IMPACT OF DIGITAL NETWORKING ON TAKSIM SOLIDARITY IN THE
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ABSTRACT

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Communication technologies have played a vital role in the organization of social movements, activism and advocacy throughout history. This project aims to understand the role played by digital communication in transforming political mobilizations into long term social movements. It explores whether use of digital communication technologies helps ephemeral dissident organizations consolidate into established and stabilized pressure groups. It investigates the impact of digital network communication on the Taksim Solidarity movement, an umbrella organization consisting of 120 NGOs and political groups in the post-mobilization stage. To this end, we take a mixed-method approach combining digital network and textual content analyses, a comprehensive survey and expert interviews. Our findings show that the contribution of the Internet and social networking is extremely little to the organization of the coalition. Contrary to the techno-utopian enthusiasm, it has organizationally grown apart as the promises of the internet are not utilized by its constituents following the Gezi Park protests. In the explanatory chapter, the analysis of the expert interviews reveal that several factors are conditional to digital and organizational cohesion of the coalition. Rising authoritarianism, governmental and

judicial pressures on free speech, restrictive political culture, deficiency of transparency in deliberative decision-making and the financial, organizational and workforce vulnerabilities of civil society organizations stand out as the main rationale behind the non-fulfilment of the potentials of social networking.

Keywords: Social movements, Internet, Social Media, Digital Networks, Taksim Solidarity

ÖZ

DİJİTAL AĞ İLETİŞİMİNİN MOBİLİZASYON SONRASI DÖNEMDE TAKSİM DAYANIŞMASI'NIN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

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İletişim teknolojileri tarih boyunca toplumsal hareketlerin örgütlenmesi, aktivizm ve savunuculukta hayati bir rol oynamıştır. Bu proje, dijital iletişimin siyasi eylemleri uzun vadeli toplumsal hareketlere dönüştürmede oynadığı rolü incelemektedir. Dijital iletişim teknolojilerinin kullanımının, kısa süreli muhalif hareketlerin yerleşik ve istikrarlı baskı gruplarına dönüşmesine yardımcı olup olmadığı ele alınmaktadır. Çalışma, dijital ağ iletişiminin 120 STK ve siyasi gruptan oluşan bir şemsiye örgüt olan Taksim Dayanışması üzerindeki etkisini mobilizasyon sonrası döneme odalanarak incelemektedir. Bu amaçla, dijital ağ ve metinsel içerik analizleri, kapsamlı bir anket ve uzman mülakatlarını harmanlayan karma bir yöntem kullanmaktadır. Araştırma bulguları, internet ve sosyal ağların koalisyonun örgütlenmesine katkısının son derece sınırlı olduğunu göstermektedir. Tekno-ütopyacı iyimserliğin aksine, Gezi Parkı protestolarının ardından koalisyon, internetin sunduğu olanaklar bileşenleri tarafından kullanılamadığı için örgütsel olarak çözülmeye uğramıştır. Açıklayıcı bölümde yer alan uzman mülakatlarının analizi, koalisyonun dijital ve örgütsel uyumunun çeşitli faktörlerden etkilendiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Yükselen otoriterlik, ifade özgürlüğü üzerindeki idari ve

yargısal baskılar, kısıtlayıcı siyasi kültür, müzakereye dayalı karar alma süreçlerindeki şeffaflığın eksikliği ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının mali, örgütsel ve işgücü zafiyetleri, sosyal ağların potansiyelinin hayata geçirilememesinin ardındaki temel gerekçeler olarak öne çıkmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Hareketler, Internet, Sosyal Medya, Dijital Ağlar, Taksim Day

To Yüksoş,
my beloved mother
who told me
"all is over"
before leaving

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> *Communication is a spectre that haunts collective action theory: it is always lurking in the background but rarely placed at the centre of enquiry.*
> *(Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006 cited in Kavada, 2016:9).*

This dissertation project aims to understand the role played by digital communication in transforming political mobilizations into long term social movements. It explores whether use of digital communication technologies helps ephemeral dissident masses consolidate into established and stabilized pressure groups. It problematizes the potential function of digital networking and its impact on the organizational and political journey of persistent dissident groups.

The mobilization wave of the 1960s spurred an interest in social movement studies; and the development and evolution of social movements came under the academic spotlight (Earl, 2015:35). However, even as late as 2017, in the introduction of the book *Media Activism in the Digital Age*, Pickard & Yang rightfully questioned the existence of distinct theorization on media activism and the adequacy of the existing social movement scholarship (2017:4). Despite much shared concerns, social movement and political communication literature have remained largely independent from each other, except for the cyberactivism research (Earl et.al., 2015:361). The unusual interest in cyberactivism or online activism studies was due to the importance that researchers placed on the role of new media technologies in the formation of the new social movements. The emergence of digital technology had led to a paradigm shift regarding the role of communication within social movement studies (Kavada, 2016:9). While this importance has long made online networks the

focus of political communication, as social unrest broke "*in country after country*" (Tufekci, 2014:12) in the form of first-ever movements relying primarily on the Internet (Gerbaudo, 2017:136), the year 2011 saw the highest number of and striking highlights by social scientists, opinion leaders and the press talking about the role of the Internet in mobilization of the demonstrations going on around the globe at that time (Turner, 2013:376). This scholarly attention has in recent years developed in a global context of weakened individual attention and the rise of undemocratic and polarized politics (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018:250).

During the academic interest wave, it is broadly suggested that the Internet, with its citizen empowering features, is "*a perfect complement for social protests*" (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014:365) and provides social movements with tools for mobilization and campaign framing (Berntzen, Rohde-Johannessen, & Godbolt, 2014:22). As both communication and organization means, digital media offer the potential of loosely organized, ad hoc, spontaneous organization capable of adapting to changing conditions and priorities (Chadwick, Dennis, & Smith, 2015:10). Acts of political information gathering, political deliberation and performing political dissent have been associated with the political use of the Internet (Mosca, 2010:14). Several scholars, each developing a different framework about online political networks, observed their reinforcing impact on the formation, organization of and information exchange within social movements, and established themselves in the literature with their founding theories (Castells, 2015; Gerbaudo, 2012; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Although a plethora of research has been done on the relationship between dissent politics and social networks, the academic focus has barely moved onto the long-term impact of online networks on the survival, consolidation and evolution of movements. Research has been confined, for the most part, to the social media's relationship with protest initiation and internet-only cyberactivism. Likewise, while social media use of dissident groups has repeatedly been looked into in terms of organization of demonstration and mobilization of citizens, the research on the association between new media practices and conventional types of political participation is extremely scarce.

For Castells, collective action platforms that consist of cross-sectional elements of society such as different age, sex and class groups exert counter power to claim their

interests and voice their values against institutionally entrenched power structures (Castells, 2015). However, these collection action forms such as protests, uprisings, riots of the recent political history have proved to be volatile and ephemeral; and in most cases, they either ended up in reconsolidation of hegemonic state power or settled for negligibly modest gains (Lynch, 2014:94, Sharma, 2014). As is typically the case with most social movements (Loader, 2008:1921), social mobility experiences in the last decade have seen that a wave of political demonstrations is usually followed by a latent and dormant stage, where strong internal connectivity, interaction, reorganization, information exchange, member recruitment and participation play a crucial role in their survival and consolidation. This phase not only affects the remobilization expectation inside the movement but also whether it consolidates through other collective types of political participation than protest, such as voting, lodging petition, public deliberation, expressing views on and campaigning for or against public policy, contacting political representatives, taking part in political organizations, fundraising and so forth.

Sustaining a political movement in the post-mobilization stage has taken a new turn by the advent of digital network communication. Referencing the increasing threat of everyday politics to constitutional democracy, Delli Carpini describes the role of ICTs in metaphorical terms:

> *"... if real-world issues are the firewood of our current state, and public mistrust the kindling, the radically changed information environment brought about by social media and other forms of digital information and communications technologies (ICTs) are increasingly identified as the match that set fire to this combustible mix."* (Delli Carpini, 2019:2)

With its intrinsic features such as multi-directional informational flow, interactivity, decentralized structure, coupled with the convergence of other media such as telephony and TV, it enhanced the communicative power of social movements and shifted the power from gatekeepers of mass communication to the audience, i.e. end users of the Internet (McQuail, 2010:63, Loader, 2008:1922-1923). Unlike conventional communication means, the network communication grants these end users the ability of connecting their autonomous private spheres and strengthens their expressive capabilities (Papacharissi, 2010:166). High and easy dissemination

opportunities of the Internet for low cost also help promote social activism (Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014:375).

As the tools of post-Fordist production, Internet technologies have redefined new guerilla movements (Hardt & Negri, 2005:82). By altering the motives behind participation, they switch the nature of social movements from confrontational action to rather persuasive discourse (Brunsting & Postmes, 2002:550). On the Internet, as the medium of acts where users exert power over issues related to governance - also social media themselves - (Nahon, 2015:51), symbolic meaning is negotiated between dispersed individuals, groups and formal organizations as a result of informal interaction, an integral element of social movements (Diani, 1992:3). Due to this deliberative nature, it constitutes a "*training ground*" to politicize the non-politicized and recruit (Gerbaudo, 2017:150).

The digital turn, however, does not suggest the end of social movement organizations by any means. Empirically and historically observable enough, instant and ephemeral mobilizations turn into long-term movements and campaigns usually by the agency of formal organizations and their concentrated and organized resources with which activists plan, coordinate, strategize their content and course of actions. Online-initiated, online-supported or online-oriented movements are also not organization- or leader-free. Instead, networked movements generated a division of labor with informal grassroots groups performing tasks that need a new media literacy (Dolata, 2017:25).

Along with the continued and active presence of social movement organizations, the Internet, with its novel affordances, facilitates a certain type of organization that formal organizations would not be able to, rather than determining the mode of organization (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:35). Castells called this new Internet-enabled public space of social movements a "*hybrid space*" creating "*instant communities of transformative practice*" (2015:11). However, the Internet is not seen only as a mobilizing means but also a politicizing one (Tarnoff, 2017) epitomized in the last decade's surge of social mobilization, which has included Iran protests, Iceland anti-government mobilization, Arab Spring, Spanish Indignados movement,

Occupy Wall Street, Turkish Gezi uprising among others. During all these political mobilizations, digital networks have extensively been resorted to by participant organizations, dissident groups and individual protesters. Affordances of social networking have rapidly increased the information flow within social alliances, introduced novel and more personal ways of group interaction, removed spatial and temporal constraints of physical organization, thereby paving the way for new types of counter-publics. Although its free and self-regulated nature is exaggerated by techno-utopians, the Internet has generally been conducive to social movements (Akin, 2011:45).

Turkey stands out with social media prevalence and vast Internet use among its population. As of January 2021, 77.7 percent of the Turkish population is connected to the Internet and 90.8 percent access the Internet via mobile devices. The Internet penetration percentage was 74 in January 2020 when the world average was 59 percent (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2020:37). Majority of the population (70.8%) actively use social media in their daily lives, with an annual growth rate of 11.1 percent. While the average daily Internet use is almost 8 hours, about 3 hours of which is spent on social media. The time users spend on social media ranks 2nd among different types of media consumption in the country, following TV viewing (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2021: 17-18-22). The country was ahead of most of western countries with high Internet penetration in the index of time spent on the Internet among those aged 16 to 64 (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2020:43). The Gezi Protests, the massive nation-wide anti-government demonstrations that rocked the country in 2013, also dramatically facilitated social media adoption and use among the population (Tunç, 2014:13).

Against this backdrop, this project investigates the impact of digital network communication on the post-mobilization stage endurance of the Taksim Solidarity (TS) coalition, the umbrella organization of over 120 NGOs and political groups that have either supported or actively taken part in the 2013 Gezi Parki protests all across Turkey. Despite being founded before the mass protests, the coalition in the first place brought together groups with environmental concerns. Upon the break of the protest, however, it attracted organizations with completely different backgrounds

from left-leaning political initiatives to environmental groups, from artist collectives to major national political parties. The constituent organizations highly varied by size, legal status, income, resources, and ideological stance. During the protests, the coalition was the only organized entity representing the movement and negotiated its demands with the government. In the years following the protests, the group has had its share of rising authoritarianism in the country and was ever-increasingly criminalized. Moreover, as the country's political orbit changed, the composition of the TS also altered. Some constituents grew distant from the groups, some lost the organizational contact. Nevertheless, it continued to participate in every-day politics through announcements, calls for action and press conferences about social and political developments. Our study aims to test a potential association between the transformation that the TS has undergone over the years following the initial mobilization and adoption as well as active use of digital networking by its secretariat and constituents. In other words, it explores whether or not digital communication technologies have helped the coalition evolve into a stable and established pressure group, in contrast to a group of volatile flash protestors.

In addition to expressing views about public issues, raising awareness of discontent among its followers and responding to public policy through announcements and press conferences in the aftermath of the initial protests, the TS has strived to retain and consolidate its base, carry out inter-constituent communication for the past 9 years. The study specifically looks into the patterns of organizational and communicative transformation within the coalition and among its constituents as well as its supporter base.

As the scope of the dissertation project covers over 120 members of the TS coalition and spans a period of almost 9 years, we started with a member list available online on the coalition's official website. This was the only available member list and was already 6 years old at the time of data collection. Therefore, we verified the status of each member organization beforehand by contacting its representatives or former representatives. It was only after the verification that a large majority of the organizations are still alive that we started collecting data. To develop a holistic view of the coalition, we designed the project as a trifold and sequential investigation. It

took place in 3 stages because the final part is an explanatory chapter based on the findings of the first two parts.

We set out by automatically collecting network and text data from Facebook and Twitter. Several computers worked day and night for months and retrieved digital data. Meanwhile, the researcher collected data from organizations in person under the restrictive circumstances of the Covid-19 pandemic. Only after the collection and analysis of these first two stages, we drafted the interview section, the explanatory part of the study. In other words, we interviewed a selection of organization representatives based on the findings of the digital data and survey data exploration.

All this years-long ordeal, we later found out, was only to see that the contribution of the Internet and networking applications such as Facebook and Twitter to the cohesive organization, sustainment and survival of social movement coalitions is extremely limited. A sound legal framework for civic liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly as well as judiciary independence, liberal political culture and, lastly, a supportive environment for civil society is imperative for activism bolstered and facilitated by Internet technologies. The restrictive climate and oppressive policy of authoritarian contexts against dissent, as seen in our case, debilitate the potential of social networking for organized collective action and resets its influence on activist organizations and their volunteers, recruits and sympathizers. Moreover, horizontal and vertical enlargement of activism, that is, alliances of organizations and recruitment of new activists, by means of social networking is undermined to a degree perilous for a working democracy. At least within the scope of this dissertation project, we failed to prove our hypotheses, bringing a smile on the faces of those on the pessimistic strand of the big "internet and activism" debate.

The project is based on the hypotheses that (1) *digital networking plays a crucial role in the survival of political movements that unexpectedly arose with abrupt mobilization*; (2) *use of digital technology by a movement helps it transform from a transient mobilization into long term pressure group* (3) *digital communication helps movements strengthen their internal coherence in the absence of physical political participation channels*. The hypotheses will be tested through three research

questions: (1) *What is the impact of online connectivity, interaction and deliberation on the long-term coherence and survival of a multi-organizational social movement? (2) What are the dynamics and the extent of the organizational and deliberative transformation caused by extensive use of digital communication in a political movement? (3) What affordances does digital communication offer for movements to inform, motivate, encourage their base for political participation and keep them politically active in the absence of participation channels?*

Rather than seeking linear and somewhat oversimplified causalities such as the ones assumed between social media use and protest behavior, we turn to the prospects of long-term political activity, alternate organizational models enabled by digital technologies, internal deliberation, online - offline ties and the organization of communication within the coalition in the aftermath of its initial mobilization. To this end, we extensively draw on literature on new social movements and activism in the digital age to characterize the relationship between contemporary social movements and the new media.

In order to test the hypotheses sticking to the original research questions we raised above, this study brings together and combines three different types of data. First, we start by analyzing social media data retrieved from Facebook and Twitter. It covers the 7 years of the TS and the TS constituents' activity following the Gezi protests. Through network analysis, we investigated the patterns of information flow inside the coalition. We also conducted content analysis of social media posts through post texts and hashtags to gain insight into the verbal character of social media use. This yielded us the proportion of social media discussions and postings used for public advocacy and participation in politics.

Second data type we analyzed is survey data. We collected institutional data from 104 out of 106 active members of the TS coalition. The dataset includes frequency statistics regarding use of social media for various purposes, various dimensions of communication within TS and with its supporter base as well as online and offline growth in the post-mobilization period, agreement/disagreement rates on ongoing political controversies, loyalty, and organizational demographics.

8

Finally, taking an explanatory approach over the findings of the first two analyses, we conducted expert interviews with the representatives of 36 TS member organizations to seek the reasons and rationales for the current organizational structure and the digital cohesion of the TS revealed by the quantitative data analysis in the preceding chapters.

The findings from the network, content and survey analyses run counter to the hypotheses and common sense expectations. The social media adoption boom during the Gezi protests, almost a decade of national digital penetration growth, active individual use of Internet by constituents, exclusion of all kinds of dissent from a majority of mainstream media have not helped, we found, establish a sound online organizational structure, and cohesive communication pattern inside the TS coalition. Its deliberative capacity stayed limited throughout the investigated period. However, the online communication with supporters of each constituent organization has played a relatively larger role in their advocacy. Specifically, social media outlets have functioned as information conduits for organization members, supporters, sympathizers and potential recruits.

Our qualitative exploration demonstrated that, without material conditions of democratic civil society organization, political participation and public opinion formation, Internet applications provide limited contribution to developing active, organized, coordinated, diverse, transparent and participating civil society actors. In the absence of a liberal legislative framework for free speech, diversity-fostering political culture, supportive climate and regulation for organizations in resource and capacity building, and transparent culture of political activism, social media brings no magic-bullet solution for social movement organizations to thrive.

The dissertation narrates the entirety of the research in a total of 7 sections. Following this brief introduction, the next chapter starts with a rundown of the social media features that have impacted everyday practices of society, conventional forms of news and information consumption, different forms of activism and media ecology. It is followed by a brief review of the literature of networked protests and revisits theories of authoritative thinkers and scholars of the field. The following

9

section takes up the issue beyond the protest context and discusses activism in the digital age in a broader sense. Here, we review the original contributions of digital networks to long-term and established movements, more generally cyberactivism, in a list, each referenced in the literature. In the final section, we take a look at the relationship between social movement organizations (SMOs), the main unit of analysis of this study, and digital networks. Chapter 3 presents an overview of recent Turkish political history, marking the Gezi Protests as the starting point of a historical background. It is followed by two sections on how the rise of authoritarianism unfolded in the years following the protests and stifled the already problematic diversity and free speech in Turkish media. The chapter concludes with a historical background of the Taksim Solidarity. Chapter 4 lays methodological foundations of the study from conceptual framework, sampling approach to data collection and analysis techniques. Chapter 5, the main findings section, begins with profiling the Taksim Solidarity in detail and brings together the result of analyses over different types of quantitative data: Social network, post-text, and statistical data. Here, we examine digital cohesion inside the network and the share of political discussion through network and content analyses. Then, we move on to cross-check these findings with statistical digital use frequency data. We also report the results of analyses about many other dimensions of the relationship between the TS's organization, growth, political participation and Internet. Preceding the conclusion, Chapter 6 relies on qualitative expert interviews to develop a deeper understanding of the current state and failures in different areas of the TS network and delve into the reasons of its - online and offline - disconnection in detail.

CHAPTER 2

PROTEST, PERMANENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND DIGITAL NETWORKS: A LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. The Architecture and Novel Affordances of Digital Networks

Social network services (SNS) have penetrated all aspects of human life ranging from shopping, banking, personal communication, entertainment healthcare to broadcasting, traveling and participation in politics. Every single human activity has been networked in the past decades. For many, social activity and social media activity has become indistinguishable (Kennedy, 2016:26). Interactive networks allow users to transcend time and space in their activity and intervene with their content or structure rather than being only receivers (Castells, 2015:260). In boyd and Ellison's account, a social network service is a web-based service "*that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system*" (boyd & Ellison, 2007:211).

Castells pointed to the converged character of the Internet: "*the new communication system is so versatile, diversified, and open-ended, it integrates messages and codes from all sources, enclosing most of socialized communication in its multimodal, multichannel networks*" (Castells, 2009:417). Another account emphasizes its ideological and technological foundations and the fact that it allows for the exchange of user-generated content (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010:61). Thanks to Internet technology, interconnectedness and complexity have become key notions in modern world social interactions (González-Bailón, 2013b:148).

For Gerbaudo social networks are "*means through which people mediate and manage their connections to extensive social networks of friends and acquaintances from a distance. These services have become particularly useful precisely because of the spatial dispersion characteristic of post-industrial society*" (Gerbaudo, 2012:43). Networking technologies are essential for social mobilizations along with pre-existing online and offline networks in that they are multimodal and constantly adapting to changing conditions of the movement (Castells, 2015: 249).

Castells calls this internet-based communication environment "mass-self communication" referencing the historical, social and technical distinction between mass and interpersonal communication. Interactivity, horizontality (particularly on networks) and multidirectionality are the key traits of online media, specifically online networks (2015:248). Castells is not alone in drawing attention to the ambiguation of founding distinctions between mass and interpersonal communication. Digital media is frequently contrasted with mass media which have long been associated with geographically defined media markets, varying spatial reach, circulation/reception range. Digital media, however, is made of communication webs and is delocalized, theoretically not restricted to any territory (McQuail, 2010:133). Coupled with the deterritorialization of media consumption, a singular public sphere is replaced by micro-spheres created around certain issues. These "*public sphericules*" usually overlap and interact with one another, and temporarily coexist on the World Wide Web and/or digital networks. The transition represents a fundamental transformation of traditional monolithic conception of the public sphere (Bruns & Highfield, 2015:70). In the next section we will review the existing literature on social movements and digital culture. In passing, we will see in detail the innovative features of digital technology in relation to activism.

2.1.1. Connectivity

As a stage of the historical development of telecommunications, the invention of the Internet, along with mobile technology, carried human connectivity to another level (Marcienne, 2013:1220). As the technology of peer-to-peer communication between people and groups (Haythornthwaite, 2005:141), the Internet made it possible for

millions to connect with each other for countless social life-related activities. World Wide Web's connective and participatory nature was embraced during the rise of social networks (Van Dijck, 2013:4). Contrary to the one-way communication model devised for and mere content creation and distribution of the traditional mass media, the Internet technology produces connectivity itself, allowing anyone to connect with anyone else (McQuail, 2010:447). Today, online connectivity reached a global scale in terms of connected people and virtual objects.

The phenomenon of online connectivity is not limited to the social connection of real people on the online realm but also includes that of pages, platforms. Apart from inter-user ties on the same platform, also platforms interconnect to each other for information transfer and other relationships (Bennett & Segerberg 2013:8, Van Dijck, 2013:4). Although it was, in the early years of the web, acclaimed by techno-utopians for its horizontal and non-hierarchical nature, Internet connectivity may not necessarily be established on egalitarian networks and affected by network structure, strength of ties, access to necessary means (Haythornthwaite, 2005:142). Connective nature of the Internet both allowed for and is enabled by its interactive use.

2.1.2. Interactivity

The Internet allows users to exert reciprocated influence over one another (Pavlik, 1996:135). In Kiousis' words "*interactivity can be defined as the degree to which a communication technology can create a mediated environment in which participants can communicate (one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many) both synchronously and asynchronously and participate in reciprocal message exchanges (third-order dependency)*" (2002:379). He adds a perceptional dimension for human users: "*the ability of users to perceive the experience to be a simulation of interpersonal communication and increase their awareness of telepresence*" (pp. 379). Users interact in many ways with each other, online content and software through web or application interfaces. The Internet user, as opposed to the passive recipient of the mass media audience, came to an active and determining party of online media.

Drawing on the feedback from individual elites active in teaching computer-mediated interactive media, a qualitative study revealed that the features that

13

characterize interactivity are the message dimensions - direction of communication, time flexibility- and the participant - sense of place, level of control, responsiveness, perceived purpose of communication (Downes & McMillan, 2000:173). McMillan identifies three approaches to the concept of interactivity, especially in terms of emerging media technologies: *User-to-user interactivity* refers to the ground new media lays for communication between humans. *User-to-documents interactivity* is the interaction between users and internet-based documents and the co-creation processes of online content. The third category, *user-to-system interactivity*, is the interaction between human and computer systems (McMillan, 2002:209-220).

2.1.3. Digitality

The long-lasting analogue existence of human life has been unprecedentedly disrupted by digital technology and interactivity (Hassan, 2020:200), a byproduct of digitalization. The digital, as opposed to analogous human existence and condition, has colonized every aspect of human life from workplace to romantic relationships. The physical means of being and doing have been replaced by virtual at exponentially growing rates on the verge of the 21. century. All representational formats of the thousands-year-long world history have been transferred to the digital medium (Murray, 1997:27). The virtual nature of the Internet allows for all kinds of information, which existed in different formats in the pre-digital era, to be contained, archived and circulated on its networks (McQuail, 2010:62).

The digital contains features that sharply oppose human nature (Hassan, 2020:200). The storage of the physical data in virtual databases increases tractability of data for numerous purposes to an unprecedented level unimaginable by the physical human capacity. The non-temporal and non-spatial character of the digital technology transcends human capability to apply physical labor to material production both in workplace and leisure.

In addition and thanks to the increased human control on data, past technologies that had developed on their own separate paths such as telephony, telegraphy, video, TV have come to converge, synchronize and build upon each other on the digital realm

in an interactive manner, producing more advanced communicative outcomes than their mere addition.

2.1.4. Convergence

The 20th century saw synthesis of communication technologies that had long gone on their own paths during the 19th and a part of 20th centuries. Telecommunications - the telephony and the telegraph - and mass communication - TV, radio and print media - were gradually combined. The process resulted largely in the "*blurring of boundaries between traditional sub-sectors of communications*" (Latzer, 2013:131) and the concentration of interpersonal and mass communication means under telecommunications i.e. the Internet. The convergence process culminated at the end of the 20th century with the advent of broadband and mobile technology. The intertwinement of priorly separate communication media has caused fundamental structural changes in the public communication sphere. Driven by the continuous digitization, convergence of media brought about the predominance of multimedia narratives and interactive content.

Formulated and famously named by Jenkins, the culture of convergence means more than merger of priorly separate communication media. Acknowledging an economic motivation behind the rise of convergence in a time of crisis in the media business, he views convergence of different media on digital medium as a matter of access to mediated content:

> "*Convergence does not depend on any specific delivery mechanism. Rather, convergence represents a paradigm shift -a move from medium-specific content toward content that flows across multiple media channels, toward the increased interdependence of communications systems, toward multiple ways of accessing media content, and toward ever more complex relations between top-down corporate media and bottom-up participatory culture*" (Jenkins, 2006:243).

Undoubtedly the largest distribution medium and the main driver of the creative economy of the day (Latzer, 2013:131), the Internet, since its inception, has consisted of tenets of conventional media in itself and also introduced new features

that did not exist before the online world. It is a hybrid realm combining the mass media logic with more, both in number and diversity, actors and interactions; which in turn, transforms into a hybrid realm (Chadwick, Dennis & Smith, 2015:14). However, online media, specifically digital networks, are more than only a synthesis of the old and the new, but more complex, multi-directional and multi-modal type of communication. Castells names the online media "mass self-communication for it combines the self-directed dimension of interpersonal communication with mass media's principle of multiplicity of receivers" (2015:7).

2.1.5. Non-territoriality

The Internet has been one of the driving forces of the third globalization era. With transnational connection, digital media transcended national borders and permeated the least connected nations in less than two decades. Despite its contested relevance in the past decades through satellite and mobile technologies, the physical proximity rule of the conventional media was entirely abandoned. Increased accessibility of any creative content from any point on earth regardless of their origin led to a consumption logic called "long tail." The globalization of the culture industry through digital distribution marks a shift from geographically constrained markets to another where *one country's hits are another country's niches*" (Anderson, 2008:251).

The emerging virtual public space without territorial character and boundary is claimed to deepen social fragmentation and weaken political organization of society. Borrowing the term "third space" from the urban theorist Edward Soja (1996), Shangapour, et.al. assert that Internet networks constitute the virtual third space, which has been absent as the suburban and more private lifestyle urges society to spatially fragment and renders it less connected, a situation that negatively impacts the political engagement of the community and the overall quality of life quality (2011:5). In contrast to the fragmentation argument, Mitchell construes the proliferation of wireless and mobile devices as a continuity of presence "*that may extend throughout buildings, outdoors, and into public space as well as private*", with fundamental consequences to social life (Mitchell, 2004:144).

16

On the social movement front, however, social networks have been hailed as the new organizational infrastructure and a cementing force among social movements scattered around within different national borders and territories. Because cyberactivism differs from physically bound activism in its ability to bypass state regulations and spatial practices; and reach out to the relevant actors worldwide (Akin, 2011:40). In a reverse interpretation, Castells theorized that the disappearance of physical constraint in formation of social movements is not a result of the disappearance of their territorial character but an extension from space of places to space of flows (2015:62). The importance of the physical space has moved onto the network structure, that is, the position of actors on the overall network.

2.1.6. Significance of Network Structure

Despite the initial prevalence of horizontality and neutrality discourse about social networks, growing empirical evidence led to the research to a more realistic path regarding the affordances of social networks. The myth that social networks are neutral is based on the false belief of "*procedural justice*" (Nahon, 2015:52). The assumption suggests that the self-presentation would bring about a direct participation in an environment of unfettered deliberation. Nevertheless, as research progressed the issue of network structure, position of a user in its entire network came to appear as a weak point of the techno-utopian views which argue that social media empower the unheard by granting a voice in a horizontal medium. Contrary to the egalitarian view, evidence shows that while the position of certain actors, or nodes in network analysis terminology, are advantaged and better information hubs, the others are only receivers. Certain social media users represent shortcuts and broker between different communities. The network proximity reduces the path of information flow from its sources to other communities (González-Bailón, 2013b:150). Those at brokering positions in the overall network attain more control over the information flow (González-Bailón, Wang & Borge-Holthoefer, 2014:3). Most conversations take place in closed clusters of densely connected users while only a limited number of strategically positioned users transcends these bubbles, consequently watering down the claims of unfettered deliberation (González-Bailón & Wang, 2016:102).

Although networking technologies are hailed as egalitarian and horizontal, the network structure determines the potential influence and outreach of users. Position of users over digital networks usually reflects their real life position or status, with similar relationships over digital networks (González-Bailón, Wang & Borge-Holthoefer, 2014:3). These technologies have not changed the basic communication mechanisms and how information is diffused, but "*the speed and the reach of communication*" (González-Bailón & Wang, 2016:103).

In addition to online reach, the network size is also a predictor of the extent of political participation. Individuals with larger social networks are more prone to engage in online and offline political activity, a study on youth participation (Kahne & Bowyer, 2018:489) found.

2.1.7. Virality and Diffusion Dynamics

Even though the widespread use of social networking facilitated and popularized the relational character of digital communication, its infrastructure was based on nodes and ties even in the early days of unidirectional Internet. Hogan suggests that online activity is almost always network-based whether it occurs between connected senders and recipients or on the World Wide Web where interlinked pages form hypertext networks. In either case, communication takes place between nodes through links (2008:1).

The new, simple and uncostly ways of aggregating information on digital networks pushed the level of long-time habit of information sharing - priorly in the form of cutting newspaper clips and sending via regular mail - to another level (Shirky, 2008:149). Heavy use of these networks gave rise to circulation of information over and across digital platforms causing repeated information cascades (Zhou et.al, 2021:2) and viral diffusion of content (Mills, 2012:163). The internet based viral popularization of content has extensively influenced public opinion and emerged as one of the agenda-setters in the public sphere. The viral diffusion of information and multimedia material incited masses, united and motivated them for their social and political struggle (Castells, 2015:28).

18

In addition to influencing the formation of public opinion and strengthening the sense of unity among citizens, the circulatory nature of social networks generated new forms of participation in the public sphere, partly blurring the boundaries between the public and the private. In their theory of "Connective Action", Bennett & Segerberg point out the significance of personalization of digital protest content circulated over Internet networks, in contrast to collective action. In the connective action logic, easy diffusion of personal action frames enables rapid scaling up of the movement. (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:753)

The strength of information diffusion is usually associated with network size. Online networks allow users with a larger follower base to convey information to larger masses. Empirical evidence finds that although network size is a determinant of diffusion dynamics, it does not suffice for viral diffusion. The number of followers is a weak predictor of information distribution but not enough for the cascade effect (Klinger & Svensson, 2015:35). A strategic information spreader over Internet networks is a well-connected person to the rest of the network.

After this brief review of fundamental novelties of new communication infrastructure, we will move on how this infrastructure informs and shapes the modern day protest culture. Nevertheless, this section starts with the theories based mainly on short term protest action rather than established movements, and is followed by an overview of the work by founding scholars of the field.

2.2. Protest in the Age of Digital Networks

In his 2015 book *Networks of Outrage and Hope*, Castells lines up man-made problems society faces at varying levels and forms:

> *In each specific context, the usual horses of humanity's apocalypses ride together under a variety of their hideous shapes: economic exploitation, hopeless poverty, inequality, undemocratic polity, repressive states, unfair unjust judiciary, racism, xenophobia, cultural negation, censorship, police brutality, warmongering, religious fanaticism (often against others' religious beliefs), carelessness toward the blue planet (our only home), disregard of personal liberty, violation of privacy, gerontocracy, bigotry, sexism,*

19

homophobia, and other atrocities in the long gallery of portraits featuring the monsters we are. (Castells, 2015:12)

In character, movements in the last two decades pushed against "politics as usual", concentrating on representation problems, parliamentary representation regime, inequality, social drawbacks of free market economy. These concerns were shared particularly by Occupy movements, several European movements of the era. They advocated for direct means of democracy such as deliberative decision-making and petition (Turner, 2013:378). Plagued by one or multiple of these problems, individuals overcome their fear and identify themselves with those suffering from the same problem(s). This identification process and connecting with others to form a movement constitute a communication process, which creates the feeling of togetherness (Castells, 2015:14-15). While voter turnout during elections and party membership rapidly decline for decades globally, people still mobilize around contentious issues (Berntzen, Rohde-Johannessen, & Godbolt, 2014:21).

The imbalance of communicative resources between protestors and the law enforcement have played a key role throughout history. Before the public use of digital technologies, police, with its radios, logistics and special training, had the upper hand against protestors. However, the balance has shifted in favor of protestors as they can coordinate better thanks to the affordances of online tools (Tufekci, 2014:10-11).

Extensive use of social media during political mobilizations in the last decade popularized among pundits sloppily coined phrases such as "the Facebook revolution" or "the Twitter revolution" (Gerbaudo, 2012:2). From the 2009 Iran protests to the Arab Spring riots, Spanish Indignados movement, US Occupy mobilizations, Singapore Population White Paper protests, the Internet played a key role in this mobilization wave for the first time in history (Gerbaudo, 2017:136). In this respect, Turner cites "*an endemic relationship between the spread of new radical movements and the development of Web 2.0 technologies*" (2013:381).

Just as radio, print material such as pamphlets, fanzines in the past, protestors have heavily relied on social platforms in the last two decades for coordination and

planning of their events. However, they differ from the former media in that they amplify movements both in quantity and quality (Papacharissi & Blasiola, 2015:217-218). Networked mobilizations cut across extremely different contexts in terms of culture, social and political structure, economic condition, institutional setting and development level. (Castells, 2015: 221-222).

Networked movements are distinguished from traditional movements also by their organizational model. Loosely connected and digitally networked masses come together around certain issues intermittently in contrast to formal organizations of NGOs. This loose organizational pattern is seen as an advantage to match the omnipotent repressive power of the state which possesses all kinds of sources to counter autonomous movements (Castells, 2015: 81).

Characteristic to most of the demonstrations in the last decade, they represented an interaction between cyberspace and urban space, hence creating what Castells calls the space of autonomy (2015: 250). Before reaching the urban space, as in the Case of Singaporean Population White Paper protests, this interactive environment turned into a breeding ground for deliberation and discursive exchange among virtual "weak publics" (Pang & Goh, 2015:256). In addition to spatial interaction of the digital and the physical, for Castells, traditional and digital networks also interact in the formation and survival of protests. During the Arab Spring, traditional face-to-face social networks integrated into digital networks in the absence of civil society institutions decimated as a result of state repression. (Castells, 2015:108)

During 2009 massive Iran protests, reformists circulated information and imagery and communicated them to the world ("Iran protests…", 2018). The extensive use of social media during the Iranian uprising attracted the world's attention to the role of social media, event ually leading Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, to advocate for the growth of social media and its infrastructure *for the sake of democracy*" (Gambs, 2012:56).

The movements initially started on digital networks and then spread to urban spaces. For the first time in the modern history of the Middle East, aspirations for freedom

and democracy were discussed and expressed so intensely and the medium of the debate and the publicity was the Internet, specifically, social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, video sharing sites as well as popular blogs (Shirazi, 2013:29).

It is argued that the Arab Spring revolutions that toppled several authoritarian regimes across the Middle East would not have succeeded without the opportunities provided for protestors by the Internet (Ponder, J. D., & Sharma, R. (2015: "The Internet and Civic Mobilization", Section, para.5). Although it did not determine the outcome, the scale of the demonstrations was boosted by digital social networks (Lynch, 2014:97). Egyptian demonstrators, for instance, used Facebook for planning, Twitter for coordinating and Youtube for webcasting their protests against the Mubarak regime during the Arab Spring (Castells, 2015:60). Field research found that Egypt and Tunisia saw stronger civil obedience with their relatively higher Internet penetration rates. It is only after digital devices and the Internet became available that dispersed grievances of the protestors were organized into a common agenda outside state control. (Howard & Hussain, 2011, 41).

2011 Occupy Wall Street movement burst following the call for action by Adbusters, a Canadian activist website, and a sudden rise in the circulation of the call over blogs and social networks. The movement was born digital and gained momentum online. The occupation started all across the US after the Internet campaign (Castells, 2015: 171). Once the physical occupation took place, demonstrators connected their physical presence to their online presence by creating websites and Facebook groups specific to their camps, providing hot spots for continuous Internet activity and so on (Castells, 2015: 176-177).

The Indignados movement in Spain, like other movements, was also a hybrid movement where local physical gatherings were integrated on a large scale through the uncontrolled Internet space (Castells, 2015: 119). The movement distanced itself from the traditional leadership structure and hierarchies of formal organizations (Christancho & Anduiza, 2015:165).

Many other mobilizations with networked nature took place among which are 2013 Turkish Gezi Park protests, 2013-14 Brazil demonstrations against political

corruption, 2011 student movement in Chile, Mexican #YoSoy132 movement in 2012, 2011-2012 Moscow demonstrations, Ukrainian Maidan Square riots in 2013 and Hong Kong's Umbrella movement in 2014 (Castells, 2015: 220). Nevertheless, the history of Internet-supported protests goes well beyond this wave. Farrell cites evidence that shows the Internet's significant role in mobilizations that date back to the early 2000s, such as color revolutions in several eastern bloc countries (2012: 44).

The global protest movement of the early 2010s urged theorists to come up with more encompassing theories concerning the interplay between Internet technologies and contemporary collective action. A brief overview of the 3 most cited of them is timely at this point, before we move on cyberactivism research in a broader sense.

2.2.1. Main Pillars of the Networked Social Movements Theory

2.2.1.1. Castells and *Mass-self Communication*

Theorizing social movements in the age of information and online networking from early 1990s onwards, social scientist Manuel Castells represents the optimist wing of networked social movement theory. Despite his rejection of techno-determinism, Castells contends that society cannot be fully defined without taking its technological resources into consideration (2010:5). Castells coined the term "mass self-communication" for multi-directionality and multi-modality of digital network communication. He identifies converging characteristics of mass media and online technologies as follows:

> "*It is mass communication because it can potentially reach a global audience, as in the posting of a video on YouTube, a blog with RSS links to a number of web sources, or a message to a massive e-mail list. At the same time, it is self-communication because the production of the message is self-generated, the definition of the potential receiver(s) is self-directed, and the retrieval of specific messages or content from the World Wide Web and electronic communication networks is self-selected.*" (Castells, 2009:55).

Castells sees the novelty of the Internet in that this reformation of the meaning produced by human interaction has potential consequences for cultural change and social organization (Castells, 2009:55).

Castells suggests a strongly deterministic view of the relationship between technology adoption, specifically communication technology, and social movements, arguing that the characteristics of the communication between individuals taking part in social movements determine the characteristics of the movement (Castells, 2015:15). In his analysis of power, networks play a pivotal role. Human networks operate as the medium where power is exercised and enacted. Castells introduces four concepts, each qualifying a different aspect of his theory of network society: *Network power*, the power exercised through multimedia networks adapting messages to common protocols; *networking power*, the power to control the existence and direction of messages over multimedia networks; *networked power*, the power exercised over other nodes and to set the agenda, control the extent of virality and finally, *network-making power*, the power to launch and program multimedia networks (Castells, 2009:418-420). Given the decisiveness of power exercised to frame collective minds, the use of multimedia networks is central for construction of meaning (Castells, 2009:416). For Castells, historically, communication lies at the core of the formation and practice of social movements (2015:258). As all social movements in history, networked social movements represent the features of their society. What Castells calls "*hybrid world of real virtuality*" refers to the values, goals and organizational style of the culture of autonomy; and it could exist only with the Internet. This way, these social preferences become the agents of social change (2015: 262). In one of his latest works, he endorses initiatives that, although embryonic, unstable and insufficient, benefit from the deliberation and co-decision-making opportunities of the Internet for attending contemporary problems humanity faces (Castells, 2018:133).

Castells' techno-utopian views about the type of communication and social movements are the backdrop of more elaborate ideas about the relationship between digital networks and the autonomy they create for contemporary social movements. Despite his warnings in an early work against the challenges of corporate control, commercial bias, ownership, digital divide and the uncertainties created by the new epistemology that the Internet introduced (2001:277-278), Castells contends that people can challenge domination only through interaction with fellow dissidents, gaining a sense of togetherness, which makes digital communication networks an

indispensable part of today's social life. Digital networks offer horizontal and less hierarchical means for interaction and sharing of grievances as well as projections for solution (2015: 258). For Castells, *"the more interactive and self-configurable communication is, the less hierarchical is the organization and the more participatory is the movement"* (2015: 15). Therefore, digital social movements differ from movements of the past in their nature.

2.2.1.2. Gerbaudo and the *Occupation of the Digital Mainstream*

The 1999 and early 2000s anti-globalization campaigns marked the first mobilization experience whereby the Internet served as a facilitator. In the early 2010s, however, the use of the Internet gained a "mass" character. Theorizing the transformation that Internet use by activists underwent, Paolo Gerbaudo contrasted two periods of mobility in terms of whom these movements addressed and appealed to by utilizing the Internet (Gerbaudo, 2017:137). The first wave, the anti-globalization movement, comprised largely by elements of the ultra-left, preferred small-group politics which prioritized networking of activists or the already politicized citizen. The focus in this era was on creating a secure and autonomous Internet only for the disposal of activists. This included safe spaces for discussion and internal communication for coordination purposes by setting up websites dedicated to activists such as Indymedia, and alternative ISPs, secure email servers, and maintaining listservs. They aimed at keeping control of their protected online space, which resulted in *ghettoisation* of cyberactivism.

In the 2011 wave, however, - also due to increased global Internet penetration, activists turned to what Gerbaudo terms as *"occupation of the the digital mainstream"*, that is, a cyber-populist approach that capitalizes on the masses aggregated on subscriber or follower lists of popular social media accounts (Gerbaudo, 2017:139). Instead of following an activists-only underground path, organizers of what Gerbaudo calls *"movements of squares"* invited Internet users to discuss, comment, share and like movement-related content on social media, specifically on Facebook and Twitter. The efforts marked a fundamental shift from preserving *"virtual communes"* of the *"alternative Internet"* to politicizing and mobilizing the online population through networking platforms.

Gerbaudo has also concerned his research with the impact of the Internet on organization and structure of social movements. His views differentiated from the techno-utopian strand in that use of the Internet by activists does not render movements leaderless and horizontal. Instead, employment of internet technologies, including social networking, gives rise to new forms of leadership. Albeit participatory and interactive, networked movements do not level all participating voices. A group of salient social media users direct and influence activists throughout action (Gerbaudo, 2012:140). A small number of social media users, typically, admins, well-connected tweeters, influence movements and become soft leaders or in Gerbaudo's terms, "choreographers" of movements (Gerbaudo, 2012:5).

The concept of "horizontalism", a catchword among techno-utopians and the assumption that in the presence of social networks, a chain of command mechanism is needless for collective action, is also questioned and probed in Gerbaudo's work. He illustrates the reductionist approach that absence of a leader with legal status leads to horizontal organization as follows:

> "*The type of confusion which underlies the ideology of 'horizontalism' can be traced back to an erroneous equation between informal or 'liquid' organising and leaderlessness. The assumption is that if you do not have an elected chair, with legal status, that automatically means there are no leaders or leading groups.*" (Gerbaudo, 2012:140)

In many of the contemporary networked movements, activists called their action leadless and horizontal. However, outstanding actors shaped the movements in a diffuse manner than a centralized authority. Facebook admins, prominent Twitter users and the like played an extraordinary role framing mobilizations and motivating demonstrators (Gerbaudo, 2012:135).

Likewise, organizations do not disappear in networked social movements contrary to the expectations of techno-utopian views. Instead, organizations transform into softer and liquid structures thanks to the affordances of the Internet. Gerbaudo points out that "*communication and organisation become almost indistinguishable, and the 'communicators' of a movement become also automatically its organisers and leaders*" (Gerbaudo, 2012:135).

2.2.1.3. Bennett & Segerberg's Concept of *Connective Action*

The Connective Action approach, developed by Bennett and Segerberg, centers around individualized social structure of the information age. Globalization has facilitated the rise of individuated society, debilitating the ties between citizens and collective structures such as political party, NGO, class, church, family, union and others (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:6). Therefore, thanks to the connective features of the communication technology, political participation behavior of modern individualized society differs from former participation practices.

Bennett and Segerberg introduced the term "*connective action logic*" and contrasted it to the former collective action theory where movements typically are initiated by one or a few formal organizations (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). In connective action, participants join and support the issue network by sharing the circulated content in their own personalized forms, as such participating in the creation of the overall publicity about the issue. Organization takes a new form afforded by network features of the Internet:

> "*Beyond sharing information and sending messages, the organizing properties of communication become prominent in connective action networks. Communication mechanisms establish relationships, activate attentive participants, channel various resources, and establish narratives and discourses.*" (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:42)

This new form of participation, for Bennett & Segerberg, lies in full contrast with the classic movement logic of receiving and possibly sharing the content as they are posted from a Facebook group or fan page of the issue organization (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:11). This way "*technology—enabled networks may become dynamic organizations in their own right*" (pp.8). Compared to the traditional collective action framework, in connective action, movement networks are individualized and reject collective identity frames (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:750).

In Bennett & Segerberg's account of networked movements, the act of "sharing" and co-production occupy a key role. Content sharing displaces the free-rider problem (Olson, 1965:2) of physical participation by reducing the actual and potential cost of

participation. Additionally, in connective action logic, participants rely less on rich resources of formal organizations (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:760).

The researchers identify for primary differences between what they call connective movements and traditional, formal style movements: Connective mobilizations (1) escalate instantaneously and more quickly, (2) bring together large masses, (3) are unusually flexible, adaptive to changing targets and bridge between different issues, (4) are open to different action repertoires, make use of open source software and inclusive (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:35).

2.3. Digital Networks and Established Movements

In social movements history, media, in different forms, have played a special role, which converts symbolic assemblages into physical ones (Gerbaudo, 2012:41). Information transmitted face-to-face, from the pulpit or from the press, historically, has shaped movements (Castells, 2015: 15). For optimists, the Internet was no exception. With its potential for grassroot negotiation, almost unfettered access of all parties and provision of a diverse range of information and ideas, the Internet technology is usually positioned against the top-down politics prevalent in mass democracies organized around formal institutions (McQuail, 2010:213).

Contemporary social movements have had post-industrial characteristics such as pluralism, everyday life specific aspirations, different levels of action and different motivations for participant involvement. Women, ecologists, immigrants and the anti-nuclear community have risen for their own aspirations (Melucci, 1989:203). These highly decentralized and informal movements, moreover, have been relatively flexible in their action course, participant composition and changing goals (Willems & Jegers, 2012:77). Bennett & Segerberg's illustration contemporary activism scene as follows:

> "… *many of today's issue and cause networks are relatively de-centered (constituted by multiple organizations and many direct and cyber activists), distributed, or flattened organizationally as a result of these multiple centers, relatively unbounded in the sense of crossing both geographical and issue*

borders, and dynamic in terms of the changing populations who may opt in and out of play as different engagement opportunities are presented" (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:52).

These characteristics were historically accompanied by the widespread use of digital communication technologies. They provided the movements with organizational flexibility, contrary to conventional membership-based movements with common banners and collective discourse, flexibility in adapting to changing political priorities as well as the flexibility to personalize their identity and action frames (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:742).

Digital media, specifically digital networking and blogs, among others, have become key platforms for social movements to communicate and mobilize (Turner, 2013: 377). Twitter and Facebook have been compared to the printing press of the Reformation and the coffeehouse of the French Revolution (Tarnoff, 2017). della Porta et.al. point to ever more "media-conscious" movements of the recent past as their extreme protest repertoire have been moderated, normalized and in turn legitimized (2006:119).

Mass media's centrality has lied in its ability to bring public events, governments and political actors to the public attention. However, this type of media was loaded with the perils of uniformity as in representation of few voices, the predominance of vertical information flow and commercialization at the risk of democratic functions (McQuail, 2010:213). The advent of digital technologies, however, fundamentally changed the collective building capacity as well as created the ability to switch between multiple and co-existing publics. This led, within social movement studies, to a shift from viewing communication merely as a tool of interaction among movement actors to acknowledging its role in building the collective (Kavada, 2016:9). The public forms with the existence of certain types of communication - the Internet herein - and it is no longer constrained to physical space (González-Bailón, 2013b:152). Although social media is necessarily not a counter-public by itself, it helps communities create counter-public political networks (Bunz, 2015:147). Digital media, by its nature and architecture, bring about counter-publics, which were once prevented to emerge by the mass media's throttling mechanisms.

What made the difference with the networked mobilization wave is, unlike the cyberactivism of late 1990s and early 2000s, the networked activists externalized mainstream platforms' functions at their disposal so as to reach out to the broadest public possible, rather than representing the narrow ambitions and organizational efforts of a small counter-public (Gerbaudo, 2017:145). They appealed to masses which potentially include multiple counter-publics, eventually turning small dissent communities into a unified public.

Since the early 1990s, there have been several episodes which have brought the potential of the Internet and ICTs in creating and sustaining social movements under the spotlight. These include Zapatista movement in Mexico, creation of the Indymedia network in 1999 and World Social Forum in 2001, the Arab Spring, 2011 England demonstrations, Spanish Indignados movement and Occupy movements in the United States and many others in the last decade (Bacallao-Pino, 2015, Introduction section, Para 2).

Despite the myriad of research on short-term or issue-based mobilizations following the recent wave of network movements, permanent movements have been largely overlooked or neglected. Since its early phases on, Internet research confined the emerging discipline into the limited understanding of social movement studies and assessed its impact in relation to the state (Palczewski, 2001:162). However, the sustaining effect of Internet-powered movements may yield impressive outcomes in influencing conventional politics, creating long-lasting issue networks, bridging different networks among others. Online organization is important in that "*online acts can also demonstrate the strength of numbers*" in long term advocacy campaigns, as in the case of a sudden congressional shift in the political support for the Online Piracy Act and the Protect Intellectual Property Act after activists organized online and overwhelmed the congressmen's offices with calls (Tufekci, 2014:9-10).

Farrell points to the frequently raised claim that the Internet boosts freedom and democracy as well as its potential to coerce governments to step down, liberalize society and to create a pluralistic public sphere has been acknowledged (2012:43-

44). Social networks are a medium where actors exert power over and engage with issues of political relevance (Nahon, 2015:51), which are often seen as a realm where movements move from the marginal to the mainstream, communicating their ideas to the outer world (Tarnoff, 2017). It unites activists around the same cause and amplifies their voices with their advocacy efforts (Ponder & Sharma, 2015: The Internet and Civic Mobilization Section Para.1), while strengthening them in their social resistance and activism by providing the needed means to contribute to the social discourse with equifinal meaning (Shirazi, 2013:43).

Tufekci lists three major fields in which the social networks greatly empowered dissenters: Public attention, censorship evasion and coordination. Public information flow is no more in the exclusive discretion of a handful broadcasters whose professionals decide what to air and what not; it is no more easy as it was in the past decades for governments to keep certain issues away from public attention; and lastly, social movements, especially those on the ground can coordinate among themselves on the fly (2014:2). Indeed, in Gerbaudo's terms, "*power social media accounts*", pages of popular movements with thousands of followers or subscribers, emerged as the public attention and coordination medium (2017:145).

The Internet has become the medium of cyberactivism, i.e. *"the extensive use of the Internet to provide counterhegemonic information and inspire social mobilizations*" (Langman, Morris & Zalewski, 2003:225) for many advocacy groups. This trend was made possible by lowered costs of reaching out to broader public as well as social activists and providing wider grassroot support (McNutt, 2008:34; Loader, 2008:1928) and mobile technologies such as smartphones with global geo-location positioning devices, notebook and tablet computers, pagers, with which activists equipped themselves to secure more flexibility in their activity (Kahn & Kellner, 2004:89). With the tools afforded by the Internet, advocacy movements would have the tools to mobilize and campaign (Berntzen, Rohde-Johannessen, & Godbolt, 2014:22). Especially when combined with mobile technology, the Internet and social media networks are useful tools to spread information, to secure autonomous communication channels and coordinate with other activists (Ponder & Sharma, 2015: "The Future of Politics..." section, para.1).

Langman, Morris & Zalewski cite four main types of cyberactivism: *Internetworking* denotes affordances of the Internet to coordinate activities and organizations. *Alternative media via the Internet* refers to the Internet as a communication technology for the purposes of cultural resistance as a spatially unrestricted platform. *Direct cyberactivism* or *hacktivism* is a civil obedience activity and disruption of the digital activity for political ends and by exploiting opportunities offered by the Internet itself. And lastly, *contesting and constructing the Internet* is the interactive and participatory nature of this technology (2003:225). To crystallize the concept of cyberactivism with certain hands-on practices, these include online petition campaigns, website hacking, massive verbal protests, email flooding, virus attacks, data theft, destroying web page interface, online sit-ins. As these are Internet-native means, they are widely used by cyberactivists. (Bacallao-Pino, 2015, Information… section, para 2; Yang, 2009:34).

Another categorization regarding cyberactivism was made by Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia. The authors make a distinction between what they call cyberactivism 1.0 and cyberactivism 2.0. While the former is a regional cyber activity based primarily on email and websites, and organized around formal organizations, the latter takes places instantly, constantly and horizontally - with no organizations involved - over social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and others at a global scale with no language restrictions (2014:368).

After the initial wave of networked mobilizations, governments have come to respond to the dissent-breeding character of the digital media by adopting online repression methods along with legal measures and demonization of social media Tufekci, 2014:1-2). While grassroot political opposition employ digital networks effectively to break apart the political siege of authoritarian state, especially in drawing public attention to repression and brutality, they usually have to settle for limited gains far from bringing about political change or, at least, expanding the movement. Shortcomings of networked movements were largely evident in the case of Azerbaijani opposition which organized outside traditional parties. Nevertheless, social media activism granted oppositionists only a relative visibility but fell largely short of bringing permanent recognition (Pearce & Guliyev, 2015:243-244).

Following the measures taken by governments to counter disruptive and prolific social effects of the Internet, later generations of researchers adopted a relatively cautious stance on the impact of networked movements on social change. *"As the new information environment evolved, as new examples emerged, and as our theorizing, data, and research methods expanded and improved, these initial camps have blurred; the central question has shifted (perhaps inevitably) from whether the digital information environment is good or bad for democratic politics to how and in what contexts specific attributes of this environment are having an influence on specific theories and practices of democracy, citizenship, and constitutionalism"* (Williams and Delli Carpini 2011, cited in Delli Carpini, 2019:3).

Contrary to the prior enthusiasm, Internet networks have not revolutionized politics *per se*, since their use in political processes heavily depend on the structure of political institutions (Klinger & Svensson, for instance, 2015:34). Apart from the functioning and structural shortcomings of the digital networks, even in successful instances where movements utilized digital technologies aptly and efficiently, they did not necessarily produce the desired social and political outcome. The risk of overlooking these unexpected consequences grows as the visibility of digitally networked movements and public expectation from it increase hand in hand (Papacharissi & Blasiola, 2015:218).

One of the the central arguments of this pessimist strand of the research is the ephemerality of network-powered mobilizations. Farrel noted that the role of digital technologies in contemporary social movements is found exaggerated by several scholars (2012: 44), while Castells reminded that, in many contexts where social media were heavily used, movements did not scale up (2015: 226). Although acknowledging the disruptive affordances of the Internet, its potential to co-create networks and reshape discursive power structures, Loader & Mercea warn of the early academic celebrations of digital democracy (2011:766) mostly expressed following the above-mentioned mobilizations. Others also questioned Internet networks' role in maintaining public and political advocacy rather than being a coordination tool for volatile protests movements. West, acknowledging the uncontested position of the Internet technology in gathering people quickly,

challenges the notion of the Internet's ability to turn these mobilizations into long lasting movements: "*...as subsequent events has shown, the ability of the new electronic media to transform those movements into lasting social change, or to use the new media as a public sphere whose discourse must be reckoned with, is not yet evident.*" (2013:158).

Slacktivism was another challenge to the techno-utopian view of social movements. Perils of slacktivism have repeatedly been expressed. (Shulman, 2009:46-47; Morozov, 2009; Gladwell, 2010; Bacallao-Pino, 2015). It is suggested that Internet-based activism endangers the possible achievement of long-term and durable political goals due to its low-risk nature (Farrell, 2012: 45). It will be preferable for citizens to engage in costless, showy but ineffective ways of political participation such as joining Facebook groups (Morozov, 2011:190). Despite these concerns, in authoritarian contexts, ICTSs can still outfit activists who are more likely to be the target of state repression (Lai, 2005 cited in Earl et.al., 2015:356), even though surveillance capacity of the state has increased to a considerable extent.

The strength of the social media has been put into question also on the grounds that while they were efficient in sharing of innovation, information flow and for deliberative purposes, as suggested in Granovetter's well-known "weak ties" approach (Granovetter, 1973:1364), high-risk tasks such as protestor recruitment are efficient only through strong-ties i.e. physical and tighter acquaintances. So, network communication is intrinsically not an "*enemy of the status quo*" but rather "*well suited to making the existing social order more efficient*" (Gladwell, 2010).

