THE WAXING OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM
CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

THE WAXING OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM
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This thesis studies the waxing of religious nationalism through the case study of Pakistan and questions how religious nationalism forms and endures *after* a nation-state is formed. For this purpose, the study primarily focuses on the domestic environment and argues that religious nationalism waxes when domestic religious frontiers and threats are combined and securitized by the political elites for the masses, which ultimately influence the identity of the nation. Based on qualitative analysis of primary documents such as speeches, journals, parliamentary debates and special committee proceedings and on a close scrutiny of three historical moments, namely the Objectives Resolution of 1949, declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims through the second amendment in1974 and Islamization under Zia-ul-Haq's regime, this thesis establishes how domestic religious frontiers were constructed and the ensuing perceived threats were securitized. The findings of the study demonstrate that domestic religious frontiers were instrumental in creating a threat perception to the Muslim identity in Pakistan. It also explains that there can be more than one religious frontier simultaneously and that an external religious frontier can be used to magnify a domestic religious frontier. The central argument of the thesis is that in an ideological state, the religious frontiers and the perceived threats are open to interpretation by the political leaders that lead to waxing of religious nationalism.

Keywords: Religion, Nationalism, Religious Nationalism, Pakistan, South Asia

ÖZ

DİNİ MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİN YÜKSELIŞI
PAKİSTAN ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tez, Pakistan örneği üzerinden dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişini incelemekte ve bir ulus-devlet kurulduktan sonra dini milliyetçiliğin nasıl oluştuğunu ve devam ettiğini sorgulamaktadır. Bu amaçla, çalışma öncelikle iç ortama odaklanmakta ve iç dini sınırlar ve tehditler siyasi elitler tarafından kitleler için birleştirilip güvenlikleştirildiğinde dini milliyetçiliğin yükseldiğini ve bunun da nihayetinde ulusun kimliğini etkilediğini savunmaktadır. Konuşmalar, günlükler, parlamento tartışmaları ve özel komisyon tutanakları gibi birincil belgelerin niteliksel analizine ve 1949 Objectives Resolution (Hedefler Kararı), 1974'teki ikinci değişiklikle Ahmedilerin gayrimüslim ilan edilmesi ve Ziya-ül Hak rejimi (1977-1989) altında İslamlaştırma olmak üzere üç tarihsel anın yakından incelenmesine dayanan bu tez, ülke içindeki dini sınırların nasıl inşa edildiğini ve bunun sonucunda algılanan tehditlerin nasıl güvenlikleştirildiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışmanın bulguları, iç dini sınırların Pakistan'daki Müslüman kimliğine yönelik bir tehdit algısı yaratmada etkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Ayrıca, aynı anda birden fazla dini sınır olabileceği ve bir dış dini sınırın bir iç dini sınırı büyütmek için kullanılabileceği açıklanmaktadır. Tezin temel argümanı, ideolojik bir devlette dini sınırların ve algılanan tehditlerin siyasi liderler tarafından yorumlanmaya açık olduğu ve bunun da dini milliyetçiliğin yükselmesine yol açtığıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Din, Milliyetçilik, Dini Milliyetçilik, Pakistan, Güney Asya

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIML	All India Muslim League
ALP	Awami League Party
AG	Attorney General
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
INC	Indian National Congress
JUI	Jamiat e Ulema e Islam
JUP	Jamiat e Ulema e Pakistan
MRD	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PCO	Provisional Constitutional Order
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PNC	Pakistan National Congress
PPP	Pakistan Peoples' Party
OR	Objectives Resolution
RCO	Revival of the Constitution Order
RTC	Round Table Conference
USA	United States of America

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This thesis examines the relationship between religion and nationalism. It argues that religious nationalism is one result of this interaction. In order to explain this relation, the study focuses on the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan. The case study builds its foundation by analyzing the political conditions of the Muslims from the year 1857 uptil 1947 by focusing on three Muslim leaders: Syed Ahmed Khan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Maulana Maududi. The central argument is further built on this foundation by focusing on three historical events after Pakistan gained independence in 1947-the Objectives Resolution (OR) 1949, Second Constitutional Amendment of 1974 and General Zia-ul-Haq's era (1977-1989). The research is novel because it departs from mainstream explanations of religious nationalism based on structural reasoning, external circumstances, and foreign pressures. Instead, it investigates how domestic pressures contributed to the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan and how this, in turn, shaped the country's national identity.

These aspects are significant as they shed light on an important aspect of religious nationalism and nationalism more broadly: the endurance of religious nationalism *after* a nation-state is established. The thesis argues that Islam and Muslim identity were integrated into the idea of *Pakistaniyat* by the political and religious leaders through a top down approach in the domestic arena. The passing of each event (re)defined and (re)imagined what it meant to be a Pakistani. Thus, the central hypothesis of this thesis is that religious nationalism waxed in Pakistan after independence due to domestic pressures present in the form of religious frontiers and perceived threats from these frontiers. The thesis asserts that these religious frontiers and the ensuing threats were securitized by political elites and subsequently accepted by the masses. The thesis shows that the formation of religious frontiers and the perceived threats existed before partition and acted as foundations for the later waxing of religious nationalism. This study addresses a critical gap in the literature by demonstrating that domestic pressures, alongside external factors, are vital for understanding the formation and persistence of religious nationalism after nation-state formation. The following section will explain the theoretical framework adopted to explain the waxing of religious nationalism in the case of Pakistan.

This analysis follows Barker's (2009) theory about the formation of religious nationalism but is revised with further assumptions and then reinforced through the idea of "securitization", put forward by Buzan et al (1998). Barker argues that religious nationalism occurs where not only do religious frontiers intersect externally but also when perceived threats arise from the same frontiers. For Barker, only those religious frontiers that pose the ultimate threat of subjugation or the perception of annihilation are significant. Moreover, his work focuses on case studies of Ireland, Poland and Greece that analyze religious frontiers in the external arena with a single religious frontier and threat structure. However, Barker left several questions unanswered: Can there be domestic religious frontiers and threats in a state? Can there be multiple religious frontiers and threats simultaneously? If so, can these multiple frontiers and threats be combined into a single threat? How a single religious frontier and the ensuing threats made it primary? Can the external and domestic religious frontiers be combined to amplify the threat to the nation? What is the mechanism of prioritizing a specific religious frontier and threat over the other? This thesis attempts to answer these questions by making a number of changes to Barker's theory and combining it with the securitization thesis. The assumptions and mechanisms adopted for this study are discussed below. Moreover, this thesis moves beyond the European scope of nationalism and religious nationalism studies with Pakistan as a case study. By focusing on primary sources such as speeches and parliamentary debates of Pakistan's political leaders, this study contributes a South Asian case of religious nationalism to the field.

Religion and nationalism are both powerful social forces. While the former shuns the material world and idealizes a transcendental world, the latter speaks to and from within the material world. However, both are deeply rooted in the present world to derive any meaningful connection. It is worthwhile to understand how this study conceptualizes religion, nationalism and nations. This will help us better understand the literature discussing the significance of the relationship between religion and nationalism.

Religion, long brushed aside owing to the popularity of secularization thesis has returned from exile (Hatzopoulos & Petito, 2003) to the field of nationalism studies and International Relations (IR). Religion carries different meanings for different people depending on their social, economic, political, cultural, and historical context as it is a marker of identity as well as a set of belief. Peter Berger distinguishes between functional and substantive definitions of religion (Berger, 1974). Functional definition views religion "in terms of its social or psychological functions" while the substantive definition focuses on "the believed content" (ibid, p.125). This thesis will undertake the functionalist understanding of religion to explain

the waxing of religious nationalism. The reasons for this choice are explained further. First, to use Berger's words, "the gods are not empirically available", in such a case, it is relevant to see the social and psychological functions of religion. Second, the struggle for Pakistan was based on two understandings of religion, the first, as adopted by the All India Muslim League (AIML) under Jinnah, was functionalist in nature. The Muslims of undivided India wanted a separate homeland away from Hindu domination. The AIML was not focused on how the beliefs or practices of Muslims contradicted those of Hindus; neither did they portray the struggle as a monotheist religion-Islam-challenged by an idolatrous religion-Hinduism. This understanding, this thesis claims, continued even after partition and it was only during Zia-ul-Haq's era that religion was viewed in its substantive perspective. Continuing in parallel was the second understanding of ulema, which was of substantive nature. The ulema wanted implementation of the sharia in the new homeland for Muslims. Communal identities, apart from obvious differences, were further reinforced by manipulation of religion or religious sentiments by the elite. Third, defining religion as a marker of identity explains the post partition era of Pakistan better as the political leadership of Muslims emphasized the distinctiveness of Muslims based on Islam which encompassed political, economic, social and cultural aspects. As such the implementation of sharia was not on the agenda of political leadership. The thesis contends that this identity was interpreted and reinterpreted over the years leading to the waxing of religious nationalism. Hence, religion for the purpose of this study is defined in a functional perspective, functioning as a marker of identity, an identity which was perceived of paramount importance for the Muslims of India and later Pakistan. This identity marker was (re)interpreted to construct religious frontiers and perceived threats that led to the waxing of religious nationalism.

Before moving on to discussion of the literature, it is worthwhile to explain how this study conceptualizes nations and nationalism. What follows are the working definitions for both concepts. There exist contesting positions on what constitutes a nation. Moreover, there is a debate surrounding the origins of nations: Hastings views nations and nationalism having European and Judeo-Christian roots (Hastings, 1997), while some view nations as a modern phenomenon (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983), and some argued for nations having ethnic origins (Smith, 1986) while others questioned whether nations preceded nationalism (Armstrong, 1982) or vice versa. Out of these many explanations for the origin of nation and nationalism, this thesis will adopt a modernist understanding of these concepts as explained below.

A modernist view of the nation as propagated by Anderson merits attention here. Anderson defines a nation as "an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991). This understanding of a nation as something imagined is closer in proximity to the position taken by this study. For instance, Muslim Indians of undivided India were a community living alongside Hindu Indians but this changed after the War of Independence of 1857. Muslims felt marginalized in comparison to their Hindu counter-parts due to British policies. This broadly led to the imagination of Muslims as a separate nation. In addition, the strength of this definition is that it dovetails with the theoretical framework propagated in this thesis. Muslim identity, it is contended, was imagined and led to the creation of Pakistan. After partition, the Pakistan identity was reimagined which explains the "othering" of non-Muslims and minorities (Triandafyllidou, 1998). Thus, this thesis follows Anderson's definition of nation.

The literature on nationalism is teeming with definitions of this concept. It can be argued that nationalism at its broadest understanding is an order-creating ideology (Greenfeld, 1996; Juergensmeyer, 1996), one that can be compared to religion. While nationalism has been viewed as a religion (Hayes, 1960), a political principle (Gellner, 1983) and group identity defined in terms of political, ethnic, or cultural identities, associations, and attachments (Omer & Springs, 2013), however, the position closest to the understanding of nationalism for this study is put forward by Anthony Smith. Smith following an ethnosymbolist approach defines nationalism as "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members deem it to constitute an actualor potential 'nation"(Smith, 2000, p. 796). This definition of nationalism synchronizes with the understanding of religion and nation as discussed above. Additionally, it complements the theoretical framework of religious frontiers adopted for this thesis. It was because the unity and identity of the Muslims and laterPakistanis was threatened that religious frontiers were imagined and fortified.

1.2 The State of the Field in the Study of Religion and Nationalism:

This study claims that religion did not wither away as claimed by the secularization thesis, which prophesied that modernization entails the sidelining, undermining and privatization of religion (Wilson, 1966). While the secularization thesis in social science largely ignored religion, the recent scholarship increasingly has taken an interest in explaining this relationship. Events such as the Isalmic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and collapse of communism coupled with the wave of decolonization which left behind mostly nation-states based on national identities fused with religion as a significant component questioned the

modernity undermining religion argument to the extent that the claim of religion's demise was not only challenged but also convinced academics to argue in favour of jettisoning the idea of secularization (Stark, 1999). Religion, it can be observed, is relegated to the sidelines in nationalism studies. Moreover, religion is seen as transcendental while nationalism is considered a secular phenomenon, finding meaning in this world. This is line with the secularization thesis which not only implies the privatization of religion but also the fading away of religious identification giving way to secular identities based on nationalism (Mentzel, 2020).

The purpose of this literature is to illuminate the theme of religion's "return from exile" in social sciences with specific focus on the relationship between religion and nationalism. Firstly, it will highlightthe shortcoming of the major theories of nationalism that is marginalization of religion as a relic of the past. Secondly, this review will scrutinize scholarly studies that view nationalism as religion (Hayes, 1960; A. D. Smith, 2000; Stevens, 1997). The literature also looks into the numerous reasons for the rise of religious nationalism. Finally, the review hopes to bring to light the gap in the literature. The gap which this study aims to fulfill follows. First, the scholarly works, though significant for their contributions to understanding religious nationalism emphasize, the rise of religious nationalism rather than its waxing that is how religious nationalism evolves *after* its rise. Second, they treat the rise and continuity of religious nationalism as a reactionary phenomenon, as a byproduct of systematic features alone such as globalization and conflict, ignoring the internal or domestic perspective of a nation. While external circumstances do play a significant role in the rise of religious nationalism, this thesis tries to show how religious nationalism waxes after its rise, that the triggers for its waxing behavior are not systematic alone but also domestic in nature.

Various scholars have attempted to elaborate the relationship between religion and nationalism from different perspectives and have highlighted various ways in which religion and nationalism interact (Aktürk, 2021; Brubaker, 2012; Rieffer, 2003); One of them is the concept of religious nationalism. Religious nationalism has received scholarly attention primarily because of the existence of a religious type of nationalism which challenged the secular foundations of nationalism. Many a scholar have attempted to define religious nationalism; Greenfeld asserts that religious nationalism is not a distinct kind of nationalism (Greenfeld, 1996) whereas Brubaker argues that it is distinct (Brubaker, 2012). Rieffer views religious nationalism as the fusion of religion and nationalism such that both are inseparable (Rieffer, 2003) and Anna Grzymala builds on Rieffer's understanding by claiming that "it is

the fusion of religion, national identities and goals (Grzymala-Busse, 2019). Here, Grzymala drops the claim of inseparability and introduces national identities and goals. This fusion oriented understanding of religious nationalism, however, does not mean that nationalism turns into a religion or a substitute for one. Barker expands this definition by emphasizing that religious nationalism is "religious identity and political religion (or public religion) combined into political objectives of self-rule" (Barker, 2009, p. 15).

Ernest Gellner, in his foundational work *Nations and Nationalism* (Gellner, 1983), takes on a modernist approach in explaining the origins of nationalism. His work, mostly silent on the relationship between religion and nationalism, attributes the rise of nationalism to economic factors, specifically late 18th and 19th century industrialization. He claims that it was in response to the rise of the industrial stage that nationalism emerged. In order to meet the need for homogeneity of the industrial stage, the state was used as a tool to create this standardization among the masses. The industrializing state created a common culture which was accomplished by mass education and a standard language. For Gellner, in this industrialization process, the high culture is imposed on lower cultures (ibid, p.35). Thus, Gellner argues that this industrialization aided by the sharing of a common language and high culture, led to the development of nationalism.

While Gellner attributed the rise of nationalism to the need for cultural homogenization of industrialization, Benedict Anderson, in his *Imagined Communities* explains the rise of nationalism with the spread of vernacular languages coupled with print capitalism (Anderson, 1991). Defining the nation as an "an imagined political community, imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (ibid, p.6), Anderson sticks to the modernist argument.

However, owing to his modernist explanation of nationalism and in line with the secularization thesis, he does acknowledge the eighteenth century as the "dawn of age of nationalism but the dusk of religious modes of thought" (ibid, p.11). He also attributes the rise of nationalism to the translation of the Bible from Latin to vernacular languages aided by the expansion of print-capitalism. This transformation, Anderson believed, "exemplified a larger process in which the sacred communities integrated by old sacred languages were gradually fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized" (ibid, p.19). But he is quick to refute the claim that nationalism only arose because of the erosion of religious beliefs. Nevertheless, Anderson does leave a door open considering the possibility where religion and nationalism can merge. He argues that nationalism is capable of being transplanted to a variety of social terrains and that this will enable it to interact with various ideologies (ibid, p.4); religion being one such ideology capable of interacting with nationalism.

On the other hand there is a strand of literature that views nationalism as religion. Scholars arguing for this understanding of nationalism identify various reasons for it. Carlton Hayes in his *Nationalism: A Religion* (Hayes, 1960) while citing Western religious examples, opines that people have always carried a "religious sense" (ibid, p.11) without which life was unthinkable.

This religious sense in his view was in decline and was later replaced by communism and nationalism. Hayes concedes that there are other ways of viewing the relationship between religion and nationalism, one of which is "nationalism as a religion". It is interesting to see that Hayes argues that "nationalism may be a paramount, a supreme loyalty, commanding all others. This usually occurs when national emotion is fused with religious emotion and nationalism itself becomes a religion or a substitute of religion" (ibid, p.10) but authors such as Grzymala-Busse, (2019) and Rieffer (2003) see religious nationalism as a fusion of religion and nationalism and not how nationalism becomes religion or substitutes it. Hayes makes a poignant insight that there are "degrees of nationalism, as of any emotion" (ibid, p.10). Thus, if there are degrees of nationalism and if nationalism fuses with religion, we can conclude that there are various degrees of religious nationalism. It further signals that religious nationalism waxes or wanes over time.

Stevens, on the other hand, takes a contrasting position in viewing nationalism as religion by introducing violence and conflict in the discussion. Building on the work of Ernest Gellner, Stevens gives the examples of the French and Russian Revolutions and argues that nationalism is a new form of religion (Stevens, 1997). He adopts René Girard's understanding of religion as "loss of difference leading to violence and that community, with its order and differences, is created through the successful driving out of the scapegoat". He argues that conflicts unite a society into a cohesive unit or an in-group and simultaneously creates the other or the out-group. This leads to identity crises where the in-group turns on the other through perpetrating violence, the out-group is ostracized as a scapegoat after which peace returns and unites the society. Thus, he argues that the secularization of the society does not mean that religion fades away but reappears in a different form (ibid, p.256) Steven does not explain the reasons as to why one group will spontaneously turn against the other. Second, what if the society does not suffer from an identity crisis even after conflict; in such a scenario, will nationalism still emerge? This is a gap which needs to be addressed. The framework proposed in this thesis aims to bridge this gap.

On the contrary, Smith, defends religion and nationalism against the pessimism of arguments based on the violent nature of nationalism (Smith, 2000). He contends that if we adopt a

functionalist understanding of religion in line with Durkheim, we may "see in nationalism a particular form of political religion" (ibid, p. 792) in contention with traditional religions. This contention further leads to conflicts of interests in politics. Thus, according to Smith, a nation with sacred qualities may contribute to the stability or instability of the international order (ibid, p.792). In doing so, he rejects the modernist origins of nationalism and instead argues that nationalism in its modern form is actually indebted to ethnies, traditions including religion for its variations and ingredients (ibid, p.810). For Smith, the origins of nationalism, nation and national identity lie in the "in the sacred properties of ethnic communities (or ethnies) and their social uses" (ibid, p.804).

Greenfeld's (1996) work contrasts with those of Carlton, Steven and Smith and cautions against treating nationalism as religion. Looking at whether nationalism is a modern religion, Greenfeld departs from the deterministic modernist understanding that secularization pushed religion to the private sphere. Instead, she argues along Durkheimian line that nationalism sacralizes the secular so that society itself becomes the soul. However, Greenfield does agree that nationalism and religion are functional equivalents as they are order creating systems which allow the interpretation of the world (ibid, p.170).

There is a myriad of studies on how religion and nationalism interact with each other. This push towards explaining the interaction opened up a number of conceptual frameworks for a better understanding of nationalism. Religious nationalism is one such form of interaction which gained impetus under this strand of literature. While the secularization thesis led to a perception of nationalism and religion as mutually exclusive, this understanding was challenged by scholars who looked at the interactions between religion and nationalism. Here, Rieffer (2003) argues similarly to Smith (2000) that "a proper understanding of the development of nationalism should incorporate the direct and indirect influences of religion". She points out that in explaining the origins of nationalism, religion has been deliberately ignored in the modernist explanation of nationalism. The author offered three classifications-religious nationalism, instrumental pious nationalism, and secular nationalism- for the relationship between religion and nationalism. She explains the importance of such a relationship and concludes that the type of religious nationalism influences what kind of state will develop. Accordingly, the higher the religious influence, the more discriminatory the ensuing nationalism will be. Rieffer's attempt to provide a systematic understanding of the relation between religion and nationalism is commendable. However, a number of questions need clarification. First, her explanation of instrumental pious nationalism echoes Smith's messianization of politics; Both of them argue that leaders

use religion to sanctify politics; as such it seems a repetition of Smith's position. Second, Reiffer explains Great Britain and Iran as cases of religious nationalism and Russia as instrumental pious nationalism but whether Great Britain can be classified as religious nationalism, she does not explain if a nation can move the two types of nationalisms. For instance if a nation starts off following instrumental pious nationalism, will it move towards religious nationalism or vice versa? And are these the only categories available? This thesis addresses this gap by arguing that nations with religiously infused national identities are not static; they move from one position to another. This movement can be explained by the waxing of religious nationalism. Third, if religion and nationalism are inseparable under religious nationalism, does that mean they are separable under instrumental pious nationalism?

This relationship between religion and nationalism is further explored by Brubaker who also questions secular/religious divide. He identifies four ways of interaction between religion and nationalism: religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena, religion explaining nationalism, religion as part of nationalism, and finally, religious nationalism (Brubaker, 2012). The first approach resembles the narrative of treating nationalism as religion. The second traces the roots of nationalism in religion. The third, considers religion and nationalism being distinct. The fourth describes religious nationalism as a distinct form of nationalism. Nevertheless, Brubaker maintains that "their fundamental ontologies and structures of justification differ" (ibid, p.17); thus, they are two distinct phenomena but they interact with each other and are not mutually exclusive. Grzymala (2019) offers a different perspective. She looks at the relationship between religion and nationalism, claiming that religious and national identities coexist rather than replace each other as touted by secular nationalist understanding. Replicating Brubaker's four possible interactions framework above, she identifies three possible sites of interaction between religion and nationalism: nationalism replacing religion or the secular model, religion complementing nationalism, and third, reinforcing and reifying each other. Finally, she discusses the impact of religious nationalism on religiosity, attitudes towards immigration, public policy and violence.

She argues that religious nationalism should be seen as a spectrum, not as something static and that a nation and its professed religion form an amalgam at different meeting points. If it is an amalgam, then religious practice, often wrongly attributed to higher religious nationalism, is not the sole cause of the latter. Thus, religious nationalism is distinct from religious observance. A similar approach at extrapolating the relationship between religion and nationalism was undertaken by Yıldız & Çengel (2022) who aim to look at what they

call “repertoires of religious nationalism” with special focus on İsmet Özel; a Turkish Islamist, poet and intellectual. Problematizing the study of religious nationalism, this systematic study suggested, similar to Brubaker, six patterns of operationalizing religious nationalism: religio-national identity, exceptionalism, religious territoriality, civilizational othering, sectarianism, and anti-secularism. The interesting part about the work is how İsmet Özel reinterprets the ummah to explain Turkish nationalism. In contrast to the common perception of viewing Islam as having transnational designs in opposition to nationalism, Çengel and Yıldız explain Özel’s point of view as about *daru’l-Islam* (House of Islam) which is based on religion, sharia rule, and opposition to infidels realized by Turks justifying religious territoriality. Such an understanding challenges the transnational ummah narrative and brings nationalism closer at explaining the Muslim varieties of nationalism.

The scholarly work we discussed explains various categories and ways through which religion and nationalism interact. But they do not broach the topic of explaining the endurance of religious nationalism in the post-state formation. Aktürk (2021) raises this point while exploring the relationship between religion and nationalism in his state of the field study. He identifies the shortcomings in the literature and highlights six types of relationship between nationalism and religion: “nationalism as a modern religion in competition with traditional religions; religious origins of the “chosen people”; religious exclusion as nation-building; religious influences on national policies; influence of religious observance on national identification; and religiously based ‘civilizations’ transcending nationalisms. Aktürk argues that these interactions further depend on two conditions: first, “the degree to which the dominant religious tradition is doctrinally supraethnic and institutionally transnational”, and second, “the religious identity of the main adversary in the constitutive conflict that culminated in national statehood” (ibid, p.1).

A similar approach had already been explained by Barker in his *Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for us* (2009), explaining the endurance of religious nationalism in the post-state formation. Barker argues that religious nationalism emerges at religious frontiers coupled with a threat, which continues in the post-state formation period. Aktürk’s approach does not explain how the two conditions lead to the endurance of religious nationalism. This gap is completed by Barker’s approach where the presence of a threat explains why religious nationalism persists after state formation.

Literature explores various reasons explaining the rise of religious nationalism. Juergensmeyer maintains that religious nationalism is a distinct type of nationalism and attributes the rise of religious nationalism to the rise of modern Western culture and secular

nationalism. Linking the rise of religious nationalism to its confrontation with the secular state, Juergensmeyer (1994) maintains the strict secular and religious divide and argues that religious and secular nationalism are competing ideologies. In discussing the worldwide rise of religious nationalism, Juergensmeyer (1996) explains the rise of ideological religious nationalism through a five step cycle: despair over secular nationalism, seeing politics in a religious way, identifying the enemy, the inevitable confrontation, and the goal of peaceful nations. Maintaining this religious and secular divide, Juergensmeyer (2010) focuses on the global rise of religious nationalism and traces its original sin to be the ineffectiveness of secular nationalism in expressing public and moral values. However, he also concedes that contemporary religious politics is the mutant offspring of "old competing ideologies of order-religion and secular nationalism" (ibid, p.272). Thus, religion has the ability to form symbiotic relations with the changing political environment, which explains its resilience. Moreover, religion fills in the vacuum created by the secular order, subsequently enhancing its appeal to the masses and its return from the private realm.

Greenfeld (1996) takes a different stance in explaining the rise of religious nationalism. She maintains that religious nationalism is not a distinct type of nationalism (ibid, p.181), she argues that the reasons for rise of nationalism are the constraints affecting the social groups; these constraints, she maintains, are always of secular nature (ibid, p.182). Nationalism actually emerged when religion held strong roots in the society and not to fill the gap left by a receding religion as touted by the modernist school of nationalism. Hence, Greenfeld refutes that religious nationalism rises because of the marginalization of religion or the propensity of religion to coexist with its surroundings as claimed by Juergensmeyer. For Greenfeld, since religion often is perceived as an inherent attribute of human beings, it can be classified as part of ethnic nationalism.

Juergensmeyer (2019) later offered a structural explanation for the rise of religious nationalism and claimed that the "rise of new forms of religious nationalism is a byproduct of globalization". Sticking to a modernist understanding of religious nationalism, his basic premise was that globalization had weakened the states and their secular national identities. This resulted in a symbiotic relationship between religion and nationalism where the latter was aiding the former to regain its lost glory. This led to the rise of violent ethno-religious movements which aim to consolidate religious national identities. He thus maintains that religious nationalism is one of the responses to globalization and that higher the levels of globalization, higher the religious nationalism in the world. However, a question can be raised: if religion is a tool for the revival of nationalism, can nationalism be also used as a

tool for the revival of religion? Moreover, when globalization was in its nascent stage or nonexistent, what were the conditions explaining religious nationalism at that time?

Lastly, Aktürk (2015) looks into the contradictions of Islamic origins and secular nation building in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan by investigating the causes as to why these three countries have been persistently challenged by Islamist and ethnic separatist movements. His intertemporal comparison, where he divides the history of the three countries into four periods aligns with the division undertaken in the study at hand. His main claim is that Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria faced Islamist and ethnic separatist challenges because of the respective state leaders' turn towards secular nationalism in the post independence period. In retaliation, Islamist and ethnic separatist movements took shape. Taking this insight at face value, one can imagine a link between rising secular nationalism and Islamist challenges as a response to secular nationalism. This argument by Aktürk dovetails with what Juergensmeyer (2019) argued where he views religious nationalism as a response or a byproduct of globalization.

Taking up the case of Hindu nationalism, Annavarapu (2015) argues that not only is religious nationalism a by-product of globalization but it also employs globalization for its intensification. This adds a new dimension to the secular versus religion debate and questions the "modernization leading to marginalization of religion" narrative. Sneha shows that religious nationalism is not in stark opposition to modernity but is actually using it to strengthen its position. This also contrasts with Greenfeld's argument that "religion now exists on the sufferance of nationalism and serves mainly as a tool for the promotion of nationalist ends, not vice versa" (Greenfeld, 1996).

Another reason for the rise of religious nationalism and one adopted by this study is that of religious frontiers and perception of threat emanating from those frontiers (Barker, 2009). Barker argues that two distinct religions form a religious frontier and when one religious group feels threatened by the other, religious identity is formed and crystallized. Where earlier authors such as Juergensmeyer and Aktürk argued that increased secularization leads to increased religious nationalism, Barker does not hold secularization responsible for the increased role of religion. For him, secularization leads to economic development and economically developed states are not threatened in the international system. In case they are threatened, the state will resort to religious mobilization as a quick tool for mobilization.

While the literature explains the rise of religious nationalism through systematic features such as globalization and secularization, there is not much discussion as to the waxing of religious nationalism in post-state formation with Aktürk and Barker being exceptions.

Second, scholarly works often opt for external factors over internal ones in studying the rise and not the waxing of religious nationalism. The inclination towards external factors such as globalization offers a holistic approach, or a one size fits all approach at the expense of internal developments of a nation. Finally, the literature lays great emphasis on the secularization versus religion debate in expalining the formation of religious nationalism leading to state formation and not after state the is formed.This study addresses this gap on three fronts: first, it looks at the waxing of religious nationalism; second, it looks at it from a domestic context; and finally, it observes it from outside the secular versus the religious divide. For this purpose, the following section will discuss the theoretical framework adopted for this study to explain the waxing of religious nationalism.

In order to understand the waxing of religious nationalism in the case of Pakistan's political history, the framework developed by Barker will be utilized. He argues that "modern religious nationalism is shaped by (1) a nation's existence at a religious frontier, and (2) a clear threat from that frontier" (Barker, 2009, p. 44). He maintains that religion plays an important role in identity formation; this happens as Barker understands, at "religious frontiers". As such, religious frontiers are not a novel idea. The division of the world into *Dar ul Harb* (House of War) and *Dar ul Islam* (House of Islam) in Islamic teachings represented such frontiers. Picking up a hint from Gellner, it can be argued that at that time the political and the religious were congruent. Similarly, religious frontiers were observed between the Muslims of India and Hindus of India.

This thesis will employ the concept of religious frontiers as outlined by Barker, however with certain modifications, with each flowing into the next. To begin with, Barker defines religious frontiers as "geographic borders where two regions or peoples, each prominently influenced by a specific and unique religion, come together" (ibid, p.31). This understanding not only ignores the possibility of religious frontiers forming within a unique religion owing to ideological schism such as Shia-Sunni divide but also ties it down to geography. This study, however, contends that religious frontiers are not necessarily physical or visible borders, although they may take up that form, but that religious frontiers are also ideological. As such, religion cannot be contained by geographical borders alone; moreover, ideological frontiers shift easily compared to shifting geographical borders. Second, treating religious frontiers as ideological frontiers better explain the subdivisions of unique religions and the endurance of religious nationalism after state formation. Third, Barker's understanding of religious frontiers as borders between "specific and unique religion" such as Islam and Christianity, Catholics and Protestants or Islam and Hinduism (ibid, p.31) further ignores the

possibility of religious frontiers forming between masses who are attached to a particular religion and those who are not such as between Islam and Communism.

This study will address this shortcoming by assuming the possibility of a religious frontier between the adherents of a particular religion and those of a non-religious ideology. Fourth, Barker considers religious frontiers to be external in nature such as between Catholic Ireland and Protestant Britain or Muslim Pakistan and a Hindu India. This study revises this position and argues that religious frontiers can also be domestic in nature as political leaders often rely on religion to ostracize religious minorities by declaring them as a threat. Last, Barker assumes that these geographic religious frontiers exist naturally and any threat from them is also natural in nature. This study aims to add to this assumption that religious frontiers are not naturally occurring. Moreover, threats from the frontiers are also perceived and securitized for the masses.

The religious frontiers and the threats arising from them are perceived by the political leaders who securitize them through speech act for the masses. This does not mean that such perceived religious frontiers and threats cannot be desecuritized. This study contends that they can be desecuritized but not completely; any securitization of a threat becomes part of the identity of the nation. Thus, for the purpose of this study, religious frontiers will be defined as geographic and/or ideological imagined borders where two regions or peoples, each prominently influenced by either a similar or specific and unique religion or non religious ideology, come together in the domestic or external environment. The domestic environment will help explain how religious frontiers formed within Pakistan which will explain the waxing of religious nationalism.

Religious frontiers are not enough to explain the formation of religious nationalism as "a threat must also emanate from that frontier"(Barker, 2009, p. 34). The threat from a religious frontier plays an important role in identity formation. This study makes a number of revisions over the concept of threat as explained by Barker. First, Barker views threat in a traditional context emphasizing "military security" (ibid, p.38) and explains that threat "will be examined partly on the basis of military capabilities and the potentiality of subjugation, while the context will always be accounted for (ibid, p.38). While he limits the threat to its material and military dimension with space for context, I expand the concept of threat to incorporate its political, economic, cultural and social dimensions. These aspects further fall into Barker's threat as a continuum approach ranging from assimilation to complete annihilation (ibid, p.36) and makes the nature of threat fluid enough to incorporate various nuances to the religious identity. Second, Barker views the threat as external in nature. For

instance in explaining the religious frontier between Ireland and Britian, he argues that the threat to Irish identity of military subjugation was external in nature i.e. Britain, which explains the rise of religious nationalism. This study argues that threats can be internal or domestic in nature. Third, this study not only asserts that there can be multiple threats from external and domestic environments but also that these threats can be combined to alleviate the danger to the nation. Fourth, Barker does not explain how a threat is perceived from a religious frontier. For instance, if a nation faces multiple religious frontiers and threats, how will the particular threatened nation identify the primary threat? This study explains the threat formation mechanism.

Borrowing from Wendt (1992) who conceptualized the role of intersubjective ideas as structures; this study argues that threats from religious frontiers are what political elites make of them. Any threat from a religious frontier is perceived by the political leaders and subsequently securitized through speech act. This thesis contends that such threats can be desecuritized eventually but not completely as they become part of the identity of the nation. This expanded understanding of a threat will be useful to explain how identity of Muslims of the subcontinent under the British rule was threatened, andhow later domestic religious frontiers were securitized in Pakistan by the political elite which eventually led to waxing of religious nationalism. This study suggests that the Muslims of pre and post-partition Pakistan saw the threat in a continuum and whenever the threat perception was heightened for them in times of crises, they mobilized around religion as an identity marker.

The idea of waxing of religious nationalism can be better explained when compared to the movement of the moon around the earth. The moon completes its lunar cycle around the earth in 29 days. During these 29 days the moon waxes when it is completely visible and wanes when it is invisible to the naked eye. The inability of the human eye to see the moon when it has waned does not mean that the moon no longer exists. Similarly, religious nationalism waxes and wanes with time. When it waxes, there are certain signs that can explain its waxing behavior. Those signs, this study argues, are the visible religious frontiers and the threats from them. Moreover, this study suggests that those signs are domestic in nature, unlike the structural explanations of religious nationalism which attribute its rise to globalization and modernity. Here, it is pertinent to explain how the study conceptually envisages religious nationalism. First, this thesis suggests that religious nationalism is not the all out fusion of religion and nationalism but their interaction and collision at different points. A number of possible ways for interaction are already discussed (Aktürk, 2021; Brubaker, 2012; Juergensmeyer, 1996; Yıldız & Çengel, 2022). Second, based on the first

assumption, this study claims that in cases where religious nationalism is present, that nation has its own particularities. This is because political elites who utilize religion and nationalism for mobilization cherry pick from the reservoirs of both religion and nationalism to tailor their appeal to the people. Third, following Soper and Fitzer (2018), who view the relationship between nationalism and religion on a continuum and suggest various types of religion inspired nationalism, this study assumes that this interaction is on a continuum where the religious nationalism waxes and wanes, as shown in Figure1. Fourth, it agrees with Barker's stance on the interaction between religion and nationalism that they both interact at religious frontiers and only those frontiers that pose a threat are prioritized, but this prioritization is not automatic. While Barker assumes that religious frontiers are naturally occurring and take on an objective garb, this study claims that religious frontiers are constructed. Finally, in explaining the rise of religious nationalism, Barker suggests that any threat of annihilation or the perception of annihilation from a religious frontier and the interaction between the two leads to rise of religious nationalism.

However, Barker does not explain the mechanism of this interaction, which, precisely, this study attempts to explain. Building upon the idea of securitization through speech act as suggested by Buzan et al (1997), this study argues that the political elites actually securitize the religious frontiers and the perceived threats emanating from the frontiers through "speech act". The political elites push the idea of an existential threat through the religious frontiers, which is further accepted by the masses as a viable narrative and leads to the waxing of religious nationalism. This study also takes into account that there is a limit to securitization as not every religious frontier can be securitized. This is because the masses are not without agency and they are able to question any narrative. Moreover, the study also argues that once securitization of a threat has taken place, it cannot be completely desecuritized. This was most obvious in the case of Pakistan immediately after independence where the new Muslim nation that had coalesced together on a communal division against non-Muslims in general and Hindus in particular before partition was told, immediately after partition, that the communal differences were no longer significant.



Figure 1 Interaction between Religion and Nationalism at religious frontiers**.**

1.3 Methodology:

I have relied on a qualitative analysis for this thesis by using the case study approach. The case study covers the time period from 1857 war of independence uptil 1947 focusing on three key Muslim thinkers-Syed Ahmed Khan, Maulana Maududi, Muhammad Ali Jinnah- and later analyses three historical events after partition spanning from 1949 until 1989: passing of the Objectives Resolution (OR) in 1949, the second constitutional amendment in 1974 and General Zia-ul-Haq's era (1977-1989). This thesis is based on the content analysis of primary documents pertaining to each event chosen for this study. For the period from 1857 uptill 1947, the primary documents include writings and speeches of Syed Ahmed Khan, the speeches and addresses of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the writings and publications of Maulana Maududi. For 1947 onwards, the parliamentary debate surrounding the passage of OR of 1949, the proceedings of the special committee which decided upon the status of Ahmadis in 1974, and the speeches and public addresses of General Zia-ul-Haq are analyzed.

Gerring (2004) defines case study as "an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units".Thus, the case study approach is chosen to give an in-depth account of the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan after 1949. Moreover, a case study approach helps in chalking the religious frontiers and threats which this thesis aims to map. In addition, this thesis agrees with Flyvbjerg (2006) when he argues in correcting the misconceptions about case studies: that they help in generating concrete knowledge, they aid in generalizing, they do not fall into the verification trap and finally help in generating propositions and theories. Keeping these features in mind, this thesis chose the case of Pakistan to explain the waxing of religious nationalism. Last but not the least, choosing Pakistan as a case study offered a break from the Eurocentric focus of studies on religious nationalism and moved the spotlight to a significant case of South Asia.

The three events after partition are chosen because of two reasons. First, as argued by Ali Saleem (2017, pp. 243–244), Islamization of the government of Pakistan started after 1949 and picked up pace from the 1970's. This makes the three events ideal for explaining the formation of religious frontier which takes to us to the second reason that is salience. Mylonas and Tudor explains the significance of salience as follows: "salience of a national identity relative to other identities rises during moments of crises" (Mylonas & Tudor, 2023, p. 49). Hence, owing to increased Islamization, the salience of Muslim identity was higher during these three events chosen for this study. This salience, as the study will later show, is clearly visible in the choice of primary documents selected for this thesis.

The primary documents-speeches, addresses, parliamentary debates, special committee proceedings are selected to explain the above events for two major reasons. First, these documents clearly portray the religious frontiers and threats which led to the waxing of religious frontier. These documents decrease the proximity between the creation of a religious frontier and the securitization of perceived threats from those frontiers, hence, making it comprehensible. Second, this approach avoids the process of tracing the historical narrative over the longue durée which is open to influence from multiple variables; the primary documents offer a concentrated form of the narrative which better explains the waxing of religious nationalism.

Thus, for explaining the waxing of religious nationalism through the OR of 1949, I primarily focused on the parliamentary debate that occurred prior to the passage of the resolution. The document was available at the website of the national assembly of Pakistan. The parliamentary debate was chosen as it reflects the formation and waxing of religious nationalism. The debate highlights the disagreements between the Muslim and non-Muslim lawmakers in taking a religious turn for the country. The thesis then explains how the domestic religious frontiers established through the OR despite the claim of promoting inclusiveness later became exclusionary in nature by declaring the Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan in 1974. The thesis explains the exclusion of Ahmadis as waxing of religious nationalism by analyzing the proceedings of the special committee established by the government of Pakistan in 1974. This three-thousand-page primary document was declassified a decade ago. The thesis identified themes of religious frontiers and threats as debated by the parliamentarians. This thesis further applied its theoretical perspective on General Zia-ul-Haq's era (1977-1989) by analyzing his speeches delivered on pivotal moments during his rule. The pivotal moments include his addresses made immediately after the coup in 1977, on the Defence and Independence Day of Pakistan, on postponing

elections twice, on announcing executive orders extending his presidential powers, on curbing political activity and gagging the media. These addresses were particularly chosen as they reflected Zia's world view, the problems faced by Pakistan and his vision for the country. These speeches and addresses lay out in bare terms the domestic religious frontiers and the perceived threats that waxed religious nationalism in his era.

1.4 Structure of The Thesis:

This thesis is mainly organized into two broad parts. Part one which includes chapter one and chapter two discusses the formation and waxing of religious nationalism among the Muslims of undivided India before partition.

Chapter two which falls under part one of this study, engages with the question how religious nationalism was used to coalesce the Muslims around the marker of Islam. With the help of the theoretical framework explained above, the chapter relies on the speeches of three key Muslim leaders in explaining how these leaders viewed the religious frontiers and securitized the threats emanating from these frontiers. The chapter finds out that although each leader's ultimate objective was to safeguard the Muslim identity from dilution, each of them mapped the religious frontiers and the threats in different ways. Syed Ahmed Khan, taking up a modernist approach, propagated for an Islamic renaissance in the absence of which Muslims lagged behind the English and Hindus in all the aspects of changing times posing a threat to Muslim identity. For Maulana Maududi, it was the religious frontier of Islam and the threats to Islamic civilization posed by secularism, modern education, nationalism, the Indian National Congress (INC) and the AIML. Finally, Jinnah opposed democracy along the British lines and demanded for a separate single Muslim state where Muslim majority states of undivided India would be joined to create Pakistan. The second part of this thesis begins with chapter three. This chapter discusses in detail the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan after independence. The chapter analyses two key domestic events-OR in1949 and passing of the second constitutional amendment of 1974- that shaped the religious frontiers and defined the perceived threats from the frontiers. For the OR in 1949, the parliamentary debate that led to the passage of the resolution was examined. For, the second constitutional amendment of 1974 which declared the Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority, the debate of the Special Committee which was declassified a decade ago was analyzed. The analysis showed how religious frontiers and the perception of domestic threats elicit a response to them, which contribute to the rise and waxing of religious nationalism For the first event, the government through the OR laid the religious frontier by openly declaring that religion would be the guiding ideology of the state of Pakistan as it would

protect the country from external and internal threats. Later on, building on the religious frontier of the OR, the Ahmadis were securitized as a threat through the speech act of the committee members. As such, the religious threat emanating from the domestic religious frontier warranted a response. This chapter will also look at how external religious frontiers are combined with domestic religious frontiers to magnify the threat perception.

The second constitutional amendment declaring Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority was the response to mitigate what was perceived as the Ahmadi threat. The legislative debates analyzed for both events demonstrate that the outcomes of the debate were dubbed as moral victories necessary for Pakistan. However, it is stated that these victories were successful attempts at securitizing the religious threat to Pakistan from within. In doing so, the state defined one aspect of Pakistaniyat tied around the elusive variable of Islam and a Muslim. As chapter four on the era of General Zia-ul-Haq will show, this call to protect Islam and Muslim identity could be called up anytime to justify a government policy to further define what it meant to be a Pakistani and declare a new religious frontier.

Chapter four discusses the era of General Zia-ul-Haq from 1977 until 1989. This chapter, with the help of General Zia's speeches, explains how he perceived the religious frontiers and threats to Pakistan. The chapter also sheds ligth how Zia utilized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1989 to bolster his position in the external aswell as domestic arena. For General Zia, the state of Pakistan was an incomplete project and the missing ingredient to complete Pakistan was Islam. Since General Zia wholeheartedly believed that the foundation of the country was ideological, he set out in his aim to fill out the gap between what was promised and what was delivered. This chapter brings home the broader point that an ideological state's foundations will be open to interpretation for being insufficiently religious. Consequently, domestic religious frontiers can be drawn by any ruler any time. This endurance of religious nationalism through this mechanism explains how religious nationalism continues to wax after the formation of the nation-state.

Chapter five is the final and concluding chapter of this thesis. It summarizes the findings of the study and makes a point that domestic religious frontiers are significant as external religious frontiers in explaining the waxing of religious nationalism after nation-state formation. In addition, the chapter also highlights future venues for research. For instance, how can religious nationalism wane after nation-state formation? Can the speech acts that led to securitization and waxing of religious nationalism completely desecuritizied? In other words, can an ideological nation redefine itself? Finally, when and how do external religious frontiers overcome the primacy of domestic religious frontiers?

CHAPTER 2

MAPPING THE RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS; TRACING THE THREAT

2.1 Introduction

You may be a *pucca* (staunch) nationalist and four squate Gandhite, yet you will be treated as an untouchable as soon as you announce to a Hindu that you are a Muslim.

Shaukatullah Ansari, *Pakistan the Problem of India.*

Whenever a people feels threatened in its distinct existence by the advance of a power committed to another religion, the political conflict is likely to have superimposed upon it a sense of religious conflict, almost crusade, so that national identity becomes fused with religious identity.

Adrian Hastings, *the Construction of Nation Hood.*

The aim of this chapter is to map the internal religious frontiers and the perceived threats generated from these frontiers for the Muslims of undivided India. These frontiers and the ensuing threats significantly influenced Muslim identity of undivided India after the mutiny of 1857. This chapter lays the foundation for the broader argument that is the waxing of religious nationalism after 1947 in Pakistan. In order to understand how religious nationalism waxed after 1947 in Pakistan, it is imperative to understand how the Muslim identity was imagined and reimagined prior to the partition of India. This chapter will illuminate the religious frontiers and also shed light as to how the threats from these frontiers were perceived by the Muslims and how they responded to those particular threats. The task of mapping the religious frontiers will be undertaken by narrating the historical events that sowed the seeds of communalism between Muslims and Hindus. This will be achieved through the analysis of speeches and writings of Muslim leaders who mobilized the Muslims by using religion as a marker of identity. In this panel of Muslim leaders, Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), Maulana Maududi (1903-1979) and Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) will be considered.

Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) considered to be the father of two nation theory in the historiography of Pakistan toiled hard to educate the Muslims in modern education and founded Mohammad Anglo University (MAO). He forewarned of the dangers of majority rule of Hindus over minority Muslims if representative institutions were to be brought to

India. Second Muslim leader, Maulana Maududi, a staunch Islamist who fought tooth and nail against the creation of Pakistan on the basis of religious identity. He had garnered a substantial following during the 1940's and resisted the calls for partition of India and creation of Pakistan. He favoured the notion of *ummah* and Islamic rejuvenation by returning to the scriptures. Finally, the speeches of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan will be considered. His speeches are indispensible to put to rest whether Pakistan was to be a secular or an Islamic state or something more. Jinnah initially did not subscribe to the traditional religious frontiers and threats but instead argued that constitutional safeguards would be enough for the Muslims of India only to revise his stance later on. Thus, the choice of these intellectuals brings to light different viewpoints arguing the sanctity of the Muslim identity but from various vantage points.

It is argued that religion is an order creating system (Greenfeld, 1996) and Islam being such a religion carries within itself the blueprints of life for this world and the hereafter. However, it also discusses the concept of war under *Jihad* (armed struggle) from military threats.[1] But imagine a scenario when the perceived threat is non-militaristic in nature? This study argues that threats as perceived by the Muslims included but were not limited to political, social, cultural, military, economic aspects. As Ole Waever argues in his paper "the core-fears of each nation are unique; they relate to its vulnerabilities and historical experience. Thus security means different things to different nations" (Waever, 1989, p. 46).

As previously mentioned, for Barker, religious nationalism has two elements; religious national identity and political religion (Barker,2009, p.46). This study agrees with Barker's viewpoint that religious nationalism is shaped by two aspects, first the nation's existence at a religious frontier, and second a threat, external in nature, emanating from that frontier (ibid, p.44). Although he does dwell upon the nature of the threats he does not show how a threat is perceived. Second, Barker makes a generalization that a nation based on linguistic roots will feel threatened from other linguistic groups. Similarly, a particular religious group will be hostile towards other religious group (ibid, p.36). This was not the case with Pakistan as religion was used for non-religious functions as well. For instance, Scholars argue that religion mobilizes the people against secular ideals and as globalization increases; religious nationalism pushes back (Annavarapu, 2015; Juergensmeyer, 2019). This study argues that religious nationalism opposes modernization as it views modernity as a threat. Thus, it actually depends on how the threat is perceived in the first place and who creates the

[1] Armed Jihad is a form of defensive war.

perception for the masses. This is where the thesis aims to incorproate the securitization theory propounded by Buzan et al.[2] This study builds and revises Barker's theory by arguing first that any threat emanating from a religious frontier is actually perceived and created through a "speech act" as argued by Ole Waever. Second, Barker presupposes the threats to be external in nature while this study argues that threats can be domestic in nature which leads to the emergence of religious nationalism. It is asserted here that the elites securitize the narrative by naming and framing any issue as a threat through "speech act". They are able to securitize the issue and utilize religious mobilization to achieve their objective. However, there is a limit to this act. Political elites might securitize an issue but later they cannot desecuritize it completely as the impact of the securitization will always be felt. This is true in case of Jinnah and Pakistan where the religious identity of Muslims under threat was initially securitized to gain independence but later an attempt was made to desecuritize this narrative.[3] The result was that religious nationalism bounced back with great vigor leading to its waxing after 1947 in Pakistan.

2.2 The Muslims of Undivided India:

The British East India Company first set its foothold in Madras (1639), Bombay (1662) and Bengal (1765) and subsequently expanded inwards into India (Cross, 1922, p.1). With the passage of time, the company simultaneously wrestled control from the ruling Muslim Mughals and introduced a multitude of reforms including education reforms. It was under Lord William Bentinck (1834-1835) that the English Education Act of 1835 was introduced encouraging English education at the expense of traditional Indian languages such as Persian and Sanskrit. Hindus being a majority in Madras, Bombay and Bengal were quick to adapt to the new educational model while Muslims viewed this development with suspicion. This development coupled with the excesses of the British East India Company, the waning Mughal influence, loss of privilege of the Muslim elites, upward social mobility of Hindus through government employment and increased influence of the Christian Missionaries pushed the people of India to a corner. The final nail in the coffin was the introduction of new cartridges packed with pig and cow fat, chewing of which was a red line for both Hindu

[2] See Barry Buzan et al. (1998). *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London.

[3] Jinnah's speech to the Constituent Assembly on 11th August 1947 where he stated that one might belong to any religion or creed as it has nothing to do with the principle that everyone is an equal citizen of the state.

and Muslim soldiers. This ignited a mutiny[4] in northern-India[5] in 1857, the flames of which only watered down in 1859. The British government introduced several reforms to address this development.

This was the beginning of a major reorganization on the part of the British rule and was to have long-term consequences for the Muslims of India. The mutiny brought with it changes on various levels which were for the most part detrimental to the political, economic, cultural and educational interests of the Muslims. The British, enraged by the hostility of the Muslims of northern-India to their rule, wanted to humble them. This translated into policies aimed at reducing the influence of the Muslims. Immediately, after the mutiny, the British government wrested control of India from the British East India Company. Though the Queen's proclamation promised to deal with her subjects fairly, however, the new administration significantly undermined the position of the Muslims of northern-India. Sayeed highlights two policy measures that reduced the Muslim influence. First, the British Government, while recognizing the rights of the subjects of India, introduced fiscal measures, known as 'resumptions'.[6] Second, the British (Sayeed, 1998, p.13) curtailed employment in the Military, which was a reliable source of income for the Muslims. Deprived of their estate and a stable source of income, Muslims of northern-India were losing their influence. This was not always the case. Despite the decline of the Mughal Empire, Muslims of northern-India dominated the government posts and professional cadres. This was in part due to their excellence in Persian, the language of the court and Islamic law practiced at the time. In addition, Muslims being a minority in United Provinces (UP) and Bihar staffed the rank and file of the administrative machinery of these two states.

[4] The Mutiny of 1857 or Sepoy rebellion or war of Independence occurred against the British East India Company in India. The principal centers of revolt were North-West Provinces, Oudh, Bihar and Punjab. See Majumdar, R.C, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, 1971, Firma.K.L Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta.

[5] Northern-India was later formed into United Provinces of Agra and Oudh in 1902 by merging North-Western Provinces and Oudh. Prior to 1902, this region was called North-Western Provinces and Oudh. It was renamed United Provinces in 1935 under the Government of India Act of 1935 and renamed present day Uttar Paradesh (UP) in 1950 in India.

[6] It stipulated that all landowners must possess and show title deeds to their estate. This deprived people of their estate and ownership were hereditary in nature at that time in India.



Map 1 India under British Raj in 1857, **Source:** J. G. Bartholomew and Sons. Edinburgh, 1908, *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, volume 26, Atlas, Oxford University Press.

As stated above, things gradually changed but for the worse after the mutiny. In UP alone, Muslims' share in the highest ranks of government service declined from 64 per cent in 1857, 45 per cent by 1886 to about 35 per cent in 1913. This was a fall from grace as Muslims constituted about 13 per cent to 15 per cent of the total population of the UP in that period (Alvi, 1989, p.1529). The situation in Bengal, a Muslim majority province, deteriorated after the mutiny in all the fields where Muslims excelled. As per the census of 1881, [7]Muslims totaled 21.7 million or 31.22 percent of the total population. However, their share in government machinery was on a decline. As described by Sayeed, in 1871, of the 773 Indians holding responsible government jobs, Muslims occupied only ninety-two positions as compared with 681 held by the Hindus (Sayeed, 1998, p.14), a paltry 11.9%. A glance at Figure.2 reflects the abysmal distribution of state patronage in Bengal in 1871 where out of

[7] See Report on the Census of British India, 1881, Volume 1, (1883), London, Eyre and Spottiswoode. https://archive.org/details/1-a-census-of-british-india-vol-i/page/n1/mode/1up.

2111 seats; Muslims of Bengal occupied a meager 92 seats, compared to their Hindu counterparts who staffed 681 seats.

DISTRIBUTION OF STATE PATRONAGE IN BENGAL, APRIL 1871.

	Europeans.	Hindus.	Musalmáns.	TOTAL.
Covenanted Civil Service (appointed in England by the Crown),	260	0	0	260
Judicial Officers in the Non-Regulation Districts,[1]	47	0	0	47
Extra Assistant Commissioners,	26	7	0	33
Deputy-Magistrates and Deputy-Collectors,	53	113	30	196
Income-Tax Assessors,	11	43	6	60
Registration Department,	33	25	2	60
Judges of Small Cause Court and Subordinate Judges,	14	25	8	47
Munsifs,	1	178	37	216
Police Department, Gazetted Officers of all grades,	106	3	0	109
Public Works Department, Engineer Establishment,	154	19	0	173
,, ,, Subordinate Establishment,	72	125	4	201
,, ,, Account Establishment,	22	54	0	76
Medical Department, Officers attached to Medical College, Jails, Charitable Dispensaries, Sanitation and Vaccination Establishments, and Medical Officers in charge of Districts, etc. etc.,	89	65	4	158
Department of Public Instruction,	38	14	1	53
Other Departments, such as Customs, Marine, Survey, Opium,[2] etc.,	412	10	0	422
TOTAL,	1338	681	92	2111

[1] This and the following grades receive their appointments from the Local Government.

[2] But exclusive of the Ecclesiastical Establishment. Some of the Opium Officers are not gazetted.

Figure 2 Distribution of State Patronage in Bengal, April 1871,
Source: W.W Hunter, *the Indian Musalmans,* 1876, Trübner and Co., London.

Hunter (1876) ably captures the deteriorating conditions of Muslims of Bengal and observes that the British denied to the Muslims three "distinct streams of wealth which ran perennially into the coffers of a noble Musalman House—Military Command, the Collection of the Revenue, and Judicial or Political Employ". Moreover, he further identified three reasons why the Muslims of Bengal abhorred the British education system and were lagging. First, he argues that British system conducts education in vernacular of Bengal through Hindu teachers, both of which Muslims abhor. Second, this occurs at the expense of Persian which Muslims prefer and finally, the public education does not accommodate the Muslim religion (ibid, p.108). Resultantly, they were not only lagging the Hindus in staffing government jobs but also their Muslim brethren in UP and Bihar. Alvi, succinctly describes the dilemma of the Bengali Muslims that despite being the largest in terms of absolute size as compared to Muslims of other provinces, their share of government jobs was proportionately less than that of the Bengali Hindus and in sharp contrast to the Muslims of the UP. The Bengali Mus

lims were not only an underprivileged majority but also poorly represented in government service (Halliday and Alvi, 1988, p.72). Alvi argues that "this perceived threat to their (privileged) position probably explains the fact that the initial and major thrust of Muslim nationalism in India came from the UP and Bihar" (ibid, p.72). The nascent national sentiment amalgamated with the interest of the landowners in Muslim majority provinces. This happened through the platform of AIML under the leadership of Jinnah resulting in the independence of Pakistan in 1947.

Unlike UP, Bihar and Bengal, which acted as the harbinger of Muslim nationalism, the rest of the Muslim-majority provinces, which make up Pakistan today, did not exhibit much zeal early on. As Alvi argues, "the Muslims of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP, were relatively backward and the urban population was predominantly non-Muslim. The educated classes that were behind modern Indian Muslim politics were absent in those areas" (Alvi, 2002, p.5120). However, based on the 1931 census of India, he adds that in "Punjab about 32 per cent of those educated in English were Muslims, rather less than their share of the total population which was over 52 per cent" (Alvi, 1989, p.1529). Moreover, the landowner class of these provinces, especially Punjab, was content with the status quo. Summing up the context above, Alvi rightly points that the "the heart of Muslim nationalism in India was in the UP and Bihar, Muslim minority provinces" which was later joined by the Punjabi Muslims (Alvi, 1989, p.1529).

In the context of the conditions of the Muslims after the mutiny, it is pertinent to mention the status of Princely states and their orientation towards the nationalist sentiment. By 1919 British India was divided into 14 provinces[8] and there were parts of India which were not annexed by the British, called the Princely states which numbered 562 (Coupland, 1944, p.13). These princely states, in exchange for their rule at home accepted the suzerainty of the Crown and handed over the foreign relations and defence of their states from external attacks over to the Crown (ibid, p. 14). The Princely states wanted to preserve their own limited sovereignty and largely remained unconvinced by the idea of a united India. After the partition of 1947, they were forced to join either the dominion of Pakistan or India.

