbids arms sale without the legislative notification. A group of senators and the Democrat Chairman

³³⁴ Tasos Kokkinidis, "Full Text of the Friendship Declaration Between Greece, Turkey", 07.12.2023, Greek Reporter, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Full Text of the Friendship Declaration Between Greece, Turkey \(greekreporter.com\)](https://greekreporter.com/full-text-of-the-friendship-declaration-between-greece-turkey/)

³³⁵ ABC Gazetesi, "Kabine sonrası Erdoğan'dan açıklama: Miçotakis ile asla görüşmem / Uzaya bir Türk göndereceğiz", 23.05.2022, ABC, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Kabine sonrası Erdoğan'dan açıklama: Miçotakis ile asla görüşmem / Uzaya bir Türk göndereceğiz \(abcgazetesi.com\)](https://abcgazetesi.com/kabine-sonrasi-erdogan-dan-aciklama-micotakis-ile-asla-gorusmem-uzaya-bir-turk-gonderecegiz/); Yeniçağ, "Erdoğan 'benim için bitmiştir' dediği Miçotakis ile görüşmeye gitti", 07.12.2023, Yeniçağ, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Erdoğan 'benim için bitmiştir' dediği Miçotakis ile görüşmeye gitti \(yenicaggazetesi.com.tr\)](https://yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/erdogan-benim-icin-bitmistir-dedigimi-micotakis-ile-gorusmeye-gitti/)

³³⁶ Laura Kelly, "Greek leader warns Congress against weapons sales to Turkey", 17.05.2022, The Hill, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Greek leader warns Congress against weapons sales to Turkey \(thehill.com\)](https://thehill.com/policy/international/118444-greek-leader-warns-congress-against-weapons-sales-to-turkey/)

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Menendez did not give their consent for Turkish F-16 deal on the grounds alleged belligerency of Turkey towards Greece:

Shortly after the reported informal notifications, the New York Times cited Chairman Menendez as welcoming the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey, saying: President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behaviour in Turkey and against neighbouring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.³³⁷

As the top-level senator leading the congressional wing of the US Foreign Affairs, Bob Menendez was known for his close ties with Greek and Armenian lobbies, therefore the American-Greek business enterprise. A local Greek newspaper refers him simply as “Our Guy”. He holds a very positive image on the media wing of Society of Hellenism and Philhellenism. He is a senator from the electoral district of New Jersey, a place known for hosting many well-organized diasporas, local wheeling-and-dealing and international intrigue. Followingly, New Jersey has 6th largest Greek population among the US States and the states which are located at the Western US accounts for the greatest majority of Greek population in the entire States. His wife, Nadina Arslanian is a Cypriot-migrant Lebanese originated Armenian. His strong anti-Turkey stance have become a defining characteristic of him in many political and media circles. However, he was and is not free from the challenge of some counter social forces and the production of new opportunistic discourses. He already invoked the opposition of some counter political-economic factions within the circles of the Washington DC. He faced with the corruption charges and coerced to resign from the

³³⁷ Revolution.gr, “New York Times: Biden Administration Signaling It Doesn’t Not Favor Turkey Over Greece as It Faces Resistance to Plan to Sell F-16s to Erdogan”, 18.01.2023, Revolution.gr, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [New York Times: Biden Administration Signaling It Doesn’t Not Favor Turkey Over Greece as It Faces Resistance to Plan to Sell F-16s to Erdogan – revolution.gr](#); Patricia Zengerle, “US Senator Menendez says he has not changed opposition to Turkey F-16 sale”, 27.07.2023, Reuters, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [US Senator Menendez says he has not changed opposition to Turkey F-16 sale | Reuters](#); Congressional Research Service, *Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. Sale of F-16 Aircraft Updated September 5*, p. 10.

Chairman position of the leading congressional Committee of American international affairs in September 2023.³³⁸ Just in the right time, it opened up a political space for Greek-Turkish rapprochement and more possibility of Turkish F-16 deal to be completed. Furthermore, usually following the superior considered-US example for its design of military like the rest of trans-nationalized NATO members and already concerned about the loss of valuable airpower asset like F-35 due to the Russian equipment purchase, the Turkish military and defense-industry elite were not eager to embrace any Russian alternatives of modern fighter aircraft. Their immediate concern for the urgent modernization alongside with the apprehensions of the other involving security circles of Turkish state apparently had established a bureaucratic class pressure on Erdoğan, in which Erdoğan must address a solution for preventing any possible damage on his leadership prestige in the security apparatus of Turkish State. Furthermore, the Turkish military staff is open to a European alternative known as the European Fighter Typhoon, but the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his social democrat coalition deemed the international standing of Erdogan's Turkey is not satisfactory enough for such sale just like American counterpart.³³⁹ All these pressures were followed by the turmoil mostly generated by the former application of unorthodox and extremely costly Erdogonomics³⁴⁰ in Turkish economy and treasure, in which Erdogan and his new neo-classical minded minister Mehmet Şimşek must find sufficient foreign finance and capital with a relatively low credibility among the dominant international capitalist clique. Without this financial liquidity, Şimşek and Erdoğan could not address the pressure from the lower social classes whose living standards have been deteriorated due to the multiply cut down interest rates – led to

³³⁸ Erica Orden and Matt Friedman, "Sen. Bob Menendez charged with taking bribes to help business cronies, Egyptian government", 22.09.2023, Politico, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Sen. Bob Menendez charged with taking bribes to help business cronies, Egyptian government - POLITICO](#)

³³⁹ Teller Report, "Bloomberg: Scholz is unlikely to approve the sale of Eurofighter fighter jets to Turkey", 16.11.2023, Teller Report, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Bloomberg: Scholz is unlikely to approve the sale of Eurofighter fighter jets to Turkey - Teller Report](#)

³⁴⁰ Erdogonomics deemed as "pseudoscience" among market-oriented economists and financial observers. It brought major social and political costs to the ruling bloc in Turkey: Mustafa Akyol, "How Erdogan's Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy", 03.12.2021, Cato Institute, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [How Erdogan's Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy | Cato at Liberty Blog](#)

the rising foreign currency and inflation feedback.³⁴¹ The former political economy of Erdogonomics served a small clique of construction sector that is closely aligned to his government apparatus but at the huge and risky cost of soaring inflation and waning popular support. It also dragged considerable condemnation of more traditional chambers of the entrepreneur capital both in Turkey and around the world before Mehmet Şimşek was assigned. Hanke's misery index demonstrates that Turkey's misery rate skyrocketed from 22nd place to 10th place just in two years whilst Turkey surpassed the number 1 of the list, Argentina, both according to OECD Data and Hanke by January and October 2022 respectively.³⁴² This record-breaking critical peak of maximum lower social class pressures represents the gradual but impactful shift from the past conjecture. It revealed the limitation of cheap labour and construction-based accumulation model of JDP-styled capitalism that was based on drastically impactful and risky interest rate cuts and low rates.³⁴³ It followed by the gradual electoral decline since 2012 and resulted in prominent municipality defeats for JDP in 2019 and 2024 in the wealthiest and most productive metropolises of Turkey such as Istanbul, Ankara and Bursa. Thus, neo-Ottomanist assertiveness of Erdoğan-led Turkey had to departure from some of its previous hawkish stances and goals in order to preserve the momentum without falling into the black hole of domestic political collapse, particularly in relation to Greece and its relational power in the fund providing West.

³⁴¹ Jay Loschky and RJ Reinhart, "Turks' Life Ratings, Living Standards Crash", 18.05.2022, Diplomatic Courier, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Turks' Life Ratings, Living Standards Crash \(diplomaticcourier.com\)](https://www.diplomaticcourier.com/turks-life-ratings-living-standards-crash/) ; Euronews, "Economic turmoil and spiraling prices: Just how bad is poverty in Turkey?", 08.08.2023, Euronews. , Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Economic turmoil and spiraling prices: Just how bad is poverty in Turkey? | Euronews](https://www.euronews.com/pt/2023/08/08/economic-turmoil-and-spiraling-prices-just-how-bad-is-poverty-in-turkey/)

³⁴²OECD, "Inflation (CPI)", (2022), Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Inflation \(CPI\) | OECD](https://data.oecd.org/inflation/cpi/); Steve H. Hanke, "The latest update — now expanded to 156 nations — on a metric of well-being as viewed through the lens of economics", 14.04.2024, National Review Capital Matters, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [2020 Misery Index: Venezuela Tops List, Again | National Review](https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/04/14/the-latest-update-on-a-metric-of-well-being-as-viewed-through-the-lens-of-economics/) ;Steve H. Hanke, "Who's miserable and who's happy?", 18.03.2023, National Review Capital Matters, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Hanke's 2022 Misery Index: Zimbabwe, Venezuela Top List | National Review](https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/03/18/whos-miserable-and-whos-happy/); Patronlar Dünyası, "Sefalet Endeksi'nde Türkiye, Arjantin'i geçerek dünya birincisi oldu", 31.10.2022, Patronlar Dünyası, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Sefalet Endeksi'nde Türkiye, Arjantin'i geçerek dünya birincisi oldu - Patronlar Dünyası \(patronlardunyasi.com\)](https://www.patronlardunyasi.com/sefalet-endeksi-nde-turkiye-arjantin-i-geceerek-dunya-birincisi-oldu/); Paranaliz, "Türkiye 93.3 puanla Sefalet Endeksi'nde dünya birincisi!", 31.10.2022, Paranaliz, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [Türkiye 93.3 puanla Sefalet Endeksi'nde dünya birincisi! - Paranaliz](https://www.paranaliz.com/turkiye-93-3-puanla-sefalet-endeksi-nde-dunya-birincisi/)

³⁴³ Mustafa Türkeş, Elif Uzgören & Coşkun Soysal: "A Historical Materialist Reading of the Contested Relations between Greece and Turkey" I, p. 16.

Therefore, the pressing circumstances resulted in an increased effort of Erdoğan government for both pleasing Americans, Germans, the involved foreign capital and his national security nexus in which new friend seeking Greeks were shined as a great opportunity improving credibility. Erdoğan's calculation is that repairing relations with Greece would enhance his bitter position and reduce risks, both internationally and domestically. This policy would satisfy either Americans or Germans for the fighter jet sale for renovating the aging Turkish fleet and removing the so-called invisible sanctions. While newly re-elected and re-formed government of Mitsotakis envisioned this opportunity offered by Erdogan as the extraction of leverages from complicated Turkish-Greek relations, especially after establishing very close ties with the US under revitalised and later enhanced Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement in his former term. The rapid insistence on enhancing relations with the US rendered the government of Mitsotakis being dependent too much on Washington and pushed Athens away from Russia in the geostrategic frame.³⁴⁴ It appeared that recent undiversified Greek dependence to the US was not always prove to be fruitful for Athens as Washington abandoned Greece in its East-Med Gas Pipeline Project Quest in January 2022.³⁴⁵ The capital and leadership of Greece also is heavily bounded by its own debts, evidently resulted in massive privatizations on the governmental and public assets wide across in the country which administrated by the creditor and investor European actors under the mechanisms and frameworks of the EU and IMF, which in sum are sponsoring Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (TAIPED)

³⁴⁴ Athens News, "The port of Alexandroupoli comes under the control of the Pentagon", 23.10. 2022, Athens News, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://en.rua.gr/2022/09/23/the-port-of-alexandroupoli-comes-under-the-control-of-the-pentagon/>

³⁴⁵ Yücel Acer, "Eastmed Projesinde Dönüm Noktasına Mı Geliniyor?", *Seta Perspektif*, 2, Sayı 326 (2022)

Sarantis Michalopoulos, "Greece fumes as Washington loses interest in EastMed gas pipeline", 19.01.2022, Euractiv, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/greece-fumes-as-washington-loses-interest-in-eastmed-gas-pipeline/>

for this task.³⁴⁶ Followingly, it is argued that the same capital manipulations of the international financial speculators and mismanagement of Greek governments are the roots for Greek debt crisis, alongside with the neoliberal roadmap of the European Market that drives Greece into a catastrophic debt crisis further in the first place.³⁴⁷ The following anti-austerity at all cost policy implementation by the New Democracy Party-led central coalition and the financial yoke of Troika resulted in the victory of a welfare policy advocating anti-austerity left wing camp coined SYRIZA³⁴⁸ by decisive margin in February 2015 through an early election. However, when they failed to attract Russian and Chinese capital's attention during the second stage of the Greek Debt Crisis period, Tsipras and his SYRIZA chose to not bypass Troika and instead their political preference is shaped in accordance with the expanded obedience to the austerity regime of Troika under the political pressure and coercion of the European capital and political elite.³⁴⁹ It took place despite the vast majority of opposition of Greek people towards the austerity had been proved in the July 2015 referendum held by the same SYRIZA government. In a striking U-Turn considering its former discourse, Tsipras' SYRIZA further fulfilled indebted Greek dependence even under harsher conditions³⁵⁰ to the Western oriented internationalised capitalism through an ideology-overwhelming structural coercion. As with Greece's overwhelming dependencies in comparison to its tininess as a country due to the collaborationist policies of Tsipras and Mitsotakis, an open door appeared for Erdogan's Turkey in Greek foreign policy since Athens paradoxically needs powerful strategic partners to balance the overly expanded Western influence on Greece. Following the SYRIZA's evident weakness in ideological and material leadership terms, the forward step

³⁴⁶ Frederick Reese, "In Greece Privatization Schemes, Who Benefits", 04.08.2014, Mintpressnews, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [In Greece Privatization Schemes, Who Benefits? \(mintpressnews.com\)](http://mintpressnews.com)

³⁴⁷ James Heneage, "Kısa Yunanistan Tarihi"

³⁴⁸ See; How once the SYRIZA had been seen as a threat to the fundamental European values" with its populist left ideology. Zuhail Mert Uzuner and Konstantinos Gogos, "Greece's Geopolitics of the Aegean Sea during the SYRIZA-led Government (2015-2019)", p. 866.

