MUSEUM AND EXHIBITION ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF
TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL MEMORY AFTER 1980

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to examine the transformation of museum and exhibition activities in the post- 1980 period in the context of the change of social memory. The dynamics which shaped collective memory in the post- 1980 period - such as the Turkish Islamic Synthesis as state discourse, the involvement of the bourgeoisie into cultural sphere, and the transformation of museum and exhibition activities under the effect of globalization and localization- will be analyzed through sample museums. Reflection of the conservative nationalist components by emphasizing the Golden Age of the Ottoman Empire in the museums and exhibition activities, the transformation of state monopolized cultural policies by the bourgeoisie through private museums, and the reflection of cultural heritage components in city museums in regard to the creation of city branding will be interpreted.

Keywords: Social memory, museums, exhibition activities, private museum, Neo-Ottomanism in museums

ÖZ

1980'DEN SONRA TOPLUMSAL HAFIZANIN DEĞİŞİMİ BAĞLAMINDA MÜZE VE SERGİ FAALİYETLERİ

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Bu yüksek lisans tezi 1980'den sonra dönüşen sergi ve müze faaliyetlerini toplumsal hafızanın değişimi bağlamında ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. 1980den sonra devlet söylemi haline gelen Türk İslam Sentezi, burjuvazinin kültürel alana dahil olması ayrıca globalleşme ve yerelleşme kavramlarının müze ve sergi faaliyetlerinde meydana getirdiği dönüşüm, örnek müzeler üzerinden yorumlanarak toplumsal hafızanın şekillenmesinde etkili olan dinamikler analiz edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Türk İslam Sentezi çerçevesinde şekillenen muhafazakar milliyetçilik unsurlarının Osmanlının Altın Çağına vurguyla müzelerde karşılık bulması, burjuvazinin özel müzeler vasıtasıyla devlet tekelinde olan kültür politikalarında getirdiği dönüşüm ve kültürel miras unsurlarının kent markalarının yaratımı konusunda metalaştırılmasının kent müzelerinde nasıl karşılık bulduğu yorumlanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Toplumsal hafıza, müzeler, sergi faaliyetleri, özel müze, müzelerde Neo-Osmanlıcılık

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As institutionalized memory expressively points out, museums are pivotal in shaping social memory and identity. They have adopted the mission of exhibiting the culture, art, civilisation, power and the history of power as a medium where the dominant discourse of power can create space for itself and shape the memory codes of the masses. Through museums, the powers have directed memory, reminding and consciously forgetting the historical elements that do not want to be remembered.

An essential element distinguishing social memory from personal life experiences is that it is not only associated with the past. Social memory also consists of memory codes produced by the present dynamics and political ideologies. In the case of Turkey, changing discourses of power have produced a process of construction of many different identities over time. Individuals and societies have become active subjects in constructing a shared identity according to the dynamics of the period in line with the ideologies of political authorities.

Various global and local transformations have brought a major developments in museum and exhibition activities, which have an important place in shaping social memory. Museums, which are among the places where cultural memory is felt most intensely, are among the most effective public spaces to convey the ideologies of the ruling powers to the masses. In this context, museums are important tools that reinforce the ideological discourses of dominant powers and shape social memory accordingly. According to Bennett, museums are spaces that regulate the identities of visitors, shape their minds through museum narrative and integrate them into common behavioural patterns.[1] Therefore, museums and exhibition activities have

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[1] Tony Bennett, *The Birth of The Museum: History, Theory, Politics* (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 24.

become a reflection of the ideological strategies of ruling powers, in addition to exhibiting art and history.

Therefore, museological activities are the exhibition of particular objects and how memory codes are transmitted. As Pierre Nora says that "[…] sites of memory are the places where memory ferments, not tradition itself, but its laboratories."[2] In this sense, museums are spaces where a particular historical narrative is used to construct identity and where history is visualized. Additionally, as Anderson points out that "[…] museums and the imagination that musealises them are radically political."[3] Although the founding subjects of museums have changed, the aim of museums to create meaning and history by influencing the memory codes of the masses has remained constant.

Major social, cultural, and economic transformations, such as the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution, led to the growth of cities and large masses' intensive use of public spaces. This situation led to new developments and needs in museology to influence large masses of people in the public sphere by producing new cultural models of nation-state structures.[4] Thus, in the 19th century, the state's intervention in the social sphere became more evident and concrete. As Habermas puts that "[…] with the transformations in the concepts of public and private spheres, political authority assumes not only specific functions in the field of the labor market and in the sphere of social labour but also political roles in the field of social power."[5]

These processes paved the way for the instrumentalisation of memory spaces for the consolidation of the ideology of power in public spaces such as exhibitions and

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[2] Pierre Nora, *Hafıza Mekanları* (İstanbul: Dost kitabevi yayınları, 2006), p.12.

[3] Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995), p.198.

[4] Burçak Madran Şebnem Önal, "Yerellikten Küreselliğe Uazanan Çizgide Tarihin Çok Paylaşımlı Vitrinleri: Müzelere ve Sunumları" in Zeynel Abidin Kızılyaprak (ed.) Müzecilikte Yeni Yaklaşımlar : Küreselleşme ve Yerelleşme: Üçüncü Uluslararası Tarih Kongresi, Tarih Yazımı ve Müzecilikte Yeni Yaklaşımlar: Küreselleşme ve Yerelleşme (İstanbul : Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2000) p. 174.

[5] Jurgen Habermas, "Kamusal Alan," in Meral Özbek (ed.) *Kamusal Alan*, (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 2004), p.101.

monuments. The technological and economic changes brought by the Industrial Revolution and the social and political interpretations created by the French Revolution have made memory spaces strategically important in the efforts of states to integrate their ideologies and historical narratives with the masses. In this context, memory sites are not only places that carry the traces of the past but also spaces where political authorities reproduce social memory by their ideological goals.

When examining the transition of the functions of museums and museology from the Ottoman period to the Republic in Turkey, we can find the ideological subtexts of the centers of power in the activities of museums. If we think of museums as showcases of their time, they are places of memory where selected parts of time are frozen, which will concretize the existence of ideologies. With this function, museums are the most critical identity tools for producing common belongings with the state's ideal of creating 'acceptable citizens'.

While the ideology of creating common belonging had an ideological basis centered on the memory codes of Turkish identity in the Early Republican Period, this situation created a complex reality for the Ottoman Empire. In this context, modern museology was shaped by nationalist movements and colonialist efforts to construct a universal identity in Europe, especially in the 19th century; it created a deep identity crisis for the Ottoman Empire, which had a multinational and multi-ethnic structure. Ali Artun states that an inclusive state discourse in the axis of Western policies implemented during the Tanzimat period was stuck between trying to prevent nationalist movements and the need to glorify Turkish identity or to include masses of different faiths while glorifying Islamist identity[6].

In the early museological activities of the Ottoman Empire, the direct reflection of an Islamist ideology based on the result of the inclusive understanding of the Empire brought by the Tanzimat was not clearly observed. However, this policy changed during the reign of Abdulhamid II when identity policy based on Islamist ideology was reflected in Ottoman museology. Within the framework of this understanding,

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[6] Ali Artun, "İmkansız Müze", (Çev: Elçin Gen), *Doxa*, (Temmuz 2008), s. 60-72 (Online), Accessed July 28, 2024, https://aliartun.com/yazilar/imknsiz-muze

objects of Islamic art were added to the Imperial Museum, and memory codes regarding the unifying power of Islam were produced[7]. On the other hand, the Ottoman state, in addition to attaching special importance to the excavation of antiquity and the exhibition of objects belonging to the ancient Greek and Hellenic civilizations, made efforts to create common belongings with the Western state and to exist in international platforms with cultural diplomacy as a new method in international relations.[8]

The complex identity structure of the Ottoman state, with its Islamic memory codes, stands in sharp contrast to the Turkish nationalist orientation of the early republican period. However, after the Turkish-Islamic synthesis became state policy in the 1980s, the historical narrative centered on Ottoman and Islamic history became visible in museum and exhibition activities. Thus, the golden age of the Ottoman Empire was idealized. This situation created a new cultural heritage discourse that moved away from the historical narrative of the Early republican period.

This thesis deals basically with the changes in the understanding of the cultural heritage in contemporary Turkey. The thesis seeks to answer whether the dominant state policy and cultural ideology since the 1980s has shown a radical deviation from the state's cultural policy in the early republican period. However, this does not mean that the discourse on cultural heritage after the 1980s has been shaped solely on the axis of Turkish Islamic politics. If the cultural policy of Turkey changed since the 1980s, what other dynamics were effective on the shaping of the new cultural policy? In the 1980s, while the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was at the center of cultural hegemony, the consolidation of the authoritarian state identity created by the September 12 coup d'état was deeply connected with neoliberal policies. For this reason, while examining the state ideology-museum-social memory practices after 1980, it is also vital to analyze how the free market economy and the identity representations brought by globalization diversified the cultural sphere while at the same time commodifying it and how the intertwined interest relationship between

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[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Madran and Önal, p. 177-178.

power and the bourgeoisie found response in forms of representation such as museums. In this context, capital developed policies distinct from the cultural discourse of the state, and at the same time, as in the case of the Sakarya Promotion Centre and Çanakkale Promotion Centres, took on a role in supporting cultural discourse, causing the cultural field to adopt a multi-paradigm structure.

In this regard, dynamics such as the opening of private museums due to Turkey's articulation with neoliberal policies, the process of joining the European Union, globalization, and the opening of city museums show that cultural policies do not have a single narrative. For example, due to neo-liberal policies, the Turkish bourgeoisie has become an object of cultural policies, preventing the state from monopolizing museum activities. However, at the same time, it evolved into a form that both separated from the state and served to elevate the state's image by also implementing exhibition and museum policies that represent the state's image. Thus, while the bourgeoisie created a new discourse alongside the cultural power of the state by preventing the monopolization of the state in the cultural field, it also became a stakeholder in the construction of state power in the cultural field by creating the opposite dynamic.

In this context, these developments enabled the bourgeoisie to increase its prestige through its presence in intellectual fields and created a space of representation to reflect its subjective ideology. Thus, unlike the Early Republican period, the monopoly of the historical narrative based on Turkish nationalism weakened and significant transformations took place in the field of museology. These transformations prevented a conservative cultural narrative such as the Turkish Islamic Synthesis (TIS) from becoming visible in museological policies as the dominant state ideology.

In summary, these processes show that museum activities after the 1980s are complex and influenced by many paradigms. In this respect, museological studies have subtexts and deep meanings. For this reason, transformations in the field of museology help us understand the change in the mentality of the powers and the transformations in cultural policies. The cultural practices of the changing discourses

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of power have a deep and multifaceted characteristic. This thesis will try to explain the transformations of cultural practices through museology and exhibition activities.

Museological studies have generally focused on similarities and ruptures in the historical process. Tony Bennett is one of the most important figures in the theorization of social memory in the context of museology.[9] In *The Birth of The Museum: History, Theory, Politics*, Bennett analyses the ideological function of museums, while at the same time creating a deep perspective for studies in the field of museology.

One of the first names that comes to mind in the field of museum studies in Turkey is Wendy M.K Shaw's *Ottoman Museology Museums, Archaeology and the Visualisation of History*. [10]This study focuses on visualizing history in the late Ottoman period by interpreting museology in the context of the relationship between archaeology and power.

While there is a wealth of literature on Ottoman and early republican museology, studies on the representation of collective memory in museum and exhibition policies after 1980 are limited. In this context, Andreas Huyssen's *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia* is an essencial source for interpreting art policies in postmodernism and multiculturalism. [11]Additionally, Ali Artun is one of the most essential names in interpreting post-1980 Turkish Museology. The author's works, *Mümkün Olmayan Müze Müzeler Ne Gösteriyor?* and *Çağdaş Sanatın Örgütlenmesi*, analyze how contemporary art responds in museums and how the period's political, economic, and social dynamics shaped Turkish museology.[12]

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[9] Tony Bennett, *The Birth of The Museum: History, Theory, Politics* (London; New York:Routledge, 1995)

[10] Wendy M.K. Shaw, *Osmanlı Müzeciliği: Müzeler, Arkeoloji ve Tarihin Görselleştirilmesi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yay., 2004)

[11] Andreas Huyssen, *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1995)

[12] Ali Artun, *Mümkün Olmayan Müze Müzeler Ne Gösteriyor*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017); and Ali Artun, *Çağdaş Sanatın Örgütlenmesi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2023)

Master's and doctoral theses in the field of museology in Turkey have generally focused on the Ottoman and early Republican periods. One of the important thesis written in the field of Ottoman museology is Selin Adile Atlıman's master's thesis titled *Museum and Archaeological Studies in the Ottoman Empire in the Westernisation Process in the 19th Century.*[13] This study interprets the development of museology and archaeology in the Ottoman Empire from a deep academic perspective and offers an approach to analyze the dynamics under which museology was shaped in the Ottoman Empire and the regulations in the field of museology.

One of the limited studies on post-1980 exhibition politics, Şeyda Barlas Bozkuş's PhD thesis *Turkey in the Global Art Scene: Dual Narratives in the Politics of International Exhibitions after the 1980s,* is one of the academic studies that enrich the literature by focusing on how cultural heritage and contemporary art create an example of cultural diplomacy in international exhibitions. [14]Moreover, Seçil Yılmaz's master thesis *Vısualization of Culture, History and Memory in Turkey: Museums Politics in the Post-1980s* focuses on how the crisis of modernity is reflected in museum studies and provides a deep analysis.[15]

This study seeks to produce a different discourse from other studies in the literature by examining the period it focuses on and the relationship between memory, power, and the bourgeoisie from a perspective centered on nationalism and neoliberalism. It adds a unique viewpoint to the thesis and aims to fill the gap in the literature by analyzing the sample museums, the manifestation of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in museums, the inclusion of the bourgeoisie in the cultural narrative, and the new forms of representation brought about by globalization.

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[13] Selin A. Atlıman, *Museological and Archaeological Studies in the Ottoman Empire During the Westernization Process in the 19th Century* (Unpublished MA Thesis), Middle East Technical University, 2008.

[14] Şeyda Barlas Bozkuş, *Turkey in the Global Art Scene: Dual Narratives in the Politics of International Exhibitions after the 1980s*, Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, (Unpublished PhD thesis), Boğaziçi University, 2011.

[15] Seçil Yılmaz, *Vısualization of Culture, History and Memory in Turkey: Museums Politics in the Post-1980s, the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, (Unpublished MA thesis), Boğaziçi University, 2005.*

In the history of museology in Turkey, there are certain beginnings, ruptures, similarities, and differences from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. For this reason, to better understand the process, this study is structured into four fundamental parts. The first part aims to understand how the Ottoman State responded to the political dynamics of its time through museological practices. Through the first exhibition and museological activities in the Ottoman Empire, how it defined its identity and presented it in museums will be examined. Then, in the first chapter, focusing on early republican history, we will analyze how the nation-state's definition of identity is reflected in the historical field and how museums are constructed in the most modern stages where history is exhibited. This analysis will lead into the second part of the thesis, which will compare the perception of history and museums in the early republican period with the contrasts and ruptures in the political conjuncture after the 1980s. In this context, examples from the early Republican period, such as the Turkish History Exhibition, the Mevlana Museum, the transformation of Hagia Sophia and Topkapı Palace into a museum, Ethnography Museum, Museum of Anatolian Civilizations and Museum branch of the People's Houses will not only give us the fundamentals of museology in Turkey, but also provide an in-depth interpretation of the fundamental dynamics of the post-1980s perception of history and the subsequent transformation in museum activities. The main reason for choosing these museums in the early Republican period is that they reveal the transformations in the light of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis after 1980 more clearly. These museums, which clearly represent the relationship between the nationalism policies implemented in the early Republican period, religion-state-social memory, are symbolic places of the values changed by the cultural hegemony after 1980.

For example, the exhibitions of the Turkish Historical Society, the Museum of Ethnography, the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations, and the museum branch of the People's Houses did not have a narrative centered on Islamic cultural values. On the contrary, they were shaped by a narrative that emphasized pre-Islamic history to sever the link with Ottoman history and give the newly established nation-state an independent identity. In addition, religiously significant examples such as Mevlana Tekke and Hagia Sophia have an ideological subtext in terms of their transformation

into museums as one of the secular ideological apparatuses of the state. The transformation of these two memory sites into objects of universal culture by purging them of their Islamic memory codes was an important reflection of the cultural hegemony of the republic. In this way, the places of religious social heritage that deeply affected social memory were turned into official institutions of the modern state, and the issue of religion became a medium that the state could control. On the other hand, the transformation of Topkapı Palace into a museum is a critical memory management policy in terms of framing the administrative center of the Ottoman dynasty with the ethical values of the Republic. By turning Topkapı Palace into a museum and opening it to the public, the symbols of the Empire were frozen in the historical time of the museum. These museum examples, which were selected to understand the dynamics of continuity and rupture in the field of museology, are essential because they contain a deep divergence with the cultural discourse that developed after 1980. With the rise of political Islam in the 1990s, these museums became symbols of the memory practices that the new cultural discourse aimed to change.

The third part of the thesis analyses whether the Turkish-Islamic synthesis has occupied a piece in museum and exhibition studies, and expanded its existence there. After the 1980 coup d'état, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis became a state discourse and, in contrast to the historical narrative of the early republican period, it focused on the Seljuk Empire and the golden age of the Ottoman Empire. By exemplifying the traces of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the cultural sphere through museum and exhibition works, the thesis analyses which cultural memory codes were activated in instilling the international and domestic identity created by the state. In this context, how the synthesis permeated the cultural works of the period and how it shaped the museum-exhibition activities will be analyzed through various examples, including The Age of Suleyman the Magnificent Exhibition(Muhteşem Süleyman Sergisi), Three Generations of the Republic Exhibition (Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet Sergisi), Creating a Citizen Exhibition (Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak Sergisi), Turks: Journey of a Thousand Years 600-1600 Exhibition (Türkler: 1000 Yıllık Yolculuk Sergisi), the Panorama 1453 History Museum (Panorama 1453 Tarih Müzesi), Sakarya Field Battle and Turkish History Promotion Center, Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center.

These museum and exhibition activities are some of the most prominent examples of the change in the political conjuncture of the period.

The Age of Suleiman the Magnificent Exhibition, which was organized during the Özal period, was chosen because it is an essential example of the practices of remembering the Ottoman Golden Age and the representation of the state image in an international framework. It shows that the representation practice that prioritizes the Ottoman past in the globalizing world order uses the memory codes of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis to create the state image. After this exhibition, how secular circles received the increasing political Islam will be analyzed through the exhibitions Three Generations of the Republic Exhibition (Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet Sergisi), Creating a Citizen Exhibition (Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak Sergisi). These two exhibitions are essential examples of the contrast between the values of the early republic and the memory practices developed after the 1980s. Following these examples, the thesis will focus on how the state image within the international context was reflected in the Turks: Journey of a Thousand Years 600-1600 Exhibition (Türkler: 1000 Yıllık Yolculuk Sergisi). Then, the traces of neo-Ottomanism, which is a part of the AKP (The Justice and Development Party) government's understanding of identity, will be sought in the representation practices in Panorama 1453, Sakarya Battlefield and Turkish History Promotion Centre, and Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center.

Panorama 1453 museum was chosen because it has a narrative that profoundly reflects the neo-Ottomanist policy in the context of its emphasis on the golden age of the Ottoman Empire and the myth of conquest. On the other hand, Sakarya Battlefield Turkish History Promotion Centre and Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center are included in the thesis narrative because they are memory sites that reflect the neo-Ottoman-centered nostalgic remembrance practices and the nationalism understanding of the government. These two war museums are important examples of the government's identity and nationalism policies. The complex political and sociological structure that developed after 1980 prevented the Turkish Islamic Synthesis from dominating the cultural sphere as a single ideological discourse. While the narrative centered on the Turkish Islamic synthesis found a response in the

cultural sphere, globalization, neoliberal policies, and relations with the European Union created a complex museological practice.

The fifth chapter will focus on analyzing museum activities through two paradigms. The first part will focus on the bourgeoisie's involvement in the cultural sphere and the effects of the establishment of private museums. The second part will focus on urban branding and the commodification of cultural heritage in the context of neoliberal urban policies.

The first will cover the changing bourgeoisie-state and museum- bourgeoisie relations, with the bourgeoisie's involvement in the cultural field due to neoliberal policies. This section will address the decrease in the state's dominance in the cultural sphere through museums with the opening of private museums. It will also examine the effect of the bourgeoisie's use of museums and exhibitions to strengthen its identity and prestige on the diversification of historical narrative and changes in the dimension of cultural capital. As Adorno states, with the strengthening of the bourgeoisie, the concept of culture has undergone a major transformation. It will be analyzed how museums, as a part of the changing concept of culture, have been industrialized and turned into a commodity by diverging from their function at the beginning of the 20th century.[16] In this context, the thesis will focus on Sadberk Hanım Museum and Sakıp Sabancı Museum, which are the first examples of Koç and Sabancı Holding in the field of museology. Through these two examples, the transformation brought about by understanding of private museology in the cultural field will be interpreted. In addition, the relationship between the free market and the diversification of museum activities that diverge from the state monopoly will be analyzed.

In the second part, the dynamics of change in museum activities, which have become a cultural industry, will be analyzed in the context of city museums. Furthermore, the reflections on the concepts of localization and globalization on museology in cities will be interpreted and discussed. In the preface of the Turkish edition of his book "The Critique of Modernity," Alain Touraine states that "Turkey is a country that

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[16] Theodor Adorno, *Kültür Endüstrisi-Kültür Yönetimi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011), p. 132-133.

endeavors not to choose between the past and the future, but to bring these two together."[17] According to him, although modernity in the early stages of capitalism was based on completely reconstructing the past, this situation has changed. The coexistence of the local and the universal has become dominant, resulting in a new vision of identity. In this regard, city museums, which have become the center of cultural interaction from local to universal, will be analyzed in the context of commodifying cultural values by examining the creation of the city brand. In this context, Sakıp Sabancı Mardin City Museum, Kadir Has City and Mimar Sinan Museum, Bursa City Museum, and Gaziantep City Museum will be analyzed. The main reason for selecting these museums is that each reflects different unique characteristics of the cities.

Sakıp Sabancı Mardin City Museum, Kadir Has City and Mimar Sinan Museum are examples that show that the bourgeoisie is also active in branding of Anatolian cities. Additionally, Sakıp Sabancı Mardin City Museum reveals the multicultural and multi-religious structure of the city of Mardin, while Bursa Museum has utilized the city's status as a former Ottoman capital in city branding. Also, Gaziantep Museum utilized narrative of the collective memory codes formed during the War of Independence by exhibiting them in the city museum. These selected examples are included in the thesis narrative because each city differentiates its cultural heritage values from a different perspective. Through these selected examples, the thesis will try to analyze how local values create identity in the global order with different cultural codes and historical heritage narratives.

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[17] Alain Touraine, Preface, *Modernliğin Eleştirisi*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları: 2002), p.12.

CHAPTER II

PRE-REPUBLICAN BEGINNINGS OF TURKISH MUSEOLOGY

2.1. Constructed Past and Social Memory on Museum

Throughout history, humanity has engaged in exhibition and collecting activities, albeit in primitive forms, for reasons such as preserving what they have, displaying their power, and creating prestige. Thus, an effort to construct an identity has emerged in line with the urge to remind the collective memory of who and what it is. However, museology is related to modern man's understanding and interpretation of the past, reflecting this process with the current political conjuncture. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about museology and collecting activities in today's sense until Renaissance humanism. [18] In ancient times, visuality was seen as a tool that distracted people from the search for truth in their perception of nature and the environment; instead, philosophy was glorified as the only means of reaching the truth.[19]

On the other hand, in the Christian and Muslim world in the Middle Ages, visual objects from antiquity were excluded from both the historical narrative and the public view, as they were associated with paganist beliefs. One of the most significant transformations in the field of museology took place with the questioning of religion in the social sense and with the beginning of the examination of the material world belonging to human beings brought by humanism with the Renaissance.[20] Thus, the artifacts belonging to ancient times broke away from their connection with paganist beliefs and began to be considered a part of history and art.

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[18] Wendy M.K. Shaw, *Osmanlı Müzeciliği: Müzeler, Arkeoloji ve Tarihin Görselleştirilmesi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yay., 2004), p. 8.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

In this sense, families in the patronage system, such as the Medici family, made the first examples of collections and exhibitions possible by funding art and turning works of art into a means of prestige for wealthy families. Thus, historical artifacts and works of art began to be seen as essential elements of perceiving the world, creating an identity or consolidating the power of existing identities and moving away from the meaning of paganism.

At this point, processes such as scientific developments and the acceptance of realism in the visual field led visual narratives to gain importance. Over time, the importance of visualizing historical narratives in the nation-state building process has increased with the values brought by the French Revolution. At this point, many nation-states, such as Turkey, made use of archaeology and museums to legitimize their existence. By taking over the cultural heritage of ancient civilizations, European nation-states created a perception of chronological time by constructing the last point reached by history in their lands. In this context, museums were used as the visual pillars of constructed historical narratives.[21]

The phenomenon we call the constructed past has a complex and multidimensional structure. Today's history books or historical discourses created by nation-states do not cover the entire past. On the contrary, the parts that are important for the construction of the identity to be created are taken to construct the selected past in the society's memory. For this reason, historiography is not only the transmission of events, but also the means by which memory codes the events will be transmitted. This is also valid for museology and exhibition activities. Therefore, the collective memory produced in museums is formed in the minds of individuals through the reproduction of their history. Therefore, social memory consists of memory codes produced by the present dynamics. In this context, in the case of Turkey, changing discourses of power have produced a process of constructing many different Turkeys and identities over time. Individuals and societies have become active subjects of the process of constructing a shared identity according to the dynamics of the period in line with the ideologies of political authorities.

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[21] Shaw, p. 13.

Various global and local transformations deeply affect museum and exhibition activities, which have an essential role in shaping social memory. Museums, which are the places where cultural memory is most intensely felt, are one of the most effective public spaces used by the ruling powers to impose their ideologies and reflect glorious, fictionalized histories to the masses. In this context, museums are essential tools that reinforce the ideological discourses of dominant powers and shape social memory accordingly. So, museums and exhibition activities are more than just exhibiting art and history; they have become a reflection of the ideological strategies of powers on memory.

Pierre Nora, In his book "Sites of Memory", defines places of memory and draws attention to their historiographical, ethnographic, psychological, and political dimensions. According to him, this conceptual framework shows that memory sites do not only reflect the past but are also active in the construction of social identity and collective memory.[22] The historiographical dimension is concerned with how memory sites record historical events. The ethnographic dimension is concerned with the relationship of these places with cultural and social structures. The psychological dimension is about how the subconscious of individual and collective memory is processed, and the political dimension is about the aspects of memory sites that serve power structures and strengthen ideological discourses. This conceptual framework pointed out by Nora reveals that social identity is shaped by memory spaces.[23]

2.2. Museum Studies in the Ottoman Empire

As a place where modern states produce identities, museological activities are also places of education with a selected historical narrative. Citizens who visit the museum, where the perception of an acceptable citizen is produced, internalize themselves with the historical narrative and feel a shared sense of belonging.

The Ottoman Empire had a complicated time creating a sense of common belonging. This was due to the complex interplay of factors, such as the modern world profile

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[22] Pierre Nora, *Hafıza Mekanları* (İstanbul: Dost Kitabevi yayınları, 2006), p. 10.

[23] *Ibid.*, p.10.

influenced by Europe and the conflicts arising from tradition, as well as the diverse religious and ethnic composition of the Ottoman people.