Given the context above, it is pertinent to understand the redistribution of power in India after the Mutiny. India's domestic setting went from bipolarity to multipolarity with the British Government, the Hindus and the Muslims vying for control and resources. The following

[8]Bengal, Madras, Bombay, Punjab, United Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, North-West Frontier Province, Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, Delhi, British Baluchistan and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

will aim to contextualize the conditions of the time through the theoretical framework adopted by this thesis. For Muslims, nationalism in India was imbued with religion (Evans, 1955, p.43). The contours of this development were not much clear prior to the mutiny of 1857; however, the post-mutiny era not only refined them but also solidified their existence. The Indian political landscape after 1857 had three active players: the British East India Company later replaced by the British government, the minority Muslims under the deteriorating Mughal Empire, and the majority community of Hindus. The type of nationalisms that developed in India from 1857 onwards until the partition can be mainly attributed to the interaction among these three players. This chapter will trace the origins of the religious frontiers that developed for the Muslims of India and similarly the domestic threat perceptions that emanated from these frontiers among these three players.

As mentioned above, the mutiny was a watershed moment for the British imperial power, Muslims, and the Hindus of India. It was significant for the British because it marked the completion of their imperial conquest over India. The mutiny was the final nail in the coffin for the already ailing Mughal Empire. This uprising provided the British with the excuse of eradicating the Mughal Empires' last vestiges from India. For Muslims, it marked a major setback as it was a shift from rulers of India to being ruled; this subjugation of status coupled with slacking in political, economic and social arenas was a blow to the Muslim consciousness. For Hindus, it meant a change of guard, as first it was the Muslims under the Mughals who ruled them and now the new rulers were the British.

Unlike Barker's case of Irish Catholic identity perceiving a threat from Protestant Britain, which eventually led to the development of the religious frontier among the Irish; for Muslims in India, it was not a monolith threat as in the case of Ireland. The Muslim identity was under assault from three religious frontiers, each influencing the Muslims in its own way. First, it was the imperial and colonial power British who held the Muslims responsible for the mutiny of 1857. Muslims faced British ire after 1857 as they were portrayed as enemies of the British raj. The underlying logic behind this antagonism was that since the

British dethroned the Mughal Empire, in a tit for tat move, Muslims rebelled against the British. Second, it was the progressing Hindu community that challenged the Muslims in every aspect of life. It is true that Hindus and Muslims remained together for centuries in India and despite constituting the majority; Hindus had always been under Muslim rule. After 1857 Hindus were no longer bound to Muslims and excelled in the modern education brought by the British raj. This coupled with the various Hindu revivalist movements (Evans, 1955, p.43-50) further threatened the Muslim identity. Third, it was the internal

divisions within the Muslim community which influenced Muslim identity. The reversal of their power generated a strong desire on the part of Muslims to return to the golden age. However, the path to regain the lost pride was contested among Muslim leaders. On the one hand there were the traditionalists such as *Dar ul alom Deoband*, *Braelvis* and *Wahabis* who preached a return to the orthodoxy and denial of everything and anything modern brought about by the British. On the other hand there were modernists, such as Syed Ahmed Khan, who saw that Britain was an imperial power and was there to stay in India. For the modernist, the only way to rise out of the ashes was to learn the modern ways. This, the modernists argued, would not only put Muslims in a positive light in the eyes of the British but also give the former a competitive leverage vis a vis the excelling Hindus (Islam, 2017).

There were ulema who vehemently opposed the reformist program of Syed Ahmed. Zaidi (2009) gives three reasons in explaining the opposition to Syed Ahmed, first, that there did not exist an agreed upon notion of who was the Muslim Qaum in the late 19th century. This was because Muslims were divided into sects such as shia, sunni, wahabi, barelvi. In addition, their concern was not with the British or the Hindu but mainly in proving each other wrong in matters of religion. In other words the threat was domestic; it came from within. Second because of the shame *(Zillat)* the Muslims faced after the 1857 war of independence as the last bastion of Mughal power disintegrated and Muslims were blamed as anti-British. Third, in such difficult circumstances, Syed Ahmed's message to reconcile with the British was rejected by the Muslims.

To put the above narrative into perspective, it is important to understand how religion was viewed in India at the time. Religion was not viewed in a purely theological or ideological binary. It inculcated in itself much more than theological ideas. When various Muslim leaders claimed that Muslims of India were different from Hindus on basis of religion, they would refer to the whole gamut of aspects that fall within religion. This included culture, social values, eating habits, the heros and forklore.

Muslim leaders such as Syed Ahmed, Maulana Maudid and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, all underscored that Muslims were different in many ways as Islam is not only concerned with the personal life of the people In fact the political leaders securitized religion as they viewed it as a unitary, monolithic category. In this model, the threat from a religious frontier does not differentiate between Muslims, seeing them all the same, overlooking tremendous diversity within the community. The Hindus saw Muslims as a threat and vice versa, there was no Shia, Sunni or Brahmin, Shudra distinction. The only distinction was the nature of the threat and how the political elites perceived it and framed it for the masses.

2.3 The Origins of the Religious Frontier

2.3.1 British and the Muslims

As previously mentioned there was a three sided religious frontier threatening the *Musalmans*[9] of India. The first was between the British and Muslims since the beginning of the 19th century. The second was between the Musalmans and Hindus that existed even during the time of the Mughal Empire. The third was between the various sects of Islam being propagated by different ulema of the time. Further, the religious frontiers were viewed as sharp lines between what was considered as a monolithic whole. It is necessary to illuminate the historical context of the roots of these frontiers. In this regard, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, while tracing the causes of discontent of Muslims, rightly argues that "every measure taken by the British, from the battle of Plassey in 1757 till the end of the nineteenth century, affected Muslims for the worse"(Ali, 1967, p. 5). It is worth mentioning that neither the British East India Company before the 1857 Mutiny nor the British Government after 1857 actively projected a secular outlook for India. Although the British introduced modern education and English laws, they simultaneously supported Christian missionaries in India establishing missionary schools, churches and proselytization. Muslims and Hindus of India responded in two ways: accepting the secular ideals or further reverting to their religious roots. This religious response to a secular threat diverges from Barker's viewpoint who asserts that "religious groups form in response to religious pressures". The pressure on the religious Muslims in particular was not religious, but they viewed the secular ideals as a threat to their religious identity. This is more in line with Juergensmeyer's approach, as to that religious nationalism gaining pace in opposition to secular values (Juergensmeyer, 1994, 1996, 2019).

Muslims already viewed the British with scorn as the British were slowly and gradually disintegrating the Mughal Empire. In contrast, the British also viewed Muslims as a threat to its imperial designs in India. This sentiment was echoed by an English Civil Servant, W.W Hunter, where he labeled the Musalmans of India "as fanatical, open to rebellion and source of chronic danger to the British Power in India" (Hunter, 1876, p. 2). There were other charges present which both the communities accused each other of. An attempt will be made to trace a few of them to show the foundations of the religious frontiers.

[9] Urdu term for the word "Muslim".

During the reign of the Mughal Empire, Persian was the language of the court and the lingua franca. Although Hindi language in its Sanskrit text form was also in vogue, it was Persian that was used in the Mughal court's administration. In 1835, the British East India Company replaced Persian with English as the official language in government dealing and the courts of law. The teaching of English to the people of India was in line with Governor General Lord Bentinck's policy to encourage the Western education in a Western language and not the oriental studies (Cumming, 1932, p. 26). While the British thought it would be prudent to bring the masses of India at par with Western education (ibid, p.28), Muslims, who were already reeling from the effects of losing power, were further handicapped in their outlook and refused to learn the new language out of opposition to the British. On the other hand, Hindus quickly took the task of learning the new mode of communication. Khalid Sayeed commenting on the state of education in Bengal in 1871 argues that "out of 773 Indians holding government positions, Muslims only occupied ninety-two positions" (Sayeed, 1968, p. 13).

In addition, the educational policies of the British had a trickledown effect. Before the dissipation of the Western education, the Indian press was in its nascent stage. However, after the establishment of Western education centers in India, the local press started to take shape. The educated classes, versed in English and knowledge of the West, expressed their views freely, unbound by the caste system of Hinduism and orthodoxy advocated by ulema in Islam. They were extremely critical of the British government which forced Lord Lyton's legislative council to control the vernacular press in India. Hence, the vernacular press act of 1878 was passed in this regard (Lovett, 1920, p. 23) which was later reverted in 1882 by Lord Rippon's government (ibid, p. 23). This crackdown of the press and later reversion further created discontent among the natives of India creating ill will towards the British.

Furthermore, Muslims derived their distinctness from Islam, seeing it as a complete code of life. This flowed into the laws that governed the Muslims, both personal and public. As Muhammad Ali argues, these laws were replaced by Western laws (Ali, 1967, p. 6). Muslims felt aggrieved with these changes, as they felt a secular understanding was replacing their religious identity. The community's response to the British policies was one of resentment and aloofness from the new rulers. The Hindus, on the other hand, continued to learn the ways of the new rulers, excelling in English education and other fields. Hence, by 1878 there were 3155 Hindus holding a graduate and post graduate degrees compared to a paltry of 57 Muslims (Gopal, 1959, p.35).



Map 2 India under British Raj 1907
Source: Joppen, Charles,1907,*A Historical Atlas of India for the use of High-Schools, Colleges, and Private Students*, London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longman Green and Co.,pp. 16, 26 maps
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Another tragedy that befell the Muslims of India was the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. Immediately after the mutiny of 1857, the British Crown was quick to wrestle control of India from the British East India Company. Some British Civil Servants argued that the mutiny was the result of British educational policies and innovations that perturbed the established elites (Lovett, 1920, p. 13). However, the British, who already viewed Muslims with suspicion, blamed them for inciting and leading the mutiny. In Sir Alfred Lyall's words, an Indian civil servant at the time, "British tuned on the Muhammadans as their real enemies" (ibid, p.15). Sayeed argues that the British, dismayed by Muslim hostility to their rule in Delhi and Oudh, wanted to silence Muslims for good (Sayeed, 1968, p. 13). The mutiny marginalized Muslims on two fronts. First, the British instituted the fiscal policy known as "resumptions"[10] that severely crippled the clout of the Muslim landowner class.

[10] Government policy stipulating landowners must present the title deeds of their property. However, estate was usually passed down from generation to generation and revenue records were non-existent.

Second, the major source of income for the Muslims was military service. In the aftermath of the mutiny, the British ceased drafting Muslims into the army. Thus, the British dealt with Muslims with an iron hand. The failed revolt brought disastrous consequences for Muslims more than the Hindus. Thus, the Muslims as a community were pitted against the British and Hindus. This laid the foundation of a hardened domestic religious frontier for the Muslims with the British and the Hindu

2.3.2 The Communal and Political Divide: Hindus and Muslims

Hindus themselves were adjusting to the new realities of the changing times. With the British fortifying its hold over India, it was not only the Musalmans who feared identity dilution but also the Hindus. The Hindus saw the advent of modern education and how their religious ideals did not meet the challenges of the times. In order to reconcile the doctrines of Hinduism with the modern notion of nationalism and democracy, various revival movements emerged. Initially, the aim was to bring Hinduism at par with the modern times. Thus a liberal outlook was adopted by the revivalist leaders. This sentiment found expression in movements like Atmiya Samaj founded by Rammohan Roy in 1817 which later evolved into Barhma Sabha (Evan, 1955, p.44;Desai, 1946, p. 258) dedicated to the amalgamation of the good in Christianity and Hinduism (Evans, 1955).

There was also Barhma Samaj founded by Devendranath Tagore (ibid), an organization aimed to be Western without being Christian. Prarthana Samaj, another movement, was founded by Mahadev Govinda in 1867 who believed that personal success is not possible without religious reform (ibid, p 45). While these organizations were liberal in their outlook, there were other Hindu organizations, which, after the mutiny of 1857, were more nationalistic and carried a narrow-minded fervor. In this list, the Arya Samaj founded by Dayanand Saraswati in 1875 tops the list. Aziz argues that Arya Samaj soon became a force in politics, 'opposed Islam with bitterness and Christianity with vigour"(Aziz, 1967, p. 100). Another Hindu nationalist organization and a social reform movement worth mentioning is the Ramakrishna Mission founded by Ramakrishna Paramahansa (1834-86). This movement disparaged Western materialism and romanticized Hinduism such as idol worship and polytheism. Thus, among the Hindus of India, two major tendencies prevailed, first Barhma Samaj which spoke of reconciliation and uplift, and second,Arya samaj which was militaristic in nature.It can be argued that Hindus were trying to safeguard themselves against the increasing influence of the British. But the Musalmans of India viewed the Hindu revivalist movements from a different perspective. For them the declining status of their fortunes coupled with the ascendency of British and Hindu revivalist movements were a

threat to their existence, which Barker calls "a threatened existence" (Barker, 2009, p. 34). In order to address this threat and check their declining fortunes, Musalmans of India founded their own revivalist movements. Initially, both the political and religious leadership of the Muslims moved towards the orthodoxy section.

Thus, the ulema, in response to the encroachment of the Western culture, argued for returning to the original teachings of Islam to create a new Medina. Desai highlights four movements started by four saints and scholars in South Asia. The movements were started by Shah Abdul Aziz of Delhi, Saiyed Ahmed of Bareli, Shaikh Karamat Ali of Jaunpur and Haji Shariat ullah of Faridpur (Desai, 1946, p. 275). While Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi advocated jihad against the Sikhs in the frontier and Punjab, Shah Abdul Aziz, later on fearing that India had come under Christian control, declared India as *Dar ul harb.*[11] In addition to this, there was the Faraiziyah Movement of 1831 in East Bengal, which aimed at ridding Muslims of practices which they learned from the Hindus. Then there was the Ahmadi Movement aimed at the obstructing spread of Christianity in Inida. However, the founder of the Ahmadi Movement, Ghulam Ahmed (1835-1908) declared prophethood and was vilified by other Muslims of India. The proponents of the movement discouraged armed jihad against the British and promoted liberal principles. This was the same Ahmadi community which would be later persecuted after the creation of Pakistan.

This perceived threat to the Muslim way of life later took a political turn. A number of developments after the mutiny created a political rift between the Hindus and the Muslims of undivided India. Although the legality of the political identity of the Muslims was only cemented in 1909 after the passage of the Minto-Morley reforms,[12] the most significant aspect of the reforms was the provision of separate electorates for Muslims in provinces where they were in a minority. As Jalal puts it, the reforms"institutionalized what until then had been a dominant colonial perception of the importance of religious divisions in Indian society" (Jalal & Bose, 1997, p.85). She continues, "A momentous step, it gave Muslims the

[11] Dar ul Harb means "zone of war".

[12] Significant promulgations included (i) the extension of the right to discuss the budget, and the concession of the right to introduce resolutions;^ (2) the extension of the right of interpellation to include supplementary questions; (3) the non-official majority on the provincial councils; (4) the official majority or bloc in the Imperial Legislative Council; (5) the Mohammedan minority representation provisions; (6) the dropping of the proposed advisory councils; (7) the authorization of executive councils in other provinces than Madras and Bombay. See *Development of Self Government in India 1858-1914,* 1922 by Cecil Merne Putnam Cross, University of Chicago Press, Illinois.

status of an all-India political category but one effectively consigned to being a perpetual minority in any scheme of constitutional reforms" (ibid, p.85). However, it is pertinent to discuss the events, which granted the Muslim diaspora this political maturity. First, as Muslims were initially blamed for the uprising, they were deprived of their large estates. The loss of land brought gerat misfortune to the Muslim landowner class. Second, the doors of the major source of employement for the Muslim working class, the army and the government service, were closed. This alienated the higher classes of Muslims inculcating in them the feeling of misfortune (*zillat)*as enunciated by Zahid (2009). Third, the British government introduced the Indian Councils Act of 1861 to enlarge the Governor Generals executive council to form a legislative council. This act Coupland argues, "May have introduced the representative principle to the Indian constitution" (Coupland, 1944, p.21). Moving further, in 1867 the Hindus started resisting the use of Urdu and wanted it replaced with Hindi of Devnagri script which was unacceptable to the Muslims. Fourth, the formation of Indian National Congress in 1885 with the blessing of the British government also put the Muslims of north-India in a corner. Lovett terms the formation of the Congress as the "formal inauguration of modern Indian politics" (Lovett, 1920, p.31). As the thesis will later discuss, the Muslims stayed aloof from politics on the advice of Syed Ahmed Khan while the Hindus started organizing under the banner of Indian National Congress. Another significant division which created a rift between Hindus and Muslims was the partition of the province of Bengal in 1905. Lord Curzon, the then viceroy of India, defended the partition of administrative grounds but the Hindu Bengalis of west-Bengal viewed this as a divide and rule policy of the British. Resultantly, the Hindus denounced this partition and organized a boycott of British goods coupled with violence against the state machinery. Muslims welcomed the partition but at the same time were apprehensive of the permanency of this move. As will be discussed below, by 1905 Syed Ahmed had passed away and Muslims realized that they could not stay aloof from politics and must organize. This was partly due the fact that the Indian Councils Act of 1892 established the principle of representation in the provinces and there were strong rumours that this would further expand. In light of this foresight, the Muslims visited Lord Minto at Simla in 1906 also known as the Simla Deputation,[13] and after receiving a positive nod formed the All India Muslim league the same year. However, this political awakening of the Hindus and Muslims was also aided by

[13] A delegation of Muslims led by Agha Khan visited Lord Minto in Simla and presented a plan requesting separate electorates based on two points. First, in provincial and local area elections, Muslims would represent Muslims. Second, Muslims should have greater seats than their numerical strength owing to their political importance and role in protecting the empire in the frontier states.

the developments in the international arena. On one side of the globe, the small east Island of Japan had defeated the bigger and stronger country Russia,on the other side of the globe there were Young Turks pressing for rule of law. The conception in India was that if others can do it, then India can also rise from her slumber.

To sum it up, the Muslims felt that they were losing out on multiple fronts and they were being left behind in the new administrative setup of the British. In such an environment, where Muslims were either being marginalized as a matter of policy or by their own myopic outlook, various leaders came to the fore. Three figures became prominent: Syed Ahmed Khan, Maulana Maududi, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The following section will analyze their ideas.

2.4 Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898)

Syed Ahmed Khan is known by various names and titles in the historiography of the Pakistan movement. He is better known as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan[14]; the reformer and the father of the two nation theory. Syed Ahmed laid the foundation on which Muslim politics was grounded. Deeply perturbed by the events of 1857, it was his oracle-like vision that guided the Muslims of India to gain modern education for a better future. For this, Syed Ahmed was dubbed as a modernist and even criticized for his outlook.

Syed Ahmed Khan was born in Delhi on 17th October 1817, the then capital of the Mughal Empire. Syed Ahmed's parents were both highly educated and his family was historically associated with the Mughal court, thus from a young age he saw the administration up close. After the death of this father, Syed Ahmed was forced to look for work which he found with the British East India Company in 1838; Syed Ahmed retired in 1876. At that time, British East India Company had settled its nest in India while the Mughal Empire[15], the sick man of the subcontinent, was on its death bed. Although Mughal emperor Shah Alam was the authority, in reality, it was the British East India Company which was the de facto ruler. He was impressed by Western education brought in by the policy ofLord William Bentick to promote European literature and science among the people of India (Lovett, 1920, p. 7). Syed Ahmed diagnosed two reasons for the decline of the Muslims of India, first, isolation from the education that was brought in by the new rulers, and second, the idea that Islam was

[14] He was knighted in 1888.

[15] It was a Muslim Empire that ruled undivided India from 1526-1857. For a detailed study, see The *Mughal Empire*, 1995 by John F Richards.

not comparable with the modern ideals of the time. Thus, immediately after the mutiny of 1857, Syed Ahmad started propagating how the golden days of Muslims can be revived. In this regard, emphasis was laid on the revival of Islam in undivided India; the primary consideration was to reinvigorate Islam for the Muslims. As a corollary, most of the Muslim intellectuals of the time conceptualized the Muslim identity as based on grand civilization designs. Moreover, representative institutions in India were yet to be established; thus the question of the political identity of the Muslims was dormant for the time and remained so for some time. However, this coalescence of Muslim identity with politics reached maturity in 1909 in the form of Minto-Morley reforms when Muslims of South Asia were granted the right of seperate electorates.

Since the political identity of the Muslims was not yet a consideration after the mutiny, the focus was the religious renaissance of the Muslims of India. According to Syed Ahmed, this was to be achieved by gaining Western education and reconciliation of Islam with the modern ideals. Here it can be seen that the religious frontier was that between Muslims of India and the West i.e. Company presence in India. The threat was one of subjugation (Barker, 2009, p. 36) of the Muslim identity.[16] This frontier and the threat emanating from the frontier were both domestic in nature for the Muslims. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argue that "societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 119). Thus, this development of the British East India Company taking over control and Muslims lagging behind was seen as the beginning of the end. In the case of Syed Ahmed, he averted any collision with the British, but favoured modern education to strengthen Islam and Muslims. In this direction, he first visited England in 1870 with his son and stayed there for more than a year. There he learned and understood the education system of the British at the University of Oxford and upon his return to India, Syed Ahmad established the Muhammad Anglo Oriental (MAO) College in 1875 in Aligarh (later Aligah University) (Graham, 1885).[17] Syed Ahmed's efforts for revival were later termed as the Aligarh Movement by his contemporaries.

[16] This is not the clash of civilization as argued by Huntington.

[17] For a detailed biography of Syed Ahmed, see *The Lift and Work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan* by lieut.-Colonel G. F. I Graham, (1885) and *Hayat e Javed* by Altaf Hussain Hali (1901) Urdu Version.

Syed Ahmed's response to the threat to Islam from this frontier was not confrontation but reconciliation. In this sense it diverges from Barker's assertion that religious threats elicit a contradictory response leading to conflict (ibid, p. 36). In order to understand why the response to the threat was reconciliation and not conflict, it is important to identify first how the threat was perceived by the Muslim figures, and second, how it was conveyed to the masses through speech act by the same notables which led to the crystallization of Muslim identity. Therefore, in order to understand the formation of religious frontiers and the threats emanating from the frontiers in the domestic arena, the whole framework for the formation of religious nationalism as discussed above will be applied to Syed Ahmed's speeches and writings. This will incorporate domestic factors in the formation of religious nationalism which will add to the framework propagated by Barker.

2.5 Tracing the Religious Frontiers and the Threat

Immediately after the mutiny, the control of the British East India Company was taken over by the British Government and by 1858 the company had lost all its power following the passage of the Government of India Act 1858 (Lovett, 1920, p. 15). [18] As the British Government held the Muslims responsible for the mutiny and initiated a crack down on the Muslim notables. This left the Muslims scarred for a long time creating resentment between the ruler and the ruled.

Syed Ahmed was one of Muslim leaders who, unknowingly and unwillingly, demarcated the religious frontier between Muslims and India's colonial masters. Initially, he did not believe in communalism and for a long time he was an advocate of promoting Hindustan and its inhabitants as Hindustanis. However, immediately after the mutiny, it became imperative on Muslims to dispel the charge of disloyalty to the empire. This domestic development, along with the policies of the British which harmed Muslim interests in India, led to the entrenchment of religious frontiers. Syed Ahmed, in response to the British government's high handedness towards the Muslims, exhumed the reasons for the mutiny. While the British government thought it was the damage to the religious values[19] of the Muslims and

[18] It envisaged that rights, dignity and honour of Indian princes' would be preserved as those of the Queen's. Moreover, the entire Queen's subjects are eligible to enter public service offices based on education and regardless of their caste or creed.

[19] The new rifle cartridges were packed with beef and pig fat, which was to be bitten before loading into the rifle. Beef is forbidden for Hindus, as cow is sacred and pig fat for Muslims as forbidden in Islam.

Hindus by the Company that triggered the mutiny, Syed Ahmad disagreed. He wrote three works[20] from which his pamphlet titled "*Asbab e Bhagawat e Hind*"[21] or "Causes of the Indian Revolt" explains the mutiny. The pamphlet was originally published in urdu in 1858 and held the Company responsible for not allowing the local Indians to be part of the state's legislative machinery. Since they were sidelined, their grievances fell on deaf ears and the gathering storm unleashed in the form of mutiny. The crux of the pamphlet was later summarized by Lieutenant Colonel Graham in his autobiography of Syed Ahmed of 1885. He highlights that the "primary cause of the rebellion-non-admission of a native to the legislative council-state interference with religious missionary schools-revenue and land administration- necessity of mutual sympathy between governors and governed-army system"(Graham, 1885, p. 15). This pamphlet of Syed Ahmed can be seen as an attempt of a "speech act" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26) in narrating the threat to the Muslims. The choice of the mutiny as a starting point by Syed Ahmed can be explained by what Volkan calls a "Chosen Trauma".[22]

Syed Ahmed argues in the beginning of his pamphlet that it was lack of political participation of Muslims in the government that resulted in the mutiny. But he later acknowledges five other reasons that led to the mutiny of the soldiers. The arguments can be broadly categorized as political, religious, economic, societal and cultural. Syed Ahmed was quick to accept the conclusion in his pamphlet that there was not a single cause that led to the mutiny but a plethora of reasons (Khan, 1858, p.27). This powder keg of resentments was seen as a threat by the Muslims to their identity and in response to this threat, the army revolted. However, this was not an organized campaign but a disorganized step within the ranks (ibid, p.27), he argued. He makes the same case that "the army had no plan of mutiny within its rank and file" (ibid, p.34).

Syed Ahmed's commentary proves this thesis's core argument that only those religious frontiers from which a threat emanates is accepted as such by the grieving party. Syed

[20] The Causes of the Mutiny (1858), The History of the Mutiny (1858) and the Loyal Mohammadans of India (1860).

[21] Syed Ahmed got 500 copies of the pamphlet in Urdu and dispatched them to the British Government in England.

[22] Defined as a mental map of tragedies that occurred to a group's ancestors. See Volkan, V. (1997). *Bloodlines: From ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism.* Boulder, CO: Westview.

Ahmed in his pamphlet addressed the allegation that Persia and Russia incited the mutiny in India; he refuted this charge in his pamphlet and argued that it cannot be the case as "Difference between Indians and Persians is like the difference between Catholics and Protestants; it is as if day and night are gathered in one place; If this scenario is unthinkable than the charge of incitement is also untenable" (Khan, 1858, p.27). Despite the existence of an external religious frontier among India, Persia and Russia there was no threat to the Muslim identity emanating from those frontiers. Nor did the political leaders use "speech act" to securitize such a frontier. Thus the identity of the Muslims of India was not much influenced by Persia and Russia. It was only in the domestic realm where Muslims of India were threatened by the advancing British Raj. This threat was portrayed as an existential threat by the securitizing actors.[23] Buzan argues that "identity itself is conservative in nature" and given identity's conservative nature, it is possible to portray any possible challenge or change as a threat to the identity (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). Thus the policies of the British East India Company as summarized in Syed Ahmed's pamphlet were the threats endangering the Muslim identity.

Regarding the domestic nature of the threats in his pamphlet, Syed Ahmed recognized the religious frontiers when he argued that British East India Company was an outsider disconnected from the way of the locals. This analysis was accepted by the Muslims of India, which created incongruity between the British East India Company and people of Hindustan (Khan, 1858, p.34-35). In his view, the original cause of the revolt was the absence of Indians in the legislative councils while everything else was just a branch from the same root (ibid, p.35). However, he later adds to his position, arguing that the revolt was based on five principles (1) misinformation against the government (2) issuance of policies incongruent with Indian government and Indians; (3) government's disconnect from the condition of the masses; (4) refutation by government of policies which was binding on them; and (5) disorganization and mismanagement of the army (ibid, p.39). Surprisingly, Syed Ahmed takes an about turn in his argument; he abandons his "lack of political participation in legislative assemblies" argument and proposes that the foremost reason of the revolt was the implementation of policies contrary to the religious principles of the Indians (Ibid, p.40). He argues that the perception was such in India that slowly and gradually policies were being implemented which resulted in people moving away from religion in return for better economic opportunities; thus, a threat of identity subjugation was

[23] Actors who securitize issues by declaring something-referent object-existentially threatened. Buzan et al, 1998.

evident. Syed Ahmed lends credibility to the argument of threats being entrenched through speech act by suggesting that "before the revolt, religious discussion became heightened" and that "government appointed and financed missionaries to preach gospel". The proselytizing activities of the missionaries expanded to schools and villages which further sensitized the religious communities of India (ibid, p.42).

According to Syed Ahmed, Muslims felt aggrieved more than the Hindus by such British overtures. In drawing the religious frontier between Hindus and Muslims here, he argued that "unlike Muslims, Hindus loosely followed their religion; they were unaware of their religion's creed. This did not create any resentment in their heart when treated unjust by the British" (ibid, p.47). But Muslims followed their religion as ordained by God, with the sense of reward and punishment. Thus, this saddened the Muslims more than the Hindus. He further explains the active participation of Muslims in the revolt (ibid, p.47). Here, he unintentionally drew two religious frontiers, between Muslims and the British on the one hand and between Muslims and the Hindus on the other.

Syed Ahmed also framed the argument in economic terms and showed that it impacted Muslims to a great extent. He argued that the government was ignorant of the suffering of the masses which inculcated hatred for the government. Accordingly, there existed overwhelming poverty among Indians, particularly of the Mohammadens (ibid, p.59).[24] For him, it was Muslims who worked in government jobs while Hindus and other minorities were historically in other professions (ibid, p.59). Thus, after the Mutiny, the crackdown on Muslims saw them being deprived of economic opportunities and government titles (ibid, p.70). Finally, the straw that broke the camel's back was the chewing of rifle cartridges made out of fat derived from cow and pig. Hindu soldiers objected as they saw cows as a sacred animal while Muslims objected to touching pig as it is forbidden in Islam. Syed Ahmed makes a poignant observation that the soldiers were disheartened at the harsh treatment meted out to Barak Pur Platoon for denying the use of the cartridge as they were only trying to safeguard their religion and were innocent of any wrongdoing (ibid, p.79).

Thus, Syed Ahmed showed the mutiny as a "chosen trauma" that resulted in the falling of Muslims from heaven. In his pamphlet he was able to demarcate the religious frontier between the Muslims and the British government and the threat the latter posed to the former. His pamphlet was an attempt of a speech act in convincing the British government that Muslims were not solely responsible for the tragedy that befell India. A loosely

[24] Mohammadens are followers of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H).

interpreted Muslim identity was taking shape against a foreign ruler that was here to stay. How Syed Ahmed couped up with these developments and how he influenced the Muslim identity under such conditions will be discussed in detail below.

2.6 Syed Ahmed and Response to the Threat

2.6.1 Muslim Renaissance

Syed Ahmed was cognizant of the fact that Muslims were lagging behind mainly because of self-imposed restrictions of religion. Moreover, after the events of 1857, he wanted to prove that Muslims were not against the British crown but the "Loyal Mohammadens" (Khan, 1860) and that Islam had the capacity to adapt to the changing times. However, strict adherence to the religious dogma made any attempt at renaissance difficult. Capturing the religious mode of the time, Syed Ahmed stated that in India, culture and traditions have fused with religion such that nothing can be undertaken without fruitless religious debates. As he expressed in the statement below:

> Tell them to leave something, the response will be that it is a pious deed and tell them to learn something; someone will respond that it is forbidden by religion. Thus, we are forced to undertake religious debate in order to teach civilization and moral values.[25]

As the above discussion reflects, the religious frontier was reinforced because of two reasons: First, Muslims were unwilling to adopt modern education as they rejected the secular education of the British. Second, they viewed the British government with suspicion. Syed Ahmed wanted to rectify both these tendencies among the Muslims. Syed Ahmed, in this regard, can be dubbed as the man who initiated the "The Muslim Renaissance" in India after the events of 1857. Syed Ahmed's strategy to avoid the threat of cultural assimilation was not an all out rejection of modern values and education but a reconciliation of Islam with European ideals. This was only possible through acquiring modern education.

> My attention has always been directed towards the education of my brother Mahomedans, for from education I anticipate much benefit for my people, for Hindustan, and for the Government (Khan, 1888, p.2).

In jump-starting the renaissance, Syed Ahmed wholeheartedly advocated modern education. He established a translation society in 1863 at Ghazipur which was renamed as Scientific Society and later shifted to Aligurh in 1864 (Graham, 1885, p.36). The purpose of the society was the translation from Western literature so that people of India can benefit from it.

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[25] *Tehzeeb ul Ikhlaq* (The Social Reformer) Vol.3, No.1 (Moharram 1289) [March 1872], pp.5.

Syed Ahmed was of the opinion that the secret of England's rise lies in the fact that arts and science work exist in the language of the country.

Although a lifelong advocate of education, Syed Ahmed's visit to England made him a great admirer of English society. In a letter addressed to the secretary of the Scientific Society at Aligarh in1869, Syed Ahmed expressed how impressed he was with the English way of life and how disappointed he was by the condition of native Indians.

> I can truly say that the natives of India, high and low, merchants and petty shopkeepers, educated and illiterate, when contrasted with the English in education, manners, and uprightness, are as like them as a dirty animal is to an able and handsome man (Graham, 1885, p.89).

He compared the people of India to "animal" and "imbecile brutes" and approved of English's contempt for Indians, "We have no right to courteous treatment" he wrote in his letters (ibid, p.89). His time in London made him believe that if Muslims do not adopt modern education, they will be forgotten in the sands of time.

Upon his return from England in 1870,[26] Syed Ahmed started his endeavors for the renaissance. He took a number of steps in this regard. First, he set up a journal "The Social Reformer" (*Tehzeeb ul ikhlaq)* and wrote extensively on the need of religious and modern education going hand in hand. He set up a school at Aligarh in 1875, which later expanded into a college and a university. He established the Muhammadan Educational Conference, which acted as a tool for organizing Muslims of all the provinces of India. Finally, he used this educational infrastructure to keep Muslims away from politics. This was the foundation for the renaissance movement which later was known as Aligarh Movement (Jain, 1965). Syed Ahmed's objective behind the journal "Social Reformer" was the moral reformation of the Muslims. He took inspiration from similar journals of England, namely "The Theatre" and "The Spectator". He was inspired by the editors of those journals as to how they were able to highlight the social evils in England and suggested remedies.[27] However, Syed Ahmed expressed his dismay that in India, one has to put up with religious debates when arguing about social evils and change.

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[26] Syed Ahmed went to England in 1869 with his son. His Son, Sayyid Mohammad Mahmood was awarded a scholarship to study in England.

[27] *Tehzeeb ul Ikhlaq* (The Social Reformer) Vol.3, No.1 (Moharram 1289) [March 1872], pp.5.

> Steele and Edison were fortunate that people would read their writings and appreciate them. It is our misfortune that people read our writings in India and claims them to be opposed to religion.[28]

Nevertheless, he expressed hope that "We do not say that through this poor paper we will bring about the change in India that Steele and Edison brought in England, but we say we will do our best to do our duty".[29] Keeping in line with this objective, he extensively wrote through the platform of the "Social Reformer" on education, religion and fealty to the British. The crux of the journal was that modern education for Muslims is futile without religious education,[30] and that Islam and its ideals, if given the chance, can be synchronized with the modern times.[31] Finally, the Muslims should express allegiance to the British as the English were the new rulers of India.

Syed Ahmed set up a school in Aligarh in 1875 which was later expanded into a college in 1877 called as MAO College (Mohammadans Anglo Oriental College). This college further expanded into Aligarh University in 1920. The fact that the college was named "Mohammadan" reflected that it was for Muslims. Although Syed Ahmed was not a communalist, the name indirectly implied a communal angle and religious educational frontier. The college prepared Muslims for Civil Service Exams, Engineering, M.A and LL.B (Jain, 1965, p. 42). What set Aligarh apart from other educational institutions set up by Muslims was the school's emphasis on acquiring Western education and moving away from oriental sciences. However, owing to the reservations of Muslim families, religious education was made part of the curriculum. In addition, the college was residential in nature, bringing together Muslim students from all over India. Thus, the youth would live, dine and study together at a college that was established purely for the education of the Muslims of India. This institution had a national character and its students formed a strong community.

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[28] ibid, pp.5.

[29] ibid, pp.5.

[30] *Tehzeeb ul Ikhlaq* (The Social Reformer) Vol.1, No.2 (1287 Shawal) [December 1870], pp.10, Jamia Millia Islamia, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi.

[31] *Tehzeeb ul Ikhlaq* (The Social Reformer) Vol.1, No.2 (1287 Zikkad) [January 1871], pp.27, Jamia Millia Islamia, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi.

Syed Ahmed was of the view that Muslims had always had high honor as they excelled in a particular element of the time that brought these honors. With the British, he argued it was education that would bring such honor, "I believe that without high education it is impossible now to acquire honor" (Khan, 1888, page 66). Moreover, in his speech at Meerut, Syed Ahmed told the crowd that Muslims have gained little from educational infrastructure set up by the British government. The underlying reason, he claimed, was that those institutions did not impart religious education which Muslims thought was a sine qua non for their identity (ibid, p 67). Thus, Muslims saw modern education without religious knowledge as useless and a threat while the British viewed uneducated Muslims as a threat to their governance.

Speaking on how education may aid in creating a"*Qaum*",[32] Syed Ahmed wanted to inculcate in the Mohammadens two more things: character, national feeling and sympathy (ibid, p.70). Thus, if members of a community are educated together in close proximity, they will develop these aspects and create a "*Qaum"*. He proved his assertion through Prophet Muhammad's order that believers gather in mosques five times a day, on Fridays and on Eid. Such actions in Syed Ahmed's words "create unity and draw a picture of the nation on the heart" (ibid, p.70). Another tool to organize the scattered Muslims was the Muhammadan Educational Conference. By now Syed Ahmed was able to direct the Muslims towards education but the community itself was not organized. Moreover, he was aware that not everyone can be a scholar among the Muslims. Thus, there was a need for a platform where the educated Muslims of different professions can come together and discuss the future of the Muslim community.

In this regard, the Muhammadan Educational Conference was formed in 1886 (Jain, 1965) which was later renamed as Muhammadan Anglo Oriental Educational Conference.[33] Bringing together Muslims from all provinces of India, the senior leadership consisted of elites (Raees and Nawabs) of the Muslim community followed by working professionals. Syed Ahmed himself led the conference from 1886 to 1897 as the secretary and conducted eleven sessions (ibid, p.78). This conference was used as a platform to guide the Muslim community towards a set goal while the Aligarh College established by Syed Ahmed was the

[32] Qaum here refers to a community and not a nation. Syed Ahmed viewed Muslims as a community in India.

[33] Resolution number 3 adopted in 10th session in 1895.

machinery to achieve those goals. In their nascent stages, both organizations needed each other to reach out to Muslims of India.

Jain highlights that Mohammadan Educational Conference was educational in character and had three main objectives. First was the encouragement of Western sciences and literature among the Mohammadans. Second was the revival and encouragement of Islamic teachings through old means of learning such as maktabs and Quranic schools. Third was to promote historical research and preserve ancient literature (ibid, p.74). The educational aspect of the conference was emphasized to keep Muslims away from politics. This was in line with Syed Ahmed's policy of pleading allegiance to the British government. However, indirectly the conference did work as a platform for the political organization of the Muslims as education was considered the passport to political power.

Despite criticism from various quarters regarding the actual achievements of the conference, this platform did succeed in generating a feeling of solidarity among Muslims. Muslims from all over India would meet annually based on their need to acquire education and being part of a single religious community. There were scholars who opposed Syed Ahmed's approach; one such Persian Islamic scholar was Jamaludin Al-Afghani. He called for Hindu-Muslim unity to get rid of British rule but as Ayesha Jalal argues, it was "Syed Ahmed's policy that held sway" (Bose & Jalal, 1997, p. 81). Thus, Syed Ahmed can be credited that through his speech act, he highlighted the threat and the response to that threat by the Muslims. Muslims accepted his viewpoint and responded by acquiring education and abandoned opposition to the British. This organization around education and religious lines and proving fidelity to the British naturally flowed into the opposition of Muslims to joining politics. Syed Ahmed was defining the Muslim identity in response to the other that was not Muslim in India.

2.6.2 Muslim Opposition to Politics

Syed Ahmed throughout his life advised Muslims to refrain from politics and agitating against the British government. However, in his famous pamphlet, "Causes of the Indian Revolt", Syed Ahmed argued that it was the absence of Indians in the legislative councils that created a rift between people and the government that led to the revolt. It is interesting to note that on the one hand Syed Ahmed identified the problem as lack of political participation but on the other hand he advised the opposite.

In addition, many a scholar have pointed out that Muslim Nationalism was the brain child of Syed Ahmed (Al Mujhaid, 1999; Malik, 1968). As scholars point out, Syed Ahmed laid out a distinct Muslim identity with a focus on education and opposition to politics and was able to create a nation where a community existed" (Symond 1949, Aziz 1967). However, he is also

assumed to be the one responsible for dividing India. He has been considered as the person who sowed the seeds of communalism in the hearts and minds of Muslims. Mehta and Pathwardan hold the British government's divide-and-rule policy responsible for this communalism. They argue that Syed Ahmed was a tool in the hands of Mohammadan Anglo Oriental College's English Principles and that he turned into a communalist (Metha and Pathwardan, 1942, Prasad, 1946, p. 99). However, there are also scholars who disagree with this view but at the same time blame the divide and rule policy of the British in fomenting communalism in India (Varma, 1946, p. 39). The case is open for interpretation.

This section will first explain the contradiction in Syed Ahmed's stance in opposing politics and simultaneously challenge the above views. It is argued instead that Syed Ahmed was indeed a nationalist in the first place as he spoke of Hindu-Muslim unity in India. But it is also true that he spoke more about his coreligionists. The underlying reason for propagating the Muslim cause was not because he was a communalist but because he wanted to prove to the British government that Muslims were a loyal subject of the crown. This, in his view, would ensure peace in India and an environment in which Muslims will flourish.

A thorough analysis of his speeches shows how Syed Ahmed securitized politics as a threat to the Muslims through his speech acts. He initially argued that Muslim and Hindus are both part of the same nation. He wrote a piece on Hindu-Muslim unity where he compared India to a beautiful bride and said that Hindus and Muslims were the two eyes of the bride. Her beauty can only be maintained if both eyes remain safe and equal, else the bride will be squinted (ibid, p.55). He even went further and encouraged Muslims to let go of cow slaughter if it brings unity between the two communities. In stressing the unity between the two, he stated the following

> We ate the harvest from the same land, drank the water of the same rivers, and breathed the same air of the country. Thus there is no distinction between a Hindu and a Muslim. Just like Aryan people are called Hindus. Similarly, Muslims can be called Hindus meaning those who live in Hindustan. (Gujrati, 1898, p. 55)

Hali, in his biography of Syed Ahmed, claims that his attitude towards Hindu-Muslim unity changed after the formation of the India National Congress(INC) in 1885 and the Hindi-Urdu Controversy (Hali,(1901),2000,p.312). Even before the formation of INC and the language controversy Syed Ahmed was against the introduction of representative institutions on the basis of elections as practiced in England. His stance remained the same throughout his three famous speeches, given in 1883, 1887 in Lucknow and 1888 in Meerut. The first speech given at the proceedings of council of the governor general of India 1883 on the

"Central Provinces Local Self Government Bill" lays out in clear terms what he thinks of self government in India on election basis. Although he gave his blessing to the passing of the bill but made a few predictions which are worth mentioning. These predictions played a role in creating awareness among the Muslims of northern-India about their political future. As mentioned, he did not wish to create a communal division between Hindus and Muslims but only to highlight the futility of the introduction of representative institutions in India. He was convinced that India was not ready for such a form of governance. "I am convinced that no part of India has yet arrived at the stage when the system of representation can be adopted, in its fullest scope, even in regard to the local affairs".[34] His argument was based on the fact that India differed from England in its socio-political context as "the present socio-political condition of India is the outcome of centuries of despotism and misrule, of the dominance of race over race, of religion over religion". Thus, in such an environment, there exist people of different races and creeds divided by religion and customs and wealth. In couching his argument for the support of the Muslims, he stated as follows "One community may be fully alive to the importance of securing representation on the local boards and district councils, whilst the other may be wholly indifferent to such matters".[35]

Syed Ahmed was of the view that modern education created a homogenous England where distinction of caste and race were laid to rest however; this was not the case in India. India was still grappling with these distinctions and if elections are held on the principles as applied in England there it will only be a recipe for disaster.

He remarked

> The larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community, and the ignorant public would hold the government responsible for introducing measures which might make the differences of race and creed more violent than ever.[36]

In this context, the first threat he identified was a larger community dominating the smaller community that is Hindus dominating Muslims. Second, Syed Ahmed did not want this to create a rift between the British and the Muslims. The local self government bill would

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[34] Extract from Proceedings of the council of Governor General of India 1883, Quoted in R, Coupland, "*The Indian Problem* ", Oxford University Press (1944).

[35] ibid, pp.153.

[36] ibid, pp.154.

empower majority communities, leaving behind Muslims who are unprepared for such a responsibility. This will create dissatisfaction and might lead to a repeat of 1857. Thus, Syed Ahmed opposed representative institutions on electoral bases.

Syed Ahmed did not stop here as he whole heartedly opposed involvement in politics and forbade Muslims to do the same. In his landmark speech in Lucknow,[37] Syed Ahmed set the rudder for the Muslim community with regard to the government and political environment of the day. First, he disagreed withthe INC demand to conduct civil service exams in India,[38] stating that India is not ready for it and that "evils will follow" if such a policy is adopted. He was of the view that "Men of good family would never like to trust their lives and property to people of low rank with whose humble origin they are well acquainted" (ibid, p.9). Dissecting the issue further, Syed Ahmed established that unlike England and Scotland that is one nation, India comprises different nations such as Hindus, Bengalis and Mahrattas. Morever, Mohammadans[39] lagged behind in English education from Hindus and Bengalis alike (ibid, p.11). If competitive exams were to be introduced, Muslims would be marginalized. Syed Ahmed disagreed on the second demand that a section of Viceroy Council be elected by Indians. He argued that Hindus, numerically outweigh Mohammadans:

> It is certain the Hindu members will have four times as many because their population is four times as numerous. Therefore we can prove by mathematics that there will be four votes for the Hindu to every one vote for the Mahomedan. And now how can the Mahomedan guard his interests? (ibid, p.12)

He rejected this suggestion based on Muslims lack of numerical strength, poor educational background, and even wealth if that was a criterion in the election of the legislative councils. Syed Ahmed was adamant that such a policy will bring more harm than good to the British government. Contrary to the received wisdom, Syed Ahmed opposed representative institutions not because Hindus will dominate but that it would create governance problems for the British government. In response to INC demands, he stated:

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[37] Speech on 28th December, Lucknow 1887 at the Mohammadan Educational Conference, quoted in "*Sir Syed Ahmed on the Present State of Indian Politics*", printed at the Pioneer Press, 1888.

[38] Exams for the Indian Civil Service were held in England. Candidates had to travel to England from India to undertake the exam.

[39] Syed Ahmed's reference to Muslims.

> The result of these unrealizable and impossible proposals can be only this, that for a piece of sheer nonsense the hearts of everybody will be discontented with Government, and everybody will believe that Government exerts over us a tyrannical rule, and turns a deaf ear to our requests. And thus anger and excitement will spread throughout the people, and the peace of the country will be destroyed (ibid, p.15).

Finally, Syed Ahmed was against handing over the budget of India to Indians on the ground that Indians were not knowledgeable of foreign policy and war. Thus, it would lead to disaster if the budget was taken over. He quipped, "How ridiculous then for those who have never seen a battlefield, or even the mouth of cannon, to want to prepare the Budget for the army?" (ibid, p.20)

Syed Ahmed, through his Aligarh movement, had hammered the narrative into Muslim minds that they lagged in education. He hypothesized a scenario, that if representative institutions are introduced in India then Muslims will be sidelined on three fronts. Thus, his opposition to joining politics was understandable.

The second threat of parting ways with the British was interlinked to the first threat of joining agitational politics alongside INC against the government. Syed Ahmed was a first hand witness to the tragedy which befell the Muslim community after the mutiny of 1857. He was afraid that given the current appalling educational and economic status of Muslims, joining politics will be detrimental to their cause. His speech in Meerut in 1888 highlights his concerns and can be divided into three parts in this regard. In the first part he assailed the Bengalis and Hindus for agitating through the INC platform and advised Muslims to refrain from joining the same. In the second part, he discussed the various scenarios contemplating self government and refuted all of them. Finally, he defended the need for the British government to continue in India and refuted the demands of Hindus and Bengalis on the grounds that the INC does not represent the whole of India.

Highlighting his reservations against the INC, Syed Ahmed alleged that Muslims are either being paid or pressured to join the INC by the Bengalis and Hindus (Khan, 1888, p.32). He said those Muslims who have joined did so of their own volition and if Muslims join INC, it does not mean the entire Muslim community have joined the cause (ibid, p.34). In the same speech, he advised Hindus not to join the INC with the intention of suppressing Muslim rituals which Hindus did not like (ibid, p.35). Moreover, Syed Ahmed acknowledged the presence of two nations in India:

> These proposals of INC are extremely inexpedient for a country which is inhabited by two different nations who drink from the same well, breathe the air of the same city, and depend on each other for its life. To create animosity between them is good neither for peace, nor for the country, nor for the town (ibid, p.37)

In drawing the religious frontiers, Syed Ahmed asked pointed questions in his speech of Meerut. For instance if Britain departs, "in whose hands shall the Administration and the Empire of India rest?" and in such a scenario, "is it possible that under these circumstances two nations the Mahomedans and the Hindus-could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power ?", to which he responded "Certainly, not" (ibid,37). Syed Ahmed was of the view that one nation will conquer the other upending the peace in India. Moreover, if Hindus conquer Muslims, he warned that Muslim brothers (the Pathan) will come out like swarms of locusts and make rivers of blood flow (ibid, p.38). Here Syed Ahmed established the threat that the Muslims faced and even narrated a violent response to it.

In the third part of the speech, Syed Ahmed justified the presence of the British government, an army and administration in India. He opposed giving the right to elect members of legislative councils to Indians as this would only bring "misfortune on us and India" (ibid, p.47). Syed Ahmed asserted that no empire matched the benevolence exhibited by Britain towards India. His message was simple to his coreligionists in terms of the government:

> Make yourselves her friends, and prove to her that your friendship with her is like that of the English and the Scotch. After this what you have to claim, claim-on condition that you are qualified for it (ibid, p.49)

It is interesting to note that Syed Ahmed's response to the threat of reprisal from the British was reconciliation which he couched in religious language. For instance, he called the British government as the "people of book" and said that "God has said that no people of other religions can be friends of Mahomedans except the Christians, he who has read the Koran and believes it, he can know that our nation cannot expect friendship and affliction from any other people". However, it is important to mention that Syed Ahmed was willing to accept political subjugation under Christians as it was ordained by God. "We ought not on account of their religion but because of the order of God to be friendly and faithful to them" (ibid, p.50). He continued, "Our Prophet has said that if God place over you a black negro slave as ruler you must obey him" (ibid, p.50). In a way, Syed Ahmed focused on acquiring modern education yet highlighted the relationship between the government and the Muslims from a religious angle. This also goes on to prove the point that political leaders create the threat perception. Although the British threatened Muslims interests, Syed Ahmed argued otherwise. Hence, if Muslims would have joined politics with INC, they would have gained nothing as they would have been numerically subdued by the Hindus and at the same time disparaged by the British for breaking ranks with the government. In Syed Ahmed's view, Muslims were dealt a losing hand and the only way out of it was to stay aloof from politics.

2.7 Why Did Syed Ahmed See A Threat?

The question then arises is why only these two threats-dominated by Hindus under the INC and breaking rank with the British again- were flagged by Syed Ahmed. The answer lies in the circumstances from the year 1857 till the passage of the Minto-Morley Reforms in 1909 which granted separate electorates to Muslims in provinces where they were in a minority. A few of the significant events that took centre stage will be briefly discussed. Syed Ahmed's interpretation of the largre political environment of the India and based on the following events encouraged him to pursue his policy of cooperation with the British and opposing the INC. First, Representative political institutions were slowly and gradually being introduced in India. Second, the Queen's proclamation of 1858 took over the territories of India from the British East India Company, guaranteed rights to the Princess as that of the Queen's own and ensured that there would be no more territorial annexations.[40] Third, on its heels came the Councils act of 1861[41] which empowered the Indians in the legislative councils. However, the same legislative council under Lord Lytton[42] passed the Vernacular Press Act in 1878 aimed at curbing Indian, non-English newspapers that harbored anti-British sentiment. Finally, there was the constitutional advance in the form of Councils Act of 1892. This act saw the enlargement of the Provincial Councils and empowered them to discuss issues of provincial budget and administration.

Technological innovation in transport and print worked in tandem with the constitutional advancement in India. Desai, commenting on how railroad technology brought India under Britain's control, argues that nationalist movement was inconceivable had it not been because of railroad. It not only compressed time and distance for the millions of Indians but also spread ideas and ideologies far and wide (Desai, 1946, p. 112). Similarly, the advancement in print technology and its use for nationalist causes prodded Syed Ahmed to

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[40] Complete text "East India Proclamations printed for the House of Commons on 13th November 1908" available at https://archive.org/details/queens-proclamation.

[41] Governor General's executive council will consist of five members, three of whom had been in Indian service for ten years. Further Governor General can appoint at minimum 6 and maximum 12, not less than half of whom must be non-officials. See Lovett, "History of Indian Nationalism", 1920, pp.15.

[42] He was the Viceroy of India from 1876 to 1880.

keep Muslims away from politics. A plethora of pro government,[43] nationalist[44] and liberal newspapers[45] were printed in India. However, as Desai (ibid, p.112) argues, the British government itself lacked clarity on whether to support the press or curtail it.

It was the communal conditions from 1857 to 1906 that encapsulated other aspects of the period. In tandem with the conditions of the time, revivalist movements were undertaken by both Hindus and Muslims. Movements such as Atmiya Samaj in 1817, which later bloomed into Brahma Sabah, Brahma Samaj founded by Devendranath Tagore in Bengal, Arya Samaj founded in 1877, the Theosophical Society in 1875 and Ramakrishna Mission aimed at strengthening the Hindu identity (Evans, 2013, p. 45) appeared. Muslims on the other hand also undertook revivalist movements such as Barelwi, Wahhabism and Faraiziyah with a claim to cleanse Islam of superstitions. However, Sayeed argues that the Hindu revivalist movements were "more anti-Muslim than anti-British" (Sayeed, 1968, p.21). Syed Ahmed during this time was pushing the Muslims to acquire modern education but was impacted by it. The biographer of Syed Ahmed, argues that Syed Ahmed wanted cordial relations between Hindus and Muslims and preferred unity of the communities over cow slaughter.[46] However, Syed Ahmed seemed to have lost his hope of Hindu/Muslim unity in 1867 when Hindu organizations protested against Urdu and Persian (Hali, 1901(2000) p.312).

Communal violence was also one aspect that caught Syed Ahmed's attention. In the year 1893, riots happened in Bombay between the Muslims and the Hindus. Lovett argues that following the riots, a movement started for the repairing of the tomb of Shivaji, a famous Maratha hero who committed the murder of a Muslim General, Afzal Khan (Lovett, 1920, p. 47). On the one hand, Syed Ahmed was willing to let go of cow slaughter for the sake of unity, on the other hand extremist Hindus were exhibiting communal tendencies. Thus, in an environment under constant flux Syed Ahmed was convinced that joining the INC will only weaken the political position of Muslims in the longer run.

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[43] The Statesman, the Pioneer and the Times of India.

[44] The Bombay Chronicle, The Hindustan Times, National Herald and National Call are a few.

[45] The Hindu, The leader, The Indian Social Reformer.

[46] The Cow is sacred to Hindus while Muslims slaughter cows on Eid ul Adha.

To sum it up, Syed Ahmed laid down the domestic religious frontiers which were later perceived as a threat for the Muslims of undivided India. As his speeches and writings show, Syed Ahmed saw the multitude of differences between Hindus and Muslims. He clarified that although Muslims were lagging in modern education and economic opportunities, the road to redemption was an Islamic renaissance. This renaissance combined with the markers of religion fortified the notion of the non-Muslims as the other with Hindus at the top. Thus, a domestic religious frontier backed by political, social and economic cleavages was strengthened and led to the mobilization of Muslims around the identity marker of Islam. The empirical evidence of this subtle communal divide came to fruition in 1906, when after his death, Muslims formed the All India Muslim league in Dacca at the annual Mohammadan's Educational Conference; a conference which was founded by Syed Ahmed urging Muslims to avoid politics.

2.8 Maulana Maududi (1903-1979)

Maulana Maudidi, while acknowledging the presence of religious frontiers as understood by Syed Ahmed, had his own understanding of conditions of Muslims. In his opinion, the decline of Islam in the future of India was the real issue. The threat to Islam was anything that was unislamic from his perspective.

First and foremost it was the secularization brought about by the British that threatened Islam. Maududi criticized the material aspect of scientific progress carrying elements of both harm and good.[47] He conceptualized secularism in terms of Western education, modern nationalism, secular constitution and a secular state. He argued that the modern English education was diluting the identity of the Muslims. This flowed into the Muslims organizing themselves around the lines of modern nationalism which he abhorred. Maududi saw different types of nationalism as a problem and divisive in nature.[48] From this viewpoint, his opposition went against joining the INC, the AIML and the idea of Pakistan. As per Maududi, these were the extension of secular principles against which Muslims had to safeguard themselves. He was of the view that in order to safeguard the Muslims from subjugation and annihilation, Muslims should return to the original scriptures, demand the departure of the British, and establish an Islamic state. This was only possible if they formed a vanguard Islamic party responsible for the upbringing and reformation of Muslims.

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[47] *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 12 (1) (Muharram 1357 Hijri) (March 1938), pp 42.

[48] *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 3 (1) (Rajab 1352 Hijri) [September 1933], pp 40.

This section will analyze Maududi's view of the religious frontier which he envisaged between Islam and Secularization. Like, İsmet Özel (Yıldız & Çengel, 2022) understanding of ummah and Turkish identity, Maududi did not apply this frontier for the global Islam, in fact he was concerned with the opposition playing out between Islam and secularization in India. This made this religious frontier domestic in nature. For the purpose of clarity, the scope of secularization will be limited to themes of danger to the Islamic way of life in India, such as perils of modern education, Muslim identity's incompatibility with modern nationalism, threat from domination of Hindus after British departure, downside of obtaining a secular state, and finally a solution to counter these threats. In order to establish the internal religious frontiers and threat of subjugation to the Muslims, Maududi's writings in Tarjuman ul Quran[49] will be evaluated as part of the speech act (Buzan et al., 1998). This analysis of his writings concludes that Maududi's worldview depicted a sort of clash between secularization and Islam in the context of undivided India. This conclusion sets itself apart from studies of other authors on Maudidi and his religio-political thought. For instance, Vali Nasr's biography of Maulana Maududi argues that it was Islamic Revivalism that guided Maududi throughout his religious and political career (Nasr, 1996). Peter Hartung's commentary on Maududi focuses on the ideologisation of Islam (Hartung, 2013) while Ali Usman Qasmi diverges from Nasr's opinion and divides Maududi's work into three themes: civilization, nationalism and the state (Qasmi & Robb, 2017, Chapter 4). This work will argue that Maududi saw everything unislamic in India as a frontier. He acted as a prophet of doom arguing that accepting modernity will lead to irreparable loss to the Muslim identity.

Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) was born in the princely state of Hyderabad Deccan. Instead of opting for a religious education through Madrassa, Maududi started of his career in journalism and exhibited great understanding of Islamic scriptures and problems of the time. His experience in journalism along with a strong grip of Islam gave him an edge over other contemporary ulemas of his time. He was concerned about the declining status of Muslims in the political realm of undivided India. In this regard, Maududi vociferously debated about the future constitution of India and how the interest of Muslims will be safeguarded after the departure of the British. However, he attributed this decline of Muslims to distancing from religion. Maulana Maududi's core argument revolved around the future of Islam in India. His main assertion was that the true form of Islam never actually made it to South Asia. That an adulterated form of Islam, mixed with Hindu traditions was in vogue

[49]This was a journal started by Maududi in 1933 from Hyderabad, Deccan. The journal not only emphasized religious issues but also commented on the political situation of undivided India.

and the only panacea was to return to the roots. According to Maududi, "The foundation of Islamic civilization in Hindustan has been weak since the beginning".[50] He reasoned that "Since Hindustan was on the borderlines of every Islamic empire, so only those who abandoned the true principles came here seeking refuge". It followed that, "by the time the real strand of Islam reached Hindustan in the sixth century, Islam had already been adulterated".[51] In his view, the Muslims of India were not practicing the original Islam as only those elements and aspects of Islam reached South Asia which were not acceptable to the original scriptures or those that were outgrowths.

2.8.1 Maududi and His Conception of Islamic Civilization

In order to materialize his argument, Maududi tried to reassert the waning Muslim identity in the face of modern education and nationalism, rising Hindu influence, the secular principles of the AIML, and the departing British from India. His program of Islamic Revivalism (Nasr, 1996) weaved together Islamic traditions and Indian Muslim culture into a distinct program that would safeguard Islam and the Muslims in an environment that was under constant flux. Thus, this inquiry argues that the underlying purpose for Islamic Revivalism was his perceived threat to the Islamic Civilization, in the form of secularization.

In line with this concern about Islam's future in India, Maududi propounded his understanding of the Islamic civilization which he saw was under constant siege from secular ideals. From the platform of "*Tarjuman ul Quran*", Maududi started to educate Muslims about the superiority of the Islamic civilization and how it was threatened.[52] His idea of Islamic civilization viewed Islam as a complete system with Allah's sovereignty over the entire universe and men being his vicegerent on earth. This worldview was diametrically opposed to the other world views of the time which favored human control and rationality. Holding such an ideological bent, Maududi not only differed from the Western ideals of governance and organization but also criticized them. For Maududi, Islamic civilization was distinct from its Western counterparts and this created the religious frontier which Maududi fortified through his writings. Maududi argued that, "Western authors and Eastern educated

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[50] See Maududi, M (1937), *Musalman Aur Maujooda Siyasi Kashmakash* (Muslims and the present state of politics), office of Magazine Tarjumanal Quran, Lahore.

[51] Ibid, pp.10

[52] Multiple editions of "Islamic Tehzeeb aur uss ke usul wa mabadi" exist in book form since 1930's.

class view that Islamic civilization is derived from Roman and Greek civilization and that the Arabian mindset has repackaged it into something new".[53]Maududi disagreed with this viewpoint and argued that "Islamic civilization was quintessentially Islamic and not influenced by any foreign influence".[54]Maududi was a vociferous critic of the conceptions regarding government, democracy and role of state as propagated by other political actors of the time. He was diametrically opposed to these Western conceptions because he envisioned a concept of Islamic civilization which was distinct from its Western counterparts. In defining Islamic civilization, Maududi stated in an article in Tarjuman ul Quran in March 1933 the following:

> It is a general consensus that a nation's civilization is its education and values, its skills and jokes, arts and culture, its form of governance but in reality they are not the soul of a civilization.[55]

He continues that these are the end products of a civilization and a civilization should be judged on its soul and not on its materially visible aspects. In establishing the superiority and distinctness of the Islamic civilization, Maududi questions the conception of civilization from various perspectives. He comes to the conclusion that a lasting civilization is based on five aspects: outlook on worldly life, purpose of life, basic belief, individual training, system of mass organization- and that it is only Islam that carries all five of them.[56] Thus, Maududi's conception of Islamic civilization was based on various themes which according to him were only present in Islam and Islam alone. This superiority and distinction of Islamic civilization from others erected a religious frontier. In addition, there was no probability of amalgamation with other modern options prevalent in India at the time. This ruled out any cooperation between Islam and the other thus converting everything else as a threat. When Muslims were lagging behind in education and material developments, Maududi saw that Islamic civilization was under threat from the European civilization. In responding to this threat, he argued for a complete return to the original scripture of Islam and avoid following false prophets and nationalist leaders.

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[53] See *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 3 (1) (Muharram 1352 Hijri) [March 1933], Pp.25

[54] ibid, pp.25

[55] ibid, pp.26

[56] ibid, pp.29

2.8.2 Perceived Threats to the Islamic Civilization

Maududi made it clear that the purpose of his work was the safeguard and progress of the Muslim millat.[57] He asserts that the biggest service to religion and the community was to highlight for Muslims the threats they face and to remind them that the only way out of this abyss was by following the Quran and the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). In highlighting the threats to the Islamic civilization, Maududi operated with the ontological assumption that it had been Britain's policy since day one to break up the Muslims and to economically batter them.[58] Eventually, Muslims will become dependent on the British raj for their survival and adopt their way of life. Maududi sounded the clarion call for Muslims by arguing that if Muslims do not wake up to this reality, they will see with their own eyes how Islamic civilization will be dismantled and there will be nothing that they can do about it. Their younger generations will be soldiers in the army erected to decimate Islam, its creed and its values.[59] Thus, in Barker's words this was a threat of subjugation where the Muslim community was not in control of its own destiny (Barker, 2009, p. 35). Maududi was of the view that responding to this threat will organize Muslims into a coherent body on Islamic lines.

The primary threat to Islamic civilization was the modern Western education which Maududi vehemently denounced and portrayed as an anti thesis of Islam. In his pamphlet, highlighting the political predicaments for Muslims, Maududi argued that Muslims were first deprived of their political and economic ascendency. The way out was to acquire modern Western education which would guarantee economic and political prosperity by way of government jobs and offices.[60] This was the viewpoint of Syed Ahmed and his Aligarh movement from which Maududi departed. Maududi criticized modern education by portraying it as a threat to Islamic creed and values. He hypothesized that modern education distanced the Muslims from Islam and inculcated materialistic values in them. On the one hand, Muslims felt proud in imitating the dress, food, language, speech and names of their Western counterparts.

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[57] See *Musalman Aur Maujooda Siyasi Kashmakash, 1937,* pp.7.

[58] ibid, pp.14.

[59] ibid, pp.10.

[60] ibid, pp.14.

On the other hand, Muslims despised being associated with anything Islamic.[61] Thus, in Maududi's view, modern education brought secular ideals to Muslims which pushed them away from their religion. This in his view would lead to eventual downfall of the Muslims and not the other ways as other modernists were propagating. Hence, modern education was a threat to the Islamic civilization.

Apart from modern education, it was the political environment of the time and other ideologies that posed a serious threat to the Muslim identity. Maududi started his political commentary in 1937, and by this time, the Indian Constitution Act of 1935 was already in vogue. Moreover, provincial elections were also held in 1937 the outcome of which catapulted INC to the corridors of power. Apart from the political environment, the ideology of modern nationalism and communism were also a subject of debate in India. Thus, Maududi was of the view that Muslims must safeguard themselves from multiple threats and Islam was the uniting banner for this task.

Another threat which Maududi highlighted was nationalism.In his article explaining the most significant problems of the modern time, he quotes Lord Lutyen saying,

> Owing to distance from religion and emphasizing on the material benefits brought about by science, the Western world is divided. Thus, it is difficult for Europe to revive its spirit and rid itself of the biggest problem of the time i.e. nationalism.[62]

Maududi wrote a polemic titled "*Islami Qaumiyat*" (Islamic Nationalism) in September 1933. He traced the origins of nationalism to its modern present day form and came to the conclusion that nationalism in its modern form was regressive, divisive, conflict prone and not suited to the Muslims. The alternative was Islam which was free from all such divisive racial elements and spoke of universalism, which was the need of the hour for Muslims to reassert themselves.

In tracing the origins of nationalism, Maududi argued as follows:

> In taking the first step from state of nature to civility, it becomes binding upon humans to cooperate with each other to create a sense of unity. As this cooperation widens, so does the number of people who abide by it.This collectivity is called "Qaum".[63]

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[61] ibid, pp.15-16.

[62] *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 12 (1) (Muharram 1357 Hijri) [March 1938],pp.44

[63] Ibid, pp.37.

Maududi continues that the purpose of this cooperation is to further the common progress. However, when this notion of collectiveness (*qaumiyat*) increases, it also increases the group feeling (*Asabiyyat*); the higher the feeling of collectiveness, the greater the group cohesiveness. Consequently, this creates a distinction between us versus them; it gives way to the other against which the group defends itself.[64] Maududi warned against this divisive characteristic of nationalism and argued that group cohesiveness is based on a number of factors. Maududi highlighted six factors that lead to the creation of "qaum" and the feeling of "Asabiyat" in that qaum, a common race, a common country, a common language, common skin color, common economic system and a common system of governance. This, he argued, had been more or less the basis of unification of all the historical nations.[65] Despite agreeing that these factors did aid in creating strong nations, Maududi counter-argues that the same elements have kept humanity divided and in a constant state of war. Maududi calls this arrangement as the head of evil and corruption (*Shar aur fasaad ka sirchasma*) and ignorant groupness (*asbiyat jahiliyat).*[66] The alternative to nationalism Maududi argues for was Islam as it is all encompassing and embracing. There is no distinction of race, language, land, skin color, economic or governance system in Islam. The only distinction was between the believers and the non-believers. If the Islamic system of organizing a community is established, it will solve the problems that modern day nationalism has introduced in present times. Thus, Maududi staunchly opposed organizing around nationalist lines and favoured the Islamic alternative.

His fear was that because of the female characteristics that Muslims have developed for the last 250 years, it was only a matter of time before Indian nationalism absorbed them.[67] However, it must be mentioned that even after replacing nationalism with Islam principles of organization, conflict and division would not fade away. There would always be a conflict between the believers and the non-believers. In such a case, the religious frontier would now take a broader shape, one where Islam was pitted against anything that did not subscribe to

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[64] Ibid, pp.38.

[65] Ibid, pp.39.

[66] Jahiliya refers to the ignorant practices of pagan Arabs before the arrival of Islam.

[67] *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 11 (5) (Zul al-Qaʿdah 1356 Hijri) [January 1938], Special Ed. pp.21.

its values. For this world view to work, Maududi, however, assumed that the internal differences in Islam will be insignificant, which was not the case.

It was not only Western education and the ideology of nationalism that threatened the Muslim identity. Other factors such as the ascendancy of Hindus through the platform of INC after the provincial victory of 1937 and AIML demand for a separate state in 1940 were also portrayed as a threat for Islam and its true followers. The electoral victory of INC in the 1937 provincial elections sent alarm bells through the rank and file of Muslims who opposed the INC. Moreover, after coming to power, the INC implemented a number of policy initiatives aimed at creating homogeneity among the masses. These policies were viewed by Muslims as a threat to their identity. The Muslim mass contact campaign[68], recitation of Bande Mataram in schools, waiving of the tri-colored INC flag, all were such initiatives. The anti-INC section of Muslims perceived these gestures as eroding their political, cultural and economic clout and Maududi was no different in this regard.

Maududi's viewpoint regarding INC was crystal clear from the beginning. Combined with his opposition to modern Indian nationalism, he criticized Nehru[69] "as being staunchly anti-religious, believer of communism and English in his heart and soul", who is shaping a nationalism which is "Indian in its political sense, communist in its believes, and completely English in the cultural sense".[70] Maududi was fearful that in such an environment, the Muslims will not be able to hold out for long and eventually accept the INC agenda and its leadership. In tracing out the threat of subjugation by Hindu dominance and his opposition in joining INC, Maududi argued that replacing the British government with a Hindu dominated government will not bring any improvement for the Muslims. He acknowledged that the struggle to dislodge the British from India was a noble one, as he argues in his pamphlet, "any person having faith in his heart will not want India to be under British rule".[71] However, Maududi was averse to joining the INC because he believed the reasons for

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[68] Campaign by INC to steer Muslims away from AIML and Jinnah. See The Muslim Mass Contact Campaign: An Attempt at Political Mobilisation by Mushirul Hasan (1986), *Economic and Political Weekly*, Dec. 27, 1986, Vol. 21, No. 52 (Dec. 27, 1986).

[69] Hindu nationalist leader leading the INC against the British.

[70] See *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 11 (5) (Zul al-Qaʿdah 1356 Hijri) [January 1938], Special Ed, pp.21.

[71] ibid,pp.35.

opposing the British were different for Muslims as compared to those of the nationalists. For Maududi believed that, "in opposing the British government, a Muslim's viewpoint is different from that of a nationalist".[72]

However, joining the INC to replace British with another party that promotes falsehood was against the ideals of Islam.[73] If joining hands with INC in the struggle for independence was against Islamic principles, than what if Muslims themselves agitated for independence apart from INC? It seems Maududi was against anyone who would talk of independence based on nationalist conceptions and that included other Muslims as well. In this context, Maududi indirectly pointed fingers at the AIML, its agenda and its leadership of being devoid of Islamic values. For Maududi, there was a distinction between a Muslim and a true believer which he briefly discussed in his pamphlet: evaluation of circumstances and future scenarios (*Halaat ka jaiza aur aainda kay imkanaat).*[74] He highlights four weaknesses of Muslim ignorance of Islam: individualism and disorganization, shamelessness, materialism and finally hypocrisy. He highlights hypocrisy as the main culprit as there are Muslims who profess to the faith but in reality they are the wolves among sheep. These people cause the most damage to the cause of Islam and this is how he viewed the independence struggle of the AIML.

Maududi was incensed by the AIML and its claim to represent the Muslims of India because he thought the leadership of the party was not Islamic in nature but rather hypocritical. He observed that "there is not a single leader in Muslim league, from the league's Quaid-e-Azam to its junior leadership who exercises Islamic mode of thinking. They "are not only ignorant of the meaning and essence of the term Muslim but also unaware of its exalted status".[75] He continued his tirade against the AIML by suggesting that Islam was a movement, and a movement's leader himself should be well aware of its essence, which was

[72] ibid,p.35.

[73] ibid,pp.36.

[74] See *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 11 (5) (Zul al-Qaʿdah 1356 Hijri) [January 1938], Special Ed.pp.25.

[75] *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 10 (3) (Ramazan 1358 Hijri) [November 1939], pp.79.

missing in the case of AIML leadership.[76] After the Lahore Resolution was passed in 1940, Maududi saw the threat of a secular state being materialized under the AIML. [77] He moved on from haranguing the leadership to the idea of Muslim rule in Muslim-majority provinces. Maududi debated whether Pakistan[78] will be based on Islamic principles or Western ideals of governance. In the absence of Islamic principles, it will be *NaPak-istan* (impure land or land of impure).[79] Hence, Maududi not only viewed Hindus with suspicion but also saw the Muslims struggling for independence as a threat to Islam and its soul. For Maududi, the threats were domestic in nature and not external and he framed the response to the domestic threat accordingly.

2.8.3 Response to the Threat

How did Maududi plan to navigate through a treacherous world that was openly hostile to Islam and the Muslims? Maududi gave the solution in one of his writings titled "Our Political Ideals" (*Hamara Siyasi Nasb ul Aain*) and later worked towards it. For Maududi, the ultimate political ideal for Muslims should be the establishment of a house of peace (*Dar ul Islam*).

> As a Muslim our final destination should not be independence alone but such an independence due to which Islam is not only established in Hindustan but also gains respect and is strengthened.[80]

However, he lamented that given the moral weaknesses of Muslims, it was a tall order establishing a purely Islamic state. He stated that, "at minimum Hindustan should be free from the influence of external as well as internal infidels and instead be an independent

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[76] *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 10 (4) (Shawal 1358 Hijri) [December 1939], pp.11.

[77] Also called the Pakistan Resolution where Muslim League demanded a separate majority provinces for Muslims within undivided India.

[78] The original name Pakstan-without an i- was suggested by Chaudhary Rehmant Ali in 1933. See *Now or Never, Are we to live to or perish forever* by Chaudhary Rehmat Ali.

[79] *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 16 (3 and 4) (Rabi ul Awwal and Rabi ul Sani 1359 Hijri) [May, June 1940], pp.11.

[80] *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* 11 (5) (Zul al-Qaʿdah 1356 Hijri) [January 1938], Special Ed, pp.42.

Shuba Dar ul Islam.[81] His Shuba Dar ul Islam, a similar conception to Al Farabi's Virtuous City, envisions that in it Muslims should be stakeholders as Muslims and not as Indians. Moreover, they should have the power to organize their qaum according to Islamic principles, that the governance system of the country be not contrary to Islamic values and civilization, that Muslims should have enough clout in India's policy formation so that India's power may not be used against other Muslim qaums. He concluded by referring once more to the threat of annihilation:

> If we want to remain Muslim and do not want to see what happened to Islam in Spain and Sicily, happening here in India than we have only one way and that is to direct the India struggle for independence from a government of infidels (*Hakumat u Kufar)* towards a just government (*Hakumat e Haq)* and prepare for a sacrificing war which either leads to victory or death.[82]

For Maududi, his political ideals differed from those of the nationalists who only wanted independence for India and the Indians while he wanted independence not only for the Indians but also for the Muslims.

While Syed Ahmed favoured modern education and improvement of Islamic ideals to rise to the occasion, Maududi solicited a return to the scriptures, outright rejection of anything unislamic and safeguard of the Islamic civilization. Maududi saw the domestic religious frontiers and the threats from them and narrated a response to the threat and in turn shaped Muslim identity. Maududi was not successful in shaping the struggle for independence but after the creation of Pakistan, his work was invoked often to define the Muslim identity.

2.9 Jinnah: Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity or Divider in Chief?

The historiography of the Indian independence movement and Pakistan is incomplete without Muhammad Ali Jinnah. While Indian historians chastise Jinnah for dividing India, Pakistani historians hold him in high regard. Jinnah played a decisive role in gaining independence from the British Empire and the partition of India. The historiography of Pakistan treats him as the father of the nation, and the implementer of the Two-Nation theory.

Jinnah was a luminary, a lawyer, a politician and a legislator. By combining these four traits, he was able to achieve the partition of India. It is argued that it was the policy of the British

[81] ibid, pp.43.

[82] ibid, pp.48.

Empire to eventually grant independence status to India. Thus, sooner or later India would be free regardless of India's leaders; however, it was Jinnah who did the impossible.

This impossible feat is best summarized in Stanley Wolpert's words:

> Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation state. Muhammad Ali Jinnah did all three (Wolpert, 1984).

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was born in a Khoja Shia family[83] in Karachi on 25th December 1876. Jinnah's connection to a sect of Shia school of thought also reflects how the Muslim identity was loosely interpreted before partition. This is significant because after the formation of Pakistan, religious nationalism that waxed also questioned whether Shia's were true believers or not. Soon after, he departed for England and there he joined the Lincoln's Inn in 1893 and passed the bar in 1895, only to later return to India in 1896. During his time in England, Jinnah came into contact with the liberal British values in vogue at the time. Jinnah would take keen interest in the political debates and would try following them as much as he can.



Map 3 India before Partition in 1947
Source: Khan, Yasmin, 2017, *The Great Partition, the Making of India and Pakistan*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London.

[83] Minority sect in Islam, also known as Ismailis followers of Aga Khan.



Map 4 India after Partition 1947
Source: Wynbrandt, James, 2009, *A Brief History of Pakistan,* Facts On File Inc, Infobase Publishing, New York.

Jinnah, unlike Syed Ahmed and Maududi, who opposed joining INC by the Muslims, was initially an idealist yet a realist. He believed that the only way to resolve the communal differences between Hindu and Muslims of India was through an inclusive approach. This he defined, as through constitutional safeguards for the minority community which was Muslims. While Syed Ahmed argued religion and education go hand in hand and Maududi gave the clarion call of Islam and Musalaman in danger, Jinnah combined politics and religion. He believed that the religious frontier for Muslims was laced with politics. The threat facing the Muslims was to be underrepresented in a Hindu-majority-country when Britain departed: his first solution to this threat was constitutional safeguards for the Muslims and the revised panacea was the demand for a separate homeland.

This part will seek to make two interventions in the literature on Jinnah. First, the question, if Jinnah was really a secular person, an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity and against division of India, then how come he argued for a separate state on communal basis that contradicted with his secular ideals? Some scholars give an event based approach to Jinnah's

conversion from an idealist to a communalist (Bolitho, 1954; Karim, 2010). Moreover, many a scholar have termed Jinnah a secular person owing to his liberal values which he gained from his early days in Britain. But his anti-imperial stance and belief in Hindu-Muslim unity, led him to join INC in 1906 and refrained from joining All India Muslim League (Ahmed, 1997; Bolitho, 1954; Karim, 2010; Wolpert, 1984). Authors have also divided Jinnah's political career into various water tight compartments or stages ranging from an Indian nationalist to founder of Pakistan (I. Ahmed, 2020) and his conversion from Indian Nationalism to Pakistani separatism (Karim, 2010). However, this theoretical framework departs from this approach. It shows that Jinnah did not have any trouble reconciling his secular and separatist ideals. Moreover, Jinnah was well aware of the religious frontiers and the threats that came from them, so he only altered his response to the threat. Initially, it was to keep Hindus and Muslims united and give Muslims constitutional safeguards, but when that did not work out, Jinnah argued for a separate state for the Muslims of India. In both cases, the threat of subjugation for Muslims was to be decreased. This was only possible through portraying Muslims, their identity, their culture, their right to live as they please under constant threat, not from any external force but from a domestic source i.e. the Hindus under the banner of INC. This is the main contribution to the waxing of religious nationalism theory propounded by Barker, that domestic factors are also significant in creating threats from religious frontiers. Second, despite the political, constitutional, communal and legal battles that ensued between Muslims under AIML and Hindus under INC, Jinnah refrained from capitalizing on the religious frontiers until his return from England in 1934.[84] This does not mean that those frontiers were irrelevant as they mattered to the Muslim community at large; however, it was Jinnah who differed from the popular opinion. This distortion was reconciled when Jinnah took the mantle of the AIML and organized it into an all India party for the provincial elections of 1936-37. The thesis argues that when Jinnah organized AIML at the all India level, only then he understood the pulse of the Muslims and altered his response to the threat i.e. a demand for a separate homeland. Thus, this analysis gives an alternative explanation to orthodox stance that Jinnah went through a metamorphosis.

2.9.1 Religious Frontiers: 1906-1940

This section will briefly highlight the generally accepted religious frontiers facing the Muslims of India from 1906 till 1940. It was in 1906 that AIML was created and in 1940, the

[84] Jinnah went into self-imposed exile in England from 1931 until 1934. He returned in 1934 and again took the charge of AIML.

AIML, under the leadership of Jinnah, presented the Lahore resolution demanding a separate state for the Muslims of India. The perceived threats were later built based on these domestic religious frontiers.

The first significant political religious frontier was the formation of the AIML itself. It was a communal organization speaking for the rights of the Muslims. It was in itself a response to the threat from the politico-religious frontier of Hindu domination via INC. Even Jinnah did not join the AIML until 1913 considering it a communal organization. Bolitho rightly captures the mood when he quotes Sir Percival Griffiths[85]commenting that "Whatever may have been the other effects of the foundation of the Muslim League, it set the seal upon the Muslim belief that their interests must be regarded as completely separate from those of the Hindus, and that no fusion of the two communities was possible" (Bolitho, 1954, p. 45). Second was the partition of Bengal into East and West Bengal in 1905 by the British Raj on administrative grounds. Hindu majority dominated West Bengal while Muslims were in majority in the east of Bengal. Indian nationalists saw this as a British ploy to divide India along religious lines while Muslims welcomed it owing to economic stifling at the hands of Hindu money lenders. To the dismay of many Muslims, the partition was annulled in 1911. Hindus welcomed it while Muslims saw the unreliability of the government and the usefulness of agitational politics. Third was the acceptance of the demand of separate electorates[86] for Muslims which was enshrined in the constitutions of 1909 also known as the Minto-Morley reforms. This acceptance of separate electorates was perceived as fomenting communal differences as Muslims thought they were in a minority so they required adequate safeguards while Hindus saw it as a policy of divide and rule by the British government. Moreover, in 1916, Jinnah was able to bring Muslims and Hindus together when he managed to get the Lucknow Pact signed. INC agreed to separate electorates for the Muslims in this pact. Jinnah's credentials of acting as the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity" were strengthened and although it looked as if unity was being created, on the contrary, communal frontiers were effectively drawn that day. Moreover, INC indirectly recognized AIML as the sole body speaking on behalf of the Muslims.

[85] Sir Percival Griffith was an English Civil Servant stationed in India from 1922-1937. He later became a member of Indian Legislative Assembly from 1937-1947.

[86] Muslims being lesser in numbers than the Hindus, wanted separate elections where a Muslim electoral college will vote for Muslim candidates. This would ensure that Hindu majority does not dominate Muslims.

On the external arena from 1914 onwards, WWI broke out and concluded with the carving up of the Ottoman Empire for the imperial powers. In response to this policy of division, a strong movement emerged in India known as the Khilafat Movement to restore the Ottoman power back to its glory. Mahatma Gandhi,[87] from the platform of INC, pledged to the cause of the Khilafat movement, demanded *Swaraj* (Self-Rule) from the British. Later on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself founded modern Turkey in 1923 and abolished the caliphate in 1924. The Khilafat movement was disbanded in India as the Caliphate no longer existed.

By this time, the problem of the constitution rose once more in India. Muslims and Hindus were bitterly opposed over representative institutions. Jinnah, while still a member of INC and AIML at that time, wanted effective constitutional safeguards for Muslims. At the same time, Hindus under INC were asking for an independent India with a strong centre. This saw the passing of the Government of India act 1919[88] which was resisted and rejected by INC under Gandhi and cautiously denounced by AIML. The act of 1919 was to be evaluated after a period of ten years by a commission which would decide if any province is ready for self rule. The Simon Commission in this regard presented its report which was rejected by INC In response to the Simon Commission Report, an All India Party conference was held which formed a seven member committee, out of which there were two Muslims members.[89] The Nehru report was presented in the conference but was rejected by Jinnah from the platform of AIML. In response to Nehru's report, Jinnah gave his "14 points" which were rejected by the INC. The INC wanted to overturn the provision of separate electorates for Muslims which they agreed to with the AIML in the Lucknow pact of 1916. This tussle was followed by three round table conferences (RTC) which were held in London.[90] After the RTC, Jinnah

[87] His full name was Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Mahatma means "Great Soul". He led the Indian struggle for independence and is a revered personality in India. For his biography, see Louis Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi, 1950.

[88] It was based on the recommendations made in Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms 1918. The constitution increased the role of Indians in administering the provinces while the Centre was still in control of the British.

[89] AIML rejected the selection of the two Muslims by INC, claiming INC does not represent Muslims.

[90] Peace conferences from 1930-1932 to find the solution to the constitutional maladies of India. They were held between Britain and political leaders from India. No meaningful result came from the conferences, but it led to the passing of the Government of India Act 1935.

stayed back in London as he was disheartened from the infighting among the Muslims and in the AIML and that his opinions found no currency in the RTC with the British.

Things changed when Jinnah returned to India only to find AIML shattered, disorganized and that the Government of India Act of 1935 was in place. The first provincial elections were held in 1936 which resulted in the INC winning six[91] out of eleven provinces, while AIML not able to form a government in a single province. The threat of political subjugation was more evident than ever now. 1937-1939 was the period of INC rule in India wherein various policies were introduced to create unity in the country. The impact of the rule on Muslims and their grievances was later recorded in the PIRPUR report.[92] Jinnah himself complained about the singing of Bande Mataram at schools, the Wardha scheme of education, the replacement of urdu language, the hoisting of INC flag and other violations that damaged Muslim identity. He saw that constitutional safeguards were not enough in the event that INC comes to power in the centre. This was to change for the better for the Muslims with the start of WWII. When WWII started in 1939, the then Viceroy of India announced that India would join Britain's war effort without consulting the INC; in protest the INC resigned from the government in the provinces. Jinnah expressed his satisfaction that the INC had resigned and ordered the celebration of the Day of Deliverance. This tussle continued and finally Jinnah shocked the Indian political arena by demanding a separate state for the Muslims of India in 1940 in Lahore, which was later called "Lahore Resolution"

2.9.2 Religious Frontiers As Seen By Jinnah:

Jinnah saw the problems of India from a different perspective. While the above narrated events pit Muslims against Hindus and vice versa, Jinnah was actually pessimistic about imposing the British form of parliamentary democracy in India. He cited a number of reasons for his pessimism. In his speeches, time and again, he warned of the unsuitability and impracticality of democracy as practiced in England. For instance, in presenting his view before the Manchester Guardian on the "Question of Democracy in India", Jinnah echoed Syed Ahmed Khan in his fear of representative form of governments by arguing: "Muslims have always had their fears and apprehensions of even a representative form of government and far more democracy in its strict application in India" (J. U. D. Ahmad, 1942, p. 86). He

[91] The United Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, Madras and Bombay.

[92] Report of the Inquiry committee commissioned by the Council of the All-India Muslim League to investigate the Muslim grievances in Congress provinces.

continued that imposing such a system on voters, "the bulk of whom are totally ignorant, illiterate and untutored, living in centuries old superstitions of the worst type" will result in the eventual outcome of "permanent communal majority government ruling over minorities" (ibid,86). Jinnah labeled this form of communal majority government as "Hindu Raj all over India", an anathema to the Muslims of India. Jinnah defended his stance by stating that "The fur coat of Canada would not do for the extremely tropical climate of India" (ibid, p.87). In another article, mapping the constitutional maladies of India written for Time and Tide in London in 1940, he elaborated upon his stance on the impracticality of the British form of democracy in India. He highlights the ignorance of British Government in thinking that they can supplant their system in India. For Jinnah, the problem was straightforward:

> Democratic systems based on the concept of homogenous nation such as England are very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India and this simple fact is the root cause of India's all constitutional ills (ibid, p.111).

Jinnah rejected all the homogenizers[93] that would create one Indian nation. Instead, he argued that Muslims of India have their own homogenizers which he defined in his landmark presidential address at Lahore in 1940.

> Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions (ibid, p.153).

By projecting Islam and Hinduism as diametrically opposed civilizations, Jinnah claimed, in Smith's words "ancestral affinity" (Smith, 2000, p. 792) for the Muslims of India. Moreover, Jinnah argued that INC wanted to obliterate social differences between Hindus and Muslims so an artificial amalgam can fit into a single mould called an "Indian Nation". He refuted Gandhi's notion that India comprises one nation; he vociferously asserted that "India is not a nation, nor a country. It is a subcontinent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations" (Ahmad, 1942, p.120) Jinnah in laying out the frontiers between the Hindus and Muslims of India, claimed:

> The British people must realize that Hinduism and Islam represent two distinct and separate civilizations. Therefore, if it were accepted that there was a major nation being Hindu and minor nation, Muslim, than a parliamentary system based on the majority principle must inevitably mean the rule of the major nation (ibid, p.113)

[93] John a Hall defines homogenization as "the actual nationalizing practices designed to create that perfect fit between nation and state. See Ozkirimli 2003, pp.17.

Thus, it can be concluded that for Jinnah the matter was two pronged. On the one hand it was political; a majority dominated the minority, and on the other hand, religious in that communities being religious in nature. The religious aspect was not limited to religion alone but encompassed the whole gamut of an Islamic civilization. This is when Jinnah used religion to carve out a distinct identity for the Muslims which was insolvent with the idea of an "Indian Nation".

2.9.3 The Threat from the Religious Frontier: Majority rule of the INC

The primary threat that Jinnah conceptualized for the Muslims of India was multifaceted in nature. It was the threat of communal majority ruling over Muslims of India through the platform of INC, controlled by the INC. Ayesha Jalal sums up this reservation of Jinnah as "the perceived threat from the singular and uncompromising 'nationalism' of the Congress to provincial autonomy and class interests which gave the discourse and politics of the Indian Muslims as a subcontinental category a fresh lease of life" (Bose & Jalal, 1997, p. 90). This fear of Jinnah was materialized after the provincial elections of 1936-37 when the INC came to power in the provinces.[94]

The INC ruled six provinces from 1937 up to 1939 and later resigned from the provincial ministries when Viceroy Lord Linlithgow declared that India is party to the Second World War without consulting the INC. Jinnah was disgruntled with the INC attitude towards Muslims when in the provincial governments and was against the INC coming to power in the centre. Jinnah not only denied any charges of AIML as being a communal organization but labeled INC as a communal organization. The INC denied such charges tooth and nail but there was nothing that they could do because Gandhi himself, a spiritual figure in INC, utilized religious lexicons to further the nationalist movement. Jinnah had been a vocal critic of the INC since 1920 when he left the organization alleging that Gandhi was turning INC into a communal party. Jinnah, through his speech act, effectively securitized the INC as a threat to the Muslims of India. However, this does not rule out the part played by the INC relying on communal politics as party policy when it was in power from 1936-39. Jinnah, in his speech on the Presidential address delivered at the Lucknow Session of the AIML in 1937, charged the INC leadership for estranging the Muslims of India. He argued as follows:

[94] Provincial elections happened in 1936-37 under the Government of India act of 1935 in eleven provinces (Madras, United Provinces, Central Provinces, Orissa, Bihar, The Bombay Presidency, Assam, Bengal, Sind, Punjab and Northwest Frontier Province) of India. INC was victorious in six provinces while Muslim League failed to win a majority in any province.

> The present leadership of the INC, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu, and since they have formed the Governments in six provinces where they are in majority they have by their words, deeds and programme shown more and more that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fair-play the their hands (J. U. D. Ahmad, 1942, p. 26).

Jinnah, in the same address, also highlighted the homogenizing policies of the INC, which were detrimental to the Muslims of India.

> Hindi is to be the national language of all India and Bande Mataram is to be the national song, and is to be forced upon all. The INC flag is to be obeyed and revered by all and sundry...the majority community has clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus; only the INC masquerades under the name of nationalism (ibid, p.27).

Jinnah, time and again, underlined the threat Hindus, under INC, posed to the minorities. In his address to the Muslim University Union in 1938, Jinnah argued that "But now there is another power which claims to be the successor of the British Government. Call it whatever name you like, but it is Hindu and Hindu Government" (ibid, p.39). Thus, it can be argued that the threat of INC pushed Jinnah to drop the demand for constitutional safeguards as insufficient "We, therefore, cannot depend upon assurances and goodwill" (ibid, p.39). Jinnah, having concluded that INC was a communal organization working for the independence of India only and to later rule with Hindu majority, abandoned his stance of Hindu-Muslim unity. As argued earlier, his initial response to the threat was constitutional safeguards that would keep the communal flames low.

However, when INC hardened its stance vis-a-vis the Muslims of India, Jinnah also looked elsewhere to solidify the Muslim identity through the platform of AIML. This is where the ingredient of religion was actively used by Jinnah to influence the Muslim nationalism in India. Finally, any action taken by INC towards independence from the British was interpreted by the AIML as an anathema to the Muslim cause further solidifying Muslim religious nationalism, deepening the religious frontiers and amplifying the threat from that frontier. Similarly, any attempt by AIML was viewed by INC as antitetical to the Indian cause to which the INC responded. Both the AIML and INC, notwithstanding the presence of ther other political forces, viewed each other with suspicion. While Jinnah from the podium of AIML championed the cause of the Muslims of India, INC championed the cause of Hindus and Indians. Both the political parties were locked in a battle for the indepedance of India with differing visions. AIML initially wanted a lose federation with more powers for provinces. The AIML later revised its stance afte the Lahore Resolution when it demanded a separate state .

2.9.4 Jinnah's Conception of Religion

This inquiry argues against the established notion that Jinnah did invoke religion but tried to keep a distinction between the personal and the public realm. This distinction was blurred near the partition. He initially tried to reconcile religion and national identity at the political level which Smith calls "official level" (Smith, 2000, p. 800) and ignored the religious frontiers as understood by the people at the time that is at the "popular level" (ibid, p.801) as He had his own understanding of the maladies of India. It was only when he organized the AIML as an all India party and became "The Sole Spokesman" (Jalal, 1994) of the Muslims that he reconciled his views with the religious frontiers or we can argue he reconciled the "official" with the "popular".

Much ink has been spilt in the literature debating whether Jinnah wanted religion to play any role in politics or not, whether he was a secular or a religious minded person. No such claim will be entertained here except Jinnah's own words as to the place of religion. He utilized the religious principles of Islam to reimagine the national landscape of India. Devare argues that Jinnah "aggressively embraced the religious marker of Islam as a political identity, wedding it to nationalism." (Devare, 2017, p. 162)

It is also important to note that Jinnah defended the Communal Awards[95]which became part of the Government of India Act 1935 in his speech on the Indian Constitutional Reforms in the Legislative Assembly in 1935. He agreed with the leader of the opposition party in opposing religion. This speech is often quoted as evidence of Jinnah's disdain for religion.

> I agree with him that religion should not be allowed to come into politics, that race should not be allowed to come into politics. Language does not matter so much…Religion is merely a matter between man and God, I agree with him entirely (J. U. D. Ahmad, 1942, p. 4).

Moreover, religious nationalism as exhibited by the Muslims of undivided India was not about reconciliation of their ethnicity and religion. Comparing the case with Iran, Litvak argues, the Iranians became the God's favoured nation by reconciling their ethnicity with the dominant strand of Islam (shiism) (Litvak, 2020). However, the Muslims of India also saw themselves as the God's favoured nation but they fostered religious nationalism to consolidate their identity against the colonial British and rising influence of the Hindu community and not for the reconciliation of their ethnicity and religion.

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[95] A policy of the British government to resolve the communal problem in India. The award extended the separate electorate mechanism of Muslims to other minority communities (Sikh, Anglo India Europeans, Christians).

Jinnah while recalling the achievements of AIML to the students expressed his disdain for the practitioners of lived religion:

> What the league has done is to set you free from the reactionary elements of Muslims…it has certainly freed you from that undesirable element of Maulvis and Mualanas…there is a section of them which is undesirable (Ibid, p.42).

While complaining about Muslim children made to sing "Bande Matarem", he himself dissolved the distinction between religions as lived and practiced, and religion in the political, in his Presidential address of the AIML in 1938:

> Muslim children must accept Bande Matram as their National song, no matter whether their religious beliefs permit them to do so or not. It is idolatrous and a hymn of hate against the Muslims (Ibid, p.70).

Although Jinnah earlier argued religion is a matter between man and God, he later does give significance to the matter concerning the political aspect of religion. Thus, for Jinnah the distinction between the two realms was blurry. This blurring of religion in personal and public life was acknowledged by Jinnah in 1940 in an article mapping the constitutional maladies of India:

> The British people, being Christian…today consider religion as a private and personal matter between Man and God. This can never be the case in Hinduism and Islam, for both these religions are definite social codes which govern not so much man's relation with his God as man's relation to his neighbor (ibid,p.113).

He continued "Such religions essentially exclusive, completely preclude that merging of identity and unity of thought on which Western democracy is based" (ibid. p113). Framing the INC as a religious threat to the identity of Muslims, he summed up the policy of INC when in power as: "An India-wide attack on Muslims was launched to defeat the Muslim lead coalition ministries...In the six hind provinces a *Kulturkamf*was inaugurated."

On the character and spirit of the constitution of Pakistan. Jinnah laid it out in clear terms:

> The constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam.[96]

[96] Broadcast talk on Pakistan to the people of the United States of America, Karachi, 26th February, 1948. See *Speeches, statements & messages of the Quaid-e-Azam* / collected & edited by Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi.

On numerous occasions, Jinnah reiterated the Islamic character of Pakistan.

> Let it be clear that Pakistan is going to be a Muslim State based on Islamic Ideals. It was not going to be an ecclesiastical state. In Islam there is no discrimination as far as citizenship is concerned. The whole world, even [the] UNO has characterized Pakistan as a Muslim State.[97]

A new state with a constitution based on Islamic principles dictated that the economy is also in line with its ideology. Thus, on economy, Jinnah suggested the following:

> It is not our purpose to make the rich richer and to accelerate the process of the accumulation of wealth in the hands of [a] few individuals. We should aim at leveling up the general standard of living amongst the masses...Our ideal should not be capitalistic but Islamic, and the interests and welfare of the people as a whole should be kept constantly in mind (Yusufi, 1996).

The above discussion concludes that for Jinnah, it was the fear of majority rule of Hindus under INC over Muslims that persuaded him to ask for partition of India. Once he established Pakistan, the threat of being overrun by the INC dissipated. A crack emerged in defining the Muslim identity which was since 1906 being viewed in a Hindu-Muslim binary. Jinnah could no longer portray INC as a threat to the Muslim way of life, and thus, in his first address to the constituent assembly tried to desecuritize the communal conception of the frontier and the ensuing threat.

Jinnah's address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August 1947 was an attempt at desecuritization of the before partition narrative. This address contradicted his earlier remarks discussed above. Certain parts of the speech ring with liberal and secular ideals; they are treated as conclusive evidence that Jinnah indeed wanted a secular country after partition. Nevertheless, reading the speech in its totality and the subsequent speeches made by Jinnah after partition challenges the secular liberal argument of Jinnah's secular-liberal outlook for Pakistan. A discussion of the address follows.

In his speech to the 1st Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August 1947, Jinnah expressed his gratitude for being elected as the President of the assembly. Immediately, after that Jinnah laid out the basic responsibility of the government: "The first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State" (Ahmad, 2018, p.15).

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[97] Speech at the Meeting of the All-India Muslim League Council, Karachi, December. See Yusufi, Vol 4, pp.2656.

Noteworthy is that Jinnah argued that the government will strive to protect the religious beliefs of the people. Later he admonished bribery, corruption and nepotism as major ills that the people of Pakistan should avoid. Jinnah then goes on to justify the partition and chose history to be the judge of the partition. The interesting part is when Jinnah asks for a way forward,"Now what shall we do?" (ibid, p.16). He responds by underlining the need for unity, to let go of any sort of divisions and work for the well being of the masses.

> If you will work in cooperation, forgetting the past and work together…no matter what community he belongs, no matter what his color, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations (ibid,p.17).

It is evident that Jinnah was emphasizing unity over division. He continues, "In the course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community…will vanish".Thus, it becomes obvious that for Jinnah the threat was a Hindu political party i.e. the INC and in his speech, this threat was no more. It was in this spirit, this thesis argues that Jinnah made his prophetic remark:

> You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed--that has nothing to do with the business of the State (ibid, p.17).

His remarks reflect the absence of the threat of INC and British government which he through his speech act, securitized for Muslims of India. However, it is important to point out a fallacy in Jinnah's claim when he referred to the deplorable conditions between Roman Catholics and Protestants.

> Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State (G.Allana, 1969).

As this speech was made on 11th August 1947, his claim of absence of any communal division was shattered when Punjab and Bengal were partitioned three days later on 14th August 1947. That bloody partition and the painful migration that followed negated Jinnah's claim that there was no discrimination in fact, Pakistan did start in those days as a

highly polarized society. Giving the example of Great Britain whereas per Jinnah the distinction between Roman Catholics and Protestants had vanished and a nation of equal citizens was formed. His remarks became a source of contention in Pakistan's historiography:

> You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State (ibid).

Jinnah's earlier speeches rebuked Great Britain's form of democracy for India but now he wanted a nation to reimagine itself in Great Britain's spirit. This thesis argues that Jinnah was no longer threatened by Great Britain or INC and asked therefore for the reimaginaton of the Muslim identity. Such wholesale desecuritization was not possible as the foundations for the Muslim identity laid down earlier were insolvent. Thus, Jinnah was not able to completely redefine the Muslim identity after partition which stayed strongly associated with religion. This incomplete project was picked up by later governments who under pressure from political and economic troubles utilized religion to create national cohesion. This cohesion turned out in the form of domestic religious frontiers which securitized through threats waxed the religious nationalism in Pakistan after 1947.

2.10 Conclusion

Nations and their ensuing nationalism, or vice versa, are formed around a number of distinct traits: culture, social structure, and economy, political, linguistic, ethnic and religious. These traits, either singular or in combination, reinforce the national identity. However, in the case of the Muslims of the subcontinent, these traits were all combined and projected through the lens of religion.

Thus, when Muslim leaders argued that Muslims were different and practiced a separate religion, it implied that all the traits were viewed from a religious lens. Second, there were ecclesiastical divisions within Islam at the time: Shia, Sunni, Bralevi, Ahmadi, Deobandi, traditionalist and modernists. All of these strands had different visions and pathways for the Muslims to follow. The idea of Pakistan despite contestation united all of them on a single platform. After the pillars of faith as highlighted in the Quran, the only point where everyone was in agreement was Pakistan. Thus the idea of Pakistan became an implied pillar of faith in itself.

In addition, if Muslims were not Hindus then Hindus were not Muslims either. This is important because on the one hand, Muslims were defining themselves by what they were not. On the other hand, Hindus were defining themselves, which, in turn, reinforced the identity of the Muslims and further strengthened the religious frontier between the two. Hence, a clear distinction emerges in the threat perception narrated by Muslim leaders. Although all the leaders contemplated saving the Muslim identity from dissolution, the threats that they highlighted were different and domestic in nature. For Syed Ahmed, it was

the missing Islamic renaissance. For Maududi, it was the religious frontier of Islam and the threats to Islamic civilization posed by secularism, modern education, nationalism, the INC and the AIML. Finally, Jinnah wanted constitutional safeguards but was bitterly opposed to democracy introduced in India along British lines. He argued for a separate Muslim state where the majority would not dominate the minority on religious grounds. Jinnah was convinced that constitutional safeguards were not enough for the Muslims in a united India. Thus, Each leader portrayed a different response to a common perception of threat. These responses collectively shaped the Muslim identity and the religious nationalism which further evolved after 1947. Since the focus had been on safeguarding the Muslim identity, any attempt to move towards a secular interpretation of it contradicted the earlier imagination of a Muslim. Muslims, after a protracted independence struggle had created Pakistan, now they had to create Pakistanis.

CHAPTER 3

WE HAVE MADE PAKISTAN, NOW WE HAVE TO MAKE PAKISTANIS

3.1 Introduction

The creation of Pakistan in 1947 was a watershed moment in the history of colonial India. Pakistan was a victory for those who argued for a separate Muslim state and it was a defeat for those who shrugged the idea of Pakistan as a communal problem. From 1857 till 1947, the Muslim identity was imagined and reimagined from a community to a minority and finally as a nation to reach the ultimate goal of achieving a sovereign nation state. After 1947, the Muslims of Pakistan had an independent state for themselves, a country on top of the hill; it was time to elaborate in bare terms what Pakistan stood for. Various authors, on both sides of the aisle had discussed at length the meaning of Pakistan but it was never taken up in the form of an official written statement. The constitution of Pakistan, which was to be framed immediately after 1947, was one such document that was to officially declare the meaning of Pakistan and what it meant to be a Pakistani. However, instead of directly drafting a constitution for the newly formed state, the government of the time took a long turn by first drafting an Objectives Resolution (OR). This resolution acted as the North Star, a guidance post, a set of markers to guide the constitution makers along the way. The OR defined Pakistan as an Islamic state in vague terms and created the religious frontier between Muslims and non-Muslims. Although the advocates of the resolution downplayed any communal perspective, the resolution indirectly and incompletely laid the foundation for a domestic religious frontier. As a coroally, the incoherently defined frontier opened the possibility of its reinterpretation by future government leaders. This reinterpretation led to the bolstering of religious nationalism in Pakistan. The first such indirect consequence as the "Ahmadi" issue that kept the government occupied since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The religious frontier created by the passage of the OR in 1949 was later fortified to the detriment of the Ahmadis in 1974. They were portrayed as a threat to the ideology of Pakistan and all the Muslims residing in Pakistan. Thus, in order to understand the role of OR and its implications for the Ahmadis, this chapter will look at both the issues from various perspectives.

First, the chapter will briefly narrate the political environment of the time as much ink has been spilled on this issue (Sayeed,1968; Wynbrandt, 2009; Symond, 1960). Second, the structure of the Constituent Assembly[98] will be discussed and finally, the OR itself will be discussed. The discussion of the resolution will be based on the evaluation of the debate that was held in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan from 7th March 1949 till 12th March 1949 when the resolution was adopted. The evaluation will be based on the theoretical framework discussed in the earlier chapter. The evaluation concludes that the OR declared and endorsed the Islamic credentials of Pakistan, that despite many reassurances, the government maintained a distinction between majority and minority community based on communal lines, and that the Quran and Sunnah will guide the state and government of Pakistan. The question was about the interpretation of Quran and Sunnah as to which school of thought's interpretation was to be followed and will there be a distinction between religion and state in Pakistan. In the state of Pakistan both were to be the same and one cannot be separated from the other. Thus, Muslim identity and Islam were engraved into the state's very foundation and any threat to either one of them, either internal or external was viewed as a religious frontier. This had long term effects on the citizenship rights of minorities, particularly the Ahmadi community which was declared out of the fold of Islam through the second constitutional amendment in 1974. As Anthony Marx quotes Bourdieu "precisely when antagonisms threaten to go out of control, to threaten the state itself, more rigid or legal codification is more likely. Such codifications then "minimize ambiguity . . . making clear cuts" upon which sufficient state support can be built. Moments of such boundary codification are then the moments in which nationalism is crystallized" (Marx, 2003, p. 24). This move on the part of the state further crystallized religious nationalism. This chapter will examine how the OR paved the way for the Ahmadi community to be declared as a non-Muslim minority. The chapter will argue that OR erected the religious frontier within the Muslims and Ahmadis through speech acts of the law makers and the ulema. This chapter will show how the law makers securitized the Ahmadis as seedlings of imperialism, as British agents, as traitors out to destroy Pakistan. The chapter will also highlight how an external and internal religious frontier can be combined by the securitizing agents to alleviate a threat. In the case of Ahmadis, the external religious frontier between Pakistan and Israel was combined with the domestic frontier between Muslims and Ahmadis. This, it is argued, was done to highlight the severity of the threat. It is argued that this presence of

[98] The assembly that acted as temporary legislature for Pakistan responsible for drafting a constitution and as well, as legislate.

domestic religious frontiers combined with external religious frontiers to create a threat led to the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan.

3.2 Details of the Constituent Assembly

The Cabinet Mission Plan[99] of 1946 envisioned a single Constituent Assembly for undivided India. The assembly was to be manned by the representatives, who were, in turn, chosen by the elected representatives from the provincial legislatures of undivided India. Elections[100] for the single Constituent Assembly was held in July 1946 and the Assembly met in Delhi the same year. However, the Cabinet Mission Plan[101] failed to reconcile the difference between INC and AIML. In response, the Mountbatten Plan[102] of 3rd June 1947 was implemented through the Independence act of 1947[103] which created two dominions, India and Pakistan, with separate sovereign legislatures (Khan, 2023).

The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan[104] was thus created by the Indian Independence Act of 1947 and was in place from 1947 to 1954 (Parveen, 2010).
Jinnah, who had by now taken the title of Quaid E Azam, was not only the first Governor-General of Pakistan but also the first President[105] of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Khan, 2023, p.47).

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[99] A British government plan to keep the unity of India intact, which envisaged a three-tier government with a loose federation and autonomy for the provinces. Its aim was to address the fear of Hindu domination of the Muslims.

[100] Out of 296 seats, Indian National Congress (INC) and its allies secured 212 seats while All India Muslim League (AIML) secured 73 seats. Thus, AIML was in a minority position in the Constituent Assembly.

[101] The plan allowed any province to secede from the federation after a period of fifteen years. This was unacceptable to Nehru who was heading the INC.

[102] The plan gave provinces the option to be partitioned by their own accord. See Sayeed, Khalid (1968), 2nd ed, *Pakistan the Formative Phase 1857-1948,*pp. 169, Oxford University Press, Pakistan

[103] For the Provisions, see Hamid Khan, 2023, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, pp-41, 4th Edition, Oxford.

[104] For a detailed analysis of the constitutional history of Pakistan, see Hamid Khan, 2023, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan,* 4th ed, Oxford, G.W Choudary, 1959, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan,* Longman and Keith Callard, 1957, *Pakistan A Political Study,* Macmillan Company.

Jinnah, in his address to the Constituent Assembly on 11th August 1947, highlighted its two cardinal functions:

> The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future Constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the federal legislature of Pakistan (JINNAH Speeches and Statements 1947-1948, 2000).

With respect to the powers of the Constituent Assembly, it was bestowed with powers originally given to the central legislature in the Government of India Act of 1935 (Choudary, 1969, p.27). In addition, the assembly not only had the power to amend the Government of India Act of 1935 and Indian Independence Act of 1947 but also no act of the British Parliament could be extended to Pakistan without legislation by the aforesaid assembly (ibid, p.27).

The composition of the first Constituent Assembly is worth mentioning as it will reflect how the religious frontier and debates around religion were defended and projected through a legislature dominated by Muslims. The first Constituent Assembly originally consisted of sixty-nine members[106] which was later expanded to seventy four members (ibid, p.27). Moreover, there were only two dominant parties in the Assembly-Pakistan Muslim League (PML) successor of AIML and Pakistan National Congress (PNC).[107] The PML had fifty nine seats in the assembly both from East and West Pakistan (Khan, 2023, p.49) while the PNC had eleven Hindu members all from East Pakistan (Parveen, 2010, p. 1). Although in theory there was no opposition in a constitution making body as the ultimate aim was to draft a constitution, the above composition translated into PML dominating any debate and ruling out any dissent.

The Constituent Assembly created various committees and subcommittees to formulate a constitution. The Basic Principles Committee further created three sub committees: sub-committee on federal and provincial constitution and distribution of powers, sub-committee on franchise and sub-committee on judiciary (Choudary, 1969, p.29). Then there was the

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[105] Jinnah was elected as the first President of the Constituent Assembly on 11th August 1947.

[106] East Bengal 44 seats, Punjab 17 seats, NWFP 3 seats, Sindh 4 seats and Baluchistan 1 seat, totaling 69 seats.

[107] It was the Pakistan chapter of INC, composed of Hindus. The party had minimal affiliation with the INC.

committee on "The Fundamental Rights of the Citizens of Pakistan" and on "Matters relating to Minorties" and finally, the State Negotiating Committee[108] and the Tribal Areas Negotiating Committee.[109] Out of these committees, the Basic Principle Committee was the most significant. This committee was formed immediately after the passing of the OR in 1949 and was responsible "to report in accordance with the OR on the main principles of the future Constitution" (Khan, 2023, p.50). This committee further set up a special committee known as the *Talimat e Islamia* (Guidance of Islam or Education of Islam) which was composed of Islamic scholars. Their job was to advise on the Islamic matters pertaining to various sub-committees. The Basic Principles Committee submitted its interim report in 1950 and the final report in 1952, five years after the creation of Pakistan. In turn, India had drafted a constitution by 1948 and had already held its first general election in 1952 after the partition.

3.3 Significance of the OR

The partition reduced the pre-partition threat of Hindu domination to the Muslim identity in the form of a separate state. However, a new crisis faced the Muslims of Pakistan in answering a fundamental question: What constitutes a Pakistani? This nascent nation of Pakistan was suffering from what Greenfeld calls "crisis of identity" (Greenfeld, 1994), a similar situation faced by the people of England that forced them to form a nation and be "God's Firstborn" (ibid, p.27). This crisis of identity was aggravated by the political, economical and social woes immediately following the blood-soaked partition. There was a need to create cohesion among the people and religion was the adhesive of choice. Two statements mentioned by Vjekoslav Pericaare are worth reiterating in highlighting the significance of religion in the nationalism of post-colonial South Asia. The first is Reinhold Niebuhr's statement that "nations are held together largely by force and by emotion," where the emotional precondition for nationhood is provided by religion, and the second is Robert Bellah's argument that "a nation cannot be forged or changed by rational politics alone, without the appeal to the nation's soul" (Perica, 2002). A similar sentiment was echoed by the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr.Liaquat Ali Khan (1895-1951) who presented the draft of the OR in the Constituent Assembly on 7th March 1949.

[108] Dealt with the representation of Princely States, which joined Pakistan.

[109] Dealt with the question of Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

He said, "This OR is the first step in the direction of the creation of an environment which will againawakenthespiritofthenation.[110] The OR was an appeal to the nation's soul. It is one of the most significant documents in the constitutional history of Pakistan. The OR was the foundation on which the future constitution of Pakistan was to be based and it had religious underpinning. It was moved in the Constituent Assembly and was adopted after rigorous debate on 12th March 1949. On 7th March when the debate began, the PM Liaquat Ali Khan underlined the importance of the OR as follows, "I consider this to be a most important occasion in the life of this country, next in importance only to the achievement of independence".[111] Ernest Renan asked in 1882 *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (What is a nation?) (Renan, 1882). A similar question was being asked after 1947 in Pakistan. What is Pakistan? Who is a Pakistani? The OR was the first attempt of the government of the time to define Pakistan and "Pakistaniyat".[112] It defined, among other things who constituted a Muslim, the role of the state, the duties of the people; it officially defined for Pakistan a predefined religion and the role and place of minorities. The OR projected the sense of uniqueness from the centre as it soldered the core fundamentals of Pakistan to Islam and the Muslim identity. It will be argued that the OR jump started the crystallization and waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan since its passage in 1949. The OR was hailed as a victory by the religious right who were successful in bending the government to officially declare Islamic credentials for Pakistan. The OR, as will be discussed below was couched in Islamic terms open to interpretation and was hailed by the Muslims of Pakistan as a corner stone in their quest for a new Medina (Dhulipala, 2015) reflecting how religious groups can influence public policy (Grzymala-Busse, 2019, p. 11; J.Rieffer, 2003). Despite being hailed as the Magna Carta for Pakistan, it made the communal division official between Muslims and non-Muslims. The political leaders envisioned a utopia in the OR but they ended up laying the foundations for classes of patricians and plebeians. In Smith's words, the OR created a "chosen people" (Smith, 2003). It made everything religion bound; principles such as democracy, justice, rights of minorities, social justice etc. were all defined through Islam.

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[110] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, March 7, Volume 5, 1949. pp 6 Online: https://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434604126_750.pdf.

[111] Ibid, pp.2.