³⁴⁹ James Heneage, "Kısa Yunanistan Tarihi", p. 237.

³⁵⁰ Alexandra Prodromidou, "Continuity and Change in Greek Politics in an Age of Austerity", *Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery, The Political Economies of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal*, Edited by Owen Parker and Dimitris Tsarouhas, (Palgrave Macmillan 2018), p. 196; Heneage, p. 238.

towards US and one step backwards from Russia in the following Mitsotakis era ended up an increased synergy between the European-US hegemonies on Greek soil. It potentially could result in revitalisation and resurgence of anti-imperialist left and anti-Westernism among Greek masses who deprived of former generous welfare policies of old ND and PASOK, an outcome that Mitsotakis and his post-austerity ND Government would not prefer, as it applies to the Western Powers that oversees Greece. Nevertheless, *the threat from the East* (Turkey) could be a strategic comrade for Greece to increase political economic space of breath, as this option may necessitate itself in a political economic calculus in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean context particularly pertaining the mutually benefiting Greek-Turkish Capital interests. Despite the leverage extraction attempts of Athens vis-à-vis a more capable Turkey through the strategic employment of even more powerful Western actors, the balance in Greek Foreign Policy rapidly lost in Greek Case over years in the favour of the limiting and seizing preferences of Atlantic Bloc. Thus, Turkey and Turkish Capital now could enjoy being the potential dealer for Greece and become a competitive adversary against the Western Capital by exploiting such impreferable imbalanced status of Greece, mitigates what Greece lacks in size and scale vis-à-vis incumbent Western Capital on Greek Soil. While the strategic Western card always present at the hands of Greek policy making elite against potential Turkish aspirations thanks to Greece's lobby intensive influential power in the West and the assumed Western patronage on Greece. All these complex and potentially counterproductive trans-nationalized interactions of elites and struggling social forces apparently could be account for reconfiguration of Turkish-Greek relations under the influencing shadow of Americano-European Atlantic Hegemony, as the capital-policy elite of these both indebted and financial flow dependent countries have to sustain their momentum within the existing structures in relation to the evolution of intra-structural and international conjecture. Otherwise, they cannot thrive in their geopolitical objectives and arguably cannot survive under the systemic dictations and its implications of hegemonic Atlantic party in which the US and the actors of European Union enjoy a higher position with superior financial and technological assets vis-à-vis geopolitically fragile and more divided Greek-Turkish periphery. The more rational step then, therefore, is the increased class unity of weaker Greek-Turkish accumulation forces rather than a further political division that interrupts the

exploitation of the regional sources and lucrative economic activity.

But until this development of Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 2023, a more prevailing imperial hegemonic dynamic emerging from the US was at play in a controversial manner which further confirms the neo-Gramscian point of imperialistic. The US had been deliberately consenting the friction between contested Turkey and Greece pertaining to the demilitarised islands of Lesbos and Samos, since the US Base in Alexandroupolis under the new MDCA framework were being used for providing logistics and lend equipment to the noted demilitarised islands according to Turkish intelligence sources, based on their drone reconnaissance on 25 September 2022. The assumably deliberate US provocation was also the partial belief of Erdogan too: “We know who unleashed Greece against us”. Most of the relevant literature considers the US a mediator and peacekeeper between Greece and Turkey but an unorthodox critical account such as of Robert Cox could assert the US as a disrupter of the relations in neo-imperialist hegemonic framework of *divide et impera*, in accordance with the evidence of like this. Based on Dinçer Bayer’s evaluation, the same majority of literature establishes a distance between mostly US-led NATO and the demilitarisation issue on the account of Jens Stoltenberg and former NATO General Secretaries’ neutral discourse towards the issue.³⁵¹ However, in practice, it sometimes claimed suspicious. The desire of encompassing Lemnos and Gavdos islands to the NATO Defense plan and the request that the forces placed by Greece shall be added to the NATO plans provoked Turkey’s open opposition and resulted in the rejection of Greek proposal by the NATO. Still the approach of NATO was ambiguous rather than being distanced or neutral. NATO was prone to support the utilization of Lemnos as one of the potential aerial spearheads against the Soviets on the Aegean Sea and rather silent towards the Greek activities on the islands via claiming it is not NATO’s duty. The US have also perceived the Aegean Region as the part of the containment and expansion policy towards the USSR and later Putin’s Russia in relation to NATO. In geopolitical terms, it is volatile realisation of Mahan and Spykman’s geopolitics by the US through utilising Greece as proxy as the British Empire did.³⁵² Further, Soner Karagül and

³⁵¹ Dinçer Bayer, “NATO’nun Ege Denizi Politikası”, p. 1130-1132.

³⁵² See, the Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

Gülşah Özdemir argue that NATO, although not openly admitting it, already picked up a side in realpolitik terms when it let the member states to participate in non-NATO Greek drills on the demilitarised islands.³⁵³ There were also events and cases including NATO involvement such as the jet fighter manoeuvres regarding NATO drills on Straits islands that violated their demilitarised status, in which Turkey's response only make a difference for fulfilling the respect to the demilitarised status:

“Though both countries benefited highly from the rapprochement process which followed the earthquakes, relations became tense again by a new crisis during NATO's Destiny Glory 2000 Military Exercises, which was planned to be carried out in Doganbey and Saros Bay in the Aegean Sea, Western Anatolia and Eastern Mediterranean between 9 and 25 October 2000. The disagreement stemmed from the intent of Greek planes to fly in the air corridors over the Limnos and Ikaria islands. Turkey opposed this by arguing that these islands should have a demilitarized status in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty, thus, the air corridors around the islands should be left out of the manoeuvres. As Greek jets entered this air space, Turkish planes took off to intercept them. Ankara warned that such incidents could lead to unwanted consequences. Upon this warning, Greece requested that the NATO manoeuvres be cancelled. When NATO refused, Greece unilaterally withdrew its planes and other forces just as the manoeuvres were concluding.”³⁵⁴

It is clear that Greece complied the Turkish demand but from very beginning NATO insisted on the planned allocation of Greek air assets as the part of drill in a blind-eye manner toward the demilitarised status. Unlike many read-only type of political discourse interpreting orthodox accounts, a critical account assert that all these actions and occurrences can be reimagined as the hegemonic and imperialistic deliberate social interactions that hidden behind a prevailing ideological discourse claiming to be neutral, produced by some elite who serve the all-encompassing world hegemony. Since the critical accounts are more flexible than orthodox accounts in terms of science philosophy, the burden of positivistic hard empirical proof that is common in the orthodox accounts replaced with the relatively substantiated and reason based systemic thinking that simply makes sufficient sense.

³⁵³ Soner Karagül and Gülşah Özdemir, “Ege Denizi’ndeki Sorunlar ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Ege Denizi Politikası”, p. 234.

³⁵⁴ S. Gülden Ayman, “Negotiations and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power Situations: The Turkish-Greek Case”, p. 1057.

5.2.3. Political Economic Outlook and Possible Incentives of Continuing Illegal Remilitarisation

The militarisation of the islands also possibly is thought to capitalize on maximizing capital benefits under the conjuncture of the relative under-development of the islands. For instance, the energy requirement for the islands by themselves could be boosted by developing an armed force presence if the islands local population and tourism factor are inadequate to compensate sufficient incentives for the energy suppliers to conduct supply operations. There is a correlative pattern indicating that it might be the case for the Hellenic Army's continuing illegal deployment on the islands. The bottom line of it, the force composition and classification of the Hellenic Army on the demilitarised islands demonstrate a considerable size of mechanized, armored and self-propelled artillery concentration, which are consisting many of the companies and battalions of military build-up on the islands. For instance, under the command of 88th Military Command (88 ΣΔΙ) that based in Myrina, Lemnos; there are one armored battalion (88th Armored Battalion / 88 EMA), two mechanised infantry battalion 285th (Mechanized Infantry Battalion / 285 M/K ΤΠ and 290th Mechanized Infantry Battalion / 290 M/K ΤΠ) and a self-propelled artillery battalion (88th Self Propelled Artillery Battalion (88 A/K ΜΒΠ-ΠΕΠ) all of which by definition utilises fuel hungry heavy vehicles designed for war. Followingly, by designation and deployment, the island of Chios embraces a full elite national guard force concentration with one armored and three mechanised battalions, while Lesbos hosts five mechanised, one armored and one armored reconnaissance battalions. In terms mechanised intensive force concentration, Lemnos is no exception either. The scheme illustrates how the remilitarisation in the Eastern Aegean islands evolved into a complex military organisation: While it is unclear that the readiness and real degree of these forces regarding their actual power in comparison to doctrinal size of manpower and equipment but assuming they are at their peak of being fully or even partially equipped in accordance with what they are designated to be, it indicates they have to generate an increase in the curvature of fuel demand with all the involving logistics and other battalions, air and naval force deployments combined, particularly diesel due to the presence of heavy vehicles and vessels in the apparent Greek military inventory. Cihat Yaycı already demonstrates some heavy mobile firing platforms do running on fuel

and as so with the capability of relocating themselves.³⁵⁵




Figure 9: A Chart that illustrates Hellenic Army Command Structure and Force Composition on the Islands³⁵⁶

Followingly, the way in which the islands attain their energy is identical to the recently developing LNG-based provision on the coastline of mainland Greece. Due to the

³⁵⁵ Yaycı and Paksüt, “Gayri Askeri Statüdeki Adalar Meselesi!”

³⁵⁶ Anonymous, “Supreme Military Command of the Interior and Islands, The Hellenic Army Branch (Greek: Ανώτερη Στρατιωτική Διοίκηση Εσωτερικού και Νήσων - ΑΣΔΕΝ)”, military-history.fandom, Accessed on 09.07.2024, Available electronic version, [https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Supreme_Military_Command_of_the_Interior_and_Islands_\(Greece\)](https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Supreme_Military_Command_of_the_Interior_and_Islands_(Greece))

involvement of high costs, the islands were not connected to the electrical grid of mainland Greece which based on the variety of imported and exported energy sources. Instead, the islands rely on the oil-based thermal power plants with operating only through continuing chain of shipment with the fuel tankers. The majority of island power stations utilise diesel, light and heavy oil fuels, with the assistance of gas turbines, internal combustion engines, and steam turbines, in addition to several combined cycle units.³⁵⁷ This energy procurement complements the deployment fashion of the Hellenic Army on the islands in terms of heavy emphasis on the fuel consuming mechanised elements. With Greece's relatively higher consumer demand for the electricity in comparison to Balkan countries and Turkey over a few decades and the mechanised development of the Hellenic Army on the islands in the future assure a stable flow of the energy and keep energy markets on the islands vivid. There are various firms operating on the islands as the distributors of the gasoline and their stations can be tracked on the satellite-based maps. Some of these firms are claimed to be fully Greek owned enterprises with relatively simpler shareholder structure such as Revoil, whilst like in the case of EKO, some of the Greek gasoline companies are owned subsidiaries of the hierarchical conglomerates like Helleniq Energy (former Hellenic Petroleum), which is the affiliation of Latsis Group through Paneuropean Oil and Industrial Holdings S.A, the unit of Latsis Group. The owner of EKO, Helleniq Energy is also partially owned by the government through its privatisation management institution, Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund. The fuel supply and distribution on the islands therefore is involving both private sector initiative and government funding and action. It indicates strong ties and coaction between Greek State and transnationally operating private initiative in which the government of Greece has gradually left the grip to the private sector under the criticism of left wing considering the Hellenic Petroleum example of reduction in the state's stake and management board control via representatives. However, as the green energy transformation of the islands is on the agenda, the companies also struggle to adapt this plan in an efficient manner. The plan is to transform the Aegean into a "green" archipelago, the internationally acclaimed TILOS research consortium seeks to transfer tacit knowledge of smart micro-grids beyond the island of Tilos. The energy

³⁵⁷ Filippos Rodger Tsakiris, *Energy Development in the Non-Connected Islands of the Aegean Sea*, ORKUSTOFNUN National Energy Authority, Internship Report, (2010)

model of Tilos (where a smart, hybrid energy production and storage system is under development) is about to be deployed on 15 further islands of the Aegean with the approval of general public opinion but still brings negative suspicion and reluctance of the end users due to the involving costs like in the installation of domestic PV Panels.³⁵⁸ While the cost for the oil and gasoline suppliers might be even greater than the increasingly insecure environment of the islands for the fossil fuels-based energy sector in upcoming future since the oil-based energy production is at the risk of abolishment because of the green energy development.³⁵⁹ This upcoming process potentially incentivises the continuation of heavy equipment intensive militarisation on the islands since the armed forces of Greece could stand as the solid customer through the green transformation and hence facilitates the Greek business world's capital to adopt and preserve the profits with the reduced risks. With the so-called *threat on the East* stands as the Greeks call it and as the Greeks continue to diminish Turkey into a bogeyman for the justification of the illegal act, the complexity and cost of dismantling all the military deployment under the light of these developments pertaining the energy sector is arguably not preferable choice both for Greek state and private entrepreneurship. Thus, the resolution of the demilitarised islands issue requires a multi-layered approach and careful management that goes beyond the simplistic normative sense. It requires a full understanding of its dynamics and total address on them. For instance, despite the feasibility and material rationality of providing the energy for the islands from the next-door Turkey, Athens persisted to the Turkish proposal of engaging in this initiative. The reasoning behind this is that the Greek private sector which is closely tied with the Greek State could not compete with Turkish counterpart due to the basic reality of geographical proximity in terms of cheap energy supply. In this case, the nation-centric and indigenous capital interest-based political economy overcomes the more common sense of political economy based on the comparative geographical material reality and results in an illegal aggravation that potentially threatens the security of the Aegean Sea. The Aegean Sea could be a zone that could be defined on the rational commonness and egalitarian share through negotiations

³⁵⁸ Phedeas Stephanides, Konstantinos Chalvatzisa, Xin Lia, Nikos Mantzarisc, Michalis Prodromouc, Christiana Papapostoloud, Dimitris Zafirakise, "Sustainable energy solutions for the Aegean Archipelago Islands: What is the public attitude?", ScienceDirect Energy Procedia 159 (2019) 243–248.

which benefits the peoples and communities of Aegean Region most rather than being loss in the less fruitful pathways of divisionism and struggle.

