

THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTES AND COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD
WAR YEARS (1991-2024): THE US FACTOR

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

SILA KAYA

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

JANUARY 2025

Approval of the thesis:

THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTES AND COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR YEARS (1991-2024): THE US FACTOR

submitted by **SILA KAYA** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Science in International Relations, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Özgehan ŞENYUVA
Head of Department
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Mustafa TÜRKEŞ
Supervisor
Department of International Relations

Examining Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şerif Onur BAHÇECİK (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Mustafa TÜRKEŞ (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Assist. Prof. Dr. Yusuf AVCI
Social Sciences University of Ankara
Department of Asian Studies

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Sıla KAYA

Signature:

ABSTRACT

THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTES AND COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR YEARS (1991-2024): THE US FACTOR

KAYA, Sila,

MS., the Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mustafa TÜRKEŞ

January 2025, 174 pages

This thesis examines the disputes between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan, focusing on the post-Cold War period and the impact of the United States as a direct actor in this bilateral relationship. Sino-Japanese relations have fluctuated. Historical issues: Taiwan, Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and mutual militarization have all had a negative impact on the relationship. The complexity of the disputes and the involvement of the US meant that the issues remained unresolved. To prevent tensions from escalating, at times the problems of the relationship have been deliberately neglected. Such deliberate neglect accumulates tensions between the two countries, which also damages the security of the region. On the other hand, the presence of the US in the region has continued to limit Japanese militarism and integrate the PRC into the US-led order. As an actor and participant in these disputes between the PRC and Japan, the US reflected its foreign policy interests in Asia-Pacific security, which directly affected the security situation between the two countries. From historical issues to strengthening the alliance with Japan, the US has left the issues unresolved, which has accelerated tensions between the PRC and Japan as well as in the region. However, since the current status quo is in line with US interest, any possibility of

escalation of tensions is also prevented by the US. The findings of this thesis show that the problems between the PRC and Japan are left to reproduce themselves, as this has been the main strategy of the US.

Keywords: Sino-Japanese disputes, Sino-Japanese security, Asia-Pacific, the United States role, historical assertions

ÖZ

SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI YILLARDA (1991-2024) ÇİN-JAPON ANLAŞMAZLIKLARI VE İŞBİRLİĞİ: ABD FAKTÖRÜ

KAYA, Sıla,
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Danışman Prof. Dr. Mustafa TÜRKEŞ

Ocak 2025, 174 sayfa

Bu tez, Soğuk Savaş sonrası döneme Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti (ÇHC) ile Japonya arasındaki anlaşmazlıklarda ABD'nin söz konusu ikili ilişkide doğrudan bir aktör olarak etkisini irdelemektedir. Çin-Japon ilişkileri inişli çıkışlı bir seyir izlemiştir. Tarihsel konular: Tayvan, Senkaku/Diaoyu adaları ve karşılıklı silahlanma gibi meseleler ilişkileri olumsuz etkilemektedir. Anlaşmazlıkların karmaşıklığı ve ABD'nin dahli, sorunların çözümsüz kalmasına yol açmıştır. Gerilimin tırmanmasını önlemek için zaman zaman ilişkideki sorunlar kasıtlı olarak ihmal edilmiştir. Bu tür kasıtlı ihmaller iki ülke arasındaki gerilimi arttırmakta ve bölgenin güvenliğine de zarar vermektedir. Öte yandan, ABD'nin bölgedeki varlığı Japon militarizmini sınırlamaya ve ÇHC'ni ABD liderliğindeki düzene entegre etmeye devam etmiştir. ÇHC ve Japonya arasındaki anlaşmazlıklarda bir aktör olarak ABD, dış politika çıkarlarını Asya-Pasifik güvenliğine yansıtmış ve bu da iki ülke arasındaki güvenlik durumunu doğrudan etkilemiştir. ABD, tarihi meselelerden Japonya ile ittifakını güçlendirmeye kadar birçok konuyu çözümsüz bırakmış, bu da ÇHC ile Japonya arasındaki ve bölgedeki gerilimi artırmıştır. Ancak mevcut statüko ABD'nin çıkarlarına uygun olduğu için gerilimin tırmanması ihtimali de ABD tarafından engellenebilmektedir. Bu

tezin bulguları, ABD'nin ana stratejisi bu olduđu için HC ve Japonya arasındaki sorunların kendi kendilerini yeniden üretmeye bırakıldığını göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çin-Japon anlaşmazlıkları, Çin-Japon güvenliđi, Asya-Pasifik, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin rolü, tarihsel iddialar

To My Beloved Family

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to start by presenting my sincere thanks to my advisor Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş, who contributed to my academic career through his profound knowledge and experience. He encouraged me to perceive the world critically and think outside of the box which I am grateful for.

Also, I would like to present my sincere thanks to my examination committee members, Assoc. Prof. Şerif Onur Bahçecik and Assist. Prof. Dr. Yusuf Avcı for their esteemed and informative contributions and considerate approach.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and love to my parents Eylem Kaya and Haydar Kaya, and my sister Merve Kaya. Their love, joy, and support were the reasons that I could finalize this thesis. Thank you for making me laugh. I would also like to thank my dear friends and colleagues, who supported me throughout the process. Lastly, my grumpy cats Akçe, Karakız, and Panik bring me joy and put a smile on my face, which must be acknowledged.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION.....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 The Subject of Thesis.....	1
1.2 A Literature Review.....	3
1.3 The Research Question and Scope of Thesis	6
1.4 Methodology.....	6
1.5 The Organization of Chapters	6
2. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PRC	
2.1 Introduction	8
2.2 Domestic Aspects of Post-War Treaties	9
2.2.1 Japan between 1945 and 1951	9
2.2.2 China between 1945 and 1949	10
2.3 Towards the Normalization of Relations Through Unofficial Channels between the PRC and Japan (1950-1978)	12
2.4 Fluctuating Relations, Surfacing Problems during the Cold War (1978-1991)	20
2.5 Conclusion	25
3. DISPUTES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PRC IN THE POST-COLD WAR YEARS	

3.1 Introduction	27
3.2 The History Problem	27
3.2.1 The Textbook Issue	30
3.2.2 The Yasukuni Shrine Issue	37
3.3 The Taiwan Issue	45
3.4 The East China Sea Issue	54
3.5 Military Development and Narratives of the PRC and Japan.....	68
3.5.1 The PRC Military Modernization.....	68
3.5.2 Japan’s Normalization.....	76
3.6 Bilateral and Multilateral Security Cooperation Attempts.....	87
3.6.1 Bilateral Security Cooperation.....	88
3.6.2 Multilateral Security Cooperation	89
3.7 Conclusion	92
4. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE US EFFECT ON THE SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS	
4.1 Introduction	94
4.2 The US and the History Issue	101
4.3 The US and the Taiwan Issue	104
4.4 The US and the East China Sea Issue	115
4.5 The US-Japan Alliance and the PRC	119
4.6 Conclusion	127
5. CONCLUSION	128
BIBLIOGRAPHY	133
APPENDICES	163
A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET	163
B. THESIS PERMISSON FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU	174

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 The numbers of China Coast Guard and other vessels that entered Japan's contiguous zone or intruded into territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands.....	64
--	----

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	Anti-Access/Area Denial
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADMM Plus	ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus
AIIB	Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
EAS	East Asia Summit
ECAFE	Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the United Nations
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
FOIP	Free and Open Indo-Pacific
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHQ	General Headquarters of the Supreme Commission for the Allied Powers
ICJ	International Court of Justice
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JHRP	Joint History Research Project
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
KMT	Kuomingdan
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MEXT	Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
MFN	Most-Favored Nation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS	National Defense Strategy
NPT	Nuclear Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODA	Official Development Aids
OSA	Official Security Assistance
PKO	Peace Keeping Law
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLASAF	PLA Second Artillery Force
PRC	People's Republic of China
QUAD	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RMB	Renminbi
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCAP	Supreme Command of the Allied Powers
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US	United States
USCAR 27	United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands Directive 27
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Subject of Thesis

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan have a long history of peace, conflict, and sometimes war. This study focuses on bilateral disputes between Japan and the PRC, taking into account the U.S. factor since the end of the Cold War when the rise of China became a possible threat in the eyes of the United States. As such, it is the most appropriate time frame to explain the current relations and structure of the region. After establishing formal relations in 1972, Sino-Japanese relations were enhanced through trade and foreign direct investments such as Japanese Official Development Aids (ODAs) which contributed to the Chinese economic development critically. In the beginning, both countries focused on flourishing economic relations without the risk of triggering an American alliance from the Japanese side or having close relations with the US's closest ally in the East from the side of the PRC. However, the relations have started to change after the start of economic rivalry between China and the USA which spread to other fields such as security and politics. With a focus on putting a century of humiliation in the past, China's ambition was to become a strong economic power center.

On the other hand, Japan appeared to be in a stuck position with its security mostly provided by the USA and a strong trade with the PRC. On top of these, the historical problems between the PRC and Japan started to resurface. Therefore, there happens to be a dilemma of Japan and a triggering effect of the PRC for the neighboring countries. Alarmed of losing its power in the Asia-Pacific, the USA strengthened its alliance with Japan. Neither the USA wants to abandon its dominance over China nor does China want to limit its growing economic power, this situation has started to evolve into a spiral that has the potential to accelerate regional disputes and even conflicts.

The history problem, the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the Taiwan question, maritime and territorial disputes in the East China Sea, and mutual militarization in the region and the tensions that these disputes bear a serious potential conflict in the region. Yet, neither side nor the US could solve the problems arising from these topics, and all of the issues were left in deliberate neglect. This deliberate neglect means that both countries follow the policy of delaying the bilateral issues since they are refraining from escalating any tension whilst they are trying to solve the disputes. Moreover, the contemporary literature started to dive into the studies of newly emerging powers such as India, South Korea, and Australia or focused too much on the Sino-US rivalry and ignored the Japanese impact on the region. However, to understand the regional security structure from an analytical view and reflect on the two important and ancient powers' situations in the Asia-Pacific, there is a need to put China and Japan at the center of the focus again in this current international situation. Moreover, as an inherent intervener in these relations, the US effect is also crucial and needs to be considered. Therefore, analyzing them from a historical perspective and then focusing on the positions of the critical states that are involved in them, namely, China, Japan, and the USA in these bilateral relations can provide a clear understanding.

On the other hand, although the issues have existed for years, any major conflict was not spotted which creates an interesting point of the Sino-Japanese relations. Although there were many disagreements, the two countries maintained a fluctuating but peaceful relations. Advances in solving the problems in the East China Sea from both sides, for example, portray that the two countries give effort into dialogue. Yet, another reason why the disputes did not escalate into a crisis was the US effect. Accordingly, the US orchestrates and prevents any dispute from reaching a breaking point.

Looking at the contemporary events, these two countries' relations for the future are in a spiral of triggering all parties. For example, China, which wants to continue its power growth in every possible way, expands its military spending, which alarms Japan and the US. As a countermove, the U.S. strengthened relations among the allies and created platforms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which China criticized as part of the U.S. containment policy. Moreover, China's perspective in Japan was sometimes perceived as a forerunner of U.S. Asia policy. Considering

these perceptions, the continuity of the mistrust between the countries is strong. This creates a need for important attention to the region.

1.2 A Literature Review

After the Cold War, Sino-Japanese relations experienced many fluctuations. From a historical perspective, Ryosei Kokubun, Yoshihide Soeya, Akio Takahara, and Shin Kawashima outline the critical turning points in the relations between the two countries. Accordingly, Japan entered the post-Cold War period with a negative outlook on China because of the Tiananmen Incidents (Kokubun, Soeya, Takahara, Kawashima, 2017, p. 132). Moreover, many of the current problems and splits that were carried to contemporary politics resurfaced after the Cold War. For example, the involvement of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the Chinese national territory in 1992 The Law of the Territorial Sea, the start of the Taiwanization after 1994 Republic of China's constitution amendments which enlarged the split after the Taiwan Strait Crises in 1995 and the underground nuclear tests that were done by China between the years 1994 and 1995 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 137-138, 141). In the 21st century, the visits of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine also created a serious negative effect that triggered the historical issue (Kokubun et al, 2017, p. 159).

On the other hand, the US-Japan relations have strengthened significantly. Although the Soviet threat has largely lost its effect after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese rise and the nuclear programs that were developed by North Korea brought the US and Japan closer which can be seen in the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security- Alliance for the 21st century in 1996 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 142). Related to that, a new guideline for Japanese defense cooperation was formed between the two actors, and the cooperation between the two countries spread towards the surrounding areas outside Japan which worsened the relations with China (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 143).

Accordingly, although 9/11 changed the view of George W. Bush's stance against China and transformed it into a more cooperative stance, this did not reflect on the Sino-Japanese relations for long, which is described as "hot economics, cold politics"

(Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 163-164). To work on improving the relations, the 1972 system changed to 2006 mutually beneficial relations which indicated the normalization of diplomatic relations and involved supporting the “one China” (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 175). After Abe came to power in 2006 on his first visit overseas, he visited PRC on 8-9 October 2006, and with Hu Jintao, they stated the relations as “a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” which changed the relations between the two countries to a more inclusive and multilateral perspective (Kokubun et al., 170-171). Moreover, Hu Jintao’s Japan visit on 5-10 May 2008, the “Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’ was published (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 175). In a theme of collaboration and conversation, the Taiwan issue was barely mentioned (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 175). This point is critical for this thesis because although a window of opportunity was slightly opened for cooperation or solving the problems and the dialogue is prolonged, it shows the essential issues of security between the two countries have been sidelined without a solution, left to the deliberate neglect policy. Moreover, due to the continuation of the disputes between the two countries which were inherited in the post-war years, this cooperation spirit died down.

After the Cold War, the common danger for both the US and China have been dissolved. According to Barry Buzan and Evelyn Goh (2020, p. 98), the US’s role in the region was discussed in two different views, whether being police between the sides or being a ring holder which prevented a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese relations after the Second World War. As is discussed in the fourth chapter, this role of the US has continued up until today. Moreover, the US did not intervene in the post-war settlements and problems that triggered the issues to stay unresolved since it had the responsibility of being a part of this war (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 99). Furthermore, the authors argue that the US has supported Japan more than China which contributed to the historical problem (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 99). Additionally, the change of the strategy of “keeping a low profile” to “national rejuvenation” and “striving for achievement” in Xi Jinping’s tenure has worsened the relations with both the US and Japan (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 157).

There appeared to be a spiral of security that worsened in Northeast Asia. According to Hiroki Takeuchi (2014, p. 14), the relations between the two countries have deteriorated both in economy and security areas, to competitors and rivals respectively. Moreover, according to Atanassova-Cornelis and Mendes (2010, p. 397), Japan has changed its security strategy due to the nuclear programs of North Korea and the increasing maritime and territorial activities of China after the Cold War. This resulted in promoting closer ties with its allies in the region, especially the USA, and its normalization process (Atanassova-Cornelis & Mendes, 2010, p. 399). However, according to Caroline Rose and Jan Sýkora (2017, p. 112), Feng Liu and Kai He (2023, p. 26), and Zheng Chen and Guangtao Wang (2023, p. 170), this in turn resulted in the feeling of mistrust but also containment and encirclement by China. Therefore, there appeared to be increasing security tensions in the region.

Looking at the position of Japan, there appeared to be another dilemma. According to Elina Sinkkonen (2019, p. 749), on the one hand, preserving its security with close alliance with the US, and promoting economic relations with China on the other, Japan follows a dual hedge strategy. However, as Caroline Rose and Jan Sýkora (2017, p. 108) state, economic interdependency does not reflect on politics. Moreover, while promoting better relations with China, according to Zheng Chen and Guangtao Wang (2023, p. 165), Japan has faced a two-contradicting situation. On one hand, Japan has a high degree of economic ties with China, however; gets triggered by the rise of China in return for its economic rise.

In these events of complexity, the East Asian security structure has the potential of tensions with the PRC, the US, and Japan forming the core pillars. The Chinese accumulation of power triggering the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance resulted in more accumulation from the Chinese side due to the concerns of encirclement. Meanwhile, the existing problems in Sino-Japanese relations which involved the US factor deliberately neglected, and the potential for tensions preserved in the region.

1.3 The Research Question and Scope of Thesis

After the Cold War, Sino-Japanese relations inherited several dispute points that irritated both sides and even came close to a full-blown crisis. This thesis aims to answer the question of how the relations between China and Japan developed after the Cold War regarding the bilateral disputes and how the United States as an actor has influenced this relationship. It focuses on the historical aspects of the disputes, narratives of the governments, and turning points which shed light on today's politics which is defined as the policy of deliberate neglect. Also, the US acted as both a catalyzer and a stabilizer in the region vis-à-vis these disputes to protect its interest in the region.

1.4 Methodology

In this thesis, a qualitative approach has been utilized. The primary resources such as international treaties like the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, joint statements, the bluebooks, the white papers, official speeches, and leaders' statements are utilized to present transparently the governments and leaders' perspectives and to objectively state the articles of the treaties. As secondary resources, digital and hard-copy texts, journals, books, think tank reports, and newspapers are used to portray diversity and enrich the research. Moreover, as a document analysis, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database has been utilized to present the military expenditure data of both the PRC and Japan from 1991 to 2023/4.

1.5 The Organization of Chapters

Having clarified the subject matter, the research question, the scope of the thesis, the literature review, and the methodology of the thesis in the first chapter, the second chapter sets the stage to point out the historical background of the relations between China and Japan, how the post-war period laid the ground for the normalization process and how the relations built up after up until the end of the Cold War. This

chapter implies the historical disputes between the two countries and the US's inherent role within them.

In the third chapter, the direct security issues between the PRC and Japan are outlined. To make a flow in the history, the first issue is the history problem which entails the textbook and Yasukuni Shrine issues. Following this, the famous Taiwan issue in the Asia-Pacific is investigated deriving from the history to the current politics. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute followed the Taiwan issue and explained the clashing sovereignty of the two countries. Finally, the mutual militarization processes beginning from the end of the Cold War are stated to underline the narratives of the two countries toward each other.

Chapter four is devoted to pointing out how the US involvement affected the relations between China and Japan and whether contributed to increasing tensions in the Sino-Japanese relations. To make a comprehensive but also specific analysis, the design of the third chapter is applied which focuses on the US intervention and its effect on the Asia-Pacific security and Sino-Japanese relations in detail. The thesis's final chapter is the conclusion, where the questions raised in the introduction chapter is answered and an overall analysis of the thesis is presented.

CHAPTER 2

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PRC

2.1 Introduction

In order to examine the post-Cold War relations and highlight the Sino-Japanese relations, it is necessary to look at the recent history. Since history cannot be cut and thoroughly explained only in one certain period, it is crucial to reflect on the continuous problems and dynamics of the relations that still affect the relations to this day. Deriving from this notion, the relations between the two countries after the Second World War have been clustered with the name of the legacy of the war. The approach of the Cold War and the division of the world has affected Asia. While operating within the mindset of the Cold War, there were times when the two countries improved their relations. The United States, the prominent leader of the “free world”, has affected and even interfered between the two countries. However, the two countries still developed some cooperation. With an everchanging nature, Japan and China experienced a fluctuating relationship. The critical point of this chapter is to reflect the current problems’ root causes that can be dated back to post-war relations building and the deliberate neglect of the problems. The background of the relations is examined under three subheads Domestic Aspects in the Aftermath of the War, Towards Normalization of Relations: Private Agreements between China and Japan (1950-1978) and Fluctuating Relationships and Resurgence Issues (1978-1991).

2.2 Domestic Aspects of Post-War Treaties

2.2.1 Japan between 1945 and 1951

The legacy of the war was as impactful as any other. Under Japanese imperialism, many Asian countries suffered. Belonging to two warring parties, the two countries had broken relations after the war. Moreover, both had been exhausted by the aftermath of internal affairs. On the one hand, Japan was invaded by the Allied forces and accused of many war atrocities. After the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August, Japan automatically ended the war and surrendered to China (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 25). During the rule of the Allied powers that lasted six years, Japan was under the authority of The Far Eastern Commission in administrative terms and by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ) in legal terms (Kusunoki, 2023, p. 112). The Commander in Chief of GHQ General Douglas MacArthur had the sole authority and power (Kusunoki, 2023, p. 113). Japan had undergone many changes like the abolishment of the military, Election Law, Anti-Monopoly Law, and most importantly, a change of the constitution, known as the 1947 Constitution of Japan. In this constitution, the prominent elements were the articles four and nine. According to Article 4, “The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government (...)” (Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 1947, Article 4). With this statement made, the Emperor of Japan was downgraded from his political duties and privileges. On the other hand, the famous Article 9 states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 1947, Article 9)

With this article, Japan became a special case regarding its military. The gap that was created by the constitution regarding the military would be filled by the USA. Moreover, this article of the constitution was to be a hindrance, especially after the “normalization of Japan” discussions.

Moreover, after reformations mostly took place during the occupation period, the USA promoted the Japanese economy and made it a self-sustainable economy (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 28). Through these reforms, Allied powers especially the USA had envisioned a Japan where they partake in the free world which they have succeeded. Coming to the end of the immediate after the war period, there were two striking events. The first one was on September 8, 1951, San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed between the Allied powers and Japan. With this treaty, the state of war was put to an end and Japan regained its sovereignty. According to the treaty, Japan had forgone its rights in many territories which occupied Korea, Taiwan, Spratly, and Paracel Islands (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 40). The second was the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan which was signed on the same day as the Peace Treaty. Japan has been limited to possessing only defensive forces. Within this context, regarding the previously mentioned military forces gap, Article 1 presents:

Japan grants and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers. (The Avalon Project, 2019, Article 1)

The baseline of the Japan-US alliance can be found in this treaty. From this point onwards, Japan and the USA would be partners regarding security in every aspect possible. Therefore, it is feasible to say that while mentioning the security of East Asia, one cannot separate the two.

2.2.2 China between 1945 and 1949

On the other hand, as part of the Big Four, China left the war scene as a winner. However, another war was on the rise for the Chinese. After their commonly fought War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist party Kuomintang (KMT) had been poisoned with corruption and faced many economic problems which led to the decrease of power for the party (Mark, 2012, p. 9). Moreover, the nationalists and communist groups that were warring against each other continued their struggle for dominance after their one-year-long peaceful coexistence named the "Double Ten

Agreement” on 10 October 1945 (Mark, 2012, p. 11). After the Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria, Mao made a move and sent the Chinese Communist Party’s forces to Manchuria. As a countermove, KMT sent their forces as well and the war between the two parties had begun in the summer of 1946 (Mark, 2012, p. 12). Both sides have received foreign support, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from the Soviets and KMT from the US, although the amounts were prominent in the latter (Mark, 2012, p. 12-13). With the two sides warring against each other, after the decrease in support of the US for KMT, KMT started to lose its dominance against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Mark, 2012, p. 16).

Eventually, with the captures of Nanjing and Shanghai and the Chiang’s move to Taiwan, Mao’s CCP became victorious in the Chinese Civil War (Mark, 2012, p. 15). As a final blow, Mao declared the People’s Republic of China to the world in Tiananmen on 1 October 1949 (Mark, 2012, p. 16). There, a never-ending struggle had begun. Mao stated that they would side with the USSR in the Cold War mindset (Mark, 2012, p. 19). Moreover, the Republic of China where nationalists were in power had moved to Taiwan and there appeared to be two possible representatives of the same nation (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 29). This situation created a problem in the San Francisco Peace Conference where the peace treaty signed. There appeared to be a dichotomy of who would represent the Japan-invaded China between the US and Britain, with the first supporting the Republic of China (ROC) and the latter People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 36). In the end, both parties decided to hand the issue over to the Japanese. As a result, the Japanese side determined to solve the issue by making peace through their bilateral channels (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 36). In the end, both representatives of the Chinese people at that time were not included in the peace talks and the treaties. Not happy not being invited, Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister of PRC stated that “The People’s Republic of China has not been participating in the preparatory process, the negotiations process, or even the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and so the Central People’s Government considers it to be illegal and invalid” (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 38). Therefore, the war presumably ended without any treaty between the two warring sides.

2.3 Towards the Normalization of Relations Through Unofficial Channels between the PRC and Japan (1950-1978)

Towards the middle of the 1950s, both countries had undergone important changes. One is now a part of the free world with an inseparable bond with the United States and the other has two representatives with clashing views regarding the world. Moreover, the international situation has grown more divided with ideology and the Cold War started to emerge as the theme for the upcoming decades. Unlike other regions, East Asia experienced hot wars under the auspices of the Cold War. The relations between the three, Japan, CCP, and KMT would be the top topic under the mentioned international bipolar structure.

One year before Japan signed the Security Treaty with the USA, the People's Republic of China and the USSR signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in 1950 which pointed out a collective action mechanism against Japanese militarism and any country that might support them (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 33). Although the parties did not have any relations with each other, both have made strong connections with the two contradicting polar (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 33). The Chinese uneasiness with the US forces in Japan imminently started after the security treaty (Inoue, 2023, p. 148). Related to this, the PRC wanted to be perceived as peaceful (Inoue, 2023, p. 148). Zhou Enlai put forward the main foreign policy aspects of the PRC in 1954 with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Mark, 2012, p. 33). The “mutual respect's territorial integrity and sovereignty”, “mutual non-aggression”, “non-interference in each other's internal affairs”, “equality and mutual benefit”, and “peaceful coexistence” will become the baselines of even today's main elements of the foreign policy of PRC (Mark, 2012, p. 33).

However, the counter-treaties were not the only contradicting issues. The eruption of the war in the Korean peninsula in 1950 has but two poles against each other. According to the US President Truman:

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. (...) the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area

and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. (Truman, 1950, para. 2)
Therefore, the US used its military bases in Okinawa, which was under its occupation at that time, and on Japanese soil to collectively fight back against the communists that were supported by the PRC forces (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 35).

One important point to make is here that Formosa, a known name of Taiwan, was also mentioned in Truman's speech. Therefore, Taiwan's critical importance to the USA was underlined. Whilst the Korean War was ongoing, surprisingly, this friction did not plug out all the cooperation routes for the two sides. Accordingly, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru acknowledged that regardless of the ideology, China's geographical closeness to Japan and its importance would eventually lead the way for cooperation (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 38). However, there appeared to be a problem from the US side for not recognizing ROC by the Japanese government. Pressuring the Japanese government resulted in the famous Yoshida Letter to the US. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida stated that the recognition issue would be solved by the Japanese government (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 39). After two months-long discussions, on 28 April 1952, ROC and Japan ended the state of war between them by signing the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan, widely known as the Treaty of Taipei (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 39). Not surprisingly, the PRC raised strong objections to the peace treaty (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 41) since both sides claimed the whole of China was under their authority.

The Korean War ended without a peace treaty in sight. The US has enlarged its security alliance including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and the ROC to encircle the USSR under the name of the San Francisco System (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 43). Moreover, the Cold War mindset and the Korean War created obstacles to the normalization of relations between the PRC and Japan and put the PRC and the US on opposing sides (Inoue, 2023, p. 147). As a result, the PRC which was unhappy with the advancing relations between the US and ROC, started to follow a "tension diplomacy" against Taiwan and bombed the Jinmen and Mazu islands in Taiwan Strait while the Taiwan-US defense treaty was in the process (Mark, 2012, p. 36). One underlying reason for the PRC to follow this policy was the feeling of encirclement by

the US in the region (Mark, 2012, p. 36). Although the mindset of the Cold War was raging in politics, the Japanese side was eager to repair trade relations with mainland China to restore their war-torn economy (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 44). This aim was reciprocated by the PRC and the Japan-China Private Trade Agreement was reached in 1952 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 44). Accordingly, this trade agreement was a step towards reaching beyond the US limit on trade with the PRC (King, 2016, p. 90). The PRC's Japanese policy was in line with these developments, which were called "private sector leading the public (yimin cuguan)" (Inoue, 2023, p. 148). What followed this was the second treaty in 1953 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 45). On the way towards the third private trade agreement in 1955, the pressures from the US side which was silently pressuring the Japanese side to limit commerce cooperation with the PRC increased (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 44). This was because the US was trying to prevent the PRC-Japan normalization (Inoue, 2023, p. 148). The Japanese side, however, wanted to step towards the normalization process. The US interference, however, postponed this (Inoue, 2023, p. 148). From the Chinese side, the PRC's Japan policy was leaning more toward promoting a Japan with the less strings than the US (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 47). Nevertheless, the PRC's Premier Zhou Enlai and Japanese Economic Council Agency's Director Takasaki Tatsunosuke had talks at the Asian-African Conference in 1955 and the PRC side showed a positive outlook towards Japan even where it both promoted Japan-US alliance and the Sino-Japanese commerce relations (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 47). Note, although the decision of the US intervention to the private trade agreements with China was made in the Cold War outlook, even after the Cold War, there were many events where the US created obstacles in Sino-Japanese relations. Japan will be exhausted in to balance between the desires of not tiring their alliance with the US and promoting advanced relations with their centuries old neighbor China.

In the second half of the 1950s, with the government change in favor of the Kishi administration, Japan had started to pave its way and become more multifaceted in foreign relations rather than following the steps of the US in Asia (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 52). Moreover, the new government was following warmer relations with the ROC. Besides, the Kishi government was not keen to develop the PRC-Japan relations which ended up with a strained relationship (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 52). Especially

after the Nagasaki Flag Incident in 1958 involving the PRC flag being forcefully taken out in Nagasaki, the PRC decided to sever the ties between the two countries. (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 55)

Coming the 1960s, the most important changes were the Sino-Soviet split and the change in the 1952 Security Treaty between Japan and the US. After the many incidents that created friction between the USSR and PRC such as the Second Taiwan Crises, criticisms against the Great Leap Forward and the US-USSR détente had led the PRC to follow an independent path such as the development of nuclear weapons without the Soviets which was different from the Cold War context (Mark, 2012, p. 46-48). Moreover, the US-PRC relations did not look promising, since the US was increasingly suspicious of the PRC's intent after the border dispute between the PRC and India (King, 2016, p. 168). One can also argue that the PRC was isolated (King, 2016, p. 168). Although the relations between both poles of the Cold War went downward, the PRC started to follow a more cooperative stance toward Japan (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 61). Secondly, Articles four and six of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the USA hinted that whenever the security of Japan or the Far East is threatened, the USA would indirectly have the right to respond by using its military bases on Japanese soil (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1960). With every revision of the security treaty between Japan and the US, these points were enlarged.

For Japan, there appeared to be a problem with the news of processes of the PRC's inclusion into the United Nations (UN) in the 1960s. The Japanese government was aiming to include the PRC in the UN without unseating ROC in line with its "two Chinas" policy aims (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 61). For the Japanese government, even if they vote in favor of the recognition of the PRC in the UN, this will not lead them to cut off their relations with the ROC (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 61). Meanwhile PRC was trying to recover from the Great Leap Forward's hazards and divergence with the USSR which led them to highlight the importance of the commerce relations with Japan (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 61). Eventually, two influential figures from the PRC and Japan, Liao Chengzi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke signed the "Memorandum on Japan-China Comprehensive Trade" in 1960 which will last for five years, known as

the LT Trade (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 67). Although the outlook of this trade agreement was diverging the politics from the economics, it was in touch with the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (Inoue, 2023, p. 152). Since this is the closest the two countries have ever gotten officially and it brought official involvement to it, this trade agreement holds a critical value in paving the way for the diplomatic normalization process. Not happy with the events, the ROC protested Japan harshly (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 70). To ease the tensions deriving from the trade agreements with the PRC, Yoshida Shigeru visited ROC and afterward, he delivered the Yoshida Letter in 1964 to find a balance in the relations with ROC (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 70).

Towards the middle of the 60s, the USA's North Vietnam invasion had started. Siding with the US and the new agreements done with ROC had led to another worsening in the relations between Japan and PRC (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 76). As a result, a revision was made in the Friendship Trade Agreement in 1967 explicitly naming some situations as enemies including Japanese militarism and expansionism, imperialism by the Americans, and Soviet expansionism (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 77). Alongside these incidents, one of the overarching goals of the Sato administrations was the reversion of Okinawa to Japan from the US (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 78). After the two leaders' meeting in 1967, the reversion of Okinawa was set to be solved in the upcoming years (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 78). Okinawa issue had a critical point since it touches upon some concerning points including the possession of nuclear weapons positioned by the US and Taiwan (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 78). Also, the reversion treaty would lead to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands problem. Regarding the nuclear weapons after the nuclear bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan was highly critical of possessing any nuclear weapons on its soil. To address this issue, Japanese Prime Minister Sato declared the famous Three Non-Nuclear Principles in the Japanese Diet in 1967 which:

My responsibility is to achieve and maintain safety in Japan under the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, in line with Japan's Peace Constitution. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1967, para. 1)

Regarding this, it was obvious that the US had to relocate its nuclear weapons. On the other hand, after the inclusion of Okinawa on Japanese soil, Japan will again be geographically close to Taiwan and South Korea. Concerning this, according to the

Joint Statement of Sato and Nixon, both Taiwan and South Korea's importance in Japanese security was explicitly stated and accepted by the American side (The American Presidency Project, 1969). Eventually, the Reversion Agreement was signed regarding Okinawa in 1971, and the administration once again changed to Japanese. (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 79) On the other side, the PRC was going through a serious political change with Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1966 (Mark, 2012, p. 63). China had diplomatically deteriorating relations since it had problems with 30 out of 50 countries which it had diplomatic relations with (Mark, 2012, p. 64).

With the start of the 1970s, the international situation has evolved once again. One of the most critical of them was the rapprochement between the PRC and the US. This change was especially triggered by the Vietnam War's economic exhaustion for the US (Kokubun et al, 2017, p. 83). Related to that, in 1969 Nixon declared a new strategy for Asia named the Guam Doctrine or later Nixon Doctrine which indicated that the US would share its burden with the Asian countries due to its struggles in economy (Kokubun et al, 2017, p. 84). This meant the withdrawal of the US army from the Asian countries and easing the burden to small portions on one hand, and relaxation of relations with China on the other (Kokubun et al, 2017, p. 84). According to their strategic plan, the US declared Taiwan belongs to China, meaning the PRC in the Shanghai Communique in February 1972 by stating:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. (Office of the Historian, 1972, para. 13)

Per the US, the PRC found this rapprochement strategically beneficial, especially in the times of the split with the USSR (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 86). Another huge gain for the PRC was the acceptance of the membership to the UN on 25 October 1971 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 87). With years of effort, finally the PRC made a big step towards internationalization and recognition.

The rapprochement paved the way for the diplomatic normalization between Japan and the PRC (Inoue, 2023, p. 149). Although at first, the so-called "Nixon Shock" was

thoroughly felt in Japanese politics, after the shock had subsided, Japan turned it to its advantage in diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 89). On the other hand, the PRC's concerns regarding Japan increased, since this Nixon shock followed by a defense build-up in Japan (King, 2016, p. 208-209). Yet, due to the beneficial relations with Japan, the PRC did not take a harsh stance against Japan (King, 2016, p. 209). The concrete step towards the normalization has been made in the Hori Letter, which was written by Hori Shigeru who was the General Secretary of the Japanese LDP in 1971 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 90). In the letter, which was written for Zhou Enlai, it was evident that Japan abandoned the Two China policy and accepted Taiwan's belonging to the PRC (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 90). However, this statement and the further statements made by Prime Minister Sato were protested internally, there was even a counter-declaration from Foreign Minister Fukuda who disagreed with the view (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 91). On the other side, Mao included Japan in his horizontal strategy against the USSR in talks with Kissinger in 1973 (Mark, 2012, p. 87). As Mark (2012, p. 87) put it, this was a crucial change in perspective regarding Japan from a power that could turn into a danger to a negotiable partner against the common enemy.

After the new cabinet under Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in July 1972 was formed in Japan, the steps to normalization started to be taken (Inoue, 2023, p. 150). After the consultation with the US at the summit between the two countries in August, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka visited the capital of the PRC to initiate the normalization process (Inoue, 2023, p. 150). There appeared to be two problems standing in the way of the normalization process: the issue of Taiwan and the alliance with the US (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 95). Accordingly, the PRC demanded that the Chinese people's representation belongs to them, any situation regarding Taiwan is an internal issue and the treaties that were made with Taiwan are going to be annulled (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 95). In response to the PRC's demands, Japan showed a positive outlook (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 95). For the second issue, since the rapprochement had eased the tensions between the PRC and the USA, Japan had an opportunity to not jeopardize the relations and progress simultaneously. Towards the diplomatic normalization, Takeiri Yoshikatsu, Chairman of the Komeito Party, visited China and in return, he brought back his notes concerning a draft for a joint communique when he held a

meeting with Zhou Enlai in July 1972 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 93). According to Zhou, the alliance with the USA will not jeopardize the relations with the PRC and time will bring the solution to the problems revolving around Taiwan (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 93). However, Zhou also indicated in a clause of another agreement that will be hidden from the public eye that Taiwan belongs to the PRC in the same meeting (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 93). Conversely, this time Japan did not abide by this wish, and the agreement was not recognized (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 93). In the end, both sides came together in the PRC capital to finalize the diplomatic normalization and eventually, they signed Joint Communiqué on 29 September 1972 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 94). The two critical points that were mentioned before, the Taiwan issue and the US alliance, were also addressed. According to the Joint Communiqué (1972),

The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1972, Article 3)

At first glance, this statement states Japan's willingness to accept Taiwan as part of the PRC. However, according to Kokubun et al. (2017), addressing the issue to the Potsdam Declaration meant that Japan left the formerly occupied Taiwan to the Republic of China and not to the PRC. Therefore, again there was not an explicit wording of acceptance (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 95). Some academicians also see this situation in the same light. By saying "Japan fully understands and respects (...)", Liff (2022a, p. 1074) argued that there was never a complete acceptance of Taiwan to the PRC. This perception will also reflect itself in the upcoming years in the Taiwan issue. However, according to the second article of the communiqué, "The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China" meant that Japan had denounced the ROC's representative status for the Chinese people. On the other hand, as a response to statements and Japan's stance, the ROC government ceased its diplomatic relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1972, Article 2). Nevertheless, the business-level relations continued after the talks between Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese envoy in the name of "farewell diplomacy" (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 97). On the other hand, regarding the US alliance, the communiqué stated that: "The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of Japan, 1972, Article 7). Deriving from this statement, again the idea there will not be a situation where clashing of interests between PRC-Japan and Japan-US relations was highlighted. Besides these issues, the war reparations were dropped from the PRC side and both countries declared they would not rise for hegemony in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1972). Further, the relations were strengthened by trade, air transport, shipping, and fisheries agreements between the years 1974 and 1975 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 97). In the fisheries agreement, the Senkaku Islands' sovereignty was not touched upon by both governments (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 98). This is an example of deliberate neglect from both sides which gave birth to bigger problems like a snowball in the future. According to Kokubun et al. (2017, p. 98), in the Chinese People's Daily News in 1953, the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands' sovereignty was placed on Okinawa. But then, in 1971 statement made by the Foreign Ministry of PRC, this placement was changed to Taiwan (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 98). On the other hand, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly stated in 1972 that the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands' sovereignty belong to them (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 99). As a side note, four days before the Joint Communique, Prime Minister Tanaka stated:

It is regrettable (...) that for several decades in the past the relations between Japan and China had unfortunate experiences. During that time our country gave great troubles to the Chinese people, for which I once again make profound self-examination. (Roderick, 1972, para. 11)

The wording "self-examination" is crucial because according to Roderick (1972) this was derived from a traditional way of extending their apology. This was a significant step before the Joint Communique since the Chinese side had always stressed over and put a distinct importance on the World War II experiences. However, for some Chinese scholars, this was not welcomed. For example, According to He (2007, p. 5), not saying the word apology directly or not stressing what the unfortunate experiences were made the apology insincere.