The first museological activities that emerged in the Ottoman Empire, with the influence of the Ottomanism movement emphasizing the continuity of the multicultural social structure, were far from the aims of identity construction of a single culture that we often see in nation-states. Both archaeological and museological activities in the Ottoman Empire, as in many other fields, were initiated to restrain the desires of European states in the Ottoman lands.[24] For this reason, when the first museum and exhibition activities in the Ottoman Empire are examined, instead of the memory codes of Turkish and Islamic civilizations, which were the central identity dynamics of the Ottoman Empire, the archaeology of the Classical period, which was compatible with the memory codes of the West, was exhibited in museums.[25]

Museum activities in this period were far from a specific policy emphasizing Turkish identity. In the 19th century, Turkish nationalism did not find a visible counterpart in the cultural field as a state policy, and the Ottoman state also refrained from defining an identity that would be identified with the Turkish identity.[26]

Although this situation changed in later times, due to the Ottoman Empire's multi-ethnic structure, which was unsuitable for the modern nation-state structure, the Ottoman State did not apply the identity construction practices applied by nation-states in museological activities in the first stage. Although there were various attempts by the Committee of Union and Progress to establish a national museum, the use of archaeology and museological policies together to build a common culture

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[24] Çiğdem Atakuman, "Shifting Discourses of Heritage and Identity in Turkey: Anatolianist Ideologies and Beyond," *In Search of Pre-Classical Antiquity: Rediscovering Ancient Peoples in Mediterranean Europe (19th and 20th c.)*, January 1, 2017, 166–81, p.168.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

[26] Mehmet Özdoğan, ''Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Arkeoloji: Siyasi Yönlendirmeler-Çelişkiler ve Gelişim Süreci'' in *Bilanço 1923-1998: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75 Yılına Toplu Bakış Uluslararası Kongresi, I. Cilt: Siyaset-Kültür-Uluslararası İlişkiler,* (İstanbul : Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999) p. 196.

was only fully realized in the republican period. [27] Museological practices in the Ottoman Empire are a rich source for understanding the political and ideological transformation of the Empire. Hagia Irene, one of the first attempts of the Ottoman state in the field of museology, gained a meaning that embodies various symbolic powers of the state. While it housed symbols showing the Islamic leadership of the Ottoman state, also it housed historical cultural objects belonging to Byzantium. Thus, it undertook the patronage of the cultural richness of the geography it dominated.[28]

With this characteristic feature, Hagia Irene had a meaning for museological activities as it glorified the imperial image of the Ottoman state. However, this endeavor in Hagia Irene centered only on the accumulation of objects. It had neither a systematic organization nor a feature open to public visitation. Therefore, until the 19th century, Hagia Irene did not constitute a model for museum activities in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, it can be considered as the starting point of museum activities. In the first half of the 18th century, an exhibition of arms and guns called Darü'l-Esliha was established in Hagia Irene, and the building became a place that Ottoman elites and foreigners could visit.[29] Names such as Osman Hamdi Bey and Ahmet Fethi Pasha played pioneering roles in the institutionalization of Ottoman museology. With the institutionalization of Ottoman museology in 1969, museological practices as a means of memory production began to create a cultural space in the Ottoman Empire.

By constructing its power through museums, the Ottoman state developed an understanding in line with the ideology of the Tanzimat and Reform Edicts, both in terms of assuming the preservation of pre-Ottoman history and defining a broad identity that included the non-Muslim Ottoman population as well. However, the fact that the ordinary public could not visit the Müze-i Hümayun at first suggests that this narrative of the Ottoman Empire was a limited showcase presented only to the

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[27] *Ibid.,* p. 195-196.

[28] Shaw, Osmanlı Müzeciliği, p. 21.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Ottoman elite and Europe.[30] Similar practices were observed in Europe when museology first emerged. However, in later times, some intellectual circles realized that museums had the potential to educate ordinary people and to instill the intellectual patterns desired by the power to the masses. They imagined a kind of educational space by producing cultural codes that ordinary people would consume in museums.[31] Thus, museums began to be used as an essential propaganda tool in the 19th and 20th centuries as a practice of nation-states to create acceptable citizens.

The museological activities in the Ottoman state embody the reflexes developed against the cultural expansionism of Europe. The Ottoman Empire followed a policy against the issue of historical claims developed by European states in the conquered geographies by assuming the patronage of ancient civilizations, which have an important place in European history. At this point, the imperial activities of European states were not only limited to the economic and political dimension; this issue also has a cultural expansionist dimension. In this context, colonial rulers sought ways to distance these societies from their own history and identity by manipulating not only the economies but also the histories of the geographies they conquered. Therefore, museums and the historical narrative they present have a political meaning. In this context, expansionist states create imagined artificial identities by reconstructing the history and cultural values of colonized states from their own perspectives. It can be said that this was also the case in the Ottoman Empire. Especially the flexible policies of the Ottoman rulers, which lacked cultural consciousness, paved the way for many archaeological finds to be taken abroad.

Most of the archaeological excavations in the Ottoman Empire were carried out by European states such as the Germans, the French, or the British due basically to the financial difficulties of the Empire and lack of finances for archeological excavations. Therefore, most of the artifacts from the excavations were smuggled to Europe and exhibited in the museums there. In addition, artifacts smuggled by treasure hunters or for personal collection reveal the Ottoman state's lack of archaeological awareness and inability to act as a protector. Although the Ottoman

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[30] *Ibid.*, Osmanlı Müzeciliği, p. 13.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

state was late in grasping the political importance of archaeology, it took steps to protect archaeological artifacts by issuing the Regulation on Asar-ı Atika in the following periods. At this point, the role of Osman Hamdi Bey in Turkish archaeology and museum studies cannot be denied. By excavating in many parts of the Empire, he prevented the exploitation of artifacts and cultural heritage in Anatolia, especially by imperial states.

In 1883, Osman Hamdi Bey made efforts to prevent the export of antiquities abroad,[32] but the practical applicability of these efforts was insufficient. The main problem in the failure to implement this regulation was that it was sometimes deliberately disobeyed by state officials. The fact that many artifacts recovered from excavations in Anatolia were sent to European states can be given as an example of how archaeological artifacts were turned into a political tool and a subject of diplomacy. [33]Due to the Ottoman state's inability to develop a policy against the subjects of cultural heritage, European states had the opportunity for cultural expansion in Ottoman lands. In this context, the regulations enacted in 1869, 1874, 1884 and 1906 were insufficient to ensure the full protection of antiquities by the state.[34]

Turkish nationalism, which gradually flared up in the Ottoman state due to the conditions of the period, led to the idea of establishing museums focused on Turkish identity, which was different from the first museological activities that emerged in the Ottoman Empire. In this context, some Union and Progress figures produced policies in line with Turkish nationalism in museology, as in every field of life.

2.3. Transition Process: The effects of the change in historiography on cultural identity and museology in the Ottoman Empire

Within the framework of the 19th-century intellectual world, historiography and exhibition activities, as a reflection of the understanding of history in the Ottoman

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[32] Madran and Önal, p. 176.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 174.

[34] Selin Adile Atlıman, *Museological and Archaeological Studies in the Ottoman Empire During the Westernization Process in the 19th Century,* The Graduade Schools of Social Sciences, Middle East Technical University, 2008, p. 108-131.

Empire, began to take shape under the influence of nationalist ideologies, similar to other European states. However, Turkish nationalism, which emerged in the intellectual field until the republican period, did not find a comprehensive response in museology in a practical sense. Although Ottoman historiography was not completely independent from Islamic thought, it was also influenced by the currents of the decadent empires in Europe that interpreted contemporary nationalism[35]. With the rise of nationalist ideas, various transformations took place in the discipline of history. The issue of history and identity have been the main elements shaping the ideological framework of states. For this reason, it is important to analyze museological studies and the impact of the political conjuncture of the period on historiography together. From this perspective, it becomes more comprehensively understandable how Ottoman historiography and exhibition activities were shaped by ideological and political transformations on both local and global scales and how they adapted to the intellectual structure of the period.

German historicism ensured that the nationalist and idealist perspective became an important factor in the state's definition of social identity. While the positivist understanding made secular identity codes more visible, romanticism made the issue of glorifying the past more effective in Ottoman historiography and was effective in the construction of national identity.[36] The transformations affecting European historiography prevented the Ottoman understanding of history from being shaped solely by traditional and Islamist discourse. Thus, in the intellectual field, the Ottoman state began to integrate with the ideological developments in Europe. This transformation process, which affected identity politics, enabled historiography to become one of the state's ideological apparatuses. Thus, historiography became a critical apparatus in the process of constructing social memory.

Before the developments in Europe that transformed the discipline and philosophy of history, the dominant narrative in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire was shaped by prioritizing the glorification of the empire and references to Islamic

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[35] Büşra Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "'Resmi Tarih'" Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), p. 23.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

values. The transformations in European historiography, which began to be effective in Europe, caused serious transformations in Ottoman historiography. In this context, Ottoman historiography, in addition to the traditional Islamic narrative, began to have a secular and nationalist character under the influence of romantic, idealist, and positivist ideas.[37] Thus, intellectual endeavors in the Ottoman Empire were influenced by European transformations and, in this way, took on a complex structure combining traditional and modern historical perspectives. Although the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) introduced various reforms with the idea of creating a national identity, these reforms could not be systematically implemented due to the conditions of the period, and the nation-state identity-oriented studies were only fully realized in the early republican period.

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF MUSEUMS IN SHAPING CITIZEN IDENTITY DURING THE EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA

3.1. The Kemalist Regime's Vision of History and the Foundations of National Identity

The instrumentalization of museums to create an identity with the consciousness of the nation-state gained a distinct appearance during the Republican period. In the early republican period, the newly established state aimed to legitimize its existence by creating an identity for its citizens. At this point, the *ummah*ist identity of the Ottoman Empire, which encompassed many ethnicities, was destroyed, and a historiography focused on secular Turkish nationalism was developed. In this way, the connection with Ottoman history was severed, and memory codes were produced that Turkish history was not only Ottoman and Seljuk state history but that Turks migrated from Central Asia and pioneered the establishment and preservation of civilizations such as Hittite and Sumer. Institutions such as schools, museums, and public houses, which were instrumental in educating the public, ensured that social memory was shaped within the framework of the republic's values. In this context, Turkish historiography were instrumentalized as one of the important intellectual tool controlled by the state to create acceptable citizen profiles.

Mehmet Özdoğan underlines that the foundations of Atatürk's Turkish nationalism did not lie in the Turanian understanding and states that an 'Anatolian' understanding of history developed against Panturkism.[38] In this context, in the production of the memory codes committed by the new regime, especially the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theories were utilized to scientifically justify the historical

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[38] Özdoğan, p. 196.

origins of the Turkish nation. While the existence of Turks in Anatolia gained historical legitimacy through various scientific studies, various reforms were made in line with the collective memory produced through practical applications. With practices such as abolishing the caliphate, closing the *dervish* lodges, adopting the civil code, and abolishing the Ministry of Sharia and the Foundations, society was practically integrated into the secular and republican ideology.[39] Moreover, through museums and exhibitions, education places of social memory were created where acceptable citizens could find their identities.

The understanding of the historiography of the 1930s, which developed under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, paved the way for the emergence of the Turkish History Thesis and became one of the most essential elements of the construction of national identity. According to the Turkish Historical Thesis, the Turks culturally had more developed civilization in Central Asia compared to Europe and when they migrated to Anatolia, Turks could enrich and develop ancient civilizations thanks to their developed civilization. The Turkish History Thesis, the sole representative of the ideological foundations of early republican museums and archaeological studies, legitimized the existence of the newly established state by shaping a new historical narrative based on the glorification of the Turkish people and the symbols produced about the Turks laying the foundations of civilization, including Europe. One of the sole missions of the Turkish History Thesis was to gain prestige in the eyes of European states by emphasizing that the Turks were the true representatives of Anatolia and civilization, to strengthen the cultural pillar of the military struggle in the War of Independence, and to emphasize that the Turks had undertaken the legacy of the Hittites, Sumerians, and Byzantines on the historical sense.

The Turkish history thesis and the museum studies carried out on this basis also had an educational purpose. The aim was to educate society, instill national consciousness, and thus construct an identity of acceptable citizens with minds compatible with the Republic's values. For example, Afet İnan wrote:

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[39] Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset Makaleler 3*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), p. 96-97.

> In most of the history books published in our country until now, and in the French history books that are the basis for them, the role of Turks in world history has been consciously or unconsciously minimized. The fact that Turks received such false information about their ancestors was detrimental to the self-recognition of Turkishness. The main purpose of this book is to correct the mistakes that are harmful to our nationality, which today has reclaimed its natural position in the world and lives with this consciousness.[40]

She emphasized that the primary purpose was to enlighten the national consciousness and provide accurate information about the ancestors. Another point to be noted in these words is the divergence between what is meant by "ancestors" and the memory codes of the Ottoman Empire. Under the influence of positivism, rationalism, and German historicism, the republican ideal wanted to prove through archaeology and other concrete practices that it was not perpetuating the imperial persona. The Turkish history thesis takes a comprehensive approach, covering the historical background of the citizens of the Republic of Turkey from ancient civilizations to the present. It goes beyond the narrative of Turkish-Islamic civilization to include the starting points of ancient civilizations dating back to much earlier periods of history, encompassing all cultures that existed in Anatolia.[41]

This perspective of the Turkish History Thesis envisaged the construction of a more comprehensive collective memory that included the cultural and historical heritage of the entire civilization by delving deeper into the past. Thus, the Turkish nation, which had been humiliated in European-oriented historical narratives with descriptions such as barbarian, Eastern, and uncivilized was trying to prove that it was at the starting point of civilization in the eyes of the whole world. Moreover, in doing so, it endeavored to prove itself in the language of the West by using modern institutional structures based on the scientific methods and techniques of the period. In this context, we see that many foreign anthropologists, archaeologists, and anthropologists were involved in the theoretical framework of the Turkish history thesis. In this context, during the production phase of the Turkish History Thesis, the work ''Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları: Methal Kısmı'' was printed in 100 copies in 1930. However, certain scientific circles found the text incomplete. In Uzunçarşılı's

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[40] *Turk Tarihinin Ana Hatlari* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 1930), p. 1.

[41] Özdoğan, p. 197.

book, *Türk Tarihi Yazılırken Atatürk'ün Alaka ve Görüşlerine Dair Hatıralar*, he states that "[…] as a matter of fact, the first book was therefore very incomplete and very inaccurate, fortunately, since it was printed in about a hundred copies, it did not spread around." He stated the situation with his expressions.[42]

In order to determine the theoretical frameworks of the Turkish History Thesis, this Thesis was shared nationally and internationally at the 1st and 2nd Turkish History Congresses were held in 1932 and 1937. In order to support the claims put forward by the Turkish History Thesis and to provide concrete evidence, great importance was attached to archaeological excavations in Anatolia. Although the History Congresses were based on the working methods of the discipline of history, they also utilized the fields of anthropology and archaeology to prove the historical background of Turkish history with concrete evidence.[43] The data of the archaeological activities in Anatolia, initiated under the leadership of the Turkish Historical Society, were discussed and evaluated in other history congresses held in the early republican period.

When the Turkish History Congress records are examined, the aim was to transform the historical narrative created through archaeological excavations from abstract elements into visible archaeological symbols. These symbols, in turn, were to be inscribed into the memory codes of the citizens on the axis of the historical narrative in the museums. The narrative, constructed as the real owner of Anatolia and civilization, was to be ensured by the Turkish History Congress that a common belonging with the Turkish identity would be formed, bringing unity to the citizens. In the context of establishing common belongings, the Turkish Historical Society Exhibition was opened in 1937 at the Dolmabahçe Palace.[44] It was a platform to exhibit the historical products of the Turkish Thesis, a result of the meticulous work and dedication of the Turkish Historical Society and the archaeological studies

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[42] İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Türk Tarihi Yazılırken Atatürk'ün Alaka ve Görüşlerine Dair Hatıralar", *Belleten*, 3, (10), p. 350.

[43] Zafer Toprak, "Adem-Havva'dan Homo-Alpinus'a Türk Tarih Tezi", *Toplumsal Tarih* (No. 206, 2011), p. 18.

[44] *Türk Tarihi ve Eski Eserleri Sergisi Hazırlık Planları No 1*, (İstanbul Devlet Basımevi, 1937) p. 3.

carried out with the institution's support. The exhibition of the Turkish Historical Society is discussed in detail in the following pages.

Like the Turkish History Thesis, the Sun Language Theory also aimed to glorify the Turkish identity. In August 1936, in the opening speech of the Third Turkish Language Congress held in Dolmabahçe Palace, Saffet Arıkan, Minister of Culture and President of the Turkish Language Association, stated that the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory were at the center of the ideal awakening in Turkey.[45] In this context, Turkish history and language are the most important symbols of the new national identity. While museums are the only showcases of history where these symbols are exhibited, with the simplification of the Turkish language, the transition to the Latin alphabet, and the elimination of the Arabic alphabet and Arabic cultural symbols, Turkey turned its direction towards the West. By eliminating foreign words in Turkish as much as possible, an understanding of language compatible with the new national identity was developed. In fact, in the first sentences of the Negotiation Minutes of the Turkish Language Congress, Atatürk was referred to as "Kamal Atatürk"[46]

Within the cultural policy of the Republic, the use of Turkish words in name preferences can be read as a maneuver in line with the identity policies of the state. In the early years of the Republican era, the use of Turkish and the glorification of Turkish history were prioritized within the framework of the state's identity policies. In this context, the state's history and language policies were reflected even using Atatürk's name. According to Mehmet Öznur Alkan, in the Zaman newspaper dated February 5, 1935, it was announced to the public that Atatürk's real name was Kamal, which means "army and fortress" in Turkish and is not the same as the Arabic name Kemal.[47] In mid-1937, it was observed that the name Kemal started to be preferred again instead of Kamal.[48] Although the name Kamal fell out of use in

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[45] *III. Türk Dil Kurultayı Müzakere Zabıtları*, (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi 1937), p. 3.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[47] M. Ö. Alkan, "En Çok Doğru Bildiğimizden Kuşkulanmak-2 Mustafa'dan Kamâl'a Atatürk'ün İsimleri," *Toplumsal Tarih*, No: 204, (2010), p. 60.

[48] Alkan, p. 62.

the following periods, it shows us the importance of language theory in constructing identity in the early Republican period. The fact that Atatürk was referred to as "Kamal" was a reflection of the glorification of Turkish and Turkish identity but also an indication of the attempt to restrict the presence of different languages in Turkish. In this context, the Sun Language Theory is one of the most important initiatives reflecting the cultural policies of the early Republican period with its characteristic of glorifying the Turkish language and history.

Within the framework of this theory, it was aimed to simplify Turkish and free it from the domination of different languages, as well as to direct the language practices of the people within the framework of the ideology created in the nation-state building process. Even the name of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was reshaped as a reflection of this ideology. At the Third Turkish Language Congress, where the foundations of the conceptual framework of the Sun Language Theory were laid, Afet Inan stated that "linguistic knowledge is one of the most important elements of historical enlightenment, emphasizing that history and language studies were equally crucial in the cultural ideology of the Republic"[49]. These statements summarise how critical the Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Language Society were in creating the imagined Turkish identity.

3.2. Memory Spaces Visualizing Kemalist Historical Understanding: Museums in the Early Republican Era

Although museological activities started with the institutionalization of the use of Hagia Irene for storage purposes in the Ottoman Empire, museological activities in the republican period were much more systematic within the scope of the Turkish History Thesis produced by the Turkish Historical Society in the process of constructing a national state identity. They were considered as memory sites where the state ideology was directly reflected. The tangible products of the archaeological activities carried out in the republican period prepared the foundations for the establishment of many state museums within the framework of the historical

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[49] *III. Türk Dil Kurultayı Müzakere Zabıtları*, 1936, p.6.

narrative shaped in the context of the nationalist ideology desired to be permeated into social memory.

The importance of the museums opened during the republican period in educating the society is critical. The historical connection of this newly established nation-state with the Ottoman state was intended to be transformed within the framework of the newly created historical narrative. On the other hand, one of the main common points in the museums of the Early Republican Era was to concretize the fact that the Turks were the actual owners of Anatolia with archaeological data and to exhibit this concrete evidence through museums. In this context, museum activities were initially under the Directorate of Education, and then the Directorate of Heritage under the Ministry of Education took over this task. In 1922, with the regulation of *Müzeler ve Asar-ı Atika Hakkında Talimatname* (Regulation On Museums and Collection of Antique Artifacts), the Culture Department under the Directorate of Education was responsible for collecting antiquities and museum activities.[50]

After a longperiods of war, it was time for social reforms. In order to introduce the social revolutions to the public and internalize them in the citizens, the educational role of museums was considered necessary by the regime. As the Republic's values spread throughout the country with the revolutions, museums and exhibitions, which were the modern carriers of the revolutions, were opened nationwide with great effort. Since it would be beyond the scope of this Thesis to mention all the museums in the early republican period, the Turkish Historical Society Exhibition, the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum, the Mevlana Museum, and the Topkapı Palace museums will be mentioned in particular. The main reason for selecting these museums is that they reflect the Republican ideology's interpretation of history and the evolution of political thought. Consequently, they were the most illustrative institutions for demonstrating the interplay between power and museology within the state's shifting policies during the 1980s.

In the Early Republican Period, one of the exhibition activities in which the constructed understanding of history is most evident is the Turkish Historical Society

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[50] Hüseyin Karaduman, "Belgelerle Konya Mevlâna Müzesi'nin Kuruluşu", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, (Sayı: 29, 2005), p. 138.

Exhibition held at the Dolmabahçe Palace in 1937. The exhibition narrative was shaped to construct a national identity and present the papers of the congresses held under the leadership of the Turkish Historical Society and the archaeological excavations carried out in Anatolia. The exhibition attempted to prove the legitimacy of the historical identity created by Kemalist ideology with the support of sciences such as history, anthropology, archaeology, and ethnography. It consists of a linear narrative starting from prehistoric times and continuing through the Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Seljuk, Ottoman, and Republican periods.[51]

In the exhibition, which ends with the Republic period as the last point reached by civilization, the Republic period is glorified as the last stage of civilization and human reason.[52] The prehistoric periods are generally intended to prove that the Turks originated in Central Asia, developed civilization there before other societies, and pioneered the formation of civilizations such as Sumerian and Hittite in Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Thus, the historical narrative claimed by the Turkish history thesis gained a concrete reality with the exhibition.

One of the most striking aspects of the exhibition is the treatment of Ottoman history. In order to understand the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic and the revolutions that opened the door to major social transformations, the link with the Ottoman Empire had to be overcome in social memory. At this point, at the Second Turkish History Congress, Richard Hartmann, in his paper titled "New Turkey within the Framework of General Turkish History", emphasized the importance of pointing out that the Republic of Turkey was not a deformed version of the Ottoman Empire, but the young state of a young nation with a completely new and promising future. [53] Hartmann should express that the newly established Turkish Republic has a different perception and identity from the Ottoman Empire. In order to prove that the new Turkish Republic is not a renamed version of the Ottoman Empire but a completely

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[51] Merve Özkılıç, *1937 İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi Sergisinde Arkeoloji, Sanat ve Mimarlık Tarihinin Temsili*, Institute of Science and Technology, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), 2016, p. 23.

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] Richard Hartmann, *Umumi Türk tarihi Çerçevesi İçinde Yeni Türkiye*, İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongrenin Çalışmaları Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler (Ankara: TTK, 2010), p. 748.

secular, Turkish nationalist, independent, and modern state, various republican achievements such as revolutions, wars, and public works are included in the exhibition narrative with various objects and photographs. [54]

Another museum that this thesis try to emphasize in the early Republican period is the Mevlana Museum. After the death of Mevlana Celalettin Rumi, the community that adopted his teachings organized themselves and turned the area around his tomb into a large complex, starting a centuries-long tradition. For centuries, Mevlana Dervish Lodge showed a harmonious coexistence with the Ottoman state structure. For example, the sheiks of the Mevlana Dervish Lodge in Konya were appointed with the sultan's permission.[55] However, with the establishment of the new Turkish Republic, state and religious affairs took on a new meaning, and a great secularisation movement began. One of the important steps taken to establish a secular state structure in the history of the Republic was the law enacted in 1925 on the closure of dervish lodges and shrines. There are many national and religious reasons for closing lodges and dervish lodges. The newly established Republic of Turkey abolished the office of the caliphate on 3 March 1924 in order to establish a structure in which religion and state affairs were carried out separately, and the Presidency of Religious Affairs was established in order to ensure that religious affairs were carried out under state control and in a single authority.[56]

Furthermore, ın 1925, with the law on the closure of dervish lodges and tombs, these institutions were closed down, and titles such as sheik, dervish, and disciple were abolished. While these changes in the religious sphere were interpreted as steps in the construction of a secular state, they were also used as a consolidation of the power of the state. With this law, groups that did not integrate with the values of the

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[54] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk did not completely ignore the past heritage of the Ottoman Empire while producing new identity practices in the process of nation-state construction, and embraced the past heritage of important historical figures such as Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, Yavuz Sultan Selim are reflected in Prof. Afet İnan's *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler* and Enver Ziya Karal's *Atatürk'ten Düsünceler. See:* Enver Ziya Karal*, Atatürk'ten Düsünceler,* (Ankara: Doğuş Matbaası, 1962), p. 86-91 *and* Afet İnan*, Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler,* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası yayınları, 2019), p. 312.

[55] Mehmet Önder, "Konya'da Mevlana Dergahı Merkez Arşivi Ve Mevlevihaneler". *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 14, (Aralık 1994), p.138

[56] *Resmi Ceride*, 07 Nisan 1924, Number: 68, p. 579.

republic and the rebellion activities carried out by using religion were also brought under control. The closure of dervish lodges and tombs was not only related to political and religious development. Such as various documents and objects of historical value that these institutions housed were also taken under protection. Thus, objects of historical value were used to produce collective memory within the framework of the desired historical fiction.

As stated by Hüseyin Karaduman, with the closure of dervish lodges and tombs, it was accepted in the meeting of the Executive Committee dated September 16, 341, that items belonging to these institutions, which were valuable in terms of art and history, would be transferred by the Directorate of Museums, with the budgetary affairs to be settled later.[57] At this point, the Mevlana Tekke was turned into a museum in 1926 upon the proposal of the Board of Education, which found it appropriate to turn the Mevlana Tekke into a museum due to the value of its building and the ethnographic artifacts inside.[58] According to Mehmet Önder, sculptures and architectural artifacts from the Phrygian, Roman, and Byzantine periods were exhibited in the Mevlana Museum until 1948.[59] Thus, the Konya Asar-ı Atika Museum was not only a reference to Islamic values in terms of its name. With this feature, the museum was transformed from carrying only an Islamic meaning and was equipped with various historical artifacts, allowing it to function as a museum rather than a place of worship. However, when artifacts unrelated to Islamic culture and civilization were removed from the museum, the Konya Asar-ı Atika Museum was renamed the Mevlana Museum.[60]

The Mevlana Tekke was transformed into a museum, one of the most essential tools of the secular state symbol, and removed from its religious symbols as much as possible. Thus, the ethnographic and cultural value of the Mevlana Tekke was taken under protection, and a place that was previously used as a tekke took on a new

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[57] Hüseyin Karaduman, "Belgelerle Konya Mevlâna Müzesi'nin Kuruluşu", p. 139.

[58] *Ibid.*, p.151.

[59] Önder, "Konya'da Mevlana Dergahı Merkez Arşivi Ve Mevlevihaneler", p. 138.

[60] Hüseyin Karaduman, *Belgelerle Konya Mevlâna Müzesi'nin Kuruluşu*, (Ankara: Vakıflar Dergisi, No: XXIX, 2005), p. 144.

identity by redefining it with secular memory codes. Instead of continuing to serve the needs of pilgrims as a religious institution, the Mevlana Tekke was fully aligned with the national and secular ideology of the new regime, incorporating the cultural heritage of Mevlana Celalettin Rumi in a secular context. Thus, the new regime redefined the Mevlevi tekke in the context of secularisation, and the elements of national identity found an encounter in the museum's historical narrative. In the museum's narrative, Jalalattin Rumi was purified from Persian-Islamic identity elements as much as possible and turned into a national figure.[61]

In this context, the newly established Turkish Republic transformed the memory codes and institutions of the Ottoman state, which were far from secularism and represented Islam, in line with the needs of the nation-state. Museums, the cultural tools of the modern state where social memory is reproduced, have planned the connection with the past and religion in line with the ideology of the new regime. The Mevlana Tekke, which was an important religious center for centuries and where the grave of an important religious figure such as Mevlana is located, was transformed in line with the ideology of culture by being completely owned by the state and revealed the regime's stance on religion and sects. Moreover, Kafadar states that one of the critical reasons why the Mevlana Tekke was not equated with other tekkes during the Republican period and was protected was that the Mevlevi Tekke traditions were in a humanist discourse and were far from dogmatism.[62] For this reason, the conversion of the Mevlana tekke into a museum is worth discussing as one of the institutions that most clearly shows the transformation in state ideology in the republican period.

Furthermore, one of the most important examples of museological activities in the Republican period aiming at change in the context of cultural memory is the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum. The conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum is particularly emphasized in this thesis because, due to the Turkish Islamic-

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[61] Hazal Yıldırımer, *The Transformation of Religious site into a State Museum in Turkey: The Case of Mevlana Museum*, Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Koç University, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), 2017, p. 62.