[112] For other aspects of Pakistaniyat, see Ali Usman Qasmi (2024), *Qaum, Mulk, Saltanat,* Stanford University Press and Javed Jabbar(2019) *What is Pakistaniyat? 41 elements of the unique Pakistani National Identity,* Paramount Books, Pakistan.

Thus, now the state had the prerogative of interpreting who was a Pakistani and who could be excluded. This control over borders of citizenship came to the fore in later events such as the anti-Ahmadi riots, the breakaway of East Pakistan in 1971, and the rule of Zia ul Haq.

This study aims to answer why there was a need to express the Islamic credentials of Pakistan. It suggests that cohesion was needed at the time which was generated by rallying around the domestic religious frontiers and the OR played a significant role in laying the foundations for domestic religious frontiers which later turned into threats and aided in the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan. This process played out vividly in the form of the "Ahmadi Question" which is also part of the current chapter.

3.4 Political Issues of the Time

It is contended here that religious nationalism in Pakistan was not divorced from the political environment of the time. The discussion will focus on the significant political issues of Pakistan from a domestic and external vantage point. The domestic issues that plagued Pakistan immediately after its creation were those of constitution, distribution of resources, the influx of refugees, and regionalism. On the external front, Pakistan had to deal with India over Kashmir, the Indus river issue, division of resources, division of assets and the refugee issue. Moreover, the last two issues concerned both the domestic and the external environment of Pakistan.

The drafting of a constitution was of paramount importance for Pakistan. Under section 8 of the Indian Independence act of 1947, the Government of India Act of 1935 with certain modifications became the working constitution of Pakistan (Choudury, 1969, p.31). The Pakistan (Provincial Constitution) order of 1947 established the federation of Pakistan, comprising West Pakistan[113] and East Pakistan[114] separated by 1000 miles of hostile territory. It was for a number of reasons to draft a constitution that would placate all the provinces. First, the Government of India Act of 1935 provided the provinces much autonomy in their day-to-day affairs; however, this colonial era act empowered the federal government over the provinces. For instance, the Act of 1935 provided that the Governor-General can, at any point in time, proclaim an emergency and order the Governor of the province to take over the administration of the province. What made it more alarming for the

[113] Provinces of West Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan.

[114] Province of East Bengal.

provinces was that the governor himself was also appointed by the Governor-General. Second, the Act of 1935 was secular in nature which went against the argument on which Pakistan was founded. Third, India's Constituent Assembly had adopted its constitution by 1949, two years after independence. Fourth, feelings of provincialism[115] loathed by Jinnah himself were rampant in Pakistan and the only way to counter it was through a constitution that would define the role and responsibilities of the constituent units.

Another significant issue that directed the attention of the political leaders away from the constitution making was the division of assets. At the time of partition, India inherited a working government with an established structure and bureaucracy. For Pakistan, that was not the case and the task of separating the civil and defence services was an uphill one. To this end, a partition council was set up in June 1947. Every government department was to be divided and Pakistan received 17.5% of the joint assets (Symond, 1949, p.78) and if an asset was indivisible, Pakistan was to receive cash in return. Thus, a common currency was maintained between India and Pakistan uptill 1948 when Pakistan established its own reserve bank (ibid, p.78). Moreover, the defense services posed a dilemma as most of the stores were based in India. Following the communal violence, India was reluctant to share the supplies with Pakistan fearing reprisals. The partition machinery, despite its efforts, failed to transparently divide the assets and despite these setbacks, a skeleton government where none existed was set up in Pakistan.

The singular event that stands out as an obstacle for the newly formed Pakistan was the issue of refugees (ibid, p.83). In the wake of partition, the province of Punjab and Bengal were divided into east and west halves. West-Punjab and East-Bengal stayed with Pakistan; however, the population in those areas did move to the other side. In quantitative terms, Sayeed argues that by 8th October 1947, two months after partition, "some 1,628,000 refugees had already been exchanged between East and West Punjab, 450,000 were on their way and 2 million in West Punjab were awaiting evacuation to India" (Sayeed, 1968, p.263) while Symond states that around 6,500,000 refugees came to Pakistan and about 5,500,000 Hindus and Sikhs left Western Pakistan (Symonds, 1949, p.83). Hamid Khan, refers to this as the "carnage and the refugee problems" (Khan, 2023) owing to the wide scale murder, looting and rape that occurred on both sides of the border. The movement of the refugees was half of the problem, the other half was to house them, feed them, and generate

[115] Keeping the interest of the province before the state. Jinnah discouraged this sentiment in the provinces.

employment opportunities for them. Since Punjab was the landing pad for the incoming refugees, the province of West-Punjab clamored that other provinces were not doing enough to address the crisis. It was true that provinces were reluctant; however, Jinnah declared a state of emergency and ordered the provinces to absorb the refugees[116] to lessen the burden on West-Punjab. The refugee crisis and their rehabilitation was a major strain on the delicate economy of the new country but the government survived this storm only to face the gathering clouds of "Provincialism".

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was against the idea of provincialism in Pakistan. He was of the view that provincialism was a poison and that provinces must guard themselves against such tendencies. Leonard, in the case of Pakistan, defines provincialism as opposition to the central government's homogenizing policies (Binder, 1963, p. 119) and that it was tantamount to being a "black guard" or "traitor" in Pakistan (ibid, p.119) to voice such feelings. The contradiction was that Jinnah, before the partition, strongly advocated for stronger provinces and a weak center as he wanted maximum autonomy for the Muslim majority provinces. This was reflected to some extent in the Government of India Act of 1935 that granted provinces a considerable amount of autonomy. However, Jinnah revised his stance after 1947 and wanted a strong center. He believed that earlier, strong provinces made sense because the center was either in the hands of the British or the INC; however, after partition, there was no such need as both the center and the provinces will be Muslim-dominated. Nevertheless, this reasoning was insufficient to quill provincialism as highlighted by various scholars. Leonard suggests that provincial feelings were always there as British designated provinces coincided with language and were differentiated by "racial characteristics" (ibid, p.119). For instance, although Bengalis were considered educated and politically aware, they were looked down upon for their rather smaller physical posture. On the other hand, people of Punjab were suitable for civil service and armed forces, and the ethnic Pathans from the N.W.F.P were considered fit for fighting while people of Sindh and Baluchistan were marginalized and considered backward. Sayeed highlighted three instances where the center controlled by Jinnah locked horns with the provinces. First, Jinnah as Governor-General was dissatisfied with the premier of West-Punjab "The Nawab of

[116] Sind, 200,000: NWFP, 100,000: Bhawalpur and Khairpur States and Baluchistan received 100,000 refugees.

Mamdot[117]" and asked for his resignation and ordered Daultana, the finance minister to replace him. This did not come to pass but shows the acrimony between the centre and the province. Second was the N.W.F.P Ministry of Congress under Khan Sahib before the partition. Pakistan's provisional government wanted the Congress ministry to be dissolved and a Muslim league ministry to be setup in N.W.F.P. This request was routed through Lord Mountbatten to the India office and was denied. Thus on 22nd August, Jinnah as Governor General ordered the governor of N.W.F.P to dismiss the ministry of Khan Sahib. Third, the brewing discontent in East-Bengal originated from language, culture and stereotypes of Bengalis against Punjabi speaking people and vice versa which were a strain on the homogenizing policies of the state (Sayeed, 1968, p.275). Jinnah, in his address to Quetta municipality said, "It naturally pains me to find the curse of provincialism holding sway over any section of Pakistan. Pakistan must be rid of this evil" (Afzal, 2018, p.177).

Three Indian States[118]-Junagadh, Kashmir and Hyderabad-stirred bitter acrimony between India and Pakistan (Symond, 1949, p.86). Out of the three, the Kashmir issue took the crown in shaping the political landscape of Pakistan. This issue single handedly framed the fractured relationship between India and Pakistan since 1947. The importance of Kashmir can be highlighted with reference to the state of Junagadh and Hyderabad. Junagadah was a state contiguous with India in territory. It had a Muslim ruler and a Hindu majority population. In September 1947, the Muslim leader of Junagadh acceded to Pakistan but his populace rebelled and favoured joining India.[119] Thus, a precedent was set that a state accedes where the populace desires. Second was the case of state of Kashmir[120] where the demographics were reversed. Kashmir was contiguous to both India and Pakistan and its ruler was a Hindu Maharaja; out of the total population of 4 million people of which 3

[117] A landlord of Punjab and a member of Muslim League. After partition, most of his estate was left behind in East Punjab. As the Premier of West Punjab, he was bitter that his estate shrank.

[118] The Indian Empire at the time of partition, apart from provinces, had 500 states. Rulers of these states accepted the suzerainty of the British Crown in foreign relations. The subscription of the crown ended on 15th August 1947 after which the states could accede to India, Pakistan or stay independent.

[119] India held a referendum in the state and the overwhelming majority voted to join India.

[120] For a detailed coverage of the Kashmir issue, see Lamb, Alastair (1991), *Kashmir: A Disputed legacy, 1846-1990,* Oxford University Press.

million were Muslims (ibid, p.87). When the Muslims of Kashmir rebelled against the rule of Maharaja and were aided by tribesmen from Pakistan, the Maharaja acceded to India. India sent its army to push back the invading tribesman while Pakistan and India entered into open hostilities that only halted when Nehru took the matter to the United Nations Security Council arguing that it will itself conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir. More than seven decades have passed and the plebiscite is yet to be held in Kashmir. Third was the case of Hyderabad, having a Muslim ruler, majority Hindu population and a contiguous state with Indian Territory. Despite signing a standing still agreement with India, Hyderabad was annexed by India in September 1948 through a military operation. This for once reflects the contradicting positions on Kashmir. In addition, Kashmir remains important to Pakistan for other reasons. Out of the five rivers[121] that irrigate Pakistan, three-Jhelum, Chenab and Indus-have their headwaters in Kashmir, that is under the control of a hostile neighbor. Thus, for the government of Pakistan, Kashmir was a two edged sword. First, there was hue and cry that Muslims are in trouble and the government was not doing enough, and second, that Pakistan's bread and butter was dependent on the water originating from Kashmir. Hence, this translated into a tremendous amount of pressure on the government as what good was a country attaining to protect the Muslim way of life if it cannot help its co-religionist.

Another major issue that besieged Pakistan was the vacuum in leadership that emerged after Jinnah passed away one year after the partition. At the time there was no one on the horizon who could match his political acumen. However, the setback was more personal to the nation as Jinnah was the Quaid e Azam for the people of Pakistan. He was a central character in the nationalism that defined the identity of people of Pakistan. He was a unifying force who kept several issues at bay and after his departure, the pandora's box of self interest besieged Pakistan. The then PM Liaquat Ali Khan, the trusted lieutenant of Jinnah, had to single handedly deal with the domestic problems and that too without Jinnah's towering personality.

3.5 Analysis of the OR

The parliamentary debate over the OR expanded over five days from Monday 7th March, 1949 upto Saturday 12th March 1949[122] when the Resolution was actually adopted. The debate will be subdivided into themes for clarity. This means that arguments presented on

[121] Sutlej, Ravi, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.

[122] Five days from Monday till Saturday because Friday was a holiday at that time.

the first day of the debate will be summed up with the counter arguments anywhere they come up during the five days discussion. Thus, the chronological order of the debate will be compromised for the clarity of the themes. It is pertinent to mention that it is possible that a single argument reappears in more than a single theme to emphasize the whole.

The OR and the parliamentary debate surrounding it has received attention from various scholars (Binder, 1963, Choudhary 1969, Khan 2023, Nair 2023) however a thematic analysis seems wanting. This study aims to fill this gap by analyzing the OR and the parliamentary debate by breaking it down into three broad themes: Imagining Pakistan, status of religious minorities and the interplay between religion, politics and role of the state. It is argued that OR was an important milestone that set Pakistan in a religious direction which waxed the religious nationalism in the years to come. The themes correspond to the theoretical framework of this study highlighting the religious frontiers and the subsequent threats that were securitized through speech acts of the members of the constituent assembly.

The Constituent Assembly met in the Assembly Chamber on 7th March, 1949. This was the first day of the fifth session of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and was presided over by Tamizuddin Khan. The motion for the OR was moved by the PM Liaquat Ali Khan. There were thirty one members present in the assembly out of which ten were Hindus and remaining twenty one, Muslims. Although there were no opposition benches in the Assembly, the debate gives the impression that Hindus were treated as the opposition. A total of seventeen amendments were moved by the Hindu members of the assembly which were all shot down by the Muslim majority in the assembly by 10-21. Moreover, all the Muslim members welcomed the OR with the exception of Mian Muhammad Iftikharuddin who opposed the OR on Marxist lines. He assailed the OR for being a toothless tiger on the economic aspect regarding the new constitution. Nevertheless, the OR was adopted in its original form on 12th March 1949. What follows is a discussion of the OR regarding the waxing of religious nationalism that revolves around three major themes.

3.5.1 Imagining Pakistan: An Islamic State?

The Muslim lawmakers in the constituent assembly wanted a constitution bound and guided by Islamic principles while the non-Muslim members opposed this idea. The non-Muslim lawmakers emphasized a bifurcation between religion and politics; the Muslim law makers shunned the idea as alien to Islam. The debate between the two sides sheds light on two diametrically opposed visions for Pakistan. PM Liaquat Ali Khan, after presenting the OR, explained it clause by clause to iron out any misunderstanding. The following analysis does not follow a clause by clause approach but focuses where frontiers were drawn.

In his clarification regarding the OR, the PM on the first day of the debate that is 7th March 1949 made explicitly clear the Islamic character of Pakistan but stopped short of calling it an Islamic state; that was done by other Muslim members of the assembly. The PM envisioned a moral state guided by Islamic values and principles. To the people asking what Pakistan is, the PM responded: "We as Pakistanis are not ashamed of the fact that we are overwhelmingly Muslims and we believe that it is by adhering to our faith and ideals that we can make a genuine contribution to the welfare of the world". The PM stated his beliefs as "universally recognized" facts: that owing to weakening of spiritual values and disruption of connection with God, the scientific developments have endangered humanity's existence. The PM emphasized that authority should be in "accordance with the standards laid down by Islam so that it may not be misused".[123] Thus, as per the PM, Pakistan was a panacea to the disease of materialism. However, the PM explicitly denied the notion of Pakistan becoming a technical theocracy.[124] But it was a theocracy in the general sense, as the PM argued "is there any corner in the entire creation where His authority does not exist?" [125] Moreover, the PM addressed the minorities that their rights will also be granted. However, he was meticulous with his words and did not take an extreme stance on any issue. It was the clarifications given by Muslim lawmakers that spelled out how Islam was to be central to Pakistan.Thus, if Pakistan was to be an Islamic state based on morality, then which principles were to be followed?

The OR highlighted that "the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice" will be followed, and further defined them by saying that these principles should be observed in the constitution as they had been "enunciated by Islam".[126] The PM was of the view that given Islam's history, all these principles are better applied in the Islamic context than their existing connotations at the time. On the question of economy,

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[123] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, March 7, Volume 5, 1949, pp.2.

[124] Theocracy was defined as having two meanings; first, "literal sense"i.e. government of God; second, "technical sense" as the government by ordained priests.

[125] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, March 7, Volume 5, 1949,pp.3

[126] ibid, pp.3.

Pakistan was to have an economy based on the basic principles of Islam.[127] Thus, the OR presented by the PM laid down a religious frontier first by arguing that Pakistan would be based on Islamic principles and second that the principles followed would be within the domain of Islam.

The draft resolution, with a clear shift towards an Islamic constitution, incensed the non-Muslim members of the assembly. The non-Muslim members, all of whom were from East Bengal and members of the Pakistan National Congress presented a total of seventeen draft amendments to the original resolution. All the amendments ranging from refuting the OR in entirety to changing the Preamble to adding rights of minorities and limiting the role of state owing to religion and politics being distinct, were rejected. The non-Muslim lawmakers took exception to the Preamble of OR[128] and wanted to omit it because it created an Islamic state, deified the state, fused religion and politics, increased the role of state, and portrayed minorities as second-class citizens or plebeians. On the topic of Islamic state, Bhupendra Kumar (Non-Muslim-East Bengal) on the first day of the debate argued that the OR will create an Islamic democracy which he opposed.[129] Non-Muslim law makers also opposed that the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice be bounded by the words "as enunciated by Islam".[130] This, they believed, would lead to different interpretations and any Muslim leader through the tyranny of majority can decide what these ideas meant. It was good that these principles made it to the Resolution but by confining those to Islam created an implied frontier between Muslims and those who do not profess Islam. It created two classes, the Patricians of Pakistan and the Plebeians. This bisection on communal lines was opposed by the non-Muslim members.

The Muslim law makers defended the OR and the Islamic credentials of the newly formed state. Dr Ishtiaq Hussian, an academic and a member, arguing in favor of the resolution, decried that:

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[127] Ibid, pp.6.

[128] Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority, which He has delegated to, the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limit prescribed by Him is a sacred trust.

[129] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, March 7, Volume 5, 1949, pp.16.

[130] Amendment by Bhupendra Kummar Dutta, 9th March, 1949, Constituent Assembly Debates, pp.26.

> If the word secular means that the ideals of Islam, that the fundamental principles of religion, that the ethical outlook which religion inculcates in our people should not be observed, then I am afraid, Sir, that kind of secular democracy can never be acceptable to us in Pakistan.[131]

After Dr Ishtiaq, a highly reputable cleric, *Maulana* (Cleric) Shabbir Ahmad Osmani gave his two cents on Pakistan. Putting the debate in a religion as good versus materialism as bad binary, he argued, "It should not dismay us if we are branded as conservatives and reactionaries".[132] For him, Pakistan "desires to show a beacon of light to the world, which has been caught in the vortex of materialism and has lost its way in the darkness of atheism and agnosticism".[133] The Maulana described an Islamic state as a "pious state" *(Hukumat i Rashda)* that is to do good and to shun evil.[134] In response to those opposing the OR, he asserted that Pakistan was always to be an Islamic state as "the motive force behind their demand for a separate state was the determination to preserve their peculiar national characteristics".[135] For him, the panacea to ailing the world was "to introduce the Islamic system of life in Pakistan and to invite all muslim countries to co-operate with us".[136]

While the PM was balanced with his words, Maulana Osmani did not mince his words and called the spade a spade. This automatically heightened the fear among the non-Muslims as to the shape of the future constitution. Hence, every law-maker who defended the OR was further carving out the religious frontier laid down by this resolution.

However, there was dissent among the ranks from Muslim lawmakers on Marxist grounds. Mian Muhammad Iftikharuddin argued against this implication that since Pakistan would be an Islamic state, there was no cause to fear despotism and injustice. He said the following:

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[131] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 9, 1949, pp.41.

[132] ibid, pp.43.

[133] ibid, pp.44.

[134] ibid, pp.45.

[135] ibid, pp.47.

[136] ibid, pp.47.

> The fight in this country is not going to be between Hindus and Muslims. The battle in times to come will be between Hindu have-nots and Muslim have-nots on the one hand and Muslim and Hindu upper and middle classes on the other.[137]

Such criticism was brushed aside by Sardar Abdur Rab Khan Nishtar, who attributed it to "misunderstanding" on the part of opposing voices. Assuring the minorities that basing the country on Islamic principles will actually save the minority from "tyranny of the majority" so in his opinion, when it was argued that constitution will be based on Islamic principles, the minorities should welcome it.[138] Moreover, he argued that Pakistan will have a democratic constitution which he defined as "the humblest will have the right to criticize the highest".[139] Ironically, this was against what the PM said earlier that only a non-Muslim would have reservations with this resolution,[140]which, in other words, meant that no Muslim would oppose it. Moving further, he stressed that although Quaid e Azam gave pledges to minorities,[141] he gave pledges to the majority. For Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar,

> Pakistan was demanded with a particular ideology, for a particular purpose and this Resolution, that has been moved, is just in accordance with those solemn pledges which Quaid-i-Azam and the leaders of the Muslim League gave to the majority as well as to the minorities.[142]

For him, like other Muslim members, Pakistan was to present an "alternative system of life" to the "communism working from behind the so called iron curtain" and "capitalism

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[137] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 10, 1949, pp.54.

[138] ibid, pp.56.

[139] ibid, pp.59.

[140] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, March 7, Volume 5, 1949, pp.10.

[141] Jinnah's address to the Constituent Assembly, 11th August 1947 where he stated the following: You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste, or creed—that has nothing to do with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.

[142] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 10, 1949, pp.62.

supported by the atom bomb".[143] Thus, a senior Pakistan Muslim League leader, who was also a member of the Constituent assembly, was convinced that Pakistan was achieved on a particular ideology and the resolution was the embodiment of that ideology. It is Important to note here that the debate around the OR laid down the domestic religious frontier. During the time the debate lasted, there was no threat highlighted by any law-maker. The threat it is argued was securitized later on when the Ahmadi issue was highlighted.

One of the most ironic defenses of the OR came from Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi, who is mentioned as a "Muslim" member from "West Punjab" in the documents. It is ironic because the OR was adopted in 1949 and four years later in 1953, a major riot against the Ahmadi community broke out in Lahore, Punjab. Resultantly, the Ahmadis were later declared non Muslim minority via the second constitutional amendment in 1974 (Khan, 2023, p.293).

Sir Zarfullah commenting first on the spirit of the OR argued that the members opposing the OR are overtaken by the "fear of the unfamiliar" and he opposed the bifurcation of religion and politics arguing in detail that both are one and the same.[144] For him, the phrase "as enunciated by Islam" to cover the basic principles of democracy, social justice and tolerance did not make the OR "vague and unsubstantial" but "I wish to point out that this qualification, far from being of a restrictive character, has the effect of charging these expressions with a live meaning and of enlarging their scope".[145]

Maintaining his optimism, Sir Zarfullah further explained the notion of "tolerance" in Islam. His argument was that Islam favours tolerance so non-Muslims should not fear the Muslims in any regard. The non Muslims were yet to witness the Islamic principles, "in practice in the practical shape which the Pakistan constitution would under this Resolution ultimately assume".[146]

Thus, Sir Zafrullah was optimistic that the OR would not turn out to be regressive in nature and the non-Muslims would come around in their opposition to the Resolution. However,

[143] ibid, pp.62.

[144] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 12, 1949, pp.65-66.

[145] ibid, pp.67.

[146] ibid, pp.70.

later years showed that the non-Muslims lawmakers were correct; the OR did take a turn and it was the Ahmadis who were squeezed under it. All of this reflected that Pakistan was to be an Islamic state but no one explicitly mentioned it.

There was one Muslim member who explicitly mentioned that Pakistan was to be an Islamic state. Dr Omar Hayat Malik, a Muslim lawmaker from West-Punjab, declaring Islam as the ideology of the state. Dr Omar said:

> It is for the first time in many long centuries...that a people has risen as a people to demand and to achieve a State which is to be placed on an ideological basis,not only on an ideological basis but on a particular ideology; the ideology of a revealed religion, the ideology of Islam.[147]

He continued that the world has seen many types of states but that "this is the first time that we, here in Pakistan, are striving to set up a State which shall conform to the will of God". He cemented his defence of the OR with the following statement:

> The Resolution itself, in its various clauses, makes it clear that our State shall conform to the entire ideology of Islam. There are no reservations about it; there are no exceptions about it: all the principles of Islam and all the laws of Islam shall be binding on the State.[148]

By all the principles and laws of Islam, it means the Quran and Sunnah based on the Shariah will be applicable to the Islamic state of Pakistan. This is what the non Muslim members were discussing in the first place. A religious frontier was being erected by way of a resolution based on Islamic ideology.

Dr Omar argued that Pakistan will be a "theo-democracy" with limited democracy where the people will have some power and not all power as "certain things have to be resolved by God".[149] Since the laws laid down in the Quran are enforced on the State, people cannot alter these God given laws. Dr Omar based his analysis on the argument that "periods of unbelief have always been followed by days of belief" similar to how days follow nights. Thus, this period of unbelief is passing in nature and the people should not be discouraged by it. Dr Omar's arguments were based on his belief that "We believe that Islamic way of life is

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[147] ibid, pp.78.

[148] ibid, pp.78.

[149] ibid, pp.78.

something superior and we are, therefore, proud of our faith in Islam".[150] He further argued that non-Muslim members should not object because they know that a Muslim-dominated Pakistan is for a specific purpose. "We said it openly to the whole world that we wanted to make Pakistan an Islamic State, based on Islamic principles, but my friends have put forward these amendments trying to dissuade us from this course".[151]His remarks reflect the significant moment where religion and nationalism coalesce. While his statement actually undermined the PM's balanced explanation given on the first day of the debate, it waxed the religious nationalism and defined Pakistan as an Islamic state where a Muslim Pakistani takes precedence over a non-Muslim owing to his "religion".

To sum up, it was not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the OR that Pakistan will be based on an Islamic ideology. However, it was in the debate that the law-makers spoke their mind. The non-Muslim law-makers wanted qualification of every principle as enunciated by Islam and opposed it while the Muslim law-makers defended the Islamic credentials of Pakistan. The PM did not use the words Islamic ideology but other Muslim law-makers applied it to the future constitution and identity of Pakistan. This study implies that a religious frontier was created by defining or implying Pakistan as an Islamic state. The non-Muslim members were the first to highlight this frontier as they faced a dilemma over defining Pakistaniyat. For the Muslims, it was a straight forward subscription to the Quran and Sunnah but for the non-Muslims it was a pandora's box. Mr Prem Hari Barma, a non-Muslim from East Bengal, was right to point out that defining the constitution with religion will force the government to have two sets of principles, one for the Muslims, and other for the non-Muslims.[152] In such a scenario, what rights will the minorities have in the Islamic state of Pakistan was an open question.

3.5.2 Status of Religious Minorities and Their Rights

The debate above makes crystal clear the vision for an Islamic Pakistan. However, what was to be the status of religious minorities in such an Islamic state? What will be their rights? And will they be at par with the majority class of Muslims? This second theme will examine the parliamentary debate from the perspective of religious minorities. This includes both the

[150] ibid, pp.79

[151] ibid, pp.79.

[152] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 9, 1949, pp.31.

non-Muslims and various sects within Islam. The question of sect is pertinent for the discussion on the Ahmadi question that will follow. The analysis under this theme will be carried out in such a way where the questions asked by non-Muslim law-makers will be discussed first, followed by the responses given by the Muslim law-makers. This once again bypasses the chronological arrangement of the debate and focuses around the second theme.

The analysis reveals that the non-Muslim members were more concerned with how minorities will be treated in a state based on Islamic ideology. They argued that the OR would divide the Pakistani nation on communal lines. On the other hand, the Muslim law-makers attributed these apprehensions to "fear" and "misunderstanding" on the part of non-Muslims. They flipped the argument over its head arguing that non-Muslims had been living with Muslims for centuries so they should know the true spirit of Islam. In addition, any amendment moved by the non-Muslim law-makers opposing the OR was turned down on the ground of their constricted numerical strength.

The PM Liaquat Ali Khan, in his explanation of the enabling clause[153] in OR, assured the different sects in Pakistan that "the state will seek to create an Islamic society free from dissensions". He clarified that "free from dissension" means not "restricting the freedom of any section of the Muslims in the matter of their beliefs" and he further assured the sects: "No sect, whether the majority or a minority, will be permitted to dictate to the others and, in their own internal matters and sectional beliefs, all sects shall be given the fullest possible latitude and freedom".[154] The PM gave a balanced statement on the question of different sects in Pakistan which was tilted towards an inclusive approach. The PM outlined his inclusive approach towards "rights of the non-Muslim". He was of the view that it would be un-Islamic to ignore and impinge upon the freedom of the minorities. He pointed to the history of Islamic cultures that treated minority cultures as a source of strength. He tried to assure the minorities that their contribution will be to the credit of Pakistan, thus that the minorities "may look toward, not only to a period of the fullest freedom, but also to an understanding and appreciation on the part of the majority". Although the statements made by the PM were endeavouring to reassure, it was the binary of minority versus majority

[153] Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the *Sunnah* in *Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume V, 1949.*

[154] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, March 7, Volume 5, 1949, pp.5.

based on communal lines that irked the non-Muslim law-makers. They wanted to know the practical implications of such a statement. Thus, they asked specific questions on this issue.

Mr Prem Hari Barma, a non-Muslim deputy from East Bengal-General, objecting to the Preamble of the OR, questioned the limitations prescribed by Allah. He argued that "limitations are known to Muslims only"[155] but the OR is not limited to Muslims alone as it will be binding on every one in Pakistan. He was followed by Kamini Kumar Datta, another non-Muslim deputy from East Bengal-General, opposing a constitution based on the bifurcation of minority and majority. He pointed out that minorities are always asked about rights, "What right do you want?" He answered his own question that the minorities want a right fight for Pakistan. He wanted to get rid of the division of minority and majority in Pakistan so everyone is an equal Pakistani. For him, everyone in Pakistan is a Pakistani: "I can tell the house that whoever belongs to our school of thought believes that they are the people of Pakistan and they form part of Pakistan".[156]

Further two pertinent questions were raised by Bhupendra Kumar Datta, a non-Muslim deputy from the same region. First, why were the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice applied as enunciated in Islam? Second, if there was any arrangement regarding holding of public offices by non-Muslims? For Mr Datta, non-Muslims were as good Pakistanis as anybody else since they lived in this land for generations and fought for it against foreign invaders. But defining principles through Islam "condemned them forever to an inferior status and prevented for all time to come ,Pakistan from growing up into a country of well-knit, homogenous people".[157] His response to the second question was that any appointment for the public offices would be through the benevolence of the majority.

An amendment brought forward by Mr Prem Hari Barma challenged the enabling clause that highlighted the increased role of the state in organizing, for Muslims, a life according to their own religion. Mr Barma wanted a similar role of the state for the non-Muslims in Pakistan. Why would the state work for the religion of one section of the people and exclude the others? This dissension came despite the OR specifically mentioning that adequate

[155] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 8, 1949, pp.18.

[156] ibid, pp.24.

[157] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 9, 1949, pp.27.

provisions shall be made for minorities freely to profess and practice their religion in one of its clauses. In the same vein, Mr.Kamini Kumar Datta, who earlier opposed the communal division, asked, "whether the rights of the minorities in respect of their freedom to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures has been secured or not". He wanted to amend the OR by substituting "adequate provisions" with "secured to the minorities" in the clause relating to the minorities.[158]

The most interesting and soul-searching questions came towards the end of the discussion from the leader of the Congress party, Mr Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya, a Hindu from East Bengal-General. Challenging the fourth paragraph of OR where basic principles were to be applied but as enunciated by Islam, he rejected the OR outright and instructed his party to do the same.[159] He argued that if the state will exercise authority within the limits prescribed by God,[160] in that case, he questioned, "What are those limits, who will interpret them?" and in case of difference of opinion, who will prevail? Here, one thing is clear that whatever those limits be, non-Muslims cannot define them and certainly cannot interpret them. This indirectly excluded the minorities from the discussion process. Moreover, he questioned whether a non-Muslim can be the head of the state. If laws can only be changed if there is an injunction in Sharia and through consensus of Muslims, then "what are we then? We are not Muslims". He pressed further and asked "what is the position of non-Muslims in a Muslim state?"He responded that "they will play the part of second fiddle". This, according to him, was not equality of rights. If Muslims call themselves Pakistanis, will the non-Muslims call themselves non-Pakistani?[161] He rebuked the Muslim law-makers for creating a majority and minority division, a *Herrenvolk* and exhorted them to treat Pakistan as one nation. Thus, it becomes visible how the minorities were not only threatened by the religious frontier drawn by the OR but also by the securitization of the "majority-minority" binary in the speeches of Muslim lawmakers.

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[158] ibid, pp.35.

[159] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 12, 1949, pp.89.

[160] As laid down in the Preamble of the OR Text.

[161] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 12, 1949, pp.91.

The Muslim lawmakers differed with their non-Muslim counterparts in their understanding of the rights enjoyed by the minorities. Each of the Muslim law-maker from the Prime Minister to Muslim members rejected all the arguments made by the PNC members and attributed their opposition to the OR to fear, ignorance, and misunderstanding of Islam. The Muslim lawmakers explained their own understanding of the OR with regard to the minorities. The debate highlights how the Muslim law-makers explained how the minorities were to be viewed in the state of Pakistan.

Dr Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi's remarks were aimed to address the questions of the minorities. He, time and again, referred to the apprehensions of the non-Muslims borne out of "fear" and "ignorance".[162]

He addressed the fears by arguing:

> All these things are absolutely foreign to our mind for the simple reason that they are foreign to our traditions, to our culture, and to our basic religious beliefs. We have never believed in the division of society into patricians and plebeians; we have never believed that any person, who does not see eye to eye with us in religious matters is sub-human or that he is not our equal in such matters as pertain to this life and to the matters of the State.[163]

However, his central argument was that the wellbeing of the community does not lie much in the inclusion in a Constitution but in the behavior of the people. Thus, he argued that the "real political safeguard for any minority is to win the affection and respect of the majority".[164] He continued and counter questioned the non-Muslims members that if Muslims failed to impress upon them the tolerant culture of Islam then how come they are aloof from it as well. Thus, he turned the argument on its head that it was the responsibility of the minorities to earn the blessings of the majority.From his point of view, minorities must work hard to earn the love of the majority.

The clergy also weighed in on the topic with polarizing positions. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Osmani argued that the modern world is ailing and the antidote lies with Pakistan being a fortress embodied on Islam. Citing the case of U.S.S.R, he was of the view that the state can only be run by those who believe in its principles and ideologies. In such a case:

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[162] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 9, 1949, pp.41.

[163] ibid, pp.42.

[164] ibid, pp.40.

> People who do not subscribe to those ideas may have a place in the administrative machinery of the State but they cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of framing the general policy of the State or dealing with matters vital to its safety and integrity.[165]

First, this meant that a person from a minority cannot be a head of the state, and second, if the person did not believe in the ideology of Pakistan, that person cannot be trusted for the security of the state or the defence of the country. This strengthened the fears of the PNC that non-Muslims would be second fiddle in Pakistan. But Maulana Osmani also mentioned that it is the duty of an Islamic state to safeguard "the lives, property, honour, religious freedom and civic rights of all the loyal non-Muslims within its jurisdiction". The interesting part was that he negated the position of Dr Ishtiaq above about the behavior of the people: "What is most important is the fact that the enjoyment of these rights by non-Muslims does not depend on the sweet will of the Muslim majority; it is a duty imposed on the latter by God to protect the rights of the minorities and they can, on no pretext whatsoever, swerve from the part of their duty".[166] It is interesting how the perspective of an academic differed from that of a clergyman. It also reflects the lack of unanimity among the Muslim law-makers on the question of minorities. The only thing binding them together was their subscription to the Islamic ideology regardless of the interpretation.

The Muslim Minister of Communications, Sardar Abdur Rab Khan Nishtar's response on the minority question is also enlightening. He towed the same line blaming apprehensions to misunderstanding of Islam. Basing his broader argument that the world was seeing two ideologies in conflict-capitalism and communism- and Pakistan had a mission to perform by providing an alternative social system. In this light, he stressed that basing the constitution on Islam was actually a guarantee to the minorities as it imposed limits on the Muslims which they cannot transgress as a principle of faith.[167] Thus, they should welcome an Islamic constitution.

Moreover, he took down two birds with a single stone. First, regarding the behaviour of the minorities, a subject discussed above by Dr Ishtiaq and Maulana Osmani, he said: "We thought our approach towards the rights of minorities would rather create a better feeling in

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[165] ibid, pp.45.

[166] ibid, pp.46.

[167] Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 10, 1949, pp.51.

their minds and they would be considerate towards us also but unfortunately they deny to us even this much right".[168] The "this much right" he speaks of was the fifth enabling clause of the OR. He complained that minorities should at least grant the Muslims this right as they are in a majority in Pakistan. However, he warned against enabling the state to promote other religions since Muslims would be in a majority, and that the minorities would therefore not want someone outside of their faith making policies for their faith.

Mr Nur Ahmed, instead of responding to the specific queries on the minorities, broadly argued that it is the fault of Hindus that they failed to understand the inner meaning of Islam. Pointing to the inclusive character and the democratic spirit of Islam, as well as the deteriorating rights and liberties of people in the USA and South Africa, he challenged the minorities as follows: "I do not know what more the minority of Pakistan can expect from the constitution of Pakistan?" [169]

Towards the end of the debate, the PM Liaquat Ali Khan responded to queries and amendments proposed by the non-Muslim lawmakers. He argued that the non-Muslim lawmakers were not ready to be persuaded and that there was no point explaining the implications of the OR. However, he did answer the questions raised by the leader of the PNC. First, he attributed the information provided by the Congress leader to nefarious elements among Muslims who want to disrupt the country. The PM categorically stated that *Jumma (*Friday) prayers can be held in a state whose head is a non-Muslim and any opinion to the contrary is propaganda. Second, whether a non-Muslim can be head of a state, he responded as: "A non-Muslim can be the head of the administration under a constitutional government with limited authority that is given under the constitution to a person or an institution in that particular State".[170] The PM was of the view that for the non-Muslims, the greatest guarantee comes only through the OR so they should not think that the OR will push the non-Muslims out of Pakistan or make them second-class citizens. On the question of whether Pakistani nationals are only Hindu or Muslims, he responded: "I say we are both" as "one can be a national of state with equal rights, equal privileges and equal responsibilities

[168] ibid, pp.60.

[169] Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 12, 1949,pp.83.

[170] Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 12, 1949, pp.95.

yet remain Muslim and Hindu".[171] This statement contradicts with that of Jinnah where he mentioned that a Hindu will stop being a Hindu and Muslim will stop being a Muslim in the political sense of the term. However, the OR debate shows that the Hindu-Muslim category was being debated on political grounds. Moreover, the PM asserted that non-Muslims will flourish in the services of Pakistan as "we are leaving the doors open for Muslims and non-Muslims". Finally, the PM pleaded with the minorities to give Pakistan and the OR a chance as his administration was "trying to build up this state on morality and on higher values of life than what materialism can provide".[172]

3.5.3 Religion, Politics and Role of the State:

The third theme focuses on the role of religion in the governance of the state. All the non-Muslim law-makers and those who opposed the OR were of the opinion that religion and politics are two different spheres and one should not mix into the other. For them faith and reason were the opposite of each other. On the other hand, all the Muslim law-makers supporting the OR believed that the bifurcation of faith and reason in the political sphere is unknown to Islam that such a Machiavellian ideal of the state is unacceptable, and that faith and reason both went hand in hand.

This debate about the role of religion came to the fore because of the Preamble[173] and the fifth clause dubbed as the enabling clause of the OR. The Preamble attributed absolute sovereignty to Allah who further delegated the authority to the State, deifying the state in the process and exercised through the people. However, the people were also limited by the boundaries prescribed by Allah considered a sacred trust. The enabling clause increased the role of the state in creating favourable religious conditions for the Muslims. Both sides of the aisle gave convincing arguments opposing each other. Ironically, both sides contended that Jinnah would not approve of their positions. The arguments and counter arguments regarding the Preamble of the OR will be analyzed to determine how this difference of opinion in drafting of the constitution laid down the religious frontiers which aided in waxing of religious nationalism later on. The PM Liaquat Ali Khan justified the Preamble arguing:

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[171] ibid, pp.96.

[172] ibid, pp.98.

[173] See *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume V, 1949.*

> We are overwhelmingly Muslims and we believe that it is by adhering to our faith and ideals that we can make a genuine contribution to the welfare of the world. Therefore, Sir, you would notice that the Preamble of the Resolution deals with a frank and unequivocal recognition of the fact that all authority must be subservient to God.[174]

The PM denounced the Machiavellian ideals where morals are sacrificed at the altar of the state but also clarified that this resort to Islam did not validate the "Divine Rights of Kings or Rulers". The authority ultimately would boil down to the people of Pakistan.His viewpoint on the enabling clause was that the state cannot be a "neutral observer" where Muslims may profess religion as they please. This would be contrary to the demand of Pakistan. Thus, the state will create conducive conditions "to the building up of a truly Islamic society, which means that the state will have to play a positive part in this effort".[175] Islam as per the PM was not a matter of private beliefs and conduct and it was incumbent upon its followers to create a "good life". Such a constitution based on a religious identity which endorses the increased role of the state in encouraging the majority religion was unacceptable to the non-Muslims in the Constituent Assembly. The clarification given by the PM clearly showed that the state will play an active and positive part in encouraging Islam.

The analysis will first focus on the arguments presented by the law-makers who were against the amalgamation of religion and politics. The Pakistani population consisted of people belonging to various religions, all having their own customs and cultures. Thus, for non-Muslims an inclusive constitution was an ideal goal. Mr Sri Chandra was the first one to question the logic of the OR as the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights had finalized its report. In his opinion, Pakistan has to be great "politically, economically and culturally. Merely spiritually would not do".[176]

Mr Bhupendra upped the ante in opposing the role of religion in politics and increased role of the state in regulating lives of the people; he proposed that the Preamble be omitted from the OR altogether. He asserted that laws and regulations dealing with the relationship between people and state fall within the political realm. On the other hand, the relations between men and God falls under the religious realm. Thus, for him, politics and religion

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[174] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, March 7, Volume 5, 1949, pp.2.

[175] ibid, pp.4.

[176] ibid, pp.9.

belonged to two different regions of the mind, even if it be held that these two regions are inter-related by the presence of God. He further asserted that politics devoid of religion can be criticized and changed but criticizing politics imbued with religion leads to resentment and absolutism.[177] This argument echoed the statement by the earlier PM himself that only the minorities might find an issue with the OR indirectly implying that majority Muslims would never object to the OR.

An academic perspective was given by Professor Raj Kumar. He had qualms with the enhanced role of the state in the future constitution of Pakistan. He objected to the Preamble with the view that it deifies the state, puts the state before the people which should not be the case. He wanted to amend the second clause[178] of OR which categorically declared that:

> Elected representatives of the people…shall exercise their powers through such persons as are by law authorized to do so. The elected representatives shall control acts of Government and may at any time divest it of all authority.[179]

On the issue of separation between religion and politics, he sided with his Congress members in keeping the two distinct. A strong closing argument upholding the bifurcation of religion and politics and favouring the reduced role of the state came from the leader of the PNC Mr. Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya. Regarding the Preamble of the OR, he suggested that it must be deleted as in his opinion "All power, in my opinion, rests with the people and they exercise their power through the agency of the State".[180] He referred to Jinnah when he argued that Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in religious sense but in the political sense of the term.

To sum up the PNC lawmakers viewpoint, they vehemently denounced the Preamble of the OR on the grounds that it weds religion and politics which should not be the case. This, in their opinion, would not only create a tilt towards the majority religion and declare a state

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[177] ibid, pp.14.

[178] The second clause states: "Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the Chosen representatives of the people" *in The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume V, 1949.*

[179] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 9, 1949, pp.25.

[180] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 12, 1949, pp.89.

religion but also marginalize the minorities, their customs and their culture. This established a religious frontier with the fear of domination lingering on the minorities. The securitization of this fear as a threat in the future was what the PNC members were warning against. How the Muslim law-makers reacted to this criticism defined the role of religion in politics in Pakistan.

Dr Ishtiaq, an academic, defended the OR against the criticism from the PNC members. He deemed it impossible to separate religion and politics because of the underlying reason: "Our reason is fashioned by our faith and our faith is fashioned by our reason". Moreover, Dr Ishtiaq questioned how politics can be devoid of ethical and spiritual principles? If there were instances when religion was used as a pretext to resort to violence then there were other instances when religion was not involved but violence occurred nonetheless. So in his opinion: "Such convulsions are not caused by faith but by the lack of faith".[181] His advice was that divorcing politics from moral and ethical principles guided by faith ends in disaster.

A similar stance was echoed by the cleric, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Osmani. His words clarified his position on the matter: "Islam has never accepted the view that religion is a private affair between man and his Creator and as such has no bearing upon the social or political relations of human beings".[182] In support of his argument, he quoted both Jinnah and the Quran that religion and politics were not to be separated. This sent a message that despite the noble ideals, religion was to play a significant part in politics. This would start a cycle where the questions of interpretation, enforcement and debating the laws would baffle the administration.

Another strong proponent of keeping religion and politics intact was Sardar Abdur Rab Khan Nishtar. He defended the Preamble of the OR by recognizing the difference of opinion between Muslims and non-Muslims. It is a cardinal belief of the Muslims, he argued: "Our religion governs not only our relation with God, but also our activities in other spheres of life".[183] Similarly, Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi and a Muslim lawmaker also defended the merger of politics and religion. His argument for keeping the two together was that Islam not only satisfied the intellectual cravings of the mind but also beautified those

[181] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 9, 1949, pp.39.

[182] ibid, pp.44.

[183] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 10, 1949, pp.56.

intellectual faculties. For him, the reason why religion and politics were bifurcated was because of the "failure to grasp the full significance of religion".[184] If one were aware that religion stood for bringing out the best in humanity then such criticism would not occur. Defending the OR and the role of the state, Mr Zafrullah questioned what objection could be made of Muslims demand that the constitution discouraged lending on interest and encouraged co-partnership and profit-sharing? However, in his remarks, he termed the state as subservient to the people.[185] But the overall justification given by Mr Zafrullah regarding the role of religion in politics and the role of state was in a problem-solution binary. The problem being the current deplorable state of the state and the solution being Islam; anything else was dubbed as lack of understanding, ignorance or fear of religion.

3.6 The Question of Ahmadis

The status of religious minorities is a sensitive topic in Pakistan. In 2018, the PTI backed government of PM Imran Khan formed an 18 member Economic Advisory Council (EAC) and appointed notable academics to the council. One of the academics was a renowned economist Atif Mian at Princeton University, USA. The government on 4th September 2018 vociferously defended Atif Mian's appointment but after three days, on 7th September, requested him to step down from the EAC. The underlying reason was that Atif Mian was an Ahmadi.[186] The religio-political parties along with opposition legislators in the parliament and provincial assemblies clamored that non-Muslims cannot be appointed to powerful positions in the state. Unwillingly, the government succumbed to the pressure and withdrew Atif Mian's appointment from the EAC. This identity crisis, where Atif Mian was considered an Ahmadi first and a Pakistani second can be explained by the waxing of religious nationalism. A similar confusing environment was observed back in 1949 during the parliamentary debate concerning the OR as Dr Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, a Muslim law-maker and an academic assured the non-Muslims and minorities that an Islamic state does

[184] See Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, March 12, 1949, pp.66.

[185] ibid, pp.77

[186] Ahmadis also known as Qadiani or Mirzai in Pakistan are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed who claimed Prophethood for himself. Ahmadis call themselves Muslims but are termed as heretics by other sects of Islam. The Ahmadi bifurcated into two groups in Pakistan: The Lahori Group and the Rabwah Group.

not bar people from holding office or participate in the political life of the country while his colleague, Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Osmani, a cleric, argued:

> The Islamic state means a state which is run on the exalted and excellent principles of Islam…People who do not subscribe to the those ideas may have a place in the administrative machinery of the state but they cannot be entrusted it with the responsibility of the framing general policy of the state or dealing with matters vital to its safety and integrity. (Constituent Assembly of Pakistan debates, 1949, p.45).

Then why the appointment of a single Ahmadi individual stirred the hornets' nest? This study will aim to answer this question.

The academic debate around religious minorities in Pakistan focuses on the marginalization of these minorities (Fuchs & Fuchs, 2020; Neelam & Khan, 2023). The post-colonial state revised its stance from accommodating all sects in 1949 to declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims in 1974 in turn consolidating the Muslim identity with Pakistaniyat. This thesis argues that internal religious frontiers that were ill defined with the passage of the OR were open to interpretation. This vagueness led to the securitization of Ahmadis as a threat to the Muslim identity. The presence of religious frontiers carried forward from 1949 led to the religious exclusion and marginalization of Ahmadis. This further consolidated the bond between Pakistaniyat and Islam and resulted in the waxing of religious nationalism. This thesis argues that the Ahmadis were portrayed as a threat not only to the ideological foundations of Pakistan but also what it meant to be a Muslim and a Pakistani. Although Ahmadis were already looked down upon as heretics since Mirza Ghulam claimed prophethood in the 19th century, in 1974 they were finally securitized as a threat through the platform of the parliament.

This study examines the portrayal of Ahmadis as a threat to the ideological foundation of the Pakistani state and the Muslim identity of a Pakistani by analyzing the proceedings of the Special Committee that was formed to consider the Qadiani Issue. The proceedings were declassified only a decade ago. This analysis is different from other scholarly works on the Ahmadis (Friedmann, 1989; Lavan, 1974; Saeed, 2007) as it reflects the narrative of the then government in power voiced through the law-makers. While most of the scholarly work focuses on the theological differences, they ignore the viewpoint of the government voiced through the parliament. This is not to say that the theological differences between Ahmadis and other mainstream Muslim sects were insignificant. However, during the proceedings it was not only the theological differences that were securitized as a threat but the Ahmadis were also shown to pose a political and ideological threat to Pakistan as well. This study also highlighted an interesting insight that is how external and domestic religious frontiers were

combined and securitized to boost the domestic frontier and magnify the ensuing threat. Pakistan shares a hostile external religious frontier with Israel that was combined with a domestic religious frontier by associating Ahmadis with Israel with the purpose of showing the seriousness of the threat. The study argues that political leaders through a top down approach created a domestic religious frontier between the Ahmadis and other Muslim sects, and securitized the Ahmadis as a perceived threat to Pakistan. This resulted in the waxing of religious nationalism and the identity of the people of Pakistan was influenced.

3.6.1 The Ahmadis

There emerged in South Asia varieties of Islam in the context of Islamic revival and reform in the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Robinson, 1988). One such variety was the Ahmadis who emerged in the period after the mutiny of 1857 (ibid, p.9) in 1889. Muslims, after 1857, confronted an energized proselytization campaign by Christian emissaries and Hindu revivalist movements in India. In response to this, the Ahmadi school of thought was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1835-1908) based in Qadian, a city in the Gurdaspur[187] district of Punjab in India (ibid, p.10). After the partition of India and independence of Pakistan in 1947, majority of the Ahmadis moved from Qadian to Rabwah and Lahore, both cities in Punjab, that is present day Pakistan. Mirza Ghulam Ahmed initially defended Islam against the polemics from Christians and Hindus. However, major doctrinal schism emerged between Mirza Ghulam Ahmed and other sects of Islam during his own lifetime and Ahmadis were declared as heretics by the ulema of India early on.

Robinson states that Mirza Ghulam differed from other Muslims on three major points (Robinson, 1988). First, he argued that the door of prophethood had not closed and as "Jesus brought Mosaic order to an end so he brought that of Prophet Mohammad to a close" (ibid, p.10). Islamic scholars through the writings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed proved that he claimed prophethood and superiority over Prophet Mohammad and Jesus (Special Committee Proceedings, 1974). Second, Mirza Ghulam argued Jesus did not die at the cross but only swooned and travelled to continue his missionary work. He even claimed that the grave of Jesus was in Sirinagar, Kashmir (Robinson, 1988, p. 10). He further claimed that he was the promised Messiah/Mahdi. This view about Jesus challenged the widely held Islamic belief that Jesus was taken up in physical form and will return as a Messiah. Mirza Ghulam's claim

[187] A Muslim majority district in undivided India with road access to Kashmir. This area was given to India after the partition, which Pakistan claimed, was unfair on the boundary commission's part. Later, the Ahmadis were blamed for influencing the boundary commission to hand over the district to India

to be Mahdi was objectionable to almost all the sects of Islam. Third, Mirza Ghulam ruled out any form of armed Jihad.[188] He argued that the time of armed jihad was a thing of the past, and that the only jihad binding upon Muslims is through missionary work (ibid, p.10). This was significant as this meant that armed jihad against the British was also restricted. Other theological differences were also present. One such difference was that Ahmadis considered every non-Ahmadi to be a non-Muslim and called them infidels (*Kafir)*. A similar attitude was adopted by other sects of Islam who considered Ahmadis as infidels (Special Committee Proceedings, 1974). In addition, Mirza Ghulam claimed to have received revelation *(Wahi)* directly from Allah (Friedmann,1989, p. 5). From an Ahmadi perspective, the Ahmadi community justified the above differences in their writings[189] and through the special committee proceedings; however, others were not convinced by the Ahmadi arguments. Besides this, the Ahmadi community also had internal theological rifts and was subdivided into two groups. This came to the fore after the incumbency of Nur-ul-Din.[190]

Spencer Lavan in tracing the religious and political history of Ahmadis before partition, rightly claims that although "controversial, heretical, polemical, persecuted-all these terms apply to the history of the Ahmadis movement in India and Pakistan", he continues, "the term-effective-applies equally well to the organizational structure and missionary efforts of the movement" (Lavan, 1974, p. 186). Despite being marginalized and excluded from the pale of Islam, the Ahmadi community managed to survive, with hardships in Pakistan and abroad as the Ahmadi community-Rabwah and Lahore- was declared as a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan in 1974 through the second constitutional amendment. This push to

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[188] For Mirza Ghulam's detailed view on Jihad, see "ورنمنٹ گریہ زیہ اورجہاد" "British Government and Jihad", 1900.

[189] See "Mahzarnama", explains major beliefs of Ahmadis in a summarized form. Submitted by the Rabwah group to the Special Committee 1974.

[190]After Nur-ul-Din's death, Mirza Bashir ud Din, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed's son, became the second "caliph" of the Ahmadi community. His succession split the movement into two factions in 1914: the Qadianis led by Mirza Bashir ud Din and the Lahoris led by Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din and Maulvi Muhammad Ali (ibid, p.16). The major point of contention between the two was that the former considered Mirza Ghulam Ahmed to be a prophet while the latter thought of him as a *mujaddid* or *muhaddas*. The Lahore group also established in Lahore their own organization "Ahmadiya Anjuman-i-Isha'at-i-Islam". After the partition, the Qadian group moved to a city called Rabwah in Punjab and Ahmadis from Qadian were referred to as Qadianis or the Rabwah group. However, the local lexicon does not create a distinction between the two groups as both are addressed as Ahmadis, Qadianis, or Mirzais in Pakistan.

declare Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority particularly came from a single organization called the Ahrars, which further snowballed into an all out anti-Ahmadi campaign.

3.6.2 The Ahrars

The Ahrar was a Muslim nationalist party and an offshoot of the INC. The Majlis-i-Ahrar-e-Islam was founded in a meeting held in Lahore on 4th May 1931.[191] The Ahrar's evolution as a party can be divided into two phases: pre-partition and post-partition. Before the partition, as Smith argues, Ahrar, like INC, was struggling for the freedom of India from "the brutal exploitation of alien imperialism"(Smith, 1943, p. 260). The party, mainly based in Punjab, opposed British rule from a religious and nationalist standpoint, arguing instead for the benefits of "ethically and religiously and economically socialist society" (ibid, p.261). In following its agenda of freeing Muslims from oppression, "it aided the lower classes of Kashmir in their self-assertive movement of 1931-1932" (ibid, p.261) when "Mazhar Ali Azhar led a determined band of one hundred volunteers from Sialkot to march into the Jammu territory" (Report of inquiry, 1954, p.10) against Dogra control. On the communal question, Ahrar, before partition, stood for Hindu-Muslim unity (Smith, 1943, p. 262); however, it later tilted towards the Sunni sect in the Sunni-Shia riots (ibid, p.262). On the question of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India, Ahrars denounced it tooth and nail. In a resolution passed by Majlis-e-Ahrar's working committee in 1940, they not only disapproved of the Pakistan plan but in later speeches called Pakistan "Palidistan" *(Land of the Impure)* (Report of Inquiry, 1954, p.11). Later resolutions, passed in 1943, reconfirmed their anti-partition stance as vivisection of the country. Moreover, they detested Jinnah to the point of calling him an infidel and were openly against the ideals of the Muslim League. Thus, before partition, the focus of Majlis-i-Ahrar was opposing British imperialism and forwarding a socialist/nationalist agenda from a religious spring board to keep the country intact. The pre-partition politics was their bread and butter and although they disliked Ahmadis, it was not one of their primary concerns.

Things changed after the partition of India in 1947. The Majlis-i-Ahrar that once championed the nationalist cause against the exploitative British was out of agenda now. Much to Majlis-i-Ahrar's chagrin, the partition took place in 1947; INC came to power in India while the Muslim League gained Pakistan for the Muslims; and Majlis-i-Ahrar became politically irrelevant (Report of Inquiry, 1954, p.12). The sense of bewilderment was so great

[191]For a detailed study about Majlis-i-Ahrar, see Samina Awan, (2010), *Political Islam in Colonial Punjab: Majlis-i-Ahrar, 1929–1949,* Karachi: Oxford University Press.

that in a moot held in 14th January 1949, Lahore, Pakistan, the party announced to cease as a political party and work as a religious group instead (ibid, p.13). However, all this changed when this religious group demanded for the first time in 1949 that Ahmadis be declared as a non-Muslim minority. From that point onwards, leaders of Majlis-e-Ahrar maintained a persistent criticism of the Ahmadis, using derogatory remarks for the Ahmadi caliph and Sir Zafarullah Khan, an Ahmadi and Pakistan's first Foreign Minister. The consistent diatribe of the Majlis-i-Ahrar against the Ahmadis is well documented in the Munir Kiyani report on the Punjab disturbances of 1953. In what follows we will look into the securitization of Ahmadis as a religious threat to the majority Muslim body which was initiated by the Majlis-i-Ahrar.

3.6.3 Political Environment: 1947-1974

In order to better contextualize and understand the background behind the second constitutional amendment in 1974 that declared the Ahmadis as non-Muslim it is important to comprehend the political environment which led to it. This section will address two questions: first, what was the political landscape from 1947 to1974 and second, why were the Ahmadis declared a non-Muslim minority in 1974 and not in 1953 when martial law was imposed in Punjab.

There were numerous political developments from 1947 till 1974; this section will focus specifically on the political events that fanned the anti-Ahmadi narrative in Pakistan since independence in 1947. These events, it is argued, placed the religious frontier between Muslims and Ahmadis in focus and constructed the latter as a domestic threat to the former. Resultantly, the Muslim identity was further tied to the idea of a Pakistani. These events include but are not limited to the death of Quaid e Azam , appointment of Zafarullah Khan as Foreign Minister of Pakistan, the passing of the OR of 1949, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy in 1951, the assassination of Prime Minister Liaqaut Ali Khan in 1951, the anti-Ahmadi agitation by Ahrars and the ulema, and subsequent imposition of martial law in Punjab in 1953, elections of 1970, the breakup of East Pakistan in 1971, the passing of Pakistan's third constitution in 1973, and finally the Rabwah incident that landed the Ahmadi question in the National Assembly of Pakistan.

A turning point in Pakistan's history was the death of its founder, Quaid e Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah on 11th September 1948. Before his death, Jinnah appointed Sir Chaudary Mohammad Zafarullah Khan, an Ahmadi, as the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan in 1947. His appointment was singled out by the Ahrar and other ulema as the increasing encroachment of Ahmadis on central positions, an allegation that was thoroughly discussed later in 1974. Moreover, Zafarullah was not only a cabinet member in PM Liaquat Ali Khan's government but also one of the supporters of the OR of 1949. How these two events

dovetail into the anti-Ahmadi narrative is significant to understand. First, Jinnah belonged to a Shia Ismaili sect and as an Ahmadi, Sir Zafarullah Khan did not offer the funeral prayers of Jinnah on the pretext that the funeral prayer was led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani who declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims, deserving to be killed. This argument was later used against the Ahmadis that neither did they offer the funeral prayers of Jinnah with other Muslims but also avoided praying for him in absentia. The ulema argued that Ahmadis were ordained by their caliph not to offer the funeral prayers of non-Ahmadis and Zafarullah followed his orders. As the study will show, this argument was later used against the Ahmadis during the parliamentary proceedings. Thus, the death of Jinnah was turned into an anti-Ahmadi talking point.