2.4 Fluctuating Relations, Surfacing Problems during the Cold War (1978-1991)

The resignation of Nixon and the Joint Communique between China and the US reflected a change in the international environment again (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 99). The normalization of relations between the USA and PRC was declared through the

Joint Communiqué and it came into force in January 1979 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 100). However, this progressive outlook was strained by the PRC invasion of Vietnam one month later (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 100). Meanwhile, through the peace treaty that was in the works between the PRC and Japan, the Japanese side fell into a dilemma regarding the “anti-hegemony” depiction of the Joint Communiqué in 1972 which surfaced again in the negotiation process in 1975 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 101). According to Kokubun et al. (2017, p. 101), the PRC had designed that clause not just for the rejection of the US but also for the USSR hegemony. This had put the Japanese decision-makers who were also following a progressive foreign policy towards the USSR in a tough place since the PRC had a strong outlook toward any developing relations with the USSR (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 101). Although Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa tried to solve this problem by stating that the clause does not mean a stance towards a third country, this problem prolonged and even hindered the way towards the peace treaty in 1978 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 101). Finally, the issue was solved between the two by finding a middle ground, and the peace treaty in the name of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in Beijing on 12 August 1978 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 102). Regarding the anti-hegemony clause: “(...) both shall oppose any attempt by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony” (United States Treaty Collection, 1981, p. 270). Through this article, the PRC had managed to get Japan’s activeness against any possible hegemon which were the USA and the USSR. This article may create a hazard against the Japanese foreign policy which has a strong alliance with the USA and trying to establish improved relations with the USSR. To prevent that, the treaty included: “This Treaty shall not affect the relations which either Contracting Party maintains with third countries” (United States Treaty Collection, 1981, p. 296). With this peace treaty, both sides prevented the most critical issues from happening from their sides. Although the outlook of the Japanese foreign policy stands presumably secondary, this policy reflected the willingness to pose a neutral position (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 154). Furthermore, for the first time normalization with China and alliance with the US went hand in hand with Japanese foreign policy (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 155). During the Cold War period, these times were known as the most successful period between the two countries (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 150).

In 1978, two important events occurred. The first one was the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation which aimed to create a platform for the study areas of cooperation (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 142). The guidelines thoroughly explained what should happen before and during an armed attack on Japan with a wide-ranging topic from what the US forces and Self Defense Forces of Japan do or how the facilities will be used (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 142). With these guidelines, it was evident that the US and Japan were so intertwined with each other in the military sense. On the other hand, the PRC had decided to open its economy to the world which even with humble words can only be explained as it changed history. This change had a snowball effect that can be taken as a starting point of the Rising Dragon story. Moving away from the Mao mindset after his death, Deng Xiaoping underlined the importance of the modernization of the economy in the name of Four Modernizations derived from Zhou, including industrial, agricultural, defense, and scientific advancement (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 104). Deng even described this pragmatic shift by stating that “no matter what the color of the cat is white or black if it catches the mice, it is a good cat” (Mark, 2012, 97). To complement this, the Japan-China Long-Term Trade Agreement was signed the same year (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 104). Finally, another critical point which will be presented as foreign direct investment in the name of Official Development Aid (ODA) from Japan to PRC started the next year including projects of infrastructure building (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 105). Although there were many struggles among PRC decision makers about the foreign capital, finally, the economic modernization was heavier in the pair of measures (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 111). With Japanese help, China stepped towards the modernization of the economy much easier. According to Kokubun et al. (2017, p. 112), China had received 330.9 billion yen from 1978 to 1983. In this period, many railroads, ports, and hydropower plants were built (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 113). With the help of the trade agreement, China had achieved help in technology and industrial plants (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 113). On the other hand, Japan enjoyed the new market that was introduced and welcomed it. Moreover, Japan finally had access to crude oil and coal which was gravely needed especially after the bitter experiences gained from the oil crises in the 1970s (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 113). Regarding the ODAs, the mindset was to include the communist PRC in the world economy which in time may evolve into a more liberal country (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 113). From the Chinese side, Japan was paying the debt that was left from the World

War II legacies (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 155). However, Japanese Prime Minister Ohira explained that this assistance would not turn into a military cooperation (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 114). Resulting of this, although the aim is to get closer and strive to one aim, a dominance of the liberal world economy, the ODA was appealed to be designed to focus solely on economic growth. Still, the effect was not trivial and continued in the mindset of the Cold War or the 1989 Tiananmen Incident (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 156). On the other hand, the PRC had changed its assertive policy against Taiwan. Marshall Ye stated the Nine Principles for the Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan and stated that although the PRC preserved the principle of militarily intervening as they fit, Taiwan will have high autonomy in the name of a “special administrative region” (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Latvia, 2006). Thus, Deng Xiaoping named this as the “one country, two systems” (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Latvia, 2006, para 6).

Meanwhile, another critical issue between the two countries, mainly known as the “history issue” had started to surface. According to Buzan and Goh (2020, p. 158), both countries started to change the narratives regarding wartime events. The change in the perspectives served their domestic needs, sometimes used as a political tool to lead the masses (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 158). One significant issue that surfaced was “the textbook issue” which will reoccur several times. In the Japanese textbook, the change of the words from “invasion” to “advance” had become severely problematic for the two countries’ peaceful relations in June 1982 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 116). The Japanese side had explained this change as a reevaluation of the terms (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 116). However, there was even criticism from the Japanese people regarding this change (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 116). On the other side, China had raised its criticism slowly and even concluded that this change of the terms may indicate a militaristic tendency of Japan that was reborn (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 117). Even Deng Xiaoping had supported the criticisms that were raised (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 117). This stance from the Chinese side never disappeared, and even grew stronger over time. Eventually, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa made a statement on this issue and stated the deep remorse that was caused by the Japanese to the Chinese people and the Republic of Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1982). Moreover, Miyazawa stated that due to raised criticisms, they will “revise the

Guideline for Textbook Authorization after discussions in the Textbook Authorization and Research Council and give due consideration” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1982, Article 3). With these statements, the Japanese side had tried to clarify that there was no plan for military upbuilding and assertiveness in the Japanese agenda and the Chinese side agreed in September (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 118). Although this issue will surface again and again, there is a will to restate the historical facts in a beneficial way from both sides. This was deriving from two groups in Japan. The first one is the right wing which pursues a glorified attitude towards the incidents that happened at the war (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 59). The other side highlights the peaceful constitution and tends to leave the war memories in the dark (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 59). On the other hand, China needs the power of the masses, and this led them to overstretch the issues regarding history and overstress nationalism (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 60). Combined with these two sides, the history issue had gained a deliberately neglected status in Sino-Japanese relations, especially regarding the history books, Yasukuni Shrine visits, Nanjing Massacre, and comfort women issues. On the other hand, the Chinese youth also protested the trade imbalance in favor of Japan. Some critics even named the issue as the “second invasion” and there were calls for the boycotting the Japanese products and cars (Mark, 2012, p. 104).

Meanwhile, the international situation had started to change once again. On the one hand, the Chinese and Soviet sides had started to melt the ice (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 119). On the other hand, China had faced a new problem with the US regarding weapon transfers to Taiwan (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 119). Amidst this, the outlook of the Sino-Japanese relations stayed strong with the three main principles which were peace and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, and eventually long-term stability (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 119). Coming to the end of the 1980s, Japan had intensified its multilateral diplomacy such as with Southeast Asian countries and its alliance with the USA from the words of Prime Minister Nakasone, they are “a community with a common destiny” (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 120). Further, the relations with China had risen to a never-seen closeness which resulted from the friendship between Chinese General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 120). A new principle to the relations between the two countries has been born because of this friendship, mutual trust (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 120). However,

this mutual trust was hit with a crisis after the visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Nakasone on 15 August 1985 (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 125). This shrine embodies Class A War criminals from World War II (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 125). Not surprisingly, this visit was strongly protested by the Chinese side, and the mutual trust, which had just flourished, had been damaged. A year later, the Japanese government decided to increase investments in national defense (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 126). It was decided to be %1 of the national expenditures, and with the aforementioned aim, this was terminated (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 126). This again raised the questioning of the Japanese government's aims as militaristic.

At the end of the decade, in 1989, when the Cold War living its last moments, the Tiananmen Square Incident had positioned itself as the turning point in Sino-Japanese relations (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 127). The bloody suppression of democracy protests by the Chinese citizens by the PLA showed an unknown face of the PRC (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 127). After this incident, the reformists inside the PRC government started to lose their voices, blamed the name of favoring bourgeois liberalization, and the West accused of being interventionist in the politics of China started to emerge (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 127). On the other hand, Japan, following the steps of the US had imposed sanctions in various areas including military, economy, and diplomacy to the PRC (Mark, 2012, p. 111). However, this stance from the countries had started to erode due to the economic benefits that the PRC brings to the table (Mark, 2012, p. 112). Eventually, with the Berlin Wall demolition and the declaration of the USSR no more, the Cold War ended (Kokubun et al., 2017, p. 128). The modern times of the security scene of the Asia-Pacific are composed of the USA as the only superpower remaining, Japan as its biggest ally in the region, and a more politically strict and economically developing PRC.

2.5 Conclusion

The legacy of the war had hit the Chinese and Japanese gravely. After the immediate recoveries, both sides experienced a serious flux of events. Without any official diplomatic relations until 1972, the two sides had put their centuries-old neighborly relations on hold. PRC, fought for international recognition and its right to

representation with Taiwan while trying to figure out the economic hassles. Japan, with the alliance agreement and the constitution change, had somewhat lost its prominent voice in the security agenda of the Asia-Pacific to the US. As the US played chess game against the USSR and played the role of the police towards Japan and China, it always existed between the Sino-Japanese relations as an intervener. According to Wan (2016, p. 5), the US is the offshore balancer to both. The real reason why Japan and China were able to build relations was because of the Sino-Soviet split and the rapprochement between the US and China. Without the US rethinking the position of China, it was unlikely for Japan to continue its progressive steps. However, the relations were not only defined by the US will, and both countries paved the way toward diplomatic normalization. Towards the end of the Cold War, it was clear that many issues were swept under the carpet due to various reasons such as fear of escalating tensions between the two superpowers, preventing any progressive steps taken towards diplomatic relations, or creating a bigger problem whilst aiming for a solution. However, due to this deliberate neglect, the issues had grown into critical problems or serious conflict zones between the two countries.

CHAPTER 3

DISPUTES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PRC IN THE POST-COLD WAR YEARS

3.1 Introduction

Sino-Japanese bilateral relations have been fluctuating due to various issues. These bilateral issues, which directly and profoundly affect the relationship, have not found a solution, thus disturbing the security environment not only between the two countries but also in the region. In order to have a clear understanding of the problems between the two countries, the history issue, the Taiwan issue, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue, and the militarization narratives are presented as bilateral direct disputes that are intertwined with each other and affect the two countries, which have been stuck, and some are still stuck in deliberate neglect. On the other hand, in order not to exclude pessimism from the analysis, security cooperation between the two countries was also presented as a final subtopic. It seems that the results were not sufficient to resolve the contentious issues. On the other hand, it is important to note that the United States appeared as an actor in all the disputes.

3.2 The History Problem

One of the unresolved problems in the Sino-Japanese relations was the so-called history problem. The history problem can be explained as “either the cultivation of negative historical memories or the denial or avoidance of historical responsibilities, used to condition both political and public attitudes towards contemporary policies and relationships in ways that encourage tension” (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 4). The two countries that normalized their relations were not able to solve their historical issues due to the Cold War and the ring-holder position of the US (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 140-141). Not thoroughly solved in the Joint Communique or the peace treaty, the

history problem only grew in time to explode in the forms of textbook issues and the Yasukuni Shrine visits.

Due to the political turmoil in China during the Cold War, the historical issue was not opened to negotiation by Japan (Berger, 2003, p. 69). Moreover, due to the possible effects on Japanese domestic politics, the issue was shelved until today (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 60). There, it is obvious that the issue was under the concept of deliberate neglect. After the PRC-USSR split, it was more suitable for China to accept Japanese investment as a remorse (Berger, 2003, p. 69-70). However, this has been changed after the 1980s. With the opening of the PRC to the world, the historical problem started to surface because of the increasingly narrowed gap in politics and economics between the two countries (Berger, 2003, p. 70). Moreover, the textbook changes and the Yasukuni Shrine visits pave the way for the return of the militarized and assertive Japan in the region for the Chinese governments (Berger, 2003, p. 70).

On the other hand, after the Cold War, the balance of Asia had shifted from the Soviets to the new threats to come such as the problems in the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and eventually the 9/11 attacks (Berger, 2003, p. 79). The fear of the US's complete withdrawal from Asia and the decrease of importance for the US in Japanese eyes had led to a more active Japan in the region (Berger, 2003, p. 79). This resulted in the new government dwelling on the historical problem with a compromising attitude in 1993 (Berger, 2003, p. 79). Following this, Japan's Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama gave their condolences to the victims of the war and expressed their remorse on 15 August 1995 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995c). Nevertheless, the Japanese government did not lose sight of settling the historical problem, and they succeeded in 1998 with South Korea, with a direct apology from the Japanese side (Berger, 2003, p. 80). The same result was to be reached with the Chinese side too with Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in November 1998, however, the Chinese side was the ones who were reluctant to agree on a common basis (Berger, 2003, p. 81). Yet, another view was that Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi was the one who was unwilling to offer a direct apology which was different from the Korean case (Christensen, 1999, p. 54). This was commented as the Japanese side was wary of the military development of China, so they were not willing to offer an apology (Berger, 2003, p. 81). One of the reasons

why the Chinese side was reluctant can be explained through that there was the separation of the responsibility of the war from the Japanese Emperor and other high-level politicians involving the historical issue (He, 2007, p. 5). Moreover, due to this different behavior towards China from Japan and refraining from saying the word “apology” perceived as an insincere act from the Chinese side (He, 2007, p. 6).

Deriving from these points, it was obvious that even in the problem of the bilateral relations that happened in the past, the security agenda and the political calculations were intervening factors between the two countries (Berger, 2003, p. 64). Another important cause of the historical problem is the modern national identification of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) derived from Japanese invasions (Kawaji, 2011, p. 58). Therefore, this situation is impossible to neglect even in security relations since this is a hindrance that was politicized and highly severe. Moreover, at the start of the new millennium, the relations deteriorated due to the power changes in the region (Cui 2012, p. 201). The Japanese side was seeing the Chinese rise and feeling overwhelmed by it. As a result, Japan strengthened its alliance with the US. On the other side, not provided with the same importance and apology for the South Koreans, Chinese bureaucrats felt like they were not receiving respect from the Japanese side. Also, both textbook and Yasukuni issues were perceived as a revival of Japanese militarism. Further, Chinese researchers were concerned about the change of narrative of Japan from oppressor to victim in World War II, where Japan understated the massacres but highlighted the bombings (Christensen, 1999, p. 53). Moreover, due to the beginning of the somewhat Sino-US rivalry, Chinese officials were perceiving Japan more as an ally of the US and less as an ancient neighbor with a flourishing economic partnership which led the region to a more polarized one, and the accumulation of tension increased. Although the relations were brought back to normal with South Korea, with a joint historical research project, this was not the case with the PRC. Deriving from these points, although the relations had developed at the end of the Cold War, this did not help to overcome the critical issues in Sino-Japanese relations.

3.2.1 The Textbook Issue

Between the countries, one issue that could not be reached in a common ground was the history textbook issue. The first eruption in the post-war period was in 1982 which was covered in the previous chapter. Although there were statements for easing the tensions from the Japanese side, the protests from the Chinese side again appeared in 2001. But before that, how Japanese history came to the surface was crucial to grasp the situation. Therefore, how the issue circulated first inside Japan and how it expanded to the international level is to be examined. This way, the continuous protests from the Chinese and Koreans whenever the historical issue came to the surface is easier to comprehend.

First of all, the Japanese history narrative involved militaristic and even chauvinistic aspects with high regard for the emperor (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 37). However, immediately after the war, the history textbooks were ordered to not involve nationalistic and militaristic contexts by the ruling authority of Japan at the time, the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in October 1945 (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 38). Therefore, new history textbooks were ordered to be prepared. There comes the famous historian and high school teacher Ienaga Saburo who prepared a textbook called *Shin Nihonshi* meaning New Japanese History in 1946 (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 38). His idea of narrating history was through scientific provable facts and democratic values (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 38). The Japanese new constitution involving the School Education Law, rather than state-handed history textbooks, paved the way for many groups such as teachers, historians, and publishing house editors to prepare their draft for the Ministry of Education's screening process in 1947 (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 39). This established order reached even to this day. Four years later, Ienaga Saburo prepared a high school history textbook after the demand from Sanseido Press (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 39). Some inspectors in the textbook screening system had rejected Ienaga's draft due to its depiction of Japan in certain issues such as the relations with China implicated a sense of inferiority in the 5th century or the Pacific War was prolonged in the book (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 39). Nevertheless, his book was approved by another committee and published

in 1953 (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 39). However, one issue is drawing attention to this situation.

There, the first steps of division in Japan regarding the history textbook preparation were taken between the left and right sides inside Japan. With the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s efforts, the studies to bring back patriotism to the history textbooks returned (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 40). In 1956, the Ministry of Education rejected up to %33 of the drafts within the criteria of their verifiability and nationalistic terms (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 40). After the conservatism rise in the education field, Ienaga demanded revision, and each time at first it was rejected in 1957 and 1963 (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 40). With the high demands for change, Ienaga contemplated this as censorship and he initiated legal proceedings in 1965 (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 40). He stated that the Japanese people were left in the dark regarding the war events which may lead to underestimating the war consequences (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 40). However, the Ministry was critical of Ienaga's stance as it reflected norms of the history. Two years later, after the revised version of him was rejected by the Ministry, he filed a new suit as an unlawful act (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 41). Eventually, although the files were not finalized, Ienaga lost the first one, but he won the second suit (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 41-42). This is reflected in the new textbook drafts, where the authors were freer to include some facts such as war mayhem (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 42). For example, a Japanese history teacher in a high school Shirota Tsuyoshi stated that the wartime history narrative was leaning on the impacts on the Japanese people rather than the other countries (Yoshida, 2000). One another example was Honda Katsuichi, who published a travel article series in 1972 named "Chūgoku no tabi" which involves the Japanese atrocities in China (Yoshida, 2000). In his books, Honda underlined how the Japanese media and government were neglecting the atrocities that the Japanese military inflicted upon China (Yoshida, 2000).

In the 1980s, however, a stricter stance returned as the LDP's power increased (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 42). As a result, the 1982 history textbook issue had evaporated. However, although the Japanese government accepted the criticisms, it was still recommended to lessen the war casualties due to Japanese attacks on the

Chinese or Singaporean soil (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 43). Meanwhile, Ienaga was again on his way to the courts to prove the unlawful actions of the textbook committee. Ienaga was protesting because of the changes demanded by the committee in 1984 (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 43). These changes include the change of the Japanese army killings of Chinese people to the deaths of Chinese people due to the chaos (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 43). One other was regarding Ienaga's mentioning of the Nanjing rapes which the committee argued that rape was not a distinct figure in war situations, so it was stated as unnecessary to be included in the history books (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 43). In 1993, Ienaga won in the points of Nanjing rapes, the court find Ministry guilty due to its rejection of the revised versions (Yoshiko & Hiromitsu, 1998, p. 44).

2001 History Textbook Issue

As a result of the Ienaga suits, the Japanese history textbook guidelines were revisited and reformed in the name of taking the foreign relations of Japan into account. However, a new problem arose after these reforms. With the inclusion of comfort women into middle school history textbooks, conservatives protested and argued that comfort women should not be included for two reasons: the issue was not verifiable, and it was inappropriate for middle schoolers (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 254). Although the forcing of the women was acknowledged and the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet Yohei Kono apologized (Kawaji, 2011, p. 64), some conservatives sought to eliminate Japanese textbooks from these issues. As a result, a new textbook preparation process was started by the group named *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai* (Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform) or *Tsukuru Kai*, for short (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 254). According to their mindset, the wartime atrocities were making the students less nationalistic (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 255). With the perception of their chairman Nishio Kanji, they prepared a history textbook draft named *The Nation's History* (*Kokumin no rekishi*) and the drafts were sent to the ministry in 2000 (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 255). Accordingly, the words spread, and on 15 November 2000, the Chinese Spokesperson stated that "The essence of the "textbook question" in Japan is whether Japan can correctly understand and approach the history of aggression in its past, genuinely draw lessons from it and avoid going back to that road" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2000b). The 2001 textbook issue had sparked from this

very book. After the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) demanded revisions, Tsukuru Kai accepted all, and the book was authorized (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 257). Gaining power from the authorization, they have declared that a new stage of history narrative was on the rise exempt from the external demands from China and South Korea (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 257). It should be noted that, even within the Japanese conservatives, Tsukuru Kai was criticized for being tactless in describing wars (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 258). This new history narrative involved, for example, the comfort women issue was eliminated, and the casualty numbers in the Nanjing Massacre which was stated by the Chinese were questioned (Qiu, 2006, p. 37). In the Tokyo Trials, the number was assessed as exceeding 200,000 men, women, and children and 20,000 rapes (Yoshida, 2000). Eventually, The Nation's History textbook was accepted to be used in eleven schools all around Japan (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 259). Once again, in the new term for the adoption of the books every four years, another textbook issue had arisen. Combined with the Yasukuni Shrine visit, this also created an international protest environment from the PRC and the ROK (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 261). Moreover, the protests were also fueled because of the formalization of the Japanese flag and the anthem in Law Regarding National Flag and Anthem in 1999 since it was like the nationalistic practices in the imperial period (Kawaji, 2011, p. 62). The protests in the PRC were so widespread that there were demonstrations in nearly 40 cities (Qiu, 2006). The Chinese side, furious with the Yasukuni Shrine visits and the textbook revisions, argued that conservative Japanese politicians and groups were redefining the war with glorification in mind which undermined the sufferings that were left because of their invasion (Qiu, 2006, p. 25). Regarding this issue, the Chinese Spokesperson stated:

The basic tune of the textbook concocted by Japanese rightist scholars is to deny and whitewash Japan's history of aggression. Despite big revisions, the textbook still contains numerous distortions of history. (...) We have noted that the Japanese Government has said that the historical viewpoint of this textbook does not represent the stand of the Japanese Government. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2001)

Furthermore, a new stage of history textbook issues started to develop. As of 2005, Japan started to criticize Chinese and South Korean history narratives (Hiroshi, 2012, p. 262). For the author which also is agreed in this thesis, the history textbook issue is treated as a tool for political leverage.

From another point of view, the Chinese side was also analyzed. The perceptions of the Chinese and Japanese differ from each other regarding the history textbooks. By looking at the history textbooks of 2004, Ibaraki Satoshi made a comparison between the two countries' history textbooks. Accordingly, in the Chinese history textbooks, Japan's invasions starting with Taiwan's invasion were reflected to promote the Communist Party's leadership in fighting against the Japanese (Satoshi, 2012, p. 278). By providing the pictures and quotations, they portray Japan as malicious (Satoshi, 2012, p. 278). Examples from war stories where an eleven-year-old kid's story and death at the hands of the Japanese soldiers show the great nationalistic history narrative PRC has (Satoshi, 2012, p. 279). After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, China relied more on its patriotic history to increase its nationalistic sentiments (Satoshi, 2012, p. 279). From after the war to the Joint Communique of 1972, Japan was scarcely mentioned in the Chinese history books. On the other hand, in the Chinese world history books, prewar Japan was named as a fascist country like Germany and Italy (Satoshi, 2012, p. 283). However, postwar Japan was underlined gravely by its economic development (Satoshi, 2012, p. 283). Overall, both countries were interpreting the history to benefit their internal politics (Satoshi, 2012, p. 285). Although both left and right fought over the history narratives' benefits for themselves in Japan, this internal fight spread around the region and affected the relations with both the ROK and the PRC.

The textbook issue became an international issue since there were frozen relations for many years after the war and many issues remain pending. The issue is still creating tensions and although any crises did not appear after 2005, the issue is not solved. The history issue as one of them, the sincerity of the Japanese bureaucracy was questioned by the Chinese (Qiu, 2006, p. 29). Moreover, the textbook issue is highly related to the security realm in the region (Qiu, 2006, p. 38). Because the views of history can affect the new generations and since there was less and less indication of remorse towards the war issues, Asian countries started to inquire about what Japan look like in the future regarding its military development (Qiu, 2006, p. 38). With the accumulation of events such as the abolishment of the arbitrary limit of %1 investment in the military field, the security of Asia-Pacific started to look more and more destabilized. Moreover,

with the Chinese rise and the assertive role of Japan with the US alliance backing its stance, the security structure in the region is strained further.

The Deliberate Neglect is Interrupted, A Way Towards Cooperation

Still, some people sought cooperation. There were Chinese academics such as Ma Licheng and Shi Yinhong who indicated that China should become more bias-free towards Japan in the era of rise which brought the “new thinking/ideas” concept in diplomacy regarding Japan in 2002 (Qiu, 2006, p. 44-45). However, most of the people and the bureaucracy in China were not willing to and named them as traitors (Qiu, 2006, p. 46). After this incident, a break in deliberate neglect occurred. The Japanese and Chinese sides came together to create a common history. After the meeting of foreign ministers of Japan and China on 17 April 2005, the Japan-China Joint History Research Project (JHRP) was formed in 2006 (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 22-23). With four meetings in total, the project’s first meeting was held on 26-27 December 2006 and ended on 23-24 December 2009 (Wang, 2010, p. 223). The project aimed to create a common “historical recognition” and to produce a common understanding and perception regarding historical events (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 19). Due to the Cold War mindset, the history problem did not surface (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 24). Then with the democratization of countries such as Taiwan and South Korea, with the Chinese rising and becoming an influential power in the region, countries started to voice their resentments and made their voices heard further (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 24). The abovementioned protests and the Yasukuni Shrine visits by Prime Minister Koizumi resulted in the strain between the two powerful countries in Asia (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 25). To solve this serious obstacle, the Japanese Foreign Minister formulated a solution in 2005, and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo accepted the project and settled on an agreement with Hu Jintao in 2006 (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 25-26). The proceedings were handled by the Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro in the November APEC Ministerial meeting, where they discussed the common history project execution (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 26). The project included a wide range of topics from two centennials long history to modern day. According to the Chairman of the Kitaoka Shinichi from Japan, another goal was to change the historical problem’s position from a political issue to a historical one (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 26). Both sides

were aware that the compromise was hard to achieve, but that did not prevent them from reaching out and accepting there were different versions of the same historical events, which Professor Shin Kawashima himself participated in the project called “History or Histories” (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 27-28, 33). When the project ended in 2010, the study that was prepared by the project attendees was not given to the public (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 32). This, however, contradicted the agreement of preparing a report which will be given to the public around 2008 (Wang, 2010, p. 224). There, due to the gap between what was studied in the project and what was released to the public, the real meaning of the project was lost (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 33). From Professor Kawashima’s words:

This is unfortunate because third parties will not understand what was discussed, to what extent the two sides compromised, and what challenges remained. In that event, the only way is to read and compare both sides’ papers and smoke out the differences. (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 33)

Moreover, after the historians prepared a report and papers regarding the studies that they had done, the reports were sent to the political authorities (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 34). In that part, there were revision requests from the Chinese to the Japanese side which prevented the reports from becoming public (Kawashima & Minoura, 2010, p. 34). According to Bu Ping who was the chairman of the Chinese side, the reason for not publishing was due to the reflections of the Chinese side (Wang, 2010, p. 224). Besides, due to the not creating any problem mentality within China during the time of the Beijing Olympics, one reason for the request of not publishing was because of the events such as Great Leap Forward or Tiananmen Square Incident where various opinions presented by the scholars in the meetings (Wang, 2010, p. 224). On the one side, there appeared to be a consensus on the premodern history narrative. Moreover, there appeared to be a more positive atmosphere as well. For example, historian Wang Xinsheng from Peking University changed the insulting word “wokou (dwarf pirates)” which was commonly used for the Japanese pirates to “haishang jituan (sea merchant groups) (Wang, 2010, p. 226). However, regarding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the sides highly contradicted each other, and comfort women incidents were disregarded (Wang, 2010, p. 231-232). In the Nanjing Massacre, there were some acceptances of the Chinese claims from the Japanese side. However, there were special notes attached to it regarding the casualty number or the responsibility neglect from both sides (Wang, 2010, p. 232).

As a result of the many clashes between the two sides, unfortunately, a common history was not created. Yet, the issue never became a crisis after it as well. Eventually, in March 2011, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published “Japan-China Joint History Research Report Modern and Contemporary History”, where they stated both sides reached a mutual understanding (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2011b, p. 2). Eventually, although the history problem never surfaced to this extent up until today as of 2024 as a crisis, the situation was not resolved and again hit a stalemate in intergovernmental relations. It is also important to note that, the end of the project also coincides with the well-known issue of the 2010 boat clashes between the two parties which flamed the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands problem. The issue’s unresolved position is also important because the problems come to the surface from time to time. For example, on 28 December 2015, in the Joint Declaration of Japanese and South Korean Prime Ministers on the Comfort Women issue, both ministers stated that the issue was finalized and solved, yet the lawsuits from the former comfort women to the Government of Japan tells otherwise (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2024, p. 376-377). Moreover, in the 2024 Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan, they continue to criticize the claims of the abductions of the women, forcing them to work as sex workers, and the number of the people which approximately coincides to 200,000 women (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2024, p. 41). Therefore, it is possible to say that the issue has not resurfaced yet or the focus has changed to another topic. However, deriving from the historical background of the two countries in the post-war period, one can state that where an issue is left to the let time decide outlook, it always resurfaces at another time in the future. With the Sino-US rivalry and the strengthening of the Japanese-US alliance, the structure of the security begins to leave no space for a common place to settle issues that were deliberately neglected before.

3.2.2 The Yasukuni Shrine Issue

Worked as a catalyzer to the textbook issue and another big obstacle in the way of Sino-Japanese relations, the Yasukuni Shrine Issue/Controversy depicts itself as another problem without a visible solution in sight. Accordingly, the shrine was built in the name of “Tokyo Shokonsha” in 1869 to commemorate victims of political conflicts during to Meiji Restoration and the deceased soldiers who lost their lives in

the Boshin War (Sakamoto, 2017, p. 4). After the change of the status of the shrine in 1879, the place became an Imperial Shrine of Special Status (Jash, 2023, p. 177). This change made Yasukuni Shrine a place for the deceased soldiers' commemoration place (Jash, 2023, p. 178). Yet not only that, Yasukuni Shrine is a place where the dead's accomplishments are also honored which was stated in the Yasukuni Shrine policy preface (Sakamoto, 2017, p. 6). After the World War II, the new constitution (1947) changed the situation of the shrine again, which then turned the shrine into a private religious place with no strings to the state (Jash, 2023, p. 178). However, the shrine's importance for the war deceased continued. The enshrinement of the Class B and C criminals of the World War II to the Yasukuni Shrine from 1946 to 1948 is an example (Jash, 2023, p. 178). However, the real problem occurred, when the 14 Class A war criminals were enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine in 1978 (Jash, 2023, p. 178). This classification came from the Tokyo Trials and meant those people committed "a "crime against peace," by participating in "a joint conspiracy to start and wage war" (Woolf, 2013). In the Tokyo Trials, half of them were punished by death (Sakamoto, 2017, p. 6). The offense is not just this but also because the Yasukuni Shrine represents a rejection of the Tokyo Trials because the supporters of the enshrinement in the Yasukuni had long seen the Tokyo Trials as unjust (Jash, 2023, p. 179). Resulting from these incidents, it was highly contested that the visits from the officials to the Yasukuni Shrine. For example, as one of the continuous visitors to the shrine, Emperor Hirohito ceased to visit after the enshrinement of the Class A criminals (Jash, 2023, p. 180). However, several Prime Ministers visited the shrine in their tenures. Like the textbook issue, the Yasukuni Shrine also leads the Chinese minds to the possibility of reemergence of the Japanese aggression in the region.

The Yasukuni Shrine Issue is offensive to the Chinese and many other Asian countries in three points. The first is the above noted enshrinement of the Class A war criminals. The second one was the Yushukan Museum where the Japanese glorified the Japanese soldiers in China during the invasion (Jash, 2023, p. 181). The third one, which is currently still a major issue among the Asian countries is the visits of the high officials from the Japanese government (Jash, 2023, p. 182). For the Chinese, because the Yasukuni Shrine is an embodiment of Japanese militarism with a glorification for their servitude, the visits were highly damaging to the relations. Moreover, although

apologies were made and remorse for the war was declared, due to these events, the Chinese people find it hard to believe the sincerity of the Japanese government officials (Jash, 2023, p. 184). However, up until the visit of Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko to the Yasukuni Shrine, the Chinese side had not raised a problem against the visit (Jash, 2023, p. 185). What followed was a condemnation from the Chinese government and serious student protests, also affected by the textbook issue. However, especially, before Prime Minister Nakasone's visit in 1985, 12 prime ministers also visited the shrine (Sakamoto, 2017, p. 4). However, what changed during Nakasone's visit was the officiality (Jash, 2023, p. 186).

After Prime Minister Hashimoto's visit in 1996, when Koizumi Junichiro took the prime minister seat, he visited Yasukuni Shrine 6 times starting in 2001 and ending in 2006 which became a diplomatic issue (Jash, 2023, p. 186). The critical point, the formulation of the Yasukuni Shrine visits as a dire problem in Sino-Japanese relations was due to the Koizumi visits in his tenure (Jash, 2023, p. 197). Accordingly, even when he was working in LDP to become the prime minister, he made his visit intentions clear and showed his desire to visit the shrine on 15 August (Sakamoto, 2017, p. 6). Accordingly, his visits were coming from his nationalistic sentiments, rather than focusing on the office he holds (Sakamoto, 2017, p. 5). This statement was seen as an attempt to de-escalate the issue (Sakamoto, 2017, p. 5). Not seeing eye to eye, many Chinese government officials conveyed the negative stance of the Chinese government to their Japanese counterparts in bilateral and international meetings in the case of a visit (Jash, 2023, p. 198). For example, both in the Asia-Europe Meeting and ASEAN Plus Three meeting Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Makiko came together, and Tang conveyed the concerns and the possible outcomes of the visit (Jash, 2023, p. 199). In the media, there were many articles published regarding the visit such as "Japanese PM Should Think Thrice Before Acting" or "Koizumi, Rethink Before Going to Yasukuni Shrine" from People's Daily newspaper (Jash, 2023, p. 199). However, after the change of the visit's date from 15 to 13 August 2001, Koizumi visited the shrine officially (Jash, 2023, p. 201). Then, not just China but other Asian countries who suffered from the Japanese invasion reacted strongly. According to BBC News (2001), a nationalist from South Korea demonstrated their anger by severing part of their little fingers. On 13 August 2001,

Wang Yi, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, stated that the visits were contradicting the 1972 Joint Communiqué which Japan showed remorse and the relations will be negatively affected after this incident (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Papua New Guinea, 2001). Moreover, President Jiang Zemin showed his protest by not meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi at the Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC) Meeting (Jash, 2023, p. 202). His attitude towards the Koizumi can be best explained as “whoever started the trouble should end it” (as cited in Jash, 2023, p. 202). To ease the tensions, Koizumi visited China in October 2001 and conveyed his apologies to the Chinese people (Jash, 2023, p. 203). The Chinese government was relaxed to some extent but what they expected from Koizumi was to cease the visits. The complex actions of Koizumi continued as he described the Chinese rise as an opportunity rather than a threat in the Boao Forum on 12 April 2002 and then he visited the Yasukuni Shrine nine days later (Jash, 2023, p. 204). Not expecting to visit again, the Chinese government protested the issue harshly and the stance hardened more than ever regarding the visits. For example, they halted the visit of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces General to China (Jash, 2023, p. 207-208). There, one critical change was the rise of Hu Jintao to the CCP General Secretary in 2002 and becoming the president in 2003 (Jash, 2023, p. 209). Hu Jintao and Koizumi were known for their close friendship. However, this situation did not prevent Koizumi from visiting the shrine. In 2003, he visited in the new year in the name of peace (Jash, 2023, p. 209). As a response, the Chinese administration put forward the plan of not meeting with Koizumi in the meetings, which they aimed to stop Koizumi from visiting the Yasukuni (Jash, 2023, p. 210). On his fourth visit, he stated: “No country interferes in other countries' respect for history, tradition, custom. Since I am visiting here every year, I hope to gain understanding gradually” whilst wearing a traditional kimono with his family crest on it (Taipei Times, 2004, para. 6). For Koizumi, due to the already spoken apologies, the visits hold a place not for the victims where war criminals were enshrined but for the deceased warriors who fought for their country. Enraged by the notion, Chinese officials and the public voiced their criticisms once again. The year 2005 was one of the worst times for the relations of China and Japan. With the lighthouse issue, a joint statement on security between the USA and Japan, Japan's will for permanent membership to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the 2005 textbook issue, the relations deteriorated strongly (Jash, 2023, p. 218). On top of it, Koizumi visited

the Yasukuni Shrine on 17 October 2005 for the fifth time and many LDP members joined him (Jash, 2023, p. 218). One important note was that Koizumi explained his visits were not directed against any country, he does not share the same feelings which was promoted in the Yushukan Museum, and he does not send prayers to the acclaimed war criminals (Sakamoto, 2017, p. 3). Yet, after this visit, the relations strained and the bilateral visits halted including the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit where even the security issues such as North Korea and the East China Sea will be discussed, for the upcoming four years (Jash, 2023, p. 221). However, although the diplomatic relations were nearly frozen, Koizumi officially visited the shrine for the last time in his tenure on 15 August 2006 (Jash, 2023, p. 224). The timing was also crucial since 15 August represents the surrender of Imperial Japan to the Allied Forces. This also created a special backlash because the Chinese claim that the date is also crucial and visit on that day represents a Japanese assertive stance that neglects historical responsibility (Jash, 2023, p. 227). Moreover, in 2001, Koizumi initially responded to this criticism and changed the date from 15 to 13 August, but not this time. However, to ease the tensions, in his address on the same day, he also voiced remorse for the victims of the war. He stated:

Japan reflects on past wars and must never cause war again. (...) The Japan of today was built on those whose precious lives were sacrificed in war. I visit Yasukuni Shrine with the spirit of heartfelt respect and gratitude to the dead who had to go to war and give up their lives for their mother country and their families. (as cited in Sakamoto, 2017, p. 2)

However, neither the Chinese government nor the people and media acknowledged this since they were suspicious of the intentions of the Japanese Prime Minister. As mentioned before, Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine officially until his term ended. Therefore, in the minds of the Chinese government and people the two stances, apologizing on one and visiting the shrine on the other, created a questioning of the Koizumi's sincerity regarding the apology (Jash, 2023, p. 210). On many occasions, the Chinese officials had voiced their demands from the Japanese government which was cancelling the Yasukuni Shrine visits. However, the demand was not reciprocated which damaged the relations.

When Abe Shinzo rose to power in September 2006, Chinese officials were hoping for a better understanding which was reciprocated by Abe (Jash, 2023, p. 229). Abe chose

Beijing to visit as his first official international visit one month after he took office, and the diplomatic halt was ended (Jash, 2023, p. 229). As a response, a year later Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April where he gave a speech and touched upon the historical issue with a peaceful and friendly undertone in the Japanese diet (Jash, 2023, p. 229). Moreover, the high-level visits from both sides continued. On top of it, the two sides signed the Joint Statement for the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” on 10 May 2008 where many topics were covered. Regarding the history issue, according to Article 3 of the statement:

The two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future, and endeavor with persistence to create a new era of a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" between Japan and China. (The World and Japan Database, 2008, Article 3)

However, in his second tenure started in 2012, Abe stated that he regretted his choice not to visit the shrine (Cheung, 2017). As a result, Abe received strong criticism like his predecessors from China. Thus, he also received a negative statement from the US as well, in the name of “disappointment” (Cheung, 2017).

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo visited the shrine on 26 December 2013. Accordingly, he stated:

Today, I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine and expressed my sincere condolences, paid my respects, and prayed for the souls of all those who had fought for the country and made ultimate sacrifices. (...) Regrettably, it is a reality that the visit to Yasukuni Shrine has become a political and diplomatic issue. Some people criticize the visit to Yasukuni as paying homage to war criminals, but the purpose of my visit today, on the anniversary of my administration’s taking office, is to report before the souls of the war dead how my administration has worked for one year and to renew the pledge that Japan must never wage a war again. (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2013, para. 1; para. 8)

The Chinese side gave an even harsher response (Jash, 2023, p. 190). On 28 December 2013, in the statement published by the PRC Mission to the European Union (EU), Yang Jiechi, PRC State Councilor stated the Chinese perception of Yasukuni Shrine visits:

In total disregard of international opposition, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe blatantly paid homage to the Yasukuni Shrine three days ago where Class-A war criminals of World War II are honored. This act brazenly affronted people of all countries that once suffered from Japanese militarist aggression and colonial rule. (...) The issue of Yasukuni Shrine, in essence, boils down to whether or not the Japanese government can correctly look at and profoundly repent its past of militarist aggression and colonial rule. Abe is the Prime Minister of Japan. His visit to the Yasukuni Shrine is by no means a domestic

affair of Japan, still less an act by an individual. (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2013, para. 2; para. 3)

As a result, the firm stance of the Chinese officials regarding the Yasukuni visits and the internationalized stance is evident. The Chinese, seeing the visits as offensive, were protesting Japan for not considering the war victims.

