THE HISTORICAL FORMATION OF THE MODERN MILITARY: LEGACIES OF THE ANCIEN ARMY, REVOLUTIONARY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES

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ABSTRACT

THE HISTORICAL FORMATION OF THE MODERN MILITARY: LEGACIES OF THE ANCIEN ARMY, REVOLUTIONARY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES

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According to the evolutionary conceptualization, the modern military is a product of historical progress achieved by technical innovations in weaponry, the adoption of rationalism to organize armed forces, and the development of scientific approaches to warfare. However, the evolutionary conceptualization, which implies progress, is insufficient to explain why the organization of the armed forces in their relationship to the political structure is formed in distinct ways in advanced modern states. As a symptom of the limitations of this conceptualization, the thesis of exceptionalism or

particularity appears in examinations of examples not fitting the given definition. The thesis problematizes the modern army itself with questions on its class character to overcome these limitations and seeks to reveal the class tensions characterizing the modern army and its historical formation, concealed by the evolutionary conceptualization, by framing them within the capitalist social relations' contradictory development. The Open Marxist position in the Marxist state debate provides enabling tools thanks to their specifying the complex relationship of the political and economic forms of capitalist domination, and notifying the French Revolution of 1789 as a critical rupture in the historical development of capitalist relations. By resting on Simon Clarke's theorizing on forms of capitalist domination as the object of class struggle, and Heide Gerstenberger's stress on the specificity of the bourgeois form of state power, the thesis develops the categories of ancien army, revolutionary army, and counter-revolutionary army to study the modern military and the historical process forming it by focusing on their contradictory features.

Keywords: modern military, modern state, capitalist state, French Revolution, class struggle

ÖZ

MODERN ORDUNUN TARİHSEL OLUŞUMU: ESKİ ORDU, DEVRİMCİ VE KARŞI DEVRİMCİ GÜÇLERİN MİRASLARI

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Modern ordu, evrimsel kavramsallaştırmaya göre, silahlardaki teknik yenilikler, silahlı kuvvetleri organize etmek için rasyonalizmin benimsenmesi ve savaşa bilimsel yaklaşımların geliştirilmesiyle elde edilen tarihsel ilerlemenin bir ürünüdür. Ancak, ilerlemeyi ima eden evrimsel kavramsallaştırma, silahlı kuvvetlerin siyasi yapıyla ilişkisi içinde örgütlenmesinin gelişmiş modern devletlerde neden farklı şekillerde oluşabileceğini açıklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Verili tanıma uymayan örneklerin incelenmesinin istisnailik ya da özgünlük tezleri ile yürütülmesi bu kavramsallaştırmanın kısıtlarını işaret eden bir semptomdur. Tez, bu kısıtları aşmak

için modern ordunun kendisini sınıfsal karakterine ilişkin sorularla sorunsallaştırmakta ve evrimsel kavramsallaştırmanın gizlediği modern orduyu ve tarihsel oluşumunu karakterize eden sınıfsal gerilimleri, kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin çelişkili gelişimi içinde çerçeveleyerek ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Marxist devlet tartışmasındaki Açık Marksist pozisyon, kapitalist tahakkümün siyasi ve ekonomik biçimlerinin karmaşık ilişkisini vurgulaması ve 1789 Fransız Devrimi'ni kapitalist ilişkilerin tarihsel gelişiminde kritik bir kırılma olarak tanımlamaları sayesinde istisnailik ve özgünlük tezlerinin ötesine geçmek için elverişli araçlar sunmaktadır. Simon Clarke'ın sınıf mücadelesinin nesnesi olarak kapitalist tahakküm biçimlerini kuramsallaştırmasına ve Heide Gerstenberger'in devlet tahakkümünün burjuva biçiminin özgüllüğüne yaptığı vurguya dayanan tez, modern orduyu ve onu oluşturan tarihsel süreci çelişkili özelliklerine odaklanarak incelemek için eski ordu, devrimci ordu ve karşı-devrimci ordu kategorilerini geliştirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: modern ordu, modern devlet, kapitalist devlet, Fransız Devrimi, sınıf mücadelesi

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Lastly, my dear one, Damla Kuru. I regret that I have made it hard for her to have a normal life for her, too. Surely, my disassociations and living in a different time zone

are not her favorite things about me, but if she was not there to listen, I am not sure if I could persist that long. I will always be grateful to Damla for her reassuring presence throughout, but I am not sorry for treating her as a tester for my rawest arguments and an audience of my personal podcast on the most niche information I learned the day before. We are even now.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

- Watkins why did you join the army?

- For the water-skiing and for the travel, sir. And not for the killing, sir.

- Watkins are you a pacifist?

- No sir, I'm not a pacifist, sir. I'm a coward.[1]

1.1. Problem

The analysis of the modern military is one of the least developed research areas in Marxist studies on capitalist politics and the state. This has become in nowhere more obvious than in Turkey, where the civilianization reforms failed to deliver the high expectations that liberal theories on military politics attach to them, namely demilitarization and democratization, but Marxists could propose no proper alternative explanation why this has been the case even though they have criticized these liberal approaches due to their neglect of class dynamics in the analysis of the military. This is indeed a very significant analytical and political weakness in a period in which the

[1] A silly line from a Monty Python sketch "Full Frontal Nudity," *Monty Python's Flying Circus*, December 7, 1969.

arguable civilian exit from the military tutelage has turned out to be an integral element of the so-called authoritarian re-structuring of the state, a new path of militarism appears to develop in the image of Erdoğan the 'civilian President' in uniforms, and within such a political context, a substantial transformation has been going on in the Turkish military towards its professionalization.

The initial inspiration of this thesis had been indeed to propose an alternative class-based understanding of such transformations in the Turkish military. However, the overview of the hitherto developed Marxist approaches to the capitalist states' coercive apparatuses manifested that they are incapable of proposing appropriate class-based analytical tools to help one make sense of such contemporary transformations in the military. This realization re-shaped the aim of the thesis as one to contribute to the rather limited Marxist endeavors to this end[2] instead of focusing on the historical developments in Turkey.

The reader might still detect this earlier plan to focus on the Turkish case from the observations and comments made and examples given particularly during the overview of the liberal Weberian approaches to military politics as well as between the lines of the text. This is not considered to be a problem for the internal consistency of the thesis, as the so-called 'modernization of the Turkish military' has always been a

[2] Funda Hülagü's study on the neo-liberal transformation of the police force in Turkey and Çağlar Dölek's on the emergent issue of private security companies rest on similar observations. Funda Hülagü, "Restoring Class Power Over the Police: The Role of the International in Neoliberal Police Reform in Turkey" (PhD Thesis, Ankara, METU, 2011); Çağlar Dölek, "Privatization of Security and the Transformation of the Modern Bourgeois State in the Neoliberal Era: The Case of Turkey" (Master's Thesis, Ankara, METU, 2011). For an outline for a critique of the theorization of the security that these studies develop: Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, Çağlar Dölek, and Funda Hülagü, "Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmalarının Marksist Eleştirisine Katkı: Devlet, Zor ve Sınıf Mücadelesi Bağlamında 'Güvenliği' Yeniden Düşünmek," *Praksis* 40 (2016): 9–40. For an analysis of the transformation of security the transformation of the state under AKP rule: Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, Çağlar Dölek, and Funda Hülagü, "The Transformation of Internal Security and of the State in Turkey during the AKP Rule: A Class-Based Analysis," *Austrian Journal of Development Studies* 32, no. 1/2 (2016): 21–41.

significant focus of the liberal approaches to military politics in general due to the centrality attached to Turkey in the analysis of the processes of modernization worldwide.

In its search for an alternative Marxist problematization of the military in capitalism, this thesis will firstly investigate the historical process in which Weberianism has risen to become the dominant paradigm in military politics after the World War II even though Weber did not really theorize the military *per se*. Identifying later the Weberian influences in the Marxist analyses of Althusser and Poulantzas on the repressive apparatuses of the capitalist state, and reflecting on the important but insufficient Political Marxist critique of Althusserianism, the thesis will then focus on Heide Gerstenberger's historical studies on the development of the bourgeois form of the capitalist state to rethink it from the perspective of the military politics.

On the basis of these investigations, it will ultimately argue that a revolutionary moment targeting pre-revolutionary military forms, the major example being the French Revolution of 1789, is the main determining factor in the formation of modern militaries, rather than the necessities of innovations in weaponry or of capitalist production. While this argument is primarily based on Gerstenberger's argument on the ancien regime's being the pre-condition of the bourgeois state form, the categorization as such is inadequate to reflect on the post-revolutionary turmoil.

To overcome this, the thesis will develop two new categories, the revolutionary army and the counter-revolutionary army to make sense of the historical processes and class tensions that constituted the modern military. In short, the modern military is discussed as an outcome of the conflictual relationship of the ancien army, revolutionary army, and the counter-revolutionary army.

The Marxist critique of the liberal perspectives to military politics would say that they take the state-civil society differentiation as absolute in neglect of the capitalist relations of production constituting both of these spheres. One of the main problems of the liberal military tutelage regime analysis, which might also be counted as an example for 'the fallacy of coupism'[3] for instance, is indeed this neglect as the presence of civilian control in a specific country is judged solely by the absence of military coups there. Such liberal analyses ignore many other forms enabling soldiers to influence civilian politicians let alone engaging in a dialogue with critical approaches that question the militarization of politics. They approach the military as an anomaly to be erased from the political sphere even though their proponents have never been anti-militarist or pacifist seeking for the withering away of the man with guns. They advocate for a professional military that would deliver fighting necessities effectively as ordered by civilians, while it is hard to find any questioning regarding the political implications of constructing a professional army as an apolitical and technical institution, or on how a civilianized military politics would function.

Risa A. Brooks' review of recent studies emerging in the field of the civil-military relations indicate that the problem encountered in Turkish case is not unique. She calls normalizing the military's role in politics by going beyond an understanding of the military as an exceptional actor possessing abilities to oust political leaders, and draws a specific attention to the Arab Spring that demonstrated that the military may also play a significant role by not intervening in favor of the autocrats.[4] Identifying various

[3] Aurel Croissant et al., "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-Ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies," *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (October 2010): 950–75; Risa A. Brooks, "Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield," *Annual Review of Political Science* 22, no. 1 (May 11, 2019): 379–98.

[4] Brooks, "Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield."

ways that the military can pursue political activities and locating them within the wider political context are crucial in terms of overcoming deficiencies of approaching the military politics with such assumptions that the military is a purely technical institution and soldiers' involvement to political processes is an anomaly within a democratic structure, normative predispositions fetishizing the civilian within the civil-military relations as ultimately democratic. However, such an approach would also fall short of "normalizing" if the discussion is reduced to the political inclinations of the military elites only. Several questions problematized to this end in Turkey have been, for instance, controversies between field-promoted and academy-trained officers to explain the transformation at the turn of the 20th century,[5] the pro-Prussian and pro-American generals on the question of the direction of military restructuring after the World War II,[6] the guardians and rulers on the topic of the post-coup political restructuring,[7] the traditional guardians and pro-European reformists on the issue of civilianization,[8] or the Atlanticists and Eurasianists for the events related to the 2016

[5] Ahmet Turan Alkan, *II. Meşrutiyet Devrinde Ordu ve Siyaset*, 2nd ed. (1992; repr., İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2013); Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 2 (1997): 151–66; Murat Belge, *Militarist Modernleşme - Almanya, Japonya ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: İletisim Yayınları, 2011).

[6] Doğan Akyaz, *Askerî Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi: Hiyerarşi Dışı Örgütlenmeden Emir Komuta Zincirine* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002); Serhat Güvenç, "ABD Askeri Yardımı ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü: 1942-1960," in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 255–84; Serhat Güvenç and Mesut Uyar, "Lost in Translation or Transformation? The Impact of American Aid on the Turkish Military, 1947–60," *Cold War History* 22, no. 1 (January 2, 2022): 59–77.

[7] George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," *Middle East Journal* 19, no. 1 (1965): 54–66; William M. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968; repr., New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

[8] Ersel Aydınlı, "Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish 'Inner State,'" *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (June 2011): 227–39; Metin Heper, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (2011): 241–52; Yaprak Gürsoy, "The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy of the Turkish Military," *South European Society and Politics* 16, no. 2 (June 2011): 293–308; Yaprak Gürsoy, "The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: Democratization through Coup Plots?," *Democratization* 19, no. 4 (August 2012): 735–60; Ersel

coup attempt.[9] Interest in such controversies reflect scholars' dissatisfaction with the unitarist approach to the study of the military politics; yet, they do not provide an account of the social and political context giving rise to the emergence of such cliques, which are examined via soldiers' background information or alleged ideological affinities. That is to say, they are insufficient to normalize the politics within the military politics as long as they rest on the understanding of the military as an autonomous agency with decisive capability to determine and structure the wider political and social context.

1.2. Formulating Questions for a Critical Study of the Military Politics

This thesis is an effort to redirect the focus to the military itself in a way not to produce an isolated military sphere, but to bound it to the social and political relations by framing the military as a social form. The task necessitates moving beyond core questions addressed by liberal scholars of military politics on the military's political role or position because of the inherent normative stance they pose, which limits the problematization of the actual by its divergence from pre-determined ideals.[10]

We can start this investigation by formulating fundamental questions making the military an object of inquiry rather than its relationship to something else. What is the

Aydınlı, "The Reform-Security Dilemma in Democratic Transitions: The Turkish Experience as Model?," *Democratization* 20, no. 6 (October 2013): 1144–64.

[9] Metin Gürcan, "Bir Daha Asla! Ama Nasıl? 15 Temmuz Sonrası Türkiye'de Devlet ve Ordu" (İstanbul: İstanbul Policy Center, April 2017); Metin Gürcan and E. Fuat Keyman, "15 Temmuz'dan On Beş Ay Sonra: Ordunun Reformu, Devletin Dönüşümü" (İstanbul: İstanbul Policy Center, October 2017).

[10] Rut Diamint, "A New Militarism in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 4 (2015): 155–68; Risa A. Brooks, "Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States," *International Security* 44, no. 4 (April 2020): 7–44; David Kuehn and Aurel Croissant, *Routes to Reform: Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in the Third Wave* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).

military, why is it still there? Obviously, the military is the main institution for the organization of violence that would sort out who would assume responsibility in life-and-death exigencies that are political in character. Without any doubt, the persistence of war in human affairs is the main factor behind the persistence of the military. Whatever function or role is attached to the military, it is essentially about killing people, at least causing physical harm or posing the threat of it; thus, its constituents, i.e., soldiers and officers, are expected to reach an excellence in capabilities of using lethal means in an organized manner, and to deliver the task when confronting a similar lethal organization, conditions of which are nothing but unpredictable and open to unintended consequences. In short, "[w]ar is hell, and militaries train soldiers for hell."[11] It is a justified speculation that on a distant future when the war ceases to exist as an applied practice altogether, the military would wither away accordingly; yet, the possibility of war persists even in the absence of war. Apart from some micro states, all currently existing states still have militaries as an instrument arguably to avoid a situation like the Hobbesian state of nature.

How is violence organized? Who formulates the political objective that is to be delivered via lethal means, and how? Who assumes lethal tasks that many would consider to be unacceptable under normal conditions? Who bares costs, who collects benefits? It is hard to put forward a golden standard to be applied in response to these questions. Various forms of military organizations observed in different historical episodes and in different geographies indicate the variety in responses to these questions. One can deduce them in a simple comparison of ancient and modern military forms. Primary actors assuming lethal tasks are not raiders, semi-god heroes,

[11] Michael Mann, *On Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023), 12.

soldiers of fortune, nobles with known bloodline, or Don Quixote-like warriors, but unknown soldiers recruited among commoners and organized in highly sophisticated bureaucratic institutions. “[E]very thirteenth-century noble household owned swords, but no twentieth-century household owns an aircraft craft.”[12] “The knight of olden days was the owner of his horse and his armour… The modern army came into being when … the soldier and the officer … ceased to own the means of conducting war.”[13] Armies are not anymore *ad hoc* formations for a specific occurrence but permanent bodies not just delivering lethal tasks but also regulating an individual’s abstract relationship to the political community. Soldiers are not private individuals participating to an army, but part of a collectivity, of a state.[14] The presence of a political leader in a warzone as a warrior, a common practice encountered throughout history, is now beyond unthinkable. “[T]he central government assume[s] the role not only of the leader but of the organizer of people's war via measures” enabling the state to penetrate domestic civilian life and to wage well-organized people's war.[15] The knowledge on conduct of warfare is not derived from the art of war that could be utilized by ones possessing exceptional skills; but the military science implying universality in a sense any capable one could excel with a proper education and training.[16]

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[12] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 84.

[13] Max Weber, “Socialism,” in *Weber: Political Writings*, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (1918; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 280–81.

[14] Christopher Adair-Toteff, *Werner Sombart and the “Spirit” of Modern Capitalism: Rediscovering a Classic* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024), 80.

[15] Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, “Introduction,” in *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871*, ed. Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (1997; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7–8.

[16] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957; repr., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 11–18.

How and why has the organized violence undergone such transformations? What is the significance of the *modern* in the modern military making it a global phenomenon? We can observe that liberal scholars of military politics are in a consensus on understanding of the modern military with reference to Weberian notion based on the state monopoly on the legitimate use of physical violence achieved by bureaucratization. Another consensus is on the argument that political changes and social transformations observed since the 19th century came to existence by the adoption and endorsement of the new ruling strata of these transformations who then favored further aspects of modernization and challenged traditional ruling elites as well as the traditional society.[17] Despite this historical account, the ahistoricity of the Weberian notion of the modern military as an offspring of his rationalization thesis has to be duly noted here as Weber naturalizes the modern state along with capitalism as final forms of progress in reason and freedom emancipating humanity from constraints of tradition and magic.[18]

Political developmentalist versions of the Weberian modernization perspectives have been optimistic on the further advancement of rationalization on a global scale, in other words, the replication of the Western path in non-Western context, and attached a particular importance to Turkey for advancements in the development of secular

[17] Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics* 13, no. 1 (October 1960): 19–44; Dankwart A. Rüstow and Robert E. Ward, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1965); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," *Daedalus* 102, no. 1 (1973): 169–90; Metin. Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Beverley: Eothen Press, 1985); Ahmet Insel, "Bir Toplumsal Sınıf Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri," in *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu*, ed. Ahmet Insel and Ali Bayramoğlu (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2004), 384; Tanel Demirel, "Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 1 (2004): 127–50.

[18] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View* (1999; repr., London: Verso, 2002), 191–92.

institutions dismantling traditional ones.[19] Critiques, however, have formulated their discontent by reminding Weber's definition of rationalization as a uniquely occidental process that led him, as they argue, propose patrimonialism as a distinct category applicable to the orient.[20] The failure of civilianization in bringing democracy to Turkey requires the reconsideration of such liberal arguments, which is not indeed the task of this thesis.

The development of a critical Marxist approach should be framed primarily as a challenge to the Weberian rationalization thesis by addressing its naturalizing aspects. Thus, the main question is to be reformulated as *what the class character of the modern military is.* In answering this question, the present historical materialist tradition on state might provide some help as it is rich in revealing the class-bias in categories applied by Weber[21] and Weberians[22], besides reminding how they were vocal about it. However, this tradition is unfortunately also rich in the non-problematic integration of the Weberian notions in historical materialist analysis thanks to the Althusserian structuralism and the statist-institutionalist influence. Peculiarly, rather than challenging it, efforts have concentrated on developing a class-based analysis co-

[19] Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force"; John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: The Free Press, 1964); Rüstow and Ward, *Japan and Turkey*; Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*; Cyril Edwin Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization; a Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper, 1966).

[20] İdris Küçükömer, *Batılaşma ve Düzenin Yabancılaşması* (1968; repr., Ankara: Bağlam Yayınları, 2007); Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?"; Ahmet İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kıskacında Türkiye: Kalkınma Sürecinde Devletin Rolü*, trans. Ayşegül Sönmezay (1984; repr., İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1996); Heper, *The State Tradition*.

[21] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*; Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (1995; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jan Rehmann, *Max Weber: Modernisation as Passive Revolution: A Gramscian Analysis*, trans. Max Henninger, Historical Materialism Book Series 78 (2013; repr., Leiden: Brill, 2015).

[22] Galip L. Yalman, *Transition to Neo-Liberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s.* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009).

working with Weberian concepts by re-directing the emphasis on the modern military's contributions to the development and reproduction of capitalism, which Althusser formulated as "securing by force (physical or otherwise) the political conditions of the reproduction of relations of production which are in the last resort relations of exploitation."[23] Poulantzas' later reformulation reemphasized the original position by stating that the institutional materiality of the state and pacification of the economic sphere are depended on the national army's monopolistic grasp on the use of physical force, and added, the form of it reflects the social relations in a way concealing interests of dominant classes and concessions imposed by the popular struggles.[24] The Weberian influence preserved within the works of Althusser and Poulantzas is reflected on the analyses of military-related events with a consequentialist approach finding causality in the necessities of the capitalist development and maintenance of the capitalist accumulation[25] and a focus on the place of the military in the ruling class composition dictating a change in the accumulation strategy.[26] In that sense, the adoption of the Weberian notions with a class-wise re-interpretation may not give the expected results. This shortcoming could be overcome if the historiography that Weber relied on when developing such categories is also addressed in a reformulated

[23] Louis Althusser, "Appendix 2: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, trans. Ben Brewster (1971; repr., London: Verso, 2014), 232–72.

[24] Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, trans. Patrick Camiller (1978; repr., London: Verso, 2000), 76–86.

[25] Sungur Savran, "1960, 1971, 1980: Toplumsal Mücadeleler, Askeri Müdahaleler," in *11. Tez, Altıncı Kitap: Demokrasi, Devlet ve Sınıflar*, Onbirinci Tez 6 (İstanbul: Uluslararası Yayıncılık, 1987), 132–68; Sungur Savran, *Türkiye'de Sınıf Mücadeleleri, vol.1: 1908-1908*, Türkiye'de Sınıf Mücadeleleri 1 (1992; repr., İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2011).

[26] İsmet Akça, "Militarism, Capitalism and the State: Putting the Military in Its Place in Turkey" (PhD Thesis, İstanbul, Boğaziçi University, 2006); İsmet Akça, "Ordu, Devlet ve Sınıflar: 27 Mayıs 1960 Darbesi Örneği Üzerinden Alternatif Bir Okuma Denemesi," in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 351–406.

question: *what is the class character of the modern military and of the historical process bringing in the modern military?*

It is easy to detect the commercialization model in the Weber's narration of the historical development of capitalism[27] whereas it is challenging to find a well-structured piece on the historical development of the modern military among Weber's texts apart from some minor comments. It is possible to claim that the model Weber had in mind is articulated best in the military revolution thesis by Michael Roberts. In line with Weber's claim that historical farks of the modern society lay in the secularization of life with the Puritan Reformation, Roberts claims that modern aspects of the society are principally a product of the military revolution which could be possible by the improvements in the military sphere in the 16th and 17th centuries. The application of the scientific breakthrough of the Renaissance, a revolution that became most apparent in the Thirty Years' War[28] facilitated this revolution. Compared to Weber's rationalization thesis, Roberts' thesis is much more technological determinist in its account for the historical development of the modern state as it emphasizes that the scientific approach to the warfare developed and adopted in the North-Western Europe functioned effectively in empowering the bourgeoisie at the expense of feudal aristocrats, giving rise to the rule of meritocratic principles and democratic ideas.[29] Basic premises of the military revolution thesis, as an account for the rise of the West, is reproduced in the defensive modernization thesis giving an account of the non-Western world with references to decline and reaction, in which Prussia and Ottoman

[27] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 17–21; Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, 146–78.

[28] Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (1955; repr., London: Routledge, 2018), 13–36.

[29] Roberts, 24–25.

Empire stand as prime examples. While the military revolution refers to a process triggered mainly by domestic factors, defensive modernization is an argument on the modernization's being a process determined by external relations, i.e., the geopolitical push, which in turn would be the base for arguments on the mis-development or under-development in relevant cases due to the inability of the military-led modernization to replicate social process empowering the bourgeoisie.[30]

The military revolution thesis may generate a debate on the various forms of relationship the modern military establishes with other institutions in different cases, which is indeed the main concern of the civil-military relations approach as well. For, this thesis tends to propose the adoption of the main tenants of the military revolution as success, thus a variable to be referred, even though it is rather limited in addressing the issue of historical varieties observed in military organizations in modern societies. The main examples appearing in Roberts' account are the Netherlands and Sweden, and extension of the argument to French case has valid grounds; but it does not question why the Anglo-Saxon cases diverged from them even though secularization of life and advancement in adopting military techniques were also the case for the former.

Specifically, why have the armies in Anglo-Saxon cases remained *ad hoc* in character to respond specific contingencies but permanent in the Continental Europe? Why did the British military remain unmodernized even until the turn of the 20th century,[31] while conscription or draft and centralized military bureaucracy were practically non-

[30] Kurtuluş Kayalı, *Ordu ve Siyaset: 27 Mayıs-12 Mart* (1994; repr., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000); Belge, *Militarist Modernleşme - Almanya, Japonya ve Türkiye*.

[31] Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 17.

existent in the United States at the same time?[32] For Roberts,[33] it's a non-issue because he tries to place improvements in techniques and technologies in the military sphere at the center in the emergence of the modern Europe as a direct challenge to sociological and economic historical approaches. It was the improvements in firearms and artillery that first helped monarchs' curbing the power of feudal lords and forming absolutist states, and only the increase in the scale of standing armies enabled bourgeoisies to challenge the predominance of the aristocracy.

Only conclusion to be deduced is that modern states share same essential characteristics in Europe, as in the Tilly's argument on European nation-states. According to Tilly, since the war-making and extraction of resources for it were shared concerns of the rulers across Europe, the transformation of the warfare was decisive in the transformation of the statehood; and such a transformation introduced by the military revolution led European states to be transformed into modern national states with centralized bureaucracies, even though extraction strategies may vary.[34] The puzzle lays in, Tilly suggests, the deviation in the third world, in which the development of modern militaries were not followed with civilianization as in Europe.[35] It is no surprise that Tilly's arguments are presented as the proof for the

[32] Richard N. Current, "From Civil War to World Power: Perceptions and Realities 1865-1914," in *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871*, ed. Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (1997; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 636.

[33] Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," 13.

[34] What makes the Third World as a deviation is the absence of civilianization of the government despite professionalization in the military. Civilianization in Europe is a paradoxical by-product of the historical process a result of civilians' proving to be more efficient in extraction and of the concession secured by civilians in negotiations with the ruler. Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (1985; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 170; Tilly, *European States*, 14–15.

[35] Tilly, *European States*, 206.

success of the military revolution thesis in its objective for challenging the social and economic historians.[36]

Critiques of the military revolution thesis point out that aforementioned innovations are exaggerated for the sake of the argument. Geoffrey Parker gives the example of the Spanish army in 16th century, another supposedly declining military, to show techniques argued to be revolutionary were already in use before the so-called revolution.[37] Ottoman Empire poses a similar challenge. Disciplined organization in the use of firearms could be documented in the Janissary practices of the late 16th and early 17th century, if not earlier.[38] Ottoman case is also challenging for Tilly's argument for the causality between capitalist development and military modernization with the mediation of financial relations that it empowered: If the presence of a central standing army, use of mercenaries, centralized bureaucracy subordinating local authorities, and huge financial burden of enormous armies forcing the state to abide capitalist and modern rationality for the sake of efficiency are factors in the development of capitalism as a result of the military revolution,[39] why did capitalism and modern state not emerge in the Ottoman Empire where almost all presented factors were present? Black points out the Western triumphalism ruling the military revolution thesis by reminding that Ottoman Empire's most significant military humiliation was brought

[36] Clifford J. Rogers, "The Military Revolution in History and Historiography," in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (1995; repr., London: Routledge, 2018), 3.

[37] Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Military Revolution, 1560-1660'—A Myth?," in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (1976; repr., London: Routledge, 2018), 39.

[38] Günhan Börekçi, "A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Janissaries Use of Volley Fire During the Long Ottoman—Habsburg War of 1593—1606 and the Problem of Origins," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 59, no. 4 (2006): 407–38.

[39] Tilly, *European States*, 16–28.

by Persia and that such a triumph could not be referred before the industrial revolution, and definitely not in the 17th century.[40] Halil İnalcık, a notable historian of the Ottoman Empire, similarly mentions triumphalism in such accounts as examples of the Orientalist setting of the Western historiography, and challenges the arguments on the inferiority of the orient in the face of the occidental progress by highlighting similar Ottoman achievements like the standing military even though his narrative does not go beyond grudged emphases and relates the emerging lag towards the collapse of the Empire to a decline process stemming from corruption.[41]

Black questions the relevancy of the military revolution thesis further, and proposes French Revolutionary Wars to be a breakthrough in the warfare leading the development of the modern military.[42] Accordingly, for him, rather than tactics or techniques, the increase in the size of the armies should be taken into account in the development of the modern military; thus, the French Revolution appears to be critical in passing a threshold thanks to the invention of the citizen-soldiers.[43] On that account, we should be aware that noting the significance of the French Revolution does not automatically overcome naturalizing aspects since the stress on the army size indicates that the historical process is still assumed to be a linear progress, just like Tilly's

[40] Jeremy Black, *Beyond the Military Revolution: War in the Seventeenth-Century World* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 196.

[41] Historians addressing Janissaries as the first example of the military modernization: Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Dankwart A. Rüstow and Robert E. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 42–63; Halil İnalcik, "Comments on 'Sultanism': Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity'," *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies* 1, no. 1 (1992): 49–72; Cemal Kafadar, "The Ottomans and Europe," in *Handbook of European History 1400-1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, Vol.1: Structures and Assertions*, Handbook of European History 1400-1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 589–635; Mesut Uyar and Edward J Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009).

[42] Black, *Beyond the Military Revolution*, 196.

[43] Black, 110.

understanding of it as an invention of a cheap and effective method for extraction of soldiers from the society compared to the use of mercenaries,[44] or Skocpol's framing it as a replacement of impotent elites by capable ones in the utilization of the state power.[45]

Within this scope, Huntington's intervention could be recalled. Huntington, as a critique of the military revolution thesis, also points out the importance of the French Revolution in the emergence of the modern military, not by emphasizing the innovations brought about by the Revolution itself but the innovations brought about by reactions. He disregards developments before the 19th century on the ground that the bourgeoning military thinking in the 18th century could only be developed as an art of war celebrating heroism, but not as a science.[46] What made the scientific breakthrough, the inspiration for Huntington's model of the objective civilian control, was the Prussian experience. For him, the Prussian generals successfully avoided the France-like politicization of the army and developed the military as a scientific profession that reached its peak after the Bismarck-Moltke initiative. According to Huntington, this initiative successfully concreted the military science in the institution of the General Staff, which played a key role in achieving the military successes that realized the German unification.[47]

At that point, it should be underlined that Weber is on the same page with Huntington in framing the modern military with the type of bureaucratization like the General Staff

[44] Tilly, *European States*, 82–83.

[45] Theda Skocpol, "State and Revolution: Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises in France, Russia, and China," *Theory and Society* 7, no. 1/2 (1979): 7–95.

[46] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 19–29.

[47] Huntington, 30–37.

Prussian generals developed, which the majority of Western states gradually concentrated their efforts to imitate for their military reformations. Huntington's focus on the reactions to the French Revolution provides an insight to a question that Tilly and Skocpol avoids: Why did rulers in Europe not rush for adopting French Revolution's innovation of citizen-army and concentrated their efforts instead to restore pre-revolutionary practices in the early 19th century, but showed a significant interest in adopting Prussian innovations? Huntington's attention to this avoided question and formulation of an ideal type out of Prussian reaction gives a hint for engagement: The significance of the French Revolution could be grasped if only its innovation of the citizen-army is considered together with the reaction's version of it that claimed to develop a non-political and scientific approach. What is the class character of this kind of citizen army? This question could be engaged if they are placed within the paradox of the modern capitalist state with its class-neutral appearance.

1.3. Theoretical Predispositions and Arguments

Studies problematizing the formation of the modern military focus on the rulers' abilities or inabilities to respond geopolitical challenges and to adapt to the changing conditions of the warfare. The underlying assumptions framing such an approach are deterministic in various ways, which lead to the advent of rationalization in Weberian accounts, and the development of capitalism in structuralist Marxist ones. The main problem that emerges is the total disregard for priorities, considerations, expectations, and constraints of rulers as well as those exposed to rulers from a privileged position of knowing what would happen next at the expense of developing transhistorical categories:

> …at each historical moment the actual development of the structure of power contains more or less pronounced elements of historical contingency; more precisely, the development is determined by the life practice of the people of the time. The conditions of this practice are given by the existing forms of material reproduction and appropriation, the form of political power and the dominant conceptions of God and the world. But these general conditions of action – and it is these that carry the 'structural logic' of the development from feudalism to the present day – do not completely determine concrete behaviour.[48]

Speaking of Weber and Weberian perspectives, it is clear that such categories possess class-biases expressed in the commercialization model of the historical development of capitalism, which relates it with human progress that has been realized in the West thanks to the bourgeois' delivering its mission in an active manner. By elevating a meta process like rationalization-cum-commercialization, this model formulates a historically specific social form as a natural path for progress together with accompanying models of backwardness and failures to approach diverging observations. Such naturalization limits thinking over alternatives that are and were possible to be realized, and functions in concealing class-biases under the disguise of objective analysis, out of which normative positions would be developed.

The integration of the Weberian frame into a Marxist analysis, a common practice in approaching the military in order to develop a class-based analysis, can produce mixed outcomes and obscure the objective if it also endorses the commercialization model. When the Weberian notion of the modern state and the modern military is reproduced with an emphasis on their class character as a pro-bourgeois one, an emphasis lacking in Weberian accounts, the result is the production of an instrumentalism that proposes direct class representation in the state structure, by so, the absence of such

[48] Heide Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State*, trans. David Fernbach, Historical Materialism Book Series 15 (1990; repr., Leiden: Brill, 2007), 28–29.

representation in the state structure to be argued as a weakness in the development of capitalist social relations. In that sense, Skocpol is right when she points out that actions taken by the state contradicting with bourgeois interests as a phenomenon weakening the appeal of such Marxist approaches. This does not necessitate though, as Skocpol does, rejecting the state's class-based conception and accepting the modern state formation and emerging inter-state system as autonomous developments in the study of social relations.[49]

We need to turn to Simon Clarke at this point, to clarify one of the most confusing issues in Marxist state analysis, namely the question of how to relate state and class, while complementing his analysis with a discussion on the political form of the capitalist domination as problematized by Gerstenberger.

As Clarke argues, the autonomy of the state emphasized with its detachment from the immediate class interests is the specificity of the capitalist state in maintaining a class domination through a neutral appearance in the face of fundamental contradictions of the capitalist society: The class content of the capitalist state cannot be deduced from the immediate production relations; neither from its enabling particular bourgeois interests[50] nor from its coercive capacity subordinating labor to the social power of the capital.[51] The economic and political power in capitalism is derived "from the contradictory form of capitalist production,"[52] "a form of social production defined by

[49] Skocpol, "State and Revolution," 4–6, 10–11.

[50] Simon Clarke, *Keynesianism, Monetarism and the Crisis of the State* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), 129–31; Simon Clarke, "The State Debate," in *The State Debate*, ed. Simon Clarke (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 166–67.

[51] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 669; Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 143.

[52] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 18.

the appropriation of labour on the basis of property"[53] and commodity circulation,[54] where the power of command over the labor is abstracted in the power of money.[55] The historical development of capitalism has been realized by the destruction of pre-capitalist forms of domination, "which was resolved by the reconstitution of the state on the basis of the radical separation of the state from civil society and of the social power of money from the political power of the state."[56] The class content of the state can be deduced from "the duality of money and the state as the complementary forms of existence of capital-in-general."[57] Yet, this duality does not mean a complete socialization of the capitalist production presupposing "the generalisation of commodity relations with the generalisation of wage labour."[58] This process cannot be approached as an organic evolution of the society that can be understood with the natural rise of a particular class associated with a particular activity. The conflictual character of it stands against its complete realization because "[t]he forms of capitalist domination are themselves the object of class struggle, as capital and the working class confront them as barriers to their own social reproduction," thus, this contradictory totality of the capitalist production itself makes resolutions of class struggle only provisional[59] as it "overflows the institutional forms provided for it" and determine the capitalist state form.[60] The destruction of pre-capitalist forms could be realized

[53] Clarke, 16.

[54] Clarke, 137.

[55] Clarke, 13–14.

[56] Clarke, 24.

[57] Clarke, 132.

[58] Clarke, 137.

[59] Clarke, 23.

[60] Clarke, 149.

dramatically as in France through a revolution, or in less dramatic but a more systematic manner as in England.[61] Even after all pre-capitalist forms of domination are abolished and replaced by contractual relations, the contradictory character of the capitalist state develops over the capital's tendency to carry the accumulation into the global scale and the capitalist state's national base. "[A]s capital tries to overcome the barrier of the limited domestic market" it contradicts with the state's concern about "securing the accumulation of domestic productive capital at a pace sufficient to absorb the surplus population, provide stable or rising wages, and growing public revenues," and state involvement in maintaining the social reproduction at the domestic level encourages capital to engage more on global scale, causing at the same time class struggle to force the state to go beyond the boundaries set by its class character.[62]

Such an approach to the state in capitalism relieves us from formulating political forms accompanying the advancing capitalist social relations, but necessitates to focus on the transformation of class relations in accordance with the advancement of capitalism on the one hand, and the temporary resolution of their contradictions on the other. The critical intervention is the reminder that apart from the protection of the private property, which is enough for the capitalist relations to develop, the logic of capitalism itself does not presuppose any receipt for resolving political struggles; it does not initiate an organic evolutionary process leading to the bourgeois democracy.[63]

[61] Clarke, 133.

[62] Clarke, 150; Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, "Kapitalizm-Demokrasi İlişkisini Simon Clarke'ın Marksist Devlet Kuramı Üzerinden Düşünmek," in *Kapitalizm ve Demokrasi: Bir Zıtlığın Anatomisi*, ed. Cem Cangil and Ömer Turan (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2023), 159–77.

[63] Pınar Bedirhanoğlu and Cenk Saraçoğlu, "Demokrasi Nereye: Neoliberalizm Döneminde Demokrasi-Cumhuriyet Bağının Kopuşu," in *Demokrasi: Kavram, Kurum, Süreç*, ed. Menderes Çınar (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2023), 375–92.