The passing of the OR by the government of PM Liaquat Ali Khan on 12th March, 1949 was another significant political event that carried anti-Ahmadi implications. As stated earlier, the OR made it abundantly clear that the state would enable Muslims to live an Islamic life but also that other sects in Islam and non-Muslims were free to practice and preach their religion. Interestingly, Sir Zafarullah Khan as a member of the cabinet had supported the passing of this resolution. How the OR gained anti-Ahmadi traction was visible in the 1973 constitution when the OR was made the preamble to the constitution. Since the state was to enable the Muslims to pursue an Islamic way of life, it also implied that the state now prevented other sects from interfering with this sacred way of life. Hence the Ahmadis were seen as a threat to the Islamic way of life.

Another significant event that amplified the religious exclusion of Ahmadis was the demand made by the Ahrar to declare the former as non-Muslim minority. As per the record of the Munir Inquiry report, it was on 1st May, 1949, two months after the passing of the OR, that the Ahrar publicly demanded Ahmadis be declared a non-Muslim minority (Report of Inquiry, 1954, p.15). The Ahrar kept on making anti-Ahmadi speeches from its establishment until the breakout of hostilities and impositions of martial law in 1953. Ahrar, which was obsolete after independence thus gained political dividends by criticizing the Ahmadis.

The political dividends further expanded for the anti-Ahmadi supporters owing to two events: the discovery of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy in 1951 and the assassination of PM Liaquat Ali Khan the same year. The Ahrars and similar anti-Ahmadi groups were anxious that Ahmadis were trying to bulk up their military capability by joining the Pakistan military for an eventual military takeover of Pakistan. Credence was led to this claim in the form of Rawalpindi conspiracy in March 1951 when one of the co-conspirators, Major General Nazir

Ahmed turned out to be an Ahmadi (Report of Inquiry, 1954, p.28). The Ahrar charged that General Nazir did not act out of his own volition, that it was ordained by the Ahmadi caliph to do so (Qasmi, 2015, p. 46). Unfortunately, in October of same year, PM Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated and the Ahrar joined the two dots in proving their argument that Ahmadis were out to take over Pakistan and that the Rawalpindi conspiracy and Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination were clear evidence in this regard (Ibid, p.46).

The anti-Ahmadi agitation instigated by the Ahrars and other ulema went unabated with occasional stern warnings from the government, as noted in the Munir Kiyani report. However, this anti-Ahmadi resentment turned violent in 1953 followed by the imposition of martial law in Punjab, Pakistan. An All Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention was called in Karachi in June 1952 followed by an All Muslim Parties Convention in Lahore on 13 July 1952 demanding that Ahmadis be declared a non-Muslim minority, removed from senior positions, and Rabwah be declared an open city (Report of Inquiry, 1954, p.78). Moreover, in the Lahore convention, it was decided to form a council for action (*Majlis e amal*) to decide the way forward. The council of action met Prime Minister Nazim ud Din on 13th August 1952, giving him an ultimatum to meet their demands by January 1953. The council met the PM again in January and February 1953 for their demands but Nazim ud Din refrained from accepting those demands (Qasmi, 2015, p.95). Finally, the call for a direct action *(rast iqdam)*[192] was submitted to the government by the ulema on 26th February 1953. The negotiations between the government and the Council for action broke down and sporadic episodes of violence ensued. It was on 6th March, 1953 when things spiraled out of control that the government had to impose martial law. As a result, Ahmadis were not declared non-Muslim minority while the ulema faced a setback with the realization that without representation, street power carried less weightage. However, this episode did imprint the anti-Ahmadi narrative and the state's response in the minds of many.

The representation that ulema were seeking was achieved in the first general elections of 1970 and with it came the call for religious homogenization. This came in the form of the breakup of East Pakistan in 1971. Out of the 300 seats in the National Assembly-162 for East Pakistan and 138 for West Pakistan- Mujib ur Rehman's Awami party won 160 out of 162 in East Pakistan while Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's PPP won 81 seats in West Pakistan. The religious political parties made significant gains, for instance,JUI won 7 seats, Jama'at-i-

[192] The form of direct action adopted was that five volunteers with demands written on placards would visit the PM house, if they were arrested, five more will be sent in a peaceful manner until the acceptance of the demands.

Islami had 4 seats (1 from Punjab, 2 from Sindh and 1 from the NWFP) and Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP) also won 7 seats (4 from Punjab, 3 from Sindh) (Qasmi, 2015, p.171). However, after East Pakistan's separation in 1971, West Pakistan's parliament shrunk to 138 seats only. This reduction in size, as Qasmi argues, enhanced the importance of the opposition, which now comprised right-wing parties (Ibid, p.171). One of the various reasons why the constitutional amendment was passed in 1974 was that the right wing parties were present in the parliament and possessed greater street power compared to 1953.This increased representation had a spillover effect on the third constitution of Pakistan promulgated in 1973. The constitution of 1973 was in many ways considered an Islamic constitution as the OR was made its preamble while it was decided that only a Muslim who believed in Allah and the finality of Prophet Mohammad can become the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan. Moreover, Islam was declared as the official ideology of Pakistan with Part IX of the constitutions suggesting that all laws be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah (Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, p.127). This explicit turn towards Islamization emboldened the religious parties to later push for excluding the Ahmadis from the pale of Islam.

Finally, the Rabwah incident of 1974 sparked country-wide protests against the Ahmadis and reignited the Ahmadi debate in Pakistan. It is reported that on 29th May 1974, a train carrying a group of students from Nishtar medical college stopped near Rabwah. There was an altercation between the Ahmadis at the station and the students on board the train which ended up without escalation. However, the train on its return journey stopped at the same station with the same students on board. A scuffle broke up between the two parties at the station with later investigation[193] found to be full of claims and counter claims. Resultantly, this was portrayed as a threat by the ulema that Ahmadis had become politically strong that they had taken to open hostilities against Muslims. This put the PM Bhutto government in a tight spot as his government was blamed for putting the issue on a back burner. Avoiding the fatal mistake of imposing a martial law, Bhutto announced that he would place the matter before the National Assembly where the fate of the Ahmadis was to be decided.

Based on the political context , one can observe why the Ahmadis were declared as a non-Muslim minority in 1974 and not in 1953. First, the religious political parties were in the National Assembly unlike 1953. Second, the bitter memories of the breakup of Pakistan were still alive, resulting in a search for stability as Ahmadis were also blamed for the

[193] Samdani Report by Justice Samdani.

breakup of East Pakistan. Third, the constitution of Pakistan was drafted with a clear religious bent. Fourth, the anti-Ahmadi narrative simmering since 1947 had achieved a critical mass.

3.6.4 Who Is A Muslim?

Since Pakistan gained independence in 1947, there was not any official agreed upon definition of a Muslim. The question of defining a Muslim came to the fore immediately after the disturbances of 1953.[194] Various attempts were made to answer who is a Muslim. For this purpose here, four official documents will be referred to: the report of the court of inquiry of 1954,[195] the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, *Mahzarnama* (Memorandum),[196] and the proceedings of the Special Committee.

On the question of who is a Muslim, the report of the court of inquiry stated:

> We have decided to use the word 'Musalman' to distinguish the general body of Muslims who do not believe in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad from those who believe in him and the word 'Ahmadi', 'Qadiani' or 'Mirzai' for the Qadiani section of Ahmadis who believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet (*nabi*). (Report of Inquiry, 1954, p.9).

The above stated definition was a working definition adopted by the report of Inquiry. However, the court of inquiry interviewed various ulema on ascertaining the rights of non-Muslims in Pakistan followed by an attempt to come up with a single definition of a Muslim. For the first part, the ulema were of the view that non-Muslims were to be treated as protected non-Muslim minorities *(zimmies)*, that the head of the state cannot delegate any authority to such people, and that they can play no part in the policy-making of the state (Report of Inquiry, 1954, page 213). In such a scenario, if Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims, then they would have no say in devising the law of the state. Thus, all the ulema interviewed stated that non-Muslims did not enjoy the same rights as Muslims in an Islamic

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[194] Disturbance broke out in Lahore, Punjab in 1953 in March.when the government rejected the two demands of the ulema: to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims and to sack any high-ranking Ahmadi official. Resultantly, martial law was declared in Punjab, and a court of inquiry was formed to investigate.

[195] Punjab Governor promulgated the Punjab Disturbance (Public Inquiry) Act of 1953 directing that a court be set for public inquiry into the matter. The is also known as "Munir Inquiry Report".

[196] A document presented by the Ahmadis to the Special Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan in 1974. The document laid down the beliefs of Ahmadis, responded to misconceptions about their beliefs and argued that Ahmadis were Muslims.

state (ibid, p.214). As to the latter part regarding who constituted a Muslim, there were divergent opinions given by the ulema. Only consensus was upon two beliefs: belief in the unity of Allah and belief in the finality of Prophet Mohammad. Justice Kiyani, the president of the court of inquiry stated:

> Keeping in view the several definitions given by the *ulema*, need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the *ulema*, we remain Muslims according to the view of that *alim* (Scholar)but *kafirs* (infidel)according to the definition of everyone else. (Report of Inquiry, 1954, p.218)

The question of who constituted a Muslim was first officially asked in 1954 by the court of inquiry and remained unanswered for the next two decades when in 1973 the third constitution of Pakistan was adopted. This constitution Islamized Pakistan in various areas: it declared Islam to be the state religion; the Objectives Resolution of 1949 was to form part of the substantive provisions; and Pakistan was to be renamed as "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" (Constitution of Pakistan, 1973). Moreover, it was the state's responsibility to encourage an Islamic way of life by making compulsory teaching of Holy Quran and *Islamiat* (Religious Studies), to encourage learning of Arabic and correct moral standards as outlined in Islam (ibid, p.18). The most significant clause was that only a Muslim can become the president and the prime minister (ibid, p.25-53). The 1973 constitution indirectly defined a Muslim through the oath of the president and the prime minister as outlined in the Third Schedule, Oath of office:

> I,————————————, do solemnly swear that I am a Muslim and believe in the Unity and Oneness of Almighty Allah, the Books of Allah, the Holy Quran being the last of them, the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him) as the last of the Prophets and that there can be no Prophet after him, the Day of Judgement, and all the requirements and teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah (ibid, p.186-187).

If a person or a community did not subscribe to the criteria above, they were automatically considered to be outside the pale of Islam even if they claimed to the contrary. As a corollary, Ahmadis were considered non-Muslims.

The debate regarding who was a Muslim reached its zenith in 1973-1974 when the question of whether Ahmadis were Muslims or non-Muslims was put before the National Assembly of Pakistan by the then government of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This was a victory for the ulema that the matter reached the parliament where they were able to influence policy. The Ahmadi community of Rabwah presented their viewpoint in a

document titled *"Mahzarnama"* (the Memorandum). This document defined who was a Muslim from the perspective of the Ahmadi beliefs. Their foundational argument was that an acceptable definition be predicated upon "the Holy Quran, one which is clearly established to have been narrated by the Holy Prophet and adherence to which definition is clearly established throughout the lifetime of the Holy Prophet and the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs" (Mahzarnama, p.15). The Mahzarnama quotes three sayings of Prophet Mohammad to define a Muslim. In these sayings, the belief in the unity of Allah, five prayers, payment of zakat and fasting were the main pillars (ibid, p.16-18). However, the three-page definition of a Muslim as given by the holy founder of the Ahmadi Muslim community in the same document did not refer to the three sayings of Prophet Mohammad but only to a narration from the Quran. The whole crux of the new definition was that anybody who submits to the will of Allah, both doctrinally and practically, is obedient to Allah, looks after his creation and does everything for the sake of Allah is a true Muslim (ibid, p.20-23). For the ulema, the problem with this definition was that it did not mention explicitly believing in the finality of the Prophet Mohammad, which was the main controversial issue between Ahmadis and other Muslim sects.

In response to the Mahzarnama submitted by the Ahmadis, the ulema also came up with a response of their own, called *Millat-e-Islamia ka Mauqauf* (View point of the community of Islam) and *Jawab-e-Mahzarnama* (Response to the Memorandum) and presented it in the special committee proceedings of the National Assembly of Pakistan. Maulana Ghaos Hazarwi, the author of the latter document, refuted each and every claim[197] of the Ahmadis made in the Mahzarnama along with the definition of a Muslim. In doing so, the Islamic scholar gave the definition of a Muslim which he stated was missing till date. This lack of definition, according to Maulana Ghoos, enabled non-Muslims in gaining senior governmental positions (Special Committee, 1974, p.2363), a clear hint at Ahmadis and Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan (1893-1985).[198] Maulana Ghaos refuted the definition of a Muslim given in the Mahzarnama. For him, that definition based on the Quran only sanctified the position of the false prophet Mirza Ahmed Qadiani and deceived the people at

[197] Various claims were made: the parliament is not empowered to decide a religious matter, definition of a Muslim as per Ahmadis, stance on finality of Prophet hood and Mirza Ahmed stature, commentary on denial of Jehad by Ahmadis and blasphemous claims of other sects.

[198] He was an Ahmadi and Pakistan's first Foreign Minister (1947-1954) appointed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. His appointment invited criticism that Ahmadis were attaining high positions in the government and proselytizing their religion.

large (ibid, p.2377). The criteria for being a Muslim for the ulema lie in the visible observable traits of the person. This, he bisected into a binary of faith *(imaan)* and sin *(Kufar)*. Thus, if a person subscribed to the unity of Allah, finality of Prophethood and obeyed what is decreed, then he is a Muslim as he had faith. But if the same person later on denied Allah and his Prophet or refuted their commands then he committed a sin which would make him an infidel (ibid,p.2374). Based on this binary definition of a Muslim, Maulana Ghoos summarized six sins[199] that Mirza Ahmed Qadiani committed and declared that he along with all his followers either the Rabwah group or the Lahori group were to be considered non-Muslims and infidels (ibid,p.2379).

The second constitutional amendment made it abundantly clear that Ahmadis were non-Muslims. This religious exclusion was because of the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan. The objective to create a unified group consciousness through a state-based on the ideology of Islam required a religiously homogenous community and Ahmadis were inconsistent with this ideology. Consequently, the Ahmadis were portrayed as a domestic threat not only to the ideological fabric of Islam but also to Pakistan. The end result was that the state defined who is a Muslim and what it meant to be Pakistani.

3.7 Proceedings of the Special Committee of National Assembly

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, whose political party PPP (Pakistan People's Party) came to power after the breakup of East Pakistan, announced on 13th June, 1974 that "after the Assembly had finished this Budget session, he would bring the issue of finality of Prophethood (*Khatme Nabuwat)* before this "august house". This statement was reiterated by the Law Minister, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada on the floor of the house (Special Committee, 1974, p.1298). He also moved a motion on 30th June, 1974 for the "Appointment of Special Committee of the Whole House to Determine the Status in Islam of Persons Who Do Not Believe in The Finality of Prophethood of Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him)" with the Speaker as its

[199] 1. Claim of prophethood after Prophet Mohammad. 2. Use of derogatory language for other Prophets of Allah. 3. Considering Prophet Jesus to be lower in rank than Mirza Ahmed. 4. Claim of receiving revelation directly from Allah and claiming the revelation received by Mirza Ahmed was tantamount to that of the Quran and other books revealed by Allah. 5. Changing the meaning of the Quran to prove Mirza Ahmed's claims. 6. Declaring all Muslims as non-Muslims who do not believe in the prophethood of Mirza Ahmed.

Chairman[200] (Special Committee, 1974, p.1302). The primary task of the committee[201] was to decide on the status of the people who do not believe in the finality of the Prophet Mohammad and make recommendations for such people. Following the motion, a resolution was tabled the same day in the same session of the National Assembly by Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, an opposition member belonging to the political party *Markazi Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan* (Central Community Ulema of Pakistan). The resolution declared that "Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, a product of imperialism, claimed to be a false prophet and his attempts to falsify Quranic texts and the forbidding of Jihad were detrimental to Islam. His followers, whoever they are and wherever they are, are outside the pale of Islam", it argued. The Conference of the World Muslim Organization[202] also called them as a divisive factor for Islam. Thus, Qadianis should be declared a non-Muslim minority through a constitutional amendment which should also provide for their rights as a non-Muslim minority.

After the adoption of the motion and the resolution, both sections of Ahmadis[203] submitted their memorials for the perusal of the committee. The heads of both the groups were invited to make their narrative heard and address any misconception held by the members of the committee. In their submission, both groups rejected all the allegations attributed towards them. The delegation of the Rabwah community of Ahmadis was headed by their leader

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[200] The Special Committee procedure was that both Ahmadi groups would read their statements followed by those from the ulema. This was followed by cross-examination of both groups of the Ahmadi community through the Attorney General (AG), Yayha Bakhtiar. After the cross examination, the members were to give proposals and suggestions regarding the motion. The Rabwah group was cross-examined for eleven days by the AG while the Lahori group was questioned for two days. During the entire proceedings, the members were not allowed to debate or put any question directly to either leader of the Ahmadi community. Any question or comment they required was routed through the AG who would ask on behalf of the members. This procedure was adopted so that conflict could be avoided between the opposing parties. Moreover, when the debate began among the members, no Ahmadi group was present in the debate. Thus, there was no direct interaction between the members of the Special Committee and the head of the Ahmadi community.

[201] The motion proposed that the quorum of the Committee shall be 40 out of which 10 shall be from the parties opposed to the Government in the National Assembly.

[202] The conference was held in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in April 1974 under the auspices of Al-Rabita Al-Alam-e-Al-Islami (Meeting of the Islamic World). Delegates from one hundred and forty Muslim Organizations and institutions participated. See National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 30th June, 1974.

[203] Rabwah Group and Lahore Group.

Mirza Nasir Ahmed while the Lahori group headed by Maulana Sadruddin was examined; Maulana Sadruddin spoke through Mian Abdul Mannan Omar on account of old age.



Figure 3 Timeline of the Proceedings of the Special Committee

3.8 Documents Presented In the Proceedings:

The special committee began its proceedings on 1st July, 1974. Although various documents were presented during the proceedings, four documents deserve special consideration. Two documents were submitted by the Ahmadis while the other two were submitted by the ulema in response to Ahmadis. It was on the recommendation of the steering committee that the Ahmadi community of Rabwah and *Ahmadiyyah Anjuman Isha'at-i-Islam, Lahore* (Ahmadiyyah Association of Islamic Publication, Lahore) were asked to provide their viewpoint to the Special Committee in writing. The Ahmadi community of Rabwah presented the Memorandum *(Mahzarnama)* and the Lahore group submitted "Detailed Statement of the Ahamadiyyah Association of Islamic Publication, Lahore to the National Assembly Pakistan's Special Committee" *(National Assembly Pakistan ki Special Committee kay Rubaru Ahmadiyyah Anjuman Ishat-i-Islam ka Wazahati Bayan)*. The Mahzarnama was read out by Mirza Nasir Ahmed before the Special Committee on 22nd and 23rd July (Qasmi, 2014, p. 185) the contents of which have been already discussed above. Later on, the Lahore group presented its view point through its publication which was different from the Rabwah

group. The Lahore group in its written response explained their ideology and addressed the four objections raised in the resolution that was passed in the National Assembly.

First, Ghulam Ahmed's claim of prophethood, second, him allegedly altering the Quran, third, rescinding armed Jihad, and finally being an offspring of the English government spawned to destroy the unity of Islam. The Lahore group disagreed and vehemently opposed the Rabwah group in considering Mirza Ghulam to be a prophet and considered him to be a *Mujaddid* of this century (National Assembly kay Robro, 1974, p.2). In fact this was the main ideological fall out that led to the breakup of Qadianis and formation of the Lahore group in 1914 (ibid, p.1).[204] They stated that Mirza Ghulam Ahmed never claimed prophethood but only when he argued that Jesus died and he himself as the promised messiah, people alleged him to have claimed prophethood (ibid,p.5). According to the Lahore group, this novel idea that Mirza Ghulam Ahmed was a prophet was introduced after his death by his son, Mirza Mehmood Ahmed (ibid, p.6). Moreover, the Lahore group considered Prophet Mohammad to be the last prophet and anyone who recited the kalma to be a Muslim.

The ulema also read out their case against the Ahmadis. The first was titled the viewpoint of the Muslim Community *(Millat-e-Islamia ka mauqaf)*.[205] It was read by Mufti Mehmood and reread after the cross examination of both Ahmadi groups (Qasmi, 2014, p. 187) and second one was titled "Response to the Memorandum"*(Jawab e Mahzarnama)* read out by Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarwi. The second document, a rejoinder to Mirza Nasir Ahmed's Memorandum, was written by Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarwi of Jamiat-e-ulema Islam and two other members, Abdul Hakim and Abdul Haq Baluchistani. Initially the Rabwah

[204]For a detailed argument, see Maulana Muhammad Ali (1994), *The Split in the Ahmadiyya Movement* (1994), 2nd Ed, Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at Islam Lahore, USA.

[205]The document was divided into seven parts: Belief in finality of prophet hood and Mirzaiyat, Glimpses of Mirzai prophethood, decision of the Islamic world, Mirzai misconceptions, Mirzaiyats acrimony towards Islam, rejection of Islam's belief of Jihad and finally Mirzaiyat and the Islamic world. The first four parts were dedicated to what was perceived as the theological misconceptions harbored by the Ahmadis while the remaining parts spoke of how Ahmadis were against Islam, the Islamic world and Pakistan. The crux of the viewpoint was that Ahmadis were not only a religious threat to Islam but also an ideological threat to Pakistan. It argued that in addition to their false believes, Ahmadis were planning to damage Pakistan internally and externally. They wanted to establish a state within a state like the Vatican City and that their approach was like that of Israel and Israelis. Thus, the viewpoint concluded that "Mirzais should be declared a non-Muslim minority at the government level, and like other minorities, responsibility for the protection of life and property of Mirzais fall on the Muslims" See Proceedings of Special Committee, p.2098-2099

group had argued in their memorandum that the National Assembly was not competent to decide on the faith of an individual and that freedom to profess a religion was a universal right guaranteed by the charter of human rights. The ulema, in their rejoinder, counter argued that since Pakistan was founded on the ideology of Islam, its parliament was guided by the injunctions of Quran and Sunnah. Further, it questioned how an assembly that possessed the right to frame a constitution through its chosen representatives cannot amend it (Special Committee, 1974, p.2351). Hence, the rejoinder justified the National Assembly's right to legislate in this matter. Maulana Abdul Hakeem then took up the part explaining the definition of a Muslim. The rejoinder then challenged all the sects of Mirzais to prove Mirza Ghulam Ahmed's ultimate objective as no one can openly prove what he desired. Infact, what he actually desired was to be called god (ibid, p.2451). The rest of the rejoinder was a polemic against Mirza Ahmed and his claims and finally the Lahore group was discussed and an appeal was made to the Lahore group to come back to the true fold of Islam. The "Response to Memorandum" concluded by supporting the bill which was presented and demanded that both Rabwah and Lahore group be declared non-Muslim minority, Rabwah be declared an open city and Mirzais be removed from central positions (ibid, p.2615).

3.9 Muslims and Ahmadis, Religious Frontier and the PerceivedThreat:

For the members of the National Assembly, Ahmadis were non-Muslims even before the Special Committee began its work. There was a unanimous opinion on both sides of the aisle that Islam, a Muslim person and a loyal Pakistani are distinct from Mirza Ghulam Ahmed and his followers. The discussion of the Special Committee proceedings reflects how the Ahmadis were securitized as a religious frontier, threatening not only the Muslims in Pakistan but also Islam across the world, reminiscent of Hastings formulation of "mythologisation and commemoration of great threats to national identity" (Hastings, 1997, p. 188). This thesis asserts that in an attempt to create a homogenous Muslim state in Pakistan, "the religious identity was tied to nationalism as a means of marginalizing and determining who does not belong within the state" (Malji, 2022, p. 11). This was achieved by portraying the other as a threat emanating from a religious frontier which consequently led to the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan. Moreover, as the analysis will later reflect, the securitizing actors merged external and internal religious frontiers in order to amplify the threat emanating from the internal frontier of Ahmadis: the external religious frontier between Pakistan and Israel and the internal frontier that existed between Ahmadis and Muslims. This exercise, it is maintained, further led to the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan. Mylonas and Radnitz attribute such marginalization to the "enemies

within" or the "fifth-column politics" where political elites attempt to redraw the boundaries of inclusion in society (Mylonas & Radnitz, 2022). However, in the case of Ahmadis in Pakistan, it was not the political elites but the religious-political elites who used religious nationalism to influence public policy across a wide range of domains (Grzymala-Busse, 2019) and to declare Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority. But the findings of this study differ with Anna Grzymala's findings wherein she argues when religious nationalism is equated with religion and nation, religious actors do not need to exert much pressure on the ballot box as they are considered representative of the common good and enjoy direct access to the institutional structure of the state such as the parliament (ibid, 2019, p. 11). This was not the case in 1974 when the second constitutional amendment was passed. As the composition of the National Assembly above shows, the PPP formed a majority government while the opposition did not enjoy any significant majority but owing to the shrinking of the parliament in 1971, opposition carried a louder voice. Thus, once the question of Ahmadis was portrayed as a moral imperative, they were securitized as a domestic religious frontier for the majority of Muslims of Pakistan.

This section will analyze the discussion that took place among the members during the Proceedings of the Special Committee from 29th August 1974 till 6th September 1974. Although the discussion broadly revolved around theological and political differences, for the sake of clarity the following section outlines the arguments chronologically into two periods- from the creation of the sect in 1889 till 1947 and second from 1947 till 1974- focusing on different themes.

This bifurcation will better reflect how the Ahmadis were viewed before and after the independence of Pakistan. It is noteworthy that all the threats share a commonality of "Islam in danger", which further endangers the Muslims and after partition, eventually Pakistan. This demarcation will better reflect how Ahmadis were demonized as outsiders in order to create unity among the in-group.

3.9.1 From 1889 to 1947: Seedling of Imperialism

The Ahmadi community (Rabwah and Lahore group), its leader and its followers were labeled as a product of imperialism, a grand conspiracy by the British crown to sow dissension in India by creating among the Hindus and Muslims two groups that challenge their fundamental beliefs. This narrative follows a linear chain of events that portrays how the colonial British Empire, in its aim to control India, relied on "divide and rule" policy.

During the proceedings it was placed on record that after the power of the Muslims waned, under the Mughals, the British tried to make inroads into India. At that critical juncture,

Muslim ulema gave the clarion call for armed struggle (*jihad*) against the British. This jihad was a major inconvenience to the British imperial designs for India. Their prognosis was that Muslims were united behind two fundamental beliefs: finality of Prophet Mohammad and the idea of armed struggle. The remedy was that if these two foundational beliefs were somehow adulterated, Muslims would drop their resistance to British rule. It was argued that the British were able to dismantle the two fundamental beliefs by courting Mirza Ghulam Ahmed.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmed's family, it was argued, served the British well during the mutiny of 1857. On the other hand, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed rebuked the Christian missionaries proselytizing their faith in India. This made him, accordingly, a suitable candidate in the eyes of the British. Thus, a person who was pro-British and who had earned a good reputation among the Muslims by censuring Christian missionaries was convenient for the British interests. The British, it was claimed, wanted Muslims to abandon jihad and accept the suzerainty of the crown over them. This, in their mind, was possible by creating a sect within the Muslims, hence the Ahmadi.

The committee members claimed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, true to his foreign masters, outlawed armed jihad and advocated accepting British rule. Moreover, he later declared to be a prophet, superior to Jesus Christ and claimed to have received revelation directly from Allah. Because of the support Mirza Ghulam Ahmed received from the British and the claims he made, he and the Ahmadi community were declared non-Muslims by the ulema and labeled as a plant of the English, nurtured to divide the Islamic ummah. Thus, the members portrayed the foundations and growth of the Ahmadi community as a grand conspiracy going back all the way to the 19th century. This narrative was not fully given by a single member but weaved by bringing together the comments of various members.

The first explanation was offered by Maulvi Mufti Mehmood, an opposition member from Dera Ismail Khan, belonging to Jamiat Ulema Islam party. In the 250 page book[206] that he read as part of the proceedings, he explained Mirzayit's "hostility to Islam" (*Mirzaiyat ki Islam Dushmani).* Accordingly, "Mirza and his followers were the tools for European colonialism" (Special Committee, 1974, p.2017) and that both Europe, Britain, and Mirza agreed to this arrangement among them. What remained to be seen was how Britain and Europe will use Mirza for their colonial and anti-Islam objectives.

[206] Book title "Millat Islamia ka Mauqof" (Narrative of Millat of Islam).

He explained that in the 19th century when Britain looked towards the subcontinent and Islam, they were faced with two problems: "first, was their ideological religious unity" and "Second, was their passion for armed struggle that was a nuisance for Christian Europe since the Crusades" (ibid, p.2019). In order to address this, the imperial English resorted to the policy of "divide-and-rule" to "break the geographical and ideological unity of the world of Islam" (ibid, p.2019). He further quoted that in a document titled "The arrival of British in Empire in India", it was mentioned that in 1869, a group of Christian representatives came to the subcontinent to identify how to route the Muslims and instill loyalty towards the English. In their report presented in 1870, they argued that since Muslims are blind followers of their spiritual leaders, only if we can find a person claiming to be an Apostolic Prophet can break their unity (ibid,p.2021). He established that Mirza Ahmed was loyal to the British by quoting Mirza Ahmed's praise and prayers for the Queen of England. For instance, he quoted Mirza Ahmed saying, "Oh our great Queen may countless blessings shower upon you. May God relieve you of all the worries in your heart. However, it is possible to accept her prayers" (ibid, p.2489). Since Mirza Ahmed's family had been loyal to the British, Maulvi Mufti argued that the British seemed it worthwhile to support and encourage his divisive sect for their own aims.

Rao Khursheed Ali, a government member, followed a similar chain of events but added that on the one hand, the English were unable to counter jihad and on the other hand, there were opportunist ulema who would give edicts for fame and fortune. This hand in glove arrangement made Britain's position somewhat tenable in India but they still needed someone who could void jihad. Once this was attained, Muslims would abandon Islam and engulf in worldly pleasures, no longer posing a threat to British rule. Rao Khursheed's addition to the narrative was that he quoted Willam Hunter's book "Indian Musalman" where he argued that all the edicts that the English took from the ulema did not do much to stop the passion of jihad (ibid, p.2720). He concluded that this was a seed planted by the imperial powers to divide the ummah and destroy its unity (ibid, p.2720).

Dr S.Mehmood Abbas Bhukari, a treasury bench member, passionately defended the finality of Prophet Mohammad and labeled Mirza Ahmed as an apostate. On the question of the Ahmadi being a foreign conspiracy, he had a similar argument. He stated that "this English planted seed wanted to scar the inheritance of Muslims from two sides: jihad and love for Prophet Mohammad" (ibid, p.2724). In his opinion, the British were worried that as long as Muslims are united on the above two fundamentals, they were unshakeable. A similar sentiment was voiced by the Federal Minister, Mian Muhammad Attaullah again from the

treasury benches. He labeled the Ahmadis as a divisive sect planted and nurtured by the English to counter the passion for jihad in the subcontinent. His addition to the narrative was that he called the Ahmadis as a party with political ambitions, that it was a political sect given a religious color made to weaken the Muslims (ibid, p.2745).

Muhammad Afzal Randhawa analysed the Ahmadi question from two perspectives: political and religious. From the political perspective, he seconded others that this was an English conspiracy, the proof of which was in the fact that Mirza Ahmed called the first war of independence of 1857 as a mutiny (ibid, p.2798). From a religious standpoint, he compared the case of Ahmadis to that of Israel. He stated: "Just like the English stabbed a dagger in the form of the state of Israel in the chest of Arab world, similarly, a dagger was stabbed into the chest of the Muslims of the subcontinent in the form of Qadianis" (ibid, p.2798). It is interesting to note here that the religious frontiers and the threat of the Ahmadis was linked to a broader and well established religious frontier between Israel and the Arab World. This was common throughout the proceedings: that the threat Ahmadis posed should not be taken lightly. Chaudhary Mumtaz Ahmed, a government member, also believed that Ahmadis were planted by the English to counter the religious zeal of the Muslims of the subcontinent. However, he portrayed his argument in a sacred vs profane binary where Islam needs to be purified from the exploiters of religion (ibid, p.2804). True Islam was the need of the hour and Ahmadis were a corrupting influence in it.

Makhdoom Noor Ahmed, an independent member, introduced various angles to the above narrative on 2nd September 1974. Labelling the Ahmadis as a product of imperial Britain's "divide-and –rule" policy, he asserted that Ahmadis were the product of British intelligence, the Jewish lobby and a party form of a Jewish group (ibid, p.2814). Citing Britain's "divide-and-rule" policy as a pretext, he argued that Britain's intelligence created the two sects- Ahmadis and Arya Samaj- among Muslims and Hindus to sow dissensions within their ranks.

He asserted that Britain was afraid that owing to the increasing population, trade and wealth of the Muslim world, and that Muslims will become affluent so they orchestrated this underground conspiracy to split the fortress of Islam inspired by imperialism and zionism (ibid, p.2814). He theorized further that when Britain's clout declined, they handed over control to the CIA which was "an illegitimate child of the British Home Department" (ibid, p.2816). Like all British colonial possessions, this sect, a plant of the British, was also handed over to the CIA (ibid, p.2816). He concluded his remarks by labeling Ahmadis as an imperial ghetto against the unity of Islamic world, hiding underground as a hidden conspiracy (ibid, p. 2817).

A day later, during the proceedings on 3rd September 1974, Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Khan Qasoori, a PPP member repeated the same argument against the Ahmadis and Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (ibid, 2971). Mr Karam Bhaksh Awan, a member from the Council Muslim League voiced the similar sentiments raised by Rao Khursheed Ali above. He reviewed William Hunter's book further that although "after the mutiny of 1857, war of 1863 and 1868, the religious zeal for jihad was decreasing, Hunter was worried that this sentiment for jihad can remerge anytime as India was declared *Dar-ul-Harb* (House of War)" (ibid, p.2829). The only way to address this was to void jihad and it was in those days that Mirza Ghulam announced the banning of armed struggle and allegiance to British rule (ibid, p.2829). Mr Jamaal Mohammad Korayja from the Convention Muslim League followed the same narrative but later turned the guns on the governments of Pakistan since 1947. He criticized them for nurturing the Ahmadis more than the English did before the partition: "Twenty seven years have passed. Our governments gave it more guidance than those of the English. Thus, we cannot claim in front of any Islamic country that we have faith" (ibid, p.2912).

Malik Mohammad Suleman, member of PPP and the government called this issue as "the 90 year old problem" and emphasized a similar narrative. He identified that English never wanted to leave this country but the only problem they faced was the passion of jihad of the Muslims. To resolve this, the English devised a plan to "eradicate the passion of jihad from the hearts and minds of the Muslims" and for this purpose they chose the land of Gurdaspur from where they attempted to qualify a person who curry favoured to be a prophet (ibid, p.2633). Like other members, he also portrayed the Ahmadis as a continuing religious threat after the English.

Why did the English, out of all the people, choose Mirza Ghulam Ahmed to be their tool? Mr Ghulam Rasool Tarar, a treasury bench member, proposed one such explanation. He began by questioning how anyone could accept Mirza Ghulam as a prophet when he himself declared that he and his family were loyal to the English. Moreover, he argued that historically God-fearing people, saints and prophets never sought favours from kings and monarchs. So his response to the question above was that Mirza Ahmed was an English agent and that all the times he debated with Christians priests safeguarding the honor of Prophet Mohammad was in reality pre-arranged, in order to gain the trust of the Muslims (ibid, p.2939), "like a Sikh who sit in mosques to spy, similarly, Ahmadis are also spies for the English Government" (ibid, p.2939). Maulana Syed Ali Rizvi from the *Markazi Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan* (Central Party Clerics of Pakistan) voiced a similar narrative. He argued that Mirza was a tool to counter the jihad edicts given by Muslim leaders. He made his place

in the hearts of Muslims by debating with Christians. After that he declared prophethood and enjoyed the English government's patronage and whatever injustice the Ahmadis committed, it was ignored or condoned by the English (ibid, p.2952).

3.9.2 After Independence

3.9.2.1 Ahmadi as Israel

The combining of multiple religious frontiers to magnify a single threat was also witnessed during the Special Committee Proceedings of the whole house. The domestic religious frontier between Muslims and Ahmadis and the ideological and political threat they posed to the Muslims of Pakistan was associated with an external religious frontier, which existed between Israel and Pakistan. It is noteworthy; Pakistan's opposition to Israel and the ensuing religious frontier was not geographical in nature. Pakistan opposed Israel on ideological grounds. This is contrary to Barker's (2009) perception that religious frontiers are always geographical in nature. The Ahmadis were associated with Israel and through speech acts of the parliamentarians were labeled as a Jewish conspiracy, a Zionist plan to dismember Pakistan and Jewish agents to undermine Islam and Pakistan.In light of this argument, this section will analyze how two religious frontiers facing Pakistan, that is Ahmadis and Israel, were presented as one in order to amplify the perception of the threat.

Maulvi Mufti Mehmood in the book he read out during the proceedings dedicated a portion titled "Intercommunion of Mirzaiyat and Jews" (*Mirzaiyat aur Yahodiyat ka bahami ishtirak*) in highlighting the link between the two. He argued that imperial English's disdain for Islam was an open secret and zionist colonialism, also a tool of the West, was a big challenge for the Arab Muslims (Special Committee, 1974, p.2053). He continued: "The aims and loyalties of both of them, that is hatred for Islam and hostility to Pakistan became visible through the deep cordial relations between Qadyanis and Israel". He further clarified the frontier that existed between Pakistan and Israel: "If Israel considered any country to be its biggest rival after the Arab world, it was Pakistan" (ibid, p.2053). He presented three arguments in support of this claim. First, a speech of Ben Gurion[207] delivered in 1967 at a university in Paris where he called Pakistan an ideological challenge to Israel which would endanger Israel's existence in the future. Second, as Ahmadis were already blamed for the breakup of East Pakistan in 1971, Maulvi Mehmood made a reference to Israel's Foreign Minister Abba Eban's speech in the Knesset in support of East Pakistan's separatist

[207] Ben Gurion was the first Prime Minister of the state of Israel.

movement, and third, PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's statement that funding from Israel was used during the 1970 general elections in Pakistan. Accordingly, Israel's amicable stance towards the Ahmadi community was due to the latter's hidden hatred for Pakistan (ibid, p.2054-2055). A reference to Ben Gurion's speech was again made by a government member, Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Khan Qasoori on 6th September. He linked together the presence of a Qadiani mission in Tel Aviv, Israel, the anti-Pakistan speech of Ben Gurian propagating using India to destroy Pakistan and the performance of Qadiani army generals in the debacle of east Pakistan as evidence of a wider conspiracy against Pakistan (ibid, p.2974-2975).

Sardar Inayatur Rehman Khan Abbasi, the Parliamentary Secretary, argued that just like Israel, Ahmadiyat was also a big mischief (ibid, p.2707). Creating a parallel between the Ahmadis and Israel, he argued that Mirza Ahmed created a mischief that had achieved the status of Israel. Just like Israel cannot be erased from history today despite the Arab World's opposition to it, similarly this was the position of Rabwah today. He cautioned that Israel was now a state and in its nascent stage, Israel was just like the Ahmadis (ibid, p.2707). Here, it can be observed how two threats emanating from religious frontiers were combined to magnify the danger to Pakistan.

Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarwi, from the opposition party, *Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam* (Party of Clerics of Islam) called the Ahmadis "a Zionist sect (*Sayhoni Firqa*), more poisonous for Muslims than the Jews. Jews were clear infidels. They are our enemies but they (Ahmadis) are hidden. They are snakes" (ibid, p.2833). Malik Mohammad Suleman, from the treasury benches, argued that the "Ahmadis wanted to return to Qadian in India, thus they were not true Pakistanis. Their aim was similar to that of Israel. Israelis also did the same and they (Ahmadis) again wanted to create a new country" (ibid, p.2635). He also cautioned as their population was increasing, "they would want to find a piece of land to establish their own government. Just like Israel started a movement to run its Zionist system of governance, similarly they who call themselves as a new sect, a new community and new religion would start a movement" (ibid, p.2635). For him, recognizing the religion of Ahmadis is tantamount to telling the Arabs to accept Israel, which was impossible.

3.9.2.2. Ahmadis as the Other

It was argued that since Ahmadis were non-Muslims, English agents, a tool to undermine jihad and illegal claimants on the seal of the Prophet, they were a threat to true Islam as practiced by Muslims of Pakistan. The narrative was created in a binary between the true believers called Muslims on one hand and the non-Muslims who considered themselves Muslims, the Ahmadis, on the other.

The question was who were the Ahmadis? The members of the proceedings were politicians and ulema who viewed the Ahmadis as non-Muslims from the start. Apart from the glaring theological differences argued by the members, they also viewed the Ahmadis as impure, profane, and other. This thesis argues that religious nationalism espoused by the post-colonial state in its aim to create a homogenous religious unit required a diametrically opposed plank, something which was the other and impure in its genesis. The Ahmadis were dubbed by the members of the Special Committee as follows: a community who was impure from its foundation and nurtured by the same adulterated elements that opposed Islam before the partition. This section will highlight how the members of the Special Committee perceived the Ahmadis by focusing on two aspects: how the members viewed beliefs and policies of the Ahmadi community as distinct from the Muslims and the pejorative terms used to address them. This othering of the Ahmadis, it is argued created and solidified religious exclusion to be the basis of unity in Pakistan, resultantly, waxing religious nationalism.

Maulvi Mufti Mehmood, one of the authors of the book "Viewpoint of the community of Islam", argued that it had always been the policy of the Ahmadis to be recognized as a separate and distinct community (ibid, p.1909). While the underlying demarcation principle was set by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed himself: "Those Muslims who have denied Mirza Ghulam Ahmed Qadiani's claim are out of the circle of Islam and are infidels" (ibid, p.1909).

Maulvi Mufti quantified the differences by quoting three beliefs of the Ahmadis vis-á-vis Muslims.First was the prohibition on the Ahmadis that no Ahmadi can offer prayers behind a person who denies the claims of Mirza Ahmed. He quotes Mirza Ahmed, "can a living person offer prayers behind a dead person?" (ibid, p.1917). Second, Ahmadis were prohibited by Mirza Ahmed to marry off their daughters to a non-Ahmadi. Mufti Mehmood quoted an anecdote where Mirza Ahmed advised one of his followers to keep his daughter unmarried rather than give her hand in marriage to a non-Ahmadi (ibid, p.1918). Third, Ahmadis were prohibited to offer the funeral prayers of a non-Ahmadi. Whoever denied Mirza Ahmed, their funeral prayer should not be offered. In the event if the non-Ahmadi is a child, funeral prayers are not to be offered (ibid, p.1918). In highlighting the distinct tendencies of the Ahmadis, Mufti Mehmood addressed the controversy surrounding Zafarullah Khan not offering the funeral prayers of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He argued that Zafarullah not joining the prayers was actually a belief of the Ahmadis. Quoting a statement from the Ahmadi newspaper "Alfazal", he asked "Is it not true that Abu Talib like Quaid e Azam was a true friend of the Muslims but neither Muslims offered his (Abu Talib) funeral

prayers nor did Prophet Mohammad" (ibid, p.1920). Mufti Mehmood claimed that Ahmadis considered themselves as a separate community. Finally, he cited Mirza Bashir ud Din:

> I requested a responsible English officer that like Zoroastrians and Christians, our rights should also be granted. The British official counter argued that the latter are minorities while yours is a religious sect, on this I replied that Zoroastrians and Christians are also religious sects, just like their rights have been granted, similarly our rights should be granted. You give one Zoroastrian, in comparison I will present two Ahmadis (ibid, p.1921).

Thus, Maulvi Mufti Mehmood made a compelling argument in portraying the Ahmadis as the other. His main premise was that since they did not want to be part of us and viewed themselves as a distinct community, there was no harm in declaring them as such a community. The Ahmadis were viewed as the other in this case.

The Minister of State, Chaudhary Jahangir Ali, underlining the same three beliefs of Ahmadis discussed by Maulvi Mufti Mehmood above, tried to establish how Ahmadis were distinct from the Muslims. On the point of non-Ahmadis being infidels, he quoted the interaction between the AG and Mirza Nasir Ahmed where the latter went quiet when the AG inquired whether the members of the Special Committee were Muslims or non-Muslims since none of them believed in Mirza Ghulam Ahmed to be a prophet. The Minister of State further questioned the logic behind prohibition of marriage between an Ahmadi female and a non-Ahmadi male but freedom to marry a non-Ahmadi female by an Ahmadi male on the grounds that Ahmadi male members were just in their behaviour. On the point of funeral prayers, he again added from the interaction between the AG and Mirza Nasir; Ahmadis maintained that since Muslims called them infidels, they did not offer funeral prayers of people who called them infidels. Zafarullah did not offer Quaid e Azam's funeral prayer because he was a Shia and various Shia ulema had given edicts declaring Ahmadis infidels (ibid, p.2867). Hence, according to the Minister, it was clear that "their religion is separate, our religion is separate, their faith is different, our faith is different" (ibid, p.2866). Maulana Mohammad Zafar Ahmed Ansari, an independent, questioned how it made sense that "his (Mirza Ghulam Ahmed) son has the right to declare seven hundred and fifty million Muslims of the world as infidel but these sixty million Muslims representative of the National Assembly of Pakistan, in line with the wishes of its representatives, did not have the right to give it a legal cover? (ibid, p.2875). His views were similar to the earlier members that it was Mirza Ghulam Ahmed who originally argued that Ahmadis were distinct from the rest of the Muslims. He summarized Mirza Ghulam Ahmed's statement that, "between us and non-Ahmadis, and by non-Ahmadis it means infidels, there is no disagreement, instead our God,

our prophet, our Quran, our prayers, our pilgrimage, everything is separate" (ibid, p.2878). The arguments were often laced with incendiary and provocative remarks to address the Ahmadis during the proceedings, further fortifying a dichotomy of "us and them". Jamal Mohammad Koreja, pointed out the uselessness of the whole proceedings since it was clear that Ahmadis were infidels (*kafir)*. In criticizing the government he called Ahmadis a bastard (*wald ul haraam)* sect: "This is the only country which, since the past one and half month, is asking this bastard sect for arguments to prove whether their prophet is true or not" (ibid, p.2912). He continued his tirade against the Ahmadis and called Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, his religious party and his followers as bastards (*wald ul haraam)* and infidels and anyone who housed them also an infidel. Hence, "they should be expelled from this pure land and this country should be purified" (ibid, p.2915). In creating the "other", Ahmadis, apart from being called non-Muslims, were now referred to as an impure element plaguing Pakistan.

Mr Hanif Khan, a government member, argued that Ahmadis were a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan. Accordingly, first, Pakistan was achieved because the Muslims claimed they were a minority in a Hindu majority Hindustan; that the Muslim way of life was different from that of the Hindus and Hindus would dominate them once Britain departed. Similarly, when Ahmadis have a distinct way of life from the majority Muslims then why were they reluctant to be called as a minority? Second, he argued that when Ahmadis considered anyone who denies Mirza Ghulam Ahmed and his teachings as an infidel (*kafir)* then it was implied that they themselves were a minority because the majority was outside the pale of Islam (ibid, p.2625-2626).

Another interesting aspect was how this debate was understood and framed by the members of the Special Committee. The records of the National Assembly for Proceedings of the Special Committee address this as "Qadiani Issue" in the whole document, while members used different phrases to address this issue. For instance, the chairman of the Special Committee responding to a query called it a "national problem" (ibid, p.2703). The Minister of Justice, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada said "this was not an issue of the Government, this was not an issue of the Opposition; we had to treat it as a national issue" (ibid, p.3073). Mr Hashim Khan, however, went a step further and called it an important matter and an international issue (ibid, p.2958). Maulvi Mufti Mehmood cautioned using this issue for political scoring by any political party but "to resolve the issue purely within the bounds of religion and faith" (ibid, p.2920). Sahibzada Safiullah from Jamaat-e-Islami concurred and argued that "this was a time of trial and tribulation from Allah upon us…as we not only represent Pakistan but the whole Muslim world and the Muslim ummah" (ibid, p.2967).

There were references to the time line and usage of Mirza Ahmed's name in the matter also. For instance Mr Tarar from the treasury benches called it a "90 year old problem" (ibid, p.2938) while Hashim Khan said that this issue stands unresolved for the past one hundred years (ibid, p.2957). In terms of the name, Maulfi Mufti Mehmood argued that Mirza Ghulam Ahmed's name can be used in the constitution as it would not make the constitution impure as some members believed. However, Malik Muhammad Suleman on 5rd September criticized the members for addressing the Mirzais and Qadyanis as Ahmadis. His underlying reason was that Ahmad was the name of Prophet Mohammad and by calling Mirzais as Ahmadis, Muslims were being taught to hate Prophet Mohammad (ibid, p.2635). He continued that this is not an Ahmadi issue but a Qadiani issue (ibid, p.2635). Thus, an open contradiction was visible among how the members viewed this matter. The framing of the matter oscillated from being a national issue to a religious issue and to an international issue. Moreover, there were concerns regarding how to name the issue but the interesting part was that both the opposition and treasury benches were unanimous in their decision as voiced by Azam Faroqi of Jamat-e-Islami: "It is one of those problems on which colleagues sitting on both sides of the aisle are unanimous not only with an open mind but Expression And Heart" (Ibid, p.2944).

3.9.2.3 Ahmadis as Traitors

The Ahmadis were portrayed as the enemies of Pakistan on a mission to dismember the country. Hence, for the members of the Special Committee, the history of the Ahmadis before the partition of 1947 was associated with imperialism and their opposition to the Muslim ummah's unity. The opposition was mainly theological and religious in nature. However, a nationalist perspective was later introduced into this narrative by portraying the Ahmadis as "Anti-Pakistan". These two narratives-theological differences and anti-Pakistan actions-were combined and were a constant observable theme throughout the proceedings of the Special Committee. This section will analyze how the members securitized the notions that the Ahmadis were against Islam and the Muslims and Pakistan.

Blaming the Ahmadis for most of the ills that befell Pakistan since 1947, the members touched upon various themes: The Ahmadis, a seedling of imperialism, were against the unity of Islam and Muslims because of their fealty to the British. They were against the creation of Pakistan and favoured a united India because their spiritual land, Qadian, was in India. It was because of the Ahmadis, it follows, that Pakistan lost Gurdaspur district to India as Ahmadis at the time of partition pleaded with the boundary commission to be considered a minority distinct from the majority Muslims. Although they were not considered as a

minority, Gurdaspur district was given to India which also gave strategic crossing lines into Kashmir to India resulting in the loss of Kashmir for Pakistan. However, the partition of India forced Ahmadis to move to Rabwah, Pakistan but they still longed to return to Qadian one day and recreate a united India *(akhund bharat).*[208] It was claimed that Ahmadis were successful to some extent, the evidence of which was the breakup of East Pakistan in 1971. Moreover, it was implied the Ahmadis wanted to take over the province of Balochistan to have a province under their direct control. Accordingly, Ahmadis required elaborate state machinery for this purpose which they established in the city of Rabwah also called "the Vatican City inside Pakistan" or "a state within the state". This was made possible by Ahmadis occupying senior government positions in Pakistan, the most important being the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Ahmadis enjoying the support of the Western world and Pakistan's government were able to penetrate the governance structure of the state. In addition, the Ahmadis owed their allegiance to their caliph first and Pakistan second. In such a scenario they can never be loyal to Pakistan and the founding ideology of the country. The Special Committee was to put an end to all of this once and for all as it was Pakistan protecting its ideological and religious frontiers from an existential threat that was the Ahmadis.

The original motion moved by the government was to discuss the question of the status in Islam of persons who did not believe in the finality of Prophethood of Mohammad. In this regard, the members questioned how a group of people can be loyal to Pakistan when they openly disagreed with the basic tenets of the founding ideology of Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Hakeem, blaming the Ahmadis, contended that "Mirzai people can never be loyal to the country. They are not bound by the government, they are bound by the caliph" (ibid, p.2363). Mr Ghulam Nabi Chaudhary from the treasury benches portrayed Ahmadis as an anti-Pakistan element responsible for creating conflict in the subcontinent. Blaming the Ahmadis for the division of Gurdaspur district, he argued that Ahmadis approached the British government to be declared a minority. The Gurdaspur district which had 52% Muslims was reduced to 49% or 47% Muslims by the Radcliff Commission because Ahmadis wanted to be a minority. This division of Gurdaspur provided India with a gateway to Kashmir which resulted in the Kashmir dispute, partition of Pakistan and numerous wars with India (ibid, p.2809). Moreover, the Ahmadis have taken over central positions in the government, caused economic damage, created a state within a state in the city of Rabwah,

[208] A single united India encompassing Pakistan and Bangladesh.

all have wreaked havoc for the administration of Pakistan (ibid, p.2810). Maulana Ghaus Hazarwai claimed that Ahmadis were hostile to the idea of Pakistan and further added to the Gurdaspur episode.

He stated that Mr Zafarullah Khan went to the boundary commission and gave them in writting that Muslims are different from the Ahmadis and that "we are not one nation" (ibid, p.2834). He continued: "this is the result for all conflicts over Kashmir, continuing rivalry with India. Certainly, they are agents" (ibid, p.2835). He further elaborated on Ahmadis being agents carrying anti-Pakistan agenda. He informed the Special Committee that 313 Ahmadis went to Qadian for protection of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed's grave while 313 Sikh came from India for the protection of Nankana Sahib's Gurdwara in Sheikhpura Pakistan. These 313 Ahmadis and Sikhs were all agents and this practice should be curtailed (ibid, p.2835).

In addition, the members argued that Ahmadis want to reunite India and recreate a united India *(Akhund Bhara)* as their spiritual city, Qadian was in India. This meant that Ahmadis wanted to undo Pakistan; hence, a community who wanted to take away the hard earned independence was not loyal to the state. Maulvi Mufti alleged that when Qadianis and Hindus of INC under Nehru realized that partition was inevitable, both of the parties started working in cahoots to weaken Pakistan's cause and retain their dream of a united India (ibid, p.2069). Mian Mohammad Ataullah also pointed to the facts presented in the Special Committee that "Ahmadis were pro united India and even if Pakistan was established, it would be temporary and would later merge into Hindustan" (ibid, p.2745). Maulana Mohammad Zafar Ahmed Ansari quoted the speeches of the head of the Ahmadi community where the latter stated they were in favour of a united India and even if Pakistan was created, they would keep on trying to recreate a united India (ibid, 2898). These efforts of the Ahmadis were seen as anti-Pakistan, aimed to break up Pakistan. The charge against the Ahmadis for the breakup of Pakistan was the East Pakistan debacle in 1971. The committee proceedings will show in this study that the Ahmadis allegedly succeeded in breaking Pakistan. This was part of a broader argument against the Ahmadis emphasizing their anti-Pakistan stance.

The breakup of East Pakistan in 1971 was one such attempt blamed on the Ahmadis. The bitter memory of the East Pakistan debacle was very much alive by 1974 and members argued that it was the doing of the Ahmadis in line with their opposition to Islam and Pakistan. Makhdoom Noor Ahmed urged the members to question how Pakistan was

dismembered (ibid, p.2820). Quoting an excerpt from Mujeeb ur Rehman's[209] speech, he held the Qadianis responsible for the breakup of Pakistan: "This syndicate of Qadiani Generals and the ruling bureaucratic clique-this clique of pythons-is not going to transfer power to me…they want to fight an aimless battle and ultimately they will surrender before the enemy and not before their majority" (ibid, p.2820). Mr Makhdoom alleged that India was also involved in this conspiracy to dismember Pakistan and everyone was already aware of Israel's anti-Pakistan stance. Thus, he stated that, "the crux of India and Israel is Qadyan and Rabwah" (ibid, p.2821). He amplified the threat from Ahmadis by associating them with the nation's already established hostile frontiers and memories of the past that elicited emotional sentiment. Another Member, Maulana Mohammad Zafar Ahmed Ansari, an independent, blaming the Ahmadis for the breakup of East Pakistan, provided the Special Committee with an in-depth account. He argued that Mr Zafarullah Khan wrote a letter to a close aide of Yahya Khan and implored him to accept the demand for separation of the eastern wing as no fruit would come from bloodshed (ibid, 2903). Although Zafarullah Khan's approach made sense, Maulana Zafar complained that there was also the option of reconciliation between West and East Pakistan. Since the Ahmadis wanted to break up Pakistan, they, through Zafarullah Khan, favoured separation (ibid, p.2904). Ahmed Raza Khan Qasuri argued that, "the foundation of Pakistan was Muslim nationalism" and that "Pakistan was an ideological state" (ibid, p.2973), "such states", he contended, cannot be broken by tanks and guns but by anarchy and Ahmadis were the sect creating anarchy in Pakistan. He concluded that "break up of east Pakistan was also part of this conspiracy to dismember Pakistan brick by brick…remove the ideological bricks from its ideological foundations" (ibid, p.2974). Maulvi Naimat Ullah was more direct in blaming the Ahmadis for the East Pakistan debacle. He stated: "East Pakistan was originally destroyed by them. Because of them West Pakistan's five thousand mile territory was taken away. We have become infamous throughout the world and it is said Pakistan was defeated. We have become infamous because of Qadyanis" (ibid, p.2990). To sum it up, the separation of East Pakistan was squarely put on the Ahmadis as a conspiracy against Pakistan. Ahmadis were blamed for anti-Pakistan activities in cohorts with India and Israel, the evidence of which was the separation of East Pakistan in 1971.

Ahmadis were further alleged for creating a state within a state referred to as a Vatican city for Mirza Ghulam Ahmed and his followers. Maulvi Mufti Mehmood called it "the demand

[209] Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman was a student activist turned politician and the founding leader of Bangladesh.

for a Vatican City" and traces the events to the time when the boundary commission was listening to arguments from both the representatives of INC and AIML relating to division. At that point, the Ahmadi community took a different stance from both parties and presented the boundary commission with its own view to declare Qadian as Vatican City (ibid, p.2076). However, the boundary commission did not oblige but did hand over Gurdaspur to India. Second was a plan to establish a Qadyani state in Pakistan.

