

THE EMERGENCE AND POLITICIZATION OF ANATOLIAN CAPITAL  
IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKEY'S CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN  
1960-1980

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1960-1980**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE EMERGENCE AND POLITICIZATION OF ANATOLIAN CAPITAL IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKEY’S CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN 1960-1980**

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**M.S., The Department of Media and Cultural Studies**

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This thesis examines the dynamics of the emergence of Anatolian capital and its politicization processes within the context of Turkey's capitalist transformation. The transformation of productive forces during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic, along with the formation of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, laid the fundamental groundwork for the institutionalization of capitalist relations. The entry into the expansion phase of capitalism after 1960, the state's directive economic policies, and import substitution industrialization strategies accelerated the emergence of small and medium-sized capital groups in Anatolia in the economic sphere. This period is also considered as the process of political subjectification of Islamism, which was excluded in the context of the Republic's modernizing paradigms. The prominent National View movement of this period articulated the economic interests of Anatolian capital with Islamist ideology, bringing these two elements together on a common platform of political discourse and social mobilization. In this respect, this thesis addresses the positioning of Anatolian capital not only as an economic actor but also as a political and ideological subject shaped within hegemonic struggles.

**Keywords:** Anatolian Capital, Political Islam, National View

## ÖZ

### TÜRKİYE’NİN KAPİTALİSTLEŞMESİ BAĞLAMINDA ANADOLU SERMAYESİNİN SİYASALLAŞMASI: 1960-1980

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Yüksek Lisans, Medya ve Kültürel Çalışmalar Bölümü

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Bu tez, Türkiye’nin kapitalistleşmesi bağlamında Anadolu sermayesinin ortaya çıkış dinamiklerini ve siyasallaşma süreçlerini incelemektedir. Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e geçişte üretici güçlerin dönüşümüyle sanayi ve ticaret burjuvazisinin oluşumu, kapitalist ilişkilerin kurumsallaşmasının temel zeminini oluşturmuştur. 1960 sonrası dönemde kapitalizmin genişleme aşamasına girilmesi, devletin yönlendirici ekonomik politikaları ve ithal ikameci sanayileşme stratejileri, Anadolu’nun küçük ve orta ölçekli sermaye gruplarının ekonomik alanda görünür hale gelmesini hızlandırmıştır. Bu dönem aynı zamanda Cumhuriyet’in modernleşmeci paradigmaları bağlamında dışlanan İslamcılığın siyasal özneleşme süreci olarak ele alınmaktadır. Burada öne çıkan Milli Görüş, Anadolu sermayesinin ekonomik çıkarlarını İslamcı ideolojiyle eklemleyerek bu iki unsuru ortak bir siyasal söylem ve toplumsal mobilizasyon zemini üzerinde artiküle etmiştir. Bu bakımdan, bu tez Anadolu sermayesinin yalnızca ekonomik bir aktör olarak değil, aynı zamanda hegemonik mücadelelerin içinde şekillenen siyasal ve ideolojik bir özne olarak konumlanışını ele almaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Anadolu Sermayesi, Siyasal İslam, Milli Görüş

*To my parents*

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ASKON	Anatolian Lions Businessmen Association
DP	Democrat Party
MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association
NOP	National Order Party
NSP	National Salvation Party
RPP	Republican People's Party
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The concept of Anatolian capital has been a phenomenon discussed in various contexts since at least the 1990s, but there is no agreed-upon definition of the extent to which this phenomenon actually exists or, if it does exist, what it encompasses and to what degree. From this perspective, discussions are held in different contexts on the economic, political, and ideological dimensions of this phenomenon. In addition, extensive discussions continue on the dimensions of the mutual relationship between the Justice and Development Party, which has held political power in Turkey for more than 20 years, and Anatolian capital.

The general acceptance within society of the concept of Anatolian capital is based on the mutual and holistic relationship between Islamist, Conservative Democratic, and right-leaning political structures and the religious and conservative industrial and commercial capital in Anatolia. This faction of capital has been at the center of various economic and ideological debates, particularly since the 1990s. The most prominent of these debates is that the real reason behind the conflict of the February 28 (1997) process was the struggle for distribution between Istanbul capital and Anatolian capital. Accordingly, February 28 was an attempt by the bureaucracy and large capital segments, which had been privileged economically and class-wise since the founding of the Republic, to eliminate the newly emerging social forces in society (Özipek, 2005, p.641). In other words, the fundamental dynamics behind this process were the failure of Anatolian capital, which had grown stronger as a capital faction, and the National View movement, which also served as its political sponsor, to develop a political position suitable for the new politics of the post-Cold War era (Bölükbaşı, 2012: 176).

Another critical threshold inherent to Anatolian capital is the 2010 referendum held in Turkey. When viewed in the context of the relations between TÜSİAD, the professional organization of Istanbul capital, and the ruling power, The Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey at that time, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emphasized that capital in Turkey had begun to change hands in a significant way and underlined that Istanbul capital and Anatolian capital could merge both economically and politically (Erdoğan, 2010). This discourse is another concrete demonstration of how tensions between capital factions in Turkey are intertwined with political power relations.

All these discussions essentially concern the accumulation of a certain level of capital in Anatolia and its ability to compete to a certain extent with Istanbul capital. Accordingly, Anatolian capital, which initially constituted a marginal class fraction in the form of small and medium-sized enterprises in Anatolia's small and conservative cities, has reached a certain level of accumulation and has become a force poised to join the dominant bloc of Turkish capitalism.

In addition, it is important to emphasize that, given the stage of accumulation reached, Anatolian capital is not homogeneous in scale and is not limited to Anatolian cities in terms of geography. In the literature and social discourse, there are many capital groups that can be mentioned, such as Green Capital, Islamic Capital, Anatolian Tigers, Conservative Capital, and Local Industry, which are often associated with Islamist-conservative ideology and used as derivatives of the concept of Anatolian capital (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010; Demir, 2005; Demir, Acar, and Toprak, 2004; Tuğal, 2009).

The most fundamental reason for these different definitions, as we have stated, stems from the fact that the fraction referred to as Anatolian capital does not have a homogeneous structure. Accordingly, when looking at the phenomenon of Anatolian capital today, although its class origins are similar, the dynamics of development within the process and the diversity of capital have led to the phenomenon being defined in different ways. In general, certain problems are also encountered in the classification of these forms, which are considered synonymous with Islamic capital. According to Öztürk, while there are no definitive criteria for determining whether a particular company is Islamic, the question of how to classify capital according to its

political or ideological character remains ambiguous. In addition, although not entirely explanatory, temporary methods are used as a solution in the literature inherent to this field. For example, evaluations based on the capital organizations to which the capital or capitalist belongs are among such solutions (Öztürk, 2015, 119-120).

However, classifications of the type mentioned by the author are only possible for the period after the 1990s. Indeed, the phenomenon we emphasize in this study as Anatolian capital consists of economic actors with the characteristics of a “class in itself” that began to emerge in the 1960s. In addition, Islamist-conservative capital organizations are symbolic manifestations of class consciousness corresponding to a certain level of capital accumulation and consciousness within this capitalist class. Therefore, these organizations emerged at a later stage: for example, MÜSİAD, where the Islamist bourgeoisie is concentrated today, was founded in 1990, and ASKON was founded in 1998.

Although there are differences in terms of their characteristics and developmental dynamics, Anatolian capital can be categorized as follows: conservative, religious businesspeople; companies belonging to sects or religious communities; and companies with numerous shareholders (Can, 1997). Although all of these are the product of different processes, they are not completely disconnected and independent from one another. Accordingly, it is necessary to emphasize the organic interrelationship between these dynamics of Anatolian capital, which are largely shaped around an Islamist-conservative ideology.

In Kurtuluş Cengiz's study on Kayseri Hacılar, he broadly classifies concepts such as Green Capital, Anatolian Tigers, and Anatolian capital, which have sparked this debate, as follows:

[The groups referred to as ‘Green Capital’ or ‘Anatolian capital’...] are Anatolia-based capital owners who have risen over the last two decades. Emerging from various cities such as Gaziantep, Denizli, Kayseri, Malatya, Konya, and Çorum, they accumulated capital, knowledge, and experience through small trade, craftsmanship, wage labor, commerce, or various freelance professions. They invested these into labor-intensive industries, generating and accumulating surplus value through manufacturing and exports, while being distinguished by their religious and conservative values. (Cengiz, 2013, p. 14).

It is also possible to mention of religious community and religious order capitals that are not directly included in this capital group, but have economic or political ties to it. According to Bulut, who examines religious order-capital relations, the development of Islamic-referenced capital can be divided into five stages: The first stage is the period between 1923 and 1950, when the bureaucracy viewed Islamic capital as a political rival and kept it under strict control. The second stage is the period between 1950 and 1973, when the Democrat Party and the Justice Party softened their stance towards Islamic capital. By the 1970s, communities aligned with the Justice Party began to establish small and medium-sized businesses. From the 1970s onwards, with this segment shifting towards Erbakan's political line, Muslim business circles began to take steps towards growth from small and medium-sized businesses. The third stage is between 1973 and 1983. This period saw Muslim capitalists accumulate capital based on community formation outside of political Islam, marking a qualitative leap. The fourth phase spans from 1983 to 1994. This period saw significant expansion as the state, under Özal's leadership, paved the way for Muslim capital. The fifth phase is the period after 1994, when local governments were taken over. Here, privatizations and activities to obtain shares from municipalities are observed (Bulut, 1997: 256-263).

In addition, it is necessary to specifically mention MÜSİAD, which we mentioned above and which is now the professional organization of the Islamist-conservative bourgeoisie. Indeed, MÜSİAD is an organization that defines itself as the professional organization of Anatolian capital, independent of any labeling, even partially encompassing the groups mentioned. Founded in 1990, this professional organization has grown into an association with 14,000 members and 168 branches in Turkey and abroad as of the end of 2024 (MÜSİAD, 2025).

Necmettin Erbakan was consulted on the founding of MÜSİAD, conceived the idea for the association's name, and openly supported it. This is a concrete demonstration of the continuity of Erbakan, who represented Anatolian capital in the political arena from the second half of the 1960s onwards, and his political Islamist movement. In a conversation between Erol Mehmet Yazar, the founder and first president of MÜSİAD, and Erbakan, he shared the following memory, which is inherent to the origins of Anatolian capital and the Erbakan movement:

I asked the late Erbakan Hoca about the 1970s at a meeting. “Why didn't the business community form in the 70s?” I said. Because when we reached the 1990s, there was still a predominantly artisan environment. We hadn't become businesspeople. I will never forget his knowledgeable response: “Erol, we started out with grocer (bakkal) Mehmet.” In other words, he said that when he set out on his path within his own Islamic community at that time, he couldn't find a businessman; he only had grocers like Mehmet by his side. I can summarize those days leading up to the founding of MÜSİAD by saying that it was a transition from grocer (bakkal) Mehmet to businessman Mehmet and to an international businessman vision. The 1970s were the grocer era. After the 1990s, MÜSİAD differentiated itself. (Dönmez, 2015, p. 31).

In addition, the opportunities offered by the neoliberal restructuring of the 1980s enabled these capital groups to increase their levels of capital accumulation and shift their focus to the industrial and financial sectors. This transformed small-to-medium-sized groups with a petty bourgeois character into a medium-to-large-scale capital fraction. Thus, the spatial positioning of Anatolian capital also began to change. In her study on the relationship between economics and politics, Ayşe Buğra emphasizes that production and market relations are intertwined and that it is not correct to make such a geographical distinction. Indeed, a large portion of the companies that are members of MÜSİAD and are ranked in the top 500 or second 500 are based in Istanbul. In addition, there are also TÜSİAD member capitalists based in Anatolia (Buğra, 2010).

It must be emphasized that the transformation of Anatolian capital is not merely an economic expansion. This growth process should also be considered as a process of political and ideological formation. Indeed, Erbakan's politics in favor of Anatolian capital within the Chambers Union in the 1960s brought him into the political arena, and with the growth created by the accumulation phase after the 1980s, the National View movement won many municipalities, primarily Istanbul and Ankara, and came to a position of power.

Historically speaking, the emergence of Anatolian capital and the Islamist political movement coincides with the second half of the 1960s. Accordingly, Anatolian capital, which participated in the accumulation process later and relatively weakly in Turkey's capitalist development, began to become more prominent during this period. However, this late participation in the accumulation process does not mean that there was no capital accumulation in Anatolia. Indeed, capital accumulation had always occurred in

Anatolia through trade, small-scale industry, and agricultural production, albeit in a weak, scattered, and local scale. Nevertheless, the emergence of Anatolian capital as an economic actor and its politicization process took place within the economic and political conditions of 1960s Turkey. The emergence of small producers and merchants from rural areas and towns with an Islamic background as an opposition group corresponds to this period, in response to the increasing demands of the large bourgeoisie, which was also part of the hegemonic power bloc of the time.

To understand the reasons for the late participation of Anatolian capital in the accumulation process, it is necessary to examine Turkey's modernization process and the dominant paradigm at the founding of the Republic. Accordingly, the bureaucracy set out to create a new Turkish national bourgeoisie within a Westernist, secular, and nationalist framework. This resulted in the national bourgeoisie created during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic becoming the new ruling class by excluding Islamism (Göçek, 1999: 310).

In the context of this new dominant paradigm, it is meaningful to focus on the two intertwined dimensions of Anatolian capital and the Islamist movement. The first of these is that Islamist ideology has resisted Turkey's trend toward modernization, which has continued since the Tanzimat reforms. With the Kemalist-positivist revolution, the culmination of this process, Islamist-conservative thought was pushed outside the system, religion was reduced to the realm of individual belief outside the public sphere, and Islamism was marginalized as a dissenting position. In this respect, the Islamist movement in Turkey was virtually forced underground between 1923 and 1950. Indeed, in the second dimension of the issue, it is seen that Anatolian Islamist-conservative business circles were also unable to find a place within the hegemonic structure of the Republic's founding.

From this perspective, the reemergence of Islamic-conservative capital and social segments as actors in Turkey became possible with the transition to a multiparty system. The state's softening stance toward Islamism during the Democrat Party era after 1950 began to soften further in the relatively free environment provided by the 1961 Constitution. Of course, this softening was not directed against the radical segments of Islamism, but was only possible for segments that existed within the

system at a reasonable level. In addition, Anatolian capital also accelerated its accumulation of capital with the Democrat Party era and was able to voice its economic demands more loudly during the Justice Party era in the 1960s. Ultimately, Anatolian capital, which Erbakan brought into the political arena, and the Islamist-conservative segments of society began to take their place as important actors in society from 1970 onwards. With this historical background and conceptual framework, this study aims to provide a historical and structural analysis of the emergence of Anatolian capital and its process of politicization. Accordingly, it will examine how Anatolian capital, which remained in a limited accumulation phase with the transition to capitalism in Turkey, and the Islamist movement, which could not find a place within the new dominant paradigm, articulated themselves under the National View ideology led by Erbakan after the 1960s. The study takes as its basis the historical background of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to capitalism and the processes of expansion and deepening of capitalist development in Turkey. However, it focuses primarily on the rise of small and medium-sized capital structures centered in Anatolia, this capital fraction's search for political representation, the relationships they established with the National View movement, and the ideological formation of the National View movement. Therefore, within the scope of this study, the initial formation, political visibility, and ideological formation of Anatolian capital between 1960 and 1980 are analyzed in depth.

The emergence and political-ideological positioning of Anatolian capital, which is predominantly discussed in the literature in the context of the post-1990 period, actually dates back much further. Anatolian capital, which began to emerge during the expansion phase of capitalism after 1960, also formed the material core of Islamist-conservative politics and ideology as a movement against the hegemonic bloc of the period. Accordingly, the significance of this study lies in its offering an alternative approach to cultural approaches in the literature by focusing on economic and class dynamics to explain the development of Anatolian capital as an economic actor and the social origins of the Islamist movement.

The main argument of this study is that the emergence of Anatolian capital is a process shaped not only at the economic level, but also at the political and ideological levels. Accordingly, Anatolian capital, which emerged in the late 1960s as a class faction,

sought alternative representation against Istanbul capital, institutionalized itself through the National View movement, and attempted to legitimize its demands and interests at the ideological level through Islamist-conservative discourse.

This thesis aims to answer the following research questions within the context of the fundamental claim presented.

1. What are the historical processes and structural conditions behind the emergence of Anatolian capital?
2. How did the National View movement transform the economic core of Anatolian capital into a political power center and become a permanent Islamist political movement in Turkey?

In this study, the historical materialist methodology has been used. According to the historical materialist understanding, social structures are subject to objective and identifiable laws of historical development. Accordingly, while economic relations form the social structure, production relations and class conflicts are also factors that guide the change in the social structure.

Social structure is a whole composed of economic, political, and ideological levels, and the economy level has a significant impact on the whole. In the historical materialist understanding, the economic base is decisive, but the superstructure, such as politics and ideology, also contributes to the outcome (Engels, 2000: 15). The economic level consists of productive forces and production relations; productive forces are an objective structure consisting of capital, labor, and technology. Production relations, on the other hand, express the legal relations of the mode of production. While revealing the economic-based integrity of the social structure, it is a research technique to take one of the productive forces (capital, labor, and technology) as the unit of analysis and to consider the others as fixed according to the *ceteris paribus*<sup>1</sup> understanding. In this context, this study adopts a perspective based on capital and capital accumulation, because it is important to focus on capital due to the rigid deterministic dimension of technology and the subjective dimension of labor.

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<sup>1</sup> *All other things being equal.*

The process of capital accumulation, from a classical sociological perspective, has a constitutive nature alongside factors of social change such as urbanization and population. On the other hand, factors such as urbanization and population growth are derivatives of capital accumulation. From this perspective, treating capital accumulation as a privileged element in this study means constructing social phenomena through the economy. Consequently, this study seeks objective reality rather than discourse. It is a fact that this objective reality is constructed through an understanding of structure. Therefore, this study is written based on a modernist paradigm rather than a postmodern one.

In this study, historical analysis and structural analysis have been chosen as the methodological steps inherent in the concrete application of the historical materialist framework. Historical and structural analyses are two different but interrelated approaches in the social sciences. The subjects inherent in each type of analysis are different. Historical analysis focuses on how events unfolded in historical processes, while structural analysis examines the structural elements that enabled and shaped these events. This study will attempt to provide an explanatory analysis of the emergence of the phenomenon of Anatolian capital, a topic that has been considered and discussed in different contexts, particularly from the 1990s to the present day. Furthermore, this research aims to address capital classes not only as economic actors but also as determinants of political and ideological processes.

Structural analysis provides a deeper framework for understanding the relationships between the classes under examination at the economic, political, and ideological levels. In addition, it focuses on examining the place of the capitalist class within the system and how its class interests are shaped, rather than the individual subject. In the economic outlook of Anatolian capital, the processes of primitive accumulation and economic organization will be examined. In the political context of Anatolian capital, Necmettin Erbakan's National View movement will be examined, focusing on the economic and social role of National View as a functional ideology.

This study draws on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include industrial statistics from the period, election poll results, the core pamphlets of the National View movement, the programs and statutes of National View parties, and

Erbakan's speeches. These documents enable an examination of both the conditions under which Anatolian capital emerged and the process of its politicization. Secondary sources consist of academic studies and articles examining Turkey's capitalist development process, capital factions and their differentiation, and the Islamist political movement along with its social base.

According to the structure of this study, the thesis consists of three main sections in addition to the introduction and conclusion sections. This introductory section examines Anatolian capital from today's perspective, focusing on both its counterpart in the literature and its social expression. It then goes on to discuss the aim of this thesis, its main argument, research questions, and research method.

The second chapter aims to conduct a socio-economic analysis within the context of capitalist transformation from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey. Accordingly, this chapter examines the state-capital relations within the old mode of production in the Ottoman Empire, the reflections of the global capitalist transformation on the Ottoman Empire, and the modernization process. Subsequently, the period from the founding of the Republic to the 1980s is examined by periodization in line with historical ruptures in society. In this respect, this section examines a broad historical range, generally focusing on critical thresholds. In particular, this section provides a historical analysis of modernization, bureaucracy, and Istanbul capital, which were opposed by Anatolian capital and the Islamist movement.

The third chapter aims to examine the National View movement, which emerged as a result of Anatolian capital and its search for political representation. This chapter focuses on the reasons that led to the emergence of Anatolian capital as an economic actor, as well as how these reasons influenced the formation of an Islamist political-ideological movement. It then examines the class and social dynamics behind the emergence of this political-ideological formation. The emergence of this formation also represents the process of the formation of the Islamist subject in the period before 1980. This formation took place around the National View movement, Turkey's first permanent Islamist political party. Indeed, with this process, the Islamist movement in Turkey became one of the important elements in Turkish political life.

The fourth chapter aims to examine National View as an economic and social ideology and to analyze it structurally. In this chapter, the production of the Islamist-conservative subject is analyzed using the Althusserian approach. Subsequently, it discusses how Anatolian capital and Islamist formation are articulated in the National View ideology. In addition, it focuses on the opposition of the National View ideology to the current hegemonic bloc components, namely the bureaucracy and Istanbul capital, and its counter-hegemonic initiative. Furthermore, it examines how the National View, largely based on Islamic rhetoric, is also functionalized as a means of producing social legitimacy. Finally, the economic dimension of National View is examined through Anatolian capital and alternative capital accumulation strategies.

In the conclusion section, the main claim of this thesis and the answers to the research questions will be examined as a result of all historical and structural analyses.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TURKEY'S POLITICAL ECONOMY FROM THE OTTOMAN TO THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD**

Periodization is important for better understanding the holistic view of historical development and structural change. According to Jacques Le Goff, periodization should be as follows: periodization indicates human influence on history, and the division of history is not a situation that has arisen spontaneously without human influence. Furthermore, when dividing history into periods, the periods that emerge must be emphasized for the qualities that people attribute to them or their qualitative importance. Accordingly, it is necessary to highlight the qualitative differences that each period signifies in that historical context. Each periodization is a process of drawing the boundaries of a qualitative concentration and emphasizing its position within history (2017, p. 2).

The main thread we follow in this periodization process is the capitalist transformation of Ottoman-Turkish society. As demonstrated by the Ottoman Empire's historical development, which followed a different path from Western-style development, there was a strong tradition of statehood and a robust bureaucracy. With the capitalist transformation process, the classical Ottoman structure underwent change, and classes began to emerge. Unlike in the West, the process of class differentiation proceeded at a slower pace. In this context, this section will examine three periods. Accordingly, the first period covers the period from the general Ottoman social structure up to 1908, when the Second Constitutional Era was declared or referred to as the revolution. the period from 1908 to 1946, which was a period of capitalist development, as the second period; and finally, the period from 1946 to 1980, which was a period in which both the capitalist and working classes developed. This makes it easier to understand the unique forms of articulation between the elements of the structure—the base and

superstructure—and, consequently, the changes associated with them.

## **2.1. Pre-Capitalist Social Structure in Turkey: The Structure of Ottoman Society**

The most important debate in Ottoman tradition and Turkey's economic, political, and ideological development concerns the quality of society. According to this debate, which has roots stretching far back in time, the qualities of society have been a constant subject of discussion. The most fundamental debate and arguably the most ancient proposition is the duality of Eastern and Western societies, whose roots date back to pre-Christian times. According to this debate, the West is distinct from Eastern societies and even possesses a more advanced civilization. Indeed, without delving into deep analysis, various differences can be observed when looking at Western and non-Western societies. Features such as broader individual rights and freedoms, the limited role of the state, and a class structure that developed spontaneously in the modern sense distinguish the West from the East. Undoubtedly, the scope of this study is not an examination of Western and Eastern societies, but this difference must be emphasized in order to understand the development of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey and the conditions under which Anatolian capital emerged. Ancient Greek philosophers emphasized that the West was civilized and the East was barbaric (Aristoteles, 1975, p. 97). Montesquieu emphasized that property was not clearly defined in Eastern societies (Montesquieu, 2015, p. 30). Adam Smith attributed the difference in Eastern societies to the underdevelopment of market relations (1977, p. 40). Karl Marx, on the other hand, viewed the issue in terms of property. According to him, the fundamental determinant of Eastern societies is the absence of private property and the phenomenon of common property that replaces it (1995, p. 91). According to Marx, who defined these societies as Asiatic societies, Eastern societies have a strong state institution because they are based on common ownership. The development of Ottoman and Turkish societies can also be defined through this image of a strong state.