Compared to Marxists engaging in state debate during the Cold War years, it is much easier today speaking of the detachment of capitalism and bourgeois democracy at a moment when even the slave-owning sheikhdoms are integral to the capitalist relations at a global scale. In this manner, Heide Gerstenberger's extensive historical studies are noteworthy for her interventions to such accounts as those of Political Marxists, which define capitalist relations with reference to the free labor, understood as the absence of violence in the moment of appropriation.[64] Gerstenberger's take on the post-feudal and pre-bourgeois state already points out that a commoner's status as a free and equal subject took place much later than legal protections over the private property.[65] She also presents that the slavery was not an obstacle for the capitalist appropriators compared to a moral economy of a community, and only the slaves' active resistance enabled their freedom.[66] Awareness in this historical lag between the capitalist development and bourgeois democracy is revealing for the study of military politics. Contrary to Wood's claim that military institutions remained relatively insignificant in England compared to France and Germany because nobles had been able to establish a wealth-creation scheme through private property,[67] the historical record shows that nobles were actually clinging to their privileges over the command over armies even during the early World War I years, and neither capitalist accumulation, nor the advancement of military rationalization, nor costly military humiliations, but the active interventions of lower strata in the form of series of mutinies and social movements

[64] Heide Gerstenberger, *Market and Violence: The Functioning of Capitalism in History*, Historical Materialism Book Series 258 (2017; repr., Leiden: Brill, 2022).

[65] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*.

[66] Gerstenberger, *Market and Violence*.

[67] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Liberty and Property: A Social History of Western Political Thought from Renaissance to Enlightenment* (London: Verso, 2012), 62–63.

like laborers' association themselves with the objectives of war made reforms possible that ripped noble privileges in favor of rationalization.[68] Given the less dramatic English modern state transformation, it is fair to say that the French Revolution is a significant historical rupture giving rise to the modern form of military organization for its radical overthrow of noble privileges enabling the radical definition of the armed forces on republican grounds.[69]

In this framework, I want to raise two main arguments in this thesis. First, the advancement of the capital does not formulate or suppose a form of military organization. The task of soldiering is placed on the public realm in the historical separation of the state from the civil society, a process that was engendered by social and political struggles. Transhistorical categories associating some forms of military organizations with specific classes, like calling mercenaries as capitalistic entrepreneurs, or defining educated officers as part of the bourgeoisie or conscripts as surplus population do not make any sense. The fact that some military activities function as instruments of wealth creation, as in office-sales in Britain, lootings taken place almost in all wars ever happened and happening, or even soldiers' status as wage-earner does not refer to any specifically capitalist relation.

Secondly, the modern military is a product of popular demands regarding the armed forces. On the one hand, this means that if the military forms did not become an object of any political struggle during the capitalist transition, pre-capitalist elements of the military might have remained intact whatever technological advancements were

[68] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 280–88; Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 68–79, 193–96.

[69] Bedirhanoğlu and Saraçoğlu, "Demokrasi Nereye: Neoliberalizm Döneminde Demokrasi-Cumhuriyet Bağının Kopuşu."

introduced in the meantime. On the other hand, this means, plebians have not remained as passive subjects suffering as a result of being exposed to war-making modern rulers' endless demands. They showed their reaction by deserting troops, running away from compulsory services, mutinies, and uprisings besides demanding acceptance to ranks, conditioning their involvement to further concessions, or, in its extreme form, forcing the abolishment of existing military forms to be replaced by new ones. That is not to say that these reactions have been appreciated and integrated unproblematically, but they have been nonnegligible factors in the formation of the modern military. Additionally, the modern military refers some sort of repression of such demands, since no one understands the modern military as a militia group organized on a collective political identity, but as a public institution with strict bureaucracies.

1.4. Organization of Chapters

The thesis will discuss the modern military in the following three chapters. The second chapter will review the Weberian notion of modern military by following it through Weber's life and its peculiar journey following his death. The main puzzle in that epoch is that even though Weber's remarks on the military were fragmental and he did not leave a well-structured piece on the modern military, he turned out to be the pioneer of the study of the military politics and his principle gained an indispensable status. It should also be added that despite the post-mortem fame, Weber's political activism failed to make a significant impact. The chapter is organized in two parts parallel to the two separate paths Weber's thought followed. The first part will focus on Weber's real-life experience marked with his debate with Werner Sombart on modern capitalism within the circle of German Historical School of Economics. Weber's reservations on Sombart's ethic-based response to the historical materialist

interpretation of capitalism by raising the case for distinctly autonomous ideal and material spheres is the focal point of the Weberian notion of modern military. Sombart formulated his response to Weber by relying more on the technique (rational thinking) as the main factor of human progress that simultaneously developed the modern state, modern military, and modern capitalism. Weber started to contemplate on the rationalization of the military sphere only in his response to Sombart, but apparently in a half-hearted manner. His reactions to the Bolshevik and German revolutions produced the main texts the Weberians have used thereafter when dealing with the topic of modern military. The anti-revolutionary position is definitely a factor in Weber's appeal for liberals, but Sombart's drift towards a nationalist anti-capitalism, eventually towards endorsing Nazism, also contributed this outcome.

The second path is the journey of Weber's texts across the Atlantic. The American utilization of Weber's polemical texts, which were targeting the Bismarckian rule in the German Empire, in the development of the modernization theory provided Weber with a global appeal. What Americans did was the utilization of Weber's ideal types for a task that Weber had never bothered: How the Western path of modernization could be replicated in the non-Western underdeveloped world? As this question gained a global appeal in tandem with the US foreign policy, two distortions on Weber's thought were also globalized.

First one is the treatment of polemical pieces as analysis of actual historical experiences; second one is the turning ideal types, originally logical tools to be utilized and improved in the analyses of actual processes, into normative statements favoring liberal democratization. Thanks to these distortions, as preoccupations with the German and the Ottoman-Turkish particularities show, Weber's approach has become

a ground for critical thinking by raising the central question in different context: Why is [a specific state to be examined] not a British state?

The peculiarity still stands. What Weber did when formulating the notion of modern military was nothing more than repeating the predominant interpretation on the modern military formulated by Prussians: The counter-revolutionary agenda formulated and implemented in the process of German Unification, i.e., Moltke's military professionalism co-existing with Bismarck's civilian control. This feature of the modern military in Weber's thinking was voiced by Samuel Huntington as a critique of optimistic accounts of modernization theory. Huntington's review of the post-war reformation of the military institutions in the US by supporting it with an historical account on the development of the European military politics in the 19th century clearly underlines that the civilian control accompanying the military professionalism in the Prussian case was a successful evasion from the politicization of the army with the popular pressures that was the case for the French military politics marked with revolutionary fevers.[70] The implicit argument he developed in a study on the military politics, the necessity of regulating social mobilization as the primary task for the states, would gain popularity after the 1960s as a critique of the optimist accounts of the modernization theory.[71]

The third chapter will address Weber's stand-still impact over historical materialist accounts on the modern military as a legacy of Althusserian structuralism, which integrated Weberian framework in its whole through the formulation of repressive state

[70] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.

[71] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics* 17, no. 3 (April 1965): 386–430; Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

apparatuses, and orthodox historiography on the bourgeois revolution, which depicts the French Revolution in a consequentialist manner as a critical conjunction of the bourgeois ascend to power. Both positions are well articulated in Perry Anderson's remarks on the absolutist state, which has a unique appeal for the non-Marxist scholars because of its perception as a Marxist voice, confessing limits of a class-based approach that shows superiority of the institutionalist approach or the patrimonial state analysis. What stands as a puzzle for Weberians is made manifest in Anderson's approach that frames the modern military as a capitalist form of military organization and as an instrument enabling the integration of the bourgeoisie into the state. The military remained unmodern for a long period in the conditions of developed capitalism in Britain, while the modern form of military is an innovation introduced in a deficient bourgeois society.

After overviewing the Althusserian approaches, the chapter will review the Ellen M. Wood's Political Marxism. Even though Wood and her followers leave to the point remarks on the class-bias of Weber and Weberian tradition, and raise critical questions on the viability of the consideration of the French Revolution as a bourgeois triumph, Political Marxism remain short of its promises because of its persistent argumentation on the historical specificity of the English origins of capitalism and on the capitalist appropriation's being a purely economic one excluding the use of extra-economic methods.

Peculiarly, Political Marxism's approach to the modern military as an element of non-capitalist social relations reflects similar shortcomings of the Althusserian conceptualization of the modern military as the capitalist form of it.

In order to overcome this Weberian mainstream having impact on the Marxist theorizing as well, the fourth chapter of the thesis will utilize *structural types* Heide Gerstenberger proposed for the analysis of the historical processes of the state's separation from the civil society by tracking depersonalizations. As an alternative to the absolutist state, she proposes the ancien regime as a structural type conditioning personal rules to the generalized rule, in which the development of capitalist relations may set loose but not necessarily the bourgeois state. The main advantage it provides is developing a historical analysis of the modern capitalist state on contingent political struggles stemming from the crises of the ancien regime.

The fourth chapter will also highlight the revolutionary dynamic beneath the modern military. Revolutionary epochs are the most concentrated moments where political struggles over military forms take place. The formulation and implementation of radical popular interpretations over the military is the starting point of the formation of the modern military. Gerstenberger's structural type of bourgeois state is the main base for this discussion, but to avoid any instrumentalist connotations, I prefer to use the modern military instead.

Another motivation for the discussion in this chapter is the mistreatment of *the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* as a text concluding with an assessment of the modern military as bourgeois instrument used against the feudal and proletarian elements. It was a journalistic account obsessed with detailed accounts of the events, but most strikingly, a track of the national guards' position in the process, which eventually gained frustration in tone as a result of national guards' hesitation to pioneer the radicalization of the revolution. Marx's account on the Paris Commune experience in 1871 is much clearer in admitting the national guards' pivotal role in that event. If the

events during the French Revolution are reviewed in such a perspective, it becomes clear that the real military innovation was not the citizen-army, but the national guards, the militia forces of representative institutions in local and national levels, an immediate product of the dramatical overthrown of ancien forms by popular forces. Contrary to that, the citizen-army of the French Revolution was a mark of the advancement of the counter-revolutionary forces. The course of events that turned the Jacobin *levée en masse* into Napoleonic citizen-army show that what the Revolution did in terms of military politics was turning the military sphere into an arena of political struggles by giving it a public character. The main camps in that struggle, in its most schematic form, were the radical ones pushing for a right-based formulation of the military and the reactionary ones favoring the duty-based formulations. The modern military is eventually an outcome of such confrontations.

Throughout the 19th century, revolutionary movements did contemplate over the topic of military either through the principle of equality or through political agency, and the national guard experience remained as a historical reference; just like counter-revolutionary moments modelled Napoleonic citizen-army and were wary of the revolutionary potential of the modern military form.

CHAPTER 2

MODERN MILITARY FROM WEBER TO HUNTINGTON

This chapter intends to problematize two questions. Firstly, the intellectual exchanges that historically shaped Weber's views on the development of the modern state and his preliminary thoughts on the modern military will be critically scrutinized besides his main arguments on these topics. Secondly, the popularization of Weber on the other side of the Atlantic, in the US, will be discussed with a specific emphasis on the ultimate interpretation of his works in Samuel Huntington's studies on the military politics. The objective of the chapter is to reflect critically on the political trajectory that has turned Weber's essentially fragmented and incomplete views on the modern military into a complete and systematic Weberian theory of military politics after the World War II in the hands of the American sociologists and political scientists. The interpretation of Weber is also a contested topic as Huntington's reservations on the initial interpretation developed by Parsons illustrate.

2.1. Weber

Weber's method for the study of institutions is at the core of the mainstream understanding of the military as a unique modern institution with a rationality separate

from the civilian one. This is interesting because Weber's comprehensive historical studies on capitalism as well as its contemporary conditions in Germany aimed primarily to develop a sophisticated methodology for the study of the state and the society, while his remarks on the military remained rather limited and fragmental. As Parsons notes,[72] Weber planned to elaborate on the modern military in his latest work, *Economy and Society*, but his sudden death in 1920 left the piece as a draft and the topic of the modern military untouched.

Yet, scholars of military politics have embraced the association of the modern military with the notion of the state as the monopolistic owner of the means of physical violence that appears in fragmental mentions in Weber's lecture notes and personal notes, which became available for readers with posthumous publications. Bruneau places the study of civilian-military relations as a branch of institutionalist tradition developed on Weber's method for analyzing the political power and bureaucracy.[73] When Huntington formulated the professional soldier as the key for achieving civilian supremacy, he made it clear that the professional military ethic is an ideal type developed in the Weberian manner for the analysis,[74] just like Perlmutter did when he proposed a definition for modern praetorianism distinctive from traditional praetorianism to study contemporary military interventions in underdeveloped countries.[75] Half a century later, rather than being a methodological inspiration, the

[72] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. Talcott Parsons, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947), n. 20 page 336–337.

[73] Thomas C. Bruneau, "Introduction," in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 5–8.

[74] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 61.

[75] Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities," *Comparative Politics* 1, no. 3 (1969): 382–404.

ideal type, essentially a methodological tool Weber proposed, appears in 'ought to be' statements similar to Weber's engagements. This was when Pion-Berlin put forward the rational bureaucracy defined by Weber as a guide for the organization of defense structure aiming efficiency in functioning, even though the study is pre-occupied with soldiers' extensive application of informal structures while managing relations with politicians.[76]

What does make Weber so indispensable? Why is Weber's methodology not challenged? How have his methodological statements developed into normative statements? Many of his adherents proclaim the significance of Weber's method by positioning it against that of Marx, either as a refutation or as claim for being a better alternative to it. Those arguing for refutation underline Weber's contributions in reviving the role of ideas (and religion) in historical transformations enabling capitalism and the modern state to rise, obviously by citing *the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* as a response to historical materialism.[77] Marxist scholars have all the rights in refuting Weber's "weak thesis"[78] presented in a tautological manner[79] as an adequate reply to historical materialism. Skocpol opposes such a contrast as well. What make Weberian methods a better alternative to Marxism, she claims, is its recognition of distinct autonomies of ideal and material spheres, which actually

[76] David Pion-Berlin, "Informal Civil—Military Relations in Latin America: Why Politicians and Soldiers Choose Unofficial Venues," *Armed Forces & Society* 36, no. 3 (April 2010): 530.

[77] Sabri Ülgener, "İktisadi Hayatta Zihniyetin Rolü ve Tezahürleri," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 2, no. 1 (1940): 351–80; Ömer Sarc, "Werner Sombart," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 3, no. 1–2 (1942): 60–63; Talcott Parsons, "Introduction," in *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, by Max Weber, trans. A. M. Henderson (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), 6; Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, *Türkiye'de Yeni Kapitalizm - Ayşe Buğra, Osman Savaşkan* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), 40–47.

[78] Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 357–58.

[79] Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, 154–55.

provides a ground for the integration of Marxist insights if grasped as limited to the economic sphere.[80]

The still strong relevancy of Weber in contemporary approaches to the state or the military owes much to an odd journey of Weber's ideas after his death in 1920. Blackbourn and Eley call it as "the Atlantic trade of ideas" in their review of the scholarship on the German peculiarity addressing the liberal democracy's failure to get consolidated in Germany as opposed to Britain, France, and the US. It is essentially American historians' distortion of Weber's writings for the development of American social and political sciences by treating his political texts written in polemical and journalistic manner as if they are systematical analysis.[81] As a critical cornerstone of this trade, Eley notes Parson's critique of Nazism in the early 1940s drawing parallels to pre-Nazi period with references to Weber's critique of the Imperial Germany and proposed a distinctive German road to modernity out of Weber's take on Germany's backwardness vis-a-vis Britain.[82] German historians in the post-war period cemented the distortion by re-importing the German peculiarity thesis to guide their critical study of their national history placing the failure of the bourgeois revolution in 1848 as the main factor giving rise to the Bismarckian authoritarianism in Imperial Germany and eventually to Nazism.[83]

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[80] Skocpol, "State and Revolution," n. 24, p.83; Paul Cammack, "Statism, New Institutionalism, and Marxism," *Socialist Register* 26 (1990): 156–59.

[81] David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, "Introduction," in *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 7–10.

[82] Talcott Parsons, "Max Weber and the Contemporary Political Crisis," *The Review of Politics* 4, no. 2 (1942): 155–72; Geoff Eley, "The British Model and the German Road: Rethinking the Course of German History Before 1914," in *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 39–41, 91–97.

[83] Eley, "The British Model and the German Road," 51–61.

The distortion brought by the Atlantic trade is functional in the neglect of Weber's self-consciousness of being a member of bourgeois class reflected clearly in his account of capitalism presenting the bourgeoisie as the historical agent of human progress.[84] It is a neglect of the fact that Weber formulated his arguments on the state as a class strategy for the bourgeoisie that would turn the bureaucracy into an instrument for the capitalist development for the realization of objectives set by the bourgeoisie, but not an agent setting the agenda itself.[85] It was a strategy he developed while formulating *the modern* over his inspiration by the Americanism that would introduce "bourgeois economic subjects while simultaneously integrating the workers in a lasting way."[86]

It is significant to notice that Weber developed such a position in his debate with Werner Sombart, his colleague who developed the military modernization as a strategy for the capitalist development. More critically, half-hearted mentions on the modern military in this debate turned into a sharp statement for the monopolization of the violence by the state in order to pacify the civil society after the emergence of a revolutionary context first with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and with the German Revolution in 1918.

2.1.1. Weber within the German Historical School

Weber, with Werner Sombart, was among the youngest members of the German Historical School of Economics, which has always been influential in shaping

[84] David Blackbourn, "The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie: Reappraising German History in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 166–67; 218–19.

[85] Yalman, *Transition to Neo-Liberalism*, 146–47, 150–51.

[86] Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 6–8.

mainstream economic perspectives since the early 19th century in Prussia/Germany as well as elsewhere with prominent other members including Joseph Schumpeter. Since its foundation, despite personal affinities with the Katheder (armchair) socialists, confronting Marx's historical materialism with a culture-specific understanding of economics used to be the defining characteristic of the thoughts of its members such as Gustav von Schmoller, Lujo Brentano, Karl Bücher, Eberhard Gothein and Georg Friedrich Knapp.[87] Parson's controversial interpretation substantially distorts this anti-Marx character of the Historical School as it depicts interestingly Marx as a representative of the School, while Weber's thought as an alternative to the economic determinism of Marxist historical materialism.[88]

A closer look at the development of Weber's thought in exchange with the other intellectuals of the Historical School would help eliminate such distortions. For, even though Weber was pre-occupied with challenging Marx's historical materialism in general, his leading motivation when writing on Protestantism in 1904 was to challenge Werner Sombart's account on the spirit of capitalism presented two years earlier in 1902.[89]

It is crucial to understand that the notion of state and society with distinct autonomies of their own started to identify the main premises of Weber's thought only after he challenged Werner Sombart's non-Marxist account of capitalism. Werner Sombart,

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[87] Rehmann, 339.

[88] Talcott Parsons, "'Capitalism' In Recent German Literature: Sombart and Weber," *Journal of Political Economy* 36, no. 6 (1928): 641–61; Talcott Parsons, "'Capitalism' in Recent German Literature: Sombart and Weber (Concluded)," *Journal of Political Economy* 37, no. 1 (1929): 31–51.

[89] Guenther Roth, "Introduction," in *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, by Max Weber, ed. Claus Wittich and Guenther Roth (1968; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), lxix–lxxvii.

Weber's colleague who is argued to be much more influential member of the Historical School at that time,[90] formulated an ethical overcoming of Marxism by placing psychological motives as the final cause of the capitalist social system rather than economic relations; and proposed the capitalistic spirit as the main drive in the modern capitalism's development.[91] Weber adopted Sombart's non-Marxist definition of capitalism and of capitalistic spirit in *the Protestant Ethic*, yet challenged how they are presented in a causal relation that he commented to be an "one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation."[92]

Sombart argued, the capitalistic spirit came into existence in Europe within a specific historical condition, when the medieval craftsmanship developed workshops operating like a corporate business, in which a master employing several apprentices and transmitting the technical knowledge to them; and when the market's function went beyond from being an avenue for exchanging workshop products for coins after the Reformation legitimized the trading activity as a proper way to gain a livelihood and enabled the vocation of trader to develop as a technical work specialized on determining the "just price."[93] The technique's gaining predominance in these two spheres enabled the determination of the social life by the capitalistic spirit, the pursuit for the accumulation of profit; and the capital, an impersonal organization adopting a rationalistic approach by operating through calculations.[94] The cooperation with the

[90] Nico Stehr and Reiner Grundmann, "Introduction," in *Economic Life in the Modern Age*, by Werner Sombart (2001; repr., London: Routledge, 2017), xxxii; Adair-Toteff, *Werner Sombart*, 15.

[91] Werner Sombart, *Der Moderne Kapitalismus* (Leipzig: Duncker, 1902); Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 342–43.

[92] Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (1930; repr., London: Routledge, 2001), 125.

[93] Adair-Toteff, *Werner Sombart*, 18–23.

[94] Adair-Toteff, 24–25.

trader, who knows how to transport products effectively to places where they are demanded, enabled the workshop master, who knows how to produce effectively, to go beyond boundaries of his locality, as a result, the production was liberated from personalistic dependencies, industries grew in size and in profit, the wealth emerged, and the capitalistic spirit started to shape the social life in big cities and rural population.[95]

Sombart meant his study on capitalism to be an overcoming of Marx's historical materialism, which became an additional concern for the Historical School that had already been occupied with formulating an "'ethico-political moment' for political economy" as a response to the *Western* cosmopolitanism represented by Smith and Ricardo, who surgically extracted economy from the life of man and of the state.[96] Unlike his predecessors, Sombart rejected denying Marx's critique as a whole and proposed furthering it, initially to turn it into a glorification of capitalism. By interpreting Marx's analysis of the capitalist mode of production as an "account for an entire social system in a 'unitary' manner and in terms of 'final causes,'" he develops a revision replacing economic relations with psychological motives governing human action, by doing so, locating the ethics as the final cause of capitalism as a social system.[97] With this argument, he was celebrated by one of his students for contributing underdeveloped nations in understanding the essence of capitalism in a way avoiding the venomous Marxism.[98] The reaction Sombart's history of capitalism got was not as he expected because conservatives among the Historical School reviewed the work to

[95] Adair-Toteff, 26–29.

[96] Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 338.

[97] Rehmann, 342–43.

[98] Sarc, "Werner Sombart."

be an offspring of Marx's historical materialism disguised in the history. The negative reception made Sombart to rewrite a second edition that he claimed to be an entire new work rather than an edition to the first one.[99]

The Protestant Ethic was among those pieces negating him. However, Weber's rejection was not based on the definition of the capitalistic spirit as "a struggle for profit free from the limits set by needs" and the capitalist enterprise with reference to the entrepreneur' "utilizing capital (money or goods with a money value) to make a profit, purchasing the means of production and selling the product;" what he rejected was the definition of the *modern* capitalism as such.[100] While it is possible to find the capitalistic spirit applying rationalistic techniques to acquire profit in different historical epochs and geographies, it was only in the modern capitalism that the labor adopted a rationalist approach as well. The rationalistic transformation of the labor's attitude towards being in the service of a rational organization is what makes the modern capitalism a uniquely Occidental progress, Weber claims, and its historical development cannot be understood as an impact of the rise of the rationalistic entrepreneur without a consideration on the rationalization of life that the Protestant Reformation's religious challenge to Catholicism had realized. Weber's proposal[101] was to study the social system by questioning correlations (elective affinities) between ethics and work-life that have independent historical trajectories.

Sombart's response to criticisms, especially to that of Weber, was to emphasize more on the technical aspects in the development of capitalism. To that end, he changed the

[99] Adair-Toteff, *Werner Sombart*, 56–63.

[100] Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 27.

[101] Weber, 27, 35–38, 125; Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 49–50.

definition of the capitalistic spirit to be composed of the bourgeois spirit and the "spirit of enterprise" that formed "the modern army, structures the state, shapes technology and discovers the sites of precious metals."[102] In this phase, he concentrated more on religious aspects only to refute Weber. The first argument he raised was that "all that Weber ascribes to Puritanism… is in reality Judaism:"[103]

> [T]he Jews contributed no small share in giving to economic relations the international aspect they bear to-day; in helping the modern state, that framework of capitalism, to become what it is; and lastly, in giving the capitalistic organization its peculiar features, by inventing a good many details of the commercial machinery which moves the business life of to-day, and co-operating in the perfecting of others… the importance of the Jews is so enormous because they, above all others, endowed economic life with its modern spirit; they seized upon the essential idea of capitalism and carried it to its fullest development.[104]

The stress on Jewishness was not an expression of his antisemitic sentiments, because Sombart was still arguing for the glory of the capitalism; only when he turned out to be an anti-capitalist, his started to mention Jewishness in a manner of attacking.[105] The second argument opposing Weber's Puritanism thesis was to stress on the Renaissance origins of the capitalistic spirit as opposed to the Reformation. Not in the Puritan ethics, but in the Renaissance man one can find economic rationalization and bourgeois virtues at the same time that coincides with the capitalistic spirit.[106]

The military, together with the production of luxurious goods, complements Sombart's argument on the development of capitalism to be essentially related to the progress in

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[102] Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 352.

[103] Werner Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, trans. M. Epstein (1911; repr., Kitchener: Batoche, 2001), 134.

[104] Sombart, 19.

[105] Adair-Toteff, *Werner Sombart*, 69–70.

[106] Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 369–70.

the technical knowledge. One aspect of the new warfare's contribution was related to the rise in the size of armies that necessitated extensive organization skills in conducting combat. The invention of standardization to this end gave rise to utilization of uniforms in expectation of empowering the feeling of solidarity among soldiers, and the rise in the size of armies turned such task to be completed only by relying on the industry's capacities to produce in mass and the state's capacity to make use of credit relations. The other aspect was the mechanization of the warfare. Technical innovations in weaponry are significant in modern warfare. Speaking of guns and ammunition, the task compelling states is not unique development of the modern capitalism; just like in uniforms, the modern capitalism enables their production mass. Instead, the shipbuilding, Sombart argues, represents a unique relationship between the modern warfare and the modern capitalism because of the nature of the product. The development of modern capitalism correlates with the enlargement of ships, and only in modern capitalism one can produce those larger ships consuming enormous resources and labor more in quantity and shorter in time.[107]

Weber remained silent Sombart's repeated provocations, among them the vulgar Jewish thesis that was meant to be semi-mockery.[108] His neglect could be seen in the absence of an address to Sombart's arguments in his notes for the *Economy and Society.* Weber started to work on the project in 1909 when he accepted to take role as editor and contributor in the project of *Grundriß der Sozialökonomik* (Outline of Social Economics), a handbook on political economy with the contributions of members of the Historical School. A detailed plan of his part was published in the first volume of

[107] Adair-Toteff, *Werner Sombart*, 80–85.

[108] Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: A Biography*, trans. Patrick Camiller (2005; repr., Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 203–8, 437–43.

the project in 1914, however, troubles in the management of the project as well as the outbreak of the war postponed the publication. Weber returned working on the project in 1919 with a substantial revision of the previously announced plan, but unable to finalize it.[109] Even though its reception hints otherwise, *Economy and Society* is actually a work-in-progress, because out of four available chapters only three of them are known to be proofed by Weber himself so could be considered to be completed, but the last one stands as mostly a fragment. The earlier plan and his remarks in the written pieces indicate that the unfinished chapter would possibly include a concise discussion on the modern military.[110] This chapter and personal notes understood to be dating the period 1910 and 1914 are the main source of the Weberian notion of the modern military.

The way Weber approaches the modern military in *Economy and Society* is nothing more than definitional statements that are simplistic in nature, mostly because of the nature of the project he was involved. In the complete sections of the work, we may find only one mention that is definitional. Accordingly, "the modern army is essentially a bureaucratic organization administered by that peculiar type of military functionary, the 'officer'", who are not elected, but appointed.[111] Another encounter is related to the history of it: The bureaucratization of the military is an outcome of the dissolution of feudalism as a result of supreme lords' initiatives, which first replaced the feudal military with capitalistic military entrepreneurs, i.e., mercenaries that rationalized the

[109] Radkau, 410; Keith Tribe, "Preface," in *Economy and Society: A New Translation*, by Max Weber (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), vii.

[110] Weber, *Social and Economic Organization*, 336 n. 20; Roth, "Economy and Society," lxii–lxiii.

[111] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (1968; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 221–22.

royal rule in the long run concurrent to the rise of bourgeoisie in town.[112] Two more mentions could be extracted from his notes. The first one indicates that the source of officers' distinctiveness is not their class position, but the particular life-style imposed by necessities of the vocation that turn officers into a status group.[113] The other one is a statement on the state's monopoly on violence that lists the modern military among means of coercion functioning as the ultimate guarantee of the law and absence of violence in the economic sphere.[114] Needless to say, none of these statements are conclusions arrived with a convincing and extensive discussion based on rich empirical material.

Things changed with the World War I when Sombart turned towards snubbing British as mere traders as opposed to German excellence in warfare, but Weber preserved his idea that "if the Germans were to become a powerful nation they had rather to learn from the Puritan-formed British and Americans, instead of romantically glorifying non-Western German traditions."[115] Nevertheless, Weber did not express his response to Sombart in a well-articulated piece. The only publication serving to this end was the re-publication of *the Protestant Ethic* with extensive footnotes that he specifically underlined his agreement with Sombart's original definition of the modern capitalistic spirit as opposed to later ones in relation to the religious aspects.

Two notes drew upon the modern military by proposing revolutionary armies in English and Dutch revolutions to be "the fathers of modern military discipline" thanks

[112] Weber, 259.

[113] Weber, 306.

[114] Weber, 312–14.

[115] Radkau, *Max Weber*, 458.

to the reliance on Puritan principle of self-control.[116] The Dutch moment passed after Puritan principles was replaced by reliance on money and mercenaries, while Cromwell's armies preserved their status as an army of citizens even after the abolishment of the conscription thanks to the preservation of the idea that "one could fight justly only for the glory of God in a cause hallowed by conscience, but not at the whim of a sovereign."[117]

His lecture notes provide a more comprehensive response. While he accepts Sombart's remarks on capitalism's involvement in provisioning military requirements in mass, he rejects its being "the decisive conditions affecting the development of modern capitalism" by giving examples from non-capitalist Mogul and Chinese empires with similar large armies.[118] The modern army has much to do with the unique characteristics of the occidental city, in which economic activities are pacified and limited to the exchange in market place as the common interest for all inhabitants. Rather than compulsory services, fraternity organizations, "the brotherhood in arms for mutual aid and protection," assumed the task of defending the city and laid grounds for the development of citizenship.[119] The necessity of collective and coordinated action later enabled the development of democratic procedures.[120] One can find similar free cities with fraternity organizations outside of Europe or in ancient ages, but in all cases their subordination to imperial rules resulted in elimination of such freedoms

[116] Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 196–97.

[117] Weber, 247.

[118] Max Weber, *General Economic History*, trans. Frank H. Knight (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), 308–9.

[119] Weber, 319.

[120] Weber, 324–25.

and fraternity organizations. The distinctiveness of the occidental city, however, is the preservation of the city's such characteristics during their subordination to centralized nation states. It has been possible in the modern period thanks to the mediation of the capital. Because nation-states were competing for an alliance with the capital, the capital was able to dictate its own terms, among them was the non-compulsory relationship of the citizen to the political organization as a tool to preserve the pacification of the economic activities. "Out of this alliance of the state with capital, dictated by necessity, arose the national citizen class, the bourgeoisie in the modern sense of the word."[121] In that sense, the idea of a citizen-army was the ethical development unique to the occidental city in the late medieval age, but not the necessity of standardization in service of mass industrial production as Sombart claimed.

While these more detailed addresses can be associated with his feud with Sombart, it is crucial to notice that Weber remained aloof from the public for the majority of the war years and he produced such pieces mentioning Sombart, which were essentially polemical in nature, only after 1917 when he decided to take a public appearance.[122]

Needless to say, it was more related to the course of the war marked at that moment with the Revolution in Russia and the American entry to the war that should move beyond concentrating on Weber's intellectual journey. For Weber, the Bolshevik Revolution was alarming because of the possibility of its spread to Germany and the American entry to war was nothing but an outcome of the impotent leadership.

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[121] Weber, 336–37.

[122] Radkau, *Max Weber*, 481.

Sombart, instead, preserved his public appearance throughout his life, but it only got more bizarre. The war against Britain led him to turn against capitalism and start to argue for its eventual collapse.[123] The wartime publication, *Heroes and Traders*, depicted British as a subordinate lifestyle compared to the German ways in a strong patriotic language. His engagements to socialism as an alternative to capitalism, which was already underway in pre-war years, turned into a case for a corporatism that he rallied with several scholars with the slogan of *German ideas of 1914*. In his remaining years he concentrated on the possibility of overcoming the class conflict with the direct state management of the economy. During the years of Great Depression, he supported national economies[124] and autarky.[125] Eventually, he proposed a program for the national socialism in 1934 with an unconstrained antisemitism, only to be neglected by the Nazi leadership:

> In order to free ourselves from the Jewish spirit —said to be the chief task of the German people and, above all, of Socialism— it is not enough to exclude all Jews, not even enough to cultivate an anti-Jewish temper. It will be far better to so transform the institutional culture that it will no longer serve as a bulwark for the Jewish spirit.[126]

Stehr and Grundmann underline that in terms of xenophobic statements, understanding of Judaism on stereotypes associating it to commercial activities, patriotic and nationalist position Weber was no different from Sombart. Considering his anti-socialist sentiments, it is plausible to speculate that Weber would support National Socialism as well if he did not die early.[127] It is impossible to know that, but it is

[123] Adair-Toteff, *Werner Sombart*, 115.

[124] Adair-Toteff, 134.

[125] Adair-Toteff, 159–60.

[126] Werner Sombart, *A New Social Philosophy*, trans. Karl Frederick Geiser (1935; repr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1937), 179.

[127] Stehr and Grundmann, "Introduction," xxxiii–xxxix.

possible to argue that Sombart's drift towards National Socialism is key in Weber's presentation to the Anglo-Saxon world as a champion of liberalism thanks to Parsons framing him in this context.

2.1.2. Weber as a conscious bourgeois intellectual

What Weber's theoretical discussions did not do was to give an account for why the rationalization prevailed others or for how the transition to rationalization happened. Gerstenberger underlines that his stress on ideal types' being a mere mental construct rather than a historical analysis enables him to this deliberate evasion, yet it is constructed on a historical assumption that the precondition of rationalization is burghers' becoming bourgeois in their struggle against feudal lords that set market and monetary relations having their own dynamics in motion as transformative forces giving rise to modern state and modern capitalism.[128]

Leaving aside the question of whether pre-capitalist urban burghers and feudal lords actually had such a feud, Rehmann underlines, the other side of the elective affinity, depoliticized Puritanism, appears in Weber's account in way concealing the real history of it that was not immune to contradictions. Not only "a petty bourgeois and artisan Protestant social ethos stood in the way of a specifically capitalist spirit," individualism was adopted by a faction of the Protestant clergy in their struggle within the church.[129]

According to Wood, Weber's narration on the history of capitalism was constructed on the commercialization model -which was indeed developed by Sombart with Weber

[128] Gerstenberger, 26–29.

[129] Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 318.

putting it in its right place.[130] He was questioning, even though commercial activities were not absent in non-Western context, why did they not develop into capitalism there but in the West? Wood underlines that he was eager to find capitalism in earlier periods and in other geographies, but only to emphasize the uniqueness of the West by questioning what factors impeded such developments in there. His proposal was to locate the rationalization as the central transforming factor that produced first the Enlightenment, and then capitalism.[131] Wood argues that Weber naturalized the development of capitalism by depicting it as the final form of human progress in reason and freedom that emancipated humanity from the constraints of tradition (or magic).[132]

Jan Rehmann's study on Weber places his scholarship on his life-long opposition against the bourgeois-Junker coalition power bloc in Imperial Germany and advocation for a capitalist modernization integrating labor movement into a bourgeois society.[133] Weber's "two-front struggle" was to emancipate the bourgeoisie from "a state of political and cultural subalternity vis-à-vis the [Junker] agrarian class" in a way enabling the subordination of labor through "an 'orderly', purely economic struggle."[134] Addition to his conviction of the bourgeoisie's having a historical mission for progress, Weber's position was determined by his observation that Junkers with their declining hold on the economic affairs were losing their capacity to be a model for the nation to follow. Inspired by his observations over well-paid American workers, he developed his proposal for a bourgeois subordination of labor through integration

[130] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 17.

[131] Wood, 182–83.

[132] Wood, 191–92.

[133] Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 1.

[134] Rehmann, 8–9.

on the grounds of rational production that led him to take a critical stand against Bismarck's suppression of trade unions.[135] Weber's stress on Protestantism is about its enabling bourgeoisie to seize the masses; unlike Renaissance thought, Reformation was not confined to aristocratic circles; but, in Gramsci's words, created a popular culture and a broad national-popular movement resisting Counter-reformation.[136]

On the first front, he was critical, though not in an antagonistic way, of the Eastern Prussian land-owners, Junkers, for their preservation of coercion-based labor relations. Both in his earlier engagements when dealing with agrarian affairs in the 1890s and in his late period, he preserved a consistent position simply because their economic position was not any different from agricultural entrepreneurs, if not worse, Junkers should abandon engagements in the agricultural production and concentrate activities in state and military affairs. However, the way he advised Junkers indicates his aggressiveness in the second front. The existential threat landowners facing was not geopolitical challenges Germany facing, but the fear of social democracy, which persisted in Weber's political activism to the end. The call for Junkers to let businesses to assume agrarian production was voiced in a period Engels was hopeful of Social Democracy's appeal in the East that would mean not only the conquest of agricultural workers but also "the soldiers of Prussia's core military regiments: 'That will bring down the old order with a vengeance, and we shall govern.'"[137] The resistance of Junkers to keep their estates led Weber to denounce them as the "greatest Poloniser" for their preference to utilize influxing Polish peasants as workforce at the expense of

[135] Rehmann, 137–43.

[136] Rehmann, 380.

[137] Engels' letter to Sorge, dated 12 April 1890, cf. Rehmann, 70.

German peasants; and to align with the Pan-Germans whom later he broke off on the ground of their failure to promote the expulsion of Polish immigrants, a failure that would serve interests of the landowners but not Germans.[138]

In a sense, Weber was advising Junkers to accept their weakening social power and strengthen direct hold on the state, just like the British counterparts had done it.[139] Historically proven Junker skill in the organization of the state and in military discipline,[140] a product of their well-established fraternity distinguished from other fraternities constructed via education institutions and that of "Anglo-Saxon gentleman or Latin salon-type of man," is vital for the protection of national interests; Prussian generals Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen, who assumed the leadership in the independence war against Napoleon's France, and the dual leadership of Moltke and Bismarck in unification wars are historical examples showing that the *old* Prussian spirit had capacity to pursue a reform agenda successfully.[141]

Contrast to them, the *new* Prussian spirit represented by conservative parliamentarians, who were seeking for offices without assuming any responsibility for the nation, had no such potential. The most urgent task was to develop instruments to integrate the popular passion into the state structure, which was lacking in German classical discussions on the 1789 but impossible to ignore anymore because of the rise of urban masses. This task, Weber underlines, cannot be delivered neither by ignoring it or by

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[138] Rehmann, 78–81.

[139] Clarke on British nobles' protecting their domination within the state offices with competitive *public schools*: Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 68–79.

[140] Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 71.