Below, we review the existing research on the impact of Internet technologies on and interaction with various aspects of social movements of a wide-range of movement types. The section is of key importance to show the current level of research in the field up until the date of this study.

2.3.1. Connection & Coordination

The difference between centralized urban army and dispersed peasant army leads one to the point where information technologies come into play regarding social struggle.

Urban proletariat army was one that was centralized and uniform whereas peasant guerilla armies were scattered around, isolated and unconnected to one another. Thus, modernization of the army has called for strict communication (Hardt & Negri, 2005:71). Symbolic meaning and collective identity are negotiated between different individuals, groups and organizations through communicative action. This action provides common meaning to the different sides, actors and practices of an issue, uniting them on the same side (Diani, 1992:2-3).

As communication media, social networks have been an informative source in the last decade for people seeking to express their dissent over certain issues just as other media types such as newspaper, poster, leaflet were for past movements. However, they are not only information conveyors as the older media, but also, due to their interactive architecture, are shapers of the movement. Citizens not only seek information on social media but also choreograph action (Gerbaudo, 2012:4). The architecture of network platforms allows activists to gather around shared issues. For instance, Meetup platform is used to enable users to organize offline meetings, Doodle, a web-polling service by Google, is used to schedule assemblies; Facebook's event feature is used to invite users to various activities (pp.39-40).

In regard to the shifting relationship between communication environment and social movements, McQuail suggests that the factors that affect the formation of cyber communities are the degree of interest, dispersed members and minority status. Once these conditions are present, new media offer tools and the platform for interactive communication that mass media do not (2010:210). The interactivity is achieved when locality of information and restrictions on group reaction was removed by these networking platforms, then leading to altered "*spread, force and especially duration of that reaction*" (Shirky, 2008:153)

Online networks provide movements with easy internal coordination and organization of participation activities (Gerbaudo, 2012:150). People can self-coordinate through "*mechanisms that rely on the connectivity of the network, and on the interdependence of their decisions and actions*" (González-Bailón, 2013a:9). These claims were repeatedly expressed after digital networks came to be widely

used in social life. For instance, activist in the first networked mobilization wave (2011-2013) utilized the web to organize preparation by exchanging information and discussion (Gerbaudo, 2017:140). Occupy Wall Street participants actively used Facebook for organization of less tech-savvy mobilizations and connecting with larger occupation websites. They stayed in touch with each other, put announcements online, sent private and public messages to members of the groups, set calendar items, posted on each other's feeds during the demonstrations (Castells, 2015: 177-178). The 5 Star movement's campaigning experience in Italy demonstrates that the Internet also facilitates non-protest and only-online types of political participation. The movement was able to collect hundreds of thousands of petition signatures by utilizing a blog page as early as 2007 (Turner, 2013:377).

In social movements, emotions follow a trajectory from anger to hope, eventually affecting the decision to take action and the spirit of solidarity (Eslen-Ziya et.al, 2019:7) Communication over social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter helped citizens transform their anger against government policies into solidarity to overcome their long demobilization (Gerbaudo, 2012:77). For instance, in the days preceding the 2011 15M uprising in Spain, Twitter hashtags such as #15M, #indignados, #tomalacalle (take to the streets), #spanishrevolution became a venue where mobilization hope was cultivated among activists, opinion leaders, bloggers (2012:89). After construction of collective identity, the consolidation phase takes place. Digital communication networks are instrumental also in achieving higher internal cohesion and, furthermore, soliciting external support for movements (Castells, 2015: 173). Gerbaudo, for instance, notes his observation on Twitter's role in creating emotional cohesion among the activist community during the 2011 Egypt uprising (2012:72).

Empirical research has thus far mainly focused on the impact of digital networks on ephemeral protest campaigns, whether offline or online, rather than long-term advocacy efforts organized and sustained by formal or informal interest groups. However, Theocharis acknowledges that the flexibility afforded by social networks attracts activists for advocacy organizations for they can "get on and off" the wave at any time; and the networks of activists can be mobilized after a long time of

"standby mode". This loose type of self-organization has long-lasting consequences for advocacy campaigns (2015:193). In contradiction with this expectation, however, a study focusing on the aftermath of the actual protest behavior suggests that social media does not help movement organizers much in terms of continuity and success once the physical protest has ended. (Bacallao-Pino, 2015, Conclusions section, Para. 2).

In terms of authoritarian contexts, however, the role of networked movements in political achievement may be less than developed democracies. Bacallo-Pino points to the relative vulnerability of contexts where conditions of free expression of social dissent are missing. It might, the author argues, lead to overestimating the role of the communicative process in the overall collective action while offline conditions remain unchanged, eventually creating "happy islands" (2015, Conclusion section, Para 3).

2.3.2. Flexible & Horizontal Organization

The desire for a horizontalist, leaderless, participatory and ad hoc organization is repeatedly expressed by the recent networked movement actors. (Tufekci, 2014:13). The Internet and its network-based communication platforms are hailed as the disappearance of the hierarchy in social campaigns were imminent. The Internet was believed to revolutionize social movement governance and introduce an egalitarian decision-making logic. Brunsting and Postmes point to the Internet's paradox in terms of its potential to facilitate collective action among its users:

> "*The Internet's potential for collective action is particularly interesting because this issue is at the heart of a classical paradox of this new medium: A socially isolating medium can reinforce social unity.*" (2002:528)

Bennett & Segerberg assert that digital networks are more than only communication tools but also flexible organizations in themselves capable of adapting to the changing conditions and goals of the movement (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:753). Contrary to the traditional notion of "collective", they represent a contemporary "collective" which is dispersed, decentralized and temporary (Kavada, 2016:8).

Movements loosely structured thanks to ICTs allow organizations "*to expand and contract in space and time to suit trans-national or more local political exigencies*" (Loader, 2008:1930). Hardt & Negri share this view emphasizing the post-Fordist character of information technologies (2005:82).

Activists in the last decade's networked movements have often claimed that their movements are leaderless (Gerbaudo, 2012:134). Collective activities in the offline world have long required central coordination and hierarchical organization. However, collective organization can now be carried out more loosely by means of the Internet (Shirky, 2009). "Looseness" did emerge not only in the sense of sporadic offline gatherings but also association with individual values and beliefs as long as she or he identifies her or himself with the cause of the movement. Castells observed that horizontality of protestor networks is positively associated with cooperation and solidarity (Castells, 2015: 253). The crowd can collectively form a collective intelligence thanks to digital means, echoing Hardt & Negri's concept of "swarm intelligence" (Gerbaudo, 2012:27). A rather nuanced argument was put forward by Kellner: The major point of digital horizontality debate comes not from the nature of digital networks but their difference from the traditional media. Computer-mediated communication diminishes the exclusion of oppositional groups in political struggle and promises democratization (Kellner, 2021:155).

Pre- and post-mobilization organizational experiences provide insight into movement formation over digital networks. For instance, Indignados movement emerged following the formation of a Facebook group created by Spaniards residing in different cities of the country. The group later changed its name to "Democracia Real Ya" (Real Democracy Now!), the title of the platform which initiated the mobilization, and functioned as a debating and action medium. It was later accompanied by an email group, a forum and a blog all created by the members of the group. Its decentralized structure allowed the members to organize flexibly and meet in different cities they resided (Castells, 2015: 114). More recently, the same decentralized organizational pattern was evident within the anti-Trump movement in the US against the president's policies, which also extensively leaned towards social network for organization (Manjoo, 2017).

Although Internet networks are said to be "leaderless", in the sense of total horizontality, they are hierarchical platforms with emerging forms of leadership (Gerbaudo, 2012:143). In Gerbaudo's account, which calls the concept of "horizontalism" in question, social networks bring certain users to the positions of disproportionate influence and prevent others from having the same degree of attention (pp.140). Many networked actions saw prominent users such as Wael Ghonim in Egypt, Pablo Gallego and Fabio Gandara in Spanish Indignados either initiated or facilitated the action on the ground (pp.135).

Paradoxically, for the very reasons that challenge hierarchies in movement, several scholars call attention to the drawbacks of decentralized, leaderless campaigns. Acknowledging the fact that digital networks are non-hierarchical, Gladwell sees no transformative potential in social media due the lack of a number of characteristics that are enjoyed by offline movements such as authority, rules, procedures and consensus (2010). Tufekci observes what she termed as "*capacity weakness*" towards the end of movements, especially when the circumstances turn unfavorable for protestors in the form of increased repression, challenging weather and energy depletion (2014:14). In these moments, with an ad hoc organization, rather than a solid organizational structure, activists become discouraged to respond to government action. Although movements can be maintained with the same size and energy as their ability to challenge the state power is compromised in the absence of organization structure (p.15)

2.3.3. Personal Publics & Individual Participation

The transformation from offline to online forms of participation in the public sphere ambiguates the boundary between private and public realms. Revisiting the concept of collective action in light of the digital technologies, Flanagin, Stohl & Bimber put forward the notion of collective action as a communicative process where people cross the boundary between private and public by "*expressing or acting on an individual (i.e., private) interest in a way that is observable to others (i.e., public)*" (2006:32). A substantial transformation that occurred on the private-public and personal-political axes has redefined the boundaries of private and public sphere.

39

Caused by the technological advances of the past decades to a great extent, connective but not isolated private spheres came to form and identify the public sphere, eventually ambiguating the way of exerting political citizenship (Papacharissi, 2010:162-163). The trend was evident, aided also by globalization and individualization, in the estrangement of individuals from formal organizations and centralized structures of the society. Citizens, although they pursue common political aspirations and experiences, came to identify themselves less with collective identities. These changes caused branding of politics with more personalized forms and individual lifestyles, boosting individual "Do It Yourself" culture (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:6).

The very fact that citizens can personalize and share their support or opposition to a candidate or policy has revolutionized political communication (Boulianne, 2019:50). Digital networks serve well to this individual need of personalized participation in every aspect of life and politics (Gerbaudo, 2012:138), and paved the way for more individualized participation in social movements (Nash, 2010:126). Personalization of publics is achieved through online politics and does not require trading off personal beliefs in contrast to participation through formal organizations and traditional movements (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:1). Contemporary networked movements offer an environment where personal and public are balanced and, moreover, integrated.

In order to respond to the radical changes in social realm and communication environment, Bennett and Segerberg devised the concept of "connective action" as opposed to "collective action", the traditional term used to denote movements based on strongly and formally connected networks, mediation of formal and hierarchical organizations, collective identity (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:748,760). Theory of connective action positions itself in the opposite of collective action logic: Connective action networks are "*individualized and technologically organized sets of processes that result in action without the requirement of collective identity framing or the levels of organizational resources required to respond effectively to opportunities*" (pp.750). In the heart of this new action logic lie the phenomena of sharing, digital communication technologies, personalized participation and content

40

circulation. In the logic of connective action, Bennett & Segerberg regard digital networks as the formative principle and a situation rather than mere precondition for participation and information providers (pp.760). The personalization of participation is not only a shift in content but one in organization of participation

2.3.4. Autonomous Communication

Autonomy of communication takes a pivotal place in Castells social movement theory. Since it allows movements to emerge and connect with the broader public, autonomy of communication is essential for social movements (Castells, 2015:11). All networked movements in the last decade took place in what Castells calls "*the culture of autonomy*" (pp.258) and have benefitted from the autonomous communicative capacity of digital networks (pp.223). He suggests that "*Social movements exercise counterpower by constructing themselves in the first place through a process of autonomous communication, free from the control of those holding institutional power*" (pp.9). Castells claims that networked social movements promise a utopia where the subject retains his or her autonomy against the established institutions of society (pp.256).

As tools of post-Fordist production, information networks have come to define new guerilla movements (Hardt & Negri, 2005:82). Arab Spring uprisings in different contexts such as Tunisia, Egypt took advantage of free and autonomous spaces of the Internet to debate, organize and circulate calls to rise up (Castells, 2015:105). In Egypt, for instance, the Internet was a popular means among activists because the right of assembly was highly repressed under the Mubarak regime until the 2011 incidents (Gerbaudo, 2012:50). Digital platforms were also used to bypass the state restrictions on communication (pp.64). Blogs and Facebook groups were commonly used to accommodate anti-government sentiments.

Loader (2008:1928) recalls the early depictions of the Internet as beyond the control of the state due to its flexible routing opportunities for activists. It was welcomed as a liberating technology and considered hard to be controlled by the state (Castells, 2015:17). However, despite its early promises as a free and autonomous space, the

Internet was later found to be vulnerable and "*at the risk of control by state authorities*" (Akin, 2011:44; Deibert et al. 2010). This control has taken the form of throttling, blockage, domain seizure or overall shutdown.

Governments adopted repressive ways of dominating social networks where dissent is bred exponentially; while they target high-profile users with legal action, they demonize social media to marginalize its use, keeping their constituents away from accessing undesired information (Tufekci, 2014:6). Despite all the efforts by the state to keep the virtual space under control and quash when needed, Tufekci maintains that the information control will never work the same way as it did in the days of centralized mass media (pp.16). These and other repressive acts by hostile governments may also lead to an increased visibility of dissident movements, a paradoxical effect of social network communication that eventually renders movements vulnerable to state surveillance (Neumayer, 2015:305).

In underdeveloped democracies, governments devised ways of countering autonomous communication of social opposition and networked dissent. Scholars suggest that, in authoritarian regimes, the state has caught up with cyber-activism through its control over Internet networks (Kalathil & Boas, 2010:137; Tufekci, 2014:16). Governments around the world intervened with the online information flow and the citizens' access to the Internet during mass mobilizations. The Egyptian government, for instance, took a radical step during the Arab Spring and shut down all digital traffic in the country including cell phone services, on the night of January 28, 2011 when a nationwide protest was underway the next day (Richtel, 2011). Likewise, during 2017 protests, the Iranian government temporarily unplugged Instagram and Telegram while Facebook, Youtube and Twitter had already been banned ("Iran Protests..", 2018). Myanmar for instance shut down the Internet for six weeks to quash the 2007 protests in the country. China banned Facebook, Twitter and Youtube in 2009 during clashes between Uighurs and Han. Dubbed "The Great Firewall", Chinese Internet censorship extended to the extent that the government in Beijing required Internet cafes to use a certain software that makes English language websites inaccessible, and computer users to register with their real names and official identification numbers (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2012:14-16). Castells suggests

that repressive governments can prevail against networked movements only if they cooperate with influential foreign powers (Castells, 2015:62), justifying Shirky's criticism of the United States' efforts to promote Internet tools in undemocratic countries which could end up in a backlash that these efforts may be countervailed by autocratic regimes by cutting off access or controlling the Internet (2011:40).

2.3.5. Offline - Online Ties: Hybrid Public Space

The tension between online and offline collective action is among the main mediators of the online - offline transition. The relationship, depending on the context, may work in both directions: Digitally native social currents are bred online and spill over to streets. Or, reversely, street actions provoke debate and campaign on social networks (Yang & Calhoun, 2008:10). While movement participants acknowledge the continuity of network characteristics in their offline practices, they also accept the fact that they need to voice their dissent in unity and take to streets in order to influence decision-makers (Bacallao-Pino, 2015, Online and Offline... section, para. 5). Social movements are most visibly embodied on streets in the form of marching, protests, or benefitting from a repertoire of political participation that includes voting, fundraising, filing petition, debating, promoting ideas, taking part in civil society and political parties among other forms. However, free spaces of the Internet are crucial for them to persist (Castells, 2015:249).

Castells and Gerbaudo conceptualized the interplay of cyberspace and physical space in the context of networked social movements: For Castells (2015:180), networked movements link space of flows (virtual networks) to space of places (physical or urban conditions). Gerbaudo, echoing Castells' concepts, terms the hybrid space, in his words "*venues for magnetic gatherings*", as trending places, referencing the trending topic, the term indicating the popular subjects on Twitter (2012:155).

Even in 2008, the early days of most Web 2.0 applications, more complementary forms of activism in terms of face-to-face and virtual action were anticipated (Loader, 2008:1931). Despite the attraction of online action for new activists who have little or no experience in traditional, offline action (Brunsting & Postmes,

2002:550), extensive use of digital networks caused the integration of cyberspaces of the Internet and urban spaces of physical political mobilization, making digital technology an adjunct means for advocacy purposes (McNutt et.al, 2008:34). Reminding Charles Tilly's view that social movements are demonstrative, Tufekci rejects the online-offline dichotomy and suggests that social movements should be evaluated in their complex impact formula rather than what she calls "*asphalt fetishism*" (2014:8-9). Confirming the complexity, work on the 2011 wave of the European movements maintains that the online tools were key in fostering offline street action (Turner, 2013:378).

In this complex environment of emerging activism, digital network communication does not necessarily supplant face-to-face political communication or street action (Gerbaudo, 2012:154). Communication over Facebook, Youtube and Twitter created a composite public space eventually leading to physical forms of participation with many movements in the last decades including M5S movement in Italy, Occupy Wall Street and Tunisian uprisings during the Arab Spring (Castells, 2015:23). Substantiating this composite character, Turner emphasizes the importance of juxtaposition of online and offline action, defying the idealization of the Web as "virtual space" (2013:378). In the broader context of Arab Spring mobilizations, for instance, digital networks interacted with pre-existing traditional offline networks within society (Castells, 2015:60).

Inspired by the term "flash flood", the flash activism concept was one of the manifestations of the transitivity between online and offline activism. It was adopted to illustrate the potential effects of ephemeral massive collective action enabled by ICTs. These tactics bring mobilizations to the attention of policy makers, public opinion and the mass media. The attention deluge also attracts the attention of the international public to the protesters mobilized especially in authoritarian contexts (Earl et.al., 2015:356).

2.3.6. Digital Networks and Political Participation

In addition to facilitating the existing practices of participation, digital network communication has paved the way for a new participatory culture thanks to its nature

which allows citizens to create, collaborate, share and exchange content (Kennedy, 2016:37). As a business model, the Internet's participation-provoking and disagreement encouraging nature also contributes to online participation. Nonproprietary content production and the rise of produser ie. the Internet user that both creates and consumes content, boosted web traffic and engagement rates, thereby propelling the Internet economy (Yang, 2009:35).

Although the word chosen for the activity is predominantly "sharing" (John, 2012:178), digital media, along with the old media environment, introduced novel means of political participation and retains the potential of subverting civic engagement practices of formal political organization (Chadwick, Dennis, & Smith, 2015:16). Political participation repertoire consists, in addition to protests, riots, rebellion, petition filing, striking, forming pressure groups among others (Nash, 2010:98), contributing to formation of public sphere by sharing or producing information, criticize politicians and bureaucrats,

The Constitutional Assembly Council extensively benefited from the participatory features of social media during Icelandic constitutional deliberation and drafting in 2010. Facebook and Twitter were used to inform citizens about the progress of the work while Youtube and Flicker constituted intermediary platforms between council members and citizens for debating constitutional issues during the making (Castells, 2015:39).

The online culture's effect is not limited to only online political participation but also evident in more conventional, offline practices. Research tested the association between Internet use and offline political engagement: Several studies found that online activities such as joining discussion groups, news-seeking, sending email with political content positively affect offline engagement among youth (Quintelier & Vissers, 2007:423; Lee et.al, 2012:687). This holds true also for radical participatory experiences such as mass mobilizations. For instance, those who used blogs, Twitter and Facebook were more likely to attend Tahrir square protests in the early days of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012:375). Online media use also positively affects participation efficacy. Evidence shows that online news

consumption, especially in an interactive manner, raises the internal efficacy of young people for political participation (Moeller et.al, 2014:696).

Empirical participation research also reached more nuanced, skeptical and somewhat contradictory evidence such as limited effects of the Internet over political participation. Prior, for instance, found that the information abundance and choice diversity on the Internet, and its versatility cause participation gap among citizens (Prior, 2005:587, Xenos & Moy, 2007:714). Another study found no significant evidence to confirm the association between participation and Internet use among Australian youth (Vromen, 2007:65).

2.3.7. Deliberation

Theories of democracy, especially the deliberative democracy debate, has revolved around a communicative perspective, since political discussion is seen as vital for a robust democracy and for its potential to create "publics" (Dahlgren, 2005:156). Visions of democratic decision-making and constitutionality as well as city as public space, as theorized by Habermas and Chicago School, lost their significance upon the formation of new publics on and by the Internet (Castells, 2004:30). As a many-to-many directed technology, the Internet extends the scope of public interaction to a broader audience, taking up the speaker role of mass media for lower cost (Bohman, 2007:74).

Due to its many-to-many nature, the Internet is frequently said to pave the way for the atomization of the public sphere and debilitation of organized civil society. In this regard, Sunstein underlines the importance of spontaneous exposure to unsought information in creating shared experiences and developing a common agenda among heterogeneous societies. That said, he warns of the perils of an increasingly personalized Internet and diminishing effect of the shared experience, which runs counter to the republican ideals (Sunstein, 2007:117-118). Against the atomization arguments, Bruns & Highfield suggest moving beyond a singular conception towards the pluralistic "*public sphericules*" approach, wherein interconnected, overlapping, unpredictable, sporadic issue publics interact (2015:70). The use of the Internet for

political purposes has the potential to bring about a pluralistic and deliberative environment encouraging civic discussion (pp.150-151). Despite rising state surveillance, the Internet, specifically digital networks, offers largely *unfettered* spaces for deliberation (Castells, 2015:10).

Social movements typically reveal reliable information from their websites, however, individuals both inside and outside the movement interpret its goals and connect with a broader audience through digital networks (Nash, 2010:126). Users in the position of bridging nodes serve as information sources between different communities (González-Bailón, Wang & Borge-Holthoefer, 2014:15).

Deliberative functions of online networks have been evident in several movements in the last decade. In the days leading up to the Arab Spring uprisings, proliferation of ICTs with different levels of diffusion depending on the context, fostered a culture of political debate, critical thinking and activism among the youth. Citizens heavily deliberated political matters over networks and became a movement over time (Castells, 2015:109). Different factions of anti-government Islamists in Egypt discussed the goals of the revolution (pp.76-77). Italian 5M movement elected candidates to office benefitting from the Internet's deliberative nature; candidates publicized and presented themselves over the Internet (pp.279). Spanish Indignados members debated the new projects of the movement over Internet networks (pp.179).

Online political deliberation is also frequently associated with political engagement and news consumption. Online discussion predicts increased civic engagement and promotion of issues of public importance (Reichert & Print, 2016:9). Online news consumption is also a predictor of engagement in civic discussions online (Reichert & Print, 2016:11-12). Yet, the same study found a negative correlation between engagement in online discussion and civic knowledge. In authoritarian contexts, online discussion has complex and indirect effects: Exchange of user-generated content might help citizens better understand the risks and dangers of activism and thereby affect the level of motivation to participate (Earl et.al., 2015:360).

Theoretical assumptions that the Internet could be the facilitator of more deliberative forms of democracy and civic discussion is often contested by empirical analyses.

Interactivity and political interaction via the Internet are lower than expected. Participation in discussion is typically weak, and dominated by male, politically like-minded and ideologically homogeneous users and uncivil discussion (Cammaerts and van Audenhove, 2005:193). Far from a constructive political dialogue environment, online networks are frequently overwhelmed by jokes, insults, derision and negative comments on politicians or policies (Robertson et.al, 2019:11). The deliberative ideal is often challenged by a dominant online minority. A minority of active users dominate a large part of the network (Wilson & Dunn, 2011:1265).

Critics of the idea that online deliberation serves to diversification of information and views that users are exposed to have claimed that participation in digital networks brings about only noise (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:760). Moreover, researchers, despite its ability to expose users to alternative views, have found evidence that online interactions lead to homophily among those with strongly partisan views (Farrell, 2012:43). Networked information is likely to be confined within party lines or ideological position (Adamic & Glance, 2005:43; Conover et al. 2011:95). Internet users prefer staying away from those they disagree with and engage in political argument only on comment threads about unrelated topics (Duggan & Smith, 2016:2). Although not invalidating these ideas and findings, Bruns & Highfield's evidence from Australian Twittersphere, points to a midway understanding where, instead of individuals, fragmented issue publics are not in complete isolation but still in interaction over social networks (Bruns & Highfield, 2015:70).

2.3.8. Different Economic Logic and Cost-effective Participation

Funding is the foremost vulnerability of activist groups, which puts them in disadvantage against better institutionalized entities that counter-campaign. In sustaining their cause and campaign, advocacy groups, NGOs and other organizations of any sort rely on financial resources especially for publicity, organization and communication with the public. Activist individuals and organizations can diffuse their message with only basic computer skills (Leizerov, 2000:469).

Compared to mass communication which need vast financial and organizational resources, the low-cost communication opportunity for global activists is peculiar to the Internet (Loader, 2008:1928). Social movements around the world have enjoyed cost-effective communication and organization opportunities via the Internet. They get across even barely relevant information to large swathes of global society for little or no cost (Kobrin, 1998:107). The resource-saving Internet organization was evident during many campaigns worldwide such as the anti-landmine campaigns, 2003 demonstrations against the Iraq War and the World Social Forum mobilizations which connected multiple cities around the globe (Della Porta & Mosca, 2005:169-170).

Benkler points to the emergence of new economic logic as a result of the rise of ICTs. He suggests that the lowered cost of information production and distribution in a networked environment causes the replacement of economic remuneration by self-motivated participation in return of information production. In what he terms "Networked Information Economy", expression and co-distribution of personalized content becomes the main economic drive of individuals (Benkler, 2006).

2.3.9. Influential Personae & Organized Guidance

Social movements emerge, thrive or collapse largely depending on particular political, social and economic conditions of the context in which they are bred. That said, leaders and influential figures play a key role in interpreting and benefitting from these conditions which eventually leads to development and the demise of movements. To a large extent, their trajectories and outcomes depend on the performance of the influential figures. Leaders identify conditions in which the movement operates and its strengths, weaknesses, contradictions (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004:191). Although it is frequently suggested that networked social movements are horizontal and "leaderless", they have one or several persons initiating the movement at the outset (Castells, 2015:13). Movement communities on the Internet form around one or a few influential mediators who control the information flow within and between movements. These mediators are not necessarily individual influencers but also anonymous users with a large base of

followers and organizations that work as intermediaries for grassroot level activists or supporters (Isa & Himelboim, 2018:10). The gatekeeping system of the conventional media perpetuates itself in the form of stratified platform users, i.e. professional content creators on Youtube, successful Wikipedia contributors, tweeps with a large follower base, well-connected Facebook users among others. The influence of these users derives not only from their popularity but also are they boosted by platform algorithms, leading network structures to even deeper hierarchical environments (Van Dijck, 2013:159).

Just as information diffusion, organization of movement also does not occur spontaneously at grassroots level. Horizontality of social networks does not bring an absolute spontaneity in terms of motivation and recruitment. Without organizers capable of evoking emotional ties among protestors, sympathy for the movement does not necessarily mean extra participation (Gerbaudo, 2012:5). Influential Internet users such as Facebook admins, activist Twitter users called tweeps take the lead as "*choreographers*" and "*soft leaders*" to inform, motivate and encourage potential participants. (pp.5).

During the Arab Spring mobilizations in Egypt, Wael Ghonim, the moderator of the Facebook group named after the young man brutally killed by the Egyptian police and a gathering point for activists, streamlined information and announced the upcoming events to activists on the ground (Gerbaudo, 2012:61). Similarly, Occupy Wall Street had several organizers, who delivered tactical information from an office which was later called by the mainstream media "Occupy Headquarters", covered the course of the events minute-by-minute and provided suggestions for activists on the ground to avoid police attacks (pp.128-129). Just as individuals, groups such as Adbusters and Anonymous, among others, have played a significant role in giving birth to social movements over the virtual realm (Turner, 2013:377).

2.3.10. Information Brokerage

The role of social media networks as news and information sources has extensively been discussed among scholars. They provide ground to challenge the uneven

information flow of the traditional media, offering easy and almost universal access to the public sphere bypassing gatekeepers of the mass media (Naughton, 2011:150). This is thanks to the convergence of different architectures of mass and interactive media, which has complicated traditional linear news conveyance processes and brought about a new information ecology. With its countless channels, the Internet provides a more mediated environment for political information seekers (Ponder & Sharma, 2015: "The Internet and its Impact…", Section, para.7). One of the innovative ways of information dissemination that the age of social networks introduced, for instance, is the form distribution. News distribution takes place in conversational form among Twitter and blog users (Lotan et.al., 2011:1400) unlike the traditional equation of news consumption which assumes a simple and linear message transmission between the communicator and the recipient.

Studies show that during major news events, citizens turn to social media to seek firsthand information from the ground as they happen. For instance, many citizens turned to social media for reliable information during the Gezi protests (Baruh & Watson, 2015:202). Twice more Internet users sought information and opinion on Twitter than those sharing their opinion. González-Bailón found that bursts in digital network activity during social incidents such as protests contribute to the diffusion of information globally (2013b:153). The unusual level of information diffusion functions as a "megaphone" in authoritarian contexts, as was the case during the Arab Spring (Aday et.al, 2013:912), which attracts the attention of the international public rather than the domestic public of the country where the mobilization takes place. During Arab Spring protests in Egypt, Kullena Khaled Said Facebook became a venue where people, particularly protestors, shared, collected and accumulated information about the decay of the Mubarak regime, police brutality against the protesters and so forth (Gerbaudo, 2012:58-59).

Different online platforms and forms of networking have operated during mass mobilizations to address various needs of activists. Blogs, just as Facebook and Twitter, also served different needs among movement members. Tumblr, a blogging network, for instance, was used as a storytelling medium during the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations. People published stories about their grievances and how US

economic policies have impoverished them. Likewise, streaming platforms were used to provide audiovisual portrayal of the movement and showed people police violence through real-time broadcast (Castells, 2015: 176 -178).

Despite the opportunity of easy and instant access to information offered by online networks, their impartiality as information diffusers has been questioned as a part of the global debate concerning the growing impact of algorithms in social life. Algorithmic information selection, curation, formation and distribution hampers the intact image of social networks as objective media for information distribution (Mazzotti, 2017).

Another potential drawback of digital information seeking is the disorientation of the audience by information overload resulting from the indefinite number of information channels enabled by the Internet. Loader warns of perils of informational navigation of activists in the content saturated environment of the Internet (2008:1931). In saturated information environments, the problem is rather a user centric one where users tend to selectively search for political information instead of gaining access to the scarce information (Earl et.al, 2015:362). However, Wojcieszak & Mutz challenge the idea of selective exposure, maintaining that discussion groups with non-political orientations create a climate for cross-cutting political encounters and information exchange between users with dissimilar views and contribute to dialog between them (2009:50). Ponder and Sharma also claim that the Internet provides tools to navigate through the online information myriad and turn it into argumentation, integrate into existing political knowledge for making informed decisions as to participate in political processes (2015: "The Internet and its Impact…", Section, para.8), confronting the selective exposure claims in the information saturated environment of online media.

Networked information brokerage is crucial for the existence and survival of movements also for reasons related to the mass media. Especially in the contexts where ties between the government and the mass media outlets are strong, mass media may choose to turn its attention away from the dissenters. Protests may have little or no coverage in major outlets as was the case in Spanish Indignados

(Gerbaudo, 2012:114) and Gezi ("Censorship in the Park..", 2013). The dependency on the mass media's information provision may have a lethal impact on the awareness about the movement. On the other hand, from the dissidents' perspective, social media's informational effect is stronger in countries without free press (Boulianne, 2019:49).

2.3.11. Participant Recruitment

The question of encouraging inactive and peripheral supporters of a campaign for active participation has always been a contested debate. *The latent group* of collective action, a category suggested by Mancur Olson, denotes the sympathizers of a social movement who do not act with the protesters without a separate incentive or a punishment offered to them. The individuals making up the latent group do not wish to participate in the collective action to accomplish a public demand nor do they want to bear the cost of participation, thereby making its contribution to the movement almost impossible (Olson, 1965:50-51). The interactive nature of Internet activism and user-generated content circulation addresses the need of an external incentive for the members of the latent group to mobilize. The circulation of self-generated content evokes satisfaction for users, eventually leading to taking part in collective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:53).

Active social media users occasionally attempted to benefit from networks to recruit new participants in movements. Although the extent of successful attention attraction varies from one platform to another, group-focused communication and use of hashtags attract the attention of a majority of the public (Gerbaudo, 2012:152). Peripheral users who typically do not take part in offline action are likely to join a variety of online actions. Online means of protesting are more popular among non-participants of traditional offline action and the Internet was an "*easy entry point*" for newcomers (Brunsting & Postmes, 2002:550).

Since we selected organizations as the level of analysis of the study, we provide below an elaborate literature on the role of organizations in contemporary activism facilitated by social networks.

2.4. The Position of Formal Organizations in Networked Movements

Organizations play a key role for social movements to emerge as they match grievances of their base with resources and turn them into advocacy (Earl, 2015:36). Bimber, Flanagin & Stohl observe the centrality of organizations in collective action theory as follows:

> "*Many of the largest obstacles to collective action efforts are communicative and organizational in nature: locating and contacting appropriate participants, motivating them to make private resources publicly available, persuading them to remain involved despite short-term setbacks and long-term risks, and coordinating their efforts appropriately.*" (2005:368)

It would be a misconception to equate contemporary movements with organizations working for shared goals. In the broader context of social movements, mass and the movement consciousness are two elements that need to be well integrated (Oliver, 1989:18). The advent of digital technologies revolutionized the relationship between social movement organizations and participants and fit well into this need to integrate the mass and the consciousness. Digital technology is seen as a game changer and puts the role of formal organizations in social movements in question (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:748). Many functions priorly fulfilled by organizations were overtaken by affordances of the Internet, which in turn led to a decrease in this role (Earl, 2015:48). For instance, their coordination role has been transferred to Internet networks and changed the nature of bottom-up social movements and grassroot initiatives (González-Bailón, 2013a:9). Internet allows ever more citizens to participate in the movements without any formal organization involvement (Earl et.al., 2015:357). Also, the need for formal organizations to gather the like-minded and put shared goals and emotions in common perspective has been contested (Christancho & Anduiza, 2015:165).

Despite the decline in core significance of organizations in collective action, digitally enabled movements do not inform the disappearance of organizations; instead the line between organization and communication blurs as the use of digital technologies for collective action spreads (Gerbaudo, 2012:135). Although, in modern political

sociology, formal organizations and collective action typologies and discourses associated with them represent an out-of-date social movement strand, Earl acknowledges that long-term advocacy campaigns might need organizations in play to achieve their set goals. Organizations might still be relevant in social struggles where organizers avoid resorting to novel opportunities of the Internet, a long-term struggle is needed or stable networks of offline organization are preferred to aggregate large numbers of people. Movement endurance is one aspect, among many others, where organizations are still relevant (Earl, 2015:48). Long-term campaigns and movements need core coordination actors and capabilities of formal and well-structured organizations, such as planning, strategy developing, publicity in order to sustain in the long run. Without formal organization which can perform these functions, Dolata claims, no online-oriented or flexible forms of activism can survive (2017:25).

As one of the best manifestations of less visible organization presence, during the days Democracia Real Ya movement prepared 15M protests, NGOs supporting the movement stayed off the stage (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:741). However, the engagement of these organizations in the Twitter campaign in the other phases of the event demonstrated that the organizations retain the power to shape protest frames due to their significant structural positions in the network. Their follower bases and account visibility granted them an influential position in the overall network and the ability to diffuse their own perspectives of the movement (Christancho & Anduiza, 2015:176-177).

In multi-organization movements, there emerges a division of labor among different categories of organizations, a functional distinction between core organizations and periphery members in the case of umbrella organizations such as Taksim Solidarity during 2013 Gezi protests. Core organizations play a facilitator role in engaging peripheral organizations to the wider network (Bennett, 2003, cited in Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:89).

Beside the functional shift, organizational affiliation and online political engagement are not unrelated. Empirical evidence demonstrates that political activity in formal

organizations is a predictor of online engagement. Those who have already taken part in offline politics, e.g. party executives, activists, experienced individuals in politics, also engage in online political activity the most (Loader & Mercea, 2011:761). Ekström & Sveningsson's study on Swedish youth confirms that online political membership mimics the individuals' online engagement and commitment in the offline world (2017:14-15). Mosca's empirical findings also confirm the relationship between offline activism experience and online political activity regardless of organizational background: "...*the Internet is more likely to be used politically by those individuals with previous radical and unconventional participatory experience while organisational experience is less important*" (2010:14). With the rising use of ICTs and the blurring boundaries between online and offline political activity, organizations adapt to the new communication environment, possibly with some members prioritizing technology use over the traditional functions of formal organizations (Earl, et.al., 2015:359).

While freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are still highly regarded, contemporary movements disfavored freedom of association (Gerbaudo, 2012:137). In this context of freedom of association in decline, Bennett & Segerberg note two possible trends for the role of organizations in contemporary social movements: In the first pattern, organizations coordinating the action behind the scene avoid branding or associating it with its own political goals, and allow the broader public identify themselves with them in more personalized ways. In the second pattern, echoing Gerbaudo's point, networking technologies take over the role of formal organizations and allow citizens to express their grievances and political aspirations in personalized forms (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012:742). While many pointed to the supportive effects of online action less dependent on organization in authoritarian political environments, it may be encouraging for activists to easily fall outside the legal limits drawn by the state. For Earl et.al (2015:358), while the rise of activism outside formal social movements organization can empower protestors against authoritarian state power, it might also pave the way to illegal ways of protest in the absence of organizational liability.

At this point, a contextual overview will help the reader grasp the gist of the findings, providing the background factors that have been active behind the

dynamics shaping the current structure of the TS for over 10 years. We break down this background section in two complementary parts. First, we go over the social and political developments of recent history that facilitated the entrenchment of an authoritarian system in Turkey and, in the second part, the developments in the country's public communication that contributed to it.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

3.1. Gezi Protests: A Climactic Moment in the Social Movements History of Turkey

As one of the largest social mobilization experiences in the modern Turkish history, Gezi protests erupted in an era wherein the Islamist AKP entrenched itself in the government after winning three consecutive elections between 2002 and 2011 with an ever-increasing vote. Around 3.5 million - 5% of the population at the time - protesters participated in almost nation-wide demonstrations. Although underlying reasons behind the outburst were diverse, an urban reconstruction plan by the government was the last straw that triggered a months-long unrest against illiberal government policies (Anisin, 2016:411).

The AKP had emerged from its third electoral victory with a landslide majority, receiving almost half of the population's vote, which was seen as an approval of its policy in the preceding 9 years. The election also marked a major change to an even more majoritarian understanding of governance. In these 9 years, the AKP cadres had eliminated the established order of the state bureaucracy which they viewed as the major threat to the party's rule. The unrivaled position allowed the party to turn to and exploit a majoritarian discourse to impose a blend of Islamist conservatism and neoliberalism (Onbasi, 2016:275). Interference in personal life such as abortion debate and restrictions on alcohol use, threat against secular lifestyle, lifestyle-based discrimination, marginalization of those who do not conform to AKP policies were growing concerns among the public (Civelekoglu, 2015:116). Secular segments of the society felt excluded, fettered and discriminated against as a result of neoliberal conservatism and cronyism. Gezi protestors largely shared these concerns (Özen,

58

2015:547). Onbasi rounds up a non-exhaustive list of concerns shared by the social opposition:

> "*the government's interventions in the judiciary that risk undermining the separation of powers; Erdoğan's increasing references to Islamic themes (such as his promise to raise 'pious generations,' anti-abortion statements, a new law aiming to restrict alcohol consumption or insults against female and male students sharing the same house); Erdoğan's statements aiming to justify government pressure on the media; the government's plans to privatize public theaters and operas; encroachments on urban public spaces without paying any attention to the advice of city planners and architects, or allowing any public debate on these projects; the endorsement of transnationally determined neoliberal economic policies fueling consumerism and commercialism; excessive use of police force against almost every demonstration; long pre-trial detention periods; vague and broad definitions of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist propaganda' in the Anti-Terror Law; attempts to micro-manage even such lifestyle choices as which bread to eat and how much salt to add to one's food.*" (Onbasi, 2016:276)

These concerns were largely shared by the protestors. Studies conducted among Gezi participants reflected a common dissatisfaction by electoral majoritarianism, unresponsiveness of the government to social injustices, rising repression, curtailment of civic liberties (Haciyakupoglu & Zhang, 2015:454-455). In addition, the contradiction in the government repression on secular segments of the society without sufficient cultural hegemony peaked at the protests (Irak, 2015:149).

The nation's everlasting cultural contradiction had become evident and grown over social networks before the protests exploded (Castells, 2015:229). In fact, the interest of citizens critical of the government in digital networks had begun a year ago when over 30 villagers were killed in an air strike and the news organization censored the incident until they received instructions from the government (Tufekci, 2014:4).

Against this backdrop of rising online and offline government criticism, the plans for demolition and rebuilding of the Gezi Park, one of the ever-reducing green spaces in Istanbul, was the last straw. The AKP had already announced over the years its mega infrastructure projects for Istanbul such as turning the city into an international financial center, building a waterway, Canal Istanbul, that would cut across the northern part of the city and the reconstruction of the Taksim Square including the

construction of a mosque and rebuilding of Ottoman military barracks in the park (Ertugrul & Topal, 2024:57). The initial drives to take to streets were environmental concerns, particularly protection of the park, however, following the police attack on the protestors, it quickly turned to a mobilization against the recent pressures on citizens with a secular and western-oriented lifestyle (Erkoc, 2013:43). Although the government repression was focused particularly on certain groups and identities, Gezi demonstrators, unlike former social mobilization experiences in modern Turkish history, came from such a diverse background that they had to seek deliberative methods both within and between their groups (Uluğ & Acar, 2016:133; Ertuğrul & Topal, 2024:59). Tens of thousands across the country took to streets to protest police brutality and the harsh, degrading remarks of the prime minister against the protestors (Çelik, 2016:227-228). Those excluded by the religious-partisan majoritarianism turned to a civic struggle to create an awareness about themselves with politicians and participate in the public sphere (Dević & Krstić, 2015:72). Street forums convened all across Turkey served as the public sphere through which grievances and demands were discussed and voiced (Uluğ & Acar, 2016:133).

The protests were one of the most unusual movements in Turkey in terms of its methods of action and discourse (Yanık, 2015:179). It maintained innovative, non-violent and civic protest methods and rhetoric throughout the uprising. The protestors subscribed to a constructive and unifying discourse. Describing the themes that it contained, Toktamış characterized eccentrically intelligent manifestations during the demonstrations as "Rabelaisian", borrowing the term from Bakhtin:

> "*it [Gezi movement] left its mark as an inclusive mobilisation with a critical capacity for coalition-building among diverse segments of the society. It was a movement of individual citizens with diverse identities and interests who upheld irreverence, subversive and liberating 'Rebelaisian laughter' (Bakhtin 1984) as a political instrument, undermining the methods of dominant styles, authoritarian stiffness and military orders. The movement invoked the universal values and principles of the individual with rights to collective access to space and political decision-making, rather than evoking a particular past shaped by modernizing elites.*" (Toktamış, 2015:42)

The way the protests were staged was also avant-garde in that the movement was leaderless and horizontal. As much as polycentric, multifaceted, disorganized the

movement was, it did not have a permanent, systematic set of demands or agenda apart from stopping the demolition of the Gezi Park. The Taksim Solidarity (TS) was the only body loosely representing the movement and condensing its changing, disorganized voices into organized demands (Sofos, 2014:39).

Insteading of accommodating the protesters' demands and appeasing the turmoil, the AKP government responded to it with disdain and hostility. The then prime minister characterized events as a grand scheme to topple the government and the protesters as foreign agents, collaborators of the "interest lobby" (Özkırımlı, 2014:2). Clashes between security forces and the protestors throughout the unrest left 5 people dead and many more injured.

The months-long unrest debunked the image of the strong and well-supported government image of the AKP. Besides, it caused significant challenges and objections to the government and its neoliberal conservatism. The bewilderment of the AKP elites that the Gezi protests caused translated into more authoritarian and repressive rule in its aftermath (Özen, 2015:548). Its strongest impact manifested in the long-run as the tarnished domestic and international legitimacy of a moderate Islamist party - usually likened to Western European style Christian democratic parties - by the images of police brutality and handling of the events by the government. On the other hand, it demonstrated the sensitivities among the social opposition, such as environmental concerns (pp.549).

On the grassroots-level, Gezi's impact has been the new-born spirit of protest and brand-new organization styles. The uprisings resulted in an exponentially increased awareness of collectivity, especially among the social opposition which was long fragmented along issue and/or party/ideology lines. A sense of unity was born among the secularist segment of the society during Gezi. Also, it added new tools to mobilization motives and organization of activists. Instead of top-down mobilization such as following a leader or organization's call and/or under their supervision, people experienced more civic forms of collective protest action (Toktamış, 2015:42). The incidents also politicized the most apolitical groups of the society such as youth, students and white-collar professionals. These groups developed their civic

political capacities and discovered the importance of forming issue coalitions. This was particularly evident in civil initiatives such as Vote and Beyond (Oy ve Ötesi), founded to prevent electoral fraud (Özen, 2015:549). The culture of public forums also emerged during the protests and left its mark on the deliberative capacity among protestors. They fostered a participatory and interactive environment and encouraged citizens to civically voice their opinion and demands. Some opposition parties have made attempts to incorporate this Gezi legacy bottom-up engagement and dialog culture into electoral campaigns (Ugur-Cinar & Gunduz-Arabaci, 2020:245).

The Gezi episode was a milestone for social media adoption, use and literacy for Turkish public. It proved that the alternative media, rather than the established Turkish media system, could well be the major source of information (Ozvaris, 2020: "Internete İtilen Basın" Section, Para.1). It was a breaking point for social media adoption in Turkey. In only 10 days following the outburst, the number of active Twitter users increased more than fivefold. Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and prominent figures of the protests gained a remarkable number of new Twitter followers (Kuzuloglu, 2013).

Twitter was a strong information source for the public. Gezi-related hashtags topped the Turkish trending list during the protests. 9 out of 10 most popular hashtags were protests-related, among which were *#direngeziparki, #direnankara, #occupygezi, #tayyipistifa, #direnizmir* (Kuzuloglu, 2013). For 69 of the protestors, social media was the first source that they initially heard about the protests (Gezi Park Survey, 2013:3). Videos of police violence, for instance, were frequently circulated over Youtube (Castells, 2015:227-228). In addition to providing first-hand information, it was also instrumental in mobilizing Turkish protestors across the country (Castells, 2015:227-228). They connected through Twitter for medical and legal needs as well as assistance for documentation of police violence (Yesil, 2016:109).

After the Gezi protests, social media continued to be one of the major news-seeking and sharing platforms (Yesil, 2016:112), with a rising trend onwards. By the time of the writing, the latest research indicated the share of news-seekers in the Turkish twittersphere as 35 percent, and on Facebook as 32 percent (Newman et.al, 2023:109).

3.2. The Aftermath of Gezi and Turkey's Drift towards Authoritarianism

3.2.1. Transition to Political Authoritarianism

Yilmaz & Turner list the main components of modern authoritarianism as centralized power, limited personal freedoms, decline of rule of law and limited accountability (2019:692). The primary instruments exploited by the AKP style authoritarianism to impose the almost two-decades-long transformation within the state apparatus and the political economy correspond to these manifestations of modern authoritarianism:

> "*single facet of an authoritarian model of governance which was already shaped by executive centralisation – at the expense of political oversight and public participation – and sustained by the deployment of the full power of the state in the service of the party's interests. These interests have largely coalesced around neoliberal policies that have increased the scope and pace of commodification and restructured the state's regulatory and distributive roles*" (Tansel, 2018:209-210).

It is not easy to trace back the turning point of the transition from democracy to authoritarianism for several reasons: First, the AKP government has always exploited the rhetoric of "ending the tutelage" implying the long-lasting military pressure over governments, while it simultaneously carried out its anti-democratic campaign. Secondly, the AKP government has avoided rushing to impose its illiberal agenda over Turkish politics (Ozvaris, 2020: "AKP'nin Geleneksel Medyaya…" Sect, Para 1).

Even before the AKP era, several episodes in modern Turkish history such as post-coup periods in 1971 and 1980 had seen major democratic setbacks; full democratic transition could not be achieved due to the inability to transcend the authoritarian regime (Somer, 2016:497). AKP's early policies of reducing the military involvement in statecraft and a novel and constructive approach to the Kurdish question impelled many to label its first term as the democratic phase. The government through a series of legal rearrangements had strengthened the civilian control in state institutions (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016:1585).

The early economic policies hints at the labor-capital relations as a part of the social order that the AKP envisioned for the later years: Bozkurt-Güngen notes that the economic status of the labor class has declined in the AKP era. Inherited from the post-1980 coup neoliberalism, in the system AKP established, the labor costs were reduced and participation of the labor class in the policy-making process were systematically prevented. In the first two terms of its rule, the AKP introduced formal regulation that would counter the problems that might arise from high unemployment; the middle class became dependent on social assistance and bank loans. These policies laid the ground for the party's authoritarian turn in which it took more coercive forms of measures against the working class (2018:233).

On the other end of the class spectrum, the capitalists, a new economic elite class has emerged. While the surfacing of a counter-economic elite may predict more democratization, the rise of the new elites was dependent on state-licensed businesses such as construction and land enclosure and created a group of tycoons that are closely tied to the government. Clientelistic business relations between businessmen and the government circles also contributed to the dependence of the new entrepreneurial class on the government ties (Somer, 2016:497-498). The same clientelistic relations have been highly evident in other sectors licensed by the state authorities such as mining and media as well as public tenders.

Despite several attempts to curb civil rights since its rising to power in 2002, it accelerated its anti-democratic policies from 2011 on, leading to an unfair climate for competition with the political opposition. Only 9 months after the Gezi protests, the AKP government received 45 percent of the vote in the local elections, the first vote since the protests, largely owing to the support of the working class (Watson & Duke, 2014). This was, along with other preceding and following elections, due to the divided and, compared to the AKP, ill-organized opposition which often allowed the ruling party to present itself as "the best choice at hand" to the electorate, while it simultaneously deprived the opposition of fair political communication means (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016:1596).

The neo-Ottomanist discourse manifested itself in most of the political activity and political communication of the government and was used as a justification rhetoric

for democratic degradation. The party cadres and supporters presented themselves, and in broader context the nation, as the continuation of Ottoman ancestors and striving for a revolution which would supposedly end the republican era and return to the ostentatious days of the righteous empire (Somer, 2016:497).

The June 2015 election marks the beginning of the era where authoritarian tendencies of the government consolidated to date (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016:1596). The election resulted in the first hung parliament in the AKP era, forcing the party to seek a coalition with the opposition to form the government. The second major outcome of the election was the rise of People's Democratic Party (HDP), a pro-Kurdish coalition with a broad range of the left from environmentalists, women's rights groups to ethnic minorities. The increase in HDP's vote was a game-changer for the AKP's hold on to power (Anisin, 2016:425-426). Instead of sharing power with the opposition, the AKP took the path of coercion and violence. Following the election, Turkey entered a strong securitization period and a revival of the security state echoing the 90s anti-terror climate. Dissent was unprecedentedly securitized and the state violence was directed to the social opposition embodied during the Gezi protests and the law enforcement capacity was strengthened against this social wave. The dominant rhetoric of extreme nationalism accompanied the episode. Beside the social opposition, parliamentary opposition had its share of the repression. Members of opposition parties, particularly pro-Kurdish politicians and opinion leaders, were frequently repressed through judicial processes (Yilmaz & Turner, 2019:694). Citizens and groups from all walks of life, environmentalists, students, advocacy groups, labor unions, journalists were targeted by police violence. The ruling party increasingly suppressed the right of assembly, violating one of the key freedoms provided by the Turkish Constitution. A rising number of rallies and demonstrations such as May day rally, Gezi anniversaries, LGBT pride parade, suicide attack commemorations and other public event against the government policies were brutally attacked by the police. (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016:1593). After the June 2015 elections, Turkey's political system has frequently been compared to competitive authoritarian regimes where ruling elites typically maintain the control of the state apparatus despite an electoral defeat. While the election result signifies that the competitive nature of the Turkish political system was still alive, the drastically

uneven campaign playground for the parties represented the authoritarian tendencies of the ruling party preceding the snap election of November 2015 (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016:1595).

Not an exception to the chronology of democratic decay, the AKP's stance on the Kurdish question also corresponded well to its approach to the broader issues of public importance: It initiated several projects to address the Kurdish question until 2015, however it moved away from solution rhetoric and aligned with the nationalist politics, both in parliament and discourse. The Kurdish question, once again, turned out to be viewed in a security framework, rather than a political quagmire, in turn, was approached with military means. (Yilmaz & Turner, 2019:695).

The 2016 failed coup attempt has been the final blow to the remaining elements of democratic standards and pluralist arrangements in Turkish politics. It was followed by an accelerated persecution of dissent, especially in academia, media and civil society. The two-years-long emergency rule granted the government the power that it needed for a deeper purge in the state apparatus and influential circles, and for facilitating what is called "regime change" by many. While the government propaganda often resorted to "saving the nation" rhetoric, the government deepened its grip over the state apparatus and public sphere (Yilmaz & Turner, 2019:691-693).

In 2017, the government implemented its long-time ambition of a presidential system following a referendum that passed the needed constitutional reform by a narrow majority. The system had been presented as one to strengthen check and balance mechanisms inside the state. However, it only ended up in concentration of power in the executive branch and created a one-man rule. Moreover, an evaluation of the 1,5 years of administrative actions proved that the system is inefficient in bureaucratic processes (Gözler, 2019).

While the free and fair election rhetoric was maintained for a long time to distance Turkey from many Middle Eastern autocracies, this myth was debunked when the electoral authority annulled the Istanbul mayoral election after the AKP's loss and decided for a re-run (Yilmaz & Turner, 2019:691). Even before 2019, while there

was no direct evidence detected showing an organized election fraud, the playground for campaigning was skewed in advantage of the ruling party due to the limited or unequal access resources, media and services of politicized state institutions, regulations in the electoral law and the composition of the Supreme Election Council (YSK), which was changed by the AKP led parliament to increase its involvement. An equal campaigning opportunity was denied to the opposition parties also by violent and often deadly attacks to party members and activists, especially to those pro-Kurdish parties (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016:1586-1590).

In a nutshell, Gezi protests were the first occasion at which the long-standing conservative democrat reputation of the AKP government was tarnished. For the first time its authoritarian tendencies were debunked when it chose the path of coercion as a response to the protestors instead of compromise and consensus (Civelekoğlu, 2015:116). As outlined above, authoritarianism has been a way for the party following the protests, with an increasing level of force up until the time of writing. Below, we turn the focus on public communication and review the recent developments in and current state of the media landscape and the Internet communication. We observe how they were both instrumental in consolidating authoritarianism in the country and how they were affected by its rise.

3.2.2. The Consequences of Political Authoritarianism on Public Communication Environment

Information technologies, despite the empowerment they provide to activists, can also offer authoritarian governments the tools they need for crackdown on dissent (Lynch, 2014:94). Skoric et.al found that in Asian countries with repressive regimes, the expressive function of social media offsets the lack of representation on traditional media largely controlled by the government, providing alternative means for political expression. However, its potential for mass mobilization is less significant under authoritarian systems (2016:2). In Turkey's authoritarian turn, the government heavily made use of constant "*manipulation of political information and public opinion*" (Somer, 2016:498). Somer points to the state's "*impressive organizational and communicational ability*" to organize massive public events to

keep its reputation positive and the fact that it is in full contradiction that the state has lately failed to provide basic services of safety and security as hundreds of lives were claimed by suicide attacks and by military operastion in eastern part of the country (2016:498).

Although the debate concerning the Turkish media's objectivity dates long back, since the coming of the AKP into power, it has leveled up and the freedom of press is often questioned. As the government pressure increased, the mainstream media were criticized for reconfiguring itself to align with government policies (Baruh & Watson, 2015:198). *"Beset by clientelism, conglomeration and politicization"*, although it has never been a perfect model since 1980, conditions of free speech and diversity in the Turkish mainstream media have worsened even further under the AKP rule. In this period, facilitated by incoming actors in the industry, the ownership structure has deeply transformed. These new actors, most of which were either close to or backed by the government cliques, quashed critical voices in the public arena. Furthermore, an unusually high number of media professionals and public opinion figures have been imprisoned in order to silence non-parliamentary opposition by instrumentalizing the legal framework (Yesil, 2016:138).

In parallel with its political climate, the Turkish media moved away from its pluralistic character and public service mission during Turkey's drift to authoritarian rule in the years following Gezi protests. Even before, in fact, Turkish media were not a perfect model in terms of press freedom, independent journalism especially when it comes to the areas where media owners risk a possible fallout with the political elite. Nevertheless, the Gezi protests saw an intensified level of censorship. Major news networks aired any irrelevant content such as cooking shows, talk shows to avoid covering the incidents (Tufekci, 2014:3-4). 22 journalists were fired and another 37 were forced to resign when the protests were still underway, resulting in a migration of a large number of journalists from the mainstream media to the Internet and mushrooming of Internet-based news outlets (Ozvaris, 2020: "Gezi Öncesi ve Sonrası …" Section, Para.4). The protests have been a breaking point of public trust in mainstream media. It was the sense of mistrust, along with other factors, that led

the public to turn away from relying on conventional outlets and seek information on social media (Baruh & Watson, 2015:208).

The intelligence law enacted the following year introduced another obstacle for the press to research and report on government wrongdoings, by outlawing the leakage and publication of confidential information, a crime punishable by up to a nine-year-term in prison. Upon its passage, coverage of the 2013 corruption investigations were prohibited including reporting and commentary on the subject matter (Yesil, 2016:121-122).

The publicly owned actors in the media field, TRT, the Turkish Public Broadcaster; AA (Anadolu Agency), state owned news agency and RTUK (Radio and TV Supreme Council), the broadcasting regulatory body, all were used in harmony to provide the government a conduit to propagate its ideology and throttle dissenting voices, specifically that of the parliamentary opposition. AA was turned into the mouthpiece of the government. Although public broadcasting had never been autonomous from government interference except for the ten years between 1961 and 1971, from the adoption of liberal 1961 Constitution and up through a set of large-scale constitutional amendments (Sahin, 1981:399-400), the TRT has turned to even more unfair airing policy between political parties and leaders. RTUK, as the broadcasting authority overseeing all local and national TV and radio networks, was weaponized to penalize critical voices among broadcasters on the grounds of defaming governmental institutions, violation of moral values, national sovereignty among other charges (Yesil, 2016:131). It often fined TV broadcasters critical of the policies and threatened their operation license (Turkey's Journalists on the Ropes, 2020:5).