5.3. Conclusion

This chapter have sought to establish a fresher outlook to the subject issue which often interpreted and understood under the light of historic legal foundation, legal normativism and bilateral geopolitical action. It has been surveyed that the more unconventional means of analysis and less operationalised approaches like the political economy and multi polar geopolitics could be utilised for covering the subject matter of the demilitarisation issue after laying the historical and theoretical base for this realisation of perspective expansion. It demonstrated that the other actors can be interfered or should be taken into the account in this issue besides Greece and Turkey such as the US if the current conjuncture is the focus of inquiry. This approach is further supported by the general historic evidence that is in line in the US example with the involvement of the Great Powers, particularly British and Russian Empires. This chapter also demonstrated that the case of demilitarised islands problem could be linked more general problems of society and economics such as the energy consumption market expansion. The illegal militarisation incentivises and encourages the development of the infrastructure and supply rates of oil in an economically fragile area. The legal and bilateral dimensions are obliged but inadequate for full coverage of the issue.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The issue of demilitarization of the Northeastern Aegean Islands is the focus of this thesis. As shown in this thesis, the existing literature on demilitarization in the Northeastern Aegean Islands is controversial. Theoretical dimensions also complement this review. It has been shown that the current international legal basis is controversial and does not help to properly address the issues, especially the Turkish-Greek bilateral problems. The thesis firstly introduces the picture that the Aegean Sea is home to a multitude of island groups, which are distributed throughout the entire basin. While not entirely parallel, the diversity of geography is accompanied by a corresponding diversity in the political and legal status of the Aegean islands in relation to the historical development of politics. Two distinct demilitarisation regimes can be discerned: The first of these is the Lausanne Regime, which is based on the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923. The second is the Paris Regime, defined by the Paris Peace Treaty between the Allies and Italy in 1947. The noted island groups constitute the focus of this thesis due to the difference in legal regimes and regulations, which follows the Lausanne Regime and is categorised as part of the broader group of the Northeastern Aegean Islands: The Islands of the Straits' Frontier (Samothrace and Lemnos) and the Central Aegean Islands (Mytilene/Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Nicaria) While the Dodecanese and the Paris Demilitarization Regime on these islands are not the primary focus of this thesis, this research compares two respective regimes with different historical and legal backgrounds in order to draw a better picture of the situation with the Northeastern Aegean Islands. It also encourages a separate inquiry for the Dodecanese through this comparison. In order to achieve this objective fully, the background of the Dodecanese problem is briefly analysed and the existent sources of the history of Italian occupied Dodecanese are demonstrated. The stance of the Greek government with regard to the Dodecanese emphasises the principle of *Res Inter Alios Acta* which echoed in the Article 89 of the Paris Peace Treaty and Article 34 of

the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Greece also claims that Turkish Solitude regarding the demilitarisation demand alters Turkish demand for respecting the international law illegitimate. The Turkish stance on the Dodecanese emphasise the objective factuality and independence of international law from subjective interpretation, followed by the idea that necessary submission to the *erga omnes* and *pacta sunt servanda* principles are required. Furthermore, the principle of *accord collateral*, is identified by another crucial aspect to consider within the literature review. Through this demonstration, this thesis clarifies the echoed but often overlooked classification that a notable distinction can be made between the military status of the Northeastern Aegean islands and the Dodecanese. As a contrasting case pertaining Dodecanese, the Paris Peace Treaty provides a clear definition of demilitarisation in paragraph D of Annex 13, and the term 'demilitarised' is explicitly stated in Article 14. It was not the case for the Northeastern islands and older Lausanne demilitarisation regime. However, the textual demonstration of this thesis suggests an undeniable presence of a strictly and well-regulated demilitarisation regime on the Northern party of the former Ottoman islands which had occupied by Greece during the First Balkan Wars. Later, these islands were to be transferred to the international regime of the Six Powers Decision and referencing Lausanne Peace Treaty via the Articles 12 and 13 of primary legal body of Lausanne. Although controversial between Turkey and Greece as demonstrated with the introduction of Montreux revision, the related articles of the Lausanne Convention on the Straits further enforce the idea that the demilitarisation regime does present within the international law as Turkey proposes. It is also one of the critical historical indications that the military status issue of Northeastern islands is intensively linked to the problem and security of the Straits. This thesis strongly suggests the overlapping categorisation that the demilitarization of the Northeast Aegean islands has historical and legal facets. The equally important case is the fact that extra-regional actors have also contributed to the rise of tensions between Greece and Turkey pertaining this issue. This thesis has attempted to provide a revised historical overview of the issue of demilitarization within a broad geopolitical context. It has also sought to demonstrate the limitations of perspectives that examine the issue solely through the lens of bilateral relations or the development of textual legislation. According to Turkey, Greece has been violating the status quo of demilitarisation on the Northeastern Islands for trackable decades via contradicting the

established international law regulations based on the interstate treaties, the same international legislation that also granted Greece the possession and sovereignty of the occupied Ottoman islands in the Balkan Wars. Hence, the sovereignty of Greece on the islands is conditional and result of relevant international law in Turkish interpretation. Furthermore, Turkey emphasizes that the incident poses a direct threat to Turkish security on the Aegean Region and erodes the legitimacy of Greek sovereignty on the islands. The primary Turkish principle of the demilitarised status is identified as the *pacta sunt servanda* by this thesis. Meantime, Athens claim that Greece possesses the unconditional sovereign right to arm the islands as it wishes. According to Greece, its sovereignty on the islands is unbounded especially under the absence of direct reference to the demilitarisation nor a condition on its sovereignty. For Athens, Turkey threatens Greece on the Aegean Region, reflecting the mirror version of Turkish apprehension. It has demonstrated that both parties also assert the UN Charter and Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in order to formulate their own national and intellectual stances pertaining the military status of the islands. To navigate through these demonstrated discourses and arguments, this thesis has relied on valuable and accurate interpretations of the source texts from these relevant earlier perspectives and studies. From the Decision of Six Powers to the Lausanne Peace Treaty with including never mentioned Treaty of Sevres, the textual and historical analysis of this thesis finds out that the clear insistence on and objective of demilitarisation of the Northeastern Aegean islands by the international state actors is an inevitable interpretation. This analysis displays the primary historical goal of the removal of the chance which permits the potential utilisation of the islands for military purposes, particularly in relation to the Straits and regional peace. After drawing this legal and historical picture, the thesis has identified a number of possible approaches to the issue of demilitarization that go beyond the legal and historical case studies that currently dominate the literature. Instead, it proposes a multidisciplinary approach that draws on insights from IR and other branches of the social sciences. For this objective, relevant realist, liberal and critical accounts are utilised. For instance, the enhanced structural realist account of Stephen Walt under the headline of balance of threat has applied to the issue due to the close proximity between the re-armed Greek islands and Turkish homeland. Followingly, the military security-confined explanatory limitations and operational context requirement of the realism are demonstrated. For later,

geopolitical accounts are used for drawing the context. Under the light of this interpretation of realist limitation, the primary liberal concepts and assumptions were applied. It has shown that the neoliberal trends and liberalisation of Turkish-Greek relations have not been effective to mitigate the demilitarisation issue alongside with the other Aegean Dispute issues. It is concluded that the demilitarisation case constitutes an example of failing international regime and the inadequacy of the institutions on international matter. It lacks in the department of offering a tangible solution, especially under the frame of relative Turkish advantage *vis-à-vis* evident Greek weakness both in economic and military terms. The unevenness and imbalance of Turkish-Greek bilateral dynamics and the peripheral status of the respective two countries in relation to the greater powers of global politics creates a feasible ground for the application of the lesser-used critical accounts. Within a neo-Gramscian frame, it has shown that the lack of Turkish consent in the Greek re-militarisation opens a pathway for instability and exogenous exploitation of the issue both in the past and current conjuncture. To make use of these insights, the thesis analysed the recent tensions between Greece and Turkey on the issue of demilitarization, considering the role of additional regional actors of the past and current. It offers that more unconventional analytical tools and less operationalized approaches, such as political economy and multipolar geopolitics, could be used to cover the topic of demilitarization, after laying the historical and theoretical groundwork for this broadening of perspective. This approach is further supported by the general historical evidence, which is consistent with the involvement of great powers, particularly the British and Russian empires in the late nineteenth early twentieth century and in the case of current rise of tension the US involvement under the frame of re-vitalised Greek-US defense cooperation. In order to draw a current picture, it has shown that the presence of regular NAVTEX protests of Turkey regarding the violated demilitarised status of the islands continued all along despite the Athens Declaration of October 2023 and ongoing trend of the improving relations. The current official exchanges and statements pertaining the demilitarisation issue are demonstrated, indicating an unresolved issue which could not be redeemed by the improving economic or diplomatic relations. It has also shown that the case of demilitarized islands can be linked to more general social and economic issues, such as the expansion of the energy consumption market. The illegal militarization of the area

encourages the development of infrastructure and oil supplies that are economically fragile. While the legal and bilateral dimensions are important, they do not fully cover the issue. It can be said that all these accounts and assessments show the variety of ways in which the issue of the demilitarization of the Aegean islands can be examined, using and going beyond the existing legal and historical accounts.

Consequently, this thesis concludes that although the islands do not have a demilitarized status explicitly written in the treaty, it is imperative that the acts of the treaty negotiations be interpreted in accordance with a strict demilitarization regime based on provisions of international law. This conclusion is a necessary consequence of the textual structure of historical international legislation.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Adaların askerden arındırılma statüsüyle ilgili tarihi kayıtlara ilişkin bir ihtilaf bulunmaktadır. Türkiye, söz konusu Yunan adalarının askerden arındırılmasına ilişkin tarihi bir hukuki dayanağın reddedilemez bir şekilde mevcut olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bununla birlikte, Yunanistan'ın adaları yeniden askerileştirme geçmişi mevcuttur ve bu da uygulama ile yasal iddia arasında bir tutarsızlık yaratmaktadır. Bu nedenle konu Yunanistan ve Türkiye arasında önemli bir ihtilaf kaynağı teşkil etmektedir. Gerginliğin nedenlerini analiz etmek için kapsamlı bir araştırma yapılması gerekmektedir. Ele alınan ilk ada kategorisi, Türkçe'de Boğazönü Adaları ve Yunanca'da Porthmos olarak adlandırılan Boğazlar Bölgesi adalarıdır. Bu kategori Lemnos/Limni ve Samothrake/Semadirek gibi önemli stratejik öneme sahip adaların yanı sıra bir dizi küçük adadan oluşmaktadır. İkinci grup adalar ise Doğu Sporadlar, Saruhan ya da Asya Adaları olarak da adlandırılan Orta Ege Adaları'ndan oluşmaktadır. Bunlar Lesvos/Midilli, Chios/Sakız, Samos/Sisam ve Ikaria/Nikaria'dır. Bu adaların askeri statüsü, her ne kadar başka adalar da mevcut olsa da, Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında, dışsal müdahaleler de dikkate alındığında, çatışmalı bir geçmişe sahiptir. Görünürdeki askerden arındırma talebinin ve hükümlerinin ilk tarihi hukuki belgeleri Balkan Savaşları dönemine kadar uzanmaktadır. Bu dönem, Kuzey Ege Adaları'nın statüsünün önemli ölçüde tartışma yapıldığı bir dönemdir. Bunun nedeni 1912 sonlarında Birinci Balkan Savaşları konjonktüründe Kuzey Doğu Ege Adaları'nın Yunanistan tarafından işgal edilmesidir. Bu, aynı yıl İtalya'nın Oniki Adaları işgal etmesinin jeopolitik bir takipçisiydi. Ayrıca, Ege ve Boğazlar bağlamında İtalyan yayılmacılığını yönetmeye ve sınırlamaya çalışan büyük güçlerin eylemlerinin bir sonucuydu. Birinci Balkan Savaşı'nın sona ermesinin ardından Londra'da yapılan müzakerelerin sonucu Mayıs 1913'te Londra Antlaşması ve Kasım 1913'te Atina Antlaşması yapılmıştır. Bu antlaşmaların sırasıyla ilgili 5. ve 15. maddeleri

çerçevesinde 14 Şubat 1914'te Avrupalı Büyük Güçler, Kuzey Doğu Ege adalarının askerden arındırılmasına ilk resmi atıfları yapan ve bu konudaki ilk düzenleme hükümlerini barındıran bir nota yayınladılar. Ayrıca, aynı karar adaların mülkiyetinin Yunan işgal kuvvetlerine devredilmesiyle sonuçlandı. Bu karar, ilgili literatürde kararı müşterek biçimde alıp ilan etmiş Avrupalı Büyük Güçlere gönderme olarak "Altı Gücün Kararı" olarak anılmaktadır. Ayrıca, ilerleyen bölümlerde tartışıldığı üzere, askersizleştirme vakasının büyük güçler tarafından belirlenen ve istismar edilen başka bir amacı daha vardır ve bu amaç mevcut literatürün çoğunluğu tarafından göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu durum, eski konjonktür değişirken günümüz güçlerinin Türkiye'nin gayri askerleştirme meselesine yönelik kaygı ve protestolarına gereken ilgiyi göstermemesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Kısa bir tarihsel bakış, 1920 yılında imzalanan Sevr Antlaşması'nın 84. Maddesinde belirtildiği üzere Büyük Güçlerin 1914 notasını onayladığını ortaya koymaktadır. Ancak bu antlaşma, Küçük Asya'daki Türk-Yunan Savaşı'nın sonucu nedeniyle uygulanmamıştır.