[141] Max Weber, "National Character and the Junkers," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (1917; repr., New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 390–91.

reducing it to a matter of suffrage as Italian plutocracy and Louis Bonaparte's fake parliament had not been successful to balance *the rule of the street*.[142]

Weber's support for the parliamentary democracy was not about the prospect of the realization of popular sovereignty since he favored indeed the limitation of suffrage.[143] Wood points out that beneath his efforts to elevate the bourgeoisie as the champion of the Enlightenment, Weber held a conservative stance; even his liberal epoch was essentially about the nation-building project rather than advancement of freedom, and his political legacy for Germany was the plebiscitary and powerful president of the Weimar Republic designated as a bulwark against revolution.[144]

He considered that the British parliamentary system had proved its superiority in terms of recruiting capable statesmen,[145] unlike Germany where Bismarckian state failed to promote a new generation of politicians and bureaucrats. While the World War I showed how was it possible for Britain to have a government in Ceasarist character without having a Ceasar,[146] Germany suffered from the incapability of statesman. Consequently, towards the end of the war, Germany was lacking capable statesman who can exert influence on the military decisions that led to a critical departure from the Bismarckian principle of civilian supremacy over the military.[147] The problem with

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[142] Weber, 394–95.

[143] Rehmann, *Modernisation as Passive Revolution*, 105–6.

[144] Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, 176–77.

[145] Max Weber, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics," in *Weber: Political Writings*, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (1919; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 331–34.

[146] Max Weber, "Suffrage and Democracy in Germany," in *Weber: Political Writings*, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (1917; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 116–17.

[147] Max Weber, "Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order," in *Weber: Political Writings*, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (1918; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 177–96.

the Bismarckian state, in that sense, was not about Bismarck's deeds as he delivered effective resolutions in foreign and military affairs; it is related to his departure that showed there was no other Ceasar to replace him.[148]

2.1.3. The Military in the Revolutionary Context

What's striking in Weber's account on the modern military in relation to the state as the possessor of the legitimate means of use of physical force is the specific emphasis put on this argument in his sharp anti-revolutionary statements. As opposed to remarks in his intellectual feud with Sombart, these pieces were public, but polemical in nature. In that sense, the military is the sphere where Weber's attitude as a conscious member of the bourgeois class becomes most apparent. One of these pieces is the lecture educating Austro-Hungarian officers on socialism such as the new political system of Russia, in June 1918, a few months before the World War I came to an end. It was part of a training of officers prepared by "the Department to Counter Enemy Propaganda" and is known to be his single public engagement on the topic of socialism.[149] Coherent with his earlier assessments, this text does not search for a causality between the rise of modern capitalism and that of modern military; but draws attention to similarities of the modern state, capitalist production, and modern warfare on only to stress for the impossibility of a socialist economy and a socialist army. Accordingly, the most prominent character of the modern military is the fact that "[members of the army] were all 'separated' from the means of conducting war, just as the worker is from the means of carrying out his work."[150]

[148] Weber, 221–22.

[149] Radkau, *Max Weber*, 492.

[150] Weber, "Socialism," 281.

The main obstacle for socialism to prevail in the modern period, Weber claims, is the absence any perspective to respond the bureaucratization of all aspects of life. The contemporary democracy is bureaucratized now and "is replacing the noble, aristocratic or other honorary officials with a body of paid officials."[151] Likewise, the modern economy cannot be managed without specialists, a thing that the socialist prophetic calls for direct action and self-management cannot be considered as an alternative to it. Weber elaborates by giving example from the conduct of the warfare. While the modern warfare demands a total organization assumed by the state machine linking interests of every ordinary soldier to another, an organization that can be maintained by capable generals, an attempt of single military unit for a self-management under a leadership of a corporal is doomed to failure as it risks overall unity of the army.[152] The experiment in Russia, he labels, was nothing more than a military dictatorship of corporals, not of generals that cannot stand without enforcing a martial rule, similar to the one in the Paris Commune.[153]

The pre-caution Weber proposed, on the other hand, is being receptive to the aspirations of workers through empowerment of trade unions. Addition to the sophistication, the modern economy also gave rise to workers as a collective force with a strong sense of solidarity. "The feeling of honour, of comradeship among workmates and allies in a factory or in a branch of industry binds them in solidarity, and that is, after all, a feeling upon which the solidarity of military groups rests."[154] The task is channeling this solidarity to be expressed through trade unions, which is the only

[151] Weber, 279.

[152] Weber, 296–97.

[153] Weber, 299–301.

[154] Weber, 275.

option for serving interests of the real working class that is the increase in wages. The absence of it enables syndicalist option that neglects such interests but exploits workers' aspirations for high wages for a romantic hope of revolution to be realized with a general strike.[155]

Weber underlines that Germany was in an advantageous position compared to Russia in that sense because what made the revolution possible in there was the prevalence of agrarian communism. A romantic revolutionary would be an unfortunate one for the "the fact that at least two-thirds of the German army is recruited from the countryside and a further one-sixth from the petite bourgeoisie, for whom it would be a genuine pleasure to slap down the workers, or anyone else who wanted to start any such revolution."[156] The agrarian production in Germany was marked by the individualist farmer who "clings to his inheritance and his soil. He is unlikely to be persuaded otherwise. He is more likely to ally himself with the large landed proprietor than with the radical socialist worker, if he believes there is any threat to these things."[157]

Weber's other text in relation to the military politics in the post-1917 context is *The Profession and Vocation of Politics,*[158] a lecture given to a liberal student community in the midst of the German Revolution where he presented his critique of the Bismarckian Imperial Germany, support for the adoption of the parliamentary system, and rejection of the Bolshevik and Spartacist alternatives. Weber presents the state's monopoly on violence relationship, as the foundation of his lecture, by mentioning his

[155] Weber, 297–98.

[156] Weber, 300.

[157] Weber, 301.

[158] Weber, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics."

encounter with Trotsky in Brest-Litovsk when Trotsky put forward that "[e]very state is founded on force." Accordingly, it is a limited grasp of the state's relationship to the violence, since it cannot make sense of the specificity of the state among other "kinds of association" by being a "human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory." As this crude definition irons out all differences among state or authority types, we have either a clan-like association in which the individual use of violence is a normal practice, or an advanced human existence in which the use of violence is possible "to the extent that the state for its part permits this to happen."[159]

His lengthy lecture on modern politics is based on a simple idea which he expressed in various ways throughout his whole career that what prophetic promises of socialism can lead to is nothing but a social organization typical of pre-historic times that as human beings we had left behind much earlier. It is either a production relation that cannot accept the sophistication of the modern economy, or a barbaric way of politics that cannot offer anything but bloody confrontation. In this case, it is the rejection of the human advancement in political engagements achieved in Europe that is the chasing of political interests through political parties recruiting profession politicians who know how to represent and advocate as a technical work. The professional politician is a historical product carrying the legacy of the ancient Roman jurisprudence, the secularization of the medieval canon law into the natural law, the legal rationalization of the absolutist state, and the English parliament.[160] The historical example resembling "Bolshevism with its Soviets" is the parties of the

[159] Weber, 310–11.

[160] Weber, 329.

medieval cities that were “purely personal followings” and knightly armies and for that reason, Weber claims, “such organisations based on violence” should not be taken into consideration as a modern one based on “professional politicians whose aim is to achieve power by means of sober, 'peaceful' canvassing by the party in the electoral market-place.”[161]

Weber took a lengthy road to depict socialist alternatives as barbarianism. Weber was actually the generation did not experience the unification wars and familiar with Moltke as a national hero. His anti-socialist or anti-revolutionary statements reflect the dominant framework of his era, and if we recall that he actually did not engage in studying the military history in depth, he naturalized what he saw.

It is telling that he spent a significant intellectual labor to narrate the rationalization of the warfare by referring the emergence of fraternities in occidental cities as an argument against Sombart’s economism, yet, when he encountered a similar organization all he could depend on is the separation of workers from the means of production.

2.2. The Development of Weberianism after the Death of Weber

More than what and why Weber had actually said in his lifetime, various interpretations and their contest to each other have been the core of studies on the military politics. The next subtitle will present how did Weber’s arguments take a journey to the United States, and the following one will address why is Huntington’s intervention to the study of the military politics in the underdeveloped world actually a dissident interpretation raised against to the earlier one.

[161] Weber, 334–36.

2.2.1. The Atlantic Trade of Ideas

Weber's uncompleted project was published as the *Economy and Society* in different versions after Weber's sudden death in 1920, causing a mess to be resolved much later. The first version published in 1921 was the latest draft composed of three completed chapters and a partial one. This one was followed by other publications in 1921 and 1922 as an initiative of Marianne Weber, Max's wife, that also included earlier drafts written between 1910 and 1914. Contrary to Marianne's expectations, the expansion could hardly fulfill the goal of completing, but caused ambiguity because new installations significantly differ from Max's latest draft in terms of sequence and content. Whether Marianne's version represents the final sequence of Max Weber's theory of state and domination seems to be resolved with the contributions of historians claiming that Marianne's additions should be considered as an arbitrary collage created out of remaining notes and fragments.[162] The problem raises because in the absence of a clear plan written by Max, she preferred to approach whole material as a single work and organized a large amount of material thematically making it difficult to determine which arguments were actually developed fully or which parts were written before 1914 or after 1919. Correction efforts produced another version, one published in 1925 and the other in 1956; however, such efforts to combine earlier and later drafts were abandoned.[163]

The presence of different German versions of *Economy and Society* contributed the debate on Weber in the Anglo-Saxon context. To be more precise, the debate was

[162] Radkau, *Max Weber*, 410–12.

[163] Keith Tribe, "Introduction to Max Weber's Economy and Society," in *Economy and Society: A New Translation*, by Max Weber, ed. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 25–27, 36–38.

concentrated on whether Talcott Parsons' interpretation was adequate and the accurate interpretation of Weber's sociology and methodology. As an observer of the Weber-Sombart debate on the capitalistic spirit,[164] Parsons introduced Weber to the English-speaking world by translating the second edition of *the Protestant Ethic* in 1930. As an open opponent of the Nazism in the American public, he presented Weber's typology on authority as a proper framework to understand the rise of National Socialism as a rise of charismatic absolutism that used a modern-rational instrument, the utilization of political parties to realize a group's common interest, by turning into an idea-based association that revived traditional authorities and broke state's monopoly on violence in its organization.[165] In 1947, he translated the *Economy and Society*[166] and penned a lengthy introduction on Weber's sociology. In these works, the repeated argument Parsons put forward was that Weber presented an alternative to Marxist historical materialism's economic determinism by re-emphasizing the role of ideas (religion) in historical processes, and to Sombart's ethical determinism by recognizing economic system's autonomous functioning with its own rules.[167]

Critiques of Parson's translations argue that with the choice of terminology emphasizing the structure, "Parsons in effect presents Weber in terms of his own sociology, the guise in which Weber did become a 'founding father' of sociology in the 1950s and 1960s."[168] In that sense, it is no surprise that an alternative translation based on the extended version of *Economy and Society* was published in 1968, in a

[164] Parsons, "Sombart and Weber - I"; Parsons, "Sombart and Weber - II."

[165] Parsons, "Max Weber and the Contemporary Political Crisis."

[166] Weber, *Social and Economic Organization*.

[167] Parsons, "Introduction," 6–7, 54–55.

[168] Tribe, "Introduction to Max Weber's Economy and Society," 3–7.

decade when the modernization school lost its charm to a great extent compared to the 1950s. The editor of the new translation justifies such an enormous task by stating that earlier translated works of Weber were inadequate not just in their linguistic capacity, but also because deliberate omit of Weber's some pieces misrepresented Weber's intentions and motivations or concealed the historical context.[169]

Eley and Blackbourn's study shows that the peculiarity of Weber's post-war fame with distortions in his arguments is not limited to a deliberate translation error; for, starting from the 1930s German emigres in Britain and America, who, similar to Weber, hold a critical stance against the Imperial Germany and idealized the British capitalism, were also active in the formulation of a critique of the National Socialism under a broader questioning of the German peculiarity.[170] The specific distortion focuses in the study is that Weber's arguments have been incorporated into the thesis of the failed 1848 bourgeois revolution, even though the bourgeoisie's failure in Weber's writings was referring to their failure to pioneer the industrial capitalism unlike British counterparts; but not a failure to repeat what French bourgeoisie did in 1789.[171]

The distortion they point out regarding Weber's polemical texts is not limited to the historiography of the German state as the same problem appears in the studies on Turkish state as well. It is no surprise that Metin Heper finds similarities to the particularity of the German state in his thesis on the particularity of the state in Turkey,[172] and applies Weber's targeting Junkers for their utilization of the

[169] Roth, "Economy and Society," cix.

[170] Eley, "The British Model and the German Road," 5, 45, 67–69.

[171] Eley, 40–41.

[172] Heper, *The State Tradition*, 10–12.

bureaucracy as a wealth-creation instrument at the expense of the parliament for an analysis of the bureaucracy in Turkey focusing on its conflictual relations with parliamentarians over policy-making.[173] Yalman also notes that misleading treatments of mental-constructs as empirical realities is central in statist/institutionalist accounts on the state in Ottoman-Turkish context that not only Weberian legal authority but the Hobbesian Leviathan has been considered as if representing the actual historical development of the state in Europe in a way proving the particularity.[174]

What unites Germany and Turkey in terms of having scholarly tradition of problematizing their particularities is the American mediation, the Parsons-inspired modernization theory that acquired a global appeal in the post-1945 period in way serving the American foreign policy's *global* vision. The main question preoccupying modernization scholars was never a concern for Weber himself; whether the Western experience of the political development, i.e., the modernization, could be replicated in pre-modern societies. Though he was convinced that Germany should transform itself into something other, it is hard to claim that Weber is a scholar of political change or transition. The history in his account is more like a description of the natural order observed in Europe; if non-Europeans do not show any modern characteristics, it is a proof for the main argument rather than a question to be engaged; he did not ask possibilities for a modern society in the patrimonial China. Parson's pattern variables helped modernization theory to put Weber's ideal types into a motion with argument "that all societies were moving along a continuum from 'traditional' to 'modern,' and 'development' meant the process of movement down this continuum;" to group states

[173] Heper, 91–97.

[174] Yalman, *Transition to Neo-Liberalism*, 116–20, 135–37.

as developed ones and late-comers that encourages the former one to contribute overcoming traditional values as a legitimation for the American foreign policies global appeal.[175]

In this line, Dankward Rüstow and Robert Ward argue in their theorization of the political development that underdeveloped societies, primarily those former colonies coming into existence as new nations after gaining independence, "are not alone in" their struggles for "'modernization' or 'development'" since "'developed' societies are also committing very sizeable amounts of capital and other forms of assistance in an effort to shorten, meliorate, and direct this process of 'development.'"[176]

In the post-war context, Turkey had a respected position in the political development current. Turkey was serving to the main concern of "The Princeton school," which was "to theorize the passage from traditional to modern society" for her success in the modernization with "rapid urbanization, industrialization, secularization, and the replacement of traditional values with universal ones" that was accompanied by success in the democratization with "the endurance of the multi-party system."[177] The objective was to discuss whether the experience in Turkey could be abstracted into a model for traditional societies with aspirations for modernization.[178] The staged political development modern that these studies brought into attention seems to have

[175] William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (1996; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 46–48.

[176] Dankwart A. Rüstow and Robert E. Ward, "Introduction," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 11.

[177] Barış Çetin Can Eren, "The Trajectory of Democracy: The Social Roots of Regime Change in Turkey" (PhD Thesis, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, 2014), 62–63.

[178] Major studies on Turkey framed with the stages of political development: Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*; Kemal H. Karpat, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis* (Leiden: Brill, 1973).

resonated among the US foreign policy-making circles as a report presented by the US Department of State to the National Security Council on 18 June 1959advised keeping smooth relations with emerging authoritarian regimes in the underdeveloped world by presenting Turkey together with Japan, Latin American nations, and Soviet Union as successful cases proving effectiveness of the application of authoritarian measures in resolution of problems encountered in modernization of traditional societies:

> We should bear in mind, nevertheless, that in Mexico as in Turkey social revolutions conducted by military dictators paved the way for greater stability, and acceptance of representative institutions and a transfer of power to civilians without resort to costly 'second stage revolutions'[179]. The widest possible repetition of this sequence should be our objective in Asia in conducting relations with military regimes.[180]

The military coup in 1960 would pose a serious challenge for the political developmentalist current. The debate on Turkey has its own trajectory, in which the optimism for Turkey's path towards becoming Western was replaced by a rather pessimistic one stressing obstacles for this objective, primarily that of the legacy of the *traditional society* framed by Weber's patrimonialism analysis. Since then, Weber gained prominence in the debate on the state in Ottoman-Turkish context as the historiography present in Weber's account on the modern state is accepted as the real historical experience. In that context, the distortion of Weber's argument gained acceleration. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, Huntington presented a proper rectification to Parsons's Weber interpretation as a critique of the American foreign policy pursued in the 1950s.

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[179] Second stage revolution is defined in the report as "revolutions engendered by the dissatisfaction or stifling of opposition groups (labor, students, intelligentsia, dissident younger officer groups)" and exampled by Gamal Abdel Nasser's action against Mohamed Naguip in 1954 that placed him as the president of Revolutionary Command Council.

[180] "Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers" (General CIA Records, June 18, 1959).

2.2.2. Huntington on the Political Development

"The erroneous dogma" dominating the American foreign policy for two decades following the end of the World War II that proposed "economic assistance promotes economic development, economic development promotes political stability", Huntington claims, was proven to be wrong with the "increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d'etat…, the pervasive alienation of urban political groups."[181] The course of events had clearly disapproved earlier theses associating violence and instability with poverty and lack of economic development, rather he argues, efforts to overcome it had been the main dynamic leading political instability.[182] As the finest example of the Cold War political thought in the US, he suggested focusing on the political gap between "developed political systems and underdeveloped political systems"[183] rather than the economic gap because of the communists' offering modernizing nations with broadened political participation "a tested and proven method of bridging the political gap" and of assuring political order.[184] Analytically speaking, Huntington claims, the experience showed that the modernization is not equal to political development. A rapid economic development enabling peasants and urban middle classes possibilities of social mobility can be counter-productive and generate political decay if political institutions are inadequate to meet high expectations of newly integrated social forces.[185]

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[181] Huntington, *Political Order*, 3–6.

[182] Huntington, 39–47.

[183] Huntington, 2.

[184] Huntington, 8.

[185] Huntington, 49–56.

Additionally, there is no possibility to approach developed political entities pre-dating modern era like Roman and Chinese empires.[186] Troubles of the political developmentalism, he claims, are caused by the arbitrariness in determining the criteria for it. Parsons-inspired proposals to put rationalization, nation-formation, and democratization as factors to define it are not useful because "all definitions may be equally arbitrary and equally legitimate, they do vary greatly, however, in their relevance to particular problems and their usefulness for particular ends."[187]

What he proposes is to track the impact of the modernization on the political participation, especially that of new classes, with considerations over political institutions' capacity to integrate them. What this departure means could be demonstrated in the Turkish case; after the 1960 coup, the motive for a study of the military politics cannot be understood by questioning how the American initiative of road program implemented in the post-war period made an impact on the economic development in Turkey, or how the conscription system contributed the social modernization, i.e., major questions of the political developmentalist raised in their account on the military in Turkey;[188] but, it can be comprehended by focusing on the guardian role, the new conservative role the Gürsel junta defined to counter a progressive role in relation to the alliance with the urban middle class, and its impact on the political structure.[189]

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[186] Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 389.

[187] Huntington, 2–4.

[188] Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force"; Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*; A. Haluk Ülman and Frank Tachau, "Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization with Democracy," *Middle East Journal* 19, no. 2 (1965): 153–68.

[189] Huntington, *Political Order*, 221.

Huntington's intervention is considered to be a major departure from the optimist accounts of the modernization school. Francis Fukuyama argues that Huntington's solid argument on the political change "killed off the modernization theory" by divorcing the political change from the economic advancement.[190] Colin Leys, on the other hand, argues that the influence of the study is more about its ideological intervention rather than consistency. Despite having "deficiencies of logic, methodology, and factual support", the significance lies in the revitalization of the modernization ideology with an "open and abrasive commitment to maintenance of order as the supreme political value" in a moment when the framework of the modernization school was under severe criticism of the dependency school.[191] Whether it is the termination or revitalization of the modernization, arguments he raised in *the Soldier and the State* in the 1950s on the popular mobilization and the history of military as a profession in a discussion on the developed world indicate that his resentment to the political developmentalist position was not depended on an observation of its failure in the underdeveloped world. He presents his conservative history of the modern military centered on the French Revolution by negating evolutionary accounts concentrating on the sophistication of the warfare with innovations in weaponry, i.e., theses of the military revolution and defensive modernization.[192]

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[190] Francis Fukuyama, "Foreword," in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, by Samuel P. Huntington (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), xi–xvii.

[191] Colin Leys, "Samuel Huntington and the End of Classical Modernization Theory," in *Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing Societies,"* ed. Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin (1982; repr., London: Macmillan, 1983), 332–49.

[192] Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660"; Dankwart A. Rüstow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics* 11, no. 4 (1959): 513–52; Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*,

The problem addressed in *the Soldier and the* State is the post-war the institutional arrangements regarding the armed forces that meant the establishment of a permanent army for the first time. In the absence of aristocratic forces, the armed force in the US was formed within a liberal and federalist framework that was modelled on the British legal structure of 18th century decentralizing the control over the armed force: The authority over *the militia forces* was divided between the states and the federal government, the Congress was enjoying significant controls over the President's mandate as the command in chief like limiting the federal army in a time frame or approving president's appointments, armed forces had separate command responding separate, and a unitary command structure was absent.[193] The only challenge to the military order in the United States before the world wars was the South, which was suppressed in the Civil War in 1865, but, a gigantic army remained as a war-time measure as post-war arrangements reduced the size in line with the isolationist foreign policy.[194]

Until the World War II the decentralized legal structure did not face any significant challenge. War time necessities forced the reformation of the military structure to establish a unitary command responding directly to the President. Additionally, the Congress lost some of its controls, the authorization of the top command to make decisions on the industrial affairs equipped soldiers with powers over non-military

ed. John Asher Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 69–90; Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John Asher Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 7–68; Dankwart A. Rüstow, "The Military: Turkey," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Dankwart A. Rüstow and Robert E. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 352–88; Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization; a Study in Comparative History*.

[193] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 163–92.

[194] Huntington, 222–30.

affairs, and personal bonds Roosevelt established with military men introduced them in the conduct of the foreign relations.[195] There was no de-mobilization like the one after the Civil War thanks to Truman's preference to designate the Soviet Union as a permanent enemy and to preserve the influence of military men in administration by appointing them to non-military positions. The trend was halted when the Congress showed discontent by not approving Truman's appointments and Eisenhower adopted a reverse course by resisting soldiers' demands.[196]

The argument he formulates for this epoch of the military politics in the United States is that the risk was not about turning into a military state, but the loss of professionalism with the blurring boundaries between military and non-military affairs that was specifically visible in the growing partnership of military and business leaders.[197] In that sense, Huntington argues, the risk was a drift towards subjective control like it happened in Germany and Japan during the World War II that cost them to lose the war due to the detrimental impact of this on armies' fighting capabilities.[198]

This historical account of the European developments in the 19th century as an addition to the detailed narrative on the post-war developments in the US is to further argue for the objective civilian control as the sole model maximizing combat effectiveness. It is rather an account for the French Revolution and Prussian reaction, where the former represents pitfalls of the subjective control and latter is a model of the objective control. Accordingly, he rejects any historical discussion on the modern military

[195] Huntington, 315–44.

[196] Huntington, 373–99.

[197] Huntington, 343–54.

[198] Huntington, 80–97.

covering periods before the French Revolution by claiming that in that period the armies were still under exclusive aristocratic command and one cannot find any military ethic in mercenary units. Though one may find military schools in the 18th century, it should be taken into account that they were to serve noble needs rather than to improve military efficiency.[199] The military as a profession was a product of the bourgeois challenge to the aristocratic command, and the Napoleonic military represents an extreme example of this conflict; it came into existence as a response to find a balance between them in the context of "technological specialization, competitive nationalism."[200] In France, even though there were promising initiatives during the Restoration period with the introduction of military schools concentrating on recruitment of professional officers, constitutional and political struggles hindered their advancement.[201] Prussian generals, on the other hand, successfully avoided the politicization of the army and developed the military as a scientific profession that reached its peak in last quarter of the 19th century when Bismarck-Moltke initiative achieved German unification.[202] The strict division of labor between Moltke and Bismarck in 1871, the former military leader to have a free hand in the conduct of the warfare while the latter would stick to the matters related to diplomacy, was the key providing Prussians superiority over the French. Huntington argues that this experience came into existence because military and civilian leaders followed the word of Clausewitz, the first military thinker who approached military in a scientific manner and laid the ground of the professional military ethic:

[199] Huntington, 19–28.

[200] Huntington, 32.

[201] Huntington, 34–39.

[202] Huntington, 30–37.

> The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.[203]

Here is the trick: The way Clausewitz' position presented in Huntington's account follows Moltke's deliberate distortion of Clausewitz's calls for making the war a matter for people as well by giving them rights like the French Revolution did. What makes Clausewitz a significant military thinker still relevant today is his rejection of the *geometrical* approach to the warfare to develop a philosophical framework.

What Prussian generals concentrated on was to reduce his approach into a practical guide for the modern warfare. Moltke assumed a laborious intellectual effort to distort it alongside the whole Prussian military establishment who did not enjoy the idea of a citizen-army specifically, to preserve their hold on peasants. Jehuda Wallach, in his review of these numerous "misperceptions" points out that

> [i]t was his firm belief that war and its general outlines had always been determined by the political institutions and not by the military. Therefore, in order to prevent frictions between the politicians and the generals and for the sake of smooth coordination between policy and military actions, Clausewitz suggested, in cases where there was no personal union of the statesman and the soldier, that the commander-in-chief be made a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet could participate in the principal issues of the commander's action. This clear indication of the primacy of policy over the conduct of war was rejected by the German soldiers… Whereas Clausewitz' genuine definition illuminated the problem from the statesman's point of view, the adulterated definition enlarged the powers of the general who was now made a member of the cabinet, so that he could participate in the decision-making process. That means Clausewitz' opinion was turned upside down! Nothing illuminates better the German soldier's rejection of political primacy than this intentional change.[204]

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[203] Huntington, 58.

[204] Jehuda L. Wallach, "Misperceptions of Clausewitz' on War by the German Military," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 9, no. 2–3 (June 1, 1986): 227–28.

With the support of the German Emperor Wilhelm II, who preached that "[p]olicy keeps its mouth shut during war until strategy allows it to speak again," Moltke's version provided a free hand to generals:

> Policy makes use of war to gain its objectives, it acts with decisive influence at the beginning and the end of the war, in such a way either to increase its claims during the progress of war or to be satisfied with lesser gains. With this uncertainty strategy cannot but always direct its efforts towards the highest goal attainable with the means at its disposal. It thereby serves policy best, and only works for the object of policy, but is completely independent of policy in its actions.[205]

What Weber and Huntington have in common is their fortification of the counter-revolutionary camp under disguise of a scientific approach. Unlike Weber, Huntington engaged in a systematical study of an ongoing development related to structuring of the military institutions together with a detailed historical account on the 19th century development. Huntington did deliberately what Weber had done in a reactionary manner. By doing so, he makes it clear that a true Weberian perspective could be framed if only it is framed in an anti-revolutionary position as in the case of the Bismarck-Moltke type of military organization.

[205] Wallach, 228.

CHAPTER 3

CAPITALIST STATE AND THE MILITARY

The problem of the military is not one of topics historical materialist scholars problematized primarily. Bedirhanoğlu, Dölek, and Hülagü[206] note in their review of the critical security studies that Marxists remain silent on the topic of coercion in capitalism as long as concerned coercive/repressive state apparatuses cannot be related directly to the dynamics of capital accumulation. When engaged, as will be also discussed in this chapter, they fail to overcome the non-Marxist ahistorical state conceptualizations formulated on its autonomous conception. Furthermore, despite assessments on the necessity of it, Marxists addressing coercion in the analyses of the real historical processes have framed the state in functionalist terms that depict coercive apparatuses of the capitalist state as instruments serving dominant class interests either immediately via economic relations or by intervening in the last instance. They point out that Marxist silence on the security or the failure to approach it as a social relation may risk a blindness towards the contradictory class character

[206] Bedirhanoğlu, Dölek, and Hülagü, "Devlet, Zor ve Sınıf Mücadelesi," 4.

inscribed in coercive state apparatuses just like the state itself.[207] Ultimately, as Bedirhanoğlu, Dölek, and Hülagü underline the silence of Marxists on the Weberian notion of state monopoly on means of violence reflects the inadequacy of Marxist analytical tools to make sense of state's coercive apparatuses.

Judging from the perspective of military politics, one might move beyond a criticism of silence and claim that the structural Marxists[208] have even integrated the Weberian notion of modern military into historical materialist analysis rather unproblematically. Indeed, this has been applauded enthusiastically in Weberian circles on military politics, and those insisting on the state's autonomous position in relation to any particular class interest as the primary proof for the limitation of the historical materialist class analysis of the state have in return integrated structuralist Marxist arguments to their analyses in a similar unproblematic manner.[209] Skocpol's assessment on the utility of Marxist theory as long as it is subsumed to the economical realm[210] is noteworthy if considered with her conceptual stance for the determination of the superstructure in the analysis of the state.[211] On the one hand, it is yet another example of the Weberian tendency to approach historical materialism in a caricaturized form produced from the vulgar economistic argument for the infrastructure's determination of the superstructure. Examples go back to the German historical

[207] Bedirhanoğlu, Dölek, and Hülagü, 25.

[208] Louis Althusser, *Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx* (1959; repr., London: NLB, 1972); Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, trans. Timothy O'Hagan (1968; repr., London: NLB, 1976); Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: NLB, 1974); Nicos Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, trans. David Fernbach (1974; repr., London: NLB, 1975); Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*.

[209] Alfred C. Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[210] Skocpol, "State and Revolution."

[211] Skocpol.

school's efforts for overcoming Marxism as discussed in the previous chapter. On the other hand, structuralist Marxists have also contributed to such perceptions of Marxism in their utilization of Weberian categories while opposing, in their view, the vulgarism of the Marxist state derivation theory. Similar criticisms of vulgarism and reductionism can also be observed in Marxist accounts reconciling with the statist institutionalist tradition.[212]

While Althusser, the leading figure of structuralist Marxism, integrates the Weberian notion of legality as the ultimate pre-condition of the unity of state apparatuses in a stealth way when defining the repressive state apparatuses, Nicos Poulantzas and Perry Anderson, who construct their arguments on Althusser's theory of state apparatuses, are more outspoken about the availability of the Weberian approach. This chapter will provide a review of this Weberian influence in the development of the main premises of Althusserian Marxism first. It will then move to overview Ellen Meiksins Wood's Political Marxist critique of Anderson that is aware of this influence, yet unable to overcome it. In other words, this chapter is essentially a critique of a critique. The objective is to start moving away from a role-based study of the military politics towards a framework reflecting its contradictory class character that does not reduce dominated classes into passive subjects exposed to social and political transformations, but observes their constitutive role in these transformations.[213]

To this end, the first part will address how Althusserian Marxism has integrated Weberian notions together with its historiography. One of the main pillars of this is the

[212] As an example for a such reconciliation within the discussion on the military politics that integrates Michael Mann's framework on the state power in an analysis of class hegemony to overcome the Marxist silence on the coercive nature of the state power: Akça, "Militarism, Capitalism and the State."

[213] Bedirhanoğlu, Dölek, and Hülagü, "Devlet, Zor ve Sınıf Mücadelesi."

claim for remaining loyal to the so-called classical Marxist historiography of the bourgeois revolution derived from early works of Marx and Engels in the context of 1848 revolutions, *The Communist Manifesto* and the *18th Brumaire of the Louis Napoleon*. Accordingly, the bourgeois revolution is conceptualized as a historical moment finalizing the transition from feudalism to capitalism due to the bourgeois triumph over aristocracy in a revolutionary act. While the stress in the argument is on the realization of the bourgeois political domination, it also presupposes that the bourgeoisie had matured its economic domination prior to it. That is why Althusserians focused on the conditions of the pre-revolutionary state, i.e., the absolutist state as the enabling factor for the development of capitalist relations. The second part will cover Wood's Political Marxism, which has serious reservations on Althusser's structuralism but arrives at a similar functionalism while elaborating on violence in capitalism. Her elaboration on agrarian origins of the transition from feudalism to capitalism addresses the problems of the bourgeois paradigm in the historiography of transition, which is represented best in Weber's account on the modern-rational state and reproduced, according to Wood, by Marxists as well. For, just like Weber's modern state, structuralists' capitalist state identifies the bourgeois with the capitalist in a historiography arguing for the rise of "capitalism as a natural product of commercialisation, the growth of cities, and the expansion of trade."[214] The bourgeois paradigm does not make any sense either for birth of capitalism within agrarian relations with direct noble involvement in England, or for making sense of the distinctive outcomes of the English bourgeois revolution and the French Revolution.

[214] Larry Patriquin, "Introduction: The 'Method' of Ellen Meiksins Wood," in *The Ellen Meiksins Wood Reader*, by Ellen Meiksins Wood, ed. Larry Patriquin, Historical Materialism Book Series 40 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 11.

Wood's intervention is meaningful to show the shortcomings of structuralism in recognizing the plebian constitutive contributions to modernity, but her overall discussion creates more problems than it resolves. The problem lies in her ultimate idealization of capitalist production as a sphere defined by the absence of extra-economic coercion, an argument which would indeed be happily shared by structuralists underlining the capitalist state's precondition as its separation from the economy. Wood's over-emphasis on the modern's being something else than capitalist turns counter-productive as will be problematized in her remarks on the American imperialism, which she assesses to be a burden for capitalism in its entirety due to its potential to bring back extra-economic coercion. A further proof of its being counter-productive is her followers' contemplation of practices related to the modern military such as French Jacobinism as elements of historical efforts to create substitutions for capitalist social relations.[215]

3.1. The Althusserian Formulation

Even though they differ in their historical evaluations on how to make sense of the absolutist state and the bourgeois revolution in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, Althusser, Poulantzas and Anderson reproduce similar Weberian arguments while problematizing the repressive apparatuses of the capitalist state via structuralist premises.

The core argument on state crosscutting all three thinkers is the conception of the capitalist state as an arena of class struggles pursued through state apparatuses. They

[215] Robbie Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations: The Rise and Fall of a Liberal Project* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Eren Düzgün, *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations: Revisiting Turkish Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

also put a common emphasis on the unity within the state to be sustained in the ideological instance with the help of repressive apparatuses. As will be highlighted in this chapter, in their accounts for the repressive state apparatuses of the capitalist state, Althusser and Poulantzas preserve this core argument on the capitalist state by relying on the Weberian notion of modern military as the source of the state's monopoly on violence. Anderson contributed to these arguments by elaborating further on the military sphere via conceptions of military revolution and the defensive modernization to formulate a different trajectory for the Eastern European and Ottoman cases.

3.1.1. The Absolutist State

Althusser addresses the absolutist state in his elaborations on Montesquieu's political theory and proposes a revision on the classical Marxist formulation.[216] For him, the absolutist state was not an arbiter seeking an equilibrium in the noble-bourgeois competition because the mercantile bourgeoisie was integral to the state power as much as the feudal lords; but, an integration as such gives the state a contradictory character that would produce paradoxical outcomes. The absolutist efforts for preserving the feudal appropriation in conditions of growing mercantile activity had only precipitated the conditions for the development of capitalist relations with the bourgeois ideology becoming dominant. Poulantzas elaborates on this argument by focusing on the modern law in this epoch and argues for the absolutist state's being a capitalist state that the bourgeoisie utilized in their antagonistic relationship to nobles under conditions of capitalism's co-existence with feudalism.[217] Lastly, Anderson, while questioning differentiated trajectories to capitalism, has provided categories that

[216]Althusser, *Politics and History*.

[217] Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, 161–67.

may be considered as *forms of the absolutist state* if we put it in Poulantzasian terms.[218] Anderson too observes the absolutist state as one holding capitalist features and adds that the absolutist experience in Eastern Europe was distinctive from the Western one. The argument he makes is that the Eastern absolutist state was an outcome of the geo-political challenges rather than domestic class relations and laid the ground for failed bourgeois revolutions, the most notable one being the 1848 revolutions.

Different focuses and disagreements do not amount to challenging the core argument on the absolutist state as being a truly transitionary state for its dissolving feudal relations and developing capitalist relations at the same time. Additionally, they frame the bourgeois revolution as a bourgeois political victory that overcame the contradictions of the absolutist state stemming from the antagonistic bourgeoisie-feudal relations it rests on by removing obstacles to further capitalist development. If reviewed with remarks on the military, the structuralist position is developed by integrating the Weberian notion of the modern military to argue that the organization of violence acquired its modern form by the centralized state's overcoming of the parcellized sovereignty feudal lords enjoyed which was to be grasped by the bourgeoisie later in a revolutionary act.

Althusser argues that historical studies necessitate re-considering "notions of absolute monarchy, of its 'alliance with the bourgeoisie'" against nobles by dwelling on the character of the pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie. For, the absolutist bourgeoisie engaging in trade and financial activities was distinct from the industrial bourgeoisie having "mass-production economy, concentrating entirely on profit subsequently reinvested in production" who led the French Revolution, the event realizing the

[218] Anderson, *The Absolutist State*.

bourgeois political domination via the capitalist state functioning in the extended re-production of conditions of exploitation.[219]

Unlike the revolutionary bourgeoisie, commercial and financial bourgeoisie were not distinct from nobles for they too constituted their wealth-creation activities in state apparatuses like office holding in exchange for rent payments to the state; likewise, the focus of their political activities was not to challenge the noble domination but to become a noble through land possession or marriages. The exploitation and political domination were still feudal in essence.[220]

The integration of the mercantile bourgeoisie into the state appeared to the 18th century man as the king's balancing feudal lords' influence by relying on an alliance with commoners, yet this perception fails to grasp that "the political regime of absolute monarchy is merely the new political form required to maintain feudal domination and exploitation in a period of the development of the mercantile economy."[221] The entry of the better-off bourgeoisie into nobility though offices-sale intensified the state's dependence to profits derived from this accumulation that eventually subordinated it to the mercantile growth; yet, the accumulation realized through commercial and financial activities oriented towards the state and the limits of growth within the absolutist state were set by the number of offices, which together are at the core of the transitionary nature of the absolutist state. The noble discomfort over the usurpation of "ancient personal political prerogatives," the continuation of the feudal exploitation in a way favoring also the bourgeoisie shows nothing less than the crown's developing

[219] Althusser, *Politics and History*, 99.

[220] Althusser, 100.

