

UNITY IN DIVERSITY?  
CHANGING THREAT PERCEPTION AND SECURITY  
CONSIDERATIONS OF INDIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

OF

MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN


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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

### UNITY IN DIVERSITY? CHANGING THREAT PERCEPTION AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS OF INDIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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September 2001, 103pages

The aim of this study is examining India's threat perception and security consideration, which has undergone a process of change with the end of the Cold War. The rationale behind choosing India is to analyze the problems confronted by the multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-cultural states with the end of the Cold War in the light of new conditions and tendencies emerged along with the globalization process. In carrying out the study the historical background is investigated in considerable detail as the basic reason for the actual plural socio-cultural structure. In order to understand the nature of changes in India's threat perception and security considerations in the post-Cold War era a special emphasis has been put on the Cold War period. At the end of the study, it was understood that with the end of the Cold War, India's externally oriented threat perception was replaced by a domestically oriented one. In a period where ultra-national institutions and sub-national units and movements acquired much legitimacy in the international arena, and where the very concept of state is being questioned both in conceptual and practical grounds, in countries like India where the state has a crucial role in the construction of national unity, the nature of domestic problems and the ways of solutions developed by the state has become of a vital importance. The ethnic and demographic composition of the South Asian region has added a regional dimension to the domestic problems. It is concluded that in order to develop sustainable solutions to her domestic problems India, in the post-Cold War era will pursue a regionally oriented policy.

**Key Words:** India, Cold War, post-Cold War, security, socio-cultural diversity

## ÖZ

### ÇEŞİTLİLİK İÇİNDE BİRLİK Mİ? SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEMDE HİNDİSTAN'IN DEĞİŞEN TEHDİT ALGILAMASI VE GÜVENLİK ANLAYIŞI

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Eylül 2001, 103sayfa

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle birlikte Hindistan'ın değişen güvenlik anlayışı ve tehdit algılamalarını incelemektir. Ülke olarak Hindistan'ın seçilmesinin nedeni Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle beraber küreselleşmenin ortaya çıkardığı yeni durumlar ve eğilimler ışığında, çok etnili, çok dilli, çok kültürlü devletlerin karşılıklı kaldıkları problemleri analiz edebilmektir. Çalışma yapılırken bugünkü sosyo kültürel çoğul yapının oluşmasına etki eden tarihsel arka plan incelenmiştir. Ayrıca Soğuk Savaş sonrası güvenlik anlayışı ve tehdit algılamasının nasıl değiştiğini anlayabilmek için Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki güvenlik algısına yer verilmiştir. Çalışma sonunda Hindistan'ın tehdit algılaması dışa yönelikken, Soğuk Savaş'ın bitişle içe yönelik hale geldiği görülmüştür. Ulus-üstü kurumların ve ulus-altı birimlerin ve hareketlerin uluslararası alanda meşruiyet kazandığı ve devletin hem kavramsal hem de uygulamada sorgulandığı bir dönemde; Hindistan gibi, devletin toplumsal birliği sağlamada temel bir işleve sahip olduğu ülkelerde, devlet içi sorunlar ve bunlara bulunacak çözüm yolları hayati bir öneme sahip hale gelmiştir. Güney Asya bölgesinin etnik ve demografik özellikleri iç sorunlara bölgesel bir boyut kazandırmış ve Hindistan'ın sorunlarının çözümü için bölge merkezli politikalar izleyeceği sonucuna varılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Hindistan, Soğuk Savaş, Soğuk Savaş sonrası, güvenlik, sosyo kültürel çeşitlilik.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In acknowledging the help I received during this study, I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation firstly to Prof. Dr. Mete Tuncoku, not only for his invaluable advice and constructive comments throughout this study, but also for his continual kindness, support and patience

I would also like to thank to the faculty members, Doç. Dr. Nuri Yurdusev and Doç. Dr. Nazlı Wasti Pamuksuz for their invaluable comments, and Instructor Melek Düzgüneş, who contributed a lot to the English redaction of this study.

I would like to extend my special thanks to my close friends Hişyar Özsoy and Serap Rūken Şengül who gave enthusiasm and helped me on the processing and printing stages of this study. I am most grateful to my family and my colleagues for the understanding and support they have shown.

Finally I would like to record my indebtedness to the faculty of International Relations Department for their informative and guiding role throughout my graduate study years.

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## CHAPTER I:

### INTRODUCTION

The unification of Germany in October 3, 1990 and the disintegration of Soviet Union in the end of 1991 had confirmed the validity of the assumption that the world would go through a great transformation and would not resemble the old world anymore. During the Gulf War, which was intimately interrelated with these global changes, US president George Bush had declared that a New World Order would be established; an order that would be respectful to human rights and democratic principles and within which no state could dominate any other. The person drawing this general framework of world politics and inter-state relations was the president of a state who had formulated its foreign policy upon the discourse that it was struggling as the representative of the free world against communism and totalitarianism. After the collapse of communism, world politics became marked with the relations of states for whom liberal democratic principles, which got a great victory against communism, were the dominating values. There were even persons like Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1992) who declared the end of history. Besides, the collapse of regimes in Central and Eastern Europe brought about another significant problem: What would the peoples of these regions, who had been living together since the end of World War II, yet within the territories of different states and despite considerable ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity marking this geography, do? The problems were not very serious in Eastern Europe, where Czechs and Slovenes had reorganized themselves as different states, yet problems originating from the more complicated ethnic and religious composition in Balkans, particularly in Yugoslavia and Albania, resulted in very dramatic events, which have been threatening the security of Europe as a whole and brought about significant changes and modifications in its legal systems. Human rights, minority rights and group rights and the various arrangements for the protection of these rights became crucial ingredients of the new legal framework. The citizens of the states who undersigned



the conventions that were prepared according to new legal conditions were given new rights, enabling them more to complain of the unlawful practices of their states to supra-national legal institutions. The nature of national laws changed and such conventions meant violations of national sovereignty in its classical sense. Another concept, newly institutionalized according to the emerging legal framework, was humanitarian intervention, which enables intervention in states without their consent when it is deemed necessary. All these changes have led to a widespread discussion on the future of nation states.

In the economic sphere, the collapse of Soviet Union was generally considered as the weakness of strictly state-controlled economies, and liberal politics became more identified with liberal economies. Most of the states formerly which had controlled economies initiated liberalization policies through a process of privatization and got financial support from global funding institutions as IMF and World Bank upon the principle of 'conditionality'.

During this process of dramatic social, economic and political transformation, many Asian states began to verbalize the fact that such policies were incompatible with their own realities and worsened their conditions. Many of these states had become independent only in the second half of twentieth century. The worldwide increase in the influence of supra-national economic and political institutions dominated by Europe and US began to be seen as mechanisms to undermine the national sovereignty of non-Western states through a process of neo-colonialism. Samuel Huntington defended his thesis of *The Clash of Civilizations* within such a political environment, and within which he argued that Islam and Confucianism would resist Western civilization (Huntington, 1993). Such global changes also contributed to the modification of the theory of international relations to a great extent; the criticisms against modernist theories that have been claiming universality increased, the idea of relativity began to dominate much of the discussions in the theory of international relations and the value-free approach of positivism has been replaced by pluralist approaches concentrating on the 'problem of value' to a considerable degree. The claims to uniqueness of different states, therefore, gained more legitimacy, at least on a theoretical level.

The idea and hope that the end of the Cold War, which had divided world into two main ideological, economic, political and military camps, paved the way for the creation of a unified world has been accompanied with the fear that a new division could emerge between the Western states identifying themselves with democratic and liberal principles and non-Western states resisting these, Western ideals, especially the Asian countries. In this context, India as an Asian country with a democratic regime seems to be the battleground of these ideas?

My aim, initially, was to analyze the basic features of global political trends through an examination of the changes in the post-Cold War era in India, which is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious Asian country claiming to be the most populous democracy of the world. I had two different, yet interrelated, questions in the beginning. First, what would be the impacts of global political trends on the social, economic, and political stability of India? The second one was related to the answer of the first question: Whether India would be able to maintain her domestic structure without any division destroying her national unity and integrity? My first readings were largely concentrated on theoretical issues, yet gradually I became aware that I was not able to catch the particularities of India. Moreover, there were also some features peculiar to India that could not be accounted for by an analysis of global trends. From then on, I concentrated on a more concrete issue; the foreign policy of India in the post-Cold War era. I became aware that the present-day conditions of India and changes in her foreign policy could not be explained without a good understanding of the particularities of India in terms of her social, cultural forms, and political traditions originating from her long and complicated history, and the basic features of the South Asian region where India occupies a large part, and especially the partition in 1947. This idea was the basic motive for me to apply a multi-dimensional approach during this study.

During my studies on the changes in India's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, I also attended a course; namely India's Security and Foreign Policy, given by Doctor Rao Sreedhar in the summer school. The way in which Professor Sreedhar had structured the lectured and his approach to Indian foreign policy provided me with valuable information and enhanced my understanding how India views her neighboring countries and the fundamental points in her foreign policy. The most

significant insight I have gained from this lecture was seeing the intimate relationship between India's foreign and domestic policy, especially as far as the post-Cold War period is concerned. In line with Mr. Sreedhar's recommendations, I began to read books written exclusively from Indian perspectives. These readings enabled me to comprehend India's changing perception of security and threat under the changing global political circumstances and see what India considers as turning points in her complicated history. Besides, concentration on the ways in which India had responded to significant events throughout her history enabled me to make some assessments about her future domestic and foreign policy orientations. After all these considerations and in the light of the new information I have gained I decided to concentrate the scope of my study on the changes in India's perception of threat and security after the end of Cold War which appeared as a very starting point.

During the study my basic argument is that, threat perception and security considerations of India during the Cold War era were external and were very sensitive to the bloc rivalry and the changes taking place in it. However, the post-Cold War era these security considerations and threat perceptions has become domestically oriented and India seems to follow a more regional policy.

I totally believed that a good understanding of India's history and her extremely diverse social and cultural conditions was necessary in accounting for India's changing perception of threat and security in the context of her domestic and foreign policies and the increasing interrelations between these two after the end of the Cold War. This is the underlying logic in the preparation of the first two chapters.

In the first chapter, the aim is to present some historical reasons that were effective in India's ethnic, linguistic, religious, and regional diversity and to indicate how British colonialism had made use of this diverse cultural and social composition achieving in its goals. Special emphasis is put on British colonialism- which initiated the modern period in India's history; the National Congress -the organization leading the struggle against British colonialism; and two important figures in this struggle -Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru- both because of their contributions to and influence over the ideology in the formation of an independent India, and particularly Nehru's impact on the formulation of domestic and foreign

policies after the Independence. Besides these the international political environment is discussed to the extent it influenced the foreign policy of India, a state on the way to independence.

Chapter II consists of two sections: the socio-cultural conditions in independent India and her constitutional framework and political structures. The underlying assumption behind describing the socio-cultural diversity in India is that it is the source of many internal and external problems, particularly in terms of national security like it does all South Asian countries, and the important impacts it has on both India's foreign and domestic policies. A description of the general features of the constitutional framework and political structures would be very functional in clarifying the manner in which such socio-cultural diversity had been organized into a national polity. The tension and controversy which had out of such a socio-cultural diversity and a considerably centralized national polity were the source of important security problems in the history of independent India.

In Chapter III, India's domestic and foreign policies during Cold War are discussed together with certain security problems with a special emphasis on historically significant events. Independent India was founded by a partition of the subcontinent in 1947. After the end of World War II, world was largely divided between two hostile camps. Both the partition and the emerging bipolar orientation in world politics had been the most important factors in shaping India's perception of threat and security until the end of Cold War. However, although the rivalry between blocks had considerably influenced India's formulating her foreign and domestic policies, the assumption that there existed a uniform pattern in Indian politics during Cold War does not reflect reality. The defeat of India in Sino-Indian War in 1962 was a turning point in the political history of India in the sense that it changed the priorities of her foreign and security policies. The War with Pakistan in 1971 and the foundation of Bangladesh had changed the power balance in the region. Other major changes came with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of the ethnic conflict Sri Lanka. Moreover, the effects of India's insufficient capability in solving her internal problems and the deepening lack of confidence between India and her neighboring countries, due to the increase of already existing structural power asymmetry in the region under the conditions of the Cold War, on

both India and the region are discussed briefly. The aim in holding this chapter extensive and detailed is to provide sufficient background information in order to pursue the changes in India's perception of threat and security in post-Cold War era in a broader context.

Chapter IV concentrates on the general implications of the end of the Cold War and the main problems India has been troubled with in the post-Cold War era. India's relations with neighboring countries and the formerly two great powers –the US and the Soviet Union- and her internal problems are described briefly with respect to the uncertainties and opportunities that had been brought about by the end of the bipolar orientation in world politics. Furthermore, the impacts of liberalization policies, globalization, and the human rights discourse on India will be discussed briefly. The changes in the nature of India's internal, regional, and international problems would give valuable information in explaining India's changing perception of threat and security.

Throughout this research the international structure and changes in the international system was given priority over national politics. The subject is divided into two parts with respect to the changes at systemic level, such as the Cold War and the Post-Cold war period. However, the emphasis is put on the fact that each actor is affected by these changes according to its peculiarity, and responds to them according to its characteristics and opportunities. Since such a process is quite painful and complicated, rather than being automatic, the actor, or the actors themselves are investigated in detail and the relationship between those changes and the actors are extensively considered. Furthermore, since a very complicated country, namely India, where the domestic and foreign policies converge on one another to a great extent is analyzed, a multi-dimensional approach to this study has been found to be more meaningful.

## CHAPTER II:

### SOME PRELIMINARY NOTES ON INDIAN HISTORY

#### 2. 1. *A Historical Introduction to South Asia*

The region which is referred to as South Asia is a land of one of the oldest ancient civilizations of humanity with cities and villages, cultivated fields, trade centers, a sophisticated urban culture and enduring religious and philosophical beliefs dating back 4000 years.

Geographically, South Asia constitutes an area situated between the Himalayan mountain ranges in the north and the Indian Ocean to the south. It is bordered to the west by the Kithar mountains of Baluchistan, the Hindu Kush, the Karakuroms, the high plateau of Tibet; and to the east the foothills of Bhutan, and the Chittagong, Mizo, Chin, Naga and Patkai hills on the Bangladesh – Burmese border.<sup>1</sup> It takes into its fold the current states of Nepal and Bhutan in the North East Bangladesh in the East, Pakistan in the west, Sri Lanka and Maldives in the south.

The earliest traces of human life in South Asia go back to 6000 B.C. The archeological remnants found in many parts of South Asia stand for the fact that the ancient inhabitants of the region had domesticated animals, adapted agriculture, established permanent settlements dating from the middle of the sixth millennium B.C. Excavations along the Indus River valley provide a composite picture of a culture which is now generally known as the Harappan culture, is one of the first great civilizations with an extensive agriculture, a uniform urban planning, a writing system, and a diversified social and economic system.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout its history, the region has undergone innumerable episodes of military conquest by extra regional powers. However, neither these, nor the

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<sup>1</sup> Vernon Hewitt, *The New International Politics of South Asia* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 4

<sup>2</sup> James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, *India A Country Study*, Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1995, Chapter I Historical Setting. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/intoc.html>



successive political formations had been mere parts of the regions political history. The political entities formed one after the other by ethnically, linguistically, or religiously different ruling parties which strongly account for the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity in the region. These not paradoxically has created a strong sense of belonging to a common geography, history and culture among the current states of the region which are now demarcated with borders not corresponding to a 'unity' which has resulted from 'disunity' characterized by inter-group toleration and conflict, and harmony and violence simultaneously.<sup>3</sup>

The Harappan culture is known to have declined around 1600 B.C. However, the exact reason for this decline is not known. It might be a result of a serious of national disasters, i.e. recurrent floods, tectonic earth movement, soil salinity, and desertification; or attacks by a group of Indo-European speaking people, known as Aryans, who migrated to the Punjab region and established "tribal" settlements across the Indo Gangetic Plain between 1500 and 800 B.C.<sup>4</sup>

The Aryans who had their own well-developed language and culture, felt no compulsion to emulate the advanced Indus Valley civilization, to borrow its script or language, or adopt any of its socio-political institutions.<sup>5</sup> They brought their language, a patrilineal and patriarchal system and a new social order, built on the religious and philosophical principles of a body of sacred texts: the four Veda's.<sup>6</sup>

By 600 B.C., the tribal settlements had been transformed by a number of hereditary monarchs, where the king and his right to rule were accepted as divine. By the end of the same century the region was integrated into the Persian Achaemenid Empire. This was the beginning of administrative contacts between Central and South Asia.

From the last quarter of the third century B.C. until the first quarter of the eighth century A.C. the region was controlled by kingdoms and empires established by Indian dynasties one after the other, or at different parts of South Asia simultaneously. During the interdynastic rivalry three religions – Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism prevailed over many aspects of communal life in the region,

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., Chapter I Historical Setting.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., Chapter I Vedic Aryans.

<sup>5</sup> Ranbir Vohra, *The Making of India: Ahistorical Survey* (New York: Library of Congress Cataloging, 1997), p.12.

however, the latter two began to decline by the middle of the 7<sup>th</sup> century where Hinduism gained an ever-increasing popular support.<sup>7</sup>

The first Arab-Muslim military conquest came during the first quarter of the eighth century. In 711, the first Indo-Muslim state was established in the Indus Delta region in Sindh.<sup>8</sup> At the beginning of the 11<sup>th</sup> century, the region had undergone a big Muslim invasion. Mahmud of Ghazni (971-1030) mounted seventeen plundering expeditions between 997 and 1027 into North India and annexed Punjab as his eastern province.<sup>9</sup> In the 15<sup>th</sup> century a Turkic kingdom was established in Delhi. By the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the Delhi sultanate controlled a vast territory extending to Bengal in the east and, Deccan to the South. Under the rule of Sultan Ala-ud-Din, a highly centralized system of administration was established. However, he could not prevent the emergence of competing dynasties. The Vijayanagar Empire, founded in today's Karnataka in 1336, became one of the centers of Hindu culture, whereas the Bahmani Sultane, founded in Hyderabad in 1347, developed a Muslim culture in its vicinity. The political rivalry between the Bahmani and Vijayanagar rulers continued even after the former was fragmented into five smaller states in 1527; in 1565 the five rulers of the former Bahmani Sultanate organized a joint attack to Vijayanagar in 1565 where the empire fell at the Battle of Talikot.

In the early sixteenth century the Mughals invaded the region. In 1526, the Mughals, under the leadership of Babur Khan established a rule in Kabul (within the borders of present – day Afghanistan) By 1560's the Mughal rule was extended to Kashmir in the north, Bengal in the east, and beyond the Narmada river in the south.<sup>10</sup>

The Mughals exercised a politically stable and economically dynamic administration until the second half of the seventeenth century. During the reign of Aurangzeb from 1658 to 1707, the empire witnessed irreversible symptoms of decline. The corruption in the bureaucratic apparatus and the army, combined with Aurangzeb's desire to rebuild the Islamic orthodoxy- namely, reimposition the hated poll tax (*jizya*) on the Hindus and razing several Hindu temples and building mosques

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<sup>6</sup> Heitzman and Waden, op.cit. Chapter I Vedic Aryans.

<sup>7</sup> Vohra, op.cit., p.15.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p.15.

<sup>9</sup> Heitzman and Waden, op.cit., Chapter I The Coming of Islam



on their sites<sup>11</sup> created severe discontents driven by the non – Muslim subjects of the empire. The revolts against his rule took either the form of peasant uprising and revolts by local leaders, or attempts by nobles to preserve and/or to enhance their own status at the expense of a steadily weakening empire. Consequent to a series of protracted wars against the Pathans in Afghanistan, sultans of Bijapur and Golkanda in the Deccan and the Marathas in Maharashtra, suffered numerous loses. The losses were not only confined to that of the Mughal empire, deprived of much of its territory, thus its political and economic power; but also they effected the region as a whole which became very instable, fragile and open to the invasion of the new comers; the European powers.

## 2. 2. *The British India*

The European presence in South Asia did not start with a military invasion. Long before the foundation of the British and the Dutch companies, the Portuguese had established a monopoly of trade in East Indies. When the English and the Dutch founded the East India Company (1600) and the United East India Company (1602) in their territories respectively, they did so with the hope of breaking the Portuguese monopoly of trade in Asia and getting as much economic and trade concessions in the region as possible. Initially they were welcomed by the regional rulers who were hoping to pit them against the Portuguese.

Unlike the Portuguese and Dutch company agents and later the French, the English, in time, became familiar with the Indian customs and languages, and the Persian language, which was then the official language of the Mughals. Their knowledge of India provided the English agents with a competitive edge over other Europeans.

In 1717 the Mughal emperor, Farrukh-Siyar, gave the British a grant of thirty-eight villages near Calcutta, acknowledging their importance to the continuity of international trade in Bengal.<sup>12</sup> They were also given the right of administering their

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., Chapter I The Mughal Era.

<sup>11</sup> Vohra, op.cit., p.16.