[62] Cemal Kafadar, "The New Visibility of Sufism in Turkish Studies and Cultural Life" in *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art, and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey*, ed. Raymond Lifchez, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 312.

based narrative that started to rise in the 1980s, Hagia Sophia was converted back into a mosque during the Justice and Development Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AKP) rule. In this sense, the secular cultural policies attempted to be constructed in the early republican period are degenerated by the current state ideology, which bases its legitimacy on religion and the Golden Age of the Ottoman state.

The Republic of Turkey tried to emphasize that Turks were the founders and protectors of civilization through scientific steps such as archaeological studies, the Turkish History Thesis, and the Sun Language Theory. In this context, the conversion of the Hagia Sophia into a museum can be interpreted as a step towards building a secular state structure, but it can also be read as an attempt by the founding regime to detach elements of cultural heritage from the religious context and identify them with universal values. While Mehmet the Conqueror's conversion of the Hagia Sophia, into a mosque after the conquest of Constantinople, signified the symbolic superiority of Islam over Christianity, the conversion of the Hagia Sophia Camii-i Kebir into a museum by the Republic of Turkey demonstrated the newly established Republic of Turkey had surpassed Ottoman Empire. This emphasizes that the new regime refused to make further use of Islamic codes and consolidated its legitimacy through embracing universal values. Thus, people who came to Hagia Sophia for religious purposes were transformed into museum visitors in a modern state institution and became the subjects of the modern state understanding and citizen profile that Kemalist ideology sought to construct. In this context, a place of worship, which was sacred for both Christians and Muslims, gained a new identity, and detached from its religious context in this way it became a universal cultural value.[63]

As Yunus Nadi stated, the state's cultural policies aimed to preserve Hagia Sophia not as a religious symbol but as a universal cultural treasure, and with the decree dated November 24, 1934, it was decided to convert Hagia Sophia into a museum.[64]

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[63] Hagia Sophia Museum was converted into a mosque in 2020, following the Hünkar Pavilion section, which was opened for worship in 1991 during the Turgut Özal period.

[64] Edhem Eldem, "Ayasofya: Kilise, Cami, Abide, Müze, Simge", *Toplumsal Tarih*, 254, Şubat 2015, p. 84.

The decree stated, "In view of its historical status as a unique architectural and artistic masterpiece in Istanbul, the conversion of Hagia Sophia Mosque into a museum is approved and accepted, with the belief that it will delight the entire Orient and provide humanity with a new institution of knowledge."[65] These statements show the regime's scientific approach to the issue of converting Hagia Sophia into a museum and preserving its universal value through musealization. However, as Anderson asserts,"[m]useums, as well as the imagination that musealizes them, are profoundly political." [66]In this context, the Republican regime used museological activities as a tools of social engineering in this way the state could legitimize its political power. Thus, within the framework of cultural policy, various religious institutions and symbols of the Ottoman Empire were transformed into official state institutions of the Republic, and new identities were adopted in line with Republican values. So, The conversion of Hagia Sophia into a museum is one of the most striking examples of this transformation and continues to be one of the most controversial issues shaping Turkish politics for years.

Moreover, The transformation of Topkapı Palace into a museum is particularly examined in this thesis because the transformation of the Ottoman palace into a museum, even though it was not actively used at the time, had not only a cultural but also a political meaning as the republican regime turned it into a modern state institution by showcasing the symbols of the Ottoman Empire. Until the 18th century, areas such as the palace, which were inaccessible to the public[67] and monopolized by the state elite, were both opened to the public as a practical reflection of the republican ideology's understanding that sovereignty belongs to the nation, and the symbols of the Empire were frozen in the historical time of the museum. Thus, the structure, which was once the center of the Empire where only a group of privileged people could be found, was opened to the public and reinforced in line with the republican ideology within the framework of the understanding of the equality of the people and the sovereignty of the nation. In this context, with the

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[65] BCA, 30.18.1.2/49.79.6.1

[66] Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995), s.198.

[67] Burçak Madran, "Mekânın Belleği, Belleğin Mekânı: Mekân İşgalcileri Olarak Müzeler," *Mimarlık Dergisi*, No: 423 2022, p.46.

decree issued on April 3, 1924, Topkapı palace was transformed into a museum by moving away from being a dynasty symbol and shaped by the modern ethical understanding of the republic. It is the first museum in the republic's history and an essential means of placing the historical ties with the past regime on a different sphere. Thus, Topkapı Palace, the administrative center of the Ottoman State for centuries, has been turned into a nostalgic symbol reflecting Ottoman history by turning it into an institution accessible to the non-privileged public masses. Thus, designing the administrative center of the Ottoman Empire as a nostalgic symbol of the past can be considered a political maneuver of the new regime. Given the historical context detached from the Ottoman Empire and its significance for public education, museum studies in the Republican period were in a very intensive production. Establishing museums in numerous cities and even at the level of schools was one of the most prominent examples of this mobilization.

The opening of the Ethnography Museum is an important cultural initiative in terms of introducing the public to the elements of common cultural identity and strengthening historical belonging. The building, as one of the first museum buildings in the history of the Republic, was opened in 1930 and presented a narrative centered on the daily life practices of the citizens.[68]

Moreover, the opening of the Museum of Anatolian Civilisations based on the Hittite civilization, which is an integral part of the historical narrative centered on Anatolia, was one of the steps of the Turkish state to embrace the past in Anatolian lands. Initially conceived as a Hittite museum, the museum, which was opened under the name of Ankara Archaeological Museum, did not have a systematic organization. It was more of a warehouse and was not open to the public. In 1923, after the restoration of Kurşunlu Han and Mahmut Pasha Bedesten and their conversion into a museum building, the museum found an opportunity to open in 1968.[69] Although this museum was originally designed as the Hittite Museum, it was renamed the Museum

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[68] Sümer Atasoy "Türkiye'de Müzecilik" in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yay, 1996), p.1465.

[69] *Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı*, Accessed August 10, 2024, https://www.ktb.gov.tr/yazdir?313974E1ECE96DDA0F95E3CAC795ECF5

of Anatolian Civilisations, as it is known today, due to the diversity in the excavation inventory.[70]

Moreover, Halkevleri (People's Houses), one of the most active institutions in the Republican period in terms of educating the public, was opened in 1932 and started to operate as the most influential institution for introducing the state ideology to the public by being divided into various branches in a format more loyal to the state instead of the Turkish Hearths. According to Şerafettin Turan, it was Atatürk's wish that the People's Houses affiliated with the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)) transform into People's Houses since the exclusionary perspective of the Turkish Hearths caused problems in establishing national unity.[71] The People's Houses' organizational structure is essential because they were much more mobilized than many other institutions in introducing national consciousness to the citizens.

The People's Houses organization was basically divided into nine branches. Divided into fields such as language, literature, history, sports, and courses, especially the museum and exhibitions branch of the public houses undertook a vital role in introducing the understanding of history in the early Republican period to the public through exhibitions. The museums and exhibitions branch of the people's houses, which organized many exhibitions and made the relatively distant structure of museums more intimate and accessible to the public, made the people's houses one of the most effective instruments of museological activities in the early republican period. In 1946, the number of Halkevleri reached 455 and they were involved in many activities ranging from spreading literacy to completing the deficiencies of museums to create the masses of acceptable citizens that the Republic was trying to build. [72]

To sum up, from the foundation of the Republic until Atatürk's death, the newly established Turkish Republic took steps to both prove to the rest of the world that

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[70] *Ibid.*, p. 1464.

[71] Şerafettin Turan, Etkin bir Eğitim, Kültür ve Sosyal Dayanışma Kurumu olarak Halkevleri, in *Bilanço 1923-1998: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75 Yılına Toplu Bakış Uluslararası Kongresi, I. Cilt: Siyaset-Kültür-Uluslararası İlişkiler*, (İstanbul : Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999) p. 205.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

Turkey was a modern and powerful state and to consolidate its power by fusing anti-regime elements within the Republic with republican values. In order to represent Turkish identity and history internationally and domestically, museums and exhibitions were one of the most sophisticated means of expression of the new regime. In this respect, museums and exhibitions were used as one of the most contemporary means of self-expression for the new regime, which aimed for a modern state model.

It is pretty understandable that during the early republican period, a particular investment was made in Ankara as the capital of the new Turkey and that this city was critical for the regime. Because Istanbul was no longer the center of government, Ankara had to transform into a place of memory in line with the ethical values represented by the Republic. Since Ankara was also a showcase place where foreign ambassadors would come and get to know the new Turkey, the Republic's ideals began to be constructed in Ankara. At this point, everything that would symbolize a modern and contemporary city was placed on the face of the city. For instance, the new regime organized parks, erected statues with historical elements, constructed hospitals, schools, state buildings, and museums in Ankara. Among all these places, museums are one of the places that will enable the perception of identity to be permeated to its visitors in the easiest way. For this reason, museums became one of the most important cultural tools used by the Kemalist regime. Ankara, the Republic's symbol, was considered the central city of the reforms and hosted many museums. While Ankara was critical in the identity construction of the young Republic, Istanbul was an important city in forgetting the memory codes of the past and building a new one. For this reason, it is possible to say that Istanbul was the center of memory codes that were tried to be forgotten and reorganized with the republican ethic, particularly evident in examples such as the conversion of Topkapı Palace and Hagia Sophia Mosque into museums.

Although both Ankara and Istanbul were the most active centers in museological activities for the construction of a new identity and the transformation of the remnants of the old regime, museums were opened in many cities in Anatolia, such as İzmir, Diyarbakır, Kayseri, and Konya. Through the museum branch of the

People's Houses, special attention could be paid to the issue of public education through more mobilized exhibitions. On the other hand, places of high cultural and spiritual value, such as the Mevlana Tekke, were reorganized with the republican ethic, resulting in a reinterpretation of society-state relations in the context of museology. In conclusion, although the locations of dozens of museums scattered all over the country are different, their discourses are common. The aim was to exhibit the Republic's identity in museums and use them as a tool for education and transformation. With this feature, the museology of the Republic period is quite different from the understanding of museology in future periods, especially in the 1980s. Because it will be more challenging to find a common discourse that will be understood clearly in museum and exhibition activities in the following periods, in the following parts of the thesis, the diversity in the discourse of museology in the 1980s will be emphasized, unlike the early republican period.

3.3. Transition Period: Museum and Historical Perception from the İsmet İnönü Era to the 1980s

In the early republican period, cultural studies were seen as one of the essential elements of the Turkish revolution, and progress was made in the light of scientific data to raise the national culture to the level of contemporary civilization.[73] During the period of İsmet İnönü, who took over after Atatürk's death, museological activities, which were instrumentalized in the first years of the Republic in order to create a unique and strong identity, entered a period of stagnation compared to the early republican period.[74] Many internal and external factors may have caused this situation. For example, one of the first international threats faced by İsmet İnönü was the Second World War. The difficulties brought about by the war economy made it necessary to allocate most of the budget to the military sphere. On the other hand, the Cold War environment initiated a process in which Turkey had to consolidate its position in the international arena. The maneuver of transition to multi-party life in the context of the requirements of being a part of the Western bloc led to significant

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[73] Şerafettin Turan, *Ismet Inönü: Yaşami, Dönemi ve Kişiliği*, (Ankara: Bilgi, 2003), p.225

[74] Madran and Önal, p.181.

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transformations in the field of culture as well as in Turkey's political history. In the 1950 elections, when the DP (Democrat Party) came to power, both liberal economic policies and populist political maneuvers led to a significant change in cultural policies. According to Copeaux, the historical narrative shaped by cultural policies from 1938 to the 1980s was based on three different definitions of identity. The first of these is the glorification of the Asian Turkish ethnic identity practiced in the early republican period, the second is the narrative that prioritizes Near Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean identity codes, and the last is the narrative that prioritizes the Islamic past.[75]

In the following sections of the thesis, the transformation in the historical narrative after the early republican period and its reflection on museology will be analyzed. In this context, before discussing the cultural transformations during the DP period, it is critical to mention Hasan Ali Yücel, who served as the Minister of National Education, in order to understand the process. During İsmet İnönü's presidency, the humanism movement was one of the most influential movements dominating the cultural field. As Şerafettin Turan emphasizes, the worldviews and ideologies of both İsmet İnönü and Hasan Ali Yücel are important in this context.[76] In this period, in addition to the initiation of an excellent public education with the Village Institutes, breakthroughs such as the translation of world classics into Turkish, especially in the field of literature, caused a significant mobilization in the cultural field. However, the political conjuncture brought about by Cold War ideology sought justifications for the closure of the People's Houses and Village Institutes, accusing them of propagandizing communism in the following periods. For this reason, the structure attempted to be built in the cultural sphere during the İnönü period was fragmented during the DP period to consolidate the government's power and strengthen its position in the Western bloc; therefore, continuity could not be ensured. Similarly, developments such as the political and economic environment created by World War II weakened the CHP government, which prevented the government from concentrating on socio-cultural areas.

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[75] Etienne Copeaux, *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine: Tarih Ders Kitaplarında, 1931-1993* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), p.84

[76] Turan, *İsmet İnönü: Yaşamı, Dönemi ve Kişiliği,* p.226.

Period after the 2nd World War, The cultural policies, did not have a systematic and glorified characteristic as in the early Republic period. However, some steps were taken that could cause erosion in the identity that the Republic tried to create. For example, processes such as the establishment of imam hatip schools, the recitation of the call to prayer in Arabic, the reopening of certain mausoleums, and the closure of Halkevleri not only tarnished the CHP's identity image but also degenerated the identity codes that the early Republic had tried to create. These actions contributed to ongoing debates that persist today. Especially with the closure of the People's Houses in 1951, the activities of the most influential representative organization of the republican ideology were halted, leaving many archival documents abandoned. After the 1960 coup d'état, with the transformation of the political environment, The People's Houses wanted to be revived. For this purpose, various arrangements were made in 1963. However, the institutions faced severe challenges due to targeting by ideological groups and financial constraints and were suspended again with the 1980 coup d'état.[77]

While DP was trying to break the influence of CHP, it also caused a dissolution in the identity codes shaped by the ethics of the Republic. In this period, a more tolerant policy on religious issues was pursued. This was partly because of the DP's populist policies but also because of the policies developed with the necessity of taking part in the Western bloc during the Cold War. Thus, the religious factor, which could be used as a more effective weapon against communism, was used as a tool. Thus, a favorable environment was prepared to strengthen the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, becoming the official state discourse in the 1980s.

In 1960, after a coup d'état overthrew the DP government, the state started to produce more active cultural policies. One reason for this may be an understanding that envisages compensating for the degeneration of the values of the early Republican period caused by DP policies.On the other hand, due to pursuing pro-western policies with the entry into the Cold War period, interest in Western history increased, and the understanding of articulating Mediterranean and Anatolian civilization with Western history gained importance rather than the Asian-based ethnic understanding

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[77] Turan, Etkin bir Eğitim, Kültür ve Sosyal Dayanışma Kurumu olarak Halkevleri, p.223-224.

of Turkish history.[78] This narrative, shaped around humanism, permeated many areas of the period, such as education, archaeology, tourism and the perception of history.

The Turkish-Islamic civilization based identity understanging developed as a reflex against the humanist movement that interpreted Anatolian civilization with a Greek-Latin-centred narrative,[79] which began to dominate culture and tourism policies after Atatürk's death. In this regard, The historical perspective centered on Turkish-Islamic civilization found expression in many areas, including tourism and promotion activities. When examining the 1971 budget negotiations in the history of the Turkish Parliament, Tourism and Promotion Minister Necmettin Cevheri, stated that "alongside the remnants of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, we have the privilege of promoting the history and works erected by our ancestors in Anatolia,"[80] shows that the Turkish-Islamic synthesis had already found expression as a state policy in shaping the cultural and state image even before 1980. In addition, Turkish-Islamic synthesists integrated historical narratives based on Turkish-Islamic civilization and manipulated the collective memory with various codes of banal nationalism. An example of these banal nationalism practices was reflected in the celebrations of the 900th anniversary of the Victory of Malazgirt. In the 1971 budget plans, the State Planning Organisation and the Institute of Seljuk History and Civilisation had planned to organize conquest week activities and to build a conquest monument as part of the Malazgirt Victory events.[81]

Historical events such as the Victory of Malazgirt, mythologised by the Turkish Islamic Synthesisists with the discourse that the gates of Anatolia were opened to the Turks, played a role in the production of collective memory by symbolising them to make them more visible to the masses. In this regard, another conquest discourse in harmony with the cultural discourse centered on Turkish Islamic civilization was the conquest of Istanbul. The conquest of Istanbul was celebrated visibly for the first

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[78] Copeaux, *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine: Tarih Ders Kitaplarında, 1931-1993*, p.82.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[80] Recep Boztemur, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi: Millet Meclisi 3. Dönem (1969-1973) 1970-1973 Bütçe Müzakereleri* (Ankara: TBMM Kültür Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, 2017), p. 318.

[81] *Ibid.*, 254.

time in the history of the republic during the DP period, and after the 1980s, as the visibility of the synthesis increased, the myth of conquest gained an even more visible meaning. [82] While the Turkish-Islamic synthesis increased its visibility through memory policies that emphasized national culture, the humanist movement, which became an important part of historiography after Atatürk's death, continued to influence archaeological and historical policies. After the early Republican period, the humanist movement, and the understanding of history based on Turkish Islamic civilization which created two contrasting historical narratives, found a response in various cultural studies but could not be the subject of intensive identity creation in areas such as museums, exhibitions, and archaeological studies as in the early Republican period.

As mentioned before, after the early Republican period, archaeological and museum studies entered a period of stagnation. In this context, Mehmet Özdoğan emphasized that the issue of conducting archaeological excavations and museum studies was a taboo for the state, and due to the bureaucratic procedures of this process, many qualified excavation teams were primarily directed to excavate in different places until the 1980s.[83] The procedural steps taken by the state in the cultural field negatively affected archaeological and museum studies and created an environment that prevented the development of cultural studies in this period.

Although the importance given by the state to museum activities decreased compared to the early Republican period, the field of culture was separated from the Ministry of Education and organized independently in 1971 with the shaping of the culture industry, so that cultural studies started to show a more systematic development process within the Ministry of Culture. The fact that globalization and the culture industry began to dominate the cultural field with new dynamics brought a sharp change process in the 1980s.

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[82] Nagehan Tokdoğan, *Yeni Osmanlıcılık: Hınç, Nostalji, Narsizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), p. 214.

[83] Özdoğan, 'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Arkeoloji: Siyasi Yönlendirmeler-Çelişkiler ve Gelişim Süreci, p. 200.

CHAPTER IV

EVOLVING IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL SHIFTS IN THE 1980S: THE TURKISH-ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS AND ITS IMPACT ON MUSEUMS

"Reality changes; in order to represent it, modes of representation must also change. Nothing comes from nothing; the new comes from the old, but that is why it is new."[84]

— Bertolt Brecht

This part of the thesis will focus on how the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which became a state discourse after the 1980 coup d'état, finds a response in the collective memory. It will analyze the development of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, its counterparts in nationalism, and its transformation over time in the context of the exhibition and museum field. The practices of using the social memory of the 1980s, which contain a deep divergence from the historical narrative used by the early Republican period in the construction of national identity, were shaped by the narrative of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Although the Synthesis became less visible as a state discourse towards the end of the 1980s, the historical discourse plays a pivotal role in defining the identity used by political Islam, which rose afterward, constituting a framework for the discourse of today's political Islamic power in the context of capitalism and class-power relations.

Therefore, this thesis will focus on the process that developed as the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis took an active role in the state's ideological apparatus and how the nationalist-conservative identity codes that developed afterward were reflected in museum and exhibition activities. In this context, by examining The Age of Suleyman the Magnificent Exhibition (Muhteşem Süleyman Sergisi), Three

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[84] Bertolt Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966),p. 110.

Generations of the Republic Exhibition (Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet Sergisi), Creating a Citizen Exhibition (Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak Sergisi), Turks: Journey of a Thousand Years 600-1600 Exhibition (Türkler: 1000 Yıllık Yolculuk Sergisi), the Panorama 1453 History Museum (Panorama 1453 Tarih Müzesi), Sakarya Field Battle and Turkish History Promotion Center, Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center, it will be analyzed how the memory practices, which underwent significant changes in the 1980s, were reinterpreted with the definitions of nationalism by the authorities.

Before addressing the issue of the shaping of collective memory in exhibition and museum practices, an analysis will be conducted on the emergence of the new historical discourse used as an ideological apparatus of the state after the 1980 coup d'état, how it was interpreted by nationalist-conservative discourse after its decline in the late 1980s, and how nationalism was produced in conservative circles and reflected in identity definitions. In this context, to better understand the memory changes in the cultural field, examining the capital dynamics in the neoliberal order and the class relations regulated by these dynamics is necessary. The next part of the thesis will focus on the permeable relationship between the bourgeoisie and power, emphasizing the influential role of the bourgeoisie as one of the power centers that affect memory dynamics. This is because the establishment of the authoritarian state identity created by the military coup of September 12 was intertwined with the dynamics of the neoliberal capitalist order.[85]

4.1. Redefining Identity and Nationalism in the 1980s: Memory Crisis and Cultural Reflections

Since the 1980s, many important breaking points in Turkey's recent history have been harbored, and many scholars refer to this period as the 'Third Republic.'[86] One reason for this was that the changing political and social dynamics brought about a new shaping of collective memory in a new sense with the political conjuncture of the period. In this context, Halbwachs, who played an essential role in the

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[85] İsmet Akça, "Türkiye'de Darbeler, Kapitalizm ve Demokrasi(sizlik)" in *Cumhuriyet Tarihinin Tartışmalı Konuları*, Yay.Haz. Bülent Bilmez, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013), p.60.

[86] Jenny White, *Müslüman Milliyetçiliği ve Yeni Türkler*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 16-17

systematization of collective memory studies, emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing between autobiographical memory and historical memory.[87] While individual memories cannot be separated from collective memory, collective memory evolves individuals along the axis of collective consciousness and gives them a common sense of belonging. According to Halbwachs, "…a remembrance is in very large measure a reconstruction of the past achieved with data borrowed from the present…"[88] This feature brings to mind museums, the memory sites of modern times, as spaces where the selected past is constructed and produced in collective memory. As places of memory, museums are important sites of social memory, serving as an apparatus through which the state can reach the minds of citizens. Lefebvre says, "Every social space is the outcome of a process with many aspects and many contributing currents, signifying and non-signifying, perceived and directly experienced, practical and theoretical."[89]

In this regard, according to Foucault, spaces are divided into utopia and heterotopia. While utopias are unreal spaces, heterotopias are actual spaces that play a role in systematizing society.[90] Museums and libraries are heterotopias of 19th-century European culture. They are utopias of time accumulating forever, organized so that time cannot harm them.[91] Additionally, Foucault states that heterotopias can undergo various changes throughout history. In line with the needs of power, spaces can align their functions with the discourses of power, using them as elements to shape the identities of the masses and consolidate power. Examples of this can be observed in many state structures. However, this thesis will focus on how social memory in Turkey has been transformed in museums, which are places of memory, particularly in the 1980s and after.

At this point, the concepts of memory and collective memory are essential areas for modern state structures and the bourgeoisie, particularly under the influence of

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[87] Maurice Halbwachs, *Kolektif Hafıza*, (Ankara: Heretik Yayınları, 2017), p. 47.

[88] Halbwach, 69

[89] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 110.

[90] Michel Foucault, *Özne ve İktidar*, (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2014), p.295.

[91] *Ibid.*, p.299

neoliberal policies, where they can shape identity. The instrumentalization of cultural elements to shape collective memory by state hegemony is an attempt observed in many nation-state structures. As discussed in the previous part of the thesis, it analyzed how the newly established Turkish nation-state tried to harmonize collective memory with the regime's ideology through museum and exhibition activities.

While the issue of shaping collective memory was framed within the ethical understanding of Kemalist ideology in the early republican period, this situation has been influenced by very different dynamics in Turkey after the 1980s. As Huyssen underlines, "The reorganization of cultural capital as we experienced it in the 1980s in the debates about postmodernism, multiculturalism, and cultural studies, and as it has affected museum practices in multiple ways, cannot be reduced to one political line."[92] There were three main trends that shaped the fundamental dynamics of museum and exhibition activities after 1980. First, neo-Ottoman cultural discourse emphasis on the Golden Age of the Ottoman Empire by identifying Turkish history with Islamic history; second, the bourgeoisie's creation of its historical narrative with neoliberal policies or sponsorship of various museums and excavation activities to undertake the preservation of history, third, the emphasis on the idea of multicultural identity within the scope of cultural heritage discourse shaped the fundamental dynamics in museum and exhibition activities of this period.

Identity formation, memory, and ideological patterns are not only shaped by internal dynamics. They are also shaped by international conjunctures. In this regard, In the 1990s, processes such as the collapse of the USSR and the Kurdish issue began to dominate politics.[93] which brought about a process of reinterpreting the memory patterns that political Islamists tried to produce within the framework of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as a more global and inclusive discourse. In a pragmatic sense, the conservative approach, which also included the Turkish republics that seceded from

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[92] Andreas Huyssen, *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1995), p.17.

[93] Sema Basmacı, *Aydınlar Ocağı ve Türk-İslam Sentezi: 1980'lerden 2000'li Yıllara Devreden Milliyetçi-Muhafazakar Bakiye*, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hacettepe University, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), 2016, p. 96.

the USSR and Kurdish nationalism, constituted an element of the identity construction process that the government would prefer. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis gained a prominent discourse, especially in education and identity policies, which influenced the identity definitions of the society and led to the upbringing of an apolitical youth, just as the putschist regime wanted. Thus, the political existence of leftist groups was marginalized by the state, and this situation paved the way for political Islam to seize power.

With this feature, the educational and cultural policies influenced by the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis brought about a process in which the political Islamist power centers that came to power in the following periods reshaped them with their interpretations of identity. For this reason, the emphasis on Ottoman and Seljuk history, in particular, led to the use of the same nostalgic codes in the memory production of both the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and the subsequent nationalist conservative legacy.

Both in the early Republican period and after the 1980 coup d'état, governments shaped their cultural studies in line with the ideology of nationalism. Although nationalism was the central element of cultural studies in both periods, the sources of nationalism varied. For example, during the early Republican period, Turkish nationalism was based on the principles of constitutional equality of citizenship. In the 1930s, this understanding of nationalism was further shaped by the Turkish History Thesis. In contrast, in the 1980s, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis replaced the state discourse aiming to raise a secular Turkish nation. Although the TIS did not oppose Kemalism, and modifying it to Ataturkism, used this new ideology to ensure its legitimacy, there were many fundamental differences between them. While the perception of nationalism of both periods prioritised Turkish identity, the early republican period emphasised the pre-Islamic period and had a secular and positivist characteristic, after the 1980s the discourse of nationalism that created a common language, history and values became identical with Islamic civilisation. Thus, in both periods, museums and exhibition activities shaped around nationalism and the perception of nationalism were used as a means of consolidating the legitimacy of nation-states. However, the sources of the ideological apparatus of the state varied.

According to Hobsbawm, *"[i]nvented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past."*[94] In this context, the ideological hegemony after the 1980 Turkish coup d'état constructed identity practices within a neo-Ottomanist framework to legitimize itself and use them to mobilize the masses. Museums, as centers of memory, became sites for producing new traditions in the postmodern world, embodying symbols within the framework of the produced tradition. Within Michael Billig's concept of banal nationalism, identity codes emphasizing the glorious history of the past were continually produced by transforming them into symbols visible to ordinary people.