[221] Althusser, 102–3.

into a state apparatus with an autonomous power of its own to guarantee the general interests of the feudal class even at the expense of some individual lords striving for personal political prerogatives.[222]

Althusser shows the emergent paradoxes in Montesquieu's relationship to the bourgeois ideology. Montesquieu, in search for a monarchy like the one in England, sought to bound the king's rule with laws pre-dating the king and securing clerical and noble privileges, to avoid a despotic rule like in the Turkish Empire defying any legal-political structure. While the despotic Turkish Empire is a pure imagination, it is also a warning against a despotic rule that does not turn clerical and noble privileges into institutions and may stimulate a popular revolution.[223] Although Montesquieu was right-wing ideologue for the preservation of feudal society, the way he proposed his position by citing a despotic king as the real threat contributed the industrial bourgeois party to formulate their genuine ideology in mobilization of popular masses to grasp the moment in the midst of a popular revolution, and to label Montesquieu as the first bourgeois victory against feudal relations of domination.[224]

Poulantzas breaks from Althusser's contention that the bourgeoisie was not challenging the noble political dominance and the absolutist state was a feudal state. The political confrontation was definitely between the bourgeoisie and the nobility: It was the mercantile bourgeoisie who challenged the feudal exploitation by developing industrial relations, which would eventually separate the labor from the means of production and establish a proper capitalist mode of production; they also challenged

[222] Althusser, 103.

[223] Althusser, 66–86.

[224] Althusser, 103–6.

the feudal political domination and grasped the moment during the French Revolution. The significance of the absolutist state, he emphasizes, is that institutions of the capitalist state – the structure of the bourgeois political domination – came into existence in a period the bourgeoisie had not achieved the political domination yet, but enabled a process of primitive accumulation.

A theory of change, or of transition as Poulantzas himself calls, should recognize "the 'consolidated' non-dominance of the" capitalist mode of production in its co-existence with feudal mode of production if it is to make sense of the absolutist state's complexity arising from "its non-correspondence between the political superstructure and the economic instance" in conditions of "a continuous (often hidden) displacement of the index of dominance from one mode of production to another."[225] As he later re-asserted, the problem to be addressed is the absolutist state's development as "predominantly capitalist while the relations of production still bore a feudal stamp," i.e., the accumulation to be primitive, that shows "a form of State may precede the relations of production to which it corresponds."[226]

The transitionary character of the absolutist state, as well as the realization of the bourgeois political dominance, stems from the active bourgeois instrumentalization of it in their attacks to noble positions standing as obstacles for further development of capitalist mode of production. The capitalist character of the absolutist state appears in functions like "expropriating small landowners, financing, supplying funds for starting industrialization, attacking seigneurial power, breaking down commercial barriers within the national boundaries, etc.," which favored the bourgeoisie against

[225] Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, 157–61.

[226] Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 41.

noble interests.[227] Such functions came into existence not as an outcome of class relations, but of a process that Weber referred as the rationalization of the authority, and Weberian military politics scholars as the military revolution. For Poulantzas, the centralization of the state as a response to the feudalism's major crisis in the 14th and 15th century overcame the problem of parcellized sovereignty, established territorial sovereignty, and transformed the state power into a public force by separating it from the private sphere to become the only source of any political power. The process is most apparent in the military field. The central state abolished the military system based on feudal dues to maintain its own army, and this army's assuming "the character of a popular army of a state representing the unity of the people" pioneered the detachment of the bureaucracy from political and economic interests of office holders to represent the general interests.[228] "The state's monopolization of war" starting from the sixteenth century as "the pacification of social forces ('private wars')" separated the central state from relations of productions by developing the modern law, a juridical system embodying the idea of a monarch bounded up by laws transcending the king's actual life. The modern law, "a system of general, abstract and formal rules that law regulates the exercise of power by the state apparatuses," matured further in efforts "to confront specific problems of organization concerning relations between the landed nobility and the bourgeoisie" by enhancing the state ability to function with a relative autonomy in order to maintain the unity of a class hegemony. The modern law giving the absolutist state a capitalist character is fundamentally depended on the state's monopolization of means of violence.[229]

[227] Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, 166.

[228] Poulantzas, 161–67.

[229] Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 86–92.

It is striking how Poulantzas frames the historical development of the capitalist state and the modern military in relation to only the French case even in his historical elaborations.[230] In England, the capitalist mode of production came into existence in its peculiar ways as an initiative of a fraction of the feudal nobility to grasp the political domination that enabled the bourgeoisie to advance in economic domination first and later in political domination. In these conditions of swift transition from feudalism to capitalism, Britain by-passed the absolutist epoch, thus, the army and the bureaucracy had preserved its feudal character and never had to deliver the function as observed in France.[231] In Germany, understood as the expansion of Prussia into German Empire, the nobility did not face any challenge and preserved their political domination together with the economic domination based on rent; thus, the state in Germany showed clear feudal characteristics even until the World War I. The German peasantry could not become a political actor at all, as the bourgeoisie was content to act in enclaves permitted by the feudal state. The failed bourgeois attempt in 1848 was proved to be too late and too little since noble-dominated feudal state already assumed the task of industrialization, the sphere where the bourgeoisie get empowered economically. In these conditions, like Britain, Germany too experienced a direct transition from feudalism to capitalism, but in its own specificity that made the containment of the emergent proletariat an urgent necessity for the feudal nobility, state-dependent bourgeoisie, and independently developing petty-bourgeoisie, setting the path for exceptional state forms.[232]

[230] Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, 168–84.

[231] Poulantzas, 171–72.

[232] Poulantzas, 180–83.

Anderson's extensive study is devoted to the divergent experiences of absolutism in Western and Eastern Europe. In doing so, he preserved Althusser's position of framing the absolutist state as only the political form capable of maintaining the feudal domination under conditions of a growing commodity economy. To be more precise, the absolutist state was a response of nobles to losing economic and political domination in the face of dismantling serfdom relations. In exchange of maintaining the hierarchical social order keeping peasants at the bottom, nobles gave consent to transfer of their political-legal coercive capabilities to a centralized authority; thus, the absolutist state was the re-organization of the feudal domination on a national scale that abolished the parcellized sovereignty.[233] Similar to Poulantzas, Anderson also recognizes the bourgeois as a challenge to the feudal domination for its economic advancements' bringing in institutions that appear preeminently capitalist in character like "standing armies, a permanent bureaucracy, national taxation, a codified law, and the beginnings of a unified market."[234] As nobles were re-organizing their class power in the absolutist state starting from 14th century, the town proved itself to overcome the major crisis of feudalism and enabled Renaissance advancements in technique and in commercial relations. The spread of the town-centered commodity relations towards rural relations, Anderson argues, emerged as an over-determining factor for the absolutist state forcing it to replace the medieval juridical relations with modern ones that was to be developed with the revival of the Roman law. In that context, under-determination of the rural relations and over-determination of the urban expansion set the main axes of the paradoxical development of the absolutist state. As this paradox sharpened, the absolutist state became more fragile for its preserving feudal

[233] Anderson, *The Absolutist State*, 15–20.

[234] Anderson, 17.

appropriation at the superstructural level in a context that its base was in decline in the face of the bourgeois-led capitalist development; consequently, “surface 'modernity' again and again betrays a subterranean archaism.”[235]

The major factor deepening the fragility of the absolutist state was the military revolution taken place starting from the late 16th century. The nobility, who were unable to grasp the emerging reality that trading was replacing the military might in growth strategies, hold an exclusionary command of the centralized armed forces and preserved the territorial expansion as the prime objective of the wars.[236] Raising costs of the warfare as a result of the military revolution led nobles of the absolutist state in search for cash to approach enriching bourgeois actors. Credit relations, mercantilism, and most critically office-sales integrated the bourgeoisie within the structure of the absolutist state. Extra-ordinary tools used in order to overcome the fiscal challenges gained a regular character in time, and the result was not limited to the integration of non-nobles to the noble ruling scheme, but also the material wealth’s overshadowing the personal clientage as the prime pre-condition of ruling.[237] Divergence of England and Netherlands in this epoch signifies war-related complications were characteristic of absolutist states. While these states, who had undergone revolutionary transformations, refrained to wage territorial conquest wars but preferred commercial wars in colonies since the 17th century, the French absolutists state was stick to the territorial expansion even immediate before its bourgeois revolution.[238]

[235] Anderson, 20–29.

[236] Anderson, 29–36.

[237] Anderson, 51–52.

[238] Anderson, 57–59.

The appearance of the absolutist state as such was a Western European process. In the Eastern Europe the trajectory of the absolutism was fundamentally different because eastern nobles had to implement absolutist practices not as a response to losing control over peasants but to a geo-political challenge posed by Sweden and England in the 17th century, who successfully adopted the military revolution. The military revolution in the West compelled the Eastern rulers to commit themselves to the defensive modernization. The success in adoption of new military techniques did not only bring Prussian and Russian victories against Swedes, but also enabled the consolidation of the royal power as a new layer of the noble domination over peasants enabling them to protect their land holdings and to secure their appropriation of the peasantry surplus.[239] The result in Prussia was a fortified feudalism that was essentially an aristocratic military organization producing a state structure accidentally.[240] In Russia, success against Swedes was followed by the Muscovite expansion into the Eurasian theatre at the expanse of the nomadic communities. The outcome in Russia was the super-absolutism, which subordinated nobles to the royal power on the condition of their becoming land-owners and maintaining serfdom relations.[241] Since nobles were integrated to the centralized state structure without any limitation on their capacity to extract peasant surplus, the Eastern absolutist monarchs did not introduce office-sales, thus, *the bourgeois was deprived of an effective instrument* to realize their bid for power.[242] In such conditions, even though, Enlightenment ideas were welcomed by the enlightened despots investing in modern institutions, the royal rule in the East

[239] Anderson, 198–200.

[240] Anderson, 212–13.

[241] Anderson, 215–16.

[242] Anderson, 216–18.

attempted to transform the archaic structure to enable a bourgeois advancement only after external pressures necessitated them, like when the Prussian King accepted the abolition of the serfdom after the humiliating defeat against Napoleon in 1807 or when Tsar Alexander the Liberator did so in 1861 with the Emancipation Law following the defeat in the Crimean War.[243]

3.1.2. The Capitalist State and State Apparatuses

In essence, structuralist remarks on the absolutist state's developing a coercive organization in public character discuss the historical development of the relative autonomy of the state from the economy as a precondition of a proper capitalist state functioning within a proper capitalist mode of production. As mentioned above, this framework is problematic if one moves from the French case. It is also problematic in making sense of the military within the capitalist state as a distinguished experience from the absolutist one apart from the presence of feudal lords; however, this significance also disappears when the contradictory character of the capitalist state is observed in the intra-dominant class contradictions. By these qualities, the structuralist account already converges with the Weberian historiography. Additionally, Weberians as well address the representation of conflicting class interests in the military as factor making the state fragile, just like Weber himself repeatedly noted Junker primacy within the army while clinging into pre-capitalist agricultural production as the major existential threat for the Imperial Germany. The Weberian influence upon structural Marxism appears most clearly in the latter's elaborations on *the capitalist army* as an integral unit of repressive state apparatuses maintaining the ideological and

[243] Anderson, 232–35.

institutional unity of class domination, formulated within the framework the Althusserian state theory.

Althusser elaborated on state power by formulating a theory of ideology as a response to the subjectivism stressing on the centrality of individual as an agent of history.[244] Historicist humanism, as he labels, defies levels or instances present in Marxism in a way making it close to the Hegelian totality, which eventually reproduces the fatality of the Second International's vulgar economism with a voluntarism centering the political consciousness.[245] The spontaneity of these currents can only detect the obvious appearing in the production sphere, but cannot observe the reproduction of conditions of production, an essential ability of a social formation to maintain its existence.[246] The social whole, the core Marxist concept overcoming Hegelian totality, proposes a topographical approach for the analysis of a social structure; a metaphor placing the economic instance at the bottom, legal-political and ideological instances at the top. Economic level's being at the bottom implies its determination in the last instance; likewise, he argues, legal-political and ideological instances' position at the top implies their relative autonomy and reciprocal action on the base. The task of Althusser's theory of ideology is to go beyond the descriptive notion of this topography by bringing in the role of the superstructure in the reproduction of the infrastructure; by developing abilities to observe the non-obvious operating in individuals' unconsciousness.[247]

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[244] Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (1984; repr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 89.

[245] Louis Althusser, "Marxism Is Not a Historicism," in *Reading "Capital,"* trans. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1970), 138–39.

[246] Althusser, "Ideological State Apparatuses," 232–33.

[247] Althusser, 237–38.

The ideology, at the center of the topography, is to intervene in the imagination of the social relations of production in its reproduction: It is "the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence,"[248] to "the relations of production and the relations that derive from them."[249] The ideology is not a pure imagination or set of ideas, because the essential component is everyday practices within a particular apparatus coming into existence through ideology's transforming individuals into subjects;[250] therefore, the ideology cannot go beyond the mode of production in a social formation and class struggles developing in them.[251] The capitalist mode of production is fundamentally grounded on the bourgeois exploitation of the labor; thus, the reproduction of social relations of production is the reproduction of relations of exploitation, the ideology functions within the capitalist struggle against the labor.[252]

Althusser understands the separation of the public and private within distinctive characteristics of the ideological and legal-political state apparatuses. Ideological state apparatuses operate within the private sphere; they are multiple, relatively autonomous from the legal-political sphere, have a capacity to express class contradictions, so they may appear as contradictory, but the ruling ideology maintains their unity in the reproduction. Legal-political ones, instead, are centralized and unified under the leadership of dominant classes and serving to their class struggle against the exploited majority. "The exercise of State power in the state apparatuses," i.e., "the legal-political and ideological superstructure," secures the reproduction of production

[248] Althusser, 256.

[249] Althusser, 257–58.

[250] Althusser, 261–66.

[251] Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory*, 91.

[252] Althusser, "Ideological State Apparatuses," 236.

relations with a distance to classes; but public and private apparatuses may function in unity only if the ruling class coalition has the control over legal-political ones, including the repressive state apparatuses.[253]

Althusser's description of the relationship between the unified repressive state apparatuses and dispersed ideological one is not fundamentally distinctive to Weber's account on the legal-rational authority. Similar to Weber, addressing the state's monopoly on the use of physical violence as the ultimate source of citizens' submission to the legality for the fear of being subjected to the actual violence,[254] Althusser claims, "[t]he role of the repressive State apparatus" is "securing by force (physical or otherwise) the political conditions of the reproduction of relations of production which are in the last resort relations of exploitation."[255]

The emphasis on fluidity between ideological and repressive apparatuses and their interplay in determination of the everyday life in a social formation can merely overcome the Weberian contention that the organization of violence is the fundamental base of a (modern) capitalist society. *The last instance* transforms this argument into an instrumental one.

In that sense, what differentiates Althusser from Weber is his outspoken instrumentalism in giving an account for the bourgeoisie's grasping the political domination. Weber develops his framework on the modern state through a study of the impact of rationalization in various distinct spheres – distinct state apparatuses in

[253] Althusser, 242–46.

[254] Weber: "As long as there is a chance that a coercive apparatus will enforce, in a given situation, compliance with those norms, we nevertheless must consider them as 'law.'" Weber, *Economy and Society*, 312.

[255] Althusser, "Ideological State Apparatuses," 246–48.

Althusserian terminology – and in distinct historical periods while he deliberately conceals his conviction of this process as progress realized by the bourgeois triumph over other classes under the cover of the argument for its being a uniquely occidental. The rationalization of the authority is a natural outcome of a healthy society that can realize the essential human potential anticipated by the Renaissance and Reformation; and such a healthy society is the precondition of market to function, i.e., class relations to take place.

Althusser, on the hand, is outspoken in his conviction that the state power is a critical instrument that the bourgeois class utilized when grasping the rule from the landed aristocracy, which had maintained the political domination by the church as an ideological state apparatus. It was possible for "the merchant-capitalist bourgeoisie" to succeed in grasping the state power from the aristocracy after class confrontations erupted consecutively since the French Revolution only because they successfully had seized the state power with a revolutionary act to break "the former repressive State apparatus and replace it with a new one (e.g., the national popular Army)" in line with class objectives.[256] More important than that, this action was possible in the first place due to the bourgeois subordination of intellectuals into their political agenda in the first place, then keeping them apart from any possible alliance with the working class.[257] What happened in the Bolshevik Revolution was not distinct to it: After embodying the revolutionary theory in Soviets, Lenin's primary concern was revolutionizing the education institutions as an attempt the secure the achievement realized with the proletariat's seizure of the state power. Upon this conviction,

[256] Althusser, 249.

[257] Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (1965; repr., London: Verso, 2005), 25.

Althusser develops his state theory as a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary strategy based on gradual realization of the seizure of the state power, the transformation of state apparatuses in line with class objectives, and the use of state apparatuses to destroy state power all together.[258] It is curious, why he preferred to mention the Bolshevik Revolution in educational instruments, but not armed ones as if Bolshevik Revolution or any other revolution or attempt of it did not have a concern over military issues at all. It necessitates more digging into Althusser's texts, life, and political activism, but it is enough to note the historical record that a peaceful revolution in the sense of absence of war or armed confrontation is only exceptional, if there is any, and revolutionaries have been present in the military sphere as intellectuals as well.

Poulantzas preserved Althusser's understanding of the capitalist state appearing in different instances and of the class struggle taking place in state apparatuses. More important than that, he concentrated on formulating a theory of structural change by reinterpreting Weber's typology with the Althusserian state theory. Poulantzas is clear in emphasizing shortcomings of the Weberian notion of class for its conceptualizing the relationship of the state to classes as an external one. He utilizes the Althusserian state theory to formulate a counter-typology on the basis of internal relations.[259] Unlike Althusser, Poulantzas expresses his utilization of Weberian analytical tools in his Marxist theory of state openly. In that sense, one cannot escape the impression that he was treating the Weberian typology, just like Marx reversed Hegelian dialectic.[260] Accordingly, what Weber referred to as the legal-rational authority is nothing but the

[258] Althusser, "Ideological State Apparatuses," 242–43.

[259] Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, 23–26.

[260] Poulantzas, 195–96; Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 128–29.

capitalist state; however, its juxtaposition against traditional and charismatic authorities cannot represent the capitalist state as a distinct type of state.[261] Poulantzas' counter-typology constructed on the observation of instances is to serve both to highlight the capitalist state's distinctiveness and to observe differentiations within a same type of state. The mode of production determined by observation of the economy's autonomy from other instances is the main feature of a type of state; and the configuration of instances, i.e., "the relation between relatively autonomous economic and political instances" articulated in state apparatuses, is that of the form of the capitalist state.[262]

Poulantzas problematized the relative autonomy of the state by moving beyond a limited mention of it as a definitional necessity put forward by Marxist classics: "[W]hy, in order to assert its political domination, does the bourgeoisie dispose of the quite specific state apparatus that is the capitalist State – the modern representative State, the national-popular class State?"[263] Posing the question as such reveal how he equates the capitalist state to the so-called bourgeois political forms that primarily refers to representative democratic practices within a state with public character; this equation would be addressed by critiques of his theory of the state, (will be presented below). His view in his early works was that this form is rooted in the absolutist state for its realization of the relative autonomy. The relative autonomy of the capitalist state comes into existence within necessities stemming from the plurality of dominant classes; but, for the capitalist state, the concern is not an antagonistic bourgeoisie-

[261] Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, 147.

[262] Poulantzas, 148–51.

[263] Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 49.

aristocracy relationship anymore, but conflicting interests of bourgeois class fractions that may not reach a level of antagonism:

> On a terrain of political domination occupied by several classes and class fractions and divided by internal contradictions, the capitalist state, while predominantly representing the interests of the hegemonic class or fraction (itself variable), enjoys a relative autonomy with respect to that class and fraction as well as to the other classes and fractions of the power bloc. One reason for this is that its task is to ensure the general political interest of the power bloc as a whole, organizing the 'unstable equilibrium of compromise' (Gramsci) among its components under the leadership of the hegemonic class or fraction; the other reason is that it organizes this hegemony with respect to the social formation as a whole, thus also with respect to the dominated classes, according to the specific forms that their struggles assume under capitalism… The state is not an instrumental entity existing for itself, it is not a thing, but the condensation of a balance of forces. The correspondence [of the state and interests of the hegemonic class] in question is established rather in terms of organization and representation: the hegemonic class or fraction, beyond its immediate economic interests which are of the moment or at least short-term, must undertake to defend the overall political interest of the classes and fractions that constitute the power bloc, and thus its own long-term political interest.[264]

In the condition of plurality of class fractions, the autonomous appearance of the state is an expression of its role in maintaining hegemonic cohesion -not to be understood as an arbitration role though-. The state is hence conceptualized as a contradictory arena where the class struggle takes place in the relationship between repressive state apparatuses and ideological apparatuses.[265] The stress on the plurality of dominant classes, class fractions as he refers, rejects "the thesis of the fusion of the state and the monopolies in a single mechanism" and enables an "analysis of the internal contradictions of the contemporary state."[266] The contradictory relation between class fractions is an obstacle for such a conclusion for an instrumentalized state in its unity; but if fractions' representation in various state apparatuses is recognized, the form of

[264] Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, 94–95.

[265] Poulantzas, 155–60.

[266] Poulantzas, 163.

the capitalist state could be approached in an analytical manner by focusing on the relationship of state apparatuses to the others.

In his early works, Poulantzas elaborates on repressive state apparatuses through the Althusserian fluid topography that rejects the consideration of the military as strictly belonging to the repressive instance; although it is utilized as the last resort in class confrontations, the organization of the violence in a capitalist state is not for appropriation, but for maintaining the ideological unity. Such fluidity appearing in repressive state apparatuses' assuming a "role in the materialization and the reproduction of ideological relations (bourgeois ideology), a key role in the reproduction of the places of social classes," is a result of the state's monopolization of the use of physical force that detaches violence from the moment of appropriation in capitalist mode of production, i.e., the disappearance of the extra-economic appropriation that is the main feature of the feudal mode of production.[267]

In this frame, the military in a capitalist state may also have an economic function. The military may contribute to "to the expansion of monopoly exploitation and to the dominant forms of intensive exploitation of labour" by emerging as a significant customer within its role in the modernization;[268] or, they may assume a supervisory role by transferring knowledge in disciplining factories to enable management and control of workers.[269]

One of the reasons for Poulantzas' significance in the Marxist state debates is that his position evolved into an insider critique of Althusserian Marxism following the

[267] Poulantzas, 32.

[268] Poulantzas, 163.

[269] Poulantzas, 237.

turbulence of the May 1968. As he went from being Althusser's student into one of his critics, this turn is also reflected in Poulantzas' utilization of Weberian arguments in his now relational methodology, which attempted to move beyond deducing the class character of the capitalist state from every instance of the capitalist domination on the principle of the determination of the economy in the last instance. Accordingly, he drops vulgar interpretations of the relationship between political domination and economic domination, and utilizes Weber to formulate his critique by bringing in the problem of positive aspects of the legal structures as one aspect of the repressive state apparatuses.

If the state is to be approached in negative terms, as Althusser does by proposing ideological trickery or Foucault by framing of it as a disciplinary machine making subjects to internalize repression by means of normalization, the risk is neglecting the role of law and of the state in the actual exercise of power.[270] The exercise of power is fundamentally related to the bodily harm; but the body is not simply a biological entity, it is a political institution itself; thus, relations of the State to the body cannot be reduced to the physical repression. Within the realm of the bodily order, "the State also acts in a positive fashion, creating, transforming and making reality;" it "institutes and manages bodies by bending and moulding them into shape and inserting them in the various institutions and apparatuses" in service of "physical constraint, manipulation and consumption of bodies."[271]

In the capitalist state, the positivity of the law is if for "the atomization of the body-politic into what are called 'individuals' – that is, juridical-political persons who are

[270] Poulantzas, 77.

[271] Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 30–31.

the subjects of certain freedoms" that state apparatuses presuppose in delivering their functions; "[t]he centralized, bureaucratized State installs this atomization" and claims for being the representative of the unity composed of atomized individuals to enable the exercise of power over a fragmented social form by turning it into "homogeneous in its division, uniform in the isolation of its elements, and continuous in its atomization."[272] Repressive state apparatuses are among various institutions including education institutions functioning in "training-apportioning-distributing agents-individuals among the classes."[273] Their essential role, however, is enabling the all other apparatuses to function in the reproduction of production relations by enabling the law with the regulation of the bodily-harm. The "state monopolization of violence concealed by the displacement of legitimacy towards legality and by the rule of law" satisfies the precondition of an established capitalist exploitation that is a pacified private realm:

> …the national army is consubstantial with parliament and the capitalist school. But this con-substantiality does not rest only on a common institutional materiality stemming from the social division of labour embodied by these apparatuses; it also rests on the fact that the national army, as an explicit part of the state monopoly of legitimate physical violence, gives rise to the forms of existence and operation of institutions – parliament, school – in which violence does not have to be materialized as such. The regular existence and even the constitution of a law enacting parliament is unthinkable without the modern national army.[274]

Poulantzas keeps earlier assessments that the absolutist state is the historical root of the capitalist state as such. "The European capitalist state" came into existence "through pacification of territories torn by feudal wars," and apart from specific occurrences, like the exceptional state, war, course of the class struggle, the violence

[272] Poulantzas, 63.

[273] Poulantzas, 75.

[274] Poulantzas, 81.

has remained separated from the moment of appropriation.[275] The objective of historical studies is to reveal what kind of class relations various state forms represent. The military in France is an apparatus addressing the relationship of the bourgeoisie to the peasantry.[276] However, "[d]epending on the form of State and regime and on the phase of reproduction of capitalism" the differences between instances may get blurred as observed in military dictatorships where the army had become "an ideological organizational apparatus functioning above all as a political party of the bourgeoisie."[277] In the long run of the class struggles, "every dominant state apparatus" … "tends to become the privileged seat of the hegemonic fraction's interests, and to incarnate changes in the relations of hegemony": the re-configuration of the relationship of apparatuses to each other upon class struggles may place repressive apparatuses in a dominant position or turn it into a resistance center.[278] Their exact place among differentiations may only be detected by paying an interest in "particular histories" of relationship of class fractions within the power bloc to each other and of the bloc to popular masses in the context of the reproduction of "the domination-subordination relationship at the heart of the State."[279]

Poulantzas' critique of Althusser and Foucault would be shared by many Marxist critiques of the Althusserian Marxism including himself as they would also appreciate his assertation that the main task is yet to make sense of the dominated classes' constitutive contributions in the formation of the capitalist state. The problematization

[275] Poulantzas, 80.

[276] Poulantzas, 221.

[277] Poulantzas, 33–34.

[278] Poulantzas, 137.

[279] Poulantzas, 141.

of the state should also include "certain real rights of the dominated classes," which came into existence as concessions imposed by the popular masses,[280] forcing the State, including the fascist state, to act "within an unstable equilibrium of compromises between the dominant classes and the dominated."[281]

Revisions on the repressive state apparatuses indicates a conviction of Weber to be pivotal in achieving such an outcome. However, Weber-inspired emphasis on the positive aspect of the legality does not produce desired outcomes since it cannot go beyond formulating another function of repressive state apparatuses in which popular masses are still passive recipients.

3.1.3. Imperialism or State in Global Capitalism

In such a framework for the study of the capitalist state, which locates the repressive apparatuses at the center in a topography of instances and searches for economic functions to prove the capitalist character of the military, the most controversial argument appears in Poulantzas' elaborations on imperialism. Poulantzas approaches the global reach of capitalism by a periodization of the international scale that suggests its current phase in the 1970s is constituted on the US ultra-imperialism for the reproduction of the monopoly capital, i.e., the US capital. Distinctive from the world market of the colonial era and the inter-imperialist rivalry of the competitive capitalism, the monopoly capital does not allow a social formation to exist independently because the monopoly capitalism's relationship to other modes of production including competitive capitalism and pre-capitalist forms is essentially antagonistic; the extended reproduction of the monopoly capitalist production

[280] Poulantzas, 84.

[281] Poulantzas, 30–31.

relations necessitates others' restructuring or subordination. Current form of the "global relations of production and of the international imperialist division of labour" is an extra-territorial exploitation relation in which "the popular masses of the dominated formations are exploited by the classes in power in the dominant formations" and dominant classes in a nation is nothing but a chain in this grand scheme.[282]

The extended reproduction of the US capital on the global scale developed class struggle on a global scale as well that the US responded by developing ideological and political apparatuses in an extra territorial character, the most notable of which being the NATO. Internationalization of institutions like armies that had remained national in its true sense in pre-American periods means a direct intervention to the internal legal systems of each particular nation that "put in question the legal conception of national sovereignty."[283] What is at stake, Poulantzas claims, is the unity of national states. The internationalization of national armies does not likely to form a supranational state but internationalization of economic management does, as observed in the European integration, which is nothing but a form dependence of the European capital to the American one: Nation states' delegation of their functions to supranational bodies has a possibility of turning the nation state into a mere repressive apparatus supplemented internationally and of creating a tendency for "the internal dis-articulation of the European social formations and of their economies" as exemplified in resurgence of regional national aspirations.[284]

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[282] Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, 42–48.

[283] Poulantzas, 79–80.

[284] Poulantzas, 80–82.

The internationalization of the state (in Europe) after 1945 under the US hegemony is also reflected in states' internalizing the international's contradictions. One aspect of the crisis of capitalism in the 1970s was the rise of Europe after its re-construction as a possible economic challenger to the American capital, Poulantzas claims, that had intensified inter-imperialist contradictions. He rejects the rise of Europe as a sign for the resurgence of the inter-imperialist rivalry as in the phase of competitive capitalism for the contention that European capital did not desire to challenge the US ultra-imperialism, but demanded a secondary position within the imperialist chain; yet, these contradictions may open a maneuvering space for popular masses in their struggle against their own bourgeoisie and state, and by so, the ultra-imperialism.[285]

The emergence of inter-imperialist contradictions is at the core of his account on the fall of military dictatorships in the Southern Europe proposing that the events were not realized as an achievement of a popular front but outcome of intensified internal contradictions in these regimes as a result of internationalization.[286] Accordingly, the background of the military regimes' crisis is the formation of a domestic bourgeoisie active in industrial relations as a competing fraction against the comprador bourgeoisie who had enjoyed American presence together with landed owners. What led the crisis into a dissolution was the inability of the military regime to function for class representation as political parties do in bourgeois democracies. In this context, the intensification of the inter-imperialist contradictions led class fractions in military regimes to associate themselves with foreign policy orientations like Atlantic-oriented, Euro-centered, or pro-independence, also caused representation of these positions

[285] Poulantzas, 85–88.

[286] Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain*, trans. David Fernbach (1975; repr., London: NLB, 1976).

directly in the institutional structure of the military. Within the dynamics of the struggle of the class fractions weakening the comprador fractions, these regimes were able to move away from convergence with the US ultra-imperialism. The course of events proves that the military dictatorship as an exceptional form of capitalist state lacks abilities to maintain the role of class representation by providing stability at the same time in conditions set by the absence of political parties.[287]

Such a frame could make sense if a structuralist stance is adopted; however, framing rival fractions by their foreign policy orientation and judging the power bloc's class preferences by their choices in the inter-state relations simply do not make any sense. Poulantzas gives specific attention to Greece's search for a non-aligned path in an orientation towards the Third World on anti-American motives, for the possibility of revitalizing the nation state as a bulwark against containment by the NATO and European Economic Community, implying them as some sort of an anti-capitalist option. Yet, these anti-imperialists or anti-Americans pursued a reactionary nationalism fueling an imperialist policy regarding Cyprus, and executed a coup in Cyprus that was both an anti-Atlanticist policy option and organized by the CIA.[288] It would be fair to interpret Poulantzas' peculiar evaluations as a confusion in the face of complexity of the inter-state relations, war, and military coups; but, it is also an example of the eventual failure of a superficial consideration of global capitalism with a specific state, and inter-state confrontations as class confrontations. Such assumptions can easily turn elaborations on production relations or class domination into interpretation of saloon negotiations, diplomatic lip-services, conspiracies as

[287] Poulantzas, 24–33, 112–18.

[288] Poulantzas, 115–17.

structural constraints, and by these qualities Poulantzas is neither the first nor the only Marxist falling into methodological fallacies as such.

3.2. Political Marxism

Ellen Meiksins Wood has posed fundamental challenges to the historical narratives of structural Marxism via her critique of Anderson's theses on bourgeois revolution and the form of the pre-revolutionary absolutist state, and indeed added a new dimension to the Marxist debates on the transition from feudalism to capitalism. What is interesting in this challenge, however, has been its ultimate reproduction of structural and functional conception of the capitalist state due to its idealized understanding of the capitalist market as an economic sphere free from open violence.

3.2.1. The Extra-Economic

The historical specificity of capitalism, Wood argues, is the organization of production relations as property relations. The control over the means of production in the form of property does not necessitates a direct control over producers, but a control over their access to the means of production. Property owners deny producers' direct access, but integrates them as owners of their own labor as a property, which constitutes relations of productions as exchange relations. The livelihood of a producer, who lacks access to the means of production, is conditioned to selling its labor for a wage to property owners whose livelihood is conditioned likewise to making profits from producers' outputs. Since both labor and product turn into commodity, the market, where the exchange takes place, turns into a place that surplus appropriation is realized, in other words, where production relations is mediated. In that sense, the historical specificity of capitalism is the subordination of both appropriator and producer to market imperatives stemming from requirements of

competition and profit-maximization, a purely economic sphere excluding direct use of coercion. Capitalist relations of production detaches the use of violence from the moment of appropriation that distinguishes it from previous ones in which "extra-economic" means realize the appropriation, such as feudal direct coercion or politically constituted property.[289]

Capitalism is not a natural product of the human's evolutionary progress; it is not a product of the expanded trade relations or the advancement on the reason. The argument for the rise of commercial activities as the principal factor for the rise of capitalism cannot answer how market opportunities turned into market imperatives?[290] Throughout the history, there have been advanced societies developing towns engaging in trade relations like the ones in Italian city-states or high civilizations in Asia and Africa that surpassed Medieval England in terms of technological advancements and the primitive accumulation, yet none of them developed capitalist relations in the sense of putting forward the market imperative as a systemic constraint, rather they used the market opportunity for wealth creation by buying cheap and selling dear in separate markets, "profit on alienation" as she refers.[291] The pre-capitalist trade's expansion was up to activities involving physical use of violence with war plunder and imperialist subjugations, or to politically constituted properties like monopolies, tax collection, office holding, or war, rather than "cost-effective production and enhanced labour productivity, in a market driven by price competition."[292]

[289] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 96–97.

[290] Wood, 49.

[291] Wood, 78 & 153.

[292] Wood, *Liberty and Property*, 35.

The emergence of capitalism, on the other hand, is a unique historical development, not simply a result of the expansion of trade or the accumulation of wealth, that transformed market relations into an imperative for social reproduction. It came into existence for the first time in England when the private property was formulated as response to an intra-feudal class confrontation on land within the context of the crises of feudalism. As a resolution to a specific social problem, property relations created a unified domestic market integrating agricultural, commercial, and industrial sectors; only after enabling England to create geo-political force on the continent, capitalist relations began to develop outside of England but determined by their relationships to England.[293] This clear-cut historical argument has contributed Political Marxist theorization of the international relations as imperialism by problematizing capitalism as a factor in inter-state relations.[294]

Wood's historical argument is essentially a critique of the historiography of capitalism the Western culture developed, which she labels as the bourgeois paradigm and contradicts with capitalism's historicity. The bourgeois paradigm frames capitalism as a social progress brought by the bourgeois agency alongside modernizations, technological advancements, and liberalizations. Its possibility is conditioned in the first place to urban bourgeois classes' embracing the reason in their confrontation against archaic aristocracy and peasantry within conditions enabled by their enrichment realized in enlarging commercial activities. Though having no historical accuracy at all, she claims, French historians and German philosophers developed such

[293] Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, 19–48; Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 95–121.

[294] Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 1994); Benno Teschke, "Bourgeois Revolution, State Formation and the Absence of the International.," *Historical Materialism* 13, no. 2 (2005).

a perspective after 1789 by integrating the 17th and 18th century English philosophers' arguments on the productivity to propose English and French bourgeois revolutions as two appearances of a single historical process that is the bourgeois-led realization of the Enlightenment.[295] It was Weber, as response to the Marxist historical materialism breaking such unilinear view of historiography by developing "a unique sensitivity to historical specificities," who reformulated the teleology claiming that "all history is a drive…toward capitalism, where the capitalist destination is always prefigured in the movements of history," and divergences from this path indicates an obstruction of that single historical drive.[296]

Wood counts the Althusserian Marxism as one of the Marxist contributors to the bourgeois paradigm alongside its contribution to the bourgeois ideology with its topography of instances identifying the capitalist mode of production with "the capitalist 'economy', as embodied in market relations and/or some abstractly autonomous 'technology.'"[297] It becomes most clear in the treatment of the absolutist state by Poulantzas and Anderson for "assuming the existence of capitalism somewhere in the interstices of feudalism, just waiting to be released"[298] and claiming its role in the abolition of obstacles for capitalism to develop by freeing the bourgeois commercial economy.[299] Wood's emphasis on the historical specificity of agrarian origins of the capitalism in England is a response to the Althusserian approach to

[295] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Kapitalizmin Arkaik Kültürü: Eski Rejimler ve Modern Devletler Üstüne Tarihsel Bir Deneme*, trans. Oya Köymen (1992; repr., İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2012), 17–24; Wood, *Liberty and Property*, 289–95.

[296] Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, 108–78.

[297] Wood, 64.

[298] Wood, 56.

[299] Wood, 46, 166.

England as a particularity or exceptionalism as discussed in Anderson's thesis establishing a causality between the crisis of capitalism in England in the 20th century and the pre-mature bourgeois revolution of England.[300] However, her relationship to the Althusserian Marxism appears to be complicated one for her re-interpretation of their conclusions to argue the modernity as an alternative to the capitalism.

The complication could be summarized as such: She claims the absence of a modern and rationalized state to be the strength of the British capitalism rather than a weakness in agreement with Anderson's elaborations on why there is no modern state in England, but in France.[301] The story they both agreed on tells that the strong royal power in England demilitarized feudal forces while centralizing the state, but this gave birth to a weak absolutist state. It was "a peculiarly contracted variant of Absolutist rule," unifying the ruling structure through "a concurrent centralization, both of royal power, and of noble representation, within the total mediaeval polity."[302] This structure separated the coercion and appropriation, and realized the departure from the feudal unity of economic power and political power with a "division of labour … between a central political power that enjoyed a virtual monopoly of coercive force much earlier than others in Europe and an economic power based on private property in land more concentrated than elsewhere in Europe."[303] The short-lived English Absolutism came to an end after when the King Charles I attempted to establish a more Continental-like absolutism by subjugating the Parliament to mobilize military forces responding

[300] Perry Anderson, "Origins of the Present Crisis," *New Left Review* 23, no. 1 (1964): 26–53; Perry Anderson, "The Figures of Descent," *New Left Review* 161, no. 1987 (1987): 20–77.

[301] Wood, *Kapitalizmin Arkaik Kültürü*, 28–37.

[302] Anderson, *The Absolutist State*, 113–15.