<sup>12</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter I The Coming of Europeans.

own civil and criminal laws wherever they settled. These first English settlements, which were to become the headquarters of the British administrative zones, represented the actual and symbolic preeminence of the British in terms of their political power – as well as their cultural values and social practices. The factories and their immediate environments were known as the white – town; meanwhile the Indian English collaborators lived in the black – town separated from them by several kilometers.<sup>13</sup>

In 1757, Robert Clive, administrator of the East Indian Company, was granted administrative rights over Bengal by the Mughal emperor Shah Alam in return for his support in the Battle of Plassey and became the first British governor of Bengal where his company was recognized as the sovereign power.

The Company rule in India lasted up until the foundation of the British Raj in 1858. During a hundred years of the Company rule, many indigenous rulers retained a fictional sovereignty under Pax Britannica by giving up their real responsibilities to the Company in India. The region was integrated into an international economic system, which it provided with a huge reserve of natural resources, mines, and manpower for plantations and cotton. The British civil and criminal jurisdiction replaced the indigenous set of codes or rules of procedure in many places; in some others a complex mixture of the two prevailed under the Company rule. Beginning with the first quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the company started to pursue an economic policy which aimed at reinforcing the existing socioeconomic division in society.<sup>14</sup>

By the 1850's India was adorned with long railroad lines, high ways, waterways, telegraph and a postal service. These developments not only accelerated the mobility of troops and increased the speed and profitability of trade through easier commercialization, but also stood for the long-term British interests in India.

The British Raj replaced the Company Rule in 1858 after the suppression of a serious uprising called the Sepoy Rebellion. The leaders of the rebellion, called sepoys, were European-trained and European-led Indian soldiers, who were initially employed so as to protect the British trade in India.<sup>15</sup> The rebellion represented the culmination of ever-increasing Indian resentment towards the British economic and

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., Chapter I The Coming of Europeans

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., Chapter I Company Rule.

social policies and the civil war spread thereafter seriously threatened the British rule in India. Although it was suppressed finally, it served as a great inspiration for the nationalists who were to emerge as an effective center of dissidence during the British Raj Rule.

In 1858, the British exiled Emperor Bahadur Shah II to Burma; this was the formal end of the Mughal Empire and the beginning of the direct rule of the British Empire, the forces of which abolished the company rule at the same time.

The governor-general of the British Raj, headquartered in Calcutta, ran the administration in India, assisted by executive and legislative councils.<sup>16</sup> Beneath him were the provincial governors who held power over the district officials. The economic policies were inherited from the Company Rule almost unchanged, whereas several administrative modifications were conducted so as to institutionalize the British rule throughout the country. The Sepoy Rebellion had changed the British attitude towards the Indian population. The latter came to be insulated from the administrative rank and the opportunities for social mobility, which added to the resentment increasing against the British rule among the ever-expanding number of western-educated Indian elites. These elites, originally coming from different religious, linguistic, caste and class backgrounds, began to perceive themselves as a “nation”, their faiths bound to one another, thanks to the very presence and practices of the British colonial rule. As Bimla Prasad puts it:

It is one of the ironies of history as well as a tribute to the work done by the British in India that the administrative and economic unification of India Under British rule itself provided the necessary base for the dawn of a national consciousness which received an organized form with the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, and reached its fruition with the end of the British rule and the achievement of the British rule and the achievement of Indian independence in 1947.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Bipan Chandra *India's Struggle for Independence* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1989), p.41.

<sup>16</sup> Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, and Robert C. Oberst *Government and Politics in South Asia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p.9.

<sup>17</sup> Bimla Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy The Indian National Congress and World Affairs 1885- 1947* (Calcutta: Bookland Private Limited, 1962) p.,

## *2.3. Indian Independence Movement*

### *2.3. 1. Origins of the National Congress*

A group of seventy-three upwardly mobile and Western-educated provincial elites who represented in themselves a growing political awareness met in Bombay in 1885 and founded the Indian National Congress. At its inception the Congress did not have an aim of independence from the British rule or even self-government. The lack of such a target was thoroughly expressed by the first president of the congress, Umesh Chandra Banerjee in these words: “There are no more thoroughly loyal and consistent well-wishers of the British Government than were I and the friends around me”.<sup>18</sup>

Since its foundation the Indian National Congress had a claim to represent all-India, however, it could not emerge as an all-India political organization up until the beginnings of the twentieth century. In the meantime it functioned no more than as a debate platform where numerous resolutions were passed on less controversial issues such as civil service.<sup>19</sup>

The partition of Bengal in 1905 so as to split the Bengali speaking population into two provinces, with Eastern Bengal and Assam (with its capital at Dhaka), and the west Bengal (with its capital at Calcutta) created an outrage among the Bengalis. The British aimed to separate Muslims and Hindus by partition.<sup>20</sup> The Congress advocated boycotting of British products, which was proved to be very successful in bringing about great challenge against the British rule ever since the Sepoy Rebellion.<sup>21</sup> The famine of 1896, followed by the plague of 1897, resulted in the deaths of many people and created a widespread discontent.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Quoted in the Proceedings of the First Indian National Congress (Madras: The Madras Printing Works, 1905), p. 9.

<sup>19</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter I Post- Rebellion Developments.

<sup>20</sup> Chandra., op.cit. p.125.

<sup>21</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter I Post- Rebellion Developments.

<sup>22</sup> Prasad, op. cit., p. 31.

In the international sphere, the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was marked with a wild and aggressive intra-colonialist rivalry on the one hand and ever-increasing anti-colonialist sentiments in the colonized world on the other. The Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 created a wave of excitement and hope throughout Asia, where it was interpreted as the victory of a small Asian nation over a big European power.<sup>23</sup>

What began as a European war in 1914 spread to the other parts of the world in the course and affected the lives of hundreds of millions of people in the colonized world. During World War I, India provided the British Army with over 1,3 million soldiers and laborers who served in other parts of the world for the Empire. However, most of these men never went back home. The high casualty rate, combined with heavy taxation and widespread epidemics, escalated the human suffering in India, thus the reaction against the British rule. The growing discontent provided a suitable ground for the flourishing of nationalist movement led by the Indian National Congress and aroused a mass support for the idea of overthrowing a foreign rule which has brought to the masses nothing but suffering and poverty.

The idea and principle of the right to “self determination”, as developed by Woodrow Wilson and Lenin, although drastically differed from one another at the very base, provided the struggles against colonialism both with an important ideological base to mobilize popular protest and a growing moral legitimacy in the international arena. The Bolshevik Revolution led to the spread of socialist ideas throughout Asia.

In between the two World Wars, the Indian National Congress became the spokesman of Indian Nationalist demands and driving force of nationalist struggle. The ever-increasing support towards it forced the British to enact a series of reforms, among which the two ‘Government of India Acts’ of 1919 and 1935 constituted milestones in the Indian Nationalist Movement. However, the Congress did not contend with such reformation acts and was determined to proceed further.

The achievements of the National Congress was undermined by its failure to attract Muslims as the true center of representation – in 1906, the All-India Muslim League was founded and it insisted on its separateness from the Hindu – dominated

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

congress as the voice of a “nation within a nation”.<sup>24</sup> Although there had been temporary alliances between the National Congress and the Muslim league, the rivalry between the two increased in time. During World War II the Muslim league supported the British under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, whereas the National Congress took up an uncooperative and often belligerent attitudes towards the British.

During the annual meeting of the Muslim League in Lahore in 1940, Jinnah persuaded the participants to adopt what later came to be known as the Two-State Solution, demanding the division of India into two separate sovereign states, one Muslim and the other Hindu. The antagonism between the Congress and the League paramounted up until the declaration of the partition of the British Indian Empire into the nations of India and Pakistan in Summer 1947.

### *2. 3. 2. Political Project of the National Congress*

Being the engine of the National Liberation Movement and the key integrative political institution since 1947, the National Congress (which was renamed as the Congress Party after independence) deserves special attention.

Notwithstanding the fact that there have been Hindu extremist groups in the National Congress since the time it was founded, the leading figures like Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, and Maulana Azad were to an important extent supportive of a secular nationalism who “put the ideas of pluralism, tolerance and syncretism at the hearth of India’s definition”.<sup>25</sup>

Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation, embodied these ideas in his person and politics. Gandhi, a devout Hindu both in his private and public life, used religion to mobilize the masses in the national movement, turning a movement confined to the western educated upper middle-classes into a mass movement in the 1920’s. His ideas and strategies of nonviolent civil disobedience, his belief in the unity of moral regeneration, social progress, and national freedom, constituted the

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<sup>24</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit. Chapter I Post -Rebellion Developments

<sup>25</sup> Ashutosh Varshney, ‘Contested meanings: India’s National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety’, *Daedalus*, Vol: 122 No: e, 1993, ygs, p. 176.



backbone of India's political discourse before and during the immediate aftermath of independence. He described his pluralism in a metaphorical statement made on 1 June 1921 thus: "I do not want my house to be walled on all sides and my windows stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any."<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, the complete absence in him of any rancor towards the British people, even though he engaged in leading the struggle against their rule, led to another assumption, namely that India has a mission in the world: the mission of establishing peace and friendship among all nations."<sup>27</sup> Born into an upper caste Kashmiri Brahman family educated at Oxford, Nehru embodied a synthesis of ideals: politically a nationalist, ideologically a pragmatic socialist, an secular in religious outlook.<sup>28</sup> As for his definition for India and Indian ness he was very much affected by Gandhi's moral philosophy and his pluralism. In *The Discovery of India*, Nehru thus stated his recalling of India:

Ancient India, like ancient China, was a world in itself, a culture and a civilization, which gave shape to all things. Foreign influences poured in and often influenced that culture and were absorbed. Disruptive tendencies gave rise immediately to an attempt to find a synthesis. Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. That unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a standardization... of beliefs. It was something deeper and, within its fold, the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety acknowledged and even encouraged.<sup>29</sup>

Nehru served as India's first Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1947 and 1964, thus he was the chief architect of domestic and foreign policies throughout this period. However, he was also one of the most important figures in the policy making of the National Congress before independence. It is not misleading to assess that there was a great continuity between the political outlook of the National Congress formulated before independence and the Nehru era.

The first factor that conditioned the congress political outlook was related to India's vast size and population and its geostrategic importance at a time when Asia was becoming ever more important in world affairs. Nehru was a participant in the

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<sup>26</sup> Quoted in *Contested Meanings*, op.cit., p. 197.

<sup>27</sup> Bimla Prasad, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>28</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter I India post rebellion developments.

<sup>29</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Delhi Oxford University Press, New Deldi, 1985, p.62.

Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held at Brussels in 1927 where he was welcomed by all others as a great champion of the struggle against imperialism and Colonialism. Referring to the geo strategic importance of India, in his speech at the Congress, Nehru stated: “Now that the epoch of the European domination has ended and India now comes, I think, in the forefront in international events and world affairs.”<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, this geostrategic importance basically stemming from her commanding position in the Indian ocean, her location in the center of Asia touching almost all parts of it through land or sea, and her proximity to China and Russia compelled the National Congress think quite early in its history of relations with Russia, China and other Asian Countries.<sup>31</sup> Other geographical factors led to a claim that India had to have a say in all developments affecting Asia. A similar vision was shared by Vijay Madan, according to whom “India was an essential component of the British Imperial military strategy, because, besides other things such as its serving as a vast storehouse of material and men, of its unique geographical location between Near, Middle and Far East.”<sup>32</sup> Hence, the National Congress laid a great stress on India’s pivotal position in the context of Asia’s resurgence and role in the ongoing imperialist struggle of the time.

The Congress was also convinced of the need to pursue an independent policy and give an end to India’s role in the international sphere as the toy of a particular big power and fulfill its obligation to become a big power herself taking initiative in creating a cooperative and peaceful international environment. This was best described in Nehru’s speech on 8<sup>th</sup> March 1949 as follows:

It is not for me to criticize other nations and their policies. But I do not see why India should act in a rigid way or should become a part of the maneuvering that is going on in the world. We have to keep aloof from that and at the same time develop the closest relations with all the countries. It so happens that because of history and chance, our relations – economic and trade – are far greater with some countries than with others. Well, we will continue them, always seeing that they do not come in the way of our growth and do not hamper us in our progress. Otherwise, we keep them so that we can play a very important part in world affairs.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Quoted in Harcharan Singh Josh, *India’s Foreign Policy Nehru to Rao* (Delhi: Surjeet Publications, 1994), p. 11

<sup>31</sup> Bimla Prasad, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

<sup>32</sup> Vijay Madan, ‘A Possible Military Thought For India’, *Strategic Analysis*, Vol: XX1, No: 7, October 1997, p. 965.

<sup>33</sup> Quoted in Harcharan Singh Josh, op.cit., p. 15.



However, this desire to have a say in world affairs was somewhat conflictual with the suspicion felt towards the power politics staged by the Great Powers; “in the end the two went hand in hand together and led to a peculiar mixture of interventionism and isolationism in the Indian attitude towards world power politics.”<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Bimla Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

## CHAPTER III:

### A BRIEF LOOK AT THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SETTING IN INDIA

#### *3. 1. Social And Cultural Diversity*

The 930 million people of the country belong to several racial types, which are further divided into many mutually exclusive ethnic groups; they follow seven prominent religions (Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Sikhism, Christianity, Jainism, and Zoroastrianism) that are split by thousands of sects and castes; and they speak nearly two thousands dialects associated with fourteen well-established languages ( each with its own script and literature).

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The assumption that the geographical size and long and complicated history of India have resulted in diverse cultural and social forms provides much of the theoretical foundation upon which most of the studies on Indian politics have been carried out. The belief and value systems that had developed throughout the history of this vast territory have always encouraged diversity, which has been, perhaps, the basis of much of the social and political tension. Therefore, some notes on India's ethnic, linguistic, regional and religious complexity, which sets it apart from many other states, would be very useful in understanding Indian politics. Moreover, since this socio-cultural diversity is a fact of South Asia, crossing the boundaries of each individual state, an overall understanding of this diversity is also necessary to understand the complexities in inter-state relations in the region.

#### *3. 1. 1. Linguistic Relations*

The languages of India are categorized into four basic families. The overwhelming majority of the population speak the languages belonging to Indo - Aryan and Dravidian families. The other two families are Austro-Asiatic and Sino-Tibetan. Furthermore, the fact that many of the more widely used languages exist in

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<sup>35</sup> Vohra, op.cit., p.17.

numerous forms or dialects due to complex geographic and social patterns leads to the further complication of linguistic relations.

According to linguistic Survey of India, there are 179 Languages and 544 dialects are prevailing in India<sup>36</sup> According to the 1921 census there existed 188 languages and 84 dialects, while 184 “mother tongues” were identified in the 1961 census. In the 1981 census the numbers are more different. Only 112 mother tongues were identified. When it comes to early 1990s. according to *People of India* series, the number of ‘major languages’ identified declined to 75 within a total of 325 languages used in Indian households. The number of languages spoken by 1 million or more speakers was 32.<sup>37</sup> The changes in the number of languages and the ways in which the languages spoken in India are identified and categorized reveal significant political implications, since the identification of what is a language or dialect is, oftentimes, more a political than a linguistic question, especially in modern nation states which have great linguistic diversity. The language politics carried out during the history of independent India has occupied an important place in Indian politics, bringing about protracted social and political tension.

The constitutional framework of India allowed for the recognition of more than one official language. Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu are all identified as official or Scheduled Languages by the constitution’s Eighth Schedule, which was amended by Parliament in 1992. Among these, the most widely used language with an approximately 43% of the total population in 1995 was the mother tongue, Hind..<sup>38</sup>

The tensions brought about by the past attempts to reach a consensus on a single national language, endeavors during 1950s and 1960s to redraw the state boundaries to coincide with linguistic usage, the failure of some states to meet the demands of minorities on education with their own mother tongue and many other problems reveal the political character of linguistic relations and it seems that the

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<sup>36</sup> J.C. Johari *Indian Political System/A Critical Study of the Constitutional Structure and the Emerging Trends of Indian Politics* (New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1997), p.6.

<sup>37</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter IV Linguistic Relations

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. Chapter IV Linguistic Relations.

language phenomenon will remain as a conflict – prone political issue, at least, in the near future.

### 3. 1. 2. *Ethnicity*

Another group considered as disintegrative to the national unity of India consists of ethnic minorities. Although there exist some constitutional arrangements in order to integrate these groups into Indian polity, the existence of numerous ethnic groups oftentimes brought about different kinds of political conflicts, especially during processes of intensive social change and transformation.

Ethnic groups can mainly be categorized into two groups: tribes and the descendants of foreign groups. However, the political significance of the first group is undoubtedly much more than that of the second one. According to the 1991 census, the number of tribal people is nearly 68 million, roughly corresponding to 8 percent of the nation's total population. They are generally concentrated along the Himalayas and the hilly regions of central India.<sup>39</sup> The number of tribal communities officially recognized as Scheduled Tribes by the government are 573. Because of their special position these groups are eligible to receive certain benefits and compete for reserved seats in legislatures and schools. However, although there exist strictly defined legal criteria in determining which groups and individuals are tribal, the actual process of determining these groups is both subtle and complex. For example, language is not always a correct sign of tribal status, since many tribal groups have lost their mother tongues and simply speak local or regional languages.

Because of the many historical processes as slavery, conquests, colonization, etc; there exist several groups descended from ancient foreign settlers in present – day India. Among these groups are Jews, Parsis, Portuguese, Anglo-Indians and Africans. However, these groups are very small in number, and the largest one is Anglo – Indians, descendants of British men and lower-Caste Hindu or Muslim women.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., Chapter IV Ethnicity

However, it is important to note that the criteria upon which certain groups are classified as ethnic, linguistic or religious groups are not fixed; rather they change according to the personal preferences of each scholar who studies the subject, and the sources they make use of in carrying out these studies. Thus, any group can be categorized on the basis of different criteria from one scholar to the other. Furthermore, this is not a mere matter of taste, or personal preference, but at the same time a highly political problem. However, this discussion falls behind the main concerns of this research. What is tried to be disclosed here is that these divisions are crosscutting in many cases, and that the group boundaries are not clear. The important thing for the purposes of this research is to point out to the socio-cultural diversity which lays the ground for many kinds of complexities and conflicts in today's India.

### *3. 1. 3. Caste*

Although the constitution of India forbade negative public discrimination on the basis of caste and the influence and significance of the caste system has been weakening due to urbanization, industrialization and other modernization attempts, the assumption that caste has been abolished altogether does not reflect reality. This Indian system still preserves some of its significance and will continue to do so well into the foreseeable future, more in the rural than in urban settings and especially in the realms of kinship and marriage. More important is the position of caste groups in the expanding political realm. They are becoming more politicized groups trying to get social and economic benefits. Furthermore, the activities of caste groups are not confined to local politics; they are expanding their areas of concern into the broader state and national political realms.<sup>40</sup>

### 3. 1. 4. Religion

Due to its large impact on both private and public life, a clear description of religious forms and practices further clarifies the realities of political sphere. Religions in India have deep historical roots and they constitute one of the most important aspects of both past and contemporary Indian politics.

Hinduism, the followers of which constituted 82 percent of the population in the 1991 census<sup>41</sup> (approximately 687.6 million people) is obviously the dominant religion. The ancient monastic religions Buddhism and Jainism have been able to remain as minority religions until the twenty-first century. Although the followers of these religions are smaller in number, 0.8 and 0.4 percent of the total population in the 1991 census respectively, their influence on Indian society, culture, philosophy, and intellectual life has been great. Some 20 million Christians and small populations of devotees of Judaism and Zoroastrianism live in present-day India.

However, the more politicized religions are Sikhism and Islam. Muslims, the largest religious minority in India, constituted some 12 percent of the total population in the 1991 census. India has one of the largest Muslim populations in the world. Before the partition took place in 1947, Muslims formed nearly 25 percent of the population. From then on, the problems with Pakistan have formed much of the political agenda of India, especially on the issues of threat and security. Furthermore, these problems affected India's relations with the other states in the region and the way she positioned herself towards the Great Powers. The Kashmir issue was internationalized as soon as 1949 and the probable status of this overwhelmingly Muslim populated region continues to be one of the most important problems India has to tackle in the making and carrying out her domestic and international policy.

Sikhism has only 20 million believers worldwide. This small but highly politicized and economically successful Sikh population is mostly concentrated in the state of Punjab. Only 4 million of Sikhs live abroad, the importance of which goes

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., Chapter V Caste and Class.

<sup>41</sup> Kochanek Stanley and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., *India Government and Politics in a Developing Nation* (Philadelphia: Harcourt Brace Collage Publication, 1993), p. 7

beyond its small number, because Sikhs have played a disproportionately large role in the armed forces and public affairs in India for the last 400 years.<sup>42</sup>

Another important issue concerning religious diversity in India is the tribal religions. Nearly 70 million of people are members of tribal groups, and the diversity among tribal forms implies the diversity of religious forms and practices in religious life. However, these diverse tribal religions are under the constant pressure of major organized religions as Hinduism, Islam, Christianity or Buddhism. More important is the influence of the process of integration within a national polity and economic system. In this very process, tribal religions get in contact with other religions and only the geographically isolated religions are able to retain their religious forms and practices. On the other hand, the tribes, which are in a process of social transformation, from hunting and gathering societies toward sedentary agriculture, are losing their religious forms.