Ancak literatürün geri kalanı, Sevr Antlaşması'nın adaların askeri statüsüyle ilgili 177. ve 178. maddelerinin Kuzeydoğu Ege Adaları'nı gayri askeri hale getiren düzenlemelerini dikkate almamaktadır. Literatür sözkonusu maddelere herhangi bir atıfta bulunmamaktadır. Söz konusu maddeler, maddelerin başlığından ve içeriğinden de anlaşılacağı üzere, aslında Türk Boğazlarından serbest geçişi sağlamak amacıyla tasarlanmıştır: "Boğazlardan Serbest Geçişin Korunması". Ancak Sevres Antlaşması Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın en büyük sahnesini teşkil eden Küçük Asya'daki Türk-Yunan Savaşı'nın İtilaf Devletleri'nin aleyhinde gelişen sonucu nedeniyle pratikte yürürlüğe girememiştir. Bu nedenle, 1922'den 1923'e kadar süren Lozan Konferansı müzakereleri ve 24 Temmuz 1923'te imzalanan Lozan Barış Antlaşması, aynı geçmiş referanslara dayanarak ve müzakere edilen akit ve antlaşma maddelerinde askersizleştirme bağlamına bazı yeni özellikler ekleyip kabul ederek onun yerini doldurmuştur. Lozan Barış Antlaşması'nın 12 ve 13. maddeleri ile Boğazlar Sözleşmesi'nin 4.ve 6. maddeleri Altı Devlet Kararı'nın alınmasını öngören Londra ve Atina Antlaşmalarının ilgili maddelerini de tasdik ederek Kuzey Doğu Ege Adaları'na gayri askeri bir uluslararası rejime tabi kılmıştır. Tarihsel jeopolitik bağlamda meselenin yeniden değerlendirmesini ortaya koyan bu tez adaların gayriaskeri statü meselesini yeniden keşfetmekte ve analiz etmektedir. Özellikle de bunu büyük devletlerin meseledeki etkilerini ve meseleyle ilişkilerini değerlendirerek

yapmakta ve gayriaskeri statü meselesinin başından sonuna kadar Türkiye'nin güvenliği için elde edilmiş bir kazanım olmanın ötesinde ve prensipte Türkiye'nin güvenliğinin aleyhinde olacak şekilde sömürüldüğünü göstermektedir.

Literatür taraması ve literatürün yeniden kapsamlı biçimde değerlendirilmesi karşımıza bu konuda iki kategoride kaynak bolluğu çıkarmaktadır. Kısaca verilmiş tarihsel yasal arkaplanın iki farklı boyutu gayri-askerileştirme meselesinin özünü teşkil etmektedir. Bunlar tarihle beraber şekillenen ancak tarihten bağımsız şekilde kendi teori ve uygulamaları bulunan hukuk ve elbette bu hukukun bağlama oturduğu diplomasi tarihidir. Bu amaçla ikinci bölümde ilerleyen bölümlerde yapılacak analizlere yardımcı olacak yeni bir eleştirel inceleme oluşturmak amacıyla ilgili iki ana ayaklı literatür incelenmektedir. İkinci bölüm, konuyu ele alan literatürün mevcut durumunun kavranmasını sağlamak ve bu tezin yeni anlatısının şimdiye kadar konu hakkında anlatılanlarla karşılaştırılmasını sağlamak için gerekli referansları eklemektedir. Bu analiz başlığı, ilgili literatürü derinlemesine gözden geçirerek eksikliklerin, atlanan noktaların ve daha az dikkat çekilen değişkenlerin neler olduğunu ve bu tezin araştırmasının bunu geliştirmek için neler sunduğunu değerlendirmektedir. Bu konu ve meselenin evrimine ilişkin tarihsel anlatılar, adaların statülerinin hem kolektif hem de müstakil olarak belirlendiği bir süreci ve ilgili tarafların bu konuda birbirlerine ilişkin yaklaşım ve duruşlarını nasıl şekillendirdiklerini yansıtacak şekilde çeşitlilik göstermektedir. Bu bağlamda, bazı anlatılar kapsayıcı tarihsel sürecin kendisine özel bir vurgu yapmakta ve bunu Ege'nin belirli coğrafi bağlamı içinde bir diplomatik tarih oluşturma aracı olarak değerlendirmektedir. Bu kaynaklar tipik olarak askerden arındırmayı tek başına bir mesele olarak değerlendirmek yerine, Ege adalarının daha geniş siyasi coğrafya konusu içinde bağlamsallaştırmaktadır. Özellikle Türk diplomasi tarihi kaynaklarının, Yunan muadillerine kıyasla adaların diplomatik tarih yazımına daha fazla odaklandığı görülmektedir. Gene de Türk diplomasi tarihi kaynaklarının da gayri-askerileştirme meselesine yönelik bir odaklanma sorunu olduğu, ancak Türk tarihsel kaynaklarının jeopolitik mücadeleden ve büyük güçlerin entrikalarından doğan uluslararası yükümlülükler çıkarımının isabetli olduğu vurgusu yapılmaktadır. Askeri statüye ilişkin hukuki açıklamalar tarihsel açıklamalara kıyasla daha vaka odaklıdır, ancak daha normatif bir tonda olup, tıpkı Ege Uyuşmazlığı başlığı altındaki diğer meselelerde

olduğu gibi, ilgili nedenselliğin anlaşılması için gerekli uluslararası siyasi tablonun oluşturulması açısından tarihe daha az atıfta bulunmaktadır. Sosyal tarih ve siyasallaşmış coğrafya mevcut hukuki zemini belirlemiştir; ancak bu yasal literatüre göre uyuşmazlığın özü hukuki bir mesele veya dava olarak yatmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, literatürdeki kanı uyarınca adaların askeri statülerine göre sınıflandırılması yürürlükteki uluslararası mevzuata ve *erga omnes, pacta sunt servanda, rebus sic stantibus* gibi hukuksal ilkelere bağlıdır. Bu nedenle, hem doğru hem de uygun bir bağlamsal yaklaşım sağlamak için araştırmacının hukuki tartışmayı dikkate alması gerekmektedir. Bu başlık altında hem meselenin odağında bulunan hem de meseleyle başka bir kanaldan ilgili olup başvurulmuş uluslararası hukuki mevzuat değerlendirilmiştir. Bunları takiben resmi ve resmi olmayan Türk ve Yunan kaynakların yaklaşımları ve argümanları ortaya konmuştur. Bu çerçevede Yunan pozisyonunun gerek resmi, gerekse gayri resmi anlamda içsel olarak tutarsız ama realist teori ve tarihsel gelişmeler temelinde meşrulaştırmalarla dolu olduğu vurgulanmakta, Türk pozisyonunun ise en başından açıkça ifade edilmese de ahde vefa (*pacta sunt servanda*) ve herkes için bağlayıcılık (*erga omnes*) ilkelerine dayandığı gösterilmekte; bir yandan Lozan Barış Antlaşması'nın yasal temelini oluşturduğu gayri-askerleştirme meselesine ilişkin düzenleyici uluslararası mevzuata bakılarak Türkiye'nin yasal olarak haklı olan taraf olduğu ortaya konmaktadır. Sonuç olarak ikinci bölüm, mevcut literatürün bir sentezini ve eleştirisini sunmakta, Kuzey Doğu Ege Adaları'ndaki tartışmalı askersizleştirme meselesine ilişkin daha ileri araştırmalar için sağlam Zemin oluşturmuştur. Takiben yeni tarihsel ve teorik boyutlar bu araştırmayı tamamlamakta ve bu bölümün sonuçları, genel olarak kabul edildikleri, yeniden kullanıldıkları ya da yeni kavramlar ve olası açıklamalarla birleştirildikleri diğer bölümlerin bağlamında değerlendirilmektedir. Uluslararası hukuki zeminin Türk-Yunan ikili ilişkileri bağlamında mevcut ancak taraflar arası ithilaf kaynağı olduğu gösterilmiştir. Bir yandan ikili ilişkilerdeki bu ithilaf kaynağının tarihsel köklerinin mevcut olduğu belli olmuş ve ilgili aktörlerin duruşlarının evrim geçirebileceğinin ve çeşitlilik gösterebileceğinin ilk ipuçları elde edilmiştir. Böylece bu meselenin tarihsel olarak nasıl meydana geldiği anlaşılır hale getirilmiştir.

Üçüncü bölümün amacı, Kuzey Ege Adaları'nın statüsü konusunda Yunanistan ve Türkiye arasında süregelen anlaşmazlığa katkıda bulunan tarihsel faktörleri tespit

etmek ve incelemektir. Ayrıca bu bölüm, adaların bölgesel bağlamdaki tarihi jeopolitik öneminin yanı sıra bu öneme katkıda bulunan temel değişkenleri de göstermektedir. Jeopolitik ve ekonomik faktörlerin her zaman devrede olduğu ve geniş çerçevede gayri askerileştirmenin, bu faktörler ve liderler ile diğer ilgili aktörlerin hesaplamaları tarafından yönlendirilen zorlu müzakerelerin yalnızca bir yan ürünü olduğu açıktır. Askerden arındırma maddesi Türkiye'nin güvenliği ve Ege Denizi'ndeki çıkarları açısından hayati öneme sahip olmakla birlikte, başta İngiltere ve Rusya olmak üzere büyük emperyal güçler için de endişe kaynağı olmuştur. Anlaşma özellikle Türk Boğazları, Karadeniz ve Küçük Asya'yı kapsayan daha geniş bölgesel bağlamdaki İngiliz ve İmparatorluk Rusyası çıkarlarının güvenliğine uygun olarak, bilhassa da Türk Boğazları'nın gayri-askerleştirilmesi meselesine paralel olarak tasarlanmıştır. Bu bölgeler, İngiliz kontrolündeki Mısır, Kızıldeniz ve Hint Okyanusu'nun geniş alanına bağlanan daha büyük Doğu Akdeniz çerçevesinde yer almaktadır. Rusya için ise öncelik Rus güvenliğine tehdit oluşturacak biçimde Karadeniz'e giriş hattıdır ve takiben Akdeniz'e güvenli açılmadır. Ancak çıkarlardaki değişim ve tarihsel süreçte siyasi konjonktürün dönüşümü, eski büyük güçlerin bu konudaki ilgi ve söylemlerinin değişimi ve noksanlığına yol açmıştır. Bunun yerine, ilerleyen bölümlerde tartışılacağı üzere, dönüşen dünya siyasetinin yeni büyük güçleri (ABD), Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki adaların statüsü konusunda diğerlerinin yaptığı gibi, en büyük jeopolitik kazancı elde etmek amacıyla askersizleştirme meselesini istismar etmeye çalışmaktadır. Askerden arındırma düzenlemesinin Türkiye'ye verilen bir taviz olduğu, ancak daha önce de belirtildiği gibi önemli bir amaca da hizmet ettiği açıktır. Kuzeydoğu Ege Sorununun tarihi büyük ölçüde Balkan Savaşları sırasında şekillenmiş olup, kökleri 1821-1829 Yunan İsyanı ve Bağımsızlık Sürecine (Türkçe literatürde Mora/Peloponez İsyanı olarak da bilinir) kadar uzanmaktadır. Bu durum daha sonra Ege bağlamında gücün dağılımına ilişkin acil soruların ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi literatürün geri kalanı, Sevr Antlaşması'nın adaların askeri statüsüyle ilgili 177. ve 178. maddelerinin Kuzeydoğu Ege adalarını gayri askeri hale getiren düzenlemeleri dikkate almamaktadır. Literatür bu ilgili maddelere herhangi bir atıfta bulunmamaktadır. Söz konusu maddeler, maddelerin başlığından ve içeriğinden de anlaşılacağı üzere, aslında Türk Boğazlarından serbest geçişi sağlamak amacıyla tasarlanmıştır: "Boğazlardan Serbest Geçişin Korunması". Adaların askerden arındırılmasına ilişkin literatür tarafından tanınmayan bu maddeler,