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis developed by the Intellectuals Hearth' accepts Islamic values as the main element of culture. According to this understanding, which argues that universal identity values cannot fully explain national feelings, every nation has a unique national history.[95] The synthesis, which aims to protect unique structure of Turkish culture by developing a religion-oriented identity discourse against communist ideas and Western imperialism, which were seen as a threat by conservative circles during the Cold War. According to the synthesis, Turkish identity is able to survive because it was identified with Islamic values. With this feature, it differs from the secular nationalism of the early Republican period. The Turkish Islamic Synthesis integrates Turkish culture with Islamic nostalgic memory codes by identifying its main focal point with Islamic civilization as a historical reference. Over time, the content of the synthesis has undergone various transformations and has been shaped by government policies. For example, while Turkish and Islamic identity developed an equal narrative during the Özal period, especially with the rise of political Islam, a narrative in which Islamic identity elements were prioritized developed. This transformed understanding of history has led to a more pronounced response to references to the golden ages of Turkish-Islamic history. In this context, the concept of neo-Ottomanism gained visibility in

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[94] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge University Press: 2007), 1

[95] Bozkurt Güvenç, Gencay Şaylan, İ. Tekeli, Ş. Turan, *Türk-İslam sentezi*. (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1991), p. 37

the 1980s, when the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was recognised as a state policy, especially with the international cultural diplomacy. However, it was only in the 2000s, when The Justice and Development Party put Ottoman nostalgic memory codes at the center of the historical narrative, that neo-Ottomanist cultural policy became one of the main representational discourses of the state. Yavuz emphasizes that the Justice and Development Party's neo-Ottomanist nostalgic memory management has an Islamist and adventurist characteristic.[96] While the neo-Ottomanist representational practices, which change according to pragmatic conditions, pursued an identity policy in line with the West in the early 2000s when the issue of inclusion in the European Union was on the agenda, in the 2010s, as pragmatic conditions change, Islam-oriented discourse gained a dominant feature.

According to Billig, the common characteristic of right-wing populism in the 1980s is that it all contains a discourse of constructing cultural hegemony by claiming to revive a glorified past.[97]. In the case of Turkey, Ongur refers to the concept of "Banal Ottomanism"[98] which involves constantly referring to the golden age of the Ottoman Empire and constructing cultural politics through nostalgic longing for the old days. According to Althusser, in contemporary capitalist societies, the state endeavors to transform the masses into acceptable citizens by activating ideological hegemony through the religious, family, political, and cultural apparatus.[99] Unlike the early Republican period, the ideological apparatus of the state and invented traditions underwent a significant transformation after the 1980s under the influence of different dynamics and power centers.

The Turkish Islamic Synthesis, which was used as a tool of ideological legitimacy by the coup regime, continued to exist in the cultural sphere after the Motherland Party came to power. Turgut Özal continued to produce cultural policies by blending

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[96] M. Hakan Yavuz, "Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision," *Die Welt Des Islams* 56, no. 3–4 (November 28, 2016), p.440.

[97] Michael Billig, *Banal Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: Gelenek Yayınları 2002), p.119.

[98] Hakan Ovunc Ongur, "Identifying Ottomanisms: The Discursive Evolution of Ottoman Pasts in the Turkish Presents," *Middle Eastern Studies* 51, no. 3 (December 4, 2014): 416–32, p. 417.

[99] Louis Althusser, *İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları*, (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2010), p. 175.

neoliberal policies with conservative nationalism. One of the most prominent examples is the glorification of Ottoman identity in the exhibitions in line with Western civilization. In the exhibitions held with the support of many local sponsorships, the splendor of the Ottoman Empire was emphasized, blending neoliberal policies with conservative nationalism. Thus, the codes of liberal and Westernist nationalism constructed social memory within a conservative understanding through museum and exhibition activities.

As global political dynamics shifted when the Motherland Party ceded power to the TPP-SPP (Doğru Yol Partisi-Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti) coalition in 1991[100] new ideological discourses emerged. The dissolution of the USSR and the globalized world order, in particular, led to diversifying the definitions of nationalism and identity. On the other hand, the rise of political Islam in the 1990s led to the continuation of the discourse of conservative nationalism in identity politics. Especially during the period when the Welfare Party came to power, cultural policies were shaped by a Neo Ottomanist understanding, and the Sunni-Muslim identity was glorified.

The post-1980 period, unlike previous periods, creates an identity crisis due to the production of new nationalist identities. Although today, Intellectuals' Hearth and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis are not as popular as they were in the early 1980s, they formed the basic structure and intellectual foundation of the nationalist identities produced by subsequent governments.

The first examples of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis can be found in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. [101]However, the systematization of the idea was shaped by the influence of the Intellectuals' Hearth. While the 1961 constitution's liberal environment positively affected the representation of leftist groups, nationalist conservative groups started to organize systematically in the 1970s against the threat

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[100] Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, (İletişim Yayınları: 2020), p.342.

[101] Etienne Copeaux, "Türk Milliyetçiliği: Sözcükler, Tarih, İşaretler" (çev. G. Doğan) in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* - C. 4 - Milliyetçilik, (der. T. Bora), (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2002), (s. 44 - 52), p.46.

of leftism and communism. At this point, especially the Intellectuals' Hearth played an important role. The synthesis, which was used as a social engineering tool in state policies, especially after the 1980 coup d'état, found its response in many fields, such as art, literature, museology, and exhibition activities, to build a national consciousness.[102] The coup administration combined the authoritarian characteristic of Kemalism and the doctrine of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis as the ideological substrate.[103] While this understanding formed a reflex in museum and exhibition activities, a new understanding of identity centered on neo-Ottomanism took shape.

In this context, the share of the international conjuncture in the rise of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis as a state discourse cannot be denied. As Kemal Can states, the political environment created by the cold war, developments such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Green Belt Project, and Russia's invasion of Afghanistan, had developed a conjuncture in the international arena that enabled the rise of Islamist thought in the political sense and its adoption by the masses, so that social memory was also shaped by the effects of the global order.[104]

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis has a historical narrative prioritizing Ottoman identity and history. With this feature, the historical imagination of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis markedly diverged from Kemalist nationalism and instrumentalized the historical narrative of the early Republican period. In the light of history and archaeological studies, which were also used as elements of prestige in the process of identity construction in the early Republican period, concrete evidence was sought and included in the perception of history against the identification of Turkish history only with Islamic history, showing that Turkish history was the founder of civilizations and that it dated back much earlier than the Turks' adoption of Islam. Thus, the historical infrastructure of the identity construction that would be compatible with the secular values of the newly established Turkish Republic was

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[102] Levent Odabaşı, "Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu," in *Türkiye'nin 1980'li Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaynar (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2023), 597–606, p. 600.

[103] Kemal Can, "Seksenli Yıllarda Ülkücü Hareket: Travma Sonrası Stres Testi", in *Türkiye'nin 1980'li Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaynar (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2023), 575–96, p. 579.

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 587

created. However, the fight against communism after World War II brought about the instrumentalisation of Islam for the state. Thus, conservatism and national culture were shaped around anticommunism. At this point, practices such as the inclusion of elective religion courses in the curriculum, the opening of the Faculty of Theology, and the opening of imam hatip courses indicate that the government acted more compromisingly on religion, and one of the reasons for this compromising behavior was the development of an Islamisation reflex against communism. Thus, Turkey's endeavor to take part in the Western Bloc and exist in the imperial world led to the development of an anticommunist reflex. On the other hand, the anticommunist reflex prepared the environment for the rise of nationalism and Islamisation issues.[105] In this context, the Islamic memory practices that became visible with the DP's coming to power formed the infrastructure of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis that gained strength in the 1980s. According to Çetinsaya, in the early years of the Cold War, conservative intellectual groups started to organize themselves into nationalist-conservative and nationalist-sacred groups.[106]

In the 1960s, as a reflex to the growing influence of leftist groups, nationalist conservatives also organized and built the process that led to the establishment of the Intellectuals' Hearth. Along with the Intellectuals' Hearth, organizations such as the National Turkish Students Union (Millî Türk Talebe Birliği) and the Association for Fighting Communism (Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği)[107] contributed to the massification and socialization of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which gained semi-official visibility after the 1980 coup. It has already been mentioned that the work of the Centre of Intellectuals was the basis of the conception of history shaped within the framework of the coup ideology. In the 1970s, when the political conjuncture of the period is analysed, it is seen that the active policies of the Hearth of Intellectuals were shaped by both a defence mechanism against the rising leftist ideology and the desire to bring religious affairs under state control.

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[105] Fatih Yaşlı, *Türkçü Faşizmden Türk İslam Ülküsüne*, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2016), p.15.

[106] Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of 'Turkish-islamic Synthesis' in Modern Turkish Political Thought", *The Muslim World* 89, no. 3–4 (October 1999): 350–76, p. 368.

[107] Hakan Ovunc Ongur, "Identifying Ottomanisms: The Discursive Evolution of Ottoman Pasts in the Turkish Presents",p. 422.

Transforming the increasing social polarization of the 1960s and 1970s into an ideological framework the state could control was the main idea of those who carried out the coup in 1980. In this context, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was turned into an apparatus for the state's aim of creating an acceptable citizen identity. It was aimed to institutionalize the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and produce policies that would permeate state institutions. Although marginalized groups were removed from the political arena after the 1980 coup d'état, it was primarily leftist groups that were removed from the state structure. According to Levent Odabaşı, institutions such as the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), the State Planning Organisation (DPT) and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism were also stakeholders in the creation of an acceptable Turkish citizen identity in order to harmonise society with the ideas of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis through state policies.[108] Thus, after the 1980 coup d'état, a systematic cultural policy was put in place to make society more controllable.

In the 1980s, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, as the state discourse, profoundly impacted cultural institutions. For instance, establishing the Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language, and History to produce state cultural policy was significant. The symbolic, ideological institutions of the early Republican period, such as the Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Language Institution, were placed under this body. This was intended to legitimize the identity policies produced in the 1980s by creating an image compatible with the values of the early Republic, including Atatürkism.[109] Although the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of the 1980s diverges from the early Republican conception of history and identity in philosophy and practice, the coup administration was trying to legitimize itself by assuming the patronage of Atatürkist values and institutions.

After the 1980 coup d'état, museum and exhibition activities were instrumentalized in integrating the imagined national consciousness into the masses, as in the nation-state building process. However, unlike in the early 20th century, the state did not

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[108] Levent Odabaşı, "Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu", p. 601

[109] Odabaşı, p. 601

monopolize museum activities in the 1980s alone. Moreover, the discourse of the state was not shaped by the influence of a single ideology.

In the 1980s, museum activities were instrumentalised in the construction of the national consciousness, as in the nation state building process. However, the main difference of museum activities in the 1980s was that museum activities were no longer monopolised by the state. Moreover, the cultural policy of the state was not shaped around a single discourse. Neoliberal policies led to the industrialisation of culture and the branding of culture as an object of tourism prevented the Turkish Islamic Synthesis from being the only dominant narrative in the cultural policies of the state. For pragmatic reasons, the state discourse on tourism did not have a parallel content with the Turkish Islamic Synthesis discourse. For pragmatic reasons, the state's tourism discourse did not have exactly the same content as the Turkish Islamic Synthesis discourse. The bourgeoisie's involvement in museum and exhibition activities and the creation of its own cultural discourse led to the diversification of the use of cultural codes. Thus, the commodification of culture has caused the bourgeoisie to expand its sphere of discourse and the state to diversify its cultural policies.

For this reason, post-1980 cultural policies were not only shaped under state control. When analyzing the transformation in this period, it is important to define, and interpret neoliberal policies and their effects. The discourses of liberal nationalism and neo-Ottomanism that supported the multicultural structure offered content that would facilitate integration into the neoliberal order.[110] Museum activities glorifying Ottoman history, which the Turkish-Islamic synthesis centered on, were used both as a means of tourism in the international global order and as a tool of state identity production in domestic politics. Thus, neoliberal cultural policies were integrated with the identity perception created by the Turkish Islamic Synthesis and consolidated the government's image.

When the Motherland Party's rule ended, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis discourse weakened and evolved into a different form. The neo-Ottomanist understanding

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[110] Nora Fisher Onar, "Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today's Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 2 (March 2009): 229–41, p. 237.

emphasized by the TİS formed the primary discourse of the cultural policies of the following periods of power. In the 1990s, rapidly changing world dynamics, processes such as the collapse of the USSR led to the loss of the function of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, which was basically developed against communism, and the emergence of different discourses of nationalism and identity. Although TIS was not part of the official discourse itself as it was in the 1980s, it continued its existence by being included in the cultural policies and identity definitions of the governments that followed it. Islamist and liberal nationalism gained great visibility in the cultural and political sphere, especially with the rise of political Islam in the 1990s, and played an even more active role in shaping the collective memory in the 2000s.[111]

In Akça's definition, the Kurdish question, the desire of neoliberalism to be included in the political dominance and the rise of political Islam were the main dynamics that enabled the neoliberal National Security State to sustain itself in the 1990s.[112] All these dynamics formed the basic building blocks of politics throughout the 1990s and shaped cultural and memory policies. In this regard, Bora, mentions two currents of nationalism that shaped cultural policies after the 1980s. The first one is reactionary nationalism, which centres on the question of a national future that feeds radical nationalist elements. Moreover, the second one is Westernist nationalism, which emphasised the importance of sharing a common culture with the West.[113] While the reactionary nationalism movement can be interpreted as a continuation of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the westernist nationalism movement can be interpreted as a reflex in the nationalism movement of existing in the globalising neoliberal order.

Both currents of nationalism are reflected in cultural policies, as will be discussed in the following sections. However, it would be insufficient to mention only these two currents in order to understand the identity crisis that emerged after the 1980s and the

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[111] Gavin D. Brockett, "When Ottomans Become Turks: Commemorating the Conquest of Constantinople and Its Contribution to World History," *The American Historical Review* 119, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 399–433, p. 427

[112] İsmet Akça, "Türkiye'de Darbeler, Kapitalizm ve Demokrasi(sizlik)", p. 61

[113] Tanıl Bora, *Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı*, (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1995), p.100.

production practices of social memory. Bora outlines five nationalist discources to comprehend these currents and analyze their interrelations: Kemalist official nationalism, Kemalist nationalism, Westernist nationalism, racist-ethnic Turkish nationalism, and Islamist nationalism.[114] In this context, elaborating on Kemalist official nationalism, Esra Özyürek noted that by the 1990s, images of Atatürk had proliferated and were effectively commodified, becoming almost mechanic representations.[115]

The image of Atatürk, the symbol of national state identity, was used as part of a discourse of unity against various threats. Additionally, it served as a means of keeping social memory alive against extremism threatening state security and symbolized legitimacy for the rulers. Kemalist nationalism, defined by Bora as the new Kemalism of the 1990s, developed as a reaction to the Islamist movement.[116]Moreover, Liberal nationalism, aims to produce policies in harmony with the West, interpreting the national existence as the attainment of Western civilization after Turkey's integration into neoliberal policies. Bora interprets Turkist radical nationalism as a deviant branch of official nationalism, while he identifies Islamist nationalism with the discourses of the Welfare Pary (RP), and states that they adopt Turkey's becoming the leader of the Islamic world as the central discourse. [117]

The emphasis on Islamic memory codes and the shaping of politics within the framework of this understanding during the rule of the Welfare Party were cited as the justification for the February 28 process. Following this process, the economic difficulties experienced during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition led to the transformation of political Islam into the AKP version. The AKP blended liberal nationalism with Islamist nationalism and incorporated the Islam-prioritising version of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis into identity politics. This new political understanding developed by the AKP was shaped based on liberal nationalism codes

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[114] Bora, p. 100.

[115] Esra Özyürek, *Modernlik Nostaljisi*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2007), p.127.

[116] Bora, p. 106.

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 120-124.

that prioritized relations with the European Union and the West.[118] The AKP's ambition to shape its identity and to dynamize society with this consciousness led to the formation of education, religion, and family policies based on Islamic values. The narrative of history has been shaped with a conservative nationalist understanding and through the idea of the *ummah*. Within the framework of the historical understanding, which continued as a new version of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, relations with Europe were developed by emphasizing Westernisation, primarily through international exhibitions.

Cultural diplomacy was emphasized to improve relations with Europe. From the 1980s to the 2000s, museum and exhibition activities were mainly shaped around the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, globalization, and the glorification of Anatolia's cultural heritage. According to Alain Servant, the main emphasis in the discussions on Turkey's membership in the European Union at the European Parliament's meeting in 2004 was that Turkey was culturally distant from Europe and had democratic deficiencies.[119] In this context, to change the European Union's perception of Turkey and manage the process, the governments of the period produced an intensive cultural policy in which they reinterpreted the Turkish image within the framework of Turkish Islamic Synthesis. Cultural hegemony carried out an identity policy through exhibitions and museological works from their nationalist perspective, producing the memory codes of the golden ages of Turkish-Islamic culture.

With Turkey's application for full membership in the European Union in 1987, a radical change in cultural policy was constructed, which focused more on the European character of the Turkish culture. This policy, which was initiated under the Motherland Party government, gained momentum with the full membership negotiations process under the AKP government in 2005. As mentioned before, the identity crisis that emerged in the 1980s prevented the cultural policies of the period from being based on the construction of a single identity, and they acquired a

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[118] Recep Boztemur, "Political Islam in Secular Turkey in 2000: Change in the Rhetoric towards Westernization, Human Rights and Democracy", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 7, Nos 1-2 (2001), pp. 125-137.

[119] Alain Servante, "Batılıların Gözünde Türk İmajının Geçirdiği Değişimler", in Özlem Kumrular (ed.), *Dunyada Turk Imgesi* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayinevi, 2005), p. 27

multidimensional character. For example, while cultural heritage codes that branded the ancient civilizations in Anatolia were produced, a cultural policy that would permeate the memory codes of both Turkish citizens and the European Union was constructed with a narrative in which Ottoman history was glorified with a nostalgic longing.[120] Thus, the neo-Ottomanist discourse shaped in the light of the TIS was both a means of consolidating the masses in domestic politics and the essential element of the image used in foreign policy.[121]

The central identity policy of the Özal era was to reconcile Turkey with its Ottoman past by combining European culture with Turkish-Islamic cultural elements and to gain prestige globally by circulating the memory codes of Ottoman culture.[122] This cultural understanding formed the basis of identity politics both in domestic politics and in the international arena, a policy continued by the Islamist governments in the following periods.

The book *Turkey in Europe Europe in Turkey*, written by Turgut Özal, summarizes the identity politics conducted to establish a common historical bond with Europe. Beginning with the dedication *"To the peoples of Europe – and to the Turkish people who belong among them",* the book sheds light on the cultural policy of the period. Emphasizing the importance of historical ties and unity with European civilization, Özal stressed that one of his biggest tasks was to compensate for the deteriorating image of Turkey after the 1980 and emphasized that Turkey is a secularising country even though it has a Muslim population. Moreover, in religious terms, he stated that Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, had a common root:

> Islam, like the two monotheistic religions, bears witness to Abraham. Despite their universal nature, all three were revealed to the Semites and, though different, have points in common. The Turks, just as much as the Indo-Europeans, were foreigners

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[120] Şeyda Barlas Bozkuş, *Turkey in the Global Art Scene: Dual Narratives in the Politics of International Exhibitions after the 1980s*, Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Boğaziçi University, (Unpublished PhD thesis), 2011, p. 191.

[121] Nagehan Tokdoğan, *Yeni Osmanlıcılık: Hınç, Nostalji, Narsizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), p. 64.

[122] Ongur, 423

to the Semites. Islam, like Judaism and Christianity, was eastern Mediterranean in origin.[123]

Özal emphasized that the Islamic religion is the product of a common culture in the eyes of Europe and stated that the Turkish-Islamic identity is not distant from European civilization. On the other hand, Özal embraced the cultural and historical narrative of ancient civilizations and defined them as the essential element of the historical structure of the Modern Turkish State with the following sentences:

> The Turks, living in this territory for a thousand years, have inherited some part of the culture of every civilization which flourished here since prehistory... You yourself accept that your own civilisation originated in Mesopotamia, then Anatolia, the Aegean Basin, and Rome. We have at least as much right as you to adopt these ancient civilisations as our own...[124]

Thus, Özal aimed to create a cultural brand internationally by appropriating the ancient civilizations' Turkish identity and cultural heritage in Anatolia with the codes of liberal nationalism. By appropriating the historical narrative of ancient civilizations that have a counterpart in the global order and by emphasizing Anatolia as the cradle of cultures, the aim was to establish common belonging with European culture.[125] In this context, the approach that prioritizes the ancient civilizations of Anatolia and Turkish identity has become a part of cultural diplomacy along with Islamic values. Özal's attempt to create a cultural brand by appropriating the historical narrative of Anatolia's ancient civilizations differs from the identity policies of the AKP era that prioritize Islamic values. Accordingly, while the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which was one of the sources of identity definitions during the Özal era, presented Turkish and Islamic identity in an equal narrative, with the rise of political Islam in the 1990s, Islamic identity elements were significantly emphasized.[126]

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[123] Turgut Özal, *Turkey in Europe And Europe in Turkey* (Nicosia, N. Cyprus: K. Rustem & Brother, 1991), p. 349

[124] Özal, p. 345-346

[125] Barlas, 220

[126] Cenk Saraçoğlu and Özhan Demirkol, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3 (September 22, 2015): 301–19, p. 307.

In the context of this historical narrative, which was an interpretation of the nationalism shaped by Özal on the axis of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, cultural propaganda was produced. In this conception of identity, on the one hand, there was an emphasis on the ancient civilizations of Anatolia and a reference to the multicultural structure of Anatolia. On the other hand, there was a narrative in which Islamic culture was glorified with emphasis on Ottoman history. According to Copeaux, Özal's book *Turkey in Europe* was a new interpretation of the Anatolian-centred historical narrative as a reflex of liberal nationalism against the unity of Hellenic culture on which the West bases its historical identity.[127] Since the Central Asian-centred Turkish history had no place in the European historiography in the context of the European social memory, Özal legitimized their common origin through both religion and culture by referring to the presence of Turks in Anatolia and the culture produced there, claiming that Anatolian civilization constituted Western civilization. In this context, Özal's neo-Ottomanist cultural policy overlapped with the universal values of the West and, at the same time, internalized political and economic globalization.[128] Thus, the neo-Ottomanist imperial cultural and political movement was used not as a discourse to be used against European civilization but as a means of identifying with European identity in the globalizing world order.[129]

The structure of the neo-Ottomanist understanding, embraced by Özal as a part of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, was compatible with multicultural and multinational identity codes. It promised peace in an environment where the Kurdish movement was rising in domestic politics.[130] On the other hand, in the international arena, the pluralist and multicultural structure of the Ottoman Empire was utilized to build the image of the state through international exhibitions. The effort to create a common social memory with Europe as a state policy in the 1980s was reflected in Özal's

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[127] Etienne Copeaux, *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine: Tarih Ders Kitaplarında, 1931-1993* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), p.268.

[128] Yılmaz Çolak, "Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 4 (July 2006): 587–602, p. 588.

[129] *Ibid.*, 593

[130] *Ibid.*, 592

book and in the museums and exhibitions of the period. In a globalizing world, Turkey's shaping of its own historical narrative in the context of the intersection of civilizations and the definition of identity within the framework of the Turkish Islamic synthesis has shown a parallel development. The issue of creating city brands in the context of globalization and localization will be analyzed in the next section, and this section will focus on museum and exhibition activities within the framework of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis.

4.2. Post-Coup Heritage: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in Exhibition and Museology

One of the most obvious reflections of the emphasis on the golden ages of the Ottoman Empire was reflected in the exhibition, *the Age of Suleiman the Magnificent*. The exhibition, in which the social memory was constructed with the legacy of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, aimed to prove Turkey's efforts to become a democratic, liberal state oriented towards the West, to recover the image of the state damaged by the 1980 coup in the international arena. [131] The exhibition, which emphasis on Ottoman history as relevant to the neoliberal and Islamist understandings of nationalism, was displayed in the USA, England, Germany, Japan, France, Australia, and Hungary between 1987 and 1995.[132] As can be understood from the introduction of the exhibition catalog, the characteristic of Anatolia as a bridge of civilizations was emphasized, and the period of Suleiman the Magnificent was depicted as one of the most critical states in terms of its effectiveness and power in the artistic field. It was mentioned that Sultan Suleiman was a supporter and sponsor of art and artists, and it was emphasized that his reign was the golden age of the empire.[133]

When the content section of the exhibition catalog was examined, the focus was on objects related to the cultural field, such as *tuğra*, edicts, *waqfiye*, religious and

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[131] Erdem Çolak, "Devlet İkonografisinin Dönüşümü ve Muhteşem Süleyman Çağı Sergisi'nden Yeditepe Bienali'ne Türkiye'nin Neo-Osmanlıcı Temsili," *Praksis*, no. 56 (2021): 85–109, p. 97.

[132] Şeyda Barlas, 184

[133] Esin Atıl, *The Age of the Suleyman the Magnificient* (New York: National Gallery of Art, Washington, 1987), p.24.

literary manuscripts, paintings, arms and armour, furniture, textiles, and furnishings of the royal kins. By exhibiting these objects, a narrative was created that the Ottoman civilization was advanced in the cultural field and undertook the patronage of the arts. Thus, by emphasizing that the Ottoman Empire was a pioneer in the cultural field, the contribution of the Turks to world civilization through Ottoman history was presented from a neo-Ottomanist perspective.[134] The fact that the state image in the 1980s was produced within the framework of conservative nationalism codes with the nostalgic image of the Ottoman Empire is evidence that the forms of representation underwent a major transformation compared to the early republican period. The fact that the identity codes produced were not military-oriented but shaped through the discourse of cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire is an indication that the common belongings that were tried to be strengthened with Europe were constructed within the framework of the Turkish Islamic synthesis understanding. This approach embraced and glorified the Islamic culture of a Muslim-majority state, as Özal also stated in his book. Unlike the early republican period, Turkey's production of memory codes centered on Ottoman history in the 1980s reflects the Turkish identity policies in the international arena of the right-wing ideology that became part of the official state discourse after the coup d'état in domestic politics. Foreign elements, which were excluded and suppressed by the right-wing ideology in domestic politics, gained a more tolerable discourse in the international arena with the pragmatic aim of joining neoliberal policies and gaining economic cooperation.

One of the main aims of the exhibition, the development of relations with the West in the field of cultural diplomacy, was also supported by the USA. For example, Ronald Reagan's words in the exhibition catalog show that the USA also found the exhibition valuable regarding cultural diplomacy. *"*It is in the spirit of such friendship that I hope each of you will view the exhibition, remembering the good faith and trust the Turkish people have shown by sharing their national treasures with us.*"*[135]

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[134] Çolak, p. 88

[135] Atıl, p.7

In addition, the film on the website of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism about the opening day of the British Museum in 1987, which was held under the patronage of Kenan Evren and Queen Elizabeth, emphasizes that Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent was not only a statesman but also a pioneer in the fields of art and architecture, and frames the narrative with the idea that the lands he once conquered through the war were now conquered with the artistic accumulation of the age he represented.[136] In the cultural sphere, the selected historical roots of the Ottoman Empire were glorified, and its contribution to the civilization not only of the past but also of the present was emphasised. Thus, the memory codes glorifying the Ottoman identity were instrumentalised in the shaping of social memory by becoming the tool of today's politics.

According to Wallis, the exhibition did not only have an artistic meaning; the exhibition's primary purpose was to create a ground for Turkey to establish economic cooperation in the context of neo-liberal policies by emphasizing that Turkey is a country compatible with Western civilization and values.[137] The exhibition can also be read as a cultural maneuver to overcome various political crises in the international conjuncture. For many years, the issues discussed in Turkey's political history had created serious opposition to Turkey in the US Congress. According to Wallis, the US Congress did not look favorably on the issue of providing economic aid to Turkey because of the demand for a monument to commemorate the events of 1915, the Cyprus issue, and the perception that the reflexes given to various nationalist movements were anti-democratic[138]. To get rid of this image in the eyes of the West, Turkey sought to strengthen the image of the state and create the image of a democratic modern state by exhibiting the Sultan Süleyman the Lawgiver period, which was considered the golden age of the Ottoman Empire. In this way, the image of a politically and economically stable Turkey could be used to demonstrate a more active expansion of the neoliberal order. On the other hand, the neo-Ottomanist

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[136] Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı,Accessed July 15 2024, filmmirasim.ktb.gov.tr/tr/film/trkiye-byk-mze-kanuni-sultan-sleyman-sergisi

[137] Brian Wallis, "Ülkeleri Pazarlamak: Uluslararası Sergiler ve Kültür Diplomasisi" in Artun, A. (der.), *Sanat/Siyaset: Kültür Çağında Sanat ve Kültürel Politika*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2016), 255-280, p. 262-263.

[138] *Ibid.*, 263

policies implemented by Özal in the international arena also created the appropriate intellectual infrastructure for Ottoman imperialism. According to Tokdoğan, Özal wanted to increase his influence in the neighboring countries, which he tried to achieve through economic and cultural unity.[139] Thus, the understanding of neo-Ottomanism, which opened space for multicultural identities, was pragmatically used in international relations politics.