The degeneration of the mainstream media in the last two decades has taken place as a result of a two-legged process: Taking advantage of the government influence over courts and its proxies in other state institutions and maintaining patron-client relationship with media proprietors and high rank professionals (Yesil, 2016:139). In 2019, journalists still continued to be criminalized, prosecuted, arrested and jailed on arbitrary charges, in many cases that of terror propaganda. As of October 2020, 77

journalists were imprisoned, bringing Turkey among the top journalist jailers. Public Advertising Agency, BIK, was also politicized to take arbitrary advertising distribution bans on independent press, thereby depriving them of a crucial income share to survive (Turkey's Journalists on the Ropes, 2020:5-6).

Disillusioned by or fired from the mainstream media, many veteran journalists, who had enjoyed its vast resources in the 1990s, moved to independent news sites. The elite media professionals of the 90s, most of whom held college degrees, are secular and liberal, were replaced by government-linked journalists with mediocre background and no noticeable professional experience (Ozvaris, 2020: "Yeni Medya Eliti" Section, Para. 1). Accompanied by the journalist migration, another trend resulting from the deep distrust of the public in the mainstream media has been the rising citizen journalism outlets such as Dokuz8haber, 140journos and others (Yesil, 2016:112).

3 years after the Gezi Park protest, the failed coup attempt of 2016 has been another breaking point that has shaped Turkey's political and media landscapes. During the years following the coup attempt from July 2016 through April 2020, for two of which the country was ruled under a state of emergency, over 120.000 people, including nearly 6.000 university members, were expelled from public service; 33 TV stations, 70 newspapers and 20 magazines were shut down. While the number of imprisoned journalists topped 140, more than 700 state-authorized press cards were revoked in this period (Ozvaris, 2020: "Olağanüstü Halde Basın" Section, Para.2)

Apart from conventional media, the rise of authoritarianism in governance has also gravely impacted digital communication in the country. The AKP government is often likened to its authoritarian counterparts in Russia, China and the Middle East in that it combines an array of repressive techniques such as individual prosecution, passing legislation that increases the scope of content banning and user data collection as well as dominating social networks with organized digital activity through recruited troll armies (Yesil, 2016:126).

Nationalism, statism and religious conservatism have been the ideologies underlying the government's Internet policy since its early legislation (Yesil, 2016:125). As

early as 2007 Youtube, the most popular video sharing platform worldwide, was blocked on the grounds of insulting Ataturk (Turkey pulls plug on .., 2007); and in 2011, the governmental bodies seized website domains for what they deemed defamatory content (Akin, 2011:44). The Internet crackdown left thousands of websites, social media accounts, blogs, and articles banned in the country. In the runup to the local elections held only 10 months after the Gezi protests, Twitter was blocked by the country's telecommunications authority until the decision was overturned by the Constitutional Court after the election on the grounds of violation of the free speech right. However, the ban caused a backlash as the number of daily tweets rose to some 24 million. In the meantime, government officials including the president himself repeatedly denounced social media and vowed battle against the Internet, citing moral erosion, technology addiction and other evils. The protests were ensued also by a skyrocketed number of removal requests by the government from online technology firms: Google reported an almost 1000 percent increase in the online content removal requests by Turkish courts in only a year while Twitter received 156 percent more requests in the first half of 2014 (Yesil, 2016:118-119). The global online encyclopedia Wikipedia has been blocked since 2017 as a result of a court decision. The use of Wikipedia has dropped by 85 percent since (Kingsley, 2017). By the end of 2021, web blockages hit an all time high with over 107.000 websites blocked by courts or other public bodies (Akdeniz & Güven, 2022:2).

However, none of these tactics proved efficient to curb the agenda-setting capability of the Internet and the government resorted to yet another technique: Internet throttling. By limiting the bandwidth for certain social media sites, Internet users were discouraged from seeking information on the Internet, specifically social networks. The government throttled the Internet for the first time when a suicide attack killed 33 citizens in July 2015 for first time and the practice was routinely put to use after every similar incident (Özvaris, 2020: "Gözetleme, Habersiz Bırakma ve …" Section, Para.1).

Although the first Internet regulation dates back as early as 2001 when slander and libel offenses on the Internet were penalized by adding a clause to the existing Broadcasting Law at the time (Ozvaris, 2020: "Daha Hızlı ve Denetimsiz …"

Section, Para.2), the first comprehensive Internet legislation came under the AKP government in 2007 when the lawmakers enacted the first Internet law. The punishable acts designated were in line with the existing fears of the public such as sexuality, pornography, drug use, violence, Ataturk's legacy, national security. The second law passed by AKP single-handedly thanks to parliamentary majority removed the court decision requirement for website blockage. The offending website could be blocked by the telecommunications authority, TIB (now defunct since the 2016 coup attempt), within twenty-four hours following the complaint of the offended; TIB could also block websites *per se* without any filed complaint. Another provision the law introduced was the requirement for Internet Service Providers (ISP) to store user data of the past two years and hand it over to the state authorities on demand. Another law enacted the same year gave the National Intelligence Agency, MIT, sweeping powers over the Internet as well as offline data of citizens. The agency gained unfettered access to user data stored in the servers of public authorities and other institutions such as financial, health, educational information and other information stored by ISPs without any court order. (Yesil, 2016:120-121). Internet regulatory body, BTK, was also granted extensive powers: In 2015, it was authorized to block websites without any court decision required. The BTK blocks access to websites either as an administrative order or through court decision. The authority acts to "*protect individual rights to life and property, national security, public order, general public health or to prevent commitment of crime*" and in other cases as a response to online content containing "*gambling, child abuse, obscenity, drug use and prostitution*" (Turkey's Journalists on the Ropes, 2020:20).

After the migration of influential journalists and opinion leaders to Internet outlets, only-online news organizations gained considerable attention. A report by International Press Institute states that these newcomer outlets have the potential to become the new mainstream media of the nation provided that they are strengthened in terms of long-run sustainability and quality journalism. These alternative news outlets are too fragmented (Kizilkaya & Utucu, 2021:59-60). Besides, international news outlets with Turkish editions, with their large budgets and resources, became safe haven for journalists since they were relatively outside the government's scrutiny. However, the legislation passed in 2018 requires them to obtain a license

issued by the broadcasting regulator RTUK like a mainstream broadcaster. In effect since August 2019, the law not only introduced the taxation of the international news outlets and platforms active in Turkey, but also put them under the state's watch by authorizing RTUK with issuing gag orders for unfavored content (Ozvaris, 2020: "Internet Yayıncılığına Son Hamle" Section, Para.2).

Internet users have frequently been prosecuted for their posts on social media with the charges of insulting Islam or religious values, inciting hatred and enmity among the public. The prosecuted citizens were often government critics, opinion leaders, journalists, academics, artists and public figures. The provisions of the Penal Code, Anti-terror Law, Press Law, and the Internet Law have often been instrumentalized to silence critical voices in the public (Yesil, 2016:8). While the scope and the techniques of the monitoring is unknown, the Internet user have been prosecuted for a wide range of offenses depending on the agenda from "evoking negative image" during the currency crisis in 2018 to insulting the president (Ozvaris, 2020: "Gözetleme, Habersiz Bırakma ve …", Para.3). The politically-driven trolling culture has been an integral part of the Internet repression. Despite the lack of formal evidence of an organized action by the AKP, politically motivated internet trolls discredit influential opposition accounts and avert their discourse. In other instances, the trolls direct the public attention to critical accounts and call prosecutors or law enforcement for action (Saka, 2018:172).

3.3. Gezi's Legacy: Taksim Solidarity Movement Today

The Taksim Solidarity (TS) held its first convention on February 15, 2012 and was launched on February 15, against the pedestrianization project of Gezi Park. 80 organizations put out a joint declaration announcing their criticism against the project and founding of the TS (Taksim Dayanışması, 2012). The meeting was held under the secretariat and coordination of the Chamber of Architects and the Chamber of City Planners. Nevertheless, it was not the first initiative formed against the project which included an extensive transformation of the Taksim Square, partial demolition of the park and reconstruction of historical Artillery Barracks, an assumed symbol of the government's Neo-Ottomanist desires. Often confused with

the Taksim Solidarity, Taksim Platform (TP) was a citizen initiative and dates back longer. The platform joined the TS when it was first launched and became a permanent member of the coalition.

Until the days leading up to the Gezi Protests, the TS' struggle against the Taksim project was twofold: Street actions and legal battle went hand in hand. Throughout 2012, the solidarity intermittently carried out street campaigns around the park such as distributing information pamphlets, screening an open-air documentary, forming a human chain and keeping guard of the park. The coalition also announced a call for withdrawal to the construction companies interested in the project. On the legal leg, a TS coordinated petition campaign which attracted thousands to file formal objections to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, the local authority responsible for the recreation plan. Afterwards, 3 major constituents, TMMOB Chamber of Architects [*TMMOB Mimarlar Odası*], TMMOB Chamber of City Planners [*TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası*], TMMOB Chamber of Landscape Architects [*TMMOB Peyzaj Mimarları Odası*] filed a lawsuit against the municipality for the stay of execution (Cereb, 2014:95-97; Taksim Dayanışması Güncesi, 2023).

Upon the start of the bulldozing on May 28, 2013, a group of TS volunteers slept in the park to watch against a further intervention. Following a brutal police attack on the group on May 30, the protests spread to many other cities. From the early days of the protests, the TS added many more members (Eliçin, 2017:106). The secretariat published the names of a total of 128 constituents on its website (Constituents, 2013). While many other organizations and groups registered to the TS following the protests, these new members were not published online, which makes the real number of TS constituents and its overall size unknown. All members registered to the coalition by contacting by phone or via email and stating their will to take part either. No constituent, except for one (People's Front [*Halk Cephesi*]), has requested a membership withdrawal (Personal interview with TS Secretariat, July 25, 2019).

The TS displays an utmostly heterogeneous composition, bringing together political initiatives and parties of varying ideologies. Although it claimed no political affiliation, its constituents were typically in different shades of the left.

74

Notwithstanding, it included organizations or groups categorically denying any political orientation. The platform was in constant contact with and supported individually by "*concerned citizens, urban planners, architects, lawyers, academics, ... political party representatives, artists*" (Eliçin, 2017:107). It was a leaderless and horizontally organized formation. The secretariat is the only body unofficially representing the coalition and is tasked with coordinating press conferences, announcements and legal strategies. During the protests, a delegation of the TS met with the government representatives and conveyed the following demands:

> "*withdrawal of the construction project, release of activists taken into police custody, punishment of the police violence and withdrawal of the police from the main city squares, as they are places for freedom of expression*" (Eliçin, 2017:106)

Despite having well-established and well-articulated demands, the decision-making process was not necessarily smooth. Pointing to the disagreements within the coalition, Cereb notes that the main divisions were on the methods of action and undertaking the advocacy of other political issues than preserving Gezi. A group of constituents preferred conventional and bureaucratic ways of struggle, while others supported radical mass protests. Likewise, the coalition members were not in full accord whether to call for participation in the upcoming May Day or focus it on issues related to the park (2014:97).

The TS held public meetings called forums open to all citizens throughout the protests (Yüce, 2016:114). Demands, strategies and the future of the movement were publicly discussed in these forums. Upon the entering of bulldozers into the park, the TS secretariat began informing the public through its Twitter account. Longform declarations were shared through the Facebook account of the solidarity. In addition to social media platforms, the coalition published minutes of street forums, time and venue of the street actions, lists of needed items in the camps within the Gezi Park on its website (Yüce, 2016:114-116). However, the secretariat continued its public communication only through Twitter, leaving its Facebook account inactive since the early days of the protests (Personal interview with TS Secretariat, July 25, 2019). The content of the meetings with the government delegation was shared with

protesters and the public through open forums in the camping sites within the Gezi Park, specifically in the TS tent. (Taksim Dayanışması Güncesi, 2023).

A year after the Gezi Park protests, the TS Secretariat denounced the Soma coal mine disaster which claimed the lives of 301 mine workers. The coalition once again convened forums in front of the buildings of the mine contractor companies, declaring solidarity with the families of the victims. It also called for justice to the victims' families and transparency with informing the public (Yerin Altını da…, 2014). The same year, five activists of the Taksim Solidarity coordinating the protests were brought to court on criminal charges of setting up a criminal organization, inciting unauthorized demonstrations. The prosecutors presented to the court the group's tweets calling public to the park and the public statements posted on Solidarity's Facebook page (Sinclair-Webb, 2014: np.).

The solidarity has often commemorated victims of police brutality and disproportionate force use, called for gathering on trial days of the Gezi victims. In April 2022, 7 members of the TS secretariat were imprisoned following a court order that sentenced the activists for 18 years. The Gezi trial had taken place two times in the past and the imprisoned members were acquitted of all charges. They often received the support of opposition parties, activists, human rights groups, academics and NGOs. The opposition parties promised the immediate release of the TS activists before the 2023 presidential election. As of the writing time, they were serving their sentence.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Since social movement studies came to prominence as an academic interest, organizations have been a core issue (Earl, 2015:36). Thus, for analyzing the communicative dynamics of the Taksim Solidarity coalition, we selected organizations, whether formal or informal, as the unit of analysis. The relationship among these entities as well as between their supporter/follower base is the main focus of the study. We investigate the role of digital technologies in the coalition's organizational cohesion with a specific focus on the constituents' digital connectivity, interaction and deliberation over social networks and their social media use dynamics. We also probe these organizations' online and offline political participation practices, the determinants of their political agenda as measured by social media coverage and their digital and managerial evolution since the 2013 Gezi Park protests.

In the study's entirety, we follow a mixed methods approach where both qualitative and quantitative data are collected, analyzed and integrated in a way that shortcomings of each are offset by the other (Creswell & Clark, 2017: "Nature of Mixed Methods Research" Chapter, "Summary" Section, para.3). For Creswell & Clark, mixed methods design is well-suited for studies involving both exploratory and explanatory purposes. In line with these purposes, we explore a variety of dynamics and parameters among the TS constituents and, through qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews, seek explanations of the findings reached after the analysis of quantitative analysis of the digital and survey data. Another reason we opted for a mixed methods design is that the approach is very useful for interdisciplinary research ("Nature of Mixed Methods Research" Chapter,

"Summary" Section, para.3) as this project positions itself at the intersection of political sociology and digital humanities.

In collective action research, the measurement problem of organizational and collective capacity has been complicated by the availability of digital data. As linkage patterns are solely not enough to interpret organizational networking dynamics, concurrent employment of narratives of organization members and network mapping constitute the most appropriate approach (Bennett, 2003:160). For this reason, the project harnesses three types of data: First we benefit from the predictive potential of digital data widely exploited in computational social science (CSS). The CSS opened vast opportunities for social science researchers and made available the investigation of priorly unavailable phenomena through its use of unprecedentedly huge amounts of data pertaining to countless aspects of social life from communicative dynamics to linguistic behavior (Lazer, et.al., 2009).

Second type of data that we utilize is survey data. Emerged on the positivist strand of social science, survey methodology is useful in that it allows the researcher to "*gather descriptive information and test multiple hypotheses in a single survey*" (Neuman, 2011:309). Since the chapter is an exploratory component of the project, we opted for a survey in order to collect as granular data as possible into the attributes and behavior of the constituent organizations. We collected data from the Taksim Solidarity constituents at the organizational level as the unit of analysis. The survey findings enable one to see different patterns of Internet use among the constituents, relationship between their social media policies and political participation practices and the information flow between them and their supporter bases.

The third type of data, interview data, is integrated in a complementary fashion into the digital and survey data types. As the structured nature of survey research does not allow for gathering data about individual perspectives and provides less freedom of expression on the side of the interviewee (Corbetta, 2003:266), in-depth interview data complements exploratory chapters based on quantitative data with an explanatory inquiry from the perspectives of the TS constituents' representatives. To this end, we opted for a specific type of interview, the expert interview, which has been

frequently utilized in political, organizational and industrial research. This particular type of interview allows for methodological triangulation and can be combined with other data collection techniques (Meuser & Nagel, 2009:465). The representatives were interviewed to unearth causal relationships that quantitative data are unable to.

4.1. Conceptual Framework and Indicators

The hypothesized internal cohesion of the TS coalition is based on three main dimensions: *Online connectivity*, *interaction* and *deliberation* - both within the coalition and with its supporter base.

In order to unravel online ties among the TS, the project follows the network analysis approach (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011). Communication networks are processors of information flows through time and space. Information, i.e. messages, travels through network channels, connections between network nodes, according to a program that "*assigns the network its goals and its rules of performance*" (Castells, 2004:3).

Intentional affiliation preferences of organizations are manifested in their social network linking patterns (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013:61). Social linking practices during the past networked mobilizations created "power" social accounts on Facebook and Twitter where thousands follow and interact with each other as well as the subscribed social movement organization (Gerbaudo, 2017:145). The *connectivity* dimension is measured by analyzing these Facebook and Twitter links and the resulting network structure pertaining to the Taksim Solidarity coalition constituents' social media accounts. In addition to the network structure of constituents' social media accounts, we measured the platform use frequency of the organizations for communication with their followers. The information flow among the organizations and with their follower base is operationalized through internal linking patterns and use frequencies.

The *interaction* dimension is operationalized by measuring the online engagement of the constituents. Non-verbal means of interaction (sharing, retweet, mention and

liking depending on the platform architecture) is also measured and mapped out in order to reveal the ways and the scope of interaction both within the movement. The constituent-level measurement was conducted only on Twitter network due to the unavailability of up-to-date Facebook data. The base-level interaction is measured through the use frequency of the constituents.

The *deliberation* dimension includes the verbal communication including responses to each other by TS member organizations. Post replies and post commentary on social and political issues fall under this category. In this section, we investigated the political character of the overall verbal communication by applying an automated content analysis. The constituent-level measurement was conducted only on Twitter network due to the unavailability of up-to-date Facebook data. The base-level political deliberation is measured through the use frequency of the constituents.

In the survey section, we designed a two-level data collection about the use of a variety of Internet applications. At the organization level, we inquired about online relations of organizations and, at the base level, relations of organizations with their member/supporter bases.

First, we aimed at cross-checking the digital data by the help of self-reported frequency of various Internet platforms. To this end, the connectivity among the TS members is operationalized over use of Facebook and Twitter as well as other popular platforms, such as Instagram, website, Youtube, for a variety of purposes. These include receiving updates from and sending updates to other TS members and the TS secretariat, coordination, solidarity, discussion, and non-verbal social media interactions such as liking, retweeting, sharing, reposting. These variables are employed also to measure online communication of the organizations with the supporter base.

Discursive convergence and divergence between the constituents and the Secretariat are measured by various types of constituent responses to the TS Secretariat announcements and the frequency of different categories of subjects posted by the constituents. The movement's potential to increase its online and offline supporter

base is measured by the trajectory of follower size on certain social networks since Gezi Parki protests up to date. The trajectories of received online feedback and offline participation in the organization's activity are also measured as the potential of the movement to enlarge its base.

The coalition's promoted repertoire of political participation includes several online and offline practices resorted to by the organizations. Likewise, we inquired about popular social media features, applications and tools employed by the organizations to encourage the base to take action and to engage.

Online ties with international movements are also measured at two levels: Movements and supporters: Frequency of interaction with international or foreign organizations and, at the supporter level, with members or supporters outside Turkey.

In the explanatory chapter, causal relationships are sought through expert interviews, regarding possible reasons that emerged during the transformation of the movement over the past 10 years and led to its current state. The analyses of the former chapters laid the ground for the qualitative inquiry. The researcher asked organizations' executives about possible causes of the findings of the first two sections, which include the level of connectivity, interaction among the movement, the role of alternative dissident platforms, their online and offline communication experiences with the TS Secretariat and other constituents.

The discursive preferences and patterns among the constituents are also inquired in the expert interviews through language use, style, form, multimedia use, popular topics brought up in online platforms, in order to profile Taksim Solidarity's online communication dynamics.

4.2. Data Corpus and Types

The project follows a mixed method approach combining quantitative and qualitative data types. On the quantitative part, digitally collected data and survey data help quantify the patterns of several concepts tested while interview data is chiefly used

for unearthing possible causes of the findings about digital and organizational coherence of the Taksim Solidarity coalition as well as discursive issues in the communication of its constituents, constituting an unstructured explanatory complement to the former two sections.

Thanks to the abundance and availability of digital data, commonly called Big Data, social scientists could now predict social phenomena with more precision than they could with offline data (Farrell, 2012:36). Big data introduces not only an exponentially larger amount of data in size but also in resolution (González-Bailón, 2013b:148). So, we opt for digitally collected network data to research the follower/following relationship among the TS coalition. For the political deliberation analysis, we obtained digital post-text data.

Organizational structure, communication preferences, relations with other movements, member organizations and the following base - before, during and after the Gezi protests are measured by conducting an extensive survey with the representatives of the constituent organizations, and their top executives where possible. 55.8% of the respondents (f=58) are executives among decision-making ranks of the organizations.

Figure 1. Position of Survey Respondents

Over one fifth (f=22; f/n=21.2) are the employees of the organizations such as social media editors, communications experts. Another one fifth (f=23; f/n=22.1) are volunteers, most of which are recruited by informal organizations (See Appendix A, Tables 126). This group is classified as such since there is no paid employment with the informal organizations in the TS. The composition of the respondent positions demonstrates that most of the survey interviews were conducted with those who are in the best knowledge of the organization and its operations as possible.

Figure 2. Frequency of those in the Same Position Since Gezi Protests

Figure 3. Number of Years in the Same Position (Discontinued Position Since Gezi Protests)

For the reliability of longitudinal questions, which covers a time span of 8 years from the Gezi Protests through the data collection, we interviewed representatives holding the same position since the protests where possible. 40.2% of the representatives (f=42) stayed in the same position since, therefore the collected data could be considered relatively reliable from this group of respondents (See Appendix A, Tables 127). The respondents who were appointed to the position after the protests were asked how long they have held it. The largest group (f=36; f/n=58.1%) have held the position for less than 4 years. 16.1% (f=10) have had 4-5 years of experience in the current position. 24.2% (f=15) have held the current position for 6 to 8 years, the group consisting of those appointed to the current position in the aftermath of the protests. Only one respondent has held the position covering the entire time span from the protests to the data collection (See Appendix A, Tables 128). Although many respondents verbally expressed longer affiliation with their organizations in other positions and longer-stretching familiarity with their operations, the shortcoming of majority of the respondents' experience in their

current position poses a limitation to the data quality of the longitudinal section of the survey.

The scale is developed so as to include and best represent the aforementioned concepts. The questionnaire is designed to include as many variables as possible to best quantify and cross-check the concepts measured (For questionnaire see Appendix B). The collected data are analyzed through the appropriate statistical tests to reveal quantitative patterns by which to test project hypotheses.

Quantitative data are complemented by interview data and a more explanatory analytical approach in order to detail and deepen the account. The section is also explanatory in that its main premises draws on the findings of the first two chapters, the digital and survey data. Marshall & Rossman organize a wider range of lists into three main three fields where qualitative approaches could be applied: (1) Society and culture, (2) individual lived experiences, (3) language and communication (2016:62). As the last part of this project aims to understand discursive, communicative and organizational dynamics of TS member institutions and how they organize their digital communication within the TS and with their followers, often labeled as base in this study, two of the application categories mentioned above are covered by the purposes of this research. Additionally, interview technique is a good fit for investigating "*the hows of human action and experience*" (Brinkmann, 2013:49).

In a series of expert interviews, digital communication officers, social media administrators and top executives were interviewed so as to reveal possible causes of - both digital and organizational - disconnection among the movement, a phenomenon that was evidenced in the analyses of the preceding chapters. Based on this outcome, we took an explanatory approach into questioning possible processes, mechanisms, conditions and reasons that led the coalition to its current state.

Discursive preferences used by the organizations, the ways of using digital communication technologies, alternative methods of internal deliberation within the TS and whether they are used to encourage the base for various types of political participation were inquired into in the expert interviews.

84

4.3. Sample Selection

For the first two stages of the project, we selected the 128 organizations appearing on the Taksim Solidarity's website as constituents (Constituents, 2013). The coalition poses an extremely heterogeneous character in composition as the constituents differ from each other not only in their size, but also in formal status - whether a formal institution or informal group -, position in the TS, social media use and political participation practices.

The Taksim Solidarity secretariat put online the names of the organizations which registered to the coalition from April 2012 when it was first founded and during the Gezi Parkı protests, a total timespan of 14 months with June 2013 included. The organizations registered to the coalition by contacting the Secretariat. Over the course of 6 years until the preliminary interview with the TS secretariat, other organizations/groups joined the coalition, but these members have not been added to the original list. Only one organization (*Halk Cephesi*) appearing on the list contacted the secretariat to withdraw from membership up until the date of the study. (TS Secretariat, personal interview, July 25, 2019). For reliability and operational reasons, we limited the project with the members appearing in the original list, as inclusion of the newcomers, each with varying length of membership, would complicate a possible account of the evolution of the coalition over the years. Also, it risked the tractability of the data collection and analysis.

We sampled the members according to their registration level as national head office or regional office. When both head and regional offices appeared on the list, we included both of them. After eliminating duplicate entries and removing the differences between Turkish and English versions of the list, we ended up with a final list of 125 organizations (For the complete list of institutions, see Appendix C).

4.3.1. Digital Network and Post Text Data

Although digital data are biased in many ways (Kennedy, 2016:37), the sample could be considered random as long as the researcher is aware of the limitations of

collection. In digital methods, the researcher either selects one or more keywords for sampling a certain communication around those keywords or a set of seed information accounts and retrieves the data flow from the selected accounts (González-Bailón, 2013b:155). In order to reveal patterns of connectivity and information flow between Taksim Solidarity coalition's secretariat account, the only active communication outlet of the coalition, and that of its constituents, the second sampling technique was chosen. We sampled the first order ego networks of TS's main accounts as ego network analysis examines the network surrounding the ego (Marin & Wellman, 2011:20).

Internet networks are best represented by social media sites today (Hogan, 2008:5). For network analysis, we have chosen Facebook and Twitter platforms, since Facebook and Twitter were cited, along with blogs, as the driving force behind the birth and growth of the social movements in the early 2010s (Turner, 2013:376). The both websites were among the most visited 20 websites in Turkey in December 2020 (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2021:30). Facebook, by far the most popular social media platform globally (Kemp, 2019), has been the communication, organization and mobilization ground for many contemporary social movements (Gerbaudo, 2012:145). In Turkey, the social network site ranks third in Similarweb's index of top websites by traffic in December 2020. The website received 380 million monthly total visits while 41.1 million of the total visits were unique. The average time spent on Facebook per visit was over 8 minutes. By its potential advertising reach, it ranks 10 in the world, with an expected reach of 37 million users (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2020:102). Besides, Turkish is the twelfth most widely spoken language across Facebook (p.111). However, the TS, as reported by the secretariat in an interview, has not updated its Facebook account since 2013. Therefore, we measured only constituent-level fan page subscription, i.e. connectivity dimension and excluded interaction and post-text data on Facebook.

Twitter, on the other hand, ranking fifth in the Similarweb's index, had 259 million monthly total visits with 30.4 million of them unique. Average user spent over 11 minutes on the website per visit. Both platforms are among the top 10 queries in Google Search (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2021:30-35). Turkey has the sixth

largest potential advertising audience in the world (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2020:151). Considering these metrics and the popularity of both networking platforms among Turkish internet users, especially in social and political matters, we selected Facebook and Twitter for the network and post text analysis. Both Facebook fan page network data and Twitter data consist of directed ties, in other words non-reciprocated relations while undirected ties are reciprocated between two nodes.

Aiming to map out online social and political discussion dynamics within the TS, the post text data consist of an automatically sampled share of Twitter posts of the organizations in the constituent list.

While some of the member organizations dissolved over the course, some others have no formal social media accounts whatsoever. Rather than excluding those with no formal social media appearance, we opted for keeping them in the sample to give an all-encompassing picture regarding the coalition's evolution. Since 2013, several organizations have changed their names (N=10). In these instances, we sampled the new organizations after verification of their continuation status with the organizations' representatives.

4.3.2. Survey Data

Of the TS constituent list of 125 organizations, we sampled only the surviving organizations (N=107). Legally or physically present but inactive organizations were included in both network data sample and survey. Status of the dissolved or legally terminated organizations were verified with their former representatives. Organizations with no Internet presence or social presence were also sampled to reach a more accurate account of the TS' evolution and current state. A small number of organizations renamed themselves (N=10) or changed their legal status from informal to a legal entity (N=2); after verifying with their representatives, we sampled the sequels of the original organizations. The updated names are indicated in brackets throughout the text and the appendices. Of the 125-constituent-list indicated on the TS' website, we verified 18 organizations whose legal existence terminated or physically dissolved in the cases of informal organizations. One

organization, People's Front [*Halk Cephesi*] withdrew from the coalition. Two organizations abstained from taking part in the survey, citing privacy reasons. However, the sampled organizations cover 98.1% of the currently active constituents.

4.3.3. Interview Data

Flyvberg breaks down qualitative case-study sampling strategies into two main groups with six sub-groups: (1) *Random selection*, (a) *random sampling*, (b) *stratified sampling*; (2) *information-oriented selection*, (a) *extreme/deviant cases*, (b) *maximum variation cases*, (c) *critical cases*, (d) *paradigmatic cases* (Flyvberg, 2006:230). In order for the case selection to serve the purposes of the explanatory part of and the structure of the population of this study, we benefited from a mixture of sampling strategies. The main sampling strategy is information-based selection since the qualitative case-study method foregrounds maximum utility of information (Brinkmann, 2013:57) and acquiring in-depth information from a single or few cases rather than achieving a generalizable representativity. We focused on the extreme, maximum-variation and paradigmatic cases based on the findings of the previous network, post text and survey analyses, in order to explore the discursive dynamics of the digital communication of both typical and *sui generis* cases among the Taksim Solidarity members. The organizational position, i.e. prominence and popularity in the coalition is also considered in selecting NGO admin interviewees. Although a secondary concern, we also added a stratified random sampling framework based on the organization size. As the TS member organizations are highly varied in size, legal status, institutionalization, financial sources, prominence and workforce, we strived to mirror the real distribution among the TS members in the interviewee selection as much as possible.

4.4. Data Collection

4.4.1. Digital Network and Post-Text Data

We used various automated data collecting software packages for digital data mining, depending on the platform and availability of data. Facebook, the world's

and Turkey's leading platform in terms of user number ("Most popular social networks", 2019), was mined through two data mining tools. Facebook data were collected between August 14th - September 3rd, 2019 through Netvizz web application (Rieder, 2013) version 1.6 which uses the Facebook API V2.2. The page network data demonstrates the network structure by the date of the data collected. The data were retrieved with a crawl depth of 1 which consists of primary ties of each constituent in the network and the ties among them. Facebook data query spans a period of 7 years starting from March 1st, 2012, the day before the formation of Taksim Solidarity through August 14th, 2019, the day data collection started. However, Facebook's API restrictions (Behar Villegas, 2016) and shortcomings of data collection software packages have been the determining factor for the amount and the quality of the data available to researchers. The impermanent nature of these services, instability of data streams and discontinuation of APIs constitute the major limitation of digital methods (Rogers, 2019:3). When faced with service discontinuation and removal of Netvizz by Facebook from its system, the tool was replaced with NodeXL, a software package used to mine and analyze data from various social media platforms. It helped collect Facebook and Twitter data (Smith et.al., 2010), two of the most popular platforms for political discussion and interaction.

APIs usually do not allow researchers to access a full stream of social media data. Since retrieved data is not a random sample, it creates sampling bias (González-Bailón, et.al., 2014:25). At the time of data collection, Twitter API allowed researchers to collect the most recent 3.200 tweets of each account. However, many of the accounts within the Twitter data had not exceeded the API limit of 3.200 from the sampling start date March 1st, 2012 up to the data collection date of September 24th, 2019. Moreover, recent tweets of the accounts are more relevant since the study's main focus is on the long-term effects of the movement.

4.4.2. Survey Data

The survey questionnaire (Appendix B) includes two sections: The first section contains questions to obtain data regarding characteristics of the organizations

sampled from the list on the Taksim Solidarity website, such as the category, legal status of the institution, financial resources, the number of members and employees for the formal institutions and the number of volunteers for informal groups, among others. The second section aims at collecting data about phenomena such as the digital behavior of the groups/institutions, digital political participation and deliberative practices.

The questionnaire was formed in Turkish as all the respondents are Turkish speaking. Majority of the questions are structured as closed-ended and the answer choice intervals are scaled in ordinal likert style. Certain organizational profile questions include categorical-scale answer choices. We reviewed the question and answers repeatedly to reduce the ambiguity in the questions and double-barreled answers following the commonly accepted questionnaire guidelines (Neuman, 2011:313-337). Additionally, we had the question form reviewed by an external survey professional and revised accordingly.

Survey data were collected through CAPI (Computer-assisted personal interviewing) and CAVI (Computer-assisted video interviewing) methods (Vehovar & Manfreda, 2017:144) in 14 months from June 22nd, 2021 to August 14th, 2022. We selected the respondents from among the organization's communication teams, social media managers, decision-makers in communicative affairs and, in a few extreme cases, representatives with the familiarity and knowledge of the organizations' social media policy.

For organizations with no Internet presence, representatives at managerial level were interviewed. Since the focus of the survey predominantly is on the post-2013 era, the difficulty of reaching out to the individuals in the knowledge of the mentioned period posed one of the major challenges. We attempted to reduce the pitfall by conducting interviews with an organization staff/volunteer with the longest-reaching knowledge. Nonetheless, the measures regarding the trajectories of received online feedback and offline participation in the organization's activity may be affected by this limitation as well as extraneous factors, such as changing social media accounts over time, ceasing of the organization's activity and the fear of political persecution.

The researcher provided minor explanations when interviewee requested clarification about questions. We followed standard explanations and instructions across respondents for consistency. In one instance where one member registered on behalf of multiple regional offices, the interviewee was asked to respond considering the average of the mentioned offices in selecting the choices.

4.4.3. Interview Data

Qualitative data is collected from a number of selected TS members in line with combined sampling techniques. As the sample size is less relevant in qualitative analysis than the utility of information to be collected (Brinkmann, 2013: 53), representatives of 36 TS member institutions were interviewed. Although most of the interviews were done under the restrictive circumstances of the Covid-19 pandemic, they were conducted in an individual, receptive and face-to-face manner, as it is the standard method to make the best use of the opportunities offered by the qualitative interviewing technique, such as interpersonal contact with the interviewee, flexibility and better sense of the context (Brinkmann, 2013: 53). Brinkmann also notes that the semi-structured interview format is the most common technique among social scientists since its knowledge-producing potential is much greater due to the researcher's increased visibility in the research and the opportunity it provides to the researcher to follow up on the issues of high relevance (2013:21). We asked respondents open-ended questions (Appendix D) prepared beforehand as a conversational framework rather than seeking standard answers. The findings of the network, post-text and survey analyses are incorporated into the interview questions as pre-assumptions to also get an explanatory account.

Most of the interviewees were selected from decision-makers in communication policies of the constituent organizations. Although most interviewees agreed to talk on the record with their open names, a fraction of them participated in the interviews on the condition of anonymity. However, due to the legal sensitivity of Gezi and the continued criminalization of TS secretariat and members, we decided to anonymize all interviewees in the final report. All interviews were conducted live either by video calls or in-person meetings and lasted from 15 to 75 minutes depending on the

amount of data offered by the interviewee. All interviews were conducted in a total of 9 months starting in June 2021 until March 2022.

4.5. Analysis

4.5.1. Digital Network Data

Digital network data are analyzed employing the social network analysis approach which is an expanding and interdisciplinary analysis framework (Hogan, 2008:1). Social network analysis treats social facts with respect to their relations to their broader environment and outer actors instead of looking into their own attributes and behavior (Hogan, 2008:1). In network analysis, causation is not established looking only at individual attributes but the position of the individual - node- in social structure (Marin & Wellman, 2011:13) Rather than an established theory through which to make inferences, it is rather a guide perspective to tell one where to look at to focus on certain attributes (pp.22); in that sense it is widely deemed a complementary technique.

Because of the nature of online interaction and digital information, social network analysis is widely preferred by researchers; and its encoded form allows academics working in communication to overcome difficulties of resource-consuming data collection processes (Hogan, 2008:1). Several properties of network structure reveal certain measures of it, such as number of relations, the degree to which a node is between other nodes, number of reciprocal ties, number of relation types nodes have in common, path length between certain nodes, the amount of similar nodes or nodes with certain characteristics in the network (Marin & Wellman, 2011:21).

We calculated network analytics such as degree values, density, centrality measures, clustering coefficient, and mapped network relationships using the Gephi network analysis package (Bastian et.al, 2009). Attributes of nodes, analytics regarding the coherence, strength, peculiarities and the structure of networks and subnetworks were calculated. We visualized the network structures with Gephi's visualizer module.

4.5.2. Post Text Data

Due to the discontinuity of use of TS Facebook fan page by the secretariat, only the Twitter data were analyzed for the political deliberation analysis. After cleaning the Twitter post data, combining certain words with different suffixes and dividing them in two major categories, *text* and *hashtags*, we first conducted word frequency analysis over the collected text data and sorted words used by TS member accounts. We shortlisted the words with those appearing at least 3 times in the first list.

The second shortlist was created qualitatively by selecting politically relevant words. These include political party names, name of the groups, institutions and individuals active in Turkish politics such as *Armenians*, *LGBT;* rhetorical concepts of everyday politics such as *justice*, *revolution*, *war*, *peace*; words belonging to political participation repertoire such as *campaigning, marching, protest*, *election*; nouns and adjectives indicating political position such as *against*, *standing by*. The final word list included a total of 36 words.

The final analysis takes place in two stages. The first stage, the number of words selected for political relevance (the qualitative shortlist) is compared to the frequent words list (the first shortlist) to reveal the proportion of political Twitter talk to non-political posting. We calculated proportions both nominally - whether it ever appeared in the list - and in terms of appearance frequency. The relative frequency size of the political words is visualized via the online application Word Clouds (https://www.wordclouds.com/). In the second stage, we returned to the original tweets in which the selected words of political relevance appeared and plotted the chronological distribution of the post. We manually checked and removed the words that are used in non-political contexts. This reveals whether the distribution of tweets with political content is even over the time or biased.

4.5.3. Survey Data

In the survey chapter that explores the structure, communication behavior and political participation capacity of the coalition, we calculated descriptive statistics of

a variety of variables, such as distribution of categorical variables regarding organization demographics. Likewise, we calculated frequency distributions and relative frequency of ordinal variables measuring the frequency of communicative and political behavior of the constituent organizations. Descriptive statistics were selected to provide a comprehensive outlook of the coalition, attributes and behavior of its constituents. For statistical data analysis, we utilized IBM SPSS software (IBM Corp., 2012). Both ordinal and nominal variables are reported and visualized in categories.

4.5.4. Interview Data

The analysis of the qualitative interview data draws on an inductive approach, with the assumption of inferring conclusions regarding the discursive behavior, preferences and orientation of long-term digital communication of interest groups and NGOs in some instances. Additionally, this part of the project constitutes an explanatory inquiry into the reasons, motives, dynamics behind the descriptive findings of the first two chapters. However, we are aware that its findings are limited only with the case of the TS and its member organizations.

For the analysis, we transcribed the interview recordings with a reconstructive manner where the interviewee's remarks are "polished" and put in order to reach a clearer sense of it (Brinkmann, 2013:61). For expert interviews, only the relevant parts of the interview are transcribed, paralinguistic elements of the text are redacted. The resulting units are coded according to the frequency of occurrence. Where needed, more than one code is assigned to an element. In the second round of coding, assigned codes are condensed to thematically frequent-occurring codes (Meuser & Nagel, 2009:476). For the coding system, we took a data-driven path where the data is the researcher's starting point and coded into patterns and concepts in the course (Brinkmann, 2013:62). This coding approach is in line with the analytic essence of the inductive model. We ended up with 39 main theme labels. In the final stage, the resulting interview units were paraphrased and reported in thematic sequence (Meuser & Nagel, 2009:476).

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

5.1. The Outlook of the Taksim Solidarity

5.1.1. Organizational Demographics

The Taksim Solidarity coalition displays a relatively heterogeneous composition. It consists of a wide range of organizations in terms of their operational areas, sizes, revenue sources, and legal status. We classified the self-selected type of organizations on an 11-category scale.

Figure 4. Type of TS Member Organizations

Rights and activism groups (f=22; f/n=21.2%), professional organizations (f=19; f/n=18.3%), political parties (f=18; f/n=17.3%) and political initiatives (f=13;

f/n=12.5%) constitute the majority of the first generation of constituents. The coalition was also joined by 9 resident community associations (f/n=8.7%), 8 solidarity groups - either in formal or informal status - on different issues (f/n=7.7%), 6 labor unions (f/n=5.8%), 3 artistic communities (f/n=2.9%), 3 press organizations (f/n=2.9%) and 2 alumni associations (f/n=1.9%). (See Appendix A, Table 112) Over three quarters of the constituents are formal organizations (f=80; f/n=76.9%); around a quarter are informal organizations with no legal presence, membership and income mechanisms (f=24; f/n=23.1%). (See Appendix A, Table 113)

Figure 5. Number of Members

Figure 6. Number of Employees

44.2% of the responding organizations with formal membership mechanisms (f=34) have a base of over 1000 members. 39% (f=30), on the other hand, have 200 or less members (See Appendix A, Table 114). In terms of employee figures, about 90 percent of the organizations that provide professional, paid employment (f=77; f/n=90.6%) employ 200 or less staff. Only one organization employs over 1000 (See Appendix A, Table 115). The dominance of Istanbul-based organizations over nationwide organized ones skews the distribution of membership and employee numbers downwards.

Figure 7. Number of Volunteers

Figure 8. Definition of Informal Organization

36.1% of the respondent organizations (f=26) recruit 50 or less volunteers contributing to different aspects of their work. 48.6% (f=35) recruit a volunteer base ranging from 51 to 1000 recruits. 15.3% (f=11) reported having more than 1000 volunteers (See Appendix A, Tables 117). Of the 24 informal organizations in the coalition, 17 (f/n=70.8%) hold regular in-person meetings. 6 organizations (f/n=25%) physically meet irregularly. Only one organization identifies itself as an online group that has a regular workflow (See Appendix A, Table 116).

Figure 9. Income Sources of Constituents

The majority of the TS constituent organizations rely on member fee (f=71; f/n=69.6%) and donation (f=68; f/n=66.7%). About one tenth of the organizations (f=12; f/n=11.8%) identify international donation among their resources. 5.9 percent (f=6) benefit from social responsibility funds. Around one third (f=29; f/n=28.4%) have other types of income (See Appendix A, Tables 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123).

In order to measure the extent to which constituents' commitment to and identification with the coalition, we asked respondents the degree to which their organization subscribes to the views of the TS secretariat and their organizational commitment to it. Both indicators corroborate the fact that the vast majority of the constituents feel politically and organizationally committed to the coalition.

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
Figure 10. Agreement on TS Views

Figure 11. Belonging to TS Network

76.6% of the respondent constituents (f=75) identify themselves with all or the majority of the views promoted by the TS secretariat. 8.2 percent (f=8) are committed to half, 11.2 percent (f=11) to a minority of the views of the secretariat. 4.1 percent of the constituents (f=4) ideologically fell apart from the secretariat over the past 8-9 years (See Appendix A, Table 124). On a binary scale of organizational loyalty to the coalition, 77.2 percent of the responding organizations (f=78) reported that they consider themselves a part of the TS coalition. 22.8 percent (f=23) no longer see their organization within the TS organizational structure (See Appendix A, Table 125). Cross-checked with a variable independent from the TS identification, the ideological divergence among constituent organizations declines even more. The organization representatives were asked about their organizations' position on seven ongoing political controversies at the time of data collection.

Figure 12. Views of Constituents on a Selection of Political Controversies

The constituent organizations display an over 90% agreement on 4 out of 7 public political debates. They predominantly oppose annulment of the Istanbul Convention (f=96; f/n=93.2%), the seizure of Gezi Park's control by the government (f=92; f/n=91.1%), the construction of Kanal Istanbul (f=97; f/n=93.3%), and the legislation for the authorization of the government to appoint trustee administrators to civil society organizations of all sort (f=96; f/n=95%). Agreement on the remaining 3 controversies - cancellation of the 2019 Istanbul local election results in favor of the ruling party (f=89; f/n=88.1%), the authorization of RTUK, the broadcast watchdog, to oversee online news outlets (f=86; f/n=84.3%) and the handling of the government with the then ongoing Covid-19 pandemic (f=83; f/n=83%) - tops 80 percent (See Appendix A, Tables 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85). After this evidence-based summary of the current state of Taksim Solidarity, we now turn to measures of digital cohesion inside it.

5.2. Digital Cohesion inside Taksim Solidarity

Digital cohesion of the movement is tracked down on highly used online platforms. The cohesion is measured over three variables: *Connectivity*, *interaction*, *deliberation*. The following chapters demonstrate that the coalition's digital connectivity appears to be considerably poor on both platforms. We observed significant differences between Facebook and Twitter networks.

5.2.1. Online Connectivity among theTS Constituents

On Facebook, the constituents have extremely little connectivity with the TS secretariat account and with one another. In a preliminary interview with the TS secretariat, we were informed that the secretariat Facebook account[1] has not been updated since 2013 for security reasons. It is quite plausible to reason that low Facebook connectivity resulted from this long inactivity. However, since inactivity does not

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[1] Another TS Fan Page, in fact, is on Facebook at: https://www.facebook.com/taksim.dynsm The page is indicated in its About section to be the official FB page of the coalition and directs visitors to the official TS webpage. It has been frequently updated since 2013, However, we failed to verify that it is operated by the Secretariat. Analysis shows that the subscriber network of the page does not pose a different outlook than the original page. While the network analytics are almost identical to the original page, the position of the secretariat account is even less central. In any case, the FB subscriber network of the coalition is disconnected.

prevent potential connections to the account and new subscriptions to the TS content, and the level of connections is a direct indicator of the interest in the TS originated information over time, Facebook network is included in the connectivity analysis. In the interaction and deliberation analyses, on the other hand, the calculations are carried out only over Twitter accounts where up-to-date data are available. Only Twitter posts and comments are analyzed for deliberation analysis since the structure of Facebook data does not allow one to distinguish whether the content belongs to an in or out-group actor.

5.2.1.1. Facebook Constituent Network

Data extracted from the core network of the Taksim Solidarity Facebook page consists of 91 nodes and 50 edges in total. The number of nodes corresponds to %71,7 of the overall number of the first-generation TS constituents. The TS network displays an unconnected outlook as only 34 out 91 nodes (f/n=37,4) have edges to another node. 57 nodes (f/n=62,6) lie in isolation, in other words unconnected.

Figure 13. Subscription ego network of Taksim Dayanismasi main Facebook account

The first step to study network structures is to look at a node's degree values (Freeman, 1978:219), which is the number of the nodes that the node in question is connected to and shows the level engagement of the node in a network (Opsahl et al., 2010:246). The in-degree measure of a node indicates the relations directed at that node. The main TS account has an in-degree of 8 while having a 0 out-degree value, a measure indicating the relationships directed at neighboring nodes from that node. The disparity between in- and out-degree measures points to the fact that the main TS Facebook is followed by only 8 constituent accounts out of a total of 91 accounts; and it follows none of the constituent accounts. These indicators show that the information flow between the constituents and the TS secretariat displays one-way direction from the secretariat to a very limited number of organizations.

Figure 14. Nodes following the main TS account

Several network analytics prove that connection among the TS network and the reach of the TS secretariat on Facebook is extremely limited. The network diameter, a distance measure referring to the longest distance between any two nodes in the entire network, is 6. The average path length of the small network is calculated as 2.040. The longer the path lengths among a network, the higher the risk of

information distortion and pollution is during the information conveyance from one node to another (Kadushin, 2012:33).

In his account of sociological character of dyads, Simmel suggests that strong and intensive dyadic relationship result from the absence of "*disturbance and distraction of pure and immediate reciprocity*" (Simmel, 1950:136) Unlike the case of transitive nodes connected to each other directly with an edge, or dyads in Simmel's words, the higher the number of intermediary nodes between two interacting parties the higher the cost of the interaction and possible delay and distortion of the conveyed information. The betweenness and closeness centralities are based on path lengths in the network (Opsahl et al., 2010:247), and indicate the distance to bridge the highest number of nodes and the path length from one node to another, respectively. Both centrality measures for the TS secretariat account scores 0 due to the asymmetry between in-and out-degrees of the account. Since there is no inward information flow into the account, it is not in a broker position between broader parts of the network.

Eigenvector centrality, however, measures the relative importance of a node in its entire network. Unlike degree measures, betweenness and closeness centralities, eigenvector centrality is proportional to the sum of its neighbors' scores (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011:427). While another account (Taksim Gezi Parki Koruma ve Guzellestirme Dernegi) tops in-degree centrality with a measure of 10 connections and despite its extremely limited connectivity within the TS network, the secretariat, with an eigenvector value 1, occupies the most important position in the Facebook constituent network.

Another indicator of network connectivity, the density is "*the number of direct actual connections divided by the number of possible direct connections in a network*" (Kadushin, 2012:29). The density value of the TS Facebook constituent network demonstrates the network is sparsely connected. While a complete network, where all nodes are connected to one another, with all possible edges scores a density value of 1, the TS constituent network graph has scores 0,006. This density figure means that the network is far from having enough channels for information conveyance on Facebook.

Clustering coefficient is a quantified measure which reveals the local density of a network; in other words, connectedness to the adjacent nodes (Kadushin, 2012:120). Average clustering coefficient for the TS constituent network is 0,037, a value far from the ideal value of 1 which amounts to an absolute clustering among adjacent nodes. The score of 1 denotes an extreme cosmopolitanism in the network and what Milgram called "small world effect" in his formative work in the early days of social network analysis (Milgram, 1967:62).

5.2.1.2. Twitter Constituent Network

The available data for the Twitter follower network of the TS constituents consist of 76 nodes and 667 edges in total. First off, it shows that the TS secretariat and constituent accounts on Twitter are over 13 times better connected on Twitter compared to the group's Facebook network. The number of sampled constituent accounts (nodes) equals to %59,8 of all the constituents. 11 out of 76 nodes (f/n=%14.47) lie in isolation creating a connected main island in the middle of the graph.

Figure 15. Follower ego network of TS main Twitter account

Represented by the network diameter, the nodal reach of the network is the same as that of the Facebook network. The maximum number of distance units that an information piece disseminated by one node has to pass through in order to reach any other node is 6. In other words, the farthest indirectly connected TS constituents are 6 steps away from each other in the entire network.

The follower count index shows that the main TS secretariat account, as on Facebook, is the most followed node [Indeg$Taksim\ Dayanışma$=28] among the constituents, predicting a central role in information flow from TS secretary to constituents. However, the account is followed by less than half of the sampled constituent accounts (f/n=%37,3).

Figure 16. Nodes following the main TS account on Twitter

The out-degree score of the TS account [Outdeg$Taksim\ Dayanışma$=27] also shows that only a minority of the constituents (f/n=%36) are followed by the TS secretariat. Again, both nodal degree figures point out the imparity between the Facebook and Twitter connectedness levels of the TS constituent networks.

Figure 17. Nodes followed by the main TS account

To assess the strength of the TS secretariat Twitter account in various roles within the entire TS network, we computed its centrality values. In the betweenness centrality index, the TS secretariat account ranks 1st (C_b=743.066). The value proves that, although followed by a minority of the network, it enjoys controlling the most of the interactions taking place between constituents on Twitter by bridging different components of the network. The closeness centrality, another centrality measure which quantifies the distance of a node to all other nodes in a network, of the TS secretariat account is computed as 0.602. The account ranks the 5th within the network following three NGOs (Association of Kemalist Thought [*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*], Nazım Hikmet Cultural Center [*Nazım Hikmet Kültür Merkezi*], Social Democracy Foundation [*SODEV - Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı*]) and a political party (Freedom and Solidarity Party, [*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi*]) accounts have the highest possible closeness value. The position indicates that the TS main account is advantaged in fast information spreading despite the presence of faster spreaders in the constituent network. (x_{TS}=0.88)

Eigenvector centrality, relative influence indicator places the TS secretariat 2nd in the index (x_{TS}=0.88). The only constituent outdoing the account in the index is TMMOB Mimarlar Odası [Chamber of Architects], which serves as the secretariat of the TS along with the partner constituent TMMOB Chamber of City Planners [*TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası*]. The score proves that the TS secretariat occupies an influential spot in the Twitter network, but with far more connections than in the Facebook network.

As for network connectivity measures, the Twitter network displays a low internal density. Although it is over 13 times higher than the TS constituents' Facebook network, the density value of the Twitter network is 0,071, whereas the absolute density value with every node directly connected with one another is 1. The score proves that the Twitter network is far from being tightly connected.

Average clustering coefficient shows that while the Twitter constituent network is loosely connected (C=0,217), connectivity in the form of follower and following relationships is much denser than on Facebook in the form of like and subscription relationship. Only a minority of the constituents are directly connected to each other.

In the section below, we complement this part with the use frequency analysis collected through the organizational survey.

5.2.1.3. Frequency of Information Exchange Among Constituents

In addition to the digital connectivity analytics, how often TS constituents communicate with one another through social media sites is also a parameter of the connectedness and digital cohesion of the network. The frequency of social media use by constituents for sending information to or receiving from one another or the TS secretariat is one of the main indicators of how well-knit of a digital communication web the TS network has built within the coalition over time. In order to quantify the connectedness, we look at two types of information exchange, one for the purposes of keeping constituents updated about each other and the other for coordination. It is particularly important in that the vast majority of this type of

106

communication takes place publicly available to the audience. Use of non-public media such as Whatsapp and email was also measured at the two purpose levels, to gain insight into the tendency to communicate through interpersonal channels.

Corroborating the digital connectivity findings in the previous sections, our analysis shows that the frequency of information exchange for two different purposes among the TS network is extremely low.

Figure 18. Frequency of Information Exchange with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat on public platforms

In a key finding, at least two third of the sampled organizations (N=103), including those with no account, do not receive or send information about themselves to other TS member organizations or the secretariat across five five different platforms ($f_{Facebook}$=76, $f/n_{Facebook}$=%73.8; $f_{Twitter}$=70, $f/n_{Twitter}$=%68; $f_{Instagram}$=80, $f/n_{Instagram}$=%77.7; $f_{Youtube}$=95, $f/n_{Youtube}$=%92; $f_{Website}$=82, $f/n_{Website}$=%79.6). Only less than one tenth of constituents have a daily information flow with each other or the secretariat across all platforms measured, with Facebook ranking the highest ($f_{Facebook}$=6, $f/n_{Facebook}$=%5/7; $f_{Twitter}$=10, $f/n_{Twitter}$=%9/6; $f_{Instagram}$=3, $f/n_{Instagram}$=%2.9; $f_{Youtube}$=0, $f/n_{Youtube}$=%0; $f_{Website}$=1, $f/n_{Website}$=%1; see Appendix A, Tables 1,2,3,4,5).

Given the rising state repression over political dissent and violations of free speech rights in the past decade, the case of non-public networks is of particular importance. The assumption that the consistent absence of domestic TS communication across public platforms is explained by the fact that the coalition might have moved its domestic information exchange to non-public channels for safety reasons. However, the assumption finds extremely limited evidence. On interpersonal communication platforms (N$Whatsapp$=102, N$Email$=103), while penetration and information exchange rates increase, active daily exchange do not differ remarkably.

Figure 19. Frequency of Information Exchange with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat on non-public platforms

Number of constituents with no account drops rapidly in comparison to the public digital media (f$Whatsapp$=5, f/n$Whatsapp$=%4,9; f$Email$=3, f/n$Email$=%2,9). Those who never send information to or receive from other constituents and/or the TS secretariat top %53,9 for Whatsapp (f=55) and %46,6 for email (f=48). Along with those without any of the two accounts, %58,8 (f=60) of the TS constituents fall completely outside the information network on Whatsapp. The figure for email, however, is slightly less than half of the organizations (f=51, f/n=%49,5). However,

constituents' interpersonal channels are used more often than public-access channels, especially for weekly, monthly and yearly updates (See Appendix A, Tables 6,7). Coordination is an additional dimension of the communicative connectivity among the TS network. The frequency of accessing various online platforms for coordination purposes by constituent organizations reveals an extra parameter for the TS network's digital cohesion. Findings of coordination communication drawn from the sample (N=103, N$Website$=102) shows strong consistency with the information exchange statistics detailed above.

Figure 20. Frequency of Coordination Communication with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat on public platforms

Along with the offline constituents, only less than one fifth of the network benefit from publicly available online media for coordination-related communication or collaborative work with other constituents and/or the TS secretariat. Facebook and Twitter lead list of most frequently used platforms (f$Facebook$=84, f/n$Facebook$=%81.6; f$Twitter$=84, f/n$Twitter$=%81.6; f$Instagram$=92, f/n$Instagram$=%89.3; f$Youtube$=99, f/n$Youtube$=%96.1; f$Website$=95, f/n$Website$=%93.1). While daily use again remains almost non-existent across platforms (f$Facebook$=2, f/n$Facebook$=%2; f$Twitter$=2, f/n$Twitter$=%2; f$Instagram$=2, f/n$Instagram$=%2; f$Youtube$=0, f/n$Youtube$=%0; f$Website$=2, f/n$Website$=%2), a tiny portion of the constituents coordinate on Facebook and

Twitter in yearly, monthly and weekly intervals (See Appendix A, Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, 12). In the case of these interpersonal channels, only a limited number of constituents engage in consistent coordination-related communication on Whatsapp and email, two channels measured within the empirical framework of the study.

Figure 21. Frequency of Coordination Communication with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat on non-public platforms

Out of a sample of 101 constituents, 63 (f/n=62.4), including those without an account, do not use Whatsapp for coordination relation activity with other TS members and/or the secretariat at all. While 28,8% (f=30) use the platform in frequencies ranging from yearly to weekly, only 5,7% (f=6) are daily participants of communication for the purpose of coordination (See Appendix A, Table 13). 35,6% of the constituent organizations (f=37) coordinate with each other and the coalition through email in weekly, monthly and yearly frequencies. Nevertheless, the figures of daily active use (f=2, f/n=2%) and non-communicating actors in the network (f=59, f/n=58.4) denote that the email is also far from being a substitute of public communication platforms as a safe-haven for the majority TS constituents (See Appendix A, Table 14).

Non-verbal communication through various kinds of interaction is as prevalent as textual information exchange. It makes up a large proportion of users' social behavior and merits an analysis to gain deeper insight into the TS' cohesion.