büyük güçlerin, özellikle de Boğazlarla ilişkili adalardaki askerden arındırma rejimini İtilaf Devletleri adına üretip dikte ettiren Britanya İmparatorluğu'nun jeopolitik niyetlerini göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla, literatürde askerden arındırma rejiminin Türkiye'nin güvenliğine yönelik işlevi dışındaki tarihsel jeopolitik işlevine herhangi bir vurgu yapılmamaktadır. Bu durum, Kuzey Doğu Ege adalarının İngiliz denizcilik ve donanma potansiyelinin serbest geçişi için Boğazlara ilişkin askersizleştirilmenin ayrılmaz ve kısmi bir unsuru olduğu hakikatine rağmen geçerlidir. Venizelos İngiliz çıkarlarına ilişkin bu vaziyeti kabul etmiş ve Balkan Savaşlarında kazanılan Yunan mülklerinin askerden arındırılması gibi askeri açıdan Yunan aleyhinde gelişen bir implikasyona rağmen İngiliz planlarına karşı hiçbir direnç göstermemiştir. İnönü açılış konuşmasında Lozan sürecinde Türkiye'nin güvenliği adına adaların gayri-askerleştirilmesinin öncüsü olmuş ancak özellikle Semadirek'i geri almak için yoğun çaba harcansa da adaların gayri-askerleştirilmesi gibi İtilaf Devletleri'nin tek sıcak baktığı mesele hariç adalar hakkında Türkiye lehinde statü kararları alınmasında başarılı olamamıştır. Lord Curzon ve Venizelos'un temsil ettiği yoğun İtilaf Devletleri direncini kırabildiğini söylemek mümkün değildir. Eski imparatorluğun ve İngilizlerin aksine Sovyet Rusya'nın boğazların askeri statüsü konusunda tam aksi duruşta oluşu adaların askeri statüsüyle ilgili olarak Türkiye'ye yönelik etkin bir Sovyet desteğine yol açmamıştır. Türkiye'nin gayri-askerleştirme hariç adalarla ilgili taleplerinde yaşanan tüm olumsuzluklara rağmen müzakerenin sonucunda Kuzey Doğu Ege adalarının gayri-askerleştirilmesi üzerine çalışacak özel uzmanlar komisyonunun toplanması kararlaştırılmış ve akabinde bahsedilen maddeleriyle beraber Lozan gayri askerleştirme rejimi üretilmiştir. Türk diplomasisi gayri-askerleştirme rejimini sahiplenmiş, stratejisini buna yaslamıştır. Bu bölüm sonuç olarak askersizleştirme konusuna uygun bir jeopolitik bağlamda gözden geçirilmiş tarihsel bir bakış sunmaya ve konuyu yalnızca ikili ilişkiler veya metinsel mevzuatın evrimi merceğinden inceleyen perspektiflerin kısıtlamalarını göstermeye çalışmıştır. Ayrıca, kaynak metinlerin bu ilgili önceki perspektiflerden türetilen değerli ve doğru yorumlarını kullanmıştır. Bir sonraki bölüm için yukarıda bahsedilen temel ve tarihsel giriş üzerine inşa edilerek, ihtilafı aydınlatmak ve entelektüel bir perspektiften analiz etmek için kullanılan ve kullanılmayan yaklaşımları incelemektedir.

Dördüncü bölümün amacı, askersizleştirme statüsü konusuna uygulanmış ya da uygulanma potansiyeli bulunan uluslararası teoriler kapsamındaki teorik çerçevelerin

detaylandırılmasını sağlamaktır. Bu inceleme, teorik perspektiflerinden yararlanarak konunun irdelenmesinde teorilerin uygulanmasını denemekte, mevcut literatürde teorinin yetersiz veya eksik uygulandığı noktaları göstermekte ve Kuzey Doğu Ege adalarının askerden arındırılması meselesini tasvir etmek için bugüne kadar uygulanmış olan teorik yaklaşımları incelemektedir. Hukuki ihtilaflar ve tarihsel araştırmalarla ilgili geniş literatürün yanında teori uygulamalarının görece ihmali göz önüne alındığında, sorunun kendisini analiz etmek için uygulanabilecek teori ve kavramları belirlemek değerlidir. Bu, askeri ve güvenlik boyutlarının ötesine geçerek diğer yönleri de kapsamalıdır. Bu anlamda kısa bir şekilde gayri-askerileştirme kavramı (demilitarizasyon) uluslararası hukuki boyutunun ötesine geçerek irdelenmiştir, ki bu Ege adalarının gayri-askerileştirilmesi meselesini inceleyen literatürde ihmal edilen bir durumdur. Açık ara farkla, gerçekçi / realist açıklamalar bu konuda en çok kullanılan çağdaş teorik Uluslararası İlişkiler yaklaşımıdır. Gerçekçilik teriminin kullanımı disiplinden disipline ve öğretimden öğretime değişmektedir. Örneğin bilim felsefesinde bu terim, pozitivism ve ampirizmin ileri sürdüğü gibi ampirik geçerlilik ya da matematiksel katılık açısından zorlayıcı olmamakla birlikte, insan zihninin dışındaki nesnel varlığın doğrulanmasına yönelik bir yaklaşımı ifade eder. Siyaset biliminde bu terim, varsayılan fayda veya çıkar maksimizasyonu faaliyetinde bulunmak için statü ve kaynaklara dayalı güç politikasına atıfta bulunur. Bu arayışta rasyonalite ve kendi kendine yardım anahtar kavramlardır. Bununla birlikte, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi kapsamında realizm, teoriyi ve uluslararası ontolojiyi tanımlayan bazı temel varsayımlara dayanan uluslararası sahnenin özellikle ayrı bir siyasi alanı kapsar. En basit haliyle, insan doğası ve uluslararası bir küresel hükümetin yokluğu tarafından siyasete dayatılan kısıtlamaları ve zorlamaları vurgular. Bunlar birlikte uluslararası ilişkileri büyük ölçüde bir güç ve çıkar mücadelesi alanı haline getirir. Ayrıca, hayatta kalma arayışında olan aşılmaz ve hakim üniter aktörler rolündeki devletler ve son olarak da devletlerin etkileşimleri ve yetenekleriyle ilgili güç dengesi tarafından tanımlanır. Uluslararası hükümetin yokluğu, realizmin en kritik tanımlayıcı bileşeni olan, aktörlerin uygun bir güvenlik güvencesi olmadan gelişmeye çalıştığı çoklu devlet ortamında daha büyük ve uygulayıcı otoritenin yokluğu anlamına gelen uluslararası anarşi kavramını üretir. Bu bir devlet için beka adına kendine yardım etme rejimi dikte eder. Dolayısıyla, askeriye yoğunluklu veya vurgulu güvenlik, bu dünya yaklaşımının diğer temel itici özelliğidir. Uluslararası İlişkiler realizminin bu

temel kavramsal sütunları, Hans Morgenthau ve Edward H. Carr'ın rehberliğinde klasik realizmin kayda değer yükselişi, Kenneth Waltz'ın yapısalcı veya neo revizyonu ve Randal L. Schweller ve Glenn Snyder gibi figürler tarafından temsil edilen neo-klasik gelenek başlığı altında klasik ve neo unsurların eleştirel yakınsaması ile yakın tarih boyunca realizmin entelektüel evriminin ürünleridir. Kuralcı anlamda realizm, devlet aygıtının karar vericileri için bir politika oluşturma yolu sunar ve normatif olarak önerildiğinde, bir aktörün tanımlanan dünyada başarılı olmak için realist bir şekilde hareket etmesi gerektiren bir ahlak türünün savunucusudur. Analitik anlamda ise, bir sorunun çözümü için gerçekçi önerilere ihtiyaç duymayan, bunun yerine birincil sorunu veya bir takım temel olguları kendi kavramsallığında teşhis edip sergileyen teorik bir araçtır. Bu ayrımın yapılması, realist reçetenin uygun bir çözüm sağlamaktan ziyade negatif geri bildirim döngülerinin istenmeyen sonuçlarına yol açabileceği için çok önemlidir. Daha katı teorik terimlerle ifade etmek gerekirse, bir sistemi asla aksi şekilde ayarlanamayan sıfır toplamlı bir oyun olarak tanımlamak, başka yollarla çözülebilecek ve muhtemelen pozitif toplamlı bir ortam yaratabilecek sıfır toplam eğimli mücadele alanlarına işaret etmekten farklıdır. Gayri askeri statüdeki Kuzeydoğu Ege Adaları meselesinde realizm özellikle coğrafi yakınlık, ofansif güç ve niyete vurgu yapan Stephen Walt'ın geliştirilmiş yapısal realizmi (tehdit dengesi) ile literatürde ilişkiselliği bahsedilmemiş bir uygulama ilişkisine sahiptir ama yapısal realizm ile beraber realizmin kendi sınırları meselenin daha geniş bir çerçeveden incelenmesini ve devlet güvenliğinin ötesinde daha derin olası nedensel ilişkilerin yakalama ihtimalini güçleştirmektedir. Diğer teorilerle beraber realizm jeopolitik kaynaklar, strateji ve dış politika yapımı ile esas operasyonel bağlamını elde etmektedir. Kısaca realist çerçeve, iddiya göre uluslar sistemine atfedilebilecek iç mekanizmalardan birisini sunmaktadır. Ancak devletlerarası sistem gibi bir toplumsal sistemin kurulabilmesi ve hayata geçirilebilmesi için içinde bulunduğu coğrafi varlığıyla ilişki içerisinde olan bir bağlam ve içeriğe ihtiyacı vardır. Siyaset ve coğrafyanın kesiştiği nokta burasıdır ve Türk-Yunan ilişkilerini daha geniş bir jeopolitik bağlamda şekillendirmektedir. Bunu takiben, Ege Denizi ve adaları, katılımcı aktörler tarafından büyük stratejik bakış açılarına uygun olarak tanımlanmakta ve işlevselleştirilmektedir. Bu aktörler arasında büyük oyun tahtasındaki hesaplarına ilişkin açıklamalar ve yaklaşımlar jeopolitik hesaplar olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bir bilim dalı olarak jeopolitik, bir devletin çıkarlarını

koruyabilmesi ve geliştirebilmesi için coğrafi konumuna ve ulusal güç unsurlarına göre izleyeceği genel politika, planlama ve stratejileri belirler. Jeopolitik, ulusal siyasi meseleleri fiziki coğrafya temelinde anlama çabası olmakla birlikte, siyasi eylemler ile bu eylemlerin gerçekleştiği coğrafya arasındaki ilişkiyi vurgulayan bir karar olarak da yorumlanabilir. Bir ülkenin nüfusu, sosyal dokusu, psikolojisi, siyasi eğilimi ve ekonomisi jeopolitiğin değişime açık unsurlarını; sınırlar, yer altı ve yer üstü zenginlikleri ve coğrafi nüfus gibi parametreler ise jeopolitiğin değişime kapalı unsurlarını oluşturmaktadır. Bir yandan aktörlerin birbirlerinin olan politik ve materyal dinamizmine nazarla coğrafyanın yalnızca bir sahne teşkil ettiği bir vaziyeti de anlatabilir. Bu noktada jeopolitik ve stratejik analiz büyük güçler, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'daki aktörlerin birbirlerine nazarla kendi jeopolitik ve stratejik algı, yorum, tanım, davranış ve kararlarına göre Kuzey Doğu Ege adalarını ve gayri askerileştirme meselesini ele almaktadır. Fakat analizin kapsamının genişleyebilmesi için başka teorilerin özellikle küreselleşen neoliberal dünya bağlamında bu kompleks resme dahil olması gerekmektedir.

Liberal yaklaşımlar, kendisini realist kötümserlik ve eleştirel aktivizmden ayıran bir uluslararası işleyiş biçimi oluşturmaya çalışan geniş bir fikirler bütünüdür. Batı düşüncesinin aydınlanma devrinde ortaya çıkan siyasi liberalizminden türemiştir ve bu geleneğin uluslararası ilişkiler alanına bir uzantısıdır. Etkin akademisyenler Keohane ve Nye, çağdaş uluslararası ilişkiler liberalizminin modern uzantısının önde gelen öncülerindedir. Keohane ve Nye'in entelektüel olarak inşa ettikleri şey, devletler ve silahlı kuvvetler dışında sınır ötesi bağlantılara, örgütlere ve kurumlara vurgu yaparak siyasi liberalizm için bir kavramsallaştırma ve operasyonelleştirme yoludur; burada karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılık, bir zamanlar uluslararası olarak kabul edilen ve bir zamanlar nihai olarak devlet egemenliğinde olanın uluslararası (transnasyonal) hale getirilmesinin anahtarını somutlaştırmaktadır. Yerel bir uygulama olarak, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde gerilimleri azaltmak için liberalizm uygulamasının temel öncülleri, karşılıklı ekonomik ilişkilere ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra liberal uluslararası düzenin ortaya çıkışına yoğun bir şekilde vurgu yapmaktadır. Hem Türkiye hem de Yunanistan, Batı Bloku'na katılımları yoluyla bu düzene proaktif olarak bağlı kalmışlardır. Bu nedenle, liberalizmin ilke ve uygulamalarının NATO ve AB'nin uluslararası bağlamında Ege Denizi'ndeki Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde de kendini