However, with the impacts of the maritime issues that brought the two regional powers against each other, the relations had only gotten worse. As a result, Abe refrained from visiting the shrine in 2014, and the relations had eased. To ease the tensions, both sides reached an agreement on the "Four-Point Principled Agreement on Handling and Improving Bilateral Relations" on 7 November 2014. The third point specifically focused on the history issue: "Second, in the spirit of "facing history squarely and looking forward to the future", the two sides have reached some agreement on overcoming political obstacles in the bilateral relations" (The World and Japan Database, 2014, para. 6). Moreover, a day before the anniversary of the Japanese surrender, Abe voiced his condolences and remorse for the victims of the war in 2015 which is known as the Abe speech. The statement which was written from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs site, shows a sincere and self-reflecting understanding regarding wartime responsibility. However, what drew the attention was saying:

We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with the war, be predestined to apologize. Even so, we Japanese, across generations, must squarely face history. We have a responsibility to inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future. (McCurry, 2015, para. 5)

Although Abe indirectly apologized to the victims, still he was criticized for his phrasings that no more apology is required from the Japanese people. According to McCurry (2015), Xinhua stated that this phrasing was dangerous as it was saying apologies were offered already so the issue should be closed.

After the 2013 visit, no other prime minister visited the Shrine officially. Nevertheless, there were offerings for the ritual's sake for both Suga Yoshida and Kishida Fumio (Jash, 2023, p. 190). With a firm stance and a continuous harsh attitude, the Chinese side protested the offerings as well (Jash, 2023, p. 190). As an example, the Chinese side is highly sensitive and politically inclined in the Yasukuni Shrine visits. To shed light on their perspective, on 15 August 2021 Hua Chunying, the Spokesperson of the

Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that: “The Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 World War II Class-A war criminals with heinous crimes are honored, is a spiritual tool and symbol of the Japanese militarism’s war of aggression” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). Former Prime Minister Kishida also sent his offerings on 22 April (Reuters, 2024) and 15 August 2024 (Kyodo News, 2024). As a response, Chinese FM Spokesperson Lin Jian stated:

What some Japanese political leaders did on the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine once again reveals an erroneous attitude towards historical issues. (...) China urges Japan to honor its commitment of recognizing and reflecting on its history of aggression, stay prudent on historical issues such as the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine, and make a clean break with militarism. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2024, para. 3)

And finally, the newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba also sent offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine on 17 October 2024 (Reuters, 2024). However, like his two predecessors, he was not expected to visit the Yasukuni Shrine at the ongoing festival which takes place that time around the year (Kyodo News, 2024). Angering the Chinese, FM Spokesperson Mao Ning stated: “The Yasukuni Shrine is a spiritual tool and symbol of Japanese militarists responsible for the war of aggression. (...) We urge Japan to see squarely and reflect on the history of aggression...” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, 2024, para. 6). These strong languages and criticism also show the continuation of the issue in which there are no cooperation efforts to be seen.

Overall, although the issue seems to not create a diplomatic problem between the two countries for the time being, after many years of trust deficit and questioning of the intentions, the Chinese side has a tense criticism of the Yasukuni Shrine visits and even the offerings. On the other hand, due to cultural and domestic aims, Japanese prime ministers still regard the Yasukuni Shrine as a holy ground where respect should be paid. Therefore, both sides were not successful in accepting the other’s claims or arguments, and the issue is now not solved but frozen. This “overshadowing” does not benefit the region (Sakamoto, 2017, p. 2). On the other hand, where some issues were accumulated, there were other issues revolving around Taiwan and maritime issues where the two sides started to get more heated, and the history issue acted as a catalyzer to the security environment of Asia-Pacific where the two great powers lack trust and not able to reach a consensus and left to the deliberate neglect.

3.3 The Taiwan Issue

The Taiwan issue is by far one of the most critical points in Sino-Japanese relations with the involvement of the USA. The issue revolves around a triangle of two great powers and one superpower, where rivalry is evident, and a conflict risk is high. Without touching upon the US factor which will be taken up separately in the next chapter, the Taiwan issue in the Sino-Japanese relations is to be covered in this section. One thing should be noted that this issue is not a cornerstone of Sino-Japanese direct problems, yet due to the issue's crucial reflection on security in Asia-Pacific and the strong lenience of Japan to US security puts this issue on the agenda of Sino-Japanese relations.

After the Joint Communique between China and Japan, the relations between Taiwan and Japan decreased in certain areas such as economy and culture (Takagi, 2006). Meanwhile, Taiwan was going through a democratization process and high economic development after the Cold War. For example, with the constitution change, Taiwanese people revised their constitution and gained the right to vote for the selection of their president in 1994 (Takagi, 2006). Moreover, the USA was involved in the progress of Taiwan and sold 150 F-16 fighters in 1992 (Takagi, 2006). For the relations between Japan and Taiwan, the rise of the politicians who received education during the Japanese colonial rule era had a positive reflection on the politics of Japan (Takagi, 2006).

However, the real problem of the Taiwan issue started to emerge after the end of the Cold War, when the common threat had been eliminated among the actors such as the USA, Japan, and PRC. Moreover, due to the grave economic development from the PRC side, the USA and Japan started to question the Chinese rise. As a result, Taiwan as a crucial geopolitical and geostrategic factor in the Asia-Pacific started to draw more attention. In the upcoming sections, how Taiwan became one of the topics that highlighted strongly in the security of Asia-Pacific is to be presented. China, protesting this, perceived an interference in their internal affairs and a violation of the "One China" principle which was agreed on the treaties of diplomatic normalization with the above noted countries.

After the Cold War, the 1992 Consensus had taken place on 28-30 October 1992. Accordingly, the PRC and the KMT from Taiwan came together to solve the problems of the passage, commerce, and many other issues and they have successfully signed 23 agreements (Chen & Cohen, 2019, p. 4). However, this common ground for various issues started to transform into a political ring-fight. The two sides came together, conducted a semiofficial meeting in non-governmental organizations, and found a common ground by stating that Taiwan belongs to China (Resar, 2022). However, the baseline of the problem was not solved since the two sides had different meanings of what “China” refers to (Resar, 2022). However, this does not mean a specific divergence since both sides were not expecting a solution to the unsolvable problem, said Alyssa Resar in *The Diplomat* (2022). However, the PRC has shown great importance to the “One China” perception and indicated that Taiwan has accepted the One China claim of the PRC (Chen & Cohen, 2019, p. 7). Yet, the two organizations had come together to find common ground in the verification of documents or mail confirmation rather than trying to come up with a solution to one of the biggest political controversies in the region (Chen & Cohen, 2019, p. 9). Moreover, the KMT side had never agreed on the issue and even submitted their separate opinion of “One China” (Chen & Cohen, 2019, p. 10). Therefore, immediately after the Cold War, the divergence between the two sides was proven.

Then, Taiwan started to show itself as a critical point in Sino-Japanese relations when Lee Tung-hui, the Taiwanese president was invited to the Asian Games in 1994 (Takagi, 2006). There the visa issue emerged, where China wanted Japan not to authorize him a visa, which was not granted (Takagi, 2006). When the invite was removed from the Olympic Committee of Asia due to the Taiwanese president being too political to invite, instead of him, Taiwan replaced him with Hsu Li-Teh and he was granted a Japanese visa. After this, as a response to the Chinese protests, in the November meeting of the APEC, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi explained to the PRC President Jiang Zemin that the Japanese do not have an aim of inviting the president of Taiwan to Japan (Takagi, 2006). The Chinese protests had an underlying reason too. Accordingly, some of the statements of Lee Teng-hui regarding the relations around the strait as relations between the “states” (Liff, 2022a, p. 1078), he was hinting the separate identity and political autonomy of Taiwan which angered the Chinese. After the cancellation of Lee

to Japan because he was a political figure, he was invited to a conference in Japan in 2000, after he handed over the position to Chen Shui-bian (Takagi, 2006). However, due to the pressures from China, Lee declined to come to the conference. Yet, he was issued a visa in 2001 (Takagi, 2006).

Although the relations were going rather smoothly for Taiwan and the PRC, the US relations with Taiwan created suspicion from the Chinese side, like how the US ambassador to Beijing treated Taiwan as another entity in 1991, and how the US president publicized the purchase of American jet fighters by the Taiwanese in 1992 (Scobell, 2009, p. 175). Moreover, independence supporters started to raise their voices in 1995 and 1996 when the presidential elections took place for the first time (Takagi, 2006). Therefore, on 30 January 1995, PRC President Jiang Zemin put forward his “Eight Point Proposal to Taiwan” (China Daily, 2011). Accordingly, the President stated:

Adhering to the principle of one China is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity must never be allowed to suffer division. We must resolutely oppose any statement and action for creating "the independence of Taiwan"; and we must also resolutely oppose the propositions to "split the country and rule under separate regimes," "two Chinas over a certain period," etc., which are contrary to the principle of one China. (China Daily, 2011, para. 3)

China was repeating the “one China” principle and arguing that the only peaceful way of solving this issue was through that principle. When Lee-Teng-hui visited the US on 1 June 1995, China reacted harshly and showed its anger through military activities such as conducting several missile tests and exercises such as marine landing and airstrikes in the waters close to Taiwan (Scobell, 2009, p. 176-177). This was a way of reflecting on how Taiwan is in a dire situation or a core issue for the PRC (Scobell, 2009, p. 171). This resulted in US involvement which the US sent two battle ships to the area (Takagi, 2006) and the issue turned into the 1995/6 Strait Crises. A month after the tensions rose, Japan and the US announced a Joint Declaration on Security on 17 April 1996 which was not a mere coincidence. With the headline Alliance for the 21st Century, both countries expressed their will and cooperation for the security of the Asia-Pacific. Then, in December 1996, Japan published the National Defense Program Outline. Of the topics covered, these drew the most attention:

In the surrounding regions of Japan, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have brought about a reduction of the military force level and changes in the military posture in Far East Russia. At the same time, there remain large-scale military capabilities including nuclear arsenals, and many countries in the region are expanding or modernizing their military capabilities mainly against the background of their economic development. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1996, para. 8)

After the explanation of the international situation in the outline, it is also stated that:

It is considered appropriate that Japan continue to adhere fundamentally to this concept of a basic and standard defense capability based on a recognition that various efforts for the stabilization of international relations will continue to be pursued, while there remain uncertainty and unpredictability in the international situation, and that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements will continue to play a key role for the security of Japan and the peace and stability in the surrounding regions of Japan. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1996, para. 11)

Firstly, what can be derived from these two statements from the Joint Declaration is that both countries started to be more cautious about the Chinese rise and development in the military field. Secondly, as it was clearly stated, the Japanese activeness and development in the military field were supported since the future of the region became vaguer. Another critical point that gained lots of attention was the phrase “areas surrounding Japan” in the US-Japan Joint Declaration. The continuation of the same phrasing increased the possibility of the inclusion of Taiwan in the phrase since it was first used in 1978 in the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, China protested and questioned whether Taiwan was included or not (Takagi, 2006). The increase of Chinese activities in the Taiwan Strait and the expansion of the US-Japan alliance to the areas surrounding Japan seem to be coinciding. As a result, both Japan and the US showed their disturbance of the Chinese activities which was shown as disturbing the region’s stability. Therefore, with the impact of the 1993-4 issues in the two Koreas, they renewed the guidelines in 1997 (Liff, 2022a, p. 1078). However, according to Chinese officials, since Taiwan is a province of China, the issue is internal and there should not be an international disturbance regarding Taiwan (Takagi, 2006). Meanwhile, the US continued its acceptance of Three No’s policy on 30 June 1998 (Pomfret, 1998) which is a declaration from US President Clinton that guaranteed China regarding Taiwan the topics of independence, acknowledgment of it as a separate entity, and representation of it in the international organizations (US-China Institute, 1998). However, this does not prevent them from forging a Japanese alliance

with Taiwan. As a result, China responded to these developments in 1998 China's National Defense Document stating:

The issue of Taiwan is entirely an internal affair of China. Directly or indirectly incorporating the Taiwan Straits into the security and cooperation sphere of any country or any military alliance is an infringement upon and interference with China's sovereignty. (...) Every sovereign state has the right to use all means it thinks necessary, including military means, to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. (US-China Institute, 1998, para. 19)

On the other hand, Japan was supporting the Chinese stance which is evident in Prime Minister Hashimoto's speech on 28 August 1997. He stated:

Japan's basic stance on this issue is clear. In the Japan-China Joint Communique of 1972, Japan took the stance that the Government of the People's Republic of China has repeatedly announced that Taiwan is an indivisible part of the People's Republic of China and that the Government of Japan fully understands and respects this position of the People's Republic of China. (...) The fact that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan is based on this stance. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997)

The beginning of the new century also positions the Taiwan issue clearer than the previous years. Taiwan became a more dire issue regarding the security bound to the Sino-U.S. rivalry and the power shift in the Asia-Pacific (Liff, 2022a, 1080). The new president of Taiwan, Chen Chui-bian was a promoter of the ideas of independence who also underlined the cooperation with Japan (Liff, 2022a, p. 1080). In August 2002, he stated that Taiwan and the PRC are two distinct states (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2003, p. 53). Yet, refraining from the Chinese backlash, in the 2004 presidential elections of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian's plan of bringing referendum appliance which can increase the so-called independence arguments, both Japan and the US indirectly intervened and showed their disapproval of interference to the status quo in the region which was welcomed by China (Takagi, 2006).

However, one big problem had arisen in Sino-Japanese relations with the US involvement in the Taiwan issue once again. In the 2+2 meeting between the US and Japan in 2005, the Taiwan issue was mentioned under the name of "common strategic objectives", and it was stated: "Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005, Article 10). Related to this, just two days before this joint statement, Chinese Foreign Minister Spokesman Kong Quan responded to the question of what China thinks of

the US official stating military assertiveness of China becoming a threat, he stated: “It is the separatists within the Taiwan Island who are causing troubles, disturbances and tense situation in the Taiwan Straits and Asia” (Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Sydney, 2005, para. 9). Therefore, it was obvious that the Chinese stance was unshakable regarding the Taiwan issue, where no foreign interference was allowed. Meanwhile, both sides were using diplomatic language not to provoke the other side. Regarding Taiwan, China took a huge step and adopted the law of Anti-Secession on 14 March 2005. According to the law, China rejects Taiwan’s independence, restating that Taiwan is part of China and China is striving for peaceful reunification (Mainland Affairs Council, 2005). However, the impact of mentioning “non-peaceful means” as a possibility was what the world paid attention to most (Mainland Affairs Council, 2005, Article 8). From both the US and Japan, this law is perceived as increasing the stresses in the region. While Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi stated that both sides should “mutually resolve things peacefully so there is no negative impact”, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that the law “clearly raises tensions” (Chen, 2005).

With the rise of KMT contender Ma Ying-jeou to the presidential seat on 20 May 2008, Taiwan pursued an “economy first politics later” policy with China (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2013, p. 57). Before, in 2006, Japan became the second in trade, surpassing the US for Taiwan (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2013, p. 65). Two years later, Ma assured China that Taiwan would not follow an independence road by accepting the Three No principles (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2013, 66). Therefore, by protecting the status quo and decreasing the PRC pressure, Ma aimed for an economic revival and protection for Taiwan (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2013, p. 66). To ease the tensions, Ma restored the 1992 Consensus with his policy of “three links” meaning straight-through flights, seaborne trade, and mail confirmation services (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2013, p. 66). Moreover, to revive the economy, the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement was signed between the two sides was signed on 29 June 2010. With this opening in the trade, Taiwan concluded commerce talks with Singapore in 2010, and with New Zealand and India in 2011. Moreover, they signed an arrangement on the protection of investment with Japan in the same year. (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2013, p. 66).

In 2009, the new government in Japan with a more autonomous stance, both followed a multilateral diplomacy. Still finding the US alliance important, however, the new government was focused more on the region (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2013, p. 58). This has meant the melting of the ice with China. Moreover, the new administration of Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama aimed to pave the way for cooperation between the two military forces with China (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2013, p. 59). This positive approach was short-lived when Hatoyama resigned in 2010 (Atanassova-Cornelis, 2013, p. 59). The same year, three months after the resignation, the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands problem erupted after the collision of two ships between the two countries. This issue also is inevitably a Taiwan issue, since the reason for the PRC's claims derives from their Taiwan province. With the tensions rising, the Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated further. As a result of the collision that sparked the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island issue, the government of Japan and the US strengthened their alliance through strategic meetings. Japan had declared the National Defense Program Guidelines in 2010. In it, they first emphasized that:

We are witnessing a global shift in the balance of power with the rise of powers such as China, India, and Russia, along with the relative change of influence of the United States (...) China is steadily increasing its defense expenditure. China is widely and rapidly modernizing its military force, mainly its nuclear and missile forces as well as its navy and air force, and is strengthening its capability for extended-range power projection. In addition, China has been expanding and intensifying its maritime activities in the surrounding waters. These trends, together with insufficient transparency over China's military forces and its security policy, are of concern for the regional and global community. (Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 2010, p. 3, 4)

With these arguments, China appears to be one of the centerlines of security disturbers in the region. Accordingly, to cope with that and the other security problems, Japan provided three solutions: increasing the power of the SDF, deepening the alliance with the US, and strengthening partnerships and dialogues with the countries in the region (Prime Minister's Office of Japan, 2010, p. 6-7). Regarding the US alliance, Japan indicated a ballistic missile defense for the areas surrounding Japan (Prime Minister's Office of Japan, 2010, p. 6-8) which indicated a strong stance towards both Taiwan and the East China Sea disagreements. On the other hand, in 2010 Chinese National Defense Document described the world as:

The international balance of power is changing, most notably through the economic strength and growing international status and influence of emerging powers and developing countries. (...) Nevertheless, Asia-Pacific security is

becoming more intricate and volatile. (...) Disputes over territorial and maritime rights and interests flare up occasionally (...) Relevant major powers are increasing their strategic investment. The United States is reinforcing its regional military alliances and increasing its involvement in regional security affairs. (Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, 2021a, para. 5, 9)

From these words, both sides acknowledged the security strains in the region. However, while Japan indicated that the straining was due to the immense military capacity building and development of China, China argued for a change in the balance of power from industrialized to new powers. Thus, they also indicated that the US alliance system's enlargement in the region was observed and paid attention to. Diving into the cross-strait relations:

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are destined to ultimate reunification in the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It is the responsibility of the Chinese people on both sides of the Straits to work hand in hand to end the history of hostility, and to avoid repeating the history of armed conflict between fellow countrymen. (Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, 2021a, para. 15)

Without a doubt, China leaves no room for any other than unification. This positioning was perceived as an assertive attitude by Japan and the US and will become in the next decades one of the roots of the problem in Taiwan.

With the rise of Japanese Prime Minister Abe in 2012, the relations with Taiwan grew extendedly which created criticism from the Chinese side in the name of support for the independence aims of the Taiwan (Liff, 2022a, p. 1081). The Japanese perception of Taiwan began to diverge from a region to a political and diplomatic actor which was reflected in the Japanese Blue Books after 2013 (Liff, 2022a, p. 1081). However, just two years later, the description of Taiwan changed gravely and became: "For Japan, Taiwan is a crucial partner and an important friend, with which it shares basic values in the form of freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law, as well as close economic relations (...)" (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2014b, p. 56). Moreover, in the 2015 Diplomatic Bluebook, Japan argued that although there is a clash of interests between Taiwan and Japan regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the two parties still manage to preserve their friendly relations (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2014b, p. 56). This issue also provides a perception that the deteriorating relations with China were not only deriving from the disputes. Moreover, after they left the Prime Minister's office to their successor, Japanese previous officials visited Taiwan between the year of 2010

and 2016 (Liff, 2022a, p. 1082). Thus, Abe met with before and future presidents of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui and Tsai Ing-wen in the capital city of Japan (Liff, 2022a, p. 1082). The relations formed even an official stance when the newly selected Tsai Ing-wen as the President was congratulated by the Japanese Foreign Minister in 2016 (Liff, 2022a, p. 1082). On top of these events, the relations were developed in the institutional sense as well. Accordingly, the Association of East Asian Relations of Taiwan and Japan Interchange Association came together for a maritime cooperation dialogue to solve the fishing entitlements of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in 2016 (Kotani, 2016). The dialogue also included officials from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Taiwan's Council of National Security (Liff, 2022a, p. 1083). Moreover, the economic relations between the two countries developed significantly and continuously with every coming year, with Taiwan as the fourth and Japan as the third biggest trading partners to each other in 2019 (Liff, 2022a, p. 1067).

These developments which create a separate identity of Taiwan in the international arena increased which creates an ambiguity regarding the "One China" policy (Liff, 2022a, p. 1085). However, different from this argument, the positioning of the USA in between the relations in the events of the rise of China, its investment and modernization of the military, and its assertive diplomacy all combined had triggered to intervention. Thus, as its biggest ally in the region, Japan followed the USA's steps. Plus, Japan is in the immediate vicinity and will be directly affected in the event of any change. These actions had led Taiwan to become a critical standpoint and problem in the Sino-Japanese relations. On the other hand, as a state, it is only natural for China to advance and progress as it accumulates more power. Moreover, due to its treaties and joint declarations with Japan and the USA, it is only natural for China to protest in the events of intervention in Taiwan. The problem arises not only from the rivalry between the two great powers in the region but also from the one superpower that can overpower the two to intervene where its already existing structure is disturbed. Accordingly, where the scholars argue there is a status quo, there will always be the most US-structured order in the Asia-Pacific. Ridding of its century of humiliation, now China wants to show its power (may even be called return to power in the region) where an overpowering actor is tolerated at best. With its security largely provided by the US, Japan feels threatened increasingly by the one ancient neighbor who acts

assertively and disturbs the order that provides them security. In this table of chess, Taiwan plays a critical role since not only an internal affair of China or a democratic country where support is needed for the US and Japan, but the already existing rules of the game also started to change. In essence, the Taiwan issue had changed its characteristics after the 2010 events between China and Japan. Taiwan as an issue in Sino-Japanese relations is to be divided into two the Senkaku/Diaoyu problem which is to be examined in the next section and Taiwan as an issue in Sino-Japanese relations is to be taken up under the US policies which is discussed in the next chapter.

3.4 The East China Sea Issue

As it was previously mentioned, the Taiwan issue embodies the East China Sea debate. Here, maritime issues between China and Japan, the famously known Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue is explored. Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are an island chain positioned in the East China Sea where many fishing activities have been held for decades. It has an impactful place in the Sino-Japanese conflict zones. The issue is embedded in the law of the sea and clashing sovereignty claims in it among PRC, ROC, and Japan. However, as it is to be discussed in the next chapter, the US involvement in the issue was a baseline for the territorial problem to arise.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are positioned in the East China Sea and composed of eight islands (Manyin, 2013, p. 1). From both mainland Taiwan and Yonaguni island of Japan, it takes approximately 170 kilometers to reach the clusters of the islands (McCormack, 2016, p. 17). The specific position of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands which in nautical miles, 120 from Taiwan, 200 from Okinawa, and 230 from mainland China, makes them especially important in maritime and aerial security of the countries (Pan, 2007, p. 71).

Before diving deep into the eruption of the conflict in 2010, it is crucial to understand where the claims are arising from the history. To answer this question, it is important to dive into the Japan-ROC relations which the issue had been negotiated long before it became a PRC-Japan issue. The Chinese claims reveal themselves in the Imperial Envoy Chen Kan's journey reports regarding the Ryukyus which belonged to the Ming

Dynasty at that time (Kawashima, 2013, p. 123). Accordingly, the envoy wrote that when he passed the Kumejima island, he declared that he entered the Ryukyus (Kawashima, 2013, p. 123). As a result, China argues that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands belong to the Chinese maritime territory (Kawashima, 2013, p. 123). Moreover, Scoville (2016, p. 97) argued that the Sino-centric structure of East Asia supports the Chinese claims. However, Kawashima (2014, p. 123) also argues that in other sources such as literature writings, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were not included in the Chinese territory. One problem that arises from history is the position of the islands as *terra nullius* meaning a place that has no belonging to anyone. Accordingly, Japan was claiming that the islands were *terra nullius*. However, according to the Chinese, the islands were discovered in 1372 and were included in the defense of the Chinese waters in 1556 which meant that the islands' status already belonged to China rather than *terra nullius* (Pan, 2007, p. 77). On the other hand, the Empress from the Qing Dynasty rewarded an alchemist with the islands in 1893 (Pan, 2007, p. 77) which meant that it was a possession of the Chinese dynasty. On the other hand, a Qing dynasty administrative official from Taiwan stated that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were under the territory of Taiwan (Kawashima, 2013, p. 123).

Finally, the Japanese claim derives from the Meiji Period of Japan when the Ryukyu Islands included to Okinawa Prefecture of Japan. The trader Koga Tatsushiro claimed the islands as Japanese sovereignty (McCormack, 2016, p. 18). Then, in the peace treaty negotiations for the first Sino-Japanese war (Treaty of Shimonoseki), Japanese officials decided to include Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (known as "Uotsuri-jima" in the 1880s in Japan) in the Okinawa Prefecture in 1895 (Kawashima, 2013, p. 123-124). Legally, the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki places Taiwan and surrounding islands in Japan (Scoville, 2016, p. 86). According to the Japanese side, however, the surrounding islands never included the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to begin with. Following another treaty, the Chinese side claimed that the 1952 Treaty of Taipei claimed all previous treaties null and void between ROC and Japan as formerly mentioned. Therefore, the sovereignty claim of Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as a part of Taiwan was canceled according to the Chinese. According to the Japanese, they annexed the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands because of *terra nullius* rather than gaining sovereignty as a result of the war (McCormack, 2016, p. 24). As a result, the Japanese

side argued that since the islands were not acquired through the First Sino-Japanese War, the returning of the invaded places articles in the Cairo or Potsdam Declarations were not involving the islands (Pan, 2007, p. 83). On this topic, the PRC side argued that after the inclusion of the Daito Islands (close islands to Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) into the Japanese territory in 1885, Japan waited to push their claims on Senkaku/Diaoyu islands because they were aware that the territory belonged to Chinese (Pan, 2007, p. 81). Therefore, according to Pan (2007, p. 81), the Japanese side waited for the end of the war to enlarge in territory. Moreover, since Japan acquired these by invading the islands, in the Cairo or Potsdam Declaration, they should have returned to China (Pan, 2007, p. 82). According to Wiegand (2016, p.162), the situation has been left to the time to be solved later. These ideas also promote the deliberate neglect of the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue.

Coming to the end of World War II, the Japanese government argued that the renunciation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was not included in the other islands that Japan left after the surrender, since the Nansei Islands, which Japan had sovereignty over, included the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Kawashima, 2013, p. 125). On the other hand, when ROC claimed Taiwan from Japan at the end of the war, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were not included and neither in the San Francisco Peace nor the peace treaty with ROC, the islands were targeted (Kawashima, 2013, p. 125). Looking from the PRC side in that period, PRC drew the attention to the geographical proximity of the islands to Taiwan. Moreover, since the PRC never accepted the San Francisco Treaty as valid (Pan, 2007, p. 79), the decision to return the Japanese islands to Japan was also illogical. Therefore, they argued for an examination regarding the inclusion of the islands in Taiwan. Until the end of the Allied forces' invasion of Japan ended, Taiwan did not raise any objections to claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from the Japanese side.

However, the Taiwanese fishers' activities such as collecting seabird eggs around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands resulted in a dramatic decrease in the species of the birds (Kawashima, 2013, p. 127). In the US invasion period of Japan, the US was involved since the islands were part of the Nansei islands, which were under occupation, and complained to the ROC to warn about the situation (Kawashima, 2013, p. 128). Many

protests regarding the trespassing of the fisherman followed. The reversion of Okinawa to Japan from the US and the UN survey regarding the rich seabed resources issue started to emerge in the framework of the island issue (Kawashima, 2013, p. 128). Firstly, Japan had put forward the sovereignty claim on Okinawa prefecture which includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Kawashima, 2013, p. 128). Using the US channels, the Japanese government expressed their displeasure with Taiwanese fishermen's actions on the islands. The answer of the ROC Foreign Ministry was in the line of protecting the fishermen who were believed not to breach the sovereignty of Japan (Kawashima, 2013, p. 129). Kawashima states that the ROC government did not protest the sovereignty claim of Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, but they raised questions about it (Kawashima, 2013, p. 129).

On the other hand, while studying Chiang Kai-shek's diaries, the President of ROC was protesting the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands as a part of Okinawa to Japan (Kawashima, 2013, p. 129). The protests from the president will be repeated many times in his tenure. The second issue was the survey of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the United Nations (ECAFE) investigation in 1968 regarding the sources in the East China Sea seabed. According to the investigation, oil reserves in the seabed were suggested by the commission which can be positioned within the continental shelf of Taiwan (Kawashima, 2013, p. 130). As a result, by deriving power from the Convention on Continental Shelf, the ROC government declared their aim to subtract the oil (Kawashima, 2013, p. 130). More to this, the ROC government took steps to change the naming of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as in the "Discussions on the Correct Naming of the Senkaku Islands" in 1970 (Kawashima, 2013, p. 130). Before they addressed the island chain as "Senkaku Islands" and after the discussion, they changed it to "Diaoyutai Lieyu" which meant Diaoyu Islets since the islands are too small to be called "islands" (Kawashima, 2013, p. 131). Moreover, the issue started to present itself between Japan and ROC as a sovereignty issue at the beginning of the 1970s (Kawashima, 2013, p. 134; Wiegand, 2016, p. 163). As a result, the ROC government started to show their disapproval of Japanese sovereignty claims on the islands due to the lack of proof to the US since the reversion had not happened yet (Kawashima, 2013, p. 133). Thus, they started the mining activities around the islands (Kawashima, 2013, p. 133). When the Japanese side protested the mining, ROC put a

memorandum and argued that the mining activities were a right that was given to them by the Convention on Continental Shelf, and they refused to acknowledge the sovereignty assertions of Japan on the islands (Kawashima, 2013, p. 133). Kawashima (2014, p. 134) argued that the ROC government was presenting the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue as a natural resource debate rather than a territorial sovereignty problem. On the other hand, since the Ryukyus were still under the administration of the US, the sides were expecting the US to be involved in the issue. However, the US decided that after the reversion, the issue should be solved between the two sides (Kawashima, 2013, p. 135).

With this decision of the US, the ROC government decided to attach sovereignty claims to the islands and according to Chiang-Kai-shek's words in his diary, he claimed all the continental shelf as a part of the ROC territory (Kawashima, 2013, p. 136). To solve these clashing claims, the ROC government highlighted the gains that can be shared from a joint mining project (Kawashima, 2013, p. 136-137).

When the US portrayed a mining project with ROC and ROK, the PRC was involved. The PRC protested the sovereignty claims of Japan and Taiwan and provided its claims on Senkaku/Diaoyu and Taiwan (Pan, 2007, p. 73). One year later, Chiang Kai-shek directly stated that the islands are no doubt part of Taiwan, and since the US is the administrator of the Ryukyus, they will have the final decision regarding sovereignty (Kawashima, 2013, p. 137). When the Okinawa reversion issue was raised, he argued that the decision would not be accepted, and ROC would put the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Kawashima, 2013, p. 137). Eventually, the USA completed the reversion of the Okinawa including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to Japan on 17 June 1971. The PRC side had never accepted the 1971 Reversion Agreement as a baseline for the sovereignty of Japan on the islands since the Reversion Agreement was derived from the San Francisco Treaty which the PRC and Taiwan were not a part of (Pan, 2007, p. 79). However, at those times, more crucial matters were on the agenda of the two countries. After the 1972 Joint Communique between the PRC, and Japan nullified recognition of the ROC. As a result, the ROC-Japan problem of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands turned into a problem for the PRC and Japan (Pan, 2007, p. 74). Again, although the biggest zenith of the relations was achieved,

deliberate neglect was operating in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue to prevent the progress of good relations.

After explaining the background of the ROC to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue, it is also important to brush up on the historical background once again between China and Japan. Accordingly, the first time that the PRC acted on the islands issue was when the US reverted Okinawa to Japan in 1971 when the issue weight switched from Taiwan to PRC (Pan, 2007, p. 74). Further, the protests were made from both Taiwan and the PRC. Another issue erupted among the actors when the Japan Youth Federation wanted to legitimately point to a lighthouse built on the islands as a marine marker in 1990 and this request was repeated in 1996 from the same group (Pan, 2007, p. 74). Aroused protests, and Taiwanese fishing boats involving Olympic athletes aimed to land on the islands but were prevented by the Japanese maritime guards (Pan, 2007, p. 74). Then, the PRC restated its sovereignty claims on the islands (Pan, 2007, p. 74). While Japan continued to exert sovereignty on the islands, in 1992, China put forward a new maritime law. According to the law:

The PRC's territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the People's Republic of China. (United Nations, 1992, Article 2)

As a result, the PRC had claimed sovereignty over many islands including Senkaku/Diaoyu. On the other hand, Japan positioned an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the waters close to the islands in June 1996 (Pan, 2007, p. 75). After this, in October, Chinese demonstrators from Taiwan and Hong Kong placed Chinese and Taiwanese flags on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Pan, 2007, p. 75). These clashing events will be repeated ever after, especially after 1999, China will be more present in the waters surrounding the islands (Pan, 2007, p. 75). Then, China started drilling in the Shirakaba/Chunxiao natural gas reserve in 2003 (Szanto, 2017). As a countermove, gas explorations from the Japanese side started in the Japanese EEZ in July 2004 (Pan, 2007, p. 76). When Japan lifted the prohibition on drilling and performed a maritime survey in the same area to answer Chinese activities in the sea, China protested it by sending forces (Szanto, 2017). In 2004, there was another dispute between Japanese

maritime guards and Chinese fishing boats following the landing of Chinese protestors (Pan, 2007, p. 76).

McCormack (2016, p. 25) criticizes the Japanese inherent claim on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands known as “koyu no ryodo”, or *terra nullius*. The author argues that Japan cannot make a claim overall since they nationalized three of the five islands in 2012 (McCormack, 2016, p. 25). The other two, which was owned by private parties and controlled by the Americans (McCormack, 2016, p. 25). One critical issue the author points out is that the Japanese side does not voice the claims on the two islands that were used by the US (McCormack, 2016, p. 25).

In 2008, Japan and China reached a settlement on Japan-China Joint Development in the East China Sea which will be conducted in the Chunxiao/Shirakaba and Longjing/Asunaro gas reserves. However, still, the disputed waters and issues were not addressed in the settlement (Watts, 2008). This again indicates a deliberate neglect for the sake of stability in the region and the relations. However, just two years later, this neglect will turn into a bigger crisis. On the other hand, both countries did not position the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue as a critical one to be solved immediately until the 2010 events (Midford, 2016, p. 177).

Eventually, the well-known crisis erupted when a Chinese fishing boat collapsed with two Japanese vessels in the conflicted area on 7 September 2010. The Japanese vessels under the duty of coastguards were aiming for the Chinese boat's departure from the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands waters (Midford, 2016, p.179). The coastguards warned the Chinese captain and requested an inspection of the boat. Their request was denied, and the boat wanted to depart the waters. Then, when the coastguards wanted to stop the Chinese boat, they clashed (Fravel, 2016b, p. 27). The Chinese captain later was detained by the Japanese officials and released on 24 September (Fravel, 2016b, p. 28). There, the sovereignty claims clashed when the Japanese side authorized an arrest, and the Chinese side protested that the Japanese officials had no right to do so. As a result, in the 2010 Japanese National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) the submarine numbers had increased drastically in one decision from 16 to 22 (Midford, 2016, p. 182). Moreover, the Japanese side argued that there is no such issue in the

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Fravel, 2016b, p. 28). On the other hand, Chinese officials perceived this as a power move from the Japanese side (Fravel, 2016b, p. 28). As a result, China protested the Japanese sovereignty claims and denial of the dispute with a diplomatic and partial economic halt between the two countries such as high-level or Japan-China Joint Development talks, and rare earth metal trade (Fravel, 2016b, p. 29). Moreover, China extended and boosted its involvement in the waters surrounding the islands by patrolling the area with coastguard-affiliated ships under the name of Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (Fravel, 2016b, p. 29).

The issue escalated again when Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara sought to buy three private islands which are part of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in April 2012 (McCormack, 2016, p. 21). To ease the tensions, that were PRC was raising in the name of disruption of the status quo, the Japanese government bought the mentioned islands in 2012 (Szanto, 2017). According to McCormack (2016, p. 21), the governor was aware of the issues' critical situation and the aim was not deescalate the tensions. Thus, the governor's statement on China as "the biggest threat to Japan" further escalated the tensions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2000a). With the purchase talks were heard, Chinese President Hu Jintao talked with Prime Minister Noda on 9 September 2012 in the APEC meeting regarding this issue and conveyed his will not to go with the purchase (Fravel, 2016b, p. 31). Contrary to the will of the Chinese president, Prime Minister Noda declared the nationalization of the islands and backed this decision with SDF involvement if it was necessary (McCormack, 2016, p. 22). However, the decision of the Prime Minister can be perceived as a way that he tried to de-escalate the crisis since the Tokyo Governor was a conservative nationalist known by the public (Fravel, 2016b, p. 30). Not surprisingly, the Chinese side perceived this move as a way of internalizing the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands through purchase and protested heavily. Putting these protests into action, China performed many activities involving the islands within a year between 2012 and 2013, reaching up to 66 patrols in the waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Fravel, 2016b, p. 32-33). As a countermove to Japan, China sent six patrol ships to the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and the biggest protests spread through 50 cities a day later involved a boycott of Japanese commodities (Windford, 2016, p. 183-184). At the end of 2012, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo rejected the

Senkaku/Diaoyu issue based on there was no need for it (McCormack, 2016, p. 23). Again, Abe followed the Japanese tradition and denied the issue's existence.

Then, the disputed waters started to boil with tension. In 2013, China put together all the agencies that work on maritime activities under the name of the Chinese Coastguard Bureau (The Economist, 2020). The same year, on December 13, an aerial surveillance vehicle penetrated the Senkaku/Diaoyu aviation zone (Fravel, 2016b, p. 33). What followed was the Chinese Air Force ship-directed radar beam to the Japanese naval warship close to the islands' waters in January 2013 (Fravel, 2016b, p. 33). The Chinese side hardened its stance on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue and announced Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on 23 December 2013 (Fravel, 2016b, p. 33). Accordingly, every aircraft that flies in the air zone of the East China Sea is obliged to inform and get approval from Chinese authorities (China Daily, 2013). Without approval, "China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions" (China Daily, 2013, Article 3). Although the defensive measures were not explained thoroughly, it will not be a surprise to contemplate whether it will contain the use of force.

Eventually, the two sides eased the tensions through the so-called four-point consensus on 7 November 2014. According to the consensus:

Both sides recognized that they had different views as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku Islands, and shared the view that, through dialogue and consultation, they would prevent the deterioration of the situation, establish a crisis management mechanism and avert the rise of unforeseen circumstances. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014, Article 3)

However, after these events, the deliberate neglect once again prevailed and comes to this day. Between the two countries, no crisis escalated strongly to the media after 2013. In the Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces document published by the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, the situation is simply put as "On the issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries are taking actions that complicate or exacerbate the situation, and Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands" (Ministry


of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, 2021b, para. 5). This small mention, however, does not reflect the reality of the time. China, according to Funabashi (as cited in Fravel, 2016b, p. 34), developed a patrolling system of 3-3-2, which meant that in a month, three patrol ships would be sent to the waters of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands three times and they would stay for two hours in the waters. Not arising any big protest from Japan, both sides conduct patrols in the territorial waters at the time (Fravel, 2016b, p. 34). However, China increased its presence in the territorial waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands more and more which triggered the Japanese. The issue still carries a sensitive position not only in the relations between Japan and China but also in the maritime security issues in the whole region.