5.2.2. Online interaction among the TS Coalition

5.2.2.1. Twitter Network

Due to the unavailability of Facebook interaction data, in this section, we focus on historical Twitter interactions. Three types of online action offered by Twitter provide quantifiable values of non-verbal interaction of TS constituents: *Mention*, *reply* and *retweet*. A Twitter *mention* is a direct reference to another Twitter user, by including his or her username in one's own tweet (Glossary, n.d.). So the act of mentioning someone is a conscious engagement with someone else. Twitter API returns a Twitter mention network of 95 edges. In another word, there have been 95 direct mentions among TS constituent accounts between the queried time span, February 1st, 2012 - September 24th, 2019. Again, Twitter API limitations explained in the Data Collection section should be kept in mind. 52 out of the 76 accounts (%68,42 of the entire network) interacted with one another over the 7 years, using the mention feature of Twitter.

Figure 22. TS Twitter mention network (Isolated nodes are excluded)

The average degree, the mean of the incoming and outgoing mentions, of the mention network ($\bar{X}Deg$=1,25) suggests an extremely low interaction rate through the mention feature given the full-time span that the network is sampled from.

Figure 23. Degree distribution of the TS Twitter mention network

The TS secretariat account is the 3rd most referenced (Along with Community Centers [*Halkevleri*], a leftist civil society organization) account by constituents in Twitter conversations (Indeg=6). The two constituent organizations with higher incoming mention value are People's Republican Party [*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*] (Indeg=18), the main opposition party in the national assembly and the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey [*DISK*] (Indeg=8), the largest worker's organization in the opposition. The only mention interaction between the TS secretariat and the two constituents took place on March 11th, 2019 when the union commemorated and expressed its support for Gezi demonstrations, mentioning the TS in its tweet.

The mention degree figures show that this type of Twitter interaction, despite a relatively central role of the secretariat, has been very limited between the highest-ranking organizations as well as others in the network.

112

Relative importance measure, the eigenvector centrality value, reflects the same pattern as the in-degree value for the top-ranking nodes in the TS mention network. The People's Republican Party [*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*] tops the eigenvector index ($x=1$), followed by DISK ($x=0.842$) and the TS ($x=0.673$). The TS account ranks 3rd with a relatively high eigenvector value, suggesting frequent reference in the tweets of high influence members of the constituents. Average clustering of the mention network also displays a loose structure ($\bar{C}=0,039$), implying the absence of a dense web of interaction.

The longitudinal progress of online interactions poses significance to assess the development of communication within the TS coalition. To this end, we plotted the number of mentions by year. Yearly distribution of Twitter mentions between TS constituents and/or the secretariat shows a relatively upward trend. While constituent members referenced each other only 3 times in 2012, the year the TS was founded, and 6 times in 2013, the year when Gezi protests took place, the mention type Twitter interaction between members kept increasing, if not constantly.

Figure 24. Frequency trend of Twitter mentions over time

Despite the drastic upward curve in the years following the Gezi protests and inconstant increase after 2015, the yearly mean frequency of mentions ($\bar{X}=11,87$)

since the foundation of the TS proves that the mentions kept at a very low rate. When controlled for the first two years, when the launch of the TS and Gezi protests occurred, which may potentially bias the distribution, the average mention frequency for the remaining years from 2014 to September 2019 scores 14,33. The figures show that, despite limited activity, the group's Twitter communication did not die down after the protests up to 2019.

Table 1. Frequency distribution of Twitter mentions by year

Number of Mentions	Year
3	2012
6	2013
9	2014
16	2015
14	2016
15	2017
15	2018
17	2019

On Twitter, a *retweet* is a feature sharing one's original post with the user's own follower community. In a retweet, the attributes and engagement figures of the original post are retained. (Glossary, n.d.) The retweet feature is the main tool in amplification of a tweet's circulation and impact. The retweet network of TS constituents for a time span of 8 years (2012-2019) consists of 75 edges on the graph. In another word, TS constituent accounts and the TS secretariat account retweeted Twitter posts of each other 71 times in the sampled 8 years. %56,58 of the constituent accounts (n=43) were involved in the retweet interaction. Despite the

majority of the accounts involved, the overall number of retweet interaction among the community is extremely low.

Figure 25. TS Twitter retweet network (Isolated nodes are excluded)

The mean degree value for all the nodes in the retweet network is less than 1 ($\bar{X}$=0,98). Yet, the average figure includes self loops, the nodes that retweet their own posts to promote them for multiple times without engaging in a real interaction. Therefore, the actual interaction mean is even lower than the calculated score.

In retweet networks, the source vertex denotes the node which retweets the original tweet which is denoted by the target vertex (Tennakoon & Nayak, 2019:7). The TS secretariat account is the 3rd most retweeted account (Indeg=5) following Student Collectives [*Öğrenci Kolektifleri*], an informal student organization, and Social Rights Association [*Sosyal Haklar Derneği*] an association advocating for social justice (both Indeg=6). Consistent with other indicators, the TS secretariat account was retweeted in 2018 and 2019 after 5 years of gap following 2013. The frequency of the overall retweet interaction remains extremely low. Conversely, the secretariat

account retweeted a constituent tweet (Outdeg=1) only once throughout the 7 years of research sample; the retweeted content was a support statement by Greenpeace with an environmentalist emphasis at the outset of Gezi protests.

Degree Distribution

Figure 26. Degree distribution of the TS Twitter retweet network

In the relative importance index of the retweet network, the TS secretariat account loses its relative centrality. Although the account's eigenvector value (λ=0.235) is higher than the mean eigenvector value of the graph (λ=0.028), it ranks 13th in the retweet network. This means that the content created by the TS secretariat account was circulated by less influential accounts than the 12 constituent accounts with higher eigenvector values ranging from a full 1.0 (Social Rights Association [*Sosyal Haklar Derneği*]) to 0.302 (Greenpeace).

Twitter retweets among the TS constituents followed an unstable pattern over the 8 years until the conduct of the data retrieval. After 2015 when the retweet numbers peaked, the retweet frequency almost constantly dropped to 2 in 2019, except the slight increase in 2018. While the 2019 data does not cover the whole year and might be biased in the index, the mention figures for the same year showed an upward curve despite the same data collection limitation.

116

Figure 27. Frequency trend of Twitter mentions over time

The mean yearly retweet count is 9,375. Excluding the first two years, the mean equals to 10.

Table 2. Frequency distribution of Twitter retweets by year

Year	Number of Retweets
2012	2
2013	13
2014	4
2015	19
2016	12
2017	10
2018	13
2019	2
Grand Total	**75**

Reply, another interaction tool on Twitter, is a direct response to one's original post (Glossary, n.d.). Reply feature is a direct answer to another account or accounts' posts rather than amplification like in retweeting or a reference in mentioning. Reply count is one of the major indicators of engagement with one's statements on the platform. For the time span between 2012 and 2019, the constituent network consists of 19 edges, making the reply network the least dense one among other interaction indicators, retweet and mention networks.

With 19 direct replies, only %17,11 of the nodes were active in in-group replying interaction (n=13). Only less than one fifth of the over constituents replied to at least one of the posts published by another coalition member. This figure makes the reply interaction the least used type of interaction over Twitter.

Figure 28. TS Twitter reply network (Isolated nodes are excluded)

The average degree of all the accounts in the reply network is 0,25. The network includes no self-loops, self-replies to prior posts in other words.

Figure 29. Degree distribution of the TS Twitter reply network

In the reply network, in-degree measure denotes the number of times a certain account attracted a response from other accounts. The TS secretariat account attracted no reply from the other members (Indeg=0). Community Centers [*Halkevleri*], a political advocacy group tops the highest replied index, followed by Freedom and Solidarity Party [*Özgürlük ve Dayanisma Partisi*] and Greens and Left Future Party [*Yeşiller ve Sol Gelecek Partisi*], both political parties. The following 12 accounts received just 1 reply. The network graph has 61 isolated nodes (Excluded in the Figure 14), meaning that 61 accounts, including TS secretariat, have never received a reply from other TS members up until September 2019, the data collection date.

Similar to the mention and retweet networks, the out-degree measure in a reply network denotes the number of times a network member replied to other members' posts and therefore is an indicator of engagement in Twitter communication. Echoing the in-degree index, the TS secretariat has never replied to another member account's tweet (Outdeg=0); thereby lies in isolation in the graph (Excluded in the figure 14). Nor Zartonk, an NGO advocating for the rights of Armenian community in Turkey tops the out-degree index (Outdeg=6), and followed by Social Democracy

Foundation [*Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı*] (Outdeg=4) and Socialist Reconstruction Party [*SYKP Sosyalist Yeniden Kuruluş Partisi*], a left-wing political party (Outdeg=3). 6 other accounts replied to only one post by another member. The remaining 11 accounts have never interacted with other members by way of replying to a tweet. While overall interaction among the TS constituents is low, the use of Twitter reply feature is negligibly limited.

In the eigenvector centrality index, the most influential node is Community Centers [*Halkevleri*] (λ=1), followed by Nazım Hikmet Cultural Center [*Nazım Hikmet Kültür Merkezi*] (λ=0.475). The rest of the nodes all have negligible eigenvector values with 61 nodes having 0 eigenvector score, including TS secretariat.

The reply network has an extremely low level of clustering. The average clustering coefficient (C= 0,005) shows that the network is very loosely knit inside. The secretariat account is the 4th lowest scoring node when the 0-scoring nodes on the graph (n=18) are excluded in the analysis.

Yearly plot of Twitter replies by the members of the TS demonstrates an unstable interaction over the years the TS was active. While the number of replies by members spiked in 2015 with 7 replies, it has been on decline since dropping to only 1 in 2019.

Figure 30. Frequency trend of Twitter replies over time

The average yearly reply number between 2011 and 2019 is 2,714. Excluding the years 2011 and 2013 the average number of replies rises to 3.2. We present, in the following section, the complementary analysis of use frequency of non-verbal applications.

5.2.2.2. Interaction Frequency Among the Constituents

Interactive architecture of internet applications has paved the way for different engagement types (Dolan et.al, 2015:8), most of which, in turn, enabled users to extensively communicate in a non-verbal manner. Users, as well as organizations, interact with each other by liking, sharing, retweeting, mentioning, replying, reposting and reacting to online content in a variety of ways. Therefore, a vast share of online communication takes place in the form of non-verbal actions. Analysis of our sample data collected from TS member organizations (N=103) shows that, despite a slight increase in the number of constituents that use non-verbal internet applications compared to verbal communication, a large majority of the constituents are disconnected from TS interaction networks.

Figure 31. Frequency of Non-verbal Interaction with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat on public platforms

Most TS constituents (f=39, f/n=%37,9) made use of Twitter's non-verbal applications at varying frequencies, compared to other platforms (See Appendix A, Table 16). It is followed by Facebook which is used by %29,1 of the organizations (f=30, See Appendix A, Table 15) and Instagram (f=24, f/n=%23,3, See Appendix A, Table 17). Youtube's interaction rate is negligibly low (f=4, f/n=%3,9, See Appendix A, Table 18). Daily online interaction among constituents is almost non-existent. Even on Facebook, the platform on which constituents interact daily most, the rate is below 5% ($f_{Facebook}$=4, $f/n_{Facebook}$=3.9%; $f_{Twitter}$=3, $f/n_{Twitter}$=2.9%; $f_{Instagram}$=3, $f/n_{Instagram}$=2.9%; $f_{Youtube}$=0, $f/n_{Youtube}$=0%).

Here, we move on to ascertain the political character of the social media communication among the TS members. We analyze this character with two measures: Proportional word and hashtag frequency analyses. The measures are, again, followed by a use frequency analysis in a complementary fashion.

5.2.3. Online Political Deliberation

Turkish Facebook users comment less than the world average (Hootsuite & We Are Social, 2020:115). Since the Facebook account of TS secretariat was not active after 2013 and is obsolete now, it is not available for long term analysis. Therefore, political character of online networking by the TS secretariat and member accounts are investigated over the Twitter network.

5.2.3.1. Proportional Word Frequency Analysis

The first shortlist of frequent words consists of 125 words (Appendix E). The bottom cut-off point for the word list was 3, meaning that the list includes words that appeared at least 3 times in the most recent 3200 posts by each TS member organization in nearly 8 years from February 2012 up to September 2019.

The second list was tailored by manually coding the words of political relevance within the context of universal and Turkish politics. The words pertaining to Turkish

politics, political actors and political rhetoric prevalent in recent Turkish politics were hand-picked. It yielded a total of 36 words.

Figure 32. Relative frequency size of the most frequent 1000 word in the TS Twitter Network

In nominal comparison (politically relevant words/non-political words), politically relevant words, or words that belong to a political statement, call, discussion, make up less than one third of the overall post words (f=36, f/n=%28,8) on Twitter.

Table 3. List of politically relevant words in TS Twitter Network

Frequency	Word	Frequency	Word
18	karşı	4	yanındayız
10	Gezi	4	yürüyoruz
10	adalet	3	ADD

Table 3. (continued)

9	TMMOB	3	Adliyesi
7	destek	3	AKP
7	Hayır	3	ANAYASA
7	ÖDP	3	Emekçiler
6	Barış	3	Halkevleri
6	Ermeniler	3	halkın
5	Gözaltına	3	Haydarpaşa
5	mücadele	3	Kampanyası
5	SODEV	3	LGBTİ
4	bırakılsın	3	Onur
4	CHP	3	Parti
4	Devrimi	3	Partisi
4	protesto	3	savaş
4	seçim	3	Türkiyeli
4	Soma	3	Yeşil

Compared in appearance frequency, the proportion of political words to non-political words also proves that the use of political words in the tweets by TS members make up only a minority (f/n=%31.08) of the 8 years of Twitter communication. 175 out 563 top frequency words are those coded as politically relevant, demonstrating that political talk is only a small share of the internal Twitter communication of TS members.

The yearly distribution of top frequency political words demonstrates that, although not constant, the use of politically related words increased in general from 2012 on. The word count spikes in 2015 and 2018, possibly affected by everyday politics, but keeps higher than the 2013 count, proving that the graph is not biased by the excessive use of Twitter in the year 2013 caused by the Gezi protests.

Figure 33. Frequency distribution of politics related word by year

The yearly average use of political words on Twitter by TS secretariat and the constituents is 19 times. In order to test the possible bias which may result from the excessive use and the popularity of Twitter during Gezi protests, we took a comparative approach by grouping and comparing yearly figures before, during and after the 2013. While in the years preceding the mobilization (2010, 2011, 2012) the average use is extremely low ($\mu=2$), the mobilization year 2013 saw an exponential increase in the political words used by TS member accounts ($n=13$). The remaining years' average up until 2019 proves the growing trend of political word use among the network ($\mu=28,5$).

Table 4. Frequency of politics related word by year

Year	Frequency
2010	1
2011	2
2012	3
2013	13

Table 4. (continued)

2014	6
2015	42
2016	21
2017	28
2018	51
2019	23
Grand Total	**190**

5.2.3.2. Proportional Hashtag Frequency Analysis

For the hashtag frequency list, we conducted the analysis on one list instead of reducing the sample into a short list, since the entire sample yields 114 hashtags used in the tweets posted by the TS network members in almost 8 years sampled from 2012 up to September 2019.

Figure 34. Relative frequency size of the hashtags in the TS Twitter Network

In the sampled hashtag list (Appendix F), 96 out 114 hashtags (f/n=%84,21) are coded as politically relevant following the coding protocol stated in the methodology section. This figure shows that the TS network's hashtag usage on Twitter is driven mainly by political motives.

Table 5. List of politically relevant hashtags used more than 1 in TS Twitter Network

Frequency	Hashtag
5	TMMOByeDOKUNMA
3	HayatıDurduruyoruz
2	AliİsmailKorkmaz
2	DoğaİçinHayır
2	DünyaKadınlarGünü
2	EkrandaHayırYok
2	HalkevleriniSusturamazsınız
2	KadınKatliamıVar
2	MEBeSoruyoruz
2	occupygezi
2	SomayıUnutmaUnutturma
2	SutasaSendika
2	TMMOBaDokunma

Nominal proportion of politics-related hashtags to overall hashtags in the sample is over 84 percent, which points to an overwhelming majority of hashtag use about and for political matters. Comparing usage frequencies, 113 out of 131 total appearances are politically relevant, which makes in percentage 86,25, a similar figure confirming the nominal measure value.

When plotted on timeline, yearly hashtag use suggests active and fairly stable hashtag use for political purposes among the TS Twitter network. Despite the past

years' decline, the overall hashtag use frequency followed higher count than the year 2013 when the Gezi demonstration burst, except for 2019, which may be biased due to the short sampling period covering only the first 9 months of the year.

Figure 35. Frequency distribution of politics related hashtags by year

On average, political hashtags were posted 16, 42 times per year between 2012 and 2019. Controlling for the bias which intensive social media use in 2013 during the protests may cause, the yearly average of the remaining years still keeps higher than 2013 ($\mu=17,33$).

Table 6. Frequency of politics related hashtags by year

Year	Frequency
2013	11
2014	15
2015	26
2016	17
2017	18
2018	20
2019	8
Grand Total	**115**

5.2.3.3. Frequency of Use for Political Deliberation Among the Constituents

Proponents of techno-utopian ideas have long found new promises in the rise of online social networks for the democratic ideal of a free marketplace of ideas (McQuail, 2010:213). In addition to organizational purposes, free flow of information among organizations within larger political coalitions is particularly needed for transparency and accountability against the public. Yet, in the case of the TS, the distribution of political deliberation frequencies over social media as well as interpersonal communication channels demonstrates that the opportunity of open and public deliberation offered by digital networking to political agents - individual or organization - is not well benefitted by the coalition member organizations and its secretariat.

Figure 36. Frequency of Political Discussion with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat on public platforms

Analysis of our data, contrary to the theoretical expectations, shows that only less than one tenth of the constituents take part in online discussion network on public platforms (f$Facebook$=7, f/n$Facebook$=6.8%; f$Twitter$=7, f/n$Twitter$=6.8%; f$Instagram$=5, f/n$Instagram$=4.9%; f$Youtube$=4, f/n$Youtube$=3.9%; f$Website$=4, f/n$Website$=3.9%). Only less than 10% of the constituents engage in

public discussion on Facebook and Twitter with other constituents and/or the TS secretariat. As for other public platforms, it is below 5% across Instagram, Youtube and the constituents' websites (See Appendix A, Table 23).

Figure 37. Frequency of Political Discussion with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat on non-public platforms

Compared to public platforms, we see a significant drop in the number of constituents detached from discussion networks on non-public media. 29.4% of the constituents discuss political matters on Whatsapp and 26.2% via email at varying frequencies (f$Whatsapp$=30, f$Email$=27). On both media, constituents engage in political discussion on a yearly (f$Whatsapp$=9, f/n$Whatsapp$=8.8%; f$Email$=8, f/n$Email$=7.8%), monthly (f$Whatsapp$=10, f/n$Whatsapp$=9.8%; f$Email$=10, f/n$Email$=9.7%) and weekly (f$Whatsapp$=8, f/n$Whatsapp$=7.8%; f$Email$=4, f/n$Email$=3.9%) basis. Occurrence of daily political discussion is negligibly rare (See Appendix A, Tables 24, 25). Albeit engaging infrequently in time, the around threefold increase in the number of constituents discussing with one another on non-public platforms proves that the coalition members prefer interpersonal media that are not open to public access. Before turning to the international digital cohesion, we conclude this domestic cohesion section by an analysis of social network use for solidarity through the survey-based use frequency data.

5.2.4. Use of Social Networks for Internal Communication, Support, Solidarity

Social media networking offers opportunities and has often been used to display and develop solidarity with other entities, be it individuals or organizations, acting under the threat of repression (Odag et.al, 2023:250). Both the TS Secretariat itself and many of the constituents have often been subject to state violence and legal persecution ("Gezi beş kişinin…", 2014). However, measured by the use frequency by organizations, the opportunity provided by social networking to act in solidarity is used to a limited extent by the TS network.

Figure 38. Frequency of Use for Expressing Solidarity with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat on public platforms

On Twitter (f=37, f/n=35.9%), only around one third of the constituents show solidarity in varying frequencies, while Facebook and Instagram are used for the same purpose by, respectively, %31,1 (f=32) and %37,2 f=28) of the network members. However, in line with the trend seen in other uses of the platforms, Youtube (f=8, f/n=7.8%) and constituent websites (f=17, f/n=16.5%) are used for solidarity less than the other platforms. Compared to the uses of Facebook, Twitter and Instagram in part for information exchange, coordination and non-verbal interaction, we observe slight increases in the number of constituents using the three platforms to show solidarity with other constituents or the secretariat in varying

frequencies. The increase could hypothetically be attributed to the sentimental arousal among the public, particularly the activist community, following acts of state crackdown, which eventually results in online displays of collective support. Daily online solidarity actions are less than 3% on Facebook and Twitter and even lower on other public platforms in consistency with other uses (f$Facebook$=3, f/n$Facebook$=2.9%; f$Twitter$=3, f/n$Twitter$=2.9%; f$Instagram$=3, f/n$Instagram$=2.9%; f$Youtube$=0, f/n$Youtube$=0%; f$Website$=2, f/n$Website$=2%).

Figure 39. Frequency of Use for Expressing Solidarity with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat on non-public platforms

The ability to communicate discreetly, our analysis demonstrates, makes no significant difference on the participation in the solidarity communication network. Around one third of the constituents join the communication intended to display solidarity with the rest of the coalition at varying frequencies. (f$Whatsapp$=37, f/n$Whatsapp$=36.3%; f$Email$=38, f/n$Email$=36.9%). While daily communication rate is extremely low on both media (f$Whatsapp$=4, f/n$Whatsapp$=3.9%; f$Email$=2, f/n$Email$=1.9%), 13.7% of the Whatsapp communicators (f=14) used the application several times a month and 29.2% of the constituents (f=28) use email at yearly and monthly frequency rates for the purpose of solidarity expression.

The survey findings that the constituents make a limited effort of online solidarity was endorsed by the statements by representatives of TS-member organizations. The representative of the Social Democracy Foundation [*SODEV - Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfi*]), summarizes the state and scope of social media communication within the coalition: "Our social media discourses overlap [with other constituents] in circulating calls for action and rally announcements, however it would be misleading to say that we are in constant contact." It is only when another constituent declares a position on a public issue that they help share the announcements on the foundation's social media accounts (Interviewee 22, Personal communication, August 12, 2021). The case of one of the major political parties in the TS network is not much different than the others. The party maintains its communication usually in in-person meetings through its relevant bodies, however its representatives report a limited number of joint social media campaigns with TS constituents (Interviewee 27 & Interviewee 28, Personal communication, August 23, 2021). A regional branch of an association uses social media to showcase the organization and the coalitions in which it takes part, including the TS, says one of the branch's executive board members, implying a coordinated social media policy between the organization and the coalitions (Interviewee19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021). Despite complaining about the effects of digital media on individuals, the representative of the Environment Volunteers of Gazhane [*Gazhane Çevre Gönüllüleri*], a small-scale urban volunteer group, underlines social media as the channel through which it strives to get involved in the TS activity (Interviewee 18, Personal communication, July 17, 2021).

As digital connectivity evidence and expert interviews reveal above, non-public channels such as in-person meetings, email and Whatsapp groups play a more pivotal role in domestic communication of the TS network. Yet, an executive board member of a TS constituent objects to the rigid distinction between public and non-public character of the TS' domestic communication. He justifies his objection by the coalition's gradual communication operation ranging from organization representatives to their follower / sympathizer base. For principal decisions, he favors in-person meetings where a group of organization representatives and volunteers participate to deliberate over policies at principal level. Email groups and

other communication channels come into play only for coordination purposes. Representatives of each constituent are responsible for conveying the decisions to their own organization. The extent to which each organization communicates these policies with its base varies. However, the step-by-step communicative strategy confers the coalition's decision-making mechanism. "*It does not mean that it is not public, I believe. It is just a method*" (Interviewee 19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021). The representative of a left-wing publication (*Mücadele Birliği*) confirms the central role of in-person meetings for policy-making and use of email only for communicating ideas developed in face-to-face conventions (Interviewee 4, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). A recently popularized medium, Zoom, sometimes replaces physical meetings (Interviewee 14, Personal communication, January 4, 2022). A small-scale neighborhood organization reports only use of email and Whatsapp to communicate with the TS constituent network (Interviewee 20, Personal communication, August 4, 2021). Another TS constituent communicates with the rest of the network through email, phone or individual contact. In case of a coordinated social media campaign, the organization joins it only after coordination through non-personal channels (Interviewee 17, Personal communication, July 7, 2021). All in all, organization representatives' statements attest to the limited use of public online media and favor of non-public channels for support and solidarity among the coalition. In the case of international cohesion, however, the coalition members display a heterogenous outlook.

5.2.5. Online ties with international dissident movements and groups

Democratic globalization is dependent on publicity about the political agenda of individual NGOs and political groups so that they can influence international organizations' policies (Nash, 2010:221). The publicity could be achieved by what Tarrow defines as transnational social movements: "*socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interaction with power holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor*" (2001:11). Since the advent of "borderless" online media and the 45-fold growth of the cross-border data flow which was non-existent in 2005 (Tyson & Lund, 2017), the Internet, particularly

online networks, have gained relevance and prominence in the context of transnational social movements.

The Internet's borderless nature has deterritorialized the performance of democracy (Akin,2011:42) as well as the performance space of social movements. Cross-border information exchange and common awareness between activists have taken a new turn by the advent of ICTs. They not only convey information of distant developments to individuals, but also foster a transnational cooperation environment for activists (Nash, 2010:124).

However, online information brokerage is often taken for granted by techno-utopians. Mimicking real life relationships, online networks are limited in their information conveyance capability as much as the global information brokerage is in the hands of a few strategically positioned users in online networks. These users bridge information gaps, activate connections between international movements (González-Bailón & Wang, 2016:96) and occupy excessively strategic positions within the network of global information traffic. Global information exchange depends on more international brokers than local conveyors (p.102).

Figure 40. Frequency of Use for Information Exchange, Political Discussion and Solidarity with Foreign and/or International Organizations on Public platforms

Unlike the limited scope of domestic information exchange, interaction and deliberation, a considerable share of the TS constituents communicate with institutions outside Turkey or international organizations on political matters. Twitter is the most popular platform for international communication. 40.8% of the sampled constituents (f=42) reported communication at varying frequencies on the platform. It is followed by Facebook (f=65, f/n=36.9%), websites (f=68, f/n=34%) and Instagram (f=61, f/n=31.1%) respectively (See Appendix A, Tables 33, 34, 35, 36). Across all the public platforms, more than 30 percent of the constituents communicate with international actors.

Figure 41. Frequency of Use for Information Exchange, Political Discussion and Solidarity with Foreign and/or International Organizations on Non-public platforms

Email and Whatsapp play differential roles in international communication of constituents. Whatsapp, an informal medium, is less influential in the constituents' communication with foreign or international organizations. 74.5% of the constituents (f=76) do not communicate with foreign or international institutions on Whatsapp (See Appendix A, Table 37). However, despite its infrequent use, email is more instrumental, with 51.5% of the constituents taking part in the communication at varying frequencies. While 21.4% of the constituents (f=22) use email a few times in a year, a decreasing number of them use the medium in less frequent intervals (See Appendix A, Table 38).

The representative of one of the major political parties in the TS, in an interview, reports a reciprocated following with a socialist party based in an EU country. Although the TS constituent effectively follows certain social media applications of the foreign party such as candidate prequalification through instagram surveys, its representatives are skeptical whether the same applications would produce results if used in Turkish politics (Interviewee 28, Personal communication, August 23, 2021). The Green Left Party, one of the constituents with most international collaborators and operations, manages online local, national and international networks simultaneously. A party representative notes that the party's volume of communication over social networks increased after the outburst of the Covid-19 pandemic at international as well as local and national level (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021). The Istanbul branch of a professional organization points to the organization's social media interaction support for its international partners when requested. This way, the organization gains more visibility from the international partners' follower base (Interviewee 19, August 3, 2021).

Throughout the preceding section, we have gone through several dimensions of the TS' cohesion at organizational level. In the next section, our focus shifts toward its digital relationship with individual activists.

5.3. Communication with the Supporter Base

5.3.1. Frequency of Use for Information Exchange and Solidarity with Supporter Base

The use of online platforms by organizations to maintain the relationship with members, supporters, followers, sympathizers and potential recruits represents the main dimension of the online connectivity between the TS organizations and their bases. Figures of the constituents' use of internet applications with the aim to communicate with their member / follower bases differs significantly from that of the use among the constituent network.

Figure 42. Frequency of Use for Information Exchange and Solidarity with Followers on Public Platforms

Compared to the domestic online communication figures of the TS, the share of the constituents which never make use of the measured platforms to communicate with followers significantly declines (f$Facebook$=13, f/n$Facebook$=12.5%; f$Twitter$=14, f/n$Twitter$=13.5%; f$Instagram$=7, f/n$Instagram$=6.7%; f$Youtube$=16, f/n$Youtube$=15.4%; f$Website$=18, f/n$Website$=17.3%). Majority of the constituents maintain communication across 5 online platforms with their followers at varying frequencies (f$Facebook$=72, f/n$Facebook$=69.2%; f$Twitter$=69, f/n$Twitter$=66.3%; f$Instagram$=65, f/n$Instagram$=62.5%; f$Youtube$=64, f/n$Youtube$=51.9%; f$Website$=58, f/n$Website$=55.8%). While 16.3% (f=17) of the constituents communicate with the base several times a day on Facebook, 12.5% (f=13) are active all day long. On Twitter, 17.3% (f=18) communicate several times daily, 15.4% (f=16) engage in communication all day long. Instagram also plays a considerable role in keeping in daily contact with the organizations' base. 15.4% (f=16) of the constituents report using the applications for communication with their base, 10.6% (f=11) use it all day long (See Appendix A, Tables 39, 40, 41, 42, 43).

In expert interviews, representatives of several TS constituents admit the contribution of social media to their organization and coordination with their base.

For a representative of the Green Left Party (*Yeşiller ve Sol Gelecek Partisi*), social media is an opportunity to connect with physically remote activists and build long-term support networks. She recalls deciding to use Twitter during a campaign when she realized its significance (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021). The representative of the Environment Volunteers of Gazhane [*Gazhane Çevre Gönüllüleri*], a volunteer neighborhood organization also credits digital networking applications for helping them re-organize during the physically distanced period of the Coronavirus pandemic. She, however, reminds their work is a local endeavor and the group members are the locals of the same district to avoid an overestimation of the role of the Internet in their case (Interviewee 18, Personal communication, July 17, 2021). Her organization is not the only case whose members are in constant physical contact; especially small-scale local organizations among the TS share these characteristics at varying degrees. The Association of Anti-coup Military Servicemen [*ADAM-Der (Askeri Darbelerin Asker Muhalifleri Derneği)*] is another organization displaying similar characteristics. Although the representative of the association acknowledges the use of social media by his organization for coordination and organization with members, he underlines the difference from organizations whose organization with remote members or supporters is more Internet-dependent in that the association, instead, consists of members who have been in constant contact for a long period of time (Interviewee 7, Personal communication, October 21, 2021).

For a part of the coalition, limited online relations with supporters are partly explained by the use of traditional means of communication. A group of organizations disfavor excessive social media connection with their base, citing various reasons. The representative of ADAM-Der mentioned above, justifies his favor of face-to-face communication with members by the loss of non-verbal information such as body language in online communication. He underlines the ease of relating to feelings of the audience and the responsibility of being consistent about organizational policies, both advantages of face-to-face communication in his view. "*When you see something on screen, you just like it, leave a clap emoji and move on. That is how social media work*" (Interviewee 7, Personal communication, October 21, 2021). For a left-wing political party within the coalition, social media's

incapacity to mobilize its people makes it unreliable. Its social media editor believes that social networks' capacity to mobilize the party's base is limited. *"Our base cannot rely on social media at all to be encouraged for action."* He explains that the party directs its campaigning capacity to face-to-face spaces such as the field, factories, local areas, instead of social media. The party members' social media engagement is also very poor. Only one tenth of the members follow its official Twitter account, he conveys to ground the organization's disinterest in professionalizing its Internet communication (Interviewee 37, Personal communication, October 11, 2021). Istanbul Branch of the Association of Academic Staff (*Tüm Öğretim Elemanları Derneği İstanbul Şubesi*) makes use of a variety of social networks in conjunction with other means at their disposal such as phone, email and Whatsapp groups, in-person meetings and stay-in-touch conferences. Its office head underlines that she cross-posts the content posted on the association's social media accounts on other groups as well as her individual accounts. She maintains that the association takes advantage of a large email and phone number database collected through in-person encounters. Special events such as conferences and other conventions play a remarkable role in gathering members of other networks of the association, where, she asserts, people share their views - whether critique or acclaim - more comfortably (Interviewee 2, Personal communication, October 18, 2021). Open conventions are preferred by another TS constituent left-wing party over social media for organizing with members and supporters (Interviewee 3, January 18, 2022). The representative of the publication *Mücadele Birliği* emphasizes that for the publication, no internet application is a substitute for in-person meetings (Interviewee 4, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). The Left Party [*Sol Parti*], the Freedom and Solidarity Party's [*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi*] successor, opts for a well-balanced strategy between online and offline to connect with its base. An Internet-only interaction with supporters brings about laziness, the representative of the party believes. He goes on to say that social media politics has an impact on the base that prevents street action or replaces it (Interviewee 29, Personal communication, August 24, 2021). A representative of Istanbul branch of Halkevleri, a left-wing political initiative, cites Whatsapp and Telegram groups as the medium where the organization maintains the connection with its base. Each branch, including Istanbul, has a dedicated Whatsapp group for

sharing with members news, calls for action and links of publicly posted content on social media accounts (Interviewee 8, Personal communication, November 11, 2021). The Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Party [*DSIP (Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi)*] mainly uses phone to maintain its relationship with members and potential members, with an ultimate goal of transforming the relationship into a face-to-face one (Interviewee 5, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). Before turning to the dynamics of the interactive online communication of the member organizations with the base, we take a look at the empirical evidence on the potential of the TS to enlarge its base and support through digital networking.

5.3.2. The Potential of the Taksim Solidarity to Increase User Engagement and Recruitment: Gezi's Heritage or Enlarged Follower Base?

The role of social networks' in boosting organizations' recruitment and enhancing engagement of supporters in their offline work is a continuous topic of academic interest. Early work on social media activism has long held the notion that online activism brings about offline participation (Kim & Ellison, 2022:2627) and increases offline interaction with organizations. In the case of the TS constituents, our analysis reveals similar rates in growth of Facebook and Twitter follower sizes as well as online and offline engagement. In parallel with the popularity of the TS, social media subscription among the coalition members' audience unsurprisingly boomed during the protests. Also, after the protests, the social media subscription numbers as well as online audience engagement over social media have grown on both Facebook and Twitter, despite lower increase rates compared to follower growth. In measurement, we ignored the constancy of changes but measured the change as the general trend of the 8-year-period. Although the change variable cannot be checked for extraneous factors such as political breakpoints, possible changes in the habits of information access and traditional media blackout against government critics, it provides a quantified measure of audience behavior towards the organizations.

More than half of the respondent constituents with no Facebook account during the Gezi protests (f=40, f/n=48.2%) launched a page on the platform in its aftermath (See Appendix A, Table 69). Today, 80.2 percent (f=77) of the TS respondent constituents operate an official Facebook page. During the heated days of the

protests and traditional media censorship, 44,6 percent of the respondent constituents (f=37) witnessed follower increase on their Facebook pages.

Figure 43. Change in size of Facebook Followers during and After Gezi Protests

In the eight-year period from the protests in 2013 through to the time of data collection 59.4 percent of the respondent constituents (f=57) saw an increase in the Facebook followers with 6.3 percent (f=6) a drastic change. Only 7.3 (f=7) of the respondent constituents experienced follower loss during the period (See Appendix A, Table 70).

Figure 44. Change in size of Twitter Followers during and After Gezi Protests

While 49 respondent constituents (f/n=58.3%) had no Twitter account during the Gezi protests, the number declined by 32.3%. Today 77.7% (f=73) of the respondent constituents are on Twitter. All constituents with a Twitter account reported follower size increase during the stormy days of Gezi protests, with 16.7% (f=14) witnessing a drastic increase (See Appendix A, Table 71). In a time of about 8 years from the fading of the protests to the time of data collection, the majority of the respondent constituents (f=55, f/n=58.5%) have seen a stable trend of increase over the past 8 years. 7.4% (f=7) reported a drastic increase trend in the same period (See Appendix A, Table 72). The figures suggest a consistently growing need for information among the audience over the years following the protests. About one third of the constituents responded to this demand by adopting a Twitter account.

Figure 45. Change in Amount of Feedback on Facebook and Twitter After Gezi Protests

Treated as another indicator of engagement trajectory since, we measured the direction and level of change in the amount of incoming feedback on Facebook and Twitter. The results show that the majority of the respondent constituents either secured a trend of rising number in incoming feedback or retained the existing amount during the protests until the time of data collection on both platforms. 37.5% (f=36) gained ever more feedback from Facebook users while 4.2% of them (f=4) have recorded a drastic gain. Likewise, 43.4% (f=39) of the constituents that

143

responded to the survey reported an increase on Twitter over the 8 years spanning from the protests to the data collection. 5.6% (f=5) of this group have seen a drastically rising amount of feedback. Received feedback by about one fifth of the respondent organizations remained the same as the amount during the protests on both platforms (f$Facebook$=20, f/n$Facebook$=20.8%; f$Twitter$=20, f/n$Twitter$=22.2%). 21.8% of the respondents (f=21) reported a decrease at varying rates for Facebook, while, on Twitter, only 11.1% (f=10) has seen a trajectory of decline at varying rates over the 8 years (See Appendix A, Tables 73, 74).

Figure 46. Current Status of Organizations' Social media Followers during Gezi Protests

As a secondary indicator of the potential of the TS to enlarge its online base, we asked constituents, based on the respondent's observation, the current status of their social media followers during the Gezi protests regardless of platform. While the majority of the constituents retained all or majority of their Gezi-time followers on social media, only a tiny number of them lost the majority or all of the followers of the time. About one fifth of the respondent organizations have preserved their entire follower base during the era (f=12, f/n=19%). The largest category, the respondent constituents which have retained the majority of the Gezi-time followers amount to 45 (f/n=71.4%). 5 respondent constituent organizations (f/n=7.9%) reported that only

144

a minority still follow them on social media, while one (f/n=1.6%) is followed by none of the followers that followed it during the protests (See Appendix A, Table 78).

Figure 47. Change in Participation in Organization's Work by Members, Volunteers, Follower since Gezi Protests through Today

The trajectory of physical engagement with constituents enables us to compare the trend to that of online engagement and online behavior statistics, thereby making inferences about the extent to which the online engagement and online social media behavior predicts offline participation.

Majority of the respondent constituents (f=54, f/n=54.6%) recorded a trend of growth in physical engagement in their work by members, volunteers and sympathizers over the same period of 8 years, 7.1% of which (f=7) being a drastic growth. By and large, the growth figures resonate with those of follower growth and feedback growth on Facebook and Twitter.   13.1% (f=13) have retained the volume of physical participation in its work that they had during the protest, however, have not gained new participation. About one third of the constituents (f=32, f/n=32.3%) have lost member and volunteer participation over the same period (See Appendix A, Table 75).

Figure 48. Current Status of Formal Organizations' Members during Gezi Protests

Figure 49. Current Status of Informal Organizations' Volunteers during Gezi Protests

Majority of the responding formal organizations in the TS network reported that all or most of those who were their members during Gezi protests are still members. 31.1% (f=23) of the respondent constituents have retained all, 58.1% (f=43) majority of their members during the protests up to present. 7 respondent constituents (f/n=9.5%) have lost the majority of its member base during the past 8 years. Only 1 (f/n=1.4%) constituent reported that none of the members during the protests have maintained membership until today (See Appendix A, Table 76). Figures for the informal organizations, by and large, echoes formal membership. Out of the 20 respondent constituents, 5 (f/n=25%) have retained all voluntary supporters that they had during the protests, while 11 (f/n=55%) majority of them. For 3 (f/n=15%), a few voluntary supporters of the time still volunteer today. Only 1 constituent (f/n=5%) reported that none of its Gezi-time volunteers work with the organization today (See Appendix A, Table 77).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the analysis disregarded other potential factors on the change of offline engagement, such as political instability, economic pressure, crackdown on dissent, loss of political efficacy, disruption of certain constituents' activity, restrictive atmosphere of the Covid-19 pandemic all of which have, at varying degrees, characterized the era following Gezi protests.

Expert interviews confirm the survey findings and provide a more nuanced account of how organizations make use of internet applications versus conventional communication means to enlarge and engage their bases. For many TS constituents, social media is a tool with which to increase their awareness and popularity among

the public, publicize its cause, values and aims to activists and citizens especially out of the organization's reach. In the case of physical proximity and the organizations' members and existing volunteers, traditional means are preferred. Potential sympathizers contact organizations via rather formal channels such as website contact box, phone or email. However, social media plays a significant role in evoking interest and inducing users to contact the organization. Interviews also reveal that formal membership relations still play many times more important role than social media factor in recruiting new activists, especially in offline action context. Nevertheless, original online content creation and online campaigns are predictive of citizen interest and motivation to contact organizations. Several organizations expressly underline that, by internet publicity, they do not aim for increasing the follower or sympathizer base but the growth of the ideology they subscribe to. They foreground the growth of the activity level and grassroots engagement over an enlarged follower base.

Mücadele Birliği, a left-wing publication, for instance, is frequently contacted via its social media accounts by its audience willing to participate in its events, rallies or street actions. Small-scale rights groups such as feminists, workers or artists based in provincial areas contact either regional representatives of the publication in person or the headquarters on its social media pages to meet the team (Interviewee 4, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). Similarly, a core TS constituent often receives contact requests for participation in its activities. Especially Facebook and Instagram, its head of communications states, are instrumental in enlarging the engagement in its offline activity and appreciated by the managing team as a means of recruitment (Interviewee 14, Personal communication, January 4, 2022). While acknowledging its limited role as a bridge for citizens to join organizations or participate online activity, the representative of Istanbul Chapter of TMMOB Chamber of City Planners and a pivotal constituent of the TS, disputes its potential to induce sympathizers for closer cooperation with organizations. He recalls his past observation during a rally for the protection of Valibeağ recreational area and the turnout of individual activists following a social media call for action; nevertheless, the turnout of formal organization members was much larger. He concludes that the organizations are still the driving force behind offline participation compared to the

social media factor for unaffiliated activists (Interviewee 12, Personal communication, December 10, 2021). The Assembly of Socialist Engineers, Architects and City Planners (*Toplumcu Mühendis, Mimar ve Şehir Plancıları Meclisi*) uses its social media outlets to reach out to potential sympathizers, rather than existing its community which communicates in a Whatsapp group. A representative of the assembly points to the website as the first contact point of those interested in the organization's activity. They access the organization-related information on its Twitter page and the website, and send a message through the website embedded contact box. Incoming contact requests, she maintains, become frequent following release of original content or introduction of brand-new campaigns (Interviewee 9, Personal communication, November 13, 2021).

Social media applications play a key role for a large number of constituents to connect with potential recruits in provincial areas, especially in case of organizations that are not well-organized across the country. A political association makes use of social media particularly to lay the ground for new contact requests from potential sympathizers. With members and volunteers residing in major cities where the association has chapters, it instead gathers them over member meetings, breakfast talks, and rallies for press releases (Interviewee 6, Personal communication, March 26, 2022). For two socialist parties that lack nationwide organization, social media functions as a virtual office in areas with no physical office where their staff and potential recruits look for ways of cooperation (Interviewee 3, Personal communication, January 18, 2022; Interviewee 36, Personal communication, October 9, 2021).

Two other TS constituents, a political party and the Social Democracy Foundation [*SODEV – Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı*], a political initiative, prioritize enlarging the scope of activity rather than the size of their base. Therefore, they report exploiting social media to increase engagement with and prevalence of political activity (Interviewee 37, Personal communication, October 11, 2021; Interviewee 22, Personal communication, August 12, 2021). With a similar motivation, Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Party [*DSIP (Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi)*] operates its social media so as to appeal to only those with favored characteristics by

it. The organization regards the quality of its follower and volunteer base higher than its size. To this end, its representative interviewed states that the party's social media editors ignore or reject contact requests by those outside the party's interest (Interviewee 5, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). The next section deals with several dimensions of connectivity with the base, drawing on the survey-based frequency analysis and qualitative expert interviews.

5.3.3. Supporter Response to the Institutions' Discourse

5.3.3.1. Frequency Analysis and Expert Statements on Written Follower Feedback

The incoming feedback, be it written or in other forms provided by the architecture of the digital medium in question, is a core indicator of online follower engagement with organizations. Written feedback on Internet platforms flows to organizations in various forms, the most prominent of which are comment, reply, private message. Unlike the reciprocated nature of deliberative practices mentioned later in the text, here we measured only the frequency of unidirectional communication initiated by social media users towards the TS organizations.

Figure 50. Frequency of Written Response by Followers on Public Platforms

149

Majority of the TS constituents receive written response from platform users or visitors regularly on Facebook (f=74, f/n=71.2%), Twitter (f=68, f/n=65.4%) and Instagram (f=64, f/n=61.5%) at varying frequencies, with Facebook ranking first. Interactive affordances of Youtube, contact boxes and tools on websites, however, attract written feedback to only less than half of the constituents ($fYoutube$=44, $f/nYoutube$=42.3%; $fWebsite$=27, $f/nWebsite$=26%). Twitter is the leading platform in daily feedback reception (f=25, f/n=24%) while two thirds of these constituents (f=17, f/n=16.3) receive written feedback all day long. More than one fifth of the constituents get a written response on Facebook (f=22, f/n=21.2%) and Instagram (f=23, f/n=22.1%) daily. On Facebook, on the other hand, 43.3% of the constituents (f=45) receive written feedback in weekly and monthly intervals (See Appendix A, Tables 44, 45, 46, 47, 48).

Although around two third of the respondent constituents receive regular written feedback online at varying frequencies, a selection of institution representatives report that it is far below the organizations' expectation and usually in non-political character. However, evidence suggests that the irrelevant and limited amount of feedback guides organizations to restructure their online - and offline - communication behavior and discourse. Moreover, they integrate follower feedback into the organizations' workflow.

The interviewed representative of the left-wing publication *Mücadele Birliği* quantifies the user feedback that the publication receives on social media as one tenth of the posts. The figure is particularly low given that the account holder is a content creator (Interviewee 4, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). Executive board member of an alumni association also observes a limited number of incoming comments to the organization's posts. Incoming feedback involves both issues regarding the association's field of work and political messages (Interviewee 17, Personal communication, July 7, 2021). It echoes the case of *Halkevleri*, a political initiative organized across the country in that politically active organizations attract more political feedback. Its representative underlines the predominance of political subjects among the online feedback that the organization draws such as rallies and street action that they organize (Interviewee 16, Personal communication,

July 1, 2021). One must stress that the organizations which draw feedback about issues of public importance are political by their field of operation. The majority of TS member organizations report that the subjects of the feedback they receive are mostly limited to non-political issues. A representative of the Association of Validebağ Volunteers (*Validebağ Gönüllüleri Derneği*) and volunteer for the protection of Validebağ Grove states that the irrelevance of a part of social media comments hits the point of absurdity, in which case the association chooses not to engage. However, the association considers the incoming feedback in its gate-keeping process even in determining the visual material posted on social media (Interviewee 1, Personal communication, June 22, 2021).

Alongside the Association of Validebağ Volunteers, many other TS constituents incorporate the limited amount of political social media feedback into their online communication strategy. The social media working group of the Green Left Party reports the received social media feedback, along with the web page hit rate figures, to the party assembly bimonthly (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021). *Halkevleri* also harnesses the received feedback to test and reshape its social media policy. The organization closely follows user comments to and interaction with its campaign posts and restructures its policy accordingly (Interviewee 16, Personal communication, July 1, 2021). Another association in the TS network has reoriented its overall communication policy following complaints received over online and traditional communication channels. Its executive board member says that the organization always engages in dialogue with those providing feedback on social media and, on certain occasions, they are contacted by the organization by phone (Interviewee 17, Personal communication, July 7, 2021). The representative of the Kuzguncuk Residents Association (*Kuzguncuklular Derneği*) also emphasizes that the association integrates online feedback into the gate-keeping process of its social media communication, although they choose not to reply to comments in certain cases (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13, 2021). Communications head of a core TS constituent highlights the importance of social media feedback both for online and offline communication strategy of the organization. He goes on to say that it even feeds the decision of campaign slogans (Interviewee 14, Personal communication, January 4, 2022).

The expert interviews also evidence a certain degree of incorporation of social media feedback into the organizations' workflow. Majority of interviewed organizations report regular interaction between follower input and the organization policy. The representative of the Validebağ Volunteers Association illustrates an unusual case where the boundaries between civil society and local public authority blurs:

> "*We are talking about a period of 23 years. Now, some people view us as representatives of the public authority. In some cases, they send us complaints that they normally should direct to the municipality or governor's office, saying "Why don't you stop this?" We received these also on social media. They view us as an intermediary [between the state and public] that resolves all problems [they encounter]. Unfortunately, we do not have such power. I wish we had… But we consider such requests as much as possible. We convey [these complaints] to local authorities*" (Interviewee 1, Personal communication, June 22, 2021).

Although an extreme case, his account shows that the social media of local scale organizations constitute a conduit to reach out to the relevant public authority and participate in local urban politics. Social media editor of a left-wing political party asserts that the party regards online feedback as data illuminating the agenda of the party management and guiding its team to frame organization's policies (Interviewee 3, Personal communication, January 3, 2022). The representative of *Halkevleri* agrees to the data function of online feedback, resembling it to a mirror showing the agenda of the base (Interviewee 16, Personal communication, July 1, 2021). A TS constituent association does not discriminate between the sources of feedback. Whether by phone, email, social media or other means, the management reviews all plausible feedback. An executive board member asserts that follower feedback could impact the association's activity in certain cases (Interviewee 17, Personal communication, July 7, 2021). Executive board member of the Istanbul regional office of a professional association, too, underlines reviewing of all appropriate social media feedback. Moreover, he goes on to say that the association regularly posts minutes of executive board conventions on its social media accounts and calls followers to provide feedback. However, the rate of return to these calls is very limited, he notes (Interviewee 19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021). The representative of the Social Democracy Foundation, while emphasizing that they review and integrate social media feedback into its work, points to the perils of

overreliance on user feedback when forming the organizational policies, for its values and consistency (Interviewee 22, Personal communication, August 12, 2021).

5.3.4. Dynamics of deliberation over digital networks inside the movement

5.3.4.1. Frequency of Political Deliberation with Supporter Base

Internet applications have opened up vast potential for free deliberation among various political actors ranging from citizens, government, journalists, online and traditional newsrooms, activists and advocates (Dahlgren, 2005:153). Majority of public deliberation today takes place over online media rather than traditional outlets such as TV. Online media offer organizations opportunities to discuss matters within their fields of operation as well as broader issues of public importance with their followers and other internet users. Nevertheless, the data collected from the TS constituent organizations disprove this commonly held assumption. Not only statistical frequency analysis but also expert interviews with organization representatives demonstrate that the discussion between organizations and internet users about public matters such as politics and social issues is very limited on online platforms.

Figure 51. Frequency of Political Discussion with Followers on Public Platforms

The analysis reveal that the share of the constituents who engage in discussion on public matters is limited across the five internet platforms measured at varying frequencies $(f_{Facebook}=20$, $f/n_{Facebook}=19.2\%$; $f_{Twitter}=15$, $f/n_{Twitter}=14.4\%$; $f_{Instagram}=12$, $f/n_{Instagram}=11.5\%$; $f_{Youtube}=11$, $f/n_{Youtube}=10.6\%$; $f_{Website}=4$, $f/n_{Website}=3.8\%$). 7.7% of the TS network member organizations (f=8) several times a month, 4.8% (f=5) several times a week have a political discussion with followers on Facebook. A share of 5.8% (f=6) does either several times or less once a year. In addition to use by most constituents for political discussion with base, Facebook also appears as the platform used most frequently compared to other platforms. Despite its visual-oriented architecture, Instagram hosted political discussion of 5.8% of the constituents (f=6) on a monthly basis, speculatively due to its ever-rising engagement rate. On constituents' websites, political discussion is almost non-existent; however, the absence is reasonable given the gradual vanishment of forums and other deliberative applications from websites following the rise of social media. Daily basis political discussion between constituents and followers take place only on Facebook (f=1, f/n=1%) and Twitter (f=2, f/n=1.9%) at an extremely limited rate.

For certain organizations, however, social media serves as a springboard for continued discussions. Those who reach the organization on their social media accounts are then contacted through phone or other non-public channels for an exchange of information or support when asked by the requesting user. Confirming this type of use by his organization, a representative of the Association for Entertainment Venues in Beyoğlu [*Beyoğlu Eğlence Yerleri Derneği*], a neighborhood-specific professional association, reports that the association responds on Whatsapp or calls by phone all users contacting it on social media. The association's executive board discusses and evaluates the issues coming from its members through social media and provides information on the relevant subject (Interviewee 15, Personal communication, June 27, 2021).

On issues of public consensus, limited reciprocality gives place to absolute one-sided comments. A representative of the Istanbul Office of the consumer rights association TÜKODER [*TÜKODER İstanbul Şubesi*] illustrates this with the example of the

1980 coup d'etat, which attracted half of the association members to comment online (Interviewee 30, Personal communication, September 14, 2021). The representative of the Assembly of Socialist Engineers, Architects and City Planners [*Toplumcu Mühendis, Mimar ve Şehir Plancıları Meclisi*] points to the relevance of the medium for a specific subject to attract follower engagement. While issues of public sensitivity such as fundraising for educational support or humanitarian aid are highly engaged on social media pages of the assembly, other relevant-medium dependent topics do not draw enough attention in terms of user comments and response (Interviewee 9, Personal communication, November 13, 2021).

Head of corporate communication of one of the major political parties in the TS network reports constant incoming private chat contacts over Instagram and Twitter with a noticeable increase, following incidents of public outrage such as political violence or imprisonment. Although the dialogs do not take place on the public page, having been replied by the party's official page admins, followers publicly share the screenshot of their conversation on social media in certain incidents (Interviewee 27, Personal communication, August 23, 2021).

While this project frames political deliberation with the one occurring on official pages of the TS member organizations, one should admit the prevalence of independent discussion groups where different actors, organizations, groups and individuals gather around issues.

A representative of the Tozkoparan Association, a neighborhood organization, points to the inefficiency of organization led, centralized discussion platforms. He underlines the popularity of grassroots initiated Facebook groups among the neighborhood residents, while the association itself does not have a Facebook page.

The residents communicate in a total of 3-4 different groups; many other neighborhoods have similar communication platforms on Facebook. Despite their popularity, the representative observes that these volunteer groups, too, operate as information dissemination outlets rather than open and unrestricted deliberation platforms (Interviewee 25, Personal communication, August 18, 2021).

5.3.5. Turkish Diaspora and the Movement: Connection with International Supporters

Turner suggests that for the mobilizations to exist in the long term, they need to be organized in a decentralized manner within national borders as well as internationally (2013:381). The increased ability of forming vast networks by the advent of computer-mediated communication helps activists overcome problems that impede growth of social movements (Bennett, 2003:164), potentially beyond national borders. Computer-mediated communication has been a response to the sufferings of transnational activism against repressive regimes and multinational corporations (McNutt, 2008:34), boosting the rate of exchange across movements scattered around the world, solidifying the shared identity and solidarity between them (Diani, 2000:395-396).

The 2011 US Occupy movement and its European counterparts have succeeded in mobilizing their base across borders by taking advantage of digital communication technologies. The 2011 5 Star movement, originally surfaced within Italy, made a connection through Meetup platform with the Italian expatriates around the world and spread its word. Likewise, the Occupy protestors carried the action across the US borders and were successful at creating overseas chapters which led to encampments in many countries (Turner, 2013:378-379).

Despite the Internet's facilitative function for cross-border movement solidarities, the key element for connection lies largely in the position of elements of the network structure. Personal contacts inside movements are essential in the formation and organization of trans-national movement fronts (Bennett, 2003:164).

The conduits that enable the information flow across movements located in different countries are limited by the number of information brokers on social networks. The number of the brokers is usually small and the digital communication social networks depend on these limited number of users, which challenge the long-hailed assumption about social networks that they are largely structured horizontally and free of hierarchies (Gonzalez-Bailon & Wang, 2013:18-19).

Figure 52. Frequency of Political Discussion with International Followers on Public Platforms

We applied our likert-scale use frequency analysis on the TS organizations' use of Internet applications for communication and discussion with international users. The findings show that only a minority of the TS constituents engage in political deliberation with followers or members living outside Turkey. Twitter (f=28, f/n=27,2%) and Facebook (f=27, f/n=26.2%), respectively, appear to be the most utilized platforms for political communication with followers abroad at varying frequencies, followed by Instagram (f=21, f/n=20.4%) and organization websites (f=19, f/n=18.4%). Only 2 constituents on Twitter (f/n=1.9%) and 1 on Facebook (f/n=1%) maintain daily political discussion. Except for Instagram (f=50, f/n=48.5%), more than half of the constituents are disconnected online from international members, supporters or followers on other platforms despite having an official account or page (f$Facebook$=57, f/n$Facebook$=55.3%; f$Twitter$=54, f/n$Twitter$=52.4%; f$Youtube$=61, f/n$Youtube$=59.2%; f$Website$=56, f/n$Website$=54.4%).

In the next section, we provide a rundown of offline and online tools at the coalition's hand to encourage the supporter base in the period following the Gezi protests.

5.4. The Internet Use and Political Participation in the Post-Gezi Turkish Politics

5.4.1. Taksim Solidarity's Promoted Repertoire of Political Participation

Various uses of social media and Internet applications have come to complement traditional practices of participation in politics. The extension of the public sphere to virtual spaces and emergence of multiple publics on the Internet have induced political policy-makers, interest groups and, generally, civil society to add Internet applications to their repertoire of political participation. In the case of the Taksim Solidarity coalition, despite the domestic online connectivity and interaction shortcomings, the coalition member organizations, the analysis reveals, have made use of participatory affordances of the Internet in combination with traditional practices.

Figure 53. Popular Repertoire of Political Action among TS Constituents

Over 80 percent of the responding constituents (f=85; f/n=81.7%) comment on social and political affairs on social media, a participatory practice more popular than any other type of online and offline action. 73.1 percent (f=76) call followers through

social media for participating in political protests and 52.9 percent (f=55) for voting in elections. A number of offline participation practices are also exerted by the majority of constituents along with online participation. 53.8 percent (f=56) organize petition campaigns, 72.1 percent (f=75) take part in petition campaigns organized by third parties, 59.6 percent (f=62) file official objection letters to an administrative body. Calls for boycotting an institution, organization or a firm on political grounds is an action that less than half of the constituents (f=47; f/n=45.2%) resort to (See Appendix A, Tables 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92).