[303] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 171–74.

ongoing conflicts with Scots and Irish and triggered an insurrection of those who were defending their right to control financial sources of the monarch's military power without having any ready armed force.[304] Anderson claims, the English bourgeois revolution did not resulted in a bourgeois democracy like in France because the bourgeoisie, the pushing force of the revolution, was immature to dictate its own terms in the 17th century. The English bourgeois revolution is "the least pure" of its kind,[305] and the bourgeoisie did not dare for a second revolution event after matured.[306] Wood argues in this line as well. Feudal classes abandoned extra-economic powers *too early* in exchange of purely economic means of appropriation and assumed leadership in its consolidation in the 17th century with the support derived from subordinate classes.[307] As a result, the class struggle has been over the definition of private property that effectively distanced political struggles from the state itself; the time-lag enabled market imperative to become dominant already by the time the political equality was demanded and granted.[308]

For the French case, Wood agrees with Anderson for the absolutist state in France to be an exit from feudalism, but rejects his conclusion for its being a transitionary form: The direction of the French exit from feudalism was something else than capitalism because it formulated politically constituted properties rather than private property. French ruling classes resolved the crisis of feudalism by assuming "new extra-economic powers as the absolutist state created a vast apparatus of office by means of

[304] Anderson, *The Absolutist State*, 141–42.

[305] Anderson, "Origins of the Present Crisis," 28–31.

[306] Anderson, "The Figures of Descent," 46–48.

[307] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 116–21.

[308] Wood, *Liberty and Property*, 315–17.

which a section of the propertied class could appropriate the surplus labour of peasants in the form of tax."[309] As a reaction to the peasant resistance to feudalism, the French absolutism initiated a departure from the feudal unity by separating "the moments of appropriation and coercion, private property and public power," but, as Wood argues, the separation of the political and the economic "would be completed only in capitalism" when "personal rule was replaced by an impersonal state."[310] The reason for this incomplete separation is the absence of a unified domestic market and of the competition in the same market. Market did not emerge in France as an autonomous sphere mediating the relationship of appropriators to direct producers. On the one hand, the agricultural production was oriented to subsistence production thanks to peasants' preserving their direct access to the means of production; on the other hand, landlords and office holders realized the surplus appropriation with rent or taxation. Neither of them needed market mediation for the reproduction of the conditions of their social being, meaning that the market remained limited to the commerce of luxury goods rather than cheap consumer products.[311] Contrary to England, the class issue for all classes remained to be politically sanctioned extra-economic means that did not create such a time-lag. The productivity was not a concern for appropriators since they were looking ways to extend their hold on the state, the bourgeoisie demand for the civil equality attacking noble privileges was for a bigger share in state offices, and the peasantry was resisting the unequal system of taxation.[312]

[309] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 103–4.

[310] Wood, 168–69.

[311] Wood, 74–81.

[312] Wood, 181–89.

Wood's divergence from Althusserian Marxism is clearer on the topic of the bourgeois revolution, compared to the one on the absolutist state. Rather than elaborating on what is bourgeois revolution or not, her position is concentrated more on how the bourgeois revolution as a concept utilized for transitions to capitalism is confusing, but not revealing. Wood recalls Brenner's critique when he argued the classical Marxist historiography of the bourgeois revolution to be self-defeating

> since the model starts with bourgeois society in the towns, foresees its evolution taking place by way of bourgeois mechanisms, and has feudalism transcend itself in consequence of its exposure to trade, the problem of how one type of society is transformed into another is simply assumed away and never posed. Second, since bourgeois society self-develops and dissolves feudalism, the bourgeois revolution can hardly claim a necessary role.[313]

The problem is rooted in the absence of an effort for differentiating the bourgeoisie and the capitalist. Two prime examples of bourgeois revolutions show that "revolutions can be 'bourgeois' without being capitalist and capitalist without being bourgeois."[314] The bourgeois revolution in France was truly a bourgeois challenge to the aristocracy pursued by the mobilization of the Enlightenment; yet, revolutionary forces, the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, were not capitalist neither in their pre-revolutionary aspirations nor in achievements. Immediate outcomes of the revolution such as the consolidation of peasants' hold on the land and the enlargement of state offices to integrate the bourgeoisie do not permit us to assess that the revolution established capitalist relations. Even though there is a space to question whether the revolutionary unification of the state and the removal of internal barriers to trade

[313] Robert Brenner, "Bourgeois Revolution and Transition to Capitalism," in *The First Modern Society: Essays in English History in Honour of Lawrence Stone*, ed. A. L. Beier, David Cannadine, and James M. Rosenheim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 271–304; cf. Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 62.

[314] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 118–19.

contributed to capitalist development in France in the long run, the questioning should also include whether such a trajectory could be possible in the absence of the external pressure the capitalist Britain posing meanwhile.[315] Associating the French Revolution with the realization of the Enlightenment and advancement of capitalism at the same time, a theoretical position shared also by Weber and post-modernists, neglects that the project of modernity the Enlightenment put forward was a product of a non-capitalist society in the absolutist France and that the bourgeoisie's utilization of the Enlightenment's universality in search for an equal share in office-holdings encouraged more democratic and more revolutionary forces to radicalize its interpretations.[316] The bottom-line of Wood's overall approach is that the historical specificity of the French experience in absolutism dismantled by the revolution is its embodiment of the Enlightenment in modern political forms that is fundamentally distinctive to the capitalist state. Where does the military politics stand in Wood's analysis of capitalism, modernity, and bourgeois revolution? The centrality of the extra-economic as a concept may indicate her contention of its central significance, yet, elaborations on the military, especially in its relationship to capitalist relations, are peculiarly inadequate. In Wood's analysis, the military appears in two core arguments: The modern state's coming into existence with the disappearance of the parcellized sovereignty; and the relegation of the military power to the secondary importance within developed capitalist relations both in domestic and inter-state affairs.

As elaborated above, Wood adopts Anderson's argument that the exit from feudalism is the centralized monarchies' abolition of parcellized sovereignties, which had been a

[315] Wood, 119–21.

[316] Wood, 182–92.

product of the dissolution of the Roman Empire enabling feudal classes to unite economic and political powers.[317] Further she argues, the creation of "[t]he 'modern' state, together with 'modern' conceptions of territoriality and sovereignty" was a pre-capitalist development realized within the tension between the nobility and the royalty and there is no guarantee for the creation of a capitalist state upon the elimination of parcellized sovereignties; yet, it is the pre-condition of capitalist relations to be established in the first place, as observed in the accelerated capitalist development after the emergence of the European state system. The English specificity is its establishing capitalist relations and creating the modern state in the same process.[318] How this pre-condition is met by centralized monarchies is not clearly expressed apart from emphasizing the Norman conquest relieving England from an experience of parcellized sovereignties like in the Continental Europe. The military subjugation deprived the English nobility enjoying any military or judiciary positions. At the same time, it also made the possession of military power insignificant for the ruling class thanks to the development of purely economic methods for appropriation. As a result, they focused on increasing the productivity of purely economic appropriation methods rather than accessing extra-economic methods, but they were conscious to preserve extra-economic powers under the monarch's monopoly as an instrument "to create and sustain the conditions of accumulation and maintain the system of capitalist property."[319] It is a bold argument that provides limited understanding for the British military that is prominent for preservation of aristocrat privileges for longer than any developed capitalist society. Contrary to Wood's contention that extra-economic

[317] Wood, *Liberty and Property*, 5–7.

[318] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 172–76.

[319] Wood, *Liberty and Property*, 248; Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 99–100, 178.

methods were insignificant for ruling classes, English aristocrats were actually interested in the possession of judicial and military powers in the form of privilege even in the 20th century and their resistance to preserve such powers could only be softened by the dual pressure created by European revolutions[320] and commoners' rebellious acts within military institutions.[321]

Additionally, addressing the military with its indirect roles in appropriation relations resurfaces the functionalist influence that fails to approach it as a social relation. Wood carries this functionalism to the analysis of inter-state relations under globalized capitalism. As mentioned above, one of the reasons for her to oppose the French Revolution as a pivotal act enabling "'spontaneous' evolution into capitalism" is the contention that capitalism started to develop in France only after Britain emerged as an external pressure, especially within the context of industrial competition.[322] Different trajectories of development of capitalism in France and England is the first example for the historical fact that "[c]apitalism had emerged first in one country. After that, it could never emerge again in the same way."[323] It is the English capitalism that transformed the mercantile trade into the capitalist commerce, introduced England as a geo-political, military, and commercial challenge for non-English world, and eventually forced non-capitalist states to pioneer the capitalist relations of production domestically.[324] And, it was the English capitalism that replaced direct military

[320] Clarke, *Keynesianism*.

[321] Gerstenberger, *Market and Violence*.

[322] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 170. Benno Teschke argues the Westphalia Peace to be the precondition of the British capitalism's becoming an external impact enabling capitalist development in Europe. Benno Teschke, "Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 1 (2002): 5–48.

[323] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 176.

[324] Wood, 64.

subjugation, plunder, and tribute with economic compulsion and market imperative as primary imperialist instruments. Besides demilitarizing the domestic market and the relationship of the appropriator to the direct producer, English capitalism created a demilitarized imperialism as well. The replacement is rooted in the colonization of Ireland in the 16th century but matured in India: In Ireland, the imperialist project was pursued as a military action, but the fundamental objective was to export the economic system that had been developed in England; the secondary position of the military action was marked when England intensified utilizing the economic compulsion after facing densely populated regions in India with advanced economic systems and sophisticated political relations.[325]

The economic compulsion enabled nation-states to assume the role played by the 19th century British imperialism in fostering capitalist development. The scale of capitalism as a social relation in the age of globalization is unprecedented in human history, Wood underlines. It is

> a complex network of tight interdependence among large numbers of people, and social classes, not joined by personal ties or direct political domination but connected by their market dependence and the market's imperative network of social relations and processes.[326]

Equally, the US military power with its stand as the guarantor of the globalized capitalist system based on nation-states is also unprecedented; yet, its growing reliance on extra-economic powers involves a potential threat for the capitalism. The US use of extra-economic powers in forms of wars "without end in purpose or time," the endless possibility of war to protect the global system of multiple states, and the US's

[325] Wood, 152–56; Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Empire of Capital* (2003; repr., London: Verso, 2005), 78–83, 110–17.

[326] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 180.

asymmetrical economic and military powers have a possibility to undermine the very fundamental element of the global economy that is the nation-state.[327] The global scale of capitalist social relations has been achieved by the reliance on single nation-states to assume tasks of transporting the market imperative and of maintaining local coercive capacity at the local level; "no other institution, no transnational agency, has even begun to replace the nation state as an administrative and coercive guarantor of social order, property relations, stability or contractual predictability, or any of the other basic conditions required by capital in its everyday life."[328] The US bid for establishing a global state accompanying the global society is an impossible objective since even the massive US military power cannot be present everywhere.

Regardless of whether Wood was correct in her assessments on the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan or not, the more significant point is that Wood somehow repeats what Poulantzas claimed more than 30 years before her by arguing the military power to be central necessity of the US capital for its reproduction, at the same time its risking the whole capitalist system by undermining the unity of nation-states that would be detrimental for their delivering function in maintaining the social unity at the local level through control over coercive apparatuses.[329] The similarity of these two comments in terms of their association of global capitalism with the US capital, searching contradictions within the contradictions of the US capital, and proposing the nation-state as something to be transformed into a bulwark against global capitalism should be noted here. This functionalism is a symptom showing that Wood's Political

[327] Wood, *Empire of Capital*, 164–68.

[328] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 180; Wood, *Empire of Capital*, 139.

[329] Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, 80–82.

Marxism "does not question how the states in general, including the British or the US ones, are disciplined by the capitalist market compulsion."[330]

3.2.2. Modernity as Substitution

The depiction of the extra-economic power's presence in the regulation of production relations as a divergence from capitalist social relations limits Wood's Political Marxism's prospects for furthering the historical materialist engagement in the study of the military politics. The insistence on this argument does not allow any space to problematize the use of violence and its social organization beyond stressing its unnatural presence in the moment of appropriation. This turns analysis into a reproduction of the Weberian association of the state monopolization of the physical force as a demilitarization of the civil society, the base also for scholars of the democratization theory that addresses the military with non-military functions as an abnormality. In that sense, possibilities to be drawn from Wood's framework for the military politics contradict with her initial intention of rejecting the association of human progress with capitalism. Her remarks on imperialism come to conclude that alongside appropriation with extra-economic means, the direct use of force in inter-state affairs appears to be at odds with capitalism for its detrimental impact on the market imperative. There are legitimate grounds to assess the abolition of slavery, limitations on the use of physical force, the elimination of personal privileges in the social organization of violence, the absence of war, demilitarization and disarmaments as achievements related to the human progress, for sure. Wood's analysis peculiarly inscribes them directly into capitalist relations of production; they appear to be

[330] Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, "Rethinking State and Capital in the Analysis of the Capitalist State: Settling the Accounts on Fundamentals between Simon Clarke and Ellen Meiksins Wood," *Capital and Class*, forthcoming.

outcomes of the logic of capitalist production forcing or encouraging appropriators and imperialists to avoid applying extra-economic means.

Studies embracing her Political Marxism reflects this limitation, as could be seen in Eren Düzgün's account on the relationship between capitalism and modernity in Turkey,[331] which acknowledges the significance of Political Marxism for its overcoming the shortcomings of internalist approaches, namely the recognition of international relations as a factor in the constitution of political economies by Wood's argument for the role of the geo-politic in the French path for capitalism.[332] To start with the positive comments, Düzgün's study is indeed promising for its utilization of Wood's reservations on the bourgeois paradigm to develop a critique of the Weberian problematization of the modern state formation in Turkey. As Düzgün rightly assesses, the revisionist historiography of the bourgeois revolution showing that "the bourgeoisie was not as capitalist and democratic as traditionally assumed"[333] has had repercussions for the study of modern state in Turkey as well. Accordingly, the revisionist turn negates the validity of Weberian accounts concentrated on the impropriety of the Turkish modernization from a standpoint perceiving the proper Western model to be existing as it appears in the bourgeois paradigm. A departure from such interpretations would make the difference of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization as another demonstration of "the interactive character of world historical development and the multiplicity of modernities generated therein."[334] The study's focus on domestic societies is also significant within the Political Marxist

[331] Düzgün, *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations*.

[332] Düzgün, 48–52.

[333] Düzgün, 51.

[334] Düzgün, 155–56.

current that rather asks questions at the international level to make sense of "the development of capitalism within a polity of multiple states;" yet, it becomes an example for "Political Marxism's limitations to make sense of politics at the domestic level."[335] For the study's methodological position on counting extra-economic methods as an indicator for a *political economy* to be something else than capitalism is counter-productive due to its ultimate convergence with the Weberian accounts denying the development of capitalist relations in Turkey.

Two strengths of the study should be marked. First, it goes beyond asking why the non-British is not British. Remaining loyal to Wood's argument on the divergence of France and England for their developing "fundamentally different forms of rule and appropriation," the study focuses on the historical specificity of Jacobin innovations in France like "universal citizenship, universal equality, universal conscription and nationalism," which would appear later in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization as desired objectives, that "had no immediate connection with the development of capitalist social relations."[336]

Düzgün integrates Robbie Shilliam's study on abstract subjectivities[337] to argue Jacobinism and Kemalism as political economies substituting English capitalism. Shilliam's study also follows Political Marxist premises to elaborate on political subjectivities appearing within the Enlightenment tradition alongside the British capitalist subject, the impersonalized individual. Shilliam's objective is to

[335] Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, "Can Jacobinism Be Questioned at the Same Level of Abstraction as Capitalism? The Lack of a Theory of State in Political Marxism," *Critical Sociology*, May 28, 2024, 5.

[336] Düzgün, *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations*, 4–5.

[337] Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*.

contextualize the political thought, as a realm operating somewhere in between the universality of human affairs and particular conditions, by integrating the international dynamics into the realm of knowledge production on an argument for the reflection of geo-political contestations in everyday life where the social reproduction takes place.[338] Accordingly, the distinct political subjectivity developing in France was a product of the perceived backwardness in the face of British capitalism, but has developed into something else than the British individual. The French absolutism's attempt to import the impersonal individual while maintaining political inequalities gave rise to the French Revolution and to the emergence of the impersonal collective. The historical specificity of the Revolution was the inception of a contradictory co-existence of the impersonal individual and the impersonal collective; the Jacobin resolution of the citizen-soldier, which intended to balance these two by defining citizens' rights and duties at same time, developed into an imperative on world scale thanks to the war-ridden course of the Revolution. In this way, Shilliam formulates two imperatives operating in the international sphere to examine German subjects in a long period from the French Revolution to the Cold War as they appear in the political philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Weber, and Morgenthau. German subjectivities have been developed in the context of the double compulsion created by Britain and France, on a ground of the perceived backwardness vis-à-vis the British capitalism accompanied by a consciousness of the danger of a revolution inherent in its unmediated importation.[339] Düzgün's remarks on the Ottoman-Turkish modernization resonate this approach. Accordingly, modernizing elites have followed two contradictory strategies with a conscious selection of their elements when importing; under the double pressure

[338] Shilliam, 4–5, 13–20.

[339] Shilliam, 21–24.

coming from above and below "consolidated the Jacobin model at the expense of market society" in its own historical specificity by developing a mass citizen-army and public schooling.[340]

The second strength of Düzgün's study is its going beyond considerations of repressive apparatuses that accept popular masses as passive agents within a very critical social issue. By approaching the Jacobin invention of the citizen-army within efforts for substituting the British capitalism, the study departs from structuralist Marxist assertations that Jacobinism was a bourgeois ideology responsible for the Revolution's serving bourgeois interests rather than its radicalization,[341] and also from the statist-institutionalist one that the citizen-army is a capitalist invention reducing manpower costs.[342] It is a recognition of the historical fact that national-popular resolutions in the military sphere have not been ruling classes' favored alternatives; the citizen-army is among such resolutions that was contemplated as a leftist instrument in the late 19th century.[343]

Düzgün recognizes that the agency of popular masses has been active in the constitution of repressive state apparatuses. The Jacobin citizen-soldier was a top-down reformation intended to respond a geo-political challenge; yet, it was also a response to the domestic "double front war" that Jacobins were facing the ancien regime and radicalized dominated classes at same time. The response produced a substitution of the British capitalism with a moral economy consolidating peasants'

[340] Düzgün, *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations*, 10–11.

[341] Althusser, *Politics and History*, 104; Althusser, *For Marx*, 25; Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, 104; Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 54–62.

[342] Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime"; Tilly, *European States*.

[343] Düzgün, *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations*, 98.

customary rights, improving workers' rights, universalizing and institutionalizing "a new extra-economic mechanism for acquiring income and status."[344]

The weakness of the study stems from its portraying Jacobinism and Kemalism alternatives to capitalism as distinct political economies. As Saraçoğlu points out, the existence of "capitalism in its purest form" is already suspicious and observing divergences of modern republicanisms from such an idealization is not enough to formulate them as alternatives; rather, Jacobinism should be considered as an instance of a hegemonic struggle in a capitalist social formation which classes and class fractions pursue by contesting "a set of ethico-political principles," and it should be recognized that "modern republicanist notions, themes, and institutions associated with 'Jacobinism'" "can take on varying meanings and produce different outcomes depending on the dynamics of struggles to contest and establish hegemony over them."[345]

The adequacy of the Jacobinism as a concept for grasping the significance of the French revolution is still questionable whether it is formulated to define *a political economy different from* capitalism or *a political form within* capitalism. The Jacobinist subject, in the studies of Düzgün and Shilliam, relies on a specific reductionism that risks the equation of revolutionary aspirations to counter-revolutionary ones as it appears clearly in their counting the Napoleonic epoch as an episode maturing the Jacobin model. This irons out critical contrasts that may be useful in understanding of the contradictory existence of the modern state. Eric Hobsbawm warns about such

[344] Düzgün, 6, 87–88.

[345] Cenk Saraçoğlu, "Making Sense of the Republic in Turkey at Its Centennial: A Jacobinist Route to Modernity?," *Critical Sociology*, March 4, 2024, 4–5.

misleading approach in the study of the French Revolution that fails to recognize 1789, 1793, and 1799 as distinctive moments: "When the educated layman thinks of the French Revolution it is the events of 1789 but especially the Jacobin Republic of the Year II [1793] which chiefly come to his mind."[346] Additionally, he is more than clear about Napoleon's being the ultimate anti-Jacobin who destroyed the first people's republic in history, "the dream of equality, liberty and fraternity, and of the people rising in its majesty to shake off oppression."[347] In Hobsbawm's account, Jacobins were not responding to a situation marked with a double threat coming from the ancien regime and radical masses at the same time; it was the threat itself. The Jacobin Republic came into existence after a group of liberal middle-class radicals preserved their revolutionary position until events reached an extreme point risking an anti-bourgeois revolution; yet it remained as an exceptional experience because post-Jacobin states in France and European liberalism concentrated on avoiding its repetition at all costs throughout the 19th century that resulted in the Jacobin Terror to be a modest moment of coercion compared to later conservative counter-revolutionary actions.[348]

Hobsbawm presents notable distinct interpretations of the Jacobin experience that were influential in the post-1815 period that indicates that Jacobinism has been a contested notion. Conservative interpretations have "created a lasting image of The Terror, dictatorship and hysterical bloodlust unchained," while "[r]evolutionaries, especially in France, have seen it as the first people's republic, the inspiration of all

[346] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848* (1962; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 67.

[347] Hobsbawm, 76.

[348] Hobsbawm, 62, 72.

subsequent revolt."[349] For sure, conservative interpretations do not necessarily demand a Jacobin Terror or Napoleonic tyranny to denounce the Revolution, if we consider that Edmund Burke expressed his conservative stance already in 1790, during the moderate epoch the Revolution.[350] How lasting this image is in the conservative thinking is recently exemplified when the richest man on earth pretending to be a mad scientist denounced the 2024 Summer Olympics' opening ceremony for being "extremely disrespectful to Christians" when leaving a comment on a video clip of Gojira performing a heavy metal version of Jacobin-era song *Ça Ira* in a palace where Marie Antoinette kept as prisoner before her execution that is decorated with beheaded Marie Antoinette.[351]

Hobsbawm provides three distinct progressive interpretations referring distinct episodes of the Revolution.[352] The moderate liberals modelled the episode of 1789-91 for a constitutional monarchy with an oligarchic parliament. Independence movements in Belgium and Greece are notable instances of its influence. In Britain, although it was a land of anti-Jacobinism, the liberal Jacobinism was influential in the formulation of the response to urban and rural upheavals that had erupted under the influence of the 1830 French Revolution. The first response in this nature was permitting Irish and British Catholics to take seats in the parliament after a successful mobilization of the

[349] Hobsbawm, 67–68.

[350] Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. Frank M. Turner (1790; repr., New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

[351] Elon Musk, "@Chesschick01 This Was Extremely Disrespectful to Christians," *Twitter*, July 26, 2024, https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1816948075174203771; Joel Harley, "Olympics Opening Ceremony Slammed as 'extremely Disrespectful' | Metro News," July 27, 2024, https://metro.co.uk/2024/07/27/olympics-opening-ceremony-slammed-extremely-disrespectful-21308973/.

[352] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, 112–13.

Irish peasantry.[353] The first examples of urban labor activism contributed the first Reform Bill of 1832 to be introduced. The reform addressed unequal regional representation and the expansion in enfranchisement was limited for its conditioning electoral rights to property ownership and educational qualifications. The disappointment with outcomes encouraged labor to mobilize for political liberalizations formulated in the People's Charter, which was not so different from the Jacobin agenda. Unlike the French episode, moderate liberals were successful in overcoming the Chartist challenge that developed into a mass labor mobilization supported by middle-class radicals who were successful to submit petitions signed by millions to the Parliament.[354]

The second progressive interpretation is the radical-democratic Jacobinism inspired by the idea of a welfare state at the expense of the rich that constituted the 1793 constitution and the Robespierre's Terror. Chartist movement in England was one example of it for demanding civic equality, expanded enfranchisement, and republic. Hobsbawm counts Marx's radicalism during the 1848 revolutions in this category together with proletarian communists who regarded the bourgeois-democratic republic to be essential for advancing socialism. This model was based on an idea of a forceful regime change in a moment of political instability and of popular uprising that would introduce representative bodies, form popular governments, and gather citizen-armies and militias. 1848 revolutions showed that governments were eager to use military force in such a turmoil and a success in the capital city would not guarantee a successful revolution.[355]

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[353] Hobsbawm, 138.

[354] Hobsbawm, 121–24.

[355] Hobsbawm, 126–31.

The last one is the socialism that modelled *Sansculottism* and the left wing of Robespierrism for their calls for the abolition of the private property. *Sansculottism*, the active force of the Revolution pushing it to its extreme, was a widespread sentiment rather than a mature political movement like Jacobinism. The group, composed of various type of urban poor, was motivated by the hatred for the rich and by the sympathy for anyone below the average including small ownerships to seek for state guarantees for their livelihood.[356] The Doctrine of Babeuf formulated the abolition of the private property as a political demand during the period of Thermidor reaction by asserting that the equality also includes "an equal right to the enjoyment of the private property," the absence of both rich and poor is the base of a real society, and the 1795 constitution is "illegal and counter-revolutionary."[357] The model's primary target, as first developed by Auguste Blanqui in the post-1815 France, is the seizure of the political power to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat with an insurrection to be initiated by an elite group of revolutionaries, rather than masses, using covert activities and addressing primarily the armed forces.[358] Hobsbawm's elaborations is an indicator for considering 1789 as a *dramatical* event opening the Pandora's Box, unleashing social and political struggles in context producing nothing but series of unintended consequences. For that reason, the revolutionary period stands as a laboratory for modern politics where various government forms and models of political upheaval eventually helped produce a political vocabulary for liberalism, radical democracy, and nationalism.[359] Rather than recognizing the French Revolution as a dynamic

[356] Hobsbawm, 63–64.

[357] John Hall Stewart, *A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 656–57.

[358] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, 122–23.

[359] Hobsbawm, 53, 112.

period and various meanings of the Jacobinism itself, Shilliam and Düzgün prefer to freeze the whole turmoil in the Jacobin subjectivity. The choice of conscription as an anchor in this effort actually moves their analysis to a very vulnerable ground: The citizen-army as an instrument linking civic rights and civic equality to the duty to the nation in the form of military service, is not a Jacobin invention; the obligation of military service was not even a revolutionary novelty, and it was anti-Jacobinist action which pioneered transformation of it into a modern form.

The compulsory military service predates the Revolution. The militia system was already present as a form of it both in England and France at the moment of the Revolution both having medieval origins. The strong royal power in the feudal England was able to introduce the contribution to king's army in time of need as an obligation by making it a responsibility of judicial and administrative bodies occupied by local nobles and checked by the central government; in effect, this kept militia organizations maintain order in localities as a separate force from the king's standing army and as an element of the estate rule. The failure of the short-lived absolutist state to integrate them into royal power secured their local and feudal character. The development of capitalist relations and the British privilege of not having an imminent threat of invasion diminished their significance for the reproduction of the estate rule, yet, noble privileges in militia organizations remained intact.[360]

Centralized political instruments were checking any possibility of a noble's rebellion that could stem from the noble monopolization of its command. Its financial and material burden was for all in that locality carrying possibilities of its breeding antagonisms between local nobles and dominated classes. It should be noted for a

[360] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 119–24.

discussion on the relationship between the British capitalism and the French Revolution, and also for the study of the military politics, that nobles renounced their privileges by giving consent to militia regiments' integration to the standing army, though this upset some of them, only after the French Revolution, in 1808.[361] In that context, it is noteworthy that when Adam Smith elaborated on state's monopolization of the use of violence just before the Revolution, it was not an observation, but a proposal that he argued the necessity of it by pointing out the danger of a revolutionary situation that a local noble's unruly actions may spark:

> Where the security of the magistrate, though supported by the principal people of the country, is endangered by every popular discontent; where a small tumult is capable of bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole authority of government must be employed to suppress and punish every murmur and complaint against it. To a sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the country but by a well-regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrances can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them… That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well-regulated standing army.[362]

In France, the militia system preserved its medieval form similar to the English case by the 17th century; however, it diverged from the English case when Louis XIV dissolved it after victory over nobles' Fronde insurrection, and resurrected it in 1688 as an integral component of the military structure permanently.

Since then, although its importance was secondary in military terms as an auxiliary force supporting the standing army, it was subordinated to the royal power as well, thus, it did not remain as a local issue and started to develop rules regarding the

[361] Gerstenberger, 282–84.

[362] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776; repr., London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1910), vol. II, 196–197; cf. Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 40.

recruitment, allocation of resources, and command that were impersonal in character.[363] It was an aristocratic general who voiced the idea of "a true national army made up of citizen soldiers" and fueled with patriotism almost three decades before the Revolution only to face a backlash.[364] Revolutionaries were not eager to establish any form of conscription either. They were concentrated on curbing the strength of the Royal Army and they abolished the military obligations to this end. Even though there were voices for making every citizen a soldier, these voices were not calling a compulsory military service. *Levée en masse* decreed by Jacobins in 1793, the moment commonly identified as the birth of citizen-army, was nothing more than a contingency action to respond a dire situation in the war when it became clear that the republic cannot pursue a gigantic war by relying solely on voluntary forces though it was not negligible by any means thanks to the revolutionary fervor. There was no sign of Jacobin intention to institutionalize a compulsory military service if we give attention to the absence of punitive actions for evaders and deserters in the legal text, unlike the Napoleonic conscription, though it failed to meet the initial objectives, or consider the absence of any similar mobilization call for the next five years.[365] The first appearance of a conditionality linking the enjoyment of civic rights to the military service was in the Constitution of 1795 drafted and implemented by anti-Jacobin forces. It was a major departure in the course of the Revolution for its definition of duties alongside rights; yet, the duty regarding the military service was related to the participation to the National Guards and the recruitment for the army remained to be on voluntary

[363] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 416–18.

[364] Harold D. Blanton, "Conscription in France during the Era of Napoleon," in *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era*, ed. Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton (London: Routledge, 2008), 6–7.

[365] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, 73; Blanton, "Conscription in France during the Era of Napoleon," 8–9.

basis.[366] The Directory government issued the first law on conscription in 1798. Still, it was not an ambitious plan for turning all citizens into soldiers, but significant in terms of perpetuating the government's authority to bring all citizens under arms in times of necessities; the Napoleonic Empire furthered the institutionalization of the system of compulsory military service that matured it into having a centralized bureaucracy in 1811.[367]

One argument accompanying the argument on citizen-soldier's being the base of a substitution of capitalism is that Britain, as a capitalist state, has relied on hiring mercenaries to keep up the necessary manpower in gigantic wars like Napoleonic Wars in that Britain did not require to create equal citizens. It was essentially related to the trauma of Cromwell's New Model Army, but the market incentive within her capitalist economy enabled British ruling class to introduce conscription.[368] If the recruitment of mercenaries, professional soldiers, or anyone joining armies within a frame of wage relations, is to be an instrument related to capitalist relations, we should embrace ourselves for a study of capitalist state that goes back to ancient periods as well, if not pre-history. At least we should arrive this conclusion for all of the European states in the 18th century together with pre-modern Ottoman Empire and pre-colonial Indian princes, but most significantly Prussia where the king's standing army was "a multinational army of mercenaries" because "at least half and often two-thirds of the enlisted men were foreign mercenaries" even during the Revolutionary Wars.[369] To

[366] Stewart, *A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution*, 572–74, 603.

[367] Blanton, "Conscription in France during the Era of Napoleon," 9–10.

[368] Düzgün, *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations*, 90–91.

[369] Dierk Walter, "Meeting the French Challenge: Conscription in Prussia, 1807–1815," in *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era*, ed. Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton (London: Routledge, 2008), 26.

associate mercenaries, who have long been an option for warring parties and still are, with capitalism is a mistake much similar to associating trade with capitalism; it needs to be explained how the market incentivized mercenary option turns into a market imperative. A discussion on mercenaries should problematize the significance of the Revolutionary Wars for its absence in the French armies. The primary reason for the French Revolution to be a critical historical rupture in terms of military politics is not the creation of a national-popular army but its *dramatical* abolition of the pre-revolutionary military forms including the use of mercenaries for a very specific historicity that revolutionaries had to confront King's Swiss mercenaries on critical occasions but most importantly when storming the Bastille and abolishing monarchy, resulting later in the King's being accused of using mercenaries against the nationals during his trial.[370] On this base, it is possible to argue the National Guard as a viable departure point and an anchor to disclose the impact of the Revolution.

Like the criminalization of the use of mercenaries, the National Guards, the revolutionary militia force, is an invention of the Revolution that came into existence at the very initial stage of the Revolution. It gained an institutional frame after the storming of the Bastille and before the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. It was an immediate product of the Revolution and gained a national character when the National Assembly authorized municipalities, which gained representative status, to form their own armies.[371] Without a doubt, it was an open contestation of the King's authority and how shocking it was could be grasped by looking at Burke's calling it as a "debauching the soldiers from their officers." To quote from Burke,

[370] Stewart, *A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution*, 391.

[371] Stewart, 110–12.

> [t]hey have begun by a most terrible operation. They have touched the central point, about which the particles that compose armies are at repose. They have destroyed the principle of obedience in the great, essential, critical link between the officer and the soldier, just where the chain of military subordination commences and on which the whole of that system depends. The soldier is told he is a citizen, and has the rights of man and citizen. The right of a man, he is told, is to be his own governor, and to be ruled only by those to whom he delegates that self-government… [Soldiers of the standing army] will not bear to be deemed the army of an imprisoned king, whilst another army in the same country, with whom too they are to feast and confederate, is to be considered as the free army of a free constitution. They will cast their eyes on the other and more permanent army; I mean the municipal. That corps, they well know, does actually elect its own officers. They may not be able to discern the grounds of distinction on which they are not to elect a Marquis de la Fayette (or what is his new name?) of their own. If this election of a commander-in-chief be a part of the rights of men, why not of theirs? They see elective justices of peace, elective judges, elective curates, elective bishops, elective municipalities, and elective commanders of the Parisian army—Why should they alone be excluded?[372]

Even before the Jacobin domination, the moderate 1791 constitution that kept the King in power defined the National Guard with reference to the popular sovereignty: "The National Guards are neither a military body nor an institution within the State; they are the citizens themselves, summoned to the service of the public force."[373] When 1793 Jacobin Constitution put forward that "[a]ll Frenchmen shall be soldiers; all shall be trained in the handling of arm,"[374] it was not beyond the previous remark on popular sovereignty, but possibly a sharper expression of its contestation against the monarchy. In this context, the axis of rights and duties was simply irrelevant because the concerned axis was the King as sovereign and the people as sovereign, and the principle of popular sovereignty was indicating the unity of rights and duties. The National Guard was one of the significant elements forcing the Revolution to its extreme, but lost its centrality in the course of the revolution as a result of deliberate

[372] Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, 186–87.

[373] Stewart, *A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution*, 258.

[374] Stewart, 467.

actions starting from the Directory, and the Napoleonic Code further reduced it into an auxiliary force of the main army.[375] The National Guard survived the Restoration, remained relevant in the post-1815 revolutions as well, and finally was abolished in 1871 for their leading role in the Paris Commune.

The shortcoming appearing in its address to the French Revolution is reflected in Düzgün's account on the Ottoman-Turkish modernization as well. The Jacobinism à la Turca cannot go beyond reproducing of the already existing interpretation developed within the Weberian tradition. Accordingly, the ruling classes convinced on the necessity of the modernization after facing external pressures, and started importing the Jacobin subjectivity with the Tanzimat edict in 1839 that got its mature form with the Kemalist Republic. The whole Jacobin project, as various Weberian currents put as well, was pursued to substitute capitalism, or at the expense of the market society.[376] In terms of military politics, it repeats the modernization fallacy of approaching the conscription system in the Ottoman Empire as a matter of capability that it got better with the practice of it. By reinterpreting as a matter of equal citizenship, the period starting from *Tanzimat* to the Kemalist republic is "a protracted process" developing mass conscription, thus, the equality of all subjects.[377] One major problem of the Weberian tradition is reproduced in its own accord: The narrative as a whole is conceptually depended on neglecting revolutionary moments by subduing forces realizing them, i.e., the constitutionalism in 1908 and republicanism in 1920s, as already present in the reformism of 19th century Ottoman sultans.

[375] Blanton, "Conscription in France during the Era of Napoleon," 18.

[376] Düzgün, *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations*, 99–100.

[377] Düzgün, 112.

CHAPTER 4

REVOLUTION AND THE MILITARY

Limits of a study of the military politics by relying on *a general model of modern military* are elaborated in the previous chapter that has reviewed the military revolution thesis, the Weberian typology of authority, and the Marxist coercive apparatuses of capitalist state. They all share the common shortcoming of insisting on a general conception cross-cutting all cases while the cases they deal with display distinct characteristics of their own, even in major cases like the Western European states. The military revolution thesis emphasizes backwardness when dealing with distinctive cases, Weberians observe anomalies to be corrected, and Althusserians raise the issue of particularity/peculiarity/exceptionalism stemming from historical specificities of individual cases. In that context, the conceptual task stands as finding ways to make sense of the variety in military forms of modern capitalist societies, and its possibility relies on opening space for contingencies rather than depending on structural or trans-historical forces.

Such an engagement is possible within a historical materialist perspective, if we distance ourselves from efforts for a general theorization of the political form of

domination in capitalism, as proposed by the Open Marxist position in the state debate. Two prominent representatives of this position, Simon Clarke and Heide Gerstenberger, had similar dissatisfactions within the Marxist state debate, shared a similar theoretical stance, and even though they did not utilize each other's work and pursued research in different contexts with distinct focuses, they arrived at similar conclusions regarding the historical development of the capitalist state. For both Clarke and Gerstenberger, the class character of the capitalist state cannot be understood with the analysis of the privileged position of certain social groups. What is significant for this thesis's focus is that the *levelled form analysis*[378] enables them address differences of the British and the (post-Revolutionary) French military forms without any assessment about abnormality and with a clear stress on the historical significance of the French Revolution. They owe this ability to their conceptual frame putting the historical separation of the state from civil society as the pre-condition of the capitalist production to exist and ascend to dominate social relations of production; and the problematization of class and state at different levels of abstraction[379] or without any pre-given assumption on the correspondence of economic and political forms of capitalist domination.[380]

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[378] Bedirhanoğlu, "Rethinking State and Capital in the Analysis of the Capitalist State: Settling the Accounts on Fundamentals between Simon Clarke and Ellen Meiksins Wood." Bedirhanoğlu uses this term to describe Clarke's treatment of class vis-à-vis the state at two different levels, namely at the level of capitalist relations of production as an abstraction and at the level of immediate and concrete relations.