### *3. 1. 5. Regionalism*

Beside the linguistic, ethnic, religious and caste divisions, India is also divided along regional and class lines. It is known that many states were formed along linguistic and ethnic religious lines in India since independence in 1947. More important than linguistic, ethnic and religious differences is undoubtedly the fact that these differences overlap, in many cases, with regional boundaries drawn during foundation of the independent Republic of India with different state and union territories. Since its foundation, the existing social and cultural diversity has constituted the core of the basic problems between India and its neighboring countries, especially those with Pakistan. However, regionalism occupies a somehow different place within the social divisions, since regionalism has also something to do with a feeling of the distinctiveness of geographical region, culture and economic inequalities. It is of crucial importance to note, once again, that many of the very elements of social diversity frequently overlap in certain regions. Such places appear as critical regions where there is a great tension and controversy with the central government; the ongoing volatile movements in Jammu Kashmir and Punjab

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p.9.

exemplify such conflicts. It is likely that the communally, dynastically and regionally based social and cultural diversities will maintain, and even increase their significance in the political agenda of India, both at the national and regional and international scale in the foreseeable future.

### *3.2. Constitutional Framework and Political Structures*

In defining the basic principles of India's constitution, the extensive influence of western legal traditions is apparent, yet in the elaboration of these very principles it differs from many Western constitutions. In describing India as a Union of States, the committee who drafted the constitution seems to be motivated by creating a unitary type of state and without ignoring features of federalism at the same time. However, the criticisms against and debates on the constitution revolve around the assumption that the structure of federal system in India creates a strong central government, especially in the Office of the Prime Minister. The relations between the Center and the States have been a significant political issue in the foreseeable future.

India's central government consists of three distinct but interrelated branches; legislative, executive, and judicial. Although the idea of separation of powers is one of the basic principles of liberal democracies, the Indian executive branch performs some control on the judiciary in the form of judicial appointments and arrangements of the conditions of work. The Parliament consists of a bicameral legislature and its primary function is to pass laws on constitutionally specified matters. The federal structure of India requires the remaining of residual power of legislation with the central government and the relations between central and state governments are specified in details. The President is an important figure in Indian politics, since a formidable array of powers is vested in the president by the Constitution. The President is both the head of executive branch and the state. However, the Forty-second Amendment in 1976 formally required the president to perform his functions according to the advice of council of ministers headed by the Prime Minister. The idea behind this arrangement is that the president represents the



nation but does not rule it.<sup>43</sup> Although the council of Ministers is formally the highest body which makes policies, its powers have declined through the gradual concentration of influence in the Office of Prime minister.

The highest judiciary mechanism in India is the Supreme Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the constitution and laws. The president appoints the justices of this institution. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of this court is to supervise the relations between the central government and the states so that the Union does not encroach upon the powers of states. The disputes between the central government and states and union territories are resolved here. Therefore, the supremacy of the Constitution is tried to be protected against encroachments of all authorities including the Parliament. Since the relations between the center and states has been a matter of political debate since Independence, the existence of an independent tribunal in such an institution, whose decisions are final, is of critical value in contemporary Indian politics.

India has twenty eight states, seven union territories and one national capital territory. The structure of state governments is similar to that of central government. Each state and territory is provided with a legislature, most of which are unicameral. Bicameral legislatures consist of two branches; legislative assembly and legislative council, the members of this second branch are selected through a combination of direct election, indirect election, and nomination. However, the influence of appointed governors over the politics in the states is great. The governor plays a role analogous to that of the president who appoints governors to states. Governors are key figures in providing and maintaining the authority of central government.<sup>44</sup> They may select who may attempt to form government, dismiss a state's government and dissolve its legislative assembly, recommend the president that the President Rule be invoked. Another important point concerning the powers of governors it that all bills that the state legislatures pass must receive their consent.<sup>45</sup> Representing the supremacy of central authority, governors are critical actors in regulation of the

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<sup>43</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter VIII Government and Politics

<sup>44</sup> S.V. Kogekar, "Some Observations on the Constitution of India" Verinder Grover and Ranjona Arora (ed) *India Wins Freedom New Constitution and the Indian Political System* (New Delhi: Deep& Deep Publication, 1994), p. 99.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p.99

relationships between the center and states and the powers they possess indicate the extent to which power is concentrated in the central government.

The fundamental rights embodied in the constitution of India are guaranteed to all citizens and take precedence over any other law of the land. There is a long list of Fundamental Rights in the constitution of India comprising rights of equality, rights to property and to constitutional remedies. Fundamental rights prohibit any discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex or caste.<sup>46</sup> This constitutional arrangement protects cultural and educational rights of minorities in the sense that minority groups, at least theoretically, are able to preserve their languages and form their own educational institutions. However, although the constitutional expression of these rights indicates the democratic way that India adopts, things may differ in practice. The violation of these civil liberties has been an important issue in both internal and external Indian policies in the history of independent India and the spread of the principles of liberal democracy after the collapse of Soviet Union seems to influence India's policies towards minority groups and its policies at the international level in the near future.

There indeed exists certain limits to the democratic constitutional framework of India, which was based on some federal principles. The Indian constitution is one of the most frequently amended constitutions in the world. As of June 1995 the constitution had been amended seventy-seven times and most of the amendments had brought about important modifications in the constitution towards centralization.<sup>47</sup>

The authoritarian powers of the Indian State reveal important implications about the concentration of power in the center. Constitution's provisions for proclamations of the Emergency Rule and the President's Rule are two important authoritarian powers. In the Part XVII of the constitution it is stated that the state can suspend various civil liberties and the application of some federal principles during states of emergency. According to the constitution there exist three categories of emergencies; war or external aggression or internal disturbances, failure of constitutional machinery and a threat to the financial security or credit of the nation.

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<sup>46</sup> Baxter *et. al* (eds) op.cit., p.56.

<sup>47</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter VIII Government and Politics.

There were three periods of state of emergency since independence; in 1962, 1971 and 1975 – during the war with China, when India went to war against Pakistan and during the political opposition to Indira Gandhi, which was evaluated as an ‘internal disturbance’, respectively.

When governors appointed to the states report that the government of any state is unable to maintain law and order according to the constitution, the President can issue a proclamation dissolving a state government, which enables the President himself/herself to assume any or all functions of the state government, or take any other measure specified in the proclamation. This procedure is called the President’s Rule and has been frequently applied. It has to be noted that the use of President’s Rule is politically motivated and a detailed study on its application throughout the history of independent India can provide scholars with further valuable information about the constant tension between the center and states. In the periods of Nehru and Lal Bahadur Shastri (1947 – 1966) it was imposed ten times. Under Indira Gandhi’s two tenures as prime minister (1966 – 1977 and 1980 – 1984) the President’s Rule was applied forty-one times.<sup>48</sup>

Some of the other authoritarian powers of the Indian state can be listed as follows: The Preventive Detention Act, passed in 1950 and remained in force some twenty years; Defense of India Act (1962); Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1971), by which the government is able to arrest individuals without specifying charges. The Defense of India Act and Maintenance of Internal Security Act were repealed by the Parliament some years later, but when the Congress (I) came back to power in 1980, Parliament passed the National Security Act (1980), Essential Services Maintenance Act (1981), National Security Amendment Act (1984), and Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (1985). Although some of the authoritarian acts were repealed later, the frequent use of authoritarian measures in domestic problems is a reality of Indian politics in terms of the relations between society and the state, which brings about the violation of fundamental rights and the principles of liberal democracies.

It seems that one of the basic problems the committee, which prepared the constitution had to solve was how the state would balance the various interests of the

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., Chapter VIII Government and Politics.

country's extremely heterogeneous society with the objectives of national unity.<sup>49</sup> Although the political structure of independent India was federal in structure, there existed important deviations from the orthodox federal principles in the Original Constitution, and simply in order to provide national integrity by means of elaborating federal principles in a specific manner, which enables the concentration of power in the center. The Parliament of India has exclusive power to make laws on 97 subjects that were specified in the Union List and these subjects range from defense, inter-state commerce and foreign affairs, to railways, patents and film censorship.<sup>50</sup> Many groups had anxieties due to a sense of uncertainty as to the increasing political significance of centrifugal forces in the society and "a strong center was in fact not only a reflection of an existing unity but also a device designed to counter anticipated disunity."<sup>51</sup> This centralization has occurred despite the increasing resistance of various ethnic, religious, regional and caste groups across Indian society. The policy towards this resistance became the use of authoritarian powers provided by the constitution. However, the assumption that Indian federalism ignored the various interests of different groups in society and interests of other states would not reflect reality; rather, even with its central bias, it applied some methods of consultation and cooperation.

The relations between center and state are of crucial political importance in the sense that the boundaries of many states were drawn according to linguistic, ethnic, religious and other divisive lines, all of which are potentially disintegrative for national unity. When the fact that such social divisions frequently overlap is taken into account the vitality of the treatment of minorities becomes much more clear. There exists many minority groups in India and the proper treatment of minorities is one of the main duties of government. Another problem that the government has to tackle was Scheduled Castes and the backward tribal people. Reservations of seats in legislatures, reservation of posts in the public services and grants of money for educational purposes are some of the constitutional measures to ease the controversy and tension with minorities, yet there still exist many problems and it is likely to further exacerbate political conflict in the near future due to the increasing

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., Chapter VIII Government and Politics.

<sup>50</sup> A.K. Ghosal, "Federalism in the Indian Constitution", Verinder Grover and Ranjona Arora, op.cit., pp. 146-7.

significance of pluralist principles in the country's party system and the growing diversity of interest – group representation. The centralization of authority in terms of administrative, legislative and financial relations, the public's perception of pervasive corruption among politicians and the use of authoritarian measures and coercive power have eroded the legitimacy of the state. This should be considered as another critical problem threatening national security.



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<sup>51</sup> Heitzman and Worden, *op.cit.*, Chapter VIII Government and Politics.

## CHAPTER IV

### INDIA'S THREAT AND SECURITY PERCEPTION DURING THE COLD WAR PERIOD

The term 'Cold War' was coined ... to describe that initial confusing period of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over the shape of the postwar world... The phrase eventually came to stand for a vague, undifferentiated relationship of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union, [where] the main points of dispute between the two nations continued to be centered around issues about the ending of the second world war... The Cold War nonetheless can best be understood as a prolonged substitute for the post -World War II peace conference that never took place.<sup>52</sup>

Fought between 1939 and 1945, World War II was an apocalyptic event, resulting in the death of tens of millions of people. Apart from the high casualty rate, the only apparent consequence of the war was the rising supremacy of two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union as the masters of the world in the foreseeable future. The nature of the postwar settlement depended on the degree of coordination between the United States and the Soviet Union, whereas the limits of this settlement were determined with respect to the degree of conflict among them – in fact, the end of World War II was not followed with the making of international peace; it was rather marked with the continuation of a worldwide confrontation with the mere avoidance of a large – scale armed conflict. The nature of the settlement devised after World War II at the very heart of the line separating the conditions of 'war' and 'peace' from one another was best described by the ironic term of 'Cold War.'

Accompanying the appearance of the Cold War was the fact that the postwar distribution of power was bipolar upon which the world was divided into two hostile camps separated by an ideological divide. This situation, "bipolarity" as it was named,

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<sup>52</sup> R. Harrison Wagner, 'What was Bipolarity?', *International Organization*, Vol:47, No:1, Winter 1993, p. 80.

formed the explanatory base of much of the behavior of the states.<sup>53</sup> During the bipolar Cold War, most of the states came to be defined in either of the two blocs. The blocks were named after the two big powers leading them as the Soviet and the American bloc, or on the basis of a geographical division as the Eastern and Western bloc.

The key policy priorities of both superpowers were in Europe. The Yalta Conference of 1945 resolved the conflicts over Europe leaving dividing the continent into two parts as East and West and leaving them under the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. But the condition of the European colonies in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which then had engaged in anti-imperialist struggles under communist leaderships, was not brought to a resolution.

From the very beginning a major objective of the US's foreign policy was containment of communism and Soviet-expansionism. Relating to the threat of communism, Henry Truman, then the US President, stated in 1947 that his government was ready to protect any states that were under the threat of Communist occupation.<sup>54</sup> It was in this context that the Middle East and the Southeast Asia emerged as two key areas of interest in the super power rivalry during the Cold War era.<sup>55</sup> It was again in this context that South Asia became the forefront of world politics, not only because that it was located in the vicinity of these two other strategic regions but also because that the Soviet influence was growing there and a communist regime was established on mainland China.<sup>56</sup>

The Republic of India was established at the very heart of South Asia in 1947. The nature of this international milieu it was born into was crucial in the threat and security perception of this newly independent state and the formulation of her domestic policy.

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>54</sup> Jaswant Singh, *Defending India* (Bangalore: Macmillan India Ltd, 1999), p. 29.

<sup>55</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *Kısa 20. Yüzyıl Tarihi* (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1996), pp. 414-415.

<sup>56</sup> Dinesh Kumar Singh, *Power Politics in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1995), pp. 5-7.



#### *4. 1. India's Policy Priorities at the Time of Independence*

As a newly independent state, which was preceded by colonial subjugation of over 200 years, and which was constantly shattered by ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional violence on her territory; the first thing India had achieve was consolidating the national unity and state formation.

There were several regional movements, even at the time when national independence was declared in 1947, such as the Telangana, Jharkhand, and groups having anxieties stemming from the uncertainty resulting from the transformation from the colonial rule to an independent India. There were huge regional disparities inherited at independence from the former colonial rule and the problems related to economic and physical disruption involved in the partition from Pakistan.<sup>57</sup>

#### *4. 2. The Nehru Era (1947-1964)*

Under these circumstances, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, had the foremost responsibility of developing a nation and statehood. His policy goals were building a unified, integrated and secular nation state on democratic principles, in which national identity would supersede regional, religious or cultural identities, establishing the state sovereignty over Indian territory, promoting its security interests and promoting economic development. He was well aware of the possible consequences of involving in the bloc rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US, and thus tried to keep India's independence by keeping away from both blocs and create, if not a peaceful, a non-conflictual international environment around her, so that he could focus on dealing with the domestic problems awaiting a solution without being disturbed by the repercussions of international conflicts on Indian territories, and without getting over-dependent on any country or group of countries in course. Relating to the importance of building a powerful and



independent state in conducting foreign policy, in a speech he made on September 2, 1957, Nehru stated the following:

Whatever part we may want to play in world affairs will depend entirely on the internal strength, unity and conditions of our country... There fore both from the point of view of our primary needs and from the point of view of any desire we might have to play a part in world affairs, we have first to attend to our own country's affairs.<sup>58</sup>

#### *4. 2.1. Non-alignment Policy*

Driven by already stated considerations, Nehru devised the foreign policy, which was named as non-alignment and became one of the most famous political concepts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The principles of non-alignment as articulated by Nehru were the preservation of India's freedom of action internationally through refusal to align India with any bloc or alliance, nonviolence and international cooperation as a means of settling international disputes, opposition to colonialism and racism, international cooperation to alleviate poverty and promote economic development, and the Panchsheel or the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis for relations between states.<sup>59</sup> Among these the most important were the Panchsheel, which were first formulated in the preamble agreement between India and China in regard to Tibet, which was signed on 29<sup>th</sup> April 1954, as follows: 1- Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2- Mutual non-aggression; 3- Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 4- Equality and mutual benefit; and 5- Peaceful coexistence.<sup>60</sup>

Whether the policy of non-alignment was a result of Nehru's own ideological and philosophical choice culminating in his personality, or a condition imposed on him by the domestic and international circumstances during his tenure as the prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for seventeen years between 1947 and 1964 is a much debated issue. Nehru, himself, explained the background of this policy in these words:

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<sup>57</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter VI Character and Structure of Economy

<sup>58</sup> Quoted in Harc haran Singh Josh, op.cit., p 14

<sup>59</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter IX Foreign Relations

It is completely incorrect to call our policy “Nehru” policy. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today. I come in by the mere accidental fact that during these few years I have represented that policy as Foreign Minister. I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in charge of the foreign affairs of India and whatever party might have been in power in India, they could not have deviated very much from this policy. Some emphasis might have been greater here or there because, as I said, it represents every circumstance that goes towards making the thought of India on these subjects.<sup>61</sup>

To get a deeper understanding of what is declared in the above quotation, it might be useful to analyze the different points of emphasis in it. The emphasis put here on the nature of the Indian mind, thinking and the whole mental outlook obviously reflects India’s self image as the land of distinct cultural heritage. The so-called “circumstances of India” repeatedly expressed was another dimension of its self-image that laid down the uniqueness of India with respect to its peculiar geopolitical location. Since the early days of the National Liberation Movement, the leaders of the National Congress, and Nehru in particular, were convinced that India had to have a say in world affairs because of her geographical location, size and population. The leaders believed, in J. Bandyopadhyaya’s words:

That emerging as the seventh largest state with the second largest population in the world, with a relatively large stock of natural resources, India in 1947 had the power potential necessary for influencing, to some extent, the course of contemporary world politics. It would have been irrational for her to be oblivious of this geopolitical reality to restrict her freedom of action in the international field by being politically or militarily aligned with one of the two blocs of power into which international politics had come to be divided.<sup>62</sup>

Or in Nehru’s words, “India was too big a country herself to be bound down to any country, however big it might be”.<sup>63</sup>

The last point to be analyzed here is the factors referred to as the “circumstances of the world then”. Nehru was well aware of the fact that South Asia was the potential battleground during the Cold War. He was also aware of the motives behind the US’s desire to be involved in the region, the expansionist

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<sup>60</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *India’s Foreign Policy* (Delhi: 1961), p.99.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p.80

<sup>62</sup> J. Bandyopadhyaya, “Nehru and Non –alignment” B.R. Nanda (ed) *Indian Foreign Policy The Nehru Years* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Ltd., 1976), p.178.

<sup>63</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *India’s Foreign Policy*, op.cit., p. 32

tendencies of the Soviet Union, and the necessity of developing a mood of good neighborhood with this huge country. In fact, Nehru believed that since the Soviet Union rejected the installation of a capitalist economy, she would not have any expansionist tendency towards India unless it feared the encirclement of the latter by western powers.<sup>64</sup> However, more important than the threat of Soviet expansionism was the rise of communist China in heartland Asia. Thus, the containment of Chinese communism in Southeast Asia was another important rationale behind the non-alignment policy. The proximity of communist-led anti imperialist movements in Indo – China and Vietnam to China held possibilities for extension of communist movement southward.<sup>65</sup> If China had succeeded to spread its communist ideology in South Asia, it would have been disastrous for India both because it would have directed the attention of the US and the Soviet Union in a more drastic way, and because it would have triggered the expansion of communist movement within India itself.

Another important factor behind non-alignment was related to the ideological composition within the National Congress. As J. Bandyopadhyaya puts it:

While the Indian National Congress represented the mainstream of Indian thinking on political and ideological issues, there were segments of political opinion and organization on both the right and the left, inside the Congress and outside, which could have been seriously disaffected by India's alignment with one of the two power blocs, to the point of threatening the internal security of the state.<sup>66</sup>

Last but not the least, the broad orientation and strategy of non-alignment was devised so as to utilize foreign policy for developing a national economy which was crucial for safeguarding India's security. As Nehru said as early as 1947: "Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, and until India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping".<sup>67</sup> Given the economic conditions of India at the wake of her independence, it was too heavy for her to defend its interests through military means as needs of military defense would place a serious limitation on the

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<sup>64</sup> Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, op.cit.,p. 541.

<sup>65</sup> D. R. Sardesai, "India and Southeast Asia", B. R. Nanda, op.cit., p. 85

<sup>66</sup> J. Bandyopadhyaya, "Nehru and Non Alignment", B.R. Nanda, op. cit., p. 179

<sup>67</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, op.cit., p. 24

investment of resources in economic development.<sup>68</sup> The resulting objective of avoiding war and solving the external problems through diplomatic means in the international platforms on the basis and principles of non-alignment ascribed India, and Prime Minister Nehru in particular, a considerable prestige both in the eyes of the super powers, and among other Asian nations who were also concerned about military confrontation between superpowers.

The strategy of non-alignment, as has been sketched so far, initially provided the newly independent state of India important advantages both in building up the state power and turning India to a state of considerable influence in the international platforms such as the United Nations and the nonaligned movement. However, whether India did achieve to keep the Cold War rivalry away from herself and South Asia was debatable. In fact, nonalignment was an orientation and strategy which made sense only in the Cold War context, and in this respect it was purely an outcome of the circumstances created by the Cold War itself. However, the question here is precisely whether India could isolate the Cold War confrontation from her environment or not. The answer to be given here implies a clear-cut “no”. Furthermore, it shall be discussed, India’s relations with the other states in the region in the immediate aftermath of independence were to a great extent reflective of the fact that the Cold War had already permeated in South Asia likely to affect the balance of power in the region.