5.4.2. Use of Digital Networks to Mobilize the Base for Participation

Social media platforms offer users - whether individual or corporate - many applications to interact with contacts and followers. These applications are instrumental for organizations to mobilize their followers and page visitors to participate in political action in many forms. Varying number of TS members use a wide array of features offered by the architectures of social media sites.

Figure 54. Popular Social Media Actions to Encourage Members, Supporters, Followers for Political Action

159

About three quarters of the respondent constituents share or retweet politically relevant content (f=76; f/n=73.1%), post the organization's view in written form (f=79; f/n=76%) and include multimedia material in posts (f=80; f/n=76.9%) on social media in an effort to engage with followers for political action. Around half of the constituents (f=53; f/n=51.%) use the pinned post feature that allows users to set certain posts on top of the feed permanently, start live broadcast (f=49; f/n=47.1%), post 24-hour story (f=54; f/n=51.9%), like relevant content posted by other parties (f=56; f/n=53.8%) and organize event (f=50; f/n=48.1%) using the event feature (only on Facebook) on social media. While 57.7 percent share or retweet a post adding a comment (f=60), the private message is used by only about a quarter of the organizations (f=28; f/n=26.9%), a finding that contradicts the coalition members' preference for non-public means of communication. (See Appendix A, Tables 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102). The behavioral structure of online communication plays a significant role in determining organizational structure of the coalition. Following section walks us through discourse, gate-keeping, preferred tools and applications and discursive hierarchy of the TS members.

5.5. Communicative Organization within the Taksim Solidarity

SMOs, as corporate but non-profit entities conduct a peculiar type of communication. Discourse, management of communication process, and in the case of coalitions, the rate of uniformity in the constituent organizations' discourse are all determinant elements of multi-organization movements. Contemporary networked movements, mostly playing to the crowds of the Internet, foregrounded the "*digital-popular rhetoric*" of succinct slogans and hashtags. Incisive, slogan-like and emotional messages overran informative discourse to attract more citizens for engagement (Gerbaudo, 2017:147). The following sections look at various aspects of the online communication that the TS constituents maintain, through the lenses of both an organizational survey and expert interviews.

5.5.1. Online Communicative Behavior Following TS Secretariat Statements

The degree of the communicative convergence and/or divergence among the TS network elements clues much about the organization of online communication inside

the coalition. The extent to which constituents identify themselves with TS Secretariat as well as other constituents indicates the level of discursive harmony of the coalition members. To this end, organizations were asked which of the online interactive actions they have performed at least once as a response following a social media post by the secretariat or other constituents.

Figure 55. Communicative Behavior of Constituents Following TS Secretariat Statements on Public Platforms

Around one third of the constituents (f=35, f=34%) have shared or retweeted the TS secretariat's original posts under its own label as an indication of embracement of the TS's message but propagating it as a secretariat-originated post. Around one fifth of the organizations (f=22, f=21.4%) have copied TS secretariat's post and posted it in a brand-new social media post of its own, suggesting a higher level of identification with the TS discourse. 28.2% of the constituents (f=29) added commentary or contribution before sharing/retweeting the TS secretariat's original message. These constituents identify with the TS secretariat either conditionally or in stronger terms. A small group of the member organizations (f=13, f=12.6%) have taken social media action only after a certain number of the constituents post statements on the issue. Only 11 constituent organizations (f=10.7%) have never taken social media action when the TS secretariat released an online statement on its Twitter account. The

findings suggest a considerable number of the TS constituents unite in embracing the TS secretariat online discourse as they exert social actions that bring higher identification with the secretariat's discourse (See Appendix A, Tables 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64).

5.5.2. Gatekeeping Mechanism inside Constituent Organizations

Dynamics of decision-making in communicative policies and operations are one of the integral parts of the organization of the coalition's communication. Evidence obtained through the survey and interviews shows that editorial decisions are usually communicated in Whatsapp or email groups composed of largely informal social media working groups and members of executive boards, with principal decisions taken by executive bodies themselves. However, in the event of instant developments, individuals tasked with social media management take initiative to spontaneously post content. Dedicated social media editors usually seek approval of social media working group members communicating in Whatsapp groups, before posting. Larger institutions typically employ formal social media teams while, in some cases, a unit of content production works in collaboration with them.

Figure 56. Distribution of Communicative Decision-maker of Constituents

162

The largest group among the responding constituents (f=41; f/n=39.8%) form Internet communication strategies and take related decisions on their executive boards, the top decision-making body. Nevertheless, the role of executive boards extends well beyond policy making in terms of communication.

In the expert interviews, numerous organization representatives reported that the executive board has the ultimate authority to approve the policy even when it is made by other parties within the organization. Around a quarter of the organizations (f=24; f/n=23.3%) formed informal working groups specifically tasked with making Internet communication policy, creating the needed content and conducting the final operations. Informal groups are usually composed of staff from other departments or those in other positions with a certain degree of social media literacy. Contrary to these informal groups consisting amateurs by profession, about one fifth of the responding constituents (f=20; f/n=19.4%) employ dedicated corporate communication units that make the Internet communication policy along with other communicative strategies and operations. Corporate communication units typically involve communication professionals. 4 organizations (f/n=3.9%) employ a digital media manager instead of employing an in-house department of professionals. In 3 of the organizations (f/n=2.9%), communicative policy and operations are left to the discretion of the person(s) heading them. 8.7 percent (f=9) do not need a labor force in internet communication since they have no significant presence on the internet (See Appendix A, Table 110).

With the majority of the TS constituents, the person or the composition of the group responsible for communicative policy-making on the Internet have undergone a significant change since the 2013 Gezi Protests.

29 percent of the responding organizations (f=27) have replaced the person or all the members of the group of communicative policy-makers for the Internet over the years since 2013 protests. With 37.6% (f=35), although a majority of the group members have been replaced, some members have gone unchanged. In the 20.4 percent of the responding constituents (f=19), the majority of the internet communication policy-makers are still in the same positions; lastly 12.9 percent of

the organizations (f=12) have retained the Gezi-time communication professional for Internet communication (See Appendix A, Table 111).

Figure 57. Change in Communicative Decision-makers of Organized since Gezi Protests

Two interviewed professional organizations in the TS network maintain collective decision-making about social media publicity. In the case of the Association for Entertainment Venues in Beyoğlu, despite the fact that its representative reports posting singlehandedly on certain occasions, potential content is typically shared among the relevant personnel before it is posted (Interviewee 15, Personal communication, June 27, 2021). The other divides the communication work among executive board members, who communicate upcoming social media operations in a Whstapp group (Interviewee 19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021). Istanbul Chamber of Medicine (*Istanbul Tabip Odası*) carries out its social media affairs through a dedicated executive board member technically supported by others when needed. The member makes communicative decisions within the framework pre-determined by and often in consultation with the board (Interviewee 24, Personal communication, August 16, 2021). In the Green Left Party, likewise, one executive member, called press and communication coordinator, is charged with performing communicative operations. The member works in coordination with social media and communication commissions and is responsible for the accounts of both headquarters and regional offices (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021). Two

executive board members are charged with social media operations of *Halkevleri*, a left-wing political initiative. The members bridge between the board, which assigns social media campaigns and the related material and approves before the final publication, and a dedicated social media team. In addition to social media campaigns, the team is also charged with establishing and overseeing relations between the accounts of headquarters and local offices (Interviewee 16, Personal communication, July 1). In the case of the Kuzguncuk Residents Association (*Kuzguncuklular Derneği*), while content production and communication strategy are worked out collectively by the executive board, a member is tasked with final social media operations (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13, 2021).

The communicative organization of larger scale constituents display a significant difference regarding relations between social media operatives and final decision-makers. One of the major political parties in the TS network oversees the work of a communication bureau through a high-ranking executive. The communication bureau, consisting of 9-10, is online full time, creates content and operates as a corporate relations unit which provides communicative support to party politicians (Interviewee Interviewee 27, Personal communication, August 23, 2021). The Left Party [*Sol Parti*], the Freedom and Solidarity Party's [*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi*] successor has a dedicated publications unit which also carries out social media operations along with content production. (Interviewee 29, Personal communication, August 24, 2021). The Green Left Party, unlike other organizations, allows for a controlled chaos in social media decisions. However, managerial cadres interfere with a specialized social media team in certain cases and provide guidance about issues such as visual material (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021). The Communist Party of Turkey [*Türkiye Komünist Partisi*] also employs a professional social media team which oversees the operations of accounts of major regional offices, in addition to that of the headquarter. The team ensures the coordination between local and regional accounts (Interviewee 36, Personal Communication, October 9, 2021).

Validebağ Volunteers Association takes a more horizontalist approach with an unofficial Whatsapp group of decision-makers on the association's behalf. The group

assigns selected issues of importance or campaign materials to be posted on its internet outlets such Twitter, Facebook, Youtube. "*Decisions are never made singlehandedly. This is against our raison d'etre*", says a representative of the association (Interviewee 1, Personal communication, June 22, 2021). In an interesting observation of cross-recruitment, the representative of Istanbul Halkevleri takes part also in the social media team of Validebağ Volunteers Association and the account of the association's representative (Interviwee 8, Personal communication, November 11, 2021). An activist art group takes a similar approach and consults in a Whatsapp group consisting of active members of the organization (Interviewee 26, Personal communication, August 19, 2021). Informal organizations with modest teams and limited number of supporters assign social media work to voluntary individuals in their network (Interviewee 18, Personal communication, July 17, 2021; Interviewee 20, Personal Communication, August 4, 2021).

5.5.3. Information Dissemination

Social networks enhance public actors' ability to convey their message first-hand to the audience, bypassing gatekeeping mechanisms of traditional mainstream media institutions (Newman, 2009:5). TS constituents utilize social media as a form of shout-out. Majority of the organizations post press releases, declarations, announcements, criminal complaints, events and other forms of information on social media accounts. This is even more so with those having a limited degree of access to traditional media outlets and larger members and sympathizers residing away from the headquarters and overseas. Several constituents that own or control publications in online or print form, as well as constituents that are publications themselves, make best use of social networks to disseminate information. A number of political parties publishing news in the forms of daily newspaper, journal and web portal routinely share published news on their social media accounts. We also observe, in the expert interviews, manifestations of organization-based citizen journalism enabled by social networks. Certain organizations report from the ground on social issues, transmit information collected by their members. A few constituents share TS convention notes with the public on their pages. Facebook once played a key role in these operations along with propaganda activities, especially of those in the left that has

limited access to conventional media outlets. However, algorithmic changes on the site over the years have limited the organizations' capacity to diffuse information.

The representative of the Assembly of Socialist Engineers and Architects makes sense of what having social media tools at disposal means for TS organizations:

> "*I believe that we view those media as shout-out grounds, especially speaking of Twitter. Not as organizing-tools per se but capable of it. Rather than something that reproduces and reorganizes itself, it is like a hailer.*" (Interviewee 9, Personal communication, November 13, 2021).

She confirms that the assembly makes use of Twitter, Facebook and other platforms to circulate press releases and news stories after discussing with members on Whatsapp. She recalls the culmination of the organization's social media reach when 8-10 members of its staff created the Diaries of Urban Crimes, a blog published daily on the assembly's website and posted on its social media pages for several months. The representative observed that the publication of the diary contributed much to the assembly's visibility. Echoing her hailer metaphor, Mücadele Birliği publication's representative reminds the time when wall graffiti and posters were used for political campaigning and claims that they were replaced by social networks, which she describes as indispensable for communication. She emphasizes the feature of social networks which enables organizations to decide and convey what kind of reaction they want to organize around political developments (Interviewee 4, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). Crediting social media's capacity to transform, subjectify and comfort individuals, the representative of Istanbul Halkevi remembers the period before restrictive changes on Facebook's algorithms: "*When Facebook did not restrict users, it was a serious propaganda tool. It would have turned into something major ... We had a million interactions. Solely showing your [organization's] name to a million is a propaganda campaign, let alone conveying your idea. How much would such a campaign cost now?*" (Interviewee 8, Personal communication, November 11, 2021)

Social media editor of a socialist political party resembles the function of social media sites to that of the newspaper envisaged by Vladimir I. Lenin to justify socialist ideals:

> *"Here is what Lenin says in his book What is to Be Done: A newspaper needs to be published for the entire Russia. This is now Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Youtube… These replaced the newspaper's function. One need has always existed: Something is written about or recorded on video or photographed. Publication of or a treatise on this by a party or an association. This is the theory if it is a socialist [cause]. Explaining a certain ideology to everybody"* (Interviewee 3, January 18, 2022).

Like many other TS constituents, Haydarpaşa Solidarity manages its social media accounts in order to spread its message to as large an audience as possible (Interviewee 35, Personal communication, September 30, 2021). Another constituent posts activities of its regional chapters and posters to ensure the information flow to its followers. A representative of the organization confirms that the information posted on its social media pages contributes to its close contact with followers outside physical reach. It extensively transmitted its statements on political developments in the past years; nevertheless, the representative admits, the degree of social media activity has waned recently due to an organizational decline (Interviewee 6, Personal communication, March 26, 2022). The Istanbul Branch of the Association of Academic Staff [*Tüm Öğretim Elemanları Derneği İstanbul Şubesi*] regularly posts press releases, texts of criminal complaints, and statements condemning the government's policies on its social media accounts, particularly on Facebook and Twitter (Interviewee 2, Personal communication, October 18, 2021). A key TS organization using social media in a similar fashion, publishing documents of legal actions that it is involved in, Istanbul Chapter of TMMOB Chamber of City Planners [*TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası İstanbul Şubesi*] relied on social media's information diffuser role during Covid-19 lockdowns. Its representative maintains that developments in its professional area and legal processes were announced on social media pages since physical gatherings were not possible during the pandemic lockdowns (Interviewee 12, Personal communication, December 10, 2021).

The representative of the Istanbul branch of Halkevleri, a left-wing political initiative, recalls that his organization witnessed periods when Facebook was more useful to reach out to people than distributing print leaflets. Admitting that restrictions Facebook introduced over the years curbed the benefit of the platform for organizations, he claims that his branch enlarged its follower base by operating its

pages as a citizen-journalism portal than that of organization. The branch heeded the trend of the moment to decide about posts, a style which appealed to social media users across many platforms. Its members reported about rallies from the ground with multimedia material used in the posts. As the audience could access reliable and first-hand information, he concludes, the organization built new followers (Interviewee 8, Personal communication, November 11, 2021). In a more TS-related practice, the local office of a professional organization bridges the information gap between coalitions in which the organization takes part, including the TS and its members and followers. On its social media account, the organization shares highlights, or minutes, of coalition conventions in an effort to provide more transparency about the organization activity (Interviewee 19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021).

For a major political party in the TS, the capability of information dissemination is extra important due to the media censorship. The party has been isolated from the mainstream media and has very limited access. Therefore, it has honed its capacity to take advantage of social media reach and utilize every platform at its disposal such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Youtube, Flickr among others to bypass media blackout (Interviewee 28, Personal communication, August 23, 2021).

Contrary to the case of organizations with limited mainstream media access, another group of constituents are advantaged in that they either own or publish traditional media outlets. The Left Party, in addition to its active presence on social media, publishes Birgün, a daily print and online newspaper. Although the party's representative we interviewed denies the claim that the daily is the official publication of the party, he admits political and ideological proximity between the two. He notes that the Birgün is an advantage for the party's social media presence and its content is extensively published on the party's social media accounts (Interviewee 29, Personal communication, August 24, 2021). Another political party with owning or controlling multiple publications such as newspapers and journals sees circulating self-created content over its social media outlets as the fastest method of transmitting it to followers, coupled with an email newsletter service (Interviewee 36, Personal communication, October 9, 2021).

In one unusual case, grassroot-initiated Facebook groups proved more efficient in reaching the audience base of Tozkoparan Association, a neighborhood solidarity organization. The organization circulated information about the neighborhood and its campaigns, and participated in public discussion in Facebook groups launched and administered by individuals residing in the area. The representative of the group maintains that the residents' distance against formal associations made Facebook groups an efficient media to transmit information from opinion leaders and organizations to the public. He adds that traditional campaigning methods did not work as well as Facebook groups in reaching people from all walks of life and drew them to civic discussion about the developments in the area (Interviewee 25, Personal communication, August 18, 2021).

5.5.4. Corporate Communication Policy: Predesigned or Spontaneous?

One determinant of organizations' communication practices is whether they arrange communicative operations under pre-established rules, charters or guidelines, or decide it on the go. This corporate habit is extra important when the organizations are involved in politics and matters of public importance at varying levels. Our interviews demonstrate that Turkey's ever-changing political atmosphere fosters spontaneous communicative practices for many TS constituents as they feel the need to respond to political developments. Particularly, political parties and initiatives foreground more agenda-oriented discourse. Long-established institutions, on the other hand, are inclined to manage online communication according to pre-established rules of a variety of forms such as verbally-agreed principles and founding statutes, the latter usually serving as a framework for overall communication strategy. Special dates such as memorial days, awareness weeks are an integral element of predesigned communication for many organizations.

A representative justifies the spontaneous decision-making behind the social media communication of the Green Left Party with the Internet's chaotic nature: "*It is imperative to allow for chaos to a certain extent*" Party executives let social media teams make mistakes on social media and they step in to correct discursive or content failings by individuals where needed. The party takes this strategy to prevent

estrangement of communication teams from the Internet medium, which the party views as a political arena for its advocacy (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021). A representative of the Association for Entertainment Venues in Beyoğlu points to the unpredictability of the business that the association represents. The association responds to flash business developments on its social media outlets instantly. However, he emphasizes that this spontaneity works only within the limits of the institution's ethical undertakings, vision, mission, collaborative decision-making (Interviewee 15, Personal communication, June 27, 2021). An activist art group ensures collective decision-making among active members even if they have to carry out unplanned social media activity. Its spokesman confirms that the group has no written set of rules or a guideline of any sort (Interviewee 26, Personal communication, August 19, 2021). Kuzguncuk Residents Association's communication decision-makers consist of politically like-minded individuals which allows for rapid collective agreement on the policy. Its representative rejects the existence of a set of principles by which they decide whether to publish a possible content (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13, 2021). Two left-wing political parties in the TS network manage social media operations casually as they usually have to respond to breaking current affairs. One party follows a deliberate policy of not professionalizing its social media communication in effort to keep offline campaigning active (Interviewee 36, Personal communication, October 9, 2021; Interviewee 37, Personal communication, October 11, 2021).

Following a discursive guideline on the Internet, whether it is a written set of rules, the organization's statute, founding principles, or verbally agreed conventions, is a common practice among TS constituents. Halkevleri, a nationwide-organized political initiative, is an exception in strictly sticking to a charter that lays out rules for social media operations. Its representative observes "*we have principles, resolutions and rules. Even if team members change, [social media] operations are carried out in the same framework.*" The initiative keeps its own agenda independently from that of the nation and promotes it on social media sites (Interviewee 16, Personal communication, July 1, 2021). Executive boards members of a solidarity association and a professional organization also report the organizations' adherence to a priorly adopted guidelines, with the latter calling it a

"*loose framework*" (Interviewee 17, Personal communication, July 17, 2021; Interviewee 19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021). A representative of the Istanbul Chapter of TMMOB Chamber of City Planners [*TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası İstanbul Şubesi*], calls it "*building on tradition*" rather than operating in accord with codified rules or principles. The organization perpetuates, for instance, its Twitter content and style shaped by its tradition (Interviewee 12, Personal communication, December 10, 2021). "*We should think of it as a template rather than rules*" says Left Party's representative. On critical developments, the party trespasses the usual communication framework and publishes extra information depending on the agenda. He argues that being a political party, it needs to combine and reconcile topics on and off agenda. While the party continuously brings up off-agenda information such as expropriation, secularism; flash developments that need rapid response, such as controversial remarks of a government official, interrupt ongoing campaigns. The party raises issues independent from the agenda, however, it turns matters of everyday developments into constant campaigns when its managerial bodies decide (Interviewee 29, Personal communication, August 24, 2021). Like the Left Party, Validebağ Volunteers Association reports context-specific use of social media communication as long as the discourse stays within the confines of environmental rights (Interviewee 1, Personal communication, June 22, 2021). A solidarity association alternating the two communication styles on the Internet regularly publishes memorial statements; nevertheless, it does not abstain from responding to abrupt social, political, urban, environmental developments by posting a declaration (Interviewee 17, Personal communication, July 7, 2021).

5.5.5. Convergence and Divergence of Online Discourses between Taksim Solidarity and the Constituents

Similarity of online content disseminated by the constituents, to that of each other and the TS secretariat, is a direct indicator of the extent of the discursive unison among the coalition, hence, of the way they organize their online communication strategy in relation to each other. To measure the discursive similarity, we developed a four-step relational coverage scale. We measured the frequency that constituents cover topics that correspond to each step on social media.

Figure 58. Frequency of Topic Types Appearing on Constituents Social Media

The frequency analysis reveals that the TS constituents' social media coverage is largely independent from the coalitions' common discourse and individual-interest oriented. Rates of disinterest in the coalition's common discourse is telling: Only a minority of the TS constituents cite in their own social media coverage the topics covered by the TS secretariat and majority of the constituents. The share of those who never cover topics posted by the secretariat (f=50, f/n=49) and the majority of the member organizations (f=52, f=51%), are over three times higher than those who never cover any socially or politically relevant information (f=14, f=13.7%) and around five times higher than that of those who cover the topics of organization's own interests at varying frequencies (f=11, f=10.8%). About a quarter of the constituents (f=26, f/n=25.5) post about topics covered by the secretariat only several times a year, while 9.8% (f=10) several times a month (See Appendix A, Table 65).

In the coverage frequency of topics of interests of constituents' majority, organizations unite further, with 15.7% (f=16) covering several times a year and

173

another 15.7% (f=16) covering several times a month. 4.9% (f=5) posts common topics several times a week (See Appendix A, Table 66)

When asked independently from the TS network, the coverage figures of issues of political and social importance drastically improves in higher frequency categories. Organizations covering any political or social topics daily amount to 28.4% of the members (f=29), with 13.7% (f=14) posting or retweeting/sharing/reposting all day long (See Appendix A, Table 67).

The last category that we measured deals with topics of the organizations' own interest such as professional matters or information that falls within their field of operation. Increase in the coverage figures of this category denotes the fact that organizations' social media discourse is bound to their individual agenda and interest rather than the shared agenda among the TS network. In this category, the share of daily posters climbs up to 41.1% (f=42), with 17.6% (f=18) posting throughout the day. While only less than 3 percent of the constituents (f=3, f=2.9%) post as rarely as several times a year, 20.6% (f=21) post several times a week, 12.7% (f=13) several times a month (See Appendix A, Table 68).

Majority of organizations interviewed are distanced from involvement in politics in social media discourse and prefer to stay within the confines of their main issue of advocacy. It is the common ground that they choose to unite with people across the political spectrum. The fear of politicization and, hence, disfavor by the government and local authority is observable as a result of authoritarian climate. However, one should note that for many constituent representatives interviewed, the definition of "the political" is limited to everyday party politics and broader issues of social importance such as environment and gender equality are considered more legitimate to advocate for. Therefore, these social issues are often seen in the organizations' social media discourse. As another rationale prominent in taking a professional-oriented discourse, the organizations do not deem themselves relevant for issues that fall outside their field of activity, as a part of issue-based activism tendency elaborated in the next chapter. Several organizations include broader public concerns in their rhetoric only from the perspective of their primary issue of advocacy.

Involvement in politics and boundaries of political discourse are a thorny issue for many organizations, and sparked fierce debates among managerial cadres.

The representative of Validebağ Volunteers Association cites the risk of division among the group as a reason for its discursive non-involvement in politics: "*If we attempted to develop a shared political discourse it would divide us. We shall debate politics for hours for no success. It shall separate us into camps, break asunder. We do not need this. What is our common ground? Validebağ grove. Let's talk about this.*" Referencing the polarized political environment, his remarks demonstrate that the group does not want to be identified with a political camp beyond the general political struggles, particularly that of environmentalists. It does not get into election debates but raises environmental rights. "*We have no reservation in this* [constitutional rights]. *But the closer these constitutional rights get, the farther away we move.*" (Interviewee 1, Personal communication, June 22, 2021). Along the same line, the Association for Entertainment Venues in Beyoğlu stands clear of political online discourse, citing concerns over ostracization by local authorities. While its representative strictly emphasizes the organization's distance from everyday politics, he points to its implicit touch on social issues such as women's rights and suggests that NGOs in Turkey are by nature political and oppositionist. He also relates the interest of the organization in social issues with its own perspective, its commercial concerns (Interviewee 15, Personal communication, June 27, 2021). The representative of the Assembly of Socialist Engineers, Architects and City Planners (*Toplumcu Mühendis, Mimar ve Şehir Plancıları Meclisi*) states that the informal group stays within the boundaries of topics of its interest in its social media discourse. She believes that there is a division of labor in the contemporary Turkish activism scene and it is not the organization's job to be involved in everyday politics, but political parties'. For her, each organization should tackle the social problems that they are supposed to (Interviewee 9, Personal communication, November 13, 2021). The chairperson of an informal neighborhood organization states that, even though it gives voice to other social struggles, notably environmental advocacy, its Facebook page consists of content related predominantly to the problems that the organization deals with. She adds that whether to state its stance on public issues was discussed among organization members but most opposed to the idea (Interviewee

20, Personal communication, August 4, 2021). Association of Kuzguncuk Residents is another organization careful not to trespass the boundaries of its own field of work and environmental concerns. Its representative subscribes to the broader definition of the word "political" and admits that they covered issues such as women's rights, annulment of the Istanbul Convention in rare occasions. However, the organization's online content typically stays within the limits of its discursive preferences (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13).

Other organizations that tackle broader public agenda than their own relate it with their prioritized issues of interest. One of these organizations, Women for Women's Human Rights - New Ways incorporates women's perspective when its social media team decides touching a nationwide public issue. The organization, for instance, declares its position on the economic crisis through the lenses of women's economic despair, government's refugee policies through the state of refugee women, ecology issues through interviews with activist women. The association never engages in party politics, but it declares its stance on issues and cooperates - online and offline - with civil society working on the issue, says its representative we interviewed (Interviewee 11, Personal communication, December 2, 2021). A professional solidarity association includes issues of public concern as long as it sees violation of humanitarian values (Interviewee 19, August 3, 2021). Haydarpaşa Solidarity for the City and Environment (*Kent ve Çevre için Haydarpaşa Dayanışması*), for its representative, is more liberal selecting topics for its social media coverage. The informal conservationist group, alongside its original topic of advocacy, preservation of the historic Haydarpaşa Train Station, covers social and political issues such as privatization and corruption cases. He notes that they seek consensus among constituents for publishing the content (Interviewee 35, Personal communication, September 30, 2021).

5.5.6. Dominant Discourse

As shown in the preceding section, small-scale organizations with specific fields of activity such as resident solidarity, regional conservation, professional solidarity and environment among others, prefer a social media discourse largely motivated by

attracting attention of the shareholders of the issues. The more an organization tends to perform political activity, the larger its boundaries are to step in concrete, everyday politics in its online campaigning discourse. While, for instance, Validebağ Volunteers Association's publicity, apart from the conservation of Validebağ, is limited to conservationist campaigns in other regions, and at most, to the raising of human rights violations (Interviewee 1, Personal communication, June 22, 2021); posting subjects of nation-wide organized organizations such as the Left Party and *Halkevleri* encompass most of the issues that thematic organizations touch upon (Interviewee 16, Personal communication, July 1, 2021; Interviewee 29, Personal communication, August 24, 2021). Self-organized events are standard content posted by the majority of TS constituents.

As significant as the topics that the TS constituents prefer to cover is the tone and references of the language used in social media commentary and announcements. Our expert interviews reveal that many of the constituents regard the language of feminist and ecologist movements and use it as a frame of reference. Another common characteristic across a majority of constituents is the use of the jargon of left-wing politics. A group of constituents prefer corporate language rather than informal expressions. Others point to social platforms' urge to use succinct language. These subscribe to pithy expressions of opinion and wishes. Visual material also displays more or less the same traits of the verbal discourse. It is also remarkable that a number of professional organizations pay strict attention to the accuracy of information in their specialization areas.

Avoidance of sexist language is a shared characteristic by many organizations. Use of masculine, misogynic tone on social media is a red line for a number of organizations. (Interviewee 1, Personal communication, June 22, 2021; Interviewee 9, Personal communication, November 13, 2021; Interviewee 16, Personal communication, July 1, 2021; Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13, 2021). The ecologist references also emerge to be one of the dominant emphases in constituents' social media discourse. The prevalence of the ecologist language extends beyond the environmentalist organizations (Interviewee 1, Personal communication, June 22, 2021; Interviewee 9, Personal communication, November

13, 2021). For professional organizations, accuracy of information within their expertise area is a central issue. An organization representative states that the organization bears the responsibility of disseminating accurate information from its outlets for the organization is a professional solidarity. It also heeds the sensitivities of the left in its language use. For instance, she reports, its social media team deliberately avoids including words such as private property and inheritance (Interviewee 9, Personal communication, November 13, 2021). Sharing this concern, the representative of *Halkevleri* adds other references that the organization avoids including in its posts as violence-promoting, nationalist, sectarian, racist and speciesist. He observes that the organization ensures that its online posts are shaped in pithy, articulate and intelligible manner (Interviewee 16, Personal communication, July 1, 2021). The representative of the Association of Consumer Consciousness Development [*Tüketici Bilincini Geliştirme Derneği*] points to the importance of adopting a plain language on social media. The association posts its messages in slogan-like expressions (Interviewee 34, Personal communication, September 27, 2021). The Istanbul office of a professional organization, however, formulates its posts in a corporate style addressing its audience in a bureaucratic tone (Interviewee 19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021). The Green Left Party prioritizes short-texted social media posts. A representative of the party believes "*social media teaches us how to spread the word in the easiest way like a pill.*" She highlights the tendency to reach consensus through short words and short hashtags, adding that they are usually the expression of concrete demands rather than analysis and long form prose. Echoing other organizations, she reports that the party never shares posts containing discriminatory, racist, violence-promoting, insulting remarks (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021). The representative of the Kuzguncuk Residents Association claims that the association shapes its social media posts in a constructive and reconciliatory, and somewhat didactic manner rather than agitative and manipulative one (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13, 2021). Social Democracy Foundation follows a corporate but flexible language in its online communication in line with its political content. Its representative, however, says that they strive to adapt to the informal environment of social media (Interviewee 22, Personal communication, August 12, 2021).

5.5.7. Encouragement for Political Participation

The interviews with constituent representatives reveal details about their social media discourse with respect to encouraging political participation. Whereas organizations putting an instructive discourse at the forefront of their communicative strategy strive to evoke consciousness and refresh the public memory, intrinsically, political initiatives prefer more participation-oriented discourse - both in online and offline realm.

The Association for Entertainment Venues in Beyoğlu, a sector-specific professional organization and a TS constituent, calls clients of its corporate members for action to hold them accountable within the framework of civil responsibility and, specifically consumer rights. The organization's representative, however, adds that they resort to both encouraging and instructive discourse depending on the situation (Interviewee 15, Personal communication, June 27, 2021). *Halkevleri* uses social media for calling its supporters to street protests as well as hashtag campaigns. The organization also promotes online reaction against wrongdoings of public authority, for instance, in the form of inviting its followers to comment on a post after tagging the wrongdoer (Interviewee 16, Personal communication, July 1, 2021). The representative of the publication *Mücadele Birliği* also confirms that the publication often invites its readers to its gatherings and collective work. She implies that, rather than campaigning online, the publication tends to organize or take part in offline action (Interview 4, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). Kuzguncuk Residents Association takes a softer tone in participation encouragement, possibly as a result of its character as a neighborhood organization, and publishes inducement messages for desired policies and values, rather than call for action posts (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13, 2021). A professional organization urges its followers to exercise various rights of civic participation such petition rights, right of information among others. The organization provides guidance to its followers on how to exercise the participation rights, through hashtag campaigns and instructive visuals (Interviewee 19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021).

Organizations that opt for passive social media discourse, on the other hand, configure the post language so as to keep the public's collective memory fresh on

certain historical events or awareness days or weeks. The representative of the Validebağ Volunteers Association asserts that the association posts information on spontaneous subjects within the association's focus to keep the public awareness fresh. He also underlines that they also utilize social networks to fight disinformation by public authorities by posting reliable information to correct false knowledge (Interviewee 1, Personal communication, June 22, 2021). "What we do is informing [our followers] … just as organizing information meetings and forums." executive board member of an association observes. It publishes memorials of political violence and terror victims (Interviewee 17, Personal communication, July 7, 2021).

Unlike organizations that prefer one type of discourse - instructive or encouraging - over another, Istanbul Branch of Association of Academic Staff (*Tüm Öğretim Elemanları Derneği İstanbul Şubesi*) and the Social Democracy Foundation take the midway, posting social media content in either tone depending on the situation. (Interviewee 2, Personal communication, October 18, 2021). The representative of the Social Democracy Foundation reports that it utilizes social media sites to 1) inform followers about the organization's work, 2) to make its stance in political controversies clear, 3) produce content supportive to disadvantaged groups. He emphasizes that the organization's members are politically so active that its discursive encouragement is limited to providing stimulus only (Interviewee 22, Personal communication, August 12, 2021).

5.5.8. Digital Tools Used to Increase User Engagement by the Movement

The methods used by the constituents for engagement growth span a wide range of activities both online and offline. We measured a selection of these activities, especially those relevant in context of the Taksim Solidarity coalition. While some of the practices measured may be helpful to increase engagement rate independently, several of them have the potential of harnessing the popularity and sympathizer base of the Taksim Solidarity.

The most popular practice aiming to attract more followers to the account is keeping the social media traffic of the organization high. Three quarters of the responding

constituents (f=78) keep their social media accounts active in an effort to reach out to a broader public.

Figure 59. Popular Social Media Features to Increase User Engagement

47.1 percent (f=49) introduce their social media outlets by physical means such as announcements during events, publishing account links on leaflets and other print material distributed by the organization and, in rare cases, by verbal means. While over 40 percent (f=42; f/n=40.4%) tag other TS constituents in their posts, only a quarter (f=26; f/n=25%) tag the secretariat.

The secretariat's popularity plays a less important role in its constituents' effort to broaden their follower base than interaction with each other. A significant part of the constituents (f=40; f/n=38.5%) expect follower and visitor growth by tagging accounts of renowned figures such as celebrities, opinion leaders, politicians and other people of a certain level of fame. Even though many representatives expressed disagreement with the practice, 28.8 percent (f=30) purchase sponsored content promotion from platforms in order to appear to a wider and more relevant audience. Only 7.7 percent (f=8) reply to posts by accounts or users with a high number of followers, expecting to increase the salience of the organization's account (See Appendix A, Tables 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109).

5.6. Chapter Summary

The demographic data reveals that the TS is a heterogeneous network of activist organizations. Executive boards, informal working groups and professional communication departments are the main actors in communicative decision-making in most of the constituents.

Several online connectivity indicators show that the TS network is a very sparse, disconnected network, deplete with isolated nodes. Online network of the constituents and the secretariat has a higher cohesion on Twitter rather than Facebook, possibly due to the secretariat's regularly updated Twitter account. The information exchange as well as the manifestations of solidarity over public platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are extremely poor. The penetration and infrequent information exchange rates slightly increase on non-public media such as email and Whatsapp. Although they are clearly no substitute for publicly available platforms, more constituents prefer their domestic TS communication not to be publicly accessible. Likewise, interaction within the TS network through non-verbal Internet applications is extremely limited despite short-term increases and fluctuations over the years between 2013 and 2019. The coalition's online deliberation also displays a fluctuating trend over time. However, the constituents' use of online applications for deliberative purposes with domestic and international users is very limited, especially on public platforms. Constituents mainly use hashtags in political discussion rather than plain text. Overwhelming majority of the hashtag discussions revolve around political issues. Unlike domestic online communication inside the coalition, a significant share of the constituents communicate with international organizations for deliberation and solidarity on social platforms.

The coalition members' online communication with the follower, supporter and volunteer base takes on a different outlook in terms of use practices. Majority of the members communicate with their base on public social media platforms. Social networks serve many of the constituents with limited access to mass media as the

only conduit through which they can reach out to the public. This also holds for those owning a traditional media outlet such as print or online publication.

For a majority of organizations, with the exception of those who enjoy vast resources, social media serve as a conduit to disseminate information about their activity, calls for action, advocacy and publications. Significance of this role is amplified even more in the case of the organizations that suffer from mainstream media isolation. Platforms also function as an information desk for the majority of coalition members. Organizations receive regular feedback in written form from followers, supporters and sympathizers through a variety of Internet applications. Despite the one-way information flow from audience to the organization, political discussion between the two parties is almost non-existent. Many organizations deliberately avoid public discussion with the audience.

While a wide range of features and applications of social media platforms are widely used by TS organizations to encourage followers to participate in politics, they seem to have helped the majority of the organizations either retain or enlarge their online follower base as well as offline participation in their activity.

Constituents display differing levels of discursive identification with the TS secretariat. While about one third of the constituents identify insofar as they take part in disseminating the secretariat's online messages. A smaller yet still considerable share of constituents demonstrate higher levels of identification and contribute to the messages drafted by the Secretariat. In terms of posting topics, however, the constituents' preferred agenda is independent from that of the TS secretariat. Small or middle scale organizations settle for communicating the topics of their issue of advocacy, whereas political initiatives and parties embrace wider aspects of everyday politics and ideological struggle.

CHAPTER 6

BIG DISCONNECTION: ASPECTS OF ONLINE DISORGANIZATION AMONG TODAY'S TAKSIM SOLIDARITY

As the previous chapters empirically demonstrated, the 128-member TS coalition's online connectivity, interaction and deliberation remained extremely limited. Impacted by the outburst of Covid-19 pandemic for almost 2 years, a group of organizations adopted online technologies that they had long neglected, while others' detachment grew due to the disappearance of in-person meetings, the sole communication channel for some constituents with the rest of the coalition. Views of representatives of TS member organizations demonstrate that the disconnection goes far beyond an online detachment, mostly driven by political and organizational divisions. The representative of TMMOB Chamber of Electrical Engineers (*TMMOB Elektrik Mühendisleri Odası*) believes that the entire coalition suffers from an organizational disconnection. It is not only between the core organizations and the rest of the movement but also among the latter (Interviewee 10, Personal communication, November 25, 2021). In this chapter, we investigate the underlying reasons and possible consequences of the TS's online fragmentation.

6.1. Reasons Underlying the Online Disconnection among Taksim Solidarity

In order to gain insight into the causes of online disconnection among the Taksim Solidarity coalition, we conducted 35 expert interviews (Meuser & Nagel, 2009) with TS member organizations' representatives such as chairs, decision-makers, communication executives and social media editors. Following the analysis of the insight provided by the experts, certain political-sociological, organizational and communicative patterns of reasons for the online disconnection surfaced. The discouraging impact of rising authoritarianism was a common observation across

many respondents, specifically in the form of censorship and self-censorship. Shortage of human resource capable of dealing with online communication and operating social networking tools, and digital illiteracy resulting from aging organization personnel, disbelief in digital visibility and effectiveness of digital networking were cited frequently as a determinant of organizational Internet immaturity and hence TS's poor effectiveness over social networks. The very same reason also poised an organizational background as seen in the waning organizational relations as a result of individual-bound ties between organizations. The political culture, which does not welcome public interaction but favors in-person relationships, is also seen as an obstacle to achieving public connectivity and deliberation, integral elements of political transparency. A political rationale frequently cited as behind the weak social network ties among the TS coalition appears to be its hierarchical organization. Many organizations' representatives expressed that, over the past 9 years since Gezi protests, the coalition transformed into a hierarchical structure from its horizontalist promises in the Gezi era and disappointment with their isolation from the TS network and activity. Decline in perceived political efficacy and the role of Covid-19 pandemic were among the arguments for the failure of TS in becoming - both organizationally and online - a well networked movement.

6.1.1. Rising Authoritarianism and Free Speech Violations

The Gezi protests are commonly seen as a landmark for the authoritarian turn in Turkey. The protests would be followed by corruption scandals, a failed coup attempt and a long-term emergency rule, all of which jointly paved the way to an unprecedented control over mass media, curbing of free speech through a series of legislations and harassment of social media users for government critique. A rising number of dissidents were imprisoned for their critical views expressed on networks. When it comes to dissident organizations, rather than individual users, higher visibility of corporate accounts attracts increased hostile attention. We observed that while corporate entities, on one hand, are less limited in voicing their dissent, on the other hand, they are also wary of attracting the fury of judges to their organization, which may end up in total seizure by government through appointed trustees. Several

organization representatives pointed to the detrimental impact of judicial harassment on the present failure of TS networking, both online and offline.

The representative of Kuzguncuk Residents Association finds authoritarian contemporary politics an important factor in, both online and offline, the weak organization of the TS coalition. Drawing on her community level observations, she adds that the repression evokes the sentiments of despair, passivity and inaction at solidarity level too (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13,2021). The representative of another constituent, Association of Consumer Consciousness Development (*Tüketici Bilincini Geliştirme Derneği*), confirms the impact of free speech violations on the disorganization of the TS in what he calls "*mass intimidation policy*", citing unjust imprisonment of critics on social media (Interviewee 34, Personal communication, September 27, 2021). The representative of Istanbul Chapter of TMMOB Chamber of City Planners, a core constituent in TS, notes that the core and most active institutions in the coalition are the main victims of judicial processes, and adds, "*Others might have been affected by this hegemony of horror and stepped back*" (Interviewee 12, Personal communication, October, 12, 2021). Head of an informal neighborhood organization reminds interrogation calls to social media users for even simple critique and states that as a result, people stay away from expressing their dissent on social media. Even as the head of a non-political community organization, she was warned by friends for her public critique, she adds (Interviewee 20, Personal communication, August 4, 2021).

6.1.2. Deficit of Human Resource

"*Professional use of social media technologies requires another level of support. Not every organization's social media capability and access are at that level.*" says an executive board member of the Istanbul branch of a professional organization, adding the pandemic factor in the recent spread of these technologies (Interviewee 19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021). Literacy and expertise are key for effective use of social networking technologies at corporate level. The lack of this capacity in a majority of constituent organizations keeps the coalition's digital networking capabilities inadequate. The widespread absence of human and financial

resources allotted to the adoption and continued operation of social network tools, hence digital illiteracy of organization personnel hampered the development of cadres capable of effectively carrying out social media communication among the coalition. While most of the constituent organizations have units or individuals tasked with social media communication, only major players with vast funds employ professionals. Most organizations' social media operations are performed by employees with amateur level literacy or through cross-assignments. The domestic Internet illiteracy problem causes many organizations to stick to obsolete communication approaches in an ever-changing technological environment and hindered a well-connected digital network among the coalition, the field interviews show.

The representative of Istanbul branch of *Halkevleri*, a left-wing political initiative, underlines the limited and problematic relationship of Turkey's left with technology, referencing the predominantly left-wing composition of the Taksim Solidarity. "*The social media of younger and more active leftist groups are managed better. The others are just mediocre*", he notes as an exception (Interviewee 8, Personal communication, November 11, 2011). He claims that a renewal of organizational staff would enhance organizations' capacity to benefit from social network technologies. "*However, this is not possible where this capacity is non-existing*" (Interviewee 8, Personal communication, November 11, 2011). Observations of Tozkoparan Association' representative reinforce his remarks. He notes a general lack of personnel rejuvenation in civil society. Organization's deprivation of younger teams prevents them from responding to the digital operational needs, he notes. "*Organizations where old cadres, old tools and old logic reign, including ours, operate with traditional communication devices.*" His view is in line with the interviewed representative of *Halkevleri*. He lists phone, print material, pamphlet, posters, banners among these traditional communication means that organizations opt for. He claims that although his organization uses email and Whatsapp for communicating with members, it is far from having a systematic social media communication planning and strategy (Interviewee 25, Personal communication, August 18, 2021). The case for a left-wing informal political initiative, as conveyed by one of its representatives in an interview, is no different than this description. She

admits that her organization's social media communication is spontaneous and unsystematic as it failed to task an employee with the relevant knowledge and could have reached a larger social audience if Twitter and Instagram were used effectively (Interviewee 6, Personal communication, March 26, 2022).

The digital illiteracy caused by the widespread lack of human resource among constituent organizations pose an obstacle to proliferation of Internet technologies and publicly available organizational networking. The representative of Istanbul Branch of Association of Academic Staff (*Tüm Öğretim Elemanları Derneği İstanbul Şubesi*) describes the phenomenon as a reaction of their members to technology adoption. She illustrates her colleagues' distance to social media in their own words: "*Social media is an information garbage!*" While many in the organization prefer phone and face-to-face communication, she notes colleagues incapable of using email technology (Interviewee 2, Personal communication, October 18, 2021). To illustrate the scope of the organizational know-how deficit, the representative of *İstanbul Halkevi* remembers that they were not able to find digitally literate members for a multi-organization hashtag campaign only several years ago (Interviewee 8, Personal communication, November 11, 2011).

The representative of TMMOB Chamber of Electrical Engineers (*TMMOB Elektrik Mühendisleri Odası*), one of several core organizations of the TS upholds the claims of aging staff as the cause of poor social media adoption which, he believes, eventually leads to the main problem for many organizations: Visibility. He explains the reluctance to social media adoption with higher average age of decision makers. "*As a result of aging personnel, those channels cannot be established.*" He reports that the Instagram page of his organization was inactive for 5 years, and it is adapting to social media communication very slowly. He also notes that organizational decision-making mechanisms are still too slow to respond to the needs of this type of instant communication (Interviewee 10, Personal communication, November 25, 2021). The representative of the Istanbul Chamber of Medicine (*İstanbul Tabip Odası*) agrees with the view that the staff with the needed capacity are not represented in decision-making mechanisms. For him, the majority of civil society organizations are incapacitated by traditional workflow and bureaucracy and this

applies to almost all civil society from socialist to professional organizations, including TS members, with the exception of feminist and ecology movement organizations (Interviewee 24, Personal communication, August 16, 2021).

6.1.3. Hierarchical Structure

An extremely heterogeneous coalition, the Taksim Solidarity consists of organizations from all walks of life, issue advocacy groups, formal and informal organizations, political parties, trade unions, professional associations, organizations of different sizes with a variety of financial resources. While they all joined the TS before or during the Gezi Park protests, the coalition has grown more hierarchical over time. DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions), KESK (Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions), TMMOB (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects), İstanbul Tabip Odası (Istanbul Chamber of Medicine) constituted the core and coordinating body of the TS, as well as of many Istanbul-based activist platforms, since its early days. The composition of the TS Secretariat mirrored the core position of the four organizations. Despite the privileged position of the four organizations, along with others well-connected with them, the movement maintained its horizontalist discourse. Organizational transformation of the coalition, however, compromised the inclusive decision-making mechanism of the Gezi era. Representatives of the smaller-scale and less active organizations are left isolated from the decision-making mechanisms and communication channels of the coalition, and marginalized, our interviews reveal.

While the represenative of the informal conservationist group Haydarpaşa Solidarity for the City and Environment (*Kent ve Çevre için Haydarpaşa Dayanışması*) asserts that, especially in face-to-face meeting context, each organization has a voice, he does not rule out the possibility of relative hierarchy, drawing on his first-hand experience. He admits that several of the core organizations take the decisions and drafts legal documents and his organization joins its signatory parties (Interviewee 35, Personal communication, September 30, 2021). The representative of the TMMOB Chamber of Electrical Engineers agrees on the hierarchy in the decision-making mechanism of the coalition, in the sense of shortcomings in its participatory

character. Yet, he contests the idea that the coalition's inaction is the outcome of its hierarchical nature; he instead suggests that advocacy issues of the TS, namely urban issues, specifically conservation of the Gezi Park, are off the public opinion. (Interviewee 10, Personal communication, November 25, 2011). Social media manager of a trade union's Istanbul office states that despite their participation in TS members' event, they do not receive any invitation or call from the network. He views their isolation from the network as a result of the fact that their membership in the TS is "left only on paper". *"They registered us upon our participation in the Gezi Protests. … Afterwards, we have never been called for a meeting; we have never been contacted following the Gezi episode."* (Interviewee 33, Personal communication, September 22, 2021). He adds that they are not in the coalition's Whatsapp group, otherwise they would voice their views there. He also believes that many other constituents are excluded from the group. *"They seem to be focused on themselves."* The experience of the representative of the Istanbul Branch of Association of Academic Staff (*Tüm Öğretim Elemanları Derneği İstanbul Şubesi*) endorses these claims. She remembers no incoming phone or email contact from the rest of the network. She was not involved in the organization during the protests, however, she notes no contact effort by the TS with herself of the organization through its contact person since then. She states that if contacted, she would have gladly met, participated in their meetings, tried to know them and see what kind of an opposition they can jointly form (Interviewee 2, Personal communication, October 18, 2021). Confirming the previous observations, the representative of the Association of Consumer Consciousness Development, states that his organization was not invited for the 98 percent of the TS meetings (Interviewee 34, Personal communication, September 27, 2021). Finding this centralist approach reasonable to a certain extent, he asserts that it damaged the coalition itself rather than the constituents. The representative contends that the hierarchy in the movement rendered it vulnerable to "what awaits it in the future", referencing the challenges of state criminalization and judicial harassment of the movement members. The aforementioned social media manager of the trade union opines that the exclusion of many organizations from communication channels intends at concentrating the decision-making in the hands of a few organizations (Interviewee 33, Personal communication, September 22, 2021). *"When a righteous movement cannot survive,*

you should acknowledge that it has been directed to somewhere. I think it is the case with the TS" (Interviewee 33, Personal communication, September 22, 2021).

One needs to consider the role of heterogeneity inside the coalition in the formation of hierarchical decision-making, moving away from its early discourse of horizontalism. From its foundation in 2012 on, the TS has been a compilation of extremely dissimilar groups across ideology, formal status, size, organization, funding, advocacy issue and legal liability lines. This very diversity has made it harder for the coalition to take decision and action as a bloc. The differences of preferred working frameworks caused severe disagreements among the constituents on the form, content, pace, extent and direction of collective action. Possibly, the current organizational and communicative fragmentation of the coalition could be linked to the heterogeneity which came along throughout its lifetime. Organization representatives see this as a potential reason for the disconnection among the coalition. The representative of the Association of Consumer Consciousness Development, for instance, states that his observation points to the heterogeneity of the coalition as the reason for difficulties to overcome existing problems between constituents (Interviewee 34, Personal communication, September 27, 2021). The representative of the TMMOB Chamber of Electrical Engineers underscores the irreconcilable individual agendas imposed on the coalition's collective agenda. He reminds the existence of constituents with different levels of legal viability and the incompatibility of constituents' projections for the overall coalition. He also acknowledges the distinction in collective action patterns between the core organizations, TMMOB members, DISK, KESK and Istanbul Chamber of Medicine, and the rest of the coalition members. (Interviewee 10, Personal communication, November 25, 2011).

6.1.4. Various Reasons Reported by Organization Representatives

Representatives of the constituent organizations view various other phenomena as the potential reason for the severe online and offline disconnection among the Taksim Solidarity. They include the collective loss of efficacy and disinterest in solidarity, organizational discontinuity embodied specifically in individual-bound

ties among constituents as well as prevalence of offline communication channels. Rather than being the sole cause of the TS disconnection, our interviews reveal, they each contribute to the online connectivity deficit among the coalition.

The representative of the Kuzguncuk Residents Association points to the loss of efficacy among the constituents and, generally, individuals after many attempts of collective action proved unsuccessful and the state repression has expanded over the years. "*Let's call it passivization. I believe that everybody has been pacified. They are scared and despaired. Battles were lost. For example, Northern Forests are gone. Many things have fallen apart. Perhaps, it was not managed well. Perhaps, it was blamed on certain groups.*" She illustrates the coalition's disinterest in solidarity with her reluctance to even read online bulletins of TMMOB Chamber of Architects (*TMMOB Mimarlar Odası*), one of the most central organizations in the coalition, and suggest a refreshed motivation for the Secretariat (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13, 2021). Taking the issue in a broader context than the TS, the representative of ADAM-Der (Association of Anti-coup Military Servicemen) (*ADAM-Der [Askeri Darbelerin Asker Muhalifleri Derneği]*) agrees with the claims of disfavor of solidarity among left-wing organizations (Interviewee 7, Personal communication, October 21, 2021).

Another group of constituent representatives underline the prevalence of individual-bound relationships among member organizations to explain the disconnection. Change of boards, contact persons and communication platforms over time have posed a liaison discontinuity which eventually led to an overall disconnection. Several organizations suffered from the fact that outgoing staff left organizations cut off from the rest of the TS network. For instance, the representative of Istanbul Branch of Association of Academic Staff had to make three different phone calls to find out the contact person of the association with TS. The representative of the Istanbul Chapter of TMMOB Chamber of City Planners states that the underlying reason is the change in the composition of managerial bodies of organizations over time. He points out the incoming personnel's difficulties in or reluctance to adapting to the ongoing processes due to the waning of the Gezi atmosphere. Even in his own organization, he observes, only 2-3 board members remain in the management from

the coalition's early period, with the majority of executives being replaced. He remarks that he had been employed by the organization for 7 months and, apart from social media posting, he was far from taking part in the coordination with the TS, let alone in decision-making mechanism; he, therefore, believes in the need of self-criticism in this regard (Interviewee 12, Personal communication, October, 12, 2021). The representative of the Istanbul branch of *Halkevleri* describes the constant change of representatives: "*Constituents take part on representation basis. Their representatives change. Those bodies split, fall apart. Associations hold general assemblies and elect new administrators. Representatives of political parties are replaced. Individuals do not remain in the same positions*". He also reminds the discontinuous nature of communication channels such as Whatsapp groups, where platforms, including the TS, heavily communicate and coordinate (Interviewee 8, Personal communication, November 11, 2011). The representative of Gülsuyu Gülensu Solidarity Association (*Gülsuyu Gülensu Yaşam ve Dayanışma Merkezi Derneği*), a residential solidarity organization, confirms the claims of individual-bound organizational relationships. He notes the association's ongoing communication with executives of certain TS member organizations while rejecting a broader communication with the rest of the coalition, adding that he is not even aware that the TS is still active (Interviewee 13, Personal communication, December 26, 2021).

Not unrelated to the prevalence of individual-bound relations, the social media expert of a left-wing political party underlines the role of alternative communication channels in the absence of an intensive online networking. "*Majority of the organizations do not follow each other [online]. Why? Because no one is oblivious of each other's work. We all know about each other's activities.*" (Interviewee 37, Personal communication, October 11, 2021). In addition to personal contacts, the alternative channels include individual online networks and the conventional media.

As we saw in the preceding findings chapter, the challenge that the TS faces is not limited to disconnection; the coalition also suffers heavily from an absence of public deliberation. Below, we look closer at the rationales underlying the absence, drawing on expert interviews.

6.2. Lack of Deliberation

Evidenced by the survey data in the preceding chapter, The Taksim Solidarity constituents' political deliberation is extremely limited. For the most part, the deliberation deficit could be seen as the direct outcome of digital disorganization among the solidarity. However, expert interviews with constituent representatives revealed that the real reason is deep-rooted and lies in the offline realm. Echoing the reasons underlying the TS digital disconnection, adaptation shortcomings of organization personnel to digital communication, the role of political culture and state repression against dissidents stand out as the primary factors for the absence of public political discussion. A representative of the Association of Consumer Consciousness Development maintains that absence of deliberative culture begins in the offline realm and that reflects on the online network of the coalition. Only offline dynamics can feed offline presence and interaction of organizations, he believes. He observed a certain level of effort by the coalition to establish an environment of public deliberation through in-person conventions during and after the Gezi Protests, but it did not last long (Interviewee 34, Personal communication, September 27, 2021).

Rather than multi-directional political discussion, the information flow through the coalition's public communication channels is usually unreciprocated. Statements of the representative of the Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Party (*DSIP [Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi]*) attests the phenomenon even when the contacting party is one of the major constituents of the TS and the medium an interpersonal channel such as email. He believes that political discussion between constituents would eventually lead to aggressive arguments implying the political culture of left-wing organizations and political divisions (Interviewee 5, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). ADAM-Der's (Association of Anti-coup Military Serviceman) representative states that the experience of his organization showed that the online realm proved unsuccessful to deliberate and coordinate for political action. Despite the fact that the organization informed a majority of organizations including chambers, trade unions, associations through emailing, social media posts and videos, it did not receive any response from organizations (Interviewee 7, Personal communication, October 21,

2022). Social media expert of a left-wing party refers to individual-bound relations between organizations as a predictor of the deliberation lack on public platforms, adding it is a habitual behavior among political parties. (Interviewee 37, Personal communication, October 11, 2021). The head of communication of a major political party in the TS underlines sharp political divisions among the constituents. Certain players may avoid appearing in touch with others. He reminds of the extra difficulties of discussion on public channels between politically polarized organizations (Interviewee 28, Personal communication, August 23, 2021). Social media manager of the same organization links the argument to the role of organizational tradition in Turkey and claims that the problem goes well beyond the TS. "*No political party and organization is ready for this. Neither are the people. Let's try it out on Twitter or Facebook. We initiate a discussion and people respond to it with their views. But more than political arguments, curses, insults, trolling... It is impossible to stop this by blocking each of them. Therefore, we avoid it. Plus, it demoralizes those who engage civilly*" (Interviewee 27, Personal communication, August 23, 2021). The representative of the Istanbul Office of the consumer rights association TÜKODER (*TÜKODER İstanbul Şubesi*) adds the role of irrelevant chat based on her experience in Whatsapp groups of many NGOs. She describes the TS's Whatsapp group as informative compared to others, acknowledging its unidirectional nature made up of announcement postings (Interviewee 30, Personal communication, September 14, 2021).