[379] Clarke, *Keynesianism*; Simon Clarke, "Configurations of Dissent: Fractions of Capital, Class Struggle and the Decline of Britain," *Unpublished Manuscript*, 1988; Simon Clarke, ed., *The State Debate* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

[380] Heide Gerstenberger, "Class Conflict, Competition and State Functions," in *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate*, ed. John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, vol. 152 (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), 148–59; Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*; Heide Gerstenberger, "The Bourgeois State Form Revisited," in *Open Marxism, Vol. 1: Dialectics and History*, ed. Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, and Kosmas Psychopedis, vol. 1, Open Marxism (London: Pluto, 1992), 151–76; Heide Gerstenberger, "The Historical Constitution of the Political Forms of Capitalism," *Antipode* 43, no. 1 (January 2011): 60–

Clarke's theory of the state and money and Gerstenberger's reservations on the classical Marxist historiography of the bourgeois revolution do not refrain from mentioning pre-modern characteristics of the British military in the 19th century, in which they do not assert its being an anomaly or a central contradiction of the British state. One may find this confusing or contradictory when considered with the catalyzer role attributed to the French Revolution in furthering the separation of public and private during the 19th century. Can we relate the development of capitalist relations to the development of the modern military as a public armed organization detached from any specific class interest altogether? Yes. In France, the development of the capitalist state is marked with the revolutionary overthrow of political privileges, i.e., abolishing state offices' status as property including military positions as well. Is it possible for feudal military forms to remain intact in conditions of capitalism as the dominant mode of production? Also, yes. In England, the aristocracy has been able to cling into their privileges within armed forces and to preserve these offices' function for wealth creation even when the capitalist relations were dominant without a doubt. Isn't this disparity contradictory? Not really. The disparity between economic and political forms of domination cannot be amounted to be a contradiction, but may only be considered as a hint about crises and political struggles related to the military politics in the process of capitalist transformation.

An additional ability the Open Marxist position provides is the recognition of the constitutive role of lower classes in the formation of the modern capitalist state. As both scholars underline, structuralist explanations on the maintenance and

86; Heide Gerstenberger, "'How Bourgeois Were the Bourgeois Revolutions?': Remarks on Neil Davidson's Book," *Historical Materialism* 27, no. 3 (October 24, 2019): 191–209; Heide Gerstenberger, "On Stepping Stones and Other Calamities of Marxist Historiography," *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (September 17, 2021): 224–44; Gerstenberger, *Market and Violence*.

reproduction of the class domination are depended on over-estimations regarding the cohesion of concerned instruments and the rationality of adopted actions.[381] The capitalist state is fragile and its resolutions of political struggles are only temporal because of the contradictory nature of the capitalist production. Clarke underlines that class struggles determine "the forms of capitalist domination" because they "are themselves the object of class struggle, as capital and the working class confront them as barriers to their own social reproduction;"[382] while class struggle is also "a struggle over the form of the state, conducted in and against the differentiated institutional forms of capitalist domination."[383] Gerstenberger formulates the bourgeois state category by emphasizing how the bourgeois revolution also served into the interests of lower classes, especially by constituting protections for labor side by side with the protections for private property. Accordingly, the actual emancipation of the labor from the customary legal obligations enabling a contract-based relationship between the appropriator and labor is an outcome of historical struggles rather than any logic derived from the necessities of capitalist appropriation.[384]

These efforts to integrate the objections and resistances of the dominated classes to the understanding of politics within capitalism would contribute to overcome its peculiar absence in the theories of military politics, including those proposed by the Marxist perspectives. The absence of lower classes that are excluded either through property or privilege relations in the analysis cannot be attributed to a real absence in concrete historical developments. For, they have not remained as passive agents suffering under

[381] Gerstenberger, "Class Conflict, Competition and State Functions," 159; Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 11.

[382] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 23.

[383] Clarke, 149.

[384] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 669–71.

the pressures of dominant forces. Just the contrary, they have intervened in the historical development of military forms in numerous ways ranging from individual escape and volunteering to collective actions pushing for a specific political objective or collective rejection. Conscription in its form as the compulsory military service, the core military institution integrating lower classes in mass, has never been favorable for popular classes, as dominant classes have also not favored mass armament of dangerous classes; yet, many modern states have institutionalized it and it is doubtful if it delivered initial expectations without causing further troubles. The complicated character of conscription obstructing the formulation of a general scheme based on democratic quality, economic development, or class participation could be grasped if it is recalled that only North Korea, South Korea, Finland, Switzerland, and Eritrea are among the contemporary states implementing compulsory service most effectively.

This chapter will question how it would be possible to address military politics without falling into any essential or functional position. Following that, it will discuss the historical categories Gerstenberger provides for the historical investigation of the transformation of political forms of domination in the context of the generalization of capitalist relations. Her category of ancien regime will be utilized to rethink the ancien army since it significantly contributes to an alternative Marxist comprehension of modern military politics by releasing a rich historical material that free the conception of the absolutist state from teleological arguments. However, the discussion in this chapter adds to Gerstenberger's recognition of the French Revolution as a significant historical rupture by the analyses made on the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary armies. The revolutionary army and counter-revolutionary army are proposed as distinct categories appearing first within the French context to emphasize that the

French revolution's significance in terms of military politics is not related to the generation of a specific model to be adopted by others, but to its releasing a novel contestation over military forms, which failed to remain a domestic matter for France. Lastly, the chapter will apply these categories to conscription practices as all categories have their own versions of conscription different from others.

4.1. The Open Marxist Position

Gerstenberger's involvement to the state debate goes back to the 1970s when Marxist debate on state was responding to the limited state theorization of Lenin's revolutionary theory on two major developments: Bourgeois parliamentary democracies proved their capacity to realize political equality, and a substantial improvement in the conditions of working classes was achieved to overcome a generalized crisis of capitalism without a widespread revolution. Gerstenberger argues that the possibility of such a development of the bourgeois state instigated the Marxist debate by recognizing the limits of instrumentalist interpretation and by allowing for the possibilities that the dominated classes could consider the bourgeois state as a guarantor of their interests and state policies may be formulated at the expense of the capitalist accumulation. Yet, regardless of the question that whether these developments encouraged attempts to re-vitalize Leninist revolutionary theory or to overcome it, they failed to expand the historical materialist research agenda towards a new methodological stance of grounding the theorization on the capitalist logic.[385] Gerstenberger shows however that Marx had already problematized the concerned development of the bourgeois state in a similar path. At the stage of primitive

[385] Gerstenberger, "The Historical Constitution of the Political Forms of Capitalism," 61–62; Gerstenberger, "The Bourgeois State Form Revisited," 151.

accumulation, the state may be described as an outright instrument serving to dominant class interests just like any other pre-capitalist political organization, as in the *Communist Manifesto*'s definition of the modern state as a committee for the bourgeois affairs. But once established, the capitalist state departs from such instrumentalization, turning the property owners' undisclosed exploitation of producers into a secret within the relations of domination that is subject to concrete analysis, as put forward in the Preface *to the Critique of Political Economy*. The research agenda for historical materialism in developing a state theory, Gerstenberger suggested, was to answer how his change took place historically. Why does the state not reflect its oppressive character openly anymore although it is still a system of exploitation? "Why does it become, in form, the state of society as a whole?" Why is it not the rulers' organization anymore, but the guarantor of all interests? In that context, she claims, the task is to understand how "the contradiction between the form and function of the bourgeois state unfolds concretely, and in what ways it is partially reconciled." Various arguments for the derivation of the state from the logic of capitalism showed that this task cannot be accomplished by centering the analysis on the general conditions for the capital valorization; by arguing for the bourgeois democracy as a necessary legitimation tool to conceal class exploitation; by having *a priori* assumptions and convictions and develop an analysis of the concrete "in order to provide a mere illustration of any given theory;"[386] or by integrating class struggle into the analysis at any moment if it serves to the primary motivation. All these should be approached as methodological mistakes with little contribution to the analysis of the concrete and the root cause of the historical materialism's stagnation.[387] She repeats this criticism four

[386] Gerstenberger, "Class Conflict, Competition and State Functions," 148.

[387] Gerstenberger, 154–59.

decades later when addressing a reconstruction of the classical Marxist notion of the bourgeois revolution, which designates the non-correspondence between economic and political forms of domination as a contradiction leading to a revolutionary situation, by arguing that such an historical approach would just subordinate the historical analysis to one's preferred theoretical explanation, an attitude Hobsbawm admitted to shape the analyses of Historians' Group of the Communist Party of Great Britain in the early Cold War years:[388]

> Yet the problem of party-history was quite exceptional… history, even in its remoter periods, was much more directly linked with politics. Politics then often insisted a priori on the 'correct' interpretation, which it was the business of Marxist theory to 'prove', i.e. to confirm. There is no doubt that we ourselves were apt to fall into the stern and wooden style of the disciplined bolshevik cadres, since we regarded ourselves as such. Our arguments were sometimes designed a posteriori to confirm what we already knew to be necessarily 'correct', especially in our discussions on Absolutism and the English Revolution. I do not know how many old members will now be satisfied, on rereading the Group's 'State and Revolution in Tudor and Stuart England' (Communist Review, July 1948) with the results of these discussions.[389]

Shortcomings of the structuralist logic, which was also present in the modernization theory, caused "'big questions' of historical development" to be abandoned for a revisionist turn focusing on "local developments, the jumble of contradictions, contingent processes and changing discourses."[390] Similarly, Clarke notes casualty of structuralist shortcomings for the historical materialist research agenda when he elaborates on the state theory with a focus on the crisis of Keynesian welfare state. The observation of the autonomy in the state's ability to act contrary to interests of capital

[388] Gerstenberger, "Remarks on Neil Davidson's Book," 192–93.

[389] Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The Historians' Group of the Communist Party," Verso, accessed September 16, 2024, https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/news/the-historians-group-of-the-communist-party.

[390] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, x–xi.

as in the case of democratic welfare states "has led many to reject or abandon the Marxist theory of the state"[391] to argue for "the irreducibility of political to economic conflicts."[392] Structuralists, drawing upon the relation between the state and economy, have furthered this tendency with their response centered on the particular and the general interest. The emphasis on *the last instance,* i.e., the general interest of dominant classes to reproduce conditions of capitalist exploitation, is primarily to open a space for recognizing the state's defying particular capitalist interests, while it is also for a recognition of the more-than-admitted importance of ideological and political instruments in the reproduction of capitalist relations. Later, the relaxation in economic determinism enabled arguments for the determinism of the role of ideology and discourse, in which "[t]he class struggle is then only a particular form of struggle within and between discourses."[393]

This discontent is mainly about the location of the class struggle in the analysis of the state. On the one hand, class struggles in its most intense and direct form playing an integral role in a major historical event is disregarded on the grounds that eventually a capitalist state would come into existence. On the other hand, a fallacious expectation for the capitalist state to serve bourgeois interests just like the feudal state serves to lords encourages the disregarding of the significance of the class struggle at all. Here emerge two main tasks. How to develop a state theory that does not rely on instrumentalizations of the state power in service of specific class interests when demonstrating the state's class character? How to integrate class struggle to the

[391] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 121–22.

[392] Clarke, "The State Debate," 1991, 5.

[393] Gerstenberger, "Class Conflict, Competition and State Functions," 149–50; Clarke, "The State Debate," 1991, 15–20.

analysis of the state without relying on random placements? Gerstenberger and Clarke turns to the notion of the modern state as separate from the civil society, and of the capitalist production as value production.

4.1.1. Levelled Form Analysis

Clarke and Gerstenberger distance themselves from designations of the capitalist domination as the domination of a specific group with some alleged essential tendencies they endorse in capitalist relations of production, as it is not an outright exploitation of a specific class by another with ever-existing appropriation methods that the legal structure of the state does not hinder but protect. The capitalist production is not a replacement of nobles by the bourgeoisie in commanding the means of production or possessing privileges in relations of distribution. As the study of mercantilism reveals, in comparison to feudal classes, the urban bourgeoisie, which is contemplated to have pioneered generalization of capitalist relations of production by negating feudal appropriation, did not really show distinctive attitudes towards accessing politically sanctioned properties and privileges that were exclusive in character enabling the possessor to escape market competition, even in market activities.[394]

The capitalist production is the production for commodities as a method of surplus appropriation, and it is possible as long as the property ownership is not politically sanctioned and commodities are circulated as values in the market without encountering exclusive regulations. Clarke's theory of money addresses the capitalist transformation by drawing upon the transformation of the money: The money is not a

[394] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 23–26; Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 18.

means of exchange anymore, but "the independent form of value, appropriated by capital as the basis of its social power" re-orienting production towards commodities to accumulate money.[395] Hence, since the labor is a commodity in capitalist societies and the money enables control over commodities, for Clarke, "the power of money is the irreducible form and the most abstract embodiment of the social power of property."[396] Gerstenberger approaches the same issue by the transformation of competition from an armed to an economic one. The competition for power and wealth is centered on the elimination of market competition and it is determined by the use of armed capabilities in the last instance, like the one between bourgeoisie and nobles which Anderson refers as the central contradiction of the absolutist state giving it a transitionary character;[397] it is also centered on inter-state struggles engaged for the possession of trading monopolies and colonies.[398]

The market competition, instead, excludes the option of eliminating the competitor by discriminatory means like monopolies mercantile burgers enjoyed, and forces capital owners to focus on increasing productivity of labor or reducing production costs; thus, the market competition is essentially an organization of appropriation in capitalist societies.[399]

As both Clarke and Gerstenberger underline, the precondition of capitalist relations of production was the separation of the state from civil society that dissolved corporate

[395] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 89.

[396] Clarke, 12.

[397] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 21–22.

[398] Gerstenberger, *Market and Violence*, 34–36.

[399] Gerstenberger, xi–xii, 37–38, 90–91.

forms of property and enabled **"**commodity circulation and the appropriation of the means of production as private property" assuming the form of money.[400] In Gerstenberger's terms, the separation of state and civil society means the abolishment of the political definition of appropriation that releases the market imperative as an impersonal force on social relations distinctive from power relations.[401]

Historically speaking, the separation was a pre-capitalist development formulated as a response to the crisis of feudalism, in which the state and civil society exist in unity, only to precipitate crises of its political and ideological forms.[402] However, a complete separation is a later development. For Clarke, its origin in England was the Glorious Revolution of 1688 that abolished the personal nature of the sovereign,[403] and the radical separation, which subordinated both state and society to the impersonal and abstract rule of law and money, was realized in the 19th century in more systematical manner compared to the dramatical one in France, after series of constitutional reforms.[404] Gerstenberger argues similarly with reference to depersonalization processes that took moment in France with the transformation of the centralized state into the ancien regime and French Revolution enabling the bourgeois form of the capitalist state by the definition of both spheres in impersonal terms.[405]

It is this recognition of the time lag between the emergence and completion of the separation that allows two to mention the persistent ancien character of the British

[400] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 137.

[401] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 4–5.

[402] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 17.

[403] Clarke, 21.

[404] Clarke, 133.

[405] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 21–22.

military throughout the 19th century. For Clarke, the state's military power was a direct class instrument serving to mercantilist interests during the 18th century, and one of the topics Adam Smith mentioned in his critique of mercantilism by calling the sovereign to monopolize the military power.[406] Although the administrative reforms introducing rationalization had such an objective, they preserved the class biases in the recruitment for the military positions and caused the British military to appear as an un-modernized army.[407] In that sense, British army was not so much different from the German Empire on the grounds that revolutionary moments in the 19th century led the old aristocracies to empower their hold on state apparatuses to compensate their declining social position.[408] Gerstenberger proposes an explanation by arguing that the ancien personal rule could be maintained as it was subordinated to the market competition and restricted to the political realm by conceding appropriation functions.[409] Additionally she shows, further progress towards an impersonal military power in Britain was also a product of revolutionary contexts as well as soldiers' mutinous actions against the aristocratic command maintained by office-sales until 1871.[410]

The structuralist tendency for addressing the pre-modern military forms as an indicator of an abnormal particularity along liberal arguments could be rethought and corrected by this intervention. For, the theorization of the state's separation from the civil society as the separation of state and economy, Clarke claims, grounds the analysis on "a bourgeois sociological theory of the state" with "a 'Marxist' twist by emphasising the

[406] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 23–26, 39–40.

[407] Clarke, 70–71.

[408] Clarke, 131–33.

[409] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 271.

[410] Gerstenberger, 280–88.

primacy of the relations of production" and enhances economism that risks locating the class struggle as external to these structural levels.[411] Accordingly, he suggests, in order to avoid such externalization of the class struggle that fails to grasp the specificity of the capitalist form of the state, the state and class should be analyzed at different level of abstraction[412] that would enable the derivation of the state "from the analysis of the class struggles surrounding the reproduction of capital."[413]

Gerstenberger's account is centered on the historical specificity of the bourgeois state rather than the capitalist state. "Class struggles and concrete competition strategies grow out of conditions of valorization and take place in the framework of a definite political structure;" however, addressing these two levels as if they correspond to each other means a denial of their complicated relationship and of "the historical importance of concrete class struggles."[414] She claims, the assumption adopted in the state derivation debate that "the political form of capitalism is the 'bourgeois state': the state of western industrial societies" is not only misleading in methodological terms, but it also assumes that "the very nature of the capitalist state invites hopes and demands of increased welfare."[415] In this line, she expanded her rejection of an automatic correspondence between capitalist relations of production and bourgeois democracy by questioning capitalism's relationship to the use of violence, which is generally assumed to be an exclusive one on the grounds that capitalist relations of production

[411] Simon Clarke, "Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzas's Theory of the State," in *The State Debate*, ed. Simon Clarke (1977; repr., London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 64.

[412] Clarke, "The State Debate," 1991, 45–46.

[413] Simon Clarke, "State, Class Struggle, and the Reproduction of Capital," in *The State Debate*, ed. Simon Clarke (1983; repr., London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 165–66.

[414] Gerstenberger, "Class Conflict, Competition and State Functions," 151.

[415] Gerstenberger, "The Historical Constitution of the Political Forms of Capitalism," 64.

is based on capital's constituting its relationship to labor in contractual terms. Here, she points out another non-correspondence by pointing out that the contractual relationship guaranteeing the labor's status as a free individual was secured after the French Revolution before capitalism gained dominancy, and also before such progress was achieved in Britain. Additionally, there are various examples showing that capitalist relations can be maintained and reproduced through the utilization of the so-called extra-economic appropriation methods including slavery, forced labor, privatized legality, political containment and policing of labor, etc.[416]

Interventions of Clarke and Gerstenberger on the theorization of the state call for giving importance to historical specificities of the capitalist state possessing democratic elements. If we are to utilize it in the study of the military politics, we should start by rejecting a necessary relationship between the capitalist state and the modern military based on the mobilization of citizen-soldiers, and questioning whether such appearance is also a historically specific one.

4.1.2. Bourgeois Revolution

Critiques of the military revolution thesis point out that much of the elements associated with the modern military came into existence with the French Revolution rather than the proliferation of firearms in the 16th and 17th century. They propose the Revolution's introducing citizen-armies as the prime novelty paving the way for developments such as massively destructive total wars and democratic forms of government. Although these interventions are important in terms of overcoming a weaponry-based approach to the military politics, if reviewed in terms of methodology,

[416] Gerstenberger, *Market and Violence*, 228–31.

it is evident that such critiques risk the danger of formulating another model for the modern military centered on the Revolution's citizen army. For, this model freezes the significance of the Revolution by neglecting conflicts within the revolutionary period.

As discussed in the previous chapter, historical materialist accounts integrating this model to discuss the military politics in its relationship to the capitalism also reproduce shortcomings of this frozen perspective in their analyses, whether they designate this model to be capitalist for its functioning in favor of the capitalist classes, or non-capitalist for its functions in substituting capitalism. Consequently, as this integration drifts analyses to reproduce the bourgeois paradigm's ahistoricity, they fail to recognize the Revolution's significance by neglecting the critical rupture it led to in the historical development of capitalist relations that was the powerful push for the realization of popular sovereignty. Consider, for example, Düzgün's remarks on the Ottoman *Tanzimat* reformations as a moment introducing popular sovereignty for its laying grounds of a modern conscription system and of a meritocratic system in officer recruitment, and on the proclamation of the Republic as the final act completing the *Tanzimat*'s main projects;[417] or Poulantzas' remarks on Jacobinism to be a continuation of the absolutist tradition.[418] Such a perspective on modernization as a linear and evolutionary progress towards popular sovereignty could only make sense, if one adopts the Weberian notion of the legal-rational authority and equates it to popular sovereignty.

The introduction of novel political subjects by the French Revolution, the spectre haunting Europe, launched fundamental social and political changes. Great

[417] Düzgün, *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations*, 110–18.

[418] Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 133–34.

transformations in the long 19th century associated with the modernization, like the capitalist production's becoming dominant, the idea of nation and homeland, the rationalization of bureaucracies, and citizen-armies based on mass and meritocratic recruitment came into existence thanks to this mobilization. It was not a smooth process that could be foreseen in the 18th century; and the revolutionary character of this transformation stems from "the destruction of the entire former practical context of life."[419] Even in the British case, proposed to be the moderate and managed version of this transformation,[420] the period is marked with severe struggles that did not preclude the use of violence. The revolutionary turbulence is not limited to sudden and dramatical changes in political structures and the confusion regarding what was to be established in its place; it included urban and rural revolts, insurgencies, violent confrontations, brutal suppressions, prolonged inter-state and civil wars, internationalization of conflicts with involvements of fragile and shifting alliances of foreign forces. Naturally, the military was at the center of this turbulence turning the military politics itself into a battlefield of contesting social and political forces. Developments regarding the military politics were marked by the contestation of distinct military forms in the sense of both legal-institutional arrangements and naked confrontations.

As Hobsbawm points out, the revolutionary turmoil provided a new vocabulary for political struggles that took place after 1815.[421] This comment is also relevant for the developments in the military politics as well. What makes violence during the

[419] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 25.

[420] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 17.

[421] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, 53.

revolutionary period important is not its brutality or the death toll it caused, as one can easily give examples of much more destructive conflictual episodes in the human history. The significance of the use of violence in this episode is the emergence of new forms of military organization, each claiming to universalize the armed forces in line with the notion of popular sovereignty. In this regard, any linking of military institutions to the French Revolution with a claim for their being revolutionary innovations would be limited and probably misleading if not framed within the turbulence caused by the mobilization of novel political forces in the struggle against the ancien regime on the one hand, and novel conflicts emerged after the dismantling of the ancien regime on the other.

Open Marxist position enables grasping the historical specificity of the Revolution, as the analysis of the capitalist state with a democratic structure is framed within the Revolution's impact. The position is centered on negating economism while addressing the French Revolution as an event enabling the bourgeoisie to overcome fetters to capitalist expansion. The Revolution "was not carried out in the name of capital, it was a more or less popular democratic revolution, in which capitalists often played a minor part."[422] Revolutionaries were not motivated by the prospects for a generalized capitalist relation of production, but for the overthrow of the ancien regime. In that sense, unlike Wood's approach arguing that the Revolution is not related to the development of capitalist relations because it targeted state offices rather than property relations, Gerstenberger considers the significance of the revolution exactly in its targeting the state for its elimination of state offices' status as property that both enabled capitalist relations to develop and revolutionized the public space

[422] Clarke, "State, Class Struggle, and the Reproduction of Capital," 174.

simultaneously: "[S]tate power" may not "be used for the private enrichment of those who executed it. Their incomes were to be reduced to the officially decreed levels; anything above this was corruption."[423]

Gerstenberger's attempt is to frame the analysis of the bourgeois revolution within the crises of the pre-revolutionary structures, i.e., the ancien regime. Bourgeois democracies achieved with a bourgeois revolution are historically specific political forms that came into existence as a result of political struggles against "personal/privatized forms of political domination" of European ancien regimes. In the ancien regime, the appropriation was realized through the possession of the rule with instruments like the "ownership of legal power and the possibility of exploiting this particular power of disposal over the unfree, the competence to raise 'taxes', the enforcement of monopolies on baking, milling and brewing, the authority to organise armed force, excommunication, and so on."[424] When peasants were opposing a tax-collector, it was actually a struggle against an appropriator and it was a struggle over property forms, because the state offices in the ancien regime were property. In that sense, the call for civic equality cannot be regarded as a demand for equal share in distribution. On that point, Clarke mentions that the bourgeois revolution does not necessarily mean replacement of one group with another, for

> the revolutions which gave rise to the modern state, on the basis of the separation of state and civil society, were primarily directed at breaking this hold of the financial and landed aristocracy over the state apparatus. These changes did not lead to the political displacement of the aristocracy of land and finance in favour of the emerging industrial bourgeoisie, but they did lead to a transformation in the character of these privileged classes and in their relationship to the state, their prosperity no longer depending on their political privileges, but on their role in the expanded reproduction of capital, and their

[423] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 667.

[424] Gerstenberger, 21–22.

> political privileges no longer deriving from their power in civil society, but being determined by the priorities of the state.[425]

Framing the bourgeois revolution within the crises of the pre-revolutionary structure would also enable observing varieties in the bourgeois state form. The varieties in the ancien regime are products of specific struggles for power distribution engaged during the centralization of the feudal state. Since the bourgeois revolution is nothing but a result of the crises of the pre-revolutionary ruling structures, and bourgeois state form was a dramatical replacement of such forms, "[t]he different preconditions and forms of the 'bourgeois revolution' also prepared specific conditions for the development of economics and politics in the historical phase of the bourgeois state."[426] Accordingly, the ancien regime was based on the transformation of independent feudal rules into privileges after their subordination to the centralized royal rule; thus, it is "a conflictual matrix of individual and generalised personal rule," but their regularization initiated their depersonalization.[427] These privileges could differ, the subordination could refer to various different methods, and were not exclusive to nobles; yet, the ancien regime lacked efforts for their standardization.[428] But most importantly, the limited prospects of growth and the deficient reproduction abilities of the ancien regime precipitated its crises-prone privilege-based ruling structure to be the object of political struggles.[429]

The abolishment of the personal character of the rule did not mean that the newly introduced impersonal rule abolished all discriminations. In most of the bourgeois

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[425] Clarke, "Configurations of Dissent: Fractions of Capital, Class Struggle and the Decline of Britain."

[426] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 28.

[427] Gerstenberger, "The Bourgeois State Form Revisited," 153–54.

[428] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 359–61.

[429] Gerstenberger, "On Stepping Stones and Other Calamities of Marxist Historiography," 10–11.

societies, *the people* has not meant the whole population. Woman, dispossessed, slaves, immigrants, etc. have not been the part of the people for a long time, and their inclusion has been realized through political struggles; either as a direct victory of those showing their discontent, or as pre-cautionary measure adopted by those feared a social unrest.[430]

Despite its productive provocations for the reconsideration of the bourgeois revolution, Gerstenberger's effort for formulating a structural category still has the risk of freezing the Revolution as a model as well. Later, she acknowledged that the emphasis on the emergence of formal neutrality with the revolutionary overthrow of privileges and obligations approximated her stance to the Political Marxist position that argues for the post-Revolutionary state in France to be forming as something else. To clarify her position, she claims that the state's becoming formally neutral in relation to society with further protections for peasants' holdings on land and the abolition of privileges enabled the market to function as an imperative both for capital and labor that "turned the French state into a potential safeguard of capitalism even before capitalist relations of production became dominant in France;" however, this historical moment cannot be designated as "a permanent characteristic of capitalist states."[431]

4.2. Ancien, Revolutionary and Counter Revolutionary Conscriptions

Central texts Marxists use in their engagements to military politics are the ones that Marx and Engels wrote to reflect on the course of the 1848 Revolutions. Accordingly, the army is argued to be an instrument of class domination, utilized when the representatives of the bourgeoisie fail to deliver their fundamental function. However,

[430] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 672.

[431] Gerstenberger, 234–38.

there is the need to follow Gerstenberger to move beyond these texts while making sense of the modern military. Hence, we should note her provocative tone in the utilization of these texts in attempts for formulating a general theory. When she dismissed the proposal for a change of terminology from the capitalist mode of production to the "bourgeois mode of production," she held for instance that "[s]ince historical materialism is not exegesis, it does not bother me one bit that this distinction is not yet present in the writings of Marx and Engels."[432] Or, when she questioned the adequacy of *The Communist Manifesto* for the theorization of the bourgeois revolution, she stated the following:

> When a particularly confined version of Second-International Marxism spread in France, claiming to be a science of society and its historical development, the materialist interpretation of the Revolution (usually known in France as the 'social' interpretation) passed from the heady emotion of the Manifesto to the sorry structural analysis of orthodox Marxism.[433]

Whether they are adequate or not, they could make sense if they are taken as witness accounts of notable revolutionaries and compared with their later development in their thought on the military politics. It is notable in that sense that almost two decades later Engels depicted the army as the most democratic institution of the Prussian state that he had no love of it, and advised to create pressure for further equal implementation of the conscription.[434] Similarly, while Marx referred the National Guards as the bourgeoisie betraying workers' cause in *18th Brumaire*, he hailed the Paris Commune's establishing the National Guard as a replacement of the compulsory military service in 1817 as a truly revolutionary action.[435]

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[432] Gerstenberger, "Remarks on Neil Davidson's Book," 193.

[433] Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power*, 518.

[434] Frederick Engels, "The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers' Party" (Marxists Internet Archive, February 1865), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/02/12.htm.

[435] Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (1871; repr., London: Dodo Press, 2012).

Despite these other comments of Marx and Engels, it is still common among Marxist currents to approach the military as a class instrument for its contribution to absorb the reserve army of labor or to discipline human bodies for an easier labor containment with the conscription system, to maintain social cohesion with militarist techniques, and to manage crises of capitalist accumulation with military spending.[436] However, as Gerstenberger underlines "modern wars fought between large collective entities or states using people and weapons in an organized manner always have causes that differ from mere strategies of appropriation."[437] That does not to mean a recognition of the ultimate decisiveness of the military logic in war independent of economic objectives and potentials, but an emphasis on the condition that the military logic "has not coincided and does not coincide with" the economic one.[438]

Instrumentalist Marxist approaches fail to deliver one of the main Marxist premises that capitalist social forms are inherently contradictory and its unity is fragile (necessity of its constant reproduction) primarily because of the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist production that its realization in its full purity abolishes its social conditions. To define the military politics as an integral and coherent element

[436] Such economism could be found an analysis of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in Morton and Bieler's piece discussing the war as a Western initiative to overcome the crisis of capitalism with a war enabling the transnational capital to grow through bomb-and-build strategy within the conditions of inter-imperialist rivalry. Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, "Reframing the Geopolitics of Global Capitalism," *Socialist Register* 60 (March 6, 2024). For a Marxist critique of such an anti-imperialist stance reducing the explanation of conflict-ridden global order and almost all armed confrontations taking place right now to the emergence of the so-called New Cold War Frederick Harry Pitts, "New Cold War or 'World Civil War'? *Wertkritik* and the Critical Theory of Capitalism in an Age of Conflict," *European Journal of Social Theory*, May 3, 2024. For a critique of the leftist populist political position framing the global order to be shaped by orders and interests of global elites that the far-right has utilized unproblematically in their racist and conspiracy-ridden critique of capitalism: Matt Bolton, "The Rigged System: Corbynism and Conspiracy Theory," in *Corbynism: A Critical Approach*, by Frederick Harry Pitts (Bingley: Emerald, 2018), 207–50.

[437] Gerstenberger, *Market and Violence*, 315.

[438] Gerstenberger, 316.

within the structures of the modern capitalist domination begs an answer for the question of "where is the contradiction?"

Notwithstanding the totalizing elaborations neglecting contestations over it, approaches freezing the French Revolution in an army model constructed on citizenship, based on those accounts contemplating the modernization as progress, avoids addressing the restoration efforts in the post-1789 period in the same weight they emphasize the advancement towards institutionalized conscription practices. Dominant classes were never so much enthusiastic about the armament of such a huge population, and as observed perfectly during the post-1871 restoration in France, the driving motivation for the military reformers was not to give every socialist a gun.[439] Thus, the conscription system constituted on an idealized perspective could not prevent a French soldier in 1917 to establish connections between capitalism and the military when expressing his complaints about injustices in leave policies:

> It's like how long the war has lasted. The capitalists who aren't at the front and whose money earns three times as much as before the war, the ones who keep it going to annihilate the worker.
> A soldier on leave told me that things in Paris are heating up and that today there is supposed to be a general strike there, so much the better as long as nobody gets killed and it can bring this Hell to an end, which for three years has tormented us physically and morally, because we all know very well that to send the Boches[440] back where they came from there is nothing to be done - kill people in chaos and that's all.[441]

As this quotation reminds, analyses addressing the 19th century Prussian military reforms to form national-popular armies based on the idea of citizen-army, launched after the Napoleonic Wars, as historical progress overlook fundamental differences in

[439] Arpad F. Kovacs, "French Military Legislation in the Third Republic 1871-1940," *Military Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1949): 1–13; Sanford Kanter, "Sacrificing National Defense to Class Interest: The French Military Service Law of 1872," *Military Affairs* 49, no. 1 (1985): 5–8.

[440] A pejorative term for German soldiers

[441] cf. Leonard V. Smith, "War and 'Politics': The French Army Mutinies of 1917," *War in History* 2, no. 2 (July 1995): 187.

between distinct French and Prussian cases. Though commonly associated with the Jacobin *levée en masse* on the grounds of nationalism, the Prussian military system matured by the late 1860s had nothing to do with it. The Prussian army was not a replica of the French but its contrast, if judged by the French Revolution's primary novelty of introducing new social and political forms. Centuries-long Franco-German enmity definitely contributed to Prussian military system's developing in contrasting ways as could be seen in the Prussian reformers' non-hesitant expression of their solid distaste of a French-like army. However, the fact that the Prussian army was much more similar to the Napoleon's Grand Army[442] compared to the revolutionary citizen-army indicates clearly that the contrast could be comprehended if it is framed within the revolutionary developments in France. Both armies were fruits of successful counter-revolutionary initiatives attempting to contain revolutionary mobilizations in their own specific social and political conditions.

The significant difference of the Prussian army is its privilege of having a present model to follow, the Napoleonic army, when responding a similar turmoil in 1848. By the turn of the 20th century, all European military thinkers pushing for comprehensive reformation to accommodate fighting capabilities to the industrial capitalism, including those in France as well, were looking at the Prussian model on the grounds that it was the successful model integrating the revolutionary innovation, i.e., the citizen-army, by preserving its integrity of the monarchical structure without facing a catastrophe like 1789. That does not mean that they were successful to convince decision-makers in other countries to implement it and the Prussian military was

[442] Dennis E. Showalter, "The Retaming of Bellona: Prussia and the Institutionalization of the Napoleonic Legacy, 1815-1876," *Military Affairs* 44, no. 2 (1980): 57–63; Stig Förster, "Facing 'People's War': Moltke the Elder and Germany's Military Options after 1871," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1987): 209–30.

generalized non-problematically in the European continent. Additionally, the World War I made almost all military forms in Europe, including the Prussian model, to reach a point of breaking apart, especially after Tsar's fall in 1917. Mutinies in German army in 1918 played pivotal role in the war's coming to an end, while there were similar mutinies with similar demands in British, French, Italian, and Habsburg armies as well, and British efforts for implementing conscription in Ireland in 1918 only exacerbated republicanism and gave momentum to the Irish Independence War.

Related problems appear in nations that have not bothered with developing a citizen-army neither Jacobin nor Prussian versions of it. The modernization as progress perspective dictates the absence of modern military elements like universal conscription system, meritocratic officer recruitment, and bureaucratized command as indicators of underdevelopment and of backwardness in the face of superior West powers. This reading is typical for the non-Western world, and most clear examples could be seen in the Ottoman decline thesis and arguments on the Republican Turkey as a successful case of modernization. Accordingly, these detected deficiencies could be rectified only after a social and economic development providing the state with necessary capabilities. This can hardly make any sense for such absences of these modern characteristics in the British and the American armies by the end of the 19th century. Aristocratic privileges were still intact in the 19th century British military with mass conscription remaining as a contingent measure, and staff recruitment came into the British state's reform agenda only after the World War I. In the US, a permanent army with a unified command structure was simply non-existent throughout the 19th century as a result of the preference for a militia-based federal army. The modern army as such in the US is a thing of the post-1945 period. Similar deficiencies in the

developed modern world suggest the necessity of addressing them as deliberate political choices rather than expected outcomes of rulers' inertia.

If we follow the Open Marxist position on the specificity of the bourgeois form of the capitalist state to make sense of these observations, the issue of conscription should be located within a framework covering ancien practices and their crisis, the revolutionary intervention, and contestations over the impersonal definition of the conscription. The category of the ancien regime Gerstenberger formulates as a pre-condition of the bourgeois revolution and of the bourgeois state already presents us a framework to develop the category of the ancien army. Within this framework, the ancien army could be formulated as one that emphasizes privileges and refers to the co-existence of various types of military organizations, including the King's standing army, noble armies, private armies, mercenaries, pirates, etc. Pre-1789 French armies and 19th century British army are typical examples of it, but it should be underlined that modernizing Romanov and Ottoman armies in the 19th century also held ancien character to a great extent.

The revolutionary intervention was primarily centered on abolishing the privilege-based ancien army. Since revolutions imply radical destruction of pre-revolutionary aspects of life altogether, the revolutionary army's relationship to the ancien army was essentially antagonistic. Though many may consider the citizen-army as the revolutionary army, focusing on militias that assumed violent tasks in critical revolutionary moments makes more sense. The National Guards of French Revolution is the first example of such militia forces which later inspired other democratic and revolutionary forces as model, like German Landwehr militias in the 1848 revolutions. Their emergence was a spontaneous action that also introduced the question of how a

privilege-free armed organization could be constituted, and after the fall of the Monarchy in 1792 it became one of themes related to the popular sovereignty. The spontaneity led to the introduction of previously excluded ones having no privilege to the political sphere with guns in their hands in a context full of uncertainties, and for that reason they were dangerous forces that could have further radicalized the revolution. Revolutionary militias' coming into existence was a precondition of a modern army with a universal conscription, but should not be reduced to it.

The *levée en masse* was a critical historical rupture, but not in terms of military innovations. Conscription was already present in the pre-Revolutionary era, and the French ancien army was already a military hegemon in Europe. The French citizen-army was not that spectacular as narrated; it brought significant successes likewise suffered defeat. The revolutionary army was already at the field when the decree was issued; and enabled the revolutionary authorities to gain self-confidence to further radicalize the revolution – Battle of Valmy was not a significant event in terms of military action, yet, the victory was key in encouraging the abolishment of the monarchy. Its critical character lies in its turning the war as a matter of everyone, abolishing civilian-military division that used to exist in the cabinet war. Hence, it does not mean merely a total war that made civilians suffer too, for the non-combatants were already subject to the violence bestowed by the war as the mercenaries' plunder in the thirty-years' war manifest. It welcomed non-combatants to contribute war efforts and enabled a significant advantage over the ancien armies thanks to people's sharing the burden of the war, i.e., armies were able to detach themselves from the supplies from a center by relying on sources provided by locals. The *levée en masse* is a text proclaiming their contribution will be rewarded or compensated.