In this context, the concept of creating a new identity was also reflected in the nation-building process. Although the image of Turkey in the eyes of the West has changed over the years, the struggle against the prejudices of some sections of society shaped the essential cultural and political policies of both periods. The main difference, however, is that while in the early republican period, the secular and especially the pre-Islamic period identity codes were emphasized in the construction of the state's image in the international arena, in the 1980s, the perception of Turkish identity within the framework of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse included Islam and the Ottoman past as a state policy. For example, in the preparatory plans for the Turkish Historical Society's exhibition at Dolmabahçe Palace in 1937, it is clear that many ministries and institutions, including the Ministry of Education were asked to provide materials documenting the mistakes in the cultural field and the influence of foreign authorities during the imperial period.[140] The early Republican approach to producing cultural memory, which focused on the Ottoman Empire's deficiencies, shifted in the 1980s to a perspective that highlighted the strength, magnificence, and patronage of culture and the arts during the most powerful periods of the Ottoman Empire. Whereas in the early republican period, the newly established Republic of Turkey sought to sever the cultural link with the Ottoman Empire in its identity formation to legitimize its existence, in the 1980s, cultural policies aimed to construct the image of the state with an emphasis on the Ottoman Golden Age. This sharp transformation in the construction of the past demonstrated that the memory codes of the early republican period were abandoned at specific points, and the understanding of the period representing Turkish identity evolved and acquired a neo-Ottomanist dimension.

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[139] Tokdoğan, 68

[140] Türk Tarihi ve Eski Eserleri Sergisi Hazırlık Planları No 1, (İstanbul Devlet Basımevi, 1937) p. 29

Although the nationalist discourses underwent various transformations after Özal's death in 1993, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis continued to dominate the political and cultural arena with the 1991 and 1999 general elections.[141] In the context of the growing Islamist discourse in the 1990s, the Welfare Party's interpretation of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was aligned with Özal's imperial understanding; its extreme exclusion of European culture gave it a dynamic different from other periods.[142] In particular, the Welfare Party's reinterpretation of neo-Ottomanism with a more visible Islamic narrative led to reactions from secular circles. The most visible of these reactions was reflected in the celebrations of the 75th anniversary of the Republic. In the October 29, 1998 issue of Cumhuriyet, Süleyman Demirel was quoted as saying: "Reaction will be overcome through legal means. Turkey is satisfied with the Republic. We will continue on Atatürk's path."[143] These statements, which were in line with the sentiments of the masses defending the secular and republican values of the time, were reflected in two exhibitions within the framework of the 75th-anniversary celebrations. *"Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet"* (*Three Generations of the Republic*) and *"Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak: Muasır Medeniyet için Seferberlik Bilgileri"* (*Creating a Citizen: Mobilization Information for Contemporary Civilization*) can be interpreted as clear reactions to political Islam's challenge to the ethical values of the Republic in the exhibition space.[144]

The exhibition "*Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet*," organized by the *Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı* (Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey) as part of the program to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Republic, had a narrative that focused on comparing the changes in society's everyday life over three generations.[145] According to Özyürek, the exhibition emphasized the existence of

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[141] Çetinsaya, 371

[142] Tokdoğan, 72

[143] Cumhuriyet, October 29, 1998, 1

[144] Esra Özyürek, Cumhuriyetle Nikahlanmak: Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet ve Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak Sergileri in *Hatırlattırdıklarıyla Unutturduklarıyla Türkiye'nin Toplumsal* hafızası (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), p. 191

[145] Yiğit Gülöksüz, preface, in *Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998), p. 11.

secular families and was shaped around the narrative of modernizing families in a modernizing state.[146] On the other hand, the exhibition *Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak* focused on constructing a citizen identity within the framework of Republican values. Both exhibitions emphasized the positive impact of the republic on the transformation of the Turkish citizen. They were reflexive responses to the issues on the agenda in the political conjuncture of the period. In this context, the role of museums and exhibitions in creating an acceptable civic identity produced memory codes to support the masses' embrace of the Republic. In Özyürek's interview with İlhan Tekeli, Tekeli explained that the exhibition was shaped by the question, "[w]hat can we do against the rise of political Islam".[147] These two exhibitions, which were responses to the February 28 process and the protection of republican values in the context of the exhibition, were reflexes of protecting the Republic and secular values with a narrative that glorified the image of the modern Turkish state built by the Republic.

Whereas the Turkish Islamic Synthesis imposed its ideological narrative on the masses through the exhibition works, secular intellectual groups responded by attempting to consolidate their own acceptable civic identity using the same modern methods. While conservative nationalists were looking for the past in another country, in the golden age of the Ottoman Empire, the subtext of the exhibitions claimed the secular values of the Republic had a narrative that was compatible with the values of the early Republic and glorified the identity profile created by the Republic. Thus, by highlighting the success of the modernization project, criticisms of radical Islamist groups on the Republic's values were addressed, and achievements from the early Republic to the present were celebrated.

4.3. Neo-Ottoman Reflections: Museum Practices and Identity in the AKP Era

The AKP, the reformist wing of the transformed *Milli Görüş* line, incorporated neo-Ottomanism into its cultural discourse within the framework of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis discourse that became visible in the 1980s, as Özal used it in the

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[146] Özyürek, p. 196

[147] *Ibid.* , p. 212-213

international arena. However, according to Saraçoğlu, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, which became the official state discourse in the 1980s, has similarities with AKP ideology and discourse. However, there are points where it differs from the AKP's definition of identity. For example, in the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of the 1980s, Turkishness and Islam were equal elements of national identity, whereas, in the AKP's Islam-centred definition of identity, Turkishness is not an essential element and Islamic memory codes predominate.[148] This aspect distinguishes the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and the neo-Ottomanist approach in the AKP period from the first version of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which was shaped around the Intellectuals' Hearth. In this context, although Turkishness is not a core element of AKP nationalism, Islam and Turkishness are symbolized together in various cultural initiatives.

In this regard, Turkish identity is part of the narrative, but the main emphasis is on Islamic identity. This feature distinguishes AKP nationalism from other nationalist approaches of the republican period. Although the AKP's neo-Ottomanist narrative emerged as a foreign policy vision, over time, it gained value in domestic politics as part of the identity production of collective memory under the hegemony of power. In this context, *Turks: A Thousand Years of Journey, 600-1600* will be analyzed as an exhibition in which the neo-Ottomanist narrative finds its counterpart in foreign policy. The more visible neo-Ottomanist identity practices after 2009, such as the Panorama 1453 History Museum, The Sakarya Field Battle and Turkish History Promotion Center, and the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center, will be discussed in terms of their functionality in the construction of Sunni Muslim Turkish identity in domestic politics and their impact on the creation of collective memory with a neo-Ottomanist vision.

Turks: A Thousand-Year Journey, 600-1600 was one of the exhibitions in which the government's Islamist and liberal nationalist memory patterns were used. In 2005, the exhibition was organized at the Royal Academy of Art with a historical narrative that aimed to identify with European identity by prioritizing Turkish and Islamist

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[148] Saraçoğlu and Demirkol, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity" p. 307.

identity codes in Turkey's relations with the EU. The exhibition not only focussed on Turkish culture during the Islamic period, but the pre-Islamic period was also exhibited in the section 'Religion of the Turks in the Pre-Islamic Period'.[149] After the Historical Overview, the exhibition started with the religion of the Turks in the pre-Islamic period and included chapters on Central Asia, Seljuk history, and the Turkish world up to the reign of Murad III of the Ottoman Empire. In the exhibition catalog, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that the Seljuk and Ottoman Civilisations were the patrons of art and that the exhibition had a critical importance in promoting Turkish culture.[150]Although the attempt to visualize and promote the historical past of Turkey in the international arena starts from the pre-Islamic period, the fact that it ends in a period called the Golden Age of the Ottoman Empire can be interpreted as a project of memory management focused on Islamic and Ottoman history.[151] Thus, the identity discourse expressed in the international arena emphasizes the Turkish and Islamic codes, and Turkey's presence in the political arena indicates the continuity of the elements of cultural discourse used in the 1980s. However, as Saraçoğlu points out, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the AKP period had a vision that gave more importance to the Islamic reference.

In this context, an analysis of the 2005 activity reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides evidence of the neo-Ottomanist vision's reference to Islamic identity codes.[152] During this period, when Turkey was taking concrete steps towards

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[149] *Turks: A Journey of a Thousand Year* (London: Royal Academy of Arts, 2004), p.7-8

[150] *Ibid.,* p.9.

[151] Çolak, 99

[152] Some of the events organized in 2005, in the context of Turkey's relations with the EU, illustrate Turkey's efforts to emphasize its Islamic and Ottoman identities as a matter of state policy and to ensure that the international community recognizes these identities. Among these events were Prof. Dr. Günseli Renda's lecture on 'The Ottoman Court and Sultanic Portraiture' and Dr. Caroline Finkel's lecture on 'Ottoman Dream,' along with a booklet titled 'Turks in Europe: Why Are We Afraid?' presented at the Turkish Embassy in London. Additionally, the display of Ottoman caftans and fabrics sourced from Topkapı Palace and the Konya Mevlana Museum at the "Style and Status: Imperial Costumes from Ottoman Turkey" exhibition at the Sackler Gallery, and the Rhode Island School of Design (RISD) Museum displayed 'The Needle's Excellence: Ottoman Embroideries' with support from the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in New York. Furthermore, a keynote speech on 'Europe's Attitude to Islamic Culture' at a panel organized by the Embassy in Vienna discussed Turkey-EU relations and the development of Islam in Turkey. These events collectively illustrate how the Ottoman-centered narrative of history actively promotes a neo-Ottoman identity construction in

EU membership, the policy of promoting Turkish history within the framework of the Islamic understanding of Turkish history and promoting Turkish and Islamic identity to Europe was realized through many initiatives. The activities carried out under the languages of liberal and Islamist nationalism within the context of the Western nationalist movement sought to be legitimized by referring to the Ottoman world, which was presented as the ancient representative of civilization while maintaining Islamist identity in relations with Europe.

Apart from the narrative that prioritizes Turkish-Islamic identity abroad, the Panorama 1453 Museum is one of the most essential museums where the neo-Ottomanist approach is reflected in the domestic sphere. The Panorama 1453 Museum was opened in 2009 as a place of memory constructed within the framework of the AKP government's historical narrative. This museum, one of the sites where the conquest of Istanbul and Ottoman power find their most profound resonance, presents a vision in which Ottoman history is glorified within the framework of the myth of conquest.[153] The museum's narrative, constructed within the neo-Ottomanist discourse's understanding of history, can be interpreted as a reflection of the international political conjuncture of the time in the identity construction of domestic politics. The year of the museum's opening was no coincidence in terms of the rise of neo-Ottomanist discourse because the foreign policy, shaped in line with Ahmet Davutoglu's vision of international politics, necessitated the development of a cultural policy that emphasized the visibility of Ottoman symbols in the domestic arena. Islamic-conservative memory codes were shaped within neo-Ottomanism and became part of the production of social hegemony.[154].

In this context, Istanbul, as the center of the neo-Ottomanist narrative, serves as a symbol of the newly constructed national consciousness and can be described as an

Europe through various exhibitions and initiatives. Republic of Turkiye Ministry of Foregn Affairs, AccessedJuly10,https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/dispolitika/tanitim/2006yili_kulturel_etkinlikler_raporu.pdf

[153] Tokdoğan, p. 209-210

[154] Cenk Saraçoğlu, "AKP, Milliyetçilik ve Dış Politika: Bir Milliyetçilik Doktrini Olarak Stratejik Derinlik," *Alternatif Politika* 5, no. 1 (April 2013): 52–68, p.64.

open-air museum where themes of conquest and the Ottoman Empire are prevalent. The traces of the government's cultural policies are more pronounced here than in many other cities. As both the administrative and cultural capital of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul is an excellent place of memory that nourishes the government's nostalgic feelings in the production of memory. From the neo-Ottomanist perspective, Istanbul is a crucial means of highlighting the golden age of the Ottoman Empire. It is one of the cities where the government's memory policy is most effective, particularly in embedding memory codes related to Islamic values. In this context, museum palaces are one of the most visible subjects of Istanbul's neo-Ottoman face. These nostalgic memory sites of the Ottoman period were transferred to the Presidency with a decree issued in 2018.[155] The transfer of the national palaces to the government is an example of the inheritance of memory sites representing the Ottoman dynasty and the establishment of historical continuity between the current government and the Ottoman past.

In the early republican period, Istanbul was the center where the memory codes of the Ottoman Empire were attempted to be forgotten to move away from Ottoman identity. At the same time, Ankara was the center where new memory codes were produced to build a secular nation-state. The transformation of Hagia Sophia and Topkapı Palace into museums in the early republican period was both an attempt to create a secular identity and a reinterpretation of cultural objects that emphasized the golden age of the Ottoman Empire within the framework of the republican ethics of the new regime.

However, the new national consciousness developed within the framework of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis since the 1980s has led to reproducing some memory codes previously excluded from the early republican period. In this context, the conquest of Istanbul, one of the pivotal events of the Golden Age of the Ottoman Empire, was mythologized and transformed into a tool of the government's political ideology. According to Tokdoğan, while there were no significant celebrations of the conquest in the early Republican period, the first apparent conquest celebration took place in 1953 during the DP government. After Erdoğan became mayor of Istanbul,

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[155] *Milli Saraylar*, Accessed July 12, 2024, https://www.millisaraylar.gov.tr/Kurumsal/Hakkimizda

the myth of the conquest gained popularity within the framework of an ideology shared by the Welfare Party.[156] The statements on the website of the Panorama 1453 Museum, which highlight this perspective, describe the site as "the area where the conquest was dreamed of, as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan supported the construction so that we set out on a journey through history and remember the never-ending story of the city of Istanbul"[157], reflecting the cultural policies that enabled the significant conquest celebrations in the history of the Republic.

The myth of the conquest, created by combining history and technology, is presented to visitors from a panoramic perspective. The conquest is revived with three-dimensional panoramic paintings and sound effects, in this way, visitors are more actively involved in the historical narrative. In addition to the panoramic hall, where technology is intensively integrated into the anatomy of the exhibition, there is also an exhibition of sultan portraits from the early years of the Ottoman Empire to the time of its collapse.[158] In addition, information boards with titles such as "Haçlıların yaktığı İstanbul (The Istanbul Burned by the Crusaders)", "Bir Peygamber müjdesi: Fetih Hadisi (A Prophet's Good News: The Hadith of Conquest)", "Latin külahı mı Türk sarığı mı? (Latin Mitre or Turkish Turban?)"[159] are essential reflections on the interpretation of neo-Ottomanism within the framework of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the line of Islamist nationalism.

Although the Panorama 1453 Museum is dedicated to the conquest of Istanbul, it offers a broad historical narrative and includes general exhibits related to Ottoman history. In addition, it has the dynamism to encourage more frequent visits with its regularly updated exhibition content. One of the narratives displayed periodically is the *Haremeyn – Kutsal Yolculuk (Haremeyn – The Sacred Journey)* Exhibition, organized especially for Ramadan. It includes various holy relics, such as the *Sakal-ı*

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[156] Tokdoğan, 213-214

[157] Panoramik Müze Hakkımızda. Accessed July 27 2024,
https://www.panoramikmuze.com/en/about-us

[158] "İstanbul'un Fethi'ni dijital fetih deneyimiyle kutla!". Accessed 27 July 2024.
https://www.panoramikmuze.com/haberler-muzeler-haftasi-panorama.html

[159] *"Fatih'in Çocukluk Defteri"*. Accessed July 2024 https://www.panoramikmuze.com/tr/fatihin-cocukluk-defteri-haber-47

Sharif (Relics of Muhammad) and draws on Islamic elements and the myth of the conquest.[160] Furthermore, the Mehter Show, painting and composition competitions on the theme of the conquest, and other events that take place from time to time provide an interactive museum experience.

In the 2013 article entitled *Neydi ? Ne Oldu? (What Was It? What Has It Become?)* on the museum's website, it details how the Topkapı region has been transformed into a large open-air museum by correcting its previously irregular and disorganized structure and outlines the activities that have been carried out in the region since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's term as mayor. In response to the question, *"What is there today in this historical area where Mehmed the Conqueror pitched his tent?"* it is noted that the Panorama 1453 Museum has been constructed, along with structures such as playgrounds, a helipad, an open-air theatre, a cultural center, and a viewing terrace, in order to create a face for the city that is befitting the glorious historical dignity of the Sultan.[161] Thus, it highlights that not only the museum building but also the face of the area is organized in such a way that it establishes a connection with the past. The government of the time changed the appearance of an area, previously in poor condition, to a place where museum and exhibition activities could be done properly.

The fact that the myth of conquest found its counterpart in a museum provided an environment in which the masses could comprehend the splendor of the Ottoman Empire and the conquest in their minds, not only during the anniversary celebrations but also through continuous visits to the museum. In this way, the masses are exposed to memory codes integrated with the myth of the conquest every day, not just one day a year. This museum, which many students visit through institutions such as schools, is also part of the educational policy, creating minds in which the acceptable profile of citizens is shaped by the identity codes produced.

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[160] *"İstanbul Fethini Dijital Fetih Deneyimiyle Kutla".* Accessed July 27 2024. https://www.panoramikmuze.com/tr/istanbulun-fethini-dijital-fetih-deneyimiyle-kutla-haber-124

[161]*" Neydi? Ne Oldu".* Accessed July 27 2024. http://panoramikmuze.com/arsivhaberler/arsiv-neydi-neoldu.html

In this context, the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque on November 24, 1934, seen as a complementary element of the myth of conquest, has also helped to give integrity to this historical narrative. An example is the transformation of the anniversary celebrations of the conquest of Istanbul into a conquest festival in Hagia Sophia. In this context, in addition to original historical symbols such as Hagia Sophia, sites of memory such as the Panorama 1453 Museum, which reflected the government's understanding of culture and history, provided a space for the re-identification of Istanbul with the government's memory codes and ensured that the neo-Ottomanist and understanding was more systematically recognized in the minds of the masses.[162]

Many examples can be cited from exhibitions and museum activities regarding the memory codes in which Turkish Islamic identity is produced. In this regard, war museums are the places of modern public memory production where identity and nationalism policies are most intensely engaged. The political Islamist perspective implemented during the AKP government period, the liberal and Islamist nationalism understanding is most pronounced in areas such as education and religious affairs. At this point, the Sakarya Field Battle and Turkish History Promotion Center and the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center, which contain the intellectual infrastructure of political Islam's perception of identity, are the leading representatives of the understanding of history developed and transformed within the framework of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis. While the historical narrative in both memory centers is shaped within the framework of Islamist nationalism, the historical narrative ends with a perspective that glorifies the achievements of the AKP government. Thus, with the historical narrative, which is used to create an acceptable citizen identity, the cultural discourse of the government creates a collective belonging.

In this context, individuals whose identities are shaped by the state from birth through the banal symbols of nationalism produced by schools and various state institutions refresh their memories in museums through their constructed citizenship consciousness and connect with their nationalist historical past. Althusser sees these institutions as one of the most essential ideological apparatuses of the state, and

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[162] Tokdoğan, p. 212

Foucault defines them as the machines where state hegemony is made visible. In this respect, the cultural capital of individuals has already been constructed with memory codes continuously produced for years by educational institutions.

Therefore, the state's ideal of impacting the minds of individuals through education and linking its legitimacy to the national past finds a significant response in such history and war museums. Individuals already integrated into the social memory previously produced by the citizen identity created by the state are inclined to empathize with and internalize the historical narrative presented by these museums. Therefore, museums, one of the most sophisticated public spaces for the state to educate individuals and impose its cultural discourse, are one of the cultural spaces where the governments most easily integrate nationality and religion. At this point, the AKP government, within the framework of its ideological approach, easily integrates individuals who already possess (or tend to have) the desired sense of belonging with nationalist and religious sentiments into the historical narrative of museums, and they become a part of the historical belonging given by the past.

To establish dominance in historical collective memories, governments construct a perception of nationalism through the myth of martyrdom, drawing support from the glorious power of the past. Değirmencioğlu stated that the myth of martyrdom was constructed after the 1980s, and this issue was intensified by the conflicts in the 1990s, culminating in the declaration of March 18 Martyrs' Day in 2002.[163] Areas such as The Sakarya Field Battle and Turkish History Promotion Center and the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center, among the most tourist-attracting public memory sites today, are not only places of memory but also possess political meanings. These sites have been harmonized and processed in line with the neo-Ottomanist and pan-Islamist, understanding of the government and have acquired a dual function in tourism, transforming history and national sentiments into commodified experiences. At this point, the historic national parks, which have been turned into martyr tourism, have created a practice of memory production in which Islamist nationalism aligns with the neoliberal order. As places where the masses are introduced to and educated

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[163]Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu, Preface, in *"Öl Dediler Öldüm" Türkiye'de Şehitlik Mitleri*, ed. Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014), p. 13.

about national consciousness within the systematic cultural policy of the state, historical national parks are a part of identity politics. Thus, while national and unifying memory codes create individuals with the memory patterns desired by the government, martyr tourism enables many private organizations to generate an income.[164]

The Sakarya Battlefield and Turkish History Promotion Centre can be considered as an important place of memory that contains the government's cultural discourse. Through this center, which contains nationalist memory codes related to Turkish history, the government has created a narrative that is compatible with its own definition of identity and has directed memory to strengthen its political legitimacy. One of the most critical features of this memory space is that it not only contains the narrative of the Battle of Sakarya but also the historical narrative of 16 Turkish states. The exhibition narrative, which begins with the Turkish 12-animal calendar, continues with information on the Turks' specific war strategies and includes elements of the first Turkish states established in Central Asia and Europe, followed by Seljuk and Ottoman history. The exhibition, which gives extensive coverage to Ottoman history in particular, focuses on presenting the general characteristics of the sultans through information panels accompanied by wax statues of the sultans. Although the Battle of Sakarya is at the center of the exhibition's narrative, the ample space devoted to Ottoman history can indicate that the national narrative of history is shaped by a neo-Ottomanist perspective.

After the exhibition on Ottoman history, the process of the War of Independence is presented using wax sculptures and various display techniques. After a short film about the Battle of Sakarya, which aims to create an emotional connection with the soldiers who lost their lives on the Independence War through the concept of martyrdom, the exhibition ends with a section that displays projects from the AKP era. This section aimed to present history and civilization as the last point reached by showing the projects implemented by the government. Within the framework of the historical narrative that began with the first Turkish states, all Turkish cultural

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[164] Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu, Şehit Turizmi: Kitlelerin Çanakkale Seferberliği in *"Öl Dediler Öldüm" Türkiye'de Şehitlik Mitleri*, ed. Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014), p. 381.

products were presented as being under the patronage of the present administration. Although the central theme is the Battle of Sakarya and the national struggle, the inclusion of the history of the first Turkish states, the Seljuks and the Ottomans, the narrative turns the museum into a theme that corresponds to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of today by creating the perspective that the struggle was fought solely by the Turkish- Islamic identity. In this way, subjects outside the framework of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis are excluded from the struggle, and visitors' memories are shaped within the framework of the official nationalist understanding.

Moreover, The martyrdoms, monuments, objects such as weapons, ammunition, and soldiers' belongings, which are displayed around the Kartaltepe section of the Sakarya Battlefield Historical National Park along with other essential battle points such as Duatepe and Karatepe, create a heroic narrative that enables visitors to feel the same identity and belonging with the generation that fought the national struggle and ensures that the spirit created by the national struggle is reflected in the memories of today's generations. In the context of the memory produced within the common discourse of martyrdom and the museum narrative in the historical national park, nationalism and memory codes contain a complex meaning that begins with a primordial historical narrative from the perspective of an Islamist understanding and ends with the achievements of the AKP government and includes the concept of martyrdom within the narrative.

In this regard, the interpretation of history within the framework of Islamist nationalism and the myth of martyrdom is also a part of contemporary politics. For example, during the commemoration events of July 15, the President of Religious Affairs, Ali Erbaş, stated, "From Badr to Manzikert, from Gallipoli to the National Struggle, from Sakarya to July 15, and from July 15 to the present day, we have given so many martyrs that it cannot be without martyrs."[165] These statements can be interpreted as an indicator that the understanding of history within the framework of neo-Ottomanist discourse is constructed around the myth of martyrdom in contemporary memory practices. In this context, the July 15 Democracy Museum

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[165] Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Accessed July 25 2024. https://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/Detay/36717/90-bin-camide-sehitler-icin-dua-edildi

can be shown as an example. In the July 15 Democracy Museum, the myth of martyrdom is reproduced with sections such as *Sala* and *Respect for Martyrs*, and the values of the past are integrated with Islamist nationalist practices.[166]

In this context, another important center of memory that reflects Neo Ottomanist cultural policies is the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre, which opened in 2012. The Gallipoli Peninsula, where the center is located, was designated as a national park in 1973 to protect the area.[167] The project, constructed in Kabatepe, is one of the many memory centers associated with the Çanakkale Wars Gallipoli Historical Site Presidency and has a structure consisting of 11 sections in total.

The narrative begins with the section entitled "*The Ottoman Empire Enters the War*", continues with a section on the developments of the Çanakkale War, and concludes with the section entitled "*Memories and Turkey from 1915 to the Present*". The section on Turkey from 1915 to the present, which is one of the most conspicuous points of the Promotion Centre, includes the achievements of the government, as well as the Sakarya Battlefield and the Turkish World Promotion Centre. The appropriation of the accomplishments of the entire republican history by the ruling identity as the last point reached by history is indicative that the memory codes produced were consciously steered.

In the case of the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre, the historical narrative of the national struggle is based on a neo-Ottomanist understanding of the construction of Islamic cosmopolitanism. With the rise of neo-Ottomanism, the narrative of the Çanakkale War, as in many other aspects of history, was reorganized with Islamic cultural codes. In this context, the narrative of the Battle of Çanakkale and the War of Independence has been transformed by the cultural discourses of the government throughout the Republican history. According to Yanıkdağ, the historical narrative of

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[166] During the AKP rule, the Directorate of Religious Affairs also assumed a dominant role in the cultural sphere. In this context, it is a crucial state apparatus in the dissemination of cultural codes based on Islamism and Ottomanism to the masses. For example, the 15 July Democracy Museum also harbors nationalism codes based on Islamism. However, these topics are beyond the scope of this thesis.

[167] *Simulation and Information Center for the Legend of Gallipoli,* p. 5.

the Çanakkale War, which was shaped by Kemalist nationalism, evolved into a form in which the Ottoman identity was prioritized, especially in the 2000s, under the influence of Islamist nationalism.[168]

As the sources of social memory through which the ruling power constructs its power change, the narrative through which the rulers construct the national struggle also changes. Within this understanding, Islam has been constructed not only as a catalyzing force that unites the masses but also as the true meaning of the war.[169] As Şakul points out, the government's narrative of the War of Independence as a crusade against the Allied powers by uniting Muslims from different parts of the empire reflects the *ummah* identity that the neo-Ottomanist perspective seeks to create.[170] It can be said that the neo-Ottomanist understanding finds deep resonance even in sites of memory such as war museums, where ethnic nationalist discourse is deeply rooted. According to the historical narrative within the framework of Islamist nationalism, which is also reflected in the exhibition, while the narrative based on Ottoman identity glorifies Muslim identity, ethnic nationalist elements remain in the background.[171] Thus, the narrative shaped according to the vision within the framework of the Ottoman understanding of the *ummah* exhibits a profound break with the nationalist understanding of the early Republican period by rewriting the period of national struggle with conservative cultural codes.

According to the understanding of identity in the early republican period, the cosmopolitan and Islam-centred structure of the Ottoman state constituted the most fundamental elements of its collapse. In this context, Kemalist nationalism prioritized secular Turkish identity and saw the process of national struggle as an awakening of Turkishness. On the contrary, the narrative shaped by the

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[168] Yücel Yanıkdağ, "The Battle of Gallipoli: The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting in Turkey," *Comillas Journal of International Relations*, no. 2 (February 2015): 99–115, p. 111.

[169] Kahraman Şakul, "Contemporary Turkish Perceptions of the Gallipoli Campaign," in *The Gallipoli Campaign: The Turkish Perspective*, ed. Metin Gürcan and Robert Johnson (New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 181–204., p. 193-194

[170] *Ibid.*, p. 194

[171] Yılmaz Çolak, "Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey", p. 593.

understanding of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis glorified the multi-ethnic and religious structure of the Ottoman state and exhibited it in museums as the main element of its power.