In his book titled ‘Defending India’, Jaswant Singh, the current Minister of Defense and External Affairs, accuses Nehru of failing to acknowledge the relevance of the partition of India in the context of the Truman Doctrine, and the possible international consequences of this partition at the dawn of the Cold War. Singh maintains that the partition was an extension of the Truman Doctrine in South Asia, and by not foreseeing this, Nehru had made a disastrous strategic error of authorizing the foreign powers and international platforms to solve her internal problems. Nehru’s first error was, as Singh argues, the internationalization of the Jammu and Kashmir problem, which was also the first instance where the effect of the Cold War was experienced almost immediately:

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<sup>68</sup> J. Bandyopadhyaya, *Nehru and Non-Alignment*, B. R. Nanda, op. cit., pp 173-175

This had foreign implications, and should immediately have been assessed as such. A military conflict had followed the Pakistan-inspired tribal invasion of the state. Nehru authorized an appeal to the United Nations Security Council to secure their withdrawal – a critical strategic error... What needs to be emphasized here are two aspects: that a reference was made to UN in a ‘spirit of internationalism’, and that Western powers, under advice of British ‘expertise’, sought to treat the Kashmir question as if it was still some kind of an internal pre-independence problem – to determine whether Kashmir, with a Muslim majority, should be a part of India.<sup>69</sup>

From the very beginning the Indo-Pakistani relations have formed the basis of Indian security considerations. The first war broke out between the two states just after the partition in August 1945 over Jammu and Kashmir and could be resolved two years later in 1949 by the Karachi Agreement, the principles of which was arranged by two UN Security Council resolutions in 1948 and 1949. The implication of this first war was that India’s security problems had turned vicious after partition because, “the India-Pakistan issues became enmeshed in the East-West rivalry and the global strategy of containment and competition. Instead of trying to decouple from the big cold war, the subcontinent diplomacy in different directions came to bank on it.”<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, the great power competition between the Soviet Union and China became intertwined with the conflicts between the two states. Besides, after the creation of the states of India and Pakistan, the US sought for alliance with the latter as the former pursued the policy of non-alignment.

Being a Muslim state, Pakistan was a proper candidate for “crusade against communism”.<sup>71</sup> In 1954, she became a member of SEATO and CENTO. Alarmed by these developments, the Soviet Union approached India, whereas China started to support Pakistan to diminish the US’s influence on her. All of these, in turn, diminished India’s capability of maneuvering in the region and she became almost trapped in the circumstances imposed on her by such Cold War alliances.

India’s relations with her smaller neighbors were to a great extent shaped by the strategic considerations emerged out of the Cold War circumstances. Through developing cooperative relations with her neighbors, India was, among other concerns, trying to prevent them from falling into the sphere of influence of other

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<sup>69</sup> Jaswant Singh, op.cit., p.31.

<sup>70</sup> Jagat S. Mehta, “Forty Years of Foreign Policy”, Verinder Grover (ed) *Introduction to International Relations and India’s Foreign Policy Voll* (New Delhi: Deep& Deep Publications, 1992), p. 511

powerful states in the region, namely Pakistan and China. Moreover, these relations were usually conflict-prone due to the fact that India shared common ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities and natural resources with these states. In trying to establish such a mood of good neighborhood with her smaller allies and consolidate her power in the region vis-à-vis treaties, protocols of friendship and cooperation – such as those signed with Bhutan in 1949, and Nepal in 1950, and a good give-and-take policy to the benefits and security interests of both parties, India employed a political discourse based on the historical, cultural, and political integrity of South Asia. This discourse, which was also reflective of India's self-image as discussed earlier, is clearly sketched in the following excerpt from Jagat S. Mehta, a former foreign secretary of India:

The overriding rationale in our policy towards Pakistan and other South Asian neighbors has to be permeated by the simple, unalterable fact that the India sub-continent has an indestructible, ecological and economic unity derived from the common dependence on the Himalayas and the monsoon. With all its diversity, including that of different religions, the civilization of the Indian peninsula had a distinct cohesion, which separated it from South West Asia and South East Asia.<sup>72</sup>

In effect, during first decades of independence India was able to devise a foreign policy towards her smaller neighbors to the best of her security interests. However, these relations were not non-conflictual, either. In fact, they were particularly difficult due to the huge asymmetry of power between India and these states. Here, a further phrase from Jagat S. Mehta shall be clarifying:

Diplomacy between unequal neighbors in the post-colonial decades has been particularly difficult because historical analogies and 19<sup>th</sup> century axioms obscure the 20<sup>th</sup> century propensity of defiance against coercion by bigger powers... India's problems in the sub-continent are akin to that of the United States in Central America – the same mix of obvious dependence, oversensitive fears to domination and demonstrative assertion of independence vis-à-vis the big neighbour.<sup>73</sup>

While pursuing the strategy of non-alignment in external affairs during his tenure, Nehru was predominantly occupied by trying to overcome the domestic problems of

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.512

<sup>72</sup> Jagat S. Mehta, "Forty Years of Foreign Policy", Verinder, op.cit., p. 518.

<sup>73</sup> ibid, p 517



the newly independent state of India. Domestically, the most dangerous problems threatening India's security and integrity emerged in the form of separatist movements based on ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines. In trying to keep up with these problems, Nehru employed several democratic and authoritarian measures at the same time based on a balance that would not trigger these kinds of disintegrative tendencies by excess repression, but would not harm, rather reinforce, the integrity of the nation. He put an important emphasis on the necessity of economic development as a lever in overcoming both domestic and external problems. His economic policy rested on a benign socialist persuasion, through five year development plans between 1947-1964 he tried to use the power of the state to direct economic growth to reduce widespread poverty and improve social justice. Agreeing that strong economic growth and measures to increase incomes and consumption among the poorest group were crucial for the integration of the new nation, Nehru adopted three successive five 1951 and 1964. Although, the long-term rates of growth were more positive than Nehru desired there was considerable growth in the 1950s. Industry grew at an average rate of 4,5 percent a year, compared with an annual average of 3,0 percent for agriculture.<sup>74</sup> Nehru also believed that industrialization was the key to economic development and this was more convincing for a country like India because of the country's large size, huge population, and substantial natural resources.

Up until the last years of Nehru's tenure as the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of India, both foreign and domestic policy formulated on the basis of non-alignment in the international affairs, mild interventionism in regional ones and a developmental project on democratic and secular principles within the country, were projected with the aim of turning India to a great power in the world. This was best reflected in Nehru's own remarks: "India is going to be and is bound to be a country that counts in world affairs, not I hope in the military sense, but in many other senses which are most important and effective in the end."<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Hetizman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter VI Character and Structure of the Economy.

<sup>75</sup> S.S. Budhiraja & p.N. Mishra, "Strategy and Doctrine to Achieve Long Term Peace in the Subcontinent", Arun Chaturvedi and Sanjay Lodha (ed) *India's Foreign Policy & Emerging World Order* (Jaipur: Printwell Publishers Distributors, 1998) p. 143.



Although the emphasis on moral and economic leadership would continue, resistance against building up military and defense capabilities was abandoned in 1962 Sino-Indian war.

#### *4. 2. 2. 1962 – Indo Chinese War*

The 1962 war was a mind-blowing event in Indian foreign policy thinking. The relationships between India and China were relatively non-conflictual before the emergence of communist China as a great power. As early as 1949, the two states had a conflict of interest in Tibet, which was a geographical and political buffer zone where India had inherited special privileges from the British colonial government.<sup>76</sup> The consequent border problems between India and China on the territories over the McMahon line in the north-east for recognized Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin in the north-west was brought to a solution by 1954 treaty for an eight-year long period on the basis of Panchsheel. The agreement was praised as “bold wholesome principles”<sup>77</sup>; however, they did not survive the border crisis of 1962.

On September 8, 1962 Chinese soldiers crossed the McMahon line down to the border of India. The invasion proper started on October 20, and a one-month long war erupted. The successive cease-fire announced by China unilaterally on November 21, 1962 was the declaration of India’s total defeat. During the war, India had to seek for the help from the US, which according to Nehru and other politicians was a great “humiliation” for India. Furthermore, the rationale behind the Chinese invasion was undoubtedly not confined to her claim over the disputed territories. It is more logical to assess this invasion within the broader context of the Cold War.

First of all the timing of the event was result of a carefully planned strategy on behalf of China. It was a time when the Soviet Union and the United States were over involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Some American scholars, notably Herald Hinton, have hinted at a time correlation between the Chinese attack on India and the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the confrontation between the

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<sup>76</sup> Heitzman and Werdon, op.cit., Chapter IX Foreign Relations

<sup>77</sup> Vernon Hewitt, op.cit., p. 58.

Soviet Union and the United States over Cuba. The Chinese evidently were aware of the US-Soviet confrontation.<sup>78</sup>

Secondly, during the attack the Chinese military managed to penetrate into the Indian territory, but thereafter they withdrew from almost all of these territories. This fact enables one to deduce that the argument of Chinese claim to Indian territories was rather vague. It is, therefore, better to see this attack as a Chinese declaration on the futility of the strategy of non-alignment for guaranteeing and preserving a country's national security. It is also argued that the Chinese "may have armed at toppling the Nehru government or at pushing India into the Western Camp in the hope of scoring a point vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in their ideological debate."<sup>79</sup> Whatever the reason of the Chinese attack, this defeat showed the fact that Nehru had overemphasized Pakistan as the principal geo-political problem<sup>80</sup>, and thereafter China came to constitute a central place in India's security considerations.

One of the most important consequences of the defeat was that it forced Nehru and Indian politicians to reassess their foreign policy orientations and defense strategies As Shrikant Paranjpe argues in his article:

The key to security was to be a long term strategy of self reliance through development. It was the 1962 war that brought a change in perceptions about this approach. In post - 1962, a direct linkage was sought to be made between defense (military) capability and political role. Inevitably defense expenditures in the past 1962 - decade show a marked upward curve. In political terms, the narrowing down of focus from pan Asian, pan African role to a South Asian role is largely product of this linkage.<sup>81</sup>

The shocking effect of the defeat in India was strikingly expressed by Nehru himself, "We live in an artificial world which we create, but now we wake up to the real world."<sup>82</sup>

Nehru died in 1964.

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<sup>78</sup> K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and India China Conflict of 1962", B.R. Nanda, op. cit., p. 127,

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, p. 129.

<sup>80</sup> Asok Kapur, "Indian Foreign Policy in Seventies", Verinder. op.cit p. 361,

<sup>81</sup> Shrikant Paranjpe, "India's Security Policy: The Non- Strategic Dimensions" Chaturvedi and Loda, op.cit., pp.232-233 p. 361.

<sup>82</sup> Michael Edwades, *Nehru A Political Biography* (New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 274.

#### 4. 3. Post Nehruvian Era

After Nehru's death, Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister. However, upon his death due to a heart attack after two years, Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi came to the power. Except Janata Dal Party rule between 1977 and 1979, the rule of the National Congress Party under the premiership of Nehru-Gandhi dynasty continued.

The Post-Nehruvian Era, hereafter named the Indira – Rajiv Period, implies a considerable shift from the Nehruvian politics both at the domestic and foreign levels. Although the differences in the personality of Nehru and his successors also make some sense in this shift, it was to a great extent the result of the change in India's threat and security perception.

In this period, as A.Varaik and P.Bidwayi put it, "India became less concerned about having a high international profile in various fora, and more concerned about strengthening the components of its national power. Non-alignment became, more or less, a loose synonym for a traditional realpolitik approach."<sup>83</sup>

In the mid-sixties, India was shattered by several major crises, the first of which was widespread food shortage in 1964 that created a great wave of discontent throughout India. Second, there were violent anti-Hindu demonstrations in the state of Madras (as Tamil Nadu was then called), rebellion in Punjab for linguistic separatism, and Mizo tribal uprisings in the Northeast that were to be quelled by the army. The economy was in a stagnation, which was worsened in 1965 during the second war with Pakistan. The two successive years of drought in 1965 and 1966 were followed by famine, labor unrest, currency devaluation that increased the misery among the poor.

During the two successive periods of her premiership, Indira Gandhi could not develop a competent domestic policy without resorting to oppression of dissidence and centralization. The main characteristics of her tenure is described by

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<sup>83</sup> A. Vanaik and P.Bidwayi, "India and Pakistan" R.C.Karp (ed.) *Security Without Nuclear Weapons? Differing Perspectives on Non-nuclear Security*, (London :Oxford University press 1992), p. 263.

Shekhar Gupta as follows: “India Gandhi deviated sharply from Nehruvian methods by over-centralizing authority, cutting at the federal roots of the power structure, systematically destroying regional centers of power and leaders, even within their own party, reducing state (province) chief ministers to glorified vassals, and single-mindedly chipping away at democratic institutions, including the judiciary and election commission.<sup>84</sup> Although Gupta’s arguments are debatable to some scholars in India, his emphasis on Indira Gandhi’s tendency of centralization and her imperious style of administration seem relevant so far as the frequent constitutional amendments made during her tenure; a total of 41 times of presidents rule was declared in the some period. However, despite these measures the economic crises deepened. Furthermore, they even increased the existing tension in the society. In order to counter this tension and keep the power in her party, Indira resorted a “vote-catching populism”<sup>85</sup> based on Hindu nationalism such kind of a populism triggered secessionist tendencies among the non-Hindu population in several parts of the country, i.e. Punjab and West Bengal.<sup>86</sup> This, in turn, provided India’s neighbors with a suitable ground for exploiting these movements to strengthen their bargaining power against India.

The Indira-Rajiv period was marked with a more assertive policy towards India’s neighbors. However, the more India attempted to assert her power status in the region, the more conflictual her regional relations became. According to Arun Chaturvedi, this role:

... created more misunderstanding between [her smaller neighbors] and also allowed Pakistan to play the anti-Indian card more frequently. The fear of India’s size, power and technological advancements developed a sense whereby they become aware of India’s increasing role and yet could not avoid India’s powerful presence in the region.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Shekhar Gupta, *India Redefines Its Role* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 3.

<sup>85</sup> Heitzman and Worden, *op.cit.*, Chapter VIII

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* Chapter VIII

<sup>87</sup> Arun Chaturvedi, “Understanding the Post Cold War Changes in India’s Foreign Policy, Chaturvedi and Lodha, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

#### 4.3.1. 1971 Indo-Pakistani War

The first instance where the framework outlined above was embodied during this period was the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. India's involvement in the Pakistani civil war (1969–1971) in 1971 resulted in a war between the two states, which led to the dismembering of East Pakistan and creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. The motives behind India's intervention were rather complex. The official Indian explanation for it was based on a humanitarian cause which put emphasis on the severity of the civil war and the tragedy of over 10 million refugees who had to flee Pakistan and seek shelter in India. In a statement she made, Indira Gandhi had remarked the underlying cause of India's move as follows: "India could not be a silent spectator to the annihilation of an entire unarmed population next door to us. The annihilation of an entire people next door will create permanent threat to our security and to all our cherished values."<sup>88</sup> However, India might also have taken action to prevent a probable spillover effect of this civil war on her own Bengalese population According to Vernon Hewitt:

New Delhi was provoked into action through the fear that an influx of Bengali refugees would complicate matters in India's already troubled north-east. By August 1971, up to ten million Bengalis had crossed into West Bengal and Assam to escape the fighting. Moreover, unsure of the ideological views of many of the refugees India feared that they would add to its problems with left-wing groups already active in West Bengal against a Congress administration. The prospect of the 'two Bengal's' falling to the left raised the specter of a United Bengali nation under its own state, and a Marxist one to boot, and gave rise to concern within India over the prospects of her territorial disintegration.<sup>89</sup>

Ashok Kapur on the other hand, takes our attention to another point and remarks that the second Indo-Pak war could be seen as a continuation of the process of securing India's northeast, in her effort since the mid 1960's to deny this area as an arena for power politics to Beijing to invest in an area to keep India off balance."<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Harcharan Singh Josh, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>89</sup> Vernon Hewitt, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

<sup>90</sup> Ashok Kapur, "India's Foreign Policy in Seventies", Verinder (ed), *op.cit.*, p. 361.

In all these respects, it appears obvious that, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a perfect case where India's domestic, regional and international security considerations were intertwined with one another.

The events that took place before and during the 1971 war are worth investigating in the sense that they display the role of Cold War on the intra-regional relations. The pro-Pakistani attitudes of China and America before India's intervention made her move closer to the Soviet Union. This was also desirable for the Soviet Union, for she sought to increase her influence over the region. In 1971, the Soviet Union and India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. By the IX and X articles of the treaty, India and the Soviet Union assured not to make treaties to the disadvantage of one another and to immediately enter into mutual consultations in the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

The coming of the US Navy to the bay of Bengal during the war and her forcing India to withdraw from the territories in Pakistan was very humiliating for India. Rao Sreedhar evaluates the 1971 war as the most important event which compelled India to develop nuclear build-up.<sup>91</sup> On the other hand, it was also the instance where Pakistan started nuclear weaponization. Because, not being able to set the necessary support from the US and China, Pakistan realized that she had to develop her defense capabilities against an enemy which was far stronger than her conventionally in the region.

#### *4. 3. 1. 1. Post 1971 War Developments*

According to many observers the regional balance of power changed in favor of India after the war: Sajjad Hyder, who was Pakistan's High Commissioner in New Delhi on the run-up to the Bangladesh crisis noted in a his book:

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<sup>91</sup> Rao Sreedhar, Unpublished Lectures Notes, METU Summer School 2001.

Our perceptions of India are that, beneath a thin veneer, the Indian leadership and a sizeable segment of Indian opinion continue to regard the formation of Pakistan as an historical error and that given the opportunity they would wish in some way to redress the situation.<sup>92</sup>

1971 war was resolved by Simla Agreement, by which the parties assured to solve their problems through bilateral means.

The Sino-Soviet split of early the 1970's and Kissinger's and Nixon's policy of improving ties with China had a negative impact on intra-regional relations. China sold weapons to Pakistan in order to balance India. Considering that the Sino-Pak axis aimed to contain her, India increased her defense expenses with the help of the Soviet Union.

According to Vernon Hewitt, Indian policy in this period could be defined as "Indira Doctrine", which he describes as follows:

... Indira Gandhi doctrine, as defined by the Bangladesh campaign in 1971, India supports and has encouraged regional democracy (as pro-Indian governments) and that it has increasingly sought to tie up its regional primacy through a series of regional bilateral accords covering defense trade and technical co-operation.<sup>93</sup>

Whether this policy could be defined as a doctrine is debatable. But the important thing was that India's attitude towards Bangladesh, of sending a draft constitution and unilateral projects on the sharing of Ganges water resources to her, empowered the anti-Indian sentiments both in Bangladesh and among other states in the region.

India intervened in the struggle between the king and his adversaries in Sikkim in 1973. At the end of this intervention both parties recognized through the Sikkim Agreement the need to establish responsible governments. In 1974, Chogyal (monarchy in Sikkim) was converted into a constitutional monarchy presiding over an elected cabinet and was then eventually 'deposed' in 1975. Preparations were then made for popular elections within the framework of the Indian Union.<sup>94</sup> This event, named as integration or annexation, rose the fears of other Himalayan kingdoms,

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<sup>92</sup> Sajjad Hyder, *Reflections of an Ambassador*, Vanguard, Lahore, 1888, p.75.

<sup>93</sup> Vernon Hewitt, *op.cit.*, p.74.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p.66.



namely Bhutan and Nepal, about India's interventionist tendencies and they sought to develop their relations with China and Pakistan beginning from the mid-1970's. In turn, India became more assertive towards its neighbors.

At the beginning of the 1980's, the intra-regional relations were considerably tense. Nepal and Bhutan have been brought closer to Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Nepal supported Bangladeshi objections to the link canal proposal, while Bangladesh and Pakistan supported Nepal's calls for a Himalayan Peacezone.<sup>95</sup> However, a widely shared belief among the Indian politicians and scholars is that India's problems with its neighbors were resulting from the former's legitimate security concerns. This was put by Sen Gupta, a foreign policy analyst working then at the Center for Policy Studies in New Delhi as follows: "No South Asian government must ask for extensive military assistance with an anti-Indian bias. If a South Asian country genuinely needs to deal with a serious internal conflict it should ask for help from neighboring countries, including India".<sup>96</sup>

The former Indian ambassador in Laos, S. D. Muni argues in one of his articles concerning India and her neighbors that India's involvement in her neighbors domestic affairs while at the same time proposing may be criticized but a democracy would not have developed in Nepal, if India had not intervened.<sup>97</sup>

Bangladesh had evaluated India's project of ZOP (Zone of Peace) she developed with the so called aim of protecting the Indian Ocean from the involvement of extra-regional powers, and that of NFZ (Nuclear Free Zone) she developed with the so-called aim of protecting the Himalayan kingdoms from the nuclearization of extra-regional powers as follows: "Bangladesh realistically perceived that a security system that sought to remove to extra-regional military presences, but left the questions relating to security threats emanating from within the region would not be workable or acceptable".<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p.66.

<sup>96</sup> Quoted in, MiC Kabir and S. Hassan, *Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy*, (Dhaka:Peoples' Press, 1983), p. 23.

<sup>97</sup> S. D. Muni, "India and Neighbours; Persisting Dilemmas and New Opputunities", Chaturvedi and Lodha, op.cit., p.114.

<sup>98</sup> E. Ahamed, *The Foreign Policy of Banglades: Imperatives of a Small State*, (Dhaka:People's Press, 1984), p.85.