The emphasis on the bourgeois democracy's being historically specific in the long history of capitalism also needs an investigation of its regression. In this line, the counter-revolutionary army can be proposed as the third category. As implied above, the Napoleonic army and the post-1848 Prussian military are typical examples of this category. Though they may be associated with the ancien army, the counter-revolutionary army was not merely a feudal reaction like the French royal armies confronting revolutionary armies together with their Austrian and Prussian counterparts. Rather, it recognized the mobility unleashed by the revolutionary moment, but concentrated on taming their radical potential. Just like the revolutionary army, its main effort was to constitute armed forces on the basis of an impersonal rule to "confine the political aspirations of the working class within the constitutional limits."[443]

Prussian military reformers of the post-1815 era addressed the issue of discipline from a critical review of disciplinary mechanisms associated with Frederick II, whose 40 years of rule in the 18th century developed a disciplined army that secured territorial expansion and checked the Habsburg pressure. Though reformers like Clausewitz, Moltke, and Goltz appreciated these achievements, they all agreed that the moment enabling Frederick's harsh methods to be productive had lapsed with the French Revolution: An army dependent on harsh punishment to discipline its soldiers, who had to accept such slavery-like conditions only to escape obligations to his lord, could not be a match for an army composed of right-bearing citizens fighting in the name of the nation, which was proven in 1806 when the Kingdom lost all previous accomplishments and independence in a single war. The task laid ahead for reformers

[443] Clarke, *Keynesianism*, 133.

was to formulate a new kind of discipline but the already present alternative was not favored by Prussian ruling cadres. This means the discipline became a notion that was contested by several classes, at least for the next six decades.

Popular-national armies formed in the 19th century on the idea of citizens' duties were products of counter-revolutionary concerns opposing revolutionary militias' pressure for armament as a right inscribed in the popular sovereignty.

In that sense, their main characteristic was this contradiction that became clear in the fact that in the period leading to the World War I while all European countries were seeking for ways to integrate Prussian methods, the one obstacle for its realization was the contention of the ruling cadres that citizen armies were considered to be "a tool of the left"[444] reminding the turmoil generated by the *sans-culottes* and conscription to be an act "putting arms into the hands of potentially revolutionary proletarians."[445]

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[444] Sandra Halperin, *War and Social Change in Modern Europe: The Great Transformation Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 101.

[445] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914* (1987; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 340–41.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

As a way of conclusion, I want to mention two personal moments that shaped this study. First one is my actual witness to the civilianization reforms in Turkey with an odd end in 2016 causing a general confusion. Second one is the repeated references made to the Prussian military paradigm in studies on military politics in Turkey in every critical historical moment without any proper explanation why.

The coup attempt of 2016 in Turkey is a conceptual shock for the studies on military politics. We witnessed a naked confrontation of two political Islamist groups through state institutions including the military, and the armed forces appeared to become the site of contestation or negotiation of several groups. How was it possible? It was hard to make any sense because the main conceptual framework dominating public and scholarly debates on military politics had portrayed the armed forces as the bastion of secularism instrumentalized by state elites mainly to suppress Islamism. Though sparked by the general staff's pressure to oust an Islamist party from government, the debate evolved into one that defined the republican modernization as a failed project

for its turning into an obstacle to furthering democratization. Those adopting this argument have utilized the analytical tools provided by the Weberian critique of the state as a barrier for a functioning capitalist economy in Turkey, contributing to the reproduction of a dissident but hegemonic political discourse.[446] As an example of Wood's remarks on the convergence of Weberian and post-modern conceptualizations of modernity, a scholarly tradition has become prominent with its insistent problematization of the contemporary crisis of the Turkish state in relation to what had been done back in the 1920s because things had been established so wrong at that time that the democratization perspective is still flawed.[447]

Measures taken following the failed coup have been equally challenging. As one long-time observer of the military politics in Turkey underlines, institutional arrangements have not been actually different from the ones made in the advanced democracies; we may finally observe an officer-type respecting democratic values that Janowitz was promoting.[448] The parliament was saved from bombardments, and martial rule was averted. However, the civilian-led emergency rule assaulted fundamental rights and liberties, and the 2017 constitutional amendments threw the parliament into insignificance. Implementing such a substantial civilianization as an integral element of an authoritarian agenda has posed a conceptual problem for liberals because of their active intellectual support for turning the civilian authority into an indicator of democratic progress. The problematic 'civilianization' process caused liberal

[446] Yalman, *Transition to Neo-Liberalism*, 19–20.

[447] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, 189–97.

[448] Metin Heper, "Civil–Military Relations," in *The Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics*, ed. Alpaslan Özerdem and Matthew Whiting (London: Routledge, 2019), 115–25. For the post-coup arrangements: Gürcan and Keyman, "15 Temmuz'dan On Beş Ay Sonra: Ordunun Reformu, Devletin Dönüşümü"; İsmet Akça, "The Restructuring of Civil-Military Relations during the AKP Period," *Confluences Méditerranée* 107, no. 4 (2018): 59.

theorization to lose its explanatory capabilities in the field of military politics. However, it did not necessitate the AKP to drop liberal arguments since the terminology of the military tutelage regime analysis is still functional and unproblematic. Accordingly, the plotters' dare to bomb the parliament and to slaughter indiscriminately approved the democratic character of their rightful stance against tutelary forces that they had been holding since the mid-1990s. In Yalman's terms, the military tutelage regime analysis now is just hegemonic.

I think contemporary liberals are experiencing what the political developmentalist position went through in the 1960s. The civilian but not democratic form of military politics as an outcome of a successful civilianization reform is a topic discussed within the discipline of civil-military relations only recently. Thus, Turkey is neither the only case nor the developments there are unique; it is just a new example.[449] The populist tendencies of civilian actors have been identified as answer to the questions of why this kind of civilianization is not the right kind of civilianization and how it has come into reality.[450]

[449] Imperfect civilianization resulting in elected presidents' relying on military power for domestic purposes in Latin America: Diamint, "A New Militarism in Latin America.". A review of soldiers' compliance to civilian authorities in Latin American cases: David Pion-Berlin and Igor Acácio, "The Return of the Latin American Military?," *Journal of Democracy* 31, no. 4 (2020): 151–65. Generals' stealth intervention in Brazil: Karabekir Akkoyunlu and José Antonio Lima, "Brazil's Stealth Military Intervention," *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 14, no. 1 (April 2022): 31–54.

[450] Tuba Eldem, "Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces," in *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies: Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness in Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn (Cham: Springer, 2017), 171–92; Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu, "Turkey: How the Coup Failed," *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 1 (2017): 59–73; Hakan Şahin, "Turkey's Play with Its Military," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2018): 32–51; Akça, "The Restructuring of Civil-Military Relations during the AKP Period"; Yaprak Gürsoy, "The 15 July 2016 Failed Coup and the Security Sector," in *The Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics*, ed. Alpaslan Özerdem and Matthew Whiting (London: Routledge, 2019), 284–95; Zeynep Şentek, "Subverting Civilian Control: Security Sector Reform and Autocratisation in Turkey (2002–2017)" (PhD Thesis, Heidelberg, Heidelberg University, 2020); Hakkı Taş, "Populism and Civil–Military Relations," *Democratization* 31, no. 1 (January 2, 2024): 70–89.

This reminds the political developmentalist response to its own unexpected observations by proposing civilian failure as a factor. Turkey just before the 1960 coup used to be presented by political developmentalists as a model for the underdeveloped world thanks to the civilian outlook that was derived from "a unique record of a generation of civilian government by orderly constitutional procedures" for more than three decades in which principle of the supremacy of civilian arm over the military" had never been challenged but furthered.[451] The 1960 military coup disrupted this record and re-introduced the military into the political sphere because civilians failed to further what soldiers had achieved as institution-builders in electoral competition as the Democrat Party adopted a fearful and revanchist attitude towards the opposition leading to "discredit of democratic processes and a reversion to dictatorship."[452] Existing political institutions could not absorb the mobility achieved by the economic modernization in the 1950s, necessitated the military as a modernizing force to step in to rectify that these scholars considered to be an open violation of "the Kemalist doctrine of an apolitical army" to "re-establish the conditions of democratic civil government."[453]

Huntington had intervened in such approaches back then by calling for the resetting the objective as a successful management of political participation rather than promotion of modernization with an optimistic expectation of this development to maintain an orderly democratization. Likewise, while the current conceptual challenge for the study of military politics is set as reconsidering "the a priori assumption that

[451] Rüstow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," 549–52.

[452] Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, 417.

[453] Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," 40–42.

the effective civilian control is essential for the effective functioning of democratic procedures,"[454] we observe a renewed interest in Huntington as we can see in two main arguments circulating within liberal circles. First, by raising the difference between the objective and the subjective civilian control, it has been stressed that Justice and Development Party advanced civilianization at the expense of the military with potential problems in terms of institutional capacities in responding to security or defense-related problems.[455]

The second argument has restored the military's role to balance political turmoil generated by corrupt politicians, especially during periods of economic crisis, causing political institutions to malfunction.[456] Signs for the revitalization of Huntington indicate a total failure of liberal theories to formulate a critique. His arguments affirming military interventions contributed to the formulation of the weak civil society thesis as a distinct critique of the political developmentalist position.[457] Even though this thesis has been adopted and developed into maturity with conservative

[454] Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); cf. Kuehn and Croissant, *Routes to Reform*, 9–10.

[455] Esen and Gumuscu, "Turkey: How the Coup Failed," 69–70; Gürcan and Keyman, "15 Temmuz'dan On Beş Ay Sonra: Ordunun Reformu, Devletin Dönüşümü"; Eldem, "Democratic Control and Military Effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces," 185; Şahin, "Turkey's Play with Its Military," 47–51; Sertif Demir and Oktay Bingöl, "From Military Tutelage to Civilian Control: An Analysis of the Evolution of Turkish Civil–Military Relations," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, August 2018, 1–20; Murat Ülgül and Sertif Demir, "Keeping the Soldiers at Bay: Coup-Proofing Strategies in Turkey," *Middle East Policy* 27, no. 3 (September 2020): 140; Şentek, "Subverting Civilian Control: Security Sector Reform and Autocratisation in Turkey (2002–2017)," 182.

[456] Berk Esen, "Praetorian Army in Action: A Critical Assessment of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey," *Armed Forces & Society* 47, no. 1 (January 2021): 201–22; Nil S. Satana and Burak Bilgehan Özpek, "Civil-Military Relations and the Demise of Turkish Democracy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Turkish Politics*, ed. Güneş Murat Tezcür (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 97–116; Berk Esen, "Post-Kemalizmin Vesayet Eleştirisi: AKP Rejiminin Resmî Tezi," in *Post-Post-Kemalizm: Türkiye Çalışmalarında Yeni Arayışlar*, ed. Berk Esen and İlker Aytürk (2022; repr., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2023), 355–416.

[457] Küçükömer, *Batılılaşma*; Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?"; İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma*; Heper, *The State Tradition*; Kayalı, *Ordu ve Siyaset*.

contributions, it has occupied a significant position within dissident circles shaping intellectual agenda until recently, notwithstanding the complicated relationship to left-leaning positions. In contrast, however, democracy has never been Huntington's concern; his intellectual labor, with organic relations to American foreign policy-making, concentrated on promoting the stability of the political authority by making it resilient, in his terminology, to interruptions of urban middle-class radicalism. If you don't have a state to be protected against aspirations for emancipation, there is little to gain from his *scientific* approach.

The second issue that shaped the work for this thesis is the frequent encounters with the Prussian military paradigm presented as an explanatory category for various topics related to the military politics in Turkey. Hence, the growing presence of German officers as military reformers in the last century of the Ottoman Empire has been identified as a dynamic that had prepared the ground for development of an alliance in the World War I. The active presence of military intellectuals such as Helmut von Moltke and Colmar von der Goltz in the Ottoman military modernization has been addressed as the primary inspiration and source for staff officers eager to assume a pivotal role in the modernization mission. The Prussian military paradigm, with its contributions to the ideological formation encouraging soldiers' active involvement to political affairs, is argued to be a long-term influence thanks to its encouraging officers to push for a privileged position within the state structure and for a political unity framed by a militarist-nationalism, which are supposed to be the main pillars of the political modernization in Turkey, addressed as the military tutelage regime.[458] Later,

[458] Handan Nezir-Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to WWI* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2005); Gencer Özcan, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi," in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça

it would be the base of the uneasy relationship of the military command to the civilian leadership during the World War II years because of the sympathies of man with guns towards Germany despite the official alliance with Allies.[459] Even though the top command turned towards the US as a source of military modernization after the US' proven superiority compared to Germany, the deep impact arguably caused a deficient adoption of the American military paradigm.[460] We may identify arguments shaped by such assumptions that either emphasize intra-military confrontations' between Prussian and American minded officers as a factor leading to the 1960 coup,[461] or the military's inability to develop a pro-democratic mind reflected in their continuing inclination to overthrow governments and dissolve parliaments.[462]

Peculiarly, one central issue in these debates remains rather obscure. What would be the benefits of adopting the Prussian military paradigm as a category to give an account for the modernization of Turkey and Turkish military? I can understand that

(İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 175–222; Gencer Özcan, "Türkiye'de Milli Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi," in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 307–51.

[459] Frank G. Weber, *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain, and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979); Feroz Ahmad, "The Historical Background of Turkey's Foreign Policy," in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 9–36; John M. VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2012); Cemil Koçak, *Dönüşüm: Ordu, Din, Hukuk, Ekonomi ve Politika*, Türkiye'de Iki Partili Siyâsî Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları (1945-1950) 4 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015).

[460] Hikmet Özdemir, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Rejim ve Asker İlişkisi Üzerine İnceleme* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1993); Güvenç, "ABD Askeri Yardımı ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü: 1942-1960"; Güvenç and Uyar, "Lost in Translation or Transformation? The Impact of American Aid on the Turkish Military, 1947–60."

[461] Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics"; Kemal H Karpat, "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution," *The American Historical Review* 75, no. 6 (1970): 1654–83; Ümit Cizre, "Ideology, Context and Interest: The Turkish Military," in *Cambridge History of Modern Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1959–2009; Esen, "Praetorian Army in Action."

[462] Güvenç, "ABD Askeri Yardımı ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü: 1942-1960"; Tanıl Bora, *Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de Siyasî Ideolojiler* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), 189.

connotations of the 'Prussian' as a prefix are used to mean paternalism, strict military discipline, and authoritarianism; however, these indicate nothing but the ahistoricity ruling the historiography on German modernization that Blackbourn and Eley address. Nevertheless, it can be deduced that the prefix has two core assumptions. First, the military science embodied in the general staff as the rationalist central organization of the armed forces introduced strategical military preferences as a decisive factor in politics. Secondly, it is a perfection of the militarist nationalism that French Revolution invented. In this study, I came to conclusion that none of these two assumptions makes any sense in either conceptual or empirical terms mainly because of their flawed understanding of the French Revolution.

When elaborating on Weber's modern military of a legal-rational state and Huntington's *scientific* approach to the military politics, the objective was emphasizing their being framed by a specific interpretation of the military debate in the 19th century Prussia that put an effort to contain the French Revolution's main innovation, which was the people's war. Clausewitz, the pioneer of this debate, formulated his well-known dictum that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means,"[463] in an effort to emphasize that the war and politics cannot be considered in isolation after the revolutionary citizen-armies.

> Looking at the situation in this conventional manner, people at first expected to have to deal only with a seriously weakened French army; but in 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly war again became the business of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens. We need not study in detail the circumstances that accompanied this tremendous development; we need only note the effects that are pertinent to our discussion. The people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance. The resources and efforts now available for use

[463] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Beatrice Heuser, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1832; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28–29.

> surpassed all conventional limits; nothing now impeded the vigour with which war could be waged, and consequently the opponents of France faced the utmost peril.[464]

Trotsky, an admirer of Clausewitz and the key personality in Bolshevik Red Army's coming into existence, argues for the impossibility of a military science as an argument against the reductionist approach to military based on strategical thinking:

> Let us not seek for general logical definitions, because these will hardly, by themselves, get us out of the difficulty. Let us rather approach the question historically. According to the old view, the foundations of military science are eternal and common to all ages and peoples. But in their concrete refraction these eternal truths assume a national character. Hence we get a German military doctrine, a French one, a Russian one, and so on. If, however, we check the inventory of eternal truths of military science, we obtain not much more than a few logical axioms and Euclidean postulates. Flanks must be protected, means of communication and retreat must be secured, the blow must be struck at the enemy's least defended point, etc. All these truths, in this all-embracing formulation, go far beyond the limits of the art of war. The donkey that steals oats from a torn sack (the enemy's least defended point) and vigilantly turns its crupper away from the side from which danger may be expected to come, acts thus in accordance with the eternal principles of military science. Yet it is unquestionable that this donkey munching oats has never read Clausewitz, or even Leer.[465]

It does not make any sense to refer a change in preferences for methods to be used in a possible combat as a sign or result of a broader process, and it is impossible to designate it as a structural imperative. The Prussian could make sense as a reference if only Clausewitz's is emancipated from being a guide for conducting a combat, which was the objective of the counter-revolutionary military in Prussia throughout the 19th century, by recognizing that his position on the French Revolution and the emerging warfare was fundamentally about the popular sovereignty. This perspective lacks in references to the Prussian paradigm in studies on the modern military in Turkey; but

[464] Clausewitz, 237–38.

[465] Leon Trotsky, "Military Doctrine or Pseudo-Military Doctrinairism" (Marxists Internet Archive, December 1921), https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1922/military/ch37.htm.

rather it is centered on Prussian careers pursued in Turkey. Oliver Stein commends that there is gap between Moltke's importance attached by scholars and his rather insignificant position in the general course of the Ottoman-Prussian relations and argues it to be myth.[466] Similarly, Grüshaber shows that Turkish military command during the early republican period was looking for fragmenting the foreign knowledge sources in an effort to develop a native approach, not to mention they were holding a cautious stance towards German experts.[467]

The interest in Prussian officers as such can be a topic to be examined indeed. Studies on diplomatic history shows that the role of Prussian officers as advisors in the Ottoman Empire and a sign of deep historical friendship of Germany and Turkey was indeed a German initiative during the World War II years adopted upon proposal of the ambassador von Paper, who also served alongside the Ottoman armies during the World War I but his name does not enjoy the appreciation like Moltke and Goltz still do.[468]

Third and fourth chapters of the thesis have responded to the second assumption on Prussians' perfecting the citizen-army. The modern military cannot be grasped within a progressive line from the feudal state towards the capitalist state with the interval of the absolutist state. The historical formation of the modern military had been rather a

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[466] Karabekir's study could be counted as the first systematic one: Kâzım Karabekir, *Türkiye'de ve Türk Ordusunda Almanlar*, ed. Orhan Hülagü (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2001). Oliver Stein, "The Moltke Myth in German–Turkish Relation," *History Compass* 17, no. 7 (July 2019): e12582.

[467] Gerhard Grüßhaber, *The "German Spirit" in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938: A History of Military Knowledge Transfer* (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2018), 202–39.

[468] Zehra Önder, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası*, trans. Leyla Uslu (1977; repr., Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2010); Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An "active" Neutrality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Onur İşçi, *Turkey and the Soviet Union During World War II: Diplomacy, Discord and International Relations* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2019).

contradictory process that neither rulers nor commoners initially demanded a mass military yet eventually popular armies were generalized making intellectuals to consider it as an essential component of the capitalist state. Contrasts between pre-revolutionary standing armies, revolutionary militaries, and counter-revolutionary armies are more apparent than similarities. A historical study on the modern military should focus on how revolutionary armies negated ancien armies and how counter-revolutionary armies succeeded to contain radicalization this negation. In that sense, the Prussian army with Moltke and Bismarck should be related with Napoleon's *grande armée* rather than the Jacobin *levée en masse* by recognizing the revolutionary fever forcing them to study Napoleon when institutionalizing the conscription system. Therefore, there is much to learn from revolutionary alternatives that were formulated on the model of the National Guard of the French Revolution like the Bolshevik Red Army, or Jaures' pacificist interpretation of Goltz' nation-in-arms.

Speaking of Turkey, the bourgeois revolution is a topic addressed both by Weberian and Marxist scholars with various conclusions. Heide Gerstenberger's framework however would liberate us from searching for class origins of revolutionaries, capitalist motivations encouraging revolutionary overthrow of the non-capitalist state, the bourgeois ideology as a ruling ideology, or class interests satisfied as a result of the event. The most essential factor in the designation of an event as a bourgeois revolution, for her, is the elimination of all forms of personal rule, and nothing but their destruction enables the capitalist relations to become the dominant mode of production. By relying on this framework, it is possible to examine the period between 1908 and 1924 as an episode of bourgeois revolution. In this framework, deliberations of two former generals on the 2016 coup attempt appears odd because of their

mentioning the failure of the bourgeoisie revolution in Turkey to create a national bourgeois class as the agent of democratization.[469] Since they did not own high positions that they had occupied as a property, indeed, these generals themselves are proofs of a successful bourgeois revolution. The bourgeois revolution in terms of military politics is essentially about making the armed forces to belong to no one thus turning them into a public affair that is addressed mainly with reference to the popular sovereignty. This is what happened in the period of 1908-1924 by turning the sultan's army into the parliament's army, nothing more, nothing less.

As a last word. What about coups of the 20th century and civilianizations? I don't know yet. All I can note is that the military politics is a dynamic sphere, open to transformations to be determined by political struggles within the context of a probable political crisis that would make military forms an object of these struggles.

[469] İlker Başbuğ, *Sorunlarla Yüzleşmek* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2017), 13–109; Ahmet Yavuz, *Vesayet Savaşları* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2017), 23–57.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year
PhD	METU Political Science and Public Administration	2013-
MS	METU International Relations	2011 – 2013
BS	METU International Relations	2006 – 2011

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2014-2022	METU, Political Science and Public Administration	Research Assistant
2012 – 2013	Dumlupınar University, Department of Political Science and International Relations	Research Assistant

TEACHING ASSISTANTSHIPS (METU)

ADM 1121: Introduction to Politics I

ADM 1122: Introduction to Politics II

ADM 4145: The Administration of the Turkish Foreign Policy

PUBLICATIONS

"From Military Tutelage to Nowhere: On the Limitations of Civil-Military Dualism in Making Sense of the Rise of Authoritarianism in Turkey in the 2010s," in *Turkey's New Neoliberal State in the Making: Transformations in Legality, Economy, and Coercion,* edited by Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, Çağlar Dölek, Funda Hülagü and Özlem Kaygusuz, 188–205. London: Zed Books. 2020.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Kapitalist siyaset ve devlet üzerine yürütülen Marksist çalışmalarda en az gelişmiş araştırma alanlarından biri modern ordunun analizidir. Bu eksiklik hiçbir yerde Türkiye'de olduğu kadar belirginleşmedi. Hem gerçekleştirilen sivilleşme reformları ordu siyasetine dair liberal teorilerin reformlara atfettiği demokratikleşme ve militarizmden arınma gibi yüksek beklentileri karşılamadı, hem de Marksistler bu liberal pozisyonu sınıf dinamiklerini ihmal ettikleri doğrultusunda eleştirseler de yaşananlara dair alternatif bir Marksist açıklama sunamadılar. Askeri vesayetten tartışmaya açık sivillik ile çıkışın 'devletin otoriter yeniden yapılandırılması' denilen dönüşümün ayrılmaz bir unsuru haline geldiği, üniforma giymiş 'sivil Cumhurbaşkanı' Erdoğan imgesinde yeni bir militarizmin geliştiği ve bu siyasi bağlamda Türk ordusunda profesyonelleşme yönünde önemli bir dönüşümün yaşandığı bir dönemde, Marksistlerin bu eksikliği gerçekten de önemli bir analitik ve siyasi zayıflıktır.

Bu teze yönelik çalışmalara Türkiye'de ordu dönüşümüne ilişkin sınıf temelli alternatif bir açıklama önermek üzere başlandı. Fakat, kapitalist devletlerin zor aygıtlarına yönelik halihazırdaki Marksist yaklaşımlara genel bir bakış, Marksist yaklaşımın da ordudaki bu tür dönüşümleri anlamlandırmaya uygun sınıf temelli analitik araçlar önermekte yetersiz kaldığını göstermiştir. Bu gözlem ile, tezin amacı ordu siyasetine dair Marksist analizin eksiklerinin giderilmesine yönelik çabalara katkıda bulunmak olarak yeniden şekillendirildi. Erken dönemlerdeki Türkiye odağı metinde özellikle ordu siyasetine liberal Weberci yaklaşımlara dair gözlemler ve

yorumlarda fark edilecektir. Bu durum tezin iç tutarlılığı açısından bir sorun teşkil etmemektedir, zira 'Türk ordusunun modernleşmesi' olarak adlandırılan sürece modernleşmenin dünya genelindeki analizlerinde atfedilen merkezi konum nedeniyle ordu siyasetine yönelik liberal yaklaşımların her zaman önemli bir odağı olagelmiştir.

Orduyu kapitalizm içerisinde Marksist sorunsallaştırma arayışındaki bu tez, ilk olarak, Weber'in çalışmalarında ordu kendi başına kuramsallaştırılmasa da İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ordu siyasetinin incelenmesinde Weberciliğin baskın paradigma haline getiren tarihsel süreç inceledi. Takiben, Weberci etki Marksist analizlerde takip edildi, Althusser ve Poulantzas'ın kapitalist devletin zor aygıtlarına ilişkin Marksist analizlerindeki konumu aktarıldı. Althussercilik'e yönelik önemli eleştiriler geliştiren, ancak zor aygıtlarına dair yorumlarda benzer yetersizliklere sahip Politik Marksist konumun incelenmesi sonrasında Heide Gerstenberger'in kapitalist devletin burjuva devlet biçiminin oluşumuna ilişkin tarihsel araştırmalarına odaklanıp ve Gerstenberger'in sunduğu çerçeveyi ordu siyaseti perspektifinden yeniden düşündü. Bu incelemeler temelinde, sonuç olarak, modern orduların oluşumundaki temel belirleyici faktörün silahlardaki teknik yenilikler ya da kapitalist üretimin gerekliliklerinden ziyade, devrim öncesi askeri biçimleri hedef alan devrimci bir anın olduğunu ve bu anın en önemli örneği 1789 Fransız Devrimi olduğunu savunuldu. Bu argüman, Gerstenberger'in eski rejim'in (ancien regime) burjuva devlet biçiminin ön koşulu olduğu argümanına dayanmakta, bu doğrultuda Gerstenberger'in eski rejim kategorisinden hareket ile eski ordu (ancien army) kategorisi geliştirildi. Tez, Gestenberger'in çerçevesinin devrim sonrası çalkantıları yansıtmak için yetersizdir kaldığı tespitinden hareket ile, 'devrimci ordu' ve 'karşı-devrimci ordu' kategorilerini modern ordunun oluşumunun belirleyen çelişkili askeri formlar olarak, modern orduyu

oluşturan tarihsel süreci ve sınıfsal gerilimleri incelenmede kullanmak üzere sunmaktadır. Kısacası bu tez, modern orduyu eski ordu, devrimci ordu ve karşı devrimci ordu kategorilerinin çatışmalı ilişkilerinin bir sonucu olarak tartışmaktadır.

Ordu siyasetine liberal yaklaşımın Marksist eleştirisi, bu yaklaşımların devlet-sivil toplum ayrımını bu iki alanı da şekillendiren kapitalist üretim ilişkilerini göz ardı edip mutlak olarak ele aldığına dikkat çekecektir. 'Darbecilik yanılgısı''nın bir örneği niteliğindeki liberal askeri vesayet rejimi analizinin temel sorunlarından biri olan bu ihmal, belirli bir ülkede sivil kontrolün varlığını sadece o ülkede askeri darbelerin olmaması şeklindeki değerlendirmelere yansımıştır. Bu tür liberal analizler, siyasetin militarizasyonunu sorgulayan eleştirel yaklaşımlarla diyaloğa girmek bir yana, askerlerin sivil siyasetçileri etkilemesini sağlayan diğer birçok biçimi görmezden gelmektedir. Bu liberal yaklaşıma sahip olanlar hiçbir zaman anti-militarist ya da silahlı adamların ortadan kalkmasını isteyen pasifist bir pozisyon almazlar, orduya siyasi alandan silinmesi gereken bir anomali olarak yaklaşmaktadırlar. Sivillerin komutasında olacak ve savaş durumunda hazır bulunacak profesyonel orduyu savunurken, bu profesyonel orduyu apolitik ve teknik bir kurum olarak inşa etmenin siyasi sonuçlarına ilişkin veya sivilleşmiş ordu siyasetinin nasıl işleyeceğine dair herhangi bir sorgulamada bulunmamışlardır.

Risa A. Brooks'un sivil-asker ilişkileri alanında son dönemlerde öne çıkan çalışmaları taradığı inceleme, Türkiye örneğinde karşılaşılan sorunun Türkiye'ye özgü olmadığını göstermektedir. Brooks, orduyu siyasi liderleri devirebilecek yeteneklere sahip istisnai bir aktör olarak görmenin ötesine geçerek ordunun siyasetteki rolünün normalleştirilmesi çağrısında bulunuyor ve ordunun otokratlar lehine müdahale etmeyerek de önemli bir rol oynayabileceğini gösteren Arap Baharı'na özellikle dikkat

çekiyor. Ordunun siyasi faaliyetlerde bulunabileceği çeşitli yolların belirlenmesi ve ordunun daha geniş siyasi bağlam içinde konumlandırılması, ordu siyasetinde ordunun salt teknik bir kurum olduğu ve askerlerin siyasi süreçlere katılımının demokratik yapı içinde bir anomali olduğu gibi varsayımlarla yaklaşmanın ve sivil-asker ilişkilerinde sivili demokratik olarak fetişleştiren normatif yatkınlıkların eksikliklerinin giderilmesi açısından önemlidir. Ancak, tartışma sadece askeri elitlerin siyasi eğilimlerine indirgenirse de ordunun siyasetteki rolü "normalleştirici" olmaktan uzak kalacaktır. Türkiye'de bu amaçla şunlar sorunsallaştırılmıştır: 20. yüzyılın başındaki dönüşümü açıklamak için başvurulan alaylı ve mektepli subaylar, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra ordunun yeniden yapılandırılmasının yönü konusunda Prusya yanlısı ve Amerikan yanlısı generaller, darbe sonrası siyasi yeniden yapılanma sürecinde bekçi konumunu savunanlar ile ve doğrudan yönetimi benimseyenler, sivilleşme konusunda geleneksel bekçi konumu benimseyenler ile Avrupa yanlısı reformları savunanlar, 2016 darbe girişimiyle ilgili Atlantikçiler ve Avrasyacılar. Bu tür tartışmalara duyulan ilgi, ordu siyasetinin incelenmesine yönelik üniter yaklaşımdan duydukları memnuniyetsizliği yansıtmaktadır; ancak askerlerin özgeçmişlerine veya iddia edilen ideolojik yakınlıkları üzerinden geliştirilen çalışmalar bu tür kliklerin ortaya çıkmasına neden olan sosyal ve siyasi bağlama dair açıklamasını sunmamaktadırlar. Diğer bir deyişle, ordunun daha geniş siyasi ve sosyal bağlamı belirleme ve yapılandırma kabiliyetine sahip özerk bir kurum olduğu anlayışına dayandıkları sürece, ordu siyaseti içindeki siyaseti normalleştirmek için yetersizdirler.

Bu tez, izole bir askeri alan üretmek yerine, orduyu sosyal bir form olarak çerçeveleyerek sosyal ve siyasi ilişkilere bağlı bir şekilde odağı ordunun kendisine yönlendirme çabasıdır. Bu çaba ordu siyasetinin liberal düşünürler tarafından ordunun

siyasi rolü ya da konumu üzerine yöneltilen temel soruların ötesine geçmeyi gerektirmektedir; çünkü bu sorular normatif bir duruşları göstermekte, somut incelenmesini verili ideallerden ne kadar farklılaştığının sorunsallaştırılmasına sınırlamaktadır.

Bu araştırmaya, başka bir şeyle ilişkisinin incelenmesinden ziyade ordunun kendisini bir sorgulama nesnesi haline getiren temel soruları formüle ederek başlayabiliriz. Ordu nedir, neden hala mevcuttur? Açıkçası ordu, siyasi nitelik taşıyan ölüm kalım meselelerinde kimin sorumluluk üstleneceğini belirleyecek olan şiddet örgütlenmesinin ana kurumudur. Hiç şüphesiz, insan ilişkilerinde savaşın sürekliliği, ordunun sürekliliğinin arkasındaki ana faktördür. Orduya atfedilen işlev veya rol ne olursa olsun, esasen insanları öldürmek, en azından fiziksel zarar vermek veya bunun tehdidini oluşturmakla ilgilidir; bu nedenle, bileşenlerinin, yani askerlerin ve subayların, ölümcül araçları örgütlü bir şekilde kullanma yeteneklerinde mükemmelliğe ulaşmaları, bu yetenekleri benzer bir ölümcül örgütler ile beklenmedik sonuçlara açık karşılaşmalarda ve öngörülemeyen koşullarda kullanmaları beklenir. Kısacası, savaş cehennemdir ve ordular askerleri cehenneme hazırlar. Uzak bir gelecekte savaşın tamamen ortadan kalkması durumunda ordunun da buna bağlı olarak ortadan kalkacağı haklı bir spekülasyondur; ancak savaşın yokluğunda bile savaş olasılığı devam etmektedir. Bazı mikro devletler dışında, şu anda var olan tüm devletlerin, olası Hobbesçu doğa durumu benzeri bir durumdan kaçınmak için hala orduları mevcuttur.

Şiddet nasıl organize edilir? Ölümcül araçlarla gerçekleştirilecek siyasi hedefi kim ve nasıl formüle eder? Normal şartlar altında pek çok kişinin kabul edilemez bulacağı ölümcül görevleri kim üstleniyor? Maliyetleri kim üstleniyor, faydaları kim topluyor?

Bu sorulara yanıt olacak altın bir standart ortaya koymak zordur. Farklı tarihsel dönemlerde ve farklı coğrafyalarda gözlemlenen çeşitli askeri örgütlenme biçimleri, bu sorulara verilen yanıtların çeşitliliğine işaret etmektedir. Bunları antik ve modern askeri formların basit bir karşılaştırmasından çıkarmak mümkündür. Ölümcül görevler üstlenen başlıca aktörler akıncılar, yarı-tanrı kahramanlar, zenginlik peşinde maceraperestler, soylular ya da Don Kişot benzeri savaşçılar değil, sıradan insanlar arasından seçilen ve son derece sofistike bürokratik kurumlar içinde örgütlenen meçhul askerlerdir. On üçüncü yüzyılda soyluların evlerinde kılıçları vardı ama yirminci yüzyılda hiçbir hane bir uçak gemisine sahip değil. Eski zamanların şövalyesi atının ve zırhının sahibiydi... Modern ordu, ... asker ve subay ... savaş yürütme araçlarına sahip olmayı bıraktığında ortaya çıktı. Ordular artık belirli bir olay için bir araya gelen ad hoc (geçici) oluşumlar değil, kalıcı organlardır. Ordular artık sadece ölümcül görevler yerine getiren değil, aynı zamanda bireyin siyasi toplulukla soyut ilişkisini de düzenleyen organlardır. Askerler orduya katılan şahıslar değil, bir kolektivitenin, bir devletin parçasıdır. Bir siyasi liderin savaş bölgesinde savaşçı olarak bulunması, tarih boyunca sıkça karşılaşılan bir uygulama olmakla birlikte, artık düşünülemez bir durumdur. Merkezi hükümet artık sadece lider değil, önlemler yoluyla halk savaşının örgütleyicisi rolünü de üstlenirken devletin yerel sivil hayata nüfuz etmesini ve iyi örgütlenmiş bir halk savaşı yürütmesini de sağlar. Savaşın yürütülmesine ilişkin bilgi, istisnai yeteneklere sahip olanların yararlanabileceği savaş sanatından değil, uygun bir eğitim ve öğretimle herhangi bir yetenekli kişinin başarılı olabileceği bir evrenselliği ima eden askeri bilimden türetilmekte.

Örgütlü şiddet nasıl ve neden bu tür dönüşümler geçirmiştir? Modern ordunun küresel bir fenomen haline gelmesinde modernin önemi nedir? Ordu siyasetine liberal

çerçeveden yaklaşanların, Weberci bürokratikleşme yoluyla elde edilmiş fiziksel şiddetin meşru kullanımı üzerindeki devlet tekeli fikrine referansla modern orduyu anlama konusunda fikir birliği içinde olduklarını gözlemleyebiliriz. Bir diğer görüş birliği ise, 19. yüzyıldan bu yana gözlemlenen siyasi ve toplumsal dönüşümlerin, bu dönüşümlerin yeni yönetici tabakalar tarafından benimsenmesi ve onaylanmasıyla ortaya çıktığı ve daha sonra modernleşmenin daha da ilerletilmesini savunarak geleneksel yönetici elitlere ve geleneksel topluma meydan okuduğu yönündedir. Bu tarihsel açıklamaya rağmen, Weber'in modern devleti kapitalizmle birlikte insanlığı gelenek ve büyünün kısıtlamalarından kurtaran akıl ve özgürlükteki ilerlemenin nihai biçimleri olarak doğallaştırması nedeniyle, Weber'in rasyonelleşme tezinin bir ürünü olan modern ordu kavramının tarih dışılığına burada dikkat çekilmelidir. Weberci modernleşme perspektiflerinin siyasi kalkınmacı versiyonları, rasyonelleşmenin küresel ölçekte daha da ilerleyeceği, başka bir deyişle Batı'nın izlediği yolun Batı dışı dünyada da tekrarlanacağı konusunda iyimser olmuş ve geleneksel kurumların tasfiyesi ile seküler kurumların geliştirmedeki ilerlemelerinden dolayı Türkiye'ye özel önem atfetmiştir. Ancak bu pozisyon, Weber'in rasyonelleşmeyi Batı'ya özgü bir süreç olarak tanımlaması ve bunun sonucunda patrimonyalizmi Doğu'ya uygulanabilir ayrı bir kategori olarak önermesi hatırlatarak eleştirilmiştir. Sivilleşmenin Türkiye'ye demokrasi getirmedeki yetersizliği, bu tür liberal argümanların yeniden gözden geçirilmesi gerektiğini ortaya koymaktadır, ama bu konu bu tezin görevi değildir.

Eleştirel Marksist bir yaklaşımın geliştirilmesi, öncelikle Weberyan rasyonelleşme tezinin doğallaştırıcı yönlerine değinerek ona bir meydan okuma olarak çerçevelenmelidir. Dolayısıyla temel soru, modern ordunun sınıfsal karakterinin ne olduğu şeklinde yeniden formüle edilmelidir. Bu soruyu yanıtlarken, devlet üzerine

mevcut tarihsel materyalist gelenek, Weber ve Weberciler tarafından uygulanan kategorilerdeki sınıf önyargısını ortaya çıkarma ve bu konuda nasıl seslerini yükselttiklerini hatırlatma açısından zengin olduğu için faydalıdır.