Wars and coups, which leave an indelible impression in individual and collective memories, create traumas that people who experience them wish to forget. However, these traumas have become political tools for nation-states with the motive of claiming the glorious past of history and have become practices that shape today's political life.[172] The nationalist practices embrace the wars that are painful for the social memory and, at the same time, ensure its existence. Presentation of national struggle through governments' narratives, turning it into a political tool to consolidate their legitimacy. In this context, The Sakarya Field Battle and Turkish History Promotion Center and the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center mentioned in the thesis are the re-presentation of the national struggle within the framework of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis understanding.

In this context, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, neoliberal policies, and efforts to integrate into the global order since the 1980s have led to the patterns of memory and history production in Turkey evolving into a multi-paradigmatic order. In this context, the reason for choosing The Sakarya Field Battle and Turkish History Promotion Center and the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center as examples of memory policies managed in collaboration with capital is that the Oruçoğlu Holding presents both museums as a contribution to national consciousness. Additionally, the neo-Ottomanist perspective is visible in both museums.

In this regard, the Sakarya Battlefield and Turkish History Promotion Centre and the Gallipoli Epic Promotion Centre can be seen as the common products of liberal nationalism and Islamist nationalism, reflecting the bourgeoisie's participation in the consciousness of national identity. The statements on the website of Oruçoğlu Holding, "It has been a source of pride for Oruçoğlu System to serve history by

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[172] Ahenk Yılmaz, "Bellek Topografyasında Özgürlük: Gelibolu Savaş Alanları ve Mekansal Bir Deneyim Olarak Hatırlama" in *Nasıl Hatırlıyoruz? Türkiye'de Bellek Çalışmaları*, ed. Leyla Neyzi (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), p.210

combining the national historical awareness and knowledge, which has been instilled in all members of the Oruçoğlu family for generations, with technology in the museums and promotion centers built in our lands."[173] indicate that the centers built aim to contribute to Turkish history and national consciousness. Thus, due to the neo-liberal order, the bourgeoisie is also involved in the cultural sphere, sometimes establishing its independent cultural policy and sometimes collaborating with the state's policy.

To sum up, after the 1980 coup d'état, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis became a state discourse and, as a tool of cultural practice, it underwent various transformations with changing governments. These transformations were also reflected in museum and exhibition practices. After the 1980 coup d'état, a neo-Ottomanist understanding of history was adopted, focusing on Turkish and Islamic history in the light of Islamist and liberal nationalism, together with the multiculturalist understanding of history brought about by the EU accession process and globalization. The perception of Islamist nationalism, which also shapes the understanding of education, is also reflected in museum studies, one of the most effective ways of educating society. In this regard, The Sakarya Field Battle and Turkish History Promotion Center and the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Center mentioned in the thesis form part of the continuing cultural practice of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis by shaping social memory from the perspective of the neo-Ottomanist understanding of history.

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[173] Oruçoğlu Holding, Accesssed July 10 2024, orucogluholding.com.tr/portfolio/item/sakarya-meydan-muhaberesi-tanitim-merkezi/

CHAPTER V

THE NEW MUSEOLOGY PARADIGM UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMODIFICATION OF CULTURE

After the 1980 coup d'état, it was mentioned in the previous chapter how the dynamics of cultural authority shaping the social order shaped social memory. The neo-liberal order, which dominated the economic life with the 24 January decisions, paved the way for the formation of a new cultural order and consumer culture. In this context, when we look at the 1980s from a sociological perspective, factors such as micro-nationalism, migration to big cities, slums, the formation of arabesque culture, the rise of political Islam paved the way for the rapid transformation and heterogenisation of society, and the social identity shaped on the axis of new cultural codes moved away from the homogenous form created in the process of nation state construction. Many factors are effective in the heterogenisation of society. The most critical of these factors is the bourgeoisie's creation of its own cultural discourse and the state's move away from being the sole determinant of cultural policies. The bourgeoisie's involvement in the cultural sphere prevented the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which became the state discourse after 1980, from dominating the cultural sphere on its own, and created a conjuncture in which the private world views, interests and tastes of the bourgeoisie began to play a role in shaping social memory. For this reason, the cultural field evolved into a multi-paradigm structure after 1980. For this reason, when analysing the museum and exhibition organizations in Turkey after 1980, not only state hegemony but also the practices of the neoliberal order and the impact of globalisation on the cultural sphere should be analysed.

Moreover, the Turkish bourgeoisie, by producing an active policy in private museum and exhibition activities, created a respectable image, shaped social memory, and created a dynamism that influenced the state's presence in domestic and foreign politics. The museum and exhibition activities of the bourgeoisie should not only be

evaluated as an artistic endeavor, but also the relations of interest with the state and society should be evaluated in the subtext of the policies they produced. Although museums, as places of memory that shape the identities of the masses, are established by private individuals rather than states, they are not devoid of political implications. Private museums and exhibitions have been instrumentalized for various pragmatic reasons and have become an apparatus of the political sphere. For this reason, private museums are systematic memory centers that have a role in the production of nationalist codes, both because they represent state identity in the international arena and because they are the center of memory production that will shape mass identity in the domestic arena. In this regard, the bourgeoisie has acted within the framework of various nationalist languages while building its presence in the cultural sphere.

In this context, this chapter will analyse how the new cultural discourse created in the neoliberal order, the establishment of private museums and the impact of the bourgeoisie's involvement in the cultural sphere on social memory practices. In addition, the articulation with the global world order has been effective in the development of tourism and the commodification of cultural values by symbolising elements of cultural heritage and using them as a means of reinforcing city images in the eyes of the masses.

While this situation made it necessary to market one's own identity in the globalised world, it also brought along the process of commodification and presentation of unique cultural characteristics in the context of localisation. In this context, the interaction of the concepts of globalisation and localisation in the new world order in the field of museology will be analysed, focusing on how local elements define their identities through museums, the relationship of creating city brands in the axis of neoliberal urban policies with the issue of commodification of culture in the context of city museums.

5.1 The bourgeoisie's involvement in the cultural sphere and its reflections on museology

In the 1980s, free market economy affected Turkey's art and cultural fields and found significant resonance in Western capitalist countries, particularly in the USA and the

UK. Until the 1980s, capital had not been seriously involved in the cultural sphere[174]; at this point, the cultural policy of states constituted a monopoly dominance. The Reagan and Thatcher governments implemented policies to make the market more influential in the cultural and economic spheres rather than maintaining state dominance.[175] A similar economic conjuncture began to emerge in Turkey after the January 24 decisions. The spread of the free market economy in the 1980s led to the growth of the middle class and contributed to the proliferation of museums, which became one of the intellectual spaces consumed by the middle class. In the early 20th century, museums, as ideological institutions of states, began to diverge from the state's discourse on art and culture, developing cultural practices that could be consumed in daily life. In this context, the cultural sphere also became an element of capital, creating a field of tourism and serving as a means of elevating the social status of the bourgeoisie.

In this context, Bourdieu conceptualises the elements that function in the context of social power relations as capital.[176] Bourdieu's conceptualisation of cultural capital has created an interconnected dynamic shaped by economic capital by using it as a means of gaining social status of the bourgeoisie. Wu, interpreting Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital, emphasises that cultural capital can be transformed into social capital and the network formed by social capital will contribute to economic capital again.[177] In this context, cultural and economic capital act as a power apparatus in the image creation of the bourgeoisie in a dynamism that supports each other. Thus, the issue of the shaping of social memory by the state undergoes a major transformation and becomes a cultural industry that can be controlled by those who hold economic capital. Thus, the cultural sphere, the historical and ethical values of society evolve to reflect the tastes and interests of individuals within the bourgeoisie and become commodities. In the case of Turkey, the transition to neoliberal policies and the strengthening of capital groups led to a change in the socio-cultural order. As

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[174] Chin- tao Wu, *Kültürün Özelleştirilmesi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), p.24.

[175] *Ibid.*, p.19.

[176] David Swartz, *Kültür ve İktidar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), p.66.

[177] Wu, *Kültürün Özelleştirilmesi*, 213

İsmet Akça states, the authoritarian state structure created after the 1980 coup d'état integrated into the neoliberal capitalist system as a way of consolidating its power and redefined class power relations. In this context, the redefinition of the cultural sphere after the 12 September coup transformed the consumption habits and identities of the society and enabled the bourgeoisie to play a role in memory politics.

In the 1980s, while state hegemony repressed society through various prohibitions and restrictions on freedoms, popularizing popular culture through the mass media and the consumer culture introduced by the neoliberal order simultaneously created a significant space of freedom.[178] These two dynamics, popular and consumer cultures, not only influenced the dialogue between state and citizen but also reshaped the dynamics of individual memory. In this regard, what distinguishes the 1980s from other periods is the transformation of the social structure by the culture industry, which introduced new habits and invented traditions. These new habits, reflecting the economic order of the 1980s, gave rise to identity politics, which, unlike the nation-state building process, was monopolized not only by the state but also by major capital owners.

After the 1980 coup, the left-wing opposition became less visible in the political sphere, and right-wing groups dominated the political and cultural spheres. In a cultural conjuncture in which the Turkish-Islamic synthesis shaped social memory, Özal's populist politics constructed new pasts and identities for the masses and became a popular cultural subject that had lost its intellectual meaning. The banalization of history and its reconfiguration through neo-Ottoman elements within the framework of the Turkish Islamic synthesis was a major social engineering initiative. In this way, the banalized past was removed from its intellectual context and became an element of populist culture, creating the profile of an apolitical and controllable acceptable citizen.

Gürbilek mentioned two different cultural discourses in the 1980s. After 12 September, while the oppressive policies of the coup administration shaped society,

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[178] Nurdan Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2014), p.15

the cultural field diversified with the shaping of the consumption area and the new cultural codes brought by globalization. [179] The economic environment brought by the 24 January decisions and the freedom in the consumption field effectively shaped the 1980s. While the coup regime suppressed the political sphere, there was an identity crisis in which micro nationalisms were rising against the cultural integration brought about by globalization, and local cultural codes shaped the social memory. The modernization initiatives shaped within the framework of Kemalist ethics degenerated. Turkey's re-discovery of itself in the international arena with its Ottoman past by producing its Eastern and Islam-prioritising structure within the framework of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis,[180] consumer society practices, changing power dynamics with the more visible presence of the bourgeoisie in the cultural and political sphere are some of the basic equations that constitute the socio-cultural conjuncture from the 1980s to the present.

With the coup d'état of 12 September, the banishment of leftist opponents from the political arena and the bans on trade union organisations hindered the labor movement, while on the other hand, the bourgeoisie began to grow steadily with the effect of the 24 January decisions.[181]These dynamics caused the bourgeoisie to gain a great deal of independence and its cultural sphere to develop outside of state control. With the 24 January decisions, the independence and growth of the bourgeoisie made it necessary for the bourgeoisie to create a new image. Thus, they took steps to increase their prestige and social acceptance. They produced policies that would glorify both their corporate and businessman images in public opinion by being more active in the cultural sphere along with various aid organizations, thus becoming a public figure and turning into subjects respected by the public and glorifying their corporate identities. [182] Business people who started to become public figures increased their prestige and visibility by producing cultural and aid policies to communicate and integrate with the public.

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[179] Ibid., p.15-16

[180] *Ibid.*, p.15

[181] Rıfat N. Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Lıfe Style'a Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni yaşamlar* (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p.19.

[182] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

According to Bali, there were two pragmatic reasons why business people chose to be visible in public. Firstly, to increase their prestige by creating a wise man profile in the public opinion and undertaking a task that observes, values and protects the traditions of the society, and secondly, to advertise their own companies.[183] According to Wu, the bourgeoisie carried out serious advertising campaigns not only to promote their products but also to share their views on life, identity, and opinions on current events with the public[184] because in the competitive capitalist order, being visible in the media, various social responsibility projects, and cultural and intellectual fields was also a free advertising strategy.

In this regard, being visible in the media, giving invitations, participating in various social responsibility activities, and producing active policies in the cultural field supported the creation of an image that the public would find more meaningful than a shallow advertising policy. In this context, Adorno states that the culture industry serves as a public relations service and that each subject is its advertisement in the commodification of the cultural field. [185] In this context, museum and exhibition activities were actively instrumentalized and industrialized as one of the most sophisticated ways of representing the bourgeoisie's patronage of wisdom, art, and culture as places of memory where the past was preserved and protected. At this point, museum activities, in which museums were instrumentalized in the context of nation-state building, basically aimed to create a common citizen consciousness. However, in the neo-liberal order, the aims of museology changed and evolved into a multi-paradigmatic feature. While museums instrumentalized by the bourgeoisie were used as an element of prestige, social utilitarianism was declared. In this context, the understanding of museology, which changed with the involvement of the bourgeoisie after 1980, has become a part of the capitalist order by moving away from the characteristics of the early 20th century.

One of the most influential holding companies in the cultural sphere, Koç Holding, organizes numerous museum and exhibition activities and aims to pioneer in cultural

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[183] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[184] Wu, *Kültürün Özelleştirlmesi*, p. 209.

[185] Adarno, *Kültür Endüstrisi*, p. 111.

and scientific fields through institutions like VEKAM, the Research Center for Mediterranean Civilizations, and Koç University. On the back cover of the book titled *Vehbi Koç Anlatıyor,* the words "[a]s long as my state and country exist, so do I. If there is a democracy, we all exist" frame social responsibility and the guardianship of cultural values as part of patriotism. In the book, which is presented with the hope that Vehbi Koç's life experiences will bring goodness to Turkey and the world, Vehbi Koç talks about his wife's desire not to be forgotten and explains that the Sadberk Hanım Museum was established due to her desire to exhibit the artifacts she collected throughout her life in a museum bearing her name.[186]

In this context, various cultural activities, such as museums, serve as elements of prestige for business people; simultaneously, museological activities become memory codes that fulfill individual desires to be remembered and perpetuated in society. In the early 20th century, museums, which were instrumentalised by states to create collective memory, have now become an apparatus for the private tastes and social economic interests of capital within the framework of neoliberal dynamics.

Sadberk Hanım Museum, Turkey's first private museum, is basically divided into two sections: Archaeology and Turkish-Islamic Works. While the Archaeology section contains artifacts from Anatolian Civilisations starting from the Neolithic Period, the Turkish-Islamic Arts section exhibits cultural products from the Seljuk and Ottoman periods. [187]With this feature, Sadberk Hanım Museum has a narrative in which a broad historical perspective is presented to the visitors. With the establishment of private museums, museum activities, which were monopolized by the state, started to gain independence and became a new center for the production of memory. As the first private museum in Turkey, Sadberk Hanım Museum is essential as a pioneer in diversifying the discourse in the field of museology, using different presentation techniques and contents, and conveying historical narratives with different interpretations. In this context, the contents of private museums have

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[186] Filiz Özkan and Gürel Tüzün, *Vehbi Koç Anlatıyor: Bir Derleme,* (İstanbul: YKY, 2018), p. 355.

[187] Sadberk Hanım Museum, Accessed August 8, 2024, https://www.sadberkhanimmuzesi.org.tr/tr/koleksiyon

transformed the sphere shaped by the official narrative of history and brought about a process in which private collections are also active in the production of memory.[188]

Like the Sadberk Hanım Museum, the first private museum established in Turkey, the Sakıp Sabancı Museum is significant as a place of memory where the bourgeoisie reflects its cultural narrative. In the 1980s, business people gained public admiration as embodiments of imagined wealth by presenting their lives to people. In this context, one of the most active figures in the cultural sphere was Sakıp Sabancı. Sakıp Sabancı, whom Bali refers to as the pioneer of the Anatolian Tigers, was one of the businessmen most concerned with gaining prestige through the arts and culture. As previously mentioned, the visibility of business people in the media and cultural sphere is a feature that conglomerates emphasize as a form of free advertising. In this regard, Sakıp Sabancı became a public figure and a profile widely accepted by the public by initiating various charity projects, museum and collection activities, and projects in the field of education. One of the most effective tools in creating a profile of a wise man is his involvement in museum and collecting activities.

In his opening speech at the exhibition *Golden Letters: Ottoman Calligraphy from the Sakıp Sabancı Collection*, which featured calligraphy works and paintings from his collections at the Metropolitan Museum, Sakıp Sabancı stated, "[h]ere, I have brought you the cultural heritage of 65 million people. After the economy, it is now a bridge of art. It is an honor to share this with you and come to this museum. Thank you."[189] With these words, he emphasized the importance of promoting Turkey's cultural heritage economically and culturally. The Sabancı collection exhibited at the Metropolitan Museum in 1998, is also significant in reflecting the period's neo-Ottomanist trend. At this point, the exhibition was also criticized by various circles. A report in the Milliyet newspaper criticized the fact that only Ottoman art was

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[188] Burçak Madran Şebnem Önal, "Yerellikten Küreselliğe Uazanan Çizgide Tarihin Çok Paylaşımlı Vitrinleri: Müzelere ve Sunumları" in Zeynel Abidin Kızılyaprak (ed.) *Müzecilikte Yeni Yaklaşımlar : Küreselleşme ve Yerelleşme: Üçüncü Uluslararası Tarih Kongresi, Tarih Yazımı ve Müzecilikte Yeni Yaklaşımlar: Küreselleşme ve Yerelleşme* (İstanbul : Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2000) p. 183.

[189] Manhattan'da Sonsuz Ritimler, Accessed July 31, 2024, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/the-others/manhattanda-sonsuz-ritimler-5346857

brought to New York to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Republic.[190] In the shadow of this criticism, the collection was exhibited at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art and the Harvard University Museum, where it was also used as teaching material, before being exhibited at the Louvre Museum in 2000.[191] Following this exhibition, Sakıp Sabancı was honored by the Anatolian Cultural Centre in Paris for his pioneering role in promoting Turkish culture. After these exhibitions abroad, the Sabancı collection was donated to Sabancı University and transferred to the museum in 2002.

The Sakıp Sabancı Museum, which opened in 2002 following the Sabancı family's active cultural policy with its international exhibition activities, functions to raise the prestige of the family with the main objective of protecting the cultural heritage of the country. This artistic breakthrough can be interpreted as an important step in the domestic shaping of Sakıp Sabancı's image as a businessman who embraces culture and upholds social values. After serving as the private property of the Sabancı family for a while, the pavilion was purchased from the Hidiv family, donated to Sabancı University and turned into a museum. [192]The content of the museum consists mainly of the Book Arts and Calligraphy Collection, the Painting and Sculpture Collection, the Decorative Works Collection and the Archaeological Works Collection, framing the special tastes and cultural understanding of the Sabancı family. The Book and Calligraphy Collection includes examples of Ottoman books and calligraphy, copies of the Holy Qur'an and documents belonging to Ottoman sultans, while the Painting Collection includes works of early Turkish painting and works by leading artists of the late Ottoman and Republican periods. The collection of archaeological artifacts contains objects from the Late Antique period and neoclassical interpretations of Late Antique motifs.[193] Thus, the narrative in the museum can be interpreted as a subtext that emphasizes the importance of preserving art and historical values rather

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[190] *Ibid.*

[191]Sakıp Sabancı'ya Fransa'dan Onur Ödülü Verildi, Accessed July 30, 2024, https://www.sabanci.com/tr/haber-detay/sakip-sabanci-ya-fransa-dan-onur-odulu-verildi

[192] Sakıp Sabancı Müzesi, Accessed July 28, 2024, https://www.sakipsabancimuzesi.org/hakkimizda

[193]*Sakıp Sabancı Müzesi Koleksiyon, Accessed July 25, 2024,* https://www.sakipsabancimuzesi.org/koleksiyonlar-ve-arastirmalar/koleksiyonlar

than a story used as a means of identity construction by nation-states. One of the most essential features of the Sakıp Sabancı Museum as a private museum is that the building used to be the living space of the Sabancı family. The Family Halls section in the musicalized rooms was realized by preserving the belongings of the Sabancı family. Thus, by realizing a part of their family history, the family, which owns one of the largest conglomerates in Turkey, has turned their identity into an intellectual tool and created a sphere to raise their social status. In this context, cultural capital is used to increase the social status of the bourgeoisie, increase their prestige, and create an opportunity to support their economic capital.

In the case of Sadberk Hanım Museum and Sakıp Sabancı Museum, which have an essential place as the first private museums in Turkey, private collection museums do not have a subtext of creating an acceptable citizen identity in the format used by nation-states but can be considered as a symbolized symbol of the bourgeoisie's preservation of historical and cultural values. In this context, the purpose of identity construction for state museums and private museums differs. While the cultural discourse of the State aims to transform society into the identity of an acceptable citizen in museums, private museums aim to transform the founder's identity into a respectable person in the masses.

In this context, non-governmental power centers became active in memory production, creating an order in which the cultural sphere was not only under state control. In the early 20th century, museums, one of the State's ideological apparatuses, became one of the cultural apparatuses of capital by transforming into individuals' forgetting concerns, tastes, and prestige issues in the neoliberal order. The separation of the cultural sphere from the state monopoly and its connection to the market led to the shaping of cultural dynamics by causing the production of many symbols and memory codes without the control of the State. [194]Thus, a new culture of memory practice outside the official centralized culture was formed.

In this regard, Nejat Eczacıbaşı, one of the founders of the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts and a pioneering businessman in the realization of the International

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[194] Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak*, p.21.

Istanbul Biennial, which has been organized since 1987, responded to the question whether he was in favor of the state's involvement in art in an interview with Aytekin Hatipoğlu with the following words: "Those who govern the state try to impose their political views... Culture should have no boundaries. The state imposes limits... When you confine culture to official duties, you cannot achieve anything. However, those in society who are inclined towards culture and art, those who want to realize new and different practices in art, should be allowed to do as they wish."[195] Although Nejat Eczacıbaşı's words question the existence and domination of the state in the cultural sphere, the collaboration between capital and power is also reflected in the artistic sphere. Although the bourgeoisie assumed leading roles in museum activities with the discourse of glorifying its own corporate identity and image in the public sphere and assuming the patronage of the society's cultural and artistic values, they were also touting the glorification of the state's image and benefiting the Turkish nation as one of their main duties. Istanbul Modern was established with the initiative of İKSV and the Eczacıbaşı Group in order to ensure the permanence of the International Contemporary Art Exhibitions that began to be organized in 1987. While the opening of the museum was originally planned for 2005, the opening was postponed to the EU summit on 17 December 2004 upon Erdoğan's request. This development not only shows that the museum was designed as the contemporary face of Turkey but also proves that the museum is a product of international cultural diplomacy. In this context, Oya Eczacıbaşı stated that "Istanbul Modern is a very important project in terms of opening Turkey's cultural and artistic accumulation to the universe and showing the Europeanisation of Istanbul"[196] these sentences emphasising Istanbul Modern's mission to both open Turkey's cultural and artistic accumulation to the world and to reinforce Istanbul's European identity. The use of Istanbul modern as a bourgeois project to glorify the image of the state can be given as an example of liberal nationalism. The opening of Istanbul Modern reveals how private museum activities play a role in the construction of national identity and state image in the neoliberal order, and at the same time create new capital-power relations.

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[195] Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı, *Yeni bir Türkiye*, (İstanbul: Dr. Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı Yayınları, 1998), p. 487.

[196] *İstanbul Modern'in Hikayesi*, Accessed July 29, 2024, https://www.arkitera.com/haber/oya-eczacibasi-anlatti-istanbul-modernin-ilginc-hikayesi/

Another example of the relationship between capital and power in art activities was Kenan Evren's exhibition. [197] It was observed that numerous business people bought Kenan Evren's paintings. Among the people and institutions that sold Kenan Evren's paintings were names such as Sakıp Sabancı, Koç Group, and Muharrem Eskiyapan, the owner of Nuh Çimento. [198]In fact, the Atatürk painting that Kenan Evren put up for sale in 1998 was bought by Ali Balkaner, making Evren 'the most expensive living Turkish painter.[199] In 1993, paintings by Kenan Evren were exhibited at Aksanat with the participation of many business people. This exhibition, which received a great reaction from the artists of the period, was reciprocated in the 'Atsanat' exhibition held at the UN Contemporary Art Centre in 1993.[200]

Beral Madra who was a founder of the UN Contemporary Art Center, expressed her reaction to the support given to Kenan Evren's paintings by exhibiting them at Aksanat and to the fact that his paintings were being purchased by businessmen at high prices, stating the reason for opening the Atsanat exhibition with the following words: "...As an art center director who never thought of benefiting society by selling horse paintings, I felt it was my duty to open this exhibition." [201] The fact that Kenan Evren's paintings found a space in an important intellectual art centre such as Aksanat, which is affiliated with Sabancı Holding, was criticised by the art community of the period. The support of Kenan Evren's cultural activities by the bourgeoisie can be interpreted as an indication that the cultural field was turned into an instrument of the relationship between capital and power and politically instrumentalised.

Obviously, with the involvement of capital in the cultural field, a diverse and polyphonic order has emerged. The fact that state museums only produce content in

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[197] Kenan Evren was one of the architects of the 12 September Military Coup. He served as the head of state following the coup and later became the 7th President of Turkey from 1982 to 1989.

[198] *Cumhuriyet Haber*, Accessed July 20, 2024, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/evrenin-tablolarini-kimler-aldi-274291

[199] Ali Artun, Accessed July 10, 2024, https://www.e-skop.com/skopbulten/diktatorun-sanatciligi/2454

[200] The *Aksanat-Atsanat* analogy, based on phonetic similarity, refers to the horse paintings in Kenan Evren's exhibition.

[201] Beral Madra, Accessed July 11, 2024, https://www.beralmadra.net/articles/basin-bultenleri/basin-bulteni-atsanat-sergi/

the palace-archaeology-ethnography fields[202] has created a situation where museum content can not catch up with international trends. With the opening of private museums, a more dynamic environment emerged in the field of museology. After 1980, alongside the state's cultural policy, private museums and exhibitions produced discourses free from the cultural hegemony of the state. However, there was also an environment that helped to construct the state's cultural discourse centered on the Turkish Islamic Synthesis. For example, the Sakarya and Çanakkale Promotion Centres, which were mentioned in the previous chapter, were presented as Oruçoğlu Holding's gifts to history. Apart from these museums, which construct the state's authority in the cultural sphere, another project of Oruçoğlu Holding is the July 15 Martyrs Commemoration and Democracy Museum.[203] In this context, the museums that are being designed and implemented serve as examples showing that certain elements of the bourgeoisie support the cultural hegemony of the ruling power and dominate the cultural sphere by producing projects in line with the policies of the government.

Although Turkey's integration into the neoliberal order has created diversity in the cultural sphere and prevented the shaping of a single dominant narrative centered on the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, it is also clear that certain capital groups serve the cultural discourse of the government. While some capital groups have emphasized the glorification of the state identity, preservation of cultural values, catching up with the era, and showing Turkey's Western and intellectual side in line with liberal and Westernist nationalism, other capital groups have developed policies to patronize the Neo-Ottomanist, conservative cultural codes of the government in line with liberal and Islamist nationalism.

To sum up, the privatization of culture and its evolution into one of the image elements of the bourgeoisie shallow and trivialize the historical and intellectual experiences that constitute the element of social memory.[204] In this context,

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[202] Orhan Silier, "Preface" in *Kent Müzeleri Uluslararası Sempozyumu, 21-22 Nisan 2006, Antalya*, ed. Orhan Silier (Antalya: Tarih Vakfı Müzecilik-Sergicilik Yayınları, 2008), p.2.

[203] Oruçoğlu Holding, Accessed August 13, 2024, https://orucogluholding.com.tr/portfolio/item/15-temmuz-sehitleri-anma-ve-demokrasi-muzesi/

[204] Kevin Walsh, *The Representation of the Past: Museums and Heritage in the Postmodern World*, (London: New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 2.

neoliberal cultural policies have produced a new dynamism by dominating the museum and exhibition field. While the state's presence in the cultural field continued, cultural policies evolved into a form in which large capital groups were also involved. The cultural field, monopolized by the state until the 1980s, gained a characteristic that served the tastes, understanding of history, and pragmatic interests of capital owners. Examples such as Sabancı, Koç, Eczacıbaşı, and Oruçoğlu Holding, which are cited in the thesis, summarise the involvement of capital in the cultural sphere and the purposes for which it is used.