gösterdiği ve bu ilişkilerin iki toplum ve devlet arasındaki ikili liberal boyutu da kapsadığı açıktır. Bununla birlikte, pratik durum, toplumlar arası ilişkilerin uyumlaştırılması ve pozitif toplamlı bir bağlamda çatışmaların önlenmesine ilişkin liberal teorilerin öngördüğü sonuçlardan önemli ölçüde sapmaktadır. Pratik sonuçların biraz karışık bir tablo sergilediği, ancak iki devleti birbirine bağlayan artan karşılıklı bağımlılık nedeniyle birbirlerini görmezden gelememeleri açısından da etkili olduğu düşünülmektedir. Sorun, uluslararası bir ekonomik düzen içinde iki devlet ve toplum içinde gelişen sosyal yapıların ekonomik ve uluslararası gereklilikleri nedeniyle liberal fikirlerin birkaç on yıl boyunca uygulanmasına rağmen, bu teorilerin mevcut gerilimleri çözümede etkili bir araç olmamasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Literatür, özellikle Ege Denizi üzerindeki etkiye ve adaların pratik egemenliğine ve statüsüne yönelik herhangi bir potansiyel meydan okumayla ilgili olarak, Türk-Yunan vakası bağlamında liberalizmin realist dinamiklerin ve düşünsel siyasetin terimleri ve müdahaleci uygulamaları tarafından gölgede bırakılmaya açık olduğunu ortaya koyma eğilimindedir. Liberal yaklaşımın sınırları ortaya konduktan sonra eleştirel yaklaşımlar inceleme konusu yapılmıştır. Eleştirel açıklamalar, askerden arındırma statüsü çalışmalarında açık ara en az operasyonelleştirilmiş yaklaşımlardır; bu da, realizmin tartışılabilir istisnası dışında, bu konudaki teorik açıklamalarının nadirliğinin bir başka göstergesidir. Hiçbir açıklama, askerden arındırmanın iki alan altında ayrı ayrı ele alınması nedeniyle eleştirel açıklamalara değinmemektedir: Hukuk ve Güvenlik. Bu nedenle, çok boyutluluk analitik sorgulamada daha fazla mevcut olabilir ve uygulanabilirken, politik ekonomik değerlendirmeler ciddi şekilde eksiktir, çünkü yasal ve güvenlik çerçevelerinin politik ekonomik sosyal dinamiklerin ve yapıların omuzlarında yükseldiği, onlara uyacak şekilde oluşturulduğu ve daha sonra sosyal evrim nedeniyle onlara uymayabileceği varsayılabilir. Dolayısıyla, Doğu Ege adalarının askerden arındırılmış statüsü bir istisna değildir. Ancak öncelikle, az kullanılan bu anlatılara kısaca değinilmelidir. Eleştirel açıklamalar, literatürde ortodoks olmayan açıklamalar teriminden neo-Marksist açıklamalara kadar birçok takma almakta, ancak bunların hepsi Marksist türde yapısal ekonomik analiz kullanmamaktadır ve bu nedenle post-yapısalcı veya bazen post-modern niteliktedir. Buna ek olarak, Marksist türde analiz kullanımı, ilgili eleştirel materyalde büyük ölçüde değiştirilmiştir. "Eleştirel" teriminin bu şekilde kullanılması, geleneksel ekonomi anlayışına meydan okumayı amaçlayan tüm fikirleri ve teorik çerçeveleri

kapsayan teorik bir şemsiye oluşturma çabasının bir sonucudur. Eleştirel yaklaşımın temel özelliklerinden biri, sadece verili sistemdeki düzenlemelerin değişimine odaklanmak yerine, mevcut sistemi değiştirerek yerine alternatifini koyabilen dinamik toplumsal değişimdir. Eleştirel çalışmalarda bu analitik özellik, sınıf odaklı toplumsal mücadeleye dayanan tarihsel ilerleme ve evrimin bir ürünü olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu nedenle eleştirel yaklaşımlara göre, Uluslararası İlişkiler'in daha önce tartışılan geleneksel yaklaşımları, kaçınılmaz ontolojik veya sosyo-etik zorunluluk olarak teorik değerlendirmelerinden bağımsız ve bağımsız olarak, mevcut sosyal ve politik yapıları meşrulaştırmaya yönelik kronik bir eğilimle, gerçek anlamda eleştirel değil, sadece mevcut bir düzende sorun çözümlerinin göstergesidir. Bu tezde daha yapısal odağa sahip eleştirel yaklaşımlar tercih edilmiş; bu konudaki etkin öncüler olan Wallerstein ve Cox'ın yaklaşımlarının ana hatlarıyla adalarının statüsünün belirlenmesinde nasıl açıklamalarda bulunabileceği tartışılmıştır. Wallerstein'in yaklaşımıyla adalar, Yunanistan ve Türkiye Büyük Avrupai güçlerin temsil ettiği merkeze nazarla çevreleştirilmiştir. Cox'un yaklaşımdan ise rıza ve zorlama temelinde neden Ege bağlamında Yunanistan'ın adalarda silahlanma çabasına rağmen istikrarlı bir hegemonyanın ya da istikrarın kurulamadığı tartışılmış, bir yandan ilerleyen kısımlarda da bu yaklaşımın ışığından faydalanılarak Batı ittifak bloğu kapsamında Birleşik Devletlerin ve diğer potansiyel hegemonik aktörlerin Türk Yunan ilişkilerindeki potansiyel bölücü ve kışkırtıcı etkisine vurgu yapılmıştır. Politik ekonomik fayda ve bu sürtüşmeden istifade edecek sermaye çıkarları anlaşılmalı çalışılmıştır.

Sonuç itibarıyla dördüncü bölümde, askerden arındırma konusuna çeşitli yaklaşımların uygulanabileceği keşfedilmiştir; sadece literatüre hakim olan hukuki ve tarihsel yaklaşımlar değil, aynı zamanda çeşitli disiplinlerden, tipik olarak uluslararası ilişkiler sahasının çok disiplinli sorgulamalarından gelen yaklaşımlar da konu hakkındaki araştırmayı durduğu ve etkileşimde bulunduğu daha geniş çerçeveye ilişkili olarak ilerletmek için kullanılabilir. Araştırmacının konuya ilişkin algısını oluşturan zihin bulmacasını doldurmak üzere bağımsız değişkenlerin rolünü üstlenebilecek potansiyel adaylar olarak katı gerçeklere dayalı nedensellikler değil, bazı işlevsel teorik içgörüler sunmaktadır. Beşinci bölüm ilgili değişkenleri ve parametreleri sistematik bir şekilde inceleyerek en son gelişmeleri bunlardan yola çıkarak tanımlamaktadır. Amaç,

çevredeki jeopolitik ve ekonomik ortamın evrimiyle ilişkili olarak konunun mevcut gelişimini aydınlatacak değerli içgörüler elde etmektir. Bu, konuya yönelik daha dar yaklaşımları analiz çerçevesini genişletme konusunda teşvik etmeyi gözden kaçırmadan gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bu anlamda NAVTEX mesajları, gelişen Yunan-ABD askeri ilişkileri ve Türkiye'nin tepkileri incelenmiştir ve gerek Yunanistan, gerekse de ABD'nin adaların Türkiye'yi kışkırtacak biçimde silahlandırılmasının arkasındaki olası askeri ve politik ekonomik temelde işleyen çıkar bağlamları ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır. Aynı zamanda bir LNG merkezine çevrilen Dedeağaç'ın askerileştirilmesi ve ABD'nin teşvikiyle LNG'nin yükselişte olduğu enerji sektörüyle ilişki kurulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu inceleme başlıkları ve bulguları ışığında bu bölümde, genellikle tarihi hukuki temeller, hukuki normativizm ve iki taraflı jeopolitik eylemler ışığında yorumlanan ve anlaşılan konuya daha taze ve daha geniş bir bakış açısı getirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Böylesi bakış açıları teşvik edilmek istenmiştir. Bu perspektif genişlemesinin gerçekleşmesi için tarihsel ve teorik temelin ortaya konmasının ardından, askerden arındırma konusunun ele alınmasında ekonomi politik ve çok kutuplu jeopolitik gibi daha alışılmadık analiz araçlarının ve daha az operasyonel yaklaşımların kullanılabileceği araştırılmıştır. Mevcut konjonktürün inceleme odağı olması halinde, Yunanistan ve Türkiye'nin yanı sıra ABD gibi diğer aktörlerin de bu konuya müdahil olabileceğini veya hesaba katılması gerektiğini göstermiştir. Bu yaklaşım, başta Britanya ve Rusya İmparatorlukları olmak üzere Büyük Güçlerin müdahil olduğu, güncel ABD müdahalesi örneğiyle de uyumlu olan genel tarihsel kanıtlarla da desteklenmektedir. Bu bölüm ayrıca askerden arındırılmış adalar sorununun, enerji tüketim pazarının genişlemesi gibi daha genel toplumsal ve ekonomik sorunlarla bağlantılı olabileceğini göstermektedir. Yasadışı askerileştirme, ekonomik olarak kırılgan bir bölgede petrol altyapısının ve arz oranlarının geliştirilmesini teşvik etmekte ve cesaretlendirmektedir. Yasal ve iki taraflı boyutlar zorunludur ancak konunun tam olarak ele alınması için yetersizdir.

Sonuç olarak bu tez, Lozan Barış Antlaşması'nda açıkça yazılı biçimde askerden arındırılmış bir statü zikredilmemesine rağmen, antlaşma müzakerelerinin akdinin ve antlaşmada boy gösteren düzenlemelerin Kuzey Doğu Ege Adaları'na uluslararası hukuk hükümlerine dayanan katı bir askerden arındırma rejimini dayattığı yorumlanmasının zorunlu olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. Bu sonuç, tarihsel

uluslararası mevzuatın metinsel ve kronolojik yapısının gerekli bir sonucudur.

B. Treaty of London – Peace Treaty between Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire – Relevant Article, 30 May 1913

Article 5

His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans and their Majesties the Allied Sovereigns declare that they entrust to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias the task of determining the title to all the Ottoman islands in the Aegean Sea (except the island of Crete) and to the peninsula of Mount Athos.

C. Treaty of Athens – Relevant Article, 14 November 1913

Article 15

The contracting parties undertake to comply with the provisions of the Treaty of London dated 30 May 1913, including the provision of the fifth article of the treaty, in matters concerning them.

D. The Decision of Six Powers, 13 February 1914

The undersigned, ambassadors of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Great Britain and the Chargés d’Affaires of France, Germany and Russia, have the honour, by order of their governments, to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government the following communication:

By article 5 of the Treaty of London of May 17/30, 1913, between Turkey and the Balkan Allied States, as well as by article 15 of the Treaty signed in Athens between Turkey and Greece on November 1, 1913, the Porte is committed to leaving it to the six Powers to decide the fate of the Aegean Islands.

Consequently, the six Powers submitted the question to careful study and after an exchange of views, decided that Greece would restore to Turkey the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos and retain definitive* possession of the other islands of the Sea Aegean which it currently occupies. The island of Castellorizo will also be returned to Turkey. The Six Powers also decided that satisfactory guarantees would be given to them and to Turkey by Greece that the islands of which it will retain possession will neither be fortified nor used for naval or military purposes and that it will take effective measures in order to prevent smuggling between the islands and Ottoman territory. The six Powers have undertaken to use their influence over the Greek Government with a view to ensuring the loyal execution and maintenance of these conditions. The six Powers will also demand from Greece satisfactory guarantees for the protection of Muslim minorities in the islands it acquires.

The six Powers have confidence that the above decisions will be faithfully respected by the Ottoman Government.

E. The Treaty of Sèvres – Relevant Articles, 10 August 1920

Part 3

Political Clauses

Section 5

Greece

Article 84

Without prejudice to the frontiers of Bulgaria laid down by the Treaty of Peace signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27, 1919, Turkey renounces in favour of Greece all rights and title over the territories of the former Turkish Empire in Europe situated outside the frontiers of Turkey as laid down by the present Treaty.

The islands of the Sea of Marmora are not included in the transfer of sovereignty effected by the above paragraph.

Turkey further renounces in favour of Greece all her rights and title over the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The decision taken by the Conference of Ambassadors at London in execution of Articles 5 of the Treaty of London of May 17/30, 1913, and

15 of the Treaty of Athens of November 1/1-1, 1913, and notified to the Greek Government on February 13, 1914, relating to the sovereignty of Greece over the other islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, is confirmed, without prejudice to the provisions of the present Treaty relating to the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy and referred to in Article 122, and to the islands lying less than three miles from the coast of Asia.

Nevertheless, in the portion of the zone of the Straits and the islands, referred to in Article 178, which under the present Treaty are placed under Greek sovereignty, Greece accepts and undertakes to observe, failing any contrary stipulation in the present Treaty, all the obligations which, in order to assure the freedom of the Straits, are imposed by the present Treaty on Turkey in that portion of the said zone, including the islands of the Sea of Marmora, which remains under Turkish sovereignty.

Section 11

Libya

Aegean Islands

Article 121

Turkey definitely renounces all rights and privileges which under the Treaty of Lausanne of October 18, 1912, were left to the Sultan in Libya.

Article 122

Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands of the Aegean Sea: Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Pscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calymnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Sini (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo.

Part 5

Military, Naval and Air Clauses.

Section 1

Military Clauses

Chapter 7

Fortifications.

Article 177

In the zone of the Straits and islands referred to in Article 178 the fortifications will be disarmed and demolished as provided in that Article. Outside this zone, and subject to the provisions of Article 89, the existing fortified works may be preserved in their present condition but will be disarmed within the same period of three months.

Chapter 8

Maintenance of the Freedom of the Straits

Article 178

For the purpose of guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits, the High Contracting Parties agree to the following provisions:

(1) Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all works, fortifications and batteries within the zone defined in Article 179' and comprising the coast and islands of the Sea of Marmora and the coast of the Straits, also those in the Islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mitylene, shall be disarmed and demolished.

The reconstruction of these works and the construction of similar works are forbidden in the above zone and islands. France, Great Britain and Italy shall have the right to prepare for demolition any existing roads and railways in the said zone and in the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, and Tenedos which allow of the rapid transport of mobile batteries, the construction there of such roads and railways remaining forbidden.

In the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace and Tenedos the construction of new roads or railways must not be undertaken except with the authority of the three Powers mentioned above.

(2) The measures prescribed in the first paragraph of (1) shall be executed by and at the expense of Greece and Turkey as regards their respective territories, and under control as provided in Article 203.