As the owner of the land in the Ottoman Empire, the state was able to establish a strong and direct relationship of domination over the state due to this economic power. Later, despite the transition to private ownership, this powerful state image persisted, and the Republic of Turkey continued the same tradition. To understand this powerful state

image and the dynamics of the emergence of the Anatolian bourgeoisie in Turkey in the 1960s, it is necessary to look at Ottoman social dynamics and, in particular, the situation of the classes. In this context, this section requires a close look at the conditions of the reaya (the ruled, the peasants), artisans (the origins of today's capital), foreign capital, and the institution of property in the Ottoman Empire.

When we look at the labor force in agriculture in the Ottoman Empire, we see a difference between it and its Western contemporaries and the feudal mode of production. According to Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert, in this system [the Ottoman system], peasants were both dependent and free: 'dependent' meant that their mobility and land use were strictly regulated by the state and that the amount of income determined in state records had to be handed over to the government; 'free' meant that the family farm could organize its production independently and that no one could arbitrarily use its labor (1997, p. 145). This dependent and free character of agricultural labor in the Ottoman Empire contained a structure quite different from that of its Western contemporaries. In the West, serfs or agricultural laborers were dependent on the lord and worked on the lord's land three days a week. They paid taxes on the land allocated to them by the lord and were, in short, completely dependent on the lord (Pirenne, 1936, p. 65). From this, we must note that while the Ottoman Empire had a strong central structure, Western feudalism was based on a system composed of decentralized power centers. Indeed, the most important feature distinguishing the Asiatic mode of production from the feudal mode of production is that in Asiatic society, the central state power was the sole power center. In Western examples, power was distributed among local units. In the Ottoman Empire, there was a single central power.

In the Ottoman Empire, the reaya (the ruled) were also extremely important. According to Halil İnalçık, Ottoman rulers considered the people they ruled, whether Muslim or not, to be reaya and viewed the reaya as a trust from God. The function of the sultan was to rule the reaya in the way of God. It is important to govern the Muslim subjects in the way of God by administering them according to Sharia, which is the way of God (2004, p. 73). The reaya is a unit that plays an extremely important role in the emergence of agricultural surplus, and the Ottoman economic, political, ideological, and social structure is entirely based on this agricultural surplus

mechanism. The reaya must be carefully protected for the continuation of production and the reproduction of the social structure. In return, the reaya must fulfill their obligations to the state through obedience and production. This structure was preserved during the founding years of the Ottoman Empire.

After examining the agricultural structure of the Ottoman Empire, we must also understand why trade and the associated Asiatic state model emerged. According to İnalcık, the Ottoman state undertook public works such as the construction and maintenance of canals, dams, roads, and caravanserais to develop trade and agriculture, which would ultimately enrich the treasury (2004, p. 146). According to Marx and Engels, the fundamental reason for the formation of Asiatic societies is climate, and due to natural difficulties, there is a need for strong state administration. The state has three functions in these societies: finance, war, and public works (1995, p. 91). While Western-style states also have fiscal and military functions, the public works function is generally applicable to Asiatic societies with harsh climatic conditions because public works services require the mobilization of a large labor force due to challenging natural conditions, and only a strong state with central authority can fulfill this role.

To understand the structure of the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to look at the commercial bourgeoisie, which was considered the driving force behind Western development. As Fernand Braudel pointed out, in the West, the commercial bourgeoisie and the market economy gave rise to new energies, innovations, initiatives, different ideas, and even progress (2023, p. 22). In the Ottoman Empire, however, the situation was different. As Suraiya Faroqhi points out, the Ottoman ruling elite was by no means hostile or indifferent to trade; on the contrary, large-scale wholesalers were allowed to become wealthy, but even the largest merchants could not compete in terms of wealth with a member of the middle-level political class such as a sanjakbey; they could not even be compared to officials in the higher echelons of the administrative hierarchy (1997, p. 545). Thus, in the Ottoman Empire, the commercial bourgeoisie, which had a significant impact on Western feudalism and urban life, had less wealth in terms of accumulation than the wealth provided by agricultural surplus, and since the Ottoman state officials took their share of the agricultural surplus, the commercial bourgeoisie had little place in the balance of

power. Since the Ottoman structure was based on the reproduction of agricultural production, change was at a very low level.

Again, in the Ottoman Empire, when we look at the situation of artisans, the ancestors of today's industrial bourgeoisie, we see that profit margins were very low and restricted by the state, leaving no room for capital accumulation, which can be considered the engine of social change. According to Suaiya Faroqhi, the administrative implementation of prices favored long-distance merchants over artisans, with artisans being granted only a profit margin of between 10% and 20%, which left very little room for capital accumulation. While long-distance merchants were generally allowed to set their own prices. Even if prices were set by the qadi, the qadi usually had to rely on merchants for information about purchase prices in distant locations. This situation provided merchants with considerable leeway (1997, p. 546). It should also be noted that long-distance merchants generally came from non-Muslim minorities.

When examining political struggles, which were a superstructural element in the Ottoman Empire, it is evident that those who led these struggles always came from within the state apparatus, that is, from within the ruling group. When examining the Celali revolts of the 16th century, it becomes clear that those who led the peasants were timar sipahis who had been harmed by the deteriorating socio-economic structure (Akdağ; 1979, p. 35). Timariot sipahis were officials appointed by the ruling center. By the 18th century, the Janissaries had lost their importance due to changing technological levels, had become involved in urban life, and had become artisans, ultimately defending the interests of the urban population (Quataert; 2002, p. 84). According to Quataert, the Janissaries became the voice of the street and even increased their influence in domestic politics, to the point where they could influence the accession of the sultan to the throne with their rebellions (2002, p. 85). However, in the end, the Janissaries, like the timar sipahis, were essentially an element of the state, i.e., the sovereign. In the Ottoman Empire, unlike in the West, a class<sup>2</sup> opposed to the ruling class did not emerge and develop from among the popular strata; instead,

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<sup>2</sup> The ayan movement can be considered as an exception to this; yet this initiative was also not successful and was suppressed.

the struggle between the internal components of the state structure's integrity became the driving force of historical development.

The breakdown of the Ottoman system began with the uprisings of 1595 and 1610 (the Celali Revolt) According to İnalcık, the empire's tax and land ownership system underwent a transformation during the uprisings between 1595 and 1610, and the new conditions enabled the ayans to become feudal lords in the provinces and the timar holders on state-owned lands to take their place as tenants or tax collectors. At meetings of the ayans and notables under the judge's administration, the most important and extraordinary taxes allocated to the districts were discussed. Generally, the issue of distributing the total taxation of the district among the people was addressed. After the decline of the old timar army, the central government resorted to increased taxation due to the growing financial needs of the expanding Janissary army (2010, p. 127).

Indeed, with the Industrial Revolution and then the French Revolution of 1789, the Ottoman Empire entered a period of serious economic decline. According to estimates made in 1789, the Ottoman Empire's state revenues were 2.5 million pounds sterling annually, while during the same period, Great Britain's revenues were 16.8 million pounds sterling and France's were 24 million pounds sterling (McGowan, 1997, p. 714). This situation is the most important indicator of the widening gap between the Ottoman Empire and its contemporary Western countries on a global scale. The industrial revolution in England and the 1648-1688 revolutions, as well as the 1789 Revolution in France, played an important role in this. As Theda Skocpol notes, revolutions largely give rise to nations that did not experience revolutions, and these nations significantly outpace their contemporaries that did not undergo revolutions (2023, p. 22). England and France, which experienced revolutions, also left the Ottoman Empire behind.

The 19th century was a period of serious decline for the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of this century, the uprising of the ayans and the Sened-i İttifak (The Charter of Alliance) agreement signed between the ayans and the Ottoman administration in 1808 transformed the Ottoman Empire, where the ayans held power, into a decentralized structure similar to its Western contemporaries. According to İnalcık,

the ayans, excluding the notables, were the most influential and wealthy citizens in a town, and most of them came from modest backgrounds; many were low-ranking local officials or janissary officers who had risen through the ranks by exploiting their official positions (2010, p. 127). However, the Ottoman Empire regained its power and sought to reestablish its sovereignty over the land. Under Mahmud II, efforts were made to strengthen central state power, and the state sought to limit ownership of miri lands (lands subject to private ownership) and seize the estates held by the ayan (Pamuk, 2007, p. 8). However, the policies established under Mahmud II and his successors failed to reestablish state control over agricultural surpluses.

With the relative weakening of the center in the 19th century, according to Quataert, the renewed civil and military bureaucracy was used to control, weaken, or eliminate its rivals within the country—the Janissaries, guilds, and ayans (Quataert, 2002, p. 107). Indeed, the central state sought to reestablish the balance between the center and small producers that it had built during its reestablishment period. During the same period, the Land Code of 1858 (*Arazî Kanunnâmesi*) allowed for private ownership of land under certain conditions (Karpát; 2008, p. 59). With the Land Code, the state recognized private property rights over land and allowed for its sale and purchase (Pamuk, 2007, p. 9). From this point onward, the emerging bureaucracy engaged in a struggle to limit the ruler's power alongside the nascent, fragile bourgeoisie, and with the opening of the parliament in 1908, a fundamental structural transformation began.

According to an observation regarding the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim population in the Ottoman Empire was not involved in commercial activities controlled by non-Muslim groups, or was only involved in a general sense (Buğra, 1994, p. 36). Therefore, capital in the Ottoman Empire generally accumulated in the hands of non-Muslim minorities. In addition, as a result of the Balta Limanı Agreement signed with Britain in 1838, external borrowing that began after 1854, and privileges granted to foreign capital for railway construction in the 1850s, the Ottoman Empire gradually began to come under the control of Western capital (Pamuk, 2007, p. 7). The inadequacy of capital accumulation in the Ottoman Empire and the privileges granted to foreign countries as a result were the most important factors preventing the emergence of a domestic bourgeoisie, capital, and entrepreneurship (Toprak, 1995, p. 51).

When we look at the Ottoman social structure from its establishment until 1908, we see that, despite its deterioration in its final years, there were essentially two classes in the Ottoman Empire: the rulers, known as the military class, and the ruled, known as the reaya (Timur, 1994, p. 247). The social structure was based on the balance between these two classes. However, after the 19th century, the social structure and, consequently, the political structure underwent radical changes due to the deterioration of the Ottoman Empire, the accumulation of capital by non-Muslims, the entry of foreign capital into the Ottoman Empire, and the recognition of private property rights. However, it is unlikely that there was a local bourgeoisie and capital by 1908, the end of the period. Capital during this period was still concentrated in the hands of non-Muslim minorities. By the end of the period, the Asiatic social structure had begun to dissolve within the framework of limited capital accumulation, and capitalist relations began to develop in the Ottoman Empire, particularly through foreign capital.

As a result, with the Second Constitutional Era (İkinci Meşrutiyet) in 1908, the dynasty completely lost its power in the Ottoman Empire. The dynasty no longer had any share in the balance of power within the political structure. As a result of 1908, the dynasty, which was the fundamental founding principle of an Asiatic society, came to an end in practice, even though it continued to exist legally. New actors began to gain power within the political structure. Along with political parties, this period was dominated by the Committee of Union and Progress. It is also possible to mention the formation of a weak bourgeoisie. Therefore, the main historical actors of the new era were the petty bourgeois bureaucracy, landowners, and the bourgeoisie.

## **2.2. The Political and Social Transformations with the Transition to Capitalism: From 1908 to 1980**

In societies undergoing Western-style capitalist development, the state acts as an instrument of the class that owns the means of production, i.e., the bourgeoisie. In Asiatic societies, however, the absence of private property and the lack of division of labor and class formation due to state ownership have led to the political power of the bureaucracy, or what we might call the petty bourgeoisie. This has led to a static social structure compared to the West. Therefore, according to the logic of dialectical transition, in the advanced stage of these societies, the Asiatic society began to

disintegrate and, with the transition to the capitalist production model, the bureaucracy continued to be effective as the dominant power as a result of the weakness of the bourgeoisie (in terms of underdevelopment and failure to reach a certain threshold of accumulation). The bourgeoisie also experienced the accumulation process under its hegemony. Thus, it would be more appropriate to identify the first structural change process in Turkish society as beginning in 1908 rather than 1923, from the founding of the Ottoman Empire onwards. As a result of 1908, the institution of the dynasty, which was the fundamental founding characteristic of a Asiatic society, effectively came to an end. After this, the main historical actors would be the petty bourgeois bureaucracy, the landowners, and the bourgeoisie.

The Second Constitutional Era (İkinci Meşrutiyet), declared in 1908, marked a transition from classical agrarian surplus to capitalism in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the classical agrarian structure had already begun to disintegrate in the 17th and 18th centuries. Globally, the focus was shifting from agriculture to industry and trade following the Industrial Revolution. From this perspective, it was highly unlikely that the Ottoman Empire could remain exempt from this process and sustain its existence based on a classical agricultural surplus product model while the world was moving toward capitalist modernization as a fundamental trend. Capitalism also imposed a process of modernization in political, ideological, and social terms. Therefore, the modernization efforts of Ottoman sultans, followed by the 1839 Imperial Edict of Reorganization (Tanzimât Fermânı) and the 1856 Islahat Edicts (Islâhat Fermânı), were significant steps in these modernization processes.

With the process of modernization, the classical Ottoman structure began to disintegrate. The classical Ottoman structure was as follows: in a Muslim state, as in previous states in the Middle East, all classes of society and all sources of wealth were considered responsible for protecting and developing the ruler's power. Therefore, all political and social institutions and all economic activities were regulated by the state, and the population was considered to consist of two main groups: Those who represented the ruler's authority (administrators, soldiers, religious leaders) and the ordinary subjects, i.e., the reaya. The first group was not involved in production and did not pay taxes; the second group was productive and tax-paying. The state's primary concern was to ensure that each individual remained within their own class; this was

seen as a fundamental condition for political and social order and harmony (İnalçık, 2010, p. 118).

This structure began to disintegrate in the 20th century. The entry of non-Muslim bourgeoisie and foreign capital into the Ottoman Empire initiated the disintegration of the Asiatic social structure. The transformation of the social structure naturally required the transformation of the superstructure. As a result, the Second Constitutional Monarchy was declared in 1908, and the dynastic order began to be dismantled. The Committee of Union and Progress came to power. During this period, the classes began to reach a certain level of consciousness, although they were not yet fully defined. The years after 1908 were somewhat complicated. The differences in the ideological liberation prescriptions of the cadres made the political atmosphere somewhat complicated.

In 1908, the Second Constitutional Monarchy was declared in the Ottoman Empire. Some thinkers, including Aykut Kansu (2002), have argued that this was not merely the proclamation of a constitutional monarchy, but rather a Turkish revolution. According to Aykut Kansu, the 1908 Revolution was not merely a “restoration” of the 1876 Constitution, but rather an attempt to bring about fundamental changes in Turkey's political structure. The revolution brought about the end of the Ottoman Empire in more ways than one. While the Ottoman Empire represented everything associated with absolutism and its related practices, “Young Turkey” symbolized a radical break with this past. A modern, centralized state that promoted capitalist production relations in the economy and advocated a parliamentary form of government in politics replaced the absolutist state symbolized by the autocratic personality of Abdulhamid II (2000, p. 2).

Unlike in the West, in Eastern societies, the state and bureaucracy are the main agents of social change. According to Aykut Kansu, the bureaucracy of the Abdülhamid II period opposed the Second Constitutional Era, and in response, the Committee of Union and Progress subjected the bureaucracy to radical reform. Therefore, the state bureaucracy was subjected to a top-to-bottom transformation, and the 31 March Incident of 1909 must be understood in this context (2002, p. 156). It would be appropriate to interpret the 31 March Incident as a reaction by the monarchist

bureaucracy against the state bureaucracy that was being established after the Second Constitutional Era and against the Committee of Union and Progress government. Even this radical transformation of the state demonstrates that 1908 should be understood not as a simple constitutional monarchy but as a revolution. After the 1908 Revolution, the monarchy remained legally intact but had no practical influence.

The radical change in the Ottoman Empire after 1908 was the result of historical social development. The industrialization processes in the world after the French Revolution also affected the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the Asiatic joint ownership structure of land began to dissolve. Foreign capital increased its influence in the Ottoman Empire during its final period. Certain non-Muslim groups accumulated capital from trade and finance to a certain extent. Significant changes were observed in the bureaucratic structure and, consequently, in the state after 1908. We can define this period as one of structural change in this context. After 1908, Turkey entered a period of searching for a new structure until 1923. Movements such as Islamism, Ottomanism, and Turkism can be interpreted within the framework of an ideological identity search for this new period. Among these, Islamism and Ottomanism had lost a significant amount of prestige since the Abdülhamid period. In this context, the Turkism movement gained considerable strength.

By the 20th century, with the dissolution of the timar system, small-scale, independent peasant farmers emerged on a large scale in agriculture. In the final period of the Ottoman Empire, there were 31,626 villages, each with fewer than 500 inhabitants, and these villages were isolated from one another and from road junctions (Timur, 2001, p. 16). Thus, there was a self-sufficient closed village economy. According to an agricultural survey conducted in 1907, 81% of agricultural land consisted of 50-acre farms, which were large enough to support a family of four or five (Makal, 1997, p. 134). This situation reflects the ownership status of the land.

Looking at the state of industry in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, the following picture emerges: in terms of production, the period can be roughly divided into three sections: approximately 1800-1826, 1826-1870, and 1870-1914. In the first period, exports of Ottoman industrial products were already declining. After the Napoleonic Wars ended and political stability returned, British

manufactured goods increased and were imported in growing quantities to the Eastern Mediterranean. Between 1826 and 1870, the decline of Ottoman industries—particularly in textile production—reached its peak; however, even then, new Ottoman industries were emerging. Subsequently, until 1914, manufacturing production in many sectors increased relatively and absolutely for both the domestic and export markets (Quataert, 1997, p. 889).

Looking at trade in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, international trade probably accounted for a larger share of total Ottoman trade in 1914 than it did in the 1800s, comprising intra-regional, inter-regional, and foreign trade. Western and Central Europe increasingly occupied a larger place in Ottoman international trade throughout the century, both in terms of absolute trade volume and relative importance (Quataert, 1997, p. 827). When we look at the nature of merchants in the Ottoman Empire during this period, the active position of foreign merchants revived in the late period, at least in Western Anatolia. After 1870, the general expansion of foreign capital, including railway networks and the activities of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyûn-ı Umûmiye), served to weaken the position of local merchants. Various new banks, including the state-supported Ziraat Bank, began to grant loans and eroded credit monopolies. Non-Muslims dominated international trade in most Ottoman port cities where conditions were most favorable to them. For example, Beirut owed its existence to foreign trade, and indeed, non-Muslims dominated its commercial activities (Quataert, 1997, p. 840).

When it comes to land and agriculture, according to Donald Quataert, the Ottoman Empire remained an agricultural empire until it completely disappeared after World War I (1994, p. 843). Therefore, agriculture was a vital issue for the Ottomans. According to one estimate, in 1914, agriculture contributed 56% of the Ottoman “national” income, and agricultural taxes were the most important single source of imperial revenue (1994, p. 845). It should be remembered that the Land Code of 1858 allowed for private ownership of land. This situation led to the emergence of a class of landowners. It can be argued that this class, which owned property, began to have a say in politics. This can be seen in practice after the emergence of the iltizam system within the Ottoman Empire. According to Pamuk, the iltizam, who replaced the harvest, determined the price the producer would pay based on the amount he set, and

this situation favored large landowners because they were protected, while it created a disadvantageous situation for small landowners (2007, p. 10). This situation indicates the emergence of a class of large landowners who were protected by certain state officials.

There was a fundamental difference between the Young Turk (Jön Türk) tradition that came to power in the late Ottoman period and the policies of Abdulhamid II. Initially, the two had very different ideological worlds. While Abdulhamid II pursued Islamist policies, the Young Turks had a positivist tradition. According to Eric J. Zürcher, it is true that there was a world of difference between Abdülhamid and the Young Turks at the ideological level, and the Young Turks were deeply influenced by both a popularized understanding of positivism and Büchnerian materialism (2010, p. 59). Thus, there was a clash between two opposing poles, the idealist and materialist traditions, and it can be argued that the materialist approach prevailed after 1908. This materialist tradition was not only an approach to events but also a reaction to the Islamist policies implemented by Abdulhamid II.

The nature of the relationship between Islamists and political authorities after 1908 manifested itself in two important cases. The first was an Islamist who, as one of the leaders of the İttihad-ı Muhammedi Party and editor of the Volkan newspaper in 1908-9, constantly called for the reestablishment of religious law. In 1909, he was accused of inciting a counter-revolution against the “secular” Young Turks in Istanbul and was sentenced to death and hanged after the Young Turks regained control of the capital. The second incident involved a group of radical Sufis who arrived in the Aegean town of Menemen in 1930 and declared themselves the vanguard of an Islamic army that would overthrow the “infidel” (kafir) republic. They killed Kubilay, a young teacher and reserve officer (Zürcher, 2010, p. 56). The government reacted harshly to this incident as well. Therefore, during the period between 1908 and 1946, the governments did not allow much freedom for Islamic movements and even took harsh measures against them.

These groups emerged from within the Young Turks. This power struggle began between the Freedom and Union Party (Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası), led by Prince Sabahaddin, who advocated decentralized administration and emphasized Islam, and

the Union and Progress Party, which advocated centralized administration and emphasized Turkishness, and later ended with the dominance of the Kemalists. The weak bourgeoisie and landowners were only able to hold secondary positions by submitting to them. Keyder describes this period as one in which bureaucrats eliminated their rivals within their own ranks and opposition, oversight, and competition mechanisms were eliminated (Keyder; 1989, p. 121).

Another important issue in the Ottoman Empire was the capitulation issue. Capitulations, which meant foreign intervention in the country's economy, became an important agenda item after 1908. Finally, the cabinet of Prince Said Halim Pasha announced that, effective October 1, 1914, all financial, economic, judicial, and administrative privileges enjoyed by foreigners living in Ottoman territories, known as capitulations, would be abolished, and relations with foreigners would be regulated in accordance with the principles of international law (Toprak, 2019, p. 147). This measure was one of the first steps toward creating a native bourgeoisie, and in the following period, the effort to establish a native and Muslim bourgeoisie became one of the fundamental issues for those in power.

According to Selim İlkin, the economic policy pursued after the establishment of the Republic was as follows: The most important element of the economic policy pursued between 1920 and 1980 was to create a cadre of Muslim Turkish entrepreneurs to replace non-Muslim businessmen and to develop industry. Although the tools used to achieve this goal underwent significant changes over time, there was no significant deviation from this fundamental objective. Regardless of how they were labeled in different periods, these policies were fundamentally based on the assumption that Turkey had entered the industrial world late (1993, p. 187).

Following the establishment of the Republic, the Ashar tax was abolished on February 17, 1925, in accordance with the decision taken at the İzmir Economic Congress. Ashar (Aşar or Öşür) was a type of tax inherited from the Ottoman Empire and was collected by tax farmers following the structural dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. According to Önder, the Ashar tax primarily affected the small peasant class and benefited the tax collector and large landowner peasants (Önder; 1988, p. 120). Thus, it created an alliance. While the tax collector profited, the small peasant borrowed

money from the large landowner in his region to remedy his deteriorating economic situation, and when he could not repay the debt, he had to surrender his land to the creditor. An important issue at this point is that the large landowner peasant was also engaged in commercial activities, thereby assuming the role of commercial capital. Thus, the large landowner and merchant gained power.

According to Yalçın Küçük, at the beginning of the Republic, the state turned to statist policies to protect the domestic market from foreign competition, but this goal was not fully achieved in practice. In particular, the need for foreign capital for growth prevented this objective from being effectively implemented. At the same time, commercial capital and its collaboration with foreign capital hindered the implementation of an effective protection policy (2022, p. 111). In this context, it is possible to argue that commercial capital, rather than industrial capital, was advantageous in the early years of the Republic and influenced state policies.

This development also reveals the origins of today's bourgeoisie. This is also the primitive accumulation process of the bourgeoisie in Turkey. As Keyder points out, the bureaucracy has used public resources to support certain groups of the commercial class (Keyder; 1999, p. 98). However, the same bureaucracy simultaneously slowed down the dissolution process of small peasantry, preventing their direct proletarianization, and thus maintained its hegemony over the newly emerging bourgeoisie through this balance. The point to note here is that the emerging bourgeoisie, or the bourgeoisie that was being formed, was the bourgeoisie that would later be called Istanbul capital. With the 1960s, this capital, which is the subject of this study, was confronted with the emerging Anatolian capital as a rival. In this context, it is possible to speak of a two-part bourgeoisie in Turkey. Although the basic designs of these two bourgeoisies on Turkey are different, they have one thing in common: to accumulate more capital. Despite differences in perspective, the fundamental motivation of both bourgeoisies is the same. This situation represents a fundamental attitude that could lead to the integration of these two bourgeoisies within a certain balance in the future. The key issue for integration is the balance of power between the two bourgeois factions, and this balance of power is linked to developmental processes.