#### *4.3.1.2. India's Intervention in Sri Lanka: The implications of IPFK in India's Regional Policy*

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was an other event about which India was alarmed in the mid-1980's. The armed clash between the Sinhalese population, which formed the majority of population on the island, and the Tamil people who clustered in the northern and eastern parts of the island, was perceived as a great threat for Indian national security and interest. The conflict was both a linguistic and religious one. What began as a conflict between Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalese, in time, turned into a large-scale fighting with its effects spreading to India. During the conflict, the Sri Lankan Tamils fled the island and migrated to the state of Tamil Nadu in India. Moreover, the allegations concerning that the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) militants were trained in India aroused big reactions in Sri Lanka. The news covered in the press about India's support of the LTTE were copies sent to the international arena and India was accused of interfering in the domestic affairs of Sri Lanka.<sup>99</sup> The Indian intervention reminded Sri Lanka of the 1971 intervention in Pakistan and founding of Bangladesh as an independent state.

Sri Lanka had seen geostrategically very important for the security of the Indian Ocean ever since the period of the British Empire. Since independence, it had been the rest and recreation point in the oil transfer from the Middle to Far East. Therefore, the island used to be very important for China, U. S., and India during the Cold War. The Sri Lankan appeal to US and Israel to cope with the LTTE secessionism created important discontent among New Delhi circles. As Vernon Hewitt argues:

Such implied extra-regionals merely compounded the domestic pressure from Tamil Nadu and forced New Delhi to act decisively. Rajiv Gandhi escalated Indian involvement prior to the actual signing of the accord by sanctioning a small-scale naval relief operation- and when this failed- authorizing an airdrop of food over Jaffna in blatant violation of Sri Lankan airspace, with a provocative and gratuitous display of newly purchased Mirage 2000 jets.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Hewitt, *op.cit.*, p.72.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p.72.

In short, India was accusing Sri Lanka of ignoring her security concerns. In fact, this was the period when the Cold War reached its peak with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasing Great Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. This was also a great security concern for South Asian states; in such circumstances India could not ignore the strategic gestures of Colombo.<sup>101</sup>

The US strategy of repulsing under Reagan's presidency, and India's discontent with the Soviet existence in the region after the invasion of Afghanistan paved the way for the improvement of Indo-US relations. The increased convergence of the interests of US and India in the region led the former to neglect Sri Lanka's arguments on India indicating her as a potential aggressor and to advise Jayewardene, then the Sri Lankan Prime Minister; to seek for Indian help in resolving her ethnic conflict.<sup>102</sup>

In 1987, at a time when the LTTE upsurge gained momentum in Sri Lanka and its effects created a widespread discontent and instability in Tamil Nadu, India decided to send the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) to Sri Lanka. The IPKF could not create a compromise between the parties; moreover, it found itself involved in a high-density war with the LTTE forces. The IPKF did not leave Sri Lanka within the period it assured to withdraw there. The Sri Lankan government strongly protested this. In effect, the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka leaving behind thousands of deaths and a country whose problems became much more severe and complex. But the true bill of the intervention became obvious in 1991, when a Tamilian militant assassinated Rajiv Gandhi.

#### *4.3.1.3. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another event which deeply affected the Indians on South Asian security at the dawn of 1980. India was very much irritated by the fact that the Soviet invasion had been realized without her knowledge. The timing of the invasion coincided with the Iranian Revolution and the rise of the PLO

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<sup>101</sup> P. Sahadevan, "India and Sri Lanka", Lalit Mansingh et.al. *Indian Foreign Policy Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Vol. 2 p. 169.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p.170.

struggle against Israel. Thus, the invasion itself posed a great threat to the US's interest, especially in the Middle East. In this respect Pakistan was again ascribed a forefront state against the Soviet threat and got extensive arms supply from the US and China. This, in turn, triggered the armament in India.

After the Soviet invasion, the US mobilized an Islamic resistance in Afghanistan via Pakistan. The Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan after eight years, leaving behind a country in total chaos, with several Islamic factions fighting against one another for political power, an economy based on goods and drugs trafficking and a hotbed of arms.

The Indo-Pak relations which were full of tension because of the Kashmir problems, worsened during the second half of the 1980's, when the corpses of Afghan Mujahiden were found in the battlefields in Kashmir. India held Pakistan responsible for the infiltration of the Afghan Mujahiden to Kashmir. The rise of Islamic movement in the Middle East became a part of India's security perception in this period.

The 1970's had been a period when India was over involved with its internal problems. The country was shattered with mass poverty and ethnic, linguistic, and regional insurgency movements. Indira Gandhi, then the Indian Prime Minister, responded these problems with strict centralization. During her tenure, the extra-constitutional practices became an indispensable part of administration. The rejection of many of the constitutional amendments by the supreme court upon the reason of being in contrary to the essence and spirit of the Indian constitution, resulted in the narrowing of the rights and authorities of the supreme court.<sup>103</sup>

Indira Gandhi's failure in eradicating mass poverty and reviving the economy compelled her to adopt populist policies so as not to lose her electoral base. The policies of centralization did not lead to the creation of an effective governing, in turn, the feelings of discontent and discomfort against the government reached immense proportions. In 1975, the first Emergency Rule was declared.

The heavy bill of the 1971 war worsened the already bad economic conditions. India's need to protect the security of its borders increased the defense expenditures;

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<sup>103</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Chapter IV, Political Structure

the effects of the 1973-74 Oil Crisis increased the budget deficit and India had to appeal to the IMF for getting credit.

#### *4. 4. Shifting Alliances in the 1980's: A Decade-long Search for Stability*

In the early 1980's, the Sikhs, who had long feared the loss of their separate identity, were increasingly apprehensive over an ethnic balance within the state (Punjab) that was shifting against them because of both the out-migration of Sikhs and the immigration of Hindus. The anxieties fuelled a political movement that by 1984 had taken an increasingly violent turn, precipitating a series of events that led to the army's siege of the Golden Temple, the citadel of Sikhism, and the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.<sup>104</sup> This incident aroused great anxiety among Hindus and thereafter several thousands Sikhs were killed within a few days.

In the 1980's, Rajiv Gandhi tried to develop good relations with the US. The need towards the international institutions such as IMF to sustain the liberalization policies inside and problems arose in tackling with the Soviet Union -which was closely connected to the internal turmoil in the USSR-, and the clash of American and Pakistani interests over Afghanistan were the major reasons behind India's rapprochement to the US in this period.

Another important event of this period which had a serious impact on the changing of India's security perception was the manner in which Gorbachev approached China. Gorbachev defined the S4 as a European state, and China as a great power which had a crucial role in Asia and Asian security.<sup>105</sup>

The Sino-Soviet rapprochement brought about changes in India's China policy. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visited China and Jiang Zemin and he concluded a protocol for the development of bilateral relations even if they could not take a step further in resolving Sino-Indian border dispute.

The change in the international system started during the late 1980's gained a totally different direction with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. India welcomed the new decade with unresolved internal problems in Punjab and Kashmir

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<sup>104</sup> Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. and Stanley A. Rochanek, op.cit., p.11.

and economy at the brink of bankruptcy. In his study of the Indian policy during Indira and Rajiv Gandhi period, Atul Kohli states the following:

Over the last two decades, India had too much of the wrong kind of democracy and not enough of the right kind. A highly interventionist but ineffectual national government and weak political parties are two factors in India's governability crisis that contribute toward making India's democracy the wrong type.<sup>106</sup>

According to him the paradox is that the very strategy enabled Indira Gandhi to hold onto power also undermined the visibility of using that power for constructive ends. Having reduced the significance of important institutions, she found that when she (and later, her successors Rajiv Gandhi) needed institutional support to implement desired goals, such support was not available.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Hewitt, *op.cit.*, p.103.

<sup>106</sup> Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent, India's Growing of Governability*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, ,1980), p.X.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p.16.

## CHAPTER V:

### THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD

#### *5. 1. Implications of the End of the Cold War*

Before the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union by the failed coup of August 1991 in Moscow, there were many significant political changes indicating that the Cold War would eventually wane. The Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, the upsurge of revolutions against Eastern Europe authoritarian regimes, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the ratification of German unification by the great powers have deeply transformed the security structure and political map of Europe.<sup>108</sup> However, the impacts of the end of the Cold War, the basic feature of which was a relative stability in world politics based on a perception of approximate military capabilities of the US and Soviet Union, have been very disorienting for most of the economic, political, and military establishments of the world. By the disruption of familiar Cold War patterns and the end of East-West military confrontation over Europe, almost all countries were forced to reassess their strategic policies, interest, and alignments.<sup>109</sup> The two simultaneous developments conditioning these reassessments were the dramatic rise of the US image of strength and the constant decline in Soviet power.

The Gulf War has crucial historical significance in the sense that it indicated the oncoming global distribution of power. In this new distribution of power, the role of the Gulf War in proving the supremacy of United States was stated by Rodney Jones as follows:

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<sup>108</sup> Rodney. W. Jones, 'Old Quarrels and New Realities: Security in Southern Asia after the Cold War', *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1992. p. 105.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*, p. 105.



The formidable US role in building a multilateral war coalition against Iraq established the perception that the United States alone now has the will and both the military and economic means to operate globally as a superpower. Realistically, the US strength on the global scene will not depend just on unilateral US initiatives but also on both continued US ability to mobilize domestic and broader Western support and on Soviet restraint.<sup>110</sup>

The seen dominance of US led many analysts to argue that the main characteristics of the future distribution of power would be a state of 'unipolarity'. However, unipolarity is not the only argument concerning the future power distribution. A new bipolarity between US and China, polycentrism and multipolarity are the other possible alternatives, widely discussed by scholars and politicians. An active Indian politician and scholar V.P. Dutt argues that it must be understood that "this was and is a prolonged transitional phase, a place that perhaps will not come to a close for many years. The Soviet Union has collapsed, the Cold War has come to an end, but the world is in a flux and will remain so in the coming years."<sup>111</sup> The former director of Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) K.Subrahmanyam proposes another similar argument that single power hegemony is transitional and a reversion to bipolarity is unlikely. His argument follows: "The legitimacy of nuclear arsenals, the growing awareness of war not being a viable instrument of policy and the globalization process together will lead to a world of six power centers which will have to find a balance among themselves."<sup>112</sup> However, the strongest one among the many arguments seems to be that the future distribution of power will be determined in time and through the responses of many powers to the results of the end of Cold War.

The foremost feature of the post - Cold War era is undoubtedly the supremacy of US in world politics. After the end of bipolarity between the two great powers, the tension between them had determined the basic worldwide political tendencies during 1945 - 1990. The U.S has risen because although the Soviet Union had sufficient nuclear capabilities and other military equipment, it was suffering from many internal problems such as the crisis concerning the legitimacy of authority, economic stagnation and the conflictual relations between the center and republics

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<sup>110</sup> *ibid*, p. 107.

<sup>111</sup> V.P. Dutt, "The Complexities in the post-Cold War World: The Indian Perspective". Lalit Mansingh et.al., *op.cit.*, p. 120.

<sup>112</sup> K. Subrahmanyam, 'The Global Strategic Environment: Bipolarity or Polycentricism?', *Strategic Analysis*, Vol: XX, No:2, May 1997, p.192.

constituting Soviet Union. The shift in the balance of power on behalf of US also brought about the muting of the East – West ideological clash and the spread of principles of liberal democracy. The power vacuum originated from the disintegration of Soviet Union brought about new possibilities for United States to extend the security umbrella of NATO to Central and Eastern Europe and thereby consolidates its influence over Europe as a whole.<sup>113</sup> The end of the relative stability of the Cold World period has forced many countries to formulate their own national security policies, since there is no option of playing one super power off against the other. The uncertainties of post-Cold War era has both accelerated and increased nuclear proliferation. The response of the United States and the existing nuclear powers has been strengthening denial regimes, which were created from time to time since the emergence of Soviet Union as the second country to conduct a nuclear explosion in 1949, to prevent the exportation of nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapon states. This issue has been creating considerable controversy and tension in international relations and seems to preserve its critical position in the foreseeable future.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was generally perceived as the weakness of étatist economies and thereby gave impetus to liberalization policies. The worldwide economic interdependency has increased and new routes for the flow of capital and investment emerged. These economic changes have been accompanied with hard social transformations in many countries and created new problems. When economically weak Soviet Union could not maintain the arms race with the United States and collapsed, the need to give primacy to economics was clarified. Many states began to think of economics as an extremely critical issue in terms of national security. The ideological and political confrontations of the Cold-War era have lost their significance and economic relations have become the more important sphere of international relations.

The globalization process rose as an important prelude to the oncoming international system in the post-Cold War era. Although it can be interpreted in many ways, it is usually employed in an economic sense to the mean "the

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<sup>113</sup> Satish Kumar, 'The Post-Cold War International System: An Indian Perspective' *Strategic Analysis*, Vol: XXI, No: 1, September 1997, p.830.

transformation of national economy and integrating it with world economy".<sup>114</sup> The globalization process not only marked the end of the ongoing ideological conflict between the states but also pointed to an important transformation of the meaning of the concept of 'sovereignty' with the rise of multi-centric institutions and international corporations as opposed to the state centric ones. With this conceptual transformation the line drawn between domestic jurisdiction and external matters is disappearing, the national leaders are getting more accountable to the rules established by international norms and standards; and their authority to act on their free will are diminished, at least in matters pertaining to the economic sphere.<sup>115</sup> The globalization process emerged in the post-Cold War period as a great threat for most of the developing countries.

Ethnic and religious revivalism is another marked feature of the post-Cold War era. The immediate effect of the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe has been the rise of ethnic and religious conflicts. This also brought about a huge discussion on the position of many kinds of minorities at an international level. As important threats to nation states, such conflicts were able to attract worldwide attention. Aspiring from the general tendency of ethnic and religious revivalisms, many groups are struggling to voice their demands and achieve their goals, which indeed is a great threat for multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious states.

## *5. 2. India at the Wake of the Post-Cold War Era*

At the wake of the post-Cold War period, India was being shattered by serious problems ranging from a severe economic crisis to an extensive political corruption threatening social stability, and to the rise of insurgency movements organized through ethnic and religious lines. The kind of vote - catching populism pursued since the 1970s coupled with the rivalry in party politics, whereby all the Indian political parties were trying to stick on to the government at the expense of

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<sup>114</sup> H. C. Shukul, "India in the Emerging Global Order", Chaturvedi and Lodha (eds), op. cit., p.33.

<sup>115</sup> B. Bhattacharyya, "India's Foreign Economic Policy: Evolving Context and Tasks", Lalit Mansingh *et.al.* Vol 1, pp. 212-213.

one another, resulted in widespread political corruption. One of the most worrying effects of such political circumstances was the increase in the number of alienated groups within the polity. The problems in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Sikkim had reached a critical point.

The indications of the rising importance of China since the disintegration of the Soviet Union had turned the Sino-Indian relations to a conflict-prone one, despite some confidence building measures taken during Rajiv Gandhi's premiership. The conflict with Pakistan, on the other hand, deteriorated because of the endeavors of Benazir Bhutto (then the Pakistani Prime Minister) to internationalize the Kashmir conflict and the mutual accusations they rouse towards one another of supporting the secessionist movements in each other's territories, i.e., those in Sindh, Punjab and Kashmir. The increasing nuclearization in both states worsened the already existing controversies between India and Pakistan. The disputes over allocation of water resources of Ganges, and the influx of Bangladeshi refugees to India increased the tension between two states. The Indo-Nepalese relationship, already problematic due to the disputes over sharing of hydropower resources, worsened by Nepal's purchase of important amounts of weaponry from China. The rapprochement between Nepal and China compelled India to take some measures against this small state, i.e. economic blockade. Founded in 1985 with some purposes of confidence building among regional countries and establishing cooperation between them, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, (SAARC) could not fulfill its intended functions, especially because of mutual lack of confidence between India and neighboring countries.

These were some of the major problems of India before the end of bipolar orientation in international politics. The end of the Cold War has both created new national security problems and modified some of the other already existing ones. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the calming of the Soviet – US rivalry have posed considerable new uncertainty, which forced India to rethink and reformulate its economic, political and military structure together with its foreign policy, interests, and alignments.

The most immediate consequence of the end of the Cold War in Indian policy was the fall of non-alignment strategy both in an ideological and pragmatic

political sense. Traditionally, India had adopted the non-alignment strategy during the Cold War era in its conduct of international relations. The philosophical and political discourse of non-alignment was based on peace articulation in the international arena, which was seen essential to the development and security of the new states of Asia and Africa in the immediate aftermath of their independence. The attainment of international peace was also interpreted as essential for the economic, technological, and industrial developments of these states.

The policy of non-alignment occupied a high moral ground and ascribed India a status of moral leadership among Asian and African states.<sup>116</sup> On the other hand, it was again the non-alignment strategy which enabled India to check out the Cold War politics and to abuse the super power rivalry to its own advantage.<sup>117</sup>

If the end of the East-West ideological conflict broke the ideological base of non-alignment, the end of superpower rivalry rendered its political meaningless. If the fall of the bipolar system deprived India of the opportunity to increase its right have a say in international affairs by maneuvering between the super powers of the era and at times playing one off against the other, it was again the fall of superpower rivalry which provided India with a greater sphere of maneuvering to pursue an independent foreign policy free from the pressures from both sides in carrying out her relations with the other states, especially with those states in South Asia. However, some scholars like Neera Chandhoke put forward some other views on the implications of the end of the bipolar world on India's policy options. In her article "The New World Order: Implications for India's Domestic and Foreign Policy", Chandhoke argues that India's policy options in this period shrunk with the shrinkage of international space- by which India used to make use of the superpower conflicts to carve a space for herself in the international arena- with the attainment of a hegemonic consensus among the advanced capitalist states and due to the fact that the South-South cooperation was fragile and the Southern states had neither the collective resources nor the institutional means with which they could carry out their policies.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Neera Chandhoke, "The New World Order: Implications for India's Domestic and Foreign Policy", Lalit Mansingh Vol.1 op.cit. p.79.

<sup>117</sup> Heitznam and Worden, op.cit. Chapter 9, Foreign Policy.

<sup>118</sup> Neera Chandhoke, op. Cit., pp.78-80.

Another important consequence of the end of bipolarity which posed a considerable threat to India was the fact that, states like Pakistan in South Asia and Iraq in the Middle East, which were bound in their foreign policies by the priorities of their superpower allies during the Cold war period began to make use of the power vacuum emerged out of the disintegration of Soviet Union in their search for becoming great powers in their regions. The regional power rivalry accelerated thereof further complicated the already complex relations in South Asia. It was not only this power rivalry which posed a threat to regional peace and stability in South Asia but also with the revival of ethnic and religious sectarianism which had grown sharply and manifested themselves violently on a large scale and resulted in the erosion of the legitimacy and efficiency of institutions set up for governance in every state in the region including India.<sup>119</sup>

The economic imperatives of the post-Cold War period usually discussed within the framework of globalization are another factor which should be counted as an integral part of India's current threat and security considerations.

### *5.3. 1990's: A Decade Long Adjustment Process to the Changing Threat and Security Environment*

Having defined the major impacts of the end of bipolarity on Indian policy we will now try to investigate the changes in India's threat and security perceptions by discussing the policies she pursued throughout the 1990s at the three basic levels:

1. India's relations with extra-regional powers; namely the US, China and Russia.
2. India's internal problems and the spillover effects of these problems on her relations with her neighbors.
3. The effect of the globalization process on India's threat perception and its repercussion on regional political-economic relations.

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<sup>119</sup> S. S. Budhirafa and P. N. Mishra, "Strategy and Doctrine to Achieve Long Term Peace in the Subcontinent", Chaturved and Sonjoy Lodha op. Cit., p.117.



### 5.3.1. *Basic Trends in India's Relations with Extra-Regional Powers in Post-Cold War Era*

The adversarial relationships between US and India because of the political patterns of bipolarity have been on the way of a strategic friendship since the collapse of Soviet Union. Although whether the US considers India, as a future strategic ally may be debatable, the convergence of the interests of the two states on security concerns has been contributing to the enhancement of the relationships. The diminishing importance of security alliances and blocs together with India's wide marked size, resources and its regional power and influence had persuaded US to rethink the place of India in its global politics in the post-Cold War era. That the US policy-makers refer to India as an emerging power is a phenomenon in 1988 and accelerated toward 1993.<sup>120</sup> India's opening refueling facilities to US military aircraft in the run-up to the Gulf War –although later closed due to the immense internal pressure the Indian government was faced with- was an indicator of the future political relations between the two states. The US and Indian joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean in 1992 was another important sign of the nature of oncoming Indo-US relations. In 1994, a US embassy was installed in New Delhi. A good example indicating the changing attitude of US towards India was the suggestion of the first ambassador of US in Delhi, Frank Wisner, that United States should look for other solutions to the Kashmir issue outside the framework of the 1948-1949 United Nations resolutions, which apparently favor the position of Pakistan.<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, Washington lent its support to India in the World Bank and the IMF to rescue Delhi's falling financial credibility in international competitive market system during the mid-nineties.<sup>122</sup>

The general agreement among concerned scholars and politicians on the reasons for increasing interaction and strategic relationship between India and the US is that the convergence areas of the interests of these two states would be trade,

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<sup>120</sup> Shekhar Gupta, op.cit p. 59.