Ancak bu gelenek ne yazık ki Althusserci yapısalcılık ve devletçi-kurumsalcı etki sayesinde Weberci kavramların tarihsel materyalist analize sorunsuz entegrasyonu açısından da zengindir. Althusser'in son kertede sömürü ilişkileri olan üretim ilişkilerinin yeniden üretiminin siyasi koşullarını zor kullanarak (fiziksel ya da başka türlü) güvence altına almak şeklindeki formülleştirmesinde görüleceği gibi, tuhaf bir şekilde tarihsel materyalist gelenekte Weberci kavramlara meydan okumak yerine bu kavramlar ile birlikte sınıf temelli bir analiz geliştirmeye eğilimi ön plana çıkmakta, bunu Weber'in tarif ettiği modern ordunun kapitalizmin gelişimi ve kapitalist ilişkilerin yeniden üretimine katkılarına vurgulayarak gerçekleştirmeyi ummaktadır. Poulantzas'ın daha sonra geliştirdiği yeni formülasyon, ulusal ordunun fiziksel gücü ile sağlanan şiddet tekelinin devletin kurumsal maddiliği korunması ve ekonomik alanın pasifleştirilmesinde işlevsel olduğunu belirterek orijinal pozisyonu yeniden vurguladı, askeri biçimin egemen sınıfların çıkarlarını ve toplumsal mücadeleler sonucu dayatılan tavizleri gizleyecek şekilde toplumsal ilişkileri yansıttığını eklemiştir. Nedenselliğini sonuç odaklı bir yaklaşım ile kapitalist gelişimin ve kapitalist birikimin sürdürülmesinin gerekliliklerinde bulan veya ordunun birikim stratejisinde değişikliği dikte eden egemen sınıf kompozisyonundaki yerine odaklanan çalışmalar Althusser ve Poulantzas'ın çalışmalarında korunan Weberci etkiyi sürdürmekte. Böylesi Weberci kavramları sınıfı dikkate alır şekilde yeniden yorumlanarak içerme beklenen sonuçları vermeyebilir. Weber'in bu kategorileri geliştirirken dayandığı tarih yazımını da soruyu formüle ederken ele alınırsa bu

eksiklik aşılabilir: modern ordunun ve modern orduyu ortaya çıkaran tarihsel sürecin sınıfsal karakteri nedir?

Weber'in kapitalizmin tarihsel gelişimine dair anlatımında ticarileşme modelini tespit etmek kolayken, bazı küçük yorumlar dışında Weber'in metinleri arasında modern ordunun tarihsel gelişimine dair iyi yapılandırılmış bir metin bulmak zordur. Weber'in aklındaki modelin en iyi Michael Roberts'ın askeri devrim tezinde ifade edildiğini iddia etmek mümkün. Weber'in modern toplumun tarihsel kökenlerini Püriten Reformu ile yaşamın sekülerleşmesinde yattığı iddiasına paralel olarak Roberts, toplumsal modernleşmenin esas olarak 16. ve 17. yüzyıllarda askeri alanda yaşanan gelişmelerle mümkün olabilmiş askeri devrimin bir ürünü olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Rönesans'ın bilimsel atılımının uygulanması, Otuz Yıl Savaşları'nda en belirgin hale gelen bu devrimi kolaylaştırdı. Weber'in rasyonalizasyon tezine kıyasla Roberts'ın tezi, modern devletin tarihsel gelişimini açıklarken çok daha teknolojik belirlenimcidir; zira Kuzey-Batı Avrupa'da geliştirilen ve benimsenen bilimsel savaş yaklaşımının, feodal aristokratların aleyhine burjuvaziyi güçlendirmede etkili bir işlev gördüğünü; meritokratik ilkelerin ve demokratik fikirlerin başatlığını sağladığını vurgulamaktadır. Batı'nın yükselişini açıklayan askeri devrim tezinin temel dayanakları, gerileme ve gerilemeye verilen tepkilerine atıfta bulunarak başlıca örnekleri Prusya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu olmak üzere Batı dışı dünyayı açıklayan müdafaacı modernleşme tezinde yeniden üretilmiştir. Askeri devrim esas olarak iç faktörler tarafından tetiklenen bir sürece atıfta bulunurken, müdafaacı modernleşme argümanı dış ilişkiler, yani jeopolitik basınç tarafından belirlenen süreçlere dayanmaktadır. Bu yanıyla müdafaacı modernleşme modeli, ilgili durumlarda askerlerin liderliğindeki modernleşme burjuvazinin güçlenmesi ile gerçekleşmiş toplumsal süreci

tekrarlayamaması nedeniyle yanlış gelişmişlik veya az gelişmişlik argümanlarına temel oluşturacaktır.

Askeri devrim tezi, aslında sivil-asker ilişkileri yaklaşımının da temel kaygısı olan, modern ordunun farklı durumlarda diğer kurumlarla kurduğu çeşitli ilişki biçimleri üzerine bir tartışma açabilir. Zira askeri devrim tezi modern toplumların askeri örgütlenmelerinde gözlemlenen tarihsel çeşitlilikleri ele almakta oldukça sınırlı kalsa da askeri devrimin ana ilkelerinin benimsenmesini bir başarı olarak değerlendirme eğilimde olduğu için söz konusu başarının bir değişken olarak önermektedir. Roberts'ın çalışmalarında öne çıkan ana örnekler Hollanda ve İsveç'tir ve geçerli gerekçelere bu argüman Fransa örneğine genişletilebilir; ancak Roberts yaşamın sekülerleşmesi ve askeri tekniklerin benimsenmesindeki ilerleme Anglosakson örnekler için de söz konusu olmasına rağmen bunların neden ayrıksı olduğunu sorgulamamaktadır. Özellikle, Anglosakson örneklerinde ordular neden belirli durumlara cevap vermek için ad hoc karakterde kalırken Kıta Avrupası'nda kalıcı olmuştur? Neden İngiliz ordusu 20. yüzyılın başına kadar bile modernleşmemiştir? Yine aynı dönemde, neden ABD'de zorunlu askerlik ve merkezi askeri bürokrasi neredeyse hiç yoktu? Roberts'a göre bu bir mesele değil çünkü Roberts, sosyolojik ve ekonomik tarih yaklaşımlara doğrudan bir karşı çıkış olarak modern Avrupa'nın ortaya çıkışında askeri alandaki teknik ve teknolojik gelişmeleri merkeze yerleştirmeye çalışıyordu. Buna göre, monarşilerin feodal beylerin gücünü sınırlamasına ve mutlakiyetçi devletler kurmasına yardımcı olan ateşli silahlar ve topçuluktaki gelişmelerdi, bu gelişme temelinde gerçekleşen daimi orduların boyutlarındaki artış burjuvazinin aristokrasinin ayrıcalıklı pozisyonuna meydan okumasını sağladı. Çıkarılabilecek tek sonuç, Tilly'nin Avrupa ulus-devletlerine ilişkin argümanında

olduğu gibi, modern devletlerin Avrupa'da aynı temel özellikleri paylaştığıdır. Tilly'e göre, savaş yapımı ve savaş için kaynak yaratmak Avrupa'daki yöneticilerin ortak kaygıları olduğundan, savaşın dönüşümü devletin dönüşümünde belirleyici olmuş; ve askeri devrimin getirdiği bu dönüşüm, stratejiler farklılık gösterse de, Avrupa devletlerinin merkezi bürokrasilere sahip modern ulusal devletlere dönüşmesine yol açmıştır. Tilly'ye göre muamma, modern orduların gelişiminin Avrupa'da olduğu gibi sivilleşmenin takip edilmediği üçüncü dünyadaki sapmada yatmaktadır. Tilly'nin argümanlarının, askeri devrim tezinin sosyal ve ekonomik tarihçilere meydan okuma hedefindeki başarısının kanıtı olarak sunulması şaşırtıcı değildir.

Askeri devrim tezine yönelik eleştiriler, yukarıda değinilen yeniliklerin argüman uğruna abartıldığına işaret etmekte. Geoffrey Parker, devrimci olduğu iddia edilen tekniklerin devrim denilen süreçten önce de kullanıldığını göstermek için 16. yüzyılda gerileyen bir başka ordu olan İspanyol ordusunu örnek veriyor. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu da benzer bir karşı örnek teşkil etmektedir. Ateşli silahların kullanımındaki disiplinli örgütlenme, 16. yüzyılın sonları ve 17. yüzyılın başlarındaki Yeniçeri uygulamalarında belgelenmiştir. Osmanlı örneği, Tilly'nin kapitalist gelişme ile askeri modernleşme arasındaki nedenselliği modern orduların finansal ilişkilerin güçlendirmesi aracılığı ile kurduğu argümanı da zorlamaktadır: Eğer merkezi bir daimi ordunun varlığı, paralı askerlerin kullanımı, yerel otoritelerin merkezi bürokrasiye bağlanması ve devasa orduların devleti verimlilik uğruna kapitalist ve modern rasyonaliteye uymaya zorlayan büyük mali yükü askeri devrimin bir sonucu olarak kapitalizmin gelişmesinde etkenlerse, kapitalizm ve modern devlet neden sunulan faktörlerin neredeyse tamamının mevcut olduğu Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda ortaya çıkmamıştır? Black, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na en gurur kırıcı askeri yenilgisini İran'ın yaşattığını

hatırlatarak askeri devrim tezine yön veren Batı zaferciliğine dikkat çeker ve böylesi bir Batı üstünlüğünün sanayi devriminden önce hele 17. yüzyılda söz konusu olamayacağını iddia eder. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nu inceleyen önemli tarihçilerinden Halil İnalcık da benzer şekilde Batı tarih yazımının Oryantalist kurgusunun örnekleri olarak bu tür anlatılardaki zaferciliğe karşısına alır ve daimi ordu gibi ilerlemelerin Osmanlı örneklerine işaret eder; ancak, erken elde edilen başarı ve bu başarının yozlaşma sonucu kaybolup çöküşün zemininin hazırlandığı iddiaları yapılan vurguları yarış-vari bir karşılaştırmaya çevirir. Black, askeri devrim tezinin geçerliliğini sorgulamada Fransız Devrimi Savaşları'nın modern ordunun gelişimine öncülük ettiğini öne sürer. Black için modern ordunun gelişiminde taktikler ya da tekniklerden ziyade orduların büyüklüğündeki artış dikkate alınmalıdır; haliyle, Fransız Devrimi, yurttaş-askerlerin icadı sayesinde orduların boyutları açısından önemli bir eşiğin geçilmesinde kritik bir öneme sahip görünmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Fransız Devrimi'nin önemine dikkat çekmenin doğallaştırıcı unsurları otomatik olarak ortadan kaldırmadığının farkında olmalıyız, zira ordunun büyüklüğüne yapılan vurgu, tarihsel sürecin hala doğrusal bir ilerleme olarak varsayıldığını göstermektedir; tıpkı Tilly'nin devrimi paralı asker kullanımına kıyasla ‘toplumdan ucuz ve etkili bir asker toplama yönteminin’ icadı olarak anlaması ya da Skocpol'un devrimi devlet gücünün kullanımında yetersiz kalan elitlerin yerine yeni becerikli elitlerin geçmesi olarak çerçevelemesi gibi.

Bu kapsamda Huntington'ın müdahalesi hatırlanabilir. Huntington da askeri devrim tezine bir eleştiri olarak, modern ordunun ortaya çıkışında Fransız Devrimi'nin önemine işaret ederken, Devrim'in getirdiği yeniliklere değil, devrime verilen tepkilerin yeniliklerine vurgu yapar. Huntington, 18. yüzyılda gelişen askeri

düşüncenin bir bilim olarak değil, ancak kahramanlığa vurgu yapan savaş sanatı temelinde ilerlediği gerekçesiyle 19. yüzyıl öncesindeki gelişmeleri göz ardı etmektedir. Prusya deneyiminin bilimsel atılım şeklindeki yorumu Huntington'ın nesnel sivil kontrol modeline ilham kaynağıdır. Ona göre, Prusyalı generaller ordunun Fransa benzeri siyasallaşmasından başarıyla kaçınmış, Bismarck-Moltke girişiminde zirveye ulaştığı haliyle askerliği bilimsel bir meslek olarak geliştirmişlerdi. Askerlik bilimi, Almanya'nın birleşmesini gerçekleştiren askeri başarıların elde edilmesinde de kilit rol oynayan Genelkurmay Başkanlığı kurumunda başarılı bir şekilde somutlaştı. Bu noktada, Weber'in modern orduyu, Prusyalı generallerin geliştirdiği ve Batılı devletlerin çoğunun askeri reformlar için yavaş yavaş uyarlama çabalarını yoğunlaştırdığı 'Genelkurmay Başkanlığı' gibi bürokratik yapıyla çerçeveleme konusunda Huntington ile aynı sayfada olduğunun altını çizmek gerek.

Huntington'ın Fransız Devrimi'ne verilen tepkilere odaklanması, Tilly ve Skocpol'un kaçındığı bir soruya ışık tutmaktadır: Avrupa'daki yöneticiler neden Fransız Devrimi'nin yurttaş-ordu icadını benimsemek için acele etmeyip ve 19. yüzyılın başlarındaki askeri yenilenme çabalarını devrim öncesi uygulamaları onarmaya yoğunlaştırırken, diğer taraftan Prusya yeniliklerini benimsemeye büyük ilgi gösterdiler? Huntington'ın bu kaçınılan soruya dikkat çekmesi ve Prusya tepkisi üzerinden ideal bir tip formüle etmesi, tezin sorununa ilişkin nasıl bir angajman gerektiğine dair bir ipucu vermektedir: Fransız Devrimi'nin önemi, sadece yurttaş ordu yeniliği ile buna verilen tepkinin siyaset dışı ve bilimsel bir yaklaşım geliştirdiğini iddiası ile birlikte ele alınırsa kavranabilir. Bu tür bir yurttaş ordusunun sınıfsal karakteri nedir? Bu soru, sınıfsal açıdan nötr bir görünüme sahip olan modern kapitalist devlet paradoksu içerisine yerleştirilirse yanıtlanabilir.

Modern ordunun oluşumunu sorunsallaştıran çalışmalar, yöneticilerin jeopolitik meydan okumalara yanıt verme ve değişen savaş koşullarına uyum sağlama konusundaki yeteneklerine veya yetersizliklerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu türde yaklaşımların altında yatan varsayımlar çeşitli şekillerde belirlenimcidir. Belirlenim Weberci açıklamalarda rasyonelleşmenin ortaya çıkması ve gerçekleşmesiyken, yapısalcı Marksist açıklamalarda kapitalizmin gelişimi ve gereksinimleridir. Ortaya çıkan temel sorun, tarih-ötesi kategoriler geliştirmek pahasına, yöneticilerin ve yöneticilere maruz kalanların önceliklerinin, düşüncelerinin, beklentilerinin ve kısıtlamalarının, bir sonraki adımda ne olacağını bilme ayrıcalığına sahip bir konumdan tamamen göz ardı edilmesidir. Yapısal mantık her tarihsel anda iktidar yapısının fiili gelişimindeki tarihsel olumsallık unsurlarını göz ardı eder, önerdiği kategorilerin somut davranışı tamamen belirlediği şüphelidir.

Weber ve Weberyen perspektiflerden bahsetmişken, yapısal mantıkta öne sürülen kategorilerin, kapitalizmi Batı'da burjuvanın tarihsel misyonunu etkin bir şekilde üstlenerek gerçekleştirilen insanlık ilerlemesi ile ilişkilendiren ticarileşme merkezli tarih modelinin sınıfsal önyargılara sahip olduğu açıktır. Bu model, rasyonelleşmenin sonucu olarak ticarileşme gibi meta düzeydeki süreçleri ön plana çıkarıp, ayrıksı örnekleri geri kalmışlık ya da başarısızlık temelinde inceleyecek modellerin eşliğinde, tarihsel özgün bir toplumsal biçimi doğal bir ilerleme yolu olarak formüle etmektedir. Bu tür bir doğallaştırma, gerçekleştirilebilecek ve gerçekleştirilmiş olan alternatifler üzerine düşünmeyi sınırlar ve normatif pozisyonların geliştirildiği nesnel analiz kisvesi altında sınıfsal önyargıları gizleme işlevi görür.

Yaygın bir uygulama olarak görünen sınıf temelli analiz geliştirmede modern ordu için Weberci çerçevenin Marksist analize entegre edilmesi, eğer ticarileşme modelini

benimsemişse sonuç karmaşık sonuçlar doğurabilir, sınıf temelli analiz geliştirme hedefini silikleştirebilir. Weberci modern devlet ve modern ordu fikri, Weberci anlatılarda olmayan ya da örtük şekilde ifade edilen, bu kurumların günün sonunda burjuva yanlısı sınıfsal karaktere sahip olduğu vurgusu ile yeniden üretildiğinde, sonuç, devlet yapısında doğrudan sınıf temsilini öneren bir araçsalcılığın üretilmesi, aynı zamanda devlet yapısında böyle bir temsilin olmamasının kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin gelişiminde bir zayıflık olarak tartışılmasıdır. Bu anlamda Skocpol, devletin burjuva çıkarlarıyla çelişen eylemlerinin bu tür Marksist yaklaşımların itirazını zayıflatan bir olgu olduğuna işaret ederken haklıdır. Ancak bu, Skocpol'un yaptığı gibi, devlete sınıf temelli yaklaşımı reddetmeyi, modern devletin oluşumunu ve ortaya çıkan devletlerarası sistemi otonom gelişmeler olarak kabul etmeyi gerektirmez.

Bu noktada, Marksist devlet analizindeki en kafa karıştırıcı konulardan birini, yani devlet ve sınıfın nasıl ilişkilendirileceği sorusunu açıklığa kavuşturmak için Simon Clarke'a dönmemiz ve Clarke'ın analizinin Gerstenberger tarafından sorunsallaştırıldığı şekliyle kapitalist tahakkümün siyasi biçimi üzerine tartışmayla tamamlamamız gerekiyor. Clarke'ın ileri sürdüğü gibi, devletin dolaysız sınıf çıkarlarına karşı tarafsız olması ile vurgulanan özerkliği, kapitalist toplumun temel çelişkileri karşısında tarafsız bir görünümle sınıf egemenliğini sürdüren kapitalist devletin özgünlüğüdür: Kapitalist devletin sınıfsal içeriği dolaysız üretim ilişkilerinden çıkarılamaz; ne belirli burjuva çıkarlarını mümkün kılmasından ne de emeği sermayenin toplumsal gücüne tabi kılan zorlayıcı kapasitesinden çıkarılamaz. Kapitalizmdeki ekonomik ve siyasi gücün kaynağı, emeğe mülkiyet temelinde el konulması ve meta dolaşımı ile tanımlı, emeğe hükmetme gücünün para gücünde soyutlandığı bir toplumsal üretim biçimi olan kapitalist üretimin çelişkili biçimidir.

Kapitalizmin tarihsel gelişimi, kapitalizm öncesi tahakküm biçimlerinin yıkılmasıyla, devlet ve sivil toplum ayrışması ve paranın toplumsal gücünün devletin siyasi gücünden radikal bir şekilde kopması temelinde devletin yeniden kurulmasıyla gerçekleşmiştir. Devletin sınıfsal içeriği, genel olarak sermayenin birbirini tamamlayan varoluş biçimleri olarak para ve devlet ikiliğinden çıkarılabilir. Ancak bu ikilik, ücretli emeğin yaygınlaşmasıyla birlikte meta ilişkilerinin de yaygınlaşmasını öngören kapitalist üretimin tamamen toplumsallaşması anlamına gelmemektedir. Bu sürece, spesifik bir faaliyetle ilişkilendirilen spesifik bir sınıfın doğal yükselişi şeklinde, toplumun organik bir evrimi olarak yaklaşılamaz. Kapitalist üretimin bu çelişkili bütünlüğü, kendisine sağlanan kurumsal biçimlerden taşarak kapitalist devlet biçimini belirlediği için, sınıf mücadelesinin çözümlerini yalnızca geçici kılar; çünkü sermaye ve emek kendi toplumsal yeniden üretimlerinin önündeki engeller olarak karşı karşıya geldiklerinden, kapitalist tahakküm biçimlerinin kendileri de sınıf mücadelesinin nesnesidir. Kapitalizm öncesi biçimlerin yok edilmesi, Fransa'da olduğu gibi devrim yoluyla dramatik bir şekilde ya da İngiltere'de olduğu gibi daha az dramatik ama daha sistematik bir şekilde gerçekleştirilebilir. Kapitalizm öncesi tüm tahakküm biçimleri ortadan kaldırılıp yerini sözleşmeye dayalı ilişkilere bıraktıktan sonra bile kapitalist devletin çelişkili karakteri, sermayenin birikimi küresel ölçeğe taşıma eğilimi ve kapitalist devletin ulusal tabanı üzerinden gelişir.

Sermaye sınırlı iç pazar engelini aşmaya çalışırken, devletin fazla nüfusu soğurmaya yetecek bir hızda yerli üretken sermaye birikimini güvence altına alma, istikrarlı veya artan ücretler sağlama ve kamu gelirlerini artırma kaygısıyla çelişir ve devletin yerel düzeyde toplumsal yeniden üretimi sürdürme konusundaki müdahalesi, sermayeyi küresel ölçekte daha fazla angaje olmaya teşvik eder ve aynı zamanda sınıf

mücadelesinin devleti sınıf karakterinin belirlediği sınırların ötesine geçmeye zorlamasına neden olur.

Kapitalist devlete böylesi bir yaklaşım, bizi ilerleyen kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilere eşlik eden siyasi biçimler formüle etmekten kurtarır, ancak bir yandan kapitalizmin ilerlemesine uygun olarak sınıf ilişkilerinin dönüşümüne, diğer yandan da çelişkilerinin geçici çözümüne odaklanmayı gerektirir. Bu önemli müdahale, kapitalist ilişkilerin gelişmesi için yeterli olan özel mülkiyetin korunması dışında, kapitalizmin mantığının kendisinin siyasi mücadelelerin çözümü için herhangi bir çıkış yolu öngörmediğini; burjuva demokrasisine giden organik bir evrim süreci başlatmadığını hatırlatmaktır. Soğuk Savaş yıllarında devlet tartışması yapan Marksistlerle kıyaslandığında, köle sahibi şeyhliklerin bile küresel ölçekte kapitalist ilişkilerin ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu günümüzde, kapitalizm ve burjuva demokrasisinin kopuşundan bahsetmek çok daha kolay. Bu anlamda Heide Gerstenberger'in kapsamlı tarihsel çalışmaları, kapitalist ilişkileri el koyma anında şiddettin yokluğu ve emeğin özgürlüğüne referanslar ile tanımlayan Politik Marksistlerin açıklamalarına yaptığı müdahaleler açısından dikkate değerdir. Gerstenberger'in feodalite sonrası ve burjuva öncesi devleti ele alışı, sıradan birinin özgür ve eşit bir özne olma statüsünün, özel mülkiyet üzerindeki yasal korumalardan çok daha sonra gerçekleştiğine işaret etmektedir. Ayrıca, bir topluluğun ahlaki ekonomisinin aksine, köleliğin kapitalist mülk sahipleri için bir engel teşkil etmediğini, sadece kölelerin aktif direnişinin özgürlüklerini sağladığı vurgulamakta. Kapitalist gelişme ile burjuva demokrasisi arasındaki bu tarihsel gecikmenin farkında olmak, ordu siyasetin incelenmesi açısından açıklayıcıdır. Wood'un İngiltere'de askeri kurumların Fransa ve Almanya'ya kıyasla görece önemsiz kaldığı, çünkü soyluların özel mülkiyet yoluyla bir servet

yaratma düzeni kurabildikleri iddiasının aksine, tarihsel incelemeler soyluların aslında Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ilk yıllarında bile orduların komutası üzerindeki ayrıcalıklarına sıkı sıkıya sarıldıklarını göstermektedir. Ne kapitalist birikim, ne askeri rasyonelleşme, ne de maliyetli askeri yenilgiler, ancak alt tabakaların askeri isyan biçimindeki aktif müdahaleleri ve emeğin kendisini savaş hedefleriyle ilişkilendiren toplumsal hareketler soylu ayrıcalıklarında mahrum eden rasyonelleşme lehine reformları mümkün kıldı. İngiliz modern devletinin daha az dramatik dönüşümü göz önüne alındığında, Fransız Devrimi'nin, silahlı kuvvetlerin cumhuriyetçi zeminde tanımlanmasını sağlayan, soylu ayrıcalıklarını radikal bir şekilde ortadan kaldırması nedeniyle modern askeri örgütlenme biçimini doğuran önemli bir tarihsel kırılma olduğunu söylemek doğru olacaktır.

Bu çerçevede, bu tezde iki temel argümanı gündeme getirildi. Askerlik görevi, tarihsel olarak, devlet ve sivil toplumun toplumsal ve siyasi mücadelelerin sonucu olarak ayrışmasıyla kamusal alana yerleşmiştir. Paralı askerleri kapitalist girişimciler olarak adlandırmak, eğitimli subayları burjuvazi ile özdeşleştirmek, askere alınanları artık nüfus olarak tanımlamak gibi bazı askeri örgütlenme biçimlerini belirli sınıflarla ilişkilendiren tarih ötesi kategoriler hiçbir anlam ifade etmemektedir. Britanya'daki ofis satışlarında olduğu gibi bazı askeri faaliyetlerin servet yaratma aracı olarak işlev görmesi, neredeyse tüm savaşlarda gerçekleşen ve gerçekleşmekte olan yağmalar, hatta askerlerin ücretli çalışan statüsü bile spesifik bir kapitalist ilişkiye işaret etmez. İkinci olarak, modern ordu, silahlı kuvvetlere ilişkin toplumsal taleplerin bir ürünüdür. Bu bir yandan, eğer askeri biçimler kapitalizme geçiş sürecinde herhangi bir siyasi mücadelenin konusu haline gelmeseydi, bu süreçte yaşanan teknolojik gelişmeler ne olursa olsun, ordunun kapitalizm öncesi unsurları bozulmadan kalabilirdi anlamına

gelir. Öte yandan bu, alt sınıfların, savaşçı modern yöneticilerin bitmek bilmeyen taleplerine maruz kalarak acı çeken pasif özneler olarak kalmadıkları anlamına da gelmektedir. Alt sınıflar, tepkilerini firar ederek, zorunlu asker hizmetinden kaçarak, askeri isyanlar ve ayaklanmalarla gösterdi, ayrıca subay rütbelere kabul edilmeyi talep etmişler, katılımlarını daha fazla tavize bağlamışlar ya da en aşırı örneklerde olduğu gibi mevcut askeri biçimlere meydan okuyup yerine yenilerinin getirilmesini zorlamışlardır. Bu dönüşüm, alt sınıfların tepkilerin takdir edildiği ve sorunsuz bir şekilde entegre edildiği anlamına gelmez, ancak modern ordunun oluşumunda ihmal edilemez rolleri olmuştur. Buna ek olarak, modern ordu bu tür taleplerin bir ölçüde bastırmıştır; çünkü kimse modern orduyu kolektif bir siyasi kimliği örgütleyen bir milis grubu olarak değil, katı bürokrasilere sahip bir kamu kurumu olarak anlar.

Bu tez modern orduyu üç bölümde tartıştı. İkinci bölümde Weberci modern ordu kavramı, Weber'in yaşamı ve ölümünden sonraki kendine özgü yolculuğunda incelendi. Bu dönemdeki temel muamma, Weber'in ordu üzerine düşüncelerinin bölük pörçük olmasına ve modern ordu üzerine yapılandırılmış bir eser bırakmamasına rağmen, Weber'in ordu siyasetinde öncü haline gelmesi ve Weberci pozisyonun ordu siyasetinin incelenmesinde vazgeçilmez bir statü kazanmasıdır. Şunu da eklemek gerekir ki, ölümünden sonra kazandığı ünün aksine Weber'in siyasi aktivizmi önemli bir etki yaratamamıştır.

Bu bölüm, Weber'in düşüncesinin izlediği iki ayrı yola paralel olarak iki kısımda düzenlendi. İlk kısımda, Weber'in Alman Tarihsel İktisat Okulu çevresinde Werner Sombart ile modern kapitalizm üzerine yaptığı tartışmaya damgasını vuran gerçek yaşam deneyimine odaklanacaktır. Sombart'ın kapitalizmin tarihsel materyalist yorumuna etik temelli yanıtına dair Weber’in çekincelerini ideal ve maddi alanların

belirgin bir şekilde özerk varoluşunu gündeme getirerek dillendirmesi, Weberci modern ordu kavramının odak noktasıdır. Sombart, Weber'e cevabını, modern devleti, modern orduyu ve modern kapitalizmi eşzamanlı olarak geliştiren insanlığın ilerlemesinin ana faktörünün teknik gelişmenin (rasyonel düşünce) olduğuna dair vurguları keskinleştirerek formüle etmiştir. Weber, askeri alanın rasyonelleştirilmesi üzerine düşünmeye ancak Sombart'a verdiği yanıtta, ama görünüşe göre baştan savma bir şekilde başlamıştır. 1917 Bolşevik ve 1918-1919 Alman devrimlerine Weber'in verdiği tepkiler, Webercilerin daha sonra modern ordu konusunu ele alırken kullandıkları ana metinleri üretmiştir. Devrim karşıtı pozisyon Weber'in liberallere hitap etmesinde kesinlikle bir faktördür, ancak Sombart'ın milliyetçi bir anti-kapitalizme ve nihayetinde Nazizm'i onaylamaya doğru sürüklenmesi de Weber'in Atlantik'in ötesine taşıyarak bu sonuca katkıda bulundu.

İkinci yol ise Weber'in metinlerinin Atlantik ötesindeki yolculuğudur. Weber'in Alman İmparatorluğu'ndaki Bismarck yönetimini hedef alan polemik metinlerinin Amerika'da modernleşme teorisinin geliştirilmesinde kullanılması Weber'e dönük küresel bir ilgi sağlamıştır. Amerikalıların yaptığı şey, Weber'in ideal tiplerini Weber'in hiç uğraşmadığı bir iş için kullanmaktı: Batılı modernleşme yolu Batılı olmayan azgelişmiş dünyada nasıl tekrarlanabilirdi? Bu soru ABD dış politikasına paralel olarak küresel bir ilgi kazanırken, Weber'in düşüncesindeki iki tahrif da küreselleşti. Birincisi, polemik yazılarının gerçek tarihsel deneyimlerin analizi olarak ele alınması; ikincisi ise aktüel süreçlerin analizinde kullanılacak ve geliştirilecek mantıksal araçlar olan ideal tiplerin liberal demokratikleşme lehine normatif ifadelere dönüştürülmesidir. Bu tahrifler sayesinde, Almanya ve Osmanlı-Türkiye özelindeki tartışmaların da gösterdiği gibi, Weber'in yaklaşımının eleştirel düşünce için bir zemin

haline gelişi farklı bağlamlarda şu temel sorunun gündeme getirilmesi ile gerçekleşmiştir: Neden [incelenecek özel bir devlet] bir İngiliz devleti değildir?

Bu tuhaflık hala devam etmekte. Weber'in modern ordu kavramını formüle ederken yaptığı şey, Prusyalılar tarafından formüle edilen modern orduya ilişkin baskın yorumu tekrarlamanın ötesinde değildi: Almanya'nın birleşme sürecinde formüle edilen ve uygulanan karşı devrimci program, yani Moltke'nin askeri profesyonelliğinin Bismarck'ın sivil kontrolüyle bir arada var olmasıdır. Weber'in düşüncesinde modern ordunun bu özelliğini Samuel Huntington tarafından modernleşme teorisinin iyimser açıklamalarına karşı eleştirmek için dile getirilmişti. Huntington'ın ABD'deki askeri kurumların savaş sonrası reformunu 19. yüzyılda Avrupa ordu siyasetinin gelişimine dair tarihsel bir anlatımla destekleyerek gözden geçirmesi, Prusya örneğinde askeri profesyonelliğe eşlik eden sivil kontrolün, devrimci hararet ile şekillenen Fransız ordu siyasetinde olduğu gibi ordunun halk baskısıyla siyasallaşmasından başarılı bir kaçış olduğunun altını çizmektedir. Ordu siyaseti üzerine geliştirdiği örtük argümanı, yani devletlerin birincil görevinin olan toplumsal hareketliliği denetlemesi gerekliliği, 1960'lardan sonra modernleşme teorisinin iyimser açıklamalarına karşı aldığı eleştirel duruş popülerlik kazanacaktı.

Üçüncü bölüm, devlet baskı aygıtları formülünde Weberci çerçeveyi bütünüyle entegre eden Althusserci yapısalcılığın ve Fransız Devrimi'ni burjuvazinin iktidara yükselişinin önemli bir eşiği olarak ele alan burjuva devriminin sonuç odaklı ortodoks tarih yazımının bir mirası olarak modern ordu üzerine tarihsel materyalist açıklamalarda Weber'in halen süren etkisi ele alındı. Her iki pozisyon da Perry Anderson'ın mutlakiyetçi devlete ilişkin görüşlerinde tutarlı bir şekilde ifade edilmiştir. Anderson'ın görüşleri sınıf temelli bir yaklaşımın sınırlarını itiraf eden

Marksist bir yorum olarak algılanması nedeniyle ilginç bir şekilde Marksist olmayan düşünürlerin ilgisini çekmiş, kurumsalcı yaklaşımın ya da patrimonyal devlet analizinin üstünlüğüne işaret eden argüman olarak kullanılagelmiştir.

Weberciler için bir muamma olarak duran şey, Anderson'ın modern orduyu kapitalist bir askeri örgütlenme biçimi ve burjuvazinin devletle bütünleşmesini sağlayan bir araç olarak çerçeveleyen yaklaşımında açıkça ortaya çıkmaktadır. Britanya'da gelişmiş kapitalizm koşullarında ordu uzun süre modern olmayan bir yapıda kalırken, modern ordu biçimi eksik bir burjuva toplumunda ortaya çıkan bir yeniliktir. Anderson ile birlikte Althusser ve Poulantzas'ın yaklaşımları özelinde yapısalcı Marksizm'i ele alan bu bölümde Ellen M. Wood'un Politik Marksizm'i de incelendi. Wood ve takipçileri, Weber ve Weberci geleneğin sınıfsal önyargılarına dair açıklamaları bir kenara bırakıp Fransız Devrimi'nin bir burjuva zaferi olarak görülmesinin uygulanabilirliğine dair eleştirel sorular ortaya atsalar da Politik Marksizm, kapitalizmin İngiltere'deki kökenlerinin tarihsel özgünlüğü ve kapitalist el koymanın ekonomi dışı yöntemlerin kullanımını dışlayan salt ekonomik bir el koyma olduğu yönündeki ısrarlı argümanları nedeniyle vaatlerinin gerisinde kalmaktadır. Tuhaf bir şekilde, Politik Marksizm'in modern orduya kapitalist olmayan toplumsal ilişkilerin bir unsuru olarak yaklaşması, modern ordunun kapitalist biçimi olarak Althusserci kavramsallaştırmasına benzer eksikliklerini yansıtmaktadır. Fransız Devrimi farklı rejimler ve farklı askeri biçimler üreten hareketli bir dönemken, Politik Marksizm'de Fransız Devrimi'ni kapitalist olmayışı, yani İngiltere olmayışı ile ele alınıyor, Devrim farklı bir modele donduruluyor. Bu hatta üretilen ve Osmanlı-Türkiye bağlamında da kullanılan kapitalizmin alternatifi olarak sunulan Jakoben modelin eleştirisi Fransız Devrimi'nin ordu siyasetinde yarattığı kırılmaya dikkat çekerek eleştirildi.

Marksist kuramsallaştırmayı da etkileyen bu Weberci ana akımı aşabilmek için, tezin dördüncü bölümünde Heide Gerstenberger'in devlet ve sivil toplum ayrışmasının tarihsel süreçlerini analiz etmek için önerdiği gayrı-şahsileşme izini süren yapısal tipleri ordu siyasetinin incelenmesi için yeniden ele aldı. Mutlakiyetçi devlete alternatif olarak, kişiselleşmiş iktidarların genelleştirilmiş kişisel iktidara koşullanmasını ifade eden eski rejim, kapitalist ilişkilerin gelişimini mümkün kılabilen ancak devletin burjuva biçiminin zorunlu olmadığı yapısal bir tip olarak önermektedir. Sağladığı temel avantaj, modern kapitalist devletin tarihsel bir analizini eski rejimin krizlerinden kaynaklanan olumsal siyasi mücadelelerin çerçevesine sokulmasıdır.

Dördüncü bölüm aynı zamanda modern ordunun altında yatan devrimci dinamiği de vurgulayacaktır. Devrimci dönemler, askeri biçimler üzerindeki siyasi mücadelelerin en yoğun yaşandığı anlardır. Ordu üzerinde radikal toplumsal yorumların formüle edilmesi ve uygulanması, modern ordunun oluşumunun başlangıç noktasıdır. Gerstenberger'in yapısal burjuva devlet tipi bu tartışmanın omurgasını oluşturuyor, ancak araçsal çağrışımlardan kaçınmak için burjuva biçim yerine bu çalışma modern orduyu kullanmayı tercih etmiştir. Bu bölümdeki tartışmanın bir diğer motivasyonu, hatalı bir şekilde, Louis Bonaparte'ın 18. Brumaire'i'nin, modern ordunun feodal ve proleter unsurlara karşı kullanılan bir burjuva aracı olarak değerlendiren metin gibi ele alınmasıdır. Louis Bonaparte'ın 18. Brumaire'i olayları ayrıntılı bir şekilde ele alan gazetecilik anlatısıydı, ama en çarpıcısı, ulusal muhafızların süreçteki konumunun izini sürüyordu; ulusal muhafızların devrimin radikalleşmesine öncülük etme konusundaki tereddütleri metne hayal kırıklığını yansıtan bir ton kazandırdı. Marx'ın 1871'deki Paris Komünü deneyimine ilişkin anlatısı, ulusal muhafızların bu olaydaki önemli rolünü kabul etme konusunda çok daha nettir. Fransız Devrimi sırasındaki

olaylar böyle bir perspektifle gözden geçirilirse, gerçek askeri yeniliğin yurttaş ordudan ziyade, yerel ve ulusal düzeydeki temsili kurumların milis güçleri konumunda ve eski ordu biçimlerinin halk güçleri tarafından dramatik bir şekilde deviren, halk egemenliğinin bir pratiği niteliğindeki ulusal muhafızların olduğu ortaya çıkar. Bunun aksine, Fransız Devrimi'nin yurttaş-ordusu karşı-devrimci güçlerin ilerlemesinin bir işaretiydi. Jakoben levée en masse'yi Napolyoncu yurttaş-ordusuna dönüştüren olayların seyri, Devrimin ordu siyaseti açısından yaptığı şeyin, askeri alana kamusal bir karakter kazandırarak onu siyasi mücadelelerin arenası haline getirmek olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu mücadeledeki ana kamplar, en şematik haliyle, ordunun hak temelli bir formülasyonunu zorlayan radikaller ve görev temelli formülasyonları tercih eden devrim karşıtlarıydı. Nihayetinde modern ordu bu tür çatışmaların bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

19. yüzyıl boyunca, devrimci hareketler ya eşitlik ilkesi ya da siyasi eylemlilik yoluyla ordu konusu üzerinde düşünmüş ve ulusal muhafız deneyimi tarihsel bir referans olarak kalmıştır; tıpkı karşı devrimci anların Napolyon'un yurttaş ordusunu model alması ve modern askeri formun devrimci potansiyeline karşı temkinli olması gibi.

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