In Turkish political tradition, especially on the left wing, there are two opposing views regarding the position of the bourgeoisie during the founding period of the Republic of Turkey. One group claims that there was no bourgeoisie in Turkey when the Republic was founded, and that instead, the 1923 Revolution was carried out by a small bourgeoisie consisting of civilian and military bureaucrats. The other side argues that there was a bourgeoisie in Turkey during the founding period of the Republic and that this bourgeoisie had a certain class consciousness. These two different perspectives had a profound impact on the leftist movements in Turkey, particularly in the 1960s. As a result of this profound impact, the leftist movement split into two factions based on political strategy. This difference in perspective continues to cause divisions within the leftist movement today.

Emre Kongar states that the origins of today's big bourgeoisie lie in the commercial capital supported by the bureaucracy through state tenders in the early years of the Republic (2000, p.620). He also points out that part of this commercial capital came from people in the bureaucracy. However, it is necessary to emphasize one point regarding this perspective and the commercial bourgeoisie. According to this perspective, commerce does not produce surplus value but rather takes a share of existing surplus value. In this context, the capital faction that establishes the basic mechanisms of social control and supervision is industrial capital, i.e., production. Commerce corresponds to the exchange part and has a more limited capacity for social change than industrial capital. While industrial capital leads to faster social change, the social change created by commercial capital is more long-term. If we accept Kongar's thesis, social change in Turkey has been slower than in Western formations due to limited industrial capital. We can see this situation as the reason for the slow dissolution of the Asiatic social structure.

According to Yalçın Küçük, a bourgeois democratic revolution took place in Turkey in 1923, and those who call it a petty bourgeois revolution are mistaken. Those who refer to it as a petty bourgeois revolution argue that the revolution was carried out by soldiers and civil servants whom they consider to be petty bourgeois, but there was a bourgeoisie at that time, and the real petty bourgeoisie were the merchants and artisans. Therefore, 1923 was a bourgeois democratic revolution. This bourgeois class also developed a certain level of consciousness (2022, p. 61).

Çağlar Keyder, on the other hand, states that in addition to public support, the Armenian deportation and the subsequent exchange resulted in a decrease in the non-Muslim population in Turkey and the transition from the non-Muslims who had bourgeois characteristics in the late Ottoman period to the newly formed Turkish bourgeoisie, and that the local notables took possession of the lands vacated as a result of the deportation and exchange (Keyder, 1999, p. 115). Thus, these resources also became a means of capital accumulation.

According to those who argue that there was no bourgeoisie in the 1923 revolution, the War of Independence was a petty bourgeois anti-imperialist struggle waged by Mustafa Kemal and his friends, and the Kemalist Revolution was an incomplete national democratic revolution (Şener, 2023, p. 175). Due to the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire, no class that could be described as bourgeois emerged during the founding of Turkey. Therefore, 1923 represents an unfinished revolution.

Feroz Ahmad is another proponent of this approach. According to him, since there was no bourgeoisie to take the initiative during the founding period of the Republic, the Kemalists, who saw themselves as a patriotic group independent of all class interests, took on the task of carrying out a bourgeois revolution on behalf of the Unionists, who had begun this task during the 1914-1918 War (Ahmad, 1993, p. 79). This perspective also posits that, in the absence of a bourgeoisie, the revolution was carried out by civil servants and military officers who were part of the petty bourgeoisie. Again, according to Ahmad, the Kemalists were satisfied that “our intellectuals, merchants, farmers, peasants, and civil servants did not belong to different social groups, that there were no deep economic differences between them, and that everyone was a producer and part of the people” (1993, p. 79).

The period in question, namely the period between 1923 and 1946, is known as the period of Single Party rule under the Republican People's Party. The short-lived Progressive Republican Party - Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası- (1924) and Liberal Republican Party - Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası- (1930) experiments were terminated in the short term and these parties were closed down. In general, this period continued under Single Party rule. The Democrat Party movement that emerged later was also organized around the interests of large landowners during this period of Single Party

rule. The Republican People's Party sought to represent all segments of society between 1923 and 1946, but this effort to represent all segments created a situation that was contrary to the conflictual nature of social life. Any objections that might arise were attempted to be prevented by the strong state and bureaucratic structure.

Another important reason why the bourgeoisie, which had begun to accumulate wealth as mentioned above, was unable to participate in power during this period was the 1929 global economic crisis. The crisis led to bankruptcies and a shift to a state-controlled economy. This caused the newly emerging bourgeoisie to lose significant power. Thus, the bureaucracy, through the Republican People's Party, established a single-party political system at the 1931 Congress. The single party imposed its rule as a necessity dictated by the national and international conjuncture (Keyder, 1999, p. 118).

However, the situation changed with World War II. Production declined sharply due to the war. However, during this period, commercial capital also accumulated significantly through profiteering and the black market (Keyder, 1999, p. 193). According to Boratav, the war years were a period of profiteering and enrichment in Turkey, during which the commercial bourgeoisie and the land-owning elements in the market became excessively powerful (2005, p. 95). This profiteering capital was also the primitive form of the future Istanbul capital and Anatolian capital. During this period, the bureaucracy imposed certain extraordinary taxes as a result of the income deficit. Industrialists and merchants who had accumulated a certain amount of wealth by the end of the war began to openly express their opposition to the bureaucracy's sole hegemony. In other words, a certain threshold had been crossed, and accumulation, i.e., the division of labor, was also developing. Ultimately, the door to a new era was opening.

Developments in Turkey between 1923 and 1946 led to the dawn of a new era. This new era was characterized by a multi-party democratic structure. The single-party structure established after 1931 was transformed into a multi-party structure. The Republican People's Party government led by İsmet İnönü allowed other political parties to be established and to compete for power in the general elections held that same year. A new party called the Democrat Party immediately won one-seventh of

the seats in Parliament. Following this victory, the party gained momentum and won more than 53 percent of the vote in the next general election in 1950 (Dodd, 1990, p. 8).

### **2.3. The Development of the Big Bourgeoisie in Turkey and the Political and Social Panorama: 1946-1980**

The Democrat Party, which came to power with the 1950 elections, ended the rule of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). Again, differences in interests among the bureaucracy, capital, and landowners led to the overthrow of the Democrat Party in the 1960 coup, and in 1960, the army intervened in politics and ended the rule of Adnan Menderes and the Democrat Party. According to Cem Eroğul, the collapse of the Democrat Party's rule was fundamentally class-based because the Democrat Party represented landowners and the commercial bourgeoisie, and the divergence of interests between these classes and the industrial bourgeoisie led to the collapse of the Democrat Party's rule (2014, p. 249). In short, the end of the Democrat Party's rule was entirely the result of a struggle for hegemony among the classes within the ruling bloc.

In fact, the political climate in Turkey was positive in the early 1950s. When the Democrat Party came to power, it advocated liberal economic measures without going to extremes; for example, it did not attempt to abolish the public economic enterprises established by the Republic of Atatürk. The party drew on religious references, but did not allow any threat to the nationalist and secular state it had inherited. While the Democrats were careful about the principles of the state, they were less concerned about the freedoms enjoyed by their political rivals and restricted them in various ways. However, they soon began to restrict press freedom, made it easier for civil servants (including judges and university faculty members) to retire, prevented opposition political parties from forming coalitions, and banned public meetings. Toward the end of their rule, they began to make more direct threats against the opposition (Dodd, 1990, p. 10). Ultimately, the Democrat Party and Adnan Menderes were removed from power in the May 27, 1960 coup.

With the coup d'état of 1960, a new constitution was drafted in 1961. The framework of constitutions also provides information about the economic, political, and

ideological framework of society. According to Metin Heper, the framework of the 1961 Constitution was as follows: The 1961 Constitution was also a “mixed” constitution; “national sovereignty” would be exercised not only by the parliament but also by “authorized institutions”; These institutions indirectly included the Constitutional Court and bureaucratic institutions similar to the Constitutional Court (1991, p. 3). In this context, the state intervened significantly in society through various institutions in the structural order established after 1960. If we examine this within a historical materialist framework, the state has directly defined the limits of the productive forces and production relations.

Feroz Ahmad makes the following observation regarding the coup: The 1960 coup undermined the process of creating a civil society that began in Turkey with the establishment of a multi-party political system in 1945. Paradoxically, the coup, carried out by 38 officers who seized power, contributed to this process by transforming Turkey's political landscape and introducing fundamental new liberal institutions such as a constitution and a Constitutional Court. Political life also opened up to the left, allowing the establishment of a socialist party and enabling trade unions to engage in collective bargaining with employers (2010, p. 97).

The most important institution established after the 1960 coup was the National Security Council (MGK). According to Feroz Ahmad, generals were granted constitutional authority under Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution, which established the National Security Council. This council was to consist of important ministers (civilians) in the cabinet, the Chief of General Staff, and representatives of the armed forces. The President who retired after the coup or, in his absence, the Prime Minister would chair the MGK. Its duty was to assist the cabinet in “making decisions related to national security and coordination” (2010, p. 97). The National Security Council has been an influential institution in Turkish politics for many years and has regulated civil-military relations in favor of the military.

The Justice Party won the 1965 and 1969 elections held after the coup. Süleyman Demirel, an important figure in the Justice Party, lost the premiership with the 1971 Memorandum (12 Mart Muhtırası). Between 1965 and 1971, despite population growth, the welfare of Turkish citizens began to improve, with growth rates showing

that their real average welfare in 1969 was 20 percent better than in 1963 (Dodd, 1990, p. 12). Despite this partial development, the positive picture changed at the beginning of 1970. As a result of the economic deterioration, the government devalued the currency on August 10, 1970. The positive atmosphere of the 1960s deteriorated at the beginning of 1970. Ultimately, the Justice Party and Süleyman Demirel lost power on March 12, 1971, following a military memorandum.

With the import substitution economic policy that began after 1960, Turkey entered a period of economic policy based on the domestic market that would last for approximately twenty years. Başkaya has stated that the import substitution economic policy was a conscious intervention in the economic structure aimed at overcoming institutional obstacles or underdevelopment barriers to the mobilization of production factors (Başkaya, 2000, p. 107). Thus, the capital accumulation process was accelerated through the cooperation between the bureaucracy and Istanbul capital. The implementation of this economic policy, which, according to economics or the Marxist approach, means the development of *production factors* or *productive forces through intervention*, has shown that Turkey's modern class structure has developed in a form quite different from the Western model of development.

However, the transition to a planned economy was met with some objections. According to Feroz Ahmad, during the objections, Turkey's planned economy was implemented in 1963 with the goal of rapid industrialization based on an import substitution model. However, even before it was implemented, the First Five-Year Plan (1963-1967) was strongly criticized by opponents in Parliament. Supporters of the agricultural lobby refused to allow the adoption of a moderate land reform bill or a law (drafted by British economist Nicholas Kaldor) that would have permitted the taxation of agricultural income in a manner that rewarded productivity and efficiency rather than rent-seeking. Supporters of the private sector, on the other hand, refused to allow public economic enterprises to be restructured into efficient competitors for the private sector; they preferred that the state continue to subsidize private production within the mixed economy model (1993, p. 133).

According to Selim İlkin, at least part of capital accumulation was used in industrial investments after 1950. External dynamics (particularly the foreign-backed Turkish

Industrial and Development Bank -*Türkiye Sanayi ve Kalkınma Bankası*) played an important role in this transformation. However, the main factor was the implementation of an import substitution policy, which was necessitated by the foreign exchange crisis that emerged following the relatively short-lived liberal economic policy experiment of the Democrat Party. The bureaucratic inadequacies, which were the main complaint of businessmen, could not prevent the acceleration of industrial development (1993, p. 189).

Another important feature of this period is the continuous intervention of the military bureaucracy in politics through coups or memorandums at regular intervals. This is essentially a manifestation of the collaboration between the bureaucracy and Istanbul capital. The curtain was raised with the 1960 coup, followed by the 1971 memorandum and the 1980 coup. A distinctive feature of these coups was that each was followed by the reorganization of economic, political, and ideological spheres in favor of the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. Through the state institutions established after 1960—the Constitutional Court (established in 1962), the National Security Council (established in 1962), the State Planning Organization (established in 1960), etc.—the bureaucracy has directly intervened in the economic, political, and ideological spheres and sought to maximize its power within the power relations.

In general, Turkey's political and economic historical periodizations treat the period between 1960 and 1980 as a separate period. In this study, we have chosen to periodize the period between 1946 and 1980. There is a functional aspect to this. According to Çağlar Keyder, the perspective on the period before 1945 suggests that Turkey's critical break with its Ottoman past occurred in the decade following World War II (1987b, p. 293). The period after 1946, when single-party rule came to an end in Turkey, can also be said to be a period of qualitative transition due to the severing of ties with the Ottoman past. At the same time, a certain stage of capital accumulation had been reached after 1946. The period after 1946 was also a period in which certain capital groups emerged in Turkey, which was striving to achieve its initial accumulation.

However, a turning point in the economic structure is also important. There was a change in the economic structure between 1908 and 1946. Boratav saw a qualitative

difference in the period beginning in 1950 and stated that this period marked a transition from a statist model to a state-supported private capital accumulation model—a new mixed economy (2005, p. 109). This means that the bourgeoisie had reached a certain level of capital accumulation and gained power in production by entering into joint ventures with the state. It is clear that the continuation of bureaucratic hegemony was also in the interest of the bourgeoisie. However, this change in the economy—the development of the bourgeoisie—also meant that it became a partner in political power. Therefore, the rejection of the old structure and capitalist development essentially began during this period. Again, during this period, TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry & Business Association), the professional association of Istanbul capital, was established in 1971, and this institution became a symbolic indicator that the bourgeoisie had reached a certain class consciousness.

Turkish businesspeople became more politically influential with the establishment of the Turkish Industry & Business Association (TÜSİAD) in 1971. This was strongly supported by large holding companies. TÜSİAD has served as a collective force far more powerful than the combined efforts of its individual members. As a result, large businesses have gained a significant voice in Turkey's economic and political arenas (İlkin, 1993, p. 191).

Between 1946 and 1980, industrial capital became an effective force, unlike financial capital, which established hegemony within the post-1980 ruling bloc. According to Çağlar Keyder, industrial capital began to establish its hegemony after the 1960 coup, and this new transformation was realized with the support of bureaucrats, military personnel, and intellectuals (1989, p. 180). The economic design of the period between 1960 and 1980, which began with the multi-party democracy experiment in 1946, was based on the implementation of an import substitution industrialization policy rooted in the real economy.

The economic policies implemented between 1960 and 1980 were, in a sense, a return to the past, namely the 1930s. The strategies of the 1960s and, to some extent, the 1970s revived the fundamental planning concepts of the 1930s, which were still primarily based on industrialization and inward-looking (i.e., import substitution) policies and supported by a high degree of protectionism (Hershlag, 1988, p. 21).

However, the period between 1960 and 1980 also contained significant differences from the planning of the 1930s. The five-year plans of the 1960s and 1970s differed from those of the 1930s in terms of their scope and more modern models. While industrialization and self-sufficiency (i.e., inward orientation) still formed the backbone of the plans, they aimed at the integration of all sectors of the economy and the general distribution of resources (Hershlag, 1988, p. 22). The period between 1960 and 1980 was organized within a planning framework based on a state-centered economy. This situation was consistent with the Keynesian Welfare State model prevalent in the West at the time; however, the model implemented in Turkey was more of a developmental state model than a Keynesian Welfare State application.

Between 1960 and 1980, the most important institutional structures were the TOBB (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), which was established in 1950 and continued its activities in the context of capital, the Turkish Confederation of Employers' Associations (TİSK), established in 1962, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD), established in 1971, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ), established in 1952, and the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK), established in 1967, and the State Planning Organization within the state context. These institutions formed the institutional structure of the social structure between 1960 and 1980, particularly in the economic context. The most important situation that stands out here is that with the establishment of TİSK in 1962 and TÜSİAD in 1971, industrial capital began to differentiate itself from commercial capital, which it had previously represented through TOBB. This framework implies that within the ruling bloc, industrial capital and commercial capital began to diverge, and the industrial bourgeoisie began to establish its hegemony.

The SPO (State Planning Organization), an important state institution, was particularly important during this period, as it was the sole authority responsible for developing development plans and the sole approving authority for the allocation of subsidized loans and scarce foreign currency. This situation created a reality in which political allocation processes, or in other words, bargaining at the highest administrative level rather than in the market, held a privileged place. In practice, this ensured that the rent derived from scarce resources and those who utilized them flowed directly to the

industrial bourgeoisie at the highest levels of the bureaucracy (Keyder, 1999, p. 183).. This situation is the most important indicator of the power and hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie during the period between 1960 and 1980.

During this period, four five-year development plans were drawn up: 1963-1967, 1968-1972, 1973-1977, and 1979-1983 (Hershlag, 1988, p. 22). The fifth plan, covering the period from 1979 to 1983, emphasized market forces (Hershlag, 1988, p. 22). The main reason for the end of the import substitution industrialization policy was the unfortunate combination of Turkey's national development-oriented, mixed economy regime, import dependency, and lack of export competitiveness. The fragility caused by foreign exchange shortages began to affect Turkey's trade deficit shortly after the 1973 oil shock and resulted in a classic balance of payments crisis by the end of that year (1980s) (Güven, 2016, p. 188). As a result, the economic decisions of January 24, 1980, were adopted, and the import substitution industrialization policy came to an end with the September 12, 1980, coup. In its place, an export-oriented, outward-looking economic policy was adopted. This was a step in line with the gradual transition to the neoliberal economic system following the 1973 oil crisis, and this time, the hegemony of industrial capital that had prevailed within the ruling bloc between 1960 and 1980 began to be replaced by the hegemony of financial capital. This situation was maintained in line with globalization.

When we examine the structure of society between 1960 and 1980, when the import substitution industrialization policy was implemented, we see that at the beginning of the period, the structure was primarily rural, but by the end of the period in the 1980s, this rural structure had dissolved. The most important statistic supporting this, as Üstün Ergüder points out, is that while 84% of the population lived in rural areas in 1950, this rate had dropped to 40% by 1988. We can also see the dissolution of a rural-based society in the following statistic: the employment of labor in agriculture decreased from 80% in 1950 to 57% in 1980 (Ergüder, 1991, p. 71). This picture shows that a rural-based economy has rapidly transformed into an urban-based economy, and that this has led to a transformation in politics and ideology, which in turn has led to a serious cultural transformation. It is a natural consequence to note that one of the most significant outcomes of this transformation was in politics, with the emergence of new political actors seeking a new political order. As the social structure undergoes

transformation, it is a natural necessity for the structures to undergo transformation as well.

The import substitution industrialization policy and rapid industrialization implemented between 1960 and 1980 led to significant transformations in the social context. The success of industrialization accelerated the differentiation between social classes and began to threaten the previous positive overall balance. In addition, a lower-level group consisting of marginal employment grew rapidly within the working class (Keyder, 1987b, p. 303). Turkey's founding period, with its vision of a classless, integrated society, gave way to a social structure in which classes became more distinct. Indeed, as industrial capital began to take shape during this period, the working class also began to crystallize. Accordingly, the period between 1960 and 1980 was a time of rapid class mobilization and relative instability. The relatively autonomous environment of the 1961 Constitution opened the way for the organization of the lower classes, and both capital and the lower classes became relatively multi-structured. This situation was a challenge for Turkey, which came from a monist tradition, and the system used military coups to maintain relative stability. Both the 1971 memorandum and the September 12, 1980 coup were carried out to establish relative stability and order. This period was particularly significant in terms of labor, as the Turkish Workers' Party (TİP) was founded in 1961 and the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) was established in 1967, providing the working class with significant opportunities for mobilization.

Following the 1971 memorandum, several parties participated in the 1973 elections. Some of the parties that participated in the elections were the Republican People's Party (RPP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), the Justice Party (JP, Adalet Partisi), the Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi), and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). Between 1960 and 1980, the political structure established in Turkey, based on proportional representation in large constituencies, was quite effective in ensuring the representation of small parties in parliament and led to the formation of successive coalition governments throughout the 1970s (Ayata and Ayata, 2001, p. 91). This situation allowed many small-scale political parties to enter parliament, but while

ensuring fairness in representation, it failed to provide the stability required for governance.

As September 12 approached, the political landscape was as follows. Another noteworthy development regarding the military's view of the economy was the rise of globalization. In December, Demirel's appointment of Turgut Özal as undersecretary for economic affairs signaled a radical split. The government declared its determination to promote a “free market” economy by removing almost all obstacles. Shortly thereafter, Özal launched his economic program known as the “January 24 Decisions” [1980]. This program required serious austerity measures from workers and consumers. He declared that the economy needed five years of social peace to stabilize: there would be no collective bargaining, strikes, or demonstrations for an Islamic state in Turkey (Ahmad, 2010, p. 102).

The import substitution industrialization policy before September 12 had entered into a crisis both in Turkey and around the world. The 1973 oil crisis and foreign exchange shortages had caused problems for the model. High inflation and the embargo imposed as a result of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus created a serious crisis. The global economic paradigm was gradually shifting toward what came to be known as neoliberalism, with monetary economics emerging as an alternative to Keynesian welfare state or state interventionist economic policies. This signaled an economic, political, and ideological restructuring. This meant economic, political, and ideological restructuring. The new era was one of export-based economic policy, and a coercive force was needed to restructure the economy, particularly to reduce domestic consumption for the sake of exports. The September 12 military coup was the implementation of this coercive force.

Ultimately, on September 12, 1980, the military staged a coup and seized power. The military government that came to power on September 12, 1980, decided to implement the January 24 Decisions. Additionally, the military government aimed to strengthen the state, which it believed had weakened, in the political arena. To this end, most organized political and social groups in Turkey were excluded from politics by the military. The business community had little difficulty filling the resulting vacuum (İlkin, 1993, p. 193).

This period ended with the military coup of September 12, 1980, and was followed by a transition to an export-oriented free market economy in Turkey. This also signaled the maturation of Istanbul capital. At the same time, this period saw the emergence and development of a rival capital group known as Anatolian Capital. Anatolian Capital, which is not within the scope of this study, entered a period of rapid development after 1980 and paved the way for an important new restructuring within the ruling bloc in the 2000s.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AS A NEW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTOR IN TURKEY**

The emergence, development, and transformation of a class or capital fraction into an active actor in the social process, when considered solely in terms of its internal dynamics, offers a limited perspective on the explanation of the phenomenon. On the contrary, the emergence of a class movement onto the historical stage must be evaluated within a multi-layered framework shaped by the transformations in production relations, its relationship with the existing hegemonic ideology, and its connections with the power bloc, all within the historical and social context in which it is situated. As Marx pointed out, “people do not make their own history by their own will, but under conditions given from the past” (1990 [1852], p. 15). This reveals that any subject acts not only according to its own will, but also within the structural limits in which it finds itself.

The period between 1960 and 1980 was a historical turning point in Turkey, marked by intense structural transformations. This historical period, which began with the military coup of May 27, 1960, continued until September 12, 1980, when another military intervention took place. With the military coup of May 27, 1960, the Democrat Party era came to an end in Turkey, and a new political and economic order was established. This order was institutionalized through the 1961 Constitution, Turkey's first constitution to be enacted by referendum. In this new order, while superstructural institutions were redesigned, a fundamental change was also made at the infrastructural level, shifting the direction of the capital accumulation regime.

With the new constitution, economic, political, and ideological spheres were reorganized in favor of the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. The bureaucracy began to rebuild the power it had lost during the Democrat Party era, primarily in the political

sphere but also in all institutions. At the same time, the new constitution was based on the principle of the social state and expanded fundamental rights. This pluralistic constitution paved the way for the emergence of new class movements and political actors. According to Özdemir, despite the restrictions imposed on socialist and Islamist thought, this constitution ensured that the regime gained certain guarantees in line with civil society (1990, p. 204).

Karpat sees the duality of guardianship and freedoms brought about by the new order as Turkey's contradictory situation. According to him, the old elitist regime [bureaucracy] was strengthened under military tutelage, while at the same time political rights and freedoms were expanded, creating a contradictory situation (2013, p. 187). In fact, the 1961 Constitution should be regarded as the constitutional embodiment of hegemonic restructuring. Although the institutionalization of tutelage and the expansion of freedoms appear contradictory, they are complementary phenomena. From a dialectical perspective, the 1961 Constitution, which emerged as a result of a hegemonic crisis, aimed to consolidate the position of the ruling bloc through new regulations while ensuring the integration and absorption of the lower classes and new social actors into the system. From this perspective, the two seemingly contradictory phenomena are actually the result of the state's quest to control class struggles in an institutionalized manner. Thus, while the state serves as an instrument for establishing class domination on one hand, it also functions as an ideological apparatus for producing hegemonic consent on the other.