In 2018, China put the Chinese Coastguard Bureau under the People's Armed Police which positioned the maritime affairs in a high level of militarization (The Economist, 2020). Moreover, the Chinese Coast Guard Law in 2021 went into practice and the Japanese side drew their attention to the specific articles in the enacted law. Accordingly, the law includes the areas of Chinese jurisdiction. In this specific part, the Japanese Ministry of Defense found that the specific meaning of "under Chinese jurisdiction" may mean the inclusion of territorial waters and airspace of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the use of force possibility if any penetration without approval as critical (Ministry of Defense of Japan, n.d.). Moreover, in the 2024 brochure of the Japanese Coast Guard, the situation is now portrayed as more complex since the Chinese Coast Guard vehicles around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are more armed and equipped and pay a visit to the waters of the islands nearly every day (Japan Coast Guard, 2024). Whether it is for fishing or foreign maritime science studies, the Japanese Coast Guard positioned the situation as critical (Japan Coast Guard, 2024, p. 7-8). For example, the Japanese Coast Guard argued that they spotted a Chinese vehicle with presumably cannons on it that had entered the contiguous waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands on 22 December 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016). Moreover, according to the statistics of the Japan Coast Guard, which was stated on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, after the September 2012 events, the amount of Chinese official and nonofficial vehicles that penetrated the island's territorial and contiguous zone increased sharply (Figure 1.) As a result of the 2012

events, the Chinese and Japanese clashes on the sovereignty claims now turned into a possible crisis zone.

Figure 1

The numbers of China Coast Guard and other vessels that entered Japan’s contiguous zone or intruded into territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands



(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024b)

According to Szanto (2017), both sides had no impactful resolution effort to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue. By reflecting their perspective to the other side, both sides fail to solve the issue. Hence, the option for solving the issue varies which creates a critical point in the problem where one actor may choose a military conflict. The same can be said for Japan as well. After the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, Japan relied on petroleum and natural gas which was provided from the outside. This situation also led Japan to follow an economic pragmatism in the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue (Szanto, 2017).

On 27 June 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met at G20 Osaka Summit. There, the two countries opened a new era for Sino-Japanese relations. The two sides had declared that stability in the region cannot be achieved without the two and they should seek cooperation as partners (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). After the establishment in 2007 and the halt in 2012, the two sides agreed to continue their cooperation on the Japan-China Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism in 2015 (Kawakami, 2023). This mechanism was also pronounced in the meeting and the sides continued cooperation on various defense and maritime law aspects of relations which started at the end of 2018 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). With the mindset of cooperation in maritime defense, the two sides planned to increase their communication such as establishing a hotline, and the defense institutions were promised to have consistent meetings (Kawakami, 2023). Finally, this initiative was brought fruit on 31 March 2023 by the establishment of the hotline between Japanese and Chinese Defense Authorities. This was a way of promoting confidence between the two sides and preventing collusion (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2023b). However, the cooperation was facing problems due to the past promises of exchange of military officials between the two defense authorities were not held and there was still no mechanism to prevent any crisis from escalating in maritime encounters (Kawakami, 2023). As a final event, in the first month of 2024, tensions increased when Japan sent a destroyer and a system-check aircraft as a response of discovering the Chinese military warships in the Japanese ADIZ (Roy, 2024). Afterwards, the Chinese Coast Guard warned the Japanese and demanded their departure from the designated area (Roy, 2024).

Economically, after the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) decisions, countries can exploit maritime sources with full or limited sovereignty. Deriving from this, China which needs petroleum and natural gas directed its eyes on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands after the ECAFE investigation within which the area can be rich with maritime sources (Szanto, 2017). Moreover, China had benefited very little compared to other big powers such as the US, Britain, or Japan after the 1982 UNCLOS and wants to benefit from maritime sources through the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (McCormack, 2016, p. 27). This meant that Chinese interests were heavily

involved. On the other hand, the sovereignty issue Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is important to highlight deriving from the UNCLOS. According to Pan:

Ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands would enable China to claim sovereign rights over the continental shelf plus the EEZ to the north and east of the Diaoyu Islands. This would give China exclusive economic rights to the whole southern portion of the East China Sea. Sovereignty over these islands, if assigned to Japan, would entitle Japan to an EEZ, which would extend Japan's sovereign rights 200 nautical miles to the north and west, leaping over the Okinawa Trough and securing base points from which to claim China's continental shelf area. (Pan, 2007, p. 84)

The sovereignty issue is crucial in the economic incentives of both countries where both require natural gas and petroleum. Since the UNCLOS does not provide a solution to the problems that arise from these overlapping situations, both sides have provided their solutions. According to the Japanese side, the solution can be provided with the median line (equidistance) principle. This principle argues for a division of the waters between the two countries from half (Pan, 2007, p. 84). On the other hand, the Chinese side argued the principle of natural prolongation. According to their argument, the Okinawa Basin acts as a demarcation of territorial division (Pan, 2007, p. 84). Once again, both sides were unable to reach an agreement in the East China Sea.

To explain the political side, Szanto (2017) gives the efforts of the CCP to produce stability of the party rule through patriotism as a reason for China. Accordingly, the islands dispute triggers the Chinese patriotism against Japan (Szanto, 2017). On the other hand, the rise of Chinese military and maritime power and its assertiveness is a source of the problem for Japan (Szanto, 2017). From a strategic point of view, the islands have a crucial point in Chinese security. Two points have been made by Szanto (2017). First, maritime security in the first island chain where China declares full authority is a direct security issue for Japan. Therefore, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue is a direct security issue if it was included in the areas that China has full control over, China would be able to detect the Japanese and American activities on the sea, deploy missiles even nuclear ones to deter or second strike the enemy (Szanto, 2017). What is more the crucial point of the islands affecting the security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS). To ensure the security of the SLOCS, it will be advantageous to gain full sovereignty on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands for China (Szanto, 2017). However, according to Szanto (2017), for the US or Japan, the benefits

that China will gain from Senkaku/Diaoyu island sovereignty is critical rather than having the islands for themselves. One another political implication also is a possible domino effect on other maritime issues that both countries have. For China, it is Spratly and Paracel Islands with Southeast Asian countries and its strongest claim in Taiwan whereas, for Japan, it is Northern islands with Russia and Dokdo/Takdo Island with South Korea (Pan, 2007, p. 85-86). Seeing the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue as a springboard, both countries are stubborn to revise their claims on the islands since not only one, but many issues are at stake.

Japan was behaving as if “there is no Senkaku/Diaoyu issue” because the islands issue was a leverage for Japan against China (Wiegand, 2016, p. 166). After the Chinese rise, Japan was losing its relative power to China. Therefore, Japan used the islands issue to assert its importance as a big power and its alliance with the USA to China (Wiegand, 2016, p. 167). Moreover, while China is putting its sovereignty claims boldly due to its rise in power, Japan is using the issue as a tool for following an assertive foreign policy (Midford, 2016, p.178). Using the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue as a deterring factor for China is critical in a sense since Chinese officials are already aware of the situation and considering their increasing relative powers against both sides. Without finding a position to settle, the triggered rivalry will only result in a bigger crisis or an accumulation of tension in the region.

The reason for not reaching a crisis yet can be explained through several reasons. Firstly, the deterrence as a factor plays the utmost important role. The use of force by China, which will result in a crisis in the region, is deterred by the Japanese and US forces (Fravel, 2016b, p. 26). The same result will be reached if the other parties act against China. None of the countries also want to become a status quo disturber in the region. Both sides, China on one and Japan and the US on the other want to position themselves as assertive with a possible use of force in the international system (Fravel, 2016b, p. 26).

As it was explained, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue is a problem between the two countries that can easily be reached into a crisis, with the possibility of the use of force. The issue which has its roots for hundreds of years, has again reached a deliberate

neglect in contemporary relations and both sides accuse the other disturber of the status quo in the region regarding the islands. The sovereignty claims, which clash with each other lead the two to present themselves in the territorial waters of the islands where two sides observe each other's actions. Meanwhile, both sides improved their naval power which only added fuel to the fire. Whether this fire will be extinguished is a critical question for the security of the region. Up until today, the issue is observed as a ticking bomb. Therefore, this issue too is another pillar of the accumulation of tension in the region. The issue's criticality is also amplified by the Sino-American rivalry, the US-Japan alliance, and the historical aspects of the US control in Japan. This aspect, however, is to be discussed in the next chapter.

3.5 Military Development and Narratives of the PRC and Japan

As it was previously underlined, one of the key reasons for the dispute points which was conceived as a problem and later as a threat by the Japanese and the US was the development and modernization of the PRC army. Moreover, the impact and normalization arguments in Japan also trigger the Chinese minds on the rise of Japanese militarism. As a result, how the sides saw each other's militarization process and how they evolved to the current situation which was underlined in the defense papers or white papers will be pointed out, and how these positions exacerbated the dispute points between China and Japan will be portrayed. The aim of this chapter is not to dwell upon what is the newest technology that was brought to the rivalry among the countries, but to explain the strategic points that accelerate the accumulation of the tension and the militarization in the region, and how the sides perceive each other.

3.5.1 The PRC Military Modernization

Immediately after the Cold War, China was in a situation where the main reason for the US to have positive relations with it, the USSR, had dissolved. After that, China felt insecure in the aspects of becoming the new target for the US due to having a socialist ideology in a world where the forerunner was defeated, its importance decreased due to the defeat of the USSR and falling behind in the technological and scientific development in the world (Chen, 1993, p. 238-239). As a result, China felt

the need for immense development in the era of the switch from a bipolar to a multipolar system. Moreover, the overarching dominance of the US forces in the Gulf War shocked the Chinese and affected their will to modernize their military (Garcia, 2019, p. 46). Gaining power from Deng Xiaoping's socialism with Chinese characteristics, China was believed to be successful in that quest. While China was benefitting from the open economy and trade with the world, the gained profit will be invested in the areas where China is lacking. However, these investments and developments known as the rise of China, especially its military developments created disturbances in the minds of many states in the region. Not sure of what to expect, these states were trying to understand the mindset of the Chinese officials. As a response, Chinese officials openly discussed that they would rise for friendly relations in the region, improving relations with the US, and never to seek becoming a hegemon (Chen, 1993, p. 241-243). To prove their point, for example, they participated in and acceded to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 17 March 1992 (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, n.d.), However, one thing was certain after clarifying their position in the world, they were also proving that they will not hinder their improvement. According to Chen (1993, p. 246), Chinese defense spending in 1992 was not strikingly high compared to the Japanese and American spending. Moreover, although China is seeking modernization of its army, this does not correlate with the Taiwan invasion. Neither the islands dispute, nor the 1992 Chinese Law of the Sea depicts an unpeaceful way of solving the problems, argued Chen (1993, p. 247). On the other hand, China published the document called China: Arms Control and Disarmament in November 1995. Accordingly, after the Cold War,

(...) China, while retaining the precondition that the nation maintains necessary defense capabilities, has unilaterally adopted a series of measures aimed at disarmament. These include greatly reducing military staff, reducing defense spending, strictly controlling transfers of sensitive materials, technology, and military equipment, and converting defense technologies industry to civilian production. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1995a, para. 3)

Moreover,

China's national defense policy is defensive in nature. Its basic goals are to consolidate national defense, resist foreign aggression, defend the nation's sovereignty over its land, sea, and air as well as its maritime rights and interests, and safeguard national unity and security. (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1995b, para. 6)

Therefore, according to Chinese Officials, China is improving its military forces based on the inherent right to protect its own country. One can understand that meanwhile the neighboring countries and the US perceive this military rise as a problem, China reflects upon this as a natural right of a state. Therefore, they argue that the developments in the military were peaceful. To support their ideas, they give the example of downsizing the military personnel from 4.238 million in 1987 to 3.199 million in 1990 which reflected the change of mind from a warlike mindset to a peaceful one (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1995c). Moreover, aware of the suspicion of the other countries on Chinese military investment's increase, this topic was also addressed in the same document. Pointing out the levels of investments compared to other countries, in 1994 China invested in military defense taking 1.3 percent of the gross domestic product, yet it took 4.2 percent in the US (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1995d).

However, China also was aware of the neighboring countries and the US actions in the world in the new century. Moreover, they were already triggered by the need for further modernization due to the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crises where the US sent forces to the strait and showed as a contender (Garcia, 2019, p. 47). In the 2000 National Defense White Paper which was published in the Office of the Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Lithuania:

The United States is further strengthening its military presence and bilateral military alliances in this region, advocating the development of the TMD system and planning to deploy it in East Asia. Japan has passed a bill relating to measures in the event of a situation in the areas surrounding Japan. All this goes against the tide of the times. Joint military exercises have increased in the region, to the detriment of trust between countries. (The Office of the Chargé d'Affaires in the Republic of Lithuania, 2004, para. 9)

Moreover, relating to both peaceful defense posture and the modernization of the military:

China spares no effort to avoid and curb war, and to solve international disputes and questions left over by history through peaceful means. However, because hegemonism and power politics still exist and are further developing, and in particular, the basis for the country's peaceful reunification is seriously imperiled, China will have to enhance its capability to defend its sovereignty and security by military means. (The Office of the Chargé d'Affaires in the Republic of Lithuania, 2004, para. 16)

Deriving from these points, it was evident that China was hinting that the political situation was emerging as threatening to Chinese sovereignty. As a result, they clearly explained that they would do whatever was necessary to protect their soil, including Taiwan. This resulted in the improvement and growth of the military of China. Moreover, China was concerned about Japan, the Japanese defense advancements and military dispatches were presented as a possible step towards change in the constitution or forgoing the self-limitation on military developments (Christensen, 1999, p. 56). Therefore, they increased their spending on the military to 8.29 percent in 2000 which corresponds to 14.60 billion US dollars (1212.9 RMB billion yuan) (The Office of the Chargé d'Affaires in the Republic of Lithuania, 2004). In the next National Defense White Paper in 2004, again although the stability of the region was underlined, the notion of this stability is about to be disturbed mindset always highlighted which was mentioned in the same paragraph with the US and Japan activities (US-China Institute, 2004). As a result, although they continued to reduce their military personnel, in the same document in 2004, China mentioned the modernization of the PLA Army to be prepared for any clash, focusing on combat skills as well as the artillery and equipment (US-China Institute, 2004). The same posture was also continued in the 2008 Defense White Paper. One thing to add, “China implements a military strategy of active defense. Strategically, it adheres to the principle of featuring defensive operations, self-defense, and striking and getting the better of the enemy only after the enemy has started an attack.” (USC US-China Institute, 2009, para. 21). With this statement, China created a clear stance on their understanding of the defense. More, this also created a path for China to decide whether an action is an attack (Garcia, 2019, p. 48). They have many issues that they must protect, therefore they improve and modernize their military. Moreover, they are at a point where the “enemy” cannot easily win against them. Then, in the 2010 National Defense Document in 2011, one important development was the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF). This particular pillar:

(...) continues to develop a military training system unique with the strategic missile force, improve the conditions of on-base, simulated and networked training, conduct trans-regional maneuvers and training with opposing forces in complex electromagnetic environments. (...) Through the years, the PLASAF has grown into a strategic force equipped with both nuclear and conventional missiles. (Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2021a, para. 30)

On top of this, the Chinese response to attacks from the enemy toughened as they added to their statement that the retaliation would surely come in the 2013 White Paper called *The Diversified Employment of China's Forces* (Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, 2013b). Therefore, it is obvious that China has become more powerful and confident in its stance on military defense. This was partially referring to the US and Japanese actions in the region where both sides blamed each other for disturbing the status quo in the region. Moreover, by mentioning the specific developments of the pillars of the PLA Army, and also highlighting the retaliation, China is seemingly more assertive in its stance against the military issues.

In the 2015 Military Strategy, as they did before, the modernization of the PLA was stated through "informationization". Accordingly, China positioned the upper hand will be on the side who have more information (Anand, 2016, p. 5). Moreover, the active defense was directed at any country that China perceives as offensive (Anand, 2016, p. 5). Moreover, Anand portrayed significant points where the modernization of the PLA stands as critical. Accordingly, the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) abilities, developments in power projection with the improvements in naval capabilities, and increased developments in the cyber fields are positioned as striking modernizations (Anand, 2016, p. 6-7). Another important development occurred in the PLA Second Artillery Force, which has been named the PLA Rocket Force since 2016 (Anand, 2016, p. 12). Having a special place in President Xi Jinping's eyes, the pillar was responsible for ballistic missiles which involved nuclear as well. Accordingly, in 2012, Xi Jinping stated that the pillar was the main source of strategic deterrence in 2012 (Anand, 2016, p. 12).

On the other hand, comparing the defense budgets is a tricky business. Accordingly, although the Chinese white papers did not portray a significant rise in the defense budgets, according to Anand (2016, p. 8), China achieved a huge jump in defense spending in 2015 which reached around 10 percent of the national budget. Moreover, Anand did not forget to highlight that this was a slight decline compared to the previous two years. When compared to the US, although still, China was still behind, looking from the purchasing power parity (PPP) lens, Chinese defense investments were nearly a third of the US defense investments (Anand, 2016, p. 8).

To dive into the strategic thinking of Chinese military officials, the book called Science of Military Strategy 2013 version is critical. One thing that depicts a serious change in the military mindset of China is evident in this book. A significant change was the perception of war in contemporary times including information and space domains besides the three known domains, soil, air, and sea (Fravel, 2016a, p. 10). Another critical change was the perception of the defense started to become more inclusive of other regions than only defending the Chinese territory which was clustered under the name of “forward defense” (Fravel, 2016a, p. 11-12). Deriving from these, it was obvious that due to the immense development, China was feeling more confident to tactically include other regions in its strategic thinking. According to Fravel (2016, p. 12), this was the enlargement of the first-line strategy of China which only depicted the Chinese territory involving soil, water, and air. Also, the “effective control” concept was introduced which meant preemptive actions for the crises (Fravel, 2016a, p. 15).

In 2017, the mindset of the Chinese officials did not wither away but grew stronger. According to the 2017 White Paper of China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, although China argued for a stable region where various crises were under control, it implicitly pointing the Japanese change of mindset to increase their military situation as a disturber in the region by stating: “certain country seeks to shake off military constraints” (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017). Also, in the 2017 White Paper, due to the US activities in the region, China called for mutually beneficial cooperation by stating: “Major countries should treat the strategic intentions of others objectively and rationally, reject the Cold War mentality, respect others' legitimate interests and concerns, strengthen positive interactions and respond to challenges with concerted efforts” (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017, para. 5). One thing is critical in this statement. According to various countries in the region including Japan and the US, Chinese activities from military development to maritime claims were found assertive and concerning. Yet, it was reflected as “strategic intentions” by the Chinese officials which demand respect in these topics. Also, by “concerted efforts”, they meant the Belt and Road Initiative, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Silk Road Bank. By stating these, China was indirectly stating that cooperation for

security can be achieved through economic ways. Meaning, that China was aiming to create “a new model of international relations centered on mutually beneficial cooperation” (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017, para. 6). Therefore, in this White Paper, China was stating that they were promoting security cooperation through these initiatives. To achieve that and also promote their territorial security, China states that they have to promote military developments (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017). Moreover, a new concept was introduced in this White Paper called “Common, Comprehensive, Cooperative and Sustainable Security” derived from the talk of President Xi Jinping in May 2014 (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017). Deriving from this concept, China offered inclusive security, based on dialogue, reaching both traditional and other security issues and permanent security for the region (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017). Regarding Japan, although there were mentions of positive relations with high-level talks between the two countries, which resulted in a Japan-China Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism in 2015, the document stated that the critical strategic points were still left unresolved (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017). One critical issue in this East China Sea reference is that both sides constantly positioned cooperation mechanisms concerning petrol and natural gas research, law enforcement, fisheries, and many more (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017), the sides did not reach a strategic solution for the root cause of the problem which was the territorial claims from both sides. Although it sounds pessimistic, if these cooperation pillars do not form stronger and more cooperative bounds, the situation will still be dire and considered critical rather than solved or close to the end.

In 2019, China called for the speed-up of militarization in the region and the world. In the 2019 White Paper called China’s National Defense in the New Era, American, Japanese, and many other countries’ militarization build-up has been underlined (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2019a). Moreover, following these statements, the developments in the Chinese military were found inadequate which signaled more improvements were to be expected (The State Council

Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019a). Another critical point mentioned in the 2019 White Paper was that China explicitly underlined how they never initiated any conflict. Moreover, to answer any question regarding its peaceful rise, the document stated:

The development of China's national defense aims to meet its rightful security needs and contribute to the growth of the world's peaceful forces. History proves and will continue to prove that China will never follow the beaten track of big powers in seeking hegemony. No matter how it might develop, China will never threaten any other country or seek any sphere of influence. (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019b, para. 8)

Strategically speaking, however, China was stating a militarization in the Chinese way for the new era. Accordingly, this meant a military that befits the Chinese rise which may mean higher than everyone other than the US. However, according to the document, China is the sixth in average GDP spending and fourth in average government expenditure in defense investment in 2019 falling behind the US (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019c). After the 2019 White Paper, China did not publish any paper regarding the defense strategy. However, on 31 October 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the Global Security Initiative (GSI) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2023c). Accordingly, with the mindset of "security for every country", the initiative argues for no bloc politics and division between the countries, promoting common security rather than absolute security, making every security concern heard and validated, and expenses throughout the traditional and non-traditional security areas within the framework of non-interference principle and respect for the sovereignty of every country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023). This initiative was criticized as providing a new security order in the world in place of the US-led one (Green, Nouwens, & Nouwens, 2024).

Statistically, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, the share of Chinese military expenditure in GDP between 1991-2023 had never experienced more than 2.4% which was in 1992 (SIPRI, 2024). From 2000 to 2023, it never exceeded 2.1% (SIPRI, 2024). However, this does not mean that China has not drastically improved its military investments. According to the World Bank data, Chinese GDP had grown from 383.37 billion US

dollars in 1991 to 17.79 trillion US dollars in 2023 (World Bank, 2024). On the other hand, after 1994, the Chinese military expenditure increased constantly from 9.87 billion US dollars to 296.44 billion US dollars (SIPRI, 2024).

Regarding the statistics, two important points were presented by Peter Robertson. Although China highlights the decrease in military staff, there is another factor in the military spending. China increased its military equipment spending by 7.6% between the years 2001 and 2021 whereas the US decreased its spending by 0.9% per year (Robertson, 2024, p. 813). Moreover, for the last ten years, Chinese real military equipment acquisition has grown by 8.6% more than the US per year (Robertson, 2024, p. 813). Another important point is that converting the defense spending of one country to the US dollars does not create a good comparison. For example, the Chinese military staff resource allocation will take half of the US if the RMB is converted to US dollars (Robertson, 2024, p. 815). Yet in reality, the Chinese military staff which equals 2.7 million, nearly doubles the US, which is 1.39 million (Robertson, 2024, p. 815). This results from the differences in labor costs and the exchange rates which were designed for products but not for military calculations (Robertson, 2024, p. 815). Deriving from these causes, the comparisons of military spending data among the countries will also change. Therefore, the real Chinese defense budget is estimated to be 476 billion US dollars in 2021, which is 60% higher than the exchange rate calculated budget, of 293 billion US dollars (Robertson, 2024, p. 819-820). With these calculations counted, it is clear that Chinese development in the military field is even higher than the SIPRI or Chinese official data suggests (The Economist, 2021). However, still, in modern weaponry, technology, and real-life war experience, the US prevails in its dominance against China (Hartung, 2024). Although, from the looks of it, the gap is narrowing.

3.5.2 Japan's Normalization

Although China started the post-Cold War period with cooperative mindsets, the suspicion in the neighboring countries and the US has only been shelved but never subsided. Moreover, it grew in time due to the more confident China became. In this part, therefore, how the Japanese responded or triggered the Chinese side to the modernization of the military is to be investigated. This part aims to dwell on the

Japanese official perceptions of security rather than combining them with the US outlook. This way, the Japanese voice is to be heard rather than lost in the Sino-US rivalry which is the current trend in the literature.

One important aspect of Japanese militarization was firstly the mindset change of Japan. In the Cold War times, Japan was mostly seen as a country that did not have a national strategy (Welch, 2011, p. 16). Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi argued for the possibility of considering the Yoshida Doctrine as it (Welch, 2011, p. 16). This doctrine relied on a peaceful constitution and the US alliance (Soeya, 2011, p. 75). Coming to the post-Cold War period, the abnormal situation deriving from the peaceful constitution had started to change (Tadokoro, 2011, p. 39). According to Soeya (2011, p. 80), the Japanese security outlook was linked to three points, security in the international domain, the strengthening of the US alliance, and the promotion of its defense. In line with the American burden-sharing mentality and its decreased dominance in the economic field, Japan planned to fill the vacancy. Further, Japan felt the heavy burden of free-rider accusations where they did not participate in security issues in the world which paved the way for them to act (Tadokoro, 2011, p. 44). One example of this is the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF)'s first outside mission from the Japanese territory. On 29 April 1991, Japan sent six mine warfare ships and other vehicles to assist them with the mission of clearing the mines in the Gulf region during the Gulf War (Narusawa, 2014). This was a clear implication of Japanese activeness in the security issues which was in line with the US policies (Garcia, 2019, p. 62). There were many questions about how this was not jeopardizing Japan's peaceful constitution (Narusawa, 2014). To respond to these questionings, in the 1991 Diplomatic Bluebook, Japan stated:

Irrespective of whether or not Japan's interests are directly affected, it will be necessary henceforth for Japan, from the perspective of assuming responsibility and role of its own for the peace and stability of the world, to engage in diplomatic activities to help solve regional confrontations and disputes in various regions of the world and to secure regional stability after settling the disputes. (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1991a, para. 7)

As a result, Japan stated that for the peace of the world in general, not only in their territory but also in the regional conflicts that occur anywhere around the world, Japan will react and partake in action under the UN authority and possibly with the US leadership. Moreover, this situation was a way for Japan to show up as an active

economic power in the world. Deriving from these points, this outlook of Japan was coined as “a turning point” (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1991b). Further, to ease the tensions on whether this dispatch was constitutional, Japan passed the Peace Keeping Law (PKO Law) on 19 June 1992 which enabled Japan, although within certain limits, to participate in the Peace-Keeping operations (Garcia, 2019, p. 64). According to Garcia (2019, p. 64), this dispatch was the beginning of the famous normalization process of Japan in the military aspect. Thus, the Japanese defense posture was explained as:

Japan, while upholding the Japan-U.S. security arrangements firmly and providing various supports to ensure the presence of the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as strengthening defense cooperation with the United States, as far as its defense capabilities are concerned, adhered consistently to the maintenance of an exclusively defense-oriented posture under the basic guideline that Japan will never become a military power. (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1991b, para. 34)

Moreover, drawing attention to the security preparedness within, Japan was underlining its leadership role which can be achieved through military and legislative changes. This activeness and leadership role was also mentioned in defending freedom and democracy where Japan took a harsh position against China after the Tiananmen Square Incident (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1991b). This stretching out of Japanese responsibility for the sake of humanity to the world was a way of Japan’s involvement in global security issues which has no direct linkage. Finally, regarding China, Japan highlighted the importance of economic and trade improvements such as the Official Development Assistance (ODA) agreement or trade agreement renewals (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1991b). However, they also mentioned the military modernization of China as something to be checked for. From the looks of it, running towards the Soviet dissolution, Japan was aware of the Chinese investments in the military field, yet it did not position any connotations to it other than the difficulties arising from the South China Sea problem. Another point to make is that Japan positioned the US as its center regarding security issues. In the 1992 Diplomatic Bluebook, this awareness of China turned into a situation where cautious consideration is needed (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1993). Another point was underlined that the improvements in the military field were also provided as crucial in the Japanese 1992 Bluebook. Accordingly, beware of the suspicion of Japanese remilitarization by the regional countries, Japan decreased its defense budget by 580 billion yen (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1993). Also, the same year on August 19, another dispatchment of JSDF which was to Cambodia occurred. In

1993, Japan was made the first important highlight regarding Chinese militarization with a critique of nuclear rearmament, which was due to the Chinese nuclear test. Moreover, the three pillars of the Japanese defense policy were full-on force, the US alliance, own military capability development, and the leadership role in promoting peace in the world (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1994). More cautious of the security situation in the Asia-Pacific, Japan, and China decided to come together to form the Sino-Japanese Security Dialogue in 1993 (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1994). However, it was obvious that the main issue for Japanese defense and security, the problem maker was North Korea, especially after they decided to opt out of the NPT agreement in 1993 (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1995). Yet, Chinese two nuclear tests in 1994 also positioned itself as “regrettable” (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1995).

In 1995, Japan positioned a new era for the international situation with a new international order where on the 50th anniversary of the II World War’s end, Japan took an active role as a big holder of the world’s GDP portion (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1996). In this new order, Japan targeted China to welcome it. However, meanwhile, the welcoming behavior based heavily on the economy sounds promising, in the security agenda, Japan was looking more cautious in the region. China repeated the two nuclear tests in 1995 which resulted in the temporary stopping of financial aid of Japan to China (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1996). As a result of these new developments, they felt the need to renew the 1976 National Defense Program Outline. Accordingly, Japan is aware of the security situation of the region and wants to strengthen its defenses since “there remain large-scale military capabilities including nuclear arsenals and many countries in the region are expanding or modernizing their military capabilities mainly against the background of their economic development” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1995a, Article 3). Moreover, Japan stated that “should indirect aggression - or any unlawful military activity which might lead to aggression against this nation - occur, take immediate responsive action to settle the situation at a near stage” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995b, Article 4). However, the important point is that what is meant by indirect aggression or responsive action was not provided in the document. Here, although still the core of Japanese defense was the US alliance, the national changes occurred as a self-improvement in defense. In 1996, Japan was more vocal in stating the problems with China regarding conflict

topics such as the Taiwan elections, the East China Sea issue, history problems, or nuclear testing (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1997). Although the sides were stated a peaceful region based on dialogue and the sides came together in the APEC meeting in November which took place in the Philippines (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1997), after the statement of the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996 and renewal of Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, Japan took a big step towards the US in the security field for the new century (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1997). As a result, although Japan states that they do not promote their militarization, the strengthening, and improving of the US alliance was also paving the way for indirect militarization of Japan.

On 26 November 1998, China and Japan published a statement called the Joint Declaration, named On Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1998). Although many bilateral problems were touched upon, the US alliance was not given a place. Since the Japanese military building was highly related to the US alliance, this declaration did not solve or ease the militarization suspicions. This is also an indicator that although the sides improved their dialogue, the solution cannot be brought together due to the US involvement. This was also stated by the 2001 Diplomatic Bluebook:

A limited defense capacity restricts Japan's ability to respond to every situation which could threaten Japan's safety. To ensure national safety, as well as the safety of the region on which this is premised, Japan will continue to position the alliance with the U.S. as the axis of its foreign policy. (The Diplomatic Bluebook, 2001, para. 33)

Moreover, Japan continued its cooperation on military developments with the US. In 2001, as a result of the 9/11 attacks, the world was focused on the fight against terrorism. In October, Japan passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and on 9 November 2001, sent SDF ships to the Indian Ocean (Narusawa, 2014). In 2003, the SDF was dispatched again for the Iraq War (Narusawa, 2014). Then, regarding the militarization of China, on 28 August 1997, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto stated in his talks regarding the Japanese foreign policy towards China, that for China to erase the suspicions regarding its military developments, transparency is required, which also be reciprocated by Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997).

One important statement in 2005 came with the former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso's naming the Chinese militarization as a "threat" (Al Jazeera, 2005). Although this threat statement will never be introduced in the defense documents or blue books, this statement was a truthful explanation of the Japanese mindset that stayed hidden. The maritime activities regarding the East China Sea, such as the maritime surveys by the Chinese started to be stated as serious infringement after 2005 (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2005, p. 12). Moreover, Japan had been more leaning towards the ballistic missile support of the US which started in 2003. One important development of Japan regarding Chinese militarization evoked itself as "the situation related to the modernization of Chinese military power and increases in its national defense expenditures is also still partially unclear" (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006, p. 9). This transparency issue will be pronounced by the Japanese in the following years as well as a crucial point as to why Chinese militarization was and is a concern. This was the situation of not knowing the other's intention situation. Since they cannot see or analyze, Japan considers the Chinese militarization from its intentions. On top of this opaqueness, the confident standing of the Chinese posed a problem where one has to take measures.

Until 2010, the statements were similar to the previously mentioned document contents. Yet, with the 2010 developments, the change in the Japanese discourse regarding security in the region was drastic, which was stated as "the increasing uncertainty of the security environment surrounding Japan became clear especially in 2010" (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2011, p. 9). Although the pillars of Japanese security remained the same, the underlining of enhancing security links with countries who share the same values as Japan such as ROK, Australia, India, and ASEAN countries now more prominent in the 2011 Diplomatic Bluebook which covers the 2010-year calendar. With this accumulation of tensions kept in mind, Japan accepted the document named "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond" on 17 December 2010. Accordingly, Japan underlined the rising powers and power shift, the relative decline of the US, and the militarization of nuclear weapons in the region (Prime Minister's Office of Japan, 2010, p. 3). Eventually, Japan stated that the Chinese modernization and lack of transparency regarding it posed a "concern" (Prime Minister's Office of Japan, 2010, p. 4). There, a new concept was introduced in the

name of “Dynamic Defense Force”. This concept envisions a JSDF in which its deterrence power, rapid technology, military operations, equipment, and personnel will be enhanced and strengthened to protect Japan from any invasion (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, 2010, p. 7-8). This change from Basic Defense Force which was created in 1976 defense guidelines to Dynamic Defense Force was a response to Chinese militarization and grey zone activities (Grønning, 2014, p. 4). Deriving from this point, the changing of the defense budget was mentioned. In 2011, Japan started to change its defense equipment export ban to a looser one which indicated if Japan did not sell the equipment to a warring country, or the recipient country used the weapons within the designated framework, Japan could export the equipment (Garcia, 2019, p. 66). This was also a new step in the normalization of Japan.

Regarding the Chinese White Papers, Japan positioned a specific critique where the transparency of military spending declined (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2014, p. 34). One clear change in the perception of Japan towards China was shown in the 2014 Diplomatic Bluebook. Accordingly, the activities of China in the East and South China Seas which refers to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, are considered as “unilateral attempts to change the status quo (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2014a, p. 4). Further, Japan criticized the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, arguing that it was a limitation to air zone freedom (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2014a, p. 4). As a result of these developments, Japan published the very first National Security Strategy (NSS) on 17 December 2013. All the concerns regarding China regarding the resilience, capacity building, deterrence power, and rebalancing of Asia combined with the strengthening of the US alliance were highly dwelled upon in the document. This “rebalancing” was targeting China (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, 2013b, p. 6). On the same day as the NSS document, the new National Defense Program Guidelines for 2014 and beyond were published. Similar to the prior document, the activities and untransparent military developments of China were portrayed as a concern for Asia-Pacific security (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2013a, p. 3). With all these combined, Japan passed the legislation of Seamless Security on 1 July 2014. This legislation is crucial due to the “constitutional interpretation” of Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution which prohibits Japan from using force which will be named as Legislation for Peace and Security in 2016. However, accordingly, due to the increased security severeness in the region and

to provide security to the Japanese people, it is stated that “the use of force to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted” (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2014, p. 8). Thus, this use of force will include:

(...) not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, and when there are no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014, p. 7-8)

Thus, Japan opened the way towards the collective defense of JSDF, which enabled them to take positions in the fighting zones as well (Garcia, 2019, p. 68). This “seamless” change, however, change the outlook of Japanese security drastically. Moreover, the Japanese policy of “Open and Stable Seas” was an implicit criticism of Chinese activities in the seas where they argued the prominence of the rule of law rather than the use of force in the maritime issues (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2017, p. 189). In 2016, an important development emerged with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Vision which was introduced by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2021, p. 30). Although the vision was introduced as bringing together two continents and oceans, this vision was targeted at Japan’s allies, known as like-minded states within which China is not involved (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2021, p. 30).

On 18 December 2018, another new National Defense Program Guidelines were published. In this document, the overarching theme of increasing the defense capabilities for the newly emerging areas such as space or cyber on top of the traditional areas was underlined and coined as “Multi-Domain Defense Force” (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2018, p. 10-11). The reason for highlighting these newly emerging areas was the dominance of China in these fields (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2019, p. 12). In 2021, Japan stated the Sino-US rivalry explicitly (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2022, p. 14). The newly formed Kishida Cabinet focused on their basic policy where they focus on universal values such as freedom and democracy which they will promote with like-minded states against the wills of changing the status quo (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2022, p. 18). This was a clear message to the Chinese who were blamed by the Japanese as unilaterally trying to change the status quo in the

region. Japan, with the support of the US and like-minded states such as Australia and India, will pose an obstacle to Chinese activities and developments. This was also a shoutout for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Moreover, Japan stated a polarizing powers' rising in the region with increasing tensions (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2023, p. 2). However, the QUAD, FOIP, and mentioning of like-minded states are also a form of polarization since they do not involve China. Moreover, Japan renewed its National Security Strategy (NSS) document on 16 December 2022. The document may answer why China was not in the like-minded states. Accordingly:

Guided by their historical views and values, some nations, not sharing universal values, are making attempts to revise the existing international order (...) This is coupled with ongoing unilateral changes to the status quo and such attempts at sea. In addition, some states, not sharing universal values, are exploiting unique approaches to rapidly develop their economies and science technologies, and then, in some areas, are gaining superiorities over those states that have defended academic freedom and market-economy principles. These moves challenge the existing international order, thereby intensifying geopolitical competitions in international relations. (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2022, p. 1)

This also provides a perception of alienation from the cooperative look for China from the Japanese officials. Moreover, any development other than militarization is also conceived as a concern to the current order. Hence, with all these reasons combined Japan stated that for Japan's security, China poses "the greatest strategic challenge" (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2022, p. 9). Thus, Japan started to increase their defense budget and for the fiscal year of 2027, they plan to achieve 2% of the GDP to be allocated to defense spending (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2022, p. 20). Other documents called "Defense Buildup Program" and National Defense Strategy (NDS) (replaced the National Defense Program Guidelines) which were published on the same day as the new NSS document, provided similar statements. Former Prime Minister Kishida stated on 13 January 2023 that these documents are a turning point for Japanese security while stating that Japan is and will be a peaceful country in his other speeches (Hughes, 2024, p. 157).

According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, from 1991 to 2022, Japan never surpassed the arbitrary limit of 1% defense expenditure in GDP (SIPRI, 2023). However, in 2022 and 2023, this limit was exceeded by 1.1% and 1.2% respectively (SIPRI, 2023). Then, Japan increased its military expenditure percentage by 1.6% in

2024 (Nagatomi, 2024). Another development in the current military and security era was the Official Security Assistance (OSA) by Japan on 5 April 2023. Targeting like-minded states, infrastructure building to ease the way for the militaries, supplies, and equipment assistance will be provided by Japan in the form of grant aid to increase security cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023a, p. 1).

Finally, in the 2023 Defense White Paper, two very important aspects of the Chinese military were the increasing capabilities of Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) which refers to preventing countries from entering the designated areas, and civil-military fusion which includes the civilian usage to the military combat and defense technologies (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2023a, p. 55). Moreover, short, medium, intermediate-range, submarine-launched, cruise (supersonic, land-attack), anti-ship, intercontinental ballistic missile developments with nuclear warhead capability, nuclear-infused submarines, and expected to emerge hypersonic glide vehicles, third-largest land army forces, and allegedly the biggest naval force, poses a great concern for Japan (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2023a, p. 60-63). Further, the new areas in outer space such as satellite systems and cyberspace such as cyberattacks and developing aircraft having electronic military capabilities are also serious concerns for the security agenda of Japan (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2023a, p. 67-69). A final word can be given as “a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression” (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2023a, p. 232). These developments in the Chinese military were crucial for the Japanese since China was on its way to accumulating adequate power to even win against the US, which is the primary security provider for Japan (Hughes, 2022, p. 14). Therefore, Japan pushed for counterattack capabilities which is in the event of an attack or similar occasion such as using ballistic missiles, Japan will retaliate or deter an attack with these capabilities (Defense of Japan, 2023, p. 234). This deterrence or retaliation will be managed through many developments such as stand-off missiles, vehicles using the Aegis system, unmanned aerial vehicles, satellite formations or cyber defense units, and more (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2023a, p. 246-247).

Japan, by building up its military, sending the JSDF overseas, strengthening the US alliance, and cooperating with like-minded states started to become a global military

power (Hughes, 2022, p. 1). These military developments were conceived to be a clash between Japan's statement on not becoming a military power (Hughes, 2022, p. 2-3). Moreover, the abolishment of the arbitrary limit of defense budget by 1% of the GDP in 2017 by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's decision made Japan a country paving its way for militarization (Nippon, 2018). On the other hand, throughout the years, the three pillars of providing security for Japan had never decreased or changed drastically. This was a continuation of the Yoshida Doctrine which indicated limited defense expenditure, strengthening the US alliance, and economic prevalence above else (Hughes, 2022, p. 4). However, due to the changes in world security, this doctrine was challenged with the Gulf War and then with 9/11 (Hughes, 2022, p. 12). There, the dispatching of the JSDF forces followed the challenge and the nature of the Japanese security posture started to change, even for a little. Moreover, primarily the nuclear developments of North Korea, the concern of abandonment of the US from Asia, and the Chinese rise altogether triggered Japan to become stronger in the security field (Hughes, 2022, p. 13). Coming to Prime Minister Abe's tenure, the security posture was defined in three pillars, own military strengthening, the US alliance, and cooperation with like-minded states in the name of multilayered security (Hughes, 2022, p. 18-19). Still promoting these, Japan is creating a new posture for defense in the way of becoming a global military power. The situation is not promising for them, since the Chinese militarization is strong and the US relative power is declining (Grønning, 2014, p. 14).