However, in addition to these examples, there has been a significant increase in the number of private museums in Turkey and the rest of the world. In the process that Huyssen expresses with the words "the planned obsolescence of consumer society found its counterpoint in a relentless museummania." [205] According to this sentence museums have turned into a mass tool with the neoliberalisation that started in the 1980s; losing its characteristic of being an intellectual tool of high culture at the beginning of the 20th century, it has assumed an essential role in the commercialization of cultural heritage in the service of tourism and capital in the globalizing world order. However, despite transforming the cultural sphere into a commercial commodity, the issue of instrumentalizing museums and other cultural spaces in the process of identity construction by states continues.[206] Even though neoliberal policies began to dominate the cultural sphere and private museums introduced new discourses, the global field could not change the state's power to control individuals' memory. In fact, the state's presence in the culture field was consolidated with the support of some capital groups. Thus, in the post-1980 cultural field, identity policies produced by the state hegemony on the one hand and cultural codes produced by private museums on the other became partners in shaping mass memory. Although sometimes private museums produced discourses contrary to the cultural narrative of the state, sometimes they acted in cooperation, as in the case of Oruçoğlu Holding.

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[205] Andreas Huyssen, *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1995), p.14.

[206] Andreas Huyssen, 'Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia', in *Public Culture*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2000, p. 26.

5.2 Turkish Museology between Localisation and Globalisation

In the aftermath of the world wars, it can be observed that the protection of the common cultural heritage became systematically organized at the international level. Processes such as the establishment of UNESCO within the UN as a means of establishing social peace after the war and Turkey's membership of ICOM in 1950 transformed the fundamental processes of museum and identity construction of the 19th and 20th centuries and led to the development of policies on the axis of a common cultural ideal. Thus, museum studies, which at the beginning of the twentieth century were part of the efforts of nation-states to create their legitimacy, began to develop in a global discourse after the Second World War, thanks to organizations such as the United Nations, ICOM, and the Council of Europe. While the globalized world order united the world's cultures within a common understanding, it paradoxically also created a cultural discourse in which local cultures became more prominent. In this context, Robertson describes an order in which local elements are integrated with global cultural subjects, asserting that "globalization, defined in its most general sense as the compression of the world as a whole, involves the linking of localities."[207] In this regard, in Turkey, one of the most critical intersections of local and global discourses is observed in the development of city museums within the field of museology.

In the 1980s, efforts to integrate into the neoliberal order brought not only the globalization of large cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir but also initiated the process of branding Anatolian cities. As local governments became more active in the political and economic spheres, municipalities assumed the responsibility of creating a city image. In this context, the cultural sphere was instrumentalized to create an advantageous identity for tourism.[208] Within the neoliberal order, identity creation has a reality that is shaped by the economic and political conjunctions between the concepts of locality and globality. In this regard, this section will

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[207] R. Robertson, "Glocalization: Time-Space and homogeneity-heterogeneity", In *Global Modernities* ed. by M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson (London; California; New Delhi: Sage, 1995), (pp. 25-44). p.35.

[208] Tahire Erman, "Küresel ve Yerel Dinamikler Altında 'Anadolu Kaplanı' Kentleri", *İdealkent Kent Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 8 (January 2013): 50-73. P.52

analyze how museums are interpreted within the axis of locality and globality, how museums are integrated into global consumption, and how culture is commodified through local components and transformed into an object of tourism.

Madran and Önal basically categorise the museum activities in Turkey into 5 periods.[209] The first one was the late Ottoman period museology, which developed under the leadership of Osman Hamdi Bey. In this period, the Ottoman Empire could not develop a successful and unique museological perception due to the diversity of its demographic structure and political instability. Although the Asar-ı Atika regulations of 1874-1884-1906 were attempts to protect cultural heritage, they were insufficient in practice. In the second period, the process of formalising cultural heritage into the form of the nation-state was implemented as an important cultural policy of the Early Republican period. Following the early republican period, the third period covering the 1960s and 1970s was called the period of political transformation, and then the period until the end of the 1980s brought a new discourse of identity creation in which serious cultural transformations took place, as mentioned in the thesis. The last periodisation is the period of transition to multiculturalism, which covers the period from the 1990s onwards. From the 1990s onwards, the promotion of the cultural sphere and the discourse of inclusive culture due to globalisation has been the main factor determining the urban policies of local elements.

The establishment of city museums is an essential cultural movement in many aspects, such as integrating the city's history with the society, enabling newcomers and tourists to get to know the city, and shaping the collective memory elements of the city in the minds of individuals. In the case of Turkey, the homogenous understanding of identity created by state authority prevented the development of localization elements and led to a delayed response to the issue of various institutions such as city museums. The suspension of the activities of the museum branch of the People's Houses, which was active in the early Republican period, caused developments similar to urban museums to be shelved for many years. [210]However,

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[209] Madran; Önal, Müzeler ve Sunumlari, p. 173.

[210] Orhan Silier, *Kentler ve Kent Müzeleri*, p. 3.

since the 1990s, globalized cultural space and museum activities have been instrumentalized for local governments to create brand value, making local cultural values more visible again.

In this context, the effort to transform local cultural elements into an image in the public's minds has led to the presentation of museums by fusing them with local cultural values and commodifying them as elements that glorify the city's image. Hence, places of social memory, where cultural heritage is embodied, have become a means of communication involving the mutual integration of the producing and consuming masses. For this reason, local governments have made pragmatic gains by shaping both the memories of the masses and the image they gain from the industrialized cultural narrative. Accordingly, the cultural narrative, which includes the values and historical elements that society has built up over centuries, is preserved and passed on to future generations through museum activities. At the same time, it has become a means of economic capital for administrations and local communities.

In the case of city museums, it can be interpreted as a reflection of both globalization and localization that cities protect their cultural values, blend cultural heritage in a historical narrative, embody it in museums, and generate economic income. In this context, museums and exhibition activities have become widespread in the globalised world as devices of the modern era. Municipalities utilized museums to convert their cultural capital into economic capital by incorporating local and unique cultural elements into museums to market the unique identities of cities and build their images. Thus, the increased importance of cultural capital in the 1980s led to various innovations in these fields. In fact, valorizing the cultural sphere and developing cultural tourism have led to interrelated processes. In this context, preserving and protecting unique cultural values and turning them into a touristic medium both created a plane preferred by the administrations regarding social status, and generating income from tourism created a new culture-capital relationship.

For example, the Anatolian Civilisations exhibition, which was organized with the contributions of the Council of Europe in 1983, produced a vision of Anatolian

cultural heritage from the prehistoric period to include the Ottoman period. This vision is essential in terms of evaluating Anatolian history as a cultural heritage in the globalised world order and supporting tourism with the metaphor of Anatolia, the Cradle of Civilisation[211]. This perspective, which presents Anatolian history as a metaphor in the international cultural field, was later reciprocated by the spread of city museums, where local cultural elements were shaped by the narrative of history and gained a place in the global economic and cultural order. In this regard, the preface of the exhibition catalog states that what is essential for peace and cooperation is for European civilizations to get to know each other's culture and history. In this context, the exhibition catalog includes the following statement: "The Anatolian Civilisations Exhibition documents the earliest historical sources of Mediterranean and European civilizations and reveals the development of the Council's easternmost country."[212] This sentences emphasizes the importance of developing common belongings in a globalized world order. Furthermore, in the exhibition catalog, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Franz Karasek, states the purpose of the exhibition as follows: "The common contributions of Anatolian cultures to all civilizations, especially to Europe, will be exhibited."[213] This sentence can be considered as a contribution to the process of accession to the European Union and the tourism issue brought about by the global neoliberal order.

The first part of this exhibition, which covers the history of Anatolia in a holistic manner, focuses on the prehistoric, Hittite and Iron Age, while the second part includes historical objects related to Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and the third part to Seljuk and Ottoman history. [214]The narrative of Anatolian history from the prehistoric period to the Ottoman period praised the cultural diversity of Anatolian history and emphasised the fact that it encompassed many civilisations and developed common affinities with European civilisation. Within the framework of the cradle of civilizations discourse of the Anatolian Civilisations exhibition, global

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[211] Madran; Önal, "Müzeler ve Sunumlari," p. 183.

[212] Republic of Turkey, *Avrupa Konseyi 18. Avrupa Sanat Sergisi: Anadolu Medeniyetleri I* (Ankara: T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1983), p.9.

[213] *Ibid.*, 10

[214] *Ibid.*

values were also produced by local governments and formed the basis of the concept of intercultural dialogue.

At the point of systematic institutionalization of city museums, which play an essential role in the context of integration into the global order and multi-shared cultural discourse, the Foundation for the Protection and Promotion of the Environment and Cultural Heritage (ÇEKÜL) founded in 1990, and the Union of Historic Cities, founded in 2000, have assumed a pioneering role. However, before these institutions began to operate systematically, the first step that could serve as an example for urban museology studies was taken in Safranbolu in 1975.[215] Safranbolu was selected as a pilot region due to its traditional architectural structures that preserved the Ottoman city image, and various restoration works were carried out to protect and preserve the cultural heritage. The real major initiative in City Museology was realized within the scope of the 7 Regions 7 Cities Project initiated by the ÇEKUL Foundation in 1998.[216]

This emphasis on city branding in the globalizing world order has increased the importance and visibility of local cultures. With the industrialization of culture, cities have also attempted to brand their own values and present the branded values. The reflection of the industrialization of culture in the field of museology is that cultural values, which have become a part of global culture and tourism, are considered as a part of rich cultural heritage and lead to the development of the concept of intercultural dialogue.

In this context, city museums developed intercultural dialogue by creating a platform where local cultural values can be identified with global cultural elements. By becoming a part of international culture through city museums or exhibitions, local cultures are leveraged as promotional campaigns that positively affect the image of cities and contribute to the city economy by increasing recognition in tourism. Thus, as part of modernizing state structures, cities have become places where micro-

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[215] Handan Dedehayır, Müge Değirmenci, eds., *Kent Tarihi Müzeleri ve Arşivleri* (İstanbul: ÇEKÜL Vakfı-Tarihi Kentler Birliği Yayınları, 2013), p. 23.

[216] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

nationalism is felt more intensely and have become production areas of the cultural industry.[217]

In this context, city museums concretize national discourses and micro-nationalisms on the historical plane, enabling local elements to find a response in the global neoliberal order and be articulated to the global market with the image of a city with brand value. By producing discourses such as Cradle of Civilisation, World City, and Capital of Culture, local governments try to give their city identities a feature that will enable them to integrate into global markets. In this context, city museums are instrumentalized as places of intellectual memory corresponding to the global cultural world. Thus, thanks to city museums, each city develops a local discourse language by interpreting its historical values in the context of museology. The image productions that will enable cities to be marketed globally are sometimes constructed by municipalities and sometimes produced by large capital groups supporting municipalities under the name of a philanthropic vision.

In this context, for example, business people like Sakıp Sabancı and Kadir Has played a role in the branding of Anatolian cities by making cultural investments not only in globalized cities but also in Anatolian cities. For instance, the Sakıp Sabancı Mardin City Museum, which opened in 2006 and was designed to embody Mardin's multicultural and multi-religious structure, shares a similar mission with the Anatolian Civilisations exhibition held at Aya İrini with the contributions of the Council of Europe. In harmony with the rich cultural texture of Mardin, the content of the museum, which consists of cultural products belonging to people of different religious beliefs, handicraft products, and local objects used in daily life, emphasizes the multicultural structure of Anatolia and draws the image of a peaceful and rich city with the image of the bridge of civilization.[218]The museum content, which is harmonized with Mardin's culture, represents the promotion of the city both nationally and internationally. In this way, both the local people living in Mardin are

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[217] Georges Prévélakis, "City Museums and the Geopolitics of Globalization", in *City Museums and City Development*, ed. Robert R. Macdonald, Ian Jones, and Darryl McIntnyre (Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc, 2008), p.19.

[218] Sakıp Sabancı Müzesi, Accessed July 10, 2024, https://mardin.ktb.gov.tr/TR-312380/sakip-sabanci-muzesi.html

integrated with the city's collective memory, and tourists can comprehend the city's texture. The example of the city museum, which aims to make Mardin a world city, was shaped by the elements of local and global identity and tried to shine the star of Mardin. [219]

Another city museum opened with the support of a businessman, similar to the Sakıp Sabancı City Museum, is the Kadir Has City and Mimar Sinan Museum. Kayseri-born businessman Kadir Has, who places importance on cultural activities such as the Rezan Has Museum within Kadir Has University, was the economic supporter of the Kadir Has City and Mimar Sinan Museum, a project implemented in collaboration with the municipality to enhance the city's brand value. The museum includes elements related to Kayseri's cultural heritage as well as information about the life of Mimar Sinan and models of his works. In this way, the unique culture of Kayseri is promoted, and the works of renowned Kayseri scientists are internalized into the city, becoming an element in creating the city's image.

These two examples of capital-supported city museums show that the bourgeoisie, which has been raised by the global economic order, has also played a role in the construction of local cultural identities, revealing how global cultural dynamics are reflected at the local level. In this context, while Sakıp Sabancı City Museum was shaped with a narrative that would promote the cultural richness of Mardin's multicultural, multi-religious structure, Kadir Has City Museum promoted the local values of Kayseri. Thus, the unique cultural texture of each city was shaped by neoliberal urban policies, and an image was created that would increase its domestic and international recognition and value. While city museums with the status of private museums were sometimes built with the support of business people, sometimes they were used to create their own city images and increase the touristic value of the city with the initiative of municipalities.

Another example of using local cultural values and historical elements for city branding is the Bursa City Museum. As the first city museum to open in Turkey, the

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[219] Mardin Kent Müzesi, Accessed July 12, 2024, https://www.cekulvakfi.org.tr/haber/mardinde-kent-muzesi-kurulmasinin-kisa-oykusu

Bursa City Museum has embodied its historical and cultural values in the localization context. The museum, which is said to have been built by the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality to glorify and promote the socio-cultural and economic values of Bursa and to bequeath them to future generations, presents a narrative that focuses on the changes Bursa has undergone in the Republican period, starting from prehistoric times, Bithynia, Rome, Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire, and the War of Independence.[220] In the section on Ottoman history, the museum features wax sculptures of the sultans who lived in Bursa and offered a narrative that intensely focuses on Ottoman history due to the city's historical background.

Ahmet Erdönmez, the coordinator of the Bursa City Museum, stated that Bursa is one of the Ottoman capitals and, therefore, has a deep-rooted Sufi culture. He notes that Ottoman history-themed exhibitions with titles such as 'Mystical Symbols and Objects in the Ottoman Empire' are essential for the city's history.[221] This feature shows that city museums are also used as a means of activating neo-Ottomanist and conservative nationalist memory codes, while these historical features are also turned into elements of city branding, offering an identity profile that glorifies the city's image for participation in the global market. An example of a city museum where nationalist memory codes are reproduced is the Gaziantep City Museum. As stated by Tahire Erman, the Gaziantep City Museum has wax statues of important historical figures such as Şahin Bey, who played a significant role in the social memory during the Defence of Antep in the beginning of the Turkish Independence War, along with objects of daily life belonging to the city's culture. In this context, while creating the city's image, historical memory elements and cultural codes with nationalist values are used to create images with touristic values that can be transformed into economic capital.[222]

To sum up, the elements of cultural heritage that shape collective memory have been systematized and institutionalized in museums, the most intellectual form of modern

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[220] *Bursa Kent Müzesi*, Accessed July 18, 2024, https://www.bursamuze.com/bursa-kent-muzesi

[221] Ahmet Erdönmez, "Bursa Kent Müzesi," in *Kent Müzeleri Uluslararası Sempozyumu, 21-22 Nisan 2006, Antalya*, ed. Orhan Silier (Antalya: Tarih Vakfı Müzecilik-Sergicilik Yayınları, 2008), p. 66.

[222] Erman, *Küresel ve Yerel Dinamikler Altında 'Anadolu Kaplanı' Kentleri,* p. 65

institutions. The process of institutionalization of culture has undergone continuous changes and has been instrumentalized sometimes by the state and sometimes by the private sector. However, one of the most significant transformations of the cultural sphere occurred due to the neoliberal urban policies created by the globalizing world order. Neoliberal urban policies have designed cities to create brands and use their multilayered pasts to integrate with the global market and tourism. In this context, Turkey's cultural heritage elements and historical values were turned into commodities and became part of museum image creation. City museums were shaped within the framework of the historical memories of cities and developed their narratives. This situation enabled city museums to have rich and independent content. As Urry states, in the globalized world, identities become more open and fluid and are shaped by many different dynamics.[223] For instance, while the Bursa City Museum emphasizes Ottoman history, Mardin highlights multiculturalism, and Antep underscores the memory of the liberation struggle. In the context of globalization, neoliberal urban policies have instrumentalized the commodification of cultural values and the creation of brand value by enabling cities to discover their local memory codes. In this context, the concept of cultural heritage has been turned into an apparatus that supports tourism and ensures global recognition by serving the purpose of capital to obtain new markets.[224]

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[223] John Urry, Consuming *Places*. (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 215.

[224] Kevin Walsh, *The Representation of the Past: Museums and Heritage in the Postmodern World*, (London: New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 149.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Museums, as places of memory where history and cultural values are visualised, have been instrumentalised by the cultural hegemony of the state and the bourgeoisie. For this reason, when analysing museum and exhibition activities, one should focus not only on their artistic quality but also on issues of political and economic interest. In the case of Turkey, the economic, political, and social transformations brought about by historical processes have changed the discourse policies of the government and caused museology and exhibition activities, as one of the forms of representation, to change over the years.

The first museological activities in the modern sense were shaped by a cultural policy that would consolidate the multi-ethnic structure within the framework of Ottomanism. For this reason, the first museological activities in Ottoman history did not construct a visible museological policy supporting the nation-state form. The main transformation of museology as a part of the hegemony of power was reflected in the official nationalism policy of the early Republican period. In the process of national identity construction, disciplines such as archaeology, anthropology, and history created collective memories shaped by the state's historical narrative by exhibiting concrete evidence in museums that would shape the past narrative of the Turkish nation. Thus, the creation of common belonging, the basic infrastructure of the nation-state form, was realized by presenting the selected past narrative in museums. Therefore, museums, which became the ideological apparatus of modern nation-states, became one of the fundamental elements of modernization, westernization, and nationhood in the early republican period.

In this context, museums, which are memory sites with a narrative in which history is visualized, became a means for the newly established nation-state to break the link

with the Ottoman Empire. While the places that represented the power and presence of the Ottoman dynasty were transformed into museums, places with religious meaning were also turned into museums and memory practices identified with the secular state form were implemented. Thus, the invention of traditions and cultural habits were turned into memory practices through museums in order to consolidate the presence in the political sphere.

This extensive identity construction project realized in the early republican period, has changed due to changing discourses of power and the international political conjuncture. At this point in the republic's history, the 12 September coup d'état marked a turning point in the discourse within the cultural field.

After the 12 September coup, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, which became the official state policy, the neoliberal policies that dominated the economic sphere after the 24 January decisions and the globalized world order created a new cultural discourse that would significantly change society's collective memories, understanding of consumption, and practices of remembering the past. Thus, the codes of representation on which the narrative of the past of the early Republican period was based changed and evolved into a form based on conservatism, the commodification of culture, and globalization. Thus, museum and exhibition activities in the 1980s were shaped on the axis of firstly, the emphasis of neo-Ottomanism on the golden ages of the Ottoman Empire; secondly, the bourgeoisie assuming the protection of history on the axis of their ideologies, and thirdly, the commodification of cultural heritage elements by the multicultural discourse brought by the global order.

The post-1980 administration, to create a sterile environment in the political and economic spheres, removed leftist groups from politics and imposed limits on labor organizations while harmonizing the official cultural discourse with the Turkish Islamic Synthesis and creating a bourgeoisie empowered by neoliberal policies. The narrative of the past shaped on the axis of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis gained a populist characteristic during the Özal period and created a reality that dominated cultural policies. The elements of conservative nationalism constructed within the

framework of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis were incorporated into the narrative of popular policies by finding a counterpart in fields such as education and art. In this context, memory practices emphasize the Golden Age of the Ottoman Empire; in this way, museum and exhibition policies were shaped on the axis of banal Ottomanism.

Since the 1980s, the cultural discourse has produced a nostalgic longing centered on the Ottoman history of the Turkish Islamic synthesis narrative. The process of accession to the European Union and the global order created by the free economy market also created the practice of presenting the Ottoman cultural heritage internationally and domestically through exhibition activities, thus enabling this narrative to gain an essential place in the representation of the state image. Thus, in the eyes of Westerners, the narrative of the past, which is at peace with the Ottoman past and praises the multicultural structure of Ottomanism, has shaped both domestic and international memory policies. In this regard, the practice of constructing cultural identity during the Özal period through multiculturalism is similar to the dynamics of museum policies in the Ottoman period.

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, the central discourse of the cultural policy during the Özal period, included Turkish identity and Islamic values equally in the cultural narrative. However, with the rise of political Islam in the 1990s, Islamic cultural codes gained prominence and caused the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis policy to diverge from its 1980s version. However, this situation was further transformed over time, and with the AKP-MHP coalition, a crystallized narrative of the past was created in which Turkish identity regained importance while Islamic cultural codes remained dominant.

Since the 1990s, with the rise of political Islam, liberal and Islamist nationalist codes have enabled neo-Ottomanist memory codes to become more dominant in the cultural sphere, leading museum and exhibition policies to develop a narrative compatible with the emphasis on the golden age of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, while Istanbul was transformed into a memory center as a symbol of the myth of conquest, narratives centered on the conquest of Istanbul became a typical example of banal nationalism in museums and other cultural spaces. On the other

hand, examples such as the Sakarya Field Battle and Turkish History Promotion Centre, and the Çanakkale Epic Promotion Centre demonstrate that nostalgic longing for the Ottoman Empire is a crucial representational element of identity construction by crafting historical narratives in which Islamist nationalism finds its counterpart in the neo-Ottomanist framework.

One of the most significant breaking points of the 1980s was the bourgeoisie's involvement in the cultural sphere, which the free market economy had made independent and expanded. By taking on the task of preserving collective memory and historical values, the bourgeoisie not only took a step that the public would appreciate but also brought innovation to the field of museology by producing museum content beyond the confines of state museums that had been limited to history and ethnography for many years.

Private museums brought a new perspective to the cultural field, which created a dynamism that diversified the artistic field and reorganized the relationship between the state and capital. At this point, the free market economy and global order did not eliminate the presence of the state in the cultural sphere but evolved into a dialogue shaped between capital and power. Private museums not only brought diversity to the field of art but also shaped the representation practices of identities in political terms. The collections of private museums enriched the field of museology by producing content other than archaeological and ethnographic objects. This situation enabled identities and ideologies outside the state discourse to be recognized in museums. In addition, the fact that private museums and exhibitions were an element of representation that influenced the state's image in the international arena created an example of cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, in the domestic sphere, large capital groups shaped social memory by conducting museum activities in a context that would serve the discourse of power as a means of achieving pragmatic gains in political and economic terms.

While the bourgeoisie grew and expanded abroad with the free market economy, they also contributed to the visibility of the state's image abroad through artistic activities. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie-power cooperation in the construction

of the cultural authority of the state in domestic politics was reflected in museum and exhibition activities. Thus, while the bourgeoisie helped the state to construct Islamist nationalism policies centered on the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, they also ensured the production of liberal and Westernist nationalism codes in relations with the West through museums and exhibitions. The point to consider is that with the privatization of the cultural sphere, memory practices are now produced by the wider public. Since privatization has allowed cultural activities to include individuals' political views, interests, and artistic tastes, considerable diversity has emerged. On the one hand, the bourgeoisie was part of the Turkish-Islamic-centred narrative and acted according to the ideological orientation of the state, but at the same time, it developed practices outside this hegemonic narrative. For this reason, the reflection of the state-bourgeoisie relationship in the cultural sphere was shaped around the interests, ideological views, and tastes of the bourgeoisie.

Another dynamic in shaping social memory is the transformative effect of the multiculturalism discourse brought about by globalization on the concept of cultural heritage. While the globalising world order constructed a holistic understanding of culture, paradoxically, it also enabled local cultural values to gain importance. Neoliberal urban policies and the globalising cultural environment have made domestic and national elements aware of their own unique identities, bringing about a process of branding and commodification of identities. While discourses such as the Cradle of Civilisations and Capital of Culture create a dynamism in which collective memory is sustained, and the protection of history is undertaken, on the other hand, the concept of cultural heritage has been transformed into tourism objects and become a part of neoliberal urban policies.

In this context, city museums contribute to the survival of local cultural values by undertaking visions such as creating urban belonging and promoting the historical and cultural values of the city to local and foreign tourists. Thanks to the globalized world order, city museums have become modern instruments of neoliberal urban policies in the global arena by enabling different cultural heritage elements to interact. For this reason, creating local cultural brands by building city museums at the center of neoliberal urban policies has become a systematic strategy. While the

city museums, which have the status of private museums, are built with the municipalities' own budget, the bourgeoisie is also involved in creating the city brand and undertakes a common task in constructing local memory codes. With these initiatives, the bourgeoisie assumes the protection of history and culture and glorifies its image, while at the same time, the city's image gains a feature that will make it attractive in a touristic sense. Thus, city museums are instrumentalized by local governments and the bourgeoisie as an element that will enable cities to create their own brand and integrate their local cultural heritage into the global market and tourism.

While neoliberal policies and globalization, which were among the central dynamics affecting museum activities in the 1980s, found a definite response in city museums, the reaction of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis in city museums did not create such a clear reflection. Because the cultural heritage of ancient civilizations in Anatolia has a severe international tourist capacity, for this reason, pre-Islamic Anatolian civilisations are among the cultural heritage elements most frequently included in the narrative of city museums since they have a global equivalent in city brand creation. However, according to the unique historical narratives of the cities, we can say that Ottoman and Seljuk history finds a response in city museums. For example, the Ottoman past was glorified in the Bursa City Museum and part of the city's brand creation. However, it would be too generalizing to say that the historical narratives of city museums are only influenced by the Turkish Islamic Synthesis. For example, Sakıp Sabancı Mardin City Museum used memory practices to glorify the city's multicultural and multi-religious characteristics while creating the city brand. In short, pragmatic elements were considered in the construction of the city branding. While cities with brandable memory codes of Turkish-Islamic civilizations have developed a narrative that includes the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, some cities have produced a cultural discourse outside this framework by incorporating ancient civilizations in the local identity narrative due to their cultural heritage.

To sum up, exhibition and museum activities as the center of institutionalized memory policies have been shaped by the political and economic discourse of the period, influenced by many political, social, and economic factors throughout

history. For this reason, the transformation in the government's identity discourses, neoliberal economic policies, and the effort to integrate into the universal world have enabled museums and exhibition activities to diverge from the form in which they initially developed. In this context, the principal aim of this thesis is to analyze the critical factors for the transformation in the field of museology and to demonstrate that museum and exhibition activities can only be considered with political meaning.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez temel olarak Türkiye'deki toplumsal hafızanın 1980'den sonraki dönüşümünü müze ve sergi faaliyetleri üzerinden analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Müzeler, geçmişin ve kültürel mirasın vitrinselleştiği hafıza mekanları olarak devlet ve burjuvazi tarafından araçsallaştırılarak temsil biçimlerinin bir öznesi olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu sebeple, müze ve sergi faaliyetleri analiz edilirken yalnızca sanatsal niteliği değil aynı zamanda politik ve ekonomik gerçeklikler de gözetilerek analiz edilmelidir.

Bu bağlamda, 12 Eylül darbesinin ardından resmi devlet politikası haline gelen Türk-İslam Sentezi, 24 Ocak kararlarının ardından ekonomik alanı şekillendiren neoliberal politikalar ve globalleşen dünya düzeninin getirdiği neoliberal kent politikaları; geçmişi hatırlama pratiklerinde büyük değişime sebep olacak yeni bir kültür söylemi yaratmıştır. Böylece Cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca üretilen kimlik politikalarında büyük bir dönüşüm yaşanarak Erken Cumhuriyet döneminde şekillenmiş olan geçmiş anlatısının temsil kodları değişmiş; muhafazakarlık, kültürün metalaşması ve globalleşme eksenli bir forma evrilmiştir. 1980'lerde müze ve sergi faaliyetleri kapsamında bu tezde ilk olarak Osmanlı Devleti'nin Altın Çağlarına yapılan vurgu, ikinci olarak burjuvazinin kendi ideolojileri ekseninde geçmişin koruyuculuğunu üstlenmesi üçüncü olarak ise global düzenin getirdiği neoliberal kent politikalarının kültürel alanı domine etmesi meselesine odaklanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, tez çeşitli örnek müzeler üzerinden kültürel dönüşümü yorumlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Tezin ikinci kısmında bahsedildiği üzere, Osmanlı Devleti'nde modern anlamda ilk müze faaliyetleri Osmanlıcılık ideolojisi bağlamında gelişerek Osmanlı Devleti'nin multi-etnik nüfus dokusunu koruma amacı içeriyordu. Bu sebeple Osmanlı tarihindeki ilk müzecilik faaliyetleri modern ulus-devlet yapılarında gözlenen formda

bir müzecilik politikası inşa edememişti. Müzeciliğin iktidarın sistematik bir kültür politikasının parçası olmasındaki esas dönüşüm, tezin üçüncü kısmında belirtildiği üzere, erken Cumhuriyet döneminin resmi milliyetçilik politikasında karşılık bulmuştur. Bu sayede müze ve sergi faaliyetleri ulus-devlet inşa sürecinin bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Milli kimlik inşası sürecinde, arkeoloji, antropoloji, tarih gibi disiplinler kullanılarak Türk milletinin geçmiş anlatısını içeren somut kanıtlar, müzelerde sergilenmiş böylece devletin tarih anlatısının şekillendirdiği kolektif bellek mekanları inşa edilmiştir.