One of the fundamental interventions in the new social order established after the coup was directed at the economy. During this period, Turkey entered a new phase of economic expansion, adopting the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model as its new accumulation strategy. Consequently, import substitution industrialization and planning emerged as the two central concepts defining this era under the theme of economic development (Atılğan, 2015a, p. 519).

Economic policies based on planning since the 1960s have been decisive for Turkey's investment policies (Boratav, 2005, p. 118). The State Planning Organization (SPO, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) was where the ideology of planned development took shape. The State Planning Organization, which embodies Turkey's desire for planned

and coordinated development, was established by Article 129 of the Constitution and later by Law No. 91 dated September 1960. This institution was granted the authority to formulate industrial plans, as well as broad planning powers encompassing economic, social, and cultural areas (Zürcher, 2004, p. 265). From this perspective, the institution serves as a superstructural apparatus, exemplifying state intervention aimed at safeguarding the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie. In addition, it cannot be denied that regulatory bodies with such broad powers may become a battleground for class struggle. From this perspective, these bodies will become one of the focal points of the struggle for a share of the pie as Islamic capital begins to emerge.

From a social perspective, the socio-political structure and distribution relations of the 1960s shaped the existing political economy. According to Boratav, as the urban and rural bourgeoisie reached a certain income level, they gained the power to influence the state in order to secure the resources necessary to satisfy their demands (2005, p. 118). Those who imposed these demands were also the groups that dominated the state and participated in political processes.

The impossibility of meeting these demands under the existing economic and political conditions triggered a new process that would lead to economic expansion. Accordingly, it was envisaged that products would be manufactured domestically through foreign capital partnerships. According to Keyder, this new restructuring, which constitutes an expanded reproduction process for Turkish industry, has not only led to the production of domestic substitutes for imported goods but also created a situation where modern capitalist sector products have replaced those of small manufacturers (1999, p. 210). In other words, the increasing demands of the bourgeoisie and the suppression of small producers' production to meet these demands have created new socio-economic problems in Turkey.

We have already mentioned that, in this period of social restructuring, the industrial bourgeoisie began to develop as a result of the acceleration of capital accumulation. Along with this situation, which created movement in society in terms of urbanization and internal migration, class conflicts also began to emerge. This period, marked by the emergence of new capital factions alongside worker and student movements, represents a structural transformation phase.

During this period of intense political and ideological struggle, the religious-conservative subject also accelerated its politicization process with a political party that suited its ideological equation. In addition, Anatolian capital, as an economic actor, also entered the process of politicization under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. This subject, which is a faction of capital, consists of small and medium-sized rural producers and tradesmen. In addition, groups with an Islamist-conservative identity, especially in rural areas and cities, but unable to find a place for themselves in the political arena, have intertwined with conservative-nationalist discourse to form an alternative subject identity in the political arena. As a result, this situation has served as the driving force behind the emergence of the Islamist movement in Turkey as a complex and enduring political movement.

### **3.1. The Politicization of Anatolian Capital and the Islamist Movement in the Transformation of the Social**

The roots of Islamist right-wing thought, with its rich ideological tradition, can be traced back to opposition to the Tanzimat reforms and to Abdülhamid (Keyder, 1999, p. 287). From this perspective, Islamism in Turkey has manifested itself as an ideology of resistance to modernization processes. Modernization is essentially the transformation of the social formation of developing production relations. Therefore, Islamists have appeared to be in opposition to developing capitalist production relations. As we will see later, politicized Islamism will manifest itself in the form of a struggle against modernization, or in other words, against the cultural tools of capitalism, in an attempt to dominate them.

With the Kemalist revolution, all social formations in Turkey underwent radical change. As Savran puts it, the Kemalist revolution carried out a civilizational cleansing in Turkey (2015, p. 52). This was the result of policies aimed at renewing every aspect of society and culture. At the forefront of these policies was the severing of Turkey's ties with religion. This move was envisioned both to implement modernization policies and to dismantle the traditional bureaucracy.

Despite widespread opposition, the abolition of the caliphate marked the beginning of secularization in Turkey (Sarıbay, 1985, p. 72). According to Lewis, the steps that severed the link between Islam and the state were: the prohibition of religious

education, the adoption of European civil land penal codes, the nationalization of pious foundations, the weakening and eventual elimination of the power of the ulema, the removal of social and cultural symbols, and finally, the removal of Islam from the constitution (Lewis, 1969, p. 404). The secular reforms—or revolutions—of the Republic radically transformed the social position of Islam.

However, these reforms were mostly limited to urban centers and did not significantly affect rural areas. Until the 1950s, the majority of the population lived in rural areas and remained traditional and religious, while urban centers were modern and secular (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008, p. 33). This transformation in society, which was the result of the modernization initiative, took Islam out of the realm of mere belief. Islam or Islamism became a reactive identity, a sense of belonging, and a political discourse. The reaction against modernization, which accumulated particularly in rural and provincial areas, reproduced Islamism as a critical ideology.

With the transition to a multi-party system, Islamist movements began to seek influence in the political arena. The National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi), founded in 1945, the The Islamic Protection Party (İslam Koruma Partisi), founded in 1946, the Nation Party (Millet Partisi), founded in 1948, and the Islam Democrat Party (İslam Demokrat Partisi), founded in 1951, were the products of this initiative. However, these short-lived parties were closed down within a few months or years on the grounds of “using religion for political purposes” (Bora, 2017, p. 469). Islamist movements, whose attempts at politicization were constantly disrupted, gathered within right-wing parties such as the Democrat Party (DP) and the Justice Party (AP) until the 1970s. In the 1950s, the Naqshbandis (Nakşibendi) and Nurcus supported the Democrat Party, and in the 1960s, they supported the Justice Party (Demirer, 2012, p. 259).

As a result of the Islamist movement's clustering within right-wing parties, religious discourse began to infiltrate the political arena and was also used as a pragmatic tool by center-right parties. This ultimately created a platform for representation, particularly for conservative segments of the population in rural areas and small towns. From this period onwards, Islamist thought manifested itself in various forms, both within the state's ideological apparatus and in cultural productions opposed to it.

During the Democrat Party era, Islamism expressed itself through religious orders, associations, and political parties, and also made its presence felt in magazine circles. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, writers published in magazines such as *Sebilürreşad*, *Büyük Doğu*, and *Hilal* emphasized Islamic civilization in opposition to the secular and Westernizing character of modernization. One of the important writers in the politicization of Islamism during this period, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983), stood out as one of the pioneers of reactionary ideology with his anti-Kemalist and anti-Communist stance. According to Bora, Kısakürek's establishment of an action-oriented language on reactionary ground was a threshold that shifted Islamist opposition from defense to offense and established it on a political identity basis (Bora, 2017, p. 442). From this perspective, the initiatives of Islamist intellectuals during this period shaped the political consciousness of the Islamist movement, which would later be represented by the MSP cadres.

Finally, in the evolution of Islamism into a political entity, *tarikats* (brotherhoods), Congregations (Sunni Islamic orders or *cemaat*), and Islamic foundations, as well as their intertwined economic activities in rural areas and small towns, played a critical role. In particular, the financial support provided by Anatolian capital to these organizations and its establishment of contact with the state through these networks has created a new field where political and class interests intersect. This new field has enabled those with an Islamist ideological identity to express their demands for representation, both from the perspective of Anatolian capital and from their own perspective. Therefore, from this point onward, Islamism has evolved into a process of politicization motivated not only by religious beliefs but also by the desire to find a political solution to the crisis of representation of capital.

### **3.1.1. From Islamist Subjectivity to Party Formation: The Experience of the MNP and MSP**

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Islamist movement within right-wing parties found the opportunity to be represented by a permanent political party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011). It should be noted that the Islamic movement's breakaway from right-wing parties and the establishment of their own political parties

was based on class divisions. The dynamics of the Islamist movement's politicization stem from the struggle over the distribution of resources.

According to Cem, with the development of the Turkish economy, conflicts between the interests of the ruling classes began to emerge. The Justice Party, however, found it difficult to satisfy all of these classes' interests. The Anatolian merchants and tradesmen, who were beginning to be oppressed by big capital and the bourgeoisie, also supported Erbakan as their new representative and distanced themselves from the Justice Party (Cem, 2011, p. 188). Erbakan, who served as general secretary (1967) and president (1969) of the Union of Chambers, adopted a tough stance against big capital and gathered supporters from groups victimized by big capital. In this regard, he received significant support from rural small producers who were concerned about the problems created by the new production methods, particularly from conservative circles and those alarmed by monopolistic tendencies. This can be considered the first concrete sign of Anatolian capital's direct intervention in the political arena.

Erbakan, who formed an alliance with small and medium-sized capitalists in the provinces, fought against the uncontrolled domination of big capital [Istanbul capital] over economic life through loans, tenders, import and export quotas (Savran, 2015, p. 58). Erbakan, who militantly defended small and medium-sized industrialists and merchants against Istanbul-based big capital, accused the existing economic mechanisms of favoring the “comprador-Masonic minority” and argued that Anatolian industrialists and merchants were treated like orphaned children (Bora, 2017, p. 469). Thus, a symbiotic relationship emerged between the Anatolian merchant and artisan class with an Islamic ideological identity and Erbakan.

Erbakan's fierce opposition within the Chambers Union, the umbrella organization of capital, created disagreements among the capital groups that were part of it. The Union of Chambers was at the forefront of the capital's important hegemonic struggles at the time. This resulted in Demirel removing Erbakan from his position as president of the Union by police force. This situation led Erbakan, who was supported by rural producers and merchants, to leave the Union of Chambers, form a political party, and move his opposition to a new field.

Erbakan, whose term at the Union of Chambers had come to an end, made a political move by seeking to run for parliament as a candidate for the Justice Party (JP, Adalet Partisi), but his request was rejected by Demirel. According to Kayalı, the rejection of Erbakan's candidacy for parliament is an indication that the JP was pursuing policies aligned with those who carried out the May 27 coup in matters of religion. From this perspective, it is evident that the architects of the politicization of religious organizations were the JP and the forces behind the May 27 coup (Kayalı, 1994, p. 141).

The ideological framework of Islamism, which became politicized under Erbakan's leadership, was formed by the Milli Görüş ideology. The National View movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi, MG) was launched in 1969 by a dissident group that split from the JP and became known as the Independents Movement (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p. 42). Erbakan, whose candidacy for the Konya parliamentary seat was vetoed by the JP, ran as an independent candidate in the 1969 elections from Konya within the Independent Movement and won. Although there were candidates from different regions who ran independently within this group, only Erbakan was able to win the election.

After the election results, Erbakan, who became a member of parliament, immediately began the process of forming a party. The National Order Party (NOP, Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), based on the principles of National View and the first party of the Islamist movement, was officially established on January 26, 1970. The founders of the MNP and its successor parties also generally emerged from the National View movement, which aimed to return to traditional values and institutions (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008, p. 40).

The ideological father of the newly established party was Mehmed Zahid Kotku, the Naqshbandi leader of the İskenderpaşa Congregation, while the Nurcu movement and some Sufi orders also played a role in the party's founding (Atılğan, 2015a, p. 587). Additionally, Süleyman Arif Emre, a former member of parliament from Adıyaman and a member of the executive board of the Yeniden Türkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party), Hasan Aksay, a former member of parliament from Adana for the Justice Party, and Ekrem Ocaklı, a former member of parliament from Gümüşhane for the Demokrat

Parti (Democrat Party), also joined the NOP. Furthermore, Hüsametdin Akmumcu, deputy from Isparta, and Hüseyin Abbas, deputy from Tokat, who had left the JP, also joined the NOP, and the party was represented by three deputies in the Parliament.

The NOP was officially launched on February 8, 1970, in Ankara with a large turnout. The opening ceremony, which was accompanied by slogans such as “Allah Allah” and “Faithful Turkey, Faithful Turkey” (İmanlı Türkiye) was attended by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. In his speech at the opening, Kısakürek delivered harsh criticisms of imperialism, communism, and Freemasonry, stating that Western imperialism had eroded the soul of society and depleted national resources (Milliyet, February 9, 1970:1,11).

In addition to the prominence of Islamic references at the launch of the NOP, there was a similar atmosphere in the press. According to Sarıbay, despite the objective conditions that made the establishment of the NOP necessary, namely the sharp functional divisions in society, the press and public opinion characterized this new party as a supporter of Islam in Turkey. The newspaper Bugün, which was among the Islamist newspapers of the period, assured its readers that the NOP would be a right-wing party, while the newspaper Sabah announced that the NOP was the right-wing party expected by the defenders of Anatolia's sacred values. In fact, it was not entirely unfounded for the newspapers to present the party in this way. This is because Erbakan, in his opening speech, mentioned names such as “Sultan Fatih, Sultan Yıldırım, Ulubatlı Hasan, Nizam-ül Mülk, Sultan Yavuz, and Sultan Hamid,” stating that they were the true founders of the party (Sarıbay, 1985, p. 99, Cumhuriyet, February 9, 1970: 1).

During this politicization process, which was based on the National View ideology, Kotku and his followers established the necessary organizational model and networks. According to Yavuz, the National View movement conveyed the voice of Islamist groups in Turkey to the state and represented Islamist interests in Parliament. It enabled Islamist figures to enter local municipalities and the national bureaucracy. Thus, by offering a more inclusive identity rooted in the Ottoman-Islamic tradition, it played a significant role in integrating the prominent Islamist segment in Anatolia into the political process (2003, p. 208).

At the time of its establishment, NOP published a brochure entitled “Founding Declaration,” which addressed issues inherent to Turkey. The assessments in this brochure were divided into two categories: “our situation in the material sphere” and “our situation in the spiritual sphere.” Accordingly, the material field includes the Turkish economy's dependence on foreign markets and capital, low income levels, and the unfair distribution of wealth; Turkey's dependence on foreign aid; the sending of workers abroad; and the weak financial situation that led to the loss of autonomy in foreign policy. the failure of the education system to educate young people in line with national goals, the focus of education policies on rejecting their own history, the adoption of goals that aim to emulate Western countries that have been driven into a spiritual crisis, and the neglect of the spiritual sphere in the face of foreign cultures' communism and cosmopolitan mentality are among the ideas put forward for the spiritual sphere. (Toprak, 1981, p. 98).

The first lasting attempt at an Islamist political party, the NOP, did not last long. The NOP, which existed for approximately 15 months, was shut down on May 20, 1971, two months after the March 12 Military Memorandum, without ever participating in an election. The Constitutional Court dissolved the party on the grounds that it sought to alter the state's secular principles and establish an Islamic order. Subsequently, Erbakan, seeking to avoid arrest, was forced to flee to Switzerland (Yavuz, 2003, p. 209).

Approximately 17 months after the closure of NOP, the second party of the National View line, the National Salvation Party (NSP, Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), was established. Founded on October 11, 1972, the party continued to exist until October 16, 1981. Although the NSP was the successor to the NOP, none of the names on the party's founding list were from the NOP's founders. Süleyman Ârif Emre (1923-2019) was appointed as the party's general chairman. Erbakan returned to Turkey before the 1973 general elections and became the party's general chairman after the elections.

The party's first congress was held in Ankara on January 21, 1973. The congress, which was attended by a large number of participants, was attended by 879 delegates (Milli Gazete, January 22, 1973:1). Süleyman Ârif Emre, who was elected as the general chairman at the congress, delivered a long opening speech. In his speech, Emre

addressed issues such as material development, the elimination of waste, exploitation, and usury, as well as the wrong practices in Turkey's industrialization, state-centered industrialization, industrialization and heavy military industry, and finally, freedom of religion and conscience (Milli Gazete, January 22, 1973:7).

Here, it is necessary to make a separate note regarding the speech made under the freedom of religion and conscience. In his speech, Süleyman Ârif Emre clearly upheld the principle of secularism, stating that secularism, along with other beliefs, guarantees everyone's freedom of thought and conscience. A notable detail here is that during a press conference held at the time of the NSP's founding, Erbakan declared that Zionists and Freemasons would not be admitted to the party. (Cumhuriyet, January 27, 1970:1). Indeed, the phrase "Freemasons cannot be members of the party" was included in the NOP party charter (MNP, 1970, p. 39). However, the phrase "Freemasons" was removed from the section on who could be members of the party in the NSP party charter. Nevertheless, the same arguments were repeatedly emphasized at the rhetorical level by the NSP and its leaders. According to Karpat, the National View movement believes that Turkish modernization took place under Western influence. Therefore, it is based on the idea that modernization reforms destroyed the Ottoman-Muslim character. From this perspective, for the National View movement, which does not believe in democracy and secularism, these are merely a means to seize power (Karpat, 2013, p. 232).

The concepts of Western-Jewish-Masonic played a central role in the political and economic relations of the National View movement, whether written or unwritten. In Erbakan's politics, these concepts served as a tool for both mass mobilization and for legitimizing the capital that supported him economically, namely Anatolian capital. According to Keyder, the NSP proposed the geographical distribution of capital in contrast to the economic concentration of large capital, which it identified with the Western-Jewish-Masonic alliance. Within this framework, it advocated state-guided industrialization through support for businesspeople in towns (1999, p. 287). This can be seen as the NSP's attempt to create a Muslim bourgeoisie through state intervention and to legitimize this ideologically through Islamic references.

For the NSP, industrialization and the development of heavy industry were more important than all other issues. The fundamental problem with Turkey's industrialization was evident in the wrong practices, state control of industrialization, and heavy military industry. The program they put forward aimed to have SOEs (KİT), which were made up of many shareholders, dominate the private sector, while the state would take on the role of a coordinating body rather than a direct producer (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p. 44).

From a political perspective, the NSP lasted longer than its predecessor, the NOP. The NSP was actively represented in parliament for seven of the eight years leading up to its closure on October 16, 1981. In the 1973 general elections, its first, it won 48 seats with 11.8 percent of the vote; in the 1977 general elections, it won 24 seats with 8.56 percent of the vote. Although there appears to be a decline in votes between the two elections, the NSP actually increased its votes by approximately 4,000 in the 1977 elections. The NSP received 1,265,771 votes in the 1973 elections and 1,269,918 votes in the 1977 elections. The percentage decrease in votes was due to an increase in the number of voters and voter turnout (Çakır, 2005, p. 547).

Despite failing to win a large number of votes, the NSP played a decisive role in politics, given the arithmetic of the parliament. Throughout the 1970s, the NSP was a partner in three coalition governments and also provided support to the last government formed before the September 12 military coup, albeit “reluctantly” (referred to in Turkish political literature as the “Kerhen Milliyetçi Cephe Hükûmeti”). This demonstrated that the NSP had gained significant political and social legitimacy during this period.

The Republican People's Party (RPP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) became the leading party in the 1973 general elections, winning 33.3% of the vote. However, the RPP did not secure an absolute majority and was therefore unable to form a government on its own. As a result, there was intense coalition negotiation activity during this period. The outcome of these negotiations was surprising. On one side of this coalition was the RPP, which espoused Kemalist ideology, had recently positioned itself as “left of center” (ortanın solu) in politics, and embraced secular and social democratic values. On the other side was the NSP, which represented the Islamic

tradition and was anti-Western and anti-secular. In other words, two political parties with diametrically opposed ideologies had come together.

The coalition formed between the RPP and the NSP was also widely debated in public. The debates mostly revolved around how an Atatürkist party and a religious party could come together, while the NSP focused on the possibility that the legislative legitimacy gained through elections could also be gained at the executive level (Sarıbay, 1985, p. 188). In fact, commentators from both the right and the left agreed that Erbakan was an opportunist who would do anything to gain access to the state and power (Bora, 2017, p. 472). However, it is important to emphasize that the debate conducted by the NSP was also significant. This coalition, which officially gave rise to the government partnership, also served as a sign of the legitimacy of Islamism that was becoming politicized and the relationship established with the state.

Despite their differences, these two parties also had common ground. They agreed on issues such as guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms, a mixed economy, and economic development based on social justice. At the same time, they opposed big capital and its hegemony over the economy and society (Ahmad, 1993, p. 161). However, issues such as hostility toward the economic and cultural dominance of the West and large capital were insufficient to keep these two parties united. This alliance, which had emerged primarily from pragmatic, even opportunistic ideas, was ultimately doomed to fail (Schick and Tonak, 1987, p. 368).

At this point, Karpat emphasizes that it is wrong to view the NSP as a purely reactionary Islamist party. According to him, the NSP not only defended a cultural and social return based on Islam and history, but was also concerned with issues such as social and economic development and industrialization. Ultimately, most of the NSP's cadres were university-educated technocrats (Karpat, 2010). However, the goals and ideas of the RPP and NSP prioritized their own ideologies and interests over the realities of Turkey (Karpat, 2013, p. 206). Therefore, as mentioned, this alliance did not last long, and the coalition formed on January 26, 1974, dissolved on November 17, 1974.

One of the main debates of the 1973 elections was the relationship between religion and politics. Until the 1973 elections, the religious segment of society had been part

of right-wing parties. According to Toprak, it was only possible to understand the impact of religious appeals on Turkish voters with the 1973 general elections, when a party ran in the elections. As İsmet İnönü also stated, with these elections, Turkish intellectuals would have the opportunity to measure the importance of religion on political behavior for the first time. From this perspective, the MSP, which entered the 1973 elections as the “silent Muslim majority” party, also legitimized the political nature of religious interests (1981, p. 96).

The NSP's other coalition experiences were the First National Front coalition (First National Front) formed in 1975 and the Second National Front coalition (Second National Front Coalition) formed in 1977. The first coalition included the Justice Party, the Nationalist Movement Party, and the Republican Reliance Party, while the second coalition included the Justice Party and the Nationalist Movement Party, but the Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi, CGP) did not participate due to its low vote share. The NSP joined these parties, which held a center-right and nationalist ideological position, as an Islamist party. According to Mert, the governments formed under the National Front should be considered as ideological alliances beyond mere parliamentary coalitions. This is because the Justice Party's voters have organic ties with the other coalition parties beyond ideological proximity (2007, p. 48).

There were many factors that led up to the military coup of September 12, 1980 in Turkey. Among these factors, when looking specifically at the Islamic tradition, the radicalization of Islamism also came to the fore. In the 1970s, when Islamism began to politicize and gain legitimacy in Turkey, there was also unrest in the Islamic world. One of the most important events during this period was the Iranian Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. Such radicalization tendencies in the Islamic world also reflected in Turkey. During this process, some intellectuals and cadres within the NSP who had radical tendencies left the party and founded a radical magazine called *Hicret* (Tuğal, 2009, p. 44).

The direct radicalization trend within the NSP manifested itself at a rally held in Konya on September 6, 1980. The extreme religious slogans chanted at this rally, which protested Israel's occupation of Jerusalem, became one of the reasons for the closure

of the NSP. Erbakan was arrested on the day of the coup, and party activities were suspended. In February 1981, the State of Emergency Command filed a lawsuit against the NSP's general chairman and 33 members for actions contrary to secularism. As a result of the lawsuit, the NSP was closed along with other parties by Law No. 2533 dated October 10, 1981 (Karpat, 2013, p. 211).

As a result, the expansion of capitalist production relations in Turkey from the 1960s onwards gave rise to the need for politicization in order to represent the interests and demands of new classes and ideological formations. Indeed, the emergence of Erbakan as a political actor is also a result of the need for politicization of Anatolian capital and the Islamist-conservative movement. From this perspective, Erbakan's politics within the Chambers Union, based on the interests and demands of Anatolian capital, evolved into a process of becoming a party with the support of the religious and conservative segments of society. The politicization initiative that began with Erbakan himself continued with the formation of the NOP and then the NSP. This also marked the emergence of a permanent Islamist party movement in Turkey. Accordingly, it is important to understand the class and social dynamics on which this political movement historically rose.

### **3.2. The Class Background and Socio-Economic Dynamics of the Islamist Movement**

From a historical materialist perspective, classes are determined by their relationship to the means of production. Therefore, it is important to note that Islamism itself does not correspond to a homogeneous class structure in the Marxist sense. Islamism, which gained visibility in the second half of the 1960s, was made possible by the intersection of the ideological orientation of the religious segment of society and certain class demands and the search for representation.