Maulvi Mufti argued that in 1952, Mirza Mehmood announced an Ahmadi revolution in waiting following which there were riots in 1953 in Punjab, Pakistan. The corollary of this, Maulvi Mufti stated, was that Ahmadis gathered around a four point agenda: "achieve political clout by any means; at least one province or area be declared as an Ahmadi state; all external, internal and important sectors, resources and means of the state to be used to fulfill their objectives; and capture central positions in the government" (ibid, p.2083). Maulfi Mufti Mehmood spoke of the Ahmadis' plan to capture Balochistan. Quoting an excerpt from an Ahmadi caliph speech delivered in Quetta in 1948, he accused the Ahmadis of planning to take over Balochistan. The caliph argued that Paki-Balochistan was part of one unit of Pakistan and carried greater weightage. If the population of Balochistan, which was not much, could be converted to Ahmadis, then this province could be turned into an Ahmadi province (ibid, p.2088).

Maulana Muhammad Zafar Ahmed Ansari also highlighted the two plans of Ahmadis for a separate state. First, he said that Qadyanis always wanted a place specifically for Ahmadis and they created Qadyan and later Rabwah in Pakistan where lives of general Muslim masses were difficult. "Muslim shop owners were made to pay taxes *(Jizya)* on account of them being non-Muslims" (ibid, p.2902) as Ahmadis considered themselves Muslims. Second, they planned to take over Balochistan by converting the sparsely populated province into an Ahmadi province (ibid, p.2902). Similar remarks of Ahmadis running a parallel government in Pakistan were made by Syed Ali Rizvi, a member of the Central Community of Ulema of Pakistan *(Markazi Jamiat-e-Ulema-Pakistan)*. He quipped "In Pakistan, you see, by acquiring land in Rabwah, they have set up a parallel government in the heart of Pakistan, and there also they decided upon their own matters themselves either civil or criminal" (ibid, p.2953). Hence, the Qadianis allegedly posed a serious threat to Pakistan owing to the presence of their parallel administration in the form of a state in Pakistan.

The loyalty of the Ahmadi community to Pakistan was also questioned on two accounts. First, it was argued when Ahmadis would be declared a non-Muslim minority, they would cause considerable damage to Pakistan from within on account of them occupying central

positions and abroad through foreign propaganda. Second, Ahmadis were not in favour of partition and till date wanted to return to Qadian, therefore they were loyal to the caliph and not Pakistan. This questionable understanding of the loyalty of the Ahmadis was in itself an internal religious frontier.

On the first topic of minority status, Malik Mohammad Jafar, the Minister of State, highlighted two concerns: that they would create internal disturbance in Pakistan and second they would censure Pakistan through foreign propaganda. For the first aspect, he advised not to be worried but for the second he cautioned that the Ahmadi party should be disbanded so foreign propaganda can be curtailed (ibid, p.2649). Mehmood Azam Farooqi from Jamaat-e-Islami stated he was certain that when the assembly will declare them a non-Muslim minority, they would try to create disturbance in the country so "Pakistan will become notorious and people will think that Pakistan is a country where a sect or non-Muslims suffer injustice" (ibid, p.2946). He continued, "I know as a matter of fact that preparations are being made to provoke the Muslims by attacking here or there" (ibid, p.2946), but after declaring them a minority, it was the duty of the state to protect their rights. Malik Mohammad Suleman highlighted the anti-Pakistan view of the Ahmadis.

He was of the view that Ahmadis should be charged for high treason given their shifting loyalties. He hypothesized a scenario: if a directive were given from the state to an individual occupying a central position, and on the other hand, the head of the community also gave the same individual an order contradicting the earlier directive of the state. In such an instance whose order would that person follow? He replied that Ahmadis would follow their leader and because of this they should be charged for high treason as they did not exhibit loyalty to the state (ibid, p.2639).

On the second account of Ahmadis resistance to the partition, Malik Mohammad Suleman claimed that Ahmadis were involved in irredentist behavior similar to that of Israel. He stated, "Mirza Sahab has said that after overpowering we will return to Qadian. So it means that he is not even a correct Pakistani. Their aim is similar to that of Israel. Israelis also used to do the same. And they want to create a new state again" (ibid, p.2635). He further highlighted that since the population of the Ahmadis is increasing, they will soon attempt to have a separate state (ibid, p.2635). This showed the Ahmadis as anti-state and anti-Muslim community out there to strike when given the chance. Doctor Ghulam Hussain reiterated this stance and called out the Ahmadis for not being "well wishers of Pakistan and well wishers of Islam" for the reasons that "Ahmadis considered Quaid e Azam an infidel, the majority of the Muslims infidels, made Ghulam Ahmed a prophet by force, not offering the funeral

prayers of Quaid e Azam even in absentia and declaring Jihad as void" (ibid, p.2669). Maulana Zakir of Central Jamiat e ulema e Pakistan *(Markazi Jamiat e ulema e Pakistan)* questioning the loyalty of the Ahmadis, called them "a domestic and an external threat, loyal to India" and that "they are working against the ideology of Pakistan" (ibid, p.2950).

This internal religious frontier between all the Muslim sects on the one hand and Ahmadis on the other posed a theological and nationalist threat to the majority Muslims. Securitized as an anathema to the ideology of Pakistan, a response was required to contain this threat. This response came in the form of the banding together of the opposition and government in declaring the Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority. This religious exclusion was justified in Chaudry Mumtaz's words as purification of Islam (ibid, p.2801) and to use Maulana Mohammad Zafar Ahmed Ansari's remarks, "It was a primary duty of ours to protect our ideological borders *(nazaryati sarhaday)*" (ibid, p.2884). This threat of adulteration of Islam countered by purification Islam by way of protecting its ideological borders further solidified the religious and national identity of Pakistan and Pakistanis. Qasmi succinctly puts this, "to be a Pakistani was not simply to be a legal resident of the country; it also required a sense of belonging and affiliation mediated through history, culture and literature" (Qasmi, 2024, p. 4) and in this case, religion.

3.10 Proposals to Resolve the Qadiani Issue:

This study argues that along with the presence of religious frontiers and threat, a response to the perceived threat is also required to explain the rise and waxing of religious nationalism. In the case of Ahmadis being that threat to the Muslims of Pakistan, the response to this perceived threat came in the form of proposals suggested by the members of the special committee. The committee members through their speech act first securitized the Ahmadis as a threat and later responded by suggesting proposals, the final form of which as the second constitutional amendment. This response, it is argued, further defined the Pakistani identity.

The special committee started the discussion on the 2nd September 1974 which lasted till 6th September 1974. The Chairman of the steering committee suggested to the members that apart from making speeches on the issue, the members should also suggest proposals.

> Now this discussion should be in the form of some proposals, suggestions and solutions...in case they are declared as a minority, what would be the consequences, and in case they are not declared as minority, what would be the result and consequences (Special Committee, 1974, p.2702).

The proposals revolved around four broad points: first was a unanimous proposal of every committee member to declare the Ahmadis as non-Muslims by way of a constitutional

amendment or some law; second, both Ahmadi groups to be labeled as a political community and then declared as non-Muslims; third, that Ahmadi literature should be banned and their properties should be confiscated, only to be handled by a trust; fourth, Rabwah should be declared an open city; fifth, Ahmadis should be removed from central government assignments and any fallout from declaring them as non-Muslims should be countered by the foreign office in the international arena. Moreover, there were some committee members who proposed a jihad against the Ahmadis but those proposals were turned down. Following are a few of the proposals scattered throughout the discussion that lasted for five days. A set of proposals similar in their demand was suggested by four members of the committee. Sardar Muala Baksh Soomro, Doctor Syed Mehmood Abbas Bhukhari, Rao Khursheed Ali and Mian Muhammad Attaullah while presenting their proposals shared their desire for a similar outcome: to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims.

In responding to the perceived Ahmadi threat to Pakistan and its Islamic ideology, they proposed that Ahmadi literature and propaganda should be banned, that Rabwah be declared an open city, and the land surrounding Rabwah should not be given to Ahmadis (ibid,p.2701). Moreover, they suggested that Ahmadis be declared non-Muslims by way of a constitutional amendment with specific wording that declares any follower of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed as a non-Muslim (ibid, p.2707). They were convinced that this move will bring multiple benefits, "it will ensure unity of the ummah, Ahmadis will forfeit central positions in the government and this will prevent the breakup of Pakistan" (ibid, p.2721).

In order to meet the Ahmadi threat, it was also proposed to declare Ahmadis as a political community followed by their declaration as non-Muslims and finally confiscation of their properties in Pakistan which were to be handled by a trust managed by the Government (ibid, p.2747). Moreover, Choudhary Mumtaz Ahmed, Ghulam Hussain Dhandla, Makhdoom Noor Ahmed and Karam Bhaksh Awan were also unanimous in their proposals to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims along with the banning of their literature, removal from central positions and declaring Rabwah an open city for all (ibid, p.2823). The members viewed Ahmadis as a threat to the ideology of Pakistan.

Abdul Aziz Bhatti stood out for questioning what it meant to be a Pakistani. Although he agreed that Ahmadis should be declared non-Muslims (ibid, p.2793) he did warn that declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims will carry risks for Pakistan. However, he was not in favour of removing them from central posts. According to him, "if the government wants to hire responsible people, it can appoint anyone to any post" (ibid, p.2794). He even questioned whether an Ahmadi would always be considered a disloyal Pakistani as there can be cases

where even an Ahmadi was ill-informed about his own faith. Hence, Abdul Aziz Bhatii diverged from the rest and asked questions clarifying what it meant to be a Pakistani.

Muhammad Afzal Randhawa disagreed with Abdul Aziz Bhatii viewpoint and proposed that central positions should not be given to Ahmadis. He gave a number of proposals. First, that Ahmadis be treated as a political party and a clampdown be applied on it. Second, the clampdown be followed by an audit of all the funds that they received from Israel and Pakistan; third, Rabwah city be declared an open city, and finally he asked again how Ahmadis, who are not Muslims, can be good Pakistanis (ibid, p.2800).

Professor Ghafoor Ahmed suggested that a census be held for Ahmadis as both Rabwah and Lahore groups were unaware of their followers. Moreover, they can be appointed to such positions just like any other minority. Professor Ghafoor argued that since Ahmadis helped the ruling PPP government, they were enjoying certain exemptions which should not be the case (ibid, p.2848-2849).

Chauhdary Jahangir Ali presented concrete proposals as he proposed two major amendments to the constitution. First, amending the third schedule of the constitution (ibid, p.2872) as this would make anyone claiming to be prophet of any kind to be a non-Muslim. Following this, he proposed that a second clause be added to Article 2 of the constitution. The clause would read as follows:

> A person who has a faith different from that laid down in the Third Schedule of this Constitution made for the oath of the President and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, shall be , considered a non-Muslim, and the rights and obligations of the non-Muslims shall be determined by law (ibid, p.2873).

Khawaja Jamal Mohammad Koreja, an opposition member, was the harshest in his vitriol against the Ahmadis. He questioned the faith of other members in the parliament as to why they were still questioning whether Prophet Mohammad was the final prophet or not (ibid, p.2913). He called the head of the Ahmadi community and his followers as bastard (*wald ul haraam)* and infidels, liable to be killed. Thus, he proposed that all of them be declared non-Muslims and the country be purged of them (ibid, p.2914-2915).

Committee members from tribal areas- Naimatullah Khan Shinwari and Malik Muhammad Sadiq- shared this viewpoint of purging Pakistan of Ahmadis. Naimatullah Khan Shinwari, an independent member elected from tribal areas of Pakistan requested on behalf of the seven million tribal people that they should be allowed to carry out jihad against the Ahmadis (ibid, p.2986). His radical proposal was that ten thousand tribal people should be settled in the land surrounding Rabwah city to keep a check on Ahmadis (ibid, p.2988). He

concluded his proposals with the view that if Ahmadis were declared a non-Muslim minority then there was no need for armed jihad against them (ibid, p.2988). Finally, Malik Muhammad Sadiq, a member of the ruling party, unlike Dr Ghulam Ahmed, argued that it was not a matter of religious fanaticism but reason, rationale and need of the hour to declare the Ahmadis as a minority (ibid, p.2992).

His proposals were different from the rest of the members. First, he proposed that the religion of Ahmadis should be named "Mirzaiyat" or "Qadyaniat" so that it reflected they have no relationship with the Islamic ummah. All the Ahmadi established educational institutions must be taken under national custody, and finally, their identification cards should be amended to reflect their religion as "Mirzaiyat" or "Qadyaniyat" (ibid, p.2994). The ulema also suggested a set of proposals aimed at declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims. First was Maulana Syed Ali rizvi, belonging to the right wing party Markazi Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, proposed that a complete ban be placed on the activities of this sect which included propagation of Islam and that they should be declared a political community followed by monitoring of their activities (ibid, p.2954). However, he did argue that Ahmadis may enjoy the legal rights of the *zimmis* (non-Muslims) only when they would be declared as a non-Muslim minority. He cautioned that if they were not declared a non-Muslim minority then there was no power that could stop the anti-Ahmadi public sentiment among the masses (ibid, p.2954). Second was Maualana Abdul Haq, an opposition member belonging from the Jamiat-ul-ulama Islam, Lahore suggested that Ahmadis must be simultaneously declared a non-Muslim minority and removed from the senior governmental positions. He cautioned that if Ahmadis were declared a minority but not sacked from central positions, they would cause damage to Pakistan and a committee should be formed to look into this matter (ibid, p.2919). He was of the view that Allah would help run the affairs of the state when Ahmadis are removed from the central positions, hence the government should not be afraid from this act. Finally, Maulvi Mufti Mehmood, another opposition member, proposed a constitutional amendment to declare the Mirzais as a non-Muslim minority. He wanted to add the Ahmadis under the heading of minority in article 106 of the constitution[210] by clearly defining that anyone who considered Mirza Ghulam Ahmed to be their prophet in any capacity must be called a Mirzai (ibid, p.2921). On the controversy over naming Mirza Ghulam Ahmed in the constitution, he proposed that his name be mentioned Mirza Ghulam Ahmed in the definition of a Mirzai (ibid, p.2922). Finally, he proposed that a

[210] Article 106 of the constitution of 1973 deals with the representation of minorities-Christians, Jews, Sikh, Hindu-in the provincial assemblies.

law should be made that would govern the rights of this sect and non-Muslim minorities and provide job opportunities according to the population of the minority (ibid, p.2923).

A somewhat reconciliatory tone as adopted by the treasury members. Malik Mohammad Jaffar, Minister of State, a treasury bench member from Punjab and one of the drafters of the motion presented in the National Assembly, made few recommendations some of which were reconciliatory in nature to both the Ahmadis and the ulema. First, he proposed that "the property and assets of these organizations, that is, the Rabwah and the Lahori group, should be taken over by the Auqaf department" and that a retired Supreme court judge look after it assisted by the Ahmadis (ibid, p.2661). This would ensure propagation of Islam on one hand, and Ahmadis would be assured that their resources are not wrongly appropriated, on the other. A second proposal was to take legislative and executive measures in countering the foreign influence of Ahmadis against Pakistan which the Ahmadiya community carried out through their missions abroad. He suggested that the sources of income of this community should be investigated (ibid, p.2664). Third, he proposed that the provocative literature of the Ahmadis that was disrespectful to the religious sentiments of the Muslims and Christians should be curtailed. Its printing, import into Pakistan and circulation, all should be banned (ibid, p.2664). In his fourth proposal he suggested a special oath for public servants which stated the public servants' first and foremost responsibility was to Pakistan regardless of that servant's communal or sectarian association (ibid, p.2666). This was an effort to allow Ahmadis to keep serving in the central positions. The underlying logic was when an Ahmadi declared his allegiance to the state of Pakistan through this oath, the ulema's argument that Ahmadis owed their primary allegiance to the Caliph would be addressed. Resultantly, Ahmadis would not use their position to damage the interest of the state, a threat propagated by the opposition members. Finally, he proposed that the government should "form an organization that would propagate the basic articles of the faith of Islam, particularly the concept of the Finality of the Prophethood" (ibid, p.2667). It was reconciliatory in nature as he blamed the rest of the ulema for not doing their job to propagate Islam properly. Had they done their job correctly, the question of Ahmadis would have never arisen as Ahmadis were lost and could be guided to the right path (ibid, p.2667). Dr.Ghulam Ahmed, a senior member of the ruling PPP government, termed this matter a religious matter. He proposed that a summit be called where Islamic scholars from all over the world could derive the fundamental truths of Islam. This would, in his view, reduce the communal divisions among the Muslims. His other proposals were in line with earlier suggestions that Ahmadis be declared non-Muslim minority and the government should establish foreign missions specifically to counter foreign influence of Ahmadis (ibid, p.2673).

To sum it up, the proposals suggested by all the members including opposition, independent and government members with the exception of a few revolved around three main themes. First and a unanimous proposal was that both groups of the Ahmadis should be declared a non-Muslim minority through a constitutional amendment. Second, Ahmadis must be sacked from the central positions in the government so that after the amendment, they would not use their power to harm Pakistan. Third, there should be a clamp down on their proselytization activities both at home and abroad, and finally, that Rabwah should be declared an open city. Another significant observation is that the whole house was united in their opposition against the Ahmadis. Since the start of the hearing, both the opposition and the treasury benches were unanimous in their view that Ahmadis were not Muslims. There was not a single member who opposed or questioned the motion tabled by the government or the resolution moved by the opposition. It is worth reiterating that the Ahmadi delegation and the parliamentarians were not allowed to question each other directly but through the Attorney General. This was done to avoid any flaring up of emotional sentiments during the proceedings.

3.11 Conclusion

This chapter discussed at length the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan from two vantage points: the passing of the OR in 1949 and the second constitutional amendment in 1974 declaring the Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority. These vantage points illustrate how religious frontiers and the perception of domestic threats elicit a response to them which contribute to the rise and waxing of religious nationalism. The government through the OR laid the religious frontier by openly declaring that religion would be the guiding ideology for the state of Pakistan as it will protect the country from external and internal threats. Building on the religious frontier of the OR, the Ahmadis were securitized as a threat through the speech act of the committee members. As such, the religious threat emanating from the religious frontier warranted a response.

The second constitutional amendment declaring Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority was the response to mitigate the Ahmadi threat. The legislative debates analyzed for both events demonstrate that the outcomes of the debate were dubbed as moral victories necessary for Pakistan. However, it is stated that these victories were successful attempts at securitizing the religious threat to Pakistan from within. In doing so, the state defined one aspect of Pakistaniyat tied around the elusive variable of Islam and a Muslim. The analysis further found that in order to create unity through the OR and contain conflict through the second constitutional amendment, segments of society were excluded on religious grounds by being securitized as a threat to the Islamic ideology of Pakistan.

CHAPTER 4

ZIA UL HAQ, PROTECTOR OF PAKISTAN'S RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS

4.1 Introduction

This section aims to explain the waxing of religious nationalism during the era of General Zia-ul-haq (hereafter Zia) from 1977 uptill 1989. The thesis argues that Pakistan was founded on the principle laid down by Jinnah that Muslims were a nation by every definition of a nation. This notion was made official in 1949 with the adoption of OR and later reinforced when Pakistan was declared as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in its first constitution of 1956. This study argues that the ideological understanding of the state, after partition, was interpreted differently by different leaders as once the foundation of the state becomes ideological (Islam), it is potentially open to a ruler's understanding who may not find it Islamic enough. This was the case with Zia; his peculiarity was his obsession with what he perceived as the unfulfilled promise of Pakistan, that is, the gap between what it supposedly promised and what it became. Since the original foundations of the state were ideological and defined incompletely, Zia picked up these inadequately defined domestic religious frontiers and interpreted them as per his understanding. This explains the waxing of religious nationalism during his rule as his era was what has been called as messianisation of politics (Smith, 2000, p. 799). In order to demonstrate how religious nationalism waxed under Zia, this chapter will analyse selective speeches and interviews of Zia from 1977 till 1989. In order to conduct a systematic analysis and to avoid confirmation bias, Zia's key addresses to the nation[211] along with three interviews and a press conference addressed to the foreign media were used in which he outlined his vision for Pakistan. This approach aims to reduce selection of any selective material and provides a more objective analysis.

[211]They include address to the nation after the coup in 1977, Speech at the extraordinary session of Othe rganization of Islamic Counties (OIC) Foreign Ministers meeting, address to the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly 1980, address to the nation on Defence Day on 6th September, Independence Day on 14th August, addresses to the nation when elections were postponed twice and address in 1984 to announced referendum for his presidency.

This study will not be an evaluation of the Islamisation policies of Zia or his eleven years in power.[212] This study will focus on how his Islamisation policies and his decade-long rule waxed religious nationalism in Pakistan. Scholarly literature emphasizes Zia's era as one of Islamisation and dictatorship. However, it does not answer how this influenced the religious identity of Muslims in Pakistan and the Pakistani identity. This study aims to fill this research gap by focusing on the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan. It is based on examination of primary documents such as key speeches and interviews of Zia which he delivered during his eleven years in power. Another important and significant contribution of this chapter is how Zia combined the external religious frontier of Afghan resistance with the domestic religious frontier in Pakistan to legitimize his rule. A similar finding was discussed in chapter three, where in order to securitize the Ahmadis as a threat and alleviate the domestic religious frontier, Ahmadis were compared to an external religious frontier between Pakistan and Israel. Similarly, as the analyses will show below, Zia relied on the Afghan resistance to convince the nation of the religious credentials of his regime. By committing Pakistan's resources to the cause, Zia could claim that he was implementing Islam in letter and spirit with religious laws in his country and supporting jihad and Muslim brothers in the neighbouring country. This will highlight how Zia was able to amalgamate religion with national consciousness and also provide insight into the lasting influence of his Islamisation policies on the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistani society.

Before Zia came to power, Pakistan went through extreme political turbulence. The elections of 1970 brought right-wing political parties to the parliament followed by the 1971 debacle when East-Pakistan seceded from West-Pakistan to become Bangladesh. Role of religion was further magnified during the government of PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from 1971 to 1977. The third constitution of 1973, adopted under PM Bhutto's government, reaffirmed Pakistan's religious credentials by making Islam and the role of the state in implementing it as a cornerstone. Moreover, the 1973 Constitution stated that only a Muslim can become the President or Prime Minister of Pakistan and laid down the criteria of Muslimness for both the President and Prime Minister. This process of Islamisation further continued in 1974 when the second constitutional amendment,discussed in the previous chapter, was passed unopposed, declaring the Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority. Besides this, Bhutto's

[212] For an evaluation of Zia's rule, See Craig Baxter and Shahid Javed Burki's, (1991), *Pakistan under the Military, Eleven Years of Zia,* West View Press, USA; Shahid Javed Burki, (1988), Pakistan Under Zia 1977-1988, (1988), *Asian Survey*, Vol 28, No. 10, University of California Press; Hassan Askari Rizvi (2013), *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997*, Sang e Meel Publications, Lahore.

government undertook various religious reforms to placate the right wing opposition (Mutalib & Hashmi, 1994). However, owing to political deadlock after the elections of March 1977, his government was removed through a coup in July 1977 by Zia.

Zia, immediately after the coup, announced his intention of purifying Pakistan. Despite the strong presence of Islam in legislation, he perceived Pakistan to be an Islamic republic in name only. For him, Islam had been confined to legislation alone while its practical part was ignored on purpose by successive governments. Hence, it was under his governance that Pakistan inched closer to be the prophesized fortress of Islam. Zia thought this land of the pure required further purification and thus, underwent a social, cultural, political and economic sanctification. Zia single handedly transformed the relationship between the state, society, and nation's identity by binding them together with Islam. This reshaping of the state and society along religious lines had a significant impact on the Pakistani identity. If the question was asked what it meant to be a Pakistani, Zia's policies showed that to be a Pakistani was tantamount to being a practicing Muslim. The difference between the religions and the secular became so obvious that any criticism of Zia's government was considered a violation against the will of God. Why despite Pakistan's religious credentials and the religious codification of laws through constitutions and amendments, did Zia press for further religiosity? This study identifies two reasons for this question. First, that it was the incomplete definition of the religious frontiers since independence. Second, which dovetails into the first reason, any ruler can pick up the unfinished frontiers and complete them as per their understanding. In the case of Zia, it was the glaring gap between the promise and reality.

4.2 Who Was Zia?

Zia was a multitalented individual. He was a soldier who became a general and later Pakistan's Chief Martial Law Administrator and President. However, before he shouldered such responsibilities, he was considered to be an apolitical officer who lacked charisma, carrying the ostensible bluntness of a soldier (Arif, 1995). Zia's legacy is still contested till date in Pakistan where the masses, the politicians, and the academics alike either detest him or extol him for the same reason: his eleven-year rule over Pakistan. Scholars have attempted to explain his legacy with varied opinions. Masood Akhtar called his era as "Dictatorship in Pakistan" (Zahid, 2011) while others focused on the impact of his Islamisation policies on Pakistan (Ziring, 1984; Kennedy, 1990; Iqbal, 1986). An insightful analysis was offered by Burki et al of Pakistan under the military where the political, constitutional, economic, administrative, and foreign policy aspects of Zia's eleven years in power were discussed

(Burki & Baxter, 1991). Zia was mainly credited for putting Pakistan on the international stage as a bulwark against expanding Soviet rule in Afghanistan and was detested in Pakistan for setting up an untamable Islamic juggernaut. Zia was born on 12th August, 1924 in Jullundur, India. He graduated from St.Stephen's college in 1944 and joined the British India Army. Upon completion of his training he was commissioned into the Indian Cavalry in 1945. After the partition, Zia opted for Pakistan and subsequently moved to the newly independent country. Zia, as a soldier, "was an unknown figure, marked by his professionalism and lack of interest in politics" and "a reputation of unquestioning loyalty to his superiors" (Burki & Baxter, 1991, p. 6). This was the reason why PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto passed over half a dozen senior generals in appointing him as the Chief of Army of Staff in 1976 (ibid, p.6). Unfortunately, for PM Bhutto, all this was to change on 5thJuly 1977 when Zia toppled PM Bhutto from office, placed the country under martial law, and declared himself to be Chief Martial Law Administrator (ibid, p.155). Zia's metamorphosis had just begun; from a soldier to the Chief of Army Staff to Chief Law Martial Administrator in a period of two years since his appointment as Chief of Army Staff in 1976. After eleven years in power, Zia along with other senior officers, died in a plane crash in August 1988.

4.3 Political Environment: 1970-1977

The purpose of discussing the political environment from 1970 till 1977 is to highlight the domestic threats Pakistan faced. For, in this period of seven years, Pakistan, under the government of PM Bhutto, had gone through extreme instability: Pakistan lost its eastern half in 1971; Bhutto's government purged the armed forces of soldiers having political ambitions; passed Pakistan's third constitution in 1973, declared Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority in 1974; tested a new system of Islamic socialism with mixed results; dissolved the non-PPP provincial governments in NWFP and Balochistan; held elections in 1977 whose results were rejected by the opposition that ultimately led to widespread protest inevitably inviting army to take over. As Lawrence Ziring succinctly puts it, "After independence was granted, it was not the Muslims of Pakistan who were in danger, but Pakistan itself. It was the need to save Pakistan that prompted the armed forces to act in 1977, and to sustain their dominant political role into the mid-1980s" (Ziring, 1984, p. 941). The political developments from 1970 till 1977 are briefly discussed below.

The first general elections in both West and East Pakistan since independence in 1947 were held in 1970. Mujeeb ur Rehman's Awami League Party (ALP) attained a landslide victory in East Pakistan by attaining 74.9 per cent of votes cast while Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won majority of the seats in West Pakistan by winning 81 out of 138

seats (59 per cent) in West Pakistan (Mutalib & Hashmi, 1994, p. 51). If everything had proceeded as per the results, the ALP would form a majority government in the centre.

However, owing to reasons discussed above, this did not come to pass; subsequently a civil war broke out and East-Pakistan was separated from West-Pakistan turning into an independent Bangladesh in 1971. General Yahya Khan, in the face of this ignominious defeat, abdicated power to Bhutto's PPP who won the majority mandate. The separation of East-Pakistan was a major blow to morale of the armed forces, to the idea of Muslim identity, and the Two-Nation theory, which was the basis of Pakistan's independence in 1947 and thus left Pakistan vulnerable to internal pressures of breaking up.

Following this debacle, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, with his PPP, was the victor of the 1970 elections and formed the government at the centre in 1972. Bhutto, belonging to the feudal class called for "*roti, kapra aur makaan*" (bread, cloth, and house) from the platform of the PPP and used further slogans such as 'Islam is our Faith', 'Democracy is our Polity', 'Socialism is our Economy', and 'All Power to the People' (Mutalib & Hashmi, 1994, p. 49). This call was well received by the masses who suffered from income inequality and political instability under General Ayub Khan[213] and General Yahya Khan's[214] government. During his time in power, PM Bhutto tried to charter Pakistan on the path of Islamic socialism by nationalizing key industries, which resulted in the flight of capital from Pakistan. However, Bhutto, being a charismatic leader, was able to hold the people in awe and the opposition in check throughout his time in power. Towards the end of his rule, the opposition resented him as a leader and Islamist groups "charged him with being less than a strict Muslim" (Burki & Baxter, 1991, p. 29) for which Bhutto took measures.

The process of institutionalizing Islam with the state was already underway during PM Bhutto's government, contrary to the accepted notion which solely holds Zia responsible for the Islamic tilt of Pakistan. The first glimpse of this was visible when the third constitution of 1973 was adopted where both the government and opposition cooperated. In exchange for the oppositions' cooperation, the conservative opposition was able to convince the government to pass the second constitutional amendment in 1974 declaring the Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority. Moreover, Bhutto's Muslimness was also under scrutiny during his

[213] Ayub ruled Pakistan under martial law from 1958-1962 and then with a presidential constitution from 1962-1969.

[214] General Yahya Khan also ruled under martial law; his rule lasted till 1971.

term, thus in order to emphasize his Muslimness and undercut the support for Islamic parties, he undertook a plethora of symbolic initiatives aimed at fortifying his religious bent. Zohair Hussain summarizes them as follows, from renaming the Red Cross to Red Crescent, to placing the Holy Quran in all the rooms of first-class hotels throughout Pakistan, from creating a Ministry of Religious Affairs to encouraging Islamic propaganda through the national radio and television stations, to promoting Arabic instruction in schools, from encouraging facilities for the separate Islamic instruction of Shi'ah for Sunni children in all schools, to sponsoring an international conference on the life and work of Prophet Muhammad, from removing quota restrictions imposed on those wanting to go to perform the *haj* (pilgrimage), to increasing the pilgrim's foreign exchange allowance along with increased flights to Saudia Arabia, PM Bhutto did what he can to align himself with the popular Islamist sentiment (Mutalib & Hashmi, 1994, p. 53). Despite this window dressing, the opposition was not persuaded and later they formed a joint front known as Pakistan National Alliance[215] (PNA) to challenge PM Bhutto. The PNA attracted large crowds against Bhutto and his PPP and both sides argued to be the champions of Islam. It was in this conflicting environment that Pakistan again went to the polls in 1977. The elections results of 1977[216] were a setback for the PNA and a referendum for the PPP. The opposition boycotted the elections terming them as rigged, demanding renewed elections. Upon Bhutto's denial of this demand, the opposition launched a civil disobedience movement to dislodge Bhutto. Their aim was to "replace the regime of the 'Whiskey party leader', under whom 'Islam was in Danger', with the pristine purity of *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (Prophet Muhammad's System) or *Nizam-i-Islam* (The Islamic System) (Mutalib & Hashmi, 1994, p. 56). Bhutto first tried to appease the opposition by not only prohibiting alcohol consumption, gambling and night clubs but also promised to introduce sharia law based on Quran and Sunnah (ibid, p.56). The opposition did not blink and Bhutto resorted to suppression through martial law in April 1977, censorship and imprisonment of opposition members. As Burki and Baxter argued, "to be in opposition was to be associated with treason under Bhutto's government (Burki & Baxter, 1991, p. 28). However, Bhutto did request the offices of Saudi

[215] An amalgam of conservative and mainstream parties like The Jama'at-i-Islami, The Jamat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), Muslim League to the leftist remnants of the National Awami Party (NAP).

[216] The PNA won 36 percent of the votes; 36 seats out of 200 while PPP won 60 percent of the votes; 155 out of 200 seats. See Election results for Pakistan on Gallup Pakistan National Election of 1977. https://gallup.com.pk/bb_old_site/election/2GIER1977.pdf.

Arabia and United Arab Emirates, Pakistan's Arab allies, to negotiate a settlement, but to no avail. The climax of this political bickering occurred on 5th July 1977 in the shape of "Operation Fairplay" when Zia toppled the government of Bhutto, a second military coup in a time span of three decades

4.4 From Soldier of Islam to Zia, the Martyr

This section will briefly dwell on the political environment and the eleven-year rule of Zia. It will discuss Zia through various roles: as a politician, as a dictator, as a reformer, a soldier of Islam, and a foreign policy tsar. Although Zia simultaneously juggled through these roles, this approach, it is contended, will aid in answering why Zia undertook certain policies. This part will further dovetail into the next piece of the puzzle which aims to explain how religious nationalism waxed during Zia's time in power.

4.4.1 General Zia, the Soldier of Islam:

> To conclude, I must say that the spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement, was commendable. It proves that Pakistan which was created in the name of Islam will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why; I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.[217]

Zia appeared on the national scene on 5th July 1977 as the latest Chief Marshal Law Administrator (CMLA) of Pakistan; through "Operation Fair Play" Zia sent the government of PM Bhutto packing. He did not abrogate the constitution but placed some of its articles in abeyance and promised elections within ninety days-October 1977- which were postponed to November 1979 and ultimately happened in 1985. In addition, President of Pakistan Fazal illahi Choudhary stepped down from his post in 1978 and Zia became the president of Pakistan as well; all in all he was the Chief of Army Staff, the CMLA and President of Pakistan; the trinity of power. Gathering from the excerpt of his address above, Zia indicated to be a benign CMLA, who dissuaded politics for the armed forces, promised early election and return to the barracks. This challenge he undertook in his own words as a "Soldier of Islam" with a promise of non-deviation. These assurances were initially a break from the previous two martial law regimes that Pakistan witnessed under Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan but later turned out to be more of the same.

Zia viewed Pakistan's problems from a soldier's perspective: Pakistan in danger from internal and external threats. Naturally, as a soldier, it was his duty to protect the country

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[217] Excerpt from Zia's address to the nation on 5th July 1977. See Documents, June — November 1977, *Pakistan Horizon*, 1977, Vol. 30, No. 3/4 (Third and Fourth Quarter, 1977), pp.212.

from such threats. But Zia went a step further and undertook upon himself to single handedly guard the ideological frontiers of Pakistan. General Khalid, a colleague of Zia noted, "he felt that intellectual liberalism had eroded the moral fiber of the permissive western society. He considered Islam a strong shield to avoid such decay in the Muslims" (Arif, 1995, p. 120), a decay that was nurtured by the previous governments since independence which brings us back to the waxing of religious nationalism. Zia erected a religious frontier between his regime and the secular world out there to dismantle Pakistan which included political opposition. Any opposition to his regime was securitized as a threat to the ideology of Pakistan and his response to these threats were policies of Islamisation aimed at creating cohesion in a bickering country.

Zia's remedy to Pakistan's ailment was the complete Islamisation of the society. As Lawrence Ziring argued, this soldier-president wanted to transform the state "from Islamic republic to Islamic state in Pakistan" (Ziring, 1984); thus Ziaism was seen was the antithesis to Bhuttoism and his predecessors. In Ayesha Jalal's words, "Pakistan had seen military authoritarianism before. What was to be distinctively different about its reimposition after 1977 was the fusing of martial rule with a state-sponsored Islamic ideology" (Jalal, 2014, p. 217). This "martial law in Islamic garb" (ibid, ch.7) was Zia' innovation in addressing the political deadlock in Pakistan.

Zia justified his preference for the presidential form of government over parliamentary form with Islam. General Khalid quotes him stating the following, "The Muslims have one God, one Prophet, and one Book; how can you have two hundred leaders ruling you? You have got to have one Ameer (ruler). In my humble opinion, for Pakistan, the· presidential form, which is closer to the Islamic ideology, ·is the most suited one" (Arif, 1995, p. 133). Zia harboured this view throughout his eleven-year rule and amassed absolute power for the presidency through various constitutional amendments.

In advancing the Islamic renaissance for Pakistan, six weeks after taking power Zia reconstituted the Council of Islamic Ideology (referred to as Council). This constitutional body had been in existence since the adoption of the 1962 Constitution but was left redundant. As Mufti Taqi Usmani, an imminent Islamic scholar argued, it was because the "earlier government was indifferent to islamization and little work had been done till 1977" (Azzam, 1990, p. 64). The purpose of the Council as per article 230 of the constitution was to make recommendations and advise the government at the federal and provincial level to enable the Muslims of Pakistan to live a life according to the injunctions of Quran and Sunnah. As Mufti Usmani put it, had all the recommendations of the Council been adopted

"the dream of an Islamic order would have begun to emerge" (ibid, p.65). Zia's crusade expanded to the legal system as he declared in 1978 that *Nizam-i-Mustafa*[218](the law of the Prophet) would be the foundations of Pakistan's legal machinery and that Shariah would be the basis of all law in Pakistan (Burki & Baxter, 1991, p. 36). This required the establishment of Shariat courts that could adjudicate cases relating to Shariah law. Through a constitutional amendment by way of a presidential order in 1979, high courts were given jurisdiction to "establish Shariat Benches to determine whether a law was repugnant to Islam" (Jalal, 2014, p. 223). However, in 1980's, these Shariat Benches were disbanded and a separate Federal Shariat Court was established (FSC), the purpose of which was to keep a check on the government in passing laws that were in line with the injunctions of Quran and Sunnah (Kennedy, 1990). This was also an ingenious way of doing away with any Western democratic principle that hampered Zia's control.

Under the Nizam-i-Mustafa, new Islamic punishments known as *hudood* (limits) were also imposed in 1979 for the order of the society. The four ordinances-*zina* (adultery),*qazf*, prohibition and property-also known as the Hudood ordinances, were implemented in the criminal law as professed in Islam. As Kennedy explains, these ordinances covered crimes such as "adultery, rape, kidnapping, enticement, attempted rape, sodomy, prostitution, conspiracy to engage in prostitution, and deceitful marriage, wrongful imputation of adultery, possession of alcohol and prohibited drugs" (Kennedy, 1990, p. 70). Moreover, women were specifically aggrieved by the *zina* (adultery) Ordinance as a strict criterion of four male witnesses to a rape was prescribed, failing which the case was considered as adultery and the punishment for adultery was stoning to death. Fortunately, no such punishments were meted out as explained by Kennedy (ibid, p.70) and despite these strict measures, the crime rate remained high. Mufti Usmani attributed this to the lack of a professional police and low rate of conviction by the judiciary (Azzam, 1990, p. 67) and not as the failure of the laws.

The *Nizam-i-Mustafa* envisioned economic reengineering as well. A country-wide attempt was made to introduce interest-free banking in Pakistan with the opening of profit-and-loss accounts as an alternative to interest bearing accounts. However, this attempt at overhauling the banking system generated mixed results. As Mufti Usmani explains, owing to lack of supervision and implementation in line with as per the Sharia, this was just normal interest

[218] For an evaluation of the impact of this system on Pakistan's legal structure, see Charles H Kennedy, (1990) Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Spring, 1990), pp. 62-77.

disguised as Islamic and was disowned by the ulema (Azzam, 1990, p. 74). In addition to these measures, two new taxes were also introduced. First, *zakat* (a compulsory tax of 2.5% of wealth in Islam) was imposed on all the bank accounts. The funds were to be used by the government to help the poor. The introduction of zakat stirred sectarian hostilities between the Sunni and the Shia. The Shia ulema protested the compulsory implementation of zakat and penal laws based on the sunni jurisprudence of Islam and were in conflict with their own jurisprudence (Ahmad, 1996, p. 378). Owing to the huge protest staged by the Shia community, the government made the payment of zakat voluntary for the community. *Ushar* (One tenth of farm produce) an annual tax was also introduced in 1983 to Islamise the economy.

In guiding the renaissance from the above, Zia created an advisory body called the *Majlis-i-Shura* (Federal Advisory Council) in 1982. Baxter and Burki note that Zia wanted a body modeled on the "classic Islamic pattern of notables serving as advisers to the ruler (the amir) of an Islamic state". They continue that Zia narrowed the role of advisers to proposals only with legislative powers lying with the government (Burki & Baxter, 1991, p. 35). Thus, the council could only propose and not legislate.

Zia also relied on Islamic language and symbolism to prop up support for his regime among the right wing political parties. His message of guarding the ideological frontiers of Pakistan resonated with the middle classes in the provinces. As Mumtaz Ahmed argues, Zia "officially sponsored religious festivals and rituals, in the newly created religious institutional network of zakat, 'ushr, and the *islah-i-muashra* (reformation of society) committees, and in government-organized religious gatherings such as the *Milad-un-Nabi* (celebrations of the birth of the Prophet), and the *Qirat* (recitations) and *Na'at* (poetry in praise of the Prophet Muhammad) competitions" (Ahmad, 1996, p. 383). Moreover, mass media was ordered to reflect orthodox values, daily prayer provisions were made in government offices and *Nazimeen-e-salat* (Organizers of prayers) were setup to encourage people to regularly offer prayers (Rizvi, 1993, p. 248).

The minorities also came under scrutiny during Zia's time with Ahmadis bearing the substantial brunt of this scrutiny. Although they were declared as non-Muslim through a second amendment during PM Bhutto's time in 1974, under Zia their non-Muslimness was now criminalized through a presidential ordinance in 1984. The second amendment of 1974 did not bar the Ahmadis from preaching their religion or using Islamic lexicon to refer to their activities. However, Zia, in his efforts to placate the religious right not only declared it a crime for Ahmadis to propagate their religion but also to use Islamic vocabulary for their

brand of religion. Lastly and above all were the blasphemy laws introduced by Zia to safeguard the ideological frontiers of Pakistan and Islam in 1984. The blasphemy laws were often misused as a tool to settle scores against one's foe by the public. Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Ahmadis alike were charged with blasphemy and without evidence were meted out mob justice. It is hard to say if Zia had imagined such misuse of these laws but the fact they continue till date in Pakistan testifies to their misuse.

The above-stated policies were the major initiatives introduced by Zia to create cohesion in the nation and remold Pakistan into an Islamic state. The underlying reason for these policies was to protect Pakistan from the ideological decay from within. Zia as a soldier saw Pakistan in danger and Zia, as the soldier of Islam, created this internal religious frontier by conjoining Pakistan and Islam. Any threat to Pakistan or Islam was considered the same, which justified his response to the threat that is, his Islamisation campaign. Yes, it was aimed directly at creating an Islamic state but it was also the waxing of religious nationalism. For it was under Zia's period that Islam and Pakistan were considered as one not only in legal language but also through practice and implementation. Despite these efforts, masses resisted his Islamisation campaign as it focused more on the performative, regulative, and extractive part of Islam and failed not only to create and inculcate egalitarianism in the society but also avoided holding political authority to account which is the essence of Islam.

4.4.2 General Zia, the Politician:

Zia's growth from a soldier to a politician was slow and gradual. Given Pakistan's past experience with military rulers, he was aware of the pitfalls of the coup. Initially, Zia was motivated to restore order and hold elections within the 90 day time as stipulated in the constitution. However, as time passed his views changed considerably. Following comments reveal how Zia's opinion changed diametrically. His first comments are from July 1977, immediately after the coup. While his second opinion is from a few years after the coup. Zia.

> But the Constitution has not been abrogated. Only the operation of certain parts of the Constitution has been held in abeyance…My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections which will be held in October this year. Soon after the polls, power will be transferred to the elected representatives of the people. I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule.[219]

[219] Address to the nation, General Mohammad Zia, 5 July 1977. See Documents, June-November 1977, *Pakistan Horizon*, 1977, Vol. 30, No. 3/4 (Third and Fourth Quarter, 1977), pp. 211-212.

> What is the Constitution? It is a booklet with ten or twelve pages. I can tear them up and say that from tomorrow we shall live under a different system. Is there anybody to stop me? Today the people will follow wherever I lead. All the politicians including the once mighty Mr Bhutto will follow me with their tails wagging.[220]

The above two diametrically opposed statements were uttered by the same person. Zia the politician was an indecipherable enigma, starting off with a solemn promise to hold elections within ninety days in the year 1977, he put off the same for eight years till 1985. Committing to bring stability to Pakistan in the name of Islam, he became the President, the CMLA and COAS of Pakistan, creating an authoritarian presidency. He held a referendum to validate his rule in 1985, took on USSR to prop up his domestic base, banned elections on the bases of political parties, granted separate electorates on religious grounds, sacked two governments,[221] blunted the judiciary, suppressed opposition, gagged media, hounded the minorities and set up a parallel religious machinery to Islamise Pakistan. Relying on the Machiavellian advice of Lion and the Fox, that is blind support from senior tier of military officers and luck, Zia was able to weather the political storms in creating an Orwellian setup during his eleven-year rule. Zia proved everyone wrong who had written him off as a soldier disinterested in anything other than his duty. This section will briefly analyze the major policy initiatives undertaken by Zia as a politician. This analysis serves the purpose of clarifying how religious nationalism waxed during Zia's time as it will give the theoretical framework a historical and policy-oriented perspective.

Zia came to power through a coup, which required legitimacy. In order to avoid stirring the hornets' nest, Zia purposefully portrayed the coup as a necessary evil to protect Pakistan. His approach since the coup was to outline a threat to Pakistan which he as a soldier had a solemn duty to protect. Any action undertaken by Zia was to save Pakistan from the troubled days of the past, like in the Animal Farm, where Napoleon and Snowball[222] would justify any harsh policy by playing on the threat of return of Mr Jones, the farmer. Zia, in his first speech to the nation, stated:

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[220] Comments delivered by Zia at a press conference in Iran. See Khan, R (1998), *Pakistan: A Dream Gone Sour,* pp.87-88, New York, Oxford.

[221] Government of PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977 and PM Mohammad Khan Junejo in 1988.

[222] They were pigs in charge of the Animal Farm after the successful and bloodless rebellion of animals against their human owner. See Orwell, G (1945), *Animal Farm,* Secker and Warburg, London.

> It must be quite clear to you now that when the political leaders failed to steer the country out of a crisis, it is an inexcusable sin for the Armed Forces to sit as silent spectators. It is primarily, for this reason that the Army, perforce had to intervene to save the country.[223]

Zia's analysis of the political scenario was that no solution was insight to the political imbroglio in Pakistan and thus he decided not to be a silent spectator. This understanding of Zia that politicians were ill suited to run Pakistan and posed a threat to the country only strengthened over the years.

Zia, the politician like earlier CMLA announced the new administrative setup of the country. Unlike his predecessors, he did not abrogate the constitution but put certain clauses in abeyance to avoid intense criticism. Moreover, he also let the then President Fazal Illahi Choudhary continue in his post but later when Mr Choudhary resigned in 1978, Zia took this portfolio under his wings. A four member military council comprising the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force was formed to advise the president in running the affairs of the state. Ironically, he deduced that upper echelons of the armed forces were better suited to run a country rather than perform their core duty. Zia further took it upon himself as CMLA and COAS that he will be issuing authority of Martial Law orders as required as the CMLA will be the Chief Executive. General Secretary Defence was to coordinate the working of the Federal Ministries and Federal Secretaries were to continue heading their Ministries. On the provincial level, each province's administration was to be headed by a Provincial Martial Law Administrator and Civil servants were assured of no harassment. Thus, Zia set up a skeleton administrative system that seemed to have alienated the political class but also brought calm to the country.

The judicial arm of the state was also twisted and turned until it toed the General's line.Zia was clear since day one that he will avoid "restricting the power of judiciary"[224] but "under unavoidable circumstances, if and when Martial Law Orders and Martial Law Regulations are issued, they would not be challenged in any Court of Law"[225] thus, having the cake and eating it too. Immediately after the coup, he announced that the Chief Justice of the

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[223] See Documents, June-November 1977, *Pakistan Horizon*, 1977, Vol. 30, No. 3/4 (Third and Fourth Quarter, 1977), pp. 211-212.

[224] ibid, pp.211.

[225] ibid, pp.212.

Provinces will be acting as the Governors of their respective Provinces. In this relaltering of the judicial landscape of Pakistan, Zia sought judicial cover for his coup and removal of Bhutto from the political arena which eventually came through. The then Supreme Court of Pakistan gave a carte blanche to Zia in the case "Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs Chief of Army Staff" by validating the martial law under the doctrine of necessity with explicit instructions to hold elections at the earliest under the 1973 constitution. Moreover, the judgment granted Zia the legal cover to amend the constitution in order to perform his duties, to hold free and fair elections. Later, the Supreme Court also upheld the verdict of the Lahore High Court upholding Bhutto's death penalty. Zia utilized the judiciary to hit two birds with a single stone but was still threatened by the judiciary. He further blunted the judicial arm of the state by stripping it of its power of judicial review. The Provisional Constitutional Order of March 1981 replaced the constitution of 1973 making the higher judiciary subservient to the CMLA as senior justices disagreed to take oath under a revised and compromised temporary constitution. Despite the martial law's validation and Bhutto's judicial murder, the sword of election and pressure from the opposition loomed large over Zia's head. Initially promised to be held ninety days after the coup in October 1977, the elections were postponed to November 1979. However, local body elections were held in 1979 on non party basis where candidates associated with PPP performed well enough to convince Zia that holding general elections was inappropriate as it would catapult PPP back to power. This second postponement of elections was followed by banning of the press, of political parties and political activities in the country by Zia on the ground that "method of elections was totally un-Islamic and that there was no concept of political parties in Islam" (Khan, 2023, p.350).

Moreover, Zia made amendments to the Political Parties Act, 1962[226] making electoral participation difficult for the political parties. This was vehemently opposed by the opposition political parties and Zia made numerous overtures to the right-wing parties. He first cajoled the opposition alliance PNA in joining the cabinet under martial law. The aim of this alliance was to dilute the blowback from the postponement of elections and Bhutto's execution. Zia had strategized that keeping the PNA close would provide the regime with a civilian face and ultimately approval of the people. However, PNA was reluctant to be associated with a military regime for long as it damaged their constituencies and thus, this marriage of convenience ended after Bhutto's execution in April 1979. After this Zia joined

[226] (i) Each party must register with Election Commission (ii) Registration can be cancelled if a party works counter to ideology of Pakistan, disturbs public order or spread dissatisfaction against the Judiciary and the armed forces (iii) Submission of accounts for audit and source of income.

hands with Jamaat-i-Islami, a constituent of PNA. This alliance did not last long either. Lastly, Zia sought support for his Islamisation policies and deferment of elections by accommodating orthodox religious leaders who wanted a theocratic state (Rizvi, 2013, p. 252) but these orthodox elements were also abandoned as their worldview collided with the military regimes islamist vision for Pakistan. Further in its attempt to depoliticize and regulate the society, the military regime forced the leftist opposition parties to crystallize into the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD)[227] in 1981. This movement demanded elections under the1973 constitution along with the lifting of martial law. However, by 1981, Afghan jihad[228] was underway, and with Zia grasping this opportunity, the Islamist parties approved of his policies. This precluded the MRD efforts to substantially challenge Zia, who delayed the elections uptill 1985 when they were finally held on non-party basis. However, before the general elections of 1985, Zia wanted a vote of confidence so that a new government would not dislodge him. This vote of confidence came in the form of a referendum held on 17th December 1984. The referendum was simple and asked a single question, the response to which was a "Yes" or "No". The question read as follows:

> Whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General Muhammad Zia, the President of Pakistan, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and *sunnah* of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan, for the continuation and consolidation of that process, and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.

For Zia, an affirmative response to the loaded question meant that people wanted him to continue as President of Pakistan for another five years. Despite the credibility of the referendum, the Chief Election Commissioner announced that out of the 62% ballots cast, 97% voted in favour (Khan, 2023, p.365). Hence, Zia fortified his position before the elections of 1985. However, this overhauling of the system was reversible and to preclude

[227] Led by PPP, it included other parties such as (i)National Democratic Party, (ii) Pakistan Democratic Party, (iii) Tehrik-i-Istiklal, (iv) Pakistan Muslim League (kahiruddin-Qasim Group), (v)Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi, (vi)Pakistan Mazdoor Kisaan Party, (vii)Pakistan National Party, (viii) Awami Tehreek, (ix) NAP (Pakhtoonkhwah).

[228] The Afghan Soviet war from December 1979 to February 1989, also known as Afghan Jihad in Pakistan. See Begum, I (2018), *The Impact of the Afghan Soviet War on Pakistan*, Oxford University Press.

such a scenario Zia required a constitutional cover.[229] Before the transfer of power and lifting of martial law, Zia wanted to ensure that there was no fall out that would implicate him, therefore, he went the extra mile and changed the 1973 constitution through various amendments. The first such act was the promulgation of the Laws Order, 1977 to run the administration of the country. Under this order, the superior courts were to function as it is with a caveat: they could not question martial law orders or regulations. Moreover, the fundamental rights under the 1973 Constitution and any cases pending adjournment were suspended. The second foray on the constitution was when military courts were set up under the constitution; Article 212 was added to the constitution establishing military courts and tribunal in Pakistan.[230] As Hamid Khan argues, this provided a constitutional cover to the military courts on the one hand and reduced the writ of the judiciary on the other (Khan, 2023, p.351). The Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) 1981 was another such attempt at disfiguring the 1973 Constitution that addressed the interest of Zia's regime. The PCO validated all the orders of the CMLA, the President and the Martial Law regulations made on or after the coup in July 1977. It was a carte blanche to Zia's action since he came to power. The PCO, when challenged in the courts, was upheld by Lahore High Court, thus further solidifying Zia's control (ibid, p.360). However, the Laws Order of 1977 and PCO of 1981 were temporary arrangements and a permanent constitutional solution to Zia's dilemma was still missing. This silver bullet came in the form of, "Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order 1985 (RCO)".[231] The RCO was based on Zia's constitutional plan[232] where he favoured the presidential form of government over its parliamentary variant. Zia was of the view that the presidency needs to be empowered and balance be struck between the powers of the president and the prime minister. The RCO was promulgated immediately after the general elections in 1985 and was made part of the constitution as the Eighth amendment in

[229] Martial law was an act of treason in terms of Article 6 of the Constitution of 1973.

[230] Constitution (Second Amendment) Order 1979. President's Order 21 of 1979. PLD 1979 Central statues 567. See Khan, H (2023), *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 4th Ed,* Oxford Publisher.

[231] It was a constitutional amendment through Presidential order. Among other things, the RCO empowered the president to dissolve the National Assembly at his discretion. Zia wanted this clause to ensure that his presidency remains unchallenged after elections and when martial law is lifted.

[232] Zia announced a constitutional plan on 12th August 1983 to the Majlis-e-Shoora (Federal Council).

1985. Zia pushed this amendment before the parliament was set to meet for the first time in 1985 after eight years. Through the eighth amendment,[233] Zia strengthened the presidency to the point of making both the legislative and judicial arm of the state subservient to it. Some of the main features were the following: the President could dissolve the national assembly when desirable; appoint the Prime Minister and disqualify him if he loses the confidence of the National Assembly. Moreover, the President was conferred the power to appoint the Chairman, Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air force, and Chiefs of Staff Committee. Zia made the law and instead of transferring power, he shared the power with a civilian government, hence ensuring his continuity in office and brought the tine of Constitutional deviation to an end.

As per the revised constitution, Zia appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo as the new PM, sworn in on March 23, 1985. PM Junejo rocked the boat by, first, announcing that a civilian government cannot go hand in hand with martial law which Zia was in no earnest to do away with, and second, by reviving the political parties abhorred by Zia. However, the martial law was finally lifted by way of the Eighth amendment which was a safety guarantee that Zia would not be sacked or held accountable. In doing so he bid farewell to the title of CMLA, only retaining the position of COAS and the President. Despite these iron clad guarantees, President Zia dismissed the government of PM Junejo on 29th May 1988 on the grounds that it was an ineffective government, where bribery, nepotism and corruption were in vogue, flawed economic policies were pursued, life and property of the citizens were in jeopardy and the party-less national assembly was once again full of political parties. According to Zia, "the snake in the sleeve inside the country belonged to a group that believed in the politics of violence and opposed Pakistan's ideology" (Jalal, 2014, p. 237).

4.4.3 General Zia, Afghanistan and Pakistan:

A few monumental events shocked the Islamic world-Bhutto's hanging, Iran's Islamic Revolution, Iran-Iraq War, Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, Seizure of Grand Mosque of Mecca and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan- during Zia's years in power. The Islamic world was in turmoil and Zia's foreign policy overtures along with his Islamist ideals coupled with the brewing Cold War between USA and USSR catapulted Pakistan to the front and centre in

[233] For detailed assessment of the Eight Amendment, See Khan, H (2023), *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Chapter 29, Oxford Publisher.

world affairs. Over a couple of years Zia became the blue eyed boy for the West.[234] Despite his strong grip on the domestic arena, Zia's regime was isolated internationally. A military coup, Bhutto's death and continued postponement of elections left him looking over the shoulder and in need of strong support both domestically and internationally.

Divine mercy came in the form of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 which not only rekindled the decaying US-Pakistan ties but also gave a lifeline of legitimacy to Zia's regime. Overnight, Zia became the champion of the Muslim cause. No longer was supremacy of democracy, human rights or proliferation of nuclear weapons a primary concern for the USA as routing the Communist threat took precedence. As Ayesha Jalal argued, Zia used"this opportunity to wriggle out of his domestic political corner and bid for the prize most coveted by his predecessors— leadership of the Muslim world" (Jalal, 2014, p. 230) and fortified his reputation as the *amir-ul-momineen* (leader of the faithful)(ibid, p.230).

From the perspective of this study's theoretical framework, Zia was able to construct the external frontier and a perceived threat of annihilation to Pakistan from the Soviet Union. He framed the Soviet threat and Afghan resistance as a challenge to the unity and defence of the entire Muslim community (*ummah).* He convinced the global leaders that supporting the resistance was a duty binding on himself as a Muslim and on Pakistan as an Islamic state. This framing dovetailed with Zia's Islamization campaign back home, granting him political legitimacy. Resultantly, this played a role in the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan by influencing Pakistani identity. Pakistanis no longer viewed themselves struggling under martial law and undergoing Islamization but on the contrary were proud to be playing their role in defending the Muslim community. In addition, the increased resources and economic support that came by aligning with the USA ensured a flourishing economy. This also denied any opposition on the economic front, further proving credence to Zia's rule. Thus, the external religious frontier of a communist Soviet Union and the perceived threat of invasion combined with Zia's domestic religious frontiers aided in waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan.

Pakistan under Zia became the frontline state in the Cold War against communism. Since the start of the invasion in 1979, Pakistan warned the world of the disastrous consequences of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. Through Zia's careful maneuvering in the foreign policy arena, Pakistan became the champion of the Afghan cause. The Soviet invasion

[234] West refers to both the USA and Europe.

had broadened the prospect of war for Pakistan, as the country had to protect its borders from two fronts: from the east, the ever-present threat of India and from the west was threat of Soviet Union entering Pakistan through Afghanistan. The threat of a hostile superpower on the western borders made Zia nervous. The threat exacerbated by the alliance between India and Soviet Union, as Zia feared that Pakistan would be sandwiched between two rivals.