<sup>121</sup> Sandy Gordon, 'South Asia After the Cold War Winners and Losers, *AsianSurvey*, VolXXX, No:10, October 1995, p. 883.

<sup>122</sup> N.s. Gehlot, "Security Perceptions in India's Foreign Policy" Chaturvedi, op.cit., p. 259



economics, and regional stability.<sup>123</sup> In his article 'India-USA Strategic partnership – The advent of the inevitable'<sup>124</sup>, Dr. Subhash Kapila summarizes the main reasons that prompt the U. S. and India to seek a strategic partnership with one another under three titles: first of all, he points to their convergent interests in the preservation of the status quo in the existing strategic equilibrium in Asia-Pacific security architecture. That is to say, both India and the US are concerned with the quasi strategic alliance between China and Russia to checkmate the US in the Asia Pacific, and the Sino-Pakistani nexus. Although, the US's response to these partnerships manifested rather double standards,<sup>125</sup> that is to say, although she employs a strategy of reproaching China and Russia separately in order to contain their influence on the one hand, and approaches on the other hand, the India's shared interest in preserving the status quo condition both the US and India to move closer to one another.

Another area of shared strategic interest is to contain Islamic Fundamentalism, which is a live threat to India and domestic threat in the making of the United States. To be precise, the roots of this threat lie in South West Asia currently. But their probable spillover effect in the Persian Gulf region is of a great concern for both the U. S. who has a vital stake in the huge natural reserves of the Gulf region, and India who has a Muslim population exceeding 14 million by most estimates. It is an irrefutable fact that the U. S had backed the Islamic factions in South West Asia within her endeavors to contain the Soviet Union; more precisely to pull the Soviet army out of Afghanistan during the 1980's, and to get a strong foot in the region. However, the criminalized war economy in the region led by the competing Islamic factions from Dubai, to Herat and from there to the Central Asian Republics and even to Russia now, is perhaps the biggest obstacle to the creation of regional peace and stability. Moreover, this economic organization based on goods and drugs trafficking undermines the formal state institutions day by day and the spillover of corruption to the basic public institutions undermine the legitimacy of political powers from Dubai in the South to Moscow in the North. Until unless, this economy is brought to an end it will remain as a great threat for not

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<sup>123</sup> Shekhar Gupta, op.cit. p. 60.

<sup>124</sup> Dr. Subhash Kapila, "India-USA Strategic Partnership –The advent of the inevitable", South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) Web Page, 22. 4. 2000

only India and the U.S, but also for China and Russia. Thus, these four great powers are supposed to take collective measures against this threat.

Another important convergence point of interests concerns the security of the Indian Ocean together with Washington's broader strategic perceptions about the region in the context of its Middle East and Gulf policy. The problems with Russian arms supplies, the need for technology and investment for economic development are some of the other motives encouraging India to approach the US in the post-Cold War period. However, the US insistence on extending its non-proliferation agenda to South Asia attempts at curbing India's missile program, her strategic relations with China proceeding under the most favored nation status she attributed to China in 1994 remains as major controversial issues between two states. Although Washington seems to be willing to recognize India as an emerging great power, there still exist many uncertainties as to the extent India would concur with US hegemony over the subcontinent.<sup>126</sup>

The Soviet Union was India's major strategic ally during the Cold War era. However, the end of bipolarity brought about the loss of access for India to her superpower patron together with huge amounts of different kinds of weaponry subsidized. Although the new Russia seems to be willing to share military technology with India, it now has to take the sensitivities of the US into consideration in formulating its foreign policy towards India, both because of the calming rivalry with the US and the need to get access to US dominated global financial institutions as the IMF and World Bank in order to carry out its economic development projects. By the way, India has lost the political support provided by the Soviets at international circles, particularly at the UN and on the issue of human rights violations in Kashmir. The security relationship with Russia has lost its significance and has been replaced by beneficial economic relationships. Although a series of arrangements have been made between India and Russian companies in order to improve the defense industrial base,<sup>127</sup> the issue of Indian nuclearization created tension and controversy between the two states. Two changes in the attitude of Russian Foreign policy, largely because of American pressures, towards India revealed important

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Vernon Hewitt, *op.cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>127</sup> Sandy Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 881.

implications about the general patterns of emerging global politics of the post-Cold War era. India is one of the three states which did not undersign the Non-proliferation Treaty and has been trying to prevent the regionalization of the nuclear issue through establishment of a nuclear free zone in South Asia. However, Russia had supported a Pakistani and Bangladeshi resolution calling for a nuclear free South Asia in 1991.<sup>128</sup> A second example to the changing attitude of Russia came in 1993. The Russians appeared to cancel an old deal signed between its space hardware manufacturing country, Glovkosmos, and India. The canceled deal had been designed to supply India with technology for cryogenic engines to be used in polar satellite launch vehicle programs.<sup>129</sup> On the other hand, the common concerns and interests of these two states are largely concentrated in the spheres of trade and economics and developments indicate that the relationships that were largely based on geopolitical and security concerns before the Soviet Union collapsed are reorganized around basically economic issues with the new Russia. The most important issue of common interest between Russia and India is that they both demand the formation of regional stability in Central Asia, where the new actors of international relations have emerged with definite ethnic characteristics, facing grave economic crises and being constantly shattered by domestic violence and internal problems.<sup>130</sup> Moreover, Russia is still the major arms supplier to India. Seeking protection from Pakistani nuclear tipped missiles and any probable attack on her from other great powers, India negotiates with Russia for help in constructing antimissile defenses.<sup>131</sup>

The basic limitation to the improvement of Indo-Russian relations is the latter's potential resurgence as an assertive player not only in the European affairs but more so in the Asia-Pacific and with possibilities in the Middle East which might alter the strategic equation in the region. Moreover, the strategic partnership between China and Russia complicates the Indo-Russian relationship in the beginning of the new millennium.

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<sup>128</sup> Vernon, Hewitt, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>129</sup> Shekhar Gupta. P. 61.

<sup>130</sup> Arun Chaturvedi, "Understanding the Post Cold War Changes in India's Foreign Policy", Chaturvedi and Lodha (eds), *op.cit.*, p 44

<sup>131</sup> Vivek Raghuvanshi, India Seeks Russia's help to Construct Antimissile Defense, Defense News, July 30-August 5, 2001

One of the two states perceiving itself as a great power in South Asia is of course China, which also had fulfilled an important function in the South Asian power balance during the Cold War. Before the end of the Cold War, the three major problems in Sino-Indian relations were the border issue, Chinese assistance to Pakistan, and the threat due to increasing nuclearization of China.

A turning point in the controversial relationships between China and India was the visit of Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. In the 1990s visits and counter-visits continued. The improvement of the Sino-Indian relationships in the post-Cold War era was best summarized by Gupta as follows: “Within the region, the most important development is the Sino-Indian thaw, evident in the wide ranging agreement between the Asian giants to freeze the border issue, embark on a program of mutual disengagement and troop withdrawals, institute confidence-building measures and increase trade and cultural relations.”<sup>132</sup> This changing attitude was largely because of the worldwide transformation of political conditions. The collapse of the strategic ally of India during Cold War and the rapprochement between new Russia and China and the primacy of economics in the emerging “New World Order” can be counted as important motives in such a change in political orientation. The Indian compromise on the border issue, the decrease in Chinese assistance to Pakistan, China’s adoption of a position of ‘careful neutrality’ on the Kashmir issue and supporting a solution through bilateral means and the improvement in business relations are all integral parts of an adjustment process. Moreover, China accepted the accession of Sikkim to India in 1994 and declared that it would not back any insurgency in India in future.<sup>133</sup>

However, despite the great degree of improvement in Sino-Indian relations, many Indian strategists and politicians continue to assert that China will be the most important security threat in the long run. In Dr. Rajesh Kumar Mishra’s words: “All that happened was that what should have been left ‘unsaid’ in diplomatic exchanges was said but the fact of the matter was that if the Indian security concerns were to be considered in a larger matrix, the Chinese threat will have to be taken into

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<sup>132</sup> *Ibid*, p. 56.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid*, p. 57.

account”.<sup>134</sup> The linkage between China and some Islamic countries (Pakistan and Iran in, particular), with Beijing selling them arms and ammunitions including nuclear missile technology, and the way China has evolved her military cooperation with Pakistan in the last decade and the manner she is also seeking to strengthen military ties with Bangladesh causes great concerns in New Delhi.<sup>135</sup> Moreover, the Chinese superiority over India in terms of nuclear power both in qualitative and quantitative respects is a great source of worry in New Delhi circles. India’s seek for parity with China involves enormous outlay and at great political and economic costs to her.

Other sources of concerns in Sino-Indian relations stem from the fact that the rise of Asia in the post-Cold War period is often argued so as to mean “the rise of China” with respect to its high degree of economic development, huge market potential, nuclear power and its claim to being a great power and a highly possible Chinese hegemony over the South Asia.

### *5. 3. 2. India and Its Neighbors: General Policy Trends in the 1990’s*

#### *5. 3. 2. 1. India’s Domestic Problems in the Post-Cold War Era*

At the wake of the post-Cold War Era, India was shattered by ethnic, religious, and regional unrest and insurgencies; the problems staged by rising communalism and casteism; mass poverty and class struggles.

The end of the Cold War and the process of globalization had certain impacts not only on the nature and intensity of such problems but also on the methods and institutional means that were available to the Indian government in overcoming them.

This section will examine India’s internal problems with their causes and the new dimensions they acquired with the end of the Cold War; the spillover effects of

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<sup>134</sup> Dr. Rajesh Kumar Mishra, “Sino-Indian Relations III: More on Indian Nukes and China”, SAAG web page, 21 October 2000

<sup>135</sup> N. S. Gehlot, op.cit. p . 262

these problems on India's relations with her neighbors; and the policies devised by Indian governments to overcome these problems will be examined.

In the year 1991, the Indian economy was at the brink of bankruptcy. The almost ten-years-long Sikh uprising in Punjab, the Kashmir uprising of 1990, the tribal uprisings in the Northeast resulted in enormous increase in defense expenditures. The rising unemployment and mass poverty became important elements of political and social instability. India did not have enough public savings to allocate for the solution of these problems. In 1991, the Indian government made negotiations with the IMF, and received credits from it under the conditions determined by the institution itself. As a result of these negotiations India started to privatize her state-owned institutions, reduce the trade barriers, and abolish the obstacles to foreign direct investment.

The liberal democratic principles that were counted among the main features of the Post-Cold War, era, the recognition of minority and cultural rights as distinct categories of rights in the International Law enabled different political groups –be it religious, ethnic, linguistic, or regional- to voice their differences and demand the making of certain adjustments in the political structure of the state. Furthermore, with the developments in the communication technology, poor people's demands from the state for better living opportunities increased parallel to the increase in their knowledge about the world outside.

This period, during which India's internal problems reached such a critical point, coincided with the great transformation in the newly developing international system, leaving India with a necessity to pursue an active foreign policy in order to shape the latter to the best of her interests. Not only the Indian leaders believed that their country should have a right to say in the making of the new international system, but also did they believed that their country deserved a peculiar place in the world. In this period of overall transformation, the solution of internal problems and the way in which they were to be solved came to have a vital importance for India.

Moreover, India's neighbors confronted with serious internal problems at the beginning of 1990's. The problems of democratic transformation in Nepal and Bangladesh, the timely coincidence of the privatization policies in Pakistan, the ethnic problems in Sri Lanka which reached beyond a manageable point, the



economic problems these countries were facing with, the problems created by the mass influx of over 12 million people from Bangladesh to India with the hope of having better living conditions urged India to assess her internal problems together with the problems of her neighbors.

One of the most serious challenges India faced in the Post-Cold War era has been the insurgency in Kashmir Valley. The Kashmir issue remained as an unsolved dispute between India and Pakistan after the partition of 1947. The status of this region with an overwhelmingly Muslim population and a Hindu Maharaja (King) could not be agreed upon during partition and since both India and Pakistan were in seek of legitimizing their ideologies in their proposals to solve the dispute, neither parties showed enough flexibility during the negotiations held with this aim. While Pakistan insisted on the integration of Kashmir to Pakistan according to the “Two Nations Theory”, as developed by Muhammed Ali Jinnah, India, having developed “secularism” as her founding ideology, rejected the Jinnah’s proposal as un acceptable, as she believed that the separation of a group on ethnic, religious, or linguistic basis would render the founding ideology, the ideology of secularism, meaningless.

By the UN sponsored agreement of 1949, a “Line of Control” leaving one third of the region under Pakistan’s sphere of influence and the rest to India was determined. Relating to the Kashmir problem Amalendu Misra states that:

There is no denying fact that policy-makers in New Delhi have always been acutely aware of the sensitive profile of Kashmir. Kashmir was accorded a special status in the Indian constitution soon after its annexation. This provision allowed it to enjoy special autonomy within the federation, which all other units are denied. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution limits the power of the federal parliament to make laws for Kashmir and forbids non-Kashmiris from settling there.<sup>136</sup>

India tried to develop a sense of Indian ness in the region by making large economic investments there, and at the same time she sought to develop close ties with the Kashmiri regions to make them the agents of the center. “Whenever this policy failed, New Delhi created division among the regional political establishment,



in order to prevent the development of anti-Indian sentiments and tendencies there.”<sup>137</sup>

Although this demanding attitude of India resulted in discontent among the Kashmiris, there had been no serious demand for independence up until 1989. The global resurgence of Islam in 1990's, the growing power of the Mujahiden in Afghanistan and the Pakistani support given to them, the failure of already corrupt political structure to pursue an effective economic and political governing, the tendency of Indian leaders to solve the growing discontent by over-centralization can be counted among the reasons of the insurgency in Kashmir in this period.

India accused Pakistan of inciting the insurgency in Kashmir and training the militants in the military camps within the Pakistani borders, and started to pursue a counter-insurgency strategy. It has deployed almost 400,000 security officers in Kashmir comprising troops of the Central Reserve Police Force, the Border Security Force, a specially constituted counterinsurgency force, which was called the Rashtriya Rifles drawn from units of the Indian Army and the Indian Army itself. “The strategy involved the extensive use of numerically superior paramilitary forces and the Army's efforts to torment the insurgent.”<sup>138</sup>

In response, Pakistan tried to internationalize the problem and bring the dispute to the attention of the UN, holding that India had used an excessive force and violated the human rights. Pakistan's role in the arousal of the insurgency and her later efforts to internationalize the issue once more brought the two countries at the brink of war in early 1990's.

The methods devised by India to suppress the insurgency in Kashmir was severely criticized in the international arena, and India was accused of ‘violating the human rights’ in an extensive manner. This fact pointed to an important shift from the Cold-War era. Besides, India was then deprived of the Soviet veto in the UN, and the fact that two other permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and the US had close ties with Pakistan, increased the probability of the

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<sup>136</sup> Amalendu Misra, ‘The Politics of Seccessionist Conflict Management in India’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, August 2001, Vo.22, No.2, pp. 61,68.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., p.61.

<sup>138</sup> Sumit Ganguly. ‘Future Uncertain: Indian Security Policy Approaches the Millenium’, *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1997, Vol. 51, Issue 1, pp.226-27.

internationalization of India's ethnic, linguistic, and religious problems. This situation brought about a qualitative change in India's threat perception related to these kinds of problems.

1990's were the period of rise of Hindu nationalism in India. The Hindus regarded the privileges constitutionally recognized for religious difference as obstacles to the realization of national integrity and national consolidation. Moreover, the secessionist movements throughout the country and their relations with the kin-states aroused a strong feeling that the Hindus were the true patriots of India. The problem related to the Babri Mesjid in Ayodha Pradesh was once more provoked. The Hindu radicals attacked the Babri Mesjid, a 16<sup>th</sup> century mosque, in 1992. The attackers justified their action alleging that the mosque had been built on the ruins of a Hindu temple "that consecrated the birthplace of Lord Rama, a significant member of Hindu pantheon".<sup>139</sup> During the successive clashes, most of them being Muslim, many people lost their lives and the relationships between the two communities decreased to a very low level. After the clashes had ended, anti-Indian demonstrations were held in Bangladesh and the Bangladeshi Government overtly criticized the Indian policies towards the Muslims. This was interpreted by India as an interference in the country's 'internal affairs'. The funding of many Mujahiden corpses among the militants who lost their lives during the clashes between the Indian security forces and the Islamic militants in Kashmir; and the extensive support given to the latter by Taliban, who initially organized around the *madrassas* in Pakistan and later captured the government in Afghanistan, increased the Hindu-Muslim tension in the region. In 1999, Taliban hijacked a passenger plane with the demand of release of the Taliban militants incarcerated in India. The government agreed to make a compromise with the pirates and released the prisoner. However, this was a shock for India. In addition to this, the armed conflict over Kargil heights in the disputed Kashmir region in the same year, once more brought India and Pakistan at the edge of a big war. The reason for the conflict was the attack of Kashmiri militants to Indian forces by passing through the strategic highlands under the Pakistani control. Although Pakistan withdrew for all the territories she

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid. p. 227.

had captured during the course of the attack, this withdrawal is argued to be the most important reason behind the military coup in Pakistan in 1999.<sup>140</sup>

The Sikh secessionism in Punjab was one of the most violent uprisings in post-independence India. This Sikh has raised the demand for independence at the time of the foundation of the Republic of India. Accordingly, Bhupendiya Singh and Sardar Hukum Singh who joined in the Constituent Assembly as Sikh representatives rejected the Constitution.<sup>141</sup>

In the population censuses of 1951 and 1961, the Punjabi Hindus stated that they did not accept Punjabi as their mother tongues. This had alienated them from the Sikhs, and the Sikhs who stuck to the Punjabi language in *gurmukhi* script came to be seen as the true representatives of the Punjabi culture and Punjab. "This became tantamount to mark Sikhism as a distinctive religion separate from Hinduism with a distinct language and a script fostering a distinct nationality amongst the Sikhs living in a defined territory of Punjab".<sup>142</sup>

During the Indo-Pak war of 1965, Sikh played a critical role in India's victory; and in turn, they were given certain concessions, which later caused discontent among the Punjabi Hindus. In response, New Delhi attempted to divide the Sikh opposition in Punjab to remove the Hindu discontent. The Congress Party managed to buy off a part of the opposition and tried to bring it to the power in Punjab. However, this resulted in a serious uprising in the region led by the radical Sikh leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. He took shelter in the precincts of the Golden Temple of Amritsar with his militants, and threw down the gauntlet at the authority of the state that asked him to vacate it.<sup>143</sup> The Indian army deployed an operation called the "Operation Blue Star". During the clashes, Bhindranwale and many Sikh militants were killed alongside many army members. Though the militants were flushed out, the raid deployed at the temple created a widespread discontent. In 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by a Sikh, who was in fact one of her own

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<sup>140</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Pakistan in 2000/Starting Anew or Stalemate?', *Asian Survey*, January/February 2001, Vol. XLI, No. 1, pp. 109-10.

<sup>141</sup> Pannalal Dhar *Ethnic Unrest in India and Her Neighbours* (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1998), p. 228.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 228-29.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 228-29.

security guards. During the anti-Sikh riots in the country, thousands of Sikhs were massacred who killed many Hindus in Punjab for revenge.

According to Amalendu Misra, “Sikh insurgency posed a major threat to national unity and sovereignty owing to Punjab’s contiguous border and, in response, the state used all manner of tactics at its disposal to check this secessionist tide.”<sup>144</sup> India accused Pakistan of supporting the Sikh militants, and even of letting them to establish training camps within her borders.

Some analysts argue that the Indian state carefully orchestrated a form of ‘managed disorder’ in Punjab to stop the emergence of any democratic consensus against New Delhi.<sup>145</sup> According to Gurharpal Singh, “elements within the central government propped up various terrorist counter-insurgency programs”.<sup>146</sup> Besides, James Manor argues that Indira Gandhi promoted Sikh extremism in Punjab as a controlled experiment to diffuse opposition to her government.<sup>147</sup>

The uprisings in Punjab were still continuing in 1991. However, the Akali Dal Party in Punjab was displaying a kind of democratic opposition, demanding the recognition of a kind of autonomy to Punjab similar to the one recognized for Kashmir. The Congress Party, which was then at the government, was competing with the Akali Dal Party, and it sought for the emergence of a political party in Punjab which might cooperate with the central government. The Congress Party was in power in Punjab representing 30% of the local parliament. In this respect it was nevertheless far from representing the Sikhs. The Sikhs demanded the Government to establish contacts with the Akalis and make negotiations with the representatives of Sikh militants. This demand was put forward for the legitimacy of the representation; and the Sikhs wanted to be participated to the political process just as those who were given a right to have a say in the government after the Nagas and Mizos uprisings in the Northeast.<sup>148</sup> This demand was refused by the Center; in effect the Akali Dal Party boycotted the elections.

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<sup>144</sup> Misra, op.cit., pp. 58-59.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., pp. 59-60.

<sup>146</sup> Gurharpal Singh, ‘Punjab Since 1984: Disorder, Order, and Legitimacy’, *Asian Survey*, April 1996, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp.420-21.