(3) The territories of the zone and the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos, and Mitylene shall not be used for military purposes, except by the three

Allied Powers referred to above, acting in concert. This provision does not exclude the employment in the said zone and islands of forces of Greek and Turkish gendarmerie, who will be under the Inter-Allied command of the forces of occupation, in accordance with the provisions of Article 161, nor the maintenance of a garrison of Greek troops in the island of Mitylene, nor the presence of the Sultan's bodyguard referred to in Article 152.

(4) The said Powers, acting in concert, shall have the right to maintain in the said territories and islands such military and air forces as they may consider necessary to prevent any action being taken or prepared which might directly or indirectly prejudice the freedom of the Straits.

This supervision will be carried out in naval matters by a guard-ship belonging to each of the said Allied Powers.

The forces of occupation referred to above may, in case of necessity, exercise on land the right of requisition, subject to the same conditions as those laid down in the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention, 1907, or any other Convention replacing it to which all the said Powers are parties. Requisitions shall, however, only be made against payment on the spot.

F. The Lausanne Treaty of Peace – Relevant Articles, 24 July 1923

Part 1

Political Clauses

Section 1

1. Territorial Clauses

Article 12

The decision taken on the 13th February, 1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue of Articles 5 of the Treaty of London of the 17th-30th May, 1913, and 15 of the Treaty of Athens of the 1st-14th November, 1913, which decision was communicated to the Greek Government on the 13th February, 1914, regarding the sovereignty of Greece

over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, is confirmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty respecting the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of

Article 13

With a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace, the Greek Government undertakes to observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria:

- (1) No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands.
- (2) Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Government will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands.
- (3) The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory.

Article 15

Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo.

Article 16

Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future

of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.

The provisions of the present Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising from neighbourly relations which have been or may be concluded between Turkey and any limitrophe countries.

**G. Lausanne Convention Relating to the Régime of the Straits – Relevant Articles,
24 July 1923**

Article 3

With a view to maintaining the Straits free from any obstacle to free passage and navigation, the provisions contained in Articles 4 to 9 will be applied to the waters and shores thereof as well as to the islands situated therein, or in the vicinity.

Article 4

The zones and islands indicated below shall be demilitarised:

1) Both shores of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus over the extent of the zones delimited below (see the attached map)

Dardanelles:

On the north-west, the Gallipoli Peninsula and the area south-east of a line traced from a point on the Gulf of Xeros 4 kilometres north-east of Bakla-Burnu, reaching the Sea of Marmora at Kumbaghi and passing south of Kavak (this village excluded);

On the south-east, the area included between the coast and a line 20 kilometres from the coast, starting from Cape Eski-Stamboul opposite Tenedos and reaching the Sea of Marmora at a point on the coast immediately north of Karabigha.

Bosphorus (without prejudice to the special provisions relating to Constantinople contained in Article 8);

On the east, the area extending up to a line 15 kilometres from the western shore of the Bosphorus;

On the west, the area up to a line 15 kilometres from the western shore of the

Bosphorus.

2) All the islands in the Sea of Marmora, with the exception of the island of Emir Ali Adasi.

3) In the Aegean Sea, the islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands.

Article 6

Subject to the provisions of Article 8 concerning Constantinople, there shall exist, in the demilitarised zones and islands, no fortifications, no permanent artillery organisation, no submarine engines of war other than submarine vessels, no military aerial organisation, and no naval base.

No armed forces shall be stationed in the demilitarised zones and islands except the police and gendarmerie forces necessary for the maintenance of order; the armament of such forces will be composed only of revolvers, swords, rifles and four Lewis guns per hundred men, and will exclude any artillery.

In the territorial waters of the demilitarised zones and islands, there shall exist no submarine engines of war other than submarine vessels.

Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs Turkey will retain the right to transport her armed forces through the demilitarised zones and islands of Turkish territory, as well as through their territorial waters, where the Turkish fleet will have the right to anchor.

Moreover, in so far as the Straits are concerned, the Turkish Government shall have the right to observe by means of aeroplanes or balloons both the surface and the bottom of the sea. Turkish aeroplanes will always be able to fly over the waters of the Straits and the demilitarised zones of Turkish territory, and will have full freedom to alight therein, either on land or on sea.

In the demilitarised zones and islands and in their territorial waters, Turkey and Greece shall similarly be entitled to effect such outside these zones and islands of the men recruited therein.

Turkey and Greece shall have the right to organise in the said zones and islands in their respective territories any system of observation and communication, both telegraphic, telephonic and visual. Greece shall be entitled to send her fleet into the territorial waters of the demilitarised Greek islands but may not use these waters as a base of operations against Turkey nor for any military or naval concentration for this purpose.

Article 9

If, in case of war, Turkey, or Greece, in pursuance of their belligerent rights, should modify in any way the provisions of demilitarisation prescribed above, they will be bound to re-establish as soon as peace is concluded the regime laid down in the present Convention.

H. Proceedings of the Montreux Conference, Convention Drafts, June-July 20, 1936

June-July 20, 1936

III. Appendices

Appendix I

Draft Convention Proposed by the Government of the Turkish Republic with a Concern of Replacing the Convention Concerning the Regime of the Straits Signed in Lausanne on July 24, 1923

Preamble

BULGARIA, BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, GREECE, ITALY, JAPAN,

ROMANIA, TURKEY, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS and YUGOSLAVIA,

Motivated by the desire to regulate the passage and navigation in the Dardanelles Strait, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus, included under the general name of "Straits", so as to safeguard the interests of international trade within the framework of the security of Turkey , have resolved to replace with a new Convention that concluded at Lausanne on July 24, 1923 which they recognize and declare abrogated, and have appointed for this purpose their respective plenipotentiaries:

Section V

Article 13

This Convention, which abrogates and replaces the provisions of the Convention concerning the Straits regime signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, will be ratified and the ratifications will be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic in Paris, as soon as possible. It will come into force on the date of its signature. It will last for fifteen years. Turkey and each of the other contracting powers, with the consent of this, will have the faculty to propose, in giving three months' notice to the contracting parties, any modification to this agreement that they deem useful, at the expiration of each five-year period from the date of signing.

Appendix II

New Draft Version Established on The Turkish Draft Convention on July 4, 1936, By the Delegation of The United Kingdom

Section V

Article 24

This Convention repeals the Convention concerning the Straits Regime which was

signed in Lausanne on July 24, 1923.

I. The Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Relevant Segment), 20 July 1936

Preamble

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BULGARIANS, THE PRESIDENT BRITAIN, IRELAND AND THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND HELLENES, HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN, HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ROUMANIA, THE PRESIDENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC, THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AND HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF YUGOSLAVIA;

Desiring to regulate transit and navigation in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term "Straits" in such manner as to safeguard, within the framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian States, the principle enshrined in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th of July 1923.

Have resolved to replace by the present Convention the Convention signed at Lausanne on the 24th of July 1923, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

J. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy (Paris), Relevant Segments, 10 February 1947

Part I

Territorial Clauses

Section V

Greece (Special Clause)

Article 14

1. Italy hereby cedes to Greece in full sovereignty the Dodecanese Islands indicated hereafter, namely Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), Cos (Kos) and Castellorizo, as well as the adjacent islets.

2. These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarised.

3. The procedure and the technical conditions governing the transfer of these islands to Greece will be determined by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Greece and arrangements shall be made for the withdrawal of foreign troops not later than 90 days from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Part XL

Final Clauses

Article 89

The provisions of the present Treaty shall not confer any rights or benefits on any State named in the Preamble as one of the Allied and Associated Powers or on its nationals until such State becomes a party to the Treaty by deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Annex XIII. Definitions

(See Articles 11, 14, 49 and Article 3 of Annex VI)

For the purpose of the present Treaty the terms "demilitarisation" and "demilitarised" shall be deemed to prohibit, in the territory and territorial waters concerned, all naval, military and military air installations, fortifications and their armaments; artificial military, naval and air obstacles; the basing or the permanent or temporary stationing of military, naval and military air units; military training in any form; and the production of war material. This does not prohibit internal security personnel restricted in number to meeting tasks of an internal character and equipped with weapons which

can be carried and operated by one person, and the necessary military training of such personnel.

K. Original Texts in French

Traité de Paix signé à Londres le 17/30 Mai 1913, entre la Bulgarie, la Grèce, le Monténégro, la Serbie et la Turquie.

Article 5

Sa Majesté l'empereur des Ottomans et Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés déclarent confier à Sa Majesté l'empereur d'Allemagne, à Sa Majesté l'empereur d'Autriche, roi de Bohême, etc., et roi apostolique de Hongrie, à M. le président de la République française, à Sa Majesté le roi de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des territoires britanniques au delà des mers, empereur des Indes, à Sa Majesté le roi d'Italie et à Sa Majesté l'empereur de toutes les Russies le soin de statuer sur le sort de toutes les îles ottomanes de la mer Égée, l'île de Crète exceptée, et de la péninsule du Mont-Athos.

La Décision de six Puissances

Tél.

No. 4226g/42.

Voici la note qui m'a été remise aujourd'hui par les Ambassadeurs des six Grandes Puissances:

“Les soussignés, ambassadeurs d'Autriche -Hongrie, d'Italie, et de Grande-Bretagne et les Chargés d'Affaires de France, d'Allemagne et de Russie, ont l'honneur, d'ordre de leurs Gouvernements, de porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement Impérial la communication suivante:

Par P'article 5 du Traité de Londres du 17/30 Mai 1913 entre la Turquie et les Etats alliés balkaniques, ainsi que par l'article 15 du Traité signé à Athènes entre la Turquie et la Grèce le 1er Novembre 1913, la Porte s'est engagée à laisser aux six Puissances le soin de décider du sort des Îles de la Mer Egée.

En conséquence, les six Puissances ont soumis la question à une étude attentive et après un échange de vues, ont décidé que la Grèce restituerait à la Turquie les Îles d'Imbros et de Ténédos et conserverait la possession définitive* des autres îles de la Mer Egée qu'elle occupe actuellement. L'île de Castellorizo sera également rendue à la Turquie. Les six Puissances ont également décidé que des garanties satisfaisantes leur seraient données ainsi qu'à la Turquie par la Grèce que les îles dont elle gardera la possession ne seront ni fortifiées ni utilisées pour un but naval ou militaire et qu'elle prendra des mesures effectives en vue de prévenir la contrebande entre les îles et le territoire Ottoman. Les six Puissances se sont engagées d'user de leur influence sur le Gouvernement Grec en vue d'assurer l'exécution loyale et le maintien de ces conditions. Les six Puissances exigeront, en outre, de la Grèce des garanties satisfaisantes pour la protection des minorités musulmanes dans les îles qu'elle acquiert.

Les six Puissances ont la confiance que les décisions ci-dessus seront loyalement respectées par le Gouvernement Ottoman.

Traité de paix entre les Puissances alliées et associées et la Turquie (Traité de Sèvres)

Partie III

Clauses politiques

Section V

Grèce

Article 84

Sous réserve des frontières attribuées à la Bulgarie par le Traité de paix signé à Neuilly-sur-Seine le 27 novembre 1919, la Turquie renonce en faveur de la Grèce à tous droits et titres de l'ancien Empire ottoman situés en Europe au delà des frontières de la Turquie fixées par le présent Traité.

Les îles de la mer de Marmara ne sont pas comprises dans le transfert de souveraineté stipulé à l'alinéa qui précède.

La Turquie renonce, en outre, en faveur de la Grèce à tous ses droits et titres sur les îles de Imbros et Tenedos. La décision prise par la Conférence des Ambassadeurs à Londres, en exécution des articles 5 du Traité de Londres du 17/30 mai 1913 et 15 du Traité d'Athènes du 1/14 novembre 1913, et notifiée au Gouvernement hellénique le 13 février 1914, concernant la souveraineté de la Grèce sur les autres îles de la Méditerranée orientale, notamment Lemnos, Samothrace, Mitylène, Chios, Samos et Nikaria, est confirmée sans préjudice des stipulations du présent Traité, concernant les îles placées sous la souveraineté de l'Italie et visées à l'article 122, ainsi que les îles situées à moins de trois milles de la côte asiatique.

Toutefois, dans la partie de la zone des Détroits et les îles, prévues à l'article 178, placées en vertu du présent Traité sous la souveraineté hellénique, la Grèce accepte et s'engage à observer, à moins de stipulations contraires du présent Traité, toutes les obligations qu'en vue d'assurer la liberté des Détroits le présent Traité impose à la Turquie dans la partie de ladite zone, y compris les îles de la mer de Marmara restant sous la souveraineté ottomane.

Section XI

Libye et îles de la mer Égée

Article 121

La Turquie renonce définitivement à tous droits et privilèges qui, en vertu du Traité de Lausanne du 12 octobre 1912, avaient été réservés au Sultan en Libye.

Article 122

La Turquie renonce, en faveur de l'Italie, à tous ses droits et titres sur les îles de la mer Égée, savoir: Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi) et Cos (Cos), actuellement occupées par l'Italie et les îlots qui en dépendant, ainsi que sur l'île de Castellorizzo.

Partie V

Clauses militaires, navales et aériennes

Section I. Clauses militaires

Chapitre VII

Fortifications

Article 177

Dans la zone des Détroits et des îles, prévue à l'article 178, les fortifications seront désarmées et démolies ainsi qu'il est prévu audit article.