Zia was also concerned that after Afghanistan, the Soviet Union will turn towards Pakistan in search of warm water ports. To avert such an outcome, Zia concluded that Pakistan requires the support of another superpower. The need for an ally became acute by the domestic political scenario where Zia was losing ground. Meanwhile, the USA to curb the influence of communism under the rubric of the Cold War was looking for means to deter the Soviet Union's influence. This necessity of both the countries dovetailed into decade long cooperation aimed at supporting the freedom fighters (*mujahideen)* against the Soviets.

Zia, realizing the geopolitical importance of the Soviet invasion, concluded that aiding the Afghans would help his government and put Pakistan on the centre stage. As the later discussion will reflect, Zia was already pursuing the implementation of Islamic laws in Pakistan but was facing domestic opposition. His decision to champion the Afghan cause in the international arena and framing it as a challenge to the unity of the Muslim Community (*ummah)* made him the informal voice of the Muslims. Immediately after the Soviet Invasion in December 1979, an emergency session of the foreign ministers of Islamic countries was held in January 1980 in Islamabad, presided by Zia. In his address, Zia framed the Muslim predicament as challenge and a threat to the entire Muslim community. Pondering over the reasons for the Muslim suffering, he pointed out in his address "the House of Islam[235] was under alien occupation" while "people of Kashmir yearned for restoration of their rights".[236] To make things worse, "our Iranian brothers aiming to consolidate Islamic Revolution are subject to intimidation and pressure" and "the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan is the latest tragedy to befall the Muslim World".[237]

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[235] A reference to the Mosque Al-Aqsa.

[236] See Documents December 1979-May 1980, *Pakistan Horizon*, First and Second Quarters, 1980, Vol. 33, No. 1/2 (First and Second Quarters, 1980), pp.246.

[237] ibid, pp.246.

The reason for this fall from grace as stated by Zia was

> My own study of these problems has led me to the conclusion that the real weakness of our actions stems from our lack of conviction in our faith. We loftily claim that we are holding fast to the covenant of Allah but perhaps our grasp of this cable is not strong enough and our hearts are not inspired by true Islamic fervor.[238]

Zia repeated a similar argument of the Muslim community under threat at the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 1 October 1980. Highlighting the tragic Iran-Iraq war, the occupation of Palestine by Israel and the tragedy in Afghanistan, he argued that the Afghan struggle was sacrosanct comparable to "the heroic struggles of the Algerian people, the people of Zimbabwe".[239] It can be argued that Zia's "Islamist foreign policy" (Cohen, 2004, p. 172) bore dividends for Pakistan and his government. Owing to his support of the Afghan resistance, Zia was able to gain international recognition and informal legitimacy for his government by other countries. His policy can be broken down into four aspects for analysis. First, over the years, Zia weaved together a loose alliance among the USA, China and Arab countries, all united in their opposition to communist aggression. This role of a spokesperson forwarding the Afghan cause on every international forum earned him the respect of the global leaders. Second, the welcoming of Afghan refugees into Pakistan garnered global sympathy for Zia. The humanitarian fall out of the Soviet invasion was such that the number of refugees swelled from four hundred thousand at the beginning of the invasion to three million by 1988. Zia's government did not frown upon the housing, feeding and settlement of these refugees. He would raise this issue and simultaneously mention that this was being done in the humanitarian spirit and "in conformity with the tradition of Islamic brotherhood".[240] For a resource deprived country like Pakistan to host three million refugees was a positive achievement for Zia's regime. Third, Zia's decision to provide clandestine support to the Afghan freedom fighters (*mujahideen)* by using Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as a conduit for US arms and equipment was in line with Ronald

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[238] ibid, pp.247.

[239] See The President of Pakistan, General Mohammed Zia-Ul-Haq's Speech Before The 35th Session Of The United Nations General Assembly, On 1st October 1980, *Pakistan Horizon*, Fourth Quarter, 1980, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Fourth Quarter, 1980), pp. 3-20.

[240] See The President of Pakistan, General Mohammed Zia-Ul-Haq's Speech Before The 35th Session Of The United Nations General Assembly, On 1st October 1980, *Pakistan Horizon*, Fourth Quarter, 1980, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Fourth Quarter, 1980), pp. 12.

Reagan administration's objective of supporting freedom fighters. This overlapping of the foreign policy objectives of the two countries was significant. For the USA, it carried plausible deniability or any direct involvement in Afghanistan and for Pakistan, it was the informal legitimacy granted to Zia's regime by Reagan's administration for fighting the Soviets. [241] Moreover, President Ronald Reagan's administration in the USA looked the other way on Pakistan's nuclear proliferation. Fourth, notwithstanding the role of other developments in the international arena at the time, Zia, through his consistent campaign, was able to bring the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. In 1988, Geneva Accords were signed between Pakistan, Afghanistan, the USA and the Soviet Union, calling for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan by 1989 (Burki, S. J. & Baxter, C, 1991, p.150). Lastly and the most significant aspect was the precedent set by Pakistan. A relatively small country with limited resources, a small military and limited diplomatic influence standing up to be a superpower at a time when the Cold War was at its peak was unheard of. Pakistan, under Zia, by opposing the Soviets, gained the respect of the international community by raising voice for the people of Afghanistan. Moreover, Zia hit two birds with a single stone, as he was able to dilute Afghanistan's opposition to the Durand Line and create "Strategic Depth"[242] in a beleaguered Afghanistan.

This recognition on the international arena not only eased Zia's domestic political vows but also complimented his agenda back home. It showed that there was congruence between how Zia views the external and domestic environment. In addition, Zia's policy of supporting the Afghan resistance not only found currency with the military high command but also with his government allies. With the support of the allies and considerable economic assistance flowing into the country, the opposition could not seriously deny Zia's claim to power. On the contrary, the developments discussed above strengthened his hand. However, Zia's support for the Afghan resistance carried a cost for the Pakistan society. Omar (1989) notes two menacing effects in the wake of Zia's Afghan policy; "the militarization of civil society due

[241] Ronald Reagan's administration initially offered Pakistan $3.2 billion (divided between economic and military assistance) over six years. Pakistan was also provided with 40 F-16-fighter jets. In addition, a new program worth $4.02 billion was announced in 1986. See Baxter, C, "Pakistan Becomes Prominent in the International Arena" in Burki, S. J. & Baxter, C. (1991). *Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq.* (Vol. 65, Issue 4). Westview Press.

[242] Pakistan's policy to use Afghanistan as a military asset against India, see Parkes, A (2019), *Considered Chaos: Revisiting Pakistan's 'Strategic Depth' in Afghanistan,* Centre For Arab & Islamic Studies, ANU College of Arts & Social Sciences.

to the large influx of arms" and "the drug business" latched onto Pakistan, which had further implications for the economy and the social fabric of the society.

To sum it up, Zia's performance in foreign policy arena was, to his supporters, nothing less than poetic. They viewed him as a pious ruler, who not only strived to Islamize the society but also waged the holy war against God-less communists by helping out a Muslim neighbouring country. If there was a competition among the Islamic countries based on following Islam, Pakistan under Zia would have out-shinned the competition. For Zia, his main achievements were a successful foreign policy towards the USA and India, his Afghan policy, spreading the popularity of Islam (despite the emergence of 'isms'), and the economic stability given to the country (Arif, 1995, p. 121).

4.5 Mapping the Religious Frontiers, Tracing the Threats

> Let me tell you, my dear countrymen, that a country does not survive by the defence of its geographical borders alone. Its ideological frontiers have also to be fully protected. Otherwise, a country is likely to slide into internal chaos and confusion.[243]
>
> The armed forces, as you know, are the ultimate instrument for protecting national integrity against all threats - internal as well as external…As I have said on many occasions before, the survival of the country does not lie in the defence of its geographical borders alone. To give it solid foundational moorings, its ideological frontiers have also to be zealously guarded.[244]
>
> Pakistan is an ideological state. It is the duty of its Armed Forces to defend its geog- graphical frontiers and protect its ideology. They will always stand guard against external dangers and internal hazards.[245]

Zia, the soldier, firmly believed that it was the duty of the armed forces to protect a country's geographical and ideological frontiers. The geographical frontiers of Pakistan were visible and permanent; however, the ideological frontiers were not physical but latent and open to construction and deconstruction. That is to say, the ideological frontiers of Pakistan as understood by Jinnah were most likely different from Zia's perception. This study contends that Zia transmuted these ideological frontiers into religious frontiers by lacing the former

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[243] See Documents June-November 1977, 6th September, Defence Day Address, pp.245.

[244] General Zia-ul-Haq's message to the nation, on the occasion of Defence of Pakistan Day. See Documents, September-November 1978, *Pakistan Horizon*, Fourth Quarter, 1978, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp.173.

[245] President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq's message to the nation on Defence of Pakistan Day. See Documents September— November 1979, *Pakistan Horizon*, Fourth Quarter, 1979, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp.206.

with a heavy dose of religion dipped with nationalist rhetoric. Zia set out to reconfigure the mix between Muslim and Pakistani identity by resorting to religious nationalism. This waxing of religious nationalism, this study suggests, occurs at religious frontiers that pose a threat and suggest that religious nationalism continues even after the nation gained independence.

This section will discuss how Zia interpreted the ideological frontiers of Pakistan and viewed them as religious frontiers. Moreover, it will also reflect how Zia perceived the threat from these frontiers and securitized it for the masses. Zia promoted the narrative that Pakistan's problems were more religious and less political and thus required religion as the silver bullet. The study will attempt to show this by analyzing Zia's key addresses,[246] his interviews and press conferences with foreign and local journalists after the imposition of martial law on 5th July 1977. The analysis of the primary sources will show how Zia understood the ideology of Pakistan as completely Islamic, his plan to safeguard and implement a specific vision for Pakistan and to protect it from the threat of disintegration. This will contribute to the literature on Zia's period in the examination of how Zia aided in the broader process of the waxing of religious nationalism in Pakistan.

4.5.1 Pakistan's Ideology as the Contested Religious Frontier

The woes of Pakistan when Zia came to power on 5th July 1977 could not be labeled as exclusively religious; they were political and socioeconomic as well. Yet, Zia was able to spin this narrative and characterized the political troubles in religious terms. This mobilization around religion provided Zia with a stable foundation in times of political misdirection. Subsequently, the Pakistani identity was reframed with reference to Islamic teachings, laws and institutions which were further crystallized and made significant through Zia's Islamisation agenda for Pakistan. Zia, while framing the ideological frontiers of Pakistan as religious frontiers, also outlined the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, to use Aronczyk's title, Zia, in associating Pakistaniyat with Islam, "branded the nation" (Aronczyk M. 2013) and its ideology as Islamic. Not that Pakistan was not Islamic earlier but this time it was different as Zia wanted more than just the promulgation of Islamic laws; he wanted to reform the state through the implementation of Islamic laws. Hence, the

[246] Address to the nation after the coup in 1977, Speech at the extraordinary session of the Organization of Islamic Counties (OIC) Foreign Ministers meeting, address to the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly 1980, address to the nation on Defence Day on 6th September, Independence Day on 14th August, addresses to the nation when elections were postponed twice and address in 1984 to announced referendum for his presidency.

religious nationalism fostered was able to instill hope among the masses and he was partially able to achieve his objective by redefining the ideology of Pakistan as a religious frontier.

Zia's Islamic renaissance cast its net far and wide as he wanted to alter the political, societal, economic and cultural aspects of Pakistan. This was plausible only if the majority was onboard with what Pakistan stood for. This begs the following question: what was the ideology of Pakistan as understood by Zia? Zia from the start blamed the political turmoil in the country to shunning of Islam; a glimpse of his understanding came to the fore in his first address to the nation on the day of the coup, 5th July 1977.

In the concluding remarks of his maiden address, Zia stated:

> To conclude, I must say that the spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement, was commendable. It proves that Pakistan which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.[247]

From the start of the coup, Zia linked the survival of Pakistan to Islam, and with it, the Islamic system for the country. This adjoining of Pakistan and Islam into a monolithic body, this messianisation of the ideology of Pakistan and the amalgamation of nationalist rhetoric with religion formed a religious frontier protected by Zia's government. This simplified the narrative for the masses; Pakistan meant Islam which, in turn, was made possible by Zia and any opposition to either of the three can be viewed from a theoretical framework of a religious frontier.

Zia in his press conference on 14th July 1977 while reiterating that Pakistan was made in the name of Islam complained that "none of the political parties had Islam as number one item in their manifestos when the elections were announced".[248] This refitting of Pakistan's political troubles with lack of religiosity continued further as it helped in editing the ideology of Pakistan. For instance, in emphasizing the importance of frugality, Zia argued that Pakistanis have given excessive importance to material things[249], such as Western clothes while

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[247] See Documents June-November 1977, pp.213.

[248] Press Conference of the Pakistan COAS and CMLA, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, 14th July 1977. See Documents June-November 1977, pp.219.

[249] Address to the nation of the CMLA of Pakistan, General M, Zia-ul-Haq 27th July 1977. (English rendering of the address in Urdu), See Documents June-November 1977, pp.235.

Pakistan's own national dress is nothing less than graceful. Doing introspection on the 30th anniversary of Pakistan, Zia reemphasized the ideology of Pakistan: "The key to the welfare of the common man lies in an Islamic system which was promised to him 37 years ago at the Minto Park, Lahore"[250] and after that Zia stated, "we have sacrificed national interest for personal aggrandizement. This has made some people wealthy but the country has become poorer and poorer"[251] and continued "Had the Islamic system been introduced at the appropriate time all the basic necessities of every citizen would have been met easily" and that Pakistan came to into being for a particular objective which could be only achieved depending on "when we begin to give a practical shape to our real love and dedication for Islam".[252] This pattern of repeating the ideology of Pakistan and combining it with Islam continued throughout the tenure of Zia. He was able to create this religious frontier by securitizing the narrative that Pakistan's problems since independence in 1947 owed to the lack of an Islamic system. Zia emphasized this rhetoric publically. When questioned about the resurgence of Islam in Pakistan at that particular point in history, he responded that the background of the resurgence is the idea that "whole basis of Pakistan is Islam"[253] as it is a Muslim nation based on a belief being Islam which the previous governments were unable to attain. Zia argued that the agitation against Bhutto's government was not because of electoral rigging "but it was a love of Islam which brought the people of this country into the streets from March 1977 onwards". Zia once declared

> When I took over, one of the first and the foremost things that I promised, apart from holding the elections, was that the Government that has taken over on the 5th of July 1977 is committed of introducing Islam in this country.[254]

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[250] The CMLA and COAS of Pakistan, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq's address to the nation on Independence Day, 14th August 1977. See Documents 1977, pp.238.

[251] ibid, pp.238.

[252] ibid, pp.239.

[253] Interview of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq to a CBS Television team, given in Rawalpindi, 14th February, 1979. See Documents, December 1978— May 1979, *Pakistan Horizon*, First and Second Quarters, 1979, Vol. 32, No. 1/2, Focus on Asia, pp.292.

[254] ibid, pp.293.

Zia was persistent in this narrative that the masses wanted more religion and less politics and he hammered out the same rhetoric to the foreign media. In one of his interviews, Zia was asked if people of Pakistan were more interested in two meals rather than five prayers a day and he emphasized that people were equally interested in five prayers and two meals.[255] The underlying reason, Zia said, was that Pakistan was based on the ideology of Islam which is different from Indians in all aspects and because previous rulers were unable to achieve this objective, this government was intent to rectify this problem.[256] In brief, Zia interpreted the ideology of Pakistan by terming it as completely based on his understanding of Islam. Subsequently, Zia portrayed Pakistan's woes owing to the absence of an Islamic system. This interaction between religion and nationalist rhetoric securitized by Zia formed the religious frontier where Pakistan was Islam and Islam was Pakistan and the conduit between the two was Zia.

4.5.2 Zia's Version of Islam and Religious Frontiers

By simply stating that Pakistan was tantamount to Islam was not enough and requires further elaboration as to how Zia understood Islam and the role it was to play in the remodeling of the state and society. An insight into Zia's understanding of Islam is provided from his interviews and speeches. In his address as CMLA on the first Independence Day after the coup, he explained Islam as:

> For an Islamic system does not only mean the amputation of the hand of a thief, but it also presupposes the creation of a social system in which all sectors of life, including administration, judiciary, banking, trade, education, agriculture, industry and foreign affairs are regulated in accordance with the Islamic principles. This task can be fulfilled only by a duly constituted government.[257]

For Zia, Islam encompassed a whole gamut of variables of the society. He considered that he was allowed to tweak the whole system according to his understanding, which translated into a top-down enforcement of his version of Islam. As stated earlier, religious nationalism is not just the amalgamation of religion and nationalism but the interaction between the two at

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[255] Interview of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq to the American columnist, Mr Smith Hempstone (Reported version), 22nd February 1979. See Documents, December 1978— May 1979, *Pakistan Horizon*, First and Second Quarters, 1979, Vol. 32, No. 1/2, Focus on Asia, pp.302.

[256] ibid, pp.303.

[257] Address to the nation on 14th August 1977. See Documents 1977, pp.239.

various points. This means that religious nationalists combine elements of religion and nationalism which serve their purpose in creating a religious nationalist narrative. For Zia, this was the understanding that Islam permeates both state and society and since the armed forces were responsible for the geographical and ideological frontiers of Pakistan, it was common sense that Zia had to cleanse the system.

The Islamic principles which Zia spoke of in 1977 were further explained in an interview an in 1978 which focused on the type of Sharia, its implementation, the timings of elections, Bhutto's trial and Pakistan's economy. On the question of the Sharia and its implementation, Zia argued that it has three aspects "the social, the economic, and the penal" where penal was the easiest to introduce and implement while the remaining were a "slow and gradual process".[258] Zia further stated that all the political parties of Pakistan were in favour of the Islamic laws including the previous government of PM Bhutto. Here again, Zia tried to wrap the political problems of the country in a religious garb, maintaining that lack of religion was the real cause of political and economic instability in the country. Zia confirmed this in the same interview when he asserted that PM Bhutto never meant to introduce Islamic laws in Pakistan.[259] A second line of question was how he will address the sectarian dimension of Islamic laws given that there are various schools of thought in Islam. Zia responded:

> We are not getting into that debate. We are going to the basic laws: Quran and the Sunnah. We are not going into various schools of thought. We are not getting into the controversy of Shia, Sunni, Wahabi, Maliki, Humbali, etc. We are not getting into controversies on the issues where various sects are involved. We are going to stick purely to basic laws on which there is no controversy between the various sects.[260]

When Zia was questioned whether the Shia community would be permitted to interpret the marriage laws their way, he replied, "Every person is free and at liberty to follow his own".[261] In an interview with BBC in April 1978, Zia explained how he saw himself as a

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[258] Interview of General Zia-ul-Haq, given to Ralph Joseph, published by the Iranian magazine Keyhan International, 9th April 1978. See Documents, March — August 1978, *Pakistan Horizon*, Second and Third Quarter, 1978, Vol. 31, No. 2/3, pp.236.

[259] ibid, pp.237.

[260] ibid, pp.237.

[261] ibid, pp.237.

person trying to be a practicing Muslim and an idealist in Islamic beliefs. He further stated that he was on a mission to cleanse and implement Islam.[262] Zia enforced the Hudood ordinance where strict punishments were enforced for theft, alcohol consumption, rape, and adultery. Thus when he was questioned how an idealist understanding of Islam was to be implemented, Zia responded by arguing that these punishments were a source of deterrence but that Islam means more than the punishments.

> No, that is only one side of it. Islam is a universal religion. I am using the word "religion" because in the Western thinking, it basically has that meaning. But Islam is not only a religion. It is more than that. It is a way of life. And when I say "universal", I mean that God brought Islam at the end of all the evolution that had taken place in theology. Islam was the climax and it has come to stay forever and to suit all times to come. From that point of view the introduction or the revitalization of Islamic ideal in Pakistan is not a dream. It is something which is possible and which can be brought about. And it has to come in all the three spheres of society, that is, the social, economic and punitive.[263]

Zia's understanding of Islam was on full display at his 2nd December 1978 address when the implementation of the *Nizam-i-Islam* (Islamic System) was announced. Zia explained that Islam comprises three components: beliefs, prayers, and laws. He argued that his government at that point in time was not in a position to implement the first two parts of Islam but only persuade the people, however, the government was able to implement the laws. The Nizam-i-Islam that Zia announced included banning of interest payment on government loans, setting up of a "Shariat Bench" in every province at the High Court level and a "Shariat Appeal Bench" at the Supreme Court level.[264] With these benches citizens could take up any law with the government challenging its compatibility with Sharia. This was an adroit move on the part of the government as any constitutional hurdle to Zia's government could now be challenged in the Shariat bench and abandoned on being religiously incompatible. This was significant because by 1978, Zia had already postponed the elections once and wanted accountability before transfer of power. This brings us to

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[262] Interview given by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, to the BBC television correspondent, Brian Barron, in Rawalpindi, 14th April 1978. See Documents, March — August 1978, pp.241.

[263] ibid, pp.243.

[264] Address by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, to the nation over the Radio and TV network, 2nd December, 1978. See Documents, December 1978— May 1979, pp.279.

another aspect of Zia's understanding of Islam concerning the makeup of the state, the elections, and meaning of democracy in Pakistan.

4.5.3 Zia's Conception of an Islamic State and the Religious Frontier

Zia's understanding of Islam was not limited to the social fabric of the society; in fact, he had a strong opinion about the governance of Pakistan along Islamic lines. It was an open secret that Zia detested Western values and the Western form of parliamentary government. His whole argument rested on his self proclaimed idea that Pakistan's ideology was Islam and nothing else. and that it was superior to its western counterpart. Commenting on Zia's conception of an Islamic polity, Hasan Askari argues,"Zia's future shape of Pakistani polity were influenced by his fundamentalist-Islamic disposition" (Rizvi, 2013, p. 259), and he continues that "Zia favoured a presidential system, a weak legislature and an engineered electoral process" (ibid, p.259). A similar sentiment was echoed by General Chishti, a close confidant of Zia, in his book that "Zia wanted the Islamic *khalifate* (Caliphate) revived and that he wanted to be the head of an Islamic state" (Chishti, 1990, p.183). The dilemma for Zia was how to give his own inclinations an Islamic fervor. He did so by asserting that the meaning of democracy as practiced in Pakistan, the form of elections and the parliamentary form of governance were not in accordance with Islam. A modified system was required that would make Pakistan an Islamic democracy.

In his world view, the system of multiple political parties was flawed. He was against elections being held on a multi party basis and for this reason he banned political parties in Pakistan in 1979. This he did before postponing elections indefinitely that were supposed to be held in November that same year. Zia believed that Islam does not stress on the need for elections on party basis but focuses on implementation of Islamic principles. Elections, Zia believed, should be held on a non-party basis and only when the environment is conducive.This had long term implications for the domestic political landscape of Pakistan. Before Zia's government, Pakistan practiced elections on a multi party basis. When Zia tried to do away with this safety valve of democracy, he directly suppressed the political voices and divided the opposition and indirectly gathered power to prolong his rule. Since the underlying motive was better implementation of Islam, it was difficult for the already divided opposition to appeal to the masses. A reporter once asked what he meant by environment which as conducive, Zia replied:

> There is a tremendous polarization - polarization between the Right and the Left, the poor and the rich, among the students and the labour, and between the have and the have-nots. This was all an intentional doing of the former government so that you have various elements whom you could manipulate. We are a developing country and it is more important for us that we have no

> polarization. The objective must be one, the ideology of Pakistan should be in the forefront and the people should have clear politics devoid of agitation. This is what I call the environment.[265]

For Zia, the environment meant two things: the ideology of Pakistan and clear politics without agitation which if not achieved translated into delay in elections. In October 1979, Zia, in an interview with the foreign press, highlighted a conducive election environment, suggesting elections will be held when the "time is ripe" which he further linked to four self allotted mandates which were, "related to the improvement in the law and order situation, improvement in the national economy, ready availability of justice to the people and elimination of corruption - all within the scope of the Islamization process".[266]

Another aspect of Zia's conception of an Islamic polity was the system of governance. Zia did not view the parliamentary form of government favourably. He considered the politicians as wanting believers and weak in their faith. Returning the country to such men through elections contested by political parties would be repeating history and shooting oneself in the foot. Zia distanced himself from any particular form of government, however, he argued:

> You can rest assured that Islam does not say that we should have a theocratic state, we have a democratic state or we have a monarchy… Islam does not lay down the form of government, Islam lays down the principles. It is my earnest desire to follow those principles within the framework of the 1973 Constitution.[267]

In addition, in what Hassan Askari refers to as "civilianization of military rule" (Rizvi, 2013, p. 259). Zia sought advice from three governmental committees to bring his political Islamist ideology to fruition through amending the 1973 constitution. The first committee was the council of Islamic ideology and it submitted its first report in 1982 that suggested a federal system, universal adult suffrage, and separate electorates while doing away with party-less elections. It was rejected by Zia as it deviated from the official stance of party-less elections (ibid, p.259). The Special Committee of the Federal Council also endorsed the right to form political parties and was thus rejected. Finally, Zia himself appointed a commission headed

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[265] See Documents, March — August 1978, pp.237.

[266] Interview of General M. Zia-ul-Haq to foreign correspondents in Rawalpindi, (Reported Version), 27th October, 1979. See Documents, September— November 1979, *Pakistan Horizon*, Fourth Quarter, 1979, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp.213.

[267] ibid, pp.213.

by Maulana Zafar Ahmed Ansari for an appropriate form of government.[268] The report endorsed the presidential viewpoint and was applauded by Zia but never implemented. This civilianization of military rule continued further as Zia expressed his vision for Pakistan. In his address to the nation on 1st December 1984, Zia differentiated between Western democracy and Islamic democracy. Western democracy states that people are the source of legitimacy and power should be transferred to those who win the elections who in turn will legislate based on rationality.

He argued that "we are standing at the crossroads of Western democracy and Islamic democracy and we must choose one".[269] For Zia, an Islamic democracy does not oppose elections but emphasizes that the source of legitimacy lies with Allah and not the people, and his abiding people are his vicegerents who not only legislate through rationality but through Quran and Sunnah.[270] This understanding of Zia about the Islamic polity was significant because Zia was going out of his way in associating the ideology of Pakistan with Islam. He, himself an idealist, believed in enforcing Islamic principles through a top down approach through his policies of Islamisation. This interaction between various aspects of Islam and the nationalist rhetoric surrounding the ideology of Pakistan, both guided by Zia's vision, created the religious frontier. Moreover, he made an important claim in his 1st December address of 1984. By 1984 he had established that Pakistan was made in the name of Islam and it was Jinnah's leadership that made it possible. However, in this address Zia explicitly mentioned, "It is my faith that the father of the nation, Jinnah's thinking was not secular but Islamic and he created this movement so that South Asian Muslims can spend their lives according to their religion in a separate country".[271] It can be argued that in creating the religious frontier by redrafting the ideology of Pakistan, Zia claimed that even Jinnah was Islamist in his approach. Hence, he not only associated the ideology of Pakistan to Islam but even conceived of the father of the nation as an Islamist at heart. This was the religious

[268] The Report also called the Ansari Report, was submitted in August 1983. *See Ansari Commission Report on Form of Government*, Islamabad. Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1983.

[269] See Shaheed General Zia-ul-Haq, (2016, August 27), *Shaheed Gen Zia Ul Haq, Address to the Nation (Part 2)* [Video], YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkCADmUz5wY,13:00.

[270] Ibid, 14:00.

[271] See Shaheed General Zia-ul-Haq, (2016, August 27), *Shaheed Gen Zia Ul Haq, Address to the Nation (Part 1)* [Video], YouTube.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xurg-fTi4FY&t=321s, 5:05.

frontier that he securitized for the masses and this was the frontier which Zia as the head of the armed forces vowed to protect from all threats-external and internal.

However, the existence of an external religious frontier cannot be ruled out during Zia's reign. It is true that from 1977 till the end of 1979, Zia aimed at solidifying his position in the domestic arena by focusing on Islam and campaign of accountability of the corrupt and continued untill his death. But it is also a fact that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created an external religious frontier for Pakistan which Zia amplified to the fullest. One of the reasons why Zia gained popularity in the domestic arena and among the Muslim countries was his support for the Afghan *mujahideen* (Freedom Fighters). Zia placed himself as leading Pakistan against a much bigger godless foe, the communist Soviets, all the while speaking up for a smaller state Afghanistan, the Muslim brethren. Given the Cold War rivalry between USA and Soviet Union, Iran's revolution of 1979, the Iran hostage crisis of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War and Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1991, incoming Ronald Reagan's presidency; USA found a ready partner in the form of a self proclaimed pious General Zia. Banking on this religious frontier and the threat of Soviets taking over small countries, Zia was able to wean off the masses from claiming self rule to a religious nationalist rhetoric till his death in 1988.

To sum it up, this section argued that Zia created the religious frontier by securitizing the narrative that the ideology of Pakistan was tantamount to Islam and the founding father was also Islamist in his thinking. The section further explained how Zia understood Islam and focused on different dimensions of Islam which he deemed significant. His understanding of Islam permeated various aspects of the religion that helped him cling to power. He favoured social, moral, cultural, and economic transformation of the state based on Islamic principles. This selective amalgamation of religion and nationalism to create religious frontier confirms the theoretical perspective discussed earlier.

4.6 The Perceived Threat and Response to the Threat

As previously stated, one of the claims of this study is that there can be more than one religious frontier, both external and domestic, securitized as a threat which further aids in creating and the waxing of religious nationalism. This also means that not all religious frontiers aid in the creation and the waxing of religious nationalism; only the frontiers and threats which can be securitized for the masses. In Zia's case, it was the religious frontier of Pakistan's threatened ideology and the threat perception of being annihilated which was securitized for the masses. Given the political instability in Pakistan before the 1977 Coup, it was only natural for the masses to believe that Pakistan's problems were not only political

but something more. Zia convinced the people that there were religious problems and that the binding of Islam and Pakistan by previous governments was incorrect, that the conception of the ideology of Pakistan was misinterpreted and that limiting Islam's role to the preamble was a mistake and that the religious frontiers were incorrectly interpreted with more focus on legislation and less emphasis on implementation. Zia believed that had Islam been allowed to enter the gates of this country, Pakistan would not be politically unstable. It is important to mention that Zia simultaneously reinterpreted the religious frontier and securitized the threat from that frontier.They were not distinct or mutually exclusive of each other. This process started in 1977 when Zia came to power and lasted till 1988 when Zia died. Hence, this section will analyze Zia's speeches and media interactions to ascertain how he securitized the threat and also crafted the response to that threat which led to the waxing of religious nationalism.

4.6.1 Threatened Ideology

What threat did Zia securitize emanating from the religious frontier? The threat from the religious frontier that Zia highlighted is best summarized by Ziring (1984): "Pakistan was most immediately threatened by internal forces, or at least this was the perception of the military leaders", emphasizing the domestic aspect of the threat in 1977. The threat to the ideology of Pakistan and Pakistan itself was magnified by the events from 1971 till 1977; the breakup of East Pakistan, Bhutto government debacle, Zia's coup, a faltering economy and political uncertainty. Moreover, Pakistan had already experimented with Ayub's capitalist approach, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Islamic socialism with mediocre results, and had refrained from joining the Communist bloc, and thus the people were looking for a way out of the political quagmire. According to Zia, the Pakistani nation was not in control of its own destiny and the only way to reign in their destiny was through Islam. For him, any attempt to democratize Pakistan on a parliamentary system, to nationalize the economy, to modernize it along Western ideas, holding of elections contested by political parties by candidates who were not god fearing, a slow and inept judiciary, an education system out of sync with Islamic values and society moving towards unchecked materialism, all were securitized as threats to the ideology of Pakistan. In his press conference in July 1977, he started by complaining about politics devoid of morals, that Islam was the cornerstone of the ideology of Pakistan and despite this none of the political parties considered Islam as a top priority in their manifestos when election date was announced January 7, 1977.[272] In his address on 14th

[272] See Documents, June — November 1977, pp.219.

August 1977, he said that if the current policies continue, "the parties in power and their workers may change their fortunes, but the destiny of the country will not be changed".[273] Moreover, he criticized the Western model of democracy as impossible in Pakistan as it led to violence. In his 1st October 1977 address, he insisted that violence precedes elections in Pakistan and a similar situation recurred which has threatened the safety of the citizens and the country.[274] Zia pushed this theme of the threatened ideology of Pakistan uptill the end of his rule and viewed any challenge as a threat. He dissolved the popular elected government of PM Junejo on 29th May 1988, along with the cabinet and the National Assembly leveling allegations of mismanagement of law and order, ineptness in performance, corruption at government level, faltering economy and infighting between Muslims (Khan, 2023, p 384). In response, he promulgated the Shariah Ordinance on 15th July 1988 for Sharia enforcement in Pakistan. This Ordinance as Hamid Khan illustrates focused on the implementation of Sharia in the judicial, economy and education system of Pakistan (ibid, p.386). Zia's response to political crises was to halt the current system which he deemed below par and unislamic and simultaneously inject religion to address the crises. Zia rallied the masses against the prevailing political forces, labeling it as a religious struggle against a corrupt system guided by him. Although these threats never materialized, Zia banged the war drums out loud that mobilization around a religious identity was possible.

Thus, the broad threat he outlined was clear, restoring the system that brought Pakistan on its knees will result in a similar situation. The response to such a threat was to weave an Islamic system so that power can be transferred and democracy restored. This safety and integrity of Pakistan was the initial reason Zia believed that the armed forces took over on 5th July 1977.

4.6.2 Elections as a Threat

This brings us to the sub-threat germinating from the primary threat to the ideology of Pakistan: elections based on party system. Zia argued that "elections by themselves do not constitute a goal but are only the means to achieve a goal. For him, "the goal is the setting up of a strong democratic government for which all of us must strive".[275] In his 27th July, 1977 address to the nation, he advised the political parties to emphasize national unity,

[273] ibid, pp.238.

[274] ibid, pp.254.

[275] ibid, pp.241.

establishment of Islamic order, and avoid feelings of regionalism in their manifestos.[276] Zia not only wanted Islamic manifestos but also the election of candidates who, in his view, ideally must be pious and God fearing with a transparent character. Zia believed that if democracy was practiced like in the past it would lead to similar results and jeopardize Pakistan's integrity. Therefore, as Pakistan under Zia inched closer to the first promised election date of October 1977, the rhetoric that people should vote for candidates who were true Pakistanis and a *momin*[277](believer) gained momentum.[278] The perceived threat from the elections was that the electoral exercise without holding anyone accountable for the political stalemate in the previous government would be catastrophic for Pakistan.

Responding to a reporter's question, Zia said:

> Once we found that out, and with the effects of polarization still existing, we had to postpone the elections. What would have happened on the 18th of October had we not postponed the elections on the 1st of October, would have been perhaps worse than the situation on the 5th of July.[279]

Zia held the conviction that elections presupposed a peaceful atmosphere which only he could certify as acceptable. He was further emboldened in his belief by the Supreme Court's decision of accepting Martial law under the law of necessity. Zia blamed the earlier government for subjecting the country to a reign of terror and he deduced from the public opinion that stability could only be achieved if law and order was restored and that was only possible if the miscreants were handled accordingly through accountability. Thus, Zia concluded:

> To hold the elections on 18 October will only be an invitation to a new crisis…This step has only been taken to save the country from a dangerous crisis and to place the full facts before the public through the process of accountability.[280]

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[276] ibid, pp.230.

[277] Momin is one who believes and practices Islam while Muslim is one who professes Islam as his religion.

[278] See Documents, June — November 1977, pp.232.

[279] See Documents, March — August 1978, pp.241.

[280] See Documents, June — November 1977, pp.257.

Zia's response to the threat of holding elections was to cleanse the political environment Thus, he questioned,

> What I am concerned about is that in today's conditions when violence, fears and lawlessness are rampant all around us, and when certain important personalities are being subjected to render account before the higher judicial organ, will it be in the national interest to hold elections now, or that as a result of this democratic system the country will be faced with a bigger crisis?[281]

Zia however, did suggest a way forward which, this study argues, was the response to the threat. First, he proclaimed that thorough accountability will be ensured; not only cases will be heard in open courts but the media will be allowed to cover the process. Second, he banned all political activities in the country for the lofty ideal of ridding Pakistan from "all physical and mental strains and to allow passions to cool down".[282] Finally, Zia wanted to utilize the time available since the postponement of elections for a number of objectives such as maintenance of law and order, elimination of anti-social elements, improving bureaucratic inefficiencies, taking steps to enforce an Islamic system, and improving the economy and education. Such was the mood of the Zia government's first three months after coming to power. The threat to Pakistan and its ideology was magnified and the process of election was sacrificed at the altar of national security and interest which could only be insured by Zia and the institution he commanded.

The government announced in March 1979 that the elections will be held on non-party bases on 17th November 1979. However, one month before the elections, Zia made an important address to the nation on 16th October 1979 and postponed the general elections indefinitely. In explaining his reasons and reluctance to this exercise in his address, the threat he underlined in 1979 was significantly different compared to his 1977 address when it came to the political circumstances. By 1979, Zia's military government had been in power for two years and postponing the elections on the same grounds as 1977 would translate into accepting the incompetence of the government that despite two years in power, the military government was not able to improve law and order and insure accountability. However, the remaining argument was the same in the address. That it was for the safety of the country that armed forces ceased power on 5th July. That the political environment was not conducive and elections will result in violence which will undermine Pakistan's integrity.

[281] ibid, pp.256.

[282] ibid, pp.257.

That the democracy must be imbued with the spirit of Islam and morally upright representatives should come to power if elections were to be held. In such an atmosphere, what was more important, Zia asked; the commitment to hold elections as early as possible or the safety of the country? Knowing the obvious answer, Zia responded to the threat, further committed the country to the enforcement of an Islamic system and reconfirmed his firm belief in democracy and reiterated his promise of holding elections at the earliest. Zia set the tone of his address by the following remarks:

> The main need of this country is an Islamic democratic and stable government for which elections for the sake of elections have no meaning. The elections must yield positive results and from positive results, I meant that the country should get a government which, while adhering to the ideology of Pakistan, should be able to guarantee stability at least for some time so that the country can be put on the road to progress.[283]

While postponing the elections indefinitely for the second time, Zia found three scapegoats. First he blamed the political parties and politicians for dragging their feet over holding elections. He had earlier introduced laws with respect to increased transparency of the political parties. Zia argued that the political parties were reluctant to implement the laws and delay elections. Second, it was the crime and corruption that was undermining the life of a common man. Zia's argument was, "no effective and satisfactory steps have been taken in our country to eradicate them".[284] His assessment was right but it was actually an indictment of the judicial system of Pakistan which he thought was below par. Thus, Zia clipped the power of the courts in the same address while empowering the Martial Law courts to be outside the jurisdiction of regular courts. Finally, Zia blamed the limping economy for Pakistan's woes.

In response to these problems which were propagated as threats, Zia highlighted measures that would bring the country on a stable path. Zia followed the similar pattern of curtailing the current system in practice followed by a dosage of religion to rectify the current system. Thus, first was postponing the elections indefinitely. Second was to ban all political activities, including political parties, processions followed by muzzling of the press. Third was the reconstitution of the federal cabinet. Following the stifling of the system at work,

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[283] The President of Pakistan, General M. Zia-ul-Haq's address to the nation, 16th October, 1979. See Documents, September— November 1979, *Pakistan Horizon*, Fourth Quarter, 1979, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp.207.

[284] ibid, pp.210.

Zia was preparing the ground for Islamic democracy which was supposed to put the country on the path of its destined goal, one that was envisaged by Jinnah and interpreted by Zia. Thus, for Zia it meant the reformulation of the ideology of Pakistan which entailed that the practical implementation of Islam takes centre stage. This also meant that other prominent ideologies of the day such as communism, socialism, liberalism and Western form of parliamentary democracy and elections were unacceptable and their propagation was viewed as a threat to Islam. The acceptable system of governance was to be in line with Islamic values with Zia dictating and interpreting those values. The message for Pakistanis was simple, it was not enough to be believers; they had to become practicing Muslims. This was only possible if the whole state was reorganized according to Islamic principles as understood by Zia. He announced, "Simultaneously, the Government will take steps to expedite the enforcement of Nizam e-lslam" and he continued,

> I want that our democracy should be imbued with the spirit of Islam and those people who are elected in such a democratic system should have genuine love for Islam, and the country and the spirit of service to the people.[285]

4.7 Conclusion

An interesting irony will suffice to conclude this chapter and fortify the argument of this study that religious nationalism waxed in Pakistan from 1947 till Zia's era. On the floor of the house during the Constituent Assembly debate about the OR on 12th March 1949, Dr Mahmud Husain, a Muslim lawmaker from East Bengal made the following remarks in favour of the OR:

> The idea that it might lead to the establishment of an autocracy or the establishment of an absolutist or dictatorial Government is quite baseless. I can assure the Members of this House that if ever a dictatorship was established in Pakistan-let us hope that it never will-the dictator will not quote this Resolution in support of his authority. He will have to have something more concrete and more positive without which he would not be able to function as a dictator.[286]

Ironically, three and half decades later, Zia, in his address to the nation on 1st December 1984, in veiled a reference to the OR, complained that Islam was limited to the preamble in Pakistan. Later on, on 2nd March 1985, he amended the constitution through the eighth

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[285] ibid, pp.212.

[286] The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, March 12, 1949, pp.86 Online: https://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434604343_885.pdf.

amendment which made the OR as an operative part of the constitution. The argument favouring the OR from 1949 evaporated; a dictatorship was established in Pakistan, a dictatorship that quoted the same OR in support of its authority.

This section demonstrated the waxing of religious nationalism during Zia's government by mapping the religious frontier, the threat from that frontier, and the response to that threat. It first explained how Zia mapped the religious frontier by claiming that the armed forces were responsible for the protection of a country's ideological borders. Second, he associated the ideological frontiers and ideology of Pakistan to Islam and third, he had his own understanding and interpretation of Islam which was to be the ideology of Pakistan. Moreover, his understanding of Islam not only permeated the society but included a vision for Pakistan as an Islamic state with Sharia as its primary law. Framing the frontier in religious terms, Zia simultaneously securitized the threat to the ideology of Pakistan. This threat in his view was the governing model based on Western democracy where the right to vote was enshrined as cardinal. Zia disagreed with the Western democratic model, propagating instead a democracy imbued with the spirit of Islam that is a democracy where elections would result in stability and accountability. Thus, Zia took it upon himself to cleanse the system. This cleansing of the system was the response to the threat which came in the form of his Islamisation campaign having a four-pronged approach: social, economic, political, and cultural reformation of Pakistan. In doing so, Zia promulgated constitutional amendments, muzzled the press, curbed the rights of minorities, emasculated the judiciary, suppressed the opposition, implemented Islamic punishments, tried to Islamise the economy, and amassed great political power in his own hands. Accordingly this would bring stability to Pakistan but that did not happen. Zia's era is open to interpretation but one thing becomes clear. When the foundation of the state is based on an ideology, then that particular ideology is open to interpretation by political leaders. For Zia, this ideology was Islam and the problem he identified was not the lack of legislation around Islam but the absence of implementation of Islamic principles in Pakistan and lack of practicing people .

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

"If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants"

Sir Isaac Newton

5.1 Findings and Discussion:

This thesis attempts to explain the waxing of religious nationalism through the case study of Pakistan. It serves the broader argument of exploring the relationship between religion and nationalism by analyzing a nation before and after independence. In explaining the waxing of religious nationalism, the thesis builds on the work of Barker (2009) which suggests that "religious nationalism is primarily shaped by two key factors: religious frontiers and threats" (ibid, p.182). While Barker only focuses on geographical, single, external religious frontier and under-theorizes the threat formation mechanism, this study focuses on domestic religious frontiers, the possibility of multiple frontiers, and furthermore, explains the threat perception mechanism. Moreover, it also explains the prevalence of religious nationalism after nation-state formation. In this regard, the study hypothesizes that domestic religious frontiers are constructed and pose a religious threat when that threat is securitized through the speech act of the political elites. Resultantly, this leads to the formation and crystallization of national identity fused with religion resulting in the waxing of religious nationalism. This is not to say here that religion acts as the only marker of identity but it does take centre stage in identity formation. The case of Pakistan is significant because the struggle for independence for Pakistan was laced with religious connotations asMuslim political leaders, before and after partition, defined the Muslim identity based on Islamic ideals. This coupling of religion and nationalism was visible when religious frontiers were constructed between Muslims and Hindus. This is not to claim that it was only Muslim political leaders who created the communal boundaries. The British raj policies and unwillingness of the INC to accommodate the demands of Muslims significantly encouraged the communal angle. In the interaction among these political forces, Muslims erected religious frontiers and viewed others as a threat. Moreover, the case of Pakistan enriches the religious nationalism literature along other European cases.

Chapter one examined and traced the political conditions of Muslims in undivided India from 1857 till 1947. Chapter two focused on parliamentary debate of the Objectives Resolution 1949, the proceedings of the special committee formed to determine the status of Ahmadis in 1974 while chapter three discussed General Zia-ul-Haqs era (1977-1989) and his experiment with intense Islamization. Both primary and secondary sources were utilized for the purpose of this research. Primary documents such as original writings, speeches and addresses of the political leaders as well as parliamentary debates were used for this study. The findings of this study are novel because instead of exclusively looking at external religious frontiers and assuming threats *a priori* in explaining the formation of religious nationalism, this study takes into account the domestic religious frontiers and attempts to explain the mechanism of threat formation. Moreover, it also takes into account the presence of multiple religious frontiers and threats, and the combination and securitization of external and domestic religious frontiers to formulate a domestic threat. Taking a top down approach, it improves upon Barker's theory of religious frontiers and threats to explain how the Muslim identity was defined and redefined by political elites by securitizing threats in the domestic arena. This concluding chapter first summarizes the findings of the study as well as the basic premise of the study followed by suggesting future research venues.

The findings expand Barker's (2009) understanding of religious frontiers as geographical. Unlike Ireland, Poland and Greece, where the religious frontiers were external to the country and initially shaped their identity, were geographical in nature, this study shows that the frontiers influencing the Muslim identity were not just geographical and external but also ideological. Moreover, it was the political leaders who constructed and interpreted these frontiers. Thus, the Muslim leaders, in order to gain political and economic clout for the Muslims defined the frontiers as ideological, geographical or both. The study shows the construction of these domestic frontiers by analyzing the period after the war of independence of 1857 as the English held Muslims responsible for what they called the mutiny. The Muslim identity coalesced around an ideological religious frontier because unlike the Irish and Polish, Muslims of undivided India were not militarily threatened by the Hindus or the English. In the aftermath of the events of 1857, Muslims lost their political and economic clout. The leading families and elites of the Muslim community were dispossessed of their estate and titles. Moreover, Muslims were also marginalized when it came to government employment. Thus, the threat which the Muslims faced was in the political and economic realm and was viewed through a religious lens by the political leaders.

The Muslims of undivided India, influenced by the clergy of the time, viewed both English and the Hindu culture with contempt, out on a quest to wipe out Islam from India. These

Muslims began to identify themselves as a religious minority in opposition to the new threat. While the Muslim clergy blamed the deplorable state of affairs to the people leaving the rope of Allah, there were other Muslim leaders who thought otherwise. A modernist analysis of the Muslim's predicament was forwarded by Syed Ahmed Khan. He felt the pulse of the situation that Muslims lagged behind because of ignoring modern education brought about by the English. This disadvantage was multiplied for the Muslims by that fact that Hindus were gaining modern education. Things further came to a precipice when the notion of introducing representative institutions as practiced in England was to be introduced in India. Syed Ahmed argued that in such a scenario, Muslims were at a disadvantage on three fronts; first, considered hostile by the ruling government, second, lagging behind in modern education while their Hindu counterparts progressed, and third, representative institutions based on numerical strength. As a corollary, a latent communal divide and a religious frontier was created, which, at the time, no one was willing to accept. The genius of Syed Ahmed was that he grasped the latent communal divide between the Muslims, the Hindus and the British and securitized it as an ideological domestic religious frontier. This new frontier, initially devoid of any geographical elements, later evolved into a combination of ideological and geographical religious frontier. This was visible under the leadership of Jinnah and the lobbying efforts of Maulana Maududi. The response to this threat as suggested by Syed Ahmed was Islamic renaissance. In other words, Syed Ahmed interpreted the religious frontier as ideological, and therefore his response was also ideological. Given Syed Ahmed's fealty towards the British, he advised Muslims to refrain from politics but excel in serving the government. This could only be achieved if Muslims first reorganized themselves and regained their lost status. Syed Ahmed tapped into the domestic religious frontier between the Hindus and Muslims, not to create a communal divide but to uplift the Muslims from their quandary. Syed Ahmed's vision was partially successful. While the educational institutions set up by Syed Ahmed were able to usher in the Islamic renaissance he long wished, at the same time, the graduates of these institutions joined politics to safeguard the rights of Muslims. Nevertheless, by the time Syed Ahmed died, the religious frontier between the Muslim and the Hindus was a reality.

As the mantle of Muslim leadership passed down to Jinnah, he initially tried to undo the communal divide between the Muslims and the Hindus. He held membership of both the INC and AIML to foster Hindu-Muslim unity. Unlike Syed Ahmed, who saw that the British were there to stay, Jinnah along with the INC wanted the British to depart. In doing so, Jinnah demanded constitutional safeguards for Muslims after Britain's departure.

As chapter two shows, after a while, it became evident that constitutional safeguards were insufficient for Muslims in a united India. Jinnah saw Muslims being marginalized politically. He simultaneously created the Muslim nation and the religious frontier between the Muslims and those who opposed their political emancipation. In doing so, Jinnah viewed the religious frontiers in both ideological and geographical terms. He argued that Muslims were no longer a minority but a nation by every definition of a nation. Thus, for him the Muslims were no longer a minority seeking safety through law but a separate nation distinct from the Hindus. For Jinnah, the threat to Muslim identity was political in nature but he fused it with religion. He securitized the religious frontiers as both ideological and geographical in nature and called for partition of India along geographical lines. His speeches after the Lahore resolution of 1940 not only strongly emphasized the distinct Muslim identity, different from Hindus focusing on the ideological side of the religious frontier but also how owing to this ideological divide, a separate territory was imperative for the survival of Muslims. However, immediately after partition, Jinnah tried to desecuritize the communal threat that Muslims faced from Hindus. He tried to undo the communal divide by arguing that a person's religion has got nothing to do with the state but he did not live long enough to see it through. This left the religious frontiers of the new Muslim state open to interpretation by the future political leaders.

Maududi, a right-wing leader and a contemporary of Jinnah, took a different approach. He dismissed Jinnah's understanding of the religious frontiers as purely geographical and argued for a return to an ideological portrayal of the frontiers along with the threat. He securitized the narrative of a regional clash of civilization between Islam and the rest. He narrowed down the epicenter of this clash to India, arguing that Islam was in danger and the only panacea was the implementation of sharia. Maududi argued that modern education, forms of governance, material progress, new forms of nationalism, all were a threat to the already established Islamic foundations and its jurisprudence. Instead of adopting new things through trial and error, Muslims should stick to their own religion. For Maududi, the religious frontier was between Islam and other ideologies, and the ultimate objective for him was to attract Muslims back to the fold of Islam who, in those days, were impressed by the glitter of new ideas propounded by AIML under Jinnah and INC under Nehru.

Maududi's understanding influenced the Muslim identity in a way that one had to be a practicing Muslim, one who not only rejected the modern values of the time and Westminster type democracy introduced by Britain but also believed that returning to the original scripture was the only option. This chapter showed how three political leaders with different views constructed the religious frontiers ideologically and geographically and

securitized the threats from them leading to the waxing of religious nationalism in the process. Each leader perceived the religious frontiers and the threats differently and responded in a different manner.

This ideologically and geographically driven domestic understanding of religious frontiers continued after Pakistan‘s independence in 1947 which resulted in legislation. In chapter three, the study shows how just after two years of partition in 1949, PM Liaquat Ali Khan’s government took a religious turn in defining Pakistan as the fort of Islam by passing the OR of 1949. This chapter revisits the dominant romanticized understanding of the OR. Instead of analyzing the text of the resolution, the study focused on the parliamentary debate that discussed the draft of the OR. The debate reflects how the domestic religious frontiers were constructed and validated to justify the passage of this resolution. The findings of the chapter highlight that the frontiers of a state based on ideology will be open to interpretation and reinterpretation. Thus, the religious frontiers constructed after 1947 were prone to reinterpretation on the premise that they were not sufficiently defined. This was obvious during the debate of the OR when Muslim lawmakers strongly implied that Pakistan was an ideological state where modern values such as equality, freedom, democracy, human rights, and rights of minority were to be guided by Islam. The opposition to this resolution came solely from the non-Muslim lawmakers belonging to PNC. This religiously inclined definition of Pakistan was not acceptable to the non-Muslim lawmakers who argued that limiting Pakistan to Islam will divide the country between plebeians and patricians. However, given the close proximity of Muslim identity with Islam before partition, Jinnah’s death immediately after partition and problems faced by the PM Liaquat Ali Khan’s government, it was imperative to rally the people around the flag and religion was used by the state to create cohesiveness. But this proximity of Pakistani identity with religion was picked up by future political leaders to define in detail what it meant to be a Pakistani. They claimed that the Islamic principles on which Pakistan was originally created were inadequately implemented. Subsequently, this led to creation of new religious frontiers and threats with the aim of creating cohesion in the nation.

The second part of chapter three analyses how the above stated argument was utilized to deal with a sect who was unacceptable to mainstream Muslims. The findings of the first part of chapter three dovetail into its second part by explaining how the inadequate conception of domestic religious frontiers was later used in 1974 to portray the Ahmadis as a threat to the religiously laced national Muslim identity. The second part shows how in order to further define and interpret the Muslim identity of Pakistani; a pre-partition religious frontier was

fortified and securitized to label the Ahmadis as a threat. The ensuing religious nationalism defined and redefined what it meant to be a Pakistani. In order to understand how Ahmadis, who were once considered Muslims before partition were declared as non-Muslims after partition, the study took a two pronged approach. First, the study analyzed the historical context before and after partition, tracing the origins of the Ahmadi sect and how other mainstream Muslim sects viewed the former. Second, the study analyzed the three-thousand-pages of in-camera proceedings of the special committee held in 1974 to consider the question of whether people who did not believe in the finality of the prophethood were studied for the Ahmadi case. The in-camera proceedings were only released for the public a decade ago. The Ahmadi case offered a number of interesting findings further adding to our understanding of religious nationalism. First, the analysis supported the argument that the OR inadequately defined the religious frontiers leaving them vulnerable to reinterpretation. The OR in 1949 specifically stated that no sect or non-Muslim people would be negatively influenced by the resolution; however, in 1974, the same text was refuted in the case of Ahmadis. My second finding is that there can be more than one religious frontier, simultaneously threatening the nation both externally and internally. Barker's (2009) framework explaining the cases of Ireland, Poland and Greece relied on a single external religious frontier model to explain religious nationalism. This study, with the help of the Ahmadi case, enriched this framework by arguing that there can be more than one religious frontier. Third, it showed that external and domestic religious frontiers are not always mutually exclusive; and that they can be combined by the political elites to securitize any frontier of their choice.In the case of Ahmadis, the external religious frontier between Pakistan and its external enemies was lumped up with the domestic religious frontier of Ahmadis as non-Muslims unacceptable to mainstream Muslim sects. This was interesting as during the whole time of the special committee, Muslim lawmakers utilized both the external and domestic religious frontiers of Pakistan to securitize the Ahmadis as a threat. The Ahmadis were repeatedly referred to as the brainchild of the British planted to destroy Pakistan, as agents funded and supported by Israel to undermine Pakistan, as spies similar to Sikhs in India. This was coupled with the domestic religious threat the Ahmadis posed to the ideology of Pakistan and Islam. Fourth, the study showed that the purpose of combining multiple religious frontiers was to make a strong threat perception which would warrant a strong response. The lawmakers were unanimous in their perception of Ahmadis as foreign-funded agents and demanded that not only they be declared non-Muslims but also that the Ahmadi proselytization be curbed and print propaganda curtailed. The Ahmadi case was the opposite implementation of the principles laid down in the OR in 1949 explaining the waxing of religious nationalism which was used by successive political leaders.

Finally, in chapter four, this study demonstrated that despite the OR in 1949, and the passing of the 1974 constitution endorsing Islam and declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims, successive political leadership still wanted further Islamisation of Pakistan. This study explained the need for increased religion by its broader argument that in an ideological state, the religious frontiers are considered inadequately defined and are open to reinterpretation by political opportunists. This study argues that this task of redefining and reimagining the incomplete religious frontiers could be taken up by any leader under the pretext of improvement based upon religion. This results in the identity further being crystallized around religion leading to the waxing of religious nationalism. This is what occurred during General Zia's era in the 1980's when he redefined and reimagined the domestic frontiers. He reanimated the relevance of the domestic religious frontiers which were thought of as settled by arguing that Pakistan must shift from mere religious legislation to religious implementation. Borrowing from the ideological foundations of the state, Zia deduced that Pakistan must step ahead and implement its Islamic ideology. His definition of the frontiers was different from others in a way that he aptly defined his rule as implementation of religion and sharia. The threat which was securitized was that to question his rule meant questioning the implementation of Islam. His logic was simple and comprehensible for the common man and so was his portrayal of the domestic religious frontiers. He argued that since 1947 governments have only legislated about Islam and paid lip service when it came to its implementation. He reiterated time and again that the solution to Pakistan's problems was the implementation of Islamic principles and values. This study argues that Zia was successful in his attempt as he argued that the religious frontiers until his time were insufficiently defined and the nation required further reforms. His eleven years in power was an attempt to redefine what it meant to be a Pakistani. He introduced various reforms aimed at reforming social, economic, cultural, political, and educational aspects of Pakistan. Zia was convinced that he was on a holy mission. In implementing his mission, he reiterated that the duty of the armed forces was not limited to the protection of the geographic frontiers of a country alone. In fact, they had the duty to protect Pakistan's ideological frontiers as well. Having bestowed upon himself the duty of guardianship of ideological frontiers, he was in a position to define the religious frontiers as he saw fit and create and securitize threats accordingly. In this process of defining and linking Muslim identity to the implementation of Islam, any opposition to his rule was opposition to Islam itself and an Islamic system of governance. The masses welcomed Zia's era as a sign of restoration of heavenly blessings. However, one of the reasons for the resumption of blessings was the external arena where Pakistan was in the good graces of the USA.

Zia's Islamist agenda on the external religious frontiers dovetailed with the USA Cold War objectives to keep communism at bay. Zia achieved this by covertly participating in the Afghanistan Jihad against communist USSR. Hence, Zia's eleven year rule saw further bonding of the Pakistani identity with religion where he upped the ante by focusing on the practice aspect of religion. The broader question of who is a Pakistani was still a work in progress.