The deliberation scarcity occurs not only at organizational level but also individual. Engagement of organizations in political discussions with their member, volunteer, follower, sympathizer base has fallen short of bridging the information gap between individuals and the organizations. The representative of TMMOB Chamber of Electrical Engineers explains this shortfall with a general observation: "*Usually, members do not have much freedom of public discussion in organizational environments*" (Interviewee 10, Personal communication, November 25, 2021). A representative of the Communist Party of Turkey declares that not interacting with followers online is an organizational policy. She notes that the party intends to benefit from social media accounts for propaganda purposes, specifically to support the party policies (Interviewee 36, Personal communication, October 9, 2021). The

representatives of the group Women for Women's Human Rights - New Ways (*Kadının İnsan Hakları - Yeni Çözümler Derneği*) and the Assembly of Socialist Engineers and Architects (*Toplumcu Mühendis, Mimar ve Şehir Plancıları Meclisi*) both point to the imparity in deliberative environments between organizational and individual engagement. The imparity restricts organization's interaction capabilities especially in terms of verbal discussion, evocative of those who foreground the use of individual accounts, rather than corporate, to interact with base (Interviewee 11, Personal communication, December 2, 2021; Interviewee 9, November 13, 2021). A representative of the Istanbul Chapter of TMMOB Chamber of City Planners notes that the dialog with the organization's base mostly takes place over interpersonal communication channels such as phone, email, rather than public social media accounts. He recounts an incident in which, after being targeted by a local authority, his organization was contacted by many for solidarity by phone and email, rather than tweeting under the press release that the organization posted on Twitter (Interviewee 12, Personal communication, December 10, 2021). A representative of the Gülsuyu Gülensu Solidarity Association evidenced the lack of reciprocal dialog even in non-public mediums such as Whatsapp groups. Group members read but do not reciprocate the text delivered by administrators as, he believes, a reservation not to offend their favored parties even though they do not support its policies, pointing to the partisanship factor in the disappearance of deliberative communication (Interviewee 13, Personal communication, December 26, 2021). In a general observation, social media manager of a trade union's Istanbul office relates the deficit of participatory and horizontal organization to the lack of dialog both within the coalition and with its base (Interviewee 33, Personal communication, September 22, 2021). Other causes rarely cited by organization representatives are loss of efficacy among the public (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, August 13, 2021), the role people's keenness for in-person interaction in the aftermath of the Coronavirus pandemic (Interviewee 12, Personal communication, December 10, 2021) and digital divide among the follower base of certain organizations and challenges of accessing social media applications (Interviewee 25, Personal communication, August 18, 2021). Following sections take a closer look into commonly observed reasons for deliberation deficit within the TS coalition.

6.2.1. Free Speech Violations and State Repression

The crackdown on political dissent has undermined not only digital literacy of organizations but also efforts for public political deliberation between organizations and individuals. Persecution of individuals criticizing the government, the president and the ruling party's policies discouraged voicing dissent on online networks and engaging in political discussion with organizations and/or their members. While citizens largely opt for keeping a low profile by avoiding political commentary on public mediums, many also downsize their non-verbal online interaction with dissenting organizations. In addition to the fear from online surveillance and persecution, the loss of efficacy and discouragement by the course of politics also contribute to the citizens' voicelessness (Interviewee 23, Personal communication, Ağustos 13, 2021), which impairs ties of organizations with grassroots and bottom-up organizing. The regional office representative of the Association of Academic Staff, observes that the democratic decay cripples the discourse on social media. She recalls the government's crackdown on associations and the fear of academic staff from being unemployed if they voice their views publicly (Interviewee 2, Personal communication, October 18, 2021).

Remarks of of the Social Democracy Foundation's representative illustrates best the effects of rising state pressure on critical voices:

> "*I believe that [the role of the repressive atmosphere on the move from public to interpersonal channels] is large. Because it has turned into an absurd comedy which is inexplicably irrational. Citizens are prosecuted and imprisoned on absurd charges that can be found in comic journals. A parliament member could be arrested for a retweet or an activist could have hard times for his or her social media content. So, both individual and organization members of the solidarity may tend to go low profile in private channels. This is reasonable in itself. The power of the organization and the reach of influence of the person matter. When they feel more vulnerable and defenseless, they move towards [private communication]. I believe that they have already moved there and it is very humane and understandable. Already insufficient corporate capacity decreased even more during the current government's term, almost non-existent in organizations now. This pushes them towards such behavior [communicating in non-public channels]*" [Interview 22, Personal communication, August 12, 2021).

Criminalization of dissent has gone beyond the limits of reason in certain situations. Elements of an online civic discussion could be considered evidence for terror propaganda charges. "*Even the meaning attributed to the word 'organization' has changed*" says the social media editor of a left-wing political party. He believes this insecurity among citizens pushes them to discuss in non-public channels (Interviewee 3, Personal communication, January 18, 2022).

Social media users' deliberative approach differs between individual and corporate accounts. Interaction on corporate accounts of dissenting organizations and publications are refrained more than individual accounts of opinion leaders, observes the representative of the Haydarpaşa Solidarity (Interviewee 35, Personal communication, September 30, 2021). The representative of the Association of Academic Staff reports that due to the fear of persecution, her organization's followers abstain from liking, commenting, sharing, replying on social media. Her experience shows that compared to 4-5 years ago, the number of those who press the like button has constantly declined. So did those commenting and sharing. She has received warnings from friends about her social media discourse: "*Be careful. You post too much, you criticize too much. Something might happen to you. Think about your family*" (Interviewee 2, Personal communication, December 18, 2021). Communications Head of one of the major constituents of the TS with more than a hundred thousand Twitter followers confirms the reluctance among them to interact with the organization online (Interviewee 14, Personal communication, January 4, 2022). The representative of TMMOB Chamber of City Planners and another major TS constituent also attests the follower tendency to avoid public interaction with organizations while maintaining that the fear-evoking climate has not impacted his personal and his organization's social media discourse (Interviewee 12, Personal communication, December 10, 2021). While social media has remained the only means where citizens could voice their say following the state's consolidation of its repressive capacity in the past years, they avoid keeping in touch with opposition parties, afraid of being detained at 5-6 am, communications head and social media editor of a major political party explain. "*People no more like or reply 'I am coming' to our calls for action*", noting a recent detainment of his friends on the grounds that they posted against the annulment by the government of the Istanbul Convention, a

European Commission treaty aiming at prevention of violence against women (Interviewee 27 & 28, personal communication, August 23, 2021). The representative of the left-wing publication *Mücadele Birliği* cites fear or surveillance as one of the reasons for abstention from online discussion. She observed users reluctant to share or like the organization's posts use anonymous accounts for political interaction (Interviewee 4, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). The representative of DSIP points to destructive consequences especially for those employed in the public sector. The group is one of the most vulnerable against state repression since teachers, workers, academics, officials employed in public institutions have been fired for posting or sharing content critical of the government (Interviewee 5, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). The Green Left Party (*Yeşiller ve Sol Gelecek Partisi*) is another TS constituent whose members have been harassed on the grounds of social media activity. Its representative states that the harassment does not change its corporate communication policy nor lead to censorship of any sort. However, she notes an interesting defense action against state repression and judiciary harassment: "*Our social media crew teamed up with the Humans Right Association to provide legal training in order to increase the confidence* [in social media use]. *We are determined not to give up on it.*" That said, she warns that the extent of censorship may go to the point of total internet blackout (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021).

Another aspect of political discussion deficiency crystallizes in the form of censorship and self-censorship. A group of constituents experienced content and page removals from platforms, while others tone down their online political discourse. A political party's social media editor claims: "*There is self-censorship with everyone [every organization]. Whoever says no… I do not believe that it is non-existent.*" While the effects of surveillance are less noticeable on individual accounts, he believes, all organizations self-censor their corporate accounts at any rate. Even the use of a simple word such as "dictator" could have destructive repercussions for parties and individuals (Interviewee 37, Personal communication, October 11, 2021). Head of corporate communications of a political party and a major TS constituent, cites removal or ban of their certain content on Facebook, Twitter due to extensive abuse reporting, likening it to the blackout about the

coverage of his party by the conventional media. His claims include occasions when the party's broadly participated campaign hashtags did not appear on the trending topic ratings and its Facebook page was restricted before the live stream of a major event (Interviewee 28, Personal communication, August 2021).

6.2.2. Digital Illiteracy Issues

As shown in the preceding sections, shortcoming of digitally skilled workforce coupled with the personnel with traditional communication orientations in managerial positions has hampered the improvement of the TS's online network, as well social media literacy. These very factors have played a significant role in the almost non-existence of an interactive online relationship among constituents and a limited information flow with their followers. Organizations have lacked employees with relevant skills and literacy to keep up with the pace and fluidity of digital communication. Others' bureaucratic unwieldiness has not allowed them to integrate gate-keep mechanisms to effective communication operations. Larger organizations find it costly to engage in reciprocal communication.

Representatives of many TS constituent organizations typically acknowledge that they do not benefit from the potentials of social media communication in full capacity. Even though the organizations are aware of its promises to the recruitment capacity and increasing their reach, they have not been able to appoint qualified employees to the post nor had a planned social media policy. Proper utilization of different platforms would benefit the organizations in terms of reaching a more varied audience, such as different age groups, admits the spokesperson of an association (Interviewee 6, March 26, 2022). Larger organizations cite intractability of discussion with a large base of followers and organized trolling as reasons of reluctance for deliberative social media operation. Employing a social media team that carries out online dialog with hundreds of thousands of users is not seen feasible by the managements of large-scale organizations. It exceeds the financial resources of even major organizations. At organizational level deliberation, they prefer offline channels for political discussion usually through local chapters or sub-departments, arguing that they cannot handle these relations with a top-down approach but only

with a hierarchical one (Interviewee 14, Personal communication, January 4, 2022). Reminding the power of "being social" on the Internet, a constituent representative believes that organizations still rely on obsolete communication logic, as a result of aging personnel, their techno-skepticism and unwieldy domestic operations. In a reference to digital illiteracy issues, he states staff are usually focused on technical trivia of the Internet, overlooking "*how it relates to the everyday life of commoners.*" His organization employed traditional propaganda means during its advocacy campaigns; however, Facebook and Whatsapp groups launched by other parties were much more beneficial for conveying their message out to masses thanks to the participatory and dialogic working of social network sites. (Interviewee 25, Personal communication, August 18, 2021).

A representative of the TMMOB Chamber of Electrical Engineers notes the incompatibility of organizations' bureaucratic logic and social media logic. He asserts that the modus operandi of many TS organizations - most organizations generally - does not work in unison with an interactive use of social networks with their follower base (Interviewee 10, Personal communication, November 25, 2021). Confirming the argument of human resource shortage, spokesperson of an association points to effective use of social networking by student movements. She contends that the reluctance of organizations to online deliberation is a matter of generation. Those who are accustomed to the social media use carry their skills and literacy over to their organizations, thereby, the organizations absorb an interactive network culture, she believes (Interviewee 6, Personal communication, March 26, 2022).

6.2.3. Political Culture

The political culture, which fosters non-deliberative behavioral tendencies among Turkish civil society, specifically left-wings politics, is one of the predictors of avoidance from online discussions at both levels (individual and organizational). Our expert interviews reveal that the tendency originates mainly from a weak tradition of political discussion, an assumed imparity between organizations and individuals as discussant parties and strong favor of non-public and face-to-face exchange of information and opinion, typically through pre-established personal contacts.

The issue is seen as a reflection of the broader transparency problem which takes its root from offline political culture among left-wing activism. While characterizing it as a transparency issue, a representative of the Assembly of Socialist Engineers, Architects and City Planners believes that organization's unwillingness for online discussion is not a deliberate preference. It is out of left-wing groups' radar. "*We never talk about this*", she says, echoing the techno-adaptation challenges demonstrated in the previous sections (Interviewee 9, Personal communication, November 13, 2021). The DSIP representative interviewed attributes the phenomenon to the longstanding incapability of organizations to conduct civic discussion:

> "*[Social media] is not used for deliberation. Priorly, we had web forums. … I remember the debate whether we should enable user comments. Tech-savvy friends said that we should have enabled and attracted follower interaction. But if we do, they will swear. It is not only from the right, the left also will lambast us. We have seen this. Then, in the email groups, we all fought each other. Ten years ago, during the Ergenekon trials, everyone fell out with each other. Because it is easy to attack from the keyboard. You cannot build a civil organization relationship online. [It should be] 'My dear friend, we are of this opinion. What do you think?' But no! When you say something, others will attack it. Domestic rivalries within the left killed organizational communication.*" (Interviewee 5, Personal communication, February 16, 2022).

Another organization representative confirms these observations, suggesting that the political culture where actors aim at dominating rival views does not allow constructive deliberation. According to him, hierarchies in organizations also impede formation of a transparent deliberative environment as they tend to "*keep the status quo rather than bringing a value into question.*" He adds that the problem is a deliberative culture issue independent from the repressive political climate. He believes transparency will not be achieved even if the free discussion environment was reinstated (Interviewee 10, Personal communication, November 25, 2021). Organizations also assume an uneven discussion sphere between their corporate accounts and individuals, which evokes an insecurity on the organizations' part. "*You never know whether the other side of the discussion is the organization or person that she or he says s/he is*" says the representative of Mücadele Birliği, explaining why her publication does not engage in online discussion. Instead of

online open discussion, the publication prefers conferences or in-person discussion. "*You can call it traditional, usual, safe, conservative… I believe that we are a little conservative in this regard*" (Interviewee 4, Personal communication, February 16, 2022). Another insecurity evoked by public deliberation on social media is that it is seen as irreparable for organizations' reputation. Social media editor of an association likens online discussion to live broadcast. Organizations may find open discussion as irreversible, hence, detrimental for discourse (Interviewee 6, Personal communication, March 26, 2022).

6.3. Issue-based Activism and the Influence of Participating in Alternative Coalitions

After going through typical online disconnection and deliberative fracture factors, we would finally like to touch on a phenomenon that could be considered both one of these factors and an outcome of the longstanding situation of the Taksim Solidarity. Although the TS, as a coalition, appears like a picture of domestic detachment, it does not mean a total disconnection on the part of constituents. Majority of the coalition's constituent organizations take part in other - online or offline - platforms. These organizations are not only in contact but also in constant dialog in these diverse coalitions or virtual platforms. Major platforms include the labor movement, women's rights groups, LGBTI+ advocates, environmentalists and regional solidarity networks.

While Taksim Solidarity's purpose of existence has been debated ever since the Gezi protests - whether an environmental movement organized solely against the plans of demolition of the Gezi Park or an anti-government uprising against political repression of all sorts of dissent - these umbrella organizations are varied in their goals. For the most part, they are issue-based organizations and do not have an all-inclusive political agenda, which is the offspring of the social opposition's fragmentation along issue lines. They distance themselves from the idea of a united movement and disfavor all-encompassing movements across social and political issues of public significance, as expressed by representatives of several organizations, members of both the TS and these platforms. They establish

themselves in the country's social opposition arena after a course of action on the relevant issue.

Despite the continued nature of their organization, these platforms should not be understood as fixed, stable and unchanging entities. While a group of them maintain their connection only on online spaces, such as Whatsapp and email groups, hence even more vulnerable to dissolution and waning of movement resources, others are characterized by organizational fluidity, volatility and are in constant motion. This is so even though a majority of these coalitions hold in-person meetings. In a side observation, their tendency to communicate, coordinate and network on interpersonal channels through representative individuals is noteworthy, reminiscent partly of the TS networking dynamics.

Over the ten years since the Gezi protests, the Turkish public have faced a myriad of political and economic risks, which urged organizations, initiatives and solidarities to take action. The questions of which framework to team up in and what types of action to take have been at the heart of these alliances. They form after an initial course of action and establish themselves as a new initiative as in the example of the Taksim Solidarity (Interviewee 6, Personal communication, March 26, 2022). For an organization representative, it is expected for political platforms to dissolve after mobilization and re-form in other compositions and ways of expression. They transform and reshape over time since only all-inclusive identities are insufficient. Many coalitions emerged after Gezi protests such as Istanbul Labor and Democracy Coordination (*Istanbul Emek ve Demokrasi Koordinasyonu*) and anti-austerity platforms in 2018. He illustrates below the trajectory of the transformation the movement has undergone:

> "*The TS was the archetype of the forums which formed after the protests, it turned into fora. If you look for communication, it is not within the TS. Back then, they launched inter-fora coordination. They had email groups and in-person meetings. ... First, the fora turned into urban defense fronts. Northern Forests Defense (Kuzey Ormanları Savunması) was launched right after Gezi protests. ... And the Istanbul Urban Defense Front (İstanbul Kent Savunması). The fora then turned into urban defense fronts following the urban rallies. And then into solidarity assemblies, then into democracy*

204

assemblies with various names. And finally, pandemic solidarity assemblies, solidarity networks in a number of locations in Istanbul. But their archetype is Gezi fora. Therefore, it is not the right way to look for [the communication] in one place, it seems to me" (Interviewee 8, Personal communication, November 11, 2021).

Coalition diversity dates back even before the Gezi protests. The Istanbul Chamber of Medicine was a member of multiple coalitions along with the TS in the period prior to the protests. Among them were the Coordination of Medical Professionals Chamber, No to Commercialization of Water Platform, Workers Safety Assembly, Initiative for Mine-free Turkey, Platform for Healthy and Safe Future for Everyone. The TS was the least important until the outburst of the protests and it was only then the Chamber changed its attitude, says the representative of Istanbul Chamber of Medicine. He adds "*Doubtless, every platform is important, however, given the historical event that it coincided, the TS has been the most strategic [platform] in the history of opposition.*" He reports that although none of these platforms has been as influential as the TS, they are still in contact with them. Conversely, 80 percent of the TS constituents are participants of these platforms at varying levels (Interviewee 24, Personal communication, August 16, 2021).

Majority of the member organizations of the TS also communicate over different platforms. Same organizations organize around different issue-based coalitions, which in certain cases leads to redundant platforms with almost identical political goals. To illustrate the discoordination redundant coalitions potentially cause, representative of a TS member association points to the case of two platforms with almost identical goals, Women Stronger Together (*Kadınlar Birlikte Güçlü İnisiyatifi*) and Istanbul Convention action group, which were formed upon the annulment of the convention, instead of organizing around the former, already existing coalition. The both operated as umbrella organizations and consisted of almost the same constituents (Interviewee 6, March 26, 2022).

While the Green Left Party's TS activity is limited to annual commemoration of the Gezi protests, it is in active interaction with its constituents in other platforms. A representative of the party believes the course of the political struggle in Turkey expanded the TS style cooperative activism. She cites the dormancy of TS channels

and the lack of leadership role by core organizations such as TMMOB members as the reason that prompts them to communicate in other coalitions. The party is an active participant of Whatsapp communication among and in-person working assemblages of cooperation groups involving trade unions and ecologist organizations at local and national level, including the ecology assembly of HDK and ecology commission of HDP, both TS constituents themselves. (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021). The Green Left Party's experience in participating in HDP and HDK is not the unique case for TS constituents. In an interesting manifestation of cross-participation in intertwined activism networks, two thirds of the TS members are among the constituents of Peoples' Democratic Congress (*HDK [Halkların Demokratik Kongresi]*), a major TS constituent itself. In a similar case, 4 political party members of the TS are also among Peoples' Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*), successor of the banned Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Democracy Partisi) and a major TS constituent.

The networked political struggles that the TS constituents partake display issues-of-today nature. New cooperation networks arise from popular issues that fall within the confines of interest of participating organizations. For instance, voluntary organizations including many TS members form a Labor Day platform for the upcoming Labor Day. Likewise, Health for All Laborers Platform (*Tüm Çalışanlar için Sağlık Platformu*) was formed in the early days of the Coronavirus pandemic. Emergence of activist coalitions is issue-bound rather than all-out network operating in a united manner (Interviewee 6, Personal communication, March 26, 2022). The social media editor of a left-wing political party confirms the agenda-driven motivation of these assemblies, conveying that it is easier and faster to coordinate the Labor Day activities with parties of similar political leanings than those in the TS network. He also reminds that, in addition to popular occasions, formation of advocacy coalitions is limited to the issues of broad consensus among organizations. In the absence of it, only political parties of shared ideology gather to form small-scale platforms (Interviewee 37, October 11, 2021).

Association of Consumer Consciousness Development also takes part and stays in regular contact and interaction with other TS constituents in other coalition networks.

The association's representative cites the Poisonfree Dishes Platform (*Zehirsiz Sofralar Platformu*) to illustrate the scope of cross-membership among the TS constituents. 40 percent of the at least 117 members of the platform are also TS constituent organizations. The platform communicates and maintains its work mainly on Whatsapp and email groups (Interviewee 34, Personal communication, September 27, 2021, Quote 79). Representatives of the Left Party (*Sol Parti*), the Freedom and Solidarity Party's (*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi*) successor, also confirm that they constantly work with the majority of the TS constituents on many different platforms, but not in the TS framework. Nearly 70 percent of the TS constituents are part of broader coalitions, reports a representative. He is one of the proponents of the idea that the TS should not be concerned with broader social and political affairs than demolition of the Gezi Park and urban transformation plans in the area, which sparked the protests in 2013. "*Given the fact that they maintain campaigning on platforms around different subjects, they must be in line with this view*" He explains the activity of the coalition's constituents in other platforms by its size. They may be in full agreement on the conservation of the Gezi Park and the surrounding area but diverge when the scope of the issues broaden (Interviewee 29, Personal communication, August 24, 2021). Participation in multiple coalitions is the organizational model of the zeitgeist says Communications Head of a core TS organization. Umbrella initiatives, cooperative organizations and platforms form for specific topics and needs, and then the organization decides whether to take part in them. Commenting on this organizational atomization, he finds issue-based coalitions fair in terms of organizational division of labor in campaigning. He believes that his organization should only support the existing initiatives instead of claiming its leadership (Interviewee 14, Personal communication, January 4, 2022).

The Communist Party of Turkey establishes temporary cooperation on specific topics rather than long-term ties with multiple platforms. They cooperate - both online and offline - in specific coalitions with women's rights organizations on women rights agenda, with trade unions on workers agenda and certain political parties all of which are also TS constituents (Interviewee 36, Personal communication, October 9, 2021). The representative of the Social Democracy Foundation justifies his organization's avoidance of contact with other TS members outside the coalition by their

consideration not to contribute to the social polarization, implying the longstanding criminalization of Gezi protests and the secretariat of the TS (Interviewee 22, Personal communication, August 12, 2021).

While most communication, coordination and interaction take place on non-public mediums such as Whatsapp and email groups, as well as in-person meetings within these coalitions just as the TS, a group of organizations display solidarity on social media with other coalitions' members by retweeting, sharing their posts, participating in hashtag campaigns. The Green Left Party backed online campaigns of KHK Platform (*KHK Platformu*), a non-TS ally of the party, by contributing to the campaign hashtags. In a coordinated effort by the two organizations, possibly along with others, the hashtags saw the top ranks of the trending topic list. A part representative acknowledges that social media applications boosted interaction among like-minded organizations (Interviewee 21, Personal communication, August 6, 2021). The Istanbul Branch of a professional association also interacts with organizations outside the TS. It shares and circulates content created by organizations in the same field of activity as well as platforms of which the association is a part. An executive board member of the branch recalls the social media interaction and support to a TS-like coalition to pump up its visibility by circulating their announcements online during an international convention in İstanbul (Interviewee 19, Personal communication, August 3, 2021). The group Women for Women's Human Rights - New Ways also engages in public social media interaction with other women's rights organizations. The interaction is usually reciprocal among organizations, says its representative, and it empowers their advocacy on social media (Interviewee 11, Personal communication, December 2, 2021). However, these instances are exceptional given the predominance of non-public communication means detailed in the preceding paragraphs.

As statements and comments of representatives of TS constituents demonstrate, redundancy, ephemerality and fragmented organization of the networks as well as the opaqueness of communication channels cause organizational, political and communicative challenges that hamper united action efforts. Representative of a TS member association illustrates the situation, pointing to the short-lived, hence,

ineffective cooperation: *"These solidarities do not feel like we gained a common ground and will walk together all along throughout these political struggles"* (Interviewee 6, Personal communication, March 26, 2022).

6.4. Chapter Summary

The disconnection and the deliberative division among the TS coalition, and between its constituents and the supporter base, demonstrated in the preceding section, impedes the TS's cohesive action and participation in the public sphere. The disconnection results, as expressed by organization representatives, from several factors including rising number of crackdowns on dissent, violations of free speech rights, hierarchical transformation of the coalition over the years since its formation, shortcomings of human resources and restrictive atmosphere of the Covid-19 pandemic. Political repression discouraged many constituents to secure a working information infrastructure for coordinated action or decision-making among the constituents. Moreover, supporters of the constituent organizations abstain from publicly contacting or participating in online activity of the constituents, creating an impediment to grassroot political organizing. The lack of human resource skilled with making maximum use of social networking applications play a restricting role in poor informational connection within the TS. Particularly, small and mid-size constituents suffer from unadaptability to new information technologies. The decision-making mechanism of the TS itself also grew hierarchical over time with core constituents distancing themselves from smaller and peripheral ones which eventually became isolated from decision-making, many representatives complain.

Similar factors also obstruct maintaining an active, transparent and constructive deliberation among the coalition members and with supporters. Restrictions on and violations of free speech rights play a significant role in public deliberation avoidance of both supporting citizens and Internet users, and organizations. On the individual level, individuals supporting TS constituents refrain from interacting and discussing matters of public importance with the organizations, while, on the organizations level, the constituents opt for face-to-face deliberation methods, which eventually results in a dwindling transparency and isolation of less connected

organizations from the network. Digital illiteracy within many organizations, specifically those with modest resources, also affects the efficient use of online media to establish and consolidate a deliberative and participatory culture within the TS. Exogenous factors, such as historical dynamics of Turkish political culture, are also in play to discourage actors for public discussion. This is the case especially among organizations. Most of the TS member organizations appear to have been affected by the cultural disfavor of public discussion both with other organizations and their sympathizers. The other exogenous reason underlying the lack of deliberation within the TS appears to be the tendency of the constituent organizations to campaign along issue lines and in fragmented, redundant and ephemeral alliances. The avoidance of forming an all-encompassing front diminished both organizational capacity of the TS, and the social opposition in broader terms, and the general efficacy thereof.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Throughout history, social movements have strived for the resources required for growth, visibility, recognition and realization of their claims. Flash mobilizations, such as meetings, rallies, protests, sit-in or stand-in performances, have depended on material and immaterial resources to exert the protest with maximum impact on the targeted individuals or institutions. These include a long list of resources: Funds to finance the campaign, human resources in the form a network composed of supporters and organizers, affective resources such as conviction to pursue the shared goal and self-identification with the cause and peer-pursuers, a shared level of consciousness on the advocated issue, organizational resources such as skills to organize and execute required actions, physical organizations, a communication infrastructure that is used by all parties of the movement for coordination, campaigning, managing relations with the public, supporters, adversaries and others. In the case of long-term and established advocacy, nevertheless, the resources needed to maintain, expand and consolidate the campaign, have to be more complex, diverse and used in a more coordinated way, unlike ephemeral campaigns. Since the campaign spans a long period of time, movement organization needs the skills to retain a certain level of cohesion among various parties of the movement. In addition, long-term movements differ from flash mobilizations in terms of participation repertoire. Advocacy campaigns resort to more varied techniques of political participation. Unlike protest, advocacy groups carry out campaigns through a mixture of radical and conventional techniques. This amalgamation of participation practices necessitates other resources such as a sound communication infrastructure and symbolic tools, and a sophisticated use thereof. This is especially true if the movement consists of multiple organizations in the form of coalition, umbrella organization, united front, or platform that include at least two or more groups. The

more and diverse the constituents of a movement the more organizational symbolic resources it needs to coordinate the organizations so all of them act in accordance and minimize conflicts of identity and ideology orientation.

Of the required resources, communication has played a key role as an organization tool by itself, but also as the carrier of other immaterial resources such as dissemination and transmission of symbolic resources, creating the affective environment needed by existing and potential sympathizers, political deliberation between and within movements as well as other parties of public sphere such as the state institutions, other segments of society and stakeholders of campaign. For decades, campaigns have hinged on mass media outlets. Mass media provided movements of any size with visibility in public, reputation of different kinds and, most importantly, contact, dialog and interaction with stakeholders of the contested issue such as government, parliament, public bodies among others. NGOs, interest and pressure groups have long been subjected to the gatekeeping mechanism of conventional media. Editorial boards of newspapers, journals, TV networks and radio stations decided on their portrayal, image and coverage time. They are shaped in public imagination passing through the lens of editorial choices, potentially reflecting the interests of the industry and political elites. The process involved the notion termed as "mainstreaming" by Gerbner, Gross, Morgan and Signorielli (Gerbner et.al, 1984:286-288), eventually conveying to the public, especially those consuming much media content - a moderate, homogenous and conventional image regarding the campaign. In addition, a second distortion in the portrayal of movement campaigns occurred when they are presented through the lenses and the discourse of the campaign elites. Movements are usually represented by organization executives, campaign managers or other opinion leaders, obscuring the domestic debates, views and critiques of the lower segments in the movements. The practice held the perils of misrepresenting an issue by hurting transparency and limiting free speech within the movement. Its public image and discourse is narrowed down to an elitist representation in public opinion.

Emergence of the Internet as a new medium upended the communication landscape and conferred an unprecedented level of connectivity on the contemporary human-

being, termed as *Homo Super Communicatus* (Sahin, 2023:123). Digital media, not only a step forward in the communication technology but an environment where all the preceding media converge, their boundaries - as well as producer-consumer relations - ambiguate, has revolutionized the relationship between social movements and public sphere. It was welcomed as an opportunity to neutralize the disparity in the access of social movement representatives to the media and gain prominence in public, challenging the near absolute control of the media-makers in the decisions in coverage, portrayal and framing of campaigns. Apart from public portrayal, vast Internet opportunities provided movements with much anticipated tools to control, expand and communicate resources.

Having said that, overreliance on techno-determinism risks overestimating the technology and ignoring the human factor as the transformative power in society (Fuchs, 2017:342). To kill off the hype around the role of the Internet in social mobilizations and the downplay thereof, one needs to admit that it would be naive to assert that social networks are the sole cause of social movements. Networks, as tools at the disposal of citizens and activists, are one of the necessary conditions of social movements but not the sufficient condition (Castells, 2015:223-226). They only form a new type of public space, changing the way people gather on the streets (Gerbaudo, 2012:160), members, sympathizers and organizers meet and discuss the ideals, goals and logistics of movements. Rather than a linear cause and effect, they form a logistic, organizational, communicative infrastructure to meet the deficit of autonomous communication against hegemonic power of the state, media and the industry.

This could be hypothesized to hold especially for persistent advocacy campaigns that span a long period of time, ideally carried out at least by an organization or an informal governing group. This type of movements would need the coordination and deliberation tools most because they have to maintain an equilibrium between the elements of the movement such as organizers, ideologists, members, participants, potential recruits as well as countless external actors including but not limited to allied organizations and groups, fellow activists, international allies, public institutions and legislative bodies. They are expected to make best use of the Internet

and social media tools such as free discussion forums, news feeds on which campaign organizers disseminate public information, non-verbal interactive features to demonstrate aggregate public approval or disapproval of campaign activity, autonomous and hard-to-control contact and communication conduits with users, virtual event organization. While flash mobilizations, as evidence of numerous studies in many contexts shows, also resort to these applications utmostly, we hypothetically expect long-term movements, an understudied area, to adopt social media and employ Internet applications in their operations. Yet, findings of this study indicate otherwise to a large extent.

The Internet's mobilizing power for mass movements came to prominence first in the late 1990s. Activist groups became aware of its then-primitive affordances provided by web forums, email networks, web sites among others and their contribution to the pursued goals. The protests of the World Trade Organization in Geneva and Seattle in 1998 and 1999, for instance, saw extensively networked mobilization as a result of these tools. The second wave of networked mobilizations came several years after Facebook, Twitter and Youtube, social networking sites, also called Web 2.0, spread around the world. Starting with 2009 Iran protests, demonstrators, organized on social networks, took to streets *en masse* in the US, Europe, the Middle east and elsewhere. During the Occupy, Indignados, Arab Spring and other mobilizations, people used online and offline methods in a very well-integrated way for protest. Although these movements had to settle for modest gains in many contexts, they stayed active for a long time on online networks of the Internet and served as meeting venues for the like-minded. They still document the historical events to a large extent through large bodies of textual and multimedia archival material that they contain. The Gezi protests erupted as a part of the wave of networked movements in 2013 with environmental concerns by Istanbulites and spread across the country as an anti-government movement in a matter of days with broader concerns such as restrictions on civil liberties, attempts at interfering in personal lifestyle, neoliberal economic policies. Echoing preceding movements, participants and supporters of the events went online to follow, participate, voice support and coordinate with fellow protestors. Moreover, social media turned for the public into the only reliable information source under the media blackout from the early days on.

The protests were responded to by the government with an increasing amount of use of force and crackdown in the following years, however, they marked a breakpoint in social media adoption for Turkish citizens and many organizations. Whereas the democratic institutions and rule of law decayed over the ten years following the events, the Internet literacy and social media penetration in Turkey has multiplied.

The main case of research in this study, The Taksim Solidarity, was the main organizational body loosely representing the Gezi demonstrators. It was a large and heterogeneous coalition with 126 constituent organizations by the time of the protests. Following the protests, members of its secretariat faced trial several times and several of them eventually were evertually arrested in 2022. In addition to secretariat members, several of its member organizations have been persecuted over the past 10 years. Yet, the coalition has not dissolved and continues to react to political developments and the government pressure on itself and its members mainly through its website announcements and press conferences.

Although the Gezi protests were a cornerstone for digital adoption and literacy for civil society organizations in Turkey, especially for TS participant organizations, our study points to the historical interest in the Internet has not evolved into a continued trend in terms of building a "communicative front" within the TS. The online communication infrastructure is used mainly for connecting with the follower base for each constituent organization. Organizations connect, communicate, interact with and transmit information to their audiences through social media sites. Nevertheless, domestic online cohesion, i.e. digital communication network between the TS organizations is utmostly sparse. While the digital data evidences that the online social media subscription clusters are unconnected at a limited to non-existing level in certain incidences, relevant indicators of the use frequency survey point to a very limited organization-to-organization online public relationship, especially on social media. Non-public applications are the preferred media for organizational communication, however, its size and intensity do not make up for the lack of public connection among the constituents. Offline organizational decomposition of the TS explains only a part of the online disconnection. However, given that more than two thirds of the constituents identify with the majority or all of the TS Secretariat's ideas

and report loyalty to the coalition, the organizational disconnection argument falls short of grounding the online "miscommunication" inside the TS. Moreover, we observe a significant difference between the communication frequency levels with organizations and the base. Various indicators show that the TS's online communication with its base is relatively dynamic compared to its domestic communication. This lack of communication at the organization level impedes public transparency in campaign issues as well as preparing, coordinating and operating joint action. The interactive, continuous and transparent communication potential offered by the Internet for social movement organizations does not appear to be fulfilled in the case of the TS coalition.

Our observations demonstrate that the TS constituents do not use Internet and social media applications for deliberative purposes. Unlike the connectivity dimension, deliberation over public Internet applications is absent also at the base level. The constituent organizations choose not to engage in discussions not only with one another but also with their supporter and follower base. The frequency of reciprocal discussion, at both levels, is almost non-existent. However, this fact should not overshadow the fact that the social media or organizational websites do serve as information desks for sympathizers, potential recruits and members in distant areas from the organization headquarters. These usually contact the organizations through website contact pages, social media message modules and, in rare cases, email. While one-way communication, a constructive one in many cases, is common, this does not transform into a dialogic relationship over publicly available online media. However, the first contact through private social media channels is usually followed up by the organizations over more conventional contact methods such as phone calls and invitations to face-to-face meetings, eventually creating a springboard for a constructive and long-standing relationship with users. At the organization level, email, phone calls and face-to-face conventions host most of the private discussion. Constituents, purposefully abstain from public discussion online and willfully keep the deliberative part of the communication in private for various reasons. Conventions of Turkish political culture allow organizations to engage in political discussion with neither other organizations nor individuals. Experts of the vast majority of the constituents openly acknowledged purposeful avoidance of

discussion on online platforms. State repression on online dissent is also at play in deliberation avoidance, especially on the part of individuals who would otherwise be willing to engage with organizations and activist communities.

Qualitative expert interviews with organization representatives yielded us patterned insight into the major reasons of the TS's failure of making use of the capacity offered by Internet technologies for political participation and activity. Nearly all reasons are a product of offline dynamics, or result from the offline realm which is largely determined and shaped by the political and social dynamics. For instance, the capacity of the Internet, specifically social networks, for public communication is minimized, if not completely killed, as a result of criminalization of dissent by the state. In face of mass arrests of government critics upon accusations such as insulting the president, revealing the identity of law enforcement officers in wrongdoing, and disclosing state secrets, organizations step back from publicly interacting with one another on a shared public agenda. The non-transparency impedes free information flow for the public, mobilization of larger masses for contested issues and recruitment of members, volunteers. Moreover, the absence of first-hand information by organizations and groups strengthen the position of mainstream media, which is largely controlled by government-backed capital groups, eventually leaving the control of political information to their biased gate-keeping teams.

The digital capacity of the TS is also affected by the insufficient human resource in digital operations. Many of the TS member organizations, like many other NGOs in the Turkish civil society, lack financial resources to employ qualified personnel for digital operations. Except for large-scale and mainstream organizations, they are largely deprived of public support and live on limited self-raised funds. Cross-employment of amateur staff for digital communications is common among organizations. Many of those in charge of organizations' social media management or post editors work with a digital literacy level of personal social media use. Personnel without required skills, training and experience make use of the Internet's capacity for public communication to a very limited extent. These practices are direct consequences of a weak civil society composed of financially and organizationally insufficient pressure groups. Arguments for the lack of a supportive environment for civil society actors could be found in modern Turkish political history.

In the context of political coalitions, identification with the rest of the network plays a key role for acting in unison. Identification of member organizations hinges on democratic decision-making mechanisms, inclusion of all members therein regardless of their size, orientation, resources and formal status. In addition, a collective identity along with shared goals and ideals is essential for the success of the coalition. The approximately ten years between the Gezi protests and the time of the data collection (2013-2021,2022) has rendered the coalition more hierarchical and declustered the network in terms of shared ideals. Many small-scale members have felt isolated from the decision-making networks, and in extreme cases, detached from the rest of the coalition. The disconnection is mirrored in the investigated online networks. The dominant decision-maker role of the core organizations in the TS grew over time to the extent to which peripheral organizations are reduced to followers of the leading organizations, an undesirable state at the start of the coalition and during the Gezi protests. Growing hierarchy was both compounded with and resulted in independent activism among the TS. Each member or groups of members have campaigned on their priority issues independently from the rest of the network. Not all political or social issues have been embraced by all the coalition members, eventually preventing formation of a united front against power structures.

Overall, the study did not provide the evidence to prove the initial hypotheses. We were not able to confirm the relationship between a strong online communicative infrastructure and the survival and cohesion of the movement, nor its impact on the coalition's transformation into a long-term movement. In light of the empirical data, we failed to reject the null hypotheses. Having been unable to prove our causal hypotheses, we turned to conditional factors in the explanatory chapter and looked into underlying socio-political factors in the offline realm such as the current state of Turkish civil society, the impact of rising authoritarianism, and political culture within activist environments.

The current situation of Turkish civil society, status of NGOs, pressure and interest groups and other civil and non-capital actors in the formation of the public sphere display a completely different outlook than their counterparts in the West. Either organizations' operational capacity is poor or they are not able to benefit from it to

the full extent in activism for various reasons. Therefore, unrestricted spaces and opportunity for circulation of first-hand information, political discussion among interest groups and opinion leaders, and issue advocacy generally, do not thrive. Our study found that the reasons for the online troubles that the TS organizations, and the TS as a platform, have faced lie in the offline realm. Ongoing difficulties for NGOs in taking part in civil society and maintaining activity both hamper the already weak efforts of developing a digital communication infrastructure and are mirrored in the existing structure of their digital communication.

An extensive legislation and restoration of the fair trial process are imperative to attract wider participation in online communication from the public. Reinstatement of rule of law and a liberal legislative review of several existing laws concerning digital media are required to restore users' and organizations' confidence in unbridled, open Internet communication. Although the reluctance of organizations to engage in political interaction in public - especially political initiatives with leftist tendencies - dates long back, one can safely suppose that use of free speech rights on the Internet will accelerate the free market of ideas and bring about a livelier public sphere. Moreover, the reluctance of organizations for public debate may be linked to restriction of these rights and needs further research. Apart from organizations, the restriction of free speech rights discourages users from engaging with organizations and public actors. They step back from participating in online debate, contacting organizations, opinion leaders, discussion groups and other forms of offline/online political activity. Decay of judicial independence in the past decade is the main obstacle to the full exercise of the rights of free speech and organization. Dependence of courts on the executive branch results in mass and ungrounded arrests of citizens on charges of insulting the president, terror, blasphemy, attempt of coup d'etat, inciting public disorder. Without basic freedoms and a liberal legal approach, online technologies do not automatically provide the shelter of autonomous spaces for political activity and unity.

The other major drawback of TS organizations that affect the development of a sound digital communication infrastructure, namely the lack of skilled labor in digital operations is a matter of insufficient human resource, or simply resources of

any sort in general. The problem specifically affects peripheral organizations with small resources rather than mainstream ones with broader outreach. Putting aside Castells' critique that NGOs are unable to seek alternative forms of democracy on the grounds that they are state-subsidized (2001:281), the professionalization deficit in NGOs could potentially be countered by taking measures of public support for civil society. Mobilization of means and resources of public support for civil society organizations could be a partial but effective solution to bolster the diversity of the public sphere and encourage organizations to take part in it - both online and offline. Such measures not only would provide resources for professionalization of staff, active campaigning and large-scale influence, but also relatively fair conditions for disadvantaged organizations.

Unlike the mass media, the self-operated nature of the Internet applications blurred the level distinction between professional and amateur use. However, as the requirements of public use are notably different than personal use of social media applications, skilled personnel dedicated specifically to digital operations of organizations could boost their public reach, devise innovative ways of autonomous networking with fellow organizations. They could use these applications more effectively to keep their bases active, lively and constantly informed on the issues of advocacy. Digital media professionals could also acknowledge the opportunity of mobilizing grassroots for political activism by the help of ICTs. In the hands of underskilled labor, they would underperform their potential for activism and political campaigning.

The notion that online activism is no substitute for street protest is now accepted *a priori* (Gerbaudo, 2017:149). Along the same line, a general implication of our study on the case of the Taksim Solidarity would be that, on the contrary to the initial enthusiasm of scholars for liberating role of the Internet technology, the Internet and the social networks do not function as the political instruments autonomous from social and political dynamics in play as well as the state and other power holders. These technologies may outfit social movement organizations with powerful networking, campaigning and discussing tools provided they have the capacity, resources as well as a liberal legal framework and supportive political culture to use

them in full capacity. Nevertheless, in the absence of these conditions, as our analysis showed, it would be naive to expect from the Internet *per se* to boost the capacity of organizations and increase the cohesion inside political coalitions for activism. For a well-knit, densely connected, transparently informed resistance front in continuous interaction to self-sustain and survive, a robust online infrastructure should be operating in a supportive political environment. Moreover, communicative and organizational capacity may build mutually, eventually leading to a strong and all-encompassing movement. However, in many authoritarian contexts, the promises of the Internet for social and political resistance are not fulfilled. Unlike Western counterparts, excessive use of both legal and physical force on political opposition in Turkey discourages social opposition actors to go public with their campaigning and deliberation. In addition, ideology is prioritized over public issues in many aspects of political activity. Civil society organizations and groups in the TS, and generally in Turkey, prefer following ideology lines in activism rather than forming issue-specific coalitions and participating in politics in resistance collectives.

We expect the outcomes of the project to contribute to the literature by introducing insights into the long-term new media effects on cohesion, self-sustainment, survival and growth as well as efficiency in networking, campaigning and participation. Since digital networks are an integral part of today's public information-flow, findings of and ideas emanating from this project can be beneficial for political organizations, pressure groups, NGOs and unaffiliated dissenter groups in participating in the formation of public opinion and pushing their political agenda most efficiently into formal politics, as should be in a working democracy.

The research in this field has so far focused on the flash mobilizations type or ephemeral protest actions and the new media's role in it. We, on the contrary, concentrate on established movements with all-encompassing issue advocacy, multi-organization structure and continued activity. The findings are expected to help civil society organizations shape their long-term political campaigns in the age of online networking and most efficiently make use of digital technologies in order to thrive and succeed in their political aspirations.

Even though our findings are instructive mostly as pointing to the vulnerabilities and pitfalls of reliance merely on digital means, its implications for structural elements of a political environment underscore significant preconditions of use of these technologies in contentious politics. The findings here that digital networks have very limited contribution to the efforts of furthering interests of movements should by no means be construed as a pessimistic conclusion on the part of these technologies. On the contrary, they point to the necessity of both online and offline struggle to go hand in hand in a broader context that encompasses financial, organizational, legal and cultural aspects of the issue. While well-built, effectively utilized online connections and infrastructure is conditional for boosting the capacity of social movements both in quality and quantity, configuration of offline factors such as law, political culture, material and immaterial resources, organizing type among other factors seem causal for making the best use of online technologies for activism purposes.

Acknowledging the blindspots of this project and the new questions that its findings have brought about, the closest possible research area would be testing a political coalition as large as the TS in a liberal democratic context in order to make the distinction between factors in authoritarian and democratic contexts. Such a work could be embodied in an environment where political tolerance is strong, public support for and participation in civil society is high and the public opinion forms through transparent deliberation using the first-hand information conveyor role of the Internet.

Changing communication patterns and networking means of social movement organizations in well-connected and loosely connected online environments could be the other research direction drawing on this study. Also, the way they relate to other dissenter parties such as individual activists, public bodies and how they integrate non-conventional, everyday methods of resistance as well as horizontalist movements into formal structure of SMOs are worth academic attention and investigation.

Further research should take a path that leads to evidence-based conclusions on the functions, capacity and contribution of social networks for the use of activists.

Empirical conclusions and the ideas inferred from them should strengthen dissenters against the hegemonic power of the state, capital-owners, multinational conglomerates and other power holders. The academic research should produce the information not only for the movements' physical but also historical empowerment. In other words, it should help the resistance survive and sustain over time for a snowball enlargement and empowerment. Finally, academic efforts should provide needed knowledge to laborers working for a better world, i.e. those who stand up and go out for it.

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APPENDICES

A. LIST OF STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 1

Facebook Use to Exchange Information with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	19	18.3	18.4	18.4
	Never	57	54.8	55.3	73.8
	Several times a year	7	6.7	6.8	80.6
	Several times a month	11	10.6	10.7	91.3
	Several times a week	3	2.9	2.9	94.2
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	96.1
	All day long	4	3.8	3.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 2

Twitter Use to Exchange Information with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.4	20.4
	Never	49	47.1	47.6	68.0
	Several times a year	9	8.7	8.7	76.7
	Several times a month	9	8.7	8.7	85.4
	Several times a week	5	4.8	4.9	90.3
	Several times a day	5	4.8	4.9	95.1
	All day long	5	4.8	4.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 3

Instagram Use to Exchange Information with TS Member Organizations and/or TS
Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	31.1	31.1
	Never	48	46.2	46.6	77.7
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	78.6
	Several times a year	9	8.7	8.7	87.4
	Several times a month	9	8.7	8.7	96.1
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	97.1
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	98.1
	All day long	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 4

Youtube Use to Exchange Information with TS Member Organizations and/or TS
Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	34	32.7	33.0	33.0
	Never	61	58.7	59.2	92.2
	Several times a year	4	3.8	3.9	96.1
	Several times a month	3	2.9	2.9	99.0
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 5

Use of Institutions' Websites to Exchange Information with TS Member Organizations
and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	28	26.9	27.2	27.2
	Never	54	51.9	52.4	79.6
	Several times a year	11	10.6	10.7	90.3
	Several times a month	7	6.7	6.8	97.1
	Several times a week	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 6

Whatsapp Use to Exchange Information with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	5	4.8	4.9	4.9
	Never	55	52.9	53.9	58.8
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	2.0	60.8
	Several times a year	11	10.6	10.8	71.6
	Several times a month	11	10.6	10.8	82.4
	Several times a week	5	4.8	4.9	87.3
	Several times a day	7	6.7	6.9	94.1
	All day long	6	5.8	5.9	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 7

Email Use to Exchange Information with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	3	2.9	2.9	2.9
	Never	48	46.2	46.6	49.5
	Less than once a year	4	3.8	3.9	53.4
	Several times a year	17	16.3	16.5	69.9
	Several times a month	14	13.5	13.6	83.5
	Several times a week	14	13.5	13.6	97.1
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 8

Facebook Use for Coordination with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	19	18.3	18.4	18.4
	Never	65	62.5	63.1	81.6
	Less than once a year	3	2.9	2.9	84.5
	Several times a year	6	5.8	5.8	90.3
	Several times a month	7	6.7	6.8	97.1
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	98.1
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 9

Twitter Use for Coordination with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.4	20.4
	Never	63	60.6	61.2	81.6
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	1.9	83.5
	Several times a year	7	6.7	6.8	90.3
	Several times a month	7	6.7	6.8	97.1
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	98.1
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 10

Instagram Use for Coordination with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	31.1	31.1
	Never	60	57.7	58.3	89.3
	Several times a year	2	1.9	1.9	91.3
	Several times a month	7	6.7	6.8	98.1
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 11

Youtube Use for Coordination with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	34	32.7	33.0	33.0
	Never	65	62.5	63.1	96.1
	Several times a year	2	1.9	1.9	98.1
	Several times a month	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

250

Table 12

Use of Institutions' Websites for Coordination with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	28	26.9	27.5	27.5
	Never	67	64.4	65.7	93.1
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	94.1
	Several times a year	1	1.0	1.0	95.1
	Several times a month	3	2.9	2.9	98.0
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 13

Whatsapp Use for Coordination with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	5	4.8	5.0	5.0
	Never	58	55.8	57.4	62.4
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	2.0	64.4
	Several times a year	7	6.7	6.9	71.3
	Several times a month	16	15.4	15.8	87.1
	Several times a week	7	6.7	6.9	94.1
	Several times a day	4	3.8	4.0	98.0
	All day long	2	1.9	2.0	100.0
	Total	101	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	3	2.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 14

Email Use for Coordination with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	3	2.9	3.0	3.0
	Never	56	53.8	55.4	58.4
	Less than once a year	3	2.9	3.0	61.4
	Several times a year	12	11.5	11.9	73.3
	Several times a month	16	15.4	15.8	89.1
	Several times a week	9	8.7	8.9	98.0
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	101	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	3	2.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 15

Facebook Use for Non-verbal Interaction (Share, retweet, repost, like, react) with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	19	18.3	18.4	18.4
	Never	54	51.9	52.4	70.9
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	1.9	72.8
	Several times a year	8	7.7	7.8	80.6
	Several times a month	11	10.6	10.7	91.3
	Several times a week	5	4.8	4.9	96.1
	Several times a day	3	2.9	2.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 16

Twitter Use for Non-verbal Interaction (Share, retweet, repost, like, react) with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.4	20.4
	Never	43	41.3	41.7	62.1
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	1.9	64.1
	Several times a year	9	8.7	8.7	72.8
	Several times a month	12	11.5	11.7	84.5
	Several times a week	13	12.5	12.6	97.1
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 17

Instagram Use for Non-verbal Interaction (Share, retweet, repost, like, react) with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	31.1	31.1
	Never	47	45.2	45.6	76.7
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	1.9	78.6
	Several times a year	7	6.7	6.8	85.4
	Several times a month	8	7.7	7.8	93.2
	Several times a week	4	3.8	3.9	97.1
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

252

Table 18

Youtube Use for Non-verbal Interaction (Share, retweet, repost, like, react) with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	34	32.7	33.0	33.0
	Never	65	62.5	63.1	96.1
	Several times a year	1	1.0	1.0	97.1
	Several times a month	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 19

Facebook Use for Political Discussion with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	19	18.3	18.4	18.4
	Never	77	74.0	74.8	93.2
	Several times a year	2	1.9	1.9	95.1
	Several times a month	3	2.9	2.9	98.1
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 20

Twitter Use for Political Discussion with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.4	20.4
	Never	75	72.1	72.8	93.2
	Several times a year	2	1.9	1.9	95.1
	Several times a month	2	1.9	1.9	97.1
	Several times a week	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 21

Instagram Use for Political Discussion with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	31.1	31.1
	Never	66	63.5	64.1	95.1
	Several times a year	2	1.9	1.9	97.1
	Several times a month	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 22

Youtube Use for Political Discussion with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	34	32.7	33.0	33.0
	Never	65	62.5	63.1	96.1
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	97.1
	Several times a year	1	1.0	1.0	98.1
	Several times a month	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 23

Use of Institutions' Websites for Political Discussion with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	27	26.0	26.2	26.2
	Never	72	69.2	69.9	96.1
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	97.1
	Several times a year	1	1.0	1.0	98.1
	Several times a month	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 24

Whatsapp Use for Political Discussion with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	5	4.8	4.9	4.9
	Never	67	64.4	65.7	70.6
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	2.0	72.5
	Several times a year	9	8.7	8.8	81.4
	Several times a month	10	9.6	9.8	91.2
	Several times a week	8	7.7	7.8	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 25

Email Use for Political Discussion with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	4	3.8	3.9	3.9
	Never	72	69.2	69.9	73.8
	Less than once a year	5	4.8	4.9	78.6
	Several times a year	8	7.7	7.8	86.4
	Several times a month	10	9.6	9.7	96.1
	Several times a week	4	3.8	3.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 26

Facebook Use for Solidarity with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	18	17.3	17.5	17.5
	Never	53	51.0	51.5	68.9
	Several times a year	13	12.5	12.6	81.6
	Several times a month	12	11.5	11.7	93.2
	Several times a week	4	3.8	3.9	97.1
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 27

Twitter Use for Solidarity with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.4	20.4
	Never	45	43.3	43.7	64.1
	Several times a year	14	13.5	13.6	77.7
	Several times a month	15	14.4	14.6	92.2
	Several times a week	5	4.8	4.9	97.1
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 28

Instagram Use for Solidarity with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	31.1	31.1
	Never	43	41.3	41.7	72.8
	Several times a year	11	10.6	10.7	83.5
	Several times a month	11	10.6	10.7	94.2
	Several times a week	3	2.9	2.9	97.1
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 29

Youtube Use for Solidarity with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	34	32.7	33.0	33.0
	Never	61	58.7	59.2	92.2
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	1.9	94.2
	Several times a year	3	2.9	2.9	97.1
	Several times a month	3	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 30

Use of Institutions' Websites for Solidarity with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	28	26.9	27.2	27.2
	Never	58	55.8	56.3	83.5
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	84.5
	Several times a year	4	3.8	3.9	88.3
	Several times a month	8	7.7	7.8	96.1
	Several times a week	2	1.9	1.9	98.1
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 31

Whatsapp Use for Solidarity with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	5	4.8	4.9	4.9
	Never	60	57.7	58.8	63.7
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	2.0	65.7
	Several times a year	9	8.7	8.8	74.5
	Several times a month	14	13.5	13.7	88.2
	Several times a week	8	7.7	7.8	96.1
	Several times a day	3	2.9	2.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 32

Email Use for Solidarity with TS Member Organizations and/or TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	3	2.9	2.9	2.9
	Never	62	59.6	60.2	63.1
	Several times a year	15	14.4	14.6	77.7
	Several times a month	15	14.4	14.6	92.2
	Several times a week	6	5.8	5.8	98.1
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 33

Facebook Use for Information Exchange, Political Discussion and Solidarity with Foreign and/or International Organizations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	19	18.3	18.4	18.4
	Never	46	44.2	44.7	63.1
	Less than once a year	7	6.7	6.8	69.9
	Several times a year	15	14.4	14.6	84.5
	Several times a month	8	7.7	7.8	92.2
	Several times a week	7	6.7	6.8	99.0
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 34

Twitter Use for Information Exchange, Political Discussion and Solidarity with Foreign and/or International Organizations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.4	20.4
	Never	40	38.5	38.8	59.2
	Less than once a year	8	7.7	7.8	67.0
	Several times a year	18	17.3	17.5	84.5
	Several times a month	7	6.7	6.8	91.3
	Several times a week	5	4.8	4.9	96.1
	Several times a day	3	2.9	2.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 35

Instagram Use for Information Exchange, Political Discussion and Solidarity with Foreign and/or International Organizations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	31.1	31.1
	Never	39	37.5	37.9	68.9
	Less than once a year	6	5.8	5.8	74.8
	Several times a year	13	12.5	12.6	87.4
	Several times a month	6	5.8	5.8	93.2
	Several times a week	6	5.8	5.8	99.0
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

258

Table 36

Use of Institutions' Websites for Information Exchange, Political Discussion and Solidarity with Foreign and/or International Organizations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	29	27.9	28.2	28.2
	Never	39	37.5	37.9	66.0
	Less than once a year	6	5.8	5.8	71.8
	Several times a year	12	11.5	11.7	83.5
	Several times a month	8	7.7	7.8	91.3
	Several times a week	6	5.8	5.8	97.1
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	98.1
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	31	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 37

Whatsapp Use for Information Exchange, Political Discussion and Solidarity with Foreign and/or International Organizations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	5	4.8	4.9	4.9
	Never	71	68.3	69.6	74.5
	Less than once a year	4	3.8	3.9	78.4
	Several times a year	8	7.7	7.8	86.3
	Several times a month	4	3.8	3.9	90.2
	Several times a week	6	5.8	5.9	96.1
	Several times a day	3	2.9	2.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 38

Email Use for Information Exchange, Political Discussion and Solidarity with Foreign and/or International Organizations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	3	2.9	2.9	2.9
	Never	47	45.2	45.6	48.5
	Less than once a year	5	4.8	4.9	53.4
	Several times a year	22	21.2	21.4	74.8
	Several times a month	12	11.5	11.7	86.4
	Several times a week	9	8.7	8.7	95.1
	Several times a day	4	3.8	3.9	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

259

Table 39

Facebook Use for Information Exchange and Solidarity with Followers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	19	18.3	18.3	18.3
	Never	13	12.5	12.5	30.8
	Several times a year	5	4.8	4.8	35.6
	Several times a month	20	19.2	19.2	54.8
	Several times a week	17	16.3	16.3	71.2
	Several times a day	17	16.3	16.3	87.5
	All day long	13	12.5	12.5	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 40

Twitter Use for Information Exchange and Solidarity with Followers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.2	20.2
	Never	14	13.5	13.5	33.7
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	1.9	35.6
	Several times a year	4	3.8	3.8	39.4
	Several times a month	14	13.5	13.5	52.9
	Several times a week	15	14.4	14.4	67.3
	Several times a day	18	17.3	17.3	84.6
	All day long	16	15.4	15.4	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 41

Instagram Use for Information Exchange and Solidarity with Followers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	30.8	30.8
	Never	7	6.7	6.7	37.5
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	38.5
	Several times a year	4	3.8	3.8	42.3
	Several times a month	11	10.6	10.6	52.9
	Several times a week	22	21.2	21.2	74.0
	Several times a day	16	15.4	15.4	89.4
	All day long	11	10.6	10.6	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