<sup>147</sup> James Manor, ‘“Ethnicity” and Politics in India’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, p. 470.

<sup>148</sup> Dhar, op.cit., pp. 249-50.

There were several reasons behind Akali Dal Party's boycotting of the elections; but there was a clear effect: the Sikhs became more alienated. The most obvious reasons were the Congress Party's will to increase its power and the Hindu nationalist' election campaign against the privileges planned to be given to the ethnically, religiously and linguistically different groups. Moreover, during the insurgency period the Sikhs put emphasis on the religious difference between them and the Hindus rather than the cultural similarities among them, while many concerned Indian scholars and the Indian state used the cultural argument to stem the Sikh notion of an independent identity outside Hinduism.<sup>149</sup>

The resurgence in Punjab was suppressed by the use of military force. The international media and the non-governmental organizations were rather indifferent to the excessive use of military force in Punjab, quite different than their careful observation of Kashmir; in effect this policy of the Indian state did not make it possible to maintain the resurgence over a longer period of time. Besides, at a time when the conflict was at its height, the upper class Sikhs stopped supporting the militants, who were largely coming from the economically depressed sections of the society, as their economic conditions worsened and as they recognized that the Center would not let the secessionist movement to proceed.<sup>150</sup> As a result the Sikhs gave in their demands for an independent Punjab. Akai Dal Party allied with the BJP during the elections of 1996, and it has been on the power since then.

Although the military means seemingly proved to be successful, the resurgence caused the lives of millions of people, the widespread alienation of Sikhs and economic depression, especially in Punjab. Dhar argues that if the means of dialogue had been employed before the elections of 1992, Pakistan would have been automatically isolated where the militants would have found its assistance no longer necessary of breaking the constitution from within.<sup>151</sup>

An article covered in the *Times of India* of September 3, 2001 reveals the fragility of the situation. In her article *Memorials to Terrorists dot Punjab Villages*, Yudhvira Rana states: "Though the virulent days of terrorism are over, their reminiscence is still alive in the very heart of militancy-affected area of Punjab where

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<sup>149</sup> Misra, op.cit., p. 59.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p.59.

<sup>151</sup> Dhar., op.cit., p. 250.

some people still eulogize the 'brave' acts of their village boys who joined the various militant organizations. They are establishing memorials for them."<sup>152</sup>

The northeast region has always been one of the most politically instable regions in India. Some of the prolonged secessionist uprisings have taken place in the region called the 'Seven Sisters' where is also geographically isolated from the rest of the country. The so-called Seven Sisters are located on a 6.387km-long strategically important shared by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma and China. Comprising a total of 209 distinct tribes, 257 recognized dialects, and a multiplicity of pagan and proper religions, the region has always been a hotbed of conflicts organized along ethnic and/or religious nationalisms.

As discussed earlier, the Sino-Indian War of 1962 was the most important instance where India realized the strategic importance of the region. From then on, a great portion them being military, large-scale investments were made in the region. These increased the discontent of the people living there. As Misra argues "the inhabitants complained living in a police state and spared no opportunity to strike back against the central government."<sup>153</sup>

Relating to the situation in the region current Minister of Defense and External Affairs Jaswant Singh remarks:

A geographical distancing of these far flung states of the Indian Union has had consequences born not only simply of the distance alone; the relatively lower contribution to the arithmetic of India's parliament is another reason. Consequently, the importance and the say of these states in the political calculus of the power play at the center is less. This, in part, was compensated for by the international factor, which then had predictable consequences. In the ultimate a geographical distancing combined with diminishes political importance resulted in an emotional separateness.<sup>154</sup>

What made the insurgence movements in this region strategically important threats to Indian security was, just as in Bengal and Kashmir, that they were located on the border with the neighboring states. The Chinese factor in the Nagaland insurgence, the first insurgence movement within the Indian Union, the Bangladeshi factor in the insurgence in Assam, the Bhutanese factor in the Bodo uprising both affected India's

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<sup>152</sup> Yudhvir Rana, <http://www.timesofindia.com>

<sup>153</sup> Misra, op.cit., p. 57.

<sup>154</sup> Jaswant Singh, op.cit., pp. 151-52



approach to such movements at a certain direction, and deteriorated her relations with the neighboring states.

Relating to the insurgence movements Jaswant Singh states:

Political insensitivity to the just needs and demands of the people; their yearning to be the masters of their own political and economic destiny; the failure of the Central Government to at first understand of this thirst, thereafter to respond to it but always too late and even mostly with too little, and that too, only grudgingly has always caused deep alienation.<sup>155</sup>

In this respect, what Nehru had said during the years of independence, “any conception that India is ruling them and that they are the ruled will alienate them”.<sup>156</sup>

According to Jaswant Singh the break up of the Soviet Union, the Intifada in Palestine, and the revolutionary changes in the communication technology, which enabled the related news, all across the world at the beginning of 1990’s had a tremendous impact on the insurgency movements in India:

Thus both television and radio broadcasts today are the news weapons that come to the aid of insurgency, with television and reaching almost every rural hamlet across the length and breadth of India, at a particularly virulent phase of insurgency in the Kashmir valley, scenes of the break up of the Soviet Union and of the Intifada movement in Palestine inspired the local population, no doubt falsely, but they did delude themselves into thinking that what was happening in the former USSR could well happen in India, too.<sup>157</sup>

A parallel change took place in the profile of the insurgency movements. Referring to this change Misra states:

Although many of the current secessionist and separatist movements in the northeast operate according to the patterns set in the past, they pose a unique challenge. In the past, the nature of the conflict in the Northeast was bilateral, that is, the affected community or region vs. New Delhi. In the current setting a dissatisfied community or region not only fights against the central government but the local authority too. Thus, the conflict has assumed a tripartite character and the solutions to it are equally hard to find. Inadvertently, New Delhi has often been sucked into a regional issue and its failure to find just solutions has precipitated secessionism.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid., p. 152.

<sup>156</sup> Quoted in Misra, op.cit., p. 56.

<sup>157</sup> Jaswant Singh, op.cit., p. 153.

<sup>158</sup> Misra, op.cit., p. 58.



A case in point is the Bodo uprising in Assam. Although Bodos wish to have a separate autonomous province of their own, they are nevertheless positively interested in Indian national cohesion.<sup>159</sup> The non-Bodo majority in Assam however, oppose such a move.

However the Bodo uprising has not been the uprising in Assam worrying for the Central Government. The Ultra-Assamese nationalist movement led by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) is a genuinely secessionist one which receives an extensive support from outside India, especially from those neighboring state which has a stake in India.

This puts the central government into a big dilemma in dealing with the Bodo uprising, the policy of giving into the demands raised by the Bodos would result in a worrisome backlash from the ULFA; on the other hand, ignoring these demands may turn a separatist movement into a serious secessionist one. It is important here to note that Assam is not the only state where this dilemma exists; thank to the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic composition of the Indian polity, the central government has to deal with such problems throughout the country.

During the period of foundation, the Indian state had determined the formation of national unity as its first task to achieve. the newly independent state agreed on a developmentalist model to remove the regional, class or caste disparities, either created or deteriorated by the two hundred-year-long colonial rule. New constitutional formulations were made in order to improve the conditions of backward classes, scheduled castes and tribes, which were largely divided by ethnic, linguistic lines, through positive discrimination. For instance, the reservation of electoral offices and jobs in central and state governments to the scheduled castes together with certain educational benefits were guaranteed by the constitutions. Thus, these groups became able to voice their demands within the governmental apparatus. The following quotation from Heitzman is illustrative of this case.

A government-appointed commission, officially the Second Backward Classes Commission, chaired by former member of Parliament Bindhyeshwari Prasad

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<sup>159</sup> Jyotindra Dasgupta, 'Community, Authenticity and Autonomy: Insurgence and Institutional Development in India's Northeast', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, May 1997, Vol. 56, No. 2, p. 357.

Mandal from December 1978 to December 1980. Of the five members, four were from Backward Classes and one was from a Scheduled Caste. The commission's controversial December 1980 (*The Mandal Commission Report of the Backward Classes Commission*) called for reserving 27 percent of all services and public-sector undertakings under central government and 27 percent of all admissions to institutions of higher education (except in states that have reserved higher percentages) for Backward Class members and Dalits (Untouchables).<sup>160</sup>

In August 1990, then the Prime Minister V. P. Singh suddenly announced that his government would implement the recommendation of the Mandal Commission to reserve 27 percent of central government to include around 52 percent of the population. This led to riots throughout North India. Some seventy-five upper-caste youths died after restoring to self-immolation to dramatize their opposition and almost 200 others were killed in clashes with the police.<sup>161</sup> The riots and self-immolations resulted in the fall of the prime minister.

Since caste divisions are largely economically based, class struggles and caste conflicts in India overlap to a considerable extent. The upper-castes generally live in urban areas, while members of the lower-castes live in the rural. Ethnic and religious diversity, in many cases, coincides with regional disparities, which also aggravates the already existing conflicts.

Besides manifold ethnic, religious, regional and caste problems in the early 1990s, for which the Indian State had spent much of its energy, India was also suffering from a serious economic crisis.

The doubling of oil prices after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, brought the Indian economy at the brink of bankruptcy. the need for financial aid compelled India to start negotiations with the IMF. At the end of the negotiations, India agreed to employ an extensive liberalization program in return for receiving credit. The basic feature of this program was that it was designed to overcome the financial deficits. In order to achieve this end, the government had to curtail the public expenditures, which was also meant a discouraging factor for investing in non-profitable areas such as education, health, defense, etc. Another threatening effect of the liberalization policies was mass unemployment.

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<sup>160</sup> Heitzman and Worden, op.cit., Glossary.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., Chapter V Caste and Class

Such economic reforms in India could be considered as attempts of adjustment to the emerging global economy. In opening up the national economy to foreign capital, India expected to create new employment opportunities and financial support for making new investments. Smitu Kothari argues that the investments were concentrated in either already affluent regions or large-scale investments such as hydro-electrics, irrigation, mining (particularly open cast mines), super-thermal and nuclear power plants, industrial complexes, military installations, weapons testing grounds and superhighways. While the former has an increasing affect in regional disparities, the latter result in the displacement of some 500,000 people a year.<sup>162</sup> The displaced people migrated to rural areas and caused serious problems in their new settlements.

Regional disparities stimulated revolts against the central government. For instance, Amalendu Misra points out to the economic, rather than the ethnic factor in explaining separatism in Uttar Pradesh. Misra argues that the advocates of Uttarkhand emphasized the obvious economic disparity between their own region and the rest of Uttar Pradesh, which they believed, could only be eradicated by the formation of a separate Uttarkhand province.<sup>163</sup>

Migration from rural to urban areas galvanized mass unemployment, and this in turn, increased the tension between castes. The difficulty in finding jobs compelled the upper-caste youngsters to criticize the privileges recognized for the Backward Class more severely. People coming from the Scheduled Castes began to establish new parties in order not to lose the privileges given to them, while upper-caste members did the same in search of defending their rights.

One other important consequence of the economic liberalization process has been the enormous increase in the share of foreign products in Indian markets. These resulted in a considerable change in consumption patterns, and in turn, incited a fear of cultural assimilation. The rise of Hindu nationalism can well be evaluated as a reaction to these changes. It is important here to note that it was the sister

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<sup>162</sup> Smitu Kothari, 'Whose Independence? The Social Impact of Economic Reform in India', *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1997, Vol.51, Issue 1, p. 91.

<sup>163</sup> Misra, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

organization of the BJP, namely the Rasthriya Swamyamsevak Sangh (RSS), that challenged the government policies on economic, political and cultural issues.<sup>164</sup>

Swamy holds that failure of the current coalition government to sustain fiscal discipline has resulted in economic and political corruption. Any privileges given to the supporters of a particular party in power stimulated other parties to act in a certain way so as to please their own supporters.<sup>165</sup>

In his article *India as a Global Power: Capacity, Opportunity and Strategy*, Varun Sahni comments on the problems confronted by India after the end of the Cold War as follows:

The tragedy in India is that the state as bureaucracy is thoroughly discredited today, and this has directly resulted in the delegitimization of the state as law and the state as an arbiter of the public good. All countries need the state as law, and a developing country like India, in which the cake is small and the claimants many, desperately needs the state as an arbiter of the public good.<sup>166</sup>

### 5. 3. 2. 2. *India and Her Neighbors in the Post-Cold War Era*

Vernon Hewitt argues that the actual threat to the security of South Asian countries is the tension originating from the cultural similarities among these states and their endeavors to legitimize their existence as nation states on the foundation of their distinctiveness.<sup>167</sup> What further traumatizes this tension is the domineering affect of India in terms of its population, culture and geography, in the region.

India's relations with her neighbors during the Cold-War period were largely motivated by the strategy of keeping them away from joining anti-Indian pacts and improving military and economic relations with them. Many scholars and strategists underline that the end of Cold-War has brought about a decline in strategic importance of the neighboring countries. Although this meant a period of relative relief, the world-wide and regional developments in the Post- Cold War era not only added new dimensions to the already existing problems but also created new ones.

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<sup>164</sup> Arun Swamy, 'India in 2000/ A Respite from Instability', *Asian Survey*, January-February 2001, Vol. XLI, No. 1, p. 92.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>166</sup> Varun Sahni, "India as a Global Power: Capacity, Oppotunity and Strategy", Lalit Mansingh Vol I *et. al.* op.cit., p. 35.

<sup>167</sup> Hewitt, op.cit., pp. 76-77.

### 5. 3. 2. 2. 1. *Indo-Pak Relations*

An interesting political debate revolves around who are the winners and losers of the end of the Cold War. So far as Pakistan is concerned the most frequent answer is that India is the winner. As already mentioned before, both India and Pakistan have been forced to reassess their foreign and domestic policies, interests, and alliances. Both Pakistan and India lost their super power patrons, the US and Soviet Union respectively. The end of the Cold War rendered Pakistan's strategic importance to the US as a front state in its struggle against communism meaningless. Pakistan's overt support to fundamentalist Islam, its role in the continuity and extension of regional economic corruption, its insistence on policies of nuclearization with the help of China are among the major reasons to the rapidly diminishing US support. The improving Sino-Indian relations result in the more isolation of Pakistan both in regional and international arena. These changes in the political circumstances have brought about the progressive weakening of Pakistan in relation to India. Rodney W. Jones summarizes some major common features of India and Pakistan and the nature of the relations between the two in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War as follows:

Dramatic as the external changes are, they have done nothing to reduce the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Those countries are no less adversaries today than before. If anything, the events of the last decade deepened their hostility. Each alleges it has been the victim of "low-intensity war" and "subversion" by the other. Both continue to be plagued by an array of political crises and internal security problems, some of explosive proportions, as in the case of the conflicts in Kashmir and Indian Punjab. Both are facing economic crises, aggravated in both India and Pakistan by the effects of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, and in Pakistan also by the loss of foreign aid. Each is afflicted by government or regime instability, internal political violence, and secessionist movements.<sup>168</sup>

The Pakistani support towards the Jihadi movements in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, increasing fundamentalist fervor in Pakistan despite the fact that no religious party managed to come to the power since 1993, the role of Pakistan in Islamic resurgence in Central Asia, the Islamic militancy in Kashmir

,deepened the Indian anxiety towards Pakistan.<sup>169</sup> However, these tensions are less likely to result in conventional wars between India and Pakistan, notwithstanding the fact that there have been occasional, short-term proxy wars between them. The reason for this is mainly that they both have greater incentives than before to employ preemptive measures in the early stages of hostilities to refrain from the disastrous economic consequences of any large-scale war. Still, however, the Kashmir problem is a war-prone one despite a kind of *modus vivendi* seems to have been accepted by Pakistan.<sup>170</sup>

Another strategy both India and Pakistan employ in their desire to refrain from war is paradoxically the increasing amount of nuclearization. To put it more precisely, the motive behind nuclearization is not only that it reflects a desire for being a great power, but also that it acts as an unmatched leverage for deterrence. In this respect, India seems to be more advantageous than Pakistan since that it has a technical and strategic superiority over and more economic resources to allocate for it than the latter. This nuclear rivalry is likely to yield important consequences for the overall balance of power in the Indian Ocean.

The isolation of Pakistan in international for a, her desire to get access to global institutional funding, which is attached to a more strict the principle of 'conditionality' in the post cold war era to carry out economic liberalization and development policies, and India's superiority over her military and economic capabilities seem to compel Pakistan to a more compromising attitude towards India.

### *5. 3. 2. 2 India's Relations with Other Regional Actors*

India's problematic relations with her small neighbors during the Cold War era was largely stemming from the structural character of the region which can be described as power asymmetry between India and her neighbors, and the repercussion of the Cold War on the intraregional relations. It can easily be said that

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<sup>168</sup> Rodney W.Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 106.

<sup>169</sup> Shekhar Gupta, *op. cit.* p. 18.

<sup>170</sup> Sandy Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 894.



both these two factors deteriorated the relations between India and her neighbors and prevent any constructive relations between them.

With Nepal and Bangladesh there was a conflict over access to the water resources of the basin of the Brahmaputra and Ganges Rivers. In addition, problems of soil erosion have contributed to the illegal immigration into India from Nepal and Bangladesh. This immigration threatens in turn to alter the tenuous ethnic balance in a number of Indian border districts, particularly the states of West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. "Such changes in ethnic composition, coupled with competition for scarce resources, particularly arable land, created tensions in communities on both sides of borders".<sup>171</sup>

Both Nepal and Bangladesh have defense ties with China and this is a great concern for India. In 1992, the destruction of Babri Masjid in Ayodha Pradesh by the militant Hindus in India led to anti-Indian demonstrations in Bangladesh. Besides, Bangladesh accused India of failing to protect her Muslim citizens and condemned her. India acknowledged this incident as an intervention to her domestic affairs and warned Bangladesh in turn. Another point of controversy between India and Bangladesh is that the former accuses the latter of supporting the insurgency movements in Northeastern India.

Pakistani intelligence activities in Bangladesh came not only from the Indian Central government, but also from local authorities in the neighboring Indian regions.<sup>172</sup> Although the Bangladeshi government has denied these activities, the political ambiguities stemming from the process of transition to democracy is argued to provide Pakistan and other anti-Indian powers with favorable conditions and new possibilities.<sup>173</sup>

The political instability in Nepal, too, has posed a serious challenge to India. An Indian airplane was hijacked in December 24, 1999. India's suspicions about Nepal's involving in hijacking was denied by Nepal. India Today magazine featured a story on June 12, 2000, captioned "The Nepal Game Plan". The story suggested that important Nepali politicians, media persons, and businessmen were being used by

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<sup>171</sup> Sumit Ganguly, 'South Asia After the Cold War', *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn, 1992, p.177.

<sup>172</sup> M. Rashiduzzaman, 'Bangladesh in 2000/Searching for Better Governance?', *Asian Survey*, January-February 2001, Vol. XLI, No. 1, p. 128.



Pakistan's intelligence service. Nepal vigorously denied the report, claiming that it was play to tarnish the country's image.<sup>174</sup>

The prolonged conflict between the Tamils and the government in Sri Lanka, and the rejection of the Sri Lankan government to acknowledge the cultural rights of its Tamil population, increase the tension between India and Sri Lanka. Besides, thousands of Sri Lankans who sought refuge in Tamil Nadu in 1980's are continuing to stay on, creating pressures with the attendant problem of anti-social and criminal activities.<sup>175</sup>

All of these states mentioned so far are suffering from insurgency movements organized along ethnic and religious lines.

Pressures from ethno-sectarian conflicts and religions fundamentalism are also rising in all countries of South Asia. Pakistan is sitting atop an ethnic cauldron as pressures simmer threatening to tear apart the fabric of Islamic identity from below. The challenge in Sindh underscores disturbing dimensions of large scale violence between ethnic groups. The continued Punjabi domination in the power structure spells a certain uncertainty for the future of Pakistani federal polity. Running feuds between Shias and Sunnis in various parts of Pakistan have become a common feature on the Pakistani scene. Sri Lanka remains mired in prolonged ethnic conflict as the continued intransigence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) makes for a virtual civil war in the strife-torn island. Sinhalese resistance to grand of effective and substantive devolution power to the Tamils only queers the pitch of ethnic politics in the multi-ethnic society of Sri Lanka. Even Bangladesh, which has a relatively homogenous society, is facing problems in overcoming difficulties in integrating its small tribal minority. The likelihood of the region remaining in a state of crisis due to rising scale of political and social discontent is thus going to be a part of South Asian realities for quite sometime. This not only poses a threat to state structure within these countries but also has an adverse impact on the matrix of inter-state relationship in the region.<sup>176</sup>

Unlike her relations with other neighbors, India's relations with Bhutan became some problematic in the Post-Cold war era. The existence of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and BODO's military camps in the eastern and southern Bhutan is the main deteriorating factor.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Sreedhar, Unpublished Lectures, METU Summer School 2001.

<sup>174</sup> Lok Raj Baral, 'Nepal in 2000/Discourse of Democratic Consolidation', *Asian Survey*, January-February 2001, Vol. XLI, No. 1, p.140.