Bu bağlamda, ulus-devlet formunun temel dinamiklerinden olan ortak kimlik yaratımı, Cumhuriyet değerleriyle şekillenmiştir. Modern ulus devletlerin ideolojik aygıtlarından olan müzeler ve sergiler, Erken Cumhuriyet döneminde modernleşmenin, batılaşmanın ve ulus olmanın temel dinamiklerini oluşturdu. Erken Cumhuriyet döneminde ulus-devlet inşası sürecinin bir parçası olarak kullanılan müze faaliyetleri, yeni kurulan devletin, geçmişle olan ilişkisini de yeniden tasarlayarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile olan tarihsel aidiyet bağını koparmanın bir parçası olarak kullanıldı. Türk Tarih Kurumu Sergisi, Mevlana Müzesi, Ayasofya ve Topkapı Sarayı'nın müzeye dönüştürülmesi, Etnografya Müzesi, Anadolu Medeniyetleri Müzesi ve Halkevleri Müzecilik kolu içerikleri, erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi müze ve sergi dinamiklerini tanımlamak amacıyla örnek müze olarak teze dahil edilmiştir. Erken Cumhuriyet döneminden seçilen bu müze ve sergi faaliyetleri örnekleri, hem erken Cumhuriyet döneminin temsil biçimlerini analiz etmemizi sağlar hem de 1980 sonrası gelişen kimlik söyleminden derin ayrışımlar içerdiği için, müzecilik alanındaki dönüşümü anlamlandırmamıza olanak tanımaktadır. Bu bağlamda, erken Cumhuriyet dönemi müze politikalarını analiz ederken bu müzelerin örnek olarak seçilmesi, dönemin milliyetçilik politikalarının yanında devlet ve toplumsal hafıza dinamiğindeki dönüşümü anlama amacını barındırır. Erken Cumhuriyet döneminden seçilen Türk Tarih Kurumu Sergisi, Etnografya Müzesi, Anadolu Medeniyetleri Müzesi ve Halkevleri'nin müzecilik kolu gibi örnekler, İslami kültürel kodları merkeze almasından ziyade, yeni kurulan ulus-devlete bağımsız bir kimlik kazandırmayı amaçlaması bakımından İslamiyet öncesi kültür kodlarını da içeren bir anlatı geliştirmişlerdir. Ayrıca Mevlana Tekkesi ve Ayasofya'nın erken Cumhuriyet döneminde geçirdiği dönüşümler, ideolojik alt

metne sahip olup yeni kurulan devletin kültür politikasını yansıtan ve onunla uyumlu bir anlatıya sahiptir. Bu bağlamda, bu iki hafıza mekanı İslami hafıza kodlarından arındırılıp evrensel kültür öznelerine dönüşerek bu dönemin kültür politikalarının temel dinamiklerini yansıtmaktadırlar. Erken Cumhuriyet dönemindeki dini anlamlar içeren bu hafıza mekanlarının, modern devletin resmi kurumları haline getirilmesiyle toplumsal hafıza ve din meselesi, devlet kontrolüne alınmış bir pratiğe dönüşmüştür.

Ayrıca yine erken Cumhuriyet döneminden seçilen Topkapı Sarayı'nın müzeye çevrilmesi örneği, Osmanlı hanedanının yönetim merkezinin Cumhuriyet'in etik değerleriyle çerçevelenmesi açısından kritik bir hafıza yönetimi politikası olarak değerlendirilebilir. Topkapı Sarayı'nın müzeye çevrilmesi ve halka açılması, imparatorluğa dair hafıza sembollerinin müzenin zamanı içerisinde dondurulmasıyla imparatorluk sembolleri geçmişin bir parçası haline getirilmiş ve egemenliğin halka ait olduğu düşüncesi müze pratiğinde karşılık bulmuştur. Türk müzecilik tarihindeki süreklilik ve kopuş dinamiklerini anlamak için seçilen bu müze örnekleri, 1980 sonrasında gelişen kültürel söylemle derin bir ayrışma içermesi açısından önemlidir. Bu müzeler, 1990'larda yükselişe geçen siyasal İslam çerçevesinde şekillenen yeni kültürel söylemin değiştirmeyi hedeflediği bellek pratiklerinin sembolik mekanları haline gelmiştir.

Tezin dördüncü bölümü, 1980'den sonra kültürel alanı şekillendiren Türk-İslam Sentezinin müze ve sergi faaliyetlerinde nasıl karşılık bulduğunu analiz etmeye odaklanmıştır. 1980'den itibaren kültürel alanı domine eden tarih anlatısı, Türk-İslam Medeniyetinin kültürel hafıza kodlarını devreye sokarken Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Altın Çağı'na nostaljik vurgular ön plana çıkmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Muhteşem Süleyman Sergisi, Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet Sergisi, Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak Sergisi, Türkler: 1000 Yıllık Yolculuk Sergisi, Panorama 1453 Tarih Müzesi, Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi ve Türk Tarihi Tanıtım Merkezi ve Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi içeriklerine odaklanılarak hakim kültür söyleminin dinamikleri ve bu dinamiklere tepkiler analiz edilmiştir.

Dördüncü bölümde bahsedilen ilk sergi olan *Muhteşem Süleyman Sergisi*, Özal döneminin kültür anlayışının önemli bir örneğidir. Sergi, Osmanlı Altın Çağı'nı

merkeze alarak inşa edilen hatırlama pratikleri çerçevesinde tanımlanırken aynı zamanda devlet imajının uluslarası alanda nasıl karşılık bulduğu açısından analiz edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda sergi, küreselleşen dünya düzeninde Türk-İslam sentezinin hafıza kodlarının Osmanlı tarihini merkeze alarak devlet imgesini oluşturmak için kullanıldığını göstermektedir. Dördüncü bölümde ayrıca, devlet söylemi haline gelen Türk-İslam Sentezi eksenindeki politikalara tepki olarak değerlendirilebilecek *Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet Sergisi* ve *Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak Sergisi* incelenerek seküler çevrelerin yükselen siyasal İslam karşısında sergi alanındaki refleksleri analiz edilmiştir. Bu iki sergi örneği, erken Cumhuriyetin kültürel değerlerinin 1980'lerden sonra gelişen bellek pratikleri karşısında yüceltilmesi bakımından ele alınmıştır. Bu iki sergi ardından ele alınan *Türkler: 1000 Yıllık Yolculuk Sergisi*, Batı ile olan ilişkiler bağlamında devlet imajının nasıl yaratıldığı konusunda önemli bir örnektir. Royal Academy of Art'da 2005 yılında düzenlenen sergi, İslamiyet öncesi tarihe dair anlatıya sahip olsa da özellikle Türk-İslam Medeniyetini merkeze alan anlatımı dolayısıyla, iktidarın Türk ve İslam medeniyetine dair kimlik kodlarını öncelemesi bakımından değerlendirilmiştir. 2005 yılındaki uluslarası alanda yapılan faaliyetler de incelendiğinde iktidarın devlet imajı, Erken Cumhuriyet döneminde olduğu gibi seküler evrensel değerleri öncelemek üzerinden değil Türk ve İslam kültürünü kapsayan değerler üzerine inşa edilmiştir.

Dördüncü bölümde Türk-İslam sentezinin karşılık bulduğu müze faaliyetlerine diğer bir örnek de Panaroma 1453 Tarih Müzesi'dir. Osmanlı Altın Çağı'na yapılan vurguyla Neo- Osmanlıcı anlayışın ve fetih mitinin karşılık bulduğu müze anlatımı 2009'dan sonra yükselişe geçen Neo-Osmanlıcı kültür politikalarının derin bir yansımasını içerir. Toplumsal hafızanın Osmanlı Altın Çağına nostaljik bir özlemle şekillendirilmesi bakımından bu sergi bir öncü niteliğindedir. Bu bölümde ele alınan diğer iki müze faaliyeti ise Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi ve Türk Tarihi Tanıtım Merkezi ve Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi'dir. Savaş müzesi olarak değerlendirilecek bu iki örnek hükümetin milliyetçilik ve kimlik politiklarına dair önemli yansımalar içerir. Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi ve Türk Tarihi Tanıtım Merkezi, Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi'ne dair tarihsel anlatının yanında aynı zamanda ilk Türk devletlerine dair tarihsel anlatıları ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na dair tarihi sembolleri içermektedir. Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi ise ümmetçi

bir perspektiften, Çanakkale Savaşı tarih yazımını Osmanlı kimliğini merkeze alarak İslamcı milliyetçilik bağlamında yeniden yorumlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Oruçoğlu Holding desteğiyle açılan bu iki müze örneği, burjuvazinin iktidarın kültür politikalarının destekçisi olması bakımından da değerlendirilmiştir. Liberal ve İslamcı milliyetçilik dillerinin kullanıldığı bu iki müzenin tarih anlatısı da AKP iktidarının başarılarını yücelten bir perspektifle sonlanmaktadır. Böylece makbul bir vatandaş kimliği yaratmak için kullanılan tarihsel anlatı ile hükümetin kültürel söylemi müzelerde karşılık bularak devletin toplumsal hafızadaki imajı, tercih edilen hafıza kodlarının kullanılması sayesinde şekillendirilmiş olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi ve Türk Tarihi Tanıtım Merkezi ile Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi, burjuvazinin milli kimlik politikalarına katılımını yansıtması bakımından bir taraftan liberal milliyetçiliğin diğer taraftan ümmetçi bir perpektiften tarihi anlatımı dolayısıyla İslamcı milliyetçiliğin ortak ürünleri olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Tezin diğer bölümü olan kültürün metalaştırılması konusu temelde iki kısma ayrılmıştır. İlki, burjuvazinin özel müze ve sergi faaliyetleriyle kendi söylemini yaratmasını analiz etmektedir. İkinci kısım ise kültürel mirasın neoliberal politikalar ekseninde araçsallaştırılmasıyla kent markası yaratımı konularına odaklanmıştır. İlk bölümde ele alınan burjuvazi-devlet ve müze ilişkisi çerçevesinde Koç, Sabancı, Eczacıbaşı ailelerinin özel müze faaliyetleri; Sadberk Hanım Müzesi, Sakıp Sabancı Müzesi ve İstanbul Modern müzeleri bağlamında ele alınmıştır.Bunun yanında Kenan Evren'in sergi faaliyetleri ve Oruçoğlu Holding'in müzecilik alanındaki çalışmaları analiz edilerek burjuvazi ve kültürün metalaştırılması meselesi neoliberal politikalar çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiştir.

Burjuvazinin müze ve sergi faaliyetleri sadece bir sanat girişimi olarak değerlendirilmemeli, aynı zamanda üretilen politikaların alt metninde devletle ve toplumla olan çıkar ilişkileri de değerlendirilmelidir. Müzeler, kitlelerin kimliklerini şekillendiren hafıza mekanları olarak devletler dışında özel kişiler tarafıdan kuruluyor olsa da politik anlamdan azade bir özelliğe sahip değildir. Özel müzeler ve sergiler çeşitli pragmatik sebeplerle araçsallaştırılarak politik alanın bir aparatı haline gelmiştir. Bu sebeple, özel müzelerin hem uluslarası alanda devlet kimliğini temsil

etmesi hem de iç politikada kitle kimliğini şekillendirecek bellek üretimlerinin merkezi olduğu için milliyetçi kodların üretimi bağlamında rol sahibi olan sistematik hafıza merkezleridir. Türk burjuvazisi, özel müzecilik ve sergi faaliyetlerinde aktif bir politika üreterek, hem saygın bir imaj yaratmış, hem toplumsal hafızayı şekillendirmiş hem de devletin iç ve dış siyasetteki varlığını etkileyen bir dinamizm yaratarak kimlik üretim sürecine ortak olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, burjuvazi kültürel alanda varlığını inşa ederken çeşitli milliyetçi diller çerçevesinde hareket etmiştir. Bu tezde özellikle liberal milliyetçilik, islamcı milliyetçilik ve Batıcı milliyetçilik çerçevesinde şekillenen politikalara odaklanılmıştır.

12 Eylül darbesiyle sol grupların siyasetten uzaklaştırılması, işçi hareketlerini kısıtlayan düzenlemeler, aynı zamanda neoliberal ekonomik düzene eklemlenme süreci burjuvazinin güçlenip bağımsızlaşmasına sebep olmuştu. Bu dinamikler, kültürel alanının devlet kontrolünün dışında gelişmesine sebep oldu. 24 Ocak kararlarıyla beraber burjuvazinin bağımsızlaşması ve büyümesi, burjuvazinin yeni bir imaj yaratmasını zorunlu kılmıştı. Böylece toplumsal anlamda kabul görecekleri prestijlerini arttıracak atılımlar gerçekleştirdiler. Çeşitli yardım organizasyonları ile beraber kültürel alanda da daha aktif bir şekilde var olarak hem kurumsal imajlarını toplumun gözünde konsolide edecek politikalar ürettiler. Bu bağlamda, kültürel alanının en entelektüel faaliyetleri olan müze ve sergi çalışmaları, burjuvazinin halkla iletişim kurup imajını yüceltmenin aracı olarak kullanıldı.

1980'lerde serbest piyasa ekonomisine geçilmesi, kültürel alanın devlet tekelinden ayrışarak aynı zamanda burjuvazinin de dahil olduğu yeni bir kültür dinamiği yaratmıştı. Bu bağlamda, devlet söylemi haline gelen Türk-İslam Sentezi müzecilik alanını tek başına domine eden bir etkiye sahip değildir. Kültürel alana burjuvazinin de dahil olması, toplumsal hafızanın burjuvazinin değerleri, zevkleri ve çıkarları doğrultusunda şekillenmesini getirdi. Dolayısıyla, kültürün burjuvazi tarafından metalaştırılarak sadece devletin kontrol ettiği bir alan olmasından uzaklaşmasıyla oldukça çeşitli bir söylem niteliği kazandı. 1980 sonrası kültürel alanının devlet dışı söylemler tarafından şekillenmesi bir noktada erken Cumhuriyet döneminden ayrışan bir özellik yaratmıştır. Bu özelliğiyle de 1980'ler sonrası gelişen müze politikaları özgün bir karaktere sahiptir.

Türkiye'nin ilk özel müzeleri arasında önemli bir yere sahip Sadberk Hanım Müzesi ve Sakıp Sabancı Müzesi özelinde düşünüldüğünde özel koleksiyon müzelerinin, ulus-devletlerin kullandığı formatta makbul vatandaş kimliği yaratmak gibi bir alt metni olmayıp, burjuvazinin tarihi ve kültürel değerleri koruduğunun bir sembolü olarak düşünülebilir. Bu bağlamda, devlet müzeleri ve özel müzelerin kimlik inşası amaçları birbirinden ayrılır. Devletin kültür söylemi müzelerde, toplumu makbul vatandaş kimliğine dönüştürmeyi amaçlarken özel müzeler daha çok kurucusunun kimliğini, kitlelelerde saygın kimseler haline getirmeyi amaçlar.

Bu bağlamda, 1980'den sonra devletin kültür politikasının yanında özel müzeler ve sergiler devletin kültür söyleminden azade söylemler ürettiler. Fakat bunun yanında, devletin Türk-İslam Sentezi merkezli kültürel söylemini inşa etmeye yardım eden bir ortam da oluştu. Örneğin, iktidarın tarih algısını ve kimlik politikalarını en derin hissettiren hafıza mekanlarından olan Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi ve Türk Tarihi Tanıtım Merkezi ve Çanakkale Destanı Tanıtım Merkezi, Oruçoğlu Holding'in tarihe armağanları olarak sunulmuştu. Bu bağlamda tasarlanmakta olan ve hayata geçirilen müze örnekleri, bazı burjuvazi unsurlarının iktidarın kültür söylemini desteklediğini ve iktidarın politikalarıyla uyumlu projeler üreterek kültürel alanı domine ettiğini gösteriyor.

Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin neoliberal düzene eklemlenmesi kültürel alanda çeşitlilik yaratıp tek hakim anlatının Türk-İslam Sentezi merkezli şekillenmesini engellese de aynı zamanda belli sermaye gruplarının iktidarın kültür söylemine hizmet ettiği açıktır. Bazı sermaye grupları devlet kimliğini Batı'nın gözünde yüceltmek, kültürel değerleri korumak, çağı yakalayarak Türkiye'nin entelektüel yönünü göstermeyi liberal milliyetçilik çizgisinde vurgularken, kimi sermaye gruplarıysa iktidarın Neo-Osmanlıcı, muhafazakar kültürel kodlarını himaye edecek politikalar geliştirmiştir. Bu sebeple, burjuvazinin kültürel alana dahil olması bir tarafta devletin müze ve sergi politikalarına alternatif bir anlatının oluşmasını sağlarken diğer taraftan çeşitli pragmatik sebepler çerçevesinde burjuvazi, devletin kültür söylemini toplumsal alanda inşa etmesini destekleyecek bir pratik çerçevesinde hareket etmiştir.

Bu bağlamda, neoliberal kültür politikaları, müze ve sergi alanında dominasyon sağlayarak yeni bir dinamizm üretti. Devletin kültürel alandaki varlığı azalarak

devam ederken kültürel politikalar büyük sermaye gruplarının da kontrol ettiği bir forma evrildi. 1980'lere kadar devlet tekelinde olan kültürel alan sermaye sahiplerinin zevklerine, tarih anlayışlarına ve pragmatik çıkarlarına hizmet eden bir özellik kazandı. Bu bağlamda, tezde örnek gösterilen Sabancı, Koç, Eczacıbaşı, Oruçoğlu Holding gibi örnekler sermayenin kültürel alana dahil olduğu ve hangi amaçlarla kullanıldığını özetler niteliktedir. Fakat bu örneklerin yanında tüm dünyada olduğu gibi Türkiyede de özel müze sayısında ciddi bir artış gözleniyor.

Müzeler 1980'lerde başlayan neoliberalleşme ile birlikte kitlesel bir araca dönüşmüş; 20. yüzyılın başında yüksek kültürün entelektüel bir aracı olma niteliğini yitirerek, küreselleşen dünya düzeninde turizmin ve sermayenin hizmetinde, kültürel mirasın ticarileşmesinde önemli bir rol üstlenmiştir. Böylece 1980 sonrası kültürel alanda bir tarafta devlet söylemi tarafından üretilen kimlik politikaları bir tarafta özel müzelerin ürettiği kültürel kodlar kitle hafızasını şekillendirme sürecine ortak oldu. Kimi zaman özel müzeler devletin kültürel anlatısına zıt söylemler üretse de kimi zaman Oruçoğlu Holding örneğinde olduğu üzere bir işbirliği içerisinde hareket edildi.

Tezin kültürün metaştırılması kısmındaki bir diğer mesele ise Yerelleşme ve Küreselleşme Arasında Türk Müzeciliği başlığıyla ele alınmıştır. 1980'lerde neoliberal düzene entegre olma çabası sadece Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir gibi büyük şehirlerin küreselleşmesini değil aynı zamanda anadolu kentlerinin de kendi markasını yaratma sürecini getirdi. Yerel yönetimlerin siyasi ve ekonomik alanda daha aktif olmasıyla beraber belediyeler kent imajı yaratma konusunda bir misyon edindiler. Bu bağlamda, neoliberal düzende kimlik yaratımı yerellik ve globallik kavramları arasında ekonomik ve politik konjonktürler tarafından şekillenen bir gerçekliğe sahiptir. Bu çerçevede, müzelerin yerellik ve globallik ekseninde nasıl yorumlandığı, müzelerin nasıl küresel tüketimin bir parçası haline getirildiği ve kent markası yaratmanın toplumsal hafızayı nasıl etkilediğine odaklanılarak aynı zamanda kültütün yerel bileşenler tarafından metalaştırılıp turizm öznesi haline getirilmesi meselesi analiz edilmiştir.

Kent müzelerinin kurulması kent tarihinin toplumla bütünleştirilmesi, kente yeni gelenlerin ve turistlerin kenti tanıması, kente ait kolektif bellek unsurlarının

bireylerin zihninde şekillendirilmesinin sağlanması gibi pekçok açıdan önemli bir kültür hareketidir. Türkiye özelinde, devletin kültür söylemlerinin yarattığı homojen kimlik anlayışı yerelleşme unsurlarının gelişmesini engelleyerek kent müzeleri gibi çeşitli kuruluşların faaliyet göstermesi meselesinin geç karşılık bulmasına sebep oldu. Fakat 1990'lardan itibaren globalleşen kültürel alan ve müzecilik faaliyetleri yerel yönetimlerin marka değeri oluşturması amacıyla araçsallaştırıldı.

Bu bağlamda, yerel olan kültürel unsurların kamuoyunun zihninde birer imaja dönüştürülmesi meselesi, müzelerin yerel kültürel değerlerle harmanlanarak sunulmasını ve kent imajını yücelten unsurlar olarak metalaştırılmasını getirdi. Bu doğrultuda, Kültürel mirasın somutlaştırıldığı toplumsal hafıza mekanları, hem üreten hem de tüketen kitlelerin karşılıklı entegrasyonunu içererek bir iletişim aracı haline geldi. Bu sebeple yerel yönetimler hem kitlelerin hafızalarını yönlendirecek hem de endüstriyelleşen kültürel anlatıdan devşirecekleri imaj dolayısıyla pragmatik anlamda kazanç yarattılar. Böylece, Toplumun yüzyıllardır inşa ettiği değerleri ve tarihi unsurları içeren kültürel anlatı müze faaliyetleri vasıtasıyla korunduğu ve gelecek nesillere aktarıldığı gibi aynı zamanda yöneticilerin ve yerli halkın ekonomik sermayesinin bir aracı haline geldi. Bu kapsamda, tezin son kısmında, kültürel miras değerlerinin kent müzeleri bağlamında nasıl turizm nesnesi haline getirildiği analiz edebilmek amacıyla Sakıp Sabancı Mardin Kent Müzesi, Kadir Has Kent ve Mimar Sinan Müzesi, Bursa Kent Müzesi ve Gaziantep Kent Müzesi örneklerinin içerikleri incelenerek analiz edilmiştir.

Yerel yönetimler, kent müzeleri gibi kültürel hafıza mekanları sayesinde, Kültür Başkenti, Medeniyetlerin Beşiği gibi söylemler üreterek şehir kimliklerine küresel pazarlara entegre olmasını sağlayacak bir özellik kazandırmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, kent müzeleri küresel kültür dünyasında karşılık bulan entelektüel hafıza mekanları olarak araçsallaştırılmaktadır. Böylece, kent müzeleri sayesinde her şehir tarihi değerlerini müzecilik bağlamında yorumlayarak yerel bir söylem dili geliştirmektedir. Şehirlerin küresel anlamda pazarlanmasını sağlayacak imaj üretimleri kimi zaman belediyeler tarafından inşa edilirken kimi zaman büyük sermaye gruplarının hayırseverlik vizyonu adı altında belediyeleri desteklemesiyle üretilmektedir.

Bu bağlamda, örneğin Sakıp Sabancı, Kadir Has gibi işinsanları globalleşmiş kentlerde yatırım yaparken aynı zamanda Anadolu kentlerinde de kültürel yatırımlar yaparak Anadolu kentlerinin markalaşmasında öncü rol üstlendiler. Bu iki sermaye destekli kent müzesi örneği, küresel ekonomik düzenin büyüttüğü burjuvazinin yerel kültürel kimliklerin inşa edilmesinde de rol aldığını göstererek, global kültürel dinamiklerin yerel düzlemde nasıl karşılık bulduğunu gözler önüne seriyor. Bu bağlamda, Sakıp Sabancı Kent Müzesi, Mardin'in çokkültürlü, çok dinli yapısının kültürel zenginliğini yüceltecek bir anlatımla şekillenirken, Kadir Has Kent Müzesi, Kayseri'nin yerel değerlerini önceleyerek değerlendirmeyi amaç edinmiştir. Böylece, her şehrin kendine has kültürel dokusu neoliberal kentsel politikalarla şekillendirilerek yurt içi ve yurt dışında değerini arttıracak bir imaj yaratılmış oluyordu. Özel müze statüsündeki kent müzeleri kimi zaman bizzat işinsanlarının destekleriyle inşa edilirken kimi zaman bizzat belediyelerin girişimiyle kendi şehir imajlarını yaratmanın, şehrin turistik değerini arttırmanın bir aracı olarak kullanılıyordu.

Yerel kültürel değerlerin ve tarihsel unsurların şehir markası yaratma amaçlı kullanımına bir diğer örnek olarak da Bursa Kent Müzesi verilebilir. Bursa Kent Müzesi, Türkiyede açılan ilk kent müzesi olarak tarihi ve kültürel değerlerini hem yerelleşme hem de globalleşme bağlamında bu müzede somutlaştırmıştır. Bursa'nın tarihi geçmişi dolayısıyla Osmanlı tarihini yoğun bir şekilde merkeze alan bir anlatımı vardır.

Milliyetçi hafıza kodlarının tekrardan üretildiği bir diğer kent müzesi örneği de Gaziantep Kent Müzesi'dir. Türk tarihinde önemli yere sahip tarihi figürlerin balmumu heykellerinin bulunması ve tarih anlatımının milli mücadele sürecine odaklandığı bu müze, kent müzelerinin yerel kültürel tarih unsurlarını merkeze alarak yüceltmesinin bir örneği olarak düşünülebilir.

Bu bağlamda, kolektif hafıza ve kolektif hafızayı şekillendiren kültürel miras öğeleri modern kurumların en entelektüel formlarından olan müzelerde sistematik hale getirilerek kurumsallaştırıldı. Kültürün kurumsallaşma süreci sürekli değişimlere uğrayarak kimi zaman devlet kimi zaman özel sektör tarafından araçsallaştırıldı.

Fakat kültürel alanın en büyük dönüşümlerinden biri globalleşen dünya düzenin yarattığı neoliberal kent politikaları sayesinde gerçekleşti. Neoliberal kent politikaları, kentlerin kendi markasını yaratıp geçmişlerini global markete ve turizme eklemlenmenin aracı olarak kullanmasını kurguladı. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin kültürel miras unsurları ve tarihi değerleri bir meta haline getirilip müzelerde imaj yaratımının bir parçası oldular. Bu çerçevede, Kent müzeleri kentlerin özgün tarihi bellekleri çerçevesinde şekillendirilerek imaj yaratımının bir parçası haline geldiler. Bu durum kent müzelerinin zengin ve birbirinden bağımsız içeriklere sahip olmasını sağladı.

Sonuç olarak, kurumsallaşmış hafıza politikalarının merkezi olarak sergi ve müzecilik faaliyetleri tarih boyunca siyasi, sosyal, ekonomik pek çok faktörden etkilenerek dönemin siyasi ve ekonomik koşulları tarafından şekillendirilirler. Bu sebeple iktidarın kimlik söylemlerinin değişmesi, neoliberal ekonomik politikalar, globalleşen dünyaya eklemlenme çabası gibi gelişmeler müze ve sergi faaliyetlerinin ilk ortaya çıktığı zamanlardaki formdan uzaklaşmasını sağlamıştır. Bu tezin temel amaçlarından biri de müzecilik alanındaki dönüşümün temel sebeplerini anlamladırarak müze ve sergi faaliyetlerinin politik anlamdan, kimlik politikalarından ve ekonomik koşullardan azade düşünülemeyeceğini ortaya koymaktır. Bu bağlamda; Türk-İslam Sentezi, burjuvazinin kültürel alana dahil olması ile müzecilik alanındaki gelişmeler ve neoliberal kent politikaları ekseninde yaratılmaya çalışılan kent markaları bağlamında kent müzeleri analiz edilerek 1980 sonrası müze ve sergi faaliyetlerinin etkilendiği dinamizmler üzerinde durulmuştur.

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