En dehors de cette zone et sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 89, les ouvrages fortifiés existants pourront être conservés dans leur état actuel, mais seront désarmés dans le même délai de trois mois

Chapitre VIII

Maintien de la liberté des Détroits

Article 178

En vue de garantir la liberté des Détroits, les Hautes Parties contractantes conviennent des dispositions suivantes:

1° Dans le délai de trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, il sera procédé au désarmement et à la démolition de tous ouvrages, fortifications ou batteries dans une zone comme il est dit ci-après à l'article 179, et comprenant le littoral et les îles de la mer de Marmara et le littoral des Détroits, ainsi que dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos et Mitylène.

Sont interdites dans ladite zone et dans ces îles, la reconstruction de ces ouvrages et la construction d'ouvrages semblables. La France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie auront le droit, dans ladite zone ainsi que dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace et Tenedos, de préparer la mise hors service des routes et voies ferrées existantes et

pouvant être utilisées pour amener rapidement des batteries mobiles, et dont l'établissement y reste interdit.

Dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace et Tenedos, l'établissement de nouvelles routes ou voies ferrées ne pourra être entrepris qu'avec l'autorisation des trois Puissances ci-dessus mentionnées.

2° Les mesures prévues au § 1°, alinéa premier, seront exécutées, par les soins et aux frais de la Grèce et de la Turquie, en ce qui concerne leurs territoires respectifs, et sous le contrôle prévu à l'article 203.

3° Les territoires de la zone et les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos et Mitylène, ne pourront être utilisés militairement que par les trois Puissances alliées ci-dessus visées, agissant conjointement. Cette disposition n'est pas exclusive de l'emploi, dans ladite zone et îles, des forces de gendarmerie helléniques et ottomanes, qui seront subordonnées au commandement interallié des forces d'occupation conformément aux dispositions de l'article 161, non plus que du maintien d'une garnison hellénique dans l'île de Mitylène, ni de la présence de la garde personnelle du Sultan, prévue à l'article 152.

4° Lesdites Puissances agissant conjointement auront la faculté de maintenir dans lesdits territoires et îles telles forces militaires et aériennes qu'elles jugeront nécessaires pour empêcher qu'aucune action puisse être effectuée ou préparée, qui, directement ou indirectement, serait susceptible de porter atteinte à la liberté des Détroits.

Cette surveillance sera exercée, au point de vue naval, par un stationnaire de chacune desdites Puissances alliées.

Les forces d'occupation visées ci-dessus pourront, en cas de nécessité, exercer à terre le droit de réquisition, dans les mêmes conditions que celles prévues par le Règlement annexé à la Convention IV de La Haye 1907, ou toute autre convention qui viendrait à remplacer celle-ci et à laquelle chacune desdites Puissances serait partie. Toutefois, ces réquisitions ne pourront être effectuées que moyennant paiement immédiat.

Traité de Paix (Traité de Lausanne) 1923

Section I

Clauses territoriales

Article 12

La décision prise le 13 février 1914 par la Conférence de Londres, en exécution des Articles 5 du Traité de Londres du 17/30 mai 1913 et 15 du Traité d'Athènes du 1er/15 novembre 1913, ladite décision notifiée au Gouvernement hellénique le 13 février 1914, concernant la souveraineté de la Grèce sur les îles de la Méditerranée orientale, autres que les îles de Imbros, Tenedos et les îles aux Lapins, notamment les îles de Lemnos, Samothrace, Mitylène, Chio, Samos et Nikaria, est confirmée, sous réserve des stipulations du présent Traité relatives aux îles placées sous la souveraineté de l'Italie et visées à l'Article 15. Sauf stipulation contraire du présent Traité, les îles situées à moins de trois milles de la côte asiatique restent placées sous la souveraineté turque.

Article 13

En vue d'assurer le maintien de la paix, le Gouvernement hellénique s'engage à observer les mesures suivantes dans les îles de Mitylène, Chio, Samos et Nikaria :

1. Aucune base navale ni aucune fortification ne seront établies dans lesdites îles.
2. Il sera interdit à l'aviation militaire grecque de survoler le territoire de la côte d'Anatolie. Réciproquement, le Gouvernement turc interdira à son aviation militaire de survoler lesdites îles.
3. Les forces militaires helléniques dans lesdites îles seront limitées au contingent normal, appelé pour le service militaire, qui pourra être instruit sur place, ainsi qu'à un effectif de gendarmerie et de police proportionné à l'effectif de la gendarmerie et de la police existant sur l'ensemble du territoire hellénique.

Article 15

La Turquie renonce en faveur de l'Italie à tous ses droits et titres sur les îles ci-après

énumérées, savoir: Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), et Cos (Kos), actuellement occupées par l'Italie et les îlots qui en dépendent, ainsi que sur l'île de Castellorizo (voir Carte n) 2).

Article 16

La Turquie déclare renoncer à tous droits et titres, de quelque nature que ce soit, sur ou concernant les territoires situés au delà des frontières prévues par le présent Traité et sur les îles autres que celles sur lesquelles la souveraineté lui est reconnue par ledit Traité; le sort de ces territoires et îles étant réglé ou à régler par les intéressés.

Les dispositions du présent Article ne portent pas atteinte aux stipulations particulières intervenues ou à intervenir entre la Turquie et les pays limitrophes en raison de leur voisinage.

La Convention des Détroits (Lausanne)

Article 3

En vue de maintenir libres de toute entrave le passage et la navigation dans les Détroits, les mesures stipulées aux Articles 4 à 9 seront appliquées à leurs eaux et rives, ainsi qu'aux îles qui s'y trouvent ou qui les avoisinent.

Article 4

Seront démilitarisées les zones et îles désignées ci-après:

1° Les deux rives du détroit des Dardanelles et du détroit du Bosphore sur l'étendue des zones délimitées ci-dessous (voir la carte ci-jointe):

Dardanelles: Au Nord-Ouest, presqu'île de Gallipoli et région au Sud-Est d'une ligne

partant d'un point du golfe de Xeros situé à 4 kilomètres Nord-Est de Bakla-Burnu aboutissant sur la Mer de Marmara à Kumbaghi et passant au Sud de Kavak (cette localité exclue).

Au Sud-Est, région comprise entre la côte et une ligne tracée à 20 kilomètres de la côte, partant du cap Eski-Stamboul en face de Tenedos et aboutissant sur la Mer de Marmara en un point de la côte situé immédiatement au Nord de Karabigha.

Bosphore (sans préjudice du régime particulier de Constantinople, Art. 8): A l'Est, zone s'étendant jusqu'à une ligne tracée à 15 kilomètres de la côte orientale du Bosphore;

A l'Ouest, zone s'étendant jusqu'à une ligne tracée à 15 kilomètres de la côte occidentale du Bosphore.

2° Toutes les îles de la Mer de Marmara, sauf l'île d'Emir-Ali-Adasi.

3° Dans la Mer Égée, les îles de Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos et les îles aux Lapins.

Article 6

Sous réserve des dispositions de l'Article 8 concernant Constantinople, il ne devra y avoir, dans les zones et îles démilitarisées, aucune fortification, aucune installation permanente d'artillerie, d'engins d'action sous-marine autres que les bâtiments sous-marins, ni aucune installation d'aéronautique militaire, ni aucune base navale.

Aucune force armée ne devra y stationner en dehors des forces de police et de gendarmerie qui sont nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre, et dont l'armement ne comportera que le revolver, le sabre, le fusil et quatre fusils mitrailleurs par cent hommes à l'exclusion de toute artillerie.

Dans les eaux territoriales des zones et îles démilitarisées, il ne devra y avoir aucun engin d'action sous-marine, autre que des bâtiments sous-marins.

Nonobstant les alinéas qui précèdent, la Turquie gardera le droit de faire passer en transit ses forces armées dans les zones et îles démilitarisées du territoire turc, ainsi que dans leurs eaux territoriales où la flotte turque aura le droit de mouiller.

En outre, en ce qui concerne les Détroits, le gouvernement turc aura la faculté de faire observer, au moyen d'avions ou de ballons, la surface et le fond de la mer. Les aéronefs turcs pourront toujours survoler les eaux des Détroits et les zones démilitarisées du territoire turc et y atterrir ou amerrir partout en toute liberté.

La Turquie et la Grèce pourront également dans les zones et îles démilitarisées et dans leurs eaux territoriales, effectuer les mouvements de personnel nécessités par l'instruction, hors de ces zones et îles, des hommes qui y seront recrutés.

La Turquie et la Grèce auront la liberté d'organiser dans lesdites zones et îles de leurs territoires respectifs, tout système d'observation et de communications télégraphiques, téléphoniques et optiques. La Grèce pourra faire passer sa flotte dans les eaux territoriales des îles grecques démilitarisées, mais ne pourra user de ces eaux comme base d'opérations contre la Turquie ou pour une concentration navale ou militaire dans ce but.

Article 9

Si, en cas de guerre, la Turquie ou la Grèce, usant de leur droit de Puissances belligérantes, étaient amenées à apporter des modifications à l'état de démilitarisation prévu ci-dessus, elles seraient tenues de rétablir, dès la conclusion de la paix, le régime prévu par la présente Convention.

Actes de la conférence de Montreux [concernant le régime des Détroits]

Juin-20 Juillet 1936

III. Annexes

Annexe I

Projet de Convention Propose Par le Gouvernement de la République Turque en vue de Remplacer la Convention Concernant le Regime des Détroits Signée a Lausanne le 24 Juillet 1923.

Préambule

La BULGARIE, l'EMPIRE BRITANNIQUE, la FRANCE, la GRÈCE, l'ITALIE, le JAPON, la ROUMANIE, la TURQUIE, l'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES et la YOUGOSLAVIE,

Animés du désir de régler le passage et la navigation dans le Déroit des Dardanelles, la mer de Marmara et le Bosphore, comprissous la dénomination généralede « Détroits », de manière à sauvegarder les intérêts du commerce international dans le cadre de la sécurité de la Turquie, ont résolu de remplacer par une nouvelle Convention celle conclue à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 qu'ils reconnaissent et déclarent abrogée, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs

Article 13

La présente Convention, qui abroge et remplace les dispositions de la Convention concernant le régime des Détroits signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923, sera ratifiée et les ratifications seront déposées aux archives du Gouvernement de la République française à Paris, aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Elle entrera en vigueur à la date de sa signature.

Elle aura une durée de quinze ans. La Turquie et chacune des autres Puissances contractantes, avec le consentement de celle-ci, auront la faculté de proposer, en donnant un préavis de trois mois aux Parties contractantes, toute modification à la présente Convention qu'elles jugeront utiles, à l'expiration de chaque période quinquennale à compter de la date de la signature.

Nouvelle Version Établie le 4 Juillet 1936 par la Délégation du Royaume-Uni du Projet de Convention Turc.

Article 24

La présente Convention abroge la Convention concernant le régime des Détroits qui a été signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923.

Convention Concernant le Régime des Détroits, Signée A Montreux, le 20 Juillet 1936

Préambule

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DES BULGARES, LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE, D'IRLANDE ET DES TERRITOIRES BRITANNIQUES AU DELÀ DES MERS, EMPEREUR DES INDES, SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DES HELLÈNES, SA MAJESTÉ L'EMPEREUR DU JAPON, SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE ROUMANIE, LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TURQUE, LE COMITÉ CENTRAL EXÉCUTIF DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES, ET SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE YOUGOSLAVIE;

Animés du désir de régler le passage et la navigation dans le détroit des Dardanelles, la mer de Marmara et le Bosphore, compris sous la dénomination générale de « Détroits », de manière à sauvegarder, dans le cadre de la sécurité de la Turquie et de la sécurité, dans la mer Noire, des Etats riverains, le principe consacré par l'article 23 du Traité de paix signé à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923;

Ont résolu de substituer la présente Convention à la Convention signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires:

No 747. Traite' de Paix Avec l'Italie. Signe a Paris, le 10 Fevrier 1947

Partie I

Clauses Territoriales

Clauses Speciales)

Section V

Grèce (Clauses Spéciales)

Article 14

1. L'Italie cède à la Grèce en pleine souveraineté les îles du Dodécanèse ci-après énumérées, savoir: Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), Cos (Kos) et Castellorizo, ainsi que les îlots adjacents.

2. Ces îles seront et resteront démilitarisées.

3. Les formalités et les conditions techniques du transfert de ces îles à la Grèce seront fixées par un accord entre les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de la Grèce et des arrangements seront pris pour que le retrait des troupes étrangères soit terminé au plus tard quatre-vingt-dix jours après l'entrée en vigueur du présent Traité.

Partie XL Clauses Finales

Article 89

Les dispositions du présent Traité ne conféreront aucun droit ni bénéfice à aucun Etat désigné dans le préambule du Traité comme l'une des Puissances Alliées ou Associées ou à ses nationaux, jusqu'à ce que cet Etat devienne partie au Traité par le dépôt de son instrument de ratification.

D. Définition Des Termes "Démilitarisation" et "Démilitarisé" (voir articles 1.1, 14, 49 et article 3 de l'annexe VI)

Aux fins du présent Traité les termes "démilitarisation" et "démilitarisé" doivent s'entendre comme interdisant, sur le territoire et dans les eaux territoriales en cause, toutes installations et fortifications navales, militaires ou d'aviation militaire ainsi que leurs armements, les obstacles artificiels, militaires, navals ou aériens; l'utilisation de bases par des unités militaires, navales ou d'aviation militaire ou le stationnement permanent ou temporaire de ces mêmes unités; l'instruction militaire sous toutes ses

formes et la fabrication du matériel de guerre. Cette interdiction ne vise pas le personnel de sécurité intérieure limité en nombre à l'exécution de tâches de caractère intérieur et pourvu d'armes qui peuvent être transportées et servies par une seule personne, ainsi que l'instruction militaire nécessaire à un tel personnel.

L. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

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