This intersection includes rural small and medium-sized producers and artisans within the production relations, Islamist communities and orders, the religious-conservative intelligentsia, segments of society with religious sensitivities, and the urban poor. From this perspective, Islamism emerges as a formation resulting from the interconnection of these social layers. The unification of these segments, which come together around a common political discourse through political representation tools

such as NOP-NSP, has been shaped by both economic interests and cultural affiliations.

The secular policies of the early Republic and its efforts to dominate religion failed to prevent religious practices and forms of religious engagement in society. Although the ideology of the Kemalist revolution was strong in urban areas, the strong ties between artisans and craftsmen and religious orders remained intact. In addition, the phenomenon of urbanization that has been taking place since the 1950s contradicted the urbanization theses of classical sociology. The religious and conservative segments of society that the ideology of the Republic failed to transform in the countryside and villages retained this characteristic. The phenomenon of migration that accompanied urbanization did not dissolve traditional ties, but rather carried rural and traditional relationships into cities. This reality, which contributed to religious revival and forms of religious expression in cities, also necessitated the political consideration of religion (Mert, 2007, p. 90; Demirer, 2012, pp. 255-256).

The politicization of the Islamist movement demonstrates both its quantitative dimension in terms of mass support and political representation, and its qualitative dimension in terms of identity affiliation and ideological discourse. Although it is not possible to obtain definitive data on the distribution of these groups, a survey conducted by the Milliyet newspaper prior to the 1973 elections is noteworthy.

**Table 1. Reasons for NSP Support of Potential NSP Voters, 1973 Election Poll**

<i>Reason</i>	<i>Percentage of Potential NSP Voters</i>
Because it is a religious party	42.5%
Because the JP changed its goals and became a party of Freemasons	12.3
Because of Erbakan's leadership	9.4
Because of influences from close friends or relatives	6.6
Because it expresses the respondent's own political outlook	5.7
Because the JP has failed during its tenure in office	5.7
Because of rising prices	2.8
Don't know	0.9
Other	27.4

**Source:** Toprak, 1981, p. 97; as cited in Milliyet, 9 October 1973.  
 Note: The total percentage may differ from 100 due to a participant giving more than one answer.

In the survey, it was predicted that the NSP would receive between 4.1 and 7 percent of the vote and be represented by approximately 10-15 members of parliament. However, the NSP exceeded these predictions by receiving 1,265,771 votes, or 11.80 percent of the vote, and winning 48 seats in parliament. When analyzing the survey results, the primary reason cited by potential NSP voters for casting their ballots was the party's Muslim and religious identity, at 42.5%. The second reason was the JP's change in direction and its association with Freemasonry. These two reasons, which clearly reflect religious considerations, accounted for 54.8% of the total. Therefore, it is evident that the majority of potential NSP voters were motivated by religious factors.

Çakır argues that the NOP consists roughly of three social strata. The first consists of new elites who come from religious families in rural areas, were educated in the secular educational institutions of the Republic, and are generally engaged in liberal professions; the second consists of religious entrepreneurs engaged in trade and industry in rural areas; and the third consists of low-income Sunni Muslims living in both rural areas and large cities (2005, p. 545). Considering that the NSP is seen as the successor to the NOP, it is important to emphasize that the layers that make up the NSP are largely the same groups.

Among the dynamics shaping the complex structure of Islamism, it is necessary to focus first on small and medium-sized enterprises in Anatolia, which are directly involved in production relations. Conceptualized as Anatolian capital, Islamic capital is a capital faction that, as a result of the Kemalist revolution in Turkey, withdrew into its shell until the 1950s, acting with the instinct to protect what it had; began to emerge in medium-sized areas throughout the 1960s; and grew to the point of being called the national bourgeoisie by the mid-1970s. (Bulut, 1997, p. 220). This bourgeois [capital] faction, which began to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s, was concentrated in conservative small towns and composed of small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs, KOBİ) (Savran, 2015, p. 45).

The fundamental opposition in the years when Anatolian capital began to emerge was between the growing demands and hegemonic position of Istanbul capital and the large bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the economic demands of small and medium-sized enterprises, on the other. According to Keyder, this type of division in the 1960s was

between the small bourgeoisie, small capital, and commercial bourgeoisie in cities and villages, and the industrial bourgeoisie. Its ideological reflection, rooted in the 17th-century small bourgeois market ideology, manifested itself after 1945 as a conflict within bourgeois ideology (1999, p. 197).

At this point, although it does not seem possible to make clear distinctions between the cities where capital fractions are located, we can generalize that developed cities are where large industrial capital is concentrated, while rural capital, consisting of small and medium-sized enterprises, is located in smaller cities. In addition, even if we start from the fact that rural capital began to emerge in the 1950s, there has been a long-standing reality of rural capital dating back to the Ottoman period. According to Kahraman (2008), who emphasizes the importance of the countryside, although the phenomenon of the countryside is significant, the lack of sufficient knowledge about the details of the countryside and the neglect it has suffered over time, as well as the fact that the rural bourgeoisie and the dynamics associated with it were provided through minorities in the Ottoman Empire, are constraints to understanding the reality of the countryside.

According to Yücekök's (1971) interpretation of the relationship between religion and capital, production relations expanded in Turkey in line with capitalist development, and finance capital began to gain prominence. Faced with developing capitalism, some of the oppressed artisans and small farmers believed that Islam's economic and political system was the only system that could save them from the exploitative order, and they acted accordingly. However, Yücekök highlights a critical point. According to him, it is not a correct conclusion that the oppressed artisans and small farmers engaged in a comprehensive religious struggle against exploitation in the face of developing capitalism. Religion served as an alternative path in the struggle against exploitation for this segment of society. As can be understood from Yücekök's conclusion, religion was instrumentalized with an ideological function from the perspective of Anatolian capital.

Anatolian capital, seeking to protect its own economic interests against Istanbul capital and the big bourgeoisie, embarked on a search for representation in order to have its class demands met by the state and capital centers, and ultimately produced its own

politics in the process that began with Erbakan. At this point, there is a clash between capital and politics. As Demirer also notes, the National View movement emerged with the aim of conveying a discourse reflecting the economic interests of rural capital groups under the conditions of a deepening market economy to broader masses through a religious-cultural language (2012, p. 259).

From this perspective, the politicization of Islamism in 1970, while closely linked to the efforts of this new bourgeois [capitalist] faction, led to this faction being regarded as a driving force behind the rise of Islamism (Savran, 2015, p. 45). Indeed, this perspective reveals the intra-class struggle perspective.

In addition, Erbakan's National View movement party, NSP, was the first party to be allowed to participate in elections. Landau highlights an important point regarding these first elections in 1973. Although the NSP fielded some candidates, the absence of merchants and artisans in its parliamentary group is noteworthy. This situation indicates a significant divide between the party base and the party leadership (1976, p. 31).

One of the important components that has formed the social base of Islamism since the Ottoman Empire is the phenomenon of Sufi orders and communities. However, with the Kemalist revolution, old ideological structures were dismantled, the social superstructure was reshaped, and new ideological mechanisms were established. In this context, medreses were abolished in 1924, tekkes were closed in 1925, and tarikats (orders) were declared illegal. In their place, the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Müdürlüğü) and the Directorate-General for Pious Foundations (Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü) were established under the direct authority of the prime minister's office. These two institutions also meant that the state controlled religion (Zürcher, 2004, p. 187). As a result, religious orders and communities were excluded from the public sphere through political and legal interventions and rendered ineffective.

Religious orders and communities that were opposed to the practices of the Single Party and the RPP began to increase their activities again in the 1950s. This Islamist group, which was mostly within the Democrat Party throughout the 1950s, joined the Justice Party in the 1960s. According to Mert, right-wing politics emphasized religious

and local cultural values rather than secular and Western elements in shaping the identity of society. This approach aimed to establish a sense of belonging between the state and society that nationalism had failed to achieve sufficiently, and over time, it largely succeeded in this goal (2007, p. 66).

At the end of the 1960s, Erbakan made a political move, bringing together the religious orders and communities affiliated with the Democrat Party and the Justice Party under an independent Islamist political umbrella. After becoming an independent member of parliament, Erbakan founded his first political party, the NOP. From this perspective, the NOP represented both the first independent political initiative of the religiously conservative segment of society, which had long served as a voter base for right-wing parties, and, as Erbakan put it, a political party whose “true owners were the religious orders” (Çakır, 1991, p. 215; Çalmuk, 2005, p. 561).

Indeed, religious orders and communities played an important role in the founding of NOP, the first party of the National View movement, and its successor MHP, as well as in their organization throughout Turkey. These groups, which came together around the theme of “Islamic brotherhood,” were united by religiously knowledgeable cadres and the guidance of Islamic community leaders. The cadres involved in the establishment of NOP were affiliated with the İskenderpaşa Congregation of the Naqshbandi order. Nurcu cadres also joined MNP either during its establishment or later (Çakır, 1991, p. 217; Çakır, 2005, p. 545).

Thus, the NOP was established with the İskenderpaşa Congregation as its main driving force and in alliance with the Nur Congregation and many other religious orders and congregations. From this perspective, despite their apparent heterogeneity, such alliances between religious orders are based on functional homogeneity. In short, the religious orders have formed a purposeful union. At this point, Savran reminds us that such initiatives by religious orders could be perceived as a social movement independent of social classes, but that such initiatives by members of religious orders and communities create dense networks of interests that contribute not only to their spiritual needs but also to their material well-being (2015, p. 59).

We have previously stated that the main driving force behind the politicization of Islamism, which emerged from the National View movement, was the İskenderpaşa

Congregation. This congregation is based on the Gümüşhânevî Dergâhı of the Naqshbandi order. In 1952, Mehmed Zahid Kotku, the leader of the İskenderpaşa Congregation, and his congregation structure were at the center of the politicization of Islamism. Kotku mobilized figures such as Necmettin Erbakan and Süleyman Arif Emre, who were also members of the Naqshbandi order, as well as Fehim Adak, Korkut Özal, Hasan Aksay, and Lütfi Doğan, to establish the NOP. Kotku's main goal was to heal the sharp divide between traditional Turkish society and the Kemalist order. In addition, Kotku was Turgut Özal's spiritual advisor and strongly supported Özal's liberalizing, market-oriented economic policy (Yavuz, 2003, p. 141). Furthermore, the cadres within the NOP and NSP held ministerial and bureaucratic positions in the coalition governments of the 1970s. This also marked the integration of religious structures into the state apparatus through politics, as community and sectarian cadres assumed roles in the state's administrative ranks.

One of the NSP's major voter groups was religious Kurdish voters in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (Aytürk and Bora, 2020, p. 326). The MSP, which received most of its votes from rural areas, was very popular in Sunni Kurdish provinces such as Elazığ, Bingöl, and Diyarbakır in both the 1973 and 1977 elections (Yavuz, 2003, p. 210). According to Toprak, the widespread discourse behind the NSP's electoral strength and organizational network in the eastern provinces was the existence of its ties to the Naqshbandi order (Toprak, 1987, p. 230).

During this process, the Naqshbandi movements established cultural, social, and economic autonomous areas outside state control and achieved effective expansion through complex organizational practices. Figures such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Nurettin Topçu, and Sezai Karakoç pioneered discourses on behalf of various interests and identities in these areas. The discourse of this new urban Muslim intelligentsia sought to show that integration with Islamic culture developed alongside different perspectives and practices within traditional institutional structures (Yavuz, 2003, p. 149). In other words, while this discourse sought to establish a connection with traditional structures, it also aimed to develop an Islamic way of thinking that was compatible with modern urban life.

One of the developments that accelerated the politicization of Islamism in the 1960s and 1970s was communism. Anti-communism, especially with the transition to a multi-party system, served as an ideological vehicle. According to Yavuz, under the Democrat Party administration, the state, recognizing the importance of Islam, attempted to normalize its stance against Islamist structures. The state thus expanded its own social base by preventing the radicalization of Islamism and integrating Islamist groups into the system. In addition, within the context of the Cold War, the Turkish state not only aligned itself with American strategic interests but also increasingly positioned Islamic movements as an ideological counterweight to leftist ideologies and communist structures in domestic politics (2003, p. 62).

The state's softening stance toward Islamism was also evident in the military bureaucracy. According to Çalmuk, during this period, the state supported Islamists and even religious orders because the military perceived communism as a threat. Moreover, after the military intervention of March 12, 1971, there were those within the army who were hesitant about closing the MNP. Additionally, there were also views within the army that religious education should be emphasized in order to counter the rising leftist anarchy in Turkey (Çalmuk, 2005, p. 560).

The military, especially after the military intervention of March 12, 1971, functioned as an ideological discipline mechanism, conducting open propaganda against all kinds of Marxist and leftist tendencies. After the military intervention, the army published a brochure titled “Wake Up! How Communists Are Deceiving Our Youth and Workers,” (Uyanalım!, Komünistler Gençlerimizi ve İşçilerimizi Nasıl Aldatıyorlar?, in Turkish) in which it portrayed communism as more dangerous than cancer and described it as a disease that spreads from person to person and leads to the death of a nation (Bora, 2017, p. 295).

This also had social repercussions on the streets. In some university circles, trade unions, and professional organizations, there were attempts to counter Marxism with active nationalist-Islamist-Ottoman sentiment (Karpat, 2013, p. 201). Under the guise of anti-communism, Society for the Struggle Against Communism (Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği) played a significant role in the attacks. Starting from the second half of the 1960s, ultranationalists and the National Turkish Students' Union (Milli

Türk Talebe Birliği, MTTB) also participated in anti-communist violent actions, employing a highly violent rhetoric (Bora, 2017, p. 295-296).

### **3.3. The Current Hegemonic Bloc and Anatolian Capital as a Conflictual Relationship**

The emergence of Anatolian capital in the 1960s is directly related to the hegemonic blocs established in Turkey and their crises. From this perspective, Anatolian capital remained confined to agriculture and trade during the Single Party period, operating within a domestic market with limited accumulation opportunities. However, during the Democrat Party period, economic liberalization brought about free market reforms, credit opportunities, and mechanization policies, enabling Anatolian capital to rapidly strengthen its position by integrating into industry and the domestic market. Following the 1960 coup, under the military-bureaucratic tutelage of the newly established hegemonic bloc structure, it found itself in a tense and sharp conflict with industrial capital, which had grown particularly strong under a new accumulation regime based on import substitution.

After 1945, opposition to the RPP, led by large landowners and supported by the petty bourgeoisie, resulted in the formation of a ruling bloc in 1950, led by the Democrat Party, which excluded the bureaucracy from agriculture, trade, and land ownership (Sencer, 1971, p. 387; Atılgan, 2015b, p. 389). The DP became a party that was the political expression of the segments that were the source of its power, bringing together the interests of different classes with an economic program and securing its ideological legitimacy in society with a liberal discourse and an emphasis on religious identity.

The Democrat Party's accumulation strategy was primarily based on agriculture. However, the economic policy that was implemented was based on decisions made before the DP came to power. 1947 was a year of transformation. Accordingly, the Truman Doctrine, Turkey's membership in the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the July 12 Declaration were among the important developments of 1947. Additionally, a report known as the 1947 Report was prepared in order to benefit from the Marshall Aid. Contrary to the state-centered policy of the previous period, this report prioritized agricultural development and export promotion, while state

resources were to be channeled into infrastructure development to expand markets. Financial resources were to be secured through foreign loans. The results of Turkey's initiatives began to materialize starting in 1948. As a result, Turkey was accepted into the Marshall Plan and became a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). With the implementation of liberal legislation regarding foreign capital, economic liberalization began in Turkey (Timur, 1991, p. 103; Gülaıp, 1985, p. 336).

Economic policies that had been gradually implemented since 1948 began in earnest with the DP coming to power. In this respect, the DP was successful in its agricultural policies during its time in power. According to Erođul, the following tools were used to achieve this success: first, the state opened up unused land for use, distributing some of it to landless peasants and converting some pastures into arable land; second, a certain percentage of the unemployed population was employed in these new work areas; third, mechanization in agriculture became widespread, and the number of tractors increased tenfold in a short time, with the necessary tools and equipment imported and transferred to farmers through easy credit channels; fourth, new opportunities were created for the transportation and storage of products; fifth, the credit needs of those in the agricultural sector were largely met through the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası); and finally, the presence of suitable conditions. Accordingly, while weather conditions were favorable during those years, the ongoing Korean War increased global demand for grain, leading to price increases and enabling countries like Turkey to export wheat (Erođul, 2014, p. 132).

As a result of the Democrat Party directing its resources mainly to agriculture, the agricultural bourgeoisie grew stronger with the accumulation of land and the beginning of the liquidation of traditional production relations, while small agricultural enterprises that continued to exist became part of the market, no longer subsisting on subsistence farming (Sencer, 1971, p. 387). Thus, the DP, through its agricultural policies, sought to strengthen the political mobilization of this group by expanding the agricultural bourgeoisie on the one hand and consolidating the support it received from peasants on the other.

During the middle of the DP's period in power, its political and economic choices moved in opposite directions. Accordingly, the DP moved away from political liberalism and tried to move as close as possible to economic liberalism. During this period, it lifted restrictions on foreign trade with a few exceptions, aimed to reduce bureaucratic obstacles for the private sector, and established the Turkish Industrial Development Bank (Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası), a state-supported bank with special status, to provide credit to entrepreneurs. Additionally, it made significant investments in transportation infrastructure, particularly in highway tenders, opening public resources to private capital and expanding the money supply to stimulate trade (Eroğul, 1987, p. 110).

According to Boratav, this period saw a relative economic decline for the urban working class. In addition, although there is little information about non-labor income, commercial capital, which was mainly engaged in the domestic and international marketing of agricultural products and imports in general, rather than industrial profits, experienced its golden years. Furthermore, small merchants and artisans also benefited from these developments (Boratav, 2005, pp. 103-104). Thus, the small merchant and artisan sector utilized primitive accumulation conditions to relatively increase capital accumulation.

Despite this general picture in the first half of the 1950s, the second half of the decade saw the emergence of major problems for the DP. In particular, problems such as low productivity in agriculture, external borrowing, and urbanization pressures exposed the crisis of this strategy. At the forefront of these problems were the deteriorating economy and the DP's indifference to the growing discontent of the rising industrial bourgeoisie. Insistence on free trade policies, prioritizing agriculture and trade, and implementing these policies despite the demands of the industrial bourgeoisie forced the DP to adopt an unplanned import substitution industrialization strategy. At the core of this unplanned economic policy was the DP's hardline stance against communism. The DP, which viewed planning as related to socialism, avoided the issue of planning. However, unplanned state intervention, while criticized on one hand, provided economic gain opportunities for many capital groups on the other (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p. 34; Kaymak, 2005, p. 361).

Towards the end of the 1950s, the Democrat Party's crisis of power became apparent. The DP's economic policies, combined with repressive measures, rendered its accumulation strategies unsustainable. Indeed, the DP failed to find the expected support from external financing sources such as foreign aid, credit mechanisms, and foreign capital inflows (Atılgan, 2015b, p. 491). Economic instability and an increasingly authoritarian political discourse led to serious discontent among both the broader public and the emerging industrial bourgeoisie.

As a result, these unsolvable problems have led the segments suffering from DP rule, especially the urban bourgeoisie and capital owners, to seek a more predictable and institutional political structure. However, as Kaymak points out, in a country like Turkey, where small producers constitute the majority, it is not possible for the urban classes, who are in a minority position, to effectively lead a political transformation. At this point, the military intervened, leading to the May 27 military coup (Kaymak, 2005, p. 361).

Following the military coup of May 27, 1960, Turkey underwent a significant transformation in its capital accumulation strategy. The agriculture-centered accumulation strategy of the Democrat Party era gave way to a new import substitution industrialization model. In this regard, the 1961 Constitution provided an institutional framework for planned development and state-supported industrialization for industrial capital. As Savran also noted, with the coup, the industrial bourgeoisie [capital] gained an important foothold against other classes. The historical significance of May 27 was the adaptation of the political superstructure to the needs of the transition from agricultural and commercial capital accumulation to industrial capital accumulation (Savran, 2016, p. 182).

In this new period, the dominance of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie in large cities was embodied in the Justice Party (Sencer, 1971, p. 389). In addition, while the Justice Party became the voice of industrial capital, it also won the votes of the rural electorate inherited from the Democrat Party. As Toprak also points out, the Justice Party, which presented itself as the successor to the Democrat Party, mobilized rural voters who saw the 1960 military coup as the reestablishment of the Kemalist military-bureaucratic alliance against the elitist alliance and repositioned them under

its own umbrella. By taking control of the DP's organizational network, the AP also secured mass support (Toprak, 1981, p. 92). As we will see later, the decisive factors in Erbakan's process of political massification were his ability to attract rural religious voters who were dissatisfied with the AP and his development of a discourse that prioritized Anatolian capital over the large capital groups that the AP supported and even favored. In addition, as Savran points out, the industrial bourgeoisie [capital] is now the ruler rather than the opponent of the rural majority, which it sought to restrict with the new political regime (Savran, 2016, p. 194). These are the two issues that enabled Erbakan to achieve mass appeal by establishing opposition.

The fundamental reason why industrial capital has assumed a dominant position in this debate is that, due to its class position, it occupies the center of production relations and is in conflict with its opposites, namely labor power and other fractions of capital. This is because these are also the dynamics that restructure the social formation. Additionally, while the industrial bourgeoisie continued to accumulate capital during the DP period, it failed to achieve a hegemonic position. From this perspective, the new restructuring in Turkey after 1960 brought the industrial bourgeoisie into a hegemonic position relative to other classes.

Starting in the 1950s, with the acceleration of the capitalist process in Turkey, industry and private entrepreneurs increased their share. According to a study based on data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Enstitüsü, TÜİK) that examines the structural problems of industrialization in Turkey, public institutions accounted for approximately half (48%) of the value added created in the manufacturing industry in 1950, while this share fell to 37% in 1972. In 1950, the share of workplaces with more than 10 employees in the private sector's manufacturing value added was 55%, rising to 62% in 1963 and 71% in 1972. Accordingly, as the share of industry in the private sector increased, its scale also expanded proportionally (Varlier, 1977).

With the rapid growth of industrialization, production processes began to concentrate in the hands of capital-intensive groups, and weakening competitive conditions strengthened monopolistic tendencies. In a study examining monopolization trends in Turkish industry, the extent of these trends is also revealed. Based on comprehensive

production analyses of all sectors using data from the Ministry of Industry dated 1961, a total of 251 different production items were examined. As a result of this analysis, in 93 items, 100% of production was carried out by only three firms. In 87 items, these firms accounted for 75% to 99% of production, while in 56 items, they held a production share of 50% to 74%. In only 15 items, the production share of the three largest firms was below 50% (Silier, 1977). These findings indicate that industrial production was highly concentrated in certain sectors during the relevant period and that monopolistic tendencies were strengthening.

The rapid growth of industrial capital and its tendency to concentrate at the sectoral level have created a serious asymmetry in the distribution of economic power. According to Sencer, the contradictions between the large commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie began to surface after a while. This situation resulted in the emergence of political and ideological opponents of big capital and the Justice Party, which was its concrete manifestation. From this perspective, political organizations such as the Republican People's Party, which adopted a "left of center" policy advocating for the rural population facing deteriorating material conditions in the countryside, and the Turkish Workers' Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP), which embraced socialist ideology, emerged (Sencer, 1971, pp. 388-9).

Apart from these, another movement that emerged in the 1960s was the Erbakan movement, which defended small and medium-sized industrialists and merchants against large capital groups and was religious and anti-capitalist. Erbakan's opposition to big capital and the Justice Party began in the 1960s within the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB). According to Bulutay, based on figures from 1963-1967, the small bourgeoisie was the segment that benefited the least from economic growth during the Justice Party era. From this perspective, the small bourgeoisie waged its struggle against big capital and the Justice Party within the Union of Chambers (Bulutay, 1970, p. 89). Indeed, when examining the 1969 general elections, it is observed that in the first 27 largest provinces of Turkey, where small merchants, industrialists, and artisans were predominant—excluding Diyarbakır—the Justice Party's vote share decreased compared to 1965 in all district centers (Bulutay, 1970, p. 90). This indicates that the

segment we have classified as the small bourgeoisie has broken away from the Justice Party.

The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye (TOBB) became the focal point of the struggle against big capital and the Justice Party, with Necmettin Erbakan at the forefront. Erbakan's journey with TOBB was an extension of his relationship with the Gümüş Motor Factory. Founded in 1956, the Gümüş Motor Factory was a motor production plant established with nearly 200 partners, each holding less than 5% of the shares, and capitalized at 6 million dollars. Mehmed Zahid Kotku, the leader of the İskenderpaşa Congregation and a shareholder of the factory, was also one of the factory's shareholders (Yalçın, 2024, p. 27). Erbakan served as the general manager of this factory. In this capacity, he was elected chairman of the Machine Manufacturers' Industrial Committee at the İstanbul Chamber of Industry (İstanbul Sanayi Odası) in 1959, thereby establishing his first contact with the Union of Chambers. Subsequently, in 1966, he was appointed as the head of the Industrial Affairs Department of TOBB, and eight months later, he became the general secretary of the Union. He was then elected as a member of the board of directors and, after six months in that position, he was elected as the president of TOBB (Yalçın, 2024, pp. 36-7).