Looking at the military developments and the strained narratives from both sides positions the current Asia-Pacific region as a highly militarized, and tension-full region. With both sides developing and enhancing their military capabilities on top of the deteriorating relations coupled with the trust deficit exacerbates the security environment. Moreover, the two great powers' relations deteriorate further by the inevitable US involvement deriving from the nationalistic interest and Japanese alliance. Moreover, with the increase in multilateral engagements, the picture looks more like Cold War-like.

3.6 Bilateral and Multilateral Security Cooperation Attempts

With all the issues covered up to this point, many cooperation attempts were made regarding the disputes mentioned. Yet, the sides could not produce a cooperation mechanism that could solve the disputes. It is beneficial to look from the bright side, none of the issues turned out to be an armed conflict as well. However, the question of how long this will last, unless attempts of cooperation will eventually end up with a concrete example of a step towards a solution made is crucial. Therefore, in this chapter, the attempts of security cooperation between China and Japan will be portrayed through bilateral and multilateral lenses.

After the Cold War, the security structure in the region experienced changes due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Before, due to the bipolar structure in the region, the security alliances were made through the US and were mostly based on the bilateral form, which is known as the San Francisco System, known also as the hub-and-spokes system (Ye, 2008, p. 122). As widely known, one of those bilateral security relations that is still standing and strong is the US-Japan alliance. Based on the US economic dominance in bilateral relations and the other party's forgoing of some sovereign rights such as letting the US forces reside in their territory, this system created a split in the region under the Cold War such as between China and Japan (Ye, 2008, p. 127-128). Then, with the Soviet dissolution, the core importance of the US presence in the region started to decrease and the US demanded Japan become more active (Ye, 2008, p. 132). Moreover, with the Asian economies thriving, the San Francisco System started to weaken, and the US economic dominance was challenged (Ye, 2008, p. 133). On top of these changes, another turning point was the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crises. With the harsh economic loneliness that the Asians faced, other cooperation efforts were made within Asia such as through ASEAN (Ye, 2008, p. 137). With these cooperation spirits to evolve in Asia, the security cooperation also made itself a place in the agenda. Yet, in many issues involving the North Korean problem and the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crises, the US was the problem-solver in the region whereas China and Japan lacked that position (Sahashi, 2024, p. 277).

3.6.1 Bilateral Security Cooperation

The security exchange, which is any bilateral activity concerning security relations is active in Sino-Japanese relations (Akiyama, 2012). The bilateral security in Sino-Japanese relations was placed as annual Japan-China Security Dialogues where the first meeting was held in December 1993 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2011b). As one of them, the Japan-China Consultations concerning the East China Sea and Other Matters were held. Although there was not much information on the content of the consultation regarding the East China Sea, the framework resulted in a consensus on 20 July 2007 which served as a confidence-building step (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007). Moreover, on 7 May 2008, the Security Dialogue's importance was highlighted, and its continuity was affirmed in the Joint Press Statement between the two countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008a). Thus, regarding military exchange, on 8 September 2008, 15 PLA officers visited JSDF forces officers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008b). In 2011, the 12th Security Dialogue was held where high-level officials from foreign affairs and defense ministries attended (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2011b). The 13th one was held on 20 March 2015, where both sides explained their defense policies, Japan explained a "proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation" and China stated the continuation of "peaceful development" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015a). Finally, on 22 February 2023, the 17th Security Dialogue was held, where Japan explained and positioned a strong concern on defense policies, Chinese activities around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and Chinese joint exercises with Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023b). On the other hand, in the 17th Security Dialogue, China explained the Global Security Initiative to the Japanese counterparts and stated serious concern about the Japanese narrative of the "Chinese threat" in various defense documents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2023a). The initiative further underlined the Chinese will to solve the disputes through dialogue (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Costa Rica, 2023).

The Sino-Japanese security cooperation is limited to trust and tolerance building based on communication and military exchanges (Akiyama, 2012). Although the sides did not provide an explicit analysis and the literature was scarce covering this topic, the

dialogue's content will be presented as much as possible in this part. Accordingly, the dialogue was a way of constituting trust between the sides where the Chinese military developments and the lack of transparency gained attention from the Japanese side (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2000). Moreover, a way to solution to disputes in Sino-Japanese relations can be through collective security (Akiyama, 2012). Deriving from these bilateral security cooperation frameworks, although the dialogue was mostly maintained, they were not fruitful in the end. This does not correlate with the efforts being in vain, yet due to the dire situation the world is in, and the unresolved problems accumulated in this bilateral relation, the cooperation efforts fall short.

3.6.2 Multilateral Security Cooperation

The first multilateral step towards the cooperation on Asian security which includes Japan, China, and the US was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Ye, 2008, p. 134). The first meeting was held on 25 July 1994, in Bangkok (ASEAN Regional Forum, n.d). The forum was established to provide a common ground for the countries to come together to communicate on the issues of security, politics, and diplomacy (ASEAN Regional Forum, n.d.). With regular meetings with the participant countries, ARF became a common ground for communication and dialogue (Stramer-Smith, 2024, p. 156). However, in the minds of the ASEAN countries and Japan, the forum was a way to convince China to reduce its opaqueness and developments regarding the military (Chien-peng, 2017, p. 135-136). China, who was at first unwilling to partake in this forum was cautious on the ground that the forum was established in the mindset of controlling the Chinese threat (Ye, 2008, p. 134). As a result, in the second meeting in 1995, when the South China Sea was brought up in the agenda of the forum, China resisted, and the topic was slowly removed from the agenda (Chien-peng, 2017, p. 136). Moreover, although transparency was underlined in the documents published by the forum such as in the Annual Security Outlook documents which were designed to give information on military personnel, equipment, or defense budget, China did not comply with it and the forum lacked the enforcement power (Chien-peng, 2017, p. 137). In the second half of 1990, the clashes between the two in the forum continued as one side criticized the developments in the waters surrounding Taiwan, and the other protested as it was internal affairs and criticized the US alliance strengthening (Chien-

peng, 2017, p. 137). Yet, in time, China started to find the ARF beneficial because it did not have coercive powers to dominate China, Taiwan was left outside, and the US was not the dominant power in the forum (Ye, 2008, p. 135). There, after 2009, the divergence of the ARF increased gravely due to the US will to take control back and the Chinese assertiveness to not let them (Stramer-Smith, 2024, p. 156). Although it looked promising, due to the decisions' non-binding character, and lack of the country weights on the topics visa vis the power distribution resulted in the inaction on crucial security issues such as Taiwan or North Korea developments (Ye, 2008, p. 135). Moreover, communication which was thought to be the provider for cooperation found ineffective (Chien-peng, 2017, p. 138).

Another attempt was made through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework. In 1999, ASEAN countries and the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China were included in the network to prevent the harm that was created due to the 1997-78 Asian Financial Crises (ASEAN Plus Three, n.d.). In the report, East Asia Community for Peace, Prosperity, and Progress on 31 October 2001, the need for security and political cooperation was underlined (ASEAN Plus Three, 2001). In 2003, when China proposed military officials' expert meetings with the ASEAN countries, Japan was alarmed by the increased dominance of China within the frameworks and proposed the East Asian Community notion which involved countries who could lessen the Chinese impact such as Australia (Chien-peng, 2017, p. 143). Ten years later, another report from the East Asia Vision Group was prepared and then submitted on 29 November 2012. Accordingly, regarding security especially maritime security the report aimed "to strengthen policy dialogue and capacity building activities in the political and security" arenas (ASEAN Plus Three, 2012, p. 13). However, the Sino-Japanese dispute points covered above was not addressed. Another platform formed in 2005 was the East Asia Summit (EAS) which focused on bringing the heads of state and government officials together (East Asia Summit, 2021). Moreover, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) was convened for the first time on 12 October 2010 (ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting, 2024). The talks resulted in military exercises with the participation of all members (Stramer-Smith, 2024, p. 157). For example, on 21 November 2024, the Defense Ministers of Japan and China conducted a meeting under the auspices of the ADMM Plus framework (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2024).

There, the Japanese Defense Minister stated Japanese concerns about Chinese military developments, maritime and airspace activities in the East and South China Seas, and Taiwan (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2024). However, the probability of ASEAN being affiliated with any cooperation pillar to effectively address and solve a problem regarding traditional security issues was extremely low since the institution's core value is non-interference in internal affairs which includes military cooperation (Chien-peng, 2017, p. 147). Providing a security dialogue platform that takes place every year, the meeting mostly focused on non-traditional security issues which again falls short of providing a cooperation targeting solution for the Sino-Japanese disputes. Also, for example, in the talks on the South China Sea, the presence of the US in both EAS and ADMM Plus in the 2010s made the issue non-solvable due to their clashes of interests in the region (Stramer-Smith, 2024, p. 153). Therefore, the effectiveness of the frameworks hit an impasse again (Stramer-Smith, 2024, p. 153-154). Moreover, the same argument can apply to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) where traditional security issues were aimed to be touched upon and many times the two countries' leaders conducted a meeting. After the 9/11 attacks, the agenda of APEC started to evolve into anti-terrorism topics rather than focusing solely on energy and economic security (Ravenhill, 2013, p. 56). Yet, due to the inactiveness of the participants except for Japan, the aim of bringing traditional security issues to the APEC agenda was declined (Ravenhill, 2013, p. 60). Therefore, it is possible to say that although the initiatives were taken and the path to cooperation was laid ahead, due to the clash of the interests of Japan, China, and the US led to these paths being blocked (Jho & Chae, 2014, p. 241).

As time passed and the security issues both traditional and non-traditional continued to exist in the region, other forms of multilateral security cooperation started to emerge. These can be AUKUS, QUAD, or Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy, concerning the region's security which included Japan and the US, but never China (Sahashi, 2024, p. 283, 286). Due to their non-inclusive nature regarding China in the security topics, it is difficult to expect a solution to be provided to the Japan-China security relations. Unfortunately, these cooperation fields are dividing the region and jeopardizing Sino-Japanese security relations more due to the mindset of power politics involved within against one another (Chien-peng, 2017, p. 134). According to

Acharya (2014, p. 167), the security cooperation forms in the region accommodated China better than the European counterparts did regarding Russia such as during the NATO expansion periods. However, currently, the security cooperation initiatives repeat the mistake of excluding China and if this exclusion was not the case, then there would be talks of effective cooperation in the region where the security issues will be discussed, and a common ground can be reached. With all these points aside, maybe the notion of Professor Akiyama's suggestion can only bring effective security cooperation within the region which is the US, China, and Japan trilateral security cooperation (Akiyama, 2012).

In both bilateral and multilateral cooperation efforts ranging from historical problems to transparency of the military, both sides were unable to find a common ground that could effectively ease the tensions and solve the disputes. This, again, does not mean that the sides were unwilling to solve the disputes between them. Yet, as commonly reflected in the literature, neither Japan nor China was able to communicate with the mindset of solving the problems of traditional security disputes between them. It seems that the sides only agree to not agree which eventually causes the issues to be non-touched, dwelled upon, and eventually deliberately neglected to prevent the escalation of any further tension.

3.7 Conclusion

The accumulation of tension and deliberate neglect is present and evident in the disputed issues between China and Japan. The historical issue involving both textbook and Yasukuni Shrine problems reflected that the sides were unable to find a common ground for how to perceive each other. Moreover, due to the differences in the perception of history, which is backed by nationalism from both sides, the trust deficit between the two countries is growing. Related to this trust deficit that has history, the Taiwan and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issues increased the tensions and added to the form of the trust deficit from diplomatic and military problems. On top of it, due to the developments and enhancements of the militaries, the sides are perceiving each other more and more as a serious concern, some even named it a "threat". With the lack of

security cooperation ability between the two sides, the issues are positioned as critical, and the security environment in the region seems dire.

With all these issues combined, the US has a role in the Sino-Japanese bilateral security relations. Sometimes as a superpower that intervenes in the relations and sometimes as a participant which involved and currently is partaking in the security issues. This strange situation, where an actor is both an intervener and a participant in the bilateral relations of two other countries, also needed to be explored and analyzed to portray and comprehend the Sino-Japanese security relations.

CHAPTER 4

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE US EFFECT ON THE SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

4.1 Introduction

In the wake of the post-Cold War era, US President Bush famously coined the “new world order” and positioned the US as a superpower who is responsible for taking the leadership in the world (Cameron, 2005, p. 16). In the 1990 East Asia Strategy Report from the US Department of Defense, the US declared that they would lessen the military presence by 40,000 soldiers in three years starting from 1990 (Mak, 1998, p. 102). Moreover, with the burden-sharing mentality, the US expected to take a more active role from the allies in security matters (Tow, 2015, p. 35). What followed was the concern of the US allies, such as Japan, of a security vacancy (Mak, 1998, p. 102). Yet, this was not a political move to decrease the US supremacy in the region (Mak, 1998, p. 102). For example, in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crises, the US sending of two maritime vessels was an indication of both reasserting the dominance of the region against the Chinese and a comforting move to the Japanese (Mak, 1998, p. 102). Accordingly, this presence was welcomed even by the Chinese for limiting Japan from becoming a nuclear power (Mak, 1998, p. 103). Yet still, the US dispatchment from East Asia was hinted at again in 1991 in the US National Security Strategy (NSS) which the US policy for the world was coined as “We cannot be the world’s policeman with responsibility for solving all the world’s security problems. But we remain the country to whom others turn when in distress” (US Department of Defense, 1991, p. 2). Moreover, Japan’s role in the world was also mentioned as promoting its global role in the world (US Department of Defense, 1991, p. 6). On the other hand, Chinese relations were put on the agenda for prevention of isolation (US Department of Defense, 1991, p. 9). However, the Chinese rise as a potential threat to the US was always considered (Mak, 1998, p. 104). This consideration prevented the US

presence's eradication from the region. The US decrease of presence due to the rise of China and Japan all contributed to the strategic importance of the region (McGrew, 1998, p. 166-167). Also, the US had the "structural power" in the region which meant that the US had "the capacity to initiate, promote, organize, or block changes to, the norms and rules which regulate trans-Pacific relations" (McGrew, 1998, p. 167). This also gives birth to preserving the US dominance in the region. Accordingly, to protect interests, and give life to and implement the security policies as they see fit requires the US dominance, therefore; it is important for the US (McGrew, 1998, p. 169). Regarding Japan, the US was encouraging them to take an active role in the framework of burden-sharing whilst not concerning the allies from the US completely dispatched on the one hand, and Japanese remilitarization on the other (McGrew, 1998, p. 175). This burden-sharing mindset found itself a place in the renewed USA-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1996 which the Japanese security agenda was widened (McGrew, 1998, p. 176). However, the alliance mentality before 1995 did not always receive support from some US circles due to the economic incentives, and some even argued that due to the alliance's nature, the US may force Japan to make use of Japanese commerce and financial markets for the Americans (Christensen, 1999, p. 59). Yet, this notion did not receive support from the government and in the 1995 Nye Report regarding East Asia, the importance of the alliance was underlined (Christensen, 1999, p. 59).

Chinese, on the other hand, perceived the US invitation of China to the market economy as an implicit containment (Mak, 1998, p. 104). Not so far off from the reality, accordingly, from the emerging news of the US Defense Department's newly developing policy document in 1992 stated that the US was determined to prevent any rising powers which has the potential to become a superpower to emerge neither in Europe, Asia, or the former Soviet soils (Tyler, 1992). Regarding Asia, the same document was focused on the prevention of the remilitarization of Japan, which was also what made the US military presence alive in the region (Tyler, 1992). Chinese post-Cold War mentality was to economically pragmatic diplomacy and to modernize their military and become a global power (Roy, 1998, p. 143-145). This, however, triggered the Japanese as unilateralism was the strategy for the US, and modernization and high-tech military were for China (Roy, 1998, p. 149). Also, the Chinese military

modernization and developments were found illogical since after the Cold War, the Chinese stated that the region and the world now became a more peaceful place (Roy, 1998, p. 151). But also, one can argue that, although China was welcomed to the market economy and gained a surplus out of that system, they were not welcomed to invest in the areas that they chose within the system currently. On the other hand, security relations with the US have certain points that are critical and involve Japan, these are Taiwan and the East China Sea disputes (Stuart, 2015, p. 17). Therefore, both to prevent the Japanese remilitarization and incorporate China into the liberal order, the US preserved its presence in East Asia.

The post-Cold War era of Japan was designed to focus on strengthening the country's economy rather than taking an active security role according to the former Prime Minister Yoshida (Pyle, 1998, p. 124). Gaining power from the "Yoshida Doctrine", this system did not start to work in the Gulf Crises which threatened the petroleum supplies of Japan (Pyle, 1998, p. 125-126). Combined with the US unilateralism rise, Japan was somewhat forced to take a more active role immediately after the Cold War. Before, the road was paved, especially in the 1970s when Japan covered more than 70% of the costs of the bases belonged to Americans (Campbell, 2012, p. 7-8). The US alliance, which was expected to lose its importance after the Cold War was preserved due to the unresolved issues in the Asia-Pacific, and the impediment of the Japanese rearmament (Pyle, 1998, p. 133). For the latter issue, the commander of the Marine Corps Bases in Japan, Henry C. Stackpole III stated that "No one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan. So, we are a cap in the bottle, if you will" (The Washington Post, 1990). On the other hand, looking at the relations with Japan, the US-Japan alliance was born out of Cold War politics, to deter the Soviets in the Asia front (Ikenberry, 2004, p. 355). In return for the American protection, technology, and markets, Japan gave its political, and economic support to the US (Ikenberry, 2004, p. 355). Moreover, due to the alliance's nature and the US involvement, the suspicion of the remilitarization of Japan was halted (Ikenberry, 2004, p. 355). The involvement of the US as a status-quo power, where security is provided both to Japan and to every country that is vary of Japanese militarism (Mak, 1998, p. 101). Moreover, this presence prevented the eruption of disputes among the disputed issues within the

region (Mak, 1998, p. 101). Therefore, both to prevent the Japanese remilitarization and incorporate China into the liberal order, the US preserved its presence in East Asia. Looking into the internal dynamics of the US foreign policy decision-making, when the tenure of Bill Clinton started in 1992, the new president was aiming to focus on internal affairs, especially the economy rather than the outside world which created suspicions in Asia region (Cameron, 2005, p. 19). Different from the Bush administration of the “new world order”, President Clinton focused on internal affairs and “cooperative security” where the allies share the burden (McGrew, 1998, p. 171-172). This policy drew criticism from the Clinton government, who are in a tough position to draw a new line for the US policy for the world (Mandelbaum, 2016, p. 16). Therefore, to solve the problem of policy for the future, US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake coined the enlargement, in place of the containment (Mandelbaum, 2016, p. 17). However, they were not successful in changing making this statement into a strategy (Mandelbaum, 2016, p. 17). To bring the countries behind the curtain to the market economy, the Clinton administration followed the policy of “constructive engagement” (Cameron, 2005, p. 169). Combined with “enlargement”, this policy meant the sharing of the burden with the allies, which enabled the US to decrease their defense spending and the number of deployed troops (McGrew, 1998, p. 173). These were also put into documentation in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (McGrew, 1998, p. 173). The president even mentioned the possibility of a strategic partnership with China (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 4). Regarding the MFN Status, the Clinton administration used the Tiananmen Incident’s political criticism from the American people, and he pushed forward an order that to get a renewal of MFN status, China would be assessed by its domestic administration and have to show an improvement such as for political detainees, or permitting Chinese people to international media (Mandelbaum, 2016, p. 26). Yet, this order received a harsh rejection and eventually failed (Mandelbaum, 2016, p. 27). Then, coming to 1994, this Chinese policy shifted due to the Chinese market’s beneficial inclusion prevailing in the human rights discussions (Mandelbaum, 2016, p. 28-29). However, these policies of improving trade relations with China received criticism from Republicans due to the nature of the relations between the two was leaning towards competition rather than cooperation (Cameron, 2005, p. 27). Due to this nature, the alliances in Asia should be improved rather than the relations with China in the minds

of the critics (Cameron, 2005, p. 27). In the 1990s, all-cooperative relations started to bump into serious obstacles with the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crises and the claims in the East and South China Seas (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 4). Chinese and the US interests clashed on these topics gravely, yet due to preserving the status-quo politics from both sides, the issues did not accumulate into a crisis (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 5).

This ambiguous stance of Clinton towards Asia continued in the new Bush administration which took office on 20 January 2001 (Cameron, 2005, p. 28-29). Regarding the US-China policy, it can be best explained by Michael Mandelbaum's words: "The single consistent feature of the history of relations between the United States and China is inconsistency" (Mandelbaum, 2016, p. 18). Moreover, the new administration was harshly criticized due to its isolationist/unilateralist stance regarding world affairs, where the world was waiting for the US to lead (Cameron, 2005, p. 30-31). They were expected to follow a harsh policy against China, with the mentality of China is becoming a "strategic competitor" (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 9-10). The US criticized China for its actions on Taiwan (Cameron, 2005, p. 168). Accordingly, President Bush stated that if the island came under attack from China, he would order "whatever it took" to help Taiwan defend itself" (Sanger, 2001, para. 1). What followed was the arms sales to Taiwan and the plane collusion between the two countries (Cameron, 2005, p. 169). However, with the 9/11 attacks, the perception of the US regarding the world changed, it can be said it was an awakening of the US as a superpower in the world. This change enabled the US to improve its relations with China (Cameron, 2005, p. 139). Moreover, the Chinese cooperative stance in the war on terror and help to G20 countries in the 2007-8 economic crises maintained a cooperative US policy toward China (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 10). With the 9/11 attacks and the US policy shift away from Asia, the allies such as Japan and South Korea felt the dilemma of not losing the US attachment to the region which led them to act in Afghanistan and Iraq and not losing the public support from their people (Ikenberry, 2004, p. 360).

In the 2008 Economic Crisis, due to the Chinese success in not being affected by it, China became more confident against the US-led market system which proved itself

to be more resilient towards the 2008 Economic Crisis (Mandelbaum, 2016, p. 347). More, deriving from these, 2008 coined itself as a decline of the US power in the world (Mandelbaum, 2016, p. 347). In Obama's tenure starting from 2009, the same approach in the previous administration was sustained (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 10). Obama stated that he would continue the constructive policies toward China (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 10).

However, towards the end of Obama's first tenure, the Chinese policies started to be renewed (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 10). For example, the Air Defense Identification Zone was declared in the East China Sea which triggered the Obama administration to take a different step toward East Asia (Tow, 2015, p. 30). There comes the famous "pivot to Asia" which was a strategic rebalancing policy of the US, of Obama in his second tenure (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 10). This strategy was the result of the balance of power which prevents any country from accomplishing a superiority in the region (Stuart, 2015, p. 9). Due to criticisms of the Chinese regarding this policy and the activities in the East and South China Seas, the US supported its alliances, mainly with Japan (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 11). Moreover, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement was put into force as an economic pillar of the "Pivot to Asia" policy, which China was not a part of (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 11). As a countermove, China introduced its economic initiatives such as the famous Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 12). The US rebalancing strategy, however, was perceived as containment by the Chinese (Tow, 2015, p. 39). On the other hand, due to the Chinese assertiveness in the region, the Obama administration continued the Cold War San-Francisco System of preserving the bilateral alliances strengthened the Japanese alliance and reasserted the protection regarding Senkaku/Diaoyu islands against China (Tow, 2015, p. 40). These efforts were made due to two possible aims, one was the US wanted to regain the dominance in the region or force China to split the dominance (Liu, 2015, p. 103). The US also stated that this pivot strategy, however, did not present a zero-sum game in the relations with China (Liu, 2015, p. 105).

The relations also went downhill when the Trump administration came to power in 2017 (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 12). There, China became the “revisionist power” that threatened the US interests (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 12). After 2018, the trade war began and the relations had deteriorated further (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 13). Although there were efforts to ease the tensions through trade agreements like “Phase 1” between the two giants, due to the global pandemic outburst, the cooperative spirit was gone (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 13).

On the other hand, due to Chinese economic growth, military developments, and taking the role of big power in the international arena all affected the well-known power shift (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 14). More, with the Chinese healing relations with Russia, and the US strengthening alliances in Asia all exacerbated the rivalry between the two countries (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 14). Within this global shift, the US military presence affected the Chinese reactions in the East Asia region, where China saw the presence as an interference in internal affairs like in East and South China Seas disputes, whereas the US was concerned over the increasing influence and growing power of China in the region (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 15). What followed was the US policies that counter China in the South China Sea and Taiwan (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 15). When China increased its weight on Taiwan, the US support also increased (deLisle & Goldstein, 2021, p. 15).

As an overall look at the region, in the event of the post-Cold War period, the unpredictability was felt to the core by the regional powers, China as a developing state which is not happy with the US presence and Japanese militarism, and Japan as worry of US dispatched from the region and the Chinese rise (Mak, 1998, p. 93). Three of the four powers that enable researchers to understand the security dynamics of the region were China, Japan, and the US (Mak, 1998, p. 88). China as the unsatisfied power, the revival of Japan as a military power, and the US dominance in the region position the security environment as tension-full (Mak, 1998, p. 88-89). Within this environment, how the US affected the Sino-Japanese relations reflects the character of the security situation in the region.

4.2 The US and the History Issue

Looking at the Sino-Japanese history issue, the US involvement in it implicitly reflected itself. However, this was thoughtfully stated in the literature. Throughout history, the mentioned historical events, where mistrust and historical issues arise from the US involvement. In this part, the US involvement in the Sino-Japanese history issue is divided into three parts. In the first part, how the US affected the Second World War events and the aftermath of it is to be explained. In the second part, how the US police and the ring-holder position have affected the relations is portrayed. Finally, the post-Cold War history problem events and the US position in it is to be discussed.

The very first US intervention in the Sino-Japanese history problem was derived from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (also known as Tokyo Trials) on 3 May 1946 (Lind, 2023). Accordingly, the first involvement was the exemption of Japanese Emperor Hirohito from persecution (Lind, 2023). According to historian Gary Bass, the emperor approved the entering of the war (Lind, 2023). Moreover, the repeatedly mentioned A Class War Criminals who were punished under the trials, were the officials who were directly under the emperor, where the Japanese Prime Minister Tojo stated that “it was inconceivable to have taken action contrary to the emperor’s wishes” (Murphy, 2014, p. 109). Yet, the American persecutor in the Trials, Joseph Keenan withdrew the testimonial by Toji (Murphy, 2014, p. 109). This decision, according to Gary Bass, was taken due to the concerns over Japanese revolts when the US occupied Japan and this led to the myth of reflecting the emperor as innocent (Lind, 2023). Thus, to ease the transformation of the Japanese society under the US occupation, one important aspect was sidelined. It may be reminded that, in the second chapter, the Chinese were protesting that the real offender of the war which they meant the emperor, was gone unpunished which also escalated the apology issue. The second involvement was that the Trials did not cover the “comfort women” issue or Unit 731 (Lind, 2023). Without undergoing inspection, very critical and sorrowful situations were not addressed. This has also accelerated the comfort women issue’s unresolved nature which is still ongoing today. Moreover, because the US was not persecuted regarding the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the objectivity of the trials was also questioned and named as “victor’s justice” (Murphy, 2014, p. 109). All these applied,

and although the Trials were held and the many subjects of the war atrocities were punished, pure objectivity was lacking in the Trials which led to the various issues resurfacing and accumulating the tension. The third important involvement was that after the massacre and rape of Nanjing, the Cold War stopped the Americans from forcing the Japanese to apologize or its reflection on the history books which then the issues were not covered (Shin & Sneider, 2016, p. 159-160). However, even immediately after the massacre in 1937, American media was informed and made headlines which was used as a propaganda tool against the Japanese during the war (Shin & Sneider, 2016, p. 163). As a result, due to this Cold War mindset, Americans did not persecute several responsible officials of the war (Shin & Sneider, 2016, p. 170). Moreover, the US does to the history problems in which it partakes for example in comfort women, unit 731, vague stance on maritime issues, or neglecting the persecution of the Japanese emperor regarding the war atrocities (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 99) all caused frictions between China and Japan. This was pointed out as a lack of objectivity of the US regarding the issue (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 99). Moreover, the US involvement in not inviting the PRC and the ROC to the San Francisco Conference led to serious problems for the future ahead (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 94).

According to Buzan and Goh (2020, p. 57), western countries such as the US and Britain play a significant role in the historical problem in the region. Thus, the US is also a foreign but intact actor in the historical problem because it is the architect of the post-war order in East Asia (Shin & Sneider, 2016, p. 16-17). In this part, the history problem has two aspects: regional and global (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 66). Globally, firstly both China and Japan suffered from the Western invasion (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 73). Yet, during the Cold War, due to the ideological clashes, the US did not promote the industrial development of China and North Korea, which was not the case for Japan and South Korea (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 81). Accordingly, the US's Japan policy was named "soft peace" which derived from the development of Japan and was needed for the Cold War politics (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 99). This resulted in the Japanese rising "victim" mentality (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 99), due to the non-involvement of the victims of the Japanese army in the San Francisco Conference which was a decision of the US. Since, the US was involved in not inviting the PRC and the ROC to the San Francisco Conference (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 94).

On the other hand, regionally, as it was previously stated, the US presence played the role as a stabilizer to prevent Japanese remilitarization and regional disputes. However, although it was not pronounced widely in the literature, the US presence also prevented the regional states from finding a solution to their bilateral disputes after the war (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 98). The US succeeded in limiting the Japanese easing the tensions and normalizing the relations in the region by making the path for the recognition of the PRC (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 98-99). However, in the Cold War years, this stabilization also reflected the prevention of any relations from developing. The establishment of the bilateral security alliance between Japan and the US enabled the US to “step into the breach between Japan and China as an ‘outside arbiter play[ing] a policing role’ (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 140). Accordingly, even if Japan and China had shown willingness to normalize the relations, due to the Cold War politics, the US would have prevented it. For example, during the US occupation of Japan, Japanese officials wanted to establish relations with the PRC, which was sidelined by the US (Murphy, 2014, p. 100). Moreover, this role of the US which was coined as “ring-holder” by Buzan and Goh, takes the form of enhancing economic relations with China and promoting the US alliance with Japan, which is becoming more negative towards Chinese assertiveness, simultaneously in the post-normalization process of the Sino-Japanese relations (Buzan & Goh, 2020, p. 140). Although the US role in the region was widely known as the police, the ring-holder position was simultaneously filled by the US in the region.

Yet in time, when the Japanese and the US started to be concerned about the Chinese rise coming to the 2000s, this ring-holding position started to change, and the US started to follow a preservation of the *status-quo* policy in the region. There, the US also takes the role of the stabilizer of tensions or the pre-alarming actor in the region as well. For example, when the relations were strained due to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue, where the Sino-Japanese relations hit a big obstacle with the rising tension in 2013, Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine on top of it could have led to an eruption of a crisis. After the visit, therefore, the Americans advised Abe not to visit the shrine (Shin & Sneider, 2016, p. 5; Atanassova-Cornelis & Sato, 2019, p. 85). This warning was not due to the American policy of sidelining China, but it was due to the easing of the tensions in the region and the mentality of not giving more

reasons for the tensions to escalate. Therefore, the Sino-Japanese history problem is a possible hindrance to the US-Japan alliance as well (Berger, 2003, p. 64). Moreover, the US did not want the historical issue to escalate since the issue disrupted the stability in the region and is an important dispute (Berger, 2003, p. 84).

This perception is not widely discussed in the literature. Although the US involvement certainly brought stability to the region, this stability also paved the way for historical issues in the Sino-Japanese relations to be left unresolved, not discussed, or too late to unfold. On the other hand, the US manipulated and formed the region for its benefit within the Cold War stance, which also jeopardized the historical problem. This does not mean that the problem was caused, and not solved solely because of the US involvement. Yet, the issue was not laid immediately after through bilateral talks between the parties that were involved due to the US interest. Therefore, these little changes amounted to a problem, which added fire to the deep mistrust between the two neighbors.

4.3 The US and the Taiwan Issue

The Taiwan issue is where the US involvement and effect on the Sino-Japanese relations became evident. To clarify some points, Japan does not have any sovereignty claim clashes with China regarding Taiwan. However, Taiwan's inclusion of the Chinese full sovereignty has the risk of clashes between the two countries in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and jeopardizing the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) flow of Japan (Bercaw, 2024). However, all those risks do not reflect the reality of the seriousness of the Taiwan issue. This grim and tension-full situation in Taiwan derives from the US rivalry with China. To thoroughly explain this situation, the US factor within the Taiwan issue and how the US policies affected the Japanese security policies vis-à-vis China will be analyzed in this part.

Taiwan has never been the sole issue between the PRC and the ROC. Taiwan was colonized by the Japanese after the signing of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki which lasted for 50 years in time Taiwan had developed and gathered affinity towards the Japanese (Goldstein, 2015, p. 49). On the other hand, the US has seen Taiwan as an

important island with a strategic interest due to the US experiences in the Pacific War (Hara, 2007, p. 53). Closely related to this, the 1945 Yalta Conference affected Taiwan's situation, where the Asia-Pacific was envisioned (Hara, 2007, p. 53). Accordingly, the US and the UK had two different visions of China, in which the former wanted a unified area, whereas the latter preferred a segregated one (Hara, 2007, p. 53). Therefore, the status of Taiwan has always been a global political issue.

Another point is that, as was previously mentioned, it is mostly pronounced that in the outcome of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it was not clearly defined where Japan left the authority of Taiwan (Hara, 2007, p. 51). Yet, after the US forces occupied Japan, General McArthur ordered that Taiwan be handed over to Chiang Kai-shek (Hara, 2007, p. 54). According to Chou En-lai, the US should have not mentioned where should Japan leave the authority which indicated that they wanted to preserve Taiwan in their hands (Hara, 2007, p. 66).

Therefore, to deeply understand the embeddedness of the US regarding Taiwan politics, looking at the history is crucial. Accordingly, after World War II, when the Chinese civil war was continuing, there were two counterarguments regarding Taiwan. Louis Johnson, the US Secretary of Defense, portrayed Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" that should not fall into the hands of the communists (Goldstein, 2015, p. 50). Yet, Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, argued that the aid to KMT forces, which were positioned in Taiwan, leads to bad relations with Chinese people, therefore the US should not interfere (Goldstein, 2015, p. 50). That is why, in the "Acheson Line", which is the line described where the US defense interest should be preserved, Taiwan did not take a place (Hara, 2007, p. 55). At first, the Truman government planned to leave the KMT by themselves and stated that the island had "no strategic significance" (Tan, 2016, p. 284). Although Truman leaned towards Acheson's notion, the outbreak of the Korean War changed his outlook and portrayed the importance of the Taiwan Strait, where the US positioned the Seventh Fleet afterward (Goldstein, 2015, p. 50). Another development that triggered the US presence in the region was the Friendship Treaty between the PRC and the USSR on 14 February 1950, which coincided with the main foreign policy objective of the Truman administration, containment of the Reds (Hara, 2007, p. 54-55). Therefore, Taiwan gained strategic

importance in the framework of the containment policy (Tan, 2016, p. 285). However, as was previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the Truman administration was also not willing to support the KMT, which led to the leaving of Taiwan without a solution until the security situation in the region was settled (Hara, 2007, p. 55).

Then, in 1954 when the PRC army killed two US soldiers during advancement on Quemoy which was controlled by the KMT forces, President Eisenhower decided to send three battlegroups closer to Taiwan (Tan, 2016, p. 285). In these tension-full times, the American and the KMT sides came together and signed the Mutual Defense Treaty on 2 December 1954 which the sides agreed that any attack against one side would be automatically perceived as an attack on both (Tan, 2016, p. 285). More crucially, Taiwan allowed the US forces to occupy Taiwanese land, air, and maritime zones (Tan, 2016, p. 285). With this agreement, Taiwan was included in the “hub and spokes system” (Tan, 2016, p. 285). By this inclusion, Taiwan became one of the security pillars of the US foreign policy, which shows the embeddedness of the US on the Taiwan issue and links Taiwan to Japan, the two spokes of the same hub.

These developments were conceived as involvement in the internal affairs of the PRC by the Chinese (Tan, 2016, p. 285). Yet, from both sides, the harsh responses were silenced by Mao and Eisenhower (Goldstein, 2015, p. 51). The US started to follow a strategic ambiguity such as where no clear stance regarding the defense of Taiwan was presented within the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty (Tan, 2016, p. 285-286). Accordingly, this policy which became embedded into US politics paved the way for the well-known “strategic ambiguity” and “dual deterrence” of the commonly known 21st century policies (Goldstein, 2015, p. 51). This way, the US prevented any drastic change in the status quo, such as the PRC attack on Taiwan, and limited Chiang Kai-shek’s assertive policies which may have led to an attack on the PRC and involved the US in the process (Tan, 2016, p. 285-286). The same straining of PRC-US relations repeated in the 1958 PRC advance on Taiwan’s offshore islands (Tan, 2016, p. 286). Therefore, it was obvious that the US tried to prevent the escalation of the tensions due to the Cold War politics.

These tensions subsided after the Sino-U.S. rapprochement (Tan, 2016, p. 286). In the Joint Communiqué in 1972 between the two sides, Taiwan was overshadowed by the Nixon administration (Tan, 2016, p. 286-287). Therefore, the Nixon administration accepted the “one China” principle and Taiwan’s inclusion in it (Tan, 2016, p. 287). With the Sino-US normalization process completed in 1979, the 1954 Defense Treaty with Taiwan became null and void (Tan, 2016, p. 287). Closing the gap, in this normalization process, with the PRC’s rise in the international organizations, the US retrieved its troops from Taiwan (Goldstein, 2015, p. 51). However, due to the importance of Taiwan for regional security, on 1 January 1979, in place of that treaty, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. Accordingly:

(...) The United States shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and shall maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan. (Congress Gov., 1979, para. 1)

Still, the strategic ambiguity policy was active in this statement, where the US did not state clearly how it would react in the event of an attack (Tan, 2016, p. 287). Due to Chinese politics’ focus on acting against the Soviets, this act was sidelined except for arms sales (Tan, 2016, p. 288). After the clarification request was made by the Chinese on this topic, on 17 August 1982 Joint Communiqué, the US:

(...) does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over some time to a final resolution. (as cited in Tan, 2016, p. 288)

However, the same year, the so-called “Six Assurances” of the US to Taiwan portrayed some clashing points with the abovementioned Communiqué. According to the Six Assurances, the US did not determine a deadline for the arms sales to Taiwan (Hsiao, 2018). This inconsistent behavior of the US created mistrust in the minds of the Chinese (Tan, 2016, p. 288).

The post-Cold War created a new era for the Taiwan issue since the rapprochement’s *raison d’être* had vanished. The rise of Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui, a local Taiwanese and an advocator of independence, in 1996 paved the way for the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait Crises (Tan, 2016, p. 289). Then, the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait Crisis posed a turning point in the relations. When Lee wanted to visit his university in the US as a graduate, the

US filed a visa (Tan, 2016, p. 289). As a result, the Chinese military activities increased in the waters surrounding Taiwan. The US positioned a high military force on the straits and that much force was unseen since the war in Vietnam (Goldstein, 2015, p. 52). Taking the US wind behind him, Lee argued for the PRC and Taiwan relations as “state-to-state” (Tan, 2016, p. 290). In the US, after experiencing the determination of the PRC regarding Taiwan first-hand, the perception of the “China threat” started to prevail (Tan, 2016, p. 290). Although Bush stated that the US would defend Taiwan mindset, the US administration was less controversial against China and retreated that the US would follow the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act (Tan, 2016, p. 293). However, the US also strengthened its alliance with Japan, immediately after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Crises. On 17 April 1996, the sides declared “the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century” (US Department of State, 1996). The declaration stated the repatriation of the importance of the alliance for the security of the region and enhancing security cooperation through signing treaties on the topics of logistic support, army supplies, and services, or defense assistance (US Department of State, 1996). This was the start of the articulation of Japan’s active role in the security field. Moreover, according to the declaration:

The United States reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward-deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan. (US Department of State, 1996, Article 4)

Although Taiwan never explicitly stated in the declaration, deriving from the tensions in the Straits, the US highlighted the importance of the US forces on Japanese soil. Critically important that the US positioned Japan as a security baseline for the whole region, even after the Cold War. Therefore, the security cooperation between the two sides started to evolve into a way of reflection of the US foreign policy against China since there were no clashes between China and Japan, only the Japanese government’s affiliation with the Taiwanese ones, which was already covered in Chapter 3.