260

Table 42

Youtube Use for Information Exchange and Solidarity with Followers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	34	32.7	32.7	32.7
	Never	16	15.4	15.4	48.1
	Less than once a year	5	4.8	4.8	52.9
	Several times a year	20	19.2	19.2	72.1
	Several times a month	11	10.6	10.6	82.7
	Several times a week	16	15.4	15.4	98.1
	All day long	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 43

Use of Institution's Website for Information Exchange and Solidarity with Followers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	28	26.9	26.9	26.9
	Never	18	17.3	17.3	44.2
	Several times a year	5	4.8	4.8	49.0
	Several times a month	17	16.3	16.3	65.4
	Several times a week	18	17.3	17.3	82.7
	Several times a day	9	8.7	8.7	91.3
	All day long	9	8.7	8.7	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 44

Frequency of Written Response by Followers on Facebook

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	19	18.3	18.3	18.3
	Never	11	10.6	10.6	28.8
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	29.8
	Several times a year	6	5.8	5.8	35.6
	Several times a month	23	22.1	22.1	57.7
	Several times a week	22	21.2	21.2	78.8
	Several times a day	8	7.7	7.7	86.5
	All day long	14	13.5	13.5	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 45

Frequency of Written Response by Followers on Twitter

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.2	20.2
	Never	15	14.4	14.4	34.6
	Several times a year	9	8.7	8.7	43.3
	Several times a month	14	13.5	13.5	56.7
	Several times a week	20	19.2	19.2	76.0
	Several times a day	8	7.7	7.7	83.7
	All day long	17	16.3	16.3	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 46

Frequency of Written Response by Followers on Instagram

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	30.8	30.8
	Never	8	7.7	7.7	38.5
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	39.4
	Several times a year	7	6.7	6.7	46.2
	Several times a month	16	15.4	15.4	61.5
	Several times a week	17	16.3	16.3	77.9
	Several times a day	8	7.7	7.7	85.6
	All day long	15	14.4	14.4	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 47

Frequency of Written Response by Followers on Youtube

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	34	32.7	32.7	32.7
	Never	26	25.0	25.0	57.7
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	58.7
	Several times a year	13	12.5	12.5	71.2
	Several times a month	19	18.3	18.3	89.4
	Several times a week	9	8.7	8.7	98.1
	All day long	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 48

Frequency of Written Response by Followers on Organization's Website

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	28	26.9	26.9	26.9
	Never	49	47.1	47.1	74.0
	Less than once a year	5	4.8	4.8	78.8
	Several times a year	4	3.8	3.8	82.7
	Several times a month	9	8.7	8.7	91.3
	Several times a week	7	6.7	6.7	98.1
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 49

Frequency of Political Discussion with Followers on Facebook

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	19	18.3	18.3	18.3
	Never	65	62.5	62.5	80.8
	Less than once a year	3	2.9	2.9	83.7
	Several times a year	3	2.9	2.9	86.5
	Several times a month	8	7.7	7.7	94.2
	Several times a week	5	4.8	4.8	99.0
	All day long	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 50

Frequency of Political Discussion with Followers on Twitter

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.2	20.2
	Never	68	65.4	65.4	85.6
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	1.9	87.5
	Several times a year	5	4.8	4.8	92.3
	Several times a month	2	1.9	1.9	94.2
	Several times a week	4	3.8	3.8	98.1
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 51

Frequency of Political Discussion with Followers on Instagram

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	30.8	30.8
	Never	60	57.7	57.7	88.5
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	1.9	90.4
	Several times a year	3	2.9	2.9	93.3
	Several times a month	6	5.8	5.8	99.0
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 52

Frequency of Political Discussion with Followers on Youtube

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	34	32.7	32.7	32.7
	Never	59	56.7	56.7	89.4
	Less than once a year	3	2.9	2.9	92.3
	Several times a year	5	4.8	4.8	97.1
	Several times a month	3	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 53

Frequency of Political Discussion with Followers on Organizastion's Website

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	28	26.9	26.9	26.9
	Never	72	69.2	69.2	96.2
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	97.1
	Several times a month	2	1.9	1.9	99.0
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 54

Frequency of Political Discussion with International Followers on Facebook

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	19	18.3	18.4	18.4
	Never	57	54.8	55.3	73.8
	Less than once a year	6	5.8	5.8	79.6
	Several times a year	8	7.7	7.8	87.4
	Several times a month	7	6.7	6.8	94.2
	Several times a week	5	4.8	4.9	99.0
	Several times a day	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 55

Frequency of Political Discussion with International Followers on Twitter

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	21	20.2	20.4	20.4
	Never	54	51.9	52.4	72.8
	Less than once a year	3	2.9	2.9	75.7
	Several times a year	8	7.7	7.8	83.5
	Several times a month	10	9.6	9.7	93.2
	Several times a week	5	4.8	4.9	98.1
	Several times a day	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 56

Frequency of Political Discussion with International Followers on Instagram

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	32	30.8	31.1	31.1
	Never	50	48.1	48.5	79.6
	Less than once a year	3	2.9	2.9	82.5
	Several times a year	8	7.7	7.8	90.3
	Several times a month	6	5.8	5.8	96.1
	Several times a week	4	3.8	3.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 57

Frequency of Political Discussion with International Followers on Youtube

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	34	32.7	33.0	33.0
	Never	61	58.7	59.2	92.2
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	93.2
	Several times a year	2	1.9	1.9	95.1
	Several times a month	4	3.8	3.9	99.0
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 58

Frequency of Political Discussion with International Followers on Organization's Website

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No account	28	26.9	27.2	27.2
	Never	56	53.8	54.4	81.6
	Less than once a year	4	3.8	3.9	85.4
	Several times a year	4	3.8	3.9	89.3
	Several times a month	8	7.7	7.8	97.1
	Several times a week	3	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 59

Sharing / Retweeting Statement of TS Secretariat

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	68	65.4	66.0	66.0
	Yes	35	33.7	34.0	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 60

Copying and Posting Statement of TS Secretariat from the Organization's
Account

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	81	77.9	78.6	78.6
	Yes	22	21.2	21.4	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 61

Quoting and Commenting on Original TS Post

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	74	71.2	71.8	71.8
	Yes	29	27.9	28.2	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 62

Waiting for other TS Constituents for a Statement on Organization's Behalf

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	90	86.5	87.4	87.4
	Yes	13	12.5	12.6	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 63

No Online Action After TS Statement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	92	88.5	89.3	89.3
	Yes	11	10.6	10.7	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 64

No Social Media Presence

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	89	85.6	86.4	86.4
	Yes	14	13.5	13.6	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 65

Topics that only TS Secretariat posts an Announcement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No social media presence	12	11.5	11.8	11.8
	Never	50	48.1	49.0	60.8
	Less than once a year	3	2.9	2.9	63.7
	Several times a year	26	25.0	25.5	89.2
	Several times a month	10	9.6	9.8	99.0
	Several times a week	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 66

Topics that only majority of TS member organizations post an Announcement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No social media presence	12	11.5	11.8	11.8
	Never	52	50.0	51.0	62.7
	Less than once a year	1	1.0	1.0	63.7
	Several times a year	16	15.4	15.7	79.4
	Several times a month	16	15.4	15.7	95.1
	Several times a week	5	4.8	4.9	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 67

Topics of social or political relevance

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No social media presence	12	11.5	11.8	11.8
	Never	14	13.5	13.7	25.5
	Less than once a year	2	1.9	2.0	27.5
	Several times a year	6	5.8	5.9	33.3
	Several times a month	19	18.3	18.6	52.0
	Several times a week	20	19.2	19.6	71.6
	Several times a day	15	14.4	14.7	86.3
	All day long	14	13.5	13.7	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 68

Topics related to Organization's goals or interests

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No social media presence	12	11.5	11.8	11.8
	Never	11	10.6	10.8	22.5
	Several times a year	3	2.9	2.9	25.5
	Several times a month	13	12.5	12.7	38.2
	Several times a week	21	20.2	20.6	58.8
	Several times a day	24	23.1	23.5	82.4
	All day long	18	17.3	17.6	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 69

Change in Size of Facebook Followers during Gezi Protests

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Drastically increased	13	12.5	15.7	15.7
	Increased	24	23.1	28.9	44.6
	Remained same	5	4.8	6.0	50.6
	Drastically decreased	1	1.0	1.2	51.8
	Had no account during the protests	21	20.2	25.3	77.1
	No account	19	18.3	22.9	100.0
	Total	83	79.8	100.0	
Missing	No answer	21	20.2		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 70

Change in Size of Facebook Followers since Gezi Protests through Today

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Drastically increased	6	5.8	6.3	6.3
	Increased	51	49.0	53.1	59.4
	Remained same	13	12.5	13.5	72.9
	Decreased	5	4.8	5.2	78.1
	Drastically decreased	2	1.9	2.1	80.2
	No account	19	18.3	19.8	100.0
	Total	96	92.3	100.0	
Missing	No answer	8	7.7		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 71

Change in Size of Twitter Followers during Gezi Protests

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Drastically increased	14	13.5	16.7	16.7
	Increased	21	20.2	25.0	41.7
	Had no account during the protests	28	26.9	33.3	75.0
	No account	21	20.2	25.0	100.0
	Total	84	80.8	100.0	
Missing	No answer	20	19.2		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 72

Change in Size of Twitter Followers since Gezi Protests through Today

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Drastically increased	7	6.7	7.4	7.4
	Increased	55	52.9	58.5	66.0
	Remained same	8	7.7	8.5	74.5
	Decreased	1	1.0	1.1	75.5
	Drastically decreased	2	1.9	2.1	77.7
	No account	21	20.2	22.3	100.0
	Total	94	90.4	100.0	
Missing	No answer	10	9.6		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 73

Change in Number of Follower Feedbacks through Facebook since Gezi Protests through Today

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Drastically increased	4	3.8	4.2	4.2
	Increased	32	30.8	33.3	37.5
	Remained same	20	19.2	20.8	58.3
	Decreased	13	12.5	13.5	71.9
	Drastically decreased	8	7.7	8.3	80.2
	No account	19	18.3	19.8	100.0
	Total	96	92.3	100.0	
Missing	No answer	8	7.7		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 74

Change in Number of Follower Feedbacks through Twitter since Gezi Protests through Today

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Drastically increased	5	4.8	5.6	5.6
	Increased	34	32.7	37.8	43.3
	Remained same	20	19.2	22.2	65.6
	Decreased	6	5.8	6.7	72.2
	Drastically decreased	4	3.8	4.4	76.7
	No account	21	20.2	23.3	100.0
	Total	90	86.5	100.0	
Missing	No answer	14	13.5		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 75

Change in Participation in Organization's Work by Members, Volunteers, Follower since Gezi Protests through Today

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Drastically increased	7	6.7	7.1	7.1
	Increased	47	45.2	47.5	54.5
	Remained same	13	12.5	13.1	67.7
	Decreased	22	21.2	22.2	89.9
	Drastically decreased	10	9.6	10.1	100.0
	Total	99	95.2	100.0	
Missing	No answer	4	3.8		
	System	1	1.0		
	Total	5	4.8		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 76

Change in Membership and Support since Gezi Protests

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	All of those who were the Organization's member back then are still member	23	22.1	31.1	31.1
	Majority of those who were the Organization's member back then are still member	43	41.3	58.1	89.2
	A few of those who were the Organization's member back then are still member	7	6.7	9.5	98.6
	None of those who were the Organization's member back then are still member	1	1.0	1.4	100.0
	Total	74	71.2	100.0	
Missing	No answer	9	8.7		
	System	21	20.2		
	Total	30	28.8		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 77

Change in Voluntary Support since Gezi Protests

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	All of those who were Organization's volunteers back then still volunteer for it	5	4.8	25.0	25.0
	Majority of those who were Organization's volunteers back then still volunteer for it	11	10.6	55.0	80.0
	A few of those who were Organization's volunteers back then still volunteer for it	3	2.9	15.0	95.0
	None of those who were Organization's volunteers back then still volunteer for it	1	1.0	5.0	100.0
	Total	20	19.2	100.0	
Missing	No answer	1	1.0		
	System	83	79.8		
	Total	84	80.8		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 78

Change in Social Media Followers since Gezi Protests

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	All Followers of Organization on Social Media during Gezi Protests follow today	12	11.5	19.0	19.0
	Majority of Followers of Organization on Social Media during Gezi Protests follow today	45	43.3	71.4	90.5
	A Few of Followers of Organization on Social Media during Gezi Protests follow today	5	4.8	7.9	98.4
	None of Followers of Organization on Social Media during Gezi Protests follows today	1	1.0	1.6	100.0
	Total	63	60.6	100.0	
Missing	Had No Social Media Presence During the Protests	16	15.4		
	No Social Media Presence	11	10.6		
	No Answer	13	12.5		
	System	1	1.0		
	Total	41	39.4		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 79

View on Annulment of Istanbul Convention

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Supporting	4	3.8	3.9	3.9
	Opposing	96	92.3	93.2	97.1
	No view	3	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	No answer	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

273

Table 80

View on Transfer of Gezi Park's Proprty Rights from Istanbul Municipality to Government

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Supporting	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
	Opposing	92	88.5	91.1	92.1
	No view	8	7.7	7.9	100.0
	Total	101	97.1	100.0	
Missing	No answer	3	2.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 81

View on Implementation of Kanal Istanbul Project

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Supporting	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
	Opposing	97	93.3	93.3	94.2
	No view	6	5.8	5.8	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 82

View on Cancellation of 2019 Istanbul Mayoral Election

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Supporting	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
	Opposing	89	85.6	88.1	89.1
	No view	11	10.6	10.9	100.0
	Total	101	97.1	100.0	
Missing	No answer	3	2.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 83

View on Legislation for RTUK Scrutiny over Internet News Outlets

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Supporting	3	2.9	2.9	2.9
	Opposing	86	82.7	84.3	87.3
	No view	13	12.5	12.7	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	No answer	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 84

View on Handling of Government with Coronavirus Pandemic

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Supporting	4	3.8	4.0	4.0
	Opposing	83	79.8	83.0	87.0
	No view	13	12.5	13.0	100.0
	Total	100	96.2	100.0	
Missing	No answer	4	3.8		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 85

View on Legislation for Governmental Authority to appoint trustee administrator to NGOs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Supporting	2	1.9	2.0	2.0
	Opposing	96	92.3	95.0	97.0
	No view	3	2.9	3.0	100.0
	Total	101	97.1	100.0	
Missing	No answer	3	2.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 86

Posting Organization's View on Social Media About Social and Political Issue

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	19	18.3	18.3	18.3
	Yes	85	81.7	81.7	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 87

Encouraging Followers through Social Media to Vote in Elections

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	49	47.1	47.1	47.1
	Yes	55	52.9	52.9	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 88

Encouraging Followers through Social Media to Participate in Protest
About a Political and/or Social Issue

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	28	26.9	26.9	26.9
	Yes	76	73.1	73.1	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 89

Organizing a Petition Campaign for a Social and/or Political Issue

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	48	46.2	46.2	46.2
	Yes	56	53.8	53.8	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 90

Participating in a Petition Campaign for a Social and/or Political Issue

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	29	27.9	27.9	27.9
	Yes	75	72.1	72.1	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 91

Filing an Official Objection to an Administrative Office about a Social
and/or Political Issue

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	42	40.4	40.4	40.4
	Yes	62	59.6	59.6	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 92

Calling for Boycott on an Institution, Organization or Firm

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	57	54.8	54.8	54.8
	Yes	47	45.2	45.2	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 93

Sharing, Retweeting, Reposting Relevant Content on Social Media to Encourage Members, Supporters, Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	28	26.9	26.9	26.9
	Yes	76	73.1	73.1	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 94

Setting Relevant Content on Social Media as Pinned Post to Encourage Members, Supporters, Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	51	49.0	49.0	49.0
	Yes	53	51.0	51.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 95

Sharing, Retweeting Relevant Content on Social Media with a Comment to Encourage Members, Supporters, Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	44	42.3	42.3	42.3
	Yes	60	57.7	57.7	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 96

Posting Organization's View or Objection in Written Form on Social Media to Encourage Members, Supporters, Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	25	24.0	24.0	24.0
	Yes	79	76.0	76.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 97

Starting Live Broadcast on Social Media to Encourage Members, Supporters, Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	55	52.9	52.9	52.9
	Yes	49	47.1	47.1	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 98

Posting Multimedia Content such as Image and Video to Encourage
Members, Supporters, Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	24	23.1	23.1	23.1
	Yes	80	76.9	76.9	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 99

Posting Story on Social Media to Encourage Members, Supporters,
Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	50	48.1	48.1	48.1
	Yes	54	51.9	51.9	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 100

Liking relevant Content on Social Media to Encourage Members,
Supporters, Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	48	46.2	46.2	46.2
	Yes	56	53.8	53.8	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 101

Organizing Event on Social Media to Encourage Members, Supporters,
Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	54	51.9	51.9	51.9
	Yes	50	48.1	48.1	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 102

Sending Direct Message to Followers on Social Media to Encourage
Members, Supporters, Followers for Political Action

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	76	73.1	73.1	73.1
	Yes	28	26.9	26.9	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 103

Purchasing Sponsored Content to Increase Supporter Engagement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	74	71.2	71.2	71.2
	Yes	30	28.8	28.8	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 104

Using Account more Actively to Increase Supporter Engagement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	26	25.0	25.0	25.0
	Yes	78	75.0	75.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 105

Tagging other TS Constituent Accounts in Posts to Increase Supporter Engagement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	62	59.6	59.6	59.6
	Yes	42	40.4	40.4	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 106

Tagging TS Secretariat Account in Posts to Increase Supporter Engagement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	78	75.0	75.0	75.0
	Yes	26	25.0	25.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 107

Tagging Accounts of Renowned Figures in Posts to Increase Supporter Engagement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	64	61.5	61.5	61.5
	Yes	40	38.5	38.5	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

279

Table 108

Replying to Posts by Accounts with Large Follower Base to Increase
Supporter Engagement

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	96	92.3	92.3	92.3
	Yes	8	7.7	7.7	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 109

Introducing Account by physical means

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	55	52.9	52.9	52.9
	Yes	49	47.1	47.1	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 110

Decision-makers of Organization's Internet-based Communication Policy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Head of organization / Top executive	3	2.9	2.9	2.9
	Executive board	41	39.4	39.8	42.7
	Corporate communication unit / department	20	19.2	19.4	62.1
	Digital media executive / manager	4	3.8	3.9	66.0
	An informal executive group	24	23.1	23.3	89.3
	Other	2	1.9	1.9	91.3
	No internet communication	9	8.7	8.7	100.0
	Total	103	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 111

Change in the Composition of the Decision Makers of Organization's Internet-based Communication Policy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	The same person/group are still in charge without change	12	11.5	12.9	12.9
	Minority of the members are different	19	18.3	20.4	33.3
	Majority of members are different	35	33.7	37.6	71.0
	All members are different	27	26.0	29.0	100.0
	Total	93	89.4	100.0	
Missing	System	11	10.6		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 112

Type of Organization

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Professional Organization	19	18.3	18.3	18.3
	Political Party	18	17.3	17.3	35.6
	Worker's Union	6	5.8	5.8	41.3
	Art & Culture Community	3	2.9	2.9	44.2
	Neighborhood Association	9	8.7	8.7	52.9
	Right & Activism Community	22	21.2	21.2	74.0
	Press & News Organization	3	2.9	2.9	76.9
	Alumni Association	2	1.9	1.9	78.8
	Political Initiative	13	12.5	12.5	91.3
	Solidarity Group / Association	8	7.7	7.7	99.0
	Other	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 113

Status of Organization

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Formal	80	76.9	76.9	76.9
	Informal	24	23.1	23.1	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 114

Number of Members

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1-50	5	4.8	6.5	6.5
	51-100	12	11.5	15.6	22.1
	101-200	13	12.5	16.9	39.0
	201-500	10	9.6	13.0	51.9
	501-1000	3	2.9	3.9	55.8
	Over 1000	34	32.7	44.2	100.0
	Total	77	74.0	100.0	
Missing	System	27	26.0		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 115

Number of Employees

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1-50	70	67.3	82.4	82.4
	51-100	4	3.8	4.7	87.1
	101-200	3	2.9	3.5	90.6
	201-500	3	2.9	3.5	94.1
	501-1000	4	3.8	4.7	98.8
	Over 1000	1	1.0	1.2	100.0
	Total	85	81.7	100.0	
Missing	System	19	18.3		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 116

Definition of Informal Organizations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A volunteer group that gather in-person regularly	17	16.3	70.8	70.8
	A volunteer group that gather in-person irregularly only when needed	6	5.8	25.0	95.8
	A volunteer group that gather and work online regularly	1	1.0	4.2	100.0
	Total	24	23.1	100.0	
Missing	System	80	76.9		
Total		104	100.0		

282

Table 117

Number of Volunteers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1-50	26	25.0	36.1	36.1
	51-100	10	9.6	13.9	50.0
	101-200	9	8.7	12.5	62.5
	201-500	10	9.6	13.9	76.4
	501-1000	6	5.8	8.3	84.7
	Over 1000	11	10.6	15.3	100.0
	Total	72	69.2	100.0	
Missing	System	32	30.8		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 118

Member Fee

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	31	29.8	30.4	30.4
	Yes	71	68.3	69.6	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 119

Donation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	34	32.7	33.3	33.3
	Yes	68	65.4	66.7	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 120

International Donation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	90	86.5	88.2	88.2
	Yes	12	11.5	11.8	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

283

Table 121

Social Responsibility Fund

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	96	92.3	94.1	94.1
	Yes	6	5.8	5.9	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 122

Internet-based Micro Funding

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	101	97.1	99.0	99.0
	Yes	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 123

Other

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	73	70.2	71.6	71.6
	Yes	29	27.9	28.4	100.0
	Total	102	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System	2	1.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 124

Share of TS Views that Organization Shares

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None of TS Views	4	3.8	4.1	4.1
	Minority of TS Views	11	10.6	11.2	15.3
	Half of TS Views	8	7.7	8.2	23.5
	Majority of TS Views	47	45.2	48.0	71.4
	All of TS Views	28	26.9	28.6	100.0
	Total	98	94.2	100.0	
Missing	No answer	5	4.8		
	System	1	1.0		
	Total	6	5.8		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 125

Whether Organization still considers itself as a TS Constituent

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	23	22.1	22.8	22.8
	Yes	78	75.0	77.2	100.0
	Total	101	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	3	2.9		
Total		104	100.0		

Table 126

Respondent's Position

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Executive	58	55.8	55.8	55.8
	Employee	22	21.2	21.2	76.9
	Volunteer	23	22.1	22.1	99.0
	Member	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 127

Has Been in the Same Position since 2013 Gezi Protests?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	62	59.6	59.6	59.6
	Yes	42	40.4	40.4	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 128

Number of Years in the Same Position (Discontinued Position Since Gezi Protests)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1-3 years	36	58.1	58.1	58.1
	4-5 years	10	16.1	16.1	74.2
	6-8 years	15	24.2	24.2	98.4
	Longer than 8 years	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
	Total	62	100.0	100.0	

B. QUESTIONNAIRE

ARAŞTIRMAYA GÖNÜLLÜ KATILIM FORMU

Bu anket kim tarafından yürütülüyor?
Bu anket, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi doktora adayı Can Türe'nin Sosyal Hareketlerin Değişen Yüzü başlıklı tez çalışması kapsamında gerçekleştirilmektedir. Anket görüşmeleri, çalışmanın yazarı Can Türe tarafından bizzat ve yüz yüze gerçekleştirilmektedir. Tez çalışmasının akademik danışmanlığı ODTÜ Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Öğretim Üyesi Doç. Dr. Barış Çakmur yürütmektedir.

Çalışmanın Amacı Nedir?
Çok bileşenli bir çatı hareketi olan Taksim Dayanışması'nın ve bileşenlerinin, Gezi Parkı protestolarının üzerinden geçen 8 yılda Internet teknolojilerini kullanma dinamiklerini araştırmaktır. Bu yolla, demokratik toplumun gereği olan sivil toplum kuruluşları ve bağımsız baskı gruplarının bu teknolojilerden faydalanarak geniş tabanlı kamuoyu aktörleri oluşturma potansiyelinin ortaya konulması amaçlanmaktadır.

Ankete katılımınız neden önemli?
Bu anketin bir parçası olduğu akademik tez çalışması kapsamında ortaya çıkacak olan bilimsel veriler ve varılacak sonuçlarla, Taksim Dayanışması benzeri toplumsal aktörlerinin sayısının artırılarak, tabanları ve diğer toplumsal aktörlerle daha etkili iletişim ve koordinasyon olanaklarının hayata geçirilmesi büyük önem taşımaktadır. 128 bileşeni ve kuruluşunun üzerinden 9 yıl geçmesine rağmen bir baskı grubu olarak varlığını sürdürmesiyle Taksim Dayanışması Türkiye kamuoyunun önemli aktörlerinden biri konumundadır. Ankete katılımınız, Taksim Dayanışması'nın ve bileşenlerinin ülke kamuoyunun oluşumuna yaptığı katkının ve mekanizmalarının daha yakından ve bilimsel kriterlerle anlaşılmasına yardımcı olacaktır.

Bize Nasıl Yardımcı Olmanızı İsteyeceğiz?
Araştırmaya katılmayı kabul ederseniz, sizden temsilcisi olduğunu kurum ya da grubun dijital kurumsal davranışlarına yönelik bazı bilgiler beklenmektedir. Yaklaşık olarak bir saat sürmesi beklenen bu anket kapsamında, sizlere temsilcisi olduğunuz kurum/grubun sosyal medyadaki takipçileri, diğer aktivist gruplar ve Taksim Dayanışması ile sosyal medya üzerinden kurduğu ilişkilere gibi boyutları kapsayan sorular yöneltilecektir. Sorulara verilen yanıtlar araştırmacı tarafından not alınacaktır.

Sizden Topladığımız Bilgileri Nasıl Kullanacağız?

Araştırmaya katılımınız tamamen gönüllülük temelinde ve sizin, kurumunuzun /grubunuzun rızası dahilinde olmalıdır. Ankete katılan tüm kişi ve kurumlardan toplanan veriler, yukarıda ismi verilen tez çalışması kapsamında bir araya getirilerek, sonuçları ve bu sonuçlar ışığında öneriler yayınlanacaktır. Talep halinde çalışmanın son halinin bir nüshası size ulaştırılacaktır. İşlenen tüm veriler, anonimleştirilecek ve hiçbir veri sağlayıcı kişi ve kurum ismi çalışmada kullanılmayacaktır.

Katılımınızla ilgili bilmeniz gerekenler:

Çalışma, genel olarak kişisel rahatsızlık verecek ya da kurumsal gizlilik gerektiren sorular içermemektedir. Ancak, katılım sırasında sorulardan ya da herhangi başka bir nedenden ötürü kendinizi rahatsız hisseder ya da kurum/grubunuzun onaylamadığı bir soru ile karşılaşırsanız, bu soruyu atlamakta ya da cevaplama işini tümüyle yarıda bırakıp çıkmakta serbestsiniz. Böyle bir durumda çalışmayı uygulayan kişiye, çalışmadan çıkmak istediğinizi söylemeniz yeterli olacaktır.

Araştırmayla ilgili daha fazla bilgi almak isterseniz:

Bu çalışmaya katıldığınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederiz. Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için ODTÜ Öğretim Üyesi Doç. Dr. Barış Çakmur (E-posta: ya da çalışmayı yürüten doktora adayı Can Türe (E-posta: ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz.

Yukarıdaki bilgileri okudum ve bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum.

(Formu doldurup imzaladıktan sonra uygulayıcıya geri veriniz).

İsim Soyad   Tarih
  İmza

                         ---/----/-----

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren politik ve sosyal konularda, <u>kurumsal görüşünüzü beyan etmek amacıyla</u> aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

Facebook

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Twitter

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Instagram

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Taksim Dayanışması veya bileşenleri hakkında haber almak veya onları kurumunuzla ilgili gelişmelerden haberdar etmek amacıyla aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

Facebook

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Twitter

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez

- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Instagram

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Youtube

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Bileşen kurumun kendi web sitesi

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Web sitesi yok

Whatsapp

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az

- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>E-posta</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi ve sosyal konularda <u>Taksim Dayanışması ve/veya bileşenleriyle koordinasyon amacıyla</u> aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

<u>Facebook</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Twitter</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Instagram</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez

- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Youtube

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Bileşen kurumun kendi web sitesi

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Web sitesi yok

Whatsapp

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

E-posta

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez

- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi ve sosyal konularda <u>Taksim Dayanışması veya bileşenleri ile sözlü konuşma dışı, beğenme, retweet etme, paylaşma gibi sosyal medya araçlarıyla iletişim amacıyla</u> aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

<u>Facebook</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Twitter</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Instagram</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Youtube

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi ve sosyal konularda, <u>Taksim Dayanışması veya bileşenleri ile sözlü tartışma ve müzakere amacıyla</u> aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

Facebook

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Twitter

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Instagram

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez

- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Youtube

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Bileşen kurumun kendi web sitesi

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Web sitesi yok

Whatsapp

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

E-posta

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez

- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi ve sosyal konularda, <u>Taksim Dayanışması veya bileşenleriyle dayanışma amacıyla</u> aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

Facebook

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Twitter

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Instagram

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Youtube

- Gün boyunca

- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Bileşen kurumun kendi web sitesi</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Web sitesi yok

<u>Whatsapp</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>E-posta</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi ve sosyal konularda <u>başka bir ülkeden ya da uluslararası bir kuruşla haberleşme, müzakere ya da dayanışma amacıyla</u> aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

<u>Facebook</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Twitter</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Instagram</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Bileşen kurumun kendi web sitesi</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez

- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Web sitesi yok

<u>Whatsapp</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>E-posta</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi ve sosyal konularda, <u>kurum hesabınızın takipçileriyle iletişim ya da dayanışma amacıyla</u> aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

<u>Facebook</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Twitter</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez

- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Instagram

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Youtube

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Bileşen kurumun web sitesi

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Web sitesi yok

Taksim Dayanışması bir karar alıp, kendi çatı hesabından yayınladığında sizin kurumsal sosyal medya iletişim davranışınız ne olur?

- ☐ Taksim Dayanışması'nın açıklamasını hemen paylaşmak / retweet etmek
- ☐ Açıklamayı kopyalayarak aynen kendi hesaplarımızdan hemen yayınlamak
- ☐ Hemen açıklamayı alıntılayıp üzerine kendi yorumumuzu yazmak
- ☐ Kurumsal paylaşım için TD bileşenlerinin kendi kurumsal hesaplarından açıklama yayınlamasını beklemek
- ☐ TD'nin açıklamasını yeterli bulup ayrıca kurumsal bir paylaşımda bulunmamak.
- ☐ Sosyal medya iletişimi bulunmuyor.

Kurumsal sosyal medya hesaplarınızdan yapılan paylaşımlarda aşağıda sayılan konulara hangi sıklıkta yer verirsiniz?

Sadece TD'nin ortak açıklama kararı aldığı kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi veya sosyal konular

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Sosyal medya hesabı bulunmuyor

Sadece TD bileşenlerinin çoğunluğunun açıklama yaptığı kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi veya sosyal konular

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Sosyal medya hesabı bulunmuyor

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren herhangi siyasi veya sosyal konu

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez

- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Sosyal medya hesabı bulunmuyor

Kurum / grubunuzunu ilgilendiren, kuruluş amacını ilgilendiren veya mesleki konular

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Sosyal medya hesabı bulunmuyor

Kurumsal Facebook sayfanızın takipçi sayısı Gezi protestoları sırasında hangi yönde değişti?

- Çok arttı
- Arttı
- Aynı kaldı
- Azaldı
- Çok azaldı
- Protestolar sırasında hesabı yoktu
- Hesabı yok
- Cevap yok

Kurumsal Facebook sayfanızın takipçi sayısı, Gezi protestolarından bugüne kadar geçen 8 yılda hangi yönde değişti?

- Çok arttı
- Arttı
- Aynı kaldı
- Azaldı
- Çok azaldı
- Hesabı yok
- Cevap yok

Kurumsal Twitter sayfanızın takipçi sayısı Gezi protestoları sırasında hangi yönde değişti?

- Çok arttı
- Arttı
- Aynı kaldı
- Azaldı
- Çok azaldı

- Protestolar sırasında hesabı yoktu
- Hesabı yok
- Cevap yok

Kurumsal Twitter sayfanızın takipçi sayısı, <u>Gezi protestolarından bugüne kadar geçen 8 yılda</u> hangi yönde değişti?

- Çok arttı
- Arttı
- Aynı kaldı
- Azaldı
- Çok azaldı
- Hesabı yok
- Cevap yok

Kurumsal <u>Facebook</u> sayfanız üzerinden takipçilerden kuruma gelen geribildirimlerin sayısı <u>Gezi protestolarından bugüne kadar geçen 8 yılda</u> hangi yönde değişti?

- Çok arttı
- Arttı
- Aynı kaldı
- Azaldı
- Çok azaldı
- Hesabı yok
- Cevap yok

Kurumsal <u>Twitter</u> sayfanız üzerinden takipçilerden kuruma gelen geribildirimlerin sayısı <u>Gezi protestolarından bugüne kadar geçen 8 yılda</u> hangi yönde değişti?

- Çok arttı
- Arttı
- Aynı kaldı
- Azaldı
- Çok azaldı
- Hesabı yok
- Cevap yok

Gezi protestolarından bugüne kadar geçen 8 yılda destekçi veya üyeleriniz tarafından kurumunuzun çalışmalarına katılım hangi yönde değişti?

- Çok arttı
- Arttı
- Aynı kaldı
- Azaldı
- Çok azaldı
- Cevap yok

Kurumunuzun bir tüzel kişiliği bulunuyorsa, Gezi Parkı protestoları sırasında üyesi ya da destekçisi olan kişilerle olan ilişkisi nasıl bir seyir izledi?

- Tamamının kurumumuza üyeliği devam ediyor.
- Çoğunun kurumumuza üyeliği devam ediyor.
- Küçük bir bölümünün üyeliği devam ediyor
- Hiçbirinin üyeliği devam etmiyor.
- Cevap yok

Kurumunuzun bir tüzel kişiliği bulunmuyorsa, Gezi Parkı protestoları sırasında destekçisi olan kişilerle olan bağlantısı nasıl bir seyir izledi?

- Tamamının kurumumuza desteği devam ediyor.
- Çoğunun kurumumuza desteği devam ediyor.
- Küçük bir bölümünün desteği devam ediyor
- Hiçbirinin desteği devam etmiyor.
- Cevap yok

Kurumunuzun Gezi Parkı protestoları sırasında sosyal medya takipçisi olan kişilerle olan bağlantısı nasıl bir seyir izledi?

- Tamamı hala sosyal medya hesaplarımızı takip ediyor.
- Çoğu hala sosyal medya hesaplarımızı takip ediyor.
- Küçük bir bölümü hala sosyal medya hesaplarımızı takip ediyor
- Hiçbiri artık sosyal medya hesaplarımızı takip etmiyor.
- Protestolar sırasında sosyal medya iletişimi bulunmuyordu
- Sosyal medya iletişimi bulunmuyor.
- Cevap yok

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi ve sosyal konularda, kurum hesaplarından yapılan paylaşımlara takipçilerinizden aşağıdaki mecralar üzerinden ne sıklıkta yazılı cevap alıyorsunuz?

Facebook

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Twitter</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Instagram</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Youtube</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Bileşen kurumun kendi web sitesi</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Web sitesi yok

Kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi ve sosyal konularda, kurumsal hesap takipçilerinizle sözlü tartışma ya da müzakere amaçlı olarak aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

<u>Facebook</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Twitter</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Instagram</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Youtube</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az

- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Bileşen kurumun kendi web sitesi</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Web sitesi yok

Türkiye kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi veya sosyal konularda, <u>yurtdışında yaşayan takipçilerle ya da destekçilerle tartışma amacıyla</u> aşağıdaki mecraları ne sıklıkta kullanıyorsunuz?

<u>Facebook</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Twitter</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

<u>Instagram</u>

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez

- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Youtube

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Hesabı yok

Bileşen kurumun kendi web sitesi

- Gün boyunca
- Günde ortalama bir-iki kez
- Haftada ortalama bir-iki kez
- Ayda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda ortalama bir-iki kez
- Yılda bir kezden az
- Hiç
- Web sitesi yok

Türkiye'de son dönemde yaşanan aşağıdaki gelişmelerle ilgili kurumsal görüşünüz nedir?

Istanbul Sözleşmesi'nin feshedilmesi

- Destekliyor
- Desteklemiyor
- Görüşü yok
- Cevap yok

Gezi Parkı'nın mülkiyetinin Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi'nden alınarak bir vakfa devredilmesi

- Destekliyor
- Desteklemiyor
- Görüşü yok
- Cevap yok

Kanal Istanbul projesinin uygulanması

- Destekliyor
- Desteklemiyor
- Görüşü yok
- Cevap yok

Mart 2019 Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi seçiminin iptal edilmesi

- Destekliyor
- Desteklemiyor
- Görüşü yok
- Cevap yok

Internet yayın mecralarının RTÜK denetimine alınması

- Destekliyor
- Desteklemiyor
- Görüşü yok
- Cevap yok

Hükümetin Coronavirüs salgınıyla mücadelede kullandığı yöntemler

- Destekliyor
- Desteklemiyor
- Görüşü yok
- Cevap yok

İçişleri Bakanlığı'na dernek ve vakıflara kayyum atama yetkisi verilmesi

- Destekliyor
- Desteklemiyor
- Görüşü yok
- Cevap yok

Geçtiğimiz 8 yılda kurumsal olarak aşağıdaki davranışlardan hangilerini gerçekleştirdiniz?

BİRDEN FAZLA SEÇENEK İŞARETLENEBİLİR

- Siyasi veya toplumsal bir konuda sosyal medyadan kurumsal görüşümüzü paylaşmak
- Takipçilerimizi sosyal medya üzerinden seçimlerde oy kullanmaya davet etmek
- Sosyal medya üzerinden takipçilerimizi siyasi veya toplumsal bir konuda düzenlenen bir protestoya katılmaya çağırmak.

- Siyasi veya toplumsal bir konuda imza kampanyası düzenlemek
- Siyasi veya toplumsal bir konuda düzenlenen imza kampanyasına destek vermek
- Siyasi veya toplumsal bir konuda ilgili resmi mercilere itiraz dilekçesi vermek.
- Bir firma, kurum ya da kuruluşu boykot çağrısında bulunmak.

Türkiye kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi veya sosyal bir konuda üye, takipçi ya da destekçilerinizi aksiyon almaya teşvik amacıyla sosyal medya sitelerinin hangi özelliklerinden yararlanıyorsunuz?

BİRDEN FAZLA SEÇENEK İŞARETLENEBİLİR

- Konuyla ilgili içerikleri kurumsal hesabımızdan paylaşmak / retweet / repost etmek.
- Konuyla ilgili ve bakış açımızı yansıtan içerikleri hesabımızın sabitlenmiş gönderisi olarak ayarlamak.
- Konuyla ilgili içerikleri kurumsal hesabımızdan alıntılayarak kendi yorumumuzu ekleyerek paylaşmak / retweet / repost etmek.
- Konuyla ilgili görüş ya da eleştirimizi yazılı gönderi olarak paylaşmak.
- Konuyla ilgili canlı yayın gerçekleştirmek
- Konuyla ilgili fotoğraf ya da video paylaşımında bulunmak.
- Konuyla ilgili süreli öykü (story) paylaşımında bulunmak.
- Konuyla ilgili ve bakış açımızı yansıtan içerikleri beğenmek.
- Konuyla ilgili bir etkinlik için sosyal medya platformu üzerinden etkinlik oluşturmak.
- Takipçilerimize özel mesaj göndermek.

Destekçilerinizin dijital ortamda kurumla etkileşimini artırmak amacıyla aşağıdaki yöntemlerden hangilerine başvurursunuz?

BİRDEN FAZLA SEÇENEK İŞARETLENEBİLİR

- Kurumsal hesabın tanıtımı amacıyla platformlardan sponsorlu içerik satın almak
- Hesabı daha aktif kullanmak
- Taksim Dayanışması'nın diğer bileşen hesaplarını etiketlemek
- Taksim Dayanışması hesabını etiketlemek
- Kamuoyunca tanınan kişilerin hesaplarını etiketlemek
- Takipçisi yüksek hesapların gönderilerine cevap yazmak
- Kurum hesabını yüz yüze yöntemlerle tanıtmak

Kurumunuz çalışma alanı itibariyle aşağıdaki kategorilerden hangisinde yer almaktadır?

- Meslek örgütü
- Siyasi parti
- Sendika
- Kültür sanat topluluğu
- Semt/hemşeri derneği
- Hak savunuculuğu / aktivizm topluluğu
- Basın-yayın kuruluşu
- Mezun derneği
- Siyasi inisiyatif
- Öğrenci topluluğu
- Dayanışma grubu/derneği
- Diğer

Kurumunuz resmi bir kurum mu, bir tüzel kişiliğe sahip mi?

- Evet
- Hayır

Tüzel kişiliğe sahip/resmi bir kurum ise

Üye sayısı ne kadar?

- 1-50
- 51-100
- 101-200
- 201-500
- 501-1000
- 1000 kişi üzeri

Çalışan sayısı ne kadar?

- 1-50
- 51-100
- 101-200
- 201-500
- 501-1000

- 1000 kişi üzeri

<u>Tüzel kişiliğe sahip olmayan bir grup ise</u>

Grubunuzu nasıl tanımlarsınız?
- Fiziksel olarak bir merkezde düzenli olarak toplanarak faaliyet yürüten gönüllüler grubu
- Fiziksel olarak bir merkezde ihtiyaç halinde ve düzensiz aralıklarla toplanarak faaliyet yürüten gönüllüler grubu
- Internet üzerinden düzenli olarak toplanıp faaliyet yürüten gönüllüler grubu
- Internet üzerinden ihtiyaç halinde ve düzensiz aralıklarla toplanıp faaliyet yürüten gönüllüler grubu
- Internet üzerinden spontane olarak bir araya gelen gönüllüler grubu
- Whatsapp üzerinden iletişim kurarak faaliyet yürüten gönüllüler grubu
- Birbirini faaliyetlerin dışında da tanıyan bir arkadaş topluluğu

Gönüllü sayısı nedir?
- 1-50
- 51-100
- 101-200
- 201-500
- 501-1000
- 1000 kişi üzeri

Gelir kaynağı nedir?

BİRDEN FAZLA SEÇENEK İŞARETLENEBİLİR

- Üye aidatları
- Gönüllü bağışları
- Dış bağışlar
- Sosyal sorumluluk fonları
- Internet tabanlı mikro fonlama
- Diğer

<u>Cevaplayanın</u>

Pozisyonu:
- Yönetici
- Çalışan
- Gönüllü
- Üye
- Diğer

2013 yılındaki Gezi Parkı protestoları sırasında da aynı görevde miydiniz?

- Evet
- Hayır

Gezi Parkı protestolarından bugüne kadar hep aynı görevde mi kaldınız?

- Evet
- Hayır

Hayır ise, kaç yıldır bu görevdesiniz?
- 1-3 yıl
- 4-5 yıl
- 6-8 yıl
- Daha uzun

Takipçi ya da destekçilerinizle Internet üzerinden kurduğunuz iletişime dair kararlar kim tarafından alınıyor?

- Kurumun/grubun başkanı /en üst yöneticisi
- Yönetim Kurulu
- Kurumsal iletişim birimi
- Dijital medya sorumlusu
- İnformel bir icra grubu
- Diğer
- Internet iletişimi bulunmuyor

Mayıs 2013'ten bu yana Internet üzerinden kurduğunuz iletişime dair kararları alan kişi ya da grubun yapısında aşağıdaki değişikliklerden hangisi gerçekleşti?

- Aynı kişi / kişiler değişiklik olmaksızın aynı görevi icra ediyor
- Bu dönemde bu görevi yapan tek kişi değişti
- Bu dönemde bu görevi yapan grubun üyelerinin küçük bir bölümü değişti
- Bu dönemde bu görevi yapan grubun üyelerinin çoğu değişti
- Bu dönemde bu görevi yapan grubun üyeleri tümüyle değişti

Kurumunuz kamuoyunu ilgilendiren siyasi ve sosyal konularda Taksim Dayanışması'nın savunduğu değer ve görüşlerin ne kadarını paylaşıyor?

- Hiçbirini paylaşmıyor
- Birazını paylaşıyor

- Yarısını paylaşıyor
- Çoğunu paylaşıyor
- Hepsini paylaşıyor
- Cevap yok

Kurumunuz kendisini hala Taksim Dayanışması'nın bileşeni olarak görüyor mu?

- Evet
- Hayır

C. LIST OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE PROJECT SAMPLE

Institution	Status	Website	Facebook Account	FB Page ID	Twitter Account	Twitter Page ID
İstanbul Dişhekimleri Odası		https://www.ido.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/idoyayin/	9245 2980 4226 560	https://twitter.com/idoyayin	idoy ayin
İstanbul Eczacı Odası		https://www.istanbuleczaciodasi.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/ieo.org.tr/	1143 6568 5265 341	https://twitter.com/ist_eczaciodasi	ist_e czaci odasi
İstanbul Tabip Odası		https://www.istabip.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/istanbultabipodasi	1159 6255 5150 903	https://twitter.com/istabip	istabi p
TMMOB Çevre Mühendisleri Odası		http://www.cmo.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/CevreMuhendisleriOdasiSayfasi/	2448 9961 8962 192	https://twitter.com/cevremuhodasi	Cevr eMu hOda si
TMMOB Elektrik Mühendisleri Odası		http://www.emo.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/emoorgtr	1985 6353 3501 453	https://twitter.com/emoorgtr	emo orgtr
TMMOB Harita ve Kadastro Mühendisleri Odası İstanbul Şubesi		https://www.hkmo.org.tr/subeler/index.php?sube=6#m7	https://www.facebook.com/HKMOistanbulsubesi/	1640 2103 0958 5809	https://twitter.com/istanbulhkmo	istan bul_ HK MO
TMMOB İnşaat Mühendisleri Odası		http://www.imo.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/imomerkez/	1665 2197 0705 9086	https://twitter.com/imomerkez	imo merk ez
TMMOB Makina Mühendisleri Odası		https://www.mmo.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/tmmobMMO/	1496 5684 7200	https://twitter.com/MMOtmmob	MM Otm mob
TMMOB Mimarlar Odası		http://www.mo.org.tr/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/tmmobmimarlarodasi/	3188 1322 1475 750	https://twitter.com/mimarlarodasi_t	Mim arlar Odas i_T
TMMOB Peyzaj Mimarları Odası		http://www.peyzajmimoda.org.tr/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/peyzajmimoda/	8225 7139 7806 068	https://twitter.com/peyzajorgtr	peyz ajorg tr
TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası İstanbul Şubesi		http://www.spoist.org/	https://www.facebook.com/spoistanbul	2738 3616 2685 884	https://twitter.com/spoist	spois t
TMMOB Jeoloji Mühendisleri Odası İstanbul Şubesi		https://www.jmo.org.tr/subeler/sube_yonetim_kurulu.php?sube=6				
Tiyatro Oyuncuları Meslek Birliği		http://tomeb.org/				
DİSK		http://disk.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/diskinsesi/	5894 3161 7765 197	https://twitter.com/diskinsesi	diski nsesi

KESK İstanbul Şubeler Platformu						
Eğitim Sen İstanbul 6 Nolu Üniversiteler Şubesi			https://www.facebook.com/E%C4%9Fitim-Sen-%C4%B0stanbul-6-Nolu-%C3%9Cniversiteler-%C5%9Eubesi-157145817675074/	1571 4581 7675 074	https://twitter.com/egitimsenst6	Egiti mSe nst6
Kültür Sanat Sendikası		http://www.kultursanatsen.org.tr/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/kultursanatsen.org.tr/	5589 0972 0860 051		
Sendikal Güçbirliği Platformu	CLOS ED		https://tr-tr.facebook.com/sendikalgucbirligi/	1383 0587 3529 5487	https://twitter.com/sendikalgbp	Send ikal GBP
Beyoğlu Semt Dernekleri Platformu						
Boğaziçi Dernekleri Platformu			https://www.facebook.com/Bo%C4%9Fazi%C3%A7i-Platformu-179918915385379/	1799 1891 5385 379	https://twitter.com/BODEP_ist/	BOD EP_i st
Emekliler Yaşlılar Hareketi [Emekliler Daynışma Sendikası]		emeklilerdayanismasendikasi.org	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/emeklilerdayanismasendikasi/	1111 5190 4225 1115		
Filmmor Kadın Kooperatifi (Filmmor)		http://filmmor.org/	https://www.facebook.com/Filmmor	2302 1916 3714 199	https://twitter.com/Filmmor_	Film mor_
İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği			https://www.facebook.com/%C4%B0stanbul-Kad%C4%B1n-Kurulu%C5%9Flar%C4%B1-Birli%C4%9Fi-105279761810018		https://twitter.com/1995ikkb	
İstanbul Halkevi		http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/istanbul/istanbul-halkevi				
İstanbul Kültür Forumu	CLOS ED					
İstanbul SOS Girişimi	CLOS ED	https://istanbulsos.wordpress.com/	https://www.facebook.com/istanbulsos/	1266 7452 4059 614	https://twitter.com/istanbulsos	istan bulso s
Kadınlarla Dayanışma Vakfı (KADAV)		http://www.kadav.org.tr/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/KADAVistanbul/	6039 7055 3020 879	https://twitter.com/Kadavist	Kada vist
Kamusal Sanat Laboratuvarı			https://tr-tr.facebook.com/kamusalsanatlaboratuvari/	1519 7324 4896 005	https://twitter.com/kamusalsanat	kam usals anat
Karadeniz İsyandadır Platformu		http://karadenizisyandadir.net/	https://www.facebook.com/karadenizisyandadir	2118 5186 3121	https://twitter.com/karadenizisyan	kara deniz isyan
Kent ve Çevre için Haydarpaşa Dayanışması			https://www.facebook.com/Haydarpa%C5%9Fa-Dayan%C4%B1%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1-132976733427744/	1329 7673 3427 744	https://twitter.com/haydarpasadayan	hayd arpas aday an
Lambda İstanbul		http://www.lambdaistanbul.org	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/lambdaistanbul.lgbt/	4113 3130 5720 851	https://twitter.com/lambda_istanbul	lamb da_is tanb ul
Müştereklerimiz	CLOS ED	http://musereklerimiz.org/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/musereklerimiz/	5142 5976 1954 735	https://twitter.com/musterekler	must erekl er
Nazım Hikmet Kültür Merkezi		https://www.nhkm.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/NHKM.KADIKOY	3711 8607 8860	https://twitter.com/NHKMistanbul	NHK Mist anbu l
Özerk Sanat Konseyi		http://www.ozerksanatkonseyi.org/	https://www.facebook.com/ozerksanatkonseyi/	2770 5723		

Name	Status	Website	Facebook	ID	Twitter	Handle
				5798 526		
Sanatçılar Girişimi		http://sanatcilargirisimi.blogspot.com/	https://www.facebook.com/Reddediyoruz	3711 1243 6242 362	https://twitter.com/reddediyoruz	redd ediy oruz
Sulukule Platformu	CLOS ED	http://sulukulegunlugu.blogspot.com/				
Taksim Platformu		http://taksimplatformu.com/			https://twitter.com/TaksimPlatformu	Taks imPl atfor mu
Toplumcu Mühendis, Mimar ve Şehir Plancıları Meclisi		http://toplumcumeclis.org/	https://www.facebook.com/toplumcumeclis/	5085 8125 2504 709	https://twitter.com/toplumcumeclis	toplu mcu mecl is
Üçüncü Köprü Yerine Yaşam Platformu [Kuzey Ormanları Savunması]****		https://kuzeyormanlari.org/	https://www.facebook.com/KuzeyOrmanlariSavunmasi/		https://twitter.com/kuzeyormanlari	kuze yorm anlar i
Anadolu Kültür ve Araştırma Derneği			https://www.facebook.com/Aka-Der-Genel-Merkez-643458675753164/	6434 5867 5753 164	https://twitter.com/akadergm	Akad erG M
Arkeologlar Derneği İstanbul Şubesi		https://www.arkeologlardernegist.org/	https://www.facebook.com/ArkeologlarDernegiIstanbulSubesi/	1729 6817 6218 097	https://twitter.com/ArkeoDerIst	Arke oDer Ist
Asmalımescit Derneği						
Ataköy Sakinleri Dayanışma ve Çevre Koruma Derneği						
Ayaspaşa Derneği		http://ayaspasadernegi.blogspot.com/				
Bedrettin Derneği	CLOS ED					
Beykoz Vakfı			https://www.facebook.com/beykozvakfi/	4648 7751 3700 305	https://twitter.com/beykozvakfi	Beyk ozVa kfi
Beyoğlu Eğlence Yerleri Derneği		http://www.beyder.org/	https://www.facebook.com/beyderorg/	1736 0828 2758 084	https://twitter.com/beyderbeyoglu	beyd erbe yogl u
Cihangir Güzelleştirme Derneği			https://www.facebook.com/cihangirguzellestirmedernegi/	5362 6984 3164 727		
Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği		https://www.cydd.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/CagdasYasamDD	3331 5500 3487 972	https://twitter.com/CagdasYasamDD	Cagd asYa sam DD
Denge Ekolojik Yaşam Derneği	CLOS ED	http://dengeekolojik.blogspot.com/				
Galata Derneği		http://galata.org.tr/				
Gazhane Çevre Gönüllüleri						
Genç Sosyalistler						
Gülsuyu Gülensu Yaşam ve Dayanışma Merkezi Derneği			https://www.facebook.com/gulsuygulensuyasamvedayanismamerkezi/	1323 4724 3509 536		
İstanbul ODTÜ Mezunları Derneği		https://odtumist.org/	https://www.facebook.com/odtumist/	3443 0335 2319 606	https://twitter.com/odtumist	odtu mist
Kadının İnsan Hakları – Yeni Çözümler Derneği		http://www.kadininsanhaklari.org/	https://www.facebook.com/KadininInsanHaklariYeniCozumler	4700 4710 9747	https://twitter.com/kadinih	kadi nih

				276		
Karadeniz Çevre ve Kültür Derneği	CLOSED					
Kızıldere Derneği						
LGBTT Dayanışma Derneği*	CLOSED	http://www.istanbullgbti.org/	https://www.facebook.com/istanbullgbti/	14339396 5738341	https://twitter.com/istanbullgbt	istanbulLGBT
Mülkiyeliler Birliği İstanbul Şubesi		https://www.mulkiyeistanbul.org/	https://www.facebook.com/M%C3%BClkiyeistanbul-538824762978173/	53882476 2978173	https://twitter.com/mulkiyeistanbul	mulkiyeistanbul
Sokak Bizim Derneği		https://sokakbizim.org	https://www.facebook.com/SokakBizimDernegi/	17024359 9682371	https://twitter.com/sokakbizim	sokakbizim
Sosyal Haklar Derneği		http://sosyalhaklardernegi.org/	https://www.facebook.com/sosyalhaklardernegi/	22267218 4479030	https://twitter.com/sosyalhaklar	sosyalhaklar
Taksim Gezi Parkı Koruma ve Güzelleştirme Derneği			https://www.facebook.com/taksimgeziparkidernegi/	56520557 0170310		
Tarlabaşı Mülk Sahipleri ve Kiracıları Kalkındırma ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Derneği						
Tiyatro Oyuncuları Derneği						
Tokatlılar Derneği			https://www.facebook.com/TokatlilarDernegi1985/	15796340 55626670	https://twitter.com/tokatlilarder	tokatlilarder
Tozkoparan Derneği						
Tüketici Bilincini Geliştirme Derneği		http://www.tubider.com/	https://www.facebook.com/tuketicibilinci.tubider		https://twitter.com/TuketiciBilinci	TuketiciBilinci
Tüketiciyi Koruma Derneği Beşiktaş Şubesi	CLOSED					
TÜKODER İstanbul Şubesi		http://tukoder.org.tr/subeler/#sube-i				
Tüm Restoratörler ve Konservatörler Derneği	CLOSED		https://www.facebook.com/T%C3%BCm-Restorat%C3%B6rler-ve-Konservat%C3%B6rler-Derne%C4%9Fi-367884349891666/	36788434 9891666		
Tüm Öğretim Elemanları Derneği İstanbul Şubesi		http://tumodistanbul.org/			https://twitter.com/tumodblog	tumodblog
Türkiye Sakatlar Derneği		http://www.tsd.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/pages/T%C3%BCrkiye-Sakatlar-Derne%C4%9Fi-Genel-Merkezi/456580707762499	45658070 7762499		
Uluslararası Plastik Sanatlar Derneği		http://www.upsd.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/upsdturkiye/	15003559 10267787		
Validebağ Gönüllüleri Derneği		http://www.validebag.org/	https://www.facebook.com/KoruyuKoru/	54648870 8788511	https://twitter.com/validebagonullu	validebagonullu
Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi [Halkların Demokratik Partisi]		https://www.hdp.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/HDPgenelmerkezi/	14076648 29448583	https://twitter.com/HDPgenelmerkezi	HDPgenelmerkezi
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi		https://www.chp.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/herkesicinCHP	12729064	https://twitter.com/he	herkesici

				0672 745	[rkesicinch p](rkesicinchp)	nCH P
Emek Partisi		https://www.emep.org/	https://www.facebook.com/emekpartisi/	3772 9052 9069 820	https://twitter.com/emekpartisi	emek parti si
Halkın Sesi Partisi	CLOS ED					
İşçi Partisi [Vatan Partisi]		http://vatanpartisi.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/VatanPartisi/	3190 2656 4921 676	https://twitter.com/vatan_partisi	Vatan_Pa rtisi
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi [SOL Parti]**		http://portal.odp.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/ozgurlukvedayanisma/	7248 9021 761	https://twitter.com/odpbilgi	odpb ilgi
Türkiye Komünist Partisi		http://www.tkp.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/TurkiyeKomunistPartisi/	1796 3965 5405 679	https://twitter.com/tkpninsesi/	tkpni nsesi
Yeşiller ve Sol Gelecek Partisi		http://www.yesilsolparti.com/	https://www.facebook.com/YesillerSol	1763 3822 5842 984	https://twitter.com/yesillersol	Yesil lerSo l
Alınteri		https://gazete.alinteri1.org/	https://www.facebook.com/gazetealinteri18/	1552 3657 8673 792	https://twitter.com/gazetealinteri	Gaze teAli nteri
BDSP (Bağımsız Devrimci Sınıf Platformu)			https://www.facebook.com/BDSP.net/	1323 5465 0180 625	https://twitter.com/bdsp_	BDS P_
DAF (Devrimci Anarşist Faaliyet)	CLOS ED	http://anarsistfaaliyet.org/	https://www.facebook.com/anarsistfaaliyetorg/	1480 9160 9212 4276	https://twitter.com/dafaaliyet	DAF aaliy et
DİP (Devrimci İşçi Partisi)	INAC CESSI BLE		https://www.facebook.com/devrimciiscipartisi/	2007 4958 3298 152	https://twitter.com/dip_org_tr	dip_ org_t r
DSİP (Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi)		https://www.dsip.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/devrimcisosyalistiscipartisi/	3613 0554 3931 078	https://twitter.com/DSiP_	DSiP _
EHP (Emekçi Hareket Partisi)		http://www.ehp.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/EmekciHareketPartisi/	1887 3545 7815 836	https://twitter.com/emekci_hareket	emek ci_ha reket
Emek ve Özgürlük Cephesi			https://www.facebook.com/EmekveOzgurlukCephesiSosyalistBarikat/	4541 5308 1358 558	https://twitter.com/emekozgurluk	Eme kOzg urluk
Eğitim İş İstanbul Şubeleri						
ESP (Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Partisi)		http://www.esp.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/ezilenler/	1616 6103 3848 164	https://twitter.com/ezilenler	ezile nler
Greenpeace		http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/tr/	https://www.facebook.com/Greenpeace.Akdeniz.Turkiye/	4828 1319 516	https://twitter.com/Greenpeace_Med	Gree npea ce_ Med
Halkevleri		http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/Halkevleri/	3482 4465 2098	https://twitter.com/Halkevleri	Halk evler i
HDK (Halkların Demokratik Kongresi)		https://www.halklarindemokratikkongresi.net/	https://www.facebook.com/HalklarinDemokratikKongresi.HDK/	3093 4088 5747 296	https://twitter.com/hdk_kongre	HDK _KO NGR E
I. Bölge Birleşik Mücadele Platformu	CLOS ED	http://birlesikmucadele.blogspot.com/	https://www.facebook.com/birincibolge/	2200 7931 8122 100	https://twitter.com/BirinciBolge	Birin ciBol ge

İstanbul Forumları Koordinasyon	CLOSED					
İşçi Cephesi [Nisan]			https://www.facebook.com/iscicephesi/	2019 2191 3181 314		
İşçi Kardeşliği Partisi [İşçinin Kendi Partisi]		https://iscikardesligi.org/	https://www.facebook.com/iscikardesligi/	1985 7008 3501 435	https://twitter.com/iscikardesligi	iscikardesligi
İşçi Mücadele Derneği	CLOSED	http://iscimucadeledernegi.blogspot.com/				
İşçilerin Sesi			https://www.facebook.com/%C4%B0%C5%9F%C3%A7ilerin-Sesi-148469548590553/	1484 6954 8590 553		
Kaldıraç		https://www.kaldirac.org/	https://www.facebook.com/kaldiracdergisi/	1498 8997 5200 885	https://twitter.com/kaldiracdergisi	kaldiracdergisi
Kent Hareketleri			https://www.facebook.com/kenthareketleri2012/	2619 4217 7212 500	https://twitter.com/KentHareketleri	Kent Hareketleri
Mücadele Birliği		http://www.mucadelebirligi.com/	https://www.facebook.com/M%C3%BCcadele-Birli%C4%9Fi-Dergisi-160736640658914/	1607 3664 0658 914	https://twitter.com/mbirligi_gazi2	mbirligi_gazi2
Nor Zartonk		http://www.norzartonk.org/	https://www.facebook.com/norzartonk/	1478 0768 1955 377	https://twitter.com/NorZartonk	NorZartonk
ÖSP (Özgürlük ve Sosyalizm Partisi) [Kürdistan Komünist Partisi]		partiyakomunistekurdistan.org	https://www.facebook.com/Partiya-Komuniste-Kurdistan-KKP-1494812293979269/	1494 8122 9397 9269	https://twitter.com/kkpkurdistan	kkpkurdistan
Öğrenci Kollektifleri		http://www.kolektifler4.net/	https://www.facebook.com/kolektifler/	1532 4571 4703 536	https://twitter.com/kolektifler	kolektifler
Pangea Ekoloji			https://tr-tr.facebook.com/pangeaekoloji/	2934 8945 4122 515	https://twitter.com/pangeaekoloji	pangeaekoloji
Partizan			https://www.facebook.com/partizanresmi1/		https://twitter.com/Partizan_1972	
Proleter Devrimci Duruş		http://www.proleterdevrimcidurus2.org/	https://www.facebook.com/Proleter-Devrimci-DURU%C5%9E-565107130293360/	5651 0713 0293 360		
SDP (Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi) [Devrimci Parti]			https://tr-tr.facebook.com/SosDemPar/	3184 5654 0281		
Sosyalist Feminist Kollektif	CLOSED	http://www.sosyalistfeministkolektif.org/	https://www.facebook.com/Sosyalist-Feminist-Kolektif-360925193993662/	3609 2519 3993 662	https://twitter.com/sfkfeminist	sfkfeminist
SYKP (Sosyalist Yeniden Kuruluş Partisi)		http://www.sykp.org.tr/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/SYKPgenelmerkez/	3638 8166 3716 149	https://twitter.com/SYKPgenelmerkez	SYKPgenelmerkez
TÖPG (Toplumsal Özgürlük Parti Girişimi) [Toplumsal Özgürlük Partisi]		http://www.toplumsalozgurluk.org/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/ToplumsalOzgurlukPartiGirisimi	3687 1956 3226 196	https://twitter.com/toplmsalozgrlk	toplmsalozgrlk
Türkiye Gerçeği	CLOSED					
KÖZ		https://www.kozga	https://www.facebook.com/K%C3%	4219	https://twit	Koz

		zetesi.org/	B6z-Gazetesi-421989794672781/	8979 4672 781	ter.com/K ozGazete	Gaze te
Halk Cephesi	QUIT					
TKP 1920		https://tkp.org/	https://www.facebook.com/TurkiyeK omunistPartisi1920	1806 5634 2038 786	https://twit ter.com/tk p1920	tkp1 920
SODEV – Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı		http://sodev.org.tr/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/sosyaldemokrasivak fi/	3267 6297 4177 171	https://twit ter.com/So syaldemok rasi	Sosy alde mokr asi
Halkın Kurtuluş Partisi		https://www.hkp.or g.tr/	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/hkurtuluspartisi/	4658 8754 6792 664	https://twit ter.com/ku rtulusparti si	kurtu luspa rtisi
ADAM-Der (Askeri Darbelerin Asker Muhalifleri Derneği)		http://adam-der.org/				
Kuzguncuklular Derneği ***			https://www.facebook.com/kuzguncu klulardernegi1997/	2320 7886 0314 814	https://twit ter.com/ku zguncuklu lard	kuzg uncu klula rd
TODAP (Toplumsal Dayanışma için Psikologlar Derneği)		http://todap.org/	https://www.facebook.com/todapder/	1022 4129 6492 273	https://twit ter.com/to dapder	toda pder
Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği		https://add.org.tr/	https://www.facebook.com/ADD.Ge nel.Merkez/	3062 9873 4806	https://twit ter.com/ad d_genelm erkez	add_ genel merk ez
Gezi Şehit ve Gazileri Dayanışma Platformu	INAC CESSI BLE		https://www.facebook.com/Gezi-%C5%9Eehit-ve-Gazileri-Platformu-722817841071907/	7228 1784 1071 907	https://twit ter.com/G eziSehitve Gazi	Gezi Sehit veGa zi
Taksim Dayanışması	SECR ETARI AT	https://www.taksim dayanisma.org/	https://www.facebook.com/TaksimD ayanismasi/	3217 7793 7871 920	https://twit ter.com/ta ksimdayan isma	taksi mda yanis ma

* Not included in the Twitter follower network
**Different only in the Twitter follower network
*** Not included in the TS Twitter constituent network
****Only in the TS follower network

D. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Sosyal medya (SM) iletişiminizi nasıl yönetiyorsunuz?