Erbakan's relations with the Chambers during this period were very contentious. We have already mentioned that Erbakan won the presidential election with the support of small and medium-sized capital groups within the Chambers Union. Indeed, Erbakan's presidency began with the Justice Party's Minister of Trade refusing to recognize Erbakan as president Chamber. In addition, the Istanbul and Izmir Chambers of Commerce, where large trade and industry sectors were influential, were other Chamber groups that reacted against Erbakan's presidency (Sarıbay, 1985, p. 98). As a result of the reactionary stance of big capital and the Justice Party against Erbakan, the presidency process ended in less than three months. Erbakan, who criticized the Justice Party's steps toward re-taxing the incomes of merchants and artisans, was removed from his position by Süleyman Demirel through a Council of State (Danıştay) decision (Atılğan, 2015a, p. 586).

As a result, Erbakan emerged defeated from the hegemonic struggle he had engaged in with industrial capital and the Justice Party, which acted in concert with it, within the Chambers Union. Along with this process, the politicization of Islamic capital, generally referred to as Anatolian capital, as well as the religious and conservative segments of society, began. Furthermore, the tendency toward politicization among these segments emerged precisely from the crises of the broader process outlined in detail above, rising as a counterforce to the processes and trends in question.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE CLASS AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY: THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL VIEW IDEOLOGY**

Emerging in the late 1960s, the National View movement positioned itself as a reaction and alternative to the exclusionary structure of the hegemonic bloc of the time. This reaction was both a response from segments of society opposed to the Kemalist-positivist revolution and a response from small and medium-sized businesses oppressed by Istanbul capital. From this perspective, the National View movement aimed to be a movement that politicized the interests and demands of various economic and social groups, primarily small capital groups in conservative small towns, religious-conservative masses in rural and urban areas, foundations and religious community networks, and other communal relationship networks.

Looking at the course of the Islamist movement in Turkey, there were no permanent political parties until the National Salvation Party was founded in 1972. With the transition to a multi-party system, these social groups, which were part of various political parties, found their own political line with the National View movement. Therefore, this period marks the emergence of Islamism as a distinct political force in Turkey. Accordingly, from the late 1960s onwards, the emergence of Islamism and Anatolian capital as political actors in Turkey was largely achieved through the National View ideology.

The power of the National View ideology stems both from its ability to address the demands of these social segments and from the very functioning of the concept of ideology itself. In this regard, Louis Althusser's understanding of how ideology shapes individuals is significant;

ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way as to 'recruit' subjects among individuals (it recruits them all) or 'transforms' individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) through the very precise operation that we call interpellation or hailing. (Althusser, 2014, p. 190).

Accordingly, ideology places individuals in specific subject positions within the social formation through interpellation (literally, “hailing” or “calling into subjecthood”). In this context, National View addressed different social segments in different ways through discourses such as ‘morality’, ‘spirituality’, ‘interest-free economy’, ‘domestic’ and ‘milli’ industry, placing these segments within an ideological framework and incorporating them into itself.

However, from a historical materialist perspective, it is necessary to reiterate that Islamism does not correspond to a single class position. Classes are determined by the relationships they establish with the means of production. Therefore, the National View ideology functioned as an ideological discourse mechanism that brought together broader heterogeneous social segments. In other words, while National View addressed different social segments in different ways, transforming them into subjects, it also sought to unite these subjects under a single hegemonic project.

From this perspective, the articulation of different segments of society becomes apparent. From the perspective of the National View movement's ideology, Stuart Hall's concept of articulation is explanatory:

An articulation is thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time (Hall, as cited in Grossberg, 1986, p. 53).

Accordingly, articulation refers to the contingent and non-necessary connection between different ideological elements and social groups. In the specific case of National View, it refers to a situation where different class interests and religious-cultural demands come together to form a temporary unity.

In conclusion, during this period, the National View ideology sought to construct an Islamist political line while also aligning itself with the interests of Anatolian capital, which was emerging as a new capital faction. This also represents the National View ideology's attempt to produce a new counter-hegemonic project within Turkey's

process of capitalist transformation. In other words, National View can also be thought of as a pre-hegemonic strategy aimed at building intellectual and moral leadership in the Gramscian sense of consent production (Gramsci, 1971). Thus, Erbakan and his National View ideology sought to establish an alternative hegemonic project within the existing hegemonic bloc of the period, opposing both big industrial capital and the Westernizing-modernizing paradigm.

The determination that the National View ideology is an alternative or counter-hegemonic orientation can be considered as the expression of ideas that are not yet dominant but are candidates for dominance. Therefore, the legitimacy strategies of the dominant power and its ideology are also possible for the National View movement. According to Eagleton, the legitimization process of hegemonic ideology involves at least six different strategies; The hegemonic power can legitimize itself by promoting its own beliefs and ideas, naturalizing and universalizing these beliefs as if they were self-evident and inevitable, denigrating ideas that challenge it, systematically excluding rival forms of thought, and obscuring social reality in ways that suit it. Accordingly, these strategies interact in complex ways within any ideological formation (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 5-6). Proceeding from this, this section will discuss the National View ideology as an ideological formation that produces consent through economic, religious, and cultural discourses, both in terms of the class position of Anatolian capital and in the other segments of society it has incorporated

#### **4.1. The National View as an Economic and Social Ideology**

The National View ideology entered Turkish political life in the late 1960s, with its theoretical framework established by Necmettin Erbakan in the early 1970s. It is an ideological perspective that interweaves many elements such as economics, politics, religion, and culture. In this sense, the National View ideology is not only an economic ideology but also forms the framework for a comprehensive structure in Turkey, including the writing of a Milli history, political strategy, the construction of an Islamist identity, and the institutionalization of Islamist structures.

One of the key points to note here is that many of the economic and social issues that form the intellectual framework of Milli Görüş have been addressed within the context of conjunctural problems. Furthermore, these themes were addressed in a consistent

and repetitive manner in the National View booklet, the programs and statutes of National View parties, the rhetoric of National View movement politicians in the 1970s, and the writings of authors and Islamist intellectuals in National Newspaper (Milli Gazete), the publication organ of National View.

The term milli in the name Milli Görüş has a meaning that refers to the Quran. According to this, the meaning of milli is related to the concept of the ummah<sup>3</sup> rather than national. The reason Erbakan gave this name to his political and ideological movement is because the workers' associations he established in Europe also bore the same name. These associations, established to operate among Turkish migrant workers in Europe, were known as National View (Çakır, 2005, p. 544).

The National View Movement was unable to maintain its political existence through a single party. The political parties Erbakan established after his term as an independent member of parliament were shut down on the grounds that their actions violated the principle of a secular republic. Thus, National View politics was continuously interrupted until the 2000s. After each party was shut down, replacement parties were established one after another. Accordingly, the process that began with the National Order Party (1970-1971) under Erbakan's leadership and based on the National View ideology continued with the National Salvation Party (1972-1981), the Welfare Party (1983-1998), the Virtue Party (1997-2001), and finally the Felicity Party (2001-...), which was established after them. These parties were known as National View parties in Turkish political life.

Erbakan's rhetoric is based on the revival of the past through the narrative of an honorable millet<sup>4</sup>. From this perspective, for Erbakan, the concept of millet is ontologically privileged, beyond being merely a sociological community. In other words, the millet is seen as a subject that carries Islamic responsibility, represents it, and embodies its manifestation on earth. Erbakan clearly expressed these views in conferences and public addresses he gave in different cities during his candidacy for independent deputy and his tenure as a deputy. For example, in a lecture he gave to

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<sup>3</sup> The ummah is a Muslim community bound together by religious ties.

<sup>4</sup> In Erbakan's thinking and discourse, the word "Millet" is synonymous with "ummah" (Bora, 2017, p. 470). In addition, the noun form of millet is milli.

university students in Konya in 1970, entitled 'Positive Science and Islam', (Müspet İlim ve İslam), Erbakan argued that Muslims have the greatest system of thought that has ever existed. Therefore, the period in which the most important scientific developments for humanity accelerated began with Islam. Accordingly, the progress of sciences in the history of mankind has not been in a straight line. The people of the first period had limited knowledge and the progress of this knowledge was slow. However, with the emergence of Islam in the 7th century, the production of science and knowledge accelerated thanks to Muslims. This situation lasted for about 7 centuries until the 14th and 15th centuries after the Crusades. With the renaissance movements that started in this period, Europeans took knowledge and science from Muslims and embraced the process. However, they never said that they got them from Muslims. As a result, Muslims are now the owners of 60-70 percent of the sciences, and the Western thought system covers up this reality and belittles Muslims (Erbakan, 1970).

Erbakan's historical narrative provides concrete examples of Eagleton's strategies for legitimizing ideology. Accordingly, by promoting the past successes of Muslims, Islam is universalized as the common heritage of humanity. Erbakan goes on to present an external-force-based approach to today's problems by excluding the Western historical narrative and obscuring the complexity of historical flow. In addition, according to Ayoob, who describes this reappropriation of the past as the 'invention of tradition', this situation is the reason for Islam's instrumentalization. According to him, the invention of tradition strips Islam of its historicity and disconnects it from its context. This provides Islamists with a powerful ideological tool to purge society of all forms of 'purge' and 'impurities' they see as the cause of Muslim decline, disregarding social and political conditions (Ayoob, 2004, p.1).

Indeed, Erbakan's political and ideological position was shaped by antagonisms built upon this historical background. Foremost among these were antagonisms with the West. According to Erbakan, the realities that the West conceals and distorts are also the reason for Turkey's backwardness. Therefore, establishing "A Grand Turkey Once Again" is the fundamental goal of the National View ideology. Those who subscribe to the National View ideology know that the West is the cause of Turkey's backwardness and avoid imitating the West. From this perspective, the salvation of

humanity will be possible with National View (Erbakan, 1975, p. 10). Indeed, Erbakan's anti-Western stance was the reason why Turkey should not join the European Single Market. According to him, the European Single Market was a plan to dissolve Muslim Turkey within Christian Europe, and if Turkey joined this market, it would become colonized. Therefore, it should not be part of this union (Erbakan, 1971). For this reason, Erbakan pointed to the establishment of a union with Islamic countries, which he claimed had strong cultural ties with Turkey, as the direction to take. Accordingly, the National View ideology denigrates and excludes everything related to the West and Western values, and promotes the establishment of an Islamic Union with Islamic countries.

Another concept that is denigrating and excluding is the existing ideologies. Erbakan positions the National View ideology as a third way, an alternative to capitalism and communism. According to Erbakan, neither the exploitative and usurious Western capitalism nor the socialist and communist views of the Eastern bloc can bring happiness to humanity. Both of these ideologies are *Batıl*<sup>5</sup> views (Erbakan, 1975, p. 10). Thus, an attempt was made to make room for the political project of National View by denigrating and excluding other ideologies. To this end, the phrase “The truth has come and falsehood has vanished” (“Hak geldi, bâtıl zâil oldu”) quoted from a verse in the Quran, was turned into a slogan in an attempt to gain legitimacy. Furthermore, this phrase was used as a slogan throughout Erbakan's entire political life and within the National View movement and its components. For example, this phrase has been used as a slogan since the founding of the National Newspaper, the publication organ of the National View movement.

Erbakan presents the National View ideology as the only correct path without alternative. According to him, with the transition to a multi-party system, the political parties that were established are not mass parties but ideological parties, contrary to their claims. From this perspective, National View is expressed as one of the “three fundamental ideologies in Turkey.” These are: 1- National View; 2- Liberal View; and 3- Leftist View (Erbakan, 1975, p. 25). Accordingly, the National Salvation Party

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<sup>5</sup> False or invalid according to Sharia.

represents the National View, the Justice Party represents the Liberal View, and the Republican People's Party represents the Leftist View.



**Figure 1.** A visual representation of the three major political parties and their ideological views as featured in National Newspaper prior to the 1973 general election (Milli Gazete, August 28, 1973: 3).

According to Erbakan, liberal views based on capitalism and leftist views based on inefficient socialism have entered our national fabric and had a temporary impact. However, because the fabric is strong, they have not been able to have a full impact. In addition, both ideologies are based on material development and have therefore neglected spiritual development. However, felicity and salvation are only possible with the National View. From this perspective, the National View set out under the banner of “Morality and Spirituality First”, (Önce Ahlak ve Maneviyat) (Erbakan, 1975, p. 28).

From an Althusserian perspective, National View's discourse on morality and spirituality is a call to define individuals as moral and spiritual subjects. Thus, individuals are positioned within a specific religious-moral identity. Indeed, the National View ideology claims to assess Turkey's current situation not only in economic terms but also in terms of its moral and cultural structure. Economic phenomena are only one of the obstacles to social development. In addition, the weakening of the value system is also an obstacle to development at the same level. The reason for the weakening of the value system is fundamentally rooted in the lack of spirituality in society. According to Erbakan, social success is possible with milli consciousness. This consciousness can only be achieved through morality and spirituality (Erbakan, 1975, p.29).

From this perspective, the National View ideology argues that society is inherently idealistic and views materialism as one of Turkey's greatest threats. According to

Erbakan, when one starts from a materialistic perspective, the solution inevitably lies in communism. Ultimately, materialism and communism are one and the same. Accordingly, when materialistic premises are false, the conclusion is also flawed. Society must therefore be moralistic and spiritualistic. From this perspective, issues of morality and spirituality are a primary goal and the backbone of the National View ideology (1975, p. 23).

When viewed through Eagleton's concepts, the National View ideology systematically excludes materialism and obscuring social reality based on the claim that society is idealistic. For example, a speech made by Süleyman Arif Emre during the 1976 parliamentary budget debates can be considered an example of this type of obscuring:

Our broad masses, consisting of families with six or seven children and living at the minimum wage level, remain steadfast despite all the negative propaganda. It is evident that Marxist propaganda can influence circles that have essentially succumbed to materialist philosophies. This demonstrates how accurate our view is. It is also evident that destructive propaganda has no effect on groups attached to spiritual values (Emre, 1976, p. 18).

According to Althusser, “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” (1971, p. 256). This means that ideology obscures class contradictions and subjects individuals to values such as morality and spirituality. Indeed, the emphasis placed on issues such as morality and spirituality in an idealist society reproduces capitalist production relations and is also a manifestation of its ideological hegemony. From this perspective, it creates a sphere of influence that obscures the material interests and material consciousness of the working class. In other words, such discourses are the emptying of the revolutionary potential against capitalism through superstructural concepts such as idealism and morality.

Another example of this type of discourse, which enables the reproduction of the structure through a vision of a conflict-free society based on the concepts of morality and spirituality, can be found in Erbakan. In 1967, Erbakan, speaking as general secretary at the closing ceremony of a seminar titled “Problems of Developing Eastern Anatolia” (Doğu Anadolu’yu Kalkındırma Sorunları) organized by the The Union of Chambers, again emphasized spirituality.

We are bringing pipes and cement to a certain village. However, the villagers themselves are not helping with their own drinking water. There is an important issue we need to focus on here... There is no possibility of real development through external shipments. This brings us to the spiritual aspect of the matter. The most important factor in development is undoubtedly the factor that will come from the spiritual direction. If our villagers believe, as we do, that bringing water to their village is a form of worship in the cause of developing the East, the results will be faster and exceptionally good. For this reason, I would like to see a circular from the Presidency of Religious Affairs. We believe that religious officials have a great responsibility in the development of the East (Erbakan, 1967, p. 470).

Although the emphasis on morality and spirituality is expressed as a religious or cultural issue, from an Althusserian perspective, this situation serves as an inherent function of the reproduction mechanism of capitalist production relations (Althusser, 2014, p. 236). Accordingly, the school and education system are important as ideological apparatuses that ensure the reproduction of production relations. Indeed, Erbakan stated that they would establish a new education system, which they sloganized as Milli Education (Milli Maarif), to ensure the spiritual revival of society. This education system would aim to raise generations that are faithful and attached to their roots and would be an alternative system to materialist and liberal teachings (1975, p. 92-93). Indeed, throughout the 1970s, discourse and actions aimed at fundamental change in the education system were the most fundamental issues of the National View movement.

Alongside National View's vision of a spiritual society, its second fundamental issue is industrialization. According to Sarıbay, when the National Salvation Party was founded, it was the party that most strongly emphasized Turkey's need for industrialization (Sarıbay, 1985, p. 122). Indeed, throughout the 1970s, the most fundamental discourse of National View was the issues of development and industrialization. In this respect, the National View movement viewed industrialization as a matter of life and death for the country (MSP, 1973, p. 44).

National View presents industrialization as a technical and economic necessity, developing an ideological discourse. Erbakan highlights issues such as population growth, rising unemployment, and inefficiency in agricultural labor not as structural crises of capitalism but as problems caused by technical inadequacy. According to Erbakan, 70 percent of the labor force in Turkey works in agriculture, which is much

higher than it should be. Indeed, the work done by one person in Europe is done by six people in Turkey, and the work done by one person in America is done by 20 people in Turkey. Similarly, there are labor-time imbalances in the industrial sector. Furthermore, the development of the war industry is also necessary to become a strong and powerful nation (Erbakan, 1975, pp. 195-196). Thus, Erbakan addresses the necessity of industrialization through the prism of social development and national competitiveness.

Erbakan's industrialization concept is also based on reviving the past. According to him, there were many factories in the Ottoman Empire in the modern sense until the Republic. It was also the most advanced in many areas. With the Republic, the industrialization drive was constantly postponed or failed to be implemented due to both the incompetence of governments and the actions and rhetoric of external forces (Erbakan, 1975, pp. 198-209). In addition, until that day, the Republican People's Party's economic state enterprises based on statism and the Justice Party and similar parties implemented a liberal system that provided industrial facilities to a minority group, and they failed (MSP, 1973, p.47).

The National View movement's sensitivity to development and industrialization issues was also evident in the coalition governments it was part of. The National Salvation Party, which was part of three coalition governments formed between 1973 and 1978, insisted on and obtained the Ministry of Industry and Technology (Toprak, 1981, p. 102). Erbakan first began to use the rhetoric of *milli*, strong, rapid, and widespread development (Milli Gazete, May 28, 1974:1). Later, Erbakan included heavy industry policy in the Third Five-Year Development Plan, defining the industrialization formula as “industry producing basic investment goods,” “factories building factories,” and “machines building machines” (Milli Gazete, July 27, 1976: 1-7).

According to Savran, the National View ideology was a truly homegrown product that combined both the imperialist-expansionist thinking of a segment of the ruling class and a parochial outlook. The imperial aspect of this lies in the greatness of the Ottoman Empire and its role as the leader of the Islamic world. For this reason, National View is unequivocally seeking an Islamic common market or Islamic Union instead of the European Common Market. The parochial aspect of National View is a provincial

mindset that is both compatible with the imperialist view and suited to the needs of small and medium-sized businesses in rural areas. Accordingly, Turkey needed a heavy industry initiative to protect itself from the interests of the West, which was also an ally of the ruling bourgeoisie. This necessary drive was also suitable for revitalizing the narrow horizons of small and medium-sized enterprises in Anatolia. The National View ideology was also situated at such an intersection (Savran, 2015, pp. 63-64).

According to Gülalp, the fact that the National View, which claimed development and industrialization at the time, also talked about spiritual development, morality and spirituality did not carry enough credibility compared to other political movements. Moreover, Kemalism, the founding ideology of the Republic, was also a developmentalist ideology. In this respect, the social democratic or Kemalist-influenced Left movement, which presented itself as an updated form of Kemalism at the time, had a more convincing discourse than the National View (Gülalp, 2003, p.13).

It should be noted that the National View ideology does not have a comprehensive plan inherent to industrialization and development. For National View, material development, the development of Anatolia, industrialization, and heavy industry issues are intertwined, and it is proposed that they be established through a model similar to state capitalism on average. Accordingly, the State Planning Organization, structured on the basis of regional planning, will prepare the necessary plans and projects for development and industrialization. Different segments in the specified region, such as workers, peasants, merchants, and tradesmen, will come together and become partners here. The state will build the necessary infrastructure for free or at a very low cost and will also provide the necessary interest-free credit support. Offices will be established to deal with technical and financial issues at the intermediate levels. As the business opens and begins to make a profit, the debt to the state will be repaid and the business will remain with the shareholders (Erbakan, 1975, pp. 223-224). Thus, Regional Development Companies and multi-shareholder enterprises will emerge, and these will be able to produce either jointly as the state and private sector or independently as the private sector.

Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that there is an ambivalent situation regarding the political economy of National View. The National View ideology, which explicitly rejected communism, liberalism, and capitalism, appeared to be a type of mixed economic model. Accordingly, while supporting state-backed development within capitalist production relations on the one hand, it also internalized the logic of private property and the free market on the other. Accordingly;

Islam has its own developed economic system. This economic system is neither the Eastern system nor the Western system. Because Islam is two-winged, it has always pursued material and spiritual matters in parallel... Islam's economic system respects material things. Everyone has property and possessions, and everyone's property and possessions belong to them and are innocent... Islam also places great importance on profit and gain... Muslims are obliged to work, produce, and be economically useful, no matter what. In these respects, Islam seems to resemble the Western style... But the Islamic system is not exactly the same as the Western capitalist system. The big difference lies here: Muslims cannot be wasteful; they are obliged to spend what they earn on good causes. People in the West do not have such a principle... In this respect, the Islamic system is one that has found a way to eliminate the drawbacks of the Western regime and to establish a lofty goal that capitalism cannot achieve, using spiritual forces according to its own standards. (Erbakan, 1975, pp. 149-150).

According to this discourse, Erbakan criticized capitalism on the one hand and developed a kind of moral capitalist discourse that incorporated Muslim values on the other. It is also important to note that Erbakan did not put forward an original economic perspective other than the principle of morality. In addition, the National View emphasized that they would be 'respectful of everyone's legitimate earnings and activities' (Erbakan, 1975, p. 27) and that issues such as the inviolability of property and the protection of the right to trade were essential (Erbakan, 1975, p. 31)

#### **4.2. Anatolian Capital Alternative Capital Accumulation Strategies**

The 1960s and 1970s, when the National View ideology emerged as an economic ideology, were also the years when the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy took off in Turkey. According to Güllalp, this model, widely used in the modernization of Third World countries in the 20th century, was a development strategy led by the state. Drawing on a nationalist ideology, this model combined the fundamental principles of the welfare state with rapid industrialization. In Turkey, the elements that formed the Islamist opposition consisted of small businesses that felt

threatened by the implementation of the Import Substitution Industrialization strategy. Indeed, the emergence of Islamist political parties established under the umbrella of National View was also the result of the conflict between large industrial capital and other business circles at the center of the import substitution industrialization strategy in cities and traditional, small, and medium-sized business sectors in rural areas (2001, p. 435).

To understand how the demands of the small and medium-sized capital group, referred to as Anatolian capital, are reflected in the political arena, it is important to first examine the structural characteristics and class position of this capital segment.

Qualitative and quantitative criteria are used in classifying the manufacturing form of small-scale industry. From a manufacturing perspective, quantitative methods that provide statistical data such as the number of workers, annual sales, energy used, etc., are more commonly preferred. In addition, there are qualitative criteria that contain criteria that are decisive in terms of business management. Furthermore, there are qualitative criteria used in examining characteristics such as the dominant form of ownership in small industrial enterprises, the use of labor in the production process (family labor, etc.), and the division of labor (Aktar, 1990, p. 112).

Although it is difficult to provide exact figures due to differences in the sources regarding the number of small producers in the 1960s, the State Planning Organization states that there were 400,000 small producers in the 1950s. The figures provided by the General Manager of the Halk Bank for 1965 indicate that there were approximately 1.5 million tradespeople, 600,000 of whom were small industrialists (Bıçakçı, 2015, p. 77; Milliyet, September 8, 1965:7).

By the 1970s, as large-scale capital centers moved toward monopolization under the influence of Turkey's new accumulation strategy, the decline of older and smaller-scale firms accelerated. Accordingly, in 1969, the increase in the number of small capital groups driven into bankruptcy was 62.5%, and the number of companies filing for bankruptcy protection increased by 20%. This situation was the result of large capital's tendency toward monopolization, which led to the elimination of small firms or their absorption into larger entities (Sarıbay, 1985, pp. 95-96).