To sum it up, the findings of this study enrich and deepen our understanding of religious nationalism and offer us a venue to make sense of contemporary developments. The findings explain in detail through the Pakistani case how religious nationalism arises and endures after state formation. It explores a niche for the interaction between religion and nationalism. It builds a strong case that domestic religious frontiers and threats are as significant as external religious frontiers and play an important role in the waxing of religious nationalism. It demonstrates how multiple religious frontiers and threats are combined into a single synchronized point. Moreover, it shows how religious frontiers are evolving in nature,that they are not limited to a geographical understanding alone but can also be ideological in their conception. Finally, this study adds to the plethora of European cases explaining religious nationalism by studying a Muslim-majority-country from South Asia.

This theory can help in explaining the long and perplexing relationship between Islam and the Pakistani identity in present times. There certainly exist domestic religious frontiers in the society which are often tapped into by right-wing politicians. However, as the case study has shown, religious frontiers often become significant when backed by the elites. PM Imran Khan's government did go down this path but left it halfway and the new Medina envisioned by the then government did not realize. However, given the acceptance of the idea as one of the panacea to Pakistan's problems, it looked as if the domestic religious frontiers are still not settled and open to reinterpretation. Thus, many questions remain unanswered and it will be worthwhile to explore those avenues.

5.2 Future Research Venues:

This study has shed light on the waxing of religious nationalism. A relevant follow up research area would be to explain the waning of religious nationalism. Can religious nationalism wane? How will it wane? A good starting point would be to reverse the theoretical framework of this study and argue that desecuritizing threats and religious frontiers by the political elite would lead to waning of religious nationalism. However, desecuritization itself is an under explored venue and open to further questioning.

Environments which are dominated by routine securitization narratives are hard to desecuritize. For instance, who will initiate the desecuritization of the narrative?Adamides' (2020) work on conflict resolution offers a starting point on desecuritization: top-down approach initiated by the political elites and an audience driven approach (ibid, p.145-148). Moreover, can political and religious issues be completely desecuritized? This is important because in the case of Pakistan after partition, Jinnah attempted to desecuritize the communal divide between Hindus and Muslims in his landmark address.[287] The newly formed Muslim nation had ingrained the distinct Muslim identity to such an extent that a complete desecuritization of the communal narrative was never achieved. For one, Jinnah did not live long to push his new calling and second, the carnage that followed the partition made it difficult to desecuritize the narrative. Thus, understanding desecuritization of religious frontiers and threats may offer a better mechanism in explaining waning of religious nationalism.

Another venue for research is the external religious frontiers. This study took inspiration from Barker's (2009) work focusing on external religious frontiers but has principally focused on the relevance of domestic religious frontiers and their role in waxing of religious nationalism.

An important line of future research would be to ask under what circumstances external religious frontiers become relevant again. Second, how are territorial conflicts accommodated into religious frontiers? This is significant as Kashmir is securitized as a red line for Pakistan. It is worthwhile to see if such territorial disputes play a role in influencing the Muslim identity and the waxing of religious nationalism.

Another line of research concerns the relationship between religious nationalism and populism. Religious, nationalist elites often influence the borders of identities by altering its composition. This results in broadening, reducing, or at times rethinking identity. This study argues that this occurs at threatening domestic religious frontiers. But what role does populism play in this process? Brubaker's (2017, 2019) conceptualization of the relationship between populism and nationalism can be a good starting point. This direction of research is significant for South Asia. For instance, in Pakistan, the government of PM Imran Khan (2018-2022) wanted to create a "New Medina" where the state would have the power to

[287] Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly, 11th August 1947. Jinnah said, "You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state".

order goodness in society. This line of research will widen the scope of the relationship between religion and nationalism by introducing populism into the discourse. Given the rise of right wing governments, this will also contribute to better understanding the relationship between religious nationalism and populism.

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APPENDICES

A. DRAFT TEXT OF THE OBJECTIVES RESOLUTION OF 1949

" In the name of Allah, the Benificent, the Merciful;[288]

WHEREAS sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being excercised within the limit prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;

This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan;

WHERElN the State shall excercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;

WHEREIN the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed;

WHEREIN the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy

Quran and the *Sunnah*[289]

WHEREIN adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures;

WHEREBY the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed ;

WHEREIN shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of

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[288] Text from the "Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates", Official Report, Volume V 1949, available at https://na.gov.pk/en/debates.php

[289] The debate defined Sunnah as Traditions of Holy Prophet

thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality.

WHEREIN adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;

WHEREIN the independence of the judiciary shall be fully secured;

WHEREIN the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded;

So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity."

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

JOB

Teacher at Montgomery County Public School, Marylan, USA, 2025-Continuing.

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations, Ankara, Turkey (Thesis Title: "The Waxing of Religious Nationalism: Case Study of Pakistan", Supervised by Prof. Dr. Zana Çitak), 2025.

Masters (Non-Thesis). in Asian Studies, Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations, Ankara, Turkey, 2020.

Masters in Business Administration (Finance), Institute of Business Management, Karachi, Pakistan, 2013.

Bachelors in Business Administration (Finance), Institute of Business Management, Karachi, Pakistan, 2011.

WORK EXPERIENCE:

Year	**Institution**	**Job Title**
2025-Present	Montgomery County Public Schools, Maryland, USA	Teacher
2022-2023	National University of Modern Languages Islamabad, Pakistan	Lecturer, IR Dept
2022	International Islamic University Islamabad Pakistan	Visiting Lecturer
2021	Ankara Centre for Crisis and Policy Studies, Türkiye	Intern
2019	Pakistan Embassy, Ankara, Türkiye	Intern
2014-2016	Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd, Karachi, Pakistan	Credit Officer
2014	EFU Life Assurance Ltd, Karachi, Pakistan	Executive Officer

PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION:

-Turkish Language: Level B1M2 Qualified from Turkish American Association, Ankara, Türkiye.

AWARDS:

-Academic Year 2020-2021 Performance Award in PhD International Relations from Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Türkiye.

-Academic Year 2019-2020 Performance Award in Msc (Non-thesis) in Asian Studies from Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Türkiye.

NEWS PAPER PUBLICATIONS:

1. Domestic Political Change, Pakistan-Türkiye Ties And The Future, Published in "The Friday Times", 2nd February 2023
https://thefridaytimes.com/02-Feb-2023/domestic-political-change-pakistan-t-rkiye-ties-and-the-future

2. Why Is the Ministry Of Foreign Affairs An Ideal Scapegoat? Published in "The Friday Times", 25th February 2023
https://thefridaytimes.com/25-Feb-2023/why-is-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-an-ideal-scapegoat

3. Why would China want to replace the US in the Middle East? Published in "The South China Morning Post", 5th May 2023
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3219136/why-would-china-want-replace-us-middle-east#comments

4. Erdoğan's Victory and Future Course for Türkiye, Published in "Stratheia" 9th June, 2023
https://stratheia.com/erdogans-victory-and-future-course-for-turkiye/

TEACHING:

Lecturer for Course “Political Geography of the World”, International Islamic University Islamabad, Pakistan, Spring Semester 2022

Lecturer for Course “Politics of the Middle East”, National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2022-2023

Lecturer for Course “Political Philosophy”, National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2022-2023

Lecturer for Course “Research Methods”, National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2022-2023

Lecturer for Course “CPEC and Pakistan”, National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2022-2023

LANGUAGES:

Languages: English (Advanced), Urdu (Native), Punjabi, Turkish (Level B1M2)

RESEARCH INTEREST:

Religion and Nationalism, Religious Nationalism, Religion in International Relation, Long-distance Nationalism, Pakistan, South Asia

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez, din ve milliyetçilik arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Dini milliyetçiliğin bu etkileşimin bir sonucu olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bunu açıklamak için, çalışma Pakistan'da dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişine odaklanmaktadır. Bu amaçla, vaka çalışması Pakistan'ın 1947'de bağımsızlığını kazanmasından sonraki üç tarihsel olaya dayanmaktadır: 1949 tarihli Hedefler Kararı (OR), 1974 tarihli İkinci Anayasa Değişikliği ve General Ziya-ül Hak dönemi (1977-1989). Bu üç olayı daha iyi açıklamak için, çalışma 1857 isyanından Hindistan'ın bölünmesine kadar geçen 1947 yılına kadar olan dönemi başlangıç noktası olarak almaktadır. Tez, üç önemli siyasi figürü ele almaktadır: Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah ve Maulana Maudud. Araştırma, dini milliyetçiliğin yapısal gerekçelere, dış koşullara ve dış baskılara dayanan ana akım açıklamalarından ayrıldığı için yenidir. Bunun yerine, iç baskıların Pakistan'da dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişine nasıl katkıda bulunduğunu ve bunun da ülkenin ulusal kimliğini nasıl şekillendirdiğini araştırmaktadır.

Bu hususlar, dini milliyetçiliğin ve daha geniş anlamda milliyetçiliğin önemli bir yönüne ışık tutması açısından önemlidir: bir ulus-devlet kurulduktan sonra dini milliyetçiliğin dayanıklılığı. Bu tez, İslam ve Müslüman kimliğinin, siyasi ve dini liderler tarafından ülke içinde yukarıdan aşağıya bir yaklaşımla Pakistaniyat fikrine entegre edildiğini savunmaktadır. Her bir olayın geçişi, Pakistanlı olmanın ne anlama geldiğini (yeniden) tanımlamış ve (yeniden) hayal etmiştir. Dolayısıyla, bu tezin temel hipotezi, dini sınırlar ve bu sınırlardan algılanan tehditler şeklinde mevcut olan iç baskılar nedeniyle bağımsızlıktan sonra Pakistan'da dini milliyetçiliğin yükseldiğidir. Tez, bu dini sınırların ve ardından gelen tehditlerin siyasi elitler tarafından güvenlikleştirildiğini ve daha sonra kitleler tarafından kabul edildiğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu çalışma, ulus-devlet oluşumundan sonra dini milliyetçiliğin oluşumunu ve kalıcılığını anlamak için dış faktörlerin yanı sıra iç baskıların da hayati önem taşıdığını göstererek literatürdeki kritik bir boşluğu doldurmaktadır.

Bu analiz, Barker'ın (2009) dini milliyetçiliğin oluşumuna dair teorisini takip etmekte, ancak Buzan ve diğerleri (1998) tarafından ortaya atılan “güvenlikleştirme” fikri ile güçlendirilerek başka varsayımlarla revize edilmektedir. Barker, dini milliyetçiliğin sadece dini sınırların dışarıdankesiştiğidurumlardadeğil,aynızamanda algılanan tehditlerin aynı sınırlardan kaynaklandığı durumlarda da ortaya çıktığını savunmaktadır. Barker'a göre, yalnızca nihai boyun eğdirme tehdidi veya yok edilme algısı oluşturan dini sınırlar önemlidir. Dahası,

Barker'ın çalışması tek bir dini sınır ve tehdit yapısı ile dış arenadaki dini sınırları analiz eden İrlanda, Polonya ve Yunanistan vaka çalışmalarına odaklanmaktadır. Ancak Barker bazı soruları cevapsız bırakmıştır: İç dini sınırlar ve tehditler olabilir mi? Aynı anda birden fazla dini sınır ve tehdit olabilir mi? Eğer öyleyse, bu çoklu sınırlar ve tehditler tek bir tehditte birleştirilebilir mi? Tek bir dini sınır ve buna bağlı tehditler nasıl birincil hale getirilebilir? Dış ve iç dini sınırlar tehdidi büyütmek için birleştirilebilir mi? Belirli bir dini sınırı ve tehdidi diğerine göre önceleyen mekanizma nedir? Bu tez, Barker'ın teorisinde bir dizi değişiklik yaparak ve onu güvenlikleştirme tezi ile birleştirerek bu soruları yanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma için benimsenen varsayımlar ve mekanizma aşağıda tartışılmaktadır. Bu tez, milliyetçilik ve dini milliyetçilik çalışmalarının Avrupa'daki kapsamının ötesine geçerek Pakistan'ı bir vaka çalışması olarak ele almaktadır. Pakistan'ın siyasi liderlerinin konuşmaları ve parlamento tartışmaları gibi birincil kaynaklara odaklanan bu çalışma, Güney Asya'dan bir dini milliyetçilik örneğini alana katmaktadır.

Din ve milliyetçiliğin her ikisi de güçlü toplumsal güçlerdir. Birincisi maddi dünyadan kaçınıp aşkın bir dünyayı idealize ederken, ikincisi maddi dünyayla ve maddi dünyanın içinden konuşur. Bununla birlikte, her ikisi de anlamlı bir bağlantı kurmak için mevcut dünyaya derinden kök salmıştır. Bu çalışma, modernleşmenin dinin bir kenara itilmesini, altının oyulmasını ve özelleştirilmesini gerektirdiğini öngören sekülerleşme tezinin iddia ettiği gibi dinin ortadan kalkmadığını iddia etmektedir (Wilson, 1966). Sosyal bilimlerdeki sekülerleşme tezi dini büyük ölçüde görmezden gelirken, son dönemdeki akademik çalışmalar bu ilişkiyi açıklamaya giderek daha fazla ilgi göstermeye başlamıştır. İran'daki İslam Devrimi ve komünizmin çöküşü gibi olayların yanı sıra dinin önemli bir bileşen olduğu ulusal kimliklere dayalı ulus-devletleri geride bırakan dekolonizasyon dalgası, modernitenin dinin altını oyduğu argümanını sorgulatmış, öyle ki dinin öldüğü iddiası sadece sorgulanmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda akademisyenleri sekülerleşme fikrinden vazgeçilmesi gerektiğini savunmaya ikna etmiştir (Stark, 1999).Görüldüğü üzere din, milliyetçilik çalışmalarında bir kenara itilmiştir. Dahası, din aşkın olarak görülürken, milliyetçilik bu dünyada anlam bulan seküler bir olgu olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu durum, sadece dinin özelleşmesi değil, aynı zamanda dini kimliğin kaybolması ve yerini seküler bir kimliğe bırakması anlamına gelen sekülerleşme teziyle de uyumludur. Bu durum, yalnızca dinin özelleştirilmesini değil, aynı zamanda dini kimliğin yerini milliyetçiliğe dayalı seküler kimliklere bırakmasını ifade eden sekülerleşme teziyle de uyumludur (Mentzel, 2020).

Bu çalışmanın din, milliyetçilik ve ulusları nasıl kavramsallaştırdığını anlamakta fayda vardır. Bu tez, dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişini açıklamak için işlevselci din anlayışını

benimseyecektir. Bu seçimin nedenleri daha sonra açıklanacaktır. İlk olarak, Berger'in deyimiyle "tanrılar ampirik olarak mevcut değildir", böyle bir durumda dinin sosyal ve psikolojik işlevlerini görmek yerinde olacaktır. İkincisi, Pakistan için verilen mücadele iki din anlayışına dayanmaktaydı; bunlardan ilki, Cinnah yönetimindeki Tüm Hindistan Müslüman Birliği (AIML) tarafından benimsendiği şekliyle işlevselci bir yapıya sahipti. Bölünmemiş Hindistan Müslümanları Hindu egemenliğinden uzak ayrı bir vatan istiyordu. AIML, Müslümanların inançlarının veya uygulamalarının Hindularınkilerle nasıl çeliştiğine odaklanmadı; mücadeleyi tek tanrılı bir din olan İslam'ın putperest bir din olan Hinduizm ile mücadelesi olarak da tasvir etmedi. Bu tezin iddiasına göre bu anlayış bölünmeden sonra da devam etmiş ve ancak Ziya-ül Hak döneminde dine esas perspektifinden bakılmaya başlanmıştır. Buna paralel olarak devam eden ikinci ulema anlayışı ise tözsel nitelikteydi. Ulema, Müslümanlar için yeni vatanda şeriatın uygulanmasını istiyordu. Bariz farklılıkların yanı sıra toplumsal kimlikler, seçkinler tarafından dinin ya da dini duyguların manipüle edilmesiyle daha da pekiştirilmiştir. Üçüncü olarak, dini bir kimlik göstergesi olarak tanımlamak Pakistan'ın bölünme sonrası dönemini daha iyi açıklamaktadır çünkü Müslümanların siyasi liderliği Müslümanların siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel yönleri kapsayan İslam'a dayalı farklılığını vurgulamıştır. Bu nedenle şeriatın uygulanması siyasi liderliğin gündeminde değildi. Tez, bu kimliğin yıllar içinde yorumlandığını ve yeniden yorumlandığını, bunun da dini milliyetçiliğin güçlenmesine yol açtığını iddia etmektedir.

Anderson ulusu "hayali bir siyasi topluluk - ve hem doğası gereği sınırlı hem de egemen olarak hayal edilmiş" olarak tanımlar (Anderson, 1991). Hayal edilen bir şey olarak ulus anlayışı, bu çalışmanın aldığı pozisyona daha yakındır. Örneğin, bölünmemiş Hindistan'ın Müslüman Hintlileri Hindu Hintlilerle birlikte yaşayan bir topluluktu ancak bu durum 1857 Bağımsızlık Savaşı'ndan sonra değişti. Müslümanlar, İngiliz politikaları nedeniyle Hindu meslektaşlarına kıyasla ötekileştirildiklerini hissettiler. Bu durum genel olarak Müslümanların ayrı bir ulus olarak tasavvur edilmesine yol açmıştır. Buna ek olarak, bu tanımın gücü, bu tezde savunulan teorik çerçeve ile örtüşmesidir. İddiaya göre Müslüman kimliği hayal edilmiş ve Pakistan'ın kurulmasına yol açmıştır. Bölünmeden sonra Pakistan kimliği yeniden tasarlanmış, bu da gayrimüslimlerin ve azınlıkların "ötekileştirilmesini" açıklamıştır (Triandafyllidou, 1998). Dolayısıyla, bu tez Anderson'un ulus tanımını takip etmektedir.

Bu çalışma için milliyetçilik anlayışına en yakın görüş Anthony Smith tarafından ortaya atılmıştır. Etnosembolist bir yaklaşım izleyen Smith milliyetçiliği "bazı üyelerinin gerçek ya da potansiyel bir 'ulus' oluşturduğunu düşündüğü bir insan nüfusunun özerkliğini, birliğini ve kimliğini elde etmeye ve sürdürmeye yönelik ideolojik bir hareket" olarak

tanımlamaktadır (Smith, 2000, s. 796). Milliyetçiliğin bu tanımı, yukarıda tartışılan din ve millet anlayışıyla örtüşmektedir. Ayrıca, bu tez için benimsenen dini sınırlar teorik çerçevesini de tamamlamaktadır. Müslümanların ve daha sonra Pakistanlıların birliği ve kimliği tehdit altında olduğu için dini sınırlar hayal edilmiş ve güçlendirilmiştir.

Bu çalışma için benimsenen teorik çerçevenin daha iyi Bu çalışma için milliyetçilik anlayışına en yakın görüş Anthony Smith tarafından ortaya atılmıştır. Etnosembolist bir yaklaşım izleyen Smith milliyetçiliği "bazı üyelerinin gerçek ya da potansiyel bir 'ulus' oluşturduğunu düşündüğü bir insan nüfusunun özerkliğini, birliğini ve kimliğini elde etmeye ve sürdürmeye yönelik ideolojik bir hareket" olarak tanımlamaktadır (Smith, 2000, s. 796). Milliyetçiliğin bu tanımı, yukarıda tartışılan din ve millet anlayışıyla örtüşmektedir. Ayrıca, bu tez için benimsenen dini sınırlar teorik çerçevesini de tamamlamaktadır. Müslümanların ve daha sonra Pakistanlıların birliği ve kimliği tehdit altında olduğu için dini sınırlar hayal edilmiş ve güçlendirilmiştir.anlaşılabilmesi için, bu çalışmanın dini sınırlar ve tehditler kavramlarını operasyonel hale getirdiğini açıklamak önemlidir. Çalışma Barker'ın (2009) dini sınırlar anlayışını geliştirmektedir. Öncelikle, Barker dini sınırları "her biri belirli ve özgün bir dinden etkilenen iki bölge veya halkın bir araya geldiği coğrafi sınırlar" olarak tanımlamaktadır (ibid, s.31). Bu anlayış, Şii-Sünni ayrımı gibi ideolojik farklılıklar nedeniyle tek bir din içinde dini sınırların oluşma ihtimalini göz ardı etmekle kalmayıp bunu coğrafyaya bağlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, bu çalışma dini sınırların ille de fiziksel ya da görünür sınırlar olmadığını, ancak dini sınırların aynı zamanda ideolojik olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu nedenle, din sadece coğrafi sınırlarla çevrelenemez; dahası, ideolojik sınırlar değişen coğrafi sınırlara kıyasla daha kolay değişir. İkinci olarak, dini sınırları ideolojik sınırlar olarak ele almak, özgün dinlerin alt bölümlerini ve devlet oluşumundan sonra dini milliyetçiliğin dayanıklılığını daha iyi açıklamaktadır. Üçüncüsü, Barker'ın dini sınırları İslam ve Hristiyanlık, Katolikler ve Protestanlar ya da İslam ve Hinduizm gibi "belirli ve tek bir din" arasındaki sınırlar olarak anlaması (ibid, s.31), İslam ve Komünizm arasında olduğu gibi belirli bir dine bağlı olan ve olmayan kitleler arasında dini sınırların oluşma ihtimalini göz ardı etmektedir. Bu çalışma, belirli bir dinin taraftarları ile dini olmayan bir ideolojinin taraftarları arasında dini bir sınır olasılığını varsayarak bu eksikliği giderecektir. Dördüncü olarak Barker, Katolik İrlanda ile Protestan İngiltere ya da Müslüman Pakistan ile Hindu Hindistan arasında olduğu gibi dini sınırların doğası gereği dışsal olduğunu düşünmektedir. Bu çalışma bu pozisyonu gözden geçirmekte ve siyasi liderlerin dini azınlıkları tehdit olarak ilan ederek dışlamak için sıklıkla dine başvurmaları nedeniyle dini sınırların içsel nitelikte de olabileceğini savunmaktadır. Son olarak Barker, bu coğrafi dini sınırların doğal olarak var olduğunu ve bunlardan kaynaklanan herhangi bir tehdidin de doğal olduğunu varsaymaktadır.

Bu çalışma, bu varsayıma dini sınırların doğal olarak oluşmadığını eklemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Dini sınırlar ve bunlardan kaynaklanan tehditler, bunları kitleler için konuşma eylemi yoluyla güvenlikleştiren siyasi liderler tarafından algılanmaktadır. Bu, algılanan bu tür dini sınırların ve tehditlerin güvenliksizleştirilemeyeceği anlamına gelmez. Bu çalışma, tehditlerin tamamen ortadan kaldırılamayacağını, ancak kısmen ortadan kaldırılabileceğini savunmaktadır. Bir tehdidin ortadan kaldırılması, ulusal kimliğin bir parçası haline gelecektir.

Dini sınırlar, dini milliyetçiliğin oluşumunu açıklamak için yeterli değildir çünkü "bu sınırdan bir tehdit de gelmelidir" (Barker, 2009, s. 34). Dini bir sınırdan gelen tehdit, kimlik oluşumunda önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu çalışma Barker tarafından açıklanan tehdit kavramı üzerinde bir dizi revizyon yapmaktadır. İlk olarak, Barker tehdidi "askeri güvenliği" vurgulayan geleneksel bir bağlamda ele almakta (ibid, s.38) ve tehdidin "kısmen askeri yetenekler ve boyun eğdirme potansiyeli temelinde inceleneceğini, bağlamın ise her zaman hesaba katılacağını" açıklamaktadır (ibid, s.38). Barker tehdidi maddi ve askeri boyutuyla sınırlayıp bağlama yer verirken, ben tehdit kavramını siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ve sosyal boyutlarını da içerecek şekilde genişletiyorum. Bu boyutlar Barker'ın tehdidi asimilasyondan tamamen yok etmeye kadar uzanan bir süreklilik yaklaşımı olarak ele almakta (ibid, s.36) ve tehdidin doğasını dini kimliğe çeşitli nüansları dahil edebilecek kadar akışkan hale getirmektedir. İkinci olarak, Barker tehdidi doğası gereği dışsal olarak görmektedir. Örneğin İrlanda ve Britanya arasındaki dini sınırı açıklarken, İrlanda kimliğine yönelik askeri boyun eğdirme tehdidinin doğası gereği dışsal olduğunu, yani Britanya'nın dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişini açıkladığını savunmaktadır. Bu çalışma tehditlerin içsel ya da yerel nitelikte olabileceğini savunmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, bu çalışma sadece dış ve iç çevreden gelen birden fazla tehdidin olabileceğini değil, aynı zamanda bu tehditlerin ulusa yönelik tehlikeyi hafifletmek için birleştirilebileceğini de ileri sürmektedir.Dördüncüsü, Barker dini bir sınırdan gelen tehdidin nasıl algılandığını açıklamamaktadır. Örneğin, bir ulus birden fazla dini sınır ve tehditle karşı karşıya kalırsa, tehdit altındaki ulus birincil tehdidi nasıl belirleyecektir? Bu çalışma tehdit oluşum mekanizmasını açıklamaktadır. Özneler arası fikirlerin rolünü yapılar olarak kavramsallaştıran Wendt'ten (1992) ödünç alan bu çalışma, dini sınırlardan gelen tehditlerin siyasi elitlerin onlardan yaptığı şey olduğunu savunmaktadır. Dini bir sınırdan gelen herhangi bir tehdit siyasi liderler tarafından algılanır ve daha sonra konuşma eylemi yoluyla güvenlikleştirilir. Bu tez, bu tür tehditlerin eninde sonunda güvenliksizleştirilebileceğini ancak ulusun kimliğinin bir parçası haline geldikleri için tamamen güvenliksizleştirilemeyeceğini iddia etmektedir. Bu genişletilmiş tehdit anlayışı, İngiliz yönetimi altındaki alt kıta Müslümanlarının kimliklerinin nasıl tehdit

edildiğini ve daha sonra Pakistan'da yerel dini sınırların siyasi elit tarafından nasıl güvenlikleştirildiğini ve nihayetinde dini milliyetçiliğin yükselmesine nasıl yol açtığını açıklamak için faydalı olacaktır. Bu çalışma, bölünme öncesi ve sonrası Pakistan Müslümanlarının tehdidi bir süreklilik içinde gördüklerini ve kriz zamanlarında tehdit algısı onlar için yükseldiğinde, bir kimlik işareti olarak din etrafında harekete geçtiklerini öne sürmektedir. Çalışma, vaka çalışması yaklaşımını kullanarak bu tez için nitel bir analize dayanmaktadır. Vaka çalışması 1857 bağımsızlık savaşından itibaren bir dönemi kapsamakta ve daha sonra bölünmeden sonra 1949'dan 1989'a kadar olan üç olayı analiz etmektedir: 1949'da Hedefler Kararı'nın (OR) kabul edilmesi, 1974'te ikinci anayasa değişikliği ve General Ziya-ül Hak dönemi (1977-1989).

Bu tez, bu çalışma için seçilen her bir olayla ilgili birincil belgelerin içerik analizine dayanmaktadır. Birincil belgeler arasında Syed Ahmed Khan'ın yazıları ve konuşmaları, Muhammed Ali Cinnah'ın konuşmaları ve hitabeleri, Maulana Maududi'nin yazıları ve yayınları, 1949 tarihli OR'nin kabulünü çevreleyen parlamento tartışmaları, 1974'te Ahmedilerin statüsüne karar veren özel komitenin tutanakları ve General Zia-ul-Haq'ın konuşmaları ve halka hitapları yer almaktadır. OR ile ilgili parlamento tartışmaları, Pakistan'da İslam'ın konumu, devlet ve din arasındaki ilişki ile azınlıkların ve çoğunluğun rolü gibi çeşitli konuları ele almaktadır. Diğer önemli birincil belge olan parlamento komitesinin özel tutanakları üç bin sayfa uzunluğundadır. On yıl önce gizliliği kaldırılan bu belge, Ahmedilerin Pakistan için dini bir tehdit olarak nasıl güvenlik önlemlerine tabi tutulduğunu göstermektedir. Son olarak, Zia ul Haq'ın konuşmaları, Pakistan konusunda yıllar içinde tutumunun nasıl değiştiğini yansıtmaktadır.

Bölünmeden sonraki üç olayın seçilmesinin üç nedeni vardır. Birincisi, Ali Saleem'in (2017, s. 243-244) iddia ettiği gibi, Pakistan hükümetinin İslamlaşması 1949'dan sonra başlamış ve 1970'lerden itibaren hız kazanmıştır. Bu da bu üç olayı dini sınırların oluşumunu açıklamak için ideal hale getirmektedir ki bu da bizi ikinci neden olan belirginliğe götürmektedir. Mylonas ve Tudor belirginliğin önemini şu şekilde açıklamaktadır: “Bir ulusal kimliğin diğer kimliklere göre belirginliği kriz anlarında artar” (Mylonas & Tudor, 2023, s. 49). Son olarak, dini milliyetçiliğin ortaya çıkışı ve tehdit algısı tartışmalarda açıkça görülmektedir. Farklı görüşler farklı zamanlarda dağınık bir şekilde ortaya çıkmak yerine, bir tartışma içinde bir araya gelmektedir. Parlamento tartışmalarını ve konuşmalarını analiz ederken bir kalıp tespit etmek kolaydır. Dolayısıyla, artan İslamlaşma nedeniyle, bu çalışma için seçilen üç olay sırasında Müslüman kimliğinin belirginliği daha yüksek olmuştur.

Çalışmanın daha sonra göstereceği gibi bu belirginlik, bu tez için seçilen birincil belgelerin seçiminde açıkça görülmektedir. Birincil belgeler -konuşmalar, hitaplar, parlamento

tartışmaları, özel komisyon tutanakları- yukarıdaki olayları açıklamak için iki ana nedenden dolayı seçilmiştir. Birincisi, bu belgeler dini sınırları ve dini sınırların yükselmesine neden olan tehditleri açıkça tasvir etmektedir. Bu belgeler, dini bir sınırın yaratılması ile bu sınırlardan algılanan tehditlerin güvenlikleştirilmesi arasındaki yakınlığı azaltmakta, dolayısıyla bunu anlaşılır kılmaktadır. İkinci olarak, bu yaklaşım çok sayıda değişkenden etkilenmeye açık olan tarihsel anlatının uzun bir süre boyunca izini sürme sürecinden kaçınmaktadır; birincil belgeler, dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişini daha iyi açıklayan anlatının yoğunlaştırılmış bir biçimini sunmaktadır.

Bu nedenle, 1949 tarihli OR aracılığıyla dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişini açıklamak için, çalışma öncelikle kararın kabul edilmesinden önce meydana gelen parlamento tartışmalarına odaklanmıştır. Söz konusu belgeye Pakistan Ulusal Meclisi'nin internet sitesinden ulaşılabilmiştir. Parlamento tartışması, dini milliyetçiliğin oluşumunu ve yükselişini yansıttığı için seçilmiştir. Tartışma, Müslüman ve gayrimüslim milletvekilleri arasında ülke için dini bir dönüş yapma konusundaki anlaşmazlıkları vurgulamaktadır. Tez daha sonra, 1974 yılında Ahmedilerin Pakistan'da gayrimüslim bir azınlık olarak ilan edilmesiyle, YA yoluyla kurulan iç dini sınırların nasıl dışlayıcı bir nitelik kazandığını açıklamaktadır. Tez, 1974 yılında Pakistan hükümeti tarafından kurulan özel komitenin tutanaklarını analiz ederek, Ahmedilerin dışlanmasını dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişi olarak açıklamaktadır.

Bu üç bin sayfalık birincil belgenin gizliliği on yıl önce kaldırılmıştır. Tez, içerik analizi yoluyla, parlamenterler tarafından tartışılan dini sınırlar ve tehditler temalarını belirlemiştir. Bu tez, ayrıca, General Ziya-ül Hak'ın iktidarı sırasında önemli anlarda yaptığı konuşmaları analiz ederek teorik perspektifini General Ziya-ül Hak dönemine uygulamıştır. Bu önemli anlar arasında 1977'deki darbeden hemen sonra, Pakistan'ın Savunma ve Bağımsızlık Günü'nde, seçimlerin iki kez ertelenmesinde, başkanlık yetkilerini genişleten kararnamelerin ilan edilmesinde, siyasi faaliyetlerin kısıtlanmasında ve medyanın susturulmasında yaptığı konuşmalar yer almaktadır. Bu konuşmalar Ziya'nın dünyaya bakışını, Pakistan'ın karşı karşıya olduğu sorunları ve ülke için vizyonunu yansıttığı için özellikle seçilmiştir. Bu konuşma ve hitaplar, Ziya döneminde Pakistan'da dini milliyetçiliğin yükselmesine neden olan iç dini sınırları ve algılanan tehditleri çıplak bir şekilde ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu tez iki geniş bölüm halinde düzenlenmiştir. Birinci bölüm, birinci ve ikinci bölümleri içermektedir. Bu iki bölüm, bölünmeden önce bölünmemiş Hindistan Müslümanları arasında dini milliyetçiliğin oluşumunu ve yükselişini tartışmaktadır. Bunu yaparken, Müslümanlar için dini sınırları ve tehditleri vurgulayan üç önemli Müslüman siyasi figürün -Seyyid Ahmed Han, Cinnah ve Maulana Maududi- konuşmalarını analiz etmektedir. Kalan

bölümleri içeren ikinci kısım, 1947'den sonra Pakistan'da dini milliyetçiliğin nasıl yükseldiğini açıklamak için üç iç olaya -1949 OR, 1974 İkinci Anayasa değişikliği ve General Zia ul Haq dönemi (1977-1989)- odaklanmaktadır.

İkinci bölüm, dini milliyetçiliğin Müslümanları İslam işareti etrafında toplamak için nasıl kullanıldığı sorusuyla ilgilenmektedir. Bu bölüm, 1947'den sonra Pakistan'da dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişine dair daha geniş bir argümanın temelini oluşturmaktadır. Bu bölüm dini sınırları ortaya koymuş ve aynı zamanda bu sınırlardan gelen tehditlerin Müslümanlar tarafından nasıl algılandığına ve bu tehditlere nasıl karşılık verildiğine ışık tutmuştur. Dini sınırların haritasını çıkarma görevi, Müslümanlar ve Hindular arasında komünalizmin tohumlarını eken tarihi olayları anlatarak üstlenilmiştir. Yukarıda açıklanan teorik çerçevenin yardımıyla bu bölüm, üç önemli Müslüman liderin -Seyyid Ahmed Han, Maulana Mevdudi ve Muhammed Ali Cinnah- konuşmalarına dayanarak bu liderlerin dini sınırları nasıl gördüklerini ve bu sınırlardan kaynaklanan tehditleri nasıl güvenlikleştirdiklerini açıklamıştır.

İsyanın ardından İngiliz hükümeti, Müslümanların askeri hizmet ve devlet görevlerinden mahrum bırakılması, mülklerine el konulması ve dilin Farsçadan İngilizceye değiştirilmesi yoluyla Müslümanların etkisini azalttı. Bu, kuzey Hindistan'daki Müslümanların sosyal statüsüne ciddi zarar verdi. Hunter (1876), Bengal'deki Müslümanların kötüleşen koşullarını ustaca ele alır ve İngilizlerin Müslümanlara "asil bir Müslüman hanesinin kasasına sürekli olarak akan üç farklı zenginlik kaynağını" reddettiğini gözlemler: Askeri Komuta, Vergi Toplama ve Yargı veya Siyasi İstihdam. Dahası, Bengal'deki Müslümanların İngiliz eğitim sisteminden nefret etmelerinin ve geride kalmalarının üç nedenini daha belirlemiştir. İlk olarak, İngiliz sisteminin Bengal'in yerel dilinde Hindu öğretmenler aracılığıyla eğitim verdiğini ve Müslümanların her ikisinden de nefret ettiğini savunur. İkincisi, bu durum Müslümanların tercih ettiği Farsça'nın aleyhine gerçekleşir ve son olarak, kamu eğitimi Müslüman dinini barındırmaz (ibid, s. 108). Sonuç olarak, sadece hükümet işlerinde Hindulardan geri kalmakla kalmadılar, aynı zamanda UP ve Bihar'daki Müslüman kardeşlerinden de geri kaldılar. Alvi, Bengal Müslümanlarının ikilemini kısaca şöyle anlatıyor: Diğer eyaletlerdeki Müslümanlara kıyasla mutlak sayı olarak en büyük grup olmalarına rağmen, devlet memurluğu pozisyonlarındaki payları Bengal Hindularının payından orantısal olarak daha azdı ve UP'deki Müslümanlarla keskin bir tezat oluşturuyordu. Bengalli Müslümanlar sadece dezavantajlı bir çoğunluk olmakla kalmayıp, devlet hizmetlerinde de yeterince temsil edilmiyorlardı (Halliday ve Alvi, 1988, s. 72). Alvi, "(ayrıcalıklı) konumlarına yönelik bu algılanan tehdit, Hindistan'daki Müslüman milliyetçiliğinin ilk ve en büyük itici gücünün UP ve Bihar'dan gelmesini muhtemelen

açıklıyor" (aynı eser, s. 72) diye savunuyor. Yeni doğan ulusal duygu, Müslüman çoğunluklu eyaletlerdeki toprak sahiplerinin çıkarlarıyla birleşti. Bu, Jinnah'ın liderliğindeki AIML platformu aracılığıyla gerçekleşti ve 1947'de Pakistan'ın bağımsızlığıyla sonuçlandı.

Bir modernist olan Seyyid Ahmed Han, İngilizlerin 1857'deki isyandan Müslümanları sorumlu tuttuğunu anlamıştı. Dahası, Müslümanların üç cepheden gelen yok edilme tehdidiyle karşı karşıya olduğunu da fark etti: İngilizler, Hindular ve Müslümanlar arasındaki iç anlaşmazlıklar. Seyyid Ahmed isyanın nedenlerinin altını çizen ünlü bir broşür yazdı ve İngilizleri Hindistan'ın yerli halkını devlet işlerinin yürütülmesinde bir kol mesafesinde tutmakla eleştirdi. Modern eğitim yoluyla İslami bir rönesans başlatılması gerektiğini savunmuş ve aynı zamanda Müslümanların modern eğitimden ve sayısal güçten yoksun olmaları nedeniyle Hindistan'da temsili kurumların oluşturulmasına karşı çıkmıştır. Bir başka Müslüman lider, Maulana Maududi, Hindistan Müslümanlarının durumları için farklı bir analize ve derde devaya sahipti. Mevdudi'ye göre İslam iki farklı medeniyetin tehdidi altındaydı: İngiliz ve Hindu. İngiliz İmparatorluğu'nun seküler ve maddi anlayışını Hindistan Müslümanları için bir anathema olarak şiddetle kınadı. Ayrıca temsili yönetim biçiminin Hindistan için kabul edilemez olduğunu söyledi. Onun çözümü Müslümanlar için orijinal kutsal metinlere dönüşü gerektiriyordu. Dolayısıyla onun çözümü Seyit Ahmed'inkiyle taban tabana zıttı. Son olarak, günümüz Pakistan'ının kurucusu Muhammed Ali Cinnah da Hindistan'da İngiliz çerçevesine dayalı temsili kurumların oluşturulması halinde Müslümanların Hindular tarafından marjinalleştirileceğini anlamıştı. İngilizlerin ayrılmasından sonra Hindistan'ın geleceği konusunda endişeliydi. Başlangıçta Cinnah, Müslümanlar için anayasal güvenceleri savunarak dini sınırları güvenlikleştirmekten kaçındı. Ancak bu politika pek sonuç vermeyince, Cinnah dini sınırları benimsedi ve Müslümanlar için kimliğin sulandırılması tehdidini güvenlikleştirdi.

Bu bölüm, her bir liderin nihai amacının Müslüman kimliğini sulandırılmaktan korumak olmasına rağmen, her birinin dini sınırları ve tehditleri farklı şekillerde haritalandırdığı sonucuna varmıştır. Modernist bir yaklaşım benimseyen Seyyid Ahmed Han, İslami bir rönesans için propaganda yapmış, bunun yokluğunda Müslümanların değişen zamanın tüm yönleriyle İngiliz ve Hinduların gerisinde kalacağını ve bunun da Müslüman kimliği için bir tehdit oluşturacağını savunmuştur. Maulana Maududi'ye göre İslam'ın dini sınırı ve laiklik, modern eğitim, milliyetçilik, Hindistan Ulusal Kongresi (INC) ve AIML'nin İslam medeniyetine yönelik tehditleriydi. Son olarak Cinnah, İngiliz çizgisindeki demokrasiye karşı çıkmış ve bölünmemiş Hindistan'ın Müslüman çoğunluklu eyaletlerinin Pakistan'ı oluşturmak üzere birleştirileceği ayrı ve tek bir Müslüman devlet talep etmiştir.

Bu tezin ikinci bölümü üçüncü bölüm ile başlamaktadır. Bu bölümde bağımsızlıktan sonra Pakistan'da dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişi ayrıntılı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bölümde iki önemli iç olay -1949'da Hedefler Kararı (OR) ve 1974'te ikinci anayasa değişikliğinin kabulü- ve dini sınırları şekillendiren ve sınırlardan algılanan tehditleri tanımlayan ilgili birincil belgeler analiz edilmektedir. 1949'daki OR için, kararın kabul edilmesine yol açan parlamento tartışmaları incelenmiştir. Ahmedileri gayrimüslim azınlık olarak ilan eden 1974 tarihli ikinci anayasa değişikliği için, on yıl önce gizliliği kaldırılan Özel Komite'nin tartışmaları analiz edilmiştir. Analiz, iç dini sınırların ve iç tehdit algısının, dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişine ve ağdalanmasına katkıda bulunan bir tepkiyi nasıl ortaya çıkardığını göstermiştir.

İlk olayda, OR aracılığıyla hükümet, ülkeyi dış ve iç tehditlerden koruyacağı için dinin Pakistan devletinin yol gösterici ideolojisi olacağını açıkça ilan ederek dini sınırın temellerini atmıştır. Tartışma Pakistan Kurucu Meclisi'nde 7 Mart 1949'dan kararın kabul edildiği 12 Mart 1949'a kadar devam etmiştir. Parlamento tartışması, din ve milliyetçilik arasındaki ilişkinin çeşitli yönlerine değindi. Anayasa Meclisi'nde Pakistan Müslüman Ligi ile Pakistan Ulusal Kongresi olmak üzere iki kamp vardı. İlki, doğu ve batı Pakistan'dan Müslümanlardan oluşurken, ikincisi Hindulardan oluşuyordu. Pakistan Müslüman Ligi, İslam'ın Pakistan'ın temeli olduğu gerekçesiyle OR'yi savundu. Aksine, Pakistan Ulusal Kongresi, OR'nin Jinnah'ın vizyonundan saptığı gerekçesiyle OR'ye karşı çıktı. OR metni, dini Pakistan için birincil hale getirmeye eğilimli olsa da, parlamento tartışmalarının analizi farklı bakış açılarını ortaya koymaktadır. Değerlendirme, OR'nin Pakistan'ın İslami kimliğini ilan ettiği ve onayladığı, birçok güvenceye rağmen hükümetin çoğunluk ve azınlık toplumu arasında toplumsal hatlara dayalı bir ayrımı sürdürdüğü ve Kur'an ve Sünnet'in Pakistan devletine ve hükümetine rehberlik edeceği sonucuna varmaktadır. Soru, Kur'an ve Sünnet'in yorumlanmasında hangi düşünce ekolünün yorumunun takip edileceği ve Pakistan'da din ve devlet arasında bir ayrım olup olmayacağıydı.Pakistan devletinde her ikisi de aynı olacaktı ve biri diğerinden ayrılamazdı. Böylece, Müslüman kimliği ve İslam devletin temeline kazındı ve bunlardan birine yönelik iç ya da dış herhangi bir tehdit dini bir sınır olarak görüldü. Bu durumun azınlıkların, özellikle de 1974'teki ikinci anayasa değişikliğiyle İslam'ın dışında ilan edilen Ahmedi toplumunun vatandaşlık hakları üzerinde uzun vadeli etkileri olmuştur.

Bu bölüm, Ahmedilerin Pakistan devletinin ideolojik temeline ve Pakistanlı Müslüman kimliğine yönelik bir tehdit olarak tasvir edilmesini incelemiştir. Özel Komite, Başbakan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto'nun hükümeti döneminde, peygamberliğin kesinliğine inanmayan kişilerin statüsünü belirlemek üzere kuruldu. Ahmediler'in iki grubu olan Rabwah ve Lahore,

İslam ve Pakistan hakkındaki inançları ve görüşleri konusunda günlerce sorguya çekildi. Daha sonra, komitenin diğer Müslüman üyeleri Ahmediler topluluğu hakkındaki görüşlerini bildirdiler. Belgeler, Müslüman üyelerin ilk günden itibaren Ahmedileri Pakistan için bir tehdit olarak gördüklerini yansıtmaktadır. Dönemin siyasi senaryosunu göz önünde bulunduran bu bölüm, Ahmedilerin, Peygamberin kisvesinin nihai olup olmadığı sorusunu tartışmak üzere kurulan Özel Komite'nin komite üyelerinin konuşma eylemleri aracılığıyla bir tehdit olarak güvenlikleştirildiğine dair çok katmanlı bir argüman sunmaktadır. Bu analiz, Ahmediler üzerine yapılan diğer akademik çalışmalardan (Friedmann, 1989; Lavan, 1974; Saeed, 2007) farklı olarak, o dönemde iktidarda olan hükümetin kanun yapıcılar aracılığıyla dile getirdiği söylemi yansıtmaktadır. Üç bin sayfalık belge, Müslüman kanun koyucuların Ahmedileri nasıl İngiliz, CIA ve İsrail ajanları olarak Pakistan'ı, İslam'ı ve içinde yaşayan Müslümanları yok etme misyonuyla güvenlikleştirdiğini göstermektedir. Ahmediler ile diğer Müslüman mezhepler arasında Peygamberin son peygamberliği konusunda dini bir sınır çizilmiştir. Ahmediler Pakistan için siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal ve ideolojik bir tehdit olarak adlandırıldı ve böyle bir tehditle başa çıkmanın tek yolu onları gayrimüslim bir azınlık olarak ilan etmekti.

Her iki olay için analiz edilen yasama tartışmaları, tartışma sonuçlarının Pakistan için gerekli ahlaki zaferler olarak adlandırıldığını göstermektedir. Ancak bu zaferlerin Pakistan'a yönelik dini tehdidin içeriden güvenlikleştirilmesine yönelik başarılı girişimler olduğu belirtilmektedir. Bunu yaparken devlet, Pakistaniyat'ın bir yönünü İslam ve Müslüman kimliğinin zor değişkenine bağlı olarak tanımladı. İki tartışmanın analizi, dini milliyetçilik konusundaki anlayışımızı zenginleştiriyor. İlk olarak, iç dini sınırların sadece coğrafi değil, aynı zamanda ideolojik nitelikte olduğunu da teyit ediyor. İkinci olarak, algılanan dış dini sınırların iç dini sınırlarla birleşerek güçlü bir tehdit algısı yaratabileceğini gösteriyor. Bu durum, milletvekillerinin Ahmedilerin İsrail ve Yahudiler tarafından desteklendiğini ve ABD Merkezi İstihbarat Teşkilatı'nın da onları Pakistan'ı içeriden zarar vermek için desteklediğini iddia etmesiyle açıkça ortaya çıktı. Üçüncüsü, dini terimlerle yorumlanan bir iç tehdit dış tehditlerle bağlantılı olduğunda, dinin kimlik belirleyicisi etrafında birleşmenin gerekliliği daha da önem kazanır. General Ziya-ül Hak dönemini ele alan dördüncü bölümün de göstereceği gibi, İslam'ı ve Müslüman kimliğini korumaya yönelik bu çağrı, Pakistanlı olmanın ne anlama geldiğini daha fazla tanımlamaya ve yeni bir dini sınır ilan etmeye yönelik bir hükümet politikasını meşrulaştırmak için her zaman gündeme getirilebilir.

Dördüncü bölüm General Ziya-ül Hak'ın 1977'den 1989'a kadar olan dönemini ele almaktadır. Bu bölüm, General Ziya'nın konuşmalarının ve dönemin siyasi ortamının yardımıyla, ülke içindeki dini sınırları ve Pakistan'a yönelik tehditleri nasıl algıladığını

açıklamaktadır. Bölünmeden sonra devletin ideolojik anlayışı farklı liderler tarafından farklı yorumlanmıştır çünkü devletin temeli bir kez ideolojik (İslam) olduğunda, onu yeterince İslami bulmayan herhangi bir yöneticinin anlayışına potansiyel olarak açıktır. Ziya'nın durumu da böyleydi; onun özelliği Pakistan'ın yerine getirilmemiş vaatleri olarak algıladığı şeye, yani sözde vaat ettiği şey ile gerçekleştiği şey arasındaki uçuruma olan takıntısıydı. Devletin orijinal temelleri ideolojik olduğundan ve tam olarak tanımlanmadığından, Ziya bu yetersiz tanımlanmış iç dini sınırları ele aldı ve bunları kendi anlayışına göre yorumladı. General Ziya'ya göre Pakistan devleti tamamlanmamış bir projeydi ve Pakistan'ı tamamlayacak eksik bileşen İslam'dı. Ziya Pakistan'ın sadece ismen bir İslam cumhuriyeti olduğunu düşünüyordu. Ona göre İslam sadece yasama ile sınırlandırılmış, pratik kısmı ise birbirini izleyen hükümetler tarafından kasıtlı olarak göz ardı edilmişti. Zia döneminde dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişini açıklarken, bu bölüm Zia'nın dini sınırlar ve algılanan tehditler yaratmada üstlendiği farklı rollere odaklanmıştır. Bölüm, Zia'yı bir asker, politikacı ve dış politika uzmanı olarak ele almaktadır. Zia'nın konuşmalarını analiz eden bölüm, Zia'nın Pakistan'ın yönetimi konusundaki anlayışının iktidar döneminde nasıl değiştiğini vurgulamaktadır. Zia başlangıçta 90 gün içinde seçimlerle demokrasiye dönülmesini desteklemiş, ancak daha sonra demokratik yönetimin tüm paradigmasını sorgulayarak bu görüşünden vazgeçmiştir. Zia, Batı'da uygulanan demokrasiye şiddetle karşı çıkmış ve Pakistan'a uygun bir model istemiştir. Dışarıdan gelen yardımla bu vizyonunu bir ölçüde gerçekleştirebilmiştir. Dış yardım, Sovyetler Birliği'nin Afganistan'ı işgali şeklinde geldi. Soğuk Savaş'ın doruk noktasında Zia, ABD ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin tehdidi altındaki diğer ülkelerin desteğini kazanmayı başardı. Bu, Zia'ya Pakistan'daki iktidarını güçlendirmek için kullandığı uluslararası destek sağladı. Zia, İslam hukukunu getirip uygulamaya koydu ve silahlı kuvvetlerin Pakistan'ın ideolojik sınırlarını korumakla sorumlu olduğunu ilan etti.

Ancak bu bölüm Ziya'nın İslamlaştırma politikalarının ya da on bir yıllık iktidarının bir değerlendirmesi değildir. Bu bölüm Ziya'nın İslamlaştırma politikalarının ve on yıllık iktidarının Pakistan'da dini milliyetçiliği nasıl körüklediğine odaklanmaktadır. Akademik literatür Ziya dönemini İslamlaştırma ve diktatörlük dönemi olarak vurgulamaktadır. Ancak bunun Pakistan'daki Müslümanların dini kimliğini ve Pakistanlı kimliğini nasıl etkilediği sorusuna cevap vermemektedir. Bu çalışma, Pakistan'da dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişine odaklanarak bu araştırma boşluğunu doldurmuştur. Bu bölüm sadece Ziya'nın dini ulusal bilinçle nasıl birleştirebildiğini vurgulamakla kalmıyor, aynı zamanda İslamlaştırma politikalarının Pakistan toplumunda dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişi üzerindeki kalıcı etkisi hakkında da fikir veriyor. Son olarak bu bölüm, ideolojik bir devletin temellerinin yeterince dini olmadığı yönünde yorumlara açık olacağına dair daha geniş bir noktayı ortaya

koymaktadır. Sonuç olarak, ülke içindeki dini sınırlar herhangi bir yönetici tarafından her an çizilebilir. Dini milliyetçiliğin bu mekanizma sayesinde varlığını sürdürmesi, ulus-devletin kurulmasından sonra dini milliyetçiliğin nasıl devam ettiğini açıklamaktadır.

Son olarak, beşinci bölüm tezin bulgularını tekrarlayarak tezi sonlandırmaktadır. Bu tez, Pakistan örneği üzerinden dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bağımsızlıktan önce ve sonra bir ulusu analiz ederek din ve milliyetçilik arasındaki ilişkiyi keşfetmeye yönelik daha geniş bir argümana hizmet etmektedir. Dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişini açıklarken tez, Barker'ın (2009) "dini milliyetçiliğin öncelikle iki temel faktör tarafından şekillendirildiğini öne süren çalışmasına dayanmaktadır: dini sınırlar ve tehditler" (ibid, s.182). Barker sadece coğrafi tek bir dış dini sınıra odaklanıp tehdit oluşum mekanizmasını yeterince teorize etmezken, bu çalışma iç dini sınırlara, birden fazla sınır olasılığına odaklanmakta ve ayrıca tehdit algısı mekanizmasını açıklamaktadır. Ayrıca, ulus-devlet oluşumundan sonra dini milliyetçiliğin yaygınlığını da açıklamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, çalışma, yerel dini sınırların inşa edildiğini ve bu tehdidin siyasi elitlerin konuşma eylemi yoluyla güvenlikleştirildiğinde dini bir tehdit oluşturduğunu varsaymaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu durum din ile kaynaşmış ulusal kimliğin oluşmasına ve kristalleşmesine yol açarak dini milliyetçiliğin güçlenmesine neden olmaktadır. Burada dinin kimliğin tek belirleyicisi olarak hareket ettiği söylenemez, ancak kimlik oluşumunda merkezde yer almaktadır. Pakistan'ın bağımsızlık mücadelesi dini tanımlamalarla örülü olduğu için Pakistan örneği seçilmiştir. Müslüman siyasi liderler, bölünmeden önce ve sonra, Müslüman kimliğini İslami idealler temelinde tanımlamışlardır. Din ve milliyetçiliğin bu birleşimi, Müslümanlar ve Hindular arasında dini sınırlar inşa edildiğinde görünür hale gelmiştir. Bu, toplumsal sınırları yaratanların yalnızca Müslüman siyasi liderler olduğunu iddia etmek anlamına gelmemektedir. İngiliz raj politikaları ve INC'nin Müslümanların taleplerini karşılamadaki isteksizliği, komünal açıyı önemli ölçüde teşvik etmiştir. Bu siyasi güçler arasındaki etkileşimde Müslümanlar dini sınırlar çizmiş ve diğerlerini tehdit olarak görmüştür. Ayrıca Pakistan örneği, diğer Avrupa örnekleriyle birlikte dini milliyetçilik literatürünü zenginleştirmektedir.

Bu bölüm ayrıca gelecekteki çalışma alanlarını da vurgulamaktadır. Dini milliyetçiliğin zayıflamasını açıklamak ilgili bir takip araştırması alanı olacaktır. Dini milliyetçilik azalabilir mi? Nasıl azalacaktır? İyi bir başlangıç noktası, bu çalışmanın teorik çerçevesini tersine çevirmek ve siyasi elit tarafından tehditlerin ve dini sınırların güvenliksizleştirilmesinin dini milliyetçiliğin azalmasına yol açacağını iddia etmek olacaktır. Ancak, güvenliksizleştirmenin kendisi yeterince araştırılmamış bir konudur ve daha fazla sorgulanmaya açıktır. Rutin güvenlikleştirme anlatılarının hakim olduğu ortamların

güvenliksizleştirilmesi zordur. Örneğin, anlatının güvenliksizleştirilmesini kim başlatacaktır?Adamides'in (2020) çatışma çözümü üzerine yaptığı çalışma, güvenliksizleştirme konusunda bir başlangıç noktası sunmaktadır: siyasi elitler tarafından başlatılan yukarıdan aşağıya yaklaşım ve izleyici odaklı yaklaşım (a.g.e., s.145-148). Dahası, siyasi ve dini meseleler tamamen kutsallıktan arındırılabilir mi? Bu önemlidir çünkü bölünmeden sonra Pakistan örneğinde, Cinnah dönüm noktası niteliğindeki konuşmasında Hindular ve Müslümanlar arasındaki toplumsal bölünmeyi kutsallıktan arındırmaya çalışmıştır.Yeni kurulan Müslüman ulus, farklı Müslüman kimliğini öylesine kökleştirmişti ki, komünal anlatının tamamen kutsallıktan arındırılması asla başarılamad. Birincisi, Cinnah yeni çağrısını kabul ettirecek kadar uzun yaşamadı ve ikincisi, bölünmeyi takip eden katliam, anlatının kutsallıktan arındırılmasını zorlaştırdı. Dolayısıyla, dini söylemin kutsallıktan arındırılmasını anlamak. Dolayısıyla, dini sınırların ve tehditlerin güvenliksizleştirilmesini anlamak, dini milliyetçiliğin zayıflamasını açıklamada daha iyi bir mekanizma sunabilir.

Bir diğer araştırma alanı da dış dini sınırlardır. Bu çalışma Barker'ın (2009) dış dini sınırlara odaklanan çalışmasından ilham almıştır ancak esas olarak iç dini sınırların geçerliliğine ve bunların dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişindeki rolüne odaklanmıştır. Gelecekte yapılacak önemli bir araştırma, dış dini sınırların hangi koşullar altında yeniden önemli hale geldiğini sormak olacaktır. İkinci olarak, bölgesel çatışmalar dini sınırlar içine nasıl yerleştirilmektedir? Keşmir Pakistan için bir kırmızı çizgi olarak güvenlikleştirildiği için bu önemlidir. Bu tür bölgesel anlaşmazlıkların Müslüman kimliğini ve dini milliyetçiliğin yükselişini etkilemede bir rol oynayıp oynamadığını görmek faydalı olacaktır.

Bir başka araştırma alanı da dini milliyetçilik ve popülizm arasındaki ilişkiyle ilgilidir. Dini, milliyetçi elitler genellikle kimliklerin yapısını değiştirerek sınırlarını etkiler. Bu da kimliğin genişlemesine, daralmasına ya da zaman zaman yeniden düşünülmesine yol açar. Bu çalışma, bunun yerel dini sınırların tehdit edilmesinde meydana geldiğini savunmaktadır. Peki popülizm bu süreçte nasıl bir rol oynamaktadır? Brubaker'ın (2017, 2019) popülizm ve milliyetçilik arasındaki ilişkiye dair kavramsallaştırması iyi bir başlangıç noktası olabilir. Bu araştırma yönü, Güney Asya ve Pakistan için önemlidir. Pakistan'da Başbakan İmran Han'ın önceki hükümeti, devletin toplumda iyiliği emretme gücüne sahip olacağı bir "Yeni Medine" yaratmak istiyordu. Bu araştırma dizisi, popülizmi de söyleme dahil ederek din ve milliyetçilik arasındaki ilişkinin kapsamını genişletecektir. Sağ kanat hükümetlerin yükselişi göz önüne alındığında, bu aynı zamanda dini milliyetçilik ve popülizm arasındaki ilişkinin daha iyi anlaşılmasına da katkıda bulunacaktır.

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