SM iletişiminiz ne kadar spontane, ne kadar önceden belirlenmiş ilkeler ya da çerçeve kararlar dahilinde yapılıyor?

SM iletişimine yönelik olarak kurum/grubunuzun karar mercilerinde alınmış/belirlenmiş çerçeve ilkeler var mı?

<u>Varsa</u>, bu kararları dijital iletişimden sorumlu bir ekip mi alıyor yoksa kurum/grubun daha yüksek karar mercileri mi?

Kurum/grup içerisinde kaç kişi bu kararlarda etkili? Bu insanlar hangi pozisyonlarda?

Takipçilerinizden gelen geribildirimleri ve talepleri SM iletişiminizi oluştururken ne kadar dikkate alıyorsunuz?

Takipçilerden en fazla geribildirim aldığınız konular hangileri?

Üyelerinizden gelen talepleri iletişiminize ne kadar yansıtıyorsunuz? Dijital veya dijital olmayan iletişime?

Takipçilerden alınan tepkiler kurumun ya da grubunuzun faaliyet gündemine ne kadar etki ediyor?

Paylaşımlarda nasıl bir dil kullanıyorsunuz?

Paylaşımlarda kullanmaya tercih ettiğiniz özel bir dil ya da üslup var mı?

Mesela belirli kelimelerin özellikle tercih edilmesi?

Belirli bir konunun sistematik olarak öne çıkarılması ya da vurgulanması?

Geçmişteki belli olayların gündemde tutulması?

SM paylaşımlarınızda daha çok güncel olaylar temelinde bir söylem mi yoksa ilkeler, haklar çerçevesinde bir söylem mi tercih ediyorsunuz?

<u>Vatandaşları yasal ve anayasal haklarını kullanmaya çağırmak ya da bu hakları hatırlatmak amacıyla</u> sosyal medyada nasıl bir söylem kullanıyorsunuz?
Seçimlerde oy vermeye teşvik?

SM medya iletişiminizde yönlendirici/teşvik edici bir dil mi yoksa hatırlatıcı/bilinçlendirici bir dil mi daha çok yer buluyor?

Gösteri ve toplanma hakkının vurgulanması?

SM paylaşımlarınızı daha çok siyasi ya da toplumsal olaylar için mi yoksa kurum/grubunuzun ilgi alanına giren, mesleki vs. konular için mi kullanıyorsunuz?

SM üzerinden genellikle hangi konularda paylaşım yaparsınız?

Takipçilerinizde siyasi ve toplumsal olaylar karşısında farkındalık oluşturmak için dijital iletişiminizde neler yapıyorsunuz?

Bunun amaçla paylaşımlarda kullanmaya dikkat ettiğiniz özel bir dil ya da üslup var mı?

Paylaşımlarda ne sıklıkta görsel / işitsel malzeme kullanıyorsunuz?

Bu görsel malzeme hangi kriterler göz önünde bulundurarak seçiliyor?

TD bileşenleriyle Dayanışma dışı kanallarda da iletişiminiz bulunuyor mu?

TD'nin şu anda yeteri kadar aktif olmaması TD bileşenleriyle olan iletişiminizi nasıl etkiliyor?

TD bileşenleriyle başka hangi tür kanallardan iletişiminiz bulunuyor?

TD üzerinden sağlanan iletişim kadar etkili bir muhalefet yaratıyor mu?

E. LIST OF FREQUENT WORDS OF TWITTER POSTS*

Frequency	Word
18	karşı
17	saat
14	Başkanı
13	Genel
11	İstanbul
10	Gezi
10	Taksim
10	adalet
9	TMMOB
8	günü
7	destek
7	Ekim
7	Hayır
7	İl

7	Meydanı
7	var
7	ÖDP
6	alınan
6	Barış
6	Haziran
6	iş
6	Ermeniler
6	serbest
6	Tüm
5	birlikte
5	Gözaltına
5	işçi
5	Kadıköy
5	Mart
5	mücadele
5	SODEV
5	Türkiye

5	Yarın
5	Çağrı
5	üyeleri
4	açıklaması
4	biz
4	bırakılsın
4	CHP
4	demek
4	devam
4	Devrimi
4	Eylül
4	Galatasaray
4	gel
4	geri
4	kadar
4	Mayıs
4	Mimarlar
4	Nisan

4	ortak
4	Pazar
4	protesto
4	seçim
4	Soma
4	tüm
4	yanındayız
4	yapılan
4	yer
4	yok
4	yürüyoruz
4	Çarşamba
3	ADD
3	Adliyesi
3	adına
3	AKP
3	ANAYASA
3	Ankara

3	aynı
3	Bak
3	basın
3	bekliyoruz
3	Birliği
3	bize
3	Bugün
3	buluşuyoruz
3	buradayız
3	büyük
3	cinayetlerine
3	Cuma
3	Cumartesi
3	Dayanışması
3	Dokunma
3	dostlarımızın
3	Emekçiler
3	Eskişehir

3	Ethem
3	Eş
3	gün
3	Halkevleri
3	halkın
3	Haydarpaşa
3	Kampanyası
3	Kardeşim
3	Kartal
3	Kasım
3	kongremizi
3	LGBTİ
3	MYK
3	Odası
3	olsun
3	olur
3	Onur
3	paneli

3	Parti
3	Partisi
3	Prof
3	sahip
3	savaş
3	selamlıyor
3	son
3	Sönmez
3	Temmuz
3	Türkiyeli
3	Videolarımızı
3	yapılacak
3	yaygınlaştırmak
3	yerde
3	Yeşil
3	yönelik
3	yıl
3	çağırıyoruz

3	üyemiz
3	üyesi
3	Şubesi

* Words coded as politically relevant (second short-list words) are marked with yellow background.

F. LIST OF HASHTAGS USED IN TWITTER POSTS*

Frequency	Word
5	TMMOByeDOKUNMA
3	HayatıDurduruyoruz
2	Aliİsmailkorkmaz
2	DoğaİçinHayır
2	DünyaKadınlarGünü
2	EkrandaHayırYok
2	HalkevleriniSusturamazsınız
2	KadınKatliamıVar
2	MEBeSoruyoruz
2	occupygezi
2	SomayıUnutmaUnutturma
2	SutasaSendika
2	TMMOBaDokunma
1	301İçinAdalet

1	4AralıktaTandoğana
1	8MartKizildirkizilkalacak
1	AdaletiBeklerken
1	AdaletKurultayı
1	AdaletYürüyüşüGün21
1	AdaletŞöleni
1	AhmetŞık
1	AsgariÜcret
1	AtillayaÖzgürlük
1	Barış
1	BarışaİhtiyacımVar
1	barışiçinelele
1	BerkinElvan
1	BernaKoç
1	BerxwedanaKobane
1	bianet
1	BirlikteİmzaVeriyoruz
1	BuBedenBenim

1	Demirtaş
1	DirenFatihOrmanı
1	DirenGeziParki
1	direnişçi
1	doraotelişçileri
1	EmeklilikteYaşaTakılanlar
1	EsraMungan
1	EtfaliKöklerindenKoparma
1	EthemSarısülük
1	FatihOrmanı
1	FaşizmeKarşıOmuzOmuza
1	FeritİcinAdaletİcinKartala
1	ForumVar
1	freeatilla
1	FreedomForEcologistAtilla
1	FreeThemAll
1	GeziParkı
1	GeziParkıİçinTaksime

1	geziçintaksime
1	GünKömürKarası
1	HakanKoçakYalnızDeğildir
1	HalkevleriniSusturamazsiniz
1	HalkevleriSusmayacak
1	Haydarpaşa
1	HaydarpaşaGardırGarKalacak
1	haydarpaşagardırgarkalacak
1	HepimizAbbasağadayız
1	HepimizGezideydik
1	HerkesİçinAdalet
1	İstanbul
1	Kadıköy
1	KadınlarınHayırı
1	kaldirimnerede
1	Kayyum
1	KentDirenişAğıMeclisi
1	kentseldönüşüm

1	KobaneDireniyor
1	koctaneleroluyor
1	kuito
1	KuzeyOrmanları
1	KöleDeğiliz
1	KıvançErsoy
1	LaiklikveAydınlanmaSempozyumu
1	LaikliğiKazanacağız
1	LGBTİYASAKLANAMAZ
1	Madde80
1	Madde80İptalEdilsin
1	MarmarayıSavun
1	MedeniYıldırım
1	MehmetAyvalıtaşSeniÇağırıyor
1	MeralCamcı
1	MuzafferKaya
1	myfirstTweet
1	OkumuşİnsanHalkınYanındadır2019

1	OmuzOmuza
1	OnurHocayaÖzgürlük
1	OnurKılıçSerbestBırakılsın
1	ParkDeğilOrman
1	SALI
1	sendikahaktır
1	SesÇıkarHayatDursun
1	SKHKarşılaşmalar
1	SokaktaHayırVar
1	SomayıUnutma
1	SoykırımlaYüzleş
1	Sütas
1	tarlabaşı
1	Taseronahayir
1	tenceretava
1	TeslimOlmayız
1	TMMOB
1	TrakyaTermikİstemiyor

1	UnutmuyoruzBuradayız
1	VicdanlardaMahkumsunuz
1	violenceagainstwomen
1	WMAGA16
1	women
1	yağmur
1	Yaşam
1	YaşamıSavun
1	ÖzgürlükNöbeti
1	şiddetekarşıkadınlarsendikaya

* Hashtags coded as politically relevant (second short-list words) are marked with yellow background.

G. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER

ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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29 EYLÜL 2021

Konu   : Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi   : İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Doç.Dr. Barış ÇAKMUR

Danışmanlığını yürüttüğünüz Mustafa Can TÜRE'nin "Shifting Definition of Social Movements in the Age of Digital Networking: Impact of Online Network Communication on thw Taksim Solidarity Group in the Post-mobilization Stage" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülmüş ve **372-ODTU-2021** protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla bilgilerinize sunarız.

Dr.Öğretim Üyesi Şerife SEVİNÇ
İAEK Başkan Vekili

H. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

TÜRE, MUSTAFA CAN

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Social movements, digital activism, networked activism, Turkish politics and media, First Amendment Studies.

EDUCATION

PhD	METU, Political Science and Public Administration	2024
MSc	METU, Media and Cultural Studies	2016
MA	Istanbul University, Political Science and International Relations	2011
BA	Istanbul Universirty, Radio-TV-Cinema	2008

I. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Giriş

Tarih boyunca toplumsal hareketler büyümek, görünür olmak, tanınmak ve taleplerini gerçekleştirmek için gerekli kaynaklara sahip olmaya çalışmışlardır. Toplantılar, mitingler, protestolar, oturma eylemleri gibi ani gerçekleşen ve kısa süreli eylemler, protestonun hedeflenen kişi ya da kurumlar üzerinde maksimum etki yaratabilmesi için maddi ve manevi kaynaklara ihtiyaç duymuştur. Kampanyayı finanse edecek fonlar, destekçiler ve organizasyondan sorumlu insan kaynağı, ortak hedefin peşinden gitme inancının yanı sıra dava takipçileriyle kendini özdeşleştirme gibi materyal olmayan kaynaklar, savunulan konuda ortak bir bilinç düzeyi, gerekli eylemleri organize etme ve yürütme becerileri gibi örgütsel kaynaklar, fiziksel organizasyonlar, hareketin tüm taraflarının koordinasyonu, kampanya yürütme, halkla, destekçilerle, rakiplerle ve diğerleriyle ilişkileri yönetmek için kullanılan bir iletişim altyapısı bunlardan sadece birkaçıdır. Bununla birlikte, uzun vadeli ve yerleşik bir savunuculuk kampanyası söz konusu olduğunda, kampanyayı sürdürmek, genişletmek ve sağlamlaştırmak için gereken kaynaklar, geçici kampanyalardan farklı olarak daha karmaşık, çeşitli ve daha koordineli bir şekilde kullanılmalıdır. Kampanya uzun bir süreyi kapsadığından, hareket organizasyonu, hareketin çeşitli tarafları arasında belirli bir düzeyde uyumu sürdürme becerisine ihtiyaç duyar.

Uzun vadeli hareketler, ayrıca, katılım repertuarı açısından anlık mobilizasyonlardan farklılık gösterir. Savunuculuk kampanyaları daha çeşitli siyasi katılım tekniklerine başvurur. Protestoların aksine, savunuculuk grupları kampanyalarını radikal ve geleneksel tekniklerin bir karışımıyla yürütür. Katılım pratiklerinin bu şekilde bir araya getirilmesi, sağlam bir iletişim altyapısı ve sembolik araçlar gibi başka kaynakları ve bunların sofistike bir şekilde kullanılmasını gerektirir. Bu durum özellikle hareketin koalisyon, şemsiye örgüt, birleşik cephe veya platform yapılanması şeklinde, yani en az iki veya daha fazla grubu içeren, birden fazla örgütten oluşması halinde geçerlidir. Bir hareketin bileşenleri ne kadar çok ve çeşitli

olursa, tüm örgütlerin uyumlu hareket etmesi, kimlik ve ideolojik yönelim çatışmalarını en aza indirmesi için daha fazla sembolik kaynağa ihtiyacı olur.

Gerekli kaynaklar arasında iletişim, tek başına bir örgütlenme aracı olarak kilit bir rol oynamasının yanı sıra, sembolik kaynakların yayılması ve iletilmesi, mevcut ve potansiyel sempatizanların ihtiyaç duyduğu duygusal ortamın yaratılması, hareketler arasında ve içinde siyasi müzakerenin yanı sıra devlet kurumları, toplumun diğer kesimleri ve kampanyanın paydaşları gibi kamusal alanın diğer tarafları gibi diğer gayri maddi kaynakların da taşıyıcısı olmuştur. On yıllar boyunca kampanyalar kitle iletişim araçlarına bağımlı kalmıştır. Kitle iletişim araçları her büyüklükteki harekete kamuoyunda görünürlük, farklı türlerde itibar ve en önemlisi hükümet, parlamento, kamu kurumları ve tartışmalı konuların paydaşlarıyla temas, diyalog ve etkileşim sağlamıştır. STK'lar, çıkar ve baskı grupları uzun zamandır geleneksel medyanın kapı bekçiliği mekanizmasına tabi tutulmaktadır. Gazetelerin, dergilerin, TV kanallarının ve radyo istasyonlarının yayın kurulları bu grupların tasvirine, imajına ve yayın süresine karar vermiştir. Bunlar, potansiyel olarak endüstri ve siyasi elitlerin çıkarlarını yansıtan editoryal tercihlerin merceğinden geçerek kamusal imgelemde şekillenmektedir. "Ana akımlaştırma" olarak adlandırılan bu sürecin sonunda, kamuoyuna ve özellikle de çok fazla medya içeriği tüketenlere, kampanyaya ilişkin ılımlı, homojen ve geleneksel bir imaj aktarılmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, sosyal hareketlerin kampanyalarının tasvirinde ikinci bir çarpıklık da kampanya elitlerinin mercekleri ve söylemleri aracılığıyla kamuoyuna sunulduklarında ortaya çıkmaktadır. Hareketler genellikle örgüt yöneticileri, kampanya yöneticileri ya da diğer kanaat önderleri tarafından temsil edilmekte ve hareketlerin alt kesimlerinin iç tartışmaları, görüşleri ve eleştirileri gizlenmektedir. Bu uygulama, şeffaflığa zarar vererek ve hareket içinde ifade özgürlüğünü kısıtlayarak bir konuyu yanlış temsil etme tehlikesini barındırmaktadır. Hareketin kamusal imajı ve söylemi, kamuoyunda elitist bir temsile indirgenmektedir.

İnternet ve Toplumsal Hareketler

İnternetin yeni bir mecra olarak ortaya çıkışı iletişim ortamını altüst etmiş ve günümüz yurttaşlarına eşi benzeri görülmemiş düzeyde bir bağlantısallık imkanı kazandırmıştır. Sadece iletişim teknolojisinde ileri bir adım değil, aynı zamanda

önceki tüm medyaların birleştiği, sınırlarının ve üretici-tüketici ilişkilerinin belirsizleştiği bir ortam olan dijital medya, toplumsal hareketler ve kamusal alan arasındaki ilişkide devrim yaratmıştır. Toplumsal hareketlerin temsilcilerinin medyaya erişimindeki eşitsizliği nötralize etmek ve kamuoyunda öne çıkmak için bir fırsat olarak karşılanmış, medya profesyonellerinin kampanyaların kapsamı, tasviri ve çerçevelenmesi kararlarındaki neredeyse mutlak kontrolüne son vermiştir. Kamuya açık tanıtımın yanı sıra, geniş internet olanakları hareketlere kaynakları kontrol etmek, genişletmek ve iletmek için gereken araçları sağlamıştır.

Çok yönlü enformasyon akışı, interaktivite, ademi merkeziyetçi yapı gibi kendine has özellikleri, telefon ve televizyon gibi diğer medya araçlarının yakınsamasıyla birleşerek toplumsal hareketlerin iletişim gücünü artırmış ve gücü kitle iletişiminin eşik bekçilerinden izleyicilere, yani internetin son kullanıcılarına kaydırmıştır. Geleneksel iletişim araçlarından farklı olarak, ağ iletişimi bu son kullanıcılara kendi özerk özel alanlarını birbirine bağlama olanağı verir ve ifade yeteneklerini güçlendirir. İnternetin düşük maliyetle yüksek ve kolay yayılma olanakları da sosyal aktivizmi teşvik etmeye yardımcı olmaktadır.

Bununla birlikte, tekno-determinizme aşırı güvenmek, teknolojiyi abartma ve toplumdaki dönüştürücü güç olarak insan faktörünü göz ardı etme riski taşımaktadır. İnternetin toplumsal hareketlenmelerdeki rolüne ilişkin abartıyı ve bunun küçümsenmesini ortadan kaldırmak için, sosyal ağların toplumsal hareketlerin tek nedeni olduğunu iddia etmenin naif bir iddia olacağını kabul etmek gerekir. Vatandaşların ve aktivistlerin elindeki araçlar olarak sosyal ağlar, toplumsal hareketlerin gerekli koşullarından biridir ancak yeterli koşulu değildir. Sosyal ağlar, sadece yeni bir tür kamusal alan oluşturarak insanların sokaklarda toplanma şeklini değiştirmektedir. Hareketlerin üyeleri, sempatizanları ve organizatörleri bu ağlarda bir araya gelerek hareketlerin ideallerini, hedeflerini ve lojistiğini tartışmaktadır. Doğrusal bir neden-sonuç ilişkisinden ziyade, devletin, medyanın ve endüstrinin hegemonik gücüne karşı özerk iletişim açığını kapatmak için lojistik, örgütsel ve iletişimsel bir altyapı oluştururlar.

Bu durumun özellikle uzun bir süreye yayılan ve ideal olarak en azından bir örgüt ya da gayri resmi bir yönetim grubu tarafından yürütülen ısrarlı savunuculuk

kampanyaları için geçerli olduğu varsayılabilir. Bu tür hareketler koordinasyon ve müzakere araçlarına en çok ihtiyaç duyan hareketlerdir, çünkü organizatörler, ideologlar, üyeler, katılımcılar, potansiyel katılımcılar gibi hareketin unsurlarının yanı sıra müttefik örgüt ve gruplar, diğer aktivistler, uluslararası müttefikler, kamu kurumları ve yasama organları dahil ancak bunlarla sınırlı olmamak üzere sayısız dış aktör arasında bir denge sağlamak zorundadırlar. Bu hareketlerin, örneğin, serbest tartışma forumları, kampanya düzenleyicilerinin harekete dair bilgileri yaydığı haber akışları, kampanya faaliyetlerinin kamusal onay düzeyini gösteren sözel olmayan etkileşimli özellikler, kullanıcılara yönelik özerk ve otoriteler tarafından kontrolü zor iletişim kanalları, sanal etkinlik organizasyonu gibi internet ve sosyal medya araçlarını en verimli şekilde kullanmaları gerekmektedir. Birçok bağlamda yapılan çok sayıda çalışmanın da gösterdiği gibi anlık hareketler de bu uygulamalardan azami ölçüde yararlanırken, varsayımsal olarak, daha az çalışılmış bir alan olan uzun vadeli hareketlerin de sosyal medyayı benimsemesini ve faaliyetlerinde internet uygulamalarını kullanması öngörülmektedir. Ancak bu çalışmanın bulguları büyük ölçüde aksine işaret etmektedir.

İnternetin kitle eylemlerini harekete geçirme gücü ilk olarak 1990'ların sonlarında ön plana çıkmıştır. Aktivist gruplar o yıllarda, web forumları, e-posta ağları, web siteleri gibi dönemin ilkel imkanlarının ve bunların takip edilen hedeflere katkılarının farkına varmıştır. Örneğin 1998 ve 1999 yıllarında Cenevre ve Seattle'da düzenlenen Dünya Ticaret Örgütü protestoları, bu araçların bir sonucu olarak yoğun bir ağ tabanlı eylemliliğe sahne olmuştur. İkinci ağ tabanlı eylemlilik dalgası, Web 2.0 olarak da adlandırılan sosyal ağ siteleri Facebook, Twitter ve Youtube'un dünya çapında yayılmasından birkaç yıl sonra ortaya çıkmıştır. Sosyal ağlar üzerinden örgütlenen göstericiler, 2009 İran protestolarıyla başlayarak, ABD, Avrupa, Orta Doğu ve başka yerlerde kitlesel olarak sokaklara dökülmüştür. Occupy, Indignados, Arap Baharı ve diğer eylemler sırasında insanlar protesto için çevrimiçi ve çevrimdışı yöntemleri çok iyi entegre edilmiş bir şekilde kullanmıştır. Bu hareketler birçok bağlamda mütevazı kazanımlarla yetinmek zorunda kalsa da internetin çevrimiçi ağlarında uzun süre aktif kaldılar ve benzer düşünenler için buluşma mekanları olarak hizmet ettiler. İnternet kanallarında paylaştıkları geniş sözel ve

multimedya arşiv malzemesi sayesinde bu tarihsel olaylar hala büyük ölçüde belgelenmektedir.

Gezi Protestoları ve Taksim Dayanışması

Gezi protestoları, 2013 yılında İstanbulluların çevresel kaygılarla başlattığı ağ bağlantılı hareketler dalgasının bir parçası olarak patlak vermiş ve sivil özgürlüklerin kısıtlanması, kişisel yaşam tarzına müdahale girişimleri, neoliberal ekonomi politikaları gibi daha geniş kaygılarla birkaç gün içinde hükümet karşıtı bir hareket olarak ülke geneline yayılmıştır. Daha önceki hareketlerde olduğu gibi, olayların katılımcıları ve destekçileri protestoları takip etmek, katılmak, destek vermek ve diğer protestocularla koordinasyon sağlamak için internete yönelmiştir. Dahası, sosyal medya ilk günlerden itibaren medya karartması altındaki yurttaşlar için yegane güvenilir bilgi kaynağına dönüşmüştür. Hükümet, protestolara ilerleyen yıllarda artan düzeyde güç kullanımı ve baskı ile karşılık vermiş, ancak protestolar Türk vatandaşları ve birçok kuruluş için sosyal medyanın benimsenmesinde bir kırılma noktası olmuştur. Olayları takip eden yaklaşık on yıl boyunca demokratik kurumlar ve hukukun üstünlüğü zayıflarken, Türkiye'de internet okuryazarlığı ve sosyal medya penetrasyonu katlanarak artmıştır.

Bu çalışmanın ana vakası olan Taksim Dayanışması (TD), Gezi göstericilerini resmi olarak olmasa da fiilen temsil eden ana örgütsel yapıdır. Protestolar sırasında TD 126 kurucu örgütten oluşan geniş ve heterojen bir koalisyon görünümü sergilemiştir. Protestoların ardından, sekreterya üyeleri birkaç kez hakim karşısına çıkmış ve sonunda birçoğu 2022 yılında tutuklanmıştır. Sekreterya üyelerinin yanı sıra, TD üyesi kuruluşların birçoğu da son 10 yılda baskıya uğramıştır. Buna rağmen koalisyon dağılmamış, siyasi gelişmelere, hükümetin sekreteryası ve üyeleri üzerindeki baskısına çoğunlukla web sitesi duyuruları ve basın toplantıları aracılığıyla tepki vermeye devam etmektedir.

Türkiye'de İnternet ve Sosyal Medya

Türkiye, sosyal medya yaygınlığı ve nüfusu arasında geniş internet kullanımı ile öne çıkmaktadır. Ocak 2021 itibarıyla, Türkiye nüfusunun yüzde 77,7'si internete bağlı

ve yüzde 90,8'i internete mobil cihazlar üzerinden erişmektedir. Dünya ortalamasının yüzde 59 olduğu Ocak 2020'de internet penetrasyon oranı 74 düzeyinde gerçekleşmiştir. Nüfusun çoğunluğu (%70,8) günlük yaşamlarında sosyal medyayı aktif olarak kullanmaktadır ve yıllık büyüme oranı yüzde 11,1'dir. Günlük ortalama internet kullanımı yaklaşık 8 saat iken, bunun yaklaşık 3 saati sosyal medyada harcanmaktadır. Kullanıcıların sosyal medyada geçirdiği süre, ülkedeki farklı medya tüketim türleri arasında, televizyonun ardından 2. sırada yer almaktadır. Ülke, 16-64 yaş arası kişiler arasında internette geçirilen zaman endeksinde yüksek internet penetrasyonuna sahip batılı ülkelerin çoğunun önünde yer almaktadır. 2013'te ülkeyi sarsan Gezi Protestoları da sosyal medyanın halk arasında benimsenmesini ve kullanılmasını önemli ölçüde hızlandırmıştır.

Bu arkaplan bilgisi ışığında, bu tez dijital ağ iletişiminin, Taksim Dayanışması koalisyonunun eylem sonrası etkinliği, direnci ve konsolidasyonu üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktadır. Koalisyon, kitlesel protestolardan önce kurulmuş olmasına rağmen, ilk etapta çevresel kaygıları olan grupları bir araya getirmiştir. Ancak protestoların patlamasıyla birlikte, sol eğilimli siyasi girişimlerden çevreci gruplara, sanatçı kolektiflerinden geniş ulusal siyasi partilere kadar tamamen farklı geçmişlere sahip örgütleri bünyesine katmıştır. Kurucu örgütler genişlik, hukuki statü, gelir, kaynaklar ve ideolojik duruş bakımından büyük çeşitlilik gösteriyordu. Protestolar sırasında koalisyon, hareketi temsil eden tek örgütlü oluşum ortaya çıkmış ve taleplerini hükümet temsilcileriyle müzakere etmiştir. Protestoları takip eden yıllarda grup, ülkede artan otoriterleşmeden nasibini almış ve giderek daha fazla kriminalize edilmiştir. Dahası, ülkenin siyasi yörüngesi değiştikçe TD'nin görünümü de değişmiştir. Bazı bileşenler koalisyondan uzaklaşmış, bazıları ise örgütsel anlamda TD ile teması yitirmiştir. Bununla birlikte, aradan geçen zaman içerisinde koalisyon sosyal ve siyasi gelişmelerle ilgili duyurular, eylem çağrıları ve basın toplantıları yoluyla günlük siyasete katılmaya devam etmiştir. Bu çalışma, TD'nin ilk mobilizasyonu ve benimsenmesinin ardından yıllar içinde geçirdiği dönüşüm ile sekretaryası ve bileşenleri tarafından dijital ağların aktif kullanımı arasında olası bir ilişkiyi test etmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, dijital iletişim teknolojilerinin, koalisyonun, geçici ve anlık protestoculardan oluşan bir grubun aksine, istikrarlı ve yerleşik bir baskı grubuna dönüşmesine yardımcı olup olmadığını araştırmaktadır.

Metodoloji ve Araştırma Dizaynı

Bu kapsamda, Facebook ve Twitter'dan otomatik olarak ağ ve metin verileri toplanarak yola çıkılmıştır. Birkaç bilgisayar aylarca gece gündüz çalışarak dijital verileri toplarken araştırmacı, Covid-19 pandemisinin kısıtlayıcı koşulları altında kuruluşlardan bizzat veri toplamıştır. Ancak bu ilk iki aşamanın toplanması ve analizinden sonra, çalışmanın açıklayıcı kısmı olan görüşme bölümünü hazırlanmıştır. Başka bir deyişle, dijital veri ve anket verilerinin analizinden elde edilen bulgulara dayanılarak seçilen kuruluş temsilcileriyle uzman mülakatları gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Çalışma şu hipotezlere dayanmaktadır: (1) *dijital ağlar, beklenmedik bir şekilde ani eylemle ortaya çıkan siyasi hareketlerin hayatta kalmasında önemli bir rol oynar*; (2) *bir hareketin dijital teknolojiyi kullanması, geçici bir eylemlilikten uzun vadeli bir baskı grubuna dönüşmesine yardımcı olur* (3) *dijital iletişim, fiziksel siyasi katılım kanallarının yokluğunda hareketlerin iç bağlılıklarını güçlendirmelerine yardımcı olur*. Bu hipotezler şu araştırma soruları aracılığıyla test edilmiştir: (1) *Çevrimiçi bağlantı, etkileşim ve müzakerenin, örgütlü bir toplumsal hareketin uzun vadede devamlılığı ve hayatta kalması üzerindeki etkisi nedir?* (2) *Bir siyasi harekette dijital iletişimin yoğun kullanımının neden olduğu örgütsel ve müzakereci dönüşümün dinamikleri ve kapsamı nelerdir?* (3) *Dijital iletişim, toplumsal hareketlerin tabanlarını bilgilendirmeleri, motive etmeleri, siyasi katılım için teşvik etmeleri ve katılım kanallarının yokluğunda onları siyasi olarak aktif tutmaları için ne gibi olanaklar sunmaktadır?*

Yukarıda ortaya konulan orijinal araştırma sorularına bağlı hipotezleri test etmek için bu çalışma üç farklı veri türünü bir araya getirmekte ve birleştirmektedir. Çalışma Facebook ve Twitter'dan alınan sosyal medya verilerinin analiziyle başlamaktadır. Bu veriler TD'nin 7 yılını ve TD bileşenlerinin Gezi protestoları sonrasındaki faaliyetlerini kapsamaktadır. Ağ analizi yoluyla koalisyon içindeki bilgi akışı örüntülerini araştırılmış, sosyal medya kullanımının sözel karakteri hakkında fikir edinmek için gönderi metinleri ve hashtag'ler aracılığıyla sosyal medya gönderilerinin içerik analizi yapılmıştır. Sonuçlar, sosyal medya müzakere ve

paylaşımlarının kamusal savunuculuk ve siyasete katılım için kullanım oranlarını ortaya koymuştur.

Analiz edilen ikinci veri türü anket verisidir. TD koalisyonunun 106 aktif üyesinin 104'ünden kurumsal veri toplanmıştır. Veri seti, sosyal medyanın çeşitli amaçlarla kullanımına ilişkin frekans istatistiklerini, koalisyonun kendi içinde ve destekçi tabanıyla iletişimin çeşitli boyutlarının yanı sıra eylemlilik sonrası dönemdeki çevrimiçi ve çevrimdışı büyümesini, devam eden siyasi tartışmalara katılma/katılmama oranlarını ve örgütsel demografiyi içermektedir.

Son olarak, ilk iki analizin bulguları üzerinden açıklayıcı bir yaklaşımla, önceki bölümlerdeki nicel veri analizinin ortaya koyduğu TD'nin mevcut örgütsel yapısı ve dijital uyumunun nedenlerini ve gerekçelerini araştırmak üzere TD üyesi 36 kuruluşun temsilcileriyle uzman mülakatlar gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Araştırmanın dizaynında, daha önceki çalışmalarda olduğu gibi sosyal medya kullanımı ve protesto davranışı arasında doğrusal ve basitleştirilmiş nedensellikler aramak yerine, uzun erimli siyasi faaliyet beklentilerin, dijital teknolojilerin mümkün kıldığı alternatif örgütsel modeller, iç müzakereye, çevrimiçi ve çevrimdışı bağlar ve ilk eylemliliğin sonrasındaki dönemde koalisyon içindeki iletişimin organizasyonu inceleme altına alınmıştır. Bu amaçla, çağdaş toplumsal hareketler ve yeni medya arasındaki ilişkiyi tanımlamak için dijital çağda yeni toplumsal hareketler ve aktivizm literatüründen kapsamlı bir şekilde yararlanılmıştır.

Bulgular

Gezi protestoları Türkiye'deki sivil toplum örgütleri, özellikle de TD örgütleri için dijital medyayı benimseme ve okuryazarlığı açısından bir mihenk taşı olsa da bu proje internete yönelik tarihsel ilginin TD içinde bir "iletişim cephesi" inşa etme açısından devam eden bir eğilime dönüşmediğine işaret etmektedir. Çevrimiçi iletişim altyapısı esas olarak her bir bileşen kuruluşun takipçi tabanıyla bağlantı kurmak için kullanılmaktadır. Kuruluşlar sosyal medya siteleri aracılığıyla kitleleriyle bağlantı kurmakta, iletişim kurmakta, etkileşime geçmekte ve onlara bilgi aktarmaktadır. Bunuınla birlikte, TD kuruluşları arasındaki yerel çevrimiçi uyum,

yani dijital iletişim ağı son derece seyrektir. Dijital veri analizi, çevrimiçi sosyal medya abonelik kümelerinin belirli olaylarla sınırlı ya da tümüyle bağlantısız olduğunu kanıtlarken, kullanım sıklığı anketinin ilgili göstergeleri, özellikle bileşenler arasında çok sınırlı bir kamuya açık sosyal medya iletişimine işaret etmektedir. Kamuya açık olmayan uygulamalar kurumsal iletişim için tercih edilen medyadır, ancak boyutu ve yoğunluğu bileşenler arasındaki kamusal bağlantı eksikliğini telafi etmemektedir. TD'nin örgütsel ayrışması, çevrimiçi kopukluğun sadece bir kısmını açıklamaktadır. Ancak, bileşenlerin üçte ikisinden fazlasının TD sekretaryasının fikirlerinin çoğunluğuyla veya tamamıyla özdeşleştiği ve koalisyona bağlılık bildirdiği göz önüne alındığında, örgütsel kopukluk argümanı TD içindeki çevrimiçi "iletişimsizliği" temellendirmekte yetersiz kalmaktadır. Dahası, örgütlerin birbirleri ve tabanlarıyla olan iletişim sıklığı düzeyleri arasında önemli bir farklar bulunmaktadır. Çeşitli göstergeler TD'nin tabanı ile olan iletişiminin iç iletişimine kıyasla nispeten dinamik olduğunu göstermektedir. Bileşen düzeyindeki bu iletişim eksikliği, kampanya konularında kamusal şeffaflığın yanı sıra ortak eylemlerin hazırlanması, koordine edilmesi ve yürütülmesini de engellemektedir. İnternetin toplumsal hareket örgütleri için sunduğu interaktif, sürekli ve şeffaf iletişim potansiyeli, TD koalisyonu örneğinde yerine getirilmiş görünmemektedir.

Araştırma gözlemleri TD bileşenlerinin internet ve sosyal medya uygulamalarını müzakere amaçlı kullanmadıklarını göstermektedir. Bağlantısallık boyutunun aksine, kamuya açık internet uygulamaları üzerinden müzakere taban düzeyinde de mevcut değildir. Bileşen kuruluşlar sadece birbirleriyle değil, aynı zamanda destekçi ve takipçi tabanlarıyla da tartışmaya girmemeyi tercih etmektedir. Her iki düzeyde de karşılıklı tartışma sıklığı neredeyse yok denecek kadar azdır. Ancak bu durum, sosyal medyanın veya bileşen kuruluşların web sitelerinin örgüt merkezinden uzak bölgelerdeki sempatizanlar, potansiyel üyeler ve üyeler için bir nevi danışma masası işlevi gördüğü gerçeğini gölgelememelidir. Bu bireyler genellikle web sitesi iletişim sayfaları, sosyal medya mesaj modülleri ve nadiren de olsa e-posta yoluyla örgütlerle iletişime geçmektedir. Çoğu durumda yapıcı bir tek yönlü iletişim yaygın olsa da bu kamuya açık çevrimiçi medya üzerinden diyalojik bir ilişkiye dönüşmemektedir. Bununla birlikte, kapalı sosyal medya kanalları üzerinden kurulan ilk temas genellikle kuruluşlar tarafından telefon görüşmeleri ve yüz yüze toplantı davetleri

gibi daha geleneksel iletişim yöntemleriyle takip edilmekte ve nihayetinde kullanıcılarla yapıcı ve uzun süreli bir ilişki için bir sıçrama tahtası oluşturulmaktadır. Kurum düzeyinde, e-posta, telefon görüşmeleri ve yüz yüze toplantılar özel tartışmaların çoğuna ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Seçmenler, çevrimiçi ortamda kamuya açık tartışmalardan kasıtlı olarak kaçınırken iletişimin müzakereye dayalı kısmını çeşitli nedenlerle özelde tutmaktadır. Türk siyasi kültürünün gelenekleri, kuruluşların ne diğer kuruluşlarla ne de bireylerle siyasi tartışmaya girmesine izin vermektedir. Mülakat yapılan bileşenlerin büyük çoğunluğunun temsilcileri, çevrimiçi platformlarda tartışmaktan kasıtlı olarak kaçındıklarını açıkça kabul etmişlerdir. Çevrimiçi muhalefet üzerindeki devlet baskısı da, özellikle örgütler ve aktivist topluluklarla etkileşime girmeye istekli olan bireylerin müzakereden kaçınmasında rol oynamaktadır.

Kuruluş temsilcileriyle yapılan nitel uzman görüşmeleri, TD'nin siyasi katılım ve faaliyet için internet teknolojilerinin sunduğu kapasiteden yararlanamamasının başlıca nedenleri hakkında ayrıntılı bir fikir vermektedir. Neredeyse tüm nedenler çevrimdışı dinamiklerin bir ürünüdür veya büyük ölçüde siyasi ve sosyal dinamikler tarafından belirlenen ve şekillendirilen çevrimdışı alandan kaynaklanmaktadır. Örneğin, internetin, özellikle de sosyal ağların kamusal iletişim kapasitesi, muhalefetin devlet tarafından kriminalize edilmesinin bir sonucu olarak, tamamen yok olmasa da en düşük düzeye inmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanına hakaret, görevi kötüye kullanan kolluk kuvvetlerinin kimliğini ifşa etmek ve devlet sırlarını ifşa etmek gibi suçlamalarla hükümeti eleştirenlerin sıkça tutuklanması karşısında, örgütler ortak bir kamu gündemi üzerinde birbirleriyle kamusal olarak etkileşime girmekten geri adım atmaktadır. Şeffaflığın olmaması, kamuoyu için serbest bilgi akışını, tartışmalı konular için daha geniş kitlelerin harekete geçirilmesini ve üye, gönüllü kazanımını engellemektedir. Dahası, örgüt ve grupların birinci elden bilgi vermemesi, büyük ölçüde hükümet destekli sermaye grupları tarafından kontrol edilen ana akım medyanın konumunu güçlendirmekte ve nihayetinde siyasi bilginin kontrolünü bu grupların tarafsızlıktan uzak editoryal süreçlerine bırakmaktadır.

TD'nin dijital kapasitesi, dijital operasyonlarındaki yetersiz insan kaynağından da etkilenmektedir. Koalisyon üyesi kuruluşların birçoğu, Türk sivil toplumundaki diğer birçok STK gibi, dijital operasyonlar için nitelikli personel istihdam edecek mali

kaynaklardan yoksundur. Büyük ölçekli ve ana akım kuruluşlar haricinde, TD bileşen kuruluşları büyük ölçüde kamu desteğinden mahrumdur ve sınırlı öz kaynaklarla hayatlarını sürdürmektedir. Dijital iletişim için amatör personelin çapraz istihdamı kuruluşlar arasında yaygındır. Kuruluşların sosyal medya editörleri ya da sorumlularının çoğunun sosyal medya okuryazarlığı kişisel düzeydedir. Gerekli beceri, eğitim ve deneyime sahip olmayan personel, internetin kamusal iletişim kapasitesinden çok sınırlı ölçüde yararlanmaktadır. Bu uygulamalar, mali ve örgütsel açıdan kendine yetersiz baskı gruplarından oluşan zayıf bir sivil toplumun doğrudan sonuçlarıdır. Sivil toplum aktörleri için destekleyici bir ortamın eksikliğine dair argümanlar modern Türk siyasi tarihinde bulunabilir.

Siyasi koalisyonlar bağlamında, ağın geri kalanıyla özdeşleşme, birlikte hareket etmek için kilit bir rol oynar. Üye kuruluşların özdeşleşmesi, demokratik karar alma mekanizmalarına, büyüklükleri, yönelimleri, kaynakları ve resmi statülerine bakılmaksızın tüm üyelerin dahil edilmesine bağlıdır. Ayrıca, ortak hedef ve ideallerle birlikte kolektif bir kimlik de koalisyonun başarısı için elzemdir. Gezi protestoları ile veri toplama zamanı arasında geçen yaklaşık on yıl (2013-2021,2022) koalisyonu daha hiyerarşik hale getirmiş ve ortak idealler açısından ayrıştırmıştır. Birçok küçük ölçekli üye, karar alma ağlarından izole edilmiş ve bazı uç örneklerde kendisini koalisyonun geri kalanından kopmuş hissetmiştir. Bu kopukluk, incelenen çevrimiçi ağlara da yansımıştır. TD'deki çekirdek örgütlerin baskın karar verici rolü, zaman içinde çevre örgütlerin lider örgütlerin takipçilerine indirgendiği ölçüde büyümüştür. Bu hiyerarşi koalisyonun başlangıcında ve Gezi protestoları sırasında istenmeyen bir durum teşkil etmiştir. Büyüyen hiyerarşi, paradoksal olarak TD içerisinde hem bağımsız aktivizmle birleşmiş hem de bu sonucunu doğurdu. Her üye ya da üye grupları, ağın geri kalanından bağımsız olarak kendi öncelikli konusunda kampanya yürütmüştür. Tüm siyasi ve sosyal meseleler koalisyonun tüm üyeleri tarafından benimsenmemiş, bu da iktidar yapılarına karşı birleşik bir cephe oluşturulmasını engellemiştir.

Sonuç ve Tartışma

Genel olarak, çalışma başlangıçtaki hipotezleri kanıtlayacak kanıtlar sağlamamıştır. Güçlü bir çevrimiçi iletişim altyapısı ile hareketin hayatta kalması ve uyumu

arasındaki ilişkiyi ya da koalisyonun uzun vadeli bir harekete dönüşmesi üzerindeki etkisini doğrulayacak bulgulara ulaşılamamıştır. Bilimsel deyimle, ampirik veriler ışığında, sıfır hipotezi reddedilememiştir. Çalışmanın nedensel hipotezleri kanıtlanamaması nedeniyle açıklayıcı bölümde koşulluluk faktörlerine yönelinmiş ve çevrimdışı alanda Türk sivil toplumunun mevcut durumu, yükselen otoriterliğin etkisi ve aktivist çevrelerdeki siyasi kültür gibi altta yatan sosyo-politik faktörler incelenmiştir.

Türkiye'de sivil toplumun mevcut durumu, STK'ların, baskı ve çıkar gruplarının ve kamusal alanın oluşumundaki diğer sivil ve sermaye dışı aktörlerin durumu Batı'daki benzerlerinden tamamen farklı bir görünüm arz etmektedir. Örgütlerin ya operasyonel kapasiteleri zayıftır ya da çeşitli nedenlerle aktivist çalışmalarında bu kapasiteden tam anlamıyla yararlanamamaktadırlar. Bu nedenler, birinci elden bilginin dolaşımı, çıkar grupları ve kanaat önderleri arasında siyasi tartışma ve genel olarak konu savunuculuğu için yeterli alanın ve fırsatın gelişmesine izin vermemektedir. Çalışma, TD bileşenlerinin ve bir platform olarak TD'nin karşılaştığı çevrimiçi sorunların nedenlerinin çevrimdışı alanda yattığını ortaya koymuştur. STK'ların sivil toplumda yer alma ve etkinliklerini sürdürme konusunda devam eden zorlukları, hem zaten zayıf olan dijital iletişim altyapısı geliştirme çabalarını sekteye uğratmakta hem de dijital iletişimlerinin mevcut yapısına yansımaktadır.

Kapsamlı bir mevzuat reformu ve adil yargılama sürecinin yeniden tesis edilmesi, halkın çevrimiçi iletişime daha geniş katılımını sağlamak için zorunlu görünmektedir. Kullanıcıların ve örgütlerin kısıtlanmamış, açık internet iletişimine olan güvenlerini yeniden tesis etmek için hukukun üstünlüğünün yeniden tesis edilmesi ve dijital medyaya ilişkin mevcut bazı yasaların liberal bir perspektifle gözden geçirilmesi gerekmektedir. Örgütlerin kamusal alanda siyasi etkileşime girme konusundaki - özellikle sol eğilimli siyasi girişimlerde görülen - isteksizliği çok eskilere dayansa da, internette ifade özgürlüğü haklarının kullanılmasının serbest fikir dolaşımını hızlandıracağı ve daha canlı bir kamusal tartışma alanı yaratacağı rahatlıkla düşünülmektedir. Dahası, örgütlerin kamusal tartışma konusundaki isteksizliği bu hakların kısıtlanmasıyla bağlantılı olabilir ve daha fazla araştırmaya ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Örgütlerin yanı sıra, ifade özgürlüğü haklarının kısıtlanması

kullanıcıları örgütler ve kamusal aktörlerle etkileşime girmekten caydırmaktadır. Bireyler, çevrimiçi tartışmalara katılmaktan, örgütlerle, kanaat önderleriyle, tartışma gruplarıyla ve diğer çevrimdışı/çevrimiçi siyasi aktörlerle iletişime geçmekten geri durmaktadır. Son on yılda yargı bağımsızlığının azalması, ifade ve örgütlenme özgürlüğü haklarının tam olarak kullanılmasının önündeki başlıca engeldir. Mahkemelerin yürütme organına bağımlı olması, vatandaşların cumhurbaşkanına hakaret, terör, dini kurumlara hakaret, darbe teşebbüsü, kamu düzenini bozmaya teşvik gibi suçlamalarla kitlesel ve mesnetsiz şekilde tutuklanmasına yol açmaktadır. Temel özgürlükler ve liberal bir hukuki yaklaşım olmaksızın, çevrimiçi teknolojiler siyasi faaliyet ve birlik için özerk alanlara dönüşememektedir.

TD bileşenlerinin sağlam bir dijital iletişim altyapısının geliştirilmesini engelleyen diğer önemli dezavantajı, dijital operasyonlarındaki vasıflı işgücü eksikliği, yetersiz insan kaynağı veya genel olarak her türlü kaynak eksikliğidir. Bu sorun, daha geniş bir erişim alanına sahip ana akım kuruluşlardan ziyade küçük kaynaklara sahip periferik kuruluşları özellikle etkilemektedir. STK'lardaki profesyonelleşme açığı, sivil topluma yönelik kamu desteği önlemleri alınarak potansiyel olarak kapatılabilir. Sivil toplum kuruluşlarına yönelik kamu desteği araç ve kaynaklarının seferber edilmesi, kamusal alanın çeşitliliğini artırmak ve kuruluşları hem çevrimiçi hem de çevrimdışı alanda yer almaya teşvik etmek için kısmi ama etkili bir çözüm olabilir. Bu tür önlemler sadece personelin profesyonelleşmesi, aktif kampanya yürütülmesi ve geniş çaplı etki için kaynak sağlamakla kalmayacak, aynı zamanda dezavantajlı kuruluşlar için nispeten adil koşullar da sağlayacaktır.

Kitle iletişim araçlarının aksine, internet uygulamalarının kendi kendine işleyen yapısı profesyonel ve amatör kullanım arasındaki ayrımı bulanıklaştırmıştır. Ancak, sosyal medya uygulamalarının kamuya yönelik kullanımının gereklilikleri kişisel kullanımından önemli ölçüde farklılık gösterdiğinden, özellikle kuruluşların dijital operasyonlarına adanmış vasıflı personel, kamusal erişimlerini artırabilir, diğer kuruluşlarla yenilikçi özerk ağlar oluşturmalarına fırsat verebilir. Kuruluşlar, tabanlarını aktif ve canlı tutmanın yanı sıra savunuculuk konularında sürekli bilgilendirmek için de bu uygulamaları daha etkili bir şekilde kullanabilir. Dijital

medya uzmanları, siyasi aktivizm için tabanı harekete geçirme fırsatının da farkına varabilir.

Çevrimiçi aktivizmin sokak protestolarının yerini tutamayacağı fikri artık *a priori* olarak kabul edilmektedir. Aynı doğrultuda, Taksim Dayanışması örneği üzerine yaptığımız çalışmanın genel bir çıkarımı, akademisyenlerin internet teknolojisinin özgürleştirici rolü konusundaki ilk iyimserliğinin aksine, internet ve sosyal ağların, toplumsal ve siyasi dinamiklerden, devletten ve diğer güç sahiplerinden özerk siyasi araçlar olarak işlev görmediğidir. Bu teknolojiler, toplumsal hareket örgütlerine, kapasiteleri ve kaynaklarının yanı sıra bunları tam kapasiteyle kullanabilecekleri liberal bir yasal çerçeve ve destekleyici bir siyasi kültüre sahip olmaları koşuluyla, güçlü ağlar oluşturma, kampanya yürütme olanakları ve tartışma araçları sağlayabilir. Bununla birlikte, veri analizinin de gösterdiği gibi, bu koşulların yokluğunda, internetin kendi başına örgütlerin kapasitesini artırmasını ve aktivizm için siyasi koalisyonlar içindeki uyumu artırmasını beklemek naiflik olacaktır. Sağlıklı kurulmuş, yoğun bağlantılara sahip, şeffaf bir şekilde bilgilendirilen ve sürekli etkileşim halinde olan bir direniş cephesinin kendi kendini sürdürebilmesi ve hayatta kalabilmesi için güçlü bir çevrimiçi altyapının destekleyici bir siyasi ortamda faaliyet gösteriyor olması gerekir. Dahası, iletişimsel ve örgütsel kapasite karşılıklı olarak gelişerek sonunda güçlü ve her şeyi kapsayan bir harekete yol açabilir.

Pek çok otoriter bağlamda, internetin sosyal ve siyasi direnişe yönelik vaatleri yerine gerçekleşmemektedir. Batılı muadillerinin aksine, Türkiye'de siyasi muhalefete karşı hem yasal hem de fiziksel aşırı güç kullanımı, toplumsal muhalefet aktörlerinin kampanya ve müzakerelerini kamuoyuna duyurma cesaretini kırmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, siyasi faaliyetlerin pek çok alanında ideolojiye kamusal meselelerden daha fazla öncelik verilmektedir. TD'deki ve genel olarak Türkiye'deki sivil toplum örgütleri ve gruplar, konulara özel koalisyonlar oluşturmak ve direniş kolektifleri halinde siyasete katılmak yerine aktivizmde ideolojik çizgisini izlemeyi tercih etmektedir.

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