The tension between large producer capital, which showed a tendency toward monopolization from the late 1960s onwards, and small-scale producers in rural areas and small towns continued into the 1970s. For example, this tension can be seen in Nilgün Çelebi's study on small industrialists in the province of Aydın during that period:

The occupations of small industrialists who are part of the traditional activity group and view large industries as competitors are as follows: box making, journalism, cold ironwork, tile making. Of these, the participant engaged in journalism stated that they were in competition with the Istanbul press and that it was very difficult for the provincial press to survive against the Istanbul press, while the participant engaged in tile manufacturing stated that large industries had developed rapidly in the field of flooring and that competition took place under extremely harsh conditions. Other subjects from the traditional activity group who stated that they were in competition with large-scale industry were engaged in the following occupations: shoemaking, tailoring, shirt-making, coppersmithing, tinsmithing, clog-making, and carpentry (Aktar, 1990, p. 113; as cited in Çelebi, 1983).

The political movement that articulated the material demands of the traditional or modern small and medium-sized producers in rural areas and small towns, expressed as Anatolian capital, took place under Erbakan's leadership. According to Keyder, National View [National Salvation Party] aimed to mobilize the discontent of the traditional small bourgeoisie in rural areas towards the revival of Islamism. Combining the ideology of the tradesmen with demands for state intervention in large-scale industry, the National View movement sought to protect the petty bourgeoisie against the destructiveness of monopolistic capitalism. It also proposed religious social solidarity as a replacement for the image of religious communities that was beginning to disappear due to destructive capitalism (1987a, p. 54). According to Toprak, the National View ideology [National Salvation Party] attempted to ease the burden of rapid industrialization by instrumentalizing Islam and tried to appeal to the 'little man' [the petty bourgeoisie] caught between big industrial capital and the organized working class (Toprak, 1987, pp. 228-229). In Althusser's words, Erbakan and the National Salvation Party were an interpellation that sought to appropriate the interests and demands of Anatolian capital and bring them into the political arena.

Indeed, in many of his statements, Erbakan transformed the economic interests of Anatolian capital into a political demand. One such statement is an interview he gave

to Yılmaz Çetiner shortly before the 1969 General Elections, when he ran as an independent candidate after being removed from his position at the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges:

...we demand that investments be directed to Anatolia... [Only] Istanbul benefits from [these investments]. Of the \$20 million investment quota given to the Chambers Union, \$19 million is distributed to Istanbul merchants and \$1 million to Anatolia... On the other hand, the European Investment Bank provides \$35 million in investment loans, which have been distributed to those in Istanbul through the Ministry of Industry for five years. ...Where is the Anatolian merchant's right... (Milliyet, September 25, 1969:11).

After being elected as a member of parliament for Konya, Erbakan continued to conflict with Istanbul capital in a similar manner:

... We soon realized that the Chambers Union was operating entirely as an instrument of a comprador-Masonic minority. The entire organization is under the absolute control of comprador trade and industry. So we said, let's first get into the administrative board and make the Chambers Union useful to Anatolian merchants and industrialists as well... They do not want Anatolian merchants to develop. They want to keep the reins firmly in their hands. They want to add a twenty-first factory to their twenty existing ones. They sell the assembly trucks they make for 140,000 lira without a second thought... (Cem, 2011, pp. 65-66; as cited in Necmettin Erbakan).

This segment of capital, referred to as Anatolian capital, represented the small and medium-sized bourgeoisie in rural Anatolia at that time and also became one of the main pillars forming the economic basis of the National View ideology. In other words, during this process, the economic interests of the aforementioned Anatolian capital and the political interests of the National View parties (National Order Party, National Salvation Party) were articulated within the National View ideology.

Alongside this small segment of capital, which served as the driving force behind the politicization process by supporting Erbakan, there were other capital centers as well.

These were capital groups that did not directly fall under the definition of Anatolian capital at the time and had increased their capital accumulation by entering into production and trade relations earlier than others, quantitatively close to the average Istanbul capitalist or at least ahead of Anatolian capital in terms of accumulation and capacity, and were positioned on the Islamist-conservative line. According to Öztürk, Islamists [the aforementioned small and medium-sized capitalists interacting with Erbakan] constituted only a portion of smaller-scale capital compared to large capital. In addition, ‘conservative’<sup>6</sup> currents existed within the big bourgeoisie [capital]. This segment expanded its activities during the Import Substitution Industrialization period without establishing opposition to secular large capital groups. For example, the Anadolu Group was hesitant to produce alcoholic products due to the Islamist segment, but entered this sector with the proposal of the conservative Ülker and Topbaş groups. Similarly, a ‘gentlemen's agreement’ based on division of labor in production was made between another conservative capital group, the Kale Group, and the Eczacıbaşı Group (Öztürk, 2015, pp. 126-127; Öztürk, 2010, pp. 301, 399).

In addition, it is necessary to emphasize the change in Erbakan's rhetoric after he became politicized. During his politicization process, Erbakan used the concept of Anatolian capital directly, expressing the problems and demands of this capital faction on every platform. However, as Erbakan became a permanent political actor, we can note that he did not use the expression “Anatolian capital” directly. From this perspective, it is possible to say that Erbakan and National View addressed broad segments of society such as small producers, small tradesmen, peasants, workers, and agricultural workers instead of directly referring to Anatolian capital.

The broad base that National View appealed to also shaped its alternative accumulation strategies. National View called on the grassroots masses to become shareholders in a way that would fuel Turkey's development and industrialization policy. In this model, which resembled a cooperative system, every Turkish citizen, including workers, peasants, laborers, as well as the petty bourgeoisie consisting of merchants and tradesmen, could become a shareholder. In return for this system, it proposed to pay

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<sup>6</sup> The author highlights capital groups that cannot be directly labeled as Islamist, that began accumulating capital earlier, and that were relatively large in the 1960s and 1970s (Öztürk, 2015).

shareholders a share of wages and profits (Erbakan, 1975, pp. 130, 131, 166, 189). Accordingly, National View aimed to accelerate its development strategy by, on the one hand, linking labor to capital relations by making it a small property owner through shareholding and, on the other hand, providing capital for rapid industrialization.

This call for shareholding was valid not only for those within the country, but also for Turkish citizens living abroad. They were offered a program whereby they could become both workers and partners in factories under state guarantee with the capital they had accumulated abroad (MSP, 1973, p. 60). By the mid-1970s, the number of worker companies had reached 322 in priority regions designated by the State Planning Organization, 90% of which were located far from major industrial and commercial cities (Özcan and Çokgezen, 2003, p. 2068).

In conclusion, it is possible to discuss two fundamental functional aspects inherent in the economic dimension of the National View ideology. First, National View seeks to build an alternative class bloc against Istanbul capital by supporting the existing components of Anatolian capital. Second, National View has sought to develop an alternative capital accumulation strategy through projects such as development and heavy industry initiatives. Therefore, it is possible to view National View as an encounter with Anatolian capital, an attempt to create new capitalists through alternative accumulation strategies.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

This study aims to examine Turkey's capitalist development process in general, and specifically the emergence of Anatolian capital and the National View movement in the 1960s. Accordingly, the historical context of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to capitalism and the dynamics of capitalism's expansion in Turkey form the framework of this study. In addition, this thesis is addressed in the context of two research questions posed at the beginning of the study. The first question is what the historical process and structural conditions were in the emergence of the phenomenon of Anatolian capital. The second question is how the National View movement transformed the economic core of Anatolian capital into a political power center and became a permanent Islamist political movement in Turkey.

The development process of capitalism in Turkey has followed a different course from its Western counterparts. When viewed in the context of debates on the Asiatic mode of production within the Ottoman social structure, it is possible to say that the capitalist classes developed late and in an inorganic manner, unlike in the West. Indeed, the most fundamental reason for this is the absolute dominance of the central state apparatus over almost the entire society. Accordingly, the state is in a position to control surplus product and hold a monopoly on private property in land. Consequently, this situation points to a social structure in which the division of labor could not develop and commodification was virtually non-existent. Furthermore, the failure of the division of labor to develop fundamentally prevented the emergence of classes as an objective category.

From this perspective, within the Ottoman social structure, the bourgeoisie emerged as a class shaped by state interventions and external dynamics at a later stage than its Western counterparts. This delay within society limited both capital accumulation and

the bourgeoisie's transformative power over the social structure. Indeed, in the dialectic of the transition to the capitalist mode of production in Turkey, the bureaucracy emerging from the central state apparatus played a leading role instead of the bourgeoisie class. In this sense, it is possible to see the traces of the bureaucracy to a large extent in the reforms of the late Ottoman period and in the profound changes inherent in the base and superstructure of society made by the cadres who founded the Republic.

During this period, positivist thinking, which became widespread among supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress, was inherited by the Republic and became the fundamental paradigm through Kemalist bureaucrats. In addition, the Kemalist bureaucracy, which came to power and assumed a dominant position, set out to create a Turkish national bourgeoisie, and Islamism was excluded from the new equation and attempted to be reduced to the realm of individual belief. Therefore, this period was almost a period of retreat for both the weak Anatolian capital and Islamism.

The new Turkish bourgeoisie created with the Republic was predominantly commercial capital supported by state contracts. In addition, the years of World War II in particular were years when industrial capital, alongside commercial bourgeoisie, began to accumulate capital on a significant scale. Indeed, in the post-war period, the bureaucracy, seeking to close the current account deficit, resorted to imposing extraordinary taxes. During this period of intensifying accumulation, industrialists and merchants had reached a stage where they could openly express their reactions to the bureaucracy's practices and hegemony. Ultimately, in proportion to the accumulation phases of the capital factions, the doors to the multi-party era in Turkey were opened.

The late emergence of the bourgeoisie in Turkey, the dominant role of the state in capital accumulation strategies, and tensions between capital factions collectively constituted the inherent dynamics of Turkey's capitalist development process. With the transition to a multi-party system, a new era began in Turkey. The Democrat Party, which held power for approximately 10 years, excluded the bureaucracy and established a new power bloc with the ruling classes in agriculture, trade, and land. In this sense, the dominant accumulation strategy of the period was an agriculture-centered accumulation strategy. During this period, which saw mechanization in

agriculture, expansion of the domestic market, economic liberalization, and the provision of credit opportunities, Anatolian capital also began to participate more directly, albeit relatively limited, in the process of capital accumulation. This period was a golden age that increased the profits of industrial and commercial capital. However, the Democrat Party's emphasis on agricultural and commercial capital and its indifference towards industrial capital, unplanned economic policies, the failure to achieve the expected productivity in agriculture, and the pressure of urbanization exposed the crisis of the agriculture-centered accumulation strategy. Indeed, this process resulted in the overthrow of the Democrat Party by a military coup in 1960.

Following the coup, a new economic, political, and ideological order was established with the newly drafted Constitution. With the 1961 Constitution, a new hegemonic bloc consisting of the bureaucracy, the military, and industrial capital was officially established in Turkey. While the import substitution industrialization model was preferred as the fundamental accumulation strategy of this period, industrial capital also attained a hegemonic position within the new structure vis-à-vis other classes. This period saw the greatest increase in capital accumulation for industrial capital. Indeed, during this process, industrial capital began to consolidate its hegemonic position by establishing its own professional organization, TÜSİAD (1971).

As can be seen here, although the conditions for the transition to capitalism in Turkey followed a different course from Western examples, the stages of expansion and deepening of capitalism were largely shaped by the struggles of class factions. These stages were established with new hegemonic and power blocs, and were dismantled by the struggles of factions emerging from within them. Indeed, Anatolian capital had reached a level where it could express its opposition to the hegemonic bloc established in the 1960s as a result of reaching a certain stage of accumulation. This unique historical situation provides an important background for understanding the rise of Anatolian capital and its search for political representation. Indeed, this background largely reveals the historical process and structural conditions that led to the emergence of Anatolian capital.

In this study, examining Turkey's capitalist development process is a key factor in understanding the conditions under which Anatolian capital emerged. However, the

main and specific focus of this study is the rise of Anatolian capital and the role of Islamist political movements in this process. Islamism, which was excluded within the framework of modernization paradigms during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic, found its material core in Anatolian capital, which began to emerge in the 1960s.

Indeed, the rise of Anatolian capital and the Islamist ideology's counter-hegemonic initiative exhibit a dialectical character. Accordingly, the rise of Anatolian capital as a capital faction has provided a material basis for the Islamist ideology to find a social base. As Anatolian capital rose, Islamism under the National View ideology legitimized the interests of this capital faction, enabling its political representation. This dialectical link between Anatolian capital and Islamism is a concrete manifestation of the reciprocity in the capital-ideology relationship.

From a historical materialist perspective, National View emerged not only as a political movement representing Anatolian capital but also as an ideological formation that legitimized new areas of capital accumulation and produced masses in society as an Islamist political subject. Indeed, the period before 1980 was a process of subject production in terms of Islamism. Until the National Order Party, the first of the National View movement parties, was established in 1970, Islamism did not have its own political party. With the transition to a multi-party system, there were attempts in this direction, but the founding paradigm and dominant ideology of the Republic prevented such formations. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize certain dynamics in the formation of a lasting Islamist movement in Turkey. From this perspective, Islamism sought to establish itself first during the Democrat Party era and then during the Justice Party era in the 1960s, following the transition to a multi-party system.

However, the Justice Party's actions in favor of industrial capital in distribution relations, its allocation of support and resources to this capital group, its continuation of the Kemalist paradigm as an ideological discourse, and its approach to reality through a Westernizing discourse gave rise to new political pursuits from both the perspective of Anatolian capital and Islamism. Indeed, Erbakan positioned himself precisely at this intersection and gave concrete form to demands for politicization. In Erbakan's representation of these segments in the political arena, it is necessary to

emphasize the functional role of the National View ideology. Indeed, it is possible to mention many functional aspects of National View. Foremost among these is the relationship established with Anatolian capital as a meeting point. Indeed, Erbakan's efforts to bring the interests and demands of Anatolian capital into the political arena, starting with the Chambers Union, can be seen as an outcome of this encounter. The second role of National View is that, especially with Erbakan gaining legitimacy as a partner in the governments established in the 1970s, it turned to alternative capital accumulation strategies and, in particular, played a role in creating a Muslim bourgeoisie in Anatolia. Indeed, from the outset, Erbakan advocated for the geographical distribution of capital opportunities beyond Istanbul to the provinces and rural areas. Therefore, we can say that National View's convergence with Anatolian capital represents a two-dimensional approach to capital: both meeting Anatolian capital and creating new capital areas in its favor.

Another functional role of National View lies in its understanding of society. The reference point for Erbakan and the National View ideology in producing an Islamist political subject is the period when Islam emerged. Indeed, Erbakan connects this period to the Ottoman Empire and sees the development of the Turks in the religious structure of Ottoman society. According to him, the transition to Western paradigms with the Republic was the greatest evil, surrender, and loss inflicted on Turkey. Therefore, Erbakan referred to a new Islam-centered social structure based on the revival of history. Indeed, his discourse enabled the Islamist-conservative segments of society to transform their daily demands into political struggle within a religious framework. In this sense, National View served as an ideological formation that mobilized the Islamist-conservative segments of society as a political subject.

This framework also emerged as the answer to another research question of the study: how the National View movement transformed the economic core of Anatolian capital into a political power center and became a permanent Islamist political movement in Turkey.

In this context, the study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it examines the emergence of Anatolian capital as a capital fraction and its politicization process from a comprehensive historical materialist perspective. Second, it demonstrates that

National View, as the political-ideological outcome of this process, is not merely an economic entity but a functional ideological formation that intertwines numerous elements such as politics, religion, and culture.

The most fundamental limitation of this study is the lack of sufficient empirical data on Anatolian capital during the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, in this study, which examines capital accumulation processes, certain abstractions and generalizations had to be made based on the observed phenomena and their consequences. Furthermore, in this study, only the capital component of the productive forces, consisting of capital, labor, and technology, has been taken as the unit of analysis. Consequently, labor and technology have been excluded from the scope of this study. It should be noted that this study, which mainly examines Anatolian capital and its politicization, was part of the labor movement of the 1970s, where Islamist-conservative groups unionized and established their own labor organizations. Accordingly, studies on labor and technology inherent in the early period of Anatolian capital await as topics that can be studied to the extent that empirical data can be accessed.

In conclusion, understanding the relationship between the emergence of Anatolian capital and the National View movement is important for seeing the internal contradictions in the development of capitalism in Turkey. Furthermore, understanding the mutual interaction between the rise of Anatolian capital and the Islamist ideological formation of National View provides an important key to understanding the structural change in Turkey after the 2000s.

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## APPENDICES

### A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin kapitalistleşmesi bağlamında bir sermaye fraksiyonu olarak Anadolu sermayesinin orta çıkış dinamiklerinin ve siyasallaşma sürecinin tarihsel ve yapısal bir incelemesini amaçlamaktadır. Anadolu sermayesi olgusu, en azından 1990lardan başlayarak günümüze kadar farklı bağlamlarda üzerine düşünülen bir olgu olmakla beraber, bu olgunun gerçekten ne ölçüde var olduğu ya da var olduğu ölçüde neyi, ne kadar kapsadığı konusunda üzerinde uzlaşılmış bir tanım söz konusu değildir. Bu açıdan, bu olgunun ekonomik, siyasal, ideolojik ve mekânsal boyutları üzerine çokça tartışmalar yapılmaktadır.

Anadolu sermayesi olgusunun toplumsal görünüşündeki genel kabul ise, İslamcı, Muhafazakar Demokrat, Sağ eğilimli siyasal yapılar ile Anadolu'daki sanayi ve ticaret sermaye gruplarının karşılıklı bütünsel ilişkiseliliği üzerinedir. Bunun yanında, Anadolu sermayesi olarak anılan sermaye fraksiyonunun homojen bir yapıda olmamasından dolayı farklı isimlendirmelerle de anılmaktadırlar. Buna göre, literatürde ve toplumsal söylemde, özellikle İslamcı-muhafazakar ideoloji sahipliğiyle anılan ve Anadolu sermayesi kavramının türevleri olarak kullanılan Yeşil Sermaye, İslami Sermaye, Anadolu Kaplanları, Muhafazakar Sermaye, Yerel Sanayi gibi pek çok sermaye grubundan söz edilebilmektedir. Buna göre, Anadolu sermayesi olgusuna bugünden bakıldığında, sınıfsal kökeni benzer olmakla beraber süreç içerisindeki gelişim dinamikleri ve sermaye çeşitlilikleri olgunun farklı biçimlerde tanımlanmasına neden olmuştur.

Bu alanda yapılan çalışmalara bakıldığında İslamcı ve Muhafazakar ideolojiye sahip sermaye grupları Anadolu sermayesi olarak genel bir isimle anılmakla beraber bunların doğrudan sınıflandırmalarını yapmanın güçlükleri bulunmaktadır. Bu sınıflandırma sorunlarına karşın, bu sermaye gruplarının özellikle MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İş adamları Derneği), ASKON (Anadolu Aslanları İşadamları Derneği)

gibi meslek örgütlerine üyelikleri üzerinden bazı değerlendirmelerde bulunulabilmektedir. Ancak bu türden değerlendirmeler bu çalışmanın kapsadığı 1960-1980 arası dönem için çok mümkün değildir. Nitekim, bu meslek örgütlerinin kuruluşları 1990lı yıllardan itibaren gerçekleşmiştir. Ayrıca bu meslek örgütleri Türkiye’de İslamcı-muhafazakar sermaye olarak Anadolu sermayesinin sınıf bilincine ulaştığının sembolik bir göstergesi olarak sayılabilir.

Literatürde yoğunluklu olarak 1990 sonrası bağlamında ele alınan Anadolu sermayesinin belirmesi ve siyasal-ideolojik konumlanması çok daha eskiye gitmektedir. Buna göre, bu çalışmanın odaklandığı dönem itibarıyla, Anadolu sermayesi 1960larda belirmeye başlayan ve ‘kendinde sınıf’ niteliği olan ekonomik aktörler olduğudur. Bu açıdan, sınırlı bir sermaye birikimine sahip ve coğrafi olarak dağınık olan bu sermaye grupları için meslek örgütleri üzerinden sınıflandırma yapmak mümkün değildir. Bu dönem özelinde bir başka problemlili alan da Anadolu sermayesine içkin ampirik verinin kısıtlılığdır. Özellikle İstanbul merkezli büyük sermaye gruplarına kıyasla Anadolu’daki girişimcilerin faaliyetleri daha parçalı, kayıt dışı ve yerel ölçekte kaldığından, doğrudan ampirik veriye ulaşmak çoğu zaman mümkün olmamaktadır. Bu nedenle, çoğu çalışmada olduğu gibi bu çalışmada da Anadolu sermayesini anlamak için zorunlu olarak belirli soyutlamalara ve genellemelere başvurulmuştur. Bu soyutlamalar ile tek tek firmaların veya bireysel girişimcilerin mikro hikâyelerinden ziyade, sermaye birikim süreçlerinin genel eğilimleri, devletle ve siyasal kurumlarla kurulan ilişkileri ve ideolojik yönelimleri kavramsal düzeyde yakalanmaya çalışılmıştır. Nitekim bu yaklaşım, Anadolu sermayesini yalnızca ekonomik bir kategori olarak değil, aynı zamanda siyasal ve ideolojik bir aktör olarak kavramsallaştırmayı mümkün kılmaktadır.

1960 sonrası kapitalizmin genişleme aşamasında belirmeye başlayan Anadolu sermayesi aynı zamanda dönemin hegemonik blokuna karşı bir hareket olarak İslamcı-muhafazakar siyasetin ve ideolojinin de maddi çekirdeği oluşturmuştur. Buna göre çalışmanın önemi, ekonomik bir aktör olarak Anadolu sermayesinin gelişimi ve İslamcı hareketin toplumsal kökenlerini açıklamada ekonomik ve sınıfsal dinamikleri merkeze alarak kültürel yaklaşımlara literatürde alternatif bir yaklaşım sunmasıdır.

Bu çalışmanın temel iddiası, Anadolu sermayesinin belirmesinin yalnızca ekonomik değil, aynı zamanda siyasal ve ideolojik düzeylerde de şekillenen bir süreç olduğudur.

Buna göre, 1960ların sonunda beliren ve sınıf fraksiyonu olarak ortaya çıkan Anadolu sermayesi, İstanbul sermayesine karşı alternatif bir temsil arayışına girerek Milli Görüş hareketi aracılığıyla kurumsallaşmış ve ideolojik düzeyde de İslamcı-muhafazakar söylem aracılığıyla talep ve çıkarlarını meşrulaştırmaya çalışmıştır.

Bu tez, ortaya konulan temel iddia bağlamında aşağıdaki araştırma sorularını yanıtlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

1. Anadolu sermayesi olgusunun ortaya çıkışındaki tarihsel süreç ve yapısal koşullar nelerdir?
2. Milli Görüş hareketi Anadolu sermayesinin ekonomik maddi çekirdeğini nasıl siyasal bir güç odağına dönüştürmüş ve Türkiye’de kalıcı bir İslamcı siyasal hareket haline dönüşmüştür?

Bu çalışmada tarihsel materyalist metodoloji kullanılmıştır. Materyalist tarih anlayışında toplumsal yapılar, nesnel ve tespit edilebilir tarihsel gelişim yasalarına bağlıdır. Buna göre, ekonomik ilişkiler toplumsal yapıyı oluştururken, üretim ilişkileri ve sınıf çatışmaları da toplumsal yapının değişimini yönlendiren faktörlerdir.

Toplumsal yapı, ekonomik, politik ve ideolojik katmanlardan oluşan bir bütündür ve ekonomik katman, bütün üzerinde önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. Materyalist tarih anlayışında, ekonomi temel belirleyicidir, ancak siyaset ve ideoloji gibi üst yapı da sonuca katkıda bulunur. Ekonomik düzey, üretici güçler ve üretim ilişkilerinden oluşurken, üretici güçler sermaye, emek ve teknolojiden oluşan nesnel bir yapıdır. Üretim ilişkileri ise üretim tarzının yasal ilişkilerini ifade eder. Sosyal yapının ekonomik temelli bütünlüğünü ortaya çıkarırken, üretici güçlerden birini (sermaye, emek ve teknoloji) analiz birimi olarak almak ve diğerlerini *ceteris paribus* anlayışına göre sabit kabul etmek bir araştırma tekniğidir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma sermaye ve sermaye birikimine dayalı bir bakış açısı benimsemektedir, çünkü emeğin öznel boyutu ve teknolojinin katı deterministik boyutu nedeniyle sermayeye odaklanmak önemlidir.