On the other hand, one important change in the alliance regarding the security of the region came with the US-Japan Defense Guidelines on 23 September 1997. According to the guidelines:

Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close

interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan. (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 3)

Related to this statement, it is important to note that the mentioned defense preparations include that “Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements” (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 3). Therefore, though not explicitly stated, it can be contemplated that if Taiwan as an area that is in the proximity of Japan attacked, this can be interpreted as an action that threatens the defense of Japan, which enables the US base to function. This contemplation is also included in the Japanese 1999 legislation where if the attack does not receive any reaction, this threat can turn into an attack on Japan (Liff, 2022b, p. 143). Also, the alliance’s stance on whether the security treaty involves Taiwan or not is ambiguous because they do not want to reassure China on this topic and pave the way for the Chinese inclusion of Taiwan (Christensen, 1999, p. 75). This resulted in the “cope of the alliance in the revised defense guidelines refers to "situational" rather than "geographic" conditions” (Christensen, 1999, p. 75).

Yet, this strained relationship eased after the 9/11 attacks (Tan, 2016, p. 293). The critical situation was that, after the War on Terror occupied US politics, the US changed its stance on China and switched to the preservation of the status quo in the region (Tan, 2016, p. 293). This was evident when President Bush explicitly showed disapproval of President Chen’s independence policies in November 2004 (Tan, 2016, p. 293). However, the involvement of the alliance on the Taiwan issue started to present itself in other ways as well. On 19 February 2005, the 2+2 meeting between the US and Japan which was a high-official meeting with the foreign and defense ministers from both sides, included the promotion of the resolution of the tensions in the straits between the PRC and Taiwan without forceful means (Liff, 2022b, p. 145). These actions provoked a Chinese reaction. On top of the rise of Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan who was also an independence supporter, paved the way for the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 of the PRC (Tan, 2016, p. 291). With this law, the US involvement was officially declared illegitimate (Tan, 2016, p. 292). A month later, the US sold destroyers and aerial vehicles to Taiwan with the authorization of the newly elected US President Bush (Tan, 2016, p. 293).

In 2008, the new government in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou aimed to follow a closer policy towards the PRC (Goldstein, 2015, p. 53). This policy was provided with economic developments that increased the linkage between the two sides, yet also showed no willingness to unification (Goldstein, 2015, p. 53-54). These policies seemed durable and sustainable since they were supported by both the people in Taiwan which was proved when Ma was reelected in 2012 and the US (Goldstein, 2015, p. 54). Also, the newly elected Obama and his government were aiming for a cooperative relationship under the name of “engagement” with the PRC (Tan, 2016, p. 294). This is evident that from the 1990s to 2008, the US built a great military base on the small island called Guam, which included submarines with nuclear attack capabilities, and bomber aerial forces (Goldstein, 2015, p. 60). Yet, after 2008, the US started to limit the buildup (Goldstein, 2015, p. 61). However, due to the US policies of containment included Taiwan, the arguments also made that the US was not perceiving the healing relations between the PRC and Taiwan positively (Goldstein, 2015, p. 56). In 2010, although there were talks on arms sales to Taiwan jeopardizing the security stability in the region in the US army circles, it did not prevent the US from making a huge arms sale to Taiwan which reached up to 6 billion US dollars’ worth (Tan, 2016, p. 294). These two clashing views can be both true. For the first argument, the US did not want any disturbances in the status quo in the region which serves the cooperation between the sides, the PRC and Taiwan. Yet, the US also wants a China that is cooperating to a certain level, where the disputes are still preserved so that they will not lose their customers in arms sales and their strategic cruise. As a result, the Taiwan solution was also prevented from occurring and led to the issues’ critical situation to be preserved in the region.

After the 2010s, there were some arguments on the US highlight on Taiwan started to dim (Goldstein, 2015, p. 58). Yet, these arguments were sidelined. As an example, in 2011, Obama’s second tenure started to behave less accommodating to China, and the “Asia pivot” policy was declared (Tan, 2016, p. 295-296). This mindset started to be clearer when the US was not accommodating the increasingly close relations between the PRC and Taiwan (Goldstein, 2015, p. 56). All these points were made due to the status quo preservation; the US was against the independence of Taiwan. Yet, due to the Chinese hand becoming stronger, it is also against unification. Further, in this

Obama period, the latter leaned towards the security agenda (Goldstein, 2015, p. 56). Further, the US sold four missile warship sales to Taiwan (Tan, 2016, p. 296). Taiwan was made an armed island with high technology such as missiles provided by the US and the security of the island was also provided by them since these technologies were tied to US-controlled islands or satellites (Goldstein, 2015, p. 56). In 2013, when China included the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the AIDZ, the US sent two bomber planes to the designated airspace as an implicit confrontation (Tan, 2016, p. 295). Deriving from this accumulation of tensions in the region, the defense cooperation guidelines between the US and Japan were altered on 17 April 2015. Accordingly, political contemplation of the situation regarding the security environment in the region would lead to the invoking of the alliance's power (Liff, 2022b, p. 147).

Towards contemporary politics, his candidate for president times, Donald Trump was a supporter of the Republican Party's thoughts for Taiwan such as promoting arms sales and international activities in non-governmental organizations (Copper, 2017, p. 5). This situation was enhanced by Trump which proved itself when he conducted a telephone call with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen between the period of the triumph in the elections and the inauguration to the position in December 2016 (Copper, 2017, p. 5). Yet, the ambiguous stance presented itself on 9 February 2017, when Trump also reassured China to follow the "one China" policy (Copper, 2017, p. 6). However, according to Copper (2017, p. 7), there was a play of words, in which the policy and principle of "one China" have different meanings the latter meant the reiteration of Taiwan's belonging to the PRC, and Trump supported the former. This was also backed with evidence when the US declared the continuation of the arms sales amounted to 1.42 billion US dollars (Copper, 2017, p. 7). This importance of Taiwan in the contemporary era was a result of the Taiwanese strategic position vis-à-vis China, where the US wanted to preserve dominance (Copper, 2017, p. 8).

On the other hand, regarding the Trump period's coldness towards the Taiwan defense of the US in 2020, Japan pursued closer relations with the PRC, where Japanese high officials highlighted the importance of the 1972 Joint Communiqué, which stated the "one China" policy, on 8 March 2024 (Cheung, 2024, p. 12). This can be given as evidence that when the US retrieved itself from Asia politics during the Trump period,

China and Japan followed a cooperative policy where Japan distanced itself from the Taiwan issue. However, when the Biden administration came to power, the US involvement in East Asia was restored, and the Taiwan issue again flared up for Japan (Cheung, 2024, p. 13). The US Secretary of State Blinken portrayed the US approach to Taiwan and stated that the US would react to the Chinese attack, although the means were not specified (Reuters, 2021). According to Cheung (2024, p. 13), one of the reasons why Japan followed such a policy was due to the US demands that Japan take a role in the Taiwan issue (Cheung, 2024, p. 13). Yet, this does not mean that Japanese foreign policy was a tool that was used by the US. For example, US National Security Council's Indo-Pacific affairs coordinator Kurt Campbell wished Japan to create its own "Taiwan Relations Act" in the meeting on 16 April 2021, which did not come to fruition in Japan (Cheung, 2024, p. 13-14). Moreover, the possibility of a war in Taiwan which the US reports dwelling on, highly disturbs the Japanese military officials and the lives of the Japanese citizens living in the surrounding islands put into danger (Cheung, 2024, p. 14). These prove that the US wants to make Japan a responsible actor in the Taiwan issue, which takes place within the Sino-U.S. rivalry and increases the tension between China and Japan regarding the Taiwan issue. For example, although Japan stated a common interest in the peace of Taiwan issue in the declaration of the joint statement with the US, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga indicated in the parliamentary statement that the JSDF would not partake in a role in a possible Taiwan conflict (Hornung, 2021).

However, the mentioning of Taiwan in the joint statement in 2021 which was last seen 52 years ago also portrays some involvement (Liff, 2022b, p. 129). Moreover, Japan also cooperates with the US for the sake of protecting the Senkaku/Diaoyu island involvement in the Taiwan issue (Cheung, 2024, p. 14). Accordingly, some talks within the inner circles in Japan, in the case of an attack from the Chinese side on Taiwan would eventually include the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Cheung, 2024, p. 14). Therefore, the enhanced relations on deterring China from the US also find supporters from the Japanese side as well (Cheung, 2024, p. 14). On top of all these, according to Cheung, if there is an increasing Chinese aggressiveness or the US influence exerted in Japan, Japan will eventually become a side in the Taiwan issue (Cheung, 2024, p. 15). Although this sounds pessimistic, the current developments reflect that Japan's

involvement in the issue will be certain. As a result, PRC repeated its stance on the White Paper regarding “the Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 2022). According to the 2022 White Paper:

Still lost in delusions of hegemony and trapped in a Cold War mindset, some forces in the US insist on perceiving and portraying China as a major strategic adversary and a serious long-term threat. They do their utmost to undermine and pressurize China, exploiting Taiwan as a convenient tool. The US authorities have stated that they remain committed to the one-China policy and that they do not support "Taiwan independence". But their actions contradict their words. They are clouding the one-China principle in uncertainty and compromising its integrity. They are contriving "official" exchanges with Taiwan, increasing arms sales, and colluding in military provocation. To help Taiwan expand its "international space", they are inducing other countries to interfere in Taiwan affairs, and concocting Taiwan-related bills that infringe upon the sovereignty of China. (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 2022)

China was disturbed by the two-sided policy in the name of an “ambiguous strategy” which on the one hand supported the “one China” principle but turned Taiwan into a military power on the other.

On the other hand, the involvement of Japan in the Taiwan issue increased in contemporary politics. Japanese Vice Minister of LDP and former Prime Minister Aso Taro visited Taiwan on 8 August 2023 (Office of the President, 2023). In his speech, while he was mentioning a collective reaction alongside the US, he stated: “We need to be prepared to put into action very strong deterrence. It's the will to fight” (Moriyasu, 2023). This embarked a serious criticism from the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, who stated on 9 August that:

The Japanese politician, however, kept raising the possibility of “a war” whilst in Taiwan—an obvious attempt to stir up trouble in the Taiwan Strait and push the people in the Taiwan region over the edge of an abyss. Today’s China is no longer what it was when the Qing government signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. What makes this Japanese politician think he is in a position or has the confidence to make such unwarranted remarks in Taiwan. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2023b, para. 3)

Angry with the Japanese involvement in the issue, China's harsh response also stated confidence in the military capabilities, which was a reminder that the current China is not the former China that was defeated by the Japanese. This also accumulates the tension between the two sides. Yet still, the US criticizes Japanese actions which were

found inadequate for the Taiwan defense (Cheung, 2024, p. 16). The Chinese side perceives any public action towards Taiwan as interference, reflecting a harsh response, and alongside the already existing problems deriving from the history, and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the Sino-Japanese relations deteriorate further. Moreover, the US pressure for more activeness of Japan regarding Taiwan acts as a catalyzer in the issue.

The US benefits from Japan as a military base in the rivalry of domination in the region against China. In the case of an attack only on Taiwan from China, the US will want to use its base in Japan and will need to consult with Japan beforehand (Hornung, 2021). There, Japan might face a dilemma of how to define and perceive the Taiwan conflict since they are not directly attacked (Hornung, 2021). This points out that for the US, Japan's support is crucial in the containment and deterrence against China (Liff, 2022b, p. 128). To explain it more explicitly, the US National Security Council's former director Daniel Russel stated that "the U.S. cannot successfully defend Taiwan without Japanese support" (as cited in Liff, 2022b, p. 128). Therefore, strategically the US will prefer Japan which the Taiwanese defense is felt responsible for. This may explain why the US pressure on Japan regarding the Taiwan issue.

Overall, the US has seen Taiwan as a strategic area against its rivals. Starting from the aftermath of the war, and the Cold War politics started to function, Taiwan became crucial for the US in preserving the status quo in the region. Moreover, after the Cold War, the US foreign policy followed an ambiguous stance where the nature of it changed due to its relations with China. In the meantime, the US continued to equip Taiwan through its arms sales. Moreover, Japan, although the security concern for Taiwan does not envision Japan in the middle of the Taiwan issue directly, the US pressures and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue brought the Japanese to the agenda of Taiwan security. As a result, the Taiwan issue was implicitly put on the agenda of Sino-Japanese disputes due to the involvement of the US by tacitly including Taiwan in the alliance's scope.

4.4 The US and the East China Sea Issue

The Senkaku/Diaoyu issue is a crucial dispute in East Asia, where the two great powers have clashing sovereignty claims and economic interests. Moreover, they have gone through a close military conflict, and now the issue is again under the deliberate neglect policy from both sides. As a security provider to one of them, and a balancer to the other, the common expectancy for the US is that it should be involved in this issue. However, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is inherently an American issue as well which is portrayed in this chapter, where the US had two direct roles, both historical and political.

The US is an important actor in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue deriving from partaking in the critical treaties that accelerated the dispute and alliance with Japan (Zhang, 2014, p. 1). Hara (2016, p. 50) even argues that the most important topic to understand the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is the US. There is a well-funded reason for these points. Firstly, historically the US forces entered the Ryukyu Islands on 1 April 1945, and they started to use the islands as a military operation base towards the end of the year (Blanchard, 2000, p. 103). One of the most important points that escalated the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue was the linkage of the Ryukyu Islands to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. According to the 1947 American maps, the islands were included in Okinawa (Ryukyu and Daito islands) (Blanchard, 2000, p. 103). This decision was already planned since the US did not want to see Japan losing islands more than it already had and disarm them because the strategic importance of these islands might be lost according to the secret studies in 1943 and 1944 (Blanchard, 2000, p. 103). Moreover, according to the US 1949 National Security Council (NSC) secret report, the US again asserted Okinawa's cruciality for the future when they planned to gain control of the islands after the planned peace treaty with Japan (De Oliveira, 2022, p. 124). Therefore, the inclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in Okinawa was a decision deriving from the US plans to enhance its military web in the world after the war (Blanchard, 2000, p. 104). The reason for the strategic thinking was due to the Cold War outlook, if the ROC was given the islands and if then the communists defeated the ROC, the islands would be in the hands of the communists and they would have access to the strategic seas (Blanchard, 2000, p. 105). Therefore, the US wanted

to preserve the islands as long as possible in their hands (Blanchard, 2000, p. 105). This led to the “residual sovereignty” of the Okinawans for the Japanese in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty (De Oliveira, 2022, p. 124). This strategic thinking worked during the Korean War where the US used it as a base for operations (Blanchard, 2000, p. 106). This also resulted in the segregation of the Ryukyus from Japan to the US trusteeship in the 1951 Peace Treaty (Blanchard, 2000, p. 109). Further, according to the Ryukyus Proclamation 27 (USCAR 27) in 1953, the Ryukyu area was defined with the inclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Niksch, 1996, p. 3). Moreover, the US rented two islands from Jinji Koga, who was the son of the first Japanese immigrant to the islands and used the islands as a base for shooting grounds (Han, 2013, p. 67). Not surprisingly, the Chinese side claimed that the islands should have been returned to them with Formosa, and the US presence afterward was not welcomed (De Oliveira, 2022, p. 123). Up until the reversion treaty, this strategic thinking of the US led to the using the island chain as a base for the national interests in the Cold War framework (De Oliveira, 2022, p. 125).

Eventually, on 17 June 1971, Japan and the USA Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands, known as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, was signed which left the full authority of the islands to the Japanese (United Nations Treaties, 1971, p. 275). The critical point in the treaty is:

“The Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands” means all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America (...). (United Nations Treaties, 1971, p. 276)

Due to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands being accepted as a part of the Ryukyus in USCAR 27, the authority of the Senkaku/Diaoyu was also positioned in the hands of Japan in the reversion treaty. After the reversion treaty, the US argued that they took a neutral position regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue (Blanchard, 2000, p. 96). Accordingly, Thomas Foley, who was the American ambassador to Tokyo, was interviewed on 7 November 1997 and answered the question “Can you qualify your position, the U.S. position on the Senkaku island?” by stating “Well, this is a matter, we think, for both countries to deal with” (US Department of State, 1997). Further, the US stated that “whatever the legal status was before the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty comes into effect” (as cited in Blanchard, 2000, p. 120). This

can be interpreted as the US implicitly giving the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands but did not take responsibility afterward for the upcoming clashes of sovereignty. This also created a bigger friction in Sino-Japanese relations since the treaty indirectly indicated that the islands were now under the authority of the Japanese government. Accordingly, China blamed the US for not being objective or neutral regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue (Liu, 2015, p. 106). What happened is, that the US involved the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the Ryukyu islands due to their strategic interests in the Cold War. However, when the reversion was agreed upon, they positioned themselves as neutral and left China and Japan clashing in the sovereignty claims (Niksich, 1996, p. 3).

Deriving from the inclusion of the islands to the Ryukyus, however, the US silently supported the Japanese claims (Blanchard, 2000, p. 120). What is more is that, secondly, in the reversion treaty, the sides stated that Okinawa falls under the protection of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, where the alliance's defense scope is defined (Niksich, 1996, p. 4). This created suspicion regarding the neutrality of the US. Yet, the US continued the neutrality posture in the following years, especially in the 1960s, and 1970s (De Oliveira, 2022, p. 123).

Following this, the protection of the islands was reiterated after the 2010 and following events. Obama stated that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were protected through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in April 2014 (Panda, 2014). The neutrality posture, however, started to become more fluid after the "pivot" policy of the US under the Obama administration's second tenure (De Oliveira, 2022, p. 130). For example, Japan and the US military forces conducted a joint exercise on 22 September 2012, in Guam to deter the Chinese assertiveness via military presence (Han, 2013, p. 71). More, as famously reported throughout the literature, Hilary Clinton, who was the US Secretary of State, stated on 18 January 2013:

I reiterated longstanding American policy on the Senkaku Islands and our treaty obligations. As I've said many times before, although the United States does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands, we acknowledge they are under the administration of Japan, and we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine the Japanese administration, and we urge all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means. (US Department of State, 2013, para. 7)

Further, because of the Chinese assertive reaction to the East China Sea such as declaring the islands' territory within the scope of ADIZ, President Obama also reiterated the islands' defense was protected by the alliance treaties (De Oliveira, 2022, p. 131). However, this neutrality was not eradicated, since the US also states that "the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States' acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands" (as cited in De Oliveira, 2022, p. 132). The reason for this, blatantly speaking was that the islands do not pose a crucial interest, like it did in the past for the US and the US did not want to be drawn into a crisis where the crucial interests were lying elsewhere such as in the South China Sea (Shlapak, 2013). Moreover, the US expressed its concerns to Japan and even cautioned the government regarding the Tokyo Governor's will to buy the three islands of the Senkaku/Diaoyu (Han, 2013, p. 62). Furthermore, although the US was preventing China from disturbing the status quo or making advancements, they also prevented the allies from taking harsh steps which may lead to provocation as well (Liu, 2015, p. 106). This consistent repetition regarding the islands issue proves that although the US does not accept either party's sovereignty claims, the important issue is not disturbing the status quo in the region where on the one hand the Chinese are deterred through the alliance treaties, and the Japanese is rejected from getting endorsed their claims on the islands by the US on the other. Therefore, the neutrality itself was a strategy of the US for protecting the status quo and easing the tensions in the region. This strategy enabled the US to both balance China and protect Japan (De Oliveira, 2022, p. 133).

One important note for the Senkaku/Diaoyu island issue and the US factor in it is the Chinese perception. From the Chinese side, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue is perceived in the framework of the US-China rivalry, due to the tendency to downplay the role of Japan in the alliance from the Chinese (Zhang, 2014, p. 2). Because of the changing attitude of the US regarding China after the 2008 global financial crisis, the Obama administration switched to re-balancing (Zhang, 2014, p. 2). Being aware of this shift, China perceived the 2010 incident with Japan as a boldness of the US (Zhang, 2014, p. 2-3). Moreover, for China, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue reflects the US plans for the region, which includes containment of Chinese maritime power (Zhang, 2014, p. 4). Therefore, the actions of the US-Japan alliances are also perceived in this context (Zhang, 2014, p. 4). Zhang (2014, p. 6) even argued that Chinese politicians

lack a specific policy focusing solely on Japan. Consequently, it is crucial to understand that when Chinese assertiveness was mentioned, it was not only against Japan but more importantly, it was a reaction against the US. Deriving from these, the vicious cycle of perceiving each other with suspicion appears among the three actors. On the other hand, there is a change in the US Asia-Pacific policies, where the focus point of started to switch from allies such as Japan, or South Korea to the Oceania and Indian Ocean (Zhang, 2014, p. 5). This is one of the reasons why the South China Sea dispute started to be voiced more in contemporary literature. The outcome of this issue for Sino-Japanese relations is that Japan is expected to partake in an active role around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands where the Chinese maritime enhancement will experience obstacles before countering the US (Zhang, 2014, p. 5-6). Of course, the US did not desert the area. In the 10-day long joint military exercise in October 2020 between Japan and the US, Kevin Schneider, Commander of US forces in Japan, stated “Our arrival today was simply to demonstrate the ability to move a few people, but the same capability could be used to deploy combat troops to defend the Senkaku Islands (...)” (Zhou, 2020, para. 2).

It can be said that the US as a direct historical and treaty-bounded actor regarding the dispute, has taken up the role of preserving the status quo and preventing any crises from escalating. This meant averting Japan from stating bold statements and preserving a neutral position. Yet, on the other hand, by protecting the area through alliance mechanisms such as treaties, China is also deterred from asserting its forcefulness in the region. Yet, the US’s unwillingness to take responsibility and leave the issue to the other parties prolongs the solution of the issue where the issue is continuously left in deliberate neglect.

4.5 The US-Japan Alliance and the PRC

The narratives of the US which involves deterring China and supporting Japan had reflected itself in the Japan-US alliance. Moreover, the alliance’s target had started to change with the Chinese rise in the region. Due to the baseline for the security in the region clustered around the US-Japan alliance, any decision made with the two allies

reflected in the Sino-Japanese relations. In this part, what is the nature of the alliance vis-à-vis China is to be examined.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the alliance's *raison d'être* was at first ambiguous due to the changes in the global structure (Atanassova-Cornelis & Sato, 2019, p. 78). This was mostly due to the emergence of China as a concern for the US was not in effect for that time being (Atanassova-Cornelis & Sato, 2019, p. 82). Explicitly stating, in 1993 the US National Security Strategy, was explicitly stated that to prevent China from becoming a "security threat" in the region, engagement and cooperation were underlined (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1994, p. 24). Moreover, in the same document, the stability baseline in the region was stated through Japan (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1994, p. 19).

Just before coming to the Taiwan Strait crises, in line with the US policy of the burden sharing with the allies after the Cold War, in the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, it was underlined that Japan would increase its burden on defense, which was also mentioned in the 1995 Japanese National Defense Program Guidelines (US Department of State, 1996). However, the Chinese rise as a concern was not reflected in this document, rather the only mention of China was the cooperative relations with both sides (US Department of State, 1996). Moreover, it was explicitly stated that the revision of the documents was not an action vis-à-vis any country (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. 42). This impact is aligned with the US policy at that time, which is reflected in the US security cooperation with Japan. Therefore, it can be said that China has not positioned itself as a concern in security yet. However, as it was covered in the Taiwan topic, in the 1997 Security Guidelines, the perspective started to change, where the alliance's scope was enhanced with the inclusion of Japanese surroundings (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 1997). This change, however, should not be understood as a complete change of the alliance which targeted China (Soeya, 2002, p. 38). Rather, although the Strait crises affected the alliance vis-a-vis China, the importance was laid on the cooperation side (Soeya, 2002, p. 38). Therefore, one can mention a slow turn, rather than a drastic change where China immediately takes up the place of the Soviet Union. This slow turn was used as a consolidation for the US-Japan security alliance (Soeya, 2002, p. 38). This small

change derived from the perceptions of the US's Chinese politics which started to focus on the Chinese rise after the Cold War (Soeya, 2002, p. 52). Therefore, this perception paved the way for the observation of the Chinese rise through cooperation, and it was argued that this could be a controlling mechanism for the Chinese (Soeya, 2002, p. 52). What can be derived from this is that the US politics regarding the security issues was formed through the production of the Chinese politics from the US decision-makers. The consolidation of the alliance, therefore, reflects the nature of US politics vis-à-vis China (Soeya, 2002, p. 54). In line with this, when the Bush administration changed the mindset regarding China from cooperation to competitor, which was reflected in the Japan-US alliance as well (Soeya, 2002, p. 57). For example, the US supported the nationalism rise in Japan, which coincided with the rise of the Koizumi administration because the nationalistic side of Japan promoted a more active Japan in the international arena (Soeya, 2002, p. 59). These nationalistic policies caused serious damage such as the Yasukuni Shrine visits, to the Sino-Japanese relations. Still, it can be summed up that according to the special reports of the Armitage-Nye study group on the US-Japan alliance, before coming to the new millennia, the alliance's focus was to cooperate rather than contain China for the time being (Armitage & Nye, 2000, p. 2).

Yet, the year 2000 changed the mindset of the US regarding China. According to the US National Security Strategy Report (NSS) of the year 2000, due to the Chinese military developments and its growth overall, was posed as a possible confrontation for the future (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2000). Related to this, the same NSS report mentioned the renewal of the alliance with Japan for the new coming threats after the Cold War (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2000). Even again, the process of reflection of this concern to the alliance was slow.

On the other hand, the Chinese perspective on this Japanese step within the alliance had two phases. The first was the Chinese were relieved by the US-Japan alliance, due to its limitations on the Japanese rise militarily (Xinbo, 2005, p. 119). Then, the Japanese activeness within the alliance started to be perceived as aggressiveness, where the alliance was also consolidated by the implicit reference to China (Xinbo, 2005, p. 119-120). The second is this change, where the US left the policy of limiting

Japan to support its activeness militarily (Xinbo, 2005, p. 120). This enhancement of the alliance and the stronger Japan resulted in damaging the Sino-Japanese relations on history, Taiwan, and East China Sea issues (Xinbo, 2005, p. 122). Meanwhile, according to the Joint Statement of the security committee between the two countries on 19 February 2005, the sides articulated their attention on the militarization of the designated countries, which can be easily interpreted as China and underlined for the first time the Chinese military transparency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005). Therefore, the slow turn of the alliance's focus after the new millennium started to get from. A bold argument was also presented by Xinbo (2005, p. 125) that the alliance was preserved after the Cold War due to the prevention of the Chinese attack on Taiwan. Further, it gained a new character after the Cold War, the consolidation of the US control in the region, in which the alliance with Japan played the biggest part (Xinbo, 2005, p. 126). Moreover, according to Xinbo (2005, p. 129), if both countries' relations with China do not follow a cooperative line, the nature of the alliance will be perceived as a means of containment against China. Considering the relations covered up until now, it is not surprising to say that China is considering the alliance against its rise. This also leads China to balance against the alliance (Xinbo, 2005, p. 128).

Coming back to the US perception, in the 2006 US NSS, the US disappointment of not being able to transform communist China into a democratic country was explicitly observed (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. 41). Moreover, in the document, it was argued that China has benefited from the US-produced system, yet this system does not only bring economic wealth but also expects the countries who benefited from this system to change their policies, strategies, and values. Therefore, according to the US, if China benefits from the system, then it is also responsible for changing its values into the system-endorsed one (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. 41). Related to this, the continuation of the Chinese communist system started to change the perception of the US against the Chinese. Then, in 2007, in the second Armitage-Nye report, the Chinese impressive rise was underlined, yet this time with a lot more suspicion than it had ever aroused. Related to Taiwan, the alliance took the role of preventing China from usurping Taiwan through deterrence and providing Taiwan with military capabilities yet limiting its independence claims (Armitage & Nye, 2007, p. 11). This, as it was discussed in the Taiwan topic, is the same political strategy that the

US followed to protect the *status quo* within the region. In this part, it was also reflected in the US-Japan alliance and their politics towards China. In the 2008 National Defense Strategy, the Chinese rise defined as a possible competitor where the hedging policy would be followed (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 3). Therefore, it can be said that the US was focusing on the wait-and-see approach regarding the Chinese developments, especially in the military field. This approach, however, was not a peaceful one, since the US capabilities will be prepared to respond (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 10).

In the 2011 National Military Strategy Document of the US, Chinese assertiveness and military developments regarding the East and South China Seas, and the Yellow Sea were positioned as a concern where the attention was carefully attached (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011, p. 14). In the 2012 Armitage-Nye report, the enhancement of the “core interests” of China brings a certain concern for the alliance (Armitage & Nye, 2012, p. 9). Accordingly, the alliance still chose to hedge towards China in the militarization and confidence (Armitage & Nye, 2012, p. 9). Yet, according to these spread of core interests and the militarization, on top of the assertiveness, requires the alliance to expand its capabilities as well, for the cases of if China takes action to change the status quo (Armitage & Nye, 2012, p. 17). The stance against China started to solidify.

The year 2015 was a busy year for the alliance. In the 2015 US National Military Report, Chinese steps positioned as a disturber for the peaceful environment in the region (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015b, p. 2). As a result of this, the proliferation of the partners in the region underlined carefully (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015b, p. 9). This was a sign of enhancing the alliance and partnership system with the US in the region. Like the previous document, in the 2015 US NSS Report, Chinese assertiveness especially in the maritime domain was underlined, where the US policy was strengthened against any crises (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015a, p. 10). Moreover, for the alliance with Japan, the US aim was to enlarge the web of alliances where the spokes also built ties among them (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015a, p. 24). This statement was paving the way for the enlargement of the Japan-US alliance in the region, with the involvement of like-

mindful countries. On top of this enlargement, the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance was simultaneously promoted. On 27 April 2015, the new guidelines were published between the US and Japan, the Defense Cooperation Guidelines (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015b, p. 1). Accordingly, the US military presence in the region was promised to be enhanced, for a possible attack (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2015, p. 1). Moreover, for an effective reaction to any situation that requires the alliance's response, the Alliance Coordination Mechanism was formed for collective decision-making, informing, and action between the forces (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2015, p. 3). Moreover, the alliance's scope is enhanced further, even if there is no direct harm to Japan, the alliance will take responsibility (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2015, p. 4). The critical part of this document is that according to the guidelines, JSDF will conceive any attack on a country that has close relations with Japan as a threat and will take responsibility and if it is suitable, Japan will use force (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2015, p. 16). Any attack regarding the South China Sea, or Taiwan, for example, may or may not be indicated within the scope. The only explanation stated was that the limitation cannot be brought through geographic definition (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2015, p. 7). To materialize the strengthening and activeness of the alliance, the alliance forces may be used for the protection of maritime vessels, using ballistic missiles, information-sharing, and logistical help is all involved within the responsibility (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2015, p. 16-17). Deriving from these points, the US started to strengthen and evolve the hub-and-spokes system within the region into a web of alliances, and the perception of China hardened more.

In the 2017 NSS report, the critical change of the US foreign policy under Trump towards Asia was evident. Accordingly, Chinese actions are defined as a challenge to the US policies, presence, and influence which targets to jeopardize the security the US built (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017, p. 2). More importantly, the Chinese rise is now explicitly stated as a move towards taking the US out of the region and filling the vacancy by the Chinese (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017, p. 25). The Chinese catchphrase mutual benefit is also underlined as a breach of the sovereignty of the other countries who enter a relationship with China (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017, p. 46). One can interpret that the Chinese steps which were stated as cooperative also perceived with suspicion from the US side. Of this, the

alliance's balancing role against China increased its importance (Atanassova-Cornelis & Sato, 2019, p. 84). This has resulted in the strengthening of the JSDF which reaches up to the level of conducting joint military exercises with the US (Atanassova-Cornelis & Sato, 2019, p. 84).

On the other hand, Trump's rise brought the notion that Japan's defense role should be increased so that Japan eased the burden on the US again to the alliance table (Armitage & Nye, 2018, p. 3). This led to an increase in Japan's defense spending, which was perceived as a concern from the Chinese side (Armitage & Nye, 2018, p. 3). Finally, the nature of the US-China relationship was defined in the framework of "great power competition" in the 2018 US National Military Strategy, alongside with Russia (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018, p. 2). As a result of this definition of the notion and the Trump critique, in the 2020 Armitage-Nye report, the alliance's focus which represents the current politics was explicitly stated. As the defense role of Japan increased, now Japan became a "more equal ally" (Armitage & Nye, 2020, p. 3). Moreover, the accumulation of suspicions and concerns within the alliance finally erupted in the name of China as "the biggest security challenge" and a status-quo challenger (Armitage & Nye, 2020, p. 3). As a result of this, the solution provided by the authors was the enhancement of the alliances, such as through the QUAD (Armitage & Nye, 2020, p. 5). As a result, the containment policy is planned to be expanded.

In the 2024 Armitage-Nye report, the Chinese actions in the region were named "revisionist" (Armitage & Nye, 2024, p. 1). Moreover, although the alliance refrained from turning the relations with China into a "new Cold War", the practices portray some similar aspects (Armitage & Nye, 2024, p. 1). For example, the alliance's effort to gain the upper hand in trade or technology is a form of balancing, rather than accommodating (Armitage & Nye, 2024, p. 1). Moreover, as was previously mentioned in the cooperation topic, the organizations that do not involve China such as the QUAD or AUKUS do not serve the purpose of easing the tensions. It is a wonder, then, how these steps are different from a complete containment policy that focuses on a specific country.

On the other hand, the formulation of the new alliance system was on the rise. According to Armitage and Nye (2024, p. 4), for the alliance to succeed in its quest, which is the preservation of the *status quo* in the region, there is a need for institutionalization. Moreover, this possibility was started to be prepared by enhancing the alliance with like-minded countries and actors, namely: the ROK, Australia, Philippines, and Taiwan (Armitage & Nye, 2024, p. 5-6). This leads the minds to the Asian NATO discussions. The newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba mentioned an Asian NATO in his talk in the Hudson Institute commentary on 1 October 2024 (Basu, 2024). This will not be supported by the other parties within the QUAD, especially after the statement of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Minister of External Affairs of India, which reflected that India was not planning to get involved in such an institution (Miyagi, 2024). Yet, this statement of the Japanese Prime Minister is surely having no cooperative effect on Sino-Japanese relations, especially as it was previously stated when China perceived the US-Japan alliance as a forerunner of the containment policy of the US against China.

On the other hand, this evolvement of the alliance system goes hand in hand with the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance. For example, in the 2+2 meeting on 28 July 2024, the US forces positioned in Japan altered to joint force headquarters (JFHQ) as the main body of the security coordination, which gained control of 55,000 US personnel in Japan (Maslow, 2024). Moreover, both sides agreed that China was aiming to change the order of the region, which was named the greatest strategic challenge (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024a). To provide security, the US repeated its will to use its capabilities, including nuclear (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024a). This meeting and the developments stated in it were perceived as aggressive and blamed for forming a bloc mentality within the region from the Chinese side (Yang, 2024).

With all these developments considered, the US-Japan alliance was a means of re-establishing the US-built order in the Asia-Pacific (Tow & Limaye, 2016, p. 8). By keeping the alliances alive and functioning, the US both deters China and reassures the allies of the US intention of protecting them (Tow & Limaye, 2016, p. 8). Through these alliances, the US plans to prevent China from becoming a dominant power that

can surpass the US (Tow & Limaye, 2016, p. 11). To do that, the US focuses on binding the alliances (spokes) to each other, alongside the partners in the region such as centralizing the US-Japan alliance and then linking it with the ROK, Australia, or India (Tow & Limaye, 2016, p. 12). “The China factor” for the alliances play a great role (Tow & Limaye, 2016, p. 20). Regarding the US-Japan alliance, the Chinese assertive stances led Japan to have more role in the defense posture in the region, however, the effect of China on the alliances is not clear-cut (Tow & Limaye, 2016, p. 20-21). This notion is also evident in the documents, reports, and guidelines that China still was not directed as a threat to the alliance.

4.6 Conclusion

From the historical involvement to the alliance building, the US was and is an active player in the Asia-Pacific. Regardless of the time, the US partake in the Sino-Japanese bilateral relations as an important game-changer to achieve its interests in the region, whether through intervention or neglect. To preserve its peace in the occupation process after the Second World War to preserve the *status quo* and deter the strategic competitor, the US effected, shaped, and targeted this bilateral relation. As a hegemon, it does not want challengers in the region or any tensions that can disturb or change the security environment. To reach that end, the US shaped the region and affected the Sino-Japanese relations since the end of the Second World War.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis focused on the bilateral disputes between Sino-Japanese policy and the impact of the US on this relationship. According to the literature, although the issues raised in this thesis regarding the PRC and Japan are crucial and affect the security of the entire region, the focus has been more on the Sino-US rivalry, neglecting the Japanese influence, or the emerging security structure through multilateral security arrangements, focusing more on US foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. This thesis concludes that the Sino-Japanese disputes reached an impasse under the policy of deliberate neglect, where the two major actors in the region kept these security issues unresolved for decades, which resulted in the accumulation of tensions in the area as days passed. A major contributor to this impasse was the United States, which played a direct role in the issues covered in this thesis, acting as both a catalyst and a stabilizer where it did not take responsibility for intervention. One of the most important findings is that this impasse benefits US interests in the region, as this situation maintains the US presence in the area and allows the US to position itself against China. This thesis argues that US intervention in Sino-Japanese disputes created an inseparable mistrust and deep friction between the two countries. Initially, Sino-Japanese relations focused on the restoration of their own country after the Second World War. After that, relations focused on the trade needed to rebuild the countries. However, with the US in control of relations, although relations improved and the inclusion of official channels of private trade was discussed, this did not pave the way for the normalization of diplomatic relations. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s changed the rules of the game. The US rapprochement with the PRC caused the Nixon shock in Japan, but Japan followed the US steps and started its normalization process. Therefore, the main initiator of the normalization process was neither the PRC nor Japan, but the international politics of US orchestration in the Cold War context. Subsequently, the US-led liberal order benefited both sides, with each accumulating significant surpluses

and economic relations improving. However, this improvement was not reflected in relations. The stagnation in political relations was the result of a deliberate policy of neglect, where both sides touched on critical security issues where cooperation or resolution was urgently needed. The gaps in the 1951 San Francisco Treaty that ended the war between the US and Japan, which did not invite the PRC to join, and the deliberate policy of neglect pursued by the governments of the time only postponed the disputes, which grew in the shadows. In addition, the Security Treaty, together with the San Francisco Treaty, created the San Francisco system, where the US strengthened its presence and control over the security structure in the region by creating a network of hub-and-spoke systems. Moreover, by demilitarizing Japan, although it is widely known that the US prevented the remilitarization of Japan, which eased the worries of the other countries, it also prepared a perpetual US presence in the region. This system allowed the US to use the soil of Taiwan and Japan as a base, militarize the region and emphasize its presence in the region within the Cold War mindset of containing communism. Unsurprisingly, this policy prevented Sino-Japanese relations from evolving into a progressive relationship leading to diplomatic normalization. Then, with the change in the PRC in 1978 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the seeds of the strategic rivalry between the PRC and the US began to take shape, with a corresponding hardening of US-Japanese relations.