<sup>175</sup> Nancy Jetley, 'India's Security Challenges: Perspectives and Prospects', *Strategic Analysis*, Vol: XXI, No: 9, December 1997, p. 1243

<sup>176</sup> Nancy Jetley, *Ibid.*, p.1250

<sup>177</sup> Padnamaja Murthy, 'India and Its Neighbors: The 1990s and Beyond', *Strategic Analysis*, November 2000, Vol. XXIV, No.8, pp.1411-1429.

Bhutan complains about the existence and activities of these militants within her territory, yet she lacks the power to cope with them, the number of whom is some 40000 people according to Indian sources.<sup>178</sup> These militant activities in Bhutan has such an effect on Indian- Bhutanese relations: " While some in Bhutan, including representatives within the National Assembly, tended to believe that India was not doing enough to solve the problem, there were those in India who have had suspicions that Bhutan was acting as a safe sanctuary for insurgent."<sup>179</sup>

Padnamaja Murthy takes our notice to another point and argues that Bhutan's training her forces to combat any eventuality would not be enough, for the militants are wee-armed and organized. However, any unilateral action by India would be construed as a violation of the territorial integrity of Bhutan.<sup>180</sup>

Furthermore, India is located between Golden Crescent in the Northwest and Golden Triangle in the Northeast. These two regions are where 70% of world's opium production, and 95% of world's drug trafficking take place.<sup>181</sup> The route of drug trafficking extends from Myanmar in the East to Pakistan via India, and from there to Europe via Afghanistan. The civil war in Afghanistan brings about a flow of arms into the region. These two facts intensify the extent of insurgency movements in India's conflictual regions. For Jetley, it is no mere coincidence that the most critical challenges of insurgency in India are located in the sensitive border states in the northwest and northeast which adjoin the drug generating regions.<sup>182</sup>

The complexities of such transnational problems strictly challenge national solutions. That is why the urgency for building bilateral cooperative relationships and promoting a coordinated regional perspective on these critical developments which are cutting across the sanctity of national borders remains self-evident.

As the regional problems became more complicated, intertwined, and thus difficult to solve, India's space of maneuvering expanded. According to S. D. Muni, and many other analysts, the end of the Cold War diminished the great power

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<sup>178</sup> Thieryyy Mathou, 'Bhutan in 2000/Challenges Ahead', *Asian Survey*, January- February 2001, Vol. XLI, No. 1, p. 133.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>180</sup> Murthy, op.cit., p. 1420.

<sup>181</sup> Sreedhar, Unpublished Lectures, METU Summer School.

<sup>182</sup> Jetley, op.cit., op.cit., p.1260.

involvement in South Asia.<sup>183</sup> This development provided India with a greater flexibility in her relations with the great powers on the one hand, and on the other hand it provided her with the opportunity to shape her smaller neighbors' relations with those powers in a way that would not be constitute a concern for her. It has been again through this policy that India tries to consolidate her regional primacy and leadership.

Regarding the intra-regional relations during 1990's India tried to revive the SAARC, resolved the problem between Bangladesh and herself on the sharing of the water resources in 1997, resolved her hydroelectric problems with Nepal by the Mahakali Treaty in 1996, lent a rehabilitation fund of 50 million rupees to Sri Lanka so that the latter could close her balance of trade deficits.

India's regional policy which was shaped during 1990's, but reached a theoretical policy framework under the name of the Gujral Doctrine in 1996. The Gujral Doctrine named after K.Gujral, a popular Indian statesman, who served first as Foreign Minister (1989-90) and later as Prime Minister (1996-97) in the last decade, is a set of principles to guide the conduct of foreign relations with India's immediate neighborhood. These principles are:<sup>184</sup>

1. With neighbors like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India would not ask for reciprocity, but would give and accommodate what she can in good faith and trust;
2. No Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country in the region;
3. No country should interfere in the internal affairs of another;
4. All South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
5. They should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.

These are the principles on which India attempts to base her regional policy. Pakistan has strongly opposed these principles and accused India of trying to contain

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<sup>183</sup> S. D. Muni, "India and Its Neighbors; Persisting Dilemmas and New Opportunities", Chaturvedi & Lodha op. cit. ,p. 108

her power in the region. However, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's bus journey to Lahore to ease the Pakistan's suspicions demonstrates the importance of regional tranquility for India. This is also important for the reason that whether BJP-led new government changed India's attitude towards regional states. However, the bus journey to Lahore marked the continuity of India's regional policy.

### 5. 3. 3. *Globalization Process as an Emerging Threat to Indian Security*

Globalization has brought about in its wake changes of epochal proportions in relations between the state and non-state actors in the international system as longstanding structures of authority are being weakened and national 'loyalties' redirected, eroding the salience of state boundaries, which has led many scholars to reconsider the status of the Westphalian state *vis-à-vis* other forms of human organization.... What is at stake is not merely the 'sovereign' authority of the state, but also the welfare of the communities living within the territorial boundaries of a state.<sup>185</sup>

The first imperative of the globalization process has been the spread of liberal economic principles across the globe where the equation of demand and supply are determined on the basis of market conditions free from the state intervention of any kind. This condition necessitates a dramatic economic transformation in most of the developing countries, where the state has a great hold over the economic activity, and protects the national economy from the influence of external markets.

The development of the role of extra-state actors, such as Multi National Companies (MNCs) and Transnational Companies (TNCs) as opposed to the state centric ones, results in the marginalization of the state as an economic entity. The budgets of these extra-state actors have already exceeded the state budgets, moreover, the trade volume among them have already exceeded the trade volume between states. Such developments necessitate fundamental changes in the provisions of trade law. The regulations on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that

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<sup>184</sup> Padnamaja Murthy, 'The Gujral Doctrine and Beyond', *Strategic Analysis*, July 1999, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, p. 641.

were made during the negotiations of Multilateral Agreements on Investment (MAI) were the major steps that have been taken so far in this direction.

The way such developments are generally evaluated in the developing countries to a great extent reflects the suspicion and uncertainty these countries feel towards globalization. B. Bhattacharya, current Dean of the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, evaluates FDI and the provisions of MAI from an Indian perspective:

The drafts that are currently being circulated are totally biased in favor of FDI suppliers. They seek the right to invest as a legal right, national treatment, a level playing field and top and down approach. The top down approach means that only some exceptions to the national obligations as incorporated in the MAI will be initially permitted which will also be subjected to progressive liberalization. In addition to the adverse economic consequences commonly associated with operations of the MNCs, the implication of such an agreement is that the role of the host country governments will be practically non-existent.<sup>186</sup>

The rise of FDI as such is considered as a threat to national sovereignty by the developing countries, inciting among them a fear of being subjected to some kind of a neo-colonialism. In B. Vivekanandan's words:

Liberalization of the Third World economies is a pre-requisite for globalization. To attain the pre-requisite, the TNCs demand the reduction of customs tariffs for their export items so that they can compete freely with the domestic products of the host country and progressively ebb them out and capture the markets. ... [In this sense] there should be no doubt that a globalized world, as it is molded today, will belong to the dominant and powerful countries and their TNCs in which the TNCs will play a pivotal role in every area of economic activity, with adverse social impact. Therefore this globalization is a euphemism for recolonization of the developing countries.<sup>187</sup>

In fact the globalization process is not a threat only for the developing countries. The success of Newly Industrialized Countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, in penetrating the markets of the North raised fears that the North had lost its global competitiveness. Public perception, mostly not empirically proven, that job losses in the west are caused by low-priced imports from the south, coupled with the fact that most western countries are going through a long process of quasi-

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<sup>185</sup> Arun Kumar Banerji, "Adjusting to Process of Change: India and Globalisation", Purusottam Bhatta and Ajitava Ray Chaudhuri (ed.) *Globalization and India*, (Calcutta: Lancers Books, , 2000), p. 27

<sup>186</sup> B. Bhattacharya, op. cit. , p. 213

stagnation, creates a mismatch between the what the long term objective demands and what short term policy expediency dictates. As a result, while free trade is being advocated to ensure continued and expanding market access for exports and investment (FDI) from the North, regulatory measures and ideological issues are being used or raised to contain the exports from the South to North. Regulatory measures in the form of countervailing duties have become the most commonly used instrument to dampen the export growth rate from the South.<sup>188</sup>

Even though the dimensions cited here so far treats the globalization process on the basis of North-South relations, the process does not completely correspond to this; at least it is not limited to the relationship in question. There has emerged a global competition to attract FDI, which is necessary for running big projects. The strategy employed here is a two-sided one: increasing the bargaining power against those who make FDIs by creating the conditions that are necessary for increasing the profitability and attractiveness of the markets on the one hand, and competing with the other markets on a global scale to attract the FDIs. In order to attain both ends, the states seek to develop regional markets. The European Economic Bloc is a perfect sample of this case, whereas ASEAN is very important in revealing a will on behalf of its party states to meet the requirements of globalization while increasing their bargaining power in the process and raising the profitability of an irresistible economic adjustment process for themselves. Apart from these, the states, which form an economic block, get the power to increase the intra-regional trade, which, in turn, increase their prosperity. So far as economic regionalization is concerned, South Asia has not proceeded enough yet. India's economic policy in this respect is directed towards supporting the development of a regional economy both for increasing her competitiveness and bargaining power in the global market, and for leading the formation of a regional economic unity which will contribute immensely to her claims to leadership in the region.

Moreover, drawing upon the common perception that economic backwardness and mass poverty is the major source of regional instability, India is very much concerned with the probable marginalization of South Asia as opposed to

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<sup>187</sup> B. Vivekanandan, 'Globalization and India' op.cit p. 15

<sup>188</sup> Buddhaharya, op. cit., p. 212. 213



the economic blocks of the EU and NAFTA in the global economy, since such a case would result in a dramatic decrease in the opportunities for investment, increasing accordingly the level of poverty and instability in the region.

The signing of the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in 1995 was an important breakthrough in heralding the beginning of a new and significant process of regional cooperation. Nancy Jetley, an Associate Professor of South Asian Studies in Jawaharlal Nehru University, summarizes the initial achievements of SAPTA as follows:

SAPTA outlines a step-by-step liberalization of intra-regional trade, envisaging periodic rounds of trade negotiations for exchange of trade concessions on tariff and non-tariff measures. Adequate safeguards and balance of payment measures have been laid down to protect the member states during critical economic circumstances.<sup>189</sup>

Though SAPTA is making a steady progress, moreover founded in 1985, SAARC, South Asian Association and Regional Cooperation, has built a record of achievement. If India manages to devise a coordinate and comprehensive policy in these organizations, it will serve both for her own interests and for regional interests simultaneously. Thus, she tries to do so. However, the success of such regional organizations, along with other reasons particularly stemming from the intervention from outside, is hampered by the undercurrent of politico-strategic dissonance in the region. India's vast size, location, and power potential in an asymmetrical framework of resource potential is still a source of great concern for her neighbors, and their anxieties appertaining thereunto about the preservation of their own national identities and independence have led to artificial barriers being erected to stem further regional cooperation and coordination. However, India is well aware of these facts, and as has been discussed already she tries to develop her relationship with her smaller neighbors taking into consideration the necessity of removing such barriers, as well.

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<sup>189</sup> Nancy Jetley, "SAARC: Looking Ahead", Lalit Mansingh Vol II, op.cit., p. 6



## CHAPTER VI:

### CONCLUSION

It was in 1994 when I was fascinated by a three hours-long film about a little great man, who happened to be born into a land of ancient civilization and buried her miserable fate in to the depths of the history. The man was Mahatma Gandhi; the land was India. The film was about Gandhi by whose resistance against the British Imperialism, high moral principles, and rejection of discrimination o

f any kind –be it racial, religious or sexual-which I admired very much. The land was highly impressive like the landscape of the Rajasthan Desert, and sacred as was the water of Ganges. In their native costumes, people seemed like having been pulled out from the time immemorial.

I decided to prepare an M. A. thesis on India only with these images in my mind. Frankly speaking, I did not know anything about India except for that movie. I even did not know what I was going to come across. But, since the topic was India, I had thought then, whatever I would have learnt would be as unique and as sacred as Gandhi and his pictures in my mind. Having looked briefly at the literature on modern India, I came to realize that India is no longer a land of sacredness, and in the jungle of international relations, where might is right, India no longer is an exception, it is not unique even. Accordingly, it was required to study India in a scientific manner to understand her peculiarities and her place it takes in the world. This study is a step to realize this aim.

The aim of this research has been to investigate India's threat and security perception in a process of change with a particular emphasis on the Cold War era in order to find out the basic aspects of this perception in the post-Cold War era from a historical perspective. Throughout these research, a special emphasis has been given to the social and historical background, which I found indispensable in understanding a country like India, which was subjected to a colonial rule for over 200 years and owes much of its political understanding, fears and desires to its past.

Another point of emphasis has been the role of India's multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic social structure as the core determinant of the nature of her conflicts it has been shattered so far. Last but not the least, India's self-image, her "natural" claim to leadership which, to a great extent originates from its deep-rooted history and huge population scattered over a country which makes over two thirds of the whole South Asian region, has been found to make a great sense in defining both what is to the 'national interest' of India and what constitutes a threat to the interests, and thus directed against her security.

In trying to investigate India's threat and security perception since her independence, I took the nature of her domestic and foreign policy orientations as the basic units of analysis in each chapter.

The problems, which arose from the needs and priorities independent state effectively shaped India's policy orientations nearly for two decades following independence. Under Nehru's tenure as the first Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the strategy of non-alignment constituted the core of the theory and practice of external relations. Non-alignment strategy was India's, more precisely Nehru's, response to the threats imposed upon the country's security from outside by the rigid norms and alliance patterns of the Cold War era. As a broad set of policy orientation, non-alignment did not foresee the isolation of India from the international arena to her benefit; rather it proposed integration with the international institutions and involvement in the international affairs, but maintenance of a strategic analytical distance from the block politics that would have harmed India's independence and hampered the new state's sovereignty. Thus, during this period a kind of internationalism, together with non-armed interventionism, especially in regional affairs went hand in hand in India's Foreign Policy. Although, India could not refrain from a two-year war with Pakistan, nor could she prevent the penetration of the Cold-War politics into South Asia, the non-alignment policy provided her with a considerable space of maneuver to diminish the threats posed against her from outside, and a highly moral superiority among the states of the formerly colonized world. However, the strategy of non-alignment did not match the military and economic capability of India, and the suspicion felt towards her by her smaller neighbors increased time after time with India's failure of,

or unwillingness to, pursue a coordinated and comprehensive non-aligned policy towards them.

As for the policy employed to overcome domestic threats, arising to a great extent from the broader difficulties in state and nationhood formation, an integrated set of secularist, democratic and developmentalist policies found their way to her agenda. Centralization has always been a part of India's Domestic policy, however, during Nehru's tenure the degree of centralization was carefully devised so as to strengthen the national unity on the one hand, and undermine the ground for any probable kind of domestic insurgency which would threaten the integrity of the state on the other.

The first challenge to these initial policy orientations came with Sino-Indian War of 1962. But, until the period of Nehru's daughter and his successor Indira Gandhi Nehru's legacy was more or less observed. The defeat of 1962 had forced India to acknowledge the necessity of becoming a military power to protect her national security and interests, and Indira Gandhi's coming to power militarization became an integral part of India's strategy in both her domestic and foreign policy. First Indira and then Rajiv Gandhi employed a more pragmatic version of non-alignment strategy in their relations with extra-regional great powers, based on an understanding of bringing multilateral solutions to international problems. However, things went quite different in regional relations. Both 1970s and 1980s were periods of great unrest and instability in South Asia. The region was shattered with several ethnic and religious conflicts, the spillover effects of which constituted great threats and security problems in India. Drawn by the rationale of bringing problems to an end which would be reasonable and profitable for India, and by the desire of establishing Indian hegemony over the region, both Indira and Rajiv pursued a more assertive and highly interventionist South Asian policy. Bilateral approach of resolving the conflicts which spread across the boundaries of states, constituted the core of Indian leaders' regional strategy. This strategy was highly fruitful for two reasons: first, it increased India's right and ability to have a say in regional affairs; second it decreased the others' rights to have a say in each other's affairs. However, it further increased the tension between India and her neighbors.

The repercussions of such a foreign and regional policy over the domestic one during Indira-Rajiv period were important. However, more important was the growing resentment of masses towards the highly interventionist but ineffectual national government and the diminishing life standards. As the resentment grew, so did the dissidence, and upsurges. The Governments' response to these threats came about in the form of over-centralization. And the vicious circle of repression, opposition, suppression and violence marked India's internal circumstances for near a decade during 1980's.

India welcomed the mine-blowing event of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and later the disintegration of the Soviet Union in such regional and internal circumstances. The end of the Cold War was not only marked with the removal of the iron curtain between the East and the West, and the fall of one of the two superpowers, but also with the emergence of many new issues in the top agenda of international relations. Ethnic and religious revivalism, the ascendancy of the political discourse on cultural rights, economic liberalization, globalization, and the questioning of state sovereignty accompanied the end. Along with the ongoing period of transformation in global balance of power, all these emerging trends became major concerns for India's security.

The disintegration of Soviet Union, meant the loss of its strategic ally for India, but also it meant the end of Cold War rivalry in South Asia. If the former left India weaker in defending her security and interests against her adversaries, the latter was a relieving fact, as she no longer had to observe the power balance between two extra-regional great powers in making her policies. However, this end does not imply the end of great powers' interests in South Asia, nor their desire to involve in the affairs of this region. Although, a decade had passed since the breakdown of bipolarity, no one seems quite sure about whom shall be the ultimate winner in struggle for hegemony in South Asia. India's strategy in dealing with this uncertainty has so far been nominating herself to regional leadership while trying to develop, if not cooperative, at least less-conflictual relations with extra-regional powers, primarily with the U. S., Russia, and China. India seems to have been driven by the rationale of manipulating the extent of extra-regional powers' involvement in the region to her benefits. Regarding India's post-Cold War strategy towards the U. S., the only remaining superpower whose "greatness" has been confirmed, India needs the U. S.

also for running her economic, and technological adjustment to the changing conditions. As for China she has to observe the imperatives brought forward by the fragile relations in South Asia. With Russia, she has many shared concerns ranging from military and defense affairs, to economy, and ethnic and religious insurgency.

India's policy towards her neighbors in this era does not seem to have undergone a big transformation after the end of the Cold War. With her rising claim to regional leadership India insists on her assertive policy in the region. The greatest threat to India's security and interests in the region has always come from Pakistan. This fact has not changed during the last decade, either. However, the major emerging trend in India's policy towards her neighbors is her increasing willingness to resolve regional conflicts through compromise, and a good give-and-take policy. In this, what she has been trying to do is to extend her influence on her smaller neighbors and to keep them away from the sphere of influences of extra-regional powers, while at the same time preventing them from seeking alliances with other states, which might, in turn, pose a great threat to India's security and interests not only in the regional setting but also in the international arena.

The effects of the emerging areas of concern in the international arena, especially ethnic and religious revivalism, cultural politics, challenging of state sovereignty has had important consequences in Indian stability. During 1990's class conflicts, casteism and communalism reached their peaks since the foundation of India. These conflicts, currently, pose great threats to the integrity of the state. The revolution in information and communication technology is likely to trigger such identity politics, and thus, to increase these threats in the foreseeable future. The economic imperatives of the globalization period result in the deepening of regional disparities, and accordingly the force of oppositional movements as primary agents of instability. To overcome such internal threats, the Indian governments in 1990's tried to decentralize the administrative apparatus, and thereby improving the affiliation of the masses with the state. Furthermore, refusing to give in the claim of being a distributive state, the rate of privatization have been slowed down in India to reduce its negative affect on masses in the short run. However, unlike any other era, the most important challenges to India's security and her projected interests are posed from within the country. Thus, it shall not be wrong to argue that the Indian governments will allocate much of their energies to deal with the country's internal

problems, which seem to be the greatest obstacles to the realization of India's great power vision both in the regional arena and within the international system. But, since the very solution of India's internal problems are also deeply intertwined with those of other states in the region, in economic, social and political aspects, a greater move towards regional integration in South Asia is the most desirable policy for India.

This study has been very useful to me in the sense that, besides other factors, it also gave me an international perspective which enabled me to grasp the true nature of the problems Turkey has encountered since the beginning of 1990s. The problems India faces since the end of the Cold War are very similar to those confronted by Turkey. The similar challenges encountered during the nation formation and state formation processes and the resulting tensions are common challenges that India and Turkey shared. Secular constitutions were adopted to gain legitimacy in the consciousness of the people coming from different ethnicity, religious beliefs, languages and castes. However, defining the nation intensely with the peculiarities of a dominant ethnic, religious, linguistic or caste group led to the questioning of the legitimacy of the secular state such as definition of 'Turk' in Turkey or the dominance of the Hindu culture in the representation of Indian ness.

The centrality of secular state in binding different parts of society is so vital that any discussion on the nature and the role of state, which is very common in the post-Cold War era, pose a serious threat to its survival. Closely related to this concern was the recognition of sub-national groups as actors in the international relations, i.e., Kurds in the northern Iraq and Kashmiri Muslims in India which became threat to a survival for these states. Moreover, in a new international system where old order collapsed and the new one is taking shape, these new dimension of ethnic, cultural, and religious issues seems to prevent these states from carving a respectable place for themselves.

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