Sermaye birikimi süreci, klasik sosyolojik perspektiften sosyal değişimin faktörleri olan kentleşme ve nüfus gibi unsurlarla birlikte kurucu bir nitelik taşır. Bir yandan da kentleşme ve nüfus artışı gibi faktörler sermaye birikiminin türevleridir. Bu açıdan, sermaye birikimini bu çalışmada ayrıcalıklı bir unsur olarak ele almak, sosyal olguları

ekonomi aracılığıyla inşa etmek anlamına gelir. Buradan hareketle, bu çalışma söylemden ziyade nesnel gerçekliği aramaktadır. Bu nesnel gerçekliğin yapı anlayışıyla inşa edildiği bir gerçektir. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışma postmodern bir paradigma yerine modernist bir paradigma temelinde yazılmıştır.

Bu çalışmada tarihsel materyalist çerçevenin somut uygulamasına içkin yöntemsel adım olarak tarihsel inceleme ve yapısal çözümleme tercih edilmiştir. Tarihsel ve yapısal analizler sosyal bilimlerde iki farklı ama birbiriyle ilişkili yaklaşımlardır. Her iki analiz türüne içkin olan konular farklıdır. Tarihsel analiz, olayların tarihsel süreçlerde nasıl yaşandığına odaklanırken, yapısal analiz, bu olayları mümkün kılan ve şekillendiren yapısal unsurları inceler. Bu çalışmada da özellikle 90lı yıllardan başlayarak günümüze kadar farklı bağlamlarda üzerine düşünülen ve tartışılan bir konu olan Anadolu sermayesi olgusunun ortaya çıkışına dair açıklayıcı bir inceleme ortaya konmaya çalışılacaktır. Ayrıca bu araştırma, sermaye sınıflarını yalnızca ekonomik aktörler olarak değil, aynı zamanda siyasal ve ideolojik süreçlerin belirleyicisi olarak da ele almayı hedeflemektedir.

Yapısal çözümleme ise incelenecek sınıfların ekonomik, siyasal ve ideolojik düzeylerdeki ilişkilerini anlamak için daha derin bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Bunun yanında, birey öznenen ziyade, sermaye sınıfının sistem içindeki yerini ve sınıfsal çıkarlarının nasıl şekillendiğini incelemeye odaklanır. Anadolu sermayesinin ekonomik görünümünde, ilkel birikim süreçleri ile ekonomik örgütlenmelerinin incelemesi yapılacaktır. Anadolu sermayesinin siyasal görünümünde ise Necmettin Erbakan'ın Milli Görüş hareketi ele alınacak, işlevsel bir ideoloji olarak Milli Görüş'ün ekonomik ve toplumsal rolü üzerinde durulacaktır.

Bu çalışmada hem birincil hem de ikincil nitelikteki materyallerden yararlanılmıştır. Birincil kaynaklar arasında dönemin sanayi istatistikleri, seçim anket sonuçları, Milli Görüş hareketinin temel kitapçıkları, Milli Görüş partilerinin program ve tüzükleri ile Erbakan'ın konuşmaları yer almaktadır. Bu belgeler hem Anadolu sermayesinin ortaya çıktığı koşulları hem de siyasallaşma sürecini gözlemlemeyi mümkün kılmaktadır. İkincil kaynaklar ise Türkiye'nin kapitalistleşme sürecini, sermaye fraksiyonlarını ve onların farklılaşmalarını ile İslamcı siyasal hareketi toplumsal tabanıyla beraber inceleyen akademik çalışmalar ve makalelerden oluşmaktadır.

Bu çerçevede çalışma, iki temel yöntemsel adım üzerine kurulmuştur. İlk olarak, tarihsel inceleme aracılığıyla Osmanlı'dan kapitalizme geçiş süreci ve 1980'e kadar uzanan sosyo-ekonomik dönüşüm, Anadolu sermayesinin ortaya çıkışını mümkün kılan yapısal koşullar bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. İkinci olarak, yapısal çözümleme yoluyla Anadolu sermayesinin siyasal temsil arayışları ve bu süreçte Milli Görüş hareketiyle kurduğu ilişkiler incelenmektedir. İdeolojik boyut ise bağımsız bir söylem analizi yöntemiyle değil, hareketin temel metinleri ve programları üzerinden, tarihsel materyalist çerçevede işlevsel bir değerlendirmeyle ele alınmaktadır.

Bu çalışma giriş ve sonuç bölümlerinin dışında üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Girişten sonra başlayan İkinci bölümde Osmanlı'dan Türkiye'ye kapitalistleşme bağlamında sosyo-ekonomik bir inceleme yapılması amaçlanmıştır. Buna göre, Türkiye'de kapitalizmin gelişim süreci, Batılı örneklerinden farklı bir seyir izlemiştir. Osmanlı toplum yapısına Asyatik üretim tarzı tartışmaları bağlamında bakıldığında, sermaye sınıflarının Batının aksine geç ve organik olmayan biçimde geliştiğini söylemek mümkündür. Nitekim bundaki en temel neden, merkezi devlet aygıtının toplumun neredeyse tamamı üzerindeki mutlak hakimiyetidir. Buna göre devlet, artı-ürünü denetleyen ve topraktaki özel mülkiyetin tekeli elinde bulunduran bir konumdadır. Dolayısıyla bu durum toplumdaki iş bölümünün gelişmemesinin ve metalaşmanın neredeyse hiç olmadığı bir toplum yapısına işaret etmektedir. Ayrıca, işbölümünün gelişmemesi temelde sınıfların nesnel bir kategori olarak ortaya çıkmasını da engellemiştir.

Bu açıdan, Osmanlı toplum yapısı içinde burjuvazi Batılı örneklerinden farklı olarak daha geç bir dönemde devlet müdahaleleri ve dışsal dinamiklerle şekillenen bir sınıf olmuştur. Toplumdaki bu gecikme hem sermaye birikimini hem de burjuvazinin toplumsal yapıyı dönüştürücü gücünü kısıtlamıştır. Nitekim, Türkiye'de kapitalist üretim tarzına geçiş diyalektiğinde burjuvazi sınıfı yerine merkezi devlet aygıtı içinden çıkan bürokrasi başat rol oynamıştır. Sonuç olarak, Osmanlı'nın son dönemlerindeki reformlarında ve Cumhuriyet'i kuran kadroların toplumun altyapı ve üstyapısına içkin köklü değişikliklerinde büyük ölçüde bürokrasinin izlerini görmek mümkündür. Bu gelişen güçlü bürokrasinin Cumhuriyet sonrası kapitalist ilişkilerde merkezi rolde yer aldığını belirtmek önemlidir. Nitekim 1923 yılından 1946 arası döneme kadarki Tek Parti döneminde güçlü bir bürokrasinin varlığı söz konusudur. Aynı Bürokrasi 1950

yılında iktidara gelen Demokrat Parti tarafından dışlanmış, 1960 darbesi sonrasında yeni hegemonik blokun asli unsuru haline gelmiştir. Bu açıdan, Türkiye’de kapitalizmin gelişmesi ve derinleşmesi süreçlerinde bürokrasinin yadsınamaz rolünü vurgulamak gerekmektedir.

Üçüncü bölümde ise Anadolu sermayesi ve onun siyasal temsil arayışlarının sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan Milli Görüş hareketi incelenmiştir. Anadolu sermayesinin ortaya çıkışı 1960’lar Türkiye’sinin ekonomik ve siyasal koşullarında gerçekleşmiştir. 1960 darbesinin hemen ardından 1961 yılında yapılan yeni Anayasa ile beraber, ekonomik, siyasal ve ideolojik alanlar bürokrasi ve burjuvazi lehine yeniden düzenlendi. Bu yeni yapılanmanın başat aktörleri, bürokrasi, ordu ve sanayi sermayesi olmuştur. Sermaye birikim stratejisi olarak ithal ikameci birikim modeli benimsenen Türkiye’de, 1960’lı yılların sonlarından itibaren bir birikim rejimi krizi yaşamaya başlamış, bu da sosyo-politik yapıyı ve bölüşüm ilişkilerini derinden etkilemiştir. Dönemin hegemonik iktidar bloğunun parçası da olan büyük burjuvazinin belirli bir gelişim aşamasında artan talepleri karşısında, İslami referanslarla hareket eden taşra ve kasabalı küçük üreticiler ve tüccarlar bir muhalefet grubu olarak ortaya çıkarak birikim ve bölüşüm politikalarından duydukları hoşnutsuzluklarını siyasal alandaki temsilcileri aracılığıyla duyurmaya başlamışlardır.

Anadolu sermayesinin siyasallaşma süreci Necmettin Erbakan önderliğinde gerçekleşmiştir. Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği içinde genel sekreterlik ve genel başkanlık görevlerinde bulunan Erbakan, Anadolu sermayesinin talep ve çıkarlarını siyasal alana taşıyan bir aktör olmuştur. O dönemde iktidarda olan Adalet Partisini İstanbul sermayesini kayırmakla suçlayan Erbakan’a göre, bu sermaye grubu “komprador-Mason” azınlıklardı. Bu açıdan, Batı-Yahudi-mason kavramları, yazılı olsun ya da olmasın Milli Görüş hareketinin siyasal ve ekonomik ilişkilerinde merkezi bir roldeydi. Erbakan siyasetinde bu kavramlar hem kitle mobilizasyonu açısından hem de ekonomik olarak kendini destekleyen sermayenin, yani Anadolu sermayesinin meşruiyetini sağlayan bir enstrüman görevi görüyordu. Nitekim dördüncü bölümde ele alındığı üzere, Erbakan siyasetini Batı paradigmasına ve Avrupa Ortak Pazarı’na karşıtlık üzerinden kurmuştu. Dolayısıyla Cumhuriyet’in kuruluşundaki Batıcı, laik söylem etrafında şekillenen İstanbul sermayesi ve Kemalist paradigmadan kopmayan

Adalet Partisi, Erbakan'ın siyasal açıdan eleştirel söyleminin doğrudan muhatabı olmuşlardı.

Bu dönem yaşanan siyasi gerilimler nedeniyle Erbakan'ın Odalar Birliğinden ayrılarak 1969'da Konya bağımsız milletvekili olarak siyasal alana geçmesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Bağımsız milletvekili seçildikten sonra 1970'de Milli Nizam Partisi'ni kuran Erbakan, bu partisi kısa süre içinde seçimlere giremeden 'laikliğe aykırılık' gerekçesiyle kapatıldı. Ardından 1972 yılında yine Erbakan'ın öncülüğünde Milli Selamet Partisi kurularak siyasal alandaki girişimler sürdürüldü.

Siyasal olarak bakıldığında, MSP'nin ömrü selefi olan MNP'den daha uzun sürdü. MSP, kapatıldığı 16 Ekim 1981 tarihine geçen 8 senenin 7 senesinde aktif olarak mecliste yer aldı. İlk girdiği 1973 genel seçimlerinde % 11.8 oy alarak 48 milletvekili kazanırken; 1977 genel seçimlerinde ise % 8.56 oy alarak 24 milletvekili kazanmıştır. İki seçim arasında oylarda düşüş var gibi görünse de aslında MSP 1977 seçimlerinde yaklaşık 4 bin oy arttırmıştır. 1973 seçimlerinde 1.265.771 oy alan MSP, 1977 seçimlerinde 1.269.918 oy almıştır. Oy oranının yüzdesel olarak azalması, seçmen sayısının ve seçime katılım oranının yükselmesi nedeniyle olmuştur.

Milli Görüş partileri olarak anılan bu partiler aynı zamanda Türkiye'deki ilk kalıcı İslamcı partiler olma özelliğine sahipti. Burada, Türkiye'de çok partili hayata geçişle beraber başka İslamcı-muhafazakar çizgide parti kurma denemelerinin olduğunu da belirtmek gerekiyor. Ancak onlar da kuruluşlarından kısa süreler sonra yine aynı şekilde 'laikliğe aykırılık' gerekçesiyle kapatıldılar.

1973 genel seçimlerinin birinci partisi, oyların %33.3'ünü alan Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi oldu. Ancak CHP'nin aldığı oylar mutlak çoğunluğu sağlamadığı için tek başına hükümet kuramadı. Dolayısıyla o dönemde yoğun bir koalisyon görüşme trafiği yaşandı. Görüşmelerden çıkan sonuç ise şaşırtıcı oldu. Kurulan bu koalisyonun bir yanında Kemalist ideolojiye sahip çıkan, son dönemlerde kendini ortanın solu bir siyasette konumlandıran, laik ve sosyal demokrat değerleri benimseyen CHP, diğer yanında ise İslamcı geleneğin temsilci olan, Batı karşıtı ve anti-laik MSP vardı. Başka bir ifadeyle, taban tabana zıt ideolojilere sahip iki siyasi parti bir araya gelmişti.

CHP-MSP arasında kurulan bu koalisyon kamuoyunda da çokça tartışıldı. Tartışmalar ekseriyetle, Atatürkçü bir parti ile dinci bir partinin nasıl bir araya geldiği üzerinden yapılmaktaydı. Buna karşın, MSP'lilerin odaklandığı yer ise seçimle kazanılan yasama meşruiyetini yürütme düzeyine ilerletebilme fırsatıydı. Nitekim o dönemde pek çok farklı kesimden yorumcunun ortak görüşü, Erbakan'ın devlete-iktidara temas etmeye çalışan oportünist tavrı olduğuydu. Ancak bu tartışmaların yanında, MSP'lilerce yürütülen tartışmanın ayrıca önemli olduğunu vurgulamak gerekiyor. Resmi olarak hükümet ortaklığını doğuran bu koalisyon, aynı zamanda siyasallaşan İslamcılığın meşruiyetinin ve devletle kurulan ilişkinin göstergesiydi.

1973 seçimlerinin esas tartışmalarından birisi de din-siyaset ilişkisiydi. Toplumdaki dindar kesim, 1973 seçimlerine kadar sağ partiler içerisinde yer aldılar. Bu döneme kadar kalıcı bir İslamcı bir partinin olmamasından dolayı 1973 seçimleri dini çağrıların İslamcı ve muhafazakar seçmen kitleler üzerindeki etkisinin ölçülmesi mümkün olmuştur. Bu açıdan, 1973 genel seçimlerinde meclise girmeyi başaran MSP, aynı zamanda “sessiz Müslüman çoğunluğun” partisi olarak dini çıkarların siyaset sahnesinde geçerli ve kabul edilebilir bir nitelik kazanmasını sağlamıştır.

CHP ile MSP, siyasal gelenekleri ve ideolojik yönelimleri bakımından birbirine zıt konumlarda bulunmalarına rağmen, temel hak ve özgürlüklerin güvence altına alınması, karma ekonomi anlayışının sürdürülmesi ve ekonomik kalkınmanın toplumsal adaletle bütünleştirilmesi gibi başlıklarda ortak bir zeminde buluşmuş; ayrıca her iki parti de büyük sermayenin ekonomi ve toplum üzerindeki belirleyici etkisine karşı benzer bir eleştirel tutum geliştirmiştir. Ne var ki Batı'nın ekonomik ve kültürel hâkimiyetine yönelik eleştiriler ile büyük sermayeye karşı ortak muhalefet, bu iki partiyi uzun vadede bir arada tutmaya yetmemiştir. Esasen pragmatik, hatta yer yer fırsatçı saiklerle şekillenen bu ittifak, yapısal bir temele dayanmadığından, nihayetinde başarısızlığa uğraması kaçınılmaz olmuştur.

MSP'nin diğer koalisyon deneyimleri ise 1975'de kurulan Birinci Milliyetçi Cephe koalisyonu ve 1977'de kurulan İkinci Milliyetçi Cephe koalisyonları oldu. Birinci koalisyonda, Adalet Partisi, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi ve Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi yer alırken, ikinci koalisyonda Adalet Partisi ve Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi yer almış, ancak düşük oy aldığı için Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi yer almamıştır. Merkez sağ ve

milliyetçi ideolojik konuma sahip olan bu partilere İslamcı bir parti olarak MSP de katıldı. Milliyetçi Cephe hükümetlerini yalnızca parlamentodaki aritmetik dengelerin ürünü bir koalisyon olarak değil, aynı zamanda ideolojik bir ittifak olarak değerlendirmek gerekir; zira özellikle Adalet Partisi seçmeninin diğer koalisyon partileriyle ilişkisi, basit bir ideolojik yakınlığın ötesine geçerek organik bağlara dayanmaktadır.

Buna göre, bu bölümde aynı zamanda Anadolu sermayesinin siyasal temsil arayışlarının sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan Milli Görüş hareketi incelenmiştir. Bu açıdan, bölüm hem ekonomik bir aktör olarak Anadolu sermayesinin belirginleşmesini sağlayan nedenleri, hem de bu nedenlerin İslamcı bir siyasal-ideolojik formasyonun oluşumuna etkisini ele almaktadır. Devamında, bu siyasal-ideolojik formasyonun ortaya çıkışındaki sınıfsal ve toplumsal dinamiklerin incelemesi yapılmıştır.

Dördüncü bölümde, Milli Görüş ideolojisinin yapısal bir incelemesi yapılmıştır. Buna göre, Milli Görüş ideolojisinin ekonomik ve toplumsal boyutları tartışılmıştır. Tarihsel materyalist bir perspektiften bakıldığında, Milli Görüş yalnızca Anadolu sermayesini temsil eden siyasal hareketi değil aynı zamanda yeni sermaye birikim alanlarını meşrulaştıran ve toplumdaki kitleleri İslamcı bir siyasal özne olarak üreten bir ideolojik formasyon olarak çıkmıştır. Dolayısıyla, Milli Görüş ideolojisinin burada Anadolu sermayesi ve İslamcı hareketin mobilizasyonu olmak üzere işlevsel iki yönü ele tartışılmıştır. Bunlardan ilki, Milli Görüş ideolojisinin 1980 öncesi dönemde İslamcı siyasal özne yaratma işlevidir. Bu açıdan bölümde, İslamcı öznenin inşası süreci, Althusser'in 'çağırma' (interpellation) kavramı çerçevesinde ele alınmış ve ideolojik aygıtların bireyleri belirli bir kimlik ve aidiyet etrafında özneleştirme biçimleri tartışılmıştır.

Erbakan Milli Görüş ideolojisini dönemin liberal ve komünist ideolojilerinin dışında konumlandırarak üçüncü ama mutlak doğru bir yol göstermiştir. Bu açıdan, hem liberalizm hem de komünizm maddi temele dayanan ve manevi yanı eksik olan iki ideoloji olarak düşmanlaştırılır. Buna karşın, Milli Görüş ideolojisi ise maddi ve manevi kalkınmanın bir arada olduğu, ikisinin birbirini tanımladığı ve toplumun kalkınmasının gerçek reçetesidir. Nitekim, Erbakan siyasal propagandasını da

dönemin iki büyük siyasi partisi olan Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ve Adalet Partisini bu ideolojilerle özdeşleştirerek yapmıştır.

Milli Görüş ideolojisinin İslamcı özne yaratma işlevi Erbakan'ın geçmişin ihyasına dayanan şerefli bir millet retoriği başlamaktadır. Onun millet kavrayışı salt bir sosyolojik topluluğun ötesinde ontolojik açıdan ayrıcalıklı bir kavrayıştır. Buna göre, millet İslami sorumluluğun taşıyıcısı, temsilcisi ve yeryüzündeki tezahürünü üstlenen bir özne olarak görülür. Erbakan İslamiyet'in çıktığı dönem ile Osmanlı dönemi arasını bağlayarak bir hat kurmakta ve Türklerin gelişmelerini de Osmanlı'nın dindar toplum yapısında görmektedir. Ona göre, Cumhuriyetle beraber Batı paradigmalarına geçilmesi Türkiye'ye yapılmış en büyük kötülük, teslimiyet ve bir kayıptır. Dolayısıyla Erbakan tarihin ihyasına dayanarak yeniden İslam merkezli bir toplum yapısını referans göstermekteydi. Nitekim onun bu söylemi toplumdaki İslamcı-muhafazakar kesimleri gündelik taleplerini dini bir çerçevede siyasal mücadeleye dönüştürme imkanı verdi. Bu açıdan Milli Görüş, toplumdaki İslamcı-muhafazakar kesimleri siyasal bir özne olarak mobilize eden ideolojik bir formasyon işlevi gördü.

Ayrıca bölümde Milli Görüş ideolojisinin kendini meşrulaştırma stratejileri üzerinde de duruldu. Burada teorik çerçeve Gramsci ve Eagleton kavramı aracılığıyla ele alındı. Nitekim, Erbakan ve onun Milli Görüş ideolojisini her şeyden önce mevcut hegemonyaya karşı bir hegemonya girişimi olarak okumak mümkündür.

Milli Görüş ideolojisinin bir diğer işlevselliği ise Anadolu sermayesinin genişlemesi ve Anadolu'da Müslüman burjuvazi oluşumunu sağlayacak stratejilerdir. Buna göre, Anadolu sermayesinin yükselişi ile İslamcı ideolojinin karşı-hegemonya girişimi diyalektik bir karakter göstermektedir. Buna açıdan, bir sermaye fraksiyonu olarak Anadolu sermayesinin yükselişi, İslamcı ideolojinin toplumsal taban bulmasında maddi bir zemin sağlamıştır. Anadolu sermayesi yükseldikçe Milli Görüş ideoloji altında İslamcılık da bu sermaye fraksiyonunun çıkarlarını meşrulaştırarak onun siyasal temsilini mümkün kılmıştır. Anadolu sermayesi ile İslamcılık arasındaki bu diyalektik bağ sermaye-ideoloji ilişkisindeki karşılıklılığın somut bir göstergesidir.

Milli Görüş esasen çok kapsamlı olmayan ancak mevcut hegemonik yapılanmaya karşı alternatif sermaye birikim stratejileri önermiştir. Bu açıdan Milli Görüş'ün sermaye ile ilişkisinin iki boyutu üzerinde durulmuştur. Bunlardan ilki siyasal temsilciliğini

üstlendiği Anadolu sermayesidir. Anadolu sermayesiyle ifade edilen İstanbul'un dışındaki şehirlerde bulunan daha çok taşralı küçük ve orta ölçekli üretici ve esnaf kesiminden oluşmaktaydı. Nitekim bu kesimin çıkar ve talepleri Erbakan'da karşılık bulmuştu. Bu açıdan, durumu Anadolu sermayesi ile Erbakan'ın karşılaşması ya da buluşması olarak ele almak mümkündür.

Milli Görüş'ün sermayeye içkin olarak ikinci boyutu ise bir sermaye ve Müslüman burjuva yaratma girişimidir. Bunun için Erbakan'ın kalkınma projeleri önemli bir girişimdi. Milli Görüş'e göre maddi kalkınma, Anadolu'nun kalkınması, sanayileşme ve ağır sanayi konuları iç içe geçmiş olup, bunların ortalama olarak devlet kapitalizmine benzer bir modelle kurulması önerilmektedir. Buna göre, bölge planlama esasına göre yapılandırılan Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, kalkınma ve sanayileşme için gerekli plan ve projeleri hazırlayacaktır. Belirlenen bölgedeki işçi, köylü, tüccar, esnaf gibi farklı kesimler bir araya gelerek burada ortak olacaklardır. Devlet, gerekli altyapıyı bedelsiz veya çok düşük bir maliyetle kuracak ve ayrıca gerekli faizsiz kredi desteğini sağlayacaktır. Ara kademelerde teknik ve mali konularla ilgilenecek bürolar kurulacaktır. İşletme açılıp kâr etmeye başlayınca devlete olan borç kapatılacak ve işletme ortaklarda kalacaktır. Böylece Bölgesel Kalkınma Şirketleri ve çok hissedarlı işletmeler ortaya çıkacak ve bunlar ya devlet ve özel sektör olarak birlikte ya da özel sektör olarak bağımsız olarak üretim yapabileceklerdir.

Milli Görüş, Türkiye'nin kalkınma ve sanayileşme politikasını besleyecek şekilde tabandan gelen kitleleri hissedar olmaya çağırmıştır. Kooperatif sistemine benzeyen bu modelde, işçi, köylü, emekçi ve tüccar ve esnaftan oluşan küçük burjuvazi de dahil olmak üzere her Türk vatandaşı hissedar olabilmiştir. Bu sisteme karşılık hissedarlara ücret ve kârdan pay ödenmesini öneriyordu. Buna göre Milli Görüş, bir yandan emeği sermaye ilişkilerine bağlayarak onu hissedarlık yoluyla küçük mülk sahibi yaparak, diğer yandan da hızlı sanayileşme için sermaye sağlayarak kalkınma stratejisini hızlandırmayı amaçlıyordu.

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