After the Cold War, the US maintained its presence in the region for two reasons. One is to prevent Japan from re-emerging as a military power in the region. The other is the policy of incorporating the PRC into the market-oriented order, which was a policy both to open the crucial Chinese market to the world and to weaken the level of socialist system in the PRC. In terms of bilateral relations, the Sino-Japanese disputes have evolved, become more complex, and have more tensions in the current relations. Regarding the history textbook issue, due to the non-addressing and unsettlement of several issues such as the comfort women issue after the Second World War, the political unrest increased between the two sides. The two sides encounter troubles from the historical burdens of the war. Moreover, the ease of occupation of the US forces in Japan prevented the US from thoroughly addressing these issues in the Tokyo Trials. Moreover, the Cold War US foreign policy shaped the region's security structure and accordingly, Japan needed to recover from the war quickly so that the US could rely

on it for the coming years in fighting against communism. This led to further friction between the PRC and Japan where the Chinese side raised suspicion on the Japanese government's actions and jeopardized Japan's image in the Chinese minds as a forerunner of the US policy in the region. Although the deliberate neglect policy was suspended for a while between 2006-2010 for the textbook issue, due to a lack of consensus on contemporary historical perceptions, the deliberate neglect policy returned. Yasukuni Shrine visits also increased the tensions and mistrust between the two actors. Yet, when the relations worsened significantly after the boat clash in 2010 on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue, Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine exacerbated the tensions further. There, to stabilize the tensions to a certain level, the US warned the Japanese side to refrain from visiting the Shrine. Then, there has never been another Japanese Prime Minister who visited the shrine. Consequently, the US involvement prevented an escalation of a crisis that could have erupted on the island's issue. The Chinese rise and the perception of it as a concern for the US and Japan made itself clear in the Taiwan issue. Again, although the issues' historical claims go back to the former empires and decades, the issue was exacerbated after the San Francisco Treaty, after Japan's withdrawal from Taiwan. General McArthur's decision to leave Taiwan to Chiang Kai-shek's forces the PRC's gaining control of the mainland and the KMT's staying in Taiwan all created the environment for the clashes. Due to the lack of a concise explanation of Taiwan's future, and McArthur's decision, the issue grew like a snowball and turned the issue into a legal dilemma. Moreover, the 1992 Consensus' impasse was deriving from the San Francisco Treaty where the clause of "left to China" was an ambiguous place. According to the US mindset, due to the geo-strategic importance of Taiwan and the US arms sales, Taiwan is the island where the PRC should never include to its borders. As a result, the US militarized Taiwan heavily. Then, the density of forming the US-Japan alliance against a possible attack of the PRC on Taiwan increased. The encirclement of the US against the PRC was explicitly shown in the Taiwan issue. In return, the PRC felt threatened on the issues of declared core values. Another reflection of this feeling was the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue. The islands which both countries claim sovereignty on, are a critical security issue for the whole region. It is argued in this thesis that although the issue is currently disputed, the seeds of the 2010 crisis were the result of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty where the US left the authority of the islands to Japan. The decision to include Senkaku/Diaoyu

islands to the Ryukyus to gain maritime advantage vis-à-vis the USSR, and then giving the islands' control to Japan afterward, it is argued that when the US retrieved from Okinawa, the US did not consider the disputed sovereignty of the islands. Consequently, it is argued that this act was neither neutral nor responsible for maintaining the security stability of the region. As a result, relations between the PRC and Japan on the islands deteriorated. Moreover, due to the Chinese power increase in the international order, the US perceived the PRC more as a threat. This resulted in the strengthening and enlarging of the hub-and-spokes system where the spokes also started to be tied to each other. As the critical center for this alliance enlargement, Japan took the role of the primary speaker in the region. In contemporary politics, the US policy of the PRC started to evolve more into the containment policy in which Japan takes an important part. Therefore, it is argued that this newly emerging US policy against China sets the PRC and Japan against each other. On the other hand, the intensification of the PRC-US rivalry was reflected in the regional cooperation effort as well which at first the PRC treated as a containment tool imposed by the US. Deriving from this point, the militarization of the PRC is also related to this. Expectedly, China's growing wealth has also been invested in the military. The concerns of the US on China's gaining dominance in the region and one day reaching the point where it will be replaced by China through the Belt and Road Initiative or Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank changed the trajectory of the US foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific, in the name of rebalancing and Asia-pivot. This perception of the US reflects on the security relations in the region, where the US allies and partners formed their initiatives and started to encircle the PRC. This encirclement contributes to the Chinese assertive and aggressive foreign policy which directly affects the regional security environment. As a result, this thesis argues that there appears to be a dilemma in the Asia-Pacific. Due to the bilateral disputes which are also left due to the US's lack of responsibility, Japan and China lack trust in each other. Due to deliberate neglect policy, neither side is providing a solution for the time being to the core security disputes. The mistrust increases with the Chinese rise. Following up, threatened by the Chinese rise, the US hardens the alliances in the region and encircles the PRC with security initiatives. This in turn exacerbates the PRC's assertiveness. Japan, feeling threatened by this, leans on the US more but also changes the constitutional restraints on its militarization. The PRC which sees the increasing

presence of the US and the remilitarization of Japan as an encirclement, boosts its modernization and investments in the military. This vicious circle of militarization, counter-militarization and encirclement leads to an accumulation of tensions in the region, which paints a pessimistic picture of the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific.

Finally, this thesis states that the Sino-Japanese disputes hit an impasse and were deliberately neglected, and this policy is still effective by both governments. Moreover, it is impossible to state and analyze the issues between the PRC and Japan without stating the US effect. The US, as a direct role-player, controls the tensions, forms alliances, and enlarges them by highlighting the role of Japan and changing the security structure of the Asia-Pacific against China. These two big actors in the region which one is challenging the US and the other is the biggest ally of it in the region, are becoming more adversaries towards each other which disturbs the stability in the region. The US has benefited from this friction by both maintaining its presence and exacerbating tensions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acharya, A. (2014). Power shift paradigm or paradigm shift? China's rise and Asia's emerging security order. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(1), 158-173. <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12084>
- Akiyama, M. (2012). A theoretical study of security exchange: Toward a new era in Japan-China relations. *The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research*. <https://www.tokyofoundation.org/research/detail.php?id=515>
- Al Jazeera. (2005). *Japan calls China a 'threat'*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/12/22/japan-calls-china-a-threat>
- Anand, B. V. (2016). Trends in Chinese military modernization: Implications and responses. *Vivekananda International Foundation*. 1-25. <https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/trends-in-chinese-military-modernization-implications-and-responses.pdf>
- Armitage, R. L., & Nye, J. S. (2000). The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership. *Armitage International*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://armitageinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ArmNye-Oct-2000-Report.pdf>
- Armitage, R. L., & Nye, J. S. (2007). The US-Japan alliance: Getting Asia right through 2020. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://armitageinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ArmNye-Feb-2007-Report.pdf>
- Armitage, R. L., & Nye, J. S. (2012). The US-Japan alliance: Anchoring stability in Asia. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://armitageinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ArmNye-Aug-2012-Report.pdf>
- Armitage, R. L., & Nye, J. S. (2018). More important than ever: Renewing the US-Japan alliance for the 21st century. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://armitageinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2018-Armitage-Nye-Report.pdf>

- Armitage, R. L., & Nye, J. S. (2020). The US-Japan alliance: An equal alliance with a global agenda. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from https://armitageinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/120720_ArmitageNye_USJapanAlliance_Report.pdf
- Armitage, R. L., & Nye, J. S. (2024). The US-Japan alliance: Toward an integrated alliance. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from https://armitageinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/240404_Armitage_USJapan_2024.pdf
- ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting. (2024). *About the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus*. Retrieved November 27, 2024, from <https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus.html>
- ASEAN Plus Three. (n.d.). *Overview of ASEAN Plus Three cooperation*. Retrieved November 27, 2024, from <https://aseanplusthree.asean.org/overview-of-asean-plus-three-cooperation/>
- ASEAN Plus Three. (2001). *Towards and East Asian Community*. Retrieved November 27, 2024, from https://aseanplusthree.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/east_asia_vision.pdf
- ASEAN Plus Three. (2012). *Report of the East Asia Vision Group II*. Retrieved November 27, 2024, from <https://aseanplusthree.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Report-of-the-EAVG-II.pdf>
- ASEAN Regional Forum. (n.d.). *ASEAN Regional Forum*. Retrieved November 27, 2024, from <https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about-arf/#objectives>
- Atanassova-Cornelis, E. (2013). Shifting domestic politics and security policy in Japan and Taiwan: The search for a balancing strategy between China and the US. *Asia-Pacific Review*, 20(1), 55-78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2013.793066>
- Atanassova-Cornelis, E., & Mendes, C. A. (2010). Dynamics of Japanese and Chinese Security Policies in East Asia and Implications for Regional Stability. *Asian Politics and Policy*, 2(3), 395-414. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2010.01200.x>

- Atanassova-Cornelis, E., & Sato, Y. (2019). The US-Japan Alliance Dilemma in the Asia-Pacific: Changing Rationales and Scope. *The International Spectator*, 54(4), 78-93. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2019.1665272>
- Basu, T. (2024, October 10). Ishiba's Push for an 'Asian NATO' Is a Non-starter. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/ishibas-push-for-an-asian-nato-is-a-non-starter/>
- BBC News. (2001, August 13). *Anger over Japan PM's shrine visit*. Retrieved October 17, 2024, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1488305.stm>
- Bercaw, R. C. (2024). Yes, Japan will defend Taiwan. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved December 11, 2024, from <https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/yes-japan-will-defend-taiwan/>
- Berger, T. (2003). The construction of antagonism: The history problem in Japan's foreign relations. In G. J. Ikenberry & T. Inoguchi, (Eds.), *Reinventing the alliance: U.S.-Japan security partnership in an era of change* (pp. 63-88). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Blanchard, J. M. F. (2000). The US role in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, 1945–1971. *The China Quarterly*, 161, 95-123. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000003957>
- Buzan, B., & Goh, E. (2020). *Rethinking Sino-Japanese alienation: History problems and historical opportunities*. Oxford University Press.
- Cabinet Secretariat of Japan. (2014). *Cabinet decision on development of seamless security legislation to ensure Japan's survival and protect its people*. 1-8. Retrieved November 20, 2024, from https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei_eng.pdf
- Cabinet Secretariat of Japan. (2018). *National defense program guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond*. 1-33. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryu/pdf/2019boueikeikaku_e.pdf
- Cabinet Secretariat of Japan. (2022). *National security strategy of Japan*. 1- 36. Retrieved November 21, 2024, from <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryu/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>

- Cameron, F. (2005). *US foreign policy after the cold war: global hegemon or reluctant sheriff?* (2nd ed.). Routledge.
- Campbell, J. R. (2012). US foreign policy towards Northeast Asia. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 17(4), 3-26.
- Chen, M. (2005). US, Japan criticize 'anti-secession' law for raising tensions. *Taipei Times*. Retrieved December 9, 2024, from <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/03/15/2003246312>
- Chen, Q. (1993). New approaches in China's foreign policy: The post-Cold War era. *Asian Survey*, 33(3), 237-251. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645249>
- Chen, Y. J., & Cohen, J. A. (2019). China-Taiwan relations re-examined: The "1992 Consensus" and cross-strait agreements. *Penn Carey Law Journals*, 14(1), 1-40. <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss1/2>
- Chen, Z., & Wang, G. (2023). The Japanese "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and Sino-Japanese Relations: A Chinese Perspective. *China Review*, 23(1), 161–186. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48717992>
- Cheung, M. (2017). Policy variations: The China-Japan Yasukuni controversy during the second Abe administration (2012-15). In *Political survival and Yasukuni in Japan's relations with China*. (pp. 119-137). Routledge.
- Cheung, M. (2024). Assessing Japan's Taiwan policy: Systemic clarity, political survival and bureaucratic prudence. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2024.2385833>
- Chieng-peng, C. (2017). China and Japan in East Asian Arrangements: More Rivalry, Less Interdependence. In L. P. Er, (Ed.), *China-Japan relations in the 21st century: Antagonism despite interdependency* (pp. 133-154). Palgrave Macmillan.
- China Daily. (2011). *Jan 30,1995: President Jiang Zemin puts forward eight propositions on development of relations between two sides of Taiwan Straits*. China Daily. Retrieved November 25, 2024, from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2011-01/30/content_29715090.htm

- China Daily. (2013). *Announcement of the aircraft identification rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People's Republic of China*. Retrieved November 4, 2024, from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/23/content_17126618.htm
- Christensen, T. J. (1999, Spring). China, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia. *International Security*, 23(4), 49-80. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539294>
- Congress Gov. (1979). *H.R. 2479 - A bill to promote the security of Taiwan*. U.S. Congress. Retrieved December 22, 2024, from <https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:~:text=States%20that%20the%20United%20States%20shall%20provide%20Taiwan%20with%20arms,of%20the%20people%20of%20Taiwan>
- Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Sydney. (2005). *Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan's Press Conference on 17 February 2005*. Retrieved October 19, 2024, from http://sydney.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/zlgdt/202208/t20220825_10751979.htm
- Copper, J. F. (2017). Understanding President Trump's Taiwan Policy. *American Journal of Chinese Studies*, 24(2), v-viii. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44759209>
- Cui, S. (2012). Problems of nationalism and historical memory in China's relations with Japan. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 25(2), 199-222. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6443.2011.01419.x>
- De Oliveira. (2022). Assessing neutrality: The United State's role in the Diaoyu Islands dispute. In M. De Souza, G. Coutaz, & D. Karalekas, *Asian territorial and maritime disputes* (pp. 121-137).
- deLisle J., & Goldenstein A. (2021). Rivalry and security in the new era for the US-China relations. In J. DeLisle & A. Goldenstein (Eds.), *After engagement: Dilemmas in US-China security relations* (pp. 1-50). The Brookings Institution.
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (1991a). Diplomatic Bluebook 1991: Changing world and Japan's foreign policy. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-1-1.htm>

Diplomatic Bluebook. (1991b). Diplomatic Bluebook 1991: Objectives and Priorities of Japan's Foreign Policy. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-1-2.htm>

Diplomatic Bluebook (1993). Diplomatic Bluebook 1992: Japan's role in the international community. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1992/1992-2-1.htm#1.%20Ensuring>

Diplomatic Bluebook. (1994). Diplomatic Bluebook 1993. Toward a construction of a new international network. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 15, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1993/c2_2_1.html

Diplomatic Bluebook. (1995). Diplomatic Bluebook 1994: The international community in 1994. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 15, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1995/chp1.html#3>

Diplomatic Bluebook (1996). Diplomatic Bluebook 1996: Overview of Japan's foreign policy and events in 1995. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 15, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1996/I-a.html>

Diplomatic Bluebook (1997). Diplomatic Bluebook 1997: General Overview- The International Community and Japan's Foreign Policy in 1996. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 15, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1997/I-a.html#1>

Diplomatic Bluebook. (2001). Diplomatic Bluebook 2001: The World and the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 19, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap1-a.html>

Diplomatic Bluebook. (2004). Diplomatic Bluebook 2004: Regional diplomacy. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. 38-79. Retrieved November 25, 2024, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap2-a.pdf>

- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2005). Diplomatic Bluebook 2005: Overview. 1-15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved November 19, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2005/ch1.pdf>
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2006). Diplomatic Bluebook 2006: Overview. 1-15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved November 19, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2006/02.pdf>
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2011). Diplomatic Bluebook 2011: Japan's Foreign Policy by Region. 9-16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved November 19, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2011/pdfs/chapter2_p9_16.pdf
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2014a). Diplomatic Bluebook 2014: International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2013. 2-10. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 20, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000055800.pdf>
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2014b). Diplomatic Bluebook 2014: Japan's foreign policy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map. 25-172. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved November 8, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000106464.pdf>
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2017). Diplomatic Bluebook 2017: Japan's foreign policy to promote national and worldwide interests. 186-257. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 20, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000287686.pdf>
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2019). Diplomatic Bluebook 2019: International Situation and Japan's foreign policy in 2018. 12-28. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000527146.pdf>
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2021). Diplomatic Bluebook 2021: Japan's foreign policy by region. 30-34. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 20, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2021/pdf/pdfs/2-1.pdf>
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2022). Diplomatic Bluebook 2022: Overview of the International Situation and Outlook for Japan's Diplomacy. 14-23. *Ministry of*

- Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2022/pdf/pdfs/1.pdf>
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2023). Diplomatic Bluebook 2023: Overview of the International Situation and Outlook for Japan's Diplomacy. 1-13. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100523117.pdf>
- Diplomatic Bluebook. (2024). *Diplomatic Bluebook 2024*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved December 5, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2024/pdf/pdfs/2024_all.pdf
- Embassy of People's Republic of China in the United States of America. (2022). White Paper: The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era. Retrieved December 10, 2024, from http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202208/t20220810_10740168.htm
- Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Costa Rica. (2023). The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper. November 30, 2024, from http://cr.china-embassy.gov.cn/esp/ndle/202302/t20230222_11029046.htm
- Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Papua New Guinea. (2001). *Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi urgently summons Japanese Ambassador Koreshige Anami to make solemn representations*. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Papua New Guinea. Retrieved November 24, 2024, from http://pg.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/200108/t20010814_887148.htm
- Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Latvia. (2006, May 8). *Ye Jianying's Nine Principles for the Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan (1981)*. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Latvia. Retrieved September 27, 2024, from http://lv.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zt/twwt/200605/t20060508_2913661.htm
- Fravel, M. T. (2016a). China's changing approach to military strategy: The science of military strategy from 2001 to 2013. In J. McReynolds (Ed.), *The Evolution of China's Military Strategy*. 1-22. Jamestown Foundation. <http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/109318>
- Fravel, M. T. (2016b). Explaining China's escalation over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands. *Global Summitry*, 2(1), 24-37. <https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw010>

- Garcia, Z. (2019). *China's military modernization, Japan's normalization and the South China Sea territorial disputes*. Routledge.
- Goldstein, L. J. (2015). *Meeting China halfway: How to defuse the emerging US-China rivalry*. Georgetown University Press.
- Green, E., Nouwens, M., & Nouwens V. (2024). The Global Security Initiative: China's international policing activities. *International Institute for Strategic Studies*. Retrieved November 30, 2024, from <https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/10/the-global-security-initiative-chinas-international-policing-activities/>
- Grønning, B. E. M. (2014). Japan's shifting military priorities: Counterbalancing China's rise. *Asian Security*, 10(1), 1-21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2013.870157>
- Han, I. (2013, November 18). The United States Commitment to the Senkaku Islands Issue. *Sanyo Review*, 20, 61-75. https://doi.org/10.24598/sanyor.20.0_61
- Hara K. (2016). Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in United States-Japan-China relations. In T. F. Liao, K. Hara, & K. Wiegand, (Eds.), *The China-Japan border dispute: Islands of convention in multidisciplinary perspective* (pp. 85-114). Routledge.
- Hara, K. (2007). *Cold War frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: divided territories in the San Francisco system*. Routledge.
- Hartung, W. (2024). New estimate of Chinese military spending doesn't hold water. *Forbes*. Retrieved November 13, 2024, from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2024/04/30/new-estimate-of-chinese-military-spending-doesnt-hold-water/>
- He, Y. (2007, February). History, Chinese nationalism and the emerging Sino-Japanese conflict. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 16(50), 1-24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560601026710>
- Hiatt, F. (1990). Marine General US Troops must stay in Japan. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved December 3, 2024, from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/03/27/marine->

[general-us-troops-must-stay-in-japan/1040d582-b39b-408f-a0cb-cf7dab87dea6/](https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/05/what-the-united-states-wants-from-japan-in-taiwan.html)

Hiroshi, M. (2012). Japan's history textbook system and its controversies. In D. Yang, J. Liu, H. Mitani, & A. Gordon (Eds.), *Toward a history beyond borders: Contentious issues in Sino-Japanese relations* (pp. 240-266). Harvard University Press.

Hornung, J. W. (2021, May 10). What the United States Wants from Japan in Taiwan. *RAND Corporation*. Retrieved December 10, 2024, from <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/05/what-the-united-states-wants-from-japan-in-taiwan.html>

Hughes, C. W. (2022). *Japan as a global military power: New capabilities, alliance integration, bilateralism-plus*. Cambridge University Press.

Hughes, C. W. (2024). Japan's "three national security documents" and defense capabilities: Reinforcing a radical military trajectory. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 50(1), 155-183). <https://doi.org/10.1353/jjs.2024.a918586>

Ikenberry, G. J. (2004). American hegemony and East Asian order. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 58(3), 353-367.

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. (1995a). *China: arms control and disarmament: Foreward (November 1995)*. Retrieved November 25, 2024, from <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/a-1.htm>

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. (1995b). *China: arms control and disarmament: Promoting peace and development or all mankind*. Retrieved November 25, 2024, from <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/a-2.htm>

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. (1995c). *China: arms control and disarmament: Military personnel reduced by one million*. Retrieved November 25, 2024, from <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/a-3.htm>

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. (1995d). *China: arms control and disarmament: Maintaining a low level of defense*

spending. Retrieved November 25, 2024, from <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/a-4.htm>

Inoue, M. (2023). Postwar Japan-China relations. In M. Yamauchi, & Y. Hosoya (Eds.), *Modern Japan's place in world history: From Meiji to Reiwa* (K. Krulak, Trans.) (pp. 147-158). Springer.

Japan Coast Guard. (2024). *Keeping the oceans safe and enjoyable for future generations!*. Retrieved from November 5, 2024, from https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/e/pdf/r06_en.pdf

Jash, A. (2023). Politics of memories: The Yasukuni Shrine issue. In *China's Japan policy: Learning from the past* (pp. 175-234). Palgrave Macmillan.

Jho, W., & Chae, S. A. (2014). Hegemonic disputes and the limits of the ASEAN Regional Forum. *Pacific Focus*, 29(2), 237-259. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12029>

Kawaji, K. (2011). The history of the "history problem": Historical recognition between Japan and Neighboring Asian Countries. *Asian Regional Integration Review*, 3, 56-75. [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=The+history+of+the+"history+problem"+historical+recognition+between+Japan+and+neighboring+Asian+countries&author=K+Kawaji&journal=Asian+Reg.+Integration+Rev.&volume=3&pages=56-75&publication_year=2011&](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=The+history+of+the+)

Kawakami, Y. (2023). Japan-China crisis communications are improving but face challenges: How can both sides avoid unforeseen circumstances devolving into conflict?. *United States Institute of Peace*. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/japan-china-crisis-communications-are-improving-face-challenges>

Kawashima, S. (2013). The Origins of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue: The period before the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972. *Asia-Pacific Review*, 20(2), 122-145. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2013.874619>

King, A. (2016). *China-Japan relations after World War II: Empire, industry and war, 1949-1971*. Cambridge University Press.

- Kokubun, R., Soeya, Y., Takahara, A., & Kawashima, S. (2017). *Japan–China Relations in the Modern Era* (K. Krulak, Trans.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315229058>
- Kotani, T. (2016). A Japanese perspective on how Japan and Taiwan should deal with Okinotori-shima. *Global Taiwan Institute*. <https://globaltaiwan.org/2016/11/a-japanese-perspective-on-how-japan-and-taiwan-should-deal-with-okinotori-shima/>
- Kusunoki, A. (2023). US policy for the occupation of Japan and changes to it. In M. Yamauchi, & Y. Hosoya (Eds.), *Modern Japan's place in world history: From Meiji to Reiwa* (K. Krulak, Trans.) (pp. 111-122). Springer.
- Kyodo News. (2024, October 17). *Japan PM Ishiba sends offering to war-linked Yasukuni shrine*. Retrieved November 24, 2024, from https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/10/ad0aa294f000-update1-japan-pm-ishiba-sends-offering-to-war-linked-yasukuni-shrine.html#google_vignette
- Liff, A. P. (2022a). Japan, Taiwan and the “one China” framework after 50 years. *The China Quarterly*, 252, 1066-1093. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741022001357>
- Liff, A. P. (2022b). The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Taiwan. *Asia Policy*, 17(3), 125–160. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27227223>
- Lind, J. (2023). Japan's Nuremberg: The Tokyo Trial and the Birth of Postwar Liberalism. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved August 1, 2024, from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/japans-nuremberg>.
- Liu F. K. (2015). The US pivot to Asia: Taiwan’s security challenges and responses. In W. T. Tow & D. Stuart (Eds.), *The new US strategy towards Asia: Adapting to the American pivot* (pp. 102-112). Routledge.
- Liu, F., & He, K. (2023). China’s Bilateral Relations, Order Transition, and the Indo-Pacific Dynamics. *China Review*, 23(1), 11–43. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48717987>
- Mainland Affairs Council. (2005). The Official Position of the Republic of China (Taiwan) on the People's Republic of China's Anti-Secession (Anti-Separation)

Law. *Mainland Affairs Council Republic of China (Taiwan)*. Retrieved November 25, 2024, from https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8A319E37A32E01EA&ms=2413CFE1BCE87E0E&s=D1B0D66D5788F2DE#:~:text=The%20“Anti%2Dsecession%20Law”—a%20domestic%20law%20unilaterally,by%20China%20to%20achieve%20unification

Mak, J. N. (1998). The Asia-Pacific security order. In A. McGrew & C. Brook (Eds.), *Asia-Pacific in the new world order* (pp. 88-120). Routledge.

Mandelbaum, M. (2016). *Mission Failure: America and the world in the post-Cold War era*. Oxford University Press.

Manyin, M. E. (2018). *The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: US Treaty Obligations*. 1-11. Congressional Research Service. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170221_R42761_2ca255915046151588d267da7f502d03981f3828.pdf

Mark, C. W. (2012). *China and the world since 1945: An international history*. Routledge.

Maslow, S. (2024, October 23). What the upgraded US–Japan alliance means for Indo-Pacific security. *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/10/23/what-the-upgraded-us-japan-alliance-means-for-indo-pacific-security/>

McCormack, G. (2016). Much ado over small islands: The Sino-Japanese confrontation over Senkaku/Diaoyu. In T. F. Liao, K. Hara, & K. Wiegand, (Eds.), *The China-Japan border dispute: Islands of convention in multidisciplinary perspective* (pp. 15-36). Routledge.

McCurry, J., (2015). Japanese PM Shinzo Abe stops short of new apology in war anniversary speech. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/14/shinzo-abe-japan-no-new-apology-second-world-war-anniversary-speech>

McGrew, A. (1998). Restructuring foreign and defense policy: The USA. In A. McGrew & C. Brook (Eds.), *Asia-Pacific in the new world order* (pp. 158-188). Routledge.

Midford, P. (2016). Sino-Japanese conflict and reconciliation in the East China Sea. In T. F. Liao, K. Hara, & K. Wiegand, (Eds.), *The China-Japan border dispute: Islands of convention in multidisciplinary perspective* (pp. 177-198). Routledge.

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (n.d.). *The Coast Guard Law of the People's Republic of China*. Retrieved November 4, 2024, from https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/ch_ocn/index.html

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (1997). The guidelines for Japan-US cooperation. Retrieved December 10, 2024, from https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/19970923.pdf

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2014). *Defense of Japan: Defense Policies of Countries*. 32-52. Retrieved November 21, 2024, from https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_1-1-3_web_1031.pdf

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2023a). *Defense of Japan*. 1-552. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2023/DOJ2023_EN_Full.pdf

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2023b). *Establishment of the hotline between Japan-China defense authorities*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2023/03/dd1ddd1e633fe6b16f982cf5fd6762ec152934e7.html>

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2024). *Japan-China Defense ministerial meeting*. Retrieved November 28, 2024, from <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2024/11/c6b1471937da48d2226ecf04783d9868b5fb4a1d.html>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1960, January 19). *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved December 11, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1967). *Three Non-Nuclear Principles*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved September 23, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/>

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1972, September 29). *Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved September 24, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1982, August 26). *Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa on History Textbooks*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved September 27, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page25e_000351.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1995a). National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996: International situation. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 15, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/defense96/situation.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1995b). National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996: Security of Japan and Roles of Defense Capabilities. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved November 15, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/defense96/capability.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1995c). *Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama "On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end" (15 August 1995)*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved November 20, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1996). *National Defense Program Outline in and after FY1996*. Retrieved November 25, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/6a.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1997). *Speech by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto: Seeking a new foreign policy toward China*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from <https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8896781/www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/seeking.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1998). *Japan-China Joint Declaration on building a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html>

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2000). Japan-China Foreign Ministers Meeting: Summary. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from <https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8896781/www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/meet0005.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2005). *Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee*. Retrieved November 25, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2007). *Meeting between the Japan Coast Guard and the State Oceanic Administration of China*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8896781/www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/7/1174543_830.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2008a). *Joint press statement on the strengthening exchange and cooperation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from <https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8896781/www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pv0805/press.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2008b). *Visit to Japan by young officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8896781/www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2008/9/1183263_942.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2011a). *Japan-China joint history research report: Modern and contemporary history*. 1-194. Retrieved December 5, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100512970.pdf>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2011b). *The 12th Japan-China Security Dialogue*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/8896781/www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2011/1/0118_01.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2014). *Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China Relations*. Retrieved November 4, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/pag4e_000150.html

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2015a). *13th Japan-China Security Dialogue*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/page3e_000315.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2015b). *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2016). *Status of activities by Chinese government vessels and Chinese fishing vessels in waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands*. Retrieved November 5, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000180283.pdf>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2019). *Japan-China Summit meeting and dinner*. Retrieved November 12, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page3e_001046.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2023a). *Implementation guidelines for Japan's official security assistance*. 1-3. Retrieved November 21, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100487432.pdf>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2023b). *The 17th Japan-China Security Dialogue*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000381.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2024a). *Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00455.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2024b). *The numbers of China Coast Guard and other vessels that entered Japan's contiguous zone or intruded into territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands*. Retrieved November 5, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100647455.pdf>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2000a). *Spokesperson on Shintaro Ishihara's remarks of China being the biggest threat of Japan*. Retrieved November 30, 2024, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2721_663446/2725_663454/202406/t20240607_11409070.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2000b). *Spokesperson on the toning down the history of aggression in Japanese history textbooks*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Retrieved November 30, 2024, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2721_663446/2725_663454/202406/t20240607_11409078.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2001). *Spokesperson on the report that the Government of the Republic of Korea demanded the Japanese Government revise the facts-distorting history textbook*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Retrieved November 30, 2024, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2721_663446/2725_663454/202406/t20240607_11409091.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2021). *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's remarks on Japan's erroneous acts related to the Yasukuni Shrine*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. Retrieved November 24, 2024, from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/fyrbt/202405/t20240530_11349722.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2023a). *China and Japan Hold the 17th Security Dialogue*. Retrieved November 27, 2024, from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wjbxw/202405/t20240530_11343282.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2023b). *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on Japanese Politician Taro Aso's Visit to Taiwan and His Irresponsible Comments*. Retrieved December 10, 2024, from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/fyrbt/202405/t20240530_11349800.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2023c). *Jointly Implementing the Global Security Initiative For Lasting Peace and Security of the World*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202405/t20240530_11343749.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2024). *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning's regular press conference on October 17, 2024*. Retrieved November 24, 2024, from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202410/t20241017_11509439.html

- Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China. (2021a). *China's National Defense in 2010*. Retrieved November 8, 2024, from <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887922.html>
- Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China. (2021b). *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*. Retrieved from November 8, 2024, from <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887929.html>
- Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union. (2013). *Remarks by Yang Jiechi on Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine*. Retrieved November 24, 2024, from http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/zbzc/201312/t20131228_8303200.htm
- Miyagi, T. (2024, November 20). A New Government in a Shaky Part of the World: Thinking About Ishiba Shigeru's "Asian NATO" Concept. *Nippon.com*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01070/>
- Moriyasu, K. (2023). In Taiwan, Aso says Japan must show 'will to fight' to deter China. *Nikkei Asia*. Retrieved December 10, 2024, from <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-tensions/In-Taiwan-Aso-says-Japan-must-show-will-to-fight-to-deter-China>
- Murphy, R. T. (2014). *Japan and the shackles of the past*. The Oxford Press.
- Nagatomi, S. (2024). Japan's defense spending climbs to 1.6% of GDP. *Nikkei Asia*. Retrieved November 21, 2024, from <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Japan-s-defense-spending-climbs-to-1.6-of-GDP>
- Narusawa, M. (2014). The overseas dispatch of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and U.S. war preparations, *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 12(31). <https://apjif.org/2014/12/31/narusawa-muneo/4158/article>
- Niksich, L. A. (1996, September 30). Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute: The US legal relationship and obligations. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

Nippon. (2018). *Japan's defense budget and the 1% Limit*. Retrieved November 21, 2024, from <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00196/>

Office of the Historian. (1972, February 27). *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972 - Office of the Historian*. Office of the Historian. Retrieved September 24, 2024, from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203>

Office of the President. (2023). President Tsai meets former Prime Minister Aso Taro of Japan. *Office of the President of the Republic of China*. Retrieved December 10, 2024, from <https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6560>

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (1994). A national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. *Historical Office*. Retrieved December 14, 2024, from <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1994.pdf?ver=YPdbuschbfpPz3tyQQxaLg%3d%3d>

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (1998). A national security strategy for a new century. *Historical Office*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1998.pdf?ver=z11p-sJtgDvXOM01YVnfqA%3d%3d>

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2000). A national security strategy for a global age. *Historical Office*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2000.pdf?ver=vuu1vGIkFVV1HusDPL21Aw%3d%3d>

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2006). The national security strategy of the United States of America. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2006.pdf?ver=Hfo1-Y5B6CMl8yHpX4x6IA%3d%3d>

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2008). *Department of Defense: National defense strategy*. Retrieved December 14, 2024, from https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2008_NDS.pdf?ver=WEYyBjnf6UkNioPqfkSr3Q%3d%3d

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2015a). National Security Strategy. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/NSS2015.pdf?ver=TJJ2QfM0McCqL-pNtKHtVQ%3d%3d>

- Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2015b). The National military strategy of United States of America. Retrieved December 14, 2024, from https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/NMS2015.pdf?ver=XGOU_7X6YpNjZfuyM7Jfvw%3d%3d
- Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2017). *National Security Strategy*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/NSS2017.pdf?ver=CnFwURrw09pJ0q5EogFpwg%3d%3d>
- Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2018). *National Military Strategy*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/NMS2018%20Overview.pdf?ver=oERVYfgg1p-jtLK_kYsZHQ%3d%3d
- Pan, Z. (2007). Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The pending controversy from the Chinese perspective. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 12(1), 71-92. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-007-9002-6>
- Panda, A. (2014, April 24). Obama: Senkakus covered under US-Japan Security Treaty. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved December 12, 2024, from <https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkakus-covered-under-us-japan-security-treaty/>
- Pomfret, J. (1998). Clinton restates ‘Three Noes’ policy on Taiwan. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/30/clinton-restates-three-noes-policy-on-taiwan/535aa6a0-1384-4c6b-a113-3ab8a3f0a307/>
- Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. (1947, May 3). *The Constitution of Japan*. Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. Retrieved October 20, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
- Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. (2013). Statement by Prime Minister Abe: Pledge for everlasting peace. *Cabinet Public Affairs Office, Cabinet Secretariat*. Retrieved November 24, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201312/1202986_7801.html
- Prime Minister’s Office of Japan (2010). *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond*. 1-19. Retrieved November 19, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/kakugikettei/2010/ndpg_e.pdf

- Prime Minister's Office of Japan. (2013a). *National defense program guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond*. Retrieved November 20, 2024, from https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf
- Prime Minister's Office of Japan. (2013b). *National security strategy*. Retrieved November 20, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/18/NSS.pdf
- Pyle, K. (1998). Restructuring foreign and defense policy: Japan. In A. McGrew & C. Brook (Eds.), *Asia-Pacific in the new world order* (pp. 121-136). Routledge.
- Qiu, J. (2006). The politics of history and historical memory in China-Japan relations. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, *11*, 25-53. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02877032>
- Ravenhill, J. (2013). APEC and security. In V. K. Aggarwal, & K. Govella, *Linking trade and security: evolving institutions and strategies in Asia, Europe, and the United States* (pp. 49-66). Springer.
- Resar, A. (2022, July 18). The 1992 Consensus: Why it worked and why it fell apart. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved November 28, 2024, from <https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/>
- Reuters. (2024, October 17). *Japan's Ishiba sends offering to Yasukuni Shrine, angering S.Korea, China*. Retrieved November 24, 2024, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/japan/japan-pm-ishiba-sends-offering-yasukuni-shrine-ahead-election-2024-10-17/>
- Robertson, P. E. (2024). The Military Rise of China: The Real Defence Budget Over Two Decades. *Defence and Peace Economics*, *35*(7), 809–825. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2024.2342043>
- Roderick, J. (1972, September 26). Tanaka Tells Chou of Japan's Regret for Aggression. *The New York Times*. Retrieved September 25, 2024, from <https://www.nytimes.com/1972/09/26/archives/tanaka-tells-chou-of-japans-regret-for-aggression-2-premiers.html>

- Rose, C., & Sýkora, J. (2017). The trust deficit in Sino-Japanese relations. *Japan Forum*, 29(1), 100–124. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2016.1227353>
- Roy, D. (1998). Restructuring foreign and defense policy: The People's Republic of China. In A. McGrew & C. Brook (Eds.), *Asia-Pacific in the new world order* (pp. 137-157). Routledge.
- Roy, D. (2024, February 8). China's zombie East China Sea policy. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved November 29, 2024, from <https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/chinas-zombie-east-china-sea-policy/>
- Sahashi, R. (2024). Opposition and cooperation: The Asia Pacific after the Cold War. In R. Sahashi, Y. Matsuda, & W. Aoyama, (Eds.), *Asia rising: A handbook of history and international relations in the East, South and Southeast Asia* (pp. 269-288). Springer.
- Sakamoto, K. (2017). Visits to Yasukuni Shrine by the Prime Minister and Japan-China relations: What is confusing the debate?. *The Japan Institute of International Affairs*, 1-18. https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=tr&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Visits+to+Yasukuni+Shrine+by+the+Prime+Minister+and+Japan-China+Relations%3A+What+is+Confusing+the+Debate%3F&btnG=
- Sanger, D. E. (2001). US would defend Taiwan, Bush says. *The New York Times*. Retrieved November 30, 2024, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/26/world/us-would-defend-taiwan-bush-says.html>
- Satoshi, I. (2012). Sino-Japanese mutual understanding as seen in history textbooks. In D. Yang, J. Liu, H. Mitani, & A. Gordon (Eds.), *Toward a history beyond borders: Contentious issues in Sino-Japanese relations* (pp. 267-298). Harvard University Press.
- Scobell, A. (2009). Show of Force: The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. In *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (pp. 171–191). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510502.010>
- Scoville, R. M. (2016). Sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands: A guide to the legal debate. In T. F. Liao, K. Hara, & K. Wiegand, (Eds.), *The China-Japan*

border dispute: Islands of convention in multidisciplinary perspective (pp. 85-114). Routledge

Shin G. W., & Sneider D. (2016). *Divergent memories: Opinion leaders and the Asia-Pacific war*. Stanford University Press.

Shin, K., & Minoura, H. (2010). The three phases of Japan-China joint-history research: What was the challenge?. *Asian Perspective*, 34(4), 19-43. <https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2010.0005>

Shlapak, D. A. (2013, March 28). America's Delicate Dance in the Pacific. *RAND Corporation*. Retrieved December 12, 2024, from <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2013/03/americas-delicate-dance-in-the-pacific.html>

Sinkkonen, E. (2019). The more the merrier? Sino-Japanese security relations in the context of complex interstate rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region. *Pacific Review*, 32(5), 748–777. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1569113>

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. (2023). *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://milex.sipri.org/sipri>

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. (2024). *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://milex.sipri.org/sipri>

Soeya, Y. (2002). The China Factor in the US-Japan Alliance: The Myth of a China Threat. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 2(2), 37-66. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800000904>

Soeya, Y. (2011). A 'normal' middle power: Interpreting changes in Japanese security policy in the 1990s and after. In Y. Soeya, M. Tadokoro, D. A. Welch, (Eds.), *Japan as a 'normal country': A nation in search of its place in the world* (pp. 72-97). University of Toronto Press.

Stramer-Smith, J. (2024). Towards Regional Security Cooperation. In L. Hebron, (Ed.), *Asian security in the age of globalization* (pp. 146-163). Routledge.

- Stuart, D. (2015). Obama's 'rebalance' in historical context. In W. T. Tow & D. Stuart (Eds.), *The new US strategy towards Asia: Adapting to the American pivot* (pp. 9-29). Routledge.
- Szanto, B. (2017). *China and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute: Escalation and de-escalation*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315105635>
- Tadokoro, M. (2011). Change and continuity in Japan's 'abnormalcy': An emerging external attitude of the Japanese public. In Y. Soeya, M. Tadokoro, D. A. Welch, (Eds.), *Japan as a 'normal country': A nation in search of its place in the world* (pp. 38-71). University of Toronto Press.
- Taipei Times. (2004). *Koizumi pays surprise visit to Yasukuni shrine*. Retrieved October 17, 2024, from <https://www.taipetimes.com/News/world/archives/2004/01/02/2003086040>
- Takagi, S. (2006). The Taiwan factor in Japan-China relations. In L. P. Er, (Ed.), *Japan's relations with China: Facing a rising power* (pp. 107-127). Routledge.
- Tan, A. T. (2016). Taiwan in US–China relations. In A. T. Tan (Ed.), *Handbook of US–China Relations* (pp. 283-302). Edward Elgar Publishing.
- The American Presidency Project. (1969). *Joint Statement Following Discussions With Prime Minister Sato of Japan*. The American Presidency Project. UC Santa Barbara. Retrieved September 23, 2024, from <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/joint-statement-following-discussions-with-prime-minister-sato-japan>
- The Avalon Project. (2019). *Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan*. Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Library. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp
- The Economist. (2020). *A new law would unshackle China's coastguard, far from its coast*. Retrieved November 4, 2024, from https://www.economist.com/china/2020/12/03/a-new-law-would-unshackle-chinas-coastguard-far-from-its-coast?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=18151738051&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=c_onversion.direct-response.anonymous&gad_source=1&gbraid=0AAAAADf4AbbqWaYuQuZ8z_BeB6eJ808Ky&gclid=Cj0KCCQiA_qG5BhDTARIsAA0UHSIytgcWq46lcXLTkWva_eGDfKqZOZ8WmvB5tjGmXWs6jhrfa9zULmQaAo71EALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds

The Economist. (2021). Nominal spending figures understate China's military might. Retrieved November 13, 2024, from https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/05/01/nominal-spending-figures-understate-chinas-military-might?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=18151738051&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=c_onversion.direct-response.anonymous&gad_source=1&gbraid=0AAAAADf4AbaX-OjiiNAdEgcg7n1L7XTM0&gclid=CjwKCAiAudG5BhAREiwAWMISjLdx-HtKkTpKxmbUQ-lZsYleZDZbD8FbR9gedLca0mBn_2thjPkUGhoC0zgQAvD_BwE&gclsrc=a_w.ds

The Office of the Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Lithuania. (2004). *China's National Defense in 2000*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from http://lt.china-office.gov.cn/eng/zt/zfbps/200405/t20040530_2910848.htm#3

The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2017). *China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2017-01/20/content_40535681_2.htm

The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2019a). *China's national defense in the new era: International situation*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/2019-07/24/content_75026800_2.htm

The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2019b). *China's national defense in the new era*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/2019-07/24/content_75026800_3.htm

The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2019c). *China's national defense in the new era: Reasonable and appropriate defense expenditure*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/2019-07/24/content_75026800_6.htm

The World and Japan Database. (2008). Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on comprehensive promotion of a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests". *University of Tokyo*. Retrieved November 24, 2024, from <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPCH/20080510.D1E.html>

- The World and Japan Database. (2014). Yang Jiechi meets National Security Advisor of Japan Shotaro Yachi: China and Japan reach Four-Point Principled Agreement on handling and improving bilateral relations. *University of Tokyo*. Retrieved November 24, 2024, from <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPCH/20141107.O1EX.html>
- Tow, W. T. (2015). Rebalancing and order building: Strategy or illusion?. In W. T. Tow & D. Stuart (Eds.), *The new US strategy towards Asia: Adapting to the American pivot* (pp. 30-52). Routledge.
- Tow, W. T., & Limaye, S. (2016). What's China got to do with it? US alliances, partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 8(1), 7-26. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12228>
- Truman, H. S. (1950, June 27). *Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea*. Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. Retrieved October 20, 2024, from <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/173/statement-president-situation-korea>
- Tyler, P. E. (1992, March 8). US strategy plan calls for insuring no rivals develop. *The New York Times*. Retrieved November 30, 2024, from <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/us-strategy-plan-calls-for-insuring-no-rivals-develop.html>
- United Nations. (1992). *Law of the People's Republic of China on the territorial sea and contiguous zone*. United Nations. Retrieved November 6, 2024, from https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf
- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Treaties Database. (n.d.). *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. Retrieved November 6, 2024, from https://treaties.unoda.org/t/npt/declarations/CHN_moscow_ACC
- United Nations Treaties. (1972). *Japan and United States of America Agreement concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands*. Retrieved December 12, 2024, from <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20841/volume-841-i-12037-english.pdf>
- United Nations Treaty Collection. (1981, May 20). Japan and China Treaty of peace and friendship. In *United States Treaty Collection*. 296-270. Retrieved

September 26, 2024, from <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201225/volume-1225-I-19784-English.pdf>

US Department of Defense. (1991). *National security strategy of the United States: 1991*. Retrieved December 21, 2024, from <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1991.pdf?ver=3sIpLiQwmknO-RplyPeAHw%3d%3d>

US Department of State. (1996). U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century. *US Department of State Archive*. Retrieved December 22, 2024, from <https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eap/japan/jointsec.html>

US Department of State. (1997). Ambassador Thomas Foley On-the-Record Briefing on U.S.-Japan Relations. *US Department of State Archive*. Retrieved December 11, 2024, from https://1997-2001.state.gov/policy_remarks/971107_foleyt_japan.html

US Department of State. (2013). Remarks With Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida After Their Meeting. *US Department of State: Diplomacy in Action*. Retrieved December 12, 2024, from <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/203050.htm>

US-China Institute. (1998, July 1). *PRC State Council, China's National Defense in 1998*. US-China Institute. Retrieved November 25, 2024, from <https://china.usc.edu/prc-state-council-chinas-national-defense-1998#I>

US-China Institute. (2004). PRC State Council, China's national defense in 2004, December 27, 2004. *University of South Carolina*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://china.usc.edu/prc-state-council-chinas-national-defense-2004-december-27-2004>

US-China Institute. (2009). PRC State Council, China's national defense in 2008. *University of South Carolina*. Retrieved November 22, 2024, from <https://china.usc.edu/prc-state-council-chinas-national-defense-2008-january-20-2009>

Wan, M. (2016). *Understanding Japan-China relations: Theories and issues*. World Scientific Publishing.

- Wang, Q. E. (2010). Remembering the past; reconciling for the future: A critical analysis of the China-Japan Joint History Research Project (2006-2010). *The Chinese Historical Review*, 17(2), 219-237. <https://doi.org/10.1179/tcr.2010.17.2.219>
- Watts, J. (2008). China and Japan agree on joint gas exploration of East China Sea. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/18/china.japan>
- Welch, D. A. (2011). Embracing normalcy: Towards a Japanese 'national strategy'. In Y. Soeya, M. Tadokoro, D. A. Welch, (Eds.), *Japan as a 'normal country': A nation in search of its place in the world* (pp. 16-37). University of Toronto Press.
- Wiegand, K. E. (2016). How Japan benefits from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. In T. F. Liao, K. Hara, & K. Wiegand, (Eds.), *The China-Japan border dispute: Islands of convention in multidisciplinary perspective* (pp. 1161-176). Routledge.
- Woolf, C. (2013, December 26). Why the Yasukuni Shrine is so controversial. *The World*. <https://theworld.org/stories/2013/12/26/why-yasukuni-shrine-so-controversial>
- Xinbo, W. (2005). The end of the silver lining: A Chinese view of the US-Japanese alliance. *The Washington Quarterly*, 29(1), 117-130. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016366005774859715>
- Yang, D. (2024). More aggressive US-Japan alliance threatens Asia Pacific security, stability. *China Military Online*. Retrieved December 15, 2024, from http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/OPINIONS_209196/Opinions_209197/16329039.html
- Ye, M. (2008). Security Institutions in Northeast Asia: Multilateral Responses to Structural Changes. In V. K. Aggarwal, (Ed.), *The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific* (pp. 121-149). Springer.
- Yoshida, T. (2000). A battle over history the Nanjing massacre in Japan. In J. A. Fogel (Ed.), *The Nanjing massacre in history and historiography* (pp. 70-132). University of California Press. <https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520923515-004>
- Yoshiko, N., & Hiromitsu, I. (1998). Japanese education, nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo's court challenges. *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 30(2), 37-46. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1998.10411042>

Zhang, Y. (2014). The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute in the context of China-US-Japan trilateral dynamics [RSIS Working Paper No. 270]. *Singapore: Nanyang Technological University*, 1-9. <https://hdl.handle.net/10356/101941>

Zhou, L. (2020). American troops could be sent to ‘defend the Senkaku Islands’, US commander says. *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved December 12, 2024, from <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3107291/american-troops-could-be-sent-defend-senkaku-islands-us>

APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Bu tezde Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti ve Japonya arasındaki anlaşmazlık ve iş birliği konuları ele alınmış, Soğuk Savaş sonrası döneme odaklanılmıştır. Günümüze kadar seyreden bu anlaşmazlıklar, iki ülke arasında anlaşmazlıkların krize dönüşmesi endişesi sebebiyle bilinçli olarak ihmal edilmiştir. Bu durum, anlaşmazlıkların hem tarihsel süreçte hem de günümüz siyasetinde çözülmeden korunmasına sebep olmuştur. Öte yandan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD), iki ülke arasındaki anlaşmazlıklarda önemli bir aktör olarak kendini göstermiştir. Stratejik çıkarları sebebiyle tarihsel süreç boyunca hem ikili ilişkileri hem de bölgenin güvenliğini etkilemiştir. Bu tezde, ABD'nin Çin-Japon ilişkilerinde stratejik çıkarlarına bağlı olarak bölgedeki gerilimi azaltıcı bir rol oynadığı gibi öte yandan gerilimi koruyan hatta arttıran bir etki de yarattığı sonucuna varılmıştır.

Öncelikle, tarihsel sürece bakıldığında, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti (ÇHC) ve Japonya'nın İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan hemen sonra geçirdikleri süreçler ele alınmıştır. Japonya, 1945 yılında mağlup olarak savaş sonunda ABD'nin vesayeti altına girmiştir. Yedi sene süren söz konusu vesayet sürecinde Japonya'nın, şu anda da yürürlükte olan ve barışçıl olarak bilinen anayasası 1946 yılında hazırlanmış ve 3 Mayıs 1947'de yürürlüğe girmiştir. Bu anayasaya göre, Japonya güç kullanımını ve askeri birlik bulundurmaya reddetmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, bu ABD vesayeti sonucunda, ihtilafli taraflar 8 Eylül 1951'de San Francisco Barış Antlaşması'nı imzalamıştır. Böylelikle müttefik kuvvetler ile Japonya arasındaki savaş hali son bulmuştur. Ancak, bu müttefik kuvvetler grubunun içerisinde ABD ve İngiltere'nin orkestra etmesiyle Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti ve Tayvan ya da o zamanki adıyla Çin Cumhuriyeti bu anlaşmaya taraf olmamışlardır. Bu davranış, günümüze kadar uzanan Çin-Japonya ilişkisini de olumsuz etkilemiştir. Bir başka önemli konu ise Japonya ile ABD arasında San Francisco Barış Antlaşması ile aynı gün imzalanan güvenlik anlaşmasıdır. Bu

anlaşmaya göre, Japonya'nın anayasasında da belirtilen güvenlik açığı, ABD askerlerinin ve askeri üssünün Japonya topraklarında kalması şartıyla giderilmiştir. Elbette ki bu durum, süregelen zamanda tüm bölge için bir yandan güvenlik refahı oluştururken bir yandan da gerginlikler oluşturmuştur. Diğer bir yandan, Çin anakarasında savaş sonrası komünist ve milliyetçi taraflar arasında bir iç savaş başlamıştır. Bu iç savaşın galibi olan komünist taraf, 1 Ekim 1949'da Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'ni kurmuştur. Öte yandan, Çan Kay Şek liderliğinde milliyetçi taraf, Tayvan'a çekilmiştir.

1950'li yıllarda, Soğuk Savaş'ın sert seyrettiği bir dönem olup Çin-Japon ilişkisinde de önemli yere sahiptir. İki taraf 1950'lere Soğuk Savaşın iki farklı kutbu ile anlaşmalar yaparak girmiştir. ÇHC, Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (SSCB) ile dostluk anlaşması imzalamışken Japonya, ABD ile yakınlık gösterip güvenlik anlaşması imzalamıştır. Dünya siyaseti bu seyirde iken ÇHC'ni ABD ile karşı karşıya getiren ve Soğuk Savaşın sıcak savaşı Kore'de patlak vermiştir. Bu durum, ABD için hem Asya-Pasifik ülkelerinin hem de Tayvan'ın Soğuk Savaş çerçevesinde önemini belirtmiştir. Buna bağlı olarak, ABD San Francisco sistemini oluşturmuştur. Bu sistem, ABD'nin komünizmi çevreleme politikasının bir parçasıdır. Merkezi ABD, kolları ise Japonya başta olmak üzere Tayvan, Güney Kore, Filipinler gibi ülkeler oluşturmaktadır. Bu çevreleme politikasından rahatsızlık duyan ÇHC ise ekonomik zorluklarından ve ulusal tanınmama endişelerinden dolayı sert bir tepki vermemiştir. Hem Japonya hem de ÇHC'nin savaş sonrası ekonomilerini iyileştirme çabaları ise bu iki ülkeyi resmi olmayan yollardan bir araya getirmiştir. Bu amaç ile yola çıkan iki taraf, 1952'de Japon-Çin Özel Ticaret Anlaşmasını imzalamıştır. Genişletilmesi iki taraf tarafından da pozitif karşılanmış ve 1953'te bir yenisi daha eklenmiştir. 1955 yılında genişletilmiş ve derinleştirilmiş bir versiyonu, daha hazırlık sürecindeyken ABD, Japonya'ya bir eleştiride bulunmuş ve bu ticaret anlaşmasının genişletilmesini engellemiştir. Burada açıkça görülmektedir ki taraflar resmi olmayan yollardan da olsa ilişkileri derinleştirmeye çalışırken ABD'nin o dönemdeki siyaseti ile örtüşmediği için iki ülkenin arasındaki iyileşme sürecinin yavaşlamasına sebep olmuştur.

1960'lı yıllarda, ÇHC ile SSCB'nin ayrılığı çok önemli bir dönüm noktası olarak tarihe geçmiştir. Bunun sebebi, ABD'nin asıl hedefindeki SSCB ile ayrılık yaşayan ÇHC

nezdinde geliřtirdiđi yakınlařma politikasına temel oluřturmasıdır. 1970'lerde ise bu yakınlařma politikası pratiđe dökülmüřtür. Bu durum, Japonya ile ÇHC arasındaki resmi normalizasyon süreci önündeki asıl engeli kaldırmıřtır. Bu temellerden yola çıkarak ÇHC ve Japonya temsilcileri, Pekin'de bir araya gelmiř ve 29 Eylül 1972'de Japonya ve ÇHC hükümetleri Ortak Bildiri yayınlamıřtır. Taraflar, resmi iliřkilerin normalizasyon sürecinde olduđunu belirtmiřtir. En sonunda, 12 Ađustos 1978 yılında Çin-Japon Barıř ve Dostluk Anlařması imzalanmıřtır. 1978 yılı aynı zamanda iki önemli geliřmeye tanık olmuřtur. Hem Japon-ABD ittifakı güçlendirilmiř hem de ÇHC hükümeti ülke pazarını yurtdıřına açmıřtır. Japonya ve ABD tarafından ABD'nin kurduđu düzene ÇHC'ni dahil etme isteđi ile bu geliřme olumlu karřılanmıř ve Japonya'nın hem ticari anlařmaları hem de Resmi Kalkınma Yardımı (ODA) ile pekiřtirilmiřtir. Ancak, bu olumlu geliřmelerle birlikte iki ülke arasındaki anlařmazlıklar da belirmeye bařlamıřtır. Literatürde çokça bilinen tarih sorunu ierisindeki kitap sorunu 1982'de patlak vermiřtir. Bununla birlikte Sođuk Savař dönemi sona ermiřtir.

Sođuk Savař sonrası, SSCB'nin oluřturduđu tehditin yok olması ile ABD tek kutuplu bir uluslararası düzen arayıřına girmiřtir. Buna ek olarak, ABD Sođuk Savař döneminde oluřturduđu ittifaklardan kendi ülkelerinin savunmalarında daha fazla rol üstlenmelerini istemiřtir. ABD'nin tamamen bölgeden çekilmesi endiřesi ile Japonya, ülke güvenliđinde daha fazla rol üstelenmeye bařlamıřtır. Ancak bu durum, Japonya'nın İkinci Dünya Savařı'nda bıraktıđı etki sebebiyle ÇHC'nin de dahil olduđu bölge ülkeleri tarafından endiře ile karřılanmıřtır. Bu etkilerden yola çıkarak tarih sorunu hem tarih kitapları hem de Yasukuni Tapınađı sorunu altında ikiye bölünmüřtür. 2001 yılında "tarih kitabı sorunu" yeniden patlak vermiřtir. Japon tarih kitaplarında yer alan belirli tanımların deđiřtirilmesi ve Japonya'da yükselen ařırı muhafazakâr kesimin Japonya'nın Çin'i iřgali, Nanjing Katliamı ve Tokyo Mahkemeleri gibi konulardaki bakıř açılarının açıka dile getirilmesi bölgedeki ülkeleri tedirgin etmiř, güven zedelenmesine sebep olmuř ve iki ülke arasındaki iliřkilere zarar vermiřtir. İki ülke, bu duruma ortak bir müdahaleyle Japonya-Çin Ortak Tarih Arařtırma Projesi'ni 2006 yılında hayata geirmiřtir. Proje dört yıl sürmüř, sonunda ortak bir rapor hazırlanması planlanmıřtır. Ancak, ihtilaflı konular hakkında ortak bir zeminde buluřulamamıřtır. İkinci olarak Yasukuni Tapınađı sorunu ise Tokyo Mahkemeleri

sonucunda A sınıfı Savaş Suçlusu olarak ilan edilen Japon askerlerinin Yasukuni Tapınağı'na yerleştirilmeleri ve sonrasında Japon başbakanlarının tapınağa resmi ziyarette bulunmaları bir başka anlaşmazlık konusu olmuştur. 2001 yılında Japon Başbakanı Koizumi'nin hükümet başında olduğu süre boyunca her yıl resmi olarak Yasukuni Tapınağı'nı ziyaret etmesi, ikili ilişkileri derinden zedelemiştir. Savaş içerisinde büyük zarar gören ÇHC dahil bölge ülkeleri, bu ziyaretlere hem hükümet hem de halk nezdinde sert tepkiler göstermiştir. ÇHC hükümeti, bu ziyaretleri hem bir Japon militarizminin yeniden doğuşu hem de savaşta sebep oldukları acılara karşı duyarsızlık olarak nitelendirmiştir. Japonya tarafı ise bu durumun Japon militarizmi veya duyarsızlıkla ilgili olmadığını, gerekli özürlerin dilendiğini ve Yasukuni Tapınağı'nın ülke için canını feda eden insanlara saygı göstermenin temsili olduğu için ziyaret edildiğini öne sürmüştür. Koizumi hükümetinden sonra gelen Şinzo Abe hükümetinin ikinci döneminde, 2013 yılında Japon Başbakan Yasukuni Tapınağı'na resmi ziyaret gerçekleştirmiştir. Hem ÇHC hükümetinden gelen sert eleştiriler hem de ABD uyarıları dolayısıyla bu ziyaretten sonra başka bir ziyaret gerçekleştirilmemiştir. Ancak, Abe'den sonra gelen başbakanlar tapınağa adak sunmaya devam etmiştir. Böylelikle, tarih sorunlarına bir çözüm getirilememiş ve bu durum günümüzde bilinçli ihmal politikası içerisinde bulunmaktadır.

ABD'nin tarihsel süreçte tarih sorununa etkisi literatürde çok yer bulmamıştır. Ancak, Tokyo Mahkemelerinde ABD'nin görevlendirdiği Amerikan yargıcın Japon İmparatoru Hirohito'nun emrindeki askerlerin cezalandırılıp imparatorun bu cezalandırmanın dışarısında bırakılması, “konfor kadınları (comfort women)” konusunun mahkemeye konu olmaması ve Soğuk Savaş stratejisine uygun olarak Japonya'nın Nanjing Katliamı hakkında bilgileri oldukları halde tarih kitaplarındaki düzeltmeler yapmaları ve özür dilemeleri hakkında direktmemeleri sebebiyle tarih sorunu açıkça göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu ihmal, ilerleyen süreçte ÇHC ile Japonya arasındaki tarih sorununun katlanarak büyümesine ve daha karmaşık bir hale gelmesine sebep olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, Hiroşima ve Nagazaki şehirlerine atılan atom bombaları ve sonrasındaki yıkım için özür dilenmemesi de Tokyo Mahkemelerinin tarafsızlığını sorgulatmış, Japon aşırı muhafazakarlarının mahkemeleri “kazananın adaleti” olarak eleştirmesine sebep olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, Amerika'nın Japonya'daki askeri varlığı literatürde çokça Japon

militarizminin tekrar yükselişini engelleme olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Ancak, çok önemli başka bir hususun altı çizilmemiştir. Her ne kadar Amerika, Japonya militarizminin yükselişini engellemiş ve bölgedeki Japon korkusunu gidermiş olsa da aynı zamanda Japonya ve ÇHC arasında savaş sonrasında bir normalizasyon sürecinin gelişmesine de dolaylı yoldan engel olmuştur. Bunu Barry Buzan ve Evelyn Goh, ABD'nin halka tutan rolü (ring-holder role) olarak tanımlamıştır.

Tayvan sorunu; güvenlik alanında ÇHC ve Japonya arasında, ABD'nin de içerisinde bulunduğu çok kritik bir anlaşmazlıktır. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında, 1992 Konsensüsü ile Tayvan'daki yönetimle ÇHC arasındaki Çin tanımının farklılığı ortaya çıkmıştır. ÇHC'nin temel çıkarları içerisinde yer alan ve Tayvan'ın ÇHC'nin bölünmez bir parçası olduğu ilkesi ile derinden çakışan bu durum, Japonya ve ABD için de önem arz etmektedir. Tayvan içerisindeki bağımsızlık sesleri sebebiyle ÇHC sert ve yaptırımcı politikalar izlemiş, Tayvan Devlet Başkanı Lee Teng-hui'nin ABD ziyareti sonrası, ÇHC füze testleri ile birlikte çeşitli gözdağı verici hareketleri sonrasında ABD iki savaş gemisini boğaza göndermiş ve 1995-1996 Tayvan Boğazı Krizi patlak vermiştir. Bu durum, Japonya'yı ÇHC'ni güvenlik çerçevesinde ve dikkat edilmesi gereken hususlar konularında değerlendirmesine sebep olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, ÇHC'nin protestosu ABD'nin Çin'in iç işlerine karışması yönündedir. Buna ek olarak, 17 Nisan 1996'da ABD ile Japonya arasında duyurulan Güvenlik Ortak Deklarasyonunda Japonya'nın güvenlik alanının içerisinde "Japonya'yı çevreleyen bölgelerin" de eklenmesi, ÇHC ile Japonya arasında bir gerginlik yaratmıştır. Ek olarak, ÇHC, Japonya'yı çevreleyen bölgeler arasında Tayvan'ın kastedilip kastedilmediğini sorgulamış ve ABD-Japonya ittifakının kendi iç meselelerine karşı hareket ettiğini gözlemlemiştir. Sonuç olarak, ÇHC Tayvan'a yönelik 14 Mart 1995'te Ayrılıkçılık Karşıtı Kanunu'nu (Anti-Secession Law) çıkartmıştır. Bu durum bir kısır döngüye sebep olmuş, ABD-Japonya ittifakı ile ÇHC arasında artan bir gerilim sarmalına dönüşmüştür. 2010 yılında Japonlar tarafından Senkaku, ÇHC tarafından Diaoyu adaları olarak adlandırılan Japon-ÇHC-Tayvan üçgeninde kalan adaların sularında gerçekleşen Japon-ÇHC çarpışması ise bölge için katlanarak büyüyen bir gerginliğe sebep olmuştur. Bu gergin bölgede güvenliğini arttırmak için Japonya, ABD ile iş birliğinde savunma amaçlı balistik füze çalışmalarına da ortak olmuştur. Buna ek olarak, Şinzo Abe'nin 2012'deki döneminde Japonların Tayvanlılarla artan ortaklıkları

da sorunun ABD-ÇHC-Japonya arasında çözülememesi ve gittikçe karmaşıklaşmasına sebep olmuştur.

Tayvan sorunu, ABD'nin kendi elleriyle bölgeye çözmeden bıraktığı ve iki bölge ülkesi için anlaşmazlık teşkil eden bir sorun olmuştur. Japonya'nın kontrolündeki Tayvan, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında San Francisco Barış Antlaşması'nda bahsedildiği gibi teslim edilmiştir. Ancak, Formosa adıyla bilinen Tayvan'ın anlaşmada hangi otoriteye teslim edildiği vurgulanmamıştır. Bunun üzerine başlayan ABD'nin Japonya kontrolünde ise, General McArthur Tayvan'ı milliyetçi tarafın lideri Çan Kay Şek'e teslim etmiştir. Ancak Çin'in içerisinde milliyetçilerin anakara kontrolünü kaybetmesiyle ve Tayvan'a çekilmesiyle başlayan sorun ise ÇHC'nin Tayvan'ın da egemenlikleri altında olduğunu söylemesiyle durum hem hukuki hem de siyasi açıdan çok karmaşık bir hale gelmiştir. ABD ise Soğuk Savaş sırasında hem coğrafi hem de stratejik çıkarları sebebiyle Tayvan'ı bir askeri üs olarak kullanmıştır. ABD-ÇHC yakınlaşması ile ortak bir yol bulunmaya çalışılsa da ABD iki taraflı bir diplomasi yürütmüş ve ÇHC'ne "Tek Çin" prensibini benimsediğini 1972'deki Şanghai Ortak Bildirisi'nde belirtmiştir. Ayrıca, Tayvan'a silah satışının azaltılarak duracağını taahhüdünü iletmiştir. Ancak aynı zamanda, Tayvan'a güvenliklerini sağlayacaklarını da belirtmiştir. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında ise Tayvan'ın ÇHC'nin tam kontrolüne geçmesi, ABD'nin bölgedeki stratejik çıkarlarına uymamaktadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemdeki bu çıkar, ABD'nin bölgedeki etkisini aşacak başka bir gücün ilerlemesini durdurmaktadır. Bu sebeple, ÇHC'nin karşısında güç elde edip kendini savunma kapasitesine sahip olması için ABD, Tayvan'a silah satışlarında bulunmuştur. Buna ek olarak, Japon-ABD güvenlik ve savunma belgelerinde Tayvan'ın işgali durumunda ABD'nin bu durumu tehdit olarak algılayıp harekete geçeceğine dair üstü kapalı ibareler yer almaktadır. Bununla birlikte, sorumluluk paylaşma adı altında Japonya, savunma alanına daha fazla yatırım yapmaya başlamıştır. Bu gelişmeleri endişe ile takip eden ÇHC ise kendisine karşı yürütülen bir çevreleme politikası olduğunu öne sürmüştür. Her ne kadar ekonomik alanda ÇHC'nin ABD açık pazar düzenine ayak uydurması desteklense de bu durum siyaset ve güvenlik alanına yansımamıştır. ABD devlet başkanı Obama'nın 2011'de başlayan ikinci döneminde bu durum Asya'ya Dönüş adıyla dengeleme politikası altında form kazanmıştır. 2016 yılında ise Donald Trump liderliğinde ABD, ÇHC ile derin bir rekabete girmiştir. Buna

bağlı olarak Tayvan'ı ÇHC'ne karşı stratejik bir hamle olarak kullanmıştır. Ancak, Trump'ın başka bölgelerin savunması konusunda gösterdiği isteksizlik, Japonya'yı ÇHC ile yakınlaştırmıştır. Bu da ABD'nin bölgedeki ayrışmayı tetikleyen bir unsur olduğunu kanıtlamaktadır.

Bir diğer ÇHC-Japonya ilişkilerindeki çözülememiş anlaşmazlık ise Tayvan sorunu ile bağlantılı olan Senkaku/Diaoyu takımadaları sorunudur. Bu sorun, iki ülke arasında hem deniz hukuku hem de egemenlik savlarının çatışması ile meydana gelmektedir. Tarihsel açıdan bakıldığında yüzyıllar öncesine dayanan bu savlar, birbirleri ile çatışmakta; ÇHC, Tayvan otoritesi ve Japonya, adalar hakkında egemenlik iddiasında bulunmaktadır. Çin ile Japonya arasındaki Birinci Çin-Japon Savaşını bitiren 1895 Şimonoseki Anlaşmasında, kazanan taraf olarak Japonya, Çin'den bazı adaları elde etmiştir. Çin tarafı, bu adaların arasında Senkaku/Diaoyu adaları olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Böylelikle 1951 San Francisco Antlaşmasına göre Çin, Senkaku/Diaoyu adalarının Japonya'nın militarizmi ile elde edildiğini savunup Çin'e iade edilmesi gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır. Ancak Japonya, Senkaku/Diaoyu adalarının kontrolünü adaların *terra nullius* (hiçbir devlete ait olmayan toprak) statüsünde olması sebebiyle elde ettiğini açıklamıştır. Buna bağlı olarak Japonya, Şimonoseki Anlaşmasında ele geçirilen adalar içerisinde Senkaku/Diaoyu adalarının olmadığını savunup San Francisco Antlaşmasının adaları kapsamadığını ve egemenliğin Japonya'ya ait olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu durum uzun bir süre boyunca iki ülke tarafından da bilinçli olarak ihmal edilmiştir. 1968'de yapılan Birleşmiş Milletler Asya ve Uzak Doğu Ekonomik Komisyonunun adalar etrafında yaptığı araştırma sonucu, bölgenin bir petrol yatağı olma ihtimali bulgusu adaların önemini arttırmıştır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, Japon milliyetçilerinin adalara ziyaretlerini hem ÇHC hem de Tayvan protesto etmiştir. Ancak asıl sorun 7 Eylül 2010 yılında Japonya ile ÇHC arasında gemi çarpışması olayı ile patlak vermiştir. Bundan iki yıl sonra ise bahsi geçen takımadalarındaki üç adanın Japonya hükümeti tarafından millileştirilmesi ise gerilimi tırmandırmıştır. Bu gerilimlerin sonucunda ÇHC adaların etrafındaki varlığını arttırmış ve 23 Aralık 2013'te adaların da dahil olduğu Doğu Çin Denizi'ni Hava Savunma Tanımlama Bölgesi (ADIZ) ilan etmiştir. Japonya ise hem güvenlik ve savunma rehber belgelerinde durumun ciddiyetini belirtmiş hem de ABD ile olan ittifakında bu adaların da Japonya'nın savunmasına dahil olduğunu göstermiştir. İki

ülke, bu tür bir krizin tekrar yaşanmaması için önlem almak istemiş ve 2015'te Japonya-Çin Deniz ve Hava İletişim Mekanizmasını devam ettirme kararı almıştır. Bu mekanizmanın yaptırım olarak geri dönüşü ise 31 Mart 2023 yılında açıklanan iki ülke otoriteleri arasındaki acil hat olmuştur. Ancak, iki ülke arasındaki egemenlik çatışmalarına bir çözüm getirilememiş ve sorun tekrar bilinçli ihmale bırakılmıştır.

ABD'nin bu ikili ilişkilerdeki soruna etkisi oldukça büyüktür. Öncelikle, Soğuk Savaş döneminde, stratejik çıkarlar için bölgenin adalarının kontrolü önemli olduğundan, ABD Japonya'yı savaş sonrasında kontrol ettiği dönemde Senkaku/Diaoyu adalarını Japonya'ya ait olan Ryukyu Adaları ile birleştirmiştir. San Francisco Barış Antlaşmasında, her ne kadar Japonya bağımsızlığını kazansa da Okinawa olarak bilinen bu bölge ABD kontrolünde olmaya devam etmiştir. ABD Japonya baskısından dolayı, 17 Nisan 1971'de Okinawa İade Anlaşması ile Japonya'ya teslim etmiştir. Ancak, burada ÇHC, Tayvan ve Japonya arasında bir egemenlik çatışması olduğu bilinmesine rağmen, ABD burada bunu göz ardı etmiş ve Senkaku/Diaoyu adaları dahil olmak üzere Okinawa'yı Japonya'ya iade etmiştir. Sonrasında konu hakkında tarafsızlık politikası izlediğini vurgulamış ve bu sorunun taraflar arasında çözülmesi gerektiğinin altını çizmiştir. Ancak Japonya ile olan ittifak belgelerinde adaların saldırıya uğraması halinde savunulacağını belirtmişlerdir. Böylelikle ABD ihmallerinin sorumluluklarını almayı reddetmiş ve iki ülke arasında günümüze kadar ulaşan ve gerilim üreten bu soruna olumsuz etki etmiştir.

Bir başka anlaşmazlık konusu ise iki ülkenin de askeri sanayilerinin, kapasitelerinin, savunma harcamalarının ve yatırımlarının artmasıdır. Bahsedilen sorunlar etkisiyle iki ülke de ülke savunması adı altında bölgede silahlanmaya devam etmektedirler. ÇHC, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında, açık pazar üzerinden kazandığı ekonomik gücü askeri güç ile taçlandırmaya başlamıştır. ÇHC, bu askeri yükselişin barışçıl olduğunu, bölgede hegemonik güç olma gayesi taşımadığını ve savunmacı bir doğaya sahip olduğunu iddia etmektedir. 1971'de Senkaku/Diaoyu adalarının Japonya'ya teslim edilmesi veya 1995-1996 Tayvan Boğazı Krizi ve Amerikan gemilerinin boğaza gönderilmesi, ÇHC otoritelerince ülke egemenliğine tehdit oluşturan unsurlar olduğu vurgulanmış ve bu sebeple ülkenin askeri gücünün artmasının gerekli olduğu ifade edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, büyük güç olarak bölge ve dünyada kendini göstermek isteyen ÇHC, sadece

ekonomik ve teknolojik olarak değil, aynı zamanda askeri varlığını da büyük güç statüsündeki ülkeler seviyesine yükseltmek istediğini sıkça dile getirmiştir. Bir başka husus ise Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping, 31 Ekim 2022 yılında Küresel Güvenlik İnisiyatifini dünyaya açıklamıştır. Genel anlamda “her ülke için güvenlik” anlayışını benimseyen ÇHC, iç işlerine karışmama ve müdahale etmeme prensiplerine dayalı bir güvenlik tanımı ortaya koymuştur. ABD bu tanımı, Yol ve Kuşak İnisiyatifi gibi küresel anlamda ÇHC’nin ABD’nin baskınlığını azaltma ve zamanla kendisinin yerini ÇHC’nin alması gayesiyle oluşturulmuş bir adım olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Japonya ise küresel anlamda kendi askeri gücünü kazanmayı “normalizasyon” süreci olarak tanımlamıştır. Japon askeri gücü, her daim ABD ittifakını temel almaktadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Japonya, ilk defa 29 Nisan 1991’de Körfez Savaşı’na asker göndererek kendi toprakları dışında askeri müdahalede bulunmuştur. Bu durum, Amerika’nın Soğuk Savaş bitimi döneminde ittifaklarla sorumlulukları paylaşma ilkesiyle de bağlantı içerisindedir. 1993 yılından itibaren ise ÇHC’nin askeri gücünün artması Japonya için bir endişe olarak resmi kaynaklarda yer bulmaya başlamıştır. 1995-1996 Tayvan Krizi ile, Japonya Ulusal Savunma Programı Taslağı’nı 1995’te güncellemiştir. ÇHC’nin denizlerde nükleer testleri ve Tayvan’a karşı artan baskıları, Japonya için birer endişe kaynağı olmuştur. Bunlarla birlikte, ÇHC’nin askeri gücüne yönelik yatırımları ve gelişmeleri hakkında giderek artan opaklığı ise Japonya’nın şüphelerini arttırmıştır. Büyük kırılma noktası ise Senkaku/Diaoyu adalarındaki çarpışma sonrasında meydana gelmiştir. ABD ile ittifakın güçlendirilmesinin yanı sıra, Avustralya ve Güney Kore gibi ABD’nin bölgedeki diğer ittifakları ile de güvenlik bağları güçlendirilmeye başlamıştır. ÇHC’ni statükoyu tek taraflı değiştirme ile itham eden Japonya, ÇHC’nin askeri alandaki her gelişmesine şüpheyile yaklaşmaya başlamış ve karşılığında ABD ve diğer müttefikleri ile bağlarını sıkılaştırmıştır. Bir başka kritik nokta ise 1 Temmuz 2014 yılında Japonya’nın barışçıl anayasasında bir değişikliğe gidilmiş ve Japonya’nın güvenliği için minimum ölçüde güç kullanımına izin veren maddeler eklenmiştir. Bir diğer yandan Japonya; ABD, Hindistan ve Avustralya ile Dörtlü Güvenlik Diyalogu (QUAD) gibi güvenlik kurumları güçlendirmeye ve yapılandırmaya başlamıştır. Her ne kadar bu kurumların ÇHC’ne karşı olmadığı belirtilse de ÇHC bu kurumların kendisine karşı bir çevreleme politikası içerisinde olduğunu savunmuş ve Soğuk Savaş dönemi düşüncesi ile kutuplaşmanın

olduğunu ileri sürmüştür. Dahası, 2022 yılında ÇHC'ni "en büyük stratejik hasım" olarak tanımlayan Japonya, ulusal savunma yatırımlarını da yıllardır bozmadığı %1'lik sınırdan 2027 yılına kadar %2'ye çıkarmak istediğini duyurmuştur.

Bunlara ek olarak, yıllar içerisinde iki ülke için hem ikili ilişkilerde hem de çok taraflı bağlamda güvenlik açısından iş birliği olanakları doğmuştur. İkili ilişkilerde, Japonya-Çin Güvenlik Diyaloglarına Aralık 1993'te başlanmıştır. Ancak bu diyaloglar, tarafların birbirlerine endişe duydukları noktaları iletmelerinde önemli bir rol oynamışken çözüm üretmede aynı başarıyı yakalayamamıştır. Çoklu bağlamda ise Güneydoğu Asya Ülkeleri Birliği (ASEAN) bünyesinde alt kurumlarında güvenlik diyalogu ve iş birliği çabaları ön plana çıkmıştır. Ancak iki ülkenin güvenlik sorunlarına bu kurumlarda da bir çözüm getirilememiş, hatta bu karşı karşıya gelişler sebebiyle gerilimlerin tırmanması da söz konusu olmuştur.

Soğuk Savaş sonrasında ABD, öncelikle Asya-Pasifik bölgesinde askeri varlığını azaltmayı düşünmüştür. Ancak ÇHC'nin yükselişi, bu durumu tersine çevirmiştir. ABD-Japonya ittifakı ise bölgede hem ABD'nin varlığını korumaya yardımcı hem de Japonya'nın askeri yükselişine bir kontrol mekanizması görevi görmüştür. Bu durumdan başta memnun olan ÇHC, iç işleri olarak müdahalede bulunulmamasını istediği Tayvan gibi meselelerde ABD'nin müdahalesinden zamanla rahatsız olmaya başlamıştır. Buna bağlı olarak, ÇHC, ABD-Japonya ittifakını kendisine karşı bir oluşum olarak tanımlamaya başlamıştır. ABD ise kendi kurduğu düzen içerisinde Asya-Pasifikte statükoyu koruma yolunda ilerlemektedir. 2015'te ise ABD-Japonya ittifakı, diğer ABD ittifakları için bir ağ merkezi olmuş ve rolü artmıştır. Adı konmasa da bu ittifaklar ağı, sessizce ÇHC'ni caydırma yolunda ABD'nin hamleleri olmuştur. Günümüz siyasetinde de şu anda görülmektedir ki ABD, bu ittifaklar ağını daha da genişletme çabası içerisinde.

Tüm bu bilgiler ışığında bu tez, ÇHC ve Japonya arasında yıllardır süregelen sorunların iki ülkenin arasındaki gerilimi arttırmamak adına bilinçli olarak ihmal edildiğini vurgulamaktadır. Bu duruş, iki ülke tarafından da devam ettirilmektedir. Araştırmalar ışığında, ABD'nin bu iki ülkenin ilişkilerinde ayrılmaz bir parça ve önemli bir aktör olduğu da vurgulanmıştır. ABD, çıkarları ile örtüşecek şekilde,

izlediđi politikalarla belirli aralıklarla blgede gerilimleri azaltmıř veya arttırmıř ve blgedeki ittifakları HC'ne karřı duracak řekilde biimlendirmiřtir. Bu durumda, biri ABD'nin en byk stratejik hasmı iken diđeri en nemli mtfeiki olarak bu iki lke arasındaki iliřkiler gerilmekte ve blgede gvenlik dengesi bozulabilmektedir.

B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

(Please fill out this form on computer. Double click on the boxes to fill them)

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences**
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences**
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics**
- Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics**
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences**

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Kaya
Adı / Name : Sıla
Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English): THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTES AND COOPERATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR YEARS (1991-2024): THE US FACTOR

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master Doktora / PhD

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır.** / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years**. *
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. *

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date

(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)
(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)

Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.